Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00395/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Daryl Lowry, 

Petitioner,

vs. 

California State Prison - Solano, Eric 

Arnold Warden, Kamala D. Harris, 

Respondents.

 Case No.: 15cv395 DMS (NLS) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

FOR ORDER DENYING 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY 

AND ABEYANCE 

[Dkt. No. 8] 

 Petitioner Daryl Lowry filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus contesting the 

constitutionality of his confinement. He filed the operative First Amended Petition 

(FAP) on March 11, 2015. In the FAP, Lowry asserts two claims for ineffective 

assistance of counsel and two due process claims. His four claims are based on events 

that resulted in him pleading guilty in the state trial court. 

 After receiving a court notice regarding a possible failure to exhaust, Lowry filed a 

motion to stay this case and hold his unexhausted claims in abeyance. For the following 

reasons, the court RECOMMENDS that the district court DENY the motion for stay and 

abeyance. 

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Relevant Background. 

 In June 2013, Lowry pleaded guilty to assault with force likely to produce great 

bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon. FAP, p.2. He was sentenced to four 

years in prison, to be served at eighty percent. FAP, p.1. Lowry filed an appeal 

challenging the trial court’s refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. The 

appellate court affirmed the judgment and denied Lowry’s petition for rehearing. FAP, 

pp. 23-25;1 see People v. Lowry, 2014 WL 5424491, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). The 

California Supreme Court denied Lowry’s petition for review on January 14, 2015. FAP, 

p.27. Lowry filed this action on February 1, 2015. 2

 On March 18, 2015, the court issued a “Notice Regarding Possible Dismissal of 

Petition for Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies.” It ordered Lowry to choose one of 

the following options: (1) demonstrate exhaustion; (2) voluntarily dismiss the petition; 

(3) formally abandon any unexhausted claims; or (4) file a motion to stay the federal 

proceedings. On April 6, 2015, Lowry filed a motion to stay these proceedings and hold 

them in abeyance while he returns to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims. 

 Respondent filed an opposition on May 15, 2015, explaining that at least three of 

the four claims are unexhausted. Respondent argues there is no good cause to stay the 

                                                                

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 All page citations are to the CM/ECF page numbers.

2

 The date stamp from the court shows a different date of filing. But per the “prison 

mailbox rule,” a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is deemed filed on the day that it is 

delivered to prison authorities for mailing to the court. See Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 

1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001).

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action because Lowry still has 11 months left on the statute of limitations within which 

he can exhaust those claims. 

Discussion. 

Habeas petitioners in federal court must first exhaust their state judicial remedies. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987). Ordinarily, to 

achieve exhaustion, a petitioner must “fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest 

state court with jurisdiction to consider it . . .or . . .demonstrate[] that no state remedy 

remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations 

omitted). When a petitioner files a “mixed” petition (one that contains both exhausted 

and unexhausted claims), a district court may grant a stay and abeyance of the mixed 

petition if “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted 

claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). But 

a “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 277. 

 The Supreme Court did not define the good cause standard in Rhines. The Ninth 

Circuit considers it a standard less stringent than the “extraordinary circumstances” 

standard for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 

654, 661-662 (9th Cir. 2005). But it rejects a broad interpretation of “good cause” and 

reiterated Rhines’ requirement that stays should be granted only in “limited 

circumstances.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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 Here, Lowry argues factual innocence and a miscarriage of justice. Dkt. No. 11. 

But he offers no explanation or justification for why he failed to exhaust all his federal 

claims before filing the Petition. Further, the California Supreme Court denied his 

petition for review on January 14, 2015, making his conviction final as of April 14, 2015. 

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a judgment 

becomes final upon the expiration of the 90-day period in which a petitioner may seek 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, regardless of whether the petitioner 

actually seeks such review). As of the date of this order, Lowry has almost 11 months 

remaining on his limitations period. Based on these facts, the court finds that Lowry has 

not demonstrated sufficient good cause to warrant a stay of his petition. Because there is 

no good cause, this court need not address whether the claim is meritorious or whether 

Lowry engaged in any intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Therefore, this court finds 

that the stay and abeyance procedure is not appropriate, and RECOMMENDS that 

Petitioner’s motion be DENIED. 

Lowry’s Options. 

 The petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and as a result, it is 

subject to dismissal. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). Should the district judge 

adopt this Report and Recommendation, this court RECOMMENDS that Lowry be 

given the following options: 

/ / / 

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 1. Option 1: File a Motion for Withdrawal and Abeyance. 

 Another method of staying a timely federal petition while a petitioner returns to 

state court to exhaust unexhausted claims is the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure. 

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2009). Unlike the “stay and abeyance” 

procedure, a petitioner seeking to use the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure need not 

show good cause for his failure to exhaust. Id. at 1140. Under the “withdrawal and 

abeyance” procedure, a petitioner may withdraw the unexhausted claims from his federal 

petition, return to state court and exhaust those claims while the federal court holds the 

fully exhausted claims in abeyance, then seek to amend the timely, stayed federal petition 

with the newly exhausted claims. Id. The newly exhausted claims, however, must either 

themselves be timely under the statute of limitations or they must “relate back” to the 

claims in the fully-exhausted petition. That is, they must share a “common core of 

operative facts” with the previously exhausted claims. Id. at 1141 (quoting Mayle v. 

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659, 662-64 (2005)). If Lowry cannot show that the claims are 

timely or that they relate back to any exhausted claim, he cannot litigate those claims in 

this court. 

 2. Option 2: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition. 

 Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to 

state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal 

petition containing only exhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510 (stating that when a 

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mixed petition is dismissed, a petitioner may “return[] to state court to exhaust his 

claims”). Petitioner is cautioned, however, that any new federal petition must be filed 

before expiration of the one-year statute of limitations and in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d). The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 

petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 

(9th Cir. 1999); but see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an 

application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with 

the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state habeas petition that was dismissed as untimely was 

neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while under consideration by the state court and 

therefore did not toll the statute of limitations), as amended 439 F.3d 993. Absent some 

other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a federal habeas 

petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-182 (2001). 

 3. Option 3: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claims. 

 Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his 

exhausted ones. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520 (stating that a petitioner who files a 

mixed petition may resubmit the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims). 

Petitioner is cautioned that once he abandons his unexhausted claims, he may lose the 

ability to ever raise them in federal court. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486-87 

(2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b). 

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Conclusion. 

 For the foregoing reasons, this court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion for 

stay and abeyance be DENIED and that Petitioner be given his options on how to 

proceed with this case, and that Petitioner be ordered to notify the court of his selection 

no later than 30 days following the filing date of the district court’s order. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 18, 2015, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections be filed and served 

on all parties by July 2, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 27, 2015 

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