Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00253/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00253-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRETT GRASSI, individually 

and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL COMFORT 

PRODUCTS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 1:15-cv-00253-JAM-JLT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant International Comfort Products, LLC (“Defendant”) 

promptly provided a replacement for a failing part in Plaintiff 

Brett Grassi’s (“Plaintiff”) air conditioning unit free of 

charge. Although these actions in fact complied with Defendant’s 

warranty, Plaintiff brought this class action complaint alleging 

violations of warranties and consumer protection laws. Because 

Defendant adequately performed on its valid warranty and 

Plaintiff was not misled by any misinformation about the product, 

the Court dismisses each of Plaintiff’s claims.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff bought a new home containing an air conditioning 

unit (“HVAC”) manufactured by Defendant. FAC ¶ 51. The unit 

worked properly for two years, then “stopped blowing cold air.” 

FAC ¶ 54. Plaintiff alleges that the failure resulted from a 

leak in the unit’s copper coil. FAC ¶ 55. The leak allegedly 

resulted from “formicary corrosion” when the copper was exposed 

to certain indoor pollutants regularly found in residential 

houses. FAC ¶¶ 34, 39-43. According to reports referenced in 

the FAC, “the occurrence rate of these [copper coil] failures is 

low nationwide[.]” FAC ¶ 41 (alteration in original). 

“Soon” after Plaintiff discovered the problem, Defendant 

replaced the coil with an aluminum coil – which, unlike copper, 

is “not susceptible to formicary corrosion.” FAC ¶¶ 34, 58. 

Defendant informed Plaintiff that it would cover the cost of the 

part. FAC ¶ 56. Plaintiff paid to diagnosis the problem and 

labor to install the new coil, but the home builder agreed to 

reimburse Plaintiff for half these costs: $521.50. FAC ¶¶ 57-58. 

At the time of repair, the unit was covered by Defendant’s 

“parts” warranty, which stated:

International Comfort Products, LLC (“ICP”) warrants this 

product against failure due to defect in material or 

workmanship under normal use and maintenance as follows. 

. . . If a part fails due to defect during the applicable 

warranty period ICP will provide a new or remanufactured 

part, at ICP’s option, to replace the failed defective part 

at no charge for the part.” 

Defendant’s RJN Exh. A at 1; FAC ¶¶ 81-82.

Despite the fact that Plaintiff apparently experienced no 

 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for August 5, 2015.

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further problems with his air conditioning, he sued Defendant in 

a class action complaint (Doc. #15) alleging nine causes of 

action: (1) Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies 

Act (“CLRA”); (2) Violation of Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); 

(3) Violation of the California False Advertising Law (“CFAL”); 

(4) Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; (5) Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability 

under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (6) Breach of 

express warrant; (7) Unjust enrichment; (8) Fraudulent 

concealment; and (9) Declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged 

federal diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness 

Act. FAC ¶ 7.

Defendant now moves to dismiss each of Plaintiff’s claims 

(Doc. #26). Plaintiff opposes the motion, except as to his 

fourth cause of action (Doc. #42). The Court therefore dismisses 

the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing, and addresses the parties’ arguments on the

viability of Plaintiff’s other causes of action below.

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, Defendant requests judicial notice of 

two documents: Defendant’s written limited “parts” warranty and 

the pleadings in another case, Sumer v. Carrier Corporation,

filed in the Northern District of California. Defendant’s RJN at 

2. Because Plaintiff apparently agrees that the first document 

is the written express warranty at issue in the FAC, see FAC 

¶¶ 81-82; Opp. at 5, the Court considers the document to be 

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incorporated by reference into Plaintiff’s FAC, see Tietsworth v. 

Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he actual 

terms of the one-year limited warranty, [] properly may be 

considered under the incorporation by reference doctrine

. . . .”) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff opposes judicial notice as to the second document:

the Sumer pleadings. Opp. at 11-12. The Court takes judicial 

notice of the fact that pleadings were filed in that case – as 

they are in the public record – but does not take statements in 

those pleadings as true or use their exhibits as evidence. See

Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noticing “matters of public record, including documents on file 

in federal or state courts”) (citation omitted); Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (reiterating that 

a court “may not take judicial notice of disputed facts stated in 

public records”) (emphasis in original); M/V Am. Queen v. San 

Diego Marine Const. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(“As a general rule, a court may not take judicial notice of 

proceedings or records in another cause so as to supply, without 

formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a 

contention in a cause then before it.”).

B. Analysis

1. Express Warranty

Defendant argues that it complied with its warranty, 

therefore precluding Plaintiff’s express warranty claim. Mot. 

at 4. Plaintiff contends that Defendant in fact breached its 

warranty, and even if it did not, the warranty was

unconscionable and invalid. Opp. at 5-8. The Court agrees with 

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Defendant. 

“A manufacturer's liability for breach of an express 

warranty derives from, and is measured by, the terms of that 

warranty.” Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F. Supp. 

2d 1128, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett 

Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 525 (1992)). A plaintiff must plead 

the exact terms of the warranty. Id. at 1142.

The FAC here identifies a “five-year limited ‘parts’ 

warranty” that covered the replacement part, but did not cover 

“the cost of labor to replace the defective coil” or other 

“associated costs for diagnostics, inspection and refrigerant 

replacement[.]” FAC ¶¶ 81-82; Defendant’s RJN Exh. A. For the 

first time in his brief, Plaintiff points to another warranty

provision entitled “No Hassle ReplacementTM limited warranty.” 

Opp. at 5. That warranty apparently went further and promised to 

replace the entire HVAC unit if “the evaporator coil failed due 

to defect[.]” Opp. at 5:15-16. 

The Court disregards the No Hassle warranty terms, because 

Plaintiff never mentioned it in the FAC, and moreover, it likely 

did not apply to Plaintiff. See Opp. at 5:17-18 (declining to 

advise whether this warranty applied, and instead stating 

hypothetically that “[i]f this warranty also applied” then 

Defendant would have breached it); Defendant’s RJN Exh. A at 1 

(showing that this “No Hassle ReplacementTM limited warranty” only 

applied to a subset of HVAC units).

Measuring this case by the terms of the “parts” warranty

then, Defendant fulfilled its obligations. That is, it replaced 

the part that failed (i.e., the coil) “at no charge for the 

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part.” See Defendant’s RJN Exh. A at 1; Opp. at 5. The 

opposition brief contends that “Plaintiff contests whether 

[Defendant] charged Plaintiff or the builder for the replacement 

coil.” Opp. at 5 n.3, 6. Yet this allegation appears nowhere in 

the FAC, and the FAC in fact resolves that issue in Defendant’s 

favor: Defendant allegedly “stated to Plaintiff that they [sic]

would cover the cost of the replacement coil itself,” and the 

only costs Plaintiff alleges are in regards to the labor to 

inspect and replace the part. FAC ¶¶ 55-58.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s replacement of the 

part was “ineffective.” FAC ¶ 106. But the FAC’s other 

allegations contradict that statement. In particular, the FAC

states that Defendant replaced the defective copper coil with an 

aluminum coil, which - according to the FAC – “is not susceptible 

to formicary corrosion[.]” FAC ¶¶ 34, 58. Plaintiff’s 

allegations thus establish that Defendant fully performed on the 

warranty.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant failed to perform as 

required by yet a different sentence (or rather, a fragment of a 

sentence) in the same warranty provision. See Opp. at 6 

(alleging that Defendant violated warranty “against failure due 

to defect in materials or workmanship under normal use and 

maintenance”). The full context of that snippet indicates that 

the language refers to the same promise discussed above – which 

Defendant performed on by replacing the coil. See Defendant’s 

RJN Exh. A at 1 (“International Comfort Products, LLC (‘ICP’) 

warrants this product against failure due to defect in material 

or workmanship under normal use and maintenance as follows. 

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[Sentence describing duration of warranty.] If a part fails due 

to defect during the applicable warranty period ICP will provide 

a new or remanufactured part, at ICP’s option, to replace the 

failed defective part at no charge for the part.”). 

In an attempt to bolster his reliance on the sentence 

fragment, Plaintiff cites Gustafson v. Goodman Manuf. Co., 2014 

WL 1669069 (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2014). But that case is 

distinguishable. Although it involved a very similar “parts”

warranty for an air conditioning unit, the unit in that case

failed twelve times, followed by twelve separate replacements of 

the coil. Id. at *1. The Gustafson defendant apparently never 

resolved the issue, because the plaintiff eventually purchased a 

bi-annual maintenance agreement to have his unit continuously 

repaired. Id. Here, in contrast, Defendant fully and 

permanently repaired Plaintiff’s unit on the first try. See FAC 

¶¶ 34, 55-58.

Plaintiff moves on from trying to find a hole in Defendant’s 

performance, and next argues that even if Defendant complied with 

the stated terms of the warranty, the warranty was nonetheless 

invalid. See FAC ¶¶ 81-85. Each of Plaintiff’s three theories 

of invalidity fail.

Plaintiff first asserts that the warranty was invalid 

because it contradicted itself. Opp. at 7. Plaintiff does not 

explain, and the Court does not see, how the warranty terms 

“negat[ed] [its] express description[s].” See Opp. at 7:26. 

Next, Plaintiff argues that the warranty “fail[ed] in its 

essential purpose” because the product is “destroyed by [its] own 

flaws[.]” Opp. at 8. As described above, this argument is 

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unpersuasive because the FAC establishes that Defendant fully 

repaired Plaintiff’s HVAC unit by replacing the failed part with 

a functioning part. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the warranty was 

unconscionable. Opp. at 8-9. To succeed in this argument, 

Plaintiff must show that the warranty was both procedurally and 

substantively unconscionable. Marchante v. Sony Corp. of Am., 

Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2011). The warranty 

was not procedurally problematic; Plaintiff is incorrect in 

contending that the warranty resulted from “a complete inequality 

of bargaining power.” See Opp. at 9 n.4. Indeed, the FAC 

alleges that Plaintiff had the option of “insist[ing] on the 

installation of a different brand of HVAC system[.]” FAC ¶ 64; 

see Tietsworth, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (finding no procedural 

unconscionability because complaint demonstrated that “other 

machines were available to Plaintiffs”). Nor was it 

substantively unconscionable, because the terms in no way “shock 

the conscience.” See Sumer v. Carrier Corp., 2015 WL 758314, at 

*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015) (concluding that this same “parts”

warranty was not unconscionable).

Based on the allegations in the FAC, the warranty was valid

and Defendant fully complied with its relevant terms. The Court 

therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s express warranty claim with 

prejudice.

2. Implied Warranty

The parties disagree as to whether the malfunction in 

Plaintiff’s HVAC unit falls within the one-year life of the 

implied warranty of merchantability. See Cal. Civ. Code. 

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§ 1791.1(c); Mot. at 10; Opp. at 10. Defendant asserts that 

Plaintiff’s claim fails because his HVAC unit did not malfunction 

until two years after he purchased the home. See FAC ¶¶ 51, 55. 

Plaintiff in response characterizes the copper coil as a “latent 

defect” that rendered the unit unmerchantable at the time of 

sale, even though the problem did not manifest for two years. 

Opp. at 10. 

The parties point the Court to Mexia v. Rinker Boat Company, 

Inc., 174 Cal.App.4th 1297 (2009) – which held that a delayed 

malfunction arising from a latent defect can fall within the oneyear time limit - and a number of cases disagreeing about whether 

to follow Mexia. Opp. at 10; Reply at 6-7. The Court finds it 

unnecessary to decide whether to follow Mexia, because even if it 

does, Plaintiff’s argument still fails.

In particular, Mexia requires a plaintiff to show that the 

product “became unfit during the warranty period.” Jones v. 

Credit Auto Ctr., Inc., 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 10 (2015). 

“[I]t is the defect itself, rather than some theoretical 

imperfection, that must exist during the warranty period, and 

that defect must be so severe as to cause the product to fall 

below the ‘minimum level of quality’ guaranteed by the warranty.” 

Parenteau v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2015 WL 1020499, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 

Mar. 5, 2015). Falling below the minimum level of quality means 

the product “did not possess even the most basic degree of 

fitness for ordinary use.” See Viggiano v. Hansen Natural Corp., 

944 F. Supp. 2d 877, 896 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Plaintiff has not made such a showing here. He alleges 

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that his HVAC unit contained a copper coil, which had a “low” 

“occurrence rate” of causing corrosion, leading to leakage of 

refrigerant. FAC ¶¶ 21, 41. The unit functioned properly for 

over two years. See FAC ¶¶ 51, 55. Then, “[s]oon” after the 

malfunction, Defendant fixed the problem by replacing the coil 

with an aluminum one, which was “not susceptible to formicary 

corrosion[.]” FAC ¶¶ 34, 58. Defendant’s product thus meets at 

least the “minimum level of quality.” See Sumer, 2015 WL 758314, 

at *1 (rejecting nearly identical implied warranty claim for 

copper coil defect). The Court dismisses the implied warranty 

claim with prejudice, because the FAC establishes that Defendant 

complied with the implied warranty.

3. CLRA

Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s 

CLRA claim because he does not explain what statements he saw 

before purchase and cannot plead reliance. Mot. at 14. The 

Court agrees.

The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair 

or deceptive acts or practices[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). A 

CLRA claim may be premised on either an affirmative 

misrepresentation or a material omission that “deceive[s] 

reasonable consumers.” Doe v. SuccessfulMatch.com, 70 F. Supp. 

3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2014). A plaintiff must plead reliance on the 

misrepresentation or omission. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. 

Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.4th 36, 46 (2009). To show reliance, 

the misrepresentation must relate to the allegedly defective 

part. See Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1138 (N.D. 

Cal. 2010) (dismissing CLRA claim for misrepresentations, because 

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the “affirmative representations pled in the SAC are either 

puffery or do not relate to the Machine’s allegedly defective 

Electronic Control Boards”). Under an omission theory, the 

plaintiff must show that he “would have been aware” of the 

omitted information. Jekowsky v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2013 WL 

6577293, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013).

Plaintiff here appears to allege both a misrepresentation 

and an omission – namely, that Defendant advertised its products 

to be “of a particular quality which they are not” and that it 

failed to disclose the corrosion problem. See FAC ¶ 89. But 

both theories fail, because Plaintiff cannot plead any actual 

reliance. First, none of the misrepresentations alleged in the 

FAC relate to the defective coils, but rather are general 

statements about the HVAC machine. See FAC ¶¶ 41, 50. As to the 

alleged omission, Plaintiff has not explained how he would have 

been aware of the information about the coils even if Defendant 

had disclosed it. Indeed, Plaintiff does not explain what 

information he reviewed about this particular HVAC unit before 

purchasing his house, or even whether he knew what kind of air 

conditioning unit the house contained. 

Plaintiff bases the omission claim on certain written 

information provided to him about the unit. See Opp. at 16; FAC 

Exhs. D & E (containing “Installation Instructions” and 

“Homeowner’s Information”). But according to the FAC, he 

received this information “[a]long with his HVAC unit[.]” FAC 

¶¶ 52-53. Therefore, Plaintiff was not aware of this information 

before he purchased the house, and – even if it contained the 

proper disclosures – it could not have changed his decision about 

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whether to buy his house or how much to pay for it. See FAC 

¶ 64. See also Sumer v. Carrier Corp., 2015 WL 3630972, at *2-*3 

(N.D. Cal. June 10, 2015) (rejecting CLRA claim based on nearly 

identical theory in part because “this particular plaintiff never 

read” the statements allegedly misrepresenting and omitting 

information about the coils).

Plaintiff argues that a relaxed standard should apply for 

pleading an omission and that reliance should be “presumed.” 

Opp. at 14-16. But these arguments are irrelevant, because the 

FAC itself forecloses a claim of reliance in stating that 

Plaintiff only received the allegedly deficient documents after 

he purchased the home. See FAC ¶¶ 52-53.

Because Plaintiff has identified no misrepresentations about 

the coils, and because he would not have been aware of any

omitted warning (had it been disclosed), the Court dismisses 

Plaintiff’s CLRA claim with prejudice. Given this conclusion, 

the Court does not reach the parties’ further arguments about 

whether Defendant did actually disclose the problem to consumers 

and whether the alleged misrepresentations were mere puffery. 

Mot. at 11-15. 

4. CFAL

Defendant argues that it cannot be liable for false 

advertising because the alleged statements forming the basis for 

this claim are mere puffery. Mot. at 15. Plaintiff counters 

that his allegations include “quantifiable statements of fact.” 

Opp. at 7:3. Defendant’s argument is correct.

A CFAL claim fails if the alleged advertising statements are 

puffery. In re Song Grand Wega KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear 

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Projection HDTV Television Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 

(S.D. Cal. 2010). The statements alleged in this case are that 

the HVAC units were “manufactured to some of the industry’s 

toughest standards and are covered by some of the best warranties 

in the industry.” FAC ¶ 41; Opp. at 7. These statements are 

indeed puffery. See, e.g., Fisher v. Monster Beverage Corp., 

2013 WL 4804385, at *13 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) (collecting 

cases identifying nonactionable puffery, including averments that 

a product is the “best technology,” the best in the world, the 

“best quality ever,” or is the “best mortgage rate possible,” or 

that a company provides “better customer service” than its 

competitor); Tietsworth, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (“To the extent 

that Plaintiffs base their claim on the representations that 

Defendants did make, for example that the Machines were 

‘designed, manufactured and tested for years of dependable 

operations,’ such representations are mere puffery . . . .”). 

See also Sumer, 2015 WL 758314, at *2 (“Carrier’s general 

statements about the reliability and quality of its evaporator 

coils are non-actionable puffery.”). Plaintiff’s CFAL claim 

therefore fails.

5. Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent concealment fails for the 

same reasons as his CLRA claim. That is, he cannot show that he 

relied on any misinformation. See Sumer, 2015 WL 3630972, at *1-

*2 (rejecting similar claim for lack of reliance). 

6. UCL

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the unlawful and 

unfair prongs of the UCL. FAC ¶ 98. He cannot maintain this 

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claim under the unlawful prong, because as described above, this 

Court has rejected all of Plaintiff’s predicate claims. See

Jordan v. Paul Fin., LLC, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 

2010).

His claim for unfair practices fares no better. Plaintiff 

bases that claim on “promises that [the HVAC units were] 

‘durable, reliable, and easier to install and maintain.’” FAC 

¶ 104. This alleged “promise” is puffery that cannot support a 

UCL claim. In re Sony Grand Wega, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. He 

also bases the claim on the allegation that the coil replacement 

was “ineffective and merely delayed the ultimate complete failure 

of the HVAC unit[].” FAC ¶ 106. But that statement is fatally 

contradicted by the FAC’s other allegations, namely that 

Defendant provided an aluminum coil, thus solving the corrosion 

problem. See FAC ¶¶ 34, 58. Plaintiff’s UCL claim therefore 

fails in its entirety. 

7. Unjust Enrichment

The parties contest whether unjust enrichment is a viable 

cause of action. Mot. at 19-20; Opp. at 20 (citing Johnson v. 

Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Grp., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80011 

(E.D. Cal. July 22, 2011)). Even assuming that it can be a cause 

of action, it fails here because Plaintiff has not adequately 

pled any predicate claim. See Johnson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

80011, at *18 (“Unjust enrichment [] is not a separate cause of 

action, but depends upon the viability of the other claims. 

Since Plaintiffs plead viable claims for strict products 

liability, unfair business practices, fraudulent business 

practices, negligent design, breach of warranty, and violations 

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of the CLRA, the unjust enrichment claim survives as an 

alternative theory of recovery.”) (citing Sanders v. Apple, Inc., 

672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2009)).

8. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff bases his declaratory relief claim on the “actual 

controversy . . . regarding marketing and sale of [Defendant’s]

defective HVAC units.” FAC ¶ 157. As described above, there is 

no “actual controversy” because Plaintiff has failed to state any 

claim on which relief could be granted. The Court dismisses this 

claim as well.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s 

claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2015

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