Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01558/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01558-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEAN A. ROBBINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY,

Defendant.

TIMOTHY GREEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-00292-RS 

Case No. 19-cv-01558-RS

ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, 

APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS 

COUNSEL, AND DENYING 

MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Timothy Green moves to consolidate the following two cases: (1) Robbins v. 

Phillips 66 Company, 18-cv-00292-RS (“the Robbins matter”); (2) Green v. Phillips 66 Company, 

18-cv-01558-RS (“the Green matter”). In opposition, Plaintiff Dean Robbins moves to stay the 

Green matter pursuant to the first-to-file rule or, in the alternative, name his counsel as interim 

class counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3). Although noticed for hearing 

on separate dates, the matters are appropriately considered together. This matter is suitable for 

disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons explained 

below, the cases are consolidated, the Setareh Law Group is appointed interim class counsel, and 

Case 3:19-cv-01558-RS Document 46 Filed 08/08/19 Page 1 of 7
ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL, AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

CASE NO. 18-cv-00292-RS

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Robbins’s motion to stay is denied as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

On November 17, 2017, Robbins filed the Robbins matter in San Francisco Superior Court 

as a putative class of non-exempt hourly employees who worked for Phillips 66 Company 

(“Phillips 66”) and alleged numerous labor code violations, including failure to provide meal 

periods, to provide rest periods, to pay hourly wages, to provide accurate written wage statements, 

to timely pay all final wages, and for unfair competition. The putative class also sought civil 

penalties under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698, 

et seq. The matter was subsequently removed to the Northern District of California in January 

2018 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). In April 2018, 

Phillips 66’s motion to dismiss and strike the first amended complaint was denied. The parties 

have engaged in active document discovery and are currently scheduled to participate in a 

mediation session on October 3, 2019.

The Green action was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court on July 23, 2018 as an almost 

identical putative class of non-exempt hourly employees who worked for Phillips 66, alleging the 

same claims for relief with the exception of a claim for minimum wages, for failure to pay 

overtime, and without a PAGA claim. After Phillips 66 was served in September 2018, the case 

was removed to the Central District of California in October 2018. In February 2019, the parties 

conducted their Rule 26(f) conference, after which Green propounded formal written discovery on 

Phillips 66 consisting of a request for document production and interrogatories. The next month, 

the parties stipulated to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, after which the 

Green action was deemed related to the Robbins action, in April 2019.

A case management conference was held in the Green matter on June 27, 2019. The 

parties represented in their joint statement that they had agreed to stay formal discovery until the 

October 3rd mediation. Green had been invited to participate in the mediation with Robbins and 

Phillips 66, and Robbins had also agreed to exchange all discovery produced in the Robbins matter 

to the parties in Green subject to a stipulated protective order. Green’s counsel represented that 

Case 3:19-cv-01558-RS Document 46 Filed 08/08/19 Page 2 of 7
ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL, AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

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they were attempting to coordinate the matter with Robbins’s counsel, but that no formal 

agreement had been reached and that an order consolidating the matters would be necessary. After 

the case management conference, Robbins filed a motion to stay the Green matter under the firstto-file rule or, in the alternative, name his counsel as interim class counsel pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3), noticed for a hearing on August 22, 2019. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Consolidation

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), a court may consolidate actions that “involve 

a common question of law or fact.” “The purpose of consolidation is not only to enhance 

efficiency of the trial court by avoiding unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures, but 

also to avoid inconsistent adjudications.” Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., Nos. 1:08-

cv-00872-LJO-SMS, 1:08-cv-01050-LJO-SMS, 2008 WL 4712759, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 

2008). District courts have broad discretion under this rule to consolidate cases pending in the 

same district. Inv’rs Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989). In 

deciding whether to consolidate actions under Rule 42(a), the court must balance the savings of 

time and effort consolidation will produce against any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it 

would cause. Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other 

grounds by Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018).

B. Appointment of Interim Class Counsel

A district court may “designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class before 

determining whether to certify the action as a class action.” Fed R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3). Appointment 

of interim class counsel during the pre-certification period may be appropriate, as “it will usually 

be important for an attorney to take action to prepare for the certification decision.” Advisory 

Committee Note to Rule 23(g)(2)(A) (2003 amendments). This is particularly true in a situation 

where there are a “number of overlapping, duplicative, or competing suits pending in other courts, 

and some or all of those suits may be consolidated, [and] a number of lawyers may compete for 

class counsel appointment.” Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., No. C 10-0502-RS, 2011 WL 

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ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL, AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

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13141425, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In such cases, 

designation of interim counsel clarifies responsibility for protecting the interests of the class 

during precertification activities . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

When selecting counsel for appointment, a court considers various factors: (1) the work 

counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (2) counsel’s 

experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in 

the action; (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources that counsel will 

commit to representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Stay Pursuant to First-to-File Rule

The “first-to-file” rule is a “generally recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits 

a district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same parties 

and issues has already been filed in another district.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Inc., 678 

F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982). The rule “favors the forum of the first-filed action, whether or not 

it is a declaratory action,” see Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 

1993), overruled on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995), in the 

service of “promot[ing] judicial efficiency and prevent[ing] the risk of inconsistent decisions that 

would arise from multiple litigations of identical claims.” Interactive Fitness Holdings, LLC v. 

Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 10-cv-04628-LHK, 2011 WL 1302633, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 

2011). The rule “should not be disregarded lightly.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 

F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). That said, it is “not a rigid or inflexible rule to 

be mechanically applied, but rather is to be applied with a view to the dictates of sound judicial 

administration.” Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 95. In applying the rule, courts focus primarily on the 

chronology of the filings, the identity of the parties, and whether the issues presented in the 

successive actions substantially overlap. Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. v. Intersearch Grp., Inc., 

544 F. Supp. 2d 949, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

Courts have found that the first-to-file rule is not limited to cases brought in different 

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districts. See Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 

2013). Others have not been persuaded. See Bell v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., No. LACV 

17-07079-VAP (KSx), 2017 WL 10562859, at *3 & n.2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) (distinguishing 

Wallerstein on the basis that it dealt with two cases that were in different districts at the time the 

court decided the first-to-file rule applied and concluding the first-to-file rule does not apply where 

both cases are in the same venue). The latter is more convincing, as there is no concern a court 

will issue inconsistent rulings in two cases that are already before it. As discussed below, 

however, the parties’ concerns regarding judicial economy will be adequately served by 

consolidating these actions, thereby mooting Robbins’s motion to stay under the first-to-file rule.

B. Consolidation

The core factual allegation in both cases is the same: plaintiffs contend Phillips 66 violated 

California labor law regarding payment of wages, providing meal and rest periods, providing 

accurate wage statements, and engaging in unfair competition. Both cases are putative class 

actions seeking certification of purportedly similar classes. Moreover, because both cases target 

the same defendant, Phillips 66’s discovery obligation in each matter is sure at least to overlap. 

Consolidation would ensure coordinated discovery, and would appear to save both time and costs

for all concerned by avoiding duplicative class certification proceedings, discovery matters, and 

dispositive motions. Finally, consolidation would permit a potential global resolution at the 

October 3rd mediation, should it prove fruitful.

Robbins asserts in his Reply that consolidation is not one of the recognized exceptions to 

the first-to-file rule and that holding otherwise would be tantamount to barring application of the 

rule whenever actions are in front of the same district court. Such fears are overblown. As 

discussed above, Robbins’s argument that the first-to-file rule applies to matters before the same 

district court is beside the point. Even if applied, it is not “a rigid or inflexible rule to be 

mechanically applied, but rather is to be applied with a view to the dictates of sound judicial 

administration.” Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 95. The rule does nothing to deprive a district court of its 

broad discretion to consolidate matters that are before it. Inv’rs Research Co., 877 F.2d at 777. 

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ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL, AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

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Furthermore, given the cooperation already in place between the matters regarding discovery and 

mediation, a stay of the Green matter makes little sense. Since all factors favor consolidation, 

Green’s motion is granted. Accordingly, a single, consolidated complaint shall be lodged within 

ten days of the date of this Order.

C. Appointment of Interim Class Counsel

Rule 23 details three factors that inform a court’s designation of interim class counsel: (1) 

the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (2) 

counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims 

asserted in the action; (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources that 

counsel will commit to representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). There is no question 

here that both the Setareh Law Group and James Hawkins APLC have ample experience handling 

class actions and complex litigation. It is also clear that both have particular familiarity with wage 

and hour lawsuits.

The only factor that separates the two is that the Setareh Law Group has been involved in 

this litigation from the outset. The Setareh Law Group filed the Robbins matter first, participated 

in briefing on Phillips 66’s motion to dismiss and strike, and has already engaged Phillips 66 in 

discovery, including securing class contact information and class data, placing the firm in a strong 

bargaining position for the October 3rd mediation. Accordingly, it makes sense for the Setareh 

Law Group to continue as counsel and they therefore will be appointed as interim class counsel.1

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Robbins and Green matters are consolidated, the 

Setareh Law Group is appointed as interim class counsel, and Robbins’s motion to stay is denied 

as moot. A Case Management Conference is set for September 5, 2019 at 10:00 AM in 

Courtroom 3, 17th Floor, San Francisco.

 

1 Green contends it is premature to determine the interim class counsel prior to the consolidation 

of the matters. As discussed above, the matters are consolidated, and so the question is 

appropriate for review.

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ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL, AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2019

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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