Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01296/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01296-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FILED 

United States Coμrt(?f Appeals Tenth C1rcmt 

NOV 15 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JAMES BRUNING, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-1296 

) 

REID C. PIXLER, individually and in his) 

official capacity as District Attorney ) 

for the Seventh Judicial District; ) 

JOSEPHS. PACYGA, individually and in ) 

his official capacity as Deputy District) 

Attorney for the Seventh Judicial ) 

District; DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ) 

FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO'S SEVENTH ) 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT; FLOYD JOHNSON, ) 

individually and in his official ) 

capacity as Chief of the Gunnison ) 

Police Department; CITY OF GUNNISON ) 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; JAMES ROBERT KEEHNE; ) 

RUSSELL LOCKE; ROBERT G. RYAN, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

KEITH ROBINSON; J. STEWART FERGUSON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 87-M-1600) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Daniel M. Reilly and Larry Pozner, Denver, 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Colorado, for 

Don D. Jacobson, Lohf, Shaiman & Ross, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appellate Case: 90-1296 Document: 010110097316 Date Filed: 11/15/1991 Page: 1 
Before McKAY, Chief Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judge, and SAFFELS,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Defendants Keith Robinson and J. Stewart Ferguson appeal the 

district court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment 

based on qualified immunity. 1 Both Defendants are members of the 

Gunnison, Colorado, Police Department (GPD), who contend that they 

are immune from liability for their alleged wrongful acts in 

obtaining an order for nontestimonial identification and an arrest 

warrant for Plaintiff. "We review the denial of immunity de nova 

as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Snell v. Tunnell, 

920 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1622 

(1991). Upon review, we conclude the district court properly 

denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. 

In the early hours of June 17, 1986, "Victim #1," who had 

just finished work at a grocery store in Gunnison, was sexually 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-1296 Document: 010110097316 Date Filed: 11/15/1991 Page: 2 
assaulted by a man who had hidden himself in the back of her car. 

Victim #1 reported the assault to Officer Keehne of the GPD, who 

failed to make any written or oral record of his conversation with 

Victim #1. 

On June 25, 1986, Victim #1 saw Plaintiff, with whom she was 

acquainted, in the grocery store and was struck by his resemblance 

to her assailant. Victim #1 became upset, left work, and went to 

the GPO. She spoke with Officer Locke and Detective Robinson, but 

neither officer made any written or oral record of the 

conversation with Victim #1. 

On September 5, 1986, Victim #2 was sexually assaulted in her 

home in Gunnison. She reported the assault to Officer Ryan of the 

GPO. Victim #2 was blindfolded throughout the assault and never 

saw her assailant. 

On October 7, 1986, Durango Police Detective O'Connell, who 

was assisting with the investigation, interviewed Victim #1. 

Detective O'Connell tape recorded the interview, and the recording 

was subsequently transcribed. During this interview Victim #1 

described the assault and what she was able to see of the 

assailant as follows. 

Victim #1 got into her car, which was parked at the grocery 

store, and turned on the dome light to get her cigarettes out of 

her purse. She sensed something in the back of her car and turned 

to see a man she did not know crouched in the back seat. Because 

he was able to crouch down so far, Victim #1 thought the man could 

not be very big: "Like five eight I think is pushin it." R. Vol. 

I, Doc. 6, Ex.Cat 5. The man had a white handkerchief over his 

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nose and mouth, so Victim #1 could not see his face below the 

bridge of his nose. She distinctly remembered that his eyes were 

icy blue, and described him as having a receding hairline, 

blondish hair, and a reddish complexion. When she looked at him, 

the man yelled at her to turn off the light, which she did. 

Victim #1 did not have an opportunity to see the man thereafter. 

He stayed behind her in the car while she drove to a deserted 

parking lot, at his direction, and while she got out of the car. 

Victim #1 was blindfolded during the assault and, at the 

assailant's direction, kept her head averted while he fled the 

scene. 

During the interview with Detective O'Connell, Victim #1 said 

that she had been having nightmares about the assault and in them 

she knew the assailant. When asked who the assailant was in her 

dreams, she replied that it was different people. She also said 

she dreamed the assailant was her store manager one time, and that 

he was a customer in the grocery store in another dream, but she 

knew it was not really either of these people. 

Victim #1 did not identify Plaintiff as the assailant, though 

in response to Detective O'Connell's statement: "It could well be 

that you will eventually recognize this guy," following the 

discussion of Victim #l's dreams, Victim #1 said: 

[Victim #1]: 

Det. O'Connell: 

Well there is one person that gave, 

I've gave the name to the Police and 

stuff. It just freaked me out one 

day when he came in cause I know 

him, his girlfriend is one of the 

people I told I was working that 

night, you know, and. 

Does he have receding blond hair? 

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Appellate Case: 90-1296 Document: 010110097316 Date Filed: 11/15/1991 Page: 4 
[Victim #1]: 

Det. O'Connell: 

[Victim #1]: 

Det. O'Connell: 

[Victim #1]: 

Det. O'Connell: 

[Victim #1]: 

Det. O'Connell: 

Yep. 

And the icy blue eyes? 

Yep. And 

everything. 

the 

And. 

You could be right. 

build. And 

But it, I mean it bothers me but I 

can't even talk to this person 

anymore. You know. 

Yeah. Well that's, even if it isn't 

him I'm sure he's gonna understand. 

He's too close to ... 

Yeah. 

To the real thing, even if it isn't 

him. 

Id. at 27. In response to Detective O'Connell's statement near 

the end of the interview: "You're still don't know who he is." 

Victim #1 responded "No." Id. at 30. 

On October 24, 1986, Detective Robinson and Denver Police 

Detective Wallis interviewed Victim #1. They too failed to record 

the interview in writing or on tape. After the interview, 

Detective Robinson drafted an affidavit in support of an order for 

nontestimonial identification from Plaintiff in connection with 

the two assaults. Based on the affidavit, the court entered the 

order, which was carried out on October 27, 1986. Pursuant to the 

order, Plaintiff was required to give police samples of his 

fingerprints, blood, hair and saliva, to make a voice recording, 

and to be photographed. 

On October 28, 1986, although all the samples from Plaintiff 

had not yet been analyzed, Officer Ferguson2 drafted an affidavit 

2 The record does not reveal Officer Ferguson's role in the 

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Appellate Case: 90-1296 Document: 010110097316 Date Filed: 11/15/1991 Page: 5 
in support of a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest for the two sexual 

assaults. 3 Plaintiff was arrested that day. 

After the preliminary hearing, held on December 11, 1986, and 

January 22, 1987, the judge dismissed the charges for lack of 

probable cause. Plaintiff then brought this suit against 

Defendants and others for violation of his civil rights in 

connection with his arrest and prosecution. 

II. 

Plaintiff admitted that on their faces, Defendants' 

affidavits established probable cause. He contended, however, 

that the affidavits contained material false statements or 

omissions that Defendants made intentionally or with reckless 

disregard for the truth. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Detective Robinson 

falsely and recklessly represented in his affidavit that Victim #1 

had (1) positively identified Plaintiff as her assailant; (2) 

observed Plaintiff some days after the assault wearing grey 

sweatpants; (3) observed the color of Plaintiff's eyes; and (4) 

stated that Plaintiff's eyes were the same color as her 

assailant's. R. Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 3-4. 

Plaintiff also alleged that Detective Robinson intentionally 

and maliciously failed to include in his affidavit the following 

investigation of either assault. 

3 The only evidence linking the two assaults together appears 

to be that in each assault the assailant held a knife to the 

victim's throat, blindfolded the victim, and wore what each victim 

thought was a nylon windbreaker. Also, the statements each victim 

reported the assailant made during the assault were similar. 

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information: (1) in the brief moment Victim #1 saw the assailant, 

he wore a mask over his face; (2) Victim #1 only saw the 

assailant's face above the bridge of his nose; (3) Victim #1 gave 

an extensive recorded statement to Detective O'Connell on 

October 7, 1986, for the purposes of identifying the assailant; 

(4) even though she knew Plaintiff before the assault, Victim #1 

did not identify Plaintiff as her assailant during this interview; 

(5) in the interview Victim #1 said she did not know who assaulted 

her; (6) Victim #1 told Detective O'Connell that the man who 

assaulted her was not more than 5' 8 11 ; (7) Plaintiff is 5'11"; (8) 

Victim #1 described her assailant as being of slim to medium 

build; (9) Plaintiff weighs 190 pounds; (10) Victim #1 told 

Detective O'Connell her assailant had icy blue eyes; (11) 

Plaintiff has hazel eyes; (12) Victim #1 told Detective O'Connell 

she thought the man who assaulted her might be a person who worked 

at the Standard Gas Station in Gunnison; and (13) Victim #2 was 

blindfolded throughout her assault and could not identify her 

assailant. Id. at 4-5. 

Plaintiff alleged that Officer Ferguson's affidavit contained 

the same false statements and omissions. Plaintiff claimed that 

by their misrepresentations, Defendants violated his rights under 

the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment claiming qualified 

immunity under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). The Court 

held in Malley that an officer is immune from liability for his 

actions in seeking a warrant unless "a reasonably well-trained 

officer in petitioner's position would have known that his 

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Appellate Case: 90-1296 Document: 010110097316 Date Filed: 11/15/1991 Page: 7 
affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should 

not have applied for the warrant." Id. at 345. 

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court 

adopted an objective standard for qualified immunity. Under the 

Harlow standard, government officials will not be liable for their 

conduct when performing discretionary functions unless their 

conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 

818. "Because of the important values protected by qualified 

immunity, the procedures to be followed when this particular 

affirmative defense is raised differ from those applicable to most 

other affirmative defenses." Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 

1457 (10th Cir. 1989). 

When a government official raises the defense of qualified 

immunity in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must , 

produce facts "sufficient to show · both that the defendant's 

alleged conduct violated the law and that that law was clearly 

established when the alleged violation occurred." Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Ctrs. Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th 

Cir. 1988). Only after the plaintiff has met this burden must the 

defendant bear the usual summary judgment movant's "burden of 

showing that no material issues of fact remain that would defeat 

his or her claim of qualified immunity." Id.; see also Powell, 

891 F.2d at 1457. 

This procedure must be modified slightly, however, when the 

plaintiff's claim contains a subjective element, such as the 

defendant's purpose, motive, or intent. Prior to Harlow, the 

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qualified immunity standard had both a subjective and an objective 

component. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The 

subjective component focused on the good faith of the official and 

relieved him from liability if he did not actually know his 

conduct was unconstitutional and did not act with malicious 

intent. Harlow eliminated any consideration of the defendant's 

intent as it relates to his knowledge of the law, see Halperin v. 

Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1986), but did not 

preclude consideration of the defendant's intent when his state of 

mind is an essential element of the plaintiff's substantive claim, 

Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., 847 F.2d at 648. 

When a defendant moves for summary judgment asserting he is 

qualifiedly immune and his state of mind is an element of the 

plaintiff's claim, he must do more than merely raise the immunity 

defense; he "must make a prima facie showing of the 'objective 

reasonableness' of the challenged conduct." Lewis v. City of Ft. 

Collins, 903 F.2d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1990)(citing Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Ctrs., 847 F.2d at 649; Martin v. D.C. Metro. 

Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). If the 

defendant makes this prima facie showing, the plaintiff must then 

produce specific evidence of the defendant's culpable state of 

mind to survive summary judgment. Pueblo Neighborhood Health 

Ctrs., 847 F.2d at 649. 

At the time Defendants drafted the affidavits at issue, the 

law was clearly established that an officer would violate a 

plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by knowingly or 

recklessly making a false statement in an affidavit in support of 

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an arrest or search warrant, if the false statement were material 

to the finding of probable cause. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 

U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 31 

(1st Cir. 1984)(applying Franks v. Delaware standard to civil 

rights case involving arrest warrant). The law also was clearly 

established that "to knowingly or recklessly omit from an arrest 

affidavit information which, if included, would have vitiated 

probable cause," would violate a plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582-83 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

A reckless disregard for the truth in the context of an 

alleged Fourth Amendment violation under Franks v. Delaware is the 

same as that in the context of an alleged First Amendment 

violation. A plaintiff must prove that "the affiant 'in fact 

entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his' allegations." 

United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 

1984)(quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)), 

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); accord DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 

F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 65 

(1991). "Recklessness may be inferred from omission of facts 

which are 'clearly critical' to a finding of probable cause. 114 

DeLoach, 922 F.2d at 622 (quoting Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 

(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th 

Cir. 1986)). 

4 This statement, of course, assumes that the affiant was aware 

of such omitted facts. 

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Because the state of mind with which Defendants allegedly 

acted was an element of Plaintiff's claim, Defendants had to make 

a prima facie showing that their actions were objectively 

reasonable. Defendants, however, did not submit any materials in 

support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. They did not file 

any affidavits attesting to their good faith, Martin, 812 F.2d at 

1434, or establishing the objective reasonableness of their 

conduct, Lewis, 903 F.2d at 755. Instead, Defendants merely 

argued that Plaintiff could not establish their culpable state of 

mind and that any alleged false statements or omissions were not 

material to a finding of probable cause. On this record, it does 

not appear that Defendants made a prima facie showing that their 

conduct was objectively reasonable. 

Moreover, Plaintiff came forward with specific evidence from 

which one could infer that Defendants recklessly made false 

statements in, and omitted material information from, their 

affidavits. As Plaintiff's expert witness said in an affidavit 

attached to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant-Police 

Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment, "the only material evidence 

in [Officer Ferguson's] affidavit linking [Plaintiff] to the 

offenses enumerated in the affidavit is the alleged identification 

of [Plaintiff] by one of the victims, [Victim #1]." R. Vol. I, 

Doc. 6, Ex. G at 2. Plaintiff pointed to evidence within 

Defendants' knowledge that clearly indicated Victim #1 could not 

positively identify Plaintiff, or any one else, as her assailant. 

In denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 

district court focused on the following statements or omissions 

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that it concluded were actionable: (1) Detective Robinson's 

statement that Victim #1 said she "had an opportunity to observe 

the subject closely," R. Vol. I, Doc. 6, Ex. Bat 1; (2) Detective 

Robinson's statement that Victim #1 "'knew it was him,'" when she 

saw Plaintiff in the grocery store on June 25, 1986, id.; (3) 

Detective Robinson's failure to mention Detective O'Connell's 

interview with Victim #1; and (4) Officer Ferguson's statement 

that he was "not aware of any other facts which would tend to 

exculpate [Plaintiff]," id. at Ex. D, p. 3. The district court 

also concluded that Officer Ferguson's affidavit suffered from the 

same deficiencies as Detective Robinson's affidavit. 

Defendants argue that Detective Robinson's statement that 

Victim #1 had an opportunity to observe her assailant closely is 

true, as evidenced by her ability to describe the assailant in 

some detail. The statement is clearly misleading, however, in 

light of the information Detective Robinson omitted from his 

affidavit: that the man was wearing a handkerchief that concealed 

his face from the bridge of his nose down, and Victim #1 only saw 

him briefly by the light of her dome light while he was crouched 

down 

doubt 

in her back seat. 

on Victim #l's 

The omitted information casts substantial 

ability to identify Plaintiff as her 

assailant and, therefore, is material to a finding of probable 

cause. 

Defendants also contend that Detective Robinson's statement 

that Victim #1 said she "knew it was him" when she saw Plaintiff 

on June 25, 1986, is true. In their interview with Victim #1 

after her encounter with Plaintiff on June 25th, however, neither 

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Detective Robinson nor Officer Locke wrote down what Victim #1 

told them. Officer Locke testified in his deposition that if 

Victim #1 had positively identified her assailant, he would have 

written it down. Furthermore, although Victim #1 allegedly 

identified Plaintiff as her assailant in this interview, the 

record does not reflect that the 

information until October 24, 1986. 

GPD took any action on this 

Both of these pieces of 

circumstantial evidence are sufficient to create an issue of fact 

as to whether Victim #1 actually made the statement Detective 

Robinson attributed to her in his affidavit. The statement is 

material, as it constituted a positive identification of Plaintiff 

as Victim #l's assailant. Also, one could infer from the GPD's 

failure to act on the information Victim #1 provided in the 

interview that Detective Robinson did not believe the information 

was sufficient to link Plaintiff to the crime. 

Defendants contend that pursuant to Easton v. City of 

Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

816 (1986), they were not required to discuss in their respective 

affidavits any of the statements Victim #1 made in her interview 

with Detective O'Connell because even if those statements were 

inconsistent or contradictory to the statements she allegedly made 

in the June 25th and October 24th interviews, they would not 

nullify probable cause. Defendants' interpretation of Easton is 

too broad. 

Easton involved an alleged sexual assault on two young boys 

by a man who lived in their apartment complex. When the first 

detective interviewed the boys separately, each described going to 

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the man's apartment where a nonviolent sexual assault occurred and 

later going to the laundry room with the man where he made a tent 

out of a blanket and assaulted one of the boys again. Each boy 

identified the man's apartment to the detective and together they 

took the police to the laundry room. There, the detective found a 

blanket, which the boys said was the one the man used to make a 

tent. The detective then contacted the building manager to 

determine who lived in the apartment the boys had identified. The 

manager said Daniel Easton lived in the apartment. Id. at 

1443-44. 

A week later, a second detective, who was experienced with 

juveniles, interviewed one of the boys again. At that time, the 

boy recalled only the incident in the laundry room. Although he 

denied being in the man's apartment, he identified the same 

apartment as the man's residence. The boy's description of what 

occurred in the laundry room remained consistent with his earlier 

account, however, and his description of the man was consistent 

with that given by the complex manager. At the end of the 

interview, the boy's stepfather saw a man coming out of his 

apartment across the complex and asked the boy if that man was the 

assailant. The boy responded "yes." Thereafter, police 

approached the man and asked him his name. He identified himself 

as Daniel Easton. Id. at 1444. 

Later that day, the detective interviewed the other boy 

again. His account of the laundry room incident was consistent 

with all other accounts. He again related that the boys were in 

the man's apartment, but denied that any assault took place there. 

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He described the man as having lighter hair than the other boy 

did. After the interview, the detective who first 

interviewed the children drafted an affidavit for Easton's arrest 

with the assistance of the second detective. The detective did 

not reveal in his affidavit that the first boy's statements as to 

whether he had been in Easton's apartment and whether he had been 

assaulted in Easton's apartment were contradictory, or that the 

two boy's descriptions of the assailant's hair color varied 

slightly. Id. at 1449. 

We concluded that the omitted inconsistencies 

d[id] nothing to undermine the solid core of the 

children's statements regarding the laundry room assault 

and the location of the perpetrator's apartment. Nor 

d[id] they detract from the detectives' impression, 

based on personal observation of [the first boy's] 

demeanor and behavior, that his statements were 

spontaneous and revealed knowledge of things that a 

child his age could not possibly possess had an event of 

the kind described not occurred. 

Id. at 1450. We also noted that "[t]'he detectives did not need 

[the first boy's] statement about a further assault in the man's 

apartment to establish probable cause and did not rely on it in 

the affidavit they submitted to [the judge]." Id. at 1450-51 

(emphasis added). We therefore held that "because the evidence 

excluded in no way alter[ed] the fact that the evidence included 

state[d] probable cause, the warrant was valid, whatever the 

intent of the officers, and Easton suffered no harm." Id. at 

1451. 

In contrast, the omissions here directly undermine Victim 

#l's alleged identification of Plaintiff as her assailant. That 

identification was virtually the only evidence linking Plaintiff 

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to either of the assaults, 

probable cause to believe 

and without it, there would be no 

Plaintiff was the assailant. 

Defendants' interpretation of Easton as holding that an officer 

need never report an inconsistency in the statements of a victim 

or witness is completely unreasonable. See also Stewart, 915 F.2d 

at 583 (holding law was clearly established in December of 1985 

that the victim's alleged recantation of his accusation was highly 

material to a finding of probable cause). 

On appeal, Defendants argue that Officer Ferguson's statement 

that he was unaware of any evidence exculpating Plaintiff was 

true. They contend that exculpatory evidence is that which 

positively eliminates the defendant as the perpetrator, and none 

of the evidence Plaintiff claims Officer Ferguson omitted from his 

affidavit concerning Victim #l's ability to identify Plaintiff and 

how well Plaintiff fit Victim #l's description of the assailant 

tended to show Plaintiff could not be the assailant. Appellant's 

Reply Brief at 8-13. Defendants did not raise this argument as to 

the meaning of "exculpatory" evidence in the district court, 

however, so we will not consider it on appeal. Gillihan v. 

Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Mountain 

Fuel Supply v. Reliance Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 

1991)("We are not obligated to address an argument which was not 

made in the district court, nor even in this court until the reply 

brief."). 

Officer Ferguson knew Victim #1 made statements to Detective 

O'Connell that undermined her ability to identify Plaintiff as her 

assailant and he knew that Plaintiff did not fit Victim #l's 

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( 

description of the assailant in all respects, including that he 

had hazel rather then "icy blue eyes," yet he not only failed to 

set forth this information in his affidavit, he positively stated 

he was unaware of any facts tending to exculpate Plaintiff. 

Officer Ferguson's statement was not only false and misleading, 

but material to the finding of probable cause. 

In his affidavit, Plaintiff's expert witness, a former police 

officer and chief investigator for a District Attorney's Office, 

opined that under the circumstances, 

the information relied upon by [Officer Ferguson] in the 

preparation of the affidavit for issuance of an arrest 

warrant was so obviously contraindicated as to the 

positive identification of [Plaintiff] by [Victim #1], 

that to include it in the affidavit without 

qualification or explanation constitutes a deviation 

from what an objective and reasonable police officer 

would consider appropriate in like circumstances. 

R. Vol. I, Doc. 6, Ex. G at 4. Detective Robinson's affidavit 

suffered 

affidavit. 

from the same deficiencies as Officer Ferguson's 

The statements Defendants made in their affidavits and the 

information they omitted from those affidavits concerned facts 

that were "clearly critical" to a finding of probable cause. A 

factfinder could infer that Defendants made the statements and 

omitted the information with reckless disregard for the truth. 

See DeLoach, 922 F.2d at 622. 

III. 

In conclusion, Defendants failed to make a prima facie 

showing that their conduct was objectively reasonable, while 

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Plaintiff pointed to specific evidence that Defendants' conduct 

violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable officer 

would have known. Therefore, the district court properly denied 

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The ruling of the United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED, 

and the action is REMANDED for further proceedings. 

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