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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 1996 Decided April 22, 1997

No. 95-5323

DAVID E. SKAGGS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ROBIN H. CARLE, CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv00251)

Louis R. Cohen argued the cause for appellants, with whom

Lloyd N. Cutler, Jonathan J. Frankel, Bruce A. Ackerman

and David A. Westbrook were on the briefs.

Kerry W. Kircher, Senior Assistant Counsel, U.S. House of 

Representatives, argued the cause for appellee, with whom 

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Geraldine R. Gennet, Deputy General Counsel, was on the 

brief.

David G. Leitch, Amy F. Kett, Daniel J. Popeo and Paul 

D. Kamenar were on the brief for amici curiae Washington 

Legal Foundation, et al.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS, and GINSBURG, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The appellants, a group comprising 27 Members of the United States House of Representatives, six of their constituents, and the League of Women 

Voters, appeal the judgment of the district court dismissing 

their challenge to two rules of the House of Representatives. 

The appellants claim that the rules violate the Constitution of 

the United States by infringing upon the rights of the individual Representatives to speak, to be heard, and to be counted. 

Because the injury that the appellants allege is hypothetical 

rather than actual, they lack standing to pursue this case. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 4, 1995 the House of Representatives adopted 

House Rules XXI(5)(c) and XXI (5)(d). The former provides 

that: "No bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference 

report carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be 

considered as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a 

vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting." 

The latter provides that: "It shall not be in order to consider 

any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report 

carrying a retroactive Federal income tax rate increase."

The appellants brought suit challenging the constitutionality of each rule. See Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 

1995). They argued that the three-fifths majority required 

by Rule XXI(5)(c) is repugnant to the principle of majority 

rule they see embodied in the presentment clause of Article I, 

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§ 7 of the Constitution ("Every Bill which shall have passed 

the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it 

becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United 

States"). As for Rule XXI(5)(d), they argued both that it 

unconstitutionally precludes the House from considering legislation upon which it is empowered by Article I, § 8 to act, 

and that it abridges the first amendment rights of the individual Members to speak and, on behalf of their constituents, to 

petition on the floor of the House.

Robin H. Carle, the Clerk of the House, moved to dismiss 

the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, 

concluding that prudence counsels against deciding the merits 

of a partisan political dispute:

Whether expressed in terms of a failure of standing, or 

"equitable" or "remedial" discretion, the fundamental 

consideration underlying those decisions is one of prudent self-restraint: federal courts should generally refrain, as a matter of policy, from intruding in the name of 

the Constitution upon the internal affairs of Congress at 

the behest of lawmakers who have failed to prevail in the 

political process.

Id at 2. The court also dismissed the voters' derivative 

claims: To allow the voters to raise the claims of their 

Representatives, the court reasoned, "is an all-too-facile expedient to circumvent the doctrine of equitable discretion, and 

to subvert altogether the holdings of the line of discretionary 

abstention cases." Id. at 3. The plaintiffs appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

The appellants call upon the court to consider the constitutionality of two rules governing the internal workings of a 

coordinate branch of the Government. The appellants maintain that we are both authorized and competent to perform 

this task: The harm worked by the Rulesdiluting the 

Representatives' votes and diminishing their ability to advocate a positionis apparent, as is the command of the Constitution that we remedy that harm. The Clerk responds, 

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among other things, that the appellants lack standing because 

they have suffered no concrete injury.

A. Rule XXI(5)(c)

According to the appellants, the presentment clause establishes that a simple majority of the Members voting in each 

House of the Congress is all that is needed to pass a bill. 

Therefore, we are told, by providing that legislation carrying 

an income tax increase will not be considered to have passed 

in the House even if it receives the support of a majority (but 

not of a three-fifths majority), Rule XXI(5)(c) runs afoul of 

the presentment clause.

The Clerk contends that the appellants lack standing to 

raise this challenge because they have suffered no injury by 

reason of Rule XXI(5)(c) and are unlikely ever to do so. The 

House has never failed to deem passed a bill that has 

received the support of a simple majority and it is unclear 

whether the House will ever do so.

In order to establish their standing to sue under Article III 

of the Constitution, the appellants must show that: (1) they 

have suffered an injury that is both "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not "conjectural' or "hypothetical' "; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of 

which they complain; and (3) the injury is likely to be 

redressed by a court decision in their favor. Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The 

appellants bear the burden of establishing each element. Id.

at 560-561. A Representative, like any other plaintiff, must 

satisfy each requirementinjury in fact, causation, and redressabilityannounced in Lujan. See Boehner v. Anderson,

30 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The appellants claim that Rule XXI(5)(c) injures them in 

fact because it dilutes the vote of each Representative in the 

same manner as did the rule challenged in Michel v. 

Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In that case a group 

of Representatives and voters challenged the House Rule 

giving each territorial delegate a vote in the Committee of the 

Whole. The Representatives claimed that they were each 

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entitled to cast one of no more than 435 votes in the Committee and that the rule injured them by diluting each of their 

votes to one of 440. The voters raised the derivative claim 

that they had been deprived of a Representative entitled to 

cast one of only 435 votes. We held that, even if the doctrine 

of equitable discretion blocked the Representatives' challenge, 

the voters had standing to complain about the dilution of their 

representation; they had alleged a concrete injury.

The present appellants argue that, just as the voters in 

Michel had standing to challenge the dilution of a Member's 

vote to one of 440 that could be cast in the Committee of the 

Whole, so too do they have standing to challenge the dilution 

of a Representative's vote from one of 218 to one of 261 

needed (assuming that all 435 Members vote) for the House 

to pass an income tax increase. The injury is neither conjectural nor hypothetical, they say, because the House has 

already taken several votes that were subject to Rule 

XXI(5)(c). According to the appellants, it is immaterial that 

Rule XXI(5)(c) did not affect the outcome of any such vote, 

i.e., there was not even a simple majority in favor of an 

income tax increase; it is enough under Michel, they argue, 

that the vote of each Member is in some way diluted. In 

addition the appellants assert (without elaboration) that Rule 

XXI(5)(c) reduces each lawmaker's power to bargain with his 

or her colleagues in order to pass an income tax increase

presumably because each Member can now offer only 1/261st 

of the votes needed.

The Clerk responds that the plaintiffs in Michel would have 

suffered a concrete injury, namely the dilution of their Representatives' votes, as soon as a vote was taken in the Committee of the Whole, and it was certain that such a vote would be 

taken. Therefore, the injury alleged in Michel was imminent, 

if not actual. In the present case, by contrast, the Clerk 

contends that the appellants would be injured only if a 

particular piece of income tax legislation for which the 

Member-appellants voted were to garner a simple majority 

but fail to pass under Rule XXI(5)(c) for want of a three-fifths 

majority. That these conditions will be met is far from 

certain; indeed, we are told, both reason and experience 

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suggest that it is unlikely, making the appellants' injury 

neither imminent nor a concrete probability but only a hypothetical and speculative possibility.

As an initial matter, we do not agree with the Clerk that, in 

order to establish that they have been injured by the Rule, 

the appellants would have to show that 218 Members have 

voted or would vote (but for the Rule) in favor of a bill 

carrying an income tax increase. The lesson of Michel is that 

vote dilution is itself a cognizable injury regardless whether it 

has yet affected a legislative outcome.

We do agree, however, that the appellants' alleged injury 

depends upon their assertion that Rule XXI(5)(c) in fact 

renders the votes of 218 Members inadequate to pass legislation carrying an income tax increase. If the votes of 218 

Members are still sufficient in practice to pass such legislation, then Rule XXI(5)(c) has not caused the vote dilution that 

would establish their injury for the purpose of standing under 

Article III.

Both the House Rules and their role in the 104th Congress 

strongly suggest that Rule XXI(5)(c) does not prevent 218 

Members set upon passing an income tax increase from 

working their legislative will. First, the House Rules allow 

any Member to introduce a resolution to amend or to repeal 

Rule XXI(5)(c), and any such resolution could be adopted by 

the vote of a simple majority. See House Rule X(1)(m) and 

XI(4)(d); see also, for example, H. Res. 168, 104th Cong., 1st 

Sess., 141 Cong. Rec. 6104, 6116 (1995) (amending Rule 

XIII(4)). Although the Rules Committee would have jurisdiction over such a resolution and might slow or block its 

consideration, 218 Members of the House could by petition 

cause a resolution to be discharged from that Committee and 

put to a vote on the floor of the House. See generally 

Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, vol. V, at 3 (motion to discharge); id., vol. I, at 

318-319 (procedure for discharging from Rules Committee 

resolution to amend the rules). Similarly, if the Rules Committee determines that the vote on a bill should be governed 

by a special rule, a simple majority may amend that rule. 

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See id., vol. VI, at 328-329. For that matter, a simple 

majority may suspend Rule XXI(c)(5) in order to allow a bill 

carrying a tax increase to pass by a simple majority vote; 

although suspending a rule ordinarily requires the support of 

two-thirds of those voting, see House Rule XXVII, a simple 

majority has in the past resolved to suspend this two-thirds 

requirement. VIII Cannon's Precedents of the House of 

Representatives at 841. And, contrary to the dissent, these 

procedures for amending, suspending, and repealing the 

House Rules are not "alternative remedies" for the vote 

dilution allegedly worked by Rule XXI(5)(c). Rather, if a 

simple majority can prevail in the House by voting first on a 

procedural and then on the substantive issue, then there has 

been no vote dilution even arguably offensive to the presentment clause.

The appellants object that the procedures by which they 

might avoid the three-fifths requirement of Rule XXI(5)(c) 

are rarely tried and still more rarely successful. For example, they observe that "[s]pecial rules are now so complex and 

detailed that it is extremely difficult for the floor to amend 

them without the assistance of the Rules Committee."

The Clerk's very telling response is that on at least four 

occasions during the 104th Congress the House voted to 

waive the requirements of Rule XXI(5)(c) in order to allow a 

simple majority to enact legislation that increased income tax 

rates. See H. Res. 238, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. 

Rec. 10314, 10327-28 (1995) (suspending application of Rules 

XXI(5)(c) and (d) in connection with Medicare Preservation 

Act); H. Res. 245, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec. 

10853, 10867-68 (1995) (same in connection with Seven Year 

Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act); H. Res. 392, 104th 

Cong., 2d Sess., 142 Cong. Rec. 3029, 3045 (1996) (same in 

connection with Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act); H. Res. 440, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 142 Cong. Rec. 

5432, 5444-45 (1996) (same in connection with Small Business 

Job Protection Act). However complicated the procedures 

for suspending Rule XXI(5)(c) may seem, therefore, they do 

not appear in practice to prevent a simple majority from 

enacting an income tax increase.

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Chief Judge Edwards, in dissent, concludes that the present appellants' votes were diluted as in Michel when they 

voted in favor of the Mink Amendment. But our colleague is 

able to reach this conclusion only because he assumes that in 

fact "each of the 96 votes in favor of the Amendment represented only 1/261st of those necessary for passage." As we 

see it, the plaintiffs have given little reason to believe that the 

Mink Amendment would not have passed had it had the 

support of 218 Members. For, as detailed above, when a 

simple majority wanted to vote for legislation increasing 

income tax rates, the House has voted to waive the Rule; 

indeed, the appellants point to no instance in which a Member 

(presumably one who wanted to vote for legislation increasing 

income tax rates) proposed to waive the Rule but the House 

voted against waiving the rule. We are therefore forced to 

the conclusion that the plaintiffs have alleged only a conjectural or hypothetical injury.

In sum, the appellants claim that they face imminent injury 

because a simple majority of the House of Representatives 

cannot commit the House to raising income tax rates. We 

are unpersuaded, however, that Rule XXI(5)(c) prevents a 

simple majority from doing just that. At most the appellants 

have shown that Rule XXI(5)(c) could, under conceivable 

circumstances, help to keep a majority from having its way

perhaps, for example, because a simple majority in favor of an 

income tax increase might not be prepared, for its own 

political reasons, to override the preference of the House 

leadership against suspending or waiving the Rule in a particular instance. But that prospect appears to be, if not purely 

hypothetical, neither actual nor imminent. We conclude 

therefore that the appellants lack standing to challenge Rule 

XXI(5)(c).

B. Rule XXI(5)(d)

In what seems to be an afterthoughtfor they give the 

matter almost no separate attentionthe appellants challenge Rule XXI(5)(d) on the grounds that it (1) "deprives the 

Member Appellants of some of the "legislative Powers' that 

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the Constitution vested in House Members" in violation of 

Article I, § 8 of the Constitution and (2)[a] "bar[s] Members 

from proposing and discussing matters within Congress's 

competence and [b] prevent[s] their constituents from effectively petitioning the Congress and from having their Representatives present their views" in violation of the first amendment. With respect specifically to injury, the appellants 

allege that Rule XXI(5)(d) prevents each Member-appellant 

from "introducing or debating on the House floor legislation 

that might increase tax rates retroactively." And, we are 

toldin the only purely factual allegation relevant to injury

that "Rule XXI(5)(d) continuously stifles debate on the House 

floor."

The Clerk responds that no Member has ever tried to 

introduce a bill carrying a retroactive tax increase, nor even 

risen to speak in favor of such an increase only to be ruled 

out of order by reason of Rule XXI(5)(d). Therefore, according to the Clerk, no Member, let alone one of the appellants, 

has suffered the concrete injury necessary for standing to 

challenge the Rule.

Although the appellants claim that the Rule stifles debate 

on the floor of the House, they do not explain how the Rule 

does this. After reading the Rule more than once, we remain 

at a loss to know how it affects the appellants. The Rule, 

recall, provides that "[i]t shall not be in order to consider any 

bill [etc.] carrying a retroactive Federal income tax rate 

increase." We cannot ascertain from this text, standing 

alone, whether the Rule forbids a Member from proposing a 

retroactive income tax increase; forbids the leadership from 

allowing Members to debate a retroactive income tax increase; precludes the House voting on a retroactive income 

tax increase; has all of these effects, or none of them. Or 

more: Does it forbid a Member from speaking in favor of 

repealing the Rule? We are reluctant to think that it does, but 

the Rule leaves even this question unanswered. Still, the 

appellants offer nothing but the Rule in support of their 

standingno legislative history, no facts to which it has been 

applied, nothing.

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Without further factual allegations the court can neither 

know what the Rule means in practice nor see how the 

appellants have been injured by it. See U.S. Const., Art. I, 

§ 5 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings ..."); United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 

1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Where ... a court cannot be 

confident that its interpretation is correct, there is too great a 

chance that it will interpret the Rule differently than would 

the Congress itself; in that circumstance, the court would 

effectively be making the Rulesa power that the Rulemaking Clause reserves to each House alone."). Thus the appellants have not made out their standing to complain of the 

Rule.

We reach this conclusion fully awarealbeit no thanks to 

the appellantsthat a party has standing to challenge a law 

before it is enforced against him provided that his first 

amendment rights are chilled by a credible threat of prosecution under that law. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n,

484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988); Chamber of Commerce v. FEC,

69 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Putting aside the question 

whether the House of Representatives is constrained by the 

first amendment in determining the Rules of its Proceedingsa question not raised by the Clerkwe are not persuaded that Rule XXI(5)(d) even arguably chills the first 

amendment rights of the Member-appellants. First, there is 

no apparent penalty for attempting to do whatever it is the 

Rule proscribes; so far as we can tell, one may at most be 

ruled "out of order." Moreover, those whose first amendment rights are allegedly chilled by the Rule are all Members 

of the United States House of Representatives. We cannot 

imagine that the mere risk of being ruled out of order has 

caused the Member-appellantsor any Member of the 

Houseto cower silently in derogation of his or her perceived 

constitutional right, indeed duty, to speak on behalf of himself 

and his constituents.

Before repairing to the courts, therefore, we think it only 

appropriate for those who would object to the Rule first to 

test its meaning by pursuing in the House a retroactive 

Federal income tax rate increase. If they are ruled out of 

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order merely for speaking their minds, or for any other act 

even arguably protected by the first amendment, then they 

can document their injury and assert their standing to sue.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the appellants do not allege that they have suffered any concrete injury as a result of either Rule XXI(5)(c) 

or Rule XXI(5)(d), they have not established their standing to 

sue. The judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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EDWARDS, Chief Judge, dissenting: Appellants ask this 

court to decide whether Congress, through a purported 

House Rule of Procedure, can change the number of votes 

required to enact a bill into law. At issue here is House Rule 

XXI(5)(c) ("Rule"), which provides that

[n]o bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference 

report carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall 

be considered as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the 

Members voting.

Under this Rule, Members of the House of Representatives 

who voted in favor of tax legislation have suffered a dilution 

of their votes from 1/218th to 1/261st of the votes necessary to 

pass a tax increase. As a consequence, these Members, a 

number of whom are appellants in this case along with the 

voters they represent and the League of Women Voters 

("LOWV"), have suffered the requisite injury to satisfy the 

Article III standing requirements. I, therefore, dissent from 

the judgment of the majority dismissing this case for lack of 

standing. I also find that House Rule XXI(5)(c) cannot 

withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The presentment clause of the Constitution requires that

[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a 

Law, be presented to the President of the United States.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). To determine 

the meaning of "passed" under the presentment clause, I look 

to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution, as well as 

Supreme Court precedent construing the clause. This evidencealong with longstanding traditions underlying our 

constitutional democracymakes it clear that "passed" 

means "passed by a majority," except in those few instances 

where the Constitution explicitly states otherwise. The rulemaking clause of the Constitution, which merely provides that 

each House has the power to "determine the Rules of its 

Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, surely is not an 

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1

See Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in 

Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 83-84 (1996). 

2

See Susan Low Bloch, Disciplining CongressThe Taxing 

and Spending Powers, Address at the Tenth Annual Lawyers 

Convention of the Federalist Society (Nov. 14-16, 1996). 

3 Appellants also challenge House Rule XXI(5)(d), which states 

that "It shall not be in order to consider any bill ... carrying a 

retroactive Federal income tax rate increase." I can find no merit 

in this claim, so I do not address it. 

explicit exception to the presentment clause. Thus, in using 

the rulemaking clause to redefine what it means for a bill to 

be passed, Rule XXI(5)(c) rewrites the imperative of the 

presentment clause and, therefore, must be struck down.

If Congress is allowed to employ the rulemaking clause to 

impose new supermajority requirements beyond those already stated in the Constitution, the potential for mischief is 

great. Two simple examples will suffice to highlight the 

problem:

Example One:1 The Clerk's argument in favor of House 

Rule XXI(5)(c) would allow the House to adopt an internal 

rule of procedure that requires the votes of nine-tenths of its 

Members to pass a bill into law, thus giving one state, 

California, which elects over ten percent of the Members of 

the House, effective veto power over proposed legislation.

Example Two:2 Because the rulemaking clause applies 

equally to both Houses of Congress, the Clerk's argument in 

favor of House Rule XXI(5)(c) would allow the Senate to 

adopt an internal rule of procedure that requires the votes of 

three-fifths, rather than one-half, of its Members to confirm a 

presidential appointee. The Senate, acting unilaterally, could 

thereby increase its own power at the expense of the President.

I think it is clear that the Framers never intended for 

Congress to have such unchecked authority to impose supermajority voting requirements that fundamentally change the 

nature of our democratic processes. It is for this reason that 

I find House Rule XXI(5)(c) to be an unconstitutional exercise 

of Congress's rulemaking power.3

A. The Jurisdiction of This Court

Before turning to the merits, I will first address the 

jurisdictional issues on which my colleagues decide this case. 

I disagree with the majority, because I find that appellants 

have fully satisfied traditional standing requirements and that 

the doctrine of equitable or remedial discretion does not act 

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as a bar to judicial review of their claims.

1. Standing

It is well established that in order to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements of Article III, plaintiffs must 

demonstrate (1) that they have suffered injury that is concrete and particularized, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) 

that the injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of which they 

complain; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by 

a court decision in their favor. See Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Under the precedent of 

this circuit, these requirements are satisfied by the dilution of 

appellants' votes in favor of the Mink Amendment.

Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994), described 

in detail by the majority, clearly governs the result in this 

case. In Michel, this circuit found that congressional vote 

dilution constitutes cognizable injury for both the Members of 

Congress whose votes are affected and for the voters who 

rely on such Members to represent their interests. Id. at 

625-26; see also Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (In a case challenging the allocation of House 

committee and subcommittee seats, this court found that 

Republican Members had standing to sue based on the alleged dilution of their votes by virtue of the disproportionate 

allocation of the seats.). The plaintiff Members in Michel

suffered cognizable injury based on vote dilution where the 

value of each Member's vote in the Committee of the Whole 

was diluted from 1/435th to 1/440th by a House Rule that 

gave the vote to the five territorial delegates. The court 

found standing despite the fact that after any vote in which 

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4

See 14 F.3d at 625 (citing the House Rule at issue in the case, 

which provides "[i]n a Committee of the Whole House on the state 

of the Union, the Resident Commissioner to the United States from 

Puerto Rico and each Delegate to the House shall possess the same 

powers and privileges as Members of the House" but "[w]henever a 

recorded vote on any question has been decided by a margin within 

which the votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner have been decisive, the Committee of the Whole shall automatically rise and the Speaker shall put that question de novo 

without intervening debate or other business. Upon the announcement of the vote on that question, the Committee of the Whole shall 

resume its sitting without intervening motion."). 

5

See Declaration of Barbara K. Bracher, Principal Assistant 

General Counsel and Solicitor to the United States House of 

Representatives (July 14, 1995) (describing the application of Rule 

XXI(5)(c) to the Mink Amendment to H.R. 4), reprinted in Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") 136-37.

It is clear from the record that the Mink Amendment was 

supported by at least some of the appellant Members. See, e.g.,

Declaration of the Honorable Patsy T. Mink (June 15, 1995), 

reprinted in J.A. 84; Declaration of the Honorable Bruce E. Vento 

(June 16, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 127. 

the territorial delegates' votes were outcome determinative, a 

new vote would be taken without including them.4

Like the majority, I, too, find that Michel stands for the 

proposition that "vote dilution is itself a cognizable injury 

regardless whether it has yet affected a legislative outcome." 

Appellants here suffered vote dilution when they voted in 

favor of the Mink Amendment, which proposed an increase in 

corporate income tax rates.5 The vote-counting rule applicable to the Mink Amendment was Rule XXI(5)(c). The Mink 

Amendment was defeated by a vote of 96 to 336. Under Rule 

XXI(5)(c), each of the 96 votes in favor of the Amendment 

represented only 1/261st of those necessary for passage, 

rather than the 1/218th that they would have represented 

under the normal practice of "majority rule." This vote 

dilution constitutes injury-in-fact sufficient to meet the Article 

III standing requirements.

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6 As indicated in part A.2. infra, even assuming its continued 

validity, the remedial discretion doctrine is not dispositive of this 

case. 

The majority claims Rule XXI(5)(c) caused no cognizable 

vote dilution because 218 Members set upon passing an 

income tax increase could have attempted to avoid the effect 

of the Rule. According to the majority, the Members in favor 

of a tax increase can first seek to pass a resolution to amend 

or to repeal Rule XXI(5)(c) and then they can pursue passage 

of an income tax increase pursuant to a simple majority vote. 

The same could have been said to deny standing in Michel

and Vander Jagti.e., the aggrieved Members in those cases 

could have been told to muster a majority of their colleagues 

to change the disputed rulebut the court eschewed any 

such view of standing. Even more noteworthy is the fact 

that, in Michel, the court found an injury even though the 

vote dilution at issue could never affect whether a bill became 

law. Thus, Michel makes clear that the substantive outcome 

is irrelevantit is the vote dilution itself that causes the 

injury.

In an apparent effort to avoid what is obvious from Michel

and Vander Jagt, the majority opinion uses a strand of the 

remedial discretion doctrine to change the requirements of 

Article III standing. The majority says that if a plaintiff can 

find an alternative remedy for the injury that is the subject of 

the law suit, then there can be no judicially cognizable injury 

to support Article III standing. This is an extraordinary 

holding that finds no support in the law on standing. Indeed, 

the only case law offering any support for this notion is the 

questionable remedial discretion doctrine of this circuit.6See, 

e.g., Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that dismissal of a legislator's suit 

under a doctrine of remedial discretion is appropriate 

"[w]here a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial 

relief from his fellow legislators"). However, the remedial 

discretion doctrine never has been part of the standing inquiry, and the majority cites to no case that suggests otherwise. 

The question, thus, is not whether appellants could have 

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7

It is clear from the record that the Mink Amendment was 

supported by at least some of the appellant voters' representatives. 

See, e.g., Declaration of June Austin (June 14, 1995) (represented by 

Congressman Maurice D. Hinchey, who voted in favor of the 

Amendment, see 141 CONG. REC. H3777 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995)), 

reprinted in J.A. 61. 

prevented the vote dilution injury by repealing or amending 

House Rule XXI(5)(c). The question is whether appellants in 

fact have suffered vote dilution.

Having established that the vote dilution caused by Rule 

XXI(5)(c) satisfies the injury-in-fact prong of the standing 

inquiry, appellants' challenge to Rule XXI(5)(c) also satisfies 

the next two prongs of the standing inquiry, causation and 

redressability. The Rule published by the Clerk causes the 

harm. And the harm could be redressed by a declaration 

from this court that the Rule violates the Constitution.

Like the Members, the individual voters and the LOWV 

also meet the standing requirements. In Michel, this court, 

acting in reliance upon Supreme Court precedent that recognizes that voters have standing to challenge practices that 

dilute their vote, found that voters suffer cognizable injury 

through the dilution of the voting power of their representatives. See 14 F.3d at 626 (holding that it was of no significance that the voters' vote dilution claim could be considered 

derivative of their representatives' claim). Just such dilution 

occurred here where, by operation of Rule XXI(5)(c), a voter 

represented by a congressional Member who favored the 

Mink Amendment no longer had as much access to political 

power as a voter represented by a Member who opposed the 

Amendment.

7 And, of course, the voters satisfy the causation 

and redressability prongs of the analysis for the same reasons 

as the Members.

The LOWV has representational standing pursuant to 

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 

333, 343 (1977). Under Hunt, an organization such as LOWV 

has standing if (1) its members would have standing to sue on 

their own; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to 

its purpose, and (3) its claim and requested relief do not 

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require participation by individual members. Id. The Hunt

test is satisfied in this case. For one thing, the League's 

members are no different than the individual voters, so they 

have standing to sue on the same terms. Furthermore, the 

interests the League seeks to protect are germane to its 

purpose. See Declaration of Becky Cain, President of the 

League of Women Voters of the United States (June 13, 

1995), reprinted in J.A. 52, 53 ("The League is a non-partisan 

membership organization consisting of voters committed to 

the improvement and reform of representative democracy."). 

Finally, the League's claim and requested relief do not require participation by individual members. Therefore, all of 

the appellantsthe Members, the individual voters, and the 

LOWVmeet the standing requirements under Article III of 

the Constitution.

2. Remedial Discretion

The District Court did not doubt the standing of appellants. 

Rather, the trial court dismissed all of appellants' claimsthe 

Members, the individual voters, and the LOWVon the basis 

of its perceived remedial discretion. See Skaggs v. Carle, 898 

F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995) ("The [defendant's] motion [to 

dismiss] will be granted on the sole ground of the doctrine of 

equitable or remedial discretion."). This doctrine has been 

described as a "prudential self-imposed limitation" on the 

court's jurisdiction. Michel, 14 F.3d at 628. It permits the 

court to decline to hear a case even when it has Article III 

jurisdiction over the controversy. The remedial discretion 

doctrine has never been adopted by the Supreme Court; and, 

as I have previously indicated, the constitutional status of the 

doctrine is questionable. See Melcher v. Federal Open Market Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., 

concurring). However, the doctrine remains the law of the 

circuit, by which I am bound.

The important point here is that, whether or not remedial 

discretion is a viable doctrine, it has no application in this 

case. Even assuming, arguendo, that the claims of the 

congressional Members should be dismissed, the Michel decision makes it clear that remedial discretion cannot be used 

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against the non-congressional plaintiffs who possess standing. 

See Michel, 14 F.3d at 627-28 (Regardless of whether the 

remedial discretion doctrine bars the challenge of Members of 

Congress to the constitutionality of a voting rule change, the 

doctrine cannot be employed to bar a private citizen's claim 

over which the court has jurisdiction.). In short, the doctrine 

never has been held to be applicable to claims other than 

those brought by legislators. See 14 F.3d at 628. ("[Remedial discretion] has no applicability to private voters."); see also 

Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Thus, it 

is plain here that this court must exercise its jurisdiction over 

the claims brought by the individual voters and the LOWV. 

Accordingly, because their claims are the same, it is unnecessary to decide whether the remedial discretion doctrine would 

mandate dismissal of the Members' case. I, thus, turn to the 

merits of appellants' challenge to Rule XXI(5)(c).

B. The Constitutionality of Rule XXI(5)(c)

The presentment clause of the Constitution says that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives 

and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented 

to the President of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, 

§ 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Although the word "passed" is 

not defined explicitly, an analysis of the Framers' intent and 

Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that it means passed 

by a majority. The majority-passage rule is not a malleable 

default position. It is an unalterable constitutional demand. 

I, therefore, find that Rule XXI(5)(c) is an unconstitutional 

exercise of Congress's rulemaking power.

1. The Intent of the Framers

In this case, unlike many law suits involving constitutional 

claims, the intent of the Framers is both evident and enlightening with respect to the issue at hand. The Framers had 

experienced supermajority voting requirements under the 

Articles of Confederation, and they specifically debated and 

rejected similar proposals when the Constitution was drafted 

and ratified. Historical evidence shows that, during their 

deliberations, the Framers positively concluded that a simple 

"majority vote" was sufficient for the passage of legislation in 

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8

"In the Parliament, if the greater part of the Knights of the 

Shire do assent to the making of an Act of Parliament, and the 

lesser part will not agree to it, yet this is a good Act or Statute to 

last in perpetuum: and that the Law of majoris partis is so in all 

Counsels, Elections & c. Both by the rules of the Common law and 

the Civil." WILLIAM HAKEWILL, MODUS TENENDI PARLIAMENTUM: OR 

THE OLD MANNER OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND 93 (Abel 

Roper ed., 1671); see also GEORGE PETYT, LEX PARLIMENTARIA: OR A

TREATISE OF THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND

165 (1689). 

Congress. And nothing has changed since the Framers' 

deliberationseither in the words of the Constitution or in 

societal conditionswarranting an alteration of their original 

intent. Thus, this case is unique in that there is actually 

something to be gained by starting the analysis of appellants' 

claim on the merits with an assessment of the Framers' 

intent.

a. The Constitutional Convention

The general rule governing parliamentary procedure at the 

time of the constitutional convention, which still holds true 

today, was that the act of a majority of a quorum is the act of 

the body.8 The presumption of parliamentary procedure 

therefore was a presumption of majority rule. Furthermore, 

at the constitutional convention, the Framers explicitly considered whether to adopt supermajority requirements and 

decided against them.

The Articles of Confederation had required a supermajority 

vote of the states for action on many issues. Under that 

system, each state was represented by no less than two and 

no more than seven Members, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 

V, cl. 2, and each state had only one vote, ARTICLES OF 

CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 4. The power to engage in a war, 

enter into a treaty, coin money, borrow or appropriate money, 

and appoint a commander in chief all required the agreement 

of nine of the thirteen states, a supermajority. ARTICLES OF 

CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 6. Speaking against a proposal to 

require a two-thirds vote on commerce regulations at the 

constitutional convention, Roger Sherman observed that "to 

require more than a majority to decide a question was always 

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embarrassing as had been experienced in cases requiring the 

votes of nine States in Congress." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 450 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) 

(hereinafter FARRAND) (Madison's Notes, Aug. 29). James 

Wilson made the same point. "Great inconveniences had, 

[Wilson] contended, been experienced in Congress from the 

article of confederation requiring nine votes in certain cases." 

Id. at 451 (Madison's Notes, Aug. 29). The Framers, thus, 

affirmatively decided against supermajority requirements for 

the passage of legislation.

Later on during the convention, George Mason made a last 

ditch effort to require a supermajority on one class of legislation. He moved for a proviso that "no law in nature of a 

navigation act be passed before the year 1808, without the 

consent of 2/3 of each branch of the Legislature." Id. at 631 

(Madison's Notes, Sept. 15). Mason's proposal was defeated 

seven states to three. See id. Yet, even if Mason's proviso 

had been accepted, the Constitution would have said only that 

passage of a navigation act shall require the consent of twothirds of each House until 1808, implying that the general 

rule of parliamentary procedure, i.e., the majority-of-aquorum rule, would apply thereafter. The convention's defeat of Mason's proviso makes even more clear its assumption 

that the majority-of-a-quorum rule would apply in all cases.

The text of the original Constitution explicitly provides for 

majority voting in three circumstances. See U.S. CONST. art. 

I, § 5, cl. 1 (quorum); art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (election of President 

by electors); id. (election of President by House). Yet, the 

existence of these provisions does not imply that whenever 

the Framers meant to insist on a simple majority they said so 

in explicit terms. The Framers inserted the quorum clause 

because the size of a quorum was not dictated by any general 

rule of parliamentary bodies. The majority requirements 

governing the election of the President and Vice President 

address areas that are not a traditional function of a legislative body. Further, the majority requirement was imposed 

against the backdrop of a two-thirds quorum requirement for 

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9 Seven more explicit majority requirements were added by 

amendment: amend. XII (election of President by electors); id.

(election of President by House); id. (election of Vice President by 

electors); id. (election of Vice President by Senate); amend. XXV, 

§ 2 (Vice Presidential vacancy); amend. XXV, § 4 (declaration of 

Presidential inability); id. (response to Presidential declaration of 

no inability). All of these requirements pertain only to the unique 

task of the election or status of the President and Vice President. 

10 The original seven exceptions to majority rule were art. I, 

§ 3, cl. 6 (the Senate conviction of an impeached official); art. I, 

§ 5, cl. 2 (expulsion of a Member of either House); art. I, § 7, cl. 2 

(overriding a presidential veto); art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (the presence of a 

quorum in the House for the election of the President); art. II, § 2, 

cl. 2 (Senate consent to a treaty); art. V (amendment of the 

Constitution); and art. VII (ratification of the Constitution itself by 

the States).

The Framers carefully debated each case in which they imposed a 

supermajority requirement. In each situation, the Framers found 

good reasons for requiring something more than a simple majority. 

For example, on impeachment, the Convention first entertained and 

rejected a proposal by Dickenson that "the Executive be made 

removable by a ... majority of the Legislatures of individual 

States." 1 FARRAND at 85 (Madison's Notes, June 2). The Convention, of course, ultimately approved the requirement of a two-thirds 

vote by the Senate. On expulsions, Madison argued that "the right 

of expulsion ... was too important to be exercised by a bare 

majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be 

dangerously abused." 2 FARRAND at 254 (Madison's Notes, Aug. 10) 

(footnote omitted). There was also extensive debate about the twothirds rule for Senate ratification of treaties, see id. at 540 (Madison's Notes, Sept. 7); id. at 548 (Madison's Notes, Sept. 8). On 

amendments, after Elbridge Gerry argued that a simple majority 

should not be able to "bind the Union to innovations that may 

subvert the State-Constitutions altogether," id. at 557-58 (Madison's Notes, Sept. 10), James Wilson proposed the three-fourths of 

the states requirement that appears in the Constitution, id. at 559 

(Madison's Notes, Sept. 10). 

ty would suffice to avoid any misapprehension that it had 

changed the established rule.9

The text of the original Constitution also provides for 

supermajority voting in seven distinct cases,10 and minority 

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11 Art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (adjournment); id. (compelling attendance of 

absent Members); art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (entry of yeas and nays in 

Journal of Proceedings). 

voting in three cases.11 In all other cases the Constitution is 

silent. The debates at the constitutional convention indicate 

that where the Constitution is silent, the Framers made a 

calculated judgment that a supermajority vote should not be 

required.

b. Writings Contemporaneous with the 

Constitutional Convention

Along with the debates at the constitutional convention, 

written commentary contemporaneous with ratification indicates that the Framers deliberately adopted the general rule 

of parliamentary procedure that a bill be considered passed 

where it receives the support of a majority of the quorum. 

James Madison observed that, in the constitutional debates, it 

had been argued "that more than a majority ought to have 

been required for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not in 

all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision." THE 

FEDERALIST No. 58, at 396 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke 

ed., 1961). In explaining why supermajority votes were 

inappropriate for the passage of legislation, Madison said:

In all cases where justice or the general good might 

require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be 

pursued, the fundamental principle of free government 

would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority 

that would rule; the power would be transferred to the 

minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage 

of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the 

general weal, or in particular emergencies to extort 

unreasonable indulgences.

Id. at 397.

Alexander Hamilton also defended the Convention's decision to jettison the supermajority system of the Articles of 

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Confederation, declaring that in votes on ordinary legislation 

the Constitution should not "give a minority a negative upon 

the majority." THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 140 (Alexander 

Hamilton). He explained that,

The public business must in some way or other go 

forward. If a pertinacious minority can controul the 

opinion of a majority respecting the best mode of conducting it; the majority in order that something may be 

done, must conform to the views of the minority; and 

thus the sense of the smaller number will over-rule that 

of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence tedious delayscontinual negotiation and 

intriguecontemptible compromises of the public good. 

And yet in such a system, it is even happy when such 

compromises can take place: For upon some occasions, 

things will not admit of accommodation; and then the 

measures of government must be injuriously suspended 

or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of 

obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of 

votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must 

always savour of weaknesssometimes border upon anarchy.

Id. at 141. Like Madison, Hamilton counseled that "much ill 

may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what 

may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular 

periods." Id.

Madison and Hamilton, thus, explicate the rationale that 

motivated the Framers to reject supermajority requirementsa desire to protect majority rule in the final passage 

of legislation and to facilitate legislative change on substantive issues.

The Framers, however, were concerned about the tyranny 

of the majority. Madison recognized that a temporary majority would exercise power "adverse to the rights of other 

citizens." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison). 

He said: "To secure the public good, and private rights, 

against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to 

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12 Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (written by 

now-Justice Stevens, who was then a Circuit Judge writing for a 

three-judge District Court panel), which the Clerk cites as support 

for this argument, is factually distinct from the case at bar. Dyer

involved the vote required for state legislators to ratify an amendment to the Constitution. The federalism concerns that underlay 

that decision are not present here. Dyer's statements about the 

meaning of a constitutional silence on voting requirements, id. at 

1306, thus, are inapposite to this case. 

preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is 

then the great object to which our enquiries are directed." 

Id. at 61. To prevent the tyranny of the majority, Madison, 

along with the other Framers, established a system of checks 

and balancessuch as the presidential veto, which can only 

be overcome by a two-thirds majority of Congress. It was 

believed that these checks and balances would operate to 

restrain the majority more effectively than supermajority 

requirements for the passage of legislation, which had already 

failed under the Articles of Confederation. Recognizing that 

the presentment clause mandates that any bill receiving the 

vote of a majority of the Members be presented to the 

President, thus, does not require acceptance of the insupportable proposition that a majority must always prevail. Other 

checks and balances to restrain the majority are permissible 

and, in fact, consistent with the Framers' intent.

c. The Rejection of a Legislative Supermajority 

Requirement

Despite the evidence of the Framers' intent from their 

debates at the constitutional convention and their contemporaneous writings, the Clerk argues that where the Constitution contains no explicit voting requirement, the Framers 

intended the House itself to decide the voting requirement for 

the passage of such legislation. According to the Clerk, 

majority rule for the passage of legislation is simply a default 

position. But this premise ignores the Framers' concerns 

about supermajority requirements.12

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majority requirement, claiming it is more consistent with 

majority rule since the majority itself can pass and repeal a 

legislative supermajority requirement. This argument ignores the fact that the Framers desired to preserve majority 

rule over substantive decisionmaking on the final passage of 

legislation. Allowing legislative supermajority requirements 

interferes with majority rule over substantive decisionmaking 

on the final passage of legislation. For, indeed, it is not clear 

that, where there is a majority in favor of a tax increase, the 

same majority will always favor repeal or amendment of a 

legislative supermajority requirement.

Consider the following hypothetical: 218 of 435 legislators 

favor a tax increase, a majority. Rule XXI(5)(c), in its 

present form, is in effect. One legislator who would vote in 

favor of a tax increase refuses to support a move to amend, 

repeal, or suspend Rule XXI(5)(c) on the ground that tax 

increases impose such a great burden on the citizenry that 

she believes the passage of tax increases should require more 

than majority support. The legislators who do not support 

the increase similarly refuse to support an attempt to amend 

or repeal the Rule. A vote to enact a tax increase into law 

receives only 218 votes, thus failing to become law because 

the supermajority requirement remains in effect. It is just 

this situation that was rejected by the Framers, who specifically decided not to require a supermajority over decisionmaking in most substantive areas. The Framers debated, 

decided, and enumerated the specific circumstances when a 

supermajority is required. Any changes to the list of situations warranting supermajority votes must come through 

constitutional amendmentnot by a simple decision of the 

House of Representatives.

d. Past Practice

Past practice also demonstrates that, until now, the Members always have acted as if they were bound by the vote of a 

majority of a quorum. Indeed, the House of Representatives, 

without exception, has followed the majority-of-a-quorum rule 

since its beginning. Thomas Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, prepared while Jefferson presided over the 

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Senate as John Adams's Vice President, makes this commitment explicit:

The voice of the majority decides. For the lex majoris 

partis is the law of all councils, elections, &c. where not 

otherwise expressly provided. Hakew. 93. But if the 

House be equally divided, "semper presumatur pro negante," that is, the former law is not to be changed but 

by a majority. Town col. 134.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, 

§ 41, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS, 407 

(Charles T. Cullen ed., 1988). In 1837, the House adopted 

Jefferson's manual for the conduct of its own proceedings, 

and Jefferson's rule continues to operate to this day, except 

where it has been amended by later rules constitutionally 

promulgated by the House.

Rule XXI(5)(c) marks the first time the House has attempted to avoid the majority-of-a-quorum rule for the passage of 

legislation. Past practice, of course, does not determine what 

is constitutionally required; nevertheless, it provides good 

evidence that lawmakers have always assumed that the majority-of-a-quorum rule must govern.

2. Supreme Court Precedent 

Although no Supreme Court decision has directly addressed the question whether a bill that receives the vote of a 

majority of the Members must be presented to the President, 

Supreme Court precedent provides guidance on the question. 

It demonstrates that the Court has understood the Constitution to require that bills that receive the vote of a majority 

indeed must be presented to the President; in other words, 

"majority rule" has been accepted without question by the 

Court.

a. Construing the Presentment Clause

In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in the course of 

evaluating the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the 

Court explained the formulaic nature of the structure mandated by the presentment clause. In the course of its explanation, the Court repeatedly stated that a simple majority is 

all that is required for passage of legislation. The Court first 

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found that the Framers "provid[ed] that no law could take 

effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of

the Members of both Houses." Id. at 948 (emphasis added). 

The Court then noted that, providing for Senate approval of 

treaties, "Art. II, § 2, requires that two-thirds of the Senators present concur ... rather than the simple majority 

required for passage of legislation." Id. at 956 n.21 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court stated that the presentment 

clause:

requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative 

action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.

Id. at 958 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that not 

even Congress and the President acting together could 

change the requirements of the presentment clause. The 

presentment clause "represents the Framers' decision that 

the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised 

in accord with a single, finely wrought, and exhaustively 

considered, procedure." Id. at 951.

The Court's explanation of the requirements of the presentment clause in Chadha is consistent with its analysis in 

United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). In Ballin, the 

Court answered two questions: whether the Constitution 

prescribed a particular method for determining whether a 

majority constituting a quorum was present and whether the 

act of a majority of the quorum present, but less than a 

majority of the full House, had been sufficient to pass a bill. 

Although Ballin is not a presentment clause case, it sets out 

the methodology that determines the meaning of the clause.

The Court in Ballin makes it clear that where the Constitution is silent on voting requirements, the general law of 

parliamentary bodies applies:

[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, 

when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the 

quorum is the act of the body. This has been the rule 

for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms 

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13 Appellees and amicus mistakenly rely on Gordon v. Lance,

403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (finding that West Virginia's requirement of a 

three-fifths majority of voters to increase tax rates or bonded 

indebtedness did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). That 

case deals with the constitutionality of state supermajority requirements under the equal protection clause, not the presentment 

clause. Gordon simply does not address the federal legislative 

process. 

of the organic act under which the body is assembled 

have prescribed specific limitations.... No such limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore 

the general law of such bodies obtains.

Id. at 6. This language indicates that unless the Constitution 

specifically provides otherwise, the Constitution embodies the 

general rules of parliamentary procedure. Because the presentment clause provides no explicit rule for counting votes for 

and against the final passage of bills, "the general rule of 

bodies obtains," and "the act of a majority of the quorum is 

the act of the body," as decided by the Framers, indicated in 

Ballin and reaffirmed in Chadha.13

It should be noted, however, that construing the presentment clause in accord with the general rules of parliamentary 

procedure (such that "passed" means passed by a majority of 

a quorum) does not invalidate all supermajority requirements. Requiring a supermajority to pass a bill into law can 

be distinguished from procedural ruleslike the Senate cloture rulethat require a supermajority to bring an issue to a 

vote. Although such supermajority requirements may hinder 

or help a bill to become law, these procedural rules do not 

explicitly conflict with the presentment clause requirement 

that a bill that has passed be presented to the President.

For example, Clause 2(h)(2) of House Rule XI authorizes 

committees to establish a quorum of only one-third for the 

reporting of legislation. Thus, a bill in committee that may 

enjoy the support of more than one-half of the House Members may nonetheless die in committee if a majority of the 

one-third quorum so chooses. While this Rule affects whether and when a bill comes to a vote, it does not purport to 

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14 Judge Joyce Hens Green recognized the distinction between 

procedural rules that affect which bills reach the entire House and 

rules that alter what constitutes the passage of a bill. In Page v. 

Dole, Civ. No. 93-1546 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1994), a challenge to the 

Senate's cloture rule, which she dismissed for lack of standing, she 

suggested that impermissible vote dilution might result if Congress 

imposed a supermajority requirement for passage of a bill but did 

not result from the Senate's supermajority cloture rule. Rejecting 

the plaintiff's argument that he had standing because the Senate 

cloture rule resulted in impermissible dilution of his Senator's vote, 

she said, "To put it more baldly, Senate Rule XXII [the cloture 

rule] is not the same as a vote for or against legislation." Page, slip 

op. at 15 (emphasis added). 

redefine what counts as passage of a bill or to alter the 

House's duty to "present" to the Senate or the President any 

bill that has commanded a majority vote of a quorum of the 

House.14 The presentment clause, by virtue of the Framers' 

adoption of the general rule of parliamentary procedure, 

merely defines the number of votes necessary to enact a bill 

into law. It does not speak to these other procedural matters.

b. Three Co-equal Branches of Government

Not only does House Rule XXI(5)(c) conflict with the 

general rule of parliamentary procedure outlined in Ballin

and reiterated in Chadha, it also changes the finely tuned 

balance of power between Congress and the executive. By 

redefining what it means for a tax bill containing a tax 

increase to "pass," House Rule XXI(5)(c) alters the responsibilities of the executive and opens the door for either House 

of Congress to use the rulemaking power to adopt other 

requirements for the passage of legislation which destroy the 

system of checks and balances designed by the Framers.

Professor Jed Rubenfeld explains that reading the word 

"passed" in the presentment clause to embody majority rule 

supports the following principles that are fundamental to our 

constitutional system of checks and balances: "(1) every 

Senator and Representative gets one equal vote; (2) only the 

votes of Senators and Representatives count; (3) the relative 

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power of the small and large states to pass laws cannot be 

changed; (4) no state can be given the power to veto legislation passed by a majority vote of the chamber; and (5) 

neither chamber can transform the legislative process from a 

two-tiered process with a decisive presidential veto, into a 

two-thirds-two-thirds process in which the President's veto is 

a virtual formality." See Rubenfeld, note 1 supra, at 85. 

According to Rubenfeld, allowing Congress to decide for itself 

what constitutes the passage of a bill calls each of these 

principles into question. For example, as mentioned in the 

introduction, if Congress could decide what constitutes passage of a bill, not only could Congress transform the President's veto power, Congress could also make voting rules like 

a ninety percent majority rule that would give one state 

effective veto power over legislation.

The confirmation clause example (also cited in the introduction) illustrates the ramifications outside the presentment 

clause context of a decision upholding Rule XXI(5)(c). See

Bloch, note 2 supra. Professor Bloch provides a striking 

demonstration of how Congress could use the rulemaking 

clause to increase its own power at the expense of the 

executive. The Constitution states that the President "shall 

nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 

Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 

and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 

Officers of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 

The Constitution does not specify the number of votes required for confirmation, so if Rule XXI(5)(c) is constitutional, 

the Senate could use the rulemaking clause to require that 

three-fifths of its members, rather than one-half, vote in favor 

of confirmation of a presidential appointee. The Senate 

thereby could essentially take over the appointment process 

from the President. Acceptance of the Clerk's argument that 

Congress can use the rulemaking clause to change the number of votes required to pass a law amounts to acceptance of 

the proposition that each House of Congress can fundamentally alter the balance of power established by the Framers.

In sum, House Rule XXI(5)(c) conflicts with Supreme 

Court precedent, which recognizes that, consistent with the 

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Framers' intent, the Constitution adopted the general rule of 

parliamentary procedure, the act of a majority of a quorum is 

the act of a body. By altering this fundamental principle of 

parliamentary bodies, House Rule XXI(5)(c) works an unconstitutional change in the procedure that governs the relationship between Congress and the executive, and it opens the 

door for Congress to make further changes in our "finely 

wrought" system of checks and balances.

CONCLUSION

Because the majority opinion fundamentally alters standing 

doctrine to avoid reaching a significant constitutional question, I dissent. Under the law of this circuit on standing in 

"vote dilution" cases, this court has jurisdiction to reach the 

merits of appellants' claim. The constitutionality of House 

Rule XXI(5)(c) is not a question that can be left unanswered 

by this court. By granting itself the power to change the 

number of votes required to enact a bill into law, the House 

violated the command of the presentment clause, which requires that all bills that receive the vote of a majority of a 

quorum of each House be presented to the President. The 

House's action conflicts with the intent of the Framers and 

Supreme Court precedent. Allowing this Rule to stand permits Congress to use the rulemaking clause as a tool to 

redefine its relationship to the executive, a result that should 

not be countenanced by this court.

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