Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07228/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07228-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 1997 Decided February 10, 1998 

No. 96-7228

MARY JO SMITH,

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON SHERATON CORPORATION,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEES

Consolidated with

No. 96-7238

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(94cv01472)

-

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 1 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Edward J. Lopata argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant/cross-appellees.

Stephen V. Wehner argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: On June 2, 1993, the plaintiff, 

Mary Jo Smith, sustained head injuries when she fell off a 

ramp leading from a parking garage into a lobby of the 

Washington Sheraton Hotel. Invoking the district court's 

diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Smith named as 

defendants responsible for the condition of the ramp ITT 

Sheraton Corporation; Washington Sheraton Corporation; 

Sheraton Operating Corporation; Woodley Road Associates, 

Inc.; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company; and 

Sumitomo Life Realty.1 At the close of all the evidence, the 

attorney jointly representing these six defendants moved for 

judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). The 

district court granted the motion except with respect to 

Washington Sheraton Corporation, which became the sole 

remaining defendant. The jury found Washington Sheraton 

Corporation guilty of negligence and awarded Smith $175,000.

Thereafter, Washington Sheraton Corporation renewed its 

motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial or 

remittitur, arguing that Smith had failed to present any 

evidence showing who owned or controlled the ramp. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) and 59. The district court denied the 

motion.

In its appeal, Washington Sheraton Corporation raises 

sufficiency of the evidence and, in the alternative, seeks a new 

__________

1 The district court granted judgment as a matter of law in 

favor of a seventh defendant, Doggett Enterprises, Inc., the operator of the Sheraton Parking Garage. Smith does not appeal this 

order.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 2 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

trial on the basis of the "egregious conduct" of plaintiff's 

counsel. Brief for Appellant at 17. Smith cross-appeals from 

the judgment in favor of the five other defendants.

The governing legal principles are well known. Our review 

of district court decisions on motions for judgment as a 

matter of law is de novo. We consider all evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Scott v. 

District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 752-53 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

We do not assess the weight of the evidence, only its sufficiency. The jury's verdict will stand unless "the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so 

one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree 

on the verdict." Id. at 753. But the evidence must be "more 

than merely colorable"; it must be "significantly probative." 

Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 878 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 

1989).

Because this is a diversity case, the substantive tort law of 

the District of Columbia controls. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter 

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The 

standard of care owed by an owner or occupier of land is 

"reasonable care under all of the circumstances." Sandoe v. 

Lefta Assocs., 559 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C. 1988). To recover 

against either an owner or occupier of land, the plaintiff must 

show "that the defendant had noticeeither actual or constructiveof the present existence of an allegedly dangerous 

condition." Croce v. Hall, 657 A.2d 307, 311 (D.C. 1995). 

While generally a landlord is not responsible for injuries 

caused by conditions developing after the lessee takes possession, a third party may recover against the lessor or landlord 

of a property leased for public purposes if the party demonstrates that the injury was caused by a "condition existing 

when the lessee took possession" and that the lessor "knew or 

should have known of the condition and realized or should 

have realized the unreasonable risk" involved. RESTATEMENT 

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965); see also Daly v. Toomey, 212 

F. Supp. 475, 478-79 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Muldrow 

v. Daly, 329 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Hilleary v. Earle 

Restaurant, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1952). A party 

who operates the premises but is neither the owner nor the 

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 3 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

lessee may also have a duty of reasonable care. See F.W. 

Woolworth Co. v. Stoddard, 156 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1959).

I

We will take up first Smith's claim that the district court 

erred in granting judgment for Sheraton Operating Corporation. Counsel for the six defendants told the court: "[W]e 

would move for judgment as a matter of law as to all six of 

the defendants that I am representing because there is a 

complete lack of evidence in the plaintiff's case as to which, if 

any, of these corporations own" the hotel. Trial Transcript at 

967. Defense counsel then acknowledged that one witness 

had testified to working for the Sheraton Operating Corporation and so he assumed "for all the other five defendants, our 

motion should be granted." Id. at 1014. The court responded: "[T]he only possible defendant that the plaintiffs [sic] 

have brought to the attention of the jury may be the Washington Sheraton Corporation ... everyone other than Washington Sheraton Corporation is out of the case." Id. at 1079-

80.

Given this exchange, the court must have meant to keep 

Sheraton Operating Corporation in the case and to grant 

judgment for the other five defendants, including Washington 

Sheraton Corporation. The only evidence of ownership or 

control brought to the jury's attention related to Sheraton 

Operating Corporation. A witness for the plaintiff had testified that he was the director of engineering at the Washington Sheraton Hotel and was employed by Sheraton Operating 

Corporation. He further testified that the engineering department was responsible for the maintenance of ramps leading from the garage to the hotel.

Because there was evidence of Sheraton Operating Corporation's control of the premises, it should not have been 

removed from the case for lack of such evidence. The court 

plainly intended for it to remain, although the order stated 

something quite different. We therefore reverse and remand 

for a new trial against Sheraton Operating Corporation.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 4 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

II

We shall deal next with appellant Washington Sheraton 

Corporation. In the confusion caused by the similarity of the 

defendants' names, it alone wound up before the jury. On 

appeal, Washington Sheraton Corporation argues that the 

district court erred in submitting the case to the jury because 

Smith "failed to introduce evidence of who owned or controlled the ramp." Brief for Appellant at 7. Washington 

Sheraton Corporation points out, correctly, that the only 

defendant mentioned in trial testimony was Sheraton Operating Corporation. Id. at 5. In other words, because the 

evidence implicated only Sheraton Operating Corporation, the 

verdict against Washington Sheraton Corporation cannot 

stand.

We believe Washington Sheraton Corporation's post-trial 

motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been 

granted, but for a reason other than the one just mentioned. 

Smith's case failed not on the element of ownership or 

controlas we shall discuss in a momentbut on the element 

of knowledge. Smith presented no evidence that Washington 

Sheraton Corporation knew or should have known of the 

allegedly dangerous condition of the ramp. See Croce, 657 

A.2d at 311. Judgment as a matter of law may be rendered if 

one party fails to present evidence on a material issue. See 

Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F.3d 1221 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996); McFarlane v. Caterpillar, Inc., 974 F.2d 176 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992).

Having concluded that the district court erred in denying 

Washington Sheraton Corporation's motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, we have three choices. We may enter judgment for that party, or we may order a new trial, or we may 

remand the case to the district court to determine whether a 

new trial is appropriate. See Scott, 101 F.3d at 760 (citing 

Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 329 (1967)); 

see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(d). For the reasons next discussed, 

we order a new trial.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 5 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

A. The Pretrial Order

Washington Sheraton Corporation defended at trial, and 

again on appeal, on the basis that there was a "total lack of 

proof" of its ownership or control of the hotel. Trial Transcript at 1003; see also Brief for Appellant at 9. But this 

ignores the pretrial order in the case, an order designed to 

"control the subsequent course of the action." FED. R. CIV. P. 

16(e). Smith's pretrial statement described the defendants as 

"all either owners, operators, or parent corporations of the 

Washington Sheraton Hotel." The Sheraton defendants' pretrial statement stated that Sheraton Operating Corporation 

"operates the Sheraton Washington Hotel pursuant to a 

management agreement with Woodley Road Associates. 

Woodley Road Associates leases the Sheraton Washington 

Hotel from 2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture." The Joint 

Venture consists of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 

Company, Sumitomo Life Realty, and Washington Sheraton 

Corporation.2See Defendants' Answer to First Amended 

Complaint. Under the heading "Statement of Defenses," the 

Sheraton defendants listed four defenses which are so brief 

they may be set out in their entirety.

1. Plaintiff's claim is barred by her contributory negligence in failing to see and heed the clear warning sign on 

the door leading to the elevator lobby on the third floor 

of the Park Tower.

2. Plaintiff cannot show how the accident occurred because she has no recollection of how it actually happened 

and therefore she cannot prove proximate cause, which is 

an essential element of her claim.

3. There is no evidence of wanton or reckless conduct to 

support a claim of punitive damages.

__________

2

In the pretrial statement, counsel for the Sheraton defendants 

described the joint venture as being comprised of "Sumitomo Life 

Realty (N.Y.), Inc., John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 

and ITT Sheraton Corporation." This seems to be an error. In 

the Answer and in the Response to Interrogatories, the partners in 

the joint venture are listed as John Hancock, Sumitomo, and 

Washington Sheraton Corporation.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 6 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

4. Plaintiff's damage claims are not supported by competent evidence.

After exchanging these pretrial statements, the parties appeared for a pretrial conference. On October 5, 1995, seven 

weeks before trial, a magistrate judge entered a final Rule 

16(e) pretrial order. The order stated that the parties' 

pretrial statements were "incorporated herein" and that the 

defendants "are the owners, operators, and parent corporations of the hotel." At no point in these proceedings did the 

Sheraton defendants dispute their ownership or control of the 

hotel and its parking facility.

A Rule 16 pretrial order "conclusively establish[es] the 

issues of fact and law in the case," United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 315 (1960), thereby "lessening the opportunities for surprise" and "expediting the trial." Rosden v. 

Leuthold, 274 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also 

Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120 (1991); 6A CHARLES A.

WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1527 (2d ed. 

1990). Failure to comply with a pretrial order can give rise 

to sanctions. See Rule 16(f). While a pretrial order may be 

modified "to prevent manifest injustice," Rule 16(e), the defendants in this case never sought a modification. Smith was 

entitled to rely on the parties' pretrial statements and the 

pretrial order to inform her of "precisely what [was] in 

controversy." Erff v. Markhon Indus., Inc., 781 F.2d 613, 

617 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Pierce County Hotel Employees 

& Restaurant Employees Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, 

B.P.O.E. No. 1450, 827 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987).

The plaintiff in a premises liability action must prove the 

defendant owned or controlled the property. But a defendant 

waives any objection on this score if the defendant fails to 

raise lack of ownership or control as a defense in the face of 

the plaintiff's pretrial statement clearly asserting the contrary. As the court said in Morro v. City of Birmingham, a 

"defendant can waive a potential defense by failing to ensure 

that the issue is clearly preserved in the pretrial order." 117 

F.3d 508, 515 (11th Cir. 1997). See Correa v. Hospital San 

Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1195 (1st Cir. 1995); FED. R. CIV. P. 

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 7 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

16(c) advisory committee's note. Even a prima facie element 

of the plaintiff's case may be removed from dispute in this 

manner. See Romero Reyes v. Marine Enter., Inc., 494 F.2d 

866 (1st Cir. 1974). Furthermore, Local Rule 209 requires a 

party's pretrial statement to contain a statement of defenses 

raised by that party, including "defenses raised by way of 

general denial, without regard to which party has the burden 

of persuasion." D.D.C.R. 209(b)(4).

The pretrial statements and the resulting order are consistent with other representations the Sheraton defendants 

made during the course of litigation. Responding to interrogatories, Sheraton Operating Corporation stated: "2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture is the owner of the Sheraton Washington Hotel." In their motion in limine, the defendants, 

referring to themselves as "collectively 'Sheraton,' " stated 

that "Sheraton as the owner of the premises satisfied its duty 

to plaintiff."

Thus the district court's grant of judgment in favor of five 

of the six defendants was erroneously predicated on the 

ground that Smith had failed to prove ownership or control 

when the pretrial order had relieved Smith from the burden 

of proving this.

B. The Conduct of Defense Counsel

As we have described, defense counsel's motion for judgment on behalf of five of his clients included Washington 

Sheraton Corporation. Counsel explicitly acknowledged that 

there had been testimony concerning Sheraton Operating 

Corporation. He then stood silent as the court inadvertently 

granted judgment in favor of Sheraton Operating Corporation 

but kept Washington Sheraton Corporation in the case. Defense counsel no doubt viewed this development with glee. 

Every attorney likes to try a case with a net, to have a sure 

basis for reversal if the jury finds against his client. On the 

other hand, plaintiff's attorney also said nothing to correct 

the court's misstatement. Why he did not speak up is a 

mystery to us.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 8 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

At any rate, there is a good reason not to reward the 

defense for the confusion that ensued. Defense counsel 

represented to the district court that there was "a total 

vacuum as to who owns the Sheraton Operating Corporation, 

who owns the Sheraton Hotel, what partners are involved in 

it," see Trial Transcript at 1003. At oral argument in this 

court, defense counsel maintained that his Answer denied 

ownership and control 3 while it acknowledged the leasing 

arrangement of the hotel.4 Clearly someone owned the hotel 

and the universe of all possible owners seems to have been 

the defendants. When we asked about this, defense counsel 

__________

3 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleged:

11. The defendant ITT Sheraton Corporation owns defendant 

Washington Sheraton Corporation and the Sheraton Operating 

Corporation.

12. Defendant Washington Sheraton Corporation, defendant 

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, and defendant 

Sumitomo Life Realty are partners in an entity known as 2660 

Woodley Road Joint Venture, through which they own the 

Sheraton Washington Hotel and the Sheraton Parking Garage.

13. 2660 Woodley Joint Venture leases the Sheraton Washington Hotel to defendant Woodley Road Associates, Inc., which in 

a joint agreement with Sheraton Operating Corporation, operates the Sheraton Washington Hotel.

The Sheraton Defendants submitted two Answers, identical in the 

following paragraphs:

11. Admitted.

12. & 13. The Sheraton Washington Hotel is leased by Woodley Road Associates, Inc. and operated by Sheraton Operating 

Corporation. The leasee [sic] is a tenant under a lease from 

2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture which is comprised of John 

Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, Sumitomo Life Realty, and Washington Sheraton Corporation. The remainder of 

the allegations are denied.

4 Of course, a negligence action may lie against a defendant 

who is the lessor rather than the owner of property. And an 

admission that one is the lessor of property is not a denial that one 

is also the owner of the property.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 9 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1

In the color photo contained in the Joint Appendix the sign gives 

off an iridescent glow, but trial testimony indicates that this may 

well have overstated the sign's salience. The black-and-white photocopy appears to cancel that overstatement.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 10 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

responded that he did not know who owned the hotel, that he 

never asked any of his Sheraton clients whether they did, that 

he never investigated the subject. In other words, on his 

interpretation of the pleading, he filed an answer denying his 

clients' ownership without knowing whether the denial had 

any evidentiary foundation. There is a rule against such 

practices. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(4) provides 

that in pleadings and other representations to the court, an 

attorney is certifying that "denials of factual contentions are 

warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 

reasonably based on a lack of information or belief."

C. The Defect in Proof May be Remediable

Our final reason for ordering a new trial rather than 

judgment for Washington Sheraton Corporation is that we 

believe Smith's failure of proof on the element of whether 

defendants knew or should have known about the ramp's 

condition may be remedied. In Neely v. Martin K. Eby 

Construction Co., the Supreme Court stated that when "the 

court of appeals sets aside the jury's verdict because the 

evidence was insufficient to send the case to the jury, it is not 

so clear that the litigation should be terminated." 386 U.S. at 

327. In considering a post-verdict motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, a district court has discretion to order a new 

trial rather than grant judgment "if it believes that the defect 

in the nonmoving party's proof might be remedied on a 

second trial." 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2538, at 357 (2d ed. 1994). 

An appellate court has no less discretion. See id. § 2540; see 

also Network Publications, Inc. v. Ellis Graphics Corp., 959 

F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1992). While not all cases involving 

insufficiency of evidence deserve a new trial, the matters we 

have already mentioned make a new trial the appropriate 

remedy here.

III

With respect to cross-appellees John Hancock Mutual Life 

Insurance, Sumitomo Life Realty, and Woodley Road Associates, we also vacate the judgment in their favor and remand 

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 11 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

for a new trial. The court's judgment rested on the proposition that Smith had introduced no evidence of their ownership 

or control of the hotel. As we have discussed, that issue was 

conceded by the parties' pretrial statements and the pretrial 

order. Defendants' pretrial statement described John Hancock and Sumitomo as partners in 2660 Woodley Road Joint 

Venture, and stated that "Woodley Road Associates leases 

the Sheraton Washington Hotel from 2660 Woodley Road 

Joint Venture." Thus the reasons the court gave for its 

judgment do not support it.

Smith's case did suffer a complete lack of evidence on the 

element that these defendants had notice of the allegedly 

defective condition of the ramp, but for reasons already 

mentioned we believe it appropriate to remand for a new 

trial. Had the district court been alerted to the absence of 

evidence of knowledge and decided to grant the defendants' 

Rule 50(a) motion on that ground, it would have had discretion instead to grant plaintiff a dismissal without prejudice. 

See 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2533, at 318; see also Cone v. West 

Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947).

The grant of judgment in favor of ITT Sheraton Corporation is another matter entirely. We affirm that judgment 

because, as a corporate owner of Washington Sheraton Corporation and Sheraton Operating Corporation, see Defendants' Answer ¶ 11, ITT Sheraton Corporation is not liable 

for harm caused by a condition on property belonging to its 

subsidiaries. As Smith conceded at oral argument, no attempt was made at trial to pierce the corporate veil. The law 

in the District of Columbia is that "the acts and obligations of 

the corporate entity will not be recognized as those of a 

particular person until the party seeking to disregard the 

corporate entity has proved by affirmative evidence that 

there is (1) unity of ownership and interest and (2) use of the 

corporate form to perpetrate fraud or wrong." Vuitch v. 

Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 815 (D.C. 1984); see also Camacho v. 

1440 Rhode Island Ave. Corp., 620 A.2d 242, 248 (D.C. 1993). 

Nor can ITT Sheraton Corporation be held liable as an owner 

of the property where the injury occurred. It is a fundamenUSCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 12 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tal principle of corporate law that "[t]he owner of the shares 

of stock in a company is not the owner of the corporation's 

property." Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 

U.S. 69, 81 (1926). In Office of People's Counsel v. Public 

Service Commission of the District of Columbia, 520 A.2d 677 

(D.C. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

ruled that a holding company which owned all the stock in 

three parent corporations had no legal interest in the taxicabs 

which were the property of those corporations. The court 

there explained:

Ownership of stock by one corporation in another does 

not create an identity of corporate interest between the 

two companies, nor render the stockholding company the 

owner of the property of the other. Even complete 

ownership of all outstanding stock of a corporation is not 

the equivalent of ownership of a subsidiary's property or 

assets, because a parent and subsidiary comprise two 

wholly separate entities with individual property rights.

Id. at 681 (quoting 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 751 

(1985)). Thus ITT Sheraton Corporation, despite its ownership of the companies that leased and operated the hotel, did 

not own the hotel.

IV

We reject the additional points of error raised by the 

parties. Only one of the points warrants discussionthe 

defense contention that Smith was contributorily negligent as 

a matter of law. The theory is that a sign posted on the door 

opening to the rampreading "Caution Watch Your Step" 

with arrows pointing downsufficiently alerted Smith to the 

need to exercise a greater degree of care and that her failure 

to do so rendered her contributorily negligent as a matter of 

law. See Brief for Appellant at 13.

Contributory negligence is almost always a question of fact 

for the jury. See Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 

532 (D.C. 1979). "Only in exceptional cases, where the facts 

are undisputed and where but one reasonable inference can 

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 13 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

be drawn, is the trial court justified in holding that negligence 

or contributory negligence has been established as a matter 

of law." Singer v. Doyle, 236 A.2d 436, 437 (D.C. 1967); see 

also Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp., 822 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C. Cir. 

1987).

Washington Sheraton Corporation relies on Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 69 (D.C. 1997), for the proposition that a person 

"must see what is reasonably there to be seen." Reply Brief 

of Appellant at 7. Poyner held that a legally blind plaintiff 

had failed to use reasonable care when he continued to walk 

along an elevated sidewalk while turning his head to the side. 

"At the critical moment, according to his own testimony, 

Poyner, who could see six to eight feet in front of him and 

was aware of his handicap, did not look where he was going." 

694 A.2d at 71. Poyner, however, does not alter District of 

Columbia law; the Court of Appeals reiterated that "[o]nly in 

the exceptional case is evidence so clear and unambiguous 

that contributory negligence should be found as a matter of 

law." Id. (citing Tilghman v. Johnson, 513 A.2d 1350, 1351 

(D.C. 1986)).

The fact that a warning sign was posted on the door 

leading to the ramp does not mean that Smith's fall was the 

result of her failure to exercise ordinary care. Smith's counsel argued to the jury that the sign did not adequately direct 

a reasonable person's attention to anything on the far side of 

a closed door. See Trial Transcript at 1107. The cautionary 

words with downward pointing arrows could have led a 

reasonable person to believe that the danger was at the 

doorsill rather than beyond, or at least a reasonable jury 

could so conclude. Smith did not know, at the time she 

approached the door, that it opened onto a ramp. Even had 

she been aware of the ramp, "[k]nowledge alone of a condition 

is insufficient to charge [her] with contributory negligence as 

a matter of law." Trust v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 252 

A.2d 21, 22 (D.C. 1969). In Trust, the Court of Appeals held 

that although the plaintiff had noted the existence of a step 

prior to her fall, the trial court erred in granting judgment 

n.o.v. to the defendant. Id. When there is evidence on which 

reasonable people might differ, see District of Columbia v. 

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 14 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Cooper, 445 A.2d 652, 655 (D.C. 1982), the issue of contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury. So here.

* * *

The judgment as a matter of law in favor of ITT Sheraton 

Corporation is affirmed. The verdict against Washington 

Sheraton Corporation is vacated. The judgments in favor of 

Sheraton Operating Corporation, John Hancock Mutual Life 

Insurance Company, Sumitomo Life Realty, and Woodley 

Road Associates are reversed. The case is remanded for a 

new trial against these five defendants.

So ordered.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 15 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Except for one issue I 

find myself in full agreement with the majority. Unfortunately the issuecontributory negligenceis dispositive. If, 

as I believe, no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff free of 

contributory negligence, then all the other issues are moot. 

Accordingly I dissent.

The plaintiff, wife of a U.S. Senator, drove with friends to a 

lunch at the Shoreham Hotel in honor of the First Lady. 

Because the parking at the Shoreham was full, she left her 

friends off there, and went to park her car at the nearby 

Sheraton Washington. To exit from the parking structure to 

the hotel proper, she had to pass through the Exit door 

shown in Exhibit 1 to this opinion (a black-and-white photocopy of Defendant's Trial Exhibit # 26, a color photograph). 

On it, perhaps two inches below the door handle, appears a 

warning sign saying,

C A U T I O N

WATCH YOUR

STEP

with five arrows pointing down.

On the hotel side of the door there is a ramp that appears 

roughly symmetrical to the one on the garage side. (Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability as 

to Defendants ITT Sheraton, Sumitomo Life Realty, John 

Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, Sheraton Operating Corporation and Woodley Road Associates, Exhibit C.) A 

person going through the door directly (i.e., pursuing a course 

perpendicular to the plane of the doorway) would step onto 

the far ramp. Beyond the area directly aligned with the 

doorway, the edge of the far ramp fell vertically to floor level, 

so that for anyone who stepped to the side while entering the 

hotel there was a drop of several inchesthe record does not 

make clear how manyat least at the end of the ramp 

nearest the door frame. It was this configuration of the 

ramp, and/or the absence of a handrail, that the jury found 

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 16 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

negligent. Defendant does not dispute that it could reasonably do so.

Plaintiff described her fall as follows:

I ... opened the door ... with my left hand and my left 

shoulder and probably my left leg and foot as well, 

because it was a very heavy door, and pushed open the 

door and proceeded in with my right foot. My right foot 

fell off that right side of that ramp and I was catapulted 

into the metal framework of the [elevator].

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 130. In a passage from her deposition read into evidence at trial, she said

I stepped through the doorway expecting there to be a 

ramp on the other side and my foot just went intoI can 

only describe it as an abyss.

Id. at 267. According to plaintiff's testimony, she was able to 

see the "Exit" sign by the door "easily," and the lighting on 

the hotel side of the door was "much brighter" even than that. 

Trial transcript at 1024, 1027.

I do not believe a reasonable jury could have found that 

someone leaving the parking garage through this exit could 

have suffered the accident that befell plaintiff if she exercised 

reasonable care in light of the prominent "Caution" sign. 

First, a person exercising reasonable care would see the sign, 

right next to the door handle and in very bold lettering.1

(Plaintiff testified that she did not remember seeing it. J.A. 

270.) Plaintiff's counsel evidently assumed the sign's visibility, arguing instead to the jury that it failed to direct attention 

to any danger on the other side of the door. Trial transcript 

at 1107. But this depends on an odd construction of the sign. 

Counsel's idea evidently was that it directed the reader's 

attention only to hazards before the door, which she could see 

before she touched it, and perhaps to hazards directly beneath the door, but not at all to hazards just beyond the door. 

____

1

In the color photo contained in the Joint Appendix the sign gives 

off an iridescent glow, but trial testimony indicates that this may 

well have overstated the sign's salience. The black-and-white photocopy appears to cancel that overstatement.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 17 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

I cannot see how the sign means anything other than for the 

patron to proceed with caution both as she approaches and as 

she steps through the door. This includes the first steps she 

takes on the other side. Of course, under special circumstances a reasonable person might disregard the warning, say 

if she were pursued by a thug. But plaintiff suggested no 

such extreme circumstances.

In its recent decision in Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 69 (D.C. 

1997), D.C.'s Court of Appeals made clear that in its view 

proof of contributory negligence as a matter of law is not just 

a once-in-a-blue-moon event. In Poyner, the plaintiff, legally 

blind but able to see about six to eight feet in front of him, 

was on a walkway elevated four feet above the street level 

and lacking guardrails. Shrubs normally acted as a (modest) 

barrier to persons' falling off the walkway, but on the day in 

question one was missing, as Poyner noticed. Distracted by 

someone calling out his name, and failing to take the precautions indicated by the absence of the protective shrub, Poyner 

walked over the edge and suffered injuries. The court found 

his conduct contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In 

our case, similarly, plaintiff "failed either to look at all or to 

look observantly and see what should have been plainly 

visible." Poyner, 694 A.2d at 71 (quoting Singer v. Doyle,

236 A.2d 436, 438 (D.C. 1967)).

The majority is, of course, correct that negligence and 

contributory negligence are only rarely established as a matter of law, see Maj. Op. at 12-13 (citing Singer v. Doyle, 236 

A.2d 436, 437 (D.C. 1967)), and that Poyner wrought no 

change in District of Columbia law, id. at 13. But Poyner

dramatically illustrates the District's idea of reasonable care 

and its insistence on real, not rubber-stamp, superintendence 

of the jury. To be true to the District's substantive law, 

which controls our review of the district court's decision on 

the motion for a directed verdict, Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler 

GMBH & Co. KG, 79 F.3d 1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we 

should reverse for failure to grant the motion.

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 18 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Exhibit 1

[Photograph not available electronically.]

USCA Case #96-7228 Document #329842 Filed: 02/10/1998 Page 19 of 19