Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00005/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRIMUS GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 

HEALTH, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-00005-WHO 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 40

INTRODUCTION

Primus Group, Inc. (“Primus”) and Institute for Environmental Health, Inc. (“IEH”) ask 

me to construe a single term from the two patents asserted in this case: IEH’s '143 Patent (Patent 

Number 8,882,143, issued September 2, 2014) is titled “Modular Compositing-Multiple Lot 

Screening Protocols for Detection of Pathogens, Microbial Contaminants and/or Constituents;” its

‘771 Patent (Patent Number 9,637,771, issued May 2, 2017) is titled “Modular CompositingMultiple Lot Screening Protocols for Detection of Pathogens, Microbial Contaminants and/or 

Constituents.” The patents in suit both describe a method for testing of multiple lots of a product 

for microbiological contamination. For the reasons stated below, I adopt IEH’s proposed 

construction.

LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 

U.S. 370, 372 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

Terms contained in claims are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics, 

90 F.3d at 1582. In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court begins with the 

intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of the claim language, the patent specification, and, if in 

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evidence, the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 

see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “A claim term used in multiple claims should be construed 

consistently . . . .” Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 

1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

“The appropriate starting point [ ] is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.” 

Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he ordinary 

and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date 

of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “There are only two exceptions to this 

general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when 

the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during 

prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not 

only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of 

the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “Claims speak to those 

skilled in the art,” but “[w]hen the meaning of words in a claim is in dispute, the specification and 

prosecution history can provide relevant information about the scope and meaning of the claim.” 

Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). “[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. 

Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 

90 F.3d at 1582. “However, claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only 

in the specification.” Id. “Thus, although the specifications may well indicate that certain 

embodiments are preferred, particular embodiments appearing in a specification will not be read 

into the claims when the claim language is broader than such embodiments.” Id. “[T]he 

description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms 

used in the claims,” and the “patentee is free to be his own lexicographer,” but “any special 

definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the specification.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 

989–90.

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On the other hand, it is a fundamental rule that “claims must be construed so as to be 

consistent with the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. “The construction that stays true to 

the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, 

in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 

1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Finally, the Court may consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence. 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history may “inform the meaning of the claim 

language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor 

limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would 

otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–83); see also Chimie 

v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the 

prosecution history in construing a claim is to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed 

during prosecution.”) (internal quotations omitted).

In most situations, analysis of this intrinsic evidence alone will resolve claim construction 

disputes. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. However, “it is entirely appropriate . . . for a court to consult 

trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent 

file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in 

the pertinent technical field.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 

(Fed. Cir. 1999). Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the patent and 

prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. All extrinsic evidence should be evaluated in light of the intrinsic 

evidence, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319, and courts should not rely on extrinsic evidence in claim 

construction to contradict the meaning of claims discernible from examination of the claims, the 

written description, and the prosecution history, Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (citing Vitronics, 

90 F.3d at 1583). While extrinsic evidence may guide the meaning of a claim term, such evidence 

is less reliable than intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19.

DISCUSSION

The asserted patents describe a method for testing products for microbial contamination. 

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The method involves taking samples of test lots and combining a portion of those samples with 

other lots to create a separate composited lot sample. Then portions of multiple separate 

composited lot samples are combined to form a pooled modular composite sample which is then 

tested for the target microorganism. If the pooled modular composite sample tests positive for the 

target microorganism (i.e., is contaminated), the separate composited lot samples are tested to 

narrow down which test lots contain the microorganism. The disputed claim term relates to the 

initial collection of product from the test lot that will later be used to make up the composited lot 

sample and, ultimately, the pooled modular composite sample.

As an initial matter, the parties agree to the following constructions, with respect to terms 

used in the ‘143 and ‘771 patents:

To “validate” means to “determine that a particular sample tests negative using the 

detection assay.” Opening Claim Construction Brief at 4-5 [Dkt. No. 40];

“Enriching” means “incubating a sample under conditions suitable to allow levels of a 

target agent/organism that is present to reach detectable levels and become uniform or 

substantially uniform.” Id.; and

A “selective agent” means an “agent that inhibits competing non-target microbe(s).” Id.

I. THE DISPUTED CLAIM TERM

The parties ask me to construe the following claim term:

CLAIM TERM IEH’S PROPOSED 

CONSTRUCTION

PRIMUS’S PROPOSED 

CONSTRUCTION1

Separately collecting multiple 

independent samples from 

each of the multiple separate 

lots

Collecting multiple samples 

from different, noncontiguous locations from 

each of multiple separate lots

Collecting multiple portions 

from each of multiple lots

Primus argues that the claim language does not support collecting samples from noncontiguous locations, as it runs contrary to the ordinary meaning of the words “separately,” 

“independent,” or “samples.” Primus’s Responsive Claims Construction Brief at 6 [Dkt. No. 43]. 

 

1

In Primus’s responsive claims construction brief, it contends that “sample” and “portion” are 

interchangeable and their proposed construction could also be “Collecting multiple samples from 

each of multiple lots”. Resp. at 12 n.5.

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It contends that, when read in conjunction with the second portion of the claim term (“wherein 

each separate test lot is separately sampled by taking said multiple independent samples thereof”),

“separately” contemplates separate acts of collection from separate test lots, not separate samples 

from separate lots. Id. at 6-7. It also asserts that independent does not mean “from noncontiguous locations,” that spatial non-contiguity is not an inherent characteristic of samples, and 

that sampling from non-contiguous locations has nothing to do with the purpose of the claimed 

invention. Id. at 7-10.

I disagree. The words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary 

meaning” that “the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time 

of the invention . . . .” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). “The person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not 

only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of 

the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In the context of the 

asserted patents, a “sample” can only be understood to have a probative purpose because the entire 

point of the asserted patents is to test for contamination. If, as Primus argues, unrepresentative 

samples could be used, then any results reached under the asserted patents, either in the separate 

composited lot samples or the pooled modular composite sample, would have limited probative 

value. The use of unrepresentative samples would be commercially useless because results based 

on unrepresentative samples have little predictive power to identify the presence of microorganism 

contaminants.

Primus’s argument that “independent” does not mean “from non-contiguous locations” is 

similarly flawed. Resp. at 7-8. In order to have a representative sample of a given test lot, the 

portions of the product that constitute the sample must be taken from non-contiguous locations to 

be effective. Primus contends that fluids or liquids are homogenous and as a result, there is no 

reason to take non-contiguous samples. This is also nonsensical--a volume of fluid or air is not 

necessarily homogenous. The air near a wildfire is not the same as the air a mile away. The water 

in a lake is not homogenous when on one bank there sits an oil refinery and on the other a petting 

zoo.

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IEH’s construction clarifies the claim term. I construe the claim term as “Collecting 

multiple samples from different, non-contiguous locations from each of multiple separate lots.”

I recognize the “fine line between construing the claims in light of the specification and 

improperly importing a limitation from the specification into the claims[,]” but this construction is 

the only way “to capture the scope of the actual invention, rather than . . . allow the claim 

language to become divorced from what the specification conveys is the invention.” Huawei 

Techs., Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-CV-02787-WHO, 2017 WL 7058419, at *8 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 31, 2017) (citing Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 

1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

CONCLUSION

The claim term is construed as follows: “Separately collecting multiple independent 

samples from each of the multiple separate lots” means “Collecting multiple samples from 

different, non-contiguous locations from each of multiple separate lots”.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2019

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

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