Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01256/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01256-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAHMOUD ELSAYED, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVID MCALEE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01256-JST 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 29

Before the Court is Defendants David McAlee and the City of Palo Alto’s motion to 

dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT the motion in part 

and DENY it in part. 

I. BACKGROUND1

The plaintiffs in this action are Mahmoud Elsayed (“Elsayed”), his wife Nanette Dumas 

(“Dumas”), and Mashallah Elsayed (“Mashallah”), their developmentally disabled adult daughter. 

ECF No. 28 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 5-6. Elsayed and Dumas bought a townhouse in Palo Alto, California, in 

May 2004. Id. ¶ 13. They lived there with Mashallah until February of 2015, when the family 

moved to a new home in Santa Clara, California. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Elsayed and Dumas maintained 

ownership of the townhouse, and, through a property manager, began renting it out to a Caucasian

tenant named Dennis Bruno in April of 2015. Id. ¶¶ 14, 59. Elsayed is a Muslim and a

naturalized United States citizen of Arabic ethnic origin with a “long history of living and working 

in the Bay Area with his family.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 49. 

 

1 For the purposes of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the second 

amended complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 1 of 9
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiffs assert their First through Sixth Claims for Relief against David McAlee and Does 

1 through 30, all of whom are police officers for the City of Palo Alto. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs have not 

yet ascertained the identities of Does 1 through 30. Id. ¶ 9. The Seventh Claim for Relief is 

asserted against the City of Palo Alto (“City”) and Does 31 through 60, other “public or 

governmental entities also having control, supervision, and training duties over Defendant McAlee 

and Does 1 through 30,” whose identities Plaintiffs have similarly not yet ascertained. Id. ¶¶ 10-

12. Internal audit statistics suggest that the Palo Alto Police Department has a “history of racial 

profiling and discrimination in law enforcement practice,” and “within 10 years of this incident, 

the Chief of the Palo Alto Police Department made public comments endorsing or reasonably 

appearing to endorse racial profiling in [his] officers’ practice.” Id. ¶¶ 94-97.

On the night of March 2, 2016, McAlee and other Doe defendants entered Plaintiffs’ home 

in Santa Clara and arrested Elsayed “in front of his family and in view of his neighbors.” Id. ¶ 42. 

The entry and arrest were executed pursuant to a warrant authorizing the arrest of Elsayed for a 

violation of California Penal Code § 594(b)(1), felony vandalism. Id. ¶ 34. The arrest was made 

in connection with a January 9, 2016 incident witnessed by Delia Tung, a resident of a Palo Alto 

condominium adjacent to the backyard of Elsayed and Dumas’ townhouse. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 34. 

At around 9:00 p.m. on that date, Tung reported seeing “a ‘white male’ in his 40’s” 

smashing a floodlight on the condominium property, which had recently been flickering directly 

into the rear of the townhouse. Id. ¶¶ 18, 25. “Tung reported that she believed the perpetrator of 

the act of vandalism to be the person who was residing at [the townhouse].” Id. ¶ 19. Dan Held, a 

maintenance worker at the condominium, viewed security-camera footage from what he believed 

to be the incident, and he also recognized the perpetrator as the person living at the townhouse. Id.

¶ 23. Held believed that Elsayed lived there, and he reported his beliefs and observations to 

McAlee and Does 1 through 30 during an interview. Id. The condominium’s owner claimed the 

cost to restore the light was $536. Id. ¶ 21. Under California law, vandalism is a “wobbler” 

crime, charged as a felony if damages amount to $400 or more, but only as a misdemeanor if less 

than $400. Cal. Penal Code § 594(b). After his arrest, Elsayed obtained a pretrial dismissal of all 

criminal charges against him, as well as a judicial finding of factual innocence. Id. ¶ 43.

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 2 of 9
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

From the beginning of the investigation, McAlee wrongly assumed Elsayed was the person 

who had vandalized the light “and made him the sole focus of the investigation.” Id. ¶ 22. In the 

arrest warrant application, McAlee and “other participating officer defendants” made intentional 

or reckless omissions to establish probable cause that Elsayed had committed the crime. Id. ¶ 35. 

Prior to applying for the warrant, the officer defendants knew: that Elsayed was not living at the 

townhouse at the time of the incident and he used a property manager to rent it out; that the 

property manager rented the property to Dennis Bruno, who was living at the townhouse at the 

time of the incident; and that Bruno was a middle-aged Caucasian male who matched Tung’s 

description of the perpetrator, and who had a history of arrest on alcohol-related charges. Id. ¶ 25. 

The officer defendants also “knew that Mr. Elsayed was represented by an attorney and that his 

attorney had offered to cooperate and to maintain communications with the Palo Alto Police

Department in this investigation.” Id. ¶ 49. Moreover, they “knew that the amount of damages 

was less than $400, or they reasonably should have known that the amount of damages was less 

than $400 but recklessly disregarded or ignored such available information.” Id. ¶ 30. 

About two weeks after the incident, the officer defendants went to the townhouse seeking 

Elsayed but instead found people staying at the property temporarily; they said they were renting 

through Airbnb.com from a man named “Den” and provided Dennis Bruno’s phone number. Id. ¶ 

25. Before Elsayed’s arrest, the officer defendants possessed an accurate photo of Bruno but they 

did not show the photo to Held, the maintenance worker, until “well after Mr. Elsayed had already 

been arrested.” Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Upon viewing the photo, “Held recanted his earlier identification of 

Mr. Elsayed as the perpetrator captured on [video] and advised Defendant McAlee that the person 

in the photograph (Dennis Bruno) looked more like the perpetrator.” Id. ¶ 29. 

Plaintiffs bring the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of Elsayed’s 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by illegal arrest; (2) violation of Elsayed’s Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by use of excessive force; (3) violation of Elsayed’s Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination; (4) violation of Dumas and 

Mashallah’s Fourth Amendment rights by illegal entry; (5) violation of Dumas and Mashallah’s 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by abuse of executive power; (6) violation of Elsayed and 

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 3 of 9
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Mashallah’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by interference with familial relationships; 

and (7) violation of each Plaintiff’s civil rights under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 

(1978). Id. ¶¶ 4-111.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the complaint 

brings claims under federal law, as contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, when accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. While this standard is not a probability requirement, “[w]here a 

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this plausibility standard, the Court 

accepts all factual allegations as true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that (1) under Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, Elsayed’s Fourteenth 

Amendment claims based on his arrest should be dismissed because they are properly determined 

under the Fourth Amendment; (2) under Plaintiffs’ Second Claim for Relief, Elsayed’s Fourth 

Amendment excessive force claim should be dismissed because the complaint fails to state an

excessive force claim separate from Elsayed’s claim of false arrest; (3) under Plaintiffs’ Third 

Claim for Relief, Elsayed’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim of discriminatory intent or 

motive; and (4) under Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim for Relief, Elsayed’s First and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims based on his arrest should be dismissed because they, too, are properly 

determined under the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 29 at 4, 6-9. The Court addresses these

arguments in turn.

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 4 of 9
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

A. Fourteenth Amendment False Arrest Claim

Plaintiffs assert their First Claim for Relief for Illegal Arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based 

on underlying violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. At this stage, Defendants do 

not challenge Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. See ECF No. 29 at 4. But

Defendants urge that because false arrest claims are properly brought under the Fourth 

Amendment, Plaintiffs may not also plead their false arrest claim under the Fourteenth. Id. at 9.

“If a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the 

Fourth . . . Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific 

provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 

272 n.7 (1997). “Petitioner asks us to recognize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. 

We decline to do so.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994) (upholding dismissal of 

Fourteenth Amendment claims based on arrest warrant allegedly issued without probable cause). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ assertions that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Elsayed are 

properly pled under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. 

The Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, as asserted under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, without leave to amend. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“Because any amendment would be futile, there is no need to prolong the 

litigation by permitting further amendment.”). Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ First Claim 

for Relief under the Fourth Amendment, and that portion of his false arrest claim still stands.

B. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force Claims

Similarly, Plaintiffs plead their Second Claim for Relief for Excessive Force based on 

underlying violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs contend that the 

police’s action in arresting Elsayed in his home in front of his family was unreasonable because an 

arrest was unnecessary: Elsayed was represented by an attorney and had offered to cooperate; the 

police could have set up a self-surrender appointment; Elsayed could have been evaluated for 

release on his own recognizance so that he would never have been taken into custody. Thus, 

Plaintiffs contend, the police’s action in arresting Elsayed unannounced in front of his family 

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 5 of 9
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

constituted the use of excessive force. ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 48-54. 

Plaintiffs’ claim fails as a matter of law. “Because the excessive force and false arrest 

factual inquiries are distinct, establishing a lack of probable cause to make an arrest does not 

establish an excessive force claim, and vice-versa.” Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 

1064 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiffs attempt to collapse the two claims, alleging that the officer 

defendants “chose to carry out the arrest of Mr. Elsayed with excessive force and the intent to 

inflict the most harm and damage to Mr. Elsayed, including . . . seeking a felony arrest warrant 

without factual basis to support the allegation that the conduct at issue constituted a felony.” ECF 

No. 28 ¶ 61. But “[j]ust [alleg]ing lack of probable cause for the arrest . . . does not establish that 

the police used excessive force, or, indeed, any force.” Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 

1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); see Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 443 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)

(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “any amount of force against her” was excessive if the officers 

did not have probable cause).

Moreover, Plaintiffs have made no allegation that the police used unreasonable physical 

force – or indeed, any force whatsoever – in arresting Elsayed. Instead, they allege that the officer 

defendants’ “action and decision of arresting Mahmoud Elsayed at his home, at night, in front of 

his family and in view of his neighbors, constituted the use of excessive force in executing the 

arrest warrant.” ECF No. 28 ¶ 54. Plaintiffs have cited no case where an excessive force claim 

survived a motion to dismiss in the absence of any allegation of physical force employed by 

officers, and where the alleged harm was merely reputational. Instead, for example, Plaintiffs 

point to Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010), where the Ninth Circuit held that the 

use of a Taser stun gun in dart mode “constitute[d] an intermediate, significant level of force that 

must be justified by the governmental interest involved.” Id. at 826. Similarly, in Smith v. City of 

Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that a jury could have found that the 

use of pepper spray and a police service dog was excessive. Id. at 696. Finally, in Robinson v. 

Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had 

adequately alleged an excessive force claim where officers pointed a gun at his head at close range 

and he feared for his life. Id. at 1013-15. These cases, and the other cases Plaintiffs cite, allege 

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 6 of 9
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

excessive force and involve more than the simple act of taking a defendant into custody. 

Plaintiffs’ case is different. They do not allege that officers used excessive force or that 

the length of Elsayed’s post-arrest detention was unreasonable. They allege only that officers 

could have done something to bring Elsayed before the court other than arrest him. Because that 

claim is not cognizable, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Second Claim for Relief without leave 

to amend. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1088.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Discrimination Claims

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief for racial, ethnic, and 

religious discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to 

identify any conduct or statement by officers showing discriminatory motive. Instead, the 

complaint alleges only that the sole “reasonable explanation for [officers’] decisions and actions 

. . . [was that] Mr. Elsayed was an Arab-American and a Muslim, as opposed to the much more 

likely suspect, Dennis Bruno, the Caucasian male.” ECF No. 28 ¶ 62. 

These allegations are insufficient. “To state a claim for violation of Equal Protection under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that the individual defendants, acting under 

color of state law ‘acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.’”

Harris v. Clearlake Police Dep’t, No. 12-0864-YGR, 2012 WL 3042942, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 

2012) (quoting Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Although the SAC offers facts to support the allegation that the evidence known to the officers 

pointed to Bruno more than Elsayed, Plaintiffs allege nothing to suggest the officer defendants 

acted with the intent to discriminate. The mere assertion that “there is no reasonable explanation 

for their decisions and actions other than the fact that they had acted . . . solely or primarily 

because Mr. Elsayed was an Arab-American and a Muslim, as opposed to [pursuing] the much 

more likely suspect, Dennis Bruno, the Caucasian male” is conclusory and lacking in factual 

support. ECF No. 28 ¶ 62. Plaintiffs identify nothing that officers did or said when they arrested 

Elsayed, or on any other occasion, that would suggest that their actions were motivated by his race 

or religion. Accordingly, this claim fails. See Jianjun Xie v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 

12-02950 CRB, 2013 WL 812425, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2013) (dismissing Title VI 

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 7 of 9
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

discrimination claim where plaintiff alleged disparate treatment based on her race and ethnicity 

but provided no facts such as “overtly racially-motivated misconduct” or allegations that “other 

members of the protected class suffered similar mistreatment”). The Palo Alto Police 

Department’s history of racial profiling, without any specific facts suggesting discriminatory 

intent on the part of the officer defendants, also is not enough. 

The Third Claim for Relief is DISMISSED without prejudice.

D. First and Fourteenth Amendment Familial Interference Claims

Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim for Relief alleges that executing Elsayed’s arrest warrant at night, in 

his home, in front of his developmentally disabled daughter amounted to unwarranted state 

interference into their parent/child relationship. See ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 86-87. Defendants attack this 

claim by contending that Elsayed’s allegations “based on an unreasonable search and seizure may 

only be brought under the Fourth Amendment.” 2 ECF No. 29 at 9. 

“Claims [can properly be brought] under both the First and Fourteenth Amendment for 

unwarranted interference with the right to familial association.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 

1236 (9th Cir. 2018). At the same time, “there is no mistaking the holding of Graham v. Connor”

– that an individual alleging excessive force during arrest may do so only under the Fourth 

Amendment. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991). But “[w]hile the 

person who claims excessive force was directed at him or her can only raise a Fourth Amendment 

claim, a parent who claims loss of the companionship and society of his or her child, or vice versa, 

raises a different constitutional claim”). Id. Thus, Mashallah’s claim for unwarranted familial 

interference at least remains viable. Indeed, Defendants clarify in their reply brief that they do not 

challenge Mashallah’s claims – only Elsayed’s claims based on the familial interference caused by 

his own allegedly excessive arrest. ECF No. 32 at 7.

The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Elsayed’s First and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims in Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim for Relief. These claims are dismissed 

 

2 Similarly, Defendants attack the First Claim for Relief by mistakenly arguing that Plaintiffs have 

improperly based it on the First Amendment. ECF No. 29 at 9. But Plaintiffs’ First Claim for 

Relief is based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments only. See SAC at 2.

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 8 of 9
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

with prejudice because further leave to amend would be futile. As to Mashallah’s claims the 

motion is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim in the First Claim for Relief is 

dismissed with prejudice; Plaintiffs’ Second Claim for Relief is dismissed with prejudice in its 

entirety; and the Third Claim for Relief is dismissed without prejudice. The Sixth Claim for 

Relief is dismissed with prejudice, but only as to Elsayed, not Mashallah. The motion to dismiss 

is denied with respect to the remaining claims. 

Plaintiffs may amend their complaint within 30 days solely for the purpose of curing the 

deficiencies identified in this order. Amendment for any other reason requires a motion for leave 

to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-01256-JST Document 34 Filed 11/08/18 Page 9 of 9