Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-01823/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-01823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION 

BRENDA MORGAN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:14-CV-01823-CLS 

) 

THE COUNTY COMMISSION ) 

OF LAWRENCE COUNTY, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS 

Brenda Morgan's complaint alleged six claims against her former employer, 

the County Commission ofLawrence County, Alabama: i.e., gender discrimination 

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title 

VII"); I disability discrimination under Title I ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act 

of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. ("ADA,,);2 retaliation under both Title VII § 

1 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ~~ 78-89; see also doc. no. 36-1, at ECF 39 (EEOC Charge ofSex 

and Disability Discrimination). "ECF is the acronym for Electronic Case Filing, a filing system that 

allows parties to file and serve documents electronically." Atterbury v. Foulk, No. C-07-6256 MHP, 

2009 WL 4723547, *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8,2009). Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 allows citation to "page 

numbers generated by the ECF header." Wilson v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246,257 n.5 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citing Rule 7.1.4 of The Bluebook: A Uniform System o/Citation, at 21 (Columbia Law 

Review Ass'n et al. Eds., 19th ed. 2010)). Even so, the Bluebook recommends "against citation to 

ECF pagination in lieu of original pagination." Wilson, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 257 n.5. Thus, unless 

stated otherwise, this court will cite to the original pagination in the parties' pleadings. When the 

court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will, as here, precede the page number with 

the letters "ECF." 

2 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ~~ 90-96; see also doc. no. 36-1, at ECF 39 (EEOC Charge ofSex 

and Disability Discrimination). 

FILED

 2016 Jun-20 PM 01:39

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 1 of 108
2000e-3(a) and ADA § 12203;3 and age discrimination under the federal Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) ("ADEA"),4 as 

well as the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Ala. Code § 25-1-20 

(1975) ("AADEA,,).5 

This court, upon its own motion, ordered plaintiff to show cause why her 

ADEA and AADEA claims should not be dismissed due to her failure to allege that 

her age was the "but-for" cause ofthe adverse employment actions taken against her.6 

That order was based upon a series of cases in this court in which Judge William M. 

Acker, Jr., and the undersigned had held that '''an employee cannot claim that age is 

a motive for the employer's adverse conduct and simultaneously claim that there was 

any other proscribed motive involved.'" Hendon v. Kamtek, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 

1325, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (Acker, J.) (quoting Culver v. Birmingham Board of 

Education, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1271-72 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (Acker, J.)) (emphasis 

in original).7 Such holdings were based upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Gross 

3 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ~~ 97-105; see also doc. no. 51-1, at ECF 2 (EEOC Charge of 

Retaliation). 

4 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ~~ 59-71; see also doc. no. 51-2, at ECF 2 (EEOC Charge ofAge 

Discrimination). 

5 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ~~ 72-77. 

6 Doc. no. 49 (Order to Show Cause), at 3-4. 

7 See also Donaldv. UAB Hmp. Mgmt., Inc., No. 2: 14-cv-727-WMA, 2015 WL 3952307 

(N.D. Ala. June 29, 2015); Holley v. Gibco Constr., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-2277-WMA, 2015 WL 

2365580 (N.D. Ala. May 18,2015) (same); Savage v. Secure First Credit Union, No. 2: 14-cv-2468­

WMA, 2015 WL 2169135 (N.D. Ala. May 8,2015); Montgomery v. Bd. ofTrustees ofthe Univ. of 

2 

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v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), stating that, in order to prevail on 

a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, "a plaintiff must prove that age was 

the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision." Id. at 176 (emphasis 

supplied). Plaintiff responded that she could not "establish that her age was the 'butfor' cause ofthe adverse employment actions [taken against her]," and conceded that 

those claims should be dismissed. 8 

After the date on which this court entered the foregoing show-cause order, 

however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed Judge Acker for holding, in Savage v. Secure 

First Credit Union, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1212 (N.D. Ala. 2015) - a case in which the 

plaintiffhad alleged claims based upon Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the ADA, and the 

ADEA - that the plaintiff 

"must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause ofthe employer's adverse 

decision." Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176, 129 S. Ct. 

Ala., No. 2:12-cv-2148-WMA, 2015 WL 1893471, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015); Dixon v. 

Birmingham, No. 2: 13-cv-404-WMA, 2015 WL 353162, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 27,2015); Ephraim 

v. Pantry, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207-08 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Gwin v. BFI Waste Services, LLC, 

718 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 2010). 

Moreover, Alabama and federal courts have held that the AADEA uses the same principles 

and analytical framework as the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See, e.g., 

Robinson v. Ala. Cent. Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 2007) (citing Bonham v. Regions 

Mortg., Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1315,1321 (M.D. Ala. 2001)); Ehrhardtv. Haddad Restaurant Group, 

Inc., 443 F. App'x 452, 454 (lIth Cir. 2011); Perry v. Batesville Casket Co., No.7: 11-cv-994-LSC, 

2013 WL 1498959, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10,2013); see also Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (expressly 

providing that "the remedies, defenses, and statutes oflimitations, under [the AADEA] shall be the 

same as those authorized by the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ....") (alteration 

and ellipsis supplied). 

8 Doc. no. 50 (Response to Order to Show Cause), at 2 (alteration supplied). 

3 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 3 of 108
2343, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009). Adopting the "but-for" cause 

requirement, instead ofthe "mixed motive" possibility, squares with "the 

ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took 

adverse action 'because of' age[, which] is that age was the 'reason' that 

the employer decided to act." Gross, 557 U.S. at 176, 129 S. Ct. 2343. 

"Because an ADEA plaintiff must establish 'but for' causality, no 'same 

decision' affirmative defense can exist: the employer either acted 

'because of' the plaintiff's age or it did not." Mora v. Jackson Mem 'I 

Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201,1204 (lith Cir. 2010). "The only logical 

inference to be drawn from Gross is that an employee cannot claim that 

age is a motive for the employer's adverse conduct and simultaneously 

claim that there was any other proscribed motive involved." Culver v. 

Birmingham Bd. ofEduc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1271-72 (N.D. Ala. 

2009). Therefore, "a plaintiff must make it perfectly clear in her 

pleading that there are no proscribed motivations other than [the one 

alleged]." Montgomery v. Bd. ofTrustees ofthe Univ. ofAlabama, 2015 

WL 1893471, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015). 

Savage, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (alterations in original). The Eleventh Circuit's 

opinion reversing the district court said simply that "[i]t is a well-settled rule of 

federal procedure that plaintiffs may assert alternative and contradictory theories of 

liability." Savage v. Secure First Credit Union, No. 15-12704, slip. op. at 2 (11 th Cir. 

May 25, 2016) (alteration in original, citation omitted). 

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion was not published. Accordingly, it is not 

binding precedent.9 Even so, this court construed it as a clear warning of potential 

reversible error, and allowed plaintiff to reinstate her claims of age discrimination 

9 11 th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority."). 

4 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 4 of 108
under the ADEA and AADEA. 10 

The remainder ofthis opinion addresses the merits of defendant's "Motion to 

Strike or, in the Alternative, for In Camera Review,',ll as well as the same party's 

motion for summary judgment. 12 

I. MOTION TO STRIKE 

Defendant's motion requests that this court strike: portions ofthe deposition 

testimony of Lawrence County Commissioner Mose Jones; the affidavit of former 

County Administrator Peggy King; and the affidavit ofTricia Galbreath, who served 

for a period following the resignation ofMs. King as Interim County Administrator. 13 

A. Deposition Testimony of Commissioner Mose Jones 

Commissioner Jones testified that he "was getting some information that 

Commissioner Burch and several of them was having problems with [plaintiff, 

Brenda Morgan]." 14 Moreover, when plaintiff's counsel asked about the basis for the 

Commission's decision to eliminate the position ofDeputy Director ofthe Lawrence 

10 See doc. no. 56 (Order NotifYing Plaintiff of Right to Reinstate Age Discrimination 

Claims), and doc. no. 57 (notification by plaintiff of her intent to reinstate her age discrimination 

claims). 

11 Doc. no. 43. 

12 Doc. no. 26. 

13 Doc. no. 43 (Defendant's Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, for In Camera Review), 

atECF 1-3. 

14 Doc. no. 37-1 (Jones Deposition), at 18-19 (emphasis and alteration supplied). 

5 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 5 of 108
County Emergency Management Agency, Jones stated: 

A. 	 Well, you know, in my opinion - and that's the reason why I 

voted "no" - because, in my opinion, they didn't want Brenda to 

have the position. Because what I told them, that if you want to 

eliminate the - plus they cut the pay, they cut the pay in the 

position. And so, Brenda wasn't really going to apply for the 

lower pay, but then she went back and did apply. And from my 

way ofthinking on it and the reason why I voted "no" is because 

they didn't want her to have the position. 

Q. 	 Who, specifically, didn't want her to have the position? 

A. 	 I believe that Commissioner[ s] Burch, and Prentis Davis and Joey 

Hargrove didn't want her to have the position. Now, whether that 

is true or not, I don't know, but I know that I know that [s ic] they 

was trying to get rid of her and she knew that, too. 

Q. 	 And those three were all Commissioners on the Commission, the 

County Commission, at that period oftime? 

A. 	 That's right. 

Q. 	 What led you to that belief? Was it statements that they made? 

A. 	 What I heard, conversation. Lawrence County is a small county, and 

you have a whole lot of conversation going on, and just listening to 

people talk and listening to her talk. 

Q. 	 Do you remember specific conversations and I know it was a while 

ago but specific conversations? 

A. 	 Well, some ofthem just said that they didn't want her to have thejob; 

they just wanted somebody else to have it. 

Doc. no. 37-1 (Jones Deposition), at 20-22 (emphasis and alteration supplied). 

6 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 6 of 108
The Commission objects to that testimony as being not relevant, not based on 

personal knowledge, and inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 602, 701. 

The foregoing excerpts from the deposition of Commissioner Jones might be 

admissible as an "opposing party's statement," ifCommissioner Jones had testified 

that Commissioners Burch, Davis, and Hargrove had said to him (or stated in his 

presence and hearing) that "they didn't want her to have the job; they just wanted 

somebody else to have it." See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).15 Here, however, it is clear 

from the context ofthe contested testimony that Commissioner Jones's "opinion" (or 

"belief') about the motivations of the three Commissioners was not founded upon 

what anyone ofthem had said, either to him or in his presence and hearing, but was 

15 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) states that an opposing party's statement is "not 

hearsay" if it is offered against the opposing party, and it: 

(A) 	 was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; [ or] 

(B) 	 is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; [ or] 

(C) 	 was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the 

subject; [or] 

(D) 	 was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of 

that relationship and while it existed; or 

(E) 	 was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. 

The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the declarant's 

authority under (C); the existence or scope of the relationship under CD); or the 

existence ofthe conspiracy or participation in it under (E). 

7 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 7 of 108
instead based upon "a whole lot of conversation[s]" by unidentified third parties in 

the "small county."l6 That is classic hearsay within hearsay, and it cannot be reduced 

to admissible evidence at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 805 ("Hearsay within hearsay is not 

excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements 

conforms with an exception to the rule.") (emphasis supplied). 

Commissioner Jones also testified that, "sometimes, it's a whole lot ofpolitics 

being played."l7 The federal anti-discrimination statutes upon which plaintiffs 

claims are based are not concerned with the issue of whether a majority of the five 

County Commissioners "didn't want [plaintiff] to have the job" for unspecified 

"political reasons." Instead, those statutes are implicated only when a plaintiff 

demonstrates that the adverse employment actions complained ofwere motivated by 

one ofthe characteristics protected by federallaw. 18 

Thus, the Commission's motion to strike the foregoing excerpts from the 

deposition of Commissioner Mose Jones is due to be granted. 

B. Affidavit of Peggy King 

Peggy King's affidavit states that the salaries of the Director and Deputy 

16 Doc. no. 37-1 (Jones Deposition), at 22 (alteration supplied). 

17Id. at 33-34. 

18 For example, federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin (Title VII), disability (ADA), age (ADEA), or in retaliation 

for an employee's opposition to or participation in activities to correct an employer's discriminatory 

practices (all of the foregoing statutes). 

8 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 8 of 108
Director of the Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency ("EMA") 

discussed in an article published in the September 28, 2013 edition of The Decatur 

Daily under the title "Salaries raised without OK vote" (see the discussion in Part 

HLF" infra) were, in fact, approved by the Lawrence County Commission in 2008 or 

2009,19 Her affidavit also states that the Commission voted in October 2013 to reduce 

the salary of the incoming EMA Director by approximately $28,000, but that, after 

Johnny Cantrell was hired to fill the position vacated by Hillard Frost, the 

Commission voted to increase Cantrell's base salary.20 Moreover, Ms. King testified 

that plaintiff performed "well" during her tenure as Deputy EMA Director.21 The 

foregoing statements are cumulative of other evidence of record, and the motion to 

strike them will be denied as moot.22 

Ms. King also testified that the interview process preceding the selection of a 

new EMA Director was not equitable, in the sense that the Commissioners "ma[ de] 

it easier for [Johnny Cantrell]" than for plaintiff.23 Defendant objects to that 

19 See doc. no. 38-1 (King Affidavit), at ECF 2; see also doc. no. 32-4, at ECF 69-70 (copy 

ofarticle from www.decaturdaily.com)(alterationssupp1ied);doc.no. 52-1, at ECF 2-3 (photostatic 

copy of article as printed in The Decatur Daily). 

20 Doc. no. 38-1, at ECF 3 (King Affidavit). 

21 Jd. 

22 In other words, information provided by Ms. King's affidavit also was provided by other 

deponents or aftiants, whose testimony has not been the object of a motion to strike. 

23 Doc. no. 38-1, at ECF 3-4 (King Affidavit) (alterations supplied). 

9 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 9 of 108
testimony on the basis that Ms. King attended only one round ofinterviews, and has 

no personal knowledge regarding questions which were asked at the other rounds of 

interviews.24 Because the court will not consider that statement when deciding the 

motion for summary judgment, defendant's motion to strike that testimony will be 

denied as moot. 

C. Affidavit of Tricia Galbreath 

The final aspect ofthe Commission's motion to strike contends that: 

The most disturbing evidence submitted in support of Plaintiffs 

Response [to the motion for summary judgment] is the Affidavit of 

[former Interim County Administrator] Tricia Galbreath, which, on its 

face, purports to disclose advice allegedly given by the undersigned [i. e., 

retained trial counsel Jamie Kidd] and County Attorney Dave Martin. 

(Doc. 39-3.) To say that any attorney decided a particular course of 

action is nonsense; [25] all that an attorney can do is recommend such a 

course to the Commission, which then must vote as a body as to whether 

it will follow the recommendation. Ms. Galbreath's affidavit can thus 

only be based on privileged advice to which she only could have been 

privy in her role as County Administrator. This affidavit is extremely 

prejudicial to the Commission because it cannot even contradict the 

allegations made therein without revealing more privileged information. 

The Commission therefore respectfully requests that this Affidavit be 

stricken. In the alternative, the Commission respectfully requests that 

this Court allow it to submit evidence in camera, without waiving any 

24 See doc. no. 43 (Defendant's Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, for In Camera 

Review), at 2. 

25 As will be discussed in the following text, Ms. Galbreath's affidavit states that "County 

attorneys Jamie Kidd and Dave Martin, along with Commissioner Bobby Burch, made the decision 

to eliminate the EMA Deputy Director [position] on or around September 30, 2013, when the County 

budget was finalized for the upcoming year." Doc. no. 39-3 (Galbreath Affidavit), ~ 13 (alteration 

supplied). 

10 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 10 of 108
privilege, further detailing the ways in which this affidavit IS an 

unconscionable breach of attorney-client privilege. 

Doc. no. 43 (Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, for In Camera Review), ,-r 6 

(alterations, emphasis, and footnote supplied). 

The only part ofMs. Galbreath's affidavit to which the attorney-client privilege 

could possibly apply is the statement that "County attorneys Jamie Kidd and Dave 

Martin, along with Commissioner Bobby Burch, made the decision to eliminate the 

EMA Deputy Director [position] on or around September 30,2013, when the County 

budget was finalized for the upcoming year.,,26 Without deciding whether the 

Commission satisfied its burden of proving that the foregoing statement is covered 

by the attorney-client privilege, the court will not consider the statement when 

deciding the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the motion to strike the 

affidavit ofMs. Galbreath will be denied as moot. 27 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 

Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment should be 

rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 

affidavits show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

26Id. (alteration supplied). 

27 The Commission alternatively moves for in camera review ofthe Commission's evidence 

addressing plaintiffs contention that the County attorneys participated in the decisions to take 

adverse employment actions against plaintiff. The court declines to do so, because the fact or degree 

of the County attorneys' involvement in those decisions is not material. 

11 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 11 of 108
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other 

words, summary judgment is proper "after adequate time for discovery and upon 

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden ofproofat trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). 

"In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all 

reasonable inferences in favor ofthe party opposing summary judgment." Chapman 

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (lIth Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. 

City ofMiami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (lIth Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor ofthe nonmoving party are not unqualified, however. "[A]n inference is not reasonable ifit is 

only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but 

is pure conjecture and speculation." Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 

1321,1324 (lIth Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover, 

[t ]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary 

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the 

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the 

materiality ofa disputed fact. A genuine issue ofmaterial fact does not 

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor. 

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921)(alteration and emphasis 

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) 

12 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 12 of 108
(asking "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to reqUlre 

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a 

matter of law"). 

III. SUMMARY OF FACTS 

Plaintiff began her employment with the Lawrence County Commission in 

1989, as a clerk in the Tax Collector's office.28 She occupied several other positions 

before transferring in September of 2003 to the Lawrence County Emergency 

Management Agency ("EMA"), where she initially occupied the "TVA Planner" 

position. She was promoted to the position of "Deputy EMA Director" in 2004. 29 

She described her duties in that position as "[p ] lanning, mitigating, preparing, [and 

providing] protection for citizens ofLawrence County.,,30 

Throughout most of plaintiff s tenure with the Lawrence County EMA, the 

agency was staffed by three persons, holding the positions of Director, Deputy 

Director, and TVA Planner. 

A. Thursday, June 27,2013 

The minutes ofthe June 27,2013 "Special Called Meeting" of the Lawrence 

28 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 12. 

29 Id. at 11-17. Other positions occupied by plaintiff prior to transferring to the EMA 

included Assistant License Inspector (1997-99) and Solid Waste Officer (1999-2003). Doc. no. 34­

2, at ECF 3 (Brenda Morgan Resume). 

30 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 17 (alterations supplied), 

13 

Case 5:14-cv-01823-CLS Document 60 Filed 06/20/16 Page 13 of 108
County Commission recorded two facts ofsignificance to the issues in this suit. First, 

EMA Director Hillard Frost announced that he would retire on July 31, 2013.31 

Second, the Commissioners' unanimous decision to "borrow $400,000 ... to run the 

county for the rest of [the] fiscal year,,32 reflected an unanticipated decline in the 

County's anticipated revenue. 

B. Thursday, July 18,2013 

The Commissioners' decision to borrow $400,000 for payment ofthe County's 

normal operating expenses during the two-and-a-half months remaining in the 2012­

13 fiscal year was consummated during a "Special Called Emergency Meeting" ofthe 

Commission held on July 18,2013.33 The County's fiscal difficulties were reflected 

31 See doc. no. 28-5, at ECF 3 (Minutes of June 27, 2013 Special Called Meeting of the 

Lawrence County Commission). 

32 Id. at ECF 4 (ellipsis, emphasis, and alteration supplied). The Commissioners also 

discussed during this same meeting various "cost saving measures," such as the possibility of 

terminating all temporary employees. Ultimately, however, no action was taken on that issue at the 

June 27th meeting, and discussion was tabled "until more information [was] received about the 

temporary workers." Id. at ECF 4 (alteration supplied). 

33 The minutes of that meeting recorded the following action: 

The Lawrence County Commission met today in a Special Called Emergency 

Meeting for the purpose of considering the adoption of a resolution and order 

authorizing the issuance and sale of the $400,000 Certificate of Indebtedness of 

Lawrence County Alabama (the "Certificate"), which is to be issued in order to 

provide funds for current operating expenditures of the County, including the costs 

ofissuing the Certificate, and for the purpose of considering other matters related to 

the Certificate. . .. 

Mr. Kane Burnette, from Bank Independent, explained that the resolution is 

for a $400,000 line of credit to be used solely for the operating expenses of the 

County. It is set to mature on February 1,2014 with an interest rate of5.29%. [The] 

14 

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in the following letter, signed by all three EMA employees (Director Hillard Frost, 

Deputy Director Brenda Morgan (plaintift), and TVA Planner Tammy Vinson), and 

delivered to the County's Interim Administrator, Tricia Galbreath, on July 18,2013: 

We would like to address the current changes that are occurring 

in the Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency. Hillard 

Frost has made the decision to retire after twenty four years. There 

have been several disasters and changes over the past few years. After 

careful consideration and due to the current county financial situation 

we would like to ask the county commission not to hire anyone at this 

time. We would like to ask that you promote Brenda Morganfrom EMA 

Deputy Director to Director and Tammy Vinson from TVA Planner to 

EMA Deputy Director and TVA Planner. Currently the TV A Planner is 

100% paid by TV A and the Deputy Director employee is paid 30% with 

TV A funds and approximately 35% reimbursement paid by the Alabama 

EMA. We will perform the duties required with just the two of us 

during thisfinancial crisis. We would appreciate your consideration in 

this matter. We only have the county's best interest at heart. 

Hillard Frost has agreed to assist in the event of any major 

disasters or events that might occur in our county. If there becomes a 

need for Hillard Frost to work part-time his income could be paid thru 

the TV A funds we receive. 

Doc. no. 28-16, at ECF 2 (July 18, 2013 EMA Proposal) (all emphasis supplied); see 

also doc. no. 37-1, at ECF 37 (same). 

State law requires each county to have an EMA Director,34 and Lawrence 

County can pay back at any time but must all be paid by February 1, 2014. . .. 

Jd. at ECF 7 (Minutes of July 18, 2013 Special Called Emergency Meeting) (ellipses and alteration 

supplied). 

34 See Ala. Code § 31-9-1O(a) (1975) (2011 Replacement Vol.). 

15 

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County's agreement with the TV A requires that there be a TVA Planner position,35 

but there is no requirement for the employment of a Deputy EMA Director.36 

C. Monday, July 22, 2013 

Plaintiff submitted an application for the position ofEMA Director on July 22, 

2013,37 four days after presenting the foregoing EMA Proposal to the Interim County 

Administrator, and nine days prior to the July 31 st effective date of Hillard Frost's 

retirement. 

D. Wednesday, July 31, 2013 

On the date of the July 31st effective date of Hillard Frost's retirement, the 

Commission appointed plaintiff"Acting EMA Director" and commenced a search for 

a permanent replacement. The relevant portions of the "Recruiting Guidelines" 

contained in the County's Personnel Handbook provided that: 

4.3.4. Advertisement. Employment opportunities, other than 

35 See doc. no. 28-16, at ECF 3 (Nov. 26, 2013 Resolution Eliminating Position of Deputy 

EMA Director) (recording that "the TV A Planner position is required by virtue of the Lawrence 

County Commission's agreement or grant assurances with TVA"); doc. no. 37-1, at ECF 38 (same). 

36 Note well that, in view of the following facts recited in the July 18,2013 EMA Proposal 

quoted in text i. e., the salary of the "TV A Planner" was paid entirely with funds supplied by 

TV A, and approximately 65% of the salary of the "Deputy EMA Director" was paid by state and 

federal funds (35% from the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, and 30% from TV A) - the 

proposal to promote plaintiff "Brenda Morgan from EMA Deputy Director to Director" may have 

resulted in little or no actual savings to Lawrence County. See doc. no. 28-16, at ECF 3 (Nov. 26, 

2013 Resolution Eliminating Position ofDeputy EMA Director) (recording that "100 percent ofthe 

salary ofthe TV A Planner position is funded by TV A; as a result, no cost savings would be realized 

ifthe position was eliminated"); doc. no. 37-1, at ECF 38 (same). 

37 See doc. no. 34-2 (Brenda Morgan Employment Application), at ECF 2. 

16 

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those which have been determined to be filled through a contracted 

temporary services company, will normally be advertised through an 

appropriate media, to include posting at locations readily available to 

county employees, to ensure adequate advertisement in the recruiting 

area. 

4.3 .5. Content ofAdvertisement. All advertisements will provide 

a description ofthe job, necessary qualifications, pay grade, pay range, 

deadline for applying, date and time of any qualifying examination and 

where applications may be picked up and returned. All advertisements 

will contain the statement: "Lawrence County is an Equal Opportunity 

Employer." All advertisements will also indicate that subsequent 

vacancies will be filled from names on the eligibility list that will be 

prepared from the qualified applications and the length oftime that the 

list will remain active. 

4.3.6. Duration ofAdvertisement. All advertisements will remain 

open for receipt ofapplications for at least seven (7) calendar days from 

the date of the notice. 

Doc. no. 34-1 (Lawrence County Personnel Handbook) §§ 4.3.4. - 4.3.6., at ECF 19 

(underscored emphasis in original, italicized emphasis supplied).38 

38 Defendant alleged in its initial brief in support of summary judgment that, "[a]fter Frost 

officially retired, Plaintiff was temporarily appointed as acting EMA director while the position was 

advertised in accordance with policy." Doc. no. 27 (Defendant's Brief in Support of Summary 

Judgment), at 4 (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

Plaintiff denied that the vacant EMA Director's position was advertised "in accordance with 

policy." Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Brief), at ECF 5. Her denial was based upon the fact that, during 

a Commission meeting held "on or around September 24,2013, Commissioners Burch and Davis 

voted to promote a male individual to the position ofCounty Assistant Engineer without advertising 

the position as required by the Handbook [provisions quoted in text]." ld. at ECF 14 (alteration 

supplied); see also doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 96-97; doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), 

at 52; doc. no. 28-3 (Davis Deposition), at 43; doc. no. 37-1 (Jones Deposition), at 39 (testifying that 

the "procedure that [the Commission had] been following ever since [he had] been there," was: "if 

I'm the Assistant and if someone steps out, then the Assistant takes over . ...") (alterations, 

emphasis, and ellipsis supplied). 

Plaintiff failed to note, however, that two Commissioners do not constitute a governing 

majority. Indeed, the motion of Commissioners Burch and Davis to hire a male County Assistant 

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E. Wednesday, September 11,2013 

The difficult financial circumstances reflected by the Commission's decision 

to borrow $400,000 for payment of the County's normal operating expenses were 

exacerbated on September 11,2013, when the directors of Intemational Paper, the 

County's largest employer, announced that the company's Courtland plant would be 

closed by the end of the first quarter of 2014. That closure left 1,100 workers 

jobless,39 and adversely impacted the County's tax base. 

F. Saturday, September 28, 2013 

One of plaintiff's duties as Acting EMA Director was to prepare a proposed 

agency budget for the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 2013.40 That proved to be 

an unusually stressful task as a result ofthe County's financial difficulties, as well as 

the allegations contained in an article published in the September 28, 2013 edition of 

The Decatur Daily, and entitled "Salaries raised without OK vote: LawCo unaware 

TVA funds went to EMA officials." The full text ofthat article read as follows: 

Engineer without advertising the position vacancy in accordance with Personnel Handbook § 4.3.4 

did not pass. See doc. no. 37-1 (Jones Deposition), at 42-43. Moreover, plaintiff admitted that the 

"Lawrence County Personnel Handbook ... prescribes the procedures that the [Commission] must 

follow when hiring, firing and disciplining employees. Under the hiring procedures set forth in the 

Handbook, the [Commission] is required to advertise vacant positions. . .." Id. (ellipses, 

alterations, and emphasis supplied). 

39 See http://www.al.com/business/index.ssf/20 13/09/international~aper_largest_ em.html 

("International Paper, largest employer in Lawrence County, to close plant by early 2014, layoff 

1,100") (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 

40 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 30. 

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MOUL TON - Two Lawrence County Emergency Management 

Agency employees received raises that were never approved, county 

officials said Thursday. 

The County Commission plans to rectify the matter by reducing 

pay for both positions when it approves its budget Monday. 

Interim County Administrator Tricia Gilbreath [sic] said for some 

reason, 30 percent of the money the county receives from the Tennessee 

Valley Authority went to salaries of ex-EMA Director Hillard Frost and 

Assistant Director Brenda Morgan. Lawrence County receives the 

money because of its location near [TVA's] Browns Ferry Nuclear 

Plant. 

The move increased Frost's pay to more than $80,000 annually 

and put Morgan's salary at more than $64,000 per year. Morgan County 

is more than twice the size of Lawrence County, and its EMA director 

makes just more than $60,000 annually. 

Gilbreath [sic] said she cannot find anything in the minutes about 

a Commission vote to reclassify the two positions. It was not known 

how much Frost and Morgan were making before they began receiving 

the TV A money. 

Interim administrator Donna Llewellyn said only the commission 

can authorize employee raises. She said 30 percent ofthe $123,000 the 

county gets annually is being used to supplement salaries. 

Mose Jones is the only commissioner who was in office when 

Frost and Morgan started receiving the money in 2008. He said he 

remembers the commission discussing the money but couldn't remember 

if there was a vote. 

"What is the county paying them?" Jones asked. 

"Too much," Commissioner Joey Hargrove said. 

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Morgan has been serving as [Acting EMA] director since Frost 

retired this past summer. She was not aware of the commission's 

discussion and declined to comment on the matter. 

The commission is proposing to cut the director's pay to $48,951, 

which still is more than what Colbert and Winston counties pay their 

director. 

Morgan's pay would be trimmed from $64,640 to $41,962 

annually. 

The commission also agreed to re-advertise for a permanent 

director and post the new salary. 

"Since we have an opening, now is the time to fix the 

classification problem," Commissioner Bobby Burch said. 

He said the county had been using general fund money to 

supplement EMA services such as evacuation planning because the 

salaries were "eating up the TVA money." 

Llewellyn said EMA has a planner, but unlike Frost and Morgan, 

all of her $59,034 annual salary is coming from TVA and 911 money. 

Burch said the county could have used part of the TV A money to 

help buy public storm shelters and weather sirens after the April 27, 

2011, tornado outbreak that killed 14 in Lawrence County. 

Doc. no. 32-4, atECF 69-70 (copy ofarticle from www.decaturdaily.com)(alterations 

supplied); see also doc. no. 52-1, at ECF 2-3 (copy of same article as printed in The 

Decatur Daily). 

G. Monday, September 30, 2013 

Just two days after publication of the Decatur Daily article, the County 

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Commission met for the purpose of adopting a budget for the 2013-14 fiscal year. 

Plaintiff attended in order to address three potential EMA budgets that she had 

prepared,41 but the majority of her presentation was devoted to refuting the Decatur 

Daily's accusation that she and Hillard Frost had received "raises that were never 

approved" by the County Commission,42 and attacking the credibility of the person 

identified by the newspaper's reporter as the source ofthat charge: Interim County 

Administrator Tricia Galbreath. 

As will be discussed more fully in Part III.Q. ofthis opinion, infra, Lawrence 

County Commission Chairman Prentis Davis subsequently cited plaintiffs behavior 

during the September 30th Commission meeting as one basis for the adverse 

employment actions that led to this suit. He accused her of being "disrespectful" 

when addressing members ofthe Commission, "insubordinate" when questioning the 

Commissioners' "judgment" about budgetary decisions affecting the County EMA 

office (and particularly her own salary), and "abusive" when confronting the Interim 

County Administrator about statements attributed to her in the newspaper article.43 

41 Throughout plaintiff's comments to the Commissioners, she repeatedly referred to her 

budget proposals by the letters "A," "B," and "e." 

42 See, e.g., doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), ~ 14, at 

ECF 6 ("Plaintiff disputes that she came to the September 30, 2013 meeting to simply present the 

budget she had prepared. Rather, Plaintiff came to the September 30,2013 meeting to correct certain 

inaccuracies regarding the EMA budget presented at the previous meeting that she was not present 

for [sic] that were subsequently printed in the paper.") (citation omitted). 

43 Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 6 (Oct. 30,2013 Letter). 

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This court listened to an audio recording of the Commission meeting,44 and 

directed an official reporter to prepare a transcript. A copy of the transcript is 

attached to this opinion as an "Appendix.,,45 

Chairman Davis and other Commissioners asked plaintiff on several occasions 

to "move on," and to confine her comments to the three budget proposals she had 

prepared, but she repeatedly focused her remarks on her salary, and what she 

described as "rumor control" necessitated by the Decatur Daily article.46 

Plaintiff hand-printed numbers beside ten of the eighteen paragraphs of the 

newspaper article,47 and distributed copies to each Commissioner. She sequentially 

addressed each ofthe numbered paragraphs, while posing rhetorical questions to the 

Commissioners, such as: "Did y'all approve the budgets the last two years ... ?,,48 

When Mose Jones the only Commissioner who expressed support for plaintiff 

44 Doc. no. 29 (Recorded Audio Files Stored on CD). 

45 As frequently is the case, a cold, typewritten transcript is a poor substitute for hearing the 

tone of words actually spoken. 

46 Appendix, at 11 (doc. no. 27, at Track 4, 1 :20). 

47 See doc. no. 52-1, at ECF 2-3 (a copy ofthe article as printed in The Decatur Daily, and 

bearing plaintiff's handwritten numbers beside ten ofthe article's eighteen paragraphs). 

48 Appendix, at 13 (doc. no. 27, at Track 4, 1:35) (ellipsis supplied). The significance of 

plaintiff's rhetorical question was based upon these facts: four ofthe five members ofthe Lawrence 

County Commission were "new," in the sense that they had been elected in 2010; and, the Interim 

County Administrator (also a new appointee) could find no evidence in Commission minutes that 

the amounts paid as annual salaries to Hillard Frost and plaintiff had been approved by the County 

Commissioners who served prior to 2010. Hence, plaintiff was arguing that the lack of minute 

entries was unimportant, because the incumbent Commissioners had approved the EMA's budgets 

- which clearly depicted the amounts paid as salaries to each EMA employee - during the two 

previous fiscal years. 

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during the meeting addressed a subject in one ofthe paragraphs toward the end of 

the newspaper article, plaintiff chided him: "Ifyou will stay in number, I won't have 

to flip back and forth."49 

At another point, after being asked by Chairman Davis to "stay on [the] 

budget," plaintiff rebuffed him, saying: "Let's get back on this [i.e., discussion ofthe 

Decatur Daily article], please."so 

Plaintiff's tone when addressing Interim County Administrator Tricia 

Galbreath was argumentative and, at times, disrespectful. For example, when 

Galbreath attempted to speak in her own defense about plaintiff's accusation that 

Galbreath had either failed or refused to distribute copies ofjob descriptions for the 

EMA Director and Deputy Director positions to all members of the Commission, 

plaintiff snapped: "You don't have to speak. I'm passing it around."sl Her anger 

was barely suppressed under a thin veneer of courtesy. 

Plaintiff berated Galbreath for telling the newspaper reporter that Hillard 

Frost's salary as EMA Director "was more than $80,000 annually."s2 It appears that 

amount was an aggregate of salaries separately paid to Frost for two County 

49 Appendix, at 19 (doc. no. 27, at Track 7, 0:28). 

50 Appendix, at 27 (doc. no. 27, at Track 9,0: 15) (alterations supplied). 

51 Appendix, at 16 (doc. no. 27, at Track 5, 4:10). 

52 Doc. no. 52-1, at ECF 2 (paragraph bearing plaintiff's handwritten number "3"). 

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positions held by him: i.e., Director ofthe Lawrence County EMA, and Director of 

the Lawrence County 911 Center.S3 Plaintiff rebuked Galbreath, saying: "You are 

the County Administrator acting. You should have known the difference."s4 

Plaintiff subsequently attempted to excuse her behavior by saying that she had 

"little sleep" prior to the September 30th Commission meeting, and that she had done 

"the best [she] could do" under the circumstances. 55 Nevertheless, plaintiff chose to 

express what may have been valid concerns about the accuracy ofthe Decatur Daily 

article in a manner that left her vulnerable to Chairman Davis's accusation that her 

behavior had been "disrespectful," "insubordinate," and "abusive." 

H. Thursday, October 3,2013 

Three days after plaintiffs appearance at the Commission's September 30th 

budget meeting, she told her EMA co-worker, Tammy Vinson, that "snakes were out 

to get her and those snakes had revealed theirselves [sic]," but "she had took [sic] 

care of them," or "chopped their heads off."56 On the same morning, plaintiff told 

Vinson that 

files were missing out ofher office. She said the only person that had 

53 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 38. 

54 Appendix, at 21 (doc. no. 27, at Track 7, 2:40). 

55 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 118 (alteration suppJied). 

56 Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Vinson Testimony), 

at 140-41. 

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a key was me and Hillard, and Hillard was in Orange Beach. And I told 

her, I said, I promise you, I haven't took [sic] anything out of your 

office. And she said, okay. And I said, I promise I haven't took [sic] 

anything out of your office. 

Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript of February 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Vinson 

Testimony), at 99; see also id. at 125. 

Later that same day, plaintiff told Vinson that she was experiencing high blood 

pressure and "needed to rest.,,57 She decided to take sick leave.58 Vinson agreed to 

respond to emergency calls while plaintiff was out of the office.59 Vinson testified 

that plaintiff appeared "a little distraught," "stressed," and "out of sorts" before 

leaving the office.60 

I. Friday, October 4,2013 

Sometime during the "middle ofthe night between Thursday, October 3,2013, 

and Friday, October 4, 2013,,,61 plaintiff received a telephone call from a 911 

57 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 63. 

58 See id. 

59 See doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript of Feb. 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing; Vinson 

Testimony), at 140-41. 

6°Id. at 112, 120. 

61 This statement was stipulated by the parties as the time frame within which events critical 

to the issues ofthis case occurred. See doc. no. 55 (Joint Stipulations ofFact) ~ 1 ("The middle of 

the night between Thursday, October 3,2013, and Friday, October 4, 2013, is when Plaintiff entered 

the Hill residence."). The parties also stipulated that statements contained in letters from 

Commission Chairman Prentis Davis to plaintiff "citing the incidence as having occurred in the 

middle of the night between October 5, 2013, and October 6,2013 ... are not correct." Id. ~ 2 

(ellipsis and emphasis supplied, internal citations omitted). 

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operator. She recounted the ensuing conversation as follows: 

I remember picking up the phone and the dispatch telling me that there 

had been a wreck in the Bankhead Forest, it had a fatality, and that there 

was some diesel spill or something to the effect that it probably had 

burned up but that they need[ ed] - they had requested EMA. And 1­

she said something about they had called ADEM [i.e., the Alabama 

Department ofEnvironmental Management], and they said, Call EMA 

first. And I had explained to the dispatcher that I was on leave and that 

I wasn't supposed to be receiving this call, and she said, Oh, I wasn't 

aware. And I paused and I thought, Tammy is going to be working 

tomorrow, so I'll take the call and respond to it where she can have her 

sleep to do EMA on Friday [sic]. 

Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition) at 67 (alterations supplied).62 Plaintiff testified 

that she also was "concerned about [the security of] her job" ifshe did not personally 

respond to the call for emergency assistance.63 

As plaintiff drove toward the accident site, however, the fatigue and stress that 

had caused her to take sick leave increasingly weighed upon her - so much so that 

she reached the point of believing that she would be "taking [her] life in danger" if 

she continued her journey.64 She also testified that she was "not thinking straight," 

and was "scared to be in the Bankhead Forest.,,65 Plaintiff cited her fatigue, stress, 

62 See also doc. no. 36-2 (Vinson Deposition), at 11; doc. no. 28-3 (Davis Deposition), at 79. 

63 Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Morgan Testimony), 

at 78 (alteration supplied). 

64 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 68 (alteration supplied). 

65Id. at 84 ("Before I went any further to a wreck, not one step further was I going to go. On 

the way, I was thinking and not knowing nothing. It was time to pause because I was not thinking 

straight."); id. at 82 (describing her feeling that something bad would happen to her in the Bankhead 

Forest). 

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and fears as reasons for her stopping, en route to the accident site, at the residence of 

an elderly couple named Martha and Thurston Hill. 

She did not immediately approach the Hills' home, but instead pulled into the 

driveway ofthe house located next door: the home ofthe Hills' daughter and son-inlaw, Sandra and Ricky Nelson.66 She sounded her automobile's hom in an attempt 

to attract the attention ofthe sleeping occupants, but eventually realized that was "not 

a good idea," because Sandra and Ricky Nelson did not know her.67 So, she "pulled 

out of the [Nelsons'] driveway, [and] ... into Thurston and Martha Hill's 

driveway.,,68 

It then was the early morning hours ofFriday, October 4th,69 and the house was 

dark as plaintiff walked to the front entrance. She knocked, and when no one 

responded, she turned the knob and found that the door was not locked.70 She 

entered, and was confronted by Mr. and Mrs. Hill in their hallway. Plaintiff 

attempted to explain her reasons for entering the home unbidden, and asked if she 

could use their telephone to call Tammy Vinson and request that she report to the 

66Id at 68-69 (stating that, even though she "had thought about stopping at Thurston and 

Martha Hill's house," she remembered "that he had been sick, and I said, I just don't want to stop 

there. And I pulled in their daughter's driveway and blowed ....") (ellipsis supplied). 

67Id 

68Id (alterations and ellipsis supplied). 

69 See supra note 61. 

70 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 69; doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript of Feb. 3,2014 

Personnel Board Hearing: Morgan Testimony), at 39, 41. 

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accident scene. 71 

Notably, plaintiff had a cellular telephone and a radio in her truck, but she had 

not attempted to use either device before entering the Hills' residence and asking for 

pennission to use their land-line telephone.72 

Later that same morning (and during regular business hours), the Hills' 

daughter, Sandra Nelson, drove to the Lawrence County EMA office to report the 

incident in person. 73 According to Tammy Vinson, who received her complaint, Mrs. 

Nelson reported that a lady named "Morgan" had identified herself as working for 

EMA, and pulled into the driveway ofher home after midnight,14 

blowing her horn and all. And she said, me and my husband was getting 

up and ... I saw her go into my mother's house. [Ms. Morgan] was real 

upset and said she kept telling her, said you know me. And she said she 

would pull her shirt up and show her EMA badge and said that I work 

for EMA, you know me. And she stated then, she said that she seemed 

upset. And she said, they're trying to set me up, they're trying to kill 

me. 

71 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 69. 

72 See id. at 84 ("Radios and phones do not pick up there in Bankhead Forest in a lot of 

areas."). 

73 See doc. no. 55 (Joint Stipulations ofFact) 'Il3 ("Friday, October 4,2013, is when Sandra 

Nelson came to the EMAl911 officc and reported the incident to Tammy Vinson and the other 

women in the EMAl911 office. (Doc. 28-14)."). See also doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 

Personnel Board Hearing: Vinson Testimony), at 102; doc. no. 28-14 (Written Statements by 

Tammy Vinson, Donna Campbell, Judy Letson, and Rhonda Dunlop); doc. no. 36-2 (Vinson 

Deposition), at 13-15. 

74 See doc. no. 55 (Joint StipUlations of Fact) 'Il 1 ("The middle of the night between 

Thursday, October 3, 2013, and Friday, October 4, 2013, is when Plaintiff entered the Hill 

residence. "). 

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Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript of February 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Vinson 

Testimony), at 102-03 (ellipsis, alteration, and emphasis supplied). 

J. Sunday, October 6, 2013 

Plaintiff delivered a card to Tammy Vinson's home on the Sunday following 

the foregoing events, for the stated purpose ofexpressing that she "trusted" Vinson. 75 

When asked during deposition whether she had enclosed money within the card, 

plaintiff testified that she did "not recal1.,,76 

Later that same day, while visiting her mother, plaintiff attempted to call her 

husband. The first telephone unit that plaintiff attempted to use had no dial tone, and 

she concluded that someone had "cut" the line to her mother's home. 77 Plaintiff then 

used her mother's cell telephone to call the 911 center, to ask that law enforcement 

officers be dispatched to her mother's home.78 When the officers arrived, however, 

plaintiff did not come to the door. Instead, she told the officers through an open 

window that another telephone unit in her mother's house had functioned properly, 

and she apologized for the inconvenience she had caused. 79 The officers reported that 

75 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 74-77. 

76Id. at 78. 

77 Id. at 78-79, 85;see also doc. no. 28-1 at 54 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 Personnel Board 

Hearing: Morgan Testimony). 

78 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 79; doc. no. 55 (Joint Stipulations of Fact) ~ 4 

("Plaintiffs 911 call occurred on Sunday, October 6,2013. (Doc. 32-3 at p. 78)."). 

79 See doc. no. 28-12, at 150-51 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Davis 

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plaintiff also said that "she loved them."so 

Plaintiff subsequently provided two incoherent explanations for her conclusion 

that "someone" had "cut" the telephone line to her mother's home. The first was 

given during her February 3, 2014 Personnel Board hearing: 

My mother had had problems with a neighbor prior. And she had told 

me something. My husband and I had been out oftown and - for just 

- on a Friday night. And she had told me that the neighbor had said 

something to her about - we were in Tennessee and my mom did not 

even know we were in Tennessee. My mom said that this neighbor had 

said he had connections in Tennessee. 

Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofPersonnel Board Hearing: Morgan Testimony), at 55. 

The second explanation was provided during her August 25,2015 deposition: 

I had picked up my one ofmy mother's cordless phones to call 

my husband and it did not work, and my mother had just told me 

something that upset me concerning one of her neighbors that she had 

had some disputes with, [who] said something about - my husband and 

I had went to Tennessee on Friday night, and I was trying to get some 

sleep and he - she had talked to her neighbor and he said something 

about he had connections in Tennessee. And I said, What are you 

talking about? She said, Well, I don't know. I didn't even know you 

were in Tennessee. And when I called my husband - and I could not 

get him on the phone because the phone - I thought the phone line had 

been cut. I picked up, to the best of my knowledge, my mom's 

Testimony); doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 85 ("I had picked up one ofmy ... mom's other 

cell- cordless phone [sic], and it worked. 1 had found out that the other phone, the battery had 

died. 1 was really embarrassed, and 1 opened up the window when the cop was getting out ofthe car 

and I told him that the phone line was not cut and I was sorry, or something to that effect, for making 

the call.") (ellipsis supplied). 

80 Doc. no. 28-12, at 151 (Transcript of Feb. 3,2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Davis 

Testimony) (emphasis supplied). 

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cellphone and called 911 because I thought the phone line had been cut. 

Doc. no. 28-1 (Deposition ofBrenda Morgan), at 78-79 (alteration supplied). 

The 911 dispatch operator reported the foregoing incident to Tammy Vinson;81 

and she, in turn, forwarded the report to the Chairman of the Lawrence County 

Commission, Prentis Davis.82 

K. Monday, October 7, 2013 

Ricky Nelson reported plaintiff's invasion of his father- and mother-in-Iaw's 

home by a telephone call to the Lawrence County Sheriff's Office on the morning of 

Monday, October 7, 2013.83 He described plaintiff as being "kind of hysterical, 

rambling on about somebody trying to get her, needing some help ... that she felt like 

she'd been kind of lured up there.,,84 Captain Tim McWhorter of the Lawrence 

County Sheri ff' s Office later testified that the Hill family reported the incident to him 

for safety reasons, because "they were afraid ... that something could have 

happened" _. specifically, that "Mrs. Morgan could have got harmed, got shot. ,,85 

81 See id. at 107; see also doc. no. 36-2 (Vinson Deposition), at 14. 

82 See doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 7 (Notice of Proposed Action); doc. no. 28-3 (Davis 

Deposition), at 85. 

83 See doc. no. 28-13 (Lawrence County Sheriff s Office Criminal Investigation Division 

Report); doc. no. 55 (Joint Stipulations of Fact) ~ 5 ("Ricky Nelson reported the incident to the 

Lawrence County Sheriffs Office on Monday, October 7,2013. (Doc. 28-13)."). 

84 Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript of Feb. 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing: McWhorter 

Testimony), at 83, 87 (ellipsis supplied). 

85Id. at 92 (ellipsis and emphasis supplied). 

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Prentis Davis, the Chairman ofthe Lawrence County Commission, related a 

telephone conversation with Martha Hill on this same date, during which she told him 

that plaintiff 

had came [sic] into her house around 1 :00 or 2:00 and was basically 

yelling and screaming. And I believe she said she was in the bed at the 

time and she got up and her and her husband got up and looked down 

the hallway and seen that there was definitely somebody in the house. 

And she, I guess, approached Mrs. Morgan [plaintiff]. And she said she 

was screaming andflashing her shirt that she was from EMA, somebody 

was trying to get her, ["]they're on to me.["] 

[Martha Hill] ... was definitely concerned. She did mention, she said, 

["]Lord, child, we'll just call the law and get you some help.["] Then 

she told me that Mrs. Morgan said, ["]Lord, don't do that, they're in on 

it, too. ["] 

Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript of February 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Davis 

Testimony), at 145-46 (ellipses, emphasis, and alterations supplied). 

Commissioner Jon Mark Nelson testified that Thurston and Martha Hill were 

regular patrons ofhis convenience store,86 and they had told him on some date shortly 

after the incident "that Ms. Morgan had come into their house while they were 

sleeping[,] yelling about people being after her.,,87 

Plaintiffs subsequent assessment of her behavior demonstrated a lack of 

86 Doc. no. 28-20 (Nelson Declaration), ~ 2. 

87 ld ~~ 2-3 (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

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insight into both its bizarre nature and its dangerousness. She said: "I don't know 

how I could have handled it any better."ss She testified that she "apologized to Mrs. 

Hill that night, and [Mrs. Hill] told [her] that she had no problems whatsoever with 

[her] being there."s9 Plaintiff also alleged that she and Mrs. Hill "sat down and had 

coffee," and reminisced about "old times," following her unauthorized entry.90 When 

asked during the February 3,2014 Personnel Board hearing whether she had told the 

Hills that "somebody was trying to kill her," plaintiff replied: "Not that I recal1.,,91 

After Commission Chairman Prentis Davis learned of the events that had 

occurred over the preceding weekend, he sent the following letter to plaintiff on 

Monday, October 7,2013: 

This letter is to notify you that you are being placed on 

administrative leave with pay pending an investigation into recent 

events suggesting that you may no longer be qualified to hold your 

position. This action is not punitive or disciplinary in nature; rather, it 

arises out ofmy concern for the safety of citizens of Lawrence County, 

including yourself. While you are on administrative leave, you are not 

authorized to take any actions or perform any work on behalf of 

Lawrence County. Accordingly, you are required to tum over any and 

all County property currently in your position. 

Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 2 (Oct. 7, 2013 Letter). 

88 Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Morgan Testimony), 

at 37. 

89Id. at 43 (alterations supplied). 

90Id. at 44. 

91 Id. at 69 (alteration supplied). 

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L. Tuesday, October 8, 2013 

Several significant events are recorded in the minutes of the regular meeting 

of the Lawrence County Commission that occurred on Tuesday, October 8, 2013. 

First, the Commissioners discussed the question of 

whether the EMA Director position should be an exempt employee or 

notL] and what [the pay] grade [or classification for] this position 

should be. TVA funding for this position was also discussed. 

Commissioner Hargrove made a motion to table until next meeting and 

to ask a TVA representative to come and explain their funding at that 

time. Commissioner Jones gave a second and all Commissioners voted 

aye. 

Doc. no. 28-5, at ECF 12 (Oct. 8,2013 Minutes) (alterations and emphasis supplied). 

The Commission later voted to "go into executive session" for the purpose of 

discussing "an individual employed by the county [sic] and some considerations that 

need to be dealt with by the County.,,92 

After emerging from executive session, the Commissioners voted unanimously 

to amend the previously-published agenda to include consideration ofthe following 

resolutions: 

RESOLUTION RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT OF 

BRENDA MORGAN: 

The resolution states that Ms. Morgan is placed on administrative leave 

with pay effective October 2, 2013 [sic] and that the Chairman is 

designated as the appointing authority ofMs. Morgan. Commissioner 

Burch made a motion to adopt this resolution with a second from 

92 Doc. no. 28-5, at ECF 16 (Minutes of Oct. 8,2013 Meeting). 

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Commissioner Nelson. All Commissioners voted aye except 

Commissioner Jones who abstained. 

RESOLUTION APPOINTING ACTING EMA DIRECTOR: 

This resolution states that Tammy Vinson is appointed as acting 

Director of Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency until 

further notice. Commissioner Hargrove made a motion to adopt this 

resolution with a second from Commissioner Burch. All commissioners 

voted aye. 

Id. at ECF 17 (emphasis supplied). 

M. Thursday, October 10, 2013 

Two days after the foregoing Commission meeting, Chairman Davis handdelivered the following letter to plaintiff: 

The Lawrence County Commission voted to make me your 

appointing authority as of October 7, 2013. As your appointing 

authority, I am notifYing you of a meeting to be held on Monday, 

October 14,2013, at 10:00 a.m. at the law office of David L. Martin at 

681 Main Street in Moulton regarding your employment. 

As stated in my letter to you of October 7, 2013, recent events 

suggest that you may no longer be qualified to hold your position with 

the Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency. The purpose of 

the October 14 meeting is simply to discuss the events with you. 

An investigation ofthese matters is ongoing. No discipline ofany 

kind has been proposed. We just want to hear your side ofthe story so 

that the Lawrence County Commission can determine the best way to 

proceed in order to ensure that the safety of all citizens of Lawrence 

County, including you, is protected. 

If you cannot attend this meeting, please contact me at 

256-565-7393 as soon as possible. If you are unable to reach me, you 

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may contact County Administrator Tricia Galbreath at 256-974-2401. 

Please be aware that failing to attend this meeting without calling 

to re-schedule will be considered to be vio lation ofa direct order ofyour 

appointing authority. 

Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 3 (Oct. 10,2013 Letter). 

N. Monday, October 14,2013 

Plaintiff met with Chairman Davis on October 14,2013, in accordance with the 

directive contained in the foregoing letter. 

O. Thursday, October 17, 2013 

Three days after that meeting, Chairman Davis hand-delivered a third letter to 

plaintiff, stating simply that she would "remain on administrative leave with pay until 

further notice.,,93 

P. Tuesday, October 22,2013 

The minutes ofthe October 22, 2013 regular meeting ofthe Lawrence County 

Commission record the following actions affectingthevacantEMAD irectorposition: 

EMA CLASSIFICATIONS: 

There was discussion about a representative from TV A possibly being 

able to come speak at the next meeting. 

Commissioner Hargrove made a motion to put the EMA Director 

position in [the County's Pay Classification] Class XI with the TVA 

money included in the salary[, and] not in addition to. Commissioner 

93 See id. at ECF 5 (Oct. 17,2013 Letter) ("This letter is to notifY you that you will remain 

on administrative leave with pay until further notice."). 

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Burch gave a second and all Commissioners voted aye except 

Commissioner Jones who voted no. 

Commissioner Hargrove made a motion to table the Deputy Director 

Classification. Commissioner Jones gave a second and all 

Commissioners voted aye. 

EMA POSITION: 

There was discussion on contacting the applicants to let them know of 

the Pay Classification change. Commissioner Nelson made a motion to 

re-advertise for the EMA Director Position with the [new, starting] Pay 

Classification included. The people that have already applied will be 

contacted to see if they still want their application considered. 

Commissioner Jones gave a second. Commissioners Jones and Nelson 

voted yes while Commissioners Burch and Hargrove abstained. Motion 

passes. 

Doc. no. 28-5, at ECF 20 (Oct. 22, 2013 Minutes) (alterations and emphasis 

supplied). The significance of changing the payroll classification for the EMA 

Director position from a "Class XIV" to a "Class XI" was that the annual salary ofthe 

person selected to replace Hillard Frost would be approximately $28,000 less than the 

amount previously paid to Frost.94 

I t is important to note the "motion to table the Deputy Director classification. ,,95 

That action suggests that the Commission was contemplating elimination of the 

Deputy EMA Director position as early as October 22, 2013. 

94 See doc. no. 38-1 (Affidavit of Peggy King), ~ 7, at ECF 3 ("I attended a Commission 

Meeting in October of2013 where the Commission voted to reduce the EMA Director's pay grade 

level classification from a level XIV to a level XI, equating to approximately a $28,000 pay cut for 

the incoming EMA Director ....") (ellipsis supplied). 

95Id. tT 3. 

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Q. Wednesday, October 30, 2013 

Chairman Davis hand-delivered a fourth letter to plaintiff on October 30th, 

stating that he intended to terminate her employment, for cause, on November 5th: 

This letter is a Notice ofProposed Action under Section 9.11.2 of 

the Lawrence County Personnel Handbook. This will serve to inform 

you that 1 intend to terminate your employment with the Lawrence 

County Commission, effective November 5, 2013, for the following 

Group Two violations: 

9.6.19: Abusive Conduct 

9.6.21: Conduct Unbecoming an Employee 

9.6.22: Insubordination 

9.6.30: Other Unacceptable Conduct 

This termination is based on the culmination of an investigation 

into recent events in which you were involved. The events have 

damaged relationships in the community, with the members of the 

Lawrence County Commission and within the Lawrence County 

Commission office, while also raising serious questions regarding your 

judgment and leadership abilities. 

The first incident is your behavior at the meeting ofthe Lawrence 

County Commission on September 30, 2013, where you were 

disrespectful towards the members of the Commission and openly 

questioned their judgment in regard to making budgetary decisions 

affecting the EMA, including your salary. The conduct constituted 

insubordination. 

Further, you were abusive towards your co-employee, Ms. Tricia 

Galbreath. I understand that you may have some kind of dispute with 

Ms. Galbreath; however, you have made it clear several times, 

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including in our meeting ofOctober 14,2013, that you are unwilling to 

attempt to resolve this dispute in a professional and courteous manner. 

It is of particular concern to me that you have discussed this dispute 

with other employees, referring to Ms. Galbreath as a "snake" on more 

one occaSlOn. 

The second incident occurred on October 5, 2013[96] when you 

entered a private home uninvited shortly after 1 :00 a.m. while in route 

to an unrelated emergency call. 

The third incident occurred on October 6, 2013 when you called 

911 from your mother's residence in Moulton and made a false 

allegation that her phone lines had been cut. 

Your behavior on any ofthese occasions was unacceptable for any 

employee ofthe Lawrence County Commission, much less for someone 

in the position of acting EMA Director. 

You have a right to respond to the above matters orally or in 

writing within three (3) business days. You also have the right to 

request an informal hearing in front of me, where you may present 

evidence on your behalf. You may either represent yourself and/or be 

represented by a person of your choosing. Ifyou choose to request a 

hearing, this hearing will be held on November 5, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. at 

the meeting room ofthe Lawrence County Commission, located at 12001 

Alabama Highway 157, Moulton, Alabama. 

If you do not request a hearing or otherwise respond to this 

Notice, your termination will be effective on November 5, 2013. In the 

event that you request a hearing, your administrative leave with pay will 

end on November 5,2013. However, you may use your vacation or any 

other paid leave time after that date. 

Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 6 (Oct. 30,2013 Letter) (footnote and emphasis supplied). 

96 The parties stipulated that this date is not correct. See doc. no. 55 (Joint Stipulations of 

Fact), at 2, ~ 1 ("The middle ofthe night between Thursday, October 3, 2013, and Friday, October 

4,2013, is when Plaintiff entered the Hill residence."). 

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R. Friday, November 1,2013 

Plaintiff exercised the right outlined in the preceding letter to request a hearing 

before Chairman Davis. In preparation for it, she drafted with the aid ofan attomeyfriend an affidavit for execution by Martha Hill. Plaintiff took the affidavit to Mrs. 

Hill, who signed it on Friday, November 1,2013.97 The full text of that document 

reads as follows: 

1. My name is Ms. Martha Hill. I am a resident of the State of 

Alabama and am over the age of twenty-one and competent to give this 

statement. 

2. On October 4, 2013, Ms. Brenda Morgan came to my house 

about 1 :00 a.m. 1have known Brenda/or over 30 years. Brenda asked 

ifshe could come in my house and make some telephone calls. 

3. I allowed Brenda to come in my house and make her calls. 

Brenda seemed very tired and did not think she could go into the 

Bankhead Forrest [sic] to check on a truck accident. Brenda called 

someone and asked if that person could check on the accident. 

4. I did not have a problem with Brenda coming to my house that 

evemng. 

Doc. no. 39-2 (Hill Affidavit) (emphasis supplied).98 

S. Tuesday, November 5, 2013 

97 See doc. no. 39-2 (Hill Affidavit), at ECF 2 (Notary Public's certification dated Nov. 1, 

2013). 

98 A reasonable juror could not conclude that Mrs. Hill "allowed" plaintiff to enter her home, 

when it is undisputed that Mrs. Hill was not expecting plaintiff, did not answer the door, and did not 

even see plaintiff until she was standing in the Hills' hallway. 

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When plaintiff presented Mrs. Hill's affidavit to Chainnan Davis during the 

November 5th hearing, his "first reaction was that [the statements contained in it 

were] completely opposite" to the description of events previously related to him by 

Mrs. Hill during their telephone conversation on or about October 7, 2013. 99 He 

added that Mrs. Hill had said to him that, even though she had known plaintiff "for 

a while," she had not spoken to her in "five or six years."1OO For such reasons, 

Chairman Davis assigned little weight to the affidavit. 101 Moreover, he believed the 

incident to be a serious one: "something we couldn't tum our attention away from. 

It was definitely a fireable offense according to our handbook. y.oujust couldn't let 

it go, so to speak."I02 

T. Friday, November 15,2013 

Ten days after the hearing before Chainnan Davis, plaintiff chose not to wait 

for his decision on the evidence presented, and filed a charge ofdiscrimination with 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). She alleged 

discrimination based upon her sex and perceived disability.103 She hand-delivered a 

99 Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofFeb. 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Davis Testimony), 

at 148-49 (alteration supplied). 

100 Id. at 149. 

101 Davis also surmised that, "[u]nder the circumstances, I almost felt like Mrs. Hill was 

probably pretty good people and didn't want to cause any trouble, and that she may have signed it 

to keep Mrs. Morgan out of any trouble." Id. (alteration supplied). 

1021d. at 155. 

103 See doc. no. 36-1, at ECF 39 (EEOC Charge Filed Nov. 15,2013). See also doc. no. 1 

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copy of the charge to both Chairman Davis and Lawrence County Attorney David 

Martin on the same day it was filed. 104 

U. Tuesday, November 19, 2013 

Chairman Davis hand-delivered a fifth letter to plaintiff on November 19,2013. 

The copy filed in the record ofthis case states that the letter was "Drafted November 

11,2013," but not "Hand Delivered" until eight days later: "November 19, 2013."105 

Laying aside the questionable veracity ofthe self-serving "Drafted" date - i.e., 

November 11, 2013 was Veterans Day, a legal holiday in both Alabama and the 

United States, and four days before plaintifffiled her EEOC Charge the letter 

clearly states that it was "Hand Delivered" to plaintiff on "November 19,20 13,"four 

days after her EEOC charge had been filed. 

The letter stated that Chairman Davis had changed his mind, and decided to 

downgrade the sanction for plaintiffs conduct from termination of employment for 

cause, to suspension without pay for "twenty (20) work days," beginning on the same 

date that termination was slated to have occurred (i.e., November 5,2013). 

The Jetter also reiterated the fact that the County Commission had rescinded 

plaintiffs appointment as "Acting EMA Director" on October 8, 2013, and 

(Complaint), ~ 40; doc. no. 1-1 (Right to Sue Letters); doc. no. 5 (Answer), ~ 40. 

104 See id. at ECF 38 (Letter Informing Chairman Davis ofEEOC Charge). 

105 Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 8 (alteration supplied). 

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reassigned her to her previous position ofDeputy EMA Director. The full text ofthe 

letter reads as follows: 

This letter is a Notice of Suspension under Section 9.10 of the 

Lawrence County Personnel Handbook. I have considered both the 

evidence that you presented at the pre-disciplinary hearing and your 

long record of service with the Lawrence County Commission, and I 

have decided not to terminate your employment at this time. Instead, I 

am imposing suspension without pay oftwenty (20) work days, effective 

November 5, 2013, based on my determination that you committed the 

following Group Two offenses: 

9.6.21: Conduct Unbecoming an Employee 

9.6.30: Other Unacceptable Conduct 

These violations are based on your conduct on October 5 [sic], [1061 

when you entered a private horne in the middle of the night while 

supposedly responding to an emergency call, and October 6, when you 

called 911 making a false allegation that phone lines had been cut. Your 

conduct on both those occasions in interacting with members of the 

public and with law enforcement officials was unacceptable. That these 

incidents did not result in more harm being done does not change the 

fact that you showed very poor judgment on both of these occasions, 

which damaged critical relationships and raised very serious questions 

regarding your leadership abilities. 

This suspension is also based on your commISSIOn of the 

following Group One and Two offenses: 

9.4.4: Work Interference 

9.4.13: Other Conduct 

9.6.19: Abusive Conduct 

106 See supra note 96. 

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These violations are also based on your behavior at the meeting 

ofthe Lawrence County Commission on September 30,2013, and on the 

manner in which you have handled an apparent dispute between yourself 

and Ms. Galbreath, both in the September 30 meeting an [sic] on other 

occasions. Your behavior has been unprofessional and has needlessly 

interfered with Commission operations. 

The modification ofthe proposed discipline should in no way be 

taken as a signal that I do not consider these incidents to be very serious 

in nature. While these incidents warrant termination under the 

Handbook because of your long term employment with Lawrence 

County I have chosen to suspend you without pay. You have the right 

to request, in writing, within ten (10) calendar days an appeal in front of 

the Lawrence County Appeals Board as to your suspension without pay 

in accordance with Chapter Ten ofthe Personnel Handbook. 

Further, this letter serves as a notification that your temporary 

assignment as Interim [or "Acting"] EMA Director was canceled by the 

Commission's appointment of a new Interim EMA Director, which 

occurred on October 8, 2013. You have therefore been reassigned to the 

position of deputy EMA director. This reassignment is not a 

disciplinary action; therefore, you do not have the right to appeal this 

reassignment. 

Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 8 (Nov. 19,2013 Letter) (emphasis, footnote, and alterations 

supplied). 

V. Monday, November 25, 2013 

Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Lawrence County Appeals Board on 

November 25, 2013, noticing her "appeal of the decision of Lawrence County 

Commissioner Prentis Davis suspending [her] without pay for 20 work days.,,107 

107 See doc. no. 36-1, at EeF 40 (Nov. 25, 2013 Letter) (alteration supplied). 

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W. Tuesday, November 26, 2013 

The minutes ofthe Commission meeting held on November 26,2013, record 

the following actions: 

EXECUTIVE SESSION: 

Mr. Martin [the County Attorney] stated that the executive session was 

to discuss potential litigation. Commissioner Jones made a motion to 

go into executive session. Commissioner Nelson gave a second and all 

Commissioners voted aye. 

Commissioner Jones made a motion to come back into regular session. 

Commissioner Nelson gave a second and all Commissioners voted aye. 

EMA CLASSIFICATION: 

Commissioner Burch made a motion to adopt the Resolution 

Eliminating the Position of Deputy EMA Director. Commissioner 

Hargrove gave a second. Commissioner Jones voted no with all other 

Commissioners voting yes. Motion passed. 

Doc. no. 37-1, at ECF 44 (Nov. 26,20 13 Minutes) (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

The resolution thus adopted reads as follows: 

RESOLUTION ELIMINATING POSITION OF 

DEPUTY EMA DIRECTOR 

Whereas, the Lawrence County Commission received a July 18, 

2013 letter from the three staff members of the Lawrence County 

Emergency Management Agency stating that two employees could 

adequately perform the duties necessary for the operation of the 

Lawrence County EMA and recommending, in part, that another 

employee not be hired after the retirement of EMA Director Hillard 

Frost [see Part I1LB., supra]; 

Whereas, at the time ofthe July 18,2013 letter the members ofthe 

Lawrence County Commission were considering eliminating one ofthe 

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three EMA positions as a cost-saving measure and the Commission has 

continued to consider the matter since that time; 

Whereas, the Lawrence County Commission recently reduced the 

salary of the EMA Director position as a further cost-saving measure 

[see Part HLP., supra]; 

Whereas, the job titles of the three Lawrence County EMA 

positions are EMA Director, EMA Deputy Director and TVA Planner; 

Whereas, the TV A Planner position is required by virtue of the 

Lawrence County Commission's agreement or grant assurances with 

TVA and a 100 [sic] percent of the salary of the TVA Planner position 

is funded by TVA; as a result, no cost savings would be realized ifthe 

position was eliminated; 

Whereas, it is required by law that each county in the State shall 

have an EMA Director and, further, it is necessary for the efficient 

operation of the Lawrence County EMA that the position of EMA 

Director should remain as one ofthe two staff positions ofthe Lawrence 

County EMA; and 

Whereas, in view ofthe above, the only remaining staff position 

that the Lawrence County Commission can eliminate which will not 

have a negative impact on the operation ofthe Lawrence County EMA 

is the position ofDeputy Director; 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the position of 

Deputy Director of the Lawrence County Emergency Management 

Agency is eliminated, effective December 3, 2013. 

ADOPTED this 26th day of November, 2013. 

Id. at ECF 38 (alterations and emphasis supplied); see also doc. no. 28-16, at ECF 3 

(same). 

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County Attorney David Martin sent a letter to plaintiff on the same day that the 

Commission adopted the foregoing resolution, informing her that her employment 

would end as ofDecember 3rd: i.e., the same date on which plaintiff's twenty-workday suspension without pay expired. lOS His letter read as follows: 

The Lawrence County Commission voted today, November 26, 

2013, to eliminate the position of Deputy EMA Director effective 

December 3, 2013. Your employment with the Lawrence County 

Commission will, accordingly, end as ofthat date. 

This action is not disciplinary and is not in any way a reflection 

on your job performance or personal conduct, but rather is being done 

as part ofa general cost reduction program that has unfortunately been 

necessitated by current economic conditions. 

There are currently no vacant positions ofequal or lower grade in 

the classified or part-time service either in your department or any 

position controlled by the Commission for which you are qualified; 

however, you are eligible for rehire and will be placed on the 

reappointment re-employment eligibility list. 

Thank you for your service to Lawrence County. 

Doc. no. 28-16, at ECF 5 (Nov. 26,2013 Letter) (emphasis supplied). 

X. Monday, December 23, 2013 

Plaintiff was included in each round of the interviews for applicants for the 

108 Ifonly the National Holidays of November 11,2013 (Veterans Day) and November 28, 

2013 (Thanksgiving) are subtracted from plaintiffs twenty-work-day suspension, that sanction 

would have expired on Wednesday, December 4,2013. Assuming, however, that as is normally 

the case in national, state, and local governments the day after Thanksgiving (Friday, Nov. 29, 

2013) also was a holiday for Lawrence County's employees, then "twenty (20) work days" would 

have expired on Tuesday, December 3,2013. 

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vacant EMA Director position, !09 but the Commission ultimately selected an external 

candidate named Johnny Cantrell on Monday, December 23,2013: twenty days after 

the termination of plaintiff s employment. lIO 

The official description ofthe EMA Director position states that its occupant 

must possess the "[a]bility to analyze situations and adopt quick, effective, 

reasonable courses of action," and sufficient "[s ]tamina and endurance to work 

under stress for several days at a time in emergency situations."l1! The Lawrence 

County Personnel Handbook states that "mobs shall be filled, whenever possible, 

with the most qualified eligible applicants,,,112 and that, "[nJormally,preference will 

be given to qualified regular status classified employees; however, an appointing 

authority will have the right to select an applicant who is not an employee, if that 

person is considered to be the best qualified.,,!!3 

Even though the Commi ssion had voted on October 22, 2013 to reduce the pay 

classification for the incoming EMA Director from a class XIV to a class XI (a 

$28,000 reduction), Cantrell received pay raises exceeding the aggregate amount of 

109 See doc. no. 28-3 (Davis Deposition), at 50. 

110 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 164. 

III Doc. no. 28-17 (EMA Director Job Description), at ECF 4-5 (alterations and emphasis 

supplied). The court notes that plaintiff complained that she was "getting tired," two hours into her 

deposition. See doc. no. 28-1, at 48. 

112 Doc. no. 34-1 (Personnel Handbook), at ECF 5 (alteration supplied). 

113 ld at ECF 18, § 4.1.4 (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

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$10,000 within the first year following his date of hire. 114 

Y. The Relative Qualifications of Plaintiff and Johnny Cantrell 

Plaintiff contends that she was "more qualified" for the Director position than 

Johnny Cantrel1. 115 "[N]umerous" letters ofrecommendation had been submitted on 

her behalf during the interview process, including letters from Hillard Frost and 

114 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 166-67 (indicating that Cantrell's starting salary, 

as ofDec. 23,2013, was $41,849.60, and that amount was increased to $52,000). The Commission 

claims that it awarded those raises in order to compensate Cantrell for performing duties above and 

beyond his role as EMA Director. Commissioner Bobby Burch explained the considerations as 

follows: 

See, Johnny carne in, and Johnny had a lot of IT background. Johnny was able to go 

to the revenue commission and the sheriff's department. He's been around to the 

commissioner's office. He's gone around - he's been able to save tons ofmoney 

networking our phones together by changing over our ITT [sic]. He's been doing all 

this computer work. 

We ... can't afford an IT person .... So now we do have an IT person, 

somebody that's qualified and that's working. 

He's not always in the office .... but he's a phone call away. But, you know, 

EMA has to be there when things are bad. Sometimes you go through days when 

there's nice weather and there's no threats and there's no warnings, and they have all 

their stuff together. Instead ofjust sitting down there, you've got an employee that 

can go around and can do all these things. . .. 

And these other department heads have called me and said thank you for 

letting him corne in and do these things, volunteering. And he has already saved tons 

of money, just at the commission alone, being able to bundle and network our phone 

packages and our cable and our DSL. And he's done that for others. 

Plus, in addition, we found out that his qualification or his certification, or 

whatever it is, we get reimbursed $11,000 more than what Hillard Frost brought. 

Doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 168-69 (ellipses supplied). 

115 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 24-25. 

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"other EMA Directors around the state.,,1l6 She also had: logged 250 hours of 

"Advance Level Emergency Management Re-Certification," 117 training that Cantrell 

did not match; served as Deputy Director of the Lawrence County EMA for nine 

years, whereas Cantrell served as Deputy Director ofthe Morgan County EMA for 

only three months; 118 and, established relationships with "the mayors and agencies 

[with whom and which the EMA worked] in the county.,,119 

Commissioner Burch agreed that plaintiff was more "certified" than Cantrell, 

but argued that she was not more "qualified.,,120 Cantrell had served in the United 

States Air Force for nearly four years as a "Security Specialist,,,121 and also had 

worked for the Morgan County EMA since 2002 a year longer than plaintiffs 

tenure in the Lawrence County EMA office. 122 He had completed a number of 

courses of instruction offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency,123 as 

116 Doc. no. 28-3 (Davis Deposition), at 52 (alteration supplied). 

117 See doc. no. 34-2, at ECF 3 (Brenda Morgan Resume). 

118 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 165. 

119 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 88-89 (alteration supplied). 

120 Doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 127. 

121 See doc. no. 28-7 (Cantrell Collective - Part 1), at ECF 2, 4; doc. no. 28-8 (Cantrell 

Collective Ex. - Part 2), at ECF 5. 

122 Following a tornado that occurred on Feb. 6,2007, but while still employed by the Morgan 

County EMA, Cantrell assisted the Lawrence County EMA in its relief efforts. See doc. no. 28-7 

(Cantrell Collective Ex. Part I), at ECF 49 (Lawrence County EMA log signed by Tammy Vinson 

showing that Cantrell contributed eighty hours ofwork to the relief effort). 

123 Cantrell completed each of the following courses offered by the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency ("FEMA"), among others: Introduction to the Incident Command System (doc. 

no. 28-7 (Cantrell Collective Ex. - Part 1), at ECF 6); National Response Plan (NRP): an 

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well as other organizations,124 and had been certified by the Alabama Association of 

Emergency Managers in 2005 as an "Intermediate Level Emergency Manager," and 

in 20 11 as an "Advanced Level Emergency Manager." 125 His interview was described 

as "impressive."126 According to Commissioner Bobby Burch, Cantrell "brought 

things out in the interview to me that I didn't realize. He brought out things the EMA 

should be doing that we were not doing."127 

Tammy Vinson testified that, even though plaintiffhad entered the Hills' home 

uninvited, she continued to believe that plaintiff was "qualified" to serve as Acting 

Introduction (id. at ECF 8); Decision Making & Problem Solving (id. at ECF 11); The Role of 

Voluntary Agencies in Emergency Management (id. at ECF 13); Radiological Emergency Response 

(id. at ECF 15); Hazardous Materials for Medical Personnel (id. at ECF 17); National Incident 

Management System, an Introduction (doc. no. 28-7 at ECF 19); Emergency Program Manager: 

An Orientation to the Position (id. at ECF 21); Emergency Preparedness, USA (id. at ECF 23); An 

Introduction to Hazardous Materials (id. atECF 27); Buildingfor the Earthquakes ofTomorrow (id. 

at ECF 29); An Orientation to Community Disaster Exercises (id. at ECF 31); Animals in Disaster, 

Awareness andPreparedness (doc. no. 28-7 at ECF 37); Animals in Disaster, Community Planning 

(id. at ECF 39); Are You Ready? An In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness (doc. no. 28-9 (Cantrell 

Collective Ex. Part 3), at ECF 8); Household Hazardous Materials: A Guide for Citizens (id. at 

ECF 10); An Introduction to Exercises (id. at ECF 11); Exercise Design (id. at ECF 14); Principles 

ofEmergency Management (id. at ECF 15); Active Shooter: What You Can Do (id. at ECF 24); 

Guide to Points ofDistribution (doc. no. 28-9 at ECF 27); and Developing & Managing Volunteers 

(id. at ECF 49). 

124 Cantrell attended the "Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program" hosted by Auburn 

University in Montgomery, and the "S torm Spotter Training" course hosted by the U.S. Department 

ofCommerce's National Weather Service. See doc. no. 28-8 (Cantrell Collective Ex. Part 2), at 

ECF 12 and 23. 

125 See doc. no. 28-8 (Cantrell Collective Ex. Part 2), at ECF 6-7. 

126 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 110, 165, 167-69, 189-90; doc. nos. 28-9 through 

28-11 (Cantrell Collective Ex. - Parts 1 through 3). 

121 Doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 122. 

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EMA Director. 128 Vinson based her assessment upon the facts as plaintiffrecounted 

them, however i. e., that the Hills had known her for decades, and Mrs. Hill was not 

bothered by plaintiff's unauthorized and unannounced entry into her home. Thus, 

Vinson added, "ifthe incident ... happened like [the Hill family] said it did, [then] 

it was a concern." 129 

Tricia Galbreath testified in her affidavit that she had heard Chairman Davis 

and Commissioner Burch describe plaintiff as "crazy," and state that she had a 

"mental problem.,,130 Galbreath also testified that Davis and Burch had stated their 

opinion that plaintiff "would be making too much money as EMA director," 131 and 

blamed plaintiff"for the County not receiving CDBG [i. e., Community Development 

Block Grant] money earlier [that] year.,,132 

On the other hand, Commission Chairman Prentis Davis stated that the 

sanctions he imposed upon plaintiff were not based upon a perceived "disability," but 

128 See doc. no. 36-2 (Vinson Deposition), at 16-17. 

129 Jd. at 15 (ellipsis, alterations, and emphasis supplied). 

130 Doc. no. 39-3 (Galbreath Affidavit), ~ 11. 

131 See id. ~ 9. See also doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 43 (stating that the 

Commission's motive for "getting rid ofher" was to prevent her from earning the Director's salary). 

132 See doc. no. 39-3 (Galbreath Affidavit), ~ 10 (alterations supplied). CDBG is a program 

run by the United States Department ofHousing and Urban Development. One designated "program 

area" for use ofCDBG funding is "Disaster Recovery Assistance," under which the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development "provides flexible grants to help cities, counties, and States 

recover from Presidentially declared disasters." 

http://portal.hud. gov /hudportallHUD?src=/program _offices/ comm lanning/ communitydevel op 

ment/programs (last accessed Mar. 29, 2016). 

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instead upon her "poor judgment": 

Immediately after the events ofthe week of September 30,2013, 

I was initially concerned that Ms. Morgan's erratic behavior might have 

been caused by a health issue, particularly because she had stated during 

that following week that she was having trouble with high blood 

pressure and exhaustion. It became clear to me, however, that these 

events were just a matter ofpoorjudgment on Ms. Morgan's part. The 

fact that she has never seemed to understand exactly how badly entering 

a house unannounced in the middle ofthe night could have turned out 

for her only reinforces to me that her misconduct was a result of 

deliberate choices made by her. 

Doc. no. 28-18 (Davis Declaration), ~ 3 (emphasis supplied). He testified during 

plaintiffs February 3, 2014 Personnel Board Hearing that he also was concerned 

about the County's exposure to liability if plaintiff continued to engage in such 

behavior while working for the EMA.133 

IV. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provides: "No covered entity 

shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis ofdisability in regard to 

job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 

employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 

employment." See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Plaintiff alleges that the Lawrence County 

Commission violated that statutory prohibition by: (a) suspending her without pay 

133 Doc. no. 28-12 (Transcript ofFeb. 3,2014 Personnel Board Hearing: Davis Testimony), 

at 155. 

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for twenty work days; (b) demoting her to the position ofDeputy EMA Director; (c) 

terminating her employment by eliminating the Deputy EMA Director position; and 

(d) failing to hire her as permanent EMA Director. She contends that each of those 

employment actions was based upon the Commissioners' perception of her as 

"disabled."134 

Plaintiff does not present direct evidence that the Commissioners regarded her 

as "disabled." In the absence of such evidence, the Eleventh Circuit employs the 

same burden-shifting framework originally developed to analyze the sufficiency of 

circumstantial evidence offered in support of Title VII employment discrimination 

claims in ADA cases. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 

802-03 (l973); Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.c., 492 F.3d 1247,1255 (lith Cir. 

2007); Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (lith Cir. 2001); 

Durley v. APAC, Inc., 236 F.3d 651, 657 (lith Cir. 2000); Hilburn v. Murata 

Electronics North America, Inc., 181 F .3d 1220, 1226 (11 th Cir. 1999). The first step 

ofthat now familiar framework requires a plaintiff to make out a case sufficient to 

withstand a motion for summary judgment (or a motion for judgment as a matter of 

law) - i. e., r,'a prima facie case." A prima facie case under the AD A requires a 

plaintiff to establish at least three elements: (1) that she either had, or was regarded 

134 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 15,21,25. 

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by the employer as having, a "disability" within the meaning ofthat term as defined 

in the Act; (2) that she is "a qualified individual with a disability," meaning that she 

can perform the essential functions of the employment position she held or sought, 

with or without reasonable accommodations being made by the employer; 135 and (3) 

that she suffered an adverse employment action because ofher disability. 136 See, e.g., 

Lucas v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). Ifthe plaintiff 

makes such a showing, that gives rise to a presumption that the employer intended to 

discriminate on the basis of the plaintiffs disability. 

Once such a presumption is raised, the burden then shifts to the employer to 

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action(s) complained of. If the employer meets its burden of production, the 

presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs prima facie case is rebutted, 

and drops from the case. At that point, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show 

135 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability" as "an 

individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 

essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires"); see also 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) ("Qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability 

who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the 

employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position."). 

136 There actually is a fourth element, implicit in the interstice between the second and third: 

i. e., "a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge of 

the disability or considered the employee to be disabled." Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, Inc., 

100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 (l1th Cir. 

1996) (per curiam)). 

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that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. The inquiry into 

pretext requires the court to determine, in view of all the evidence, whether the 

plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt upon the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory 

reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer's proffered 

reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct. Cf, e.g., Crawford v. Carroll, 

529 F.3d 961,975-76 (lIth Cir. 2008) (Title VII case). 

With regard to the first prima facie element, the ADA defines the term 

"disability" in three ways that is, as including any individual who: 

(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one 

or more of such person's major life activities; [or] 

(ii) has a record of such an impairment; or 

(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (alteration and emphasis supplied). The term "major life 

activities" includes, but is not limited to, "caring for oneself, performing manual 

tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 

breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, andworking." 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis supplied). 

Defendant contends that plaintiff "is not disabled," and that she "cannot 

present substantial evidence that she was ever considered to be [i.e., was regarded as 

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being] disabled by the Defendants [SiC].,,137 In response, plaintiff argues that, even 

though she admittedly did not have an actual "disability," the "evidence shows that 

both Commissioner's [sic] Burch and Davis perceived Plaintiff as having a mental 

disability at the time that Plaintiff was disciplined in the fall of 2013." 138 The only 

evidence that plaintiff offers in support of that contention, however, is Chairman 

Davis's statement that he was concerned that her erratic behavior was the result of a 

"health issue,,,139 and the statements of Chairman Davis and Commissioner Burch that 

137 Doc. no. 27 (Defendant's Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 14 (alteration 

supplied). EEOC regulations define a person who is "regarded as having an impairment" in terms 

ofthe attitudes, perceptions, beliefs of-or treatment by - other persons: i. e., as (1) an individual 

who has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit that person's major life 

activities, but who is treated by his or her employer as having such a limitation; or as (2) an 

individual who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities, but 

only as a result ofthe attitudes ofothers toward such impairment; or as (3) an individual who has 

no illness or malady defined by the EEOC as a physical or mental impairment, but who is treated 

by his or her employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1); 

Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996). 

138 Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), § ILA., at 17 

(arguing that defendant wrongfully discriminated against plaintiff when it disciplined her i. e. , 

suspended her without pay for twenty work days based upon the perception of Commissioners 

Burch and Davis that she had "a mental disability"). See also id., § ILB.I., at 21 (arguing that 

defendant discriminated against plaintiff when it "failed to hire/promote Plaintiff to the position of 

EMA Director based on Plaintiff's perceived disability": i.e., "In this case, as set forth above, 

Plaintiff has established that she was perceived to have a disability, that she was qualified, and that 

she was not hired as permanent EMA Director. Thus, she has established her prima facie case [under 

the ADA].") (emphasis and alteration supplied); see also id., § II.C.l., at 26 (arguing that defendant 

discriminated against plaintiff when it "terminated" her employment - i. e., eliminated the Deputy 

EMA Director position- based upon its perception ofher as disabled: "Indeed, the evidence in this 

case demonstrates that Commissioners Burch and Davis both expressed that they thought Plaintiff 

was 'crazy' and had a 'mental problem' close to [the] time Plaintiff was terminated" (emphasis and 

alteration supplied». 

139 See, e.g., doc. no. 28-18 (Davis Declaration), ~ 3. 

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she was "crazy," or had a "mental problem.,,14o 

The context in which those remarks were uttered is important. Chairman Davis 

testified in his affidavit that, "[i]mmediately after the events ofthe week ofSeptember 

3 0, 2013," he "initially" believed that plaintiff's erratic behavior "might have been 

caused by a health issue.,,141 The only health issues of which he indicated any 

awareness, however, and the only health issues ofwhich plaintiff complained in this 

record, were "high blood pressure" and "exhaustion.,,142 

Chairman Davis testified that it soon became "clear" that plaintiff's actions 

were not caused by a "health issue," but were, instead, the result ofpoor judgment; 143 

and, the "poor judgment demonstrated by [plaintiff] ... raised very serious concerns 

regarding her ability to do the job.,,144 

Even if Chairman Davis believed that plaintiff's behavior was caused by her 

health issues of high blood pressure and exhaustion, plaintiff's own testimony 

undercuts the probative value of that evidence. Plaintiff testified that she only began 

140 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 17,21,26; 

doc. no. 39-3 (Galbreath Affidavit), ~ 11. 

141 Doc. no. 28-18 (Davis Declaration), ~ 3 (alteration supplied). 

142Id. 

143 Id. ~ 3. His affidavit also states that he has never considered plaintiff to be disabled. Id. 

~ 4. 

144 Id. ~ 5 (alteration and ellipsis supplied). See Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1209 (lIth 

Cir. 1999)(citing Chandler v. City ofDallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993))("[A]n employer's 

perception that an employee cannot perform a particular task safely" does not "establish that the 

employer regarded the employee as disabled.") (alteration supplied). 

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to experience those conditions after misleading information was published in The 

Decatur Daily on September 28, 2013: i. e., just five days before the bizarre events 

that occurred during the first week of October, 2013. 145 The Eleventh Circuit has 

stated that a "severe limitation that is short term and temporary is not evidence of a 

disability." Garrett v. University oj Alabama at Birmingham Board oj Trustees, 507 

F.3d 1306, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2007) (emphasis supplied); see also Sutton v. Lader, 185 

F.3d 1203, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in order to "establish that an employer 

regarded an employee as 'disabled' and thus covered by [either] the Rehabilitation 

Act [or ADA], a plaintiff must introduce substantial evidence that the employer 

regarded him as having a permanent or long-term impairment") (alterations and 

emphasis supplied). 146 Cf Washington v. UPS, 567 F. App'x 749, 753-54 (lith Cir. 

2014) (affirming the district court's holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish 

a primafacie case, even though she had argued that the defendants perceived her as 

being "disabled by stress," because she "did not offer any evidence that the 

145 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 58-59 (PlaintifItestified that, because of the 

Decatur Daily article, she "had had very little sleep, [was] very stressed, [and] agitated to the point 

where [she] did not want to be at the office because [she] did not feel like [herselfJ") (alterations 

supplied); id at 64 ("I had not taken blood pressure pills for months until that week [i.e., the week 

the Decatur Daily article was published].") (alteration supplied). 

146 "Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards 

used in ADA cases ...." Cash v. Smith, 23] F.3d 1301, 1305 (lith Cir. 2000)(citing 29 U.S.C. § 

794( d) ) (ellipsis supplied, footnote omitted); see also Holbrook v. City ofAlpharetta, 112 F .3d 1522, 

1526 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1997). Thus, "[c lases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are precedent for 

cases under the ADA, and vice versa." Cash, 231 F.3d at 1305 n.2 (citing Pritchard v. Southern 

Company Services, 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 n.2 (lith Cir. 1996» (alteration supplied). 

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decisionmakers considered her to be disabled such that she was substantially limited 

in major activities") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (2007)). 

The Eleventh Circuit also has held that exhaustion and high blood pressure, 

without more, are not conditions that substantially impair a person's ability to 

perform major life activities, such as working. See, e.g., Garrett, 507 F .3d at 1314-15 

(Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs evidence that she suffered from fatigue and frequently 

"collapse[d] because of exhaustion when she returned home from work" failed to 

raise an issue of triable fact that she was disabled) (alteration supplied); Swain v. 

Hillsborough County School Board, 146 F.3d 855, 856 n.l, 858 (lIth Cir. 1998) 

(ADA plaintiff who suffered from urinary incontinence and high blood pressure was 

"not an individual with a disability as defined by the ADA"). Thus, plaintiff cannot 

establish that she was regarded as having a "disability" based upon Chairman Davis's 

reference to her as having a "health issue." 

Plaintiff also cannot rest her prima facie case upon the statements ofChairman 

Davis and Commissioner Burch that she had a "mental problem," or was "crazy." 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence (and the record in this case would not support a 

finding) that those remarks pertained to any cognitive or intellectual deficiency. 

Rather, the evidence before this court compels a conclusion that the remarks only 

reflected the two Commissioners' perception of plaintiff as being paranoid, unable 

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to peacefully coexist with other County employees, disrespectful, or otherwise 

disgruntled. The Eleventh Circuit has stated the following regarding workplace 

comments of that nature: 

To state a case of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff 

must first prove he has a disability as defined by the Act. Gordon v. E.L. 

Hamm & Associates, lnc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (lith Cir. 1996) .... 

Under [42 U.S.C. § 121 02(2)(C)], an individual is deemed to be disabled 

ifhe is regarded as having a mental impairment that substantially limits 

one or more of his major life activities. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, 

lnc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1327 (lith Cir. 1998). 

[The plaintiff] failed to present any evidence from which a 

rational juror could find he was regarded as having a mental impairment. 

[The plaintiff] points to evidence which shows other officers regarded 

him as "paranoid," "disgruntled," "oppositional," "difficult to interact 

with," "unusual," "suspicious," "threatening," and "distrustful." These 

characterizations of [the plaintiffs] behavior merely show he had 

serious personality conflicts with members of his department. Such 

conflicts do not rise to the level ofa mental impairment under the ADA. 

See Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 111 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(holding that an excitable, emotionally imbalanced individual is not 

disabled under the ADA). We affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the City under § 12112(a). 

Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (lith Cir. 1999) (alterations 

supplied). 

The decision of the Middle District of Florida in Mickens v. Polk County 

School Board, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2007), is similar, and, persuasive: 

[T]he [defendant's] characterizations of[the plaintiff] as "really upset," 

"insubordinate", "volatile", "disrespectful", "confrontational", 

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"combative", "defensive", "agitated", "irrational" '" "loud" "irate"

"angry," "unprofessional," "unhappy," "threatening," "unpredictable," 

and "difficult," including testimony as to [the plaintiffs] 

"uncharacteristic behavior" and his tendency to "fly off the handle," 

demonstrate (rather persuasively) [the plaintiff s] ongoing conflicts with 

his supervisors and colleagues in the workplace. As a matter of law, 

"such conflicts do not rise to the level ofa mental impairment under the 

ADA." 

Id. at 1274 (quoting Watson, 177 F.3d at 935) (alterations supplied). See also, e.g., 

Schlegelmilch v. City ofSarasota Police Dept., No. 8:06CV139T27MAP, 2006 WL 

2246147, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2006) ("Plaintiffs allegation concerning his 

perceived disability, namely that everyone regarded him as 'crazy,' falls short ofRule 

8's liberal pleading standard. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege a perceived 

disability that 'substantially limit[s] one or more of[Plaintiffs] major life activities.' 

See42U.S.C. § 12102(2).") (alterations in original); Crawfordv.AT&T, 177F. Supp. 

2d 1293, 1300 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ("The only evidence Plaintiff cites as evidence that 

CWA 'regarded' Plaintiff as having a substantially limiting disability is an alleged 

statement made by Dwayne Gray, ... that Plaintiff was 'crazy.' This statement does 

nothing to show Mr. Gray or CW A regarded Plaintiff as suffering from an impairment 

which limited his working ability.") (ellipsis supplied). 

Finally, as this court observed in note 38, supra, two Commissioners do not 

constitute a governing majority. The Lawrence County Commission consists offive 

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members, and plaintiff has presented no evidence that any of the three remaining 

members of that governmental body entertained such opinions, much less uttered 

remarks similar to those attributed to Chairman Davis and Commissioner Burch. In 

short, this court finds that plaintiff cannot prove that she was regarded as having a 

"disability," as that term is defined by the ADA, merely by presenting evidence that 

two of the five Commissioners made comments that she suffered from a "health 

issue," or that she had a "mental problem," or was "crazy." 

Accordingly, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of disability 

discrimination, and the Commission is entitled to summary judgment on her ADA 

claim. 

V. TITLE VII GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 

Plaintiff also alleges that the Lawrence County Commission discriminated 

against her on the basis ofher sex: when she was suspended without pay for twenty 

work days; when she was demoted from Acting EMA Director to her former position 

of Deputy EMA Director; when her employment was terminated by the decision to 

eliminate the Deputy EMA Director position; and, when she was not selected to 

replace Hillard Frost as permanent EMA Director. 147 

On any Title VII claim, the plaintiff "bears the ultimate burden of proving 

147 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 15,21,25. 

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discriminatory treatment by a preponderance ofthe evidence." Crawford v. Carroll, 

529 F.3d 961,975 (l1th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). To do so, the 

plaintiff must present either direct or circumstantial evidence of an intent to 

discriminate on the basis of plaintiff's gender. Again, however, plaintiff has not 

presented any direct evidence of an intent to discriminate on the basis of her sex. 

Consequently, each of her claims must be viewed through the familiar McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting analytical framework. See, e.g., Walker v. Mortham, 158 

F .3d 1177, 1193 (11 th Cir. 1998) (observing that "a Title VII plaintiff cannot succeed 

in proving that she was intentionally discriminated against if she does not establish 

a prima facie case of discrimination") (Tjofiat, J., plurality opinion). 

A. Disparate Disciplinary Treatment 

In order to establish aprimafacie case ofdisparate disciplinary treatment under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff must show: (I) that she is a 

member of a class of persons protected by the Act (e.g., a female); (2) that she 

engaged, either disputedly or admittedly, in misconduct similar to that of a similarly 

situated co-employee outside the protected class (e.g., a male); and (3) despite such 

similarities, the male co-employee was not disciplined in the same manner as plaintiff 

(i.e., suspended without pay for twenty work days). See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton 

County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1336 (lIth Cir. 2000); Lathem v. Department ofChildren 

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and Youth Services, 172 F.3d 786, 792 (lIth Cir. 1999); Jones v. Ge1Wens, 874 F.2d 

1534, 1540 (lIth Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiffhas not identified a male employee ofLawrence County who engaged 

in conduct similar to that which formed the basis for her suspension without pay for 

twenty work-days, but who was subjected to less severe disciplinary measures. 

"Absent some other similarly situated but differently disciplined worker, there can be 

no disparate treatment." Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334,1339 (lIth Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff attempts to avoid the requirement of producing a comparator by 

relying upon the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 

F.3d 1321 (lIth Cir. 2011).148 Upon initial reading, the Smith opinion appears to 

support plaintiff's reliance upon it. The pertinent portion ofthe opinion held that 

establishing the elements ofthe McDonnell Douglas framework is not, 

and never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive 

a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimination case. 

Accordingly, the plaintiff's failure to produce a comparator does not 

necessarily doom the plaintiff's case. 

Rather, the plaintiffwill always survive summary judgment ifhe 

presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning 

the employer's discriminatory intent. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 

1555, 1562 (lIth Cir. 1997) (declaring that, in cases where a plaintiff 

cannot establish a prima facie case, summary judgment only will be 

"appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present." 

(citations omitted)); Silverman v. Bd. ofEduc., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th 

Cir. 2011) ("To avoid summary judgment ... the plaintiff must produce 

148 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 15-16,18. 

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sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to create a triable 

question of intentional discrimination in the employer's decision."). A 

triable issue offact exists ifthe record, viewed in a light mostfavorable 

to the plaintiff, presents "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial 

evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by 

the decisionmaker." Silverman, 637 F.3d at 734 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also James v. N. Y. Racing Ass 'n, 233 F.3d 

149, 157 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he way to tell whether a plaintiff s case is 

sufficient to sustain a verdict is to analyze the particular evidence to 

determine whether it reasonably supports an inference of the facts 

plaintiff must prove - particularly discrimination."). 

Smith, 644 F .3d at 1328 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted, alteration in original). 

Despite those statements, the Smith opinion does not provide an easy bypass 

around the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework for plaintiffs who allege a Title 

VII disparate disciplinary treatment claim, and who cannot identify a comparator who 

engaged in similar conduct, but was subjected to less severe disciplinary measures. 

Instead, close attention to the underlying facts of the Smith case illustrates that its 

holding applies in a more limited scope. 

The plaintiff in Smith was a Caucasian male who had worked as a supervisor 

at the Lockheed-Martin Aeronautics Company plant in Marietta, Georgia. He had 

received a "racially insensitive 'joke' email" entitled "Top Ten Reasons Why There 

are No Black NASCAR Drivers" (the "NASCAR email"),149 and had forwarded the 

149 For example, the email stated that there are no blacks in NASCAR racing because a 

"[p]istol won't stay under the front seat," and because there is "[n]o passenger seat for the ho." 

Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11 th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original). 

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email to his supervisor without reporting it to the company's Human Resources 

Department. Following an investigation, Lockheed-Martin fired the plaintiff for 

violating the company's zero tolerance policy prohibiting workplace discrimination 

and harassment. 150 The plaintiff then commenced a "reverse discrimination" suit 

under Title VII and § 1981, alleging that his former employer had discriminated 

against him because ofhis race when terminating his employment. In support ofthat 

claim, the plaintiff presented evidence of two African-American non-supervisory 

employees at the Marietta plant who also had violated Lockheed's zero tolerance 

policy by transmitting "racially insensitive" emails entitled "How to Dance Like a 

White Guy" (the "White Guy Video"),151 but who had only been suspended for their 

150 Lockheed's "zero tolerance policy" was designed to provide notice to employees that the 

company's Human Resources department would discipline anyone who, while in the workplace, 

engages in an act of discriminatory "harassment based on a legally protected status 

such as race . . . when it has the effect of unreasonably interfering with an 

individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work 

environment." This includes using Lockheed email accounts "in ways that are 

disruptive, abusive, obscene, or degrading, or offensive to others," such as the 

distribution or "transmission ofethnic slurs or racial comments." 

Smith, 644 F.3d at 1323 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). One of the omitted footnotes 

stated that: "Discriminatory harassment is defined under the zero tolerance policy to include an 

employee's use of 'racial slurs, ethnic jokes, sexual or lewd jokes, negative or derogatory 

stereotypes, names, or labels that a reasonable person would find offensive. '" Id at 1323 n.2. 

151 The White Guy Video "made various derogatory references about whites, referring to them 

as 'cracker[s],' 'white[ies],' 'honk[ies],' and 'homo[s ].'" Id at 1338 (alterations in original, footnote 

omitted). The omitted footnote observed that "[t ]he video also contained sexually explicit references 

to masturbation and female genitalia and portrayed Adolf Hitler." Id at 1338 n.63. It also is 

significant to note that Lockheed did not argue that there was "any material difference in the level 

of racial offensiveness between the White Guy Video and the NASCAR email." Id at 1338 n.62. 

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conduct, as opposed to terminated. The district court, however, found that the 

non-supervisory African-American employees were not "similarly situated" to the 

plaintiff, who had worked as a supervisor, and entered summary judgment in favor 

of Lockheed-Martin. 

On appeal, Judge Tjoflat's opinion for the Eleventh Circuit panel[152] agreed 

with the district court that the plaintiff had not presented valid comparator 

evidence,153 but nevertheless reversed the district court's grant ofsummary judgment, 

saying that the facts of the "reverse discrimination" claim lodged by the white 

plaintiff in Smith had to be viewed against the backdrop of a racially-motivated, 

workplace shooting that had occurred in 2003 at the Lockheed-Martin Aeronautics 

152 In addition to Judge Gerald Bard Tjoi1at, the panel consisted ofJudge Edward E. Carnes 

and Judge Thomas M. Reavley of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 

153 Indeed, nowhere in the Smith Court's lengthy decision is there any reference to the 

Circuit's decision in Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364 (1Ith Cir. 1999), holding that, when 

deciding whether employees are "similarly situated comparators," district courts should "consider 

whether the employees are 'involved in or accused ofthe same or similar conduct and are disciplined 

in different ways.'" Id. at 1368 (quoting Jones v. Bessemer Carraway}vfed. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 

1311 (11 th Cir.), opinion modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (1998) (in turn quoting Holifield v. Reno, 115 

F.3d 1555, 1562 (1Ith Cir.l997)) (emphasis supplied). 

"The most important factors in the disciplinary context are the nature ofthe offenses 

committed and the nature of the punishments imposed." [Jones, 137 F.3d at 1311] 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). We require that the quantity and quality 

of the comparator's misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from 

second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges. 

Manieeia, 171 F.3d at 1368 (alteration supplied) (citing Dartmouth Review v. 1369 Dartmouth 

College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1 st Cir. 1989) ("Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the 

cases must be fair congeners. In other words, apples should be compared to apples.")). 

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Company plant in Meridian, Mississippi. The gunman in that incident was a white 

employee who had repeatedly harassed his black coworkers and publicized his white 

supremacist views while working at the Meridian plant. He shot and killed five 

coworkers and wounded eight others before taking his own life. See id. at 1329 & 

n.26. In the wake of that horrific incident, some groups, including national news 

media outlets and the plaintiffs in various civil suits brought by victims and the 

personal representatives of the estates of deceased victims, "began to blame the 

shootings on company HR officials, claiming that those officials knew of [the 

gunman's] racist propensities long before the shootings transpired, but did little to 

curb his harassing ways." Id. (alteration supplied). 

On the heels of several ofthe initial civil lawsuits, the EEOC, in 

July 2004, made similar allegations against Lockheed HR officials. 

Following an investigation into the Meridian shootings, the EEOC 

prepared a report that expressly faulted Lockheed's HR for having 

fostered a workplace environment in Meridian that was hostile to black 

employees. While the EEOC acknowledged that [the racist gunman], 

alone, had created a racially hostile work environment through his 

threatening comments to black coworkers, its investigation concluded 

that Lockheed had allowed this hostility to intensify by not adequately 

responding to these known race-based threats. Moreover, the EEOC 

suggested, such hostility toward black employees still festered over a 

year after the shootings, as HR had yet to remedy it. 

Then, in the spring of 2005, less than a year after the EEOC 

issued its report and while many ofthe civil cases remained ongoing, 

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Lockheed learned that ABC News planned to produce a report 

commemorating the second anniversary ofthe Meridian shootings. The 

special report was to be aired on the network's investigatory-news 

magazine show, "Primetime Live." 

ld. at 1330. Thus, facing civil liability and negative national publicity, the company's 

Human Resources Department began what could be described as a campaign ofracial 

"overcompensation." That was especially apparent in the varying ways in which 

white, as opposed to black, employees were disciplined. 

It was in the midst of that tense atmosphere that the white male supervisory 

plaintiff in Smith forwarded the racially insensitive "joke email" to his supervisor. 

ld. at 1324. Lockheed's HR department created a "matrix" to determine the 

appropriate disciplinary action for each employee who had transmitted the NASCAR 

email. [d. at 1336. That matrix notably "included a column reflecting each 

employee's race," in which the employer wrote the letter "W" to denote "white," or 

"B" to denote "black." ld. In May of2005, the plaintiffwas terminated for violating 

the company's "zero-tolerance policy" for discrimination. ld. Four other white 

employees who held non-supervisory positions also were terminatedfor transmitting 

the NASCAR email.Seeid.at1332-33. 1341. A few months later, when the "White 

Guy Video" was transmitted by company employees, including several black nonsupervisory employees, Lockheed's HR Department once again formulated a matrix 

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to determine the appropriate level of discipline. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1338-39. This 

time, however, the matrix "did not include a notation for employee race." Id. The 

employees who had forwarded the White Guy video were not terminated pursuant to 

Lockheed's "zero tolerance" policy, but were, instead, subjected to temporary 

suspensions. Id. 

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment 

in favor of Lockheed-Martin after determining that the distinction between nonsupervisory and supervisory employees should not have prevented the plaintiff from 

surviving summary judgment when that distinction was viewed in conjunction with 

the substantial circumstantial evidence indicating thatthe employer had discriminated 

against the plaintiff because he was white. Id. at 1328. Specifically, the Eleventh 

Circuit opinion stated that the "great discrepancies in the punishments received by the 

white non-supervisors . . . in contrast to their black peers, yields a reasonable 

inference that, in the summer of 2005, [Lockheed's Head of HR] intentionally 

discriminated against them because they are white." Smith, 644 F .3d at 1343 (ellipsis 

and alteration supplied). 

When the Smith opinion is viewed in context, therefore, it is clear that the 

"convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" that was present there is not present 

in this case. There is no evidence that the Lawrence County Commission engaged in 

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a pattern of disciplinary discrimination based upon an employee's gender, and 

plaintiffhas not identified (nor alleged that there were) any instances in which female 

employees were disciplined more severely than male employees. Accordingly, the 

court concludes that this is not a case to which the narrow holding ofSmith should 

apply. 

There is no other circumstantial evidence ofgender-based discrimination in this 

record. Thus, plaintiffs failure to produce evidence of a comparator is fatal to her 

claim of disparate disciplinary treatment based on the Commission's suspension of 

her employment without pay for twenty work days. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 1327-28 

("If the record contained no circumstantial evidence from which a jury could 

otherwise infer that [the plaintiff] was fired because ofhis race, our discussion would 

end here, and we would affirm the district court's judgment.") (alterations supplied, 

footnotes omitted); see also Abel, 210 F.3d at 1339 ("Absent some other similarly 

situated but differently disciplined worker, there can be no disparate treatment."). 

B. Demotion to Position of Deputy EMA Director 

There are four prima facie elements to a claim that a plaintiffs demotion, 

allegedly for work-related misconduct, violated Title VII. The plaintiff must 

demonstrate that: she is a member ofa class ofpersons protected by Title VII (in this 

case, a female); the demotion was a "tangible" adverse employment action; she was 

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qualified to perform the duties ofthe job position from which she was demoted; and, 

finally, that she was either (a) replaced by a person outside her protected class, or (b) 

that similarly situated employees who were not members of her protected class 

engaged in nearly identical misconduct, but were not demoted. See, e.g., Alexander 

v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1336 (l1th Cir. 2000); Lathem v. Department of 

Children and Youth Services, 172 F.3d 786, 792 (11 th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Bessemer 

Carraway Medical Center, 137 F .3d 1306, 1311 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1998); Holifield v. 

Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (lIth Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff can satisfY the first three elements of a prima facie case, but not the 

fourth. When plaintiff was demoted to her former position ofDeputy EMA Director, 

she was replaced in the position of "Acting EMA Director" by another female: 

Tammy Vinson. Further, plaintiffhas not produced evidence ofany male comparator 

who engaged in conduct similar to that discussed in Parts IILG. through IILJ. ofthis 

Opinion, supra, but was not demoted. Finally, as discussed in the immediately 

preceding Part of this Opinion, plaintiff has not presented a "convincing mosaic of 

circumstantial evidence" ofgender discrimination, such that she is entitled to survive 

summary judgment under the narrow holding ofSmith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 

F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate aprima 

facie case of gender discrimination in the Commission's act of demoting her from 

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Acting EMA Director to her previous position of Deputy EMA Director. 

C. 	 Termination by Elimination of the Deputy EMA Director Position 

Generally speaking, "[a]n employee establishes a prima facie case of 

discrimination in termination when the employee shows (l) membership in a 

protected class, (2) qualification for the position held, (3) termination, and (4) 

replacement with a person outside the protected class." Walker v. NationsBank, N.A., 

53 F.3d 1548, 1556 (11th Cir. 1995)( citing Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 

1532 n.14 (11th Cir. 1987)) (alteration supplied). 

However, in cases where the employee was discharged as part of a purported 

"reduction in force" or, as in the present case, the position occupied by the 

plaintiff was eliminated and the plaintiff was not replaced by any person, the 

plaintiff 

may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by (l) showing that 

[s ]he was a member of a protected group and was adversely affected by 

an employment decision; (2) proving that [s]he was qualified for [her] 

own position or to assume another position at the time ofthe discharge; 

and (3) producing sufficient evidence from which a rational fact finder 

could conclude that [her] employer intended to discriminate against 

[her] in making the discharge decision. 

Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, 161 F .3d 1318, 1331 (11 th Cir. 1998) (citing Benson 

v. 	Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203,1208 (lith Cir. 1997)) (alterations supplied). 

It is undisputed that plaintiff, a female, was a member of a class of persons 

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protected by Title VII. Defendant denies the second element, that plaintiff was 

qualified to serve as either Deputy Director or Director ofthe EMA office. Even so, 

numerous facts support plaintiffs qualifications: e.g., (a) Hillard Frost, the 

incumbent Director who had worked with and supervised plaintiff for almost a 

decade, recommended that the Commission select her to succeed him as EMA 

Director; (b) Commissioner Mose Jones testified that plaintiff was "definitely 

qualified" to serve as EMA Director; 154 (c) plaintiff had served as Deputy Director for 

nine years,155 and had effectively performed the duties oj the EMA Director during 

the final three years of Hillard Frost's tenure; 156 (d) numerous letters recommending 

plaintiffs sel ecti on for the EMA Director positi on were submitted to the Commissi on 

by other EMA Directors around the State; ( e) plaintiff had earned 250 hours of 

"Advance Level Emergency Management Re-Certification"; and (f) plaintiff had 

worked for the Commission for twenty-four years. In light ofthe foregoing, this court 

finds that plaintiff was "qualified" for the Deputy Director position. 

With regard to the last prima facie element, however, plaintiff has presented 

no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Commission 

intended to discriminate against her on the basis ofher gender when it eliminated the 

154 Doc. no. 37-1 (Jones Deposition), at 26. 

155 See doc. no. 34-2 (Brenda Morgan Resume), at ECF 3. 

156 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 92 ("Everybody knew that Brenda has been doing 

Hillard's job for the last three years."). 

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Deputy EMA Director position. 

As an initial matter, plaintiffs brief in opposition to summary judgment 

misleadingly states that: "(1) she was in a protected class as a female; (2) she was 

qualified to perform the job [ofDeputy EMA Director]; and (3) she was terminated; 

and (4) Cantrell, a male, took over her job as EMA Director."IS7 Even though 

plaintiff never officially occupied the position of "EMA Director," she effectively 

performed many ofHillard Frost's duties as Director during the final three years of 

his tenure. IS8 She also served for a briefperiod as "Acting EMA Director." Even so, 

when plaintiff was demoted on October 8, 2013 to her former position of Deputy 

EMA Director, it was Tammy Vinson not Johnny Cantrell who replaced her as 

Acting EMA Director. 159 Cantrell was not hired as permanent EMA Director until 

December 23, 2013: twenty days after the termination ofplaintiffs employment by 

elimination of the Deputy EMA Director position. 160 Stated differently, there was no 

direct transition ofpower over the EMA Director position on paper, or in practice 

from plaintiff to Cantrell. Rather, the transition was from Frost to plaintiff to 

157 Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 26 (alteration 

and emphasis supplied). 

158 Doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 92. 

159 See doc. no. 28-5, atECF 17 (Oct. 8,2013 Minutes) (stating that Tammy Vinson had been 

"appointed as acting Director of Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency until further 

notice"). 

160 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 164. 

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Vinson to Cantrell. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot establish that she was replaced by 

someone outside of her protected class. 

Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that any of the Commissioners made any 

gender-related comments regarding the elimination of the Deputy EMA Director 

position. Finally, she does not allege that the position of Deputy Director 

subsequently was reinstated, and filled with a male candidate. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case 

of gender discrimination when the Commission terminated her employment by 

eliminating the Deputy EMA Director position. 

D. Failure to Hire Plaintiff as Permanent EMA Director 

To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination for failure to hire, 

plaintiff must show that: she is a female, a classification protected by Title VII; she 

applied for, and was qualified to fill, the position for which the defendant was 

accepting applications; despite her qualifications, she was not hired; and, after her 

rejection, the employer filled the position with a male, a person outside plaintiffs 

protected class. See, e.g., Texas Department ofCommunity 4ffairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248,258-59 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (failure to hire 

based on plaintiffs race); Schoenfeldv. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1267, 1268 (1Ith Cir. 

1999) (failure to hire based on white male applicant's race and gender); Walker, 158 

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F .3d at 1179 n.2, 1185-93 (explaining that a plaintiff need not introduce evidence of 

the relative qualification of the person hired instead ofplaintiff as part of his prima 

facie case for failure to promote); Crawford v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 614 

F.2d 1300,1315 (5thCir. 1980).161 

The only disputed element is plaintif:fs qualification for the Director position. 

For the reasons outlined in the immediately preceding Part ofthis Opinion, the court 

finds that plaintiff was qualified to serve as permanent EMA Director. Therefore, she 

has established a prima facie case. 

The defendant asserts two nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting plaintif:fs 

application, and selecting Johnny Cantrell instead: the Commission believed Cantrell 

was the most qualified candidate, because he held a college degree, possessed "more 

overall experience in the emergency management field than Plaintiff," had served in 

the United States Air Force, and articulated innovative ideas for improving the 

County's financial health during his interviews; and, plaintif:fs behavior while 

serving as Acting EMA Director did not reflect well upon her ability to serve as 

permanent Director. 162 

As the Eleventh Circuit observed in a frequently-cited opinion, Combs v. 

161 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (lith Cir. 1981) (en bane), the 

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to the 

close of business on September 30, 1981. 

162 See doc. no. 27 (Defendant's Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 22-23. 

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Plantation Patterns, Meadowcrajt, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997): 

When deciding a motion by the defendant for judgment as a 

matter of law in a discrimination [ or retaliation] case in which the 

defendant has proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the 

district court's task is a highly focused one. The district court must, in 

view of all the evidence, determine whether the plaintiff has cast 

sufficient doubt on the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 

to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer's 

proffered "legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its 

conduct," Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11 th 

Cir. 1994 ) (citation omitted). The district court must evaluate whether 

the plaintiff has demonstrated "such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's 

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 

could find them unworthy of credence." Sheridan [v. E.I. DuPont de 

Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d [1061,] 1072 [(3d Cir. 1996)] (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Walker, 53 F.3d at 1564 

(Johnson, J., concurring) (discussing methods of proving pretext). 

However, once the district court determines that a reasonable jury could 

conclude that the employer's proffered reasons were not the real reason 

for its decision, the court may not preempt the jury's role ofdetermining 

whether to draw an inference of intentional discrimination from the 

plaintiffs prima facie case taken together with rejection of the 

employer's explanations for its action. At that point, judgment as a 

matter of law is unavailable. 

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (alterations supplied). See also Hulbert v. St. Mary's 

Health Care System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (1Ith Cir. 2006) (citing Wascura v. 

City o/South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1245-46 (lIth Cir. 2001)). 

In order to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must persuade this court that 

both oj the reasons stated by defendant as the basis for its decision to prefer Johnny 

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Cantrell over plaintiff were merely pretexts for unlawful gender discrimination. See 

Chapman v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 1012,1037 (lIth Cir. 2000) ("In order to avoid 

summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

factfinder to conclude that each oj the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory 

reasons is pretextual.") (emphasis supplied). 

Moreover, Title VII requires a showing that "some illegal, discriminatory 

intent as opposed to purely personal or otherwise non-prohibited animus truly 

motivated the personnel involved" in the adverse employment decision. Abel,210 

at 1339 (emphasis supplied). 

Plaintiff attempts to prove pretext in four ways. First, she states that her acts 

ofmisconduct cannot be used to prove that she was not "qualified.,,163 The question 

of whether plainti ff was qualified to serve as EMA Director - and this court found 

in Part V.C. ofthis Opinion, supra, that she was qualified for the position - does not 

inform her ability to demonstrate pretext, but only her ability to establish a prima 

facie case. 164 

Second, plaintiff states that some ofthe criteria upon which the Commission 

based its selection ofCantrell were not requirements set forth in the EMA Director 

163 Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 23-24. 

164 Ifplaintiff is trying to suggest that it was unreasonable for the Commission to believe that 

Johnny Cantrell was more qualified, the court does not agree. See the discussion in Part III.X ofthis 

Opinion, supra. 

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job listing. 165 The only authority cited by plaintiff in support of her contention that 

such conduct evinces pretext is the following statement by the Middle District of 

Alabama in an unpublished opinion: 

It may be that under different facts, not currently before the court, this 

court would agree that a plaintiff may establish pretext where an 

employer relies on a qualification that was not listed in the position 

announcement, such as a case in which the successful applicant also has 

a deficiency in the minimal requirements. 

Marshall v. Daleville City Board ofEducation, No.1 :05-cv-386-WHA, 2006 WL 

2056581, at *24 (M.D. Ala. July 24, 2006) (emphasis supplied). That statement 

merely is dicta within nonbinding authority. Moreover, the scenario contemplated 

by that court i.e., a "case in which the successful applicant also has a deficiency 

in the minimal requirements" - cannot be said to apply to Johnny Cantrell, who had 

worked for the Morgan County EMA longer than plaintiff had worked in the 

Lawrence County EMA office, and gained experience handling emergency situations 

while serving in the military. He also articulated innovative ideas during his 

interviews, which, the Commission concluded, would manifest in effective EMA 

leadership, greater efficiency ofthe County's telephone and computer systems, and 

the County's receipt offederal grant money during a time when the County suffered 

165 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 24. See 

doc. no. 28-17 (EMA Director Job Description), at ECF 4-5 ("Knowledge, Skills and Abilities," 

"Physical Characteristics," and "Other Characteristics"). 

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from a reduction in revenue. It cannot be said that Cantrell did not meet the minimal 

requirements for the position, or that the Commission fabricated irrelevant job 

requirements in order to place Cantrell in the position. 

Third, plaintiff argues that, because she was "at least as qualified" as Cantrell, 

she should have been "given preference" in accordance with the County Personnel 

Handbook. 166 Plaintiff did not specify the Handbook provision upon which she 

relied. Even so, this court reviewed the entire sixty-page Handbook, and found one 

provision that appears to support plaintiff s contention. 

4.1.4. Employee Consideration. When a vacancy occurs in the 

classified or part-time service, all employees, regardless of their 

category and status ofservice, may apply for the vacancy. All employee 

applicants will be evaluated and ranked based upon their job-related 

qualifications. The names ofqualified employees will be integrated into 

the established eligibility list for the vacancy in accordance with these 

procedures and guidelines (Chapter 5). Normally, preference will be 

given to qualified regular status classified employees; however, an 

appointing authority will have the right to select an applicant who is not 

an employee, ifthat person is considered to be the best qualified. 

Doc. no. 34-1 (Personnel Handbook), at ECF 18 (emphasis supplied). Notably, the 

emphasized portion of that provision, prefaced as it is with the qualifying adverb 

"[n]ormally," does not compel the Commission to reject external candidates (like 

Johnny Cantrell) in favor of internal employees (like plaintiff). To the contrary, the 

provision explicitly authorizes an appointing authority to hire an external candidate, 

166 Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 24. 

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"if that person is considered to be the best qualified." Plaintiff has presented no 

evidence indicating that the Commission did not consider Johnny Cantrell to be the 

best qualified candidate for the position of permanent EMA Director. 

Finally, plaintiff asserts pretext based upon the Commission's failure to follow 

the normal hiring policy of having the entire Commission interview candidates, 

because only Commission Chairman Prentis Davis, Commissioner Bobby Burch, and 

Interim County Administrator Tricia Galbreath conducted plaintiff s first interview 

for the EMA Director position. 167 The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that an 

employer's failure to follow its own policies "may be suggestive ofdiscrimination." 

Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis supplied). Even 

so, plaintiffhas not demonstrated that the Commission's failure to follow the alleged 

"policy" prejudiced her, because she has neither argued, nor presented evidence 

showing, that Johnny Cantrell was interviewed by the entire Commission during his 

first interview. In fact, Commissioner Burch testified that the first round of 

interviews during which both plaintiffand Cantrell were interviewed - were 

conducted only by himself, Prentis Davis, and Tricia Galbreath. l68 

In summary, none ofplaintiffs arguments demonstrate that the Commission's 

167Id. at 25; doc. no. 1 (Complaint), 'j[16. Plaintiff does not cite to this policy in the 

Personnel Handbook. 

168 See doc. no. 28-2 (Burch Deposition), at 74-76. 

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stated reasons for failing to select her as EMA Director were merely a pretext for 

unlawful gender discrimination. Because she cannot show that any ofthe contested 

employment decisions were the result ofprohibited gender bias, summary judgment 

is due to be granted in favor ofthe Commission on plaintiffs Title VII claim. 

VI. AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 

Plaintiff also asserts claims of age discrimination under the federal Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) ("ADEA"),169 as 

well as the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Ala. Code § 25-1-20 

(1975) ("AADEA,,).170 Another judge in this District held in Henry v. Jefferson 

County Personnel Board, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (Proctor, J.), that 

a plaintiff could not simultaneously pursue claims under both the ADEA and 

AADEA: 

The Alabama Age Act plainly states that it is a statute ofalternative, not 

duplicative, relief. "The starting point for all statutory interpretation is 

the language ofthe statute itself." United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 

1277,1281 (lIth Cir. 1999). The Alabama Age Act provides that 

plaintiffs "may elect to pursue their remedies under Title VII ... and the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 or in the 

169 See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ~~ 59-71; see also doc. no. 51-2 (EEOC Charge of Age 

Discrimination), at ECF 2. 29 U.S.c. § 623 (a)(1 ) provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to 

fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual's age." The prohibitions ofthe Age Discrimination in Employment Act are "limited to 

individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a). 

170 See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), '1~ 72-77. 

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alternative bring a civil action in the circuit court ofthe county in which 

the person was or is employed." Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (1975) (emphasis 

added). [171] The Alabama Age Act clearly entitles a plaintiff to only "one 

recovery of damages." Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (1975). Because the plain 

language ofthe Alabama Age Act forces a plaintiff to choose either suit 

under the ADEA or, in the alternative, suit under the Alabama Age Act, 

and because Plaintiff in this case has filed suit under the ADEA, the 

court finds that Plaintiff's claim under the Alabama Age Act is 

duplicative. Having determined that Plaintiff may only pursue her 

federal ADEA claim in this case, the court turns to the substantive 

analysis ofthat claim.[ln] 

Henry, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 1185-86 (ellipsis supplied, emphasis and footnotes in 

original), aff'd, 252 F. App'x 308 (11 th Cir. 2007). This court finds the rationale of 

171 Section 25-1-29 provides, in its entirety: 

Any person aggrieved may elect to pursue their remedies under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act 29 U.S.C. Section 621 or in the alternative bring a civil action in the circuit court 

of the county in which the person was or is employed for such legal or equitable 

relief as will effectuate the purposes ofthis article. However, if an action is brought 

in the federal court, any action pending in the state court shall be simultaneously 

dismissed with prejudice. Further, any party bringing action under this section shall 

only be entitled to one recovery ofdamages. Any damages assessed in one court will 

offset any entitlement to damages in any other state or federal court. In any action, 

a person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any action for 

recovery of amounts owed as a result of a violation of this article, regardless of 

whether equitable relief is sought by any party in the action. Any employment 

practice authorized by the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act shall also 

be authorized by this article and the remedies, defenses, and statutes of limitations, 

under this article shall be the same as those authorized by the federal Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act except that a plaintiff shall not be required to 

pursue any administrative action or remedy prior to filing suit under this article. 

Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (1975). 

172 In any event, the court notes that the analysis ofPlaintiff' s claims under the Alabama Age 

Act and the ADEA is the same. See, e.g., Bonham v. Mortgage, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. 

Ala. 2001). 

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the Henry opinion to be persuasive, and holds that plaintiff's AADEA claim is due 

to be dismissed as duplicative. 

In cases based upon the federal ADEA statute, the plaintiff has the ultimate 

burden of proving that age was a determinative factor in the employer's adverse 

employment decision. 

When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, "liability depends on 

whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated 

the employer's decision." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 

610, 113 S. Ct. 1701,123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993). That is, the plaintiff's 

age must have "actually played a role in [the employer's 

decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the 

outcome." Ibid. 

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (alteration 

in original) (emphasis supplied). 

A plaintiff may prove an employer's intention to discriminate on the basis of 

age in three ways: i. e., "by direct evidence of discriminatory intent; by meeting the 

test originally set out for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973); or by statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination." Verbraeken 

v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 881 F .2d 1041, 1045 (11 th Cir. 1989); see also, e.g., 

Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 940 F .2d 1497, 1500 (1Ith Cir. 1991 ) (same); 

Earley v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077,1081 (lIth Cir.1990) (same). 

Plaintiff has not presented, nor does she allege that there is, direct evidence of age 

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discrimination. 173 She also has not offered statistical proof of a pattern of 

discrimination on the basis of age. Accordingly, she must support her claims with 

circumstantial evidence in accordance with the burden-shifting framework initially 

developed for use in Title VII cases by the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).174 

A. Disparate Disciplinary Treatment 

There are four elements of a prima facie claim for discriminatory discipline 

based upon the plaintiffsage: (1) the plaintiff must show that she was a member of 

173 "Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could only be to discriminate on the basis 

of age constitute direct evidence." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (lIth Cir. 

1992). 

174 Even though the McDonnell Douglas opinion and its progeny - e.g., St. 1'vfary's Honor 

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. (1993), and Texas Department ofCommunity AfJairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

248 (1981) involved discrimination claims under Title VII, a variant ofthe analysis also has been 

consistently applied to claims based upon the ADEA. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000) (noting widespread use of McDonnell Douglas framework to 

analyze age-discrimination claims based upon circumstantial evidence, and assuming, but not 

holding, that it applies to ADEA claims) (citing 0 'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 

U.S. 308, 311 (l996) (assuming that l\1cDonnell Douglas analytical framework applies to ADEA 

claims based on circumstantial proofs)). See also, e.g., Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 

1024 (lith Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same); Bogle v. Orange County Board ofCounty Commissioners, 

162 F.3d 653, 656 (lIth Cir. 1998) ("Since Bogle has presented no direct evidence that Orange 

County discharged him because of his age and relied, instead, on circumstantial evidence, the 

burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, ..., governs his ADEA 

case.") (ellipsis supplied); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11 th Cir. 1998) 

(applying McDonnell Douglas framework in an ADEA case); Mitchell v. Worldwide Underwriters 

Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 565, 566 (lith Cir. 1 992)(same); Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 

1500 (lith Cir. 1991) (same); Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (lith Cir. 1987) 

("This court applies a slightly modified version ofthe test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green" when evaluating the strength of circumstantial evidence to prove a prima facie case of age 

discrimination.). See also, e.g., Gross v. FBLFinancial Services, Inc., 557U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009); 

Childress v. Caterpillar Logistics Services, Inc., No. 09-12772, 2010 WL 827907, at *1 n.3 (11 th 

Cir. Mar. 11, 2010). 

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the class of persons protected by the ADEA - i.e., that she was at least forty years 

of age on the date discipline was imposed; 175 (2) she was qualified to perform the 

duties of her job; (3) she was subjected to a tangible adverse disciplinary sanction 

(e.g., suspended without pay for twenty work days); and (4) the employer treated 

similarly-situated employees who were either less than forty years of age, or 

"substantially younger" than plaintiff, more favorably. See, e.g., Brooks v. CSX 

Transportation, Inc., 555 F. App'x 878,883 (l1th eir. 2014) (listing prima facie 

elements of, e.g., ADEA "discriminatory discipline or termination" claim). See also 

MacKenzie v. Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1277 (10th eir. 2005) ("[T]he requirements of 

a prima facie claim of disparate treatment require a plaintiff to produce evidence at 

a minimum establishing (1) that she was a member ofthe protected class, (2) she was 

disciplined, and (3) she was treated differently than similarly-situated non-protected 

employees for the same or similar conduct.") (alteration supplied). Cf, e.g., 

Maynard. v. Board of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (lIth eir. 2003) (Title VII 

racially-discriminatory discipline claim). 

When deciding whether employees are similarly situated, district courts are 

directed to "consider whether the employees are 'involved in or accused ofthe same 

or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.'" Brooks, 555 F. App'x at 

175 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who 

are at least 40 years of age."). 

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883 (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999» (emphasis 

supplied). As stated in Part V.A., supra, plaintiff has not identified any other 

employee who was involved in, or accused of, similar misconduct. Moreover, for 

reasons similar to those discussed in the same Part of this Opinion, she cannot 

sidestep her obligation ofproducing a comparator under the narrow holding ofSmith 

v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (l1th Cir. 2011). As is the case regarding 

her claim ofgender discrimination, there is no "convincing mosaic of circumstantial 

evidence" that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age. Accordingly, 

she cannot establish a primafacie case ofdiscriminatory discipline under the ADEA. 

B. Demotion to Plaintiff's Former Position of Deputy EMA Director 

When a demotion is the adverse action complained of, a plaintiff may establish 

a prima facie case by showing that (1) she was at least forty years ofage, (2) she was 

demoted, (3) she was qualified to perform the duties ofthe job from which she was 

demoted, and (4) a substantially younger person was placed in or promoted into her 

former position. See, e.g., Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 

(11 th Cir. 1997) (discussing prima facie elements in the context of "an ADEA case 

involving discharge, demotion, or failure to hire") (citing, e.g., a 'Connor v. 

Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (stating that an ADEA 

plaintiff must show that he was replaced by someone "substantially younger," not 

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necessarily by someone under age 40)). Indeed, an ADEA disparate treatment claim 

is not like a Title VII race or sex discrimination claim, because 

the plaintiff in an age discrimination case need not necessarily prove 

that his replacement was outside the protected class, that is, under forty 

years of age. The plaintiff in an age discrimination case may establish 

a prima facie case merely by establishing that his replacement was 

younger than he, provided that the discrepancy between the ages, along 

with any other relevant evidence, is sufficient that a fact finder could 

reasonably infer age discrimination. 

Corbin v. Southerland International Trucks, 25 F.3d 1545, 1549 (lIth Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff, who was fifty-two years of age on the date she was demoted to her 

former position of Deputy EMA Director, was a member of the group of persons 

protected by the ADEA. She also was qualified to perform the duties ofActing EMA 

Director. 176 Accordingly, it must be determined whether plaintiffs replacement was 

"substantially younger" than she. 

When plainti ff was demoted, she was replaced as Acting EMA Director by 

Tammy Vinson, 177 who was 2 years, 9 months, and 28 days younger than plaintiff. 178 

The Eleventh Circuit has held that an age difference of just a few years may be 

sufficient to establish that a plaintiff was replaced by someone "substantially 

176 See the discussion in Part V.c., supra (finding that plaintiff was qualified to perfonn 

duties of Deputy EMA Director position), and Part V.D., supra (finding that pI aintiff was qualified 

to perfonn duties of pennanent EMA Director position). 

177 See the discussion in Parts IILL. and III.D., supra. 

178 Compare doc. no. 36-1, at ECF 39 (showing plaintiffs date of birth) with doc. no. 59-1 

(showing Tammy Vinson's date of birth). 

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younger." See, e.g., Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets ofFlorida, Inc., 196F.3d 1354, 

1360 (l1 th Cir. 1999) (five-year difference sufficient); Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 

122 F.3d 997, 1003 (lIth Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (three-year difference sufficient); 

Carter v. Miami, 870 F .2d 578, 583 (11 th Cir. 1989) (four-year difference sufficient). 

Even so, the Eleventh Circuit offered a message of caution in a recent opinion: 

We recognize that we have previously held, in cases where 

plaintiffs presented substantial evidence of discriminatory animus 

beyond mere age difference, that a smaller age difference was sufficient 

to meet the "substantially younger" element of the ADEA prima facie 

case. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets ofFla. , Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 

1360 (lIth Cir. 1990) (holding that a 37-year-old was "substantially 

younger" than a 42-year-old). But we agree with the district court that, 

in this case, [the plaintiff] failed to create an inference ofdiscrimination 

because a six-year age difference, without more, does not establish that 

[the plaintiff's] age was the but-for cause ofthe School Board's failure 

to hire him. See 0 'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 

U.S. 308,312, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 134 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1996) ("The prima 

facie case requires evidence adequate to create an inference that an 

employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion."). 

See also Steele v. United States VA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58200,2011 

WL 2160343, at * 10 (M.D. Fla. June 1,2011) (concluding that a 13-year 

age difference, without more, is insufficient to meet this standard); 

Matthews v. City ofDothan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91711, 2006 WL 

3742237 at *12 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2006) (ruling that six-year age 

difference was insufficient to create an inference ofage discrimination, 

when no other evidence of discriminatory animus was present). 

Suarez v. School Board ofHills borough County, Florida, No. 15-12891,2016 WL 

212503, at *9 n.l (lIth Cir. Jan. 19,2016) (emphasis and alterations supplied). See 

also 0 'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313 (describing the three-year difference between a 68­

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year-old plaintiff and his 65-year-old replacement as "very thin evidence" of age 

discrimination, and stating that an inference of age discrimination "cannot be drawn 

from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger") 

(emphasis supplied). 

This court therefore must determine whether, in addition to the almost threeyear age difference between plaintiffand Tammy Vinson, there is substantial evidence 

of discriminatory animus. The record contains neither direct nor circumstantial 

evidence ofprohibited age bias. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that no one ever 

told her that the Commission took any ofthe adverse employment actions against her 

on account ofher age. 179 Moreover, there is no evidence that anyone made comments 

to plaintiff about her age, or the age ofany other employee. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence that the Commission was systematically eliminating older employees. 

Finally, there is no Eleventh Circuit case holding that an age difference ofless than 

three years, without additional evidence ofage discrimination, is sufficient to satisfY 

the "substantially younger" element. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish a prima 

facie case of age discrimination in the Commission's act of demoting her to her 

former position of Deputy EMA Director. 

C. Termination by Elimination of the Deputy EMA Director Position 

179 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 94. 

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In order to make out a prima facie case for discriminatory termination of 

employment under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was a member ofthe 

class of persons protected by the Act - that is, individuals who are at least forty 

years ofage, 180 (2) she was discharged, (3) she was qualified to perform the duties of 

the job from which she was dismissed, and (4) she was replaced by a person who was 

either less than forty years of age, or "substantially younger." See, e.g., Reeves v. 

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); O'Connor v. 

Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (l996); Bogle v. Orange 

County Board ofCounty Commissioners, 162 F.3d 653, 656-57 (11th Cir. 1998); 

Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (lith Cir. 1998); Jameson 

v. Arrow Company, 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (lith Cir. 1996); Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 

F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (lith Cir. 1997); Elrodv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 

1469-70 (11 th Cir. 1991); Earley v. Champion International Corp., 907 F .2d 1077, 

1082 (I Ith Cir. 1990); Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 

1045 (11th Cir. 1989); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d607, 609 

(I 1 th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff satisfies the first three elements. Even so, the record does not contain 

any evidence that the Deputy Director position was eliminated as a result of 

180 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who 

are at least 40 years of age."). 

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prohibited age bias. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that none ofthe County 

Commissioners or their agents ever stated that her position was eliminated as a result 

ofher age. 181 There also is no evidence that the Commissioners were systematically 

eliminating older workers, or took any other actions that demonstrated an age-related 

bias. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case ofage discrimination 

in the elimination ofthe Deputy EMA Director's position. 

D. Failure to Hire Plaintiff as Permanent EMA Director 

Plaintiff also claims that the Commission discriminated against her on the basis 

of her age when it rejected her, and selected Johnny Cantrell, to fill the EMA 

Director's position vacated by the retirement of Hillard Frost.182 When a plaintiff 

alleges that an employer failed to hire her because ofher age, she must show that (1) 

she was a member ofthe class ofpersons protected by the ADEA (that is, individuals 

who are at least forty years ofage),183 (2) she was qualified to perform the duties of 

the job she sought, (3) she was not hired, and (4) the position was awarded to a 

person who was either less than forty years of age, or "substantially younger" than 

plaintiff. See) e.g., Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (lIth 

Cir. 1998) (citing 0 )Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 

181 See doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 94. 

1S2 Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 22. 

lS3 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who 

are at least 40 years of age."). 

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(1996)). Here, the only disputed element is the last: the question ofwhether Johnny 

Cantrell who was 48 years, 10 months, and 2 days old on the date he was selected 

as EMA Director - was "substantially younger" than plaintiff, who was 52 years, 4 

months, and 23 days old on the same date. 184 (Stated differently, Cantrell was 3 years, 

6 months, and 28 days younger than plaintiff.) 

As discussed in the immediately preceding Part of this Opinion, such an age 

difference may be sufficient to satisfy the "substantially younger" element. See, e.g., 

Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1001, 1003 (11 th Cir. 1997) (three-year 

difference sufficient when considered in conjunction with the decision-maker's 

184 Compare doc. no. 36-1, at ECF 39 (showing plaintiffs date of birth) with doc. no. 35-1, 

at ECF 40, and doc. no. 36-1, at ECF 46 (both of which indicate Cantrell's date of birth). 

"[R]eplacement by one within the protected category [i.e., over 40 years of age] will not preclude 

proof of a prima facie case." Pace v. Southern Railway System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1390 (11 th Cir. 

1983) (alterations supplied, emphasis in original). Even so, "in no case does the court hold that as 

a matter of law a prima facie case is established if a plaintiff simply shows [she] is in the protected 

group, was adversely affected by an employment decision, was qualified and was replaced by one 

younger than [herself]." Id at 1390 (alterations supplied). To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has 

stated: 

The mere fact that one employee is replaced with another who is younger certainly 

does not, without more, give rise to an inference that age was even considered in the 

decision to dismiss or demote the first employee. Historical experience does often 

lend support to suspicions that replacements of black with whites or women with 

men are not coincidental. However, whenever employees are replaced, their 

replacements are invariably either older or younger than they are, and the 

distinctions are usually unimportant. 

Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1443 (1Ith Cir. 1985) (emphasis supplied). 

Thus, the plaintiff is not required to prove that she was replaced by someone less than 40 years of 

age, but only by someone "substantially younger." 0 'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 

517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996). 

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statements (a) that he "had gotten rid of the 'old sleazy people' employed by the 

Company when he began running it," and (b) that "it was preferable to have a nubile 

young woman making sales calls because a sales prospect might grant her an 

interview just to take a look at her"); Carter v. Miami, 870 F.2d 578,580,583 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (four-year difference sufficient where decisionmaker stated that he did not 

want his office run by "little old Jewish ladies"). 

Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit also held in a more recent opinion that a sixyear difference in age, without any other evidence of age discrimination, is not 

sufficient. See Suarez v. School Board ofHillsborough County, Florida, No. 15­

12891, 2016 WL 212503, at *9 n.1 (1Ith Cir. Jan. 19,2016). In other words, the 

question ofwhether a comparator is "substantially younger" than a plaintiff depends 

not only upon the numerical difference in age, but also upon the factual context ofthe 

case that is, whether there is other evidence ofdiscrimination on the basis ofage. 

There is no evidence in addition to the approximately 3.5-year age difference 

between plaintiff and Cantrell, much less substantial evidence, indicating that the 

Lawrence County Commissioners took the age disparity into account when selecting 

Cantrell, rather than plaintiff, as permanent EMA Director. Plaintiff testified in her 

deposition that she had "assume[d]" that Cantrell was "[a]round fortyish" when he 

was selected as Director, and that she had based that assumption on "[h ]is young 

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children and just conversations that we [i.e., plaintiff and Cantrell] had had and 

stuff." 185 When asked what facts made her believe age was the reason she was not 

selected as permanent Director "as opposed to something else," plaintiff replied: 

"Well, one of the things was I was a 52-year-old female that had applied for the job 

and a much, I assumed, younger male had received the job.,,]86 Even so, she testified 

that no one ever "ma[ de] comments to [her] suggesting that [ she] did not get the 

position because of [her] age.,,187 Finally, when asked at the end of her deposition 

whether there were any reasons not previously discussed as to why plaintiffbelieved 

she had been a victim of age discrimination, she replied, "no.,,188 

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate any evidence ofage discrimination aside from the 

fact that an individual who was about three-and-a-halfyears her junior received the 

position for which she had applied. Under the law ofthis Circuit, that age difference, 

without more, is not sufficient to satisfY the "substantially younger" element. 

Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish a primafacie case ofage discrimination in the 

Commission's failure to hire her as permanent EMA Director. 

In light ofall ofthe foregoing, plaintiff's claims of age discrimination are due 

185 Doc. no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 87 (alterations supplied). 

186Id. at 93-94. 

187Id. at 94 (alterations supplied) 

188Id. at 157. 

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to be dismissed. 

VII. RETALIATION CLAIM 

Finally, plaintiff alleges thatthe series ofmaneuvers that effectively terminated 

her employment i. e., (i) she was suspended without pay for twenty work days, and 

demoted to her former position of Deputy EMA Director on November 19,2013, (ii) 

the Commission voted one week later (on November 26, 2013) to eliminate the 

position of Deputy EMA Director as of December 3, 2013, thereby effectively 

terminating her employment by eliminating the position she occupied before the end 

of her twenty-work-day suspension; 189 and (iii) she was not hired for the permanent 

EMA Director position on December 23,2013 were carried out in retaliation for 

her act offiling an EEOC charge on November 15,2013. 190 

Generally speaking, a plaintiff must prove three elements in order to establish 

aprimajacie retaliation claim under any of the federal employment discrimination 

statutes: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an 

adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal linkage between the protected 

189 See the discussion in Part IILW., supra. 

190 See doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 28-30; doc. 

no. 28-1 (Morgan Deposition), at 101-02. Plaintiff supplemented her original EEOC charge on 

December 5, 2013, with a charge of retaliation, and again on April 24, 2014, with a charge of age 

discrimination. See doc. no. 36-1 (EEOC Charge of Sex and Disability Discrimination), at ECF 39; 

doc. no. 51-1 (EEOC Charge of Retaliation), at ECF 2-3; doc. no. 51-2 (EEOC Charge of Age 

Discrimination), at ECF 2-3. 

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conduct and the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Shannon v. BellSouth 

Telecommunications, Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (1Ith Cir. 2002); Bass v. Board of 

County Commissioners, 256 F .3d 1095, 1117 (1Ith Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Booker T. 

Washington Broadcasting Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11 th Cir. 2000). 

Once a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the 

defendant employer to come forward with legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons for its actions that negate the inference of retaliation. See 

Goldsmith [v. City ofAtmore, 996F.2d [1155], 1163 [(1 IthCir. 1993)]. 

The plaintiff must then demonstrate that she will be able to establish at 

trial that the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a 

pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation. Cf Isenbergh v. KnightRidder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436,440 (1Ith Cir. 1996). 

Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11 th Cir. 1997) 

(alterations supplied). 

Commission Chairman Prentis Davis hand-delivered a letter to plaintiff on 

October 30,2013, notifying her of his intent to terminate her employment for cause, 

effective November 5,2013. (See doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 6, and the discussion in 

Part III.Q., supra). 

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission on November 15,2013, sixteen days after her receipt of the 

October 30th letter described in the preceding paragraph, and ten days after the 

November 5th date on which Chairman Davis stated her termination for cause would 

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take effect. 191 The act of filing an EEOC charge clearly constituted "protected 

expression." See, e.g., Bass v. Board ofCounty Commissioners oj Orange County, 

Florida, 256 F.3d 1095, 1117 (lith Cir. 2001); Gupta v. Florida Board oj Regents, 

212 F.3d 571, 587 (lith Cir. 2000). 

On November 19, 2013, four days after plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, 

Chairman Davis hand-delivered another letter to plaintiff, informing her that: (1) he 

had changed his mind, and decreased the sanction for the conduct enumerated in his 

letter from termination of employment to suspension without pay for twenty work 

days; (2) her temporary appointment as Acting EMA Director had been rescinded by 

the Commission's appointment of Tammy Vinson as "Acting EMA Director" on 

October 8, 2013; and (3) she had been reassigned to her former position of Deputy 

EMA Director. (See doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 8, and the discussion in Parts III.L and 

III.U., supra). 

On November 26,2013, eleven days after plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, the 

Commission abolished the Deputy EMA Director position, and County Attorney 

David Martin sent plaintiff a letter notifying her that her employment effectively 

would be terminated on December 3,2013. (See doc. no. 37-1, at ECF 44, and the 

discussion in Part III.W., supra). 

191 Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 28. 

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On December 23,2013, thirty-nine days after plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, 

the Commission rejected her application for the position of EMA Director, and 

selected Johnny Cantrell instead. (See the discussion in Part III.X., supra.) 

Thus, plaintiff suffered a series ofadverse employment actions after filing her 

EEOC charge. The disputed element ofplaintiff's prima facie case is whether there 

was a causal linkage between plaintiff's protected conduct and the subsequent 

adverse employment actions. 

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that, "[t]o establish a causal connection, a 

plaintiff must show that 'the decision-makers [were] aware ofthe protected conduct,' 

and 'that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated. '" 

Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590 (quoting Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 197 

F.3d 1322, 1337 (lIth Cir. 1999)) (first alteration supplied, second in original). "For 

purposes of a prima facie case, 'close temporal proximity' may be sufficient to show 

that the protected activity and the adverse action were not 'wholly unrelated. '" 

Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590 (quoting Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337) (emphasis supplied). 

Even so, "when an employer contemplates an adverse employment action 

before an employee engages in protected activity, temporal proximity between the 

protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action does not suffice to 

show causation." Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (lIth Cir. 2006) (emphasis 

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supplied). See also Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 

(2001) (observing that an employer's act of "proceeding along lines previously 

contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of 

causality"). 

Defense counsel argued during the motion hearing held on May 18, 2016 that, 

because plaintiff's employment with the Lawrence County Commission was fated to 

end either way - i.e., regardless ofwhether the mechanism for achieving that result 

was plaintiff's termination/or cause, or the elimination o/the position to which she 

was demoted/ollowing the events that occurred between September 30 and October 

6, 2013 - plaintiff cannot demonstrate that her act of filing an EEOC charge on 

November 15,2013 motivated the Commission to take adverse employment actions 

against her after that date. 

Moreover, the record suggests that the Commission was contemplating the 

elimination of the Deputy EMA Director position at least as early as October 22, 

2013,192 more than three weeks before plaintiff filed her EEOC charge. 

In response, plaintiff's counsel referenced another case from this district that, 

he believes, provides some clarification about the causation principles articulated by 

192 See the discussion in Part III.P., supra, and doc. no. 28-5, at ECF 20 (Oct. 22, 2013 

Minutes, recording that: "Commissioner Hargrove made a motion to table the Deputy Director 

Classification. Commissioner Jones gave a second and all Commissioners voted aye."). 

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the Supreme Court in Breeden, and the Eleventh Circuit in Drago. See Jones v. 

Water Works Board, No.2: 1 0-cv-1323-AKK, 2012 WL 2856651 (N.D. Ala. July 5, 

2012) (Kallon, J.). 

In Jones, the plaintiff asserted a claim of retaliation under Title VII and 42 

U.S.C. § 1981. See id. at *7. The record revealed that the employer's human 

resources ("HR") representative recommended, in an email dated June 6, 2008, that 

the plaintiff be given a "final warning" for misconduct. fd. at *13. Three days later, 

on June 9, 2008, the plaintiff "complained of discrimination and retaliation" in a 

letter to that same HR representative. fd. Then, approximately one month later, on 

July 11,2008, plaintiff was fired. fd. The defendant-employer argued, based upon 

the holdings in Breeden and Drago, that the plaintiff could not prove the causation 

element of a prima facie retaliation claim because she had sent her letter to the HR 

representative i.e., engaged in protected expression after the employer "had 

already begun investigating and contemplating" possible disciplinary actions against 

the plaintiff, as evidenced by the HR representative's June 6th email. The district 

judge disagreed. He first noted that the Supreme Court's opinion in Breeden, as well 

as the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Drago, had both addressed a fact scenario in 

which 

the precise adverse employment action contemplated by the defendant 

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before the plaintiff's statutorily protected activity actually occurred. 

The defendant in Breeden contemplated transferring plaintiffbefore the 

statutorily protected activity, and the plaintiff asserted that the transfer 

constituted an adverse employment action. 532 U.S. at 271-72. 

Similarly, in Drago, the defendant considered demoting plaintiff five 

months prior to plaintiffs statutorily protected activity, and plaintiff 

alleged that this demotion served as the adverse employment action. 

453 F.3d at 1307-09. Conversely here, the evidence shows that, before 

HR received Plaintiff s complaint letter, the [ employer] contemplated . 

. . asking [plaintiff's direct supervisor] to discipline Plaintiff. ..; 

however, there is no evidence that the [employer] contemplated 

discharging Plaintiff prior to her statutorily protected activity .... As 

such, the court refuses to find Plaintiff s retaliation claim precluded 

under Breeden and Drago. 

Jones, 2012 WL 2856651, at *13 ( emphasis and ellipses supplied). In other words, 

Judge KaHon held that the plaintiff satisfied the element of causation in spite of 

the fact that an allegedly adverse employment action (in the form of issuing plaintiff 

a disciplinary "final warning" for misconduct) was contemplated by the employer 

prior to her protected expression because the action that was actually carried out 

(i.e., termination) was different from and more tangible than the action previously 

contemplated. 

This court agrees that the imposition ofa more draconian adverse employment 

action following an act of protected expression would support a finding that the 

protected expression led to an act of retaliation. In the present case, however, it 

cannot be said that the severity of the adverse employment action increased after 

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plaintiff filed her EEOC charge. 193 However clumsily the Commission ultimately 

achieved the separation ofplaintiff from employment with the County, the result was 

the same: plaintiff's employment was terminated. 

Defense counsel also argued, both in brief, and at the May 18, 2016 motion 

hearing, that the manner in which plaintiff's employment was ultimately terminated 

(i. e., elimination of her position versus termination for cause) actually benefitted 

plaintiff: i.e., 

Prentis Davis had originally proposed Plaintiff's termination for cause, 

but he reduced the proposed discipline in light ofPlaintiff' s prior service 

and employment history after Plaintiff's due process hearing. It is true 

that Plaintiff ended up without a job either way . . . . [Even so, 

termination for cause] would have made Plaintiff ineligible for rehire; 

would have placed her unemployment benefits in jeopardy; and would 

have been a permanent black mark on her job history. 

193 For reasons this court does not fully comprehend, plaintiffs counsel vehemently argued 

during the motion hearing held on May 18, 2016 that the court should accept the veracity of the 

notation on Chairman Davis's November 19th letter to plaintiff, stating that the letter was "Drafted: 

November 11,2013." See doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 8. Counsel's argument, as this court understands 

it, was that the notation demonstrated that the adverse employment action ultimately taken against 

plaintiff (i.e., suspension without pay for twenty work days) was contemplated at least as early as 

November 11, 2013, four days before plaintiff filed her EEOC charge. Under the legal principles 

set forth in Breeden and Drago, that argument would only bolster the Commission's contention that 

the plaintiffs protected expression on November 15, 2013 did not cause the Commission to suspend 

her without pay for twenty work days. Even if plaintiffs counsel meant to argue that, prior to 

plaintiffs filing her EEOC charge, the adverse employment action was suspension without pay 

(without more), and, after plaintiff s filing her EEOC charge the adverse employment action not only 

was suspension without pay, but also demotion, and elimination of the position to which she was 

demoted, that argument also would not aid the plaintiff. The record contains substantial evidence that 

the elimination ofthe Deputy Director position was seriously considered by the Commission prior 

to November 15,2013. Moreover, plaintiffs demotion actually occurred on October 8, 2013, when 

the Commission unanimously voted to designate Tammy Vinson as Acting EMA Director. 

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Doc. no. 27 (Briefin Support of Summary Judgment), at 27 (ellipsis, alteration, and 

emphasis supplied). There is merit to that argument. 

In light ofall ofthe foregoing, the court concludes that the causation principles 

set forth in Drago and Breeden preclude plaintiff from demonstrating a prima facie 

case ofretaliation in her suspension without pay for twenty work days, demotion to 

the position of Deputy Director, and the subsequent elimination of the Deputy 

Director position. 

With regard to her claim of retaliation in the Commission's rejection of her 

application for the permanent EMA Director position, there also is abundant evidence 

that the Commission contemplated taking that adverse employment action prior to 

receiving notice, on November 15th, that plaintiff had filed an EEOC charge. 

Plaintiff's acts of misconduct occurred between September 30th and October 6th. 

Almost immediately thereafter, on October 7th, Chairman Davis sent plaintiff a letter 

informing her that she was being placed on administrative leave with pay, and stating 

that he was "concem[ ed] for the safety ofthe citizens ofLawrence County, including 

[plaintiffj.,,]94 The following day, the Commission unanimously passed a resolution 

designating Tammy Vinson as Acting EMA Director, apparently (and reasonably) 

believing that it would be inappropriate or unsafe to allow plaintiff to continue to 

194 Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 2 (alterations supplied). 

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serve in that capacity.195 Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, Chairman Davis 

informed plaintiff in an October 30, 2013 letter that her employment was being 

terminated for cause. 196 The second paragraph of that letter stated: 

This termination is based on the culmination of an investigation 

into recent events in which you were involved. The events have 

damaged relationships in the community, with the members of the 

Lawrence County Commission and within the Lawrence County 

Commission office, while also raising serious questions regarding your 

judgment and leadership abilities. 

Doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 6 (emphasis supplied). The immediacy ofthe Commission's 

response to the events of September 30th through October 6th, the safety concerns 

expressed by Chairman Davis in his letters to plaintiff, and the fact that plaintiff was 

slated for termination make it clear that the Commission believed, prior to the date 

on which plaintifffiled her EEOC charge, that she was not a suitable candidate to 

serve as permanent EMA Director. 

In light of the principles set forth in Drago and Breeden, plaintiff cannot 

establish aprimafacie case ofretaliation for any ofthe adverse employment actions 

taken against her after the date on which she filed her EEOC charge. Therefore, 

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the Commission on plaintiff's 

retaliation claims. 

195 Doc. no. 28-5, at ECF 17 (Minutes of Oct. 8,2013 Meeting). 

196 See doc. no. 28-15, at ECF 6. 

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VII. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 

For all ofthe reasons discussed in the foregoing opinion, it is ORDERED that 

defendant's "Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, for In Camera Review" be, and 

the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART. Defendant's 

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and all claims alleged by plaintiff are 

dismissed with prejudice. Costs are taxed to plaintiff. The Clerk is DIRECTED to 

close this file. 

DONE and ORDERED this 20th day ofJune, 2016. 

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