Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01259/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01259-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nelson Alejandro Flores Albeno, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-01259 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

June 24, 2013. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on January 6,

2014. Any reply to the answer to the petition was due February

4, 2014.

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned in Yuma County

Superior Court on October 5, 2006, charged Petitioner with two

counts of kidnapping (Counts 1 and 2); one count of aggravated

assault (Count 3); and one count of unlawful flight from

pursuing law enforcement (Count 4). See Answer, Exh. B. In

essence, the indictment alleged that on September 27, 2006,

Petitioner kidnapped and held hostage a victim under the age of

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15 (the victim was born in 1991), assaulted her with a knife,

and fled from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle. Id., Exh. B.

Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement with

regard to the charges against him on January 31, 2008. Id.,

Exh. C. In the plea agreement Petitioner agreed to plead guilty

to Count 3, aggravated assault, a class two felony and dangerous

crime against a child. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement did not

provide for a specific length of the sentence, but recited that

the crime carried a presumptive sentence of 17 years, a minimum

sentence of 10 years, and a maximum sentence of 24 years. Id.,

Exh. C. 

During the change of plea hearing conducted January 31,

2008, Petitioner was examined by the state trial judge with the

aide of a court interpreter. Id., Exh. D. The trial court

ascertained that Petitioner was satisfied with his counsel’s

representation. The trial court found that the plea had been

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made and that

Petitioner understood the rights and privileges he was giving up

by voluntarily pleading guilty. Id., Exh. D. The court further

found that Petitioner had not been subjected to force or

promised anything to enter into the plea, and that there was a

factual basis for the guilty plea. Id., Exh. D. 

On April 15, 2008, again with the aide of a court

interpreter, the court held a mitigation hearing where

Petitioner’s counsel presented mitigating factors and closing

argument. Id., Exh. E. On April 17, 2008, again employing a

court interpreter, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive

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term of 17 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

aggravated assault, and given credit for 568 days of presentence

incarceration credit. Id., Exh. F & Exh. G. At that time

Petitioner received his notice of rights of review, in English

and Spanish. Id., Exh. H.

 Petitioner initiated a timely action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. I. On June 1, 2009, Petitioner’s appointed

counsel filed a notice indicating he could find no colorable

claim to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. J. On June

22, 2009, the state trial court ordered Petitioner’s counsel to

provide the record to Petitioner and permitted Petitioner to

file a supplemental pleading by August 6, 2009, “urging any and

all claims which he wants considered by the court.” Id., Exh.

K. On August 13, 2009, after Petitioner did not file a

supplemental pleading, the court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32

action. Id., Exh. L.

 On February 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a pleading in

his Rule 32 action alleging that his counsel was ineffective at

sentencing for failing to present testimony about the severe

abuse and frequent beatings inflicted on Petitioner by his

grandparents, and for failing to present hospital documents

about serious injury to his head, which he asserted would have

supported a neurological evaluation of him and also would have

supported the imposition of a mitigated sentence. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner also claimed that his counsel was ineffective at

trial for failing to file a Rule 11 motion and for failing to

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investigate his case. Id., Exh. M.

The state trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s

pro se pleading on February 10, 2010, finding that the notice

was untimely and that Petitioner “failed to state the specific

reasons as to why his claim based on newly discovered evidence

was not filed in a timely manner.” Id., Exh. N.

On March 4, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration of the state trial court’s order dismissing his

“Rule 32 Petition,” asserting essentially the same claims raised

in his pleading dated February 10, 2010. Id., Exh. O. On March

10, 2010, the state trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration and affirmed its previous order dismissing

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. The trial court also concluded: 

(1) Defendant was examined by two

psychiatrists, Dr. Potts and Dr. Johnson, to

determine defendant’s mental status at the

time of the offense. Specifically, defendant

was examined to determine if there were any

grounds for defendant to enter a guilty but

insane plea. Both experts found the defendant

was legally sane at the time of the offense;

(2) Defendant was also examined by

psychiatrist Dr. Johnson to determine if he

was competent to stand trial pursuant to Rule

11, Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. Dr. Johnson

determined that defendant was competent to

stand trial; and (3) Evidence regarding

mitigating circumstances was previously

presented to the Court at the April 15, 2008,

Mitigation Hearing. Thereafter, defendant was

sentenced to a presumptive prison term of 17

years. 

Id., Exh. P.

The trial court further found: 

As to the untimeliness of defendant’s

Petition, the Court notes the defendant was

sentenced April 17, 2008. Defendant filed a

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Notice of Post-conviction Relief on May 28,

2008. Counsel was appointed on June 2, 2008.

A Notice of Completion was filed by

defendant’s counsel on June 1, 2009, stating

that defendant’s counsel was unable to

discover any colorable claims to raise in

defendant’s Rule 32 Proceeding. Defendant was

granted until August 6, 2009, to file a Pro

Per Petition. Defendant failed to file a

Petition by August 6, 2009. Thereafter, On

February 10, 2010, defendant filed a Notice

of Post- Conviction Relief. As noted in the

Court’s February 16, 2010, Order, defendant

has failed to state specific reasons as to

why his claim based on new discovered

evidence as to mitigation as not filed in a

timely manner...

Id., Exh. P.

On March 19, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal

in the Yuma County Superior Court, appealing the court’s

dismissal of his “Rule 32 petition.” Id., Exh. Q. The Yuma

County Superior Court appointed counsel after Petitioner filed

a “‘notice of appeal,’ rather than a petition for review as

required by Rule 32.9(c),Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.”

Id., Exh. R. The Arizona Court of Appeals later permitted

counsel to withdraw from representation, finding that “there is

no concomitant right to appointed counsel in a discretionary

review proceeding such as the present matter.” Id., Exh. R. On

June 1, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the matter,

after finding that Petitioner had not timely filed a “compliant

petition for review”. Id., Exh. S. 

On or about June 7, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration of the order issued by the Arizona Court of

Appeals on June 1, 2010, and also seeking an extension of time

to file a petition for review. Id., Exh. T. 

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In a decision entered July 2, 2010, the Arizona Court

of Appeals again found that Petitioner had no right to counsel,

but due to the confusion of appointment of counsel, granted

Petitioner an extension of time to file a pro se petition for

review. Id., Exh. U. However, Petitioner did not file a pro se

petition for review. Id., Exh. V. On August 16, 2010, the

appellate court sent a certified copy of the order dismissing

the matter to the parties and to the state trial court. Id.,

Exh. W. 

The federal habeas petition asserts that Petitioner’s

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated because his offenses commenced with the boundaries of

the municipality of Chandler (in Maricopa County), but he was

arrested and prosecuted in Yuma County. Petitioner also

contends he received excessive punishment after being charged

with some of the same offenses in both counties. Petitioner also

argues that Petitioner was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel. 

Respondents contend the petition should be denied and

dismissed with prejudice because it is untimely, and because

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

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prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). For an Arizona non-capital defendant who pleads

guilty, the conviction becomes “final” at the conclusion of the

first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. “Arizona’s Rule 32

of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of

direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).”

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, allowing for the latest possible starting

date for the statute of limitations, the one-year statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run

on or about September 16, 2010, when the time expired for

appealing the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision terminating his

Rule 32 proceedings to the state Supreme Court. The statute of

limitations expired on or about September 16, 2011, because

Petitioner did not have any other properly filed state actions

for post-conviction relief pending during this time period.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s habeas action, filed on or about June

24, 2013, is not timely. Petitioner did not file his federal

habeas action until one year and nine months after the statute

of limitations expired.

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The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

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forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of legal representation during the applicable filing period

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

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Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Equitable tolling may be available when a petitioner can

establish they are so mentally ill that they are incompetent.

Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Bills, 628 F.3d at 1098. However, the vicissitudes of

prison life are not “extraordinary” circumstances that make it

impossible to file a timely habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

held that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of

limitations if they can establish that they are actually

innocent of the crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934.

The petitioner must show “it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the

new evidence.” Id. at 938. 

Petitioner has not docketed a reply to the response to

his habeas petition contending the petition is not timely.

Petitioner offers no basis for equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the

statute of limitations and Petitioner has not stated a proper

basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the

Court need not consider the merits of his claims.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state courts by

failing to present them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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procedurally correct manner.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

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to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2011). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

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barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

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We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

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“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

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prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

In order to exhaust a claim, the petitioner must fully

and fairly “present both the factual and legal basis for the

claim to the state court.” Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1101. “Full

and fair presentation ... requires a petitioner to present the

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement

of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.” Scott v.

Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009). “[G]eneral appeals

to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to

establish exhaustion.” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106

(9th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his federal habeas

claims in the state courts by fairly presenting them to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner, i.e.,

in his Rule 32 action by appealing the state trial court’s

dismissal of his action based on both timeliness and a finding

that Petitioner had not been denied his right to the effective

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assistance of counsel. Petitioner has not asserted cause for,

nor prejudice arising from, his procedural default of these

claims because, inter alia, there is little likelihood that

Petitioner would have succeeded on the merits of the claims.

Nor does Petitioner assert his actual innocence of the crime of

conviction, only that he was improperly sentenced and that there

were issues regarding over-charging and possibly trial venue.

 III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. Petitioner did not properly exhaust

his federal habeas claims in the state courts by fairly

presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32

action in a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not

shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of his claims, nor does Petitioner assert his actual

innocence.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Albeno’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(3), Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed ten (10) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

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DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.

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