Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00051/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00051-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY R. TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RODERICK Q. HICKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00051-AWI-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT AND REQUIRING PLAINTIFF

TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. SCREENING ORDER

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff, Anthony R. Turner (“plaintiff”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Plaintiff checked the box

indicating this is a Bivens action, yet only named and/or implicated state actors.) Plaintiff filed

this action on December 27, 2005.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious;” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) &

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.

A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on

the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to

a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were

not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff’s complaint is very difficult to decipher. It is some thirty-eight (38) pages long

with one hundred eighty-four (184) pages of exhibits. Plaintiff’s complaint is very poorly

organized, written in a combination of typed and handwritten pages – many of which are

illegible. In addition, the typed pages appear to be copies of someone else’s complaint that

plaintiff has edited/hand-written in various places, and that have faded in the lower left hand

corner so as to be illegible. Plaintiff is an inmate currently housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison

and is seeking money damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief.

On pages three and four of his complaint, plaintiff names the following defendants:

Roderick Q. Hickman (Head Respondeat CDCR and CCPOA Director); Jeanne S. Woodford

(Director of CDCR); and Susan Steinberg (Director of Medical Health Care Services for CDCR). 

However, in his rendition of facts later in the complaint, plaintiff states a number of other

possible defendants’ surnames and uses phrases such as “Defendants, et al,” “Defendant

administrative staff,” and the like, such that the Court is not sure which defendant(s) plaintiff is

claiming engaged in which actions that amounted to violation(s) of plaintiff’s constitutional

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right(s). 

Further, in section “D. Claims” plaintiff lists his claims as violations of his: (1) “Right to

be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the 8 and 14 Amends. of the U.S. Const. and th th

Cal. Const.;” (2) “Right to due process and equal protection of law under the 4 , 5 , 8 , 13 , and th th th th

14 Amend of the U.S. Const. and Cal. Const.;” and (3) “Right to be free from false th

imprisonment, servitude, peonage, without just cause, are and were violations of the 8 Amend. th

13 Amend. and the 14 Amends. to the U.S. Const. and Cal. Const. Art. I., Sect. § 1 and § th th

17(a).” Thereafter plaintiff engages in a rambling, disorganized, rendition of facts (which are not

presented in chronological order) which he is apparently asserting as a basis for his three claims. 

However, it is impossible for the Court to decipher which defendant, based on which facts,

plaintiff is alleging violated which of his constitutional rights so as to support his three claims. 

C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff may be able to state some claims for relief under section 1983. However, as

pled, the Court is unable to ascertain whether the events complained of by plaintiff rise to the

level of constitutional violations. 

The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that

complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant, as briefly as possible, what action that

defendant took or failed to take and why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for litigating in court

or for filing inmate grievances). In the subsections that follow, the court will provide plaintiff

with the legal standards that, based on plaintiff’s claims, appear to be applicable. Plaintiff should

utilize the legal standards provided in this order for guidance when filing his amended complaint.

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

In order to proceed under section 1983, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a

claim that each defendant named in the complaint either acted or failed to act in a manner that

was adverse to plaintiff and that the defendant did so in retaliation against plaintiff for either

litigating in court or filing inmate grievances. Plaintiff is cautioned that in his amended

complaint, he must clearly identify what actions or omissions led to the violation of his rights and

which defendants were responsible for the acts or omissions.

2. Retaliation

Plaintiff uses the words “retaliation,” “retaliating,” and “retaliatory” throughout his

complaint. However, the Court is unable to identify why the defendant actors were allegedly

retaliating against plaintiff. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

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1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

firmness” from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770

(9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, 486

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing

inmate grievances are protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate

against inmates for engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will

be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in

this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action

taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary

confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation

for filing grievances); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative

segregation for filing grievances); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang

member for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory

issuance of false rules violation and subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory

prison transfer and double-cell status); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch

and approached by other inmates and threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-

32 (retaliatory reassignment out of vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

3. Excessive Force

Plaintiff appears to be alleging that excessive force was used against him at various times

throughout the course of events he states in his complaint. The court however, is unable to

ascertain any specific facts constituting acts of excessive force in plaintiff’s allegations. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

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marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal

quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution

or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). An officer

can be held liable for failing to intercede only if he had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede. 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff has not alleged specific

action(s) against specific defendant(s) so as to support claims against any of the named

defendants for any such failure to intercede on his behalf.

4. Failure to Protect

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9 Cir. 1982); see also Farmer v. Brennan

th

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511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1313 (9 Cir. 1995). However, to prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner may rely on th

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish

knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1995). th

To grant injunctive relief concerning serious risks to the inmate’s safety, the court must

find that at the time the relief will be granted there is still a serious, present risk to the inmate and

that the prison officials are still acting with deliberate indifference to that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 845-47; see also Helling v. McKInney 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993) (discussing injunctive relief

where there is a threat of harm to inmate’s health).

The Ninth Circuit has held that placing a pre-operative transsexual, who acts and dresses

effeminately, in the prison’s general population evidenced of deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848-49; cf. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2 1435,

1444-45 (9 Cir. 1991)(en banc)(concluding that placing a young pre-trial detainee in a cell with th

a known aggressive sexual offender was deliberate indifference to the detainee’s safety). The

Ninth Circuit has also held that allegations that prison officials called a prisoner a “snitch” in the

presence of other inmates were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to an inmate’s

safety. See Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9 Cir. 1989). But see also th

Morgan v. MacDonald 41 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (9 Cir. 1994) (rejecting Eighth Amendment th

claim where prisoner who had been labeled a snitch had not been retaliated against). 

5. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges conditions in a “holding cell” being given one meal a day, no water for

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drinking or sanitation, no toilet facilities, and the like that, once organized, that will probably

amount to a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. However, as stated, the Court is

unable to ascertain which defendant(s) plaintiff feels is responsible for those conditions. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective

prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under

the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that

inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

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citations omitted). 

Plaintiff is reminded that his allegations must also indicate whether any defendant actors

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. Frost, 152 F.3d at

1128. 

6. Due Process – Inmate Appeals Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create liberty

interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-

84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

(citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no

entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir.

2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams,

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under

a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

When a prisoner faces disciplinary charges, prison officials must provide the prisoner

with (1) a written statement at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing that

includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the prisoner, and an explanation for

the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call

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witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and (3) legal

assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (9 Cir. 1974); see also Superintendent v. Hill 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); th

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830-31 (9 Cir. 1997); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419- th

20 (9 Cir. 1994); McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9 Cir. 1986). th th

“When prison officials limit a prisoner’s right to defend himself they must have a

legitimate penological interest.” Koenig v. Vannelli, 971 F.2d 422, 423 (9 Cir. 1992) (per th

curiam) (concluding that prisoners do not have a right to have an independent drug test

performed at their own expense). The right to call witnesses may legitimately be limited by “the

penological need to provide swift discipline in individual cases . . . [or] by the very real dangers

in prison life which may result from violence or intimidation directed at either other inmates or

staff.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985); see also Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 525

(9 Cir. 1996); Koenig, 971 F.2d at 423; Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 187-88 (9 Cir. th th

1987)(per curiam). 

“[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision

by the prison disciplinary board . . . .” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; see also Touissaint v. McCarthy,

926 F.2d 800, 802-03 (9 Cir. 1991); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9 Cir. 1989); th th

Jancsek, III v. Oregon bd. Of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9 Cir. 1987); Cato v. Rushen, 824 th

F.2d 703, 705 (9 Cir. 1987); see especially Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774-74 (9

th th

Cir. 1999) (where there is no evidence of guilt may be unnecessary to demonstrat existence of

liberty interest.) 

However, the “some evidence” standard does not apply to original rules violation report

where a prisoner alleges the report is false. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9 Cir. 1997). th

7. Substantive Due Process

 “To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required

to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

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sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d

868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117

S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). The Court is

unable to discern whether plaintiff might be able to allege any facts that would support a claim

that his rights under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause were violated.

8. Due Process – Property

Plaintiff appears to allege that, during various transfers, his personal property was taken

and/or destroyed.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners have a protected

interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However,

while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), neither

negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state employee “constitute a

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the deprivation

was authorized or unauthorized. Further, in the event that the deprivation was authorized and

therefore actionable under section 1983, plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he was

deprived of due process. Also, plaintiff has failed to link any such conduct to a named

defendant. As long as plaintiff was provided with process, prison officials may deprive him of

his property. 

9. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal

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protection claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff establishes an equal

protection claim by showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of the

plaintiff's membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

686 (9th Cir.2001). Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the

defendants’ actions were a result of the plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race. 

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish

an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

(1972); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004);

SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal

protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an

identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of

Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. If an equal protection claim is based upon the defendant’s

selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement

is based upon an "impermissible motive." Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of

Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1995).

10. False Imprisonment

Under California law, false imprisonment is the “‘unlawful violation of the personal

liberty of another.’” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744, 757 (1997)). False arrest is not a

different tort. Id. Rather, “‘it is merely one way of committing a false imprisonment.’” Id. 

“There are two bases for claiming false imprisonment: imprisonment pursuant to a false arrest

and unreasonable delay in bringing the arrested person before a judicial officer.” Estate of

Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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 A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can

show that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas

corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration” of his

confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. 

Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and this action involves no claims to the contrary. If plaintiff wishes to challenge his

imprisonment as illegal, he must do so via a writ of habeas corpus. 

11. Involuntary Servitude & Peonage

Plaintiff listed in his third claim that his right to be free from involuntary servitude and

peonage without just cause had been violated. Section 1of the Thirteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution provides: “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a

punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the

United States ....” 

Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and this action involves no claims to the contrary. If plaintiff is challenging his

imprisonment as illegal, he must do so via a writ of habeas corpus. If plaintiff is challenging

working while in prison, he must do so via allegations of a different constitutional violation. 

12. Conspiracy

(a) Section 1983 Conspiracy Claims

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-

41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v.

Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma,

866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not

know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective

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of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a heightened

pleading standard to plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of

San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307

F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However, although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. at 1964-65 (internal quotations

and citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation that defendants conspired to violate plaintiff's

constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under section 1983.

(b) Section 1985 Conspiracy Claims

Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with an individual’s civil rights. To state

a cause of action under section 1985(3), plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, (3) an act by one of the

conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Gillispie v. Civiletti, 629

F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); Giffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971). Section 1985

applies only where there is a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ actions. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In interpreting these standards, the Ninth Circuit has held that a claim under § 1985 must

allege specific facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere allegation of conspiracy

without factual specificity is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.; Sanchez v.

City of Santa Anna, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991). Bare allegation that defendants

conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy

claim under section 1985.

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(c) Section 1986 Consipracy Claims

“Section 1986 authorizes a remedy against state actors who have negligently failed to

prevent a conspiracy that would be actionable under § 1985.” Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty.

Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 unless he has first stated a claim for relief under section 1985. 

McCalden v. California Library Assoc., 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1992). As discussed in

the preceding paragraph, plaintiff’s amended complaint does not contain a cognizable claim for

relief under section 1985. Accordingly, plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim for

relief under section 1986.

13. Supervisory Liability Claim

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To

state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’

and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646

(9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims

under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993). 

 As to each defendant in a supervisorial position, plaintiff must allege facts giving rise to

a claim for relief under section 1983. As stated previously, plaintiff lists separately the rights

which he believes were violated and then sets forth all of his factual allegations in narrative form.

While plaintiff may be able to state cognizable claims for relief against the named defendants in

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supervisorial positions under section 1983, the Court is unable to identify any such claims due to

the manner in which plaintiff has organized his original complaint.

D. State Law Claims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under §

1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Because plaintiff may be able to state a claims for relief under section 1983, the court

reserves discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and to address plaintiff’s state law

claims after plaintiff files his amended complaint so as to allow plaintiff opportunity to state

cognizable claims for relief under section 1983.

II. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to file an

amended complaint within thirty (30) days. If plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply

with this order, plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than thirty (30)

days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have

resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227

(9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

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U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Further, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Finally, plaintiff is advised that it is inappropriate to attach exhibits to a complaint. See

Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the Court cannot serve as a repository for the

parties' evidence. Originals or copies of evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness

affidavits, etc.) should not be submitted until the course of litigation brings the evidence into

question (for example, on a motion for summary judgment, at trial, or when requested by the

court). At this point, the submission of evidence is premature as the plaintiff is only required to

state a prima facie claim for relief. Thus, in amending his complaint, plaintiff should simply

state the facts upon which he alleges a defendant has violated his constitutional rights and refrain

from submitting exhibits.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file

an amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

court will recommend that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

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icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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