Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00553/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00553-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cecilia M. Bean, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., f/k/a

Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P.;

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,

Inc., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-11-553-PHX-GMS

ORDER

On January 3, 2011, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20). Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s order. (Doc. 25). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s

motion is denied. 

Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate only if the Court “(1) is presented

with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A

motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to rethink what the court had

already thought through, rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing,

Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983)). Rather, such arguments should be directed to the

court of appeals. Sullivan v. Faras–RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D. Ariz. 1992).

Case 2:11-cv-00553-GMS Document 28 Filed 01/20/12 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Plaintiff contends that the Court improperly applied the Ninth Circuit’s holding in

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) to “rule[ ] against

Plaintiff’s argument concerning the bifurcation of the Note and Deed of Trust.” (Doc. 25 at

2). In particular, Plaintiff contends that it has adequately alleged that MERS was not acting

as an agent of the lender when MERS assigned its interest as beneficiary in the Deed of Trust

to Defendant BAC Home Loans. In Cervantes, the plaintiffs claimed that “all transfers of the

interests in the home loans within the MERS system are invalid because the designation of

MERS as a beneficiary is a sham and the system splits the deed from the note.” 656 F.3d at

1044. The court rejected such a widespread attack on the MERS system, holding that “the

notes and deeds are not irreparably split,” and that “the split only renders the mortgage

unenforceable if MERS or the trustee, as nominal holders of the deeds, are not agents of the

lender.” Id. (emphasis added). For instance, the court postulated that “[t]he legality of

MERS’s role as a beneficiary may be at issue where MERS initiates foreclosure in its own

name.”Id.

In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that because the Deed of Trust calls MERS the

“nominee” of the lender rather than using the term “agent” or “agency,” “[n]o agency was

created” between MERS and the lender. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 39). In Cervantes, however, the

deed of trust likewise stated that MERS was acting “solely as a nominee for Lender and

Lender’s successors and assigns.” 656 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis added). Moreover, based on

the term “nominee” and the general relationship of MERS to lenders, courts have routinely

“interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency relationship.” Landmark

Nat. Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 539, 216 P.3d 158, 166 (2009) (collecting cases). The

Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s argument that, as a lender’s nominee, MERS cannot act as

a lender’s agent. See Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal. App. 4th 256, 271, 129

Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 479–80 (2011) (“[T]he allegation that MERS was merely a nominee is

insufficient to demonstrate that MERS lacked authority to make a valid assignment of the

note on behalf of the original lender.”).

Plaintiff further alleges in her Complaint that “the record contains no evidence that

Case 2:11-cv-00553-GMS Document 28 Filed 01/20/12 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the original holder of the note, Duxford, authorized MERS to transfer the note” to Defendant

BAC Home Loans. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 58). The Assignment of Deed of Trust between MERS

and BAC, however, states that MERS is acting “as nominee” for Duxford. And Duxford did

have the authority to transfer the note. See Fontenot, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 271 (“While it is

true MERS had no power in its own right to assign the note, since it had no interest in the

note to assign, MERS did not purport to act for its own interests in assigning the note. Rather,

the assignment of deed of trust states that MERS was acting as nominee for the lender, which

did possess an assignable interest.”) (emphasis in original). In short, Plaintiff has failed to

allege facts which make it plausible that MERS was not acting as the lender’s agent. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.

25) is denied.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2012.

Case 2:11-cv-00553-GMS Document 28 Filed 01/20/12 Page 3 of 3