Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00261/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00261-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN JUSTIN BROWNLEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY LYNCH, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-0261-TLN-JDP (P)

ORDER 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that defendants 

violated her1rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 16. On June 9, 

2023, I found that her amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim against any defendant 

and recommended that it be dismissed without leave to amend. ECF No. 17. Those 

recommendations were adopted over plaintiff’s objections. ECF Nos. 18 & 19. After appeal, the 

Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, although the substantive analysis finding no cognizable 

claim was correct, plaintiff had not been given adequate notice and an opportunity to correct the 

defects in the complaint. ECF No. 25 at 2. This screening order, which dismisses the amended 

complaint with leave to amend, shall serve as that notice and opportunity. 

1 Plaintiff uses female pronouns in the complaint.

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I. Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 

entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 

claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that, on May 14, 2022, she was receiving her medication from defendant 

Edgar Lopez. ECF No. 16 at 6. Defendant Lopez was only willing to administer plaintiff’s 

suboxone medication if she took it with water, and plaintiff maintained that she could not drink 

before or after ingesting the medication. Id. Instead, plaintiff insisted that the medication was to 

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be absorbed under her tongue without water. Id. Unable to obtain an accommodation, plaintiff 

ultimately left without taking her medication and returned to her cell. Id. at 6-7. 

Later, defendant Ayala, a correctional officer, accused plaintiff of battery for trying to 

take the medication from Lopez’s hand—a charge plaintiff denied. Id. at 7. Defendant Hibbard, 

another correctional officer, told her to submit to handcuffs. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff spent sixtyeight days in administrative segregation. Id. She claims that Lopez was the architect of the false 

allegation and that the correctional officer defendants gave him free reign to author false evidence 

concerning their encounter. Id. Plaintiff vaguely outlines her suspicion that the disciplinary 

violation report was retaliation for unspecified civil rights lawsuits she brought against other, 

unnamed staff. Id. at 9. She states that two defendant officers, Leckie and Pongyan, told her that 

this is “what happens when you sue us,” but she does not allege that these officers were behind 

the false disciplinary that, earlier in the complaint, she attributed entirely to Lopez. Id. at 10.

Plaintiff undertook a hunger strike for fifty-five days and was ultimately exonerated of battery in 

disciplinary hearings. Id. at 8-9. 

With respect to defendant Lynch, plaintiff alleges only that he has “allowed” his staff to 

harass and retaliate against her. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also states that Lynch destroyed the 

disciplinary file after she was exonerated, though she does not state how this action harmed her. 

Id. 

These allegations, as I previously found and as confirmed by the Court of Appeals, do not 

state a cognizable claim. As an initial matter, there is no constitutional right to be free of false 

disciplinary proceedings. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951-53 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] 

prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely accused of conduct 

which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 

F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); see also Muhammad v. Rubia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

39818, 2010 WL 1260425, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d, 453 F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“[A] prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 

accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. As long as 

a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, allegations of a 

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fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983.”) (internal citation omitted). And given that 

plaintiff was exonerated in her disciplinary proceedings, there can be no claim that she was not 

afforded adequate process in that hearing.2 

Plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary action may have been retaliatory, but she has failed to 

allege any facts tying this retaliation to any defendant. Her claim that Leckie and Pongyan made 

an offhand comment about “what happens when you sue us” might indicate the possibility of 

retaliation, but there is no allegation that these officers were behind the false disciplinary report or 

that Lopez, who is alleged to be the mastermind behind the battery charge, was motivated by 

anything other than the dispute that occurred at pill-call (which does not implicate protected 

conduct). 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails because there is no allegation that excessive 

force was used against her. And she alleges that the hunger strike was undertaken of her own 

volition; there is no claim that any defendant denied her food. 

Finally, plaintiff’s supervisory claims against Warden Lynch fail because her vague 

allegation that he “allowed” staff to retaliate against her and violate her rights is insufficient. To 

sustain a section 1983 claim against a supervisory defendant, a claimant must allege either that 

official was personally involved in the alleged rights violation or knew of the violations and failed 

to prevent them. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A supervisor is only 

liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed 

the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat 

superior liability under section 1983.”). The vague allegation that a supervisor allowed 

misconduct, without some alleged facts that, taken as true, show that they knew of the specific 

wrongdoing, is insufficient. 

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that cures these deficiencies. Plaintiff is advised 

2 Plaintiff does allege that, because of her hunger strike, she has been “taking medication 

for her pain and suffering.” ECF No. 16 at 10. Her hunger strike, however, was self-imposed and 

cannot be attributed to any of the named defendants. I recognize that she vaguely alleges that, 

without the hunger strike, she would not have been exonerated, id. at 9, but the complaint does 

not explain how this is the case. 

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that the amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 

693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended complaint should be titled 

“Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 16, is dismissed with leave to amend. 

2. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended 

complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 

3. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 

result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed 

with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

4. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 9, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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