Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08153/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08153-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Vina Yazzie, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Mohave County, Steve Latoski, Ramon 

Osuna, Kevin Stockbridge and Warren 

Twitchel, 

Defendants.

No. CV 14-08153-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings and Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Extend Time to Amend Pleading. (Doc. 26 

and Doc. 43). At oral argument, Plaintiff argued that as to the issue of exhaustion with 

the EEOC, Defendants’ motion should be converted to a motion for summary judgment. 

As to this issue only, the Court converted the motion originally filed under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(c) to one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and allowed 

Plaintiff to submit evidence. (Docs. 68 and 73). 

 I. Facts

 Plaintiff Vina Yazzie (“Plaintiff”) was previously employed by Defendant 

Mohave County, as a road maintenance worker. (Doc. 4 at 3; Doc. 14 at 3). On July 15, 

2013, Plaintiff attended a county drug and alcohol training session conducted by 

Defendant Twitchel. (Doc. 4 at 3; Doc. 14 at 4). Plaintiff claims Defendant Twitchel 

made reference to a “zero tolerance” policy, which was not approved by the County 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 1 of 15
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Board of Supervisors. (Doc. 4 at 3). Plaintiff was selected for a drug screening the 

following day. (Doc. 4 at 3; Doc. 14 at 4). Plaintiff was later notified she had tested 

positive for drugs. (Doc. 4 at 4; Doc. 14 at 4). 

 On August 6, 2013, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Defendants Stockbridge and 

Latoski. (Doc. 4 at 4; Doc. 14 at 5). At this meeting, Defendants Stockbridge and Latosk 

notified Plaintiff that her employment was terminated and they advised her of her right to 

appeal. (Doc. 4 at 4; Doc. 14 at 5). Plaintiff filed for a hearing regarding her termination 

on August 15, 2013. (Doc. 4 at 4; Doc. 14 at 5). Plaintiff’s termination was upheld 

following a Merit Commission Appeal Hearing on December 20, 2013. (Doc. 4 at 5; Doc. 

14 at 6). 

 On April 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claiming discrimination on the basis of her race, 

national origin, and sex. (Doc. 4 at 10; Doc. 14 at 9). The EEOC issued a Notice of Right 

to Sue on May 21, 2014 and Plaintiff filed her original complaint with this Court on 

August 20, 2014. (Doc. 4 at 10; Doc. 14 at 9). Plaintiff filed a second charge with the 

EEOC on August 15, 2014, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc. 4 at 10; Doc. 14 at 9). The EEOC issued a Notice of 

Right to Sue for the second charge on September 26, 2014, and Plaintiff subsequently 

amended her complaint on November 24, 2014. (Doc. 4 at 10; Doc. 14 at 9-10). 

 In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges eleven causes of action. (Doc. 4 at 10-

22). Counts 1-9 name only Mohave County, Counts 10 and 11 name Defendants Mohave 

County, Steve Latoski, Ramon Osuna, Kevin Stockbridge, and Warren Twitchel 

(“Defendants”). (Doc. 4 at 10-22). Counts 1-3 allege violations of Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, specifically disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to 

provide reasonable accommodation. (Doc. 4 at 10-13). Counts 4-6 allege violations of the 

ADA, specifically disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable 

accommodation. (Doc. 4 at 13-16). Count 7 alleges violation of Title VII, discrimination 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 2 of 15
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

based on race and/or ancestry. (Doc. 4 at 16-17). Counts 8 and 9 allege violations of the 

Family Medical Leave Act, specifically interference and retaliation. (Doc. 4 at 17-19). 

Count 10 alleges discrimination based on race and/or ancestry, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 

1981. (Doc. 4 at 19-21). Count 11 alleges civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(Doc. 4 at 21-22). 

 On April 1, 2015, Defendants filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings, requesting this Court dismiss Counts 1-6, 10, and 11 against Mohave County.1

(Doc. 26). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion, as well as the pending 

Second Motion to Extend Time to Amend Pleading on August 14, 2015. (Doc. 43-44).

II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

 A. Legal Standard

 A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(c) is “functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, thus “the same 

standard of review applies to motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. 

Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

omitted). 

 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must 

meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

Also, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states 

a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 

 

1

 It would aid the Court if motions would reflect in their captions whether they seek partial or complete dismissal of the case and/or a particular Defendant. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 3 of 15
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

 Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) 

“requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without 

some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the 

requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also 

‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 

Federal Practice & Procedure § 1202, pp. 94, 95 (3d ed. 2004)). Thus, Rule 8’s pleading 

standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

 In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the facts alleged in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and must accept all 

well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Cafasso, 637 F.3d 1053 (“[w]hen considering a Rule 12(c) dismissal, we must 

accept the facts as pled by the nonmovant”). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

 B. Discussion 

 1. Section 504 and ADA Claims

 Plaintiff alleges six claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the 

ADA, alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 4 of 15
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

accommodation for Plaintiff’s disability. (Doc. 4 at 10-17). Mohave County 

(“Defendant”) claims the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims because Plaintiff 

failed to file these claims with the EEOC within 300 days of her termination of 

employment.2

 (Doc. 26 at 4-6). Defendant further claims Plaintiff failed to state a claim 

under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because she has not adequately pleaded having 

a disability. (Doc. 26 at 8-11). 

 Plaintiff responds by asserting that the timely claims alleging racial discrimination 

submitted to the EEOC were related to the later claims alleging disability discrimination, 

and thereby were timely under the “relation back” doctrine. (Doc. 44 at 3). Alternatively, 

Plaintiff argues the Court should consider her disability discrimination complaints timely 

under an “equitable tolling” theory. (Id.). Following oral argument, the Court converted 

this alternative defense to timeliness to a motion for summary judgment. 

 a. The Relation Back Doctrine 

 Section 2000(e)-5, requires that a charge “shall be filed . . . within three hundred 

days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 

However, the “relation back” doctrine allows that an additional claim which is “related to 

or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the 

charge was first received.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12. For this doctrine to apply, the “factual 

allegations must be able to bear the weight of [a] new theory added by amendment.” 

Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 For Plaintiff to be excused from timely exhaustion under a relation back theory, 

she must show that her new claims of disability discrimination are related to her original 

claims of race and sex discrimination. See, e.g., Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 

F.2d 667, 675 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the defendant’s initial Title VII claim was 

under an entirely different statutory scheme than his ADEA claim and the claims were 

 

2

 All named Defendants moved for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 26). However, since the motion pertains only to claims against Mohave County, “Defendant” will be used to avoid confusion. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 5 of 15
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

not related); see also Taxey v. Maricopa Cty., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (D. Ariz. 2002) 

(noting the plaintiff’s new claim of discrimination based on nationality “fails to clarify or 

amplify allegations made in the original charge, and does not allege additional Title VII 

violations related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge, age 

discrimination.”). 

 In her original filing with to the EEOC, Plaintiff alleged discrimination based 

upon sex, race, and national origin. (Doc. 44-2 at 2). Plaintiff checked only the boxes on 

the form alleging discrimination based on race, sex, and national origin. (Id.) The box to 

allege discrimination based on disability was left unchecked. (Id.) Plaintiff stated on the 

form that she believed she was terminated “because of [her] sex, [f]emale, [r]ace, Native 

American, and national origin, Navajo.” (Id.) 

 The notes from Plaintiff’s intake interview with the EEOC do not contain any 

information which could reasonably have alerted the EEOC to a disability claim. (Doc. 

44-2 at 3). Plaintiff claimed in the interview that she was told she was missing too much 

work when she was caring for her sick child. (Doc. 44-2 at 3-4). Plaintiff also alleged that 

male co-workers were given promotions when she was more qualified for the position. 

(Doc. 44-2 at 3). Plaintiff alleged that male co-workers made derogatory comments to 

her, including “today is Mother’s Day” and “a mother you-know-what.” (Doc. 44-2 at 4). 

 These facts would support only allegations of discrimination based on race, 

gender, and national origin; they could not reasonably have led the EEOC to also 

investigate disability discrimination. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 897 (noting the 

plaintiff’s claims “involve[d] totally different kinds of allegedly improper conduct, and 

investigation into one claim would not likely lead to investigation of the other.”); see also 

Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A decision that an EEOC 

complaint with no mention whatsoever of disability is ‘like or reasonably related to’ the 

plaintiff’s disability claim would reduce the exhaustion requirement to a formality.”). 

 Plaintiff’s argument that the facts contained in her original claim of discrimination 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 6 of 15
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

on the basis of race, sex, and national origin are reasonably related to her untimely claims 

of disability discrimination is not supported by the evidence Plaintiff submitted with her 

reply. (Doc. 44 at 3).3

 Thus, application of the “relation-back” doctrine is inappropriate in 

this case. 

 b. Date of Termination

 Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion regarding Counts 1-6, claiming “there are 

significant questions of fact as to when the decision to fire was final” and “no policies or 

other evidence has been entered that can be said to be dispositive on this issue.” (Doc. 44 

at 5). However, Plaintiff’s claim is not supported by the record. (Doc. 4 at 4-9). 

 Plaintiff was notified of her termination of employment with Mohave County on 

August 6, 2013. (Doc. 4 at 4; Doc. 44-2 at 2). A claim accrues at the time a 

discriminatory act occurs, and must be filed within the statutory time period. Pouncil v. 

Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 578 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 

536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)). The review of Plaintiff’s termination by the Merit Board did 

not toll the running of the statutory limitation period. See Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 

449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980) (“[W]e already have held that the pendency of a grievance, or 

some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the 

running of the limitations periods.”) (citing Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 

429 U.S. 229 (1976)). Thus, there remains no question of fact regarding when Plaintiff’s 

termination became final. 

 Therefore, the alleged discriminatory act occurred on August 6, 2013. (Doc. 4 at 

4). Plaintiff did not file her claim alleging disability discrimination with the EEOC until 

August 15, 2014. (Doc. 4 at 10). Accordingly, Plaintiff was beyond the deadline for 

filing. Thus, Counts 1-6 will be dismissed as untimely unless Plaintiff can establish that 

she should receive equitable tolling. 

 

3

 The Court considered this evidence on a Rule 12(c) motion because it is the 

filing with the EEOC, which should have been alleged in the complaint and incorporated into the complaint. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 7 of 15
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 c. Equitable Tolling 

As indicated above, the Court converted the portion of Defendant’s motion to 

which Plaintiff responded with the defense of equitable tolling to a Rule 56 motion. The 

Court will address these arguments by separate order. 

 d. Failure to State a Claim

 Alternatively, Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation 

Act claims had been timely exhausted with the EEOC, Counts 1-6 should be dismissed 

because Plaintiff failed to adequately plead a claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation 

Act. (Doc. 26 at 8). Defendant claims Plaintiff failed to establish that she suffers from a 

disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act or that she requested accommodation. 

(Doc. 26 at 9-10). Plaintiff responds that she suffers from high blood pressure in addition 

to a number of other medical problems, including “nervous and musculoskeletal 

problems,” of which she claims Defendant was aware. (Doc. 44 at 5). Plaintiff asserts that 

whether she is a qualified person is “deeply rooted in the facts of the case” and dismissal 

is not appropriate while she is still undergoing medical treatment, which includes 

obtaining a diagnosis. (Doc. 44 at 6). Further, Plaintiff claims to have requested 

accommodation on numerous occasions from her supervisors, including requests for time 

off to attend medical appointments and requests for treatment. (Doc. 44 at 7). 

 The standard used to determine whether an act violated the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act is essentially the same. Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 

F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified 

individual” with a disability in regard to “terms, conditions and privileges of 

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual” is “an individual who, 

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 

employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A 

person suffers from a disability if he or she: “(1) has a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more of the individual’s major life activities; (2) has a record 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 8 of 15
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.” Coons, 383 

F.3d at 884 (citing Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2000)); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). A “major life activity” includes such 

activities as “caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 

speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 

998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998)). Thus, 

to sufficiently plead a claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) is a qualified 

individual with a disability and (2) has “suffered an adverse employment action because 

of [his or her] disability.” Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 

1237 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

 In this case, Plaintiff is a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA. 

Prior to her termination, Plaintiff performed her duties with Mohave County for nearly 19 

years, demonstrating the ability to perform the functions of her position. (Doc. 4 at 3). 

The question becomes whether Plaintiff has a disability that substantially limits a major 

life activity within the meaning of the ADA. With the exception of high blood pressure 

and a vague reference to “nervous and musculoskeletal problems” Plaintiff has avoided 

naming specific medical conditions while simultaneously insisting that Defendant has 

“extensive knowledge” of them. (Doc. 44 at 5). Plaintiff makes no argument, in her 

amended complaint or her reply that the conditions she does not identify impact a major 

life activity. Additionally, Plaintiff states in her reply that dismissal would be 

inappropriate because some of her disabilities have yet to be diagnosed. (Doc. 44 at 6). 

These pleading deficiencies make it impossible to determine whether Plaintiff suffers 

from an actual disability. 

 Generally, this record would support granting a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. However, because Defendants chose to wait until after the deadline to 

amend to cure any pleading deficiencies had expired, coupled with Plaintiff having now 

put evidence in the record on the merits of her disability theory (Docs. 72 and 73), the 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 9 of 15
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Court will deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings. This ruling is without 

prejudice to Defendants, within the deadline, moving for summary judgment on this 

theory. 

 2. Claims Under §§ 1981 and 1983 

 Defendant claims that Counts 10 and 11 should be dismissed against Mohave 

County because Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a claim where Mohave County can 

be held responsible for the acts of its employees. (Doc. 26 at 11-12). Plaintiff asserts the 

draft “zero tolerance” drug policy was “presumably made by lawmakers of Mohave 

County” and the lawmakers then “had the draft circulated and available for use as a 

custom of the various departments when they wanted to violate the policies that had been 

publicly passed.” (Doc. 44 at 8). Plaintiff concludes that “[t]he fact that the policy was 

officially drafted by the County itself is more than enough to clear the hurdle of dismissal 

on the issue of County liability.” (Id.) 

 Section 1981 establishes that every person shall have equal right “to make and 

enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 

laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Section 1983 provides that any person who deprives another of “any rights, privileges, or 

immunities” may be held liable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To hold a municipality liable under 

section 1983 for an injury inflicted by an employee, the injury must have been in 

“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). This liability is not based 

on the theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Instead, “a plaintiff seeking to impose 

liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal policy or custom that 

caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (quoting Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 

2011)). 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 10 of 15
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 In her amended complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Mohave County’s zero 

tolerance drug policy or some other policy was discriminatory; but, she argues that “the 

County did not terminate other similarly situated non-Native American employees who 

violated the County’s Drug and Alcohol Policies.” (Doc. 4 at 20). Further, Plaintiff

alleges “the County did not enforce its Drug and Alcohol Testing Policies in a consistent 

and non-discriminatory manner.” (Doc. 4 at 21). Plaintiff alleges non-Native American 

employees received better treatment, more frequent promotions and pay raises. (Doc. 4 at 

20). Thus, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendant had a non-discriminatory 

policy or policies that Defendant had a custom of enforcing in a discriminatory manner. 

Plaintiff fails to offer any factual allegations or specify a formulated custom of

Mohave County that contributed to the actions of its employees. A bare allegation alone 

is insufficient to support Plaintiff’s claims against Mohave County. Cf. AE ex rel. 

Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the motion to 

dismiss standard from Twombly and Iqbal and holding that a conclusory allegation that 

the defendant county had unconstitutional policies, practices, or customs relating to the 

care and custody of dependent minors failed to state a claim). Indeed, “Liability for 

improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 

founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct 

has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 

918 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations of a long 

standing custom, but instead states the legal conclusion that the policy was applied in 

discriminatory manner. 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s claims under sections 1981 and 1983 against Mohave County do 

not contain sufficient factual allegations to plausibly establish liability against the 

County; and thus, do not survive Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion. Accordingly, Counts 

10-11 will be dismissed as to Mohave County. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 11 of 15
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

III. Motion to Amend 

Generally, Rule 15(a) governs a motion to amend pleadings to add claims or 

parties. However, Rule 16 also applies because Plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint 

was filed after the Rule 16 Scheduling Order deadline had expired. With respect to the 

interplay between Rules 16 and 15(a), “[a]s the Ninth Circuit explained in Johnson v. 

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992), once the district court has filed 

a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16 which establishes a timetable for 

amending pleadings, a motion seeking to amend pleadings is governed first by Rule 

16(b), and only secondarily by Rule 15(a).” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 

607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). “If [the court] considered only Rule 15(a) without regard to Rule 

16(b), it would render scheduling orders meaningless and effectively would read Rule 

16(b) and its good cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sosa 

v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court will 

evaluate Plaintiff’s motion first under Rule 16, and then, if necessary, under Rule 15(a). 

 A. Rule 16 

 1. Legal Standard 

 Under Rule 16, a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with 

the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Under Rule 16, “good cause” means the 

scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite the party’s diligence. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 

609 (citing 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 

(2d ed. 1990)). “The pretrial schedule may be modified if it cannot reasonably be met 

despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension. If the party seeking the 

modification was not diligent, the inquiry should end and the motion to modify should 

not be granted.” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

To demonstrate diligence under Rule 16’s “good cause” standard, 

the movant may be required to show the following: (1) that he was 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 12 of 15
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

diligent in assisting the court in creating a workable Rule 16 order; 

(2) that his noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will 

occur, notwithstanding his diligent efforts to comply, because of the 

development of matters which could not have been reasonably 

foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling 

conference; and (3) that he was diligent in seeking amendment of the 

Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that he could not comply 

with the order. 

Morgal v. Maricopa County Bd. of Supervisors, 284 F.R.D. 452, 460 (D. Ariz. June 6, 

2012) (quoting Grant v. United States, No. 2:11–CV–00360 LKK KJN PS, 2011 WL 

5554878, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), adopted by, No. CIV-S-11-0360-LKK-KJNPS, 2012 WL 218959 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) (other citation omitted)). 

 2. Discussion 

 Plaintiff requests the Court grant leave to amend her First Amended Complaint. 

(Doc. 43 at 1).4

 Earlier, the Court set a deadline of March 13, 2015, to file a motion to 

amend the complaint. (Doc. 21 at 2). Plaintiff was represented by counsel until May 13, 

2015, sixty-one days after the deadline to amend had passed. (Doc. 31). In her request, 

Plaintiff states that leave to amend is necessary because she had “recently retained new 

counsel and would like to allow [c]ounsel to review the documents, amend, and bolster 

any arguments.” (Doc. 43 at 1).5

 However, obtaining new counsel is not a valid reason 

for delay. See Johns v. Autonation USA Corp., 246 F.R.D. 608, 610 (D. Ariz. 2006) 

(denying a motion requesting an extension of time where only explanation for delay was 

substitution of counsel and new counsel waited four months to request extension). 

 Plaintiff offers no explanation why she failed to amend her complaint during the 

time period set forth by the scheduling order, throughout which she was represented by 

 

4

 The Court also notes that in her motion, Plaintiff failed to provide attachments or details explaining what, if any, amendments she proposes to make, which if a formal motion to amend were filed, is required by LRCiv 15.1. (Doc. 43 at 1). 

5

 While the Court has considered this argument, the Court notes it is likely moot because Plaintiff’s current counsel has now moved to withdraw from representing Plaintiff. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 13 of 15
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

counsel. Additionally, Plaintiff provides no reason that would satisfy the “good cause” 

requirement of Rule 16. See Ticktin v. Carole Fabrics, 2007 WL 38330, at *1 (D. Ariz. 

Jan. 5, 2007) (“[A] court may deny a motion to modify a scheduling order where the 

moving party fails to demonstrate diligence in complying with the order and fails to show 

good cause for the modification.”); see also Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“[C]arelessness is 

not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.”). 

 B. Rule 15

 Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the diligence necessary to meet Rule 16’s “good 

cause” standard. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to modify the 

Rule 16 Scheduling Order and an analysis under Rule 15(a) is unnecessary. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Leave to Extend Time to Amend Pleading (Doc. 43) is 

denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 26) 

is granted in part as follows: Counts 10 and 11 against Defendant Mohave County are 

dismissed.6

 The Motion is denied to the extent is seeks judgment on Counts 1-6 for 

failure to state a claim. The Motion remains under advisement regarding whether 

Plaintiff exhausted her disability discrimination claims with the EEOC (thus whether 

Counts 1-6 will be dismissed on this basis remains under advisement). Because Counts 

7-9 were not the subject of the Motion of Judgment on the Pleadings, they are not 

dismissed. Counts 10 and 11 against Defendants Steve Latoski, Ramon Osuna, Kevin 

Stockbridge, and Warren Twitchel are also not dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Extend Time to 

Amend Pleading (Doc. 43) is denied. 

/ / / 

 

6

 The Clerk of the Court shall not enter judgment. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 14 of 15
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants shall reply to Plaintiff’s Rule 56 

response by December 14, 2015. 

 Dated this 25th day of November, 2015. 

Case 3:14-cv-08153-JAT Document 74 Filed 11/25/15 Page 15 of 15