Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00250/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00250-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Smith, No.# C022968 (June 16, 1997), a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit B to Respondent’s Answer, filed May 1, 2002.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARY JOLSON SMITH,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-0250 GEB JFM P 

vs.

G.E. HARRIS, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1995 conviction on

charges of driving under the influence (count II), driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of

.08 (count III), and perjury (count IV), and the sentence of thirty years to life in prison imposed

thereon. Petitioner was also found to have two prior serious felony convictions, had served five

prior prison terms, and had two prior alcohol-related convictions. In his petition, filed February

7, 2000, petitioner raises twelve claims that his prison sentence violates the Constitution. 

FACTS1

The facts are uncontested – [petitioner] was found sitting behind

the wheel of his car, passed out, at an intersection with the engine

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 In Romero, the California Supreme Court held that in cases charged under the Three

2

Strikes Law, a court could exercise the power to dismiss prior convictions at sentencing in the

furtherance of justice. Id., 13 Cal. 4th at 529-30.

2

running. His blood-alcohol level was .18 percent. In 1991,

[petitioner] falsified an application for an identification card from

the Department of Motor Vehicles.

(People v. Smith, slip op. at 2-3.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner timely appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District. On June 16, 1997, the court remanded the case to the trial court for review of

the sentence under People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996). (Answer, Ex. B 2

at 3-4.) The appellate court denied the remainder of petitioner’s claims. (Id. at 4-7.) 

On remand, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to strike any of

petitioner’s prior serious or violent felonies and reinstated the original sentence. (Answer, Ex. D

at 2.) Petitioner appealed and the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, found no

error in the trial court’s refusal to strike petitioner’s priors and stated “no abuse of discretion

argument would be availing.” (Answer, Ex. D, at 3-4.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court which was

denied on September 16, 1998. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on October 28, 1999. (Answer, Ex. J.) The California Supreme Court, sitting en banc,

denied the petition on January 25, 2000. (Answer. Ex. K.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

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3

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different result. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough

that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm

conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) The court looks to the last reasoned state court

decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

a. Prior Convictions Not Serious or Violent

Petitioner contends that it was error for the trial court to find that his 1972 and

1975 priors were serious or violent, for purposes of imposing California’s Three Strikes Law,

because the convictions were sustained prior to the adoption of the Three Strikes Law. 

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4

Respondent contends this claim fails to present a federal question because it rests entirely on

state law. 

The record reflects that petitioner admitted priors II, III and V after the

prosecution dismissed counts I and V and prior 1. (Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 209-10.) 

Petitioner waived jury trial as to priors IV and VI, and priors VII and VIII were to be submitted to

the jury. (CT 210.) On August 30, 1995, the jury found true the two prior serious felony

allegations. (CT 213; RT 294.) On January 18, 1996, the court found priors IV and VI to be

true. (RT 312-13; 336-37.) 

This claim involves essentially an interpretation of state sentencing law. “[I]t is

not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67. Habeas corpus relief is unavailable for alleged

errors in the interpretation or application of state sentencing laws by either a state trial or

appellate court, unless the error resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. Hill v. United

States, 368 U.S. at 428; Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1993). So long as a

state sentence “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual,

racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of state

statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.

1976). Thus, “[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its

own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461,

469 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Applying these principles in federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has

specifically refused to consider alleged errors in the application of state sentencing law. See,

e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, in Miller, the court refused to

examine the state court’s determination that a defendant’s prior conviction was for a “serious

felony” within the meaning of the state statutes governing sentence enhancements. Id. at 1118-

19. The court did not reach the merits of Miller’s claim, stating that federal habeas relief is not

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available for alleged errors in interpreting and applying state law. Id. (quoting Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d at 1085).

In denying relief on this claim, the California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s

argument based on the reasoning in Gonzales v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1310-11. 

(Opinion at 4.) Numerous courts in the state of California have determined that prior felony

convictions which predate the effective date of the Three Strikes Law are “strikes” within the

meaning of that law. See e.g., People v. Sipe, (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 468, 477-479; People v.

Moenius, 60 Cal. App. 4th 820, 827 (1998); People v. Diaz, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1424, 1428-29

(1996); People v. Green (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 280, 283 (1995). Federal courts are “bound by

a state court’s construction of its own penal statutes.” Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th

Cir. 1993). This court must defer to California’s interpretation of the Three Strikes law unless its

interpretation is “untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional

violation.” Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989.) There is no evidence

of that here.

Moreover, to the extent that petitioner has stated a federal constitutional claim, he

is not entitled to relief. The application of a sentencing enhancement based upon a prior

conviction does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as long as the statute was in effect before

the triggering offense was committed. See Brown v. Mayle, 66 Fed. Appx. 136 (9th Cir. 2003); 

United States v. Sorenson, 914 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Ahumada-Avalos,

875 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir.1989). California’s Three Strikes law took effect on March 7,

1994, before petitioner committed the principal offense on March 24, 1994. Further, petitioner

has failed to show that the state courts committed an error resulting in a complete miscarriage of

justice. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (“we have repeatedly upheld recidivism

statutes ‘against contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with double

jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal protection, and

privileges and immunities’”) (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967); United States

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 A “wobbler” is an offense that can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony. 3

See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004).

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v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court and this court uniformly

have held that recidivist statutes do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if they are “on the books

at the time the [present] offense was committed.”) (quoting Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d at

683-84 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995) (recidivist

statutes do not violate double jeopardy because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later

offense is not viewed as either a new jeopardy or an additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but

is instead a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense

because it is a repeat offense). Accordingly, for all of these reasons, this claim should be denied.

b. Failure to Reduce Counts II and III to Misdemeanors

In his second claim, petitioner argues the trial court abused its discretion in not

reducing counts II and III to misdemeanors pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 17(b). Petitioner

contends the underlying offense was minor and did not merit a life sentence. (Pet. at 6.)

The Supreme Court has examined offenses commonly referred to as “wobblers”:

3

Under California law, certain offenses may be classified as either

felonies or misdemeanors. These crimes are known as ‘wobblers.’

Some crimes that would otherwise be misdemeanors become

‘wobblers' because of the defendant's prior record. . . . Under

California law, a ‘wobbler’ is presumptively a felony and remains a

felony except when the discretion is actually exercised to make the

crime a misdemeanor.

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16-17 (2003)(citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme

Court further described that “California trial courts have discretion to reduce a ‘wobbler’ charged

as a felony to a misdemeanor either before preliminary examination or at sentencing to avoid

imposing a three strikes sentence.” Id. at 17. “Though California courts have discretion to

reduce a [felony] charge to a misdemeanor, it remains a felony for all purposes unless and until

the trial court imposes a misdemeanor sentence.” Id. at 28-29 (quotation and citation omitted).

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 Petitioner did not include a specific challenge to the state court’s refusal to strike any of 4

his prior convictions, although he discusses the trial court’s statements about same in the

supporting facts section of his second claim. See also Reporters’ Transcript on Appeal, at 8-14,

filed April 15, 2008. However, even if petitioner had raised such a challenge, it would fail for

the same reasons set forth here. 

7

Here, on direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court's

exercise of discretion whether to classify Petitioner's offense as a felony or misdemeanor under

California Penal Code § 17(b). (Answer, Ex. B, at 5.) The state court rejected petitioner’s claim

based on petitioner’s “lengthy record coupled with his continued insistence upon driving under

the influence.” (Answer, Ex. B, at 5.) 

This judgment of the California Court of Appeal is not reviewable by federal

habeas petition. Federal habeas relief is available “only on the ground that [one] is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “[I]t

is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991). Petitioner cannot be

granted federal habeas relief based on his contention that his sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment because the trial court refused to reduce his conviction offense to a misdemeanor.4

c. Sentence Violates Eighth Amendment and California Constitution

In claims three and four, petitioner argues that his sentence is cruel and unusual

punishment and grossly disproportionate under both the United States and California

Constitutions. 

The last reasoned opinion addressing these claims was issued by the California

Third District Court of Appeal on petitioner’s direct appeal. (Answer, Ex. B, at 5-6.) 

[Petitioner] contends that imposition of a term of 25 years

constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and

federal Constitutions because in this case “no one was harmed, no

property was damaged, and the [petitioner] poses no threat to

society.” [Petitioner] is wrong.

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8

A punishment may violate the proscription against cruel or unusual

punishment contained in the California Constitution (Cal. Const.,

art. I, § 17) if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is

inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental

notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410,

424.) In determining proportionality, the court looks at the nature

of the offense and of the offender, which includes his age and prior

criminality. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479.)

In support of his contention, [petitioner] focuses on the lack of

harm done coupled with the preposterous claim that he does not

represent a threat to society. The argument is specious.

That drunk drivers kill and maim at an intolerable rate requires no

citation to authority. Not only is [petitioner] a recidivist drunken

driver, thereby demonstrating a clear threat to society, but he has

not been deterred from his criminality by the service of five prior

prison terms. That no harm was done on this occasion is no thanks

to [petitioner] – he was passed out at an intersection behind the

wheel with the engine running. Under such circumstances, his

punishment is not cruel or unusual under the California

Constitution.

With respect to the federal Constitution, we simply note if

imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole for a

single offense of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine upon

a defendant with no prior record is not disproportional under the

United States Constitution, which was the case in Harmelin v.

Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957 [115 L.Ed.2d 836], a fortiori a term

of 25 years to life for a person in [petitioner’s] position cannot be

considered disproportional.

(Opinion, at 5-6.)

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11

(2003), the Supreme Court considered California’s Three Strikes law. In Ewing, a direct appeal

from a judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court recognized the longstanding “tradition of

deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing” policy decisions about sentencing

laws. Id., 538 U.S. at 24. While the Court also recognized a “narrow proportionality principle,”

it held the Eighth Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime and

sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the

crime.” Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted). 

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The Court did not find Ewing’s sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life to meet the

standard of gross disproportionality. His commitment offense—grand theft—was based on his

appropriation of $1200.00 worth of merchandise from a golf pro shop. It was committed while

he was on parole from a sentence for burglary and robbery. Id. at 20, 28. His record included

“numerous misdemeanor and felony offenses,” most of them committed while on probation or

parole, and nine prison terms. Id. at 30. The Court concluded: “To be sure, Ewing’s sentence is

a long one. But it reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders

who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be

incapacitated.” Id. 

Lockyer addressed the interaction of the AEDPA and the Court’s Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence. As in Ewing, the Court recognized the lack of clarity in its earlier

Eighth Amendment cases but described the “governing legal principle” in Eighth Amendment

cases to be “gross disproportionality.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. The Court ultimately found the

California Court of Appeal had not applied federal law in an unreasonable fashion or reached a

result contrary to federal precedent on indistinguishable facts. Id. at 74. As a result, it upheld

Andrade’s sentence of fifty-years-to-life following his convictions for two counts of grand theft

stemming from two incidents of shoplifting and the findings he had suffered three prior

convictions for residential burglary. Id. at 65. His record also included two federal drug

convictions, a federal escape charge, and some misdemeanor thefts. Id. at 66-67.

In light of Lockyer and Ewing, whether the state Court of Appeal’s determination

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law depends on the severity of the

offense, the availability of parole and length of sentence, and the impact of recidivism. Id. at 72.

Petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence and driving with a blood

alcohol level in excess of .08, a “wobbler” offense under California law, which may be punished

as a misdemeanor or a felony. See Cal. Penal Code § 496(a). This crime has been punished with

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 A third striker is not permitted to earn custody credits against his minimum sentence. 

5

In re Cervera, 24 Cal.4th 1073 (2001). 

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an indeterminate sentence of life, with petitioner not eligible for parole for twenty-five years.

5

Contra Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980) (life sentence for small theft ameliorated

by Texas policy of liberal grant of good time that might make person eligible for parole in twelve

years). Nevertheless, the severity of the sentence alone will not make it grossly disproportionate. 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (sentence of life without the possibility of parole for

possession of large amount of drugs did not violate Eighth Amendment). 

The final consideration is the impact of petitioner’s recidivism. The probation

report prepared after the conviction for the instant offense shows that petitioner’s first contact

with the law was as a juvenile, when he became a ward of the juvenile court in 1963, at age 10,

after a petition alleging burglary was sustained. (CT at 343.) He was committed to the

California Youth Authority (“CYA”) in 1966 for burglary and paroled in April of 1966. (Id.) In

February of 1967, he was returned to CYA on a parole violation until he paroled again in May of

1968. (Id.) On January 8, 1971, petitioner was taken into custody for battery after he struck

another student at a local high school knocking that student unconscious. (Id.) The victim

sustained severe facial lacerations that required plastic surgery. (Id. at 343-44.) Petitioner was

committed to the CYA on February 19, 1971, and paroled on March 4, 1972. He was discharged

from CYA parole on July 12, 1974. (Id. at 344.)

As an adult, petitioner sustained the following convictions. On April 28, 1972,

petitioner was convicted of second degree robbery. (CT 344.) Petitioner was sentenced to eight

months in County Jail and four years probation. In March of 1974, following a probation

violation, petitioner was committed to state prison in Vacaville. (Id.) On June 17, 1974,

petitioner was reinstated to probation. (Id.) On August 1, 1975, petitioner was committed to

state prison for six months to life following a second probation violation. (Id.) 

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On March 16, 1975, petitioner was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. 

(Id.) Petitioner was sentenced to four years formal probation and one year County jail. On

August 1, 1975, the case was terminated pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 as petitioner had

been committed to state prison on a previous conviction. (Id.) On November 13, 1976,

petitioner was convicted of battery on a peace officer, following an auto accident where

petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id. at 345.) Petitioner was sentenced to

ninety days in jail. (Id.) On February 17, 1977, officers responded to the report of a man holding

a female at gunpoint near a railroad levee. (Id.) Petitioner approached the officers with his hand

raised and admitted he had a pistol. (Id.) Petitioner was convicted of being a felon in possession

of a firearm, denied probation and sentenced to one year in county jail.

On May 11, 1978, petitioner was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. (Id.) 

Petitioner was committed to state prison for three years, with two years stayed. (Id. at 346.) On

September 26, 1978, petitioner was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and committed to

state prison for five years, with one year stayed to be served consecutively to his prior conviction. 

(Id.) 

On April 27, 1983, petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence with

bodily injury and sentenced to three years state prison. (Id.) Petitioner had a blood alcohol level

of .23 when he drove over the center divider and collided head on with an oncoming vehicle. 

Two adults and four children sustained varying degrees of injuries. (Id.) He paroled March 22,

1985. (Id.) 

On April 13, 1986, petitioner was convicted of vehicle theft and sentenced to five

years in state prison. (Id. at 346-47.) Petitioner was paroled on September 19, 1988, but was

revoked on March 10, 1989, for a six month period. On February 28, 1989, petitioner was

convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and was sentenced to four years’ probation and

240 days in the county jail. (Id. at 347.) On September 2, 1991, petitioner was convicted of

being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to three years in state prison. (Id.) 

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Department of Motor Vehicles records demonstrated that petitioner had sustained

five prior convictions for violation of Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152(a) and (b). (CT 347.) On

January 6, 1989, petitioner was also convicted of reckless driving in violation of Cal. Vehicle

Code § 23103. On April 25, 1995, petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence in

violation of Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152 in Contra Costa County, and sentenced to state prison for

two years. (CT 347-48.)

Petitioner argues his sentence is disproportionate and cruel because his underlying

conviction was minor, with no personal injuries or property damage, and was caused by

petitioner’s alcoholism. Petitioner argues his prior convictions were remote in time, particularly

those involving violence. 

The California Court of Appeal stressed the serious nature of petitioner's offense

of driving under the influence and failing to be deterred from his criminality by the service of

prior prison terms. The sentencing judge also focused on petitioner’s recidivism, history of

alcohol abuse, which included recently making alcohol in prison, and the fact that petitioner had

failed to take any steps to address his alcoholism, such as attend Alcoholics Anonymous. 

(Reporters’ Transcript on Appeal, at 8-14, filed April 15, 2008.)

On this record, the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly

established Supreme Court precedent when it determined that petitioner's sentence does not raise

an inference of gross disproportionality to the crime committed or constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment or the California Constitution. Petitioner has

been in prison and given other chances for rehabilitation through the juvenile justice system, the

prison system and numerous grants of probation and parole. Although petitioner is correct that

no one was injured in the underlying offense, in 1983 when petitioner was also driving under the

influence, two adults and four children were injured. (CT 346.) Moreover, the record

demonstrates that petitioner was set on driving despite his problem with alcoholism, as

evidenced by his presentation of a driver’s license with the name “Greg Smith” at the time of his

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1994 arrest and his possession of several different identification cards and licenses with the

Department of Motor Vehicles. (CT 352.) As the Supreme Court has said:

One in [defendant’s] position has been both graphically informed

of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to

reform, all to no avail. Article 63 [the Texas recidivist statute] thus

is nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person

commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the

admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to

the State's judgment as to whether to grant him parole.

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 278. This case does not raise a presumption of gross

disproportionality. See Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d. 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Hayes v.

Giurbino, 2008 WL 142369 (S.D. Cal. 2008)(After conviction of driving while having a

measurable blood alcohol of .08 percent or more, the twenty-seven years to life sentence deemed

appropriate because of Hayes’ serious felony prior convictions and his two separate prison

terms). 

Although the sentence is admittedly harsh in light of the nature of the underlying

offense, this court cannot find it unconstitutionally harsh in light of the Supreme Court’s rulings. 

Sigala v. Campbell, 130 Fed.Appx. 129 (9th Cir. 2005)(nolo contendere plea to felony driving

under the influence; sentence of 25 years to life under California’s Three Strikes law is not cruel

and unusual punishment). Felony driving under the influence carries “substantial risk of injury.”

Sigala, 130 Fed.Appx. at *1. While the underlying offense may not have resulted in violence, the

potential for violence was great. The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s petition was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

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 Respondents contend that petitioner’s remaining claims are barred by the doctrine of 6

procedural default. It is evident to this court that these claims are without merit. For that reason,

the court will not reach the complex questions presented by the procedural default defense. See

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997) (procedural bar issue need not be resolved

first if ultimate denial of claim “is a foregone conclusion.”).

 Petitioner’s trial counsel raised this issue. The trial court reviewed the verdict forms 7

and the transcript of the sentencing, and noted that while the jury hung up on the use of the

firearm allegation, it was clear that the jury found petitioner guilty of the Cal. Penal Code § 245

charge, assault with a deadly weapon. (RT at 330-31; 334; 336.) Although petitioner did not

“use” the gun in that he did not fire the weapon, petitioner used the gun by striking the victim

with the gun. (Id.) The trial court found there was “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this

prior did, in fact, occur.” (RT 336.) 

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d. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel6

In his fifth claim, petitioner faults appellate counsel for not raising the validity of

the prior convictions on appeal. Petitioner contends that if appellate counsel had researched the

trial transcript, he would have found that the jury did not find that petitioner had used a firearm

or dangerous or deadly weapon. Petitioner contends that prior number nine was not a prior

conviction for purposes of Three Strikes. Petitioner argues this investigation would have resulted

in petitioner not being sentenced to 30 years in state prison.

Even if appellate counsel had challenged one of petitioner’s prior convictions for

lack of proof that petitioner had used a weapon, such a challenge would have been futile. See 7

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633 (1997)(sentencing court may consider

conduct of which defendant has been acquitted, so long as that conduct has been proved by a

preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Hurn, 496 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2007), cert.

denied, Hurn v. United States, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2008 WL 833293 (March 31, 2008)(sentencing

increase based on acquitted conduct of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute was

warranted). The challenge also would have been futile given the balance of petitioner’s criminal

history. Counsel’s failure to raise this ultimately meritless argument does not establish

ineffective assistance of counsel. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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e. Claims Six and Seven re Priors

In claims six and seven, petitioner contends his 1975 assault conviction is

insufficient to support a “serious felony” conviction, and that his 1972 and 1975 prior

convictions cannot be categorized as serious felonies because they were sustained prior to

enactment of California’s Three Strikes Law. However, these claims are based on violations of

state law and are not cognizable on federal habeas review, as noted above. Both of these claims

must fail.

f. Denial of Various Motions Implicating Petitioner’s Right to a Speedy Trial

In claim 8, petitioner contends the trial court erred by denying his motion under

Cal. Penal Code § 1381. Petitioner argues that the motion should have been granted because the

court knew from the documents and records that petitioner’s § 1381 hearing was held up over 90

days. (Pet. at 6.) In claim 9, petitioner contends the trial court should have granted petitioner’s

motion under Cal. Penal Code § 1382. Petitioner contends that after the preliminary hearing, the

court ordered a status conference for May 3, 1995, and set a jury trial date for May 8, 1995. (CT

135.) However, officials failed to deliver petitioner to court on those dates because Sacramento

County had allowed petitioner to be transferred to another county to start new trial proceedings,

and to be sent back to prison before continuing with trial proceedings. (Pet. at 6.) In claim 10,

petitioner contends the trial court should have granted petitioner’s motion under Cal. Penal Code

§ 1389 (agreement on detainers). Petitioner contends that he was picked up from state prison on

a Cal. Penal Code § 1381 demand for speedy trial, but prior to trial he was returned to state

prison, then returned to stand trial on the same charges. (Pet. at 6.) 

The record reflects that petitioner was arrested on March 24, 1994, and a parole

hold was placed against him that same day. On April 15, 1994, petitioner was moved from the

county jail to Deuel Vocational Institute on the parole violation; petitioner was not taken before a

magistrate judge for arraignment during his confinement at the county jail. (CT 52-53.) 

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 Under the United States Constitution the right to a speedy trial does not attach until the 8

filing of the information. The filing of a felony complaint or issuance of an arrest warrant does

not trigger the speedy trial provisions of the United States Constitution. People v. Martinez, 22

Cal.4th 752, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 (2000). 

16

Since petitioner was in the custody of the Department of Corrections, he was

entitled to invoke the provisions of Penal Code § 1381 to require that upon notice to the District

Attorney that he be brought to trial on the felony complaint within 90 days of their receiving

notice from the petitioner. A parole revocation hearing took place on April 27, 1994. (CT 53.) 

Petitioner contends that on May 6, 1994, he obtained and signed a § 1381 request and mailed it to

the District Attorney. (CT 53.) The District Attorney denies receiving this form. (CT 61.) 

Petitioner signed a second § 1381 request on July 19, 1994, and Counselor J. Yates took the form

indicating he was returning it to legal staff for mailing. (CT 54.) The underlying criminal

complaint (information) was filed on May 20, 1994. (CT 53.) On September 1, 1994, prison

officials mailed petitioner’s § 1381 form to the District Attorney, 97 days after petitioner signed

the form. (CT 53-54.) On October 3, 1994, petitioner was released from Soledad Vocational

Institute for transport to Sacramento County in response to the May 20, 1994 complaint. (CT 54-

55.) Petitioner was arraigned on October 5, 1994. (CT 1.) 

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the information pursuant to Penal Code

§ 1381, which motion was denied by the trial court on January 13, 1995. The trial court found

that if the initial § 1381 request had been received, it would have been untimely, as it was signed

even before the criminal complaint was filed. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, Volume One,

8

at 17.) The trial court also found that because the 90 day statute of limitations period runs from

the date the District Attorney receives the § 1381 request, the motion to dismiss should be

denied, finding that the District Attorney could not be held accountable for delays by prison

officials. (Id. at 18.) The trial court recognized petitioner’s federal and state constitutional rights

to a speedy trial. (Id.) But the trial court found that despite the delay in time, petitioner had

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failed to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that evidence had gone stale, memories had faded, or

witnesses were no longer available. (Id. at 19.) 

Preliminary hearing was held on February 2, 1995. (CT 8.) On April 5, 1995,

petitioner was transported to Contra Costa County for new proceedings in that county. (Traverse

at 20.) On April 25, 1995, petitioner was convicted in Contra Costa County of driving under the

influence, Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152. (CT at 347-48.) On May 3, 1995, May 5, 1995 and May

8, 1995, petitioner was not transported to Sacramento County because he was still in Contra

Costa County. (CT 9-10.) Minutes reflect that on May 15, 1995, petitioner was again not

transported to Sacramento County, but the minutes state “in San Quentin for FP and TD if does

not settle or vacated.” (CT 10.) The trial date continued to be trailed by minute entries dated

May 16, 1995 and May 17, 1995. (CT 11.) On May 18, 1995, the matter was transferred to a

different department, at which time petitioner’s motions to dismiss pursuant to §§ 1381 and 1382

were denied, and the trial date was reset for June 14, 1995. (CT 11.) On June 2, 1995, the trial

date was confirmed. (CT 12.) On June 12, 1995, petitioner’s motion for pro per status was set

for hearing on June 13, 1995. (CT 13.) On June 23, 1995, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

under § 1382. (CT 142.) On June 26, 1995, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss under § 1389. 

(CT 146.) Both motions were noticed for hearing on July 5, 1995. (CT 142, 146.) Attorney

Higgins was relieved as attorney and the trial date was continued to July 17, 1995. (CT 13.) 

Petitioner’s §§ 1382 and 1389 motions were continued to July 6, 1995, at which time it was

denied. (CT 14.) Attorney Brophy was substituted in as counsel for petitioner on July 12, 1995. 

(CT 15.)

Jury trial commenced on August 21, 1995. (CT 202.) Petitioner was convicted by

jury trial on August 30, 1995 of felony driving under the influence and perjury. 

Petitioner did not appeal the trial court’s rulings on these three motions. 

Petitioner first presented these claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

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Sacramento County Superior Court, which found the claim was barred based on petitioner’s

failure to timely raise the issue on appeal, citing In re Robbins, supra. Thus, the sole issue before

this court is whether petitioner’s federal constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. 

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. VI. However, the

Sixth Amendment does not proscribe all delay of the trial of a criminal defendant. Rather, the

United States Supreme Court has “qualified the literal sweep of the provision by specifically

recognizing the relevance of four separate enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly

long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether,

in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice

as the delay's result.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (citing Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir.

1986). No one of these four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to support a

finding that there has been a deprivation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Rather, the

various factors are related and must be considered together. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. However,

the first factor, length of delay, "is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some

delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors

that go into the balance." Id. at 530. Courts have generally found post-accusation delay

"presumptively prejudicial" when it begins to approach one year. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, n.1.

In this regard, depending on the nature of the charges, courts have generally found

post-accusation delay “presumptively prejudicial” when it begins to approach one year. Doggett,

505 U.S. at 652, n.1; see also McNeely, 336 F.3d at 826 (three-year delay was presumptively

prejudicial); United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2003) (22-month delay

between first superseding indictment and trial date was presumptively prejudicial but did not

weigh heavily in defendant's favor because it was not excessively long); United States v. Aguirre,

994 F.2d 1454, 1457 (1993) (finding that “a five year delay is long enough to trigger a further

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look,” but concluding that even the five-year delay in that case did not deprive the defendant of

his constitutional right to a speedy trial when all the Barker v. Wingo factors were balanced).

Here, the criminal information was filed May 20, 1994, but petitioner was not

brought to trial until August 21, 1995. Because this fifteen month period exceeds the one year

period contemplated in Barker, it is sufficient to trigger the rest of the analysis under Barker, but

it does not weigh heavily towards finding that petitioner was denied a constitutional right. 

The court must now consider whether petitioner or the prosecution is more to

blame for the delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651; Compare United States v. Sandoval, 990 F.2d

481, 485 (9th Cir.1993)(defendants' resistance to the government's efforts to secure their

presence in the United States for trial constituted relinquishment of the speedy trial right) and

McNeely v Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2003)(delay attributable to defendant's own acts

or to tactical decisions by trial counsel will not support later claim of constitutional deprivation)

with United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1162 (2003)(negligence on the government's part

weighs in defendant's favor; intentional delay even more so).

The initial delay was the fault of prison officials who took 97 days to transmit

petitioner’s request for speedy trial to the District Attorney. However, there was no evidence in

the record that demonstrated the District Attorney was involved in the delay or that prison

officials intended to delay petitioner’s trial. The trial court stated, “I can find terrible negligence

in their recordkeeping, but I don’t know exactly why that was why it took 97 days.” (Reporter’s

Transcript on Appeal, Volume One, at 18.) Thus, the initial period of delay was not attributable

to either petitioner or respondent.

At the January 13, 1995 hearing, it was noted that the delay was also caused by

the fact that this was a drunk driving complaint, which was often delayed. (Reporter’s

Transcript, Volume One, at 17.) 

It appears the second period of delay was caused by petitioner’s transport to

Contra Costa County for arraignment and trial on other criminal charges. The record reflects that

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the prosecution was aware of these charges, so the government is partially responsible for a

portion of that delay. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, Volume I, at 170.) Thus, this delay

weighs in favor of petitioner.

However, some of the delay that followed was caused by petitioner. Petitioner

filed a motion to proceed pro se, his attorney of record filed a motion to be relieved, and later,

new counsel was appointed to represent petitioner. Petitioner does not benefit from this delay.

As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Barker, “delay that can be

tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy

charge.” Id., 407 U.S. at 530. The reason for the delay in this case was not for an improper

purpose. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 (it would be improper for the prosecution to intentionally

delay in order “to gain some tactical advantage over [defendants] or to harass them”). 

Petitioner’s parole was revoked and he was returned to state prison shortly after his arrest. It

appears likely that these circumstances played more of a role in any delay than any other factor.

There is no evidence in the record that the prosecution intentionally delayed the underlying

action. 

As to the third prong, it is undeniable petitioner asserted his right to a speedy trial

in the trial court. This factor weighs heavily in petitioner’s favor.

Finally, it is the fourth factor, prejudice to petitioner, that weighs most heavily in

the evaluation of this claim. United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Three types of potential prejudice are recognized under the fourth prong of the Barker analysis:

(1) oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern of the accused, (3) the possibility

that the accused's defense will be impaired. Gregory, 322 F.3d at 1163. The third type of

prejudice is the most serious. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 

Here, petitioner has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the delay in

bringing this case to trial. Id., 407 U.S. at 533. In his traverse, petitioner failed to address

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 Rather, petitioner maintains he is not required to show prejudice when his rights under 9

the Speedy Trial Act have been violated. (Traverse at 21-22.) However, petitioner cites only

California law for this proposition. The only issue on habeas review is whether petitioner’s

federal constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

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prejudice under Barker. (Traverse at 15-32.) This case was not so complex that the length of 9

time would impact evidence or testimony. No witnesses were lost by virtue of the delay. Given

petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time of his arrest, it is unlikely that the delay hampered his

memory any more than the alcohol did. In the January 13, 1995 hearing, the prosecution pointed

out that the only prejudice petitioner suffered was he served about seven months on a parole

violation for which he might not get credit. (Reporter’s Transcript, Volume One, at 16.) The

prosecution then offered to give petitioner credit for that time served. (Id.) 

Balancing these four factors, this court finds that the delay did not violate

petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. It cannot be said that the state court's summary

denial of petitioner's claim amounted to an objectively unreasonable application of Barker and

Doggett. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

g. Trial Court Erred in Finding Petitioner Used Weapon in Prior Conviction

Petitioner’s eleventh claim that the trial court abused its discretion in considering

a charge as involving a weapon in his 1978 conviction when the jury failed to find petitioner used

a weapon essentially involves an interpretation of state sentencing law. As explained above, “it

is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. So long as a state sentence “is not based on any proscribed

federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by

indigency, the penalties for violation of state statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v.

State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). Thus, “[a]bsent a showing of

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 Under California law, a trial court’s discretionary act at sentencing will not be 10

disturbed unless the record suggests a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” See People v. Arviso,

201 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1059 (1988). 

 Indeed, the sentencing judge noted that during his recent incarceration in state prison, 11

petitioner had been written up on two separate occasions for being in possession of two gallons

of alcohol that petitioner was making in his bunker. Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, at 13, filed

April 15, 2008. The sentencing judge found petitioner has “extreme problems with alcohol,

alcoholism, and that [petitioner] has no control over it. And if [petitioner] can’t control it in

prison, [he] can’t control it anywhere.” (Id.) 

 If petitioner’s sentence had been imposed under an invalid statute and/or was in excess 12

of that actually permitted under state law, a federal due process violation would be presented. 

See Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (due process violation found where

petitioner’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole could not be

constitutionally imposed under the state statute upon which his conviction was based). However,

petitioner has failed to make such a showing.

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fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify

federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994).10

The trial court’s reference to this conviction was not fundamentally unfair. 

Whether or not petitioner used a weapon had little impact on the sentencing judge’s decision not

to strike any of petitioner’s prior convictions, as noted above, in light of petitioner’s criminal

record and the documented history of alcohol abuse. Although reference to use of a weapon 11

where no such finding had been made by a jury may have been improper under state law, it did

not result in prejudice to this petitioner, who had a lengthy criminal history spanning twenty

years, as well as a serious problem with alcohol, and who continued to drive while drinking. 

After a careful review of the sentencing proceedings, the undersigned finds no federal

constitutional violation in the state trial judge’s exercise of his sentencing discretion.12

Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 21, 2008.

001; smit0250.157

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