Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06484/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06484-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S . District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 ANDRE DAVIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

CHARLES T. RANSDELL, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:03-CV-6484 LJO HC

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties have voluntarily consented to the exercise of Magistrate Judge

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

INTRODUCTION

On April 13, 2006, an evidentiary hearing on the petition for writ of habeas corpus was

conducted in Department 8 of the United States District Court. The hearing lasted a full day with the

following witnesses having testified:

1. Andre Davis, Petitioner;

2. Gabriel Ayala, correctional officer for the CDC

3. Sandra Ayala, wife of Gabriel Ayala

4. Steven Garringer, expert for Petitioner;

5. Garrick Byers, expert for Petitioner; and

6. Dennis Doherty, state court defense trial counsel.

After closing arguments, the matter was taken under submission for written ruling.

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1

This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer to the petition, and

Petitioner’s traverse to Respondent’s answer.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION

Petitioner, Andre Davis, is represented in this action by Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Esquire.

Respondent, Charles T. Ransdell, Warden, is represented in this action by Deputy Attorneys General

Julie A. Hokans, Esquire, and Maggy Krell, Esquire.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Madera, following his conviction by jury

trial on June 2, 2000, on the following counts: Count One, attempted forcible oral copulation (Cal.

Penal Code §§ 664/288a, subd. (c)(2)); Count Two, attempted sexual battery (Cal. Penal Code §§

664/243.4); and Count Three, assault (Cal. Penal Code § 240). See Exhibit H, Answer to Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Answer”). Counts One and Two were allegations wherein

the alleged victim was Correctional Officer W. Count Three involved allegations against a separate

victim. Only Counts One and Two are the subjects of the instant petition. On October 20, 2000,

Petitioner was sentenced to a total determinate term of seven years in state prison. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). During the pendency of the appeal, Petitioner also filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5th DCA. See Exhibit B, Answer. On January 17, 2002, the

5

th DCA denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice to refiling it in the Superior

Court. On July 15, 2002, the 5th DCA issued an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment. See

Exhibit H to the Answer. 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court.

On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Madera County

Superior Court. See Exhibit J, Answer. On August 1, 2002, the petition was denied on the merits.

See Exhibit K, Answer. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Madera

County Superior Court on October 17, 2002. See Exhibit L, Answer. That petition was rejected on

November 4, 2002, on procedural grounds. See Exhibit M, Answer. On October 17, 2002, Petitioner

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These facts are taken from the factual summary set forth in the 5th DCA’s opinion of July 15, 2002. See Exhibit

H, Answer.

U.S . District Court

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filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5th DCA. See Exhibit N, Answer. The 5th

DCA summarily denied the petition on November 1, 2002. See Exhibit O, Answer. On December 6,

2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. See

Exhibit P, Answer. On September 10, 2003, the petition was summarily denied. See Exhibit Q,

Answer.

On October 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this Court. The petition

raises the following ground for relief: Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when trial counsel failed to call a witness for the defense. This claim, as discussed on the record at

the time of the Evidentiary Hearing, included a failure to investigate the need to call witness Gabriel

Ayala.

On May 3, 2004, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. 

On June 1, 2004, Petitioner filed a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

On January 18, 1999, Correctional Officer W. was assigned as the floor officer to Building

508, which is a housing unit for inmates at the Central California Women’s Facility (CCWF).

Officer W. was working the first shift, from 10:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. No other officers were assigned

to the building that shift. Petitioner was working that night as the outside patrol sergeant. Officer W.

first saw Petitioner that night when she was in the officers’ station. Petitioner knocked on the door to

the building and wanted her to let him in, which she did.

Officer W. and Petitioner then walked back to the officers’ station. Petitioner was standing

and leaning on one side of the counter area, and Officer W. was standing and leaning on the other

side. After a brief conversation, Petitioner unzipped his pants, exposed his penis, and said, “You’re

going to take care of this.” Officer W. was in total shock and disbelief. She told Petitioner that he

was “crazy” and could lose his job for his conduct. Petitioner replied, “Nobody is going to believe

you.” 

Petitioner took Officer W. by her shoulder and shoved her in a chair with his left hand while

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masturbating his penis with his right hand. Petitioner then thrust his pelvis toward her face, still

holding his penis with his hand, while Officer W. turned her head from side to side. Petitioner’s

penis was right in front of Officer W.’s face, so that each time she turned her head she felt his penis

on her face. She tried to get up but Petitioner held her down. Officer W. was “totally terrified.”

Petitioner continued his actions for a couple of minutes. Petitioner eventually stopped and zipped up

his pants. Officer W. walked out the door of the officers’ station, and Petitioner followed her.

Petitioner stood by the door to the day room, which is directly behind the officers’ station, and told

her to come over to him because he wanted to talk to her. Officer W. told Petitioner to leave, which

he eventually did.

On February 15, 1999, Officer W. was working the perimeter of the prison outside the

electric fence during the first watch, from 10:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. That night, Petitioner was the

outside patrol sergeant and Officer W.’s direct supervisor. He was also working the perimeter. Other

than Officer W. and Petitioner, no one else was working outside the perimeter fence. Around 12:30

a.m., Petitioner radioed Officer W. and told her to meet him at an outside perimeter station, which is

not usually manned. When Officer W. drove up, Petitioner was standing outside the station.

Petitioner pulled her truck up next to him and asked Petitioner what he needed. Petitioner told her to

get out of the truck. Concerned that Petitioner would again assault her, Officer W. told him she

would not get out of the truck. Petitioner replied, “I told you to get out of the truck and get inside.”

Officer W. followed Petitioner’s orders; she went into the building and sat on a chair. After

closing the door, Petitioner removed his erect penis from his pants and walked towards her. When

Officer W. said “no,” Petitioner grabbed the back of her head with his left hand, with her hair in his

fist, and held her down in the chair. With his right hand, Petitioner forced his penis into her mouth.

Petitioner then placed his right hand behind her head and moved her head back and forth while his

penis was in her mouth. After about a minute, he ejaculated in her mouth. Petitioner was still holding

onto the back of Officer W.’s head with both of his hands. Officer W. was not able to move during

the incident. Officer W. did not scream because she was scared; moreover, no one would have heard

her if she did. Petitioner turned around and started to walk out the door. Petitioner told her if she

reported the incident, no one would believe her, and then said, “Don’t you have a job to do?” After

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that, Petitioner left. 

Officer W. did not initially report either incident because she was afraid of Petitioner. A few

months prior to the sexual assaults, Petitioner had followed her home from work. Petitioner stopped

in front of her home and told her he was coming in. When Officer W. said her boyfriend was home,

Petitioner drove off. Officer W. also felt if she came forward and reported the incidents, it would be

her word against his, and nobody would believe her since he had been there longer and she was a

new probationary, part-time employee. Officer W. was also afraid of losing her job.

Officer W. did not say anything about the incidents for five months until July 29, 1999, when

Officers Stoetzl and Gault, who are union representatives, called her over during a recess for a

training class and asked her if she had experienced any incidents or run-ins with Petitioner. Officer

W. asked the other officers if the conversation would be confidential; they assured her it would be.

Officer W. indicated to them that she had experienced some problems with Petitioner. Officer Gault

recalled Officer W. telling them she had been sexually assaulted while on duty, other females were

involved, and she was concerned about her job. Officer Gault asked Officer W. to contact the other

women before giving them their names. When Officer W. returned home from the training that

morning, there was a phone message from Officer Gault, who said because of what she said, the

matter would need to be turned over to the Investigative Services Unit at the prison. Officer W. was

interviewed the following morning.

At trial, Petitioner neither took the stand, nor did Petitioner call any witnesses.

DISCUSSION

I. Issue

The evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the sole ground for relief presented in the

petition, to wit: Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel both in the

investigation phase and at the trial phase of the Madera Superior Court action against him. Those

claims center around a specific witness, and only one witness, Gabriel Ayala.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

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Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

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federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

In an evidentiary hearing, the Federal Rules of Evidence are applied.

III. Legal Standard: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must

show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so

serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were

not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994).

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Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694. Petitioner

must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose

result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S.

668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. Ineffective assistance of counsel

claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (2002). 

In presenting a claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to call witnesses,

Petitioner (1) must identify the witness, U.S. v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985), (2)

show that the witness was willing to testify, U.S. v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988),

and (3) show that the witness’s testimony would have been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as

to guilt. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Berry, 814

F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that where defendant did not indicate what witness would

have testified to and how such testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial, there can be

no ineffective assistance of counsel). 

IV. Law Allowing an Evidentiary Hearing

A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right on a claim where

the facts are disputed if two conditions are met: (1) the petitioner’s allegations would, if

proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair

hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.

Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir.1997), citing Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099,

1103 (9th Cir.1992). The first prong commonly is referred to as the requirement of asserting a

“colorable claim.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir.1994). The familiar six factors

identified in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), inform the judicial evaluation of the

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second prong of this test.

The Ninth Circuit, in the case of Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir.2005), refers to the

“colorable claim” standard as a “low bar.” Id. at 1170. Based on this language, courts may draw the

conclusion that evidentiary hearings should be granted on a more liberal basis. The “low bar”

standard, however, does not liberalize the granting of an evidentiary hearing based on the

persuasiveness of the evidence. Rather, the “low bar” standard, in the context of the opinion, refers

to the form of the evidence. The Ninth Circuit further found that in circumstances where declarations

are submitted as offers of proof for an evidentiary hearing, the veracity of the declarants cannot be

determined without conducting a hearing where credibility and demeanor can be assessed by the

judge. Based on the specific allegations found in the petition and in compliance with the holding of

the Ninth Circuit in the Earp case, this Court set an evidentiary hearing.

V. Petitioner’s Argument

Gabriel Ayala was willing to testify on behalf of the petitioner. He had been subpoenaed to

trial by criminal defense counsel Dennis Doherty, and appeared, only to be told by Mr. Doherty (or at

his direction) that his testimony would not be needed. Petitioner argues that defense counsel’s failure

to investigate Mr. Ayala’s potential testimony, coupled with his failure to put Mr. Ayala on the stand

at trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, Mr. Ayala’s testimony would have at

least contradicted and possibly negated the alleged victim’s trial testimony about being in fear of the

petitioner, thus casting doubt on the alleged victim’s credibility on whether the two attacks occurred.

In sum, that effective assistance of counsel would have altered the outcome of the trial.

VI. Respondent’s Argument

Criminal defense counsel Dennis Doherty, with 25 years of experience as a criminal defense

lawyer, made a conscious decision not to call Gabriel Ayala as a trial witness for good reasons. This

decision was well within the sound trial strategy afforded to him, and that his decision was not

unreasonable and should be given great deference. Furthermore, to suggest that there would have

been a different result is speculation. Finally, Respondent argues that the petitioner has not overcome

the strong presumption afforded the state court decision by the AEDPA.

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VII. Evidentiary Hearing of April 13, 2006: Credibility, Commentary and Finding

The credibility of witnesses is crucial and is determined by an array of factors, including but

not limited to demeanor, prior inconsistent statements, prior consistent statements, an admission of

inaccuracy, and a motive either to be truthful or untruthful. The Evidentiary Hearing and declarations

referred to therein included all of these listed factors, and this decision turns on the credibility issues.

Petitioner Andre Davis came across as an admittedly angry witness. He also came across as a

witness who knew which attorney was asking the questions, meaning that he had a more specific

recollection when his own attorney interrogated him. For instance, his testimony about his

recollection of the number of times he told Attorney Doherty about Mr. Ayala was not credible.

Furthermore, his testimony that criminal defense lawyer Doherty told him that “they have nothing”

on him or that there was “nothing to worry about” is not believable.

Trial attorney Dennis Doherty conveyed three possibilities surrounding his testimony: (1) A

faulty memory; (2) A convenient memory; or (3) A penchant for being untruthful when convenient.

It is not crucial to the determination of the instant petition for this Court to decide which of these

options was in play. Based on the combination of Mr. Doherty’s 2001 declaration, his declaration of

April 10, 2006 (3 days before the evidentiary hearing), and the testimony at the evidentiary hearing,

the Court cannot rely on the truth and/or accuracy of his testimony. Examples:

1. Paragraph 15 of the April 10, 2006, declaration (Ex. 2 to the hearing) is in direct

contradiction to his clear and detailed testimony three days later concerning whether Ayala was even

supposed to appear at trial.

2. Paragraph 9 of the April 10, 2006, declaration is contrary to his newly-found memory at

the evidentiary hearing on the topic of the alleged telephone conversation with Mr. Ayala.

3. Paragraph 5 of the April 10, 2001, declaration (Ex. C to the Answer to the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus), while using the name of another witness, uses the same reason and

phraseology used by Mr. Doherty at the evidentiary hearing to explain why he didn’t call Mr. Ayala

as a witness at the trial. 

4. Having just given reasons in that declaration lines before to explain why he didn’t call a

different witness, it can not be argued that he had forgotten those same reasons for not calling

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Gabriel Ayala. In paragraph 6 of the April 10, 2001, declaration, Mr. Doherty claims that the

reason he did not call Mr. Ayala at trial was because he didn’t think the testimony was “critical.” At

the evidentiary hearing, he said that the main reason not to call Ayala was that he didn’t think the

evidence was credible. The positions are totally different and entirely unexplainable.

Under the best case scenario to explain Mr. Doherty’s testimony, he simply confused the

telephone conversation he apparently had with potential witness Karen Mentzell with the

conversation he did not have with potential witness Gabriel Ayala.

Finally, it is not credible that Mr. Ayala would be unwilling to help in the case of his friend,

coworker and baseball teammate at trial, but after an absence of any contact whatsoever for 6 years,

Mr. Ayala would now be willing to step forward to meet with experts for the petitioner, submit

declarations, and testify at an evidentiary hearing to help Mr. Davis.

The testimony and declarations of Gabriel Ayala were consistent and credible. The

discrepancy about prior “contact” with counsel Doherty did not appear to be a topic of confusion as

it related to the existence of an “interview” with that same counsel. On that crucial (and not

collateral) issue, Mr. Ayala was clear. He was equally clear about the critical, claimed meeting

among the three (Davis, Ayala, and Officer W.). His testimony is consistent with the probability that

the meeting occurred on either May 8 or May 19 (comparing Ex. 5 possibilities). 

When Mr. Ayala testified that he did not recall the substance of the conversation between

Officer W. and Petitioner Davis, it had the ring of credibility to it because based on all evidence

before this Court, the conversation was casual and not at all substantive. The importance of the

meeting was two-fold:

1. That Officer W. approached the petitioner, and not the other way around; and 

2. Officer W.’s demeanor was friendly, forward, touching and light, tending to show (if

believed) that neither fear nor apprehension existed. In other words, that Officer W’s trial testimony

was inconsistent with her fear of, and attempt at avoiding the Petitioner.

This Court finds that no interview of any kind, telephonic or personal, ever took place

between the potential witness Correctional Officer Gabriel Ayala and Attorney Dennis Doherty.

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Since the prosecutorial emphasis at the time of the criminal trial was that the alleged victim

of Counts One and Two, Officer W, was fearful and intimidated, Officer Ayala’s testimony would

have gone to the very heart of the criminal case.

For the criminal defense attorney to: 1) use Petitioner Davis as his exclusive source for what

crucial witness Ayala would say at trial; and 2) conclude that because he felt his own client,

Petitioner Davis, was a liar, that a witness suggested by Mr. Davis must also be one, gives rise to the

conclusions this Court expresses below.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Trial counsel Dennis Doherty’s performance was deficient and made an error so serious that

he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to Mr. Davis by the Sixth Amendment of the U. S.

Constitution. That conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when Mr. Doherty

failed to meet with a witness who had the potential to contradict and thereby impeach an alleged

victim on a crucial and material issue that was central to the prosecutor’s case, i.e. fear and

intimidation allegedly experienced by Officer W.

The Court further finds that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors,

the result would have been different. This is especially true since, there was a significant delay in

reporting the crime (i.e. numerous months), there was no physical evidence available at trial, and the

crucial issue for a trier of fact to determine was credibility.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter judgment for Petitioner. Respondent is ORDERED to either retry Petitioner within 60 days

or notify the Court that there will not be a retrial. IF the decision is the latter, Petitioner is

ORDERED released from custody.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06484-NEW Document 29 Filed 04/19/06 Page 12 of 12