Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00909-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD B. SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD MILAN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-00682 JLT GSA (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

STATUS SHOULD NOT BE REVOKED 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)

PLAINTIFF’S SHOWING OF CAUSE DUE 

FEBRUARY 15, 2024

EDWARD B. SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. JASSO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-00909 NODJ GSA (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

STATUS SHOULD NOT BE REVOKED 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)

PLAINTIFF’S SHOWING OF CAUSE DUE 

FEBRUARY 15, 2024

EDWARD B. SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. PULIDO-ESPARZA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-1176 JLT GSA (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

STATUS SHOULD NOT BE REVOKED 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)

PLAINTIFF’S SHOWING OF CAUSE DUE 

FEBRUARY 15, 2024

Case 1:20-cv-00909-JLT-GSA Document 40 Filed 01/17/24 Page 1 of 11
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EDWARD B. SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. BARAJAS, et al.,

Defendant.

No. 1:23-cv-01033 NODJ GSA (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

STATUS SHOULD NOT BE REVOKED

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)

PLAINTIFF’S SHOWING OF CAUSE DUE 

FEBRUARY 15, 2024

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed the above 

captioned civil rights actions seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These matters have been

referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 

302.

Notwithstanding that each of the four cases referenced above is at a different stage of 

proceedings, for the reasons stated below Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why in each of 

these cases his in forma pauperis status should not be revoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

and he be required to pay their filing fees in full prior to proceeding further in all of them.

I. CASES AT ISSUE

The cases for which Plaintiff will be ordered to file a showing of cause are the following: 

(1) Spencer v. Milan, No. 1:20-cv-00682 JLT GSA (“Milan”); (2) Spencer v. Jasso, No. 1:20-cv00909 NODJ GSA (“Jasso”); (3) Spencer v. Pulido-Esparza, No. 1:20-cv-01176 JLT GSA 

(“Pulido-Esparza”), and (4) Spencer v. Barajas, No. 1:23-cv-01033 NODJ GSA (“Barajas”). The 

Court finds that each of these cases was brought after Plaintiff had acquired four strikes within 

the meaning of 28 USC 1915(g). Further, in the above referenced cases, Plaintiff was not in 

imminent danger of serious physical harm when he brought them. As a result, as established 

herein, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status (IFP) in the current referenced cases were improperly 

granted and must therefore be vacated in order to comply with 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).

II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

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“[In forma pauperis] status is not a constitutional right.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (brackets added); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) 

(“To proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.”). The grant or refusal of permission to 

proceed in forma pauperis is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Smart, 347 F.2d 

114, 116 (9th Cir. 1963) (citing Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963)). The latitude 

given a district court in such matters is especially broad in civil actions by prisoners against their 

wardens and other officials. Smart, 347 F.2d at 116 (footnote citation omitted); Shobe v. People 

of State of California, 362 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Smart). An inmate’s in forma 

pauperis status may be revoked at any time if the court, either sua sponte or on a motion,

determines that the status was improvidently granted. Keeton v. Marshall, No. CV 17-01213 

FMO (KS), 2018 WL 4381543, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018) (citation omitted); Owens v. 

Matthews, No. CV 16-07755 JFW (KS), 2017 WL 603183, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (stating 

same).

III. THREE STRIKES RULE: 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action

or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,

while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

“It is well-settled that, in determining a [Section] 1915(g) ‘strike,’ the reviewing court 

looks to the dismissing court’s action and the reasons underlying it.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 

F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (brackets added) (citation omitted). “[Section] 1915(g) should

be used to deny a prisoner’s in forma pauperis status only when, after careful evaluation of the 

order dismissing an action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the 

action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (brackets added). “[W]hen a district court disposes of 

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an in forma pauperis complaint ‘on the grounds that [the claim] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted,’ such a complaint is ‘dismissed’ for purposes of

§ 1915(g) even if the district court styles such dismissal as denial of the prisoner’s application to 

file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008) (second alteration in original). Dismissal also counts as a strike under § 1915(g) 

“when (1) a district court dismisses a complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim, (2) the 

court grants leave to amend, and (3) the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint” 

regardless of whether the case was dismissed with or without prejudice. Harris v. Mangum,

863 F.3d 1133, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2017).

An inmate who has accrued three strikes is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis 

unless he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). To 

satisfy the exception, the plaintiff must have alleged facts that demonstrate that he was “under

imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing the complaint. Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is the circumstances at the time of the

filing of the complaint that matters for purposes of the ‘imminent danger’ exception to §

1915(g).”); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312-14 (3rd Cir. 2001); Medberry

v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1999); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th 

Cir. 1998); Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998); Lipsey v. Allison, No. 1:21-cv00912 GSA, 2021 WL 2390424, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2021) (“The availability of the 

imminent danger exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint 

was filed, not at some earlier or later time.”).

The danger faced by a prisoner at the time of filing must be imminent or ongoing. See, 

e.g., Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193 (finding plaintiff was not in either imminent or ongoing 

danger and denying him ability to proceed in forma pauperis as three strikes litigant). 

“Imminent danger of serious physical injury must be a real and present threat, not merely 

speculative or hypothetical.” Lipsey, 2012 WL 2390424, at *3; Blackman v. Mjening, No. 

1:16-cv-01421 LJO GSA, 2016 WL 5815905, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016). In addition, “the 

imminent danger exception to the [Prison Litigation Reform Act’s] three-strikes provision 

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requires a nexus between the alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged in the 

complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2022) (brackets added).

IV. PLAINTIFF’S PRIOR STRIKES

A. Plaintiff’s Relevant Strikes

A review of court records reveals that at least four cases1brought by Plaintiff qualify as 

strikes under Section 1915(g).2 The Court takes judicial notice of the following lawsuits3

previously filed by Plaintiff and dismissed on grounds listed in Section 1915(g) prior to him 

bringing the currently pending Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas cases:

• Spencer v. Beeler, No. 1:13-cv-01624 JLO BAM (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (voluntary 

dismissal after case ordered dismissed for failure to state a claim, granting leave to 

amend);

• Spencer v. Kokor, No. 1:17-cv-00597 LJO JLT (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018) (voluntary 

dismissal after a finding by the assigned Magistrate Judge that the case failed to state a 

cognizable claim accompanied with a recommendation that Plaintiff not be granted 

leave to amend and that the case be dismissed with prejudice);

• Spencer v. Sherman, No. 1:17-cv-01025 LJO EPG (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018) 

(dismissed for failure to state a claim); and

1

 Although these four cases are sufficient to establish that Plaintiff has enough strikes to require 

that he pay the filing fee in full prior to filing Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas, Plaintiff 

also has three additional cases which were brought after the four matters currently before the 

Court, and which constitute strikes. They are: Spencer v. Edwards, 1:21-cv-1410 BAM (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 2, 2022) (voluntary dismissal after failure to state a claim determination); Spencer v. 

Smith, 1:21-cv-1646 EPG (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2022) (voluntary dismissal after failure to state a 

claim determination), and Spencer v. Fernandez, 1:23-cv-0397 ADA HBK (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 

2023) (voluntary dismissal after failure to state a claim determination). Moreover, because these 

three cases were dismissed after Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas had been brought by 

Plaintiff, the Court cannot consider them in Plaintiff’s strike calculation in this order. 

2

 Court records also reveal that since 2009, Plaintiff has filed over twenty civil rights matters in 

this district alone. The majority of them have been filed since 2017.

3

 The court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex

rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (court 

may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate determination by sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned).

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• Spencer v. Kokor, No. 1:17-cv-01561 LJO BAM (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2018) (dismissed 

for failure to state a claim).

B. Plaintiff’s Voluntary Dismissals: Beeler and Kokor

Two of the four cases above – Beeler and Kokor – were voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff 

after the Court had screened them and had determined that each failed to state claims upon which 

relief could be granted. For reasons set forth below these cases constitute strikes within the 

meaning of Section 1915(g).

1. Beeler (13cv1624)

In Beeler, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to state any 

claims upon which relief could be granted. See Beeler, ECF No. 11 at 5-7 (Court’s screening 

order finding failure to state claim). As a result, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. See id. at 

7. However, instead of amending the complaint, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the matter 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). See Beeler, ECF No. 12 (Plaintiff’s 

subsequently filed voluntary dismissal).

2. Kokor (17cv597)

After the complaint in Kokor was screened, it was determined that Plaintiff had failed to 

state claims upon which relief could be granted. Kokor, ECF No. 8 at 3-7. Consequently, 

Plaintiff was given leave to amend. Id. at 8. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. 

Kokor, ECF No. 10. In the second screening order it was recommended that the matter be 

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Kokor, ECF No. 15 (screening and findings 

and recommendations). In Plaintiff’s objections to those findings and recommendations, Plaintiff 

specifically requested that the Court dismiss the entire matter without prejudice pursuant to Rule 

41(a) so that “he would not have a strike against him.” Kokor, ECF No. 18 at 1-2. Although 

under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(1) parties may voluntarily dismiss their actions without a court order, in 

response, the Court issued an order granting Plaintiff’s request to dismiss. Kokor, ECF No. 19 at 

3.

3. Beeler and Kokor Are Section 1915(g) Strikes

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In Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2017), the Harris Court addressed the 

question of whether certain earlier cases filed by the plaintiff that had been screened and later 

dismissed, constituted strikes. See id. 863 F.3d at 1141-44. Ultimately, after considering several 

of the plaintiff’s cases alleged to be strikes, the Court held that when a complaint is dismissed on 

the grounds that it fails to state a claim, but with leave to amend, and the plaintiff subsequently 

fails to file an amended complaint, the court’s dismissal of the case constitutes a strike within the 

meaning of Section 1915(g). Harris, 863 F.3d at 1143. 

The Harris Court clearly stated:

A prisoner may not avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage 

of these opportunities to amend. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that we 

interpret § 1915(g) so as to “further[ ] Congress’s intent to screen out frivolous 

complaints by precluding prisoners from submitting and endless stream of frivolous 

in forma pauperis complaints.”

Harris, 863 F.3d at 1143 (brackets in original) (quoting O’Neal, 531 F.3d at 1152).

The Harris Court also stated:

The dismissal of each of Harris’s prior actions “rang the [Prison Litigation 

Reform Act’s] bells of . . . failure to state a claim,” even if the “procedural posture” 

meant that the entry of judgment in each case was delayed until it became clear that 

Harris would not file an amended complaint that did state a claim. . . . His failure 

to file an amended complaint did not negate the determination already made by the 

court that the complaint he had filed, and on which he effectively elected to stand, 

failed to state a claim.

Harris, 863 F.3d at 1142 (brackets added) (italics added) (comparison omitted) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissals of Beeler and Kokor after they had been screened and 

found to fail to state claims upon which relief could be granted were – by Plaintiff’s own 

admission in Kokor –done in order to avoid the cases being determined strikes under Section 

1915(g). Importantly, in both cases there was a judicial finding that Plaintiff had failed to state a 

cognizable claim before he chose to voluntarily dismiss them. By logical extension of the Harris

case, Plaintiff cannot simply voluntarily dismiss his own case in order to avoid them becoming 

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Section 1915(g) strikes. The fact that in Harris the plaintiff’s prior strike cases had been 

dismissed by the court after he failed to amend them, contrasted with what happened here where 

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his deficient Beeler and Kokor matters-- is a distinction without a 

difference. “When [] review[ing] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 

of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial.” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (brackets added); see Windham v. Franklin, No. 1:16-cv-05888 SVW JEM, 

2018 WL 1626250, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018) (referencing Harris and stating technical 

reason for dismissal irrelevant under Section 1915(g)).

In sum, in both Beeler and Kokor Plaintiff specifically attempted to avoid incurring 

strikes by employing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure sec 41(a)(1), which were employed only 

after a finding in each that Plaintiff had failed to state a cognizable claim. For this reason

Harris, by logical extension, supports the conclusion that the voluntary dismissal in Beeler and 

Kokor by Plaintiff, occurring only after it had been judicially determined that Plaintiff had failed 

to state a cognizable claim, constitute strikes.

4

4

 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in Spencer v. Beard, No. 1:19-cv-01615 DAD 

HBK (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2023) (“Beard”), another one of Plaintiff’s cases filed in the Eastern 

District, the district judge assigned to that matter disagreed that Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal 

after the Court’s finding of a failure to state a claim in Beeler constituted a Section 1915(g) strike. 

See Beard, ECF Nos. 19, 29 at 2-3 (Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis 

status; order denying same, respectively). As a result, the Beard Court declined to revoke 

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. Beard, ECF No. 29 at 3. However, and although admittedly

a close call, the undersigned finds the following cases which come to a contrary conclusion to be

persuasive: Chambers v Laske, 2018 US Dist Lexis 109466; Sumner v. Tucker, 9 F. Supp. 2d 

641, 643-44 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating voluntary dismissal does not relieve plaintiff of 

consequences of filing frivolous action under Section 1915(g)); Garrett v. Diaz, 3:21-cv-00265 

WQH MDD, 2021 WL 3209913, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2021) (counting voluntary dismissal as 

strike under Section 1915(g)); Williams v. Paramo, No. 3:17-cv-02596 MMA BLM, 2018 WL 

11271064, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2018) (counting plaintiff’s voluntary dismissals as strikes 

under Section 1915(g)); Meador v. Brown, No. 2:18-cv-00696 KJM AC, 2018 WL 2688131, at 

*5 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2018) (stating irrespective of voluntary dismissal, pre-dismissal findings 

and recommendations that filing was improper “rang the PLRA bells” of frivolousness and failure 

to state a claim and counting voluntary dismissal as strike); Heilman v. Deillen, No. CV 14-6298 

JVS (FFM), 2017 WL 10591881, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2017) (“[I]t would frustrate the 

purposes of Section 1915(g) if plaintiff avoided a strike merely because he, rather than the court, 

instigated the dismissal of an action that he acknowledged was non-viable.”); Blaisdell v. Hawaii 

Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 12-00554 LEK BMK, 2012 WL 5996797, at *3 (D. Haw. Nov. 30, 

2012) (collecting cases) (stating permitting plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss complaint would 

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V. DISCUSSION

A. The Four Current Actions were Brought After Three Strikes Accrued

Plaintiff’s Milan case, the first of the four cases filed after Plaintiff had accumulated the 

four strikes listed above, was brought5on May 5, 2020.6 See Milan, ECF No. 1 at 6 (signature 

and date page of complaint). Jasso was brought on June 29, 2020. See Jasso, ECF No. 1 at 6. 

Pulido-Esparza was brought on August 20, 2020. See Pulido-Esparza, ECF No. 1 at 6. Barajas

was brought on July 7, 2023. See Barajas, ECF No. 1 at 5. Because the above-referenced four

strike cases were dismissed before Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas were brought before 

the Court, as a three strikes litigant, Plaintiff was required to pay the filing fee in full for each of 

these cases prior to proceeding in them unless, at the time that he brought them, he alleged and 

made an adequate showing that he was in imminent danger of serious physical harm. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) (serious physical harm requirement).

B. No Imminent Danger Alleged in Instant Cases

A review of the complaints in Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas indicates that 

Plaintiff did not make plausible allegations of imminent danger of serious physical harm in any of 

them. See generally Milan, ECF No. 17; Jasso, ECF No. 1; Pulido-Esparza, ECF No. 1; Barajas, 

frustrate Congress’s purpose in enacting the PLRA, namely, to discourage prisoners from filing 

baseless lawsuits and to deter “frivolous prisoner gamesmanship”); see generally Grindling v. 

Hawaii, No. 09-00536 JMS BMK, 2009 WL 4857399, at *1 (D. Haw. Dec. 16, 2009) (collecting 

cases) (referencing PLRA and stating to permit plaintiff to dismiss matter after court had 

expended considerable energy reviewing claims in complaint would frustrate Congress’s aim of 

deterring frivolous prisoner litigation).

5

 “[A] plaintiff has ‘brought’ an action for the purposes of § 1915(g) when he submits a 

complaint and request to proceed in forma pauperis to the court.” O’Neal, 531 F.3d at 1152.

6

 The signing date of a pleading is the earliest possible filing date pursuant to the mailbox rule. 

See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 769 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating constructive filing date for 

prisoner giving pleading to prison authorities is date pleading is signed); Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 

F.3d 1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005).

7

 In Milan, Plaintiff asserts that the dining facility at California Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility was infested with “vermin, roaches, black mold and contaminated water,” and that this 

posed “an immediate and imminent threat to his health and safety.” Milan, ECF No. 1 at 7. He 

also claims that he “was and continues to be sickened by the unabated filth and unsanitary 

conditions in which his food was prepared, handled and served.” Id. at 16, ¶ 81. Plaintiff, 

however, fails to explain how these alleged conditions put him at risk of imminent serious 

physical injury. See generally Milan, ECF No. 1 (complaint). “Courts . . . deny leave to proceed 

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ECF No. 1. Because he was not in imminent danger of serious physical harm when he brought 

these four matters, Section 1915(g) precludes him from proceeding in them without first paying 

the filing fees for each one in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). However, to be fair to the Plaintiff, 

prior to preparing an Finding and Recommendation that he do so, Plaintiff will first be given an 

opportunity via an order to show cause to show/explain why he was not a three strikes litigant 

within the meaning of Section 1915(g) at the time that he brought Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, 

and Barajas before this Court.

VI. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is currently proceeding with in forma pauperis status in Milan, Jasso, PulidoEsparza, and Barajas, all of which are currently being considered by this Court. Prior to filing

these cases, the Court has determined that Plaintiff had accumulated four strikes in previous cases 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In addition, a review of the complaints in Milan, 

Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas demonstrate that when Plaintiff brought each of them, he did 

not allege plausible claims of imminent danger of serious physical harm. As a result, he is 

required under Section 1915(g) to pay the filing fee in full for each of them prior to proceeding 

any further in them.

Therefore, Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why he should not be required to pay 

the filing fee in full for Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and Barajas. Plaintiff will be given thirty 

[in forma pauperis] when a prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous.” 

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003) (brackets added) (citations omitted); see, 

e.g., Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2003) (refusing to find an “imminent danger” 

based upon conclusory assertions).

Plaintiff’s allegations in Milan are insufficient to establish that he was in imminent danger 

of serious physical harm, and his assertion of “immediate and imminent threat to his safety” from 

exposure to vermin, roaches, black mold, and contaminated water is wholly speculative. See, 

e.g., Palanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of in forma pauperis 

status where prisoner alleged speculative health risks associated with mold exposure); Wilson v. 

Cisnerous, No. 1:21-cv-01455 EPG, 2021 WL 4493556, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2021) 

(plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that alleged exposure to mold, dust, parasites put him in 

imminent danger of serious physical harm noted, leading to finding no imminent danger existed at 

time action was brought); Herbaugh v. San Diego Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:18-cv-01899 JLS NLS, 

2018 WL 5024802, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (finding plaintiff’s assertions that exposure to 

foul odors, bugs, and vermin placed him in imminent danger of serious physical injury 

implausible).

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days to do so. Should Plaintiff fail to timely file showings of cause for these cases, or fail to 

establish why he is not a three strikes litigant within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), it will 

be recommended that his current in forma pauperis status in each of these cases be revoked.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why his in forma pauperis status should not be 

REVOKED in the following cases:

• Spencer v. Milan, No. 1:20-cv-00682 JLT GSA;

• Spencer v. Jasso, No. 1:20-cv-00909 NODJ GSA;

• Spencer v. Pulido-Esparza, No. 1:20-cv-01176 JLT GSA; and

• Spencer v. Barajas, No. 1:23-cv-01033 NODJ GSA.

2. Within thirty days from the date of this order – February 19, 2024, – Plaintiff shall 

file his showing of cause;

3. The showing of cause must be one pleading which addresses whether the following 

previously adjudicated cases are strikes within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g):

• Spencer v. Beeler, No. 1:13-cv-01624 JLO BAM (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014);

• Spencer v. Kokor, No. 1:17-cv-00597 LJO JLT (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018);

• Spencer v. Sherman, No. 1:17-cv-01025 LJO EPG (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); and

• Spencer v. Kokor, No. 1:17-cv-01561 LJO BAM (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2018).

4. Plaintiff must file the same, one showing of cause in Milan, Jasso, Pulido-Esparza, and 

Barajas, and file them simultaneously.

Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to adhere to the instructions in this order may 

result in recommendations that the matters be dismissed for failure to obey court orders. 

Plaintiff is further cautioned that absent exigent circumstances, requests for extensions of 

time to file the showings of cause will not be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2024 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:20-cv-00909-JLT-GSA Document 40 Filed 01/17/24 Page 11 of 11