Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01025/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01025-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 43:945a Complaint in Condemnation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMESON BEACH PROPERTY 

OWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On May 22, 2013, Plaintiffs Jameson Beach Property Owners Association

(“Owners Association”), Gene Landon and Helen Nicolaides (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed 

the instant action against various defendants, including federal, state and local 

government entities, for allegedly using Plaintiffs’ real property without compensation 

and in a hazardous manner that exposes Plaintiffs to significant liability. On May 15, 

2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Camp 

Richardson Resort, Inc. (“CRR”) and its General Manager Kris Knox (collectively “CRR 

Defendants”) on the basis of their nuisance and trespass claims. ECF Nos. 78; see also

ECF Nos. 38, 84. The CRR Defendants timely opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion. ECF Nos. 90, 

121. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.1

 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). See ECF No. 135.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND2

B. Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations

The Owners Association is an unincorporated association of property owners in 

the Jameson Beach Subdivision Tract (“Owners”) near South Lake Tahoe, California. 

Plaintiffs Gene Landon and Helen Nicolaides are Owners. The Jameson Beach 

Subdivision Tract is located in direct proximity to CRR, a resort on Lake Tahoe. CRR is 

operated by a private entity in the National Forest pursuant to a Special Use Permit

(“SUP”) issued by the United States Forest Service.

Through this action, Plaintiffs advance claims for civil rights violations and torts 

against the CRR Defendants based on their operation of Camp Richardson pursuant to 

the SUP. ECF No. 133 at 2. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from concerns pertaining to the 

number of day users admitted to the camp in excess of 350, traffic congestion, 

positioning of an entrance kiosk, the number and designation of parking spaces and 

other parking issues, management of bicyclists, pedestrian foot traffic and noise 

pollution, as well as CRR’s alleged violation(s) of a Use Permit issued by El Dorado 

County. Id. Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint (ECF No. 2) 3 alleged thirteen causes of action: 

(1) inverse condemnation, (2) deprivation of civil rights due to local government policy 

and custom; (3) act or ratification by official with final policy making authority in violation 

of constitutionality guaranteed rights; (4) violation of the equal protection clauses of the 

U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution; (5) violation of the due process clauses 

 2 These facts are taken, at time verbatim, from Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint and Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction, ECF Nos. 2, 38, 80, unless otherwise noted.

3 In response to this Court’s May 22, 2014 Order and after the completion of briefing on (and 

subsequent submission without oral argument of) Plaintiff’s instant motion for a preliminary injunction, 

Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on July 24, 2014. ECF No. 136. Plaintiffs continue to 

allege public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass claims against the CRR Defendants. See id. at 

19-20, 23-27. A review of the FAC indicates that Plaintiffs pled additional facts in support of these three 

claims. To the extent that these new facts were not also included in Plaintiffs’ filings in support of their 

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, however, they are not considered by this Court for the purposes of this 

motion and need not be taken as true inasmuch as the CRR Defendants did not have an opportunity to 

respond to these allegations in their briefing. The CRR Defendants have moved to dismiss these causes 

of action for failure to state a claim. See Mot., ECF No. 138-1.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution; (6) private nuisance; 

(7) trespass; (8) public nuisance; (9) violation of California’s unfair competition law; 

(10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) negligent infliction of emotional 

distress; (12) unjust enrichment; and (13) negligence.

Plaintiffs contend that the Jameson Beach Subdivision Tract includes dedicated 

real property which they define as a right-of-way for road purposes running from 

Highway 89 to the subdivision along Jameson Beach Road. Plaintiffs refer to that real 

property as the “Association Roadway.”4 The USFS purchased Camp Richardson 

Resort in 1965. According to Plaintiffs, that purchase was subject to the ownership 

rights of the Owners in the Association Roadway. Although two entrances to CRR exist, 

Plaintiffs contend that the entryway historically used by all CRR patrons was Cabin 

Road. Separately, the Owners used Jameson Beach Road to access their homes from 

Highway 89. According to Plaintiffs, at an unspecified point in time, CRR moved the 

Resort entrance from Cabin Road to Jameson Beach Road, thereby increasing the flow 

of traffic on Jameson Beach Road and the Association Roadway.

In addition, as alleged by Plaintiffs, CRR Defendants, in concert with El Dorado 

County and the Federal Defendants, allowed the number of people visiting the resort to 

expand, further exacerbating traffic and congestion on Jameson Beach Road. 

According to Plaintiffs, the results of this massive infusion of people into the resort area 

include:

long traffic delays; Owner entrance to Jameson Beach Road 

is often completely blocked when the “parking” is full; travel 

on the Association Roadway is blocked by cars entering and 

backing out of parking on the Association Roadway; long wait 

times occur to enter the Resort, as well as proceed to and 

through the parking kiosk; and Owners’ and drivers are 

forced to traverse around pedestrians and bicycles who are 

 4

 Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that “[l]anguage in Owners’ Grant Deeds, including a grant deed 

dated 1933, confirms ownership of: ‘a right of way for road purposes 40 feet in width the center line of 

which is described as beginning at a point on the east boundary line of Jameson Beach Tract, said point

being S. 0 degrees 30 minutes West 315 feet distant from the northeast corner of Jameson Beach Tract 

and running thence N. 77 degrees 48 minutes West 1702.7 feet to a point 12 1⁄2 feet easterly from the west 

line of Jameson Beach Tract; thence S. 0 degrees 30 minutes West along the center line of a 25 foot right 

of way for road purposes to the county road.’” Compl., ECF No. 2 at 4.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

forced onto Jameson Beach Road by the lack of any 

pathway, a rope preventing safe travel off of the road, and 

use of a kiosk “bypass” lane as a pathway from Hwy. 89 to 

the Beacon or Beach.

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6, ¶ 32. Plaintiffs also allege that the USFS and El Dorado are 

asserting ownership rights to the Association Roadway. In addition, Plaintiffs contend 

that the USFS has wrongfully and unilaterally paved portions of the Association 

Roadway without permission.

Further, in order to maximize revenue, Plaintiffs allege that El Dorado, CRR, and 

the Federal Defendants relocated a parking enforcement kiosk from the entry to the 

Beacon parking lot to a few hundred yards from the Hwy 89 and Jameson Beach Road 

entryway. Plaintiffs contend that this change further encroaches on their ownership 

rights as it diverts drivers to seasonal parking on unimproved land within the Association 

Roadway that was transformed into parking spaces along the east side and for the 

length of Jameson Beach Road.

In 2011, Plaintiffs hired Turner & Associates, Inc. to perform a survey of the 

Association Roadway. Plaintiffs now allege that despite the survey’s confirmation of 

their rights with respect to the Association Roadway, the USFS and the CRR Defendants

continue to take unilateral action hostile to their interests. Throughout their Complaint, 

Plaintiffs allege that parking and traffic congestion on Jameson Beach Road in CRR is 

creating a worsening safety hazard and interfering with their ability to access their 

homes.

B. Procedural Background

On May 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint and also unsuccessfully 

moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). ECF Nos. 2, 7-9. In their TRO 

Application, Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin Defendants from “risking the public and 

Plaintiffs serious harm or death, and the Plaintiffs to exposure for liability, from 

implementing the parking kiosk impediment to traffic circulation, from continuing the rope 

boundary preventing safe fire and life safety access, as well as safe pedestrian access 

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

to and from the Beach; from parking perpendicular (or at all) along the Association 

Roadway, and from any other Defendant created unsafe element on or adjacent to 

Jameson Beach Road, and the Association Roadway.” ECF No. 9 at 2 (citing Pl.’s 

Application, ECF No. 7 at 15-16). Plaintiff’s instant motion is based largely on the same 

conditions. See, e.g., ECF No. 39 at 2. Because of Plaintiffs’ two- to four-year delay in 

moving for a TRO, the Court denied Plaintiff’s application without prejudice on 

procedural grounds alone. See id. at 6. The Court explained that “Plaintiffs have been 

on notice of [the alleged] dangerous congestion conditions since at least 2009 . . . [and] 

Plaintiffs knew that Defendants asserted ownership rights to their property in June of 

2011.” Id.

On September 27, 2013, at the request of the parties, the Court stayed this action 

until February 1, 2014. ECF Nos. 22, 32. Thereafter, the Court dismissed all causes of 

action against the United States Forest Service and Nancy Gibson (hereafter the “Forest 

Supervisor”) (collectively, “Federal Defendants”) and El Dorado County (“El Dorado”) for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. Order, May 22, 2014, ECF No. 83. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 

injunction against the CRR Defendants is currently pending before the Court.

5

 On 

July 24, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 136.

///

///

///

 5 On April 18, 2014, Plaintiffs moved for a Preliminary Injunction against CRR and the USFS. ECF 

No. 38. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin these parties from creating public and private nuisance. Id.; ECF No. 

42. On May 22, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 38, as to 

the Federal Defendants without prejudice as moot because the Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ tort 

claims against these Defendants. See ECF No. 83. Due to a dispute regarding service in this action and 

therefore whether Plaintiffs’ April 18, 2014 Motion applied to CRR, on May 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a 

second motion for a preliminary injunction in which they seek to enjoin CRR and Defendant Kris Knox. 

See ECF Nos. 78; 79, 80 at 2. Pursuant to the filing of Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary 

injunction, ECF No. 78, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ initial motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 38, in 

its entirety as to all Defendants as moot. Order, ECF No. 87. Plaintiffs and CRR subsequently stipulated 

that Plaintiffs’ pending preliminary injunction application, ECF No. 78, includes all of the documents that 

were filed in conjunction with its initial motion. See ECF No. 84.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the moving party has the 

burden of proving the propriety of such a remedy by clear and convincing evidence. See

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442 (1974). The party 

requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed on the 

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that 

the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stormans, Inc. v. 

Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter). To grant preliminary 

injunctive relief, a court must find that “a certain threshold showing is made on each 

factor.” Leiva–Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the Plaintiffs 

demonstrate the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and show that an injunction is in 

the public interest, a preliminary injunction can still issue so long as serious questions 

going to the merits are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in Plaintiffs’ 

favor. Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(concluding that the “serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary 

injunctions remains viable after Winter).

These two alternatives represent two points on a sliding scale, pursuant to which 

the required degree of irreparable harm increases or decreases in inverse correlation to 

the probability of success on the merits. Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 

1998); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). Under 

either formulation of the test for granting a preliminary injunction, however, the moving 

party must demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable injury. Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. 

Chronicle Publ’g. Co., 762 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1985).

///

///

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Although Plaintiffs allege numerous causes of action against the CRR 

Defendants, Plaintiffs base their preliminary injunction application on three state law 

claims: Private Nuisance, Public Nuisance, and Trespass. Plaintiffs, in large part, base 

all three of these claims on the CRR Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiffs’ 

ownership of the Association Roadway. 6 As set forth below, Plaintiffs fail to 

demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on their nuisance or trespass claims.

1. Plaintiffs’ Nuisance Claims

California law defines a nuisance, in part, as “[a]nything which is injurious to 

health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of 

property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. . . .” Cal. 

Civ. Code § 3479. A public nuisance is “one which affects at the same time an entire 

community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the 

extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 3480. “A private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance, if it is 

specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3493. A private 

nuisance is “a non-trespassory interference with the private use and enjoyment of land.” 

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.4th 893, 937 (1996); see also

Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302 (2008). 

A nuisance may be both public and private, but to proceed on 

a private nuisance theory, the plaintiff must prove an injury 

specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her 

land. The injury, however, need not be different in kind from 

that suffered by the general public. 

Monks, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 302; Koll–Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of 

Orange, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1041 (1994).

 6 In fact, although Plaintiffs characterize the tort claims at issue as ones for nuisance and trespass, 

they are, at least in part, at base to be claims related to the alleged taking of property claimed to be owned 

by the Plaintiffs.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Where the nuisance alleged is not also a private nuisance as 

to a private individual, [i.e.] where there is no allegation of an 

interference with a known property right, he does not have a 

cause of action on account of a public nuisance unless he 

alleges facts showing special injury to himself in person or 

property of a character different in kind from that suffered by 

the general public. 

Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1540, 1549–50 (2009); see Venuto v. 

Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124 (1971). “Both public and 

private nuisance claims require a showing of substantial and unreasonable interference, 

either with a public right or with the enjoyment of a plaintiff's property.” Coppola v. 

Smith, 935 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1018 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

a. Private Nuisance

As set forth in Plaintiffs’ claim for private nuisance, Plaintiffs allege, in part, that 

Defendants, by acting or failing to act, i.e. including, but not 

limited to: causing cars to park on the Association Roadway, 

installing a rope-barrier the length of Jameson Beach Road, 

forcing pedestrians to travel in and on the Association 

Roadway, installing a parking kiosk, blocking access to the 

Association Roadway, creating noise, failing to maintain a 

dedicated fire lane, adversely created a condition or 

permitted a condition to exist that was harmful to health, was 

offensive to the sense, was an obstruction of the free 

passage or use, in the customary manner of Jameson Beach 

Road and the Association Roadway.

Compl., ECF No. 2 at 20. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants’ actions “interfere[]

with Plaintiffs use and enjoyment of [their] land” and, as a result, Plaintiffs have “suffered 

annoyance, distress, mental anguish, frustration and anxiety.” Id.

[L]iability for private nuisance requires proof . . . that the 

invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of 

the land was substantial, i.e., that it caused the plaintiff to 

suffer ‘substantial actual damage’” and that “the interference 

with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it 

must also be unreasonable . . . i.e., it must be of such a 

nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable 

interference with the use and enjoyment. 

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696-97 (Cal. 1996). “The 

primary test for determining whether the invasion is unreasonable is whether the gravity 

of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant's conduct, taking a number of 

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

factors into account. . . . Fundamentally, the unreasonableness of intentional invasions is 

a problem of relative values to be determined by the trier of fact in each case in the light 

of all the circumstances of that case.” Id. at 697.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of prevailing on their

private nuisance claim for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs fail to establish an ownership 

interest in the property at issue – the so-called “Association Roadway.” Second, even if 

Plaintiffs had established an ownership interest, they fail to show that Defendants’ 

alleged interference is both substantial and unreasonable under the circumstances.

As to Plaintiffs claim of ownership, the CRR Defendants contend that:

[t]here is not one shred of evidence that any of the [P]laintiffs 

own the Jameson Beach Road. At most, [P]laintiffs perhaps 

have an easement over . . . USFS’ property, although even 

that proposition is debatable. Even [P]laintiffs’ 

representations [their Complaint, counsel’s declarations, and 

maps and surveys] fail to establish ‘ownership’ of the road. 

Suffice it to say [P]laintiffs have wholly failed to produce 

evidence they own the road in fee. 

Opp’n, ECF No. 90 at 13 n.9.7 While Plaintiffs submit some documentation which they 

claim supports their assertion of ownership, these documents do not establish any such 

ownership interest demonstrating that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on this point. See, 

e.g., ECF No. 78-4 at 1-4. Thus, the CRR Defendants’ contention is well taken.

8

 7 Plaintiffs’ filings indicate that the “Forest Service’s position [is] that the federal government owns 

the land in question.” Pl.’s Exhibit 3, ECF No. 61-1 at 19 (Response to Issue 19). Plaintiffs’ filing is 

corroborated by the USFS’s filing in a related NEPA action between Plaintiffs and the USFS, which 

confirms that the USFS avers that the “federal government owns the land in question.” Opp’n, ECF No. 50 

at 11, 2:14-cv-00718-MCE-AC. Moreover, given that Plaintiffs allege that the USFS (and El Dorado) 

assert ownership rights, the Court questions whether it would even be appropriate to issue the requested 

injunction as proposed by Plaintiffs on these grounds without joining the USFS as a party as to the tort

claims at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); ECF No. 80 at 7 (arguing that “if the Forest Service does not 

own Jameson Beach Road, CRR’s use of the Plaintiffs’ property constitutes a trespass”). That said, the 

Court does not have jurisdiction over the tort claims at issue as to the USFS. See ECF No. 83. In any 

event, because the Court finds that a preliminary injunction is not warranted, the Court need not reach this 

issue.

8 Plaintiffs appear to recognize this point as they have subsequently submitted additional evidence 

in the form of exhibits to their FAC in support of their ownership claim. However, these documents are not 

before the Court at this time nor have Defendants been presented with an opportunity to address these 

new supporting documents. See FAC, ECF No. 136. In addition, Plaintiffs added several new claims in 

their FAC related to their alleged ownership – including causes of action for quiet title, interference with 

easement, partition, and ejectment, in addition to an amended claim for inverse condemnation. See FAC, 

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Even if Plaintiffs own a possessory interest in the so-called Association Roadway

on Jameson Beach Road, they fail to establish the nature of that interest, making it

difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to determine whether any alleged interference 

with that interest is substantial and unreasonable. “The primary test for determining 

whether the invasion is unreasonable is whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the 

social utility of the defendant's conduct, taking a number of factors into account. . . . 

[T]he standard is objective: the question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the 

invasion unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole 

situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.” Id. at 938. “[T]his 

is a question of fact: Fundamentally, the unreasonableness of intentional invasions is a 

problem of relative values to be determined by the trier of fact in each case in the light of 

all the circumstances of that case.” Id. at 938-39 (internal citations omitted). 

Without knowing Plaintiffs’ interest in the Roadway and the circumstances under 

which it was created and the purpose for which it was created, it is impossible for the 

Court to determine whether the alleged interference is unreasonable. Moreover, 

notably, no Plaintiff contends that they lack access to their home, only that they often 

face severe congestion. Plaintiffs’ declarations in this regard consist of generic 

allegations of harm that, without more, fail to rise to the level of substantial and 

unreasonable. For instance, Plaintiffs complain of delays and traffic congestion and of 

an exposure to liability as a result of the congestion. See, e.g., ECF No. 114 at 3. As 

Plaintiffs acknowledge, their property is located in the vicinity of Lake Tahoe and 

National Forest lands and the alleged interference occurs largely in season and over 

long weekends. See generally ECF No. 117; see also ECF No. 9 (noting that “Plaintiffs 

filed their TRO on May 22, 2013, because they fear congestion will worsen on the 

upcoming Memorial Day holiday weekend”).

///

 July, 24, 2014, ECF No. 136. The CRR Defendants, the USFS, and El Dorado have moved to dismiss

and/or strike these new claims. See ECF Nos. 138-39, 142.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Under these facts, the Court cannot find that that the CRR Defendants’ actions amount 

to substantial and unreasonable interference so as to warrant a finding that Plaintiffs are 

likely to prevail on the merits on this claim at this time.

b. Public Nuisance

As set forth in Plaintiffs’ claim for public nuisance, Plaintiffs allege, in part, that

Defendants, by acting or failing to act, i.e. including, but not 

limited to: causing cars to park on the Association Roadway, 

installing a rope-barrier the length of Jameson Beach Road, 

forcing pedestrians to travel in and on the Association 

Roadway, installing a parking kiosk, blocking access to the 

Association Roadway, failing to maintain a dedicated fire 

lane, impacting EMS response times exposing the public at 

large to serious injury or death, and by creating noise, all 

involves conduct that is offensive to the senses, is an 

obstruction of the free passage or use, in the customary 

manner of Jameson Beach Road / the Association Roadway / 

and the Forest on the West side of Jameson Beach Road, 

creates conditions harmful to health, and obstructs the free 

use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable 

enjoyment of life or property.

Compl., ECF No. 2 at 21. Plaintiffs aver that “[a]n ordinary person would be reasonably 

annoyed or disturbed by the conditions” and that “Plaintiffs [are] harmed different from 

the type of harm suffered by the general public, including but not limited to exposure to 

liability for the condition.” Id. at 21-22. 

California permits a private person to “maintain an action for a public nuisance, if 

it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3493. Therefore, 

“[a]lthough a public nuisance can support recovery for either personal harm or property 

damage, a plaintiff suing on this basis must show special injury to himself of a character 

different in kind - not merely in degree - from that suffered by the general public.” 

Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 20 (Ct. App. 1989). In addition, as 

explained above, “[b]oth public and private nuisance claims require a showing of 

substantial and unreasonable interference, either with a public right or with the 

enjoyment of a plaintiff's property.” Coppola v. Smith, 935 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1018 (E.D. 

Cal. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

///

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that they are likely to prevail on the merits on their

public nuisance claim for two reasons. First, the harms alleged by Plaintiffs are the 

same as those allegedly suffered by the general public, despite Plaintiffs’ contention that 

they “[are] harmed different from the type of harm suffered by the general public,

including but not limited to exposure to liability for the condition.” Compl., ECF No. 2 at 

22; see ECF Nos. 7-2, 114. These blanket assertions of fear of liability, without more, do 

not establish the type of special injury of a character different in kind - not merely in 

degree - from that suffered by the general public.9 Second, as explained above,

Plaintiffs fail to make a showing that the CRR Defendants’ actions represent substantial 

and unreasonable interference under the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, the 

Court finds the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on their public 

nuisance claim.

2. Plaintiffs’ Trespass Claims

“Under California law to have a cause of action for trespass a plaintiff must prove: 

(1) the plaintiff's ownership or control of the property, (2) the defendant's intentional, 

reckless, or negligent entry on the property, (3) lack of permission to enter the property, 

or acts in excess of the permission, (4) actual harm, and (5) the defendant's conduct as 

a substantial factor in causing the harm.” Cole v. City of Sunnyvale, 2011 WL 4346510, 

*10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) (internal citation omitted).

With respect to Plaintiffs’ trespass claim, Plaintiffs allege, in part, that “Plaintiffs 

own the Association Roadway” and that “Defendants intentionally and recklessly enter[] 

and cause[] others to enter the Association Roadway and also create[] offensive noise 

impacting Association members at their homes.” Compl., ECF No. 2 at 21. However, as 

explained above, Plaintiffs have failed to establish their ownership or control of the

 9 Moreover, as explained below, allegations of speculative future liability fail to establish imminent, 

irreparable harm. Cf. Cody F. v. Falletti, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1243 (2001) (explaining that “[a]ppellants 

have not cited, and we are unaware of, any case in which an easement holder was held responsible for an 

action that had no relationship to the scope of the easement granted. None of the cited cases imposed a 

duty to guard against third party torts in the absence of any connection to the scope of the interest 

represented by the easement.”).

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Association Roadway. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to 

prevail on the merits of their trespass claim.

B. Imminent, Irreparable Harm 

“Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that, among other things, they are likely to 

suffer irreparable injury and the injury must be imminent in nature.” Caribbean Marine 

Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). “Preliminary injunctions are 

generally granted under the theory that there is an urgent need for speedy action to 

protect the plaintiffs' rights. Delay in seeking enforcement of those rights, however, 

tends to indicate at least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy action.” Citibank, N.A. 

v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Silber v. Barbara's Bakery, Inc., 

950 F. Supp. 2d 432, 441 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (noting that “[a]lthough delay may not 

preclude the grant of ultimate relief, it may preclude preliminary relief because it 

undermines the sense of urgency that typically accompanies a motion for preliminary 

injunction”). As a result, “[a] delay in seeking a preliminary injunction is a factor to be 

considered in weighing the propriety of relief.” Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 

Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1984).

1. Plaintiff’s Delay in Seeking Relief

As alleged in their own filings, Plaintiffs have been on notice of the dangerous 

congestion conditions since at least 2009 when congestion led to an ambulance delay 

which consequently led to a death. See ECF Nos. 7, 9 at 6. Further, Plaintiffs knew that 

Defendants asserted ownership rights to their property in 2011. See ECF Nos. 2 at 7, 7 

at 5. Moreover, as the CRR Defendants note, there has been parking on the 

Association Roadway since 1986, yet Plaintiffs did not file this action until 2013. To 

explain their delayed filing, Plaintiffs contend that “[e]ach season the problems increase 

and continue to grow” and that “when it became clear settlement would require filing 

litigation, they did.” ECF No. 117 at 4-5.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking injunctive relief undercuts their 

claims of imminent, irreparable harm. In May 2013, Plaintiffs sought a temporary 

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

restraining order based largely on the same grounds as the instant motion. In fact, prior 

to submitting new affidavits with their Reply brief in support of their motion for a 

preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs merely relied on the affidavits filed in May 2013 in

support of their TRO.10 See, e.g., ECF No. 39 at 2 (stating that the declarant “reviewed 

[his] declaration in support of Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and 

all of the conditions of Camp Richardson Resort described therein continued to exist 

during the 2013 season”). While Plaintiffs argue that the conditions have subsequently 

worsened, the declarations submitted with their Reply contain allegations of sporadic 

instances of alleged harm such as an altercation with an individual who worked at a 

Renaissance Fair at CRR and examples of the harms previously identified by Plaintiffs.

11 

As the CRR Defendants noted, some of these “new” conditions actually occurred years 

ago. See ECF Nos. 114 at 2, 121 at 8. For all of these reasons, the Court finds that

“[Plaintiffs’] long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency 

and irreparable harm.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., Inc., 762 F.2d 1374, 

1377 (9th Cir. 1985).

2. Lack of Imminent, Irreparable Harm 

Even putting Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking relief aside, their generic, blanket, and 

speculative assertions of harm fail to carry their burden of demonstrating that they face 

 10 The Court permitted Defendants to file a Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs’ new evidence. See Provenz v. 

Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996); ECF Nos. 121, 128.

11 Plaintiffs also included a number of allegations of illegal activity by Defendants, such as 

violations of the Forest Management Plan. See Amended Reply, ECF No. 117 at 8. However, these 

allegations are only tangentially related to Plaintiffs’ nuisance and trespass claims, and, as Plaintiffs are 

aware, many of these claims are being litigated in a related case, Jameson Beach Property Owners 

Association et al v. US Forest Service et al, 2:14-cv-00718-MCE-AC, in which Plaintiffs allege violations of

the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the 

National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”). Other allegations of illegal conduct, such as CRR’s purported 

violation of a county permit by securing a fourth liquor license, are either unsupported or unrelated to the 

claims at issue. Moreover, the Court questions whether Plaintiffs have standing to contest permits issued 

by El Dorado or the Special Use Permit issued by the United States Forest Service, and if they do, 

whether the violations would constitute irreparable harm. Cf. United States v. Petersen, 91 F. Supp. 209, 

213 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (explaining that where the United States sought an injunction restraining defendants 

from selling liquor without a federal permit, because the acts of defendants constituted only a violation of 

regulations, a criminal remedy at law was therefore adequate and an injunction was not warranted under 

the circumstances).

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

actual and imminent harm absent the requested relief. Plaintiffs summarize their 

argument as follows: 

The ongoing injury at issue essentially boils down to three 

things: (1) the absence of Life Safety Access to the Resort, 

and (2) environmental harm caused by conduct that has not 

undergone NEPA review, and is known to cause harm based 

on the Forest Service’ own allegations, and (3) traffic 

circulation that is hazardous including causing a high risk of 

auto / pedestrian conflict. 

Mot., ECF No. 80 at 6. Later, in an attempt to clarify, Plaintiffs state

[t]o be precise. Plaintiffs’ position is that irreparable harm is 

present and been proved on two grounds[:] 1) Defendants 

conduct is illegal. Violations of the Forest Management Act, 

and a Forest Plan, under the law, are generally found to 

constitute irreparable harm. 2) Plaintiffs have not rested on 

their laurels and done nothing with a static situation. When 

problems became intolerable in recent years, they began 

negotiating. When the problems continued to worsen, they 

were successful in securing some ‘fixes’ and not others. 

Amended Reply, ECF No. 117 at 4. None of these representations constitute a showing 

of imminent, irreparable harm.

First, as explained above, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants have violated 

NEPA are at issue in a related case. In fact, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction 

on that basis in that case. See Mot., April 17, 2014, ECF No. 12, 2:14-cv-00718-MCEAC. On June 6, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion without prejudice. ECF No. 59, 

2:14-cv-00718-MCE-AC.

12 In any event, despite Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions of 

irreparable harm based on alleged violations of NEPA, the Forest Management Act, and 

a Forest Plan, Plaintiffs’ affidavits in this case do not show any irreparable harm relating 

to these three bases.

In support of their contention that traffic circulation and the absence of life safety 

access amount to irreparable harm, Plaintiffs point to a 2009 death, as well as fears of 

liability. Neither basis supports their position. In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue that “EMS 

 12 The Court explained that Plaintiffs failed to submit any affidavits on the question of irreparable 

injury as it related to their NEPA claims in violation of Local Rule 231(d)(2). ECF No. 59, 2:14-cv-00718-

MCE-AC. In fact, in that case, Plaintiffs once again attempted to merely rely on the declarations filed in 

support of their unsuccessful May 2013 TRO application in this case. Plaintiffs do not allege NEPA claims 

in this action nor have they renewed their motion in the related case.

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

response time was a problem in a fatal incident. In 2009, an off-duty police officer 

resident of Jameson Beach, along with his brother and friend, responded to shouts of a 

drowning victim.” ECF No. 38 at 9 (citing ECF No. 7-13). According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he 

congestion on Jameson Beach Road places Owners, their guests, and Camp 

Richardson resort-goers’ lives at risk because of the dangerous and unsafe conditions 

created and continued by the Resort Defendants.” Id. However, as Defendants note, 

“Plaintiffs’ reference to a 2009 death, while in the hospital, of a drowning victim is devoid 

of any reliable expert evidence as to the cause of death or the relation, if any, to alleged 

delay in the arrival of medical treatment.” Opp’n, ECF No. 90 at 11.13 Moreover, this 

single incident which occurred five years ago, though tragic, is not an example of 

imminent, irreparable harm for which a preliminary injunction is appropriate. See Capital 

City Pub. Co. v. Trenton Times Corp., 575 F. Supp. 1339, 1352 (D. N.J. 1983) (noting 

that to prevail, “the moving party must show an ‘imminent threat’ which is more than 

mere speculation or fear as to what may ensue in the future”); Nissin Foods (USA) Co., 

Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 515 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (explaining that a “plaintiff 

must show an ‘imminent threat’ rather than the mere ‘possibility of remote future injury’”). 

A single example of a past injury that may be related to Plaintiffs’ claims is not sufficient.

As to Plaintiffs’ fears that they will be subject to liability in the event of an accident 

on the Association Roadway, these claims are too generic and speculative to constitute 

imminent, irreparable harm. See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 

1209 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining that “[a]ssertions of harm cannot be generic: they must 

be precise and detailed enough to enable the Court to evaluate the harms pertaining to 

injunctive relief in the context of the scope of the injunction sought”); see also Caribbean 

Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that 

 13 Defendant Kris Knox, the General Manger for CRR, notes that “[o]n occasion, emergency 

vehicles experience difficulty traveling on Highway 89 responding to calls from the South Lake Tahoe 

area. . . . To my knowledge, emergency vehicles have always been able to pass through the CRR area of 

Highway 89.” ECF No. 92 at 8. Knox continued by stating “I have never been contacted or advised by law 

enforcement or emergency responder personnel about any complaint or issue regarding access to 

Jameson Beach Road by emergency responders.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

“[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a 

preliminary injunction”). The burden rests upon Plaintiffs “to show irreparable injury, and 

this must be in the nature of an imminent threat as opposed to a possibility of remote 

injury in the future.” Nissin Foods (USA) Co., Inc., 515 F. Supp. at 1156. Plaintiffs have 

failed to meet this burden.

C. Balancing the Hardships and Public Interest

As it is here, “[i]n cases where the public interest is involved, the district court 

must also examine whether the public interest favors the [moving parties].” Fund for 

Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992). The Plaintiffs “bear the 

initial burden of showing that the injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans, Inc. v. 

Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009). “[T]he court should weigh the public 

interest in light of the likely consequences of the injunction.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., 333 U.S. 426, 434 (1948) (concluding that 

a grievance that is “too remote and insubstantial” or “too speculative in nature” does not 

justify an injunction or declaratory relief). As Defendants explain, Plaintiffs’ requested 

relief, including the removal of the traffic management kiosk and parking spaces on the 

Association Roadway, “would be harmful to CRR’s efforts to manage pedestrian, bicycle 

and vehicle traffic on Jameson Beach Road for the benefit of the general public, CRR 

guests and Jameson Beach homeowners and guests.” ECF No. 92 at 4. Moreover, 

limiting access to CRR in the manner proposed by Plaintiffs would represent an 

unwarranted curtailment of the public’s access to National Forest System lands. Based 

on the record before it, the Court finds that the balance of hardships weighs against the 

issuance of a preliminary injunction and that the public interest would not be served by 

granting the relief requested by Plaintiffs.

///

///

///

///

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they are likely to prevail on 

the merits of their trespass and nuisance claims, that they will suffer imminent 

irreparable harm absent the requested relief, or that the balancing of hardships and the 

public interest weigh in their favor. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 

Injunction (ECF No. 78) is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 3, 2014

Case 2:13-cv-01025-MCE-AC Document 158 Filed 09/04/14 Page 18 of 18