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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals 

'l'enth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN. 311989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JAMES D. ORR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GENERAL TELEPHONE, COMPANY OF THE 

SOUTHWEST, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 86-2233 

) (D.C. No. 84-676-C) 

) ( E. D. Ok la. ) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This is an appeal from an order of the district court 

granting defendant's motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff commenced this action in state court alleging that 

defendant had failed to award him benefits as provided under the 

terms of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between 

defendant and plaintiff's union, the Communication Workers of 

America. He alleged that he had begun his employment with 

Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 1 
defendant in 1954 and in 1980 had suffered a "massive heart 

attack" at work. His employment was terminated in 1981 and in 

1982 he was notified that he had been approved for a deferred 

vested pension beginning in 1986. Plaintiff alleged that pursuant 

to the collective bargaining agreement, he should have received 

termination, holiday, and sick pay, as well as paid life insurance 

and a disability pension. Plaintiff requested these amounts as 

well as $50,000 for emotional distress. 

Defendant removed the action to federal district court and 

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l), 

12(b)(6), 12(g), and 12(h). Defendant alleged that plaintiff had 

not alleged any federal cause of action and had failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies provided in the collective bargaining 

agreement, the action was time barred, and jurisdiction was vested 

exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. 

In response, plaintiff moved to amend his 

include a claim that the union had breached its 

representation by refusing to file a grievance 

complaint be ''termed as a suit brought under Section 

complaint to 

duty of fair 

and that the 

301 of the 

National Labor Relations Act [sic], 29 U.S.C. Section 185." The 

motion was granted. 

The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 

The court held that exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's cause 

of action lay under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 

u.s.c. § 158, because plaintiff's allegations were "obviously for 

unfair labor practices by defendant." The court also held that if 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 2 
plaintiff's cause of action were construed as one under state law, 

plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that these . rulings were 

erroneous. Plaintiff also argues that his action is not time 

barred under United . Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 

(1981). 

As a general principle, the NLRA preempts state and federal 

court jurisdiction over conduct that is arguably protected or 

prohibited by the act. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 

359 U.S. 236 (1959). Disputes arising under the NLRA must be 

presented to the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. § 160. 

However, when "the activity in question also constitutes a 

breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board's authority 

'is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the 

courts in suits under§ 301 [of the Labor Management Relations 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185]. '" William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters 

Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16 (1974)(quoting Smith v. Evening 

News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962)); see also Trustees of Wyo. 

Laborers Health and Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co. of 

Wyo., 850 F.2d 613, 619 (10th Cir. 1988)(citing. Garcia v. Eidal 

Int'l Corp., 808 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 

108 s. Ct. 94 (1987)). Further, the Supreme Court has held that 

"Board policy is to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in 

respect of disputed conduct arguably both an unfair labor practice 

and a contract violation when ... the parties have voluntarily 

established by contract a binding settlement procedure." William 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 3 
E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. at 16; see 

also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-4 (1967). 

This action is a hybrid§ 301/fair representation suit. See 

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171. Plaintiff alleged that defendant 

breached its contractual obligations established in the collective 

bargaining agreement in violation of§ 301, and that the union 

failed to protect his rights, thereby violating its duty of fair 

representation as implied by the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. 

See Cannon v. Kroger Co., 832 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 1987). 1 

Because jurisdiction is proper under§ 301, we must determine 

whether this action is timely. The Supreme Court has held that in 

a hybrid suit, the applicable statute of limitations is the 

six-month limitation period found in § l0(b) of the NLRA, 29 

U.S.C. § 160(b). DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 

462 U.S. 151 (1983). 

Plaintiff's cause of action accrued when, in the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, he knew or should have known that the union 

would not assist him in the grievance procedure. See Freeman v. 

Local Union No. 135, Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and 

Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff's cause of 

action accrued when employee knew the union refused to or had 

failed to assist him during the grievance procedure); Metz v. 

1 Plaintiff need not sue both his employer and union in order 

assert a hybrid cause of action. ''[T]he case he must prove is 

same whether he sues one, the other, or both." DelCostello 

International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). 

4 

to 

the 

v. 

Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 4 
Tootsie Roll Indus.,. Inc., 715 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (cause 

of action accrued when union decided not to file grievance), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984). 

Plaintiff alleged that he became aware that he would not be 

granted a disability pension February 18, 1982. While he alleged 

that he attempted to initiate a grievance and that the union 

refused to proceed with it, he has not indicated when he knew or 

should have known of the union's refusal. Therefore, we must 

remand this action for a determination of this date. 

Defendant argues that if plaintiff's cause of action does 

arise under § 301, plaintiff's state law claim for emotional 

distress is preempted. We agree. "[Q]uestions relating to what 

th e parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal 

consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that 

agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, 

whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach 

of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort." 

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). Although 

the Supreme Court has held that not all claims of infliction of 

emotional distress are preempted, see Farmer v. United Bhd. of 

Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 304-5 (1977), in this case 

where the only "outrageous" conduct is the breach of the 

collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted. See 

Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213-16, 220; Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305-07. 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 5 
• 

Defendant also ar~ues that plaintiff's complaint should be 

dismissed because plaintiff has not exhausted administrative 

remedies. 2 We disagree. Although an employee generally must 

attempt to exhaust grievance procedures provided in the collective 

bargaining agreement, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 

650, 652 (1965), plaintiff alleges that he attempted to use the 

grievance procedures but his union refused to proceed with the 

grievance, thereby violating the union's duty of fair 

representation. If established at trial, this allegation would be 

sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. DelColstello, 

462 U.S. at 164. Defendant contends that the collective 

bargaining agreement requires plaintiff not only to pursue the 

union grievance procedures but also to present personally his 

grievance to the company in order to exhaust before bringing suit. 

The agreement reads that nothing in it "shall be construed to 

deprive any employee 

company any complaint." 

from presenting individually to the 

We do not read this provision 

establishing a mandatory requirement that plaintiff personally 

approach defendant in an effort to resolve his dispute before he 

can resort to the courts. 

2 The district court below held that- if plaintiff's cause of 

action were construed as one under state law, then he had not 

exhausted his administrative remedies. Defendant argues that 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust r~gardless of whether plaintiff's 

claims arise under state or federal law. 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 6 
t 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED 

for further proceedings in accordance with this order and 

judgment. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 86-2233 Document: 01019962438 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 7