Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01298/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01298-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN RAY KEEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01298-AWI-LJO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST

BE DENIED

(Doc. 31)

I. Findings and Recommendations

A. Procedural History

This is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Glenn Ray Keel

(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR), California State Prison - Corcoran (CSP-Corcoran), Jeanne S. Woodford, D. Ortiz, Reed,

J. Payne, and Brendon (“Defendants”) violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 9.) This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s

amended complaint, filed November 16, 2005. (Id.) 

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust the available administrative remedies, filed May 5, 2006, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

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 On May 30, 2006, the undersigned issued a Findings and Recommendations recommending that 1

Defendants CDCR, CSP-Corcoran, and Woodford’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted against them, filed January 9, 2006, be granted. The Findings and Recommendations is currently

pending before the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii.

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Procedure 12(b). (Doc. 31.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 26, 2006, and Defendants filed 1

a reply on June 23, 2006. (Docs. 32, 27.)

B. Exhaustion Motions

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement

applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the

prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and

exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit, McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which Defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust nonjudicial

administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion,

rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)). In

deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the Court

concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

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C. Discussion

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights while he was incarcerated at CSP-Corcoran and housed in the Security

Housing Unit. Plaintiff’s claims arise from an incident in which he was allegedly attacked and

injured by another inmate on October 25, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that the other inmate was released

intentionally in order to stage a fight. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to a serious threat to his safety and health by staging the fight and then denying him

adequate medical care for his injuries. Plaintiff also alleges a claim for deprivation of a liberty

interest with due process of law, stemming from his placement in conditions of confinement which

violated Title 15 regulations.

Plaintiff’s claims accrued while he was incarcerated at CSP-Corcoran. (Amend. Comp.,

2:23-25.) Plaintiff was released from prison on parole on March 17, 2005, and remains on parole

to date. (Amend. Comp., 2:27-28 & 6:15; Reply, Aggio Dec., ¶4.) Plaintiff filed this suit on

September 22, 2005, following his release on parole. (Court Rec., Doc. 1, Comp.) Defendants argue

that because Plaintiff’s claims accrued while he was incarcerated, Plaintiff was required to exhaust

prior to filing suit and should not be allowed to evade the statutory exhaustion requirement by

waiting until his release from prison to file suit. (Doc. 31-2, 4:27-8:3.) Defendants argue that

allowing Plaintiff to do so would not further the PLRA’s goals and would create “illogical results.”

(Id., 6:26-7:2.) Plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that because he was not a prisoner at the

time he filed suit, he is not subject to the exhaustion requirement set forth in section 1997e(a). (Doc.

32-1, 4:4-14.)

“It is well settled that, in a statutory construction case, analysis must begin with the language

of the statute itself; when the statute is clear, ‘judicial inquiry into [its] meaning, in all but the most

extraordinary circumstance, is finished.’” U.S. v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379

(1992)). Where the statute is clear, “‘the sole function of the court [] is to enforce it according to its

terms.’” Siripongs v. Davis, 282 F.3d 785, 758 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair

Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). 

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Section 1997e(a) requires prisoners to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior

to filing suit. The section refers to “prisoner[s] confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility.” Further, section 1997e(h) of the statute defines prisoners as “any person incarcerated or

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,

violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program.” The language of both sections is clear: prisoners, defined as persons

incarcerated or detained in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, are required to exhaust prior to

filing suit. Plaintiff, as a parolee, was not incarcerated or detained in a jail, a prison, or other

correctional facility when he filed suit and does not fall within the purview of section 1997e(a). 

In Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held that “only

individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil actions, are detained as a result of being

accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for criminal offenses are ‘prisoners’ within the definition of

42 U.S.C. § 1997e . . . .” Id. at 1140 (emphasis added). Although Page involved a civil detainee

under Sexually Violent Predators Act rather than a parolee like Plaintiff, the case is controlling in

the Court’s opinion. The Court rejects Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Page on the basis that it

was decided before Booth and that since Booth, some district courts have ruled differently. Booth

did not address the definition of “prisoner” under 1997e(a). Rather, Booth addressed the meaning

of “administrative remedies . . . available” under section 1997e(a) and held that exhaustion is

required “regardless of the relief offered through the administrative procedures.” Booth, 532 U.S.

at 741. Porter and Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006), also cited to by Defendants, are equally

inapt. Porter addressed the meaning of “prison conditions” under section 1997e(a) and held that the

section “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes . . . ,” Porter, 534 U.S. at 986, and Woodford addressed whether a prisoner can

satisfy section 1997e(a) by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective appeal and held

that he cannot, as the section requires “proper exhaustion,” which requires compliance with agency

deadlines and other procedural rules, Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2382-86.

While “a few district courts have held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Booth and Porter

require former inmates to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit,” Schwartz v.

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Snohomish County, No. C05-732P, 2006 WL 692024, at *3 (W.D.Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (citing to

Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985 (D. Ariz. 2003); Mason v. County of San Mateo,

No. C 02-04643 SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1223 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 26, 2005); Reyes v. State, No. Civ.

05-584-HA, 2005 WL 1459662 (D.Or. Jun. 21, 2005)), “many other district courts have explicitly

rejected such arguments, id. (citing to Krittenbank v. Crawford, 313 F.Supp.2d 1043 (D.Nev. 2004);

Wilson v. Hampton County, No. 9:05-1777PMD, 2005 WL 2877725 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2005); Black

v. Franklin County, No. Civ.A. 3:05-18-JMH, 2005 WL1993445 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005); Thomas

v. Baca, No. CV 04-008448 DDP, 2005 WL697986 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 23, 2005); Canady v. Werholtz,

No. Civ.A.04-2083-GTV, 2004 WL 1212050 (D.Kan. Jun. 1, 2004)). “More importantly, it appears

that every federal court of appeals that has considered this issue has held that the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirements do not apply to suits brought by former prisoners--a body of case law that includes

decisions issued after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Porter and Booth.” Id. (citing to Nerness v.

Johnson, 401 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2005); Norton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2005);

Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201 (3rd Cir. 2002)). See also Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 750

(7th Cir. 2004); Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2003); Medina-Claudio v. RodriguezMateo, 292 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2002); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1999). In the

face of the Ninth Circuit’s controlling decision in Page and of what is in this Court’s opinion clear

statutory language, the Court declines Defendants’ invitation to follow the district courts venturing

down the path of inquiry into the intent of Congress.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that because Plaintiff was out of prison on parole at

the time he filed suit, he was not a prisoner within the meaning of section 1997e(a) and was not

subject section 1997e(a). The Court therefore HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion

to dismiss this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies,

filed May 5, 2006, be DENIED. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

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objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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