Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00071/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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References to section numbers hereinafter refer to sections of Title 28 of the 1

United States Code unless otherwise specified.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELVIA RUIZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

CV F 05-0071 AWI

(CR F 02-5101 AWI)

ORDER DENYING

PETITONER’S MOTION TO

CORRECT, VACATE OR SET

ASIDE HER SENTENCE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.,

SECTION 2255

(28 U.S.C. § 2255)

INTRODUCTION

In this case, petitioner Elva Ruiz (“Petitioner”) seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 1

from the sentence of 46 months that was imposed by this court on January 12, 2004, following

petitioner’s entry of a plea of guilty to one count of making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim

to the United States and aiding and abetting. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted by a plea of guilty on January 12, 2004 to one felony count of

making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim to the United States and aiding and abetting in

violation of 18 U.S.C., sections 287 and 2. In the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed not to move

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for a downward departure based on the computed offense level, criminal history category, or

criminal history points as calculated by the Probation Department. Petitioner agreed that the loss

for sentencing purposes was greater than $400,000. Petitioner also agreed to accept a two-level

enhancement for sophisticated means and to be sentenced at the high end of the guideline range. 

Petitioner also waived all rights to appeal the conviction or sentence or to collaterally attack the

conviction or sentence.

A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was prepared by the Probation Department. 

The PSR calculated a base offense level of 6, to which 14 points were added because the

intended loss attributable to Petitioner was greater than $400,000, but less than $1 million. Two

additional points were added for sophistication and two points for a leadership role. Three points

were deducted for acceptance of responsibility. The total offense level was calculated to be 21;

the criminal history category was found to be I. 

Judgment was entered on January 12, 2004. The instant motion to correct, set aside, or

vacate the judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 2255 was timely filed on January 18, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARD

 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides, in pertinent part: “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a

court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... may move

the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” Under section

2255, "a district court must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under

that section, '[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the

prisoner is entitled to no relief.' " United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1994)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (emphasis in the original). The court may deny a hearing if the

movant's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim for relief or "are so palpably

incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal." United States v. McMullen,

98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1269, 117

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(1997). To earn the right to a hearing, therefore, the movant must make specific factual

allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Id. Mere conclusory statements in a

section 2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 

1194 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges she suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, primarily because her

attorney failed to challenge certain facts set forth in the PSR pertaining to the amount of loss, the

sophisticated nature of the offense, and to her role in the offence. Petitioner also appears to

allege her attorney failed to adequately communicate how the factual assertions made in the PSR

would impact her sentence. Petitioner alleges her plea was involuntary due to the failure of her

attorney to adequately communicate to her the consequences of her plea agreement and the

contents of the PSR.

I. Waiver

“The right to attack a judgment collaterally is statutory. [Citation.] A knowing and

voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. [Citation.] For this reason a prisoner may not

collaterally attack a judgment if the prisoner waived the right to do so.” United States v. Racich,

35 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1210 (S.D. Cal. 1999). However, a waiver cannot bar a claim that relates to

the validity of the waiver itself. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9 Cir. 1993). 

Here, Petitioner has challenged the validity of her plea by claiming that her plea of guilty was the

result of her attorney’s failure to adequately challenge the factual assertions made in the PSR. 

Petitioner claims that his plea of guilty was the result of her attorney’s ineffective assistance in

failing to fully inform Petitioner of all of the implications of the PSR. 

Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel usually implicate the validity of plea

agreements that are secured through the efforts of the allegedly ineffective counsel, those claims

are not normally considered waived by plea agreements. See United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim of ineffective

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assistance of counsel based on counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant

to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain”); United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840,

844 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Pruitt for the proposition a general waiver does not include claims of

ineffective assistance brought under section 2255). This court follows Pruitt in finding

Petitioner’s general waiver of the right to collaterally attack the judgment or her sentence did not

waive her right to petition pursuant to section 2255 on the ground of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

The court notes that Petitioner’s motion is worded broadly and is somewhat vague as to

what rights are alleged to have been infringed. To the extent Petitioner is attempting to allege

any claim other than a claim of infringement of the Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel, that claim is waived.

II. Effective Assistance of Counsel

To establish a constitutional violation for the ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must demonstrate (1) a deficient performance by counsel, and (2) prejudice to him.

United States v. Cochrane, 985 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir.1993). To prove a deficient

performance of counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney "made errors that a

reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent and conscientious advocate would not have

made." Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir.1985). To show prejudice, Petitioner

must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 694 (1984). A court addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel need not

address both prongs of the Strickland test if the plaintiff’s showing is insufficient as to one

prong. Id. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id.

Petitioner’s claim fails for lack of a showing of prejudice. The charging document in

Petitioner’s case, the Second Superceding Indictment, alleged two felony counts; making a false

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or fraudulent claim and aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to defraud the United States with

respect to claims in violation of 18 U.S.C., section 286. Conviction of the second of these counts

would have exposed Petitioner to a statutory maximum term twice the length of the statutory

maximum term provided by the first count. The facts set forth in the PSR and not contradicted

by Petitioner indicate Petitioner was prominently involved in a very large and wide-ranging

conspiracy involving twenty co-defendants and encompassing a substantial portion of the state. 

By negotiating the guilty plea, Petitioner’s counsel secured for Petitioner a lesser sentencing

exposure and secured for her a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility; benefits

that would not have been available in the absence of the plea agreement. 

In exchange for the benefits realized through the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to be

sentenced at the high end of the guideline range and admitted the factual bases that were used to

enhance her sentence; namely the amount of loss, the sophisticated nature of the offense, and her

leadership role in the offense. Petitioner complains that she suffered a constitutional depravation

when her attorney failed to challenge the amount of loss, or her leadership role. However, the

admission of those facts were part and parcel of Petitioner’s part of the plea bargain and there is

nothing alleged or suggested that would indicate that Petitioner could have secured a similarly

beneficial plea bargain in the absence of those admissions. 

Further, given the nature of the offense, the number of claims against the United States,

the number of co-defendants, and Petitioner’s un-contradicted role in the offense, there is no

reason to believe that the factors that enhanced Petitioner’s sentence could not easily have been

proven. It follows that there is no basis to allege that plea agreement that was negotiated and the

encouragement by Petitioner’s attorney that she take the plea offer were in any way the product

of sub-standard representation. 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is essentially a reflection of

Petitioner’s impression that her attorney could have done more to challenge and demand proof of

all of the facts contained in the PSR that were incorporated into the calculation of her sentence,

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or find facts that might mitigate her sentence. Petitioner offers no allegation or insight as to what

facts might have been found on further investigation by her attorney. Petitioner’s claim appears

only to allege that, if her attorney had worked harder, he would have found some way of arguing

successfully for a reduction in her sentence. This is pure speculation and not a proper basis for

the granting of habeas relief.

In sum, the facts before the court provide no basis whatsoever to support a finding of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s counsel negotiated a plea agreement that was

beneficial to Petitioner, and there is no evidence or factual allegation to support a claim that, but

for ineffective assistance of her attorney, Petitioner could have received a more favorable

sentence.

THEREFORE, in accordance with the foregoing discussion, Petitioner’s motion to

correct, set aside or vacate her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 2255 is hereby DENIED. 

Petitioner’s request for assistance of counsel is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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