Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01999/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01999-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONQUIL THOMAS-WEISNER,

CDCR #AR-5757,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CONNIE GIPSON; PATRICK 

COVELLO; LANCE ESHELMAN; M. 

VOONG,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-1999-JAH-BGS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL;

3) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS 

GIPSON AND VOONG FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM; 

AND

4) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT 

AND SUMMONS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

Jonquil Thomas-Weisner (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State 

Prison (“CEN”) located in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff 

alleges Defendants violated his First Amendment rights and rights under the Religious 

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Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by revoking his right to receive 

a religious diet when he was previously housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”). (Id. at 4-5.) 

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2), along with a Motion to Appoint 

Counsel (ECF No. 3). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, 

prisoners who are granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in 

“increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 

(2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of 

whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. 

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate

Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate completed by a trust account official. See 

ECF No. 3 at 1-4; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1119. These documents show Plaintiff carried an average monthly balance of $395.56

and maintained $230.38 in average monthly deposits to his trust account for the 6-months 

preceding the filing of this action. See ECF No. 3 at 1.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $79.11 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The 

Court further directs the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect this initial 

filing fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this Order 

is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 

partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must 

be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 3.) However, there is 

no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 

U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). And while 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to “request” that an 

attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 

1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion may be exercised only under “exceptional 

circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider whether there is a 

‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is unable to articulate his 

claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Harrington v. Scribner,

785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970).

The Court agrees that pro se litigants may be better served with the assistance of 

counsel—but that is not the test. See Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 

1997) (affirming denial of counsel based on claims that pro se plaintiff “may well have 

fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert 

testimony.”), withdrawn in part on reh’g en banc and overruled on other grounds, 154 

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). “Concerns regarding investigation and discovery are ... not 

exceptional factors,” and while a pro se litigant “may not have vast resources or legal 

training,” these are simply among the commonly shared “types of difficulties encountered 

by many pro litigants.” Wells v. Washington State Dep’t of Corr., No. C13-234 

RJB/KLS, 2013 WL 4009076, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 2013).

Here, nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests he is incapable of articulating the 

factual basis for his claims, which are “relatively straightforward.” Harrington, 785 F.3d 

at 1309. In fact, the Court finds, based on its initial screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint 

under the standards of review discussed below, that he has pleaded sufficient factual 

content to state a plausible claim for relief. 

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In addition, while Plaintiff may have sufficiently pleaded claims at this preliminary 

stage of the proceedings, he has yet to demonstrate and it is too soon to tell whether there 

is a likelihood of success on the merits. Harrington, 785 F.3d at 1309; Cano v. Taylor, 

739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of counsel where prisoner could 

articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the issues involved, but did not show 

likelihood of succeed on the merits).

Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” exist at this preliminary 

stage of the case and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3) 

without prejudice on that basis. 

III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

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as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the 

Court may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A 

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 

n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 

426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may 

be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.)).

B. Factual allegations

On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff’s application for a religious diet was returned with 

“’denied’ written across it with no further explanation.” (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff “began 

the grievance process.” (Id.) Plaintiff received a “Second Level Response” to his 

grievance on October 17, 2018. (Id.) In this response, it was noted that Plaintiff “arrived 

to RJD on April of 2018” and “requested to be placed on the [religious] diet.” (Id.) This 

was treated as a “new request.” (Id.) A “review” of Plaintiff’s “canteen purchases was 

conducted, which revealed [Plaintiff] was purchasing items not consistent with the diet 

requested.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges defendants “did not follow guidelines” when denying 

Plaintiff’s request. (Id.)

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On August 3, 2018, Plaintiff arrived at CEN and “attempted to apply for [his] 

RMA diet to no avail.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff again initiated the grievance process. (See 

id.) Defendant Voong “denied both sets of appeals” at the “Third Level of Review.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages. 

(See id. at 7.)

C. Defendant Gipson

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Gipson liable because she is the “Director of the 

Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation” and is “legally responsible for overall 

operation” of the CDCR. (Compl. at 2.) There are no other allegations against Gipson 

contained in the body of Plaintiff’s Complaint. While Defendant Gipson may be subject 

to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff fails to include “further factual enhancement” to describes 

when, how, or to what extent, Defendant Gipson personally caused him any injury. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). There is no respondeat superior 

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 

1993). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, [Plaintiff] must 

plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 at 676; see also Jones v. Community 

Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even 

pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim).

Therefore, Defendant Gipson is DISMISSSED from this action for failing to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

D. Grievance Processing

Plaintiff also fails to state a plausible claim against Defendant Voong to the extent 

he challenges validity of his decisions with respect to the processing or outcomes of his 

grievances. (See Compl. at 4.)

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A prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or 

appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability. See generally 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to 

a specific prison grievance procedure.”) (citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not violated simply because defendant fails 

properly to process grievances submitted for consideration); see also Todd v. California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 615 Fed. Appx. 415, 415 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(district court properly dismissed claim based on improper “processing and handling of 

[...] prison grievances,” since prisoners have no “constitutional entitlement to a specific 

prison grievance procedure”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860) (quotation marks 

omitted); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 Fed. Appx. 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court 

properly dismissed section 1983 claims against defendants who “were only involved in 

the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860); Daniels v. Aguilera, No. 2:16-

CV-00996-JAM-CKD P, 2018 WL 558658, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2018), report and 

recommendation adopted sub nom. Daniels v. Aguillera, No. 2:16-CV-00996-JAM-CKD

P, 2018 WL 1763311 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018) (“Because there is no right to any 

particular grievance process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by 

ignoring or failing to properly process prison grievances.”).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations are simply insufficient to state a plausible 

claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-84 (citations 

omitted); Valdivia v. Tampkins, No. EDCV 16-1975 JFW (JC), 2016 WL 7378887, at *6 

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016) (sua sponte dismissing claims predicated upon the alleged 

improper processing of inmate grievances); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

E. First Amendment Free Exercise and RLUIPA Claims 

With respect to the First Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA claims alleged 

against Defendants Covello and Eshelman, however, the Court finds the allegations in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficient to survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte

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screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(discussing pleading standards for prisoner’s free exercise and equal protection claims 

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and RLUIPA).

Therefore, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of summons 

Plaintiff’s Complaint upon Defendants Covello and Eshelman on his behalf. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform 

all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be 

made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to 

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3).

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

3. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $79.11 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 

at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full 

$350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s 

account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE 

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

5. DISMISSES Defendants Gipson and Voong for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), 

1915A(b)(1

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6. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint as to 

Defendants Covello and Eshelman (ECF No. 1) and to forward it to Plaintiff along with 

a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each named Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will 

provide Plaintiff with certified copies of this Order, his Complaint, and the summons so 

that he may serve these Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must 

complete the USM Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, include an 

address where each named Defendant may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to 

S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1c., and return them to the United States Marshal according to the 

instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package.

7. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon Defendants Covello and Eshelman as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s 

provided to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

8. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone 

that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 

required to respond).

9. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

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Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or 

which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, or their counsel, may 

be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2020

Hon. John A. Houston

United States District Judge

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