Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01570/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01570-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Review Agency Decision

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS MOORE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO 11cv1570-GPC-WMC

ORDER 

(1) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO EXPEDITE

APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

[Dkt. Nos. 20, 33, 44.]

vs.

SUSAN TSUI GRUNDMANN, et al.,

Defendant.

On July 15, 2011, Plaintiff Dennis Moore (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against

Defendant Susan Tsui and a motion to appoint counsel. [Dkt. Nos. 1 and 3.] On

February 3, 2012, Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr., issued an order denying

Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel without prejudice. [Dkt. No. 13.] On March 15,

2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of order denying motion to appoint

counsel. [Dkt. No. 15.] On April 13, 2012, Judge McCurine, Jr., denied the motion to

reconsider without prejudice. [Dkt. No. 16.] 

- 1 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. [Dkt. No. 29.] On

May 16, 2012 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of order denying motion for

reconsideration of order denying motion to appoint counsel (sic). [Dkt. No. 20.] On

August 28, 2012, Defendants Susan Tsui Grundmann, Anne M. Wagner, and the

United States (“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [Dkt. No. 33.] On October 12, 2012, Plaintiff

filed an opposition to the motion. [Dkt. No. 36.] On May 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed an

emergency motion to expedite appointment of counsel. [Dkt. No. 44.]

For the reasons set out below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of order denying motion

for reconsideration. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion to expedite

appointment of counsel. 

BACKGROUND

In May 1983, Plaintiff appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”

or “the Board”) an action taken by Plaintiff’s employer, Defense Logistics Agency,

removing him from his position as an Accounting Technician based on attendance

related misconduct. [Dkt. No. 33, Declaration of Bernard Parker, Ex. 3 at 13 and Ex.

6 at 29-30.] The MSPB dismissed the appeal without prejudice. [Dkt. No. 33,

Declaration of Bernard Parker, Ex. 3 at 14.] In September 1983, Plaintiff petitioned

the MSPB for review of the initial decision. [Dkt. No. 33, Declaration of Bernard

Parker, Ex. 6 at 29.] In May 1984, the MSPB denied Plaintiff’s petition for review. 

[Dkt. No. 33, Declaration of Bernard Parker, Ex. 6 at 30.] Plaintiff then appealed to

the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. [Dkt. No. 33, Declaration of Bernard

Parker, Ex. 6 at 30.] Based on the MSPB’s motion, the Court of Appeals remanded the

matter back to the MSPB. [Dkt. No. 33, Declaration of Bernard Parker, Ex. 6 at 30.]

On remand, the MSPB held a full hearing on the merits and affirmed the removal

action. [Dkt. No. 33, Declaration of Bernard Parker, at Ex. 6 at 30, 40.] In 1987,

Plaintiff appealed the MSPB’s final decision on the merits of his employment claims

- 2 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois which affirmed the

MSPB’s decision. See Moore v. Def. Logistics Agency, 670 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Ill.

1987). Plaintiffsubsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,

which affirmed the district court’s decision. See Moore v. Carlucci, 893 F.2d 1337

(7th Cir. 1989). 

Twenty-two years later, on April 15, 2011, Plaintiff made a request for “records

of my initial filing” from the MSPB and sought to re-open his case. [Dkt. No. 33, Ex.

1 at 3.] On April 21, 2011, the MSPB provided a docketsheet listing four casesrelated

to Plaintiff and a copy of the initial decision of his appeal. [Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 2 at 9.] 

The MSPB also informed him that his file had been destroyed in accordance with their

case retention policy. [Dkt. No. 33, Ex. 3 at 11.] On April 27, 2011, Plaintiffsubmitted

a “FOIA appeal.” [Dkt. No. 33, Ex. 4 at 17.] On June 1, 2011, the MSPB granted in

part and denied in part Plaintiff’s appeal. [Dkt. No. 33, Ex. 5 at 22-23.] The MSPB

granted the appeal by providing the Westlaw and bound MSPB reporter copies of the

1984 final decision resulting from his initial appeal. [Id.] The MSPB denied the

appeal to the extent Plaintiff was requesting additional documents because MSPB

disclosed that Plaintiff’s remaining case files were destroyed pursuant to the MSPB’s

policy to destroy all case files older than six years. [Id.] 

On July 15, 2011, Plaintiff appealed to this Court the MSPB’s decision pursuant

to the Freedom Act and FOIA, naming Defendant Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

of the MSPB, in her official capacity. [Dkt. No. 1.] On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed

his First Amended Complaint, adding tort, Title VII, and damage claims as well as

criminal charges. [Dkt. No. 29.] Plaintiff also named Defendant Grundmann and

additional Defendant Anne M. Wagner, MSPB Vice-Chairman, in their official and

personal capacities. [Dkt. No. 29.]

In a letter dated July 1, 2011, the Clerk of the MSPB responded to and denied

Plaintiff’s request that the Board reopen his case [Dkt. No. 33 at Spencer Declaration

at Ex. 4.] On September 8, 2011, the MSPB received another request from Plaintiff to

- 3 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reopen or reconsider his appeal. [Dkt. No. 33 at Spencer Declaration at Ex 5.] The

Clerk of the MSPB once again responded and denied Plaintiff’s request by letter. [Dkt.

No. 33, Ex. 6 at 28.] 

DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FRCP 12(b)(1) AND 12(b)(6)

1. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the

applicable standard turns on the nature of the jurisdictional challenge. A motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or factual challenge. Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Telephone &Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). “If a defendant brings a facial attack, arguing that the allegations in the

complaint are insufficient to attain jurisdiction, the Court'sinquiry isthe same as when

ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Organization for Advancement of

Minorities with Disabilities v. Brick Oven Restaurant, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124

(S.D. Cal. 2005). “Specifically, the reviewing court must accept astrue the allegations

of the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” 

U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citations omitted). 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests

the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” he must plead sufficient

facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Taylor v.

Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1064, citing Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe

all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

(citations omitted). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely

- 4 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d

1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). If a complaint fails to state a claim, the court should grant

leave to amend unless it appears beyond a doubt the plaintiff would not be entitled to

relief under any set of facts proved. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Here, Defendants’ motion to dismiss challenges Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint on its face. Therefore, this Court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint

as true and all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff.

2. Request to Reopen or Review Plaintiff’s Appeal to the MSPB

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) permits a federal employee

subjected to an adverse personnel action such as discharge or demotion to appeal his

employer’s decision to the Merit System Protection Board. The MSPB may hear and

decide complaints for corrective or disciplinary action when an agency is alleged to

have committed a prohibited personnel practice. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214, 1215. The

complaint may allege the agency had insufficient cause for the discharge or demotion;

but the appeal may alternatively or in addition charge the agency with discrimination

prohibited by a federal statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1). If the MSPB upholds the

personnel action, the employee may seek judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(3).

a. District Court Jurisdiction

Plaintiff contends that the MSPB erred in denying his request to reconsider or

reopen his MSPB appeal. [Dkt. No. 29 at 2-3.] Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

appeal would only be appropriate in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

because the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review an MSPB decision

that does not involve an issue of discrimination decided on the merits. [Dkt. No. 33.]

However, a recent Supreme Court case clarifies this dispute: “A federal employee who

claims that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination

statute listed in § 7702(a)(1) should seek judicial review in district court, not the

Federal Circuit, regardless whether the MSPB decided her case on procedural grounds

- 5 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

or on the merits.” Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 599 (2012). In this case, Plaintiff

claims he has been affected by an adverse employment action as well as a Title VII

violation. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to seek judicial review in a federal district

court.

b. No MSPB Final Order or Decision

In the instant case, Plaintiff first sought relief before the MSPB to contest an

action taken by Plaintiff’s previous employer in May 1983. Plaintiff appealed the

MSPB’s decision and then instituted proceedings before the Federal Circuit as well as

the Seventh Circuit. Since May 1983, Plaintiff has instituted or appealed no fewer than

five actions before the Federal Court, the Seventh Circuit, and this Court relating to his

termination.

Plaintiff contendsthat the MSPB erred in denying his request for reconsideration

or reopening of his MSPB appeal. [Dkt. No. 29 at 2-3.] On April 15, 2011, Plaintiff

requested “to reopen and/or file a new appeal” in regard to his MSPB case. [Dkt. No.

33 at Spencer Declaration, Ex. 1.] On July 1, 2011, the Clerk of the Board sent

Plaintiff a letter denying Plaintiff’s request to review the MSPB’s final decision. [Dkt.

No. 33 at Spencer Declaration, Ex. 4.] On September 8, 2011, Plaintiff again

requested the MSPB to reopen or reconsider his appeal. [Dkt. No. 33 at Spencer

Declaration, Ex 5.] The Clerk of the Board again responded to Plaintiff by letter,

stating it would take no further action concerning his request. [Dkt. No. 33 at Spencer

Declaration, Ex. 6.]

Defendant contends this Court lacks jurisdiction as to Plaintiff’s request to

reopen his MSPB appeal. [Dkt. No. 33 at 7.] This Court is constrained by the “socalled ‘final judgment rule,’ [which] ordinarily limits our jurisdiction to appeals from

a decision or order that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the

court to do but execute the judgment.’” Weed v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 F.3d 1359, 1361

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373)). The Federal

- 6 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Circuit has held that the final judgment rule applies to appeals from the MSPB. See

Haines v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 44 F.3d 998, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Section 1295(a)(9)

of Title 28 circumscribes our jurisdiction to review the Board’s decisions, limiting it

to jurisdiction over ‘an appeal from a final order or final decision of the’ Board.”)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (1988)). Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction over this issue

turns on whether the determination that Plaintiff seeks to appeal constitutes a final

order for purposes of section 1295(a)(9). Id. at 999-1000. 

As set forth in Haines, an administrative response from the clerk of the MSPB

is not a final order of the MSPB. Id. at 1000. The letters Plaintiff received were an

administrative response to Plaintiff’s informal request to have the MSPB reconsider its

final decision on its own motion. Id. (“The Clerk had been delegated the authority to

make such responses by the Board and was performing only a ministerial function in

this regard.”). As there is no final order to review in this case, this Court is without

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. The Court hereby GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim to reopen or review his case before the

MSPB

3. Abuse of Discretion Claim

TheBoard has broad discretion in deciding whether to reopen particular appeals. 

See Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Under MSPB

regulations, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may request

reopening or reconsideration of final MSPB decisions. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.118. The

MSPB may also reopen an appeal and reconsider a decision by its own motion. 5

C.F.R. § 1201.118. However, such requests are granted only “under unusual

circumstances, such as when the initial decision contained clear legal errors or when

a party has proffered new and material evidence that would warrant a different

outcome.” Zamot, 332 F.3d at 137.

Plaintiff alleges “new evidence” exists, however he fails to provide material

evidence to this Court or to the Board. [See Dkt. No. 29 at 7.] Plaintiff also asserts

- 7 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that his appeal is “unusual” or “extraordinary.” [Dkt. No. 29 at 4.] Plaintiff has made

no showing of any legal error in the initial opinion or any new and material evidence

that could affect the outcome of the case. Given the absence of any such showing in

the materials before the Board, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Board not to

have reopened the appeal. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to

Plaintiff’s claim of abuse of discretion.

4. FOIA & Privacy Claims

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to raise by motion the

defense of “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)1. In this Circuit,

a “mootness” claim is properly raised with a 12(b)(1) motion. See Gemtel Corp. v.

Community Redevelopment Agency, 23 F.3d 1542, 1544 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding

“mootness” and “ripeness” properly challenged under Rule 12(b)(1)). A claim is moot

when “it has lost its character as a present, live controversy,” for instance, when an

administrative agency has performed the action sought by a plaintiff and the federal

court has no authority to grant effective relief. Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S.

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Am. Rivers v. Nat’l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997)). The court does not have

jurisdiction over a moot claim. Id.

When a person makes a FOIA request to a government agency, it must conduct

a good faith, reasonable search of those systems of records likely to possess the

requested information. Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F.3d 964, 986 (9th Cir. 2009). The agency

may prove the reasonableness of its search by the declaration of a responsible agency

official. Id. However, under FOIA, “federal jurisdiction is dependent on a showing

that an agency has (1) improperly (2) withheld (3) agency records,” not on the

reasonableness of the search. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142

(1989) (quoting Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136,

150 (1980)). Once the requested records have been produced, there is no longer a live

- 8 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

case or controversy and the FOIA action becomes moot. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.

1, 7 (1998).

Plaintiff appeals the MSPB’s decision granting in part and denying in part his

Privacy Act and FOIA request for all records from his MSPB appeals. [Dkt. No. 29.]

Defendants argue that the MSPB has provided Plaintiff with all existing agency

documents associated with his request. [Dkt. No. 33.] Attached to Defendants’ motion

to dismiss, is a declaration of Bernard Parker, an Information Management Specialist

in the Merit Systems Protection Board’s Office of the Clerk of the Board. [Dkt. No.

33, Declaration of Bernard Parker.] In the declaration, Mr. Parker details his search for

the documents. Id. Mr. Parker states he provided two documents to Plaintiff and

concluded no other documents existed because the paper case files in Plaintiff’s case

had been destroyed pursuant to the Board’s retention policy. Id. The Court cannot

provide relief to remedy the improper withholding of documents when the responsive

agency records have already been produced. As such, Plaintiff’s FOIA and Privacy

Claims are moot. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FOIA and Privacy Claims as

MOOT.

5. Tort Claims

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is the exclusive remedy for tortious

conduct by the United States, and it only allows claims against the United States. 

F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). The requirement that a party file

an administrative claim before filing an action under the FTCA arises from 28 U.S.C.

§ 2675(a), which provides in part:

“An action shall not be instituted upon a claimagainst the United States

for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or

death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office

or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim

to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally

denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered

mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

The requirement of an administrative claim prior to bringing this action is a

jurisdictional requirement. Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000)

- 9 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(citing Cadwalder v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the

requirement is jurisdictional, it “must be strictly adhered to.” Id. (citing Jerves v.

United States, 966 F.2d 517, 521 (9thCir. 1992) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Plaintiff assertsin his First Amended Complaint a “Tort claim of Obstruction of

Justice,” and a “Tort Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” [Dkt. No.

29.] However, Plaintiff failsto allege in his First Amended Complaint that he has filed

any administrative claims. [See Dkt. No. 29.] Having failed to show exhaustion of his

administrative remedies, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s tort claims. 

Plaintiff does not assert any state tort law claims in his complaint. As such, the

Court declines to consider whether Plaintiff has properly alleged a tort claim based on

state law. 

6. Title VII Claim

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respectto his compensation,terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish subject matter jurisdiction

under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before

bringing a claim before the appropriate court. Id. at 1099. 

Again, Plaintiff fails to plead in his First Amended Complaint that he has

exhausted any administrative remedies in conjunction with his Title VII claim. [See

Dkt. No. 29.] Therefore, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

7. No FEAR Act Claim

The Notification and Federal Employees Antidiscrimination Act (“No FEAR

Act”), does not create a substantive right for which the government must pay damages,

- 10 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

but rather, it requires that federal agencies repay any discrimination or whistleblower

damage awards out of agency funds rather than the General Fund of the Treasury. 5.

U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. See also Pub. Law 107-174, Sec. 201. Thus, the No FEAR Act

does not provide a private cause of action. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.; see

also Glaude v. United States, 248 Fed. App’x. 175, 177 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Of the few

courts that have considered claims made under the No Fear Act, none have found that

the Act provides a private cause of action or creates a substantive right for which the

government must pay damages.”). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Susan Tsui Grundmann and Anne M. Wagner are

in violation of the No FEAR Act and are personally liable to Plaintiff. However, the

No FEAR act does not provide for a private cause of action and therefore, this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s No FEAR Act

claim.

8. Criminal Statute Claims

To the extent Plaintiff alleges criminal claims of lying to Congress and

obstruction of justice, no private remedies exist. A claim of obstruction of justice is

a criminal charge and a private citizen does not have authority to initiate a federal

criminal proceeding. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988); United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). See also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467,

1482 (9th Cir. 1997) aff'd sub nom. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) and

overruled on different grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.

2012) (“The obstruction of justice claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is also futile because

18 U.S.C. § 1503 is a criminal statute that does not provide for a private cause of

action”). 

In Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”) may apply. To prevail in a civil action under Racketeer

- 11 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must prove that the

defendant engaged in (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of

racketeering activity, and additionally must establish that the defendant caused injury

to his business or property, which requires a showing that his injury was proximately

caused by defendant's fraudulent conduct, and that he has suffered a concrete financial

loss, which requires plaintiff to document the amount of damages to which he is

entitled. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c). Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016,

1021 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff alleges no such facts in his First Amended Complaint. 

[Dkt. No. 29.]

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims fail. A private citizen such as Plaintiff has no authority

to initiate federal criminal prosecutions. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705,

108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693

(1974); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that only the United

States as prosecutor can bring a criminal complaint under RICO). Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s criminal

statute claims.

B. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

1. Background

On July 15, 2011, Plaintiff requested appointment of counsel under 42 .S.C. §

2000e-d(f)(1), which provides for mandatory appointment of counsel for claims of

employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title

I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. [Dkt. No. 3] The Court denied Plaintiff’s

request without prejudice because it did not appear from that Plaintiff raised an

employment discrimination claim. The Court also denied Plaintiff’s request because

the Constitution does not provide a right to appointment of counsel in civil cases and

Plaintiff’s complaint does not appear to raise particularly complex issues. [Dkt. No. 13

at 2]. 

On March 15, 2012 Plaintifffiled a motion for reconsideration ofthe Court order

- 12 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

denying Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. [Dkt. No. 14.] On April 13,

2012, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for failure to provide newly discovered

evidence to justify appointment of counsel. [Dkt. No. 16.] The Court also denied

Plaintiff’s motion for failure to demonstrate a need for counsel at this stage of the

proceedings. 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration and an

emergency motion for appointment of counsel.[Dkt. Nos. 20, 44.] Although Plaintiff

requests reconsideration of the Court order denying reconsideration, [Dkt. No. 16], the

Court interprets Plaintiff’s motion as a request to reconsider the initial order denying

Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, [Dkt. No. 13]. In the motion for reconsideration,

Plaintiff argues for appointment of counsel because he has found newly discovered

evidence. Id. Plaintiff also argues for appointment of counsel because his ongoing

health issues make pro se representation difficult. Finally, Plaintiff restates his request

for appointment of counsel for his Title VII claims. Id. Plaintiff makes the same

arguments in support of his emergency motion to expedite appointment of counsel.

[Dkt. No. 44.] As such, the Court reads both Plaintiff’s motions as a request to

reconsider the Court order denying appointment of counsel. 

2. Legal Standard

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly authorize a

motion for reconsideration, the Court “has the inherent power to reconsider and modify

its interlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment.” Smith v. Massachusetts, 543

U.S. 462, 475 (2005). This inherent power extends to prior rulings in the same

litigation. Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th

Cir. 2010) (“a court may revisit prior decisions in a case and correct errors while the

case is still pending”). 

Nevertheless, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly.”

Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9thCir. 2003). “[A] motion for reconsideration

should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court

- 13 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an

intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos

Pharma GmbH &Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A motion

for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first

time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id.(citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle

to reargue the motion or to present evidence which should have been raised before.”

United States v. Westlands Water District, 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D.Cal. 2001).

Lastly, “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with

the Court’s decision, and recapitulation . . . of that which was already considered by the

Court in rendering its decision.” Id.

3. Analysis

The Court finds reconsideration of the Court’s order is not warranted. As a

preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not make any new assertions in favor of

reconsideration. Although Plaintiff asserts he has presented “newly discovered

evidence,” the Court finds the information is not new and moreover, has no relevance

to Plaintiff’s request for counsel. Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a need for

counsel. At thistime, the Court refrainsfromreconsidering its’ previous order denying

appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration and DENIES Plaintiff’s emergencymotion to expedite for appointment

of counsel. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s first amended complaint, [Dkt. No. 33.], and DISMISSES WITHOUT

PREJUDICE the following claims: Plaintiff’s request to reopen or review Plaintiff’s

appeal to the MSPB claim, FOIA and Privacy Act claims, abuse of discretion, violation

of Federal Tort Claims Act, and Title VII claim. The Court DISMISSES WITH

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s NO FEAR Act claim and criminal statute claims. 

- 14 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30) days leave from the date this Order is filed in

which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies identified

herein. If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint within 30 days, the case

shall remain dismissed. 

Finally, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion to expedite appointment of counsel. [Dkt. Nos. 20, 44.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

- 15 - 11cv1570

Case 3:11-cv-01570-GPC-MDD Document 45 Filed 05/20/13 Page 15 of 15