Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01295/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01295-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY EUGENE SAFFOLD,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES HARTLEY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:10-cv-01295 LJO MJS (HC)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR FAILING TO 

STATE COGNIZABLE CLAIM

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO 

AMEND THE PETITION TO ASSERT 

CLAIMS UINDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 WITHIN 

30 DAYS

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO 

SHOW CAUSE WHY CLAIM TWO IS NOT 

BARRED BY GILMAN v. BROWN

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is California State prisoner and proceeding pro se with a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 21, 2010. 

(Pet., ECF No. 1.) In the petition, Petitioner challenged his May 5, 2009 parole denial, 

and argued that Marsy's Law1violates the ex post facto and due process clauses of the 

state and federal constitutions. (See Pet., ECF No. 1 at 4.) On May 12, 2011, the Court 

denied the petition. The Court held that the parole denial claim was barred in light of 

 

1 Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5, as amended i 2 n 2008 by Proposition 9 (“Marsy's Law”).

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Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861-62, 178 L. Ed. 2d 732 (2011).

Further, since Petitioner was a class member in the Gilman v. Brown class action, the 

Court dismissed the claim without prejudice to prevent inconsistent adjudications and 

duplication of cases. (ECF Nos. 17, 20.) 

Petitioner appealed the ruling only with respect to his second claim alleging ex 

post facto violations. During the pendency of the appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals decided that the claims presented in Gilman v. Brown challenging the increase 

in length of time before subsequent parole suitability hearings did not violate the Ex Post 

Facto clause. Gilman v. Brown, 814 F.3d 1007, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016).

On August 26, 2016, the Ninth Circuit vacated this Court’s ruling and remanded 

the matter to this Court for further proceedings. (ECF No. 36.) The Ninth Circuit ruled 

that in light of Nettles v. Grounds, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13573 (9th Cir. Cal. July 26, 

2016), the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner’s ex post facto claim in a habeas 

proceeding and directed the Court on remand to provide Petitioner leave to amend to 

assert his claim in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. (ECF No. 36.) On September 21, 2016, the 

Ninth Circuit issued its mandate pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure.

I. Discussion

A. Failure to State Cognizable Claim

Petitioner’s first claim challenging his parole denial was previously denied by the 

court. Petitioner’s remaining claim challenging Proposition 9 as a violation of the ex post 

facto clause must be dismissed because it does not challenge the fact or duration of 

Petitioner’s confinement. However, Petitioner shall be granted leave to amend to assert 

the claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner 

can show that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). A habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the 

“legality or duration” of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 

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1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Advisory Committee 

Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper method 

for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 

U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory 

Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Petitioner’s claim does not implicate the fact or duration of his confinement and 

success on Petitioner’s claim would not necessarily result in the shortening of his 

sentence. Success on his claim that Marsy’s Law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 

would not necessarily result in the shortening of his sentence as there is no guaranty 

that he would be granted parole at his next suitability hearing. 

Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable grounds for federal habeas corpus relief 

and must be dismissed. Should Petitioner wish to pursue his claims, he must do so by 

way of a civil rights complaint. The Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of such a 

civil rights complaint.

In an appropriate case a habeas petition may be construed as a Section 1983 

complaint. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251, 92 S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 

(1971). Although the Court may construe a habeas petition as a civil rights action, it is 

not required to do so. However, the Court notes that there are several significant 

differences in proceeding in habeas corpus compared to in a civil rights action. For

instance, the filing fee for a habeas petition is five dollars, and if leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis is granted, the fee is forgiven. For civil rights cases, however, the fee is 

now $400 and under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act the prisoner is required to pay it, 

even if granted in forma pauperis status, by way of deductions from income to the 

prisoner's trust account. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1). A prisoner who might be willing to file 

a habeas petition for which he or she would not have to pay a filing fee might feel 

otherwise about a civil rights complaint for which the $400 fee would be deducted from 

income to his or her account. Also, a civil rights complaint which is dismissed as 

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malicious, frivolous, or for failure to state a claim would count as a "strike" under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g), which is not true for habeas cases.

Accordingly, the matter is DISMISSED without prejudice. Petitioner may amend 

the petition and present claim two in a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, rather than a habeas petition. The Clerk of Court shall send Petitioner a blank civil 

rights complaint form along with a copy of this Order.

B. Order to Show Cause

In his petition, Petitioner alleges that the Board's three year denial violated the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. 

Proposition 9 was passed by California voters in 2008, and was codified in 

California Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(3). It altered the frequency of parole suitability 

hearings for prisoners found unsuitable for parole. Prior to the adoption of Marsy's Law, 

the default called for reconsideration of parole suitability at a new hearing in one year, 

although the Board had discretion to defer the next parole suitability hearing for a longer 

period. Marsy's Law increased the presumptive interval to fifteen years, and reduced —

but did not eliminate — the Board's discretion to shorten it. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5. In 

Petitioner's case, the Board exercised its discretion to select a shorter permissible 

interval, specifically, three years.

Should Petitioner choose to amend and present this claim in a civil rights action, 

he is ordered to show cause why it should not be subject to dismissal because Petitioner 

is a member of the plaintiff class in Gilman v. Fisher, 814 F.3d 1007 (E.D.Cal.) 

("Gilman"), which is comprised of "all California State prisoners who have been 

sentenced to a life term with possibility of parole for an offense that occurred before 

November 4, 2008." See Gilman, 110 F. Supp. 3d 989, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26386, *3, 

Order filed Feb. 28, 2014 (ECF No. 532 at 1-2) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Like the other plaintiffs in Gilman, Petitioner alleges that retroactive application 

of Proposition 9 creates a significant risk that he will receive a longer period of 

incarceration than he would have under the law as it existed when he was sentenced. 

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On February 28, 2014, the court in Gilman issued an order granting the Gilman class 

declaratory and injunctive relief, including entitlement to annual parole hearings unless 

the Board expressly finds that a longer deferral period is warranted. See Gilman, 110 F. 

Supp. 3d 989, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26386, *82 (ECF No. 532 at 57-58). However on 

February 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and 

ordered judgment entered in favor of the State of California. See Gilman v. Brown, 814 

F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit issued its formal mandate to the 

district court on June 2, 2016.

Members of the Gilman class "may not maintain a separate, individual suit for 

equitable relief involving the same subject matter of the class action." Gilman, 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 143678, *3, Order filed Dec. 10, 2010 (ECF No. 296 at 2). Petitioner has not 

shown that he has opted out of the Gilman class. Accordingly, Petitioner must show 

cause why his Ex Post Facto claim based upon the application of Marsy's Law should 

not be dismissed without prejudice.

II. Order

Therefore it is ordered that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED 

without prejudice to Petitioner's right to file a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. The Clerk of Court shall send Petitioner a blank civil rights complaint form along 

with a copy of this Order. Should Petitioner amend and file his claim in a civil rights 

action, he must show cause as to why the action should not be dismissed in light of the 

decision in Gilman. Petitioner’s amended complaint and response to the order to show 

cause are due within thirty (30) days of issuance of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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