Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00559/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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1

 The new Commissioner for Social Security, Michael J. Astrue, is substituted for the original

defendant, Joanne B. Barnhart, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 25(d)(1). 

2

 Clerk’s record number.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wendy Tracy, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

 

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No. CIV 06-559-TUC-RCC (GEE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff filed this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner for

Social Security1

 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The case has been referred

to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court. 

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff on

February 26, 2007, and a cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant on January

March 26, 2007. [#8, 9]2

 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review,

grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, deny the defendant’s cross-motion and

remand for payment of benefits. The final decision of the Commissioner is not supported by

substantial evidence. 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tracy filed an application for social security disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income benefits alleging a disability that began on October 30, 2001, due

to “Grave’s disease, cardioactivity, enlarged heart, rheumatoid arthritis, anxiety, fluid in left

lung and around heart.” (Tr. 120, 128, 536).

The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her application initially and again upon

reconsideration. (Tr. 62-66, 71-73). Tracy requested review, and on March 8, 2004, appeared

without counsel at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Norman R. Buls. (Tr. 74,

56-61). The ALJ found Tracy was not disabled. (Tr. 61). Tracy appealed, and on June 4, 2004,

the Appeals Council vacated the decision of the ALJ and remanded the case for further

proceedings. (Tr. 95-97). The Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to supplement the record

as follows: “Obtain additional evidence and clarification concerning the claimant’s impairments

from Raymond P. Bakotic, D.O., the claimant’s treating source.” Id. “The additional evidence

should include a medical source statement about what the claimant can still do despite the

impairments.” Id.

On February 15, 2005, Tracy appeared without counsel at a second hearing before ALJ

Buls. (Tr. 28-35). On October 25, 2005, the ALJ issued a second ruling again finding Tracy

was not disabled. (Tr. 35). Tracy appealed the ALJ’s decision and submitted to the Appeals

Council new evidence including a psychological evaluation, a mental work tolerance

recommendation, and a psychiatric review technique form completed by Thomas McCabe,

Ph.D., and Denny Peck, Ph.D. (Tr. 9-12, 551). The Appeals Council, however, denied review

making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 9-12); 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. 

Tracy then filed the instant complaint in U.S. District Court appealing the

Commissioner’s final decision. She filed the instant motion for summary judgment on February

26, 2007. The Commissioner filed the instant cross-motion for summary judgment on March

26, 2007. Tracy filed a combined response and reply on April 27, 2007. 

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28 3

 The Merck Manual, 87 (17th ed. 1999). 

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Claimant’s Work History and Medical History

Tracy was born in 1972. (Tr. 120). She has a GED and attended one year of college.

(Tr. 134). In the past, she worked as a waitress, assistant manager of a restaurant, bartender,

car parts driver, certified nursing assistant, cashier, and catering service worker. (Tr. 34, 129).

At the first hearing, on March 8, 2004, Tracy testified she could not work due to anxiety,

pericarditis, rheumatoid arthritis, Grave’s disease (an autoimmune disease resulting in thyroid

disorder)3

, and degenerative joint disorder. (Tr. 614, 617). At the second hearing, on February

15, 2005, Tracy testified she had degenerative joint disease in her knees and ankles and

rheumatoid arthritis in her hands, hips, knees, and ankles. (Tr. 589). 

Tracy suffers from a number of chronic illnesses both physical and mental. She has

Grave’s disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and degenerative joint disorder in her hands and knees.

(Tr. 211, 198, 216, 370, 523, 534). Grave’s disease was first diagnosed in 1996, and rheumatoid

arthritis was first diagnosed in 1998. (Tr. 211, 559).

In August of 2002, Tracy was hospitalized complaining of chest pain. (Tr. 198, 216,

370). She was diagnosed with pleural pericarditis possibly resulting from her underlying

rheumatoid arthritis and Grave’s disease. (Tr. 198, 216, 226-27, 370) Id. Apparently, she still

suffers from chronic chest pain. (Tr. 198, 226-27). 

Tracy’s mental heath is not much better. She has long suffered from insomnia and

anxiety/depression. (Tr. 226-27). She has been diagnosed variously with adult anti-social

behavior, identity problems, adjustment disorder, cannabis dependence, and kleptomania. (Tr.

315, 491).

Raymond Bakotic, D.O., has been Tracy’s treating physician since 1993. (Tr. 130). In

July of 2003, he completed a medical assessment form for the Arizona General Assistance

benefit program. (Tr. 261). He listed Tracy’s current medical conditions as rheumatoid

arthritis, pericarditis, Grave’s disease, tachycardia, recurrent chest pain, and depression. Id. He

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asserted Tracy has a “physical or mental incapacity which prevents . . . her from performing any

gainful employment.” Id. 

On August 10, 2004, Tracy was given a mental health examination by Jill T. Caffrey,

Ph.D., for the disability determination services. (Tr. 364-67). Caffrey’s diagnostic impression

was “(1) history of major depressive disorder and adjustment disorder with anxiety. She does

not appear to be exhibiting significant signs of either depression or anxiety at this point in time.

. . . (2) history of diagnosis of kleptomania apparently in remission (3) cannabis dependency,

purportedly in full remission.” Id. Caffrey found no work-related mental impairments. (Tr.

368-69).

In June of 2005, Bakotic submitted a Medical Work Tolerance Recommendations form

in accordance with the instructions of the Appeals Council. (Tr. 96, 452-53). He opined Tracy

could perform sedentary or light work for 2-3 hours per day and 3 days per week. Id. This is

essentially a finding that Tracy is disabled. Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir.

1989) (“[T]he capability to work only a few hours per day does not constitute the ability to

engage in substantial gainful activity . . . .); See also Social Security Ruling 96-8p (Residual

functional capacity is an assessment of an individual’s ability to perform sustained work-related

physical activities in a work setting for eight hours a day, five days a week, or the equivalent

work schedule.). 

In July of 2006, after the ALJ issued his second decision, Tracy was given a mental

health evaluation by Thomas R. McCabe, Ph.D., and Denny L. Peck, Ph.D. (Tr. 557-69). They

diagnosed Tracy with schizo-affective disorder, depressive disorder with anxiety, and

personality disorder NOS. (Tr. 564). They opined Tracy met the social security listings 12.03

(schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic disorders), 12.04 (affective disorders), 12.06

(anxiety-related disorders), and 12.08 (personality disorders). (Tr. 570). Accordingly, they

believe her mental impairment is sufficiently severe to be presumptively disabling. The

McCabe/Peck report was submitted to the Appeals Council with Tracy’s request for review after

the ALJ issued his second decision on October 25, 2005. (Tr. 551-56).

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4 Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual can still do despite his or

her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.

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CLAIM EVALUATION

Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations require that disability claims be

evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Baxter

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step requires a determination of

whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4). If so, then the claimant is not disabled and benefits are denied. Id. If the

claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeds to step two which

requires a determination of whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 

In making a determination at step two, the ALJ uses medical evidence to consider

whether the claimant’s impairment more than minimally limits or restricts his or her “physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. If the ALJ concludes the impairment is not

severe, the claim is denied. Id. Upon a finding of severity, the ALJ proceeds to step three

which requires a determination of whether the impairment meets or equals one of several listed

impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App.1. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the

claimant is presumed to be disabled, and no further inquiry is necessary. Ramirez v Shalala,

8 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993). If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment, evaluation proceeds to the next step. 

The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant has sufficient residual

functional capacity4

 (RFC) to perform past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

If the ALJ concludes the claimant has sufficient RFC, then the claim is denied. Id. If the

claimant cannot perform any past work due to a severe impairment, then the ALJ must move

to the fifth step which requires consideration of the claimant’s RFC to perform other substantial

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gainful work in the national economy in view of claimant’s age, education, and work

experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4).

 In determining whether the claimant retains the ability to perform other work, the ALJ

may refer to the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“the grids”) promulgated by the SSA.

Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576-577 (9th Cir. 1988).

The grids categorize jobs according to their exertional requirements such as sedentary work,

light work, or medium work. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). Based on

the claimant’s exertional ability, age, education, and work experience, the grids determine

whether or not the claimant is disabled. Id. The grids are a valid basis for denying claims

where they completely and accurately describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations. Id. at

1101-02. If the claimant has significant non-exertional limitations, the grids do not apply.

Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958-959 (9th Cir.1993). “Non-exertional limitations are

limitations that do not directly affect a claimant’s strength.” Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335,

1340 (9th Cir.1988). Mental limitations, for example, are non-exertional. Id. at 1340-41. If

significant non-exertional limitations prevent the claimant from performing the full range of

work in any exertional category, the ALJ must take the testimony of a vocational expert to deny

the claim. Id. at 1341.

The ALJ’s Findings

At step one of the disability analysis, the ALJ stated Tracy “may have engaged in

substantial gainful activity through August 2002.” (Tr. 34). The ALJ, however, proceeded to

the next step in the disability analysis without further elaboration. Id. At step two, he found

Tracy had severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis, Grave’s disease, minimal degenerative

joint disease of the right knee, status post pericarditis, resolved, and costochondritis. . . .” Id.

He found no severe mental impairment. Id. At step three, the ALJ found Tracy’s impairments

did not meet or equal the criteria for any impairment found in the Listing of Impairments,

Appendix 1, Subpart P, of 20 C.F.R., Part 404. Id. The ALJ then analyzed Tracy’s residual

functional capacity. Id. He found she “has the residual functional capacity [to perform] the

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physical exertion requirements of sedentary work activity . . . .” Id. At step four, the ALJ found

Tracy could not perform any of her past relevant work. Id. At step five, the ALJ employed the

grids to conclude Tracy was not disabled. (Tr. 35).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An individual is entitled to disability benefits if he or she demonstrates, through

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory standards, an inability to engage in substantial

gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a

continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). “[A]

claimant will be found disabled only if the impairment is so severe that, considering age,

education, and work experience, that person cannot engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

1993) (quoting Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990)).

To establish a prima facie case of disability, the claimant must demonstrate an inability

to perform his or her former work. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984).

Once the claimant meets that burden, the Commissioner must come forward with substantial

evidence establishing the claimant is not disabled. Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir.

1985).

The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3). The court may overturn the decision to deny benefits “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or it is based on legal error.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th

Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not

disabled must be upheld if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and the record

as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the decision. Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Desrosiers v. Secretary, 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988);

Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)). Substantial evidence is defined as “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d

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643, 644 (9th Cir. 1987). The standard is less than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. 

“[I]f the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment

for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400). When

applying the substantial evidence standard, however, the court should not mechanically accept

the Commissioner’s findings but should review the record critically and thoroughly. Day v.

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence

that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Id. A denial of benefits

will be set aside if the Commissioner fails to apply proper legal standards in weighing the

evidence even though the findings may be supported by substantial evidence. Frost v.

Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 367 (9th Cir. 2002); Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir.

1978).

In evaluating evidence to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the opinion of a

treating physician is entitled to great weight. Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir.

1993). The Commissioner may reject a treating physician’s uncontradicted opinion only if he

sets forth clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.

1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). If the treating physician’s

opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may reject that opinion only if he

provides specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. No distinction is drawn “between a medical opinion as to a physical condition

and a medical opinion on the ultimate issue of disability.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759,

761 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“The opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, entitled to greater weight than the

opinion of a non[-]examining physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996).

“[T]he Commissioner must provide ‘clear and convincing’ reasons for rejecting the

uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician.” Id. “[T]he opinion of an examining doctor,

even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 830-31.

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5

 Jill T. Caffrey, Ph.D., examined Tracy on August 10, 2004, and found no mental impairments.

(Tr. 368-69). She expressed no opinion as to Tracy’s physical impairments. Accordingly, her findings

do not contradict Bakotic’s opinion that Tracy’s combined impairments are disabling. 

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When medical reports are inconclusive, questions of credibility and resolution of

conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Commissioner. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at

751 (citations omitted). The Commissioner’s finding that a claimant is less than credible,

however, must have some support in the record. See Light v. Social Security Administration,

119 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1997).

The ALJ need not accept the claimant’s subjective testimony of disability, but if he

decides to reject it, “[he] must provide specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief.” Lester, 81

F.3d at 834. “Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.”

Id. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not

credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id.

DISCUSSION

The decision of the ALJ is not supported by substantial evidence. His decision to reject

the opinion of Tracy’s treating physician, Raymond Bakotic, D.O., is not supported by the

record. (Tr. 314-20).

The opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great weight. See Ramirez v. Shalala,

8 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1993). In this case, Bakotic’s opinion of disability is

uncontradicted.5

 Accordingly, the Commissioner may reject it only if he sets forth clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). This, he did not do.

The ALJ’s major complaint is that Bakotic’s opinion is not well supported by objective

findings. While this is a legitimate concern, “[m]erely to state that a medical opinion is not

supported by enough objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases

have required [to reject the opinion] even when the objective factors are listed seriatim.”

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Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the ALJ’s criticism implies

a determination of disability must be based on objective findings. This is not so. “Disability

may be proved by medically-acceptable clinical diagnoses, as well as by objective laboratory

findings.” Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). 

The treating physician is, of course, in the best position to make such a diagnosis. The

treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the

patient as an individual.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989). He is uniquely

positioned to observe the claimant’s physical and mental condition over time. Benton ex rel.

Benton v. Barnhart, 331, F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, his opinions are

accorded the most deference in the social security analysis. Where, as here, there are no

contrary medical opinions (at least none addressing Tracy’s physical condition), the ALJ may

not discount the treating physician’s opinion just because it could be better supported by

objective evidence. 

The ALJ identifies a number of specific shortcomings in the record, but ironically they

are not themselves well supported by any medical authority. For example, the ALJ notes

Tracy’s blood tests for antinuclear antibody (ANA) and RA factor were negative in August of

2002, November of 2003, and April of 2005. (Tr. 32). He implies these tests cast doubt on

Bakotic’s opinion of disability. Nothing in the record, however, states these test results are

inconsistent with a diagnosis of disabling rheumatoid arthritis. While the ALJ is a legal expert

in disability matters, he is not a medical expert. See, e.g., Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154,

1156 (9th Cir. 1975); Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 2001).

 The ALJ observes “[t]here is no evidence the claimant was ever prescribed or received

any physical therapy for her pain, which is unusual given the nature of her complaint.” (Tr. 32).

Nothing in the record, however, indicates physical therapy is appropriate for a person with

Tracy’s medical condition.

The ALJ further notes that “Dr. Bakotic told [Tracy] . . . her thyroid is ‘well controlled.’”

(Tr. 31). While this is encouraging news, it does not necessarily mean that she is able to work.

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See, e.g., Fleshman v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1991) (Physician’s use of the term

“doing well” does not mean the claimant is without pain.). 

The ALJ was also puzzled that Tracy “has not been evaluated or treated by a

rheumatologist.” (Tr. 31). In fact, the record contains a number of references indicating Tracy

was referred to a rheumatologist. (Tr. 199, 217, 523). Accordingly, her treating physicians

believed her arthritis was sufficiently serious to warrant consulting a specialist. The ALJ is

correct, however, in noting that the record contains no rheumatologist’s report. It is not clear

whether or not Tracy was actually evaluated by a rheumatologist.

In his Medical Work Tolerance Recommendation, Bakotic opined Tracy could, at most,

work 2-3 hours, three days per week. The ALJ, however, rejected Bakotic’s opinion and

explained his reasoning as follows:

The [ALJ] has also carefully considered [] Dr. Bakotic’s June 2005 functional

assessment, but finds that it is a mere checklist without a narrative discussion or

detailed analysis. He acknowledges the claimant remains capable of sitting four

to six hours out of an eight-hour workday, three to four hours without

interruption, but provides no explanation as to why she cannot sit for a total of six

hours. Moreover, the doctor’s report appears to contain inconsistencies, and his

opinion is accordingly less persuasive. For example, he states the claimant would

have to change positions frequently during the day from sitting to standing or

walking, yet he concludes she remains capable of sitting three to four hours

without interruption, as well as standing for the same length of time. He

apparently relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and

limitations provided by the claimant. Yet, as explained elsewhere in this decision,

there exists good reasons for questioning the reliability of the claimant’s

subjective complaints. . . .

(Tr. 33). 

This “mere checklist,” however, was sent to Bakotic at the behest of the Appeals

Council. Accordingly, it is somewhat ironic that the Commissioner (through the ALJ) faults

the doctor for submitting a form which Commissioner, himself (through the Appeals Council),

sent to him. Moreover, the ALJ has a duty to develop the record. See Celaya v. Halter, 332

F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The ALJ is not a mere umpire . . . but has an independent duty

to fully develop the record . . . to scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and

explore for all the relevant facts.”). If he believed this form was insufficiently detailed, he

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could have asked the doctor to provide supplemental information. Apparently, he chose not to

do so. 

The ALJ further maintains that Bakotic’s entries are inconsistent. According to the ALJ,

Bakotic claims Tracy “would have to change positions frequently during the day from sitting

to standing or walking, yet he concludes she remains capable of sitting three to four hours

without interruption. . . .” (Tr. 33) (emphasis added). In fact, Bakotic does not state Tracy

could sit for three to four hours without interruption. In accordance with the terminology on

the form, Bakotic reports that “During the above working day the claimant could STAND for

3-4 hours at one time, and 6 total hours; and could SIT for 3-4 hours at one time and 4-6 total

hours.” (Tr. 452) (emphasis added). He then reports that Tracy “would have to CHANGE

POSITIONS FREQUENTLY during the day from sitting to standing or walking or vice versa

at least one per hour.” (Tr. 452). The phrase “at one time” need not be interpreted as “without

interruption.” There is nothing inherently contradictory with saying Tracy could sit for 3 hours

at one time as long as she could stand or walk around briefly at least once per hour. Again, if

the ALJ wanted further clarification, he was under a duty to develop the record.

The ALJ asserts Bakotic “relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and

limitations provided by the claimant.” He does not, however, indicate why he makes this

assumption.

The ALJ also found Tracy’s daily activities inconsistent with disability. He notes that

in August of 2004 “she was living alone and was independent in activities of daily living.” (Tr.

32). She “reported doing all of her domestic activities, attending appointments and following

up on appointments.” Id. “She related enjoying reading, watching television daily, cleaning

house, cooking and relaxing.” (Tr. 32, 365). In fact, Tracy’s level of activity is somewhat more

limited than the ALJ portrays. 

At the hearing held on March of 2004, Tracy reported that on a usual day she cooks a

simple breakfast like scrambled eggs and then gets dressed. (Tr. 618). She lives in a bottom

floor apartment because she cannot climb stairs. Id. She cannot do her laundry alone because

she has difficulty carrying the laundry and “they’re afraid that, you know, I could have a stroke,

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or pass out, or something like that.” (Tr. 618-19). She shops for groceries once a week and

always has one or two people to help her. (Tr. 619). She does a lot of reading. Id. She used

to do things with her hands such as drawing or sewing, but she cannot do those things any

longer. Id. 

This level of activity is not inconsistent with a finding of disability. See Prince v.

Bowen, 894 F.2d 283, 286 (8th Cir.1990) (“[A]n ability to do light housecleaning does not

necessarily indicate an ability to perform gainful employment.”); See also Reddick v. Chater,

157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Several courts, including this one, have recognized that

disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of

their limitations.”). Household activities are performed intermittently rather than continuously

and may be done in spite of the claimant’s pain. See Walston v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 580, 586

(6th Cir. 1967); See also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (The ALJ could

not discount claimant’s subjective testimony based on an ability to work sporadically with

periods of rest.). In this case, there is no evidence Tracy’s daily activities are performed with

the type of persistence and pace required in the work place. Accordingly, they are not

inconsistent with Bakotic’s opinion of disability. Baumgarten v. Chater, 75 F.3d 366, 369 (8th

Cir. 1996) (Isolated activities such as pulling weeds, mowing the lawn, painting a ceiling and

housecleaning or grocery shopping do not indicate that a plaintiff could perform full-time

competitive work.).

“Where the Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of

a treating or examining physician, we credit that opinion as a matter of law.” Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). “Where we conclude that . . . a doctor’s opinion should have

been credited and, if credited, would have led to a finding of eligibility, we may order the

payment of benefits.” Regennitter v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999); See

also Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding for payment of benefits

where the Secretary did not provide adequate reasons for disregarding examining physician’s

opinion); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d

643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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In this case, the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting

Bakotic’s opinion of disability. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir.

1989). His opinions should be credited as a matter of law. Crediting this evidence indicates

Tracy is disabled. There remains an issue as to her disability onset date.

Bakotic’s Medical Work Tolerance Recommendation form was completed on June 6,

2005. (Tr. 453). At the bottom of the form, the following statement appears: “Effective dates

of above limitations from 6-6-05 to 6-6-06.” Id. (capitalization modified). Although this part

of the form was apparently designed to allow the physician to state when the claimant first

became disabled, it does not appear that Bakotic used the entry in this way. Instead, he seems

to be stating how long this assessment of Tracy’s condition would be valid. The court reaches

this conclusion for two reasons. First, there is no reason why Tracy would be disabled on 6-6-

05 and not before. This is the date Bakotic completed the form. It is not the date of an accident

or hospitalization. Second, on the General Assistance benefit form, Bakotic stated Tracy was

disabled earlier, on July 9, 2003. (Tr. 261). The only way to reconcile the two forms is to

interpret the “6-6-05”as a medical-opinion-validity date and not as an onset date.

Bakotic finds Tracy is disabled and has been so at least as early as July of 2003. Tracy

claims her disability began on October 30, 2001, when she left her last full-time position. (Tr.

128, 129, 138, 166). This date is consistent with the medical record and Tracy’s work history.

It should be adopted as her onset date. See Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 394 (5th Cir. 2000)

(“Factors relevant to the determination of the date of disability include the individual’s

declaration of the date of when the disability began, work history and available medical

history.”); Swanson v. Secretary, 763 F.2d 1061, 1066 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985) (The claimant’s onset

date should be adopted by the Commissioner if it is consistent with the available evidence.);

Willbanks v. Secretary, 847 F.2d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).

 Remand of this case would serve no useful purpose. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d

587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing the Commissioner to decide the issue again would create

an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s play again’ system of disability benefits adjudication.”);

Holohan v. Massanari 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

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1292 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We may direct an award of benefits where the record has been fully

developed and where further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.”); See

also SSR 96-2p (“If a treating source’s medical opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent

with the other substantial evidence in the case record, it must be given controlling weight; i.e.

it must be adopted.”). A finding of disability should be entered.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after

its independent review, grant the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, deny the

defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter an order remanding the plaintiff’s claim

for payment of benefits. [#8, 9] 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may file and serve written objections within

10 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation

to all parties.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2007.

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