Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02587/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02587-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332ed Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JACK HERNANDEZ an individual, 

and on behalf of all others similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

BEST BUY CO., INC., 

Defendant. 

CASE NO. 13cv2587-JM(KSC) 

ORDER RE JOINT MOTION FOR 

DETERMINATION OF DISCOVERY 

DISPUTE 

[Doc. No. 26.] 

17 Before the Court is the parties' Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery 

18 Dispute. [Doc. No. 26.] In the Joint Motion, plaintiff seeks an order compelling 

19 defendant to disclose contact information for putative class members prior to class 

20 certification. Plaintiff argues that defendant should provide him with contact 

21 information for putative class members so he can gather information needed to present 

22 to the District Court in a motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 

23 Procedure 23. For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds that plaintiffs request 

24 for an order compelling defendant to disclose contact information for putative class 

25 members must be GRANTED subject to a protective order. 

26 Background 

27 In the operative Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") plaintiff alleges that 

28 he has been and is currently employed by defendant Best Buy Stores, ,L.P., as a store 

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1 manager in a salaried position at one of defendants Best Buy Mobile locations_ [Doc_ 

2 No_ 19, at p. 1.] In his class action Complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of California 

3 Labor Code Sections 201,202, 226.7(a), 500, 512, and 1194 et seq.; and California 

4 Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. Plaintiff also seeks to recover 

5 penalties under California Labor Code Sections 2698-2699 (known as the Private 

6 Attorney General's Act or PAGA). 

7 Plaintiff claims to represent the following class: 

8 

9 

10 

11 

All California based salaried store manager employees who 

worked at any' time during the four years precedmg.,the filing of this Complaint up until the date of class certilication at 

any Best Buy Mobile stores in the State of California owned, 

operated ana/or acquired by defendant[]. 

12 [Doc. No 19, at p. 6.] 

13 As a matter of uniform policy, plaintiff alleges that managers at Best Buy mobile 

14 locations routinely work more than eight hours per day and more than 40 hours per 

15 week. [Doc. No. 19, at p. 5.] Records of hours worked by these managers are not 

16 maintained by defendant as a pattern and practice. [Doc. No. 19, at p. 8.] Plaintiff 

17 believes that all managers at Best Buy Mobile locations should be classified as "non18 exempt" employees under California law. However, plaintiff claims that defendant has 

19 a uniform policy that mis-classifies salaried managers at Best Buy Mobile locations 

20 as "exempt" or "executive" employees. [Doc. No. 19, at pp. 2-3, 5.] As a result of this 

21 mis-classification, plaintiff claims that managers at Best Buy mobile locations are not 

22 paid overtime and are deprived of mandated meal periods and rest breaks. [Doc. No. 

23 19, at pp. 3, 5.] 

24 Plaintiff alleges that managers at Best Buy mobile locations do not meet the 

25 requirements for "exempt" employees under California law, because they regularly 

26 spend more than 50 percent of their time performing non-exempt tasks and because 

27 their work does not regularly involve discretion or independent judgment. [Doc. No. 

28 19, at p. 6.] According to plaintiff, managers spend most of their time on non-exempt 

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1 tasks because of a consistent, uniform corporate policy of "inadequate staffing" at all 

2 Best Buy mobile locations. [Doc. No. 19, at pp. 6-7.] As a result of this uniform 

3 corporate policy of "inadequate staffing," plaintiff essentially alleges that managers 

4 have no choice but to shoulder the responsibilities of "non-management" duties, such 

5 as customer service and clerical work, and to work "far in excess of forty hours in a 

6 week and/or eight hours in a day" without overtime compensation and rest or meal 

7 periods. [Doc. No. 19, at p. 7.] Plaintiff claims that any variations in the duties and 

8 responsibilities performed by managers from store to store or region to region are 

9 legally insignificant to the issues presented in this action, because the "central fact" 

10 remains that managers routinely spend more than 50 percent of their time on "non11 exempt" tasks because of a corporate policy of "inadequate staffing." [Doc. No. 19, at 

12 pp. 6-7.] 

13 The Complaint also includes general allegations that a class action is proper 

14 under the circumstances because plaintiffs claims are typical of the class; class 

15 members are numerous so that joinder would be impractical; and common questions 

16 of fact and law are predominate in the action. Plaintiff believes a class action lawsuit 

17 is the most efficient and appropriate means to redress the alleged wrongs and that the 

18 prosecution of individual actions by each employee would place them at an 

19 "unconscionable" disadvantage in relation to defendants' "superior financial and legal 

20 resources." As further alleged in the Complaint, individual employees would be 

21 discouraged from asserting lawful claims because ofthe costs involved and/or because 

22 they fear retaliation or damage to their careers. [Doc. No. 19, at pp. 6-11.] 

23 Discussion 

24 I. The Parties' Discoverv Dispute. 

25 Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 1 requests the names, last known residence 

26 addresses, telephone numbers, and cellular telephone numbers for all individuals who 

27 fall within plaintiffs definition of the class. [Doc. No. 26, at p. 2.] Defendant objects 

28 to this interrogatory on various grounds, including relevance and the privacy of 

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1 individuals who are not parties to the action. [Doc. No. 26, at pp. 2-3.] In addition, 

2 citing the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th 

3 Cir. 1985) and Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F .2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 

4 1977), defendant argues in the Joint Motion that plaintiff is not entitled to contact 

5 information for putative class members prior to class certification, because he is unable 

6 to present prima facie evidence showing that he can meet the class action requirements 

7 under Rule 23 or that the discovery he seeks is likely to substantiate his class 

8 allegations. [Doc. No. 26, at pp. 5, 14.] 

9 Even if plaintiff could present evidence to make the prima facie showing 

10 discussed by the Ninth Circuit inMantoletev. Bolger, 767 F.2dat 1424, and Doninger 

11 v. Pacific Northwest, 564 F.2d at 1313, defendant contends that plaintiff is not entitled 

12 to disclosure of contact information for all putative class members prior to class 

13 certification. According to defendant, plaintiff already has access to at least three 

14 purported class members. Defendant argues that access to three purposed class 

15 members is enough for plaintiff to test his class allegations, and, in any event, courts 

16 who allow this type of discovery usually limit it to a small "sampling" of putative class 

17 members. [Doc. No. 26, at pp. 5, 17-18.] 

18 Plaintiff asserts that he seeks contact information for putative class members 

19 described in the Complaint so he can gather information that he believes is necessary 

20 to meet his burden of proof on a motion for class certification. Citing Rule 23, plaintiff 

21 contends he must show that certification of a class is appropriate because all claims by 

22 members of the class "arise from a common course of conduct." [Doc. No. 26, at p. 9.] 

23 Plaintiff also anticipates that defendant will attempt to defeat his motion for class 

24 certification by arguing that liability can only be established on an individual-by25 individual basis, because the circumstances of each class member are unique. If he is 

26 not allowed to communicate with members of the putative class, plaintiff argues that 

27 he will not have a fair opportunity to oppose defendant's argument that the issues 

28 raised in his Complaint must be decided on an individual basis rather than in a class 

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1 action under Rule 23. 1 Plaintiff believes he has made aprima/acie showing of the 

2 prerequisites for a class action under Rule 23 based on the allegations in his Complaint 

3 and on defendant's responses to Special Interrogatories, which indicate that all 

4 members of the purported class were uniformly classified as exempt employees for the 

5 same specific reasons. [Doc. No. 26, at pp. 10-11; Doc. No. 26-1, Righetti Decl., Ex. 4, 

6 at pp. 24, 32.] 

7 Defendant has indicated in response to written discovery that the putative class 

8 includes approximately 70 individuals at 30 stores in California. [Doc. No. 26-1, 

9 Righetti Decl., Ex. 4, at p. 34; Doc. No. 26, at p. 13.] According to plaintiff, it is simply 

10 not true that he already has access to the contact information for these individuals. 

11 Rather, plaintiff represents that he has been "on leave during the last year" and has only 

12 had contact with two putative class members. [Doc. No. 26, at pp. 11-12.] 

13 II. Scope ofDiscoverv. 

14 The party seeking to compel discovery generally bears the burden of satisfying 

15 the relevance requirement of Rule 26(b). Soto v. City a/Concord, 162 F .R.D. 603, 610 

16 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is broad: "Parties may 

17 obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or 

18 defense of any party involved in the pending action. Relevant information need not be 

19 admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 

20 discovery of admissible evidence." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b). However, a court may limit 

21 discovery of relevant material ifit determines that the discovery sought is unreasonably 

22 cumulative or duplicative, or obtainable from some other source that is more 

23 convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive, or the burden or expense of the 

24 proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit. The party resisting discovery 

25 generally bears the burden to show that the discovery requested is irrelevant to the 

26 

1 In this regard, defendant has stated in response to plaintiff s Interrogatory 27 No. 16 that the actual duties performed by putative class members "vary from manager 

to manager, as does the amount of time sfent performing any particular duty or 

28 responsiDility." [Doc. No. 26-1, at p. 15. In response to Interrogatory No. 16 

defendant also listed the duties performed by managers. [Doc. No. 26-1, at pp. 37-40.j 

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1 issues in the case or is overly broad, unduly burdensome, unreasonable, or oppressive_ 

2 Henderson v. Holiday CVS, L.L. C, 269 F.R.D. 682, 686 (2010). Here, defendant does 

3 not dispute the relevance of the contact information plaintiff seeks in response to 

4 Interrogatory No. 1 as to all putative class members. Defendant merely objects to 

5 disclosure of this information prior to class certification. 

6 IlL Discoverv Related to Class Certification. 

7 Rule 23( d) provides District Courts with authority in class actions to "issue 

8 orders that: ... (C) impose conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors." 

9 Fed.R.Civ.P.23(d). For example, a District Court may enter a limiting order under 

10 Rule 23(d) to prevent inappropriate or abusive communications with class members. 

11 GulfOilv. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89,101 (1981). However, in Gulf Oil Cov. Bernard, the 

12 United States Supreme Court cautioned that "serious restraints" on communications 

13 with potential class members "in the absence of a clear record and specific findings of 

14 need" is an abuse of discretion. Id. at 103-104. "[T]he mere possibility of abuses does 

15 not justifY routine adoption of a communications ban that interferes with the formation 

16 of a class or the prosecution of a class action in accordance with the [Federal] Rules." 

17 Id. at 104. Here, defendant has presented no evidence to even suggest that contact 

18 information for putative class members should be withheld to prevent inappropriate or 

19 abusive communications. 

20 As defendant contends, the Ninth Circuit has addressed the propriety of pre21 certification discovery in class action cases on several occasions. In Doninger v. 

22 Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d at 1304, the Ninth Circuit stated as follows: 

23 "[W]here the plaintiffs fail to make even a prima facie showing of Rule 23's 

24 prerequisites, ... the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery measures 

25 are likely to produce persuasive information substantiating the class action 

26 allegations." Id. at 1313. The plaintiffs in Doninger argued that it was error to deny 

27 their motion for class certification without allowing them the discovery they needed to 

28 meetthe class requirements in Rule 23. Id. at 1312. Under the particular facts at issue, 

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1 the Ninth Circuit concluded plaintiffs were unable to show that discovery was likely 

2 to "produce persuasive infonnation substantiating the class action allegations." Id. 

3 The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint were conclusory and merely mimic[ ed] the 

4 language of Rule 23 in a parallel fashion." Id. at p. 1309, 1312. Plaintiffs were unable 

5 to present even minimal facts supporting their conclusory class action allegations. Id. 

6 at 1313. By contrast, defendants therein presented an un-controverted affidavit 

7 showing that a substantial portion of potential class members would be unable to 

8 participate in the case because they had voluntarily signed a waiver and accepted relief 

9 under a consent decree in a prior related proceeding. As a result, plaintiffs would have 

10 been unable to satisfY the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a) even if discovery had 

11 been allowed. Id. In addition, defendants presented evidence showing the class would 

12 have been fragmented so there was no reasonable possibility plaintiff could satisfY the 

13 additional commonality requirements in Rule 23(b) even if discovery had been 

14 allowed.!d. 

15 Similarly, the plaintiff in Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d at 1416, argued that 

16 class action allegations were erroneously dismissed without the opportunity to conduct 

17 "pertinent discovery." Id. at 1417, 1424. Citing Doninger, 565 F.2d at 1313, the Ninth 

18 Circuit reiterated that "the plaintiff bears the burden of advancing a prima facie 

19 showing that the class action requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 are satisfied or that 

20 discovery is likely to produce substantiation ofthe class allegations." Id. at 1424. The 

21 plaintiff in Mantolete alleged she was unlawfully denied a job based on her physical 

22 handicap. Id. at 1417. However, in support of her class allegations, the plaintiff only 

23 produced two other similar complaints against the defendant. As a result, the Ninth 

24 Circuit concluded there had been no abuse of discretion in denying "expanded 

25 discovery." Id. at 1425. 

26 The Ninth Circuit in Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, also noted that 

27 "expanded discovery" was not necessary before dismissing the class allegations, 

28 because it was apparent that applicable law would "necessitate an inquiry into the 

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1 individual's medical and work history" and other factors "bearing on the person's 

2 fitness for a given position." Id. This need for a case-by-case determination would 

3 defeat class treatment under Rule 23. Id. at 1425. 

4 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 

5 564 F.2d at 1304, acknowledged that "the failure to grant discovery before denying 

6 class treatment is reversible error" under some circumstances. Id. at 1312. '''The 

7 propriety of a class action cannot be determined in some cases without discovery, as 

8 for example, where discovery is necessary to determine the existence of a class or set 

9 of subclasses. To deny discovery in a case of that nature would be an abuse of 

10 discretion. Where the necessary factual issues may be resolved without discovery, it 

11 is not required. (footnotes omitted).'" Id. at 1312-1313. "[T]he better and more 

12 advisable practice for a District Court to follow is to afford the litigants an opportunity 

13 to present evidence as to whether a class action [is] maintainable." Id. at 1313. This 

14 is especially the case "when the information is within the sole possession of the 

15 defendant." Id. 

16 More recently, in Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935,942 

17 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit stated that District Courts have broad discretion to 

18 decide whether discovery should be permitted as part of the process of determining 

19 whether a class should be certified. Id. at 942. Therein, the Ninth Circuit also 

20 reiterated that: (1) "a party seeking class certification is not always entitled to discovery 

21 on the class certification issue" but in some cases the propriety of a class action cannot 

22 be determined without some discovery; (2) it is usually best for a District Court to 

23 allow the litigants an opportunity to present evidence on the issue of class certification; 

24 and (3) it is not an abuse of discretion to deny discovery where a plaintiff is unable to 

25 make aprimajacie showing of the class certification requirements in Rule 23. Id. To 

26 summarize its position on discovery related to class certification, the Ninth Circuit in 

27 Vinole v. Countrywide, 471 F.3d 935, said: "Our cases stand for the unremarkable 

28 

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1 proposition that often the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class 

2 certification and that some discovery will be warranted." Id 

3 In Nguyen v. Baxter Healtheare Corporation, 275 F.R.D. 503 (C.D. Cal. 2011), 

4 for example, the District Court concluded plaintiff had established a prima!aeie case 

5 for class relief after surviving a motion to dismiss and alleging sufficient facts to state 

6 "a plausible class-wide claim .... " Id at 507. Plaintiff was therefore "entitled to 

7 reasonable pre-certification discovery. Id 

8 IV. PlaintiU's Burden on a Motion for Class Certification. 

9 As noted above, plaintiff has requested contact information for members ofthe 

10 putative class so he can gather information that he believes is necessary to satisfy his 

II burden of proof on a motion for class certification. Plaintiffbelieves that putative class 

12 members will be able to substantiate his allegations that there are issues common to the 

13 class that "arise from a common course of conduct." [Doc. No. 26, at p. 9.] In addition, 

14 plaintiff anticipates that members of the putative class will be able to provide 

IS information to defeat defendant's contention that certification of a class is not 

16 appropriate under Rule 23, because the facts and circumstances are unique to each 

17 member ofthe putative class, so liability can only be determined on an individual basis. 

18 [Doc. No. 26, at pp. 10-11.] 

19 "Parties seeking class certification bear the burden of demonstrating that they 

20 have met each of the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 

21 at least one ofthe requirements of Rule 23(b)." Ellis v. Costeo Wholesale Corp., 657 

22 F.3d 970, 979-980 (9th Cir. 2011). "Rule 23(a) requires parties seeking class 

23 certification to establish: (1) that the class is so large that joinder of all members is 

24 impracticable (numerosity); (2) that there are one or more questions of law or fact 

25 common to the class (commonality); (3) that the named parties' claims are typical of 

26 the class (typicality); and (4) that the class representatives will fairly and adequately 

27 protect the interests of other members of the class (adequacy of representation). 

28 Fed.R.Civ.P.23(a)." Id at 980. 

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1 "The proposed class or subclass must also satisfy the requirements of one ofthe 

2 sub-sections of Rule 23(b), 'which defines three different types of classes.' [Citation 

3 omitted.]" Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 674 (9th Cir. 2014). Based on the arguments 

4 in the Joint Motion, it is apparent that the parties' discovery dispute relates to 

5 Rules 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3), which both concern the existence of commonality of 

6 factual and/or legal questions at issue in the case. Ifthe Rule 23(a) requirements have 

7 been met, Rule 23(b)(3) allows a class action to be maintained if "the court finds that 

8 the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 

9 questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 

10 available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Fed.R.Civ.P. 

11 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). 

12 As defendant contends, it is true that class claims "must depend upon a common 

13 contention" and "[t]hat common contention ... must be of such a nature that it is 

14 capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity 

15 will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 

16 stroke." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). In some class 

17 actions challenging the mis-classification of employees as "exempt," class certification 

18 has been denied when the evidence demonstrated that individual differences in 

19 employee duties would predominate over issues that could be determined on a class20 wide basis. See, e.g.,Inre Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Lit. , 571 F.3d 953, 

21 958-959 (9th Cir. 2009); Marlo v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 639 F.3d 942, 947-949 

22 (9th Cir. 2011); Jiminez v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 241,251-253 (C.D. Cal. 

23 2006). In these cases, the plaintiff employees generally relied too heavily on the 

24 defendant employers' uniform policies and procedures or on a blanket exemption 

25 policy with insufficient evidence to show there was common proof of mis26 classification. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff employees were not able to 

27 overcome the defendant employers' arguments that a class action was inappropriate 

28 because common issues would not predominate in the action. The defendant employers 

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1 were able to show there was a lack of uniformity injob duties that was amendable to 

2 common proof. Because of individual differences, the defendant employers were able 

3 to show it would be necessary to examine the specific facts of each employee's 

4 employment situation to determine whether anyone was mis-classified as exempt. 

5 Marlo v. United Parcel Service, 639 F.3d at 948 (concluding that plaintiff could not 

6 meet his burden of proving predominance based on common proof of mis-classification 

7 by relying on centralized control, uniform policies and procedures, or a blanket 

8 exemption policy because this evidence could not show whether employees were mis9 classified without examining the work actually performed by each individual); In re 

lOWell Fargo, 571 F.3d at 958-959 (agreeing that uniform exemption policy was "highly 

11 relevant" to the predominance analysis but did nothing to facilitate common proof on 

12 the otherwise individualized, "fact-intensive" issues into each potential plaintiff's 

13 employment situation). 

14 In Jimenez v. Domino '8, 238 F .R.D. at 241, for example, the plaintiffs alleged 

15 they were employed as general managers of defendant's restaurants but were mis16 classified as "executive, administrative and professional employees" based on their job 

17 titles. As a result, they were considered exempt for purposes of overtime compensation 

18 and rest or meal period requirements. Id. at 246. Despite the job title of general 

19 manager, plaintiffs alleged they were primarily involved in performing non-exempt 

20 functions, such as pizza making and cleaning, and were only spending about 20 percent 

21 of their time on managerial duties. Id. As proofthat common issues were predominate 

22 under Rule 23(b )(3), plaintiffs relied on general policies, such as common training and 

23 "a set of finite tasks performed by the general managers." Id. at 251. However, the 

24 District Court agreed with defendant that the predominate issue was not whether tasks 

25 performed by the general managers were managerial or not, but how much time each 

26 general manager spent on non-managerial tasks. Id. Based on the evidence presented, 

27 the resolution ofthis issue required an individual, fact-specific analysis, including the 

28 credibility of each general manager and consideration of the many variables that 

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1 affected the duties of each general manager at individual store locations. Id. at 251-253. 

2 Under these circumstances, the District Court could not conclude that common 

3 questions were predominate under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 252-253. 

4 In other cases, however, class certification has been granted when plaintiffs were 

5 able to present evidence to establish there was common proof of mis-classification. 

6 See, e.g., Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.4th 319, 

7 327-331 (Cal. 2004); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 499, 505-506 (N.D. 

8 Cal. 2010); Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 489-490 (E.D. 

9 Cal. 2006). In Sav-On v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.4th at 319, for example, plaintiffs 

10 were salaried store managers who alleged they were uniformly classified as "exempt" 

11 employees based solely on their titles and job descriptions with no reference to their 

12 actual work. Id. at 324-325. Although the plaintiffs did re1y to some extent on uniform 

13 or standardized store operations or policies, they argued convincingly in their class 

14 certification motion that there were a number of issues that could be shown by the use 

15 of "common proof." Id. at p. 327-329. For example, plaintiffs argued that "common 

16 proof' could demonstrate that each class member was deemed "exempt" based on his 

17 or her job description rather than on any consideration of actual work performed; that 

18 as of a certain date defendant reclassified managers from exempt to nonexempt without 

19 changing their duties or job descriptions; that class members were not trained on the 

20 difference between exempt and nonexempt work; and that most of the tasks actually 

21 performed by class members were nonexempt by law. Id. 

22 The plaintiffs in Sav-On v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 4th at 319, also presented 

23 significant evidence that the predominant issue was whether the "reasonably definite 

24 and finite list" of " specific tasks" that plaintiffs actually performed could be classified 

25 as "exempt," and this issue could be resolved based on common proof. Id. at 330-331. 

26 Defendant did argue that its liability, if any, could only be determined based on 

27 "individual computations of how much time each class member actually spent working 

28 on specific tasks." Id. at 328. However, the California Supreme Court concluded 

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1 plaintiffs presented enough evidence to establish that common issues would 

2 predominate the case, even though it would eventually be necessary to calculate 

3 damages individually. !d. at 332. 

4 Under the circumstances presented, the Court finds that disclosure of contact 

5 information for putative class members is justified based on the prima facie showing 

6 made in the allegations ofthe operative Complaint and in other supporting information 

7 submitted with the parties' Joint Motion suggesting there are grounds for seeking class 

8 certification. The allegations in the operative Complaint are more than conclusory and 

9 include facts relevant to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, and 

10 typicality. In addition, the allegations in the Complaint include at least one theory that 

11 could possibly satisfy one ofthe Rule 23(b) requirements (i.e., that there are questions 

12 of law or fact common to the class that predominate over issues that only affect 

13 individual class members). In this regard, plaintiff s theory is that all managers at Best 

14 Buy Mobile locations were mis-classified as "exempt" because of a uniform corporate 

15 policy of "inadequate staffing." As a result of inadequate staffing, plaintiff alleges that 

16 managers had no choice but to shoulder more than 50 percent of "non-management" 

17 duties and to work in excess of 40 hours per week. [Doc. No. 19, at pp. 6-7.] Although 

18 plaintiff has not shown that contacting putative class members is likely to substantiate 

19 these allegations, it is unlikely he could make this showing without access to 

20 information that is in the sole possession of defendant. 

21 Defendant's interrogatory responses also support some of the important 

22 allegations in the Complaint. For example, defendant has stated that plaintiff was 

23 considered an "exempt salaried store manager" and was generally scheduled to work 

24 a 1 O-hour shift. [Doc. No. 26-1, at p. 25.] Because defendant believes that plaintiff was 

25 "properly classified" as an exempt employee for specific reasons, defendant has stated 

26 that it did not track the hours he worked or the hours of other putative class members. 

27 [Doc. No. 26-1, at pp. 27, 32.] In addition defendant's responses to plaintiffs 

28 interrogatories indicate the purported class identified in the Complaint consists of about 

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1 70 individuals who are or were employed as general managers at Best Buy Mobile 

2 stores during the time period specified in the Complaint [Doc. No. 26-1, at p. 34.] In 

3 response to plaintiff's interrogatories, defendant also provided a finite list of duties and 

4 responsibilities for general managers and stated its expectations about the actual duties 

5 that a general manager may perform or choose to delegate to others. [Doc. No. 26-1, 

6 at pp. 35-40.] 

7 Based on this ''prima facie" showing, plaintiff is entitled to test his class 

8 allegations to determine whether certification is feasible. He simply cannot do so under 

9 the circumstances without contacting other potential members of the class. His current 

10 access to approximately two other general managers out of at least 70 potential 

11 members of the class is not enough in light of the burden of proof he bears in 

12 presenting a class certification motion. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff's 

13 request for an order compelling defendant to disclose contact information for putative 

14 class members must be GRANTED. 

15 V. Protecting the Privacy of Non-Parties. 

16 Ifthe Court orders disclosure of contact information for putative class members, 

17 defendant requests that their privacy be protected "through an opt-out notice procedure 

18 allowing them to object to the release oftheir personal information to plaintiff." [Doc. 

19 No. 26, at p. 5.] Plaintiff argues that an opt-out notification procedure is not necessary 

20 or required to protect the privacy of putative class members. The parties have already 

21 stipulated to a Protective Order for the disclosure of sensitive or confidential 

22 information, and other courts have found that a standard protective order is enough to 

23 protect the privacy rights of putative class members. [Doc. No. 26, at p. 12.] 

24 In the context of a class action, disclosure of basic contact information for 

25 putative class members is "common practice" and does not constitute a serious invasion 

26 of privacy, particularly when the Court determines they may possess relevant 

27 discoverable information about class certification issues and the other allegations in 

28 plaintiff's Complaint Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 353 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 

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1 Defendant's request to protect the privacy of contact information of its employees or 

2 former employees must therefore yield to plaintiff s need for this information to pursue 

3 his theory of the case and to determine whether he can support a motion for class 

4 certification. 

5 The Court also agrees with plaintiff that an "opt-out" procedure is not necessary 

6 under the circumstances. As the California Court of Appeal declared in Puerto v. 

7 Superior Court, 158 Cal.AppAth 1242 (Cal. App. 2008), an "opt-in notice unduly 

8 hampers [plaintiffs] in conducting discovery to which they are entitled by erecting 

9 obstacles that not only exceed the protections necessary to adequately guard the 

10 privacy rights of the employees involved but also exceed the discovery protections 

11 given by law to far more sensitive personal information." Id. at 1245. An "opt-out" 

12 procedure would create the same obstacles to legitimate discovery. 

13 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also support disclosure of contact 

14 information for putative class members under the circumstances presented. Rule 

15 26(a)(1)(A)(i) requires a party to provide contact information for "each individual 

16 likely to have discoverable information ... that the disclosing party may use to support 

17 its claims or defenses .... " F ed.R.Civ.P. 26( a)( 1 )( A)(i). Under the circumstances, the 

18 Court would be justified in concluding that all putative class members fall within this 

19 Rule. In addition, as plaintiff points out, the parties have already agreed to a standard 

20 protective order for disclosing confidential or sensitive information, and defendant has 

21 not explained why this protective order would not be enough to protect the privacy of 

22 putative class members. Nor is there anything to indicate that disclosure of contact 

23 information for putative class members would lead to discovery abuses. Therefore, the 

24 Court finds that defendant's request for an "opt-out notice procedure" must be 

25 DENIED. 

26 Conclusion 

27 Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs request for an order compelling defendant to 

28 provide contact information for all putative class members is GRANTED. Defendant's 

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1 request for an "opt-out notice procedure" for the disclosure of this information is 

2 DENIED. Defendant shall provide plaintiff with the names, last known residence 

3 addresses, and last known telephone numbers of all individuals who fall within the 

4 class defined in plaintiffs Complaint. This information shall be designated 

5 "confidential" or "highly confidential" under the Protective Order entered by the Court 

6 on April 15, 2014. [Doc. No. 25.] Defendant shall provide this information to 

7 plaintiffs counsel no later than November 7.2014. 

8 IT IWRDERED. 

9 Date: {Yaf /0 ,2014 

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