Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00752/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00752-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO MW

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Virender Singh,

Petitioner,

v. 

William Barr, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-20-00752-PHX-MTL (MTM)

ORDER

Petitioner Virender Singh (A# 215-677-204), who is detained in the Florence 

Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona, has filed, through counsel, a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) and a Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2). The Court will issue a temporary 

stay of removal and call Respondents to answer the Petition.

I. Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of India. On October 13, 2019, he entered the 

United States without inspection at an unknown location and was encountered and taken 

into custody by the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). (Doc. 1-3.) 

Petitioner was determined to be inadmissible to the United States and placed in expedited 

removal proceedings pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 235(b)(1), 

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (Doc. 1-6.) Petitioner expressed a fear of persecution or torture if 

returned to India and was referred for a credible fear determination. Petitioner was then 

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transferred and detained in the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Imperial, California. 

(Docs. 1-3, 1-6.)

On December 10 and 12, 2019, Petitioner received credible fear interviews. (Docs. 

1-3, 1-4.) An asylum officer found Petitioner’s testimony was not credible and therefore 

determined that he had not established a credible or reasonable fear of persecution or torture 

if removed to India.

1

 (Docs. 1-3 at 6-7; 1-5 at 2-4.) The determination was approved by a 

supervisory asylum officer (Doc. 1-3 at 7), and Petitioner was ordered removed from the 

United States (Doc. 1-6). Petitioner requested review of the credible fear determination by 

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) (id.), and on January 27, 2020, the IJ affirmed the asylum 

officer’s credible fear determination.

2

 Petitioner was subsequently transferred to the 

Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona, where he is currently detained.3

II. Petition

In his Petition, Petitioner names United States Attorney General William Barr, 

Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf, Executive Office for Immigration Review Director 

James McHenry, and former United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Phoenix Field Office Director Enrique Lucero as Respondents.4 

1 Petitioner was deemed ineligible for asylum pursuant 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(4) on 

the basis that he did not apply for protection from persecution or torture in at least one 

country through which he transited en route to the United States, and therefore found to 

have “not established a significant possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum and [] 

received a negative credible fear of persecution determination.” (Docs. 1-3 at 7; 1-5 at 

5-6.) Consequently, Petitioner was screened only “for potential entitlement to withholding 

under INA [§] 241 or [Convention Against Torture] protection under a ‘reasonable 

possibility of persecution’ and ‘reasonable possibility of torture’ standard.” (Id.)

2 See Executive Office for Immigration Review Automated Case Information, 

https://portal.eoir.justice.gov/InfoSystem (last accessed Apr. 20, 2020).

3 See United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Online Detainee Locator 

System, https://locator.ice.gov (last accessed Apr. 20, 2020).

4 Under the rationale articulated in Armentero, infra, and in the absence of authority 

addressing who is the proper respondent in immigration habeas corpus proceedings under 

§ 2241, the Court will not dismiss Respondents Barr, Wolf, or Lucero or the Petition for 

failure to name a proper respondent at this stage of the proceedings. See Armentero v. INS, 

340 F.3d 1058, 1071-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the DHS Secretary and the Attorney 

General were proper respondents), withdrawn, 382 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (order); see 

also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 n.8 (2004) (declining to resolve whether the 

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Petitioner brings two grounds for relief. In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner claims 

that his credible fear proceedings denied him a fair and meaningful opportunity to apply 

for relief in violation of the INA, the implementing regulations, and the Due Process Clause 

of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner alleges DHS failed to employ the required nonadversarial procedures when conducting his credible fear interview and failed to apply the 

correct legal standard when evaluating his credible fear claim. Petitioner further alleges 

that the IJ applied the wrong legal standard and failed to consider binding case law. 

Petitioner asserts that the Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to review his claims pursuant 

to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 

1097 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-161 (Oct. 18, 2019). 

Petitioner asks the Court to: (1) determine that his expedited removal order violated 

his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights and, as a result, he is being detained in 

violation of the law; (2) vacate the expedited removal order; (3) order that he “be provided 

a new, meaningful opportunity to apply for asylum and other relief from removal”; and (4) 

award him costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 1 

at 23.)

The Court asks that Respondents Barr, Wolf, and Lucero to answer the Petition.

III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order

Petitioner moves the Court to enjoin his continued detention or transfer, to order 

Respondents to provide him with an individualized asylum hearing, and to stay his removal 

from the United States while this action is pending. Petitioner states that he has been 

notified by DHS “that he is at immediate risk of removal” and “has already been relocated 

from California to an immigration processing center in Arizona in an effort to remove him, 

which signifies that Petitioner’s removal is imminent.” (Doc. 2 at 3.)

A party seeking injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer 

Attorney General is a proper respondent in an immigration habeas corpus petition). 

However, the Court will dismiss Respondent McHenry because the rationale articulated in 

Armentero would not extend to him.

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irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his 

favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 

2012); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (discussing Ninth Circuit’s alternative “serious questions” test). Where a 

movant seeks a mandatory injunction, rather than a prohibitory injunction, injunctive relief 

is “subject to a higher standard” and is “permissible when ‘extreme or very serious damage 

will result’ that is not ‘capable of compensation in damages,’ and the merits of the case are 

not ‘doubtful.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Marlyn 

Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

A temporary restraining order (TRO) under Rule 65(b), unlike a preliminary 

injunction under Rule 65(a), may be entered before an adverse party has had an opportunity 

to respond. A TRO may issue if: “(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint 

clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney 

certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be 

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (emphasis added). 

To the extent Petitioner seeks a new hearing on his asylum claims, release from 

custody, or to remain detained in Arizona, he has not demonstrated that he will suffer 

irreparable injury before Respondents have had an opportunity to answer the Petition. He 

therefore fails to meet his burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to immediate or 

preliminary injunctive relief, and his Motion will be denied without prejudice with respect 

to those requests. 

The potential interests of justice associated with the irrevocable nature of removal, 

however, suggest the necessity of issuing a temporary stay of removal. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has mandated that “a petitioner seeking a stay of removal must show that 

irreparable harm is probable and either: (a) a strong likelihood of success on the merits and 

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that the public interest does not weigh heavily against a stay; or (b) a substantial case on 

the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.” LeivaPerez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing application of Nken v. 

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 444 (2009)).

In Thuraissigiam, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)’s

statutory restriction on habeas corpus review violated the Suspension Clause as applied to 

Thuraissigiam. On that basis, the district court’s initial decision was reversed, and the 

Ninth Circuit remanded the matter with instructions to exercise jurisdiction and “consider 

Thuraissigiam’s legal challenges to the procedures leading to his expedited removal order.” 

917 F.3d at 1119. 

Similarly, here, Petitioner has raised legal challenges to the process leading to his 

expedited removal order and alleged circumstances which, if true, would present a 

substantial case on the merits. This is, of course, without prejudice to Respondents 

demonstrating the contrary. Because removal would deprive him of the relief he seeks –

asylum in the United States – he has also shown that it is probable that he would suffer 

irreparable harm absent a stay. 

Lastly, the balance of hardships tips sharply in Petitioner’s favor. A stay will 

maintain the status quo until the parties have had an opportunity to brief the Petition and

will facilitate a considered review of their arguments by the Court and a reasoned decision 

on the issues presented. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary 

Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is granted insofar as a temporary stay of removal is entered

and is otherwise denied without prejudice.

(2) Respondents are enjoined from removing Petitioner Virender Singh

(A# 215-677-204) from the United States pending further order of this Court. 

(3) Respondent McHenry is dismissed without prejudice.

(4) The Clerk of Court shall email a copy of this Order to the Immigration TRO 

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Distribution List.

(5) The Clerk of Court shall serve: (1) a copy of the Summons, (2) the 

Petition (Doc. 1), and (3) this Order upon the United States Attorney for the District of 

Arizona by certified mail addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United 

States Attorney pursuant to Rule 4(i)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 

Clerk of Court shall also send by certified mail a copy of the Summons, the Petition, and 

this Order to the United States Attorney General pursuant to Rule 4(i)(1)(B) and to 

Respondents Barr, Wolf, and Lucero pursuant to Rule 4(i)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

(6) Respondents Barr, Wolf, and Lucero shall have 30 days from the date of 

service to answer the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Respondents shall not 

file a dispositive motion in place of an answer absent leave of Court.

(7) Petitioner shall have 15 days from the filing of Respondents’ Answer to the 

Petition to file a Reply. Failure to file a Reply may be deemed as consent to the denial of 

the Petition on the grounds presented in Respondents’ Answer.

(8) Petitioner must file a “Notice of Change in Status” with the Clerk of Court 

within 5 days of any material change in Petitioner’s immigration or custody status. 

Petitioner may not include a motion for other relief with the Notice.

(9) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Michael T. Morrissey pursuant 

to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a 

report and recommendation.

Dated this 20th day of April, 2020.

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