Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00557/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00557-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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1

 Dr. Osborn’s contractor status is immaterial to Mr. Martin’s claim against him, because

“a private physician . . . under contract with a state to provide medical care to inmates acts

‘under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when undertaking his duties’ to treat an

inmate.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1239 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carswell v. Bay

County, 854 F.2d 454, 456-57 (11th Cir. 1988)); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORLANDO MARTIN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0557 ALA P

vs.

ALVARO C. TRAQUINA, et at.,

Defendants. ORDER

____________________________/

Orlando Martin, a prisoner confined at California State Prison-Solano (“CSP-Solano”),

has brought a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alvaro Traquina, M.D.,

CSP-Solana’s Chief Medical Officer, Randall Osborn, D.P.M., a podiatrist under contract with

CSP-Solano,1

 and Yen Dechant, a registered nurse employed by CSP-Solano. Mr. Martin asserts

that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by

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2

 Defendants argue in their reply brief that Mr. Martin “has failed to assert a single

admissible fact in opposition to . . . summary judgment” because he filed no affidavits or

declarations. Reply Brief at 3. They are incorrect. Mr. Martin’s failure to file affidavits or

declarations does not preclude this Court from considering as evidence in opposition to summary

judgment the allegations contained in Mr. Martin’s verified Second Amended Complaint. See

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (when a plaintiff is pro se, a court must

consider as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all contentions that would be

admissible in evidence, are based on personal knowledge, and are contained in pleadings and/or

motions whose contents the drafter stated under penalty of perjury are true and correct.).

3

 The facts in this section are taken from Mr. Martin’s verified Second Amended

Complaint. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 923 (allegations contained in a pro se plaintiff’s verified

pleadings must be considered as evidence for purposes of summary judgment).

2

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delaying and denying him medical treatment for his painful toenail condition. Defendants seek

summary judgment on Mr. Martin’s claim, arguing that they did not act with deliberate

indifference. As explained below, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Ms. Dechant

and Dr. Osborn, and in favor of Dr. Traquina to the extent that Mr. Martin claims Dr. Traquina

failed to obtain a soft shoe chrono for him. Summary judgment will be denied with respect to

Mr. Martin’s claim that Dr. Traquina caused an eleven-month delay in his receipt of surgery for

bone-spur removal.2

I. Facts3

Mr. Martin entered CSP- Solano on November 12, 2002. On arrival he asked prison

officials to issue him soft shoes, because the standard-issue hard boots hurt his feet. The

officials nevertheless assigned him hard boots, which caused his feet to swell and become

blistered.

On April 10, 2003 Dr. Oscar Mar examined Mr. Martin and requested that he be

examined by a podiatrist. On April 24, 2003 Mr. Martin was examined again, by a nonpodiatrist, and diagnosed with “caculus buildup” on both of his big toes. The examining doctor

made a second request that he see a podiatrist. Additional requests for Mr. Martin to see a

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4

 Mr. Martin makes contradictory statements regarding what Dr. Osborn prescribed him. 

In his Second Amended Complaint, he alleges that “Dr. Osborn didn’t give [him] any medication

because after [Mr. Martin] informed him [that he had] ‘Hepatitis-C’ Osborn told [Mr. Martin]

‘he didn’t know what to prescribe him and he didn’t prescribe anything’ . . .” In his opposition

brief, however, Mr. Martin asserts that Dr. Osborn did prescribe him Motrin. Dr. Osborn states

in his summary judgment brief and declaration that he prescribed the Motrin.

3

podiatrist were made in May, June, July, and September of 2003. 

On June 3, 2003, Mr. Martin wrote a letter to Dr. Traquina. According to Mr. Martin’s

verified Second Amended Complaint Dr. Traquina was, as CSP-Solano’s Chief Medical Officer,

“responsible for arranging medical care for prisoners . . . and specialized care outside the

prison.” Mr. Martin’s letter stated: 

I have signed-up to see the . . . Orthopedic doctor since much, I have . . . Blistes

[sic] up both of my feet, I’ve been here seven months in the C.D.C. system, and

still have not seen them, I talk with the “Annex” doctor’s and they say they can’t

help me about my feet . . . the boots i[s] making my feet very bad, and the pain is

getting worser . . . I’ve tried my counsol [sic] . . . [and] annex doctor’s, but know

[sic] one seems to help, so now I come to you for your professional help. 

Second Amended Complaint, Exh. 20. Upon receiving the letter, Dr. Traquina made a copy of it

and sent it to a Dr. Toppenberg so that Dr. Toppenberg could interview Mr. Martin. Second

Amended Complaint, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, at 3. Mr. Martin was first

examined by a podiatrist on September 12, 2003. 

On October 27, 2003, Dr. Osborn surgically removed both of Mr. Martin’s big toenails. 

Mr. Martin suffers from Hepatitis-C, and therefore is not supposed to take Motrin because it

hurts his liver. Mr. Martin told Dr. Osborn before the toenail-removal surgery that he had

Hepatitis-C, but Dr. Osborn nevertheless prescribed him Motrin for post-operation pain.4

 Dr.

Osborn did not prescribe Mr. Martin any antibiotics, open-toed sandals, a wheelchair, crutches,

or a cane. Nor did Dr. Osborn arrange for Mr. Martin to be transported back to his living

quarters or issue Mr. Martin a medical chrono, which is a form that would have instructed prison

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5

 Mr. Martin asserts, in his brief opposing Ms. Dechant’s summary judgment motion,

that his big toe was infected on October 28, 2003, when he first visited the clinic. Opposition at

9. The Court cannot consider that allegation as evidence, however, because Mr. Martin did not

include an affidavit with the brief attesting under penalty of perjury to the truth of its contents,

and the brief therefore is not a verified motion. 

4

personnel to bring Mr. Martin’s food to him in his quarters for one week. 

Because Mr. Martin was not issued a wheelchair, given a ride back to his living quarters,

or issued a medical chrono, he was forced to walk almost half a mile back to his prison building

after the surgery, and to walk to the dining room for his meals during the ensuing week. These

trips caused Mr. Martin extreme pain and bleeding in his feet, and caused his wounds to remain

open. On November 3, 2003, at Mr. Martin’s follow-up medical exam, Dr. Dwayne Highsmith

determined that the post-surgical site had become infected and prescribed Mr. Martin antibiotics

and additional pain medication. Mr. Martin later developed a bone spur on his right big toe,

which had not been there before the surgery.

On each of the three days immediately following his surgery, Mr. Martin traveled to the

prison clinic where Ms. Dechant worked as a nurse. There, he asked Ms. Dechant for medical

treatment to alleviate his pain. He showed her his toes, which were bleeding, and she gave him

fresh bandages. She did not send him to see a doctor, however, and told him he had to wait to

see a doctor until his followup visit on November 3, 2003. She stated that “the bleeding [was]

normal” and would “stop in due time.” Ms. Dechant submits uncontroverted evidence that Mr.

Martin’s feet were not infected when she examined them on October 29, 2003, that she examined

them again on November 3, 2003, and that on that date she noticed that “[h]is big toe had

developed some redness and was slightly swollen with a small amount of drainage.” Dechant

Dec., ¶ 6.5

 She states that she did not call a doctor on November 3, 2003 because Mr. Martin

was scheduled to see a doctor later that morning for his follow-up exam and there was no

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6

 There is a dispute regarding when Mr. Martin received the bone spur-removal surgery. 

Mr. Martin maintains the surgery occurred in July 2005, while Dr. Traquina states it occurred on

June 4, 2005. For purposes of summary judgment the Court must assume the truth of Mr.

Martin’s assertion that the surgery was performed in July 2005.

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emergency that would warrant calling the doctor immediately. Id.

On January 16, 2004, Dr. Highsmith examined Mr. Martin and determined that he was

still suffering from pain in his right toe. A Dr. Daniel Bunnell examined Mr. Martin on February

4, 2004, and stated that there was no abnormality of the bone suggesting osteomyelites. Also on

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February 4, 2004, Dr. Traquina examined Mr. Martin and noted that he was still suffering from

pain in his toe, although it had healed and showed no signs of infection. 

On April 23, 2004, Mr. Martin was diagnosed with a bone spur on his right big toe. The

next day, on April 24, 2004, a Doctor Chin “requested ‘URGENT’ medical care for [Mr. Martin]

to remove the bone spar [sic] and Dr. Highsmith was appointed to do the surgery.” According to

CDC-Solano regulations, requests for care that are designated as “urgent” medical needs require

treatment within twenty-for hours. Nevertheless, Mr. Martin did not receive the bone spur

removal surgery for another fifteen months. The surgery was finally performed in July 2005.6

Mr. Martin filed at least two administrative complaints at CSP-Solano between 2002 and

2005. He filed the first complaint in December 2003, requesting additional medical care for his

feet and calling for an administrative investigation into the medical care he received from Dr.

Osborn and Ms. Dechant. On February 3, 2004, Dr. Traquina issued a Second Level response to

the complaint. The response stated that Mr. Martin’s request was partially granted on the ground

that Mr. Martin had already received appropriate medical care, and that Dr. Traquina had

interviewed Mr. Martin and ‘verified that both feet were well healed and there were no signs of

infection.” “Additionally,” Dr. Traquina said in the response, “I advised you to have a follow-up

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7

 The form stated, “You may use this form to request specific reasonable modification or

accommodation which . . . would enable you to participate in a service, activity, or program

offered by the . . .Institution/facility, for which you are otherwise qualified/eligible to

participate.” Second Amended Complaint, Exh. 12.

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consultation with the podiatrist to discuss the x-rays results and to request soft shoes chrono.” 

Dr. Traquina concluded that Mr. Martin had “failed to provide evidence that proves that Dr.

Osborn and RN Deschant [sic] acted unprofessionally or have neglected your medical care.” 

Second Amended Complaint, Exh. 10. 

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On April 7, 2004, Mr. Martin filed his second complaint: a CDC form entitled

“Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request.”7

 He wrote on the form that the toenail

removal surgery “caused me to get a ‘bone spur’ in my ‘right toe,’” and complained of blisters

and pain in his foot. He requested “an[] emergency appointment with an[] outside podiatry

doctor to remove the bone spur . . .” Second Amended Complaint, Exh. 12. 

On June 7, 2004, Dr. Traquina issued a Second Level response to the April 7, 2004

complaint, stating “your appeal is partially granted in that you are receiving appropriate

treatment for your post-op complications from Dr. Highsmith, who is one of our consulting

physicians.” Exh. 12. The response explained that on April 23, 2004 Dr. Chin had examined

Mr. Martin, “noted that your wound was healing well, with no sign of infection,” and concluded

that the results of an x-ray were “negative.” Dr. Traquina also stated that Dr. Highsmith had

noticed on June 4, 2004 that Mr. Martin had “a slight dorsal deformity of [his] right toe,” and

that Mr. Martin was scheduled to see Dr. Highsmith again in thirty days. Exh. 12. On July 19,

2004, Mr. Martin’s complaint was denied at the Director’s level. Exh. 12. 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

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Summary judgment may be granted in favor of a party “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A party’s motion for summary judgment must be

granted “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . against a party who fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

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 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). 

Where the party resisting a motion for summary judgment is pro se, the court “must

consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of [his] contentions offered in

motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where [he] attested under penalty of perjury that

the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,

923 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing cases).

III. Discussion

Mr. Martin contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to

provide him with proper medical care, thus exacerbating the pain in his toes and causing him to

suffer an infection and bone spur. “‘The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a violation of the Eight Amendment.’” 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). “A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison

officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs.” Id. at 1057. 

“In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts.” Jett v.

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Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “First, the plaintiff must show a ‘serious medical

need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059). “Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent.” Id. A plaintiff can show a defendant’s response was deliberately

indifferent by demonstrating “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference ‘may appear

when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.’” Id. (quoting McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059). 

“A prison official acts with ‘deliberate indifference . . . only if [he or she] knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d 1057. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the

inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “‘[D]eliberate

indifference to medical needs may be shown by circumstantial evidence when the facts are

sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.’” Id. at 1057 n.4

(quoting Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

There is no dispute in this case that Mr. Martin suffered from a “serious medical need.” 

Defendants do not contest that he suffered from caculus buildup, and later a bone spur, in his

toes, which caused severe pain that was certain to continue if left untreated. The only question,

therefore, is whether each of the Defendants failed to respond to Mr. Martin’s medical need

despite knowledge that their failure to respond created a substantial risk of serious harm to him.

A. Ms. Dechant 

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8

 Mr. Martin alleges in his opposition to Ms. Dechant’s summary judgment motion that

his wound was infected when he visited the clinic on October 28, 2003, the day after his surgery,

and that Ms. Dechant instructed another clinic employee not to clean his wound. The Court

cannot consider these allegations as evidence in opposition to Ms. Dechant’s motion for

summary judgment because they Mr. Martin’s opposition brief is not verified. 

9

Mr. Martin contends that Ms. Dechant acted with deliberate indifference by failing to call

a doctor or send him to a doctor when he visited the prison clinic and showed her his bleeding

toes on the three days following his October 27, 2003 toenail-removal surgery. Ms. Dechant’s

actions, he argues, caused his toes to become infected and caused him unnecessary pain.

Ms. Dechant presents uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Martin visited the annex clinic

on October 29, 2003, and that at that time his wounds were clean and showed no swelling, active

bleeding, or signs of infection.8

 She presents further uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Martin

visited the clinic again on the morning of November 3, 2003, that by then his big toe “had

developed some redness and was slightly swollen with a small amount of drainage,” and that she

decided not to call a doctor because Mr. Martin was scheduled to see the doctor later that

morning.

Mr. Martin’s evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether Ms. Dechant “kn[ew] of [or] disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health and safety.” 

Toguchi, 391 F.3d 1057. Nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Dechant knew of a significant

risk that failure to clean Mr. Martin’s wounds or send him to a doctor on the days after his

surgery would cause him significant injury or unnecessary pain. On the contrary, Mr. Martin

asserts in his Second Amended Complaint that Ms. Dechant stated that the bleeding on his toes

was “normal” and would “stop on its own.” Second Amended Complaint, Memorandum of

Points and Authorities, at 14. That statement indicates that Ms. Dechant believed there was no

significant danger of infection. While she may have been wrong, that mistake is insufficient to

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constitute deliberate indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (“Mere negligence in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

rights.”). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). Summary judgment

must therefore be granted in favor of Ms. Dechant. 

B. Dr. Osborn

Mr. Martin asserts that Dr. Osborn acted with deliberate indifference by (1) prescribing

him Motrin, when he could not take Motrin because he suffered from Hepatitis-C, and failing to

prescribe any other means of pain relief; (2) failing to ensure that he received the Motrin he was

prescribed; (3) failing to prescribe him anti-infection medication; (4) performing the surgery in

an unsanitary room; (5) failing to obtain a consent form from Mr. Martin before surgically

removing his toenails, and performing the surgery after Mr. Martin asked that Dr. Highsmith

perform the surgery instead. These contentions are addressed separately.

1. Prescribing Motrin Despite Mr. Martin’s Hepatitis-C, and Failing to

Provide Other Means of Pain Relief

Mr. Martin contends that Dr. Osborn acted with deliberate indifference by prescribing

him Motrin, which Mr. Martin could not take because of his Hepatitis-C, and by failing to

provide him with any other means of pain relief. He contends that Dr. Osborn should have

prescribed him additional painkillers, open-toed sandals, a crutch or cane, and/or a wheelchair,

written him a medical chrono providing for his food to be brought to him in his room for one

week, and arranged for him to be transported from the surgery back to his living quarters. He

states he asked Dr. Osborn for a wheelchair, a ride back to his building after the surgery, and a

medical chrono for his food to be brought to him for one week, but that Dr. Osborn refused his

requests.

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9

 Mr. Martin asserts in his opposition brief that he asked Dr. Osborn for soft shoes, but

the Court cannot consider that allegation because the opposition brief is not a verified motion. 

Mr. Martin presents no affidavits or other evidence to support his claim that he asked Dr. Osborn

for soft shoes.

11

 Dr. Osborn contends that he did not believe Mr. Martin faced a significant risk of postoperative pain, and that Mr. Martin never asked him for a wheelchair, crutches, soft shoes “or

any other remedial [pain relief] measure[s].” Osborn Decl., ¶ 11. He did not prescribe a

wheelchair, he states, because it “was not medically required after removal of [Mr. Martin’s]

toenails and for this type of procedure would never be provided to any patient under the

circumstances.” Osborn Decl. at ¶ 7. He states that “[i]mmediately after surgery for removal of

toenail there is no pain because the toe is still under the effects of local anesthetic for

approximately 2-3 hours.” Osborn Decl. at ¶ 7. 

Mr. Martin has failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact

regarding whether Dr. Osborn acted with deliberate indifference in failing to prescribe him painprevention measures for the journey back to his living quarters. No evidence suggests that Dr.

Osborn knew that Mr. Martin would experience pain during the walk, that Mr. Martin’s shoes

hurt his feet, or that the walk back to Mr. Martin’s living area was half a mile long.9

 It is

undisputed that Dr. Osborn believed the local anesthetic would prevent Mr. Martin from

experiencing pain for two to three hours after the surgery. Although Dr. Osborn’s assessment of

Mr. Martin’s need for pain-prevention immediately after surgery may have been incorrect,

“[m]ere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate

a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057.

Mr. Martin also has failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact

as to whether Dr. Osborn acted with deliberate indifference in failing to provide means other

than Motrin to mitigate Mr. Martin’s pain more than two to three hours after surgery. Mr.

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Martin states that he had Hepatitis-C, but presents no evidence that he informed Dr. Osborn of

any specific risk he would face if he took Motrin. This Court has searched for, but been unable

to find, any judicially-noticeable medical authority indicating that Motrin is unsafe for patients

who have Hepatitis-C. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 880 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004)

(parenthetically citing Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003) for the

proposition that “[w]ell-known medical facts are the types of matters of which judicial notice

may be taken.” (emphasis added)). The evidence is therefore not sufficient to permit a

reasonable jury to conclude that Dr. Osborn knew of a risk, or even that a risk existed, that Mr.

Martin would suffer medical harm or unnecessary pain if he was prescribed Motrin. Nor is there

any evidence that Dr. Osborn actually knew that Mr. Martin would need other means of pain

relief. Dr. Osborn’s apparent belief that Motrin would sufficiently control Mr. Martin’s pain

precludes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he acted with deliberate

indifference.

2. Failure to Ensure that Mr. Martin Received the Prescribed Pain

Medication 

Mr. Martin contends that Dr. Osborn “intentionally failed to place the [Motrin]

prescription before the MTA so he/she could have the pharmacist fill it thereby denying him the

badly needed pain killing medication he needed.” Opposition Brief at 2. No evidence in the

record supports that assertion. It therefore is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact for purposes of summary judgment.

3. Failure to Prescribe Anti-Infection Medication

Mr. Martin also asserts that Dr. Osborn knew of and disregarded a significant risk that his

toes would become infected if Dr. Osborn did not prescribe anti-infection medication. He states

that he “was a prisoner[] living in a housing u[nit] holding more than 200 other prisoners, that in

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such a housing unit the p[lace] wasn’t likely to be clean especially since many prisoners get sick

there and . . . most of the prisoners [were] on some type of powerful medication and there wasn’t

any way such a building could be kept clean . . .” Opposition Brief at 3. “[A]ny good doctor,”

he argues, “would have recognized the risk of infection and took proper action to prevent it by

providing the plaintiff with anti infection medication . . .” Id.

Mr. Martin’s argument is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact as to deliberate

indifference. At most, it suggests the existence of facts that, if known to Dr. Osborn, could have

or should have alerted Dr. Osborn that Mr. Martin faced a significant risk of infection. 

However, “[i]f a [prison official] should have been aware of [a] risk, but was not, then the

[official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Toguchi, 391

F.3d at 1057 (quoting Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188). No evidence in the record suggests that Dr.

Osborn actually knew the nature of Mr. Martin’s living conditions. Even assuming Dr. Osborn

did know the nature of those conditions, and should have concluded that they posed a significant

risk of infection, there is no evidence that Dr. Osborn actually made that inference. The only

evidence in the record relating to Dr. Osborn’s subjective knowledge is that he knew toenailremoval surgery posed a small risk of infection, and that he believed the risk was small in Mr.

Martin’s case. The record contains no evidence of deliberate indifference.

4. Performing Toenail-Removal Surgery in an Unsanitary Room

Mr. Martin asserts that “[t]he operating room in the primary clinic wasn’t properly

cleaned ‘sanitized’ for Osborn to [d]o the surgery yet he did it anyway.” Second Amended

Complaint, ¶ 12. He fails, however, to support that assertion with any specific allegations

regarding the condition of the room. See Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1971)

(plaintiff’s allegation of “unsanitary living conditions” was insufficient to state an Eighth

Amendment claim, because it was “unaccompanied by any specific allegations, which if proved,

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would establish that the segregated confinement constituted cruel or unusual punishment . . .”) 

Mr. Martin also presents no evidence that the operating room conditions caused his infection or

otherwise harmed him. Summary judgment is therefore proper as to Mr. Martin’s allegation

with respect to the operating room conditions.

5. Failure to Obtain a Consent Form/ Performing Surgery Despite Mr.

Martin’s Requests for Dr. Highsmith

Mr. Martin asserts that “[Dr.] Osborn forced himself on the Plaintiff and failed to get the

Plaintiff to sign a consent form [before the toenail-removal surgery,] thereby violating state law

by operating on him without a signed consent . . .” Opposition Brief at 6. He contends that he

“made it clear to Osborn that he didn’t want Osborn to do the surgery [and] that he wanted Dr.

Highsmith to do the surgery and . . . [Osborn] threatened to deny [Mr. Martin] surgery for

months if he didn’t allow him to do the surgery, [saying] ‘If I don’t do this surgery today you

will have to wait another six months or more for surgery.” Opposition Brief at 5. He claims he

“was in too much pain to wait another six months for surgery so . . . he allowed Osborn to do the

surgery . . .” Id. at 6.

These allegations are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Dr. Osborn

violated Mr. Martin’s Eighth Amendment rights. They indicate merely that Dr. Osborn informed

Mr. Martin of his options: permit Dr. Osborn to perform the surgery, or wait six months to have

Dr. Highsmith do it. No evidence indicates that Dr. Osborn lied when he said Dr. Highsmith

would not be available for six months, or that Dr. Osborn otherwise coerced Mr. Martin into

permitting him to remove his toenails. 

Nor has Mr. Martin presented any evidence that he was harmed by Dr. Osborn

performing the surgery instead of Dr. Highsmith. Nothing in the record suggests that Dr.

Highsmith would have performed the toenail-removal surgery differently than did Dr. Osborn, or

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that Dr. Osborn was unqualified to perform the surgery. Mr. Martin argues that Dr. Highsmith

would have done a better job than Dr. Osborn, because Dr. Highsmith gave Mr. Martin crutches

and a medical chrono after removing his bone spur in July 2005. The difference in the postoperation treatment Mr. Martin received from Drs. Osborn and Highsmith, however, likely

resulted from the different procedures each doctor performed. It does not indicate that the two

doctors would have taken different approaches to toenail-removal. 

Mr. Martin also has not presented evidence that he was harmed by Dr. Osborn’s failure to

obtain a consent form from him. He does not allege that he would not have signed such a form,

or that he did not choose to have the surgery. Instead, he admits that he chose to be operated on

by Dr. Osborn instead of waiting for six months to be operated on by Dr. Highsmith. Summary

judgment must be granted in favor of Dr. Osborn.

C. Dr. Traquina

Mr. Martin argues that Dr. Traquina violated his Eighth Amendment rights by (1)

delaying Mr. Martin’s toenail-removal surgery for four months after Mr. Martin sent Dr.

Traquina his June 3, 2003 letter requesting medical attention; and (2) delaying the bone spurremoval surgery for eleven months “after Dr. Chen issued an ‘URGENT’ request for bone-spur

surgery on 4-24-04," and (3) causing Mr. Martin’s numerous requests for a soft shoe chrono to

be denied. He contends that Dr. Traquina, as CSP-Solano’s Chief Medical Officer, is

“responsible for ensuring that medical care to prisoners [is] provided by his medical staff, for

scheduling medical appointments outside the prison when a prisoner needs specialized treatment

or evaluation, [and] for ensuring that his medical staff follows all laws [and] constitutional

amendment rights.” Complaint at 2. According to Mr. Martin, Dr. Traquina has an “illegal stall,

delay, deny policy of withholding medical care for prisoners as long as possible.” Second

Amended Complaint, Form Complaint, at 3. 

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1. Delays in Surgery

“[W]hen . . . a claim alleges ‘mere delay of surgery,’ a prisoner can make ‘no claim for

deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(quoting Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)

(per curiam)). The unnecessary continuation of a prisoner’s condition during a delay in

receiving surgery fulfills the “harm” requirement. Id. at 1062. Mr. Martin has failed to present

any evidence that he was harmed by the delay in receiving his toenail-removal surgery, because

there is no evidence that the toenail-removal surgery was necessary to alleviate the pain in his

feet. In fact, all the evidence indicates that his pain worsened after the toenails were removed. 

Consequently, even assuming that Dr. Traquina delayed the toenail removal surgery, that delay

cannot be the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Mr. Martin has, however, sufficiently alleged that he was harmed by the delay in his bone

spur-removal surgery, because he asserts that the delay caused him constant pain. He has also

submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Dr. Traquina was

responsible for that delay, and acted with deliberate indifference in failing promptly to order the

surgery. He alleges that Dr. Traquina was responsible for scheduling surgeries, and that Dr.

Traquina knew that Dr. Chin had ordered bone-spur removal surgery to be performed on Mr.

Martin within twenty-four hours on April 24, 2004. He also attaches to his Second Amended

Complaint Dr. Traquina’s Second Level response, dated March 4, 2005 - eleven months after Dr.

Chin ordered that Mr. Martin receive “urgent” surgery. Second Amended Complaint at 16-17. 

In the response, Dr. Traquina acknowledges that Mr. Martin claims he is “going through

suffering due to your need for additional toe surgery, and states merely “[w]e are sorry for the

delay in this rescheduling of your podiatry appointment.” Exh. to Opposition to Summary

Judgment. Dr. Traquina’s response provides no explanation as to why eleven months have

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passed without Mr. Martin receiving the bone spur-removal surgery that Doctor Chin stated

should have been done within twenty-four hours. This evidence is sufficient to create a triable

issue of fact as to whether Dr. Traquina acted with deliberate indifference. See Farrow, 320

F.3d 1235, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 2003) (triable issue of fact existed as to deliberate indifference,

where plaintiff prisoner suffered a“substantial and inordinate delay” in receiving dentures and

his dentist was aware he was experiencing pain, bleeding gums, and weight loss due to lack of

dentures); Hunt v. Dental Department, 865 F.2d 198, (9th Cir. 1989) ( defendant prison medical

administrator, dentist, and medical assistant not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff

prisoner’s Eighth-Amendment claim arising from a three-month delay in receiving dentures,

where defendants knew the lack of dentures was causing severe pain, weight loss, and permanent

damage to plaintiff’s teeth); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50-51 (2nd Cir. 1988)

(reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant prison administrators on plaintiff prisoner’s

claim that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in causing a delay of over two years in

arranging for surgery to correct broken pins in plaintiff’s hip).

/////

/////

2. Denial of Soft Shoe Chrono

Mr. Martin also contends that Dr. Traquina is liable under § 1983 because he “refused to

approve a soft shoe chrono [requested by Mr. Martin] in 2003" and “refused [Mr. Martin’s]

request for soft shoes from Nov. 2002 all the way till after the bad surgery or 11-27-03 and well

into 2004 before he received the soft shoe chrono.” Opposition Brief at 23. These allegations

are insufficient to withstand summary judgment, because Mr. Martin provides no evidence that

Dr. Traquina was responsible for approving soft shoe chronos or had any control over whether

Mr. Martin received soft shoes. Mr. Martin admits that when Dr. Traquina received Mr.

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Martin’s June 3, 2003 letter complaining of foot pain Dr. Traquina “made a copy of the letter and

sent it to Dr. Toppenberg for him to interview Plaintiff.” Second Amended Complaint,

“Memorandum of Points and Authorities,” at 3. Dr. Traquina presents uncontroverted evidence

that he reviewed Mr. Traquina’s second level appeals, personally interviewed Mr. Martin on

February 2, 2004, and “advised him to have a follow-up consultation with the podiatrist to . . .

request a soft shoe chrono.” Traquina Decl. at ¶ 4. That evidence suggests that at CSP-Solano

soft shoe chronos were to be requested by the examining podiatrist, and not by the Chief Medical

Officer. Dr. Traquina is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Martin’s claim that Dr.

Traquina failed to secure him a soft shoe chrono.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment on Mr. Martin’s Eighth Amendment

claims is GRANTED in favor of Ms. Dechant and Dr. Osborn, and GRANTED in favor of Dr.

Traquina with respect to Mr. Martin’s claims that Dr. Traquina delayed his toenail-removal

surgery and prevented him from receiving a soft shoe chrono. Summary judgment is DENIED

with respect to Dr. Traquina to the extent Mr. Martin asserts that Dr. Traquina delayed his bone

spur-removal surgery. 

/////

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Osborn’s September 21, 2006, motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED;

2. Defendant Dechant’s September 21, 2006, motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED; and

3. Defendant Traquina’s September 21, 2006, motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED with respect to Mr. Martin’s claims that Dr. Traquina delayed his toenail-removal

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surgery and prevented him from receiving a soft shoe chrono, and DENIED with respect to Mr.

Martin’s claim that Dr. Traquina delayed his bone spur-removal surgery. 

DATED: August 2, 2007

 /s/ Arthur L. Alarcón 

 UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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