Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-01631/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-01631-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12117ad - Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WANDA L. YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SUNGARD FINANCIAL SYSTEMS,

L.L.C.,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:12-CV-1631-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

This case is currently before the Court on Defendant SunGard Business System, Inc.’s

(denominated in the Complaint as SunGard Financial Systems, LLC; hereinafter referred to

as “SunGard” or “Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17). In her Complaint, 2

At the conclusion of oral argument, the court informed the parties of its intention to 1

grant summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court requested that counsel for

defendant prepare a proposed memorandum opinion for the court and required that counsel

send a copy of the proposed opinion to counsel for plaintiff. Although the court has made

some changes to the opinion prepared by defendant’s counsel, it has adopted a large part of

the proposed opinion. The court is aware of the admonition of the Eleventh Circuit that

district courts not delegate “the task of drafting important opinions to litigants.” Chudasama

v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 n.46 (11th Cir. 1997). This is an important

opinion and the court had reached a firm decision as to the appropriate outcome before

requesting a proposed opinion from defendant’s counsel. In this case, however, the

defendant drafted the opinion according to the express instructions of the court as to its

contents. These instructions were stated to defendant’s counsel, with plaintiff’s counsel

present, following oral argument. Although largely taken from the opinion proposed by

defendant’s counsel, the court personally reviewed this opinion and the opinion reflects the

court’s own conclusions.

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to 2

each document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2014 Mar-17 PM 03:45

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-01631-SLB Document 36 Filed 03/17/14 Page 1 of 33
Plaintiff, Wanda Young (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Young”) asserts the following claims

against SunGard: (1) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”); (2) hostile work environment under the ADA; (3) retaliation under the ADA; (4)

retaliatory discharge under Alabama Code §25-5-11.1; (5) discrimination under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); (6) hostile work environment under the

ADEA; (7) interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); and

(8) retaliation under the FMLA.

Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of

counsel, and relevant law, the court is of the opinion that SunGard’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is due to be granted with respect to all claims. 

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d

604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once

the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving partymust go beyond the pleadings and

show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 324 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

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A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support

the assertion by: 

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronicallystored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (“it is never enough simply to state

that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial”).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to “weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “[C]ourts are required to view the facts and draw

reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary

judgment] motion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)(quoting United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). Nevertheless, the non-moving party

“need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference.” 

Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999)(citing Brown v.

City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at

380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted

by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).

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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS3

A. SUNGARD’S SERVICE BUREAU

SunGard operates a Service Bureau in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 3.) Data

entry employees, who work for the Service Bureau, process documents and information for

the Thrift Savings Plan of the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board [“FRTIB”]. (Id.

¶ 4.) Information processed by the SunGard employees is highly confidential and includes

personal identifying information and financial information of the plan participants. (Id.)

The data entry employees work in a “clean room” to ensure that confidential

information cannot be taken from the room. (Id. ¶ 5.) Service Bureau employees are

required to execute a document acknowledging the FRTIB Service Bureau Clean Room

Requirements. (Id.) Those requirements include multiple restrictions on the use of computer

systems and employees are told specifically, “There is absolutely no personal use of FRTIB

systems and applications allowed.” (Id.; doc. 19-2, exh. 3, at 86 [emphasis in original]; id.,

exh. 4, at 88 [emphasis in original].) Employees are prohibited from bringing cell phones

and other wireless devices, computing devices and cameras into the clean room. (Doc. 19-1

¶ 5; doc. 19-2, exh. 3, at 86-87.) SunGard has policies that limit employees’ use of its

As required when evaluating a Motion for Summary Judgment, the court states the 3

facts and all reasonable inferences arising from them in the light most favorable to Young,

the non-moving party. See E.G., Alan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F. 3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.

1997)(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).

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computer systems and email and that prohibit, among other things, the display or

transmission of sexually explicit material. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 6; doc. 19-2, exh. 6, at 91, 92-93.)

B. YOUNG’S EMPLOYMENT AND DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Young was hired by SunGard as a Data Entry Associate on August 22, 2007. (Doc.

19-2 at 97.) She remained in that position throughout her employment working in the service

bureau processing information for the FRTIB contract. (Id. at 99.) For the period relevant

to this case, Young’s Supervisor was Leonard Crear, age 42, and Crear’s supervisor, the

Manager of the FRTIB Service Bureau, was Mitchel “Mitt” Ware, age 37. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 8;

doc. 19-3 at 7.) The local Human Resources Representative was Debi Sisson, age 57, and

Joyce LaMere, age 57, was the Vice President of Human Resources for the division. (Doc.

19-1 ¶ 8; doc. 19-3 at 7.)

During her employment, Young received a copy of SunGard’s Global Business

Conduct and Compliance Program, which included SunGard’s anti-discrimination policies

and its polices regarding use of companyinternet, email, and other communication resources. 

(Doc. 19-2 at 114, 117; doc. 19-2, exh. 7, at 114-119, 138-143.) Young acknowledged

receipt of a copy of the Global Business Conduct and Compliance Program on August 24,

2007. (Doc. 19-2, exh. 5, at 90.) On two separate occasions, Young executed confirmations

of the FRTIB Clean Room Requirements. (Id., exh. 3, at 87; id., exh. 4, at 89.)

On February 8, 2010, Young received a warning notice for unsatisfactory work

performance for completing only 65% of her monthly performance quota. (Id., exh. 18, at

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159.) Two months later, on April 26, 2010, she received a verbal warning for sleeping on

the job. (Id., exh. 20, at 164.) Young acknowledges sleeping on one occasion while working

at her desk and on other occasions while on a break. (Doc. 19-2 at 187-89.) She testified

that a young, male employee named Tony slept on the job “every day all day” during his

employment but he was not disciplined. (Id. at 191-93.) Tony was eventually terminated by

Sungard for sleeping on the job. (Id. at 192-93; doc. 19-4 ¶ 12.)

On February 16, 2011, Young received a Final Written Warning for violating

SunGard’s Clean RoomRequirements by bringing her purse and her cell phone into the clean

room. (Doc. 19-2 at 200-01; doc. 19-2, exh. 22, at 173.) She testified that she had brought

her purse and cell phone in the clean room and that she knew such conduct was a violation

of SunGard’s Clean Room Requirements. (Doc. 19-2 at 201, 205-06.) She contends that

some employees were allowed to violate the Clean Room Requirements without discipline;

however, she acknowledges that other employees received written warnings for violation of

the Clean Room Requirements. (Id. at 204, 207.) Ware testified that at least two employees

were terminated for violation of the Clean Room Requirements – April Smith and Nicholas

Sawyer. (Doc. 19-4 ¶ 12.)

The record also contains warning notices Young received for punctuality and

attendance. (Doc. 19-2, exh. 19, at 160-63; id., exh. 21, at 165-72.) Young testified that

these warning notices correctly reflected the times she was tardy and/or absent. (Doc. 19-2

at 183-85, 199-200.) On August 3, 2011, Young received a written warning regarding an

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unexcused absence and excessive tardiness. (Doc. 19-2, exh. 23, at 174.) She does not

dispute that she was in fact tardy on the days for which she received discipline. (Doc. 19-2

at 208.) However, she argues that younger, non-disabled employees were not similarly

disciplined for tardiness or unexcused absences, but this assertion is not supported by the

record. Ware testified that a number of employees – who were under 40 and without a

known disability – received similar disciplinary notices for tardiness. (Doc. 19-4 ¶ 12.)

C. YOUNG’S ALLEGATIONS OF DISABILITY AND HARASSMENT

Young contends that she “suffers from a number of disabling physical conditions,

including anxiety, depression, sleep apnea, high blood pressure, and plantar fasciitis. (Doc.

19-1 ¶ 9.) She testified that she also has back pain. (Doc. 19-2 at 38-39.) She testified that

her back pain limits her ability to stand for long period. (Id. at 43.) She has been given work

restrictions due to her back pain, but she does not currently have any work restrictions. (Id.

at 46-47.) She also testified that the pain from her plantar fasciitis hampered her ability to

concentrate and impaired her ability to walk. (Id. at 48.) Young testified that she is not

currently being treated for depression, although she has been prescribed medications for

depression in the past. (Doc. 19-2 at 50.) She does not see a doctor for medical treatment on

a regular basis. (Id. at 38.) 

Young testified that, during her employment, she was subjected to harassment due to

her disabilities. (Id. at 282-86.) The alleged harassment included her co-employees being

mean to her, ignoring her, not inviting her to join them for after-hours activities, leaving her

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off mass emails, making her sit in the back of the room, being hard on her, and tattling on

her. (Id. at 53-55, 65-66, 283-86.) According to Young, she was “bullied in silence.” (Id.

at 70.) She also testified that her co-workers called her “gay” and questioned her sexual

orientation. (Id. at 55-56, 64-65.) She also testified that she overheard a Supervisor tell

another employee to stop talking to her. (Id. at 72-73.)

Young contends that Debi Sisson, the Human Reasources Manager, harassed her

based on her disability by telling Young “if I had a disability, I would just stay home.” (Id.

at 238-39, 240; doc. 19-5 ¶¶ 2, 7.) Sisson testified that she made this comment in response

to a statement Young made “in which she indicated to [Sisson] that she was at work even

though she was not well.” (Doc. 19-5 ¶ 7.) Sisson testified she made the statement to Young

about staying home “in conjunction with an explanation to Young that she did not have to

come to work on days when she was suffering from an FMLA-approved medical condition.” 

(Id.)

Young also testified that she was harassed byLisa Peterson because of her age. (Doc.

19-2 at 289.) She described this alleged harassment as follows: “[Peterson] would be the

one that – I mean, I remember her coming down, you know, to tell people, like you know,

everything that she would—it was like whatever I did, then it would come out, well, y’all

can’t do that no more. She just has her way. She tiptoes around there.” (Id.) She testified

that Peterson, a TeamLeader, and “management” harassed her “because ofmaybe the certain

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things that maybe some people do at their age, maybe key slower or sleep on their breaks.” 

(Id. at 288-89.) 

SunGard’s Sexual and Other DiscriminatoryHarassment Policystates that employees

who believe that theyhave been subjected to discriminatoryharassment (including age and/or

disability-based harassment) are “require[d] . . . to promptly notify [their] Supervisor, [their]

Human Resources representative or the Chief Compliance Officer.” (Doc. 19-2, exh. 7, at

142.) Young complained to Ware about the treatment she was receiving from other

employees on one occasion; she told Ware that, “People, they don’t like me.” (Doc. 19-2 at

160.) She added that she never told Ware, “Hey, they are discriminating against me.” (Id.) 

At no time during her employment did Young make a complaint to any member of SunGard

management of discrimination or harassment based on disabilityor age or anyother protected

characteristic. (Doc. 19-2 at 113, 290.)

D. YOUNG’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIM AND FMLA REQUESTS

On December 23, 2010, Young reported to SunGard that she had suffered an on-thejob injury to her finger by falling down the stairs at work. (Doc. 19-2 at 276-77.) She

received medical treatment and benefits through workers’ compensation. (Id. at 278-79.)

Young requested and was granted FMLA leave repeatedly during her employment

with SunGard. Aetna administers FMLA leave requests for SunGard’s Service Bureau

employees. (Id. at 219-20.) When an employee requests leave, Aetna processes the

paperwork and reviews the medical documentation to approve or disapprove the leave

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request. (Id. at 220-21.) Aetna’s records reflect that Young was approved for medical leave

29 times and denied leave twice during her employment. (Doc. 19-2, exh. 26, at 179-80.) 

She testified that her leave was approved every time that she provided proper documentation

to Aetna. (Doc. 19-2 at 224.)

In May 2011, SunGard held a meeting to educate all employees about the FMLA and

address potential FMLA abuse. (Id. at 214-16.) Young contends that, after the meeting, her

supervisors called her aside to talk to her about her use of FMLA. (Id. at 217-19.) She

testified that she was told that her FMLA leave was “not adding up,” but she conceded that

she was allowed or approved for all requested FMLA leave. (Id.)

E. EVENTS LEADING TO YOUNG’S TERMINATION

On September 9, 2011, Young sent an email to a number of other employees in the

Service Bureau inviting them to have some of the candy she was keeping at her desk. (Id.

at 133; doc. 19-2, exh. 11, at 152.) In this email, Young wrote:

Hey Everybody. I have candy @ My Desk for Everyone who would like a

piece. . . .

Oh . . I almost forgot! Everybody except Rhonda Nicholson. She is BAD! 

On top of that; She is wanted by the Police. And Yes she is ARMED! “she

stay strapped” I’M NOT JOKING.

(Doc. 19-2, exh. 11, at 152 [capitalization in original].) She sent a copy of the email to Ware,

Sisson, and Crear. (Id.)

After receiving the email, Young’s supervisor, Leonard Crear met with Young and

gave her a verbal reprimand for her inappropriate use of email and making harmful

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statements about a fellow employee. (Doc. 19-6 ¶ 4.) Young told Crear that, despite her

statement that she was “not joking,” she was joking about Nicholson and she told him that

she would send a follow-up email to that effect. (Id.) Crear testified that he specifically

instructed Young not to send any other email regarding the matter, although Young disputes

this testimony. (Id.; doc. 19-2 at 139-40.) Later that evening, Young sent another email to 4

the same group of employees stating that she was only joking about Nicholson. (Doc. 19-2,

exh. 12, at 153.) This email, which was also copied to Ware, Sisson, and Crear, stated:

Hey Everybody! I still have Candy @ My Desk for Everyone. But I need to

make Something Clear . . Rhonda Nicholson is NOT an “OUT LAW” as I

said in the first email. She is not wanted by the Police. She isn’t Armed, and

neither does she ‘stay strapped’. She IS!! Bad Though. . .

I was told by Management that my statement was a bit ON EDGE. I felt bad

and wanted to clarify. I also Let Mgt. Know That I would send this email,

once I got home.

I was telling Rhonda – that as I was typing the first Email – I was cracking up

as I pictured Her Coming to My Desk (matter of factly) and taking the entire

Bowl “Of Candy” to combat my statement. LOL! She got a HUGE Laugh

Out Of It All!! I was Happy Because It was All In Humor! The Sole Purpose

ofJoking “To Rhonda” In the email is because she is fun and funny IMHO and

I knew she would Crack Up! But never the less I am Sorry for Joking[.]

(Id. [capitalization in original]) 

After learning of the second email, Crear informed Ware and LaMere that he had

specifically instructed Young not to send the second email. (Doc. 19-6 ¶ 5 and exh. A.) 

Young testified that Crear told her she could send a second email from “home to 4

work.” (Doc. 19-2 at 139.) 

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Nicholson was questioned by LaMere as part of the decisionmaking process for disciplining

Young for improper use of company email. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 10.) Nicholson told LaMere that

she had been very offended by Young’s email messages. (Id.)

Also, as part ofthe investigation, SunGard reviewed its computer systemto determine

the level of Young’s personal use of the system. (Id. ¶ 11.) Upon review, LaMere

discovered that Young had used Sunguard’s computer system to send and receive a large

volume of personal communication, including a number of inappropriate jokes with coworkers and outside individuals. (Id.) SunGard also discovered that, on September 9, 2011,

the same date that she had sent the Nicholson email, Young had set up her telephone and

personal computer to forward her personal text messages and emails to her work email

account. (Id. ¶ 12.) On September 14, 2011, Young sent messages to a number of her family

members and encouraged them to correspond with her at work through her work email

account. (Doc. 19-2 at 149-53; doc. 19-2, exh. 13, at 154; id., exh. 14, at 155, id., exh. 15,

at 156.) This communication with outside individuals was problematic for SunGard in two

respects: (1) by sending and receiving text messages through her work email, Young was

by-passing the Clean Room Requirement prohibiting the use of personal communication

devices; and (2) many of the texts that she ultimately exchanged were sexually explicit and

entirely inappropriate for the workplace. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 12; doc. 19-4 ¶ 8; doc. 19-2, exh. 8,

at 149; id., exh. 9, at 150; id., exh. 10, at 151.)

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Ware decided to terminate Young and LaMere reviewed and approved his decision.

(Doc. 19-4 ¶ 9; doc. 19-1 ¶ 13.) Ware testified:

Young was terminated because: (a) she sent an e-mail to co-employees and

supervisors making alarming and hurtful comments about another employee

being armed and wanted by the police; (b) after being specifically warned by

her supervisor not to send another e-mail on the subject, she insubordinately

did so anyway; (c) upon review of its computer systems, [Sungard] discovered

that Young had engaged in a large volume of personal e-mail use on the

company’s e-mail system; (d) while her conduct was under review, Young

forwarded her personal text messages to come through her work e-mail; (e) 

those text messages, which by-passed the company’s clean roomrequirements,

included graphic sexual messages . . . ; and (f) Young had a prior history of

discipline for performance issues, attendance and violation of policy.

(Doc. 19-4 ¶ 10.) 

The termination decisionwas communicated to Young during a meeting on September

15, 2011, with Ware and Crear; Sisson and LaMere attended by phone. (Doc. 19-2 at 147-

49.) LaMere informed Young she was being terminated because of her inappropriate use of

email. (Id. at 148) On September 15, 2011, Young was forty-five years old. (See doc. 1-1

at 2.) There was no mention of age, disability or family medical leave during the call. (Doc.

19-2 at 149.)

Young contends that a number of her female co-workers viewed an email depicting

male strippers. (Doc. 22-2 ¶¶ 3-4.) Ware and LaMere deny knowing about the stripper

email. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 15; doc. 19-4 ¶ 14.) Also, Young contends that Jenna Lambert, a coemployee, sent an email with pictures of obese women at Wal-Mart wearing bikinis and other

revealing clothing. (Doc. 19-2 at 312, 316-17.) Ware testified he was aware of the Wal-Mart

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email and he believes that he verbally warned Lambert about sending the email. (Doc. 19-4 

¶ 14.) LaMere denies knowing about the Wal-Mart email. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 15.) Young

contends that Nicholson would simulate fights with another co-worker, (doc. 19-2 at 311),

and that an unidentified data entry associate allegedly walked around the office and

pretended to be on a battle ship ready to “take people down,” (id. at 171-73).

SunGard did not employ anyone to specifically replace Young. (See doc. 19-3 at 8.)

On September 26, 2011, the staffing company, Aerotek, filled three requisitions for open

positions for data entry operators, including Young’s former position. (Id.) The positions

were filled with Aerotek employees. (Id.) According to its Interrogatory responses,

“Defendant does not know the age of the Aerotek employees or whether they suffered from

any disability.” (Id.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. PLAINTIFF’S DISABILITY STATUS

To succeed on any claim under the ADA, Young must first demonstrate that she is an

individual with a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). See Rossbach v. City of

Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2004). “The ADA defines ‘disability’ to include:

‘(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as

having such an impairment.’” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “Major life activities” are

activities such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,

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sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,

concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id.(2)(A). Plaintiff has offered very

little evidence to establish that she is an individual with a disability as defined by the ADA. 

However for purposes of deciding whether defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

due to be granted, the court has assumed Young has a disability.

B. DISCRIMINATION WITH REGARD TO DISCIPLINE

SunGard contends that Young’s discriminatory discipline claims are due to be

dismissed as untimely and/or based on a lack of evidence of discrimination.

1. Timeliness of Claims

In promulgating the ADA, Congress adopted the charge-filing procedures set forth

in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). These procedures require,

inter alia, that an employee file a Charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the date of the

discrimination, and, after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the employee must file suit

in the district court within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)-(f). The ADEA also requires a

claimant to file a Charge with the EEOC charge “within 180 days after the alleged unlawful

practice occurred.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1)(A).

Young filed her EEOC Charge on December 27, 2011. (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) Thus, any

discrete act of discrimination for which she makes a claim must have occurred on or after

June 30, 2011. Young asserts claims for discriminatory discipline based upon a written

warning for performance on February 8, 2010, a verbal warning for sleeping on the job on

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April 26, 2010, and a final written warning for violation of clean room requirements on

February 16, 2011. She argues that these claims are timely because the discipline constituted

part of a continuing violation. (Doc. 21 at 24-25.) The court disagrees. The court finds that

the alleged discriminatorydisciplinaryactionswere discrete acts that are time-barred. Stovall

v. Hancock Bank of Alabama, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-1036-MEF, 2013 WL 3357851, *7 (M.D.

Ala. July 3, 2013)(citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002);

Davis v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008); Tarmas v.

Secretary of the Navy, 433 Fed. App’x 754, 760 (11th Cir. 2011)).

Therefore, defendant’s Motion for SummaryJudgment will be granted as to plaintiff’s

discriminatory discipline claims based on these incidents.

2. Prima facie case and pretext

The only timely claim for discriminatory discipline asserted by Young is the claim

based upon the written warning she received on August 3, 2011 for tardiness and unexcused

absence. 

In this Circuit, the familiar burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas applies 5

to ADEA and ADA claims based on circumstantial evidence. See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704

F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2013)(ADEA); Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America,

Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (ADA).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 5

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McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have established an

allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of

proof in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases. First, the plaintiff must establish

a prima facie case of discrimination. . . . The burden [then] shift[s] to [the

defendant] to produce evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else

was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. This burden is one

of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment. [When

the defendant offers] admissible evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to

conclude that [the plaintiff] was fired [for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason], the McDonnell Douglas framework – with its presumptions and

burdens – disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non

. . . .

Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under

this framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times

with the plaintiff. And in attempting to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff – once

the employer produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory

explanation for its decision – must be afforded the opportunity to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the

defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. That

is, the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional

discrimination by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is

unworthy of credence.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43(2000)(internal citations

and quotations omitted). 

“To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, [Young] must show: (1) she

is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) her

employer treated similarly-situated . . . employees [outside the protected class] more

favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368

(11th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted); see also East v. Clayton County, 436 Fed. Appx. 904,

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911 (11th Cir. 2011)(ADEA)(citing Zaben v. Air Prods. &Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457

(11th Cir. 1997); Collado v. United Parcel Service, 419 F.3d 1143, 1149 (11th Cir. 6

2005)(ADA). “In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of 7

establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are

involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.” 

Maniccia 171 F.3d at 1368 (citations omitted). “The most important factors in the

disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the

punishments imposed.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he quantity and quality of the

comparator’s misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent [the court] from

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be 6

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are

not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.

R. 36-2 (emphasis added).

The prima facie case under the ADA is stated somewhat differently: “To establish 7

a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is disabled;

(2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because

of his disability.” Holly v. Clairson Industries, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007). 

“An employer unlawfully discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability by

taking adverse action against him because of the disability, or by failing to provide

‘reasonable accommodations’ for the disability, unless doing so would impose an undue

hardship on the employer.” Howard v. Steris Corp. 886 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1291 (M.D. Ala.

2012)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)). In the case of allegations

of failure to accommodate an individual with a disability, the plaintiff need not identify a

comparator to establish a prima facie case. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1261-62. However, “[t]o

establish unlawful disparate treatment, a plaintiff generally must demonstrate that his

employer treated similarly situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably

than he was treated.” Wolfe v. Postmaster General, 488 Fed. Appx. 465, 468 (11th Cir.

2012)(citingBurke–Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006))(emphasis

added).

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second-guessing [an] employer[’s] reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” 

Id. (citations omitted).

Young does not dispute that she was in fact tardy and/or absent as set forth in the

written warning. She testified that she believed other employees were tardy or absent but

were not written up. However, nothing in the record supports her belief. To the contrary,

the record contains evidence that other employees, including younger employees and/or

employees with no known disabilities such as Venora Redrick, were disciplined for tardiness

and attendance. The court finds that plaintiff has not established that other employees

outside her protected classes were treated more favorably with regard to discipline.

Nevertheless, even if the court assumes a prima facie case of discriminatory

discipline, SunGard has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for issuing the

discipline, which Young has not rebutted.

A plaintiff may establish pretext “either directly by persuading the court that

a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by

showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 

Brooks v. County Com’n of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th

Cir. 2006)(quotation omitted). Either way, “[i]f the proffered reason is one

that might motivate a reasonable employer, a plaintiff cannot recast the reason

but must meet it head on and rebut it . . . . Quarreling with that reason is not

sufficient.” Wilson [v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.], 376 F.3d [1079,] 1088 [(11th Cir.

2004)]; see also Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir.

2008)(“It is the plaintiff's burden not merely to raise a suspicion regarding an

improper motive, but rather to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material

fact that the employer’s proffered reason for [the adverse employment action]

was pretextual.”). The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the

plaintiff. See E.E.O. C. v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th

Cir. 2002). Thus, “[i]f the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to

create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant

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employer's articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to

summaryjudgment.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th

Cir. 2000)(en banc).

Pears v. Mobile County, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1089-90 (S.D. Ala. 2009).

SunGard asserted that Young was written up for being late for work repeatedly and

was absent without an excuse; Young has not rebutted these reasons for her discipline. See

Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999). In order to meet her burden,

Young must “meet the reason head on and rebut it.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.

Grp., Inc., 509 F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir. 2000). In this case, rather than rebut the reason

for her discipline, Young admits that for her written warning was for the reasons stated and

that those reasons are accurate, and she has not presented evidence that she was given the

written warning because of her age or disability. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff has

not shown that defendant’s articulated reason for the written warning is unworthy of

credence and/or that the real reason for the discipline was discriminatory animus based on

her age or disability.

Defendant’s Motion for SummaryJudgment as to plaintiff’s discriminatorydiscipline

claims based on the written warning of August 3, 2011, will be granted and such claims will

be dismissed.

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C. DISCRIMINATION WITH REGARD TO TERMINATION.

1. Age Discrimination

Young testified in her deposition that she did not believe that her termination was

motivated by her age. (Doc. 19-2 at 233.) During oral argument at the hearing on this

matter, Young’s counsel conceded that she was not pursuing a termination claim based on

age discrimination. Therefore, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted

on this claim. 

2. Disability Discrimination

“To establish unlawful disparate treatment, a plaintiff generallymust demonstrate that

his employer treated similarly situated employees outside of his protected class more

favorably than he was treated.” Wolfe, 488 Fed. Appx. at 468. Young can state a prima facie

case if she can present evidence that an employee outside her protected class, who was

similarly situated to her in all relevant respects, was treated more favorably with regard to

nearly identical conduct. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir.

2004); Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368.

The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Young was terminated for violation of

SunGard’s policies. Specifically, SunGard terminated plaintiff because she sent a mass email

falsely stating that another employee was armed and dangerous; forwarded her personal text

messages to her work email account; encouraged her friends and relatives to communicate

with her through her work email account; and sent and received a large number of personal

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emails on her work email during work time, including some that were sexually graphic. At

the time of her termination, Young had a history of discipline for poor performance, poor

attendance, and policy violations. Those responsible for the decision to terminate Young,

Ware and LaMere testified that no other employee engaged in the same or nearly-identical

misconduct. Young has not presented evidence to dispute this testimony.

Young argues that other employees sent or viewed inappropriate emails. However,

she has not shown that the decisionmakers were aware of all the inappropriate emails or that

these employees had taken steps to forward personal texts and emails to their work email

account. Because the court finds that the incidents of inappropriate emails upon which

plaintiff relies are not “nearly identical” to the conduct for which plaintiff was terminated,

the court finds plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discriminatory termination

based on her disability. Because Young cannot state a prima facie case, summary judgment

is required. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).

However, even if the court assumes a prima facie case of disability discrimination,

SunGard would be entitled to summary judgment because Young has not demonstrated that

SunGard’s articulated reasons for her termination are unworthy of credence and/or the real

reason for her termination was disabilitydiscrimination. Young has the burden of persuading

the court that the proffered reason for the employment decision is a pretext for an unlawful

action. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43; St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

514 (1993). “[P]laintiff must demonstrate ‘such weaknessesimplausibilities,inconsistencies,

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incoherence, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action

that a reasonable factfinder could find [all of those reasons] unworthy of credence.’” 

Watkins v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc., 153 F. 3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 1998)(quoting Combs

v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). A proffered reason is shown

to be pretext for discrimination only when it is shown that the reason was false and that

discrimination was the real reason. Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163.

Young has produced no evidence to cast doubt on SunGard’s articulated reasons for

her termination. In fact, she has admitted all of the inappropriate conduct that led to her

termination: She admitted sending the emails about Nicholson, she admitted forwarding her

personal text messages to her email, and she admitted to engaging in the sexually graphic

exchange emails on her work computer during work hours. Her belief or speculation that

SunGard terminated her because of her disability does not create an inference of

discrimination or satisfy her burden to respond to defendant’s properly supported motion for

summary judgment. See Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068,

1073-74 (11th Cir. 1995).

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff’s disability claim based on

her termination will be granted and such claim will be dismissed.

D. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

To state a claim for disability or age-based harassment, an employee must meet the

same standard utilized for a hostile work environment under Title VII. See EEOC v. Massey

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Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1249 (11th Cir. 1997)(age); Stedman v.

Bizmart, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1219-20 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(disability). In a hostile work

environment case, “the plaintiff must show that the work environment was so pervaded by

discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment were altered.” Vance v. Ball

State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013)(citations omitted). A plaintiff establishing

a violation of the ADA and/or the ADEA based on harassment when she can show “the

workplace is permeated with . . . discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an

abusive working environment.” See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292

(11th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted); see also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

(1993).

An employer is therefore liable to an employee for a [discriminatory] hostile

work environment under . . . if the employee proves that:

(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to

unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his

membership in the protected group; (4) it was severe or

pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of

employment and create a hostile or abusive working

environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for that

environment under a theory of either vicarious or direct liability.

Id. (quoting Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1300). “The fourth element – that the conduct complained

of was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an

abusive work environment – is the element that tests the mettle of most [hostile environment]

harassment claims.” Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th Cir. 2000). 

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“While not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action,

conduct that alters an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment does constitute adverse action under Title VII.” Shannon v. Bellsouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002).

Young must demonstrate that “the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions ofthe victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 21 (1993)(internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit

has held:

It is a “bedrock principle that not all objectionable conduct or language

amounts to discrimination under Title VII.” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson

Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11th Cir. 2010)(en banc). Therefore, only

conduct that is “based on” a protected category, such as race, may be

considered in a hostile work environment analysis. See Gupta v. Florida Bd.

of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 584 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds

by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405,

165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006). “Innocuous statements or conduct, or boorish ones

that do not relate to the [race] of the actor or of the offended party (the

plaintiff), are not counted.” Id. at 583; see also Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue

Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2007)(“Title VII does not

prohibit profanity alone, however profane. It does not prohibit harassment

alone, however severe and pervasive. Instead, Title VII prohibits

discrimination, including harassment that discriminates based on a protected

category . . . .”). This “inquiry requires careful consideration of the social

context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” 

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S. Ct. 998,

1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998).

Jones, 683 F.3d at 1297 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Laosebikan v. Coca-Cola Co., 167 Fed.

Appx. 758, 765 (11th Cir. 2006).

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Young’s claim of a hostile work environment under the ADEA warrants little

discussion. Young was forty-one years old when SunGard hired her and forty-five years old

when it terminated her. She has presented no evidence of any age-based comments or

epithets during her employment. Moreover, the record contains no evidence of severe and

pervasive intimidation, ridicule, or insult based on her age sufficient to alter her work

environment. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on the ADEA hostile-work

environment claim.

As to her disability harassment claim, Young alleges that her coworkers and her

supervisors ignored her and, when she was not ignored, her coworkers and supervisors were

mean to her. These actions and inactions, to the extent the record supports Young’s

allegations, were not based on her alleged disabilities and, therefore, cannot form the basis

of a hostile work environment claim. See Stedman, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (citing Gupta,

212 F.3d at 583-84). For instance, Young testified that she was called gay by her coworkers; being gay is not a disability. Being called gay is not a reference to any of the

claimed conditions supporting plaintiff’s assertion that she is disabled. Therefore, the court

has not considered Young’s report of being called “gay” as supporting her claim of disability

harassment.

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Also, Young contends that Sisson made the statement to her that “if I had a disability,

I would just stay home.” To the extent this statement is indicative of disability bias, a

8

reasonable person would not find this statement intimidating, ridiculing, or humiliating in

context. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. The remarks of which Young complains were isolated

and not overt. The court finds that a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would not feel

that his or her work environment had been altered by harassing conduct based on his or her

disability. 

Therefore, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim based on disability harassment is due to be granted and such claim

dismissed.

E. RETALIATION UNDER THE ADA

Pursuant to the ADA, “No person shall discriminate against any individual because

such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because

such individual made a charge . . . or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “This provision creates

a prohibition on retaliation under the ADA that is similar to Title VII's prohibition on

retaliation. Accordingly, [the court] assess[es] ADA retaliation claims under the same

framework [it] employ[s] for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.” Stewart v. Happy

Sisson testified that she made this statement in response to Young’s statement to her 8

that she was at work despite not feeling well.

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Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 

In order to prove an ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1)[she] engaged in

conduct protected by the ADA; (2)[she] was subjected to an adverse employment action at

the time, or after the protected conduct took place; and (3) the defendant took an adverse

employment action against [her] because of [her] protected conduct.” Collado v. United

Parcel Service, 419 F.3d 1143, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation

omitted). Young alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activity taken

under the ADA; however, the court finds that Young did not engage in any protected activity

at any time during her employment.

“To fall within the scope of the antiretaliation provision, a complaint must be

sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both

content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their

protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335

(2011). Young’s EEOC Charge was filed after her termination; therefore, it cannot be

casaully related to any adverse action taken by SunGard. She made multiple FMLA requests

during her employment, but she did not request an accommodation or complain about

disability discrimination during her employment. In fact, Young’s only internal complaint

about mistreatment was a statement she made to Ware that her coworkers did not like her. 

However, this statement is not protected activity because she did not tell Ware her coworkers

did not like her because of her disability or that SunGard was violating the ADA. See

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Rhodes v. Tuscaloosa County Bd. of Educ., 935 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1254 (N.D. Ala.

2013)(citing Brown v. City of Opelika, 211 Fed. Appx. 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2006); Sitar v.

Indiana Dept. of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2003)).

Therefore, the court finds that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to

plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim is due to be granted and such claim is due to be dismissed.

F. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE UNDER ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1

In her Complaint, Young alleges a claim for retaliatory discharge based on her

workers’ compensation claim in violation of Alabama Code § 25-5-11.1. Under that section,

an employer may not discharge an employee “solely because the employee has instituted or

maintained any action against the employer to recover workers’ compensation benefits.” 

Ala. Code § 25-5-11.1; see also Alabama Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 2002). 

During the hearing for this Motion for Summary Judgment, Young’s counsel conceded that

summary judgment was due to be granted on the claim. Therefore, summary judgment will

be granted on the claim of retaliatory discharge under Alabama Code § 25-5-11.1.9

G. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

Generally, an employee may raise one of two basic types of FMLA claims: one based

on the employer's denial of or interference with the employee's substantive rights under the

Even if not conceded, summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim 9

is appropriate. Young testified in her deposition that she did not believe that she was

terminated because she filed a workers’ compensation claim and she admitted she had no

evidence to support a claim that she was terminated because she filed a workers’

compensation claim. (Doc. 19-2 at 279).

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FMLA and the other based on the employer's discrimination or retaliation against the

employee for engaging in activity under the FMLA. The Eleventh Circuit has held:

Among the substantive rights granted by the FMLA to eligible employees are

the right to “12 workweeks of leave during any 12–month period ... [b]ecause

of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the

functions of the position of such employee,” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), and the

right following leave “to be restored by the employer to the position of

employment held by the employee when the leave commenced” or to an

equivalent position, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). To preserve the availability of

these rights, and to enforce them, the FMLA creates two types of claims:

interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer denied or

otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act, see 29 U.S.C.

§ 2615(a)(1), and retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that his

employer discriminated against him because he engaged in activity protected

by the Act, see 29 U. S .C. § 2615(a)(1) & (2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (“An

employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees ... who have

used FMLA leave.”).

Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001).

“To state a claim of interference with a substantive right, an employee need only

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the benefit denied.”

Id. at 1206–07 (citing O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1353–54; King v. Preferred Technical Group,

166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999)). “In contrast, to succeed on a retaliation claim, an

employee must demonstrate that his employer intentionally discriminated against him in the

form of an adverse employment action for having exercised an FMLA right.” Id. at 1207

(citing King, 166 F.3d at 891). Young asserts both interference and retaliation under the

FMLA.

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1. Interference

There is no basis for Plaintiff’s claimfor interference with FMLA rights because there

is no evidence that SunGard denied or otherwise interfered with Young’s substantive rights

under the Act. Young applied for and received FMLA leave 29 times during her four-years

of employment with SunGard. Although defendant denied two requests, Young testified her

requested leave was denied when she failed to submit the proper documents to Aetna. 

Nothing in the record shows that SunGard ever improperly denied her requests for FMLA

leave or otherwise prevented her from taking leave. Based upon the undisputed facts, the

court finds SunGard is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Young’s claim of FMLA

interference.

2. Retaliation

Young claims that SunGard terminated her employment in retaliation for her use of

FMLA leave. A plaintiff may attempt to establish retaliation through the use of direct or

circumstantial evidence. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.

1998); see also Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999)(acknowledging

the availability of either direct or circumstantial evidence). When a plaintiff asserts a claim

of retaliation under the FMLA, in the absence of direct evidence of the employer's intent,

courts apply the familiar burden-shifting framework established by the United States

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for evaluating

Title VII discrimination claims. Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207; see Dollar v. Shoney's, Inc.,

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981 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (N.D. Ala. 1997). Under that framework, the plaintiff has the initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Dollar, 981 F. Supp. at 1420 (citing

Morgan v. Hilt, 108 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 1997)); see Combs, 106 F.3d at1527–28. To

state a prima facie case for retaliation, “an employee must allege that: (1) [she] engaged in

a statutorily protected activity; (2) [she] suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3)

the decision was causally related to the protected activity.” Strickland, 239 F .3d at 1207

(citing Parris v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 216 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000)). If a prima

facie case of retaliation has been established, thereby giving rise to a presumption of

unlawful, disparate treatment, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the

presumption of retaliation by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

contested employment action. Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411U.S.

at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). The defendant need not persuade the court that it was

actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises

a genuine issue of fact as to whether it retaliated against the plaintiff. Combs, 106 F.3d at

1528 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55 (citation and footnote omitted)). “[T]he employer

need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to

conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.”

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257). If the defendant successfully

articulates legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the contested employment action, the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that defendant's stated reasons are merely pretext

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for unlawful, discriminatory motives. Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at

256). 

The court finds that Young has not demonstrated a prima facie case of FMLA

retaliation because she has not presented sufficient evidence of a causal connection between

her termination and her requests for FMLA leave. Moreover, even if the court assumed a

connection between her termination and her FMLA leave, the court finds that Young has not

submitted evidence that SunGard’s articulated reasons for her termination are pretext for

unlawful retaliation.

Therefore, the court finds SunGard’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be

granted as to plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim and such claim will be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that there are no material facts

in dispute and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An Order granting

defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this

Memorandum Opinion.

DONE, this 17th day of March, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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