Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00009/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00009-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN FINKELSTEIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN MATEO COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00009-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

ADJUDICATION; GRANTING 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO FILE A 

SUR-REPLY; AND DENYING

COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Docket Nos. 70, 81, 95

Plaintiffs John and Jennifer Finkelstein have filed a § 1983 civil rights action based on a 

search that the police conducted of their home and cars. Defendants are as follows:

(1) Jeffrey S. Cichocki, a detective with the Loudoun County (Virginia) Sheriff’s Office; 

(2) the City of San Mateo and Nicolas Ryan, a detective with the San Mateo Police 

Department (“SMPD”) (collectively, the “City Defendants”); and 

(3) the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office and a deputy D.A. Vishal Jangla 

(collectively, the “County Defendants”). 

Plaintiffs have asserted the following claims for relief, all based on § 1983: (1) judicial deception 

(individual defendants only); (2) use of untrustworthy information to establish probable cause 

(individual defendants only); (3) use of untrustworthy information to procure a warrant (City and 

County only); (4) use of a search warrant application lacking probable cause on its face to procure 

a warrant (individual defendants only); (5) unreasonable search and seizure without a warrant, 

probable cause, and exigent circumstances (individual defendants only).

Currently pending before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

adjudication on the issue of probable cause and (2) the County Defendants’ motion for summary 

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judgment. Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the 

oral argument of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion and DENIES the County 

Defendants’ motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a “court shall grant summary judgment 

[to a moving party] if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is 

genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Id. at 252. At the summary judgment stage, evidence 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences 

are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. See id. at 255. 

Where a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on claims that it has brought (i.e., for 

which it has the burden of proof), it “must prove each element essential of the claims . . . by 

undisputed facts.” Cabo Distrib. Co. v. Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1992)

Similarly, where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative 

defense (i.e., an issue on which it bears the burden of proof), the defendant must establish “all of 

the essential elements of the . . . defense to warrant judgment in [its] favor.” Martin v. Alamo 

Cmty. College Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted; 

emphasis omitted); see also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (noting that a defendant bears the burden of proof at summary judgment with respect to 

an affirmative defense).

Summary adjudication differs from summary judgment only in that a Court focuses on a 

limited issue as opposed to an entire claim or the entire action. See Moxley v. Texaco, Inc., No. 

00-1518 CM (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20255, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000).

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II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

A. Relevant Factual Background

The evidence submitted by the parties in conjunction with Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

adjudication reflects the following undisputed facts.

The Finkelsteins’ home and cars were searched pursuant to a search warrant that was 

issued by the San Mateo County Superior Court. The state court approved the search warrant 

based on an affidavit submitted by Detective Ryan of the SMPD. The events that led to the 

warrant and search were as follows.

In November 2015, the Loudoun County (Virginia) Sheriff’s Office – where Detective 

Cichocki works – received a report of an unknown suspect “sexting” a female minor. See Alberts 

Decl., Ex. B (Cichocki Aff. at 3). The minor informed the police that “she had been contacted by 

‘Peter Mayfair’ on an application called LOL” and that “[t]he conversation moved to Skype where 

she was encouraged by [him] bearing Skype Name ‘johrobbins6’ . . . to use the video function and 

show herself in various forms of undress.” Alberts Decl., Ex. B (Cichocki Aff. at 3). The minor 

showed her private areas to the suspect and eventually the suspect threatened her to “‘do exactly 

what I say and beg me or I will share this video on the internet.’” Alberts Decl., Ex. B (Cichocki 

Aff. at 3). The suspect claimed that “he was using a proxy server and could not be traced.” 

Alberts Decl., Ex. B (Cichocki Aff. at 3). 

Through an administrative subpoena served on Skype, the police learned that the screen 

name “johnrobbins6” “came back to an IP in Nam[i]bia, Africa,” which, according to the police, 

“substantiat[ed] the claim that [the suspect] was using a proxy server.” Alberts Decl., Ex. B 

(Cichocki Aff. at 3). The police also learned that the registered email that Skype had for 

“johnrobbins6” was johnrob@gmail.com. 

“An administrative subpoena to [Google] returned with a user of John Robert Finkelstein.” 

Alberts Decl., Ex. B (Cichocki Aff. at 4). The recovery email for johnrob@gmail.com was 

johnrob@cs.stanford.edu. See Alberts Decl., Ex. B (Cichocki Aff. at 4). Google also had a phone 

number listed for SMS, which the police then used to subpoena AT&T, and this led the police to 

Mr. Finkelstein in San Mateo. The email address for the AT&T account was also 

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johnrob@gmail.com. 

Because Mr. Finkelstein was located in San Mateo, Detective Cichocki reached out to the 

SMPD for assistance. In December 2015, Detective Ryan of the SMPD “was tasked with 

assisting” Detective Cichocki in the investigation. See Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 4). 

Detective Ryan ultimately prepared an affidavit to support the application for a search warrant on 

the Finkelsteins’ home and cars. In his affidavit, Detective Ryan noted, inter alia, as follows:

• The victim was “contacted by an unknown subject on an application called MyLOL 

where she was sent a message by a user with the profile name ‘Peter Mayfair.’ The 

profile picture for this user was of a juvenile male with the stated birthday of 

(01/03/1999).” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 4). “MyLOL is a teenager social 

networking/dating website.” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5).

• The suspect asked the victim to Skype him, and she eventually agreed. “The 

suspect’s Skype profile name was ‘johnrobbins6.’” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. 

at 5). The profile also indicated that he was from London, England. See Merin 

Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5).

• The suspect asked the victim for video via Skype, and “she used the video feature 2 

or 3 times, but only spoke via text on Skype.” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5). 

The suspect used the video feature but one time only, and the video simply 

“showed a still image of a white juvenile male with brown hair.” Merin Decl., Ex. 

A (Ryan Aff. at 5). The victim never saw the suspect, nor did she ever hear his 

voice. See Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5).

• The suspect asked the victim to show her breasts and genitalia via Skype video and 

she did so. After she did so, the victim told the suspect she was leaving the chat 

and the suspect threatened her, saying, e.g., “‘I showed u a video that’s not even 

me’ [and] ‘u will do exactly what I say and beg me or I will share this video on the 

internet.’” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5). The suspect told the victim that 

“he used a proxy server so he could not be traced, he had her phone number[] and 

IP address, and he could find where she lived.” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5.

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• Through an administrative subpoena on Skype, the police learned that the account 

for “johnrobbins6” was created in August 2015 from an IP address in Namibia, 

Africa, “which substantiated the suspect’s claim that he was likely using a proxy 

server.” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5). The police also learned that, “[i]n 

order to create a Skype account a valid email address is necessary. The email 

address used to create this account was johnrob@gmail.com.” Merin Decl., Ex. A 

(Ryan Aff. at 5).

• Through an administrative subpoena on Google, the police learned that “[t]he email 

account johnrob@gmail.com returned to a John Finkelstein and a recovery email 

address was listed as johnrob@cs.stanford.edu.” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 

5). Google also had a phone number listed for SMS. See Merin Decl., Ex. A 

(Ryan Aff. at 5).

• The police learned that the provider for the phone number was AT&T, and, through 

an administrative subpoena on AT&T, the police obtained the subscriber 

information for the phone number. AT&T identified the subscriber as John R. 

Finkelstein with an address in San Mateo. See Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 5). 

In January 2016, a San Mateo superior court judge signed off on the search warrant 

application submitted by Detective Ryan. See Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. at 2). Subsequently, 

a search of the Finkelsteins’ home and cars (for child pornography) was conducted. It appears 

that, ultimately, nothing was found, and Mr. Finkelstein was never charged with any crime.1

Thereafter, Mr. Finkelstein filed a motion in state court, challenging the search warrant and 

asking for a return of the property seized from him during the search. In October 2017, the 

superior court judge who signed off on the warrant issued an order on the motion favorable to Mr. 

 

1 At the hearing, Mr. Cichocki suggested, for the first time, that the state judge’s approval of the 

search warrant application precludes this Court from considering, in a § 1983 civil action, whether 

there was probable cause for the search based on the four corners of the application. Mr. 

Cichocki, however, provided no authority to support the position that a state court’s issuance of a 

warrant precludes a finding by a federal court that the warrant was constitutionally deficient. 

Interestingly, Mr. Cichocki does not argue that the subsequent ruling of the state court – i.e., that 

the warrant was not legally obtained – is binding. See note 2, infra.

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Finkelstein. The judge found, inter alia, that certain statements made in the Ryan affidavit in 

support of the search warrant were made in reckless disregard for the truth and, once these 

statements were excised, the remaining statements were insufficient to establish probable cause. 

See Merin Decl., Ex. E (Order at 4). The judge also found that, even if it were to interpret the 

misleading statements “in the manner consistent with the meaning the detectives” advocated, there 

was still no probable cause. Merin Decl., Ex. E (Order at 5). The affidavit “simply showed that 

Mr. Finkelstein’s email address was provided along with other misinformation when the Skype 

account was created. Anyone could have randomly provided his email address during the creation 

of the Skype account. Consequently, the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.”

2

 Merin 

Decl., Ex. E (Order at 5) (emphasis added). 

B. Probable Cause

In their motion for summary adjudication, Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold that (1) the 

police affidavit used to obtain the search warrant failed to establish probable cause and that (2) the 

search warrant was issued without probable cause.3

Under the Fourth Amendment, a search without probable cause is prohibited. “‘Probable 

cause for a search requires a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 

in a particular place, based on the totality of the circumstances.’” United States v. Fries, 781 F.3d 

1137, 1150 (9th Cir. 2015). Fair probability does not mean “certainty or even a preponderance of 

the evidence,” United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), but “‘[m]ere 

suspicion, common rumor, or even strong reason to suspect are not enough.’” United States v. 

Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Although probable cause is a legal question, “the factual matters underlying the judgment 

 

2

In their papers, Defendants suggest that, in assessing probable cause, the Court should give no 

consideration to the state court’s order discussed above. To the extent Defendants mean that the 

state court’s findings are not preclusive, they are correct but, that being said, Plaintiffs do not 

dispute such. Moreover, even if the Court were to effectively “strike” the state court’s order, that 

does not bar the Court from arriving at the same or similar conclusions on its own, based on the 

same or similar reasoning.

3 The Finkelsteins are moving for summary adjudication with respect to the issue of probable 

cause only. They are not asking the Court to make any ruling on judicial deception (as the state 

court did). 

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of reasonableness generally mean that probable cause is a question for the jury; and summary 

judgment is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have 

probable cause to [act].” McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, the Court finds that there are no genuine disputes of material fact 

regarding probable cause. Moreover, because no reasonable juror could find probable cause based 

on the undisputed facts, as discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

adjudication. The Court agrees with the analysis of the state court judge who signed off on the 

warrant but then later found a lack of probable cause. At bottom, the sole link to Mr. Finkelstein 

was the email given for the Skype account – johnrob@gmail.com – an email that could have been

given by anyone and that required no verification by Skype.

According to Defendants, there was probable cause for the search because there 

circumstances tying Mr. Finkelstein to the crime in addition to the above email address. Those 

other circumstances, however, are not meaningful. For example:

• The fact that the suspect’s public username on Skype was johnrobbins6 – i.e., a 

name consistent with the email address johnrob@gmail.com – shows nothing. The 

suspect easily could have chosen the public username to be consistent with the 

email address (or vice-versa) but that does not mean that the email address was the 

suspect’s real email address (i.e., that the Skype account belonged to the person 

with the email address johnrob@gmail.com). In testimony before the state court, 

D.D.A. Jangla asked, “if someone was simply trying to create a random Skype 

account, why try to coordinate the user name – which in this case was johnrobbins6 

– to the e-mail address used to open it – which was johnrob@gmail – as opposed to 

just entering in random data”? Alberts Decl., Ex. E (Tr. at 74). But the easy 

answer to this is convenience, especially where a person is trying to hide his 

identity.

• The fact that the email address johnrob@gmail.com had, per Google, a recovery 

email of johnrob@cs.stanford.edu shows nothing. That the second email address 

was consistent with the first does not establish that the first email address was the 

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suspect’s real email address (i.e., that the Skype account belonged to the person 

with the email address johnrob@gmail.com). The recovery email does nothing to 

substantiate the weak link of the email address provided to Skype.

• Although Defendants argue that there was a fair probability that Mr. Finkelstein 

was the perpetrator because the perpetrator was clearly tech savvy (e.g., using a 

proxy server to hide his identity) and Mr. Finkelstein is a software engineer from 

Silicon Valley, that argument lacks merit because there is nothing in the Ryan 

affidavit to indicate that either he, Detective Cichocki, or anyone else involved in

the investigation knew at any time before the search that Mr. Finkelstein is a 

software engineer. Therefore, that fact cannot be a part of the probable cause 

calculus. To the extent Defendants have tried to argue that the recovery email 

address johnrob@cs.stanford.edu shows that Mr. Finkelstein worked for the 

Computer Science Department at Stanford, see Docket No. 81 (County Mot. at 12), 

that argument is unavailing because nothing indicates that Defendants knew that 

the “cs” referred to the Computer Science Department. And even if Defendants 

knew that, nothing shows that Defendants knew what Mr. Finkelstein did at the 

Computer Science Department. Certainly no mention is made in the Ryan affidavit 

submitted as part of the search warrant application.

At oral argument, Defendants alluded to the fact that they sought a search warrant only and 

not a more intrusive arrest warrant. But, Defendants have not cited any authority to support the 

proposition that the standard for probable cause for a search warrant materially differs from that 

for an arrest warrant. In both situations, the question is whether there is a “fair probability.” In 

any event, in this case, if there was probable cause for a search warrant, there would have been 

probable cause for an arrest warrant. The police wanted to search places within the possession, 

custody, or control of Mr. Finkelstein (i.e., his home and cars) for child pornography; if the police 

had a fair probability that Mr. Finkelstein possessed that, the police would have had probable 

cause to believe he committed the crime. Cf. Chism v. Wash., 661 F.3d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(noting that, in a prior case involving a search of a computer for child pornography, “we looked 

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for evidence in the affidavit: (1) that a crime was committed; (2) that it was Gourde who 

committed the crime; and (3) that evidence of the crime would be found in the place to be 

searched[;] [i]n light of this ‘triad of solid fact,’ we concluded that ‘the reasonable inference that 

Gourde had received or downloaded [child pornographic] images easily meets the “fair 

probability” test’”).

At the end of the day, the email address registered with Skype (johnrob@gmail.com) was 

the only link that Defendants had to tie Mr. Finkelstein with the crime. Anyone can establish a 

Skype account and list as a “valid” email someone else’s email address. Skype does not verify the 

email address given. See, e.g., Docket No. 93-3 (Merin Decl., Ex. 2) (Tr. at 19-22) (Plaintiffs’ 

expert, Neil Broom, testifying in the state court proceedings that he was able to register and create 

a working Skype account using the email address barackobama@whitehouse.gov and that it is 

possible to use an email that does not actually exist to create a working Skype account). And there 

was nothing to corroborate that this email address supplied by the suspect was in fact the suspect’s 

real email address. 

Moreover, there was actually evidence indicating that the suspect had supplied a false 

email address in registering with Skype. The suspect had taken multiple steps to conceal his 

identity – e.g., using different names for his MyLOL and Skype accounts (Peter Mayfair and 

johnrobbins6, respectively), using a proxy server from Namibia,4never showing his “live” face 

during the video exchange with the victim, never communicating orally with the victim, and using 

a picture of someone else during the video exchange (“‘I showed u a video that’s not even me’”). 

As Plaintiffs argue, “[a]n email address provided by an internet criminal that has taken steps to 

conceal his identity [is] not reasonably trustworthy information that can support a finding of 

 

4

See Alberts Decl., Ex. A (Tr. at 107) (Detective Cichocki testifying before the state court that, 

“through my training and experience with other cases and speaking with other law enforcement 

officials, that Namibia is a location that hosts proxy servers”); Alberts Decl., Ex. B (Officer 

Cichocki’s response to Rog No. 7 stating that he “spoke with several law enforcement officers to 

consult upon the fact that the suspect said he was using a proxy server and that the IP address via 

Nam[i]bia was most likely that”; adding that he “verified via the FBI that attempts to get further IP 

information via the Nam[i]bia connection would be fruitless”). 

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probable cause.”

5

 Reply to County at 3. See generally United States v. Macias-Perez, No. CR 11-

2024, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68305, at *40 (N.D. Iowa June 24, 2011) (stating that “the use of 

false names and identifying information is common in criminal society”). Whether Detective 

Ryan (or Detective Cichocki or anyone else) could have done more investigation – e.g., per 

Plaintiffs, “to trace the [Namibian] IP address used by the suspect when the Skype account was 

created . . . or trace the IP address used by the suspect on November 24, 2015, the date that the 

‘sexting’ incident is alleged to have occurred,” Mot. at 3, is not the question. The bottom line is 

that Defendants did not do more investigation, and the Court must assess probable cause based on 

what information Defendants did have when applying for the search warrant – which was simply 

an email address that had a great chance of being inaccurate (i.e., not the suspect’s real email 

address).

The above analysis in and of itself is sufficient to establish a lack of probable cause for the 

search warrant. The analysis is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chism. The 

plaintiffs in Chism were a husband and wife, Todd and Nicole Chism. They filed a § 1983 suit 

after their home and Mr. Chism’s business office were searched for child pornography. The 

search did not reveal any evidence of child pornography and charges were never filed against Mr. 

Chism. The plaintiffs brought a claim for judicial deception and, in evaluating the claim and 

whether qualified immunity applied, the Ninth Circuit noted that, if false statements in the 

affidavit supporting the warrant application had been corrected, then the application would have 

reflected that Mr. Chism’s only connection to the pornographic websites at issue was a credit card. 

See Chism, 661 F.3d at 390 (stating that “[a] truthful version of [the officer’s] affidavit would 

have indicated that the sole evidence connecting Todd Chism [the plaintiff] to the child 

pornographic images was the fact that the credit card he shared with [his wife] Nicole was charged 

three times for hosting the websites that contained child pornographic images”). The court then 

 

5 At the hearing, Defendants’ only real comeback was that it was not impossible that the 

perpetrator provided his real email address because criminals sometimes do stupid or foolish 

things (and thus get caught). Although the Court recognizes that criminals sometimes do stupid or 

foolish things, Defendants have provided no evidence – and there was nothing in the Ryan 

affidavit – to substantiate how often that is the case, or any reason to believe that is what occurred 

here.

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indicated agreement with an expert that “‘relying only on information provided by the user of a 

credit card that is associated with criminal activity is inherently unreliable.’” Id. at 391 (emphasis 

in original). The Court also approved a police training manual that stated

“[m]uch, if not all, of the cyber-evidence (the E-mail addresses and 

IP addresses used) will lead you to an innocent person,] [which is] 

why simply identifying which account was used to commit a crime 

does not provide you with probable cause . . . You’ll need to do 

more investigating to determine if there is a link between the 

account holder (or other members of the household) with the 

criminal activity that was committed with that account.” 

Id. 

A similar criticism is applicable in the instant case – i.e., relying only on information 

provided by a person associated with criminal activity, particularly when the information provided 

is identifying information and the person has taken a fair amount of effort to conceal his identity, 

is inherently unreliable. 

III. COUNTY DEENDANTS’ MOTION6

As noted above, the County Defendants are the County and D.D.A. Jangla. For the County 

Defendants’ motion, the parties have submitted evidence in addition to that provided for Plaintiffs’

motion. The additional evidence includes testimony from Plaintiffs’ expert, Neil Broom (provided 

during the state court proceedings); testimony from D.D.A. Jangla (also provided during the state 

court proceedings); and a declaration from Karen Guidotti, the Chief D.D.A. for the Country 

District Attorney’s Office. 

The County Defendants argue that, based on the evidence submitted, they are entitled to 

summary judgment on each of the claims asserted against them.

A. First Cause of Action – Judicial Deception Claim

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for judicial deception is asserted against the individual 

defendants only. The judicial deception claim against D.D.A. Jangla is premised on the fact that 

he allegedly approved the submission of the Ryan affidavit to the state court judge. D.D.A. Jangla 

argues that he has qualified immunity with respect to the judicial deception claim.

 

6 The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply as there is no apparent prejudice 

to the County Defendants. See Docket No. 95 (motion). 

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“Courts engage in a two-pronged analysis to determine whether qualified immunity 

applies: ‘[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a 

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly 

established at the time.”’” Easley v. City of Riverside, 890 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2018).

In Chism, the Ninth Circuit held that “governmental employees are not entitled to qualified 

immunity on judicial deception claims.” Chism, 661 F.3d at 393. The reason why was fairly 

simple:

“[I]f an officer submitted an affidavit that contained statements he 

knew to be false or would have known were false had he not 

recklessly disregarded the truth and no accurate information 

sufficient to constitute probable cause attended the false statements, 

. . . he cannot be said to have acted in a reasonable manner, and the 

shield of qualified immunity is lost.”

Id.

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff “to survive a defendant officer’s motion for summary 

judgment on the ground of qualified immunity,” all that the plaintiff must do is “1) make a 

‘substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth and 2) establish 

that, but for the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have occurred.” Liston v. Cty. of 

Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 1997). The first element of a judicial deception claim – “a 

deliberate or reckless false statement or omission – is a question of fact,” even though “[t]he 

second element – materiality – is for the Court and may be decided on summary judgment.” 

Rhabarian v. Cawley, No. 2:10-cv-00767-TLN-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112189, at *28-29 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013); see also Liston, 120 F.3d at 974 (stating that, “[w]hile the materiality 

issue is one ‘reserved to the court,’ if the [plaintiffs] make the required ‘substantial showing,’ the 

question of intent or recklessness is ‘a factual determination for the trier of fact’”). 

In the instant case, given that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Finkelsteins, see id. at 974-75, they have made out a substantial showing on the first element 

above, i.e., that a deliberate or reckless false statement or omission was made. A reasonable jury 

could find, just as the state court did, that, when Detective Ryan stated the following in his 

affidavit – “In order to create a Skype account a valid email address is necessary. The email 

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address used to create this account was johnrob@gmail.com,” Merin Decl., Ex. A (Ryan Aff. At 

6) (emphasis added) – he made a false statement. The state court found that “the meaning 

intended by the phrase ‘used to create this account’ was that the owner of the email account ‘used’

the email account in a manner involving control over the email account by the owner.” Merin 

Decl., Ex. E (Order at 4) (emphasis added). The state court added that this statement was made in 

reckless disregard for the truth “because the email address was not ‘used’ but instead was simply 

included along with other requested information by the individual who created the Skype account 

and had no reason to supply any accurate information.” Merin Decl., Ex. E at 4). Thus, the police

affidavit implied that there was a real connection between the Skype account and Mr. Finkelstein 

when in fact the factual basis for that implication was lacking. The misleading nature of the 

affidavit was amplified by the fact that Detective Ryan failed to clarify that a “valid” email is not a 

verified email.

While the above analysis applies to Detective Ryan, and the moving party here is D.D.A. 

Jangla, D.D.A. Jangla allegedly reviewed and approved the search warrant application submitted 

by Detective Ryan. Thus, it is plausible that D.D.A. Jangla had as much knowledge as Detective 

Ryan as to the misleading nature of the affidavit.

To be clear, the Court is not making any ruling at this juncture that there was, in fact, 

judicial deception on the part of D.D.A. Jangla. Indeed, a reasonable jury might well find

otherwise. But given that all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor, summary 

judgment must be denied.

B. Second and Fourth Causes of Action – Use of Untrustworthy Information to Establish 

Probable Cause and Use of Search Warrant Application Lacking Probable Cause on Its 

Face

As with the first cause of action above, Plaintiffs’ second and fourth causes of action –

both related to a lack of probable cause – are asserted against the individual defendants only. 

D.D.A. Jangla argues that he has qualified immunity with respect to these claims as well, which 

seem to be predicated on his approval of the Ryan affidavit for submission to the state court.

As an initial matter, the Court takes note that D.D.A. Jangla argues for a broad application 

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of qualified immunity based on the second prong of the doctrine – i.e., liability is dependent on

there being clearly established unlawful conduct. D.D.A. Jangla points out that, in White v. Pauly, 

137 S. Ct. 548 (2017), the Supreme Court stated that it is a “longstanding principle that ‘clearly 

established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’” because, “[o]therwise, 

‘[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually 

unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id. at 552 

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court criticized the lower appellate court’s decision because 

[i]t failed to identify a case where an officer acting under similar 

circumstances as Officer White was held to have violated the Fourth 

Amendment. Instead, the [panel] majority relied on Graham, 

Garner, and their Court of Appeals progeny [excessive force cases], 

which . . . lay out excessive-force principles at only a general level. 

Of course, “general statements of the law are not inherently 

incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers, but “in the 

light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” For 

that reason, we have held that Garner and Graham do not 

themselves create clearly established law outside “an obvious case.”

Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court added that “[t]his is not a case where it is obvious that 

there was a violation of clearly established law under Garner and Graham”; the case was not a 

run-of-the mill Fourth Amendment violation but rather presented unique facts and circumstances. 

Id.

D.D.A. Jangla overstates the reach of White. He suggests that White “stands for the 

proposition that in order to demonstrate that the law was ‘clearly established,’ a plaintiff must 

identify a published opinion addressing nearly identical facts that concludes that an officer 

violated the Constitution.” McKenney v. Mangino, No. 2:15-cv-00073-JDL, 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 55649, at *22 (D. Me. Apr. 12, 2017). But, in McKenney, the Supreme Court only 

“faulted the lower court for failing to identify a case with similar factual circumstances” because 

the case presented a unique set of facts and circumstances. Id. at *23-24. “Because Officer 

White’s conduct [in White] did not amount to a ‘run-of-the-mill constitutional violation, a case 

with similar facts would be required to put the officer on notice that his conduct violated clearly 

established law.” Id. at *24. “As a practical matter, the standard advanced by [the defendant 

officer] fails to account for the reality that the factual circumstances of each case are, by their 

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nature, unique, and two cases seldom involve nearly identical facts. Courts should therefore look 

to cases that analyze similar circumstances.” Id. at 25. “A case presenting a nearly identical 

alignment of facts is not required so long as the existing cases would enable an officer, as a matter 

of reason and common sense, to understand that his or her conduct in a specific situation crossed 

the constitutional line.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that Chism, 661 F.3d at 380, fits this criteria. While there is language in 

Chism that strongly supports Plaintiffs’ position, Chism arguably is not dispositive because the 

Ninth Circuit’s holding was not predicated solely on the false statements made in the police 

affidavit. The Ninth Circuit did not hold that the false statements when corrected (i.e., to show 

that the only connection between Mr. Chism and the websites was the credit card) alone 

established a lack of probable cause. Rather, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling took into account both the 

correction of false statements and the supplementation of information that had been omitted (i.e., 

IP addresses traced to persons other than the Chisms). 

But even assuming Chism is not dispositive, the facts in the instant case – i.e., that 

identifying information (such as an email address) provided by a person intent on hiding his 

identity is likely unreliable – presents an obvious situation where probable cause is lacking. Thus, 

White would not afford qualified immunity on the probable cause question. See also Easley v. 

City of Riverside, 890 F.3d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that “[t]he doctrine [of qualified 

immunity] is designed to balance “two important, competing interests: the need to hold public 

officials accountable for irresponsible actions, and the need to shield them from liability when 

they make reasonable mistakes”) (emphasis added).

D.D.A. Jangla argues he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because he “was in a 

different position than Detectives Ryan or Cichocki. His only involvement with the search 

warrant was that Detective Ryan asked him to determine whether Detective Ryan’s affidavit 

should be submitted to a judge for a determination of probable cause.” Mot. at 10-11. But all 

reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, and, for 

purposes of this motion, the Court must infer that D.D.A. Jangla did not have a reasonable belief 

that there was probable cause to support the warrant application. See id. at 856 (noting that, as 

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part of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must ask “‘whether the facts as alleged could 

support a reasonable belief that the conduct in question conformed to the established law’”). This 

is a question that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.7

C. Fifth Cause of Action – Unreasonable Search and Seizure Without a Warrant, Probable 

Cause, and Exigent Circumstances

The fifth cause of action is essentially a claim for unreasonable search and seizure based 

on a lack of probable cause. It is asserted against the individual defendants only and is predicated 

not on the initial seizure but on the fact that Detective Ryan and D.D.A. Jangla “turned over to 

[Detective] CICHOCKI computers, hard drives and cell phones seized . . . so that they could be 

searched in Virginia” and “[Detective] Cichocki then had this seized property unlawfully searched 

and forensically examined in Virginia without a warrant, judicial authorization, probable cause or 

exigent circumstances.” Compl. ¶ 124. As to this cause of action, D.D.A. Jangla makes two 

arguments: (1) there was no violation of the Finkelsteins’ constitutional rights because “[t]here is 

no case law in this Circuit holding that a person has a Constitutional right for his or her seized 

property to remain in the jurisdiction where the search warrant was issued,” Mot. at 13, and (2) 

even if the Finkelsteins “had a Constitutional right for their seized electronics to remain in 

California, such right was not ‘clearly established’ in the spring of 2016.” Mot. at 14.

To the extent the Finkelsteins are claiming a constitutional right not to have their property 

turned over to a different law enforcement agency, D.D.A. Jangla has a strong argument that there 

is no such constitutional right or, at the very least, he is protected by qualified immunity because 

such a right was not clearly established. While the Finkelsteins argue that the “transfer [of the 

property] was prohibited by Cal. Pen. Code §§ 1528(a) and 1536,” Opp’n at 18, that is not a 

constitutional right but rather a state statutory right. 

However, it appears that the fifth cause of action is not necessarily about the transfer per 

se; rather, it also seems to encompass the fact that, once property (i.e., computers, hard drives, and 

 

7 Notably, D.D.A. Jangla asserts only qualified immunity, not prosecutorial immunity in his act of 

reviewing the proposed search warrant. Cf. Patterson v. Yamhill Cty., No. 3:14-cv-00501-BR, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131036, at *10 (D. Or. Sep. 29, 2015) (“Defendant is absolutely immune 

from suit for the prosecutorial act of presenting the arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor.”). 

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cell phones) was seized, it was then searched. According to the Finkelsteins, that search should 

not have taken place because there was no probable cause. The County Defendants have not 

explained why this theory is not viable. Accordingly, the County Defendants’ motion is denied to 

the extent Plaintiffs’ theory is an improper search (rather than an improper transfer).

D. Third Cause of Action – Use of Untrustworthy Information to Procure a Warrant

Unlike the other causes of action above, the third cause of action has been asserted against 

the entity defendants only, i.e., the County and City. In the pending motion, the County 

Defendants argue that the County is entitled to summary judgment on the third cause of action 

because there is insufficient evidence to support Monell liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

It is well established that a municipality may be held liable for a violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983. But “Congress did not intend to create respondeat superior liability”; rather, it 

intended to hold municipalities liable only when action pursuant to 

official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. 

The official policy requirement was intended to distinguish acts of 

the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and 

thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for 

which the municipality is actually responsible.

Although a constitutional violation must result from official 

municipal policy, a county need not expressly adopt the policy. It is 

sufficient that the constitutional violation occurred pursuant to a 

longstanding practice or custom.

Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original; internal quotation 

marks omitted). In certain situations, deliberate indifference to a risk of constitutional violations 

can also be deemed a policy or custom. See Flores v. Cty. of L.A., 758 F.3d 1154, 1157 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (noting that, “[u]nder City of Canton v. Harris, ‘[o]nly where a municipality’s failure to 

train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its 

inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom under § 

1983’[;] [w]here deliberate indifference is proved, ‘failure to provide proper training may fairly be 

said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held 

liable if it actually causes injury’”).

In the instant case, the County argues that there is no evidence to support municipal 

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liability because, e.g., the Finkelsteins cannot establish a failure to train that amounted to 

deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Guidotti Decl. ¶ 6 (testifying that the County District Attorney’s 

Office “provides onsite training on Penal Code section 1524, the legal standards for motions to 

quash and traverse search warrants, and the components of a search warrant application”); see also

Jangla Decl. ¶ 3 (testifying about training facilitated by County District Attorney’s Office). The 

County also notes that there is no indication that a final policymaker ratified D.D.A. Jangla’s 

actions vis-à-vis the search warrant application, and hence there is no Monell liability under a 

ratification theory. See Christie, 176 F.3d at 1238 (noting that a municipality “can be liable for an 

isolated constitutional violation if the final policymaker ‘ratified’ a subordinate’s actions”).

In response, the Finkelsteins argue that D.D.A. Jangla provided testimony before the state 

court that “is sufficient to create a question of material fact.” Opp’n at 19. D.D.A. Jangla’s 

testimony was as follows: 

A. Look I think the question is, you know, you could task an 

investigator with doing an infinite amount of investigative 

steps before submitting an investigation.

The question is what is a reasonable investigative technique 

to try to get a suspect and to have sufficient probable cause? 

That’s the question. What is the standard practice and what 

is an acceptable practice as opposed to what is ideal in 

theory.

And so, what I can tell you about is what is a standard 

practice and acceptable practice. And as I indicated, I have 

reviewed a lot of these electronic warrants. And I have not 

come across an investigation, in the warrants I have 

reviewed or in the trainings that I have attended, where a 

step has been to verify that the service [such as Skype] 

validates the e-mail address [i.e., sends a confirming email to 

the email address submitted by the user].

Q. Do you think it is reasonable to rely on the documents that 

you get from a corporation, in this case, Skype?

A. That’s what we have to go on. So, yes, of course.

Q. And would that be the standard practice, in your opinion, for 

detectives or officers writing search warrants? 

A. Always.

Merin Decl., Ex. 1 (Tr. at 29-30).

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Viewing the above testimony, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in 

Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court agrees that there is a question of fact that precludes summary judgment 

in the County’s favor. D.D.A. Jangla’s testimony suggests that it was the practice of the County to 

accept an email address given to a provider such as Skype at face value – i.e., not to investigate an

email address further to determine whether the email address provided did in fact belong to the 

person who provided it.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication is granted and the 

County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 70, 81, and 95.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2018

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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