Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03025/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DWAYNE KEITH JEFFERSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

l.lniced Scatel Court of Appeals Tentb Clreuit 

MAY 2 9 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-3025 

COLONEL WILLIAM. L. HART, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-3232) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Dwayne Keith Jefferson, prose. 

Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, Mary Kreiner Ramirez and David B. Bailey, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Topeka, Kansas, for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-3025 Document: 01019279205 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 1 
Petitioner-appellant Dwayne Keith Jefferson appeals from the district court's order 

granting his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the extent of ordering that he be given a 

parole hearing. We havejurisdiction1 pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2253, and affirm. 2 

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court, having determined 

that petitioner had suffered an ex post facto violation, should have ordered his release from 

incarceration. Petitioner contends that the district court's order of a parole hearing did not 

provide him with adequate relief Respondent argues that petitioner has received all of the 

relief to which he is entitled, and that this appeal is moot. 

Petitioner, an inmate at the United States Disciplinruy Barracks, is serving a fifty-year 

sentence for involvement in the 1983 murder of a German citizen. His sentence began, for 

purposes of computing eligibility for parole, on May 10, 1983. At the time of his crime, 

Department of Defense Instruction Number 1325.4 (October 7, 1968) governed eligibility 

for parole. Under Instruction 1325.4, petitioner was entitled to discretionary parole 

Respondent contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because 

petitioner's motion for reconsideration remains pending before the district court. The clerk 

of court entered a minute order dated Januruy 6, 1995 "upon direction by the court" denying 

that motion as moot. IT R. doc. 32. This order, although signed by the clerk, was 

authorized by the court and is entitled to a presumption of regularity. ~ Weedon v Gaden, 

419 F.2d 303,305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude 

that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. 

~Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-3025 Document: 01019279205 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 2 
consideration beginning May 9, 1984, and mandatory consideration no later than May 9, 

1993. 3 On May 19, 1988, Department of Defense Directive 1325.4 became effective. 

Under Directive 1325.4, which modified Instruction 1325.4, petitioner would not become 

eligible for parole until he had served a full ten years of his sentence. He would receive 

mandatory parole consideration after ten years, and annually thereafter. 4 

3 Instruction 1325.4 reads in pertinent part as follows: 

A prisoner with a punitive discharge or dismissal confined pursuant to a 

sentence or aggregate sentences of: 

More than three (3) years who have (sic) served not less than one (1) year will 

become eligible for parole consideration at such time as the appropriate 

Clemency and Parole Board may recommend and by the Secretary of the 

Department concerned approve, but such time shall not be more than one-third 

of the sentence or aggregate sentences as lawfully adjudged and approved, or 

not more than ten (10) years when the sentence is in excess of thirty (30) 

years. 

I R. doc. 8, att. 3, p. 20. 

4 Directive 1325.4 reads in pertinent part as follows: 

Clemency and Parole Boards shall consider a prisoner for release on 

parole when the prisoner first becomes eligible and annually thereafter. A 

prisoner is eligible for release on parole, when requested by the prisoner, as 

follows: 

(b) When the unsuspended sentence or aggregate 

sentence to confinement is 12 months or more and the prisoner 

has served one-third of his or her term of confinement, but in no 

case less than 6 months, or after having served 1 0 years of a 

sentence to confinement for 30 years or more or a sentence to 

3 

(continued .. ) 

Appellate Case: 95-3025 Document: 01019279205 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 3 
' 

On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed this habeas corpus action, contending that the 

Army Clemency and Parole Board (Board) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 

Constitution by applying the 1988 Directive to him. He claimed that he was deprived of 

parole consideration prior to serving ten years of his sentence. 

The district court determined that application of the 1988 Directive to petitioner 

constituted an ex post facto violation. It granted the writ, and ordered that petitioner be given 

a parole hearing within 120 days of its July 29, 1993 order if he had not already received 

one. After respondent provided proof to the court that petitioner had received a parole 

hearing on June 8, 1993 (at which he was denied parole), the district court denied petitioner's 

requests for further relief 

Respondent does not challenge the district court's finding of an ex post facto 

violation. "The proper relief upon a conclusion that a state prisoner is being treated under 

an ex post facto law is to remand to permit the state court to apply, if possible, the law in 

place when his crime occurred." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 26 n.22 (1981). The 

parole law in place when petitioner's crime occurred provided the Board discretion to give 

petitioner a hearing before expiration of ten years. Here by the time the district court ordered 

4

( ••• continued) 

life. 

I R. doc. 8, att. 5, p. 1-10. 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-3025 Document: 01019279205 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 4 
that petitioner receive a parole hearini ten years had elapsed; it was no longer possible to 

apply the earlier law. Ci Devine v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339, 347 

(lOth Cir. 1989) (when inmate's punishment was unforeseeably and retroactively enhanced 

by a modified parole statute, inmate must be provided a parole hearing before expiration of 

the time period provided for by the prior statute; if not he must be released). However, a 

habeas petitioner who has been deprived of timely parole consideration is entitled to a 

hearing, not release. See, e.g, Jones v U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178, 1181 (8th 

Cir. 1990); Clifton v. Attorney General of the State of California, 997 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 

1993); .d McNeal v. United States, 553 F.2d 66, 68 (lOth Cir. 1977) (delay in holding parole 

revocation hearing not per se violation of due process entitling inmate to release). Under 

5 Petitioner argues that he was actually entitled to several parole hearings. He asserts 

that since the 1988 amendment makes it mandatory for the Board to consider a prisoner for 

release when he becomes eligible "and annually thereafter," and since he became "eligible" 

under the 1968 Instruction after one year, he was entitled to mandatory, annual parole 

hearings beginning in 1988. He cites Spradling v. Maynard, 527 F. Supp. 398, 404 (W.D. 

Okla 1981), for the proposition that when application of a statute results in an ex post facto 

violation, the inmate may avoid any detriment resulting from the new enactment but is 

entitled to its benefits. We disagree with petitioner's analysis. The Spradling case relied on 

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981 ). Weaver notes that when a habeas petitioner 

challenges a new law on an ex post facto basis the severable provisions that are not ex post 

facto still apply to him. Id.. at 36 n.22. Petitioner fails to show here that the provision in the 

new Directive relating to mandatory parole consideration upon eligibility (favorable to him) 

is severable from the provision making eligibility for such consideration available only after 

ten years (unfavorable to him). The two are closely intertwined, and there is no showing that 

the Secretary of Defense intended for them to operate independently. ~ id. at 38-39 

(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-3025 Document: 01019279205 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 5 
these circumstances, we agree that petitioner received all of the relief to which he was 

entitled 

AFFIRMED. 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-3025 Document: 01019279205 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 6