Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00397/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00397-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIAN DE MEDEIROS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-00397-AWI-YNP PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Doc. 38, 39)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Julian De Medeiros (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court are two motions

from Plaintiff. On June 23, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc.

#38.) On June 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc.

#39.) Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order from the Court that prohibits Defendants from

removing or destroying Plaintiff’s legal property that is currently being stored at Pleasant Valley

State Prison (“PVSP”).

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a temporary restraining order because officials at PVSP

have possession of all his legal property related to pending litigation and the destruction of his legal

property will cause irreparable harm. Plaintiff was apparently paroled from Pleasant Valley State

Prison and is currently detained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement unit (“ICE”). Plaintiff was told by PVSP officials that they will not continue

to store Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff was also told that PVSP would forward his property to an 

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address of his choice if Plaintiff provides adequate funds. PVSP officials indicated that the cost to

move Plaintiff’s 86 boxes of property was estimated to be $2,783.75.

The purpose of a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is to preserve the status

quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to

intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University

of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In order to obtain a temporary restraining order,

Plaintiff must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct.

365, 374 (2008).

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be

granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A

party seeking a preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion is unsupported by

evidence. With respect to motions for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order,

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that:

[i]n any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the extent

otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary

restraining order or an order for preliminary injunctive relief.

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no

further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires

preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct that harm.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

Plaintiff contends that he will suffer irreparable harm if PVSP officials are allowed to destroy

his legal property because he will suffer prejudice in his pending litigation. Even assuming that

Plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm, none of the

other factors weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he is likely to

succeed on the merits of his claim. The balance of equities are not in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff has

not cited any authority that suggests that PVSP officials have any legal obligation to continue to store

Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff’s property was held by PVSP officials for three years. Plaintiff was

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given notice of its pending disposal and was given the opportunity to arrange for his property to be

sent to another address. Plaintiff was unable to arrange for his property to be sent elsewhere. 

However, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s inability to take custody of his own property was in

any way caused by PVSP officials. Finally, Plaintiff has not presented any argument that a

temporary restraining order would be in the public’s interest.

The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a temporary restraining order. Accordingly,

it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, filed on June 23, 2009, be

DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, filed on June 29, 2009, be

DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty days

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 29, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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