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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 17, 2015 Decided June 26, 2015 

No. 14-7133 

ANGELA PRICE, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF J.P., A MINOR, 

APPELLANT

JEROME PARKER, 

APPELLANT

LASHAWN WEEMS, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF D.W.,

A MINOR, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

APPELLEE

Consolidated with 14-7138 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:13-cv-01069) 

Adina H. Rosenbaum argued the cause for appellants. 

With her on the briefs were Jehan A. Patterson, Allison M. 

Zieve, and Charles A. Moran.

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Michael T. Kirkpatrick was on the brief for amicus curiae 

Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. in support 

of appellants. 

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were 

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor 

General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General. 

Before: BROWN, KAVANAUGH and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellants in this case 

successfully pursued administrative proceedings against the 

District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) to vindicate 

rights to a free appropriate public education under the 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). They 

obtained representation with help from the Juvenile Branch of 

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which 

appointed an experienced member of that court’s Special 

Education Advocate Panel as counsel. Under the Superior 

Court orders making the appointments, the D.C. Courts 

promised to pay the attorney at the statutory rate in the D.C. 

Criminal Justice Act—$90 per hour—if he was not otherwise 

compensated by DCPS. After prevailing in their 

administrative proceedings, Appellants sought from DCPS 

payment for attorney fees under the IDEA’s fee-shifting 

provision at the rate of $250 per hour. But DCPS refused to 

pay more than the $90 per hour rate that the D.C. Courts 

would pay if fee shifting was denied. 

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 Appellants challenged the DCPS fee decision by bringing 

this lawsuit, pointing to their IDEA entitlement to fee shifting 

at “prevailing” market rates. The District Court rejected the 

claim to more than $90 per hour and held that the promise of 

payment in the court appointments foreclosed any greater 

recovery. We agree with Appellants that nothing in the orders 

appointing counsel can preempt IDEA fee shifting. We 

further agree that the fallback compensation offered by the 

D.C. Courts is not a proper factor in determining the hourly 

rate for statutory fee shifting. We therefore reverse. 

I. 

The IDEA guarantees that children with disabilities will 

have the opportunity to receive a free appropriate public 

education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). To protect this right, 

Congress enacted a fee-shifting provision entitling a 

“prevailing party” under the Act to “reasonable attorneys’ 

fees.” Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as 

amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)). 

There is no dispute that Appellants were prevailing 

parties in IDEA actions against DCPS. Their attorney, Pierre 

Bergeron, was in each instance appointed incident to juvenile 

delinquency proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court.1

 The 

 

1

 Although there are three Appellants in this case, there were only 

two underlying IDEA administrative proceedings. The first dates to 

February 22, 2010, when the Superior Court appointed Mr. 

Bergeron to represent Angela Price as next friend of her minor son, 

Jerome Parker. Mr. Parker turned eighteen during the pendency of 

the administrative proceeding and so the Superior Court also 

appointed Mr. Bergeron to represent him directly. The second 

IDEA proceeding dates to September 30, 2010, when the Superior 

Court appointed Mr. Bergeron to represent Lashawn Weems as next 

friend of her minor child.

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court appointment orders for Appellant Price and Appellant 

Parker each stated that “the District of Columbia Courts will 

compensate the Educational Attorney pursuant to the 

Criminal Justice Act if he is not compensated by the District 

of Columbia Public Schools.” Although the appointment 

order for Appellant Weems did not contain a similar express 

statement, the parties assume—as do we—that the same term 

attached. 

Following success on the merits in administrative 

proceedings before DCPS, Appellants sought reimbursement 

for their attorney fees at $250 per hour. DCPS refused to pay 

more than $90 per hour, which is the statutory rate at which 

attorneys are paid by the D.C. Courts under the D.C. Criminal 

Justice Act. See D.C. Code § 11-2604(a). To challenge that 

refusal, Appellants brought this suit in District Court under 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) seeking reimbursement at what they 

contend is the applicable market-based Laffey rate of $505 per 

hour. See generally Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 

F.3d 1101, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining U.S. Attorney’s 

Office updates to Laffey matrix, derived from Laffey v. Nw. 

Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other 

grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Appellants contend in 

this fee suit that the $250 rate at which pre-litigation 

reimbursement was sought merely represented an offer to 

settle.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

DCPS, denying Appellants any recovery beyond the $90 per 

hour they already had received from DCPS. See Price v. 

District of Columbia, 61 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D.D.C. 2014). 

Appellants timely noticed this appeal. 

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II. 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 

decision regarding the amount of attorney fees to award. 

Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110. An abuse of discretion occurs by 

definition when the district court does not apply the correct 

legal standard or misapprehends the underlying substantive 

law, and we examine de novo whether the district court 

applied the correct legal standard. Conservation Force v. 

Salazar, 699 F.3d 538, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

The starting point of our analysis on the merits is the text 

of the IDEA fee-shifting provision, which states that “[i]n any 

action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in 

its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of 

the costs—(I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child 

with a disability.” 20 USC § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).2

 DCPS 

suggests that this phrase entails near-plenary discretion that 

could itself be a basis for affirming the District Court’s order. 

But notwithstanding the apparently permissive language of 

the statute, the Supreme Court has interpreted similar 

language in other fee-shifting contexts to mean that the 

prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s 

fee unless special circumstances would render such an award 

unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 

 

2

 Although Jerome Parker is a Plaintiff-Appellant in this case, it is 

uncertain whether he is eligible for fee shifting under the IDEA, 

which provides for the award of fees “to a prevailing party who is 

the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 USC § 

1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (emphasis added). “Parent” is defined in the 

statute and does not expressly include the child himself. Id. § 

1401(23). But we need not decide this issue because it has not been 

raised by the parties. In any event, Mr. Parker’s mother, PlaintiffAppellant Angela Price, is a parent eligible for fee shifting based on 

Mr. Bergeron’s work on behalf of Mr. Parker.

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402 (1968) (per curiam); see also Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 

S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (per curiam) (same).3

The District Court recognized that Appellants were 

“prevailing parties.” The critical question on appeal is 

whether its reasoning can be read to have arrived at a $90 feeshifting rate consistent with the applicable law. The IDEA 

instructs that fees awarded “shall be based on rates prevailing 

in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for 

the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 USC § 

1415(i)(3)(C). 

The District Court’s opinion suggests that it never 

reached this determination. It held that “court appointment 

pursuant to a statute that clearly sets a rate of compensation is 

the beginning and end of the inquiry.” It reasoned that 

because Mr. Bergeron’s appointment was made pursuant to 

the D.C. Criminal Justice Act, that statute controlled the feeshifting entitlement and marked the end of the matter. 

The D.C. Criminal Justice Act invoked by the Superior 

Court in making the appointments and authorizing fallback 

compensation does not preempt fee shifting pursuant to the 

IDEA. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 

153 (1976) (“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a 

specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general 

one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”) (quoting 

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1974)) (internal 

 

3

 Although both Newman and Lefemine involved a different feeshifting statute, where fee-shifting statutes have similar language 

there is a “strong indication” that they are to be interpreted alike. 

Indep. Fed’n. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 

(1989) (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch., 412 

U.S. 427, 428 (1973)); see also Alegria v. District of Columbia, 391 

F.3d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same).

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quotation marks omitted). The D.C. Criminal Justice Act 

requires the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration of 

the D.C. Courts to implement a plan for furnishing 

representation to a person “who is a juvenile and alleged to be 

delinquent or in need of supervision.” D.C. Code § 11-

2601(5). Citing this law, the D.C. Courts created the Special 

Education Advocate (“SEA”) Panel, from which Mr. 

Bergeron was appointed. See D.C. Courts Admin. Order No. 

02-15 (designating SEA Panel); see also D.C. Courts Admin. 

Order No. 12-02 (re-establishing same). The Superior Court’s 

Juvenile Branch made the relevant appointments from that 

Panel in connection with juvenile delinquency proceedings. 

Nothing in the D.C. Code, the D.C. Courts’ administrative 

orders, or the Superior Court appointing orders purports to 

preempt IDEA fee shifting.4

DCPS offers an alternative interpretation of the District 

Court’s order, arguing that the District Court correctly viewed 

the D.C. Criminal Justice Act statutory compensation rate as 

preclusive of the “prevailing” rate determination under the 

IDEA. DCPS contends that “a reasonable fee is a fee that is 

sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the 

representation of a meritorious civil rights case,” Perdue v. 

 

4

 Plaintiffs’ attorney in this case has received no compensation from 

the D.C. Courts, and we need not and do not address the 

hypothetical case of a plaintiff who seeks IDEA fee shifting from 

DCPS when his or her attorney already has been paid by the D.C. 

Courts. Since this case was decided by the District Court, the 

Superior Court has issued an additional administrative order 

clarifying that any compensation paid to special education attorneys 

from CJA funds requires a certification “that the voucher does not 

include any services for which payment has been made by or 

requested from DCPS, or that such request has been denied in full 

by DCPS and such denial has been affirmed by a court of 

competent jurisdiction.” D.C. Courts Admin. Order No. 14-19. 

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Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), and because Mr. Bergeron was willing to accept $90 

per hour for his services, any greater compensation would 

produce an undue windfall. 

We disagree for two reasons. First, as a factual matter, 

the constructive terms of representation that Mr. Bergeron 

accepted were to receive the benefit of IDEA fee shifting 

from DCPS if he was successful while retaining a fallback of 

$90 per hour compensation from the D.C. Courts if his client 

did not “prevail.” That he undertook the representations in 

this case on those terms does not demonstrate he would have 

been willing to accept the work on the open market for a fixed 

rate of $90 per hour. Second, even if Mr. Bergeron accepted 

these assignments from the Superior Court and would have 

performed them at a $90 rate because of the public interest 

nature of the case, his clients remain entitled to fee shifting at 

the prevailing rate. Our Court has held that the prevailing 

market rate method applies to “attorneys who practice 

privately and for profit but at reduced rates reflecting noneconomic goals.” Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. 

Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc); see 

also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (holding that 

fee shifting is “to be calculated according to the prevailing 

market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether 

plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel”).5

 

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred as 

a matter of law in limiting Appellants’ recovery to $90 per 

hour. The $90 per hour statutory compensation rate in the 

D.C. Criminal Justice Act did not preempt the prevailing-rate 

 

5

 We treat Save Our Cumberland Mountains and Blum as 

presumptively applicable, even though each involved a different 

fee-shifting statute. See supra note 3. 

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determination required in IDEA fee shifting, nor is it an 

appropriate factor to consider in making the prevailing-rate 

determination because it was offered by the D.C. Courts and 

accepted by Mr. Bergeron only as a back-up promise of 

compensation. 

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 

District Court and remand the case with instructions to award 

attorney fees consistent with this opinion and “based on rates 

prevailing in the community . . . for the kind and quality of 

services furnished,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C), appropriately 

reduced if such rates “unreasonably exceed[] the hourly rate 

prevailing in the community for similar services by attorneys 

of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and experience,” 

id. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(ii). 

So ordered.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with my 

colleagues that appellants are entitled to “reasonable 

attorneys’ fees . . . based on rates prevailing in the 

community . . . for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). Like them, I would find the “$90 

per hour statutory compensation rate in the D.C. Criminal 

Justice Act . . . is [not] an appropriate factor to consider in 

making the prevailing-rate determination.”1

 Maj. Op. at 8–9. 

However, the court’s opinion fails to note that the Laffey 

Matrix rate of $505 per hour is also an irrelevant benchmark 

for administrative proceedings before a D.C. Public Schools 

(“DCPS”) hearing officer. 

The Laffey Matrix, which is updated annually by the 

United States Attorney’s Office, provides a benchmark for 

 

1

 As Judge Leon explained in his opinion below, “[b]oth the 

CJA and the IDEA attorneys’ fees provisions are directed to 

providing competent counsel to individuals who otherwise may not 

be able to afford it.” Price v. District of Columbia, 61 F. Supp. 3d 

135, 139 (D.D.C. 2014). The court’s opinion today holds that, in 

their current form, the terms of the D.C. CJA and of the D.C. 

Superior Court’s appointment orders do not displace the IDEA’s 

attorneys’ fees provision. However, the ruling does not foreclose 

the possibility that, in the future, plaintiffs who accept 

representation under the CJA could be required to assign their 

interest in any award of attorneys’ fees—mirroring the common 

practice of law firms that provide pro bono legal services, see 

Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990). 

Such an assignment of interest could help contain the cost of 

attorneys’ fees. Congress has, at times, expressed concern about 

“the growth of [IDEA] legal expenses . . . and the usurping of 

resources from education to pay attorney fees,” Calloway v. District 

of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 

105-670, at 50 (1998)), and has even capped the amount of 

attorneys’ fees available to IDEA plaintiffs in the District of 

Columbia, see Whatley v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 814 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). 

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reasonable fees in complex federal litigation. See, e.g., 

Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995) (“[P]laintiffs submitted a great deal of evidence 

regarding prevailing market rates for complex federal 

litigation. This included the Laffey matrix . . . .”). Appellants 

are entitled to the Laffey rate only if they can establish that the 

“relevant legal market in this action,” namely representation 

in IDEA administrative due process hearings, “is subject to 

the same hourly rates that prevail in . . . complex federal 

litigation.” Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 374 

(D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 

1984); see also Covington, 57 F.3d at 1111–1112 (holding 

that awards of fees in federal civil rights and employment 

discrimination actions should be governed by the “same 

standards which prevail in other types of complex federal 

litigation”). Absent such a finding, Laffey Matrix rates are 

irrelevant to the prevailing-rate determination. 

In deciding what constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees, 

courts have a tendency to err on the side of awarding too 

much rather than too little. However, inflated fee awards are 

far from harmless; they produce windfalls to attorneys at the 

expense of public education. Around the country, school 

districts resolve special education disputes through mediation, 

mediated settlements, or other forms of alternative dispute 

resolution—and therefore, without triggering the IDEA’s 

attorneys’ fees provision. DCPS has the dubious honor of 

adjudicating the most IDEA disputes per student of any state 

or territory in the country. In fiscal year 2010–2011, there 

were 229 fully adjudicated due process complaints for every 

10,000 students in the District—over seventy-five times the 

national average. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 35TH ANNUAL 

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 

INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 173–175 

(2013). These disputes cost DCPS nearly $6 million in 

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attorneys’ fees awards alone. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

AUDIT OF SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEY CERTIFICATIONS 33

(2013). 

While the reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs are 

many and varied, courts provide no relief when they hold out 

the promise of above-market fee awards to attorneys who 

bring due process complaints. The IDEA’s attorneys’ fees 

provision is meant to encourage compliance with the statute 

by “enabl[ing prevailing plaintiffs] to employ reasonably 

competent lawyers without cost to themselves.” Venegas v. 

Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990). In other words, it is a 

means “to ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have 

available to them a free appropriate education that emphasizes 

special education and related services designed to meet their 

unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). However, when 

courts are too generous in awarding fees, they create an 

incentive for needless conflict and enrich IDEA lawyers at the 

expense of public schools, and ultimately the very children 

the IDEA seeks to protect. 

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