Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-02966/USCOURTS-ca3-19-02966-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 19-2966

______________

JOHN DOE,

Appellant

v.

UNIVERSITY OF THE SCIENCES

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-19-cv-00358)

District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez

____________

Argued: March 31, 2020 

Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MATEY, 

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: May 29, 2020)

____________

Zainab K. Ali

Riley H. Ross III

MINCEY FITZPATRICK ROSS

1500 John F. Kenney Boulevard

Two Penn Center, Suite 1525

Philadelphia, PA 19102

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2

Joshua A. Engel [ARGUED]

ENGEL & MARTIN

4660 Duke Drive, Suite 101

Mason, OH 45040

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant John Doe

Leslie M. Greenspan [ARGUED]

Joe H. Tucker, Jr.

TUCKER LAW GROUP

Ten Penn Center

1801 Market Street, Suite 2500

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee University of 

the Sciences

David A. Super

Nancy Chi Cantalupo

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER

600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 312

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Amicus/Appellee Law Professors

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

The University of the Sciences (“USciences”) is a 

private college in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. John Doe, a 

student at USciences, had completed nearly all the coursework 

required to earn a degree in biomedical science. Before Doe

could finish his degree, two female students accused him of 

violating USciences’s Sexual Misconduct Policy (the 

“Policy”). After investigating Doe, USciences concluded that 

he violated the Policy and expelled him. 

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Doe filed a lawsuit in the District Court alleging that 

USciences was improperly motivated by sex when it 

investigated and enforced the Policy against him. Doe also 

asserted that USciences breached its contract with him by 

failing to provide him the fairness promised to students under 

the Policy. The District Court dismissed Doe’s complaint.

Doe’s complaint contains plausible allegations 

supporting both claims. So we will reverse the District Court’s 

order dismissing Doe’s complaint.

I

A

USciences distributes to its students a series of policies 

governing disciplinary issues. These documents include the 

Student Handbook and the Policy, which USciences considers 

“companion documents.” App. 191. The Student Handbook 

promises that USciences will “[e]ngag[e] in investigative 

inquiry and resolution of reports that are adequate, reliable, 

impartial, prompt, fair and equitable[.]” App. 149 (emphasis 

added). And the Student Handbook states that USciences will 

“[s]upport[ ] complainants and respondents equally[.]” Id.

The Policy specifically addresses allegations of sexual 

misconduct. Like the Student Handbook, the Policy makes the 

same promises about providing fairness to accused students.

The Policy also includes substantive rules governing

prohibited misconduct and procedures that outline the process

for investigating and adjudicating alleged violations of the 

Policy.

1

The Policy forbids students from engaging in 

“prohibited conduct.” App. 123. One form of prohibited 

conduct is sexual assault, which “consists of sexual contact 

and/or sexual intercourse that occurs without affirmative 

consent.” Id. A student gives affirmative consent “through the 

demonstration of clear and coherent words or actions[ ] . . . 

indicat[ing] permission to engage in mutually agreed-upon 

sexual activity.” App. 124.

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The Policy states that certain circumstances may 

undermine a student’s ability to give affirmative consent. For 

example, “[a]ffirmative consent cannot be gained by taking 

advantage of the incapacitation of another, where the person 

initiating sexual activity knew or reasonably should have 

known that the other was incapacitated.” Id. Incapacitation 

occurs when “a person lacks the ability to make informed, 

rational judgments about whether or not to engage in sexual 

activity.” Id. A student may become “incapacitated as a result 

of the consumption of alcohol or other drugs[.]” Id.

The Policy also forbids students from revealing 

confidential information after a formal investigation begins. 

The “consequences” for violating the confidentiality provision 

“may include suspension or dismissal from USciences, being 

barred from residing on campus, or being prohibited from 

participating in extracurricular activities, including varsity 

athletics.” App. 142.

2

USciences “deem[s itself] to have had notice [of alleged 

sexual misconduct] if a responsible employee knew, or in the 

exercise of reasonable care should have known, about [sexual] 

misconduct.” App. 128. A “responsible employee” is defined 

as “any employee who is required to share all reports of sexual 

misconduct with [USciences] administrative officials (i.e., 

Title IX Coordinator/Deputy Coordinator).” Id. The Title IX 

Coordinator is responsible for the “[o]versight of a prompt, 

fair, [and] equitable investigation and resolution process for 

reports of prohibited conduct at [USciences].” App. 122.

If the Title IX Coordinator decides to launch a formal 

investigation into alleged sexual misconduct, USciences

employs the so-called “single-investigator model.” Under that 

model, USciences hires an outside attorney to serve as an 

investigator. USciences then tasks the investigator with 

interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, and determining

the accused’s culpability. USciences, however, does not offer 

the accused student, or the “respondent,” a chance to crossexamine witnesses or the opportunity to participate in any sort 

of live, adversarial hearing in which he or she may put on a 

defense or otherwise challenge the investigator’s findings. 

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If the investigator determines that the respondent 

violated the Policy, he or she will not make a recommendation 

on any sanctions. Instead, a three-person panel appointed by 

the Title IX Coordinator—the Title IX Administrative Panel—

will issue a letter detailing the sanctions imposed on the 

respondent. 

The Policy permits certain appeals. For instance, a 

student may appeal if he “believes the decision regarding 

responsibility was in error[.]” App. 141. If the respondent 

timely files his appeal, the Title IX Coordinator “will convene 

a Title IX Appeals Panel,” which is “a [three-person] panel of 

appropriately trained faculty and staff[.]” Id. The Title IX 

Appeals Panel “may request clarification on the facts from the 

investigator[ ].” Id. “If no merit is found,” the panel “will 

notify the Title IX Coordinator that the [a]ppeal will not move 

forward.” Id.

B

Two female students at USciences, Jane Roe 1 and Jane

Roe 2, filed formal complaints alleging that Doe committed 

sexual misconduct in violation of the Policy. As for Doe’s

allegations about his encounter with Roe 1, she and Doe knew 

each other for more than a year as of the fall 2017 semester. At 

the time, Roe 1 had been in an “open relationship” with a 

student at a different university. App. 97. On November 3, 

2017, Roe 1 and Doe discussed over Snapchat her desire for 

someone “to provide physical affection in the absence of her 

boyfriend.” Id. Doe invited Roe 1 to his home, and she 

accepted his invitation. In doing so, Roe 1 understood that they

may engage in sexual activity. 

Roe 1 arrived at Doe’s house between 11:00 p.m. and 

12:00 a.m. Doe alleges that they engaged in consensual sexual 

intercourse and then fell asleep in Doe’s bed. His complaint 

also states that, during the night, Roe 1 and Doe engaged in 

sexual intercourse at least two more times. Nine months later,

in August 2018, Roe 1 and Witness 1, the president of Roe 1’s 

sorority, reported to USciences that Doe sexually assaulted 

Roe 1. Specifically, Roe 1 alleged that all their sexual 

encounters on that night were consensual except for their last 

one, which she claimed was not consensual because Doe did 

not use a condom.

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As for Doe’s allegations about his encounter with Roe 

2, she and Doe had a “friends with benefits” relationship 

throughout the fall 2017 semester. App. 99. Over that time, 

they had consensual sexual intercourse about ten times, 

including after parties. At the beginning of the spring 2018 

semester, Doe and his roommates hosted a party. Doe alleges 

that he asked Roe 2 if she wanted to come to the party and then 

spend the night with him; Roe 2 agreed. Roe 2 attended the 

party, and both Doe and Roe 2 consumed alcohol. Specifically, 

Roe 2 recalls drinking “three or four” cups of “juice,” App. 

212, a cocktail made of vodka and mixers. Doe recalls having 

three or four cups of beer and a cup of “juice.” App. 251. 

During the party, Roe 2 was elbowed on the dance floor, 

fell, and bloodied her nose. Doe tried to assist her. Afterwards, 

Doe asked Roe 2 if she wanted to lay down in his room and 

spend the night. Roe 2 agreed. Doe alleges that he and Roe 2 

then went to his room, where they soon had sexual intercourse. 

Doe alleges that Roe 2 was “an active participant” and “fully 

engaged the entire time.” App. 100. Seven months later, in 

August 2018, Roe 2 reported that Doe had sexually assaulted 

her during the party. She alleged that she passed out in Doe’s 

bedroom and woke up to him having nonconsensual sexual 

intercourse with her. 

C

In his complaint, Doe alleges that USciences “permitted 

and encouraged” Roe 1 and Witness 1 to disclose confidential 

information about Roe 1’s complaint “to find other women 

willing to make a complaint against” him. App. 98. Doe further 

alleges that, after Roe 1 reported him to USciences, she and 

Witness 1 “convinced” their sorority sister, Roe 2, to file her 

own complaint against him. App. 98–99. Within days, Roe 2 

reported that Doe committed sexual assault during their 

January 2018 “hookup.” App. 195. 

A member of the Title IX Coordinator’s team 

determined that if Roe 1’s and Roe 2’s allegations were true, 

then Doe would have violated the Policy. For that reason, the 

Title IX Coordinator gave Doe a Notice of Sexual Misconduct 

Investigation, which notified him that Roe 1 and Roe 2 had 

accused him of sexual assault. According to Doe’s complaint, 

“the Notice did not provide [Doe] with any specifics about the 

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allegations against him despite the fact that [USciences] 

possessed specific details about the allegations against [him].” 

App. 101.

USciences retained a Philadelphia attorney to serve as 

the investigator. The investigator interviewed Roe 1, Roe 2, 

Doe, and ten witnesses. She also conducted follow-up 

interviews with Roe 1, Roe 2, and Doe. After completing her 

investigation, the investigator credited the allegations made by 

Roe 1 and Roe 2 and concluded that Doe violated the Policy 

by engaging in sexual intercourse without Roe 1’s or Roe 2’s

affirmative consent. A Title IX Administrative Panel expelled

Doe. Doe appealed to a Title IX Appeals Panel, but it denied 

his appeal.

Doe then sued USciences. He alleges that USciences 

violated Title IX and breached its contract with him. The 

District Court dismissed Doe’s complaint. He timely appealed. 

II

The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 

Doe’s case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 

jurisdiction over Doe’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. And 

we exercise de novo review over the grant of a motion to 

dismiss. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2 

(3d Cir. 2016). 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must 

set forth enough factual allegations to “state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that 

permits a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). When assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 

we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and 

view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 

(3d Cir. 2008).

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“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally 

consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 

exhibits attached to the complaint[,] and matters of public 

record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 

Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). In addition, “a 

document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint 

may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss 

into one for summary judgment.” In re Burlington Coat 

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).

Because the investigator’s report, which USciences attached to 

its motion to dismiss, is integral to Doe’s complaint, we may 

consider the report. 

III

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states 

that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 

from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 

to discrimination under any education program or activity 

receiving [f]ederal financial assistance[.]” 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1681(a). “Because Title IX prohibits . . . subjecting a person 

to discrimination on account of sex, it is understood to bar the 

imposition of university discipline [when sex] is a motivating 

factor in the decision to discipline.” Doe v. Columbia Univ., 

831 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks, 

alteration, and citation omitted). No one disputes that 

USciences receives federal financial assistance under Title IX 

and that, by expelling Doe, it “excluded [him] from 

participation in [or] denied [him] the benefits of . . . [an] 

education program.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

Some Courts of Appeals have examined Title IX claims 

using the doctrinal framework announced by the Second 

Circuit in Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).

1

Yusuf recognized two theories under which one may allege a 

1 See, e.g., Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th

Cir. 2018); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 2018); 

Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2018);

Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 777 (5th Cir. 

2017); cf. Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th

Cir. 2019).

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Title IX violation: erroneous outcome and selective 

enforcement. Id. at 715. The Sixth Circuit added two additional 

theories: deliberate indifference and archaic assumptions. Doe 

v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018). In Doe v. 

Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019), the Seventh 

Circuit observed that “[a]ll of these [theories] simply describe 

ways in which a plaintiff might show that sex was a motivating 

factor in a university’s decision to discipline a student.” Id. at 

667. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit “ask[ed] the question 

more directly: do the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible 

inference that the university discriminated against [the student] 

‘on the basis of sex’?” Id. at 667–68.

We agree with the Seventh Circuit and “see no need to 

superimpose doctrinal tests on the [Title IX] statute.” See id. at 

667. Thus, we adopt the Seventh Circuit’s straightforward 

pleading standard and hold that, to state a claim under Title IX, 

the alleged facts, if true, must support a plausible inference that 

a federally-funded college or university discriminated against 

a person on the basis of sex. Although parties are free to 

characterize their claims however they wish, this standard 

hews most closely to the text of Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1681(a).

Doe’s complaint contains plausible allegations 

supporting the reasonable inference that USciences 

discriminated against him on account of his sex. His 

allegations fit into two categories. First, Doe alleges that 

USciences yielded to external pressure when implementing 

and enforcing the Policy. Second, he alleges that sex was a 

motivating factor in USciences’s investigation and decision to 

impose discipline.

To begin, Doe plausibly contends that USciences, in its 

implementation and enforcement of the Policy, succumbed to 

pressure from the federal government. Doe alleges that, after 

the United States Department of Education (“DoEd”) issued 

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the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter,2 USciences “limited 

procedural protections afforded to male students like [Doe] in 

sexual misconduct cases.” App. 96. He further alleges that 

USciences, “encouraged by federal officials, has instituted 

solutions to sexual violence against women that abrogate the 

civil rights of men and treat men differently than women.” 

App. 109.

The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter “ushered in a more 

rigorous approach to campus sexual misconduct allegations.”

Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668. Three of our sister circuits have 

found that alleged university overreaction to DoEd or other 

public pressure is relevant to alleging a plausible Title IX 

discrimination claim. See id. at 668–69; Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 

575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018); Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; 

Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58. Like our colleagues on the 

Sixth and Seventh Circuits, we also recognize that allegations 

about pressure from DoEd and the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 

cannot alone support a plausible claim of Title IX sex 

discrimination. See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 669 (“That said, 

the letter, standing alone, is obviously not enough to get [the 

plaintiff] over the plausibility line.” (citation omitted)); Baum, 

903 F.3d at 586 (noting that pressure from DoEd “alone is not 

enough to state a claim that the university acted with bias in 

this particular case”).

Doe also claims that USciences was improperly 

motivated by sex when it investigated him but chose not to 

investigate three female students who allegedly violated the 

Policy: Roe 2, Roe 1, and Witness 1. As for Roe 2, Doe alleges 

that USciences “[e]ngaged in selective investigation and 

enforcement of [its] policies by failing to consider [Doe’s] 

alcohol consumption and whether [Roe] 2 should have been 

charged with violations of [the Policy] if [Doe] was intoxicated 

when they had sex[.]” App. 104. According to the 

investigator’s report, Roe 2 and Doe consumed between three 

2 See United States Department of Education, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter 

(2011), 

https:/www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleag

ue-201104.html.

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and five drinks each.3 Doe further alleges that “[a]lthough both 

[he] and [Roe] 2 had been drinking [during the party], 

[USciences] identified [Doe] as the initiator of sexual activity, 

notwithstanding the comparable intoxication of both 

participants.” App. 110.4

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to Doe, as we must at this stage, it is plausible that, 

as he alleges, sex was a motivating factor in USciences’s 

investigation and decision to expel him. Under the Policy, 

USciences considers itself to have notice of potential sexual 

misconduct whenever a responsible employee knows or 

reasonably should know about the misconduct. See App. 133, 

134, 137. And even though USciences never investigated Roe 

2, Doe plausibly alleges that, at the latest, USciences had notice 

that she may have violated the Policy when the investigator 

submitted her report to the Title IX coordinator. See Miami 

Univ., 882 F.3d at 596.

3 The District Court erred when it noted that it was “skeptical”

of Doe’s claim “because it appears to flow from a faulty 

premise—namely, the consumption of any alcohol renders a 

person unable to give affirmative consent under the” Policy. 

App. 16. Doe’s argument does not “flow from a faulty 

premise,” but from his allegations and the reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from them. By indulging its 

skepticism, the District Court misapplied the familiar standard 

that governs motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). To the 

contrary, the District Court should have viewed the allegations 

in Doe’s complaint in the light most favorable to him and 

drawn all reasonable inferences from those allegations in his 

favor. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Umland 

v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).

4 Doe initially told the investigator that his sexual encounter 

with Roe 2 was mutually consensual. See, e.g., App. 252 

(“[Doe] state[d] that [Roe 2] fully participated in the sex and 

he had no doubt about her consent.”). But under the Policy,

Doe’s allegation that he and Roe 2 were comparably 

intoxicated undermined his ability to give affirmative consent, 

just as it impaired hers. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 

596 (6th Cir. 2018).

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Doe also contends that USciences was motivated by sex 

when it chose not to investigate Roe 1 and Witness 1—both 

female students—despite having notice that both allegedly 

violated the Policy. In his complaint, Doe alleges that Roe 1

and Witness 1 breached the Policy’s confidentiality provision 

by colluding with each other about the investigation. Under the 

Policy, “[i]f it is determined that anyone involved in a report 

or complaint either as a complainant, respondent[,] or 

witness[ ] colluded or shared information with another, 

sanctions may be imposed by USciences.” App. 142. 

According to Doe’s complaint, Roe 1 and Witness 1 

“disclose[d] information about [Roe] 1’s complaint . . . in an 

effort to find other women willing to make a complaint 

against” him. App. 98. And Doe alleges that USciences knew 

that Roe 1 and Witness 1 violated the Policy because 

USciences “permitted and encouraged” them to disclose 

confidential information in order to recruit Roe 2 to file a 

complaint against him. Id.

Doe plausibly alleges that USciences enforced the 

Policy against him alone because of his sex. In Baum, the court 

found that the plaintiff stated a viable claim because, “[w]hen 

viewing th[e] evidence in the light most favorable to [the 

accused student], . . . one plausible explanation is that the 

[b]oard discredited all males, including [the accused student], 

and credited all females, including [the accuser], because of 

[sex] bias.” 903 F.3d at 586. Doe’s allegations of sexmotivated investigation and enforcement are like the plausible 

allegations in Baum. And when Doe’s allegations about 

selective investigation and enforcement are combined with his 

allegations related to pressure applied by the 2011 Dear 

Colleague Letter, we conclude that he states a plausible claim 

of sex discrimination. See Purdue, 928 F.3d at 668–70; Baum, 

903 F.3d at 586–87. For these reasons, we will reverse the 

District Court’s order dismissing Doe’s Title IX claim. 

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IV

Next, we turn to Doe’s breach-of-contract claim. Under 

Pennsylvania law,5 “three elements are necessary to plead a 

cause of action for breach of contract: (1) the existence of a 

contract, including its essential terms[;] (2) a breach of the 

contract; and[ ] (3) resultant damages.” Meyer, Darragh, 

Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone 

Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Pa. 2016) (citation 

omitted). The parties do not dispute that the relationship 

between USciences and Doe is contractual. See Barker v. Trs. 

of Bryn Mawr Coll., 122 A. 220, 221 (Pa. 1923). Likewise, 

USciences does not dispute that, if it breached its contract with 

Doe, that breach would have caused damages. Thus, we focus 

our analysis on whether USciences breached a duty imposed 

by its contract with Doe. As explained below, we conclude that 

Doe states a plausible breach-of-contract claim. 

A

In the Student Handbook, USciences promises all 

students that it will “[e]ngag[e] in investigative inquiry and 

resolution of reports that are adequate, reliable, impartial, 

prompt, fair and equitable[.]” App. 149. USciences also 

promises in the Student Handbook to “[s]upport[ ] 

complainants and respondents equally[.]” Id. USciences makes 

these same promises in the companion Policy. App. 168. The 

Policy also tasks the Title IX Coordinator with the 

responsibility of overseeing “a prompt, fair, [and] equitable 

investigation and resolution process for reports of prohibited 

conduct at [USciences].” App. 122. And the Student Handbook 

states that “[p]rocedures and rights in student conduct 

[proceedings] are conducted with fairness to all, but do not 

include all of the same protections afforded by the courts.” 

App. 150.

5 The parties assume that Pennsylvania contract-interpretation 

principles govern their contract, and we agree. See, e.g., In re 

Remicade (Director Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515, 

523 n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (interpreting a collective bargaining 

agreement under New Jersey law because the parties assumed 

New Jersey law applied). 

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USciences contends that the fairness promised in the 

Student Handbook and the Policy consists of the procedures 

provided by those documents. USciences essentially argues 

that because it provided some procedural protections in the 

Policy, Doe was treated fairly. We disagree. “[I]n determining 

the intent of the contracting parties, all provisions in the 

agreement will be construed together and each will be given 

effect.” LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 A.2d 

639, 647–48 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Nowhere in either the Policy or the Student Handbook is 

fairness defined, let alone explicitly defined as the procedural 

protections contained in the Student Handbook and the Policy. 

Because the fairness promised in the Student Handbook and 

the Policy must “be given effect,” see id., we reject 

USciences’s circular argument.

B

Given that neither the Student Handbook nor the Policy 

defines fairness, we must construe that promise as a matter of 

contract interpretation. “When interpreting a contract, the 

court’s paramount goal is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by the language 

of their written agreement.” Halpin v. LaSalle Univ., 639 A.2d 

37, 39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted). When “the 

contract evidences care in its preparation, it will be presumed 

that [the contract’s] words were employed deliberately and 

with intention. In determining what the parties intended by 

their contract, the law must look to what they clearly expressed.

Courts in interpreting a contract do not assume that its 

language was chosen carelessly.” Steuart v. McChesney, 444 

A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

The plain meaning of the word “fair” is “just, unbiased, 

equitable, legitimate, in accordance with rules.” See Fair, The 

Concise Oxford Dictionary 347 (7th ed. 1982). Here, the 

fairness promised by the Student Handbook and the Policy 

relates to procedural protections for students accused of sexual 

misconduct, and Doe alleges that he did not receive a “fair and 

impartial hearing.” App. 114. In this context, a “fair hearing” 

or “fair process” “is a term of art used to describe a ‘judicial or 

administrative hearing conducted in accordance with due 

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15

process.’” Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 F.3d 99, 102 n.5 (2d Cir. 

2007) (quoting Fair hearing, Black’s Law Dictionary 738 (8th

ed. 1999)). 

Doe’s allegations of unfairness arise in a breach-ofcontract claim between two private parties—a private 

university and one of its students. Under those circumstances, 

courts are sometimes chary about reviewing too closely the 

manner in which a private university chooses to investigate and 

discipline its students. That is especially appropriate for 

matters uniquely within the institution’s province, such as 

academic integrity or faculty development and discipline. See, 

e.g., Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 480 n.2 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2007) (discussing Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the 

Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2001)); Boehm v. Univ. of Pa.

Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 579–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1990). 

This is not such a case. The investigation and fair 

adjudication of alleged criminal activity like sexual assault is 

not uniquely within the province of colleges and universities. 

Yet accused “students have a substantial interest at stake when 

it comes to school disciplinary hearings for sexual 

misconduct,” Baum, 903 F.3d at 582, because the 

consequences are potentially dire and permanent: “[a] finding 

of responsibility for a sexual offense can have a ‘lasting 

impact’ on a student’s personal life, in addition to his 

‘educational and employment opportunities,’ especially when 

the disciplinary action involves a long-term suspension.” 

Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 600 (citation omitted). Under the 

Policy, for example, students accused of sexual misconduct 

face grave consequences, including a suspension of up to two 

years or—as in Doe’s case—permanent expulsion. 

Moreover, this case and others like it differ from 

garden-variety breach-of-contract disputes involving colleges 

and universities because of the impact of the 2011 Dear 

Colleague Letter and colleges’ and universities’ reactions to it. 

Although the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter was provided as 

“guidance,” DoEd backed it up by investigating alleged

noncompliance. An official from DoEd’s Office of Civil 

Rights (“OCR”) warned that “[s]ome schools still are failing 

their students by responding inadequately to sexual assaults on 

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16

campus. For those schools, my office [in DoEd] and [the] 

Administration have made it clear that the time for delay is 

over.” Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668 (citing Examining Sexual 

Assault on Campus, Focusing on Working to Ensure Student 

Safety, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,

and Pensions, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Catherine 

Lhamon, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 

Educ.)). That official cautioned that OCR was “committed to 

using all its tools to ensure that all schools comply with [T]itle 

IX so campuses will be safer for students across the country.” 

Id. To ensure compliance, OCR put all of “a school’s federal 

funding . . . at risk if [the school] could not show that it was 

vigorously investigating and punishing sexual misconduct.” 

Id.; see also Baum, 903 F.3d at 586; Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 

594. In another context, the Supreme Court has described the 

total withdrawal of federal funding as “economic dragooning” 

and “a gun to the head.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519, 581, 582 (2012). Similarly, for most colleges and 

universities, the loss of federal funds would be ruinous.6

Doe’s complaint focuses on this background. He alleges 

that, after the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter issued, “educational

institutions like [USciences] limited procedural protections 

afforded to . . . students like [Doe] in sexual misconduct cases.” 

App. 96. And he claims that, although the 2011 Dear Colleague 

Letter was rescinded before his investigation and expulsion,

USciences kept in place the policies enumerated in that letter. 

In related contexts, Courts of Appeals have carefully 

considered allegations of unfairness against colleges or 

universities that were allegedly intimidated by the 2011 Dear 

Colleague Letter and associated threats of litigation or DoEd

6 “Although the [2011 Dear Colleague Letter] was fashioned 

as a guidance document that itself did not impose any new 

binding legal obligations, OCR initiated investigations into 

dozens of schools for noncompliance with Title IX, utilizing 

interpretations and requirements specified only in the [2011 

Dear Colleague Letter]. The explicit threat was (and remains) 

to terminate all federal funding—upon which virtually all 

institutions of higher education significantly rely—if schools 

did not change their policies and disciplinary procedures to 

comply.” Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 

104 Calif. L. Rev. 881, 931–32 (2016).

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scrutiny. See, e.g., Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668; Baum, 903 

F.3d at 586; Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; cf. Columbia Univ., 

831 F.3d at 58 (recognizing plausibility of allegations that 

university acted with bias because of public criticism of its 

handling of Title IX claims). The backdrop of Doe’s complaint

informs our consideration of the fairness that USciences 

promises students accused of sexual misconduct.

1

Procedural fairness is a well-worn concept.

Pennsylvania courts have made clear that, at private 

universities, “basic principles of . . . fundamental fairness [are] 

adhered to [when] the students involved[ ] . . . [are] given 

notice of the charges and evidence against them, [are] allowed 

to be present and to participate in the hearing assisted by 

faculty, to call their own witnesses and to cross-examine the 

witnesses against them, and [are] fully apprised of the findings 

of the [h]earing [p]anel.” Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 

591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).

In other private-university cases, Pennsylvania courts 

have similarly determined that fairness includes the chance to 

cross-examine witnesses and the ability to participate in a live,

adversarial hearing during which the accused may present 

evidence and a defense. In Boehm, the court held that the 

private university’s disciplinary proceedings were 

“fundamentally fair” because the procedures included (1) 

giving notice of charges to the accused students; (2) presenting 

the accused students with the evidence against them; (3)

allowing the accused students to be present for and to 

participate in a live hearing; (4) permitting the accused students 

to be assisted by a faculty adviser during the hearing; (5) 

allowing the cross-examination of witnesses; and (6) 

permitting the accused students to call their own witnesses. 573 

A.2d at 582. And in Reardon, the court found that a private 

university provided the accused with a fair process by 

“provid[ing] for minimum procedural safeguards—notice, the 

admission of relevant testimony, the right to call witnesses and 

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present evidence, and the right to be represented by a member 

of the college community.” 926 A.2d at 482.

7

In short, notions of fairness in Pennsylvania law include 

providing the accused with a chance to test witness credibility 

through some form of cross-examination and a live, adversarial 

hearing during which he or she can put on a defense and 

challenge evidence against him or her.

2

As a private university, USciences is not subject to the 

Constitution’s due process guarantees. Nevertheless, we

observe that federal notions of fairness in student disciplinary 

proceedings are consistent with those recognized in 

Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence. They require, at a minimum,

“rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings 

of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.” Goss v. 

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). And as in Pennsylvania, the 

basic elements of federal procedural fairness in a Title IX 

sexual-misconduct proceeding include a real, meaningful 

hearing and, when credibility determinations are at issue, the 

opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses. See Purdue 

Univ., 928 F.3d at 663–64 (holding that, among other things, 

procedural fairness requires “a hearing [to] be a real one, not a 

sham or pretense” and some “attempt to examine [the 

accuser’s] credibility” (citation omitted)); Baum, 903 F.3d at 

581 (holding that procedural fairness means that “(1) if a 

student is accused of misconduct, the university must hold 

some sort of hearing before imposing a sanction as serious as 

expulsion or suspension, and (2) when the university's 

determination turns on the credibility of the accuser, the 

accused, or witnesses, that hearing must include an opportunity 

for cross-examination”). 

7 Consistent with Pennsylvania’s private-university decisions, 

the Pennsylvania Administrative Code requires universities in 

the State System of Higher Education to adopt procedures that 

guarantee a hearing with “[a]n opportunity for submission of 

written, physical and testimonial evidence and for reasonable 

questioning of witnesses by both parties.” 22 Pa. Code § 505.3; 

see also Ruane v. Shippensburg Univ., 871 A.2d 859, 862 (Pa. 

Commw. Ct. 2005). 

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* * *

We hold that USciences’s contractual promises of “fair” 

and “equitable” treatment to those accused of sexual 

misconduct require at least a real, live, and adversarial hearing 

and the opportunity for the accused student or his or her

representative to cross-examine witnesses—including his or 

her accusers.8 We do not, however, attempt to prescribe the 

exact method by which a college or university must implement 

these procedures.

C

We now consider whether Doe plausibly alleges that 

USciences failed to provide him fairness. In his complaint, Doe 

claims that “[t]he conduct of the entire process . . . violat[ed] 

the guarantees of fundamental fairness and fair and impartial 

hearing.” App. 114. Doe also alleges that he “was prohibited 

from confronting his accusers” and that he “was not allowed to 

have a hearing before a panel.” Id. In particular, Doe alleges 

that the sexual assault claims against him hinged on credibility 

and so, without a hearing, the charges went unexamined in a 

meaningful way. From these allegations, we draw the 

reasonable inference that USciences failed to provide Doe a 

fair, equitable investigation and resolution process. In other 

words, Doe plausibly alleges that USciences deprived him of 

fairness because he never received a chance to cross-examine 

witnesses or any sort of real, live, and adversarial hearing.

USciences argues that, under Pennsylvania law, it need 

not provide Doe with a “full-dress judicial hearing.”

Appellee’s Br. at 31. We agree. Basic fairness in this context 

does not demand the full panoply of procedural protections 

available in courts. But it does include the modest procedural 

protections of a live, meaningful, and adversarial hearing and 

the chance to test witnesses’ credibility through some method 

of cross-examination. 

8 Doe does not allege that USciences failed to provide him 

fairness by employing the preponderance-of-the-evidence 

standard to adjudicate charges of sexual assault, so we do not 

address that question. 

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USciences also claims that the procedures outlined in 

the Student Handbook and the Policy satisfy the requirements 

of basic fairness because Doe had a chance to be heard by the 

investigator and received other procedural protections. The 

District Court accepted this argument, concluding that Doe 

received a fair and equitable process because USciences 

afforded him the following procedural protections:

(1) the time, date, sexual nature, 

and locations of the alleged 

incidents, as well as the identities 

of his accusers; (2) more than one 

opportunity to review the witness 

statements attached to the Report; 

(3) more than one opportunity to 

defend himself before the 

investigator, including the 

opportunity to provide an 

additional statement to her after 

reviewing the investigator’s 

preliminary report; (4) the benefit 

of an administrative panel, distinct 

from the investigator, to determine 

his punishment, and yet another 

administrative panel to review his 

appeal of the initial panel’s 

determination; and (5) the 

opportunity to identify witnesses 

in his defense—a right which he 

exercised with such alacrity that 

seven of the ten total witnesses 

(excluding Roes 1 & 2) were 

people Doe identified[.]

App. 22–23 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

USciences therefore argues that the process it provided Doe—

its implementation of the single-investigator model—is fair. 

To be sure, the investigator listened to Doe during her 

two interviews with him. But USciences did not provide Doe a 

real, live, and adversarial hearing. Nor did USciences permit 

Doe to cross-examine witnesses—including his accusers, 

Roe 1 and Roe 2. As we explained above, basic fairness in the 

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21

context of sexual-assault investigations requires that students 

accused of sexual assault receive these procedural protections. 

Thus, Doe states a plausible claim that, at least as it has been 

implemented here, the single-investigator model violated the 

fairness that USciences promises students accused of sexual 

misconduct.

V

Doe’s complaint includes enough factual allegations to 

state a claim for relief under Title IX. Doe also states a 

plausible claim that USciences breached its contractual 

obligation to provide him fairness. We will reverse the District 

Court’s order and remand this case for proceedings consistent 

with our opinion. 

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