Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01384/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01384-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY JOSEPH THOMAS,

CDCR #J-05107,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF 

PAROLE; PETER LABAHN,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01384-CAB-WVG

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL; and

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM, 

AND FOR SEEKING DAMAGES 

FROM IMMUNE DEFENDANTS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On July 24, 2019, Larry Joseph Thomas, (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) 

Before the Court could conduct the required sua sponte screening, Plaintiff filed a First 

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Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which became the operative pleading. (ECF No. 4.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he 

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 5).

On September 26, 2019, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP 

and simultaneously DISMISSED his FAC for failing to state a claim and for seeking

monetary damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

§ 1915A(b). (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading to 

correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 6-7.) 

On November 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

and later filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF Nos. 11, 13.)

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel in this matter. (ECF No. 13.) All 

documents filed pro se are liberally construed, and “a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)). But there is no constitutional right to 

counsel in a civil case; and none of Plaintiff’s pleadings to date demand that the Court 

exercise its limited discretion to request than an attorney represent him pro bono pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) at this stage of the case. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 

452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th 

Cir. 2004). Only “exceptional circumstances” support such a discretionary appointment. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 

970 (9th Cir. 2009). Exceptional circumstances exist where there is cumulative showing 

of both a likelihood of success on the merits and a demonstrated inability of the pro se 

litigant to articulate his claims in light of their legal complexity. Id.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s SAC demonstrates that while he may not be 

formally trained in law, he nevertheless is fully capable of legibly articulating the facts 

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and circumstances relevant to his claims, which are typical and not legally “complex.” 

Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff is not 

able to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the claims he alleges in this 

matter. Id. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

(ECF No. 13).

III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis either 

in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

C. Discussion

To the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief in the form of being deemed “eligible for 

elderly parole” date and the “earliest eligible date,” see SAC at 7, his suit “challeng[es] 

the validity of [his] continued incarceration [and therefore] lie[s] within ‘the heart of 

habeas corpus.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Preiser 

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is 

“explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” 

means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court)). Here, Plaintiff does 

not claim that he was denied parole or denied due process during his parole hearing. 

“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally 

released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska 

Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 

Second, Plaintiff may not seek damages against the Board of Parole Hearings, an 

agency of the State of California. The State of California is not a “person” within the 

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meaning of § 1983 and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. 

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment bars federal 

jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a State and its instrumentalities, unless either 

the State consents to waive its sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it); see also 

Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing prisoner’s § 1983 suit 

against the State of Arizona as legally frivolous), superseded by statute on other grounds 

as stated in Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130; Brand v. Schubert, No. 2:16-CV-1811 MCE EFB P, 

2017 WL 531721, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2017) (sua sponte dismissing § 1983 claims 

against the State of California on sovereign immunity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A).

Finally, Plaintiff cannot seek money damages against Defendant Labahn in his role 

as the Board of Parole Hearings Commissioner. State parole officials are immune from 

damages actions based on any decision to “‘grant, deny, or revoke parole’ because those 

tasks are ‘functionally comparable’ to tasks performed by judges.” See Swift v. 

California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted.).

IV. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his pleading 

deficiencies, as well as an opportunity to amend sufficient facts to support his claims to 

no avail. Therefore, the Court finds further attempts to amend would be futile. See 

Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of 

amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. 

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 

552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted 

leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, 

[t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).

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V. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 13); 

2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without further leave to amend for 

failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 21, 2020

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