Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-484/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Order Relates To:

ALL DIRECT ACTION PLAINTIFFS

 MDL No. 1917

Case No. C-07-5944 JST

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 

RELATING TO STATE LAW CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are two motions for summary judgment asking the Court to dismiss 

Direct Action Purchaser (“DAP”) Costco’s state law claims on due process, ECF Nos. 3029 (“DP 

Mot.”), and choice-of-law grounds, ECF No. 2997 (“COL Mot.”). The parties submitted a 

consolidated Opposition, ECF No. 3264 (“Opp’n”), and consolidated Reply, 3469 (“Reply”), to 

both motions. Due to various settlements and dismissals after the filing of these motions, Costco’s 

California claims are the only remaining claims at issue. Oral argument was held on March 28, 

2016. Defendants’ choice-of-law motion is GRANTED, and their due process motion is DENIED 

as MOOT.

1

II. FACTS

The history of this case is well known to parties. By way of summation, this case is 

predicated upon an alleged conspiracy to price-fix cathode ray tubes (“CRTs”), a core component 

of tube-style screens for common devices including televisions and computer monitors. This 

 

1

The Court previously filed this order provisionally under seal on April 19, 2016. ECF No. 4582. 

No party has filed a motion to seal any part of that order. Accordingly, pursuant to ECF No. 4477 

¶ 5, the Court now files the motion on the public docket.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 4733 Filed 07/28/16 Page 1 of 8
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conspiracy ran from March 1, 1995 to November 25, 2007 (the “Conspiracy Period”), involved 

many of the major companies that produced CRTs, and allegedly resulted in overcharges of 

billions of U.S. dollars to domestic companies that purchased and sold CRTs or products 

containing CRTs (“CRT Finished Products”) for purposes such as personal use. A civil suit was 

originally filed in 2007, ECF No. 1, consolidated by the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 

shortly thereafter, see ECF No. 122, assigned as a Multidistrict Litigation case (“MDL”) to Judge 

Samuel Conti, see id., and ultimately transferred to the undersigned, see ECF No. 4162.

In addition to two class actions, this MDL involves various direct actions from individual 

plaintiffs who have opted out of the class actions. Each DAP alleges that it bought at least one 

CRT Finished Product from a Defendant or an entity owned or controlled by a Defendant. The 

DAPs, despite their moniker, are classified as indirect purchasers under antitrust law -- not direct 

purchasers. Defendants bring the instant motions against DAP Costco. 

Costco filed indirect purchaser claims under California law for CRT Finished Product 

purchases it made during the Conspiracy Period for its stores throughout the United States. 

Because Costco filed its lawsuit in Washington before the case was transferred to this Court, 

Washington’s choice-of-law rules apply. In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1492 

(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that courts apply the choice-of-law rules of each state where the 

individual actions of an MDL were originally filed). Defendants argue in their choice-of-law 

motion that Washington’s choice-of-law rules dictate that Washington law should apply. 

Accordingly, they ask the Court to dismiss Costco’s California claims. In their due process 

motion, Defendants argue that Costco’s California claims should be dismissed for the independent 

reason that they violate due process. Insofar as Washington law applies, however, Defendants’ 

due process motion is moot.

The instant motions turn on California’s and Washington’s respective contacts with the 

parties and the underlying transactions. In 1993, Costco merged with Price Club, a California 

company, and incorporated in Delaware. In 1999, however, Costco reincorporated in Washington. 

Costco’s headquarters were located in Washington throughout the Conspiracy Period, though 

Costco states that some executive offices were also located in California for an unspecified 

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amount of time after the merger with Price Club.

Costco’s purchases of CRT Finished Products started with a buyer located in its 

Washington headquarters who chose vendors and negotiated price, quantity, and time of delivery. 

Purchase orders were then created in and issued directly to the vendor from either Costco’s 

headquarters in Washington or Costco’s regional offices throughout the country. Once a purchase 

order was issued, the product was delivered directly to Costco’s depots or stores. Personnel at 

those locations signed the bill of lading or other shipping document and accepted delivery, at 

which point Costco’s payment obligation arose and title transferred. Payment was then remitted 

from Costco’s Washington headquarters.2 Costco purchased and received more than four million 

CRT Finished Products for its California locations using this process, more than its stores in any

other state. 

Although Defendants allegedly engaged in conspiratorial conduct throughout the world, 

Costco presents evidence that some of this activity occurred in California. For example, on June 

20, 2000, San Diego-based HED(US) employee Yuri Mitsumoto circulated an email containing 

future production capacity plans of competitor American Matsushita Electronics Company. See

ECF No. 3265-8, Ex. 29. In addition, on July 24, 2001, Mitsumoto sent HED(US) employee Tom 

Heiser an email confirming that he “talked with Samsung Chunghwa sales manager on the phone”

and reported to Heiser the CRT pricing plans he had obtained. See ECF No. 3265-8, Ex. 28. 

Finally, Hirokazu Nishimaya from Panasonic testified that he exchanged “production information 

and capacity” with Hitachi employees at a trade-association meeting in La Quinta, California. 

ECF No. 3265-8, Ex. 32 at 508:20-514:13. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

 

2

For a more detailed description of Costco's purchasing processes, see generally, ECF No. 3264-1 (Shavey 

Decl.).

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accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact 

cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by” citing to depositions, documents, 

affidavits, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party also may show that such 

materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). An issue is 

“genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is 

“material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. “In considering a motion for 

summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, and 

is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. 

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). However, unsupported conjecture or conclusory 

statements do not create a genuine dispute as to material fact and will not defeat summary 

judgment. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 

For claims on which the defendant does not carry the ultimate burden of persuasion, 

defendant as the moving party has the burden of producing evidence that negates an essential 

element of each claim on which it seeks judgment or showing that the plaintiff cannot produce 

evidence sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof at trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 

Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party satisfies its initial burden of 

production, then the nonmoving party must produce admissible evidence to show that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1102-1103. The non-moving party must “identify with 

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). “Specific citations, not bulk references, are essential to pinpoint 

key facts and factual disputes. [A] district court [i]s not required to put the puzzle together from a 

boxful of facts, and . . . may permissibly decide the motion without mining [an] entire document 

for more substantiation” when a citation offers only a “breezy reference” to a part of an “82-page 

report” not otherwise cited or explained in briefing. Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-POSCO 

Indus., 803 F.3d 1084, 1094-95 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015). “A mere scintilla of evidence will not be 

sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving 

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party must introduce some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” 

Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). If the 

non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

For the reasons provided below, the Court will grant Defendants’ choice-of-law motion. 

This ruling moots the due process motion, so the Court declines to address the merits thereof.

Where there is an actual conflict between the laws or interests of Washington and that of 

another state, Washington follows the “most significant relationship test” from the Restatement 

(Second) on Conflict of Laws. Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 580 (1976) 

(citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971)). Here, an actual conflict exists 

because California allows indirect purchaser suits, whereas Washington does not. Accordingly, 

the Court must determine which state -- California or Washington -- has the most significant 

relationship by comparing those states’ contacts with the occurrence and the parties. Id. In 

performing that analysis, the goal “is not merely to count contacts, but rather to consider which 

contacts are most significant and to determine where these contacts are found.” Id. at 581.

The “most relevant relationship test” requires a comparison of each state’s contacts with 

(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury 

occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of 

the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Id. at 

580-81. 

As a preliminary matter, Costco argues Defendants’ California-based conspiratorial 

conduct is the most important contact to consider in the choice-of-law analysis. There is some 

support for its position. See id. § 145, cmt. c (“If the primary purpose of the tort rule involved is

to deter or punish misconduct . . . the state where the conduct took place may be the state of 

dominant interest and thus that of most significant relationship”); id., cmt. e (stating that “the 

place where the conduct occurred is given particular weight” where there is “no one clearly 

demonstrable place of injury”). Here, however, Defendants did not focus their collusive activity 

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in any particular state; rather, their conspiratorial conduct allegedly spanned the globe. Further, 

where the acts of the defendants take place in a different state than 

that where the plaintiff suffered injury, the local law of the state of 

injury will be applied unless some other state, which would usually 

be the state where the defendants acted, has a more significant 

relationship to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the 

particular issue. 

Id., § 172, cmt. b (emphasis added). The place of injury is particularly important, moreover, 

because where, as here, “two or more persons are liable to a third person for the acts of each other 

. . . [t]he applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury occurred.” Id., § 

172(2). The place of Costco’s injury is therefore the most important contact in the choice-of-law 

analysis.

Plaintiffs bringing antitrust claims “are deemed to be injured in the states where they 

agreed to pay inflated prices for products.” In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 

1827, 2012 WL 3727221, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012). It is undisputed that Costco agreed to 

pay and paid inflated prices from its Washington headquarters. See COL Opp’n at 3; see also

ECF No. 3264-1 (“Shavey Decl.”) ¶ 12. Costco was therefore injured in Washington. 

Costco argues that its place of injury was California because it bought and sold more CRT 

Finished Products in California than in any other state; because it issued purchase orders for these 

products, in part, from its California offices; because Costco purchased a significant amount of 

CRT Finished Products from California-based vendors, and because title transferred to Costco 

when the CRT Finished Products were delivered, many of which were delivered to California 

locations. These considerations, however, bear no legal weight. See also In re TFT-LCD (Flat 

Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 11-0058 SI, 2011 WL 3809767, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011)

(citing Pecover v. Electronic Arts Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (N.D.Cal.2009); In re Graphics 

Processing Units Antitrust Litig. (“GPU”), 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1027–29 (N.D. Cal.2007))

(“Thus, the ultimate destination of the panels does not have any part in Costco's antitrust injury or 

in its state-law claims.”). Rather, as Judge Illston found in LCD, Washington is the place of injury 

because

[a]lthough sales of . . . products in California may constitute a 

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significant portion of Costco’s business, those products were 

selected in Washington, the negotiation over the terms of purchase 

took place in Washington, the invoices were sent to Washington, 

and payment issued from Costco’s Washington headquarters. . . . 

[T]hese events are all more significant to Costco’s claims than the 

issuance of a purchase order.

In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 11-0058 SI, 2011 WL 5922966, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). Accordingly, the “place of injury” factor weighs heavily in favor of granting 

Defendants’ motion.

Next, the Court examines the place of Defendants’ conduct. Costco claims that the 

conspiratorial conduct “was focused in California.” Costco Opp’n at 19. Although there is 

evidence that some conspiratorial activity occurred in California, the vast majority of the conduct 

causing Costco’s injury took place outside of California. This factor therefore does not weigh in 

favor of either side.

The Court next looks at the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and 

place of business of the parties. Although Costco was incorporated in Delaware early on in the 

conspiracy, it was headquartered and incorporated in Washington for the vast majority of the 

Conspiracy Period. None of the Defendants were headquartered or incorporated in California or 

Washington. 

Costco notes that where the interest affected “is a business or financial one, such as in the 

case of unfair competition, . . . the place of business is the more important contact.” Restatement 

(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145, cmt. e (1971). Costco, however, did business across the 

country. Moreover, even if “during the early years of the [Conspiracy] Period, Costco maintained 

executive functions in both California and Washington,” Costco COL Opp’n at 20, Costco’s 

Washington operation was much more substantial and continued throughout the Conspiracy 

Period. In addition, whereas Costco’s contacts with California were limited only to those CRT 

product purchases destined for California stores, Washington directed the purchase of every CRT 

product that Costco made for its stores across the country. This factor therefore weighs in favor of 

granting Defendants’ motion.

Finally, the Court looks to the place where the relationship between the parties was 

centered. The purchase of CRT Finished Products was controlled by Costco’s headquarters in 

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Washington, and payment was remitted from Washington. Thus, even though California offices 

were involved in the purchasing process for CRT Finished Products destined for California stores, 

Costco’s relationship with Defendants was centered in Washington. See also LCD, 2011 WL 

3809767, at *4 (“[T]he relationship between [Costco and the LCD defendants] was centered in 

Washington.”).

While the parties’ contacts with California were not insubstantial, “the facts that Costco is 

located in Washington, that Costco was injured in Washington, and that the relationship between 

the parties was centered in Washington lead the Court to conclude that Washington law governs 

Costco’s claims.” Id. at *4-5.

V. CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ choice-of-law motion is GRANTED, and Costco’s California claims are 

dismissed. Defendants’ due process motion on Costco’s California claims is DENIED as MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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