Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05195/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05195-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 6, 2009 Decided June 2, 2009

No. 07-5195

PETER JAMES ATHERTON,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00680)

Sarah Campbell, Student Counsel, argued the cause as

amicus curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs

were James E. Coleman, Jr., appointed by the court, Sean E.

Andrussier, Attorney, and James McDonald, Eugenie Montague,

Emily Sauter, and Eric Wiener, Student Counsel.

Peter J. Atherton, Pro Se, was on the briefs for appellant.

Judith A. Kidwell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for Federal Appellees. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. 

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

cause for appellees Suzanne Bailey-Jones, et al. With him on

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 1 of 29
2

the brief were Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim,

Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor

General.

Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: On April 9, 2001,

appellant Peter James Atherton was sworn in as a District of

Columbia Superior Court grand juror. The grand jury was

scheduled to deliberate for 25 days. However, on April 11,

Atherton was permanently removed from grand jury service

after an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) who was

presenting evidence to the grand jurors reported to the

supervising AUSA, Daniel Zachem, that the jurors were

complaining about Atherton. After meeting with members of

the grand jury, Zachem contacted the Director of Special

Operations at the Superior Court, Roy Wynn, who directed him

to juror officer Suzanne Bailey-Jones. Zachem discussed the

matter with Bailey-Jones and then returned to the jury room,

confiscated Atherton’s notes, and directed him to report to the

Juror Office. Bailey-Jones then summarily and permanently

removed Atherton from the grand jury for being “disruptive.”

Atherton was never given a written explanation for his removal

from the grand jury, and he was not afforded a hearing before

any court official or judge. 

In April 2004, Atherton filed a pro se complaint in the

District Court, contending that he was unlawfully removed from

grand jury service because of his deliberative judgments and his

Hispanic ethnicity. Atherton’s complaint named Bailey-Jones,

Wynn, Zachem, and several other city and federal officials, as

well as the District of Columbia and the Department of Justice

Office of the Attorney General. The complaint alleged

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 2 of 29
3

constitutional violations of due process and equal protection

against the District of Columbia (“District”) defendants and the

federal defendants, citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986,

and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as well as a common law fraud

claim.

The District Court granted the District and federal

defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state

a claim. Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor,

et al., No. 04-0680, 2007 WL 1041659 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2007).

The District Court first found that Atherton had failed to allege

that any defendants other than Bailey-Jones and Zachem were

directly involved in his dismissal, and that Atherton had not

stated a claim for municipal liability against the District of

Columbia. The court also dismissed the §§ 1985(3) and 1986

claims, and found that the fraud claim against Zachem was

barred by sovereign immunity. Finding that Atherton’s

allegations did not support any personal involvement by Wynn

in the decision to remove Atherton from the grand jury, the

District Court dismissed the equal protection and due process

claims against Wynn on the ground that Atherton had failed to

state claims upon which relief may be granted. Although the

District Court found that Atherton had stated claims against

Bailey-Jones and Zachem for due process and equal protection

violations, these claims were dismissed on the ground that

Bailey-Jones and Zachem were entitled to absolute immunity.

Atherton, with the able support of appointed amicus curiae, now

seeks reversal of the District Court’s judgment. 

We reverse the District Court’s dismissal of the due process

claims against Bailey-Jones and Zachem. The District Court

erred in holding that Bailey-Jones and Zachem enjoy absolute

immunity for the removal of a grand juror. We will remand the

case to allow the District Court to assess whether Bailey-Jones

and Zachem are protected by qualified immunity. We affirm the

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 3 of 29
4

District Court’s dismissal of Atherton’s equal protection and

§ 1985(3) claims, and his due process claim against Wynn,

because the complaint and supporting submissions fail to state

causes of action. We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of all

remaining claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On review of a motion to dismiss, we “treat the complaint’s

factual allegations as true . . . and must grant [Atherton] the

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.” Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333

F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). The facts recited below are drawn from the complaint

and from additional materials submitted by Atherton, including

affidavits and exhibits incorporated therein. The parties do not

dispute that these documents may be considered for the purposes

of this appeal. See Amicus Br. at 3 n.1; D.C. Br. at 4 n.2;

Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(noting courts may “consider supplemental material filed by a

pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise claims being

urged”); Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (“In determining whether a complaint states a claim,

the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters

of which it may take judicial notice.”). 

1. Atherton’s Complaint

Atherton is a D.C. resident with degrees in electrical and

nuclear engineering. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 68. On April 9, 2001, he was

sworn in as a D.C. Superior Court grand juror for a term

scheduled to last 25 days. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16. However, on April 11,

2001, Atherton was permanently removed from the grand jury.

Id. ¶¶ 22-24. 

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 4 of 29
5

Atherton and the grand jurors with whom he served were

given jury instruction books identifying crimes and their

elements. Atherton believed that some of the cases for which

indictments were being sought included alleged crimes which

were not in the instruction book. Id. ¶ 18. Concerned that grand

jurors had voted to indict without knowing the elements of the

crimes, Atherton requested additional information from an

AUSA on the elements of crimes that were not contained in the

instruction book. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Some jurors “seemed upset”

because they had voted to indict without knowledge of the

elements “and a new vote would be needed once the elements of

the charge were known.” Id. ¶ 20. Atherton “felt a hostile

attitude from a few members of the jury when there was

continuing rebuttal to every comment [he] made concerning

deliberation on elements of crimes.” Id. ¶ 66. 

Atherton also felt that his fellow grand jurors reacted

negatively to his Hispanic ethnicity. At one point during their

deliberations, the grand jury was considering a homicide case

involving an altercation between black and Hispanic individuals.

After a Hispanic witness had finished testifying, Atherton

thanked the witness in Spanish. Atherton subsequently

perceived hostility from other grand jurors based on this

incident. Id. ¶¶ 64-67. He is half Mexican and “was the only

semi-fluent [S]panish speaking grand juror.” Id. ¶ 67. 

During the course of grand jury deliberations on April 11,

2001, supervising AUSA Zachem entered the jury room where

the grand jurors were deliberating, confiscated Atherton’s notes,

and directed Atherton to immediately report to Wynn’s office.

Id. ¶ 23-24. Atherton went to Wynn’s office as he had been

instructed. Id. Atherton was then directed to Bailey-Jones, who

“permanently dismissed” him. Id. ¶ 24. Atherton “was never

permitted the opportunity to defend himself,” id. ¶ 28, and

Bailey-Jones did not provide reasons for his dismissal, other

than that he was allegedly “disruptive.” Id. ¶ 24. Atherton

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 5 of 29
6

asked for a written explanation and Bailey-Jones assented to this

request. However, written notice was never given. Id. ¶¶ 28,

44. “Atherton left feeling very humiliated, embar[r]assed and

questioning his self worth, and did not return to grand jury

duty.” Id. ¶ 27. 

2. Additional Materials Submitted by Atherton in Support

of His Complaint

The record before the District Court includes a copy of an

email that Zachem wrote to Bailey-Jones the day after

Atherton’s removal. See Email from Dan Zachem to Suzanne

Bailey-Jones (Apr. 12, 2001), reprinted in Joint Appendix

(“J.A.”) 61-62 (“Zachem email”). According to Zachem’s

account, an AUSA who was presenting evidence to the grand

jury informed Zachem that some of the grand jurors had

requested to see a supervisor about a “scientist” who was

frustrating his colleagues. Id., J.A. 61. The email states:

[T]he AUSA reported that “the scientist” was desirous of

additional written materials, including additional jury

instructions and code provisions, and these requests, in

conjunction with extensive questioning of both prosecutor

and witness alike, [were] clearly agitating other members of

the grand jury. Efforts were made to satisfy the requests of

“the scientist” by, for example, providing xerox copies of

several code provisions, but these efforts proved

unsuccessful in mollifying his concerns. At approximately

3:00 p.m., Deputy Chief Dan Zachem was informed by the

AUSA that the grand jury was demanding to see a

supervisor “immediately.”. . . Thereafter, behind closed

doors, on the record and in the presence of the scientist,

several grand jurors, no fewer than 5-6 in number,

expressed the view that a single grand jury member was

frustrating the grand jury’s ability to conduct business.

More specifically, these grand jurors, who were not

contradicted by any of their number, expressed in emotional

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 6 of 29
7

terms their belief that the offending grand juror was “either

unwilling or unable to follow the rules” regarding, among

other things, the burden of proof, an orderly deliberative

process and voting. 

Id. 

Zachem’s email states further that he spoke briefly to

defendant Roy Wynn in the D.C. Superior Court Juror’s Office,

and that Wynn directed him to defendant Bailey-Jones. Id.

Zachem acknowledged that he did “not think it appropriate for

the US Attorney’s Office . . . to take a position with respect to

the removal of a particular juror from service.” Id., J.A 62. But

he added: “I am entirely confident in reporting, however, that

based upon my observations, if [Atherton] was permitted to

remain, that [the] Grand Jury . . . would not have been able to

discharge its function.” Id. 

In addition to Zachem’s email, the District Court record

also includes a copy of Superior Court rules covering the

removal of grand jurors. These rules, which were in effect when

Atherton was removed from grand jury service, stated: 

(g) Discharge and excuse.

A grand jury ordered by the Superior Court shall serve until

discharged by the Chief Judge or other judge designated by

the Chief Judge; but no grand jury may serve more than 18

months unless the Chief Judge or designee extends the

service of the grand jury for a period of 6 months or less

upon a determination that such extension is in the public

interest. At any time for cause shown, the Chief Judge or

other judge designated by the Chief Judge may excuse a

juror either temporarily or permanently, and in the latter

event the Chief Judge or designee may impanel another

person in place of the juror excused.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 7 of 29
8

D.C. Sup. Ct. R. Crim. P. 6(g) (emphasis added). Rufus G. King

III, the Chief Judge of the Superior Court during the relevant

time, submitted an affidavit stating that he “was never contacted

by anyone from the Court’s jury office or the U.S. Attorney’s

office before or at the time of the removal of grand juror

Atherton.” Affidavit of Rufus G. King III, J.A. 83. The

affidavit also states that “[t]he practice then in place did not

include contacting the chief judge before a grand juror was

involuntarily dismissed. . . . I [later] changed the procedures to

require that I be consulted before imposition of any grand jury

discipline.” Id., J.A. 84. 

B. Proceedings Before the District Court

Atherton alleges that as a result of the defendants’ conduct,

he was denied the right to complete his service on the grand jury

and suffered humiliation, embarrassment, emotional trauma, and

injury to his reputation. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 80. He commenced a

pro se action in the District Court in April 2004, naming as

defendants the District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, the

Superior Court Office of the Clerk, Superior Court Clerk Duane

Delaney, Director of Special Operations Division Roy Wynn,

Juror Officer Suzanne Bailey-Jones, the Department of Justice

Office of the Attorney General, and Assistant United States

Attorney Daniel M. Zachem. The District Court substituted the

District of Columbia as the proper defendant for the Office of

the Mayor and the Superior Court Clerk’s Office. Atherton,

2007 WL 1041659, at *1 n.1. The complaint alleged civil rights

violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, and

Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, as well as a common law fraud claim.

Atherton asked for “actual damages equal to the amount of

money he would have earned had he completed his 25 day jury

service,” as well as punitive damages. Compl. ¶ 79. 

The District Court initially dismissed the case sua sponte

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On June 21, 2005, this

court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 8 of 29
9

Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, et al., No.

04-5268 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2005) (Order). Beginning in

September 2006, defendants filed motions to dismiss and to

quash service.

In an opinion issued on April 5, 2007, the District Court

granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Atherton, 2007 WL

1041659. The District Court first rejected the defendants’

claims of improper service and statute of limitations bar as

grounds for dismissal. Id. at *2. The Court then held, without

explanation, that the complaint provided no basis for § 1985(3)

liability, and that the § 1986 claim was time-barred. Id. at *3. 

The District Court dismissed the official capacity claims

brought under § 1983 against the municipality of D.C. on the

ground that juror officer Bailey-Jones was acting outside the

scope of her authority when she removed Atherton from the

grand jury, id. at *5, and dismissed the individual capacity

claims against supervisors Delaney and Wynn on the ground

that the allegations did not support any personal involvement by

these defendants in the decision to remove Atherton from the

grand jury, id. at *3. The District Court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the fraud claim alleged against

Wynn and Delaney. Id. at *3 n.2.

As for the fraud claim against Zachem, the District Court

held that Atherton did not allege sufficient facts to rebut the

government’s certification that Zachem was acting within the

scope of his employment, so the Federal Torts Claim Act was

the exclusive remedy for the fraud claim and the United States

was substituted as the defendant. Because the United States is

exempt from liability based on “[a]ny claim arising out of . . .

misrepresentation [or] deceit,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), the fraud

claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at *7.

The District Court found that Atherton had stated viable

claims against both Bailey-Jones and Zachem for deprivation of

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 9 of 29
10

a liberty interest without due process and denial of equal

protection. However, the District Court held that both

defendants were entitled to absolute immunity and dismissed the

§ 1983 and Bivens claims against these defendants. 

Atherton appealed the District Court’s judgment dismissing

his case. This court then appointed Professor James E.

Coleman, Jr., of the Duke University School of Law, as amicus

curiae to present arguments in favor of appellant (“Amicus”).

Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, et al., No.

07-5195 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2008) (Order). Professor Coleman

was assisted by Sean E. Andrussier and third-year law students

Sarah Campbell, James McDonald, Eugenie Montague, Emily

Sauter, and Eric Wiener in Duke’s Appellate Litigation Clinic.

Sarah Campbell did a fine job in representing Atherton during

oral arguments before this court. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. See Muir v.

Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

A plaintiff’s complaint need only provide “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief” in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). A complaint must give the defendants notice of the

claims and the grounds upon which they rest, but “[s]pecific

facts are not necessary.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007). 

 “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge

must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the

complaint.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)) (other citations

omitted). A court may not grant a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim “even if it strikes a savvy judge that . . . recovery

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 10 of 29
11

is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “So long as the

pleadings suggest a ‘plausible’ scenario to ‘sho[w] that the

pleader is entitled to relief,’ a court may not dismiss.” Tooley v.

Napolitano, 556 F.3d 836, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). However, the Supreme Court

recently made it clear that, 

[w]here the claim is invidious discrimination . . . the

plaintiff must plead . . . that the defendant acted with

discriminatory purpose. Under extant precedent purposeful

discrimination requires more than intent as volition or intent

as awareness of consequences. It instead involves a

decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action “because

of,” not merely “in spite of,” [the action’s] adverse effects

upon an identifiable group. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, ___ U.S. ___, slip op. at 12

(U.S. May 18, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). This means that, 

[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability

requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A pro se complaint, such as Atherton’s, “must be held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 11 of 29
12

lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). But even a pro se complainant must

plead “factual matter” that permits the court to infer “more than

the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, slip op. at 15. 

B. Absolute Immunity

When government “officials are threatened with personal

liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may

well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to

skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity

to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their

conduct. In this way, exposing government officials to the same

legal hazards faced by other citizens may detract from the rule

of law instead of contributing to it.” Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. 219, 223 (1988). Because “the nature of the adjudicative

function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the

most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have,”

judges are protected by absolute judicial immunity. Id. at 226.

As the Court made clear in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)

335 (1871), judges “are not liable to civil actions for their

judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their

jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or

corruptly.” Id. at 351. “If judges were personally liable for

erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of

them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives

for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such

suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control,

and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial

adjudication.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27 (citation omitted).

However, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has “been

quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute official

immunity,” to ensure against extending “the scope of the

protection further than its purposes require.” Id. at 224. 

Judicial immunity from liability, as with absolute immunity

in other contexts, “is justified and defined by the functions it

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 12 of 29
13

protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.” Id.

at 227. In other words, “Judges have absolute immunity not

because of their particular location within the Government but

because of the special nature of their responsibilities.” Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978). It is therefore

unsurprising that absolute immunity has been extended to cover

executive branch officials who perform either quasi-judicial

functions that are “‘functionally comparable’ to th[ose] of a

judge,” id. at 513 (citing hearing examiners and administrative

law judges), or prosecutorial functions “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 

The courts have continued to apply “a ‘functional’ approach

to immunity questions other than those that have been decided

by express constitutional or statutory enactment.” Forrester,

484 U.S. at 224. Following this approach, absolute immunity

has been granted to a court-appointed mediator or neutral case

evaluator, performing tasks within the scope of his official

duties, Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994); clerks

of the court accused of issuing a false order against a pro se

plaintiff barring his access to the court, Sindram v. Suda, 986

F.2d 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1993); probation officers alleged to have

improperly investigated and prepared a presentence report,

Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1988); and a

court-appointed committee monitoring the unauthorized practice

of law, Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

However, absolute immunity has been rejected for judges acting

in an administrative capacity, Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229; court

reporters charged with creating a verbatim transcript of trial

proceedings, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429

(1993); prosecutors providing legal advice to the police, Burns

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492-96 (1991); and a judge engaged in

the selection of jurors, Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 13 of 29
14

 As this court noted in Wagshal, “[w]e have distilled the

Supreme Court’s [functional] approach to quasi-judicial

immunity into a consideration of three main factors.” Wagshal,

28 F.3d at 1252. These factors include:

(1) whether the functions of the official in question are

comparable to those of a judge; (2) whether the nature of

the controversy is intense enough that future harassment or

intimidation by litigants is a realistic prospect; and (3)

whether the system contains safeguards which are adequate

to justify dispensing with private damage suits to control

unconstitutional conduct.

Id. (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512) (other citation omitted). 

 “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon

the same considerations that underlie the common-law

immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of

their duties.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23 (footnote omitted).

Like judicial immunity, absolute prosecutorial immunity turns

on the function performed by the prosecutor. Absolute

immunity is granted only for conduct “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430.

Thus, courts look to whether the particular activity in dispute

was performed by a prosecutor in his or her official capacity as

an advocate for the state in the course of judicial proceedings.

See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997). A prosecutor

is not entitled to absolute immunity when performing

“administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do

not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a

prosecution or for judicial proceedings.” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).

“[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden

of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in

question.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. “The presumption is that

qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 14 of 29
15

government officials in the exercise of their duties.” Id. at 486-

87. For the reasons explained below, we hold that neither

Bailey-Jones nor Zachem is entitled to absolute immunity from

liability on the due process and equal protection claims raised by

Atherton. The issues in this case are distinct from – and thus do

not require us to decide – questions concerning whether judges

and prosecutors have absolute immunity for exercising or ruling

on peremptory challenges or challenges for cause at trial. 

 1. Juror Officer Bailey-Jones is Not Entitled to QuasiJudicial Immunity

The District argues that Bailey-Jones is entitled to absolute

immunity because, as a juror officer of the Superior Court, she

performed tasks “‘that are basic and integral parts of the judicial

function . . . .’” D.C. Br. at 9 (quoting Sindram, 986 F.2d at

1461). We disagree. 

Bailey-Jones’s act of dismissing Atherton from the grand

jury was not an exercise of a judicial function, nor was it

“integrally related to adjudication.” Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1253.

She was not involved in the resolution of any factual or legal

issue; and her responsibilities did not involve handling any

pleadings, disputes, or controversies of law. In fact, BaileyJones’s role in Atherton’s dismissal was entirely removed from

the adjudicative context. The juror officer is primarily

responsible for administrative tasks, such as determining the

number of jurors needed by the Superior Court each day,

managing the computer systems and equipment for the Juror’s

Office, and overseeing juror orientation and the administration

of the oath for jurors. See Juror Officer Job Description, J.A.

71-76. The juror officer also “[r]eviews written requests for

juror excuses or deferrals” and grants or denies such requests “in

conformity with policies established by the court.” Id., J.A. 72.

These administrative and managerial activities, even if essential

to the smooth and efficient functioning of Superior Court

operations, are not functions that justify the application of quasiUSCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 15 of 29
16

judicial immunity. “[T]he touchstone for the . . . applicability

[of judicial immunity] has been performance of the function of

resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively

adjudicating private rights. When judicial immunity is extended

to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are

functionally comparable to those of judges – that is, because

they, too, exercise a discretionary judgment as a part of their

function.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435-36 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

The District concedes that Bailey-Jones was performing an

administrative act when she dismissed Atherton, but is

nonetheless entitled to absolute immunity because her actions

were “taken in furtherance of a judicial function.” D.C. Br. at

10. This argument fails. The “functional approach” does not

allow for the extension of absolute immunity merely because a

public official performs an act that is arguably “part of the

judicial function.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435 (rejecting the claim

that absolute immunity should be extended to court reporters).

Indeed, certain activities performed by public officials may be

“quite important in providing the necessary conditions of a

sound adjudicative system,” but remain “not themselves judicial

or adjudicative” in nature. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229.

Moreover, Bailey-Jones’s argument that she is entitled to

absolute immunity cannot be reconciled with Ex Parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a

judge’s selection and exclusion of persons for jury service was

not a judicial function entitled to absolute immunity. The Court

held:

Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be

determined by its character, and not by the character of the

agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no

importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have

been committed to a private person as to one holding the

office of a judge. . . . [I]t surely is not a judicial act, in any

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 16 of 29
17

such sense as is contended for here. It is merely a

ministerial act . . . . That the jurors are selected for a court

makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs,

&c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act? 

Id. at 348. 

Ex Parte Virginia was cited with approval in Forrester,

where the Court stated that “[a]dministrative decisions, even

though they may be essential to the very functioning of the

courts, have not . . . been regarded as judicial acts.” Forrester,

484 U.S. at 228. The Forrester Court went on to say:

In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, this

Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who

had been charged in a criminal indictment with

discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors

for the county’s courts.

. . . . 

Although [Ex Parte Virginia] involved a criminal charge

against a Judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in

any obvious way confined by that circumstance.

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228. 

The District attempts to distinguish Ex Parte Virginia,

claiming that it involved “the ministerial act of drawing up a list

of potential jurors, which could have been done by anyone,”

while in this case “Bailey-Jones had to decide whether or not to

excuse Mr. Atherton based on his reported disruptive behavior,

an act which . . . was solely entrusted to the Court.” D.C. Br. at

12 n.6. This contention has no merit. Whether an act is “solely

entrusted to the Court” is not the test to determine whether it is

a “judicial function” for purposes of absolute immunity. The

court reporter in Antoine was engaged in acts solely entrusted to

the court, but those acts did not entitle the court reporter to

absolute immunity.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 17 of 29
18

In assessing Bailey-Jones’s claim for absolute immunity,

we must also consider “whether the nature of the controversy is

intense enough that future harassment or intimidation by

litigants is a realistic prospect.” Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252. It is

arguably conceivable that the threat of litigation might inhibit a

juror officer’s ability to make some decisions necessary for the

“smooth operation” of grand jury proceedings. But the District

concedes that the need to excuse a juror rarely arises. D.C. Br.

at 13. Therefore, there is no evidence in this case that rejecting

absolute immunity will impede independent and responsible

decisionmaking by juror officers in the future. See Antoine, 508

U.S. at 437 (“Respondents have not provided us with empirical

evidence demonstrating the existence of any significant volume

of vexatious and burdensome actions against reporters . . . .”).

Furthermore, qualified immunity should more than suffice to

protect juror officers and other like public officials in the

Superior Court. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 207-08

(1985). 

Finally, we must assess “whether the system contains

safeguards which are adequate to justify dispensing with private

damage suits to control unconstitutional conduct.” Wagshal, 28

F.3d at 1252. In Butz, the Supreme Court noted:

[T]he safeguards built into the judicial process tend to

reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of

controlling unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the

judge from political influence, the importance of precedent

in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the

process, and the correctability of error on appeal are just a

few of the many checks on malicious action by judges.

Advocates are restrained not only by their professional

obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertions will

be contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are

carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias.

Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors of

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 18 of 29
19

cross-examination and the penalty of perjury. Because

these features of the judicial process tend to enhance the

reliability of information and the impartiality of the

decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for

individual suits to correct constitutional error.

438 U.S. at 512. There were no such “safeguards” available to

Atherton when he was summarily dismissed from grand jury

service.

In sum, it is clear that Bailey-Jones was performing

administrative/managerial functions when she dismissed

Atherton from the Superior Court grand jury. The District has

failed to meet its burden to show that the acts performed by

Bailey-Jones were quasi-judicial functions that were

functionally comparable to those of a judge. Therefore, the

District Court erred in dismissing Atherton’s claims against

Bailey-Jones on the ground that she is entitled to absolute

immunity.

2. Supervising AUSA Zachem is Not Entitled to Absolute

Prosecutorial Immunity

Unlike Bailey-Jones, who is employed by the District of

Columbia, Zachem is a federal employee. However, “the law of

immunity in a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that

in a section 1983 claim against a state official.” Moore v.

Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Butz, 438 U.S.

at 504). Absolute prosecutorial immunity, like judicial

immunity, turns on the function performed by the prosecutor.

And not all work done by prosecutors is covered by absolute

immunity. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125 (noting that absolute

immunity does not encompass some of the official activities of

a prosecutor). 

As noted above, prosecutors are entitled to absolute

immunity for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. The

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 19 of 29
20

Supreme Court has explained that “acts undertaken by a

prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings

or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an

advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute

immunity.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126 (citing Buckley, 509 U.S.

at 273) (emphasis added). But “the defense [is] unavailable

when the prosecutor was performing a different function.” Id.

(citing prosecutors’ provision of legal advice to the police

during their pretrial investigation of the facts, holding a press

conference, and allegedly fabricating evidence concerning an

unsolved crime as acts that are not covered by prosecutorial

immunity). 

In this case, Zachem is alleged to have procured or

participated in the unlawful removal of a sworn grand juror. His

conduct certainly was not “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” And it surely did not

“occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.”

Indeed, Zachem’s conduct was not comparable to any of the

advocative functions for which prosecutors traditionally have

been protected by absolute immunity: His role in Atherton’s

dismissal from the grand jury was not related to a decision

whether to prosecute an individual, Imbler, 424 U.S. 409; it did

not involve his participation in a probable cause hearing, Burns,

500 U.S. 478; it was not a presentation of the state’s case at trial,

see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; and it did not concern the

evaluation or selection of evidence for presentation to a grand

jury, Kalina, 522 U.S. 118. 

Simply because a prosecutor’s conduct is connected with

the grand jury does not make it advocatory. Prosecutorial

immunity undoubtedly may extend to cover prosecutors’

conduct before grand juries, see, e.g., Burns, 500 U.S. at 490

(noting immunity at common law extended to prosecutors

participating in “any hearing before a tribunal which performed

a judicial function”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); id.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 20 of 29
21

at 490 n.6 (citing cases involving grand juries). In this case,

however, Zachem was not the AUSA who was presenting

evidence to the grand jury. He was the supervising AUSA who

was called in to address complaints raised by members of the

grand jury who were allegedly annoyed with Atherton’s

behavior during grand jury deliberations. Indeed, Zachem

acknowledged that he did “not think it appropriate for the US

Attorney’s Office . . . to take a position with respect to the

removal of a particular juror from service,” Zachem email, J.A

62, so he knew that his involvement had nothing to do with his

advocatory duties as a prosecutor. Atherton’s dismissal could

have been performed by anyone. It had nothing to do with

Zachem’s advocatory functions. 

This determination is not inconsistent with the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct.

855 (2009), where the Court held that administrative activities

conducted by a supervising prosecutor which were “directly

connected with the prosecutor’s basic trial advocacy duties” may

be protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 863. Van de Kamp

involved a lawsuit by a criminal defendant, who alleged, among

other things, that the supervising prosecutor’s failure to train and

supervise attorneys under his charge resulted in a prosecutor

improperly withholding impeachment evidence which deprived

the defendant of a fair trial. The principal claim in the case was

the alleged withholding of trial evidence, a claim with respect to

which prosecutors have long enjoyed the protection of absolute

immunity. The Supreme Court held that it would be anomalous

to deny immunity to a supervising prosecutor for failure to train

when the trial prosecutor – whose “error in the plaintiff’s

specific criminal trial constitutes an essential element of the

plaintiff’s claim” – would be entitled to absolute immunity

protection. Id. at 862. It is plain that the Court’s analysis in Van

de Kamp is inapposite here. In this case, Zachem’s alleged

activities – improperly removing a grand juror on the basis of

his ethnicity and/or for the content and quality of his

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 21 of 29
22

deliberations – had nothing to do with a prosecutor’s preparation

for or participation in a criminal trial. 

In sum, Zachem is not entitled to absolute immunity

because the activities for which he is being sued do not relate to

his performance as an advocate for the government. As

discussed above in relation to Bailey-Jones, the final two factors

of the immunity inquiry, see Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252, do not

change this outcome. Zachem did not demonstrate that “the

nature of the controversy is intense enough that future

harassment or intimidation by litigants is a realistic prospect,”

id., and the absence of safeguards in this case counsels against

extending absolute immunity to those involved. 

C. Atherton’s Equal Protection Claims: §§ 1983 and

1985(3)

The District Court found that Atherton’s complaint and

supporting submissions viably stated claims of equal protection

violations by Bailey-Jones and Zachem. Atherton’s right not to

be excluded from a grand jury on the basis of race or ethnicity

was clearly established when he was dismissed from the

Superior Court grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n of

Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (noting that “[p]eople

excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved

as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of

racial exclusion”); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398

(1998) (stating that there is a well-established equal protection

right not to be excluded from grand jury service on the basis of

race). Appellees do not contest this point. Rather, appellees

contend that Atherton failed to state claims under the equal

protection clause against Bailey-Jones and Zachem. We agree.

The only factual allegations in Atherton's complaint on his

equal protection claim are that: (1) after a witness who could

not speak English testified before the grand jury, Atherton

openly thanked the witness in Spanish, Compl. ¶¶ 64-65; (2)

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 22 of 29
23

“based on information, Atherton was the only semi-fluent

Spanish speaking grand juror,” id. at ¶ 67; and (3) Atherton is

“half Mexican,” id. From these facts, Atherton alleges that,

“based upon information,” his removal without cause from the

grand jury was an act of discrimination against him “and

Hispanics in particular because there were no other Hispanics on

the jury.” Id. at ¶ 73. He also alleges that the defendants

conspired to illegally remove him from the grand jury “for

ethnic purposes.” Id. at ¶ 68. These spare facts and allegations

are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss under Iqbal and

Twombly. The complaint and supporting materials simply do

“not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct,” Iqbal, slip op. at 15, and this is insufficient to

show that Atherton is entitled to relief. See FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). As the Court noted in Iqbal, “[w]here a complaint

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, slip op. at 14

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We therefore

reverse the District Court’s finding that Atherton stated claims

of equal protection violations by Bailey-Jones and Zachem.

Atherton’s claims under § 1985(3) fare no better. Section

1985(3) provides a cause of action against two or more persons

who participate in a conspiracy motivated by class-based

discriminatory animus. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see also Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-102 (1971) (examining the

meaning of § 1985(3)). To state a claim under § 1985(3),

Atherton was required to allege:

(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the

equal protection of the laws, . . . and (3) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either

injured in her person or property or deprived of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 23 of 29
24

Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(alteration in original). “The statute does not apply to all

conspiratorial tortious interferences with the rights of others, but

only those motivated by some class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Atherton’s complaint and supporting materials merely

allege that Zachem, Bailey-Jones, and Wynn communicated

about his removal before he was dismissed from the grand jury.

See Zachem email, J.A. 61-62. These bare facts clearly do not

raise an inference that Zachem, Bailey-Jones, and Wynn were

conspiratorially motivated by some class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus. The complaint also asserts that the

defendants “conspired under color of law to illegally remove

Atherton . . . for ethnic purposes,” Compl. ¶ 68, and that

Atherton was illegally removed from the grand jury in violation

of the Constitution and D.C. law. But these “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a cause of action

under § 1985(3). Iqbal, slip op. at 14. We therefore affirm the

District Court’s dismissal of Atherton’s § 1985(3) claims. 

D. Atherton’s Due Process Claims and Qualified Immunity

Although government officials may be sued in their

individual capacities for damages under § 1983 and Bivens,

qualified immunity protects officials from liability “insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

When determining whether a right was “clearly established,”

“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). The District Court did not decide whether Bailey-Jones

or Zachem are entitled to qualified immunity 

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 24 of 29
25

Traditionally, courts have approached the qualified

immunity analysis through a two-step inquiry mandated in

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), asking, first, whether the

alleged facts show that the individual’s conduct violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and, second, whether that right

was clearly established at the time of the incident. Id. at 200.

However, the Supreme Court recently announced that the

Saucier protocol “should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). Rather, a

district court judge now retains discretion to decide “which of

the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case

at hand.” Id. 

Whether the defendants in this case are entitled to qualified

immunity on the due process claim is a challenging question.

Atherton alleges he was denied due process in violation of the

Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. See Butera v. District of

Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 645 n.7 (1987) (explaining that while

due process violations are typically analyzed under the

Fourteenth Amendment, the District of Columbia – which is not

a state – is subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment). The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

protects individuals from deprivations of “life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

A procedural due process violation occurs when an official

deprives an individual of a liberty or property interest without

providing appropriate procedural protections. Liberty interests

may either be located in the Constitution itself or “may arise

from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.”

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “State

regulations may give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty

interest if they contain substantive limitations on official

discretion, embodied in mandatory statutory or regulatory

language.” See Price v. Barry, 53 F.3d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 25 of 29
26

1995) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454

(1989)).

Although the District Court found that there was a liberty

interest in grand jury service, the court did not explain the

source of the liberty interest, its parameters, or the particular

portions of Atherton’s allegations which stated a due process

claim. Much hinges on these determinations, because the

qualified immunity analysis “depends substantially upon the

level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be

identified.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. The Supreme Court has

explained:

For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly

established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a

sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no

matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a

violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the

same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory

violation. But if the test of “clearly established law” were

to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no

relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is

the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be able to

convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly

establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply

by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Harlow

would be transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a

rule of pleading.

Id.; see also Butera, 235 F.3d at 646. The Court has cautioned,

however, that “[t]his is not to say that an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that

in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be

apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (internal citation omitted).

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 26 of 29
27

Amicus, on behalf of Atherton, argues that D.C. law limits

official discretion to remove a sworn grand juror and pointed to

several possible sources of the liberty interest. For example, the

D.C. Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that

a grand juror may be dismissed at any time by the Chief Judge,

or another appointed judge, for cause shown. D.C. Sup. Ct. R.

Crim. P. 6(g) (emphasis added). Additionally, counsel for the

District agreed at oral argument that a juror has a recognized

interest in not being dismissed because of his or her “views on

the merits” and that this right was clearly established under D.C.

law; but he argued that Atherton’s complaint does not advance

the claim. Whether this or any other source of District of

Columbia law creates a liberty or property interest is a matter

that must be addressed by the District Court on remand.

As noted above, the District Court retains the discretion to

decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first” – (1) whether the alleged

facts show that the officials’ conduct violated a statutory or

constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the incident – “in light of the

circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 129 S.

Ct. at 818. 

“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question

remains what process is due.” FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230,

240 (1988) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481

(1972)). “[A] fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552

(1965) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In

determining whether due process requirements have been

satisfied – whether an appropriate hearing has been provided at

a meaningful time and in a meaningful matter – a court should

consider: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the

official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 27 of 29
28

such interest through the procedures used, and the probable

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;

and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.”

Garraghty v. Va. Dep’t of Corr., 52 F.3d 1274, 1282 (4th Cir.

1995) (citing the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). It is not always clear,

however, whether and to what extent a predeprivation hearing

is required or whether a post-deprivation hearing will suffice.

See, e.g., Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240. Furthermore, whether it be

pre- or post-deprivation, “[t]he question of ‘what process is due’

is more easily asked than answered.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ.

of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 983 (9th Cir.

1998). 

In assessing a qualified immunity defense to a due process

claim, a court invariably must consider the context and weigh

the Mathews factors. And

notwithstanding the fact that procedural due process rights

oftentimes will not be “clearly established” within the

meaning of Harlow and Anderson, [a court] must consider

the specific facts of [the] case to determine whether it

presents one of those occasions in which the rights are

clearly established. The question presented therefore boils

down to this: Has [the complainant] proven that, under the

three-part balancing analysis of Mathews and the precedents

that have applied it, he had a “clearly established” right to

process more comprehensive than that provided by the

District?

Brewster, 149 F.3d at 984. 

In this case, it is possible that any constitutionally required

process may be found in the law that gives content to the liberty

interest. In other words, the process required by the substantive

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 28 of 29
29

law may coincide with the constitutional minimum. For

example, D.C. Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(g)

prescribes a procedure to be followed when persons are removed

from jury service: a juror may only be removed by the Chief

Judge or another appointed judge for cause shown. Atherton

alleges that he was deprived of even this process. 

Because the qualified immunity issue was not addressed

below and was only thinly briefed on appeal, we are not in a

position to address the questions that remain to be answered

here. We will leave it to the District Court on remand to

consider these matters.

E. The Claims Against the District of Columbia

Finally, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the

§ 1983 claims against the District of Columbia. “Under § 1983

a municipality is liable not under principles of respondeat

superior, but only for constitutional torts arising from ‘action

pursuant to official municipal policy.’” Triplett v. District of

Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978)); see also Iqbal, slip op. at 11-12. The facts alleged by

Atherton do not support an inference of a course the city’s

“policymakers consciously chose to pursue.” Triplett, 108 F.3d

at 1453. 

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

USCA Case #07-5195 Document #1183349 Filed: 06/02/2009 Page 29 of 29