Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01908/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01908-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

The Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, counsel for Plaintiff Sergio Ramirez Uriquizo, seeks 

an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 30) Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant 

filed a response to the motion. For the following reasons, the motion for attorney fees is GRANTED.

I. Relevant Background

Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement with the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing

on June 21, 2011, which provided Plaintiff would pay “25% of the backpay awarded upon reversal of 

any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court.” (Doc. 30-1 at 1, emphasis omitted)

On November 21, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of the administrative decision 

denying his Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1) The Court determined the administrative law judge 

erred in the evaluation of the medical evidence and failed to identify legally sufficient reasons to reject 

limitations identified by Plaintiff’s treating physician, which were intertwined with the testimony of 

SERGIO RAMIREZ URIQUIZO,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-01908- JLT

ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(Doc. 30)

Case 1:12-cv-01908-JLT Document 31 Filed 10/21/16 Page 1 of 3
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the vocational expert who opined an individual with the limitations assessed would not be able to 

perform work in the national economy. (Doc. 24 at 13-15) Therefore, the Court remanded the matter 

for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Id. at 16) 

Following the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff (Doc. 25), the Court awarded $6,460.00 in 

attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 29)

Upon remand, the Appeals Council determined Plaintiff was “disabled as of October 6, 2009,

the date he turned age 50.” (Doc. 30-2 at 7) The Commissioner concluded Plaintiff was “entitled to 

monthly disability benefits from Social Security beginning April 2010.” (Doc. 30-3 at 2) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff was entitled to past due benefits totaling $64,268.00. (Doc. 30 at 4)

II. Attorney Fees under § 406(b)

An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is 

awarded benefits:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, et 

seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 

allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 

25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by 

reason of such judgment. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) 

controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement 

is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. Id. at 807.

III. Discussion and Analysis

District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” 

Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review 

contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 

particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of 

the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court 

should consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory 

conduct or excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits 

received.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Case 1:12-cv-01908-JLT Document 31 Filed 10/21/16 Page 2 of 3
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In this case, Plaintiff entered into the contingent fee agreement in which he agreed to pay 

twenty-five percent of any awarded retroactive benefits. The Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing

accepted the risk of loss in the representation and expended a total of 41.4 hours while representing 

Plaintiff in this matter. (Doc. 30 at 8, Rohlfing Decl. ¶ 5) As a result of counsel’s work to remand the 

action to an administrative law judge, Plaintiff ultimately received an award of benefits for disability. 

For this, the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing requests a fee of $16,000.00. (Doc. 30 at 1) 

Because $6,400.00 was paid under the EAJA, the net cost to Plaintiff is $9,600.00. (Id. at 7) This 

amount does not exceed twenty-five percent of the retroactive benefits. 

Finally, although served with the motion (Doc. 30 at 10), Plaintiff did not file an opposition, 

and thereby indicates his belief that the fee request is reasonable. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

The fees sought by the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing are reasonable in light of the 

number of hours expended in this action, and not in excess of the twenty-five percent maximum 

permitted under 42 U.S.C. §406(b). In addition, there is no indication Counsel performed in a 

substandard manner or engaged in severe dilatory conduct in the course of their representation to the 

extent that a reduction in fees is warranted. To the contrary, Plaintiff was able to secure an award of 

benefits following the Court’s remand.

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) in the amount of

$16,000.00 is GRANTED;

2. The Commissioner shall pay the amount directly to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. 

Rohlfing; and

3. Counsel SHALL refund $6,400.00 to Plaintiff Sergio Ramirez Uriquizo.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 20, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:12-cv-01908-JLT Document 31 Filed 10/21/16 Page 3 of 3