Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02054/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02054-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THAMAR SANTISTEBAN 

CORTINA, on behalf of herself, all 

others similarly situated, and the 

general public,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-cv-02054-BAS-DHB

ORDER:

(1) DENYING DEFENDANT 

LANG’S MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C §

1927;

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 

UNDER RULE 11; and

(3) IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 

UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2)

v.

WAL-MART STORES, INC., and 

LANG PHARMA NUTRITION, 

INC.,

Defendants.

This case represents one battle in a multi-front litigation war between 

Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant Lang Pharma Nutrition, Inc. (“Lang”). Since late 

2013, Plaintiff’s counsel has brought four separate class actions in federal court 

against Lang and various retailers supplied by Lang, alleging generally that Lang’s 

coenzyme Q10 (“CoQ10”) dietary supplement is deceptively advertised in violation 

of various California and federal consumer protection statutes. At issue in the instant 

case are product claims that Lang and Wal-Mart make on the packaging of WalCase 3:13-cv-02054-BAS-DHB Document 90 Filed 09/01/16 Page 1 of 21
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Mart’s “Equate” brand CoQ10 supplement. 

Pending before the Court are three motions. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff

Cortina filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (ECF No. 71.) On November 9, 2015, Lang filed an 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and brought a motion for sanctions against 

Plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (ECF No. 73.) Plaintiff then responded 

with her own motion for sanctions against Lang under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11. (ECF No. 81.) All three motions have been fully briefed. 

The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1).1 For the reasons that follow, the 

Court DENIES both sanctions motions (ECF Nos. 73, 81) and GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

motion to voluntarily dismiss the case, pursuant to the conditions set out below (ECF 

No. 71).

I. BACKGROUND

A. General Allegations

Plaintiff Cortina brought this putative class action on September 3, 2013, 

 

1

In light of the Court’s disposition on the papers submitted, Defendants’ ex parte applications for 

oral argument, consolidated hearings, and a stay pending resolution of Plaintiff’s motion for 

dismissal are DENIED. (ECF No. 75.)

Plaintiff’s motions to seal are also DENIED (ECF Nos. 77, 82.) Under Ninth Circuit law, the legal 

standard governing public access to filed motions and their attachments turns on whether the 

motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of the case. Center for Auto Safety v. 

Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). When the underlying motion is more 

than tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. When the 

underlying motion does not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard 

applies. Here, the Court finds that the motions for sanctions at issue are not more than tangentially 

related to the merits of the case, and so Plaintiff’s motions to seal are governed by the good cause 

standard. However, Plaintiff has not met the standard. Good cause requires a “particularized 

showing,” In re Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Practices Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 

(9th Cir. 2012), supported by “specific examples or articulated reasoning,” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. 

Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). A blanket protective order, or 

a party’s designation of documents as “confidential” pursuant to such order, is not itself sufficient 

to show good cause. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 

2003). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions to seal.

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against Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Lang Pharma Nutrition, Inc., alleging 

breach of warranty and deceptive advertising in connection with Wal-Mart’s sale of 

a CoQ10 supplement supplied by Lang. (ECF No. 1.) CoQ10 is a molecular 

compound produced naturally in the human body, and has been shown to promote 

heart health. (ECF No. 51, Second Amended Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 13, 14.) Lang 

specializes in the production and supply of CoQ10, and other dietary supplements, to 

mass market retail chains such as Wal-Mart.2 Wal-Mart sells Lang’s CoQ10 

supplement as a softgel under the brand name “Equate.” (Id. ¶ 3.)

CoQ10 can only provide health benefits to an individual if it is first absorbed 

into the body’s systemic circulation. (Id. ¶ 15.) According to Plaintiff, a CoQ10 

softgel supplement can only be absorbed if the outer shell ruptures and its contents

dissolve. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 25–27.) In other words, rupture and dissolution are biochemical 

precursors to absorption. 

Plaintiff alleges that when Lang’s CoQ10 supplement was subjected to rupture 

and dissolution testing, the product performed poorly. (Id. 12:23–15:22.) Based on 

these results, Plaintiff alleges that claims made by Lang and Wal-Mart on the 

packaging of Equate—including statements that Equate provides “High Absorption” 

and “3 times better absorption”—are false and misleading because the product’s poor 

rupture and dissolution rates means it cannot plausibly provide high absorption. (Id.

16–22.) Plaintiff further argues that the statement “Compare to Qunol CoQ10” on

Equate’s packaging invites a false comparison because Qunol makes the same “high” 

and “3 times better” absorption claims but far outperforms Equate on rupture and 

dissolution tests. (Id.)

B. USP Testing Standards and Revised Chapter 2040

 

2 According to Plaintiff, Lang outsources the manufacturing of the CoQ10 supplements at issue 

here to a Florida company called Swiss Caps USA, Inc. After receiving the relevant materials 

from Lang, Swiss Caps puts the CoQ10 into softgel form and ships the completed softgels back to 

Lang. Lang then packages and distributes the product to retailers. (SAC ¶¶ 36–38.)

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Lang’s motion for sanctions centers on Plaintiff’s use of United States 

Pharmacopeial Convention (“USP”) testing standards to support her claims. The USP 

is a well-respected, scientific nonprofit organization that sets enforceable standards 

for the quality of drugs, and voluntary standards for the quality of vitamins and 

dietary supplements. (Id. ¶ 21.) Although compliance with USP standards concerning 

dietary supplements is voluntary, the standards play a major role in the dietarysupplement industry, providing objective, scientifically-valid benchmarks against 

which all supplements may be measured and tested. (Id. ¶ 22.) The USP provides 

testing standards for CoQ10 rupture and dissolution tests in a publication called USP 

General Chapter 2040 (“Chapter 2040”). 

Cortina’s allegations regarding Defendants’ absorption claims rely on the 

results of USP rupture and dissolution tests, but Lang asserts that a recent revision to 

Chapter 2040 has effectively nullified the basis for Plaintiff’s claims. In 2014, the 

USP added an introduction to Chapter 2040 to explain that USP rupture and 

dissolution tests are not intended to be used to demonstrate absorption, but rather to 

detect issues that would affect a supplement’s release characteristics. The 

introduction provides in full:

“Disintegration [i.e., rupture] and dissolution tests as described in this 

chapter are quality-control tools to assess performance characteristics of 

dietary supplement finished dosage forms. These performance standards 

are intended to detect problems that may arise due to use or misuse, or 

changes in coatings, lubricants, disintegrants, and other components. 

These performance tests are also intended to detect manufacturing 

process issues such as over-compression and over-drying that would 

affect the release characteristics of the final dosage forms. These tests 

are not intended to be used as a demonstration or as a surrogate for in 

vivo absorption, bioavailability, or effectiveness, unless an in vitro-in 

vivo correlation (IVIVC) has been established.”

(ECF No. 73 (“Def.’s Mot.”), Allen Decl., Exh. 5.) Lang refers to the last 

sentence of this introduction as the USP “absorption disclaimer,” and argues that it 

renders results from USP rupture and dissolution tests irrelevant to claims regarding 

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absorption. (Def.’s Mot. 10:5–9.) Lang informed Plaintiff’s counsel of the Chapter 

2040 revision and absorption disclaimer in April 2015, Def.’s Mot. 9:17-22, and 

Plaintiff included the new introduction verbatim in the body of her Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) filed on April 23, 2015 (SAC ¶ 32). However, Plaintiff did not 

replace the older version of Chapter 2040 attached to the previous complaint, and

instead maintained as an attachment to the SAC a version of Chapter 2040 that did 

not include the absorption disclaimer.

C. Recent Procedural History

On May 21, 2015, Defendants answered the SAC. (ECF Nos. 60, 61.) Over 

the ensuing months, however, developments in other cases involving Plaintiff’s 

counsel and Lang apparently led Plaintiff to reconsider its approach to the instant 

case. On August 6, 2015, the United States District Court for the Central District of 

California dismissed the case Harris v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., et al., for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, and “without prejudice to Plaintiff reasserting his claims in a 

court of competent jurisdiction.” No. ED CV 13–02329–AB (AGRx), 2015 WL 

4694047, at * 8 (Aug. 6, 2015). Two months after the Harris dismissal, Plaintiff’s 

counsel informed Defendants that Plaintiff was contemplating a voluntary dismissal 

in this case. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), and Lang vigorously opposed. (ECF Nos. 71, 72.)

Concurrent with its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal, 

Lang brought a motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against Plaintiff’s 

counsel for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings. Lang argues 

primarily that the updated Chapter 2040 introduction and absorption disclaimer 

means that Plaintiff’s counsel had no basis to continue litigating this case after the 

new introduction became final. Plaintiff opposed and countered with a motion for 

sanctions against Lang under Rule 11, arguing that Lang’s motion for sanctions is 

frivolous. (ECF No. 81 (“Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions”).) The two sanctions motions and 

Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal are presently before the Court.

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For the following reasons, the Court will DENY both sanctions motions and 

GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the case, pursuant to the conditions 

imposed by the Court. For ease of analysis and presentation, the Court first addresses 

the Parties’ sanctions motions before discussing Cortina’s motion for voluntary 

dismissal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Lang’s Motion for Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Lang seeks a staggering $575,000 in sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (Def.’s Mot. 21:11–13.) Under § 1927, an attorney who 

“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously” may be 

required to pay the excess fees and costs caused by such conduct. See also Pac. 

Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“Section 1927 authorizes the imposition of sanctions against any lawyer who 

wrongfully proliferates litigation proceedings once a case has commenced.”). 

Sanctions pursuant to § 1927 must be supported by a finding of recklessness or 

subjective bad faith. Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(citations omitted). Recklessness may be present when an attorney continues to 

pursue a claim after it becomes clear that the claim lacks legal or factual support. See 

W. Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1528 (9th Cir. 1990); see 

also Cotterill v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 08-2295 JSW (JL), 2010 WL 

1223146, at * 7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010). “Bad faith is present when an attorney 

knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim 

for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” W. Coast Theater, 897 F.2d at 1528 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (quoting Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176, 

1185–86 (9th Cir. 1988)). District courts enjoy broad discretion in determining 

whether sanctions under § 1927 are appropriate, and if so, in what amount. See Trulis 

v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995).

Lang argues that sanctions under § 1927 are appropriate on the grounds that 

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Plaintiff’s counsel (1) failed to conduct a reasonable investigation before filing the 

First and Second Amended Complaints; (2) continued to pursue the claims after 

learning that the USP absorption disclaimer rendered those claims baseless; (3) 

engaged in discovery tactics constituting harassment; (4) filed the SAC without 

attaching the updated USP Chapter 2040 as an exhibit; and (5) filed a motion to 

voluntarily dismiss after more than two years of aggressive litigation. (Def.’s Mot. 

10:14–18.) Lang asserts that each of these actions was reckless, at minimum, and that 

any one of them alone constitutes an unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of 

proceedings. The Court finds these arguments unconvincing.

1. Reasonable Investigation and the Chapter 2040 Absorption Disclaimer 

Lang’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s (1) failure to conduct a 

reasonable investigation, (2) unwarranted pursuit of claims in light of the USP 

absorption disclaimer, and (3) failure to attach the updated Chapter 2040 to the SAC, 

all rely on the assumption that the USP absorption disclaimer rendered Plaintiff’s 

claims baseless. This assumption is incorrect. Although the Chapter 2040 

introduction states that rupture and dissolution tests are not intended to be used as a 

demonstration for absorption, this statement does not preclude Plaintiff from using 

the tests to form general hypotheses about the likelihood of absorption. Plaintiff 

alleges that rupture and dissolution are biochemical precursors to absorption, and 

contends that where a supplement has poor rupture and dissolution rates, absorption 

may be diminished. (SAC ¶¶ 15, 25–27.) Chapter 2040 does not foreclose this 

possibility, even as it advises against using rupture and dissolution to draw definitive 

scientific conclusions about absorption. 

Indeed, Plaintiff’s expert Susan Schniepp, who spent a decade serving as a 

USP Expert Committee Member on various USP committees, avers that Chapter 

2040 rupture and dissolution testing is relevant to determining whether a supplement 

is likely to offer increased absorption as claimed on its label. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Exh. 1,

Schniepp Decl. ¶ 29.) Thus, while the absorption disclaimer may provide Lang a 

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firmer basis for challenging the strength of Plaintiff’s evidence of absorption, it does 

not foreclose, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s ability to allege that poor performance 

on USP rupture and dissolution tests makes Defendants’ absorption claims false and 

misleading.3In essence, Lang is using the absorption disclaimer to dispute the merits

of Plaintiff’s case, which places Lang’s contentions outside the purview of § 1927. 

See DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Section 1927 focuses on 

the conduct of the litigation and not on its merits.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s counsel had sufficient foundation to continue litigating this case 

notwithstanding the USP absorption disclaimer. Sanctions are not warranted on these 

grounds.

2. Allegations of Harassment 

Lang also argues that § 1927 sanctions are warranted because Plaintiff’s 

counsel engaged in discovery tactics constituting harassment, including by failing to 

provide substantive responses to discovery requests, aggressively pursuing extensive 

discovery from Lang in this case and in the now-dismissed Harris case, and refusing 

to make Plaintiff Cortina available for deposition. 

The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. First, the record does not 

support a finding that Plaintiff’s counsel’s discovery conduct was intended to harass 

Lang. Certainly, discovery has not been wholly cooperative, but the record in this 

case (as opposed to Harris) is bereft of the litany of discovery disputes and motions 

to compel typical of cases involving rampant abuse of the discovery process. 

Second, and relatedly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that § 1927 is not the 

appropriate vehicle for sanctioning discovery abuses. See In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 

1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986). Lang’s complaints regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

 

3 On this point, the Court’s previous determination that “USP testing may be relevant for some 

purposes at trial and may provide evidence supporting the breach of the implied or explicit 

warranties made by Defendant” is equally applicable here. (ECF No. 42, Order Granting in Part 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss.)

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discovery misconduct are thus more appropriately addressed under the Federal Rules 

explicitly designed to deal with those issues. Id. (explaining that sanctions for 

discovery abuses are governed primarily by Rule 26(g) and Rule 37).

Finally, Lang’s invocation of Plaintiff’s counsel’s pursuit of discovery and law 

and motion across four separate cases is not a legitimate basis for inferring a 

harassing motive in this case. This is because “[s]anctions imposed under section 

1927 may be imposed only based on activities before the sanctioning court”—

conduct in other lawsuits is irrelevant. Miele v. Franklin Resources, Inc., Case No. 

3:15–cv–00199–LB, 2015 WL 4934071, at * 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) (citing 

GriD Sys. Corp. v. John Fluke Mfg. Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994)

(per curiam)). Here, a discovery-sharing agreement that permits the use of discovery 

materials from Harris minimized the need for Lang to undergo extensive document 

review in this case. (ECF Nos. 63, 65.) Furthermore, although Plaintiff’s counsel filed 

two amended complaints, motions practice preceding Plaintiff’s motion to 

voluntarily dismiss the case has been limited to Lang’s motion to dismiss the FAC. 

Thus, in considering the activities before it, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

discovery conduct and motions practice does not reflect an intent to harass Lang such 

that sanctions are justified under § 1927.

3. Abandonment of the Claim

Lang also contends that sanctions are warranted because Plaintiff’s counsel 

abruptly moved to voluntarily dismiss the case after two years of aggressive 

litigation. The implication is that Plaintiff’s counsel moved to dismiss because they 

knew they had no basis for the alleged claims, and so litigation preceding the motion 

must have been unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied. The Court finds this 

argument unpersuasive for at least two reasons.

First, the timing of Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal appears to reflect 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s re-evaluation of the case after the Harris dismissal and after 

subsequent settlement discussions broke down. (Pl.’s Opp’n 10:9–17; ECF No. 74, 

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Fitzgerald Decl. Exhs. 3–5.) Although the Court does not profess to know every 

factor underlying counsel’s decision to move for dismissal when they did, counsel’s 

proffered explanation is not an unreasonable one based on the record before the 

Court. 

Second, regardless of the timing of the motion for voluntary dismissal, 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s litigation of the case preceding the motion was not without 

foundation. This distinguishes the instant case from Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., 

Inc., 236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001), relied on by Lang. In First Lenders, the Eighth 

Circuit affirmed a district court’s award of sanctions under § 1927 where plaintiff’s 

counsel litigated a class action for more than a year and a half before abandoning the 

claims without explanation. The court’s holding, however, was based on a finding 

that the class action claims themselves were baseless. First Lenders, 236 F.3d at 445.

That is not the case here. In this case, the Court has found that the Chapter 2040 

absorption disclaimer did not render Plaintiff’s claims baseless. Thus, First Lenders

is inapposite, and the timing of Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the 

case does not justify an award of sanctions under § 1927.

In sum, the Court finds no basis to impose sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Accordingly, Lang’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

B. Cortina’s Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11

Cortina brings her own motions for sanctions against Lang under Federal Rule 

11. Rule 11 requires attorneys to certify that any paper or pleading filed with the court 

is well-grounded in fact, legally tenable, and is not being presented for any improper 

purpose. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11. Under Rule 11(b), an attorney must conduct “an inquiry reasonable under 

the circumstances” as to a paper or pleading’s factual and legal basis before 

presenting such paper to the court. “If, judged by an objective standard, a reasonable 

basis for the position [taken in a paper presented to the court] exists in both law and 

in fact at the time that the position is adopted, then sanctions should not be imposed.” 

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Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1532, 1538 (9th Cir. 

1986); see also In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 433–35 (9th Cir. 

1996). On the other hand, when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without 

factual foundation, or brought for an improper purpose, Rule 11 sanctions may be 

appropriate.4 See Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 

1997) (citations omitted). If the court determines that Rule 11 has been violated, “the 

court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that 

violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). 

Cortina moves for Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds that Lang’s sanctions 

motion is legally and factually baseless, made without a reasonable inquiry, and 

brought for improper purposes. The Court addresses these grounds in turn.

1. Factual Contentions

Cortina’s argument that Lang’s motion for sanctions lacks a factual basis 

centers on the assertion that Lang’s reading of the Chapter 2040 absorption 

disclaimer is incorrect. However, an argument that Lang’s motion is incorrect does 

not establish that the motion lacks a factual basis. Lang argues that a plain reading of 

the USP absorption disclaimer demonstrates that Cortina is precluded from using 

rupture and dissolution tests to support her allegations about absorption. Although 

the Court does not find Lang’s interpretation particularly persuasive, the language of 

Chapter 2040 itself provides evidentiary support for that interpretation. Indeed, 

Lang’s counsel was told by a senior counsel for USP that because “USP text and 

publications may have legal implications . . . their language must stand on their own.” 

(ECF No. 73, Allen Decl., Exh. 3.) This statement may plausibly be read as inviting 

the plain reading approach adopted by Lang in its sanctions motion. 

Cortina’s remaining challenges to the factual basis of Lang’s sanctions motion 

 

4 The term “frivolous” in the Rule 11 context is “used to denote a filing that is both baseless and

made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 

F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

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similarly fail. For example, Cortina argues that because Lang is required to meet USP 

standards for rupture and dissolution, Lang had no factual basis to bring a sanctions 

motion based on Cortina’s use of those tests. However, the basis of Lang’s sanctions 

motion is not that the USP standards are voluntary (though this is an important point 

of contention), but rather that Plaintiff’s counsel continued to litigate the case after 

they should have known that rupture and dissolution tests should not be used to 

demonstrate absorption. Whether or not Lang was required to adhere to USP 

standards does not negate the factual basis for Lang’s sanctions motion, which is 

rooted in the alleged impact of the absorption disclaimer on the viability of Cortina’s 

allegations.

Cortina also stresses that Lang chose to answer the SAC rather than move to 

dismiss it, and that Lang did not move for summary judgment. (ECF No. 81, 10:20–

20.) In Cortina’s view, these decisions demonstrate that Lang knew Cortina’s case 

had merit and therefore knew there was no basis for sanctions. This argument is a 

fair one, but unavailing. “Sanctions may be justified under § 1927 even if the conduct 

at issue has some merit.” Cotterill 2010 WL 1223146, at * 6 (citing Lone Ranger 

Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 1984)). Thus, 

the fact that Cortina’s case has merit does not preclude Lang from bringing a § 1927 

motion. Lang’s decision to answer the SAC and delay bringing the sanctions motion 

may implicate the merits of the motion, or limit the amount of sanctions ultimately 

awarded, see In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1184–85, but that behavior alone does not 

demonstrate that the motion lacked a factual foundation.

Finally, Cortina argues that Lang had no factual basis to argue that Plaintiff’s 

counsel attempted to mislead the Court by attaching to the SAC an older version of 

Chapter 2040 that did not include the absorption disclaimer. Specifically, Cortina 

contends that because Plaintiff’s counsel included the new introduction and 

disclaimer verbatim in the body of the SAC, Lang had no evidence to support its 

allegations. (Pl.’s Mot. 11:22–12:6.) The Court disagrees. Although the Court does 

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not find the failure to attach the most updated version of Chapter 2040 to be 

sanctionable conduct, Lang was not without factual foundation to argue that such 

conduct was part of an attempt to unreasonably and vexatiously prolong the 

proceedings. Given the rather weak justifications Plaintiff’s counsel offer for not 

attaching the most recent version of Chapter 2040, see Pl.’s Opp’n 17:4, n. 6, Lang 

had adequate evidentiary support to advance its contentions on this point. 

2. Warranted by Law

Cortina’s argument that Lang’s sanctions motion is legally baseless is also 

unpersuasive. For starters, the challenge is largely misdirected. The thrust of 

Cortina’s argument on this point is that Lang’s motion is weak on the merits, and that 

the amount of fees and costs sought is inappropriate. (Pl.’s Mot. 14–19.) These 

arguments go to the persuasiveness of the motion, and thus largely fall beyond the 

purview of Rule 11. So long as a motion is not frivolous, or advanced for an improper 

purpose, the fact that it lacks persuasive force will not, in itself, support Rule 11 

sanctions. Cf. Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[Rule 11] is 

not intended to chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal 

theories.”) (citation omitted).

Where Cortina does challenge the legal foundations of Lang’s sanctions 

motion, she supports such challenges with a distorted reading of Lang’s motion. For 

example, while Cortina correctly states that § 1927 sanctions are not available for a 

failure to investigate an initial pleading, she fails to recognize that Lang’s motion is 

focused on Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct after the initial pleading, which is proper. In 

re Keegan Mgmt., 78 F.3d at 435; see also Wilden v. County of Yuba, No. 2:11–CV–

02246–JAM GGH (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012). Cortina also notes that § 1927 sanctions 

are not available for activities in other cases, but again this correct statement of the 

law does not demonstrate that Lang’s motion was legally baseless. Lang referred to 

litigation in Harris and other cases to support its claim that Plaintiff’s counsel has

been litigating this case in bad faith and to harass Lang. Although the Court 

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ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, it is not unwarranted by law or by a 

nonfrivolous argument for modifying existing law. See, e.g., Fishoff v. Coty Inc., 634 

F.3d 647, 654 (2d. Cir. 2011) (“The fact that a legal theory is a long-shot does not 

necessarily mean it is sanctionable.”).

3. Reasonable Inquiry

Cortina next argues that Lang’s motion was brought without a reasonable 

inquiry relative to the staggering amount of sanctions sought. This is a fair argument, 

but ultimately unconvincing. Although the amount of sanctions sought by Lang may 

raise suspicion as to the reasonableness of the amount, the Court does not find that 

the amount makes Lang’s pre-filing inquiry unreasonable under the circumstances. 

Here, Lang’s counsel wrote to a USP scientific liaison about the applicability of USP 

rupture and dissolution tests for proving absorption and was told by a USP attorney 

that the language in the Chapter 2040 introduction must stand on its own. (Def.’s 

Mot. Allen Decl., Exhs. 1–4.) The USP attorney also explained that USP staff are 

prohibited from providing after-the-fact interpretation. This email conversation may 

not have been the most thorough pre-filing inquiry possible, but it was not 

unreasonable, particularly given the Court’s finding that Lang’s motion, in fact, had 

adequate factual and legal support. See, e.g., In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. 78 F.3d at 435 

n. 1 (holding that an attorney may not be sanctioned for a complaint that has merit 

on its face solely because the attorney’s pre-filing inquiry was inadequate). 

4. Improper Purpose

Finally, Cortina argues that Lang’s sanctions motion was filed for an improper 

purpose—specifically, to harass Plaintiff’s counsel—based on (1) Lang’s decision to 

bring the motion shortly after settlement discussions broke down, (2) Lang’s failure 

to attach detailed billing records to justify the amount of sanctions requested, and (3) 

emails allegedly demonstrating Lang’s personal disdain for Plaintiff’s counsel. In the 

Ninth Circuit, “[h]arassment under Rule 11 focuses upon the improper purpose of the 

signer [of the motion] objectively tested, rather than the consequences of the signer’s 

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act, subjectively viewed by the signer’s opponent.” Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 

780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. 

Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). 

The Court finds Cortina’s arguments insufficient to justify a finding that Lang 

brought its sanctions motion to harass Plaintiff’s counsel. First, with respect to 

timing, decisions about the timing of the sanctions motion were Lang’s to make. 

Although Lang’s decision to bring the motion when it did may impact the Court’s 

calculation of the proper amount of fees, or the scope of Lang’s duty to mitigate 

damages, see, e.g., In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1185 (recognizing duty to mitigate in 

cases of Rule 11 sanctions), the decision to bring the motion after settlement 

discussions broke down is no more evidence of Lang’s bad faith than Cortina’s 

decision to file a motion for voluntary dismissal is evidence of Cortina’s bad faith. 

Second, although Lang’s failure to attach billing records to justify the more than 

$575,000 in sanctions requested may support denying or vastly reducing any 

sanctions awarded, it does not compel a finding that the motion was filed to harass 

Plaintiff’s counsel. Cortina’s primary support for this argument are cases in which 

(1) a damages claim was completely unsubstantiated, or (2) an excessive request for 

fees was brought after the court had imposed sanctions. (Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions 

24:3–14.) As these circumstances are not present here, this line of cases is inapposite. 

Finally, the Court assigns little weight to two emails between Lang officials and 

Lang’s contractors suggesting that Lang dislikes Plaintiff’s counsel. In the absence 

of other evidence, the Court will not draw an inference of harassment under Rule 11 

on the basis of the unsurprising revelation that a defendant dietary supplement 

company is frustrated with plaintiff’s–side consumer protection lawyers. 

* * * 

In sum, the Court finds that Rule 11 sanctions against Lang for bringing its § 

1927 motion are unwarranted. The inquiry preceding the filing of the motion was 

reasonable under the circumstances, the factual contentions underlying the motion 

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had evidentiary support, the legal contentions were warranted by existing law, or by 

a nonfrivolous argument for modifying existing law, and the record does not support 

a finding that Lang brought the motion to harass Plaintiff’s counsel. Accordingly, 

Cortina’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED. 

C. Cortina’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss

Finally, the Court addresses Cortina’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the action 

without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). For the 

following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to voluntarily dismiss, on the 

condition that (1) Plaintiff agrees to use existing discovery in the anticipated statecourt action and (2) Plaintiff sits for her deposition. 

Under Rule 41(a)(2), after an opposing party has served either an answer or a 

motion for summary judgment, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request 

only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

41(a)(2). “The purpose of the rule is to permit a plaintiff to dismiss an action without 

prejudice so long as the defendant will not be prejudiced, or unfairly affected by 

dismissal.” Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla Int’l B.V., 889 F.2d 919, 921 (9th 

Cir. 1989). In resolving a motion under Rule 41(a)(2), the Court must make three 

separate determinations: (1) whether to allow dismissal; (2) whether the dismissal 

should be with or without prejudice; and (3) what terms and conditions, if any, should 

be imposed. Williams v. Peralta Cmty. College Dist., 227 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 

2005) (citation omitted).

Here, neither side contends that dismissal should not be allowed or that 

dismissal should not be without prejudice—both parties affirmatively request that the 

Court dismiss the action without prejudice. (see Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss; Defs.’ Opp’n 

2:22–23.) Accordingly, the Court finds that dismissal without prejudice is 

appropriate. 

Where the parties do disagree is on the conditions that should be imposed on 

the dismissal. Defendants contend that the Court should impose the following 

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conditions: (1) Plaintiff should be required to pay Defendants’ attorney’s fees and 

costs; (2) Plaintiff should be required to provide more substantive responses to 

written discovery requests; (3) Plaintiff should be required to submit to a deposition 

by Defendants; (4) Plaintiff should be required to produce evidence of the level of 

absorption of Equate CoQ10 in the human bloodstream; and (5) if Plaintiff has no 

pre-filing evidence of the blood absorption rate of Equate CoQ10, Plaintiff’s counsel 

should be dismissed as inadequate under Rule 23(g). (Defs.’ Opp’n 5:12–22.) For her 

part, Plaintiff argues that none of Defendants’ proposed conditions are appropriate, 

but acknowledges that an agreement to use existing discovery in the anticipated statecourt action is likely necessary to protect against duplicative expenses. (ECF No. 74.) 

As explained below, the Court largely agrees with Plaintiff.

1. Terms and Conditions of Dismissal

a. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

“In determining whether to award costs to a defendant after a voluntary 

dismissal without prejudice, courts generally consider the following factors: (1) any 

excessive and duplicative expense of a second litigation; (2) the effort and expense 

incurred by a defendant in preparing for trial; (3) the extent to which the litigation 

has progressed and (4) the plaintiff’s diligence in moving to dismiss.” Williams, 227 

F.R.D. at 540. In this case, Defendants request for fees and costs as a condition of 

Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal is unwarranted. First, dismissal here will not expose 

Defendants to excessive or duplicative expense because much of the work performed 

in this litigation will be relevant to the anticipated state-court action, and the Court 

will require the use of existing discovery in the anticipated state-court action as a 

condition of dismissal. See Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 13cv0041–GPC–WVG, 

2015 WL 473270, at * 8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (“[F]ees and costs should only be 

awarded for work which cannot be used in continuing or later litigation.”) (citing 

Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996)). In addition, 

this case has not progressed far, and Defendants have made no showing that the effort 

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and expense they have incurred in trial preparation justify an award of fees and costs. 

Finally, Plaintiff moved with reasonable diligence to dismiss the case, having 

discussed the motion with Defendants, and filing the motion when it became clear to 

Plaintiff that settlement would not be reached. In light of these reasons, the Court 

will not condition Plaintiff’s dismissal on an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

b. Cortina’s Deposition and Discovery Responses

Defendants seek to condition dismissal on Cortina being deposed and 

providing more substantive discovery responses on the grounds that doing so will 

provide information relevant to class certification and to the merits of the claims. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n 7:21–8:2.) Defendants emphasize that they have noticed and attempted 

to reschedule Plaintiff’s deposition several times before the close of discovery, and 

that Plaintiff has refused to admit or deny that she had evidence of the amount of 

Equate CoQ10 in her blood at any time. For her part, Plaintiff argues that the 

discovery requests in question were untimely, and that Defendants will suffer no 

prejudice by waiting to take Cortina’s deposition until after she refiles her claim in 

state court. 

“A court may, but need not, condition a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal on a plaintiff’s 

deposition or production of discovery.” Sherman, 2015 WL 473270, at * 7. In this 

case, the Court finds it appropriate to condition Cortina’s dismissal on her being 

deposed. Cortina’s deposition was noticed to occur before the close of class 

discovery, and was served on Cortina three weeks before she filed the motion to 

dismiss. Cortina’s testimony is likely relevant to Defendants’ arguments regarding 

class certification and the merits of the claims, and she should not be permitted to 

dodge the revelation of potentially adverse facts by dismissing the case before being 

deposed. Thus, to mitigate prejudice to Defendants, the Court will require Cortina to 

sit for her noticed deposition as a condition of dismissal. Id.

The Court will not, however, require Cortina to respond further to previouslypropounded written discovery requests. Defendants have not challenged Plaintiff’s 

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assertion that Defendants’ discovery requests were untimely in the first instance, and 

so the Court finds no basis for conditioning Plaintiff’s dismissal on her providing 

further responses. Defendants can re-serve their written discovery requests, or seek 

additional discovery, in state court. 

c. Pre-Filing Evidence of Absorption

Defendants’ request to condition dismissal on Plaintiff producing pre-filing 

evidence of the level of absorption of Equate CoQ10 in her bloodstream, or any other 

individual’s bloodstream, is misguided. Although Defendants clearly believe that 

Plaintiff lacked adequate facts to bring her claims, the proper means of bringing such 

arguments is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), not as a condition for 

nonprejudicial dismissal. Cortina’s Second Amended Complaint provides 

Defendants ample notice of the pre-filing evidence on which Cortina’s claims are 

based, even if Defendants dispute the strength and validity of this evidence. 

Accordingly, the Court will not condition Plaintiff’s dismissal on her provision of 

tests showing the level of absorption of Equate CoQ10 in her or any other person’s 

bloodstream.

d. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Counsel

Finally, Defendants request that if Plaintiff’s counsel had no pre-filing 

evidence of the blood absorption rate of Equate CoQ10, then the Court should find 

that Plaintiff’s counsel are inadequate class counsel. Given that the Court finds that 

Cortina has already provided her pre-filing evidence of absorption, there is no basis 

for Defendants’ pre-class certification request that Plaintiff’s counsel be declared 

inadequate class counsel.

* * *

In sum, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss this case without 

prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), on two conditions: (1) that Plaintiff agree to use 

the existing discovery from this case in the anticipated state-court action, and (2) that 

Cortina sit for her deposition. If Plaintiff is not amenable to these conditions, she may 

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withdraw her motion for voluntary dismissal or dismiss her claims with prejudice. 

See Lau v. Glendora Unified School Dist., 792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 

that a plaintiff who moves for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) must be given 

“a reasonable period of time within which to refuse the conditional voluntary 

dismissal by withdrawing the motion for dismissal or to accept the dismissal despite 

the imposition of conditions”). Accordingly, the Court will give Plaintiff until 

September 8, 2016, to withdraw her motion. If Plaintiff does not withdraw the motion 

by that time, she will be deemed to have consented to the conditions provided herein. 

See Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] 

plaintiff who knows or has reason to know that he may withdraw his motion for 

dismissal will be deemed to have consented to the conditions attached to the 

voluntary dismissal unless he withdraws his motion within a reasonable time.”), 

implied overruling on other grounds by Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 

F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Lang’s Motion for Sanctions 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (ECF No. 73), and DENIES Cortina’s Motion for 

Sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (ECF No. 81).

The Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the case 

without prejudice on the following conditions: (1) that Plaintiff agree to use existing 

discovery from this case in the anticipated state-court action, and (2) that Cortina sit 

for her deposition. The following timeline will govern disposition of this motion:

(1) If Plaintiffs are not amenable to these conditions, Plaintiffs must withdraw 

their motion by September 8, 2016;

(2) If Plaintiffs are amenable to these conditions, the deposition of Cortina 

must take place no later than September 22, 2016, and Plaintiffs must stipulate to 

using existing discovery from this case in the anticipated state-court action no later 

than September 22, 2016;

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(3) The parties will notify the Court regarding the completion of Cortina’s 

deposition no later than September 23, 2016;

(4) Once Defendants have deposed Cortina and the parties have stipulated to 

using existing discovery in future litigation of this case, the Court will GRANT

Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss this case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 1, 2016

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