Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00622/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00622-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM E. BAKER, JR., )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:07cv622-TFM

) (WO)

DARLENE DREW, )

)

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

William E. Baker, Jr. (“Baker”) has initiated a cause of action construed by this court

as an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971). (Plaintiff’s Complaint - Doc. No. 1.) Baker, a federal inmate at the time of filing,

challenges the constitutionality of the dental care treatment provided to him during his

incarceration at the Maxwell Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama (“FPC

Montgomery”). He names Darlene Drew, warden of FPC Montgomery at the time relevant

to Baker’s claims, as the sole defendant. Baker alleges that Drew (“Defendant”) was

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because she failed to assist him in obtaining

timely dental treatment for severe tooth pain. He seeks monetary damages and injunctive

relief for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Defendant filed an answer, a written report, and supporting evidentiary materials

Case 2:07-cv-00622-TFM Document 29 Filed 08/19/09 Page 1 of 11
Alternatively, Defendant asserts she is entitled to summary judgment because she was not 1

involved with the dental care treatment decisions about which Baker complains.

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addressing Baker’s claims. (Defendant’s Written Report - Doc. No. 13.) Defendant asserts

that Baker failed to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies and that,

consequently, his complaint should be dismissed. This court provided Baker an opportunity 1

to file a response to the arguments presented by Defendant and Baker has done so. (See

Court Order - Doc. No. 14; Plaintiff’s Response - Doc. No. 23.)

For reasons set forth below, and in accordance with orders entered in this case and

governing case law, this court deems it appropriate to treat Defendant’s written report as a

motion for summary judgment. See Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11 Cir. 2008) th

(although an exhaustion defense “is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary

judgment [motion,] the defense is appropriate for summary judgment when the evidence

demonstrates that administrative remedies “are absolutely time barred or otherwise

infeasible”). Thus, this case is pending on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Upon consideration of this motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and

Baker’s response to the motion, the court concludes that Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment should be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

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Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language ofRule 56 [was] amended ... to make the rule[] 2

more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These

changes ... are stylistic only.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 AdvisoryCommittee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56

underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior

rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. th

2007) (citations omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(summary judgment “should be rendered if the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 2

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting

evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving

party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears

the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.

When the movant meets the evidentiary burden of demonstrating the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish,

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. th

at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“When a motion forsummary judgment is properlymade and

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supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial.”). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor.

Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is

merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the th

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004). To th

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must

do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts....

Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

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Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA mandates that “no action shall be brought” by a prisoner 3

under any federal law until the prisoner has exhausted all “administrative remedies as are available,”

as follows:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added).

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issue of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th

Cir. 1990). A party’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of

elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Baker challenges the constitutionality of the dental care treatment

provided to him at FPC Montgomery. Defendant answers that this case should be dismissed

because Baker failed to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies as required

by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).3

Under the PLRA, a federal prisoner cannot bring a Bivens action until he has

exhausted his available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Alexander v. Hawk,

159 F.3d 1321, 1323-24 (11 Cir. 1998) (applying the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to th

Bivens claims). See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) ([F]ederal prisoners suing

under Bivens ... must first exhaust inmate grievance procedures just as state prisoners must

exhaust administrative processes prior to instituting a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 suit.”). “Congress

has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief

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sought and offered through administrative remedies.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. Exhaustion of all

available administrative remedies is a precondition to prisoner litigation, and a federal court

cannot waive the exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander, 159 F.3d at

1325.

Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.”

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in

federal court] because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

some orderly structure on the courts of its proceedings.... Construing § 1997e(a) to require

proper exhaustion ... fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary]

interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative remedies

are no longer available] would turn that provision into a largely useless appendage.” 548

U.S. at 90-91, 93. Because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary, an

inmate cannot “satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement ... by

filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal[,]”

or by effectively bypassing the administrative processsimply by waiting until the grievance

procedure is no longer available to him. 548 U.S. at 83-84; see Johnson v. Meadows, 418

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F.3d 1152, 1157 (11 Cir. 2005). th

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has established regulations setting forth the

procedures a prisoner must follow before seeking relief from a district court. Gonzalez v.

United States, 959 F.2d 211, 212 (11 Cir. 1992); see 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. According th

to these regulations, which provide a three-tiered review process, an inmate seeking redress

must first file a grievance with the warden of the facility where he is housed, describing his

complaint as well as his requested remedy; the warden then has 20 days to respond. 28

C.F.R. §§ 542.11(4) and 542.15. (See Supplement to Defendant’s Written Report:

Declaration of Terry A. Collins - Doc. No. 16, Attach. 4 at 1.) If the inmate is dissatisfied

with the warden’s response, he has 20 days to file an appeal with the Regional Director of

the region in which he is housed. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). (See Doc. No. 16, Attach. 4 at 1-

2.) Finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director’s response, he has 30

days to file an appeal with the General Counsel for the BOP. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). (See

Doc. No. 16, Attach. 4 at 2.) A decision by the BOP is not final until relief has been denied

at the national level. (Doc. No. 16, Attach. 4 at 3.) 

The evidence before this court reveals that Baker initiated the administrative review

process in his case on September 13, 2006, when he filed a grievance concerning his dental

treatment with FPC Montgomery’s warden (Defendant in this case). (Doc. No. 16, Attach.

4 at 3; see also Doc. No. 16, Attach. 4- Exh. A.) On October 2, 2006, the warden submitted

a written response to Baker denying his request for immediate dental procedures and

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There is no evidence before the court that Baker filed an appeal with the General Counsel 4

for the BOP.

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advising him to report to sick bay if was experiencing pain in his teeth. (Id.) Baker was also

advised that he had 20 days to appeal the warden’s decision to the Regional Director. (Id.)

On October 25, 2006, the Regional Director received Baker’s appeal of the warden’s

decision. (Id.) However, Baker’s appeal was rejected as untimely filed beyond the 20-day

limit. (Id.) Baker was also advised to provide staff verification that the late filing was not

his fault. (Id.) He failed to provide such verification, but instead filed two more appeals

with the Regional Director, both of which, like his original appeal, were rejected as

untimely. (Id.) Thus, Defendant now contends that Baker failed to exhaust his 4

administrative remedies.

As the evidentiarymaterials submitted byDefendant show that Baker did not exhaust

his available administrative remedies, Baker is required to produce “sufficient [favorable]

evidence” establishing proper exhaustion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(e)(1). Baker avers that he placed his appeal from the warden’s decision to the Regional

Director in the mailbox at FPC Montgomery on October 18, 2006, four days before its due

date of October 22, 2006, and that, accordingly, his appeal to the Regional Director was

timely under the “prison mailbox rule.” (Plaintiff’s Response - Doc. No. 23 at 3-5; Doc. No.

23- Exh. 5.) The prison mailbox rule considers appeals filed by a prisoner filed as of the

date the notice of appeal is delivered to “prison authorities for forwarding” to the court.

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). However, Baker’s attempt to invoke the prison

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mailbox rule is unavailing.

Here, the Regional Director received Baker’s appeal of the warden’s decision on

October 25, 2006, two days after the 20-day period for appealing had expired. Pursuant to

28 C.F.R. § 542.18, “a Request or Appeal is considered filed on the date it is logged into the

Administrative Remedy Index as received [for a response on the merits].” 28 C.F.R. §

542.18. The BOP defines “filed” within its regulations in an unambiguous manner hence,

the prison mailbox rule Baker seeks to invoke is inapplicable. See Longenette v. Krusing,

322 F.3d 758, 764-65 (3 Cir. 2003) (noting that, when “filed” is not clearly defined, a rd

mailing is considered filed when an individual places the document in the mail; however,

when “filed” is clearly defined, a document is not considered filed until it satisfies the given

definition); Williams v. Burgos, 2007 WL 2331974, Civil Action No. CV206-104 (S.D. Ga.

Aug. 13, 2007) (unpublished; citing Longenette). Furthermore, the prison mailbox rule does

not apply outside the context of court filings. See Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 782

n.15 (11 Cir. 1993). Since Baker’s appeal was not to a federal court, but rather to an th

administrative body, he is not entitled to the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule. Finally,

courts have adopted a general rule that administrative decisions should not be “toppled over”

by the courts “unless the administrative body not only has erred, but has erred against

objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.” Woodford, supra, 548 U.S. at 90

(quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)). The evidence

before the court indicates that when Baker’s appeal to the Regional Director was rejected

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as untimely, he was advised at that time to provide staff verification that the late filing was

not his fault. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14(b) and 542.15(a). Rather than submitting any such

verification, Baker chose to file two more appeals, also rejected as untimely. Thus, Baker

made no attempt to comply with the requirements of the administrative process that was in

place.

In sum, even accepting as true Baker’s assertion that he placed his appeal to the

Regional Director in the mailbox at FPC Montgomery on October 18, 2006, the materials

before this court reflect that Baker did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies

concerning his claims of inadequate dental care. Baker has thus failed to create a genuine

issue of material fact that he exhausted his administrative remedies within the requirements

set forth by the BOP. Consequently, he has not overcome the burden applicable to motions

for summary judgment, and Defendant’s motion forsummary judgment is due to be granted.

Matsushita, supra.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

2. Baker’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice due to Baker’s failure to

properly exhaust his available administrative remedies.

A final judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant.

Done this 19 day of August, 2009. th

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/s/ Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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