Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_23-cv-05225/USCOURTS-arwd-5_23-cv-05225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ADRIAN “CHIP” GARRITTY, on Behalf of

Himself and Others Similarly Situated PLAINTIFFS

V. CASE NO. 5:23-CV-5225

BLAZE MEDIA, LLC; GLENN BECK, 

Individually; BILL O’REILLY, Individually;

CARNIVAL CORPORATION; COSTA 

CRUISE LINES, INC.; PROJECT 

NEPTUNE, LLC d/b/a CRUISEBUILDER 

d/b/a VACATION BUILDER d/b/a 

LATTER DAY TRAVEL d/b/a JUNGLE 

REEF; and WES COBOS, Individually DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Adrian Garritty brings a putative class action on behalf of himself and “[a]ll

persons who purchased tickets for the Glenn Beck Cruise Through History” (the “Class”).

See Doc. 3 ¶ 48. Now before the Court are Defendants Bill O’Reilly, Wes Cobos, Project 

Neptune, LLC d/b/a CruiseBuilder, Carnival Corporation, Costa Cruise Lines, Inc., Glenn 

Beck, and Blaze Media, LLC’s Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 22, 24, 26, 28, 30). Garritty

filed Responses in Opposition (Docs. 65, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81), and Defendants filed Replies

(Docs. 90–97, 101). The Court conducted a hearing on these motions May 1st, 2024. 

(Doc. 106). The Court finds that the Motions should be GRANTED because the Court

lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. The Court therefore does not take up 

Defendants’ alternate bases for dismissal, compelled arbitration or failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6). 

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I. BACKGROUND

This suit arises out of the promotion and sale of tickets to a “Cruise Thru History

with Glenn Beck,” a fourteen-day Mediterranean cruise which was scheduled to depart in 

March of 2020. The Cruise was to feature Defendants Glenn Beck and Bill O’Reilly, 

among others, as guest speakers throughout the journey to various historic and religious 

sites. Blaze Media, Glenn Beck’s conservative media network, partnered with 

CruiseBuilder1 to put together and advertise the Cruise. Blaze Media acted “as the broker 

to purchase ad buys from third parties and also to secure event talent for the cruise.” 

(Doc. 106, p. 27). Interested customers purchased tickets from CruiseBuilder, which 

planned the itinerary, chartered a cruise ship from Carnival and Costa Cruises,

2 and 

booked vendors for the cruise. Wes Cobos was President of CruiseBuilder and was 

involved in planning the Cruise. (Doc. 3, ¶ 30). 

The Cruise was marketed throughout 2019 on Blaze Media’s website, 

“corresponding podcasts[,] and YouTube videos” and on Bill O’Reilly’s web show. (Doc. 

3, ¶ 18; Doc. 77-1). CruiseBuilder also created its own podcast about the Cruise featuring

Glenn Beck which discussed “the religious and political history of each port at which the 

1 Cruise Builder is a d/b/a of Project Neptune, LLC, a Utah company that “specialized in 

cruise-based travel featuring itineraries and excursions not typically offered by other travel 

companies, including travel featuring speakers and entertainers of interest to [Project 

Neptune’s] targeted consumers.” (Doc. 3, p. 178). Mr. Garritty has sued Project Neptune 

and its d/b/as, and the Court will refer to them collectively as “CruiseBuilder.”

2 Carnival and Costa have presented evidence that the charter agreement was actually 

with a related Italian entity, Costa Crociere. However, because the corporate identity of 

the various Carnival partners and subsidiaries is not dispositive, the Court treats Mr. 

Garritty’s allegations as true rather than attempting to resolve the factual dispute.

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ship would stop,” as well as a radio station advertising CruiseBuilder’s “various travel 

offerings.” (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 26–27). 

Garritty purchased three tickets for the Cruise for a total of $25,615. Id. at ¶ 17. 

Garritty has identified between eight and twelve Arkansans who purchased tickets and 

spent “at least $100,000.” (Docs. 77, 75-6). Approximately 2,000 total tickets were sold 

with the cheapest tickets going for $4,999 per person. In addition to cabin tickets, the 

Cruise also offered an “Inner Circle” add-on priced at $4,999 per person which provided 

special access to events with Beck and O’Reilly. (Doc. 3, ¶ 22). 

Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the Cruise was postponed in 2020 and

ultimately canceled three years later. Around the time of the postponement, CruiseBuilder

changed the terms and conditions of the Cruise from requiring a refund in the event of 

cancellation to requiring a refund only of “any unused funds from the reservation 

payments and any amounts refunded back from other travel vendors.” Id. at ¶¶ 32–33.

Beck and Cobos both made statements at various times indicating that the Cruise would 

go forward at a later date and that refunds would be available to people who could not go 

on the postponed Cruise. Id. at ¶ 41, Exs. C, K. CruiseBuilder initially offered vouchers 

for another Costa cruise (without the same itinerary or special guests) that were good 

through November 2023. Id. at ¶ 36, Ex. N, ¶ 24(e). Finally, in February of 2023, 

CruiseBuilder officially cancelled the Cruise. Id. at ¶ 39. To date, none of the roughly 2,000 

ticketholders have received a refund. Id. at ¶ 64. 

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Garritty has sued Defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, unjust 

enrichment, and constructive trust.

3

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A plaintiff must state enough facts in a complaint to support a reasonable inference 

that the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the forum. “When personal jurisdiction 

is challenged by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that jurisdiction 

exists.” Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Tech. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014). “[T]he 

plaintiff’s prima facie showing must be tested, not by the pleadings alone, but by the 

affidavits and exhibits presented with the motions and in opposition thereto.” Dever v. 

Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

“Federal courts apply the long-arm statute of the forum state to determine the 

existence of personal jurisdiction over the parties,” subject to the dictates of due process.

Kaliannan v. Liang, 2 F.4th 727, 733 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 

447, 451 (8th Cir. 2020)). Arkansas's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the 

full extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, so the due process analysis is 

dispositive. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101; Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, *5. “[T]he 

due process analysis depends on whether personal jurisdiction is alleged to be general 

or specific.” Kendall Hunt Publ'g Co. v. Learning Tree Publ'g Corp., 74 F.4th 928, 930 (8th 

Cir. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Garritty does not allege any facts on 

which the Court could conclude that it has general jurisdiction over any defendant. 

3 Notably, Garritty has not sued for breach of contract although his claims center around 

the contractual relationship created by purchasing cruise tickets, likely in an attempt to

avoid the mandatory arbitration provision of the Cruise’s terms and conditions. 

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“In analyzing whether specific jurisdiction comports with due process, we must 

decide whether the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state and 

whether the plaintiffs’ claims ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts.’” Kaliannan, 

2 F.4th at 733 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 

(2021)). Minimum contacts with the forum state “are a prerequisite to the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 288 (2014) (citing Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). To establish minimum contacts, “[t]he defendant 

must have engaged in ‘some act by with the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.’” K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 592 (8th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). Further, “[t]he 

contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” 

Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 

(1984)). Where a defendant “has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of 

conducting activities in the forum State,” courts have “no occasion to address the 

necessary connection between a defendant’s in-state activity and the plaintiff’s claims.” 

Ford, 592 U.S. at 371 (cleaned up). 

Additionally, specific jurisdiction is limited to cases where the plaintiff’s claims 

“arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford, 592 U.S. 351, 359 

(2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 

(2017)). This rule “serves to narrow the class of claims over which a state court may 

exercise specific jurisdiction.” Id. at 361–62. By limiting specific jurisdiction to cases where 

there is “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,” courts protect 

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not only out-of-state defendants but also “interstate federalism.” Id. at 360 (quotations 

omitted). “The law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with little 

legitimate interest in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the controversy.” 

Id. at 360 (cleaned up). 

The Eighth Circuit has incorporated these rules into a five-factor totality-of-thecircumstances test with the first three factors being of “primary importance”: “(1) the 

nature and quality of [the defendant's] contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of 

such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the 

forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties.” 

Kaliannan, 2 F.4th at 733 (alteration in original) (quoting Whaley, 946 F.3d at 452). “The 

third factor speaks to the particular question of specific jurisdiction[,]” akin to the Supreme 

Court’s arise-out-of-or-relate-to requirement. Whaley, 946 F.3d at 452. 

With respect to the third factor, since Garritty alleges that Defendants committed 

intentional torts the Court may also consider the so-called “effects test” announced by the 

Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones to aid its analysis. 465 U.S. 783, 787–89 (1984). The 

effects test allows a defendant’s tortious acts to serves as a source of personal jurisdiction 

if “the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant's acts (1) were intentional, 

(2) were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt 

of which was suffered—and which the defendant knew was likely to be suffered—[in the 

forum state].” Brothers & Sisters in Christ, LLC v. Zazzle, Inc., 42 F.4th 948, 954 (8th Cir. 

2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Lindgren v. GDT, LLC, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 

(S.D. Iowa 2004)). The Eighth Circuit “construe[s] the Calder effects test narrowly,” so 

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“absent additional contacts, mere effects in the forum state are insufficient to confer 

personal jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 797 (8th Cir. 2010). 

The contacts relevant for determining personal jurisdiction “must be the 

defendant’s own choice.” Ford, 571 U.S. at 359. Courts widely reject “jurisdiction by 

association,” so the mere fact that Defendant A had some relationship with Defendant B 

does not impute Defendant B’s contacts with the forum to Defendant A. See Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The unilateral activity of those who claim some 

relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with 

the forum State.”); SPV Osus Ltd. v. UniCredit Bank Austria, 2019 WL 1438163, at *8 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019) (“Even a formal parent-subsidiary relationship will only allow for 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction by association if the subsidiary is either an agent or 

a mere department of the foreign parent.” (cleaned up)).

III. DISCUSSION

In his complaint, Garritty alleges that each Defendant “has minimum contacts with 

the state of Arkansas as [it/he] derives significant revenue from Plaintiff, other Arkansas 

citizens, and other revenue from within the state of Arkansas,” but he does not point to 

any specific contacts with respect to each Defendant. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 2–13). As a result, the 

Court has had to trawl the record to identify which acts were committed by which 

Defendants in order to examine each Defendant’s contacts separately. 

The Court notes at the outset that Garritty relies heavily on Ford for his minimum

contacts analysis. However, in Ford the defendant conceded that it purposefully availed

itself of the forum states’ markets, so the only issue was whether the plaintiffs’ claims

needed to be causally connected to Ford’s contacts with the forums. 592 U.S. at 365

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(“Ford agrees that it has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities

in both places. Ford’s claim is instead that those activities do not sufficiently connect to

the suits.” (cleaned up)). Here, the defendants do not concede that they have purposefully

availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas; to the contrary,

they are actively contesting it here. Thus, the Court does not find Ford dispositive in

evaluating minimum contacts.

A. CruiseBuilder

CruiseBuilder is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of business 

in Utah. (Doc. 3, ¶ 9). Across various filings, Garritty alleges that CruiseBuilder: marketed 

the Cruise nationally, knowing the advertisements would reach Arkansas, which caused 

Arkansans to purchase tickets (Doc. 72, pp. 6–8); “wrongfully altered the terms and 

conditions of the Cruise issued to Plaintiff and the Class to ensure no refunds would be 

issued” (Doc. 3, ¶ 31); made various misleading or fraudulent statements about the status 

of the Cruise prior to its cancellation (Id. at ¶¶ 34–35, 37); and ultimately canceled the 

Cruise but refused to give refunds (Id. at ¶ 39). 

CruiseBuilder argues in its Motion to Dismiss that its marketing campaign and 

response to Arkansas customers seeking a refund do not constitute “purposeful action 

toward Arkansas,” citing Eighth Circuit precedent for the proposition that “[m]erely 

entering into a contract with a forum resident does not provide the requisite contacts 

between a defendant and the forum state . . . particularly . . . when all elements of the 

defendant’s performance are to take place outside of the forum.” (Doc. 27 (quoting Iowa 

Electric, Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1303–04 (8th Cir. 1979))). 

Garritty responds that CruiseBuilder’s argument is outdated because the Supreme 

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Court’s recent decision in Ford established that a strict causal relationship between the 

defendant’s contact with the forum and the plaintiff’s claim is not required. See Doc. 72, 

pp. 2, 4–6, 9–10. (citing Ford, 592 U.S. 351, 361–68 (2021)). Further, he argues that 

CruiseBuilder’s contacts with Arkansas are sufficient to satisfy Ford and the Eighth

Circuit’s five-factor test because CruiseBuilder knew that advertising in Arkansas would 

result in customers from Arkansas. (Doc. 72). 

On the facts of Ford, Garritty’s argues that CruiseBuilder, like Ford, “systematically 

served a market in [Arkansas] for the very [cruise tickets].” (Doc. 72, p. 9). But Ford

instead demonstrates the shortcomings of Garritty’s argument on the facts as alleged.

There, the Court described Ford’s contacts with the forum states, which Ford conceded 

rose to the level of purposeful availment, as follows: 

By every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, 

print ads, and direct mail—Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy 

its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. 

Ford cars—again including those two models—are available for sale, 

whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in Montana 

and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster 

ongoing connections to its cars’ owners. The company's dealers in Montana 

and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, 

including those whose warranties have long since expired. And the 

company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to 

independent auto shops in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford 

money. And by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans 

and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.

592 U.S. at 365. 

Like Ford, CruiseBuilder used advertisements to market the Cruise 

nationally. Unlike Ford, CruiseBuilder has no offices in Arkansas, CruiseBuilder 

offered no in-person sales in Arkansas, CruiseBuilder offered no in-person 

customer support in Arkansas, and CruiseBuilder sent no products into Arkansas. 

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In other words, CruiseBuilder advertised a single out-of-state event in Arkansas, 

but it did not systematically serve a market here. CruiseBuilder is no Ford. 

1. Nature and Quality of CruiseBuilder’s Contacts with Arkansas

The first factor in the Eighth Circuit’s test is the nature and quality of CruiseBuilder’s 

contacts with the forum. CruiseBuilder’s contacts with Arkansas can be put into three

buckets: pre-purchase marketing, contracts with Arkansans, and post-purchase 

messaging. 

With respect to pre-purchase marketing, a defendant’s national marketing 

campaign alone does not confer personal jurisdiction in every state where it succeeds. 

The Eighth Circuit has stated that where “nothing suggests that [the defendant]’s

marketing efforts were actively, exclusively, or even predominantly targeted at [forum]

customers,” the defendant’s contacts with the forum “were merely incidental and did not 

constitute a deliberate and substantial connection with the state such that [the defendant] 

could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there,” even though the defendant’s 

marketing may have reached the plaintiff and other potential customers in the forum. 

Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 824. See also Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40,

41 (8th Cir. 1988) (no jurisdiction over non-resident defendant who sold boat to resident

plaintiff via ad in “nationally distributed boat publication”); cf. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 885–

86 (directing “marketing and sales efforts at the United States” did not subject

manufacturer to jurisdiction in any state where product ended up). In rare cases, a

marketing campaign may suffice to confer personal jurisdiction. One such case is Myers

v. Casino Queen, Inc. 689 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2012).

In Myers, the Eighth Circuit held that a Missouri court could exercise personal

jurisdiction over an Illinois casino in a lawsuit brought by a Missouri resident where

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jurisdiction was premised on the casino’s marketing. Id. at 914. The court concluded that

the nature and quality of the casino’s contacts with Missouri weighed in favor of

jurisdiction because the casino specifically targeted Missouri residents with its marketing

by direct mailing to Missouri residents, advertising in a Missouri baseball stadium, and

operating a shuttle service to move Missouri residents to and from the casino. Id. at 913.

Here, Garritty has not demonstrated that CruiseBuilder’s advertising partners,

Blaze Media, Glenn Beck, and Bill O’Reilly, had any particular connections with Arkansas

or its citizens. Nor has he established that CruiseBuilder’s “marketing efforts were actively,

exclusively, or even predominantly targeted at [Arkansas] customers.” Fastpath, 760 F.3d

at 824. Mere foreseeability that an advertisement campaign may reach the forum state is

not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 883 (rejecting a

“foreseeability” approach to personal jurisdiction as “inconsistent with the premises of

lawful judicial power”).

Turning to CruiseBuilder’s contracts with Arkansans, “[a] contract between a

plaintiff and an out-of-state defendant is not sufficient in and of itself to establish personal

jurisdiction over the defendant in the plaintiff’s forum state.” K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach

& CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Iowa Electric, 603 F.2d at 1304.

“Instead courts should consider the terms of the contract and its contemplated future

consequences in determining whether personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

exists.” Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 821. The Court struggles to see how a contract for a

Mediterranean cruise could “require performance or contemplate future consequences

specifically in” landlocked Arkansas. Id. at 822. Indeed, CruiseBuilder’s terms and

conditions make no mention of Arkansas. See Doc. 3, Ex. E.

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Finally, Garritty relies on CruiseBuilder’s post-purchase messaging which, he

asserts, contained “material misrepresentations” that CruiseBuilder knew would harm the

Arkansans who had purchased tickets. Id. at ¶¶ 60, 67. Pederson v. Frost, 951 F.3d 977 

(8th Cir. 2020), is instructive. There, the Eighth Circuit found no personal jurisdiction over 

out-of-state defendants who allegedly defrauded a forum-state resident. Id. at 978.

Although “hundreds of phone calls and emails” related to the fraud were sent to the 

plaintiff in the forum state, the defendants’ contacts “fit into the ‘random, fortuitous, or 

attenuated’ category” because their only connection to the forum was that the plaintiff 

happened to work there. Id. at 980–81 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 286). 

While each of these buckets on its own is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction 

over CruiseBuilder, the minimum-contacts analysis is a totality-of-the-circumstances test. 

But here, even taken together the nature and quality of CruiseBuilder’s contacts does not 

weigh in favor of personal jurisdiction because the national marketing campaign and 

subsequent Arkansas sales have not established any link between Arkansas and 

CruiseBuilder other than the Arkansas purchasers, and “the plaintiff cannot be the only 

link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285.

2. Quantity of CruiseBuilder’s Contacts with Arkansas

With respect to the quantity of CruiseBuilder’s contacts with Arkansas, Garritty has 

alleged that CruiseBuilder “ran weekly, if not daily, advertisements through Blaze, Beck, 

and O’Reilly’s online, television, and radio markets”; contracted with at most twelve 

Arkansans from whom it collected at least $100,000; and communicated with those 

Arkansans on at least four occasions after their purchases. (Doc. 72, p.8; Doc.3, ¶¶ 30–

31, 35, 39). The exhibits Garritty submitted regarding the ad campaign demonstrate only 

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that CruiseBuilder advertised nationally, but they do not mention Arkansas, and Garritty 

has not offered any evidence about how frequently the ads reached Arkansas. 

Even assuming, as Garritty alleges, that CruiseBuilder’s ads frequently reached 

Arkansas, the marketing, payments, and various communications after purchase are not 

sufficient to weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction here without something more 

connecting CruiseBuilder to Arkansas. See Whaley, 946 F.3d at 452, 453 (stating that 

“the number of contacts does not sway the personal jurisdiction analysis” where the 

defendant “sent numerous calls, emails, and text messages to the plaintiffs in Arkansas”). 

Further, while Garritty points to the total amount paid to CruiseBuilder by Arkansas

buyers to support jurisdiction, it is not clear that this counsels in favor of jurisdiction

because the Arkansas buyers bought tickets under a contract with a Utah company, the

contract did not contemplate performance in Arkansas, and the buyers had to reach out

to the company in Utah by phone to purchase tickets. See Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v.

Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 1211, 1215 n. 4 (8th Cir.1977) (finding that the due

process clause prevented jurisdiction where “[m]ost of the sales accounting for the large

dollar volume involved transactions intentionally arranged and consummated apart from

[the forum], with only the invoicing coming from [the forum]”). At best, this factor is neutral.

The first two factors in the Eighth Circuit’s test correspond with the Supreme 

Court’s purposeful availment requirement. See Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 824 (explaining that 

there is no personal jurisdiction where “[t]he nature, quality, and quantity of [the 

defendant]’s contacts with [the forum] are not sufficient to demonstrate purposeful 

availment”). CruiseBuilder did not “purposefully direct[ ] its activities at residents of the 

forum state” when marketing the Cruise, and its subsequent contacts with Arkansas 

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residents amount to nothing more than knowledge that an Arkansan was on the other end 

of the transaction. Myers, 689 F.3d at 904; Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 824 (“Even if [the 

defendant] solicited the Agreement knowing that [the plaintiff] was an Iowa corporation, 

that knowledge cannot create minimum contacts with Iowa because ‘the plaintiff cannot 

be the only link between the defendant and the forum.’” (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 

285). In sum, on these factors, Garritty has failed to make a prima facie showing of 

purposeful availment. 

3. Relation of the Causes of Action to CruiseBuilder’s Contacts

Minimum contacts are a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 

Walden, 571 U.S. at 288. However, specific jurisdiction also requires that a case arises 

out of or relate to those contacts. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359. This requirement fits within the 

third factor of the Eighth Circuit’s test, the relation of the cause of action to the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum. 

Garritty has alleged that he heard CruiseBuilder’s advertisements in Arkansas and 

that he otherwise “would not have learned about the Cruise and would not have 

purchased tickets.” (Doc. 74, p. 8). As the Court notes above, he relies on Ford to argue

that jurisdiction is proper in Arkansas because he heard CruiseBuilder’s advertisements

in Arkansas and thereafter entered a contract with CruiseBuilder resulting in the alleged

fraud and other torts asserted here. Assuming, as Garritty alleges, that CruiseBuilder’s

advertisements were the but-for cause of his decision to purchase tickets, there is an

appropriate affiliation between CruiseBuilder’s conduct and the underlying controversy. 

See Ford, 592 U.S. at 361–62 (“The first half of [the arise-out-of-or-relate-to] standard

asks about causation; but the back half, after the ‘or’ contemplates that some

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relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.”). Thus, this factor weighs

in favor of personal jurisdiction. 

However, even weighing the third factor in favor of exercising jurisdiction, Garritty

has not met his burden because “personal jurisdiction require[s] ‘some act by which the

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

State,’” and, as described with respect to the first two factors, Garritty has not

demonstrated that CruiseBuilder took any such act here. Dever, 380 F.3d at 1073 (quoting

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). 

As an aside, Garritty could have argued (but did not) that the requisite relationship

exists under the effects test. The effects test “is merely an additional factor to consider”

when an intentional tort is alleged. Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797. The Eighth Circuit

“construe[s] the Calder effects test narrowly,” so “absent additional contacts, mere effects

in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Id. Here, even if we

assume that the first element, intent, is met, Garritty has not made the required showing

on the other two elements. As set out above, CruiseBuilder’s acts were not “uniquely or

expressly aimed at the forum state.” See Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 594 (“[The defendant]’s

refusal to pay the replacement costs in full simply was not ‘uniquely or expressly aimed

at the forum state’ . . . .” (quoting Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796)). Further, he has not shown

that CruiseBuilder “caused harm, the brunt of which was suffered—and which the

defendant knew was likely to be suffered—[in the forum state].” Id. (alteration in original).

From the approximately 2,000 tickets that Garritty alleges were sold, he has identified at

most twelve Arkansas customers. (Doc. 3, ¶ 52, Ex. E). Even assuming, liberally, that

each Arkansas customer purchased ten tickets, that would only amount to 6% of

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purchases which can hardly be considered the brunt of the harm. Thus, Garritty has failed

to make the requisite showing under the effects test. 

4. Secondary Factors

Garritty asserts that Arkansas has an interest in providing a forum for its residents

who purchased these Cruise tickets. Arkansas “has an obvious interest in providing a 

local forum in which its residents may litigate claims against non-residents.” Digi-Tel

Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecommunications (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 525 (8th Cir. 1996).

“However, [the forum state]’s interest in providing its residents with a forum cannot make

up for the absence of minimum contacts.” Id. Finally, the convenience of the parties is

neutral as CruiseBuilder would be inconvenienced by litigation in Arkansas and Garritty

would likely be inconvenienced by litigation in an alternate forum. Bros. & Sisters in

Christ., 42 F.4th at 954. Regardless, none of the additional factors considered by the

Eighth Circuit can make up for the lack of minimum contacts with Arkansas. Therefore,

CruiseBuilder’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

B. Wes Cobos

Wes Cobos, the President of CruiseBuilder, is a resident of Utah. In his Complaint,

Garritty’s only specific allegation involving Cobos is that, before the Cruise was 

postponed, Cobos sent an email about COVID precautions the Cruise would be taking. 

(Doc. 3, ¶ 30). The exhibits to the Complaint also indicate that Cobos gave a statement 

to a BuzzFeed News reporter indicating that refunds would be available and signed 

CruiseBuilder’s bankruptcy petition. See id., Exs. K, M. 

Cobos argues that CruiseBuilder’s contacts with Arkansas should not be imputed 

to him because he was acting in his official capacity as CruiseBuilder’s President. See 

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Arkansas Rice Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Alchemy Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 565, 574 (8th Cir. 

1986) (“The law is clear that a corporate officer or agent who has contact with the forum 

state only with regard to the performance of corporate duties does not thereby become 

subject to jurisdiction in his or her individual capacity.”). Further, Cobos argues, even if all 

of CruiseBuilder’s actions are imputed to him, CruiseBuilder still lacks sufficient contacts 

with Arkansas to be subject to its jurisdiction. 

Garritty’s Response to Cobos’s Motion appears in large part to be identical to his 

CruiseBuilder Response. Garritty does, however, make a single-paragraph attempt to 

address Cobos’s individual liability for his official acts. Namely, he argues that Cobos 

should be subject to individual liability because he is the owner of CruiseBuilder and 

therefore stood to profit from retaining the Class’s money. (Doc. 71, p. 10). He does not 

mention, let alone address the propriety of, veil-piercing as a means to assert personal 

jurisdiction. Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A]

court's assertion of jurisdiction is contingent on the ability of the plaintiffs to pierce the 

corporate veil. State law is viewed to determine whether and how to pierce the corporate 

veil.” (citation omitted)). In any event, even if all of CruiseBuilder’s conduct is imputed to 

Cobos, Garritty has failed to establish that CruiseBuilder’s contacts rise to the level of 

purposeful availment. Therefore, the Court cannot properly exercise jurisdiction over 

Cobos, so his Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

C. Glenn Beck and Blaze Media

Glenn Beck is a resident of Texas, and Blaze Media is a Delaware company 

headquartered in Texas. According to the Complaint, “Glenn Beck was the primary 

advertiser for the Cruise, was the decision-maker when it came to passengers’ experience 

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on the cruise and the deciding factor in Plaintiff and Class Members’ decision to purchase 

tickers on the Cruise.” (Doc. 3, ¶ 29). CruiseBuilder hired Blaze to conduct its marketing 

campaign, including ad buys and coordinating the talent for the Cruise. After COVID 

began, Beck gave a statement to BuzzFeed that refunds should be available but that he 

looked forward to going on the Cruise when circumstances permitted. Id. at ¶ 35). Further, 

Garritty alleges that Beck received $679,864 from Inner Circle tickets which was not 

returned to purchasers. (Id. at ¶ 36). 

Beck and Blaze (collectively “Blaze Defendants”)

4 argue that the Court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over them because their alleged conduct did not specifically target 

Arkansas. Garritty again responds that Ford rejected a strict causation requirement. His

reliance on Ford is again inapposite as Ford addressed the arise-out-of-or-relate-to 

requirement, not the minimum-contacts requirement. But even with his reliance on Ford, 

Garritty has failed to make the necessary showing for either requirement. 

1. Nature and Quality of Blaze Defendants’ Contacts with Arkansas

Here, Blaze Defendants’ contacts with Arkansas are even more attenuated that 

CruiseBuilder’s, as they did not enter contracts with any Arkansas residents related to the 

Cruise, did not collect any payments directly from the Class, and were not responsible for

refunding any money directly to the Class. See Hawkeye Gold, LLC v. China Nat'l 

Materials Indus. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 89 F.4th 1023, 1036 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 

4 Beck and Blaze filed a joint Motion to Dismiss and did not distinguish between the two 

in their arguments with respect to personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will treat them 

as a single unit in evaluating its jurisdiction over them. The Court finds that, even imputing 

all contacts to both defendants, Garritty has not made the requisite showing for personal 

jurisdiction and therefore will not go to the trouble of attempting to parse who is 

responsible for what. 

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S. Ct. 2605 (2024) (holding that the forum state lacked sufficient contacts with parent 

company who was consignee but not party to a contract entered into by its subsidiary in 

the forum state). Garritty argues that Blaze Defendants derived revenue from himself and 

other Arkansans who booked the Cruise. Even assuming this is true and inferring that 

CruiseBuilder wrongfully paid Blaze Defendants rather than refunding money to 

ticketholders, that is not conduct that can be attributed to Blaze Defendants because 

payments by CruiseBuilder are attributable only to CruiseBuilder. See Ford, 571 U.S. at 

359. (“The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice . . . .”). Thus, the only relevant 

contacts for the jurisdictional analysis here are Blaze Defendants’ advertisements and 

other communications that were received in Arkansas. 

As described above, mere participation in a national marketing campaign is not 

sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in every state the campaign reaches. Here

however, Blaze Defendants are even a step farther removed because they were merely 

the hosts for a third-party advertisement, not the actual seller. One would not expect Billy 

Mays to have been subject to jurisdiction anywhere that OxiClean was sold; similarly,

Blaze Defendants cannot be subject to jurisdiction anywhere that the Cruise was sold 

merely because buyers relied on the strength of their endorsement. 

Additionally, even assuming that Blaze Defendants received payment from 

CruiseBuilder for ticket sales, this does not connect Blaze Defendants to Arkansas 

because it relies on “[the] unilateral activity of another party,” CruiseBuilder, which “is not 

an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient 

contacts with a forum State to justify and assertion of jurisdiction.” Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).

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2. Quantity of Blaze Defendants’ Contacts with Arkansas

As compared to CruiseBuilder, Blaze Defendants’ only contacts with Arkansas 

were the “weekly, if not daily, advertisements” for the Cruise, some of which reached 

Arkansas, and Beck’s post-purchase statements to the Class. (Doc. 78, p. 8; Doc. 3, ¶

41). Blaze Defendants did not enter contracts with Garritty or any other Arkansans. Here, 

given the nature of the advertisements—they were for a third party’s event, rather than 

Blaze Defendants’ own offerings—this factor is at best neutral. See Whaley, 946 F.3d at 

453. And Blaze Defendants’ contacts with Arkansas are fewer and more attenuated than 

CruiseBuilders’s. In total, the nature, quality, and quantity of Blaze Defendants’ contacts 

with Arkansas do not rise to the level of purposeful availment. 

3. Relation of the Causes of Action to Blaze Defendants’ Contacts

In addition to the lack of minimum contacts, Garritty has also failed to establish 

that his claims arise out of or relate to Blaze Defendants’ contacts with Arkansas. In 

Hawkeye Gold, the Eighth Circuit determined that “there is no relation between [the 

defendant]’s alleged minimum contacts and the cause of action” where the plaintiff’s 

claims were based on its contract with the defendant’s “separate, now-defunct U.S. 

subsidiary.” 89 F.4th at 1036. Although the defendant was the consignee of the contract, 

it could not be subject to jurisdiction on breach-of-contract claims because the plaintiff 

failed to show that the defendant was a party to the contract or the subsidiary’s alter-ego. 

Id. Here too, Blaze Defendants may have benefitted from CruiseBuilder’s contacts with 

Arkansas residents, but there is no relation between Blaze Defendants contacts and 

CruiseBuilder’s failure to refund the Class’s money. 

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Garritty has also argued foreseeable harm with respect to Blaze Defendants 

without specifically raising the effects test. For much the same reasons as described with 

respect to CruiseBuilder, the effects test does not permit the exercise of jurisdiction over 

Blaze Defendants. 

4. Secondary Factors

Arkansas has an interest in providing a forum to its residents that weighs in favor 

of exercising jurisdiction. The convenience of the parties is neutral because Arkansas is 

inconvenient to Blaze Defendants, but another forum would likely be inconvenient to 

Garritty. Regardless, Garritty has failed to establish sufficient minimum contacts with 

Arkansas or a sufficient relation between those contacts and this litigation for the Court 

to exercise jurisdiction over Blaze Defendants. Therefore, Blaze Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED.

D. Bill O’Reilly

Bill O’Reilly is domiciled in New York. (Doc. 23-1, ¶ 20). Like Beck, O’Reilly was 

an intended guest speaker on the cruise and participated in the advertising campaign. 

Unlike Beck, O’Reilly did not sign off on communications with ticket purchasers and was 

not involved in planning the Cruise. There is no indication that O’Reilly’s advertisements 

were in anyway directed toward Arkansas, and Garritty’s evidence indicates the opposite. 

See Doc. 77-1 (describing “national radio and digital campaign”). As described above with 

respect to Blaze Defendants, mere participation in a national advertisement campaign 

that results in a forum resident’s purchase is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction 

in any state where a purchaser happens to reside. See Wines, 846 F.2d at 43; Iowa Elec., 

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603 F.2d at 1303. Because the advertisement campaign is O’Reilly’s only connection with 

Arkansas, his Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

E. Carnival Defendants

Carnival Corporation and Costa Cruise Lines (“Carnival Defendants”) argue that 

Garritty sued the wrong entities because the charter agreement for the Cruise was 

between CruiseBuilder and Costa Crociere, SpA, a subsidiary of Carnival Corporation’s 

sister company in Europe, Carnival PLC. (Doc. 106). Because the Court finds that it lacks 

jurisdiction over Carnival Defendants even on the facts as alleged, the Court does not 

wade into the issue of Carnival and Costa’s corporate structures. As such, for purposes 

of this discussion the Court assumes that Carnival Defendants were parties to the charter 

agreement with CruiseBuilder. 

Carnival Defendants are headquartered and incorporated in Florida. (Doc 38-1). 

The only contacts asserted between Carnival Defendants and this litigation are that 

Carnival Defendants chartered a ship to CruiseBuilder for the Cruise and retained 

CruiseBuilder’s payment. (Doc. 3, ¶ 19; Doc. 81). Garritty does not allege that the Class

entered contracts with or rendered payment to Carnival Defendants. Further, Garritty

does not allege that CruiseBuilder was acting as Carnival’s agent or vice-versa. He does, 

however, repeatedly assert that “Carnival & Costa are not strangers to this cruise charter.”

See Doc. 81, p. 4. However, the cruise charter was between Carnival Defendants and 

CruiseBuilder, not Carnival Defendants and Garritty, and Garritty admits that the charter

was signed “in Pembroke Pines, Florida,” not Arkansas. Id. All the contacts Garritty

asserts between Carnival and the Class are CruiseBuilder’s contacts which merely 

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“referenc[e]” Costa Cruises. Id. at 7. The bottom line: Garritty has not alleged any contacts 

between Carnival Defendants and Arkansas. 

There is no such thing as jurisdiction by association. Garritty has not stated any 

legal basis for the Court to impute CruiseBuilder’s conduct to Carnival Defendants solely 

because they were parties to a separate contract which is not the basis for any of his

claims. Absent CruiseBuilder’s conduct, he has not alleged that Carnival Defendants took 

“any act to ‘form[ ] a contact’ of [their] own.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 351 (quoting Walden, 571 

U.S. at 370). Just as the Florida farmer who sells crops to a national grocery distributor 

cannot be sued in Alaska merely because one of his oranges ends up there, Carnival 

Defendants cannot be sued in any and every state where a charteree of one of their boats 

sold a ticket. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 885. Carnival Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 

therefore GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 22, 24, 

26, 28, 30) are GRANTED due to lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). The 

case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 27th day of September, 2024. 

 _____________________________

 TIMOTHY L. BROOKS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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