Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05068/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05068-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

SHARON K. GRIFFIN PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-5068

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Sharon K. Griffin appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On April 12, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 10). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $3,602.03 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 24.16 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $148.00, and $26.35 in expenses. (Doc. # 11-12). Defendant has filed a response,

expressing no objection to this award. (Doc. # 13).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $148.00 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

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in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel did not attach a summary of the Consumer Price Index

or present evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's

counsel is not entitled to an award above the maximum statutory $125 per hour.

 We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 1.50 hours on April 18, 2005, to prepare a short two page motion

to proceed in forma pauperis, a short two page complaint and to have plaintiff sign a declaration

of poverty. We find the time requested to be excessive deduct 1.00 hour. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 15.75 hours for reviewing the transcript, researching

and writing plaintiff’s appeal brief. While the transcript consisted of 409 pages, there were no

unique or complex issues to be developed in this particular case. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently

represents social security plaintiff’s before this court and should be well versed in social security

law and we find that the time submitted for preparing this brief to be excessive. Therefore we

are reducing the number of hours submitted for the preparation of plaintiff’s brief to 11.00 hours.

Plaintiff’s counsel also seeks 3.50 hours on May 31, 2006, for the preparation of the

itemized billing and EAJA documents. We find the time sought on the above referenced date

to be excessive and deduct 2.00 hours from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

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Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $26.35 in expenses incurred with regard to the

postage and photocopying. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $26.35

to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 16.41 (24.16-7.75) attorney hours, at the rate of $125 per hour, and $26.35 in expenses, for

a total attorney's fee award of $2,077.60. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out

of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein underthe EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 6 day of July 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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