Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00906/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00906-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HUDSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

YUBA COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; B. MARTIN, in his

individual, official and/or

agency capacity; INGIE CLARK,

DOES 1 through 50, 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 06-906-DFL-GGH

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Hudson is suing defendants Yuba County

Sheriffs Department (“Department”) and Deputy Sheriff B. Martin

for events stemming from an altercation that occurred on July 1,

2005. In the same suit, Hudson also brings claims against the

Department, Martin, and his neighbor, defendant Inge Clarke, for

harassing him on many other occasions beginning in 1992. Hudson,

however, pleads no facts regarding these incidents. Clarke now

moves to dismiss Hudson’s claims against her under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the court

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GRANTS Clarke’s motion to dismiss Hudson’s claims against her. 

I.

 Hudson contends that on the night of July 1, 2005, he

called the Department to remove an alleged trespasser, Audriece

Tryial, and her vehicle from his premises. He further alleges

that after interviewing Tryial, the Sheriff’s Deputies refused to

remove her. Apparently the Deputies told Hudson that they could

not determine whether Tryial was a trespasser or a renter. 

Hudson claims that he later called the Department again to

complain and that Deputy B. Martin came to his property,

assaulted him, and arrested him but not Tryial. He avers that

Tryial and her accomplices later burglarized his house.

In the same complaint, Hudson also asserts that the

Department, along with his neighbor Inge Clarke, harassed him on

many other occasions beginning in 1992. According to Hudson,

Clarke, who has family and friends in government agencies, has

made numerous bogus claims against him to the Department and

“Section 8 Code Enforcement.” Moreover, Hudson alleges that she

has trespassed on his property many times. But Hudson fails to

provide even the most basic details regarding these claims, such

as when and where these alleged transgressions occurred.

The court heard oral argument on November 1, 2006. Hudson’s

attorney failed to attend and has not offered an explanation for

his absence.

II.

Clarke contends that the court lacks subject matter

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 Clarke also contends that the court should dismiss 1

Hudson’s claims against her because they fail to state a claim on

which relief can be granted and the applicable statutes of

limitations have run. Because the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over these claims, the court does not address

Clarke’s other arguments.

 In these four claims, Hudson contends that he is suing 2

for events that occurred on July 1, 2005 and other dates. 

Because Hudson does not plead facts showing that Clarke was

involved in the July 1, 2005 altercation, the court presumes that

Hudson contends that Clarke is liable under these claims only for

events that occurred on other dates.

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jurisdiction over Hudson’s claims against her. This argument is

convincing.1

“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter

jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.” 

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006). Sections

1331 and 1332 provide for “federal question” jurisdiction and

“diversity of citizenship” jurisdiction, respectively. Id. To

invoke § 1331 jurisdiction, plaintiff must plead a colorable

claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Id. To invoke § 1332 jurisdiction, plaintiff must

demonstrate that the parties are of diverse citizenship and that

the claim exceeds $75,000. Id. Here, diversity is absent. 

Therefore, Hudson can establish subject matter jurisdiction only

through federal question jurisdiction.

Hudson fails to show how his claims against Clarke arise

under federal law. Hudson asserts ten claims in his complaint

for events that occurred on July 1, 2005 and other dates. He

names Clarke as a defendant in four of them. They are: (1) 2

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 Hudson contends in his opposition that he has alleged 3

that Clarke “violated his civil rights in using state agents

acting under color of state law to deprive [him] of his federal

rights.” But as discussed above, the only claims that invoke §

1983 are his claims for violation of civil rights, assault,

battery, wrongful imprisonment, and wrongful arrest. Those

claims do not list Clarke as a defendant. 

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negligence; (2) trespass; (3) intentional or negligent infliction

of emotional distress; and (4) civil harassment. 

The first three claims are clearly state law causes of

action. In his complaint and opposition, Hudson does not explain

how they arise under federal law. Therefore, the court declines

to speculate on how these three claims might trigger federal

question jurisdiction.

While “civil harassment” could be actionable under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Hudson does not assert a violation of § 1983 when

pleading this claim. In other claims, Hudson specifically pleads

§ 1983 when he intends to do so. He does not do so here. 

Therefore, a fair reading of the complaint suggests that the

harassment claim is not based on § 1983 or any other provision of

federal law.3

Hudson argues in his opposition that the court has

supplemental jurisdiction over his claims against Clarke. Hudson

is incorrect.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, “the [federal] district courts shall

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to the claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

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 While Hudson contends that these claims are based, in 4

part, on events that occurred on other dates, there is no

indication in the complaint of any such other dates or occasions. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Thus, “[a]

state law claim forms part of the same controversy if it and the

federal claim ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’”

Briarpatch Ltd. L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308

(2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “This is so even if the state

law claim is asserted against a party different from the one

named in the federal claim.” Id., see also Kirschner v. Klemons,

225 F.3d 227, 239 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We have previously observed

that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) responds to the Supreme Court’s decision

in Finley v. United States and thereby makes pendent party

jurisdiction possible where the claim in question arises out of

the same set of facts that give rise to an anchoring federal

question claim against another party.” (citations omitted)).

Hudson’s claims against Clarke and his federal claims do not

arise from “a common nucleus of operative fact.” The only

decipherable federal claims are his assault, battery, wrongful

imprisonment, wrongful arrest, and violation of civil rights

claims against the Department and Martin in which he raises §

1983. But these claims relate to events that occurred on July 1,

2005. Hudson’s claims against Clarke, however, involve different 4

allegations that occurred on other dates. Therefore, because

Hudson fails to show how these claims and his federal claims

share “a common nucleus of operative fact,” the court cannot

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 Ordinarily the court would permit plaintiff an 5

opportunity to amend. However, counsel for plaintiff did not

attend the oral argument, offered no subsequent explanation for

failing to do so, and made no request for leave to amend. Had

counsel appeared, the court could have used the opportunity to

clarify the pleadings. His failure to appear should not permit

him to file yet another pleading, likely equally obscure, forcing

defendant to sustain the cost of yet another motion to dismiss. 

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

III.

For the reasons above, the court lacks supplemental

jurisdiction over the claims against Clarke and, accordingly, 

DISMISSES Hudson’s claims against her. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/8/2007

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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