Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02941/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02941-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES COLBERT, Civil

No.

12-2941 LAB (BGS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

v.

AMY MILLER, Warden, California State

Prison - Centinela,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Charles Colbert (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging the validity of the destruction of biological evidence used in his initial

conviction. [Doc. No. 1.] On April 9, 2013, Respondent Amy Miller (“Respondent”)

filed the pending motion to dismiss, arguing that Colbert’s federal habeas petition is

time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). [Doc. No. 7.] On May 15, 2013, Colbert filed an opposition to the motion. 

[Doc. No. 11.] The Court has considered all documentation and relevant legal authority

supporting this case. For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that

Respondent’s motion be GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1977, Petitioner was sentenced by a jury to life without the possibility of parole

for murder in the first degree with special circumstances in violation of Penal Code §

190.2(3)(iii), (Lodgment 1 at 95), two counts of rape in violation of Penal Code § 261,

sodomy in violation of Penal Code § 286(c), and two counts of oral copulation in

violation of Penal Code § 288a(c) involving two victims, (Lodgment 1 at 68-74). 

In 1984, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition challenging the trial court’s failure

to exercise its discretion to dismiss the special circumstances from his initial conviction. 

(Lodgment 4.) The San Diego County Superior Court denied this petition on March 22,

1984. (Lodgment 7.) About nineteen years later, on April 13, 2003, Petitioner filed

another state habeas petition at the San Diego County Superior Court claiming that a

statute used for his sentence was not valid at the time of his arrest. (Lodgment 8.) The

petition was denied on April 22, 2003. (Lodgment 9.) 

On May 13, 2003, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Court of

Appeal, Third Appellate District, case C054955, claiming that prison officials did not

process his inmate appeal grievances concerning theft of his property while in prison. 

(Lodgment 10.) Clearly, that petition does not address or challenge his underlying

conviction. The petition was denied on July 25, 2003. (Lodgment 11.) On August 3,

2003, Petitioner filed another habeas petition with the California Supreme Court, case

S151136, (Lodgment 12), on the same unrelated prison issues, which was denied on

March 30, 2004, (Lodgment 13). 

On November 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the San Diego County

Superior Court claiming his rights were violated when biological evidence pertaining to

his conviction was destroyed in 1985. (Lodgment 18.) The petition was denied on

December 22, 2011 for untimeliness, the absence of new facts, and the lack of evidence

to support his claims. (Lodgment 19.) On March 19, 2012, Petitioner again filed a

habeas petition in the San Diego County Superior Court claiming he was denied access

to DNA evidence testing that would have cast doubt on his guilt or proved his innocence.

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 (Lodgment 20.) It was denied on May 4, 2012 for untimeliness and lack of evidence to

substantiate his claim. (Lodgment 21.) On May 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition in

the California Court of Appeal, case D062010, claiming that he had newly presented

evidence. (Lodgment 22.) The petition was denied on June 7, 2012 for lack of evidence

to support his claim. (Lodgment 23.) On July 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a habeas petition

with the California Supreme Court, case S204209, claiming that new techniques in DNA

analysis are available but the evidence from his case has been destroyed. (Lodgment

27.) The petition was denied on November 14, 2012. (Lodgment 28.) 

Petitioner filed the current petition in the United States District Court on

December 10, 2012 claiming that the destruction of biological evidence violated his

rights and that the state courts failed to consider his petitions in light of newly presented

evidence. [Doc. No. 1.] On April 9, 2013, Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition on

the basis that it is untimely under federal law since the AEDPA statute of limitations has

long since passed. [Doc. No. 7.] On May 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a response in

opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that he has exhausted his state remedies and

that the federal court should permit the Petition in light of his constitutional right to

prove his innocence. [Doc. No. 11.]

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

 Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition because it is untimely. Respondent

argues that AEDPA applies because the Petition was filed after the act’s enactment on

April 24, 1996. [Doc. No. 7 at 4.] State inmates convicted prior to AEDPA’s enactment

are given one year from its enactment to file a federal habeas corpus petition, specifically

until April 24, 1997. [Id. at 5.] The Petition was filed in federal court in 2012, which

according to Respondent, falls far outside the statute of limitations since no tolling

exceptions apply. [Id.] 

In opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner acknowledges that the

Petition was delayed but alleges that the Court must consider it because his claims are

constitutional issues that were not raised during trial or on appeal. [Doc. No. 11 at 6.] 

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Furthermore, Petitioner states that he is an unsophisticated litigant and requests that the

Court review the matter on its merits. [Id.]

IV. ANALYSIS

The enactment of AEDPA on April 24, 1996 amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding

the following section: 

(d) (1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

A. Statutory Tolling 

The statute of limitations set forth above applies to all federal habeas corpus

petitions filed after the act’s enactment in 1996. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

2343, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). State prisoners convicted prior to AEDPA’s enactment are

given a one-year grace period to file their federal petitions, which yields the deadline of

April 24, 1997 in the absence of applicable tolling. Id.; Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951,

955 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year grace period applies to Petitioner because his

conviction was finalized in 1977 before AEDPA was in force. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), when a petition is properly filed with a state

court, the statute of limitations for the one-year grace period may toll to the extent that

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the petition remains pending. Since his conviction, Petitioner has filed multiple petitions

with the state courts for various claims. (See Lodgments 4-28.) Petitioner filed each

petition, however, years after the statute of limitations already expired, which deemed

them all untimely to qualify for any tolling. The initial claims regarding the destruction

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of biological evidence were raised in the state court in 2011 and were denied for

untimeliness and lack of new facts and evidence. (Lodgments 18-28.) Even if the

claim’s pending time in state court tolled the statute of limitations from 2011 until the

present, the initial filing would still be late by nearly 14 years. Thus, the instant federal

petition is time-barred under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations unless equitable

tolling exceptions apply. 

B. Equitable Tolling 

The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations may be subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). The court may

grant equitable tolling if the petitioner shows that (1) he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way, preventing timely

filing. Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)). Equitable tolling is

justified sparingly in few cases and the burden of proof rests with the petitioner. Spitsyn

v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002). 

Given the factors necessary to warrant equitable tolling, Petitioner has not met the

burden of proof necessary to demonstrate his entitlement to tolling. Petitioner has not

justified the fifteen-year lapse in time from AEDPA’s enactment in 1996 until his state

filing in 2011. [See Doc. No. 11.] Even after receiving confirmation of the destruction

of evidence in August 2008, Petitioner waited three years to file the current claim with

the state court. The delay in taking action indicates a lack of diligence in pursuing his

rights. As for the extraordinary circumstance requirement, Petitioner does not give any

reason for the lateness beyond the fact that he is an unsophisticated litigant. [Doc. No.

 Petitioner filed his first petition on April 13, 2003, nearly six years beyond the limitation period. See 1

Procedural Background. 

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11.] Courts have found that even faulty material recommendations by a petitioner’s

appointed counsel do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling. 

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068. Accordingly, Petitioner’s unsophisticated litigant claim does

not meet the extraordinary circumstance requirement as it is not more unique than a

petitioner’s reliance on faulty legal advice. Equitable tolling is therefore not appropriate

or applicable in this case. 

C. Actual Innocence

Petitioners may be excused of the statute of limitations set by AEDPA upon

credible showing of “actual innocence,” and may thus have their otherwise time-barred

claims heard. Lee v. Lampert, 633 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995), actual innocence claims must

be based on new reliable evidence not presented at trial that would make it “more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new

evidence.” The threshold requirement is not merely to show that reasonable doubt

exists, but to show that given the new evidence, the jury would have gone the other way

in its decision. Id. at 329. 

In Lampert, the Court considered but found against the petitioner’s claim of

innocence despite the introduction of three new items of evidence because they were not

significant enough to persuade a reasonable jury in petitioner’s favor. 633 F.3d at 945. 

In contrast, Petitioner has not provided any new evidence and states instead that he

maintained his innocence throughout his conviction and that the destroyed evidence

could have established his innocence. [Doc. No. 1.] The standard for establishing actual

innocence is clear. Petitioner must present new credible evidence that would convince a

reasonable jury that Petitioner is not guilty. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. Petitioner has not

brought forth any new evidence for consideration, much less any that would more likely

than not cause a reasonable jury to find against guilt. The actual innocence threshold has

not been met in this case and is therefore not an appropriate remedy. 

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D. Evidentiary Hearing

Lastly, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. After the enactment of AEDPA,

the revised 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides that the federal court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing on a claim if the petitioner has failed to develop its factual basis in

state court proceedings. In Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999), the

court found that the petitioner’s failure to substantiate his claims in state court despite

prior opportunity to do so resulted in the failure to develop the basis of his claim within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Similarly, Petitioner had the chance to present his

case fully in state court, but the courts continually dismissed his petition for lack of

evidence to substantiate his claims and failure to make the requisite prima facie showing. 

(Lodgments 18-28.) Petitioner’s conclusory allegations regarding the “newly presented

evidence,” which in this case is the mere existence of DNA tests, does not meet the

standard for an evidentiary hearing. 

The failure to develop the factual basis of a claim may, however, be excused

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) if the petitioner’s claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law or a factual predicate not discoverable through due diligence. As

required by the Schlup standard for actual innocence, facts underlying the claim must

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable jury would have found petitioner guilty. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Petitioner

does not qualify for this exception because he does not provide new evidence for review,

and consequently does not provide facts that would persuade a reasonable jury to find for

innocence. Petitioner does not meet the Schlup standard (as analyzed above), and

therefore has not established a basis for an evidentiary hearing. See Majoy v. Roe, 296

F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court hereby recommends that the request for an

evidentiary hearing also be DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition against Warden Miller be DISMISSED with

prejudice.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than August 15, 2013, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties within 14 days of being served with the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2013

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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