Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01380/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01380-68/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Introduction

Plaintiff George H. Robinson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s 

complaint against Defendants David, Miranda, Melo, Garcia, Mendoza and Masiel for use of 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment; against Defendants Adams and Ruiz for failure 

to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and against Defendants Martinez, David, Miranda 

and Garcia for assault and battery in violation of state law. This action is currently set for jury trial on 

March 10, 2015. 

On August 8, 2014, the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for appointment of 

an expert witness regarding the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s use of force 

procedures. (ECF No. 210.) On August 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration 

of the Magistrate Judge’s order. (ECF No. 217.) Defendants did not file a response and the motion is 

deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 

II. Reconsideration

A. Standard

Rule 60(b)(6) allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for any reason that justifies 

relief. Rule 60(b)(6) “is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and 

GEORGE H. ROBINSON,

 Plaintiff,

v.

D. G. ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS

(ECF No. 217)

Case 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM Document 225 Filed 11/17/14 Page 1 of 3
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is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances ...” exist. Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 

749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The moving party “must 

demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). In seeking reconsideration of an order, Local Rule 230(j) requires Plaintiff to show 

“what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not 

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

“A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 

unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there 

is an intervening change in the controlling law,” and it “may not be used to raise arguments or present 

evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” 

Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir.2009) 

(internal quotations marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

B. Discussion

On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the appointment of an expert witness 

regarding CDCR’s use of force policies. Plaintiff believed that an expert was necessary to “refute the 

Defendants[’] testimony” and “add credibility to plaintiff’s claims that the force was unreasonable and 

excessive.” (ECF No. 195, p. 2.)

On August 8, 2014, the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of an 

expert pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a). The Magistrate Judge determined that Rule 

706(a) did not contemplate court appointment of an expert witness to advocate for Plaintiff at trial. 

(ECF No. 210, p. 2.) The Magistrate Judge also determined that Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive 

force were not so complicated as to require the appointment of a neutral expert witness to assist the 

court and/or a jury. (ECF No. 210, p. 3.) 

Plaintiff now contends that the Magistrate Judge’s ruling was contrary to law and an abuse of 

discretion. In particular, Plaintiff disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the “trier of 

fact does not require scientific, technical or specialized knowledge regarding CDCR’s use of force 

policies and procedures” to determine whether Defendants subjected Plaintiff to excessive force in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 217, p. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge 

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erred in finding that the use of force policies are not relevant to claims of excessive force. (ECF No. 

217, p. 2.) Plaintiff asserts that an expert witness is the “only way I can show that at the time 

Defendant Martinez pepper sprayed me while I was on the cell floor, that he did so in violation of 

CDCR’s regulations in effect at the time of the incident.” (ECF No. 217, pp. 2-3.) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s apparent assertion, the Magistrate Judge did not deny appointment of a 

neutral expert witness based on the relevance of any CDCR use of force policy. Rather, the 

Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Rule 706 could not be used to appoint an expert to serve as 

an advocate for Plaintiff. See, e.g., Manriquez v. Huchins, 2012 WL 5880431, *14 (E.D. Cal. 2012); 

Brooks v. Tate, 2013 WL 4049043, *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013) (avoiding bias or otherwise assisting 

one party is not the purpose of Rule 706); Gorrell v. Sneath, 2013 WL 3357646, * 1 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 

2013) (purpose of court-appointed expert is to assist the trier of fact, not to serve as an advocate for a 

particular party). The Magistrate Judge also correctly determined that Plaintiff’s allegations of 

excessive force are not so complicated as to require an expert witness and that the trier of fact does not 

require scientific, technical or specialized knowledge regarding CDCR’s use of force policies and 

procedures to determine whether Defendants applied force in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, filed on August 20, 2014, is 

HEREBY DENIED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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