Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02375/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02375-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gonzalo Barco-Gallo, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Katrina Kane, 

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-07-2375-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1), respondent’s response (doc. 12), the report and recommendation of

the United States magistrate judge (doc. 13), and respondent’s objections (doc. 14). The

magistrate judge recommends granting habeas relief, concluding that petitioner’s continued

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates his constitutional rights. Following our de

novo review, we “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b). For the reasons set forth below, we reject the report and recommendation and deny

the petition. 

I

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Columbia who entered the United States as a 

lawful permanent resident on April 11, 1977. He was previously placed into deportation

Case 2:07-cv-02375-FJM Document 15 Filed 07/25/08 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

proceedings in September 1988, following his conviction of possession of cocaine. On May

10, 1989, he was granted a waiver of inadmissibility. Then, on January 14, 2004, he was

convicted of possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of

cannabis, for which he served approximately 40 days in jail. The Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) brought removal proceedings against him pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (conviction of an aggravated felony), and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)

(conviction of a controlled substance offense). Petitioner was taken into custody on

September 22, 2005. On March 9, 2006, the immigration judge (“IJ”) sustained the charge

of removability based on the controlled substance conviction and DHS withdrew the

allegation as to the aggravated felony. 

On May 12, 2006, the IJ denied petitioner’s application for asylum and cancellation

of removal, but granted his application for withholding of removal based on his claim that

he would be persecuted if returned to Columbia. Response, Ex. 8. Petitioner appealed the

IJ’s decision denying his application for asylum, but did not appeal the IJ’s conclusion that

he was removable. Response, Ex. 10. On October 20, 2006, the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) found petitioner ineligible for asylum, cancellation of removal, or

withholding of removal, and remanded the case to the IJ. Response, Ex. 11. On December

5, 2006, the IJ denied all relief and ordered petitioner removed to Columbia. Response, Ex.

12. Petitioner’s second appeal to the BIA was denied on February 21, 2007. Response, Ex.

17. 

On December 11, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review and a motion for stay of

removal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which immediately

granted a temporary stay of removal. The court granted petitioner’s motion to stay removal

pending review on May 11, 2007, and denied the government’s motion to dismiss. On

November 28, 2007, petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing

that his continued detention pending removal is unconstitutional. 

Case 2:07-cv-02375-FJM Document 15 Filed 07/25/08 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

II

Petitioner is currently being held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which governs

detention of deportable criminal aliens during removal proceedings. The statute broadly

provides that the “Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable

by reason of having committed [certain controlled substance offenses].” Id. § 1226(c)(1)(B)

(emphasis added). In Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003), the Supreme

Court held that the detention of a criminal alien pursuant to § 1226(c) during the “limited

period of his removal proceedings” is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 531, 123 S. Ct. at

1721-22. The Court reasoned that such detention “serves the purpose of preventing

deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus

increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.” Id.

at 528, 123 S. Ct. at 1720. The Court relied on the assumption that the period of detention

during the administrative process has a “definite termination point,” lasting on average 47

days, or about five and a half months when the IJ’s decision is appealed to the BIA. Id. at

529, 123 S. Ct. at 1720.

Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed § 1226(c) as requiring an

“expedited removal of criminal aliens,” and found that detention of over two years and eight

months was not “expeditious.” Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005). The

court found significant that Tijani, unlike the alien in Denmore, had not conceded that he was

removable. Id. “The only reason that Tijani is being detained is because the government

may be able to prove he is subject to removal.” Id. at 1243 (Tashima, J, concurring)

(emphasis in original). Tijani continued to challenge whether his underlying convictions

triggered the mandatory detention requirement of § 1226(c). Id. 

The present case is distinguishable from Tijani because petitioner has effectively

conceded that he is deportable. Petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s conclusion that he was

removable because of his controlled substance conviction. By failing to contest his

removability before the BIA, petitioner has foreclosed review of those findings. See 8 U.S.C.

Case 2:07-cv-02375-FJM Document 15 Filed 07/25/08 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

§ 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has

exhausted all administrative remedies. . . .”).

Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from Tijani because petitioner’s

administrative proceedings were expeditious. His detention during the administrative process

lasted approximately 15 months, during which time he applied for asylum and withholding

of removal, and pursued two appeals to the BIA. There is no suggestion that the government

caused any unreasonable delay during this process. 

To date, petitioner’s detention during the judicial review process has lasted 19 months.

The record reflects that during this time he has sought and obtained three extensions of time

to file his opening brief, resulting in a five-month delay. The Ninth Circuit docket indicates

that on May 15, 2008, the court granted respondent’s unopposed motion to remand the case

to the BIA, continuing the stay of removal. 

Petitioner’s ongoing challenges during the administrative process and his multiple

requests for extensions of time, and concession of remand, have contributed significantly to

the length of his detention. While an alien is entitled to file appeals and seek any form of

available relief, we must consider the alien’s role in causing delay. Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d

263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003). Otherwise, aliens would be encouraged “to raise frivolous

objections and string out the proceedings in the hopes that a federal court will find the delay

‘unreasonable’ and order their release.” Id.; see also Mboussi-Ona v. Crawford, CV-06-

2897, 2007 WL 3026946, *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007) (“If the Tijani gloss applies in this

manner, then every judicial appeal will exceed this ‘expedited’ standard. This would mean

that by merely seeking judicial review, every alien found removable would be entitled to an

individualized bond hearing and possible release.”). 

We do not suggest that petitioner’s ongoing challenges to the removal order and

requests for extension of time can only be explained as dilatory tactics. Nevertheless,

petitioner’s role in prolonging the detention period is relevant in determining whether his

detention has been unreasonably long. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that “the

length of detention required to appeal may deter aliens from exercising their right to do so.”

Case 2:07-cv-02375-FJM Document 15 Filed 07/25/08 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Denmore, 538 U.S. at 531 n.14, 123 S. Ct. at 1721 n.14. The Court reasoned that “the legal

system . . . is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which

course to follow, and even in the criminal context, there is no constitutional prohibition

against requiring parties to make such choices.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). There

is no suggestion that following a final order of removal, petitioner’s removal to Columbia

could not be promptly effectuated. But for petitioner’s decision to obtain a stay of his

removal, in all likelihood he would be out of detention and home in Columbia. 

Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that petitioner’s detention has

not been unreasonably long so as to constitute a statutory or constitutional violation entitling

him to release. Accordingly, we reject the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING the petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 1). 

DATED this 24th day of July, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-02375-FJM Document 15 Filed 07/25/08 Page 5 of 5