Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00163/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MDR 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jose J. Rodriguez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Dr. Thomas Bell, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-00163-PHX-FJM (MHB) 

ORDER 

 On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff Jose J. Rodriguez, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex-Phoenix in Phoenix, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and a 

Motion to Appoint Counsel. In a February 15, 2013 Order, the Court denied the deficient 

Application to Proceed and gave Plaintiff 30 days to pay the filing fee or file a complete 

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

 On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a second Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. In a June 28, 2013 Order, the Court granted the second Application to 

Proceed, dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim, and denied 

without prejudice the Motion to Appoint Counsel. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to 

file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Additional Time to File Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 11). On August 22, 2013, he filed his First Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 13). The Court, in its discretion, will grant the Motion for Additional Time and 

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will consider the First Amended Complaint timely filed. The Court will dismiss the First 

Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 

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Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of 

advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. 

Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to 

decide whether the court was required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). The Court 

will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, but because 

the First Amended Complaint may possibly be saved by amendment, will dismiss the 

First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 

II. First Amended Complaint 

 In his two-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants Arizona 

Department of Corrections Director Charles Ryan and Dr. Thomas Bell. In both counts, 

Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment rights regarding medical care and 

claims that as a result of Defendants actions or inactions, he has constant pain, nerve 

damage, problems standing for any length of time, and may possibly have permanent 

injuries. In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, 

monetary damages, and his attorney’s fees and costs. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff sues Defendant Ryan “in his official capacity.” Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Ryan is responsible for establishing and enforcing policies and 

practices for providing constitutionally adequate medical care for inmates. Plaintiff 

asserts that Defendant Ryan “promises Plaintiff through written policies to provide 

sufficient resources to provide the ‘community standard of health care,’ but fall[s] far 

below that measure.” He claims that Defendant Ryan is well aware of severe systemwide deficiencies that have caused Plaintiff significant harm, yet has failed to take 

reasonable measures to abate the impermissible risk of harm. He also contends that 

Defendant Ryan has “ignored repeated warnings of the inadequacies and dangerous 

conditions involving the health care system.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Ryan is 

deliberately indifferent because Plaintiff is still unable to receive tangible relief for his 

serious medical needs despite Defendant Ryan having “answered [in 2009] several 

concerns by medical professionals throughout the prison system[] that [the Arizona 

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Department of Corrections] was not providing the standard of care guaranteed by the 

Arizona Constitution, the U.S. Constitution, and the department’s own policies” and 

despite a lawsuit having been filed against him in 2012.1

 Plaintiff states that he has severe vertebrae damage that causes severe pain, but he 

has been denied any type of relief and has only been told that his pain will eventually 

subside and go away. Plaintiff asserts that he filed a grievance regarding the issue and 

Defendant Ryan acted with deliberate indifference and ignored Plaintiff’s serious medical 

problems. Plaintiff claims that in response to the grievance, Defendant Ryan stated that 

the issue had been previously and recently addressed in a response to a different 

grievance appeal and that Plaintiff should refrain from repeatedly grieving issues that 

have been previously addressed. Plaintiff contends that he never received the response 

regarding the other grievance appeal and asserts that his problems are not being 

appropriately addressed. Plaintiff also asserts that he “has had no relief to the deliberate 

indifference to his left knee that he has had surgery on, as well. And no relief to his right 

shoulder. No medication for pain.” 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bell is the acting physician on the 

unit where Plaintiff was confined when he filed his lawsuit and is responsible for “the 

overall health care of inmates on that unit.” Plaintiff contends that Defendant Bell is 

aware of Plaintiff’s back, knee, and shoulder problems because Plaintiff’s medical 

records indicate that Plaintiff has had surgeries on his back and knee and because 

Plaintiff has been given limited duty and lower-tier/lower-bunk special needs orders due 

to these problems. Plaintiff states that he sought medical care for vertebrae damage in his 

back, tendon damage in his knee, and possible damage to his rotator cuff, but Defendant 

Bell repeatedly told Plaintiff that the pain will “go away and subside, eventually.” 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bell has acted with deliberate indifference because he has 

 

1

 Plaintiff states that the lawsuit was filed on March 22, 2012, by the Arizona Center for Disability Law and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 

Arizona. Presumably, Plaintiff is referring to the class action lawsuit, Parson v. Ryan, 12-CV-601-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz.). 

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failed to order even the most rudimentary tests to determine what may be causing the 

inflammation in Plaintiff’s back and knee, has ignored the fact that Plaintiff is rapidly 

losing his range of motion in his shoulder, and has failed to prescribe any pain medication 

to alleviate Plaintiff’s severe pain. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Bell has told 

Plaintiff that “we have done all we can for you” and to “give it time to heal and you’ll be 

al[]right.” 

III. Failure to State a Claim 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Count One

 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state 

law who have violated rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and federal 

law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 

1995). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against 

the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from 

a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 

(1989) (internal citation omitted).2

 Plaintiff specifically states that he is suing Defendant 

Ryan “in his official capacity.” 

 Plaintiff cannot maintain a lawsuit against Defendant Ryan in his official capacity 

for damages. “State officials sued for damages in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ 

for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs 

them.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). See also Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, 

 

2

 “By contrast, state officials sued in their personal capacity come to court as 

individuals.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (emphasis added). “[T]o establish 

personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (emphasis in original). 

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Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of 

section 1983. Likewise ‘arms of the State’ such as the Arizona Department of 

Corrections are not ‘persons’ under section 1983.”) (citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff may maintain a lawsuit against Defendant Ryan in his official capacity 

for prospective injunctive relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10 (“[A] state official in his 

or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 

because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against 

the State.’”) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167, n.14); see also Flint v. Dennison, 488 

F.3d. 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a 

narrow, but well-established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Plaintiff 

seeks prospective injunctive relief—to have his medical issues treated “appropriately and 

timely.”3

 “Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental 

entity and not the named official, ‘the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part 

in the violation of federal law.’” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 

166). See also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 447, 

453-54 (2010) (the “‘policy or custom’ requirement [in Monell v. New York City 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] applies in § 1983 cases irrespective 

of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective.”). A plaintiff must allege, as a 

matter of law, that the policy or custom caused him to suffer constitutional injury. 

Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006). To impose liability based on a 

policy of deliberate inaction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the policy of inaction 

amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that the 

 

3

 Because Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief regarding his individual medical care, rather than systemic reform, the Court can consider his claim; Plaintiff’s requested relief does not appear to be duplicative of that sought in the class action lawsuit in Parson 

v. Ryan, 12-CV-601-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz.). Cf. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1137 

(9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here a California prisoner brings an independent claim for injunctive relief solely on his own behalf for specific medical treatment denied to him, [the class action lawsuit seeking systemic reform of medical care in the California 

prisons] does not bar the prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief.”). 

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policy was a moving force behind the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2004). The policy must be more than mere 

negligence and must constitute a “conscious or deliberate choice among various 

alternatives.” Id.

 Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state an official capacity claim for 

prospective injunctive relief against Defendant Ryan. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant 

Ryan has a policy of providing a community standard of healthcare. That policy in and 

of itself did not cause a constitutional violation and Plaintiff does not explain, other than 

making vague and conclusory allegations, how the policy was deficient. In addition, 

Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant Ryan attempted to address concerns by 

medical professionals that the provision of medical care was inadequate. Thus, to the 

extent Plaintiff may be asserting that there was a policy of deliberate inaction, Plaintiff 

also fails to state a claim. 

 Because Plaintiff cannot maintain an official capacity claim for damages against 

Defendant Ryan and because Plaintiff has failed to state an official capacity claim for 

prospective injunctive relief against Defendant Ryan, the Court will dismiss without 

prejudice Count One and Defendant Ryan. 

B. Count Two

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

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both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter 

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Two are insufficient to state a claim of deliberate 

indifference by Defendant Bell. First, it is unclear whether Defendant Bell was 

responsible for providing medical care to Plaintiff or whether he was acting in an 

administrative role. Second, Plaintiff’s allegations at best support a claim of negligence 

or medical malpractice or a difference of opinion between Plaintiff and Defendant Bell 

regarding the need for tests or treatment. Neither is sufficient to state a claim of 

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deliberate indifference. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Two and 

Defendant Bell. 

IV. Leave to Amend

 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff 

may submit a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The 

Clerk of Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a second 

amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may 

strike the second amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “Second 

Amended Complaint.” The second amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in 

its entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original 

Complaint or First Amended Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one 

claim per count. 

 A second amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint and First 

Amended Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal 

Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After 

amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint and First Amended Complaint as 

nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the 

original Complaint or First Amended complaint is waived if it is not raised in a second 

amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

V. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

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B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further 

notice to Plaintiff. 

D. Possible “Strike”

 Because the First Amended Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a 

claim, if Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint correcting the deficiencies 

identified in this Order, the dismissal may count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” 

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring 

a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the 

prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

E. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 

F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any 

order of the Court). 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Time to File Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 11) is granted. The Court will consider Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

timely filed. 

(2) The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) is dismissed for failure to state a 

claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a second amended 

complaint in compliance with this Order. 

 (3) If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint within 30 days, the 

Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action 

with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). 

(4) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a 

civil rights complaint by a prisoner. 

Dated this 29th day of October, 2013. 

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