Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01044/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01044-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TECHSHOP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAN RASURE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01044-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

SEAL

Re: Dkt. Nos. 127, 129, 173

Defendants filed administrative motions to file documents under seal in connection with 

their motions in limine and responses to Plaintiff’s motions in limine. Dkt. Nos. 127, 129, 173. 

For the reasons articulated below, the Court DENIES the motions.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 

documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana 

v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the 

common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 

and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of 

access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this 

strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion 

must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the 

general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in 

understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations

omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 

disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a 

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United States District Court

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vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public 

scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. 

Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records 

may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 

without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of 

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only 

tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This 

requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information 

is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th 

Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 

examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 

F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

Because motions in limine are nondispositive motions, the Court will apply the lower good 

cause standard. Here, Defendants seek to file under seal: (1) portions of their Motion in Limine 

No. 1; (2) Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Andrea Pallios Roberts in Support of Motion in Limine 

No. 1; (3) portions of their Motion in Limine No. 2; and (4) Exhibits 1, 3–15 to the Declaration of 

Ann McFarland Draper in Support of Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2. 

See Dkt. Nos. 127, 129, 173.

The only proffered justification for sealing is that the information was designated as 

“confidential” or “highly confidential” by Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 127-1 at ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 129-1 at 

¶ 4, Dkt. No. 173-1 at ¶ 4. But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a 

document is sealable. See Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial 

designation of confidentiality to establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See

Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the 

document is subject to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is 

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considered to be confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 

482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, Defendants’ motions do not comply with Civil 

Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). In addition, as the designating party for the materials, Plaintiff did not 

comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because it did not file a declaration within four days of 

Defendants’ motions. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1). 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ administrative motions to file under seal.

Dkt. No. 127, 129, 173. The Court DIRECTS Defendants to file public versions of all documents 

for which the proposed sealing has been denied within seven days of this order. Defendants may 

also file new motions to seal within seven days of this order according to the requirements 

discussed above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/10/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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