Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01103/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01103-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANNE NELSON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1103 DFL KJM PS

vs.

PLACER COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

The motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, by

defendants Armstrong, Bloomfield, McInerney and Meeh, and joinder therein by defendant

LaBouff, came on regularly for hearing on February 22, 2006. Plaintiff appeared telephonically

in propria persona. Jamie Edwards appeared telephonically for defendants Armstrong,

Bloomfield, McInerney and Meeh. Richard Crabtree appeared telephonically for defendant

LaBouff. Upon review of the motion, the documents in support and opposition, upon hearing the

arguments of plaintiff and counsel, and good cause appearing, THE COURT FINDS AS

FOLLOWS:

 In this action, plaintiff alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 and 1986

arising out of Placer County Code Enforcement conduct occurring at plaintiff’s home in Placer

Case 2:04-cv-01103-DFL -KJM Document 140 Filed 04/04/06 Page 1 of 5
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1 As to plaintiff’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, plaintiff fails to allege

plaintiff is within a protected class; therefore plaintiff does not state a cognizable cause of action for

conspiracy. 

2 The court also acknowledges receipt of plaintiff’s last minute filing after business hours

on February 21, 2006. Counsel for defendant LaBouff did not receive the last minute filing prior to

oral argument on February 22, 2006. Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as allowing

the last minute filing. However nothing in Rule 56 expressly allows such a filing, and the local rules

expressly provide for much earlier filing of opposition. See Local Rule 78-230(c). As with the

plaintiff’s exhibits covered by her judicial notice request, the court has reviewed plaintiff’s late filing

but determined that it does not alter the determination reached below. 

2

County.1 As explained further below, plaintiff contends that the moving defendants’ acts and/or

omissions led to further damage and injuries to plaintiff, caused by constitutional rights

violations by Placer County Code Enforcement personnel. Plaintiff requests the court take

judicial notice of several exhibits. Defendants have objected based on lack of authentication. 

The objection is well taken. In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the court has reviewed plaintiff’s

exhibits before issuing these findings and recommendations. It appears that even if

authenticated, these exhibits do not advance plaintiff’s case.2

I. Allegations in Complaint

Plaintiff alleges specifically that defendant Armstrong was notified by plaintiff

that someone reportedly had impersonated defendant Meeh with respect to a Code Enforcement

complaint. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59, 133. Defendant Armstrong’s failure to investigate the

alleged impersonation caused plaintiff further damage and injuries resulting from constitutional

rights violations by Code Enforcement personnel. Id. ¶ 133.

Defendant Bloomfield’s failure to reply to plaintiff’s letter, in which plaintiff

detailed alleged constitutional rights violations by Code Enforcement personnel, resulted in still

further damage, injuries and constitutional rights violations by Code Enforcement personnel. Id.

¶¶ 76, 132.

Defendant LaBouff also received written correspondence from plaintiff, in which

she detailed constitutional violations by Code Enforcement personnel. Id. ¶ 132. Defendant

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3

LaBouff’s failure to investigate her allegations also resulted in further damage, injuries and

constitutional rights violations by Code Enforcement personnel. Id. ¶¶ 76, 132.

Plaintiff alleges defendant McInerney was aware that the Code Enforcement file

remained open after a settlement agreement was reached. Id. ¶ 46. Defendant McInerney’s

failure to act resulted in continued injury and damage to the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 46, 76, 99. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges defendant Meeh’s failure to report the forging of his

name on the Code Enforcement complaint caused plaintiff damage, injury and constitutional

rights violations by Code Enforcement personnel. Id. ¶¶ 59-61, 99, 134.

II. Analysis

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel generally are not liable under section 1983 for

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a

named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him or her and the

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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3 Defendants’ remaining contentions also have merit. On July 11, 2000 plaintiff entered

into the settlement agreement with defendant Placer County, in which plaintiff released all claims

arising out of matters that could have been the subject of a government tort claim against defendant

Placer County. Plaintiff’s tort claim alleged events occurring between June 1999 and February 2000,

involving Code Enforcement personnel. The portions of the complaint alleging constitutional

violations based on the same alleged violations compromised by the settlement agreement are thus

barred. Release of All Claims, Declaration of Linda Puppione, Exhibit C; cf. Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 40-41. 

Plaintiff filed the original complaint on August 26, 2003. Thus, the claims based on

conduct occurring before August 26, 2002, are barred by the statute of limitations. Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 340 (amended 2002 to extend limitations period from one year to two years for conduct

occurring after January 1, 2003); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-71, 276 (1985); see

Second Am. Compl.¶ 14. 

As a threshold matter, defendants Armstrong and Meeh, Placer County Sheriff peace

officers, had no duty to investigate plaintiff’s allegation of an “impersonation” on a Code

Enforcement complaint form. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980); Ketchum

v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-61. 

Finally, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In this case,

the alleged conduct of the moving defendants cannot be linked to a constitutional violation, thus

summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

201-02 (2001); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

4

Defendants Armstrong, Bloomfield, LaBouff, McInerney and Meeh at no time had

supervisory authority over Code Enforcement personnel. Declaration of Richard Armstrong ¶ 4;

Declaration of Rex Bloomfield ¶ 4; Declaration of Anthony LaBouff ¶ 5; Declaration of Joseph

McInerney ¶ 5; Declaration of Dennis Meeh ¶ 6. Plaintiff merely alleges defendants either

received letters or were aware that the Code Enforcement file remained open after the settlement. 

Plaintiff presents no cognizable evidence supporting a claim of supervisory liability because no

constitutional violation can be linked to the conduct of the moving defendants. Moreover, based

on a review of plaintiff’s voluminous pleadings, it does not appear that plaintiff can amend the

complaint to show liability under § 1983. The lack of supervisory authority is dispositive;

summary judgment therefore should be granted.3

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that summary judgment be

granted in favor of defendants Armstrong, Bloomfield, LaBouff, McInerney and Meeh. 

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5

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, as provided by Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 4, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DMC

nelson.f&r

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