Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06027/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06027-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LINDA K. LANKFORD; NANCY CALVERY, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

JAN 04 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

~ ) No. 95-6027 

) 

CITY OF HOBART; HOBART POLICE DEPART- ) 

MENT; QUIRINO MEDRANO, JR., individually ) 

and as City Marshal and Police Chief of the City of ) 

Hobart, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. C!V-92-164-H) 

Tom R. Stephenson, Watonga, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Andrew W. Lester (Shannon F. Davies with him on the briefs) of Lester & Bryant, P.C., 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs Linda Lankford and Nancy Calvery brought charges against the City of 

Hobart alleging they were subjected to sexual harassment and discrimination by former 

Police Chief Quirino Medrano, Jr., in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as other federal and state law 

claims. A magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma gr~ted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing all of plaintiffs' 

claims. Plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal of their § 1983 and Title VII claims against the 

City of Hobart. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 636(c)(3) and affirm the 

magistrate judge's order.' 

I 

Plaintiffs allege while employed as dispatchers for the Hobart Police and Fire 

Departments they were subjected to sexual harassment and discrimination by Mr. Medrano, 

the police chief and city marshal, which created a hostile and abusive work enviromnent. 

Such discrimination consisted of unwelcome sexual advances, obscene remarks, and 

inappropriate physical touching of their bodies. They further allege when they rebuked his 

advances Mr. Medrano threw temper tantrums, slandered their reputations, began spying on 

Plaintiffs also brought charges against Mr. Medrano. On May 16, 1994, this court affirmed in part and 

reversed in part the magistrate judge's order. On June 14, 1994, this court withdrew and vacated its May 16 

opinion and reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Mr. Medrano but declined to exercise 

jurisdiction over the claims against Hobart. See Lankfordv. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477 (lOth Cir. 1994). On 

remand, upon the joint stipulation and motion of plaintiffs and Mr. Medrano, the plaintiffs' cause against Mr. 

Medrano was dismissed with prejudice. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 2 
them, and threatened to ftre them. Plaintiffs contend Hobart city officials knew or should 

have known of Mr. Medrano's actions and failed to take proper remedial measures. On 

appeal, plaintiffs argue snrmnary judgment as to their Title Vll and § 1983 claims should not 

have been granted in favor of Hobart "because triable issues exist and the law was 

incorrectly applied." 

The magistrate judge dismissed plaintiffs'§ 1983 claims after ftnding "Medrano had 

no authority to make any policy on behalf of the City including terms or conditions of 

employment and any acts of sexual harassment were personal in nature without being 

officially condoned or sanctioned." The court also found there was no evidence of a custom 

or widespread practice of sexual harassment. Regarding the Title VII claims, the court found 

Mr. Medrano's sexual harassment was not so pervasive as to create a hostile work 

enviromnent. The court also noted there was no evidence that plaintiffs had been denied any 

tangible work beneftts as a result of the sexual harassment. 

We review a motion for sununary judgment de novo. Considine v. Newspaper Agency 

Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1356 (lOth Cir. 1994). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c) a motion for 

snrmnary judgment is appropriate only where it is found "there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The 

district and appellate courts are required to draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nomnovant. Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 665 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 3 
II 

We will first address plaintiffs'§ 1983 claims. Title 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 provides: 

Evety person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage of any State ... , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at Jaw, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress. 

Municipalities, such as Hobart, are considered "persons" to whom§ 1983 liability applies. 

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Sexual harassment 

can violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the Jaws thus triggering 

a§ 1983 cause of action. Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Notably, even if we find Mr. Medrano's actions violated plaintiffs' rights to equal 

protection, the City of Hobart can be held liable under§ 1983 only if Mr. Medrano's actions 

can be characterized as representing an official policy or custom of the City of Hobart In 

Monell, the Supreme Court held "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom 

... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under§ 1983." 436 U.S. 

at 694. Simply employing a tortleasor is not enough to establish liability under § 1983. Id 

at 691. 

In order to warrant liability, a municipal policy must be a "'policy statement, 

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a municipality's] 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 4 
officers."' Starrett, 876 F.2d at 818 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). In the case at bar, 

there is no allegation nor evidence suggesting the City of Hobart had au official policy 

favoring sexual harassment. In fact, there is evidence the City of Hobart had a written city 

policy expressly forbidding it. 

If the violation cauuot be characterized as official policy then the City of Hobart cau 

. still be held liable if the practice is "so permanent aud well settled as to constitute a 'custom 

or usage' with the force oflaw." Ad/ekes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168 (1970). 

In order to establish a custom, the actions must be "persistent aud widespread ... practices 

of [city] officials." Starrett, 876 F.2d at 818 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 

Furthermore, the official charged with sexual harassment must also have "final policy 

making authority" with respect to the acts in question as a matter of state law. Pembaur v. 

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plorality). In Pembaur, the Court expressly 

limited municipal liability under § 1983 "where--aud only where--a deliberate choice to 

follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." !d. 

at 483-84. 

The question Is thus whether Mr. Medrano's acts cau be characterized as a deliberate 

choice of the city aud whether he had fmal policy making authority for the City of Hobart. 

The City of Hobart is au aldermanic form of government. Under this system, the city mayor 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 5 
has all fmal policy making decision power and control regarding the hiring and firing of city 

employees. Okla. stat tit. 11, § 9-105 (1995). Mr. Medrano served in a dual role. He was 

elected city marshal by the population and then appointed chief of police by the City 

Council. We do not have Mr. Medrano's job description before us, but we do know the 

aldermanic form of govermuent did not authorize him to hire or fire employees nor to make 

official policy as a matter of state law. 

Mr. Medrano's ability to hire or fire employees is not determinative in a§ 1983 claim 

as was shown in our Starrett decision. The defendant in Starrett, an elected deputy county 

assessor, was charged with sexually harassing a female county assessor by making unwanted 

sexual advances, inappropriate physical contact and obscene gestures. Although Starrett 

involved only one plaintiff, she presented evidence that the same defendant had sexually 

harassed other female employees. She also introduced evidence that he retaliated against her 

for rejecting his advances, culminating in her tennination. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 819. In 

Starrett, the defendant had the authority to hire and fire the plaintiff and the county was held 

liable for the plaintiff's wrongful termination. However, the county was not held responsible 

for the defendant's sexual harassment under§ 1983 because "isolated and sporadic acts of 

sexoal harassment directed at a few specific female members of his staff' did not amount to 

a county custom. Id at 820. The Starrett court noted that there was "no indication that 

sexual harassment by others in the office was tolerated or occurred" or that the defendant 

materially altered the plaintiffs employment duties or status prior to the termination. Id 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 6 
In this case, plaintiffs have also not alleged any sexual harassment in the office other 

than that connnitted by Mr. Medrano at very specific times and places against certain female 

employees. This case exemplifies a situation where the defendant was committing private, 

rather than public, acts of sexual harassment. There is also no indication that Mr. Medrano 

materially changed their employment duties or status as part of his harassment. The factual 

dispute regarding his ability to hire and fire the plaintiffs is irrelevant because neither 

plaintiff has alleged wrongful termination or that keeping their jobs was contingent on their 

acquiescence to Mr. Medrano's sexual advances. Ms. Calvery does allege that he demoted 

her from chief dispatcher to dispatcher. However, this "demotion" resulted in no change in 

her job conditions or salary. Ms. Calvery was terminated by the City Council on Mr. 

Medrano's recommendation. Although there is some dispute regarding the reasons for the 

termination, when Ms. Calvery challenged her termination the City Council provided her 

with a post-temtination hearing, at which no mention of sexual harassment was made by Ms. 

Calvery, and she was reinstated to her former position with compensation for missed pay, 

subject to a ninety-day probationary period. 

Plaintiffs also allege that Hobart city officials knew or should have known of Mr. 

Medrano's conduct yet failed to take appropriate measures. In Woodward v. City of 

Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3038 (1993), we 

adopted the Third Circuit's test for supervisory liability under § 1983 as requiring 

"allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Id (quoting 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 7 
: 

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990)). Here, plaintiffs have 

not made any allegations of personal dhection by city officials. Plaintiffs do claim, however, 

the City had aetna! knowledge of Mr. Medrano's actions. Ms. Calvery states she told the 

Mayor of Hobart of Mr. Medrano's actions after she was tenninated and prior to her 

tennination hearing. Although the Mayor denies Ms. Calvery complained to him of sexual 

harassment, after the alleged co'!versation occurred, Ms. Calvery was given a due process 

hearing, was reinstated to her position and the sexual harassment stopped. The Mayor does , 

not dispute that Ms. Lankford told him of Mr. Medrano's actions. Rather than acquiescing 

to the conduct, the Mayor inunediately suspended her with pay so he could conduct an 

investigation. Finding inconclusive results regarding her claims, she was reinstated, the 

dispatcher's office was moved and her schedule was changed so she would not come into 

contact with Mr. Medrano. Ms. Lankford admits that after these steps the harassment 

stopped. She does claim, however, that she was demoted from chief dispatcher to dispatcher. 

But as we noted earlier, such a change was merely nominal. Because Hobart did not 

acquiesce to Mr. Medrano's actions but rather took steps that resulted in preventing further 

harassment and because Mr. Medrano's conduct constitutes neither a city policy nor custom 

the district com1 properly dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 claims 2 

2 Plaintiffs1 failure-to-train allegations against the City of Hobart lack merit. Under City ,of Canton v, 

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989), in order to prevail the plaintiffs must show that the City ofHobart1s failure 

to train rose to the level of "deliberate indifference." Plaintiffs have made no such claim nor provided any 

evidence on this issue. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 8 
III 

We now tum to plaintiffs' Title VII claims.' Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act does 

not apply retroactively, plaintiffs are governed by pre-1991 Civil Rights Act law. Landgraf 

v. US! Film Products, _U.S.__,__, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508 (1994). Under the pre-1991 

Civil Rights Act plaintiffs are ''restricted to the traditional equitable remedies of 

reinstatemen~ back pay, and front pay as well as declru·atory and injunctive relief." Cox v. 

Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1347 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

Ms. Calvery is still employed as a dispatcher for the City of Hobart and has no claim 

for reinstatement. She also has made no claim for front pay or any type of declaratory or 

injunctive relief. In fact, declaratory or injunctive relief would be inappropriate in this case 

because Mr. Medrano is no longer a city employee nor city official. Ms. Calvery did make 

a vague claim that she was not fully compensated for all the back pay she missed during the 

period between her dismissal and her reinstatement. But there were no charges that this 

disntissal was based on violations of Title VII and those damages are therefore not applicable 

to this cause of action. 

Ms. Lankford admits she quit her position due to personality conflicts with the new 

3 The magistrate judge dismissed Ms. Calvery's Title VII claims as barred by the statute of limitations 

because she did not bring her claims within 300 days after the ~lleged discriminatory practice. The magistrate 

judge, however, failed to consider the possibility of an equitable tolling as provided in Zipes v. Trans World 

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). We will not address the merits of an equitable tolling claim because we find 

Ms. Calvery's Title VII claims fail to allege an adequate remedy. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6027 Document: 01019279834 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 9 
chief of police, scheduling problems and overall job dissatisfaction. She also has not made 

any claims for back pay, front pay, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief. Plaintiffs have 

claimed they were denied overtime payments. However, neither is able to docwnent nor 

even estimate how much overtime they are owed, why they were denied such payments or 

whether any dispatchers ever received overtime. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not dispute a 

1991 Department of Labor investigation which found overtime was owed to certain City of 

Hobart employees. Neither plaintiff was found to be owed overtime by this investigation. 

Therefore, we need not address the merits of plaintiffs' Title VII claims because the 

lack of an appropriate remedy moots their claims for relief. A claim iS moot when the 

controversy no longer '1ouch[ es] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests" 

in the outcome of the case. DeFunls v. Odegaard, 4!6 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (per curiam). 

"The legal interest must be more than simply the satisfaction of a declaration that a person 

was wronged." Cox, 43 F.3d at 1348. In this case, because no legal remedies are available 

to plaintiffs a verdict in their favor would do little more than provide them with emotional 

satisfaction. Such satisfaction is not an appropriate remedy under these circwnstances. See 

also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a claim is 

moot when the primary interest is the emotional satisfaction from a favorable ruling). 

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the magistrate judge's grant of smwnary 

judgment to the City of Hobart regarding plaintiffs'§ 1983 and Title VII claims. 

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