Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-05103/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-05103-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN T. HILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPT. CORRECTIONS, 

 et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 00 5103 REC SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 135) 

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brian T. Hill (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s Third

Amended Complaint, filed April 16, 2001, against Defendants C. Terhune, G. Galaza, Dr.

Hirokawa, and Dr. B. Yee for denial of adequate medical care, denial of adequate mental health

care, inhumane living conditions resulting in cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the free

exercise clause, denial of First Amendment right to access to the telephone, and denial of First

Amendment right to receive publisher books and magazines.

On April 4, 2005, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment. The Court issued Findings

and Recommendations to deny the Motion in part and grant it in part. On August 19, 2005, the

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District Court adopted the Findings and Recommendations and dismissed all claims except the

First Amendment claim regarding telephone access and possession of catalogs against

Defendants Terhune and Galaza. The Court also granted Defendants an additional thirty days to

file a second Motion for Summary Judgment as there had been some misunderstanding about the

claims at issue in the Third Amended Complaint. 

On November 7, 2005, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment on the remaining first

Amendment claims. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on November 21, 2005. 

B. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were

violated by telephone and catalog restrictions. Plaintiff names California Department of

Corrections Rehabilitation Director Terhune and Warden Galaza as Defendants. 

C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district

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court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

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Plaintiff neither admitted or denied the facts set forth by Defendants as undisputed nor filed a separate

Statement of Undisputed facts. Local Rule 56-260(b). Therefore, the Court compiled the statement of undisputed

facts from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff’s verified Third mended Complaint and

Opposition. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998) (verified complaints and oppositions

constitute opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary judgment rule if they are based on facts within the

pleader’s personal knowledge). Because Plaintiff neither submitted his own statement of disputed facts nor

addressed Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, the Court accepts Defendants’ version of the facts where

Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint and Opposition are not contradictory. 

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inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

D. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS1

Telephone Restrictions

1. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and was

confined at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”) at the filing of the Complaint. 

2. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Terhune was the Director of the

CDCR. 

3. Unlike inmates in the General Population, inmates in Administrative Segregation

(“AdSeg”) are not allowed leisure telephone privileges. Inmates are allowed

attorney telephone calls and family telephones calls where there exists a serious

family emergency or death involving an immediate family member. 

4. AdSeg provides temporary segregation for inmates pending an investigation into

allegations of misconduct, evaluation of the inmates housing and custody needs,

and disciplinary action. Inmates are removed from the general population and

placed in AdSeg when they have been accused of serious misconduct and pending

an investigation and disciplinary action. Inmates may also be placed or retained in

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AdSeg pending bed availability in the General Population. 

5. Inmates are also sometimes retained in AdSeg pending transfer to a Security

Housing Unit (“SHU”) to serve a SHU term. An inmate whose conduct

endangers the safety of others or the safety of the institution shall be housed in a

SHU. Validated gang members are one example of inmates who are housed in a

SHU. 

6. Inmates are segregated for the duration of their AdSeg confinement. This is to

preserve the integrity of any ongoing investigation as well as the safety of staff

and other inmates. Equally important is the fact that most of the inmates are in

AdSeg pending serious disciplinary charges such as assault on staff, assault on

another inmate, inciting a riot, and drug trafficking, to name a few. Accordingly,

segregation serves the purpose of maintaining the safety and security of the

institution, staff, and other inmates. 

7. Pursuant to policies and procedures, inmates in AdSeg are confined in their cells. 

Anytime an inmate has to come out of his cell, he is escorted in mechanical

restraints by two custody staff members under the watch of the control booth

officer. Inmate movement in AdSeg is highly restricted because of the security

concerns involving those inmates housed in AdSeg. 

8. Inmates in AdSeg are not allowed to make telephone calls for a number of

reasons. Telephone privileges are suspended while an inmate is in AdSeg mainly

due to the number of staff it would require to allow the inmates access to a

telephone. There are two AdSeg Units in Facility 3A: ASU-3A03 and ASU-3A04. 

There is also a stand-alone AdSeg Unit known as ASU-1. Each unit houses

approximately 200 inmates. Due to the violent nature of the inmates in AdSeg,

there is also a higher staff to inmate ratio than there is in the General Population. 

9. Inmates are, however, allowed attorney telephone calls. Such calls are arranged

by the inmate’s attorney through the Litigation Office at Corcoran State Prison. 

Once the Litigation Office verifies that the attorney has legitimate legal business

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to address with the inmate-client, the Litigation Office notifies the AdSeg staff

with directions to accommodate the telephone call. The inmate is escorted in

mechanical restraints by two staff members under the watch of the control booth

officer to a Counselor or Supervisor’s office. One staff member dials the

telephone and puts it on a speaker phone. Once the call is connected, staff leave

the room and stand guard outside the room. The inmate remains in mechanical

restraints the entire time.

10. Inmates are also allowed telephone calls in cases where there is a serious family

emergency or death of an immediate family member. In such cases, a family

member generally contacts the institution requesting notification to the inmate of a

family members demise or serious injury. The institution’s Chaplain or the

designated supervisor would then notify the inmate of the notification. The

counselor of record would verify the information provided and submit the findings

to the Facility Captain requesting authorization for the inmate to make a phone

call. The telephone call is placed in the same manner as described in paragraph 9

above. The only difference is that staff remain in the room during the telephone

call since it is not confidential attorney-client communication. 

11. While inmates lose telephone privileges when confined in AdSeg, they retain mail

and visitation privileges. 

Operational Procedure 205 Regarding Non-Subscription Bulk Mail or Catalogs

12. On February 1, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the

Washington Department of Corrections’ ban on inmates’ receipt of nonsubscription bulk mail and catalogs violated the First Amendment. The Court

also ruled that Department employees were entitled to qualified immunity

regarding the Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Prison Legal News v. Lehman,

397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005.) 

13. In response to the Prison Legal News decision, on April 5, 2005, the CDCR

issued a memorandum directing prison officials to process and permit incoming

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non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs that are addressed to individual inmates. 

The memorandum also advised prison officials that Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15,

§ 3006(c)(11) would be revised to allow non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs

that are addressed to an individual inmate. 

14. Corcoran State Prison staff are no longer enforcing the section in Operational

Procedure 205 which prohibits inmates from receiving non-subscription bulk mail

or catalogs. Staff have been directed to process and permit incoming nonsubscription bulk mail and catalogs that are addressed to individual inmates. 

E. ANALYSIS

1. Telephone Restrictions

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied use of the telephone for personal, legal and emergency

calls due to his confinement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges that the telephone

restrictions imposed on him while confined in administrative segregation violate his First

Amendment Rights and serve no penological interest. (Third Amended Complaint at 19.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that "[p]risoners have a First Amendment right to telephone

access, subject to reasonable security limitations." Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th

Cir.1996) (citing Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1986)); Carlo v. City

of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir.1997); Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th

Cir.1997). 

Defendants present evidence in the form of an affidavit of J.R. Andrews, Facility Captain

assigned to Facility 3A. (Declaration of J.R. Andrews [hereinafter “Andrews Decl.”] at 1.) The

declaration provides that inmates in AdSeg are not allowed leisure telephone privileges due to

security concerns. Id. Inmates are most often segregated from other inmates pending disciplinary

charges such as assaults on staff or other inmates, inciting riots, and/or drug trafficking. 

Segregation serves the purpose of maintaining the safety and security of the institution, staff, 

other inmates or the inmate himself. Id. Due to the violent nature of the inmates in AdSeg, the

ratio of guards to inmates is greater than in General Population. The undisputed facts show that

inmates are allowed contact with family members in cases of emergency and with an inmate’s

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attorney provided the contact is made pursuant to legitimate legal business. Id. The restrictions

imposed are that arrangements for contact must be made in advance and through the litigation

office. Id. 

The Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of informing the Court of

the basis for their Motion, and identifying those portions of the record which they believe

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to

Plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, Plaintiff

may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but is required to tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11;

First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747,

749 (9th Cir. 1973).

Here, Plaintiff provides only a denial that the restrictions imposed are pursuant to a

legitimate penological but he provides no evidence to support his contention. As noted above,

Plaintiff may not rely solely on the allegations or denials in his pleadings but must tender

evidence. Plaintiff provides solely his conclusory statements that the restrictions are oppressive

or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

the First Amendment telephone access claim. 

2. Right to Possess Publisher Catalogs 

Plaintiff also alleges that his First Amendment Rights were violated because prison policy

precludes him from having catalogs which are necessary to order books and magazines. 

a. First Amendment Right

In Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that

a CDCR ban on an inmate’s receipt of non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs violated the First

Amendment. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005). In response to this

decision, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation issued a memorandum

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directing all institutions to permit incoming non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs that were

addressed to individual inmates. (Motion at 9.) This order was to take effect April 5, 2005,

during the pendency of this action. Id. As a result, Corcoran State Prison, where Plaintiff was

confined at the time the events at issue arose, no longer enforced the operational procedure which

prohibited inmates from receiving non-subscription catalogs. Defendants argue, however, that

they are entitled to qualified immunity as to this issue. 

b. Qualified Immunity

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct

violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In ruling upon the issue of

qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next

step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. In determining whether the right was

clearly established, the inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,

not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated

must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: 

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In

resolving these issues, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of Plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d

1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

As discussed above, Defendants do not dispute that the ban on non-subscription bulk mail

and catalogs is unconstitutional as a matter of law. (Motion at 10.) Defendants argue, however,

that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the rights asserted were not clearly

established at the time. Id. 

After determining that the ban on non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs was not

rationally related to a legitimate penological interest and was therefore unconstitutional, the

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Ninth Circuit concluded that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because they

could have easily and reasonably understood the Court’s holding in Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d

896 (9th Cir. 2001) concerning a similar ban on subscription for-profit bulk mail, to allow a ban

on non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 702

(9th Cir. 2005). The Court found the following paragraph from Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896

(9th Cir. 2001) sufficient to show how prison officials could have thought a ban on nonsubscription bulk mail and catalogs was constitutional: 

Moreover, prisons can and have adopted policies permitting prisoners to receive

for-profit, commercial publications, while at the same time, prohibiting prisoners

from receiving unsolicited junk mail. For example, the California Department of

Corrections (“CDC”) adopted a regulation that prohibits prisoners from

‘possessing ... catalogs, advertisements, brochures, and materials whose primary

purpose is to sell a product(s) or service(s) and when taken as a whole, lacks

serious literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific value.’ 15 Cal.Admin.

Code § 30006(c)(11). Unlike the Oregon regulation, the CDC regulation is

specifically tailored to permit inmates to receive for-profit, subscription

publications such as The New York Times, while at the same time prohibiting the

receipt of unsolicited junk mail. 

Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 702. The Court held that prison officials could have read the

above paragraph and “reasonably (though incorrectly, as it turns out) believed that like the

CDC[R], they could ban catalogs and non-subscription bulk mail while allowing inmates to

receive non-profit and for-profit subscription bulk mail.” Id. Defendants contend that the

regulation cited by Prison Legal News is the very regulation on which the challenged Operational

Procedure in this case is based. In addition, Defendants provide evidence that neither the

regulation or operational procedure are being enforced. (Exh. A, Declaration of B. Silva

[hereinafter “Silva Decl.”].) 

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

because the fact that the policy prohibiting such catalogs has been abolished is evidence that his

rights were violated. (Opposition at 5.) However, whether the Defendants violated the

constitution is only one part of the test for qualified immunity. As noted above, Defendants

concede that a constitutional violation occurred but argue that the actions of the officials are

immune from judgment because the law was not clearly established at the time the violation

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occurred. Other than his conclusory statement, however, Plaintiff provides neither argument or

evidence to the contrary. Although the instant action was filed on December 20, 1999, prior to

the Ninth Circuit’s issuance of Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2001), the Complaint is

unclear as to the date the alleged deprivation of catalogs occurred. Even assuming that Plaintiff’s

claim arose after the Ninth Circuit issued Morrison, the Court’s finding that prison officials

could have and did reasonably read Morrison to allow a ban on non-subscription bulk mail and

catalogs would support a finding of immunity in this case. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity.

c. Claim for Injunctive Relief

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is moot in light of the CDC’s

April 5, 2005, directive that the challenged regulation no longer be enforced. (Motion at 11.) 

A federal court has no authority to issue opinions upon moot issues. See County of Los

Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Aguirre v. S.S. Sohio Intrepid, 801 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.

1986). When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where he is

incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those

conditions. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975) (finding prisoner’s due

process claim to be moot once he obtained a full release from prison supervision); Dilley v.

Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding prisoner’s suit for library access to be

moot upon his transfer to another prison); Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Rison, 962 F.2d 959, 960

(9th Cir. 1992) (finding a prisoner’s suit challenging prison’s publication regulations to be moot

upon prisoner’s release on parole). An exception to the mootness doctrine exists if the case is

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 148.

According to the evidence provided by Defendants, the CDC issued a Memorandum

April 5, 2005, directing all California institutions to allow incoming non-subscription bulk mail

and catalogs pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the issue. (Exh. A, Silva Decl.). The

Memo further indicates that Section 3006(c)(11) of the California Code of Regulations would be

revised to accommodate the Court’s holding. Id. Plaintiff concedes in his Opposition that the

policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving and possessing catalogs has been “abolished.” 

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2An Order Adopting these Findings and Recommendations would resolve the case in its entirety.

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(Opposition at 5-6.) In light of these facts, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief

moot. 

F. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Defendants Terhune and Galaza and

the case be DISMISSED.2

The Court orders that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) DAYS after being served with a copy of the

Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten

(10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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