Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-01152/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-01152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cindy Taylor,

Plaintiff,

v.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commisioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

NO. CIV-05-1152-PCT-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 10), and

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 13). After consideration of the

arguments advanced by the parties, the Court makes the following rulings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the Social Security

Administration ("SSA") on March 5, 2001, alleging an onset date of disability of March 1,

2000. (Administrative Record ("AR") 116-119). Plaintiff asserted disability on the basis

of chronic thrombocytopenia, Crohn's disease, and seizures, and epilepsy. (AR 116).

Plaintiff's application was denied, at which time Plaintiff moved the agency for

reconsideration. (AR 82-84). On reconsideration, the agency affirmed its decision. (AR

89-88). Plaintiff then requested a hearing, which was held on February 27, 2003. On

August 29, 2003, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Ronald S. Robins ruled that Plaintiff

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was not disabled, and therefore not entitled to benefits. (AR 18-28). In so finding, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of Crohn's disease and a seizure

disorder. (AR 22). Furthermore, the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform her past

relevant work, but able to make an adjustment to other work which exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. (AR 22). Plaintiff requested agency review of the ALJ's

decision on October 18, 2003. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's

determination, thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the agency's final determination.

Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's determination from this Court pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See

Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton v.

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing factual determinations

by the Commissioner, acting through the administrative law judge, this Court affirms if

substantial evidence supports the determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177,

1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Howard ex

rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276

F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is

relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169

F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Commissioner's conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,

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1075 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at

1040; Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ's

determinations of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable

construction of the applicable statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel,

201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges two grounds of error committed by the ALJ warranting summary

judgment in Plaintiff's favor: the findings that Plaintiff (1) suffers no legally severe mental

impairment and (2) the side effects of Plaintiff's medications did not preclude sustained

work activity both lack the support of substantial evidence.

I. Finding No Legally Severe Mental Impairment

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that a medically determinable

physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity,

and that the impairment is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Disability claims are evaluated according

to a five-step procedure. “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any step

in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Schneider v. Comm'r of the

Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000). 

At the second step of the procedure, the SSA considers the medical severity of the

claimant's impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Step two requires that the claimant

have one or more “severe impairments that significantly limit [his] physical or mental ability

to conduct basic work activities.” Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2003); see

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that is severe and meets the duration requirement of at least

twelve continuous months, then the claimant will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

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404.1520(a)(4)(ii). However, it is possible for the claimant to have a period of disability for

a time in the past even though they do not now have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c).

Here, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erroneously dismissed her psychiatric impairments at

step two because "the ALJ's reasoning implies that [Plaintiff's] psychiatric impairments only

began in February of 2003," which the record belies. (Dkt. 10 at 14-16). The Court

recognizes how Plaintiff may have construed the ALJ's statement in this manner. However,

the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff's mood disorder began in February of 2003. Rather, the

ALJ stated the fact that "claimant was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder with

depression and anxiety in February 2003 and began treatment thereafter (See Exhibit 28F)."

(TR 22) (emphasis added). The ALJ then continued, "There is no indication that this

impairment will impose more than a minimal impact on the claimant's capacity to perform

basic work activities for a period of at least 12 continuous months with adherence to

prescribed treatment." (TR 22) (emphasis added).

Furthermore, the test at step two is not whether Plaintiff endured a mental impairment

for at least twelve months, but whether that impairment significantly limits her capacity to

do basic work activities for a period of twelve continuous months. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(c). "The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability."

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff's argument focuses only on the

duration of the impairment without raising any issue as to the ALJ's determination that the

impairment will not impact her capacity to do basic work activities. For instance, Plaintiff

does not dispute the ALJ's interpretation of the medical opinion evidence. Plaintiff only

raises evidence that demonstrates the time period of disability, such as her daughter's illness

and death in 2001. However, Plaintiff's application had already alleged the onset disability

date of March 1, 2000, and the ALJ had medical records dated from 1991 providing

substantial evidence to support his determinations. (Tr. 116-119). There is no indication

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that the ALJ ignored or disregarded Plaintiff's circumstances to reach his conclusions, as

Plaintiff alleges. (Dkt. 10 at 15). The ALJ did not commit legal error in determining that

Plaintiff's mental impairments would not impose a severe impact on her ability to perform

basic work activities for a continuous period of time.

II. Finding that the Medications' Side Effects Did Not Preclude Sustained Work

Activity

Plaintiff also alleges the record contains sufficient evidence to support the existence

of memory problems as side effects from her prescribed medications. If the evidence can

reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Commissioner's conclusion, the Court

may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193;

McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving

ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

In particular, Plaintiff argues that her clear testimony at the hearing on February 27,

2003, and the emergency room doctors' notes when she was admitted on May 29, 2000 for

abdominal pain with worsened ataxia and confusion, constitute sufficient evidence of

memory problems. (Dkt. 10 at 16). In addition, Plaintiff relies on Dr. Lang's notes about

her memory and mood, and Dr. Boschert's notes about her depression and anxiety

exacerbated by her use of prednisone. Id. However, Plaintiff did not testify at the hearing

as clearly as she contends. Rather, when asked about whether she suffers any side effects

from her medications, Plaintiff testified her "memory is not all that wonderful." (AR 59).

Furthermore, the ALJ noted concerns with Plaintiff's credibility, finding that "she may be

prone to exaggeration of her symptoms," and Plaintiff does not challenge that credibility

determination. (AR 25). Although the emergency room doctors noted Plaintiff's confusion

at the time of her admission, her regular treating physicians, Dr. Boschert and Dr. Vine, did

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not later report any side effects from her medications. (AR 329-31, 415-20, 793-98).

Similarly, Dr. Lang's observations were not expressly attributed to any particular cause,

which Plaintiff concedes. (Dkt. 10 at 17). The ALJ considered Plaintiff's extensive medical

record, but found "her treatment record reflects little support for any significant limitations

related to such an alleged side effect." (AR 26). The ALJ based his decision "upon a

thorough review of all the claimant's impairments, both severe and nonsevere, considered

singly and in combination" (AR 26). Because the ALJ is responsible for determining

credibility and resolving ambiguities, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of

the ALJ.

Plaintiff further contends there is no support for the ALJ's conclusion that the

medications' side effects are not "significant enough to preclude sustained work activity."

(Dkt. 10 at 17). In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was required to seek testimony

from a vocational expert about the impact of an impaired memory on the relevant job base.

Id. However, Plaintiff has the burden of proof in the first four steps of the five-step

sequential process. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the

plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disability, then the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to establish that the claimant can perform a significant number of other jobs

in the national economy. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). The

Commissioner can meet this burden through the testimony of a vocational expert. See id.

In the present case, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's allegations of memory problems

and was "not persuaded that such a side effect is significant enough to preclude sustained

work activity." (AR 26). Because Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing a

disability, the burden did not shift to the ALJ, compelling him to seek out a vocational

expert's testimony.

/ / /

/ / / 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial

evidence. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d at 1180; Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d at 521.

Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is appropriate as a matter of law.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

10) is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 13) is hereby GRANTED and JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR

OF THE COMMISSIONER AND AGAINST CINDY TAYLOR.

DATED this 28th day of July, 2006.

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