Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02445/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02445-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VANESSA ROJAS,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

CASE NOS. 18cv2445-LAB

 17cr337-LAB

ORDER DENYING PETITION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT 

SENTENCE [Dkt. 201]

On April 4, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Vanessa Rojas pleaded guilty to 

conspiracy to distribute heroin. On October 10, 2017, she was sentenced to eighty 

months imprisonment and six years of supervised release. She has now brought a 

petition to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that 

she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she alleges that (1) she was 

not involved in a conspiracy and should not have pleaded guilty to being involved in one; 

(2) she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a larger amount of drugs than she was 

actually responsible for, (3) her counsel should have argued for a minor role reduction at 

sentencing, and (4) her criminal history score was miscalculated. For the reasons below, 

Rojas’ petition is DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

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I. No Hearing is Necessary

To be entitled to a hearing, petitioner must allege specific facts which, if true, would 

entitle her to relief. United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996). No 

hearing is required in order to examine vague or conclusory allegations. Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1977); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.

1993). Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), if the records and files and the motion itself 

conclusively show that the prisoner is not entitled to relief, no hearing is required. 

Having reviewed the record in this case, it is apparent that an evidentiary hearing 

is unnecessary. Rojas’ allegations are vague and conclusory. She alleges that she 

received bad advice from her counsel, but does not specify what advice she received. 

She says she was either innocent of the crime or guilty of conspiring to distribute a smaller 

quantity of drugs than what she pleaded guilty to, but she provides no other details. She 

says her criminal history at sentencing listed convictions that should not have been listed, 

but does not specify which convictions were erroneously listed nor how their inclusion 

affected her sentence. In short, the lack of actual details suggests a hearing would be 

unnecessary.

II. Analysis

Rojas’ petition seeks relief under Section 2255 on the grounds that her counsel 

was ineffective. To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Rojas would have 

to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). A petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an 

“objective standard of reasonableness” and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 

694. There is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct is reasonable, Hendricks v. 

Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995), and “[r]eview of counsel’s performance is 

highly deferential.” United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 

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1986). For multiple, independent reasons, the Court finds that Rojas did not receive 

ineffective assistance of counsel.

a. Waiver of Collateral Review

Rojas entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and waived her right to appeal 

or collaterally attack her sentence. A defendant validly waives her right to appeal or 

collaterally attack a sentence if the language of the waiver encompasses her right to 

appeal on the grounds raised and she knowingly and voluntarily agrees to waive those 

rights. See United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.2011). However, a 

waiver cannot bar a claim that relates to the validity of the waiver itself, such as ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir.1994).

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the enforceability of waivers, reasoning that the right 

to bring a collateral attack is derived by statue, and “[a] knowing and voluntary waiver of 

a statutory right is enforceable.” See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th 

Cir.1993). Petitioner's plea agreement explicitly waived the right to collaterally attack her

sentence. See Dkt. 57 at 10-11 (“Defendant waives (gives up) all rights to appeal and to 

collaterally attack every aspect of the conviction and sentence . . . . The only exception 

is that Defendant may collaterally attack the conviction or sentence on the basis that 

Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.”). Accordingly, pursuant to the plea 

agreement, Petitioner validly waived all grounds for collateral review except ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

This waiver extends to at least two of Rojas’ newfound arguments: that she was 

not involved in the conspiracy she pleaded guilty to participating in, and that, if she was, 

the conspiracy was for a lesser quantity of drugs than she pleaded guilty to distributing. 

Rojas includes all of her grounds for relief in a single claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel. See Dkt. 201 at 5. But she cannot shield claims that have little to do with 

ineffective assistance of counsel, such as actual innocence, from the scope of her waiver 

simply by placing them under a heading of ineffective assistance. The Court will look past 

Rojas’ labels to the substance of her claims. To the extent she alleges actual innocence 

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or reduced culpability, she has no standing to collaterally attack her conviction or 

sentence on those grounds.

In any event, Rojas’ new arguments that she is either innocent or less culpable are 

directly contradicted by statements made under oath during her plea colloquy. “Solemn 

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent 

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary 

dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). During her colloquy, Rojas stated under 

oath that the following facts were true: “there was an agreement between [Rojas] and 

others to distribute heroin. . . . [Rojas] worked as a heroin distributor for codefendant, 

Andrea Ball. [Rojas] worked jointly with Ms. Ball to purchase and distribute gramquantities of heroin in North County, San Diego. . . . [T]he entire conspiracy involved at 

least one kilogram and more of heroin and this type of quantity and drugs were within the 

scope of [the] agreement or were reasonably foreseeable to [Rojas].” See Dkt. 205-1 at 

13:10-21. Accordingly, even if these new challenges were not expressly waived—which 

they were—they are directly contradicted by her former statements. 

b. Lack of Specificity

Even putting aside the waiver of claims, Rojas’ arguments lack sufficient specificity 

or substance to warrant consideration. A petitioner “must make specific factual 

allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief on his claim” in order to withstand 

summary dismissal on a § 2255 motion. United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1395 

(9th Cir.1990). Rojas does not meet that threshold here.

Rojas’ allegations are conclusory at best. As noted above, she claims she pleaded 

guilty to being involved in a conspiracy that she either was not involved in or that involved 

a smaller quantity of drugs. She provides no other details from which the Court could 

infer innocence. She does not state the actual amount of drugs or explain why she 

pleaded guilty to a conspiracy she was not involved in. Rojas also says her “attorney 

gave [her] advice that was not reasonable.” Dkt. 201 at 5. She does not say what advice 

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she received or provide any context that would allow the Court to infer her assistance was 

ineffective. Rojas argues that her “criminal history overstated [her] prior record and was 

miscalculated based on [her] convictions.” Id. She does not specify which convictions 

were incorrectly listed, nor how this affected her sentence. In short, Rojas’ claims are 

exactly the kind of conclusory allegations that the law prohibits. For this reason alone, 

her petition must be summarily denied.

c. Failure to Appeal

Rojas’ claims other than those directly alleging ineffective assistance of counsel 

are also barred because she failed to raise them on direct appeal. “The general rule in 

federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is 

barred from raising the claim on collateral review.” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 

331, 350–51 (2006). A petitioner can overcome this bar only if he or she can show their 

failure to raise the issue was the result of good cause and resulted in prejudice. Id. at 

351.

Here, because Rojas did not file a direct appeal, her collateral attack is 

presumptively invalid. She fails demonstrate in her petition why, if her allegations are 

true, she failed to timely appeal her conviction or the Court’s sentence. Nor does she 

provide any argument that would support a finding that the conviction or sentence would 

have been overturned on appeal had she raised these arguments. Her claims other than 

those directly relating to ineffective assistance of counsel—including her claims of 

innocence and reduced culpability—are therefore alternatively barred by her failure to 

raise them on appeal. 

d. No Other Grounds Warrant Relief

Putting aside the various procedural issues with Rojas’ petition, it also fails on the 

merits. Rojas first argues that her attorney did not properly argue for a “minor role”

reduction at her sentencing. Dkt. 201 at 5. “A minor participant is substantially less 

culpable than the average participant. The guidelines recognize that, in some 

circumstances, a courier may play a minor role, but [ ] simply being a courier does not 

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automatically entitle a defendant to a minor role adjustment.” United States v. Hurtado, 

760 F.3d 1065, 1068-1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruled on other grounds by United States 

v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2017). “The determination of a ‘minor

role’ is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” United States v. 

Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, even if counsel had 

requested a minor role reduction, the request was unlikely to be granted. As indicated by 

her own plea agreement, Rojas was substantially more culpable than a courier, the typical 

category of defendant who is eligible for a minor role reduction in a drug conspiracy. The 

text messages and other evidence gathered indicated that Rojas was directly involved in 

purchasing drugs from co-defendant Andrea Ball and then distributing those drugs. 

Indeed, her plea agreement stated that Rojas “worked jointly with [Ball] to purchase and 

distribute gram-quantities of heroin in North County San Diego.” Given this level of 

culpability, the Court was unlikely to have granted a request for a minor role reduction. 

Rojas fails to show that her counsel’s decision not to argue for a minor role reduction was 

the result of neglect or ineffective assistance of counsel, as opposed to a reasoned 

strategic decision about how best to advocate for her client. This is especially true in light 

of what appears from the transcripts to be otherwise zealous advocacy.

Rojas’ alternative argument that her criminal history “overstated [her] prior record” 

and included certain convictions that were not felonies also fails. Dkt. 201 at 5. As noted 

above, Rojas provides no detail as to how her record was overstated or what specific 

convictions were improperly considered. In her Sentencing Memorandum, Rojas’ counsel 

argued that her “criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness 

of defendant’s criminal history,” all of which were non-violent drug offenses. Dkt. 140 at 

8. Based on this, Rojas’ counsel requested a four-level departure. Id. It therefore 

appears counsel was aware of the scope of Rojas’ criminal history and nonetheless 

argued that it warranted in a downward departure. Absent any showing by Rojas that 

certain specific convictions were improperly included in the calculation, the Court cannot 

conclude that this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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In any event, the Court is skeptical that Rojas could show prejudice even if she 

could point to one or more convictions that should not have been included. Conspiracy 

to distribute heroin carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months in prison, even 

for defendants with no prior convictions. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In this case, Rojas was 

sentenced to 80 months in prison, which was substantially less than both the mandatory 

minimum and the government’s sentencing recommendation. Accordingly, because 

Rojas’ sentence was below the mandatory minimum even for a defendant with no prior 

convictions, any erroneous inclusion of previous convictions was likely harmless error. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons above, Rojas’ Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct her 

Sentence is DENIED. Because she has not made the requisite showing, the Court 

declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000) (a certificate of appealability may be granted only if the applicant has made “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” i.e., a showing that “reasonable 

jurists could debate whether ... the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2019

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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