Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00357/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00357-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1 Plaintiff’s complaint provides indistinct claims for

relief and defendant’s motion is based on its interpretation of

plaintiff’s purported legal bases for her action. The court will

proceed on the understanding that these are the only claims that

plaintiff is asserting as she has not objected to defendant’s

classification of her complaint.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DAMARIS E. SOLANO,

NO. CIV. S-04-0357 FCD/PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Regents of the

University of California’s (“University”) motion for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of

plaintiff Damaris Solano’s (“Solano” or “plaintiff”) claims1 for:

(1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Fair Employment and

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 Plaintiff’s cited evidence that she did not have

responsibility for approving travel vouchers until she was

appointed Interim Manager does not create a dispute of fact as to

whether she was familiar with the University’s travel policy. It

is undisputed that plaintiff approved “hundreds” of travel

vouchers in her prior position of travel services manager at UC

Berkeley. (Dep. of Damaris Solano, Exh. A at 22:10-23:20.) It

is proper to infer that by virtue of this work experience

plaintiff gained familiarity with the University’s travel policy. 

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Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) gender discrimination in violation of

Title VII and FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII and

FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA;

and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion.2

BACKGROUND

Solano, an employee of the University of California

(“University”) since 1983, was hired at the Davis campus in April

1994 as an Accountant III Assistant Manager in the Accounting

and Financial Services, Student Aid Department. (Def.’s Reply to

Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Sep. Stmt. of Und. Facts (“RUF”) ¶¶ 1,

2.) As part of her job in Accounting and Financial Services,

Solano was knowledgeable about governmental laws and regulations

pertaining to the University’s accounting responsibilities, and 

University policies and procedures, including its travel policy.3

(Id.; Depo. of Damaris Solano, Exh. A at 22:10-23:20.) In March

2002, Solano was appointed to a six-month position as Accountant

III Interim Manager, in which capacity Solano was responsible for

supervising four Accountant I supervisors and reviewing the

travel vouchers of her subordinates before submitting them for

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payment. (RUF ¶ 3.) Shortly before her appointment as Interim

Manager in February 2002, Solano was asked by her supervisor to

attend a work-related conference, the SCT Summit, in Anaheim

California. (RUF ¶ 4.) Solano decided to drive to Anaheim, and

stayed in a room with two double beds at the Disneyland Hotel.

(RUF ¶¶ 5,6.) Members of Solano’s family apparently accompanied

her on the trip. 

 After the SCT Summit, Solano prepared a travel voucher

requesting payment of the following expenses: (1) $50

meal/incidental expenses on March 23 and 24 (the first two days

of the conference), (2) $37 meal/incidental expenses on March 25

to 27 (the remaining three days of the conference), (3) $247.25

lodging expenses per day, (4) $387.90 car rental expenses, and

(5) $8.00 parking fees on March 23. In the remarks section of

the travel voucher, Solano, noted that lunch was provided on

March 25 to 27 at the conference, the hotel rate was the same for

single as it was for double occupancy, and the car rental fee was

the same for five days as it was for a week. (RUF ¶ 10.) 

Maria Potratz (“Potratz”), who had responsibility for

reviewing Solano’s travel voucher, became suspicious because

portions of Solano’s corporate credit card statement were

redacted and Solano’s hotel costs exceeded those incurred by

others attending the conference. Potratz expressed her concerns

to Solano’s superior, Assistant Vice Chancellor James Allred

(“Allred”), who directed Potratz to conduct an investigation. 

During the investigation, Potratz found that Solano claimed

$244.88 more than she was entitled on her travel voucher for the

SCT Summit. Specifically, she found that Solano only should have

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4 The parties describe at length an ongoing factual

dispute regarding whether Solano overstated the cost of a chicken

dinner she ordered from room service at the Disneyland Hotel. 

Solano listed the price as $43.00, but the University submits

evidence that the most expensive chicken dinner entree on the

Disneyland Hotel room service menu is $16.50. 

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charged the University for the cost of the hotel room at the

single occupancy rate of $189.00 per night, rather than $209.00

per night for double occupancy; the cost of comparable airfare

instead of a minivan rental at $387.90 per week; $21.00 food

allowance for March 25 through 27 versus the claimed $37.50 per

day.4 (RUF ¶¶ 13-15.) 

In addition, Potratz determined that Solano used her

corporate credit card for personal expenses during the SCT Summit

in Anaheim. Potratz then reviewed Solano’s credit card

statements from October 2001 through April 2002 and discovered

that Solano had made personal purchases at Marine World, Dress

Barn, Chevron, Clark Pest Control, and Walmart. (RUF ¶ 17.) 

While Solano did not seek reimbursement from the University for

any of these personal expenses, such personal use of the

corporate credit card violated University policy. (RUF ¶ 19.)

 In addition, Potratz concluded that Solano made the

following untruthful statements during the investigation: (1)

Solano claimed she had purchased two adult tickets and two child

tickets to Disneyland, but the receipt bearing her signature

indicated she purchased three adult tickets and one child ticket;

(2) Solano indicated she was contesting the $170 charge for the

tickets because they were for use on the same day at two

different parks, but Potratz confirmed with Disneyland that the

tickets were not date-specific and could have been used anytime;

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(3) Solano told Potratz in February that she had made her air

travel arrangements, but later said she required medication when

she traveled by air and admitted she never planned to fly; (4)

Solano insisted she ordered an in-room chicken dinner that cost

$43.00, however, when Potratz obtained the menu from the hotel,

the most expensive chicken dinner was $16.99; (5) despite

Solano’s statement she intended to request payment of the cost of

comparable airfare, the original travel voucher sought

reimbursement for the full cost of the vehicle rental and did not

include any note stating otherwise, and (6) according to Solano,

she was not aware a $18.00 late return charge was included in the

cost of the vehicle rental, yet Alamo confirmed that the late

charge was added to and included in the rental agreement receipt

when the vehicle was returned. (RUF ¶ 21.) 

The University’s Internal Audit Services were notified and

affirmed Potratz’s conclusions that Solano claiming reimbursement

of inappropriate expenditures and had consistently and

inappropriately used the University corporate card. (RUF ¶ 22.) 

Based on the conclusions reached by Potratz and Internal

Audit Services, Allred issued a letter of intent to dismiss on

August 2, 2002 and placed Solano on paid administrative leave. 

(RUF ¶ 22.) On August 12, 2002, Solano responded to Allred’s

letter of intent to dismiss, disputing Allred’s findings and

alleging that Allred discriminated against her. (RUF ¶ 23.) As

evidence of the discrimination, Solano stated that Allred

demanded she give up her participation in campus groups such as

the Staff Affirmative Action and Diversity Advisory Committee

(“SAADAC”) and the Hispanic Staff Association (“HSA”). Allred

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disputes this and claims that Solano actually voluntarily ceased

participation on those committees in June 2000. (RUF ¶ 31.)

Another University employee, Bob Murta, was appointed to

review Allred’s decision to dismiss Solano and concluded that,

while Solano knew or should have known that her conduct was

unsatisfactory, in lieu of dismissal, Solano should be demoted to

work as an Accountant I in Accounting and Financial Services. 

(RUF ¶ 35.) 

Solano filed a timely grievance on March 27, 2003, alleging

violation of, inter alia, University anti-discrimination and

progressive discipline policies. The University issued a Step 1

response on April 28, 2003 concluding that no University policies

were violated. (RUF ¶¶ 35, 36.) Solano timely appealed on May

7, 2003. The resolution officer assigned to the appeal concluded

that the grievance was unsubstantiated and affirmed. Solano did

not appeal the decision to Step 3. (RUF ¶ 37.) 

Solano subsequently filed a complaint with the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California. The case

was transferred to the Eastern District on February 19, 2003. 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 23, 2003. 

Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment on May

31, 2005.

STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under this

standard, an issue is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence

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for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party and a fact

is “material” when it may affect the outcome of the case under

the substantive law that provides the claim or defense. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The

determination is made based solely upon admissible evidence. Orr

v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Furthermore, the court must view inferences made from the

underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). 

The moving party has the initial burden to demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party is

without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may either

produce evidence negating an essential element of the opposing

party’s claim, or demonstrate that the nonmoving party does not

have enough evidence to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Fritz Companies,

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party

meets this initial requirement, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific

facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact remains for

trial. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986). Summary judgment should not be granted

where “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

Following this same rubric, a court may grant summary

adjudication on part of a claim or defense, based on the

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5 Defendant contends that many of the discriminatory acts

alleged by plaintiff are barred by the statute of limitations. 

However, plaintiff clarifies that the only basis of her race

discrimination claims is the discipline imposed on her on

February 28, 2003, which claim clearly is timely. Because the

plaintiff has limited the scope of her claim to that event, the

court need not address the timeliness of the other acts cited by

defendant. (See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 21-22; Pl.’s Mem.

Opp’n Summ J. at 7.) 

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standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a),(b); State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d

772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant violated

provisions of Title VII and California’s FEHA, which both

prohibit unlawful discrimination. Because FEHA is modeled on

Title VII, California courts often rely upon federal

interpretations of Title VII when analyzing analogous provisions

of FEHA. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 269-

70 (1996). Accordingly, the court analyzes plaintiff’s federal

and state claims under Title VII, expounding any relevant

discrepancies where necessary.

I. Race Discrimination Claim Under Title VII and FEHA

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination,

plaintiff must prove: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2)

she was performing according to her employer’s legitimate

expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) the employer treated similarly situated individuals who are

not in her protected class more favorably.5 Defendant concedes

that plaintiff established the first three factors; however,

defendant disputes that plaintiff can establish that similarly

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6 Plaintiff specifically identified Allred (Latino),

Hamer (Caucasian), Sharon Henn (Caucasian), Kathy Hass

(Caucasian), Cyndy Johnson (Caucasian), Delanda Buchanan (African

American), Gary McGlinn (Caucasian), and Ruby (“Tommy”) Ullrich

(Caucasian).

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situated individuals not in her protected class were treated more

favorably. Contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff has

established a prima facie claim of disparate treatment between

herself and others similarly situated. Specifically, Solano

produced evidence that no other employees have been subject to

comparably severe discipline for similar misconduct. She

identified non-Latina employees in the Accounting and Financial

Services department who submitted fraudulent travel vouchers to

the University and were not subject to any discipline.6 

While defendant concedes that “exceptions to policy” were

made for other employees who submitted fraudulent travel

vouchers, it argues that Solano has produced no evidence that

they also “were uncooperative and untruthful in responding to

questions about their [travel vouchers] nor that they repeatedly

used their corporate card for personal purchases as she did.” 

(Def.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 23.) Construing

the facts in the light most favorable to Solano, the court finds

that she has made a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 

First, all of the misconduct here – Solano’s and that of the

other employees – was relatively minor: inadvertently overstating

the amount of reimbursement on a single travel voucher and using

a corporate credit card for personal expenses which were not

billed to the University. Solano has submitted evidence that her

misconduct was accidental rather than deliberate, which version

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of events the court accepts for purposes of this motion. 

Moreover, to the extent there is some difference in degree

between Solano’s misconduct and that of the other employees, the

difference in punishment was far greater: other employees appear

to have suffered no discipline at all, while Solano initially

faced termination and ultimately received a two-step demotion. 

According to Potratz, when she receives a travel voucher which is

incorrect, she normally returns it to the employee for

clarification or correction, but the employee is not disciplined. 

In this case, Solano’s incorrect travel voucher led to

investigation and a recommendation of termination. Potratz

admitted that no other employee has faced equivalent discipline. 

(Potratz Dep. at 13:8-19; 46:12-48:12.) Thus, plaintiff has

established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the defendant to furnish a legitimate nondiscriminatory

justification for the allegedly discriminatory conduct. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

Here, defendant contends that Solano’s demotion was based on her

submission of a travel voucher requesting reimbursement for nonreimbursable expenses for the MIT Summit, her use of the

corporate credit card for personal expenses on several occasions

(for which she did not request the University pay) and

misstatements during the investigation. 

Once the defendant provides a nondiscriminatory

justification for the treatment, plaintiff must demonstrate that

defendant’s justification was a pretext for discrimination. 

Here, Solano has submitted evidence establishing a genuine issue

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of material fact on the issue of pretext. Initially, the trier

of fact could infer pretext from the severity and

disproportionality of the discipline initially recommended by

Allred (Solano’s dismissal after eighteen years of unblemished

service to the University). Moreover, Solano testified that

Allred requested that she cease participation the Hispanic Staff

Association at the University, which provides some support for

her argument that Allred’s alleged animus toward her was racially

motivated. While Allred denies he requested Solano stop

participation in this group, resolution of factual disputes is

the province of the jury. 

II. Gender Discrimination Claim Under Title VII and FEHA

Generally, under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his or

her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

administrative remedies prior to filing a complaint in federal

court. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may

not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are

like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the

EEOC charge.” Green v. L.A. County Superintendent of Sch., 883

F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989)(citations omitted). Plaintiff

acknowledges that “she did not exhaust her administrative

remedies on the gender discrimination claim.” (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n

Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 1.) Therefore, defendant’s motion for

summary adjudication is granted as to plaintiff’s gender

discrimination claim under Title VII and FEHA.

III. FEHA Claim for Failure to Prevent Discrimination

Under the California FEHA, it is an unlawful employment

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practice for an employer “to fail to take all reasonable steps

necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment.” Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12940(k). A prerequisite to applicability of this section

is that some form of discrimination or harassment in violation of

FEHA actually occur. Trujillo v. N. County Transit Dist., 63

Cal. App. 4th 280, 289 (1998)(discussing the applicability of

section 12940(I) prior to its re-designation as section

12940(k)). Defendant does not attack plaintiff’s claim for

failure to prevent discrimination on its merits, instead

defendant maintains that plaintiff cannot support the claim

without first establishing a violation of FEHA. Because

plaintiff’s claim for race discrimination survives summary

judgment, as discussed above, she has satisfied the foundational

requirement for application of the section. Thus, plaintiff has

established a triable issue on her claim for failure to prevent

discrimination under FEHA.

IV. Claim for Retaliation in Violation of Title VII and FEHA

To create a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation,

plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in a protected

activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action

by her employer; and (3) a causal link exists between the adverse

action and the protected activity. Trent v. Valley Electric

Association Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994). There are

two ways that an employer can violate the anti-retaliation

provisions of Title VII. The adverse employment action may occur

“because of the employee’s opposition to conduct made an unlawful

employment practice” by Title VII or “in retaliation for the

employee’s participation in the machinery set up by Title VII to

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7 Plaintiff asserts that her retaliation claim also is

based on her participation in the Staff Affirmative Action and

Diversity Advisory Committee (“SAADAC”). However, in her

deposition, Solano clearly states that she voluntarily ceased all

participation in the SAADAC prior to the events at issue here.

(RUF ¶ 48; Solano Depo. at 267:2-7.) 

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enforce its provisions.” Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680

(9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff bases her retaliation claim on her

“opposition to discriminatory practices.” (Compl. ¶ 9.) 

Specifically, she alleges that she suffered an adverse employment

action (her demotion) due to her participation in the Hispanic

Staff Association.7 

Plaintiff’s claim does not fall within the classic mold of

protected “opposition to an unlawful employment practice.” See

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Crown Zellerbach

Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012 (1983). She does not identify any

discriminatory conduct by the University which she opposed; she

merely asserts she was part of a “Hispanic advocacy group.” See

Id. at 1013 (employee’s act “cannot be ‘opposed to an unlawful

employment practice’ unless it refers to some practice by the

employer that is allegedly unlawful.”). However, she provides no

evidence that the HSA opposed discriminatory conduct by the

University such that her participation with the HSA would

constitute a protected activity. Consequently, plaintiff has

failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. 

V. Wrongful Demotion in Violation of Public Policy

Defendant offers three independent grounds why summary

adjudication is proper regarding plaintiff’s common law claim for

wrongful demotion in violation of public policy. However, the

court does not reach the merits of the claim because the

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8 Although defendant construed plaintiff’s common law

cause of action to be a claim for wrongful demotion in violation

of public policy, plaintiff broadly alleges in her complaint that

defendant violated “California common law.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) 

Further, plaintiff did not clarify the basis of her claim in

response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but referred

to it as a “common law claim . . . based on a violation of public

policy set forth in FEHA.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 8.) The fact that the

claim could encompass more than one common law claim in violation

of public policy is immaterial because all are a species of a

“Tameny claim,” which the California Supreme Court held to be a

common law tort cause of action. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield

Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176 (1980); see also Williams v. Housing

Authority of the City of Los Angeles, 121 Cal. App. 4th 708, 713

n.2 (2004)(stating that public policy violations premised on

wrongful termination, wrongful constructive termination, and

wrongful demotion are all common law tort causes of action). 

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University is immune from tort liability pursuant to California

Government Code section 815(a). 

The University is a public entity as defined by the

California Torts Claims Act. Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.2. “Except

as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not

liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or

omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other

person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. Thus, it is well established

that “in California ‘all government tort liability must be based

on statute.’” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School District, 19 Cal.

4th 925, 932 (1998)(citing Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit

Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 785 (1985)). California courts have

established that a common law claim for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy is a nonstatutory tort claim.8 See

Palmer v. Regents of the University of California, Cal. App. 4th

899, 909 (2003) (explaining that “[b]ecause the ‘classic Tameny

cause of action’ is a common law, judicially created tort and not

authorized by statute, it is not properly asserted against the

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9 Plaintiff chose not to address the immunity issue in

her response to defendant’s motion.

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Regents.”) (citations omitted); see also Dao v. University of

California, No. C-04-2257, 2004 WL 1824129, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

13, 2004)(relying on Palmer to hold that section 815(a) barred

plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy); Bragg v. East Bay Regional Park District, No. C-02-3585,

2003 WL 23119278, at *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2003)(granting

motion for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy based upon section

815(a) governmental immunity and Palmer decision). Plaintiff has

not proposed a statutory basis to avoid immunity on this claim.9

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is

granted as to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful demotion in

violation of public policy. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claims for gender

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and

FEHA, and common law claim for wrongful demotion in violation of

public policy. Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to plaintiff’s

claims for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and

FEHA; and failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-00357-FCD-EFB Document 44 Filed 08/15/05 Page 15 of 15