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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 2004 Decided May 14, 2004

No. 03-5256

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL–CIO,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES M. LOY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

UNDER SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(03cv00043)

Gony Frieder argued the cause for appellant. On the

briefs were Mark Roth and Anne M. Wagner.

William G. Kanter, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C. How-

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-5256 Document #822341 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 1 of 7
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ard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Douglas N. Letter and Howard S.

Scher, Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge; RANDOLPH and ROBERTS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: A union wishing to become the

bargaining representative of newly-federalized airport screeners initiated two proceedings, one administrative, the other

judicial. The administrative action sought to have the Federal Labor Relations Authority order representation elections.

The other action sought a judgment from the district court

that the screeners had the right to engage in collective

bargaining. The FLRA rejected the union’s petition. The

district court dismissed the complaint. The question in this

appeal is whether the district court had jurisdiction.

In response to the events of September 11, 2001, Congress

enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub.

L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001), creating a federal workforce to screen passengers and cargo at commercial airports.

Section 111(d) of the Security Act, 115 Stat. 620, codified at

49 U.S.C. § 44935 note, provides that ‘‘[n]otwithstanding any

other provision of law, the Under Secretary of Transportation

for Security may employ, appoint, discipline, terminate, and

fix the compensation, terms, and conditions of employment of

Federal service for [federally employed security screeners].’’

Thereafter, the American Federation of Government Employees filed several petitions with the Federal Labor Relations Authority, seeking elections among security screeners at

a number of airports and certification as the screeners’

exclusive representative for collective bargaining. On January 8, 2003, Under Secretary James M. Loy issued a directive

stating that, ‘‘[b]y virtue of the authority vested in the Under

Secretary of Transportation for Security in Section 111(d),’’

federally employed security screeners ‘‘shall not, as a term or

condition of their employment, be entitled to engage in collective bargaining or be represented for the purpose of engaging

in such bargaining by any representative or organization.’’

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The next day, the Transportation Security Administration

filed its response to the union’s petitions. The Administration’s main contention was that the FLRA could not order

representation elections in view of § 111(d) and Loy’s directive.

One day later the union filed a complaint in the district

court seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment on

the ground that Loy ‘‘did not have the statutory authority to

issue the directive’’ and that the directive was ‘‘arbitrary and

capricious agency action in violation of the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.’’ The union also challenged

the directive on constitutional grounds, asserting that it ‘‘deprives affected federal employees of their right to free speech

and association under the First Amendment and to equal

protection under the Fifth Amendment’’ to the Constitution.

While the case was pending before the district court, the

FLRA’s Regional Director ruled that § 111(d) of the Security

Act and the Loy directive relieved the Transportation Security Administration of any ‘‘duty to bargain over conditions of

employment of security screeners.’’

The district court later dismissed the union’s statutory

claims, holding that the ‘‘FLRA has exclusive authority over

conducting elections to determine whether a labor union has

the support of a majority of employees in an appropriate

unit’’ and that the ‘‘petitions for elections and the TSA

objection that the Loy Determination deprives FLRA of

jurisdiction to conduct any election are TTT properly before

that agency,’’ not the court. 281 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C.

2003). As to the constitutional claims, the court took note of

the union’s failure to raise these before the FLRA. Id. at 64.

Finding the claims insubstantial, the court dismissed this

portion of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Id. at 66.

In the meantime the FLRA affirmed the Regional Director’s decision dismissing the union’s petitions. United

States Dep’t of Homeland Security, et al. and AFGE, AFL–

CIO, 59 F.L.R.A. No. 63, 2003 WL 22669101 (Nov. 4, 2003).

The FLRA agreed that § 111(d) granted ‘‘unfettered discreUSCA Case #03-5256 Document #822341 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 3 of 7
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tion to the [Under Secretary] to determine the terms and

conditions of employment for [federal] screener personnel,’’

and that the Loy directive validly barred the screeners from

engaging in collective bargaining. Id. at *13. Therefore, the

union’s ‘‘petitions could not be processed’’ because the FLRA

had no authority to conduct elections. Id. at *7. The FLRA

refused to consider the union’s constitutional arguments because these were not properly raised before the Regional

Director. Id. at *13. The union did not seek judicial review

of the FLRA’s decision.

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C.

§§ 7101–7134, governs labor relations between federal agencies and their employees. One of the FLRA’s exclusive functions is to conduct ‘‘elections to determine whether a labor

organization has been selected as an exclusive representative

by a majority of the [federal] employees in an appropriate

unit,’’ 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(B). A union may file a petition

with the FLRA alleging that 30 percent or more of the

employees in an appropriate unit want the union to represent

them in collective bargaining. 5 U.S.C. § 7111(b)(1)(A). The

FLRA ‘‘shall investigate’’ such a petition and, if it finds that

‘‘a question of representation exists,’’ it shall conduct or

supervise an election after determining who is eligible to vote.

5 U.S.C. § 7111(b)(1)(A) & (d). Any person aggrieved by a

‘‘final order’’ of the FLRA, other than an order under § 7112

(unit determination) or § 7122 (arbitration award), may seek

review in the court of appeals. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a).

If an FLRA order falls within one of § 7123(a)’s two

exceptions to review in the court of appeals, this does not

mean the district courts are open. It means that review is

precluded in any court. Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v.

FLRA, 283 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002). On the other hand, if

an FLRA order is not within either exception and is ‘‘final,’’ it

may be reviewed only by a court of appeals. The district

courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction over matters within

the exclusive purview of the FLRA. Karahlios v. Nat’l Fed’n

of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989); see United

States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 437, 445 (1988).

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The union thinks it was entitled to sue in district court

because this court could not review the FLRA’s refusal to

order representational elections. The FLRA rendered its

decision under § 7111. Citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. FLRA,

727 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1984), the union states that FLRA

rulings under § 7111 are unreviewable. That reads too much

into the opinion. The question before the Fifth Circuit was

whether an FLRA order requiring a rerun election pursuant

to § 7111 was a ‘‘final order’’ under § 7123(a). The court

held no because the FLRA had not finally determined if a

particular union would represent the employees. 727 F.2d at

493.

The order here is of a different sort. The FLRA’s decision

that the screeners could not engage in collective bargaining,

and thus were not entitled to union representation, was final

in every sense of the word, as counsel for the union admitted

at oral argument. We will have a few more words to say on

this subject when we discuss the union’s constitutional claims.

As to the union’s statutory claims, it is enough to point out

that the district court’s jurisdiction did not turn on the

presence or absence of our jurisdiction. We cannot review an

FLRA unit determination, see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(2), but that

does not mean a district court may. Ass’n of Civilian

Technicians, 283 F.3d at 340. What matters is whether the

union’s claim – that the screeners had the right to engage in

collective bargaining – was ‘‘arguably’’ within the FLRA’s

authority to decide. See American Foreign Serv. Ass’n v.

Baker, 895 F.2d 1460, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1990). On that score

there is no doubt. The union must have thought as much

when it filed its election petitions. Title VII gives the FLRA,

and the FLRA alone, the authority to order elections so that

federal employees may decide who, if anyone, will become

their exclusive bargaining representative. In investigating a

§ 7111 petition the FLRA necessarily must determine that

the employees are entitled to engage in collective bargaining.

Sometimes the determination will be made in the context of a

unit determination. Employees engaged in ‘‘security work

which directly affects national security,’’ for instance, cannot

be part of a bargaining unit. 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(6). Here

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the FLRA, acting under § 7111, never reached the unit

question. It ruled instead that the Security Act plus the Loy

directive foreclosed collective bargaining for all federallyemployed airport screeners and thus precluded representation elections. We do not say the FLRA was correct. That

issue is not properly before us. We do say the FLRA had

the exclusive authority to render judgment on the question,

subject to review only in a court of appeals pursuant to

§ 7123.

Citing Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Service, 321

F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the union argues that even if a

statute precluded judicial review of the legality of the Loy

directive, this would not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to decide whether Loy acted ultra vires. The short

answer is that no statute precludes judicial review of the

union’s claims in this regard. Review may be had, but it

must be in the court of appeals and it may occur only after

the claim has been presented to and finally decided by the

FLRA.

We therefore agree with the district court that it did not

have jurisdiction over the union’s complaint. The district

court nevertheless went ahead and rejected the union’s constitutional claims that the employees had a First Amendment

right to engage in collective bargaining and that the Loy

directive violated the equal protection component of the Fifth

Amendment’s due process clause. We think the court should

also have dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction. See

Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Chao, 300 F.3d 867, 877 (D.C. Cir.

2002). Parties may not bifurcate their case, pursuing only

statutory claims before the FLRA while litigating closely

related constitutional claims in the district court. NTEU v.

FLRA, 986 F.2d 537, 539–40 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Steadman v.

Governor, U.S. Soldiers’ & Airmen’s Home, 918 F.2d 963, 967

(D.C. Cir. 1990). That the union did not present its constitutional claims to the FLRA Regional Director is no reason for

allowing it to litigate those claims in the district court. To

hold otherwise would be to excuse non-compliance with the

requirement that one must exhaust administrative remedies

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on the basis that the party failed to comply. See Steadman,

918 F.2d at 968.

The cases just cited, and analogous cases concerning constitutional claims raised in administrative proceedings, see Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1,

24 (2000), and Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200,

214 (1994), assume that there can be judicial review of the

agency’s decision. Citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of

Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986), the Court

in Thunder Basin dropped a footnote stating that there

would be a serious constitutional question ‘‘if an agency

statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a

constitutional claim.’’ 510 U.S. at 215 n.20. Avoiding that

constitutional question might have been an additional factor

in favor of finding the FLRA’s dismissal of the union’s

petitions a ‘‘final order’’ within § 7123(a), and thus subject to

judicial review in this court if the union had raised its First

and Fifth Amendment claims in the agency proceedings. But

according to the FLRA, the union’s constitutional claims were

not properly before it and the union never sought judicial

review. At any rate, to decide that the district court had

jurisdiction over the union’s constitutional claims we would –

at the least – have to assume that the FLRA’s decision on

them would have been unreviewable. That assumption would

be unwarranted for the reasons we have given.

The district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint is

affirmed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction.

So ordered.

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