Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01774/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01774-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony J Gonsalves, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-01774-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Anthony J. Gonsalves has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for second-degree burglary. 

(Doc. 1.) Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner’s 

claim lacks merit.1

 (Doc. 11.) Petitioner has not filed a reply in support of his Petition 

and the deadline has passed. (Doc. 13.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends 

that the Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. The Incident Leading to the Challenged Conviction 

 On the day of the incident that resulted in the conviction challenged in this matter, 

the victim, J.W., returned home and noticed a truck with its tailgate down parked in his 

 

1

 Respondents assert that “there are issues” regarding whether the Petition is timely and whether Petitioner exhausted his claim. (Doc. 11 at 2.) However, Respondents do not address those issues because they assert that the Petition can be resolved by considering the merits of Petitioner’s claim. (Id.) Therefore, the Court does not address these issues. 

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driveway.2 (Doc. 1 at 17.) He then saw Petitioner exit the front door of his house. (Id.) 

When J.W. asked Petitioner what he was doing, Petitioner ran to the truck. (Id.) J.W. 

wrote down the truck’s license plate number and called the police. (Id.) When J.W. went 

inside his house, he saw his dishwasher near the front door. (Id.) The dishwasher hose 

was cut and there was a trail of water from the kitchen to the front door. (Id.) The stove 

was moved away from the kitchen wall and a basement window was broken. (Id.) 

 Police traced the license plate number to a business entity and learned that 

Petitioner had been assigned that truck the day of the incident. (Id. at 17-18.) Petitioner, 

however, had not worked any jobs the day. (Id. at 18.) J.W. identified Petitioner from a 

photographic line-up as the man he saw leaving his house. (Id.) Upon questioning, 

Petitioner admitted to police he drove the truck the day of the incident. (Id.) He also 

admitted that he was at the victim’s home, and that he did not have permission to be at or 

inside the house. (Id. at 20.) 

B. Charges, Trial, and Sentence 

 Petitioner was indicted for burglary in the second degree, a class three felony. 

(Id.) During the trial, Annabelle Penrose, a latent print examiner for the Scottsdale Police 

Department, testified for the State. (Doc. 11, Ex. A at 100.) Penrose testified that three 

latent prints were obtained from the crime scene. (Id. at 102.) She stated that two of the 

latent prints lacked sufficient ridge detail to be compared directly to a known print or to 

be run through a fingerprint database to find a match. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at 102, 106.) She 

testified that the third latent print (the good latent print) was run through the database and 

was not a match. (Id. at 106.) She further testified that, at the prosecutor’s request, she 

had compared all three latent prints to a known print of Petitioner. (Id.) The prosecutor 

and Penrose engaged in the following exchange about the results of that test: 

 Q. And what was the result of that? 

 A. That result was that it was — there was no match. 

 

2

 The facts are derived from the Arizona Court of Appeals decision, which does not identify the date of the incident. (Doc. 1 at 16-21.) 

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 Q. Okay. 

 A. No identification. 

 Q. Okay. So the one print that we get from the scene does match the 

defendant? 

 A. That’s correct. 

 [The prosecutor]: No further questions. 

(Id. at 106−07) (emphasis added).) 

 On cross-examination, defense counsel addressed the fingerprint evidence. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. A at 107-114.) Penrose again stated that the good latent print did not 

“come back as a hit” when it was run through the fingerprint database. (Id. at 111.) She 

also reiterated that she compared the good latent print to a known fingerprint of Petitioner 

and it “was not a match.” (Id. at 111-12.) Penrose engaged in the following exchange 

with defense counsel: 

 Q. Okay. And so this isn’t a computer thing. This is you using your training, 

 skills, experience, your own eyes? You’re the one doing this comparison? 

 A. That’s correct. Yes. 

 Q. Okay. And you got a lot of training, right? 

 A. I have a lot of experience and training, yes. 

 Q. Okay. And so your judgment, no, that was not a match, correct? 

 A. Correct. Yes. 

(Id. at 111-12 (emphasis added).) 

 During closing argument, defense counsel emphasized the lack of evidence of 

Petitioner’s fingerprints at the crime scene. (Doc. 1, Ex. B at 95.) The jury found 

Petitioner guilty as charged. (Doc. 1 at 18.) Because Petitioner was on parole at the time 

of the crime and had twelve prior felony convictions, the trial court sentenced him to 

11.25 years’ imprisonment. (Id.) 

/// 

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 C. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 16.) Appellate 

counsel notified the court that he could not find an arguable question of law and asked the 

appellate court to search the record for fundamental error. (Id. at 17.) The appellate 

court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence stating that it found no fundamental 

error and there was substantial evidence against Petitioner. (Id. at 18-20.) 

D. Post-Conviction Review 

 Petitioner sought post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, asserting ineffective assistance of appellate and post-conviction 

counsel. (Id. at 12.) The court considered and rejected Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of appellate and post-conviction counsel. (Id.) Although Petitioner did not 

specifically raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the court considered 

that potential claim and found that it lacked merit. (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 22.) On June 2, 2015, the court granted 

review, but denied relief. (Id. at 22.) 

E. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On June 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

(Doc. 1.) In his only claim, Petitioner asserts that “counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise an objection to the States [sic] finger print expert giving false testimony in my trial 

under oath.” (Id. at 6.) Petitioner cites to the specific page of the trial transcript where 

the alleged false statement appears. (Doc. 1 at 6 (citing Jan. 5, 2011 trial transcript at 

106); see Doc. 11, Exs. A and B.) As stated above, Respondents argue that regardless of 

whether Petitioner exhausted his claim, the Court should deny habeas corpus relief 

because Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. (Doc. 11 at 5); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) 

(providing that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.”). 

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II. Review of Petitioner’s Claim 

 A. Strickland Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner asserts a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 1 

at 6.) To establish a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). 

 To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s 

performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of 

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects 

of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of 

counsel’s performance is extremely limited. Id. Acts or omissions that “might be 

considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 694. The court need not address both Strickland requirements if the 

petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is 

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, 

. . . that course should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(stating that “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to 

consider the other”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

B. Application of Strickland to Petitioner’s Claim 

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when 

Penrose allegedly gave false testimony under oath. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner’s claim is 

based on Penrose’s testimony regarding whether Petitioner’s fingerprints were a match 

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for the good latent print found at the crime scene. (Id.) On direct examination, Penrose 

testified that the latent print “was no match.” (Doc. 11, Ex. A at 106.) She immediately 

emphasized that there was “no identification.” (Id.) The prosecutor then asked, “So the 

one print we get from the scene does match the defendant.” (Id.) (emphasis added). 

Penrose responded “That’s correct.” (Id.) Because Penrose initially stated there was no 

match, Petitioner asserts that Penrose testified falsely when she agreed with the 

prosecutor’s statement that the latent print “from the scene does match the defendant.” 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) 

 Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that false 

testimony. As discussed below, the record does not support Petitioner’s characterization 

of Penrose’s testimony as false. Rather, because Penrose otherwise consistently testified 

that Petitioner was not a match for the latent prints, it appears that when she responded 

“[t]hat’s correct,” to the prosecutor’s statement that Petitioner was a match, she may have 

misunderstood the prosecutor’s statement, given an incorrect answer, or there may have 

been a transcription error. On cross-examination, Penrose reiterated that none of the 

latent prints from the crime scene, including the good print, were a match for Petitioner. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. A at 111-12.) Additionally, during closing argument, defense counsel 

emphasized that Petitioner was not a match for the latent print. (Doc. 11, Ex. B at 95.) 

 From the record, the Court concludes that the jury heard evidence that the latent 

prints from the crime scene were not a match for Petitioner. Although Penrose made a 

single statement indicating that Petitioner was a match for one of those prints, in the 

context of the transcript, it appears that the statement was an error and not a false 

statement. Therefore, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to Penrose’s 

testimony as false. Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s failure to object to 

Penrose’s misstatement was objectively unreasonable, even if, in hindsight, an objection 

might have been a better decision. See Ayala v. Chappell, ___F.3d___, 2016 WL 

3913446, at * 13 (9th Cir. Jul. 20, 2016); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91. 

 

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Additionally, even assuming Petitioner satisfied the first Strickland requirement, he has 

not established prejudice because he has not shown that, but for trial counsel’s failure to 

object to Penrose’s challenged testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of his trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The 

record reflects that on one occasion during the trial, Penrose apparently made a 

misstatement regarding whether Petitioner was a match for a latent print found at the 

scene. However, she stated several times that Petitioner was not a match for the latent 

prints, and during closing argument defense counsel emphasized the absence of 

Petitioner’s fingerprints at the crime scene. Therefore, most of the evidence the jury 

heard about the fingerprint evidence indicated that Petitioner’s fingerprints were not at 

the crime scene. 

 Despite the lack of fingerprint evidence, the State presented substantial evidence 

that connected Petitioner to the charged burglary. The victim testified that he saw 

Petitioner walk out of his house and run to a truck that was parked in front of the house. 

(Doc. 1 at 20.) He recorded the truck’s license plate number and police later connected 

Petitioner to that truck. The victim testified that when he entered his house after 

Petitioner had fled, he saw that several large kitchen appliances had been moved and a 

basement window was broken. Petitioner admitted to police that he was at the victim’s 

house on the date of the incident and that he did not have permission to be at or inside the 

house. (Id.) Considering this evidence that connected Petitioner to the crime scene, 

Petitioner cannot show that, but for trial counsel’s failure to object to Penrose’s allegedly 

false statement about the fingerprint evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the 

result of the trial would have been different. Therefore, Petitioner has not established that 

trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

700. 

III. Conclusion 

 The Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim lacks merit and recommends that the 

Petition be denied. 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 22nd day of December, 2016. 

 

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