Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-08014/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-08014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALTEMIO GONZALES, )

)

Movant, )

) Case Numbers:

vs. ) CV 11-S-8014-S

) CR 07-S-177-S

THE UNITED STATES OF )

AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, brought by a federal

prisoner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The movant, Altemio Gonzales, was convicted in this court on July 20, 2007,

of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). He was sentenced on October 16,

2007, to 240 months in prison to be followed by a 120-month term of supervised

release. 

On appeal, Gonzales argued:

1) the district court violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s

Confrontation Clause by accepting a stipulation to the identity ofthe

FILED

 2014 Mar-28 PM 02:26

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 1 of 17
purported cocaine, to which his counsel had agreed, but to which

Gonzales himself objected; and

2) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

purported cocaine seized from the tractor-trailer in which he was a

passenger, because the combined traffic stop and administrative

inspection of the tractor-trailer was unreasonably long and

unsupported by reasonable suspicion.

On August 5, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Gonzales’

conviction. United States v. Gonzales, 342 Fed. App’x 446 (11th Cir. 2009). 

In support of his motion to vacate, Gonzales claims that trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to:

1) investigate Officer Gonzalez’s and Hoover Police Department’s

legal relationship with DOT; 

2) object to the due process violation and to challenge planted

evidence; and 

3) investigate presiding law and present results to rebut prosecutor’s

introduction of the invalid and repealed 1998 Alabama Statute

32-9A-3.

1

In response to the court’s order to show cause, the respondent filed an answer

in which he argues that the motion to vacate is due to be denied because the claims

are without merit. By order of the court, the parties were advised that the

2

 Doc. no. 3 at 6, 14, 20. 1

 Doc. no. 13. 2

2

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 2 of 17
respondent’s answer would be treated as a motion for summary dismissal. The 3

movant was advised that in responding to the motion for summary dismissal, he must

supply the court with counter affidavits and/or documents to set forth specific facts

showing that there are genuine issues of material fact to be decided. In response, the

movant has filed a traverse.4

ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court has established a national standard for

judging the effectiveness of criminal defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 

“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court elaborated:

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance

was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or

death sentence has two components. First, the defendant

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that

counsel’s errors were so serious asto deprive the defendant

 Doc. no. 14. 3

 Doc. no. 16. 4

3

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 3 of 17
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “Because the [petitioner] must prove both deficiency and

prejudice, a [petitioner’s] failure to prove either will be fatal to his claim.” Johnson

v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1995) (alterations supplied). 

Under the Strickland test, the petitioner must initially show that counsel’s

representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688. “While it need not be errorless, counsel’s advice ‘must be within the

realm of competence demanded of attorneys representing criminal defendants.’”

Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993)(quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921

F.2d 1125, 1151 (11th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991)). In making

such an evaluation, “the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to

have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise

ofreasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The effectiveness

or ineffectiveness of counsel must be evaluated by consideration of the totality of the

circumstances. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467

U.S. 1219 (1984).

The second requisite element in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

a showing of prejudice. Even if counsel made an error so egregious as to be outside

the broad scope of competence expected of attorneys, a movant can obtain relief only

4

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 4 of 17
if the error caused actual prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. In order to

establish actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that but for the attorney’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 207 (5th Cir.

1994). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Furthermore, in

addition to showing that the outcome would have been different, a petitioner must

prove that “counsel’s deficient performance caused the outcome to be unreliable or

the proceeding to be fundamentally unfair.” Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 207 (5th

Cir. 1994)(citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993)). “In other words,

a ‘counsel’s unprofessional errors[must] so upset the adversarial balance between the

defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect.’”

Weekley v. Jones, 56 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at

842) (alteration in original). “Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the

ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or

procedural right to which the law entitles him.” Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.

Gonzales wasindicted on one charge of possession with intent to distribute five

kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of

5

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 5 of 17
cocaine hydrochloride. The cocaine was found during a traffic stop, in an 18-

5

wheeler truck in which Gonzales was a passenger. Gonzales and his co-defendant 6

filed motionsto suppress the search of the truck. The court conducted a suppression 7

hearing on June 19, 2007. 

Claim 1. Failure to Investigate Officer Gonzalez’s and the Hoover Police

Department’s Legal Relationship with the Department of

Transportation

During the suppression hearing, Officer Alejandro Gonzalez testified that he

is a police officer for the City of Hoover, in the Interstate Criminal Enforcement unit.

8

In describing his training and experience, Officer Gonzalez offered the following:

I’ve had over 700 hours of formalized training in

criminal interdiction. I’ve had -- as far as traffic, I’ve had

40 hours back in Los Angeles County, when I went

through the academy. Also had an eight-hour block in

Georgia where I’m also post-certified in that state. And

here in Alabama, the state of Alabama, about four hours of

formalized just traffic.

As far as commercial motor vehicles, DOT authority

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, that’s

a 40-hour block, and in vehicle -- commercial motor

vehicle enforcement. 

Criminal doc. no. 1. In this Memorandum Opinion, citations to “Criminal doc. no. __” 5

are to the docket number from the criminal case, 2:07-cr-0177-CLS-JHE.

 Criminal doc. no. 32 at 13-23. 

6

 Criminal doc. no. 10 and 12. 7

 Criminal doc. no. 32 at 6. 8

6

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 6 of 17
I’ve also had over 200 hours of formalized training

in criminal interdiction, as far as commercial motor

vehicles.

. . . 

Over 700 hours of formalized training; over 200 in

commercial motor vehicle. I'm also an instructor for the

NHTSA, which is the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration. I’m a Georgia post-certified instructor.

Also, I’m an EPIC instructor, which is the El Paso

Intelligence Center, which is part of the DEA and

Department of Justice. Also, DIAP, which is the Drug

Interdiction Assistance Program, and is basically a branch

of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. I’ve

also trained hundreds of local, state and federal agents

throughout the country, both in classroom setting, as well

as hands-on training.9

During the hearing, the court received into evidence Government’s Exhibit 1,

consisting of certificates issued by the United States Department of Transportation,

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, indicating that Officer Gonzalez

successfully completed courses in North American Standard Level I and Level III.10

Gonzalez further testified that the City of Hoover has an agreement with the

Department of Transportation pursuant to which the city assumes responsibility for

inspecting commercial vehicles, specifically 18-wheelers. Gonzalez inspects the

11

Id. at 6-7.

9

Id. at 11-12; Doc. no. 4-1 at 8-9. 10

 Criminal doc. no. 32 at 42. 

11

7

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 7 of 17
trucks under the authority of Ala. Code § 32-9A-3. He explained that under the

12

statute:

After you’ve gone through the training, the Director

of Alabama Department of Public Safety authorizes us to

do an inspection. We can stop a truck for no violations,

solely to inspect the truck. And also we can go to place of

business - - which in this case when a truck is moving,

that’s his place of business - - to inspect his paperwork, his

safety equipment.13

Gonzales claims that “strange indicators showed that Officer Gonzalez lacked

DOT-Qualifications,” so he advised counsel at theirfirst jailhousemeeting and during

the suppression hearing that he needed to investigate Officer Gonzalez’ DOT

qualifications and whether the City of Hoover had an agreement with the DOT to

inspect 18-wheelers. Gonzales claims that despite his warnings, counsel agreed to 14

let Officer Gonzalez testify at the suppression hearing, conceding that Officer

Gonzalez was qualified to testify as an expert. Gonzales contends that after he was 15

convicted, he learned that Officer Gonzalez was not DOT qualified and should not

have been allowed to testify as an expert. He alleges that if counsel had pursued the

16

issue of Officer Gonzalez’ qualifications, he would have learned that Officer

Id. at 63. 12

Id. at 64. 13

 Doc. no. 3 at 6-13. 14

Id. at 7. 15

Id. at 6-13. 16

8

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 8 of 17
Gonzalez was “criminally impersonating a Federal DOT-Official during the stop and

during Petitioner’s Suppression Hearing with both false statements and counterfeited

DOT-Credentials.” 

17

In response to this claim, Gonzales’ trial attorney, Samuel Ray Holmes,

submitted an affidavit in which he states:

18

This argument is false and without merit. On June 19,

2007, this Honorable Court, held a hearing as to

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States District

Judge U. W. Clemon presiding. During this hearing,

Counsel specifically elicited testimony as to the Hoover

Police Department’s certification and ability to conduct

Department of Transportation inspections. The Honorable

U. W. Clemon at the conclusion of the hearing found that

there were no grounds for suppression of the evidence.19

According to Gonzales, prior to and during the suppression hearing, he told

counsel hewassuspicious that Officer Gonzalez was not DOT-certified and requested

that he investigate his credentials. However, at the hearing, the government presented

certificates confirming that Officer Gonzalez was in fact certified by the DOT. 

Regardless of whether Gonzales has since learned that the certificates presented by

Id. at 13. 17

Gonzales argues that Mr. Holmes’ affidavit should be stricken because it did not contain 18

the words “true and correct under penalty of perjury,” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Doc. 16 at

9. However, Mr. Holmes’ affidavit is sufficient because it is properly notarized. 

 Doc. no. 13-2 at 1. 19

9

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 9 of 17
Officer Gonzalez were fraudulent, prior

20

to his conviction, there was nothing more than the movant’s suspicion upon which

counsel could have mounted a challenge to Officer Gonzalez’ credentials. It was not

unreasonable for counsel to accept as valid, the certificates offered by the

government, showing Officer Gonzalez’ training and experience. This claim is due

to be DENIED.

Claim 2. Failure to Object to Due Process Violations during Suppression

Hearing

Gonzales claims that counsel wasineffective for failing to object to due process

violations that occurred during the suppression hearing. Gonzales alleges that his

21

due process rights were violated by the prosecution’s failure to discover that Officer

Gonzalez had fabricated and presented counterfeit DOT certificates and lied about his

qualifications; the prosecution’s use of an “ex-bomb sniffing dog to attempt to 22

establish ‘probable cause’ after the fact that the unauthorized inspection was

completed and concluded”; and the prosecution’s use of “planted” evidence and

23

photographs of that evidence “for the sole purpose of deceiving the Court and Jury.”24

The court offers no opinion as to whether Officer Gonzalez’ credentials were or are 20

legitimate or not.

 Doc. no. 3 at 14.

21

Id. at 16. 22

Id. at 19. 23

Id. at 17-19. 24

10

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 10 of 17
Gonzales further alleges that his attorney was ineffective for stipulating “with the

Government that an independent drug analysis was not necessary,” despite his

protests.

25

Gonzales first claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to

the prosecution’s failure to discover that Officer Gonzalez had fabricated and

presented counterfeit DOT certificates and lied about his qualifications. However, 26

even assuming that Officer Gonzalez fabricated his DOT certificates and lied about

his qualifications, there is nothing to indicate that the prosecution knew this during

the suppression hearing or that counsel had any reason to know Officer Gonzalez’

credentials were false or that the prosecution knew or should have known they were

false. Thus, counsel was not deficient for failing to raise such an objection. This

claim is due to be DENIED.

Gonzales next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

prosecution’s use of an “ex-bomb sniffing dog to attempt to establish ‘probable

cause’ after the fact that the unauthorized inspection was completed and concluded.”

27

He argues that once a dog has been trained as a bomb dog, she cannot later be trained

Id. at 19-20. 25

Id. at 16. 26

Id. at 19. 27

11

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 11 of 17
as a narcotics dog. Deputy Sheriff Tim Sanford, a K-9 handler, testified at the

28

suppression hearing that his narcotics dog, Tika, was used to search the 18-wheeler

in which the cocaine was found. The evidence established that Tika was a trained 29

narcotics dog. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Tika was ever trained 30

as a bomb dog. Thus, counsel was not deficient in failing to raise a baseless

objection. This claim is due to be DENIED.

Gonzales asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

prosecution’s use of “planted” evidence and photographs of that evidence “for the

sole purpose of deceiving the Court and Jury.” The movant claims that the

31

prosecution used photographs of “planted” air fresheners to make it appear that he

was trying to cover up the odor of drugs. He further claims that the drugs were 32

planted because Officer Gonzalez testified that the drugs were found in one bag that

was “almost black,” yet Government’s Exhibits 30 and 31 clearly show two different

bags, one silver and one black. He adds that “even more condemning against

33

Officer Gonzalez is that on the video of the arrest, two men in CIVILIAN clothing

 Id.

28

 Criminal doc. no. 32 at 72-75. 29

Id. at 69-72. 30

Id. at 17-19. 31

Id.

32

Id. at 18. 33

12

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 12 of 17
are seen walking TOWARDS the tractor-trailer carrying an ‘almost black’ bag,” yet

there is “no recorded evidence showing that the suspected drugs were unloaded from

Petitioner’s CMV.”34

Gonzales has offered nothing more than speculation that either the air

fresheners or the cocaine were planted in the truck. Officer Gonzalez testified at the

suppression hearing and at trial that the photographs of the air fresheners accurately

depicted how he saw the air fresheners at the time of the traffic stop. 

35

Officer Gonzalez further testified that he found thirty kilo-size packages of

cocaine in a closet in the cab of the truck. Officer Gonzalez found the cocaine in 36

a duffel bag he described at the suppression hearing as “gray, almost black,” and at 37

trial as “gray-blackish.” The duffel bag was admitted into evidence at trial as 38

Government’s Exhibit 17. The government also had Exhibits 40 and 41 admitted

39

at trial. Officer Gonzalez described Exhibits 40, 41, and 42 as being “picture[s] of 40

the bricks of suspected cocaine and duffel bag, air fresheners inside, the duffel bag

 Id. 

34

Criminal doc. no. 32 at 39; Criminal doc. no. 101 at 136. Photographs of the air fresheners

35

were admitted at trial as Government Exhibits 31-39. Criminal doc. no. 101 at 136. Gonzales has

submitted copies of Government Exhibits 31-35 as exhibits in this case. Doc. no. 4-2 at 1-7. 

 Criminal doc. no. 32 at 38; Criminal doc. no. 101 at 113-116. 36

 Criminal doc. no. 32 at 28. 37

 Criminal doc. no. 101 at 113. 38

 Criminal doc. no. 101 at 116. 39

Id. at 137. 40

13

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 13 of 17
as well as one of the kilo packages.” 

41

Gonzales has submitted copies of Government Exhibits 40 and 41. He

42

describes Exhibit 40 asshowing a silver bag and Exhibit 41 asshowing a black bag.43

Gonzales asserts that Exhibits 40 and 41 show two different bags, neither being the

“almost black” duffel bag described by Officer Gonzalez. Fromthis, he reasons that 44

the “almost black” duffel bag must have been planted in his truck by “two men in

CIVILIAN clothing . . . seen [on the video of the arrest] walking TOWARDS the

tractor-trailer carrying an ‘almost black’ bag.” The photocopies of Government

45

Exhibits 40 and 41 submitted by the movant are unclear at best. However, the court

notes that Officer Gonzalez, upon viewing the original photographs at trial, clearly

stated that the photographs were a fair and accurate depiction of the cocaine and the

duffel bag as he saw them that day. 

46

There is nothing in the record to suggest that counsel had any basis, at the

suppression hearing or at trial, to suspect that Government Exhibits 31-35, 17, 40 or

41 were anything other than the fair and accurate depictions of the air fresheners and

Id. 41

 Doc. no. 4-2 at 6-7. 42

 Doc. no. 3 at 18. 43

Id. 

44

Id. 

45

 Criminal doc. no. 101 at 137. 46

14

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 14 of 17
the bag of cocaine Gonzalez testified they were. In the absence of any evidence that

either the air fresheners or the cocaine were planted in the movant’s truck, there was

absolutely no basis upon which counsel could or should have made an argument that

they were planted. This claim is due to be DENIED. 

Gonzales further alleges that his attorney was ineffective for stipulating “with

the Government that an independent drug analysis was not necessary,” despite his

protests. On appeal, Gonzales argued that the “district court violated his rights

47

under the Sixth Amendment by accepting a stipulation to the identity of the purported

cocaine, to which his counsel had agreed, but to which Gonzales himself objected.”

United States v. Gonzales, 342 Fed. App’x 446, 447 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals held that this court erred in accepting the stipulation. Id. at

448. However, the appellate court found that the error was harmless because they

were “persuaded that the arresting officer’s testimony at trial provided sufficient

grounds for a reasonable jury to conclude that the substance was cocaine.” Id. 

Because the arresting officer’s testimony was sufficient for a reasonable jury to

conclude that the substance was cocaine, Gonzales is unable to show that he suffered

prejudice fromcounsel’s stipulation to the cocaine, even over his protests. This claim

is due to be DENIED.

Id. at 19-20. 47

15

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 15 of 17
Claim 3. Failure to Investigate the Law and Challenge the Validity of Ala. Code

§ 32-9A-3

Gonzales claims that his attorney “failed to investigate presiding law and

present results to rebut [the] prosecutor’s introduction of the invalid and repealed

1998 Alabama Statute 32-9A-3” at the suppression hearing. He alleges that:

At Petitioner’s Suppression Hearing, the Prosecutor

asked this Court to take “Judicial Notice” of Alabama

Statute, i.e. § 32-9A-3, which had been REPEALED and

made INVALID. This is the Statute which Officer

Gonzalez stated to this Court that such Statute granted him

the authority to inspect Petitioner’s CMV and Business

Records (DOT-credentials). This Court relied on this

Statute to deny Petitioner’s Suppression Motion. The

Judge at the Suppression Hearing was mislead as to the

validity of this ANNULLED law.48

Gonzales contends that if counsel had “investigated such, he would have

learned that the Prosecution offered BAD LAW via ‘Judicial Notice’ to the court.”49

For the “benefit” of the court, Gonzalesinforms the court that “the 11th Circuit found

such statute, 32-9A-3, as ‘facially unconstitutional’” in the opinion issued on his

direct appeal. However, Gonzales is mistaken. In the opinion issued on his direct 50

appeal, the court noted in a footnote that “[b]ecause Gonzales did not argue in his

brief that § 32-9A-3 isfacially unconstitutional, he has abandoned the issue.” United

 Doc. no. 3 at 20. 48

Id. at 23. 49

Id. at 23. 50

16

Case 2:11-cv-08014-CLS-JHE Document 19 Filed 03/28/14 Page 16 of 17
States v. Gonzales, 342 Fed. App’x 446, 449 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009)(citation omitted). 

The court did not find that the statute was facially unconstitutional; it simply stated

that Gonzales had not raised the constitutionality of the statute in his brief on appeal,

so it was not being considered by the court. 

Ala. Code § 32-9A-3 is valid. It has never been repealed, made invalid or

nullified in any way. Counsel was not deficient for failing to argue at the suppression

hearing that the law is invalid. This claim is due to be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

The motion to vacate is due to be DENIED and DISMISSED. An appropriate

order will be entered. 

DONE this 28th day of March, 2014. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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