Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04910/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04910-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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Case No. C 07-4910

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 2/12/2008**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LISAMARIE BRAYDEN,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

PSC INDUSTRIAL OUTSOURCING, INC.,

MARK BLANCHARD, JOE HAMBY, BRUCE

ROBINSON, AND DOES 1-50,

 Defendants.

Case Number C07-04910

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

REMAND

[re: docket no. 10]

I. BACKGROUND

LisaMarie Brayden (“Plaintiff”) is a California resident formerly employed by PSC

Industrial Outsourcing, Inc. (“PSC”) at its facility in Monterey, California. The named

defendants in this action are PSC, a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas;

Joe Hamby, the site manager of PSC’s Monterey facility and a California resident; Mark

Blanchard, Plaintiff’s former supervisor and a current resident of Louisiana; Bruce Robinson, 

Case 5:07-cv-04910-JF Document 19 Filed 02/12/08 Page 1 of 5
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Case No. C 07-4910

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

director of Human Resources for PSC and a current resident of Washington (collectively,

“Defendants”); and Does 1-50. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint entitled “Complaint for Damages for Wrongful Retaliatory

Termination and for Sexual Harassment” in the Monterey Superior Court asserting two claims:

(1) “First Cause of Action-Wrongful Termination;” and (2) “Second Cause of Action-Sexual

Harassment Against All Defendants.” Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants and each of them and/or

their agents/employees sexually harassed plaintiff and/or failed to take immediate and

appropriate corrective action.” Complaint at ¶ 17. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants

“retaliated against plaintiff for engaging in a protected activity and, complaining about sexual

harassment,” id. at¶ 10, and as a result of that retaliation “plaintiff was forced to relinquish her

job out of fear for her safety.” Id. at ¶ 9. Defendants removed this action from the Monterey

Superior Court to this Court on the grounds that there is complete diversity of citizenship among

the parties, asserting that the only California resident, Joe Hamby, was improperly joined as a

defendant. Plaintiff moves to remand.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove an action to federal court if the

plaintiff initially could have filed the action in federal court. See Ethridge v. Harbor House

Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). A party may file an action in federal court if

there is diversity of citizenship among the parties or if the action raises a substantial federal

question. Ethridge, 861 F.2d at 1393. The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden

of establishing federal jurisdiction. Id. The removal statute is strictly construed against removal. 

Id. The matter therefore should be remanded if there is any doubt as to the existence of federal

jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for remand on the basis that Plaintiff fraudulently

has joined Hamby for the purpose of defeating this Court’s diversity jurisdiction over the matter. 

“Under the Ninth Circuit rule, where a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident

defendant and the failure is obvious according the settled rules of the state, the joinder of a nonCase 5:07-cv-04910-JF Document 19 Filed 02/12/08 Page 2 of 5
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Case No. C 07-4910

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

diverse defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the non-diverse defendant’s presence in the lawsuit

is ignored for the purposes of determining diversity.” Simpson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 282 F.

Supp.2d 1151, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2003). “Although there is a general presumption against

fraudulent joinder, if the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and

the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the joinder of the resident

defendant is fraudulent.” Hamilton Materials Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., No. 05-55976, 2007 WL

2080179 at *1 (9th Cir. July 23, 2007). 

In evaluating claims of fraudulent joinder “[t]he Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits

have adopted the ‘pierce the pleadings’ approach, as have some courts in the First, Second, Sixth,

Seventh and Eighth Circuits.” 19A Federal Practice & Procedure Jurisdiction & Related Matters

Code Revision, Pt. III Reptr. N. C. “The legitimacy of removal must be decided on evidence

available at the time of removal and not on possible future evidence that may be obtained

through further discovery.” Kite v. Zimmer US, Inc., No. 2:06 CV 0745, 2006 WL 3386765 at *1

(D. Nev. Nov. 22, 2006). Ultimately, “evaluation of fraudulent joinder claims does not anticipate

a judgment on the merits, but merely considers whether there is any possibility that the plaintiff

might prevail.” Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F. 3d 746, 751

(5th Cir. 1996). Thus, to evaluate properly Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff fraudulently has

joined Hamby, the Court must decide whether on the face of the removed complaint there is any

possibility that Plaintiff could prevail against him.

The parties dispute the nature of Plaintiff’s first claim. Defendants argue that Plaintiff

cannot assert her first claim against Hamby because individuals cannot be held liable for

wrongful termination and that she is attempting to recharacterize her claim to avoid federal

jurisdiction. Defendants assert that the title of Plaintiff’s claim and the inclusion of allegations

of wrongful termination indicate that Plaintiff has stated a claim for wrongful termination and not

for retaliation. The first claim also contains the following allegations:

[D]efendnats, and each of them, demoted plaintiff to a new position on June 4,

2007, that of “yard cleanup.” In this demotion, plaintiff was directed to work with

toxic and/or harmful chemicals, without proper protection, and contrary to

company policy. She also advised that she was not getting the promised raise of

only a month earlier, and that she was no longer safety assistant. No action was

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Case No. C 07-4910

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

taken as to Blanchard’s harassment, and Blanchard actually threatened ‘to ruin’

plaintiff if she pursued her complaints.

. . .

The retaliation against Plaintiff was intended to discourage Plaintiff and

others from complaining of sexual harassment in that workplace, or from

complaining about illegal activity. In addition, the discharge constitutes

discrimination against plaintiff on the basis of, and in retaliation for Plaintiff’s

opposing defendant’s unlawful employment practices, in violation of fundamental

public policies set forth in the California Constitute, in the Fair Employment and

Housing Act, Gov. Code § 12940 et seq., the Unruh Act, and numerous other

statutory provisions.

While it is true that Plaintiff has alleged that her termination was an act of retaliation, she also

has alleged separate retaliatory behavior. Thus, it is clear from the face of the complaint that

Plaintiff has asserted a claim for retaliation against all Defendants, including Hamby. It is

equally clear that “an individual-supervisor may be held personally liable for retaliation under the

FEHA.” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1274, 1288 (9th Cir 2001);

see also Walrath v. Sprinkel, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002). 

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for retaliation against

Hamby, the motion to remand is granted.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to remand is

GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file.

DATED: February 12, 2008.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 07-4910

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Peter Nicholas Lamberto peter@lambertokreger.com

Dana Lee Paterson dpeterson@seyfarth.com

Sharon Ongerth Rossi srossi@seyfarth.com

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