Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00739/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00739-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PHYLLIS BACHILLA, SHARLENE 

WALKER and WENDY LABORICO, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY 

dba AT & T COMMUNICATIONS; 

COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF 

AMERICA; and DOES 1 through 

100, inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________/ 

No. Civ. S-07-739 RRB KJM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiffs, Phyllis Bachilla, Sharlene Walker and Wendy 

Laborico (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a state action 

against their employer Pacific Bell Telephone Company dba AT & T 

and their union Communication Workers of America (collectively 

“Defendants”) alleging, among other things, employment 

discrimination. Defendants removed the action to federal court 

on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs now 

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move to remand on the ground that removal was untimely. 

Alternatively, Plaintiffs move to remand on the ground that 

federal question jurisdiction does not exist. For the following 

reasons, the court DENIES the motion.1

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs are employees of Pacific Bell Telephone Company 

dba AT & T Communications (“Pacific Bell”). Pl.’s Mot. at 2; 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 1-3. Plaintiffs are 

represented by a labor union Communication Workers of America 

Local 9421 (“CWA”) and employed pursuant to a Collective 

Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) entered into between Pacific Bell 

and CWA. FAC ¶¶ 32, 52. The CBA governs the terms and 

conditions of Plaintiffs employment, including promotions and 

transfers based on seniority. FAC ¶¶ 32-33; Decl. of Jerrie 

Collier (“Collier”) ¶¶ 4-5, In Support of Def.’s Mot. for 

Removal. 

 

1 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). As a result, the oral argument 

presently scheduled for Wednesday, September 5, 2007, at 10:00 

a.m., is hereby VACATED. 

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The instant action arose out of Defendants alleged 

discriminatory conduct in the form of denying Plaintiffs’ 

promotions to “Power Positions” in favor of male co-workers with 

less seniority. Pl.’s Mot. at 2; FAC ¶¶ 10-12. Following their 

denial of promotions, Plaintiffs filed grievances under the CBA 

against Pacific Bell through CWA on or about October 24, 2003. 

FAC ¶ 12. In or about August 2005, Plaintiffs received 

notification that their grievances had been addressed and 

settled. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs subsequently learned that their 

grievances had been terminated on November 6, 2003, even though 

Defendants had led them to believe that they were still being 

processed. Id. ¶ 16. 

In or about August 2005, Ms. Bachilla and Ms. Laborico were 

given settlement agreements offering them different positions on 

a “now or never” basis. FAC ¶ 17. In or about September 2005, 

Ms. Walker was also given a settlement agreement offering her a 

different position on a “take it or leave it” basis. Id. ¶ 20. 

Plaintiffs allege that the settlements contained terms that 

Defendants knew would be unacceptable to them. Id. ¶¶ 18-21. 

On September 21, 2005, the grievance process was closed after 

Plaintiffs refused to accept their respective settlement offers. 

Id. ¶¶ 18, 21. 

On or about September 29, 2005, Ms. Walker filed a 

complaint against CWA with the National Labor Relations Board 

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(“NLRB”) based on its handling of her grievance. FAC ¶ 22. On 

November 1, 2005, Ms. Walker was removed from her position as a 

Steward in Local 9421, allegedly in retaliation for pursuing a 

grievance and filing a complaint with the NLRB. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. 

On December 14, 2006, Plaintiffs filed the present action 

alleging the following claims: (1) discrimination; (2) 

retaliation; (3) breach of implied contract; (4) fraud and 

deceit; (5) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 

(6) breach of fiduciary duty; and (7) gross negligence. Compl. 

at 3-11. On March 19, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their FAC and 

caused it and a copy of the summons to be served on Defendants. 

Notice of Removal ¶¶ 3-4.2

 

On April 17, 2007, Defendants filed a notice of removal on 

the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal ¶ 

6. Defendants moved for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 

on the ground that the instant action arises under, and is 

preempted by, § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Id. ¶ 6. 

// 

// 

 

2 Each and every claim in the FAC is alleged against all 

Defendants, except for the breach of fiduciary duty claim which 

is only alleged against CWA. FAC ¶¶ 9-56. Additionally, the 

FAC does not contain a gross negligence claim as alleged in the 

original complaint. Id. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Timeliness of Removal 

 Plaintiffs argue that this action should be remanded 

because Defendants failed to remove it within thirty days after 

receiving the initial pleadings. Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendants received the initial pleadings on February 12, 2007, 

but did not file their notice of removal until April 17, 2007. 

As such, Plaintiffs argue that remand is appropriate because 

Defendants notice of removal was untimely. 

 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) states: “The notice of removal of a 

civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days 

after the receipt by the defendant, through service or 

otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the 

claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, 

or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the 

defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court 

and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever 

period is shorter.” Under § 1446(b), “a named defendant’s time 

to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons 

and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or 

otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not 

by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal 

service.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 

526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999). Only when a defendant is “notified 

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of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal 

process” does the time limit for removal commence to run. Id.

 Here, Defendants argue that the time to remove was not 

triggered until Plaintiffs caused a copy of the summons and FAC 

to be served on CWA on March 19, 2007. Defendants argue that 

the time to remove did not commence prior to this date because 

service of process was defective. As such, Defendants assert 

that their notice of removal was timely because it was filed on 

April 17, 2007, within thirty days from proper service (i.e., 

March 19, 2007) For their part, Plaintiffs do not argue that 

service of the initial pleadings was proper. Rather, Plaintiffs 

simply argue that Defendants receipt of the initial pleadings 

was sufficient to trigger the thirty-day removal period. The 

court disagrees. 

n Murphy Bros., the Supreme Court expressly held that mere 

receipt of the complaint unattended by formal service is 

insufficient to trigger the thirty-day removal period. Murphy 

Bros., 526 U.S. at 348. Thus, if Defendants were not properly 

served, it is immaterial whether they had knowledge of the 

original Complaint.3 The time for removal commences upon receipt 

 

3 To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on cases pre-dating 

Murphy Bros. for the proposition that receipt of initial 

pleadings, rather than proper service, is sufficient to trigger 

the thirty-day removal period, such reliance is misplaced. The 

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of the Complaint attended by formal service. Accordingly, the 

issue before the court is whether formal service was effected 

thirty days prior to Defendants’ filing of their notice of 

removal on April 17, 2007. 

Rule 4(h) states, in relevant part: “service upon a 

domestic . . . corporation . . . that is subject to suit under a 

common name, and from which a waiver of service has not been 

obtained and filed, shall be effected: (1) in a judicial 

district of the United States in the manner prescribed for 

individuals by subdivision (e)(1), or by delivering a copy of 

the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or 

general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment 

or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one 

authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so 

requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. . . .” 

Rule(e)(1) states that service may be effected “pursuant to the 

law of the state in which the district court is located, or in 

which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the 

defendant in an action brought in the courts of general 

jurisdiction of the State. . . .” 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.30(a) provides: “A 

summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A 

 

holding in Murphy Bros. is the controlling authority regarding 

Defendants time to remove. 

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copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by 

first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to 

be served, together with two copies of the notice and 

acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return 

envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.” “Service 

of a summons pursuant to this section is deemed complete on the 

date a written acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed, 

if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender.” 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415(c). 

Here, Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden to 

establish that service of the initial pleadings was proper under 

Rule 4 to trigger the thirty-day removal period. See Universal 

Trading & Investment Co. v. Kiritchenko, 2007 WL 660083, *1 

(N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 

(9th Cir. 2004) (observing that once service is challenged, the 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service was 

valid under Rule 4)). Notably, Plaintiffs failed to offer proof 

that the written acknowledgement of service regarding the 

initial pleadings was returned. As such, Plaintiffs did not 

prove that service was properly effected under § 415.30 

regarding the initial pleadings. See Thierfeldt v. Marin 

Hospital Dist., 35 Cal.App.3d 186, 199 (1973) (holding that 

service is not properly effected until the defendant executes 

and returns an acknowledgement of service). 

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 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs concede that service of 

process regarding the initial pleadings “may have been 

technically defective,” and because Plaintiffs failed to 

demonstrate that service regarding such pleadings was properly 

effected thirty days prior to Defendants’ filing their notice of 

removal, removal was not untimely. 

B. Removal Jurisdiction 

 Plaintiffs argue that this matter should be remanded for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this dispute 

involves the breach of an implied contract, not the breach of 

the CBA. 

 A defendant may only remove an action to federal court if 

the action filed in state-court could have originally been filed 

in federal court.4

 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 

392 (1987). “[F]ederal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 

‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal 

jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Id.; 

see Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of Securities 

 

4 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides, in relevant part: “Except as 

otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 

action brought in a State court of which the district courts of 

the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by 

the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the 

United States for the district and division embracing the place 

where such action is pending.”

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Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

“[t]he existence of federal question jurisdiction is ordinarily 

determined from the face of the complaint”). 

 In general, a case may not be removed to federal court on 

the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of 

preemption. Busey v. P.W. Supermarkets, Inc., 368 F.Supp.2d 

1045, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 

393). However, once an area of state law has been completely 

preempted, such as controversies involving collective bargaining 

agreements, any claim purportedly based on that preempted law is 

considered a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal 

law and is removable. Busey, 368 F.Supp.2d at 1048. 

Accordingly, the question before the court is whether 

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under § 301 of the LMRA, thus 

permitting removal to federal court. Id.

 Section 301 of the LMRA provides, in pertinent part: “Suits 

for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees in an industry affecting 

commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the 

United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 

respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 

citizenship of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Section 301 

of the LMRA preempts state law claims that are based directly on 

rights created by a collective bargaining agreement, and also 

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preempts claims that are substantially dependent on an 

interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.” Aguilera 

v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2000); see Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 

997 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[t]he preemptive force of section 301 is 

so powerful as to displace entirely any state claim based on a 

collective bargaining agreement . . . and any state claim whose 

outcome depends on analysis of the terms of the agreement”).

 Thus, the critical inquiry in whether state law claims will 

be preempted is whether they “require interpretation of a CBA, 

or [are] ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of 

an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,’” not 

whether the complaint is framed without reference to a CBA. 

Busey, 368 F.Supp.2d at 1049 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. 

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-211, 213 (1985); Cook v. Lindsay Olive 

Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir. 1990). “[E]ven suits based 

on torts, rather than on breach of collective bargaining 

agreements, are governed by federal law if their evaluation is 

‘inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] 

labor contract.’” Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 

545 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213).5 

 

5 The purpose of expanding complete preemption beyond the 

“suits for violations of contracts” language of § 301 is to 

promote uniformity in the interpretation of CBAs and to generate 

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Section 301 does not however preempt state law claims where 

a court can uphold independent state law rights without 

interpreting the terms of a CBA. Busey, 368 F.Supp.2d at 1049 

(citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 213); see Cook, 911 

F.2d at 237 (“[a] claim is not preempted if it does not threaten 

significantly the collective bargaining process and if it 

furthers a state interest in protecting the public that 

transcends the employment relationship”). Therefore, 

nonnegotiable state-law rights independent of any right 

established by contract are not preempted because Congress never 

intended to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or 

establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor 

contract. Miller, 850 F.2d at 546 (quotation marks omitted).6

1. Breach of Contract 

 Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not preempted by § 

301 of the LMRA because they are based on an implied contract, 

 

and preserve a body of consistent federal labor law. Lingle v. 

Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). 

Another is to promote the federal policy favoring arbitration 

and to prevent litigants from using state law litigation to 

side-step or alter the negotiated provisions of a CBA, including 

the dispute resolution procedures. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 

211. 

6 “A right is nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit 

it to be waived, alienated, or altered by private agreement.” 

Miller, 850 F.2d at 546. “Independent rights are those statelaw rights that can be enforced without any need to rely on the 

particular terms, explicit or implied, contained in the labor 

agreement.” Id.

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which is primarily based on the policies and procedures of 

Pacific Bell, not the CBA. Pl.’s Mot. at 11. Plaintiffs argue 

that such contracts were breached when Pacific Bell failed to 

promote Plaintiffs in favor of male co-workers with less 

seniority in violation of their policies and oral 

representations that promotions were based on seniority. FAC ¶¶ 

11, 33-36. 

 Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are members of the 

CWA and that CWA entered into a CBA with Pacific Bell on their 

behalf, which governs the terms of their employment, including 

promotions and transfers. FAC ¶¶ 1-3, 32, 52; Def.’s Request 

for Judicial Notice, Exh. D. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that 

their grievances alleging sexual discrimination were filed 

against Pacific Bell through CWA. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Nonetheless, 

Plaintiffs maintain that their claims are not substantially 

dependent on analysis of the terms of the CBA because they are 

based on an “implied contract,” not the CBA. The court rejects 

this argument. 

 Here, Plaintiffs assert that their implied labor contract 

is independent of the CBA and therefore not a claim for breach 

of the CBA. However, because the subject matter of their 

contract is a job position covered by the CBA, any independent 

agreement of employment concerning that position could be 

effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement, 

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thus the CBA controls and the contract claim is preempted. See

Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1015 (“where the position in dispute is 

‘covered by the CBA, the CBA controls and any claims seeking to 

enforce the terms of [such agreement] are preempted’”); Young, 

830 F.2d at 997 (alleged oral contract between employee and 

employer regarding reinstatement controlled by CBA since 

employee held position covered by collective bargaining 

agreement).7 To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on Caterpillar

in support of their position that the implied contract claim is 

not preempted, such reliance is misplaced. Caterpillar is 

inapplicable to the present circumstances because, unlike in 

Caterpillar, Plaintiffs did not negotiate an individual 

employment contract for a position not governed by the CBA at a 

time when they were not covered by the CBA. Caterpillar, 482 

U.S. at 388-89. Thus, the reasoning of Caterpillar does not 

support Plaintiffs position that their implied contract claim is 

not preempted. 

 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 

cannot be resolved without interpreting the CBA, it is preempted 

 

7 Moreover, because Plaintiffs had access to a CBA-sanctioned 

grievance procedure, their breach of contract claim is preempted 

under § 301 of the LMRA. Price v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 99 

F.Supp.2d 1162, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that an employee 

in a position with access to a CBA-sanctioned grievance 

procedure cannot state an individual claim for breach of 

contract under state law because such claim is necessarily 

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA). 

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by § 301 of the LMRA. As such, Plaintiffs’ implied contract 

claim is subject to re-characterization as an artfully pled § 

301 claim and is therefore properly before this court. See

Busey, 368 F.Supp.2d at 1054 (“where a relationship is otherwise 

governed by a collective bargaining agreement, state law 

theories of breach of contract and implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing are preempted, and subject to 

recharacterization as [§] 301 claim for breach of contract”).8 

C. Jurisdiction over Tort Claims 

Plaintiffs’ FAC also alleges various state tort claims. 

The court however need not address whether jurisdiction exists 

independently over these claims because it can properly exercise 

pendent jurisdiction over such claims based on their close 

relation with the § 301 claim, the economy of hearing all claims 

arising out of the failure to promote in the same action, and 

the significant federal interest in deciding the preemption 

defense to the tort claims. Young, 830 F.2d at 999; Bale v. 

General Telephone Co. of California, 795 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 

1986) (observing that district courts have jurisdiction over 

state claims sharing “‘a common nucleus of operative fact[s]’” 

 

8 Because the implied covenant derives from the contract and 

is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, it is 

preempted to the same extent the breach of contract claim is. 

Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 195 

F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. 

at 218). 

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with federal claims).9 Here, the tort claims share a common 

nucleus of operative facts with the § 310 claim because they all 

arise out of Pacific Bell’s failure to promote and from 

Defendants conduct in connection with Plaintiffs’ grievances 

based on Pacific Bell’s failure to promote. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES the motion 

to remand. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

9 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) provides, in relevant part: “in any 

civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental 

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims 

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 

United States Constitution.” 

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