Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00708/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00708-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA A. DARNELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv708-BEN

(WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION AND GRANT

DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff Lisa A. Darnell moves under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),1

 for judicial review of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision denying her

1

 “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . brought in the district court of the United States . . . The court shall

have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) (2013).

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claim for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.2

Plaintiff asks the Court to grant her motion for summary judgment, reverse the

Commissioner’s decision and remand for further administrative proceedings because

the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to articulate specific and legitimate

reasons for rejecting examining psychologist Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion. (ECF No.

16-1 at p. 9). The Commissioner seeks summary judgment affirming the ALJ’s

decision because, defendant argues, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence and was free of error. (ECF No. 17-1 at p. 5).3

The Court finds the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and

without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After careful review of the

moving and opposition papers, the administrative record, the facts, and the law, the

Court RECOMMENDS plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED. The

Court also RECOMMENDS defendant's cross-motion to affirm the ALJ decision be

GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 25, 2009, plaintiff applied for supplemental security income

benefits alleging disability beginning March 25, 2009. See Administrative Record

(“AR”) at 25, 159.4

 Plaintiff’s alleged disability stems from depression,

fibromyalgia, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, diabetes, and panic attacks. (AR 187-188).

The Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application initially and also on

reconsideration. (AR 25). Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before an ALJ. (AR 36-

70). The ALJ found plaintiff ineligible for disability benefits. (AR 25-31). The

Appeals Council declined review of the ALJ’s decision and thus the ALJ’s decision

2

 The Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decisions became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-3).

3

 All pages numbers other than Administrative Record (“AR”) page numbers refer to the number assigned by the CM/ECF system.

4

 The AR page numbers cited herein are the numbers located near the bottom

right corner of the page. 

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became the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1-6).

Plaintiff then filed the instant complaint pursuant to section 405(g) of the Act

in order to obtain judicial review of a “final decision” from the Commissioner

denying his claim for supplemental benefits. (ECF No. 1). Defendant filed an answer

to the complaint. (ECF No. 11).

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment to reverse the Commissioner’s

final decision and remand for further proceedings. (ECF No. 16). Defendant filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment. (ECF No. 17, 18).

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

A claimant is entitled to disability benefits if, considering his age, education

and work experiences, he is unable to perform the work she previously performed

and unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The

Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines whether the claimant is

engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If she is, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If she is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a

medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. That

determination is governed by the “severity regulation” which provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work

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activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 c), 416.920 c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes

necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 (b), 416.921 (b). Such abilities

and aptitudes include “[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities for seeing, hearing,

and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple

instructions”; [u]se of judgment”; “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of

impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the

evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines whether the impairment is

equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (d),

416.920 (d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If the impairment meets

or exceeds one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to

be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to be

disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the

impairment prevents the claimant from performing work she has performed in the

past. If the claimant is able to perform her previous work, she is not disabled. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (e), 416.920 (e). If the claimant cannot perform her previous

work, the fifth and final step of the process determines whether she is able to

perform other work in the national economy in view of her age, education, and work

experience. The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if she is not able to

perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (f), 416.920 (f). 

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial

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review of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The

scope of judicial review is limited. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal

error.” Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir.

1988) (citing Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a

preponderance. Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation

omitted). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both

the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions.

Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1985)). If the evidence supports

more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. 

Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is

inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony

are functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Even if the reviewing court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the

proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. 

See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a

court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to

the Social Security Administrator for further proceedings. Id. 

2. Applicable Law

In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish

among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant

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(treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant

(non-examining physicians). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1527, 416.902,

416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995, as amended

April 9, 1996). Generally, the opinions of treating physicians are given greater

weight than those of other physicians because treating physicians are employed to

cure and therefore have a greater opportunity to know and observe the claimant. See,

e.g., Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). Despite the presumption of special weight afforded to

treating physicians' opinions, an ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion of a treating

physician. However, the ALJ may only give less weight to a treating physician's

opinion that conflicts with the medical evidence if the ALJ provides explicit and

legitimate reasons for discounting the opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (the

opinion of a treating doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be

rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial

evidence in the record).

The ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities and inconsistencies in the

medical testimony. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Furthermore, determining whether

inconsistencies are material, or are in fact inconsistencies at all, is the ALJ's

responsibility. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir.1999).

The ALJ must offer more than his conclusions and “must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors' are correct.” Embrey v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–22 (9th Cir.1988). Merely stating that medical opinions

are not supported by sufficient objective findings does not achieve the level of

specificity required. Id. at 421. The ALJ must set out a “detailed thorough summary

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stat[e] his interpretation thereof, and

mak[e] findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.1986).

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3. Analysis

The ALJ summarized his consideration of examining psychologist Dr. Kathy

Vandenburgh’s assessment and findings, and the medical expert Dr. Kent B.

Leyton’s opinion, as follows:

From a mental standpoint, I have given significant weight to the

opinion of the medical expert. He had the opportunity to review the

entire record. His opinion of the claimant’s combined mental

impairments and limiting functional limits is consistent with the

assessment and findings by consulting psychologist Kathy

Vandenburgh, Ph.D. who evaluated the claimant in February 2010

(Exhibit 4F). (AR 30)

The ALJ concluded plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

fibromyalgia, diabetes millitus, diabetic neuropathy, obesity, and major depressive

disorder versus situational disorder. (AR 27). However, the ALJ concluded plaintiff

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals one of the listed impairments because “no physician has opined that the

claimant’s condition meets or equals any listing, and the state agency program

physicians opined that it does not.” (AR 27-28). The ALJ found plaintiff had the

“residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR

416.967(a) except that he (sic) is mentally limited to simple and repetitive tasks;

with no public contact; limited co-worker or supervisory interaction.” (AR 28). 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ impliedly and impermissibly dismissed Dr.

Vandenburgh’s opinion; the ALJ found Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion consistent with

Dr. Leyton’s opinion whereas plaintiff alleges Dr. Vandenburgh found plaintiff more

limited than either the ALJ or Dr. Leyton. (ECF No. 16-1, p. 8). Defendant contends

the ALJ properly found Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion consistent with Dr. Leyton’s

opinion. (ECF No. 17-1, p. 4). 

In order to determine whether or not the opinions of Drs. Vandenburgh and

Leyton are consistent, and whether or not those opinions are consistent with the

ALJ’s findings, the Court provides the following chart of the disputed findings:

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Dr. Vandenburgh Dr. Leyton ALJ

“Major Depression”

(AR 344). “depression of amoderate nature” (AR

59).

“major depressive disorder

versus situational disorder

(20 CFR 416.920(c)).” (AR

27).

“Panic Disorder, with

agoraphobia” (AR 344).

“I didn’t see much about

panic in there” but noting

other doctors cited panic

disorder and anxiety. (AR

59-61).

Did not make specific

findings regarding a panic

disorder with agoraphobia

but did limit plaintiff to

jobs with “no public

contact; limited co-worker

or supervisory interaction.”

(AR 28).

Can plaintiff perform

simple, repetitive tasks?

Yes, but “she would

likely have

slight/moderate

difficulty completing

tasks . . . outside of her

home with people . . .

due to panic disorder

with agoraphobia.” (AR

345). 

Can plaintiff perform

simple, repetitive tasks?

Yes. (AR 61-62).

Can plaintiff perform

simple, repetitive tasks?

Yes. Findings limited

plaintiff to jobs with “no

public contact; limited coworker or supervisory

interaction.” (AR 28).

Can plaintiff interact

with the public (in a

work environment)? 

Yes, but “she would

likely have

slight/moderate

difficulty completing

tasks . . . outside of her

home with people . . .

due to panic disorder

with agoraphobia.” (AR

345). 

Can plaintiff interact

with the public (in a work

environment)? 

“Yes. Although they said,

one of the report (sic)

said it would be

preferable that she was

non-public due to her

anxiety.” (AR 62). 

Can plaintiff interact with

the public (in a work

environment)? 

No. Findings limited

plaintiff to jobs with “no

public contact; limited coworker or supervisory

interaction.” (AR 28).

Can plaintiff interact

with co-workers and

supervisors (in a work

environment)? 

Yes, but “she would

likely have

slight/moderate

difficulty completing

tasks . . . outside of her

home with people . . .

due to panic disorder

with agoraphobia.” (AR

345).

Can plaintiff interact

with co-workers and

supervisors (in a work

environment)? 

“Mild.” (AR 62). The

Court assumes this means

plaintiff would suffer

mild impairment

interacting with coworkers and supervisors.

Can plaintiff interact with

co-workers and supervisors

(in a work environment)? 

Yes. Findings limited

plaintiff to jobs with “no

public contact; limited coworker or supervisory

interaction.” (AR 28).

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Based on the chart above, the Court finds facial inconsistencies between the

opinions of Drs. Vandenburgh and Leyton. For example, Dr. Vandenburgh found

major depression and panic disorder with agoraphobia whereas Dr. Leyton found

moderate depression and made no specific finding regarding panic disorder. The

ALJ summarily found the two opinions consistent, accorded great weight to the nonexamining opinion of Dr. Leyton and did not mention the weight accorded to the

examining opinion of Dr. Vandenburgh. The ALJ did, however, place conservative

limits on plaintiff’s work-environment, including no public contact and limited coworker and supervisory interaction. (AR 28).

The main problem with the ALJ’s decision is it failed to explain why it found

Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion consistent with Dr. Leyton’s. The ALJ should have

explained its reasoning because the opinions are at least facially inconsistent and

“determining whether inconsistencies are material (or are in fact inconsistencies at

all)” is the ALJ’s responsibility. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 603

(9th Cir. 1999). Further conflating the consistency issue, the ALJ rejected and gave

no weight to the opinion of treating physician Philip G. Martin.5

 (AR 29). Dr.

Leyton referred to Dr. Martin’s opinion during his testimony, stating “in 10F they

gave her - - this was Dr. Phil Morton, Martin, he gave her major depression, anxiety,

panic with agoraphobia. That’s the only - - I didn’t see much about panic in there . .

.” (AR 59). The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Martin’s assessment is problematic because

both Dr. Vandenburgh and Dr. Martin found major depression and panic disorder

5 The ALJ analyzed the opinion of Dr. Martin but the analysis appears to relate to Dr. Martin’s physical assessments. The ALJ found Dr. Martin was only a general practitioner and had no specialized training in neurology or any other area of specialty of concern for the plaintiff. (AR 29). Moreover, to the extent the ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Vandenburgh and Rodarte because “no physician has opined that the claimant’s condition meets or equals any listing,” such a rejection, by itself, fails. Treating physician often do not treat patients with an eye toward assessing potential social security disability claims. Thus, an ALJ should "translate" the treating physician's "opinion into Social Security terms[.]" See Booth v. Barnhart, 181 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The issue of the sufficiency of the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Martin’s opinion to the extent the ALJ rejected the opinion that plaintiff suffered from major depression and panic disorder with agoraphobia was not raised by plaintiff and is not presently before the Court. 

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with agoraphobia but, inexplicably, the ALJ rejected Dr. Martin’s opinion entirely

yet found Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion consistent with Dr. Leyton’s opinion and

accorded Dr. Leyton’s opinion great weight. 

Similarly, the ALJ did not provide any analysis regarding the medical

assessments of plaintiff’s other treating doctor, Dr. Rodarte. Like Dr. Vandenburgh,

Dr. Rodarte, found plaintiff suffered from major depressive disorder. (AR 414).

Throughout her course of treatment, Dr. Rodarte noted plaintiff was depressed and

sometimes suffered from suicidal thoughts. (AR 408-14). Dr. Rodarte changed

plaintiff’s medications several times in an attempt to treat her condition. Id.

The ALJ’s ruling provides scant analysis regarding the opinions of Drs.

Rodarte and Vandenburgh even though Dr. Rodarte treated plaintiff and Dr.

Vandenburgh examined plaintiff. In the hierarchy of medical opinions, Dr.

Vandenburgh’s opinion as an examining doctor is entitled to greater weight than Dr.

Leyton’s opinion as a non-examining doctor, and Dr. Rodarte’s and Dr. Martin’s

opinions are entitled to the greatest weight as treating doctors. Lester, 81 F.3d at

830. An ALJ can disregard the presumed hierarchy so long as it provides explicit

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830-31. Alternatively, an ALJ may rely on a non-examining doctor’s

opinion as substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent

evidence in the record. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.

2001).

Despite the scant analysis regarding Dr. Vandenburgh, the Court finds the

ALJ did not impliedly reject Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion. Indeed, the ALJ’s imposed

limitations – the limitations by which the ALJ and vocational expert assessed

whether or not plaintiff could perform jobs in local and national market – conformed

to Dr. Vandenburgh’s overall assessment of plaintiff’s conditions and capabilities

and surpassed the limitations Dr. Vandenburgh recommended. For example, Dr.

Vandenburgh opined plaintiff “would likely have slight/moderate difficulty

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completing tasks . . . outside of her home with people . . . due to panic disorder with

agoraphobia” (AR 345), and the ALJ limited plaintiff to jobs with “no public contact

[and] limited co-worker or supervisory interaction.” (AR 28). Therefore, the

conservative limitations imposed by the ALJ negate the facial inconsistencies

between the opinions of Drs. Vandenburgh and Leyton.

Moreover, no expert opined plaintiff’s depression or panic disorder

constituted a “marked” or “extreme” limitation on plaintiff’s ability to function in a

work environment. See 20 CFR § 416.925 (b)(ii). Plaintiff does not point to any

evidence in the record to invalidate or undermine the ALJ’s imposed limitations of

no public contact and limited co-worker or supervisory interaction. Thus, the ALJ

did not fail in his duty to fully and fairly develop the record. See Lusardi v. Astrue,

No. 08-35712, 2009 WL 3497739, at *2 (9th Cir. 2009). Although the ALJ found

the opinions of Drs. Vadenburgh and Leyton consistent even though the doctors

used different terms (major depression versus moderate depression), the ALJ’s

imposed limitations exceeded Dr. Vandenburgh’s recommended limitations.

Similarly, although the ALJ could have better articulated its reasoning (including the

weight he accorded Dr. Vandenburgh’s opinion), the ALJ’s failure was

inconsequential to his ultimate determination. See Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454

F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS plaintiff’s motion be DENIED and

defendant’s motion be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the

Court DENY plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANT the

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED no later than July 12, 2013 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than July 19, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver

of the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153,

1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2013

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

U.S. District Court

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