Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00892/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00892-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES MAULDIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. MENDOZA POWERS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00892-AWI-SMS-P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Charles Mauldin (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on July

11, 2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at California State Prison-Avenal, where

plaintiff is currently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Warden Kathy Mendoza Powers, Correctional

Lieutenant C. Butts, Facility Captains A. Godfrey and J. Castro, and Sergeant P. Arredondo as

defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was questioned on May 18, 2004, regarding a

battery that occurred between inmates. Plaintiff alleges that he informed defendant Arredondo that

another inmate hit inmate Sessions, but that he was unable to identify the inmate. Shortly thereafter,

plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation pending an investigation. Plaintiff alleges he

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 Plaintiff cites to the rules violation report as Exhibit A in his complaint. However, there are no exhibits

attached to the complaint.

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remained in segregation for thirty days, at which time he was released back to general population.

Plaintiff’s remaining allegations are less clear.1 At some point in time, plaintiff was charged

with battery. The charges were later reduced to mutual combat. It is not clear if plaintiff was found

guilty or not guilty, and if plaintiff was found guilty, it is not clear what punishment was imposed

upon him. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions violated his due process rights, his Miranda

rights, and his right to equal protection.

1. Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause

itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). With respect to liberty

interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84

(1995). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484. 

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined

in the general prison population instead of administrative segregation,see Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-

68, and plaintiff has not alleged any facts that establish the existence of a liberty interest in remaining

free from administrative segregation created by state law. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see also May v.

Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he

has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative

segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations

omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention

in the SHU was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary

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 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme Court stated that, “[p]rior to any

questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may

be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney . . . .” The purpose of these

procedural safeguards, which became known as the Miranda warning, is to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination. Id.

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incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from

confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). Because plaintiff has not established the existence

of a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation, plaintiff fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process. 

2. Miranda Claim

The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself

in a criminal case. U.S. Const. amend. V. Custodial interrogations must be preceded by a Miranda

warning.2 Custodial interrogation is defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In contrast to custodial

interrogation, general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime does not require a

Miranda warning. Id. at 477; Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1979). Investigatory

questioning inside a prison does not always require a Miranda warning. Cervantes at 427 (rejecting

the proposition that any interrogation during prison confinement constitutes custodial interrogation

requiring Miranda warnings); United States v. Turner, 28 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s

vague allegation that his Miranda rights were violated is insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief

under section 1983.

3. Equal Protection Claim

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that

defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of inmates which

included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal protection

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claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740

(9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,

1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Although plaintiff alleges that his right to equal protection was violated, plaintiff has not

alleged any facts that support a claim for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Equal

Protection Clause.

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief may

be granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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