Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02303/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02303-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YONIS ABDULKADIR AFRAH,

Petitioner,

Case No. 14-CV-02303-BAS(NLS)

ORDER:

(1) OVERRULING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS (ECF NO. 18); 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION (ECF NO.

17); 

(3) GRANTING RESPONDENTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO.

13);

(4) DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH

PREJUDICE (ECF NO. 5); AND 

(5) DENYING AS MOOT

PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

EXPEDITE (ECF NO. 20)

v.

DHANI SIDHU, et al.,

Respondents.

On September 30, 2014, Petitioner Yonis Abdulkadir Afrah (“Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Thereafter, on October 16, 2014, Petitioner filed a First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus(“FAP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner asserts

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several grounds for relief in the FAP based on ineffective assistance of counsel and

violation of the Sixth Amendment. (FAP at 6-9.) On December 15, 2014, Respondents

filed a motion to dismiss the FAP. (ECF No. 13.)

On March 2, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes issued a

Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommending that this Court: (1) grant the

motion to dismiss the FAP, and dismiss the FAP with prejudice. (ECF No. 17.) On

March 31, 2015, Petitioner filed objections to the Report. (ECF No. 18.) For the

following reasons, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, APPROVES and

ADOPTS the Report in its entirety, GRANTS Respondents’ motion to dismiss,

dismissing this action with prejudice, and DECLINES to issue a certificate of

appealability. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which objections are

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. But “[t]he

statute [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c)] makes it clear that the district judge must review the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not

otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (emphasis in original); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219,

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (concluding that where no objections were filed, the district court

had no obligation to review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the Constitution

nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d at 1121. This rule of law is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and this district. 

See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, de novo

review of a R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); Nelson

v. Giurbino, 395 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting report

in its entirety without review because neither party filed objections to the report despite

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the opportunity to do so); see also Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (S.D.

Cal. 2004) (Benitez, J.). 

Objections must be written and specific. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“[A]

party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations” ofthe magistrate judge.) (emphasis added). “Numerous courts have

held that a general objection to the entirety of a Magistrate Judge’s [report and

recommendation] has the same effect as a failure to object.” Alcantara v. McEwen, No.

12-cv-401, 2013 WL 4517861, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing cases). In the

absence of a specific objection, the clear weight of authority indicates that the court

need only satisfy itself that there is no “clear error” on the face of the record before

adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)

AdvisoryComm. Notes(1983) (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal.,

501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

II. ANALYSIS1

Respondent moves to dismiss the FAP on the grounds it is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge makestwo relevant findings in

the Report: (1) the petition was untimely; and (2) equitable tolling does not apply. In

his objections, Petitioner argues: (1) his failure to file a timely petition is excusable

error because he is a layman, not an attorney; (2) equitable tolling should occur because

he did not learn there were deportation consequencesto his conviction until December

28, 2012; (3) exculpatory evidence was not sent to him until April 2013; (4) he is

raising a newly recognized constitutional right; and (5) he had limited access to the

prison library and limited legal assistance. (ECF No. 18.) The Court will address each

of these objections below.

///

///

The Court adopts and incorporates by reference all portions of the Report

1

that Petitioner does not object to. That includes the factual background presented in

the Report.

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A. Petitioner is a Layman

In order to establish equitable tolling, a petitioner bears the burden of

establishing “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.’” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Here,

Petitioner argues that, since he is appearing pro se, his failure to comply with the

statute of limitationsis excusable error. The Ninth Circuit disagrees, stating that “a pro

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Id. at 1154. Thus, Petitioner’s objection

on this ground is overruled.

B. Petitioner Did Not Learn of Deportation Proceedings until December

2012

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a party must demonstrate

(1) that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). When a petitioner is claiming ineffective assistance

of counsel on a habeas petition, the limitations period does not begin to run until the

petitioner has, or with the exercise of due diligence could have, knowledge of the

factual predicate of both elements of his claim. Id. at 1154-55. 

In this case, Petitioner argues that since he did not learn he was likely to be

deported back to the Netherlands until December 28, 2012, the statute of limitations

should be tolled until this date. The problem with Petitioner’s logic isthat his FAP and

his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have nothing to do with any immigration

advice or deportation consequences. In his FAP, Petitioner claims his attorney was

ineffective for failing to submit crucial exculpatory emails at trial, failing to discuss

trial strategies that included admitting Petitioner’s guilt to the jury, and failing to

provide exculpatory evidence. All of this was discovered at trial, not at the time

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deportation proceedings were initiated. The fact that Petitioner may have become more

motivated to seek review once he learned of the deportation consequencesisirrelevant. 

The key is when Petitioner learned of his counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s objection on this ground is overruled.

C. Receiving Exculpatory Evidence in April 2013

Petitioner argues he did not receive exculpatory evidence that supports his

petition until April 2013. A complete lack of access to a legal file may constitute an

“extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, a brief review of Petitioner’s filings shows that this is not the case here. The

undated communication from his lawyer, which Petitioner represents he received in

April 2013, clearly states “I already returned your files.” (ECF No. 18 at 16.) Thus,

Petitioner did not have a complete lack of access to his legal file. 

Furthermore, the grounds he raises in this federal petition were raised in his

appeal in September 2011, and his state habeas petitions in September 2013, November

2013, and December 2013. (ECF Nos. 5; 14, Lodgments 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14.) Petitioner

fails to show why he was unable to file in a timely fashion his federal petition on the

same grounds after the state petitions were denied. Accordingly, this objection is

overruled.

D. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right

Although Petitioner argues his FAP raises a newly recognized constitutional

right, he fails to identify any right that has been newly recognized by the courts. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not new. See, e.g., Rasberry, 448 F.3d at

1153. Therefore, Petitioner’s objection on this ground is also overruled.

E. Additional Reasons

As additional reasons for equitably tolling the statute of limitations, Petitioner

argues that he had limited access to the prison library, had to rely on the skills of

detainees who come and go, is not an expert on the law, and was denied appointment

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of counsel by the Magistrate Judge. “Ordinary prison limitations on [a petitioner’s]

access to the law library and copier . . . [a]re neither ‘extraordinary’ nor ma[ke] it

‘impossible’ for [a petitioner] to file his petition in a timely manner.” Ramirez, 571

F.3d at 998. 

In this case, despite limited accessto the prison library, Petitioner was able to file

numerous lengthy, well-researched habeas petitions in state court. As stated in

Ramirez, “[g]iven even the most common day-to-day security restrictions in prison,

concluding otherwise would permit the exception to swallow the rule.” Id. 

Furthermore, as discussed above, the fact that Petitioner was not an expert in the law

and was appearing pro se is not adequate excuse for failing to file a petition in a timely

manner. Hence, Petitioner’s objection on this ground is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

After considering Petitioner’s objections and conducting a de novo review, the

Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning in the Report is sound and

devoid of clear error. Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely and is not entitled to

equitable tolling. In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s

objections (ECF No. 18), APPROVES and ADOPTS the Report in its entirety (ECF

No. 17), and DISMISSES Petitioner’s First Amended Petition (ECF No. 5). In light

of this decision, the Court finds Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite District Judge

Decision (ECF No. 20) is moot and DENIES the motion on that ground.

Moreover, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). 

Under this standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000)). Here, Petitioner has not made the requisite showing. Because reasonable

jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of the claims in the petition debatable or

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wrong, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. See Slack, 529

U.S. at 484.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2015

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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