Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01117/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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According to Respondent, Petitioner was released from prison on

August 19, 2005. (Answer [Doc. No. 26] at 1.)

05cv1117

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE LYNN SZUTENBACH,

Petitioner,

v.

GUILLERMAINA HALL,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 05-CV-1117-BTM (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a former state prisoner1 who was sentenced to

a term of eight years and eight months after being convicted by

jury of the following:

Count 1 - grand theft of personal property from Dr. Richard

Richley (total loss exceeding $150,000)(CA Penal Code §§ 487.1,

487(a) & 12022.6(b));

Count 2 - fraudulent appropriation by clerk, agent, or

employee in excess of $400 from Dr. Richard Richley (CA Penal

Code 508);

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Petitioner committed two or more related felonies, a material

element of which was fraud or embezzlement, which involved a pattern

of related felony conduct involving the taking of more than $500,000. 

(CA Penal Code § 186.11(a)(1) & (2).)

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Count 3 - grand theft of personal property from Roberto

Robaina (total loss exceeding $150,000)(CA Penal Code §§ 487(a) &

12022.6(b));

Count 4 - fraudulent appropriation by clerk, agent, or

employee in excess of $400 from Roberto Robaina (CA Penal Code §

508); and

An “Aggravated White Collar Crime Enhancement” (CA Penal

Code § 186.11(a)(2)).2

(Resp.’s Lodgment 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) 579-580, 689-693.) 

The jury made a special finding that, as to Counts 1 and 2 (the

thefts from Dr. Richard Richley), Petitioner acted pursuant to a

general overall plan. (CT 694.) On May 15, 2001, Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of eight years and eight months. (CT 776-

777.)

On April 27, 2005, Petitioner filed this federal Petition in

the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. 

The Petition was subsequently transferred to this district. 

Petitioner alleges two claims in the Petition. First, she claims

that California’s four-year statute of limitations for grand

theft should have barred the prosecution of Counts 1 & 2 (the

thefts from Dr. Richard Richley). Second, she claims that she

was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal when counsel

failed to pursue her direct appeal to the California Supreme

Court. (Petition [Doc. No. 1] at 5.)

//

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Apparently, the Court of Appeal’s decision was incorrectly filestamped “April 21, 2002" when it was in fact filed on April 21, 2003.

(See Resp.’s Lodgment 4.)

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II. Procedural Background

After Petitioner was sentenced on May 15, 2001, Petitioner’s

appellate attorney filed an appeal in the California Court of

Appeal. The appeal raised the statute of limitations issue

raised in this federal Petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment on April 21, 2003.3 (Resp.’s Lodgments 2-4.) 

Appellate counsel failed to file a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court. Petitioner retained new appellate

counsel, and he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, raising (among others) the claims

raised in this federal Petition. The Supreme Court denied the

petition without comment. (Resp.’s Lodgments 5-6.)

Petitioner filed this federal Petition on April 27, 2005. 

On July 19, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Petition, contending that it had been filed outside the one-year

statute of limitations set out in the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996. Petitioner opposed the motion, and

Respondent replied. After receiving a supplemental declaration

from Petitioner, on February 1, 2006 this Court filed a Report

and Recommendation finding and recommending that the Motion to

Dismiss be denied. This Court specifically found that the oneyear statute was equitably tolled for a period of 70 days due to

appellate counsel’s “egregious conduct in assuring Petitioner on

more than one occasion that she intended to file the petition for

review and thereafter failing to do so.” (Doc. No. 20 at 8.) 

This period of equitable tolling rendered Petitioner’s federal

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Petition timely filed. The Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz adopted

the Report and Recommendation and denied the Motion to Dismiss

the Petition on March 14, 2006. [Doc. Nos. 4-23.] 

Respondent then filed an Answer to the Petition, and Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Doc. Nos. 26 & 30.)

III. Factual Background

The facts relevant to the issues presented in this Petition

are not in dispute, and this Court presumes correct the factual

determinations by state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

“The Richley thefts” were summarized by the California Court of

Appeal as follows:

[¶] Szutenbach operated a bookkeeping service under the

fictitious business name Szutenbach & Associates. From

1993 to 1995, Szutenbach did bookkeeping and tax work

for Dr. Richard C. Richley, his wife and his fourteen

businesses. As part of her services, Szutenbach was

responsible for depositing payment checks Richley

received from his patients and their insurers,

reconciling and transferring funds from Richley’s bank

accounts and writing checks to his creditors. 

Szutenbach had custody of Richley’s checkbooks and

canceled checks for the accounts, was an authorized

signatory on one of Richley’s accounts with the Bank of

America (the BoA account) and had a rubber stamp of

Richley’s signature. Over time, Richley gave

Szutenbach responsibility for negotiating loans,

contracts and leases on his behalf and performing work

related to litigation involving him or his business.

[¶] Beginning in late 1993, Richley began to experience

cash flow problems and his office received complaints

from creditors about nonpayment. When Richley

questioned Szutenbach about these matters, she provided

a variety of explanations that Richley initially

accepted. However, in 1994, Richley started

questioning Szutenbach’s explanations and asked her for

the bank statements and canceled checks for his

accounts. Szutenbach’s office provided Richley with

check stubs (some of which were blank), but did not

turn over any canceled checks. Suspicious, Richley

ordered copies of the canceled checks from the Bank of

America and discovered that Szutenbach had written a

number of large checks from the BoA account to her

business. Richley immediately contacted the bank’s

security department and ordered microfilm copies of all

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of the canceled checks for all of his accounts.

[¶] By spring 1995, Richley concluded that Szutenbach

had embezzled from him. He stopped using Szutenbach’s

services and hired accountant Michael Boardman of

Considine & Considine to straighten out his financial

records. Richley also withdrew all of his money from

the BoA account and began using another account for his

business purposes. Unfortunately, Richley did not

close the BoA account and, in August 1995, Szutenbach

took patient checks from Richley’s office mailbox and

deposited them into that account. Shortly thereafter

she wrote a check from the account for $3,400 payable

to her credit card company.

(Resp.’s Lodgment 4 at 2-3.)

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Federal habeas corpus relief is granted “only on the ground

that [the state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. §2254(a). Mere errors of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Id.; Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) govern this petition, since it was

filed after the statute became effective on April 24, 1996. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA prohibits a

federal court from granting a petition of a state prisoner whose

claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the

federal court first finds that the state court decision was

contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law, or involved an

unreasonable application of such law to the facts of the case. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). The Supreme Court has defined these terms:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

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conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). The Supreme

Court has also stated that:

...[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law.

...Under §2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause,

...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.

Id. at 410-411 (emphasis in original). See also Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

B. Petitioner’s claim that California’s statute of

limitations should have precluded the prosecution of

Counts 1 and 2 against her is a matter purely of state

law and is, in any event, meritless.

Petitioner contends that Counts 1 and 2 against her should

have been barred by the four-year statute of limitations

applicable to grand theft charges. Specifically, Petitioner

argues that Dr. Richley discovered her embezzlement in June 1995,

thereupon terminating her employment, and that the statute of

limitations accordingly began running at that time. Thus,

according to Petitioner, the statute of limitations for the

Richley thefts expired in June 1999. Because the criminal

complaint against Petitioner was not filed until August 9, 1999,

Petitioner argues, the charges were brought two months after the

statute ran.

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Respondent argues, as did the prosecution in the trial

court, that Petitioner’s overall plan or scheme of embezzlement

continued through August 11, 1995, when Petitioner stole patient

checks from Dr. Richley’s mailbox, deposited the checks into the

Bank of America account that Dr. Richley no longer used but had

not closed, and then wrote a check to her credit card account. 

In accordance with this time line, the statute of limitations did

not run until August 11, 1999, and Counts 1 and 2 were timely

brought against Petitioner.

The Supreme Court of California denied Petitioner’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus without opinion. (Resp.’s Lodgment 6.)

Thus, this Court must “look through” to the California Court of

Appeal’s decision underlying that denial as the basis for its

analysis. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

In denying Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus,

the California Court of Appeal stated:

[¶] Prosecutions for grand theft must be “commenced

within four years after discovery of the commission of

the offense, or within four years after the completion

of the offense, whichever is later.” (Pen. Code, §§

801.5, 803, subd. (c).) A person is deemed to have

discovered the commission of an offense once he “has

knowledge of facts sufficient to make a reasonably

prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on

inquiry.” (People v. Crossman (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d

476, 480, quoting People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d

538, 562.)

[¶] Pursuant to what is known as the “Bailey doctrine”

(People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Ca.2d 514 (Bailey)), if a

defendant commits a series of thefts, she is guilty of

but one count of felony grand theft if all the thefts

are “motivated by one intention, one general impulse,

and one plan ... .” (In re David D. (1997) 52

Cal.App.4th 304, 307-308, quoting Bailey, supra, 55

Cal.2d at p. 519.) Although the issue in Bailey was

whether several instances of misdemeanor (petty) theft

committed pursuant to an overall scheme may be

cumulated into one felony count of grand theft,

subsequent cases applying the Bailey doctrine have held

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In the same vein as Petitioner’s argument set forth above,

Petitioner also argues that the California courts improperly used the

Bailey doctrine to avoid finding that the prosecution violated the

statute of limitations, rather than to elevate Petitioner’s serial

thefts from misdemeanor to felony status (in Petitioner’s view, the

only proper use of the doctrine). (Traverse [Doc. No. 30] 5-12.)

8 05cv1117

that it is equally applicable to a series of grand

thefts committed pursuant to an overall plan or scheme. 

(People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 364-

365; People v. Sullivan (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 16, 18-21;

People v. Brooks (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 31.) 

Whether the wrongful conduct gives rise to one offense

rather than a series of offenses is generally a

question of fact that turns on the particular

circumstances of the case; a defendant may be properly

convicted of multiple counts of theft if the evidence

shows that the offenses were separate and distinct and

were not committed pursuant to a single criminal

intention, impulse and plan. (In re David D., supra,

52 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)

A. Denial of Motion to Dismiss the Richley Counts

[¶] Prior to trial Szutenbach made a motion to dismiss

the Richley counts on statute of limitations grounds. 

The trial court denied the motion without prejudice. 

On appeal, Szutenbach argues that the court erred in

denying her motion because, as a matter of law, her

thefts constituted separate offenses rather than part

of an overall plan. She cites to cases holding that

the Bailey doctrine is inapplicable to successive

forgeries (People v. Neder (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 846,

852-853) and to multiple instances of Medi-Cal fraud

(People v. Drake (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 592).

[¶] Szutenbach’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. 

Although the opinions decline to expand the Bailey

doctrine to other types of successive crimes, they do

not vitiate the application of the Bailey doctrine to

successive petty or grand thefts, as charged against

Szutenbach here. (People v. Kronemyer, supra, 189

Cal.App.3d at pp. 364-365; People v. Sullivan, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at pp. 18-21.) In light of the

prosecution’s theory that the Richley thefts were part

of one overall plan, the court did not err in denying

Szutenbach’s motion to dismiss the Richley counts. 

(Resp.’s Lodgment 4 at 6-8.)4

Generally, matters relating to state court interpretation of

state law do not implicate federal constitutional issues. In

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fact, this Court defers to and is bound by a state court’s interpretation of its own laws. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84

(1983). Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Petitioner has provided no authority to indicate that this case

does not fall within that general rule. Moreover, “[a] federal

court may not issue the writ [of habeas corpus] on the basis of a

perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41

(1984).

Petitioner’s claim deals solely with the interpretation and

application of California law, a matter which does not implicate

federal constitutional concerns. Moreover, notwithstanding that

Petitioner has raised a claim for which federal habeas relief is

unavailable, Petitioner’s claim is meritless.

1. The trial court’s factual finding that Petitioner

acted pursuant to a general overall plan

At trial, the jury received evidence of the timing and

nature of Petitioner’s acts of theft and fraud. Dr. Richley was

an accounting client of Petitioner from 1993-1995. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment 7, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”), 550-551.)

Petitioner was an authorized signer on Dr. Richley’s Bank of

America account and had a rubber stamp of Dr. Richley’s

signature. (RT 521, 552, 559-560.) By the summer of 1995, Dr.

Richley came to the conclusion that Petitioner had been stealing

from him. (RT 410, 589-590.) At that time, Bank of America

advised him to file a police report and complaint. (RT 590.)

In June 1995, Dr. Richley withdrew all his money from the

Bank of America account and began using another account. (RT

598.) He also terminated Petitioner’s employment. (RT 609,

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The Court responded: “There is no legal definition of an “act

pursuant to a general over all plan.” [¶] This is a question of fact

for the jury to decide based on all the evidence and based on the

common meaning of the words used in the phrase.” (CT 687.)

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673.) Dr. Richley did not close the Bank of America account,

however, and on August 11, 1995, $3,962.39 was deposited into the

account. (RT 608.) At about this time, Dr. Richley’s office

manager told him that his mailbox had been opened and that he was

missing patient payment checks. (RT 590.) On August 14, 1995,

Bank of America paid a check drawn on the account in the amount

of $3,400, signed by Petitioner and made payable to her credit

card account. (RT 433-435, 608-609, 984, 1308.) Dr. Richley

then hired another accountant, who ultimately determined that the

amount of unauthorized checks made payable to Petitioner totaled

$800,000.00. (RT 617.) 

Based on this evidence, the jury not only found Petitioner

guilty of the crimes alleged in Counts 1 and 2 (grand theft and

fraudulent misappropriation from Dr. Richley), but made a

“Special Verdict” finding as follows:

We, the jury in the above-entitled cause, having found

the defendant LESLIE LYNN SZUTENBACH, guilty of Counts

1 and/or 2 of the Amended Information, further find

that the defendant DID act pursuant to a general

overall plan.

(CT 694.) The record supports the inference that the jury

thoughtfully considered the issue of whether Petitioner’s actions

constituted an overall plan or scheme because the jury submitted

a note to the trial judge during deliberations seeking a

definition of the term “act pursuant to a general over all plan.” 

(CT 686.)5

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

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absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A

state court’s decision “based on a factual determination will not

be overturned on factual grounds unless [it is] objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the statecourt proceeding.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

The record in Petitioner’s case plainly reflects that the

jury made an objectively reasonable finding that Petitioner’s

acts of theft and fraud against Dr. Richley were motivated by a

single intention, impulse, and plan. The evidence showed that

Petitioner intended to steal from Dr. Richley’s business accounts

for her own use. She did so using the access she gained while

posing as a legitimate accountant. Her plan of thievery

continued through her final act of theft from Dr. Richley when

she fraudulently made use of his Bank of America account on

August 11, 1995. Far from appearing unreasonable, the jury’s

conclusion is completely supported by the evidence presented at

Petitioner’s trial.

2. The application of California’s statute of

limitations laws to the factual determination

made by the trial court

The trial court having reasonably found that Petitioner

acted pursuant to a general overall plan (which concluded on

August 11, 1995), the state court did not err in finding that the

trial court correctly applied the state statute of limitations

for grand theft. There is no dispute that a four-year statute of

limitations was applicable in Petitioner’s case. (See CA Penal

Code §§ 801.5 & 803(c).) The “completion of the offense” was

August 11, 1995, as found by the trial court. Because Counts 1

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“The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of

an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceedings, if

not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the

judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.” 28 U.S.C. §

2248.

7

 Moreover, although the Court does not consider the merits of

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim now that it has

been abandoned, the Court notes that she previously benefitted from

raising that claim. This Court found that the one-year statute of

limitations applicable to habeas corpus petitions was equitably tolled

for a period of 70 days due to appellate counsel’s “egregious conduct

in assuring Petitioner on more than one occasion that she intended to

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and 2 against Petitioner were filed on August 9, 1999, they were

brought within the applicable statute of limitations, and

Petitioner was properly tried on those counts.

Accordingly, this Court finds that Petitioner’s claim that

California’s statute of limitations should have precluded the

prosecution of Counts 1 and 2 against her should be DENIED.

C. Petitioner has abandoned her claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner initially raised a claim that she was denied

effective assistance of counsel on appeal when retained attorney

Elizabeth A. Barranco failed to file a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court on her behalf. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) 

Respondent, in her Answer to the Petition, argued that the claim

is moot because Petitioner’s new appellate counsel raised the

claim in the California Supreme Court in a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 26 at 11; Resp.’s Lodgments 5-6.) In

her Traverse, Petitioner did not refute Respondent’s argument,

and she appears now to have abandoned the claim. (Doc. No. 30.)6

Because Petitioner has now abandoned her ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim, it should be DENIED as

moot.7

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28 file the petition for review and thereafter failing to do so.” (Doc.

No. 20 at 8.) This period of equitable tolling rendered this federal

Petition timely filed.

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V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 2, 2007, any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed no later than April 16, 2007. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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