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Nature of Suit Code: 513
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

REINALDO CASTILLO, GONZALO PADRON 

MARINO, MAYDA ROTELLA, JULIA GARCIA, 

SHOPS ON FLAGER INC., JOSE F. DUMENIGO, 

DORA A. DUMENIGO, HUMBERTO J. DIAZ, 

JOSEFA MARCIA DIAZ, LUIS CRESPO, JOSE LUIS 

NAPOLE, GRACE BARSELLO NAPOLE, 

BERNARDO D. MANDULEY, NORMA A. 

MANDULEY, DANILO A. RODRIGUEZ, DORA 

RODRIGUEZ, AVIMAEL AREVALO, ODALYS 

AREVALO, DALIA ESPINOSA, DANIEL ESPINOSA, 

SOFIRA GONZALEZ, LOURDEZ RODRIGUEZ, 

ALBERTO PEREZ, MAYRA LOPEZ, NIRALDO 

HERNANDEZ PADRON, MERCEDES ALINA 

FALERO, LUISA PALENCIA, XIOMARA 

RODRIGUEZ, HUGO E. DIAZ, AND, CONCEPCION 

V. DIAZ, AS CO-TRUSTEES OF THE DIAZ FAMILY 

REVOCABLE TRUST, SOUTH AMERICAN TILE, 

LLC, GLADYS HERNANDEZ, NELSON MENENDEZ, 

JOSE MARTIN MARTINEZ, NORMA DEL 

SOCORRO GOMEZ, OSVALDO BORRAS, JR., LUIS

R. SCHMIDT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2019-1158

______________________

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2 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in Nos. 1:16-cv-01624-MBH, 1:17-cv-01931-MBH, Senior 

Judge Marian Blank Horn.

______________________

OPINION ISSUED: February 20, 2020

OPINION MODIFIED: March 6, 2020*

______________________

 

MEGHAN SUE LARGENT, LewisRice, St. Louis, MO, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Plaintiffs-appellants Gonzalo Padron Marino, Mayda Rotella, Julia Garcia, Jose F. 

Dumenigo, Dora A. Dumenigo, Dalia Espinosa, Daniel Espinosa, Sofira Gonzalez, Mayra Lopez, South American 

Tile, LLC, Gladys Hernandez, Jose Martin Martinez, 

Norma del Socorro Gomez, Luis R. Schmidt, Humberto J. 

Diaz, Josefa Marcia Diaz also represented by LINDSAY 

BRINTON.

 JAMES H. HULME, Arent Fox LLP, Washington, DC, for 

plaintiffs-appellants Reinaldo Castillo, Danilo A. Rodriguez, Dora Rodriguez.

 MARK F. HEARNE, II, True North Law Group, LLC, St. 

Louis, MO, for plaintiffs-appellants Shops on Flager Inc., 

Luis Crespo, Jose Luis Napole, Grace Barsello Napole, Bernardo D. Manduley, Norma A. Manduley, Avimael Arevalo, 

Odalys Arevalo, Lourdez Rodriguez, Alberto Perez, Niraldo 

Hernandez Padron, Mercedes Alina Falero, Luisa Palencia, 

Xiomara Rodriguez, Hugo E. Diaz, Concepcion V. Diaz, 

Nelson Menendez, Osvaldo Borras, Jr. Also represented by 

STEPHEN S. DAVIS.

* This opinion has been modified and reissued following a petition for panel rehearing filed by the government.

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 3

 KEVIN WILLIAM MCARDLE, Environment & Natural Resource Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JEFFREY B. CLARK, ERIC GRANT.

 ______________________

Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge

Reinaldo Castillo and others own plots of land abutting 

a railroad right-of-way that was long ago granted to, and 

for decades used by, the Florida East Coast Railway Co. in 

Dade County, Florida. It is undisputed before us that, 

when the railway company eventually abandoned the 

right-of-way for rail use (the purpose for which the rightof-way was granted), full rights to the underlying land—

title unencumbered by the right-of-way easement—would 

have reverted to whoever owned such rights, had there 

been no overriding governmental action. But there was 

such governmental action: the railway company successfully petitioned a federal agency to have the railroad corridor turned into a recreational trail. The landowners sued 

the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging 

that the agency’s conversion of the railroad right-of-way 

into a recreational trail constituted a taking of their rights

in the corridor land abutting their properties and that the 

United States must pay just compensation for that taking. 

To establish their ownership of the corridor land, the plaintiffs relied on a Florida-law doctrine known as the “centerline presumption,” which, where it applies, provides that

when a road or other corridor forms the boundary of a landowner’s parcel, that landowner owns the fee interest in the 

abutting corridor land up to the corridor’s centerline, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.

In proceedings on summary-judgment motions, the 

government argued that the landowners did not own the 

land to the centerline of the railroad corridor at issue. The 

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4 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

trial court agreed with the government, holding that the 

only reasonable finding on the evidence in this case was 

that the centerline presumption was overcome or was inapplicable. See Castillo v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 

(2018) (SJ Op.); Castillo v. United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 590 

(2018) (Reconsideration Op.). The landowners appeal. We 

conclude that the trial court misapplied the centerline presumption to the evidence. We reverse and remand.

I

A

When a railroad stops using a railroad right-of-way to 

operate a rail line, Section 8(d) of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1247(d), “allows [the] railroad to negotiate with a state, 

municipality, or private group (the ‘trail operator’) to assume financial and managerial responsibility for operating 

the railroad right-of-way as a recreational trail.” Caldwell 

v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The

federal government’s Surface Transportation Board (STB) 

has exclusive and plenary authority to “regulate the construction, operation, and abandonment of most railroad 

lines in the United States.” Id. at 1228. If the railroad and 

trail operator reach a trail agreement during a negotiation 

period provided by the STB’s issuance of a Notice of Interim 

Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU), and so notify the STB, 

trail use of the right-of-way is authorized and termination 

of the railroad easement through abandonment is blocked 

indefinitely. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d), (h); see also Rogers 

v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides that 

private property shall not “be taken for public use, without 

just compensation.” If, in the absence of a conversion to 

trail use, state law would provide for return to a person of 

full rights in the land, “[a] taking occurs when, pursuant to 

the Trails Act, state law reversionary interests are effectively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a 

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 5

railroad right-of-way to trail use.” Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 

1228; see also Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 

1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Accordingly, the government must provide just compensation to the owner of the 

reversionary rights eliminated by a Trails Act conversion.

See Rogers, 814 F.3d at 1303.

B

In the fall of 1924, Florida East Coast Railway Co.

(FEC Railway) obtained a 1.2-mile long right-of-way easement (of a basically north-south orientation) in Dade 

County, Florida, by way of four condemnation orders in the 

Dade County Circuit Court. See J.A. 708–09 (P. Russo 

judgment); J.A. 710–12 (R.S. Stanley judgment); J.A. 712–

13 (W.H. Johnson judgment); J.A. 713–16 (J. Pyles judgment). The FEC Railway completed most of the rail line on 

the right-of-way in 1932 and soon began operations on the 

line as part of its South Little River Branch Line.

As relevant here, the land to the east of the right-ofway eventually came into the hands of two families: the 

Merwitzers and the Mosses. The Merwitzers owned the 

land to the east of the right-of-way obtained by FEC Railway in the P. Russo judgment. The Merwitzers acquired 

this land from a 1945 deed from Mr. and Ms. T.C. Hollett 

(the 1945 Hollett-Merwitzer deed). On September 30, 

1947, the Merwitzers recorded a subdivision plat of the 

land, entitled “Zena Gardens.” The recorded subdivision

plat includes the following description: 

That Louis Merwitzer and Rebecca Merwitzer his 

wife owners of the S.E. 1⁄4 of the S.E. 1⁄4 of Section 2, 

Township 54 South, Range 40 East, Miami, Dade 

County, Florida, excepting therefrom a strip of 

land off the westerly side which is the right of way 

of the Okeechobee-Miami Extension of the Florida 

East Coast Railway have caused to be made the attached plat entitled “Zena Gardens.”

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6 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

The Streets, Avenues and Terrace as shown together with all existing and future planting, trees 

and shrubbery there on are hereby dedicated to the 

perpetual use of the Public for proper purposes reserving to the said Louis Merwitzer and Rebecca 

Merwitzer, his wife, their heirs, successors or assigns, the reversion or reversions thereof whenever 

discontinued by law. 

J.A. 759. 

The Mosses owned land north of the Merwitzers’ land 

and east of the FEC Railway right-of-way. The relevant 

portion of the right-of-way had been obtained by FEC Railway in the other three condemnation orders—the R.S. 

Stanley, W.H. Johnson, and J. Pyles judgments. The 

Mosses acquired this land from a 1949 deed from the Estate of Lucy Cotton (the 1949 Cotton-Moss deed). On November 3, 1949, Mr. and Ms. Moss recorded a subdivision 

plat of the land, entitled “Princess Park Manor.” The recorded subdivision plat includes the following description: 

That ERVING A. MOSS and HARRIETT E. MOSS 

his wife, owners of the South 1⁄2 of the N.E. 1⁄4, South 

of the Canal and East of the Florida East Coast 

Right-of-Way, located in Sec. 2 TWP 54 South, 

RGE. 40 East, Dade County Florida; being the land 

East of the Florida East Coast Right-of-Way and 

between Flagler Street and the Tamiami canal and 

extending East to Ludlum Road, ALSO [t]he West 

1⁄2 of the Northeast 1⁄4 of the Southeast 1⁄4 less the 

Florida East Coast Right-of-Way all in Sec. 2 Township 54 South RGE. 40 East, Dade County Florida, 

Said Florida East Coast Right-of-Way being the 

right-of-way of the Okeechobee Miami Extension of 

the Florida East Coast Railway, have caused to be 

made the attached Plat entitled “Princess Park 

Manor.”

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 7

The Streets, Avenues, Roads, Terraces, Courts and 

Alleys as shown together with all existing and future planting, trees and shrubbery thereon are 

hereby dedicated to the perpetual use of the public 

for proper purposes, reserving the said ERVING A. 

MOSS and HARRIETT E. MOSS, his wife their 

heirs; successors or assigns, the reversion or reversions thereof whenever discontinued by law.

J.A. 757. 

Between March 1977 and July 2016, Reinaldo Castillo, 

Nelson Menendez, and others acquired, by deed, title to 

parcels of land in Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor. 

The deeds did not themselves specify the precise parcel

boundaries but referred to the parcels by lot numbers

within the subdivision plats. See, e.g., J.A. 920 (conveying 

“Lot 8, in Block 11, of ZENA GARDENS, according to the 

Plat thereof”). 

On January 21, 2016, FEC Railway requested authority from the STB to abandon the right-of-way, including the 

portion that abuts Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor. 

On November 1, 2016, Florida East Coast Industries (FEC 

Industries) requested issuance of an NITU. The STB 

granted the request and issued an NITU, which allowed

FEC Industries “to negotiate with FEC [Railway] for acquisition of the Line for use as a trail under [Section 8(d) of 

the Trails Act].” J.A. 268. FEC Railway and FEC Industries notified the STB on July 18, 2017, that “they ha[d]

entered a Purchase Sale Agreement . . . for the rail banking/interim trail use of the 1.21-mile” right-of-way. J.A. 

695.

C

In December 2016, Mr. Castillo and other landowners

(collectively the Castillo plaintiffs), along with Mr. Menendez and other landowners (collectively, the Menendez 

plaintiffs), separately sued the federal government in the

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8 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the STB’s issuance 

of the NITU authorizing conversion of the FEC right-ofway into a public recreational trail constituted a taking of 

their property, entitling them to just compensation. The

trial court consolidated the cases. After filing their pleadings, the parties stipulated that at the time the STB issued 

the NITU, each plaintiff owned land—in either the Zena 

Gardens or the Princess Park Manor subdivision—adjacent to the FEC right-of-way. The Castillo plaintiffs’ corridor-abutting land is split between the two subdivisions; the 

Menendez plaintiffs’ corridor-abutting land lies entirely in 

Princess Park Manor. SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 714.

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs (collectively, the 

landowners) filed separate motions for partial summary 

judgment, asking the court to determine that the NITU 

constituted a taking.1 The landowners argued that FEC 

Railway had only an easement over, not fee-simple title to,

the land underlying the FEC right-of-way and that the 

easement was limited to operating a railway. They argued

that the NITU constituted a taking because, in its absence, 

once FEC Railway abandoned use of the corridor for rail 

service, the landowners would have regained full 

1 The Castillo plaintiffs sought partial summary 

judgment as to the government’s liability for portions of the 

right-of-way granted to FEC Railway in all four condemnation orders and a portion of the right-of way obtained by a 

1923 deed from G.F. and Mary Holman. See Castillo’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Castillo v. United 

States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF 

No. 23. The Menendez plaintiffs sought the same relief 

with respect to portions of the right-of-way granted to FEC 

Railway in three of the four condemnation orders. Menendez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Menendez v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:17-cv01931), ECF No. 20.

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 9

possession of the abutting corridor land, east of and up to 

the centerline, which they claimed they owned under Florida law.

The government opposed the landowners’ motions and 

filed its own cross-motions for summary judgment. As to 

the Menendez plaintiffs, the government sought summary 

judgment that the Menendez plaintiffs could not establish 

that they owned the land underlying the right-of-way obtained by the railway in the condemnation orders. As to 

the Castillo plaintiffs, with respect to the issues now before 

us, the government argued that the Castillo plaintiffs had 

not established their entitlement to summary judgment in 

their favor regarding their ownership of any of the corridor 

land.2

The government’s main argument was that the landowners had established ownership of only their parcels adjacent to the right-of-way and not any land underlying the 

right-of-way. Specifically, the government pointed to language in the September 1947 Zena Gardens plat “excepting 

. . . a strip of land off the westerly side which is the right of 

way of the . . . [FEC] Railway,” J.A. 759, and language in 

the November 1949 Princess Park Manor plat describing 

the subdivision as being “east of the Florida East Coast 

right-of-way,” J.A. 757. According to the government, that 

language, together with certain other language, shows that 

the Merwitzers and Mosses excluded the FEC right-of-way 

from conveyances made according to the September 1947 

and November 1949 plats. Government’s Cross-Motion for 

2 The government sought summary judgment that 

FEC Railway received fee simple title to the portion of the 

corridor land conveyed in the 1923 deed from G.F. and 

Mary Holman. The trial court agreed, SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl. 

at 730–34, and the landowners do not challenge that aspect 

of the trial court’s ruling.

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Summary Judgment at 12–13, Castillo v. United States, 

138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF No. 25. 

To prove ownership of the land underlying the right-ofway, the landowners invoked a doctrine of Florida property 

law, i.e., the centerline presumption. Under that doctrine,

in its principal relevance to the issue presented to the trial 

court on summary judgment, if a grantor conveys property 

identified as bounded by a road, stream, or similar corridor, 

and the grantor owns the land under that boundary corridor, the grant also conveys title to the land underlying the 

corridor up to the corridor’s centerline, unless there is clear 

evidence of non-conveyance as to that corridor land. Landowners’ Reply in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 7–9, Castillo v. United States, 138 Fed. 

Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF No. 32 (citing 

Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915)). According to the 

landowners, the 1947 and 1949 plats’ descriptions and depictions, on which the government relied, failed to rebut 

the centerline presumption. 

On June 29, 2018, the trial court resolved the summary-judgment motions in favor of the government. SJ 

Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 742. The trial court made similar determinations for the lots in both Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor, namely, that there is no genuine issue of 

triable fact because the plat descriptions and depictions of 

the subdivisions rebut the centerline presumption by 

clearly showing that the Merwitzers and Mosses “did not 

intend to pass title to the railroad corridor to the grantees 

of the subdivision parcels adjacent to the railroad corridor.” 

Id. at 740, 742. In particular, the trial court concluded that 

the Zena Gardens plat “makes a specific point to ‘except[]’ 

the railroad corridor from the description of [the] land platted,” id. at 740, and that the Princess Park Manor plat describes the parcels in the plat as both “East of the [FEC

Railway] Right-of-Way” and “less the [FEC Railway] Rightof-Way,” id. at 741, thus excluding the railroad corridor. In 

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 11

way from the paragraph in both plat descriptions dedicating the “Streets” and “Avenues” to the public confirms that

the individual lot conveyances did not include the railroad 

right-of-way. Id. at 740, 741. Finally, again relying just on 

the plats, the court concluded that the pictorial depictions 

of the subdivisions in the plats indicate that none of the 

parcels “extend onto the railroad corridor but, instead, end 

at the edge of the railroad corridor,” meaning that the railroad corridor is not included in the subdivision plat. Id. 

The landowners filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court misapplied the centerline presumption.3 To prove that the Merwitzers and Mosses did 

not retain for themselves a fee estate in the strip of land 

under the right-of-way easement, the landowners presented, for the first time, two pre-platting chain of title reports—one for a parcel in Zena Gardens and one for a 

parcel in Princess Park Manor. See J.A. 880–81; J.A. 882–

84 (Zena Gardens parcel chain of title report); J.A. 928–30 

(Princess Park Manor parcel chain of title report). The 

Zena Gardens report included the 1945 Hollett-Merwitzer

deed, and the Princess Park Manor report included the 

1949 Cotton-Moss deed. In response, the government submitted a 1937 quitclaim tax deed that, the government asserted, showed a conveyance of the land underlying the 

3 The Castillo landowners also argued that the trial 

court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the 

government for the portions of the FEC right-of-way obtained by condemnation order because the government had 

not moved for summary judgment with respect to those 

portions of the right-of-way. The trial court rejected the 

argument without disputing the premise about the limited 

scope of the government’s motion. Reconsideration Op., 

140 Fed. Cl. at 604–05. On appeal, the Castillo plaintiffs 

have not challenged that procedural ruling. 

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12 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

FEC right-of-way from the Southern Drainage District directly to the FEC Railway.

On October 30, 2018, the trial court denied the landowners’ motions for reconsideration. See Reconsideration 

Op., 140 Fed. Cl. at 606. The trial court found no clear error in its determination that the Merwitzers (in September 

1947) and the Mosses (in November 1949) made clear their 

intent not to convey title to the land underlying the FEC 

right-of-way. Id. at 601. The trial court then considered 

the pre-platting chain of title reports submitted by the 

landowners and found that these reports were public records available to the landowners at the time they filed their 

summary-judgment motions, and thus “should not have 

been left for a post-decision motion for reconsideration.” 

Id. Nonetheless, the trial court considered the reports and

adopted a new basis to reject the landowners’ claims, 

namely, that the Merwitzers and Mosses did not themselves own the land underlying the right-of-way when the 

subdivisions were platted. Id. at 601–02. The trial court 

supported this determination with the language of the 

1945 Hollett-Merwitzer deed and the 1949 Cotton-Moss 

deed. Id. The trial court ruled that the 1945 Hollett-Merwitzer deed conveyed land “less [the] certain strip of land” 

that is the right-of-way and that the 1949 Cotton-Moss 

deed stated that the land conveyed was “East of the [FEC] 

right-of-way” and “less the [FEC] Right-of-Way.” Id. (quoting J.A. 897, 943). The trial court did not address the 1937 

quitclaim tax deed submitted by the government. 

The landowners timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

II

We review a decision of the Court of Federal Claims 

granting summary judgment de novo. See Rogers, 814 F.3d 

at 1305. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 13

law.” Court of Federal Claims Rule 56(a). We review the 

denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. See Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 

512 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court misunderstands or misapplies the 

relevant law or makes a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” 

Id.

We analyze the property rights of the parties in a railsto-trails case under the relevant state’s law, which in this 

case is Florida law. Rogers, 814 F.3d at 1305. We decide 

legal issues, under federal or state law, de novo. Hash v. 

United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

A

The landowners argue that the trial court misapplied 

the centerline presumption under Florida law. Specifically, they argue that the court, in its summary-judgment 

opinion, improperly interpreted the Zena Gardens and 

Princess Park Manor plats as reserving a reversionary interest in the FEC right-of-way to the Merwitzers and 

Mosses, so that the subsequent deeds to the subdivision 

parcels at issue did not grant any ownership of land in the 

railroad corridor. We agree with the landowners. 

Long ago, the Supreme Court of the United States described the centerline presumption as a “familiar principle 

of law” to the effect that “a grant of land bordering on a 

road or river, carries the title to the centre of the river or 

road, unless the terms or circumstances of the grant indicate a limitation of its extent by the exterior lines.” Banks 

v. Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 68 (1864). A note to the Florida Supreme Court’s 1887 decision in Florida Southern Railway 

Co. v. Brown described the rule as applicable to a “deed describing land as bounded by a street or other way,” rather 

than “as being bounded by the side line of the street”: the 

deed “passes all the title of the grantor in and to the soil of 

such way, extending to the center line thereof, subject to 

the easement of the public, in the absence of an express or 

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14 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

implied reservation of such street or way.” 1 So. 512, 515 

(Fla. 1887). In 1915, the Florida Supreme Court in Smith 

v. Horn applied the centerline presumption to the streets 

of a subdivision plat:

Where the owner of land has it . . . platted, showing 

subdivisions thereof, with spaces for intervening 

streets . . . and conveyances in fee of the subdivisions are made with reference to such . . . plat, the 

owner thereby evinces an intention to dedicate an 

easement in the streets or other highways to the 

public use . . . and the title of the grantees of subdivisions abutting on such streets in the absence of 

a contrary showing, extends to the center of such 

highway, subject to the public easement.

70 So. 435, 436 (Fla. 1915); see also Servando Bldg. Co. v. 

Zimmerman, 91 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1956) (recognizing 

that Florida codified the centerline presumption in part for 

subdivision plats at Fla. Stat. § 177.08 (1955), now 

§ 177.085); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Southern Inv. Co., 44 

So. 351, 353 (Fla. 1907) (“The proprietor of lots abutting on 

a public street is presumed, in the absence of evidence to 

the contrary, to own the soil to the center of the street.” 

(internal quotations omitted)).4

The centerline presumption can be rebutted in two 

ways of relevance here. First, the party challenging the 

presumption may “present evidence of the grantor’s intent 

4 In a recent case, the Florida Supreme Court declined to consider “whether or to what extent t[he] ‘center 

line presumption’ rule still applies to property adjacent to 

streets and highways in Florida today.” Rogers v. United 

States, 184 So. 3d 1087, 1099 n.7 (Fla. 2015). At present, 

the rule is a fixture of Florida law. See, e.g., Bischoff v. 

Walker, 107 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Florida 

court applying centerline presumption).

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 15

not to convey to the centerline” of the easement. Bischoff 

v. Walker, 107 So. 3d 1165, 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 

Second, a party can show that “the strip of land being 

claimed is titled in someone else.” Rogers v. United States, 

184 So. 3d 1087, 1098 (Fla. 2015). 

We have not been pointed to a decision under Florida 

law that specifically rules on a contested issue about 

whether railroad rights-of-way, like streets and certain 

other corridors, come within the centerline presumption. 

But in the absence of a contrary indication under Florida 

law, we conclude that the centerline presumption applies 

to railroad rights-of-way that serve as boundaries of a plot, 

including a plot within a subdivision.

Florida courts have applied the centerline presumption 

to highways, streets, canals, and nonnavigable streams. 

See, e.g., Smith, 70 So. at 436 (applying centerline presumption to “nonnavigable stream or highway”); Bischoff, 

107 So. 3d at 1168–71 (applying centerline presumption to 

a canal). In both Florida Southern Railway and Seaboard 

Air Line Railway, the boundary involved was a street being 

used by a railway, though not exclusively. A railroad rightof-way is relevantly akin to other corridors: it comes within 

the core rationale of the centerline presumption. When a 

property description includes a two-dimensional corridor 

(having width as well as length) as a boundary, that boundary often needs to be translated into one or more one-dimensional boundaries to identify ownership, such as when 

the right-of-way use of the corridor ends; and the centerline 

presumption supplies a default rule to perform that important task—with the content of the rule being a presumption that the corridor, commonly a narrow strip, is not 

to be owned separately from the abutting land. See, e.g.,

Dale A. Whitman et al., The Law of Property § 11.2 at 713, 

719 (4th ed. 2019) (“deeds, to be valid, must describe or otherwise identify the land affected,” and “[m]onuments having significant width,” such as “public streets and 

highways,” “raise interesting problems” of precisely 

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16 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

identifying the lines that bound the land; the centerline 

presumption solves that problem). The translation problem solved by the centerline presumption is presented by 

railroad rights-of-way as by other corridors. 

Moreover, in Bischoff, the Florida District Court of Appeals described the centerline presumption as applying to

a boundary defined by a “monument.” See Bischoff, 107 So. 

3d at 1168 (“The presumption is that ownership extends to 

the centerline of a monument . . . .”). Florida Statute 

§ 472.005(11) defines a “monument” as “an artificial or natural object that is permanent or semipermanent and used 

or presumed to occupy . . . any point on a boundary line, or 

any reference point or other point to be used for horizontal 

or vertical control.” A rail line meets the definition of an 

artificial monument under Florida law.

Many other jurisdictions—very much the predominant 

number among those whose law has been cited to us—have 

applied the centerline presumption to railroad rights-ofway. See Asmussen v. United States, 304 P.3d 552, 558 

(Colo. 2013) (finding that a majority of jurisdictions have 

“held that the centerline presumption applies to a conveyance of property abutting a railroad right-of-way”); Boyles 

v. Missouri Friends of the Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc., 

981 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (applying centerline presumption to railroad right-of-way); Pebsworth v. 

Behringer, 551 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) 

(same); Church v. Stiles, 10 A. 674, 675 (Vt. 1887) (same); 

see also Whitman et al., The Law of Property § 11.2 at 719 

(“A similar rule making the center line the boundary is applied to railroad and other rights of way.”). But see, e.g.,

Stuart v. Fox, 152 A. 413, 418–19 (Me. 1930) (finding “no 

reason . . . because of analogy to extend the [centerline presumption, as applied to highways,] to railroad rights of 

way”).

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 17

We conclude that, under Florida law, the centerline 

presumption applies to the railroad right-of-way context of 

the present case. 

B

In its summary-judgment opinion, the trial court concluded that the Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor 

plats each contain a clear expression of an intent to reserve

a reversionary interest in the FEC right-of-way in the subdivision grantors—an expression that suffices to rebut the 

centerline presumption. SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 738–42. 

For Zena Gardens, the trial court relied on the plat’s reference to “excepting therefrom a strip of land off the westerly 

side which is the right of way,” id. at 739–40 (citing J.A. 

759), and for Princess Park Manor, the trial court relied on 

the plat’s references to the land conveyed being “East of the 

[FEC] Right-of-Way” and “less the [FEC] Right-of-Way,” id.

at 741 (citing J.A. 757). The landowners argue that under 

Florida law, the plats do not clearly express the intent required to avoid application of the centerline presumption. 

We agree. 

The centerline presumption is said “to be based on the 

supposed intention of the parties, and the improbability of 

the grantor desiring or intending to reserve his interest in 

the street” when passing title to the adjoining land. Fla. 

Southern Ry., 1 So. at 513–14. Thus, a party may rebut the

centerline presumption by “present[ing] evidence of the 

grantor’s intent not to convey to the centerline” of the railway. Bischoff, 107 So. 3d at 1171. This contrary intent 

must be “clearly expressed.” Servando, 91 So. 2d at 293; 

see Bischoff, 107 So. 3d at 1168 (“The presumption is that 

ownership extends to the centerline of a monument unless 

a contrary intent is clearly expressed.”). 

The trial court in the present matter relied on language 

of the Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor plats that is 

not sufficient to avoid the centerline presumption. It relied 

on “east of” and “less” language in the Princess Park Manor 

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18 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

plat and on “excepting” language in the Zena Gardens plat. 

But the relied-on language uses terminology to which the 

presumption remains applicable, in that the language used

refers to the two-dimensional corridor (not a one-dimensional edge) or even to the right-of-way itself (as an easement) in affirmatively stating the boundary of the 

subdivision land and identifying certain exclusions.

In Bischoff v. Walker, a Florida appellate court determined that the centerline presumption applied to—and 

was not rebutted by—a canal adjacent to land described as 

“lying East of [the] Canal.” 107 So. 3d at 1166–68. That 

language did not refer to the edge of the Canal as the 

boundary. The “East of the [FEC] Right-of-Way” language 

in the Princess Park Manor plat is nearly identical to the 

plat language in Bischoff, except the two-dimensional monument named as a boundary is not a canal but a railroad 

corridor.

In Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd., a Florida appellate 

court held that a deed conveying the entire parcel “less and 

except the following described [road right-of-way] easement” did not exclude the land of the road from application 

of the centerline presumption. 528 So. 2d 432, 432–33 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The court held that the language 

“served simply to exclude the recorded easement in favor of 

the [easement beneficiary] from the title interest being conveyed and to prevent the recorded easement from constituting a breach of the covenants of warranty in each deed.” 

Id. at 434. Here, the “less the [FEC] Right-of-Way” language in the Princess Park Manor plat and the “excepting 

therefrom a strip of land” language in the Zena Gardens 

plat are relevantly similar to the language held insufficient 

to avoid the centerline presumption in Dean. The government notes that the Zena Gardens description refers to the 

“strip of land,” whereas Dean involved “easement” language, but we do not think that difference calls for a different result. The Zena Gardens language states that the 

“strip of land . . . is the right of way . . . of the [FEC] 

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 19

Railway.” J.A. 759. That language is so readily susceptible 

to being understood as merely indicating that certain land 

is subject to a right-of-way use right that it does not meet 

the standard of clear expression of an intent to exclude underlying land-ownership rights from the property description.

Our conclusion is reinforced by the plats’ clauses stating reservations as to the “Streets, Avenues and Terrace” 

in Zena Gardens, J.A. 759, and the “Streets, Avenues, 

Roads, Terraces, Courts, and Alleys” in Princess Park 

Manor, J.A. 757. Both plats grant easements in those areas

to the “perpetual use of the public for proper purposes” and

“reserve to the [grantors] . . . the reversion or reversions

thereof whenever discontinued by law.” J.A. 757, 759. We 

assume, without deciding, that this reservation language 

would suffice to avoid the centerline presumption under 

Peninsular Point, Inc. v. South Georgia Dairy Co-op, 251 

So. 2d 690, 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that 

presumption avoided by grantor’s dedication of streets to 

public use, “reserving unto itself . . . the reversion or reversions of the same, whenever abandoned by the public or 

discontinued by law”). But these reservation provisions 

conspicuously do not include the railroad corridor or rightof-way, even though the railroad right-of-way is mentioned 

elsewhere in the plats. The omission from the reservations 

confirms the absence of a reservation by the grantors as to 

the railroad corridor.

The trial court stated that the plats’ pictorial depictions show that “none of the parcels belonging to the [landowners] extend onto the railroad corridor but, instead, end 

at the edge of the railroad corridor.” SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl.

at 740, 741. But the maps do not allow a conclusion that 

the standard of clear expression of exclusion is met. It is 

not truly clear what the plats’ maps of the two subdivisions, 

standing alone, show about what parts of the FEC right-ofway are outside the west boundary line of the subdivisions. 

See J.A. 757, 759. In any event, the subdivision plat “must 

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20 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

be construed as a whole . . . and every part of the instrument be given effect.” Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Worley, 

38 So. 618, 622 (Fla. 1905); see also North Lauderdale Corp. 

v. Lyons, 156 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). The 

plats’ verbal descriptions, as discussed above, mean that 

the plats as a whole provide less than a clear expression of 

exclusion of the railroad corridor from the land within the 

subdivisions or the parcels to be sold within them.

We conclude, for those reasons, that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in its original ruling 

as to the land at issue on appeal. That ruling rests on the 

conclusion that the Zena Gardens and Princess Park 

Manor plats, from September 1947 and November 1949, respectively, contain clear expressions of exclusion of the railroad corridor from the subdivisions whose parcels were to 

be conveyed to purchasers. That conclusion, we hold, is 

contrary to law.

C

Although the government defends the trial court’s original ruling, Government’s Brief at 40–43, the government’s 

primary argument on appeal is that this court should affirm on a different ground. Specifically, it argues that the 

record of transfers to the Merwitzers and Mosses (or their 

predecessors) regarding the railroad-corridor land at issue 

makes clear that the Merwitzers and Mosses did not actually own the corridor land at issue when they filed the plats 

for Zena Gardens in September 1947 and for Princess Park 

Manor in November 1949. Id. at 26–39. The trial court did 

not so conclude in originally granting summary judgment. 

But on reconsideration it considered the issue based on evidence that the landowners themselves submitted in seeking reconsideration, and after deeming the submissions too 

late, it seemingly endorsed the government’s contention.

Reconsideration Op., 140 Fed. Cl. at 601–02. We hold that 

summary judgment in the government’s favor on this issue 

is erroneous on this record.

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 21

The government argues that for the centerline presumption to apply, the landowners must first affirmatively 

establish, through pre-platting evidence, that the Merwitzers and Mosses owned the land underlying the FEC rightof-way. Government’s Brief at 20–26. The trial court did 

not so conclude. It recognized, instead, that “the center line 

presumption can be rebutted” by “evidence that the grantor 

did not own the land underlying the easement at issue.” SJ 

Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 738 (emphasis added). That treatment 

accords with the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway Co. v. Lockwood that 

“the presumption arising from the deed from [a grantor], 

conveying the land, and bounding it on the east by [a roadway], is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that [the 

grantor] owned to the center of the street.” 15 So. 327, 329 

(Fla. 1894). The government has not shown that Florida 

law required the landowners, in order to withstand summary judgment, to present affirmative proof of the Merwitzers’ and Mosses’ ownership of the at-issue part of the 

railroad corridor at the time of the 1947 and 1949 plats. In 

the absence of such a requirement, the government also 

has not shown waiver by the landowners as to pre-platting 

ownership issues.

If the government wishes to challenge the Merwitzers’ 

and Mosses’ ownership of the disputed land when filing 

their plats, it must present evidence of the transfers 

through which the Merwitzers and Mosses ultimately came 

to own what the plats presumptively include. But the record may not be fully developed on this issue. It is not clear 

to us that the government even sought summary judgment 

on this ground without relying on an incorrect legal contention that the landowners had the burden to establish what 

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22 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

the Merwitzers and Mosses owned when filing their plats 

in 1947 and 1949.5

At least some of the pre-platting property documents to 

which we have been pointed themselves use the FEC rightof-way as a boundary. See J.A. 897 (1945 Hollett-Merwitzer deed conveying land “less that certain strip of land 

off the Westerly portion . . . being bounded . . . on the East 

by a line parallel to and 50 feet East of Center Line of the 

Okeechobee-Miami Extension of the Florida East Coast 

Railway”); J.A. 943 (1949 Cotton-Moss deed conveying “the 

land East of the [FEC] Right-of-Way” and “less the [FEC] 

Right-of-Way”). Interpreting such documents, like interpreting the plats themselves, requires use of the centerline 

presumption to the extent it applies. The trial court’s discussion of pre-platting issues in the reconsideration order 

may have been colored by an understanding of the presumption that we have determined to be incorrect in rejecting the trial court’s original summary-judgment ruling.6

5 See Government’s Memorandum in Support of 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 10–14, Castillo v. 

United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), 

ECF No. 25; Government’s Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–5, Castillo v. United 

States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF 

No. 34; Government’s Memorandum in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgment at 9–10, Menendez v. 

United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:17-cv-01931), 

ECF No. 21; Government’s Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–5, Menendez v. United 

States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF 

No. 24. 

6 The trial court did not rely on the quitclaim deed 

executed by the Southern Drainage District to the FEC 

Railway in 1937, which the government submitted on reconsideration as relevant to the Zena Gardens subdivision. 

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CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES 23

On the record before us, we conclude that the government has not justified summary judgment that the Merwitzers and Mosses did not own the corridor land now at 

issue when they filed their plats. Further proceedings, including such record development as is appropriate, are 

warranted on that issue. We do not prejudge what conclusion may be justified on remand, whether or not the evidentiary record is supplemented. 

Under the summary-judgment standard requiring evidence to be viewed favorably to the nonmoving party, see 

Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 

1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the 1937 deed indicates, at most, that 

the FEC Railway fell behind on its drainage-tax payments 

owed to the District and that, to clear the debt, the FEC 

Railway paid the unpaid drainage taxes for 1932–1936 and 

received from the District, in return, the quitclaim deed reflecting the clearance and removal of the District’s tax lien. 

Under Florida law, the 1937 quitclaim deed conveyed only 

such “title or interest as possessed by the grantor [here, the 

Southern Drainage District] at the time of the making of 

the deed.” See Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Patterson, 593 

So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, “the 

execution of a quitclaim deed, without more, does not necessarily import that the grantor possesses any interest at 

all and if the grantor has no interest in the land described 

at the time of conveyance, the quitclaim conveys nothing to 

the grantee.” Miami Holding Corp. v. Matthews, 311 So. 

2d 802, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The government has 

not presented evidence that the Southern Drainage District had ownership interests in the corridor land at the 

time of the quitclaim deed. Accordingly, the evidence does 

not support the government’s summary-judgment position 

that the FEC Railway acquired fee title through the 1937 

quitclaim deed. 

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24 CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES

III

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court 

is reversed with respect to the portions of the FEC Railway

right-of-way related to the condemnation orders. The portion of the trial court’s summary-ruling not challenged on 

appeal, see note 2, supra, is not disturbed. We remand the 

case for further proceedings, including any appropriate further development of the factual record. 

Costs awarded to appellants.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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