Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00790/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00790-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RONALD ARMSTRONG, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

TOWN OF HUACHUCA CITY;

BYRON ROBERTSON,

 Defendant. 

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No. CV 11-790-TUC-CKJ (BPV)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. No. 5). Plaintiff filed a response and Defendants filed a

reply.

Plaintiff, Ronald Armstrong, alleges that the termination of his employment as

Town Clerk of the Town of Huachuca City was wrongful, and resulted from age

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29

U.S.C. § 621, et seq., (“ADEA”) and 42 U.S.C. 2000(e), et. seq., and retaliation in

violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1481, et. seq, (“ACRA”), as well

as Arizona’s Employment Protection Act A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) and A.R.S. 23-

1501(d), (“AEPA”). Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled all legal and equitable relief as

may be appropriate to effectuate the statutes, and in particular, compensation in the

form of front pay and back pay, liquidated damages and attorneys fees and costs.

Plaintiff also demands to be reinstated as Town Clerk for the Town of Huachuca City.

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Also pending before the Court are Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff’s first

amended complaint (Doc. 10), and Plaintiff's "Amended Motion for Leave to Amend

Complaint”. (Doc. 13). 

The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Velasco for all pretrial matters

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona.

For reasons which follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court DENY Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, GRANT

Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in the complaint: 

Plaintiff was employed as the town clerk for the Town of Huachuca City

from June 2004 until March 16, 2011. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A “Complaint”, ¶ II.2). 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 16, 2011, he was terminated from his position as

town clerk, and that the stated basis for his termination was that he served at the

pleasure of the counsel. (Id., ¶ II.3). Plaintiff was 73 years old on the date of his

termination. (Id., ¶ II.1). Plaintiff further alleges that prior to his termination he was

the victim of a hostile work environment created by Defendant Byron Robertson, the

town Mayor, and that he lodged a grievance with the town council on two occasions

as the result of such hostile work environment. (Id., ¶ II.3) 

Plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions between August 2010 and

January 2011, he contacted Town Attorney Ryan and expressed concern for the

hostile work environment he believes was created by Defendant Robertson. (Id., ¶

II.4). On January 27, 2011, Plaintiff made a verbal complaint to the common council

about the alleged harassment, and requested an executive session on the matter,

which was later denied by Defendant Robertson. (Id., ¶ II.5). On or about February

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2, 2011 Plaintiff sought medical treatment for stress. (Id., ¶ II.6). Also in February of

2011, Plaintiff claims that he made a second complaint to the common council

regarding a hostile work environment, and that during this meeting Defendant

Robertson lost his temper and accused Plaintiff of misconduct regarding his

handling of an employment application. (Id., ¶ II.7). Thereafter, Plaintiff again

sought medical treatment for stress on February 11, 2011 and, on February 12, 2011,

his medical provider issued a letter to the town council requesting that Plaintiff’s

working hours not overlap with Defendant Robertson’s. (Id., ¶ II.8-9).

On February 15, 2011, Plaintiff received a letter from the acting Town

Attorney scheduling a special council meeting to address Plaintiff’s employment

status. (Id., ¶ II.10). At that special council meeting, on February 17, 2011, the

council approved Plaintiff’s request for different working hours for a period of thirty

days. (Id., ¶ II.11). And on March 16, 2011, Plaintiff’s employment as town clerk

was terminated during a council meeting. (Id., ¶ II.12).

Plaintiff alleges that as a direct and proximate result of incidents as outlined,

he was wrongfully terminated due to a hostile work environment and age

discrimination. (Id., ¶ II.13). Plaintiff further alleges that he should have received

payment for accrued vacation leave pursuant to the Huachuca City Town Personnel

Rules and Regulations. (Id., ¶ II.14).

 The Town of Huachuca City and Byron Robertson (“Defendants”) removed

this case from the Cochise County Superior Court to this Court based on federal

question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on December 6, 2011, (Doc. 1,

“Notice of Removal”), and assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims

derived from the court having original jurisdiction over a matter of a federal

question, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendants moved to dismiss this cause of

action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6) on December 13, 2011. (Doc. 5). Plaintiff filed his response in opposition

to dismissal on January 3, 2012. (Doc. 7). Defendants filed a reply in support of their

motion to dismiss on January 9, 2012. (Doc. 8). 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal

Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that 1) Plaintiff’s notice of claim pursuant to

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) is insufficient; and 2) Plaintiff is a policymaker, and

therefore not an employee, and is excluded from relief under the ADEA and ACRA.

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). The United States Supreme Court held

that the pleading standard laid forth in Rule 8 doesn’t require detailed factual

allegations, but requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id., at 570. For a

claim to be facially plausible, the plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id., at 556. The Court follows a two-prong approach in determining whether

a claim can withstand a motion to dismiss. First, although the court must accept

factual allegations contained in the complaint as true, legal conclusions are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Id., at 555. Second, only a complaint that states a

plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. The determination

of plausibility is context-specific, but where the pleading does not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has not shown

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that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. As the Court stated in

Iqbal, a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying

pleadings that are no more than legal conclusions, and therefore not entitled to the

assumption of truth. Id. If the pleading contains well-pleaded factual allegations, a

court should assume the allegations as true and then make a determination as to

whether the allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id.

Generally, a district court may not consider any material outside of the

pleadings, and when matters outside the pleading are considered, a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion is to be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Branch v.

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled on other grounds by Galbraith

v. County of SantaClara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, material that is

submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss, even if

not physically attached to the complaint. Id., at 453. Altering the general rule

regarding extrinsic materials, the Ninth Circuit held that when deciding a motion to

dismiss, a court may consider the complaint and “documents whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading.” Id., at 454. Such consideration would not

require a conversion of the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

Id. Additionally, a court may disregard allegations of the complaint that are

contradicted by attached exhibits. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293,

1295 (9th Cir. 1998); Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir.

1987). Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true allegations

contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828

F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public record,

including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (abrogated on other grounds

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by Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)). “The

court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-755 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor must

the court accept unreasonable inferences or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, because it is

attached to the Complaint and because there are no issues regarding its contents or

its authenticity, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s notice of claim without converting

this motion to one for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s notice of claim is attached as

Exhibit 2 to the original Complaint, which was filed with this Court as Exhibit A to

the Notice of Removal (Doc. 1).

B. Notice of Claim

Defendants assert that the Plaintiff’s state law claims against a public entity

or employee fail because Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice of claim

requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). More specifically, Defendants

claim that Plaintiff’s August 16, 2011 notice of claim is insufficient because it

contains no specific amount for which the claim can be settled, it provides no facts

to support a claim under the Arizona Employment Protection Act, and it fails to

provide facts to support Plaintiff’s $300,000 claim for lost wages. (Doc. 5, at 3-5).

Despite Defendants arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s notice of claim is

sufficient pursuant to the requirements set forth in the notice of claim statute.

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01, a notice of claim “shall contain facts

sufficient to permit the public entity or employee to understand the basis upon which

liability is claimed.” § 12-821.01(A). That is, it must contain enough information to

allow the entity to investigate the merits of the claim and assess its potential for

liability. State v. Brooks, 534 P.2d 271 (Ariz. 1975). If a party fails to comply with

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all requirements of the statute, the party’s claim is barred. Id. In addition to

describing the proper method and time frame for filing claims, the notice of claim

statute directs that all claims “shall contain facts sufficient to permit the public

entity...to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed.” A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A). Further, the statute requires that “the claim shall include a specific

amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” Id.

The notice of claim statute protects the government from excess or unwarranted

liability, and gives public entities and employees a chance to avoid litigation

expenses by investigating and settling before the plaintiff files a complaint. See Deer

Valley Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 492 (Ariz. 2007).

i. Sum Certain

The Defendants argue that the settlement offer in Plaintiff’s notice of claim

does not meet the sum certain requirement of the notice of claim statute. (Doc. 5, 3-

4). The notice of claim statute contemplates that the government should have the

ability to investigate both liability and damages to “realistically consider a claim.”

See Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 493. Plaintiff’s notice of claim offers a settlement

amount of $11,963.58, plus interest for vacation pay, plus $300,000 for lost wages if

settled within 90 days of receipt. (Doc. 1, Ex. 2) (emphasis added). Defendants

contend that the wording “plus interest” is qualifying language that makes it

impossible to deduce an amount for which Plaintiff would settle his claim.

Defendants liken this case to Deer Valley, wherein the court found that the “repeated

use of qualifying language makes it impossible to ascertain the precise amount for

which [defendant] could have settled [the] claim.” Id.. The plaintiff in Deer Valley

used multiple ambiguous terms such as “approximately”, “or more”, and “no less

than” and never reached a single aggregate sum in her notice of claim, and, as a

result, the court found that the notice of claim did not comply with A.R.S. § 12-

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821.01(A). Id. Here, unlike in Deer Valley, Plaintiff noticed a fixed, ascertainable

sum, rendered inexact only by the inclusion of a demand for interest, which is

unascertainable only as to the precise rate and total amount of interest which would

continue to accrue through the date of any settlement offer. Id. The phrase “plus

interest” does not suggest the type of unallowable, ambiguous and qualifying

language the court found unallowable in Deer Valley.

As previously addressed, the purpose and intent of the notice of claim statute

is to allow a meaningful opportunity for the public entity or employee to make a

settlement decision prior to the initiation of a court proceeding. Yollin v. City of

Glendale, 191 P. 3d 1040, 1045 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2008). In Yollin, the court held that

although the claimant included language suggesting the settlement amount in his

notice of claim was negotiable, and that he was still incurring damages at the time of

the notice, there was a definite and exact amount offered for settlement and thus the

notice of claim was in compliance with the sum certain requirement per A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A). Id. Here, the Plaintiff offered a specific settlement in the amount of

$11,963.38 for vacation pay, and $300,000 for lost wages. The notice in this case

served the purpose and intent of the notice of claim statute and Defendants cannot

reasonably argue that the inclusion of the “plus interest”language denied them a

meaningful opportunity to make a settlement decision prior to the initiation of a

court proceeding. There is nothing else in the record that suggests that the

Defendants were prevented from assessing the possibility of a settlement or planning

by the language in Plaintiff’s notice of claim. Id.

ii. Facts sufficient to support the claim

Defendants further assert that the Plaintiff’s notice of claim is insufficient per

the second sentence of the notice of claim statute. (Doc. 5, at 4). This sentence

requires “facts sufficient” for the public entity or employee to understand the basis

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of the claim. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Defendants contend that because Plaintiff does

not make mention of a potential claim pursuant to the AEPA, A.R.S. § 23-1501, et.

seq., and does not include any facts which would have led Defendants to believe

they would possibly face a claim for retaliatory discharge, that the Plaintiff’s notice

of claim does not satisfy the “facts sufficient” requirement of A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A). (Doc. 5, at 4). 

The purpose of this portion of the statutory requirement for a notice of claim

is to allow the public entity to investigate and assess the claim. Falcon ex. rel.

Sandoval v. Maricopa County, 144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ariz. 2006). Here, the

Plaintiff’s notice of claim discusses events and actions, involving Defendant

Robertson and other identified individuals, that led up to his termination as town

clerk. He included a copy of a letter from his physician requesting alternative work

hours, and briefly lists grievances filed with the city council regarding what he

believed to be a hostile work environment. Plaintiff described an encounter with

Defendant Robertson wherein he was accused of misconduct regarding Defendant

Robertson’s wife’s employment application. Although the Plaintiff did not

specifically mention a potential claim for retaliatory discharge under the AEPA, that

is not the standard under the statute. The standard calls for “facts sufficient” to

understand the basis of the claim. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) (emphasis added). The

basis for this claim is the events and actions leading to his termination as Plaintiff

outlines in his notice of claim, and that is sufficient factual information to allow the

Defendants to adequately investigate and assess the claim.

iii. Facts supporting the amount claimed

The notice of claim statute also requires that the claimant include facts

supporting the amount claimed. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). This portion of the statutory

requirement ensures that claimants will not demand unfounded amounts that

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constitute “quick, unrealistic and exaggerated demands.” Hollingsworth v. City of

Phoenix, 793 P.2d 1129, 1133 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1990). Defendants argue that the

Plaintiff failed to include any facts to support his claim for $300,000 in lost wages,

and thus the notice of claim is insufficient. (Doc. 5, at 4-5). The supporting facts

requirement has been scrutinized by the court, and discussed in detail most recently

in Backus v. State. The court in Backus clarified this requirement of section 12-

821.01, concluding that “a claimant complies with the supporting-facts requirement .

. . by providing the factual foundation that the claimant regards as adequate to

permit the public entity to evaluate the specific amount claimed.” 203 P.3d 499, 505

(Ariz. 2009). The court further cautioned that the courts should not scrutinize the

“sufficiency” of any such facts, emphasizing that this standard “does not require a

claimant to provide an exhaustive list of facts; so long as a claimant provides facts to

support the amount claimed. Id. It is clear from the court’s decision in Backus that

the notice of claim statute “does not require a claimant to set out facts sufficient to

support the amount claimed,” but only sufficient to permit Defendants to evaluate

liability. See e.g. Carnes v. Salvino, 2009 WL 2568643, *3 (D.Ariz.), citing Backus,

203 P.3d at 504 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff’s notice of claim in this matter adequately provides the information

as is required by the statute. The court in Yollin determined that this portion of the

notice of claim statute “demands a recitation of how past events harmed the claimant

and led to his offer”, and the Plaintiff did that here. 191 P.3d at 1048. Plaintiff

claims to have been injured, describes the conduct giving rise to his injury, and

includes some facts supporting an amount for lost wages. Specifically, Plaintiff

described events and circumstances that occurred leading up to his termination as

town clerk, and explains that he believes he was wrongfully terminated due to a

hostile work environment and age discrimination. Despite Defendants’ contention

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that Plaintiff should have included reasoning behind requesting $300,000 in lost

wages, the lack of such specificity as to the amount claimed does not make the

notice of claim legally deficient. Again, the standard is a “factual foundation that the

claimant regards as adequate to permit the public entity to evaluate the specific

amount claimed.” Backus, 203 P.3d at 505 (emphasis added). The Plaintiff indicates

he believes he was wrongfully terminated, and in such circumstances it is not

uncommon for claimants to demand a sum for lost wages. Surely Plaintiff’s

$300,000 demand for lost wages does not qualify as the “quick, unrealistic and

exaggerated demands” that the statute intended to avoid. Hollingsworth, 793 P.2d at

1133. Thus, the Plaintiff provided adequate information for the Defendants to

“realistically consider” his lost wage claim, and his notice of claim is sufficient as to

this requirement. See Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 493.

D. Policymaker

Lastly, Defendants urge that the Plaintiff cannot maintain claims under the

ADEA and ARCA because he is not an “employee” for purposes of these statutes.

(Doc. 5, at 5). Defendants contend that acting as the town clerk, Plaintiff was a

“policymaker” and thus is exempt from coverage under the ADEA and ACRA. The

ADEA defines the term employee as:

“an individual employed by any employer except that the term ‘employee’

shall not include any person elected to public office . . . or any person chosen

by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the

policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the

constitutional or legal powers of the office.”

29 U.S.C. § 630(f). The ACRA has a very similar definition of employee. As the

Defendants correctly note in their motion, the Ninth Circuit has set forth certain

factors to consider when determining whether an employee is a policymaker,

including “vague or broad responsibilities, relative pay, technical competence,

power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public

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perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials, and responsiveness

to partisan politics and political leaders.” Bardzik v. County of Orange, 635 F.3d

1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011). Additionally, when considering this question, the

Seventh Circuit held that the test is “whether the position held by the individual

authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their

implementation.” Neklony v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981), See also

Auriemima v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992). 

The Defendants attach as Exhibits 1 and 2 the Town of Huachuca City Town

Code, Chapters 2, Section 2-1-1 and Chapter 3, and assert that because the Town has

no town manager, the town clerk administers and supervises all activities of the

Town, including personnel issues, finances and purchasing, and elections. (Doc. 5, at

1-2). Additionally, the Defendants contend that acting as town clerk, Plaintiff

controlled, coordinated, and presented the annual budget to the Town Council for

approval. (Doc. 5, at 6). Defendants argue that because of these duties, Plaintiff was

a policymaker and cannot be considered an “employee” as defined under the ADEA

or ACRA. (Doc. 5, at 6). The Plaintiff, in response, argues that the Town Council is

the policymaker, and that the town clerk as defined under the Town of Huachuca

City Town Code is not an appointee at a policymaking level, nor an immediate

advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of those

elected to public office, and thus not a policymaker. (Doc. 7, at 5).

The Court finds that the issue of whether or not Plaintiff was a policymaker

in his capacity as town clerk remains an issue of fact in this matter. The Defendants

claim that Plaintiff’s position as town clerk rendered him a policymaker, and the

Plaintiff contends that his responsibilities did not amount to a role as a policymaker.

Whether an employee is a policymaker is a legal question that rests on factual

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findings, making this an improper question for a motion to dismiss in the face of

obvious disputed factual assertions. The relevant issues in this determination are

questions of fact, and the Court finds that necessary factual information is not

currently found in the record. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss at this time, but that the Defendants may well be

able to demonstrate in a motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff’s

responsibilities and duties rendered him a policymaker for purposes of exempting

him from filing claims under the ADEA and ACRA. Accordingly, the Court leaves

the question of whether Plaintiff is excluded from ADEA and ACRA as a

policymaker to be determined on a motion for summary judgment.

III. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint 56 days after Defendants filed their Rule

12(b) motion. Because Plaintiff did not amend his complaint within 21 days of

serving it, or within 21 days after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

must seek leave of the court to file an amended complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P.15(a).

Because Plaintiff failed to seek leave of the court in filing his first amended

complaint, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants' motion to strike (Doc.

10) be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1) and (2) (a party may amend the party's

pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or within 21 days

after service of a responsive pleading, or 21 days after service of a motion under

Rule 12(b) is served, otherwise "a party may amend its pleading only with the

opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give

leave when justice so requires.")

IV. Motion to Amend

Subsequent to Defendants’ motion to strike, Plaintiff sought leave to amend

his complaint to add a claim for damages pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-355(A) for

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Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff his vacation pay in accordance with the

provisions of Huachuca City Town Personnel Rules and Regulations, Rule XIII.

(Doc. 13).

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the court should

freely give leave when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). This liberality in

granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes

of action or parties. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir.1987). "It is, however, subject to the qualification that amendment of the

complaint does not cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is not sought in bad

faith, and does not constitute an exercise in futility." Id. (internal citations omitted).

Defendants’ only objection to the proposed amendment is that any

amendment would be futile in light of the legal deficiencies of Plaintiff's notice of

claim. For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that the notice of

claim was not legally deficient, and thus the amendment is not futile. Because

Defendants have raised no other objections or demonstrated that any undue

prejudice would result from the amendment, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

the District Judge grant Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (Doc. 13).

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 5) be DENIED.

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Strike

(Doc. No. 10) be GRANTED.

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

(Doc. No. 13) be GRANTED.

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report

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and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

DATED this 7th day of August, 2012.

Case 4:11-cv-00790-CKJ-BPV Document 16 Filed 08/07/12 Page 15 of 15