Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02038/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TONY BORJAS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RALPH DIAZ, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-02038-PJH 

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE MOTION 

FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND INJUNCTION 

Re: Dkt. No. 2 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Plaintiff alleges that the integration of several groups on the prison yard at 

Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) will place him at risk of harm. Plaintiff argues that 

prison officials merged the prisoners in the Special Needs Yard (“SNY”), formerly known 

as protective custody, with the General Population (“GP”) prisoners in December 2018. 

As a result of the merger, there was a “major riot” that resulted in “multiple injuries.” 

Docket No. 1 at 3. He alleges that this “planned merger” “would place Plaintiff at serious 

risk of harm,” id. Though, the merger has already occurred, and plaintiff does not appear 

to have been harmed. Plaintiff is a GP prisoner. Docket No. 2 at 2. For relief, plaintiff 

requests an injunction preventing the merger of SNY and GP prisoners and a declaration 

that defendants’ actions violate his Eighth Amendment rights. Docket No. 1 at 3.

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This matter is now before the court for consideration of plaintiff’s motion for a 

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and injunction prohibiting defendants and persons 

 

1 The complaint and motion for a TRO are virtually identical to at least ten other cases 

filed recently by prisoners at CTF. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Diaz, No. 19-cv-1928 LHK; Alvarez 

v. Diaz, 19-cv-1968 WHA; Saenz v. Diaz, 19-cv-2031 WHO; Saucedo v. Diaz, 19-cv2032 SI.

Case 4:19-cv-02038-PJH Document 5 Filed 04/24/19 Page 1 of 5
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acting on their behalf “from merging the SNY and/or STG Fresno Bulldogs with GP 

prisoners” at CTF. Docket No. 2 at 3. 

 A temporary restraining order preserves the status quo and prevents irreparable 

harm until a hearing can be held on a preliminary injunction application. See Granny 

Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 

(1974). A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should 

award only when a plaintiff makes a clear showing that he is entitled to such relief. See 

Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The standards for a 

temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction. See 

Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th 

Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a 

likelihood of irreparable harm that will result if an injunction is not issued, (3) the balance 

of equities tips in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.2 The irreparable injury must be both likely and immediate. See 

id. at 22; Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 

1988) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish 

standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to 

preliminary injunctive relief.”) 

Plaintiff is not entitled to a TRO or preliminary injunction to prevent the merger of 

the different prisoner populations. 

First, the request to prevent the merger of the different prisoner groups appears to 

be moot because plaintiff alleges in his verified complaint that the merger occurred in 

 2 Winter did not, however, completely reject the validity of the sliding scale approach 

to preliminary injunctions. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 

(9th Cir. 2011). Under the “sliding scale” approach used in the Ninth Circuit – also 

dubbed the “serious question” test in Alliance for Wild Rockies -- “the elements of the 

preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may 

offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131. Thus, even after Winter, “‘serious 

questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff 

can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test 

are also met.” Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).

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United States District Court 

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December 2018. See Docket No. 1 at 3. Injunctive relief would not be able to prevent an 

event that has already occurred. 

Second, at least part of the dispute that forms the basis for the requested 

TRO/injunction is different from the allegations in the complaint and would not be the 

proper basis for interim relief. A plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief based on claims 

not pled in the complaint because the “court’s equitable power lies only over the merits of 

the case or controversy before it.” Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr.,

810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., id. at 636-38 (district court properly denied 

plaintiff’s request for an injunction to prevent HIPAA violation, where plaintiff had not 

asserted a claim for a HIPAA violation). Plaintiff wants the TRO/injunction to include 

preventing the integration of the Fresno Bulldogs “security threat group” into the GP at 

CTF. (A “security threat group” is the current term for what used to be referred to as a 

prison gang. Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412, 416 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015), reversed on other 

grounds by Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S. Ct. 1603 (2016)). But the Fresno Bulldogs are not 

even mentioned in the complaint. Not only are the Fresno Bulldogs not mentioned, the 

integration of the Fresno Bulldogs into GP seems to raise a different issue than the 

integration of the GP and SNY populations: the SNY population appears to be prisoners 

who are preyed upon, whereas members of a security threat group appear to be 

prisoners who could prey upon others. Plaintiff does not address this issue at all. A TRO 

or injunction is not proper to prevent the merger of the Fresno Bulldogs with the GP 

population because the complaint does not allege any claim related to that merger or why 

plaintiff would be at risk of harm. 

Third, the evidentiary support for the requested TRO falls far short of showing that 

irreparable harm is likely and imminent if interim relief is not granted. Plaintiff’s 

declaration provides no specific information about any particular threat to him. His 

declaration indicates that he is a GP prisoner interested in avoiding trouble but does not 

explain any specific threat to him individually posed by SNY prisoners being merged with 

GP prisoners or the Fresno Bulldogs. The only other declaration is from Kim McGill, 

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apparently a non-lawyer who works for the “Youth Justice Coalition.” McGill’s declaration 

does not show that she has any personal knowledge about the merger, prison 

operations, or the actual danger posed by the merger of GP and SNY inmates at 

plaintiff’s prison. Docket No. 3. Plaintiff does not meet his burden to demonstrate that he 

will suffer immediate and irreparable injury without a TRO. 

Finally, even if the foregoing problems did not exist, plaintiff does not show the 

need for a TRO without any notice to the defendants, who have not yet been served with 

process in this action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) provides that a TRO can 

issue without notice to adverse party only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 

complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 

to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and the movant 

certifies in writing the efforts to give notice and the reasons why notice should not be 

required. These stringent requirements “reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs 

counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to 

be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 423. 

Plaintiff does not show that immediate and irreparable injury will occur if the court does 

not act before allowing defendants to be heard, nor does he provide any information 

about his efforts to give notice to defendants. His failure to satisfy Rule 65(b)(1) is fatal to 

his ex parte motion. 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a TRO or injunction 

(Docket No. 2) is DENIED. The underlying complaint will be reviewed in due course. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 24, 2019 

 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:19-cv-02038-PJH Document 5 Filed 04/24/19 Page 4 of 5
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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TONY BORJAS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RALPH DIAZ, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-02038-PJH 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California. 

That on April 24, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 

Tony Borjas ID: AW1071 

CTF 

P.O. Box 689 

Soledad, CA 93960 

Dated: April 24, 2019 

Susan Y. Soong 

Clerk, United States District Court 

By:________________________ 

Kelly Collins, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

Case 4:19-cv-02038-PJH Document 5 Filed 04/24/19 Page 5 of 5