Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01221/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01221-47/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NIKKI POOSHS,

Plaintiff,

v.

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 04-cv-1221-PJH 

ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON 

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL FOR 

MISCONDUCT DURING TRIAL

The court hereby finds, in the exercise of its inherent power, that imposition of 

monetary sanctions on plaintiff’s counsel Gilbert L. Purcell is warranted because of 

repeated, willful, and bad faith violation of court orders. 

BACKGROUND

This case was originally filed in the Superior Court of California, County of San 

Francisco, on January 13, 2004, and was removed to this court on March 26, 2004. 

Following two judgments of dismissal, and two reversals and remands by the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals (both involving resolution of questions of state law, certified to 

the California Supreme Court), the parties appeared for a case management conference 

(“CMC”) on September 1, 2011. 

On September 6, 2011, the court issued a revised case management and pretrial 

order (Doc. 157), setting a four-week trial to commence on January 7, 2013, with a final 

pretrial conference to be held on November 29, 2012. The order imposed other pretrial 

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deadlines, and directed that, no later than 28 days prior to the pretrial conference, the 

parties file the following: a joint pretrial statement; trial briefs; motions in limine; 

deposition excerpts for witnesses who would not be testifying in person (specifying the 

witness, page, and line references); a list of all witnesses to be called at trial, in person or 

by deposition, other than solely for impeachment or rebuttal, with a brief statement 

describing the substance of the testimony to be given; and a numerical list of exhibits to 

be offered in each party’s case in chief in support of a claim or defense, with a brief 

statement describing the substance and purpose of each exhibit and the name of the 

sponsoring witness. Doc. 157 at 3. 

On November 1, 2012, the parties filed motions in limine, proposed jury 

instructions, and lists purporting to identify the witnesses they intended to call and the 

evidence they intended to use at trial. In her first pretrial filing, plaintiff designated over 

10,000 pages of deposition and trial testimony from 24 witnesses (and for one-third of the 

witnesses, designated entire volumes of prior testimony); listed 95 responses to requests 

for admissions from the three defendants remaining in the case at that time; provided an 

exhibit list including 5,266 entries consisting of 18,751 separate documents; and 

identified 12 fact witnesses, 7 experts, and 156 “other non-retained witnesses” as trial 

witnesses. See Docs. 254, 261-1, 261-3 through 261-7. 

On November 29, 2012, at what had originally been scheduled to be the final 

pretrial conference, the court noted numerous problems with the proposed jury 

instructions, and also with the number of exhibits on plaintiff’s exhibit list, the number of

witnesses, and the number of pages of deposition designations for witnesses who would 

not be testifying at trial in person. The court rejected plaintiff’s witness list and deposition 

designations as unusable, and ordered plaintiff to revise and resubmit them within a 

week. See Doc. 287 at 70-81. In the December 5, 2012, preliminary final pretrial order, 

the court stated that it was clear that the previously scheduled January 22, 2013 trial date 

would have to be vacated and that further pretrial submissions and briefing would be 

required. Doc. 289 at 9-14. 

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In the revised submissions, plaintiff designated more than 3,000 pages of 

deposition testimony by 19 witnesses. In addition, the revised submissions included 

evidence the court had already excluded as inadmissible in ruling on defendants’ motions 

in limine. Defendants filed a motion for evidentiary sanctions, and at the February 13, 

2013, hearing, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. 

The court acknowledged that plaintiff had made some effort to reduce the number 

of witnesses and the pages of designations of testimony, but found more “troubling” the 

fact that plaintiff had failed to remove deposition designations relating to evidence that 

the court had previously ruled was inadmissible. The court ruled that the witness lists 

were for the most part acceptable, and that while it was clear that plaintiff would not be 

able to present in excess of 50 hours of deposition testimony at trial, the main problem 

was plaintiff’s inclusion of material that was plainly inadmissible (per the court’s prior 

rulings). Thus, the court ordered plaintiff to re-do the deposition designations. Doc. 311 

at 11-15. 

During approximately the next year and a half, plaintiff made numerous revisions 

to her pretrial submissions, sometimes pursuant to court order, and sometimes without 

leave of court, each including excessive amounts of evidence that could not be presented

to a jury in the time allotted and that ignored the court’s orders limiting plaintiff’s evidence 

and claims. See Docs. 326, 327, 328-2, 333, 334, 342-344, 346-2, and 361. In 

response, defendants filed counter-designations, motions, and objections. See, e.g., 

Docs. 295, 330, 332, 347, 357-359. 

Between the time she filed the initial papers setting forth the evidence designated 

for use at trial, and the end of May 2014, plaintiff filed seven different versions of

prior-testimony designations, four versions of written-discovery designations, five 

versions of her witness list, and three versions of her exhibit list. The court agreed with 

defendants that plaintiff’s proposed evidence was excessive and violated its prior orders,

but in the continuing hope that plaintiff’s counsel could be made to understand what is 

required in this court as part of the process of pretrying the case, the court provided 

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plaintiff with numerous opportunities to conform her proposed evidence to the court’s 

rulings. See e.g., Docs. 310, 321, 337, 376. 

For example, at the pretrial conference held on March 27, 2014, the court once 

again attempted to convince plaintiff’s counsel of the necessity of complying with the 

rulings and procedures of the court. See Doc. 378 at 24-27. In addition, in an attempt to 

impose some organization on the generalized chaos of the pretrial proceedings, the court 

directed the parties to prepare a joint list of all the prior rulings, and also to submit 

categorical objections (with representative examples) to the witness lists, exhibit lists, 

written deposition designations, and written discovery designations, after which time the 

court would determine whether to hold a half-day hearing on those objections. See Doc. 

378 at 32-39; Doc. 376 at 2.

On May 21, 2014, plaintiff filed a seventh version of her prior-testimony 

designations (over 1,350 pages from nine witnesses), a fourth version of her writtendiscovery designations, and a fifth version of her witness list. Docs. 379, 380, 381. The 

court had not given plaintiff leave to file any of these documents. Moreover, the third final 

pretrial order (Doc. 337) had set a deadline of September 3, 2013, to file revised 

submissions of evidence. On May 22, 2014, plaintiff filed a fourth version of her “working 

‘will-use’” exhibit list, which included substantially more than the 250 exhibits plaintiff’s 

counsel had represented were on the list at the March 27, 2014 pretrial conference. 

Moreover, the “will use” and “may use” versions together comprised more than 19,000 

exhibits.

On May 27, 2014, as ordered by the court, defendants filed their categorical 

objections. See Doc. 384. On June 2, 2014, the court issued an order striking the 

plaintiff’s revised prior-testimony designations, written-discovery designations, and 

witness lists. Doc. 387 at 2. The court also suggested that plaintiff contribute to the 

categorical objections, but plaintiff declined to do so, although she did respond to 

defendants’ objections by arguing generally that they should all be “overruled.” See Doc. 

389. The court ruled on defendants’ categorical objections in an order issued on 

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December 2, 2014. See Doc. 392. On January 15, 2015, both sides submitted witness 

lists, exhibit lists, deposition designations, written discovery designations, and argument 

regarding proposed jury instructions. Docs. 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402. On 

January 30, 2015, both sides filed objections to the submissions. Docs. 403, 404, 405. 

On March 4, 2015, the court set the trial for June 1, 2015. Defendants requested 

a continuance due to unavailability of counsel. On April 1, 2015, the parties submitted 

“final” witness lists, exhibit lists, deposition designations, written discovery designations, 

and jury questionnaire, jury instructions, and verdict form. Docs. 412, 413, 414, 415, 

416, 417, 418. The court held a telephone scheduling conference, and set the trial date 

for September 14, 2015. Following issuance of the seventh final pretrial order on April 6, 

2015 (Doc. 421), the parties submitted further revised “final” witness lists, exhibit lists, 

deposition designations, written discovery designations, and jury questionnaire, jury 

instructions, and verdict form. Docs. 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428. The trial was 

subsequently continued to January 19, 2016, with jury selection on January 11, 2016. 

Plaintiff began the trial with a list of 6941 exhibits. Of those, plaintiff identified 173

during the three-week trial, and only 125 were admitted into evidence.

PRETRIAL RULINGS AND COUNSEL’S BEHAVIOR AT TRIAL

Beginning with the December 5, 2012 preliminary final pretrial order (Doc. 289), 

and continuing through the March 7, 2015 sixth final pretrial order (Doc. 406), the court 

repeatedly ruled that certain evidence that plaintiff’s counsel sought to introduce was 

inadmissible, including, e.g., evidence regarding cigarette design (Docs. 229, 337, 391, 

392, 406); evidence against the entire tobacco industry or cigarette manufacturers other 

than Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds (“RJR”), or evidence regarding effect of smoking on 

entire populations (Docs. 289, 337, 406); evidence regarding cigarette brands plaintiff 

never smoked or brands not manufactured and sold by Philip Morris and RJR (Docs. 289, 

337, 392, 406); evidence concerning plaintiff’s smoking-related injuries other than lung 

cancer (Docs. 337, 392, 406); evidence regarding defendants’ post-1987 knowledge, 

statements, and public positions (Docs. 289, 310, 391, 391, 406); and post-1969 

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evidence relating to failure to warn, including post-1969 advertising and promotion (Docs. 

319, 337, 391). The court summarized these and other evidentiary rulings in the eighth 

final pretrial order, issued January 4, 2016 (Doc. 447), which included as an appendix a 

chart listing all the rulings. 

The fact that the court was compelled to issue the same pretrial rulings over and 

over again was unprecedented in the undersigned’s many years of experience on the 

bench. More disturbing, however, was the continued effort of plaintiff’s counsel Gilbert L.

Purcell throughout the trial to seek to elicit testimony or to introduce evidence that clearly 

violated those rulings. Initially, as with Mr. Purcell’s references in his opening statement 

to evidence relating to cigarette design, see Tr. at 242-43, 264, or his questions to 

plaintiff’s expert Dr. William Farone relating to evidence of nicotine pharmacology, design 

features, and causation (subjects about which the court had previously ruled Dr. Farone 

was not qualified to testify), see Tr. at 453-56, 463-68, 471, 485-86, 501-03, 521-23, 540, 

543-44, the court was hopeful that sustaining the defendants’ objections and 

admonishing Mr. Purcell would be sufficient to persuade him to abide by the prior rulings.

Day 1 of the trial, Monday, January 11, 2016, began with jury selection. Also on 

Day 1, the court discussed deposition designations and exhibits. The court expressed 

astonishment that there had been no stipulations as to the admissibility of a single 

document. Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at 203-04. The court then outlined a procedure for 

submitting disputed deposition designations and objections to the court the day before 

they were to be used in the trial. Tr. at 205; see also Tr. at 613-17, 822-24. 

On Day 4 of the trial, Mr. Purcell asked plaintiff’s pulmonary expert, Dr. Barry 

Horn, if he was familiar with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and 

emphysema, and Dr. Horn responded that he was. Defendants objected on the basis of 

the pretrial rulings excluding evidence of plaintiff’s smoking-related injuries other than 

lung cancer. In response, Mr. Purcell stated that the question was to “address the 

defendants’ objections on the statutes . . . of limitations.” The court allowed that 

question, but sustained defendants’ objection to the follow-up question, which was 

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whether COPD/emphysema is “an entirely separate disease response associated with 

cigarettes than lung cancer.” Mr. Purcell then asked, “Does COPD or emphysema 

become lung cancer?” The court also sustained defendants’ objection to that question. 

Tr. at 679-80.

Outside the presence of the jury, the court stated, “[T]here’s been a very clear 

ruling that diseases other than lung cancer were excluded from this trial.” Mr. Purcell 

responded that he needed “evidence in the record that in fact specific to [plaintiff] her 

COPD and emphysema are entirely separate and distinct diseases from the lung cancer 

that is now involved in our trial.” He added that if defendants would stipulate, he “need 

not ask the question any longer.” The court stated that the issue had been resolved in 

the pretrial rulings, and that “there is no longer a statute of limitations affirmative 

defense,” and defendants agreed with that characterization. Tr. at 698-700.

 On Day 8 of the trial, after the jury was excused for the day, the court took up the 

matter of defendants’ objections to certain exhibits that plaintiff was seeking to have 

admitted, copies of which had been provided to the court that morning. Defendants 

objected to a series of exhibits, one of which (plaintiff’s Exhibit 6D04) was a video of an 

ad for a brand of cigarettes plaintiff never smoked. Mr. Purcell argued that the exhibit 

should be admitted because plaintiff recalled having seen it as a teenager, and 

remembered that it caused her to think it was important to learn how to smoke, how to 

hold a cigarette, how to do the “French inhale” – in short, that it persuaded her to emulate 

what she saw in the ad, to become skilled in the “ritual of smoking.” Mr. Purcell asserted 

that this ad was “particularly unique because it is the springboard into her and her friends’ 

interest in learning how to smoke.” Tr. at 1560-61.

Defendants objected because the ad depicted a brand of cigarettes plaintiff had 

never smoked. In response, the court noted that “[t]his is not a trial against the entirety of 

the tobacco industry . . . . This is a trial against these two defendants, and . . . if they are 

found liable at all, it can only be for cigarettes that they produced that [plaintiff] actually 

smoked.” However, Mr. Purcell argued that “there are notions that we have the burden of 

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proving that transcend the defendant brands, concepts of reasonable reliance, concepts 

of what an ordinary consumer would know, and that ordinary consumer would be a 

function of other brands, not limited to just the defendants.” The court stated, “I’ll give 

some thought to your argument[,]” but added, “I’m a little concerned about opening the 

door to the introduction of brands and manufacturers that are not in the case, brands that 

she didn’t smoke.” Tr. at 1562-66. 

On Day 9 of the trial, before the jury was seated, the court ruled that Exhibit 6D4 

was not admissible, because “the reason proffered by plaintiff’s counsel for the use of the 

exhibit isn’t . . . sufficiently compelling to warrant an entire reversal of the pretrial order 

that has already been entered in the case[;]” and because “the cigarette ads are, in and 

of themselves, cumulative at this point.” Tr. at 1575-76. In addition, the court found that

permitting the use of such exhibits would amount to “rewarding plaintiff’s counsel for what 

is frankly sanctionable conduct.” Tr. at 1576-77. The court added, “[I]n reviewing the 

deposition designations and the exhibits, I’ve tried to give plaintiff’s counsel the benefit of 

the doubt.” However, the court found, for that particular exhibit, “there is no doubt, there 

are no fuzzy lines. The ruling No. 75 says cigarette brands not smoked by the plaintiff, 

cigarette manufacturers of brands that are not defendants’ in this lawsuit are not to be 

admitted..” Tr. at 1577-78.

Mr. Purcell asserted that “6D4 is something the plaintiff saw, relied on. It formed 

her understanding and interest in using cigarettes.” He added, “I don’t agree that there 

are discrete aspects of this case that lend themselves to rigid adherence to rulings. We 

are making a good-faith effort to do all we can to reduce down the amount of exhibits that 

are necessary to show the witness.” As for Exhibit 6D4, he continued, “[W]e think it 

would be instructive for the jury to see that video as an appropriate part of our evidence.” 

Tr. at 1578-79.

The court responded that the fact that Mr. Purcell did not agree with the ruling did 

not give him “the right to continue to burden [the court] with exhibits that violate the 

rulings that the [c]ourt has already entered. Irrespective of whether you agree with them 

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or not, you are required to live with them.” The court cautioned Mr. Purcell that “[y]ou 

may not use exhibits that have been ruled upon previously, period[,]” and that “if you 

violate that ruling . . . during the course of your client’s testimony, there will be sanctions. 

And I feel compelled to warn you of that because it’s very clear to me that you have no 

interest in complying with orders that I’ve imposed previously. This is one that will result 

in sanctions if you violate it.” Tr. at 1580.

On Day 11 of the trial, during the cross-examination of defendants’ pathology 

expert Dr. Lucian Chirieac, Mr. Purcell attempted to question the witness about a 

supplemental report prepared by Dr. Sam Hammar, plaintiff’s pathology expert (not called 

at trial as a testifying witness). Defendants objected on the ground that the court had 

previously ruled that the supplemental report was not admissible because it was 

prepared after Dr. Hammar had been deposed, which violated a stipulation among the 

parties. Tr. at 2085-86. Mr. Purcell then turned to questioning Dr. Chirieac about his own 

expert report. Specifically, Mr. Purcell asked about Dr. Chirieac’s conclusion that 

plaintiff’s lung cancer was not caused by smoking, and about three scientific articles he 

had cited in his report in connection with that conclusion. 

In asking about one of the articles (“Yano”), and a statement in the article that the 

etiology of lung cancer remains indefinite, although many risk factors have been 

identified, Mr. Purcell asked Dr. Chirieac whether COPD or emphysema was a risk-factor 

for smoking-induced lung cancer. Dr. Chirieac responded, “I don’t know about it,” 

although he also agreed that it “co-presents quite often in people.” Mr. Purcell then 

asked, “And in fact, [plaintiff] has it, correct?” Defendants’ counsel objected, based on 

the pretrial ruling preluding admission of evidence relating to diseases other than lung 

cancer caused by smoking. Tr. at 2124-25.

In response, Mr. Purcell stated that the question did not violate the pretrial order;

the court responded that it did violate the pretrial order; Mr. Purcell insisted, “No, it does 

not;” and the court stated, “Yes, it does.” The court then excused the jury, Tr. at 2125, 

and Mr. Purcell continued with his argument, asserting that the court’s ruling had been 

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that the evidence was inadmissible only if the plaintiff was seeking damages for diseases 

other than lung cancer, which he asserted was not the case here. Tr. at 2125-26.

The court asked Mr. Purcell which ruling he was referencing, and noted that (as 

indicated in the eighth final pretrial order, Doc. 447), the court had previously excluded 

such evidence in the third final pretrial order, see Doc. 337 (granting RJR’s motion in

limine No. 2 to exclude evidence of plaintiff’s injuries other than lung cancer); in the order 

re defendants’ categorical objections to plaintiff’s proposed trial evidence, see Doc. 392

(granting request to exclude evidence of plaintiff’s injuries other than lung cancer); and in 

the sixth final pretrial order, see Doc. 406 (sustaining defendants’ objection to evidence of 

injury caused by smoking resulting in diseases other than lung cancer). See Tr. at 2126-

27. Mr. Purcell was unable to identify the ruling he claimed supported his position. See

Tr. at 2127 (“I would have to have some time to do that”). 

In her opposition to RJR’s motion in limine No. 2, plaintiff argued that evidence of 

COPD and periodontal disease was “necessary and relevant because defendants refuse, 

as yet, to concede that COPD, periodontal disease, lung cancer are ‘separate and 

distinct’ diseases.” Doc. 280 at 7-8. Plaintiff asserted, “Absent a stipulation . . . that lung 

cancer is an entirely separate and distinct disease from periodontal disease and COPD, 

which it is, it is necessary to present this issue and all evidence relevant to its resolution 

here at trial . . . in order to assure that defendants may not yet again argue that her cause 

of action for lung cancer is somehow time-barred.” Doc. 280 at 8.

On November 29, 2012, at the initial “final” pretrial conference, the court 

expressed some confusion as to why this was an issue, because the complaint and the 

briefing up to that point had suggested that the only injury for which plaintiff was seeking 

compensation was lung cancer. Doc. 287 at 30. Defense counsel responded that there 

appeared to be agreement that any claims of injury based on COPD or periodontal 

disease were time-barred, but also asserted that defendants did not want plaintiff’s 

counsel to put on evidence of any dismissed or barred claims of injuries other than lung 

cancer, because it would confuse the jury to hear testimony regarding other injuries. 

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Doc. 287 at 30-31.

In response, Mr. Purcell stated, “If we can agree and stipulate that they are 

separate and distinct as [defense counsel] just articulated, then plaintiffs have no 

intention [sic] to need to introduce evidence about that.” Doc. 287 at 33. The court then 

directed the parties to enter into a stipulation that the prior conditions were separate and 

distinct from lung cancer. “[O]therwise,” the court stated, I’m going to deny [the] motion

and allow plaintiff to put on evidence.” Defendants’ counsel indicated that they would be 

willing to enter into a stipulation. Doc. 287 at 33-35. In the December 5, 2012,

preliminary final pretrial order, the court reiterated that in the absence of a written 

stipulation that COPD and periodontal disease are separate and distinct from lung 

cancer, the motion would be denied, and plaintiff would be allowed to put on evidence as 

to other diseases caused by smoking. Doc. 289 at 6. 

In a subsequent status statement, filed June 19, 2013, the parties stated that they 

had attempted to arrive at a stipulation that COPD and periodontal disease are separate 

and distinct from lung cancer, but were unable to reach an agreement. Defendants 

asserted that they remained willing to sign a stipulation, but that plaintiff refused to sign it 

unless RJR withdrew the motion in limine. Doc. 323 at 11-12. 

Plaintiff argued that “[t]he concurrent diagnosis of separate clinical disease 

responses, such as COPD and periodontal disease, or not, in a smoker, according to 

some defense experts, is pertinent to implicating smoking causally in lung cancer;” and 

that “the absence of COPD and periodontal disease could suggest the negation of 

smoking as a causal contributor to plaintiff’s lung cancer.” Plaintiff added that her 

medical history, “including her COPD and periodontal disease, are relevant in the 

determination of the cause of her lung cancer.” Doc. 323 at 12. 

The court set a further pretrial conference for July 12, 2013. At that hearing, the 

court addressed numerous issues, including the parties’ arguments regarding diseases 

other than lung cancer, and again asked why they were still arguing about this issue if 

plaintiff was not claiming damages for any injury other than lung cancer. Plaintiff’s 

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counsel Jason Rose responded that defendants’ motion in limine was “aimed at taking 

addiction out of the case,” and that while plaintiff was not seeking damages for addiction, 

it was “part of the causation of plaintiff’s injury.” Doc. 341 at 126; see also Doc. 342 at 

128-29. 

In addition, Mr. Rose asserted, “defendants’ medical defense in this case is that it 

was something other than a smoking-caused lung cancer . . . .” He argued that “other 

diseases which are caused by smoking can and are, according to our experts and their 

experts, sometimes markers for whether or not this is – even though they are separate 

and distinct disease, whether this is a smoking caused lung cancer. So the fact that she 

has COPD is something an expert would consider when making the determination if her 

lung cancer was caused by smoking.” Thus, he asserted, plaintiff wanted to put in 

evidence of plaintiff’s other smoking-related diseases – “for a limited purpose” – because 

“[t]he fact that she has COPD and periodontal disease are things that her treating doctor 

and our experts would look at and consider when determining the cause of her lung 

cancer.” Doc. 341 at 127-31. 

In response, defendants’ counsel argued that because plaintiff was not seeking 

damages for injuries caused by diseases other than lung cancer, allowing evidence of 

other diseases in the case would confuse the jury. Doc. 341 at 128. In addition, counsel 

asserted, plaintiff had provided no testimony from any expert that COPD and periodontal 

disease were relevant in determining the cause of a lung cancer, and that theory 

“certainly was not presented in the opposition to the motions in limine.” Doc. 341 at 131, 

137-38. Furthermore, “if these diseases are markers for the disease at issue, then we 

are not dealing with separate and independent diseases. . . . You can’t have it both 

ways.” Doc. 341 at 131. Counsel argued that it would be unfair to present evidence of 

other diseases to the jury, and that “in fact, there’s no relationship between them, so it’s a 

relevance issue as well.” Doc. 341 at 138.

In the July 19, 2013 third pretrial order, which followed the July 12, 2013 further 

pretrial conference, the court noted that while plaintiff had refused to sign the stipulation, 

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“[d]efendants are willing to stipulate that lung cancer is separate and distinct from other 

tobacco-related diseases, and that they would not argue that plaintiff’s lung cancer claim 

was in any way barred by the statute of limitations.” Doc. 337 at 11. The court granted 

the motion to exclude evidence of plaintiff’s injuries other than lung cancer, as plaintiff 

had taken the position that lung cancer is separate and distinct from COPD and 

periodontal disease, which she was required to do in order to avoid another motion for 

summary judgment. The court concluded that for the reasons argued by defendants –

that evidence of other injuries would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial as it would 

serve no purpose other than to elicit sympathy from the jury and would confuse the jury 

as to the proper basis of liability and damages – the evidence would be more prejudicial 

than probative. Doc. 337 at 11-12.

In two subsequent orders – the December 2, 2014 order re defendants’ categorical 

objections to plaintiff’s evidence (Doc. 392), and the sixth final pretrial order (Doc. 406) –

the court ruled that certain exhibits and designations of proposed deposition and trial 

testimony proffered by plaintiff were in violation of the prior ruling that excluded evidence 

of smoking-related diseases other than lung cancer. Doc. 392 at 14-17; Doc. 406 at 5. 

The court added in the sixth pretrial order that this ruling also applied to evidence of 

addiction as a separate injury, but that plaintiff would not be precluded from putting on 

evidence relating to the addictive properties of nicotine. Doc. 406 at 5.

In other words, by the time of the trial in February 2016, not only had the court 

ruled on numerous occasions that evidence of plaintiff’s smoking-related injuries other 

than lung cancer was not admissible, but Mr. Purcell had previously made the same 

arguments against excluding the evidence, and the court had specifically considered 

those arguments and rejected them. Moreover, plaintiff did not seek reconsideration of 

the order excluding evidence of smoking-related diseases other than lung cancer, and 

indeed, rather than face another motion for summary judgment, conceded that lung 

cancer was separate and distinct from periodontal disease and COPD, and opted not to 

pursue any claim of injury relating to those diseases.

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Nevertheless, Mr. Purcell continued to argue that he should be permitted to 

question defendants’ pathology expert Dr. Chirieac about whether plaintiff’s medical 

records established that she suffered from COPD. At that point, defendants’ counsel 

moved for a mistrial, and the court stated, “Let me think about that. . . . I think this is 

definitely a serious violation. Mr. Purcell, you have violated my orders repeatedly 

throughout the course of litigating this case. But you’ve really crossed the line.” Tr. at 

2127-28.

Following a break, before the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the court 

denied the motion for a mistrial, but stated, “I will advise you, Mr. Purcell, that after the 

trial has concluded, there will be sanctions. You’ve continually violated this court’s orders 

repeatedly. And I am now persuaded that all of the violations you’ve committed over the 

last few weeks have been intentional, deliberate, and you will be sanctioned monetarily, 

and I’m going to refer you to the State Bar.” Tr. at 2128-29.

When questioning resumed, Mr. Purcell obtained Dr. Chirieac’s agreement that 

smoking is the predominant risk factor for lung cancer, but then went on to ask Dr. 

Chirieac to read a section of the “Yano” article, which Mr. Purcell characterized as 

involving a discussion of “lung disease.”1 Defendants objected to questions about “lung 

disease,” and the objection was sustained. Mr. Purcell then attempted to ask questions 

about the previously excluded expert report of plaintiff’s expert Dr. Hammar. Defendants’ 

objected, and the objection was sustained. Tr. 2131-34.

At the conclusion of the testimony, Mr. Purcell requested to be heard on certain 

issues, including “the communication that’s been difficult specifically regarding other 

diseases.” He asserted that the fact that plaintiff has COPD and emphysema “is a risk 

factor for her having a smoking-related lung cancer[,]” and argued that he should be 

 

1

 Mr. Purcell later indicated (outside the presence of the jury) that the section of the 

“Yano” article he directed to Dr. Chirieac’s attention stated, “Inflammation is well known to 

be carcinogenic. A multi-center study among never smokers in the United States by Wu, 

et al., demonstrated that lung cancer risk is increased with a history of any previous lung 

disease including asthma, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, pleurisy, pneumonia and 

tuberculosis.” Tr. at 2196. 

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permitted to ask about that “because it’s in the material that [defendants’] witnesses have 

reviewed and considered and they rely on. And it is an important risk factor that [plaintiff] 

presents with. . . . And the concern that the jury deal with non-lung cancer as a damages 

topic . . . could be handled by an admonition.” Tr. at 2196-97. He added that because 

defendants’ witnesses had testified that they reviewed all plaintiff’s medical records, he 

should not be limited in asking about anything in those records, including any reference 

to a smoking-caused disease, and that to preclude him from asking about smokingrelated injuries other than lung cancer or about any opinions they expressed in their Rule 

26 reports would be prejudicial to plaintiff’s case. Tr. at 2197-99. 

In response, defendants’ counsel Steven N. Geise noted that many of the Rule 26 

reports had been prepared before the parties filed their motions in limine, and that with 

particular regard to the motion to exclude evidence of smoking-related diseases other 

than lung cancer, the motion had been briefed and argued extensively. In addition, Mr. 

Geise noted that the portion of the “Yano” article that Mr. Purcell had attempted to 

question Dr. Chirieac about included a mention of “pneumonia” as a lung cancer risk, a 

subject about which defendants would have liked to have questioned Dr. Horn, but were 

unable to because of the court’s rulings that evidence of smoking-related diseases other 

than lung cancer would not be admissible. Tr. at 2199. Defendants’ counsel Pamela 

Yates added that defendants were conceding that “the biggest risk factor that [plaintiff] 

had for lung cancer was her entire history of smoking. Tr. at 2200. 

The court noted that defendants had been held to the same standard as had 

plaintiff, and that there had been three rulings that applied to the issue, none of which 

included a carve-out for what plaintiff’s counsel was seeking. The court added that had 

plaintiff requested reconsideration or a carve-out of some exception prior to the trial, the 

result might have been different. However, the court concluded, “because you have sort 

of gone ahead with every violation of my order that you chose to do without seeking leave 

for me to reverse it in advance, I’m not reversing it.” The court added, “The defendants 

have complied with the limitations [and] you’re going to have to comply with the 

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limitations. Your request remains overruled.” Tr. at 2201.

On Day 12 of the trial, Mr. Purcell again attempted to elicit testimony relating to 

emphysema and COPD when he cross-examined Dr. Eric Schroeder, defendants’ expert 

in pulmonary medicine and internal medicine. After posing a question referencing “lung 

diseases,” Mr. Purcell asked the witness whether he was familiar with the term “jellylike 

lung tissue,” and the witness responded that he had not heard that term. 

Mr. Purcell then asked the witness how he would describe “emphysematous 

changes,” and when the court sustained defendants’ objections, Mr. Purcell asked the 

witness to define “blebs.” After the court sustained defendants’ objections to that 

question, Mr. Purcell asked the witness to agree that there are “things that can happen to 

the structure of the lung having nothing to do with cancer that can co-present where the 

structure of the lung is being made less solid uniformly.” Defendants again objected, and 

the court sustained the objection. Mr. Purcell continued to pursue the subject, referring to 

“whatever [plaintiff] has as a co-presentation.” Defendants objected, and the court 

ordered Mr. Purcell to “move off the subject.” Tr. at 2239-40.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts have inherent power to impose sanctions against attorneys and/or

litigants for "bad faith" conduct of litigation or for "willful disobedience" of a court order. 

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 

U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980); see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 

134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014). The court's inherent powers "are governed not by rule or 

statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as 

to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. 

Sanctions under the court's inherent power may be imposed either on motion of a party 

or by the court sua sponte. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765; In re Intel Sec. Litig., 791 

F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, these powers “must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” 

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Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44; Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764. “Before awarding 

sanctions pursuant to its inherent power, the court must make an express finding that the 

sanctioned party's behavior constituted or was tantamount to bad faith." Haeger v. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2016 WL 625099 at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2016), amending 

and superceding 793 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Bad faith may be found “in a variety of conduct stemming from ‘a full range of

litigation abuses.’” Id. (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47). The bad-faith requirement 

sets a “high threshold,” see Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131-

32 (9th Cir. 2008), which may be met by willful misconduct, or recklessness that is 

coupled with an improper purpose. See Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 

2001).

Once a district court makes a finding of bad faith, it has the discretion to “fashion 

an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial system.” Haeger, 2016 WL 

625099 at *10 (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45). “To protect against abuse and to 

ensure parties receive due process, individuals subject to sanction are afforded 

procedural protections, the nature of which varies depending upon the violation, and the 

type and magnitude of the sanction.” F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., 

Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001). “[F]or the court to sanction an attorney, 

procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Cole v. United 

States Dist. Court, 366 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. Analysis

As detailed above, Mr. Purcell engaged in a practice of refusing to abide by the 

orders of the court throughout the course of this litigation. As a result, the court was 

compelled to conduct numerous pretrial conferences, and to issue an unprecedented 

eight pretrial orders. For some time following the initial pretrial submissions in November 

2012, the court assumed that the failure to comply with the court’s orders and rules was a 

product of inattention or confusion on the part of plaintiff’s counsel. The court began to 

question that assumption as it became clearer that Mr. Purcell was simply unwilling to 

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cooperate with the court’s pretrial procedures. With the commencement of the trial, it 

became apparent to the court that Mr. Purcell was intentionally flouting the prior orders 

regarding what could and could not be admitted into evidence. 

The court issued the eighth final pretrial order on January 4, 2016, intending it as a 

summary and a guide for the parties so that there would be no question as to what 

evidence had been excluded by the numerous prior orders. As well, in an effort to 

streamline the objections, the court instructed the parties to object to evidence at trial by 

referring to the rulings listed in the appendix to the order. See Doc. 447. 

The eighth final pretrial order indicated that evidence of plaintiff’s smoking-related 

injuries other than lung cancer was not admissible. See Doc. 447-1 (citing Docs. 337, 

392, 406). The court had provided plaintiff with a full opportunity during the course of the 

litigation to oppose defendants’ motion to exclude this evidence. The ruling was 

straightforward, the exclusion of evidence was unambiguous, and the order was clear. 

Nevertheless, in direct violation of the order, Mr. Purcell insisted on attempting to 

question Dr. Horn, Dr. Chirieac, and Dr. Schroeder about the purported connection 

between COPD/emphysema and plaintiff’s lung cancer.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court hereby imposes sanctions on plaintiff’s 

counsel Gilbert L. Purcell, in the amount of $1,500, for his bad-faith violation of this 

court’s orders during the trial of the above-entitled action. This sanction shall be paid 

from Mr. Purcell’s personal funds, to the Clerk of the Court, no later than March 23, 2016. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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