Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02416/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02416-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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09CV2416 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK HOWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

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Civil No. 09-CV-2416-IEG(WVG)

ORDER FOLLOWING IN CAMERA

REVIEW

Counsel for Defendants has lodged 488 pages of documents and

4 compact discs with the Court for in camera review. Many documents

are relevant to the subject matter of this litigation. However,

Defendants claim that various privileges and the right of privacy

protect these documents from disclosure. Having reviewed the

documents, the Court orders their production, non-production, and

redaction as set forth in Appendix A to this Order.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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1/ This privilege has also been known as the “government privilege,” the “law

enforcement privilege,” and the “executive privilege.” See Deocampo v. City

of Vallejo, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43744, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (citing

references for each variant).

09CV2416 2

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may

obtain discovery regarding any matter that is “not privileged” and

“relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The scope of discoverable information is

broad, as “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the

trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.

In civil rights cases brought under federal statutes,

questions of privilege are resolved by federal law. Kerr v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975). “State

privilege doctrine, whether derived from statutes or court decisions, is not binding on federal courts in these kinds of cases.”

Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 655-56 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Official Information Privilege1/

Defendants first invoke the qualified “official information

privilege,” which is one of federal common law. Soto v. City of

Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Sanchez v. City of

Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990). “To determine

whether the information sought is privileged, courts must weigh the

potential benefits of disclosure against the potential disadvantages.” Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-34. The balancing test “is

moderately pre-weighted in favor of disclosure.” Kelly, 114 F.R.D.

at 661. The privilege “must be formally asserted and delineated in

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09CV2416 3

order to be raised properly,” and the party opposing disclosure must

“state with specificity the rationale of the claimed privilege.”

Kerr, 511 F.2d at 198.

To properly invoke the governmental privilege, “[t]he

claiming official must ‘have seen and considered the contents of the

documents and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public

interest they ought not to be produced’ and state with specificity

the rationale of the claimed privilege.” Id. The party invoking

the privilege must at the outset make a “substantial threshold

showing” by way of a declaration of affidavit from a responsible

official with personal knowledge of the matters to be attested to in

the affidavit. Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613. The affidavit must contain

the following:

(1) an affirmation that the agency generated or collected the

material in issue and has in fact maintained its confidentiality, (2) a statement that the official has personally

reviewed the material in question, (3) a specific identification of the governmental or privacy interests that would be

threatened by disclosure of the material to plaintiff and/or

his lawyer, (4) a description of how disclosure subject to a

carefully crafted protective order would create a substantial

risk of harm to significant governmental or privacy interests, and (5) a projection of how much harm would be done to

the threatened interests if the disclosure were made.

Id. at 613; Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670.

“‘[A] general claim of harm to the ‘public interest’ is

insufficient to overcome the burden placed on the party seeking to

shield material from disclosure.’” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 614 (quoting

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 672; see also Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D.

292, 300 (C.D. Cal. 1992)); Chism v. County of San Bernardino, 159

F.R.D. 531, 534-35 (C.D. Cal. 1994). “The party resisting discovery

must specifically describe how disclosure of the requested documents

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09CV2416 4

in that particular case . . . would be harmful.” Soto, 162 F.R.D.

at 614 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

After considering the declaration submitted by San Diego

Sheriff Lieutenant W. Donahue, the Court concludes that Defendants

have not satisfied the second and fourth prongs listed above.

Moreover, Lt. Donahue’s identification of the threatened governmental or privacy interest, as well as his projection of the resulting

harm, lack specificity and are couched in more sweeping, general

terms. As a result, Defendants may not withhold any documents on

basis of the official information privilege.

B. Required Reports Privilege

Defendants invoke proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, the

California Penal Code, and three questionable cases in support of

their assertion of this privilege. However, none of these authorities are controlling or binding on this Court, and Defendants have

cited no controlling authority that has applied this privilege in

the context of a civil rights action against a law enforcement

agency. Quite to the contrary, based on the very cases Defendants

cite, the Court concludes that the required reports privilege is

inapplicable here for several reasons.

First, Califano discusses this privilege as being another

name for the official information privilege, which Defendants

simultaneously invoke. See Ass’n for Women in Science v. Califano,

566 F.2d 339, 343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Next, Defendants’ own cases vitiate their invocation of this

privilege. First, Califano suggests that this privilege does not

apply to the type of reports Defendants seek to shield from

disclosure: “This privilege covers a wide range of situations in

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2/ In re Grand Jury Subpoena is also inapplicable in the present context in

light of the very narrow question the Court considered: “[T]he precise

question before this Court is whether . . . we should adopt, as a matter of

federal common law, the proposition that public assistance records, required

to be filed by state law under assurances of confidentiality, are privileged

against use in federal grand jury proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added).

09CV2416 5

which the government seeks to protect from disclosure confidential

reports which it has received from citizens.” Id. at 343 (emphasis

added). The internal affairs reports at issue here were not

received from a citizen; the government agency itself created them.

Defendant’s next case, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 14,

1989, 728 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. Pa. 1990), which has been cited by only

two district courts since it issued over 21 years ago, also confirms

that the “required reports privilege” does not apply to the type of

reports Defendants seek to insulate here:

The . . . “required reports privilege,” stems from

a state law which requires citizens to reveal

personal information under a promise of confidentiality. In the United States, many statutes and

regulations prohibit disclosure of certain records

containing information which citizens are compelled

legally to submit to federal, state or local governments. These statutes generally are tied to specific regulatory areas such as income tax returns,

census reports, selective service records, public

health records and accident reports, among others.

Id. at 371 (citations omitted). The above cases teach that the

required reports privilege intends to protect confidential private

information that private citizens are compelled to provide to the

government. The purpose of this privilege could not possibly be

more clear: “The purpose of the grant of such a privilege is to

encourage persons to report voluntarily and accurately private

information that is needed for effective governmental functioning.”

Id. (citation omitted). This purpose is clearly not fulfilled in

the instant case, where the government agency itself created the

report.2/ Ultimately, although some Defendants technically generated

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09CV2416 6

reports, every kind of report is clearly not the type that this

privilege intends to protect.

Defendants also fail to establish that the reports they

generated are even required. After all, reports must be required in

order to invoke the required report privileged. They argue that

under California law, “law enforcement agencies must investigate

citizens’ complaints and prepare reports regarding the

investigation . . . .” (Doc. No. 29 at 10.) However, even the

basic premise that the Penal Code requires investigative reports

appears incorrect.

Although the practical effect of California Penal Code

Section 832.5 may be that law enforcement agencies routinely

generate reports after citizen complaint investigations, this

section does not expressly require them to do so. Rather, it only

mandates that such agencies “shall establish a procedure to

investigate complaints” by the public and the only written document

provision in the entire section requires that agencies make “a

written description of the procedure available to the public.” Cal.

Pen. Code § 832.5(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Moreover, properly read, the section’s requirement that “any”

reports on citizen complaints be retained for five years does not

impose the mandatory duty to actually create reports, but rather

only requires that reports be retained if they are made. See id. §

832.5(b) (“Complaints and any reports or findings relating to these

complaints shall be retained for a period of at least five years.”).

Even if the practical reality is that every law enforcement agency

in California in fact generates investigative reports, that is their

choice, not an express mandate of Section 832.5. All this section

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09CV2416 7

requires is a procedure to investigate citizen complaints, which

could plausibly consist only of a hearing before a panel that

renders an oral decision. Ultimately, insofar as Defendants rely on

Section 832.5 to support the tenuous argument that the required

reports privilege applies here, it fails to lend such support.

However, even if Section 832.5 requires investigative

reports, Defendants ignore the underpinnings of the required reports

privilege that the very cases they cite explain. Simply because a

“report” is “required” does not bring it under the auspices of the

“required reports privilege.” One must look to the kind of report

at issue and ask whether it is of the kind the privilege intends to

protect. Nothing in the cases Defendants cite supports the

invocation of this privilege in the context of the instant case, and

In re Grand Jury Subpoena in fact lends strong support to the

opposite conclusion.

Ultimately, this privilege has never been adopted by the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and has been applied by only one

court in the entire Circuit. Accordingly, the Court will not adopt

the required reports privilege, and Defendants may not withhold any

documents on this basis. Accord Fisher v. Houser, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 124519, *9-*10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010) (Skomal, M.J.).

C. Deliberative Process Privilege

Defendants next invoke the deliberative process privilege,

but again cite no controlling authority that has applied the

deliberative process privilege to these types of documents in the

context of a civil rights case. Other courts in the Ninth Circuit

have similarly rejected the use of this privilege in relation to

internal affairs investigations and records of witness or police

officer statements, as these communications are not designed to

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3/

 Defendants specifically state:

 Documents are protected from disclosure when (1) the

information results from a critical self-analysis undertaken by

the party seeking the protection; (2) the public has a strong

interest in preserving the free flow of the type of information

sought; and (3) if discovery were allowed, the flow of such

information would be curtailed. Dowling v. American Haw.

Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992). All three of

Dowling’s [sic] criteria apply to the documents herein provided.

(Doc. No. 29 at 11:19-24.)

09CV2416 8

contribute to the formulation of important public policy. See,

e.g., Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 612-13 (“The ‘deliberative process’

privilege . . . is also inappropriate for use in civil rights cases

against police departments.”); Fisher, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124519

at *11-*12. Likewise, the Court rejects Defendants’ invocation of

the deliberative process privilege, and they may not withhold any

documents on this basis.

D. Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

Quite plainly, the “self critical analysis privilege” does

not exist in the Ninth Circuit. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Mower, 219

F.3d 1069, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266

F.R.D. 433, 439 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Defendants’ use of Dowling v.

Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992), to assert that

the privilege applies here, without acknowledging the cases above,

borders on a misstatement of law.3/

The Court in Dowling discussed the theoretical contours of

this privilege while simultaneously expressing doubts about its

existence in the Ninth Circuit. Dowling, 971 F.2d at 425, 426

(“This circuit has not yet considered whether there exists a

so-called privilege of self-critical analysis,” and “Even if such a

privilege exists, the justifications for it do not support its

application to voluntary routine safety reviews.”) (emphasis added).

The Court in Dowling assumed for the sake of argument that the

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09CV2416 9

privilege existed and ultimately held that the district court abused

its discretion when it applied the self-critical analysis privilege.

Id. at 427. Dowling in no way establishes the existence of this

privilege in the Ninth Circuit and provides no support for Defendants’ assertion of the privilege here. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals cited Dowling eleven years ago for the contrary

proposition, that the Ninth Circuit “has not recognized this novel

privilege.” Union Pac. R.R., 219 F.3d at 1076 n.7. Nor has the

Ninth Circuit recognized this privilege since.

Ultimately, Defendants assert the privilege in the face of

(1) no law recognizing it in this Circuit and (2) a long line of

District Court cases that expressly state that it does not exist in

the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165

F.R.D. 614, 617-19 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Fisher, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

124519 at *10-*11; Pittman v. County of San Diego, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 97569, *4-*5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (Gallo, M.J.); Jewell

v. Polar Tankers Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45949, *2-*4 (N.D. Cal.

Apr. 8, 2010) (“While some Circuits have recognized the existence of

a self critical analysis privilege, the majority have declined to do

so. The Ninth Circuit has never recognized it and the US Supreme

Court has disavowed it. The state courts in California have

similarly rejected its existence.”); Taylor v. L.A. Police Dep’t,

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23570, *16 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1999). The

Court declines to apply this non-existent privilege.

E. Privacy and Confidentiality Under California Law

Defendants assert that law enforcement personnel files are

private under California state privacy statutes and should not be

disclosed as a result. However, Plaintiff brought this case under

a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it is well settled that

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09CV2416 10

“questions of evidentiary privilege arising in the course of the

adjudication of federal rights are governed by the principles of

federal common law.” Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 643 (C.D. Cal.

2005); Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1992)

(citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989)). Accordingly,

this Court will not apply California statutory privileges to

Plaintiff’s federal claims and Defendants may not withhold any

documents on state statutory privilege law grounds. Accord Fisher,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124519 at *9-*10.

However, insofar as the privacy right is constitutionallybased, the Court applies the analysis set forth in Soto. See Soto,

162 F.R.D. at 616-17.

III. CONCLUSION

Production of documents shall proceed as instructed in

Appendix A to this Order and shall be completed on or before June

17, 2011. All documents produced shall be subject to the operative

protective order (Doc. No. 22) in this matter, and sanctions will

issue for violation thereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 3, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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 09CV2416 11

 Appendix A

Doc. # Produce Do Not

Produce

 Comments

p0001-

p0023

x Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147

F.R.D. 227, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Soto

v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603,

620-21 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also

Carter v. City of Carlsbad, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 14921, *5-*17 (S.D. Cal.

Feb. 15, 2011) (discussing evaluative

portions of internal affairs reports);

Fisher v. Houser, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 124519, *17-*19 (S.D. Cal. Nov.

23, 2010) (discussing complaints in

similar incidents).

p0003: Redact Ms. Gonzalez’s date of

birth.

p0003, p0004, p0012: Redact Ms. Gonzalez’s street address.

p0003 & p0012: Redact telephone numbers.

p0021: Redact license plate number on

fifth line from the bottom of the

page.

p0024 x Same authority as above.

Redact license plate number and vehicle information that begins at the

2:00-minute mark and ends at the 2:22-

minute mark.

Redact telephone number information

that begins at the 3:24-minute mark

and ends at the 3:30–minute mark.

p0025 x Same authority as above.

p0026 x

p0027 x

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Doc. # Produce Do Not

Produce

 Comments

 09CV2416 12

p0028-

p0068

x Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D.

603, 620-21 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing citizens’ complaints); see also

Carter v. City of Carlsbad, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 14921, *5-*17 (S.D. Cal.

Feb. 15, 2011) (discussing internal

affairs reports).

p0069 x Irrelevant; Fed. R. Evid. 402.

p0070-

p0090

x

p0091-

p0095

x Attorney-client privilege.

p0096-

p0112

x

p0113 N/A Has been produced.

p0114 x Compact disc.

p0115-

p0238

x Intra-agency personnel matter; thirdparty highly private information,

including inmate custody data sheets:

Irrelevant; Fed. Evid. 402; Cal.

Const. art. I, § 1.

p0239-

p0240

x Redact Sgt. Palmer’s date of birth.

Redact the zip code that appears in

the middle of the page.

Redact the telephone number that appears in the middle of the page.

p0239: Redact entire bottom 2 purged

investigations.

p0240: Redact entire top 9 purged

investigations; redact the third investigation from the bottom.

p0241-

p0263

x Irrelevant; Fed. R. Evid. 402.

Fed R. Evid. 402; Cal. Const. art. I,

§ 1.

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Doc. # Produce Do Not

Produce

 Comments

 09CV2416 13

p0264-

p0320

x See Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 644

(C.D. Cal. 2005).

p0264, p0268, p0279, p0289, p0301, and

p0310: Redact Sgt. Palmer’s employee

identification number.

p0321-

p0488

x p0333-p0488: Redact names, initials,

and Arjis numbers for all individuals

other than Sgt. Palmer. Do not redact

Sgt. Palmer’s Arjis number.

p0321: Redact identification number

at top of page.

p0327: Redact information on all CPR

cards other than Sgt. Palmer’s card.

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