Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04045/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04045-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TORRY SMITH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-4045 EMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION

(Docket No. 35)

The instant lawsuit arose from a warrantless police search of the Oakland residence of

Plaintiffs Torry Smith and Patricia Gray. Mr. Smith was arrested subsequent to this search and

incarcerated for over four months. Plaintiffs allege several civil rights violations by Defendants City

of Oakland and Oakland police officers, M. Midyett and J. Parkinson. The thrust of Plaintiffs’

complaint is that the Oakland officers conspired to plant evidence on Mr. Smith in order to coerce

information from him and trump false charges against him. The officers deny all allegations of

wrongdoing and contend that they searched Plaintiffs’ residence for legitimate law enforcement

purposes.

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. In

their motion, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss some, but not all, of Plaintiffs’ claims. More

specifically, Defendants ask that the Court dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful search

and any claim for post-criminal indictment damages. Defendants further request that the Court

dismiss all claims against the City of Oakland and against Officer Midyett. Having considered the

parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral argument of counsel, the Court

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hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary

adjudication.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant facts presented by the parties are as follows.

A. Traffic Stop of Walton and Belton

On September 10, 2004, Officers Parkinson and Midyett made a traffic stop of a car driven

by Juanita Walton. Ms. Walton was accompanied by her boyfriend, Marcus Belton, who was known

to the police as a dangerous criminal. See Parkinson Depo., 27:22-25. The officers found a bank

card and some other papers belonging to Mr. Smith in the car. See id., 93:9-13. Mr. Smith had

previously reported this card, his social security card, and driver’s license missing. See Torry

Smith’s Depo., 27:21-28:25. The officers claim to have not known that Mr. Smith had made such a

report. See Midyett Depo., 113:18-20. The officers ran Mr. Smith’s name through their car

computer and learned that Mr. Smith was on parole. See Midyett Depo., 78:2-21. They obtained

Mr. Smith’s contact information from their computer and proceeded to his residence. See id. The

officers did not seize Mr. Smith’s bank card or the other documents they found in the car, nor did

they contact the bank that had issued the card. See Midyett Depo., 78:9-17. These facts are not

disputed. Defendants contend they sought Mr. Smith to determine whether he might be a cohort of

Walton or Belton or be a victim. See Parkinson Depo., 94:22-95:1.

B. Search of Plaintiffs’ Residence

It is at this juncture that the parties’ versions of the events that took place at Plaintiffs’

residence diverge.

1. Defendants’ Version

According to Defendants, Officers Parkinson and Midyett knocked on Plaintiffs’ door and

identified themselves as Oakland police, only to hear the sound of someone moving away from the

doorway. See Midyett Depo., 93:9-94:25. Officer Parkinson ran to the back of the house and saw

Mr. Smith standing outside in the backyard, naked and holding a rifle. See Parkinson Depo.,

110:15-18. After Mr. Smith put the gun on the ground, Officer Parkinson yelled at Mr. Smith to

raise his hands above his head. See id., 111:20-113:18. Officer Midyett heard Officer Parkinson

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yelling and came to the back, but Officer Parkinson told him to return to watch the front of the

house. See id., 115:7-8. 

Officer Parkinson then directed Mr. Smith into the house from the back door and ordered

him to lie on the bed to be handcuffed. See id., 116:4-118:3. In the meantime, Officer Midyett had

gained entry through the front door. See Midyett Depo., 102:19-24. Officer Parkinson informed

Officer Midyett about the rifle and went to retrieve it from the backyard. See id., 107:16-19. 

Officer Midyett radioed for a cover unit and Officer Wells subsequently arrived on the scene,

entering the house through the same front door that Officer Midyett had used. See id., 102:8-14.,

107:1-10. 

After they handcuffed and secured Mr. Smith the Officers told him about finding his bank

card and asked him whether he knew Mr. Belton. See Parkinson Depo., 141:9-10. Mr. Smith denied

knowing Mr. Belton. See id., 141:14-15. However, while being transported to the police station,

Mr. Smith spontaneously said that the gun was not his; he and Ms. Gray were just holding the gun

for Ms. Gray’s brother. See Parkinson Depo., 125:19-21. Mr. Smith did not reveal any further

information about this brother. See id., 151:21-23. As part of routine investigation, Mr. Smith was

also asked whether he had knowledge about any other crimes in Oakland. See id., 142:1-4. 

According to Officer Parkinson, Mr. Smith admitted to knowing about a murder. Officer Midyett,

however, remembered no such admission. See Parkinson Depo., 143:4; Midyett Depo., 121:16-

122:3. This conversation in the car was not reported by the officers in their official police report --

i.e., the police report did not contain any reference to Mr. Smith’s confession that the gun belonged

to Ms. Gray’s brother, nor did it mention that Mr. Smith admitted to knowing about a murder. 

Officer Parkinson claimed that he did not include the information about the confession in the report

or bring it up at any time until the parole revocation hearing because Mr. Smith had not been

admonished when these questions were asked and the officers did not want to use the statements

against Mr. Smith in violation of Miranda. See Parkinson Depo., 125:22-126:11. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Version

According to Plaintiffs, Officers Parkinson, Midyett and a third, unknown officer were

present during the initial entry of the residence. Officer Parkinson and this third officer simply

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kicked open Plaintiffs’ back door and found Plaintiffs in the bedroom. See Torry Smith Depo.,

63:18-24. The three Officers entered Plaintiffs’ home with their guns drawn-- Parkinson and the

third officer through the back door and Midyett from the front. See Torry Smith Depo., 66:19-67:15. 

 Officer Parkinson and the third officer demanded that Mr. Smith reveal information about Mr.

Belton. See id., 71:23-72-25. Officer Parkinson and the unknown officer searched Plaintiffs’

residence. See id., 73:1-2. Officer Parkinson then came from the back door and said he had found

something, but did not specify further. See id., 78:18-20. Mr. Smith and Ms. Gray thus dispute the

officers’ version of the search and specifically deny Mr. Smith had possession of a rifle. See id.,

40:10-12.

Plaintiffs’ version of the events is corroborated by Mr. Smith’s father, Tommie Smith, who

lives in the duplex adjoining Plaintiffs’ residence. Tommie Smith was alerted to activity in

Plaintiffs’ backyard by the loud noise of Plaintiffs’ back screen door opening. See Tommie Smith

Depo., 49:20-50:12. Tommie Smith has a view of Plaintiffs’ backyard from his bedroom window. 

When he looked outside upon hearing the loud noise, he saw two police officers entering Plaintiffs’

residence through the back door. See id., 50:12-18. “OPD” was written on the officers’ clothes. 

See id., 50:19-51:11. As Tommie Smith walked to his son’s residence to investigate, he saw yet

another officer in the front of Plaintiffs’ residence. See id., 62:21-23.

Mr. Smith was taken to the police car by Officers Midyett and Parkinson. On the way to the

station they asked Mr. Smith about homicides in the area and told him that, if he provided the

information they had been asking for, they would release him. See id., 90:6-20. Once they got to

the station, Officer Parkinson brought Mr. Smith out of the car, while Officer Midyett opened the

trunk of the car and retrieved a rifle. See id., 91:25-92:2. This was the first time Mr. Smith saw the

rifle. See id., 92:1-2. Mr. Smith then became concerned that the officers were trying to plant the

rifle on him. See id., 95:10-12. Mr. Smith’s public defender subsequently informed him that he was

going to be charged with possession of the rifle. See id., 96:24-97:2.

C. Mr. Smith’s Charges and Hearings

The narrative of Mr. Smith’s police report was prepared by Officer Parkinson who was

assisted by Officer Midyett. See Parkinson Depo., 70:21-25, 101:9-14. Officer Williams, the

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weapons charging officer, prepared the case for the district attorney’s office. See Williams Depo.,

29: 11-16. Officer Williams did not discuss the incident with Officer Parkinson or Midyett but

relied on their report. See id., 14:19-24. The district attorney, based on the report, decided to press

charges. See id., 29:11-16. Mr. Smith was charged with unlawful firearm activity and possession of

an assault weapon. 

The criminal charges against Mr. Smith were dismissed in two preliminary hearings. At Mr.

Smith’s parole revocation hearing Officer Parkinson, for the first time, claimed that on the way to

the police station, Mr. Smith confessed to holding the gun for his girlfriend’s brother. See Parkinson

Depo., 125:19-126:4. The parole revocation charges were dismissed, and Smith was released after

more than four months in custody.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert Report

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Defendants’ motion to strike the expert report

of Robert Clark, which Plaintiffs submitted in support of their opposition to the motion for summary

adjudication. Defendants assert that the report should be stricken because it is hearsay and because

it contains credibility assessments and legal conclusions.

The Court agrees with Defendants that the report should be stricken because it is hearsay. 

Although the report was signed by Mr. Clark and attached to a declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel (see

Benjamin Nisenbaum Decl)., the report was not sworn to by Mr. Clark. “Unsworn expert reports

prepared in compliance with Rule 26(a)(2) do not qualify as affidavits or otherwise admissible

evidence for purpose of Rule 56, and may be disregarded by the court when ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” 11-56 Moore’s Fed. Prac. -- Civ. § 56.14; see also Wittmer v. Peters , 87 F.3d

916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that unsworn expert reports are not admissible under Rule 56(e) to

support or oppose summary judgment); Fowle v. C & C Cola , 868 F.2d 59, 67 (3d Cir. 1989)

(stating that “[t]he substance of this report was not sworn to by the alleged expert” and so “the

purported expert’s report is not competent to be considered on a motion for summary judgment.”)

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B. Legal Standard for Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (c) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). An issue of fact is genuine

only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for

the [nonmoving party].” Id. at 252. However, the summary judgment stage, evidence must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. See id. at 255. The party seeking summary judgment bears the

initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

C. Fourth Amendment Claim of Unlawful Search

The parties do not dispute the basic legal principle that parole searches need not be based on

probable cause under Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). In Samson, a police officer

searched petitioner solely on the basis of his knowledge that petitioner was a parolee and recovered

a bag of methamphetamine. Id. at 2196. The petitioner attempted to suppress the methamphetamine

evidence on the claim that the search was unconstitutional. Id. The Samson court applied the Fourth

Amendment’s “totality of circumstances” approach to examine the California statute which allowed

such suspicionless searches. See id. at 2197. Under this approach, individual privacy rights are

balanced against legitimate government interests to determine whether a search is reasonable. See

id. Applying the balancing test, the Court found California’s statute reasonable. See id. at 2199. 

The government’s interest in “integrating probationers back into the community and combating

recidivism” outweighed the individual privacy interest. See id. at 2197. The Supreme Court found

the California statute was reasonable because the statute did not provide “a blanket grant of

discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards,” but rather clearly prohibited “arbitrary,

capricious or harassing searches.” See id. at 2202. 

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1 After Plaintiffs clarified that their Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful search was based on

the theory that the search was arbitrary and capricious, Defendants no longer asserted that the officers

were entitled to qualified immunity. No argument of qualified immunity was made, e.g., in Defendants’

reply brief. To the extent Defendants still make this argument, the Court rejects it. Plaintiffs’ version

of the facts suggests that the officers planted the rifle and attempted to intimidate and coerce Mr. Smith.

Reasonable officers could not have believed that planting evidence is protected under qualified

immunity. See White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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In In re Anthony, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), a state court defined a search as

arbitrary or capricious when it is “unrelated to the rehabilitation and reformative purpose of

probation or other legitimate law enforcement purposes.” Id. at 217. Anthony further stated that the

evaluation of the nature of the search “must relate to the executing officer’s motivation” and noted

that a search “motivated by personal animosity” would be arbitrary. Id.

The parties agree that the issue for the Court, therefore, is whether there is a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether the entry and search conducted by Officers Parkinson and Midyett was

arbitrary or capricious. The Court concludes there is such a dispute of material fact. Defendants

contend (and provide evidence) that the search was not arbitrary or capricious because the officers

acted to fulfill a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Defendants assert that discovering the bank

card alerted the officers to Mr. Smith, that they proceeded to investigate whether Mr. Smith might

have been Belton’s victim or cohort, and that they entered the house and conducted their search only

after Officer Parkinson saw Mr. Smith with the rifle. 

Mr. Smith and Ms. Gray both testified in their depositions, on the other hand, that there was

no gun on the premises, and their testimony is supported by Tommie Smith’s testimony. According

to their testimony, the police simply entered for no legitimate reason. They did not investigate the

circumstances of the lost credit card before initiating the search. Upon entering, the police tried to

coerce Mr. Smith and then planted the rifle. A reasonable jury, viewing the evidence and justifiable

inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, could conclude the officers were not earnestly conducting the search

for legitimate investigatory reasons and that the gun was planted by the Defendants. If that were the

case, the parole search was not for a legitimate law enforcement purpose and would therefore be

arbitrary and capricious.1

 This genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment.

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D. Claims of Post-Indictment Damages

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs are barred from seeking any damages that accrued

after the indictment was filed against Mr. Smith, because “filing of a criminal complaint immunizes

investigating officers . . . from damages suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the

prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause

for an accused’s arrest exists at that time.” Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1981)

[hereinafter “Smiddy I”]. The exercise of that judgment can break the causal chain, thereby limiting

plaintiffs’ damages.

The above presumption, however, may be rebutted. See id. For example, the presumption is

rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the prosecutor was pressured by the investigating officers to act

contrary to her independent judgment or was presented with information that the officers knew to be

false. See id. at 266-67. Evidence of material omissions, inconsistent eyewitness accounts, or

inconsistent police accounts can rebut the presumption. See Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d

991, 995 (9th Cir. 2006). While “the presumption may be rebutted in other ways,” id. at 266-67, the

presumption cannot be overcome simply based on the plaintiff’s account of the incident. See id. at

995-96 (stating that “plaintiff’s account of the incident in question, by itself , does not overcome the

presumption of independent judgment”) (emphasis added); Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1474

(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that plaintiff did not point to any evidence “other than the fact that the

officers’ reports were inconsistent with Sloman’s own account of the incident leading to his arrest”

and that “[s]uch conclusory allegations, standing alone, are insufficient to prevent summary

judgment”) (emphasis added).

The Court concludes that, in the instant case, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Plaintiffs are entitled to post-indictment damages because there is evidence that the

reporting police officers omitted material facts in presenting the case to the prosecutor thereby

preventing him from exercising his independent judgment. In so holding, the Court finds

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) persuasive.

In Blankenhorn, the plaintiff was arrested by officers at a shopping mall where mall security

had issued a written notice evicting and permanently banning him from the premises. See id. at 467. 

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The plaintiff was charged with one count of trespass, three counts of resisting arrest, and one count

of disturbing the peace. Id. All charges against the plaintiff were dropped and he was released, but

only after he had spent three months in custody. See id. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit for

unlawful arrest, excessive force and malicious prosecution (and several California state claims). On

the issue of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff claimed that deliberately false statements in the

officers’ arrest reports led to his three resisting-arrest charges. See id. at 482. In bringing these

charges, the deputy district attorney did not look at any other evidence and relied on the information

in officers’ reports. See id. at 483. The plaintiff substantiated his claim of that the reports contained

material false statements by presenting to the court the deposition testimony of a third-party witness,

Garcia. Garcia testified that never during the incident in question did he hear plaintiff claim himself

a member of a gang, while the police report by of the officers involved stated that plaintiff had

yelled that he was a gang member. See id. at 483. In that regard, the case was distinguishable from

Sloman. “The key fact in Sloman was that the plaintiff did not . . . point to any evidence of . . .

fabrication, other than the fact that the officers’ reports were inconsistent with [his] own account of

the incidents leading to his arrest.” Id. The plaintiff in Blankenhorn, however, “provided more than

conclusory allegations of the falsehood of [the officer’s] statement. Specifically, he supported his

motion in opposition with Garcia’s declaration.” Id.

Like the plaintiff in Blankenhorn, Plaintiffs in the instant case do not rely solely on their own

statements contradicting the officers’ accounts in order to assert the police report contains material

omissions and false statements to rebut the presumption of independent judgment. As in

Blankenhorn, in the instant case, a third-party witness, Tommie Smith, has provided testimony that

conflicts with Defendants’ factual assertions. Tommie Smith heard the back door open only once

during the time frame of the incidents in question. On hearing the sound, he looked out of his

window into Plaintiffs’ backyard and saw the officers entering the house. While Defendants claim

that Mr. Smith had run out of the house, naked, to hide the gun, Tommie Smith did not see Mr.

Smith when he heard the sound of the back door opening and looked out the window. Rather, he

saw two officers enter the house through the back door. Under Defendants’ version, the door would

have opened twice, once when Mr. Smith ran out with the gun and the second time when Officer

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Parkinson led him back into the house. However, Tommie Smith swears under oath that he heard

only one loud sound and saw two police officers entering the house. Tommie Smith’s testimony

materially corroborates Plaintiffs’ version of events and contradicts the officers’ version. In

addition, the inconsistencies in the officers’ testimonies regarding Mr. Smith’s alleged admissions

while under arrest raises additional credibility issues. As in Blankenhorn, the facts viewed in

Plaintiffs’ favor is sufficient to rebut the presumption of independent judgment, thus warranting

denial of summary adjudication.

E. Claims Against City of Oakland

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim against the City, Plaintiffs must prove that any injury

they suffered resulted from City policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

694 (1978). The Ninth Circuit has held that in some situations isolated constitutional violations are

sufficient to establish a municipal “policy.” See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.

1999). The court elaborated that there are three such situations: if the person causing the violation

has “final policymaking authority,” see id.; if the final policymaker “ratified” a subordinate’s

actions, see id. at 1038; or if the final policymaker acted with “deliberate indifference.” See id. at

1240.

In the case at hand, Plaintiffs fail to support their claim of policy or custom with any

evidence. The only evidence that Plaintiffs have provided in opposing summary judgment is the

expert report of Mr. Clark, but for the reasons stated above the report is inadmissible hearsay. 

Even if Court were to consider the expert report, Plaintiffs would not prevail. The only

argument that Plaintiffs seem to be making via the expert report is that no reasonable supervisor

would approve of the police report written by Officer Parkinson. See Benjamin Nisenbaum Decl.,

2:16-18; Ex. H (Clark Report at 17). Plaintiffs’ evidence does not suggest the existence of any of

the three situations in which isolated constitutional violations are sufficient to establish a municipal

“policy.” See Christie, 176 F.3d at 1235-40. Plaintiffs do not argue that their constitutional rights

were violated by a final policymaker directly; rather, their rights were violated by Officers Parkinson

and Midyett. Nor is there any evidence of ratification of the two officers’ actions by a final

policymaker. As for the argument of deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs fail to establish that the

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report was blatantly problematic on its face and should have alerted a reviewing final policymaker of

constitutional violations by her subordinates. See id. at 1240. For the above reasons, Defendant

City of Oakland is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of municipal liability.

F. Claims Against Officer Midyett

Under Ninth Circuit case law, Officer Midyett may be dismissed from this lawsuit if he is not

an “integral participant” in the alleged constitutional violation. See Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292,

294 (9th Cir. 1996). In Chuman, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual police officer could not be

found liable under § 1983 for his “team effort” in executing a search warrant when he himself might

not be guilty of any constitutional violation. See id. The court found it impermissible to “lump all

the Defendants together, rather than . . . base each individual’s liability on his own conduct.” Id. at

295.

According to Defendants’ version of the facts, Officer Parkinson was the sole participant in

the incidents that allegedly violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants maintain that

Officer Midyett remained in the front of the house, never saw Mr. Smith or the rifle in the backyard,

and was involved in the alleged violations only to the extent of being present on the scene and later

filling out the administrative portions of the police report for Officer Parkinson. However,

according to the evidence and inferences viewed in Plaintiffs’ favor, even though Officer Midyett

did not go to the backyard or enter from the back door, he had was privy to the conspiracy to

surprise Mr. Smith by entering his house from both sides, to intimidate him in order to unlawfully

extract information, and to fabricate evidence by planting the rifle. If Officer Parkinson had and

executed such a plan, it may reasonably be inferred that Officer Midyett knew about it and

participated in it. Because there is a genuine issue of disputed fact as to Officer Midyett’s role and

knowledge, the Court denies summary adjudication.

///

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///

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to strike the expert report

and grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. Defendants’

motion for summary adjudication is granted only to the extent that all claims against the City of

Oakland shall be dismissed. The motion is otherwise denied.

This order disposes of Docket No. 35. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2007 ________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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