Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00378/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00378-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ERIC EDWARD JUELL,

NO. CIV S-05-0378 FCD/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FOREST PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

and DAVID WILLIAMS,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’ Forest

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Forest”) and David Williams (“Williams”)

motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiff Eric Edward Juell (“Juell”)

opposes defendants’ motion. For the reasons set forth below,2

defendants’ motion is DENIED.

/////

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3 For the purposes of this motion, the court recounts

plaintiff’s version of the facts. (See Pl.’s Separate Stmt. of

Undisp. Material Facts (“SDF”), filed Aug. 1, 2006; Aff. of Eric

Edward Juell (“Juell Aff.”), filed Aug. 1, 2006). While

plaintiff titled this document as a separate statement of

undisputed facts, the court interprets this document as a

separate statement of disputed facts filed pursuant to Eastern

District Local Rule 56-260(b).

Where the facts are undisputed, the court refers to the

parties’ statement of undisputed facts. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to

Def.’s Separate Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“UF”), filed Aug. 1,

2006). 

2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Eric Edward Juell was born on February 8, 1953. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 1). Plaintiff was hired by defendant Forest in

June 1991 as a Territory Sales Representative. (UF ¶ 1). Forest

manufactures and markets various prescription pharmaceutical

products throughout the United States. (UF ¶ 1). After

approximately five years with Forest, plaintiff was promoted to

the position of Manager of Specialty Markets (“MSM”). (UF ¶ 2). 

As an MSM, plaintiff’s primary responsibilities were to identify

and develop working relationships with HMOs, to contract Forest’s

pharmaceutical products in a positive formulary position, and to

work with Forest’s sales force in the field. (Juell Aff. ¶ 6). 

Plaintiff was also required to call on HMOs, pharmacy benefit

management companies (“PBM”s), and medical groups, communicate in

writing and orally with his accounts before and after calling on

them, draft reports, communicate with Forest’s sales force and

upper management, create expense reports, coordinate programs

with sales representatives that accentuated Forest’s formulary

position with HMOs, and work with Forest’s sales force to

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4 Defendants assert that Forest’s records reflect that

plaintiff was assigned only one account of Shaw’s, Maxicare. (UF

¶¶ 41, 43). Defendants argue that plaintiff does not present any

evidence disputing Forest’s records. However, plaintiff states

in his declaration that he called on many account in Southern

California and Nevada that were formerly in Shaw’s territory and

attached the corresponding Contact and Activity Reporting System

(“CARS”) reports. (Juell Aff. ¶ 56; Ex. 21 to Juell Aff.; UF ¶

41). Plaintiff also asserts that the individuals whom defendants

identify as taking other accounts of Shaw’s were SMRs who assumed

(continued...)

3

maximize Forest’s market share with those markets where Forest

had a positive formulary position. (Juell Aff. ¶ 6). 

Plaintiff presents evidence that his job responsibilities

began to increase sometime in 2000. In early 2000, defendant

Williams became plaintiff’s manager. (Juell Aff. ¶ 8). When

plaintiff started in the job of MSM, he worked approximately

forty to fifty hours per week and was responsible for about eight

large accounts. (Juell Aff. ¶ 9). By late 2000, he was working

over sixty hours per week and was responsible for approximately

20 accounts. (Juell Aff. ¶ 9). In 2001, plaintiff had twice as

many lives (a number referring to an account’s member enrollment)

as other MSMs. (Juell Aff. ¶ 9). In 2000, due to a vacant

Specialty Market Representative (“SMR”) position, Williams

assigned plaintiff the additional responsibility of calling on

medical groups, including some in Southern California. (Juell

Aff. ¶ 8). Also in 2000, the MSM responsible for all of Southern

California, Marcus Shaw, was moved to a new position, and

plaintiff was assigned responsibility by Williams to all Southern

California HMO accounts and field sales force. (Juell Aff. ¶

11). This assignment increased his accounts from eight to

twenty.4 (Juell Aff. ¶ 11). As of 2001, plaintiff had

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4(...continued)

medical groups, not HMOs. (UF ¶ 43). As such, plaintiff has

presented evidence contrary to defendants’ assertions. 

4

responsibility for 16 divisional managers and 112

representatives. (Juell Aff. ¶ 14). The MSM who held the

neighboring territory had responsibility for 9 divisional

managers and 56 representatives. (Juell Aff. ¶ 15). Lastly,

plaintiff’s workload also increased due to his involvement in

producing speaker programs designed to increase market share for

the antidepressant drug Celexa. (Juell Aff. ¶ 11). From April

2001 to March 2002, plaintiff was the leader in program monies

utilized for speaker programs. (Juell Aff. ¶ 11). In order to

complete the tasks assigned, plaintiff’s wife assisted him in

administrative duties, often working forty hours per week. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 12). Further, in early 2002, SMRs were relieved of

responsibility for calling on medical group accounts, and that

responsibility was added to the MSM workload. (Juell Aff. ¶ 7). 

In February 2001, plaintiff was promoted to the position of

Senior Manager of Specialty Markets (“Senior MSM”). (Juell Aff.

¶ 2). In September 2001, plaintiff informed Williams that he had

too many accounts and responsibility for many more divisional

managers and representatives than his colleagues. (Juell Aff. ¶

14). At this time, plaintiff was spending 40% of his time

interfacing with Forest sales representatives. (Juell Aff. ¶

14). Williams told plaintiff that he did not want to hear about

it. (Juell Aff. ¶ 14). Plaintiff also spoke to Williams several

times throughout 2001-2003 about the unrealistic work load that

he had been assigned and its affect on his psychological well

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5

being. (Juell Aff. ¶ 16). On June 5, 2002, plaintiff also

informed Donald MacDonald, Vice-President of Managed Care

Operations for Forest, of his unrealistic workload and that

Williams did not provide him with any managerial support. (Juell

Aff. ¶ 17; Aff. of Donald MacDonald (“MacDonald Aff.”), filed

Aug. 11, 2006). MacDonald never spoke to plaintiff again

regarding these issues. (Juell Aff. ¶ 17).

Beginning in approximately late 2001 or early 2002, Williams

made numerous age-related comments to plaintiff every time they

spoke. (Juell Aff. ¶ 18). When Williams first made age-related

comments to him, plaintiff thought he was joking. (SDF ¶ 1). 

However, over time, the comments became more frequent and more

degrading. (Juell Aff. ¶ 18). Williams made comments about

plaintiff’s age during account calls, in peer group settings, and

over the telephone. (Juell Aff. ¶ 18). On several account

visits that plaintiff and Williams made together, Williams

implied that there was a question as to whether plaintiff could

still “get the job done” at his age and whether plaintiff’s

abilities were waning. (Juell Aff. ¶¶ 18, 20). Specifically,

plaintiff recalls Williams mentioning his age with a negative

connotation during account calls to Blue Shield of California,

Catalyst RX, Sierra Health Services, Integrated Pharmaceutical

Services, and Sutter Health. (Juell Aff. ¶ 18).

Williams would also sent numerous e-mails to plaintiff in

which plaintiff believes he made reference to plaintiff’s age. 

(SDF ¶ 4). Williams wrote e-mails to plaintiff wherein he

referred to him as “Senior,” “SR.,” and “Old manager of specialty

markets.” (SDF ¶ 5; Juell Aff. ¶¶ 21-27). In one e-mail,

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Williams wrote: “I hope that the little old ladies that you met

don’t start calling you at home – maybe you should refer them

onto Marc Shaw – he might be able to get them a great deal on a

nursing home community.” (Juell Aff. ¶ 27). In another e-mail

sent shortly after the birth of his daughter, Williams wrote:

“Don’t feel bad when the teacher asks if you’re the grandfather.” 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 28). Williams also made remarks in other e-mails

such as “Hope all is well with my very senior account manager (50

and still ticking),” “Going for the big 15 to go with 50,” “bring

your cane to the next meeting,” and “you are the oldest guy in

the department, aren’t you?.” (Juell Aff. ¶¶ 29-31). 

In the fall of 2002, plaintiff had a telephone conversation

with Williams wherein Williams told plaintiff that he was golfing

with a good friend from his church who had lost his job and who

had asked about employment with Forest. (SDF ¶ 6). When

plaintiff asked Williams whether he was going to hire his friend,

Williams responded that he was not because the man was over fifty

and had lost his snap. (SDF ¶ 6). Plaintiff felt that Williams

shared this with him as an indirect way of commenting on his age,

as this conversation occurred shortly before plaintiff’s fiftieth

birthday. (SDF ¶ 6; Juell Aff. ¶ 33). 

Plaintiff spoke to Forest’s Senior Director of Human

Resources, Jeff Wolfe (“Wolfe”), approximately five times between

January 2002 and April 2003 about his inability to handle all the

work that he had been assigned. (Juell Aff. ¶ 36). In May 2002,

plaintiff informed Wolfe that Williams was sending e-mails with

comments about plaintiff’s age and mentioning his age to

accounts; plaintiff told Wolfe that he felt like he was the

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target of age discrimination. (SDF ¶¶ 12-13). Plaintiff was

never contacted by any Forest Human Resources representative,

manager, or any other authorized representative of Forest

concerning any investigation into his complaints. (Juell Aff. ¶

36). Neither Wolfe nor anyone in Forest’s Human Resources

Department took any action to reduce plaintiff’s workload or to

investigate whether there was merit to plaintiff’s complaints

regarding age discrimination. (SDF ¶ 21). Sometime after Summer

2002, Wolfe informed MacDonald that plaintiff had some concerns

about communications from Williams relating to his age. (SDF ¶

16). MacDonald thereafter spoke to Williams in general terms and

Williams acknowledged that he may have said some things that were

mis-perceived, but that he would be sensitive to making any kind

of comments that were not work-related. (SDF ¶¶ 16-17). 

In early 2003, as a result of Williams’ focus on his age

along with the heavy workload, plaintiff felt he could no longer

perform the tasks of his job. (SDF ¶ 22). Williams’ conduct

made it psychologically impossible for plaintiff to continue as

an MSM and to continue under the supervision of Williams. (SDF ¶

23). Plaintiff informed Williams that he could no longer perform

the tasks associated with his position, that he was

psychologically and mentally stressed, and that it was impossible

for him to handle the volume of work assigned to him. (SDF ¶

24). In April 2003, plaintiff called to inform Wolfe that he was

taking a voluntary demotion because he felt that he had been

forced to resign from his position as Senior MSM due to his age. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 38). Plaintiff took a position as an office-based

Specialty Representative, which decreased his base salary by

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$28,000. (SDF ¶ 26). Plaintiff would not have taken this

position absent the conduct of Williams. (SDF ¶ 25). After

plaintiff told Williams that he was stepping down from the Senior

MSM position, Williams told plaintiff that at his age, that might

be good. (UF ¶ 58). When plaintiff stepped down from his MSM

position in April 2003, he was replaced by Irene Camarino, who

was 34 years old in 2003. (SDF ¶ 37). 

Plaintiff held the position of Specialty Representative

under the supervision of Scott Rogers from April 2003 through

July 17, 2003. (Juell Aff. ¶ 41). However, the mental distress

suffered by plaintiff as an MSM under the supervision of Williams

rendered him unable to perform even at the reduced level required

of a Specialty Representative. (Juell Aff. ¶ 41). As a result

of the mental distress, plaintiff had a nervous breakdown and

became disabled. (Juell Aff. ¶ 42). He took a leave of absence

from Forest since July 17, 2003. As of that date, he remains

unable to focus, concentrate, multi-task, or return to work. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 42). 

On January 26, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint in Nevada

County Superior Court against defendants, alleging state claims

against defendants Forest and Williams for harassment on the

basis of age in violation of California’s Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, and against

defendant Forest for discrimination on the basis of age in

violation of FEHA, wrongful termination in violation of public

policy and failure to prevent harassment in violation of

California Government Code § 12940(k). Defendants removed the

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case from state court in February 2005 on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction. 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56©,

is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

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genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

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56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. 

ANALYSIS

A. Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims

Plaintiff brings claims under the Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”) for discrimination, harassment, and failure

to prevent discrimination on the basis of age. Defendants move

for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff has not

produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact

for violations of FEHA.

FEHA provides that it is “an unlawful employment practice”

for an employer to refuse to hire or employ, to bar or discharge

from employment, or to discriminate against any individual over

the age of 40 in compensation or in terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment on the basis of age. Cal. Gov. Code §§

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12926, 12941 (West 2006). “Although the wording of the Fair

Employment Housing Act and title VII of the Federal Civil Rights

Act of 1964 differs in some particulars, the antidiscriminatory

objectives and the overriding public policy purposes are

identical,” and therefore, California courts refer to applicable

federal decisions where appropriate. Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp.,

826 F.2d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing County of Alameda v.

Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 153 Cal. App. 3d 499, 504 (1984);

Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000). “In

particular, California has adopted the three-stage

burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme

Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age

discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. Guz,

24 Cal. 4th at 354 (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973); Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 29

Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1730 (1994); Ewing v. Gill Indus., Inc., 3

Cal. App. 4th 601, 610-11 (1992); County of Alameda, 153 Cal.

App. 3d 499, 504 (1984)).

1. Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff asserts that defendant Forest discriminated

against him based upon his age as evidenced by derogatory

age-related comments, a heavier workload than younger employees,

a corporate ageist culture, and eventual replacement by a younger

employee. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s conduct made it

psychologically impossible for him to continue working in his

position, and that he was forced to demote himself and then

eventually, to take a disability leave from his employment with

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5 Defendant, citing an unpublished opinion from the

Northern District of California, mistakenly asserts that the

fourth prima facie element requires that defendant show that

employees outside the protected age class were treated

differently. While this type of showing may circumstantially

demonstrate discriminatory intent, in Guz, the California Supreme

Court set forth that the fourth element of a prima facie case

requires plaintiff to demonstrate some other circumstance which

suggests discriminatory motive, not necessarily that other

employees outside of the protected age class were not treated

similarly. 24 Cal. 4th at 355. 

13

Forest. Defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot set forth a

claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of age.

To establish a case of age discrimination in violation of

FEHA, plaintiff must prove (1) he was a member of a protected

class; (2) he was performing competently in the position he held;

(3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as

termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4)

some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.5 Guz, 24

Cal. 4th at 355 (citations omitted). Under McDonnell Douglass,

once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Id.

at 355-56. However, only the burden of production shifts; the

ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. If the defendant can make this

showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “attack the

employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or

to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive. Guz, 24

Cal. 4th at 356 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 515-18 (1993)).

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Defendant Forest does not dispute that plaintiff was a

member of a protected class or that he was performing competently

in his position. (See UF ¶¶ 6-15; Defs.’ Mem. of P.&A. in Supp.

of Mot. for Summ. J., filed June 20, 2006, at 11). Rather,

defendant argues that plaintiff fails to demonstrate (1) that he

experienced an adverse employment action on a theory of

constructive discharge; (2) that defendant had discriminatory

motives for their conduct; and (3) that defendant’s legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for their conduct was merely a pretext

for discrimination on the basis of age. 

a. Constructive Discharge

Defendant Forest contends that plaintiff cannot establish a

prima facie claim of age discrimination because he did not

experience an adverse employment action. Plaintiff argues that

he was constructively discharged from his employment as a Senior

MSM with Forest. 

The doctrine of constructive discharge seeks to address the

situation where, “[i]n an attempt to avoid liability for

wrongfully discharging an employee, an employer may refrain from

actually firing an employee, preferring instead to engage in

conduct causing him or her to quit.” Colores v. Bd. of Trs., 105

Cal. App. 4th 1293, 1305 (2003) (quoting Turner v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1244-45 (1994)). As a result, in

order to prevent “end-runs” around claims requiring employerinitiated terminations of employment, “a constructive discharge

is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.” See

id. (quoting Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1244-45). The standard by

which a constructive discharge is determined is “whether a

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reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer

actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable

alternative except to quit.” Id. (quoting Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at

1248). In order to establish a constructive discharge, a

plaintiff must show that “the employer either intentionally

created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so

intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s

resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a

reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled

to resign.” Id. at 1305 (quoting Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1251). 

For purposes of constituting constructive discharge, the “adverse

working conditions must be unusually ‘aggravated’ or amount to a

‘continuous pattern’ before the situation will be deemed

intolerable.” Id. at 1306.

Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim is based upon his

resignation from the Senior MSM position and acceptance of the

Specialty Representative position, which decreased his base

salary from $108,000 to $80,000. Plaintiff contends that his

working conditions, specifically the combination of an

unmanageable workload along with frequent and degrading comments

by his supervisor Williams, forced him to resign from his

position as Senior MSM. However, in an effort to continue some

employment, plaintiff took the position of Specialty

Representative under a different supervisor. See Colores, 105

Cal. App. 4th at 1318 (finding that although the plaintiff did

not technically quit, she still had a claim for constructive

discharge because the true logic of plaintiff’s case was that her

employer, through its agents, made plaintiff’s working conditions

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so intolerable that “she was no longer able to function in her

duties and needed to remove herself from her job, and thus was

effectively constructive discharged”). 

Defendant Forest asserts that plaintiff was not

constructively discharged because his working conditions were not

objectively intolerable. Specifically, defendant contends that

(1) plaintiff’s job responsibilities were commensurate with other

MSMs; (2) plaintiff received above-average performance reviews,

promotions, bonuses, and stock options; (3) plaintiff was paid a

six-figure salary; and (4) plaintiff was meeting all performance

expectations. 

However, there is a factual dispute regarding whether

plaintiff’s job responsibilities were commensurate with other

MSMs. Defendant contends that the number of accounts assigned to

plaintiff was in line with other MSMs and that Forest management

otherwise did not substantiate plaintiff’s allegations that his

workload was unmanageable or that plaintiff had more

responsibilities than other MSMs. (See UF ¶ 38). Plaintiff

presents evidence that he had 16 division managers and 112 sales

representatives with whom he was required to communicate,

collaborate, and educate, while another MSM in a neighboring

territory had 9 division managers and 56 sales representatives. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 15). Also, in late 2000, plaintiff’s accounts

increased from eight to twenty. (Juell Aff. ¶ 11). Plaintiff

also presents evidence that he did 28 large speaking programs

from November 2000 to October 2001 and was the leader in program

monies utilized between April 2001 and March 2002. (Juell Aff. ¶

11). Because of the increased workload and responsibility,

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6 Celexa is an anti-depressant drug marketed by defendant

Forest for which plaintiff had to design speaker programs. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 11).

7 Defendant also points out that plaintiff testified at

his deposition that he did not try to devote more time to the

accounts that affected more lives. (Juell Dep. at 27:18-20). 

Defendant asserts that the court should not consider the number

of lives plaintiff was responsible for in assessing his workload

because of this statement. See Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253

F.3d 410, 419 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party cannot create a

genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment by

contradicting his earlier versions of the facts.”). However,

plaintiff testified that the number of lives affected by a

formulary position would sometimes dictate the number of time he

spent on an account. This is not necessarily inconsistent with

his statement that he did not try to devote more time to the

accounts that affected more lives. See Messick v. Horizon

Indus., Inc., 62 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he nonmoving party is not precluded from elaborating upon, explaining,

or clarifying prior testimony elicited by opposing counsel on

deposition.”). 

17

plaintiff’s wife assisted him in his administrative duties, often

working forty hours per week. (Juell Aff. ¶ 12). In February

2001, defendant Williams stated that plaintiff had one of the

highest Celexa6 market shares and dollar volume territories in

the country and that he had a consistently high call average. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 13). Plaintiff also presents evidence that he had

approximately twice as many lives (a number referring to an

account’s member enrollment) as other MSMs. (UF ¶ 38). 

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, although the process

was the same, the effect of a formulary position on a larger

number of lives would sometimes dictate how much time plaintiff

would spend per account. (Dep. of Eric Edward Juell (“Juell

Dep.”), lodged Aug. 1, 2006, 25:14-26:6).7 As such, there are

triable issues with respect to whether plaintiff’s workload was

commensurate with other MSMs.

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Defendant’s assertions that plaintiff received above-average

performance reviews, promotions, bonuses, and stock options, was

paid a six-figure salary, and was meeting all performance

expectations is not disputed. (UF ¶ 50; SUF ¶ 26; Juell Aff. ¶

12). However, the fact that plaintiff was able to competently

perform his job and meet expectations does not prevent him from

asserting that his working conditions were intolerable such that

a reasonable person faced with these conditions would have felt

compelled to resign. See Colores, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 1307. In

Colores, the plaintiff had worked for her employer for over 21

years. Id. During her entire career, her performance reviews

rated her commendable to outstanding, she received progressive

salary increases that were consistent with her excellent work,

and she had a reputation for honesty, integrity, competence, and

for accomplishing difficult projects on time and under budget. 

Id. Nevertheless, based upon the conduct of her supervisor, her

impossible workload, and the overall atmosphere at her workplace,

the court found that plaintiff had raised a triable issue of fact

as to whether she was constructively discharged. Id. at 1308-11.

In this case, plaintiff has raised similar claims to that of

the plaintiff in Colores. As set forth above, plaintiff has

presented evidence that he was given excessive responsibilities

that could not be completed by one person. See id at 1310. In

order to complete this work, plaintiff’s wife assisted him, often

working forty hours per week. However, plaintiff admits that it

was not the excessive responsibilities by themselves that caused

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8 At his deposition, plaintiff testified as follows:

Q. Had David [Williams] not made the comments about your

age, would you have had to step down from the MSM

position?

A. If he had not?

Q. Yes.

A. Probably not.

Q. Okay.

A. I don’t think so.

(Juell Dep. at 120:25-121:6).

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him to step down from the MSM position. (UF ¶ 608). Rather,

plaintiff asserts that the combination of the workload with

defendant William’s comments and conduct relating to his age that

made his workplace conditions intolerable, such that he felt he

could no longer perform the tasks of his job. (SUF ¶ 22). 

Plaintiff presents evidence that beginning in late 2001 to early

2002, defendant Williams made numerous age-related comments to

him every time they spoke. (Juell Aff. ¶ 18). Over time, the

comments became more frequent and degrading. (Id.) The comments

were made not only to plaintiff in person, but also during

account calls, in peer group situations, in social settings, over

the telephone, and in e-mails sent to plaintiff and others. 

Plaintiff presents evidence that Williams implied to clients that

plaintiff’s abilities may be suspect because of his age. (Juell

Aff. ¶ 19). Williams focus on plaintiff’s age negatively

affected plaintiff’s mental, physical, and psychological

condition. (UF ¶ 14); see Colores, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 1309. 

As such, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise a

triable issue of fact regarding whether his working conditions

were objectively intolerable.

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9 Defendant asserts that the court should not consider

plaintiff’s evidence regarding the responsibilities associated

with the Medi-Cal account because plaintiff “never once indicated

Medi-Cal” at his deposition that this was a reason for why his

workload was too great. (Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Reply”), filed Aug. 11, 2006, at 3). This assertion

(continued...)

20

Defendant Forest argues that even if plaintiff’s evidence

creates a triable issue that at some point his workload was

unmanageable, his workload became manageable once two other

Forest Employees, Caroline Gerbis and Sanjay Gupta, became MSMs

in California. Defendant argues that because plaintiff’s

workload became manageable before he resigned from the position

of MSM, plaintiff does not have a claim for constructive

discharge. (Def’s Mem. P.&A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.,

filed June 20, 2006, at 12) (citing Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192

F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff was not

constructively discharged in part because the offensive conduct

had ceased 3-4 months before resignation)). Defendant Forest

contends that plaintiff admitted that his workload became

manageable again once Gerbis and Gupta became MSMs. (See UF ¶¶

45, 49).

Plaintiff did not concede that his workload became

manageable once Gerbis and Gupta were added to his area. Rather,

plaintiff testified that their addition to the area did not ease

his job responsibilities. (Juell Dep. at 54:24-55:1). Plaintiff

also presents evidence that when Gerbis and Gupta were assigned

to the area, he was placed on the Medi-Cal account, which was at

least equal if not greater to his responsibilities in Southern

California. (Juell Aff. ¶ 52).9 Defendant therefore argues that

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9(...continued)

is inaccurate. Plaintiff testified that an increase in accounts

caused his job to become problematic. (Juell Dep. 61:13-21). 

Plaintiff also identified the Medi-Cal account as an account that

was added. (Juell Dep. 51:22-23). See Messick, 62 F.3d at 1231. 

21

plaintiff acknowledged in his Complaint that he no longer had

responsibility for the Medi-Cal account as of October 2002, and

thus, the responsibility ended five months before plaintiff

stepped down from the MSM position. However, plaintiff presents

evidence that, for a multitude of reasons, his workload was

unmanageable up until the time he stepped down. The fact that he

was relieved of responsibility from one of his accounts does not

rebut this assertion.

Finally, defendant consistently attempts to treat

plaintiff’s allegations about his workload as somehow separate

and distinct from his allegations about Williams’ comments. 

However, plaintiff’s claim of an intolerable working environment

are based upon the conjunction of both an unmanageable workload

and offensive, age-related comments by his direct supervisor. 

Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable

issue of fact that the combination of these factors gave rise to

objectively intolerable working conditions that existed up until

the time he felt he was forced to resign from his position as

Senior MSM.

/////

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10 Defendant asserts that plaintiff has failed to

establish a prima facie case because he has not presented

evidence that individuals outside the protected class were

treated differently than him. As an initial matter, this is not

the fourth element of a prima facie case of age discrimination

under FEHA as set forth by the California Supreme Court in Guz. 

Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate some circumstance

demonstrating discriminatory motive, see Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355,

which the court discusses infra. However, to the extent that

defendant asserts that plaintiff has not shown that he was

treated differently, defendant is mistaken. As set forth above,

plaintiff has presented evidence to create a triable issue of

fact that he had more work responsibilities than other MSMs.

11 Defendant’s argument that Williams continually gave

plaintiff positive reviews is somewhat at odds with the evidence

they cite in their statement of undisputed facts. Defendants

assert that plaintiff received ratings in administrative skills

as standard or between below standard and standard. (UF ¶¶ 11-

15). However, plaintiff disputes this characterization of the

rating and asserts that his ratings in the administration

category were standard or above standard. As such, defendants’

incongruous assertions are confusing, but ultimately, do not

affect the court’s analysis of this issue. 

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b. Discriminatory Motive10

Defendant Forest also contends that plaintiff cannot

demonstrate that Williams intended to create intolerable working

conditions or had a discriminatory motive for his conduct. 

Defendant argues that the same-actor inference analogously

applies to this situation because Williams gave plaintiff aboveaverage performance reviews11 and recommended him for a promotion

and raises. The Ninth Circuit has held that “where the same

actor is responsible for both the hiring and firing of a

discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short

period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no

discriminatory action.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104

F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996). The same-actor inference is

based upon the principle that “an employer’s initial willingness

to hire the employee-plaintiff is strong evidence that the

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employer is not biased against the protected class to which the

employee belongs.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d

1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has also recently

held that the logic of the same-actor inference equally applies

to cases where the plaintiff was not fired, but merely offered a

less desirable job assignment. Id. “The same-actor inference is

neither a mandatory presumption . . . nor a mere possible

conclusion for the jury to draw . . . . Rather, it is a ‘strong

inference’ that a court must take into account on a summary

judgment motion.” Id. at 1098. Once the same-actor inference is

raised, the court must consider whether a plaintiff has made out

the strong case of bias necessary to overcome this inference. 

Id. “[W]hen the allegedly discriminatory actor is someone who

has previously selected the plaintiff for favorable treatment,

that is very strong evidence that the actor holds no

discriminatory animus, and the plaintiff must present

correspondingly stronger evidence of bias in order to prevail.” 

Id. at 1097 n.10. 

Plaintiff disputes that the same-actor inference should

apply in this case. Defendant Forest contends that Williams

recommended plaintiff to the position of Senior MSM, gave him

positive reviews, and gave him raises and bonuses, thus raising

the inference that Williams did not harbor any age-based animus

toward plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that because the Senior MSM

position required maintenance of a 3.5 rating over two years, and

because his previous supervisor, Tom Bley, was responsible for

two of those evaluations, Williams was not personally responsible

for his promotion. (UF ¶ 18). Plaintiff therefore argues that

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12 Rather, defendant’s evidence demonstrates that

defendant Williams was not ultimately responsible for plaintiff’s

promotion as the memo recommending plaintiff for promotion was

sent from Williams to McDonald. (UF ¶ 17; Ex. N)

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Williams is not entitled to the same-actor inference. Defendant

has not presented evidence that Williams was the final decisionmaker or responsible for plaintiff’s promotion.12 Nor has

defendant offered any case law or support for their proposition

that the same actor inference should analogously apply in this

type of situation. Cf. Plutt v. Safeway, Inc., No. CV 05-0384,

2006 WL 2091673, at *2 n.1 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (finding that

the same actor inference does not apply where the same actor was

involved in both decisions, but was not the final decision

maker). The court accordingly cannot conclude that William’s

participation in recommending plaintiff for a promotion invokes

the same actor inference and requires heightened proof by

plaintiff. 

However, even if the court applied the same-actor inference

to plaintiff’s case, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence

of a strong case of bias necessary to overcome this inference. 

Plaintiff presents evidence that defendant Williams made

consistent comments about his age to him and to others. 

Plaintiff also presents evidence that Williams made a comment

about a friend to plaintiff, stating that he would not hire him

because he was over fifty and had lost his snap. When plaintiff

informed Williams that he was stepping down from the MSM

position, Williams told plaintiff that at his age that might be

good. Finally, plaintiff was replaced by Irene Camerino, who was

34 years old when she took the position. In light of this

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13 Defendant also again asserts that plaintiff was

assigned responsibilities in line with other MSMs. However, as

set forth above, plaintiff has created a triable issue of fact

that his working conditions were not in line with other MSMs.

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evidence, plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact with

regard to defendant Williams’ discriminatory intent. See Johnson

v. Boys & Girls Clubs of South Puget Sound, No. 04-35959, 2006 WL

1878615, at *2 (9th Cir. July 6, 2006) (holding that the

defendant’s undisputed comments about not understanding the

plaintiff’s African-American culture and the hiring of a

Caucasian over a qualified African-American raised a triable

issue of fact regarding discriminatory intent despite the

application of the same actor inference). 

c. McDonnell Douglass Burden Shifting Analysis

As set forth above, plaintiff has sufficiently set forth a

prima facie case of age discrimination because he has presented

evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he

was performing competently in the position he held; (3) he was

constructively discharged from his position as Senior MSM; and

(4) circumstances, such as a greater workload and frequent and

derogatory age-related comments by his supervisor, suggest

discriminatory motive. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355. Defendant

Forest argues that even if plaintiff has established a prima

facie case of discrimination, it has produced evidence of

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the conduct. 

Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff was assigned

responsibilities based upon geography, workload, and abilities.13

In support of this assertion, defendant Forest points to

plaintiff’s statement at his deposition that, at the time, he

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14 As mentioned above, this assertion contradicts, at

least in part, statements made by defendants in ¶¶ 6,9-13, 15. 

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felt was given more responsibilities because of his abilities,

tenure and experience. (Juell Dep. 86, 89). Defendant also

points to the fact that plaintiff always met subjective and

objective performance evaluations. (UF ¶ 5014). In regards to

the age-related comments by Williams, Forest contends that they

were “no more than stray remarks.” 

Even if this evidence is sufficient to support a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for defendant’s conduct, plaintiff has

presented sufficient evidence of pretext or discriminatory motive

to create a triable issue of fact. At the summary judgment

stage, plaintiff’s burden is not high. Pottenger v. Potlatch

Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2003). “He must only show

that a rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence, find

that [defendant’s] explanation was pretextual and that therefore

[the] action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons.” 

Id. 

As set forth above, plaintiff has presented evidence that he

was given work responsibilities greater than any younger MSMs. 

Further, plaintiff has presented evidence that despite complaints

to his immediate supervisor, Williams, to another supervisor,

McDonald, and to the Senior Director of Human Resources, Wolfe,

nothing was done to alleviate the unrealistic job

responsibilities. Plaintiff has also presented evidence that

Williams made frequent and derogatory comments about plaintiff’s

age to plaintiff personally, in social settings, in front of and

to clients, and via telephone conversations and e-mails. Based

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15 Defendant characterizes plaintiff’s evidence as

“statistical evidence” that is insufficient due to the size and

content of the pool to constitute meaningful evidence of

discrimination. However, plaintiff proffers this evidence in

addition to the evidence relating to his own encounters as

relevant to show discriminatory intent through corporate culture. 

See Mangold v. California Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470,

1476-77 (9th Cir. 1995).

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upon this evidence alone, a rational trier of fact could find

that the employer’s actions were taken for impermissibly

discriminatory reasons. See Messick, 62 F.3d at 1231 (finding a

triable issue of fact of pretext of age discrimination where the

evidence demonstrated, in part, that the plaintiff’s supervisor

repeatedly commented to the plaintiff, coworkers, and customers

about plaintiff’s age). 

Nevertheless, plaintiff also presents evidence supporting

his contention that Forest had a corporate culture that is

hostile to older workers.15 Plaintiff presents evidence that

Bley, plaintiff’s former supervisor, currently supervises thirtynine Divisional Managers, a position at a lateral level to MSMs

who work in managed care, all of whom are younger than fifty

years of age. (SDF ¶ 31). Bley also testified at his deposition

that the eleven MSMs that he has met, out of the thirty MSMs at

Forest, are younger than fifty years of age. (SDF ¶¶ 35-36). 

Plaintiff also presents evidence Kevin Collins, a former Forest

SMR, was given a new manager in 2004 who began to say that

Collins and other older Sales Representatives in his area

suffered from “veteranitis.” (Aff. of Kevin Collins, filed Aug.

1, 2006, ¶¶ 2-14). While these circumstances alone might be

insufficient to withstand summary judgment, they are certainly

relevant, and along with the other substantial evidence presented

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by plaintiff, create a triable issue of fact of intentional

discrimination. Mangold, 67 F. 3d at 1477 (citing Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 223, 251 (1989) (“[r]emarks at

work that are based on sex stereotypes fo no inevitably prove

that gender played a part in a particular employment decision . .

. [although] stereotyped remarks can be evidence that gender

played a part”)). 

Based upon the evidence submitted by plaintiff, there is a

triable issue of fact regarding whether defendant Forest

discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of age in violation

of FEHA. As such, defendant Forest’s motion for summary judgment

in regards to plaintiff’s discrimination claim is DENIED.

 2. Hostile Work Environment Claims

Plaintiff asserts a claim of age harassment against

defendants Forest and Williams on the grounds that he was subject

to a hostile work environment in violation of FEHA. FEHA makes

it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person in

the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of

that person’s age. Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(j) (West 2006). To

survive summary judgment on a claim of hostile work environment

under FEHA, plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to

whether

(1) []he was “subjected to verbal or physical conduct”

because of [his age], (2) “the conduct was unwelcome,”

and (3) “the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiff’s]

employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir.

2002). Like Title VII, FEHA is not a general civility code. Id.

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(citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788

(1998)). “Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated

incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to

discriminatory changes in the terms or conditions of employment.” 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Rather, “[a] hostile work environment

claim involves a workplace atmosphere so discriminatory and

abusive that it unreasonably interferes with the job performance

of those harassed.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 923. Therefore, in

order to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must

present evidence that his “workplace [was] permeated with

discriminatory intimidation . . . that [was] sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create

an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214

Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Further, “[t]he

working environment must both subjectively and objectively be

perceived as abusive.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522,

1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22)). 

The Supreme Court has warned that evidence of a hostile work

environment should not be viewed too narrowly; “[T]he objective

severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all

the circumstances.’” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,

523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “The

real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a

constellation of surrounding circumstances . . . which are not

fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used . . . .” 

Id. at 81-82. Such circumstances “may include the frequency of

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the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether is unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65

Cal. App. 4th 511, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Harris, 510

U.S. at 23). “The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s

conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work

performance and would have seriously affected the psychological

well-being of a reasonable employee and that [he] was actually

offended.” Id. (quoting Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 609-10). 

“[T]he required showing of severity or seriousness of the

harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or

frequency of the conduct.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878

(9th Cir. 1991) (citing King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of

Wisconsin Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).

Defendants assert that plaintiff did not subjectively

perceive his work environment to be abusive. Defendants again

point to plaintiff’s concession that his workload alone did not

create an intolerable working environment. As set forth above in

the court’s discussion of plaintiff’s claim of constructive

discharge, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that the

workload in conjunction with the alleged discriminatory comments

from Williams created the intolerable working environment. 

Defendants also argue that the age-related comments by

Williams did not create a subjectively intolerable work situation

for plaintiff because plaintiff engaged in the same conduct. 

Specifically, defendants point to an e-mail by plaintiff to

defendant with the subject heading “Very Old,” wishing Williams a

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happy birthday, and to an e-mail from plaintiff to defendant and

others, thanking them for a gift certificate and stating that “at

least I know how to make macaroni and cheese so I have something

to eat in my old age.” (UF ¶ 53; Exs. DD-EE). Defendants rely

on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in MacKenzie v. Denver, 414 F.3d

1266 (10th Cir. 2005), for the principle that conduct that a

plaintiff personally engages in cannot create intolerable working

conditions for that plaintiff when engaged in by others. In

MacKenzie, the court characterized the conduct between the

plaintiff and her supervisor as “mutual bantering.” Id. at 1281. 

Further, in assessing the plaintiff’s hostile work environment

claims, the court found that once the plaintiff complained about

her supervisor’s comments, her employer immediately counseled the

supervisor and required him to make a public apology. Id. The

comments subsequently ceased. Id.

The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts in

MacKenzie. In this case, the conduct between plaintiff and

Williams cannot be characterized as “mutual bantering.” 

Defendants point to one instance in July 2001 where plaintiff

addressed an e-mail to Williams entitled “Very Old.” Further,

plaintiff admits that initially, when the comments began in late

2001, he believed that Williams was joking. However, the

comments became more frequent and more degrading, and persisted

from late 2001 until 2003 when plaintiff stepped down from his

position as Senior MSM under the supervision of Williams. The

court does not consider defendant’s evidence of plaintiff’s one

comment about defendant’s age in July 2001 in relation to

plaintiff’s evidence of defendant’s consistent comments about

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plaintiff’s age over the next two and a half years to demonstrate

the type “mutual bantering” described in MacKenzie. Similarly,

the court does not consider defendant’s evidence of a single email, in which plaintiff stated “[i]t’s hard to turn fifty, but

at least I know how to make macaroni and cheese so I will have

something to eat in my old age!,” comparable to defendant

William’s comments in front of clients implying that plaintiff

may lack the ability to do his job because of his age. Further,

unlike in MacKenzie, after plaintiff complained about the

comments to Wolfe, nothing was done to investigate the merits of

plaintiff’s complaints, and Williams was only spoken to in

general terms about the appropriateness of making anything other

than work-related comments.

Plaintiff presents evidence that his work environment was

subjectively intolerable. Plaintiff asserts that after

approximately one year of enduring Williams’ written and oral

references to his age, it began to affect his self-esteem, selfconfidence, and self-worth. (Juell Aff. ¶ 35). Plaintiff began

to doubt his own abilities which led to feelings of stress. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 35). Plaintiff spoke to Wolfe and Williams about

the psychological and mental stress he was experiencing. (Juell

Aff. ¶¶ 36-39). The mental distress caused by Williams’ comments

as well as plaintiff’s workload rendered him unable to perform

his job as a Specialty Representative, after he left the MSM

position. (Juell Aff. ¶ 41). As a result of the mental

distress, plaintiff had a nervous breakdown and became disabled. 

(Juell Aff. ¶ 42). Plaintiff subsequently has been under the

care of a psychologist and a psychiatrist on a regular basis

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since Summer 2003. (Juell Aff. ¶ 43). These facts are

sufficient to create a triable issue that plaintiff subjectively

perceived his working environment to be hostile. 

Defendants also assert that plaintiff’s working conditions

were not objectively abusive. For the reasons set forth in the

court’s discussion of plaintiff’s claim of constructive

discharge, plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact regarding

whether his working conditions were objectively intolerable. 

Based upon the evidence submitted by plaintiff, there is a

triable issue of fact regarding whether defendants’ conduct was

sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile work

environment on the basis of age in violation of FEHA. As such,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment in regards to plaintiff’s

hostile work environment claim is DENIED. 

3. Failure to Prevent Discrimination

Plaintiff contends that defendant Forest is liable for its

failure to investigate and take remedial action after plaintiff

notified Forest of Williams’ conduct. Section 12940(k) of the

California Government Code provides that it is unlawful “[f]or an

employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to

prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov.

Code § 12940(k) (2006). Defendants argue that this claim fails

because and for the same reasons that plaintiff’s discrimination

and harassment claims fail. As set forth above, there are

triable issues of fact regarding plaintiff’s claims of

discrimination and harassment. Further, plaintiff has presented

evidence that (1) he advised Williams of his concerns regarding

his unmanageable workload; (2) he advised MacDonald of his

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16 Plaintiff argues that the California Supreme Court’s

recent opinion in Carter v. Cal. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 38

Cal. 4th 914 (2006), casts doubt upon defendant’s argument that

plaintiff must prove an underlying discrimination claim an order

to pursue a claim under § 12940(k). Because the court has found

that there are triable issues regarding plaintiff’s

discrimination and harassment claims, the court does not reach

the merits of this issue.

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concerns regarding his unmanageable workload; and (3) that he

advised Wolfe of both his concerns regarding his unmanageable

workload and his concerns regarding Williams’ comments and focus

on plaintiff’s age. Plaintiff also spoke to his former

supervisor, Bley, about the age-related comments Williams had

been making. However, plaintiff’s workload remained unmanageable

and no one at Forest responded to plaintiff’s complaints. 

Further, the age-related comments continued. (SDF ¶¶ 49-50).

Because plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact

regarding his discrimination and harassment claims,16 and because

plaintiff has presented evidence that defendant Forest failed to

take adequate steps to prevent such conduct, defendant’s motion

for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claim for failure to

prevent discrimination is DENIED. 

B. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Finally, plaintiff asserts a common law state tort claim

against defendant Forest for wrongful termination in violation of

public policy. Defendant argues that this claim should fail

because plaintiff’s discrimination and harassment claims under

FEHA should fail. However, because plaintiff has demonstrated

that there are triable issues of fact regarding his claims under

FEHA, plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of

public policy similarly survives defendant’s motion for summary

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judgment. See Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 897

(1997) (holding that “FEHA’s policy against age discrimination in

employment is sufficiently substantial and fundamental to support

a tort claim for wrongful discharge”). Therefore, defendant

Forest’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claim

for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 12, 2006

 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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