Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05616/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05616-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAZARIS ITALO FULLER,

Plaintiff,

 

v.

OFFICER CANTRELL, OFFICER R.

THOMAS, OFFICER TONG, OFFICER

POMEROY, SERGEANT DIXON, OFFICER

MOODY, OFFICER FORMAN, OFFICER

FUNK,

Defendants

 /

No. C-03-5616 MMC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DIRECTING

PLAINTIFF TO NOTIFY COURT

WHETHER HE SEEKS APPOINTMENT

OF PRO BONO COUNSEL

(Docket Nos. 23, 28)

Plaintiff, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants, all police officers employed by the

Richmond Police Department, for the use of excessive force during the course of his arrest. 

On January 21, 2004, this Court found plaintiff’s claims cognizable, and ordered defendants to

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or, in the alternative, to advise

the Court that defendants are of the opinion that the case cannot be resolved by such a

motion. Defendants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that there

are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Although

afforded ample time to do so, plaintiff has not filed an opposition. The Court nevertheless

treats the allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint as an opposing affidavit to the extent such

allegations are based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible

in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there

is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of

the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a

material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict

for the nonmoving party. See id.

The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding fact material if it might affect outcome

of suit under governing law, and that dispute about material fact is genuine "if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"). The moving party

bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to

"go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

 At summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party; if direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence

set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d

1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to

make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed

material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

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1

 These facts are set forth in declarations by Officer Forman and Officer Cantrell, as

well as in plaintiff’s deposition. (See Fitzgerald Decl. Ex. A).

2

 Candy also claims that plaintiff raped and sexually assaulted her, claims which

plaintiff denies.

3

 Plaintiff later explained to the police that he had planned to flee because he was on

parole, because he hit Candy, and because he assumed that the police would believe

Candy’s rape allegations.

3

Cir. 1987). 

B. Evidence Presented

Defendants have submitted evidence of the following undisputed facts in support of

their motion.1 On January 5, 2003, plaintiff met for the first time and befriended a woman by

the name of “Candy.” Over the course of that day, plaintiff and Candy continuously smoked

crack cocaine at various locations, eventually ending up in a public park portable toilet where

plaintiff hit Candy for not paying him for the cocaine.2 At 12:16 a.m., Officer Cantrell received

a report of a black man fighting with a woman in the park. Officer Cantrell, his partner Officer

Tong, and Officer Cantrell’s police dog “Arrow” arrived at the scene. After seeing the police

car arrive, plaintiff came out of the toilet. After Officer Cantrell asked plaintiff to come talk to

him, Candy appeared, yelling that she had been raped by plaintiff. At this point, plaintiff ran

away.3 Officer Tong did not pursue plaintiff and instead remained with Candy in the park. 

Upon receiving Sergeant Dixon’s approval to use dogs to apprehend plaintiff, Officer Cantrell,

Officer Forman and Officer Pomeroy, accompanied by their dogs, each searched the

surrounding residential area independently. After approximately one and a half hours, Officer

Forman’s dog tracked down plaintiff in a residential backyard, but plaintiff escaped by

punching the dog and jumping over a fence into an adjoining backyard, at which point Officer

Forman’s participation in the chase ceased. Officer Cantrell and Officer Pomeroy located

plaintiff immediately after plaintiff escaped from Officer Forman, at which point Officer

Pomeroy “pushed on the fence” and Officer Cantrell and Arrow then entered the yard.

Plaintiff’s and defendants’ accounts of what next happened diverge. According to

Officer Cantrell’s declaration, he ordered plaintiff to the ground, but plaintiff refused, saying,

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4

 None of these defendants has submitted a declaration, and Officer Cantrell provides

no statement as to the timing of their arrival.

4

“Fuck you.” (See Cantrell Decl. ¶¶ 29-30.) Officer Cantrell states that plaintiff then took steps,

and Officer Cantrell warned, “Stop or I’ll send my dog.” (See id. at ¶ 31.) Officer Cantrell

states that plaintiff took another step to see where Arrow was located, and that Officer Cantrell

then repeated his warning. (See id. at ¶¶ 32-33.) Finally, Officer Cantrell states that he

released Arrow to stop plaintiff’s escape because plaintiff took another step in an attempt to

flee. (See id. at ¶ 34.) Officer Cantrell states that the attack lasted “under one minute,” (see

id. at ¶ 39), after which Officers Thomas, Moody and Funk handcuffed Plaintiff. (See id. at ¶

40.)4 

Plaintiff’s account differs significantly. According to his verified complaint, plaintiff

surrendered once he knew he was surrounded by the officers. Although plaintiff does not,

either in his complaint or deposition, differentiate between the officers by name, he initially

stated at his deposition, “There was four police back there,” (see Fitzgerald Decl. (Fuller

Deposition) Ex. A at 41), and later stated, “There was at least four of them,” (see id. at 44).

According to plaintiff, he was told to “freeze,” and he then complied with the officers’ orders:

“They said, get on your knees; I get on my knees. They say, get on the ground; get on the

ground. Put your hands behind your back; I put my hands behind my back.” (See id.) Plaintiff

states in his complaint that at this point he was not armed, combative or resistant. (See Fuller

Complaint at 3.) Plaintiff further states that Officer Cantrell nonetheless ordered Arrow to

attack him, and that the attack resulted in a gash in his neck that has left him paralyzed in the

face. (See id.) According to plaintiff, the attack lasted approximately 16 seconds. (See

Fitzgerald Decl. (Fuller Deposition) Ex. A at 41.)

C. Legal Claims

Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that defendants used

excessive force during the course of his arrest, and assert qualified immunity as the basis for

their motion. A qualified immunity defense requires the court to first ask whether, based on

the facts taken in the light most favorable to the injured party, the officer’s conduct violated a

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constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If no violation occurred,

the inquiry ends. See id. If a violation occurred, however, the court’s next inquiry is whether

plaintiff’s right was clearly established at the time of the event in question. See id. 

1. Use of Force

Excessive force claims that arise in the context of an arrest or seizure invoke the

protection of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S.

Const. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Whether the amount of

force used in a seizure or arrest is excessive is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s

“objectively reasonable standard,” which requires a careful balancing of “the nature and quality

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” See id. at 396. The fact-specific inquiry considers (1) the

severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers and others, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to escape. See id. Although these factors guide the reasonableness analysis, they are not

exclusive and are not to be applied mechanically. See id. Further, the reasonableness

standard must be applied objectively, in that the facts are viewed from the perspective of the

officer at the time of the incident rather than in hindsight, and without examining the officer’s

underlying intent or motivation. See id. at 397. 

Plaintiff has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Officer

Cantrell used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed earlier,

plaintiff and Officer Cantrell dispute the circumstances under which Officer Cantrell released

Arrow. On the one hand, Officer Cantrell states that despite repeatedly ordering plaintiff to

surrender and warning plaintiff of the possibility of his releasing Arrow, plaintiff defiantly

attempted to flee. On the other hand, plaintiff states in his deposition that he followed Officer

Cantrell’s orders and fully surrendered by dropping to the ground, getting on his knees, and

putting his arms behind his back. 

As discussed, the Court, for summary judgment purposes, must view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case the plaintiff. If direct evidence

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produced by the plaintiff contradicts evidence produced by the defendants, the Court must

assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the plaintiff with respect to that fact. See Leslie v.

Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, if plaintiff’s account as to when

he surrendered is accepted, Officer Cantrell’s conduct cannot, for purposes of summary

judgment, be considered reasonable. See Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087 (9th

Cir. 1998) (holding officer used excessive force in not calling off attack by police dog after

plaintiff had surrendered). Although defendants rely on two cases in which use of police dogs

in apprehending suspects was found reasonable, see Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959,

968 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding use of dog to “bite and hold” fleeing suspect’s arm until deputy

arrived on scene not excessive force in violation of Fourth Amendment); Mendoza v. Block, 27

F.3d 1357, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding use of dog to locate and restrain suspect until he

stopped struggling objectively reasonable under circumstances), such cases are

distinguishable from the instant case as in both instances the dogs were used to apprehend

suspects while the suspects were still actively evading arrest. See Miller v. Clark County, 340

F.3d at 967-68; see also Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d at 1358. Accordingly, Officer Cantrell is

not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether he violated plaintiff’s constitutional

rights.

Defendants further argue that, at a minimum, all of the officers other than Officer

Cantrell, none of whom exerted control over Arrow, should be dismissed. As described

above, Officer Cantrell states that Officer Pomeroy “pushed on the fence” prior to Officer

Cantrell’s discovering plaintiff, and that Officers Moody, Thomas and Funk arrested plaintiff

after the attack. Under certain circumstances, police officers may be held liable where they

have an opportunity to intercede, but fail to do so, when their fellow officers violate a plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See U.S. v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Pursuant to

a long line of civil cases, police officers have a duty to intercede where their fellow officers

violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.”); cf. Cunningham v. Gates, 229

F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding officers not present at time of shooting not liable

for failing to intercede to prevent shooting of plaintiff, as they had no “realistic opportunity” to

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intercede.) 

Here, Officers Pomeroy, Thomas, Moody and Funk are not entitled to summary

judgment on the issue of whether they violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As noted,

plaintiff, in his deposition, states that at the time of the attack, there were “at least four” officers

present. According to Officer Cantrell, he and Officer Pomeroy discovered plaintiff’s

whereabouts, and Officer Pomeroy “pushed on the fence” before Officer Cantrell and Arrow

entered the yard. While Officer Cantrell does not state that Officer Pomeroy also entered the

yard or that Officer Pomeroy witnessed the attack, he does not state that Officer Pomeroy was

absent. On this record, a trier of fact reasonably could infer that Officer Pomeroy was in fact

present on the scene at the time the attack was ordered. Similarly, while plaintiff does not

name the officers present at the time of the attack, his statement that there were “at least four”

officers present is not inconsistent with Officer Cantrell’s placing Officers Thomas, Moody and

Funk at the scene. Again, a trier of fact reasonably could infer that these three defendants

likewise were present at the time the attack was ordered. Although it might be argued that

Officers Pomeroy, Thomas, Moody and Funk did not interfere because Arrow only responds to

Officer Cantrell, or that there was insufficient time for a bystander to intercede, see U.S. v.

Koon, 34 F.3d at 1448 n. 26 (noting, “if the blows had been struck so rapidly that Koon had no

realistic opportunity to intervene, he would not be liable”), defendants here submitted no

evidence to support either such finding. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could find each of the officers on the scene at the time

Officer Cantrell ordered the attack had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede. See Cunningham

v. Gates, 229 F.3d at 1290. 

A similar inference cannot be drawn with respect to the remaining three defendants,

however. As noted, Officers Tong and Forman were not physically present at the time of the

attack, nor is there evidence that Sergeant Dixon, who initially gave approval to use a dog to

apprehend a fleeing suspect, was present at the scene or otherwise made aware of plaintiff’s

surrender. In sum, there is no evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn that

Officer Tong, Officer Forman, or Sergeant Dixon had a realistic opportunity to intervene in

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Arrow’s attack on plaintiff. Consequently, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether these defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, Officer Tong, Officer Forman, and Sergeant Dixon are entitled to summary

judgment. 

2. Clearly Established Constitutional Right

The Court next considers whether the constitutional right at issue was “clearly

established.” See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In determining whether a right

is “clearly established, the key question is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” See id. at 202. Because an

officer “might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as

to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances,” qualified immunity can

serve as a valid defense if the officer’s mistake was reasonable. See id. at 205. In excessive

force cases, therefore, qualified immunity operates to protect officers from the sometimes

“hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” See id. at 206.

Here, given plaintiff’s version of the events, Officers Cantrell, Pomeroy, Thomas, Moody

and Funk are not entitled to qualified immunity. Officer Cantrell’s conduct in ordering Arrow to

attack plaintiff after he surrendered cannot be construed as a reasonable mistaken

understanding as to whether the amount of force used was legal. See Watkins v. Oakland,

145 F.3d at 1093 (affirming district court’s denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment,

on ground it was “clearly established” that authorizing dog attack on surrendered suspect was

unconstitutional). Similarly, the failure to intercede on the part of Officers Pomeroy, Thomas,

Moody and Funk cannot be construed as a reasonable mistaken understanding as to their

duty to do so. See U.S. v. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n. 25 (holding violation of constitutional right

by passive officer standing by no different than violation by officer delivering blows). 

Accordingly, Officers Cantrell, Pomeroy, Thomas, Moody and Funk are not entitled to

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders as follows:

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1. For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to defendants Forman, Tong, and Dixon, and DENIED as to the defendants

Cantrell, Pomeroy, Thomas, Moody and Funk. 

2. Because pro bono counsel may be available to represent plaintiff, plaintiff shall

file with the Court, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, a request for appointment

of counsel or a notice that plaintiff intends to proceed without an attorney. If plaintiff requests

appointment of counsel, the Court will endeavor to locate an attorney to represent him pro

bono, i.e., at no cost to plaintiff. Plaintiff is hereby advised that if plaintiff does not request

appointment of counsel, plaintiff will continue to proceed pro se and will be required to

represent himself in all future proceedings, including trial.

3. This order terminates Docket Nos. 23 and 28.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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