Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08085/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danielle Renae Lallier,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-08085-PCT-MTM

ORDER 

Plaintiff Danielle Renae Lallier seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i), 

223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based 

on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.

I. Background.

On November 21, 2014, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning June 9, 2014. On July 18, 

2017, she appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational 

expert also testified. On January 2, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the 

Commissioner’s final decision.

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 1 of 10
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Legal Standard.

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s 

decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set 

aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, 

and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether substantial 

evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. As a general 

rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995). In reviewing the ALJ’s reasoning, the court is “not deprived of [its] faculties for 

drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 

881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process.

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act, 

the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the 

burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the 

inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether 

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 2 of 10
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step 

four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the 

ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, and determines whether the claimant can perform 

any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Id.

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2019, and that she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since June 9, 2014. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has 

the following severe impairments: obesity; persistent depressive disorder; generalized 

anxiety disorder; unspecified anxiety disorder; conversion disorder with mixed symptoms; 

major depressive disorder; panic disorder without agoraphobia; lumbar and cervical 

degenerative disc disease, status post L5-S1 fusion; idiopathic progressive neuropathy; and 

essential tremor. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment 

listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform:

[L]ight work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). The claimant can 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. She is able to occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 

crawl. She can frequently handle, finger, and feel with her left upper 

extremity. The claimant must avoid hazards, including moving machinery 

and unprotected heights. She is capable of performing simple, routine tasks 

in an environment with few changes and free from fast-paced production 

requirements, like those found in assembly line work. She can have 

occasional and superficial interaction with coworkers and the public, such 

that the interaction is incidental to the task performed.

(AR 22).

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 3 of 10
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant 

work. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers 

in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. The ALJ ultimately concluded that 

Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

IV. Analysis.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions of the 

following medical sources: Dr. Rosebrock, Dr. Frankel, and Dr. Mayer. The Court will 

address the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinions below.

A. Legal Standard.

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to one of a nonexamining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995); see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating 

opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, frequency of 

examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective evidence). If it is not 

contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating or examining physician 

can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A contradicted opinion of a treating 

or examining physician “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 

53 F.3d at 1043).

An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th 

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 4 of 10
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions.

[She] must set forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the 

doctors’, are correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. The Commissioner is responsible for 

determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and does not 

give significance to a statement by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or 

“unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d).

B. Record Evidence of Supporting Physicians.

Dr. Benjamin Rosebrock first treated Plaintiff by conducting an orthopedic 

consultative examination on March 6, 2015. (AR 346). Dr. Rosebrock stated that Plaintiff 

can complete self-care activities including meals, hygiene, and light housework, but 

observes some instability in her gait related to numbness in her feet. (AR 347). Dr. 

Rosebrock observed no acute distress and found during his examination that Plaintiff had 

a normal gait, was able to stoop without difficulty, and was able to demonstrate appropriate 

balance. (AR 348). When conducting an examination of Plaintiff’s upper extremities, Dr. 

Rosebrock opined that Plaintiff demonstrated reduced grip strength in the left upper 

extremity, had difficulty picking up coins, but was able to screw a nut and bolt together 

without much difficulty. (AR 349). Plaintiff indicated no decreased sensation in her ulnar, 

median, and radial nerves. (AR 349).

In Plaintiff’s local extremities, Dr. Rosebrock observed “no gross deformity noted

in the bilateral lower extremity.” (AR 350). Dr. Rosebrock noted Plaintiff had a full range 

of motion but Plaintiff reported decreased sensation to light touch, vibration, and pain over 

the plantar surface of bilateral lower extremities. (AR 350).

In Dr. Rosebrock’s medical source statement, Plaintiff was diagnosed with left 

upper extremity weakness secondary to subjective findings, neuropathy of bilateral feet 

secondary to subjective findings, and chronic back pain secondary to previous lumbar 

function. (AR 352). Dr. Rosebrock concluded that Plaintiff’s condition would impose 

limitations on her ability to perform work-related activities for 12 continuous months. (AR 

352). Dr. Rosebrock opined that Plaintiff could carry a maximum of 20 pounds 

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 5 of 10
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently. (AR 352). He also concluded Plaintiff had the 

ability to stand or walk six-to-eight hours in an eight-hour day, had no limitations in sitting, 

seeing, hearing, or speaking. (AR 353). Dr. Rosebrock stated that Plaintiff could only 

occasionally climb, balance, handle, finger, or feel objects, but she had no limitations 

stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, or reaching. (AR 353). Finally, Dr. Rosebrock 

concluded that Plaintiff should not work around heights, moving machinery, or extremes 

in temperature. (AR 354).

Non-examining State agency physician Ernest Griffith, M.D. reviewed Plaintiff’s 

file and concurred with Dr. Rosebrock’s findings as to her ability to lift weight and perform 

certain tasks. (AR 80-82). Non-examining State agency physician Mikhail Baragan, M.D. 

agreed with Dr. Rosebrock’s and Dr. Griffith’s assessments of Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity. (AR 96-99).

C. Record Evidence of Non-Supporting Physicians.

Dr. Rosebrock’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Justin 

Garrison, D.O., who conducted an orthopedic consultative examination of Plaintiff on 

March 6, 2015. (AR 368). Dr. Garrison opined Plaintiff had greater abilities than those 

identified in Dr. Rosebrock’s opinion and concluded that Plaintiff did not have any 

limitations on her ability to perform work-related tasks for 12 continuous months. (AR 

373). The ALJ could therefore discount Dr. Rosebrock’s opinion for specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. However, the ALJ 

decided to afford little weight to Dr. Garrison’s opinion instead, as it “contrasts sharply 

with other evidence of record.” (AR 25). Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant argues the ALJ 

was incorrect to do so.

Separately, Dr. Harris Frankel, M.D. recorded normal EMG findings when he 

examined Plaintiff in March 2014.1(AR 331) Dr. Muhammad A. Nayer, M.D. performed 

an EMG on February 16. 2016 that “showed no evidence of electrical instability.” (AR 

1 Records indicate Plaintiff’s time at Nebraska Methodist Hospital where Dr. Frankel 

conducted the EMG spanned March 10-13, 2014. (AR 299). The specific date of the EMG 

is not listed.

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 6 of 10
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

897). From these reports, the ALJ concluded that the medical evidence offset the credibility 

of Dr. Rosebrock’s opinion, and after consideration of the record as a whole, Plaintiff was 

not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

D. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ 

determined that Dr. Rosebrock’s opinion as an examining physician, and Drs. Griffith and 

Baragan’s opinions as non-examining State agency physicians should be afforded weight, 

but only “partial weight” as “their opinions regarding the claimant’s manipulative 

limitations appear to be excessively restrictive and inconsistent with the normal 

electromyography (EMG) of her left upper extremity, as well as the EMG of the lower 

extremities that revealed only mild impairments.” (AR 25). The record includes normal 

EMG findings from examining physician Dr. Frankel (AR 301) and an EMG performed by 

Dr. Nayer that “showed no evidence of electrical instability. (AR 897). The ALJ articulated 

that those studies were the basis for discounting the testimony of examining physician Dr. 

Rosebrock and non-examining physicians Dr. Griffith and Dr. Baragan. As the 

Commissioner argues, the EMG studies were performed both before and after Dr. 

Rosebrock’s examination, which could increase the studies’ persuasive value. (Doc. 17 at 

7.) The ALJ’s opinion is therefore supported by substantial evidence, even if rational

individuals might disagree on the correct outcome. “Where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 

conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(internal citations omitted). See also Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 

1992) (“The trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.”)

Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ’s determination lacked substantial evidence to 

support it are unavailing. First, Plaintiff states that the ALJ’s general statement that Dr. 

Rosebrock’s, Dr. Griffith’s, and Dr. Baragan’s opinions were “overly restrictive” is not a 

valid reason to deny disability benefits to Plaintiff, as it fails to offer a substantive basis for 

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 7 of 10
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

her conclusion. (Doc. 15 at 9, citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 

1996).) However, the ALJ’s rationale for rejecting Dr. Rosebrock’s conclusions was not 

merely a “boilerplate” statement regarding his credibility; the ALJ first considered Dr. 

Rosebrock’s conclusion, that “the claimant is limited to performing work at a light 

exertional level with additional manipulative, postural, and environmental limitations,”

before concluding that this diagnosis was not consistent with the “normal” readings of the

earlier and later EMG studies. That is a specific assessment of why the ALJ chose to afford 

only partial weight to Dr. Rosebrock’s analysis. In Nguyen, the ALJ did not expressly reject 

the opinion of an examining doctor, and the conclusions the ALJ did draw contradicted the 

rest of the medical record. Id. at 1464. The ALJ’s decision in this case is more specific, 

directly addresses Dr. Rosebrock’s conclusions, and refers to other record evidence in 

support of the ultimate conclusion. Nguyen is distinguishable from this case.

Second, Plaintiff states that the medical analysis impermissibly substitutes the

medical professionals’ opinions in favor of the ALJ’s, citing to the Ninth Circuit’s decision 

in Tackett. (Doc. 15 at 9.) Tackett is readily distinguishable; there, the Ninth Circuit 

rejected the ALJ’s determination because the ALJ disregarded medical evidence based 

solely on the claimant’s testimony during the administrative hearing that he once took a 

road trip to California. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1103. Here, the ALJ cited to the medical records 

and notations of physicians who conducted EMG studies on Plaintiff. With conflicting 

medical evidence from examining physicians, the ALJ here did not simply ignore medical 

evidence in favor of a personal opinion; the ALJ determined which of competing medical 

opinions was most persuasive, consistent with the ALJ’s responsibility as stated in Embrey.

Third, the ALJ also did not “ignore material evidence” of abnormal functioning of 

the nerves. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the “positive findings” that 

Plaintiff developed mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome affecting sensory components. 

(Doc. 15 at 10.) The ALJ’s decision characterized the EMG of the lower extremities as 

revealing “only mild impairments.” (AR 25). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

characterization of the EMG of the lower extremities as revealing “only mild impairment”

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 8 of 10
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was error, as the “only EMG and NCV of Lallier’s lower extremities [...] revealed evidence 

of peripheral neuropathy in bilateral lower extremities. The diagnostic impression did not 

describe Lallier’s bilateral lower extremity peripheral neuropathy as ‘mild.’” (Doc. 15 at 

10.) Plaintiff states that an ALJ “may not ignore material evidence contradicting its 

conclusion,” which the ALJ in this case did by failing to take into account Plaintiff’s 

bilateral lower extremity peripheral neuropathy. (Doc. 15 at 10, citing Gallant v. Heckler, 

753 F.2d 1540, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984).)

The Commissioner counters that the ALJ’s use of the term “mild” should be read in 

the context of whether it is “sufficiently severe to significantly affect a claimant’s ability 

to perform work activity.” (Doc. 17 at 9, citing Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th

Cir. 2007).) The Court agrees; reading the term “mild” in the context of the Hoopai 

standard is entirely consistent with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff, while not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act, was still nonetheless unable to perform 

certain work-related activities. (AR 26). It is Plaintiff’s burden to prove disability, which 

means Plaintiff is responsible for demonstrating how the cited evidence contradicts the 

ALJ’s conclusion, as opposed to merely asserting that it does. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 

599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court will not set aside the ALJ’s determination that the 

EMG of the lower extremities revealed “only mild impairments” that did not warrant a 

finding of disability. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s arguments against accepting the vocational expert’s testimony 

regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity focus on the ALJ’s decision to discount 

the opinions of Drs. Rosebrock, Griffith, and Baragan. (Doc. 15 at 11.) (“Remand is 

appropriate in this case because none of the hypothetical questions propounded at the 

hearing include the manipulative limitations assessed by Drs. Rosebrock, Griffith, and 

Baragan.”) As it was not legal error for the ALJ to discount the medical opinions of 

Plaintiff’s experts, it is not legal error for the ALJ to have considered hypothetical 

testimony from the vocational expert that did not account for the limitations elucidated by 

Plaintiff’s medical experts. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 9 of 10
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled 

within the meaning of sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act is supported 

by substantial evidence.

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 

affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.

Dated this 26th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:19-cv-08085-MTM Document 20 Filed 03/26/20 Page 10 of 10