Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05528/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05528-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 Where a petitioner has been released from prison and is serving a parole term, parole satisfies the custody 1

requirement of federal habeas procedure. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 326, 238 (1963). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARK ALLEN KIMBROUGH,

Petitioner,

v.

ROD HICKMAN,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-5528 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S RENEWED

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. 49]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 26, 1997, in the Fresno County Superior Court, a jury returned a verdict of

guilty of illegal possession of a firearm in violation of California Penal Code sections 12021(a)

and 12021.1(a). It was further found that Petitioner had served a prior prison term in violation of

California Penal Code section 667.5(b). On April 23, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to a total

term of nine years in state prison. Petitioner is currently on parole, having served his sentence

following his conviction. 

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On May 28, 1997, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

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 Petitioner filed several petitions or other proceedings prior to the Fifth District’s opinion. They are as

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follows: (1) Petition for Writ of Mandate, Cal Sup S065879, filed 11/19/97, denied 12/12/97; (2) Error Coram Vobis

Petition, 5DCA F030045, filed 1⁄28/98, denied 2/6/98; (3) Complaint for Prisoner Civil Rights, USDC-E 98-5131,

filed 2/6/98, dismissed/judgment entered 7/13/98; (4) Petition for Review, Cal Sup S068064, filed 2/19/98, denied

3/25/98; (5) Petition for Writ of Mandate, Cal Sup S070143, filed 5/8/98, denied 7/15/98; (6) Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, USSC 98-5192, filed 6/23/98, denied 10/5/98; (7) Petition for Transfer of Cause to Supreme Court

Pursuant to CRC 27.5/Motion to Recuse Fifth District, Cal Sup S072419, filed 8/5/98, denied 8/19/98; (8) Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, USDC-E 98-6043, filed 8/10/98, dismissed/judgment entered 2/26/99; (9) Petition for

Writ of Mandate to Direct Respondents to Perform Obligation of Duty of Office, Cal Sup S073847, filed 10/5/98,

denied 12/16/98; (10) Verified Accusation of Attorney Misconduct, Cal Sup S074786, filed 11/18/98, denied

1/13/99. (Petition, at 5-8.) 

2

On or about September 16, 1997, Petitioner filed the opening brief in his direct appeal,

case number F028471, in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Respondents’

Exhibit 2.)

On November 25, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fifth

District Court of Appeal, case number F029606; the petition was later consolidated with the

direct appeal. (Respondents’ Exhibits 3, 4.)

On April 15, 1999, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of

conviction. (Respondents’ Exhibit 4.)2

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandate on May 3, 1999, with the California

Supreme Court, case number S078545. That court denied the mandate petition on May 19, 1999. 

(Respondents’ Exhibit 5.)

On May 25, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court, case number S079028. The court denied the petition on June 30, 1999. (Respondents’

Exhibit 6.)

On June 9, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court, case number S079631. That court denied the petition on June 30, 1999. 

(Respondents’ Exhibit 7.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, case

number 99-6271, on September 29, 1999. That court denied the petition on November 29, 1999. 

(See Petitioner’s AX-9, Exhibit 98, at 2965-3063.)

On December 7, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Fifth

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District Court of Appeal, case number F034505. That court denied the petition on December 29,

1999. (Respondents’ Exhibit 8.)

On March 9, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Kern

County Superior Court, case number HC 6859A. That court denied the habeas petition on May

18, 2001. (Respondents’ Exhibit 9.)

On May 16, 2000, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of mandamus with the Fifth

District Court of Appeal, case number F035603. The court denied the petition on May 18, 2000. 

(Respondents’ Exhibit 10.) 

On May 30, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court, case number S088724. That court denied the petition on July 12, 2000. (See Petitioner’s

AX-9, Exhibit 101, at 3152-3211.) 

On September 18, 2001, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of certiorari with the

United States Supreme Court, case number 01-7824. On March 18, 2002, the court denied the

petition. (See Petitioner’s AX-10, at Exhibits 106, 109.)

On August 15, 2002, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court, case number S109168. That court denied his petition on June 25,

2003. (Respondents’ Exhibit 11.)

On September 17, 2002, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of mandamus with the

Fifth District Court of Appeal, case number F041471. The court denied the petition on

September 26, 2002. (Respondents’ Exhibit 12.)

On October 7, 2002, Petitioner filed a third petition for review with the California

Supreme Court, case number S110411. (Respondents’ Exhibit 13.) The court denied the petition

on November 13, 2002. 

On September 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of certiorari with the

United States Supreme Court, case number 03-6360. (Respondents’ Exhibit 14.) The petition

was denied on November 17, 2003.

On April 5, 2004, the instant petition was lodged with this Court.

On July 12, 2004, this Court ordered Respondent to respond to the petition.

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On October 29, 2004, Respondents’ filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds

that it violated the one-year statutes of limitations and the petition was a mixed petition subject

to dismissal. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on February 7, 2005.

On February 28, 2005, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations

recommending that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted in all respects. (Court Doc. 31.) 

On April 28, 2005, Petitioner filed objections to the Recommendation. (Court Doc. 35.) 

On August 24, 2005, the District Judge adopted the Findings and Recommendations in

part. Respondent’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of the statute of limitations was

denied, and Respondent’s motion to dismiss on exhaustion grounds was granted, and the

unexhausted claims were dismissed from the action. (Court Doc. 36.) 

On September 16, 2005, the Court directed Respondent to file an answer to the petition. 

(Court Doc. 37.) 

Respondent filed its answer on January 6, 2006. Although Petitioner filed and was

granted an extension of time to file a traverse, a traverse was never filed. (Court Docs. 48, 50.) 

On March 9, 2006, Respondent filed a renewed motion to dismiss in light of the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Evans v. Chavis, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). 

Petitioner has not filed an opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that "an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground." The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

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533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on March 26, 2997. The Fifth District

Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on April 15, 1999. Petitioner filed a petition for

review with the California Supreme Court on May 25, 1999. That petition was denied on June

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30, 1999. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court on September 29, 1999. The writ was denied on November 29, 1999. Thus, direct review

would conclude on November 29, 1999. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999) (concluding period of "direct review" includes the th

period within which one can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Thus, the statute of limitations th

would expire on November 28, 2000. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the "time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward" the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the United States Supreme Court

rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that where a state court denies the petition on both procedural

grounds and on the merits, the fact that the state court addressed the merits warranted tolling

under § 2244(d)(2). The Supreme Court stated:

Given the variety of reasons why the California Supreme Court may have

included the words “on the merits,” those words cannot by themselves indicate

that the petition was timely. And the Ninth Circuit’s apparent willingness to take

such words as an absolute bellwether risks the tolling of the federal limitations

period even when it is highly likely that the prisoner failed to seek timely review

in the state appellate courts. . . . The Ninth Circuit’s rule . . . threatens to

undermine the statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in

order to protect the federal system from being force to hear stale claims. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted.) The Supreme Court also emphasized that only a

“timely” appeal tolls the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period, and that “unreasonable” delays

are not “timely.” Id. at 214. In Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court held that when the state

court denies a state habeas petition without any explanation or indication as to timeliness, the

federal court must conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the state habeas petition was

filed within a "reasonable time." 126 S.Ct. at 852. However, where there is a "clear indication

that a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely," there is no need to conduct

such an independent examination. Id. In Chavis, the Supreme Court found a period of six

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months filing delay to be unreasonable under California law. Id. at 854. The Supreme Court

stated, "Six months is far longer than the ‘short period[s] of time,’ 30 to 60 days, that most States

provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court. Id., quoting Saffold, 536 U.S. at 219. In

addition, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance for determining timeliness:

[T]he Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely filings in California

(as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that California

law in this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other States, i.e., that

California’s ‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays substantially

longer than those in States with determinate timeliness rules. 

Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 853, citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-223.

Respondent argues that Petitioner delayed 273 days between the Kern County Superior

Court’s denial of his state habeas corpus petition (see Respondent’s Exhibit 9, to Court Doc. 21)

and his filing a petition with the California Supreme Court on August 15, 2002. The Court notes

that at the time Petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus petition in the Kern County Superior

Court on March 9, 2000, 101 days of the limitation period had elapsed. The limitations period

was tolled until the petition was denied on May 18, 2001. Petitioner waited until August 15,

2002, to file his state habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court, which was

denied on June 25, 2003. However, on September 18, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The petition was denied on March 18, 2002. 

Although direct review includes the ninety day period during which a petitioner may file a

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157,

1158-59 (9 Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and several other Circuit Courts, th

excluding the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that following state collateral review a

petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the period available to file a petition for writ of certiorari to

the United States Supreme Court, even if as here, the petition for certiorari was actually filed. 

White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 925 (9 Cir. 2002); accord Gildon v. Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, th

885-86 (7 Cir. 2004); Miller v. Dragovich, 311 F.3d 574, 577-80 (3d Cir. 2002); Crawley v. th

Catoe, 257 F.3d 395, 399-400 (4 Cir. 2001); Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033 (8 Cir. 2001); th th

Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11 Cir. 2000); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5 Cir. th th

1999); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10 Cir. 1999); but see Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d th

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 The Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in Lawrence v. 3

Florida, 126 S.Ct. 1625, 164 L.Ed.2d 332 (2006), oral argument heard October 31, 2006, to decide the instant

question:

Where a defendant facing death has pending a United States Supreme Court certiorari petition to

review the validity of the state’s denial of his claims for state postconviction relief, does the

defendant have an application pending which tolls the 2244(d)(2) statute of limitations?

See e.g. Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 788 (7 Cir. 2006). th

Although the instant case is not a capital case, the same analysis nonetheless applies to a non-capital petitioner.

 Although in some of these cases, including White v. Klitzkie, the petitioners did not actually file a petition 4

for writ of certiorari as Petitioner did in this case, the analysis nonetheless remains the same. As stated in Crawley v.

Catoe, 257 F.3d at 399, “Following the denial of relief in the state courts in state habeas proceedings, neither the

time for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, nor the time a petition for certiorari is

considered by the United States Supreme Court, is tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) from the one-year statute of

limitations under § 2244(d)(1).” See also Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d at 1155-56; White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d at 924-

25 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is simply not an application for state

review. Crawley v. Catoe, 257 F.3d 395, 399 (4 Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The time spent pursuing such a th

federal writ is not ‘time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to

exhaust state court remedies. . ..” (citation omitted); see also Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10 Cir. th

1999).”) Thus, it is reasonably inferable that the holding in White v. Klitzkie extends to the time during which a

petition for writ of certiorari is actually pending before the Supreme Court. 

8

164, 172-73 (6 Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the limitations period is tolled from the filing th

of an application for state post-conviction or other collateral relief until the conclusion of the

time for seeking certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court of the state’s final

judgment on that application, independent of whether the petitioner actually files a petition for

certiorari.) Accordingly, pursuant to current binding Circuit authority, since Petitioner was

3,4

seeking review following state collateral review, he is not entitled to tolling during the time that

he actually filed a petition for writ of certiorari at the United States Supreme Court. Therefore,

the relevant time frame to determine the reasonableness is from May 18, 2001 to August 15,

2002, i.e. 454 days. 

As Respondent points out, although this case is made more complex due to the numerous

state court filings and the zealous litigation of Petitioner, the focus on whether Petitioner is

entitled to interval tolling under Evans v. Chavis, is based simply on the time period between the

lower state court’s denial of his habeas petition and his petition filed in the California Supreme

Court as these filings constitute one complete round of state collateral review. As this Court

previously stated, 

Petitioner did file numerous other petitions in various courts during the time

the March 9, 2000 Kern County Superior Court petition was pending the time the

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 See Cal. R. Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a 5

decision of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. During this time, following state collateral review,

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of in the United States Supreme Court on September 15, 2003, which was denied

on November 17, 2003, because Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the time this petition was pending, it is

excluded 

9

August 15, 2002 California Supreme Court was pending, and the time between

these filings. However, overlapping petitions do not affect the tolling during the

time petitioner is seeking one full round of review. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340

F.3d at 819-821. Because Petitioner’s other petitions were overlapping petitions

that began separate rounds of review, they did not affect tolling during his first

full round of review. 

(Court Doc. 36, Order Adopting Findings and Recommendations, at 4.) Further, this Court has

previously recognized the significant delay between the denial at the Superior Court and filing at

the California Supreme Court, stating:

The court does note that there was over a year delay between the Kern County

Superior Court denying Petitioner’s March 9, 2000 Kern County Superior Court

petition on May 18, 2001, and Petitioner’s filing of the August 15, 2002

California Supreme Court petition. If the delay between filing petitions during

one full round is unreasonable, the petition will no longer be “pending” within the

meaning of Section 2244(d)(2).

(Court Doc. 36, Order Adopting Findings and Recommendations, at 5.) The 

unjustified/unexplained delay of 454 days is clearly unreasonable under the analysis of Evans v.

Chavis, for there the delay was only six months which the Court held was unacceptable as a

matter of federal law. Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 854. Petitioner has not provided any justification or

explanation for the lengthy delay, which is over twice as long as the delay in Evans, and over

seven times the short period of time of 30 to 60 days provided by most States for filing an appeal. 

In addition, the California Rules provide that the People have 60 days to appeal the superior

court’s granting of habeas relief. Cal. Rules of Court § 1506. Therefore, because the delay

between filings was unreasonable, Petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling during this period. 

Another 454 days elapsed against the statutory period, resulting in 555 (454 & 101) days of the

limitations period expiring. Further, following the California Supreme Court’s denial of the

habeas petition on June 25, 2003, Petitioner delayed another 285 days before filing the instant

petition on April 5, 2004. The instant petition is clearly untimely and barred by the statute of 5

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 However, even if Petitioner were entitled to tolling for the time during which he actually filed a petition 6

for writ of certiorari, which under this Circuit’s current precedent he is not, the instant action would still be untimely. 

Granting tolling, during for the time the petition for writ of certiorari was filed on September 18, 2001 and denied on

March 18, 2002, would exclude 181 days from 454, equaling 273. The unjustified and unexplained delay of 273 

days is almost as long as the delay in Evans, and is over four times the short period of time of 30 to 60 days provided

by most States for filing an appeal. Thus, the unjustified delay of 273 days is also unreasonable under Evans v

Chavis, and Petitioner would not be entitled to interval tolling for this time. Therefore, 374 (273 & 101) days

elapsed against the statute of limitations. 

Then, again, following the California Supreme Court’s denial of the habeas petition on June 25, 2003,

Petitioner delayed another 82 days until the third petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the United States

Supreme Court on September 15, 2003. Then, after the United States Supreme Court’s denial of the third certiorari

petition on November 17, 2003, Petitioner delayed another 139 days before filing the instant petition on April 5,

2004. 

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limitations. 

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D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. th

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 th

(1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled th

in part on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. th

1998) (en banc) (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions

of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing th

Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-1289.

Assuming it is available, although Petitioner previously raised grounds for equitable

tolling with respect to Respondent’s first motion to dismiss, Petitioner did not file an opposition

to the renewed motion to dismiss and has not presented any grounds for equitable tolling. Thus,

the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of limitations and must be

dismissed, with prejudice. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED; and

2. This action be dismissed, with prejudice, as time-barred.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within five (5) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 19, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05528-AWI-DLB Document 51 Filed 12/20/06 Page 11 of 11