Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_90-cv-00478/USCOURTS-caed-1_90-cv-00478-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONSTANTINO CARRERA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR. As Warden )

of San Quentin State Prison, )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. 1:90-CV-00478-AWI

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

Case 1:90-cv-00478-AWI Document 286 Filed 03/11/08 Page 1 of 78
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90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd -iTable of Contents

I. Procedural Background. ..................................................... 1

II. Brief Summary of the Case. .................................................. 2

III. Prior Findings Made. ....................................................... 3

IV. Standard of Review. ........................................................ 4

V. Claims for which Further Evidentiary Development is Sought. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

A. Claims 3, 18, and 40: that Carrera Was Deprived His Constitutional Right to Counsel

Due to the Trial Court’s Delay in Appointing Conflict-Free Counsel. . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1. Facts Relevant to Deprivation of Counsel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2. Carrera’s Argument. ............................................ 9

3. Analysis. .................................................... 11

a. Contesting Probable Cause for His Arrest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

b. The Expectation of Privacy during Jail Visits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

c. Negotiating a Plea Bargain. ............................... 13

B. Claim 20: that Carrera’s Trial Attorney was Ineffective for Failing to Object After the

Prosecutor Exercised Racially Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes During Jury Selection.

................................................................. 16

1. Facts Relevant to Ms. Huffman’s Representation During Jury Selection. . 16

a. Statements By and About Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco. . . . . . 16

b. Voir Dire Questioning of and Argument About Selected and Prospective

Jurors. ................................................ 18

(1) Selected and Prospective Jurors of Hispanic or Reputed Hispanic

Heritage. ........................................ 18

(2) Discussion About Hispanic Representation on the Venire and the

Jury Panel During Voir Dire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

(3) Selected and Prospective Jurors Not of Hispanic Heritage. . 29

2. Carrera’s Argument. ........................................... 30

3. Analysis. .................................................... 34

C. Claim 85: that the Jurors Committed Misconduct, the Prosecutor Committed

Misconduct, and Carrera’s Trial Attorney Was Ineffective in Connection with the Jurors’

Examination of Partially Unburned Corduroy Pants Material. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

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90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd -ii1. Facts Relevant to the Discovery of the Partially Burned Corduroy Pants Material.

........................................................... 44

a. Trial Proceedings. ...................................... 44

(1) Percipient Witness Testimony About Carrera’s Clothing.

............................................... 44

(2) Exhibit 186.

............................................... 45

(3) Guilt Phase Summation Excerpts.

............................................... 45

b. Declarations Attached to Carrera’s State Exhaustion Petition.

..................................................... 45

(1) Declaration of Juror Gregory Brouckaert.

............................................... 46

(2) Declaration of Juror Antonio Chavez.

............................................... 46

c. Declarations Attached to Carrera’s Evidentiary Hearing Motion.

..................................................... 46

(1) Declaration of Lois Costello.

............................................... 46

(2) Mr. Bedrick’s Declaration.

............................................... 47

(a) Condition of the Bundled Material.

......................................... 47

(b) Offer of Proof on Mr. Jinkerson’s Opinion Testimony.

......................................... 47

2. Carrera’s Argument.

........................................................... 47

3. Analysis.

........................................................... 49

D. Claim 87: that Juror Misconduct Deprived Carrera of his Sixth Amendment Right to an

Impartial Jury and Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process.

................................................................. 51

1. Facts Relevant to Juror Misconduct Concerning Pre-Judgment and Shackling.

........................................................... 51

a. Antonio Chavez’s Declaration (Second Reference).

..................................................... 52

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90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd -iiib. Carrera’s 2005 Declaration.

..................................................... 52

c. Trial Court Inquiry into Incident Where Jurors Reportedly Saw Carrera

in Shackles.

..................................................... 53

d. Evidence Introduced and Argument Made at Trial Regarding Carrera’s

Pre-Trial Escape Attempt.

..................................................... 53

e. Order Granting Carrera Investigative Funds to Further Develop Claim 87.

..................................................... 54

2. Carrera’s Argument.

........................................................... 54

3. Analysis.

........................................................... 54

E. Claims 88 and 89: that Carrera’s Trial Attorney was Ineffective for Failure to Present a

Mental Defense at Guilt Proceedings.

................................................................. 57

1. Facts Relevant to the Availability of a Mental State Defense.

........................................................... 58

a. Trial Testimony Regarding Carrera’s Use of Alcohol and Drugs.

..................................................... 59

b. Mental Health Expert Declarations.

..................................................... 60

c. Lay Witness Declarations.

..................................................... 62

d. Summary of Jailhouse Tape Recordings.

..................................................... 63

(1) Summary of Exhibit 216. .......................... 63

(2) Summary of Exhibit 217.

............................................... 65

e. Jailhouse “Kites” Passed by Carrera to Other Inmates.

..................................................... 66

f. Ms. Huffman’s Declaration Describing her Guilt Phase Defense Strategy.

..................................................... 67

g. Offer of Proof of Strickland expert Guyton Jinkerson.

..................................................... 67

2. Carrera’s Argument.

........................................................... 68

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90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd -iv3. Analysis.

........................................................... 68

VI. Order.

....................................................................... 71

Appendix ..................................................................... 72

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 No distinct claims were alleged. Rather, Carrera merely concluded his conviction and death 1

sentence were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

Beeman error is alleged because the trial court did not instruct Carrera’s jury on the intent to

2

kill element required for criminal liability under an aiding and abetting theory for murder.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 1

This matter is before the Court on a motion for an evidentiary hearing filed by Petitioner

Constantino Carrera (“Carrera”). The motion is opposed byRespondent Robert L. Ayers, Jr., as Warden

of San Quentin State Prison (the “Warden”). 

I. Procedural Background.

This action was commenced in federal court on July 31, 1990 by the filing of an initial petition

for habeas corpus. Following appointment of counsel, a first amended petition was filed on August 23, 1

1991 and a second amended petition was filed on September 14, 1993, the latter of which presented

both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Carrera was ordered on May 3, 1994 to exhaust his state

remedies. He filed an exhaustion petition in the California Supreme Court on October 27, 1995 and a

subsequent state petition on June 25, 1997. On August 13, 1998, the California Supreme Court denied

both pending state petitions (in separate orders). Carrera filed his third amended petition in federal court

on November 6, 1998. The third amended petition was amended on March 10, 1999 to delete Claim 79,

which was determined to be unexhausted. The third amended petition is the operative petition (hereafter

“Petition”). 

Carrera filed a motion for partial summary judgment and the Court denied this motion on June

22, 2000 (doc. 194). One of the claims denied in that motion, Claim 44, alleges an instructional

omission under People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561 (1984). Following a motion for reconsideration, 2

Claim 44 was found to have merit when considered in conjunction with two other claims which were

not part of the summary judgment motion. Those claims, Claims 2 and 2A, allege prosecutorial

misconduct for Mr. Vendrasco’s withholding evidence of testimonial inducements for two jailhouse

informants. The order granting partial reconsideration as to Claim 44 and determining the merits of

Claims 2 and 2A in Carrera’s favor was issued on October 4, 2004 (doc. 241). The June 22, 2000 and

October 4, 2004 orders, together, conclude that while the evidence presented at trial and offered on

federal habeas fully support Carrera’s conviction of robbery and first degree robbery felony murder, the

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90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 2

state court determination of his intent to kill cannot stand. Accordingly, the special circumstances

rendering Carrera death eligible must be vacated.

After conducting further discovery on guilt phase claims only, Carrera filed the within motion

for evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2005 (doc. 271). All remaining guilt phase claims are record

based and will be resolved in a separate order. All remaining penalty phase claims are moot.

II. Brief Summary of the Case.

Carrera and Ramiro Ruiz-Gonzales (“Ruiz”) were convicted following separate trials of robbery

and first degree murder for the April 12, 1982 stabbing deaths of motel managers Jack and Carol Hayes

and robbery of approximately $239 in cash from the office of the Imperial 400 Motel in Mojave,

California. Carrera was 20 years old and Ruiz was 17 years old at the time of the crime. The evidence

presented at Carrera’s guilt phase trial included testimony that he cut Mrs. Hayes on the arm or wrist

early in the encounter, but after Ruiz initially stabbed her. The character of Ruiz’s initial stab was never

developed. There also was evidence that Mr. Hayes was stabbed in his head, and that the force of this

blow caused the knife blade to break and remain embedded in his skull. During the guilt phase

proceedings of Carrera’s trial, the jury determined the robbery-murder and multiple murder special

circumstances to be true, making him eligible for the death penalty. Essential to both special

circumstance findings was that Carrera actually participated in the killing of Mr. and Mrs. Hayes, or, to

the extent he was only an aider and abettor in the murders, he intended to kill Mr. and Mrs. Hayes. The

jury returned a verdict that Carrera should suffer the death penalty at a separate penalty phase trial.

The key players at Carrera’s trial were his co-perpetrator Ruiz, his appointed defense attorney

Donnalee Huffman (previously Mendez), the prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Michael Vendrasco,

friend-witness Teresa Fout (age 14 at the time of the crime), friend-witness Miguel Santana (age 19 at

the time of the crime), jailhouse informant-witness Julius Jones, and jailhouse informant-witness

Thomas Hill a.k.a. Morse. Teresa Fout and Miguel Santana mainly gave evidence about the sequence

of events on the night of the crime and how Carrera later described the circumstances of the crime to

them (individually). The inmate witnesses gave the only account of Carrera’s specific intent to kill as

well as his participation as a principal in the stabbing deaths of both Mr. and Mrs. Hayes. Testimony

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Ruiz was tried as an adult and convicted of two counts of murder. He is serving a 50-year to

3

life sentence. Although Ruiz was tried as an adult, because he was a minor at the time the crime was

committed, he could not be eligible for the death penalty under California law.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 3

of all four witness was relied on by Mr. Vendrasco to establish Carrera’s criminal responsibility for

robbery and murder. Santana also was a key witness against Ruiz at his separate trial.3

III. Prior Findings Made.

In the June 22, 2000 and October 4, 2004 orders, the Court determined from the record that

Carrera entered the Imperial 400 Motel accompanied by Ruiz and that, at a minimum, he participated

in the robbery effort. This conclusion is supported by statements of percipient witnesses at a party

gathering on the night of the crime about Carrera’s and Ruiz’s absence from the party and the substance

of what Carrera told Teresa Fout and Miguel Santana as to the robbery, including the fact that when

Carrera entered the motel, he had in his possession a knife or knives and rubber gloves, and that he cut

Mrs. Hayes on the wrist. The Court further found that Teresa did not participate in the crime and that

Miguel Santana’s participation was limited to an accessory after the fact for assisting in the destruction

of evidence. The Court declined to adopt Carrera’s view that Santana acted as a “look-out” during the

robbery murders.

What the October 4, 2004 order did that the June 22, 2000 order did not do was determine that

the Beeman instructional omission was not harmless in light ofthe prosecutorial misconduct committed

by Mr. Vendrasco in several respects. First, he elicited contradictory evidence during the separate trials

of Ruiz and Carrera as to which young man asked Miguel Santana if he (Santana) had the guts or nerve

to kill someone. Attributing the question to Ruiz at Ruiz’s trial and Carrera at Carrera’s trial, Mr.

Vendrasco argued that asking this question meant the questioner harbored a plan to commit murder.

Oct. 4, 2004 Ord., at pp. 8-9 (Carrera asking the question), 25 (arguing Carrera’s intent to kill), 31-32

(Ruiz asking the question and arguing Ruiz’s intent to kill). Second, he argued inconsistently at the two

trials that Santana’s testimony about one of the perpetrators obtaining a larger knife during the attack

on Mr. Hayes supported the theory that Carrera obtained the larger knife at Carrera’s trial, and Ruiz

obtained the larger knife at Ruiz’s trial. Id., pp. 33-34. Third and fourth, he concealed the fact of

inducements to inmate witnesses Julius Jones and Thomas Hill/ Morse. Id., p.106. The Court concluded

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 The California Supreme Court already determined Beeman error had occurred. People v.

4

Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291, 309 (1989). In determining the error was harmless, the California Supreme

Court did not take into account the factual background of the prosecutorial misconduct claims developed

from extra-record evidence during post-conviction proceedings.

 Although testimony of Ruiz’s statements at Carrera’s retrial would be inadmissible, the fact the 5

testimony was given demonstrates how confused the recitation of the events were.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 4

that although the inmate testimony was exaggerated and uncorroborated as to the extent of injuries

inflicted on the victims and the amount of money stolen, Mr. Vendrasco nonetheless relied on it. 

In light of these findings, the Court could not consider the instructional omission under People

v. Beeman, harmless because all evidence relative to Carrera’s actual killing or intent to kill Mr. and

Mrs. Hayes was derived from evidence elicited as the result of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The 4

Court did not foreclose the possibility that with proper instructions, omission of misleading argument,

and introduction of withheld impeachment evidence, Carrera’s intent to kill and/or actual participation

in the murders could be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Oct. 4, 2004 Ord., at pp. 116-118.

Evidence in support of this prosecution theory, includes that Carrera lied on the witness stand about his

involvement in the robbery, relied on a dishonest defense strategy – to falsely inculpate Teresa Fout in

the murders, invoked an uncorroborated alibi of having sexual intercourse with a 12-year old girl at the

time of the crime, and bragged about killing Mr. and Mrs. Hayes to friends and family members visiting

him in the jail. The evidence as to whether Carrera cut Mrs. Hayes after she was severely wounded or

just mildly wounded by Ruiz also is not clear. At his trial, the only credible evidence, from Miguel

Santana and Teresa Fout, about when he cut Mrs. Hayes in relation to Ruiz’s murderous attack was

simply unclear. At Ruiz’s trial, however, it was not unclear. Santana there testified that Ruiz said

Carrera cut Mrs. Hayes after she was so severely wounded she was lying on the floor pleading for her

and her husband’s lives. 

5

IV. Standard of Review.

This action is not subject to the review provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of April 24, 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified in amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carrera filed his

original, first amended, and second amended petitions prior to the effective date of AEDPA. Under

controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, it is the filing of “an application for habeas relief

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 In Tamayo-Reyes, the Court modified Townsend by adopting a stricter standard for granting an 6

evidentiary hearing under the fifth enumerated factor. Before Tamayo-Reyes, so long as the petitioner

did not deliberately bypass the opportunity to develop facts at the state level, an evidentiary hearing on

federal habeas still was available. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). Under the new standard

stated in Tamayo-Reyes, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate cause for failure to develop facts in the

state court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, consistent with the reasoning in

procedural default cases. 504 U.S. at 8, 11. In the absence of cause and prejudice, the habeas petitioner

must demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, also consistent with the analysis of procedural

default cases. Id. at 12.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 5

seeking an adjudication on the merits of petitioner’s claims” that triggers applicability of AEDPA.

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003). Cases with petitions on file prior to April 24, 1996

are not subject to AEDPA. Carrrera’s first and second amended petitions, filed on August 23, 1991 and

September 14, 1993, respectively, were substantive pleadings seeking adjudication on the merits of the

claims therein presented. Because the filing of Carrera’s substantive petitions preceded the enactment

of AEDPA, the law in effect before its passage, former 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is controlling. See id. Under

this prior law, the only standard relevant to the present motion is for granting an evidentiary hearing. 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right on a claim

where the facts are disputed if two conditions are met: (1) the petitioner’s allegations

would, if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a

full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.

Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 1997) citing Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103

(9th Cir. 1992). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled in part, Keeney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). The first prong is referred to as the requirement of asserting a

“colorable claim.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1994) (Siripongs I). The second

prong is informed by six factors identified in Townsend v. Sain. When any one or more of these factors

is present, the state court trier of fact has not reliably found the relevant facts:

1. the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;

2. the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;

3. the factfinding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford

a full and fair hearing;

4. there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

5. the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing;6

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6. for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair hearing.

372 U.S. at 313.

In addition to being entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of right when the petitioner presents a

colorable claim and the state court has not reliably found the relevant facts, a federal court retains

discretionary authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Seidle v. Merkle, 146 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir.

1998).

V. Claims for which Further Evidentiary Development is Sought.

Five categories of contentions are the subject of Carrera’s request for further evidentiary

development. These categories relate to prejudice occasioned by the deprivation of counsel during a

critical stage of the proceedings, raciallymotivated juror peremptory challenges by Mr. Vendrasco, juror

misconduct during deliberations for considering evidence not properly introduced, related prosecutorial

misconduct for not alerting the trial court to juror misconduct about the improper evidence, a separate

allegation of juror misconduct for prejudging Carrera, and failure of defense counsel to develop a mental

state defense.

A. Claims 3, 18, and 40: that Carrera Was Deprived His Constitutional Right to

Counsel Due to the Trial Court’s Delay in Appointing Conflict-Free Counsel.

Carrera maintains that the time span between the date of his arrest, April 12, 1982, until April

24 or 25, 1982, when appointed counsel, Ms. Huffman, first visited him at the jail, constituted a critical

stage in the criminal proceedings against him. He argues that deprivation of counsel during a critical

stage of the proceedings requires his conviction to be vacated without a prejudice analysis.

Alternatively, he argues he can demonstrate he was prejudiced on account of not having counsel during

this 12 to 13 day period. The evidentiary hearing is requested to establish prejudice.

1. Facts Relevant to Deprivation of Counsel.

The facts proffered by Carrera relate to his own encounters with the justice system as well as

proceedings in which Miguel Santana and Teresa Fout were involved. First with respect to himself, he

was arrested for the present crime on April 12, 1982. Not mentioned in Carrera’s rendition of facts for

these claims is that he was interviewed by authorities the following day and, after waiving his right to

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 The police report indicates that when his rights were read to him, Carrera stated he wanted to 7

speak to authorities, with his attorney present. Because of the invocation of counsel, the interview was

terminated. However, a short time later investigating deputies were informed that Carrera wanted to talk

to them. His rights were read to him again and he waived counsel.

 Carrera surmises this could have been either Ruiz or Teresa Fout. 8

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 7

counsel, spoke to sheriff’s deputies about the crime. CT-1: 29-30. Another fact not mentioned in 7

Carrera’s moving papers is the fact that two days after his arrest, on April 14, 1982, an arrest warrant

was issued (even though he already was in custody) by Municipal Court Judge Carey F. Scott. CT-1:

37. Also on April 14, 1982, two separate audio tape recordings were made of conversations at the jail

he had with visiting friends and family. These recordings eventually were admitted into evidence against

him. CT-2: 279; RT-2: 76, Trial Exhibits 216 and 217. Ms. Huffman’s efforts to suppress the tape

recordings of Carrera’s jail visits were unsuccessful. CT-1: 166 (motion filed to suppress evidence of

jailhouse conversations based on privacy violation); CT-1: 166 (ruling on motion to suppress the tape

recordings deferred); CT-2: 31 (motion renewed and denied); CT-2: 279 (tape recordings admitted). 

On April 15, 1982, Carrera was arraigned in the Municipal Court. CT-1: 45; CT-8: 8; RT-1(A).

Since Carrera had no retained counsel at the arraignment, the Public Defender was tentatively appointed,

after the court gave him (Carrera) a copy of the criminal complaint, read the charges, and ascertained

that Carrera understood the charges. RT-1(A): 3-5. Aside from this appearance at Carrera’s

arraignment, nomember ofthe KernCountyPublic Defender’s Office ever spoke Carrera about the case

or visited him in jail. Four days later, on April 19, the Public Defender’s Office moved to be relieved

as Carrera’s counsel due to a conflict of interest because the office apparently also represented a juvenile

potential co-defendant. CT-8: 9; RT-1(B). Between April 19 and April 24 or 25, Carrera avers that 8

private attorney Jere Sullivan, Jr., another potential candidate for appointment, visited him in jail, but

they did not talk about the case. According to Carrera’s March 30, 1987 declaration (attached as Exhibit

B to his original state habeas petition filed on December 31, 1987), Mr. Sullivan indicated his

uncertainty about representing Carrera because “there might be a conflict of interest.” 1987 Carrera

Decl., p. 2. It was not until Ms. Huffman visited Carrera on April 24 or 25, 1982 that Carrera actually

discussed his case with any attorney. On April 27, 1982, Ms. Huffman was formally appointed as

Carrera’s counsel and Mr. Sullivan was relieved as counsel. CT-1: 43; CT-8: 18; RT-1(D).

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 Carrera states in his evidentiary hearing motion that Teresa Fout was interviewed on April 12, 9

1982 and that this was the day before Carrera was arrested. Elsewhere, Carrera alleges he was arrested

on April 12, 1982. The record reflects the latter is the case.

 Carrera alleges in his evidentiary hearing motion that Santana was first interviewed on April 10

14, 1982. The confusion may be in the date and time Sergeant Montgomery prepared the report, which

was April 14, 1982. He clearly states in the body of the report, however, that he interviewed Santana

on April 13, at about 1730 hours. CT-1:31.

 Notwithstanding discovery granted by this Court on August 19, 2005 (doc. 262), efforts of 11

Carrera’s attorneys to locate any such charging documents in the Kern County Superior Court or among

the records maintained by the Kern County District Attorney’s Office with respect to Santana proved

fruitless.

There was no corroborating evidence that Santana was involved in the actual crime, even as

12

a look-out man. There was only evidence that he had acted as an accessory after the fact for destroying

evidence.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 8

Although the record does not reflect when Teresa Fout received appointed counsel, Carrera

points out that she was first interviewed by Kern County Sheriff Sergeant Paul Montgomery on April

12, 1982. Sergeant Montgomery’s report concerningTeresa’sinterview indicates she was actually with

authorities investigating the route taken by Carrera and Ruiz after the homicides when she identified a

passing car as being driven by Ruiz. Carrera was seated as a passenger in the front seat of the car. At

that point Sergeant Montgomery requested back up from another deputy in the vicinity. They stopped

Ruiz’s car, and Ruiz, together with Carrera, were taken into custody. CT-1: 27. Formal immunity was 9

conferred on Teresa three weeks later, on May 4, 1982. The record reflects she was charged with being

an accessory after the fact to the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Hayes. CT-7: 2. The record also shows that

even though a formal grant of immunity was given on May 4, Teresa was confined at Juvenile Hall as

of May 28, 1982, when the preliminary examination hearing for Carrera and Ruiz commenced. CT-1:

69. 

Sergeant Howard Thurston first interviewed Miguel Santana in the afternoon of April 13, 1982.10

The report indicates that Santana came into the Sheriff’s Mojave Sub-Station and was then released.

CT-1: 31-32. He was never formally charged with murder or as an accessory after the fact and the trial

judge, in fact, made a post-trial finding that immunity for Santana was never granted in writing. See RT1(P): 5. Nonetheless, Santana did understand that he had been offered immunity from prosecution for 11

being an accessory in exchange for his testimony. RT-9: 829. See Oct. 4, 2004 Ord., at pp. 14-15, and 12

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 Carrera discovered this note among files produced to his counsel following the Court’s August

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n. 16. New evidence uncovered after discovery includes a handwritten note byDeputyDistrict Attorney

Joseph K. Beckett, dated October 19, 1982 (Exhibit 2 to EH Motion). The note provides: “His recruiting

sgt. is Manuel Herrera – U.S. Army – 945-3631. Mike is due to report for training in Nov. – & will be

back during the holidays – Sgt. Herrera will cooperate w/us in securing Mike’s attendance at both trials

– JKB, 10/19/82.”13

2. Carrera’s Argument.

Based on the timing of the events relative to Teresa Fout, Carrera believes the prosecutor offered

her immunity some time between April 12, 1982, when she was first interviewed, and April 25, 1982,

when conflict-free counsel was retained to represent him. Carrera believes that the October 19, 1982

note regarding Santana and Sergeant Herrera establishes that the prosecution gave Santana informal

immunity from being prosecuted for murder provided he testify against both Carrera and Ruiz, and he

enlist in the military. Carrera further believes that immunity discussions with Santana began on, or

shortly after April 14, 1982, when police first interviewed him.

Carrera maintains he was not represented by legal counsel “legally able” to act upon his behalf

at any time between his arrest and Ms. Huffman’s retention on April 24 or 25, 1982. Included in this

period was his arraignment on April 15, 1982, which is considered a critical stage of the proceedings.

See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986) (holding that defendants had a right to counsel

during post-arraignment custodial interrogations). Since he was denied conflict-free counsel during a

“critical stage of the criminal proceeding,” he maintains his conviction must be reversed without the

necessity of showing prejudice, citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (holding that

when a defendant is deprived of presence and assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the

proceeding in a capital prosecution, reversal is automatic); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)

(holding a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea at a proceeding equivalent to an arraignment without the

benefit of counsel entitled him to reversal of his conviction). Carrera explains the “arraignment period”

is critical because that is the time defense counsel, having preliminarily researched the law and facts,

is in the best position to persuade the prosecution to strike a favorable plea bargain. Separately he argues

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 The Court agrees Teresa Fout generally was an unreliable witness, having already determined 14

she provided various inconsistent accounts of the crime including her alleged participation in the crime,

which turned out to be uncorroborated. Oct. 4. 2004 Ord., pp. 16-17. 

The relevant facts demonstrate Ms. Huffman did attempt to suppress the tapes on the grounds 15

that the recordings violated Carrera’s privacy rights. She did not pursue a suppression motion based on

the delay in her appointment as counsel.

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that plea negotiations and the cooperation process constitute a critical stage in the proceedings under

Ninth Circuit authority, citing United States v. Leonetti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (presentence period while the defendant attempted to cooperate with the government to obtain a more lenient

sentence was a critical stage of the criminal process to which a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel attaches). Carrera further argues that even if the deputy public defender standing

in for him at the arraignment and Mr. Sullivan are said to have been representing him during the period

between arrest and Ms. Huffman’s formal retention, they both suffered (separate) conflicts of interest

and he therefore he is entitled to relief as a matter of law, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50

(1980) (holding that a defendant who demonstrates an actual conflict of interest due to joint

representation of co-defendants is entitled to relief without showing prejudice).

Proceeding on the assumption that prejudice must be shown, he identifies three separate nonharmless consequences occasioned by the delay in appointment of counsel. First, since he maintains his

arrest was accomplished without a warrant, he argues he should have been permitted to show there was

no probable cause for the arrest. He claims if he had been provided that opportunity, through appointed

counsel, he would have successfully challenged any probable cause finding because the only information

police had against him at that point was Teresa Fout’s statement, and she turned out to be less than

credible. Next, he maintains he lost a valuable opportunity to be advised early on by counsel not to 14

expect privacy when talking to visitors on the jail telephones. In connection with the tape recording of

his jail visits, Carrera separately argues his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective for not

challenging admission of the jail visit tapes and that the trial court erred in not suppressing the jail house

tapes due to the delay in appointing counsel. The final consequence flowing from the delay in 15

appointing conflict-free counsel is the missed opportunity to enter into negotiations with authorities for

a plea bargain. He maintains that since Teresa had counsel and he didn’t, her attorney convinced the

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prosecutor to charge Carrera and not her with the murders. His request for an evidentiary hearing is

centered on this third consequence. He claims an evidentiary hearing is warranted to show that the delay

in appointing conflict-free counsel deprived him the opportunity to enter into plea negotiations and the

inability to bargain for immunity contemporaneously with Teresa Fout and Miguel Santana.

3. Analysis.

As a preliminary matter, the lack of counsel to challenge probable cause for his arrest and to

advise him that jail house visits were not private, do not and cannot present grounds for automatic

reversal under Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475. Both missed opportunities occurred during the

period between Carrera’s arrest and arraignment. Carrera has not cited any authority and the Court is

aware of no authority for the proposition that pre-arraignment events fall into the critical stage of the

proceedings category. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, only supports the notion that arraignment and

post-arraignment proceedings are critical litigation stages. Moreover, the idea that counsel could or

would have been appointed for Carrera prior to his first appearance in court (April 15, 1982) is not

established. The Court is not aware of any previous opportunity the state trial court would have had to

do so, and Carrera has presented nothing to suggest a contrary reading of the record. Each of the three

consequences flowing from not having conflict-free counsel appointed are discussed in turn.

a. Contesting Probable Cause for His Arrest.

In presenting his argument about the inability to have challenged the probable cause for his

warrantless arrest, Carrera has overlooked two important facts: (1) the issuance of an arrest warrant on

April 14, 1982; and (2) his waiver of counsel on April 13, 1982. With respect to the arrest warrant, even

though the magistrate, Judge Scott, did not have the benefit of an attorney’s argument about the lack of

probable cause for the arrest, a probable cause finding is supportable by the record. The police reports

demonstrate that authorities questioned a number of witnesses, not just Teresa Fout, by the time the

arrest warrant was issued. Carrera was only arrested on April 12, 1982 because authorities were

concerned that Carrera and Ruiz saw Teresa talking to sheriff’s deputies. Deputies made the

determination that exigent circumstances existed justifying Carrera’s and Ruiz’s immediate arrest to

protect Teresa. The actual probable cause determination was made two days later, when the arrest

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 The arrest warrant was based on the affidavit of Sergeant Montgomery and numerous crime 16

reports appended to his affidavit. CT-1: 5-32

 The Warden’s argument that this claim is procedurally barred is not addressed in light of the 17

Court’s ruling on the merits.

 In light of these conclusions, the Warden’s procedural default arguments are not addressed. 18

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warrant was issued. CT-1: 37. More importantly, the record also demonstrates that Carrera waived 16

his right to counsel the previous day, April 13, 1982, when he spoke to interrogating deputies. Carrera

did not request that counsel be appointed until his arraignment on April 15, 1982. The claim that

Carrera’s constitutional rights were violated because counsel was not appointed to assist him in

contesting the probable cause for his arrest is denied.17

b. The Expectation of Privacy during Jail Visits.

The same analysis applies to advice appointed counsel might have given Carrera about not

expecting privacy during jail visits. Appointment of counsel was not mandated during this prearraignment period. Separate and apart from this, although the incriminating statement Carrera made

during his April 14, 1982 jail visits were prejudicial (and thus offered by the prosecution), the fact that

non-privileged communications were tape recorded was not a violation of his constitutional rights at the

time. A case decided nearly two months later, on July 8, 1982, DeLancie v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d

865 (1982), held that monitoring and recording conversations of persons detained in county jail awaiting

trial to gather evidence for use in the criminal trial infringes on the detainee’s right to privacy. Id. at

873. Prior to the rendering of DeLancie, however, inmate monitoring and recording for purposes of

gathering prosecution (prejudicial) evidence was lawful in California. People v. Loyd, 27 Cal. 4th 997,

1003 (2002). There is no chance Ms. Huffman’s failed efforts to suppress the tape recordings under the

after decided DeLancie case would have been more successful had she grounded her motion on the fact

that she, or other “conflict-free” counsel, should have been appointed earlier. The claim that Carrera’s

constitutional rights were violated because counsel was not appointed to advise him he should not expect

privacy during jail visits is denied. Separately the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing

to move to suppress the jail visit tape recordings and trial error for the trial court’s failure to suppress

the recordings sua sponte on the grounds of delayed appointment of counsel are denied.18

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c. Negotiating a Plea Bargain.

In considering the post-arraignment period from April 15, 1982 through Ms. Huffman’s retention

on April 25, 1982 as a critical stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes that the failure or inability

to engage in plea negotiations during that period does not entitle Carrera to relief, even though the

opportunity to engage in plea negotiations may have followed his arraignment. In United States v.

Leonetti, 326 F.3d at 1117, the Ninth Circuit explains that the essence of a critical stage is “the adversary

nature of the proceeding, combined with the possibility that a defendant will be prejudiced in some

significant way by the absence of counsel.” Id. at 1117. While the communication of a plea offer is a

critical event requiring the active representation of counsel, see id. (citing United States v. Fuller, 941

F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2002)), the failure

to initiate plea negotiations is not a critical event because it is not an adversarial proceeding and does

not carry the risk that the defendant’s status will worsen. The cases relied on by Carrera illustrate this

point. In each, the critical stage proceedings involved eventsin which the defendants were participants

and the presumption of their innocence was at risk because of the absence of counsel. In White v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, an unrepresented defendant charged with capital murder was brought before a

magistrate for a preliminary examination hearing on August 9, 1960 and was arraigned. Without the

benefit of counsel, he pleaded guilty. A month later he was arraigned again, this time with counsel

present, and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 59-60. At the trial, the

defendant’s guilty plea at the August 9, 1960 preliminary examination hearing was introduced against

him. He was convicted and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were reversed because

taking the defendant’s plea without counsel subjected him to significant prejudice. Id. In reaching this

decision, the Court in White relied on Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961), which held that the

arraignment of the defendant was a critical stage of the proceeding because “[o]nly the presence of

counsel could have enabled th[e] accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead

intelligently.” The critical event involving the defendant’s participation in Michigan v. Jackson, 475

U.S. 625, was a post-arraignment custodial interrogation, after the defendant specifically requested

counsel. The Court found that the defendant’s right to counsel at post-arraignment custodial

interrogations was supported by his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and

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the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at adversary judicial proceedings (which are triggered by the

arraignment). Id. at 629. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, involved actual trial proceedings before

a jury at which three defendants with conflicting defenses were represented by a single attorney. The

attorney requested separate counsel for each of the defendants and his argument became especially

urgent when the three defendants all insisted on their rights to testify. Id. at 477-80. Because an actual

conflict existed in the joint representation, Holloway’s conviction was reversed. Id. at 491. The high

Court was clear in noting, however, that joint representation is “not per se violative of constitutional

guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 482. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate an

actual conflict. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348. 

Carrera’s reliance on Leonetti, 326 F.3d 1111, for the proposition that negotiating a plea

constitutes a critical stage of the proceedings is misleading. In that case, a represented defendant, who

had already been charged with drug trafficking crimes was attempting to cooperate with authorities to

assist in making further arrests so he could obtain a more lenient sentence. His attorney was supposed

to facilitate cooperation but failed to appear at most meetings and exerted little if any effort on behalf

of his client. Id. at 1114-16. After the defendant was sentenced, with no downward departure in the

term, he filed a claim for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. at 1116. The court held that the defendant stated a claim for relief under the Sixth

Amendment which entitled him to an evidentiary hearing because the “cooperation period” after his plea

and before sentencing was a critical stage of the criminal process to which the right of counsel under the

Sixth Amendment attached. Id. at 1117-18. The facts of Leonetti cannot benefit Carrera because plea

negotiations had never been initiated with respect to Carrera’s involvement in the crime. As the

Warden’s vehemently maintains, Carrera cannot establish that the prosecutor’s failure to offer him a plea

agreement resulted from delay in appointing conflict-free counsel. The initial police reports (based on

numerous interviews, not just the interview with Teresa Fout) placed Carrera and Ruiz as the two

participants in the robbery-murder at the Imperial 400 Motel. The plea agreement with then-14 year old

Teresa only involved dropping charges as an accessory after the fact, not a participant in the murders.

No evidence presented at trial or on these federal habeas proceedings convinces the Court that a different

result should obtain. The contentions regarding Santana are even less compelling. In the first place, as

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 To the extent Hill/ Morse testified that Santana was the look-out man, that testimony has been

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discredited, just as his testimony that Carrera actively and substantially participated in both murders has

been discredited.

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already determined, no formal charges or immunity were ever made or given. Second, there is no

indication Santana was ever represented by counsel who negotiated anything on his behalf. Third, the

credible evidence at trial, as well as in the course of these proceedings shows that at most, Santana could

only be implicated as an accessory after the fact, not as a co-perpetrator in the murders, even as a lookout man. The trial evidence that Santana was present at the scene of the crime came from discredited

jailhouse informant Thomas Hill/ Morse. The evidence proffered with Carrera’s motion for an 19

evidentiary hearing fails to provide any further factual support implicating Santana. The existence of

a note from Santana’s Army recruiting officer that Santana would be available to testify at the trials of

Ruiz and Carrera does not show that Santana received immunity from murder charges, much less that

he received a plea benefit that would have been made available to Carrera if he (Carrera) had been

represented by counsel prior to April 25, 1982. The Warden’s argument that Mr. Vendrasco’s failure

to offer Carrera a plea agreement had nothing to do with Carrera’s lack of representation is persuasive.

Moreover, Carrera has advanced no argument or proffered evidence that Ms. Huffman was in any way

hampered from negotiating a plea after she became Carrera’s lawyer. 

While there is no question but that Carrera’s arraignment constituted a critical stage of the

proceedings, he has not alleged that an actual conflict of interest existed for purposes of taking his not

guilty plea. The public defender only conflicted out after the arraignment because advancing to the next

adversary proceeding apparently would implicate conflicting defenses. No conflict existed at the

arraignment in terms of the not guilty plea Carrera entered, and he does not claim otherwise. The

conflict, he alleges, was in a legal representative not negotiating a plea. This omission does not fit into

the Ninth Circuit explanation of a critical stage of a criminal proceeding given in the Leonetti case. The

claim that delay in appointment of counsel deprived Carrera his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at

a critical stage of the proceedings is denied.

Claims 3, 18, 40 are denied on the merits. The request for further evidentiary development with

respect to these claims is denied.

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 Carrera concedes that as to one of these stricken jurors, Manuel Estrada, Ms. Huffman had

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good reason not to challenge Mr. Vendrasco’s peremptory challenge. He was her residential letter

carrier.

 Mr. Jinkerson’s declaration in this regard consists of a statement that he has reviewed a number 21

of documents and responses Ms. Huffman prepared to specific inquiries presented by habeas counsel

Mr. Bedrick. Included among these responses is Ms. Huffman’s statement that she did not know of a

strategic reason for her failure to advance a Wheeler motion to Mr. Vendrasco’s peremptory challenges.

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B. Claim 20: that Carrera’s Trial Attorney was Ineffective for Failing to Object After

the Prosecutor Exercised Racially Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes During Jury

Selection.

Carrera argues that Mr. Vendrasco’s use of his peremptory challenges to strike six out of eight

qualified prospective jurors of Hispanic heritage constitutes an equal protection violation under Batson

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), as well as a Sixth Amendment violation under People v. Wheeler, 22

Cal. 3d 258 (1978). Notwithstanding these violations, Ms. Huffman failed to object. Carrera now 20

maintains that Ms. Huffman’s inattention to or ignorance of the law regarding jury selection amounts

to ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He requests

an evidentiary hearing to establish Ms. Huffman’s professional incompetence through expert testimony.

1. Facts Relevant to Ms. Huffman’s Representation During Jury Selection.

The facts pertinent to this claim fall in two separate categories. First are statements made by and

about the attorneys involved in the trial, Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco, describing their actions and

omissions. Next are excerpts from the voir dire of various Hispanic as well as non-Hispanic selected

and prospective jurors questioned at Carrera’s trial.

a. Statements By and About Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco.

In a declaration executed on December 28, 1987, Ms. Huffman states she does not know why

she failed to make a Wheeler motion as to the stricken Hispanic jurors. When asked if she had a

strategic reason for not advancing a Wheeler motion, she responded she did not. Mr. Guyton N.

Jinkerson, an experienced defense lawyer who has testified as a Strickland expert in a number of

previous cases opines in a declaration executed on December 3, 1987, that because Ms. Huffman cannot

identify a strategic reason for her failure to make a Wheeler motion, her failure to do so amounts

constitutionally deficient representation. Both Ms. Huffman’s December 28, 1987 declaration and Mr. 21

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 No explanation is offered for the mixed up chronology of the declarations. Mr. Jinkerson’s 22

declaration dated December 3, 1987 comments on the content of Ms. Huffman’s declaration dated

December 28, 1987. Both declarations were refiled with the California Supreme Court on January 19,

1988.

Both Mr. Vendrasco’s April 29, 1988 declaration and Ms. Huffman’s June 13, 1988 23

declaration are attached to the State’s return to Carrera’s original state habeas petition.

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Jinkerson’s December 3, 1987 declaration are attached to Carrera’s initial state habeas petition filed on

December 31, 1987.22

In the return to Carrera’s original state habeas petition, the State of California submitted a

declaration over the signature of Mr. Vendrasco dated April 29, 1988. Mr. Vendrasco states that due

to the nearly five year lapse in time between the execution of his declaration and jury selection (which

commenced on June 1, 1983 (CT-2: 287, RT-2: 182), his memory of the jury selection process “has been

substantially diminished.” He also states that for each peremptory strike he made he did have a specific

reason, which he could have articulated at the time if Ms. Huffman had made a contemporaneous

Wheeler motion. His reasons were based on his consideration of responsibility, not race. To dispel the

notion that he wanted to eliminate Hispanics from the jury, he states:

I believed the crimes Constantino Carrera committed were so brutal and senseless that

any responsible juror would hold Carrera responsible if I proved my case. I thought

responsible Hispanic jurors would be very good jurors, as they would not tolerate such

lawless, senseless, brutal and vicious conduct and would be particularly interested in

holding Carrera responsible for his actions.

Carrera’s current federal counsel, Mr. Stephen B. Bedrick, offers a declaration that he personally

thoroughly examined the prosecution files on Carrera’s state trial. Mr. Bedrick specifically was looking

for voir dire notes and Mr. Vendrasco’s reasons for peremptorily striking minority jurors. Mr. Bedrick

reports that “No reasons were contained in the file.” Moreover, there were “no notes whatsoever

regarding any aspect of voir dire or jury selection in the two and one half boxes made available.” Mr.

Bedrick also makes an offer that Mr. Jinkerson Carrera’s Strickland expert, would opine trial lawyers,

both defense and prosecution, at the time of Carrera’s trial invariably would have made and maintained

notes about jury selection.

Ms. Huffman also gave a supplemental declaration filed with the State’s return, executed June

13, 1988, regarding claims that her representation of Carrera was constitutionally ineffective. Like Mr. 23

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Vendrasco, Ms. Huffman also indicates that the passage of five years between the events of the trial and

her declaration have left her with diminished recollection. To become conversant on the subject in

preparation for her declaration, Ms. Huffman reviewed the list of jurors with Hispanic surnames Mr.

Vendrasco struck. She states:

I have read the list of jurors with hispanic surnames that the prosecutor excused by way

of peremptory challenge, and still see no need to make a Wheeler motion in this case.

While I cannot now recall my reasons for any other jurors, I do know that I could not

make a Wheeler motion in regard to the prosecutor’s excusal of potential juror Estrada.

He was my letter carrier.

b. Voir Dire Questioning of and Argument About Selected and

Prospective Jurors.

The following transcript excerpts cover questioning of fourteen Hispanic prospective jurors (or

jurors with Hispanic-sounding surnames) who served on and were excused from service on Carrera’s

jury. These include the six Hispanic jurors Carrera claims should have prompted Ms. Huffman to 24

advance a Wheeler motion. The excerpts also include discussions between the trial court and trial

counsel about Hispanic representation on the venire as a whole, and voir dire excerpts of non-Hispanic

jurors to inform a comparative evaluation of Carrera’s contentions. 

(1) Selected and Prospective Jurors of Hispanic or Reputed

Hispanic Heritage.

Antonio Chavez, who sat on Carrera’s jury, was the first Hispanic juror to be individually

questioned for death qualification and other cause issues. He was asked by Ms. Huffman, “Would you

have any problems, sir, being of Hispanic descent and Hispanic last name, having a problem with Mr.

Carrera being Hispanic, would that cause you any difficulties?” RT-3: 264. After responding in the

negative, Ms. Huffman passed him for cause. Mr. Vendrasco asked him a few death qualifying

questions and passed him for cause as well. Id.: 266. During general voir dire, Mr. Chavez disclosed

he was a letter carrier. RT-4: 649/15. He informed Ms. Huffman he spoke Spanish, but that if the

testimony of any Spanish-speaking witnesses was interpreted, he would listen to the official

interpretation rather than try to interpret himself. Id.: 649/43. If he perceived a mistranslation by the

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court interpreter, he would bring the matter to the attention of the court, rather than wait for the

commencement of deliberations. Id.: 649/44. Mr. Vendrasco elicited that Mr. Chavez had a brother-inlaw in prison, but that Mr. Chavez did not know the crime of which his brother-in-law was convicted.

Id.: 649/64. 

Mr. Vendrasco asked Mr. Chavez further questions on general voir dire about his(Mr. Chavez’s)

incarcerated brother-in-law. Mr. Chavez felt he could be impartial despite the fact he had a brother-inlaw who was serving time in state prison for a crime. RT-5: 708-09. 

Petra Celedon disclosed on death qualification questioning by the trial judge that she had applied

for a summer job as a special education aide beginning the first part of July 1983 through the beginning

of August 1983. RT-3: 282-83. Ms. Huffman questioned and confirmed that Ms. Celedon had a

Spanish-speaking accent. Id.: 285.

On general voir dire, Ms. Celedon was seated in the jury box for final voir dire. RT-5: 759. In

ascertaining that Ms. Celedon could be an impartial juror in the case, the trial judge noted that she

seemed “very bitter.” He asked her if there was something wrong. Id.: 760. She responded, “I wish that

I could be in school with the [special education] kids because this is a special day for them and some of

them have been very anxious because I am not going to be there today.” Id. Ms. Huffman asked her

some further general questions and passed her for cause, again. Id.: 763. Mr. Vendrasco passed her for

cause again after eliciting from her that she could sit in judgment of another person. Id. Ms. Huffman

reopened her questioning to inquire about Ms. Celedon’s Spanish-speaking abilities. Ms. Celedon

agreed she would have no problems listening to the court interpreter rather than relying on her own

understanding of what witnesses were saying. Ms. Celedon further confirmed that if she heard

something that was misinterpreted, she would bring that fact to the court’s attention. Id.: 763-64. A

short time later, Mr. Vendrasco exercised a peremptory challenge as to Ms. Celedon. Id.: 770.

Manuel J. Estrada immediately disclosed to the court and the parties that he was Ms. Huffman’s

residential letter carrier, but that he could still be impartial. Id.: 312. Before passing him for cause, Mr.

Vendrasco asked him one question about death qualification and elicited a negative response to the

question: “And the fact that the defendant might be Hispanic, that’s no consideration [sic] to you one

way or another?” Id.: 316. 

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Mr. Estrada was seated in the jury box during general jury selection (and peremptory challenges).

Ms. Huffman elicited from him that he and prospective juror Antonia Chavez knew each other from

being letter carriers, even though they worked out of different stations. In fact, they were friends. RT-5:

671. Ms. Huffman further elicited that Mr. Estrada had a brother who had an undisclosed experience

with law enforcement causing Mr. Estrada to have “a problem” with “the judicial system.” Id.: 672.

Ms. Huffman then passed him for cause (again). Id.

Mr. Vendrasco questioned Mr. Estrada further about the fact that he was Ms. Huffman’s

residential letter carrier. Mr. Estrada said he could be impartial because he didn’t know Ms. Huffman.

Id.: 673. During further private voir dire in the trial judge’s chambers, Mr. Estrada revealed his view

that since there are numerous law enforcement personnel on the witness list, they likely all would “stick

together.” Id.: 694. The trial judge and Ms. Huffman explained that evidence from law enforcement

officer s pertains to the various pieces of the investigation. Id.: 694-96. Mr. Vendrasco clarified that

there would be no police officer eye-witnesses and further that officers do not have to stick together in

the context of a criminal investigation. Id.: 696, 699. Mr. Vendrasco struck Mr. Estrada on a

peremptory challenge. Id.: 725.

Richard S. Mara stated he was a teamster truck driver for United Parcel Service. RT-3: 378, 382.

Ms. Huffman ascertained he could vote for the death penalty or life without parole, as the facts of the

case indicated would be appropriate. Id.: 380. Mr. Vendrasco only asked him if he could vote the death

penalty in certain circumstances. Id.: 382. 

On general voir dire, Mr. Mara reiterated his occupation as a truck driver, marital status, and

parentage of three children. RT-5: 779-80. Mr. Mara explained to Ms. Huffman that he previously was

a victim of an assault by a “Mexican fellow” who spoke no English, and that all proceedings had to be

conducted with an interpreter. Id.: 780. He also said that in the present trial it would make no difference

to him whether or not a witness required an interpreter. Id.: 781. Carrera does not acknowledge him

to be Hispanic or of Hispanic origin. The Warden argues he is Hispanic or of Hispanic origin. Mr. Mara

sat on Carrera’s jury. 

To further establish that Mr. Mara is not of Hispanic or Latin heritage, Carrera’s investigator in

federal habeas proceedings located him to interview him about this subject. The offer of proof from the

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investigator, Ms. Pat McGregor, is that Mr. Mara told her his ethnic background was not Spanish and

that he was not Hispanic. Ms. McGregor was not able to obtain a declaration from Mr. Mara because

he would not permit her on his property. The conversation between them was conducted via cellular

telephone with Ms. McGregor sitting in her car outside the locked gate to Mr. Mara’s property, while

he was talking to her from his front porch.

Tony Nunez a prospective juror of Hispanic heritage who eventually was excused for financial

hardship, was asked about his heritage during death qualification by both Ms. Huffman (at the time

Mendez) and Mr. Vendrasco. 

[Question by Ms. Huffman] If you were selected as a juror, sir, your last name is a

Spanish surname and so is mine [Mendez] and Mr. Carrera[‘s]. If you were maybe the

only Spanish surname on the jury, would that cause you any problems in deliberation or

do you feel you could stick with your own feelings without that being any problem?

[Answer] It wouldn’t cause no problems.

RT-3: 392.

[Question by Mr. Vendrasco] Mr. Nunez, defense brought up some questions with regard

to Spanish surnames. Is a fact the defendant has probably a Spanish surname. [sic] Do

you have any problem in reference to possibly convicting him if there is sufficient

evidence? [Answer] No. [Question] In other words, in any race there are bad apples.

[Answer] True.

Id.: 395. A week later, when the trial judge learned that Mr. Nunez would suffer a financial hardship

if called as a juror, he was excused from service on Carrera’s jury. RT-5: 749.

Angelo Urrea, who eventually was seated on Carrera’s jury, was initially subjected to questioning

by Ms. Huffman about his familiarity with media reports of the crime. RT-3: 408. Ms. Huffman then

asked him about his Hispanic heritage.

[Question by Ms. Huffman] Sir, your name is [a] Spanish surname; is that correct?

[Answer] Yes, it is. [Question] And mine is also [Mendez] and so is Mr. Carrera[‘s].

Would this cause you any difficulty if you were picked as a juror and you were the only

gentleman with a Spanish surname with regard to your feelings about the evidence and

the testimony that you heard? [Answer] No, that wouldn’t affect me at all.

RT-3: 409.

Mr. Vendrasco’s entire voir dire was:

[Question] Mr. Urrea, you are not opposed then to the death penalty under certain

circumstances? [Answer] No. [Question] And as far as the Spanish surname or anything

like that, would that cause you any problems if the defendant was Spanish in reference

to convicting him if I proved the case? [Answer] No. [Mr. Vendrasco] I would pass for

cause.

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 Without the juror questionnaires, the Court cannot tell the exact mileage between Mr. 25

Martinez’s Delano home and the Kern County Superior Court in Bakersfield. Mileage therefore is

estimated at approximately 30 miles.

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Id.: 411.

On general voir dire, Mr. Urrea confirmed to Ms. Huffman that he would listen to the interpreter

and not attempt to interpret between Spanish and English himself. He further confirmed he would bring

in any perceived translation mistakes to the court’s attention. RT-5: 784.

Lawrence Martinez, who eventually was stricken by Mr. Vendrasco on a peremptory challenge,

was asked about his Hispanic heritage by both Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco on death qualification.

[Question by Ms. Huffman] Also, Mr. Martinez, you have a Spanish surname, I have a

Spanish surname [Mendez], and Mr. Carrera has a Spanish surname. If you were chosen

as a juror in this case and you were the only one that had a Spanish surname sitting on

the panel, would you feel that you would be under an undue hardship, so to speak, for

want of a better word, feeling you would have to vote just as everyone else did simply

because they might claim because you have a Spanish surname maybe you were being

more lenient or that sort of thing? [Answer] No, I don’t think so. [Question] That would

not enter into your deliberations whatsoever? [Answer] No.

Id.: 463. Ms. Huffman passed him for cause. Id.: 464.

[Question by Mr. Vendrasco] Mr. Martinez, if it turns out the defendant is [of] Spanish

descent, would that cause you any problems in reference to whether you could convict

him of murder and impose the death penalty? [Answer] No. [Question] That has no

significance? [Answer] No. [Question] In other words, you are going to judge the

defendant just as a human being, and if he committed the crime and you believe he

committed the crime, you will convict him, and that race is not really material? [Answer]

No, it is not.

Id.: 464. Mr. Vendrasco passed him for cause. Id.: 465.

Both attorneys also questioned Mr. Martinez about the potential burden of him having to drive

from his home in Delano to Bakersfield for the trial (approximately 30 miles). Mr. Martinez responded 25

to both counsel that the drive between Delano and Bakersfield would not be a hardship for him. Id.:

463-64. He informed Mr. Vendrasco that he knew three different routes he could take. Id.: 464

When Mr. Martinez took a seat in the jury box during final jury selection (and peremptory

challenges), the trial judge questioned him further and Mr. Martinez revealed he was currently disabled

and previously drove a truck. RT-5: 661. Ms. Huffman then elicited that he spoke “very little Spanish”

and would bring the court’s attention to any perceived error in Spanish-English translations by the court

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interpreter. Id.: 662. Ms. Huffman passed Mr. Martinez for cause again. Id.: 664. Mr. Vendrasco

confirmed that Mr. Martinez could keep an open mind about offering immunity to witnesses uninvolved

in the crime and then passed him for cause, again. Id.: 665. The following day, Mr. Vendrasco excused

him on a peremptory challenge. Id.: 779.

Marilyn Torres explained that her Spanish surname was her husband’s last name and that she is

“white.” Id.: 470. Nonetheless, Ms. Huffman asked Ms. Torres about the impact her Spanish surname

would have on her deliberative process were she chosen as a juror. 

[Question] Mrs. Torres, you have a Spanish surname. [Answer] My husband was – I am

white. [Question] Okay. But I’m asking you this: Because you are carrying a Spanish

surname and I have a Spanish surname [Mendez] and so does Mr. Carrera, if you were

the only person on the panel to carry such a name, would you have difficulty regarding

innocence or guilt? [Answer] No. [Question] How about the penalty phase, would you

have a problem with that because you would be the only one on the panel with a Spanish

surname? [Answer] No. [Question] Would that cause you any problems? [Answer] No.

[Question] What I’m asking is if everybody is voting in the opposite direction than you

are voting, would the fact you have a Spanish surname make you more lenient toward

Mr. Carrera or make you more the other way toward Mr. Carrera? [Answer] No.

[Question] You wouldn’t vote against Mr. Carrera not based on the evidence before you

but simply because you didn’t want anybody else on the panel to feel you were being

biased or anything? [Answer] No.

Id.: 470-71.

Mr. Vendraso, then followed suit: “[Question] Mrs. Torres, if it turns out that the defendant is

Spanish, would that cause you any problems whether you could convict him? [Answer] No. [Question]

That would be immaterial; is that correct? [Answer] It doesn’t matter.” Before passing Ms. Torres for

cause, Mr. Vendrasco asked her briefly if she knew Carrera or had been exposed to media reports about

the crime. Id.: 471. 

Prior to general voir dire, Ms. Torres obtained a letter from her employer indicating she would

not be paid for more than two weeks of jury duty. RT-5: 700. Both Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco

agreed she should be excused due to financial hardship. Id. 700-01. The trial judge thereupon excused

her. Id.: 701.

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 The peremptory challenge as to Ms. Torres is not contended by Carrera to amount to

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discrimination in selecting the jury because she is white. The individual voir dire is recited here to

inform the Court’s decision about the type of questioning conducted by Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco

during jury selection.

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Notwithstanding the excusal, Ms. Torres came up for general voir dire in the jury box. Id.: 727.

Then Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco both passed her for cause. Id.: 728. Mr. Vendrasco struck Ms.

Torres on a peremptory challenge. Id.: 733. 26

Maria Carrillo was asked during voir dire, by both Ms. Huffman and Mr. Vendrasco about her

Spanish surname.

[Question by Ms. Huffman] Mrs. Carrillo, first I would have to ask you if you were

chosen as a juror in this case, due to the fact that you have a Spanish surname and so

does Mr. Carrera, and in fact I do too [Mendez], would you have any problems with that?

Would you feel that you should be a little more harsh or a little more biased? Would that

cause you any problems at all in this case? [Answer] No. [Question] You feel that if you

made a determination on the evidence as it was presented to you and went into the jury

room to deliberate and you were the only one with a Spanish surname, would you back

down in your determination simply because – maybe some pressure brought upon you,

or would you stay firmly convinced with your decision until the jurors changed your

decision by logic and on the evidence itself? [Answer] Huh-uh, no. [Question] You don’t

feel that would have any – you would have any problems with that? [Answer] I don’t

think so.

RT-3: 514-15. On further questions about her view on the death penalty, Ms. Huffman elicited a

negative answer from Ms. Carrillo when she asked, “do you believe there are cases where the only

penalty possible is the death penalty?” Id.: 516. Ms. Carrillo also admitted there are “some cases”

where the appropriate penalty is life without parole. Id. 

Mr. Vendrasco’s initial focus was whether Ms. Carrillo was “totally against the death penalty.”

Ms. Carrillo responded in the negative. Id.: 517. After securing these answers, Mr. Vendraso elicited

a positive response to the following: “And do you understand that race or nationality of the defendant,

whether he is Mexican or anything other, is of really no significance in the trial. Do you understand

that?” Id.: 518.

On general voir dire, Ms. Carrillo confirmed to the trial judge that she is a housewife with three

children, two living at home, and that her husband is a truck driver. She could be impartial if selected

as a juror. RT-5: 729. Her now-grown son had been picked up when he was 13 or 14 with some of his

friends for stealing. She had no animosity toward law enforcement on account of this. Id.: 731. Ms.

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Carrillo told Mr. Vendrasco she thought that her son was using drugs at the time of his (juvenile) arrest.

Id.: 732. Though she confirmed she was against drugs, she assured him she would listen to the

testimony of a witness even if that witness used drugs. Id.: 733. Mr. Vendrasco exercised a peremptory

challenge with respect to Ms. Carrillo during final jury selection. Id.: 750.

Mary Dolores Garcia was passed for cause after lengthy questioning about her ability to impose

the death penalty. Voir dire by the trial judge commenced as follows:

[Question by the judge] If you, as a juror, are convinced that the death penalty should

be imposed, could you vote that way? [Answer] No. [Question] You could not vote for

the death penalty under any circumstances? [Answer] No, I don’t think so. [Question]

You don’t think so. Now, the law provides that those are the only two penalties

appropriate, and I will tell the jury to consider both penalties. Now, would you refuse

even to consider the possibility of a death penalty? Let me ask you this way: I am not

talking about this particular case right now because you don’t know anything about this

case, you don’t know anything about the defendant here. I am talking in general terms

about any case, first degree murder with special circumstances. Can you think of a case

where the crime for instance is so vicious that the death penalty should be imposed?

[Answer] Well, yeah, in that case, yeah.

RT-4: 540. 

Ms. Huffman asked about the impact Ms. Garcia’s Spanish surname would have on her

evaluation of the case.

[Question byMs. Huffman] Miss Garcia, your last name is a Spanish surname, as is mine

[Mendez] and as is Mr. Carrera[‘s]. If you were chosen as a juror in this case, would you

be extremely harsh on Mr. Carrera because he has a last name that’s Spanish? [Answer]

No. [Question] Do you feel that if you were in the jury room debating the case with the

other jurors that the fact maybe you would be the only one with a Spanish surname in

there, do you think that would cause you any problems with the other jurors? [Answer]

No. [Question] You feel that you could look at the case, look at the evidence and the

testimony as it comes in and make up your decision, and just because you have the

Spanish surname it wouldn’t cause you any problem at all? [Answer] No.

Id.: 541.

Mr. Vendrasco followed suit regarding Ms. Garcia’s Hispanic heritage:

[Question by Mr. Vendrasco] Miss Garcia, would you have any problem in reference to

possibly being more lenient toward Mr. Carrera let’s say if he is Spanish for one reason

or another? [Answer] No. [Question] His name or nationality have no effect on your

decision. Is that correct? [Answer] Right.

Id.: 542.

Regarding Ms. Garcia’s ability to vote for the death penalty, Ms. Huffman elicited from her that

she would give the sentencing factors stated by the trial judge “due consideration” before voting for

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either penalty. Id.: 542. Mr. Vendrasco also elicited from her that there are circumstances which would

lead her to vote for the ultimate penalty, as where the defendant committed the murder or murders in a

particularly vicious fashion. Id.: 543. During general voir dire, Ms. Huffman elicited that Ms. Garcia

speaks Spanish. RT-4: 649/59. Ms. Garcia agreed that she would listen to the official interpretation

rather than try to interpret herself and further that if she perceived an error in the interpretation, she

would bring that matter to the court’s attention. Id.: 649/59-60. Mr. Vendrasco elicited that Ms. Garcia

had a sister on probation, but that she thought she could be impartial. Id.: 649/65. A short time later,

Mr. Vendrasco stuck Ms. Garcia on a peremptory challenge. RT-5: 659. 

Alicia Torres Grijalva and the trial judge engaged in quite a lengthy dialogue about whether she

would have a financial hardship if she were chosen. She wasn’t sure her employer would pay her for

prolonged jury service. RT-4: 618-19. During Ms. Huffman’s questioning, Ms. Grijalva disclosed that

she believed in the death penalty. Id.: 621. She would be inclined to vote for life without parole if the

defendant had some type of mental problem, but this would be only grounds for a life without parole

vote. Id.: 621-22. After confirming that Ms. Grijalva would not consider evidence of the a defendant’s

family background, youthfulness, and lack of criminal history to be mitigating, Ms. Huffman moved to

challenge her for cause. Id.: 627. After Mr. Vendrasco confirmed that Ms. Grijalva would follow the

court’s instructions, including instructions on the burden of proof, the trial judge denied Ms. Huffman’s

cause challenge. Id.; 628-30. Neither attorney asked her about her Spanish surname or effect her

Hispanic heritage (if any) would have on her impartiality as a juror. Ms. Grijilva’s name was not called

for general voir dire and peremptory challenges. 

Barbara Louise Cota was asked by Mr. Vendrasco on death qualification voir dire if Carrera’s

ethnicity would present any issues. She responded it would not. RT-5: 847. On general voir for

alternate juror selection, Ms. Cota informed Ms. Huffman that she does speak Spanish but that she

would listen to testimony through the interpreter and bring to the court’s attention the occurrence of any

mis-translation. RT-6: 1056. Carrera conceded in his Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities

that Ms. Cota is Hispanic (Reply Memo of Ps and As, p. 30) and then denied Ms. Cota’s Hispanic

heritage in his evidentiary hearing motion. The Warden contends she is Hispanic. Ms. Cota was

selected as a alternate juror.

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Vincent B. Calaustro emerged from death qualification without being asked any questions about

ethnicity, Hispanic heritage, or the Spanish language. Id.: 855-61. Likewise, the questioning of Mr.

Calaustro on general voir steered clear of ethnicity, Hispanic heritage, and Spanish language issues.

Rather, he described his family and his wife’s occupation. RT-6:1068-70. Mr. Calaustro eventually was

selected as an alternate juror spot on Carrera’s jury. The Warden suggests he is Hispanic and Carrera

maintains he is not.

Alice Hernandez disclosed on death qualification questioning by the trial judge that she could

vote for life without parole or the death penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. RT-6: 958-

59. She told Ms. Huffman she believed in the death penalty. Id.: 959. Ms. Huffman also inquired about

Ms. Hernandez’s Hispanic origin:

[Question by Ms. Huffman] Mrs. Hernandez, you carry a Spanish surname, and so do I

[Mendez], so does Mr. Carrera. If you were the only person on the jury that went into

deliberation with a Spanish last name, would you, because Mr. Carrera has a Spanish last

name, would you hold him to a higher degree of let’s say innocence because of that?

[Answer] No. [Question] Would you hold him to a higher degree of guilt because of the

Latin surname? [Answer] No. [Question] In other words, I am asking you, you wouldn’t

expect the District Attorney or make the District Attorney prove more to you before you

could come up with a guilty verdict simply because of the last name? [Answer] No.

[Question] And you wouldn’t expect the District Attorney to prove less to you because

of the last name? [Answer] No. [Question] You wouldn’t, in other words, be intimidated

by the fact that you are the only juror in the jury room with a Spanish surname? [Answer]

No. [Question] And if you made your decision, unless it could be changed by discussion

with the other jurors and proved to you to your satisfaction, you wouldn’t change your

vote simply because of the last name, would you? [Answer] No. 

Id.: 961-62.

Mr. Vendrasco elicited that Ms. Hernandez worked for the Juvenile Probation Department as

group counselor housekeeper: “[Question by Mr. Vendrasco] Where do you work? [Answer] I work for

the Probation Department as a group counselor housekeeper. [Question] Is that in juvenile? [Answer]

Yes.” Id.: 963. She confirmed that she could vote for the death penalty if she “had enough proof,” and

that whether the defendant had a Spanish surname wouldn’t be a factor of his criminal responsibility.

Id.: 963. Ms. Huffman then reopened questioning about Ms. Hernandez’s employment in the Kern

County Juvenile Hall. She elicited that Ms. Hernandez had personal contact with juveniles housed at

Juvenile Hall as part of her job. She worked with detainees in housekeeping. Id.: 964. While it was

possible Ms. Hernandez would recall a specific name, for instance, Ramiro Ruiz, ordinarily she only

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remembered a name if the juvenile presented problems. Id. She did not recall hearing any one at

Juvenile Hall talk about this case. Id.: 965.

When Ms. Hernandez was seated in the jury box for general voir dire, the trial judge asked her

again about her employment with juvenile detainees at the Kern County Juvenile Hall. Id.: 1032. Mr.

Vendrasco struck her on a peremptory challenge a short time later without asking her any further

questions. Id.: 1040.

(2) Discussion About Hispanic Representation on the Venire and

the Jury Panel During Voir Dire.

The issue of racial and ethnic balance on the jury came up at the very beginning of jury selection,

on June 1, 1983. The trial judge commented that a motion had been advanced by Ms. Huffman

regarding representation of minorities on the venire. The trial judge counted 14 prospective jurors in

the first panel (of 60 total) with Spanish surnames. Ms. Huffman responded that she was satisfied with

the proportion of Hispanic prospective jurors. RT-2: 232-33. During jury selection on June 6, 1983,

the trial judge ventured his opinion that there was a “fair representation” on the second panel of

prospective jurors. Ms. Huffman concurred, but Mr. Vendrasco objected “to a representation like an

affirmative action [sic] on the panel.” RT-3: 522. After the trial judge questioned and excused another

prospective juror (on the grounds of hardship), Ms. Huffman inquired further about Mr. Vendrasco’s

“affirmative action” objection. He responded, “My objection is that the defense attorney has not

established a prima facie case of discrimination, so we shouldn’t even be getting into the issue of how

many people of Hispanic descent are on the jury panel.” Id.: 524. Ms. Huffman ventured that the “fair

representation” comment pertained to her earlier motion regarding the proportion of Hispanic people

on the venire, and that the trial judge simply reaffirmed that concern “to show that the jury panel is being

selected – I mean balanced, and therefore I did not have to renew my motion.” Id. The trial judge

concurred and further commented, “I think for the purposes of this particular case, whatever the selection

process is, we have ended up with a jury panel that is representative, and I think it makes everything else

moot.” Id.: 524-25. Mr. Vendraso, still concerned, replied,

My only objection then would be when you are seeking to balance it in your own mind,

whether you are expecting to come up with exact proportionate numbers or are you

looking just at just general balance. I don’t see any problem looking towards the general

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balance, but before, if you are expecting a certain number of people to be Hispanics or

something, I think that has to be shown and proven. That’s my only objection. . . . If we

are looking towards a general balance, I don’t have any problem with that.

Id.: 525. 

(3) Selected and Prospective Jurors Not of Hispanic Heritage.

In addition to questioning people with Latin-sounding last names about the effect their Hispanic

heritage would have on the ability to serve as impartial jurors, a number of non-Hispanic prospective

jurors were questioned about the fact that Carrera was Hispanic and/or that some witnesses might not

speak English. Ms. Huffman asked prospective juror Eugene Turner about his status as “a minority.”27

[Question by Ms. Huffman] Mr. Turner, would you have any difficulties if you were

chosen as a juror in this case due to the fact that Mr. Carrera is a minority and you are a

minority and maybe you would be the only minority in the jury? Would that cause you

any difficulties in the way you would want to vote? [Answer] By being a minority?

[Question] Right. [Answer] No, it wouldn’t.

RT-4: 639. She also asked a number of non-Hispanic jurors if they would “hold it against” someone 28

who only spoke Spanish and had their testimony relayed through a court interpreter. RT-4: 649/37-38

(Thelda Jean Young, who sat on Carrera’s jury), id.: 649/53 (Murrill Wagoner, eventually stricken by

Ms. Huffman on a peremptory challenge), RT-5: 691 (Jettie Cargill, eventually stricken by Mr.

Vendrasco on a peremptory challenge), id.: 766 (James Elder, eventually stricken by Ms. Huffman), id.:

769 (Evelyn Glines, eventually stricken by Ms. Huffman); id.: 774 (Emmit Renfroe, eventually stricken

by Ms. Huffman). Ms. Huffman asked one prospective juror if she would listen to the testimony of

Spanish-speaking witnesses through an interpreter just as she would listen to the testimony of anyone

else. RT-6: 1015 (Dorothy Rankin, eventually stricken by Mr. Vendrasco). Prospective juror Bonnie

Mangrum said that she would have a problem listening to testimony through an interpreter because she

believed if people live in the United States, they should speak English. Id.: 1021-22. Ms. Huffman

passed her for cause, but excused her on a peremptory challenge. Id.: 1023, 1032. Prospective juror

Clifton Garrett, a college professor at Bakersfield College, spoke fluent Spanish and French (in addition

to English). Ms. Huffman elicited that Professor Garrett would bring to the court’s attention any errors

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 The Petition additionally alleges the discriminatory strikes were exacerbated by sustained cause

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challenges to Spanish surnamed prospective jurors “based on nonspecific opposition to the death

penalty.” No further argument on this allegation is advanced and the Court considers it abandoned.

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in translation, should they occur. Id.: 1026-27. (Mr. Vendrasco excused him on a peremptory challenge

after ascertaining that he would suffer moral anguish to sit in judgment of someone else. Id.: 1028.).

Prospective jurors Marvin Felli, Thomas Yale, Francis Taylor, Gregory Brewkart confirmed to Ms.

Huffman that they would have no problems with an interpreter. Id.: 1037, 1043, 1045, 1048. All ended

up serving on Carrera’s jury.

2. Carrera’s Argument.

Carrera complains that Mr. Vendrasco’s peremptory challenges as to six Hispanic prospective

jurors, Mary Garcia, Manuel Estrada, Maria Carrillo, Petra Celedon, Lawrence Martinez and Alice

Hernandez, should have prompted Ms. Huffman to object under People v. Wheeler 22 Cal. 3d 258. In

that case, the California Supreme Court concluded that “use of peremptory challenges to remove

prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a

representative cross-section of the community.” Id. at 276-77. Carrera’s points and authorities in

support of the Petition add that the equal protection prohibition against discriminatory jury selection

mandated under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, also applies. Even though Batson was decided in 29

1986, three years after Carrera’s trial, he argues it is controlling because it was decided before the

conclusion of direct appeal proceedings and is retroactive. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322

(1987). He adds that the prohibition against racial discrimination on equal protection grounds in jury

selection also predated the trial under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Had Ms. Huffman

challenged Mr. Vendrasco’s peremptory strikes pursuant to Wheeler, the issue would have been

preserved under Batson.

To demonstrate Ms. Huffman’s deficient representation, he makes a number of assumptions and

arguments. First, he notes that Ms. Huffman’s strategy was to have Hispanics on Carrera’s jury. It is

for this reason that she challenged the racial composition of the venire at the commencement of jury

selection. Inexplicably to Carrera, however, when she was satisfied the venire met fair cross section

requirements, she exercised no control over selection of the petit jury. Carrera surmises that she appears

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 This particular requirement of Wheelerfor measuring the sufficiency of a prima facie case was

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struck down by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005), as overly

demanding.

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not to have understood the distinction between starting off with a representative venire and prohibiting

the prosecutor from striking individual members of that venire on racially discriminatory grounds. He

claims she admitted as much in her declaration. Specifically, he argues Ms. Huffman had no strategic

reason to accept Mr. Vendrasco’s challenges toLawrenceMartinez, Maria Carrillo, or Alice Hernandez.

 As an ancillary matter, Carrera maintains that Ms. Huffman (as well as Mr. Vendrasco) disregarded the

duty to maintain a record of voir dire proceedings.

Carrera cites one Ninth Circuit case and three Eleventh Circuit cases for the proposition that an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim will lie for the attorney’s failure to advance a Batson motion.

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 583-85 (9th Cir. 2005) (implicitly approving the district court’s

finding that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not advancing a Batson motion at trial);

Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 940 (11th Cir. 2001); Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir.

1991); Goodwin v. Balcom, 684 F.2d 794, 807 (11th Cir. 1982).

As Carrera correctly points out, under the first step in the Batson/ Wheeler analysis, the Court

is called upon to decide whether the objection to a peremptory strike is sufficient to state a prima facie

case. A prima facie case, in turn is based on the removal of members of a cognizable racial group and

circumstances which raise an inference that the peremptory strikes were motivated by race. Batson, 476

U.S. at 96; accord Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280 (same except the circumstances “must show a strong

likelihood” that the strikes were motivated by racial considerations). Carrera argues an inference of 30

discrimination under Wheeler and Batson could have been advanced on two separate bases. First,

statistical disparities exist. Mr. Vendrasco used peremptory challenges to strike a disproportionate

number of Hispanics from the panel, that is six out of eight (75% of ) qualified Hispanic prospective

jurors who were passed for cause. See Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.23d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (prima

facie case established when the prosecutor struck four out of seven Hispanics); Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003); Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other

grounds, Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999). Carrera also points to the disparity between that

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percentage of Hispanic jurors struck (75%) with the percentage of white jurors struck (26%), as well as

with the low percentage of qualified Hispanic jurors on the venire (17%) in the first place. See Turner,

63 F.3d at 813. 

Carrera maintains a second basis for an inference of discrimination is established by Mr.

Vendrasco’s differential voir dire questioning. Citing the questions posed to prospective jurors

Lawrence Martinez, Maria Carrillo, and Mary Garcia, Carrera argues the questions Mr. Vendrasco

reserved for Hispanic jurors reveals an underlying discriminatory purpose. See Miller-El v. Cockrell,

437 U.S. at 343; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). As to each of these prospective jurors,

Mr. Vendrasco is said to have asked pointedly ethnic specific questions about how each prospective

juror’s Hispanic heritage would affect impartiality, and particularly bias in favor of Carrera. In all other

respects, he contends, these prospective jurors were qualified to serve on a death penalty case, both

because they would consider voting for the death penalty and because they were able to serve. He

maintains this type of questioning shows a discriminatory purpose because no white juror was

questioned in this manner. In his Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities Carrera argues that Mr.

Vendrasco’s discriminatory purpose is apparent in his objection to “affirmative action” type jury

selection considerations. He claims this anti-affirmative action argument shows hostility to the equal

protection rights of minority jurors.

Citing Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 416 (1991), Carrera argues the fact that two Hispanic

people sat on Carrera’s jury does not defeat the establishment of a prima facie case. Even one

improperly challenged juror is the basis of a violation under Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96. See United

States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that under the equal protection framework

of Batson, the striking of one juror on racial grounds is a violation), overruling on other grounds

recognized, Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1171, n. 10 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also People v. Snow, 44

Cal. 3d 216, 226 (1987) (passing some minority jurors may show non-discriminatory purpose, but is not

conclusive in ruling on a Wheeler objection). He also refutes the notion raised in the Warden’s

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 In his September 13, 2005 Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities to the Petition, 31

Carrera concedes this fact, but in his December 7, 2005 reply to the Warden’s opposition brief to the

evidentiary hearing motion, he states that Ms. Cota was not Hispanic.

 Carrera’s first state habeas petition, which included the present claim, was filed December 31, 32

1987, a year and a half before his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme

Court on August 17, 1989 and just over four years after the Kern County Superior Court filed a

commitment for his execution on October 14, 1983. The Warden does not contest that the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was timely under California rules.

 Former Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provided: 33

A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is an

officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing

unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had

knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial

to the state occurred.

Rule 9 was amended and completely rewritten in 2004 to conform to AEDPA provision 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3) and (4) concerning the filing of successive petitions.

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opposition papers that seated juror Richard Mara and alternate juror Vincent Calaustro were Hispanic,

but he concedes that alternate juror Barbara Cota was Hispanic.31

Carrera points out that once a prima facie case of discrimination in the jury selection process is

established, the burden shifts to the prosecution “to come forward with a neutral explanation” for the

peremptory strikes, Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, and a showing “that the peremptory challenges were not

predicated on group bias alone,” Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281. Carrera maintains the Warden cannot meet

this burden. First, as noted from Mr. Vendrasco’s April 29, 1988 declaration, he could not recall the

reasons he peremptorily challenged six Hispanic jurors in June 1983. Carrera does not dispute the

notion that if Mr. Vendrasco could not recall the reasons for his peremptory strikes in 1988, he is not

likely to have perfected his memory nearly 20 years later. But, he argues, the reason Mr. Vendrasco

cannot remember any race-neutral reasons for the strikes is because there weren’t any. Nor is the

passage of time an excuse for not having to demonstrate race-neutral reasons. Carrera maintains he

brought the claim of ineffective counsel for failing to advance a Wheeler/Batson motion as soon as he

could and in timely post-conviction proceedings, so there was no untoward delay and no basis for the 32

Warden to invoke the laches protections of former Rule 9 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.33

He cites United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that

since Mr. Vendrasco cannot recall his race-neutral reason for striking six Hispanic jurors, the remedy

is to vacate the conviction and conduct a new trial. He claims Mr. Vendrasco’s failure to provide raceCase 1:90-cv-00478-AWI Document 286 Filed 03/11/08 Page 38 of 78
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neutral reasons for his strikes and the absence of any notes in the prosecution records raises an inference

of discrimination. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 171, n. 6 (2005) (noting “the prosecutor’s refusal

to justify his strike in light of the court’s request . . . would provide additional support for the inference

of discrimination raised by the defendant’s prima facie case”). Referring to the offered opinion of

Strickland expert Mr. Jinkerson, he argues it is inconceivable that a trial lawyer, either defense or

prosecution, would not maintain notes about jury selection. In his evidentiary hearing motion, he

specifically asks the Court to draw an inference that even though no jury selection notes exist in the

prosecution file, Mr. Vendrasco, in fact, wrote notes contemporaneous with voir dire, but destroyed or

discarded those notes because they would have undermined his credibility on the issue of discriminatory

purpose underlying the peremptory strikes.

Addressing the Warden’s argument about race neutral reasons Mr. Vendrasco might have had

or did have for exercising peremptory strikes, Carrera argues the Court should not consider these after

the fact “conjured up” explanations. First, he maintains, the reasons supplied by the Warden are

pretextual. Second, Batson only permits consideration of the prosecutor’s actual reason, not someone

else’s conjectured reason for the peremptory strikes. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172; Paulino v. Castro, 371

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Under the equal protection analysis, even in the absence of prosecution evidence of race-neutral

reasons for the peremptory strikes, Carrera points out that this Court still ultimately must decide if

purposeful discrimination has been established. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; (ultimately, the reviewing court

determines the persuasiveness of the evidence); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (same).

Under the fair cross section analysis utilized in California, if the prosecution fails to sustain its burden

of producing evidence after the objecting party establishes a prima facie case, the presumption of validity

of the peremptory challenge is rebutted and relief must be granted. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 282. Carrera

argues that the failure of the Warden to rebut Carrera’s prima facie case requires that his conviction be

vacated and the case remanded to state court for a new trial.

3. Analysis.

To prevail on Claim 20, Carrera must demonstrate that Ms. Huffman’s failure to raise an

objection to the prosecution peremptory jury strikes of six Hispanic jurors was both constitutionally

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deficient and prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish constitutionally deficient

representation, he must demonstrate that her conduct fell below an “objective standard of

reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The assessment of Ms. Huffman’s performance, however, must be made

from her perspective at the time of Carrera’s trial, and must “eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight.” Id. at 689. Further, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and, accordingly, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential.” Id. In the context of this case, the prejudice prong requires

a showing that had Ms. Huffman advanced a Wheeler motion during jury selection, she would have

prevailed, or at least have established a prima facie case. See id. at 694 (to establish prejudice a habeas

petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391

(2000).

 Although Carrera argues the standards set forth under Batson apply to the selection of his jury,

that case was not in existence until three years after his trial was completed. No challenge to the petit

jury selection process was preserved at trial. Indeed that is the basis for Carrera’s present ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, even though Batson would be applicable had Ms. Huffman

advanced a Wheeler motion, see Paulino, 3741 F.3d at 1088, n. 4, the requirements for establishing a

Batson error claim are not controlling. See Randolph v. Delo, 952 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 1991)

(counsel did not perform deficiently for failure to object under the precepts of Batson where jury

selection occurred two days before Batson was decided). 

Rather, the Court must view Ms. Huffman’s performance in the context of what the applicable

law was at the time of Carrera’s trial, that is under Swain v. Alabama for equal protection claims and

Wheeler for fair representation claims under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court has no

occasion to consider the Warden’s laches argument under former Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing §

2254 Cases or Carrera’s contention that the Court should draw an inference that Mr. Vendrasco in fact

did have a discriminatory purpose when striking six of the eight qualified Hispanic jurors. Claim 20 is

not a Batson or even a Wheeler claim. It is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Notwithstanding

Carrera’s argument that Mr. Vendrasco should have maintained records of jury selection, the fact

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 As Carrera correctly points out, to prevail under the re-articulated equal protection standard

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in Batson, the defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, that is, an

inference that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges were exercised “to exclude veniremen from the

petit jury on account of their race.” 476 U.S. at 96. Among the “relevant circumstances” informing the

establishment of a prima facie case are a pattern of strikes against members of a cognizable group, or

the prosecutor’s racially differential questioning of potential jurors. Id. at 97. Once the defendant has

made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral

explanation for challenging the stricken jurors. Id. at 97. This requires the prosecutor to articulate

neutral explanations related to the particular case to be tried. Id. at 98. In the third step, the trial court

must then evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation to determine the ultimate question of purposeful

discrimination. Id.

 It also was broader and more demanding than a Batson claim. 35

 The Wheeler decision also is based on Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. 22 36

Cal. 3d at 265.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 36

remains, he did not do so, and it is manifest that he was not called upon to do so because no objection

to his peremptory strikes was interposed. 

The Court concludes that under the facts presented and the legal landscape for petit jury selection

mandated under Swain v. Alabama and People v. Wheeler, Ms. Huffman was not required to advance

a Wheeler motion to fulfill her legal responsibilities to Carrera. First, although a Wheeler motion would

have preserved an appellate claim under Batson, it would not have done so under Swain. To have

established an equal protection violation under Swain, Ms. Huffman would have had to demonstrate that

Mr. Vendrasco struck qualified Hispanics (or other minorities) “in case after case, whatever the

circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim.” See 380 U.S. at 223.

Swain did not permit an equal protection challenge based the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges in a

particular case. There had to be a pattern and practice established over a period of time. Id. at 224. Not

until Batson was decided, twenty-one years later, did the Court substantially reduce the “crippling”

evidentiary burden for a criminal defendant to establish an equal protection violation in the jury selection

process. 476 U.S. at 92-93.34

A claim for discriminatory jury selection under California law at the time of Carrera’s trial was

significantly less burdensome that required under Swain. Rather than being based on the Equal

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Protection Clause, the right recognized in the 1978 Wheeler case was (and is) based on the impartial jury

guarantee in the Sixth Amendment. Wheeler held that “use peremptory challenges to remove 36

prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a

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 Although the court in Wheelerstates that the objecting party must show a strong likelihood that 37

peremptory strikes were made because of group bias, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, on the next page of the opinion,

the court instructs that the trial court faced with a jury selection objection “must determine whether a

reasonable inference arises” that the peremptory challenges were made on the basis of group bias. Id.

at 281. Much discussion about whether “a strong likelihood” and a “reasonable inference” have the

same meaning for purposes of a Wheeler motion has ensued, with the final word handed down by the

United States Supreme Court that they do not have the same meaning. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168.

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representative cross-section of the community.” 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77. A prima facie case under

Wheeler, as it existed at the time of Carrera’s trial, required the offended party (either the defendant or

the People) to establish that prospective jurors stricken were members of a cognizable group and “a

strong likelihood that such persons [were] being challenged because of their group association rather

than because of any specific bias.” Id. at 280. If the court was satisfied a prima facie case had been

made, the burden shifted to the offending party to show “that the peremptorychallenges in question were

not predicated on group bias alone,” but “on groundsthat were reasonably relevant to the particular case

on trial or its parties or witnesses – i.e., for reasons of specific bias.” Id. at 281, 282. 

Wheeler has since been overruled in one significant particular. As noted previously, in Johnson,

545 U.S. 162, the Court held that the standard of proof, “a strong likelihood,” required by California

courts under Wheeler was too rigorous; the Constitution only requires sufficient evidence to permit an 37

inference that discrimination has occurred. Id. at 170.

Besides having to show a strong likelihood of discriminatory purpose, California litigants

advancing a Wheeler motion prior to 1987 were additionally burdened if the offending party left two or

three members of the stricken cognizable group on the panel. In that event, the right to a representative

cross section of jurors from the community was considered vindicated. See People v. Davis, 189 Cal.

App. 3d 1177, 1191 (1987) (quoting People v. Boyde, 167 Cal App. 3d 36, 47 (1985), overruled by

People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d at 225-26. After the 1987 decision in Snow, the California courts no longer

tolerated the practice of attorneys shielding discriminatory jury strikes by leaving two or three jurors of

a disputed cognizable group on the panel, but rather evaluated the presence of minorities on a jury panel

as some evidence (but not conclusive evidence) of “the prosecutor’s good faith in exercising his

peremptoriness.” Id. at 225. 

Carrera points out that two Hispanic jurors sat on his jury, Antonio Chavez and Angelo Urrea.

Carrera’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Petition discloses that Mr. Chavez

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was the third juror and Mr. Urrea was the fifth. His argument that neither seated juror Richard Mara nor

alternate juror Vincent Calaustro were Hispanic is persuasive. From the Court’s review their respective

voir dire statements, nothing in their answers, or even in the questions posed to them, suggests they were

Hispanic or spoke Spanish. With respect to Mr. Mara, his lack of Hispanic connection is indicated by

his report that previously he had been assaulted by a “Mexican fellow” who spoke no English and that

the ensuing court proceedings were conducted with the aid of a court interpreter. His flat out denial of

Hispanic heritage to Carrera’s investigator also is very persuasive. Mr. Calaustro’s voir dire is simply

devoid of any suggestion one way or the other about his ethnicity. The Court does find, however, that

alternate juror Barbara Cota spoke Spanish and is conceded by Carrera to be Hispanic or of Hispanic

heritage in his September 13, 2005 Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities (p. 30). 

Looking at the petit jury selection process in light of the now discredited practice of trial courts

discounting claims of discriminatory strikes when two or three jurors of a cognizable group were left

on the panel, Ms. Huffman’s declaration testimony that she still sees no basis for a Wheeler motion has

more authority. There were two confirmed Hispanics on the actual jury panel, and one likely Hispanic

(or at least a Spanish speaker) sitting as an alternate. While Carrera is correct that under Batson, the

presence of Mr. Chavez and Mr. Urrea on the jury would not be dispositive of lack of discriminatory

purpose in striking the other six Hispanics, at the time of Carrera’s trial that was a practice sanctioned

by California courts. See Boyde, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 47; Davis, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1191. The fact that

Hispanic jurors were left on the panel early in the selection process (third and fifth seats) was grounds

to defeat a Wheeler motion.

Separate from the probability that a Wheeler motion would have failed because two Hispanic

jurors left on the panel could demonstrate vindication of the fair representation requirement, Carrera has

not sustained his burden of showing that Ms. Huffman could have demonstrated a strong likelihood of

group bias based on the responses the six stricken Hispanic jurors gave on voir dire. The strikes against

three of those prospective Hispanic jurors, Petra Celedon, Manual J. Estrada, and Mary Dolores Garcia,

has not generated individual, specific argument by Carrera. Evaluation of their voir dire responses along

with the responses of Lawrence Martinez, Maria Carrillo, and Alice Hernandez nonetheless is made for

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the sake of completeness. The record evidence does not establish a strong likelihood the peremptory

strikes against any of these jurors were motivated by discriminatory purpose or group bias.

Petra Celedon. Ms. Celedon’s voir dire responses made it clear she did not want to serve on

Carrera’s jury. She had applied for a summer job as a special education aide beginning July through

August 1983 and she was currently working as a special education aide. On general voir dire, the trial

judge noted that she seemed bitter about her presence on the venire. Ms. Celedon explained that she had

her mind on her work with her special education students. The record evidence does not show that the

peremptory strike against her was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 

Manuel J. Estrada. Although Carrera has terminated his focus from the peremptory strike against

Mr. Estrada because he was Ms. Huffman’s residential letter carrier, there are at least two additional

reasons that would have supported Mr. Vendraso’s peremptory challenge on non-discriminatory grounds.

The first is that Mr. Estrada was friends with prospective and ultimately seated juror Antonio Chavez.

They knew each other because they were both letter carriers for the Post Office. Second, Mr. Estrada

voiced some distrust as to the judicial system because of his belief that law enforcement personnel would

“stick together.” Even though he seemed satisfied that the cohesiveness of law enforcement officers

would not be an issue in this case, the distrust expressed reasonably would have given Mr. Vendrasco

cause to exercise a peremptory strike against him. Ms. Huffman would not have been able to show a

strong likelihood of discriminatory purpose for this strike.

Mary Dolores Garcia. Ms. Garcia initially told the trial judge that she could not vote for the

death penalty. Although she finally admitted that there could be a case so vicious that she could vote

for the death penalty, her residual doubt on this issue was grounds for a peremptory challenge on nondiscriminatory grounds.

Lawrence Martinez. Besides being questioned by both attorneys about his Hispanic heritage and

ability to be impartial, Mr. Martinez was questioned by both attorneys, about the potential burden to him

of having to drive from his home in Delano to Bakersfield every day. The trial judge further elicited

from him that he currently was disabled. Carrera correctly maintains that the nature of Mr. Martinez’s

disability is no where described as in any way connected with his ability to make the estimated 30 mile

drive from Delano to Bakersfield or to sit in the jury box for lengthy periods of time. Carrera argues that

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if Mr. Martinez could sit in a car for a 25 (or 30) mile drive to and from court everyday, he could sit in

the jury box listening to testimony. Nonetheless, the fact that the trial judge elicited Mr. Martinez’s

current occupation as disabled from being a truck driver, lends support to the notion that the Warden

didn’t “conjure up” potential a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike. And though Mr. Martinez

assured the lawyers he could make the drive from Delano to Bakersfield, and even knew three driving

routes between the two locations, the distance and traffic patterns could give rise to concern over daily

punctuality. The offer of proof regarding Mr. Martinez does not satisfy the strong likelihood of

discriminatory purpose or group bias..

Maria Carrillo. Although Ms. Carrillo was death qualified, Mr. Vendrasco’s initial concern with

her was whether she was totally against the death penalty. This indicates he may have had doubts about

her ability to vote in favor of the death penalty. She also had some experience with the legal system

when her son, as a juvenile, was arrested for stealing. She felt that drugs were involved and in fact had

confirmed to Mr. Vendrasco that she was against drugs. From the questions posed to her, it is apparent

that Mr. Vendrasco was concerned about whether Ms. Carrillo would credit the testimony of witnesses,

like Teresa Fout and Miguel Santana, who used drugs. Focusing on the perpetrators of the present crime,

himself and Ruiz, Carrera points out there is no real comparison with the problems Ms. Carrillo’s son

encountered. Carrera was 20 years old at the time of the crime and Ruiz was 17. In contrast Ms.

Carrillo’s son was only 13 or 14 at the time of his legal problems. Carrera further points out that two

white jurors who had sons with similar problems were seated. Lois Costello’s son had previously had

a drug problem, and had been in state prison for drug related offenses. RT-5: 744-47. Zelda Roux

disclosed she had an adult son who was recently released from county jail after violating an undisclosed

court order. Id.: 749. But these two jurors were not similarly situated. Although Ms. Costello had a

son who had been in trouble with drugs, she did not indicate she was against drugs. On questioning

from Ms. Huffman, she specifically stated she would not disregard testimony of witnesses who had used

drugs. Id.: 746. Further, she had a friend in the Bakersfield Police Department and a nephew in law

enforcement in the state of Colorado. RT-5: 744, 745. Ms. Carrillo had no such law enforcement

connections. Ms. Roux’s disclosure about her son had nothing to do with drugs. The nature of the

violated court order was not disclosed at all. Because of Mr. Vendrasco’s initial question to Ms. Carrillo

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concerning her opposition to the death penalty and her opposition to drugs, his peremptory strike does

not establish a strong likelihood of group bias. Rather, there was grounds for individual bias because

of concerns over her position on the death penalty and reluctance to credit the testimony of witnesses

who used drugs. 

Alice Hernandez. Ms. Hernandez explained that she was employed by the Department of

Probation as a group counselor housekeeper and that she worked at Kern County Juvenile Hall. Ms.

Huffman elicited that she had contact with juveniles as part of her job working with detainees in

housekeeping. She stated she was not familiar with Ramiro Ruiz and ordinarily only remembered a

name if the juvenile presented problems. Notwithstanding her denial of familiarity with Ruiz, her

statement that she only became aware of juveniles who caused problems prompted the Warden to

disclose in his opposition points and authorities the fact that Ruiz caused a lot of problems in Juvenile

Hall. Citing to People v. Gonzales, 186 Cal App. 3d 591 (1986), the Warden provides persuasive

evidence. This case, concerning Ruiz (or Ruiz-Gonzales), details the many disciplinary problems Ruiz

experienced in Juvenile Hall and the reason he was deemed unfit for commitment to the California

Youth Authority. Id. at 594. Instead he was committed to state prison. Since Mr. Vendrasco was the

prosecutor in Ruiz’s case as well as Carrera’s case, he would have been aware of Ruiz’s discipline

problems. If Ms. Hernandez hadn’t previously heard of Ruiz, it is not unreasonable for Mr. Vendrasco

to have supposed she was bound to hear of him sooner or later. Not wanting a juror who was familiar

with a co-perpetrator’s misconduct is not discriminatory. Far from evidencing group bias, it shows

individual bias, which is entirely proper under Wheeler. Carrera argues that Ms. Hernandez was only

a “maid” or a “janitor” not a counselor who had interaction with juvenile detainees. This

characterization conflicts with her voir dire answers. She said she actually “worked] with detainees in

housekeeping,” even though she didn’t actually counsel them. RT-6: 964. Carrera further questions why

Ms. Hernandez’s familiarity with Ruiz would make a difference with respect her serving as a juror on

Carrera’sjury, since Carrera was an adult. In pondering this question, Carrera fails to acknowledge his

own arguments throughout this case that Ruiz was the actual killer and the instigator of the murders for

which he and Carrera were convicted. The prosecutor would not want a juror who might be sympathetic

to the defendant because of exposure to or knowledge about a particularly violent co-perpetrator (Ruiz).

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 Not counting Mr. Mara or Mr. Calaustro as Hispanic or reputedly Hispanic, but including Ms. 38

Marilyn Torres, whose husband was Hispanic, the total number of jurors with Spanish surnames was

twelve. Ms. Huffman posed the ethnicity/ impartiality question to Antonio Chavez, Tony Nunez, Angelo

Urrea, Lawrence Martinez, Marilyn Torres, Maria Carrillo, Mary Dolores Garcia, and Alice Hernandez.

Ms. Huffman mentioned Ms. Celedon’s Spanish accent and asked her about her ability to listen to

translated testimony, but did not ask her about ethnicity and impartiality. Similarly, she asked Ms.

Barbara Cota about her ability to speak Spanish and if she would commit to listen to the translated

testimony rather than rely upon her own interpretation, but not about ethnicity and impartiality. She did

not ask either Manuel J. Estrada or Alicia Torres Grijalva about ethnicity or impartiality. 

 Ms. Huffman also asked one juror, Eugene Turner, if his minority status would affect his

39

ability to be impartial. 

 Mr. Vendrasco asked the ethnicity impartiality question of Manuel J. Estrada, Tony Nunez, 40

Angelo Urrea, Lawrence Martinez, Marilyn Torres, Maria Carrillo, Barbara Cota, Mary Dolores Garcia,

and Alice Hernandez. He did not pose the question to Antonio Chavez, Petra Celedon, or Alicia Torres

Grijalva,

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 42

Carrera has failed to sustain his burden that Ms. Huffman could have shown a strong likelihood of

discriminatory purpose or group biasfrom Mr. Vendrasco’s peremptory challenge as to Ms. Hernandez.

Carrera also points to Mr. Vendrasco’s “affirmative action” objection as evidence of his overall

discriminatorymind set. In making this argument, however, Carrera has failed to include the full content

of the excerpt. As Mr. Vendrasco explained after further discussion with Ms. Huffman and the trial

judge, his concern was that Ms. Huffman and possibly the trial court were going to insist on “exact

proportionate numbers” even before Ms. Huffman had made a prima facie case of discrimination. He

explained that so long as the observations about the number of Hispanics on the various jury panels

demonstrated a general balance, he was satisfied the defense and the court were not imposing too

onerous a burden on the prosecution. Additionally, the exchange about a general balance and the fact

that Ms. Huffman had not made a prima facie case lends support to the notion that a primary concern

among the attorneys and the trial judge was whether Hispanics were fairly, or at least minimally

represented on the jury so as to defeat a prima face case under Wheeler. See Boyde, 167 Cal. App. 3d

at 47; Davis, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1191. 

Finally, Carrera’s argument that Mr. Vendrasco engaged in differential questioning of Hispanic

prospective jurors is unpersuasive. First, it is incorrect to conclude that only Mr. Vendrasco asked

Hispanic jurors ethnic specific questions. Excerpts from the voir transcripts demonstrate that eight of

twelve Hispanic jurors were asked by Ms. Huffman about the effect of their ethnicity on juror 38

impartiality. Nine were asked similar questions by Mr. Vendrasco. Seven Hispanic jurors received

39 40

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 They are: Tony Nunez, Angelo Urrea, Lawrence Martinez, Marilyn Torres, Maria Carrillo, 41

Mary Dolores Garcia, and Alice Hernandez.

Only one prospective juror, Bonnie Mangrum, responded that she would have a problem with 42

Spanish-speaking witnesses and she was excused on Ms. Huffman’s peremptory challenge.

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overlapping questions about ethnicity and impartiality from both attorneys. Second, Carrera’s 41

complaint that Mr. Vendrasco asked ethnic specific questions only to Hispanic jurors, and not to white

jurors, is senseless. Asking a white juror if his shared Hispanic heritage with Carrera could affect his

impartiality would have called into question Mr. Vendrasco’s grasp on reality. Third, the record

demonstrates that Ms. Huffman asked 13 white jurors as to whether they would have any problem or

harbor any ill-feelings if testifying witnesses only spoke Spanish and needed an interpreter.42

 It is clear that both the prosecution and the defense were concerned with ethnicity issues in this

case. Mr. Vendrasco’s ethnic specific questions, like Ms. Huffman’s ethnic specific questions were

directed to sort out impartiality issues. Given the controlling precedent in 1983, Ms. Huffman could not

have sustained her burden to show a strong likelihood of discriminatory purpose or group bias then

required by Wheeler, or a pattern and practice of discrimination under Swain. Claim 20 is denied on the

merits. No further evidentiary development concerning Ms. Huffman’s performance will be entertained.

C. Claim 85: that the Jurors Committed Misconduct, the Prosecutor Committed

Misconduct, and Carrera’s Trial Attorney Was Ineffective in Connection with the

Jurors’ Examination of Partially Unburned Corduroy Pants Material.

Carrera complains that during jury deliberations, some of the jurors manually pulled apart pieces

of partially burned (and melted together) clothing that was part of a trial exhibit they were given to

examine. In the process of pulling this burned bundle of material apart, they discovered some material

consistent with the description of corduroy pants said to have been worn by Carrera on the night of the

crime. Carrera claims that by pulling open the bundle, and discovering corduroy pants material on the

inside, the jurors placed him at the scene of the crime. The jurors then informed the prosecutor they had

done this disassembling of material, but failed to inform Ms. Huffman, or the trial judge. The juror

misconduct claim is derived from the fact that the jurors considered new, extrinsic evidence which had

not been introduced at trial. Alleged prosecution misconduct arises because Mr. Vendrasco became

aware the jurors “tampered” with the evidence in this manner and informed neither Ms. Huffman nor

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 Carmen Santana lived a short distance from the Imperial 400 Motel. 43

 Teresa observed the bloodstain on Carrera’s left pant leg, while all the other witnesses who 44

testified about a bloodstain observed it on his right pant leg.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 44

the trial judge. Ms. Huffman is alleged to be constitutionally ineffective because she failed to examine

the burned clothing bundle or cause it to be examined by a forensic expert. He contends, generally, that

an evidentiary hearing “is warranted” on the points raised in his various briefs.

1. Facts Relevant to the Discovery of the Partially Burned Corduroy Pants

Material.

The pertinent facts are derived from proceedings at Carrera’s trial, declarations appended to

Carrera’s state exhaustion petition, and declarations submitted with his evidentiary hearing motion.

a. Trial Proceedings.

The summary of facts from the trial proceeding covers percipient witness observations about

what kind of pants and jacket Carrera was wearing, trial witness accounts of the burned bundle of

material marked as Exhibit 186, and excerpts of the summation arguments of the trial attorneys.

(1) Percipient Witness Testimony About Carrera’s Clothing.

Santana testified that on the night of the crime, Carrera was wearing brown corduroy pants. RT9: 791. Other witnesses questioned about Carrera’s clothing testified that he was wearing gray corduroy

pants. Patience Sherrill, RT-8: 443; Tina Harris, id.: 480, Efrain Carrera, id.: 523; Maria Carrera

Nunez, id.: 572; Teresa Fout, RT-9: 670; and Carrera, himself, RT-12: 1427. After Carrera returned to

the party at the residence of Santana’s sister, Carmen Santana, several witnesses (excluding Carrera’s 43

siblings), testified they observed a blood stain on Carrera’s pants. Patience Sherrill, RT-8: 443; Tina

Harris, id.: 471, 479; Teresa Fout, RT-9: 669; Miguel Santana, id.: 796-97. In addition, although 44

Carmen Santana testified she didn’t remember what anyone was wearing and didn’t recall seeing a

bloodstain on Carrera’s pants, her brother, Santana, testified she was the one who brought the fact of the

bloodstain on Carrera’s pants to his (Santana’s) attention. RT-10: 880. Three witnesses also observed

Carrera wearing a brown jacket with a fur collar beforeRuiz and Carrera left the party, but not when they

returned. Efrain Carrera, RT-8: 526; Teresa Fout, RT-9: 670; Miguel Santana, id.: 794.

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(2) Exhibit 186.

Santana testified that the day after the crime, he, Ruiz, and Carrera drove into the desert to burn

items Carrera and Ruiz had worn or used during the crime, including a brown jacket with fur collar,

dishwashing gloves, brown corduroy pants, a knife, and a pair of tennis shoes. RT-10: 822. The jacket

had a lot of blood stains on it. Id.: 823. These items, partially burned, were recovered by authorities

after learning about where they were located from listening to a jail tape made of a visit Carrera had with

family members and friends. RT-11: 1075. Mr. Vendrasco marked a brown paper bag containing a

bundle of burned clothing as Exhibit 186. When shown to Miguel Santana, he identified the contents

as the brown corduroy pants he, Carrera, and Ruiz burned in the desert the day after the crime. RT-10:

830. The criminalist described the contents of Exhibit 186 as tan corduroy material with some fleecing

adhered to it. RT-11: 1194. 

(3) Guilt Phase Summation Excerpts.

With respect to Carrera’s clothing, Mr. Vendrasco emphasized that various witnesses observed

blood on Carrera’s pants and that he had been wearing a brown jacket before leaving the party at Carmen

Santana’s house (i.e., before the crime), but not upon returning to Carmen Santana’s house (i.e., after

the crime). RT-14: 1951. He reviewed also that both Ruiz and Carrera changed their pants on the trip

from Mojave to Rosamond (when the party at Carmen Santana’s house ended). Id.: 1953. Mr.

Vendrasco did not emphasize the color of the pants Carrera had been wearing (whether gray or brown).

Ms. Huffman, however, did emphasize inconsistent evidence about the color of pants Carrera wore. She

vehemently argued Miguel’s testimony should not be credited about Carrera having worn brown pants

because every other witness to testify on the subject stated Carrera had been wearing gray pants. Id.:

2014, 2017. She concluded the only reason Santana said Carrera had been wearing brown pants was

because there was brown corduroy material found at the evidence destruction site. Id.: 2032.

b. Declarations Attached to Carrera’s State Exhaustion Petition.

Carrera relies on two juror declarations attached to his October 27, 1995 state exhaustion

petition: one of Gregory Brouckaert and one of Antonio Chavez.

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 He doesn’t clarify whether he meant after the guilt phase or after the penalty phase. 45

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(1) Declaration of Juror Gregory Brouckaert.

In his April 2, 1995 declaration, Mr. Brouckaert reports that the charred clothing exhibit (Exhibit

186) appeared to be a jacket make of synthetic material that had melted from being burned. He reports

he was the juror “who found” the mostly unburned corduroy material inside the partially burned bundle

when the jurors were inspecting the exhibit. He states he “pulled apart some melted and sealed seams

on the exterior of the bundle and discovered the unburned corduroy pants material on the inside.” He

describes the deliberative process that he and the other jurors “concluded” the corduroy pants material

belonged to Carrera because he must have “burned his own clothing to cover up his participation in the

crimes.” Mr. Brouckaert reports that he told Mr. Vendrasco the jurors had found the mostly unburned

corduroy material in the bundle after the trial.45

(2) Declaration of Juror Antonio Chavez.

Mr. Chavez’s declaration, executed on April 1, 1995, also was attached to Carrera’s state

exhaustion petition fled October 27, 1995. He reports that the jurors wanted to look at the burned

clothing to help them in the guilt deliberations. “The burned clothing was partially melted and stuck

together in kind of one hardened mass.” Mr. Chavez “ripped a piece of this burned mass apart and

discovered a new piece of material stuck inside which was not burnt.” He reports that it “looked like

a small piece of the top part of a pair of corduroy pants.” Then describing the deliberative process he

reports the jurors “decided that this corduroy material belonged to Mr. Carrera, and that this meant that

Mr. Carrera burned his pants to cover up some participation he had in the crimes.”

c. Declarations Attached to Carrera’s Evidentiary Hearing Motion.

Appended to his evidentiary hearing motion are two additional declarationsin support of Claim

85: a declaration of Juror Lois Costello and a declaration of federal habeas counsel, Mr. Bedrick.

(1) Declaration of Lois Costello.

Ms. Costello reports that while “some of the jurors” were opening and pulling apart the bundle

of burned material (Exhibit 186) and examining the corduroy cloth, the bailiff was in the jury room. The

brown corduroy cloth looked to Ms. Costello“to be from a pair of brown corduroy pants.” She further

reports that the discovery of the corduroy cloth within the bundle convinced her and three other jurors

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 In fact in the Court’s July 12, 2005 order, the Court denied Carrera’s discovery request for the 46

production of the piece of partially burned and partially unburned corduroy material that is part of

Exhibit 186. July 12, 2005 Ord., at pp. 6-7. 

 In his argument, Carrera repeatedly refers to the bundle of partially burned clothing has having 47

been cut open. Mr. Brouckaert stated he “pulled apart” some melted and sealed seams on the exterior

of the Exhibit 186 bundle. Similarly Mr. Chavez stated he “ripped a piece of this burned mass apart.”

No one described any juror “cutting” into or “cutting open” the clothing bundle. 

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 47

of Carrera’s guilt. The states there “was no evidence at trial that th[e] bundle of burned material

contained unburned corduroy pants material.” The bailiff did nothing to stop the jurors from examining

the interior of the burned clothing bundle.

(2) Mr. Bedrick’s Declaration.

Mr. Bedrick discusses the condition of the bundled material comprising Exhibit 186 and an offer

of proof as to proposed testimony of Strickland expert Mr. Jinkerson.

(a) Condition of the Bundled Material.

Pursuant to authorization from this Court, Mr. Bedrick traveled to Bakersfield to inspect the

prosecution files for Carrera’s case. Although the Court did not authorize Mr. Bedrick to further inspect

Exhibit 186, he did so on his own time and at his own expense. He discovered a seven by two inch 46

fragment of material from what appeared to be the waist band of a part of brown corduroy pants inside

or as a part of the Exhibit 186 bundle of clothes.. 

(b) Offer of Proof on Mr. Jinkerson’s Opinion Testimony.

Mr. Bedrick offers that Mr. Jinkerson will testify that Ms. Huffman rendered constitutionally

deficient representation by failing to investigate, examine, and open Exhibit 186.

2. Carrera’s Argument.

Although the prosecution criminalist testified that the tan corduroy material he observed in

Exhibit 186 might have come from either pants or a jacket, Carrera maintains that because the fabric had

fleecing attached to it, it is more likely it came from a jacket. He contends that until Mr. Brouckaert,

Mr. Chavez and possibly other jurors pulled the bundled mass of partially burned material apart, the

jurors would not have had any reason to believe that Exhibit 186 contained corduroy pants.

47

Carrera argues that in this case, the jurors’ examination of physical evidence takes on the

character of considering extrinsic evidence and of tampering with evidence. He argues his case is

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analogous with the facts in Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), where he says the Ninth

Circuit found the jury had tampered with the evidence and committed misconduct. He explains that in

Mancuso, the jurors during deliberations discovered a file number purposefully obscured by tape

underneath a photograph of the defendant, William Mancuso. By virtue of this file number, one or more

of the jurors concluded that the defendant had a past criminal record. While Carrera concedes that the

court ultimately found the misconduct harmless, he maintains that the reason for this harmlessness

finding in Mancuso cannot apply in his case. A substantial basis for the harmlessness finding in the

Mancuso case was that the trial judge actually examined the extrinsic evidence the jury considered.

Since the misconduct in Carrera’s case was never brought to the attention of the trial court, Carrera

argues the jurors’ consideration of extrinsic evidence here cannot be considered harmless. He suggests

the jurors’ consideration of the corduroy pants material should be assessed by a standard somewhere in

between structural error and trial error because the evidence was never subjected to quantitative

assessment. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). He maintains pulling apart the

clothing bundle is the practical equivalent to tampering with evidence and at a minimum it is altering

evidence. Citing Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997), he claims the revelation of the

interior pants material in the Exhibit 186 bundle was not addressed in open court and thus deprived

Carrera of his rights to confrontation and cross examination. 

The claim of prosecutorial misconduct is derived from Mr. Vendrasco’s failure to disclose the

fact that the jurors had pulled the Exhibit 186 bundle apart. He claims Mr. Vendrasco’s omission in this

regard “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resultant conviction a denial of due process.”

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

647-48 (1974)).

With respect to Ms. Huffman’s alleged professional incompetence, he argues prejudice resulted

because if she had bothered to learn about the presence of an unburned fragment in the burned clothing

bundle she could have emphasized during cross examination that all but one testifying percipient witness

observed Carrera to be wearing gray rather than brown corduroy pants. She also could have shown the

piece of the brown corduroy waist band to the percipient witnesses so they could testify that the pants

worn by Carrera on the night of the crime did not match the color of that waist band. If Carrera was

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wearing gray pants on the night of the crime, then the burned brown pants garment found in the desert

were not his and he didn’t burn them to destroy evidence of his participation in the crime. Under

Strickland, he argues, the result of the guilt proceedings would have been different but for Ms.

Huffman’s professional incompetence. See 466 U.S. at 694.

3. Analysis.

The Court was first presented with Carrera’s request to further develop Claim 85 in a funding

request, which was denied in a confidential budgeting order on February 3, 2005. He rephrased his

request in a discovery motion, seeking examination of Exhibit 186 in support of his juror misconduct

and prosecutorial misconduct claims. The Court denied discovery for this purpose on July 12, 2005

because the import of the juror misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct claims would be to cast doubt

on the already determined fact that Carrera was present at the scene of the crime where Mr. and Mrs.

Hayes were robbed and murdered. Separate and apart from the prior finding of Carrera’s presence at

the scene of the crime, the Court questioned whether evidence given to jurors to examine during

deliberations assumed the character of extraneous evidence when jurors actuallyand carefully examined

it. July 12, 2005 Ord., at pp. 6 and 7. 

Carrera’s present reliance on Mancuso, 292 F.3d 939, does not alter the conclusion that juror

misconduct did not occur in this case. First, Carrera’s recitation of the facts of Mancuso is not quite

accurate. In Mancuso, the jurors were exposed to two separate extrinsic factors. First a detective

testifying for the prosecution referred to a “parole search” at Mancuso’s apartment, despite an in limine

motion prohibiting introduction of evidence concerning Mancuso’s prior felony convictions or parole

status. Id. at 948, 950. Second a juror “tampered” with an exhibit that was a booking photograph of

Stephen Christensen, who Mancuso claimed was the actual perpetrator, and who had been arrested for

the crime on the same day Mancuso was. Christensen’s booking photograph was admitted with the

booking number covered with tape. Id. at 949, 951. By removing the tape covering Christensen’s

booking number and comparing that number with the exposed booking number of the photographic

exhibit admitted of Mancuso, the juror surmised that Mancuso had a felony record because his booking

number was lower than Christensen’s number. Id. at 951. Information about Mancuso’s prior criminal

record was clearly extrinsic evidence in that case, and the trial judge endeavored to keep the information

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from the jury. Id. at 950-51. Accordingly, a harmless error analysis under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619, 637 (1993) became necessary. In Carrera’s case, however, the composition of the articles that

comprised Exhibit 186 was not extrinsic. While it surely would have been preferable for Mr. Vendrasco

to have asked the criminalist to pull the bundled material apart and comment on the types of garments

that comprised it and subjected him (the criminalist) to cross examination, the fact the criminalist was

not asked to do so and was not subjected to cross examination does not change the character of the

interior garments as relevant. It also would have been preferable for Ms. Huffman to have examined

the bundle or have hired an expert to examine it to determine its composition. Had she done so, she

would have discovered material consistent with corduroy pants within the exterior jacket-material.

Despite the failings of both the prosecution and the defense in this regard, Carrera offers no theory as

to how Ms. Huffman would have been able to exclude evidence of corduroy pants contained within the

bundle of material admitted into evidence and examined by the jurors. There is no basis to suppose the

jurors wouldn’t have received this evidence had the trial attorneys performed as Carrera claims they

should have. 

Since the interior of the Exhibit 186 clothing bundle is not properly considered extrinsic

evidence, the analysis of how to determine prejudice for jury consideration of extraneous information

is inapposite. See Mancuso, 292 F.3d at 951-52. Carrera’s independent argument that had Ms. Huffman

discovered the brown pants material within Exhibit 186 she would have had an opportunity to cross

examine witnesses about the color of Carrera’s pants on the night of the crime, and even show the

witnesses the brown corduroy fragment to elicit testimony that Carrera hadn’t worn that color of pants

remains unavailing. The ultimate argument would have been that since Carrera was not wearing brown

corduroy pants on the night of the crime, he had no reason to burn brown pants to exculpate himself.

As the summary of the facts reflect, although Ms. Huffman did not cross examine witnesses extensively

about the color of Carrera’s pants, she did make a cogent argument during summation that Santana’s

testimony about Carrera having worn brown corduroy pants was unbelievable. The jurors still were not

convinced. Using the brown corduroy fragment during cross examination would have been helpful, but

it is not dispositve, especially given the emphasis Ms. Huffman placed on Santana’s lack of

trustworthiness in her summation.

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More importantly, the probative effect of the brown corduroy pant fragment is to corroborate the

prosecution theory and already determined fact that Carrera was present at the scene of the crime where

Mr. and Mrs. Hayes were robbed and murdered. In both the June 22, 2000 and October 4, 2004 orders,

the Court determined that Carrera was present. June 22, 2000 Ord., pp. 45-47, 51; October 4, 2004 Ord.,

pp. 60-63. This conclusion is fully supported by the record, including evidence about the shoes Carrera

wore the night of the crime, bloody shoe prints at the crime scene, blood observed on Carrera’s pants

(of whatever color) after the crime, the fact that Carrera (and Ruiz) changed their clothes after the crime,

and Carrera’s recitation of the events of the crime to Miguel Santana and Teresa Fout. The presence of

corduroy material said to have been the fabric of pants worn by Carrera on the night of the crime was,

at best, cumulative. To the extent that Juror Brouckaert, Juror Chavez, and Juror Costello aver that the

discovery of the corduroy pant material affected their deliberative process, their declarations are

inadmissible in these federal proceedings. Fed.R.Evid., Rule 606(b). Claim 85 is denied on the merits.

Carrera’s request for an evidentiary hearing on this claim is denied.

D. Claim 87: that Juror Misconduct Deprived Carrera of his Sixth Amendment Right

to an Impartial Jury and Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process.

In Claim 87, Carrera mounts a three-sided attack on the robbery and murder verdicts. First he

complains that one of his jurors prejudged guilt before guilt phase deliberations occurred. Second, he

challenges the verdict because a courtroom bailiff commented to the same or another juror that Carrera

was an escape risk. Third, the same or another juror allegedly reported during deliberations to the rest

of the jurors that she had seen Carrera in shackles in the hallway outside the courtroom. He claims an

evidentiary hearing generally is warranted to further develop these issues.

1. Facts Relevant to Juror Misconduct Concerning Pre-Judgment and

Shackling.

Juror Antonio Chavez’s April 1, 1995 declaration provides the most support for the challenges

in Claim 87. As further support, Carrera submits his own declaration executed on September 1, 2005

and appended to the evidentiary hearing motion. Also relevant are record excerpts concerning a courtinitiated inquiry into an incident where jurors reportedly saw Carrera in shackles in the courthouse

hallway and actual testimony about a pre-trial escape attempt in which Carrera participated. Finally, the

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 It’s not clear whether this means after the guilt verdict had been rendered. 48

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Court’s February 3, 2005 order granting Carrera funding to further investigate and develop evidence for

Claim 87 is relevant to the resolution of the claim.

a. Antonio Chavez’s Declaration (Second Reference).

Mr. Chavez reports that before guilt phase deliberations, a female juror told him she believed

Carrera had looked at her “with some kind of attitude,” that this angered her and she would get back at

him. She further told Mr. Chavez that she had “already made up her mind” that Carrera was guilty.

Next, he reports that “at the end of guilt phase deliberations” a new bailiff stationed outside of the jury 48

room was asked by one of the jurors why there were so many additional security personnel attending to

Carrera’s trial. The bailiff responded that Carrera was a “rabbit” who may try to escape again. Finally,

during guilt phase deliberations a female juror told the rest of the assembled jurors that she had seen

Carrera in the hallway in shackles and that the trial judge had questioned her about what she had seen.

During the questioning by the judge, this female juror reported she became “very concerned” there may

have to be a new trial because of what she saw. She reported that after her session with the trial judge,

he did not order a new trial. Mr. Chavez does not identify the jurors who made the statements he

relayed. It is unclear whether there were three separate juror declarants, two declarants, or only one

declarant.

b. Carrera’s 2005 Declaration.

Carrera recalls the day during his trial when two female jurors saw him in shackles as he was

being escorted into the courthouse hallway during lunch break. This incident occurred shortly before

the jury was excused to deliberate the guilt phase issues. Although the customary procedure was for the

deputies to wait to shackle and escort Carrera until the jurors had departed, on this day the two female

jurors mentioned passed by Carrera in the hallway. Carrera’s restraints consisted of handcuffs attached

to a waist chain and leg cuffs attached by a chain. The restraints were clearly visible to the passing

female jurors.

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 Charges were brought against Carrera for his jail escape. After the preliminary examination 49

hearing on the escape charge, trial was set, but twice continued until October 7, 1983, which was the

same dayCarrera’smotion for new trial andmodification of the death sentence in the Hayes murder case

was heard. The jail escape trial was to be heard by the same judge presiding over the capital trial.

Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the jail escape charges “in the interests of justice.” CT-6: 62.

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c. Trial Court Inquiry into Incident Where Jurors Reportedly Saw

Carrera in Shackles.

Two jurors who passed Carrera in the courthouse hallway while he was in shackles are identified

as Zelda Roux and Frances Taylor. RT-13: 1905-06; RT-14: 1937. When questioned by the trial judge,

Juror Roux stated that she saw Carrera being escorted out of the courtroom, but that he was behind the

prosecutor and in front of a female bailiff. She told the trial judge she did not see shackles. RT-13:

1909-10. Juror Taylor similarly denied observing Carrera in shackles when the trial judge questioned

her. RT-14: 1937-38. 

d. Evidence Introduced and Argument Made at Trial Regarding

Carrera’s Pre-Trial Escape Attempt.

Two Kern County sheriff’s deputies were called to testify about Carrera’s jail escape on April

23, 1983. First, Deputy Sheriff Milton Grimes, who worked as a guard at the jail, testified that on the

night in question, at about 11:50 p.m., he conducted a “deck check” and heard a noise. In the location

where the noise had sounded, Deputy Grimes observed a hole in the outside wall of a cell. RT-11: 1148.

Seven inmates had escaped, including Carrera. Bars had been cut and removed with a hacksaw blade.

Id.: 1149. A 29-foot rope used by the inmates to leave the jail had been made out of bed sheets. Id.:

1151. The part of the wall missing was made out of 18 inch thick, nine inch square glass blocks. Two

blocks were missing. Id.: 1157. 

Next, Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Eddy, who was working patrol on the night of April 23-24, 1983,

testified. After receiving a broadcast that an escape from the jail had occurred, he and his partner went

to Bakersfield High School. Id.: 1161. Two men wearing jail coveralls were apprehended. They

crawled out of the bushes. Id.: 1162. Carrera was one of them. 1163. He was injured in that most of

the palm of his hands and fingers were bleeding. Id.: 1164. The site of the capture was approximately

five blocks from the jail. Id.: 1165. During Mr. Vendrasco’s guilt phase summation, he argued that 49

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Carrera’s escape attempt demonstrated his consciousness of guilt for crimes against Mr. and Mrs. Hayes.

RT-14: 1953.

e. Order Granting Carrera Investigative Funds to Further Develop

Claim 87.

In the February 3, 2005 funding order, the Court authorized Carrera investigative funds to

develop all three challenges alleged in Claim 87. The Court found Carrera established a sufficient

foundation for re-interviewing Juror Chavez, and making contact with Juror Roux, as well as Juror

Taylor. Sixty hours investigative funds for Carrera’s investigator to contact these jurors, as well as other

jurors, was approved. 

2. Carrera’s Argument.

With respect to the juror who allegedly pre-judged Carrera’s guilt (because she didn’t like the

way he looked at her), he cites to Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 2000), for the proposition

that juror pre-judging constitutes prejudicial misconduct. He relies on Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d

403, 408 (9th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that a bailiff’s improper comment to a juror about a

defendant’s past bad conduct cannot be considered harmless. Even though the jury ultimately learned

during trial proceedings that Carrera had tried to escape from jail, he argues that the reinforcement of

the perception of his dangerousness by authorities likely would have influenced the jurors on the issue

of guilt. Finally, he relies on Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005), for the proposition that the

Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles unless there it “is justified by an essential state interest.”

3. Analysis.

Finding the declaration of Mr. Chavez sufficient to authorize further investigation, the Court

gave Carrera the opportunity and monetary means to further develop the facts presented in Claim 87.

While the hearsay testimony of Mr. Chavez was grounds to prompt the Court to authorize investigative

funds, it is not sufficient to establish the ultimate facts necessary to prove Carrera’s claims. The Court

does not discount that “ bias or prejudice of even a single juror” violates a criminal defendant’s “right

to a fair trial.” Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Nor does the Court

dispute that actual juror bias “is sufficient to taint an entire trial,” Green, 232 F.3d at 676, and that the

presence of juror bias is a structural error not subject to harmless error analysis. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973,

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n. 2 (quoting United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977); see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629

(structural errors infect the integrity of the entire trial process). Similarly, with respect to extrinsic

evidence, the Court follows the precept that once it is determined that the jury was, in fact, exposed to

extrinsic evidence, the issue to be decided is whether that exposure had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Mancuso, 292 F.3d at 949 (quoting Brecht, 507

U.S. at 637). In this case, however, except for the fact that Carrera was in the courthouse hallway in

shackles at the same time two female jurors were in the hallway, the material underlying facts of Claim

87 remain unestablished and no specific offer of proof is presented. With respect to the shackling claim,

only some of the underlying facts are supported. The Court can only conclude from this that despite the

investigative authorization, Carrera was not able to learn the identities (or identity) of the jurors (or

juror) who related the information to Mr. Chavez forming the basis of Carrera’s claim.

Four facts pertinent to the shackling issue are presented: (1) two female jurors, presumably Ms.

Roux and Ms. Taylor, were in the courthouse hallway while Carrera, in shackles, was being escorted by

sheriff’s deputies; (2) Carrera specifically recalls that when he and the deputies passed these jurors, his

restraints were clearlyvisible; (3) both Ms. Roux and Ms. Taylor denied seeingCarrera’s restraints when

questioned by the trial court; and (4) one of these ladies is said to have admitted to the other jurors she

had seen Carrera in shackles, but apparently she didn’t want to derail the entire trial proceedings, so she

misrepresented what she had seen to the trial judge. Notwithstanding these facts, Carrera has not

corroborated Mr. Chavez’s hearsay declaration as to the identity of the juror who relayed seeing Carrera

in shackles to the other jurors and he has not established that the topic of Carrera’s shackles was

discussed by the jurors during deliberations. See Mancuso, 292 F.3d at 951-52 (holding that the extent

to which jury discussed and considered extrinsic evidence is a factor to be considered in determining

prejudice). More importantly, Carrera was not restrained by visible shackles during trial proceedings

in the courtroom. This fact distinguishes Carrera’s case from Deck, where the defendant, Carman Deck,

was kept in visible, physical restraints throughout the entirety of his sentencing re-trial. 544 U.S. at 625.

Deck is further distinguishable because in that case the trial judge kept Deck restrained for the simple

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U.S. at 624-25.

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reason that he had been convicted of capital crime, id., whereas Carrera actually had escaped from jail 50

and authorities clearly had an “essential state interest” to keep him from escaping again. 

The Warden relies on Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), for the

proposition that brief, infrequent glimpses of a defendant in shackles outside the courtroom does not

establish prejudice. Ghent is persuasive. In that case the Ninth Circuit found a preponderance of

evidence supported the finding that all of the jurors saw the defendant, David Ghent, at the courtroom

entrance in handcuffs and other restraints on some occasions during the trial. Id. These observations

by all the jurors, however, was “not inherently or presumptively prejudicial.” Id. The same conclusion

must obtain as to Carrera. In light of the single sighting of Carrera in shackles, even coupled with

disclosure of that sighting to all the other jurors, and the clear justification for authorities to escort

Carrera in physical restraints to and from the courtroom, the shackling claim fails for lack of prejudice.

The alleged prejudice from Mr. Chavez’s report that another juror was told by a bailiff that

Carrera was an escape risk similarly must fail. Besides the obvious failure of proof from Mr. Chavez’s

hearsay declaration and failure to identify the juror who spoke to the bailiff about Carrera’ssecurity risk

status, the fact remains that Carrera was a security risk. Evidence of this clearly was disclosed at trial.

There is no grounds to suppose that the evidence presented about Carrera’s jail escape was improper or

inadmissible.

Finally, the juror pre-judging portion of Claim 87 (because she did not like the way Carrera

looked at her) cannot be sustained. While the Court has no reason to doubt Mr. Chavez’s veracity, his

report of statements made by an unidentified fellow juror is simply insufficient under the Federal Rules

of Evidence to establish the ultimate facts necessary in support of the claim. The fact that Carrera was

given authorization to further his development of the claim, and still came up with no additional

evidence (other than Carrera’s declaration on the shackling issue) demonstrates to the Court’s

satisfaction that no additional evidence can be developed.

Claim 87 is denied on the merits. Carrera’s motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding Claim

87 is denied.

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E. Claims 88 and 89: that Carrera’s Trial Attorney was Ineffective for Failure to

Present a Mental Defense at Guilt Proceedings.

In Claim 88, Carrera claims Ms. Huffman unreasonably failed to conduct an adequate

investigation into his mental health and social background with the result being that no mental health

experts were presented during the guilt phase proceedings and incomplete, inadequate mental state

evidence was presented during penalty proceedings. He claims that historical evidence was available

and would have provided a factual basis for “possibly” presenting a mental state defense. Petition, ¶

157(c). Specifically (with respect to guilt phase proceedings), a mental state defense would have negated

Carrera’s “intent to kill.” Id.: ¶ 157(f). He claims the mental health expert that Ms. Huffman did retain,

Sidney Cohen, M.D., did not offer mental state evidence until after Carrera had been convicted of capital

murder, but could have and should have testified on Carrera’s lack of intent to kill. Id.: ¶ 157(j). In

Claim 89, Carrera contends Dr. Cohen rendered ineffective psychiatric assistance in violation of Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, because he failed to conduct an adequate interview in advance of his testimony

and covered only the possible effects of LSD on a hypothetical person’s mind but did not actually reach

any conclusions about Carrera’s mental state or the fact that LSD would have had a profound impact on

him because of his compromised brain function and other mental impairments. Id.: ¶ 158(c), (d), (g).

Since the issuance of the October 4, 2004 order, and instructions to limit briefing to first degree

robbery felony murder, Carrera has modified the argument for Claims 88 and 89. He now claims that

if Ms. Huffman had conducted a reasonable investigation and provided adequate information to mental

health experts, she could have presented a mental state defense to Carrera’s intent to rob. He maintains

that the combined impact of LSD, marijuana, and alcohol, together with his compromised brain function

and small size rendered him so suggestible to directions from co-perpetrator Ramiro Ruiz that he didn’t

know what he was doing. He further claims Ms. Huffman was incompetent for pursuing an alibi defense

at guilt proceedings rather than a mental state defense. The evidentiary hearing request is focused on

developing expert testimony about Ms. Huffman’s alleged professional incompetence for not

investigating and developing a mental state defense. Carrera also seeks to present evidence of prejudice.

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 The Court considers this argument abandoned. The claim also is non-cognizable. Ake stands 51

for the proposition that a criminal defendant who demonstrates his sanity at the time of the offense is

likely to be a significant factor in determining guilt is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of a

psychiatrist at state expense. Id. at 83. Analyzing this decision, the Ninth Circuit has found that Ake

does not permit a challenge to the adequacy of psychiatric expert assistance. Harris v. Vasquez, 949

F.2d 1497, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1990).

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With respect to Claim 89, he no longer argues that Dr. Cohen’s alleged incompetent mental health

examination amounts to a constitutional violation.51

1. Facts Relevant to the Availability of a Mental State Defense.

Carrera points to the testimony Dr. Cohen gave during penalty proceedings is the kind of

evidence that could have been presented at guilt proceedings to support a mental state defense. The

factual basis for Dr. Cohen’s opinions about the effect of LSD was taken from the testimony of a number

of lay witnesses, including Carrera, during guilt phase proceedings. Through post-conviction

investigation, Carrera has developed additional mental state evidence. In particular, he hired psychiatrist

Carlos Martinez, M.D. and neuropsychologist Karen Froming, Ph.D. to assess his social history and

organic impairments. On August 25, 1995, Dr. Martinez executed a comprehensive 83-page declaration

chronicling Carrera’s personal and family background. On August 31, 1995, Dr. Froming executed a

22-page declaration also reviewing Carrera’s family history, and, in addition, explaining the results of

the many psychological tests she administered during her examination. Both Dr. Martinez’s and Dr.

Froming’s 1995 declarations are informed by the declaration testimony of 29 lay witnesses about

Carrera’s social and family history. All of these declarations are appended to Carrera’s October 27, 1995

state exhaustion petition. Dr. Froming executed a second declaration describing a potential mental state

defense on September 14, 2005 (and submitted with Carrera’s evidentiary hearing motion). On the

Warden’s side, Ms. Huffman’s July 11, 1996 declaration appended to the State of California’s informal

reply to Carrera’s October 27, 1995 state exhaustion habeas petition specifically addresses her trial

strategy with respect to a mental state defense. Her professional opinion is, in part, informed by the

jailhouse tape recordings between Carrera and visitors on April 14, 1982, before Ms. Huffman’s

appointment, and also by jailhouse “kites” or notes passed by Carrera to other inmates. Finally, Mr.

Bedrick’s October 13, 2005 declaration describes the offer of proof of Carrera’s Strickland expert

Guyton Jinkerson on the issue of Ms. Huffman’s failure to investigate and present a mental state defense.

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a. Trial Testimony Regarding Carrera’s Use of Alcohol and Drugs.

Lay witness testimony about Carrera’s use of LSD, alcohol, and marijuana on the night of the

crime was elicited from Carrera’s brother, Efrain, his sister, Maria, Teresa Fout, Santana, and Carrera

himself. Efrain testified he saw Ruiz and Carrera smoking marijuana and drinking beer on the night of

the crime. RT-8: 547. Efrain also saw Ruiz, Carrera, and Santana using “acid” (LSD) on that night.

Id.: 550. Maria testified that marijuana was been used by Santana, Ruiz, Carrera, and Efrain Carrera,

and that everyone at the party was drinking beer. Id.: 567. Teresa testified that Ruiz appeared to be high

on acid. RT-9: 699. At about 4 to 5 p.m. in the afternoon before the crimes, Santana observed Ruiz and

Carrera each take a “half hit of acid.” He (Santana) did as well, but earlier in the day. RT-10: 812.

Santana didn’t experience any effect from the drug. Id. He also did not observe any effect in the

appearance or behavior of Ruiz or Carrera. Id.: 813. Santana, Carrera, and Ruiz had been drinking and

smoking “pot” (marijuana). Id.: 845. Carrera testified that he borrowed $10 in food stamps from his

sister, Maria, for the purpose of purchasing acid. RT-12: 1412-13. He stated the he, along with Ruiz,

Santana, and his brother Efrain all used acid on the afternoon of the crime, then drank beer and used

marijuana. Id.: 1418-18, 1421. According to his own testimony, the LSD Carrera ingested had little or

no effect on him. He didn’t hallucinate; he just “got the effect of tenseness.” Id.: 1484. He consumed

LSD, marijuana, and 2 1/2 to 3 six-packs of beer, but none of this affected his memory. Id.: 1485.

Dr. Cohen testified that LSD can make a person very suggestive, and even more so when LSD

is combined with beer and marijuana. The combination of these substances can cause a subject to lose

decision-making ability. RT-15: 54-56. LSD often makes a person paranoid so that he might believe

he is under attack when he is not. Id.: 58. LSD intoxication also could make it difficult for one to

understand the nature and consequences of behavior. Id.: 60. LSD has a more powerful effect on a

small person, like Carrera. Id.: 70. On cross examination, Mr. Vendrasco elicited from Dr. Cohen that 52

he (Dr. Cohen) was aware substances sold on the street and represented to be LSD might be substantially

diluted. Consistent with Carrera’s testimony, Dr. Cohen confirmed that LSD intoxication can be

accompanied by a sense of tenseness in the subject. Id.: 61. Dr. Cohen agreed, however, that if the

subject reports that he was not affected by ingested LSD he (Dr. Cohen) would “respect his subjective

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evaluation.” Id.: 64. On (re-)cross examination Dr. Cohen also described that a person under the

influence of LSD would have his judgment “in abeyance so that he would just accept what the other

person suggested.” Id.: 74-75.

b. Mental Health Expert Declarations.

Since Dr. Martinez was a medical doctor practicing psychiatric medicine, he offered multiple

diagnoses of Carrera’s organic, mental, and psychological impairments at the time of the crime in

addition to providing a comprehensive social history. Both Dr. Martinez and Dr. Froming describe the 53

abject poverty in Carrera’s childhood, beginning in his birth place, Corrales, Mexico, and continuing to

the Mojave Desert in California. A recurring problem for Carrera’s immediate family was lack of food

and resulting malnutrition among the children. The experts suggest that Carrera’s compromised brain

function may have its origins in lack of proper nutrition, both prenatal and postnatal as well as through

early childhood. 

The family history of Carrera’s father, in particular, is punctuated by alcoholism and mental

illness, resulting in disturbing violence and just plain sadness. The experts describe in great detail the

horrible violence suffered by Carrera and his mother at the hands of his father. According to accounts

relayed by the experts, Carrera’s mother was beaten byher husband (Carrera’s father) and mother-in-law

(Carrera’s grandmother) when she was pregnant with Carrera. The experts suggest Carrera may have

suffered brain damage in utero as the result of these beatings. Carrera’s mother also suffered a

miscarriage later on, when Carrera was a little boy and had two younger siblings, due to the severity of

a beating her husband and mother-in-law inflicted. Carrera himself was subjected to all manner of

beatings by his father, from fists, to dampened leather belts, to boards. In addition, Carrera’s father tried

to hang young Carrera from a tree, and on more than one occasion struck him with or threw at him

bottles which broke on his face. Through all of this, Carrera, as the oldest child in his family, tried to

assume the roles of caretaker of his father and protector of his mother and younger siblings, roles he

never could master. Complicating the abuse and dysfunction of Carrera’s family was the fact that the

family immigrated from Mexico and had to suffer relentless discrimination in the new Mojave Desert

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home. Due to lack of resources, coupled with this pervasive discrimination, Carrera never fully

assimilated into the culture of his new home.

The experts also document that Carrera was exposed to neurotoxins as a child, by second-hand

exposure to his father (who worked recovering metal from railway cars) and living in the vicinity of his

father’s polluted work place. Separately, Carrera was personally exposed to toxic chemicals as a farm

worker in the presence pesticides and when he worked for a mining company using solvents to recover

precious metals from discarded computers.

Dr. Martinez found that Carrera suffered from severe depression due to his ineffectual

helplessness at trying to control his environment and dysfunctional family. Within a year before the

crime, two additional stressors were inflicted on Carrera. First, Carrera’s girlfriend, who became

pregnant with his child and who he desperately wanted to marry, moved away and deprived Carrera of

his greatest hope of being a successful family man. When the girlfriend came back to Kern County and

permitted Carrera to visit with his daughter, Carrera had hoped she would stay, but she did not, and his

hopes were dashed again. Second, a close friend and mentor of Carrera’s was killed in a farm accident.

Both of these events led Carrera to increase his alcohol intake and resort to drugs, including marijuana

and PCP. Then, as Dr. Martinez described it, Carrera “was convinced to try LSD for the first time

around April 1, 1982” because marijuana was in short supply and Carrera used drugs to self-medicate

himself in order to assuage his depression. Dr. Martinez portrayed Carrera as a young man who

exercised little will to resist the suggestions of others, at least regarding the drugs he used. Despite

having a frightening experience with LSD following his first usage of the drug, Carrera ingested LSD

a second time on April 7, 1982, just before the robbery-murders of Mr. and Mrs. Hayes.

Dr. Martinez also discusses Carrera’s co-perpetrator, Ramiro Ruiz. Ruiz, a boy the family hardly

knew, was invited by Carrera’s father to come live in his apartment (along with Carrera, a younger

brother, and a cousin). Ruiz, however, and according to the expert accounts, unlike Carrera, was a gangmember type. He was very tough and purposefully tried to scare acquaintances through threats and with

knives he carried around with him.

In her 2005 declaration, Dr. Froming reiterates that the psychological testing she conducted on

Carrera revealed organic brain impairments strongly supporting the conclusion that he has left frontalCase 1:90-cv-00478-AWI Document 286 Filed 03/11/08 Page 66 of 78
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basal ganglia dysfunction. She continues that this finding suggests cerebral impairment and the

possibility of a lateralized lesion. In addition, she states that Carrera suffers from a severe motor

disorder and a moderately severe attention and memory disorder affecting his behavior and cognition.

Drawing on Dr. Martinez’s assessment of Ruiz together with Dr. Cohen’ penalty phase testimony about

the impact LSD can have on a person of Carrera’s size who has ingested marijuana and alcohol, Dr.

Froming opines that Carrera could have accompanied Ruiz to the Imperial 400 Motel, at Ruiz’s

suggestion or direction, without the personal intent to commit robbery. The combination of his preexisting mental impairments, drugs and alcohol further could have caused him to follow Ruiz’s

instructions all without the personal intent to commit robbery.

c. Lay Witness Declarations.

There are three categories of lay witness declarations: (1) family members; (2) neighbors/ friends;

and (3) educators at Mojave Elementary School in the 1960's and 1970's. The family member

declarations reveal three facts pertinent to Carrera’s social history. First, life in the Mexican town of

Corrales, Durango, where Carrera was born, was miserable for residents who owned no land. Food

supplies, living accommodations, and basic medical care were inadequate. Carrera was born on August

29, 1961, and moved to Mojave, California in 1963. Second, relatives describe a history of depression

and alcoholism, particularly on the paternal side, of Carrera’s family. Carrera’s paternal grandfather is

described bymany relatives as unusual and sad, who drank excessively to escape his troubles. Carrera’s

father, Miguel Carrera, also drank excessively, but when he drank, he was violent and abusive. Carrera’s

mother, Maria Elena, also had a very sad existence, having been raised in poverty and suffered the death

of her father at a young age and the abandonment by her mother when she was a young teenager, when

her mother (Carrera’s maternal grandmother) remarried. Third, growing up in Mojave with an abusive

alcoholic father in the face of continued extreme poverty, poor living conditions, lack of educational

opportunities, and discrimination was incredibly difficult. Carrera’s mother, siblings, and other family

members recount episodes of unbelievable violence perpetrated on Carrera and Carrera’s mother by his

father, Miguel Carrera, all consistent with the descriptions given my Dr. Martinez in his lengthy social

history declaration.

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 Ms. Huffman moved to suppress the jailhouse tape recordings as a infringement of Carrera’s 54

privacy rights under DeLancie v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865. Her motion was denied since

DeLancie was decided after the tape recordings were made and the decision was found to be nonretroactive. See CT-1: 166; CT-1: 166; CT-2: 31.

 This was part of Carrera’s alibi – that he was having sex with Tina Harris, rather than 55

participating in the robbery with Ruiz. Tina Harris was 12 years old at the time.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 63

The friends and neighbors also described Miguel Carrera’s violent and regular drunkenness as

well as the fact that both of Carrera’s parents worked extremely diligently during their marriage to make

a living for their four children. Nearly all the percipient witnesses who described Miguel Carrera,

including Maria Elena (Carrera’s mother), averred that he was a good man who tried to provide for his

family. The home life was certainly conflicted between love and duty on one hand and fear and violence

on the other. Finally, the educators all associated with Carrera’s grammar school, two school teachers,

a music teacher, a school nurse, a principal, and an ESL instructor, all describe how nearly impossible

it was for Spanish-only-speaking children in Carrera’s generation to succeed in school with so little

assistance in learning English. One teacher expressed frustration she experienced at the time when

Mexican and/or Mexican-American children would converse with each her solely in Spanish, a language

she could not understand. The impression from these declarations is that the learning environment was

less than inviting and at times hostile to children in Carrera’s age group. A listing of the declarations

is provided in the Appendix to this order.

d. Summary of Jailhouse Tape Recordings.

On April 14, 1982, one day prior to Carrera’s arraignment, two separate audio tape recordings

were made of conversations at the jail he had with visiting friends and family members. These

recordings eventually were admitted into evidence during guilt phase proceedings. CT-2: 279; RT-2:

76. Transcripts of the tapes, translated into English, were marked Exhibit 216 and Exhibit 217, and 54

read for the jury by a Spanish-English interpreter. RT-11: 1331-35. The reading was not transcribed,

but the transcript exhibits are part of the record. CT-5: 34-51 (Exhibit 216); CT-5: 52-65 (Exhibit 217).

(1) Summary of Exhibit 216.

Carrera’s sister,Maria, was the first person recorded. She and Carrera discussed what she should

tell authorities. He informed her that he told authorities he bathed at her (Maria’s) house on the night

of the crime because he went to bed with Tina (Harris). He related that he was mad at “Mike” 55

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(Santana) because Santana was the one who “put the finger” on him (Carrera). He instructed Maria to

bring “the girls” (possibly Tina and Sherry Harris) to where Santana was “and have them come to an

agreement in what to say.” Further Maria was to tell Santana that he (Santana) didn’t see anything and

that the only thing Carrera talked to Santana about was work. CT-5: 35. Next, Carmen Santana was on

the telephone with Carrera. He repeated the instructions to Carmen that she should tell her brother

Miguel Santana the only thing he (Santana) and Carrera talked about was work. Id.: 36. Carmen asked

Carrera if he left “any proof,” and Carrera replied that he did not. He instructed Carmen to tell

authorities he didn’t go out on the night of the crime, but stayed at her house to watch the children

(Carmen’s children and Maria’s children) while Carmen (and Maria) went to the arcade. Id.: 37A. His

brother Armando was next to speak with him. Their conversation focused on shoe prints left at the

crime scene. Id.: 38-39. Carrera assured Armando that the authorities didn’t “have proofs.” Id.: 40.

He said to Armando that “they” (possibly the authorities) were going to blame it (the crime) on Teresa

because she took acid and was verycrazy (intoxicated)the night of the crime. Cursing, Carrera lamented

that Ruiz purchased new tennis shoes after the crime and that this fact presented a “complication.” Id.:

42. He told Armando to tell authorities he (Armando) obtained LSD from a female hitchhiker. Id.: 44.

Carrera then spoke with Maria again, reminding her to tell authorities he (Carrera) came to her (Maria’s)

house, that they were drinking, that he borrowed ten dollars or food stamps to purchase tv dinners, and

then that Maria and Carmen left for the arcade, leaving their children in the care of Carrera, and that

when they returned at 10 p.m., he was still at Maria’s house (or Carmen’s house). He added that Maria

and Carmen should tell authorities Carrera wanted to go out too, but he was too intoxicated on acid. Id.:

45. Maria related that Teresa told authorities Carrera was stained with blood, and Carrera responded that

the authorities didn’t have any proof of this because they couldn’t find anything. Id.: 45-46. Maria also

related that Ruiz had his pants at home and washed them, but the blood stain did not come out. Carrera

told Maria she was to blame Ruiz and Teresa or just Ruiz for the crime. Id.: 46 Maria stated Teresa told

authorities that the old man (Mr. Hayes) was hit on the head with a battery Ruiz and Carrera stole. Id.:

46-47. Carrera then commented that the battery was going to be useful to show that Teresa was

hallucinating because of the acid she took. Carrera instructed that the visiting friends/ family members

were to say that Armando gave Teresa the acid. Id.: 47-48. Armando then confirmed the plan to tell

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28 This was, in fact, the trial testimony of Efrain Carrera (RT-8: 525), Maria Carrera Nunez (id.: 56

572), and Carrera himself (RT-12: 1427).

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authorities he gave Teresa acid. Carrera instructed both Armando and Maria to tell authorities they

wouldn’t lie for their brother. Carmen was to be instructed likewise. Id.: 48. Carrera told Maria to tell

Sherry and Tina Harris also to confirm that Teresa had taken acid and that Carrera didn’t leave Carmen’s

house. With respect to Ruiz, he told Maria: “Let Ramiro find out on his own, I told him to lighten up

and he doesn’t lighten up, well, that is up to him.” He stated his (Carrera’s) footprints wouldn’t be found

and that the only proof of the crime was Ruiz’s (bloody) pants. Id.: 49. Maria then asked Carrera what

shoes they (friends/ family members) could tell authorities he was wearing. Carrera responded, the

orange striped blue Nike shoes Efrain gave him. Id.: 50. 56

(2) Summary of Exhibit 217.

The first visitor on this tape was Rafael (presumably Rafael Carrera, Carrera’s cousin). Carrera

and Rafael discussed the fact that Teresa was the only “proof” against him. CT-5: 52. In the ensuing

conversation with his father, Carrera said that Teresa was the one who said he (Carrera) was the

perpetrator of the crime. Id.: 54. He relayed to his father that authorities didn’t have any evidence

(proof) against him and he would be all right so long as Santana didn’t incriminate him. Id.: 55. Carrera

encouraged his father to sell a stolen stereo that had been in Carrera’s possession (at his father’s

apartment). Id.: 56. Carrera repeated his lament about Ruiz’s shoe print at the crime scene to his father.

Id.: 58. To the next visitor, “Augustin,” Carrera said, “you see the f—ing things I get into,” followed

by “killing people like crazy. The bad thing is they weren’t ‘placas.’” Then Carrera laughed. The

interpreter indicated that “placas” is slang for badges or police officers. Id.: 59-60. To Armando,

Carrera repeated the instruction to direct Tina and Sherry (Harris) to tell authorities that Teresa was

intoxicated on acid the night of the crime. Carrera confirmed to Armando that he burned the clothes.

Id.: 61. Giving Armando detailed instructions as to where to find the burned clothes, Carrera instructed

his brother to put them in a bag and dispose of them in “the mines.” He then relayed to Armando that

he (Carrera) told authorities he had a drinking problem “to mislead” them. Id.: 62. Armando again

confirmed he would tell authorities he (Armando) gave Teresa acid on the night of the crimes, but that

he didn’t know it was acid. Id.: 64-65.

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 Jones also testified about Carrera’s inculpatory statements. That testimony was the subject of 57

the Court’s October 4, 2004 order and is not recounted here.

 An investigator with the Kern County District Attorney’s Office testified that after comparing 58

Exhibit 222 with an exemplar obtained from Carrera, Exhibit 222 was written in Carrera’s handwriting.

RT-11: 1128-36. The investigator could not come to a conclusion regarding Exhibit 223, but also could

not eliminate Exhibit 223 as being written by Carrera. Id.: 1137-38.

90dp00478.ODenyEH.Car.wpd 66

e. Jailhouse “Kites” Passed by Carrera to Other Inmates.

Jailhouse informant Julius Jones testified about a letter (or “kite”) he (Jones) was to deliver to

Ruiz on April 18, 1983 (less than two months before trial). The letter was marked as Exhibit 222 and 57

admitted into evidence. RT-10: 969-70; CT-2: 457. On cross examination, Jones testified that at the

time the letter was passed to him, he and Ruiz were in the same cell area. RT-10: 983-84. Jones did not

deliver the letter to Ruiz, as promised, but rather gave it to Investigator Tom Mireles. Id.: 973. Later,

Jones, himself, received a kite purportedly from Carrera, instructing him to keep his mouth shut and he

would get $5,000. Id.: 974. The kite to Jones was marked as Exhibit 223 and admitted into evidence.

Id.: 975; CT-2: 457.

The Exhibit 222 letter was read into evidence by Investigator Mireles over Ms. Huffman’s

objection, RT-10: 1013, as follows:

Kite me back and tell me if it’s okay. That way I can tell my lawyer this tonight. Send

this back so I can write it down for me [sic]. [¶] Smiley [Ruiz’s nickname], here’s what

we will say in court. We’ll say que [sic] we want to pull a robbery but half way there we

split up and I went to get a battery and you went to get some money at the motel. Then

we met where Pin and Patience [friends at the party] picked us up, but I didn’t know

what happened or where you got the money from. But you told me you had some

problems getting the money and I couldn’t get a battery. We’ll say I was no where

around the motel when you were there, and if they’ll ask you who was there with you,

make up a name and say he took off to Mexico but you don’t [know] what part and you

don’t know where the vato [sic] was living or put the blame on Teresa. The next

morning I went with you and helped you get rid of some clothes, but that I didn’t know

what was going on ‘til Teresa told me next morning. That way they won’t be able to

place me at the crime and get me for helping you destroy evidence, and I’ll say the

snitches said I was with you because we left together but I didn’t know the people were

dead and the stuff they found wasn’t mine. Que piensas de esto, [sic] or if you have a

better idea, let me know. If they ask me why I didn’t say nothing, I’ll tell them that you

were going to confess and tell them I wasn’t with you. Let me know if it sounds okay.

Kite back.

Id.: 1014-15.58

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f. Ms. Huffman’s Declaration Describing her Guilt Phase Defense

Strategy.

In addressing Carrera’s claim that she inadequately investigated his mental health and social

background, Ms. Huffman avers that during her interviews with him, he did not reveal any information

upon which she could build a mental state defense based on an abusive upbringing. Referencing the

taped recordings of his custodial interviews and jailhouse visits, Ms. Huffman further avers Carrera’s

statements and actions near the time of his arrest did not support a defense of diminished capacity. The

jailhouse tapes indicated to her that Carrera’s “level of functioning was reasonably high.” Further, the

jail “kites” which surfaced closer to the time of trial continued to militate against a mental state defense.

Similarly, in Ms. Huffman’s view, Carrera’s involvement in destroying evidence after the murders

negated the choice of a mental state defense. She avers: “For these reasons, among others, I presented

a defense of petitioner’s non-involvement and his impairment from the use of LSD the day of the

murders [at penalty proceedings]. I focused sharply on Teresa Fout’s credibility and possible

involvement, in petitioner’s stead, and brought in shoe print and shoe sizing evidence to build this

defense [at guilt proceedings].” Huffman Decl., ¶ 5. She continues: “Further, it was my judgment that

any effort to portray petitioner as a hapless victim of socioeconomic and mental forces common to the

Mexican immigrant experience would have opened up some highly prejudicial areas revealing petitioner

to be a socially adept, articulate, academically capable, engaging individual.” Id., ¶ 8.

g. Offer of Proof of Strickland expert Guyton Jinkerson.

Mr. Bedrick’s declaration, submitted with Carrera’s evidentiary hearing motion offers several

testimonial conclusions he anticipates Mr. Jinkerson would draw. First, competent trial counsel, trying

a capital case, would have consulted mental health experts and investigated Carrera’s mental health, drug

use, and mental health history prior to guilt phase proceedings. If Ms. Huffman and done so, she would

have developed mental state evidence consistent with penalty phase testimony of Dr. Cohen, and the

declaration testimony of Drs. Martinez and Froming. Second, competent counsel was obligated to

choose the most effective defense strategy between an alibi defense and a mental state defense. Given

the strength of the prosecution case that Carrera was present at the crime scene, pursuing an alibi defense

rather than a mental state defense was unreasonable. Ms. Huffman was constitutionally ineffective for

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 Funding for the development of evidence that he sustained organic brain damage in part or in 59

full as the result of exposure to neurotoxins, specifically was denied. The Court conducted independent

research to determine whether there is any precedent for mounting a mental state defense to the charge

of robbery based on exposure to toxic chemicals such as pesticides or solvents. The only case of which

the Court presently is aware where a defendant’s exposure to toxic pesticides was proffered as a defense

involves penalty phase proceedings for capital sentencing. See Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th

Cir. 2002). The issue now before the Court involves Carrera’s defense to the crime of robbery. 

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not adequately investigating Carrera’s mental health and for selecting an alibi defense as her defense

strategy. Finally, if Ms. Huffman had presented a mental state defense at the guilt proceedings, there

is a reasonable probability Carrera would not have been convicted of first degree robbery felony murder.

2. Carrera’s Argument.

Carrera maintains that the penalty phase testimony of Dr. Cohen, alone, was sufficient to have

presented a mental state defense during guilt phase proceedings, and that Ms. Huffman’s failure to do

so was constitutionally incompetent under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Citing Siripongs I, 35 F.3d at

1314, he claims Ms. Huffman’s declaration testimony, that she made a strategic choice not to pursue a

mental state defense, was not reasonable because she failed to investigate such a defense and therefore

her decision was uninformed. He further claims Ms. Huffman rendered incompetent professional

assistance byrelying on the jailhouse visit tape recordings and the jailhouse “kites” because these events

post-dated Carrera’s LSD intoxication by many days.

3. Analysis.

As the result of the Court’s October 4, 2004 order, neither mitigation evidence nor mental state

evidence undermining intentional murder are at issue. The only relevant mental state defense pertains

to whether Carrera harbored the mens rea necessary to commit robbery. In the February 3, 2005 funding

order as well as the August 19, 2005 discovery order, the Court further limited mental state evidence to

Carrera’s use of drugs and alcohol at the time of the crime, since evidence of a difficult family history

and depression while relevant to capital sentence selection as mitigating factors, do not constitute a

defense to robbery. In the present motion, Carrera has utilized evidence of his family background, 59

recent depression, and small size, to magnify the mind-numbing affects of LSD, marijuana, and alcohol

on his ability to have conceived or participated in the robbery plan at the Imperial 400 Motel. Although

Carrera’s character is no longer at issue for purposes of development of a mental state defense to the

robbery felony murder charge, the declarations of friends and particularly family members describe a

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well-loved, conflicted young man who was deeply hurt by his parents’ divorce, longed to have a family

with his girlfriend, and remained devoted to his father’s well-being.

The evidence of Carrera’s scheming to exculpate himself shortly after his arrest, in both the tape

recordings of the jailhouse visits and the “kite” to Ruiz, however, undermines development of a mental

state defense. Carrera’s own attempts to establish an alibi shown by this evidence, coupled with the fact

that he assisted in the burning of bloody clothes he was said to have been wearing when he and Ruiz

returned to the party (after the murders) does, as the Warden argues, make a mental defense implausible.

While post-crime conduct of a defendant trying to deflect responsibility for his part in a crime does not

invariably rule out some sort of mental disability at the time of the crime, in Carrera’s case the quantity

of such attempts close in time to his arrest supports Ms. Huffman’s strategic decision not to present a

mental state defense.

Carrera is entirely correct to point to caselaw that strategic decisions cannot defeat an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim if the decisions are uninformed or unreasonable. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133

F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1998) (Siripongs II), (“the relevant inquiry under Strickland is not what defense

counsel could have pursued, but rather whetherthe choices made by defense counsel were reasonable”);

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994) (to be strategic, the decision about developing

or not developing a defense must be “an informed one”). Ms. Huffman’s decision to present an alibi

defense instead of a mental state defense was both informed and reasonable. First of all, she averred that

Carrera did not reveal any information upon which she could build a mental state defense based on his

family background. “Trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant’s mental state if there is

evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired,” Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir.

2003), but in the absence of such evidence the duty cannot be imposed. Second, Carrera devised the

alibi defense before Ms. Huffman began representing him. He told his sister and brothers that they were

to confirm he stayed at Carmen Santana’s house (with a brief appearance at Maria’s house to have sex

with Tina Harris and eat tv dinners) during the time Mr. and Mrs. Hayes were murdered. He also

devised another idea that Ruiz would confirm he (Ruiz) was responsible for the crime, either acting

alone or in concert with a person who disappeared to Mexico or with Teresa. Had Ms. Huffman

presented a mental state defense to show that Carrera simply went along with Ruiz’s suggestion to

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accompany him to the Imperial 400 Motel and participate in the murderous robbery of Mr. and Mrs.

Hayes, Mr. Vendrasco would have undermined the defense by presenting Carrera’s post-arrest attempts

to exculpate himself. Carrera does not explain how a person who was so confused and prone to

suggestion would be so concerned with destroying evidence and designing an alibi. 

As she avers in her declaration, Ms. Huffman could not devise an explanation either. She

reasonably chose to pursue a defense that was most consistent with finding gaps in the circumstantial

evidence placing Carrera at the scene of the crime and the somewhat confused testimony of Teresa Fout.

It is not ineffective for counsel to forego a mental state defense that would have been inconsistent with

claimed innocence. Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Siripongs II, 133 F.3d

at 734.) Moreover, this Court must accord a heavy measure of deference to trial counsel’s informed

strategic decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). Even after

Drs. Martinez and Froming examined and commented on Carrera’s mental functioning at the time of

the crime, there is still little connection offered between Carrera’s reported mental impairments (basal

ganglia dysfunction, cerebral impairment, and lateralized lesion) and his cognitive abilities the night of

the crime.

Carrera’s reliance on Siripongs I, 35 F.3d 1308, is misplaced. In that case the district court

initially accepted the Warden’s assertion that trial counsel’s failure to investigate a mental state defense

was reasonable and tactical. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the record did not contain any

evidence supporting the trial attorney’s omission. Id. at 1314. It was not until the case was remanded

for an evidentiary hearing that evidence was developed supporting trial counsel’s decision not to present

mental state evidence. Siripongs II. 133 F. 3d at 734-36. Evidence supporting Ms. Huffman’s tactical

decision in this case already exists. Carrera supplied this with his conversations to friends and family

members at the jail and in his “kite” to Ruiz. Ms. Huffman did not render ineffective legal

representation. Accepting Carrera’s offers of proof from Dr. Cohen’s penalty phase testimony as well

as the declarations of the late Dr. Martinez, Dr. Froming, and Mr. Bedrick (as to Mr. Jinkerson’s

proposed testimony), the Court finds Carrera still has not presented a colorable claim warranting further

evidentiary development. Claims 88 and 89 are denied on the merits.

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VI. Order.

Carrera’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied. Accepting all the offers of proof as true,

he has not presented a colorable claim entitling him to habeas relief. The Court further declines to

exercise its discretionary authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Claims 3, 18, 40, 20, 85, 87, 88,

and 89 are denied on the merits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2008 

 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

Anthony W. Ishii

 United States District Judge

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Appendix

Twenty-nine lay declarations are attached to Carrera’s October 27, 1995 state exhaustion petition. The

identities of the declarants and their relationship to Carrera are listed.

1. Armando Carrera – brother, born September 11, 1963

2. Aurelia Carrera – paternal aunt, Uncle Manuel’s wife

3. Efrain Carrera – brother, born February 4, 1966

4. Francisco Carrera – paternal uncle, in Corrales

5. Manuel Carrera – paternal uncle, in California (wife - Aurelia)

6. Maria De la Luz Carrera – cousin, daughter of Manuel Carrera

7. Miguel Angel Carrera – father, born July 19, 1937

8. Rafael Carrera – orphaned paternal cousin, born August 2, 1961 

9. Erma Esparza – great aunt, married to maternal uncle Manuel Esparza

10. Rose Marie Hernandez – sister-in-law (Armando’s wife)

11. Maria Alicia Lizarrago – sister, born August 22, 1962 (referred to at trial as Maria Carrera

Nunez)

12. Miguel Medina – maternal uncle (younger brother of Maria Elena), born September 2, 1957

13. Pedro Medina – maternal step-grandfather (step-father of Maria Elena; Miguel Medina’s father)

14. Francisco Montenegro – husband of maternal aunt Marta

15. Marta Montenegro Montenegro – maternal aunt

16. Socorro Montenegro Peña – maternal aunt

17. Maria Elena Montenegro Santamaria – mother (with remarried last name), born March 6, 1941

18. Guadalupe Carrera Unzueta – paternal aunt (Miguel’s older sister)

19. Joel A. Cardona – minister in Rosamond

20. Tomás Lozano Garcia – childhood friend

21. Magdalena Garza – former girlfriend/ mother of Carrera’s daughter, Erika

22. Susie Navarro – adult neighbor the Carrera family 

23. Roberta Perkins – school nurse in Mojave and neighbor of the Carrera family

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24. Helen Skibe Valadez – adult friend of Carrera’s mother and Susie Navarro

25. Rebecca Barton – teacher in Mojave

26. Fermon L. Bowlin – teacher in Mojave

27. John Gardner – music teacher in Mojave

28. Sally Swenick, Ed.D. – school principal in Mojave

29. Betty Vondriska – ESL teacher in Mojave

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