Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00227/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00227-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOHAMED LASHEEN,

NO. CIV. S-01-227 LKK/PAN

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

THE LOOMIS COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

The plaintiff’s estate has sued defendant, The Loomis

Company, under ERISA and California law for benefits allegedly 

owed the decedent under a medical benefits plan. It alleges

breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. This court

previously recognized that it was unclear whether ERISA governs

this case in light of the possibility that the Plan is a

“foreign plan” excluded by ERISA. Order filed July 7, 2003. 

The court ordered that additional discovery be conducted

on this issue. Defendants have now submitted a special motion

for summary judgment regarding lack of jurisdiction which

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plaintiff opposes. 

I.

FACTS

Plaintiff, the personal representative of Mohammed Lasheen

("Lasheen"), seeks to recover healthcare benefits under the

Plan. Lasheen's claim for benefits was either denied or

ignored, apparently leading to his death. Faramawi Dec. at ¶13;

Pl.'s Compl., Andrus Dec., Exs. D-F. The Plan was provided by

the Embassy of Egypt to students and teachers who were

temporarily in the United States as "F" or "J" visa holders. 

Hayes Dec. at ¶2, Ex. A at 0021; Faramawi Dec. at 6. The Plan

provides that one of the eligibility requirements is that the

participant "[has] neither received nor applied for

naturalization or permanent residency status in the United

States, Puerto Rico, or Canada, or for any other change [in

immigration] status in the United States as an 'F' or 'J' visa

holder.” Hayes Dec. at ¶2, Ex. A at 0021. 

The Plan was established by the Embassy of Egypt which also

acted as the Plan Administrator. Hayes Dec. at ¶ 3, Ex. B;

Faramawi Dec. at ¶3. It is disputed, however, whether defendant

Loomis was also acting as the Plan’s administrator and fiduciary

and whether Loomis had any final decision-making authority. See

Andrus Dec., Ex. E. There is no evidence in the record before

the court that a formal plan trustee was ever named.

Loomis was the benefits services manager of the Plan.

Declaration of Debbie Hayes ("Hayes Dec.") at ¶3, Ex. B;

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Declaration of Randy Andrus at ¶¶5-6, Ex. D (letter from The

Loomis Company dated Nov. 3, 2000, which states “[p]lease be

advised that the health benefits program for the Cultural and

Educational Bureau of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt

is a qualified, self-funded ERISA benefit plan.”). The parties

dispute whether Loomis was also acting as the Plan’s

administrator as well, either alone or in conjunction with the

Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt. See Hayes Dec. at ¶3,

Ex. B (explaining that the Benefit Services Manager, Loomis,

would “provide the administrative services listed herein”);

Andrus Dec. at ¶4-5, Ex. D. (letter from The Loomis Company

dated Nov. 3, 2000, which provides that “[t]he Loomis Company is

a Third Party Administrator (“TPA”) that administers these

benefits on behalf of and at the pleasure of the Embassy.”). 

The Embassy of Egypt Cultural and Educational Bureau is

located at 1303 New Hampshire Avenue in Washington, D.C. and

that property is owned by the Egyptian Government. Hayes Dec.

at 4; Faramawi Dec. at 4, Declaration of Kathleen E. Dyer ("Dyer

Dec.) at 1-2, Exs. A-B. Plaintiff disputes, however, whether

the Cultural and Educational Bureau is the same as the Embassy

of Egypt, whose official address appears to be different. 

Declaration of Ross Taggart at ¶¶2-3. 

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II.

STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Secor Limited v. Cetus Corp., 51

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis

for its motion, and identifying those

portions of "the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if

any," which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

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immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); See also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Limited, 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; See also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Industrial

Maintenance Engineering & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228

(9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; See also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also International Union of

Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin

Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56(c); See also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d

1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party

is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party,

see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

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Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121,

1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp.

1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III.

ANALYSIS

Federal question jurisdiction over this matter requires

that ERISA apply. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ERISA excludes from its

provisions plans which are “maintained outside of the United

States primarily for the benefit of persons substantially all of

whom are nonresident aliens.” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(4). The

question thus before the court is whether the plan in question

is excluded from ERISA coverage by virtue of this provision. 

The Plan provides that one of the eligibility requirements

is that the participant "[has] neither received nor applied for

naturalization or permanent residency status in the United

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States, Puerto Rico, or Canada, or for any other change [in

immigration] status in the United States as an 'F' or 'J' visa

holder.” Hayes Dec. at ¶2, Ex. A at 0021. The Plan exclusively

benefits non-resident aliens. Accordingly, since it is clear

that the Plan is “primarily for the benefit of persons

substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens,” one of the

requisites for exclusion under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(4) is

satisfied. 

The remaining question is whether the Plan is “maintained

outside of the United States.” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(4). Neither

the parties nor this court have discovered any cases which

interpret what it means to be “maintained outside of the United

States.” There are, however, a number of opinion letters from

the Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs (“OPWBP”) and

from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”). The

court gives such weight to these opinion letters as they have

persuasive value. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,

587 (2000). Unfortunately, the letter opinions provide little

analysis or explanation behind the conclusions they declare.

The court can infer from the opinion letters certain

characteristics which appear to have guided the agencies in

their conclusions. They are:

(1) “All plan records concerning participation accrual,

vesting and other matters necessary to determine and pay Plan

benefits are maintained outside the United States.” Opinion No.

83-27A; PBGC Opinion 80-19; see also Opinion 82-38A 

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(“centralized information and records concerning the fund” were

stored outside the country); PBGC Opinion 80-19.

(2) The work locations of the employees was outside of the

United States. . . .” Opinion No. 83-27A; PBGC Opinion 80-19

(“one of the factors to which the PBGC will attach particular

weight is the work location of the employees covered by the

plan”); Opinion No. 80-61 A (“all participants are currently

employed outside of the United States”); PBGC Opinion 78-14. 

(3) The Plan is administered by a company located outside

the United States. Opinion No. 80-61 A.

(4) All operations of the companies are located outside of

the United States. Opinion No. 81-58A. 

(5) The trust is established outside the United States. 

PBGC Opinion 78-14.

(6) Assets of the Plan are held outside the United States. 

Opinion No. 80-61A. 

These characteristics appear to the court to be reasonably

applicable to resolution of the issue at bar. Accordingly, the

court will use them to help analyze whether the Plan is exempt

from ERISA. 

Defendants claim that all the records which may have been

kept at the Embassy of Egypt Cultural and Educational Bureau in

Washington, D.C. should be considered outside of the United

States because they are located on what defendants characterize

as “diplomatic property.” I agree that diplomatic properties

are generally treated as foreign territory. See, e.g., United

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States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2000) (under

Vienna Convention embassy land is inviolable and a host country

may not enter embassy land without consent of sending state;

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art.

22, 23 U.S.T. 3227); Gerritsen v. De La Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d

1511, 1517 (9th Cir. 1987) (for purposes of Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, Mexican Consulate fell within the definition of

foreign state); Federation for American Immigration Reform v.

Klutznick, 486 F.Supp. 564, 567 (D.D.C. 1980) (for purpose of

census, diplomatic personnel living on embassy grounds are not

counted because grounds are considered "foreign soil"). 

Plaintiff, in response, notes that the Embassy of Egypt is

located at a different address than the Cultural and Educational

Bureau. It argues as a consequence that the Cultural Bureau

should not be given the same status provided to the embassy

itself. 

It does appear that the primary headquarters of the

Egyptian Embassy is located at 3521 International Ct. NW,

Washington DC 20008 and not at 1303 New Hampshire Avenue,

Washington D.C., which is the location of the Cultural and

Educational Bureau. See Declaration of Ross Taggart at ¶¶2-4;

Official Website of the Embassy of Egypt,

http://www.egyptembassy.us/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (the

website provides 3521 International Ct. as the embassy address);

Website of the Egyptian Cultural and Educational Bureau,

http://www.eceb.us/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (the website

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1 The court believes that the information contained in the

web sites is subject to judicial notice. 

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provides 1303 New Hampshire Avenue as the Bureau’s address). As

I explain, however, this fact is not determinative.

Article 1(i) of the Vienna Convention defines the “premises

of the mission” as the “buildings or parts of buildings and the

land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for the

purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of

the mission.” 23 U.S.T. 3227. Article 24 states that the

“archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at

any time and wherever they may be.” Id. Included in the

functions of a diplomatic mission are activities which promote

“friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving

State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific

relations.” 23 U.S.T. 3227, Article 3(1)(e). The website of

the Cultural Bureau explains that it serves both cultural and

educational functions by putting on various artistic, political,

and education events while also serving as a coordinator for

Egyptian graduate students studying in the United States. See

“About ECEB” at http://www.eceb.us/aboutUs.html (last visited

Feb. 15, 2006).1 These facts and the evidence provided by

defendants that the Bureau’s offices are owned by Egypt, require

that the Bureau should be considered a diplomatic property. 

It is not clear from ERISA whether the statute meant to

exclude plans maintained at diplomatic properties within the

United States. The definitions section of ERISA provides that

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the “term ‘United States’ when used in the geographic sense

means the States and the Outer Continental Shelf lands defined

in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act” and the term “State”

includes “any State of the United States, the District of

Colombia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam,

Wake Island, and the Canal Zone.” An ordinary reading of 29

U.S.C. § 1002(10) would suggest it was, at least to some degree,

speaking in a geographic sense. Nonetheless, the definition of

the United States does not resolve the present dilemma. 

Unsurprisingly, none of the opinion letters adverted to

above, address defendants’ contention. There is one letter,

however, that is somewhat close in its factual scenario. The

Coordination Council for North American Affairs, CCNAA ,“is the

unofficial representative of the people of Taiwan established

pursuant to Section 10 of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). See

22 U.S.C. § 3309.” Id. As described by the OPWBP, the CCNAA

“has been considered to have the status of a foreign state for

purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.”

Opinion No. 93-10A. 

The CCNAA was proposing to establish a medical plan for its

employees who were resident in the United States. Those covered 

would include citizens of Taiwan, the United States and

individuals with dual citizenship. Id. CCNAA wrote to ask the

OPWBP whether the plan it was developing for its employees would

be included in Title I of ERISA. Id. The OPWBP found that the

medical plan would not fall within the category of exempt plans

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2 The OPWBP did note, however, that it did not express a view

on whether sovereign immunity could be used as a defense under

FSIA. 

3 This conclusion is somewhat undermined by the fact that the

opinion letter contains no information on whether the documents

were to be maintained at the embassy or elsewhere. 

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because section 4(b) “does not expressly exempt plans

established or maintained by foreign governments from coverage

under Title I.” Id.

2 This conclusion would appear to support

plaintiff’s position that the plan at issue should not be exempt

merely because the Egyptian government established the plan and

stored the records at a possible diplomatic property.3 

Indeed, even if the court treats the Embassy as diplomatic

property, it does not necessarily dispose of the issue. Loomis

claims that their factual investigation has shown that “all

original records concerning participation, accrual, vesting and

other matters necessary to determine and pay Plan benefits” were

maintained at the Bureau. Loomis’ proof for the assertion is

the declaration of Debbie Hayes, who is the Vice President of

The Loomis Company. Hayes Dec. at ¶1. She declares that “[a]ll

of the records concerning participation accrual, vesting and

other matters necessary to determine and pay Plan benefits were

maintained at the Embassy of Egypt Cultural and Educational

Bureau in Washington, D.C..” Id. at ¶5. 

Plaintiff, however, points to the Benefit Services

Management Agreement (BSMA), from which it may be inferred that

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at least some of the documents relating to the Plan had to have

come through, and possibly be stored at the offices of Loomis. 

For example, the BSMA provides that Loomis shall “prepare the

Benefit Plan Document,” “prepare and print descriptive booklets

for the Benefit Plan participants,” “provide suitable

facilities, personnel, procedures, forms and instructions to

facilitate the administration of claims,” “determine, in

accordance with the Benefit Plan and generally accepted claims

administration procedures and practices, the qualifications of

claims submitted, making, as required,” “furnish the employer

information that the Employer deems essential with respect to

the Benefit Plan and procedures thereunder and assist in

distribution of material furnished,” and “furnish the employer

with a copy of each claim check”, etc. Hayes Dec., Ex. B at

0001-0003. Plaintiff also tenders a letter from The Loomis

Company which requests that certain medical documents be sent

directly to Loomis. Badry Dec., Ex. C. 

There is no question that the Loomis Company headquarters

are not diplomatic property nor is there any question that its

headquarters are located in the United States. It thus appears

to be, at the very least, a disputed material fact whether the

“records concerning participation accrual, vesting and other

matters necessary to determine and pay Plan benefits” were all

maintained at the Bureau. 

As noted above, under the opinion letters, various other

factors bear on the question at issue. One is whether the

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trustee is outside of the United States. Defendants claims that

no trustee was ever named, while plaintiff claims that the

Loomis Company was named and acted as a fiduciary and trustee. 

ERISA provides that trustees are to be “either named in the

trust instrument or in the plan instrument described in section

1102(a) of this title or appointed by a person who is a named

fiduciary. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). The documents which

plaintiff cites do not clearly establish whether a trustee was

designated. The BSMA, however, provides that the “[e]mployer

retains all final authority and responsibility for the

administration and operation of the Benefit Plan as its named

fiduciary within the meaning of Section 402(a)” of ERISA. Hayes

Dec., Ex. B at 0001. While the BSMA would not appear to be

dispositive, it is some evidence bearing upon the issue.

Another characteristic derived from the opinion letters is

whether the assets of the Plan are held outside the United

States. Plaintiff purports to dispute whether all the funds

came from Egypt but has provided no evidence of this. From all

that appears, the funds originated in Egypt. 

The opinion letters highlight as a factor whether the

employees were working within the United States. See Opinion

No. 83-27A; PBGC Opinion 80-19; Opinion No. 80-61 A; PBGC

Opinion 78-14. It appears from eligibility criteria that the

Plan was designed to benefit primarily, if not exclusively,

students and teachers who were engaged in learning or teaching

in the United States. Thus, despite their status as Egyptian

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nationals, they were in the United States during the period they

were covered by the Plan. Unlike the matter at bar, most of the

opinion letters address plans where most of those covered were

not working in the United States. For example, in letter 80-19,

the PBGC found that the plan’s administrator was in California

and all of the plan’s assets were held by a company in

California, but all the plan records were stored in Hong Kong

and the plans participants were all non-resident aliens. Seeing

that the factors pointed in two directions, the PBGC put

“particular weight” on the fact that the work location of the

employees was outside of the United States in finding that the

plan was exempt. PBGC letter 80-19; see also PBGC letter 78-14

(the company was a United States corporation with principal

offices in New York, but “all participants in these plans work

and reside in Canada.”); Opinion No. 80-61A. 

Attempting to apply the criteria derived from the opinion

letters to the evidence adduced does not result in a certain

result. Moreover, as noted above, the opinions only have

persuasive value. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,

587 (2000). In the matter at bar, two other factors not

discussed in the opinion letters appear to the court to carry

considerable weight.

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4 Moreover, for most intents and purposes, the Loomis Company

appears to have believed it was an ERISA plan until midway through

this litigation.

17

 First, the Plan, in unambiguous language, declares itself

an ERISA plan.4 There is, to say the least, something appealing

about taking the Plan at its word.

Second, it appears to this court that where most of the

activities of the Plan were carried out should be significant.

In this regard, it is clear from plan documents and the letters

between plaintiff and defendant, that Loomis was doing most of

the administration of the Plan. Moreover, Loomis represented

itself as the administrator of the Plan in a letter sent to the

plaintiff’s attorney dated Nov. 3, 2000. The letter reads:

Please be advised that the health benefits program for

the Cultural and Educational Bureau of the Embassy of

the Arab Republic of Egypt is a qualified, self-funded

ERISA benefit plan.

The Loomis Company is a Third Party Administrator

(“TPA”) that administers these benefits on behalf of

and at the pleasure of the Embassy. As a TPA we are

not the plan fiduciary. Our responsibility is to

administer the benefits program as written.

Andrus Dec., Ex. E.

The plan description also contains a section entitled

“Rights and Protections” which sets out certain rights and

protections provided under ERISA. These items alone do not make

ERISA applicable. Nonetheless, in a case such as this, where

the court is attempting to interpret an ambiguous statutory

provision, the evidence of significant activity in the United

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States is a relevant indicator of the Plan’s location.

The court notes that the BSMA provides that the provisions

of the plan shall be enforced under the laws of the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania. Hayes Dec., Ex. B at 0005. Plaintiff cites to

the Foreign Service Immunities Act (FSIA) which decrees that a

foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the

courts of the United States if the “foreign state has waived its

immunity either explicitly or by implication.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(1). It seems that this factor should be given little

weight. First, given the fact that the dispute is whether the

plan at issue is an ERISA plan it seems clear that federal law

governs. Second, the issue is not immunity, but statutory

construction. Nonetheless, agreeing to submission to the law of

a state of this nation is at least suggestive that the plan was

not maintained in Egypt. 

IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS

After a review of the factors highlighted in the opinion

letters and other considerations, it appears that summary

judgment must be and is DENIED for defendants. The court

concludes that the exception for foreign plans set out in 

§ 1003(b)(4) is not applicable to this case. 

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Being a case of first impression that could be controlling

on the case, the court will certify for interlocutory appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question of whether this

plan falls under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(4)). Any such appeal

shall be taken within ten (10) days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 9, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 2:01-cv-00227-KJM-EFB Document 226 Filed 03/09/06 Page 19 of 19