Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01514/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01514-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Torts to Land

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONG JACQUELINE NGUYEN 

GARDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHEVRON CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01514-JD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 48

Plaintiff Gardner has filed a second amended complaint alleging claims under the 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 et 

seq. (“CERCLA”), and for declaratory judgment, trespass and nuisance. Dkt. No. 45. This is 

actually Gardner’s third try at stating a claim. She filed the original complaint as a pro se plaintiff, 

and the Court dismissed that complaint with leave to amend along with specific suggestions on 

facts and issues she might want to address in an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 25. Because the 

case involves a fairly technical federal environmental statute, the Court also urged Gardner to 

retain an attorney to represent her. Dkt. No. 21.

Gardner hired a lawyer who filed an amended complaint re-alleging the CERCLA claim 

and attendant state law claims. Dkt. No. 27. The amended complaint showed little substantive 

improvement over the original and made no effort to address the issues raised by the Court in the 

dismissal order, and so the Court again dismissed it with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 40. Gardner’s 

attorney failed to appear without good cause at the oral argument on the amended complaint, 

which resulted in an order to show cause and the imposition of sanctions. Dkt. No. 43. 

Case 3:15-cv-01514-JD Document 59 Filed 07/19/16 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

The second amended complaint under consideration here is basically unchanged from the 

prior version. For the most part, the amendments consist of moving into the pleadings snippets of 

text drawn from environmental reports that were attached to the preceding complaint. Compare

Dkt. No. 27-1 with Dkt. No. 45. 

Defendant Chevron Capital Corporation (“Chevron”) challenges the complaint on several 

potentially viable grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) but just one is enough 

to dismiss it. As alleged in the complaint, Gardner’s claims arise out of property in Oakland, 

California, that had been the site of a gas station up until about 1973. Dkt. No. 45. According to a 

“Site Investigation Report and Closure Request” prepared in 2014, which is attached to the 

complaint and incorporated by reference, and so properly considered by the Court in this motion 

to dismiss, see, e.g., Henderson v. Select Portfolio Servs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-03028-JD, 2016 WL 

1059414, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016), two underground storage tanks for gasoline were 

removed in 2007 and petroleum hydrocarbons were discovered in the soil around the tanks. Dkt. 

No. 45-1 at 2. The site investigation in 2014 was commissioned “to evaluate petroleum 

hydrocarbons in soil and groundwater” at the property. Id. The investigation found evidence of 

petroleum hydrocarbons from gasoline and diesel fuel, and fractional petroleum compounds such 

as benzene, ehtylbenzene and xylenes. Id. at 5. No non-petroleum compounds are identified in 

the report or in any other attachment to the complaint. Although not at all clear from the 

complaint, Gardner appears to have bought the property in 2010 allegedly without knowledge of 

the petroleum contamination. Dkt. No. 45 at 2. 

These allegations mandate dismissal of the complaint. CERCLA expressly excludes 

“petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof” from the definition of hazardous 

substances covered by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); see also Southern Pacific 

Transportation Co. v. Caltrans, 790 F. Supp. 983, 984 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The petroleum exclusion 

applies to benzene, ehtylbenzene, xylene and other petroleum constituents “even though 

CERCLA-listed hazardous substances are indigenous in the petroleum or are additives normally 

added to the petroleum during the refining process.” Southern Pacific, 790 F. Supp. at 984-85; see 

also Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Case 3:15-cv-01514-JD Document 59 Filed 07/19/16 Page 2 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleges only the presence of petroleum products and 

compounds that fall squarely within CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. Consequently, it cannot 

state a CERCLA claim, including a claim for declaratory relief. And since the complaint appears 

to be premised on federal question jurisdiction and makes no allegations of diversity jurisdiction, 

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law trespass and nuisance 

claims. See Casillas v. MTC Fin., Inc., No. 15-CV-00085-JD, 2015 WL 2120565, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. May 5, 2015).

The remaining question is whether dismissal should be with prejudice. The Court’s 

discretion to dismiss with prejudice is “particularly broad” after prior leave to amend has been 

granted. Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). In this case, Gardner 

has had three full opportunities to state a plausible CERCLA claim, along with more than typical 

guidance from the Court on ways to improve the complaint. That is more than enough. The 

CERCLA claims are consequently dismissed with prejudice. Because the state law claims are 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, they are dismissed without prejudice. See Doe v. Sempervirens 

Mental Health Facility, No. 14-CV-00816-JD, 2015 WL 4238242, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2015)

(“Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction ‘should be ... without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert 

his claims in a competent court.’”) (quoting Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 

847 (9th Cir. 1999)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2016

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-01514-JD Document 59 Filed 07/19/16 Page 3 of 3