Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01405/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01405-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODRICK I. SATRE and BONITA SATRE

DALEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ET AL.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 10-01405 JSW

ORDER DENYING POSTJUDGMENT MOTIONS

Now before the Court are the motions filed by Plaintiffs to vacate this Court’s order of

dismissal and to amend or correct the judgment. Since the Court issued judgment in this matter

after granting multiple motions to dismiss on September 16, 2014, Plaintiffs appearing pro se

have filed five motions styled in various ways challenging the Court’s determination that the

case must be dismissed. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and considered their

arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court HEREBY

DENIES Plaintiffs’ post-judgment motions challenging the dismissal and entry of judgment in

this matter.

BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendants First American

Servicing Company (“ASC”), First American (the trustee of plaintiff’s deed of trust) and Wells

Fargo entitled Satre v. American Services Co., Action No, MSC 06-02525 (“State Court

Action”). The State Court Action involved claims based on a promissory note that Plaintiffs

executed and secured by a deed of trust on their property at 530 Santa Fe Avenue, Richmond, 

Case 4:10-cv-01405-JSW Document 226 Filed 05/08/15 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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California 94801. Plaintiffs alleged that they called ASC to discuss ways to avoid foreclosing 

on their house due to short term financial difficulties. Plaintiffs then defaulted and entered into 

a forbearance agreement to allow them to cure the default and Defendant ASC proceeded with

foreclosure on the property in December 2006. Plaintiffs soon filed action to enjoin the

foreclosure sale and, on August 12, 2010, the state issued a Statement of Decision in favor of

ACS.

On April 2, 2010, appearing pro se, Plaintiffs filed a complaint before this Court against

Wells Fargo, ASC, and First American alleging fourteen separate causes of action for violations

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), multiple

causes of action sounding in fraud, defamation of character, and unfair business practices. In

addition to suing Defendants for activities related to the loan servicing and foreclosure

proceedings on their home, Plaintiffs also named Glenn Wechsler (“Wechsler”), counsel for

ASC in the State Court Action, for his conduct in the state litigation. 

Facing multiple motions to dismiss and to strike, on October 15, 2010, Plaintiffs filed

their First Amended/Supplemental Complaint which alleged twenty-two separate causes of

action including claims under the FDCPA and multiple state causes of action.

Defendants First American and Wechsler then moved to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint. On January 5, 2011, this Court granted First American’s and Wechsler’s motion to

dismiss and dismissed the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Ninth Circuit affirmed

in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Satre v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al., 507 Fed. Appx.

655, 655 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit agreed the “district court property determined that

Wechsler is immune from FDCPA liability” but reversed, stating “the district court incorrectly

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 655-56. 

On remand, Defendants Wells Fargo and First American moved to dismiss the suit and,

in the alternative, moved for a more definite statement. In the related matter, C 12-06548 JSW,

the same defendants move to dismiss or for a more definite statement. The later-filed case

involved the same parties, the same property, related the same mortgage loan and the servicing

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For the Northern District of California

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of that loan. The later case added a new Notice of Trustee Sale that Plaintiffs allege had been

more recently been posted on their door.

On November 1, 2013, the Court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, granted First

American’s motion for a more definite statement, and dismissed the later, related matter in favor

of a consolidated amended complaint in this matter. Plaintiffs were instructed to amend their

complaint for the third time to be in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and

9(b) and specifically to comply with the mandate of the order regarding the claims under

FDCPA giving this Court jurisdiction to hear this matter.

On December 6, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a second amended consolidated and supplemental

complaint that was one hundred and five pages in length and alleged fourteen separate causes of

action against twelve defendants including claims under the FDCPA, TILA, FCRA, and

RESPA, as well as multiple state causes of action, violations of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Constitution. 

On September 16, 2014, this Court issued a ruling granting motions to dismiss filed by

Defendants First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (“First American”), Ameriquest

Mortgage Company (“Ameriquest”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), and the motion

to dismiss and motion to strike filed by Glenn Wechsler, all without leave to amend. The same

day, the Court issued final judgment in this matter.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, or in the

alternative, in a series of filings, Plaintiffs move for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2) and (3) and to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary to its analysis in the remainder of

this Order.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration.

Under local rule 7-9, a party may seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration any

time before judgment. N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). A motion for reconsideration may be made on

one of three grounds: (1) a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was

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presented to the Court, which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the party applying for

reconsideration did not know at the time of the order; (2) the emergence of new material facts or

a change of law; or (3) a manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive

legal arguments presented before entry of judgment. N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)-(3). The moving

party may not reargue any written or oral argument previously asserted to the Court. Id., 7-9(c).

Plaintiffs seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration on the basis that the Court failed

to consider dispositive legal arguments, and in support of that motion, they present arguments

that were previously presented to the Court. Plaintiffs also contend there are additional facts

which were not discoverable prior to the filing of the Court’s judgment that alter the outcome. 

The Court did consider each of the arguments raised by Plaintiffs in support of their

motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. However, it found those arguments

unpersuasive. In addition, the Court finds the additional set of purported facts proffered by

Plaintiffs are, for the most part irrelevant, and further do not change the outcome of the Court’s

decision. 

B. Motions to Vacate or Amend the Judgment.

In the alternative, in a series of filings, Plaintiffs move for relief from judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2) and (3) and to alter or amend the judgment

pursuant to Rule 59(e). Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not

be reversed absent some abuse of discretion. Browder v. Director, Ill. Dep’t of Corrections,

434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978); Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1997). It

is well-settled that once final judgment has been entered, the district court lacks jurisdiction to

decide a motion to amend unless and until the judgment is reopened by the granting of a Rule

60 motion. Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Under Rule 60(b)(1), a court may “relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from

a final judgment, order or proceeding” based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); see also Engleson v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 972

F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1992) (“To qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), the movant must

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demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”) (quotations and citation

omitted). Plaintiffs contend that the Court made a mistake of law when it granted the motions

to dismiss and when it denied them leave to amend. See, e.g., Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United

States, 366 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966) (court may grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) based on

judicial error, before time to appeal has expired); see also Phonometrics v. Hospitality

Franchise, Inc., 126 Fed. Appx. 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court has considered Plaintiffs’

arguments as to the merits of their claims, and it finds no basis to reconsider its decision. 

Under Rule 60(b)(2), a court may “relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from

a final judgment, order or proceeding” based on “newly discovered evidence that, with

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(2). Although Plaintiffs attempt to proffer additional evidence, there is no

indication that such evidence is newly-discovered, or relevant, or could not have been

discovered before entry of judgment. The Court has considered the alleged proffer of evidence

and finds that it does not constitute a basis to reconsider its decision under Rule 60(b)(2).

Under Rule 60(b)(3), a court may “relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from

a final judgment, order or proceeding” based on “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by

an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Again, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Defendants

engaged in fraud and forged documents relating to the transactions at issue with their

Richmond, California property. However, the Court has considered these arguments and has

found them unpersuasive and not dispositive. Accordingly, the Court does not find that it has a

basis to reconsider its decision under Rule 60(b)(3).

Although Plaintiffs do not rely specifically on Rule 60(b)(6), that rule permits a court to

set a side a judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” “Judgments are not often set

aside under Rule 60(b)(6). Rather, the Rule is used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent

manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a

party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Latshaw v.

Trainer Wortham Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.

Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting United States v. Alpine Land

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& Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that

such extraordinary circumstances exist in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not

demonstrated a valid grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).

Plaintiffs also move to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) provides the Court with “discretion to reopen a judgment if one

has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of facts and conclusions of law or

make new findings and conclusions.” Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 928-29

(9th Cir. 2000). Relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 59(e) where any of the following

conditions are met: “(1) the district court is presented with newly-discovered evidence; (2) there

is an intervening change in controlling law; or (3) the district court committed clear error or

made a decision that was manifestly unjust.” Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740

(9th Cir. 2001). Relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in

the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate

of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Similar to its analysis pursuant to Plaintiffs’

motion for reconsideration and motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b), the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to proffer newly discovered

evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or a persuasive argument that the Court

committed clear error or made a decision that was manifestly unjust. Accordingly, the Court

does not find that it has a basis to alter or amend its judgment under Rule 59(e).

Lastly, Plaintiffs contends that the Court should have granted them leave to amend. “A

pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its

deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be

cured by amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). In its Order granting the motion to dismiss, the

Court concluded that Plaintiffs were not able to cure the defects identified in the Order. After

multiple instructive orders and a thorough disposition of the issues on the merits, the Court

determined it would be futile to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend and there is no cause to change

that determination. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for

reconsideration, or in the alternative, for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(1), (2), (3) or (6) or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2015 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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