Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01940/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01940-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONELL HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

CASE No. 12cv1940 JAH (JLB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 29]

v.

J. HURTADO, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Lionell Hamilton (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint alleging: (1) violation of First Amendment rights;

(2) violation of Fourth Amendment rights; (3) violation of Eighth Amendment rights;

(4) violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1986; and (5) violation of California Civil Code

section 52 and 52.1. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint,

contending that: (1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1986; (2)

Plaintiff failed to state a claim for violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment;

(3) Plaintifffailed to allege personal involvement of Defendants Scribner and Cate; and

(4) Plaintiff failed to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. (ECF No.

8.) 

On July 25, 2013, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation granting

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 15.) United States District Judge John A.

Houston subsequently adopted the Report and Recommendation, leaving only the First 

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Amendment retaliation claim and the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, both

against Defendant Hurtado. (ECF No. 16.) Currently pending before the Court is

Defendant Hurtado’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which argues that Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the favorable termination doctrine. (ECF. No. 29-3.) Based on

the moving and opposing papers, the evidence presented, and the applicable law, it is

hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I. BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges that on April 7, 2009, Defendant Hurtado unlawfully

seized Plaintiff during a shower escort and “roughly and forcefully pulled” him. (ECF

No. 1 at 8.) Once they reached Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff claims Defendant Hurtado

violently pulled Plaintiff’s right arm through the food port slot of his cell, pepper

sprayed Plaintiff in the face, and falsely claimed that it was Plaintiff who assaulted

Defendant Hurtado. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Hurtado’s actions

were in retaliation for Plaintiff’s previously filed grievance against Defendant Hurtado

for harassment. (Id. at 9.)

As a result of the incident on April 7, 2009, a crime/incident report was filed. 

(ECF No. 29-5 at 13.) The report details that “a battery on a peace office . . . occurred

in ASU-1, involving Inmate Hamilton . . . .” (Id.) A disciplinary hearing was held,

during which Defendant Hurtado providing the following statement:

I escorted Inmate Hamilton . . . form [sic] the shower to his cell. 

Hamilton entered his cell, but turned to his left to face me as the cell door

was closing. I ordered Hamilton to face the back wall until the door

closed. Hamilton turned away from me, but stated, “Fuck you, you’re a

scared bitch.” Once the cell door was closed, Hamilton placed his hands

through the handcuff port and I placed my left hand on the handcuffs

while preparing to remove them. I released the left handcuff and

Hamilton suddenly spun to his right and began pulling his still restrained

right hand away from me, forcing my left hand against the top of the

handcuff port and into the cell. I retained my grip on the handcuffs and

leaned backward, pulling the handcuffs back through the handcuff port,

while ordering him to stop resisting. Hamilton stated, “No,” and

continued pulling on the handcuffs. I continued holding the handcuffs

with my left hand and drew my state issued MK-9 Pepper Spray with my

right hand while again ordering Hamilton to stop. He refused, and I

sprayed a burst of Pepper Spray toward his facial area, through an opening

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on the right side of the handcuff port. Hamilton then stopped resisting

and I was[able] to release the handcuff from his right hand and secure the

handcuff port. Sergeant C. Imada arrived at my location and I informed

him that Hamilton tried to pull my arm through the handcuff port. I

departed E-Pod and was medically evaluated by on-duty medical staff. 

(Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff pled not guilty and stated that he “was attacked.” (Id. at 5.) At the

conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff was found guilty of battery on a

peace officer in violation of California Code of Regulations Section 3005(d)(1) and

assessed a 150-day forfeiture of good-time credits he had previously earned toward his

release. (ECF No. 29-5 at 6-7.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.

Id. at 325. If the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issuesfor trial. 

Id. at 324.

Summary judgment must be granted when the non-moving party failsto establish

an essential element of the case. Id. at 322-23. “[The] plain language of Rule 56(c) 

mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. The failure of the

non-moving party to prove an essential element renders all other facts nonmaterial. Id. 

Inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. V. Zenith

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Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but rather,

to determine whether there is any genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

The non-moving party must offer specific facts that establish a genuine issue of

material fact. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87. A summary judgment motion cannot

be defeated by relying on bare allegations or speculation. Roley v. New World

Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, the non-moving party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Favorable Termination Doctrine

Defendant Hurtado seeks summary judgment only on the ground that Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims are barred by the favorable termination doctrine set forth by the

Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641 (1997). According to Defendant Hurtado, the favorable termination

doctrine bars Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation causes of action because

Plaintiff was previously found guilty in a prison disciplinary proceeding of battery on

Defendant Hurtado in connection with the exact same incident that serves as the basis

for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. Defendant Hurtado argues that Plaintiff cannot

pursue his Section 1983 claims without first overturning these prior findings and

convictions. (ECF No. 29-3.) In his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiff does not address the favorable termination doctrine, but reiterates his position

that it was Defendant Hurtado who committed the battery. (ECF No. 39.)

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who is convicted

of a crime under state law cannot seek damages in a Section 1983 action if a judgment

in the plaintiff’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. An action must be dismissed under Heck if the

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plaintiff “would have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been

convicted” in order to prevail in his Section 1983 action. Id. at 487. In other words,

“if a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts stands and is fundamentally

inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which Section 1983 damages are sought,

the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (1996). In

Edwards, the United States Supreme Court extended this rule to adverse findings in

prison disciplinary proceedingsthat affect a prisoner’s termof confinement, such asthe

deprivation of good-time credits. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647-48. Reading Heck and

Edwardstogether, it is well established that “the favorable termination rule turns solely

on whether a successful Section 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a

conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the

prisoner’s confinement.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003).

A Section 1983 action should be allowed to proceed however, if the District

Court determines that success on the merits will not invalidate a conviction against the

plaintiff. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In some cases, a cause of action under Section 1983

is not barred under Heck because the factual basis for the conviction is divisible from

the alleged violation of Section 1983, and, as a result, success on the merits of the

claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. In Smith v. City of

Hemet, Smith pled guilty to resisting arrest under California Penal Code Section

148(a)(1). Smith, 394 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). He then filed a complaint under

Section 1983 alleging that police used excessive force when they sprayed him with

pepper spray and instructed a police dog to attack him. Id. at 694-95. The Ninth

Circuit concluded that Smith’s excessive force allegations were not barred by Heck

because some of the acts of alleged excessive force occurred both before and after

Smith had engaged in acts that may have constituted the factual basis for his guilty

plea. Smith, 394 F.3d at 699. 

The facts indicated that Smith committed a number of acts constituting the crime

of resisting arrest before police decided to arrest him. Id. at 693-94, 696-97. Police

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issued verbal commands, all of which were within the bounds of their general police

powers, and there was no physical contact between Smith and police that could

constitute excessive force. Id. After police decided to take Smith into custody, he

continued to disobey police commands—in violation of Section 148(a)(1)—while

officers applied force to subdue him and make an arrest. Id. at 694, 697. Although

Smith pled guilty to resisting arrest in violation of Section 148(a)(1), nothing in the

record indicated which of his actions constituted the unlawful resistance to which he

pled guilty. Id. at 698-99. Thus, because the court was unable to determine “‘the

factual basis for [Smith’s] plea,’ his lawsuit [did] not necessarily imply the invalidity

of his conviction and . . . [was] therefore not barred by Heck.” Id. at 699, citing Heck,

512 U.S. at 487. 

On the other hand, a claim under Section 1983 is barred by Heck “when the

factual basis for the underlying conviction is clear, and the 1983 claim is not in any

way divisible from that factual basis.” Velarde v. Duarte, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1213

(S.D. Cal. 2013). In the instant case, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s excessive force

and retaliation claims are based on the exact same acts that were considered in the

prison disciplinary proceeding. Defendant further argues that the encounter took place

“in a matter of seconds.” (ECF No. 29-3 at 5.) 

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that Defendant Hurtado assaulted

Plaintiff by pulling Plaintiff’s arm through the handcuff port of the cell door. During

the prison disciplinary proceeding, the Senior Hearing Officer reviewed the facts

surrounding the incident in Plaintiff’s cell and ultimately found that it was Plaintiff

who pulled Defendant’s arm through the food port and that Defendant pepper sprayed

Plaintiff while Plaintiff disobeyed orders to stop resisting. (ECF No. 29-5 at 14.) 

In order to prevail on his causes of action arising from the incident in the cell,

Plaintiff must prove facts that are entirely inconsistent with the Senior Hearing

Officer’s findings. Specifically, Plaintiff would have to prove that the battery on

Defendant Hurtado was fabricated, and that Defendant unlawfully pulled Plaintiff’s

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arm through the food port and then sprayed him in the face with pepper spray. Proof

of these facts would be fundamentally inconsistent with the findings made by the

Senior Hearing Officer in the prison disciplinary proceeding. 

Accordingly, if Plaintiff were successful on the merits of his excessive force and

retaliation claims arising from the incident in his cell, it would imply the invalidity of

the prison disciplinary finding and require reversal of the 150-day credit loss, thereby

affecting the length of his sentence. Thus, the favorable termination doctrine applies

and bars Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation claims arising from the cell incident

unless Plaintiff first proves his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared

invalid, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512

U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence that his disciplinary

proceeding has been overturned. As such, Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation

claims arising from the cell incident are not cognizable under Section 1983. 

However, Plaintiff also alleges—in a single paragraph—that excessive force was

used during the shower escort. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) With regard to the shower escort,

Plaintiff claims “[w]hile being escorted from the shower, defendant J. Hurtado

unlawfully seized plaintiff and began to roughly and forcefully pulled [sic] plaintiff

during the escort, plaintiff was wearing very fragile shower shoes and was also in

restraints.” (Id. at 8.) As noted above, the instant Motion rests exclusively on the

argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the favorable termination doctrine. 

However the record does not indicate that the Officer in Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing

reviewed the facts surrounding the shower escort and no determination was made as

to the use of force during this interaction. (ECF No. 29-5 at 5.)

Therefore, Heck does not bar Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation claims

as they relate to Defendant’s actions during the shower escort. Success on the merits

of these claims would not necessarily invalidate Plaintiff’s conviction for conduct that

occurred during the incident in his cell. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff

is not barred by the favorable termination doctrine from pursuing his excessive force

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and retaliation claims to the extent that they are based on Defendant’s conduct during

the shower escort. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for

1

Summary Judgment be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the forgoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgement be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation

claims to the extent that they are based on Defendant’s actions in Plaintiff’s cell. The

Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement be

DENIED as to Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation claims to the extent that they

are based on Defendant’s actions during the shower escort. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any

party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties by

January 14, 2015. The document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed by January

28, 2015.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 17, 2014 

JILL L. BURKHARDT

United States Magistrate Judge

As it is not presently before the Court, the Court makes no evaluation of the sufficiency of 1

Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force and retaliation as they relate to the shower escort.

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