Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00326/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00326-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN HAMMLER,

CDCR #F-73072,

Plaintiff,

vs.

J. ALVAREZ; J. DEIS; 

BARRIENTOS; HOUGH,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-0326-AJB-WVG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 

TO Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

[ECF No. 70]

Plaintiff, Allen Hammler, currently incarcerated at California State Prison located 

in Corcoran, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action (“Compl.”) 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on February 9, 2018 (ECF No. 1). 

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 9, 

2018. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff later filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) on February 26, 2018. (See ECF No. 3.) On April 25, 2018, the Court 

GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and directed the United States Marshals 

Service to serve Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See ECF No. 5.)

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On May 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Withdraw Count Three and for 

Ruling on Count Two,” followed by a “Motion for Ruling on Count 2.” (ECF Nos. 8, 

10.) Count three of Plaintiff’s Complaint relates to his claims that Defendants violated 

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process through use of libel and slander. (See

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 15.)

On July 9, 2018, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s granted Plaintiff’s motion to 

withdraw count three of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See ECF No. 15 at 3.) However, the 

Court DENIED Plaintiff’s motion for an “advisory opinion” relating to count two of his 

Complaint. (See id.) The Court then construed Plaintiff’s Complaint as his First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (See id.)

On September 9, 2018, Defendants filed a “Motion to Dismiss to First Amended 

Complaint” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 19.) In addition, Defendants 

filed a “Motion for Order to Declare Plaintiff Vexatious, Requiring Posting of Security, 

and Issuance of Pre-Filing Order.” (ECF No. 20.) 

On July 24, 2019, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Gallo’s Report and 

Recommendation to DISMISS Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims with 

prejudice and without leave to amend, to GRANT qualified immunity to Defendants 

Alvarez and Deis as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, and to GRANT dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims with leave to amend. (See ECF No. 61 at 

9-10.)

On August 13, 2019, the Court adopted Judge Gallo’s Report and 

Recommendation to DENY Defendants’ Motion requiring posting of security, GRANT

Defendants’ request for judicial notice and GRANT Defendants’ Motion to impose prefiling restrictions on Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant. (See ECF No. 53 at 7.) 

On August 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (See

ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff also filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals that was later dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (See ECF Nos. 66, 81-82.)

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On October 4, 2019, Defendants Alvarez, Barrientos, Deis, and Hough filed a 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC for failing to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). (See ECF No. 70.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition to which Defendants filed a 

Reply. (See ECF Nos. 74, 75.) Plaintiff later sought leave to file a Sur-Reply which was 

granted, and the Sur-Reply was filed on January 15, 2020. (See ECF Nos. 78-80.)

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s pleadings, as well as Defendants’ Motion as 

submitted, and has determined no oral argument is necessary pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 

7.1. For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 70) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard of Review

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (on motion to dismiss court is 

“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “The 

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, claims asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” 

are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, courts “continue to construe pro se filings 

liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting 

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that courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights 

cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any 

doubt.”)).

III. Discussion

A. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s SAC on the grounds: (1) Plaintiff failed to 

comply with the Court’s July 24, 2019 Order; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Alvarez, Deis, and Hough; (3) 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies. See ECF No. 70 (“Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to 

Dismiss”) at 2.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations1

On November 15, 2016, Plaintiff claims he was “assaulted” by Correctional 

Officers Hernandez and Figueroa.2

 (SAC at 3.) On January 28, 2016, Plaintiff was 

“collected from his assigned cell” by Defendants Sergeant Alvarez and Correctional 

Officer Deis in order to be interviewed regarding the “assault.” (Id.)

Plaintiff was interviewed by Lieutenant Piket3 and “escorted back to his cell” by 

Alvarez and Deis. (Id.) When Plaintiff returned to his cell, he “noted that a number of 

his legal books were jumbled into a pile on the floor” and “some books were torn in half” 

while “others were visibly damaged.” (Id.) 

As Alvarez was removing Plaintiff’s “leg irons,” Plaintiff asked Alvarez “why his 

cell had been searched” while he was being “interview[ed] about a staff complaint.” (Id.

 

1 Page numbers for all documents filed in the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case 

File (“CM/ECF”) will refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF as indicated on the 

top right-hand corner of each chronologically numbered docket entry.

2 Hernandez and Figueroa are not named Defendants.

3 Piket is not a named Defendant. 

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at 4.) Plaintiff told Alvarez “that’s retaliation” to which Alvarez purportedly responded 

“no, it’s not” and told Plaintiff that they were “looking for contraband.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

told Alvarez that “those are all legal books and look how you’ve torn them up.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Alvarez responded, “you can get some new ones with all that money 

you’re gonna get from suing us.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he told Alvarez “go get the 

Lieutenant” to which Alvarez responded, “what for, he already knows we searched your 

cell.” (Id.)

Plaintiff told Alvarez that “[Lieutenant Piket] don’t know y’all tore up my legal 

books and I ain’t giving up the cuffs until he comes over here.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

Alvarez then “grabbed hold of the chain of which [Deis] had already been holding.” (Id.

at 5.) Alvarez told Plaintiff “I’m giving you a direct order to put your hands out of the 

food port.” (Id.) Plaintiff “refused” and told Alvarez again to “go get the Lieutenant.” 

(Id.) 

The cell door was closed, and Plaintiff said to Alvarez “I ain’t pulling on the chain 

or actively resisting, so you can’t pull the chain either.” (Id.) Alvarez responded, “no 

one is gonna pull the chain, so don’t resist.” (Id.) Plaintiff told Alvarez that “I’m not 

putting my hands out, so call the Lieutenant.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims Alvarez “began slowly pulling the chain anyway causing Plaintiff 

to have to turn his back to the door.” (Id.) Plaintiff said to Alvarez “stop pulling the 

fuckin’ chain, I’m not resisting and won’t resist, follow procedure.” (Id.) While Alvarez 

was still pulling the chain, with Deis “aiding,” Alvarez “simultaneously reached into the 

food port and taking hold of the link to the handcuffs he began to forcefully pull 

Plaintiff’s hands into and through the food port.” (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff claims he began yelling “I’m no threat to anyone, I’m not resisting, stop 

pulling the chain” repeatedly to Alvarez. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Alvarez began yelling 

“stop resisting, stop resisting” while continuing to “yank the chain.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims that his left hand was “caught inside of the door causing him to scream out in 

pain” as Alvarez and Deis continued to “pull the chain.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he tried to 

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“unhitch the cuff with his right hand” while Alvarez reached into the door and “attempted 

to unlock the cuffs.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that his left hand “got in Alvarez’s way” and 

Alvarez “jabbed it with the key” causing Plaintiff to have cuts on his hand. (Id. at 6-7.)

Alvarez “managed to use the key to unlock the cuff of Plaintiff’s right hand.” (Id.

at 7.) Plaintiff “able to unhitch his left hand from the food port.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s left 

hand was “forcefully pulled through and out of the food port where Deis grabbed hold of 

it and violently twisted it while Alvarez unlocked the cuff.” (Id.) “Both hands now free 

of the cuffs, Deis released the left, Plaintiff pulled it in, and the food port was slammed 

shut by Alvarez.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges “moments later” he “began to have chest pains and was taken to 

CTC/Medical to be evaluated.” (Id.) When Plaintiff returned to “ASU” he was met by 

Lieutenant Garcia4 “who came out from the office clapping loudly.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims Garcia told him “thanks for the overtime.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff responded to 

Garcia “no court will be dumb enough to believe y’all not setting all this up.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff also told Garcia “I’m gonna sue the hell out of y’all.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

Garcia said, “big deal, that ain’t no surprise, you go ahead and sue me, but look that’s 

your shit on the tier not mine.” (Id.) 

Garcia then left and Correctional Officer Barrientos “stayed behind to issue 

Plaintiff a receipt for the confiscated legal books and a cell search slip.” (Id. at 8-9.) 

Plaintiff claims that Alvarez and Deis’ actions with regard to the food port incident were 

in “violation” of “procedures/prerequisites.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of 

Alvarez and Deis’ actions he “suffered injuries to the hands, consisting of a stab wound, 

cuts, swelling, bruising, [and] nerve damage.” (Id. at 10.) 

Plaintiff alleges these actions were taken in “retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected 

conduct and participating in [the] interview relevant to the complaint filed.” (Id. at 11.) 

 

4 Lieutenant Garcia is not a named Defendant.

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Plaintiff “alleges that the Defendants acted in concert to reproach him for exercising his 

right to free speech, for speaking his peace during the interview.” (Id.) 

“In furtherance of the conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of rights secured by and 

through the Constitution,” Plaintiff claims Deis “witnessed [Sergeant] Cabales5 admonish 

Plaintiff of his right to remain silent under Miranda.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff claims all the 

named Defendants engaged in a “conspiracy” which caused him to “seek further 

psychological counseling” that “forcefully placed [him] into mental hospital as a direct 

and proximate result.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that “in the course of the alleged conspiracy,” he was issued a 

rules violation report (“RVR”). (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff claims Alvarez and Deis “falsified 

facts to retaliate against Plaintiff for all the above alleged” and in an “attempt to cover up 

their illegal actions and use of unnecessary and excessive force.” (Id. at 14-15.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Barrientos and Hough entered his cell “for the sole purpose of 

retaliating against him for taking part in the interview.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff claims 

Barrientos and Hough “willing took on key roles in the conspiracy alleged, facilitating 

each and every adverse action that followed.” (Id.) Plaintiff allege they “destroyed his 

legal books” claiming that they took Plaintiff’s legal books because “Plaintiff had a 

number in excess” that was allowed. (Id.) 

Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, $1,000,000 in punitive 

damages, and “costs of litigation.” (Id. at 28.) 

C. Eighth Amendment claims

First, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on the 

ground that Plaintiff “did not comply with this Court’s Order on amendment.” Defs.’ 

Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 16-17. In Plaintiff’s FAC, he alleged that 

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

 

5 Sergeant Cabalas is not a named Defendant.

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punishment by using excessive force against him. See FAC at 3-11. This Court found 

that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege facts to support any element of an Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim. See July 24, 2019 Order at 8. Moreover, the Court 

found that even if Plaintiff were able to allege facts sufficient to state a claim, Defendants 

were entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. See id. at 

9. Thus, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim was dismissed with 

prejudice and without leave to amend. See id. at 10. 

Despite the Court’s Order, Plaintiff’s SAC is nearly identical to his FAC and he 

does appear to attempt to re-allege his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. In fact, 

Plaintiff’s SAC is merely a photocopy of his FAC with the exception that Plaintiff has 

drawn a line through the cause of action previously labeled as an Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim and merely adds an additional paragraph to this cause of action 

which contains no factual allegations. See SAC at 3, 11.

Plaintiff argues in his Opposition that the “Eighth Amendment claims that are 

alleged in the SAC do not go to the excessive force claims that were dismissed with 

prejudice.” ECF No. 74 (“Opp’n”) at 4. Instead, Plaintiff maintains that these “claims 

before the Court now go to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. 

Plaintiff also claims that he has “found a viable legal theory by which to hold the 

Defendants to answer via the state claims for assault where the excessive force claim 

would not be allowed.” Id. at 7.

While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff is using the same set of facts that 

previously formed the basis of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim and now 

intends to use those claims to support an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. To

find a violation of the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must 

have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994) (citations omitted.). A culpable state of mind in prison conditions cases requires a 

finding that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s “health and 

safety.” (Id.) 

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However, before determining whether a prison official was “deliberately 

indifferent,” the constitutional deprivation alleged must be objectively, ‘sufficiently 

serious’.” (Id.) (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to 

“take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 

468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). In order to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect 

claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that the risk he faced was objectively 

“sufficiently serious” and that the conditions under which he was confined posed a 

“substantial risk of serious harm” to him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Here, Plaintiff’s own allegations indicate that he put himself at risk. When he was 

sent back to his cell, he refused Alvarez’s orders to put his hands out of the “food-port” 

so that his handcuffs could be removed. (FAC at 4.) Alvarez, along with Deis, reached 

into the food port and took hold of Plaintiff’s handcuffs. See id. at 6. As a result, 

Plaintiff’s left hand became caught in the door of the food-port. Id. at 6. As Alvarez and 

Deis worked to remove Plaintiff’s handcuffs, Plaintiff claims that his left hand got in 

Alvarez’s way. See id. Plaintiff alleges that Alvarez twice “jabbed” at Plaintiff’s left 

hand and cut his hand. See id. at 6-7. Ultimately, Alvarez was able to unlock Plaintiff’s 

handcuff. See id. at 7. These allegations by Plaintiff demonstrate that he put himself in 

harm’s way and that his failure to comply with the orders to allow Defendants to remove 

his handcuffs caused his injuries. Thus, the Court finds that the facts do not rise to the 

level to plausibly demonstrate that Plaintiff faced a “substantial risk of harm to his health 

or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S at 834. 

Moreover, even if Plaintiff were able to allege facts sufficient to show that either 

Alvarez or Deis were to have “actually kn[own] of a substantial risk to [Plaintiff’s] health 

or safety[,] they may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, 

even if the harm was not ultimately averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Here, Plaintiff 

alleges that when his left hand became caught, both Alvarez and Deis worked to free him 

of his hand cuffs to prevent further injury which is a reasonable response to the events set 

in motion by Plaintiff’s own actions. Based on these allegations, the Court finds that 

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Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Alvarez or Deis had 

subjective knowledge and conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm to his health 

or safety. Id. at 837. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims is GRANTED.

C. Retaliation Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are insufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. See Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 10-

14. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are insufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to establish 

a causal connection between the disciplinary report filed by Deis and grievances filed by 

Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff has alleged no facts to support a showing that either Deis or 

Alvarez knew that Plaintiff had filed a grievance against them; and (3) Plaintiff has failed 

to demonstrate any causal connection between the cell search by Barrientos and Hough’s 

and Plaintiff filing an inmate grievance. Id. at 18-24. 

In his Opposition, however, Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment retaliation 

claim is not “predicated on issuance of the RVR” issued by Deis. Opp’n at 7. Instead, 

Plaintiff claims his retaliation claims are based on his allegations that the cell search was 

conducted in retaliation for Plaintiff “exercising [his] right to speak in the [Piket] 

interview.” Id.

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

As the Court noted with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, most of 

his allegations relating to the purported incident of retaliation contained in his FAC are a 

photocopy of his original Complaint. These identical factual allegations were already 

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found by the Court to be deficient to state a retaliation claim. Plaintiff does add an 

allegation that Barrientos and Hough entered “his cell for the sole purpose of retaliating 

against him for taking part in the interview.” (FAC at 16.)

Adverse action taken against a prisoner “need not be an independent constitutional 

violation.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations 

omitted). A causal connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct can 

be alleged by an allegation of a chronology of events from which retaliation can be 

inferred. Id. The filing of grievances and the pursuit of civil rights litigation against 

prison officials are both protected activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68. The prisoner 

must allege either a chilling effect on future First Amendment activities, or that he 

suffered some other harm that is “more than minimal.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 

Finally, a prisoner successfully pleads that the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal by alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that the 

defendant’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” or that they were “unnecessary to the 

maintenance of order in the institution.” Id.

Here, once again, the Court finds that Plaintiff alleges no facts to support a causal 

connection between the search of his cell by Hough and Barrientos and his participation 

in the interview with Lieutenant Piket. The Court previously found that Plaintiff’s 

Complaint was devoid of any factual allegations to suggest that “Hough or Barrientos 

knew that an interview was taking place, the purpose of the interview, or even where 

Plaintiff was at the time.” See Report and Recommendation dated February 4, 2019, ECF 

No. 53 at 21; Order Adopting Report and Recommendation dated July 24, 2019, ECF No. 

61. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his pleading specifically to plead allegations to 

support a causal connection between his interview and the search conducted by Hough 

and Barrientos. See id. Plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the adverse 

action and the protected conduct. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Plaintiff simply re-alleges 

the facts that the Court has already found deficient and adds no additional facts to support 

this claim. Instead, as noted above, he only adds the conclusory allegations that 

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Barrientos and Hough entered “his cell for the sole purpose of retaliating against him for 

taking part in the interview.” (FAC at 16.) 

“The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s statement is a 

conclusory one and does not allege any specific facts to show that either Hough or 

Barrientos were aware that Plaintiff was conducting an interview. There is simply no 

causal connection alleged by Plaintiff between the exercise of his First Amendment rights 

and the cell search. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege factual 

allegations to support a finding that either Hough or Barrientos conducted the cell search 

in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims is 

GRANTED.

D. Fourteenth Amendment claims

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process 

claims. See Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 16-18. Plaintiff’s SAC 

is unclear as to what forms the basis of his Fourteenth Amendment. However, Plaintiff 

does allege that Defendants violated his “14th Amendment rights substantively.” SAC at 

15. Plaintiff claims that he has a “liberty interest in avoiding having Defendants take any 

physical actions against him outside the processes.” Id. 

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 

process claim based on the same set of facts that he purportedly brings his Eighth 

Amendment claims, his Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed. “Where a 

particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ 

against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more 

generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide of analyzing these 

claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). “[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 

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provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under 

the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 

process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997). Here, Plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Amendment allegations are based on the same set of facts he has brought his 

claims of violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishment. 

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment 

claim is GRANTED.

E. Conspiracy claims

Defendants’ seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims. See Defs.’ Mem. of 

P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 19-20. 

A conspiracy claim under section 1983 must contain sufficient “factual matter,” 

and not simply offer “naked” and conclusory assertions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to 

plausibly show: “(1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the

defendant officers to deprive [the plaintiff] of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual 

deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.” Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 

592 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Klein v. Williams, 714 F. Appx 

631, 636 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 76 (2018); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 

423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, the allegations of conspiracy in Plaintiff’s SAC are “unadorned” and 

disjointed at best. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to provide any factual 

enhancement to show that any of the named Defendants entered into an express or 

implied agreement to violate his constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Avalos, 

596 F.3d at 592; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Although 

accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level....”) (citations omitted). Without any supporting facts, 

Plaintiff claims there was a conspiracy between Barrientos and Hough and all the other 

named Defendants to destroy his property. See SAC at 16. He claims they had a 

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“meeting of the minds” to “entrap” him. Id. He further claims that Defendants had a 

“conspirator[ial] meeting of the minds to retaliate against him.” Id. at 17. 

A plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his entitlement to relief [,]” which 

“requires more than labels and conclusions,” and “naked assertions” devoid of “further 

factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555, 

557).

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires factual allegations supporting “an 

agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 

312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 

Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989)). “To be liable, each participant in the 

conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least

share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting 

United Steelworkers of Am., 865 F.2d at 1541). 

Plaintiff does not allege coherent facts from which the Court could “draw a 

reasonable inference” of a “meeting of the minds” to violate his constitutional rights. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441. A conspiracy does not exist simply 

because Defendants all allegedly took the same action. See Myers v. City of Hermosa 

Beach, 299 Fed. Appx. 744, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Before a conspiracy claim can be 

sustained, a plaintiff must show a meeting of the minds by the so-called conspirators.).

For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the Court 

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support any claim of constitutional violations, it need 

not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations 

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); 

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to 

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resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first 

whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”).

IV. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failing to Exhaust

Defendants also seek dismissal of some of Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that 

Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies because his grievance “did 

not describe his retaliation and conspiracy claims brought in this action.” See Defs.’

Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 31. 

A. Legal Standards for Exhausting Administrative Remedies

“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that an inmate 

exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available’ before bringing suit to challenge 

prison conditions.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1854-55 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a)). “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA[.]” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citation omitted). The PLRA also requires that 

prisoners, when grieving their appeal, adhere to CDCR’s “critical procedural rules.” 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 (2006). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the 

PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.

The exhaustion requirement is based on the important policy concern that prison 

officials should have “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their 

responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. The “exhaustion 

requirement does not allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing non-exhausted 

claims.” Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

Therefore, regardless of the relief sought, a prisoner must pursue an appeal through 

all levels of a prison’s grievance process as long as that process remains available to him. 

“The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains 

‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies ... available,’ and 

the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 

(9th Cir. 2005) (original emphasis) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

“The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one baked into its text: An inmate need 

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exhaust only such administrative remedies as are ‘available.’” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1862; 

see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (PLRA does not require 

exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies “effectively 

unavailable.”).

B. Motion to Dismiss

The Ninth Circuit has held that “in those rare cases where a failure to exhaust is 

clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 

2014.) Defendants point to the grievance Plaintiff previously attached to his Complaint

in support of their argument Plaintiff failed to exhaust his conspiracy and retaliation 

claims. See Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 31 (citing ECF No. 1, 

Ex. F-3, Inmate/Parolee Appeal CDCR 602, Log No. RJD-17-00105 and SVSP-16-

07495.) 

Because the failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the 

burden of raising it and proving its absence. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1169 (noting that Defendant must “present probative evidence—in the words of Jones, to 

‘plead and prove’–that the prisoner has failed to exhaust available administrative 

remedies under § 1997e(a)”). 

In his Opposition, Plaintiff claims that his “descriptions” in the grievance he 

previously attached to his Complaint were “apt to give proper notice and that is the truth 

that must be accepted.” (Opp’n at 8.) At the heading of this grievance where there is a 

space for Plaintiff to “[s]tate briefly the subject of your appeal,” Plaintiff lists 

“enforcement, entrapment, excessive force, slander/libel, false report(s).” ECF No. 1 at 

68. In the body of the grievance, Plaintiff states that while he was being interviewed in 

the Lieutenant’s office regarding a “staff complaint,” Hough and Barrientos were 

searching his cell and threw his “legal books out onto the tier.” Id. at 68-69. Plaintiff 

also describes the same claims regarding excessive force which are found in his SAC. 

See id. at 69. 

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While Plaintiff’s grievance did include allegations of excessive force, it did not 

include sufficient detail to put any Defendants “on notice” of Plaintiff’s conspiracy or 

retaliation claims against them. It also did not provide prison officials with a fair 

opportunity to address or resolve his retaliation or conspiracy claims against Defendants 

prior to bring this action to court. Rhodes, 621 F.2d at 1005 (“[A] prisoner must exhaust 

his administrative remedies for the claims contained within his complaint before that 

complaint is tendered to the district court.”) (emphasis added). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s grievance would not have alerted Defendants 

as to the nature of the wrong for which Plaintiff now seeks redress. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 

623 F.3d 813, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy and retaliation claims for failing to exhaust his 

administrative remedies.

V. State Law claims

The only remaining claims in Plaintiff’s SAC are his claims brought under 

California state law. “In any civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 

that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, “once judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of 

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. 

Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim 

under subsection (a) if— (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if 

the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as 

well.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). For all the 

reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, in the absence of any viable federal claim upon 

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which § 1983 relief may be granted, the Court exercises its discretion and DISMISSES 

all Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3). Id.

VI. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court:

(1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 70) and DENIES leave to amend as futile;

(2) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy and 

retaliation for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies; 

(3) DISMISSES all Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims without prejudice 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2020

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