Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-12-03604/USCOURTS-ca7-12-03604-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 12-3604

DICK V. LALOWSKI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF DES PLAINES, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:08-cv-03780 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2015

____________________

Before KANNE, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Dick Lalowski was formerly a police officer for the City of Des Plaines, Illinois. However, on 

the morning of May 20, 2006, he had two altercations with a 

group of demonstrators at an abortion clinic, one while he 

was on duty and the other shortly after his shift ended. 

Lalowski’s conduct during these altercations led the City’s 

police chief at the time, James Prandini, to file charges 

against him with the Des Plaines Board of Fire and Police 

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Commissioners and to recommend his discharge. The Board 

held two sets of administrative hearings, one on the merits 

of the charges against Lalowski and the other on the appropriate penalty. After the first set of hearings, the Board voted 

unanimously to sustain the charges, and after the second set 

of hearings, it voted unanimously to terminate Lalowski’s 

employment. The Board issued a written decision on May 

30, 2008.

On July 2, 2008, Lalowski filed this action against 

Prandini, the Board, and the City. He brought five claims, 

but only two are at issue in this appeal: (1) a claim against all 

three defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they 

retaliated against him for his protected speech in violation of 

the First Amendment; and (2) a claim against the Board under Illinois’s Administrative Review Law, 735 I.L.C.S. §§ 5/3-

101 et seq., seeking review of the Board’s decision to terminate his employment. The district court granted summary 

judgment against Lalowski on both claims, and he appeals 

that ruling.

I. SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIM

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 

on Lalowski’s speech retaliation claim under the First 

Amendment. “On review of cross-motions for summary 

judgment, we view all facts and inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party on each motion.” Wis.

Alumni Research Found. v. Xenon Pharm., Inc., 591 F.3d 876, 

882 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Below, we recite the facts relevant to Lalowski’s 

speech retaliation claim that were before the district court on 

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No. 12-3604 3

summary judgment. These facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD

During the early morning hours of May 20, 2006, a group 

of demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic in Des 

Plaines, Illinois. The demonstrators hoped to dissuade women from entering the clinic, and as part of that effort, they 

planned to display large signs containing images of aborted 

fetuses. Meanwhile, then-Officer Lalowski was nearing the 

end of an overnight shift. Around 6:30 a.m., he noticed the 

demonstrators setting up, and he pulled his marked police

vehicle up to them and began speaking to a woman named 

Paula Emmerth. Lalowski told Emmerth not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic. He also told 

the demonstrators that he would arrest them if they did not 

comply.

At this point, the stories diverge. Emmerth claims 

Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” She and other demonstrators also claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats (e.g., “I’ll fucking arrest you”), accused the 

demonstrators of acting like the Taliban, and generally behaved in a way that was intimidating and “out of control.”

Lalowski, on the other hand, concedes that this initial confrontation with the demonstrators was “adversarial” but denies using profanity or accusing them of acting like the Taliban. In any event, this first exchange lasted only a few 

minutes. Upon request, Lalowski provided the demonstrators with his name and badge number, then he left the clinic 

and returned to the Des Plaines police station.

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Back in the station locker room, Lalowski began to think

about the images of aborted fetuses the demonstrators were 

displaying, and he became upset. He testified in his deposition, “At that time I was thinking about why would somebody put those signs out there, why would anybody who 

was trying to help people do that [?] I had to know.” Thus, 

he decided that he would go back to the clinic to confront 

the demonstrators about their signs.

Around 7:00 a.m., Lalowski, now off duty and wearing 

plain clothes, returned to the abortion clinic in his personal 

vehicle. He parked his car in an adjacent lot and walked over

to Matthew Jones, a fellow Des Plaines police officer who 

was stationed at the clinic to provide security and ensure 

that the demonstration remained orderly. After a brief conversation with Jones, Lalowski approached Paula Emmerth, 

greeted her, and asked if she remembered him. Emmerth

said that she remembered him as the police officer who had 

spoken to her earlier that morning. Lalowski told her that he 

was now off duty and “not [t]here representing anybody.” 

However, he concedes that he wanted the demonstrators to 

know that he was a police officer so they would show him 

respect, even though he was off duty.

Lalowski then asked Emmerth why the demonstrators 

were displaying the aborted-fetus signs. Emmerth said that 

they were using the signs to tell the truth about abortion, to 

which Lalowski responded, “Okay. Let’s talk about the truth 

then. You’re fat.” Lalowski then started telling Emmerth and 

other demonstrators that they should not show the fetus 

signs because “the truth sometimes hurts.” He noted that a 

woman who had recently had a miscarriage might drive by 

and be upset by the signs. When Emmerth refused to take 

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No. 12-3604 5

down the signs, Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow” and 

a “sinner of gluttony,” then he sarcastically asked her 

whether she was hiding food somewhere. Lalowski claims to 

have made these statements to provide Emmerth with a few 

stinging examples of how the truth can hurt. He then began 

to lecture Emmerth on the importance of exercise and got 

down on all fours to demonstrate aerobic exercises she could 

do to lose weight.

After demonstrating the exercises, Lalowski got up and 

continued talking to Emmerth. At some point, he reached 

out and made physical contact with her. There is a factual 

dispute as to the manner of the touching. Lalowski says that 

he patted Emmerth on the shoulder to “convey sincerity,” 

but Emmerth says that he “poked” her in both arms and

rubbed her arms “in a creepy, sexual way.”

This time, Lalowski remained at the clinic for approximately one hour and twenty minutes. During the course of 

that time he spoke with many demonstrators, and there are 

factual disputes over his specific language, tone of voice, and 

general demeanor during these conversations. However, it is 

undisputed that Lalowski accused the demonstrators of using intimidation tactics like the Taliban, compared their use 

of the aborted-fetus signs to using an image of a priest 

“bending over” a small boy to protest sexual abuse within 

the Catholic church, called demonstrator Wanda Glitz a 

“psycho” and a “man hater,” called Paula Emmerth a “fat 

cow” several times, called Paula’s sister Teresa Emmerth 

“fatty,” and told Paula Emmerth that she would be a beautiful woman if she were not so fat. At some point, Officer 

Jones called Lalowski over to notify him that a demonstrator

had called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with

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him. Finally, after Lalowski realized that his efforts to persuade the demonstrators to take down their signs were futile, he hugged Paula Emmerth, told her that he loved her, 

and went on his way. He made no report of his on-duty or 

off-duty contact with the demonstrators.

Later that day, then-police chief Prandini received a call 

at home from one of his sergeants about the morning’s incidents. Prandini asked two officers, Sergeant Kevin 

O’Connell and Deputy Chief Terry McAllister, to investigate 

Lalowski’s conduct at the clinic. During the course of the investigation, Lalowski and several demonstrators were interviewed and gave written statements. On May 24, 2006, Sergeant O’Connell and Deputy Chief McAllister sent Prandini 

a final report of their investigation. The report stated in part, 

“Officer Lalowski’s conduct [on the morning of May 20th] 

toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and 

caused a huge disturbance among numerous citizens of the 

city of Des Plaines. He used insulting, profane language toward numerous female citizens and caused a hostile feeling 

towards the city of Des Plaines and the Des Plaines Police 

Department.”

Based on this report, Prandini decided to suspend 

Lalowski without pay and file charges with the Board of Fire 

and Police Commissioners seeking his termination. Prandini 

filed five charges against Lalowski for violations of the police department’s rules and regulations governing unbecoming conduct, courteous and orderly dealings with the public, 

the obligation to obey all laws and department rules and 

regulations, truthfulness, and impartiality. Two additional 

charges were brought against him based on violations of Illinois Criminal Code Sections 5/12-1 and 5/12-3, which deal 

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with assault and battery. After a series of administrative 

hearings, the Board unanimously voted to sustain all charges 

against Lalowski and to order his discharge from the Des

Plaines Police Department. 

In reaching its decision, the Board credited the demonstrators’ version of the events and found that Lalowski had 

been untruthful to the extent that his story contradicted 

theirs. The Board also relied upon Lalowski’s disciplinary 

history as an aggravating factor in its decision to terminate 

his employment. That history included five suspensions and 

two written reprimands. Moreover, two of those disciplinary 

actions resulted from Lalowski’s interactions with the public. Specifically, in 1996, he was suspended for ten days after 

getting into an argument with a woman while he was on duty, calling her a “slut” and a “whore,” and pushing her to 

the ground. Then, in 2002, he received a written reprimand 

for using profane language toward a private citizen.

B. RES JUDICATA

As an initial matter, Prandini and the City argue that if 

we were to affirm the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the Board on Lalowski’s administrative 

review claim, his First Amendment claim would be barred 

by the doctrine of res judicata. We disagree. The doctrine of 

claim preclusion, or res judicata, operates to bar a “second 

suit” after a final judgment involving the same parties and 

causes of action. Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 226 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 197 (7th 

Cir. 1996)). However, it cannot be invoked to bar claims 

brought in the same suit. See Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 

196, 199 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The essential elements of the doctrine are generally stated to be: (1) a final judgment on the 

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merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and (3) an identity 

of parties or their privies in the two suits.”); cf. United States

v. Sherman, 912 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 

related doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, 

“requires separate actions”). Lalowski’s administrative review claim and his First Amendment claim were both 

brought in this action. As a result, a final judgment on one 

would not preclude the other.

Prandini and the City cite several cases in which we gave 

preclusive effect to a state court’s judgment upholding an 

agency decision. See Dookeran v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 719 F.3d 

570, 577–78 (7th Cir. 2013); Abner v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 674 

F.3d 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2012); Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 

F.3d 810, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2012); Garcia v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 644 (7th Cir. 2004); Licari v. City of Chicago, 

298 F.3d 664, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2002); Pirela v. Vill. of N. Aurora, 

935 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1991). But all of those decisions 

followed a final judgment in a separate state action. Prandini 

and the City have failed to cite any authority for the proposition that res judicata may be applied to preclude a claim 

brought in the same action. Therefore, we turn to the merits 

of Lalowski’s First Amendment claim.

C. MERITS

“It is well-established in our jurisprudence that a public 

employee does not shed his First Amendment rights at the 

steps of the government building.” Vargas-Harrison v. Racine 

Unified Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 2001). However, 

“the State has interests as an employer in regulating the 

speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it 

possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 

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citizenry in general.” Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 

346, 358 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 

U.S. 563, 568 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, a unique constitutional framework applies:

When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of First Amendment rights 

in the employment context, our analysis involves three steps. First, the court must determine whether the employee’s speech was constitutionally protected under the ConnickPickering test. Second, the plaintiff must establish that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action. 

Finally, if the plaintiff satisfies the first two 

steps, the defendant has an opportunity to establish that the same action would have been 

taken in the absence of the employee’s protected speech.

Hutchins v. Clarke, 661 F.3d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal 

citations omitted). In this case, the district court concluded

that Lalowski could not prevail on his speech retaliation 

claim because only some of his statements were constitutionally protected, and none of those statements was a motivating factor in his termination. We agree that Lalowski 

cannot prevail, but we will not reach the causation issue, because we conclude that none of his statements was constitutionally protected under the Connick-Pickering test.

The Connick-Pickering test, derived from Connick v. Myers, 

461 U.S. 138 (1983), and Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, is a two-part 

test used to determine whether a public employee’s speech 

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is constitutionally protected. See Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 

F.3d 773, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2006). “First, the speech is protected only if it addressed a matter of public concern.” Carreon v. 

Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2005). “If 

it did, the court must then apply the Pickering balancing test 

to determine whether ‘the interests of the [plaintiff] as a citizen in commenting upon the matters of public concern’ are 

outweighed by ‘the interest of the state, as an employer, in 

promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees.’” Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d 727, 731 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. 

at 568).

The district court placed Lalowski’s speech into three 

categories. First, the court found that some of Lalowski’s 

statements did not address a matter of public concern and 

were therefore unprotected. Second, the court found that 

some of Lalowski’s statements touched only loosely upon 

matters of public concern, and because the state had a 

“strong overriding interest” in proscribing them, those 

statements were also unprotected. Finally, the court found 

that some of Lalowski’s statements touched more directly 

upon matters of public concern, and because the state lacked 

a “legitimate overriding interest” in proscribing them, those 

statements were protected.

We agree that at least some of Lalowski’s speech touched 

upon matters of public concern. While Lalowski spent much 

of his time hurling profanity and insults at the demonstrators, he also managed to express his disapproval of their

methods, i.e., their use of the aborted-fetus signs. However, 

in light of the context in which those statements were made, 

we think the district court was wrong to conclude that the 

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state had no “legitimate overriding interest” in proscribing 

them.

The Pickering balancing test contemplates a fact-intensive

inquiry into a number of interrelated factors:

(1) whether the speech would create problems 

in maintaining discipline or harmony among 

co-workers; (2) whether the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and 

confidence are necessary; (3) whether the 

speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform her responsibilities; (4) the time, place, 

and manner of the speech; (5) the context within which the underlying dispute arose; (6) 

whether the matter was one on which debate 

was vital to informed decision-making; and (7) 

whether the speaker should be regarded as a 

member of the general public.

Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 909 (7th Cir. 2002). In this 

case, nearly all of the factors weigh heavily against Lalowski.

First, his speech had the potential to create problems in 

maintaining discipline and harmony in the Des Plaines Police Department. Importantly, a showing of actual disruptiveness is not required; “a government employer is allowed 

to consider ‘the potential disruptiveness’ of the employee’s 

speech.” Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Caruso v. De Luca, 81 F.3d 666, 670–71 (7th Cir.

1996)). The employer “is not required to wait until those 

working relationships actually disintegrate if immediate action might prevent such disintegration.” Breuer v. Hart, 909 

F.2d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1990).

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Protests at the abortion clinic were nothing new, and the 

Des Plaines Police Department was charged with keeping 

the peace during such protests. In fact, a Des Plaines police 

officer was stationed at the clinic during Lalowski’s rant on 

the day in question. By causing such a large disturbance, 

Lalowski positioned himself in opposition to the goals of his 

employer, thus compromising the harmony of the department for which he worked. Indeed, the officer stationed at 

the clinic was forced to confront Lalowski after one of the 

demonstrators called 911. Even if this incident did not actually cause disharmony among Des Plaines police officers, the 

potential for disruption is readily apparent. The department 

could not reasonably be expected to police protests of any 

sort, let alone the recurring protests at this abortion clinic, if 

it condoned such behavior.

The potential for disruption is exacerbated by the second 

factor, i.e., the importance of personal loyalty and confidence 

in the employment relationship. We have recognized that 

“there is a particularly urgent need for close teamwork 

among those involved in the ‘high stakes’ field of law enforcement.” Breuer, 909 F.2d at 1041. “Speech that might not 

interfere with work in an environment less dependent on 

order, discipline, and esprit de corps could be debilitating to a 

police force.” Id. Thus, “[d]eference to the employer’s judgment regarding the disruptive nature of an employee’s 

speech is especially important in the context of law enforcement.” Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 846.

Turning to the third factor, Lalowski’s speech directly 

conflicted with his responsibilities as a police officer because 

one of those responsibilities was to foster a relationship of 

trust and respect with the public. “Police officers ... are quinCase: 12-3604 Document: 48 Filed: 06/17/2015 Pages: 18
No. 12-3604 13

tessentially public servants. As such, part of their job is to 

safeguard the public’s opinion of them, particularly with regard to a community’s view of the respect that police officers 

... accord the members of that community.” Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2006). “The effectiveness of a 

city’s police department depends importantly on the respect 

and trust of the community and on the perception in the 

community that it enforces the law fairly, even-handedly, 

and without bias.” Id. at 178 (quoting Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 

F.3d 143, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2002). By attacking private citizens 

with profane and disrespectful language, Lalowski compromised the community’s trust in its police officers, thus 

failing in one of his most important duties.

Fourth, we must consider the time, place, and manner of 

Lalowski’s speech. Because he confronted the protestors at 

the time and place they chose to protest, the time and place 

of his speech were reasonable. However, the manner in 

which he spoke cannot be justified. Lalowski aggressively 

lambasted, ridiculed, and touched the protestors, going far 

beyond what was necessary to communicate his displeasure 

with their methods. His words and deeds were abusive and 

degrading, falling well below the standard of conduct the 

public expects from police officers, even while off duty.

The fifth factor to be considered is the context in which 

the underlying dispute arose. Lalowski’s termination occurred against the backdrop of his disciplinary history,

which included five suspensions and two written reprimands. One of his suspensions resulted from an argument 

with a woman he called a “slut” and a “whore” and pushed

to the ground. One of his written reprimands was for using 

profane language toward a private citizen. In light of 

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Lalowski’s history of problematic interactions with the public, Prandini and the Board had a substantial interest in preventing further hostility. See Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 846 (“The 

increasing distrust and hostility between [a police officer]

and the Chief must inform our evaluation of the Chief’s response to [the officer’s] speech.”).

The sixth factor—whether the matter was one on which 

debate was vital to informed decision-making—is the only 

factor that weighs in favor of Lalowski’s speech interests. 

We do not doubt that any organized protest could benefit 

from informed debate regarding its methods.

Finally, although Lalowski was off duty when he engaged in the speech at issue, he cannot be regarded as a 

member of the general public. He first confronted the demonstrators while on duty, in an encounter even he characterizes as “adversarial.” He then left the clinic, only to return 

off duty about a half hour later. Although his shift had ended, this second encounter was a mere continuation and escalation of the earlier, on-duty confrontation. Indeed, when 

Lalowski returned, he made sure the demonstrators remembered him as a police officer. Although he also told them 

that he was “not [t]here representing anybody,” he concedes 

that he wanted them to know he was a police officer so they 

would show him respect. Because Lalowski represented 

himself as an off-duty police officer, rather than as a mere 

private citizen, we cannot say that he was speaking as a 

member of the general public. Cf. Coady, 187 F.3d at 733 

(finding that an off-duty firefighter who displayed a political 

sign on his car was not “speaking as a firefighter” because 

“there was apparently nothing on [his] car which identified 

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him as a firefighter”). Consequently, Lalowski’s speech interests were diminished by the capacity in which he spoke.

In sum, the state’s interests in running an efficient and effective police department outweighed Lalowski’s speech interests, even in relation to his statements that directly addressed matters of public concern. Indeed, six out of the seven factors that are relevant to the Pickering balancing test favor the state’s interests over Lalowski’s. Consequently, we 

hold that none of Lalowski’s statements to the demonstrators on the morning of May 20, 2006, were constitutionally 

protected, and we will affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on Lalowski’s speech retaliation claim.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW CLAIM

Lalowski’s challenge to the district court’s ruling on his 

administrative review claim requires some discussion of the 

proceedings below. The deadline for dispositive motions in 

the district court was March 26, 2012. On that day, Prandini 

and the City filed a joint motion for summary judgment on 

the claims against them, and Lalowski filed a cross-motion 

for summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation 

claim. However, neither the Board nor Lalowski moved for 

summary judgment on his administrative review claim. Indeed, Lalowski argued that his administrative review claim 

should not be decided until after his constitutional claims 

were resolved. In contrast, Prandini and the City took the 

position (rejected above) that Lalowski’s administrative review claim should be decided first because a ruling adverse 

to Lalowski on that claim would preclude his constitutional 

claims.

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Although the Board did not move for summary judgment, it agreed with Prandini and the City that Lalowski’s 

administrative review claim should be resolved first, and on 

April 12, it moved to compel Lalowski to file a brief in support of that claim. The district court held a hearing on that 

motion on April 17, during which the court indicated that it 

would “review the file and issue an order.” However, as of 

June 19, no order was forthcoming, so the Board filed another motion asking the district court to establish a briefing 

schedule on the administrative review claim. At a hearing on 

June 26, the court denied both of the Board’s motions and 

stated that the administrative review issues would be “taken 

in context with the pending motions for summary judgment.” By this time, Lalowski, Prandini, and the City had 

already filed their responses to the pending motions for 

summary judgment.

On October 17, after summary judgment briefing was 

complete, the district court held a hearing on the pending 

motions. The next day, the court issued a written order 

granting Prandini and the City’s motion for summary judgment, denying Lalowski’s motion for summary judgment, 

and sua sponte granting summary judgment in favor of the 

Board on Lalowski’s administrative review claim. On appeal, Lalowski contends that this latter ruling was improper 

because he was never given an opportunity to brief his administrative review claim. We agree.

First, we note that summary judgment was the correct 

procedural mechanism to resolve Lalowski’s administrative 

review claim. That claim is governed by Illinois’s Administrative Review Law, which limits judicial review of a state 

administrative agency’s decision to the administrative recCase: 12-3604 Document: 48 Filed: 06/17/2015 Pages: 18
No. 12-3604 17

ord. See 735 I.L.C.S. § 5/3-110 (“No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, 

determination or decision of the administrative agency shall 

be heard by the court.”). When a party seeks judicial review 

of administrative action in a federal district court, and the 

case is to be decided on the administrative record without 

further evidence, “the district court resolves the issue 

[through] summary judgment.” Johnson by Johnson v. 

Duneland Sch. Corp., 92 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994)). The 

problem here is not that summary judgment was used to resolve Lalowski’s administrative review claim, but rather that 

the district court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of summary judgment.

Because no party moved for it, the district court could 

grant summary judgment on Lalowski’s administrative review claim only “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time 

to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Yet, the court did not notify the parties of its intent to resolve the administrative review claim until after their summary judgment response 

briefs had been filed. Nor did it allow the parties an opportunity to separately brief that claim before entering summary judgment. Indeed, by denying both of the Board’s motions for briefing on the administrative review claim, the 

court made clear that it would not welcome such briefing. 

Consequently, the court failed to comply with Rule 56(f), 

and we must vacate its entry of summary judgment on 

Lalowski’s administrative review claim and remand for further proceedings.

As discussed above, the district court properly entered 

summary judgment against Lalowski on his First AmendCase: 12-3604 Document: 48 Filed: 06/17/2015 Pages: 18
18 No. 12-3604

ment claim. As a result, all of Lalowski’s federal claims have 

been resolved, and on remand, the district court may decline 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state administrative review claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In general, 

“when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent statelaw claims rather than resolving them on the merits.” Wright 

v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (1994). “There 

are, however, unusual cases in which the balance of factors 

to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—

judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity—will 

point to federal decision of the state-law claims on the merits.” Id. We leave the decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lalowski’s administrative review 

claim to the sound discretion of the district court on remand.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s entry of summary judgment against 

Lalowski on his First Amendment claim is AFFIRMED, but the 

district court’s entry of summary judgment against Lalowski 

on his administrative review claim is VACATED, and the case 

is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

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