Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03978/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03978-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Arthur Richie,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-03978-PHX-DLR (DMF)

ORDER 

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine’s Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 15) recommending that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. The Magistrate Judge advised the parties that they had fourteen days from the 

date of service of a copy of the R&R to file specific written objections with the Court. 

(Doc. 15 at 16-17.) Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R on December 12, 2019, (Doc. 

16), and Respondents filed their response on December 11, 2019 (Doc. 17.) 

The Court has considered the objections and reviewed the R&R de novo. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Magistrate Judge correctly found that 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Petitioner’s first claim is that the State violated the Brady rule by preventing the 

jury from learning about former Officer Morris’ history of criminal conduct, including 

false reporting. The Magistrate Judge correctly found that Petitioner failed to establish 

the three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the 

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accused, (2) that evidence was suppressed by the state, willfully or inadvertently and (3) 

the defendant was prejudiced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). The 

record shows that Petitioner and his attorney were aware of Officer Morris’s history. In 

fact, on the first day of trial, the trial court considered the State’s motion to exclude 

evidence of Morris’ criminal charges. Because Petitioner and his counsel were aware of 

Morris’ charges before trial, there is no basis to claim that the information about those 

charges was withheld or suppressed. The State’s decision not to call Morris as a witness 

at trial is not evidence of suppression of Brady material. Morris’ history had been 

disclosed to the defense, who had the opportunity to subpoena Morris for trial. 

Petitioner has also failed to show prejudice by failing to establish that his trial 

outcome would have been different if Morris had been called as a witness and evidence 

of his criminal charges had come out. The record shows, and Petitioner has not presented 

evidence to the contrary, that the Court of Appeals accurately summed up Officer Morris’ 

involvement in the investigation of the case against Petitioner as “limited” and “not 

critical.” (Doc. 9-1 at 53.) The Court of Appeals found that although Morris executed 

Petitioner’s arrest, the record shows that it was Detective Zelman-Lopez-- the undercover 

officer who made the drug deal with Petitioner and a trial witness--who made the 

determination that the photograph pulled from DMV records by Morris was the person 

who sold the methamphetamine. (Id.)

Petitioner’s second claim is that his Confrontation Clause protections under the 

Sixth Amendment were violated by the prosecution’s failure to call Officer Morris as a 

witness at trial. The Magistrate Judge correctly found no Confrontation Clause violation. 

Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim rests on the admission of Petitioner’s DMV 

identification information, a certified public record. The Confrontation Clause is violated 

in cases where testimonial evidence is admitted without the opportunity for cross 

examination of the person providing that evidence. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 

56 (2004) However, as indicated at page 14 of the R&R, certified public records “are

not themselves testimonial in nature and . . . these records do not fall within the 

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prohibition established by the Supreme Court in Crawford.” United States v. Weiland, 

420 F. 3d 1062, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 

(2004)). 

The record reveals that Morris, who did not testify, showed Detective ZelmanLopez the nontestimonial evidence contained in a public record, Petitioner’s driver’s 

license photograph. The testimonial evidence of identification came from Detective 

Zelman-Lopez, not from Morris. Detective Zelman-Lopez identified Petitioner as the 

person in the driver’s license photograph and as the person who sold him the 

methamphetamine. Detective Zelman-Lopez, as a trial witness, was subject to cross 

examination. There was no Confrontation Clause violation. 

Petitioner’s objection to the R&R (Doc. 16) raises three “errors,” which will be 

referred to as “objections.” He first argues that Detective Lopez was not truthful about 

the date in which he made the identification comparison of the photos. Petitioner states 

that the inconsistency of Morris’ assertions regarding the dates he made the photo 

comparisons indicates that Morris committed perjury. He argues that “due to documents 

to the contrary det. Lopez is testifying falsely which constitute crimen falsi (perjury).” 

(Doc. 16 at 2.) Petitioner’s argument does not indicate what documents he is relying on 

for this argument; but more importantly, Petitioner fails to establish the relevance of that 

alleged inconsistency. He does not show how cross examination of Morris, to bring out 

the fact of an alleged incorrect date of comparison, was relevant or how it would have 

changed the outcome. Further, if Morris’ testimony regarding the date of the comparison 

was important, the defense could have subpoenaed Morris to testify at trial. Petitioner’s 

first objection is overruled. 

The Court does not fully understand Petitioner’s second objection but believes he 

is disputing the finding that public records in his case are not testimonial. The Court 

understands Petitioner’s further argument to be that his confrontational rights were 

violated when Morris was not called as a witness because when he compared the MVD 

photo to the surveillance photos, Morris was essentially conducting a photo lineup. 

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Petitioner’s arguments are not supported by facts or law. The facts are clear that Morris 

is not the witness who identified the petitioner at trial, and the law is clear that the public 

records employed in this case were not testimonial. United States v. Weiland, 420 F. 3d 

1062, 1077. Petitioner’s right to confrontation was not violated. Petitioner’s second 

objection is overruled. 

Petitioner’s third objection also objects to the R&R’s finding that there was no the 

Confrontation Clause violation. He challenges one of the underlying premises of the 

R&R, based on assertions in the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision, that Morris’ 

participation in the case was limited and not critical. (Doc. 16 at 4.) Petitioner points out 

that it was Morris who first recognized him from MVD photo and was the arresting 

officer. However, it was Detective Zelman-Lopez, not Morris, who worked undercover 

and was involved in the drug deal with Petitioner. Detective Zelman-Lopez testified 

about the drug transaction, explaining that he recognized Petitioner from his own 

recollection and from the surveillance photographs taken by Detective Campinso and

confirming that it was the Petitioner who sold him the drugs. Detective Campinso also 

testified and was subject to cross examination. 

The Magistrate Judge correctly noted that, even if the record had revealed a 

Confrontation Clause violation, the error would have been harmless. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals noted that Morris’ role was not critical because he was not involved in the 

drug purchase and merely obtained records that he provided to Detective Zelman-Lopez. 

As to the fact that Morris was involved in arresting the Petitioner, there is no indication 

that the arrest was used as evidence in the case to prove Petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner’s 

third objection is overruled. 

The Magistrate Judge correctly found that Petitioner has not made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would not find the 

Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

IT IS ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. 15) is ACCEPTED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED

because reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable, and Petitioner has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment denying 

and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (Doc. 1) with prejudice and terminate this action.

Dated this 18th day of February, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

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