Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02821/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02821-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND L. LAWSON,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 06-2821 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") February 5,

2005 decision to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on September 6, 2006, the court found that petitioner's

claim that the BPT's decision finding him not suitable for parole does not

comport with due process appears colorable under § 2254, when liberally

construed, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause

and petitioner has filed a traverse.

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BACKGROUND

On November 17, 1981, petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder in

Los Angeles County superior court and was sentenced to an indeterminate term

of 15 years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole each time he has appeared

before the BPT. On February 5, 2005, petitioner appeared before the BPT for a

subsequent parole consideration hearing. The BPT again found him not suitable

for parole and denied him a subsequent hearing for three years.

Petitioner challenged the BPT's February 5, 2005 decision in the state

superior, appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California

denied his petition for review on February 22, 2006, the instant federal petition

for a writ of habeas corpus followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even

when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state

inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any

claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential

standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's February 5,

2005 decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

hearing for three years, on the ground that the decision does not comport with

due process. Petitioner claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some

evidence in the record and is improperly based on the unchanging facts of his

commitment offense and pre-commitment conduct. Petitioner also claims that

the BPT violated the terms of his plea agreement by considering the commitment

offense to be a basis for parole denial. 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

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incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128

(9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It

matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that "some evidence" support the

parole board's decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125

(holding that the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions

in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d

at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard is minimally stringent and ensures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

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306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded

an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board's determination

of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence,

with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428

F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT panel afforded petitioner and his counsel

an opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to

review petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and

provided them with a reasoned decision in denying parole. 

The panel concluded that petitioner "is not yet suitable for parole and

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released from prison." Feb. 5, 2005 Hr’g Tr. at 34 (Resp’t Ex. 2). The panel

explained that it found that the offense was carried out "in an extremely callous

manner" and that it demonstrated a "total disregard for . . . human suffering." Id.

at 34-35. Petitioner and fellow gang members agreed to drive by and fire at a

rival gang member's house. As their truck went past the house, petitioner fired

four shots out of the window of the truck and hit and killed an eight year old boy

who was playing outside. The panel found that the "motive for the crime was

extremely trivial because this was just gang rivalry and yet an innocent child lost

[his] life." Id. at 35.

The panel also found that petitioner had a "record of unstable [social

history and] relationships due to his gang affiliation," and that he had "failed to

profit from society's previous attempts to correct his criminality," which included

juvenile home probation. Id. Petitioner was arrested for assault with a deadly

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weapon after a sixteen year old was shot and hospitalized, and had juvenile

petitions sustained for grand theft auto and theft.

The panel noted that petitioner had "programmed in self-help in a limited

manner while incarcerated." Id. at 36. He had not obtained his GED despite

being advised to do so at his previous hearing and had not participated in any sort

of self-help programs in more than five years. 

The panel noted that petitioner's psychiatric/psychological report was "not

totally supportive of release." Id. at 37. The January 2004 report stated that

petitioner posed a low to moderate likelihood of becoming involved in violence if

released to the community. Petitioner also "lack[ed] realistic parole plans." Id. at

38. He did not have any letter clarifying where he would live while on parole, or

any job offers or solid prospects.

The panel stated that it believed petitioner was "extremely remorseful,"

but that he had done very little to help himself "with regard to doing what the

Panel has asked you to do." Id. at 38-39. "In fact, in the '95, '96, '97, '98, 200,

and 2002[hearings], you either waived your appearance or you stipulated to

unsuitability." Id. at 39. The panel commended petitioner for 

staying disciplinary-free for several years and for recent gains (including

participation in the culinary literary program and obtaining a vocational

certificate in small engine repair), but concluded that "these positive aspects of

your behavior . . . do not outweigh the factors of unsuitability." Id. at 40.

The California superior, appellate and supreme courts rejected petitioner's

claims and upheld the decision of the BPT. The state courts' rejection of

petitioner's federal due process claim was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s February 5,

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In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release

date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that, over time, denying a prisoner parole strictly

because of the nature of his offense and his prior conduct “would raise serious

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2005 decision to deny petitioner parole is supported by some evidence in the

record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428

F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and

psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based

solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16

F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature

of offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is

simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

There is – petitioner has a pre-commitment record of escalating criminal conduct,

unstable social history and relationships with others characterized by gang

activity; petitioner has not upgraded educationally and obtained his GED, as

requested, or participated in self-help programs in over five years; petitioner's

January 2004 psychiatric/psychological report is not totally supportive of release,

noting a low to moderate likelihood of becoming involved in violence if released

to the community; and petitioner's parole plans are not firm enough, as evidenced

by a lack of a job offer or solid prospect. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) &

(d) (listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and

circumstances tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh

the evidence." Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner argues that the BPT's continued reliance on the immutable

circumstances of his murder offense and pre-commitment conduct conflicts with

the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Biggs.

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 The argument is without merit because the

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questions involving his liberty interest in parole . . . and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.

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BPT panel's denial of parole was not based solely on petitioner's commitment

offense and conduct prior to incarceration. Ample other evidence in the record

(e.g., insufficient educational and self-help programming; a less-than-favorable

psychiatric evaluation and lack of firm parole plans) constitutes some evidence

under Hill. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (inquiry under Hill is simply whether

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the BPT).

Petitioner also claims that the BPT violated the terms of his plea

agreement by allowing the commitment offense to be a basis for parole denial.

The claim is without merit.

“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement

of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404

U.S. 257, 262 (1971). A plea agreement containing a specific promise, such as

when the defendant will be paroled, is enforceable. See Brown v. Poole, 337

F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (that state prosecutor had no right to offer deal

defendant accepted in exchange for waiving her constitutional rights may be a

problem for state, but not defendant). But it is petitioner who bears the burden of

proving any alleged promise made by the prosecution. See Santobello, 404 U.S.

at 261-62. Petitioner makes no such showing. Nor is there any indication in the

record that petitioner was promised that his crime would not be considered at his

parole consideration hearings. The state courts' rejection of petitioner's breach of

plea agreement claim cannot be said to be objective unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 31, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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