Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02164/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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1

Defendant’s motion does not conform with the font and type-size limitations set forth

in the Court’s local rules. See LRCiv 7.1(b). Defendant should comply with these rules in

the future. 

2

“Tr.” refers to the Administrative Transcript.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martha L. Woody, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CV-07-2164-PHX-DGC

v ) 

)

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of ) ORDER

Social Security Administration, )

)

Defendant. )

)

The parties to this action agree that an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision

to deny benefits under the Social Security Act was based on legal error. They have asked the

Court to resolve their disagreement as to whether the case should be remanded for an award

of benefits or for further proceedings. The Court will remand with instructions.1

I. Background.

On February 21, 2007, an ALJ denied Plaintiff Martha L. Woody’s applications for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Tr. 20-30.2

 The Appeals

Council denied review (Tr. 9-12), thereby rendering the ALJ’s ruling the final decision of

Defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

Case 2:07-cv-02164-DGC Document 20 Filed 06/23/08 Page 1 of 7
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Plaintiff challenges the Commissioner’s decision to deny her benefits. Dkt. #13. This

Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits unless “it is not supported

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750

(9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the ALJ committed two legal errors. First, he

improperly discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. See Dkt. #15 at 9 (“The ALJ erred

by discounting Woody’s symptom testimony in the absence of clear and convincing reasons

for doing so.”); Dkt. #16 at 4 (the ALJ’s “credibility finding [as to Plaintiff’s symptoms and

limitations] is problematic because it is conclusory and not well supported.”). Second, the

ALJ improperly assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See Dkt. #15 at

9 (“The ALJ erred by determining [Plaintiff’s RFC] without any basis in the record.”); Dkt.

#16 at 3 (“the ALJ did not fully consider the evidence of record and explain the rationale for

his decision” regarding Plaintiff’s RFC).

The parties disagree, however, as to the legal consequence of the errors. Unable to

reach a voluntary stipulation as to what should happen next, the parties have asked the Court

to intervene. Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment, urging the Court to enter

an order remanding the case for an award of benefits. Dkt. #15 at 11. Defendant seeks a

Court order remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. Dkt. #16 at 6. The

only issue to be decided is the remedy.

II. Discussion.

Evidence should be credited as true and an action remanded for an award of benefits

when the following three factors are satisfied: (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be

resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record

that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence

credited as true. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). These conditions

have not been met with respect to the evidence at issue.

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A. Plaintiff’s Testimony.

“Pain of sufficient severity caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a

claimant is disabled.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)). “If the ALJ finds that the claimant’s testimony as to the severity

of her pain and impairments is unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination

with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not

arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir.

2002). There is no dispute that the ALJ did not provide specific and cogent reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. See Dkt. #15 at 9; Dkt. #16 at 4. 

Plaintiff asserts that the Court should credit her testimony as true insofar as it

describes the severity of her symptoms. Dkt. #15 at 7; see Varney v. Sec'y of Health and

Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting the 11th Circuit’s “credit as

true” practice as described in Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir.1987)). Plaintiff

testified that, among other things, she had a work-related shoulder injury in 2003 (Tr. 443),

has bulging disks in her lower back and upper back which lead to sharp pain in her back,

shoulders, and neck (Tr. 445-46), has about four “bad” days per week during which she is

unable to “stand or lay down or get comfortable in any position” because of pain (Tr. 446),

experiences pain in her right knee (Tr. 446-47), has been diagnosed as diabetic and has been

taking insulin for over ten years (Tr. 447), has migraines from ten to twelve days per month

that may be incapacitating for one to four hours (Tr. 447-48), has been diagnosed with

fibromyalgia (Tr. 448), can stand from fifteen to twenty minutes and sit no more than thirtyfive minutes at a time (Tr. 449), and has been using a cane for over a year because she fell

three or four times (Tr. 453).

Even if Plaintiff’s testimony is credited as true, outstanding factual issues remain and

it is not clear that Plaintiff would be found to be disabled. The transcript of the

administrative hearing indicates that the vocational expert (“VE”) was not asked a proper

hypothetical question regarding an individual’s ability to work based on the aforementioned

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difficulties. The ALJ presented a single hypothetical situation to the VE that did not

encapsulate these issues and that seemingly was based on a discredited version of Plaintiff’s

testimony. See Tr. 456. As noted above, the ALJ’s impermissibly rejected Plaintiff’s

testimony and therefore a hypothetical premised on the discredited testimony was improper.

See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006) (a hypothetical posed to

a VE based on flawed findings is “legally inadequate”) (citation omitted). When given his

turn, Plaintiff’s counsel also asked a single hypothetical: whether “a person who ten to

twelve times a month is essentially incapacitated for one or two hours on a [sic]

unpredictable basis” could “work on a regular and continuing basis[.]” Tr. 462. The VE

replied that “[t]here would be no work” for such an individual. Id. But there is no

accompanying testimony that Plaintiff had migraines, which brought about the

incapacitation, for twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A) (a “disability” must “be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months.”). Plaintiff has not pointed the Court to any evidence

suggesting otherwise. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), (c) (the claimant bears the burden of

proving the existence and severity of alleged impairments during the time of the alleged

disability).

Plaintiff does note in her testimony that she had a shoulder injury in 2003, has been

diagnosed as diabetic for over ten years, and has used a cane for more than a year. While

these conditions may have been experienced on a sustained basis, the testimony does not

show that they are disabling within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff does

not direct the Court to any evidence to the contrary. See id. And, even if the testimony

clearly stated that these particular health issues were disabling, the VE was not asked about

their effect on an individual’s ability to work. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163

(9th Cir. 2001) (a hypothetical posed to a VE must “reflect[] each of the claimant’s

limitations”); DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the

failure to do so “would of itself require remand for reconsideration after the record is

developed.”).

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3

While lacking the force of law, Social Security Rulings are binding on ALJ’s. See

Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 & n. 6 (9th Cir.1989).

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Plaintiff’s testimony, even if credited as true, does not establish that she had a

disabling condition for the requisite statutory period. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292; see also

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will not remand for

further proceedings where, taking the claimant’s testimony as true, the ALJ would clearly

be required to award benefits[.]”) (emphasis added; citation omitted). There are outstanding

issues requiring adjudication at the administrative level, including whether Plaintiff had

disabling conditions for at least twelve months, see Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 644

(9th Cir.1982) (weighing the “validity of medical opinion offered” is a “function . . . uniquely

within the ambit of the ALJ[.]”), and whether there are any available jobs in the national

workforce available to her based on those disabling conditions, see id. at 643 (it is the role

of the vocational expert to “translate factual scenarios into realistic job market

probabilities.”).

The Court will exercise its discretion and remand this case for further proceedings.

See Dkt. #16 at 2 (it is within the court’s discretion to remand for an award of benefits or for

further agency proceedings); Dkt. #19 at 4 (same). 

B. Plaintiff’s Residual Function Capacity.

A claimant’s RFC is defined as the most he or she can do despite the limitations

caused by physical and/or mental impairments. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762

(9th Cir. 1989). A claimant’s RFC is to be determined by the ALJ and based on substantial

evidence in the record. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035. “The RFC assessment must

include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing

specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily

activities, observations).” Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996).3

The ALJ found, after discrediting Plaintiff’s pain testimony, that Plaintiff had the RFC

to do “light, unskilled work” with certain restrictions. Tr. 26. It is uncontested that this

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determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to explain how

he reached this RFC determination. See Dkt. #15 at 9-10; Dkt. #16 at 3. The ALJ’s flawed

RFC determination is an independent reason to remand this case for further proceedings.

See, e.g., Robbins, 466 F.3d at 880 (remanding for additional administrative proceedings

where the ALJ did not properly explain why he set aside testimony). 

C. Other Considerations.

Plaintiff raises several prudential arguments. First, Plaintiff contends that the case

should not be remanded to the ALJ who heard her case, Judge Ronald C. Dickinson, because

he “ask[s] virtually identical hypothetical questions in the original hearing and the hearing

upon remand” and as such “a remand to this ALJ would be an exercise in futility.” Dkt. #19

at 2,4. The Court disagrees. This order explains where the ALJ’s opinion deviated from

applicable legal principles and thus provides some measure of guidance. Plaintiff cites no

legal authority for her argument that the case should not be remanded to Judge Dickinson.

More generally, Plaintiff has not given the Court sufficient reason to doubt that this particular

judicial officer will not take seriously his duties to impartially and fairly weigh the merits of

the case in accordance with the law. 

Plaintiff also argues that judicial economy counsels in favor of remanding for an

award of benefits rather than prolonging the resolution of this case. Dkt. #19 at 7. While

judicial efficiency and convenience to Plaintiff would be served by remanding this case as

Plaintiff suggests, these considerations must give way to a proper adjudication of Plaintiff’s

applications for benefits as defined by governing Ninth Circuit law.

Plaintiff complains that Defendant could have sought earlier to remand the case for

an additional administrative hearing. Dkt. #19 at 9. For support, Plaintiff cites to Ramirez

v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), a case in which the Ninth Circuit remanded

an ALJ's decision for an award of benefits where the Appeals Council “treated the record as

complete” and therefore did not remand for a further administrative hearing. Id. at 1455.

The Ninth Circuit independently assessed the record and agreed that the record was

complete. Id. In this case, the Court has concluded that the record requires further factual

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development. Ramirez therefore is inapposite. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #13) is denied.

2. Defendant’s motion for remand (Doc. #16) is granted.

3. Defendant’s administrative decision is vacated and remanded. 

DATED this 23rd day of June, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-02164-DGC Document 20 Filed 06/23/08 Page 7 of 7