Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01606/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01606-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY PERCIVAL,

Plaintiff, CV F 05 1606 AWI WMW PC

vs. ORDER DISMISSING 

 COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

R. HICKMAN,, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the complaint. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at CSP Corcoran, brings this civil rights

action against correctional officials employed by the CDCR at Corcoran State Prison. 

Plaintiff’s claims in this complaint relate to his medical care. Plaintiff suffers permanent

injuries as a result of a gunshot wound inflicted in 1980. Plaintiff was shot in the abdomen, and

suffers nerve damages, muscle spasms and cramps. Cold or damp weather aggravates the

problem. Several medications have been prescribed over the years. Plaintiff has also been

issued a lower bunk chrono and light/restricted work duty. The lower bunk and restricted duty

chronos were issued in 1990 and have continued to 2003, when Plaintiff was on a yard and could

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be assigned a job. 

In April of 2002, Plaintiff was prescribed Neurontin, which “worked wonders.” The

dosage was increased in August of 2002 by Dr. Williams at Mule Creek State Prison. The

Neurontin, coupled with a muscle relaxer reduced the severity and frequency of the muscle

cramps and eased the nerve jolts that Plaintiff suffered. 

On April 10, 2003, a physical therapist noted in Plaintiff’s chart, when he was discharged

from physical therapy, that “Bacloflen and Neurontin clearly control pain.” 

On June 16, 2004, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Greaves. Dr. Greaves, at Plaintiff’s request,

renewed a prescription for Gabapentin. Plaintiff never received the medication. 

On June 25, 2004, Plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Greaves. Plaintiff asked about the

Gabapentin, and Dr. Greaves told him that “Sacramento medical headquarters had denied the

Gabapentin order renewal, I asked him why and I was told by Dr. Greaves that it was a new

policy, I was then told by Dr. Greaves that I was only allowed to receive Elavil which is a heat

sensitive psychotropic medication, I initially refused this medication because of those reasons.”

Compl.; 8:11-18.

On August 24, 2004, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Dr. Friedman. Plaintiff advised

Dr. Friedman that he had been prescribed Gabapentin and Baclofen, and that they “worked just

fine.” Dr. Friedman prescribed Elavil, a heat sensitive psychotropic medication. He also

prescribed Parafoin-Forte, a muscle relaxer that “is known to be harmful to your liver.” Plaintiff

advised Dr. Friedman that he was undergoing treatment for Hepatitis C, and “would prefer to not

take a heat sensitive, psychotropic medication for pain.” Plaintiff advised Plaintiff that if he did

not desire to take the Elavil, he could refuse treatment.

On April 19, 2005, “after ten months of not being on medication that worked,” Plaintiff

was again prescribed the Gabapentin and Baclofen. On August 19, 2005, the dosage was

reduced by Dr. Ramen.

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On August 24, 2005, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Friedman. Plaintiff asked Dr.

Friedman to restore the previous dosages and frequencies. Dr. Friedman denied the request, and

advised Plaintiff that he would be “weaned” off of the mediation as his body healed itself. 

Plaintiff was also seen by Dr. Viravathana, who also told Plaintiff that he could not be put

back on Neurontin of Baclofen, due to policy. Dr. Viravathana opined that Plaintiff no longer

needed Neurontin, and that Tylenol may be considered.

In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on

inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). Plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that

defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321,

2323 (1991).

The requisite state of mind for a medical claim is "deliberate indifference." Hudson v.

McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998 (1992); Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2323. Deliberate indifference is

present "when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment," or it

may be shown "by the way . . . prison physicians provide medical care." McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (cites omitted). While neither negligence nor medical

malpractice is sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff is not required to show a

complete failure to provide medical treatment. Rather, "deliberate indifference" may be shown

by conduct amounting to a total failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if

some treatment is prescribed. See, Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989).

Additionally, plaintiff cannot prevail in a section 1983 action where only the quality of

treatment is subject to dispute. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1989). Mere difference

of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to appropriate medical care does not

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give rise to a section 1983 claim. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

Here, Plaintiff alleges facts suggesting that he disagrees with the course of medical

treatment he has received. Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that Dr. Friedman or Dr.

Viravathana knew of, and acted with disregard toward, a serious medical condition of Plaintiff’s. 

In order to state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that the named

Defendanst’s conduct amounted to a total failure to competently treat Plaintiff’s condition. See

Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff must also allege facts

indicating that Defendants’ conduct caused him harm. 

As to the supervisory Defendants, liability may be imposed on supervisorial defendants

under § 1983 only if (1) the supervisor personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional

rights or (2) the supervisor knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that the supervisory defendants participated in, or

knew of and failed to prevent, the alleged wrongs. 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978).

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's complaint vague and conclusory. The court

has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint

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must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's

claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

first amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

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docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

j14hj0 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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