Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00869/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00869-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1This factual background is not disputed, and is derived from the published opinion in petitioner’s

direct appeal, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 43, n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994), as well as

the exhibits filed by petitioner and respondent. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASTARTE DAVIS-RICE,

Petitioner,

 v.

SCHEILA A. CLARK, WARDEN,

et al., 

Respondents.

___________________________

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No. C 05-0869 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Astarte Davis-Rice, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional

Institution, Dublin, California (“FCI Dublin”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above titled

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. After reviewing the petition,

the Court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer, accompanied by a supporting memorandum and exhibits. 

Petitioner has filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner’s former common law husband, James Rice (“Rice”), disappeared in July

1986. After his disappearance, petitioner prepared a fictitious will in which Rice purportedly

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bequeathed most of his estate to petitioner. Petitioner altered Rice’s Power of Attorney to

allow her to control his assets and affairs. She also forged a warranty deed to transfer Rice’s

real estate to herself, and forged Rice’s signature on several checks and contracts involving

Rice’s boat. In connection with a lawsuit petitioner filed to quiet title to the property she had

fraudulently obtained, petitioner forged letters, deeds, and other documents to make it appear

as if Rice were alive and had given all of his possessions to her and her sons.

In 1991, petitioner pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of the

Virgin Islands, resulting in her conviction of numerous crimes under both the law of the Virgin

Islands and federal law. Under Virgin Islands law, petitioner plead guilty to conspiracy to

defraud, forgery, offering false evidence in a civil case, perjury, and selling property obtained

unlawfully. Under federal law, petitioner pled guilty to mail fraud, making false statements,

and failure to appear. As a result of these guilty pleas, the court sentenced petitioner to four

consecutive prison terms. Three of the prison terms were for the federal offenses: 15 months

for fraud, 21 months for failure to appear, and 24 months for making false statements. Her

fourth prison term, ten years for violating various Virgin Islands territorial laws, was to be

served after the completion of the prison terms on the federal offenses. Petitioner has been

serving her prison terms in the minimum security camp at FCI Dublin. She completed the

prison terms on her federal offenses in 1996, and is now serving her 10-year Virgin Islands

sentence as a “boarder” under a contract between the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and the

Virgin Islands Department of Corrections, which agreement provides for the reciprocal

housing of prisoners.

Two of the judgments against petitioner provide for restitution. The judgment relating

to petitioner’s violations of Virgin Islands law require restitution to the estate of James Rice in

the amount of $229,282.78. The judgment in connection with petitioner’s federal mail fraud

conviction required restitution to the estate of James Rice in the amount of $269,282.78. 

In August 1998, while serving her 10-year sentence on the Virgin Islands violations,

petitioner escaped from FCI Dublin. Petitioner was a fugitive from justice for four years, until

she was captured and returned to FCI Dublin in 2002. She was convicted of escape and

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sentenced to an additional two years in federal prison. She will begin serving that sentence

when she has completed her 10-year Virgin Islands sentence. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the execution

of a federal sentence on the ground that the sentence is being executed "in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); United

States v. Giddings, 740 F2d 770, 772 (9th Cir 1984). 

The court shall "award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause

why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or

person detained is not entitled thereto." See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is

appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are vague or conclusory, palpably

incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F2d 490, 491 (9th

Cir 1990). 

B. Legal Claims

Petitioner claims that: (1) she is entitled to release from prison one year early pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) because she completed the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program

(“RDAP”); and (2) BOP officials have violated her rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause by

continuing to deduct restitution payments from her prison salary.

1. RDAP Claim

Petitioner claims she is entitled to early release from prison pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3621 because she has completed the RDAP. In order to encourage prisoners to seek

substance abuse treatment, Congress provided that the BOP may reduce, by up to one year, the

sentence of a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense who successfully completes a drug

treatment program. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to these provisions, the BOP 

created a comprehensive substance abuse treatment program, the RDAP. See Cort v. Crabtree,

113 F.3d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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The RDAP is available to inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses who have substance

abuse problems. See Inmate Drug Abuse Programs Manual, as set forth in BOP Program

Statement 533.10 and subsequent Change Notices, attached as Smith Decl. Ex. G (“RDAP

Manual”). As an incentive to participate in and complete the RDAP, the BOP offers an early

release benefit of up to 12 months for inmates who successfully complete the program. Id.

The RDAP has three phases: a residential phase, a non-residential phase, and a communitybased transition phase. Id. The community-based transition phase involves placement in a

community corrections center, or a “halfway house.” Id.

Petitioner is not entitled to early release because she did not complete the communitybased phase of the RDAP. In order to successfully complete the program, and become eligible

for the early release benefit, prisoners must complete each phase in its entirety. See id.; see

also Agreement for Participation in RDAP, attached as Smith Decl. Ex. H. Petitioner enrolled

in the RDAP prior to her escape from FCI Dublin, completing the residential phase in April

1994, and the non-residential phase in May 1995. See Memorandum for the U.S. Parole

Commission, Smith Decl. Ex. I; Director’s Response to Administrative Appeal, Smith Decl.

Ex. K. Petitioner did not complete the community-based phase of the RDAP, a fact she does

not dispute. See id. The community-based transition phase of the RDAP is not available to

inmates with a history of escape, such as petitioner, because they are considered flight risks. 

See RDAP Manual; Response to Administrative Appeal, Smith Decl. Ex. K. 

Petitioner appears to be arguing that the BOP must allow her to re-enroll in the RDAP

so she can complete the community-based phase and obtain her early release benefit. The

Ninth Circuit, however, has held that the BOP may deny an inmate participation in the

community-based transition phase of the RDAP, and thus render the inmate ineligible for a

sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621, if the inmate is a flight risk. See Murphy v. Hood,

276 F.3d 475, 478 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Rublee v. Fleming, 160 F.3d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir.

1988). Here, petitioner’s 1998 escape from FCI, and her subsequent four years as a fugitive,

provide more than adequate grounds for classifying her as a “flight risk.” Consequently, there

is nothing improper in the BOP’s denying her the opportunity to re-enroll in the communityCase 3:05-cv-00869-MMC Document 13 Filed 12/07/05 Page 4 of 7
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2The IFRP is a voluntary financial planning program that helps inmates meet their

restitution and other court-ordered financial obligations. See IFRP Statement, Smith Decl. Ex.

L. Under the IFRP, inmates develop a financial plan with program advisors and agree to make

payments on financial penalties or toward restitution. Id. In May 2004, petitioner voluntarily

signed up to participate in this program, and agreed to have half of her prison salary applied to

her restitution payments during the term of her incarceration. See Inmate Financial Contract,

Smith Decl. Ex. M. 

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based phase of the RDAP. 

In short, petitioner is not eligible for the benefit of early release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3621, available to prisoners who successfully complete all phases of the RDAP, because she

did not complete the community-based phase. Nor is she entitled to re-enrollment in the

RDAP, because she properly is considered a flight risk after her escape from FCI Dublin.

2. Restitution Claim

Petitioner claims that the continued deduction of restitution payments from her prison

salary violates her rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Petitioner premises this claim on

her contention that the deduction of the restitution payments is being made pursuant to the

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, a law enacted in 1996,

after she was sentenced. 

Respondent does not dispute that if petitioner were ordered to pay restitution pursuant

to the MVRA, such order would present an Ex Post Facto problem. Instead, respondent argues

that petitioner’s restitution payments are not being made under the MVRA. 

Petitioner makes payments toward her restitution fines in the form of monthly

deductions from her prison salary. As respondent demonstrates, however, these payments are

being deducted pursuant to a voluntary financial planning program for federal inmates, the

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”), in which petitioner voluntarily enrolled in

May 2004.2 See IFRP Statement, Smith Decl. Ex. L; Inmate Financial Contract, Smith Decl.

Ex. M. Petitioner presents no evidence, and there is no indication in the exhibits supplied by

any party, that petitioner has been ordered to make restitution payments under the MVRA. 

Given the absence of any evidence or indication that the court or the BOP has imposed any

restitution fine or ordered restitution payments pursuant to the MVRA or any other statute

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enacted after petitioner was sentenced, petitioner’s claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause fails.

Petitioner next argues that under the Victim’s and Witness’ Protection Act (“VWPA”),

18 U.S.C. § 3663, her restitution payments should cease because it has been more than five

years since she completed her federal sentence. Petitioner completed her sentences for her

federal crimes on June 17, 1996, at which time she began serving her sentence for violating the

laws of the Virgin Islands. At the time of petitioner’s sentence, the VWPA contained the

following provision: “The court may require that such defendant make restitution under this

section within a specified period or in specified installments . . . The end of such period or the

last such installment shall not be later than . . . five years after the end of the term of

imprisonment imposed . . . .” See former 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(f)(1)-(2). In sentencing

petitioner in this case, the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands ordered that

petitioner “shall pay restitution to the victim, the estate of James Rice . . . [and the] United

States Attorney shall obtain a civil judgment against the defendant.” See Judgment and

Commitment, and subsequent amendments, Smith Decl. Exs. B-D. At no time did the court

order petitioner to pay restitution “within a specified period or in specified installments” under

18 U.S.C. § 3663(f). Id. Consequently, this section of the VWPA, and the five-year limitation

it contains, does not apply to petitioner’s sentence. Nor are petitioner’s payments under the

IFRP affected by § 3663. The VWPA provision cited by petitioner states that the five-year

limitation applies when the court “require[s]” restitution be paid within a certain time period or

in installments. The payments petitioner is making under the IFRP were not required by the

court; she enrolled in that program voluntarily. Accordingly, petitioner’s restitution payments

are not subject to the five-year limitation set forth in the VWPA.

In sum, the deduction of petitioner’s restitution payments does not violate her rights

under the Ex Post Facto Clause because her payments are not being made under the MVRA. 

Rather, her payments are being made under the IFRP, a voluntary BOP program. Further, as

petitioner has not been ordered to make restitution payments in installments or within a

specified time period, such payments under the IFRP are not governed by the five-year

limitation provision of the VWPA.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby

DENIED. 

All pending motions are terminated. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 7, 2005

_________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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