Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04586/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04586-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVORY J. VALENTINE,

Petitioner,

v.

Warden CURRY,

Respondent. /

No. C 09-4586 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Ivory J. Valentine, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed

this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court

reviewed his petition and dismissed it with leave to amend. His amended petition is now

before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. 

DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

A district court considering a petition will "award the writ or issue an order directing the

respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the

application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 

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A. Claim For Failure To Remove Documents From Prison Records

In his amended petition, Valentine claims that prison officials failed to remove from

his central prison file a rule violation report. According to Valentine, he received the

December 12, 2004 rule violation report for mutual combat. The disciplinary charge later

was dismissed. Thereafter, he requested that prison officials remove from his prison file the

documentation related to the rule violation report that had been dismissed. He alleges that

prison officials granted his request in an inmate appeal to remove the documentation from his

file, but then did not remove the documentation.

Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from

two sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427

U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining

to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an

unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are

authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v.

Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494

U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs)). Plaintiff's is

not a case involving changes so severe as to implicate the Due Process Clause itself.

Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of

confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest,

provided that state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to

impose the deprivation and that the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id. at

477-87. A state most commonly restricts the power of prison officials by establishing

"substantive predicates" to govern official decisionmaking, i.e., "particularized standards or

criteria to guide the [s]tate's decisionmakers," and then requiring, "in explicitly mandatory

language," that if the substantive predicates are met, a particular outcome must follow. See

Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461-64 (1989). An interest of

"real substance" will generally be limited to freedom from restraint that imposes "atypical

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and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" or

"will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence," Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487. 

There is some uncertainty as to whether Sandin has eliminated the requirement that

state law narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation and instead

requires only that there be an interest of real substance to determine that an inmate has a right

to due process before being deprived of that interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-84; see

also Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (“focus of the liberty interest

inquiry is whether the challenged condition imposes an atypical and significant hardship"); 

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (looking only to whether the deprivation

suffered is an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate, and not to statutory language). 

While there may be some uncertainty as to whether the court needs to find mandatory

language creating the liberty interest, there is no uncertainty at all that an atypical and

significant hardship or an inevitable effect on the duration of confinement must exist to find

that a liberty interest is protected by the Due Process Clause. Sandin made clear the need for

an atypical and significant hardship and the Supreme Court reiterated its adherence to

Sandin's rule in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-24 (2005). Whether the due process

analysis after Sandin has two prongs – i.e., (1) an atypical and significant hardship/inevitable

effect on the duration of confinement and (2) a state-created interest due to mandatory

language – or just one prong, it is beyond dispute that at least the first prong is required. 

Valentine's claim falls on the first prong of the Sandin test. Where, as here, the

conditions of confinement did not change at all, there was no imposition of a restraint that

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life. The presence of the record of the dismissed disciplinary decision

also did not inevitably affect the duration of Valentine's confinement. Any possible effect of

a disciplinary charge on a life inmate's later parole decision is too speculative to say that the

decision has the inevitable effect on the duration of confinement that is necessary for federal

due process protections to attach. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. Valentine's claim fails

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because he was not deprived of an interest of real substance. 

Although the claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which habeas relief

may be granted, it also appears that the claim may be moot. Valentine's exhibit 95

(sandwiched between pages 16 and 17 of his amended petition) is page 65 of the transcript of

the January 15, 2009 BPH hearing. On that page, a BPH commissioner stated that Valentine

received his last CDC-115 (i.e., rule violation report) on July 1, 1996, and his last CDC-128 

on July 9, 2003. The omission of any mention of a December 12, 2004 rule violation report

indicates that the report had been removed from Valentine's file or at least had been marked

to reflect the dismissal of the disciplinary charge. 

B. State Court Error Claim

The second claim in Valentine's habeas petition is that the Monterey County Superior

Court made an erroneous finding on a habeas petition Valentine filed in that court concerning

his prison disciplinary record. As this court explained when it dismissed the original petition

with leave to amend, the claim is not actionable. Errors in the state post-conviction review

process are not addressable through federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Ortiz v. Stewart,

149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998). Challenges to such errors do not generally represent an

attack on the prisoner's detention and therefore are not proper grounds for habeas relief. The

claim is dismissed without leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18, 2010 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

 

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