Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00689/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 38:4311 Uniformed Service Employment/Reemployment Rights Act

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEVEN PARKER and )

JOSEPH PRESTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11cv689-SRW

)

JOSH AND KELLIE JONES d/b/a )

C.O.P.S. PEST CONTROL, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Plaintiffs Steven Parker and Joseph Preston bring the present action against

defendants Josh and Kellie Jones d/b/a/ C.O.P.S. Pest Control pursuant to the Fair Labor

Standards (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. This matter is presently

before the court on the parties’ joint motion for approval of their amended settlement

agreement (Doc. # 31), filed on August 13, 2012. Preston alleges that he was employed by 1

defendants from December 6, 2010, through August 9, 2011, and that defendants

misclassified himas an “exempt” employee and therebywrongfullydenied himovertime pay. 

Parker alleges that defendants employed him from May 2011 through July 26, 2011, and that

they failed to pay him time and a half as required by law for hours worked in excess of forty

While the court must scrutinize the settlement of the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, court 1

approval is not required for plaintiffs’ USERRA claims. Accordingly, the court need not address

the USERRA claims.

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per work week. Defendants deny that they are an employer subject to the FLSA or that they

violated either plaintiff’s rights under the FLSA. 

The FLSA was enacted to protect employees from substandard wages and excessive

working hours; its provisions are mandatoryand not subject to bargaining between employers

and employees. Lynn’s Food Stores v. United States Dept. of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352

(11th Cir. 1982). An employee’s claim for back wages under the FLSA may be compromised

in only two ways: (1) with payment in full of back wages, supervised by the Secretary of

Labor, with the employee giving up a right to sue for unpaid wages and liquidated damages;

(2) by stipulated judgment entered by a court in an FLSA action brought against the

employer, entered after the court has “scrutiniz[ed] the settlement for fairness.” Id. at 1352-

53. The court may approve a settlement which presents a reasonable compromise over issues

that are actually in dispute with regard the pending FLSA claims. Id. 

There are actual disputes over plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in this matter, including

whether defendants are subject to the FLSA at all and, ifso, whether Preston is a non-exempt

employee covered by the FLSA’s overtime provision, and the amount of back pay to which

each plaintiff would be entitled. In view of the disputed issues in the FLSA claims of both

plaintiffs, the defendants’ tenuous financial condition (as represented in the parties’ joint

motion), and the fact that the parties have agreed to an allocation of settlement proceeds so

that both plaintiffs are receiving the full amount of overtime pay and liquidated damages that

they would be entitled to recover if they were to prevail on their FLSA claims, the court

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concludes that the settlement is a fair and reasonable compromise of the disputed issues and,

further, that the amount of the attorney’s fee is reasonable. Particularly in view of plaintiffs’ 2

representation that they have no potential claims against the defendants other than the FLSA

and USERRA claims presently before the court, the court further finds that the release

included in the settlement agreement – and for which the plaintiffs will receive separate

compensation as part of the settlement of their USERRA claims – does not render the

agreement unreasonable. (See Doc. # 31, pp. 9-11; Amended Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1,

7, 8).

CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the joint motion for approval of settlement agreement (Doc. # 31) is

The court can envision scenarios in which a contingency fee agreement would render the 2

settlement agreement unreasonable. This is not such a case. The agreed contingency fee of 40%

results in a fee of $1,158.00 attributed to Preston’s FLSA claim and $51.00 attributed to Parker’s,

assuming that theywould recover fully on those claims. The fee is reasonable, certainly, with respect

to the plaintiffs. If the FLSA claims were the only claims in this action, the court might consider the

contingencyfee to deny adequate compensation to counsel. See Silva v. Miller, 307 Fed. Appx. 349,

351-52 (11th Cir. 2009)(“That Silva and Zidell entered into a contingency contract to establish

Zidell’s compensation if Silva prevailed on the FLSA claim is of little moment in the context of

FLSA. FLSA requires judicial review of the reasonableness of counsel’s legal fees to assure both that

counsel is compensated adequately and that no conflict of interest taints the amount the wronged

employee recovers under a settlement agreement. FLSA provides for reasonable attorney’s fees; the

parties cannot contract in derogation of FLSA’s provisions.”). However, counsel will also receive

a contingency fee under the settlement attributable to the plaintiffs’ USERRA claims, which appear

from the complaint to be the more significant claims in terms of potential recovery. As to plaintiff

Parker, the FLSA claim might not have been brought at all in the absence of the stronger USERRA

claim. In view of the facts alleged in the complaint, the representations in the parties’ joint motion,

and the substantial issues in dispute on the FLSA claims, the court finds the agreed contingency fee

to be reasonable. 

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Case 1:11-cv-00689-SRW Document 34 Filed 08/27/12 Page 3 of 4
GRANTED. The court will enter a consent judgment substantially as proposed by the parties

to this action. It is further 3

ORDERED that the fairness hearing presently scheduled for 10:30 a.m. on

August 29, 2012 is hereby CANCELLED. 

DONE, this 27 day of August, 2012. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The proposed consent judgment is Exhibit B to the joint motion for approval of the 3

amended settlement agreement. The court has made minor changes to the wording and format of

the consent judgment filed by the parties, but has not altered the substance of the proposed judgment.

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