Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01680/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01680-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Citations to “Ex.” are to the exhibits in the state court record lodged with the court by

the attorney general. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN LAMAR WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.A. LAMARQUE,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-1680 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For

the reasons set out below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

 Petitioner, Brian Lamar Williams, was convicted of first degree murder with special

circumstances, attempted robbery, and assault with a firearm. He was sentenced to state

prison for life without parole and a consecutive ten-year determinate term. The judgment

was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal of California and the Supreme Court of

California denied his petition for review. 

The following facts are from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal. See Ex. 4

at 1-3.1

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On the evening of July 1, 1997, when Williams was with his friends

Rodney H. and Donald C. at a McDonald's restaurant, Donald C. proposed that

they “go rob somebody.” The three drove around in Williams' car until they saw

a group of “four Mexicans” standing outside and Donald C. said, “That's them.”

Williams parked and the three approached a group that included Anthony

Franklin (sitting on a bicycle) and teenagers Daniel Ochoa, William P. and

Raymond G., who were standing outside William P.'s house. Williams and his

friends first walked by this group without saying anything. Rodney H. walked on

to the street corner, saying he would “be the watchout man,” while Williams and

Donald C. circled back to the group.

Williams approached, asking where a girl lived, and Raymond G. started

to leave. Williams said, “Give me your money,” and then hit Raymond G. in the

head with a gun. Raymond G. ran toward William P.'s house and hid his money.

Williams and Ochoa started arguing. Williams then shot Ochoa in the head at

close range. Ochoa slumped onto Franklin's bicycle, but Franklin freed the bike

and rode away. Williams, Donald C. and Rodney H. also ran away. Near

Ochoa's body lay a .40 caliber shell casing, which was determined to have been

fired from a Glock 23 semiautomatic pistol.

The day after the shooting, Ochoa's brother Elias telephoned the police

and identified Williams as the shooter. Elias explained he had been told “[t]hose

kids who were there knew who did it.” The police arrested Williams and Donald

C. the next day. In Williams' bedroom, the police found a variety of ammunition,

including a .40 caliber round. They later recovered the pistol used in the shooting

at the home of Bobby Williams, an individual who is not related to Brian Williams.

When Williams was jailed after his arrest, a detective told him he was going to

conduct a gunshot residue test. Williams immediately scrubbed his hands in the

toilet bowl of his cell and began to cry.

Williams was charged, and the matter was prosecuted as a capital

offense. Witnesses at trial described two previous robberies in which Williams

allegedly participated. In both, the victims were hit and forced to surrender their

bicycles. In addition, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting Williams,

Rodney H. and Donald C. were associated with a North Richmond gang called

the Project Trojans. A detective testified to his opinion that the crimes in this

case were gang-related.

Williams' defense disputed his identification as Ochoa's killer and

challenged the prosecution's claim that the shooting occurred as part of a

robbery. The defense elicited testimony suggesting Williams and his friends

approached the group outside William P.'s house to buy “weed.” The boys began

arguing and Ochoa unzipped his jacket in what appeared to be a threatening

manner. Someone then shot Ochoa, but it was not clear that person was

Williams. Although Franklin identified Williams as the shooter, he was very

intoxicated and possibly under the influence of drugs at the time.

Ex. 4 at 1-3. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

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adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a

state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present

clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

///

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion, in this case that of the

California Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991);

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

As grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his Sixth Amendment rights

were violated because the jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of Contra Costa

County citizens; (2) a jailhouse confession should have been excluded because it was the

fruit of a confession to police which was obtained in violation of Miranda and which was

involuntary; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective in specified ways; and (4) his appellate

counsel was ineffective.

I. Jury Venire

Williams claims that the jury selection process in Contra Costa County violated his

right to have his jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. A

criminal defendant has a constitutional right stemming from the Sixth Amendment to a fair

and impartial jury pool composed of a cross-section of the community. Holland v. Illinois,

493 U.S. 474, 476 (1990)

In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), the Supreme Court held that to establish

a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show that (1)

the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community, see, e.g., United

States v. Cannady, 54 F.3d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (African-Americans, Hispanics and

Asians are distinct groups); (2) the group was not fairly represented in the venire from

which the petit jury was chosen see, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1101

(9th Cir. 1998)(representation constitutionally sufficient where absolute disparity between

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proportion of Hispanics in the community and proportion of Hispanics in the jury pool was

3.9%); United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring "absolute

disparity" between number of persons from distinctive group in jury pool in relation to

number of such persons in community and finding that 4.9% absolute disparity was

insufficient to make out claim); Cannady, 54 F.3d at 548 (representation constitutionally

sufficient where absolute disparity below 7.7%); and (3) the underrepresentation resulted

from a systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process, see, e.g., United

States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1985) (no systematic exclusion when only

30% of grand jury members and only 42% of venire were women, absent showing that

under-representation of women occurred generally in other venires). See Duren, 439 U.S.

at 367. 

Under the test established in Duren, disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group

from the venire need not be intentional to be unconstitutional, but it must be systematic. In

Duren itself, women were, unlike men, able to opt out of jury service by filling out a

paragraph in the questionnaire sent to them. Further, women who did not return the

questionnaire were presumed to have opted out; the same presumption did not apply to

men. Id. at 362. The Court concluded that “the resulting disproportionate and consistent

exclusion of women from the jury wheel and at the venire stage was quite obviously due to

the system by which juries were selected.” Id. at 367.

As the state court noted, it is undisputed that black persons constitute a cognizable

group under Duren. Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998). Petitioner thus

established the first prong of his prima facie showing. 

The trial court here also concluded that petitioner had demonstrated that blacks

were underrepresented in Contra Costa County jury pools, thus satisfying the second prong

of Duren, by applying a comparative disparity test. Ex. 4 at 4. However, that test is

“strongly disfavored in the Ninth Circuit on the ground that it exaggerates the effect of any

deviation.” Thomas, 159 F.3d at 1150. For purposes of applying the federal “fair crosssection” requirement, the Ninth Circuit has adopted an "absolute disparity" analysis.

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Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726. The "absolute disparity" is determined by subtracting the

percentage of the group in the jury pool from that group's percentage of the relevant total

population. Id. While California courts use several different tests to determine the degree

of under-representation of minorities on jury venires, in federal habeas corpus proceedings

attacking state convictions the Ninth Circuit's absolute disparity test is applied. Thomas,

159 F.3d at 1150. Applying the absolute disparity test, the disparity is between an AfricanAmerican population in the county of between 8.1 and 8.4 percent and 4.6 percent AfricanAmericans on Contra Costa County jury venires. Ex. 4 at 4. The absolute disparity thus is

between 3.5 and 3.8 percent. In view of cases permitting absolute disparity below 7.7%,

the exclusion of a group constituting 7.7% or less of the total population is, standing alone,

generally insufficient to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion. Rich v.

Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1239-40, amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner thus has failed to meet the second prong of the Duren test.

As to the third prong, petitioner conceded that “the county’s selection procedures are

facially race-neutral,” but contended that the showing of twenty years of underrepresentation of blacks on Contra Costa County venires was sufficient to make a prima

facie showing of systematic exclusion. Ex. 4 at 5-6. 

A showing that a jury venire under-represents an identifiable group is, without more,

an insufficient showing of systematic exclusion. Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133,

1141-42 (9th Cir. 2004) (under-representation of identifiable group not alone enough to

show systematic exclusion under third prong; no probative evidence under-representation

of Hispanics due to system county used to assemble venire). If under-representation by

itself were sufficient to support a holding of unconstitutionality, the second and third prongs

of Duren would effectively collapse into one inquiry. As the California Court of Appeal held,

Williams cannot satisfy the third prong of Duren because he has failed to present any

evidence that the under-representation of African-Americans is due to the system Contra

Costa County uses to assemble the venire. Ex. 4 at 5. Because Williams has not shown

any relationship between the disproportionately low percentage of African-Americans in the

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venire and the juror-selection system the county uses, he has not shown that the

underrepresentation of African-Americans is, as Duren requires, “inherent in the particular

jury-selection process.” Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. 

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment “fair cross-section” right thus was not violated, and the

state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly-established United States Supreme Court authority. 

II. Admission of Jailhouse Recording

Petitioner contends that admission of a recording of a jaiilhouse conversation

violated his constitutional rights. The California Court of Appeal set out the factual

background of this claim thus:

This conversation took place on the heels of a four-hour-long

interrogation, during which detectives repeatedly ignored Williams' expressed

desire to speak with an attorney and not answer their questions. After the

interrogation, detectives placed Williams in a jail cell. Williams then started

talking with Donald C ., who was being held approximately 30 to 35 feet away in

a booking cell. Due to the noise in the facility and the distance separating them,

Williams and Donald C. had to shout at each other; thus, their conversation was

largely audible to the records staff sitting nearby. One detective, who could hear

the shouting, placed a tape recorder in the hallway near Williams' cell. He did not

allow Williams to see the tape recorder.

Although the trial court excluded all statements Williams made during the

police interrogation on the grounds that they were coerced and obtained in

violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [FN3. The prosecutor

conceded the Miranda violations, which, as the trial court observed, were

numerous and egregious.], the court rejected Williams' claim that his tape

recorded conversation with Donald C. should also be suppressed. Most of

Williams' arguments below focused on the surreptitious nature of the recording,

which Williams claimed violated his statutory and constitutional rights to privacy,

due process and freedom from unlawful searches and seizures. Based on the

public nature of the jailhouse, the volume of the men's voices and the fact that

a detective had recently been in the vicinity, the trial court concluded Williams

could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with

Donald C. The court also rejected the defense argument that police violated

Williams' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because, having told

Williams he would have a chance to speak with Donald C. and then placing

Williams and Donald C. within earshot of each other, the police engaged in

conduct designed to elicit incriminating statements.

Ex. 4 at 7-8. 

During his trial, Williams alleged that the jailhouse officer’s conduct in recording the

conversation between Williams and Donald C. was the functional equivalent of police

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interrogation and a continuation of the earlier questioning. On appeal and here, Williams

argues that the conversation should have been excluded as the fruit of the previous

unlawful coercive interrogation.

A. Procedural default

The California Court of Appeal held that counsel’s failure to object to admission of

the jailhouse recording on the “fruit of the poisonous tree” ground barred that claim on

appeal, because if the trial court had been timely alerted it could have cured any error. Ex.

4 at 10. Respondent contends that the state court’s invocation of procedural default bars

the “fruit of the poisonous tree” claim here. 

A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the

decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). 

The procedural default rule is a specific instance of the more general “adequate and

independent state grounds” doctrine. Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to

an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is

barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a

result of the alleged violation of federal law, or if he can demonstrate that failure to consider

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In

order to establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from an application

of procedural default a petitioner has to prove factual innocence. Gandarela v. Johnson,

275 F.3d 744, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2002); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir.

2001). 

The state bears the burden of proving the adequacy of a state procedural bar. 

Bennett v. Mueller, 296 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2002). “Once the state has adequately pled

the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner

may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the

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inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s.” 

Id. at 762. 

The respondent has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate

procedural bar. Under Bennett this shifts the burden to the petitioner. See 296 F.3d at

762. He has, however, not demonstrated the inadequacy of the state procedure to serve

as a bar, for instance by providing citations showing inconsistent application. That

California’s contemporaneous objection rule operates as a procedural bar has been

recognized by the Ninth Circuit. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2004);

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner having made no

attempt to show cause and prejudice for the default, or to show that failure to consider the

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the court concludes that this claim

is barred by the procedural default. However, the court will also consider the merits of the

claim below, as an alternative ground for the result.

B. Merits

Williams claims the taped conversation should have been excluded because it was

tainted “fruit” of the prior, coercive interrogation. The trial court held both that petitioner’s

statement to police was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

and that it was involuntary. Ex. 11 at 543-44 (Miranda ruling); id. at 680, 683

(voluntariness). 

The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to evidence discovered as a

result of Miranda violations. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004) (plurality

opinion) (“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations); id. at

645 (Kennedy and O’Connor, JJ, concurring in the judgment) (admission of nontestimonial

physical evidence does not run risk of admission of coerced incriminating statements; in

light of evidentiary value of physical evidence, “doubtful” that exclusion could be justified by

deterrence rationale). Thus, the only question here is whether the jailhouse recording

should have been suppressed as the fruit of involuntary statements.

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 The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine generally prohibits the admission at trial of

evidence, both physical and verbal, that is derived from illegal government acts. Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 598 (1975) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88,

1963)). Although the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine developed in the context of the

Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment also provides a basis for use of the exclusionary

rule: incriminating statements involuntarily made must be excluded. Brown, 422 U.S. at

601. Exclusion is not required, however, when “the connection between the illegal

statement and the evidence . . . had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” 

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487. “[N]ot . . . all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply

because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the

more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary

illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation

of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary

taint.’” Wong Sun v. United States at 487-488; see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.

338, 340 (1939) (holding challenged evidence had “become so attenuated as to dissipate

the taint.”).

Here, as in Wong Sun, the connection between the illegal interrogation and the

subsequent recorded jailhouse conversation between Williams and Donald C. was so

attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the initial unlawful practices of the officers. Id. The

conversation between the two suspects occurred in a different area, some time after the

interrogation, and in circumstances where there clearly was no privacy. Under these

circumstances, the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that the tape was admissible

was not a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal Law,” as is required for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The California Court of Appeal also held that admission of the tape was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the correct standard set out in Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967). Ex. 4 at 10-11. 

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When the state court disposed of a constitutional error as harmless under an

appropriate standard of review, federal courts must, for purposes of application of the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), first determine whether the state court’s

harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable. Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872,

878 (9th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d at 1173 (determining that state

court’s harmlessness holding was not unreasonable and proceeding no further). If the

federal court determines that the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively

unreasonable, and thus an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the

federal court then proceeds to the Brecht analysis. Medina, 386 F.3d at 877. 

This is what the court of appeal said about the harmless error question:

Having reviewed a transcript of the recorded conversation, we agree

with the Attorney General that the evidence was trivial. Williams made very

few intelligible statements, the only possibly significant one being, “That's

(unintelligible) think I pulled the trigger, from you”-which the prosecutor

referred to in his closing argument as “sound[ing] like” Williams saying “ ‘They

found out I pulled the trigger from you.’ “ This statement is hardly an

admission of guilt, as Williams now contends. In contrast, the evidence of

William's guilt from other sources was quite strong. An eyewitness (Franklin)

identified Williams as Ochoa's shooter, and Williams' own conduct in

scrubbing his hands in a toilet before taking a gunshot residue test also

suggested he pulled the trigger.

Ex. 4 at 10-11.

This was not an objectively unreasonable harmless error analysis. For this

additional reason, petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief on this claim.

III. Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims 

 Williams alleges that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. To the

extent his assertions are intelligible, petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied

upon as having produced a just result. Id. The right to effective assistance of counsel

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applies to the performance of both retained and appointed counsel without distinction. See

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a

petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance

was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish

that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The Strickland framework for analyzing

ineffective assistance of counsel claims is considered to be "clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). 

 The defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The relevant inquiry is not

what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense

counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. It is unnecessary for

a federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim to address the prejudice

prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under the

first prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the appropriate question on the

prejudice prong is "‘whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the

fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'" Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d

954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 

///

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A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective

assistance, United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981), and tactical decisions

are not ineffective assistance simply because in retrospect better tactics are known to have

been available. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984). Also, a

lawyer need not file a motion that he knows to be meritless on the facts and the law. See

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (to show prejudice under Strickland

from failure to file a motion, petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it

is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the

motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more

favorable to him); see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (failure to

take futile action can never be deficient performance).

A. Failure to Argue Involuntariness 

At trial, petitioner sought to suppress the jailhouse recording discussed above,

contending that the circumstances of its making “violated his statutory and constitutional

rights to privacy, due process and freedom from unlawful searches and seizures,” and that

it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the police conduct

was “designed to elicit incriminating statements.” Ex. 4 at 8. As has been noted above, on

appeal he contended that introduction of the recording violated his right not have evidence

used which was “fruit of the poisonous tree,” namely an involuntary confession. Id. One

ground for the court of appeal’s rejection of this claim, again discussed above, was that it

was procedurally barred by counsel’s failure to object on the ground raised on appeal. Id.

at 10. Now petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to object on the

fruit/involuntariness theory.

The court has concluded above that there was no constitutional error because any

taint of involuntariness was attenuated, and also that admission of the tape was harmless. 

As a result, counsel’s failure to object on this ground was not deficient performance,

because the objection would have failed, see Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th

Cir. 2005) (counsel’s performance not deficient for failing to file merit less motion), and for

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the same reason, even if his performance was deficient it was not prejudicial. 

B. Failure to Seek Suppression of a Co-defendant’s Identity

 Williams also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the

suppression of the identity of Rodney H., as the product of the improper interrogation of

petitioner by the police. Petitioner has failed to provide any factual basis for his contention

that Rodney H.’s identity was discovered only as a result of the concededly-improper

interrogation. He therefore has failed to show that counsel was deficient or that he was

prejudiced.

C. Failure to Seek Suppression of Co-defendant’s Testimony

 Petitioner also contends that his counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress

the trial testimony of Rodney H. on grounds that it was the product of a coercive

interrogation of Rodney H. First, petitioner has failed to show that there was a coercive

interrogation of Rodney H. Secondly, as respondent points out, Douglas v. Woodford, 316

F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003), is controlling. In that case the court held that appellant lacked

standing to assert the constitutional rights of a witness who he contended had been

subjected to coercive interrogation. Id. at 1092. The court held that to make out a due

process violation the appellant would have to show that the witness’ actual “trial” testimony

was involuntary. Id. at 1092 (italics in original). Petitioner has presented no evidence

whatever that Rodney H.’s trial testimony was involuntary, so has failed to establish that

counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

challenge it. 

D. Failure to Seek Suppression of Petitioner’s Reaction to Gunshot

Residue Test 

After his arrest, Williams was informed that he would have to undergo a gunshot

residue test. Williams immediately began to cry and scrubbing his hands in a toilet bowl in

his cell. Ex. 4 at 2. Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to

suppress this evidence because of a discovery violation. Petitioner’s counsel did make

such a motion. Ex. 12 at 3339. This claim therefore is without merit.

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E. Failure to Seek Suppression of Eyewitness Testimony as Product of

Coerced Statement by a Third Party

 Petitioner contends that his counsel should have sought to suppress the eyewitness

testimony of Anthony Franklin, who was present during commission of the murder,

contending that the identity of this witness was only obtained through the coercive

questioning of the witness’ brother, McKenzie Franklin. There is absolutely no factual

support for the contention that McKenzie was coerced or that the police learned Anthony’s

identity from McKenzie. This claim therefore is without merit.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Williams contends he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because

counsel did not raise as an issue the trial court’s denial of his request for a mistrial as a

result of the discovery violation mentioned above. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal

defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

are reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington. Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847

(9th Cir. 1986). A defendant therefore must show that counsel's advice fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at

1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849).

It is important to note that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to

raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

745, 751-54 (1983); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller, 882

F.2d at 1434 n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See id. at 1434 (footnote and citations omitted). 

Appellate counsel therefore will frequently remain above an objective standard of

competence and have caused his client no prejudice for the same reason--because he

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declined to raise a weak issue. See id. 

The prosecutor conceded that he had failed to provide part of a police report

describing Williams’ reaction to the gunshot residue test. Ex. 12 at 3318. An appellate

challenge to the trial court’s denial of the motion to exclude or for a mistrial would have

been a weak issue. The California Penal Code section under which the defense sought

exclusion or a mistrial was section 1054.5. Id. at 3319. Subsection (c) of that statute

provides that “[t]he court may prohibit the testimony of a witness pursuant to subdivision (b)

[regarding failure to provide discovery] only if all other sanctions have ben exhausted.” Cal.

Penal Code § 1054.5(c). The trial court offered a continuance if the need for one could be

shown and offered defense counsel a chance to examine the officer who saw petitioner

washing his hands in the toilet and who wrote the report in the absence of the jury. Ex. 12

at 3333. Counsel declined both. Id. Under the statute, exclusion thus was not available. 

It was not deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this weak issue,

nor was the failure to do so prejudicial. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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