Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00987/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00987-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pl Diversity-Product Liability

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JUL 21 2016 3

4 CLERK US DlS'i RIOT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BY DRPUTY 5

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 CASE NO. 15cv0987-WQH-DHB

ORDER

KHRISTIE REED^PAUL BENESCH, REBECCA BRAUDEL, DIANE

CANUTE ROD CANUTE,

CRYSTAL LEWIS, RENE LUCHT,

DIANE ORTMAN, DEBRA

PORWOLL, and KRIS VOSBURGH

on BehalfofHerself and All Others

Similarly Situated,

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Plaintiff,

DYNAMIC PET PRODUCTS; and

FRICK’S MEAT PRODUCTS, INC,

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17 Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 40) filed by Defendants Dynamic Pet Products and

Frick’s Meat Products, Inc.

I. Background

On May 1, 2015, Plaintiff Khristie Reed commenced this action on behalf of

herselfand others similarly situated by filing the Class Action Complaint inthis Court.

(ECF No. 1). On June 16,2015, Defendants Dynamic Pet Products (“Dynamic”) and

Frick’s Meat Products, Inc. (“Frick’s”) filed amotion to dismiss and amotionto strike.

(ECF Nos. 8, 9). On July 30,2015, the Court granted Defendants’ motion in part and

denied it in part. (ECF No. 18).

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On January 15,2016, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. On January 26,

2016, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”), which is the operative

complaint. (ECF No. 37). Plaintiffs plead causes ofaction for: (1) fraud; (2) negligent

misrepresentation; (3) violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act

(“CLRA”), California Civil Code section 1750, et seq.; (4) violation of California

Business and Professions Code section 17200, etseq. (“UCL”); (5) breach ofimplied

warranty; (6) violation oftheFloridaDeceptive andUnfairTradePractices Act, Florida

Statute § 501.201, etseq.; (7) Violation ofthe Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, etseq.; (8) violation ofthe Louisiana Unfair

Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Louisiana Revised Statute §51:1401,

etseq.; (9) violation ofthe Minnesota Consumer Protection Act, Minnesota Statute § §

325F.67 etseq.; (10) violation ofthe New York Consumer Protection from Deceptive

Practices Act, New York General Business Law § 349, et seq.; (11) violation ofthe

North Carolina Consumer Protection Act, North Carolina General Statute § 75-1.1, et

seq.; (12) violation of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Oregon Revised

Statute §§ 646.605 etseq.; and (13) violation ofthe Washington Consumer Protection

Act, Washington Revised Code §§ 19.86.010, et seq. Plaintiffs request general

damages, punitive damages, restitution, disgorgement, equitable relief, and attorneys’

fees and costs.

On February 9,2016, Defendantsfiled themotionto dismiss pursuantto Federal

Rule ofCivilProcedure 12(b)(6). (ECFNo.40). On February 29,2016, Plaintiffsfiled

a response in opposition. (ECF No. 43). On March 7,2016, Defendants filed a reply.

(ECF No. 44).

II. Allegations of the Complaint

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25 This is a consumer protection class action arising out of

misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendants Dynamic Pet

Products, LLC and Frick’s Meat Products, Inc. regarding the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs. Frick’s is a meat product manufacturer. In an effort to

profit from the, waste, produced by slaughterhouses and meat

manufacturers, Frick’s orits principals createdDynamic to sellwaste ham

bones to pet owners. Through Dynamic, a wholly owned subsidiary of

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Frick’s, Defendants manufacture, market and sell the Real Ham Bone For

>gs as an appropriate and safe chew toy for dogs. Indeed, on each

product label and as the name suggests, Defendants explicitly market the

Dynamic Real Ham Bone For Dogs as a chew toy for dogs.

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(ECF No. 37 | 1). “To profit from the waste resulting from the manufacture of its

products, Frick’s, or its principals, created Dynamic to sell waste pig bones to pet

owners, marketing them as appropriate and safe for dogs.” Id. ^ 22. Defendants

Frick’s Meat Products, Inc. and Dynamic Pet Products are Missouri Corporations. Id.

fflf 19, 20. “Dynamic and Frick’s are the alter egos of one another and operate as a

single business enterprise forthe production, marketing and sale oftheRealHamBone

For Dogs.” Id. 121. “Dynamic and Frick’s share the same ownership, management

and headquarters.” Id. “Frick’s and Dynamic work in concert with each otherto profit

from the sale of waste ham bones by marketing them to pet owners as safe and

appropriate chew toys for dogs, when they are not.” Id.

“The Real Ham Bone For Dogs is not a safe or appropriate chew toy for dogs,

and is not fit for its intended purpose, despite Defendants’ contrary representations.”

Id. If 2. “The Real Ham Bone For Dogs is an 8” hickory-smoked pig femur, which

when chewed is prone to splintering into shards. When swallowed, these shards slice

through dogs’ digestive systems and cause severe internal injuries. Thousands ofdogs

have suffered a terrible array of illnesses, including stomach, intestinal and rectal

bleeding, vomiting, diarrhea, constipation and seizures, and have died gruesome,

bloody deaths as a result of chewing Defendants’ Real Ham Bone For Dogs.” Id.

The Complaint alleges that the Food and Drug Administration stated that bones

such asthe Real HamBone ForDogs are not safe for dogs. The Complaint allegesthat

the Missouri Better Business Bureau “issued a warning to Defendants about the

dangers posed by their Real Ham Bone For Dogs product” but “Defendants ignored

this notice.” Id. at 52. The Complaint quotes fifteen complaints made by pet owners

online orto Dynamic directly. For example, the Complaint allegesthat one pet owner

complained that her dog suffered “shock and couldn’t move . . . puked and had

Diarrhea and couldn’t stand up ... [and] spent 3 days in the hospital on iv’s [sic]” as

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a result ofingesting the Real Ham Bone for Dogs. Id. Tf 51.

“Despite having knowledge that Real Ham Bones For Dogs is inherently

dangerous for dogs, Defendants represent the opposite.” Id. If 57. “None of the

instructions on the product’s packaging or in other marketing informed Plaintiffs or

other consumers that allowing dogs to chew on the Real Ham Bone For Dogs as

instructed on the labeling would pose a significant risk ofserious illness or death.” Id.

f 58. “Nowhere do Defendants state the truth -that the Real Ham Bone For Dogs is

a dangerous productthat should not be given to dogs.” Id. The Complaint alleges that

the label of each Real Ham Bone For Dogs misrepresents that it is “safe for your pet”

and is “meant to be chewed.” Id.\5.

The Complaint allegesthatPlaintiffKhristieReedpurchasedtheRealHamBone

For Dogs from Wal-Mart in Oceanside, California, on March 1, 2015.

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13 When Plaintiffreturned home from Wal-Mart, she gave the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs to Fred, her healthy nine-year-old basset hound. Plaintiff

watched Fred chew on the Real Ham Bone For Dogs for approximately

one hour, after which point Fred walked away ana did not chew on it

again. The next day, Monday March 2, 2015, Fred was lethargic and

vomiting blood. Plaintiff immediately rushed Fred to California

Veterinary Specialists in Carlsbad, California. The veterinarian told

Plaintiffthat Fred was gravely ill and there was no guarantee that surgery

would save him. According to the veterinarian^ the only way to alleviate

Fred’s suffering was to puthim to sleep. Plaintifftook the veterinarian’s

advice and Frea was euthanized that evening.

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Id. f 26.

20 The Complaint defines the proposed class as “[a]ll persons who purchased one

ormoreReal HamBone For Dogs otherthan for purpose ofresale.” Id][61. Attached

to the Complaint as Exhibit A is a May 1,2015 letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel to David

S. Frick, owner of Dynamic Pet Products, requesting that “Defendants immediately

correct and rectify these violations by ceasing dissemination offalse and misleading

information as described in the enclosed Complaint. ...” (ECF No. 37-1 at 3).

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i The Complaint containsthe experiences ofthe other nine Plaintiffs who allege

their dogs became seriously ill and, in some cases, died after consuming Real Ham

Bone For Dogs product.

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1 III. Discussion

Defendants contend the Court should dismiss: (1) Plaintiffs’ implied warranty

claim on the ground that there is no vertical privity between Plaintiffand Defendants;

(2) PlaintiffBenesch’s Louisiana consumer protection claim because the Louisiana

consumer protection statute prohibits class action claims; (3) all ofPlaintiffs’ claims

relating to the risk ofsplintering because the product label contained an express waiver

of liability and assumption of risk that the bone would splinter; (4) Plaintiffs’

misrepresentation claims based onDynamic’s website and other “unnamedmarketing”

because the allegations are vague and conclusory; (5) Plaintiff Brandel’s Florida

consumer protection claims because Brandel cannot establish causation for her claim

and the Florida statute excludes claims for damage to property; (6) PlaintiffRodney

Cannut’s claim because he did not read the label or purchase the bone; and (7)

Plaintiffs’ SAC because it fails to identify which remedies are sought under each

separate cause of action.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss and requests leave to amend should

Defendants’ motion be granted in any respect.

A. 12(b)(6) Standard

Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must

contain... a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a

claim under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper ifthere is a ‘lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence ofsufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

legal theory.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep % 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

“[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ ofhis ‘entitle[ment] to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation ofthe elements

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ofa cause ofaction will not do.” BellAtl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to reliefthat is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable forthe misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he tenetthat a courtmust

accept as true all ofthe allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions. Threadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “In

sum, for a complaintto survive amotion to dismiss, thenon-conclusory factual content,

and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiffto relief.” Moss v. US. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962,969 (9th Cir.

2009) (quotations and citation omitted).

B. Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 40-7)

Defendantsrequestjudicial notice ofthreeproduct labels fortheReal HamBone

For Dogs as documents whose contents are discussed in the complaint. (ECF No. 40-

7). The first label, Exhibit A, is from “prior to approximately May 1,2015.” Id. at 1.

The second label, ExhibitB, is from approximately May 1,2015 to approximately June

8,2015. The third label, Exhibit C, is from approximately June 8,2015 to the present.

The docket reflects that Plaintiffs have not responded to Defendants’ request for

judicial notice.

Federal Rule ofEvidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a

fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it... is generally known within

the trial court’s territorialjurisdiction; or... can be accurately and readily determined

from sources whose accuracy cannotreasonably be questioned.” FedR. Enid. 210(b).

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In ruling on amotion to dismiss, a court may consider “materials incorporated into the

complaint by reference__ ” MetzlerInv. GMBHv. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d

1049,1061 (9thCir. 2008). Furthermore, courtsmay takejudicial notice ofdocuments

discussed in but not attached to a complaint, when the documents’ authenticity is not

subject to dispute. Davis v. HSBCBankNev., 1V.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160-61 (9th Cir.

2012).

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The Real Ham Bone For Dogs label is discussed in the Complaint. Plaintiffs’

claims are based on representations made on the label and communications omitted

from the label. Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity ofthe Real Ham Bone For

Dogs label. Defendants’ requestforjudicial notice is granted. The Courttakesjudicial

notice of the Real Ham Bone For Dogs labels for the purposes of this motion to

dismiss:

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14 Hickory Smoked :■<<

Real 15

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fteBone 17

18 100% FOOD GRADE INGREDIENTS

Su^rvise,yofi^^t-i^hTfe:'enjiC!y(h$>h5f-fnatMrai‘.' _________ ,

bone produd;8oneli:tohe chewed over!several, M'adeTniiSA*

■ sittings,:nbt;^^

* ofwaterto pet: Not;i^omfriendeid fordogsiwithidigestfye-problemsyl

t oraggressiveciievv^’Pemcjvebdne iinmediatelyifsplintering : 1

:v^^o.ccur5'or;sma|lA%meiTfs;l5reakpff/'Recomm'ended:sfee;fs/sirgR%'. ^

! larger,than your pets mouth.- Pet.pivnerassumes liability.associated^ f

-wfthfhe.vseqrthfe$.^ .

,;;-V^hipgtoo. MO;630^M\fl^.dyrJarnicpet.net

For Dogs 19

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22 o 49521 51001 8

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24 Exhibit A

25 III

26 III

27 III

28 III

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Case 3:15-cv-00987-WQH-DHB Document 48 Filed 07/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 16
1

2 Hickory Smoked

3 lglli§5

4 3$

! 5 f

# m

6

I»j!rais)Si'5;d-,»Ki« rgssis§iss"::?

1 ss&BMSBsags&.

’ assifmesfianjijtyiassbciateid tvitli tneiise ofthis orany;naforal bone.^raduct;

. DynamicPetProducts, Inc.

7 ForDogs

Made iii USA ,

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o "49521 51 10

n

12 Exhibit B

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>KM* 14

15 wm

4ft

/

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17 # tltHYZ BEE

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«* Supervise your p^t wink enjoying any natural bone protJkt- Bone i such?

I 2 fs to be chewed over several stftings, not eaten.Always provide' 8

1 5 a fresh supply o? waterto pet. Not recommended for dogs with

b % digestive problems or aggressive chewere RenuJve bone immediately

15 jl splintering occurs or small fragmarits breafcuff Recommended

13 site is slightly largerthan your pets mouth, -Ret .owner assumes

1 > liability associated with the use of this or any natural bone product, i

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49521 51001 8

22

Proitii#s, LLC^ mstiiligton, WQ 63P9U»Mftw#^ynamicpet.net

23 W

24 Exhibit C

C. Implied Warranty Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff Reed’s implied warranty claim on the

ground that there is no vertical privity between PlaintiffReed and Defendants because

Plaintiffpurchased theReal HamBone ForDogs from Wal-Mart. PlaintiffReed “does

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not oppose the motion to dismiss her cause of action for breach ofimplied warrant.”

(ECF No. 43 at 7 n.l). Defendants’ motion to dismiss count five for breach ofimplied

warranty is granted.

D. Waiver ofLiability and Assumption of Risk

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claimsrelated to the risk ofsplintering must

be dismissed because the label on the Real Ham Bone For Dogs contained a waiver of

liability and assumption of risk. (ECF No. 40-1 at 20). Defendants contend that

Plaintiffs alleged that they read the label and none ofthe Plaintiffs alleged that they

failed to understand the label. (ECF No. 44 at 10). Defendants contend that “[i]t is

obvious that swallowing bone splinters would be . . . dangerous, and could result in

injury or death.” Id. at 11.

Plaintiffs contend that they did not waive their claims and assume the risk ofthe

dog bones splintering because the disclaimer did not warn that the dog bone could

severely injury or kill dogs. (ECF No. 43 at 23). Plaintiffs assert that the disclaimer

was written in “about 7 point font [and] was added to the label in the latter half of

2014.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that disclaimers ofliability do not apply in cases offraud

orwillful or gross negligence. Plaintiffs contendthat even ifthe disclaimer were valid,

Defendants did not disclaim liability for deceptive advertising. Plaintiffs contend that

this type ofwaiver, when applied to consumer protection claims, is unenforceable as

a matter ofstatute.

“An agreement which purportsto release, indemnify or exculpate the party who

prepared it from liability for that party’s own negligence or tortious conduct must be

clear, explicit and comprehensible in each ofits essential details.” Ferrell v. S. Nevada

Off-Rd. Enthusiasts, Ltd., 195 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (Ct. App. 1983).

The label on the Real Ham Bone For Dogs states:

Supervise your pet while enjoying any natural bone product. Bone is to

be chewed overseveral sittings, not eaten. Always provide a fresh supply

ofwater to pet. Not recommended for dogs with digestive problems or

aggressive chewers. Remove bone immediately ifsplintering occurs or

small fragments break off. Recommended size is slightly largerthan your

15cv0987-WQH-DHB

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pet's mouth. Pet owner assumes liability associated with the use ofthis

or any natural bone product.

See Exhibits 1-3. In their SAC, Plaintiffs allege that they “read the label for the Real

Ham Bone For Dogs.” See ECF No. 37 25, 27, 30, 33, 39, 42, 48. However,

Plaintiffs allege that they were not aware that the dog bone could injure or kill their

pets. Id. The label does not reference the risk ofsevere injury or death to dogs with

use ofthe product. The Court finds that it is not “clear, explicit and comprehensible”

that giving a Real Ham Bone For Dogs to a dog could result in injury or death.

Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims related to the risk ofsplintering on the

grounds that there was a waiver of liability and assumption of risk on the label is

denied.

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E. Louisiana’s Consumer Protection Statute 12

Plaintiffs assert claims undertheLouisianaUnfairTradePractices andConsumer

Protection Law (“LUTPA”), which states,

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15 Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable

property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result ofthe use or employment by

another person ofan unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice declared

unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, may bring an action individually but not in a

representative capacity to recover actual damages.

La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409 (emphasis added). Although Plaintiffs agree that the LUTPA

bars class action, theymaintain that the limitation is procedural and that application of

Rule 23 would not modify any substantive rights under the LUTPA. Citing to Shady

Grove v. Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010),

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot bring a class action under the LUTPA in

federal district court because the state statute bans class actions. Relying on Justice

Stevens’ concurring opinion in Shady Grove, Defendants contend thatthe ban on class

actions in the LUTPA is substantive and that application ofRule 23 would violate the

Rules Enabling Act, which providesthat rules ofprocedure “shall not abridge, enlarge,

or modify a substantive right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Defendants contend that

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“[b]ecause the ban on class action is contained within LUTPA itself, and because it

only appliesto claims brought under LUTPA,” the state law limitation is a substantive

right and is not preempted by Rule 23. Plaintiffs reply thatJustice Stevens’ opinion is

not controlling and cite to district court decisions that held that Rule 23 class actions

may be maintained under the LUTPA.

“In Shady Grove, the different opinions ofthe fractured Court took contrasting

approaches to determining whether a New York statute prohibiting class actions in

suits seeking penalties orstatutory minimum damagesprecluded a federal district court

sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under Rule 23.” In re Hydroxycut

Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 299 F.R.D. 648 (S.D. Cal. 2014). In In re

Hydroxycut, the district court considered the same arguments raised in this case for

several state statutes, including the LUTPA. Id. at 652. The court explained,

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13 Whetherthe state statutoryprovisionsthatprohibit class actions for unfair

or deceptive practices are “procedural” or “substantive,” is a difficult

question with no clear answer. However, the Court tends to view these

limitations on class actions as procedural in nature. In Shady Grove,

Justice Scalia explained:

A class action no less than traditional joinder (ofwhich it is

a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate

claims ofmultiple parties at once, instead ofseparate suits.

And like traditionaljoinder it leavesthe parties’ legal rights

and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.

ShadyGrove, 559U.S. at 408,130S.Ct. 1431. Conversely, a rule barring

class actions does not prevent individuals who would otherwise be

members ofthe class from bringing their own separate suits orjoining in

a preexisting lawsuit. The substantive rights ofthese individuals are not

affected. The prohibitions against class actions only affect “how the

claims are processed.” Id. The fact that the class action prohibitions are

within the individual state consumer protection acts, as opposed to

free-standing rules, does not alter the Court’s conclusion. Accordingly,

application ofRule 23 to Plaintiffs’ claims does notrun afoul ofthe Rules

Enabling Act.

Id. at 654. Several other courts within this circuit have reached the same conclusion.

See e.g., In re Lithium IonBatteriesAntitrustLitig., No. 13-MD-2420 YGR, 2014 WL

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4955377, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2,2014) (findingthatthe class-action bans challenged

were “procedural, not substantive, and that application ofRule 23 to them would not

modify any substantive right”); Los Gatos Mercantile, Inc v. E.I. DuPontDeNemours

& Co., No. 13-CV-01180-BLF, 2015 WL 4755335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11,2015) (similar);

Johnson v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 13-CV-2445-BTM-DHB, 2014 WL

6892173 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014) (similar). The Court finds the In re Hydroxycut

decision persuasive and concludes that the class action ban in the LUTPA is

procedural, not substantive, and that “application ofRule 23 to Plaintiffs’ claims does

notrun afoul ofthe Rules Enabling Act.” 299 F.R.D. at 654. Plaintiffs’ claims are not

subject to dismissal based on the LUPTA. The Court concludes that Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim is denied.

F. The Phrase “Website and Other Marketing” and Rule 9(b)

Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Dynamic’s website

and ‘other marketing’ must be dismissed” because Plaintiffhas failed to comply with

Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs contendthatDefendants’ “requesttoparse outthe phrase ‘website

and othermarketing’ isaRule 12(f)motionto strike, nota 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”

(ECF No. 43 at 19). Plaintiffs contend that “[n]o claim will fail ifthe phrase attacked

by defendants is stricken.” Id. at n 3. Plaintiffs contend that the phrase “website and

other marketing” does not need to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements in insolation.

Claims sounding in fraud or mistake must additionally comply with the

heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which

requires that a complaint “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) “requires... an account ofthe time,

place, and specific content ofthe false representations as well as the identities ofthe

parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir.

2007) (quotation omitted); see also Vess v. Ciha-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097,

1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (averments of fraud must be accompanied by “the who, what,

when, where, and how ofthe misconduct charged”) (quotation omitted). “To comply

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with Rule 9(b), allegations offraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice

ofthe particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that

they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything

wrong.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and

internal quotations omitted).

The SAC alleges that Defendants “expressly and impliedly represented and

continue to represent on the product label and on Dynamic’s website and other

marketing that the Real Ham Bone For Dogs is ‘safe for your pet’ and is ‘meant to be

chewed.”’ (ECF No. 37 f 5). Defendants correctly assert thatthe SAC does not allege

that Plaintiffs saw Dynamic’s website and other marketing. However, Plaintiffs

allegations are “specific enough to give defendants notice ofthe particularmisconduct

which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the

charge and notjust deny that they have done anything wrong.” Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d

at 1019. The Court findsthatthe allegationsin the SAC satisfyRule 9(b). Defendants’

motion to dismiss claims based on fraud is denied.

F. PlaintiffBrandel’s Claim

Defendants contend that Plaintiff Brandel cannot bring a claim for property

damages under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act because the

Florida statute excludes damage to property. (ECF No. 40-1 at 22). Defendants also

contend thatBrandel cannot establish causation because the SAC allegesthat the bone

“appeared intact and showed no signs ofsplintering.” (ECF No. 40-1 at 22).

Plaintiffs contend thatBrandel seeksrecovery forloss ofmoney, notforproperty

damage to her dog. (ECF No. 43 at 20). Plaintiffs contendthatBrandel has adequately

alleged causation under the statute because Brandel alleged that the deceptive

advertising caused damages.

Under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff cannot

make a claim “for personal injury or death or a claim for damage to property other than

the property thatisthe subjectofthe consumertransaction.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 501.212.

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To bring a claim under the Act, a consumer “must not only plead and prove that the

conduct complained ofwas unfair and deceptive butthe consumermust also plead and

prove that he or she was aggrieved by the unfair and deceptive act.”

In the SAC, PlaintiffBrandel alleges that she “read the label ofthe Real Ham

Bone For Dogs” and that the label “stated expressly and impliedly that the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs was meant for dogs and was safe for dogs to chew on.” (ECF No. 37

^ 30). Plaintiff Brandel alleges, “In reliance on the express and implied

representations, unaware ofthe material omitted facts, and based on her reasonable

expectation that it was safe for her dog, Ms. Brandel purchased theReal Ham Bone For

Dogs.” Id. PlaintiffBrandel alleges that she purchased an “unsafe product that she

reasonably believed to be safe.” Id. ][ 32. PlaintiffBrandel alleges that she “suffered

injury in fact and lost money and property.” Id. 32. The Court concludes that

Plaintiffs have alleged a cause ofaction underthe Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade

Practices Act. To the extent that Plaintiff Brandel seeks property damages, such a

recovery may be precluded by the Florida statute. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 501.212 (a

plaintiff cannot make a claim “for personal injury or death or a claim for damage to

property other than the property that is the subject of the consumer transaction”).

Defendants motion to dismiss PlaintiffBrandeFs claim is denied.

G. PlaintiffRodney Canutt’s Claim

Defendants contend that Rodney Canutt does not have a viable claim under the

Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act because Canutt alleges that his wife read the

label and purchased the bone, not him. (ECF No. 40-1 at 22).

Plaintiffs contend that Canutt has properly pled a cause of action because the

Oregon Act does not require reliance when the allegations include omissions. (ECF

No. 43 at 21). Plaintiffs contend that the SAC alleges “a combination of false

statements, half-truths and omissions.” Id. at 22. Plaintiffs contend that “[a]s a result

ofdefendants’ unlawful business practice, Mr. Canutt gave the bone to his dog Teddy

and Teddy died, meaning Mr. Canutt suffered an ascertainable loss ofproperty.” Id.

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1 ORS 646.638(1) provides:

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[A]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss ofmoney or property,

real or personal, as a result of willful use or employment by another

person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by ORS 646.608,

may bring an individual action in an appropriate court to recover actual

damages or $200, whichever is greater. The court or the jury, as the case

may be, may award punitive damages and the court may provide such

equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.

To prevail under ORS 646.638(1) “(1) a plaintiffmust prove: (1) a violation of ORS

646.608(1); (2) causation (‘as a result of); and (3) damage (‘ascertainable loss’).”

Feitlerv. Animation Celection, Inc., 13 P.3d 1044,1047 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). To state

a claim, a plaintiff “must suffer a loss ofmoney or property that was caused by the

unlawful trade practice.” Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 361 P.3d 3, 28 (Or. 2015).

“Whether, to prove the requisite causation, aplaintiffmustshowreliance onthe alleged

unlawful trade practice depends on the conduct involved and the loss allegedly caused

by it.” Id. (citing to Sanders v. Francis, 561 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Or. 1977) (“Whether

ORS 646.638(1) requires reliance as an element of causation necessarily depends on

the particular unlawful practice alleged”). Reliance is required, for example, “when

plaintiff claims to have acted upon a seller’s express representations.” Id.

In this case, the SAC alleges that the Real Ham Bone for Dogs was advertised

expressly and impliedly as “safe for your pet” and “meant to be chewed.” (ECF No.

37 T[ 23). The SAC alleges, that Ms. Canutt, not Rodney Canutt, read the label and, in

reliance on the express and implied representations, purchasedthe Real HamBone For

Dogs. Id. f 33. The SAC alleges that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of

Defendants’ violations ofthe Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Plaintiffs and the

members ofthe Oregon sub-Class have suffered injury and incurred actual damage,

including the cost of purchasing the Real Ham Bone For Dogs.” Plaintiff Rodney

Canutt seeks to recover money based on the alleged misrepresentation that the bone

was safe for his pet. The SAC does not allege that Rodney Canutt read the label or

purchased the product. The SAC does not allege that PlaintiffRodney “loss ofmoney

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or property .. . was caused by the unlawful trade practice.” Pearson, 361 P.3d at 28.

The Court concludes that Rodney Canutt has not alleged a claim for reliefunder ORS

646.638(1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

F. Remedies

Defendants contendthatthe SAC improperly failsto identifywhich remedies are

sought under each cause of action. The Court concludes that the SAC makes it clear

what specific remedies are sought under each claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 40)

is granted as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ claim for breach ofimplied warranty is dismissed.

2. Plaintiff Rodney Canutt’s claim under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade

Practices Act, ORS 646.638(1) is dismissed.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 40) is denied in all other respects.

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qfa/te- 17 DATED:

WILLIAM Q. HayES

United States District Judge

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