Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00642/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00642-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Cordero, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Miraval Holding LLC, also known as

Miraval Holdings LLC; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 10-642-TUC-JGZ (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants,

Miraval Holding, LLC and Miraval Resort Tucson (collectively, Miraval), on May 16, 2012.

(Doc. 93) 

The plaintiff, Joseph Cordero, worked for Miraval as a busboy, server assistant, and

server. (Doc. 54) He was diagnosed with epilepsy in 2006 and was eventually discharged in

February of 2010. Id. Cordero claims he suffered employment discrimination in violation of

the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). Id. He further claims he was denied certain rights

in connection with his Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) disability insurance

plan. Id. 

Miraval moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. It argues it provided

Cordero with all the accommodations required by law. It further argues it did nothing to violate

ERISA because it is not the plan administrator and has no fiduciary duties. 

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The court finds that Miraval’s summary judgment motion should be granted on the

merits. The court does not reach Miraval’s alternative argument that Cordero’s discrimination

charge was filed more than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory acts. 

Factual and Procedural Background

Miraval operates a “world-class” resort in Tucson, Arizona. (Doc. 94, ¶ 1) It employs

more than 300 persons in a number of capacities including those in its Food and Beverage

Department. Id. The plaintiff, Joseph Cordero, began working for Miraval as a server assistant

on July 16, 2003. (Doc. 94, ¶ 2)

In 2006, Cordero notified Miraval that he had epilepsy. (Doc. 94, ¶ 14) Shortly

afterward, he began making informal verbal requests of his managers for certain

accommodations. (Doc. 94, Exhibit 10, pp. 133-34) 

In January of 2009, Assistant Controller Angela Conner formally complained that

Cordero entered her office peremptorily, interrupted her meeting with a vender, and demanded

a payroll check for 30 minutes that he had not been paid for. (Doc. 94, ¶ 20, Exhibit 12) She

found him to be “not only rude but disrespectful.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit 12) As a result, Cordero

was given a Performance Improvement Plan and a written warning. (Doc. 94, ¶ 21, Exhibit 13)

Cordero’s grandmother, Socorro Esquibel, contacted human resources explaining that

she did not believe Cordero’s behavior was rude. (Doc. 94, Exhibit 17) She asked for

permission to sit in on Cordero’s next performance meeting so she could monitor his medical

condition. Id. Miraval agreed, provided that she would be only a silent observer. (Doc. 94,

Exhibit 18) Apparently she was not silent, and Miraval decided she could not attend meetings

in the future. (Doc. 94, ¶ 29) 

At this point, Miraval provided Cordero with formal ADA request forms and asked that

they be completed by him and his doctor. (Doc. 94, ¶ 30) Cordero eventually complied with

the request, but his response was not entirely clear, and his medical documentation was not

entirely specific or up-to-date. For example, he submitted a letter from his neurologist, Hemant

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Kudrimoti, dated more than two years earlier, on November 7, 2006, stating that he needed “no

particular accommodations.” (Doc. 94, ¶ 33) 

On March 4, 2009, Cordero submitted an ADA Reasonable Accommodation Request:

Employee form in which he stated that his condition results in “no limitations [with] medical

compliance.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit 23, MIRAVAL000083) Nevertheless, he asked for three

accommodations: (1) that Miraval document any seizures that he might have for the purposes

of adjusting his medication; (1) that his grandmother be allowed to attend his weekly work

evaluations; and (2) that he be allowed time for the side effects of a seizure to pass. (Doc. 94;

Exhibit 23, MIRAVAL000084; Exhibit 24, MIRAVAL000090) Miraval agreed to document

Cordero’s seizures, declined permission for his grandmother to attend future work evaluations,

and asked for more information regarding his request for recovery time. (Doc. 94, ¶¶ 46, 47,

48) 

On March 18, 2009, Cordero submitted a list of ten additional requests for

accommodation (or points of concern): (1) for permission to place his medications in a place

where he and others would have access to them, (2) for a private area in which to rest after a

seizure, (3) for permission to work a later shift following a day during which he has a seizure,

(4) for co-workers to inform the supervisor if he is having a seizure and to not be forced to

socialize with his co-workers, (5) for incident reports and evaluation notes, (6) for his

supervisor to be aware that his mood might be affected by his medication, (7) that his weekly

evaluations be staffed only by his supervisor, (8) that no one should represent LeAnne Hamon

at weekly evaluations other than herself due to privacy concerns, (9) that he should not suffer

retaliation for requesting that his grandmother attend his weekly evaluations, and (10) that he

was experiencing harassment and retaliation because (a) he was summoned to a meeting on

January 14, 2009 and asked to respond to an accusation of being aggressive toward an employee

of the payroll office, (b) his weekly reviews are very uncomfortable because he has had six

different individuals attending, and (c) he was called into a meeting on March 13, 2009 with

LeAnne Hamon and Brenda Helps and accused of “having a voice recorder and violating

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confidentiality.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit 25, MIRAVAL 000018- 000020) Miraval agreed to provide

some of these accommodations, but not all.

Cordero was permitted to keep his medications in an area accessible to him and other

employees, but with the understanding that Miraval would not be responsible if they were lost

or stolen. (Doc. 94, ¶ 54) Cordero’s supervisors would ask him about his well-being, but with

the understanding that they were not trained or qualified to properly access his condition. Id.

Cordero could use the Food & Beverage Office, the Coyote Moon dining area (when not in use),

or the Cooking Demonstration area (when not in use) for resting and recovery. Id. Cordero

could use intermittent leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)for disability related

absences. Id. Cordero was not required to socialize with his co-workers, but he was required

to “interact with [his] co-workers in a professional and friendly manner.” Id. Miraval would

provide Cordero and his physicians with incident reports as well as his performance reviews and

notices. Id. Miraval, however, refused to limit participation at Cordero’s weekly evaluation

meetings to only his supervisor. (Doc. 94, ¶ 56) Miraval affirmed its policy against retaliation

and asked that Cordero raise specific issues should they occur. (Doc. 95, ¶ 57) Miraval

renewed its request that Cordero have his doctors provide specific information about which

accommodations were necessary for his condition. (Doc. 95, ¶ 58)

On April 15, 2009, Cordero replied to Miraval’s response indicating his general

acceptance of its decisions regarding his requests for accommodations. (Doc 94, Exhibit 28)

He accepted generally that the staffing of work evaluation meetings was an employee relations

matter. (Document 94, ¶ 59) He disputed, however, Miraval’s statement that his supervisors

are not medically trained arguing that his supervisor has had three years of paramedic training

“and is qualified to assist in my safety and well being post-seizure activity.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit

28, MIRAVAL000174) He did not accept Miraval’s decision that coming in late on a day after

he had a seizure would require him to take formal leave under the FMLA. (Doc. 94, Exhibit

28, MIRAVAL000175)

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In July of 2009, Cordero took leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act

(FMLA). (Doc. 94, ¶ 66) He had surgery to treat his epilepsy and subsequently suffered a

disabling stroke. (Doc. 94, Exhibit 36) His neurologist, Hemant Kudrimoti, informed Miraval

of Cordero’s condition explaining that he will likely “remain disabled into the foreseeable

future, and predictably for a minimum of at least 12-18 months.” Id. Cordero’s FMLA leave

expired in September of 2009, and he was placed on unpaid leave. (Doc. 94, ¶ 70) On January

8, 2010, Kudrimoti sent Miraval an updated evaluation of Cordero’s condition. (Doc. 94, ¶ 71)

He confirmed that Cordero was medically disabled. Id. Miraval formally terminated Cordero’s

employment on February 28, 2010. (Doc. 94, ¶ 73)

 Cordero obtained through his employer disability insurance, which was administered by

the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company. (Doc. 94, ¶ 79, 84) He applied for disability

benefits, and on July 13, 2009, Miraval sent to the plan administrator information about

Cordero’s job. (Doc. 94, ¶ 86) Miraval stated that Cordero was a “Class 2” employee. (Doc.

94, ¶ 86) After Cordero began receiving disability insurance payments, it was discovered that

Miraval’s information was incorrect and Cordero was, in fact a “Class 10” employee and

entitled to benefits for a longer period of time. (Doc. 94, ¶¶ 88-92) Class 2 employees are

“full-time employees of Accelerate Brain Cancer Cure, Inc.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit 43, LN_

Cordero_00034) Class 10 employees are “full-time employees of Miraval excluding Massage

Therapists, Salon Employees, Estheticians and Aqua Zen Therapists.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit 43,

LN_Cordero_00040)

Previously, in early 2009, Cordero contacted the Arizona Attorney General’s office to

make an EEOC complaint. (Doc. 115-3, p. 2) He apparently was interviewed on May 7, 2009,

but a formal Charge of Discrimination was not completed until April 14, 2010. (Doc. 115-3,

p. 2); (Doc. 94, Exhibit 42) In that charge, Cordero claimed Miraval discriminated against him

by rescinding his reasonable accommodations in January of 2009, placing him on probation, and

giving erroneous information to his disability insurance carrier. Id.

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 The court assumes Cordero intended to reference the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42

U.S.C. § 1981a. See (Doc. 54, ¶ 4); see also E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,

283, 122 S.Ct. 754, 758 (2002).

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On October 27, 2012, Cordero initiated this action by filing a complaint in this court.

He filed his Second Amended Complaint on December 8, 2011. (Doc. 54) That complaint is

separated into three counts (1) “ERISA Violations and Discrimination Arising under ERISA,”

(2) “Violations of the ADA,” and (3) “Violation of Civil Rights Act of 1981.”1

 The two

Miraval defendants filed an answer on December 22, 2011. The two Lincoln Insurance

defendants filed an answer on December 23, 2011. 

Cordero subsequently reached a settlement with the Lincoln Insurance defendants. They

were dismissed by stipulation on May 30, 2012. (Doc. 99)

The remaining defendants, Miraval Holding LLC and Miraval Resort Tucson LLC

(collectively, Miraval), move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. (Doc. 93)

Miraval argues that Cordero’s Charge of Discrimination was filed more than 300 days after the

alleged discriminatory acts. It argues in the alternative that it provided Cordero with all

accommodations required by law. It further argues it did nothing to violate ERISA because it

is not the plan administrator and has no fiduciary duties. 

Standard of Review: Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine issue of material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 

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The initial burden rests on the moving party to point out the absence of any genuine issue

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). If

the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party carries its initial burden by

presenting evidence showing no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. 

Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986); U. S. v. Four Parcels of Real

Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991). If the moving party does not have the burden

of proof at trial, that party carries its initial burden by either presenting evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or demonstrating the nonmoving party cannot

meet its burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Nissan

Fire & Marine Insurance v. Fritz, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Once satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate through production

of probative evidence that an issue of fact remains to be tried. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106

S.Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir.

1989). 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.

1990). Instead, the court should draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. That said, it remains the job of the nonmoving party “to identify with

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237

F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The district court need not examine the entire file for evidence

establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers

with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found.”).

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The court finds that Miraval’s summary judgment motion should be granted on the

merits. The court does not reach Miraval’s argument that Cordero’s Charge of Discrimination

was filed more than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory acts. 

Discussion: ERISA

In Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, Cordero claims the Lincoln defendants

failed to give him the latest available summary plan description. (Doc. 54) He does not,

however, clearly explain what the Miraval defendants did to violate ERISA. In a previous

paragraph, however, Cordero states that actions by “Lincoln Financial Plan and Employer as

fiduciary” “caused him to incur attorney’s fees and costs . . . .” (Doc. 54, ¶ 28) Accordingly,

the court will construe Count I of the complaint as claiming the employer, Miraval, breached

its fiduciary obligations to Cordero. See also (Doc. 114, p. 43) (asserting that “Plaintiff’s

allegations are controlled by his Second Amended Complaint” but declining to further explain

the nature of his ERISA claim against his employer)

Unfortunately, as Miraval points out, Lincoln Financial is designated the plan

administrator of Cordero’s ERISA disability plan. Accordingly, Lincoln Financial is the only

defendant with a fiduciary responsibility to Cordero. See Beck v. PACE Intern. Union, 551 U.S.

96, 101, 127 S.Ct. 2310, 2316 (2007) (An employer has fiduciary duties only when it acts as the

plan administrator, not as the plan sponsor.); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498, 116

S.Ct. 1065, 1071 (1996) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan, and therefore subject

to ERISA fiduciary duties, to the extent that he or she exercises any discretionary authority or

discretionary control respecting management of the plan, or has any discretionary authority or

discretionary responsibility in the administration of the plan.”) (punctuation modified).

The defendants, as Cordero’s employer, have no fiduciary duties, and cannot be held

liable for a breach of those non-existent fiduciary obligations. The defendants are entitled to

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 The record indicates that the erroneous information initially supplied by Miraval has

since been corrected, and Cordero is receiving the benefits due him under the plan. (Doc. 94,

¶ 92) Accordingly, if this were a claim for payment of benefits, it could be dismissed as moot.

See, e.g., Pakovich v. Verizon LTD Plan, 653 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2011).

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summary judgment2

 on Count I. See, e.g., Gomez-Gonzalez v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 626

F.3d 654, 665 (1st Cir. 2010) (Employer who “received [the employee’s] claims for disability

benefits, completed the employer portion of the forms and passed the forms to . . . , the plan

administrator” was not liable in action brought to recover ERISA benefits.).

Discussion: ADA

In Count II, Cordero claims Miraval violated his rights under the ADA. Unfortunately,

he does not specify in his complaint what Miraval did to violate that statute. Based on his

Charge of Discrimination, the court considers whether or not Cordero can prove Miraval failed

to provide him with reasonable accommodations or retaliated against him by placing him on

probation. See, e.g., Indergard v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 2010 WL 331774, 8 (D.Or. 2010)

(“The administrative charge requirement serves the important purposes of giving the charged

party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and decision.”).

The ADA prohibits workplace “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the

basis of disability . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination includes “not making reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that

the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

In his Charge of Discrimination, Cordero alleged generally that he was denied reasonable

accommodations beginning in January of 2009. (Doc. 94, Exhibit 42, MIRAVALEEOC000036) It is not clear, however, precisely which accommodations he was referring to.

The record indicates that in early 2009, the defendants gave Cordero formal ADA forms asking

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him to describe the accommodations that he was seeking and provide medical documentation

in support of those accommodations. Cordero responded with some 13 partially overlapping

requests. Most of these requests were granted either in whole or in part. In his reply, Cordero

seemed to understand there were some things that the defendants could not agree to because of

legitimate business concerns. There were two denials, however, that Cordero seemed to object

to specifically: (1) Miraval’s refusal to allow his grandmother to attend his work meetings and

(2) Miraval’s insistence that he use FMLA time when he needed to take time off from work the

day after he had a seizure. The court finds that Miraval’s failure to allow these accommodations

did not constitute ADA discrimination.

“Determining whether a proposed accommodation . . . is reasonable, including whether

it imposes an undue hardship on the employer, requires a fact-specific, individualized inquiry.

Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999). “In the summary judgment

context, a court should weigh the risks and alternatives, including possible hardships on the

employer, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the reasonableness

of the accommodation.” Id.

Here, Cordero asked for permission to have his grandmother attend his workplace

evaluations. He supported his request with a note from his physician. He believed that having

her at his evaluation meetings would allow her to monitor his condition and report her

observations to Cordero’s physicians. The defendants attempted to accommodate this request

by allowing Cordero’s grandmother to attend one such meeting provided she remain silent.

(Doc. 94, Exhibit 19, MIRAVAL000102, ¶ 5) Apparently she was unable to remain silent, and

the defendants decided she could not attend meetings in the future. (Doc. 94, Exhibit 19,

MIRAVAL000102, ¶ 2) The record indicates that Cordero’s grandmother was unable to abide

by the conditions set by the defendants. Her presence disrupted the conduct of the meeting.

Accordingly, having her attend Cordero’s workplace meetings would be an undue hardship for

the defendants. Miraval’s failure to allow Cordero’s grandmother to attend his workplace

meetings was not discrimination under the ADA.

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Cordero also takes issue with the defendants’ response that he could take FMLA leave

if he had a seizure and needed to come to work late the next day. Cordero apparently believed

that he should be permitted to come to work late without taking leave. Miraval’s failure to

accommodate Cordero on this issue, however, does not constitute discrimination because that

failure had no effect on Cordero’s employment.

A “reasonable accommodation” is one that enables the employee to perform the essential

functions of the job (without causing undue hardship for the employer). Dark v. Curry County,

451 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1205 (2007); 29 C.F.R. app. §

1630(o). Accordingly, an accommodation that has no effect on the employee’s performance can

hardly be said to be reasonable, and the failure to provide that accommodation is not

discrimination under the ADA. Here, the defendants’ insistence that Cordero draw down his

FMLA leave allowance when he came to work late after suffering a seizure did not affect his

employment and did not constitute discrimination.

If the defendants’ insistence that Cordero take FMLA leave caused him to run out of

leave and resulted in discipline or termination, failure to accommodate Cordero on this issue

could rise to an ADA violation. The record indicates, however, that Cordero was not

disciplined or terminated when he ran out of FMLA leave. On the contrary, the defendants put

Cordero on unpaid leave until his doctor informed the defendants that Cordero was unable to

return to work. And, they did not finally terminate him until more than one month later, at

Cordero’s request. The defendants’ insistence that Cordero draw down his FMLA leave

allowance when he took time off the day after he had a seizure did not affect his employment

at all. Accordingly, the defendants’ failure to allow this accommodation could not have violated

the ADA. See, e.g., Parker v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 108 (2nd Cir.

2001) (Failure to provide accommodation does not result in an ADA violation if the failure does

not result in an adverse employment action because of disability.).

Cordero further argues that the defendants’ accommodations were not reasonable

because they were not granted when he was first diagnosed with epilepsy in 2007. (Doc. 114,

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p. 30) He points to a report by his physician, dated January 31, 2007, stating that he can

perform activity only “as tolerated.” (Doc 115-1, p. 31) Cordero has not, however, provided

any evidence that he asked for specific accommodations at that time. 

“Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations,

are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, as is often the case when mental

disabilities are involved, the initial burden rests primarily upon the employee, or his health-care

provider, to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the

reasonable accommodations.” Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th

Cir. 1996). Cordero provides no evidence that he asked for any specific accommodations back

in 2007. It is not reasonable to expect that Miraval could infer from his physician’s vague

statement that Cordero needed specific accommodations to perform his job. Accordingly, the

defendants’ failure to provide accommodations at that time was not a violation of the ADA. See

also (Doc. 94, ¶ 33) (In November 2006, Cordero’s neurologist, Hemant Kudrimoti, wrote that

Cordero needed “no particular accommodations.”).

Cordero further claims the defendants placed him on probation in retaliation for asking

for reasonable accommodations.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must show

that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) there was a causal link between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 389

F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). “ If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employee

will avoid summary judgment unless the employer offers legitimate reasons for the adverse

employment action, whereupon the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate a triable

issue of fact as to whether such reasons are pretextual.” Id. To prove the employer’s proffered

reasons are pretextual, the employee may present evidence showing that “a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer’s proffered explanation is

unworthy of credence.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003).

Evidence of pretext may be direct or circumstantial. But “[u]nder Ninth Circuit law,

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circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary

judgment.” Id. (punctuation modified).

On January 15, 2009, the defendants presented Cordero with a written warning and a

Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). (Doc. 94, Exhibit 13, MIRAVAL000036) These

actions were apparently triggered by an incident that happened in December of 2008.

According to Assistant Controller Angela Conner, on December 24, 2008, Cordero entered her

office peremptorily, interrupted her meeting with a vender, and demanded a payroll check for

30 minutes that he had not been paid for. (Doc. 94, ¶ 20, Exhibit 12) Connor found him to be

“not only rude but disrespectful.” (Doc. 94, Exhibit 12) 

Cordero believes the warning and PIP was retaliation for his requests for

accommodation. Assuming he has established a prima facie case for retaliation, the defendants

have proffered a legitimate business reason for the disciplinary action: Cordero’s behavior was

rude and unprofessional. The burden then shifts to Cordero to provide evidence from which a

reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendants’ proffered reason is a pretext for illegal

discrimination. He has not done so.

In his declaration filled in opposition to the motion, Cordero asserts that this discipline

was retaliation for asserting his rights under the ADA. (Doc. 115, p. 7, ¶ 29; p. 9, ¶ 37) He

maintains that other employees were upset that they lost 30 minutes of pay, but he was the only

one retaliated against. Id., p. 9, ¶ 37. Unfortunately, he provides no evidence to support his

allegations. See Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A trial court

may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). And,

even if he could, it would be somewhat beside the point. The defendants argue he was

disciplined, not because he was upset at missing 30 minutes of pay, but because he was rude and

disrespectful to Angela Conner. Cordero provides no evidence that others acted as he did but

were not subject to the same discipline. 

Cordero maintains that the defendants have a “practice of terminating disabled persons

from its employment” and that their “advertising/public relations department recommends

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 Cordero labels Count III as “Violation of Civil Rights Act of 1981” and cites to “42

U.S.C. § 1981.” (Doc. 54, pp. 7-8) In the same section of his complaint, however, he states he

is entitled to “compensatory and punitive damages” and that Miraval failed to make “good faith

efforts” to accommodate him. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1, 3). Accordingly, the court

construes Count III as a reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. See

Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2121 (1999) (“Under the

terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 . . ., punitive damages are available in claims under . . .

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . .”).

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against showing pictures of persons with disabilities in the [defendants’] employ . . . .” Id., p.

5, ¶¶ 17, 18. If so, this would be some evidence of a corporate culture biased against persons

with disabilities. Cordero, however, provides no admissible evidence to support his allegations.

Cordero has not provided evidence that suggests that the defendants’ proffered reasons

for the discipline are a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue

of material fact, and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Cordero’s

retaliation claim.

Discussion: 42 U.S.C. § 1981a

In Count III, Cordero argues that Miraval’s violation of his rights under the ADA entitles

him to “compensatory and punitive damages” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.3

 (Doc. 54, ¶ 41)

This statute, however, is a damages provision and does not constitute a separate cause of action.

Koontz v. USX Corp., 2001 WL 752656, 7 (E.D.Pa. 2001); see also Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 1949 (2001). Accordingly, the court

construes Count III as a part of Cordero’s demand for relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3). It is not

a separate claim for the purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. 

//

//

//

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Recommendation

 The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, enter an order GRANTING the motion for summary judgment filed on May 16, 2012,

by the defendants, Miraval Holding, LLC and Miraval Resort Tucson. (Doc. 93) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See U. S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

DATED this 17th day of January, 2013.

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