Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01192/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01192-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-1192

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Craig Mershon,

Appellant,

v.

St. Louis University; St. Louis

University Board of Trustees;

Nancy Siwak, Trustee; Joseph

Hasten, Trustee; Jo Curran, Trustee;

Richard Baron, Trustee; Lawrence

Legrand, Trustee; Robin Smith,

Trustee,

Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: October 10, 2005

 Filed: April 5, 2006

________________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

________________

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

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1

The Honorable Henry Edward Autrey, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri. 

2

A "classified" graduate student is one who has been admitted into the graduate

school to pursue an advanced degree, an "unclassified" graduate student is not

formally pursuing a degree but is typically completing prerequisites for subsequent

degree pursuit or taking courses for educational enrichment, and a "conditional"

student typically has a classified application in progress and has been formally

admitted to permit the initiation of course work prior to full approval of classified

status. (Appellees' App. at 25.) 

-2-

Craig Mershon appeals the district court's1 grant of summary judgment to St.

Louis University and its trustees (collectively "the University") in this action alleging

a failure to accommodate and retaliation in violation of Title III of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000), and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). We affirm. 

I.

The following is a summary of the undisputed facts. Mershon is wheelchairbound and sight impaired due to complications of cerebral palsy. He took courses at

St. Louis University from 1997 through the spring of 2001 in both graduate and

undergraduate studies. Mershon first applied to the graduate school in 1997 to pursue

a Master of Arts degree in the Department of English as a classified student. While

the application process was pending and the University was awaiting the receipt of

necessary application materials, the University permitted Mershon to enroll in classes

as an unclassified graduate student and later upgraded his status, pursuant to

Mershon's request, to that of a conditional admit.2

 The University allowed him to

remain in conditional status for two terms instead of following the usual one-term

limit. When Mershon sought to change his proposed field of study from English to

American Studies, the graduate school granted this request, changed his field of study,

and reclassified his status from a conditional admit to an unclassified graduate student

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with an incomplete application. To complete his graduate school application, he still

needed to submit additional materials. 

In early August 1998, the University granted Mershon's application to enroll in

the College of Arts and Sciences as an undergraduate student on a probationary basis,

due to his poor academic performance (he had a cumulative graduate grade point

average of 1.417) (Appellees’ App. at 21). This status rendered him ineligible to

maintain his enrollment as an unclassified graduate student. Mershon stated that he

received several requested accommodations from 1998 through 2000, including large

print materials, a tape recorder, note takers, and extra time. (Appellant's App.,

Mershon's Depo. at 19-20.) The University changed his status from probationary to

that of a classified student with an undeclared major to enable him to qualify for

financial aid because he was not eligible for financial assistance from the state

vocational rehabilitation agency when he was not taking graduate-level courses. After

the fall 1998 term, his undergraduate GPA was 3.5. His cumulative GPA fell to 3.0

by the spring 1999 term, and by the end of the spring semester for the 1999-2000

academic year, Mershon's cumulative GPA had fallen to 2.423 as a probationary

undergraduate student. (See Appellees’ App. at 20.) Mershon asserts that the

University stopped providing accommodations in 2000, resulting in his inability to

complete course work for a number of courses. 

In July 2000, Mershon requested reinstatement as an unclassified graduate

student. This status would entitle him to certain benefits and financial support from

the state rehabilitation agency. Dr. Mancini, the Chair of the Department of American

Studies, refused to allow Mershon to enroll in a graduate-level American Studies

course until he completed his graduate school application, eliminated several

incomplete undergraduate grades, and was admitted to the graduate school. Mershon's

graduate school application would not be complete until he had taken and submitted

his Graduate Record Examination General Test score and submitted a combined

autobiographical sketch/statement of career goals. Mershon protested this decision

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by meeting with the University's Associate Provost, Dr. Ellen Harshman. Mershon

explained his need to be an unclassified graduate student in order to obtain benefits

and financial support from the state rehabilitation agency, but Dr. Harshman would

not interfere with Dr. Mancini's academic judgment. Dr. Harshman stated in her

affidavit that she had several meetings with Mershon regarding academic matters,

library privileges, and accommodation concerns. Dr. Harshman stated that she had

to instruct Mershon to limit his contact with her office staff because his behavior was

aggressive and upsetting to her staff. 

In October 2000, Mershon petitioned the graduate school to be classified as an

unclassified graduate student in the American Studies Department. The University

granted the petition, certified him as eligible to receive federal financial aid, and

changed his status from a classified undergraduate student to an unclassified graduate

student with an open and incomplete application file to become a graduate student in

American Studies. As such, to register for a particular graduate course, Mershon was

required to obtain prior permission of the department chair of any department offering

a course he wished to take. During both the fall 2000 and spring 2001 terms, Mershon

attempted 12 credit hours and earned 0 credit hours. In January 2001, the Chair of the

History Department denied Mershon's request to register as an unclassified graduate

student in a graduate-level history course because Mershon had not been formally

admitted into that department's graduate program, his GPA was below the standard

accepted by the department, and he lacked adequate undergraduate course preparation.

In May 2001, the University's Director of Financial Aid disqualified Mershon

from receiving federal financial aid because he did not meet the academic progress

requirements established by federal regulation – his cumulative GPA as an

unclassified graduate student was 1.214 in the spring of 2001 (Appellees’ App. at 22),

and his cumulative GPA in undergraduate-level courses was 2.4 (id. at 20). Mershon

registered for three courses in August 2001, but the University administratively

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dropped his enrollment because he failed to make adequate payment of tuition, as

required of all students. 

In November 2001, Jan Chapin, an investigator for the Office for Civil Rights,

United States Department of Education, reported to Officer David Wright of the

United States Federal Protection Services (now part of the Department of Homeland

Security) that Mershon had contacted her by telephone regarding a potential complaint

of discrimination against the University. She represented to Officer Wright that

during their phone conversation Mershon had twice stated, "[M]y professor makes me

so mad that I want to put a bullet in his head." (Appellant's Add. at 9.) She reported

that Mershon disclosed to her that the professor of whom he spoke was Dr. Matthew

Mancini, who, as Chair of the Department of American Studies, had previously

refused Mershon admission to a graduate level course. 

Officer Wright contacted Jack Titone, the University's Director of Public

Safety, and relayed the report made by Chapin. Director Titone, in turn, consulted the

Associate Provost for Enrollment Management, Edwin Harris, informing him of the

threats and requesting confirmation of whether Mershon was currently enrolled as a

student or could be restricted from campus. Harris confirmed that Mershon was not

enrolled and agreed that the University could prohibit him from entering its premises.

Director Titone then issued a directive to University Department of Public Safety

Officers informing them that Mershon should be prohibited from entering the campus

because of the threats he had made against a professor. The same day, three officers

stopped Mershon from entering the campus.

Mershon filed suit against the University and its trustees, asserting

discrimination on the basis of his disability in the failure to accommodate him while

he was a student and retaliation for expelling him from campus after he complained

of the failure to accommodate. The district court granted the University's motion for

summary judgment, concluding that Mershon had failed to present any evidence of

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a retaliatory motive in his expulsion from campus or of a failure to accommodate.

Mershon appeals. 

II.

"We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. In doing so we apply the same standard

as the district court and may affirm on any grounds supported by the record."

Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record "show[s] that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude

the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). While summary judgment must be used with caution in discrimination cases

due to the fact-specific nature of each case, it nonetheless may be proper "when a

plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of [the] case."

Simpson, 425 F.3d at 542 (internal quotations omitted). 

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, we analyze discrimination

and retaliation claims under the burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and refined in Texas Dep't of Comty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502 (1993). See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir. 1999). We

analyze claims of failure to accommodate under "a modified burden-shifting analysis,"

because a discriminatory intent is not at issue. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766

(8th Cir. 2004) (internal marks omitted). 

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3

We will refer only to the ADA, but the legal principles involved are equally

applicable to claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See Perkins v. St. Louis County

Water Co., 160 F.3d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Hoyt v. St. Mary's Rehab. Ctr.,

711 F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that retaliation against persons who make

complaints under the Rehabilitation Act is actionable). 

-7-

A. Retaliation

Mershon argues that the district court erred in finding that he failed to establish

a prima facie case of retaliation. The ADA prohibits discrimination against any

individual who has opposed an unlawful act of discrimination, made a charge of

discrimination, or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under

the ADA.3

 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation and

survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that he engaged in a

statutorily protected activity, (2) that an adverse action was taken against him, and (3)

a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected activity." Amir, 184

F.3d at 1025. If this prima facie showing is made, "the burden then shifts to the

defendant to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." Id.

at 1025-26 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07). "The burden of production then shifts

back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's reason is a pretext for

discrimination." Id. at 1026 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08). 

Mershon established a prima facie case sufficient to shift the burden of

production to the University. He demonstrated (1) that in November 2001 he called

Jan Chapin of the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of

Education to complain that he believed the University was not accommodating his

disability, which is a statutorily protected activity; (2) that the University took an

adverse action against him by banning him from the campus; and (3) that the adverse

action, which occurred the very next day when he attempted to enter the campus, was

causally related to his telephone call to Chapin. The burden then shifted to the

University to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse

action. The University presented evidence indicating that Mershon's complaint to

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Chapin was perceived as a threat to harm a professor and that campus security simply

acted to protect the University faculty and students from threatened violence. The

district court concluded that Mershon failed to present evidence sufficient to show that

the University's decision to ban him from campus was a mere pretext for disability

discrimination rather than a legitimate response to a perceived threat. After a

thorough review of the record, we agree. 

Mershon argues that he never threatened to harm Dr. Mancini when he spoke

to Chapin, and thus, a question of fact existed and the district court impermissibly

resolved a credibility determination. In the summary judgment context, we accept

Mershon's statements of fact and do not resolve credibility disputes. See Yates v.

Rexton, Inc., 267 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2001) ("In determining whether a plaintiff

has met its burden with respect to pretext in a summary judgment motion, a district

court is prohibited from making a credibility judgment or a factual finding from

conflicting evidence."). Whether Mershon actually made threats to harm Dr. Mancini

was a fact in dispute, but this fact did not preclude summary judgment. Although

Mershon denied having made the threats to harm Dr. Mancini, Mershon admitted that

he made a phone call to Chapin complaining about Dr. Mancini's refusal to allow him

to register and the University's alleged failure to accommodate him. Mershon did not

dispute that Chapin sincerely perceived that he had made a threat against Dr. Mancini,

nor did he dispute that Chapin communicated to others her perception that he had

made a threat. (Appellees' Add. at 10-11.) Cf. Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d

756, 762 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he proper inquiry is not whether AT&T was factually

correct in determining that Johnson had made the bomb threats. Rather, the proper

inquiry is whether AT&T honestly believed that Johnson had made the bomb

threats.") Thus, even assuming as true that Mershon never threatened to harm Dr.

Mancini, there is no dispute that the University reasonably believed and acted upon

Chapin's report and her perception that Mershon had made a threat against a faculty

member. The district court did not make an impermissible credibility determination.

See Euerle-Wehle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 1999)

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(concluding that the defendant, not the district court, had made the credibility

determinations and had done so "reasonably and in good faith").

 Once the University set forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse action of banning Mershon from campus, Mershon had the burden to establish

"that he was the victim of intentional discrimination 'by showing that the

[University's] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).

Mershon made no showing that the University's proffered explanation for the adverse

action was false or that the University acted in bad faith in relying on Chapin's report.

To the contrary, Mershon admitted that the University acted upon a perceived threat

when it banned him from the campus. Even assuming, as Mershon asserts, that this

underlying reason was false because he had in fact made no threat, Mershon presented

no evidence from which to conclude that the University officials knew or even

suspected as much. Cf. Johnson, 422 F.3d at 763 (stating that "even if AT&T was

mistaken in its belief that Michael Johnson had made the threats, any such mistake

does not automatically prove that AT&T was instead motivated by unlawful

discrimination;" asserted reason must be a pretext for discrimination). 

Mershon asserts that the short amount of time between his conversation with

Chapin and the University's adverse action against him is suspicious and lends an

inference of discrimination on account of his disability. Our review of the record

convinces us that the timing of Mershon's expulsion from campus casts no doubt on

the veracity of the University's explanation. The close proximity between his

conversation with Chapin and the University's swift action instead supports its

assertion that it acted quickly out of a legitimate concern for the safety of its faculty

and students, and nothing in the record indicates that the University's explanation was

a mere pretext for discrimination. See Euerle-Wehle, 181 F.3d at 900 (finding no

pretext where there was no evidence that the reasons given were an attempt "to

disguise an illegal discriminatory motive").

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B. Failure to Accommodate

Mershon argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on

his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims that the University failed to provide him with

reasonable accommodations for his disability. Title III of the ADA prohibits a private

person who owns a place of public accommodation from discriminating against an

individual "on the basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public

accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Discrimination under Title III specifically

includes the failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or

procedure to accommodate a disabled individual, unless the entity can demonstrate

that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the services.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 

Likewise, the Rehabilitation Act requires reasonable accommodations when an

"otherwise qualified" disabled student, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), "would otherwise be

denied meaningful access to a university," Stern v. Univ. of Osteopathic Med. &

Health Sciences, 220 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2000). Title III of the ADA does not

expressly articulate an "otherwise qualified" standard (in most circumstances, no

qualifications are required to enjoy a public accommodation as secured by Title III).

Basic qualifications come into play, however, when the context is that of postsecondary education. In this context, the "otherwise qualified" idea is implicit in Title

III's acknowledgment, noted above, that requested modifications need not be provided

if they will fundamentally alter the nature of the program. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). It is beyond question that it would fundamentally alter the

nature of a graduate program to require the admission of a disabled student who

cannot, with reasonable accommodations, otherwise meet the academic standards of

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While there are minor differences between Title III of the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act, none of those differences are material in this case. We will

therefore consider cases dealing with each Act as "applicable and interchangeable."

Stern, 220 F.3d at 908 (internal quotations omitted). See Amir, 184 F.3d at 1029 n.5

(noting Rehabilitation Act claims are analyzed similar to ADA claims, except for the

Rehabilitation Act's requirement that a person's disability serve as the sole impetus for

an adverse action); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The ADA

has no federal funding requirement, but it is otherwise similar in substance to the

Rehabilitation Act, and cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable."

(internal marks omitted)).

5

The statement of elements for a Title III discrimination claim listed in Amir

also includes the element of an adverse action based upon the plaintiff's disability.

184 F.3d at 1027. We eliminate that stated element from our rendition of the standard

in this case only because Mershon alleges a failure to accommodate as the sole act of

discrimination here (apart from retaliation which is separately analyzed above).

Because the alleged failure to accommodate is the adverse action and no other act is

claimed as discriminatory, there is no requirement to demonstrate any adverse action

other than the failure to accommodate itself. See Peebles, 354 F.3d at 766 (noting that

the failure to accommodate is a separate form of prohibited discrimination). 

-11-

the program. An educational institution is not required by the Rehabilitation Act or

the ADA to lower its academic standards for a professional degree.4

Thus, in the higher education context, a person alleging a failure to

accommodate under Title III or the Rehabilitation Act must show (1) that the plaintiff

is disabled and otherwise qualified academically, (2) that the defendant is a private

entity that owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation (for ADA

purposes) and receives federal funding (for Rehabilitation Act purposes), and (3) "that

the defendant failed to make reasonable modifications that would accommodate the

plaintiff's disability without fundamentally altering the nature of the public

accommodation," Amir, 184 F.3d at 1027.5

 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). 

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First, there is no real dispute here that Mershon is disabled within the meaning

of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Second, St. Louis University is a place of

public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA and receives federal funding

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. See Amir, 184 F.3d at 1028 (holding that "St.

Louis University maintains both an undergraduate division as well as graduate

programs in such areas as law, business, and medicine. Hence, it is a place of public

accommodation under the ADA.").

As to the third requirement, Mershon bears the initial burden of demonstrating

that he requested reasonable accommodations, see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535

U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002), and that those accommodations would render him otherwise

qualified for admission to the professional degree program, see Falcone v. Univ. of

Minn., 388 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2305 (2005). In his

affidavit, Mershon vaguely asserts that he sent numerous letters and made phone calls

to University officials between 1998 and 2001 requesting accommodations and that

he was unable to complete course work due to the University's failure to provide them.

Mershon admits, however, that the University provided several of his requested

accommodations from 1998 through sometime in 2000, such as large print materials

from one professor, a tape recorder, note takers, and extra time, and he stated that he

had obtained his own software. He also asserts that the University stopped providing

accommodations in 2000 and also asserts that he never received priority registration,

computer software, tape recorded lectures, books on tape, and enlarged print

documents and books. 

We conclude that Mershon's assertions are much too general and conclusory to

demonstrate that he requested reasonable specific accommodations that would have

rendered him qualified for admission into the graduate school or that the University

unreasonably failed to provide every requested accommodation. The district court

found, "Plaintiff's academic record is replete with defendants' efforts to accommodate

him in his academic endeavors until he became a perceived threat." (Appellant's Add.

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at 17.) We agree with the district court that the record indicates the University offered

Mershon many accommodations, such as many changes in his academic status and

permission to remain in conditional academic status longer than school policy

permitted, as well as the accommodations that he admitted receiving in some classes.

Mershon's list of accommodations that he did not receive does not specifically identify

which were sought and rejected for any particular course, nor does he explain how

each requested accommodation was necessary to enable him to participate in light of

his disabilities and the particular course requirements. His conclusory assertions that

he made many phone calls and wrote many letters provide no basis for evaluating

whether each request was adequately communicated to the University regarding a

specific course or whether each was necessary to enable him to participate in a

particular course in light of his disability. See Stern, 220 F.3d at 908 ("In order to be

a reasonable accommodation, any modifications requested in a program must be

related to the disability.")

Mershon complains that the University stopped providing accommodations

sometime in 2000 and that this resulted in several incomplete grades in courses that

he does not identify and for reasons not clearly articulated. Again, even accepting his

conclusory allegations as true, Mershon's lack of specificity is an obstacle to

determining whether he requested and was denied reasonable accommodations. "A

plaintiff may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but must

substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a

finding in his favor." Bass v. SBC Communications, Inc., 418 F.3d 870, 872-73 (8th

Cir. 2005). 

The record also indicates that Mershon never completed his graduate school

application, he lacked undergraduate course work preparation, and his overall

academic performance was not up to the standard necessary for admission into the

graduate school. "When the accommodation involves an academic decision, 'courts

should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.'" Amir, 184 F.3d

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at 1028 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)). See

Falcone, 388 F.3d at 659 ("'We will not invade a university's province concerning

academic matters in the absence of compelling evidence that the academic policy is

a pretext for [disability] discrimination.'") (quoting Amir, 184 F.3d at 1029, and

alteration in original). Mershon has not demonstrated that he was otherwise qualified,

with reasonable specific accommodations, to meet the prerequisites for admission into

the graduate school program. 

Mershon also asserts that the University failed to engage in an interactive

process despite his "countless letters, phone calls, and personal visits" attempting to

obtain accommodations. (Appellant's Br. at 21.) "Even if such an interactive process

is required in an academic setting," Stern, 220 F.3d at 909, Mershon nevertheless

would bear the initial burden of demonstrating that reasonable accommodations

would render him qualified for admission into the graduate school. Mershon failed

to do so. 

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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