Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04632/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04632-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1961 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID

TRANSIT DISTRICT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WILLIAM D. SPENCER, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-04632 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

COMPEL

By letter brief filed August 28, 2006, plaintiff San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District

("BART") moves to compel deposition testimony of defendant F.W. Spencer & Son, Inc. ("FWS").

Defendant FWS opposes plaintiff's motion to compel, but requests that if the Court permits the

deposition to be taken, it grant a protective order limiting the deposition to six hours of testimony and

limiting its scope to those areas not already covered in the previous depositions. Having carefully

considered the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff's motion to compel and GRANTS

defendant's motion for protective order limiting the deposition to six hours of testimony and limiting

its scope to those areas not already covered in the previous depositions. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Depositions are generally available without leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). Any

party may depose "any person, including a party." Id. Where a party seeks to depose a corporation, the

corporation shall designate a person to testify to matters "known or reasonably available" to the

corporation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The answers given by the person designated by the corporation

Case 3:04-cv-04632-SI Document 89 Filed 09/25/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition are binding on the corporation. Judge William W. Schwarzer, Judge A.

Wallace Tashima & James M. Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 11:1517.1 (Rutter

Group Practice Guide 2006).

Under Rule 30(d)(2), all depositions have a durational limit of one seven-hour day, unless

otherwise ordered by the court or stipulated by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Deponents are

entitled to the presumption that their testimony will be limited to seven-hours even if they are testifying

both individually and as corporate designee under Rule 30(b)(6). Schwarzer, supra § 11:1517.1. The

court may allow particular deponents to be required to submit to questioning which exceeds the sevenhour limit. Id. A court order may be granted where a showing is made that additional time is needed

for a "fair examination of the deponent," or where the examination has been "impeded or delayed by the

deponent, another person 'or other circumstances.'" Id. § 11:1518. If a deposition goes beyond the

seven-hour limit, counsel must object and adjourn the deposition, or the limit is seen as waived. Id. §

11:1516.1 (citing Dorn v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 n.2 (W.D.P.A. 2002)).

BACKGROUND

Mr. Spencer is the president and sole owner of defendant FWS, which in turn allegedly controls

defendant BMC. See Pl.'s Ltr. Br. at 1, see also Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiff deposed Mr.

Spencer in his individual capacity on August 11, 2006. See Def.'s Lt. Br., Ex. 1. Defendants FWS and

BMC each designated Mr. Spencer as the person most knowledgeable to testify on their behalf pursuant

to Rule 30(b)(6), and plaintiff deposed Mr. Spencer again on August 24, 2006 as the designee of

defendant BMC. See Def.'s Ltr. Br., Ex. 5. At the August 24, 2006 deposition there was a disagreement

as to whether Mr. Spencer was being produced to testify on behalf of both defendants FWS and BMC,

or solely for defendant BMC. See Def.'s Ltr. Br., Ex. 5; Spencer Dep. 8:24-12:11, August 24, 2006.

Plaintiff proceeded with the understanding that Mr. Spencer was being produced solely as the BMC

designee, with the presumed durational limit of one seven-hour day. See id. at Spencer Dep. 10:9-11:8.

Defense counsel proceeded with the understanding that Mr. Spencer was being produced as the designee

for both FWS and BMC, with the presumed durational limit of one seven-hour day for both defendants.

See id. at Spencer Dep. 11:9-18. 

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United States District Court

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Plaintiff thereafter filed a separate notice of taking the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of FWS, setting

it for September 8, 2006. See Pl.'s Ltr. Br., Ex. 4. 

DISCUSSION

Mr. Spencer has already been deposed in his individual capacity, and as the Rule 30(b)(6)

designee for BMC. See Def.'s Ltr. Br., Exs. 1, 5. Plaintiff has not, however, yet deposed defendant

FWS in this action. Furthermore, Mr. Spencer's testimony in his individual capacity is not necessarily

binding on the corporation. Schwarzer, supra § 11:1517.1. Since defendant FWS has chosen to

designate Mr. Spencer as its Rule 30(b)(6) designee, and because Mr. Spencer's testimony as such would

be binding on FWS, plaintiff has shown that additional time is needed for a fair examination of

defendant FWS. 

 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to compel. Under the

circumstances, however, the Court also GRANTS defendant's motion for protective order limiting the

deposition to six hours of testimony and limiting its scope to those areas not already covered in the

previous depositions. (Docket # 74)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2006 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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