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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3595

___________

David Williams, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Department of Correction; Ray Hobbs, *

Chief Deputy Director, Arkansas * [UNPUBLISHED]

Department of Correction; George *

Brewer, Classification Administrator, *

ADC; Greg Harmon, Warden, East *

Arkansas Regional Unit, ADC; *

Tommy James, Jr., Assistant *

Warden, Maximum Security Unit, *

ADC; Marvin Evans, Jr., Warden, *

Tucker Unit, ADC; Grant Harris, *

Warden, Varner Unit, ADC; Tim *

Moncrief, Assistant Warden, Varner *

Unit, ADC, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: May 7, 2008

Filed: May 12, 2008

___________

Before BYE, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

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1

See Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2001) (separate segregation

sentences should be aggregated for purposes of due process inquiry when they

constitute sustained period of confinement).

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Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) inmate David Williams appeals the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action stemming

from his long-term confinement in administrative segregation (ad seg). Williams

claimed that various prison officials denied him due process because their periodic

reviews of his ad seg status were meaningless, sham proceedings. He also claimed

defendants violated his right to equal protection based on differing or unfair treatment

among inmates with different classifications, in different institutions, or in different

types of confinement. The district court concluded that Williams’s lengthy ad seg

confinement was atypical, but that he received all the process he was due, and that

Williams failed to establish an equal protection violation. Following careful review,

see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006) (summary judgment

standard of review), we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Williams--who is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole,

imposed in 1981--has continuously spent almost nine years in ad seg confinement in

Arkansas, plus more than three years in ad seg in Utah,1

 and we agree with the district

court that this constitutes an atypical and significant hardship, considering the

particular restrictions imposed on Williams in relation to his ad seg status during this

time, and thus he had a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-87 (1995) (whether inmate has liberty interest

protected by due process depends on whether inmate suffered atypical and significant

deprivation in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life); Portley-El v. Brill, 288

F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002) (atypical and significant hardship is question of fact);

Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) (Second Circuit has generally found

that segregation of longer than 305 days in standard “special housing unit” conditions

is sufficiently atypical to require procedural due process protection under Sandin),

petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2008) (No. 07-1015); Shoats

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v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (prisoner’s almost eight years in

administrative custody was “atypical” and he had protected liberty interest); Herron

v. Schriro, 11 Fed. Appx. 659, 661-62 (8th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam)

(affirming district court’s finding that inmate’s lengthy ad seg confinement, more than

thirteen years, resulted in atypical hardship in relation to ordinary incidents of prison

life, and defendants could not continue to deprive inmate of general population status

without affording him due process); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 217, 223-

25 (2005) (finding atypical and significant hardship at “supermax” prison where, in

addition to conditions similar to most in solitary confinement, placement is indefinite,

is reviewed only annually after initial 30-day review, and disqualifies otherwise

eligible inmate for parole consideration).

Once a liberty interest is established, the next question is what process is due.

See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 (applying framework established in Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). We conclude that, for an ad seg inmate, the

Constitution requires no more than the process Williams received--reviews at 60-day

intervals at which Williams could make statements and present evidence, and annual

meetings with a warden--provided such reviews were meaningful. See Rahman X v.

Morgan, 300 F.3d 970, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing sufficiency of process for

ADC inmate in segregation cell); Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1983)

(due process requires procedure for periodic review of ad seg status); Kelly v. Brewer,

525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975) (where inmate is held in ad seg for prolonged or

indefinite period, due process requires that his situation be reviewed periodically in

meaningful way).

We conclude, however, that there remains an unresolved fact issue on this

record as to whether Williams actually received meaningful reviews, rather than sham

reviews, as he contends. See Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005)

(non-moving party must show existence of facts on record which create genuine

material issue); cf. de Llano v. Berglund, 282 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (8th Cir. 2002)

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(plaintiff’s unsupported belief that employment pre-termination hearing was sham did

not preclude summary judgment on due process claim; decision-makers presumed to

be honest and impartial); Ryan v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 185 F.3d

751, 762 (7th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff who can introduce evidence that employment

termination decision had already been made and any hearing would be sham is entitled

to go forward with due process claim; due process requires that hearing not be sham

or pretense). 

Specifically, the record establishes that Williams was found guilty of murdering

another inmate in 1982, and he was kept in punitive segregation through mid-1983

before being placed in general population. For the next twelve years, from 1983 to

1995, it was undisputed that he spent most of his time in general population without

any violent incident, and with no evidence that he exhibited violent or disruptive

propensities. In December 1995, after Williams was attacked by another inmate, he

was placed in ad seg and was transferred for his own protection in 1996 to a prison in

Utah, where he remained in ad seg. He returned to Arkansas in 1999, and he has

remained in ad seg at various ADC institutions since then. Defendants indicated that

the 1995 attack on Williams was precipitated by his drug activity, but they did not

dispute Williams’s evidence or statements that he had not misbehaved during his ad

seg confinement, and Williams correctly argues that undue weight should not be given

to an inmate’s past conduct (in this case, distant past) in reviewing his ongoing ad seg

status. See Kelly, 525 F.2d at 399-400 (recognizing that ad seg is not punitive and it

looks to present and future rather than past; ad seg determination involves exercise of

administrative judgment and prediction of what inmate will probably do or have done

to him if he is permitted to return to population after period of segregation).

Defendants offered no evidence whatsoever as to why they concluded, after each

hearing before a committee tasked with reviewing Williams’s housing status, that he

remained a security threat. They offered no evidence, for example, about Williams’s

behavior or demeanor while in ad seg, his psychological status, or their day-to-day

dealings with him, nor any evidence from which it could be concluded that Williams

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had a generally volatile or disruptive character. Cf. Shoats, 213 F.3d at 141-43, 145-

46 (noting committee’s conclusion that inmate remained significant danger to

institutional safety and security if released from administrative custody was supported

by psychological evaluations characterizing inmate as remorseless sociopath

knowledgeable in workings of prisons and escape techniques, capable of leading other

inmates in such undertakings, and inclined to do so, and describing him as volatile and

manipulative; prisoner was advised of rationale for continued ad seg confinement,

including his past crimes of murder, escape, kidnaping and assault, as well as

assessment that he remained current threat to institutional security based on prison

professionals’ current impressions of him based on their day-to-day dealings with him

over time); Kelly, 525 F.2d at 400 (reason for segregation must not only be valid at

outset but must continue to subsist during period of segregation). 

We therefore conclude that summary judgment on Williams’s due process claim

was improper, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We find no

support, however, for Williams’s contention that defendants were constitutionally

required to provide criteria for his progression and reintegration into general

population through good behavior. Defendants need only have provided him with

meaningful review of his status and the reasons for his continued ad seg confinement.

As to any equal protection claim, we conclude that summary judgment for

defendants was proper. Williams made no showing that parole-eligible inmates,

death-row inmates, or other categories of inmates were treated differently, despite

being similarly situated, in a manner that bore no rational relation to any legitimate

penological interest. See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the equal protection

claim, and reverse the grant of summary judgment on the due process claim, and we

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We deny Williams’s

pending motions. 

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