Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00874/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00874-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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JUL 2 1 2016

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CLERK US LnS I HiC ! COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT Or CALIFORNIA

L-rUTY

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BY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 CASE NO. 15-cv-874 WQH (BLM)

ORDER

JENNIFER GRANT,

11 Plaintiff,

v. 12 HON. JEFFREY BOSTWICK,

13 Defendant.

14 HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are: (1) the Motion for Sanctions and Costs (ECF

No. 38) filed by PlaintiffJennifer Grant, (2) the Motion to Dismiss First Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 40) filed by Defendant Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick, and (3) the

Ex Parte Application to Shorten Time (ECF No. 48) filed by Plaintiff.

I. Background

OnApril 21,2015, Plaintiffinitiated this actionby filing the Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations ofher Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF

No. 1).

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On July 15, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 9). On

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September 15, 2015, Plaintifffiled a motion for a preliminary injunction to stay state

probate proceedings pending the resolution ofthis case. (ECF No. 15). On October

22, 2015, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for a

preliminary injunction to stay probate proceedings. (ECF No. 23).

On November 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Altering the Judgment of

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1 Docket#23.” (ECFNo.25). On January 13,2016, theCourt deniedPlaintiffs motion.

(ECF No. 32).

On February 9, 2016, Plaintifffiled a motion for leave to file a First Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 33). On February 23, 2016, Defendant filed an opposition.

(ECF No. 34). On March 18,2016, the Court issued an Order granting the motion for

leave to file a First Amended Complaint (ECFNo. 36). OnMarch23,2016, Plaintiff

filed a First Amended Complaint, which became the operative pleading in this case.

(ECF No. 37).

On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed the motion for sanctions and costs based on

Defendant’s opposition to the motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF

No. 38). On April 7,2016, Defendant filed the motion to dismiss. (ECFNo. 40). On

April 22,2016, Defendant filed an opposition to the motion for sanctions. (ECF No.

42). On the same day, Plaintifffiled an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No.

41). On April 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a reply to the opposition to the motion for

sanctions and costs. (ECF No. 43). On the same day, Defendant filed a reply to the

oppositionto the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 44). OnMay 27,2016, with the Court’s

permission, Plaintifffiled a sur-reply to the motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 47).

Oh June 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application to shorten time for

decision on the motion for sanctions and costs and the motion to dismiss. (ECF No.

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20 48).

21 U. Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

A. Allegations ofthe First Amended Complaint

PlaintiffJenniferGrantis abeneficiary ofthe SchwichtenbergRevocableFamily

Trust (“trust”), dated July 28,1982,'"and is the trustee ofthe B subsection ofthe trust.

(ECF No. 23 at ^ 2). Defendant Jeffrey Bostwick is the judge presiding over the

administration ofthe trust in San Diego Superior Court’s Central Probate Provision.

Id K 7.

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28 “Defendant inherited Pro-Per Plaintiffs case ... in September 2012 ....” Id.

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Case 3:15-cv-00874-WQH-BLM Document 49 Filed 07/21/16 Page 2 of 12
1 Tf 13. Upon the death ofPlaintiffs mother, “Rusty [Grant], no relation to Plaintiff, was

to become the trustee ofsection A ofPlaintiffs parents’ ABC inter-vivos trust. ...”

Id. 114. “With no legal authority, Rusty took over all three sections ofthe trust the day

Plaintiffs mother died.” Id. 115.

“Defendant lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Both Plaintiffs parent’s wills

specifically state that their intention in creating the trust was NOT to subject their

assets to probate court.” Id. f 16.

Rusty/Larsen’s petition opened the case purporting to be an internal

affairs petition .... It was illegally plead due to: 1) lack of capacity ...

asRusty claimed capacity astrustee ofthe whole trust 2) limitations ofthe

trust terms regarding the duties accorded the trustee ofsection A post the

last settlor’s death,... 3) failure to meetthe standards for proper pleading

since its intent was to harass Plaintiff....

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Id. 118.

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Plaintifftried to bring [to] Defendant’s attention . . . that not only was

Rusty illegally acting as the administrative B section trustee . . . but she

Larsen were 1) purposefully trying to destroy the trust home and

denying her access so thatshe was deprived for years ofits enjoyment and

use 2) had stolen from the trust home, 3) were acting beyond the duties

permitted a trustee of section A, 4) were misusing trust funds, 5) were

violating the duties of care and loyalty ... 6) and otherwise disobeying

trust terms in a concentrated effort to force the sale ofthe trust home ...

by bankrupting trust A so the home would end up in foreclosure

abatementforcing its sale.

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and

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18 Id. 121.

19 Between September 2012 and June 2013, Defendant had not only denied

Plaintiffs oral motion for a hearing to show cause on why Rusty

not be removed but continually postponed calendering trial

Remove Trustee Petition__ Defendant also ignored allegations in case

managementstatements and denied numerous ex-partes filed by Plaintiff

as ‘noturgent’ despite clear and convincing exhibitsthat accompaniedthe

ex-parte documents providing that Plaintiff was being injured by

Rusty/Larsen in the manner described.

should

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Id. 124.

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“Defendant denied Plaintiff of her liberty to assume the ‘job’ her parents had

given her underthe trust instrument” and “suspended Plaintiff... for hostility with her

brother and Larsen.” Id. 128. Plaintiffalleges that Defendant denied her the “choice

of appointment ofsuccessor trustees” and “appointed a public administrator over all

the trustsections.” Id. 129. Plaintiffalleges that Defendant denied “Plaintiffher 14th

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Case 3:15-cv-00874-WQH-BLM Document 49 Filed 07/21/16 Page 3 of 12
amendment rights through the conduction of a biased courtroom.” Id. f 32. Plaintiff

alleges that after she regained trusteeship over the B and C sections of the trust,

“Defendant continued to act with bias and restrictPlaintiffs liberty to act astrustee by

ignoring Plaintiff. .. Id. f 39. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to grant ex

parte applications, refused to provide her with a hearing, and “ignored Plaintiffs

protests over [a] violation of civil procedure.” Id. 34, 40,42.

Defendant, acting under color of law, has a long history with a well

established pattern ofabusingthepower ofhis office to denyPlaintiffdue

process and equal protection of the law with the intent of depriving

Plaintiff ofthe property to which she is legitimately entitled under the

trust instrument ana her earnings and savings while restricting her liberty

to act as trust named administrative trustee.

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Id. If 19.

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Plaintiffseeks declaratory and injunctive reliefunder42U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

seeks a declaratoryjudgment that Defendant has violated and continues to violate her

Fourteenth Amendment rights by: (1) conducting proceedings without personal or

subject matterjurisdiction, (2) denying Plaintiff a timely hearing on former trustee’s

alleged breaches offiduciary duty and state crimes, (3) appointing a temporary trustee,

(4) acting without jurisdiction to conduct proceedings on the temporary trustee’s

accounting/fee petition, (5) acting without jurisdiction should Defendant attempt to

hear any fee petitions by former trustees, and (6) denying Plaintiff due process by

refusing to hear her requests for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 36-39. Plaintiffalso

seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant “acted as an accessory after the fact to

preventthe formertrustee, Rusty Grant, from facing punishment for felony crimes. Id.

at 39.

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With regard to injunctive relief, Plaintiff requests the Court to “exercise

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supplementaljurisdiction” over certain probate petitions and order Defendantto either

consolidate the petitions and immediately setthem fortrial ormake a record ofthe trial

and provide it to Plaintiff and this Court, to enable this Court to “conduct a timely

judicial review ofthe proceedings.” Id. at 40-41. Alternatively, Plaintiffrequeststhat

the trial “be conducted by Defendant before the DistrictCourt” or “be conducted by the

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Honorable William Q. Hayes in District Court.” Id. at 41. Plaintiffrequests similar

reliefwith regard to her request for attorney’s fees. Id. at 41-42. Plaintiffrequeststhe

Court to “arrange with the local district attorney’s and federal prosecutor’s offices . .

. for a hearing before a grand jury.” Id. at 42.

B. Standard ofReview

Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) provides: “A pleading that states a claim for reliefmust contain

... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a

cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep % 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all

“well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions offact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted).

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to

move for dismissal on groundsthat the court lacksjurisdiction overthe subject matter.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiffto establish that the court has

subjectmatterjurisdiction over an action. Assoc, of Medical Colleges v. UnitedStates,

217 F.3d 770,778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). In resolving an attack on a court’sjurisdiction,

“the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air For Everyone v.

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Doyle, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

jurisdiction maj! be raised at anytime, even on appeal, by motion or suasponte by the

court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Snell v. Cleveland\ 316 F.3d 822, 826-27 (9th Cir.

2002).

1 Issues regarding subject matter

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5 C. Judicial Notice

“As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on aRule 12(b)(6) motion” Lee v. City ofLos Angeles, 250 F.3d

668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, there are “exceptions to the requirement that

consideration ofextrinsic evidence converts a 12(b)(6)motion to a summaryjudgment

motion.” Id. Federal Rule ofEvidence 201 provides that “[t]he court mayjudicially

notice a fact that is notsubject to reasonable dispute because it... is generally known

within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or . . . can be accurately and readily

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed R.

Evid. 201(b). “[Ujnder Fed.R.Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of‘matters

ofpublic record.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quoting SouthBayBeerDistrib., 798

F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts may take judicial notice of “proceedings in

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, ifthose proceedings

have a direct relation to matters at issue.” US. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

Defendantrequestsjudicial notice ofcertain filings and orders fromthe probate

case inwhichPlaintiffs allegations againstDefendant arose. The documentsrequested

to be noticed are proceedings in another court that have a direct relation to the matters

at issue and are in the public recoitt. See US. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

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Council, 971 F.2d at 248; Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Defendant’srequest forjudicial notice

is granted.

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27 C. Contentions ofthe Parties

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that (1) this Court lacksjurisdiction under the probate exception because the action in

state court is properlyunderthe state probate court’sjurisdiction, (2) Defendant enjoys

absolute judicial immunity against Plaintiffs claim, (3) the Younger abstention

doctrine bars this action, (4) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiffs action

against Defendant, and (5) the First Amended Complaint fails to state sufficient facts

to state a cognizable claim against Defendant.

Plaintiffcontendsthat she is suing Defendant only in his individual capacity for

acts and omissions committed as ajudicial officer. PlaintiffcontendsthatDefendant’s

acts alleged in the First Amended Complaint were non-judicial. Plaintiffcontends,that

she is not asking the Court to re-litigate Defendant’s previous rulings. Plaintiff

contends that Defendant acted without jurisdiction and therefore does not have

immunity. Plaintiffcontends that the probate exception only applies to probate cases,

not to civil rights cases in which the Defendant is a.probate judge acting in a probate

courtroom. Plaintiff contends that the probate exception applies only to wills, not

trusts. Plaintiffcontendsthat Younger abstention does not apply because the state does

not have an interest in the case because Defendant is sued only in his individual

capacity.

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18 D. Discussion

Generally, “judges of courts ofsuperior or general jurisdiction are not liable in

civil actions for theirjudicial acts . . . Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56

(1978). “Judicial immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a

judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e. actions not taken in the

judge’s judicial capacity. . . . Second, a judge is not immune from actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in complete absence ofalljurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “[Ajbsolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial

actions, i.e. the administrative, legislative, and executive functionsthatjudges ... may

on occasion be assigned to perform.” Duvallv. County ofKitsap, 260F.3dll24,1133

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified four factors

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relevant to resolving whether a particular act isjudicial in nature:

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(1) the precise act is a normaljudicial function; (2) the events occurred in

the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then

pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and

immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official

capacity.

Id. (quoting Meekv. County ofRiverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). The

inquiry focuses on whetherthe “nature and function ofthe act” is normally performed

by ajudge, “not the act itself.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. “[I]fonly the particular act in

question were to be scrutinized, then anymistake ofajudge in excess ofhis authority

would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an improper or erroneous act cannotbe said

to be normally performed by a judge.” Id. at 12.

The FirstAmendedComplaint challengesthe decisions ofDefendantto proceed

as the judge in the pending probate case, to suspend Plaintiff as a trustee, and to

appoint aPublic Administrator astemporarytrustee,just asthe original Complaint did.

Plaintiff also challenges Defendant’s decision to timely hear Plaintiffs petitions and

motions and Defendant’s failure to rule in her favor. Each ofDefendant’s decisions

occurred within the scope of the ongoing state probate proceedings. Defendant’s

actions are normaljudicial functions undertaken in state probate proceedings and arose

from interactions between the Plaintiffand Defendant in state probate court. Plaintiff

has not alleged sufficientfactual allegationsto showthatDefendant acted “in complete

absence of all jurisdiction.” See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. The First Amended

Complaint challenges actions by the Defendant which are judicial in nature and taken

in an ongoing state proceeding within the state probate court’s jurisdiction.

In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), the Supreme Court held that while

judicial immunity bars actions against judges seeking monetary damages, “judicial

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immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting

in herjudicial capacity.” Id. at 541-42. After Pulliam, however, Congress narrowed

the judicial immunity exception. Section 983 provides that “in any action brought

against ajudicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’sjudicial capacity,

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injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as amended by Pub. L.

104-307, Title III, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3852 (Oct. 19,1996)).

Plaintiff challenges actions taken by Defendant Judge Bostwick in his judicial

capacity in ongoing state probate proceedings seeking prospective injunctive relief

under § 1983. In the Order dismissing the original Complaint, the Court concluded,

“The Complaint fails to allege facts to support the conclusion that the exception to

judicial immunity from suit in a § 1983 action for injunctive relief—namely, violation

ofa declaratory decree orthe unavailability ofdeclaratory relief—would apply in this

case.” (ECF No. 23 at 6). In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that

“injunctive relief is necessary because no declaratory decree is available that would

prevent Defendant continuing his pattern of behavior that violates Plaintiffs 14th

amendmentrights__ ” (ECF No. 37 at 40). However, the First Amended Complaint

does not provide sufficient facts to infer that no declaratory relief is available. See

Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”)

(citation omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (“for a complaint to survive a motion to

dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief’)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Plaintiffseeks to

challenge the decisions Defendant has made in probate court proceedings, Plaintiffis

free to file an appeal with the California Court ofAppeal. The Court concludes that

the First Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support the conclusion that an

exception to judicial immunity applies in this case. The facts alleged in the First

Amended Complaint do not state a plausible claim for reliefunder § 1983.

In the Order dismissing Plaintiffs original Complaint, the Court concluded that

the Younger abstention doctrine and the probate exception to federal jurisdiction

provided alternate grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs claim. (ECF No. 23 at 7). The

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Court concludes that Younger abstention and the probate exception also provide

grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs claim is

closely related to the issues pending in the underlying state probate court proceeding.

The reliefrequested would require the Court to determine issues that fall within the

purview of the state probate court. The Court declines to interfere with ongoing

judicial proceedings in state probate court. See New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.

Council ofCity ofNew Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,368 (1989) (holding thatunder Younger

abstention, federal courts should not enjoin pending civil proceedings involving

“orders that are uniquely in furtherance ofthe state courts’ ability to perform their

judicial functions”); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (prohibiting federal

courts from adjudicating rights that would interfere with the state probate court’s

administration of a decedent’s estate).

The motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint with prejudice is granted.

Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend her pleadings and has only alleged facts

regarding Defendant’s actions that are covered by judicial immunity. The First

Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

m. Motion for Sanctions and Costs

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s counsel violated Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11(b) by making statements in Defendant’s opposition to the Plaintiffs

motion for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 34) that intentionally

attemptedtomisleadthe court and by “presenting background factsregarding previous

rulings and Plaintiffs prayers out ofcontext.” (ECF No. 38-1). Plaintiffcontendsthat

Defendant’s counsel tried to commit fraud upon the Court with her arguments and

citation to inapplicable caselaw. *

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs motion should be denied as procedurally

improper because it was filed afterthe Court mled on the underlying motion for leave

to file an amended complaint. Defendant contendsthatthe motion became moot when

the Court issued its Order granting Plaintiffs motion to amend the Complaint.

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Defendant contendsthat the motion for sanctions is without merit because all factual

citations and legal arguments made in the opposition were accurate and made in good

faith.

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“Rule 11 is intended to deter baselessfilings in district court and imposes a duty

of ‘reasonable inquiry’ so that anything filed with the court is ‘well grounded in fact,

legally tenable, and not interposed for any improperpurpose.’” Islamic Shura Council

of Southern California v. F.B.I., 757 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cooter &

Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 494 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “Motions for Rule 11 attorney’s

fees cannot be served after the district court has decided the merits ofthe underlying

dispute giving rise to the questionable filing. This is because once the court has

decided the underlying dispute, the motion for fees cannot serve Rule 1 l's purpose of

judicial economy.” Id. at 873 (citing Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 1993

Amendments to Rule 11 (noting that a party may not serve a motion for Rule 11

sanctions after “judicial rejection ofthe offending contention”)).

In this case, on February 9,20016, Plaintifffiled the motion for leave to file an

amended complaint. On February 23, 2016, Defendant filed the opposition to the

motion, which is the basis forthe motion for sanctions. On March 18,2016, the Court

issued an Order granting the motion for leave to amend. On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff

filed the motion for sanctions and costs. Because the motion for sanctions was filed

afterthe Court decided themerits ofthe underlyingmotion forleave to amend and after

“judicial rejection” ofthe arguments made in Defendant’s opposition, the motion for

sanctionsis denied. SeeIslamicShura Councilof Southern California, 757 F.3d at 873

(reversing an order granting amotion for sanctions where the motion forsanctions was

filed after the Court had ruled on the motion underlying the dispute); Advisory

Committee’s Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11.

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IV. Conclusion

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 40) filed by

Defendant Honorable Jeffrey Bostwick is granted. The First Amended Complaint is

dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk ofthe Court shall close the case.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for sanctions and costs (ECF No.

38) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the “Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for a

Decision on Dkt 38 & 40” (ECF No. 48) is denied as moot.

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10 DATED:

11 WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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