Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02082/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02082-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1381 E.R.I.S.A.

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Sheet Metal Workers International

Association, Local Union 359, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-2082-PHX-NVW

ORDER

[Not for publication]

The Court has before it Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc's ("Chas Roberts") Motion

to Remand to State Court, Doc. # 7, the defendants' ("Union") Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion to Remand to State Court, Doc. # 10, and Chas Roberts's Reply in Support of its

Motion to Remand, Doc. #12. 

On June 28, 2005, Chas Roberts filed an action against the Union in Maricopa County

Superior Court. Chas Roberts alleged state-law causes of action for intentional

misrepresentation/fraud ("fraud") and equitable estoppel. In July 2005, the Union removed

the action to federal district court, stating that section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act ("LMRA") or, in the alternative, the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act ("ERISA") preempted Chas Roberts's state-law claims. In August 2005, Chas Roberts

filed a motion to remand the action, arguing that neither section 301 nor ERISA preempted

its claims. 

Case 2:05-cv-02082-NVW Document 15 Filed 12/09/05 Page 1 of 5
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On November 16, 2005, Chas Roberts's action was transferred to this court because

of a related matter between the same two parties already before this court. The present issue

before the court is whether it has jurisdiction to hear Chas Roberts’s claims, which turns on

whether section 301 or ERISA preempts Chas Roberts's claims for fraud or equitable

estoppel claim. 

I. Statement of the Case

Chas Roberts and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement on May

24, 1994. According to its terms, the collective bargaining agreement expired on July 31,

1998. However, there is a dispute between the parties as to whether the agreement did expire

on July 31, 1998 or whether it was extended and modified by the parties. This question was

before the court in case CV-04-1573, and on May 5, 2005, this court ordered an arbitration

panel to determine whether the parties extended the existing collective bargaining agreement.

This court retained jurisdiction to hear any further motions to enforce or vacate the

arbitration panel's subsequent decision. That arbitration is supposed to occur on December

13, 2005. 

Following this court's May 2005 order, Chas Roberts filed a separate action in state

court, alleging state-law causes of action for fraud and equitable estoppel.

II. Legal Standard–Motion to Remand

A party can remove any case that is filed in state court if the district courts would have

original jurisdiction to hear the case. See 28 U.S.C. §1441. Whenever a district court

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, the court must remand the

case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. §1447. The party seeking removal has the burden of

establishing federal jurisdiction, "and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal

jurisdiction." Prize Frize, Inv. v. Matrix Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'wellpleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). However, an exception to the well-pleaded

Case 2:05-cv-02082-NVW Document 15 Filed 12/09/05 Page 2 of 5
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complaint rule is the complete preemption doctrine, which is applied in cases raising claims

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 393-94 (holding that “when the heart of the statelaw complaint is a . . . clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the complaint arises

under federal law. . .”). In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 144(a) explains how ERISA preempts statelaw claims. 

III. LMRA Preemption

Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), states: “Suits for violation of contracts

between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may

be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without

respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 

Federal policy is that substantive principles of federal law should apply in section 301

cases so that a uniform doctrine of federal labor law will prevail over inconsistent local rules.

Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). The preemptive force of section 301

completely displaces any state-law cause of action for violation of a collective bargaining

agreement. Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 1987). If

resolution of the state-law claim depends upon the meaning of the collective bargaining

agreement, the application of state law is preempted, and federal labor-law principles must

apply. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., (1988). Thus, state-law claims are

preempted if they require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. However,

"[w]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a

collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly

does not require the claim to be extinguished." Livados v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123

(1994). The fact that a plaintiff may not have a remedy under federal law does not determine

whether or not a state-law claim is preempted by section 301. Newberry v. Pac. Racing

Ass'n, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988)("[W]e need only inquiry whether Newberry's claim arose under

section 301, thus permitting removal to federal court, although the plaintiff may have sought

a remedy available only under state law."). 

Case 2:05-cv-02082-NVW Document 15 Filed 12/09/05 Page 3 of 5
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Section 301 vests courts with jurisdiction to determine whether a collective bargaining

agreement exists. See Rozay's Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, Local 208, 850 F.2d 1321,

1326 (9th Cir. 1988)("Section 301, moreover, applies not only to suits for breach of a

collective bargaining agreement once it is duly formed, but also to suits impugning the

existence and validity of a labor agreement."); Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local

481 v. Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1988)("[W]e now . . . hold that under §

301(a) any disputes about the meaning or validity of collective bargaining agreements come

within the jurisdiction of the federal courts."). The question of whether a collective

bargaining agreement exists may be submitted to binding arbitration. See Bhd. of Teamsters

& Auto Truck Drivers Local 70 v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 832 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir.

1987)("And, where as here, the agreement contains a broad arbitration clause covering all

disputes concerning the meaning of the terms and provisions of the agreement and the clause

does not expressly exclude disputes over the termination provision, the answer is, again,

simple. Disputes over expiration or termination must be submitted to arbitration."). 

Chas Roberts states that its estoppel claim "simply seeks to enjoin the Union from

now asserting (in any forum) that the parties' expired collective bargaining agreement was

extended in view of the Union's prior extracontractual conduct, representations, and/or

omissions to the contrary." Doc. #12. It is attempting to prevent the Union from arguing at

the December 13, 2005 arbitration that a collective bargaining agreement exists, which was

the Union's contention in CV-04-1573 and is the very issue before the Board. A positive

result in this action would impair the Union's ability to succeed at the December 13, 2005

arbitration. Chas Roberts thus invokes state law to interfere with the Board's ability to decide

whether a collective bargaining agreement exists by limiting what the Union may present.

Such a state-law claim cannot be independent of the collective bargaining agreement. By its

very nature, the equitable estoppel claim would interfere with the Board's ability to carry out

its responsibility under the collective bargaining agreement as previously interpreted by this

court to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement remains in effect. Therefore,

section 301 preempts Chas Roberts's claim for equitable estoppel. 

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The court will await the outcome of the Board's proceedings before addressing

whether Chas Roberts' fraud claim then remains, whether it too is preempted by section 301,

and if not, whether this court should retain supplemental jurisdiction of it under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Doc. # 7, is

denied. 

DATED this 9th day of December, 2005.

Case 2:05-cv-02082-NVW Document 15 Filed 12/09/05 Page 5 of 5