Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_95-cv-01825/USCOURTS-cand-3_95-cv-01825-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel

ROBERT COSTA and STATE OF

CALIFORNIA ex rel ROBERT COSTA,

Plaintiffs,

v

BAKER & TAYLOR, INC d/b/a BAKER &

TAYLOR BOOKS, and W R GRACE & CO

– CONNECTICUT,

Defendants. /

No C 95-1825 VRW

ORDER

Qui tam plaintiff Robert Costa moves for an award of

attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses pursuant to the California

False Claims Act (CFCA), Cal Gov’t Code § 12650 et seq. Doc #348. 

Costa’s motion is GRANTED IN PART. Costa is entitled to fees,

costs and expenses in an amount to be determined following further

submissions of the parties as set forth more fully below.

//

//

Case 3:95-cv-01825-VRW Document 361 Filed 05/29/06 Page 1 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I

Relators Robert Costa and Ronald Thornburgh (collectively

“relators”) filed this qui tam action on behalf of the United

States and the State of California in 1995, alleging that

defendants Baker & Taylor, Inc, d/b/a Baker & Taylor Books (“Baker

& Taylor”), and its prior parent company W R Grace & Co

(collectively “defendants”), had schemed to overcharge public

libraries, schools and federal and state offices and agencies for

books. Ultimately, seventeen other states intervened as

plaintiffs. Relator Thornburg was dismissed on statute of

limitations grounds on March 20, 1998, and is no longer a party. 

Doc #144.

On March 9, 1999, the court concluded that much of the

alleged fraud had been publicly disclosed prior to the filing of

this action and accordingly dismissed relator Costa as a qui tam

plaintiff for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the

public disclosure bar of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 USC §

3730(e)(4)(A). Doc #251. Because the CFCA is patterned on the FCA

and there was no authoritative case law construing the California

public disclosure bar at the time of the court’s dismissal, the

court employed Ninth Circuit precedent in concluding that Costa’s

California qui tam claim was also barred under the CFCA. The court

denied relators’ subsequent motion for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration. Doc #261.

On June 25, 1999, the United States settled its claims

against Baker & Taylor for $3 million. Doc #350 (Chatfield Decl)

¶14; see also Doc #253 (order dismissing United States’ claims

against Baker & Taylor with prejudice pursuant to settlement). On

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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July 31, 2000, the United States, the State of California and the

seventeen intervening states entered into a global settlement with

defendants. The global settlement resolved the United States’

claims against W R Grace for $3 million, California’s claims

against both defendants for $4 million and the remaining states’

claims against both defendants for a total of $8.5 million. Id

¶16. The United States and the State of California each paid

relators 15% of their respective settlement proceeds to relators. 

Id ¶¶15, 17-18. Relators also applied for attorneys’ fees, costs

and expenses pursuant to the FCA and the CFCA. Doc #284. The

court denied relators’ application based on the earlier order of

dismissal. Doc #329.

Notwithstanding the global settlement, final judgment was

not entered because the United States’ claim against W R Grace

remained open pending a criminal investigation in a different

district. Further, the court denied relators’ motion to certify

the appealability of their dismissals. Doc #329. Entry of

judgment was further delayed by a bankruptcy petition filed by W R

Grace in Delaware. See Doc #330. Relators sought and obtained an

order from the bankruptcy court clarifying that the bankruptcy stay

did not encompass Baker & Taylor. Doc #359 (Chatfield Supp Decl)

¶9. Relators also sought, but were denied, an order from the

bankruptcy court allowing their claims to proceed against W R

Grace. W R Grace was eventually dismissed per the stipulation of

all parties on August 31, 2004. Doc #338. 

At the end of this procedural maze was an opening for

Costa to file a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order

dismissing him as a qui tam plaintiff, Doc #335, which the court

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denied as to the FCA claim but granted as to the CFCA claim in

light of intervening California authority interpreting California’s

public disclosure bar more narrowly than its federal counterpart. 

Doc #347. His status as a proper CFCA relator now established,

Costa now moves for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses pursuant to

California Government Code § 12652(g)(8).

II

Whether Costa is entitled to attorneys’ fees and the

manner in which those fees should be calculated are both governed

by California law. E g, Mangold v California Public Utilities

Com’n, 67 F3d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir 1995). Section 12652(g)(8)

provides: “If the state, political subdivision, or the qui tam

plaintiff prevails in or settles any [CFCA action initiated by the

qui tam plaintiff], the qui tam plaintiff shall receive an amount

for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been

necessarily incurred, plus reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.” 

Although Baker & Taylor does not dispute Costa’s entitlement to

fees, costs and expenses under § 12652(g)(8), Baker & Taylor

challenges the amount of the fee.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily

begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i e, the number of hours reasonably

expended multiplied by the number multiplied by the reasonable

hourly rate.” PLCM Group, Inc v Drexler, 22 Cal 4th 1084, 1095

(2000). The reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing rate for

private attorneys in the community conducting noncontingent

litigation of the same type.” Ketchum v Moses, 24 Cal 4th 1122,

1133 (2001) (original emphasis omitted); see also Serrano v Unruh,

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32 Cal 3d 621, 640 n 31 (1982) (“Serrano IV”) (quoting other

courts’ formulations of reasonable hourly rates as “comparable

salaries earned by private attorneys with similar experience and

expertise in equivalent litigation” and the “hourly amount to which

attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be entitled”

(quotations omitted)).

Costa’s fee request is organized along two matrices. 

First, fees are apportioned across four phases of litigation: 

PHASE DESCRIPTION HOURS X CURRENT STANDARD 

 RATES

One “investigation and drafting,

filing and service of the

complaint and detailed

disclosure statement”

152.5 $74,730.00

Two “investigation and assisting

the government in

prosecution of this action

including as well as

assisting the government

with settlement strategy”

1,683.25 $824,682.50

Three “advocating for Relators in

this case, opposing motions

to dismiss, and negotiating

a relators’ share”

474.35 $211,962.50

Four “taking steps to secure an

award of attorneys’ fees,

expenses and costs,”

including efforts to obtain

clarification from

bankruptcy court regarding

the scope of the stay

353.35 $139,608.75

($59,368.75 in

connection with

bankruptcy)

TOTAL: 2,663.45 $1,250,983.75

Chatfield Decl ¶¶7, 12, 22, 29. 

//

//

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Second, the requested fees are apportioned according to whether

work benefitted the federal claims, the California claims (or

both):

CLAIMS HOURS X CURRENT STANDARD RATES

Federal only 76 $37,412.50

California only 217.75 $106,225.00

($15,137.50 in connection with

negotiating relator’s share) 

Both Federal and

California

2,369.70 $1,125,346.25

TOTAL: 2,663.45 $1,268,983.75

Id ¶30 & n 2.

Before turning to the parties’ arguments, the court notes a

discrepancy in the above totals of precisely $18,000. At the

hearing, counsel explained that digits in one of the addend figures

were inadvertently transposed (specifically, that $842,682.50, not

$824,682.50, in fees were incurred in “Phase Two”). Costa should

address this discrepancy in his next submission to the extent

necessary in light of the modifications prescribed herein.

III

The court first addresses Baker & Taylor’s objections to

the number of hours included in Costa’s fee request.

A

Baker & Taylor contends that Costa is not entitled to

fees for services rendered only in connection with the FCA claim

because of his earlier dismissal. Costa initially reiterated (but

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understandably relegated to a footnote) his earlier failed argument

to the contrary, Doc #349 at 9 n 5, but clarified in his reply that

he does not seek fees for services that benefitted the FCA claim

only, Doc #354 at 10 n 6. 

B

Next, Baker & Taylor argues that Costa is not entitled to

fees for services that benefitted both the FCA and CFCA claims. 

The court disagrees.

“Where the issues are so interrelated that it is

impossible to separate them into claims for which fees are and are

not awardable, no apportionment need be made.” LeVine v Weis, 90

Cal App 4th 201, 214 (2001) (deferring to trial court’s discretion

in setting amount of fees and affirming fee award despite nonapportionment among successful CFCA claim and other claims that

failed early in the litigation). “All expenses incurred on the

common issues qualify for an award.” Akins v Enterprise Rent-a-Car

Co, 79 Cal App 4th 1127, 1133 (2000) (citing Reynolds Metals Co v

Alperson, 25 Cal 3d 124, 129-30 (1979)). There can be little doubt

that questions of liability under the FCA and the CFCA overlapped

significantly. The best Baker & Taylor can muster to the contrary

is that the narrower scope of the CFCA’s public disclosure bar

demonstrates the two statutes are distinct. Doc #354 (Opp) at 11

n 6. But as Costa suggested at the hearing, Baker & Taylor’s

argument proves too much: Prior to the recent divergence of

California and federal law on the public disclosure bar, the CFCA

essentially mirrored the FCA on questions of liability due to its

newness and concomitant lack of interpretive case law. Because the

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FCA claim was sufficiently interrelated to the CFCA claim,

apportionment is not necessary and, in any event, would be a

difficult and impractical undertaking for the court. Accordingly,

Costa will not be denied fees for services that benefitted the CFCA

claim simply because those services also benefitted the FCA claim.

C

Next, Baker & Taylor argues that Costa is not entitled to

reimbursement for fees for services rendered between the denial of

his first motion for reconsideration of his dismissal and the

filing of his second, partially successful, motion for

reconsideration (which, according to Baker & Taylor, amounts to

355.75 hours valued at $143,000, including 12.25 hours billed at

$6,300 attributable only to the FCA claim). Opp at 12 & n 7. 

Within this subset of billed time, Baker & Taylor alternatively

argues that Costa should not be reimbursed for attorney effort

expended in connection with W R Grace’s bankruptcy (which,

according to Baker & Taylor, accounts for 188.25 hours billed at

$67,093.75). Id at 12 & n 8; Doc #353 (Wallach Decl) ¶4 & Ex B.

The court agrees that little, if any, of this time was

“necessarily incurred,” Cal Gov’t Code § 12652(g)(8), to advance

the CFCA claim on its merits. Specifically, fees in connection

with Costa’s motions for reconsideration of his dismissal and a

certificate of appealability of his dismissal, as well as his first

application for fees and costs, were not “necessarily incurred” to

advance the CFCA claim. The same is true for Costa’s efforts

before the bankruptcy court, which occurred after the United States

and the State of California had settled their claims against

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defendants. Rather, the foregoing items were, in essence, directed

at obtaining reinstatement (either on appeal or, as it turned out,

from this court) of relators’ status as nominal parties in order to

(1) increase one or both relators’ bounty and (2) secure an award

of attorneys’ fees and costs provided for by statute. And as

counsel conceded at the hearing, after the United States and the

State of California settled their claims against defendants and

paid Costa a relators’ share, the only purpose of further

litigation was to secure a fee award.

“[A]bsent circumstances rendering the award unjust, fees

recoverable * * * ordinarily include compensation for all hours

reasonably spent * * * to establish the fee claim.” Serrano IV, 32

Cal 2d at 639; see also Ketchum, 24 Cal 4th at 1141. Although the

court is aware of no specific California case law addressing fees

for fee-related litigation in the CFCA context, the court has

little doubt that California courts would apply the general rule

stated above were this case before them. Cf Ketchum, 24 Cal 4th at

1142 (applying without analysis Serrano IV’s principles regarding

fees for fee litigation, which were rendered in the context of Cal

Code Civ Proc § 1021.5, in the context of Cal Code Civ Proc

425.16). Baker & Taylor does not argue the contrary.

Further, fees for fee-related litigation should not be

denied simply because those proceedings are unusually protracted. 

See Serrano IV, 32 Cal 3d at 632, 634-35 (opining that because the

private attorney general doctrine “will often be frustrated,

sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by

lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee

claim,” fees for fee-related litigation should be awarded even

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“[i]n cases where entitlement is vigorously contested” and “the

hours demanded * * * dwarf those spent to establish the claim on

the merits”); cf Graham v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 34 Cal 4th 553,

580-84 (blessing enhancement of fee-related lodestar under

appropriate circumstances). Accordingly, fees for steps taken by

counsel to reinstate Costa’s status as a proper CFCA relator are

not precluded simply because, at the end of the day, that status

entitles Costa to nothing more than attorneys’ fees. Still, the

court concludes that Costa is not entitled to fees for certain

categories of what was essentially fee-related work.

First, the court finds it inappropriate to award fees for

relators’ first motion for attorneys’ fees. Costa was not a proper 

qui tam plaintiff in the eyes of the law at that time. In denying

that motion, the court noted that relators had cited no authority

for the proposition that they were entitled to fees despite their

dismissal. See Doc #329 at 4. It would approach absurdity to

award Costa fees for an earlier, legally unsupported, fee

application that the court denied.

The court also finds that time expended in connection

with relators’ FRCP 54(b) motion was not reasonably spent. In

denying that motion, the court summarily found relators’ request

for immediate appealability to be wholly unjustified given that

federal and state prosecuting authorities’ diligent pursuit of

their respective claims was propelling the case to final judgment. 

Id at 3. (It bears mention that the stay effected by W R Grace’s

bankruptcy petition was not on the horizon at that time.) Under

these circumstances, although Costa’s FRCP 54(b) motion may have

been directed toward reinstatement of his status as a proper

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relator and his corresponding right to attorneys’ fees, it was

wasted effort that need not —— and will not —— be reimbursed. See

Serrano IV, 32 Cal 3d at 635 & n 21.

Turning to Costa’s efforts before the bankruptcy court,

the court concludes that Costa should be awarded fees for some, but

not all, of this time. California courts have acknowledged the

propriety of awarding fees for efforts in collateral proceedings

“that may not have been absolutely necessary to the action in which

fees are awarded but was nonetheless closely related to the action

in which fees are sought and useful to its resolution.” Children’s

Hospital and Medical Ctr v Bonta, 97 Cal App 4th 740, 779-80 (2002)

(relying upon Wallace v Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc, 170

Cal App 3d 836 (1985)). It is doubtful whether this principle

applies in the CFCA context given that § 12652(g)(8) explicitly

permits fee awards only for time “necessarily incurred.” Even

overlooking this wrinkle, the fact that Costa failed to obtain

relief from the bankruptcy stay as to W R Grace belies any

suggestion that counsel’s efforts toward that end were “useful” to

the resolution of any issues in this case, fee-related or

otherwise. On the other hand, Costa’s efforts to obtain

clarification from the bankruptcy court that Baker & Taylor was not

encompassed by the stay appear to have been both successful and

necessary to place this case in a posture that would allow Costa to

pursue the present fee claim. 

The time entries accounting for motion practice before

the bankruptcy court do not indicate whether one of these two

distinct issues dominated counsel’s time. At the hearing, counsel

represented that the majority of the time was dedicated to lifting

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the stay as to Baker & Taylor but could not estimate what share

with any degree of precision. Accordingly, the court finds it

appropriate to allow fees for two-thirds of the time spent in

connection with the bankruptcy proceedings.

D

Finally, Baker & Taylor contends that Costa should be

denied fees for services related to long-dismissed co-relator

Thornburg, which, according to Baker & Taylor, accounts for 41.75

hours valued at $35,612.50. Wallach Decl ¶3 & Ex A. Costa

concedes that time related to moving for reconsideration of

Thornburg’s dismissal should not be billed but contends that most

other entries mentioning Thornburg reflect are properly billed. 

After reviewing the contested entries, the court concludes that the

bill should be adjusted as proposed in the supplemental Chatfield

declaration. See Chatfield Supp Decl ¶13 at 6-7.

IV

Baker & Taylor also challenges the rates at which

counsel’s time is billed.

Representing Costa in this matter are Eric Havian and

Peter Chatfield, both partners in the law firm of Phillips & Cohen

LLP, which has offices in Washington, D C, and San Francisco. 

According to one False Claims Act practitioner, Phillips & Cohen is

“one of the preeminent firms in the country that specializes in

representing qui tam relators. The firm has been a leader in the

field, and enjoys an outstanding reputation.” Doc #357 (Lamprey

Decl) ¶3. Messrs Havian and Chatfield began practicing law in 1981

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and 1987, respectively. Both have impressive academic and

professional credentials and both began specializing in False

Claims Act claims when they joined Phillips & Cohen in 1994. 

Chatfield Decl, Ex 2. Mr Havian’s time is billed at a rate of

$550/hour, Mr Chatfield’s at $475/hour. Id, Ex 1. In support of

the reasonableness of counsel’s billing rates, Costa submitted

declarations of two qui tam practitioners in San Francisco, both of

whom state that the foregoing rates “are reasonable for qui tam

practitioners in the San Francisco Bay Area and commensurate with

[Havian and Chatfield’s] level of skill, experience, background and

reputation.” Lamprey Decl ¶7; Doc #356 (Scott Decl) ¶4. 

When, as in this case, fees are awarded long after the

underlying litigation has run its course, it is both acceptable and

common practice in California to calculate the lodestar based on

current billing rates in lieu of adjusting a lodestar based on

rates prevailing at time services were rendered. See Graham, 34

Cal 4th at 584 (citing Copeland v Marshall, 641 F2d 880, 893 n 23

(DC Cir 1980)); Richard M Pearl, California Attorney Fee Awards §

12.30 (2d ed Supp 2004). Doing so compensates counsel for any

erosion of purchasing power during the delay in receiving payment.

As suggested by Mr Havian’s declaration, however, qui tam

representation is rarely compensated on a non-contingent basis, Doc

#355 (Havian Decl) ¶4. It is therefore fair to conclude that the

going rate for qui tam representation accounts for the risk of nonrecovery. But the lodestar calculation must be based on the

“prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community conducting

noncontingent litigation of the same type.” Ketchum, 24 Cal 4th at

1133 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the rates submitted by

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 (128.68% - 117.5%) / 117.5% = 0.0951489, or about 10%.

14

counsel are an inappropriate starting point for the lodestar

calculation.

Consistent with the prior practice of the undersigned in

calculating lodestars, the court will refer to the Laffey matrix,

“[o]ne well-established objective source for rates that vary by

experience.” In re HPL Technologies, Inc Sec Litig, 366 F Supp 2d

912, 921 (ND Cal 2005) (Walker); see also Laffey v Northwest

Airlines, Inc, 572 F Supp 354 (DDC 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in

part on other grounds, 746 F2d 4 (DC Cir 1984). According to this

benchmark, average hourly rates for attorneys with 20+ years of

experience during the period of June 1, 2005, through May 31, 2006,

is $405/hour. See http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/ 

Civil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_5.html. This figure is, however,

tailored to the District of Columbia, which has a somewhat lower

cost of living than the San Francisco Bay area; the court will

adjust these figures accordingly. The locality pay differentials

within the federal courts —— which, like law firms, employ lawyers

—— can approximate this difference. The Washington–Baltimore area

has a 17.5% locality pay differential; the San Francisco–Oakland–

San Jose area has a 26.68% locality pay differential. See

http://jnet.ao.dcn/Human_Resources/Pay_Tables/2006_Pay_Tables/

Judiciary_Salary_Plan_Pay_Table_2006/Judicial_Salary_Plan.html. 

Thus, adjusting the Laffey matrix figures upward by 10% will yield

rates appropriate for the Bay area.1

 Applying this adjustment and

rounding upward, the court obtains a rate of $450/hour for Mr

Havian. The rough accuracy of this estimate is confirmed by the

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fact that in the recent past, Mr Havian commanded a rate of

$475/hour in a non-contingency matter. Havian Decl ¶4. The court

therefore finds that $450/hour is a reasonable hourly rate for Mr

Havian’s services in this matter.

With regard to Mr Chatfield, the court begins by

observing that according to Phillips & Cohen’s website, and as

confirmed by counsel at the hearing, Mr Chatfield works in

Washington, D C. See http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/CM/Attorneys.

The California Supreme Court has indicated that it is appropriate

to use rates prevailing in the market “where counsel is located.” 

PLCM Group, 22 Cal 4th at 1096. Chatfield has been practicing law

for 19 years. The Laffey matrix indicates a rate of $360/hour for

attorneys with 11-19 years experience. Notably, however, Mr

Chatfield served as a law clerk to a federal judge for one year

following his graduation from law school. In the court’s view,

such experience is a substitute for at least one year of litigation

practice. Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to ascribe

20 years of experience to Mr Chatfield for purposes of the Laffey

matrix, which yields a rate of $405/hour (which need not be

adjusted because Mr Chatfield works in the District of Columbia). 

The court finds this rate to be reasonable for Mr Chatfield’s

services in this case. 

V

Next, the court considers the propriety of a lodestar

enhancement. Costa requests that the lodestar be adjusted upward

by a factor of 1.5; Baker & Taylor contends that no enhancement is

justified.

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As an initial matter, the court observes that although no

case has addressed whether lodestar enhancements are proper under

§ 12652(g)(8), the California Supreme Court presumes that the

lodestar adjustment method applies unless the relevant statutory

fee provision clearly states the contrary, as, for example,

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, which provides that

fees “shall not be increased or decreased by a multiplier based

upon extrinsic circumstances.” Ketchum, 24 Cal 4th at 1135-36. In

the absence of any similar restriction in this statutory context,

the court concludes that the lodestar adjustment approach applies.

“The lodestar adjustment approach * * * allows a court

awarding attorney fees to include a fee enhancement for the

purpose, e g, of compensating the attorney who agreed to undertake

such representation at the risk of nonpayment or delayed payment,

in an amount approaching the market rate for legal services.” Id

at 1136. Other relevant considerations include the novelty and

difficulty of the issues, the skill displayed in presenting them

and the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded

other employment by the attorneys. Serrano v Priest, 20 Cal 3d 25,

49 (1977) (“Serrano III”). But “when determining the appropriate

enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the

extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.” Ketchum,

24 Cal 4th at 1138. 

Two considerations are irrelevant in this case. First,

because the court has utilized current market rates for legal

services in counsels’ respective geographic markets, a lodestar

enhancement to compensate for delay in payment is not justified. 

Second, although Baker & Taylor contends that counsel have already

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been compensated for the risk of nonpayment by whatever they may

have been paid by Costa from his share of the settlement, this does

not appear to be an appropriate basis upon which to deny an

enhancement. See Horsford v Bd of Trustees of Cal State Univ, 132

Cal App 4th 359, 401 (2005) (“[T]he trial court abused its

discretion in requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to look to their

clients, under a contingency fee arrangement, to make up for any

undercompensation arising from the court’s statutory fee award.”).

As noted, compensation for qui tam representation is

typically contingent in nature. Thus, the court concludes that the

originally requested rates of $550/hour and $475/hour account for

the risk of nonpayment. And “for the most part, the difficulty of

[the] legal question[s] and the quality of representation are

already encompassed in the lodestar,” Ketchum, 24 Cal 4th at 1139. 

See Lamprey Decl ¶7 (stating that rates of $550/hour and $475/hour

are “commensurate with [counsels’] level of skill, experience,

background and reputation”); Scott Decl ¶4 (same). Accordingly,

the court finds it appropriate to derive a multiplier from

counsels’ originally requested rates. The court does so by

dividing the sum of counsels’ originally requested rates by the sum

of their Laffey-based rates (effectively averaging each pair of

rates), which yields a multiplier of 1.2.2

Further, applying the multiplier to fee-related work is

appropriate in this case, in view of the fact that much uncertainty

surrounded Costa’s entitlement to fees even after the substantive

objectives of the action were attained. See Graham, 34 Cal 4th at

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583. Relief from the bankruptcy stay as to Baker & Taylor and

reinstatement of Costa as a proper qui tam plaintiff were certainly

not results upon which the undersigned would have bet the farm. 

But because a lower enhancement, if any, is generally appropriate

for fee litigation, see id, and because some of the fee-related

litigation (i e, the present motion) was not clouded by

uncertainty, the court finds it appropriate to apply a lower

multiplier of 1.1 for fee-related litigation.

VI

Costa shall submit a revised fee application consistent

with this order on or before June 9, 2006. Specifically, Costa’s

revised application shall:

(1) exclude time that benefitted the FCA claims only;

(2) exclude time spent in connection with relators’ FRCP

54(b) motion and earlier motion for attorneys’ fees,

costs and expenses;

(3) exclude one-third of time spent by Messrs Havian and

Chatfield, respectively, in connection with the W R Grace

bankruptcy proceedings;

(4) exclude time related to dismissed co-relator Thornburg as

set forth in ¶13 of the supplemental Chatfield

declaration, Doc #359;

(5) bill Mr Havian’s efforts at a rate of $450/hour;

(6) bill Mr Chatfield’s efforts at a rate of $405/hour; and

(7) segregate fees incurred in advancing the substantive

claims from fee-related fees.

//

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Baker & Taylor may file a response not exceeding five pages on or

before June 16, 2006, at which time the matter will be submitted.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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