Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05748/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05748-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY TYRONE FOSTER, CASE NO. CV-F-99-5748 OWW DLB HC

Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

REQUEST FOR STAY TO AMEND

vs. PETITION WITH NEW CLAIM

ROSIE B. GARCIA, Warden, [Doc. 142]

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 28, 1999. Respondent filed

an answer on November, 12, 2003. Petitioner filed a traverse on February 26, 2004, and a supplemental

traverse on August 27, 2004. The petition is currently pending review before this Court.

On June 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a new motion to stay the proceedings and hold the petition

in abeyance pending exhaustion of new claims. Respondent filed an opposition on December 9, 2005.

Petitioner filed a reply on January 3, 2006. 

Petitioner attempts to raise a new claim based on a new rule of constitutional law and indicates

that he has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court

contemporaneously with the instant request in order to exhaust his state court remedies. In attempting

to raise a new claim Petitioner relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely v.

Case 1:99-cv-05748-OWW -DLB Document 145 Filed 01/25/06 Page 1 of 3
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28 AEDPA refers to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 1

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Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

As recently discussed by the Supreme Court, the stay and abeyance procedure is available only

in limited circumstances, because the procedure frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality

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by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of federal proceedings and undermines AEDPA’s goal

of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all of his

claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition. Rhines v. Weber, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (2005). The

Supreme Court held that a stay and abeyance is “only appropriate when the district court determines

there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause for his failure to exhaust this claim. Petitioner

comes now with a new claim based on Blakely. Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. Yet, as

Respondent submits, Petitioner waited seventeen months before filing a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in state court and before requesting this stay. Booker was decided on January 12, 2005. Booker

applied Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and being that Petitioner was tried and sentenced

in state court, the Court fails to see how this claim could be controlled by Booker rather than Blakely.

In any event, as Respondent submits, ten months passed from the time Booker was decided until this

request. Petitioner does not explain why he did not take action to present his claim promptly after

Blakely was decided. 

Even had Petitioner made a sufficient showing of good cause, Petitioner’s new claim is plainly

meritless and this Court would abuse its discretion if it granted a stay to permit exhaustion of this claim.

Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1535. First, Petitioner’s Blakely claim does not relate back to his original petition,

because it does not rely on a “common ‘core of operative facts’” as his original claims. Mayle v. Felix,

125 S.Ct. 2562, 2572 (2005) (quoting Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.,

690 F.2d 1240, 1259 n.29 (9 Cir. 1982). Nor is it timely in its own right under the AEDPA limitation th

period. Even assuming that the one-year limitations period did not begin to run for this claim until

Blakely was decided, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), it expired on June 24, 2005, more than five months

ago. 

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 Petitioner’s petition for review in the California Supreme Court was denied on August 29, 1995. (Answer, Exhibit 2

F.)

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Moreover, this Court can never reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim because Blakely and

Booker were decided long after Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 27, 1995. The 2

holdings establish new procedural rules that do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9 Cir. 2005); Shardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027, th

1038 (9 Cir. 2005); Cook v. United States, 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9 Cir. 2004). Thus, Petitioner’s th th

claim is “plainly meritless” and does not warrant a stay. Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1535. 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s motion to stay is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 24, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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