Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01209/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Guadalupe Chavez Duarte,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 16-01209-PHX-JAT (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

Petitioner Guadalupe Chavez Duarte (“Petitioner” or “Duarte”) is currently 

incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Douglas, Arizona. Petitioner was 

convicted of first degree murder after a jury trial in the Maricopa County Superior Court. 

On August 27, 2001, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of release 

after 25 years. Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) on April 19, 2016. On May 4, 2016 (Doc. 4), the 

Court required an answer to the Petition. Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 8), 

asserting, among other things, that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Petitioner filed a Reply 

(Doc. 10), and the matter is fully briefed. For the reasons below, the Court recommends 

that the Petition be denied as untimely because it was filed years after AEDPA’s 1-year 

statute of limitations expired. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Proceedings Leading to Conviction and Sentence

After a jury trial in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted 

of first degree murder (Doc. 9-1 at 3). On August 27, 2001, he was sentenced to life 

imprisonment with no eligibility for release before 25 calendar years (Doc. 9-1 at 4). 

B. Appeal and PCR Proceedings 

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

(Doc. 9-4). His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), stating that he had “found no 

arguable question of law that is not frivolous” and asking the court to search the record 

for fundamental error (Doc. 9-5). Petitioner did not file a pro se supplemental brief. On 

October 10, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and 

sentence (Doc. 9-2). Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Doc. 1 at 3). 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, but on March 26, 2004, the postconviction court dismissed Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding for failure to file 

a timely petition for post-conviction relief (Doc. 9-6). It is unclear whether the notice of 

post-conviction relief was timely, but for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, 

the Court will assume such was timely. Petitioner asserts he sought review of the 

dismissal in the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 1 at 5), but the record does not support 

that assertion.1

 It is agreed that review of the post-conviction proceedings was not sought 

at the Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 9 at 5). 

II. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

In his April 19, 20162

 Petition, Petitioner names Charles L. Ryan as Respondent 

 

1

 Petitioner also asserts that he raised due process as the ground of his petition for post-conviction relief (Doc. 1 at 4), which is belied by the record (Doc. 9-6). 

2

 This is the date Petitioner delivered the Petition to prison officials (Doc. 1 at 11), 

as indicated by the date he inscribed next to his signature, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266, 270-71 (1988) (stating a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 

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and the Arizona Attorney General as an Additional Respondent (Doc. 1). Petitioner 

raises two grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because he was 

interviewed by police when he was intoxicated and no blood or breath test was taken to 

determine his level of intoxication (Doc. 1 at 6). Petitioner also appears to assert that he 

was acting in self-defense (Id.). In Ground Two, Petitioner appears to allege that his 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the government failed to 

disclose evidence favorable to him (Doc. 1 at 7). 

 Respondents assert the following regarding the Petition: 

Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely. In addition, Petitioner did not fairly 

present Ground One to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Thus, Ground One is 

procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and 

prejudice to excuse the default of that claim. Furthermore, Ground Two is 

insufficient to state a claim for habeas relief. 

 (Doc. 8 at 2). 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and Tolling 

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921–22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of the AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). 

 1. One Year Limitations Period 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). As a general matter, AEDPA’s 1-year 

 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the mailbox rule in the context of a habeas petition). 

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statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the judgment against a petitioner 

became final either by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 

available to seek such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 

U.S. 113, 118–20 (2009); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(noting that direct appeal is final upon expiration of time for seeking further appellate 

review). 

After trial and sentencing, Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence 

on October 10, 2002. Petitioner had 35 days, until November 14, 2002, to file a petition 

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, but there is no record that he did so. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 31.19(a); State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 262, 263, 782 P.2d 737, 739 (1989) 

(holding that a 5-day extension is warranted when a notice is mailed to the party who is 

required to act). Accordingly, Petitioner’s convictions became “final” on November 14, 

2002, the day that Petitioner’s time expired for filing a petition for review. See Gonzalez 

v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012). Therefore, in the present case, AEDPA’s expired 1 

year later, unless a timely PCR proceeding was filed, which would have tolled the 

limitations period. See section III(A)(2), infra. 

 2. Statutory Tolling 

 Under the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also 

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). The post-conviction court dismissed 

Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding on March 26, 2004 (Doc. 9-6). Petitioner 

then had 35 days to file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, see Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.9(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3, which he failed to do. (A prisoner is not 

entitled to the 90 days for filing a petition for writ of certiorari if he did not take the 

matter to the state supreme court. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012).) 

Thus, the 1-year AEDPA limitation period began to run on May 1, 2004, and expired 1 

year later, on May 1, 2005. Petitioner did not file his habeas petition until April 19, 2016, 

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nearly 11 years late absent any equitable tolling. See section III(A)(3), infra. 

 3. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 

(2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Id. at 649 (quoting 

Pace v. DiGuglielma, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “The diligence required for equitable 

tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and 

[the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted); see alsoPace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the oneyear statute of limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of 

showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.”) ; Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” and “the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations and internal emphasis omitted). Petitioner must 

also establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his 

failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he “has just 

learned of counsels ineffective assistance during trial, due to never being on a yard with 

legal materials available to him” (Doc. 1 at 11). 

 A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the 

law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 

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448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication 

is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see also

Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV-06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation 

during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances). Further, a prisoner’s “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

In Ramirez v. Yates, the petitioner argued that he had limited access to the law 

library and copy machine during the period in which he remained in administrative 

segregation. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). In denying equitable 

tolling for that period of time, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[o]rdinary prison 

limitations on [petitioner’s] access to the law library and copier (quite unlike the denial 

altogether of access to his personal legal papers) were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it 

‘impossible’ for him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most 

common day-to-day security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit 

the exception to swallow the rule—according to [petitioner’s] theory, AEDPA’s 

limitations period would be tolled for the duration of any and every prisoner’s stay in 

administrative segregation, and likely under a far broader range of circumstances as 

well.” Id.; see also Gutierrez-Valencia v. Ryan, No. CV-12-01318-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 

1762978, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2014) (where petitioner did not allege a complete lack of 

access to his legal file, only his being housed in lock down status in a maximum security 

facility, court held that “Petitioner has not provided this Court with any specific details 

regarding what legal materials he was seeking and how they would be of assistance in his 

habeas filing . . . [and] Petitioner does not dispute that his lock down status is an ordinary 

prison limitation.”). 

 Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing extraordinary circumstances 

or reasonable diligence that would justify equitable tolling. It is recommended that the 

Court find that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute 

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of limitations.

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition years after the expiration of the AEDPA 

statute of limitations and statutory and equitable tolling do not render the petition timely. 

Accordingly, the Petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because the Petition 

is untimely, the Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying 

habeas corpus relief. The Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed. 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s 

judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the 

District Court was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent the Court 

adopts this Report and Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

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States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 9th day of December, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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