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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted April 29, 202021TP0F

*

Decided May 11, 2020 

Before 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1066 

ISRAEL COBIAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER MCLAUGHLIN, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 14-1218-SEM-TSH 

Sue E. Myerscough, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Israel Cobian, an Illinois inmate, sued prison officials for violating the Eighth 

Amendment by leaving him in a cell that, after a full cleansing, contained remnants of 

another inmate’s feces. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary 

judgment for defendants. Because the conditions in Cobian’s nearly clean cell did not 

pose a known, excessive risk to his health and safety, we affirm. 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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 According to Cobian, in whose favor we construe the evidence and draw all 

reasonable inferences, see Bridges v. Dart, 950 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2020), the trouble 

began after he was sentenced to time in segregation for a disciplinary violation. Cobian 

was placed in a cell in which the prior occupant had “splashed” his feces. Another 

inmate hosed down the cell before Cobian arrived, but Cobian found that some human 

waste remained on the window and screen, cell door, floor near his bed, and port 

through which he received food. 

After Cobian notified prison staff about the cell’s condition, he received cleaning 

supplies—bleach, disinfectant, rags, and gloves. With them, he cleaned up all the feces 

except for remnants stuck in two areas: an enclosed section of plexiglass on the cell door 

(above the food port, which he fully cleaned) and behind the window screen near the 

foot of his bed. Because the window was broken, wind blew dry fecal matter onto 

Cobian’s feet at night, which he had to wash off in his sink in the mornings. 

Cobian continued to complain about the remaining waste to no avail. The prison 

denied his requests to be moved, and he remained in the cell for two months, 

prompting this suit. The district court initially construed his complaint as alleging only 

a First Amendment claim of retaliation, which he lost on summary judgment. That 

judgment led to an appeal and our remand of the case for the district court to consider 

Cobian’s claim that the defendants had violated the Eighth Amendment by placing and 

keeping him in the cell. See Cobian v. McLaughlin, 717 F. App’x 605 (7th Cir. 2017). 

 On remand, two procedural clashes unfolded. The first involved discovery: 

Cobian moved to compel discovery and for sanctions after the defendants objected on 

security grounds to Cobian’s inquiries about when and how they move inmates in 

segregation, the discipline of the prior occupant of his cell, and the names of inmates in 

segregation. The district court accepted the defendants’ responses and denied Cobian’s 

motions. Second, Cobian twice asked the court to recruit counsel for him, contending 

that he could not navigate discovery on his own. But the court denied these requests as 

well, concluding that Cobian had demonstrated competence to litigate the case. 

The district court later entered summary judgment for defendants. It reasoned 

that Cobian was able to clean most of the cell on the day of his transfer and that the 

remnants of feces that remained behind the window and on the plexiglass did not harm 

him, so he had not suffered an Eighth Amendment violation. 

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 On appeal, Cobian argues generally that the district court erred by denying him 

a trial on his conditions-of-confinement claim. To stave off summary judgment, Cobian 

needed to produce evidence that could satisfy both an objective and subjective element.

Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). First, he needed to make an objective 

showing that the conditions of his segregation cell denied him “‘the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities’ ... creating an excessive risk to [his] health and safety.” Id.

(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Second, he needed to make a 

subjective showing that the defendants knew of, and were deliberately indifferent to, 

that risk. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). 

Cobian has not presented sufficient evidence of either component of his claim. 

He contends that the residual fecal matter on the door and behind the window screen 

satisfy the objective prong because it posed an excessive risk to his health. Exposure to 

human feces may violate the Eighth Amendment where no cleaning supplies and water 

are made available to manage the problem. See, e.g., Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 

(7th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989). But it is uncontested 

that the cell was hosed down before Cobian arrived and, after he complained about the 

remaining waste, prison officials gave him cleaning supplies the same day, which he 

used with running water to clean the cell. Although he could not eradicate remnants in 

the encased area above the food slot (which was clean) and behind the window screen, 

no evidence suggests that this unwanted residue severely endangered him or that the 

defendants knew of such a danger. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521–23. 

Cobian responds that the district court’s denial of his discovery motions made it 

impossible for him to produce evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment. 

District courts have broad discretion to manage discovery, and we will reverse only if 

an abuse of discretion prejudiced Cobian. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 

2011). Cobian urges that the documents he sought would have revealed the identity of 

the jail official who placed him in the soiled cell. But his claim does not fail because he 

sued the wrong defendants; it fails because the cell’s conditions did not violate the 

Constitution. Cobian also argues that he needed testimony from the inmate who soiled 

the cell and the other inmates in segregation at the time to prove that the cell was 

unsanitary. But we have accepted his position that the cell was covered in feces before 

he arrived and that, after hosing it down, some waste remained. The problem for 

Cobian is that as soon as the prison’s staff learned of the residual waste, they gave him 

the means to clean it. More discovery, therefore, would not have helped him prove his 

claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health. 

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Next Cobian contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 

motions for counsel. He argues that, as an incarcerated litigant, he was in “no position 

to properly investigate” facts critical to his case. But the test for recruitment of counsel 

is not whether a lawyer could more effectively handle the case; it is whether Cobian 

appeared competent to litigate his claims. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(en banc). Here the district court reasonably found that Cobian appeared competent: he 

had served coherent discovery, filed cogent pleadings, and successfully litigated an 

earlier appeal of this case pro se. His incarcerated status may have made litigating more 

difficult, but that is a factor faced by all inmates and does not by itself justify recruiting 

counsel. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Finally, Cobian argues that Judge Myerscough was biased against him and 

should be removed from the case. Although he did not raise his recusal request in the 

district court, we may still review this issue. See Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 794–95 (7th 

Cir. 2016). A judge must recuse herself when she has a personal bias concerning a party, 

or when her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455. Cobian insists 

that Judge Myerscough’s denials of his discovery motions and motions for counsel 

prove that she was biased against him. But a judge’s adverse rulings alone do not 

establish bias or partiality. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also 

Matter of Huntington Commons Assocs., 21 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1994). And a reasonable 

person would not find that the rulings here reveal “a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. 

AFFIRMED 

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