Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00806/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Motor Vehicle Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TARA D. SALLEE, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:13-CV-806-WKW

 ) [WO]

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants have removed this action for the second time pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1446(b)(3), alleging that the Amended Complaint and a 

recently received affidavit show that this action is within the court’s original 

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Before the court is Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 17.) The motion is fully briefed (Docs. # 17, 22, 24), 

and the matter is ready for adjudication. Based upon the arguments of counsel and 

the relevant law, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is due to be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

The Plaintiffs are: (1) Tara D. Sallee, the administratrix of the estate of her 

deceased sister, Latonya Joyce Sallee (“Sallee”), and personal representative and 

next of friend of G.T., the minor child of Sallee; and (2) Ed Parish, Jr., the 

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administrator of the estate of deceased Derrick Sagers (“Sagers”), and personal 

representative and next friend of K.N.S., the minor child of Sagers (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs are citizens of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).

The Defendants are Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), Bridgestone Americas, 

Inc., Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, doing business as Firestone 

(“Bridgestone Defendants”), Woodmere Motors, Inc. (“Woodmere”), and M&D 

Automotive, Inc. (“M&D Automotive”). The Bridgestone Defendants and Ford 

are not citizens of Alabama, but Woodmere and M&D Automotive are. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

B. Facts as Alleged in the Amended Complaint

This case arises from an accident in July 2011 involving a 1995 Ford 

Explorer, bearing a Bridgestone tire also manufactured in 1995. Woodmere sold 

the vehicle to Sagers. 

In December 2008, after Woodmere sold the Ford Explorer to Sagers but 

before the accident, Woodmere filed articles of dissolution with the Alabama 

Secretary of State. Just days before the July 2011 accident, M&D Automotive 

entered the picture. It inspected the vehicle and the sixteen-year-old tire, 

previously serving as a spare, and installed the tire without warning Sagers of its 

allegedly defective condition. 

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Days later, Sagers and Sallee headed north from the Montgomery, Alabama

area on Interstate 85. Shortly after they crossed into Georgia, the tire detreaded. 

Sagers, who was driving, lost control of the vehicle, and both Sagers and Sallee

died. 

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs originally brought suit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery 

County, Alabama. The Bridgestone Defendants – with Ford’s consent – removed 

this action to this court on December 14, 2012, on the basis that Woodmere and 

M&D Automotive were fraudulently joined to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction

and that, in their absence, complete diversity existed (“First Removal”). See

§ 1441(a) (allowing removal of civil actions over which the district courts have 

original jurisdiction); § 1332(a) (defining original jurisdiction as including civil 

actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete 

diversity). Plaintiffs moved to remand on January 11, 2013, arguing there was no 

fraudulent joinder, and therefore complete diversity was lacking. This court 

granted Plaintiffs’ motion on June 27, 2013, and remanded the case back to 

Montgomery County Circuit Court. See Sallee v. Ford Motor Co., 2:12-CV-1086-

WKW, 2013 WL 3280325 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2013) (order granting remand). It 

found that although Woodmere indisputably dissolved in 2008, its dissolution did

not prevent Plaintiffs’ claims against it; thus, it was unnecessary to analyze the 

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allegedly fraudulent joinder of M&D Automotive because Woodmere’s presence 

defeated diversity jurisdiction. 

On October 10, 2013, in state court Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their 

Complaint to reflect that Ed Parish, Jr., had been substituted for Mary Coleman as 

the administrator of the estate of Sagers and as the personal representative and next 

friend of K.N.S. On October 23, 2013, Plaintiffs’ motion was granted, and the 

Amended Complaint was allowed.

The Bridgestone Defendants filed their Second Notice of Removal (“Second 

Removal”) in this court on October 30, 2013 (Doc. # 2), on the basis of the 

Amended Complaint and an affidavit the Bridgestone Defendants received from

John Fitzgerald, the former president and director of Woodmere, a non-diverse coDefendant. In the affidavit (“Fitzgerald Affidavit”), Fitzgerald states that 

Woodmere was a wholesaler at the time it owned and sold the subject vehicle. 

Fitzgerald alleges that Woodmere neither made any inspection of the subject 

vehicle nor gave any warranties at the time of the sale. (Doc. # 2, Ex. E.) The 

Bridgestone Defendants argue that this new information demonstrates that there is 

no possibility that Plaintiffs can prove their claims against Woodmere due to its 

status as a wholesaler. (Doc. # 2, at 5.)

The court finds this case in its lap again as predicted; though unexpectedly, 

Defendants make the same substantive arguments regarding their fraudulent 

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joinder argument – that Woodmere and M&D Automotive are fraudulently joined

defendants, though their arguments regarding Woodmere are slightly different.

1

Plaintiffs have moved to remand for a second time, and that motion is pending. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that § 1332(a)’s amount-in-controversy requirement is 

met; however, they again argue against a finding of fraudulent joinder. Before the 

substance of the fraudulent joinder argument can be addressed, Defendants must 

meet the procedural requirements of removal according to § 1446(b)(3).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Generally

“[F]ederal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is 

conferred upon them by Congress.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 

706, 716 (1996). However, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” 

Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, with 

respect to cases removed to this court pursuant to § 1441, the law of the Eleventh 

Circuit favors remand where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. 

“[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash 

about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.” Id. at 1095.

 1

 Defendants contend that “since this Court previously did not address whether M&D is 

a fraudulently joined defendant, that argument remains a basis for removal.” (Defs.’ Second 

Not. of Removal Doc. # 2, at 5.)

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B. Removal

When a case is removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, a successful 

removal requires a defendant to jump through both procedural and substantive 

hoops. As to the procedural hoop, the removing party must satisfy the “how” and 

“when” dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. See Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 

F.3d 744, 756 (11th Cir. 2010). Section 1446(a), which “answers the question of 

how removal is accomplished,” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1212

(11th Cir. 2007), provides that a removing defendant “shall file in the district court 

of the United States for the district and division within which such action is 

pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for 

removal . . . .” § 1446(a).

Section 1446(b) “answers the question of when an action is removable.” 

Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1212. It “governs the timeliness of removal in civil cases.” 

Pretka, 608 F.3d at 756. It is well established that “[t]he untimeliness of a removal 

is a procedural, instead of a jurisdictional, defect.” In re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire 

Co., 104 F.3d 322, 324 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 

F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010). Section 1446(b) contains two subsections that 

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are relevant to the discussion in this case.

2 Under § 1446(b)(1), a defendant may 

rely on the initial pleading, filing a notice of removal “after the receipt by the 

defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for 

relief . . . .” § 1446(b)(1). However, if the initial pleading does not provide 

grounds for removal, a defendant may later file under § 1446(b)(3) a notice of 

removal “after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, 

motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is 

one which is or has become removable.” § 1446(b)(3).

C. Remand

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides, in relevant part: “A motion to remand the 

case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must 

be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 

1446(a).” § 1447(c). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id. As 

explained in Lowery, “§ 1447(c) distinguishes between motions to remand made 

within the first thirty days following removal, and challenges to subject matter 

jurisdiction brought after that time.” 483 F.3d at 1213 n.64. “Plaintiffs have only 

thirty days from the notice of removal to file a motion to remand challenging any 

procedural defects in the removal.” Id. In other words, “[t]here is only a thirty-

 2 Prior to the statute’s revision in December 2011, § 1446(b) was divided into two 

paragraphs. The second paragraph is now the current § 1446(b)(3).

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day window . . . for a plaintiff to challenge the propriety of the removal itself, 

whether that challenge be on the basis of a procedural defect or a lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs make two arguments in support of their motion to remand. They

argue, first, that Defendants have failed to meet the procedural requirements for 

removal and, second, that Defendants have not demonstrated the fraudulent joinder 

of Woodmere and M&D Automotive such that complete diversity is lacking. 

Because the procedural inquiry is dispositive, it is unnecessary to address the 

parties’ substantive arguments regarding fraudulent joinder. 

The parties do not dispute that this is a § 1446(b)(3) removal and that 

Plaintiffs timely filed their Motion to Remand within the thirty-day window. 

Rather, the issue is whether the removal comports with the procedural 

requirements of § 1446(b)(3) as dictated by Lowery.

Section 1446(b)(3) states that a “notice of removal may be filed within 30 

days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an 

amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 

ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” § 1446(b)(3)

(emphasis added). Lowery, which involved a removal under the second paragraph 

of § 1446(b) (now § 1446(b)(3)), has compartmentalized this inquiry into three 

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elements: “[T]here must be (1) ‘an amended pleading, motion, order or other 

paper,’ which (2) the defendant must have received from the plaintiff (or from the 

court, if the document is an order) and from which (3) the defendant can ‘first 

ascertain’ that federal jurisdiction exists.” 483 F.3d at 1213 n.63 (emphasis added)

(quoting § 1446(b)). All three conditions must be present.

A. The Fitzgerald Affidavit

The second element of the Lowery inquiry pertaining to the “receipt from the 

plaintiff” rule is pivotal when analyzing whether the Fitzgerald Affidavit triggered 

the removal clock. Plaintiffs argue that the Fitzgerald Affidavit did not provide a 

basis for removal because it was not received from Plaintiffs. Defendants respond 

that § 1446(b)(3) does not mandate that the “other paper” be received from 

Plaintiffs. 

An understanding of the “receipt from the plaintiff” rule requires discussion 

of Pretka. In Pretka, the Eleventh Circuit held that, as to removals based on 

§ 1446(b)’s first paragraph (now § 1446(b)(1)), no limitations exist as to the 

evidence a federal court may consider when the removal is timely. In so holding, 

Pretka rejected Lowery’s dicta that a removal under the first paragraph of 

§ 1446(b) must be based on a document received from the plaintiff. See 608 F.3d 

at 761 (“Lowery’s ‘receipt from the plaintiff’ rule has no application to cases . . . , 

which are removed under the first paragraph of § 1446(b)). Hence, under 

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§ 1446(b)(1), “the evidence the defendant may use to establish the jurisdictional 

facts is not limited to that which it received from the plaintiff or the court.” Id. at 

768.

The Eleventh Circuit emphasized in Pretka that it was considering a removal 

under the first paragraph of § 1446(b) (now § 1446(b)(1)). Id. at 747. The Second 

Removal in this case, as in Lowery, occurred under § 1446’s provision that reopens 

the removal period for thirty days when the defendant receives a document “from 

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 

removable.” § 1446(b)(3). The Second Removal is not a § 1446(b) first-paragraph 

removal (now § 1446(b)(1)) as in Pretka. The procedure for when an action is 

removable under the second paragraph of the former § 1446(b) (now § 1446(b)(3))

is not controlled by the decision in Pretka. 

Defendants nonetheless contend that Pretka’s “discussion of the purpose of 

the removal process is not limited to first paragraph removals,” and that Lowery

should be limited to its facts. (Doc. # 22, at 5–6.) To be sure, Pretka narrowed 

Lowery’s breadth by rejecting as dicta Lowery’s statement that the “receipt from 

the plaintiff” rule applied to § 1446(b) first-paragraph removals, given that Lowery

“was not a first paragraph removal case.” 608 F.3d at 762; see id. at 767 (“Lowery

is a case in which the removal arose under the second paragraph of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(b),” and “we are not persuaded that its rule should apply to § 1446(b) first 

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paragraph removals.”). Pretka found ample reason to distinguish between 

Lowery’s second-paragraph removal and the first-paragraph removal with which it 

was confronted for purposes of the “receipt from the plaintiff” rule. See, e.g., 

Pretka, 608 F.3d at 760 (contrasting the different language in the first and second 

paragraphs of § 1446(b)). But at the same time, Pretka did not encroach upon 

Lowery’s “receipt from the plaintiff” rule as Lowery applied it to the secondparagraph removal before it.

On the contrary, Pretka shored up the (b)(3) Lowery holding by reiterating 

the traditional rule that “only a voluntary act by the plaintiff may convert a nonremovable case into a removable one.” Id. at 761. “[A]n initially non-removable 

case ‘cannot be converted into a removable one by evidence of the 

defendant . . . .’” Id. (citing Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co., 287 

F. 2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1961). Defendants’ citation to Lambertson v. Go Fit, LLC, 

918 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2013), does not persuade otherwise. 

Defendants cite Lambertson for its statement that “[t]he definition of ‘other paper’ 

is broad and may include any formal or informal communication received by a 

defendant.” Id. Defendants’ brief disregards, however, the fact that the disputed 

“other paper” in Lambertson was received by the defendant from the plaintiff. 

Lambertson addressed whether the plaintiff’s pre-suit demand package or the 

plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s request for admissions could be considered 

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“other paper,” as contemplated by § 1446(b)(3). Both documents were received 

from the plaintiff by the defendant, and thus, Lambertson is consistent with 

Lowery’s “receipt from the plaintiff” rule. 

If a principled reason exists for distinguishing the type of removal in this 

case from the type of removal in Lowery for purposes of applying the “receipt from 

the plaintiff” rule, the Bridgestone Defendants have not argued it.3

 Absent any 

other argument from Defendants or a decision from the Eleventh Circuit in a 

§ 1446(b)(3) removal case further narrowing Lowery’s “receipt from the plaintiff”

rule, Lowery’s rule will be applied in this § 1446(b)(3) removal. See Jackson v. 

Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 09cv1165, 2010 WL 3168117, at *4 (M.D. Ala. 

Aug. 10, 2010) (“Until the Eleventh Circuit changes the rule set forth in Lowery, 

this Court will continue to apply it when considering a notice of removal under the 

second paragraph of § 1446(b).”); accord Williams v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 

No. 10cv951, 2011 WL 521624, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 15, 2011).

Here, the Bridgestone Defendants received the Fitzgerald Affidavit from the 

former president of Woodmere, one of the non-diverse defendants. This affidavit 

 3

 In another case, removed under § 1446(b)(3), the defendant tried to distinguish Lowery, 

but without success, by suggesting that Lowery’s “interpretation of §1446’s procedural 

requirements only applies to removals based upon the amount in controversy requirement,” not 

the diversity of parties requirement. Maxwell v. E–Z–Go, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214 n.2 (M.D. 

Ala. 2012). The district court rejected the argument, noting that § 1446(b)(3) “makes no 

distinction between the procedural requirements for amount in controversy and fraudulent 

joinder removals,” and that “Lowery itself does not limit its discussion to removals based upon 

the amount in controversy.” Id.

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was not received from Plaintiffs and, thus, violates Lowery’s “receipt from the 

plaintiff” rule. See 483 F.3d at 1213. Because Defendants did not receive the 

affidavit from Plaintiffs, it cannot be considered “other paper,” and, therefore, the 

Fitzgerald Affidavit does not satisfy the requirements of § 1446(b)(3). Removal 

based on the affidavit was not proper.4

 

B. The Amended Complaint and New Information

The third element of the Lowery inquiry is dispositive when analyzing 

whether the Amended Complaint is a proper removal document. While 

§ 1446(b)(3) permits removal based upon “an amended pleading,” Plaintiffs argue

that Defendants’ reliance on the Amended Complaint as an alternative basis for 

removal is improper because the Amended Complaint does not provide any new 

information sufficient for Defendants to “first intelligently ascertain that this action 

is removable.” (Doc. # 17, at 12.) Defendants contend, however, that “only after 

analyzing the allegations in the Amended Complaint in light of the evidence in this 

 4 Even assuming that the “receipt from the plaintiff” rule did not apply and that the 

Fitzgerald Affidavit qualified as “other paper” under § 1446(b)(3), the Bridgestone Defendants 

have not demonstrated that the information contained in the affidavit was not available to them 

prior to the First Removal. The Bridgestone Defendants cite no authority for their suggestion 

that for purposes of removal, they were entitled to wait to “beg[i]n their investigation in earnest”

of Woodmere’s joinder until after this court rejected their initial argument for Woodmere’s 

fraudulent joinder asserted as the basis for the First Removal. See Taylor Newman Cabinetry, 

Inc. v. Classic Soft Trim, Inc., 436 F. App’x 888, 893 (11th Cir. 2011) (observing that the 

removal was untimely under § 1446(b)(3) when there was “no reason” that the removing 

defendants could not have obtained discovery earlier revealing the allegedly fraudulent joinder of 

the non-diverse defendant). Hence, the removal based upon the Fitzgerald Affidavit is not timely 

for this additional reason.

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case, including the Fitzgerald affidavit . . . , did it become clear this case had 

become removable.” (Doc. # 22, at 3.)

As discussed above, Defendants cannot rely on the Fitzgerald Affidavit since 

it does not satisfy the “receipt from the plaintiff” rule, and thus, Defendants must

rely on the Amended Complaint. In order for removal to be procedurally proper, 

Defendants must establish that the new information in Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Complaint allowed Defendants to “‘first ascertain’ that federal jurisdiction exists.” 

Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213 n.63.

The Amended Complaint contains two amendments. First, it substitutes Ed 

Parish, Jr. (“Parish”) as the administrator of the estate of Sagers, and as personal 

representative and next friend of K.N.S., the minor child of Sagers. Where an 

estate is a party, the citizenship that counts for diversity purposes is that of the 

decedent. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); see also King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 

1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007). The decedent is alleged to be a citizen of Alabama,

and thus, this amendment does not provide any new information relevant to the 

citizenship of the parties. Second, the Amended Complaint includes a new

demand for relief, but at no time have Plaintiffs denied that the amount in 

controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum; hence, this amendment likewise 

fails to provide new information relevant to whether federal jurisdiction exists. 

Indeed, Defendants have failed to point to any new information in the Amended 

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Complaint from which it can be “first ascertained” that federal jurisdiction exists. 

§ 1446(b)(3).

Accordingly, the removal is procedurally improper, and the case is due to be 

remanded. Because the procedural requirements are dispositive, it is unnecessary 

to discuss the substantive arguments relating to fraudulent joinder.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have failed to satisfy the procedural 

requirements for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) as required by Lowery. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. # 17) is 

GRANTED, and that this action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of 

Montgomery, Alabama. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to take appropriate 

steps to effectuate the remand.

DONE this day 16th of April, 2014.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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