Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00321/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 151
Nature of Suit: Overpayments under the Medicare Act
Cause of Action: 42:1395 HHS: Adverse Reimbursement Review

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

SUSIE WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:07-cv-321-WKW

) (WO)

VIVA HEALTH, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the court on the plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 4). For the

reasons set forth below, the Motion to Remand is due to be GRANTED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Susie Williams (“Williams”) sued Viva Health, Inc. (“Viva”) and Ricky

Crapp (“Crapp”) alleging tort and breach of contract claims under state law that related to

the insurance that Viva provided and Crapp sold to her. Williams has succinctly summarized

her claims: “Plaintiff sued VIVA because they [sic] negligently screwed up her insurance.”

(Pl.’s Remand Br. 10.) 

In her complaint, Williams states that in October 2006 she received a solicitation from

Viva through the mail to enroll in its prescription drug program. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Williams

contacted Viva and met with Crapp, a Viva sales representative, who told her that Viva’s

program was superior to her current prescription drug program. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.) Williams then

claims she enrolled in Viva to supplement – not replace – her Public Education Employee

Health Insurance Plan (“PEEHIP”) prescription coverage that she currently had. (Williams

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 1 of 16
 Crapp has not yet been served with the complaint.

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Aff.) However, shortly after enrolling with Viva, Williams learned from her pharmacist that

her total prescription drug coverage, including her PEEHIP plan, was $3,000.00 per year.

(Compl. ¶ 13.) Because her prescriptions cost in excess of $8,000.00 per year, Williams filed

a disenrollment form with Viva in December 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Viva did not disenroll

her from the program, and Williams claims she has experienced great stress because of

Viva’s failure to disenroll her and because she has not known how she will pay for her

prescriptions. (Id. ¶¶ 16-18.) 

On March 13, 2007, Williams filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Bullock

County. On April 12, 2007, Viva removed the case on federal question grounds, and 1

Williams filed a motion to remand on April 25, 2007. The motion is fully briefed and ripe

for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by

Congress. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). However, “[f]ederal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of Am.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, with respect to cases removed to this court pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1441, the law of the Eleventh Circuit favors remand where federal jurisdiction

is not absolutely clear. “[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and

defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.” Burns v.

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 2 of 16
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Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). 

III. DISCUSSION

Viva contends that removal was proper because there is federal question jurisdiction.

A federal court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under

the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A defendant may

remove to the federal courts “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district

courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1441(a). A case arises under

federal law “if ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause

of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a

substantial question of federal law.’” Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,

 U.S. , 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2131 (2006) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr.

Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)). Viva argues that this case

arises under federal law because Williams’s claims are preempted by the Medicare

Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), Pub. L. No.

108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), or, in the

alternative, because they depend on embedded and disputed issues of federal law. 

A. Preemption

Viva removed this case claiming that because it has a preemption defense there is

federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, Viva claims that 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) and

42 U.S.C. § 405(h) preempt Williams’s claims. The court finds that there is no federal

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 3 of 16
 Viva alleges that Williams’s claims in count one, that Viva negligently procured her insurance,

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and in count three, that Viva acted wantonly, are expressly preempted by 42 C.F.R. § 422.10, which Viva

contends prohibited it from persuading Williams not to enroll in its plans. Viva also argues that Williams’s

claims are preempted through conflict preemption by 42 C.F.R. § 423.50 because its marketing materials met

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question jurisdiction because neither statute completely preempts Williams’s claims.

Though a claim arises under federal law if it conforms to the well-pleaded complaint

rule, see McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. at 2131; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987),

the existence of a federal defense is not sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction

unless complete preemption exists. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6-8

(2003). However, in order for complete preemption to exist, “the pre-emptive force of a

statute [must be] so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint

into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’”

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).

1. Preemption under 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3)

Viva argues that there is federal question jurisdiction because § 1395w-26(b)(3)

preempts Williams’s claims arising under state law. Section 1395-26(b)(3) provides that

“[t]he standards established under this part shall supersede any State law or regulation (other

than State licensing laws or State laws related to plan solvency) with respect to [Medicare

Advantage] plans which are offered by [Medicare Advantage] organizations under this part.”

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3). 

Viva first asserts that there is federal question jurisdiction because it has federal

preemption defenses to Viva’s claims that arise under state law. Viva specifically alleges 2

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 4 of 16
federal standards. Viva does not identify which of Williams’s claims are specifically preempted by § 423.50

and merely asserts “to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims rely on the adequacy of Viva Health’s marketing

materials, Plaintiff’s claims are preempted.” (Def.’s Resp. Br. to Remand 19.) The court does not rule on

or evaluate whether these regulations preempt Williams’s claims because ordinary preemption does not give

rise to federal question jurisdiction.

 “‘Express preemption’ occurs when Congress has manifested its intent to preempt state law 3

explicitly in the language of the statute.” Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122

(11th Cir. 2004). 

 Conflict preemption “arises in two circumstances when it is impossible to comply with both 4

federal and state law and when state law stands as an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the federal

law.” Cliff, 363 F.3d at 1122. 

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that there is express and conflict preemption. Express and conflict preemption are types of 3 4

ordinary preemption; ordinary preemption “provid[es] a substantive defense to a state law

action on the basis of federal law.” Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285,

1290 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 

Viva argues that ordinary preemption is sufficient to create a federal question, but this

position has no basis in law because only complete preemption gives rise to federal question

jurisdiction. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “a case may not be removed to federal

court on the basis of a federal defense, including that of federal preemption.” Geddes v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2003). “[A] federal law may substantively

displace state law under ordinary preemption but lack the extraordinary force to create

federal removal jurisdiction under the doctrine of complete preemption.” Id. at 253. Viva’s

argument that there is express or conflict preemption is simply irrelevant to whether this

court has subject matter jurisdiction.

The next issue is whether §1395w-26(b)(3) creates federal question jurisdiction

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 5 of 16
 Viva did not explicitly put forth this argument in their briefing. In fact, it explicitly stated that it 5

was asserting express or conflict preemption. (Def.’s Resp. Br. to Remand 10.) However, because Viva

argues that § 1395w-26(b)(3) creates federal question jurisdiction, the court will address this argument. 

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because it completely preempts Williams’s claims. Complete preemption “must be manifest 5

in the clearly expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 1353. The Supreme Court has indicated

that it is reluctant to find complete preemption in “the absence of explicit direction from

Congress.” Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 64. Complete preemption rarely applies; the

Supreme Court has found complete preemption in only three statutes: § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185; § 502(a) of the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), codified at 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a); and §§ 85-86 of the National Bank Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86. See

Harris v. Pacificare Life & Health Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor any other circuit has addressed whether § 1395w26(b)(3) carries complete preemptive force, but other district courts have found that it does

not. See Lassiter v. Pacificare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 07-583, 2007 WL 4404051, at *2-

3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2007); Bolden v. Healthspring of Ala., Inc., Nos. 07-413, 07-414, 2007

WL 4403588, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2007); Harris, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. While one

court has found that § 1395w-26(b)(3) does completely preempt state law claims, Dial v.

Healthspring of Ala., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Ala. 2007), this court joins others in

declining to follow Dial. See Lassiter, 2007 WL 4404051, at *2; Bolden, 2007 WL 4403588,

at *10; Harris, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1294 n.13.

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 6 of 16
 The Supreme Court used a different analysis to find complete preemption under the National Bank 6

Act and focused on the “longstanding and consistent construction of the National Bank Act as providing an

exclusive federal cause of action for usury against national banks” and “the special nature of federally

chartered banks.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 10. Viva has not argued, and the court does not find,

that this reasoning applies here.

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Moreover, Viva has not shown that Congress intended § 1395w-26(b)(3) to be a

complete preemption statute. In effectuating complete preemption under LMRA and ERISA,

Congress expressly created a federal cause of action to resolve disputes. See 29 U.S.C. 6

§ 185(a) (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district

court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .”); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) (“The

district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without respect to the amount in

controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief provided for in subsection (a)

of this section in any action.”). Unlike LMRA and ERISA, the MMA does not have a

provision providing for a federal cause of action and only requires that federal law “shall

supersede any State law or regulation . . . with respect to [Medicare Advantage] plans . . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3). The plain language of § 1395w-26(b)(3) does not support the

conclusion that Congress intended complete preemption.

Viva also relies heavily on Uhm v. Humana, Inc., No. 06-185, 2006 WL 1587443

(W.D. Wash. June 2, 2006), to support its claim of federal question jurisdiction. However,

the court in Uhm did not discuss or analyze complete preemption. The issue in Uhm was

whether plaintiffs’ claims were due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim because

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 7 of 16
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§ 1395w-26(b)(3) preempted plaintiffs’ tort and contract claims. Id. at *2. The court’s

analysis focused on ordinary preemption. Id. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Uhm filed suit in

federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and issues related to removal were not before the

court. Id. 

Viva’s reliance on § 1395w-26(b)(3) as a basis for complete preemption is unfounded.

The court therefore finds this statute is not an adequate ground for removal. 

2. Complete Preemption under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 

Viva also argues that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) completely preempts Williams’s claims.

Viva contends that Williams’s claims “arise under” the Medicare Act and are “inextricably

intertwined” with a claim for benefits, requiring Williams to exhaust administrative remedies

before bringing a claim. 

Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act provides that no “decision of the [Secretary

of the Department of Health and Human Services] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal,

or governmental agency except as herein provided.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). Although § 405(h)

discusses old-age and disability claims, Congress has incorporated it into the Medicare Act,

so that this provision also applies to claims under the Medicare Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii.

Section 405(g) establishes the procedure for judicial review of claims seeking benefits and

allows a party to obtain review in district court only after the Secretary of the Department of

Health and Human Services has made a final decision. Id. § 405(g). Federal courts lack

subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims for benefits arising out of a Medicare plan unless

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 8 of 16
 See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (“No action against the United States, the [Secretary of the Department 7

of Health and Human Services], or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or

1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.”). 

 Interestingly, when courts list the statutes for which the Supreme Court has found complete

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preemption, § 405(h) is not included. See, e.g., Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 6-7; Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1291;

Harris, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.

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the party has exhausted administrative remedies. Id. 7

The Supreme Court has held that § 405(g) “is the sole avenue for judicial review for

all ‘claims arising under’ the Medicare Act.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 615 (1984)

(citation omitted). Courts disagree on whether Ringer stands for the proposition that §

405(h) completely preempts state law. Some courts have found that § 405(h) completely 8

preempts claims arising under the Medicare Act. See Kennedy v. Health Options, Inc., 329

F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Kelly v. Advantage Health, Inc., No. 99-362, 1999

WL 294796, at *4 (E.D. La. May 11, 1999). However, another court has found Ringer did

not address whether § 405(h) complete preempts state law claims because the plaintiff had

brought federal claims in federal court. Bolden, 2007 WL 4403588 at *4 n.11. The court

doubts that § 405(h) is a complete preemption statute (which would make removal in this

case proper) but need not decide the issue because Williams’s claims do not arise under the

Medicare Act. 

In Ringer, the Supreme Court put forth two tests for determining whether a claim

arises under the Medicare Act. The first is whether the claims are those “in which ‘both the

standing and the substantive basis for the presentation’ of the claims” is the Medicare Act.

Ringer, 466 U.S. at 615 (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975)).

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 9 of 16
 These are her claims in Count II for negligence, Count III for wantonness, Count IV for outrage, 9

and Count V for breach of contract. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 26-43.) 

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Because neither party contends that the standing and substantive basis for Williams’s claims

is the Medicare Act, the court need not evaluate this test. 

The second test is whether the state law claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a

denial of benefits. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 624. In Ardary v. Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 98 F.3d

496 (9th Cir. 1996), the heirs of a deceased Medicare beneficiary claimed the Medicare

provider’s failure to authorize an airlift to a larger hospital resulted in the beneficiary’s death.

Ardary, 98 F.3d at 497. The plaintiffs brought negligence and intentional tort claims. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit found that while the claim was predicated on the failure to provide a

specific type of benefit – an airlift – the plaintiffs were “at bottom not seeking to recover

benefits.” Id. at 500. The Ninth Circuit found “nothing in the legislative history to suggest

that [§ 405(h)] was designed to abolish all state remedies which might exist against a private

Medicare provider for torts committed during its administration of Medicare benefits . . . .”

Id. at 501. 

Here, Williams has asserted two types of claims, neither of which is, at bottom, a

claim for Medicare benefits. Some of Williams’s claims seek damages for Viva’s failure to

disenroll her from Viva’s prescription plan and return her to her original prescription plan.9

These claims are not for benefits as they involve a wholly collateral issue – Viva’s failure to

disenroll Williams when she requested it do so. Williams’s other claims relate to the quality

of insurance Viva sold Williams and what she terms Viva “negligently screw[ing] up her

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 10 of 16
 These are her claims in Count I for negligent failure to procure insurance and Count V for 10

negligent hiring, training, and supervision. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-25, 44-47.)

 After Williams commenced the lawsuit, Viva agreed to provide her prescription drug benefits

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beyond the $3,000 maximum through October 2007. (Mot. Remand Ex. F.)

The three issues are: (1) whether Viva can be liable under state law for not discouraging her from 12

enrolling when federal law prohibits health screening; (2) whether VIVA can be liable under state law for

insufficient marketing materials when the materials comply with federal law; and (3) whether Williams must

have exhausted federal administrative remedies for challenging coverage decisions in order to bring her state

law claims. (Notice of Remand ¶ 23.)

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insurance.” (Pl.’s Remand Br. 10.) With these claims, Williams is not claiming that she 10

is entitled to benefits from Viva but rather is challenging the poor quality of product that

Viva provided to her. Moreover, her claim is not one for benefits because Williams would

not be made whole if Viva paid her benefits. Williams seeks redress for her injury resulting

from Viva’s failure to disenroll her and the anguish she experienced as a result of not

knowing the status of her insurance.

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Even if § 405(h) were to completely preempt claims under state law, Williams’s

claims are not completely preempted because they do not arise under the Medicare Act.

Accordingly, removal in reliance upon § 405(h) was improper. 

B. Substantial Federal Issue

Viva argues, in the alternative, that there is federal question jurisdiction because

embedded in Williams’s claims arising under state law are substantial issues of federal law.

Viva argues there are three such issues, but these issues are actually preemption defenses.12

Because Williams’s claims do not contain substantial embedded issues of federal law,

removal on this ground was inappropriate. 

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 11 of 16
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In certain cases federal question jurisdiction lies over claims arising under state law

that “turn on substantial questions of federal law.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.

Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). The Supreme Court has long recognized

this type of federal question jurisdiction, id., although this category of cases is “special and

small.” McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. at 2136. The mere presence of a federal issue “does not

automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson,

478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). To determine whether a state law claim arises under federal law,

a court must determine whether “a state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue,

actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any

congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable, 545

U.S. at 314.

In Grable, the Supreme Court determined that removal was proper because the

resolution of the claims arising under state law depended on the interpretation of a disputed

federal statute. Id. at 319-20. The IRS had seized real property belonging to Grable to

satisfy a tax delinquency, and though Grable received notice at that time of the seizure by

mail, he brought a quiet title action under state law a few years later, claiming that the IRS’s

notice was insufficient under federal law. Id. at 310-11. The defendants removed the case

to federal court, claiming there was federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 311. 

The Supreme Court found there was a disputed federal question embedded in Grable’s

quiet title action because his claim of superior title depended on a federal issue – the

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adequacy of the IRS’s notice under federal law. Id. at 314-15. The disputed issue was

substantial as it would be dispositive for other cases in the future. Id. at 315. Notably, it was

the only disputed legal or factual issue in the case. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court found that

federal court resolution of the issue would not upset the balance between the state and federal

systems because the federal government had a strong interest in collecting taxes, in having

a federal forum available to vindicate its own administrative actions, and because only rarely

would title cases arising under state law implicate federal tax law. Id. 

A year after Grable, the Supreme Court in McVeigh reinforced that there is a

substantial question of federal law in only a “special and small category” of cases. McVeigh,

126 S. Ct. at 2136. In McVeigh, a health insurance carrier for federal employees sought

reimbursement from an enrollee for damages recovered in a state tort action. Id. at 2129.

Using the same analysis as in Grable, the Supreme Court concluded that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because the disputed issue in McVeigh did not have a federal character as

it involved the settlement of a state court action. Id. at 2137. The Court explained the issue

was not substantial by contrasting it to the one in Grable. While the issue in Grable was “a

nearly pure issue of law . . . that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern

numerous tax sale cases,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the issues in

McVeigh were “fact-bound and situation-specific.” Id. Finally, the Court found that the

federal-state balance weighed against federal question jurisdiction as the state court “is

competent to apply federal law, to the extent it is relevant.” Id. While the United States has

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 13 of 16
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an interest in the health and welfare of its employees, the interest did not justify turning the

claim into a federal case. Id. 

Here, there is not a substantial question of federal law embedded in Viva’s claims.

First, there is no disputed issue of federal law embedded in Williams’s claims. The disputed

federal issue in Grable regarding the adequacy of notice was an element of the plaintiff’s

claim under state law. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. That is not the case here. Viva is

merely asserting preemption defenses to the Williams’s state law claims. 

Second, even assuming there were disputed issues of federal law, they would not be

substantial. Although Viva claims there are substantial issues, there is no support for this

contention. Viva has not shown that the issues are pure issues of law or that the resolution

of this case would be determinative for others in the future. 

Finally, deciding this case in federal court would upset the balance between the state

and federal systems. Viva asserts that Congress intended there to be a federal forum because

it preempted state law. However, because ordinary preemption does not give rise to federal

question jurisdiction, the court cannot infer that Congress intended there to be a federal

forum. State courts are well-equipped to decide whether federal law preempts state law, as

these issues are regularly litigated in state courts. Moreover, an exercise of federal

jurisdiction here would upset the balance between the state and federal systems by moving

an entire class of cases – those that raise preemption defenses – into federal court. 

Viva has argued that its preemption defenses are embedded issues of federal law.

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 14 of 16
 The parties have also argued whether 42 U.S.C. § 1395 prohibits this court from ruling on issues

13

related to Medicare because it limits federal oversight over the practice of medicine. That statute provides:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee

to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which

medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer

or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health services; or to exercise

any supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such institution,

agency, or person. 

42 U.S.C. § 1395. Section 1395 is plainly inapplicable to the issues before the court in this case. 

15

However, substantial issues of federal law create federal question jurisdiction in only a small

class of cases, and this case is not one of them. Accordingly, Viva’s removal on this 13

ground was inappropriate. Because there is not federal question jurisdiction, this case is due

to be remanded to state court.

C. Attorney Fees

In her motion to remand, Williams argues that she is entitled to costs and attorney fees

under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because Viva acted in bad faith in removing this action. “An

order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,

including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “[C]ourts

may award attorney’s fees under §1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively

reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S.

132, 141 (2005). A trial court should not grant attorney fees simply because the effort to

remove a case failed. Sheridan Healthcorp., Inc. v. Neighborhood Health P’ship, Inc.,

459 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 15 of 16
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Viva used a reasonable ground for removal when it asserted that there was complete

preemption. “Complete preemption is not a simple concept.” Harris, 514 F. Supp. 2d at

1298. In Harris, the court did not award costs or attorney fees when the defendant removed

a case claiming complete preemption under § 1395w-26(b)(3) because the issues were novel

and had not been addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. Here, the complete preemption

issues were complex and had not been addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. Because Viva’s

removal on this ground was objectively reasonable, awarding costs or attorney fees would

be inappropriate. Therefore, Williams’s request for attorney fees will be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. # 14) is GRANTED;

2. This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Bullock County;

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand; and

4. The plaintiff’s request for costs and attorney fees is DENIED.

DONE this 25th day of January, 2008.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 01/25/08 Page 16 of 16