Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-32/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND 

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan 

Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal (“plaintiffs”) brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. On October 13, 2021, the court granted in part and 

denied in part Charter’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint in part. (Docket No. 203.) Pursuant to 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Charter now moves for 

reconsideration of that order. (Docket No. 205.) Charter also 

moves, alternatively, for certification of the order for 

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and a stay 

of the action pending appeal. (Id.)

To avoid repetition, the court will refrain from 

reciting the factual and procedural background, which remains the 

same as described in the three orders it issued on October 13, 

2021. (See Docket Nos. 201-03.)

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders, 

like the order at issue here, are governed by Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60 and Local Rule 230. Under Federal Rule 60, a 

district court “may relieve a party . . . from a[n] . . . order” 

for one of five enumerated reasons or for “any other reason that 

justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Local Rule 230 

requires that the moving party show “what new or different facts 

or circumstances are claimed to exist . . . or what other grounds 

exist for the motion.” L.R. 230(j)(3). The moving party must 

also show “why the facts or circumstances [or other grounds] were 

not shown at the time of the prior motion.” L.R. 230(j)(4).

In the instant motion, Charter has not pointed to new 

or different facts or circumstances that did not exist when the 

court issued its October 13 order addressing Charter’s motion to 

dismiss. (See Mot. (Docket No. 205).) Rather, Charter argues 

that the court clearly erred as a matter of law in finding 

plaintiff Harper’s pre-suit notice sufficient to support the PAGA

claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint. (See id.; Order 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

at 5-24 (Docket No. 203).) Charter mainly reiterates arguments 

made in its motion to dismiss and contends that the court erred

in disagreeing with those arguments, (compare Mot. (Docket No. 

205) with Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 163)); however, the court’s 

order was not intended to be a tentative ruling subject to 

further argument after it was issued. Because the court has 

already considered and addressed these arguments in its order, 

the court declines to repeat the process here.1

Charter has also filed a separate brief notifying the 

court that, after Charter filed its motion for reconsideration, 

the California Court of Appeal certified its decision in Uribe v. 

Crown Building Maintenance Co. for publication. (See Docket No. 

210 (citing Order Granting Publication, G057836 (Cal. Ct. App., 

4th Dist. Oct. 26, 2021) (Docket No. 210-1 at 26-30); -- Cal. 

Rptr. 3d --, 2021 WL 4962724 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. Sept. 30, 

2021)).) Charter argues that Uribe establishes a firm 

1 One contention not previously presented is that the 

court, in its order, impermissibly relied on the complaint in 

evaluating the sufficiency of Harper’s notice in alerting 

California’s Labor Workforce Development Agency to Charter’s

alleged Labor Code violations. (See Mot. at 5-6 (Docket No. 

205).) The court did no such thing. In its order, the court 

concluded that because the notice itself referred to commissioneligible and nonexempt employees, the notice sufficiently 

specified the “aggrieved employees” Harper sought to represent in 

a civil PAGA action. (See Order at 10-11 (Docket No. 203).)

Charter also argues, for the first time, that Harper’s 

failure to detail the ways in which Charter’s wage statements 

violated the Labor Code deprived Charter of its right to “cure 

wage statement violations based on the failure to include the 

start and end date of the pay period.” (Mot. at 8 (Docket No. 

205) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).) However, 

because Charter’s motion does not explain why this argument was 

not presented in its motion to dismiss, (see id.; Mot. to Dismiss 

(Docket No. 163)), the court will not consider it now, see L.R. 

230(j)(4).

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

requirement that each discrete factual basis for violation of a 

Labor Code provision alleged in a PAGA complaint must also be 

referenced in the underlying notice. (See Docket No. 210 at 2-

3.) Accordingly, Charter argues, this court’s order -- to the 

extent that it allows Harper’s complaint to allege violations of 

particular Labor Code sections under PAGA by relying on factual 

bases not described in the notice -– runs contrary to Uribe. 

(See id.)

In Uribe, the California Court of Appeal held that the 

PAGA plaintiff in that case could not assert a claim for 

reimbursement wholly unrelated to other reimbursement claims

referenced in the underlying notice. See Uribe, 2021 WL 4962724, 

at *12 (holding notice, which alleged employer failed to 

reimburse employees for shoes and uniform maintenance, could not 

support PAGA claim further alleging failure to reimburse for cell 

phone use, references to which were “omit[ed] entirely” from the 

notice). However, it is not clear that Uribe establishes that,

in all circumstances, each factual basis alleged in the complaint 

for violation of a particular Labor Code provision must also have 

been referenced in the underlying notice.

Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit are “bound only by 

the decisions of a state’s highest court and not by decisions of 

the state’s intermediate appellate court when considering 

state[ ]law issues sitting in diversity jurisdiction.” In re 

NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 

1268, 1278 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Where a state’s

highest court has not clearly spoken on an issue of state law, 

courts “can look to . . . [intermediate appellate] decisions as 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

guidance in predicting how the highest state court would decide 

the issue.” DW Aina Le‘a Dev., LLC v. State of Haw. Land Use 

Comm’n, 918 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re NCAA, 

724 F.3d at 1278) (internal quotation marks omitted, alterations 

adopted).

Because this court is not bound by Uribe, and because 

Uribe does not clearly support the broad proposition for which 

Charter offers it, Uribe does not warrant reconsideration of the 

court’s prior order. Further, although the California Supreme 

Court’s latest decision speaking to this topic acknowledged

PAGA’s requirement that notices identify “facts and theories” to 

allow the relevant state agency and employer to decide how to 

proceed, it also emphasized the low “threshold of weightiness” 

required of those facts and theories as well as PAGA’s purpose of 

“remedy[ing] systemic underenforcement of . . . worker 

protections.” Williams v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 5th 531, 545-46 

(2017).

In light of this emphasis, it is not clear that that 

the California Supreme Court would, if the opportunity arose, 

adopt the requirements Charter contends Uribe imposes. See DW 

Aina Le‘a Dev., LLC, 918 F.3d at 607; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 

1278. Accordingly, having considered Charter’s request, the 

court concludes that Charter has not put forward a sufficient 

“reason that justifies [the] relief” sought, Fed R. Civ. Proc. 

60(b)(6), and therefore declines to alter its October 13, 2021 

order addressing Charter’s motion to dismiss, (Docket No. 203), 

except on the limited basis described below. As such, except on 

that basis, the court will deny Charter’s motion for 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

reconsideration. (Docket No. 205.)

II. Motion for Interlocutory Appeal

Charter alternatively seeks certification of the issues 

it raises for interlocutory appeal. (See id.) A district court 

may certify for appeal an interlocutory order which is not 

otherwise appealable if the court is “of the opinion that such 

order [1] involves a controlling question of law [2] as to which 

there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that 

[3] an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 

ultimate outcome of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A 

question of law is controlling if “resolution of the issue on 

appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the 

district court” and it is not collateral to the major issues of 

the case. In re Cement Antitr. Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th 

Cir. 1982).

The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1292(b) “is to be 

used only in extraordinary cases where decision of an 

interlocutory appeal might avoid protracted and expensive 

litigation.” U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th 

Cir. 1966). It is “not intended merely to provide review of 

difficult rulings in hard cases.” Id. The party seeking to 

appeal therefore has the burden of justifying a departure from 

the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the 

entry of a final judgment. In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026.

The court finds that Charter has not met this burden, 

as it has not demonstrated that these circumstances are 

“extraordinary.” As counsel for Charter acknowledged at oral 

argument, none of its arguments, if successful on appeal –- with 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the sole exception of Harper’s alleged failure to identify the 

“aggrieved employees” in his notice -- would resolve Harper’s 

entire PAGA claim and thereby materially advance the outcome of 

the litigation. All other arguments would at best result in 

partial resolution of the PAGA claim. Further, given the weight 

of precedent cited in the court’s October 13 order, (see Docket 

No. 203), the court does not deem the issues presented --

including Charter’s argument regarding identification of 

aggrieved employees -- to provide “substantial ground” for 

difference of opinion. Accordingly, the court will not certify 

the issues raised by Charter for interlocutory appeal.

Although the parties disagree as to whether 

reconsideration is appropriate, they agree that this court’s 

prior order incorrectly identified July 11, 2017 as the date set 

by the applicable statute of limitations, pursuant to which 

Harper may not challenge wage statement violations alleged to 

have occurred before that date. (See Opp. to Mot. at 9-10 

(Docket No. 214); Def.’s Reply at 6 n.3 (Docket No. 218); Order 

at 23-24 (Docket No. 203).)

Accordingly, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, 

the court HEREBY AMENDS its prior order, (Docket No. 203), to 

clarify that the statute of limitations precludes Harper from 

challenging wage statement violations alleged to have occurred 

prior to September 14, 2017, rather than prior to July 11, 2017.

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that in 

all other respects, defendant Charter’s motion for 

reconsideration, (Docket No. 205), be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED.

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

It is FURTHER ORDERED that Charter’s alternative 

request for certification for interlocutory appeal be, and the 

same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2021

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 222 Filed 11/30/21 Page 8 of 8