Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_13-cv-00129/USCOURTS-ared-5_13-cv-00129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

PATRICK LAVELL DAVIS PETITIONER

ADC #104208 

V. NO. 5:13CV00129-SWW-JTR

WENDY KELLEY,1

 Director, RESPONDENT

Arkansas Department of Correction

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition

(“Recommendation”) have been sent to United States District Judge Susan Webber

Wright. Any party may file written objections to this Recommendation. Objections

must be specific and include the factual or legal basis for disagreeing with the

Recommendation. An objection to a factual finding must specifically identify the

finding of fact believed to be wrong and describe the evidence that supports that

belief. 

An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of

1

Wendy Kelley became Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction on

January 13, 2015, and is automatically substituted as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 25(d).

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the United States District Clerk within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation.

If no objections are filed, Judge Wright can adopt this Recommendation without

independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may

also waive any right to appeal questions of fact. 

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Room A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

I. Background

Pending before the Court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed by Petitioner, Patrick Lavell Davis (“Davis”), an Arkansas Department

of Correction prisoner. Doc. 2. Before addressing Davis’s habeas claims, the Court

will review the procedural history of this case in state court. 

On April 30, 2010, a Hot Spring County jury convicted Davis of: (1) two counts

of breaking or entering; (2) one felony county of theft of property; and (3) two

misdemeanor counts of theft of property. He was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to

an aggregate sentence of 480 months of imprisonment. Doc. 8-2; see Doc. 8-16

(“Trial Tr.”). 

On direct appeal, Davis argued that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to

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“correct” certain remarks the prosecutor made in his opening statement; (2) the trial

court should have quashed the entire jury panel because two members of the venire

were victims of the thefts Davis was charged with committing; (3) the trial evidence

was insufficient to prove his identity as the person who committed the offenses; and

(4) the trial evidence was insufficient to prove that the property stolen in one of the

thefts was worth $500 or more. Doc. 8-3. 

On September 28, 2011, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected these

arguments and affirmed Davis’s convictions. Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 561

(“Davis I”). On October 17, 2011, Davis petitioned the Arkansas Court of Appeals for

rehearing, and filed a petition for review with the Arkansas Supreme Court. Docs. 8-7

& 8-8. Both petitions were denied. Docs. 8-9 & 8-10. 

On January 25, 2012, Davis filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2 Doc. 8-12. On March 6, 2012, the trial court

2

In his Rule 37 petition, Davis argued that his constitutional rights were violated

because: (1) his trial attorney failed to object to the prosecutor’s opening statement; (2)

two members of the venire panel were victims of the thefts at issue, and his trial attorney

failed to object; (3) the trial court improperly communicated with the jury during its

deliberations and the notes were not made a part of the record, and his attorney failed to

object; (4) after stopping him for an alleged traffic violation, the police failed to develop

sufficient evidence to charge him with any crimes, and he never received a traffic citation

or arrest warrant; (5) the trial evidence was insufficient regarding the value of the stolen

property, and his attorney did not object or adequately question the witnesses about the

value or condition of the property; (6) he should have been considered eligible for release

after serving 120 days due to his “low level offenses”; (7) his attorney failed to advise

him of a five-year plea offer; (8) the prosecutor mistakenly introduced evidence of

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conducted a hearing on the Rule 37 petition. Davis, his trial attorney, and Davis’s

sister all testified. Doc. 8-17 (“Rule 37 Tr.”). On March 13, 2012, the trial court

entered an order denying Rule 37 relief. Doc. 8-13. Davis appealed. 

On March 14, 2013, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s

denial of Rule 37 relief. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. 118 (“Davis II”).

On April 24, 2013, Davis initiated this habeas action. In his habeas papers, he

argues: (1) his trial attorney was ineffective; (2) the way in which the trial court

responded to a note from the jury, during its deliberations, was improper; (3) his right

to due process was violated; (4) the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination by commenting on his anticipated testimony; (5) the

evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and (6) the trial court

illegally sentenced him as a habitual offender. Docs. 2, 10 & 15. 

Respondent argues that all of Davis’s claims are either procedurally defaulted

or fail on the merits. Doc. 8.

II. Standard of Review Governing § 2254 Habeas Claims

Where a state court has previously adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal

court may grant habeas relief for the same claim only where the state court’s decision

another individual’s prior convictions, and his attorney failed to object or explain the

mistake to the jury; and (9) witnesses brought evidence into the courtroom, and his

attorney failed to object or argue that the chain of custody had been broken. 

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“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”3

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). In

addition, a state court’s findings of fact are presumptively correct, and the habeas

petitioner has the “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1). 

III. Discussion

Davis has asserted six separate habeas claims. For the reasons explained below,

the Court concludes that some of those habeas claims have been procedurally

defaulted, and the remaining claims are without merit. Accordingly, the Court

recommends that all of Davis’s habeas claims be dismissed, with prejudice.

A. Davis’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

3

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it reaches

a conclusion opposite that of the United States Supreme Court on a question of law, or

reaches a decision contrary to the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision involves an

“unreasonable application” of federal law when it identifies the correct legal rule, but

unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407. A state court’s application of clearly

established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable,” not merely “incorrect.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). Section 2254(d) imposes a "highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” which “demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt." Id.

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In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court articulated the

two-part standard for analyzing claims that a criminal defendant's counsel was

constitutionally ineffective: whether the attorney's conduct “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms,” and whether the

“professionally unreasonable” conduct of counsel “prejudiced the defense.”4 Id. at

687-88, 691-92. If a prisoner fails “to establish either Strickland prong [it] is fatal to

an ineffective-assistance claim.” Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 498 (8th Cir.

2011). 

1. Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Communicate the Prosecutor’s FiveYear Plea Offer

Davis alleges that his trial attorney did not tell him that the prosecutor made a

five-year plea offer, eight months before his trial. According to Davis, if he had

known about it, he would have accepted the offer. Doc. 2 at 5, 20-22; Doc. 10 at 3-6.

In support of this claim, Davis has submitted a letter, dated August 8, 2009, from the

prosecutor to his trial attorney. In this letter, the prosecutor offers Davis “5 years

[incarceration in the] department of correction on each charge, concurrent with

restitution to be made to victims.” Doc. 2 at 23.

4

The defendant is prejudiced by the deficient performance if "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different." Id. at 694. 

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Respondent contends that: (1) this claim is procedurally defaulted because

Davis has modified the factual basis for the claim as it was raised and argued in state

court; and (2) alternatively, because the claim was reasonably adjudicated by the state

courts, it is without merit. 

A criminal defense lawyer has a “duty [under the Sixth Amendment] to

communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and

conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,

1408 (2012). However, to demonstrate that an attorney’s failure to communicate a

plea offer resulted in prejudice, as required by Strickland, the defendant must establish

a reasonable probability that: (1) he would have accepted the plea offer had it been

communicated to him; and (2) the trial court would have accepted the plea offer. Id.

at 1410.

According to the transcript of Davis’s state court proceedings, on October 27,

2009, the court conducted a pretrial hearing. Davis, his attorney, and the prosecutor

were all present for this hearing. After Davis’s attorney “request[ed] that the matter

be set [for trial],” the trial court noted for the record that: (1) Davis had rejected a plea

offer from the prosecutor; and (2) Davis was charged with three counts of breaking

or entering and three counts of theft of property (a total of six separate felony

offenses). Trial Tr. at 60-61.

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On April 29, 2010, the day before Davis’s jury trial was to begin, the prosecutor

filed an Amended Information, charging him as a habitual offender, based on four or

more prior felony convictions. Id. at 1-3. 

The next day, shortly before his trial began, Davis told the court that, at the time

of the October 27, 2009 hearing, he was not aware that a five-year plea offer was on

the table.5 Id. at 73. In response, the trial court stated the following: 

Whether [Davis] was or was not aware of [a five-year] offer that was

made ..., the Court [would have] rejected that offer in that these charges

pending before the Court consist of six counts. And also there is an

amended charge of habitual offender. And the Court [would have]

refused to accept the offer by the State. Therefore, that issue was moot,

anyway. 

Id. at 73-74.

At the end of Davis’s trial, the jury convicted Davis on five separate counts and

imposed the following sentences: (1) ten years for each of the two breaking or

entering counts; (2) twenty years for the felony theft of property count; and (3) one

year for each of the misdemeanor theft of property counts. Id. at 315-16. After

5

This assertion by Davis is flatly contradicted by the transcript of the October 27,

2009 pretrial hearing, which Davis personally attended. During that hearing, the trial

court explicitly stated his understanding that Davis had rejected a plea offer from the

prosecution. Thus, the burden was on Davis to ask the judge what he was referring to, if

he did not understand his reference to Davis having “rejected” a plea offer. Neither Davis

nor his attorney asked the court to explain the plea offer Davis had rejected. This strongly

suggests they either understood the court was referring to the five-year plea offer or they

understood that Davis was not going to accept any plea offer. 

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merging the one-year misdemeanor sentences into the longer sentences, the trial court

ruled that, because of Davis’s “substantial amount of prior felonies,” the sentences

should run consecutively, for a total of forty years. Id. In refusing to release Davis

pending his appeal, the court noted that it had known Davis “most of [his] life,” and

had sentenced him in that very courtroom for prior offenses. Id. at 321; see id. at 340-

55 (prior convictions). 

In Davis’s Rule 37 hearing, he argued, inter alia, that his attorney failed to tell

him about the prosecutor’s five-year plea offer. In connection with that allegation,

Davis’s attorney testified that: (1) He did not recall specifically informing Davis that

the written August 2009 plea offer was for five years, but “may have said something

to the effect of, they’re wanting you to do a little time” (Rule 37 Tr. at 61); (2) He was

“push[ing] up to the very end trying to get a probation offer [for Davis]” (id. at 62);

and (3) He was not aware, until “right up there towards the end,” that the trial court

would not accept a five-year offer because Davis was a habitual offender (id. at 61-

62). At the conclusion of the Rule 37 hearing, the trial judge stated: “[W]hen I was

advised that the [plea] offer made to you was five years and that you were a habitual

offender, I rejected that offer.” Id. at 91. 

In Davis’s Rule 37 appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Davis’s

contention that, under Strickland, his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for

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failing to communicate the prosecutor’s August 2009 plea offer: 

Counsel ... testified that the [five-year] offer was withdrawn because,

when appellant’s habitual-offender status became known, the court

advised that the deal would not be accepted by the court. Even if

appellant had been made aware of and accepted the deal with the

prosecution, he would not have been allowed to enter a plea on the terms

offered. The trial court's findings confirmed this fact as credible, and,

based on those factual findings, it was not clearly erroneous for the court

to conclude that appellant had not established prejudice from the alleged

error in failing to communicate the plea offer.

Davis II, supra at 5-6, 8-9. 

In this habeas action, Davis argues that, because he had not yet been charged

as a habitual offender, at the time of the October 27, 2009 hearing, the trial court could

not have used that as the basis for rejecting the five-year plea offer. Similarly, Davis

argues that the Arkansas Supreme Court erred in rejecting his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim because, on October 27, 2009, he had not been charged as a habitual

offender, which deprived the trial judge of his stated legal basis for rejecting the fiveyear plea offer. Finally, Davis also points out that, at the October 27, 2009 hearing,

the trial court did not explicitly reject the five-year offer, but only stated that it had

been rejected by Davis. 

 All of these arguments ignore the trial court’s unequivocal statement, during

Davis’s trial, that it would not have accepted a five-year plea offer on October 27,

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2009, because “these charges pending before the Court consist of six counts.”6 Trial

Tr. at 73. In addition, the court noted that, as of April 29, 2010, Davis had been

charged as a “habitual offender,” which was another reason the court would not now

accept a five-year plea offer. Id. at 73-74. The Arkansas Supreme Court later relied

on these facts to affirm the trial court’s denial of Rule 37 relief. Davis II, supra at 8-9. 

All of the foregoing facts are presumed to be correct, and Davis has not rebutted

any of them. Accordingly, Davis has not shown a reasonable probability that, if he had

agreed to the five-year plea offer, prior to the October 27, 2009 pretrial hearing, the

trial court would have accepted it. Accordingly, Davis was not prejudiced by his trial

counsel’s alleged failure to communicate to him the five-year plea offer.

Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s later rejection of Davis’s ineffectiveassistance claim, due to lack of prejudice, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, the law set forth in Strickland and Frye,

7

 nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Thus, the Court concludes that this

ineffective-assistance claim is without merit.

6

During the April 30, 2010 hearing, the trial court explicitly stated that, even if

Davis “was not aware of [a five-year] offer” at the time of the October 27, 2009 pretrial

hearing, it would not have accepted such a plea offer because Davis had six separate

felony counts pending against him on October 27, 2009. 

7

Although the Arkansas Supreme Court did not cite or rely on Frye, its decision is

nonetheless entitled to § 2254 deference “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result”

contradicts the governing precedent. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

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2. Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Introduce Photos of Davis to Prove His

Innocence

Davis argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to introduce

photos taken the night of the crimes, which would have shown that Davis was wearing

a white shirt and blue jeans. According to Davis, because the victims’ descriptions of

the clothing worn by the perpetrator did not match a white shirt and blue jeans, this

would have “proven [his] innocence on the breaking and entering.” Doc. 2 at 22. 

Respondent correctly argues that this ineffective-assistance claim is

procedurally defaulted because Davis did not make it in his Rule 37 post-conviction

proceedings. See Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 848-50 (8th Cir. 2011) (before

seeking federal habeas relief, petitioner must “fairly present” his claim to the state

courts; federal habeas review of defaulted claims is “barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice”) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750 (1991)).

In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct.

1911 (2013), the Court recognized that, in a narrow range of habeas cases, a petitioner

can rely on his lack of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel, which occurred at

the initial step of post–conviction review, to establish “cause” to excuse his procedural

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default of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The Eighth Circuit has made it

clear that, in § 2254 habeas claims arising in Arkansas, the Martinez exception only

allows a district court to “to find ‘cause,’ thereby excusing a habeas petitioner’s

procedural default ... where (1) the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was

a ‘substantial’ claim; (2) the ‘cause’ consisted of there being ‘no counsel’ or only

‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; and (3) the state

collateral review proceeding was the ‘initial’ review proceeding with respect to the

‘ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.’” Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 834

(8th Cir. 2014); see Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 853 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Davis appears to have satisfied the second and third elements of Dansby

because he lacked counsel during the state post-conviction proceeding, and it was the

“initial” proceeding in which he could have raised this ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. However, to invoke the Martinez exception, Davis must also satisfy the

first element of Dansby, which requires him to establish that his “underlying

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one.”8 Martinez, 132 S.

Ct. at 1318; Dansby, 766 F.3d at 834. 

8

In Martinez, the Court held that, for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to

be “substantial,” the habeas petitioner must demonstrate that his claim: (1) has “some

merit”; and (2) is supported by at least some facts. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. If a

habeas petitioner is unable to satisfy either part of this “substantiality test,” his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is procedurally defaulted and cannot be considered by a

federal court in a § 2254 habeas action.

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In Davis’s direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals expressly determined

that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove that Davis was “the person who

committed the offenses”:

[T]here was evidence that one of the victims made a 911 call in July

2009 reporting that a black man in a light-colored t-shirt broke into a car

on the caller's driveway and was driving a dark-colored vehicle. A

detective was dispatched and soon thereafter apprehended appellant in

the vicinity—so close, in fact, that the 911 caller was able to see the

officer stop appellant's vehicle atop a hill. Appellant and his car matched

the description given by the caller, and appellant's car contained property

described in detail by the original caller and members of two other

victimized families living nearby as that which had been stolen from

their three vehicles. No one else was in or near appellant's car when he

was apprehended. We hold that this is substantial evidence of appellant's

identity.

Davis I, supra at 2. 

According to the trial transcript, one of the witnesses testified that she saw a tall

black man wearing “a cream-colored shirt with designs on there and blue jeans.” Trial

Tr. at 164. Another witness, who made the 911 call, testified that the man she saw was

wearing a “light-colored shirt.” Id. at 190, 197, 200. Importantly, the officer who

apprehended Davis testified that Davis was wearing blue jeans that were “a darker

color,” and a white shirt with “a design on the front.” Id. at 223-24. 

In cross-examining the eyewitnesses, Davis’s attorney carefully questioned

them about their inability to see the man’s face or provide more details about his

appearance. Id. at 174-76, 184-87, 197-203. In his closing argument, Davis’s attorney

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argued that the evidence was insufficient to identify Davis as the perpetrator. Id. at

272-73.

In light of the numerous witnesses who described the perpetrator as wearing a

light-colored shirt and blue jeans, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ determination

that this testimony was sufficient to identify Davis as the perpetrator, Davis has not

established a reasonable probability that, if his trial attorney had introduced a photo

of him wearing a white shirt and blue jeans, the outcome of his criminal proceedings

would have been different. Because this ineffective-assistance claim has no merit

under Strickland, it is not a “substantial” claim that excuses Davis’s procedural default

under the Martinez exception.9

Accordingly, Davis has procedurally defaulted this ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim, and the Court is barred from considering its merits. 

3. Counsel’s Alleged Inadequate Cross-Examination of Witnesses to

Establish the Value of the Stolen Property

Davis argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for inadequately crossexamining one of the victims, Joe Thompson, regarding the value of his stolen

9

Davis’s conclusory assertion that the photos would have proven his “innocence”

falls far short of the high evidentiary standard required by the United States Supreme

Court to meet the demanding “fundamental miscarriage of justice” or “actual innocence”

exception to the cause-prejudice requirement. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-31

(1995) (exception requires habeas petitioner to come forward with new reliable evidence

not presented at trial and to show, in light of the new evidence, “that it is more likely than

not that ‘no reasonable juror’ would have convicted him”). 

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property (four pool cues and a cue bag). According to Davis, his attorney should have

asked for a receipt or other supporting documentation to aid the jury in determining

market value. Doc. 2 at 22; Doc. 10 at 14. Respondent contends that the state courts

reasonably adjudicated this claim. 

In Davis’s direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals expressly determined

that Thompson’s valuation testimony was sufficient to support the felony theft of

property conviction: 

At the time of the offense, theft of property was a Class C felony

if the value of the property was less than $2500 but more than $500. Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(A) (Repl. 2006). Value is the market value

of the property at the time and place of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-

36-101(12)(A)(i) (Repl. 2006). The original cost of property is one factor

that may be considered by the jury in determining market value, as long

as it is not too remote in time and relevance. Reed v. State, 353 Ark. 22,

109 S.W.3d 665 (2003). Here, there was testimony by one of the victims

that four pool cues and a cue bag were taken from his truck. He stated

that he was a retiree and that he shot pool every night at the Moose

Lodge to practice for tournaments. He testified that two of the cues,

worth $75 apiece, were “a couple of years old.” He stated that the other

two cues, worth $170 and $140, had been purchased within the last nine

months and were “pretty close to brand new” at the time of the theft. He

further testified that the cue bag, which was worth $235, was purchased

at the same time as the more expensive cues. Given that the latter

purchases were so recent, and considering that the Arkansas Supreme

Court has held that there was substantial evidence from which a jury

could have found the stolen property to be worth more than $35 where

the owner of four stolen trophies described them as “new” and testified

that they would cost around $10 each, Williams v. State, 252 Ark. 1289,

482 S.W.2d 810 (1972), we hold that this testimony is substantial

evidence that the stolen property was worth more than $500. 

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Davis I, supra at 2-3 (footnote omitted); see also Trial Tr. at 240-42.

According to the trial transcript, Davis’s attorney cross-examined Thompson

about the age of the pool cues and the bag. Trial Tr. at 243-44. In moving for a

directed verdict, Davis’s attorney argued that the proof of value regarding

Thompson’s property was “insufficient” because two of the pool cues were two years

old “and the market value today would be far less than that” due to “[s]imple wear and

tear.” Id. at 253-54. The trial court found these arguments to be “unpersuasive.” Id.

at 255. 

In Davis’s Rule 37 petition, he argued that the valuation evidence was

insufficient and that his attorney failed to adequately question the witnesses about the

market value or condition of the allegedly stolen property. Doc. 8-12 at 3-4. The trial

court rejected those claims, stating: (1) substantial evidence was submitted regarding

property value and “the jury made a determination concerning the felony range of a

theft of property through the testimony of the property owners”; (2) “[i]t was very

clear that the jury had sufficient facts as to market value”; (3) “no proof was

presented” to support Davis’s inadequate cross-examination argument; and (4)

valuations of the pool cues were “fact issues” for the jury to determine. Doc. 8-13 at

1-2. The trial court also reasonably concluded that this ineffective-assistance claim

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was without merit.10

Thus, Davis failed to establish a reasonable probability that, if counsel had

asked additional or different questions on cross-examination about the value of

Thompson’s stolen property, the outcome of Davis’s criminal proceedings would have

been different. Under these circumstances, the state court’s adjudication of this

ineffective-assistance claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the

governing standard in Strickland, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts. Accordingly, this ineffective-assistance claim is without merit. 

4. Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Adequately Challenge the Habitual

Offender Charge 

Davis argues that his trial attorney: (1) “never even read” the “false, materially

untrue” April 29, 2010 Amended Information; (2) allowed the Amended Information

to be read to the jury without making an objection; and (3) could have “better

challenged” the habitual offender charge contained in the Amended Information. Doc.

2 at 14, 22, 30; Doc. 10 at 15. Respondent contends that, because the state courts

10As previously noted, Davis’s trial attorney undermined the victim’s testimony on

cross-examination, argued that the valuation evidence was inadequate, and preserved the

issue for appeal. In Davis’s direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals determined that

the victim’s testimony about the value of his property was sufficient, in and of itself, to

support Davis’s conviction for felony theft of property. Davis failed to produce any proof

in his state court proceedings that the value of the stolen items differed from Thompson’s

testimony. Section 2254(d)'s deferential standard applies to adjudications of both trial and

appellate state courts. Worthington, 631 F.3d at 497.

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reasonably adjudicated this claim, it is without merit.11

According to the record, the prosecuting attorney filed an Amended Information

on April 29, 2010, alleging that Davis was a habitual offender with ten prior felony

convictions from Pike, Nevada, Hempstead and Howard Counties. Trial Tr. at 9. It is

undisputed that none of the convictions cited in the Amended Information belonged

to Davis. 

On April 30, 2010, Davis’s trial began. When the prosecutor realized that none

of the ten felony convictions described in the Amended Information belonged to

Davis, he immediately introduced into evidence the six prior felony convictions, from

Garland and Hot Spring Counties, that did belong to Davis. Id. at 288-89, 340-55.

The prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, also recited those six convictions “for the

record.” Id. at 288. Davis’s attorney did not object to introduction of the six

convictions because he had reviewed them and the six convictions were all “certified

and legitimate.” Id. 

 Later, in the sentencing phase of Davis’s trial, the trial court mistakenly began

to read to the jury the felony convictions listed in the Amended Information. The

11Based on the record, most of the facts cited by Davis to support this argument are

either misstated or simply untrue.

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prosecutor immediately interjected “those are not the right instructions.”12 Id. at 289.

In a bench conference, the prosecutor stated that the ten convictions cited in the

Amended Information were “not correct,” but that Davis’s six felony convictions

which had already been admitted into evidence were “correct.” Id. at 289-90.

Davis’s attorney objected to the jury being instructed on the habitual offender

allegation because Davis had not been convicted of any of the offenses alleged in the

Amended Information. Id. at 290. The trial court overruled the objection on the

ground that Davis’s six actual prior felony convictions had already been admitted into

evidence. Id. at 290-91. The court also granted, over Davis’s attorney’s objection, the

prosecutor’s request to conform the habitual offender charge in the Amended

Information to the evidence in the record which established Davis’s six prior felony

convictions. Id. at 291. Consistent with that ruling, the trial court instructed the jury

that Davis was a habitual offender with four or more prior felony convictions and

specifically informed the jury of Davis’s six prior felony convictions from Garland

and Hot Spring Counties. Id. at 292-94. As indicated earlier, Davis’s attorney had

previously stipulated that those six prior felonies were “certified and legitimate,” i.e.,

he admitted Davis had been convicted of those six felonies. Id. at 288.

12The trial court read only three of the convictions from the Amended Information

before the prosecutor interrupted. Id. at 289.

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In his Rule 37 petition, Davis argued that he was denied due process when his

attorney: (1) failed to object to the trial court mistakenly referencing the three felony

convictions that did not belong to him; and (2) failed to explain this mistake to the

jury in his closing argument. Doc. 8-12 at 4. The trial court rejected this claim,

concluding: “[Davis] was charged as a habitual offender and he was a habitual

offender in all aspects. The pen pack confirmed his status as a habitual offender.

[Davis] was not prejudiced and he has failed to prove he has suffered any actual or

specific prejudice by the finding of the jury.” Doc. 8-13 at 2.

In denying Davis’s Rule 37 appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court also concluded

that he had not established any prejudice arising from his trial attorney’s performance

in dealing with the habitual-offender evidence: 

Counsel opposed amendment of the information and introduction of the

accurate habitual-offender evidence, but appellant provided no

alternative basis on which counsel might have more successfully

challenged the amendment of the information. It was obvious from

appellant’s testimony in the sentencing phase of the trial that he was

familiar with the judgments that were introduced as evidence, and he

provided no evidence that might have better challenged the evidence that

was actually introduced at trial. Again, appellant established no prejudice

in that he did not demonstrate that counsel might have successfully

opposed ... the introduction of the habitual-offender evidence.

Davis II, supra at 6-7. 

The Arkansas Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Davis was not

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prejudiced by the way in which his trial attorney dealt with the habitual-offender

charge and the six prior felony convictions upon which it was based. Contrary to

Davis’s argument, his attorney made two objections: one to the habitual offender

charge and one to the evidence of the felony convictions that supported it. The trial

court overruled both of those objections, after explaining why neither had any merit.

It is undisputed that Davis was a habitual offender and that the only felony

convictions introduced into evidence were the six which properly belonged to him.

While the trial did read three convictions from the Amended Information that did not

belong to Davis, the prosecutor interrupted the court and made a clear statement, in

the presence of the jury, that those three convictions were erroneous and should not

be considered by the jury. The trial court then properly instructed the jury to consider

only Davis’s six prior convictions, which had earlier been admitted into evidence.

Davis’s attorney stipulated to the validity of those six prior felony convictions, and

Davis has never presented any alternative facts or arguments suggesting how his

attorney could have made a successful challenge to those convictions.

Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication of this ineffective-assistance

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland, nor was it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record.

Accordingly, this ineffective-assistance claim is without merit.

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5. Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Object to the Way the Court

Responded to a Note from the Jury

Finally, Davis argues that his trial attorney was “clearly ineffective” for failing

to object to the way the court responded to a note from the jury while it was

deliberating his guilt or innocence. According to Davis, this violated Ark. Code Ann.

§ 16-89-125(e).13 Doc. 2 at 7, 22, 26; Doc. 10 at 7. 

About an hour after the jury began deliberating Davis’s guilt or innocence, it

sent the judge the following note: “Could he [Davis] be guilty of theft of property

without being guilty of breaking or entering to obtain that property?” Trial Tr. at 279-

80. In an in-chambers hearing, with Davis, Davis’s attorney and the prosecutor all

present, the court read the jury’s note aloud. After discussing it with counsel, the

judge told the bailiff to tell the jury that the court “cannot legally answer the

question.” Id. According to Davis, the judge also wrote his response to that question

on the note he received from the jury. Doc. 2, at 7. 

13In pertinent part, this statute provides the following: 

After the jury retires for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between

them as to any part of the evidence or if they desire to be informed on a

point of law, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon

their being brought into court, the information required must be given in the

presence of or after notice to the counsel of the parties.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e). Noncompliance with this statutory provision “gives rise

to a presumption of prejudice, and the State bears the burden of overcoming that

presumption.” Bledsoe v. State, 39 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Ark. 2001).

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Although the note was not made a part of the record, the in-chambers hearing

was transcribed and is part of the official record. Trial Tr. at 279-81. Davis admits that

he and his attorney were present for the in-chambers hearing.

Later, during the sentencing phase of Davis’s trial, the bailiff delivered another

note from the jury. After an in-chambers hearing, with Davis, his attorney, and the

prosecutor all present, the court responded in writing to the jury’s question and told

the bailiff to deliver the note to the jury. Id. at 313-14. The jury was then called back

into the courtroom, where the court read into the record the jury’s question and the

court’s response, and made the jury’s note and the court’s written response an exhibit

to the record. Id. at 314-15, 360-61. 

In his Rule 37 petition, Davis argued that his trial attorney was ineffective for

“allowing unrecorded communication with a jury that was in the midst of reaching a

verdict of guilt and during sentencing.” He also argued that this “raised [a]

presumption of prejudice.” Doc. 8-12 at 2-3. The trial court ruled that it “did not hear

any testimony from [Davis] on that issue and the argument has no merit.” Doc. 8-13

at 2. 

In Davis’s appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial

of Rule 37 relief. In doing so, the Court held that there was “sufficient compliance”

with § 16-89-125(e) and Davis had not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the

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trial court’s handling of the jury’s question. In reaching this decision, the Court only

discussed the jury’s note submitted during the sentencing phase of Davis’s trial. Davis

II, supra at 7-8. 

Davis now argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the

way the court responded to the jury’s first note, which was submitted during the guilt

or innocence phase of his trial. It bears repeating that the trial court’s allegedly

objectionable response to the jury’s note stated only that: “[the court] cannot legally

answer the [jury’s] question.” Davis has admitted that, after the trial court stated its

proposed response to the jury’s first question, the judge wrote that response on the

jury’s note and presumably gave it to the bailiff to return to the jury. While the jury’s

first note and the judge’s written response were not made a part of the record, there

is nothing in the record to suggest that anything was communicated to the jury, in

response to its question, that was improper. Thus, it is pure speculation for Davis to

argue that the bailiff “might not [have] hear[d] correctly everything [the judge said]”

(emphasis added), and “possibly gave a bias[ed] response” (emphasis added) to the

jury. Doc. 2 at 26. 

Davis’s argument also fails to mention that the trial court conducted an inchambers hearing to address the jury’s question, with Davis, his attorney, and the

prosecutor present, along with a court reporter who transcribed the entire proceeding.

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No one made any objection to the way the court responded to the jury’s note, or

suggested that the note be read and responded to in the presence of the jury, or be

marked as an exhibit so it could be made part of the record. 

Finally, Davis contends that, because the trial court did not comply with Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e), in its response to the jury’s first question, he is entitled to

a presumption of prejudice, which the state has failed to rebut.

Both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals have held

that strict compliance with § 16-89-125(e) may be waived where the record reflects

the substance of the trial court’s written communication with the jury, the defendant

agreed to the language in the communication, and the court never had any direct

contact with the jury during deliberation. Anderson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 592, 598

(Ark. 2003) (state rebutted the presumption of prejudice where the trial court

responded in writing to a written question from the jury with an answer that both the

state and defendant agreed was the correct response, the substance of the court’s

communication was reflected in the record, defendant never objected to that

substance, and the court never had any contact with the jury during deliberations);

Clark v. State, 223 S.W.3d 66, 69-71 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (no prejudice where the

answers to the jury’s questions were reduced to writing with the agreement of defense

counsel, defendant did not contend there was anything improper about the substance

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of the court’s response, the questions and answers were made part of the record, there

was no direct communication between the judge and the jury, and there was no

evidence of any communication between the bailiff and the jury when the bailiff

delivered the note). 

In Clark, the Court explicitly rejected an argument, virtually identical to

Davis’s, that the defendant was prejudiced because there was no record of how the

bailiff communicated with the jury regarding the judge’s response to its question.

Because nothing in the record reflected any improper communications between the

bailiff and the jury, the Court concluded that the state was not required to rebut “a

speculative scenario with no basis in the record.” Clark, 223 S.W.3d at 70-71. 

Here, the record reflects that, in the presence of Davis, his attorney and the

prosecutor, the trial judge read the jury’s note aloud, consulted with the attorneys

regarding how to respond, stated what the court’s response would be, wrote his

response to the jury’s question on the jury’s note, and instructed the bailiff to convey

the message to the jury. The court’s response advised the jury only that it “cannot

legally answer the [jury’s] question.” Davis presented no evidence that the bailiff did

anything more than provide the jury with the court’s response to its question. As the

Court made clear in Clark, § 16-89-125(e) does not require the state to rebut a

“speculative scenario with no basis in the record.” Id.

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Thus, Davis has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, if his trial

counsel had objected and successfully gotten the judge to respond to the jury’s first

question in open court, the verdict would have been different. Thus, the state court’s

adjudication of this ineffective-assistance claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, the governing standard set forth in Strickland, nor was

it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, this ineffectiveassistance claim is without merit. 

B. Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Comply with Ark. Code Ann. § 16-

89-125(e) in Responding to the Jury’s First Note

Davis also asserts a substantive claim that the way in which the trial court

responded to the jury’s first note, during its deliberations on Davis’s guilt or

innocence, constituted a clear violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e), and

justified a new trial. Doc. 2 at 6-7, 26; Doc. 10 at 7-8, 11. Respondent contends this

claim challenges only the final resolution of an issue of state law, which is not

cognizable in a § 2254 habeas action. 

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available to correct errors of state law.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). As explained earlier, this Court is limited,

under § 2254(d), to deciding whether a state-court decision is “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court.” Although Davis cites, without discussion, one Seventh Circuit Court

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of Appeals case which is not on point,14 all of his substantive legal arguments are

based on the trial court’s alleged violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e).

 Furthermore, even if Davis’s arguments were somehow construed to raise a

federal constitutional claim, it would fail because: (1) Davis clearly was not

prejudiced by the trial court’s response to the jury’s first note, (see Stewart v. Nix, 972

F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1992) (a “clear indication of lack of prejudice” may overcome

the presumption of prejudice created by “[c]ommunication between judge and jury in

the absence of and without notice to the defendant” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth

Amendment)); and (2) there was nothing improper about the way the court responded

to that note. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that this claim is not cognizable in a § 2254

action, and, even if it could be construed to allege a substantive Fifth or Sixth

Amendment claim, it is without merit because Davis was in no way prejudiced by the

trial court’s response to the jury’s first note. 

C. Davis’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

1. Alleged Error in the Jury Instructions Given During the Sentencing

Phase of Davis’s Trial

Davis argues that, during the sentencing phase of his trial, the court violated his

14United States v. Neff, 10 F.3d 1321 (7th Cir. 1993). Doc. 10, at 8.

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due process rights by instructing the jury on the length of time he would be required

to serve in the ADC, before he would become eligible for transfer to the Department

of Community Corrections and then paroled from prison. According to Davis,

communicating such information to the jury is “alien to [a] judicial proceeding since

it is handled entirely by another department of government, the executive.” Doc. 2 at

8, 27; see Trial Tr. at 291-92. 

Respondent contends that: (1) this claim is procedurally defaulted because

Davis never raised it in state court; and (2) to excuse his default, Davis cannot rely on

the failure of his trial attorney to raise and preserve this claim, because any such

ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted.15

In Davis’s direct appeal and in his Rule 37 proceedings, he never raised any due

process claims based on the trial court’s instructions to the jury, during the sentencing

phase of his trial, about his transfer eligibility date, or a claim that his trial attorney

was ineffective for failing to object to those instructions. Thus, both claims are

procedurally defaulted. 

Finally, Davis’s failure to raise such an ineffective-assistance-of -counsel claim

in his Rule 37 proceedings does not constitute “cause” to excuse default under the

15Davis alleges that his new attorney, who handled his direct appeal, could not

raise this claim because his trial attorney had not objected and preserved the error for

appeal. Doc. 2 at 8. 

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Martinez exception because any such claim clearly is not “substantial.” Counsel is not

ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.

111, 123 (2009). Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(a) explicitly permits a court, during the

sentencing phase of a trial, to instruct the jury about the “law applicable to parole,

meritorious good time, or transfer.” In addition, the Arkansas Supreme Court has

expressly held that this statute does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers

or usurp the executive department’s power and authority to decide when an individual

defendant should be released. Teague v. State, 946 S.W.2d 670, 672-73 (Ark. 1997).

Thus, any effort by Davis’s trial attorney to object to this instruction clearly would

have been rejected. 

Accordingly, because Davis has procedurally defaulted this due process claim,

the Court is barred from considering its merits.

2. Trial Court’s Alleged Error in Denying Davis’s Motion to Quash the

Venire

Davis argues that his right to due process was violated because two victims of

his crimes were members of the venire panel or “jury pool” from which his jury panel

was called. He argues that the circumstances were “so fraught with [the] possibility

of bias” that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. Doc. 2 at 8, 27; Doc. 10

at 8. 

Respondent contends that: (1) this claim is procedurally defaulted because

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Davis raised it in state court as a Sixth Amendment claim, rather than a due process

claim; and (2) alternatively, the claim was reasonably adjudicated by the state courts. 

According to the transcript of Davis’s trial, his attorney objected, before jury

selection began, because the jury pool contained two of the prosecution’s witnesses,

Danny Hedges and Treshawna Bailey, both of whom were victims of the crimes for

which Davis was charged. Trial Tr. at 64-65. The prosecutor responded that Hedges

and Bailey were not on the jury panel for that day and, to his knowledge, the only time

the entire jury pool had been together was for jury orientation. Thus, the prosecutor

argued there was no “possibility of any tainting whatsoever.” Id. at 65. 

The trial court brought Hedges and Bailey into chambers for questioning.

Hedges provided the following sworn testimony: (1) He had not discussed, with any

members of the jury pool, “an incident whereupon [he was] involved as a victim of

a crime,” and had never mentioned Davis to any member of the jury pool; (2) He had

not served on any previous juries selected from the jury pool; (3) His only contact

with the pool was during orientation and “right now”; and (4) He knew only two other

members of the jury pool, one of whom had been a co-worker, but, “to [his]

knowledge,” he had not discussed “this matter” with anyone in the jury pool. Id. at 66-

68, 77.

Bailey testified similarly to Hedges. She stated that she had been to jury

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orientation and had appeared to serve two other times, but had not been selected as a

juror. She stated that she had not talked to any other members of the jury pool about

her being the victim of a crime involving Davis. She said she felt “absolutely

comfortable” that no one on the panel had knowledge of her being a victim of the

crimes that were about to be tried. Finally, she stated that, although she was related

to Davis, she was not related to, and did not know, anyone else on the jury panel. Id.

at 75-77. 

After admonishing Hedges and Bailey not to speak to any members of the jury

pool, the trial court denied Davis’s motion to quash the venire panel. He also ruled

that: (1) Hedges and Bailey would not be allowed to serve on the jury panel for that

day; (2) they had “in no way tainted this [venire] panel”; and (3) Davis’s right to a

“fair and proper decision” had not been jeopardized by Hedges and Bailey being

members of the venire. Id. at 77-79. 

During voir dire, Hedges and Bailey were identified as witnesses. Id. at 113.

The trial court instructed the jury not to discuss the case with anyone and not to talk

to any of the “attorneys, parties, or witnesses about anything.” Id. at 135, 146-47.

Both Hedges and Bailey later testified. Id. at 188-204, 236-39. 

On direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected Davis’s argument that

the trial court erred in failing to quash the venire panel: 

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Essentially, he argues that, even though the trial judge ascertained that

these veniremen had not served on any trial during the term and had not

discussed their experience with any other members of the venire,

including the jurors who ultimately served on this case, the panel was

irredeemably tainted because an appearance of impropriety remained.

This is not the law. The trial judge’s duty is to protect the jury from

contamination, and the question for us to decide is whether his actions

constituted an abuse of discretion. Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238, 85

S.W.3d 893 (2002). Bias will not be presumed, nor will we presume that

a jury was incapable of following the trial court’s instructions. Id. On

this record, we conclude that the trial court’s actions were proper and

sufficient. 

Davis I, supra at 4. 

In his Rule 37 petition, Davis argued that he was denied a fair trial and that his

attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the venire panel because Hedges and

Bailey were members of it and they were also witnesses for the prosecution in his

trial. Doc. 8-12 at 2. In affirming the trial court’s denial of Rule 37 relief, the

Arkansas Supreme Court noted that Davis failed “to offer any evidence of bias by a

juror.” Davis II, supra at 7. The Court went on to hold that, apart from his ineffectiveassistance claim, Davis’s allegations about the jury panel were not sufficient to

support “independent claims of fundamental error” by the trial court because he had

failed to demonstrate prejudice: 

Where the merits of a claim have been previously addressed and

adjudicated, the conclusion of the court in one opinion becomes the law

of the case on subsequent proceedings on the same cause, and the matter

is res judicata. Bliss v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 315 (per curiam). The court of

appeals addressed the issue of whether the jury panel had been tainted

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and found no error in the court’s refusing to quash the entire jury panel.

Davis, 2011 Ark. App. 561, at 34. As noted, appellant did not offer any

additional evidence of bias to support a claim of prejudice.

Id. at 9-10 & n.1. 

This Court is bound by the state courts’ presumptively correct factual findings

that Hedges and Bailey had not discussed their experiences with any members of the

venire, or otherwise tainted the jury panel from which Davis’s jury was selected. Both

the Arkansas Court of Appeals and the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted these

factual findings by the trial court. See Williams v. Norris, 612 F.3d 941, 954 (8th Cir.

2010) (“Whether a juror is biased against the defendant is a question of fact, and we

will defer to the state court’s finding ‘if it is fairly supported by the record.’”). 

Finally, Davis has not identified any United States Supreme Court case

requiring that bias be imputed to the entire venire panel, under circumstances similar

to those involved in this case. Similarly, he has not pointed to any evidence of bias

resulting from Hedges and Bailey having been members only of the venire, but not

members of the jury panel from which Davis’s jury was selected.

Thus, Davis has not demonstrated that the state courts’ adjudication of this

claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record. 

Accordingly, this due process claim is without merit.

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3. Prosecution’s Alleged Failure to Arrest or Formally Charge Davis

Finally, Davis argues that he was denied due process because he was never: (1)

arrested; (2) served with an arrest warrant; or (3) “formally charged.” Doc. 2 at 8, 27-

28; Doc. 10 at 9. Respondent contends that: (1) this claim is procedurally defaulted

because Davis should have raised it at trial and on direct appeal; and (2) Davis cannot

base an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on his trial attorney’s failure to

challenge the charging documents because any such claim is itself procedurally

defaulted. 

Davis did not properly raise this due process claim or any ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim arising from his trial attorney’s failure to assert it in any

of his state court proceedings. Thus, both of these claims are now procedurally

defaulted.

Because this ineffective-of-assistance-of-counsel claim clearly is not

“substantial,” Davis’s failure to raise it in his Rule 37 petition cannot constitute

“cause” to excuse default under Martinez. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that

any irregularities in an arrest or pretrial detention, or deficiencies in a felony

information, do not invalidate a subsequent conviction. Smith v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 18

at 3. Accord United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

U.S. 103, 119 (1975). Thus, even if Davis’s trial counsel had challenged the alleged

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procedural deficiencies surrounding the way charges were brought against Davis,

those arguments would have been summarily rejected by the trial court and affirmed

on appeal. 

Furthermore, the record in this case in no way supports Davis’s claim.

According to the record: (1) Davis was arrested at “0114" on July 8, 2009, and

released on bond the same day, Trial Tr. at 15 (bail bond); (2) Det. Brian Johnson

executed a probable cause affidavit on July 9, 2009, setting forth the underlying facts

and evidence, id. at 10-12; (3) Bench Warrant No. 2009-261 was issued in Davis’s

criminal case on July 16, 2009, and was “served ... ret[urned] & filed” on August 3,

2009, id. at 13; (4) a “Notice of Arraignment” was served on Davis on August 3,

2009, notifying him that he had been charged with breaking or entering and theft of

property, id. at 14; (5) at a hearing on October 27, 2009, at which Davis was present,

the trial court stated that Davis was charged with three counts of breaking and entering

and three counts of theft of property, id. at 60-61; and (6) an Amended Information

was filed on April 29, 2010, charging Davis with breaking or entering, theft of

property, and being a habitual offender, id. at 7-9.

16

During his Rule 37 hearing, Davis’s trial counsel testified that he “could very

well” have accepted service of the arrest warrant on Davis’s behalf at the police

16The record does not contain the original information. 

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department because that “happens routinely.” Rule 37 Tr. at 75-76. He also testified

that Davis was “formally charged.” When Davis stated that he never saw an

information, his trial counsel responded: “You saw a copy of your case file, which

contains the warrant, bench warrant and your felony information.” Id. at 76. 

Accordingly, because Davis has procedurally defaulted this claim, the Court is

barred from considering its merits. Furthermore, even if the claim was not

procedurally defaulted, the constitutional underpinnings of the claim find no support

whatsoever from the undisputed facts in the record. 

D. Alleged Violation of Davis’s Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Claim

The prosecutor, in his opening statement, said: “Now, we anticipate the defense

will say, ‘Wasn’t me. Wasn’t Mr. Davis.’ There is a term that we use for that and it’s

called the ‘Soddi’ defense, S-O-D-D-I, ‘some other dude did it.’” Trial Tr. at 156.

Davis argues that these remarks suggested he was going to testify, drawing attention

to his decision not to do so, and violating his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Doc. 2 at 10; Doc. 10 at 10. Respondent contends that this claim was

reasonably adjudicated by the state courts. 

In Davis’s direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that, in the

absence of an objection, the trial court was not required to intervene on its own motion

to correct this alleged error by the prosecutor. Davis I, supra at 5. Nevertheless, the

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Court proceeded to analyze the merits of the underlying Fifth Amendment claim: 

When it is alleged that a prosecutor has made an improper comment on

a defendant's failure to testify, we first determine whether the statement

itself is in fact a comment, overt or veiled, on the defendant's failure to

testify. Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000). Should we

determine that the prosecutor did refer to the defendant's choice not to

testify, we would then determine whether it can be shown beyond a

reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. ...

We think that, although the prosecutor was edging toward territory

that is best avoided, there is a distinct difference between a statement

anticipating that the defense will rely on failure to prove identity and a

statement anticipating that the defendant will actually testify that he was

not the perpetrator. Here, we cannot say that the statement constituted an

error so egregious and prejudicial as to require the trial judge to

intervene on his own motion.

Id. at 5-6. 

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), the Court held that the Fifth

Amendment forbids direct comments by a prosecutor on a defendant’s failure to

testify. However, the Court has “never clearly established that a prosecutor may not

comment on the evidence in a way that indirectly refers to the defendant’s silence.”

Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 460 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 58

(2013). Furthermore, even if a Griffin violation is established, the error does not

warrant habeas relief unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2002)

(citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

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The Arkansas Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Davis’s Fifth Amendment

claim was not contrary to the governing federal law.17 Moreover, in applying the law

to the facts of Davis’s case, the Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that: (1) the

prosecutor’s comment was simply a reference to Davis’s anticipated defense, rather

than an attempt to draw attention to his anticipated testimony or lack of testimony;18

and (2) Davis had not made a sufficient showing of prejudice from the comment. See

Edwards, 688 F.3d at 459-60 (prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s failure to express

remorse was an “indirect comment” on his silence, which was not a violation of

clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)); Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839,

848 (8th Cir. 2002) (prosecutor’s comment drawing the jury’s attention to the absence

of alibi witnesses was “fair comment on the weakness of the defense and was not a

violation of [the defendant’s] right to remain silent”); Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d

17The Court relied on Arkansas cases which, in turn, relied on Griffin v. California.

Davis I, supra at 5-6 (citing Jones, 10 S.W.3d at 456, citing Gates v. State, 2 S.W.3d 40,

44-45 (Ark. 1999), citing Griffin)).

18The prosecutor accurately characterized the nature of Davis’s defense, as

presented through: (1) eyewitness testimony that they were unable to positively identify

the perpetrator or determine if another person was present; (2) testimony that Davis told

officers “somebody else had been with him,” that one officer initially thought someone

ran away from Davis’s vehicle into the woods, and that the officers gave some credence

to Davis’s statement by searching the area; (3) testimony from the officers that they did

not interview Davis or try to obtain fingerprints from the vehicle or the stolen property;

and (4) defense counsel’s closing argument, which emphasized this testimony to the jury.

See Trial Tr. at 174-76, 185-86, 198-203, 211-14, 225-29, 231-34, 271-74.

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744, 759 (8th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor may comment on the defense’s failure to present

evidence to contradict the state’s case “unless the defendant alone had the information

to do so”). 

Accordingly, Davis’s Fifth Amendment claim is without merit. 

E. Davis’s Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

Davis argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of his guilt on

any of the breaking and entering charges because no witnesses positively identified

him, and the police failed to interview Davis or obtain any fingerprints or other

evidence to connect him to the crimes. Regarding the felony theft of property

conviction, Davis argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of the value

of the property, and the jury was unable to arrive at an accurate determination of

market value without engaging in speculation and conjecture.19 Doc. 2 at 12; Doc. 10

at 12-15. Respondent contends that these claims were reasonably adjudicated in

Davis’s direct appeal.

Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction whenever, “after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

19He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his misdemeanor

theft convictions. 

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of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.”20 Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In addition, where the state courts have

determined that the trial evidence is sufficient, that decision may not be overturned on

federal habeas review simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court.

Id. at 2062. Instead, as explained, the federal court must afford “considerable

deference” to the state-court determination, and may grant habeas relief only if the

decision was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 2062, 2065. 

As indicated earlier, in Davis’s direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals

expressly found that there was “substantial evidence” to “prove his identity as the

person who committed the offenses.” Davis I, supra at 2. The Court’s conclusion was

based on: (1) the 911 caller’s report of a man breaking into a car in her driveway; (2)

the apprehension of Davis shortly thereafter in the vicinity; (3) evidence that Davis

and his vehicle matched the descriptions given by the 911 caller; (4) the discovery of

property in Davis’s vehicle described by three victims as being stolen from their

vehicles; and (5) the fact that no one else was in or near Davis’s car. Id.

20Circumstantial evidence is “just as probative as any other type of evidence.”

Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d 849, 855 (8th Cir. 2011); see Holland v. United States, 348

U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (circumstantial evidence is “intrinsically no different from

testimonial evidence,” and “[i]f the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can

require no more”). 

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The Arkansas Court of Appeals also expressly found that there was “substantial

evidence” to prove “that the stolen property [the pool cues and bag] was worth more

than $500,” based on the owner’s testimony regarding the value and the fact that the

purchases were “so recent.” Id. at 2-3. 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to the legal standard

articulated in Jackson. See Dansby, 766 F.3d at 817-18 (Arkansas courts’ standard for

assessing sufficiency of the trial evidence is “consistent with Jackson”). Moreover,

the Court’s determination that the trial evidence was sufficient was not objectively

unreasonable. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational juror could find that Davis was the perpetrator of the crimes, and that the

value of the property at issue exceeded $500. 

Accordingly, Davis’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is without merit.

F. Davis’s Illegal Sentence Claims

1. Reliance on “False” Prior Convictions

Davis argues that his sentence as a habitual offender is illegal and violates due

process because the state presented ten “false, materially untrue” convictions, leading

the jury to believe that it was sentencing the man to whom those convictions belonged.

Doc. 2 at 14-15, 30-34; Doc. 10 at 15. Respondent contends that: (1) this claim is

procedurally defaulted because Davis raised it in state court as an ineffective-sentence

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claim, rather than a challenge to the legality of his sentence; and (2) alternatively, the

claim is without merit.

A sentence violates due process if it is based on “extensively and materially

false” evidence that the defendant had no opportunity to cure. Townsend v. Burke, 334

U.S. 736, 741 (1948). As previously discussed, during the sentencing phase of Davis’s

trial, the trial court mistakenly referred to three felony convictions that were not

attributable to Davis. The prosecutor immediately brought this mistake to the trial

court’s attention, and it proceeded to instruct the jury on only the six prior felony

convictions introduced into evidence as being properly attributable to Davis. Nothing

in the record suggests that the jury based its sentencing decision on the three incorrect

convictions that were not attributable to Davis. Furthermore, the April 29, 2010

Amended Information that contained those erroneous convictions was never entered

into evidence or fully read to the jury. Because Davis has not demonstrated that his

sentence as a habitual offender was based on false or inaccurate evidence, his due

process claim is without merit. 

2. Trial Court’s Allowance of Late Amendment

Finally, Davis argues that he was denied due process when the trial court

improperly allowed the prosecutor, in the sentencing phase of Davis’s trial, to amend

the “false” habitual offender allegations in the April 29, 2010 Amended Information

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and substitute Davis’s six prior convictions. Davis argues that he was “ambushed”

when the trial court and the state “discarded every allegation in Count 7 [the habitual

offender allegation in the April 29, 2010 Amended Information] and then, in effect,

completely rewrote Count 7 without providing adequate notice or affording due

process to [him].” Doc. 2 at 14, 30-34; Doc. 15 at 4-8. Respondent contends that this

claim is procedurally defaulted.

Although Davis’s trial attorney objected to the “late” amendment, Davis’s

direct-appeal attorney did not argue that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor

to amend the charging information in the sentencing phase of Davis’s trial. Similarly,

in Davis’s Rule 37 petition, he did not argue that his appellate attorney was ineffective

for failing to raise this claim in his direct appeal. Thus, both the claim of trial court

error and the ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim are procedurally

defaulted. The Eighth Circuit has held that the equitable exception announced in

Martinez does not excuse the procedural default of claims of trial error, or claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Dansby, 766 F.3d at 833-34. 

Accordingly, this Court is procedurally barred from considering the merits of

Davis’s due process claims arising from his allegedly “illegal sentence.” 

IV. Conclusion

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 2, be DENIED, and that this case be DISMISSED

in its entirety, with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

DENIED, as Davis has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)-(2); Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in

United States District Courts. 

DATED THIS 9th DAY OF March, 2015.

____________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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