Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05334/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 1995 Decided July 30, 1996

No. 94-5334

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv00986)

Paul D. Kamenar argued the cause for appellant, with whom Daniel J. Popeo was on the briefs.

Jennifer H. Zacks, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellees, with whom

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, were on the brief.

Before: BUCKLEY, GINSBURG, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The Supreme Court has stated approvingly that "the courts of this

country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents." Nixon v.

Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). At least as it applies to the federal government,

however, the reach of this common law right is far from clear. This case poses the question whether

certain documents compiled or created by an advisory committee established by the United States

Sentencing Commission are "public records" to which the public has a conditional right of access

under the common law. With such guidance as we can glean from state common law and the few

federal cases that have come before, we conclude that the documents are not public records.

I. Background

In early 1992 the Sentencing Commission established an Advisory Working Group on

Environmental Sanctions made up of individuals from both the public and private sectors. The

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Advisory Group's mission was to develop and recommend to the Commission proposed sentencing

guidelines.

Although some of the early meetings of the Advisory Group were open to the public, in June

1992 the group announced that until it completed a draft of its recommendations it would conduct

its meetings in private. In March 1993 the Advisory Group released a draft report recommending a

new set of sentencing guidelines for environmental offenses. The group solicited comments on the

draft proposed guidelines at a public hearing in May 1993. Six months later the Advisory Group

submitted final proposed guidelines to the Commission.

The Washington Legal Foundation, "a non-profit public interest law and policy center," had

been an active participant in Commission hearings and proceedings on environmental sanctions for

several years when the new Advisory Group decided to conduct its meetings in private. The WLF

objected and, when it did not receive a satisfactory response, filed thissuit in May 1993, alleging that

both the Federal AdvisoryCommittee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, §§ 1-15, and federal common law confer

upon the public a right of access to the Advisory Group's documents. In particular, the WLF sought

accessto such "internaldocuments and memoranda" asthe AdvisoryGroup developed or uponwhich

it relied as it formulated its recommendations to the Commission. Washington Legal Found. v.

United States Sentencing Comm'n, 826 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1993).

The district court entered a summary judgment for the defendants, holding that because the

Advisory Group was "established" and "utilized" by the Sentencing Commission, see 5 U.S.C. app.

2, § 3(2)(C), which is not an "agency" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1),

the Advisory Group is not subject to the constraints of FACA. See 826 F. Supp. at 13-14. The court

also concluded that the Advisory Group's documents are not "public records" subject to the common

law right of access: "The documents ... are not part of a public proceeding, nor are they official

records, nor are they a final report by the Advisory Group. Rather, they are the predecisional

materials upon which a finalrecommendation to the Commission may develop." Id. at 14. The WLF

appealed.

We affirmed the district court's holding that FACA does not apply to the Advisory Group.

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With respect to the federal common law claim, however, we held that the district court erred in

deciding, "without knowing what documents the Advisory Group had in its possession," that they

need not have been disclosed under the common law. Washington Legal Found. v. United States

Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (WLF I). The way to determine whether

the public has a right of accessto a document, we explained, isto decide first "whether the document

sought is a "public record.' If the answer is yes, then the court should proceed to balance the

government's interest in keeping the document secret against the public's interest in disclosure." Id.

at 1451-52. This balancing should not be done in the abstract; the court should focus upon "the

specific nature of the governmental and public interests as they relate to the document itself, as well

as the general public interest in the openness of governmental processes." Id. at 1452.

Although the district court "appeared confident from the nature of the Advisory Group and

the terms of WLF's document request that none ofthe requested materials would be subject to public

access under the common law," we were not so sure, "knowing no more than the general categories

of documents named by WLF, that none of these are [sic] public records that could survive the

applicable balancing test." Id. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the district court with the

following instruction:

The court should assess separately each category of documents requested to

determine whether part or all of that category might be composed of public records.

If there is any legitimate question as to any or all of the categories, then the court

should order a Vaughn index [see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C. Cir.

1973)] to evaluate the individual documents within these categories. For any and all

documents determined to be public records, the court should then balance the

government's interest in secrecy against the public's interest in disclosure with

reference to the contents of the particular documents at issue (as reflected in the

Vaughn index) to determine whether WLF has a common law right of accessto those

documents.

On remand, the Government argued for the first time that this suit is barred by sovereign

immunity. The WLF responded that 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which gives the district courts jurisdiction

over mandamussuits, also waivessovereign immunitytherefrom, and, in the alternative, that the ultra

vires exception of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), applies

in this case. The district court, recognizing that sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defect that may

be raised at any time, held (in an unpublished memorandum) that "sovereign immunity is not a bar to

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suits under the mandamus statute seeking to require the performance of a legal duty owed to the

Plaintiff." Because the jurisdictional inquiry therefore merges with the main issue in the

casewhether the Advisory Group has a legal duty to provide public access to the requested

documentsthe district court proceeded to consider the merits of the case, as follows.

The district court apparently determined that there was after all "a legitimate question as to

any or all of the categories" of documents in suit, for it did order a Vaughn index, in which the

Sentencing Commission itemized more than 700 documents divided into six categories. One of the

six consists of public comments on the draft guidelines, which comments the Commission and the

Advisory Group have made available to the public. The five categories still at issue in this case

consist of (1) personal notes, memoranda, and correspondence on policy matters; (2) preliminary

drafts of guideline proposals; (3) copyrighted scholarly research; (4) memoranda prepared at the

request ofthe AdvisoryGroup and materialsfrom other organizations; and (5) letters or memoranda

on administrative matters internal to the Advisory Group.

The district court concluded that none ofthe documentsin any ofthese categoriesis a "public

record" subject to the common law right of access. The court's opinion proceeds from the premise,

which it made express but upon which it did not elaborate, that as a matter of federal common law

the only documents to which the right of access applies are those "akin to court documents." Here,

the court found:

[T]he documents sought by the WLF memorialize the decision making process the

Advisory Group undertook in creating the draft of the recommended sentencing

guidelines that the Advisory Group ultimately produced for public comment.

Consequently, they are not "public records" as argued by the WLF. More

importantly, if these type [sic] of deliberative memorials were subject to the common

law right, then arguably jury deliberations, private conferences of judges, law clerk

notes, and rough drafts of opinions would likewise be subject to the rule. The

obvious overriding concerns of maintaining the integrity of the decisional processes

and promoting frank discussions and exchanges ofideas precludessuch a result in this

case.

In the present appeal the WLF contends that the common law right of access applies to a

broad range of records, not merely to the records of judicial proceedings and similar documents.

Moreover, the WLF argues, in deciding that the AdvisoryGroup's documents are not public records,

the district court improperly took into account the Government's concern about confidentiality,

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thereby conflating the two successive inquiries prescribed by this court in WLF I. Finally, the WLF

contends that the district court's decision rests upon erroneous factual findings; that is, even if the

court had been correct in thinking that only materials "akin to court documents" are "public records,"

not all the documents listed are predecisional and many are in fact akin to evidence that might be

introduced in a court proceeding.

In addition to asserting sovereign immunity fromthissuit, the Government maintainsthat the

common law right of access is limited to categories of documents wholly unlike those maintained by

the AdvisoryGroup. The few federal cases to uphold a common law right of access, the Government

points out, have involved documents "central to the process of adjudication." That limitation is

consistent with the policy supporting the right, which is, according to the Government, that of

ensuring open legal proceedings and promoting public confidence in the legal process. Moreover,

although some state cases have found a common law right of access to all documents that the law

requires a state official to maintain, such as licenses and deeds, the documents in this case are not

recordsthat theSentencingReformActrequirestheSentencingCommission (or the AdvisoryGroup)

to create or to keep.

II. Analysis

The first substantive issue before us is whether the Advisory Group's documents are "public

records." As detailed below, we do not agree with the district court's conclusion that the common

law right of access is limited to materials "akin to court documents" (nor do we necessarily endorse

the district court's "parade of horribles"). Even our broader concept of "public records," however,

does not encompass the documents that the WLF is seeking. We therefore resolve this case solely

on the ground that those documents are not "public records"; we need not go on to balance the

Government'sinterest in confidentiality against the public'sinterest in disclosure. Before we proceed

to the merits, however, we must address a threshold issue, namely, whether this suit is barred by the

doctrine of sovereign immunity.

A. Sovereign Immunity

The mandamus statute provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

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action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any

agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. It is well settled that this

statute does not by itself waive sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Coggeshall Dev. Corp. v. Diamond,

884 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1989); Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v. Grimm,

534 F.2d 1346, 1352 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976); Essex v. Vinal, 499 F.2d 226, 231-32 (8th Cir. 1974);

McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F.

Supp. 208, 213 (D.D.C. 1994) ("The generally accepted rule is that § 1361 does not constitute a

waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States").

If a plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus to force a public official to perform a duty imposed

upon him in his official capacity, however, no separate waiver ofsovereign immunity is needed. See,

e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This so-called LarsonDugan exception to sovereign immunity is described by the Supreme Court as follows:

There may be, of course, suits for specific relief against officers of the sovereign

which are not suits against the sovereign.... [W]here the officer's powers are limited

by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not

sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has

empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden.

His actions are ultra vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of

specific relief.

Larson, 337 U.S. at 689; see also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963).

Whether the Larson-Dugan exception applies to this case depends upon whether the

Government has a duty to the plaintiff, viz. to allow it access to certain government records. The

Government deniesthat it has such a duty, and that is the only basis upon which it resists application

of the Larson-Dugan exception. We agree with the district court, therefore, that the question of

jurisdiction merges with the question on the merits, to which we now turn.

B. The Common Law Right of Access

In "the courts ofthis country"including the federal courtsthe common law bestows upon

the public a right of access to public records and documents. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; see United

States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1976), reversed on other grounds sub nom.

United States v. Nixon, supra. A not insignificant body of state case law addresses the scope of this

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right as against state record-keepers, though the growth of the common law has been stunted in

recent years by the spread of comprehensive disclosure statutes. See Project: Government

Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1163-70 (1975).

As we explained in our first opinion in this case, the decision whether a document must be

disclosed pursuant to the common law right of access involves a two-step inquiry. First, the court

must decide "whether the document sought is a "public record.' If the answer is yes, then the court

should proceed to balance the government's interest in keeping the document secret against the

public's interest in disclosure." 17 F.3d at 1451-52. The district court resolved this case at the first

step, concluding that the documents in question are not public records; accordingly, the court held

that independent of the balance of interests, the public has no right of access to these documents. In

reviewing the district court's decision, therefore, we must first explore the definition of "public

record" for the purpose of federal common law.

We are aware of only a few cases, arising from stillfewer contexts, in which any federal court

acknowledged the common law right of access prior to its endorsement by this court and the Supreme

Court in a case arising out of the Watergate affair. See Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404

(1894) (recognizing common law right of access to documents filed with court on appeal from

decision of Patent Office); In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (same); In re Sackett, 136

F.2d 248 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (same); Sloan Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 F. 504 (C.C.D.

Colo. 1902) (common law right to inspect and copy public records precludes district court from

ordering, pursuant to stipulation to dismiss, that files and record pertaining to case be withdrawn from

clerk's office); In re Greenbaum, 243 F. 965, 969 (E.D. Mich. 1917) (same; dicta). In the

Watergate case a group of broadcasters sought the release of White House tapes that had been

introduced into evidence in certain criminal trials. Although the Government had published redacted

transcripts of the tapes, the district court denied access to the tapes themselves in the interest of

avoiding prejudice to the Watergate defendants should a new trial be ordered on appeal. United

States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1975). We reversed, holding that the common law right

clearly extended to the tapes once they were used as exhibits in a judicial proceeding, and that the

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district court's justification for denying public access was insufficient to outweigh the presumption

in favor of access to public records such as these. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1260-63. Upon further

review the Supreme Court was unequivocal in stating that there is a federal common law right of

access "to inspect and copypublic records and documents, including judicialrecords and documents."

435 U.S. at 597 (citations omitted). The Court nonetheless reversed our decision on the ground that

access under the common law should be denied with respect to documentsto which the Congress has

provided an administrative avenuein that case via the Presidential Records Act; the availability of

a legislativelyprescribed route to documentstipsthe second-step balancing test against theirjudicially

prompted release. Id. at 603-06.

Since the Watergate cases, the common law right of access has been invoked in federal courts

with some frequency, but still almost alwaysin casesinvolving accessto court documents. See, e.g.,

Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court failed to give adequate reason

for sealing court documents in derogation of common law right of access); Mayo v. United States

Gen. Printing Office, 9 F.3d 1450 (9th Cir. 1993) (common law right does not guarantee access to

Supreme Court slip opinions in electronic form and free of charge); Smith v. United States Dist. Ct.

for S. Dist. of Ill., 956 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1992) (common law right appliesto document not admitted

into evidence but explicitly relied upon by judge ruling from bench); Wilson v. American Motors

Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (common law right prevents district court from sealing court

records pursuant to settlement agreement); National Broadcasting Co. v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d

Cir. 1980) (common law right appliesto video tapes admitted into evidence in Abscamprosecutions).

But see Schwartz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 435 F. Supp. 1203 (D.D.C. 1977) (common law

right applies to Congress), aff'd, 595 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (table).

Unlike the district court in the present case, we are not persuaded by the narrow focus of the

federal casesthat the common law right islimited to recordsthat are "similar ... to court documents."

The Supreme Court's reference in Nixon to "a general right to inspect and copy public records and

documents, including judicial records and documents," 435 U.S. at 597, clearly implies that judicial

records are but a subset of the universe of documents to which the common law right applies. See

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*The Government does not argue that the Sentencing Commission is beyond the reach of the

federal common law right of access by reason of the Congress's decision to exempt it from the

federal disclosure statutes. Compare Andrade v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 989 F.2d

308, 309 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In directing the Commission to comply with certain provisions of the

APA, not including [the Freedom of Information Act], see 28 U.S.C. § 994(x), Congress

indicated implicitly that the Commission should be exempt from other provisions of the statute")

and WLF I, 17 F.2d at 1450 (Sentencing Commission exempt from FACA) with Milwaukee v.

Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) ("[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed

by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking

by federal courts disappears"). Nor, in view of the Commission's exemption from the FOIA and

the FACA, do we here resolve the question whether coverage by a federal disclosure statute

precludes the application of the federal common law right of access altogether; we note,

however, that if the common law right does apply, the availability of a statutory means of access

would likely tip the scales in the second-step balancing test against requiring disclosure of the

document under the common law. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603-06. 

id. at 597 n. 7 (citing state casesindicating that common law right appliesto non-judicialdocuments);

cf. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258 ("That the common law right to inspect public records extends to

judicial records is clear"). Indeed, it has been said in this district that "[t]he general rule is that all

three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, are subject to the common law

right." Schwartz, 435 F. Supp. at 1203.

The limited nature ofthe federal case law on the subject does pose a problem, however. Here

we are faced with a claim of access to the documents of a government entity, the Sentencing

Commission, that is within the judicial branch but is not a court. See Mistretta v. United States, 488

U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989). While we have no occasion to doubt that federal common law would

extend the right of access to such an entity,* when we look for guidance concerning the application

of this right we find that we are in uncharted waters. Cf. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-99 ("It is difficult

to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehensive definition of what is referred to

asthe common-law right of access or to identify all the factorsto be weighed in determining whether

access is appropriate").

Nor can we turn in this case to the common law of England, which is often a source of

guidance in matters of state common law. There is no indication that the common law of England

was ever incorporated in substance into the law of the United States. As Justice Chase wrote of the

common law of crimes in 1798:

If, indeed, the United States can be supposed, for a moment, to have a common law,

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it must, I presume, be that of England; and yet, it is impossible to trace when, or

how, the systemwas adopted or introduced. With respect to the individual states, the

difficulty does not occur. When the American colonies were first settled by our

ancestors, it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the judges and lawyers ofEngland,

that they brought hither, as a birth-right and inheritance,so much of the common law,

as was applicable to their local situation, and change of circumstances. But each

colony judged for itself, what parts of the common law were applicable to its new

condition.... The common law, therefore, of one state, is not the common law of

another; but the common law of England is the law of each state, so far as each state

has adopted it.... Now, the United States did not bring [the common law] with them

from England; the constitution does not create it; and no act of congress has

assumed it.

United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 384, 394 (C.C.Pa. 1798); see Seminole Tribe of Florida

v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1160-65 (1996) (Souter,J., dissenting) (noting Framersrecognized "that

the diverse development of the common law in the several states made a general federal reception

impossible"); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834) ("It is clear, there can be no

common law of the United States.... There is no principle which pervades the Union and has the

authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union. The common law

could be made a part of our federal system, only by legislative adoption"). This general conclusion

is buttressed in this instance by the Supreme Court's clear statement in Nixon that the common law

right of accessin the United Statesis quite unlike its English counterpart: "In contrast to the English

practice, American decisions generally do not condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary

interest in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit." 435 U.S. at 597; see also

Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1257. We therefore doubt the wisdom of drawing upon English case law for

guidance concerning the American public's right of access to the documents of the United States.

By default we must look for the contours of the right of access in the common law of the

states, as did the Supreme Court itself in Nixon. See 435 U.S. at 597-99. See generally 76 C.J.S.

Records § 62 (1994); 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 19 et seq. (1973); Project:

Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, supra, at 1163-1170; Comment, Public

Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1107-11

(1977). There we find a range of definitions of "public record," perhaps the most restrictive of which

is "a written memorial, made by a public officer .... required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept

in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of

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something written, said, or done." Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 634 (Fla. 1922). The Supreme Court

of Missouri applied a similar definition in Kavanaugh v. Henderson, 169 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1943),

holding that recordsrequired not bystatute but byadministrative regulations are not "public records."

169 S.W.2d at 392. Among the documents required by law and held to be public records are: an

official auditor's report of state spending, Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 752 (Mich. 1928); the

financial records of a board of education, Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. 1962); and

applications for welfare benefits, on file with a county clerk, Research Inst. v. Nix, 155 P.2d 983

(Okla. 1944).

At the other end of the spectrum, the New Jersey courtsseem to have embraced the broadest

imaginable definition of public or "common-law" records: "any records made by public officers in

the exercise of public functions.... These materials include almost every document recorded,

generated, or produced by public officials whether or not required by law to be made, maintained or

kept on file." Higg-a-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 660 A.2d 1163, 1168 (N.J. 1995); see also id.

at 1170 (computer-tape copies of tax assessment lists); South Jersey Publishing Co. v. New Jersey

Expressway Auth., 591 A.2d 921 (N.J. 1991) (memorandum of executive session at which executive

director of Authority was fired); Red Bank Register, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 501 A.2d 985 (N.J.

1985) (curriculumreports developed byoutside consultant for board of education); Irval Realty, Inc.

v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 294 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1972) (accident reports required under

regulation promulgated by PUC).

The WLF urges us to follow New Jersey's broad lead by holding that the documents at issue

here are public records because they were "required or necessary or convenient" to the Advisory

Group in the exercise of its official duties. We think it would be imprudent, however, considering

that the federal courts have had very limited experience with the common law right of access, to

impose upontheSentencingCommissionthemost demanding possible disclosure obligationthe one

implicitly rejected by most of the states.

After putting aside the most stringent disclosure requirements to be found among the states,

we are still left with a range of definitions for the term "public record." There is some common

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ground among them, however, and with that as our starting point we can discern the outline of a

definition suitable for the purposes of federal common law.

Many of the state cases would allow access only to a "written memorial" of some sort. See,

e.g., Charleston Mail Assoc. v. Kelly, 143 S.E.2d 136, 139 (W.Va. 1965). Although the law of some

states does not provide access unless the "written memorial" is required by law to be kept, see, e.g.,

Amos, 94 So. at 634, even the cases taking a more generous view of the subject seem to limit access

to documents that can fairly be called "written memorials," see International Union, UAW v.

Gooding, 29 N.W.2d 730, 735 (Wis. 1947) (common law rule, incorporated into state right-to-know

statute, is that "public records include not only papers specifically required to be kept by a public

officer but all written memorials made by a public officer within his authority where such writings

constitute a convenient, appropriate or customary method of discharging the duties of the office").

Not every writing is a "written memorial," of course. In the governmental context, a written

memorial is a writing created and kept for the purpose of preserving a precise record of an official

decision or action. See Linder v. Eckard, 152 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Iowa 1967) (whether document is

"public record" depends upon its "nature and purpose"); accord Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian

Community v. Rogers, 815 P.2d 900, 907 (Ariz. 1991); City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St.

Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Ky. 1974) ("all records maintained ... as evidence of the manner

in which the business of that unit of government has been conducted are public records").

Accordingly, we conclude, as a matter of federal common law, that a "public record"that

is, a record to which the public has a right of access, subject to the balance of public and

governmental interestsis a government document created and kept for the purpose of

memorializing or recording an official action, decision, statement, or other matter of legal

significance, broadly conceived. This definition adequately protects the public's interest in keeping

"a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies," Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598an interest we regard

as "fundamental to a democratic state," Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258and is yet narrow enough to

avoid the necessity for judicial application of the second-step balancing test to documents that are

preliminary, advisory, or, for one reason or another, do not eventuate in any official action or decision

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being taken.

If applied at the state level the definition we adopt would encompass, for example, a report

or record of government expenditures, cf. Gibson, 181 N.E.2d at 378; Nowack, 219 N.W. at 751,

as well as documents kept in order to record real estate transactions, cf. Nevada Title Guar. & Trust

Co. v. Grimes, 84 P. 1061 (Nev. 1906), and a list of tax abatements passed by a city council, cf.

McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1951) (applying Rhode Island law). It

would not encompass the preliminary materials upon which an official relied in making a decision or

other writings incidental to the decision itselffor example, the report of a blood test provided in

support of an application for a marriage license, the job application of a would-be government

employee, a government auditor's preliminary notes used in the preparation of an official report, or

a cover memorandum circulated with a copy of an official report or study.

This definition is also consistent with the federal cases holding that documents and exhibits

filed with or introduced into evidence in a federal court are public records. A court proceeding,

unlike the processes for much decisionmaking by executive and legislative officials, is in its entirety

and by its very nature a matter of legalsignificance; all of the documents filed with the court, as well

as the transcript of the proceeding itself, are maintained as the official "record" of what transpired.

See FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[W]e rule that relevant

documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course

of adjudicatoryproceedings, become documentsto which the presumption of public access applies");

see also Smith, 956 F.2d at 650 (holding common law right extends to memorandum from Clerk of

Court to judges which, though not admitted into evidence, was relied upon explicitly by trial judge

ruling from bench in open court). Indeed, the meaning and legal import of a judicial decision is a

function of the record upon which it was rendered. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW

SYSTEM IN AMERICA § 10, at 14-15 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989).

The documents at issue in the present case were not created and kept for the purpose of

memorializing or recording an official action, decision, statement, or other matter of legal

significance. Although the Advisory Group undeniably functioned in an official governmental

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capacity, it had a very limited mission, namely, to recommend sentencing guidelinesto the Sentencing

Commission. The Advisory Group's final report, which contains its recommendations, is available

to the public, as are the public commentssubmitted during the notice-and-comment period. Although

we disagree with the district court that all of the documents still at issue in this case are

"pre-decisional," some of them having been compiled after the release of the final report, we do

findwith the benefit of a comprehensive index of the specific documents at issue, which we lacked

when WLF I was before usthat each category of documents is made up entirely of materials that

are, if not preliminary, then merely incidental to the only official action the Advisory Group was

authorized to take, viz., recommending sentencing guidelines to the Commission.

Finally, the WLF contends that the Advisory Group's documents are public records because

theywere by law "required to be compiled." This argument is based upon the Sentencing Reform Act

provision "requir[ing] that, as a starting point in its development of the initial sets of guidelines for

particular categories of cases, the Commission ascertain the average sentences imposed in such

categories of cases prior to the creation of the Commission...." 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). The Act also

requires the Commission to "consult with authorities on ... various aspects of the Federal criminal

justice system" and to consider "comments and data coming to its attention." 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).

Assuming, arguendo, the WLF's premise that any document "required by law to be kept" is

necessarily a public record for the purpose of the federal common law right of access, we disagree

with the WLF's construction of the Sentencing Reform Act. A requirement that an agency merely

consult or consider certain information or make certain calculations in the process of developing a

policy or rule is not a record-keeping requirement. Nor is it a requirement that the agency

memorialize its decisionmaking process by keeping the materials upon which it relied, as does a

statute requiring formalthat is, "on the record"rulemaking or adjudication. Cf. Walsh-Healey

Act, 41 U.S.C. § 43a(b) (formal rulemaking "on the record after opportunity for a hearing" for wage

determinations for public contracts); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)-(c) (formal

adjudication of labor disputes). Neither the Sentencing Reform Act nor any more general Act of

Congress requires the Commission (or its delegate) to keep a record of its proceedings or research.

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We therefore find no basis for concluding that the documentsin question were required by law to be

kept.

III. Conclusion

Although we do not entirely agree with the district court's analysis in this case, we do agree

with its conclusion: the documents sought by the WLF are not public records. They are therefore

beyond the scope of the common law right of access, and it is not necessary to balance the public's

interest in disclosure against the Government's interest in confidentiality as provided in the second

step of the analysis laid out in WLF I. The decision of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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