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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL\inited Stares ~rt ~f Appeals Tenth Cr~nm 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAR 211991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

RAMONA RAYE MATLOCK; PHILLIP A. Clerk 

SHEPARD; FARLEY GENE JORDAN; 

HUBERT COY GILBERT, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

TOWN OF HARRAH, OKLAHOMA; BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES OF THE TOWN OF HARRAH, 

OKLAHOMA; GARY MIXON, individually 

and as Trustee of the Town of Hurrah; 

KEVIN SPAETH, individually and as a 

Trustee of the Town of Harrah; 

BEN JORSKI, individually and as a 

Trustee of the Town of Harrah, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

LOUIE ANDERSON, individually and a 

Trustee of the Town of Harrah; BOB J. 

COLLIER, individually, 

Defendants. 

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) No. 89-6295 

) (D.C. No. CIV-88-1097-A) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6295 Document: 010110031293 Date Filed: 03/21/1991 Page: 1 
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, plaintiffs 

alleged violations of their due process, equal protection, and 

first amendment rights in connection with their termination of 

employment with the Town of Harrah, Oklahoma. Plaintiffs also 

asserted several pendent state law claims. Defendants, in their 

summary judgment motion, raised the defense of qualified immunity. 

Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 

court 1) denied plaintiffs' summary judgment motion in toto, 

2) granted summary judgment to defendants as to the section 1983 

claims of plaintiffs Jordan and Gilbert, resulting also in the 

dismissal of their pendent state c·laims, 3) granted summary 

judgment to defendants as to the remaining plaintiffs' due process 

and equal protection claims, 4) denied summary judgment to 

defendants on the remaining plaintiffs' first amendment claims, 

and 5) denied qualified immunity to the individual defendants as 

to the first amendment claims. Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment on the remaining plaintiffs' state claims was granted in 

part and denied in part. 

This appeal arises from the district court's denial of 

qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial 

Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the denial of summary 

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is a collateral order, 

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Appellate Case: 89-6295 Document: 010110031293 Date Filed: 03/21/1991 Page: 2 
immediately appealable. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 

(1985). As such, the denial of qualified immunity is a final 

decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which we review de novo. McEvoy 

v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 465 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Defendants' notice of appeal lists as appellants the Town of 

Harrah and the Harrah Board of Trustees, together with defendants 

Mixon, Spaeth, and Jorski, individually and as trustees of the 

Town of Harrah. Defendants appeal only the district court's 

denial of qualified immunity. See Appellants' Brief at 4. 

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available only to 

individuals. Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Therefore, appellants Town of Harrah and the Harrah Board of 

Trustees have no standing to pursue this appeal. Valdez v. City & 

County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1287 n.2 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Likewise, appellants Mixon, Spaeth, and Jorski lack standing in 

this appeal to the extent that they appeal the court's qualified 

immunity ruling in their official capacities as trustees of the 

Town of Harrah. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-68 

(1985)(qualified immunity unavailable to individuals in 

official-capacity suits). The district court dismissed defendants 

Anderson and Collier in their individual capacities by order dated 

July 10, 1989. 

Defendants Mixon, Spaeth, and Jorski can claim qualified 

immunity from suit in their individual capacities when performing 

discretionary functions as town officials, so long as their acts 

do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6295 Document: 010110031293 Date Filed: 03/21/1991 Page: 3 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In this factual setting, 

determining whether plaintiffs' first amendment rights have been 

violated entails a three-part analysis. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 

906 F.2d 491, 494-95 (10th Cir. 1990). First, did plaintiffs' 

speech address a matter of public concern? Connick v. Myers, 461 

U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Second, if so, do plaintiffs' first 

amendment rights outweigh the public employer's interests in 

preventing disruption of its offices or the services it performs? 

Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Finally, 

if so, was plaintiffs' speech a substantial or motivating factor 

in defendants' termination decision? Mount Healthy City School 

Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 

The district court has ruled, which determinations are not 

before us on appeal, that the speech of remaining plaintiffs 

Matlock and Shepard was a matter of public concern, and that their 

first amendment rights survived the balancing inquiry called for 

in Pickering. See order dated August 24, 1989, at 11-13. The 

only issue before us is whether defendants are shielded from 

liability by qualified immunity. In this context, then, the issue 

on appeal is: "[a]t the ·time these events took place, was the 

protected nature of [plaintiffs'] speech sufficiently clear that 

defendants should have been reasonably on notice that the [town's] 

interest in its disciplinary rule[s] would not survive a 

[Pickering) balancing inquiry?" Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 

879 F.2d 706, 729 (10th Cir.), reh'g in part granted on other 

grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1989). See also Considine v. 

Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695, 702 (10th Cir. 

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1990)(qualified immunity inquiry in first amendment context 

requires that defendants be reasonably on notice that plaintiff's 

speech touched on a matter of public concern and that defendants' 

interests in the smooth operation of their office would not 

outweigh the employee's free speech rights). The determination 

whether the law was clearly established is a question of law. 

Lutz v. Weld County School Dist. No. 6, 784 F.2d 340, 343 (10th 

Cir. 1986). 

"As we recently made clear, when a defendant raises a 

qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden and 

must demonstrate a substantial correspondence between the conduct 

in question and prior law allegedly establishing that the 

defendant's actions were clearly prohibited." Laidley v. McClain, 

914 F.2d 1386, 1394 (10th Cir. 1990)(citing Hannula v. City of 

Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 130-31 (10th Cir. 1990)). See also Powell 

v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir. 1989)(plaintiff's 

burden is to show that the law was clearly established at the time 

of the speech such that defendant was reasonably on notice that 

his actions would violate plaintiff's rights); Rozek v. 

Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154; 1157 (10th Cir. 1989)(same); Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 

(10th Cir. 1988)(same); Lutz, 784 F.2d at 343 (same). 

We have reviewed the entire appellate record, including 

plaintiffs' summary judgment brief and plaintiffs' objections to 

defendants' summary judgment brief. 1 Taking into consideration 

1 Our review of the appellate record, although de nova, was 

unaided by plaintiffs' viewpoint of the case, in light of their 

failure to file a brief on appeal. 

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the pertinent law at the time plaintiffs' speech was made, in 

light of the factual circumstances surrounding this case, we 

conclude that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. Assuming 

defendants were reasonably on notice that plaintiffs' speech 

regarding defendant Collier, the town's police chief, touched on a 

matter of public concern,~ Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 814 F.2d 

1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1987)(speech which evaluates performance of 

elected officials is of public interest), aff'd on rehearing, 847 

F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); 

Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984)("[t]he 

public has a vital interest in the integrity of those commissioned 

to enforce the law"); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 

1114 (9th Cir. 1983)(speech enabling public to make informed 

decisions about government operation is protected), plaintiffs 

have not demonstrated that the law with respect to their first 

amendment rights was "clearly establ.ished" such that defendants 

should have been reasonably on notice that such rights would 

survive a Pickering balance inquiry in this instance. 

In their brief discussion of the balancing of interests 

called for in Pickering, plaintiffs argued before the district 

court that their speech was designed to promote the town's 

efficiency in providing its government services, and that "the 

Town of Harrah should have no interest in prohibiting employees 

from ... candidly discussing their grievances ...• " Brief in 

support of plaintiffs' objection to defendants' motion for summary 

judgment at 7. This conclusory allegation finds no support in the 

record and is inadequate to meet plaintiffs' burden to show that 

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the law was clearly established such that defendants would have 

been on notice that the town's interests in maintaining harmony, 

especially within its police department, would not outweigh 

plaintiffs' speech rights. See Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 

842, 865 n.33 (10th Cir. 1989)(conclusory allegations insufficient 

to support claim that law was clearly established); Hughes v. 

Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1418-19 (8th Cir. 1983)(highway patrol, 

"more so than the typical government employer," has an interest in 

controlling its officers' speech), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 

(1984). 

The Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 

(1982)), noted "'the contours of the right must be sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing 

violates that right,'" quoted in V-1 Oil Co. v. State of Wy., 

Dep't of Environmental Quality. 902 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990). Case law existing at the 

time of plaintiff's speech would not have provided clear guidance 

to defendants in determining whether plaintiffs' speech rights 

outweighed defendants' interests in maintaining a smoothly 

operating police department. "[B]ecause a rule of law determined 

by a balancing of interests is inevitably difficult to clearly 

anticipate, it follows that where Pickering balancing is required, 

the law is less likely to be well established than in other 

cases." Melton, 879 F.2d at 729. 

If plaintiffs fail to meet their burden, defendants prevail. 

Pueblo Neighborhood, 847 F.2d at 646; Lutz, 784 F.2d at 343. 

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Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of qualified 

immunity as to individual defendants Mixon, Spaeth, and Jorski. 

See Powell, 891 F.2d at 1458 (plaintiff's failure to meet this 

burden results in the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants 

as a matter of law). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, by order dated August 24, 1989, as 

to its denial of qualified immunity to defendants Mixon, Spaeth, 

and Jorski in their individual capacities, is REVERSED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6295 Document: 010110031293 Date Filed: 03/21/1991 Page: 8