Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00990/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00990-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Securities Violation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pamela Thompson, individually and as

guardian of Gabriella Thompson, Matthew

Thompson, Marcus Thompson, Michael

Thompson; and the Thompson Group,

P.C., an Arizona professional corporation,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

George Paul and Karen Paul, husband and

wife; Tom Morgan; Scott Dewald and

Deborah Jamieson, husband and wife;

Lewis and Roca, LLP, An Arizona limited

liability partnership; and Capitol Detective

Agency, Inc., an Arizona corporation, 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV-05-0990-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently, before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #35) and

Defendant Lewis & Roca, LLP's Motion to Strike the declaration of Carol M. Langford.

(Dkt #43). After reviewing the papers and determining oral argument is not necessary, the

Court issues the following Order. 

I. Factual Background

On December 5, 2005, this Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part

Defendants' Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Specifically, this Court ordered that

dismissal with prejudice was proper regarding Plaintiff's claims of: (1) Violation of Section

10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act; (2) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (3) Negligent

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Misrepresentation; (4) Third Party Professional Negligence; and (5) Tortious Interference

with Contractual Relations. Further, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff's claims

of: (6) Abuse of Process; (7) Wrongful Institution of Legal Proceedings; and (8) Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Distress. The Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss regarding

Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. Lastly, the Court held that "in

the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, on balance, favor

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant

to this Court's discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)." Plaintiff now takes issue with the

Court's ruling and requests reconsideration regarding its ruling on Plaintiff's claims arising

out of the alleged fraudulent statements made by Defendant Lewis & Roca. These include

Plaintiff's claims based upon Section 10(b), fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent

misrepresentation and third party professional negligence. Specifically, Plaintiff contends

that the Court's ruling addressing these claims involves a "novel" issue that calls for

reconsideration as well as certification of this issue to the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant

to A.R.S. § 12-1861. The "novel" issue being: "whether a lawyer is prohibited from making

a material misrepresentation to the opposing party during settlement negotiations, and

whether the opposing party has the right to rely on that representation." 

Plaintiff's motion is denied for two reasons: (1) this issue has already been addressed

by the Court and (2) Plaintiff's motion is without merit.

II. Analysis 

A. Standard For Reconsideration

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and only appropriate if the court “(1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision

was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993), cert.

denied,114 S.Ct. 2742 (1994). Motions for Reconsideration are not the place for parties to

make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 252

F.Supp.2d 936, 938 (D. Ariz. 2003) (citing Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood

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Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir.1988). Nor is it the time to ask the Court to

rethink what it has already thought. Id. (citing United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d

1112, 1116 (D.Ariz.1998). Accordingly, courts grant such motions only in rare

circumstances. See Sullivan v. Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F.Supp. 305, 308-09

(D.Ariz.1992).

B. Plaintiff Requests The Court To Rethink What It Has Already Thought

Plaintiff requests this Court reconsider its ruling relating to Plaintiff's claims based

upon the alleged fraudulent statements of Defendant Lewis & Roca on the basis that there

is no controlling law on point addressing this issue. However, this argument is misplaced.

This Court, in its December 5, 2005 clearly laid out the relevant controlling law that is

dispositive of the issue. Specifically, that an adverse party does not have any actionable

fraud claim based upon allegedly false statements by opposing counsel. The Court cited

several controlling cases that stand for this proposition. See Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189

Ariz. 398, 405, 943 P.2d 758, 765 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "as a matter of law and

common sense," opposing client has no right to rely on statements made by the opposing

attorneys); Wetherill v. Basham, 197 Ariz. 198, 208, 3 P.3d 1118, 1128, (Ariz. Ct. App.

2000) (stating an adverse party is not an intended beneficiary of the adverse counsel’s

client.); see also Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. 561, 564,617 P.2d 69, 72 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1980) (internal quotation omitted) (holding that an imposition of a duty to an individual,

other than an “intended beneficiary” would offend public policy by “plac[ing] an attorney

in a position where his own interests would conflict directly with his client’s interests.”).

Thus, this Court has already addressed this issue based upon controlling law, thereby, making

Plaintiff's request improper.

C. Plaintiff's Motion Is Without Merit

Even if Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration were somehow proper before the Court

it is clear that it does not call for the Court to reconsider or certify this issue to the Arizona

Supreme Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1861. As noted above, there is controlling case law

addressing the alleged "novel" issue raised by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's argument seems to be

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Plaintiff's declaration from Carol M. Langford suffers from the same misconception.

Further, Ms. Langford offers no authority from Arizona suggesting a contrary result to the

Court's December 5, 2005, ruling. 

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based upon the misconception that if there is an applicable ethical issue invoked by an

attorney's conduct then a related civil action may be brought.1

 That simply is not the case

as the ethical rules governing attorneys and civil liability are separate and distinct. See Smart

Indus. Corp. Mfg., v. Superior Court 179 Ariz. 141, 145, 876 P.2d 1176, 1180 (App. 1994)

(stating that ethical rules are not considered to be a basis for civil liability). Thus, as stated

in the Court's Order, Plaintiff's action based upon the alleged unethical conduct of Defendant

Lewis and Roca before this Court is misplaced.

D. Certification Would Be Improper

Plaintiff, after this Court has already issued its adverse ruling on these claims and

determining not to retain jurisdiction over this matter, requests this Court to certify this

"novel" issue to the Arizona Supreme Court. This request is improper for two reasons. First,

A.R.S. 12-1861 relates to matters "then pending in the certifying court." Here, this Court has

already issued its ruling regarding this issue and has further declined to exercise jurisdiction

over this matter. As such, Plaintiff's Motion is not timely. Second, even if Plaintiff's Motion

were timely, certification under A.R.S. § 12-1861 is only applicable where "there is no

controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Arizona] supreme court and the intermediate

appellate courts of this state." Again, as noted above, there is controlling precedent on the

very issue that Plaintiff would certify. 

E. Conclusion

Reconsideration or certification is not proper. This Court has already addressed the

issue raised in Plaintiff's motion and it is based upon controlling precedent. Thus, Plaintiff's

motion for reconsideration is both improperly asserted and without merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration. (Dkt.

#35). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Lewis & Roca's Motion to Strike

the declaration of Carol M. Langford as moot. (Dkt. #43). 

DATED this 6th day of February, 2006.

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