Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-03073/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-03073-58/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSAL TRADING & INVESTMENT

CO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 KIRITCHENKO ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C-99-03073 MMC (EDL)

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION

During a hearing on May 10, 2007 on an unrelated motion, counsel for Defendant Lazarenko

made a verbal request that the Court reconsider and strike ¶ 3 of its May 2, 2007 Order Re Motion

for Protective Order and Motion to Compel. Paragraph 3 ordered Defendant Lazarenko to execute a

FOIA release to obtain reports of interviews between Defendant and the government, which would

then be produced to Plaintiff. See May 2, 2007 Order, ¶ 3. On May 11, 2007, Defendant’s counsel

filed a declaration supporting its request, explaining that counsel had been unaware that the only

interviews between Defendant and the government were done under the protection of a proffer

agreement, which preserved Defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to

his statements to the government. See Weinberg Decl. (Doc. No. 1346). Defendant argues that it

cannot comply with Paragraph 3 without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege, which Defendant

declines to do. Id. The Court ordered Defendant to brief the issue, and allowed Plaintiff to file a

response. The Court has reviewed the papers and the applicable law and finds this matter

appropriate for a decision without oral argument. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the

Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s request for reconsideration, and ORDERS Defendant to

immediately comply with Paragraph 3 of the Court’s May 2, 2007 Order.

Case 3:99-cv-03073-MMC Document 1392 Filed 06/08/07 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects against any

disclosures which a witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could

lead to other evidence which might be so used. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45

(1972) (emphasis added). The privilege “does not extend to consequences of a noncriminal nature,

such as threats of liability in civil suits, disgrace in the community, or the loss of employment.” 

United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 124-25 (1980). Defendant entered into proffer

agreements with the government under a grant of “use immunity” rather than broader immunity, that

is, the government agreed that if Defendant would tell the government what he knew about certain

criminal activity, the government would “not use any statements made by [Defendant] during the

proffer directly against [Defendant] Lazarenko and his case-in-chief in any criminal case... .” See

Weinberg Decl. (quoting proffer agreement), at 3:4-6. Thus, the Defendant made no statements to

the government other than those covered by these proffer agreements. 

Although these agreements do not provide full immunity because they “permit[] derivative

use of [Defendant’s] statements,” see Opp. at 5:3-5, the statements themselves are immunized and

the government already has them. Paragraph 3 does not require Defendant to testify further about

these statements, nor does it require Defendant to produce any information other than that which the

government already has. Thus, Defendant is not exposed to any further incrimination beyond what

he already faces. Further, authorizing the FOIA release of the statements does not appear to be a

testimonial act. The Court sees no waiver beyond what Defendant already made to the government

by making the proffers. Accordingly, Defendant can have no reasonable belief that complying with

Paragraph 3 of the Court’s May 2, 2007 Order could incriminate him and Defendant’s assertion of

the Fifth Amendment privilege is unfounded. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1964)

(Fifth Amendment privilege exists only where there is “a reasonable danger of further crimination in

light of all the circumstances, including any previous disclosures.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2007 __________________________________

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:99-cv-03073-MMC Document 1392 Filed 06/08/07 Page 2 of 2