Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03135/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03135-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

 v

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, a judicial

branch entity,

 Defendant.

 

IRMA TOLENTINO,

Plaintiff,

 v

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, a judicial

branch entity

 Defendant.

 /

No C 04-3135 VRW

No C 04-3301 VRW

 ORDER

Defendant Superior Court of the State of California in

and for the County of San Mateo (Superior Court) has moved for

attorney fees in this Title VII case pursuant to 42 USC § 2000e-5(k)

following the court’s June 7, 2007 entry of summary judgment in

favor of Superior Court and against plaintiffs Irma Tolentino and

Yolanda Mitchell. C 04-3135 Doc #70. 

Case 3:04-cv-03135-VRW Document 98 Filed 02/08/08 Page 1 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Superior Court has resolved its fee motion with plaintiff

Tolentino (C 04-3135 Doc #88 at 2) through settlement, leaving for

the court’s resolution only Superior Court’s motion for attorney

fees against plaintiff Mitchell. 

For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS Superior

Court’s motion for attorney fees. 

I

A

The court’s summary judgment order described in detail the

unified factual chronology of the Mitchell and Tolentino cases. 

C 04-3135 Doc #70 at 5-16. Additionally, the order discussed and

applied the standards for successfully opposing a motion for summary

judgment in a case alleging discrimination under Title VII (id at

18-21), retaliation (id at 21-22), defamation (id at 22) and

intentional infliction of emotional distress (id at 23-24). Finding

that neither plaintiff had adduced evidence sufficient to establish

a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation or to oppose

summary judgment on any of their other claim, the court ordered

judgment entered in favor of Superior Court. The court noted that

“Superior Court’s evidence of legitimate personnel management

activity is extraordinarily strong,” and that “much of Superior

Court’s evidence was in plaintiffs’ hands before these lawsuits were

filed and [] the discovery process added little to support

plaintiffs’ view of these terminations.” Accordingly, the court

observed that the case might be an appropriate one for an award of

fees and costs under 42 USC § 2000e-5(k). Id at 43. 

\\ 

Case 3:04-cv-03135-VRW Document 98 Filed 02/08/08 Page 2 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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B 

Prior to filing the instant motion for attorney fees,

counsel for Superior Court requested from Mitchell’s counsel,

William Hopkins, a one-week extension of the deadline established by

Civil Local Rule 54-6 to file its motion for attorney fees and its

bill of costs. C 04-3135 Doc #73 at 1-2. After leaving a voice

mail message for Hopkins requesting the extension, Superior Court’s

counsel received a letter via facsimile denying the request. Id Ex

A at 2. Accordingly, Superior Court’s counsel then filed an ex

parte application seeking the one-week extension, which the court

granted. C 04-3135 Doc ## 72, 76. Superior Court then timely filed

the instant motion for attorney fees. C 04-3135 Doc #77.

Superior Court argues that because it prevailed on summary

judgment and because Mitchell’s claims were unreasonable and without

foundation, Superior Court is entitled to reasonable attorney fees

under 42 USC § 2000e-5(k). C 04-3135 Doc #77 at 2. Superior Court

asserts the following in support: (1) Mitchell’s lawsuit against

Superior Court contained unreasonable and unsupportable claims

(C 04-3135 Doc #77 at 4); (2) Mitchell had access to the evidence

upon which Superior Court based its termination decisions before

filing the lawsuit (id at 5); (3) Superior Court attempted, but

failed, to resolve the case through mediation and at a settlement

conference (id at 5); and (4) because the court determined that

Mitchell had failed to establish a prima facie case and, moreover, 

could not overcome Superior Court’s evidence establishing

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Mitchell. Id.

Superior Court filed a fee request based on the lodestar

method of fee calculation, consisting of reasonably expended hours

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. C 04-3135 Doc #77 at 11;

See Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 433 (1983). The lodestar

method is appropriate for determining reasonable fees under 42 USC §

2000e-5k and is “the guiding light of our fee-shifting

jurisprudence." Gisbrecht v Barnhart, 535 US 789, 801-02 (2002),

quoting Burlington v Dague, 505 US 557, 562 (1992). 

Superior Court’s motion requests $99,934.75 in fees broken

down as follows:

Year Fees for

Mitchell case

only

Joint undifferentiated

fees for both Mitchell

and Tolentino cases 

2004 - 19,557.00

2005 $31,303.50 89,626.00

2006 $3,722.00 11,992.50

2007 - 8,643.00

SUBTOTAL 35,025.50 129,818.50

1/2 of joint subtotal 64,909.25

GRAND TOTAL = Mitchell

case subtotal plus 1⁄2 of

joint subtotal

$99,934.75

C 04-3135 Doc #79 Ex C. These figures reflect a billing rate of

$205 per hour for all attorney hours billed through June 30, 2006

and a rate of $215 per hour for hours billed after June 20, 2006. 

C 04-3135 Doc #79 at 3 ¶ 7. Much of the amount claimed represents

Superior Court’s counsel’s time spent on claims related to both the

Tolentino and Mitchell jointly, of which Superior Court seeks half

from Mitchell, while the remainder represents hours devoted to the

Mitchell case alone. Id at ¶ 8. Superior Court’s counsel asserts

that both the Mitchell and Tolentino cases “stemmed from a common

nucleus of operative fact and involved the same witnesses,”

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warranting joint timekeeping. The court finds this approach

reasonable and that any further attempt to disaggregate time spent

on the Mitchell and Tolentino cases is unlikely to produce a more

accurate allocation. 

Superior Court submits declarations detailing the

experience and billing rates of Superior Court’s counsel (C 04-3135

Doc #79) together with two declarations from other attorneys in the

community knowledgeable about defense costs in employment litigation

stating that the requested billing rates of $205 and $215 per hour

are not only reasonable but low. C 04-03135 Doc #80 at 2 ¶¶ 3-4;

Doc #81 at 2 ¶ 3. 

The court finds both the billing rates and the number of

hours claimed reasonable and approves the lodestar figure. 

 

C

Mitchell failed to file timely opposition to the motion

for attorney fees. Then, ten days after the August 9, 2007 deadline

—— apparently prompted by Superior Court’s reply brief pointing out

Mitchell’s failure to oppose —— the court received an “initial

opposition” from Mitchell (C 04-3135 Doc #91) along with requests

for relief from late filing, for leave to submit supplemental late

briefing and for continuance of the hearing date. C 04-3135 Doc

#92. In a supporting declaration, Hopkins proffered a number of

excuses. Id. In particular, Hopkins stated: 

That I have recently relocated my office. Coupled with

my efforts to change office locations, also to place

closed matters in storage, and also coordinate

arrangements to take my children to visit family on the

east coast while they were out of school for the

summer, I had attempted to coordinate continuances and

rescheduling of matters. Unfortunately, I had

neglected to properly calendar this matter during this

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period, as I had thought that I had sought continuances

where possible and rescheduled, accordingly.

* * *

I am submitting the current opposition (filed

concurrently), but based on the request for relief made

herein, respectfully ask that this matter be continued

so as to allow Plaintiff to file a further opposition,

particularly if the Court is inclined to grant fees and

/or “not” [sic] stay this matter pending the resolution

of the appeal. .[sic]

Id at 2 ¶¶ 1, 4.

In addition to being filed late and admittedly

insufficient, the opposition brief essentially admitted that

Mitchell had lacked a prima facie case of discrimination or

retaliation. The opposition states:

Awarding Attorney’s fees against plaintiffs that

aren’t able to meet th[e] very difficult burden of

essentially establishing something that only exists

in the mind of the employer * * * particularly where

the action is not frivolous or brought in bad faith,

would have a chilling affect [sic] on discrimination

and retaliation claims. A conclusion that

discriminatory or retaliatory intent has not been

shown does not invariably establish that the action

is frivolous or brought in bad faith.

C 04-3135 Doc #91 at 2. 

In response, Superior Court filed a timely surreply on

August 21, 2007 in which it asked the court to deny Mitchell’s

requests based on the following points: Mitchell’s opposition

response was ten days late; Superior Court attempted, via letter of

June 25, 2007, to meet and confer about the attorney fees, but

Hopkins never responded to the letter; and Hopkins had known about

Superior Court’s motion for nine weeks, so his failure to comply

with the local rules weighed against allowing additional time. Id. 

C 04-3135 Doc #93 at 2-3. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The court determined that neither oral argument nor

further briefing was necessary and therefore took the matter under

submission on the papers. 

II

A

42 USC § 2000e-5(k) provides that a district court “in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party * * * a reasonable

attorney’s fee as part of the costs” in any action proceeding under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Either a prevailing

plaintiff or a prevailing defendant may be awarded attorney fees

under this provision. Christiansburg Garment Co v Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, 434 US 412, 421 (1978). 

“A district court may in its discretion award attorney’s

fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding

that the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith” or

“that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became

so.” Id at 421-22. The legislative history of this provision

establishes that Congress wanted to “protect defendants from

burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis,” id at 420,

and the Supreme Court specifically noted that “many defendants in

Title VII claims are small- and moderate-size employers for whom the

expense of defending even a frivolous claim may become a strong

disincentive to the exercise of their legal rights,” an “equitable

consideration” with which courts should be concerned in adjudicating

Title VII cases. Id at 423 n20. 

Nonetheless, fee awards to prevailing defendants under 42

USC § 2000e-5(k) remain unusual, presumably due, at least in part,

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to the countervailing public policy favoring vigorous enforcement of

Title VII. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “a district court must

exercise caution in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in order

to avoid discouraging legitimate suits that may not be ‘airtight,’”

while taking into account the financial burden to employers as noted

in Christiansburg. EEOC v Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F3d 285, 287-88

(9th Cir 1993). Indeed, Mitchell’s only argument in opposition to

the motion is that awarding attorney fees against her “would have a

chilling affect [sic] on discrimination and retaliation claims” (C

04-3135 Doc #91 at 2). Accordingly, the court must balance the

competing equitable factors in adjudicating the instant motion. 

B

First, the court considers whether Mitchell’s suit was

“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” a determination

that is subject to a variety of considerations including: the

plaintiff’s failure to produce any evidence; a prior adverse

decision in court or administrative proceedings; the grant of

summary judgment or directed verdict or dismissal for failure to

state a claim; plaintiff’s inability to establish a prima facie

case; the novelty of the claims or unsettled nature of the legal

issues; and whether the plaintiff is represented by counsel. See

James W Moore, 10 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 54.171[3][d] at 54-

297-303 (LexisNexis 3d ed 2007). The court should avoid “hindsight

logic,” but “if the plaintiff insists on litigating in the face of

overwhelming precedent in favor of the defendant, fees may be

assessed against the plaintiff.” Id at 54-299, 54-303.

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Mitchell filed her case not only lacking direct or

circumstantial evidence that her termination was improperly

motivated, but in full knowledge of the strength of Superior Court’s

evidence that its motive was legitimate and non-discriminatory. 

Prior to filing the complaint, plaintiff had access to three key

items of evidence. 

The six-page non-punitive disciplinary letter dated August

4, 2003 documented dishonesty, insubordination, disrespectful or

discourteous conduct, misuse of position, failure to follow

policies, procedures or work rules or negligence in the performance

of duties and violations of the Tenets of the Code of Ethics for

court employees, specifically: personal integrity, professionalism

and safeguarding of confidential information (see Doc #70 at 8 and

Thompson Depo Ex 9, C04-3135 #35 Att #1 Ex B). 

The Curiale report (C 04-3135 Doc #70 at 25) ran to

fourteen pages, was specific and detailed and “amounted to a

scathing review of Mitchell’s performance in her position,”

documenting, inter alia, that Mitchell “managed by fear,” used

demeaning language toward co-workers and subordinates, attempted to

undermine senior management and foster division and made improper

use of staff resources. Doc # 70 at 10-11. 

The eleven-page, single-spaced termination letter dated

February 19, 2004 set forth Superior Court’s grounds and factual

bases for its adverse action against Mitchell: dishonesty;

unacceptable performance; willful misconduct causing damage to

public property; disrespectful or discourteous conduct and sexual

harassment and/or discrimination toward a county officer or

official, another employee or a member of the public; and misuse of

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position and violations of seven of the tenets of the code of ethics

for California court employees (Doc #70; Mitchell Depo Ex 17 at 1).

In the face of an exceptionally strong factual record

establishing the legitimate management reasons for Superior Court’s

decision to dismiss her, Mitchell proceeded to retain counsel and

filed and served her complaint. 

Next, Mitchell undertook a “wide ranging and costly”

discovery process that encompassed ten depositions (most of which

were of Superior Court’s managers and employees) (Doc #77 at 6) and

emerged with no more evidence in her favor than she had begun with.

At that point, Mitchell had the option to dismiss the case, but

instead pressed on. “If a plaintiff’s claim appears to be colorable

when filed, but subsequent events clearly demonstrate that the claim

is not defensible either on the law or the facts, fees may be

awarded to a prevailing defendant if the plaintiff does not timely

dismiss the litigation.” Moore, 10 Moore’s Federal Practice §

54.171[3][d] at 54-300. Voluntary dismissal allows a plaintiff to

avoid unduly burdening the defendant with legal expenses after

failing to muster the evidence needed to prove her case. 

But Mitchell did not voluntarily dismiss the case after

discovery failed to reveal evidence that would enable her to make

out a prima facie case or to refute Superior Court’s evidence of

legitimate non-discriminatory motive. Rather, she waited while

Superior Court incurred the substantial expense of assembling and

bringing a summary judgment motion. She opposed the motion ——

albeit ineffectively —— and the court granted summary judgment for

Superior Court on all of her claims. 

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Finally, there were no unsettled questions of law at play

in Mitchell’s case that would weigh against an award of fees to

Superior Court. Rather, Mitchell proceeded under —— or in the face

of —— settled rules of law applicable to all the causes of action

in her complaint. 

C

In her opposition, Mitchell does not contend that she

acted on advice of counsel. Given that the opposition was prepared

by counsel, however, the court deems it prudent to address this

potential argument. 

Some plaintiffs have attempted to escape a fee

assessment by arguing that they brought the suit on

advice of counsel. This tactic is generally

unsuccessful, because the plaintiff is ultimately

responsible for the choice of counsel. Even if the

lawyer is primarily responsible for the frivolous

suit, the plaintiff can be charged with the

defendant’s fees. 

Moore, 10 Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.171(3)(e) at 54-302. 

Although not an attorney herself, Mitchell was an

experienced, long-term manager with the courts and may be presumed

familiar not only with the course of litigation but also with —— at

least in a basic form —— the discrimination, harassment and

retaliation rules applicable to employers. It was Mitchell’s

responsibility to make an independent and objective evaluation of

the underlying facts and to assess her likelihood of success in a

suit against her former employer. The court does not know and

cannot know what advice Mitchell’s attorney gave her, but had

Mitchell reviewed Hopkins’s track record with Title VII cases, she

would have known that Hopkins was in no position to turn a case

burdened with bad facts for the plaintiff into a courtroom success. 

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The court has taken the occasion to review the ten most

recent cases in which Hopkins appeared as counsel of record in this

court (not including the instant cases). Of these ten cases, one is

currently open —— C 05-5211 MMC. The outcomes in the other nine

cases are as follows: defense motion to dismiss granted, motion for

an award of attorney fees against plaintiff pending (C 05-0293

MHP)(order states: “The only issues raised by plaintiffs are issues

that were not raised in the complaint nor were they raised in the

arbitration proceedings despite ample opportunity to do so,” Doc

#87); two summary judgments for the defense with costs awarded to

the defense (C 05-0317 SI Doc ##108, 126 and C 05-2820 WHA Doc #54);

partial summary judgment for the defense (C 06-3914 SI Doc #63)

followed by settlement (id Doc #66); and three settlements (C 04-

4978 JSW; C 05-1519 EMC; C 06-5522 PJH). In the only one of these

cases in which a settlement amount can be ascertained from the

public docket, Hopkins’s client settled for a gross amount of $3000

—— a sum unlikely to have netted more than a pittance after fees and

costs were subtracted. C 04-4978 JSW Doc #35. 

In just one case did Hopkins “prevail” at trial: the jury

found for the defendant on all claims but one, awarding Hopkins’s

client one dollar on the remaining claim. C 04-3772 WDB Doc #124. 

Notwithstanding the shaky foundation for declaring victory,

Hopkins’s client unsuccessfully applied for attorney fees as a

“prevailing party.” Id Doc #126-30. The application was denied

because of counsel’s failure to keep “accurate, contemporaneous time

records.” Id Doc #140. 

The ten cases also demonstrate significant problems with

the quality of Hopkins’s work on behalf of clients. Hopkins

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received a minimum of ten notices for failure to comply with efiling requirements over a fifteen-month period from September 24,

2004, through December 5, 2005 (C 04-3772 WDB Doc ##3, 5, 8, 13, 23;

C 05-0293 MHP Doc #26; C 05-0317 SI Doc ##6, 14; C 05-0669 CW Doc

#5; C 05-1519 EMC Doc #21). Hopkins also: failed to respond to

requests for admission of material facts, thus enabling the

defendant to move for summary judgment on the ground that all

material facts were deemed admitted (C 04-04978 JSW Doc #13); failed

to oppose a motion to dismiss (id Doc #22, C 05-0317 SI Doc #18);

was sanctioned by the court for failing to respond to discovery (C

06-3914 SI Doc #32); was threatened with sanctions for failure to

file a settlement conference statement (C 06-5522 PJH Doc #17); and

prematurely appealed the district court’s order of dismissal only to

have the appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (C 05-0293 MHP

Doc #58). After failing to file a settlement conference statement

and failing to appear for a settlement conference, Hopkins, under

order from a magistrate judge, paid $250 to charity to avoid a showcause hearing re: the imposition of further sanctions. C 05-5211

MMC Doc ##13, 14, 30. In just one case, Hopkins: failed to attend

a case management conference, failed to serve a defendant with

process, failed to comply with the court’s discovery standing orders

and provided insufficient responses to discovery requests. C 06-

3914 SI Doc ## 15, 26-29, 33, 41.

In the instant consolidated cases, Hopkins failed to

produce requested documents during discovery (C 04-3135 Doc #29);

refused opposing counsel’s request for additional time to file

documents (id Doc #73 Ex A at 2); failed to e-file on four occasions

(C 04-3135 Doc ##4, 5, 11, 20); submitted documents with numerous

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typos, insufficient citations to evidence and annotations left over

from the drafting process (e g “FILL IN FACTS RE EEO COMPLAINT AND

CHARGE” (C 04-3135, Doc # 4 at 4 and passim); and, according to

Tolentino’s replacement counsel, failed to hand over Tolentino’s

complete files in an orderly or timely fashion after Hopkins’s

representation of Tolentino ceased early on in the litigation (C 04-

3301 Doc # 51). And it bears repeating that in connection with the

instant motion, Hopkins: denied Superior Court’s counsel the

courtesy of a modest extension of time to file the motion for fees

and the cost bills in these consolidated cases, thus needlessly

requiring Superior Court to spend even more on fees; failed to meet

and confer with Superior Court’s counsel regarding attorney fees as

required by Local Rule 54-6; and failed timely to oppose the instant

fee motion, ultimately submitting a tardy and poorly-crafted

response.

 In summary, Hopkins’s track record, from the standpoint of

a prospective Title VII plaintiff, cannot reasonably give rise to

optimism about her chances of success in the litigation. Mitchell,

as a long-term manager in the courts, may be presumed to be more

aware than the average citizen that a specific attorney’s competence

or skill often has a direct bearing on the outcomes he achieves for

his clients. It is therefore especially appropriate to hold

Mitchell, with her special knowledge of the attorney’s role,

accountable for the actions of her attorney. 

No matter what his or her level of skill, a lawyer is the

agent of her client and “a losing civil rights plaintiff must answer

for the conduct of her lawyer.” Schutts v Nevada, 966 F Supp 1549,

1558 (DC Nev 1997). The Ninth Circuit does not appear to have

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addressed this distinction, but a much-cited case from the Eleventh

Circuit (cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit as to a different

point in Miller v Los Angeles County Board of Education, 827 F2d

617, 621 (9th Cir 1987)) is in accord:

Like any other principal, a client may be bound by

the acts of his agent, acting within the scope of

his authority * * *. [T]he perception that

counsel was primarily at fault in filing or

maintaining a frivolous, groundless, or

unreasonable claim should play no role in the

decision whether to assess attorney’s fees against

the plaintiff in a Title VII case.

Durrett v Jenkins Brickyard, Inc, 678 F2d 912, 915-16 (11th Cir

1982)(reversing district court’s order refusing fee award to

defendant based on belief that plaintiff “bore less responsibility

for the fiasco than his lawyer.”) A plaintiff thus obligated to pay

the defendant’s attorney fees may find redress in a malpractice

action against her lawyer: “If the plaintiff’s attorney’s actions

were negligent, she can sue him for malpractice.” Schutts, 966 F

Supp at 1558; “in [] cases * * * in which the plaintiff’s counsel

may appear to be primarily culpable, the plaintiff may find relief

* * * in the form of a malpractice action”). Accordingly, it is

appropriate to make an award of fees against Mitchell personally. 

 

D

Mitchell’s opposition does not contend that the requested

award of fees would exceed her ability to pay. It also makes no

assertions, conversely, about Superior Court’s ability to shoulder

the expenses of defending against Mitchell’s suit without recouping

any fees from her. The court nonetheless must address the former

consideration in some manner because “a district court in cases

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involving 42 USC § 1981, 1983 or Title VII should consider the

financial resources of the plaintiff in awarding fees to a

prevailing defendant” although “a district court should not refuse

to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant * * * solely on

the ground of the plaintiff’s financial condition.” Miller, 827 F2d

617, 621 & n 5. The court must consider the financial impact on

Superior Court as part of the balancing of equities discussed in II

A, supra. 

In the absence of data from Mitchell, the court consulted

current employment listings on Superior Court’s website. A listing

for “lead deputy court clerk,” a position lower in rank than that

last held by Mitchell, advertised a monthly salary of $4,136 to

$5,169, which translates to an annual salary of $49,632 to $62,028.

http://www.sanmateocourt.org/director.php?filename=./jobs/index.php

(consulted December 13, 2007). Mitchell’s qualifications may

therefore be presumed to place her earning capacity at or above this

salary range. In view of Mitchell’s presumed earning capacity,

Superior Court’s fee request is presumptively within Mitchell’s

ability to pay. 

Meanwhile, the court lacks specific information about the

impact of defense costs on Superior Court’s fiscal situation. If

Mitchell had raised an argument in this regard in her opposition ——

which she did not —— Superior Court would have been prompted to

address it in reply. In the absence of specific information,

however, it is perhaps sufficient to note that Superior Court is a

public agency funded by tax revenues collected by the State of

California. Ultimately, the cost of defending against lawsuits such

as Mitchell’s must be borne by the taxpayers. 

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IV

Following her termination from employment, Mitchell chose

to retain counsel, initiate litigation, conduct extensive discovery

and await summary judgment proceedings in full knowledge of the

abundance of evidence against her claims and armed with little more

than a near-certainty of failure. 

Under these circumstances, it is not appropriate for

Superior Court, a public entity entirely funded by taxpayer dollars,

to be saddled with the substantial costs of defending this frivolous

action. For the reasons stated herein, Superior Court’s motion for

an award of $99,934.75 is GRANTED. 

Mitchell shall also pay Superior Court’s costs as set

forth in its cost bill (Doc #84) in full. 

 Mitchell’s request for leave to submit supplemental late

briefing is DENIED as untimely, futile and moot. 

Mitchell’s request to stay the motion for attorney fees

pending the resolution of her appeal from the court’s order on the

merits is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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