Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01369/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01369-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Debra Jilka, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

DriveTime Automotive Group aka Ugly

Duckling Corporation,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-1369-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Plaintiff proceeding pro se has filed a complaint asserting claims based on age

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29

U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq., and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§

2601 et seq. Defendant DriveTime Automotive Group aka Ugly Duckling Corporation has

filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff. (Doc. 107).

Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition on summary judgment (Doc. 109) and Defendant

has filed a reply. (Doc. 111). The parties have supported their summary judgment papers

with separate statements of facts. (Doc. 108, 112 & 122). Plaintiff has filed a response to

Defendant’s reply (Doc. 116) and a response to Defendant’s supplemental statement of facts

and to Defendant’s factual objections. (Doc. 117). Defendant has moved to strike these

responses. (Doc. 118). In addition, the parties have filed various motions to strike affidavits.

(Doc. 110, 114-15). 

Case 2:03-cv-01369-MHM Document 128 Filed 03/31/06 Page 1 of 12
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The Court has determined that disposition of the pending motions is appropriate

without oral argument. The Court enters this Order on these summary judgment proceedings.

I.

Standard of Review.

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows "that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Material facts are those which might

affect the outcome of the suit. ... An issue is genuine if a reasonable trier of fact could find

in favor of the nonmoving party." Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.

2005). To defeat the motion, the non-moving party must show that there are genuine factual

issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably

be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e). See also, Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). 

II.

The Parties’ Motions to Strike and Factual Objections.

Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiff’s response to its reply (Doc. 116) and her

response and objections (Doc. 117) to Defendant’s supplemental statement of facts in support

of its reply. (Doc. 118). Pursuant to Local Rules Civil 56.1, Rules of Practice for the District

of Arizona, the summary judgment briefing was completed when Defendant filed its reply

in support of summary judgment. Defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. 118) is granted. 

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise

provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial." However, "[t]o survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the

requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56". Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d

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410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit has held that generally, information submitted

at the summary judgment stage may be considered if its contents would be admissible at trial.

See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003)(the district court properly

considered the contents of plaintiff's diary on summary judgment; "[a]t the summary

judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence's form"). However, the

"nonmoving party cannot rely upon conclusory allegations in its pleadings or memoranda and

briefs to establish a genuine issue of material fact." Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of

Pennsylvania, 24 F.3d 508, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1994). Speculative testimony in affidavits and

moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment.

Thornhill Pub. Co. Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

`Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of Chris Romano who also was employed by

Defendant and who is now married to Plaintiff. Defendant has moved to strike Mr. Romano's

affidavit as not based on his first-hand knowledge. Defendant’s motion to strike Mr.

Romano’s affidavit (Doc. 110) is denied. The Court has considered the information provided

in Mr. Romano’s affidavit to the extent, if any, it is based on first-hand knowledge. See

Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay); Fed.R.Evid.802 (excluding hearsay except as

provided by rules); Fed.R.Evid. 602 (limiting witness's testimony to those matters of which

the witness has personal knowledge). 

Defendant has submitted the affidavit of its employees Lisa Sheldon and Brandie

Anslow. Ms. Sheldon states that she is the Regional Team Manager of Human Resources

and that she has provided information based on her own personal knowledge and her review

of pertinent employee files kept in the regular course of business. Ms. Anslow is the Director

of Human Resources and she also states that the information she has provided is based on her

own personal knowledge and her review of pertinent employee files kept in the regular

course of business. Plaintiff has moved to strike these affidavits and requested charges of

perjury. Plaintiff’s motions to strike these affidavits and for charges of perjury (Doc. 114 &

115) are denied. 

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Defendant has noted numerous objections based on relevancy to Plaintiff's statement

of the facts. (see Doc. 112). The Court has considered various of these objected to facts as

bearing on Plaintiff's theory of the case. Defendant's objections are denied as to Plaintiff's

statement of facts paragraphs 2, 4, 6-9, 16, 24-25, 27-29, 32, 34 and 35. As to Defendant's

other objections to Plaintiff's statement of the facts based on vagueness, misstating the

evidence, etc., the Court has considered the documents and evidence submitted by the parties

for purposes of ascertaining the undisputed facts relevant to this case to the extent discussed

below.

III.

Background Facts.

On September 24, 2001, Defendant hired Plaintiff as Regional Mediator in the

Customer Relations Department. On March 28, 2002, Ruth Leatherman, Plaintiff’s

supervisor, wrote a Letter of Recommendation to a Law School which stated that Plaintiff

“has interacted with our department in a professional capacity with tenacity, analytical

abilities and good communication skills ... She is well-liked by her peers, as well as the

internal customers that she serves.” On October 14, 2002, Plaintiff was counseled because

she had used up her allotted “Paid Time Off” (“PTO”) for the year, resulting in an unexcused

absence, and for being late to work more than ten times since August 1, 2002. On November

11, 2002, Plaintiff completed a self-evaluation in which she stated that she was a paralegal

and first-year law student and had a case load at times about 20 to 25 per cent higher than the

other mediators.

On November 22, 2002, Plaintiff and her supervisor, Ms. Leatherman, reviewed

Plaintiff’s written annual Performance Review. This Performance Review noted that

Plaintiff’s attendance was unsatisfactory and that Plaintiff was “impersonal and indifferent,”

and had difficulty interfacing with customers and co-workers. Plaintiff testified during her

deposition that she was aware of these performance issues and did not feel discriminated

against or harassed by Ms. Leatherman pointing them out to her. According to Plaintiff, her

performance rating in all areas except attendance was “consistently acceptable”, she was

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considered a “solid member of the team”, and it was stated that her “performance meets and

is occasionally better than minimum expectations.” Plaintiff has identified two instances in

December 2002 in which she promptly complied with Ms. Leatherman’s requests for workrelated information. 

On January 16, 2003, Plaintiff was written up for failing to follow up properly on two

legal matters involving customers. Because of this deficiency, additional and unnecessary

follow-up was required from other employees. Plaintiff responded by stating in writing:

“What’s done is done and will not happen again.” Plaintiff has implied in her statement of

facts that Ms. Leatherman never actually requested that these cases be opened. Plaintiff

further states that opening cases was not a normal job of her position as Relations Regional

Mediator. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s statements that this was not part of her job. 

On February 26, 2003, a customer contacted Defendant’s Customer Service

Supervisor and complained that Plaintiff had been rude and unprofessional to him. Plaintiff

received another write-up on March 5, 2003 after another employee complained that she had

insulted him by falsely stating in front of other employees that he was a drug user. Plaintiff

agreed that her comment was inappropriate and that she should have received the write-up.

Under Defendant’s PTO policy, Plaintiff was entitled to five hours off for each pay

period. By March 19, 2003, Plaintiff was entitled to 25 hours off. Had Plaintiff sought and

obtained prior approval from management for vacation or personal reasons, she could have

borrowed up to an additional 40 hours. Had she sought this additional time, Plaintiff’s total

available PTO as of March 19, 2003 would have been 65 hours, or 8 work days and one hour.

On February 10, 2003, Plaintiff had taken leave pursuant to the FMLA for five days,

until February 14, 2003. As of March 19, 2003, Plaintiff had been absent nine additional

days not covered by the FMLA. In addition, Plaintiff had been late to work twice and had

left early once. As of the pay period ending March 19, 2003, Plaintiff had negative 34.77

PTO hours. On March 19, 2003, Plaintiff was written up for violating Defendant’s attendance

policy. Plaintiff’s five FMLA days were inadvertently included in this write-up. Plaintiff

brought this error to Defendant’s attention and the five FMLA days were immediately

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removed from the write-up. Despite this error, Plaintiff had exceeded her allocated PTO and

was subject to a Performance Review and write-up. Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that

as of March 19, 2003, she had exhausted her PTO time and that the March 19th write-up was

appropriate under Defendant’s policy. 

When Ms. Leatherman discussed with Plaintiff her absenteeism and tardiness, Ms.

Leatherman allegedly told Plaintiff that several other people had been written up for

attendance issues the previous week. Ms. Leatherman mentioned to Plaintiff that she had

“probably heard them talk about it on the floor.” Plaintiff admitted during her deposition that

she had already been aware that several people had been written up at the time of Ms.

Leatherman’s comments. Plaintiff complained about Ms. Leatherman's comments about other

people in an e-mail to Brandie Anslow, Defendant’s Human Resources Director, and Eileen

Hickey, Defendants’ Director of Retail Operations. Plaintiff stated in the e-mail that “if we

believe in integrity and accountability, let’s start with certain members of management”,

specifically referring to Ms. Leatherman. 

Plaintiff claims to have submitted her resume for the position of Regional Mediator

with Supervisory Experience with Defendant on the evening of March 20, 2003. 

Defendant’s management employees Ms. Leatherman and Ms. Anslow decided to

terminate Plaintiff’s employment. The reasons for the termination were Plaintiff’s numerous

performance issues and her continuing inability to get along with customers, co-workers and

her supervisor. The employment termination decision occurred on March 21, 2003. Plaintiff

states that she was offered two weeks of pay without work which she denied and that she was

then terminated. According to Plaintiff, Ms. Leatherman stated to her on March 21st that

“we’re not happy with you and you’re not happy.” At the time of this employment decision,

Ms. Leatherman was over forty years of age. 

According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s age or attendance were not considered as reasons

contributing to the termination decision. Plaintiff’s employment allegedly was terminated

solely for poor performance.

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Plaintiff testified during her deposition that the basis of her age discrimination claim

is that her employment was terminated and she was replaced by a younger employee.

Plaintiff also testified that the basis of her FMLA claim is that the March 19, 2003 write-up

referenced days that were covered under the FMLA policy. 

Plaintiff claims that she dropped out of law school in April 2003 and was forced to

look for employment with comparable wages after her employment termination.

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Labor alleging that Defendant had

violated the FMLA by terminating her employment. The Department of Labor Wage-Hour

Investigator investigated the charge and concluded that Defendant had not violated the

FMLA. 

IV.

Discussion.

A. Plaintiff’s ADEA claim.

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . .

because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Regarding an ADEA claim, the

plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination either through evidence showing

the employer intended to discriminate or through a presumption arising from proof of the

McDonnell factors. Villodas v. HealthSouth Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (D. Ariz.

2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824

(1973) and Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff must show

that (1) she was over 40 years of age; (2) she was satisfactorily performing her employment

responsibilities; (3) she was discharged from her employment; and (4) she was replaced by

a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications. Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000); Mundy v. Household Finance Corp., 885 F.2d

542, 545 (9th 1989).

The plaintiff in an employment discrimination case “need produce very little evidence

in order to overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal.

Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff need only offer

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evidence that “gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot

Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,1005

(9th Cir. 1985)). The standard summary judgment principles apply, and a shifting burden

analysis is used. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990).

Throughout, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981). When a plaintiff alleges

disparate treatment, “liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age)

actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507

U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (1993)). If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie

showing of illegal discrimination, then the defendant must articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141, 120 S.Ct.

at 2105 (quoting McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824). The burden is one of

production, not persuasion, and does not involve a credibility assessment. Reeves, at 142,

120 S.Ct. at 2106 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742,

2749 (1993)). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate reason

proffered by the defendant is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves, at 143, 120 S.Ct. at 2106.

Defendant contends in its summary judgment motion that Plaintiff has not made a

prima facie case of age discrimination. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not identified any

fact that shows that age was a motivating factor in the employment termination decision.

Moreover, Plaintiff was not performing her job in a satisfactory manner. 

In her response, Plaintiff states that she was 45 years of age at the time of her

employment termination and that she was replaced by Stephanie Umlauf who was

approximately 25 years of age and hired approximately one month after Plaintiff’s

employment was terminated. Plaintiff also appears to contend that her employment was

terminated based on retaliation, referring to the e-mail Plaintiff sent regarding Ms.

Leatherman's comments. Plaintiff further contends that Ms. Leatherman felt “threatened”

when Plaintiff applied for a supervisor position. 

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Plaintiff has shown facts indicating that she was over the age of 40 and suffered an

adverse employment action in the termination of her employment. It is unclear, however,

whether Plaintiff was replaced by Ms. Umlauf. Plaintiff in her response has referred the

Court to the deposition of Ms. Leatherman who testified that Ms. Umlauf was hired for a

mediator position but she did not know the date Ms. Umlauf was hired. Plaintiff has

submitted as Exhibit 29 to her statement of facts what appears to be an employment

application submitted by Ms. Umlauf dated April 21, 2003. (Doc. 122, Exh. 29). Plaintiff's

employment was terminated approximately one month earlier on March 21, 2003. Other

courts have held that a cause of action under the ADEA accrues on the date of the adverse

employment action and it is at that point that the plaintiff must show age as a motivating

factor. See Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 342 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir.

2003)(although plaintiff learned sometime later after being discharged that he had been

replaced by a younger employee, injury was complete and discovered upon date of

employment termination, discussing other cases in accord). 

Moreover, Plaintiff also has not shown facts indicating that Ms. Umlauf had equal or

inferior qualifications. Plaintiff contends that Ms. Umlauf “had limited experience working

directly with customers and with complaint resolution”, she was "not a paralegal" as was

Plaintiff, and she had "minimal experience as a manager." (Doc.109 at p. 10). These

assertions essentially are conclusory. Plaintiff has referred to the deposition testimony of Ms.

Leatherman but other than testifying that Ms. Umlauf was hired for the position as

"mediator," the witness did not describe the job qualifications or requirements. (Doc. 122 -

Leatherman deposition at pp. 55- 60). See, Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 457

(9th Cir. 1995)(noting plaintiff’s failure to present specific evidence establishing the identity,

age or inferior qualifications of the alleged person who replaced him following his

employment termination). See also, Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993).

The Court has no obligation to "scour" the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)(it is not the court's task to scour the

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record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact; the court relies on the nonmoving party to

identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment). 

It further does not appear that age was a motivating factor in the decision made to

terminate Plaintiff's employment made by Ms. Leatherman and Ms. Anslow. "[A]n

employer's intent to discriminate must be evaluated by reference to the decision-maker

actually ordering the adverse employment action, not to other persons in the company."

Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 89 (2d Cir. 2005). There further was evidence

that Plaintiff was not performing her job in a satisfactory manner in light of the customer

complaint, the inappropriate comment about a co-worker and her failure to open the two

cases which caused additional work by other employees. As to this latter issue, Plaintiff has

referred to her own deposition submitted as Exhibit 9 to her statement of facts. (Doc. 122,

Exh. 9). While Plaintiff appeared to dispute that her duties included follow-up on these "two

cases," Plaintiff testified as follows in her deposition:

Q. Right. But as you sit here today, you have no reason to

dispute what was written up on January 16th of 2003, which we

have attached as Exhibit No. 4. In fact, your only response at

the time when you were given an opportunity to dispute that

was, 'What's done is done and won't happen again,' correct?

A. My response was, 'What's done is done and will not happen

again.' 'Did not follow up properly,' that's disputable. I'd have

to review the notes. 'Did not open the cases,' it wasn't my job to

open up the cases.

Q. It was your job to make sure that the cases were opened up.

If they were sent to you, it was definitely your obligation to

make sure that they were in the system?

A. Right.

Q. You're not disputing that?

A. No, I'm not.

(Doc. 122, Exh. 9, at pp. 145-46). 

Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of age

discrimination, the burden then shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment termination. In this case, Defendant has presented

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evidence that Plaintiff’s performance review in November 2002 indicated that Plaintiff was

“impersonal and indifferent,” and had difficulty interfacing with customers and co-workers.

In January 2003, Plaintiff was written up for failing to follow up properly on two legal

matters involving customers causing additional and unnecessary follow-up from other of

Defendant’s employees. In early March 2003, Plaintiff made a false accusation directed at

a co-worker. Defendant has satisfied its burden of demonstrating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination of Plaintiff's employment on March 21, 2003.

The issue is whether at this stage on summary judgment proceedings Plaintiff has

demonstrated the existence of evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the reasons proffered by Defendant for terminating her employment were a pretext

for discrimination. Plaintiff’s assertions that Ms. Leatherman was retaliating against her for

sending the e-mail or for applying for a supervisor position do not implicate age

discrimination. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of evidence that shows a

genuine issue of material fact as to her age discrimination claim. 

B. Plaintiff’s FMLA claim.

The Ninth Circuit has held that complaints alleging adverse employment actions taken

against employees because they have used FMLA leave should not be construed as claims

for retaliation or discrimination. Rather they should be considered as claims of interference

with rights guaranteed by the statute. Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d

1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). The court does not apply the burden-shifting analysis to an

FMLA claim. Instead, the plaintiff need only establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that (1) she took FMLA-protected leave; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(3) the adverse action was causally related to the FMLA-leave. Id. 

Defendant contends there is no evidence that the employment decision was based on

Plaintiff’s FMLA leave. Plaintiff has responded by citing the error in calculating the number

of days covered under her FMLA policy in the March 19, 2003 write-up. As Defendant

emphasizes, Plaintiff pointed out this error and Defendant corrected the mistake. It is

undisputed that as of March 19, 2003, Plaintiff had exhausted her PTO time. Plaintiff

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received a write-up regarding her absenteeism as consistent with Defendant’s personnel

policy. Plaintiff has not disputed the propriety of this write-up. There is no evidence that

Plaintiff’s employment was terminated because she took FMLA-protected leave or that she

was treated disparately for taking leave under the FMLA. 

V.

Conclusion.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated that there

exists no genuine issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Defendant has made such a showing on summary judgment. Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s age discrimination and FMLA claims is granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s response to

Defendant's reply and Plaintiff's response to Defendant’s supplemental statement of facts

(Doc. 118) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike the following documents:

Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s reply (Doc. 116); and Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s

supplemental statement of facts (Doc. 117). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to strike affidavit (Doc. 110)

is denied as set forth in this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions to strike affidavits and for

charges of perjury (Doc. 114-15) are denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.

107) is granted as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered consistent with this

Order.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2006.

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