Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00064/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00064-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PRIEST,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0064 LKK KJM P

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden, et al., 

Respondents FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the exact nature of his challenge is at issue in the pending

motion to dismiss.

A. Background

On July 9, 1987, petitioner was sentenced to a term of seventeen-years-to-life

following a conviction of second degree murder and the use of a gun. Petition (Pet.), Ex. A at

14. At the sentencing, the judge informed petitioner that upon his release from prison, he would

be “placed on parole for a period not to exceed seven years.” Id.

Petitioner alleges that as part of his plea agreement, he was promised by trial

counsel and the prosecutor that he would serve no more than twelve to fourteen years of the

sentence. In support of this claim, he proffers two declarations. In his own, he claims he was

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 Respondent has not included the attachments to the state habeas petition even though

the nature of petitioner’s claims were not listed on the Judicial Council form, which referred the

reader to the attached pages.

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promised by trial counsel that his term would “be fixed at the 12-14 years range by the Board of

Prison Terms” and that he would not have pled guilty had he known this would not occur, his

parole period would be fixed at life rather than seven years, and the parole board would become

politicized and would operate under a “no parole” policy for murderers. Pet., Ex. C. Trial

counsel avers that he discussed the matrix of base terms for murder with petitioner before

petitioner entered his plea and predicted that the parole board would apply the 12-14-16 year

triad to the calculation of petitioner’s base term; he also contends he would not have allowed

petitioner to plead guilty to second degree murder had he been able to predict the politicization

of the parole system. Opposition (Opp’n), Ex. B. 

Petitioner first appeared before the parole board on August 14, 1997; parole was

denied for three years. On July 17, 2001, petitioner stipulated he was unsuitable for parole. At a

hearing held on July 17, 2002, the Board found him unsuitable and denied parole for three years.

The subsequent hearing was delayed, however, and not held until January 4, 2006, resulting in a

one-year denial. The last hearing, on January 4, 2007, also resulted in a one year denial. Motion

To Dismiss (MTD), Ex. 1. 

On November 8, 2005, petitioner filed a habeas petition in San Joaquin County

Superior Court. MTD, Ex. 2.1

 The superior court directed an informal response on the question

whether petitioner had received his subsequent hearing, originally scheduled for July 17, 2005,

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 Page citations are to those assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

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but denied the remainder of the writ, reasoning in part:

Petitioner also contends that he was wrongly denied a parole date

at his last suitability hearing. The decision at issue was rendered

by the Board following a hearing on July 17, 2002. Petitioner has

failed to provide any explanation for the delay in filing this

petition . . . Further, petitioner has failed to provide the court with

either a transcript of the hearing or the board’s reasons for its

decision. Absent such evidence, the court cannot review the merits

of the decision.

MTD, Ex. 2 (San Joaquin Superior Court Order filed Nov. 22, 2005). The California Supreme

Court denied a subsequent habeas petition on November 29, 2006. Pet., Ex. F. 

The instant petition raises three grounds in somewhat abbreviated fashion:

(1) petitioner has a constitutional right to have the state comply with its part of the plea

agreement; (2) petitioner must be permitted to withdraw his plea, and (3) plea agreements are

contracts requiring the state to live up to its part of the contract. Pet. at 5A. In his statement of

facts, petitioner asserts he was assured he would serve no more than twelve to fourteen years and

a parole term of seven years in exchange for his guilty plea to second degree murder. He also

says, at the time of his plea, California Penal Code § 5075 provided that the members of the

parole board, known as the Board of Prison Terms, should reflect a cross-section of the

community, a provision which is now ignored and that he was not provided with a timely

suitability hearing. Pet. at 5B. 

Respondent argues that petitioner’s challenges to the purported plea bargain and

to the 2002 parole suitability hearing are barred by the statute of limitations and that the

challenge to the length of parole is not ripe. Petitioner counters that his challenge to his plea

bargain is not time-barred because the promise was not stated on the record and he had “to

obtain evidence before he was able to raise this claim.” Opp’n at 2-3.2 He also argues he is not

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challenging the 2002 denial but rather “a recent policy change by the governor’s office. . . .” 

Id. at 3. Finally, he argues that the challenge to his parole period should be addressed.

II. The Statute Of Limitations And The Plea Bargain

Petitioner alleges he pled guilty to second degree murder in 1987 on the assurance

that he would serve a term of twelve to fourteen years. Pet. at 5B & Ex. C. As noted,

respondents argue this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) contains a statute of

limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244. Respondent argues that because petitioner was sentenced on July 9, 1987, a

fourteen year term would have expired no later than July 9, 2001, which arguably would have

been the “date upon which the factual predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered. . ..” 

MTD at 3. With July 9, 2001 as a starting date, the statute of limitations expired on July 10,

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2002, and would not have been revived by petitioner’s 2005 habeas petition filed in the Superior

Court. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2003) (state petition filed outside the

statute of limitations does not revive it). MTD, Exs. 1 & 2. Plaintiff counters that the year did

not begin to run until he “had discovered the new evidence to support his claim” because the

promise of twelve to fourteen years was not made in open court. Opp’n at 3. 

The discovery of “the factual predicate” of a claim may give rise to a new

limitations period. Hasan v Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). However, it is not

necessary for a petitioner to understand the legal significance of the facts; rather, the clock starts

when a petitioner understands the facts themselves. Id. at 1154 n.3.

Petitioner does not say he was unaware of the factual basis of his claim in 2001,

only that he had to obtain evidence before raising the claim. Moreover, he does not explain why

it took him until 2005 to secure trial counsel’s declaration concerning the guilty plea and the

discussion of petitioner’s sentence. Opp’n, Ex. B. He has not borne his burden of demonstrating

the petition is timely as to this claim.

II. The Statute Of Limitations And Parole

Respondent alleges that petitioner’s second challenge must focus on the July 17,

2002 denial of parole and that it, too, is barred by the statute of limitations. MTD at 4 & Ex. 1. 

Petitioner counters that he is not challenging a particular hearing, but rather the change in the

composition of the parole board and adoption of a no-parole policy. Opp’n at 3. Petitioner has

cited nothing, nor has the court been able to find case law, suggesting that a habeas challenge to

a changed policy is exempt from the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. As with other claims

outside the usual challenge-to-a-conviction context, the AEDPA limitations period began to run

when the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003) (limitations period for

challenge to denial of parole begins to run when inmate received denial of administrative

appeal).

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Even if petitioner was unaware of the alleged change in the composition of the

board and of the no-parole policy earlier, it is logical to assume he became aware of the impact

of these policies at his hearing on July 17, 2002. Under this scenario, the statute of limitations

began to run on July 18, 2002 and expired on July 18, 2003, long before petitioner filed his

initial state habeas petition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding the day from which the period begins

to run from the calculation of the time). Petitioner has not suggested an alternative date on

which he became aware of the changed policies and thus has not borne his burden of showing the

petition is timely. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that

once a petitioner is given adequate notice and opportunity to respond to allegations that his

petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations, petitioner has the

burden of providing an adequate response).

III. Ripeness And The Parole Term

Respondent argues that petitioner’s challenge to the term of his parole is not ripe

because it is possible petitioner will never be found suitable for parole. MTD at 5. Petitioner

relies on state cases, which, he claims, recognize the validity of such a challenge. He also argues

he is entitled to have the promise enforced because it was made as part of his plea bargain. 

Giving the petition the liberal reading to which it is entitled, the court finds

petitioner is claiming that the life parole term constitutes a breach of his plea bargain, which is

cognizable as an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea rather than on the

potential execution of the sentence. As such, it is cognizable. Compare Carter v. McCarthy, 806

F.2d 1373, 1375-77 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to inform petitioner of mandatory parole term

undercut voluntariness of the plea and violated plea bargain cognizable) with United States v.

Veal, 322 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (challenge to term of supervised release which

required compliance with state sex offender laws not ripe because unclear whether law “would

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 The court expresses no opinion on the question whether this challenge is timely;

respondent did not raise the issue and so petitioner has not been put on notice of his obligation to

respond to such a claim. Herbst, 260 F.3d at 1042-43. 

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remain in effect and unamended” until defendant’s release). Because this claim is, in essence, a

challenge to petitioner’s plea, the court finds it is ripe.3

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to

dismiss be granted as to petitioner’s claims that his sentence exceeds his bargained-for term of

twelve-to-fourteen years and that changes in the composition of the parole board and parole

policy violate his rights, but denied as to the claim that his plea bargain has been violated by his

eligibility for parole supervision for life. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 8, 2008. 

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prie0064.157

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