Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00572/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00572-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Alejandro Seaman (aka Alejandro Seaman

Morales), 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 12-572-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

11) (“MSJ”). For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court grant the Government’s Motion.

I FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2012, the Government filed the instant action pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§1451(a) seeking to revoke and set aside the order admitting Defendant to United States

citizenship and to cancel Defendant’s Certificate of Naturalization issued in the name of

Alejandro Seaman. (Doc. 1, ¶1). Attached to the Complaint is the affidavit, with supporting

exhibits, of Sarah Rockelmann, Special Agent of U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security. (Exh. A). The Complaint advances two

counts alleging that Defendant unlawfully procured his naturalization. They are that: (1) he

committed an unlawful act that precluded him from establishing good moral character (Count

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1); and he concealed the material fact that he had been arrested and indicted for unlawful acts

(Count 2). 

The record reflects that service was returned executed on Defendant on August 22,

2012. (Doc. 6). The record also reflects that Defendant has not filed an Answer or otherwise

appeared in this action. The Government certifies that a copy of the pending MSJ was mailed

to Defendant on February 8, 2013. (MSJ, p. 3). The response time for Government’s motion

has expired. See LRCiv. 56.1(d), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District

of Arizona. To date Defendant has not filed a notice of appearance or any other document

in this action. 

II. DISCUSSION

The United States Supreme Court “has long recognized the plain fact that to deprive

a person of his American citizenship is an extraordinarily severe penalty.” Klapprott v.

United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949). “[B]ecause of the grave consequences incident to

denaturalization proceedings, [the Supreme Court has] held that a burden rests on the

Government to prove its charges in such cases by clear, unequivocal and convincing

evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt.” Id. (citing Schneiderman v. United States,

320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943). In Klapprott, the Supreme Court found a strong indication in the

denaturalization statutes that Congress did not intend to authorize courts automatically to

deprive people of their citizenship for failure to appear. Id. at 388. In setting aside a default

judgment entered in a denaturalization proceeding, the Court held that the courts should not

“deprive a person of his citizenship until the Government first offers proof of its charges

sufficient to satisfy the burden imposed on it, even in cases where the defendant has made

a default in appearance.” Id. at 612-13.

In light of Klapprott, the Government has filed the instant MSJ instead of seeking

default judgment. (MSJ, p. 2 n.1).

A. Statement of Facts

On August 7, 2007, Defendant, who was born in Mexico and had been admitted to the

United States and granted lawful permanent resident status in 1994, filed an Application for

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Naturalization (“Application”), Form N-400, with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services (“USCIS”) office in Tucson, Arizona. (Complaint, Exh. A, ¶III, & internal exhs.

2D; MSJ, Exhs. A, D) On August 20, 2008, Defendant was interviewed by a USCIS

examiner concerning his Application. (MSJ, Exh. E). Thereafter, on September 25, 2008,

while Defendant’s Application was pending with USCIS, Defendant was arrested in Tucson,

Arizona for Possession of Marijuana for Sale and Transportation/Sale of Marijuana. (MSJ,

Exh. F). After his Application was approved, on October 17, 2008, Defendant was indicted

in the Superior Court for the State of Arizona, County of Pima, for Possession of Marijuana

for Sale, a state felony violation. (MSJ, Exh. G). On October 23, 2008, when Defendant

appeared before the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona for his Naturalization Oath

Ceremony, he indicated on Form N-445, Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony, which he

submitted that same day to U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, that after the date he was

first interviewed on his Application, he had not been arrested, cited, charged, indicted,

convicted, fined, or imprisoned for breaking or violating any law or ordinance, including

traffic violations. (MSJ, Exh. H). On October 23, 2008, Defendant was administered the oath

of citizenship and admitted as a United States citizen. (MSJ, Exh. I). On December 18, 2008,

Defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty in State court to Solicitation to Possess

Marijuana for Sale, a class six felony in violation of A.R.S. §§13-1002, 13-3405, was

convicted of same, and sentenced to probation for a period of two years. (MSJ, Exhs. J-K).

The Government alleges in Count One of its Complaint that Defendant unlawfully

procured his naturalization because he committed an unlawful act that precluded Defendant

from establishing the requisite good moral character. According to the Government,

Petitioner was required to establish that he was and continued to be a person of good moral

character from 5 years before he filed his Application until October 23, 2008, the date he

became a naturalized United States Citizen. (Complaint, ¶21 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1427(a)). The

Government alleges that Defendant could not establish he was a person of good moral

character on September 25, 2008 because he committed an unlawful act that adversely

reflected upon his moral character during the statutory period, and thus illegally procured his

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naturalization. 

In Count Two, the Government alleges that Defendant unlawfully procured his

naturalization because he concealed the material fact that he had been arrested and indicted

for unlawful acts. According to the Government, Defendant’s misrepresentation and

concealment of his criminal history in Form N-445 was material to determining his eligibility

for naturalization because such history would have precluded him from establishing the

requisite of good moral character for naturalization. (Id. at ¶¶28-31).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The

moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not establish

a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).

If the factual context makes the non-movant's claim implausible, that party must come

forward with more persuasive evidence to support its claim than would otherwise be

necessary. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

supporting the non-movant's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence from which

a fair-minded jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

The ultimate question is whether the evidence "presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

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matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the

evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 248-49.

Additionally, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court must also

consider the applicable burdens of proof. Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d

1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1987). In this instance, the Government must prove its case by “clear,

unequivocal, and convincing evidence, which does not leave ‘the issue in doubt...” that the

defendant is subject to denaturalization. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125, 158; see also

Fedoronko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981); United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d

988, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Denaturalization

The Supreme Court has been clear that in an action for denaturalization filed pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), the “facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably

possible in favor of the citizen.” Scheniderman, 320 U.S. at 123. However, once a

determination that a naturalized citizen obtained his citizenship illegally or by willful

misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, the court “has no discretion to excuse

the conduct.” Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517; see also id. at 518 (courts are without authority

to sanction changes or modifications to the terms and conditions for obtaining citizenship that

Congress has prescribed; instead, the court’s duty is “rigidly to enforce the legislative will

in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.” United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472,

474-475 (1917)); United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d. 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), a defendant’s naturalization must be revoked if his

naturalization was (1) “illegally procured”; or (2) “procured by concealment of a material

fact or by willful misrepresentation.” See Dang, 488 F.3d. at 1139. 

D. Illegal procurement

A defendant’s failure to comply with all congressionally imposed requirements for

citizenship renders a certificate of citizenship “illegally procured.” Fedoronko, 449 U.S. at

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506. To be eligible for naturalization, an applicant must show, among other things, that he

has been a person of good moral character for the five-year statutory period before he files

his Application, until the time he becomes a naturalized United States citizen. 8 U.S.C. §

1427(a)(3). The Government argues that Defendant committed a crime involving moral

turpitude during the statutory period, and was thus unable to demonstrate good moral

character.

Although Congress has not specifically defined what “good moral character” is, the

Immigration and Nationality Act sets out a list of certain classes of applications who cannot

be found to have the requisite good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f); Dang, 488 F.3d

at 1139; United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2005); Khamooshpour

v. Holder, 781 F.Supp.2d 888, 894 (D. Ariz. 2011). For example, Congress determined that

any person who is a habitual drunkard, whose income is derived principally from illegal

gambling activities, or who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be found to lack

good moral character, and is accordingly ineligible for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

Additionally, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(9) contains a "catch-all" provision, which provides, "[t]he

fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that

for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character." In accordance with

section 1101(f), the INS “shall evaluate claims of good moral character on a case-by-case

basis taking into account the elements enumerated in this section and the standards of the

average citizen in the community of residence.” Khamooshpour, 781F.Supp. at 894 (quoting

8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2)). An applicant “shall be found to lack good moral character” if, for

example, he committed and was convicted of one of more crimes involving moral turpitude.

8 C.F.R. §§ 316.10(b)(2)(i). Dang, 488 F.3d at 1139. The regulations also contain a broader,

catch-all provision:

Unless the applicant establishes extenuating circumstances, the applicant shall

be found to lack good moral character if, during the statutory period, the

applicant:

...

Committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicant's moral

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character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts, although the acts do

not fall within the purview of § 316.10(b)(1) or (2).

8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii). If an applicant falls within one of the statutory categories that

requires that an applicant “shall be found to lack good moral character,” he is precluded from

establishing his good moral character and is accordingly ineligible for naturalization.

Federal courts have generally, found drug trafficking offenses to be crimes of moral

turpitude. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, —. 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1479

(2010)(“Except for ‘technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating

to narcotics,” it appears that courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving moral

turpitude.”)(internal citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that a conviction under

Arizona law for solicitation to possess at least four pounds of marijuana for sale constitutes

a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of removal. Barragan-Lopez v. Mukasey, 508

F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because Defendant was not convicted of the offense during the statutory period,

though the offense was arguably a crime of moral turpitude, his naturalization is not unlawful

under 8 C.F.R.§ 316.10(b)(2)(i). Nonetheless, Defendant’s plea and conviction for

Solicitation to Possess Marijuana for Sale, establishes, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal,

and convincing, that Defendant committed an unlawful act during the statutory period that

adversely reflected upon his moral character under 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii), rendering

Defendant’s naturalization unlawful. Even though Defendant was not convicted during the

statutory period of a crime of moral turpitude, he would have been precluded under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(f)(8), as elaborated in 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii), from establishing good moral

character, and would therefore have been barred from acquiring citizenship. See JeanBaptiste, 395 F.3d at 1194(a conviction for a qualifying controlled substance offense after

naturalization, precludes an applicant from establishing good moral character under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(f)(8)); see also United States v. Suarez, 664 F.3d 655, (7th Cir. 2011) (because Suarez

committed a drug offense as established by his later conviction, he was precluded under 8

U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8), as elaborated in 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii), from establishing good

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moral character, and thus was barred from acquiring citizenship.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge

finds that Defendant illegally procured his citizenship, and recommends that the District

Court revoke Defendant’s citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 

E. Concealment of a Material Fact or Willful Misrepresentation

The denaturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), permits the government to revoke

citizenship if naturalization was “procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful

misrepresentation.” Arango, 670 F.3d at 992-93. This ground for denaturalization contains

four independent requirements: (1) the naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or

concealed some fact; (2) the misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful; (3)

the fact must have been material; and (4) the naturalized citizen must have procured

citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment.” Kungys v. United States, 485

U.S. 759, 767 (1988). 

The Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant misrepresented and concealed his criminal

history from the USCIS by answering “No” to “Question 4.” on Form N-445 because

Petitioner had been arrested and indicted in state court for felony solicitation to possess

marijuana for sale since the date of approval of his Application.

Although the term “willful” is not defined in the denaturalization statute, The Ninth

Circuit has held that an alien who seeks to obtain immigration status by misrepresenting a

material fact has done so “willfully” if the misrepresentation was “deliberate and voluntary,”

even if the Government has not demonstrated an intent to deceive the government. Arango,

670 F.3d at 994–995 (citing Espinoza–Espinoza v. INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1977)).

Such evidence may be circumstantial. Id. at 926. 

Completion of Form N-445, a reasonably straightforward one-page form, required

Defendant to certify that he answered the questions or they were answered at his direction,

and that the answers “are true and correct as of the day of the naturalization oath ceremony.”

(MSJ, Exh. H). The Magistrate Judge concludes that Defendant’s representations on Form

N-445 were voluntarily and deliberately made, and thus finds that the misrepresentations

were willful. 

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A misrepresentation or concealment is material to an applicant’s naturalization if the

misrepresentation has “a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was

qualified” to naturalize when in fact, he was not. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72. This test must

be met by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. Id. at 772 (citing

Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 158).The Ninth Circuit has applied a heightened materiality

requirement in the context of denaturalization and held that the Government must also

produce sufficient evidence to raise a fair inference that the applicant was ineligible. United

States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992).

The Government argues that the information that Defendant concealed was

unquestionably material because it would have affected the outcome of his naturalization

process. Defendant was statutorily required, as a prerequisite to naturalization, to show that

he has the requisite good moral character up to the date he took the naturalization oath. See

8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1). Form N-445 was Defendant’s last submission where he was required

to represent his good moral character, including the disclosure of any recent arrests. The

record of his arrest on September 25, 2008, and indictment on October 17, 2008, show more

than a “fair inference” of ineligibility. Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1304. To lawfully obtain U.S.

citizenship, a person must be of “good moral character” for the five years immediately

preceding the date of filing his citizenship application, i.e. Form N-400, until the date she or

he is admitted to citizenship. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2); Dang, 488 F.3d. at 1139. Even

though Defendant was not convicted during the statutory period of a crime of moral

turpitude, he would have been precluded under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8), as elaborated in 8

C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii), from establishing good moral character, and would therefore have

been barred from acquiring citizenship. Special Agent Rockelmann’s declaration anecdotally

supports the reasonable inference that Defendant’s disclosure of his arrest would have had

an actual influence on the USCIS approval of his naturalization: “Defendant’s arrest would

have precluded him from establishing the requisite good moral character for

naturalization.”(Complaint, Declaration of Sarah Rockelmann, ¶III.B) Thus, because

Defendant’s misrepresentations and concealment of his criminal history would have had the

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natural tendency to influence the USCIS decision whether to approve his naturalization

application, the Magistrate Judge finds the misrepresentation and concealment were material.

A misrepresentation “procures citizenship” when, if disclosed, the misrepresented or

concealed information would have resulted in the denial of an applicant’s naturalization

application. See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 773; id. at 788 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the

procurement prong “requires that the material misrepresentation must have had the effect of

allowing the person to obtain citizenship when a truthful statement would have led directly

or after investigation to the denial of citizenship”). The Form N-445 stated that “[t]he

principal purposes for requesting the information are to enable Adjudication Officers of the

USCIS to determine an applicant’s eligibility for naturalization.” (MSJ, Exh. H). Under 8

C.F.R. § 335.5, USCIS may reopen an approved naturalization application before an oath

ceremony if they receive potentially disqualifying information. Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d

1087, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Defendant misrepresented and concealed information

that would have established his statutory ineligibility to naturalize, USCIS was unable to

consider the information on his arrest. His misrepresentation and concealment satisfy the

“procurement” prong of the material misrepresentation test when he subsequently was given

the oath of allegiance and became a U.S. citizen. Thus, the Magistrate Judge finds that

Defendant procured his naturalization by willful misrepresenation and concealment of

material facts and recommends that the District Court revoke his citizenship pursuant to the

requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 

III. RECOMMENDATION

Because the Government has demonstrated by clear, unequivocal and convincing

evidence that Defendant illegally procured his citizenship, and, additionally, procured his

naturalization through willful misrepresentation and concealment of a material fact, the

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Government’s motion

for summary judgment (Doc. 11), and enter an order revoking and setting aside the District

Court’s order admitting Defendant to United States citizenship. 

The Magistrate Judge FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the District Court cancel

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Defendant’s Certificate of Naturalization, Number 31674355 dated October 23, 2008, and

order him to surrender and deliver his Certificate and all other indicia of United States

citizenship to the Attorney General, or his designated representative.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party

may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy

thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If objections are

not timely filed, then the parties' rights to de novo review by the District Court may be

deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc).

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV

12-0572-TUC-DCB.

IT IS ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Report and

Recommendation to Defendant at the following address:

Alejandro Seaman

249 W. Calle Margarita

Tucson, Arizona 85706

DATED this 9th day of July, 2013.

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