Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02280/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Co~t ~~Appeals Tenth CtrcUJt 

FE.B 0 2 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CATRON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, 

NEW MEXICO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,) 

an agency of the u.s. Department of the ) 

Interior; BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of ) 

the Interior; RICHARD SMITH, Acting ) 

Director of the u.s. Fish and Wildlife ) 

Service; JOHN ROGERS, Regional Director ) 

of Region 2 of the u.s. Fish and ) 

Wildlife Service; SAM SPILLER, Field ) 

Supervisor, Region 2, u.s. Fish and ) 

Wildlife Service, ) 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

SIERRA CLUB; GILA WATCH; FOUR CORNERS ) 

ACTION COALITION; COLORADO ENVIRONMENTAL) 

COALITION, ) 

Amici Curiae. 

) 

) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-2280 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-730-HB) 

Jim Kilborn, Environmental and Natural Resources Division, U.S. 

Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, Beverly Ohline, Office of the Solicitor, 

Department of the Interior, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Brian L. 

Ferrell, Ellen Kohler, John A. Bryson, and Albert M. Ferlo, Jr., 

Attorneys, Environmental and Natural Resouces Division, u.s. Dept. 

of Justice, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Vance E. Haug, Budd-Falen Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Lee 

E. Peters, Hubert & Hernandez, P.A., Las cruces, New Mexico 

(Karen Budd-Falen, Budd-Falen Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and 

James Catron, Catron county Attorney, LaJoya, New Mexico, with Mr. 

Peters on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

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Lori Potter, Munir R. Meghjee, and Debra Asimus, Sierra Club Legal 

Defense Fund, Denver, Colorado, for Sierra Club, Gila Watch, Four 

Corners Action Coalition, and the Colorado Environmental 

Coalition, Amici Curiae. 

Paul M. Seby and William Perry Pendley, Mountain States Legal 

Foundation, Denver, Colorado, Amicus Curiae. 

Before KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and various 

governmental officials (FWS, Secretary or Appellants) appeal the 

district court's order granting Catron County's (County or 

Appellee) motion for partial summary judgment in the County's 

action alleging that the Secretary of Interior (Secretary or 

Appellants), acting on behalf of the FWS, failed to comply with 

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 

4321-70d, in designating certain lands within the County as 

critical habitat for the spikedace and loach minnow. Aplt. App. 

at 24-39. In addition, the district court granted the County's 

motion for injunctive relief but stayed its order pending appeal. 

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) and affirm. 

I. Background 

In 1985, the Secretary proposed listing the spikedace and 

loach minnow as threatened species and establishing a critical 

habitat for them. 50 Fed. Reg. 25,380 (loach minnow), 25,390 

(spikedace) (1985). The Secretary's proposed designation 

t The Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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comprised approximately 74 miles of river habitat in the County. 

The notice also provided for a sixty-day comment period, which was 

subsequently extended by an additional several weeks, and 

scheduled three public meetings to gather additional information 

and comments on the proposed actions. See 50 Fed. Reg. 37,703-704 

(1985). Also in his proposal, the Secretary determined that he 

was not required to comply with the documentation requirements of 

NEPA, claiming that Secretarial actions under § 1533 of the 

Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44, are exempt 

from NEPA as a matter of law. See 50 Fed. Reg. 25,385, 25,395 

(1985) (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244). The Secretary received over 

one hundred written comments and over thirty oral comments. See 

59 Fed. Reg. 10,899 (1994). In 1986, pursuant to§ 1533(b) (6) (A) 

of the ESA, the Secretary adopted final regulations listing the 

species as threatened and extended the deadline for final 

designation of critical habitat. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,769 (spikedace), 

39,468 (loach minnow) (1986). In June 1993, the County filed suit 

alleging that the Secretary failed to comply with the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76, the ESA 

and NEPA. In March 1994, the Secretary issued notice of final 

designation of critical habitat, which became effective on April 

7, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg 10,898 (loach minnow), 10,906 (spikedace) 

(1994). In April 1994, the County filed its motion for injunctive 

relief claiming that the Secretary had failed to comply with NEPA 

and seeking to prevent the Secretary from implementing and 

enforcing its designation of critical habitat. The district court 

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granted Appellants' motion to consolidate for consideration both 

the County's motion for injunctive relief and the parties' motions 

for partial summary judgment. Aplt. App. 28. 

On October 13, 1994, finding that the Secretary had failed to 

comply with NEPA in designating critical habitat, the district 

court granted the County's motions for partial summary judgment 

and injunctive relief. Aplt. App. 24-39. 

II. Discussion. 

A. Standing. 

The Secretary initially questions the County's standing to 

challenge his action. We review questions of standing de novo, 

Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of Housing 

and Urban Development, 56 F. 3d 1243, 1249 (lOth Cir. 1995), and 

construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, accepting as 

true all material allegations, State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan, 

969 F.2d 877, 879 (lOth Cir. 1992). The party invoking federal 

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing an actual or 

imminent injury that is concrete and particularized rather than 

conjectural or hypothetical; a causal connection that is "fairly 

traceable" to the conduct complained of; and a likelihood of 

redressability in the event of a favorable decision. Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citations 

omitted) . 

Appellee has alleged injury in fact. In particular, the 

County asserts that designation of critical habitat would prevent 

the diversion and impoundment of water by the County, thereby 

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causing flood damage to county-owned property, such as the 

fairgrounds, roads and bridges. The County's claim of flood 

damage to its property constitutes a threatened or imminent injury 

to a concrete and particularized legally protected interest. 

These injuries are perceptible and environmental, not merely 

speculative or purely economic, and fall well within the zone of 

interests protected by NEPA. Because we find that the County's 

asserted threatened injury to its property constitutes an injury 

in fact, we need not address whether the County's alleged injuries 

to its riparian, agricultural, economic or public interests would 

likewise satisfy the test. 

The County also adequately demonstrates a causal link between 

its likely injury and the conduct complained of, namely the 

Secretary's failure to comply with NEPA. The Supreme Court has 

noted that if "the plaintiff is himself an object of the 

[challenged] action . . . . there is ordinarily little question 

that the action or inaction has caused him injury .... " 

Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137 (emphasis added). Here, 

as an owner of property that falls within the proposed critical 

habitat designation and will likely be adversely affected by such 

designation, the County is the object of the Secretary's alleged 

failure to act in compliance with NEPA. 

Finally, the County has shown "redressability" by 

demonstrating a substantial likelihood that Secretarial compliance 

with NEPA will redress the claimed injuries. NEPA compliance 

would require the Secretary to assess the environmental impact and 

potential alternatives to his proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 

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4332(2) (C), (E). That the Secretary may ultimately make the same 

decision and designate critical habitat within the same 

geographical parameters is immaterial; the County's alleged injury 

results from Secretarial failure substantively to consider the 

environmental ramifications of its actions in accordance with 

NEPA. The "risk implied by a violation of NEPA is that real 

environmental harm will occur through inadequate foresight and 

deliberation" by the acting federal agency. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 

872 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.). 

Because NEPA does not provide a private right of action for 

violations of its provisions, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 

U.S. 871, 882 (1990), the County claims a right to judicial review 

under the APA.l In addition to Article III standing requirements, 

a plaintiff seeking judicial review pursuant to the APA must (i) 

identify some "final agency action" and (ii) demonstrate that its 

claims fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute 

forming the basis of its claims. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 

at 882-83. In this case, the County satisfies the standing 

requirements of the APA. The Secretary's alleged failure to 

comply with NEPA constitutes "final agency action," see 5 U.S.C. § 

551(13), and the County's claimed injuries to its proprietary and 

procedural interests fall within the zone of interests protected 

by the ESA. 

1 Under the APA, "agency action includes the whole or a part of 

an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the 

equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 u.s.c. § 

551(13) (emphasis added). 

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B. Statutory Framework. 

1. NEPA. 

NEPA requires any federal agency proposing a "major Federal 

action[s] significantly affecting the quality of the human 

environment" to prepare what is known as an Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS), detailing the environmental impact of the action; 

unavoidable adverse environmental effects; alternatives to the 

action; relationship between the short-term uses and long-term 

productivity of the affected environment; and irretrievable and 

irreversible commitments of resources should the action be 

implemented. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (i)- (v). Preparation of an 

impact statement serves two primary purposes: (1) "to inject 

environmental considerations into the federal agency's 

decisionmaking process," and (2) "to inform the public that the 

agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking 

process." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 

143 (1981); see also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1088 

(lOth Cir. 1988). An EIS also enables critical evaluation of an 

agency's actions by those outside the agency. Environmental 

Defense Fund, Inc~ v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972). 

For proposed actions the environmental effects of which are 

uncertain, the agency must prepare an Environmental Assessment 

(EA) to determine whether a significant effect will result from 

the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (E); see also 40 C.F.R. § 

1508.9; Oregon Natural Resource Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 

1421-22 (9th Cir. 1989). Based upon the EA, the agency must 

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either make a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI) or 

determine if a significant environmental impact will result, thus 

requiring the preparation of an EIS. Committee to Preserve Boomer 

Lake Park v. Dept. of Transp., 4 F.3d 1543, 1554 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Federal agencies must comply with NEPA "to the fullest extent 

possible." 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 

2. ESA. 

The ESA seeks to protect designated species from extinction 

caused by human activity by preserving the ecosystems upon which 

the species depend. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The ESA instructs the 

Secretary to list species determined to be threatened or 

endangered according to enumerated criteria. Id. § 1533(a) (1). 

For each listed species the Secretary must "designate any habitat 

of such species ... [as] critical habitat," id. § 1533 (a) (3) (A), 

which, contrary to the suggestion of the Secretary, Rep. Br. at 3, 

effectively prohibits all subsequent federal or federally funded 

or directed actions likely to destroy or disrupt the habitat, id. 

§ 1536 (a) (2). 

To designate critical habitat, the Secretary must use the 

best scientific data available to identify a geographical area 

that satisfies the statutory definition of critical habitat,2 

2 The ESA defines "critical habitat" as 11 the specific areas 

within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time 

it is listed . . . on which are found those physical or biological 

features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) 

which may require special management considerations or 

protection.n 

16 U.S.C. § 1532 (5) (A) (i). 

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consider the "economic impact, and any other relevant impact," of 

designating the habitat, and weigh the benefits of exclusion 

against those of inclusion of particular areas within the 

designated habitat. Id. § 1533(b) (2). In addition, the Secretary 

must follow enumerated procedures for public notification and 

comment during the process of designating critical habitat. Id. § 

1533 (b) (4)- (6). 

C. NEPA's Applicability To ESA. 

1. Standard Of Review. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1182 (lOth Cir. 

1995). The court should grant summary judgment if "there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). "[W]e construe the factual record and reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment." Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of 

County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1994). "Summary 

judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party cannot adduce 

probative evidence on an element of its claim upon which it bears 

the burden of proof." Rohrbaugh, 53 F.3d at 1183. Whether the 

Secretary must comply with the documentation requirements of NEPA 

when designating critical habitat under the ESA is a question of 

first impression in this circuit. 

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2. Relevant Precedent. 

Compliance with NEPA is excused when there is a statutory 

conflict with the agency's authorizing legislation that prohibits 

or renders compliance impossible. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-765, 

91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767, 

2770; see also Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 

U.S. 776, 788. Judicial interpretation of what constitutes a 

"conflict" with NEPA has varied, however. Courts have approved 

noncompliance with NEPA on the basis of statutory conflict after 

finding either (i) an unavoidable conflict between the two 

statutes that renders compliance with both impossible; or (ii) 

duplicative procedural requirements between the statutes that 

essentially constitute "functional equivalents," rendering 

compliance with both superfluous. 

In Flint Ridge, the Supreme Court addressed a conflict 

between NEPA and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 

(Disclosure Act), which imposes a statutory duty upon the 

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to allow 

statements of record to go into effect within 30 days of filing 

unless the Secretary of HUD acts affirmatively within that time to 

suspend it for inadequate disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 1706. 

Finding it "inconceivable that an environmental impact statement 

could, in 30 days, be drafted, circulated, commented upon, and 

then reviewed and revised," the Supreme Court held that a "clear 

and fundamental conflict of statutory duty" existed between NEPA 

and the Disclosure Act that prevented simultaneous compliance with 

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both statutes. Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788-91. In light of the 

"clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority," the 

Supreme Court held that "NEPA must give way . . . ' [as] NEPA was 

not intended to repeal by implication any other statute.'" Id. at 

788 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973)). 

NEPA compliance has also been excused by some courts where 

the particular action being undertaken is subject to rules and 

regulations that essentially duplicate the NEPA inquiry. See, 

~' Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding that to require registration 

procedures under both NEPA and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 

Rodenticide Act would be superfluous); Pacific Legal Foundation v. 

Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1981) (NEPA conflicts with ESA 

provisions regarding listing of species as endangered or 

threatened); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 

384 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 u.s. 921 (1974) (EPA not 

required to comply with NEPA when promulgating standards under § 

111 of the Clean Air Act). In view of the focus of the ESA 

critical habitat designation, we do not believe that the NEPA 

inquiry has been duplicated, nor do we believe the statutes are 

mutually exclusive. We rejected an analogous argument in Davis v. 

Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (lOth Cir. 1972). We declined to find an 

unavoidable, irreconcilable conflict between NEPA and 25 U.S.C. § 

415, a statute that regulates secretarial approval of leases on 

Indian lands. Section 415 provided that "prior to approval of any 

lease [on Indian land] . the Secretary of Interior shall first 

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satisfy himself that adequate consideration has been given to . 

. the effect on the environment of the uses to which the leased 

lands will be subject." 25 U.S.C. § 415. The government argued 

that NEPA did not apply to § 415 because the latter statute 

required the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to consider the 

environmental ramifications of its authorization of leases. 

Davis, 469 F.2d at 598. We disagreed, noting that, unlike NEPA, § 

415 did not require substantive and in depth environmental 

consideration but rather a more focused analysis of issues 

concerning the lease of Indian land. We concluded that "unless 

the obligations of another statute are clearly mutually exclusive 

with the mandates of NEPA, the specific requirements of NEPA will 

remain in force." Id. 

The Secretary relies upon Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 

1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3167, 1995 WL 

555389 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1996) (No. 95-371) and urges us to adopt its 

holding. After careful consideration, we believe our precedent 

and analysis require a different result. In Douglas County, the 

Ninth Circuit addressed the precise issue before us. That case 

arose after the Secretary attempted to designate critical habitat 

for the Spotted Owl, a species he listed as threatened in June 

1990 pursuant to the ESA. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990). In May 

1991, the Secretary issued a proposal designating over 11 million 

acres as critical habitat, asserting that he need not comply with 

NEPA's documentation requirements. See 56 Fed. Reg. 20,824 

(1991); 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983) (letter from the Council on 

Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicating that the Secretary may 

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cease complying with NEPA for actions under § 1533 of ESA) . After 

Douglas County filed suit claiming that the Secretary had failed 

to comply with NEPA, the Secretary issued a final habitat 

designation comprising almost 7 million acres of exclusively 

federal land. The district court held that Douglas County had 

standing to sue, granted Douglas' motion for summary judgment 

finding that NEPA did apply to the Secretary's decision to 

designate critical habitat under the ESA and, sua sponte, stayed 

the order pending appeal. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 

1470, 1484-85 (D. Or. 1992). 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, 

holding that while Douglas County did have standing, NEPA did not 

apply. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1507-08. We disagree with the 

panel's reasoning. First, given the focus of the ESA together 

with the rather cursory directive that the Secretary is to take 

into account "economic and other relevant impacts," we do not 

believe that the ESA procedures have displaced NEPA requirements. 

Secondly, we likewise disagree with the panel that no actual 

impact flows from the critical habitat designation. Merely 

because the Secretary says it does not make it so. The record in 

this case suggests that the impact will be immediate and the 

consequences could be disastrous. The preparation of an EA will 

enable all involved to determine what the effect will be. 

Finally, we believe that compliance with NEPA will further the 

goals of the ESA, and not vice versa as suggested by the Ninth 

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Circuit panel. For these reasons and in view of our own circuit 

precedent, we conclude that the Secretary must comply with NEPA 

when designating critical habitat under ESA. 

3. Factual Analysis. 

Appellants do not allege that compliance with both statutes 

is impossible due to an unavoidable, irreconcilable conflict 

between § 1533 of ESA and NEPA's documentation requirements. See 

Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788-91. Rather, Appellants argue that 

the similarity of the statutes' procedures, together with 

congressional failure to respond to judicial and executive 

announcements of NEPA noncompliance, evidence Congress' implicit 

intent to "displace[] NEPA's procedural and informational 

requirements." Aplt. Br. at 38. 

It is clear that the provisions of the ESA governing the 

designation of critical habitat instruct the Secretary to follow 

procedures that to some extent parallel and perhaps overlap the 

requirements imposed by NEPA. Together, the ESA requirements for 

notice and environmental consideration partially fulfill the 

primary purposes of NEPA, namely, "to inject environmental 

consideration into the federal agency's decisionmaking .... 

[and] inform the public that the agency" has considered the 

environment. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. at 143; see also 

Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1088. 

Partial fulfillment of NEPA's requirements, however, is not 

enough. The plain language of NEPA makes clear that "to the 

fullest extent possible" federal agencies must comply with the act 

and prepare an impact statement for all major federal actions 

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significantly affecting the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 

NEPA does not require particular results but rather a particular 

process. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 

332, 350 (1989); see also 40 C.F.R 1500.1(c). NEPA ensures that a 

federal agency makes informed, carefully calculated decisions when 

acting in such a way as to affect the environment and also enables 

dissemination of relevant information to external audiences 

potentially affected by the agency's decision. Robertson, 490 

U.S. at 349. 

By contrast, ESA's core purpose is to prevent the extinction 

of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which 

they depend from the intrusive activities of humans. See 16 

U.S.C. 1531(b). While the protection of species through 

preservation of habitat may be an environmentally beneficial goal, 

Secretarial action under ESA is not inevitably beneficial or 

immune to improvement by compliance with NEPA procedure. The 

designation of critical habitat effectively prohibits all 

subsequent federal or federally funded or directed actions likely 

to affect the habitat. Id. at § 1536(a) (2). The short- and longterm effects of the proposed governmental action (and even the 

governmental action prohibited under ESA designation) are often 

unknown or, more importantly, initially thought to be beneficial, 

but after closer analysis determined to be environmentally 

harmful. Furthermore, that the Secretary believes the effects of 

a particular designation to be beneficial is equally immaterial to 

his responsibility to comply with NEPA. "[E)ven if the Federal 

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agency believes that on balance the effect [of the action] will be 

beneficial," regulations promulgated by the Council on 

Environmental Quality (CEQ) nonetheless require an impact 

statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (1); see also Environmental 

Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. 1981). NEPA's 

requirements are not solely designed to inform the Secretary of 

the environmental consequences of his action. NEPA documentation 

notifies the public and relevant government officials of the 

proposed action and its environmental consequences and informs the 

public that the acting agency has considered those consequences. 

A federal agency could not know the potential alternatives to a 

proposed federal action until it complies with NEPA and prepares 

at least an EA. 

To interpret NEPA as merely requiring an assessment of 

detrimental impacts upon the environment would significantly 

diminish the act's fundamental purpose--to "help public officials 

make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental 

consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance 

the environment." 40 C.F.R. 1500.1(c). Appellants' theory would 

cast the judiciary as final arbiter of what federal actions 

protect or enhance the environment, a role for which the courts 

are not suited. 

Here, the County alleges that the proposed designation will 

prevent continued governmental flood control efforts, thereby 

significantly affecting nearby farms and ranches, other privately 

owned land, local economies and public roadways and bridges. 

These claims, if proved, constitute a significant effect on the 

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environment the impact of which and alternatives to which have not 

been adequately addressed by ESA. Furthermore, unlike the county 

in Douglas County, Catron County actually owns land potentially 

affected by the designation; the final designation in Douglas 

County included only federal land. See Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 

1498. It is true that after complying with NEPA's documentation 

requirements, the Secretary nonetheless may adhere to his proposed 

designation. Regardless, NEPA is clear: "to the fullest extent 

possible," federal agencies must comply with the act and prepare 

an impact statement for "major Federal actions significantly 

affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 

4332 (C) I (E) . 

Finally, Appellants argue that congressional failure to 

reverse or revise prior judicial and secretarial announcements of 

NEPA noncompliance evidences congressional endorsement of such 

noncompliance. Appellants correctly note that (1) in 1981, the 

Sixth Circuit excused secretarial noncompliance with NEPA in 

listing species as endangered or threatened under the ESA, Pacific 

Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 835; (2) in 1983, the CEQ issued a 

letter indicating that the Secretary may cease preparing NEPA 

impact statements when listing species under § 1533 of ESA, 48 

Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983); (3) in 1983, based on the recommendations 

in the CEQ letter, the Secretary announced in the Federal Register 

his intention not to prepare NEPA impact statements in connection 

with regulations promulgated under§ 1533(a) of ESA, 48 Fed. Reg. 

49,244-45 (1983); and (4) Congress, when amending ESA in 1988, did 

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not revise or repeal these judicial and executive endorsements of 

NEPA noncompliance in conjunction with actions under § 1533 of 

ESA. 

It is true that "when Congress revisits a statute giving rise 

to a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent 

change, the 'congressional failure to revise or repeal the 

agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the 

interpretation is the one intended by Congress.'" Commodity 

Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (quoting 

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974)). 

However, the failure to revise, unaccompanied by any evidence of 

congressional awareness of the interpretation, is not persuasive 

evidence. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S 61, 69 (1946) ("[I]t 

is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the 

adoption of a controlling rule of law"); see also Brown v. 

Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 556 (1994). Something more than 

passivity is required. Schor, 478 U.S. at 846 (quoting Red Lion 

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969)). We find 

the congressional silence in this case unpersuasive. 

Although a proponent of congressional acquiescence need not 

show that the acquiescence is "specifically embodied in a 

statutory mandate," he bears the burden of showing "abundant 

evidence that Congress both contemplated and authorized" the 

previous noncongressional interpretation in which it now 

acquiesces. Schor, 478 U.S. at 847; see also Wilderness Society 

v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 867 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 

411 U.S. 917 (1973). In this case, Appellants have not 

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demonstrated congressional contemplation or even awareness of 

either the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Pacific Legal Foundation, 

which only dealt with "listing," or the Secretary's announced 

policy published in the Federal Register. In fact, the 

legislative history makes no mention of either the Sixth Circuit's 

opinion or the Secretary's announcement. See H.R. Rep. No. 467, 

100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1-32 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

2700-50. 

Second, the congressional acquiescence theory applies only 

where Congress has revisited the language subject to the 

administrative interpretation. Central Bank of Denver v. First 

Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1453 (1994). In this 

case, Appellants concede that "Congress, while amending other 

parts of [§ 1533], did not address the critical habitat provisions 

of that section." Aplt. Br. at 36. A review of both the 1988 

amendments and corresponding legislative history supports 

Appellants' concession. See H.R. Rep. No. 467, 100th Cong., 2d. 

Sess. 1-32 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700-50. 

Moreover, neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Secretary in his 1983 

announcement substantively addressed the designation provisions of 

ESA. While the Secretary mentioned ESA's designation provision in 

his 1983 announcement, he based his interpretation of NEPA's 

nonapplicability entirely on interpretations relative to ESA's 

listing provisions, the CEQ's "judgement that Section 4 listing 

actions are exempt from NEPA review" and the fact that the 1982 

ESA amendments require "listing decisions ... to be based solely 

upon biological grounds and not upon consideration of economic or 

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socioeconomic factors." 48 Fed. Reg. 49244-45 (emphasis added). 

We find the congressional silence under these circumstances 

unpersuasive. 

While we recognize that interpretive analysis of legislative 

history is to be conducted with great caution, Blanchard v. 

Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), it 

is interesting that Congress apparently intended the Secretary in 

some cases to prepare an impact statement when designating 

critical habitat under ESA. For instance, during the debates 

relative to those amendments, Senator McClure proposed an 

amendment that would have defined designation of critical habitat 

as a major federal action for purposes of NEPA. 124 Cong. Rec. 

S11143-45 (daily ed. July 19, 1978) (statements of Senators Wallop 

and McClure). Although Senator Wallop opposed the amendment, his 

opposition was based on the belief that the amendment would 

require an EIS even for designations not constituting major 

federal actions. Id. at S11144. Noting his intention to withdraw 

the amendment, Senator McClure emphasized his desire that the 

record "not indicate that, in the absence of the amendment 

[requiring an impact statement] , there is no possibility that an 

EIS is required." Id. These statements indicate that Congress 

contemplated and intended secretarial compliance with NEPA when 

designating habitat under ESA. 

The Conference Report for the 1978 amendments also indicates 

congressional acknowledgment and expectation that impact 

statements were to be prepared for those designations satisfying 

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the requisite criteria under NEPA. The report notes in pertinent 

part that 

Where critical habitat is specified[,] .... [a]ctual 

notice of the regulation and any environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement prepared on it is required to 

be given to all general local governments within or adjacent 

to the proposed critical habitat at least 60 days prior to 

its effective date. 

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 27 (1978), 

reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9494 (emphasis added). 

We conclude that the legislative history does not, as 

Appellants contend, indicate congressional endorsement of the 

Secretary's announcement in the Federal Register of NEPA 

noncompliance or silent acquiescence in applying and extending the 

holding of Pacific Legal Foundation to designations of critical 

habitat. Instead, the available material indicates that Congress 

intended that the Secretary comply with NEPA when designating 

critical habitat under ESA when such designations constitute major 

federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 

environment. When the environmental ramifications of such 

designations are unknown, we believe Congress intends that the 

Secretary prepare an EA leading to either a FONSI or an EIS. 

III. Preliminary Injunction. 

We review a district court's grant of a preliminary 

injunction for abuse of discretion and "examine whether the 

district court committed an error of law or relied on clearly 

erroneous fact findings." Walmer v. Dept. of Defense, 52 F.3d 

851, 854 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 474 (1995). The 

County asserts that the Secretary's designation of critical 

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habitat will prevent government flood control efforts thereby 

causing flood damage to county-owned land, roadways and bridges. 

An environmental injury usually is of an enduring or permanent 

nature, seldom remedied by money damages and generally considered 

irreparable. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 u.s. 

531, 545 (1987). 

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding that the County's alleged injuries, supported by 

substantial evidence, constituted an imminent, irreparable injury 

warranting the grant of a preliminary injunction. 

AFFIRMED. 

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