Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01646/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01646-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERRY LYNN LACKEY,

Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, et al.,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 01646 OWW WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 15]

Response due in 20 days

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2002, the Madera County Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to a four-year

prison term for possession of drugs in prison in violation of California Penal Code Section 4573.5

and receiving stolen property in violation of California Penal Code Section 496(a). The court

sentenced Petitioner under California’s Three Strikes Law, finding that she had a prior violent felony

conviction.

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Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”) challenging her sentence. In that petition, she claimed that

the sentence was improper because she should not have been sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. 

On May 19, 2005, the Court of Appeal granted her petition and ordered Madera County Superior

Court to enter an amended abstract of judgment with a corrected sentence.

In May 2005, the Superior Court amended Petitioner’s sentence to a total term of three years

and four months. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

recalculated Petitioner’s release date and determined that she had already served the entire sentence. 

Petitioner was therefore released on parole on May 27, 2005.

Upon her release, CDCR credited Petitioner with 648 days towards her parole term for the

days she was improperly incarcerated. With the 648-day credit, Petitioner’s tentative parole

discharge date was August 18, 2006.

In December 2005, while still on parole, Petitioner stole a purse from Nordstrom. She

pleaded guilty to one count of second degree burglary in violation of California Penal Code Section

459 and one count of grand theft of personal property in violation of California Penal Code Section

487(a). San Diego County Superior Court sentenced her to a new prison term of two years and eight

months. In addition, the Parole Board offered her a parole revocation term of 10 months, eligible

for credit, which she accepted. Petitioner has served this new prison term as well as the parole

revocation term and was paroled on June 7, 2007.

On July 28, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The petition was denied on the merits on August 16, 2006. 

Petitioner filed the present petition on October 18, 2006. In this petition, Petitioner expressly

states that she is challenging her February 20, 2002 conviction in Madera County Superior Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

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1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that she suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, at the time she filed this petition, Petitioner was

incarcerated in Central California Women’s Facility, which is located within the jurisdiction of this

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

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grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

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that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the grounds that: 1) Petitioner seeks monetary

damages, a remedy not available under habeas corpus; and 2) claim 4 is unexhausted. Petitioner has

not responded to the motion.

In ground two of her petition, Petitioner specifically seeks monetary compensation for what

she terms her “false imprisonment.” Monetary damages, however, are not available through the

mechanism of habeas corpus. Sisk v. CSO Branch, 974 F.2d 116, 117 (9 Cir. 1992). Rather, a civil

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rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the operative vehicle to recover monetary damages. Id. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Respondent is correct in contending that Petitioner’s second ground

for relief must be dismissed.

In ground four of her petition, Petitioner alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It is undisputed that this claim was not presented

to the Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court and is therefore unexhausted.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

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U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”). The court must

dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains exhausted claims. Rose,

455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d

756, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d th

371, 372 (9 Cir.1988). th

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pub.L. No

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by respondent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(C). The Court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect the

rights of the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, respondent has not waived

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exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for Petitioner to pursue state claims. For

example, these claims may be presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Cal. Penal Code

§§ 1473 - 14758. 

Finally, there are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the Court to ignore the United

States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and find that California’s

corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. Accordingly, the court finds that 

as it now stands, this petition must be dismissed under Rose v. Lundy, as a mixed petition

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.

Pursuant to Ninth Circuit holdings, a petitioner should be given the option of withdrawing his

unexhausted claims and proceeding in federal court with those claims that are exhausted. Guizar v.

Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988), citing, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 510, 520 (1982). th

However, should Petitioner abandon her unexhausted claims, any later attempt to amend the petition

to include newly exhausted claims may be subject to an abuse of the writ challenge. See McCleskey

v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 455 U.S. 510, 520-521 (1982); see also,

Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (failure to allege all available

grounds for relief in a single petition may be abuse of the writ). Should the Petitioner fail to

withdraw the unexhausted claims or withdraw the Petition, the petition will be dismissed. Rose, 455

U.S. at 519; Guizar, 843 F.2d at 372. This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal

court after exhausting available state remedies. See, Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586

(9 Cir.1995). However, Petitioner should bear in mind that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) sets out a critical

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one-year limitations period within which a federal habeas petition may be filed. In most cases, the

one year period starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct

review. See, id. Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral

review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), is does not toll for the time an application is

pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1) Petitioner’s second ground for relief in which she seeks monetary damages is HEREBY

DISMISSED as seeking a remedy which is not available pursuant to habeas corpus:

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2) Petitioner is GRANTED twenty (20) days from the date of service of this order to inform the

court whether she seeks to withdraw ground four , the unexhausted claim, and proceed with

those that are exhausted or withdraw the entire petition and return to state court to exhaust

those claims that are unexhausted. No extensions of time will be granted absent extraordinary

circumstances. Petitioner is expressly cautioned that her failure to timely respond to this order

will result in the dismissal of this entire action as a mixed petition containing both exhausted

and unexhausted claims under Rose v. Lundy. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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