Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-01210/USCOURTS-ca10-19-01210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

EUGENE WIDEMAN, JR., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 19-1210 

(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00717-LTB-GPG) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Eugene Wideman, Jr., appearing pro se,1

 appeals the dismissal of his action 

against the United States Government under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193; the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680; the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-33, 245, 

2101-02, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631; and the First and 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 “Because [Mr. Wideman] is pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but we 

will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 12, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 1
2 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Wideman also has 

filed a motion to compel, in which he seeks an order from this court compelling the 

immediate reinstatement of his FECA medical benefits. Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the dismissal and deny the motion to compel. 

BACKGROUND 

According to his complaint,2

 Mr. Wideman has been receiving FECA benefits 

since 2002 due to an injury he sustained while working for the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons. Mr. Wideman was placed under the care of Dr. Anjum Sharma in late 2017. 

Dr. Sharma determined Mr. Wideman was capable of standing four to six hours per 

day and was capable of returning to work. On the corresponding paperwork, he listed 

Mr. Wideman’s job as a correctional officer, which Mr. Wideman believed was 

“racist” and based on an assumption that he, as an African-American, “has limit[ed] 

education as well [as] limited job experience.” R. at 15. Because Mr. Wideman also 

believed Dr. Sharma was ignoring his complaints with his hands and wrists and was 

conspiring with the government to terminate his benefits, he used his personal 

insurance to see a hand and wrist specialist. On November 1, 2018, the specialist 

confirmed Mr. Wideman had Carpal Tunnel Syndrome in both hands. 

The following day, Mr. Wideman called the Office of Worker’s Compensation 

Programs (OWCP) and spoke with a claims examiner. During the conversation, the 

 2

 We decline to consider additional factual allegations Mr. Wideman has 

included in his briefs that were not pleaded and part of the record before the district 

court “since it is only the sufficiency of the complaint which is being reviewed.” 

Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566 (10th Cir. 1993). 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 2
3 

claims examiner asked “[i]f he was so disabled how could he go shop for groceries.” 

R. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Wideman believed this was “racist” 

and stereotyped “African-Americans as being lazy and wanting only to set [sic] home 

and get free money from the Government while they watch TV all day and go 

shopping.” Id. That same day, the OWCP terminated Mr. Wideman’s FECA benefits 

on the ground that he refused to participate in vocational testing and training. 

However, he believed the termination was because of his age and race and that the 

government was attempting to avoid paying for several surgeries he required. 

On March 8, 2019, Mr. Wideman filed this action, which, although “rambling 

and repetitive of claims he has raised in previous complaints,” R. at 437, alleged that 

he was subjected to age and racial discrimination, that his FECA benefits were 

improperly terminated, and that he received negligent medical care. He sought, inter 

alia, reinstatement of his benefits, reimbursement for the visit to the specialist, an 

anti-gravity treadmill, a prescription for medical marijuana, and $1.7 million. The 

matter was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended the action be dismissed 

in part without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed in part 

with prejudice as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The district 

court adopted the recommendation,3

 and Mr. Wideman timely appealed. 

 3

 The government filed a motion to dismiss the day before the magistrate judge 

issued his recommendation, and Mr. Wideman asserts the magistrate judge “refused 

to allow” him an opportunity to respond. Aplt. Opening Br. at 3. But the magistrate 

judge reviewed the complaint for frivolity under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and 

therefore, neither the magistrate judge nor the district court addressed the merits of 

the government’s motion, which the district court ultimately denied as moot. 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 3
4 

DISCUSSION 

 Mr. Wideman contends the district court erred in dismissing (1) his statutory 

and constitutional claims regarding the termination of his FECA benefits, and (2) his 

racial discrimination claims.4

 We hold that Mr. Wideman waived his FECA-related 

claims and that the district court properly dismissed his racial discrimination claim. 

I. FECA-Related Claims 

Mr. Wideman first contests the district court’s dismissal of his FECA-related 

claims. These claims are waived under our court’s firm waiver rule. 

Under the firm waiver rule, “a party who fails to make a timely objection to 

the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations waives appellate review of both 

factual and legal questions.” Morales–Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 

(10th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“A party may not assign as error a 

defect in [a magistrate judge’s] order not timely objected to.”). Objections must be 

“sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal 

issues that are truly in dispute.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 

1060 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Soliz v. Chater, 82 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1996) 

(finding a general objection insufficient to preserve review of specific issues). 

 4

 On appeal, Mr. Wideman has not addressed his age discrimination or FTCA 

claims. These claims, thus, are waived. See United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 

1128 (10th Cir. 2011). We also decline to consider claims that he attempts to raise 

for the first time on appeal, including a standalone conspiracy claim purportedly 

under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and claims under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments. See 

Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 4
5 

After the magistrate judge entered his recommendation, Mr. Wideman filed 

objections but only as to his claim of racial discrimination. See R. at 453-55. 

Because he did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding his 

FECA-related claims, those claims are subject to the firm waiver rule.5

 See Port City 

Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1190 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (deeming an 

issue waived where it was not included in the objections). 

Mr. Wideman may avoid the firm waiver rule if can show that (1) he was not 

informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences for failing to object, 

or (2) the interests of justice warrant review. See Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 

1237 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Wideman cannot avail himself of the first exception 

because (1) he has not contended he was unaware of the time period for objections; 

and (2) the magistrate judge’s recommendation plainly included notice of the need to 

file objections to preserve issues for appellate review. As for the second exception, 

“we have considered factors such as a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, the force and 

plausibility of the explanation for his failure to comply, and the importance of the 

issues raised.” Id. at 1238 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Wideman has 

stated he “assume[d] . . . everything in the Record on Appeal was appealable.” Aplt. 

Reply Br. at 8. But the magistrate judge cautioned that “objections must specifically 

 5

 Although the district court stated it “reviewed the Recommendation de 

novo,” R. at 458, and, thus, applied the “review normally triggered only by timely 

and specific objections . . ., that fact [does] not preclude application of the waiver 

rule.” Key Energy Res. Inc. v. Merrill (In re Key Energy Res. Inc.), 230 F.3d 1197, 

1201 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 5
6 

identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made” 

and that failure to timely file objections would bar appellate review. R. at 431 n.2. 

Moreover, we do not find the FECA-related claims to be sufficiently substantial to 

justify excusing the firm waiver rule. Finally, contrary to his contention, the fact that 

he has received FECA benefits for over 17 years is not a basis to invoke the 

interests-of justice exception. Accordingly, Mr. Wideman’s FECA-related claims are 

waived. 

II. Racial Discrimination Claim 

Mr. Wideman next contends the district court erred in dismissing his racial 

discrimination claim premised on the claims examiner asking how he could shop for 

groceries if he was disabled.6

 We disagree. 

To the extent the court dismissed Mr. Wideman’s claim for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, our review is de novo. See Blue Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Azar, 

919 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019). To the extent the court found the claim 

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), we review for an abuse of discretion, 

unless there is an issue of law, which we review de novo. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 

1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). A claim is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 6

 Mr. Wideman asserted in his objections that the claims examiner “made some 

very discriminatory remarks,” R. at 453, but he has only identified the challenged 

statement. 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 6
7 

 It is well-settled that “[t]he burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is 

on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 

2002). In his complaint, Mr. Wideman cited the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as a 

jurisdictional basis for his racial discrimination claim. But the district court correctly 

found “nothing under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that would pertain to the claims 

that [Mr. Wideman] is raising in this action.” R. at 440. The Civil Rights Act of 

1968 encompasses hate crimes, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, 

and the Anti-Riot Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 

73-92. None of these provisions apply to Mr. Wideman’s allegations, and he has not 

argued otherwise. See United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(noting arguments not raised or adequately presented in an appellant’s opening brief 

are waived). The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed the claim for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction to the extent it was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 

 Additionally, although not specifically pleaded in the complaint, the district 

court assessed whether Mr. Wideman’s claim could be cognizable as a constitutional 

claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 

403 U.S. 388 (1971). The court properly rejected the claim to the extent it was 

against the United States Government—the only defendant named in the complaint. 

See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A] Bivens claim 

can be brought only against federal officials in their individual capacities. Bivens

claims cannot be asserted directly against the United States, federal officials in their 

official capacities, or federal agencies[.]” (citation omitted)). The court then properly 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 7
8 

determined the claim was frivolous to the extent it was against the claims examiner, 

observing that “racially discriminatory language can provide some evidence of a 

discriminatory purpose when . . . coupled with some additional harassment or 

constitutional violation” but that “a racial epithet by itself is not an actionable 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” R. at 441.7

 Cf. Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 

825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (noting verbal abuse alone does not violate the 

constitution).8

 On appeal, Mr. Wideman has offered only conclusory assertions without 

“citations to the record or legal authority.” Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 

1037 (10th Cir. 2012). And this “court will not consider . . . issues adverted to in a 

perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.” 

United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004). Having thoroughly 

reviewed the briefs and the record, we find no reversible error, and we affirm the 

 7

 Contrary to his assertion, the magistrate judge did not agree the statement 

was racist but merely concluded that “[t]o the extent the claims examiner’s question 

could be construed as racist, or even a racial epithet, the question does not rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation,” R. at 441 (emphasis added). 

8

 In his objections, Mr. Wideman asserted for the first time that his benefits 

were terminated after his conversation with the claims examiner and that she 

“followed up her words with actions that were Racially Motivated.” R. at 456. He, 

thus, attempted to connect the allegation in his complaint that the claims examiner 

asked him a racist question with his separate allegation that the requirement of 

vocational training and the resulting termination of benefits was racist. But “theories 

raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s [recommendation] are 

deemed waived.” United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 8
9 

dismissal of the racial discrimination claim for substantially the same reasons stated 

in the magistrate judge’s recommendation adopted by the district court. 

III. Restriction on Future Appeals 

As the district court observed, Mr. Wideman is “not a stranger to [the] 

[c]ourt,” having filed twelve other cases in that court since 2004. R. at 432. Four of 

those cases concerned his FECA benefits, with the district court dismissing three and 

administratively closing one. See id. at 432-33 & n.3. Mr. Wideman appealed one of 

those dismissals, and we affirmed, finding that he had “not fairly allege[d] a legally 

sufficient federal connection” and that some of his arguments were “patently 

meritless.” Wideman v. Watson, 617 F. App’x 891, 892-94 (10th Cir. 2015). 

We previously have imposed filing restrictions on Mr. Wideman because of 

his frivolous appeals regarding child custody issues. See Wideman v. Colorado, 

409 F. App’x 184, 187 (10th Cir. 2010); see also id. at 185 n.1 (citing the prior 

appeals). Because of the frivolous actions he has filed related to his FECA benefits, 

including now two frivolous appeals, we hereby restrict Mr. Wideman from filing 

further pro se materials with this court related to his FECA benefits, subject to the 

opportunity to object described below. See Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 

(10th Cir. 2008). 

Mr. Wideman shall have twenty days from the date of this order and judgment 

to file written objections, limited to ten pages, to these proposed filing restrictions. 

See id. If he does not file timely objections, the restrictions shall take effect thirty 

days from the date of this order and judgment. See id. If he does file timely 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 9
10 

objections, the restrictions shall only take effect if and when this court rules against 

his objections. See id. at 1181-82.

CONCLUSION 

The district court’s judgment is affirmed, and Mr. Wideman’s motion to 

compel is denied. His objections, if any, to the proposed filing restrictions described 

above are due twenty days from the date of this order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 19-1210 Document: 010110303232 Date Filed: 02/12/2020 Page: 10