Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00320/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00320-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERIKA GREGORY and LOREN 

MOLLNER, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF VALLEJO, former VPD CHIEF 

ROBERT NICHELINI, VPD OFFICER 

CHASE CALHOUN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-CV-0320-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

Defendants’ motion in limine number four is currently pending before the court. 

(ECF No. 70.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion (ECF No. 77), and defendants have replied (ECF No. 

81). To assist the parties in trial preparation, the court’s tentative rulings on the issues raised by 

this motion follow. 

I. Late Responses to Service Calls 

 The court grants defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks to exclude evidence of 

any habit based on Officer Calhoun’s past late responses to service calls. Fed. R. Evid. 406. 

However, because it is undisputed Officer Calhoun was late in responding to the service call in 

this case, nothing prevents plaintiffs from arguing their theory of the case, that Calhoun’s “state 

of mind may not have been focused on the call” because he was “rushing to [p]laintiff’s residence 

after ignoring dispatch for over an hour . . . .” (ECF No. 77 at 8.) 

Case 2:13-cv-00320-KJM-KJN Document 91 Filed 01/22/15 Page 1 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

 The court denies defendants’ motion to the extent they argue Calhoun’s delayed 

response is irrelevant. The reasonableness inquiry in which the jury will engage is an objective 

one. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (“An action is ‘reasonable’ 

under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind as long as the 

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (emphasis and brackets in original)). At 

the same time, Officer Calhoun’s perceptions of the objective facts are relevant. See Rowland v. 

Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172–73 (4th Cir. 1994) (in reviewing qualified immunity inquiry, noting an 

officer’s “perceptions of the objective facts of the incident in question” are relevant). Officer 

Calhoun’s late response is relevant to his perceptions of the facts in question because the delay 

may have affected those perceptions. Although a jury will have to make several inferences to get 

from any evidence of the late response to the consequential fact of an unfocused mind, the 

relevance standard is low and the judge’s role is limited in applying it. Once properly instructed, 

it will be the jury’s province to weigh the evidence and decide which side’s theory of the case to 

believe. 

II. Evidence of Termination/Circumstances Surrounding Termination 

A. Cross-Examination 

 The court grants defendants’ motion to the extent plaintiffs seek to cross-examine 

Officer Calhoun to elicit details of the sexual misconduct underlying his termination because 

those details are not relevant to the issues at trial and have a high likelihood of confusing the 

issues. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 404. Plaintiffs, however, are not prohibited from asking Officer 

Calhoun questions probing his truthfulness in connection with his employment, given that his 

credibility will be critical to the jury’s determination of the case. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b); Nat’l 

Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 219 F. App'x 658, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming district 

court’s permitting cross-examination of witness about acts underlying his bar disciplinary 

proceedings but excluding nature of the proceedings, the entities involved, and the penalties 

imposed); Lewy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 799 F.2d 1281, 1299 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 608(b) allows 

cross-examination on specific instances of conduct “that would be probative on the issue of [] 

credibility,” but “the rule expressly authorizes courts to limit such questioning ‘in [their] 

Case 2:13-cv-00320-KJM-KJN Document 91 Filed 01/22/15 Page 2 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

discretion.’” ); Stringer v. City of San Pablo, No. C 07-3544 CW (MEJ), 2009 WL 302616, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009) (“a specific act of misconduct, offered to attack the witness' character for 

truthfulness, can be elicited only on cross-examination of the witness”). 

B. Impeachment 

 The court denies defendants’ motion to the extent plaintiffs seek to use extrinsic 

evidence for purposes of impeachment by prior inconsistent statements under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 608. Courts may admit extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness if the evidence goes to 

witness’s credibility. Smith v. California, 350 F. App'x 178, 180 (9th Cir. 2009) (not abuse of 

discretion to admit witness’s inmate status reports because they were not being introduced to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to impeach witness’s prior testimony that he was 

not a disruptive inmate); Ellis v. Navarro, No. C 07-5126 SBA PR, 2012 WL 3580284, at *7 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (“the admissibility of extrinsic evidence offered ‘for other grounds of 

impeachment (such as contradiction, prior inconsistent statement, bias and mental capacity)’ is 

governed by Rules 402 and 403”). If extrinsic evidence contradicts Officer Calhoun’s testimony, 

plaintiffs may use it for the sole purpose of impeachment. 

C. Reputation/Opinion 

 The court denies defendant’s motion to the extent plaintiffs seek to offer opinion 

or reputation evidence of Officer Calhoun’s character for truthfulness. “A witness’s credibility 

may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character 

for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). If plaintiffs can establish an adequate foundation for a witness’s knowledge 

of Officer Calhoun’s truthfulness or untruthfulness, that evidence is admissible under Rule 

608(a). See United States v. Holt, 486 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting, while it is within 

the trial court's discretion to prohibit cross-examination of a police officer as to whether he had 

been suspended to call into question his credibility, plaintiff “could have used Rule 608(a) and 

called a member of the department to testify directly about his opinions or reputation of [the 

credibility of the officer].”). Though a criminal case, the evidentiary principles in Holt have been 

applied in the civil context. See Junkert v. Massey, No. 06-3243, 2009 WL 1161654, at *4 (C.D. 

Case 2:13-cv-00320-KJM-KJN Document 91 Filed 01/22/15 Page 3 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

Ill. Apr. 24, 2009) (citing Holt with approval); Maples v. Vollmer, No. CIV 12-0294 JB/RHS, 

2013 WL 1677104, at *10 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2013) (citing Holt with approval in a §1983 case). 

 However, Rule 608(a) may not be used as a vehicle for admitting specific bad acts. 

No witness may testify about the reasons for Officer Calhoun’s termination, to the extent they 

qualify as specific acts governed by Rule 608(b). See Martin v. Jones, No. 09 C 1690, 2013 WL 

3754017, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2013) (“The limitations in [Rule 608(a)] to opinion and 

reputation evidence mean that a character witness cannot be used as a subterfuge for getting 

specific acts of untruthfulness in front of the jury.”) (internal citations omitted); Behler v. Hanlon, 

199 F.R.D. 553, 559 (D. Md. 2001) (“On direct examination, the character witness may give the 

basis for the opinion or reputation testimony, but may not testify as to specific acts.”). 

 These tentative rulings assume that testimony does not open the door to allow 

questions they otherwise preclude. The court anticipates providing the jury with limiting 

instructions consistent with these rulings. 

 As the parties have been advised previously, each ruling on a motion in limine is 

made without prejudice and is subject to proper renewal, in whole or in part, during trial. If a 

party wishes to contest a pretrial ruling, it must do so through a proper motion or objection, or 

otherwise forfeit appeal on such grounds. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); Tennison v. Circus Circus 

Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Where a district court makes a tentative in 

limine ruling excluding evidence, the exclusion of that evidence may only be challenged on 

appeal if the aggrieved party attempts to offer such evidence at trial.”) (alteration, citation and 

quotation omitted). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 22, 2015. 

Case 2:13-cv-00320-KJM-KJN Document 91 Filed 01/22/15 Page 4 of 4