Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01497/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01497-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12188 Americans With Disabilities Act - Civil Enforcement Actions

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RUTHERFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARA LEBANESE GRILL, a business of 

unknown form; POLIS & SONS, INC., a 

California corporation; and DOES 1-10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-01497-AJB-WVG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CAUSE 

OF ACTION

(Doc. No. 8)

Before the Court is Defendants Ara Lebanese Grill and Polis & Sons, Inc.’s 

(collectively referred to as “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff James Rutherford’s 

(“Plaintiff”) state law cause of action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 

and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff opposes the motion submitted by 

Defendants. (Doc. No. 10.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff suffers disabilities that qualify him as a disabled person under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and possesses a Disabled Person Parking 

Placard. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.) On or about April 27, 2018, Plaintiff went to Ara Lebanese Grill. 

(Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff encountered the following barriers outside the business: the accessible 

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parking space access aisle doubled as a curb ramp; the curb ramp exceeded the 2% slope 

and counter slope limit; and the curb ramp extended into an accessible parking space. (Id.

¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff states there are additional ADA violations inside the business: 

the centerline of the water closet is 20 inches away from the 

nearest wall in violation of Section 604.2 which requires a 

maximum distance of 18 inches; the paper towel dispenser is 

blocking access to the rear wall grab bar. The space between the 

grab bars and projecting objects above shall be 12 inches (305 

mm) minimum per Section 609.3 in order to be able to properly 

access these safety devices; the restroom sink has the old style 

faucet handles which require tight twisting or turning of the wrist 

in violation of Section 309.4; the clear floor space at the interior 

front entrance door has less than the required 18 inches clearance 

on the latch side of the door as a large garbage receptacle is in 

that space; and there is no portion of the sales and service counter 

available to provide access to the disabled per Section 904.4.1.

(Id. ¶ 15.)

On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Subsequently, on August 15, 2018, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state 

law cause of action. (Doc. No. 8.) Defendants also filed a request for judicial notice of

Plaintiff’s similar pending and settled cases, filed in both this District and the Central 

District of California. (Doc. No. 8-2.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss on August 29, 2018, (Doc. No. 10), and Defendants filed their reply on 

September 5, 2018, (Doc. No. 11).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 

complaint and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack 

of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” 

SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a complaint will survive a 

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motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this 

determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual 

allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for a 

court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice of Plaintiff’s Similar Lawsuits 

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts may take judicial notice of a “fact that 

is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s 

territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Specifically, matters of 

public record and judicial proceedings in other courts have been recognized as acceptable 

facts the court may judicially notice. See Wheeler v. Premiere Credit of North America, 80 

F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (stating a federal appellate opinion was a matter 

of public record and was capable of accurate and ready determination, and therefore the 

court could take judicial notice of the opinion); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 

894 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating the court may take judicial notice of judicial proceedings in 

other courts) (citing Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006))); U.S. ex 

rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 

1992).

The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of Plaintiff’s similar lawsuits, as 

shown in Defendants’ moving papers. (Doc. No. 8-2.) These lawsuits are accurately and 

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readily determinable from this district’s PACER system, whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned. Defendants’ moving papers indicate Plaintiff has filed 169 

similar lawsuits (including the case at bar) between the dates of March 31, 2017, and 

August 13, 2018. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial 

notice. 

B. The Unruh Civil Rights Act

California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”) provides in part that “[a]ll 

persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their . . . 

disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 

privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 51(b). A violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act is also considered 

a violation of the Unruh Act in California. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant performed an

intentional act or omission. See Org. for the Advancement of Minorities v. Brick Oven Rest., 

406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2005). However, the ADA does not require a 

plaintiff to show intentional discrimination if a plaintiff’s “Unruh Act violation is premised 

on an ADA violation.” Lentini v. Cal. Center for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 

(9th Cir. 2004).

While the ADA only provides injunctive relief for plaintiffs, the Unruh Act allows 

the additional recovery of monetary damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). A plaintiff may 

recover actual damages for each Unruh Act violation “up to a maximum of three times the 

amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000)[.]” Cal. 

Civ. Code § 52(a). However, a plaintiff “need not prove she suffered actual damages to 

recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d

724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). 

C. The Americans with Disabilities Act 

The ADA bars discrimination against an individual “on the basis of disability in the 

full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

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accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases 

(or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A 

restaurant or other establishment that serves food or drink is a “public accommodation” 

under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B).

Prevailing on an ADA claim requires a plaintiff to prove that (1) he or she has a 

disability, as defined under the ADA; (2) the defendant leases, owns, or operates a place of 

public accommodation; and (3) the defendant denied public accommodations to the 

plaintiff because of plaintiff’s disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(a)–(b); see Molski, 481 F.3d 

at 730. Furthermore, a plaintiff is not required to show “intentional discrimination in order 

to make out a violation of the ADA.” Lentini, 370 F.3d at 846. The available remedy under 

the ADA does not include recovery of damages, but instead provides only injunctive relief. 

Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Wander v. 

Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1))).

D. Plaintiff’s State Cause of Action Substantially Predominates over Plaintiff’s ADA 

Federal Claim

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute states that in any civil action where the 

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental 

jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a). The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is mandatory unless prohibited by §

1367(b), or if one of the exceptions identified in § 1367(c) applies. Under § 1367(c), federal 

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 

district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, 

or

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(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). During an evaluation of § 1367(c), the Court considers various factors 

including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the 

character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal 

claims . . . .” City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). In 

addition, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “in the interests of 

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 

484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988).

If a state claim “substantially predominates” over a federal claim “in terms of proof, 

of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought,” then 

the Court may dismiss the state claims without prejudice. United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966). In addition, there may be other reasons that are 

“independent of jurisdictional considerations . . . that would justify separating state and 

federal claims for trial.” Id. at 727.

After careful consideration of both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ arguments, the Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law cause of action and 

dismisses said action. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law cause of action under the 

Unruh Act substantially predominates over Plaintiff’s ADA claim. The Court agrees for 

the following two reasons.

First, California’s Unruh Act provides both monetary damages and injunctive relief

for claimants in Plaintiff’s position, whereas the ADA only provides injunctive relief. The 

Unruh Act provides a minimum award of $4,000 to a plaintiff for each Unruh Act offense. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Here, Plaintiff claims eight (8) violations and intends to perform 

a site inspection in the future to determine additional violations. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 15–16.) If 

each of these allegations were to be proven, Plaintiff would be entitled to a minimum of 

$32,000 in actual damages. (Id. at 9.) In addition, Plaintiff requests statutory damages in 

the amount of $4,000 for each time Plaintiff visits an establishment that contains 

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architectural barriers that deny Plaintiff equal access to the premises. (Id.) Plaintiff also

requests an additional $4,000 in deterrence damages. (Id.) The sheer volume of damages 

Plaintiff requests indicates that Plaintiff’s primary focus is on recovering monetary 

damages.

Due to the existing circumstances, the Court finds that the monetary damages 

Plaintiff seeks substantially predominate over the injunctive relief available under the 

ADA. Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1030; see Org. for the Advancement of Minorities, 406 

F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (finding that statutory damages available under the Unruh Act 

substantially predominated over injunctive relief available under the ADA where the 

plaintiff alleged distinct violations that, if proven, would entitle him to an award of 

$56,000); see also Molski v. Hitching Post I Rest., Inc., No. CV 04-1077SVWRNBX, 2005 

WL 3952248, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2005) (finding that statutory damages provided 

under the Unruh Act substantially predominated over injunctive relief available under the 

ADA where the plaintiff alleged 13 allegations that, if proven, would entitle plaintiff to an 

award of $52,000).

Second, Plaintiff’s complaint relies on Defendants’ intentional failure to remove 

barriers and intentional discrimination to support Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 26, 37.)

Plaintiff states that “[g]iven the obvious and blatant violation alleged hereinabove, Plaintiff 

alleges, on information and belief, that the failure to remove these barriers was intentional 

. . . .” (Id. ¶ 26.) In addition, under Plaintiff’s state law cause of action, Plaintiff declares 

“Defendant’s actions constitute intentional discrimination against [him] on the basis of 

[his] individual disabilities.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Between Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and ADA claims, 

only the Unruh Act requires Plaintiff to show Defendant’s intentional acts or omissions.

Accordingly, Plaintiff “places intentionality at the heart of his claims for relief, which when 

combined with the amount of monetary relief sought, strongly suggests the Unruh Act 

claim substantially predominates.” Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1030 (citation omitted).

/ / /

/ / /

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E. Exceptional Circumstances and Compelling Reasons Exist to Warrant Not Exercising 

Supplemental Jurisdiction 

In 2015, California’s legislature codified its findings regarding information it 

received from the California Commission on Disability Access. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.55.

These findings declare that “[p]rotection of the civil rights of persons with disabilities is of 

the utmost importance to [California], and private enforcement is the essential means of 

achieving that goal, as the law has been designed.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.55(a)(1). In 

addition, the legislature found that between the years of 2012 and 2014 “more than onehalf, or 54 percent, of all construction-related accessibility complaints . . . were filed by 

two law firms. Forty-six percent of all [construction-related accessibility] complaints were 

filed by a total of 14 parties.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.55(a)(2). Thus, the legislature found 

that a small number of plaintiffs had filed a “disproportionately large number of the 

construction-related accessibility claims in the state[.]” Id. Moreover, the legislature’s 

findings declare that “given these special and unique circumstances, the provisions of this 

section are warranted for this limited group of plaintiffs.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.55(a)(3) 

(emphasis added). The provisions under this section and section 425.50 (codified in 2012) 

provide additional pleading and court filing requirements for high-frequency litigants and 

were created in the interest of laying down “additional safeguards . . . so as to ensure that 

the claims are warranted.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.55(b). Put more simply, the provisions’ 

purpose is to deter vexatious litigation and baseless claims. See e.g., SB 1186, Chapter 383 

§ 24 (Ca. 2012).

When tracking Plaintiff’s similar lawsuits, the Court recognizes an eerily similar 

pattern of litigants, much like the one California’s legislature declared in California Civ. 

Proc. § 425.55(a)(2). Plaintiff’s 169 similar lawsuits (including the case at bar) filed 

between March 31, 2017, and August 13, 2018, were filed by a total of four (4) plaintiffs.1

In addition, Plaintiff’s 169 lawsuits are only spread between eight (8) legal representative 

 

1 Each lawsuit is filed by Plaintiff and a combination of one or more of the three other plaintiffs.

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entities.2 The disproportion between the number of lawsuits filed and the number of 

litigants is alarming and highlights the California legislature’s concerns regarding highfrequency litigants.

When considering the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity, the Court finds additional support in declining to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction. First, the Court agrees with the Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff is 

engaging in forum shopping. Just as in Schutza, “[i]t is unclear what advantage—other than 

avoiding state-imposed pleading requirements—Plaintiff gains by being in federal court 

since his sole remedy under the ADA is injunctive relief, which is also available under the 

Unruh Act.” Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1031. Of the 52 cases Plaintiff has filed in this 

district alone, 20 have been closed within a few months of the filing date, without reaching

a trial on the merits. The Court finds this “sue, settle, and move on to the next suit[ ]” 

pattern to be a compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 1132 

(“Because a legitimate function of the federal courts is to discourage forum shopping and 

California courts should interpret California law . . . compelling reasons exist to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.”); Org. for the Advancement of 

Minorities, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.

Second, it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use the federal court system as a 

loophole to evade California’s pleading requirements. The California legislature diagnosed 

a severe issue in the court system surrounding construction-related accessibility 

complaints. As a remedy, the legislature chose to implement heightened pleading

requirements for a specific class of plaintiffs, also known as high-frequency litigants. In 

the interest of comity and in deference to the State of California’s objective in 

“discouraging unverified disability discrimination claims,” the Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law cause of action. Schutza 262 F. Supp. 

 

2 The majority of Plaintiff’s lawsuits (165 lawsuits) are filed solely by three legal groups: Manning Law, 

APC; The Law Offices of Babak Hashemi; and The Law Offices of Joseph R. Manning Jr.

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3d at 1031; see Hitching Post I Rest., 2005 WL 3952248 at *8–9 (finding comity to be a 

compelling reason for declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims on the ground 

that California courts should have the opportunity to interpret state disability laws).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law cause of action. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 

plaintiff’s state law claim without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2019

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