Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01042/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01042-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANDREWS, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

S. TORRES, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:12-cv-01042-GSA-PC

ORDER DISMISSING THIS ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 

WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED 

UNDER SECTION 1983, WITH LEAVE TO 

FILE A HABEAS PETITION

ORDER THAT THIS DISMISSAL IS 

SUBJECT TO THE ATHREE-STRIKES@

PROVISION SET FORTH IN 28 U.S.C. '

1915(g)

ORDER FOR CLERK TO CLOSE CASE

I. BACKGROUND

David Andrews (APlaintiff@) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on June 27, 2012. (Doc. 1.) On July 9, 2012, Plaintiff consented to 

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and no other parties have made an 

appearance. (Doc. 6.) Therefore, pursuant to Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the 

Eastern District of California, the undersigned shall conduct any and all proceedings in the case 

until such time as reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix A(k)(3).

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the court for screening.

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II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 

(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal 556 U.S. 

at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere 

possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, California. The events at 

issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

(SATF) in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff names as 

defendants S. Torres (Correctional Case Records Manager), J. Jones (Correctional Case 

Records Supervisor), C. Hebron (Correctional Counselor II), K. Allison (Warden), R. Pimentel 

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(Appeals Examiner), and D. Foston (Chief, Office of Appeals). All of the defendants were 

employed by the CDCR at the time of the events at issue. Plaintiff’s factual allegations follow.

Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a Computation Review Hearing (CRH) applying 

CCR Title 15 § 3043 and crediting him with a 25% sentence reduction. Plaintiff alleges that on 

June 29, 2011, he submitted a form 602 inmate grievance requesting a CRH, and his request 

was denied by reviewers who intentionally used an incorrect interpretation of P.C. 2933.2, 

which is systematically used against minorities such as Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that the 

25% sentence reduction award is not prohibited by P.C. 2933.2, but the reviewers refuse to 

apply the reduction award because of Plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants 

Pimentel and Foston acted fraudulently when responding to his appeals, because they stated in 

the Second and Third Level decisions that Plaintiff was afforded a CRH and provided a copy of 

the CDC form 1033 hearing decision, which is not true. Plaintiff seeks a hearing at which the 

applicable post sentence good behavior and participation credits are applied to his minimum 

parole eligibility date. He claims that non-minority inmates are not denied the application of 

the relevant state processes and procedures, but he has received different treatment because he 

is a minority. 

On June 29, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a Form 602 inmate grievance requesting a 

hearing. On November 17, 2011, defendant Torres came to the door of Plaintiff’s cell, waived 

the 602 form in the air and demanded to know what it was all about. Plaintiff explained that he 

wanted his post sentence good behavior credits applied to adjust his minimum parole eligibility 

date. Torres told Plaintiff that they (SATF staff) did not give “[Plaintiff’s] kind” any type of 

credit and if he wanted credit he would have to “get it from Sacramento.” (Compl, Doc. 1 at 

14.) Plaintiff is African-American, and he contends that he was denied a hearing because of his 

race. 

Plaintiff requests a nominal award of $1.00, costs of suit, and injunctive relief requiring 

that a Computation Review Hearing be scheduled at which his credits are applied and his 

minimum parole eligibility date is recalculated, and enjoining all CDC employees from 

retaliating against him for filing this lawsuit. 

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IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the 

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006). AA person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another=s affirmative acts, 

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). AThe 

requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal 

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional 

injury.@ Id. at 743-44.

A. Habeas Corpus Claim

When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, or raises a 

constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is 

a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 

874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct. 1090 (1991). A[A] state prisoner=s ' 1983 action is 

barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no 

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matter the target of the prisoner=s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison 

proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

confinement or its duration.@ Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-2, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1248 

(2005). Where the complaint states a habeas claim instead of a ' 1983 claim, the court should 

dismiss the claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust, rather than converting it to a habeas 

and addressing it on the merits. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995).

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997), the United States Supreme Court 

applied the doctrine articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), to prison 

disciplinary hearings. In Heck, the Court held that a state prisoner=s claim for damages for 

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 if a 

judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 

sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously 

been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In applying the principle to the facts of Balisok, the 

Court held that a claim challenging the procedures used in a prison disciplinary hearing, even if 

such a claim seeks money damages and no injunctive relief, is not cognizable under ' 1983 if 

the nature of the inmate=s allegations are such that, if proven, would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of the result of the prison disciplinary hearing. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646. Because 

such a challenge, if successful, would invalidate the duration of the inmate=s confinement, it is 

properly brought as a habeas corpus petition and not under ' 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.

Although the specific facts of Balisok involved allegations of deceit and bias on the part 

of a hearing officer, the Court=s reasoning applies to any claim which, if proven, would have 

the effect of invalidating the result of a disciplinary hearing. The Ninth Circuit applied the 

Balisok rule to a case in which a prisoner sought damages based on allegations that prison 

officials relied on false information to find him ineligible for parole. Butterfield v. Bail, 120 

F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). Because the claim necessarily implied the invalidity of the 

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plaintiff=s continued confinement, it could not accrue until the conviction or sentence had been 

invalidated. Id.

In the instant case, Plaintiff=s core factual allegations are that he was denied due process 

because he was denied a Computation Review Hearing applying CCR Title 15 § 3043 and 

crediting him with a 25% sentence reduction. Because Plaintiff=s claim necessarily implies the 

invalidity of his present minimum parole eligibility date, success on the claim would reduce 

Plaintiff's sentence, invalidating the duration of Plaintiff's confinement. Thus, Plaintiff's only 

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be granted an 

opportunity to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

B. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 

(1985); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may 

be established by showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based 

on his membership in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of 

Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th 

Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly 

situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a 

legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 

S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073 

(2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC 

v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff alleges that prison officials intentionally misapplied P.C. 2933.2 to Plaintiff’s 

conviction and miscalculated his minimum parole eligibility date, because of Plaintiff’s race. 

Plaintiff bases this claim on defendant Torres’ alleged statement that prison staff does not give 

any type of credit to “his kind.” (Compl. at 14.) This allegation taken as true, without more, 

does not set forth Asufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 

Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678. Mere verbal harassment or abuse, including the use of racial epithets, 

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does not violate the Constitution and, thus, does not give rise to a claim for relief under 42 

U.S.C. ' 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff has not 

alleged facts demonstrating that he was discriminated against. Moreover, evidence found in 

Plaintiff’s exhibits to the Complaint indicates that prison officials found Plaintiff ineligible for 

credits under CCR Title 15 § 3043 because he was convicted of second degree murder for an 

offense committed on 01/08/1999, and under PC 2933.2, persons convicted of murder 

committed on or after 06/03/1998 are not eligible to earn credit to reduce their minimum term. 

(Compl. at 31.)

Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly demonstrating that he was intentionally 

discriminated against on the basis of his membership in a protected class, or that he was 

intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated inmates without a rational 

relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of 

meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Therefore, Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim for relief for violation of his right to equal protection. 

C. Inmate Appeals Process

Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to respond properly to his inmate appeals. 

Defendants= actions in responding to Plaintiff=s appeals, alone, cannot give rise to any claims 

for relief under section 1983 for violation of due process. A[A prison] grievance procedure is a 

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Buckley v. 

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 

(N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty 

interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); 

Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure 

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections 

envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 

F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing a prisoner=s administrative appeal, 

without more, are not actionable under section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Thus, since he 

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has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails to state a 

cognizable due process claim for the processing and/or reviewing of his 602 inmate appeals. 

D. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to follow the rules, regulations, and policies of 

the CDCR when processing his inmate grievance. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants 

Pimentel and Foston acted fraudulently when responding to Plaintiff’s appeals. Plaintiff is 

informed that violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and policies of the CDCR, or 

other state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under ' 1983. To state a claim under '

1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See

28 U.S.C. ' 1367. In this instance, the Court fails to find any cognizable federal claims in the 

Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff=s claims for violation of rules, policies, and regulations, and for 

fraudulent conduct, fail.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable 

claims in the Amended Complaint upon which relief may be granted under ' 1983. The court 

also finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by amendment, 

and therefore further leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Noll 

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). However, Plaintiff shall be granted leave 

to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, if he so wishes.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is DISMISSED in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted under ' 1983, with leave to file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus;

2. This dismissal is subject to the Athree-strikes@ provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. '

1915(g). Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011); 

///

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3. If Plaintiff chooses to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it will be a new 

case, and Plaintiff should not refer back to this § 1983 case or case number. The 

Clerk will assign a new case number for the petition for writ of habeas corpus; 

and

4. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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