Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-04524/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-04524-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO, LTD,

Plaintiff,

v

QUANTA COMPUTER, INC et al,

Defendants.

 /

No C-00-4524 VRW

ORDER

Samsung Electronics Co, Ltd (Samsung) filed this action

November 13, 2000, against Quanta Computer, Inc (Quanta) and Compal

Electronics, Inc (Compal), alleging infringement of six patents

relating to keyboard-input processing for ISA-compatible personal

computers. Following the dismissal of various claims, only United

States Patent No 5,333,273 remains at issue. 

//

//

//

//

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Defendants have moved for summary judgment of invalidity

and non-infringement with respect to the ‘273 patent and to exclude

certain opinions of plaintiff’s expert, Dr Robert G Wedig. For

reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment of

invalidity is DENIED, defendants’ motions for summary judgment of

non-infringement is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and

defendants’ motion to exclude certain opinions of plaintiff’s

expert is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I

The ‘273 patent, entitled “protected hot key function for

microprocessor-based computer system,” issued on July 26, 1994, to

inventors Charles Raasch and David Goodman from an application

filed September 3, 1992, which was a continuation of an application

originally filed on November 9, 1990. This patent was originally

assigned to AST Research, Inc, which subsequently assigned the

patent to Samsung on April 21, 1999. 

The technology discussed in the ‘273 patent relates to

the field of computer circuitry and, more particularly, keyboardinput processing for ISA-compatible personal computers. As the

‘273 patent explains, activity on ISA-compatible computers

typically proceeds via an “interrupt,” which causes the computer’s

CPU to stop one activity and start another. Various interrupts

(conventionally labeled in ISA-compatible computers as IRQ0, IRQ1,

IRQ2 and so on) are associated with various functions. 

Conventionally, the “IRQ1" interrupt is associated with keyboard

input; when the CPU receives an IRQ1 interrupt, it stops its

activity to receive a “scan code” from the keyboard. This scan

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code signifies that a certain key has been depressed or released,

and the CPU will then execute software instructions in response to

the particular scan code. Such software instructions are specific

to the software that a user has loaded onto the computer. For

example, pressing the “A” key on the keyboard while running a word

processing program will, typically, cause the letter “a” to appear

in the active document. Less intuitively, particular keys or key

combinations call up a program or perform a certain function; these

are often known as “hot keys.” Application programs may contain a

number of hot key functions. Furthermore, so-called terminate and

stay resident (TSR) programs provide a number of useful functions

to the computer user. Because TSR programs typically run in the

background and include a number of hot keys, utilization of hot

keys assigned a different function in a running application may set

up a conflict that interferes with the programs. The resulting

conflict can cause the computer not to function in the way the user

expects.

The patent is directed to a “protected hot key function”

whose behavior is not as readily altered or customized by userloaded software as conventional hot keys. The invention describes

an “additional function key,” which, when depressed on its own or

in combination with a conventional key or keys, causes a second

interrupt — i e, an interrupt other than the IRQ1 interrupt

conventionally used in ISA-compatible computers. Apparently, at

the time of the invention, little if any software existed that

would respond to this second interrupt, thus ensuring that computer

manufacturers could reliably assign predictable behaviors to hot

keys using the additional function key (or to the additional

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function key on its own) without interference from user-loaded

software.

II

The summary judgment standard is the same in a patent

case as in any other case. Union Carbide Corp v American Can Co,

724 F2d 1567, 1571 (Fed Cir 1984). In reviewing a summary judgment

motion, the court must determine whether genuine issues of material

fact exist, resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the

motion. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a

material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Id. And the burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex

Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). When the moving party

has the burden of proof on an issue, the party’s showing must be

sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact

could find other than for the moving party. Calderone v United

States, 799 F2d 254, 258-59 (6th Cir 1986). Summary judgment is

granted only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence supporting

its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec

Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir

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1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id

at 249.

III

The first issue before the court is whether Samsung’s

‘273 patent is valid. Defendants’ joint motion for summary

judgment of invalidity contends that two prior art references

anticipate or render obvious the claims contained in the ‘273

patent. For the following reasons, the court DENIES defendants’

motion for summary judgment of invalidity.

A

A party seeking to invalidate a patent must overcome a

presumption that the patent is valid. 35 USC § 282; United States

Gypsum Co v National Gypsum Co, 74 F3d 1209, 1212 (Fed Cir 1996);

Hybritech, Inc v Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc, 802 F2d 1367, 1375

(Fed Cir 1986). This presumption places the burden on the

challenging party to prove the patent’s invalidity by clear and

convincing evidence. United States Gypsum Co, 74 F3d at 1212. 

In order to prevail on its motion, therefore, defendants must show

that no reasonable jury could find that the evidence of

anticipation was less than clear and convincing. 

Invalidation of a patent on the ground that it was

anticipated by prior art requires a finding that “all of the

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elements and limitations of the claim are found within a single

prior art reference.” Scripps Clinic & Research Fdn v Genentech,

Inc, 927 F2d 1565, 1576 (Fed Cir 1991). If there is a genuine

issue of material fact relevant to any one of these elements,

summary judgment is not proper. See Helefix, 208 F3d at 1346. 

Even if a prior art fails to anticipate the patent, it

still may render it obvious. Section 103(a) of the Patent Act

states that “[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the

differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and

the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would at

the time of the invention have been obvious to a person having

ordinary skill in the art.” See KAO Corp v Unilever US, Inc, 441

F3d 963, 968 (Fed Cir 2006). Obviousness is a legal determination

based on the following factual inquiries: (1) the scope and

content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claimed

invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the

pertinent art; and (4) secondary considerations, if any, of

non-obviousness, such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved

need, failure of others, copying, and unexpected results. See

McNeil-PPC, Inc v L Perrigo Co, 337 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed Cir 2003)

(citing Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 17 (1966)).

The analysis under 35 USC § 103 requires the

“oft-difficult but critical step of casting the mind back to the

time of the invention, to consider the thinking of one of ordinary

skill in the art, guided only by the prior art references and the

then-accepted wisdom in the field.” In re Dembiczak, 175 F3d 994,

999 (Fed Cir 1999). That is, courts “cannot use hindsight

reconstruction to pick and choose among isolated disclosures in the

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prior art to deprecate the claimed invention.” Ecolochem, Inc v S

Cal Edison Co, 227 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed Cir 2000) (quoting In re

Fine, 837 F2d 1071, 1075 (Fed Cir 1988)). 

To avoid hindsight-based obviousness analysis, the

Federal Circuit requires “a rigorous application of the requirement

for a showing of a teaching or motivation to combine the prior art

references.” Id. Accordingly, to prove obviousness, it is

insufficient to demonstrate that the separate elements of the

invention existed in the prior art. Rather, there must be some

suggestion, motivation, or teaching in the prior art that would

have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to select the

references and combine them in a way that would produce the claimed

invention. Karsten Mfg Corp v Cleveland Golf Corp, 242 F3d 1376,

1385 (Fed Cir 2001). Moreover, this showing of a suggestion,

teaching or motivation to combine references “must be clear and

particular.” In re Dembiczak, 175 F3d at 999.

Finally, an alleged infringer seeking to invalidate a

patent on obviousness grounds must establish its obviousness by

facts supported by clear and convincing evidence. KAO Corp, 441

F3d at 968 (citing Apotex USA, Inc v Merck & Co, 254 F3d 1031, 1036

(Fed Cir 2001)).

B

Defendants first offer as prior art an IBM manual

entitled “IBM PC Convertible Technical Reference” volume 1 and 2. 

It is undisputed that this manual constitutes prior art under 35

USC § 102(b), as it was published and bears a copyright date of

February 1986, well more than a year before the earliest effective

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filing dates of the ‘273 patent, November 9, 1990. Doc #347, Dang

decl, Ex C. The manual describes a computer — the IBM PC

Convertible — that allegedly anticipates or renders obvious the

‘273 patent. Doc #345 at 5. In particular, the IBM PC Convertible

is said to provide built-in functions that are invoked in response

to users pressing the Fn key in combination with other keys. Id. 

A second allegedly invalidating computer system is

described in United State Patent Number 5,560,024 (the ‘024

reference or Harper Patent), which is entitled “Computer Power

Management Systems.” Doc #347, Dang decl, Ex E. Defendants argue

that the ‘024 reference anticipates or renders obvious each

limitation of claims 5, 6 and 7 and renders obvious claims 1, 3 and

4. Doc #345 at 18. The ‘024 reference has an earliest effective

filing date of June 30, 1989, and thus is prior art under 35 USC §

102(e) and for obviousness under § 103(a) as of that date. Doc

#347, Dang decl, Ex E. The ‘024 reference describes an IBM-based

portable computer comprising a keyboard with conventional keys and

an additional function key called the “Poqet key.” Id, Ex E at

21:53-60. Pressing the “Poqet key” in combination with other keys

would trigger various built-in functions. Id. 

Samsung contends that the IBM manual and the ‘024

Reference do not anticipate the ‘273 patent because they are not

“ISA-compatible,” as required by all of the claims. Doc #379 at 5. 

Because the court agrees with Samsung for the following reasons,

the court declines to address Samsung’s alternative arguments in

opposition to anticipation.

All of the claims contained in the ‘273 patent limit the

scope of the invention to computer systems that are “ISACase 3:00-cv-04524-VRW Document 423 Filed 09/01/06 Page 8 of 29
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compatible.” See ‘273 patent at col 13-14. Samsung contends that

neither pieces of prior art adopt this design standard; therefore,

they cannot anticipate any claims of the ‘273 patent. 

The parties do not dispute the underlying structure of

the computer systems described by the prior art: they both can

handle 8 of the 16 ISA standard defined interrupts, that is, the

IRQ0-IRQ7 signals but not the IRQ8-IRQ15 signals. Doc #366, Lim

decl, Ex E, ¶ 13; Doc #381, Wedig decl, ¶ 6. The point of

contention, then, is whether partial capability satisfies the “ISAcompatible” limitation. 

In its Markman order, the court adopted the Texas court’s

prior construction, which defined the term “ISA-compatible” to be

“a computer that can handle ISA standard defined interrupts.” Doc

#227 at 10. During these proceedings, Samsung had asked the court

to add the clarification that “[n]ot all ISA standard defined

interrupts need to be used in an ISA-compatible computer.” Id at

9. The court rejected Samsung’s proposed clarification, excluding

it from the court’s construction, but noted that “some interrupts

might not be used in a given computer.” Id.

Defendants rely on this exchange to argue that the IBM PC

Convertible and Poqet PC are ISA-compatible because the limitation

does not require it to “use” all of the interrupts. Doc #345 at

15. But this argument conflates “use” with physical capability. 

The claim limitation requires that the computers “can handle” ISA

defined interrupts. Yet the IBM PC Convertible and Poqet PC not

only fail to “use” IRQ8-IRQ15 signals, they are physically

incapable of handling them. 

Defendants’ alternative argument reveals a possible

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ambiguity in the court’s claim construction. The IBM PC

Convertible and Poqet PC can handle IRQ0-IRQ7, which are “ISA

standard defined interrupts;” therefore, defendants argue, the IBM

PC Convertible and Poqet PC “can handle ISA standard defined

interrupts.” Doc #386 at 1. Yet defendants’ syllogism can work

both ways: the IBM PC Convertible and Poqet PC cannot handle IRQ8-

IRQ15, which are “ISA standard defined interrupts;” therefore,

these computers cannot handle ISA standard defined interrupts. 

Either way, it is apparent to the court that it must determine

whether ISA-compatibility requires a computer to be able to handle

only some or all of the ISA standard defined interrupts. 

Both the court’s claim construction order and the ‘273

patent strongly suggest the latter interpretation, i e, that

compatibility requires the ability to handle all of the interrupts. 

Although a court generally should not import limitations from the

specification based on disclosed embodiments, “where the

specification makes clear at various points that the claimed

invention is narrower than the claim language might imply, it is

entirely permissible and proper to limit the claims.” Alloc, Inc v

ITC, 342 F3d 1361, 1370 (Fed Cir 2003) (internal citations

omitted). Here, the specification repeatedly indicates that the

invention deals with computers that can handle all 16 interrupts,

thereby permitting a claim limitation to be inferred. See, e g,

‘273 patent at abstract (“a second interrupt different from the

IRQ1 interrupt is activated (e.g., IRQ15)”); id at col 1:17-20

(“The Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) was developed by IBM

corporation for use in its AT-type computers and defines an

architectural environment for computers that utilize an Intel 80x86

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microprocessor”); id at col 4:31-34 (“The interrupt controller has

a plurality of interrupt lines IRQ0 through IRQ15"); id at col

6:38-45 (“[the] keyboard controller is responsive to scan codes * *

* to generate an interrupt requires signal IRQ15 * * *. The IRQ15

signal line is typically not used on conventional ISA compatible

computers and is thus available for use with the thirteenth

function key Fn”); id at col 8:34-36 (“If the function key is still

active, the keyboard microprocessor actives the IRQ15 signal”); id

at col 8:68-9:2 (“The keyboard controller provides an IRQ1 output

signal on a line and an IRQ12 signal on a line”).

Accordingly, the term “ISA-compatible” in the ‘273 patent 

requires a computer to be able to handle all of the ISA standard

defined interrupts. Hence, the IBM PC Convertible and the Poqet PC

are not “ISA-compatible,” and consequently do not anticipate the

‘273 patent.

Samsung also argues that neither the IBM PC Convertible

nor the Poqet PC perform the functions of the “keyboard controller”

as required by the claims in the ‘273 patent. Doc #379 at 12, 18. 

This argument derives from the requirement in claims 1, 3 and 4

that the keyboard controller generate the “first interrupt signal”

when a conventional key is pressed and the “second interrupt

signal” when the additional function key is pressed in combination

with an alphanumeric key and the requirement in claims 5 and 7 that

the keyboard controller generate the “first interrupt signal” when

a conventional key is pressed and the “second interrupt signal”

when at least the non-conventional function key is pressed. Id. 

It is undisputed that the IBM PC Convertible keyboard

controller generates the NMI signal both when a conventional key is

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pressed and when the Fn key is pressed in combination with a

conventional key. Lim decl, Ex G at 219-21; Wedig decl, ¶ 26-27. 

Likewise, the keyboard controller used in the Poqet PC does not

have the ability to distinguish between pressing individual

conventional keys and pressing key combinations or the additional

function key because it generates both a NMI signal and an IRQ1

signal every time a conventional key is pressed. Lim decl, Ex G at

171-73; Wedig decl, ¶ 31-32. This distinction further supports the

court’s conclusion that the IBM PC Convertible and Poqet PC do not

anticipate the ‘273 patent.

C

Defendants argue in the alternative that the IBM PC

Manual and the ‘024 reference independently and together render the

asserted claims obvious, although they allocate few words to this

portion of their briefing. In essence, defendants argue that the

prior art, if not anticipatory, is close enough to render the

claims obvious.

Proving that an invention is obvious, however, requires a

far more rigorous analysis involving material issues of fact than

that presented by defendants. As outlined by the Supreme Court in

Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 17-18 (1966), the following

factual inquiries must be answered prior to any conclusions

regarding obviousness: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;

(2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;

(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the

invention was made; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness.

While defendants impliedly address the first three

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factors in the course of their discussion of anticipation, they

completely fail to discuss the last element concerning the

existence of objective evidence of non-obviousness, such as

evidence of the patented item’s commercial success. Custom

Accessories, Inc v Jeffrey-Allen Industries, Inc, 807 F2d 955, 960

(Fed Cir 1986). Yet the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that

objective evidence of non-obviousness must be taken into account. 

See Hybritech v Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc, 802 F2d 1367 (Fed Cir

1986); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v Barnes-Hind Inc, 796 F2d 443 (Fed Cir

1986). 

Accordingly, defendants have failed to provide clear and

convincing evidence that the IBM PC Manual and the ‘024 reference

independently and together render obvious the claims contained in

the ‘273 patent.

IV

Both Compal and Quanta have filed separate motions for

summary judgment of non-infringement. See Doc ##341, 359. Because

the defendants advance nearly identical arguments, the court

addresses these two motions together under this heading. 

A

Under section 271 of the Patent Act, 35 USC § 271,

liability for patent infringement may be imposed on any person who

without permission of the patentee “makes, uses, offers to sell, or

sells any patented invention[] within the United States or imports

into the United States any patented invention during the term of

the patent therefor.” Id. The rights granted to the patentee are

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defined by the patent’s claims. Markman v Westview Instruments,

Inc, 517 US 370, 373 (1996). In determining whether an allegedly

infringing device falls within the scope of the claims, a two-step

process is used: first, the court must determine as a matter of

law the meaning of the particular claim or claims at issue; and

second, it must consider whether the accused product infringes one

or more of the properly construed claims. Id at 384. The second

inquiry is a question of fact, although summary judgment of

infringement or non-infringement may nonetheless be appropriate

when no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Irdeto Access,

Inc v Echostar Satellite Corp, 383 F3d 1295, 1299 (Fed Cir 2004)

(quoting Bai v L & L Wings, Inc, 160 F3d 1350, 1353 (Fed Cir

1998)).

The patentee bears the burden of proving infringement by

a preponderance of the evidence. Laitram Corp v Rexnord, Inc, 939

F2d 1533, 1535 (Fed Cir 1991). This burden can be met by showing

that the patent is infringed either literally or under the doctrine

of equivalents. See Linear Tech Corp v Impala Linear Corp, 379 F3d

1311, 1318 (Fed Cir 2004). To support a finding of literal

infringement, the patentee must establish that “every limitation

recited in the claim appears in the accused product, i e, the

properly construed claim reads on the accused product exactly.

Jeneric/Pentron, Inc v Dillon Co, 205 F3d 1377, 1382 (Fed Cir 2000)

(citing Amhil Enters Ltd v Wawa, Inc, 81 F3d 1554, 1562 (Fed Cir

1996)). Alternatively, where one or more elements of the claim are

not literally present in the allegedly infringing product or

process, infringement may nonetheless be found under the doctrine

of equivalence if the differences between the accused device and

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the patented invention are “insubstantial.” Honeywell Int'l, Inc v

Hamilton Sundstrand Corp, 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed Cir 2004). As

with literal infringement, this inquiry requires an

element-by-element comparison of the patented invention to the

accused device. Warner-Jenkinson Co v Hilton Davis Chem Co, 520 US

17, 40 (1997). Consequently, in applying the doctrine of

equivalents, the court must consider whether the accused device

“contain[s] elements that are either identical or equivalent to

each claimed element of the patented invention.” Id.

Under the classic formulation of the doctrine of

equivalents set forth in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co v Linde Air

Products Co, 339 US 605 (1950), a feature of the accused device is

“equivalent” to an element of claimed invention if it performs

substantially the same function in substantially the same way to

achieve substantially the same result. Id at 608 (citations

omitted); see also Schoell v Regal Mar Indus, Inc, 247 F3d 1202,

1209-10 (Fed Cir 2001). Yet, as the Supreme Court subsequently

acknowledged in Warner-Jenkinson, this particular “linguistic

framework” may not be appropriate in every case. 520 US at 39-40. 

Rather, the Court observed that “[a]n analysis of the role played by

each element in the context of the specific patent claim [must]

inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the

function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the

substitute element plays a role substantially different from the

claimed element.” Id at 40. A number of other considerations may

also be relevant in determining the range of equivalents to which

the claimed invention is entitled, including the prosecution history

of the patent in suit, the pioneer status of the invention (or lack

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thereof), and the limitations on patentability of the allegedly

equivalent device that would have been imposed by prior art extant

on the date of invention. Intel Corp v United States Int'l Trade

Comm'n, 946 F2d 821, 842 (Fed Cir 1991).

B

Although this case concerns whether defendants’ accused

products infringe independent claims 1 and 5 and dependent claims 3,

4 and 7 of the ‘273 patent, defendants’ summary judgment motions

only address independent claims 1 and 5. They claim as follows: 

1. A system for providing a built-in function in an

ISA-compatible computer in response to activation of a selected

combination of user activated keys, comprising:

a keyboard having a set of conventional

alphanumeric and function keys and further

having at least one additional function

key;

a keyboard controller connected to said keyboard

to monitor said conventional keys and said

additional function key to detect when at

least one of said keys is activated, said

keyboard controller having first and second

interrupt signal lines connected to said

ISA-compatible computer, said keyboard

controller responsive to an activation of

at least one of said conventional keys to

activate a first interrupt signal to said

ISA-compatible computer on said first

interrupt signal line, said keyboard

controller responsive to an activation of

said additional function key in combination

with at least one of said conventional

alphanumeric keys to generate a second

interrupt signal to said ISA-compatible

computer on said second interrupt signal

line;

a first conventional interrupt handling routine

within said ISA-compatible computer

responsive to said first interrupt signal

from said keyboard controller to input data

scan codes from said keyboard; and

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a second non-conventional interrupt handling

routine within said ISA-compatible computer

responsive to said second interrupt signal

from said keyboard controller to input an

identification of said activated

alphanumeric key and to perform a

predetermined function selected by said

identified alphanumeric key.

* * *

5. A system for servicing keyboard interrupts in an

ISA-compatible computer, comprising:

a keyboard having a plurality of keys including

conventional alphanumeric keys,

conventional symbol keys, conventional

function keys and conventional cursor

control keys, said keyboard further

including at least one non-conventional

function key, said keyboard generating a

scan code in response to an activation of

at least one of said keys, said scan code

varying depending upon which of said keys

is activated; and

a keyboard controller coupled to said keyboard,

said keyboard controller further coupled to

said ISA-compatible computer by first and

second interrupt signal lines, said

keyboard controller generating a first

interrupt signal on said first interrupt

signal line upon receipt of a scan code

corresponding to one of said conventional

keys, said ISA-compatible computer

programmed to execute a program to input

said scan code in response to said first

interrupt signal, said keyboard controller

generating a second interrupt signal on

said second interrupt signal line upon

receipt of a scan code corresponding to

said non-conventional function key, said

ISA-compatible computer programmed to

execute at least one special routine upon

receipt of said second interrupt signal.

1

Defendants first argue that their notebook computers do

not infringe the claims because they do not meet the “keyboard” and

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“keyboard controller” limitations required by independent claims 1

and 5. Doc #359 at 11; Doc #341 at 6. Prior to the court’s claim

construction order, the parties agreed upon the construction of

“keyboard” to mean: 

An input apparatus containing internal circuitry to output

or generate data scan codes.” Doc #227 at 16. 

The parties also agreed that these scan codes are sent to a

“keyboard controller” for processing, which then transmits

interrupts to the computer. Id. Hence, the court construed the

term “keyboard controller” to mean:

A component, electronically or functionally distinct from

the keyboard, that activates interrupt signals in response

to receipt of data scan codes from the keyboard, and, upon

request, transmits data scan codes to the computer.

Both of these definitions incorporate the phrase “data

scan codes” — a term the parties hotly disputed in the Markman

hearing. Id at 11-16. In short, at that hearing, Samsung argued

that row and column signals — i e, the electrical signals generated

from the grid of wires that underlays the keys of the keyboard — can

constitute a scan code; defendants argued that they cannot. Id at

11. Ultimately, the court sided with defendants, defining the term

as: 

A code number that the keyboard generates whenever a key

is depressed or released, said code number created by

converting a pairing of a row signal and a column signal

in the keyboard matrix. Id at 16.

As the court noted, this construction order makes clear that “row

and column signals [produced by keyboards] are not scan codes.” Doc 

#227 at 15. 

Defendants rely on this prior victory to argue that the

accused products do not meet the “keyboard” and “keyboard

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controller” claim limitations because they send and receive row

signals, not data scan codes. Doc #359 at 11; Doc #341 at 6. But

according to Samsung, defendants’ argument hinges on an artificial

definition of what elements constitute the keyboard and keyboard

controller in the accused products. Doc #401 at 7-12. Rather than

merely “the keys of on the keyboard matrix,” Samsung avers that the

keyboard consists of the microprocessor core, the keyboard matrix,

the keyboard interface, and specifically identified parts of the

Keyboard BIOS. Doc #397 at 7. 

In their replies, defendants point out that under

Samsung’s broad definition, the “keyboard” overlaps with the

“keyboard controller.” Doc # 407 at 2; Doc # 383 at 1. Indeed,

under Dr Wedig’s definition, the keyboard controller shares a

processor core with the keyboard, which, defendants allege, runs

afoul of the court’s requirement that the keyboard and the keyboard

controller be “electronically or functionally distinct.” Id.

Samsung claims the two components nonetheless remain electronically

and functionally distinct because they share only a single point of

integration and the shared processor performs independent software

routines for the keyboard and keyboard controller. Doc #397 at 7.

Defendant Quanta characterizes Samsung’s argument

regarding electronic and functional distinction as “nonsensical,”

offering the example that “[a]lthough a personal computer can run

both Microsoft Word and Internet Explorer, no one would understand

the CPU in the computer to contain a functionally distinct word

processor connected to a functionally distinct internet browser.” 

Doc #341 at 9. But this analogy, as Samsung points out, suggests

precisely the opposite conclusion: everyone understands Microsoft

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Word and Internet Explorer to be functionally distinct, despite

their electronic integration. 

Based on the declarations and technical documents provided

by the parties, the court declines to find that the accused products

cannot satisfy the keyboard and keyboard controller claim terms as a

matter of law. The court’s claim construction defined keyboard and

keyboard controller by their function, not their structure. Indeed,

the lone structural limitation is that the two components be

electronically or functionally distinct. And at this point,

defendants have not convincingly demonstrated that for the keyboard

and keyboard controller to share a microprocessor core necessarily

renders them electronically and functionally indistinct.

2

Next, Defendants argue that the accused notebook computers

do not satisfy claim 1's requirement that:

said keyboard controller responsive to an activation of

said additional function key in combination with at least

one of said conventional alphanumeric keys to generate a

second interrupt signal to said ISA-compatible computer

(emphasis addeed)

Defendants allege that none of the accused computers, when sold with

the relevant operating systems, utilizes hot key combinations of the

Fn key and an alphanumeric key. Samsung disputes this allegation,

but only with respect to some of the accused products. For

defendant Compal’s products, Samsung alleges that Compal’s own Rule

30(b)(6) witness has testified that three of its products utilize

hot key combinations of the Fn key and an alphanumeric key. See Doc

#366 (Lim decl), Ex F at 188-89 (regarding model 38W2); Id at 45-49

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(model 31I5); Id at 138-53 (models 32T5 and 32T6). Moreover,

according to Samsung, these admissions extend to five products with

identical specifications. Doc #361 (Liu decl), ¶ 60 (model 38W3),

13 (models 31I3 and 31I4) and 27 (models 32T5 and 32T6). With

respect to defendant Quanta, Samsung offers Dr Wedig’s testimony

that 10 of its products use alphanumeric keys in combination with a

function key to generate the second interrupt signal. See Doc #381,

Wedig decl, ¶ 9-20. 

Otherwise it appears undisputed that the 31 of Compal’s

accused products and 22 of Quanta’s accused products use key

combinations of the Fn key together with keys other than

alphanumeric keys to activate hotkey functions. As a result, for

these products, Samsung’s theory of liability under claims 1, 3 and

4 is the doctrine of equivalents. 

Defendants contend that Samsung cannot rely on the

doctrine of equivalents because doing so would vitiate the

“alphanumeric key” limitation. Doc # 401 at 7. Defendants cite

Sage Prod, Inc v Devon Indus, Inc, 126 F3d 1420 (Fed Cir 1997) for

the proposition that when a patentee includes a specific claim term

that provides a binary choice, it cannot later walk away from that

by relying on the doctrine of equivalents. Id. Samsung argues that

the term alphanumeric is not binary in nature because a number of

conventional keys are not its opposite, such as the function key,

cursor key, shift key, or control key. Doc #401 at 18.

Despite the attention the parties paid to these arguments

at the hearing on the present motions, the court finds neither

side’s position convincing. Defendants’ reasoning, as Samsung

notes, has no principled limit: one could always add the prefix

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“non” to a claim term and argue that anything that is “non-[claim

term]” vitiates the claim limitation. Hence, the doctrine of

equivalents is not barred whenever a term is capable of being

negated. But Samsung’s reasoning has a similar flaw. To prove that

a term is not binary, it invokes the components of the term’s

opposite. Yet most binary relationships have components. For

example, whether a number is odd or even is not rendered non-binary

by the number seven. 

In any event, it is apparent to the court that the

parties’ arguments here are besides the point. Under Federal

Circuit case law, a term need not be “binary” to implicate the

vitiation rule for the doctrine of equivalents. A patent claim is

accorded limited recourse to the doctrine of equivalents if the

degree of specification clearly excludes “distinctly different or

even opposite” subject matter. BioCon v The Straumann Company, 05-

1168, (Fed Cir 2006) (emphasis added). Hence, for claims limited to

“alphanumeric keys,” the court need not conclude that the term “nonalphanumeric” is a binary opposite, only that it is “distinctly

different.” And under that standard, the court finds that claim 1

clearly excludes non-alphanumeric keys, as they are distinctly

different from alphanumeric keys. Samsung is consequently barred

from asserting infringement of claims 1, 3 and 4 under the doctrine

of equivalents for the defendants’ products that use key

combinations of the Fn key together with keys other than

alphanumeric keys to activate hotkey functions. 

3

Finally, defendants argue that the accused notebook

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computers fall outside of claim 5's requirement that the “keyboard

controller [generate] a second interrupt signal on said second

interrupt signal line upon receipt of a scan code corresponding to

said non-conventional function key.” ‘273 Patent at col 14:42-45. 

The court declined to construe this requirement, but noted that

receipt of the scan code alone is not a necessary condition; that

is, claim 5 could read, inter alia, on a function key alone and a

function key in combination with a conventional key. Doc #227 at

23. 

Defendants suggest that the court’s claim construction

order identifies only one other “scenario” in which claim 5 is

infringed. Doc #359 at 22. In doing so, defendants create a claim

limitation out the court’s unwillingness to adopt their proposed

construction. In the order, to refute the defendants’ proposal, the

court identified a sample embodiment that would be covered by the

term but would fall outside of the proposal. Improbably, defendants

now present this example as the exclusive exception. Doc #359 at

22. Moreover, defendants further narrow this exception by adding in

language spliced from a parenthetical in the court’s order. Id. 

The court finds defendants’ interpretation of the claim construction

order inappropriate, especially for claim language on which the

court concluded it was “unable to improve.” Doc #227 at 23.

Defendants remaining argument on this point falls due this

first misstep. Because the example in the court’s construction does

not constitute a claim limitation, defendants’ argument regarding

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infringement. 

V

Finally, the court addresses defendants’ motion to exclude

the opinions of Dr Wedig regarding the ‘273 patent’s conception,

reduction to practice and commercial success. Doc #343. Defendants

argue that Dr Wedig’s expert testimony is not admissible because he

is not qualified to opine on these issues and his opinions are not

adequately supported. Id. Moreover, regarding the ‘273 patent's

reduction to practice, defendants add that Dr Wedig applied an

incorrect legal standard. Id at 12-13. For the following reasons,

defendants’ motion to exclude is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

A

In determining whether to admit an expert’s testimony, a

district court must ensure that the testimony is reliable — i e, is

based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge — and

relevant — i e, will assist the trier of fact. Daubert v Merrell

Dow Pharms, Inc, 509 US 579, 589-91 (1993); FRE 702. To satisfy the

reliability requirement, the proponent of the expert testimony must

show by a preponderance of the evidence both that the expert is

qualified to render the opinion and that his opinion is adequately

supported. Daubert, 509 US at 589-90. Expert testimony is not

admissible if it is speculative, unsupported by sufficient facts or

contrary to the facts of the case. See General Electric v Joiner,

522 US 136, 146 (1997) (holding that courts should not admit expert

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testimony that “is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit

of the expert"). 

B

Defendants do not dispute the relevance of Dr Wedig’s

testimony but only argue that his testimony is not reliable. Doc

#343 at 1. First, defendants argue that Dr Wedig, due to his lack

of legal training, is not qualified to opine on the legal issues of

conception and reduction to practice. Doc #343 at 5 (citing

Hybritech Inc v Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc, 802 F2d 1367, 1376 (Fed

Cir 1986)). The court agrees. An expert’s opinion on the ultimate

legal conclusion is “neither required nor indeed ‘evidence’ at all.” 

Mendenhall v Cedarapids, 5 F3d 1557, 1574 (Fed Cir 1993) (quoting

Avia Group Int’l, Inc v LA Gear Cal, Inc, 853 F2d 1557, 1564 (Fed

Cir 1988)).

Yet that does not justify a wholesale exclusion of Dr

Wedig’s testimony on these issues, despite defendants’ argument to

the contrary. At the hearing on the present motions, defendants put

much weight on the case Price v Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187 (Fed Cir 1993)

But in doing so, defendants confuse the burden of proof with the

admissibility standard under FRE 702. Price holds that an

inventor’s testimony requires corroboration to prove conception. Id

at 1194. But to be admissible, the opinion of an expert need not be

conclusive proof. Indeed, parties often offer multiple sources of

evidence that, in aggregate, prove a proposition even though no

source independently suffices.

Accordingly, the court only excludes Dr Wedig’s legal

conclusions. It is plain from paragraphs 20 and 21 of Dr Wedig’s

rebuttal report, Doc #344, Mingrone Decl, Ex 7, that he is

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attempting to use the legal definitions of conception and reduction

to practice. See, e g, id at 11 (“I understand that the date of

conception is defined as the date at which the inventor has a

formulation of the complete means of solving a problem in such a way

that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the

invention without unduly extensive research or experimentation”). 

In four parts of his rebuttal report, Dr Wedig applies these legal

standards to offer legal conclusions regarding the invention’s

conception and reduction to practice. Dr Wedig may rely on the

technical record to estimate when the inventors thought of the

invention and when the invention became operational, but he may not

opine on when the invention was legally conceived and reduced to

practice. Accordingly, the court excludes the following parts of Dr

Wedig’s rebuttal report in which he states legal conclusions about

the ‘273 patent’s conception and reduction to practice: (1) the

first sentence of paragraph 24, (2) the fifth sentence of paragraph

29, (3) the fourth sentence of paragraph 30, and (4) paragraph 31 in

its entirety. Id.

Second, defendants argue that Dr Wedig’s testimony on

conception and reduction to practice is not adequately supported and

therefore not admissible. Doc #343 at 8. The court disagrees. 

In opining on these issues, Dr Wedig relied on Michael

Goodman’s day planner and the deposition testimony of two inventors

and two engineers. Doc #344, Ex 7 ¶19. Without question, Dr Wedig,

as a computer scientist, is qualified to review the technical

contents of Goodman’s day planner, Doc #350, Corrected Jones Decl,

Ex 11; Doc #368, Noll Decl, Ex C, and provide his opinions on them. 

This means that categorical exclusion of his opinions will risk

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depriving the jury of potentially useful expert assistance in

understanding an important piece of evidence. 

C

Defendants essentially repeat their arguments with respect

to the ‘273 patent’s commercial success. That is, Dr Wedig is not

qualified to opine on the issue and his opinions are not supported. 

Doc #343 at 14-15. The court finds neither of these arguments

persuasive. 

At issue is Dr Wedig’s single paragraph testimony,

appearing in his rebuttal report. Doc #344, Ex 7 ¶75. Defendants

appear to argue that this paragraph is not admissible because it

fails to “establish” or “demonstrate a nexus between the claimed

sales and the merits of the invention.” Doc #343 at 14 (citing

Kansas Jack, Inc v Kuhn, 719 F2d 1144, 1150-51 (Fed Cir 1983)). The

case defendants cite, Kansas, held that the number of units sold

alone is not sufficient to demonstrate the product’s commercial

success. 719 F2d at 1150-51. But again, this case has no bearing

on the admissibility of expert testimony. Dr Wedig’s testimony need

not “establish” commercial success for his testimony to be

admissible; it only need be relevant and reliable. FRE 702. 

Dr Wedig opines in the paragraph at issue that the ‘273

patent “has been widely implemented in numerous notebook computers

[he] ha[s] personally analyzed.” Doc #344, Ex 7 ¶75. An

invention’s widespread use is probative to the commercial success of

the invention. See Kansas, 719 F2d at 1151 (holding that an

invention’s market share is one of the factors the court may

consider in evaluating the invention’s commercial success). 

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In opining on the widespread implementation of the ‘273

patent in notebook computers, Dr Wedig is relying on his personal

experience of analyzing a large number of notebook computers. Doc

#344, Ex 7 ¶75. The court recognizes that Dr Wedig’s primary

expertise lies in “analysis of computer hardware and software design

issues,” rather than in analysis of the market for computers. Doc

#344, Ex 7 ¶1. Yet Dr Wedig’s personal experience with a large

number of notebook computers is sufficient support to establish the

admissibility of his opinion. 

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VI

In sum, the court DENIES defendants’ summary judgment

motion of invalidity, GRANTS defendants’ summary judgment motions of

non-infringement of claims 1, 3 and 4 of the ‘273 patent for

defendants’ products that use key combinations of the Fn key

together with keys other than alphanumeric keys and DENIES the

remaining portions of defendants’ summary judgment motions of noninfringement. The court also GRANTS defendants’ motion to exclude

the opinions of Dr Robert G Wedig with respect to his legal

conclusions, but DENIES defendants’ motion to exclude his opinions

regarding the technology’s commercial success.

The remaining issues in this case are: (1) whether the

accused products that use key combinations of the Fn key together

with alphanumeric keys infringe, either literally or under the

doctrine of equivalents, claims 1, 3 and 4 and (2) whether the

accused products infringe, either literally or under the doctrine of

equivalents, claims 5 and 7. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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