Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00970/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00970-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 444
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Welfare
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE SEWELL and CHRISTINA 

SEWELL,

NO. CIV.S-05-970 LKK/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT

et al,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is defendant City of Fairfield’s

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's first amended complaint

states a single cause of action for “battery” under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, which the court construes as an excessive force claim.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff

has failed to serve any of the police officers in accordance with

the scheduling order and that there is no evidence of a custom or

policy of excessive force by the City of Fairfield. The matter is

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There was no oral argument, plaintiff's counsel failing to 1

timely appear.

The facts here are derived from the parties’ statements of 2

undisputed fact. However, because these statements contain only

minimal information, they are supplemented with allegations in the

first amended complaint (and noted as such) where appropriate.

2

decided based on the papers. The court notes that plaintiff’s 1

counsel was not present at oral argument. For the reasons set

forth below, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Facts2

A. Background

Plaintiff Christina Sewell claims that her constitutional

rights were violated by police officers of the City of Fairfield

on November 28, 2003. Def.’s SUF 1. Specifically, plaintiff

alleges in her first amended complaint that she was pulled from

her car by the hair during a traffic stop, that five police

officers held her to the ground by her legs and neck, and that

she was unable to breathe as a result. Compl. ¶ 14-16. 

Plaintiff has brought the present action against the City of

Fairfield and against Does 1-10, who are described as members of

the Fairfield Police Department. Def.’s SUF 2.

B. Monell Claim

The parties dispute whether there is a policy, custom, or

practice regarding the use of excessive force by either the City

of Fairfield or the Fairfield Police Department. Defendant

argues that there is no such policy or custom regarding the use

of excessive force or the commission of battery in connection

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with the apprehension or detention of persons suspected of

possible criminal activity. Gresham Decl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff,

however, disputes this contention, relying on her first amended

complaint and the declaration of her attorney. McCann Dec. at ¶

5 (“To the best of my knowledge and belief, based on my

conversations with Plaintiff she believes that Fairfield Police

Department has a practice or custom of utilizing excessive

force.”).

Furthermore, in response to an interrogatory as to whether

plaintiff was “aware of any custom, policy, or practice . . .

regarding the use of excessive force,” Lucas Decl. in Support of

Mot. for Summ. J., Exh. A, plaintiff responded “No.” Id., Exh.

B. However, plaintiff also included a disclaimer providing that

“[d]iscovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to

supplement this response if additional information is obtained

and/or additional document [sic] are discovered.” Id.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her first complaint in May 2005. Defendant

filed a motion to dismiss in August 2005, which was granted with

leave to amend in September 2005. The court then issued a

Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order dated October 5, 2005. The

order instructed that service upon the officer defendants was to

be accomplished within fifteen days of the order, and that the

action was to be dismissed as to all Doe defendants sixty days

from the date of the order. To this date, no officer defendants

have been served. Def.’s SUF 3. In addition, the order

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instructed that discovery be completed by September 26, 2006.

III. Analysis

Defendant’s argument is twofold. First, defendant argues

that summary judgment should be granted with respect to the Doe

defendants because plaintiff has not accomplished service within

the time specified in the scheduling order. Second, defendant

argues that summary judgment should be granted with respect to

the City of Fairfield because plaintiff has failed to establish

a genuine dispute as to the existence of an unconstitutional

custom, policy, or practice. For the reasons discussed below,

defendant’s motion is granted.

A. Doe Defendants

The first issue is whether summary judgment should be

granted as to the Doe defendants. The chronology of events is

straightforward. In the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order

dated October 5, 2005, the court instructed that service upon

the officer defendants was to be accomplished within fifteen

days of the order, and that the action was to be dismissed as to

all Doe defendants sixty days from the date of the order. 

Plaintiff has failed to serve this action on the officers

designated as Doe defendants, Def.’s SUF 3, and does not dispute

that the time in which she was permitted to serve these officers

has since expired. 

Furthermore, according to defendant, plaintiff requested a

copy of the police report on January 23, 2006, and was mailed a

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This request took the form of a letter. According to 3

defendant, plaintiff has not undertaken any formal discovery in

this case. Lucas Decl. in Support of Reply at ¶ 4.

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copy of the report the next day. Lucas Decl. in Support of 3

Def.’s Reply at ¶ 5-6. This report allegedly contained the full

details of the incident, including the names of all police

officers involved. Plaintiff contends that she is presently

ignorant as to the identities of the officers, but believes that

she will be able to ascertain these identities upon review of

pictures of Fairfield police. McCann Dec. at ¶ 4. Moreover,

plaintiff contends that the scheduling order provided

insufficient time for her to recall the officers’ identities.

These contentions do not change the fact that plaintiff

failed to serve any officers within the time required in the

scheduling order, and indeed, has failed to do so at all. Even

if plaintiff’s contentions regarding her memory are true, she

could have chosen to file a motion to amend the scheduling order

in order to request more time to recall the officers’

identities. The present stage of the proceedings is not the

proper time in which to raise these arguments. 

Furthermore, it appears that plaintiff does, in fact, have

the necessary information to ascertain the identities of the

relevant police officers. According to defendant, plaintiff

requested a copy of the police report of the incident and was

sent a copy of this report immediately after the request. The

fact that plaintiff received the report after the time period in

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which she could have served the Doe defendants is immaterial.

Plaintiff failed to request the report before the sixty days had

elapsed, or at least not by means of any formal discovery

device. Lucas Decl. in Support of Reply at ¶ 4. In addition,

plaintiff never filed a motion to amend the complaint to name

the Doe defendants after receipt of the report.

Thus, as specified in the scheduling order dated October 5,

2005, this action was dismissed with respect to the Doe

defendants sixty days after the effective date of the order.

B. Monell Claim

The second issue is whether there is a genuine dispute

regarding the existence of a custom, policy, or practice of

excessive force by the City of Fairfield. As a threshold

matter, it should be noted that while plaintiff has labeled her

cause of action as “battery,” the court construes the claim as

one of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Section 1983 only creates a cause of action against persons who,

acting under color of state law, abridge rights created by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Accordingly, the

court would lack jurisdiction over a state law battery claim. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a

claim for relief regarding the use of excessive force, and the

court will construe the cause of action as such.

A municipality may not be held liable under section 1983

for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat

superior liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,

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426 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a plaintiff may establish

municipal liability in one of three ways. See Gillette v.

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). A plaintiff may

prove (1) that the actions in question were conducted pursuant

to an official custom, policy, or practice (2) that the

individual who committed the act was an official with final

policy-making authority, or (3) that such an official ratified a

subordinate’s unconstitutional act. Id.

With regard to an unconstitutional custom or policy, the

plaintiff must demonstrate either the existence of a custom that

constitutes the standard operating procedure of the

municipality, or the existence of a formal governmental policy. 

The custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it

effectively becomes well-settled city policy. See Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting Monell, 436

U.S. at 691. Liability does not attach where the alleged custom

is based upon “isolated or sporadic incidents.” Id. See also,

Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A single

constitutional deprivation ordinarily is insufficient to

establish a longstanding practice or custom.”). Rather,

liability must be predicated upon “practices of sufficient

duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become

a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d

at 918. See Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233-34

(9th Cir. 1989) (single incident of excessive force inadequate

to establish liability); Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856

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While plaintiff reserved the right to amend her answer to the 4

interrogatory based upon information obtained during discovery, she

has not undertaken any discovery in this case to date.

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F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (two incidents insufficient).

Defendant has met its initial burden of proving that there

is no genuine issue regarding the existence of a custom or

policy authorizing the use of excessive force. Defendant has

provided the affidavit of the Chief of Police of the City of

Fairfield, who is familiar with the operations of the Fairfield

Police Department. Gresham Decl. at ¶ 1. He stated that

“[t]here is no policy, custom or practice . . . approving,

permitting, encouraging or tolerating the use of excessive

force.” Id. at ¶ 3. Furthermore, defendant has offered

plaintiff’s answer to an interrogatory, in which she replied

that she was unaware of any such custom or policy. These 4

pieces of evidence are sufficient to meet defendant’s initial

responsibility in a motion for summary judgment.

The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that a

genuine issue does, in fact, exist. The only evidence that the

plaintiff has provided is an affidavit from the plaintiff’s

attorney, which states that, based on his conversations with the

plaintiff, “she believes that Fairfield Police Department has a

practice or custom of utilizing excessive force.” McCann Dec.

at ¶ 5. Plaintiff also relies on portions of her first amended

complaint to prove the existence of such a custom or policy.

It is clear that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of

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proving that there exists a genuine dispute with regard to this

issue. First, plaintiff must allege specific facts and may not

merely rely upon allegations or denials in her initial

pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Second, the affidavit is

inadmissible as hearsay. Mr. McCann has merely relayed what he

believes his client believes to be true. Even if plaintiff had

personally provided the statement, it did not include a basis

for personal knowledge as to how she would know about the

existence of an unconstitutional custom or policy. Certainly,

her single incident with the Fairfield police would not be

sufficient for such an inference.

Even if the alleged November 2003 incident occurred as

plaintiff described in her complaint, this would not, without

more, be sufficient to establish a finding of liability. At

best, plaintiff has offered facts that might partially support a

claim that Fairfield police had a custom of using excessive

force. However, this single incident, standing alone, is

insufficient to prove this claim as a matter of law. See

Christie, 176 F.3d at 1235 (noting that a single constitutional

deprivation is insufficient to prove a practice or custom).

Given that defendant has met its burden of demonstrating

that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and plaintiff

has failed to establish the existence of such a dispute,

defendant’s motion should be granted with respect to the Monell

claim.

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For the aforementioned reasons, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 12, 2006.

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