Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00543/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00543-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL GOMEZ LOPEZ,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-0543 JAM DAD P

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an amended application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of

conviction entered against him in the Sacramento County Superior Court in 2000 on two counts

of making terrorist threats in violation of California Penal Code § 422. He seeks relief on the

grounds that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on one of the counts

against him; (2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights by limiting his efforts to impeach

and cross-examine the complaining witness; (3) his right to due process was violated when the

trial court allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of petitioner’s prior acts of misconduct;

and (4) his pretrial, trial and appellate counsel all rendered ineffective assistance. Upon careful

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 The following summary is drawn from the April 30, 2002 opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-6, lodged in this

court on August 10, 2005.

2

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A jury convicted defendant Manual Gomez Lopez of two counts of

making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422 – count one as to victim

Kristin Seishas (Kristin) and count two as to victim Theresa

Maldonado (Theresa); undesignated section references are to the

Penal Code) and found true allegations that he had been convicted

of four strikes within the meaning of sections 667, subds. (b) - (i)

and 1170.12.

* * *

In November 1999, 21-year-old Kristin worked as a server at a

Sacramento restaurant where defendant worked as a cook. The

general manager was Theresa. Defendant told Kristin he had

served a prison term for attempted murder, for stabbing someone. 

On November 11, 1999, defendant acted “unprofessional”

according to Kristin. He banged down plates, refused to fix

customers’ orders and seemed angry. Defendant had acted this

way in the past with other servers. Kristin informed Theresa and

explained that she no longer wanted to work on the same shift as

defendant.

Theresa discussed the incident with defendant. He admitted

throwing plates up on the pass-through at Kristin. Theresa gave

defendant a “write-up” and suspended him for the night. 

Defendant became angry, started to talk rapidly, “spitting,” and

slammed his fists on the desk, telling Theresa he wanted to

“punch” her in the face. Theresa was frightened and called for

assistance. Defendant told her she did not need assistance. Later,

during a conversation between defendant and the assistant

manager, Theresa overheard defendant say that “she” needed to

watch out and that he was going to “get her.” Theresa was not sure

whether defendant meant her, or Kristin.

Defendant called in sick a few days later at which time he told

Theresa he had served a prison term for killing someone and asked

Theresa if she had any children. She replied, “Yes.”

On November 16, 1999, Kristin again worked with defendant and

he asked her about her report to Theresa. Kristin explained she had

told Theresa that defendant had been acting unprofessionally and

that she no longer wanted to work with him. Defendant angrily

threatened Kristin, telling her to “watch [her] back”, that he “was

going to get [her]” and that she was “done for.” They stood a few

feet apart and he looked directly at her. She responded that the

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conversation was over and walked away. When Kristen picked up

her orders, defendant threatened her again, saying the same things

several times, actually “chanting” his threats. The threats

continued for about 20 minutes. Kristen was afraid and believed

defendant planned to hurt or possibly kill her; she was aware he

knew her work schedule. The assistant manager then ordered

defendant to leave. As defendant was clocking out, he came face

to face with Kristin and threatened her again, saying the same

things.

Later on November 16, defendant called Theresa and asked what

was going to happen to him. Theresa said she did not know what

he was talking about, but, while she was talking to defendant, she

noted she had a call waiting and switched to that call. Kristin was

on the line, crying and hysterical, and explained that defendant had

threatened her life and had been sent home by the assistant

manager. While Theresa was talking to Kristin, Theresa answered

her call waiting and it was defendant. He was angry and worried

about losing his job, but Theresa said she could not discuss it. 

Defendant then said he would slit Theresa’s and Kristin’s throats if

he was fired, that it was second nature to him and he would not

hesitate to do it. He then hung up the phone.

To protect her, Theresa told Kristin about defendant’s threat to slit

their throat, and Kristin became even more fearful. Theresa

believed defendant would do what he had threatened to do and

feared for her safety. Thinking it was her duty to investigate the

incident, Theresa went to the restaurant but had her uncle and sonin-law watch her as she got into her car to go. Theresa feared for

her safety even at the time she testified at defendant’s trial.

On the evening of November 17, Theresa fired defendant, but took

the precaution of asking the police to be present when she did so. 

Defendant took his termination check and stated calmly that she

needed to watch her children. 

Theresa immediately changed her phone number and arranged to

have her children driven to school every day. She warned the

school and her children about defendant’s threats. Theresa

switched restaurants a few weeks later, because she no longer felt

safe.

About the time defendant was fired, Kristin learned that her

personnel file at the restaurant was missing.

After the threats, Kristin changed her routine. She no longer

worked alone at the restaurant, had someone escort her to her car,

drove her father’s car, which was more reliable, and she carried a

cell phone. “Officers” were always at the restaurant when she

worked. Kristin obtained a restraining order against defendant. A

few weeks after defendant’s threats, she quit working at the

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restaurant, because she no longer felt safe. She also moved and

changed her phone number.

Defendant testified. He admitted having sustained a conviction for

robbery and three prior felony convictions of moral turpitude in

1990. He denied having been convicted of murder and denied

telling any coworkers, or managers, that he had.

In October 1999, defendant began working as a cook at the

restaurant. At no time prior to November had Theresa counseled

him for bad behavior. While checking his food drawers on

November 11, Kristen banged on the counter and demanded to

know if he was “going to be like that all night.” He told her to

leave him alone. They did not speak to one another for the rest of

the shift. Several days later, defendant was summoned to

Theresa’s office where she explained he would be written up and

placed on probation. Defendant was upset, because Theresa had

not asked for his explanation, but he was not angry. When he

worked with Kristin later that evening, he asked Kristin what she

had told Theresa. He denied threatening Kristin and left early to

catch a bus. As he clocked out, he told Kristin, “what goes around,

comes around. I’ll get my chance.” The next day he was fired. He

explained that he had helped Kristin by busing tables and taking

food orders from regular customers. He denied his telephone call

to Theresa.

Defendant specifically denied he had made threats to Kristin, or

Theresa. He claimed he was a “nice guy.” He denied having any

problems with any of the servers and claimed he got along with

everybody, including all of his coworkers.

In rebuttal, defendant’s former coworker at another restaurant

claimed that defendant had sent a note demanding $20, which

defendant believed the coworker owed, and threatened that, if he

did not pay up, he “would be hurt really bad.” The coworker

believed defendant meant it.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

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Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

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II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner’s first claim is that the evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient

to support his conviction on count one in which he was charged with making terrorist threats

against Kristin Seishas (hereinafter “Kristen”). (Am. Pet. at 16.) He argues that his statements to

Kristen did not “rise to the level of a terrorist threat.” Petitioner explains,

Given the context of [petitioner’s] threats, the reasonable

interpretation is that in his opinion, Ms. Seishas struck him a low

blow by complaining to management and trying to have him either

fired, or curtailing his opportunity to work, and that he threatened,

that she could expect him to retaliate in kind in order to get even. 

To interpret in that context words such as “going to get you” and

“watch your back” as threats to kill or inflict physical injury is

absurd and borders on hysteria.

(Id. at 19.) Petitioner argues, “an idiosyncratic reaction to words does not invest them with a

meaning or intention that they do not have.” (Id.) He contends that Kristin’s fear was not

“reasonable.” (Id. at 23.) 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence, reasoning as follows:

Section 422 provides in relevant part: “Any person who willfully

threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great

bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the

statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic

communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no

intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the

circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal,

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person

threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of

execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably

to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her

immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in

the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the

state prison.”

To find that defendant made a criminal threat in violation of

section 422, each of the following elements must be proved:

/////

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“1. A person willfully threatened to commit a crime which if

committed, would result in death or great bodily injury to another

person;

“2. The person who made the threat did so with the specific intent

that the statement be taken as a threat;

“3. The threat was contained in a statement that was made

verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication

device; 

“4. The threatening statement on its face, and under the

circumstances in which it was made, was so unequivocal,

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person

threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of

execution of the threat; and

“5. The threatening statement caused the other person reasonably

to be in sustained fear [for [his] [or] [her] own safety] [or] [for

[his] [or] [her] immediate family safety].” (See CALJIC No. 9.94

(1999 rev.) (6th ed. 1999).)

Here, as evidenced by closing argument, the prosecution sought to

prove that defendant made a criminal threat to Kristin either when

he stated, “You better watch your back, I’m going to get you. 

You’re done for,” or when he conveyed a criminal threat to Kristin

through Theresa by stating,” “I’m going to slit your throat.” The

jury was instructed that it must agree that defendant committed the

same act. (CALJIC No. 17.01.) In conjunction with surrounding

circumstances, either statement may constitute a violation of

section 422 (a criminal threat).

The language of Penal Code section 422 requires the threat to be

‘so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to

convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an

immediate prospect of execution of the threat . . . .’ (Italics added.)

. . . The use of the word ‘so’ indicates that unequivocality,

unconditionality, immediacy and specificity are not absolutely

mandated, but must be sufficiently present in the threat and

surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and

immediate prospect of execution to the victim. The four qualities

are simply the factors to be considered in determining whether a

threat, considered together with its surrounding circumstances,

conveys those impressions to the victim.” (People v. Stanfield

(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1157-1158; italics omitted; see also

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 339-340.)

Defendant’s words, “You better watch your back, I’m going to get

you. You’re done for,” could have had more than one meaning,

but defendant had previously told Kristin he had either committed

attempted murder, or had stabbed someone. When defendant made

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his initial threats, he did so not once but several times, chanting his

threats over a period of 20 minutes. Taking these acts into

consideration along with the remainder of the circumstances

surrounding defendant’s words, Kristin reasonably could have

taken them as a threat of death, or of great bodily injury.

Defendant argues that the fact that he later conveyed a threat to slit

Kristin’s throat should not be considered in connection with his

initial threats. We disagree. Defendant’s subsequent threat to slit

Kristin’s throat, if he was fired, is a circumstance that may be used

to evaluate whether defendant intended his initial words (“to get

[her],” that she was “done for” and that she should “watch [her]

back”) to be taken as a threat. (citations omitted.)

Defendant’s threat to slit Theresa’s and Kristen’s throats, if he was

fired, was in itself a criminal threat. Although conditional, it was

highly likely defendant knew he would be fired, because he was

already on probation. “Language creating an apparent condition

cannot save the threatener from conviction when the condition is

illusory, given the reality of the circumstances surrounding the

threat. A seemingly conditional threat contingent on an act highly

likely to occur may convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and

immediate prospect of execution.” (citation omitted.)

Moreover, “[t]he kind of threat contemplated by section 422 may

as readily be conveyed by the threatener through a third party as

personally to the intended victim. Where the threat is conveyed

through a third party intermediary, the specific intent element of

the statute is implicated. Thus, if the threatener intended the threat

to be taken seriously by the victim, he must necessarily have

intended it to be conveyed.” (In re David L. (1991) 234

Cal.App.3d 1655, 1659.) Defendant communicated his threat to

slit Kristin’s throat to Theresa, Kristin’s boss, who defendant knew

had been contacted by Kristin about his plate banging. It can be

inferred that he knew Theresa would be contacted by Kristen about

his threats to get her, that she should watch her back and that she

was done for. Thus, it can be inferred defendant intended Theresa

to act as intermediary to convey the throat-slitting threat to Kristin. 

(Id. at p. 1659.) And Theresa did so.

As a result of defendant’s threats, Kristin changed her routine. She

never worked alone, had others escort her to her car, borrowed her

father’s car, because it was more reliable, and she carried a cell

phone. When she worked at the restaurant, officers were present. 

She also obtained a restraining order against defendant. She later

quit the restaurant, moved and changed her phone number. 

Sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that either defendant’s

threats to watch her back, that he would get her and that she was

done for, or his threat to slit her throat, caused Kristin to be in

sustained fear for her safety. (See People v. Allen (1995) 33

Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 [“sustained” fear means a period of time

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that extends beyond “momentary, fleeting, or transitory”].) The

jury could reasonably conclude that either defendant’s threats ro

“get [her],” “watch [her] back” and that she was “done for,” or his

threat to slit her throat conveyed to Kristin “a gravity of purpose

and an immediate prospect of execution . . . .” (People v. Stanfield

supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157, italics omitted.)

Sufficient evidence supports defendant’s conviction for criminal

threats against Kristin as charged in count one.

(Opinion at 7-11.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There

is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988). “[T]he dispositive question under

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443

U.S. at 318). A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus “faces a heavy burden when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due

process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). In order

to grant the writ, the federal habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected

an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id.

The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier of

fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign the

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inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th

Cir. 1991). Thus, “[t]he question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors

reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court

determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal

offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and for the

reasons described by the California Court of Appeal, the undersigned concludes that there was

sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that petitioner was guilty of making terrorist threats against Kristin, as that crime is defined

by California law. The state appellate court opinion rejecting petitioner’s argument in this regard

is a reasonable construction of the evidence in this case and is not contrary to or an objectively

unreasonable application of federal law. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

B. Cross-Examination of Kristen

Petitioner’s next two claims concern the trial court’s ruling that the defense could

not cross-examine Kristin regarding her history of psychological problems. Petitioner explains

that such cross-examination may have shown that Kristen’s fear was caused by her mental

disorder and not by petitioner’s words and actions. Petitioner contends that the trial court’s

evidentiary ruling violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him and

his rights to “due process of law and compulsory process under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

to the United States Constitution.” (Am. Pet. at 31, 43.) 

The California Court of Appeal fairly explained the background to these claims as

follows:

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In discussing in limine matters, the prosecutor noted that, at the

request of defense counsel and the court, the prosecutor talked to

Kristin who stated the following. Kristin had suffered a

personality disorder related to depression based on her feelings of

instability in personal relationships and lack of self-esteem. 

Although she had previously taken an antidepressant medication,

she had not been on medication for the previous two years. Kristin

had spoken with her physician, who distinguished her personality

disorder, common amongst teenagers, from those related to

paranoia or hallucinations.

The prosecutor understood that defense counsel proposed to

impeach Kristin with questions calling for privileged information

and to subpoena Kristin’s records. The prosecutor moved to quash

any such subpoena and asserted the psychotherapist/patient

privilege on Kristin’s behalf pursuant to Evidence Code section

1014.

Defense counsel stated his understanding of Kristin’s mental

health. She had been in psychiatric care for years, up to August

1999. Prior to the age of 18, she attempted suicide on two

occasions. Defense counsel argued “the whole issue is Kristin’s

credibility,” and the court should not rely on Kristin’s evaluation of

her problem but rather should review the records in camera. 

Defense counsel argued that Kristin’s mental status affected her

perception of the incident and whether she reasonably sustained

fear and that Kristin’s own admissions, without any records,

constituted a sufficient showing of psychological problems.

The prosecutor responded that defense counsel had not shown

good cause for the court to review the records in camera and that,

because a reasonable-person standard applied, whether Kristin

sought counseling in the past was irrelevant.

Although the trial court took the matter under submission, it

tentatively concluded, at least until after direct examination, that

the medical records would not be reviewed, because such records

were not relevant to Kristin’s credibility or her ability to perceive.

The next day, the prosecutor moved in limine to preclude defense

counsel from asking Kristin about her suicide attempts and any

other questions about psychiatric treatment for a mental disorder. 

Consistent with the court’s tentative ruling regarding psychiatric

records, the court granted the motion subject to further

consideration after direct examination.

After Kristen testified, the court ruled: “With respect to the

request by the Defense for the Court to review the psychiatric

records, psychotherapy records of Kristin Seishan, I do not find

after listening to the testimony that there is sufficient good cause to

overcome the psychotherapist/patient privilege such as to open the

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documents that have been subpoenaed from the psychotherapist.” 

Defense counsel queried, “In the event that I should recall Miss

Seishan and cross-examine her regarding her psychiatric history, I

assume the Court would allow me to remake my motion at that

time if there was a change of circumstances.” The court agreed.

Thereafter, prior to recalling Kristin to testify, defense counsel

asked the court once again to allow cross-examination concerning

Kristin’s psychiatric history. The court found an insufficient basis

to question Kristin about her treatment in that it had no bearing on

her credibility and that an objective standard applied to whether

she was reasonably in sustained fear. The prosecutor later clarified

that her disclosure of Kristin’s condition was to show it was not

relevant to the case. The prosecutor feared that defense counsel

would ask Kristin whether she hallucinated. The prosecution

requested that the court exercise its discretion under Evidence

Code section 352 and preclude all questioning relating to Kristin’s

mental background. The court noted that it had already ruled there

would be no references to psychotherapy, because it was irrelevant,

that the defense had made an insufficient showing otherwise and

that “it would be unduly prejudicial without a sufficient basis.”

(Opinion at 12-14.)

Petitioner argues that evidence about Kristin’s mental health history was

necessary to show that her reaction to petitioner’s words was not “reasonable.” (Am. Pet. at 31,

32.) He states:

Whether her subjective reaction was extreme and objectively

unreasonable was not explored at trial. The trial court prevented

the defense from questioning her on her history of psychological

problems, which could support the finding that her reaction to

appellant’s words was not reasonable.

(Id. at 32.) To illustrate his point, petitioner argues, “it is unlikely that any of the other waitresses

would have reacted that way because it was not a reasonable reaction.” (Id. at 34.) He contends

that Kristen’s “claims of fear could not be placed in proper perspective sans admission of

evidence that tended to reveal the potential for overreaction based on past psychological

abnormal reactions.” (Id. at 44.) Petitioner disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion that

evidence of Kristen’s mental health was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and argues that his

right to cross-examination outweighed Kristen’s right to assert the psychotherapist/patient

privilege with respect to her prior mental health history. (Id. at 39, 40-42.) 

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The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments in this regard,

reasoning as follows:

We disagree. The element of the offense requiring that the

defendant’s words caused the victim reasonably to be in sustained

fear has two components – the victim actually sustained fear, a

subjective evaluation, and the victim’s fear was reasonable, an

objective evaluation that asks whether a reasonable person being

treated in a like manner would reasonably be in sustained fear. 

(See In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1140.) Thus,

whether Kristin suffered psychological problems was irrelevant to

the issue whether her fear was objectively reasonable, and the trial

court properly precluded defendant from cross-examining Kristin

about her psychological history.

Contrary to defendant’s claim, Kristen did not place her mental

health at issue. He mistakenly relies on Evidence Code section

1016, which is inapplicable here. A patient does not place her

mental health at issue by charging someone with a crime. (See

Susan S. v. Israels (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1297.) 

“[A]lthough a witness’s credibility is always in issue, this does not

mean the defense is entitled to rummage through the medical

records of every witness in a criminal prosecution to impeach the

witness’s credibility.” (Ibid.) Further, “[t]here is a duty [of the

court] to protect [a witness] from questions which go beyond the

bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or

humiliate [her].” (Alford v. United States (1931) 282 U.S. 687,

694 [75 L.Ed. 624, 629].) The trial court’s rulings on this issue

were correct.

(Opinion at 16-17.)

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The primary interest secured by the

confrontation clause is the right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315

(1974) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). However, the Confrontation

Clause does not prevent trial judges from imposing limits on cross-examination. Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Rather, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever

way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474

U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis in original)). In fact, “a trial judge retains ‘wide latitude’ to limit

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defense counsel’s questioning of a witness without violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment

rights.” Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F 2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Michigan v. Lucas, 500

U.S. 145, 149 (1991). For instance, a trial court has a duty to protect a trial witness “from

questions which go beyond the bonds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or

humiliate” the witness. Alford, 282 U.S. at 694. “‘A limitation on cross examination does not

violate the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony and prejudices the defendant,

and denies the jury sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.’” 

Murdoch v. Castro, 489 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Bridgeforth,

441 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment,

to present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). However, the constitutional right to present a defense is not

absolute. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 877 (9th Cir. 2003). "Even relevant and reliable

evidence can be excluded when the state interest is strong." Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447,

1450 (9th Cir. 1983). A state law justification for exclusion of evidence does not abridge a

criminal defendant’s right to present a defense unless it is "arbitrary or disproportionate" and

"infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,

308 (1998). A criminal defendant “does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is

incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Montana

v. Egeloff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)). See

also Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333. Finally, “[a] habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a

due process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 California Penal Code § 422 requires that a defendant’s threats cause the victim

“reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety.” Under this code section “a victim

must actually be in sustained fear, and the sustained fear must be reasonable under the

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circumstances.” In re Ricky T., 87 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 1140 (2001). As explained by the state

appellate court and conceded by petitioner, there was ample evidence introduced at petitioner’s

trial demonstrating that petitioner’s remarks caused Kristen actual fear. The only question is

whether her fear was “reasonable under the circumstances.” 

Under California law, whether the victim’s fear for his/her safety was reasonable

is determined by application of an objective test. In other words, the test is not based on the

reactions of any particular person but is based on the objective reaction of a “reasonable person.” 

(Opinion at 16.) Evidence of Kristen’s mental health history was thus irrelevant to the issue of

how a “reasonable person” would have reacted to petitioner’s threats, and was properly excluded. 

In any event, evidence was introduced at petitioner’s trial to show that Kristen’s reaction was

extreme. Specifically, petitioner’s counsel elicited testimony that petitioner had “problems” with

other waitresses at the restaurant and that petitioner and some of the other employees “would

constantly argue back and forth and yell at each other.” (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at

89.) The implication of this evidence was that these other employees did not accuse petitioner of

having committed a crime, and that Kristen was unreasonable in reacting as strongly as she did. 

The trial court reasonably imposed limits on the cross-examination of Kristen in

order to exclude irrelevant evidence about her mental health history. The trial court’s ruling was

not “arbitrary or disproportionate” and did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. For

these reasons, the decision of the California Court of Appeal that petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court’s preclusion of cross-examination

concerning Kristen’s mental health history was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

C. Admission into Evidence of Prior Bad Acts

Petitioner’s next claim is that the trial court improperly allowed the introduction

into evidence of his “prior misconduct” in order to “bolster its weak case concerning the threat

against Ms. Seishas.” (Am. Pet. at 46.) The court will evaluate these claims in turn below. 

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1. Missing Information

Petitioner claims that the trial court improperly permitted the prosecutor to

introduce evidence that he threatened Ms. Maldonado, that Kristen’s personnel file was missing

from the restaurant’s office and that his uncle may have obtained access to Maldonado’s personal

information. (Id.) 

The state court record reflects that the prosecutor asked Kristen whether, “at some

point,” she learned that her personnel file was missing. (RT at 83.) She responded, “yes.” (Id.) 

When the prosecutor asked her whether she took any actions as a result, defense counsel objected

on the grounds that there was no evidence petitioner had anything to do with the absence of the

personnel file. (Id. at 83-84.) After the trial court overruled this objection, Kristen testified that

she asked her then employer not to give out her personal information to anyone. (Id. at 84.) She

also testified that, as a result of petitioner’s threats, she eventually changed her phone number

and moved to another residence. (Id. at 85.) Subsequently, petitioner’s counsel conducted

extensive cross-examination in order to dispel any insinuation that petitioner may have stolen the

personnel file. (Id. at 85-88.) 

The state court record also reflects that after the prosecutor asked Ms. Maldonado

whether she had “anything further you would like to add,” Maldonado stated: “The reason that I

left Eppie’s is Manuel’s uncle got ahold of my personal information.” (Id. at 146.) The trial

court immediately sustained a defense objection and the subject was not pursued any further. (Id.

at 146-47.)

A writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an erroneous admission of evidence

“only where the ‘testimony is almost entirely unreliable and ... the factfinder and the adversary

system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.’"

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.

880, 899 (1983)). The introduction of evidence violates due process only if “there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Jammal, 926 F. 2d at 920. Even

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then, the challenged evidence must "be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial." Id.

(quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Under Ninth Circuit law, the admission of “other acts” evidence violates due

process only if there were no permissible inferences the factfinder could have drawn from the

evidence. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993) (the question is “whether

any inferences relevant to a fact of consequence may be drawn from each piece of the evidence,

or whether they lead only to impermissible inferences about the defendant's character”); Jammal

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[e]vidence introduced by the prosecution

will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, some not; we must rely on the jury to

sort them out in light of the court's instructions"); see also United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d

1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (evidence of prior similar crimes “will only sometimes violate the

constitutional right to a fair trial, if it is of no relevance, or if its potential for prejudice far

outweighs what little relevance it might have”). For purposes of AEDPA, petitioner must

demonstrate that the California courts’ rejection of his federal due process claim was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). 

The court concludes that petitioner’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair

as a result of the admission into evidence of the challenged testimony. First, all arguable

references to possible prior bad acts by petitioner were fleeting and unsupported by any

compelling evidence. Moreover, in the case of Ms. Maldonado’s testimony, a defense objection

was sustained and the topic was dropped. Finally, although Kristen’s testimony that she learned

that her personnel file at work was missing was admitted, petitioner’s counsel through crossexamination effectively dispelled any possible insinuation that petitioner was responsible. Thus,

the challenged testimony was not of a quality that would result in the denial of a fair trial. Under

these circumstances, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

/////

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26 Pages 47 - 53 of the amended petition were missing from the original petition filed in 2

this court on April 29, 3005. Those missing pages were later filed by petitioner on May 7, 2008.

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2. Threats Against Former Co-Worker

Petitioner also objects to the trial court’s admission of evidence that petitioner

threatened a former co-worker and roommate. (Am. Pet. at 47.) The California Court of Appeal

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fairly described the background to this claim as follows:

Defendant testified he was a “nice guy” and got along well with

coworkers. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor offered

the testimony of Philip Jones, a former coworker and short-time

roommate, who would testify that he received a written threat from

defendant (“You better pay me the $20 or you will be sorry, you

will get hurt bad.”), which, in part, led to defendant’s transfer to

another restaurant. The note was left at the restaurant and signed

by defendant. The prosecutor cited Evidence Code section 1101,

subdivision (b) (intent) and also argued that “defendant opened the

door” when he claimed he was a “nice guy.”

Defense counsel asserted that the note referenced an unpaid bill

when Philip moved out as defendant’s roommate, so it related to

defendant’s relationship with roommates not coworkers.

The trial court ruled that Philip’s testimony was admissible: “With

respect to the nice guy and Phil, I’ll allow him to come in and say

that he felt he wasn’t a nice guy because he threatened him on this

occasion. I’m not allowing another 1101(b) offer. And the

defendant can get along with him or he didn’t get along with the

defendant.” Philip, thereafter, testified in accordance with the offer

of proof.

(Opinion at 18-19.)

On appeal, petitioner argued that the introduction of Philip’s testimony violated

the California Evidence Code and the Due Process Clause. (Id. at 18.) The California Court of

Appeal rejected the Evidence Code argument on state law grounds. With regard to the federal

constitutional claim, the court ruled as follows:

Defendant’s failure, in the trial court, to object on the grounds of

due process waives any challenge on that basis to the admission of

the uncharged misconduct. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th

238, 265, fn. 4; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 892.) 

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(Id. at 20-21.) Respondent now argues that the ruling by the California Court of Appeal on the

federal constitutional claim constitutes a state procedural bar precluding this court from

addressing the merits of petitioner’s due process claim. (Answer at 11.) 

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). As a general rule, a federal habeas court “‘will not

review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a

state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.’” Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state rule for these purposes is

only “adequate” if it is “firmly established and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia,

498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[t]o

be deemed adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and consistently

applied.”) The state rule must also be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal

law.” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463

U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, the claim may be

reviewed by the federal court if the petitioner can show: (1) cause for the default and actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. 

Respondent has met his burden of adequately pleading an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

Petitioner does not deny that his trial counsel did not raise a contemporaneous objection on

federal due process grounds to the introduction of Philip’s testimony. (Traverse at 8.) Petitioner

has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific factual allegations demonstrating the

inadequacy of California's contemporaneous-objection rule as unclear, inconsistently applied or

not well-established, either as a general rule or as applied to him. Id.; Melendez v. Pliler, 288

F.3d 1120, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s claim is therefore procedurally barred. See

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Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 654 (9th Cir. 2004) (claim procedurally barred on federal habeas where petitioner

“raised only an evidentiary, not a constitutional, objection at trial”); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d

1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (claim that defendant’s due process rights were violated by the

trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “major participant” was

procedurally barred because counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the

instruction at trial). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that there was cause for his

procedural default or that a miscarriage of justice would result absent review of the claim by this

court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court is therefore precluded from considering the merits of this claim.

Even were this claim not procedurally barred, it lacks merit. The question

whether evidence of prior uncharged acts was properly admitted under California law is not

cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. The only question

posed to this court by the pending habeas petition is whether the trial court committed an error

that rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process. 

Id.; see also Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919 (“the issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings

satisfied due process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is largely beside the

point”). 

Petitioner’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair because of the admission

of evidence of his threat against Philip. The prior acts evidence against petitioner was reliable

and was admissible to impeach petitioner’s testimony that he was a “nice guy.” Although the

prior crimes evidence was perhaps arguably potentially powerful, “[the fact] that prior acts

evidence is inflammatory is not dispositive in and of itself.” LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1030. Further,

the other incident was no more inflammatory than the circumstances of the two charged crimes. 

Under these circumstances, admission of the “other crimes” evidence did not result in a due

process violation.

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In any event, the United States Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it

violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in

conformity therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other

purposes without an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such

purposes.” Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds

by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). Rather, the Supreme Court has expressly left

open this question. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 (“Because we need not reach the issue, we

express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted

the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”). Petitioner

therefore has failed to demonstrate that the California courts’ rejection of his federal due process

claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as

required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir.

2008) (claim that trial court’s use of “other crimes” evidence to show a propensity for criminal

activity violated due process properly denied under AEDPA because the Supreme Court has

“expressly left this issue an ‘open question’”); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 863-67 (9th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1834 (2007) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that

the introduction of propensity evidence violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment because “the right [petitioner] asserts has not been clearly established”); Holgerson

v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002) (habeas relief not warranted unless due process

violation was “clearly established” under federal law); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69

(9th Cir. 2001) (same).

For all of these reasons, petitioner’s is not entitled to relief on these claims.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of pretrial, trial, and

appellate counsel. Respondent argues that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner has not responded to the statute of limitations

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argument advanced by respondent. Below, the court will address whether petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims have been timely filed in this court.

1. Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal

habeas petitions. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides as follows:

(d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection. 

2. Factual Background

For purposes of statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this case

is as follows. Following his conviction petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in state court, in

which he claimed that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on count one;

(2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights by limiting his efforts to impeach and crossexamine the complaining witness; and (3) his right to due process was violated when he was

improperly impeached with a prior bad act. (Appellant’s Opening Brief, Third Appellate District

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26 See Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1978) (judicial 3

notice may be taken of court records), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Court of Appeal, lodged on August 10, 2005.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed

petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished opinion filed on April 30, 2002. (April 30, 2002, Court

of Appeal Opinion Affirming Petitioner’s Conviction, lodged on August 10, 2005.) 

On May 14, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court, in which he raised the same claims he had raised on direct appeal. (Petition for Review,

lodged on August 10, 2005.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated July 10, 2002. 

(July 10, 2002 Order Denying Review, lodged on August 10, 2005.)

On March 17, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

court setting forth the same fully exhausted claims he had raised on appeal. On August 18, 3

2003, he filed a motion to hold his petition in abeyance while he presented additional claims to

the state courts. On January 17, 2004, this court issued findings and recommendations

recommending that petitioner’s motion for abeyance be granted. Petitioner was advised that he

should file a state exhaustion petition within thirty days.

On January 20, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

Sacramento County Superior Court, in which he claimed that his pretrial, trial and appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that “new evidence” cast doubt on the credibility of 

prosecution witnesses. (January 20, 2004, Sacramento County Superior Court Petition for Writ

of habeas Corpus, lodged on August 10, 2005.)

On February 2, 2004, the district court adopted the January 17, 2004 findings and

recommendations and granted petitioner’s motion to hold his petition in abeyance so that he

could exhaust additional claims in state court.

On March 11, 2004, the Sacramento County Superior Court denied petitioner’s

habeas petition as untimely and on the merits. (March 11, 2004, Sacramento County Superior

Court Order Denying Petition, lodged on August 10, 2005.)

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 Petitioner filed his first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on March 4

17, 2003, before the expiration of the statute of limitations. However, the filing of this federal

petition did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-

82 (2001) (the statutory tolling provision contained in § 2244(d)(2) authorizes tolling while a

petitioner is pursuing state, but not federal, post-conviction remedies). Further, there is no basis

for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because petitioner was not affirmatively misled

by the court. See Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner not

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations where he filed an untimely petition after

he had previously filed a timely mixed petition but, pursuant to district court instructions that

were not affirmatively misleading, chose to dismiss the entire petition and return to state court to

exhaust additional claims); see also Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2006)

(affirming the denial of equitable tolling because neither the district court's failure to advise the

petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include unexhausted claims nor petitioner's

inability to correctly calculate the limitations period were extraordinary circumstances warranting

equitable tolling). 

24

On April 26, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, in which he claimed that his pretrial, trial and appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance. (April 26, 2004, California Supreme Court Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, lodged on August 10, 2005.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated

March 23, 2005. (March 23, 2005, Order Denying the Petition, lodged on August 10, 2005.)

On April 29, 2005, petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this court. 

3. Analysis of Statute of Limitations

The California Supreme Court denied review of petitioner’s judgment of

conviction on direct appeal on July 10, 2002. The ninety day period during which petitioner

could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired on

October 8, 2002. Therefore, petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final for purposes of §

2244(d)(1)(A) on October 8, 2002. See Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001);

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The one-year statute of limitations began to run on October 9, 2002 (see Patterson

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001)), and ran without interruption until October 8,

2003. Petitioner filed his state exhaustion petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court on 4

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January 20, 2004. Respondents argue that because this petition was filed more than a year after

the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on October 9, 2002, the amended petition filed in

this court on April 29, 2005, is barred by the statute of limitations. 

District courts may employ a “stay-and-abeyance” procedure in which the court

stays an exhausted petition in order to allow exhaustion of additional claims in state court. See

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[o]ur precedent unequivocally

authorizes district courts to stay fully exhausted federal petitions pending exhaustion of other

claims”). Once the petitioner has exhausted the unexhausted claims in state court, the court may

allow the petitioner to amend the original federal petition by adding the newly-exhausted claims,

which may under appropriate circumstances “relate back” to the original petition, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other

grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).

In Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that

claims raised in an amended habeas corpus petition filed after expiration of the limitations period

relate back to claims raised in a timely petition only if the claims “are tied to a common core of

operative facts.” Id. at 664. The fact that the claims arise from the same trial, conviction or

sentence, without more, is insufficient to support relation back of the claims. Id. New claims do

not relate back if they depend upon events separate in both “time and type” from those set forth

in the original pleading. Id. at 650. See also United States v. Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.

2005) (“[A] petitioner does not satisfy the Rule 15 “relation back” standard merely by raising

some type of ineffective assistance in the original petition, and then amending the petition to

assert another ineffective assistance claim based upon an entirely distinct type of attorney

misfeasance.”), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1217 (2006).

Here, respondent contends that the new ineffective assistance of counsel claims

raised in petitioner’s amended petition do not arise from a common core of operative facts

underlying the claims that petitioner advanced in his original petition filed with this court. 

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would have expired on October 8, 2003 and would not have been tolled by the filing of the first

federal petition. Petitioner’s first exhaustion petition containing the new ineffective assistance of

counsel claims was not filed in state court until January 20, 2004, over three months after the

AEDPA statute of limitations for the presentation of those claims in federal court had expired. 

26

Therefore, respondent argues, the new ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not “relate

back” to the timely filed original petition. If petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel set forth in the amended petition do not relate back to the original petition, they are timebarred because they were filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations period established by

the AEDPA. 

5

The habeas petition filed by petitioner in this court on March 17, 2003 contained

four claims: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on count one; (2) the trial

court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by limiting his efforts to impeach

Kristen with evidence of her mental health history; (3) the trial court violated his right to due

process and “compulsory process” by limiting his efforts to cross-examine Kristen with evidence

of her mental health history; and (4) his right to due process was violated when he was

improperly impeached with evidence of prior bad acts in the form of: (a) an alleged threat against

Ms. Maldonado; (b) the disappearance of Kristen’s personnel file; (c); information that

petitioner’s uncle obtained personal information about Ms. Maldonado, and (d) the threat against

Philip Jones, described above. As part of the last of these claims, petitioner also alleged that his

trial counsel should have requested a cautionary instruction that the jury should disregard the

testimony of Ms. Maldonado when she stated that she thought petitioner’s uncle had obtained her

personal information. (March 17, 2003 Petition, at 36.) In addition, petitioner made the

following statement in his original habeas petition:

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 Petitioner also made these latter allegations in his opening brief on appeal. (Opinion at 6

21.) The state appellate court declined to address these arguments, noting that they had not been

properly presented as a separate claim with supporting legal citations. (Id.)

27

Trial counsel in many of these instances rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to object. There were no strategic or other

good reasons for counsel to remain silent. 

(Id. at 37-38.)6

In his amended petition filed on April 29, 2005, petitioner raises the following

additional claims: his pretrial and trial counsel: (1) failed to communicate with petitioner about

conducting interviews with Kristen, Theresa Maldonado, and Philip Jones (Am. Pet. at 51); (2)

failed to interview Assistant Manager Bill Owen and Kitchen Manager Don Tipple regarding the

alleged threats (id. at 52); (3) failed to interview other witnesses suggested by petitioner who

observed the relevant events and could have corroborated his claim of innocence (id. at 52-53);

(4) failed to interview and subpoena employees of the restaurant who would have disproved the

pretrial testimony of Kristen and Maldonado to the effect that petitioner “had a history of arguing

and causing commotion among fellow servers and employees” (id. at 53); (5) failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress the threatening note he allegedly wrote to Philip Jones (id. at 54); (6)

improperly failed to introduce petitioner’s employment records into evidence, which would have

shown that petitioner was never sent home or suspended for misconduct (id. at 53, 54, 58, 68-

69); (7) failed to sufficiently communicate with petitioner, in retaliation for his complaints about

counsel (id. at 54-55); (8) failed to investigate the fraudulent allegations made by Kristin and Ms.

Maldonado that they obtained a restraining order against petitioner and that a police officer was

present at the restaurant thereafter to protect Kristen (id. at 55, 66); (9) failed to interview and

subpoena numerous witnesses for trial, including petitioner’s co-workers (id.); (10) failed to

investigate an assault against petitioner by the Sacramento Police Department during petitioner’s

arrest (id. at 56, 59); (11) “refused to communicate with Petitioner, interview his witnesses,

gather evidence, file pre-trial motions, investigate the case, suppress hearsay testimony and

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inquire into the police assault [against petitioner]” (id. at 56); (12) failed to object to

“inadmissible evidence, inflammatory testimony, orchestrated hearsay information,

uncollaborated references by Kristin Seishas, Theresa Maldonado and Philip Jones that was

solely designed to mislead the jury” (id. at 57); (13) failed to call to the stand persons who had

been designated as potential defense witnesses (id.); (14) failed to investigate corroborative

witnesses that Kristin, Ms. Maldonado and Jones made reference to in their responses to

discovery (id. at 57, 63, 65-66); failed to subject the prosecution case to “meaningful adverse

testing process” (id. at 58); (15) allowed the prosecutor to suppress evidence of Kristin’s mental

health history (id.); (16) failed to subpoena a police officer and to cross-examine another officer,

who could have rebutted the testimony of Ms. Maldonado to the effect that petitioner had

threatened to harm her children (id. at 58-60); (17) failed to respond to a prejudicial remark made

by the prosecutor during his closing argument regarding the threatening note received by Jones

(id. at 60); (18) improperly discarded investigative reports and police records related to

petitioner’s case (id. at 61); (19) failed to object to the “hearsay testimony” of Ms. Maldonado to

the effect that “her employee Ruby told her to be very careful in terminating petitioner, because

he had murdered somebody” (id. at 76); and (20) failed to investigate the circumstances

surrounding the threatening note allegedly received by Jones. (Id. at 77-78). Petitioner further

claims that his appellate counsel improperly refused to raise on appeal a proper claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at 62, 82.) Petitioner claims that the cumulative effect

of all these errors made by his various counsel resulted in prejudice. (Id. at 60, 78-82.) 

Applying the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Felix, this court concludes that

the following claims in the amended petition relate back to the March 17, 2003 petition filed in

this court and are therefore timely: (1) trial counsel “allow[ed]” the prosecutor to suppress

evidence of Kristin’s mental health history (id. at 58); and (2) trial counsel failed to investigate

the circumstances surrounding the threatening note allegedly received by Jones. (Id. at 60). In

this regard, the court notes that petitioner makes several references in his amended petition to

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testimony from Kristen to the effect that her personnel file was missing from the restaurant, and

from Ms. Maldonado to the effect that petitioner’s uncle obtained access to her personal

information in relation to these claims. (Id. at 46-47). Petitioner specifically claims that his trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with this testimony. (Id. at 47.) 

Accordingly, these claims would also appear to relate back to the original petition pursuant to the

test set forth in Felix because they appear to arise from the same “core of operative facts” as the

claims presented in the original petition.

However, none of petitioner’s other ineffective assistance of counsel claims set

out in the amended petition arise from a “core of operative facts” shared with the claims raised in

the original petition. Specifically, petitioner’s claims contained in the March 17, 2003 petition

stem from the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at trial, the trial court's ruling disallowing

testimony about Kristin’s mental health history, and the trial court’s ruling allowing the

introduction of evidence of the threatening note received by Philip Jones. By contrast, the

remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims which petitioner has presented in his amended

petition stem from other distinct aspects of his trial and pretrial proceedings and are based on

independent facts, different in both time and type. Put another way, the original petition does not

allege the essential facts which predicate the latter claims. Because these claims brought for the

first time in the amended petition involve different errors committed at different times, they do

not satisfy the requirements of the "relation back" doctrine in the habeas context as explained by

the court in Felix and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Accord Ciampi, 419 F.3d

at 24 (holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to explain

consequences of guilty plea did not relate back to claim alleging due process violation based on

trial court's failure to advise defendant of same consequences); Jones v. Woodford, No.

03cv1463 J(RBB), 2008 WL 505230 *42 (S.D. Cal. Feb 25, 2008) (new claims that involve 

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 Even assuming arguendo that these other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 7

were timely filed, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to such claims

because he has not established that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 

 Respondent requested leave to file further briefing addressing the merits of any claim of 8

ineffective assistance of counsel that this court deems timely filed. (Answer at 20.) However,

the court has determined further briefing to be unnecessary.

30

different errors and different times from those previously alleged do not relate back to the filing

of the earlier federal petition).7

4. Timely Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

As discussed above, petitioner has raised timely claims that his trial counsel: 

(1) “allow[ed]” the prosecutor to suppress evidence of Kristin’s mental health history (Am. Pet.

at 58); (2) failed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the threatening note allegedly

received by Philip Jones (id. at 60); and (3) failed to object to Kristen’s testimony that her

personnel file was missing from the restaurant and to testimony from Ms. Maldonado that

petitioner’s uncle obtained access to her personal information. The court will analyze these

claims in turn below. 

8

a. Legal Standards

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. To support

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the

circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged

not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine

whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

(2003). In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption

that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in

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addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

b. Kristin’s Mental Health History 

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was provided ineffective assistance in

failing to persuade the trial court to allow the admission of testimony regarding Kristin’s mental

health history. Specifically, he alleges:

Petitioner was prejudiced by attorney Dennis Owens Higgins for

allowing the prosecutor and court to suppress Kristin Seishas

background of suffering from mental health problems, and two

suicide attempts relating to paranoia and hallucinations. . . . The

said attorney refused to provide case law, status [sic] and leading

authorities to counter the Court’s crucial decision in disallowing

any mention of Kristin Seishas mental status, which was relevant

to the outcome of the trial.

(Am. Pet. at 58.)

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance in this

regard was outside the “wide range of professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The

record reflects that counsel argued extensively that testimony and other evidence regarding

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Kristen’s mental health history was relevant to the issues at petitioner’s trial and should have

been admitted. (RT at 34-48.) The fact that the trial court ruled to the contrary does not

demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate prejudice

because he has made no showing that the result of the proceedings would have been different

absent counsel’s alleged errors. As explained above, evidence that Kristen had suffered from

mental health problems in the past was irrelevant to the issues before the jury at petitioner’s trial

and was properly excluded. 

For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

c. Threat to Philip Jones

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

investigate the circumstances surrounding the threatening note allegedly received by Philip

Jones. (Am. Pet. at 77-78). 

The state court record reflects that Jones testified he was given a threatening note

at his place of employment by someone who told him the note was from petitioner. (RT at 303-

06.) Jones also testified that he had explained all of the facts surrounding this incident to a

prosecution investigator. (Id. at 304.) On cross-examination, Jones conceded that the

investigator’s written report did not include a statement that Jones had said the note was passed

on to him by someone else or that it was signed by petitioner. (Id. at 306.) Petitioner makes the

following claim based upon these facts:

Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the

inadmissible evidence of an alleged threatening note directed to

Mr. Jones, who supposedly received it from “somebody” at his

place of employment, which he claimed was authored by

Petitioner. During Cross-examination trial attorney failed to

ascertain the name of the person who Mr. Jones claimed gave him

the threatening note. In addition trial counsel refused to interview

and subpoena the testimony of Investigator Juarez from the District

Attorney’s Office as a rebuttal witness who would have

contradicted Mr. Jones testimony of him telling the said

investigator that Petitioner’s signature was at the bottom of the 

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have testified, or to demonstrate that they would have agreed to testify at all at his trial, precludes

a finding of ineffective assistance with regard to his claim that his attorneys failed to interview

and/or call witnesses at trial.

33

note, which was never conveyed during the interview a couple days

prior to his trial testimony. (citation to the record omitted.)

(Am. Pet. at 77.)

Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel failed to fully investigate the facts

surrounding Jones’ testimony and to present the witness suggested by petitioner and that such

failures constituted deficient performance, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

Petitioner has not made a showing that Jones’ testimony regarding his receipt of the note was

false in any way. Further, petitioner’s speculation regarding what Investigator Juarez would have

testified to is clearly insufficient to establish prejudice. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486

(9th Cir. 2000) (ineffective assistance claim based on failure to investigate witness rejected

where petitioner did not present an affidavit from witness demonstrating that he would have

provided helpful testimony for the defense); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir.

1997) (relief denied on petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim where he presented no evidence

concerning what counsel would have found had he investigated further, or what lengthier

preparation would have accomplished); United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th

Cir. 1988) (no ineffective assistance because of counsel’s failure to call a witness where, among

other things, there was no evidence in the record that the witness would testify). Accordingly, 9

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

d. Failure to Object

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to object to or otherwise prevent testimony that Kristan’s personnel file was missing from

the restaurant and that Ms. Maldonado thought petitioner’s uncle had obtained access to her

personal information. (Am. Pet. at 48.) The record in fact reflects that trial counsel did object to

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both of these lines of questioning. (RT at 83, 146.) With respect to Kristen’s testimony,

petitioner’s counsel thereafter conducted extensive cross-examination in order to dispel any

insinuation that petitioner may have stolen the personnel file. (Id. at 85-88.) With respect to Ms.

Maldonado’s testimony, trial counsel’s objection was sustained. (Id. at 146-47.) Accordingly,

petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient in responding to the testimony of

Kristen and Ms. Maldonado. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 6, 2008.

DAD:8

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