Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00643/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00643-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brad Blansette, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-15-00643-PHX-NVW 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Brad Blansette seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied 

him disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security 

Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by 

substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be 

affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Plaintiff was born in November 1963. He completed two years of college, earning 

an associate’s degree in electrical engineering technology. Plaintiff was self-employed 

from 1997 to 2004 and sold computer equipment. After that, he performed telemarketing 

and a few part-time jobs. In 2006, he suffered a brain injury in a motorcycle accident. 

Plaintiff worked as a sales associate at a RadioShack store from December 2008 through 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 1 of 11
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

July 2010, when the store closed and Plaintiff was not relocated to another store. 

Plaintiff experiences chronic headaches, left foot and ankle pain, fatigue, and insomnia. 

B. Procedural History 

On July 13, 2011, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income,1

 alleging disability beginning June 26, 2006. On July 16, 

2013, he appeared with his attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A 

vocational expert also testified. During the hearing and through counsel, Plaintiff 

amended his alleged onset date to July 27, 2010. 

On August 16, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the 

Commissioner’s final decision. On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff sought review by this Court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

 1

 The ALJ’s decision from which this appeal is taken denies only Plaintiff’s 

application for disability insurance benefits and does not mention his application for 

supplemental security income. 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 2 of 11
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); 

accord Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings 

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). 

III. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at 

step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity and determines whether the claimant is still 

capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, 

where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements 

of the Social Security Act on June 30, 2013, and that he did not engage in substantial 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 3 of 11
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

gainful activity from July 27, 2010, through June 30, 2013. At step two, the ALJ found 

that through the date last insured Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: postconcussion syndrome with headaches, status post motor vehicle accident in 2006; 

adjustment disorder, NOS; personality disorder NOS; cervical degenerative disc disease; 

and left lower extremity injury with pes planus (“flat foot”). At step three, the ALJ 

determined that through the date last insured Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment 

listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

At step four, the ALJ found that through the date last insured Plaintiff: 

had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant was able to occasionally push and 

pull with the lower left extremity. He was also able to occasionally climb 

ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl. In addition, the 

claimant was able to frequently stoop, reach, handle, and finger. He should 

have avoided climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Further, the claimant 

should have avoided concentrated exposure to loud noise and hazards, 

including unprotected heights and moving machinery. He was limited to 

simple, routine tasks with occasional changes in the work setting, 

occasional interaction with the public and co-workers, and no fast paced, 

high production demands. 

The ALJ further found that through the date last insured Plaintiff was unable to perform 

any past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, through the date last 

insured, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that 

Plaintiff could perform. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Weighing Medical Source Opinion Evidence. 

1. Legal Standard 

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit 

distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat 

the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 4 of 11
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(3) non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must give weight to the 

treating physician’s subjective judgments in addition to his clinical findings and 

interpretation of test results. Id. at 832-33. Where a treating physician’s opinion is not 

contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” 

reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not be rejected without “specific and 

legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 830; Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Further, an examining physician’s opinion generally must be given greater weight 

than that of a non-examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. As with a treating 

physician, there must be clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted 

opinion of an examining physician, and specific and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting an examining physician’s contradicted 

opinion. Id. at 830-31. 

In deciding weight to give any medical opinion, the ALJ considers not only 

whether the source has a treating or examining relationship with the claimant, but also 

whether the treatment or examination is related to the alleged disability, the length of the 

relationship, frequency of examination, supporting evidence provided by the source, and 

medical specialization of the source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The ALJ may discount a 

physician’s opinion that is based only the claimant’s subjective complaints without 

objective evidence. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

2. Treating Physician Chad E. Campbell, D.O. 

Plaintiff saw primary care physician Dr. Campbell on April 11, 2013, and reported 

chronic pain, fatigue, and “odd symptoms” that possibly were neurological in nature. Dr. 

Campbell’s general examination findings were normal, including no clubbing, cyanosis, 

or edema of the extremities and normal motor strength of the upper and lower 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 5 of 11
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

extremities. He noted that he spent 45 minutes in conversation with Plaintiff and did not 

prescribe any medications. Although Dr. Campbell made a note to get Plaintiff’s medical 

records and order lab tests, for “follow up” he wrote only “prn,” and the record does not 

show that Plaintiff saw Dr. Campbell other than on April 11, 2013. 

Dr. Campbell referred Plaintiff to a rheumatologist who saw Plaintiff in June 

2013. Upon examination, the rheumatologist concluded that Plaintiff had chronic pain 

syndrome with somatization disorder (i.e., extreme anxiety about physical symptoms), 

not treatable by the rheumatologist. 

In July 2013 Dr. Campbell completed a Residual Functional Capacity Form. Dr. 

Campbell opined that in an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit for 2 to 3 hours, 20 

minutes at one time; stand for 1 hour, 20 minutes at one time; walk for 1 hour, 10 minutes 

at one time; and recline 7 hours, 20 minutes at one time. Dr. Campbell opined that 

Plaintiff was not capable of using either hand for repetitive grasping, pushing/pulling, or 

fine manipulations and was not capable of using his feet for repetitive operation of foot 

controls. Dr. Campbell further opined that Plaintiff’s condition caused frequent severe 

pain, frequent severe fatigue, severe inability to deal with stress, and frequent severe 

cognitive problems. He reported that the medications he prescribed for Plaintiff caused 

drowsiness, nausea, impaired concentration, and irritability. Dr. Campbell opined that 

Plaintiff would miss work more than 75% of time due to his medical conditions, would 

need to take 5-minute breaks every 30 minutes, and would need to alternate between 

sitting and standing positions at will. Finally, Dr. Campbell opined that it was his 

medical opinion that Plaintiff had been unable to sustain any type of full-time 

employment since July 1, 2010. 

The ALJ noted that Dr. Campbell’s assessment was more restrictive than Plaintiff 

had alleged, relied heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective report of symptoms and limitations, 

and was unsupported by the medical evidence of record, including Dr. Campbell’s 

physical examination findings. As an example, the ALJ observed that Dr. Campbell 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 6 of 11
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

asserted Plaintiff was unable to use either hand for grasping, pushing, pulling, and fine 

manipulations, yet found no deficiencies or deformities upon physical examination. The 

ALJ did not err by not giving Dr. Campbell’s opinion controlling weight and gave clear 

and convincing reasons for not doing so. 

3. Examining Psychologist Shefali Gandhi, Psy.D. 

On April 9, 2012, Dr. Gandhi performed a psychological examination of Plaintiff. 

On intelligence testing Plaintiff demonstrated very superior verbal reasoning abilities, 

high average nonverbal reasoning abilities, and high average ability to sustain attention, 

concentrate, and exert mental control. He demonstrated superior ability in processing 

simple or routine visual material without making errors. Plaintiff did not demonstrate 

any of the symptoms characteristic of Asperger’s Disorder. 

Dr. Gandhi found evidence of a personality disorder, but did not have enough 

information to diagnose a specific personality disorder, such as narcissistic personality 

disorder. She noted that he demonstrated a strong tendency to be socially disinhibited at 

times and appeared to lack insight into how his behavior affected others. Dr. Gandhi 

concluded: 

Although his overall cognitive difficulties are not likely to interfere with his 

social and occupational functioning, his current interpersonal challenges 

seem to have serious functional implications. His pattern of instability of 

interpersonal relationships, consistent irresponsibility as indicated by 

repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior, inappropriate 

interaction with others, and arrogant behavior and attitude may adversely 

affect his social and occupational functioning. 

Dr. Gandhi completed a Psychological/Psychiatric Medical Source Statement. 

She opined that Plaintiff was able to understand and remember simple instructions and 

able to engage in simple, routine, repetitive tasks that were not physically demanding. 

Dr. Gandhi said Plaintiff was able to maintain attention and concentration throughout 

several hours of testing and was able to adapt to changing tasks. Dr. Gandhi commented, 

however, that Plaintiff had a history of unstable employment. 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 7 of 11
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The ALJ gave Dr. Gandhi’s opinion great weight. He expressly found that the 

opinion considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and was consistent with the 

treatment record, objective findings, opinion evidence, and the medical evidence as a 

whole. 

4. Reviewing Psychologist Christal Janssen, Ph.D. 

Based on Dr. Gandhi’s examination findings and opinions, Dr. Janssen opined that 

Plaintiff had mild restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in 

maintaining social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 

persistence, or pace. She further opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in 

most areas, but was moderately limited in the ability to carry out detailed instructions, 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, sustain an ordinary routine 

without special supervision, accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism 

from supervisors, respond appropriately to changes in the work setting, set realistic goals 

or make plans independently of others, complete a normal workday and workweek 

without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and perform at a consistent 

pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. Dr. Janssen concluded 

that Plaintiff appeared able to perform at least simple/repetitive unskilled work with 

incidental interpersonal contact and direct/concrete supervision. 

Plaintiff contends that the vocational expert was given a hypothetical with the 

limitations opined by Dr. Janssen, and the vocational expert testified that there would be 

no work available with those limitations. However, Plaintiff’s counsel imposed a 

condition on the hypothetical that was not included in Dr. Janssen’s or Dr. Gandhi’s 

opinions. Plaintiff asked the vocational expert to assume not only that Plaintiff had the 

moderate limitations identified by Dr. Janssen, but also to assume that “all those 

moderate limitations represented that up to 1/3 of the day the individual would suffer 

from these limitations.” With the assumption that the moderate limitations would 

interfere with Plaintiff’s performance as much as 1/3 of the workday, the vocational 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 8 of 11
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

expert opined there would be no work available. Even if the ALJ gave “great weight” to 

Dr. Gandhi’s opinion and believed that Dr. Janssen’s opinion appropriately converted Dr. 

Gandhi’s opinion to certain moderate limitations, the ALJ did not err by disregarding 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s hypothetical that assumed these moderate limitations would interfere 

with Plaintiff’s work up to 1/3 of the day. 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err by Failing to Consider Grid Rule 201.14. 

Grid Rule 201.14 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines directs a finding of 

disabled for an individual who is 45-49 years old, limited to sedentary work, and does not 

have transferable skills. Plaintiff contends that in determining whether Plaintiff was able 

to perform work other than past relevant work, the ALJ should have considered Plaintiff 

as an individual 50-54 years old because at the time of the hearing he was 491⁄2 years old 

and should have considered his residual functional capacity as sedentary because it did 

not include the full range of light work. 

Age is a vocational factor considered in deciding whether a claimant can make the 

adjustment to other work. If a claimant is younger than 50 years old, it is generally 

assumed that age will not seriously affect the claimant’s ability to adjust to other work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). However, if the claimant is “within a few days to a few months 

of reaching an older age category,” and using the older age category would result in a 

determination that the claimant is disabled, the ALJ will consider whether to use the older 

age category after evaluating the overall impact of all the factors. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1563(b). For the purpose of deciding whether a claimant is entitled to disability 

insurance benefits,2

 the oldest age to be considered is the claimant’s age at the date last 

insured. SSR 83-10. On June 30, 2013, the date Plaintiff was last insured, Plaintiff was 

49 years old. Moreover, he was more than 4 months from becoming 50 years old. 

 2

 This appeal challenges only the ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff’s application 

for disability insurance benefits. Any issues regarding Plaintiff’s application for 

supplemental security income are not before the Court. 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 9 of 11
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines provide rules for deciding whether a claimant 

is capable of performing other work based on findings of fact regarding the claimant’s 

age, education, and work experience in combination with his exertional residual 

functional capacity, i.e., maximum sustained work capability for sedentary, light, 

medium, heavy, or very heavy work. SSR 83-10. Where one or more of the criteria of a 

rule are not met, no decision is directed, and the rules provide guidance only in 

conjunction with the definitions and discussions in the text of the Social Security 

regulations. Id. “Since the rules are predicated on an individual’s having an impairment 

which manifests itself by limitations in meeting the strength requirements of jobs, they 

may not be fully applicable where the nature of an individual’s impairment does not 

result in such limitations, e.g., certain mental, sensory, or skin impairments.” 20 C.F.R. 

Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e). 

This is not the case where the claimant’s exertional capacity falls between the 

sedentary and light levels. The ALJ’s capacity findings are consistent with light work in 

the primary strength activities of sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and 

pulling, except for only occasional pushing and pulling with the lower left extremity. 

Plaintiff’s postural, environmental, and mental limitations erode the unskilled light 

occupational base, but they do not mean that he is capable of performing the full range of 

sedentary work. Therefore, Grid Rule 201.14 does not apply, and it was appropriate for 

the ALJ to rely on the vocational expert’s testimony regarding the existence of jobs in the 

national economy3

 for an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity. 

C. Consideration of New Evidence 

Upon judicial review, the court “may at any time order additional evidence to be 

taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is 

 3

 Jobs existing “in the national economy” means either in the region where the 

claimant lives or in several regions in the country. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1). 

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 10 of 11
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate 

such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On October 

23, 2015, Plaintiff requested the Court to consider updated medical information regarding 

a diagnosis of neuropathy obtained in August 2015. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiff believes the 

neuropathy was caused by an antibiotic he received in June 2006. 

The medical records Plaintiff submitted to obtain Social Security disability 

insurance benefits show that he reported symptoms of neuropathy in addition to chronic 

severe headaches, left lower extremity pain, fatigue, and insomnia. The records include 

neurological examinations with no abnormal results. Further, Plaintiff never claimed that 

neuropathy prevented him from working. In his application for disability insurance 

benefits in this case, Plaintiff claimed that his ability to work was limited by brain injury, 

Asperger’s syndrome, pain and joint issues in both ankles, continuous headaches, and 

emotional instability. Plaintiff may have new information regarding the cause of his 

now-diagnosed neuropathy, but the cause of any medical condition is not material to the 

determination of whether before June 30, 2013, he was capable of performing work. 

Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not 

under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act at any time from July 27, 2010, 

through June 30, 2013. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall 

terminate this case. 

Dated this 25th day of January, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00643-NVW Document 21 Filed 01/25/16 Page 11 of 11