Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00455/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00455-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WAYNE WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

LURA MERRITT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:22-cv-00455-JLT-CDB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS

(Doc. 62)

14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Plaintiff David Wayne Wilson is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Following screening of the first amended complaint, this action proceeds on Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants 

Carlson, Correa,

1

and Merritt, First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Merritt, and 

Fourteenth Amendment and state law equal protection clause claims against Defendant Carlson. 

On May 13, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis 

Status. (Doc. 62.) Plaintiff opposed (Doc. 64) and Defendants replied (Doc. 68). 

1 Defendants’ answer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint notes “Defendant Correa is sued under the name 

‘Fishburn.’” (See Doc. 53 at 1, n.1.) Thus, the Court replaces references to “Fishburn” with “Correa.” 

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On August 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Counterclaim to 

Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Revoke In Forma Pauperis Where Plaintiff Meets 

On-Going Imminent Danger.” (Doc. 69.) 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply Brief

Initially, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s “counterclaim” to Defendants’ reply. The Court 

construes Plaintiff’s filing to be a sur-reply. This Court’s Local Rule 230(l) concerning motions in 

prisoner actions does not provide for the filing of a response to a reply or sur-reply. Rather, the 

rule allows for the filing of a motion, an opposition by the non-moving party, and a reply to the 

opposition by the moving party. See Local Rule 230(l). That rule also provides that “[a]ll motions 

will be deemed submitted when the time to reply has expired.” Id. Therefore, Defendants’ motion 

to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (IFP) status was deemed submitted with the filing of their 

reply on July 11, 2024. As a result, on this basis, Plaintiff’s sur-reply should be stricken.

Next, Local Rule 230(m) provides as follows:

Supplementary Material. After a reply is filed, no additional 

memoranda, papers, or other materials may be filed without prior 

Court approval except:

(1) Objection to Reply Evidence. If new evidence has been 

submitted with the reply brief, the opposing party may 

file and serve, no later than seven (7) days after the reply 

is filed, an Objection to Reply Evidence stating its 

objections to the new evidence. The Objection to Reply 

Evidence may not include further argument on the 

motion.

(2) Notice of Supplemental Authority. Any party may file 

a notice of supplemental authority to bring the Court’s 

attention to a relevant judicial opinion issued after the 

date that party’s opposition or reply was filed. The notice 

of supplemental authority may contain a citation to the 

new authority but may not contain additional argument 

on the motion.

Here, Plaintiff did not seek prior Court approval to file a sur-reply following Defendants’ 

reply. Because he did not do so, it should be stricken. 

Further, a review of Plaintiff’s filing reveals it includes additional argument (Doc. 69 at 2-

4) and numerous court decisions or opinions (id. at 6-109). As to the latter, Plaintiff submits the 

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following: a Memorandum Decision and Order Re Findings & Recommendations Re Defendants’ 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings issued September 17, 2015, in Jackson v. Brown, No. 

1:13-cv-1055-LJO-SAB (id. at 6-67), a printout of cases citing to Jackson v. Brown (id. at 68-70), 

and copies of Ninth Circuit decisions in Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (id. at 

71-87), Washington v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 833 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (id. at 88-98), 

and El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2016) (id. at 99-109).

The Court will not construe the filing to be an Objection to Reply Evidence because it 

does not object to new evidence submitted with the reply brief. Moreover, a review of the reply 

brief submitted by Defendants reveals it does not contain any new evidentiary submissions. (See

Doc. 68.) Additionally, it is untimely—Plaintiff’s filing is dated and signed August 1, 2024 (Doc. 

69 at 4) and was served August 4, 2024 (id. at 5); both dates fall well beyond July 18, 2024, or the 

7 days provided for in the rule plus time for mailing. See Local Rule 230(m)(1). Nor will the 

Court construe the filing to be a Notice of Supplemental Authority because the opinions or 

decisions provided with Plaintiff’s filing were not “issued after the date of” Defendants’ reply and 

thus are not “new authority” as contemplated by Local Rule 230(m)(2). For those reasons too, 

Plaintiff’s filing should be stricken. 

Summary of the Parties’ Briefing

Defendants move to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status because he has accrued three strikes 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) and does not meet the imminent danger exception because the 

Court cannot redress the imminent danger asserted here—Plaintiff’s risk of contracting Valley 

Fever. (Doc. 62 at 1-2.) Specifically, Defendants argue that because the operative claims in this 

action no longer concern Valley Fever—the Court having screened out Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment conditions of confinement claim based on Plaintiff’s alleged exposure to Valley 

Fever—Plaintiff does not qualify for the imminent danger exception. (Id. at 7-9.) Therefore, 

Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot obtain a judicial remedy for the risk of contracting Valley 

Fever. (Id. at 9.) Moreover, Defendants maintain Plaintiff’s alleged harms do not amount to 

imminent dangers of serious physical injury. (Id. at 9-10.) They contend the “alleged harm that 

this Court previously found satisfied the imminent-danger exception does not share a nexus with 

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any claim on which this action is proceeding and is not redressable by the Court,” and “the harms 

that this Court can redress do not qualify Plaintiff for the imminent-danger exception.” (Id. at 10.) 

Defendants argue the Court should vacate its order granting IFP status and direct Plaintiff to pay 

the filing fee for this action. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Plaintiff argues he meets the imminent danger exception based upon the allegations in his 

first amended complaint. (Doc. 64 at 7.) Plaintiff contends previous actions he has filed, 

identified by Defendants as strikes, should not have been dismissed because they “fall[] within” 

or “meet [Armstrong,] Coleman and Plata.”

2

(Id. at 8-10.) Citing to grievances Plaintiff has filed 

concerning his physical injuries, including grievances submitted after the filing of the operative 

complaint, Plaintiff contends he faces an ongoing imminent danger of serious physical injury. (Id. 

at 11-12.) Plaintiff argues the “Court has already ruled on subjective prong of a serious risk of 

serious harm” for his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim. 

(Id. at 12-13.) He contends the cases cited by Defendants in their motion do not apply to his case, 

the motion should be denied, and he should be permitted to proceed. (Id. at 13-14.) Further, 

Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of approximately two dozen exhibits supporting his 

opposition. (Id. at 15-44.) 

Defendants reply that Plaintiff does not contest that his alleged risk of contracting Valley 

Federal does not entitle him to IFP status, that Plaintiff’s other litigation activities are irrelevant, 

that his opposition fails to identify another imminent danger that could support his IFP status, and 

that his opposition fails to distinguish the case law supporting Defendants’ arguments for 

revocation of Plaintiff’s IFP status. (Doc. 68 at 2-7.) 

Analysis

Relevant Background

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on April 18, 2022, in the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of California. (Doc. 1.) On April 19, 2022, the action was transferred to 

this Court. (Docs. 5 & 6.) 

2 Armstrong, et al. v. Newsom, et al., No. 4:94-cv-2307 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1994); Coleman v. Newsom, et al., No. 

2:90-cv-520 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990); Plata, et al. v. Newsom, et al., No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2001). 

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On April 26, 2022, this Court issued its Order to Submit Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis or to Pay Filing Fee. (Doc. 9.) Following submission of the application, the Court issued 

its Order Granting Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on May 5, 2022. (Doc. 

14.) Specifically, the then-assigned magistrate judge found that although Plaintiff had accrued 

three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), having taken judicial notice of four actions filed in this 

district that were dismissed for a failure to state a claim (id. at 2, n.1), Plaintiff met the imminent 

danger exception by contending “he is at high-risk to contract Valley Fever and that medical 

professionals at the facility are ignoring policies and procedures in place that would preclude 

Plaintiff from living at his current facility due to the risk posed to him by Valley Fever” (id. at 3). 

The Court noted in the Order that Plaintiff’s complaint would be screened in due course. (Id. at 

4.) 

On April 4, 2023, the Court issued its First Screening Order. (Doc. 28.) Specifically, the 

Court found Plaintiff’s original complaint stated the following cognizable claims: (1) a First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Merritt; (2) Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants Correa and Merritt; and (3) a 

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation against Defendant Carlson. (Id. at 5-26.) 

However, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state any other cognizable claims for relief against any 

other defendant. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff was directed to select one of the following three options: (1) 

notify the Court in writing that he did not wish to file a first amended complaint and he was

willing to proceed only on his First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Merritt, 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants 

Correa and Merritt, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation against Defendant

Carlson, with the remaining claims and defendants to be dismissed; or (2) file a first amended 

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in the screening order; or (3) file a 

notice of voluntary dismissal. (Id. at 27-28.) 

On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (Doc. 32.) 

On November 23, 2023, the Court issued Findings and Recommendations to Dismiss 

Certain Claims and Defendants Following Screening of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. 

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(Doc. 34.) Relevant here,3concerning Plaintiff’s first claim asserting a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, the Court found:

 Here, liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff 

has met the first, objective prong of the deliberate indifference test 

by alleging he suffers from numerous medical conditions a 

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

comment or treatment or that significantly affect his daily activities. 

Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066. 

 Regarding the second, subjective prong of the relevant test, and 

liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff plausibly 

alleges Defendant [Correa] knew Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate the risk by refusing to address Plaintiff’s 

incontinence and need for an egg crate mattress. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

847. Further, Plaintiff plausibly alleges a claim against Defendant 

Merritt by alleging she knew he faced a substantial risk of serious 

harm and disregarded that risk by refusing to address his claims 

concerning headaches, dizziness, and severe back and neck pain. Id. 

Lastly, Plaintiff plausibly alleges a claim against Defendant Carlson 

by asserting Carlson knew he faced a substantial risk of serious harm 

and disregarded that risk when she refused to see or treat him 

following his complaints of dizziness and severe tension headaches. 

Id. 

 In sum, Plaintiff states cognizable Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants 

[Correa], Merritt and Carlson, in their individual capacities.

(Doc. 34 at 10.) Further, construing Plaintiff’s third claim for relief to include an Eighth 

Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the Defendants, the Court found: 

 Here, liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff 

fails to allege cognizable Eighth Amendment conditions of 

confinement claims against Defendants [Correa], Merritt or Carlson. 

While Plaintiff meets the objective prong of the relevant test by 

alleging his exposure to Valley Fever given his susceptibility to the 

disease is sufficiently serious, Plaintiff again fails to show a 

sufficient casual connection or link between any knowledge or 

awareness by Defendants [Correa], Merritt or Carlson and the 

constitutional deprivation alleged. General assertions concerning the 

existence of the Plata litigation does not establish that [Correa], 

Merritt or Carlson were aware of a sufficiently serious risk to 

Plaintiff. None of the factual allegations specific to the actions of 

[Correa], Merritt or Carlson pertain to Plaintiff’s claim of Valley 

3 Plaintiff’s second claim asserts a violation of the First Amendment against Defendant Merritt for retaliation, a 

portion of the third claim and the fourth claim assert violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 

clause against the Defendants, and the fifth claim asserts state law equal protection claims against the Defendants. 

(See Doc. 34 at 11-12, 14-16.) 

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Fever exposure. It is not enough that Plaintiff references 

correspondence sent to state agencies complaining of Valley Fever 

exposure, among various other complaints, while vaguely 

referencing a lack of doctors and nurses, or “other Nurses’s” that 

“ignore” requests or “subvert” health issues. Nor does the fact 

Plaintiff complained about Defendants Merritt and Carlson in 

“’Group Class’” health care complaints causally connect Merritt or 

Carlson to having the required knowledge of the specific risk to 

Plaintiff. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160; 

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. In sum, Plaintiff fails to allege a 

cognizable Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim 

against any named Defendant.

(Doc. 34 at 14.) 

On December 12, 2023, District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston issued an Order Adopting 

Findings and Recommendations to Dismiss Certain Claims and Defendants Following Screening 

of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 35.) The action was to proceed only on the claims 

found cognizable at screening against Defendants Correa, Merritt, and Carlson, in their individual 

capacities; the remaining claims and defendants were dismissed. (Id. at 2-3.) The following day, 

Plaintiff’s objections to the findings and recommendations were filed. (Doc. 38.) On December 

19, 2023, Judge Thurston issued an Amended Order, wherein she considered Plaintiff’s 

objections, reaching the same conclusion and otherwise issuing the same order concerning the 

claims to proceed and the claims and defendants dismissed. (Doc. 39.) 

On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the December 12, 

2023, Order. (Doc. 43.) Finding the motion moot given her issuance of an Amended Order on 

December 19, 2023, Judge Thurston issued an Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration as 

Moot on January 3, 2024. (Doc. 45.) Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed that order. (See Docs. 47-

49, 52, 55.) 

Applicable Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) permits a federal court to authorize 

the commencement and prosecution of any suit without prepayment of fees by a person who 

submits an affidavit demonstrating that the person is unable to pay such fees. However,

[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment 

in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, 

on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

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facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States 

that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The “three strikes rule” was part of “a variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad 

claims [filed by prisoners] and facilitate consideration of the good.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 

U.S. 532, 535 (2015) (quoting Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). If a prisoner has three 

strikes under section 1915(g), the prisoner is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he 

meets the imminent danger exception of serious physical injury. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 

1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). To meet this exception, the complaint of a three-strikes prisoner must 

plausibly allege that the prisoner was faced with imminent danger of serious physical injury at the 

time his complaint was filed. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2015); Andrews, 

493 F.3d at 1055. A prisoner may meet the imminent danger requirement by alleging that prison 

officials continue with a practice that has injured him or others similarly situated in the past, or 

that there is a continuing effect resulting from such a practice. Id. at 1190. 

The “PLRA requires a nexus between the alleged imminent danger and the violations of 

law alleged in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Whether 

such a nexus exists requires a court to consider two things: (1) whether the imminent danger of 

serious physical injury alleged is fairly traceable to the unlawful conduct asserted in the 

complaint, and (2) whether a favorable judicial outcome would redress that injury. Id. at 701. 

Plaintiff Has Accrued Three or More Strikes

To the extent Plaintiff’s opposition can be understood to challenge the Court’s prior 

finding that he has accrued three or more strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because the 

claims asserted in the four actions judicially noticed by the Court “f[e]ll within” or met 

Armstrong, Coleman, and/or Plata, Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. 

Here, the undersigned agrees with the previously assigned magistrate judge’s conclusion 

that the following four actions count as strikes because they were dismissed for a failure to state a 

claim: (1) Wilson v. Tilton, No. 2:06-cv-01031-LKK-PAN, dismissed September 12, 2006; (2) 

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Wilson v. Schwartz, No. 2:05-cv-01649-GEB-CMK, dismissed October 31, 2006; (3) Wilson v. 

Dovey, No. 2:06-cv-01032-FCD-EFB, dismissed March 8, 2007; and (4) Wilson v. Veal, No. 

2:06-cv-00067-FCD-KJM, dismissed June 4, 2007. See Moore v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 

657 F.3d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2011).

If Plaintiff believed those cases were improperly dismissed based upon a failure to state a 

claim because they “f[e]ll within” or met Armstrong, Coleman, and/or Plata, his remedy was to 

appeal those dismissals.4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a prior dismissal on a 

section 1915(g) ground counts as a strike, even where the dismissal is the subject of an ongoing 

appeal. Coleman, 575 U.S. at 537-540. In short, there is no basis to revisit these strike-qualifying 

dismissals. See Benyamini v. Hammer, No. 2:11-cv-2317 TLN AC P, 2014 WL 2174937, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (concerning strikes accrued under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), stating “The 

first two of these cases have been found to constitute strikes, and plaintiff’s opposition [to 

defendant’s motion to revoke IFP status] provides no basis to deviate from the law of the case”). 

The Imminent Danger Exception

The imminent danger exception forms the crux of Defendants’ argument to revoke 

Plaintiff’s IFP status. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim as it relates to the asserted 

imminent danger—his susceptibility and exposure to Valley Fever—is not fairly traceable and 

cannot be redressed by this action where that claim was dismissed following screening. The Court 

must first address when the imminent danger exception is to be assessed. 

“[T]he three-strikes rule is a screening device that does not judge the merits of prisoners’ 

lawsuits.” Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1050. The Ninth Circuit has “stress[ed] at the outset that § 

1915(g) concerns only a threshold procedural question – whether the filing fee must be paid 

upfront or later. Separate PLRA provisions are directed at screening out meritless suits early on. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). ... [W]e should not make an overly detailed inquiry 

4

In Wilson v. Tilton, Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed for a failure to prosecute. (2:06-cv-01031, Doc. 14 [3/7/2007].) 

Likewise, in Wilson v. Schwartz (2:05-cv-01649, Doc. 33 [3/2/2007]), and Wilson v. Dovey (2:06-cv-01032, Doc. 20 

[7/30/2007]). In Wilson v. Veal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and judgment. (2:06-cv-00067, Doc. 17 

[1/27/2009].) 

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into whether the allegations qualify for the exception.” Id. at 1055. “It is thus particularly 

important that the inquiry ordinarily be conducted through analysis of the prisoner’s facial 

allegations and that these allegations be liberally construed. The inquiry is in essence 

administrative and may be conducted as such.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1190.

As noted above, Plaintiff was granted IFP status despite having accrued three or more 

strikes because it was determined his complaint sufficiently asserted the imminent danger 

exception. Later, following screening of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the undersigned 

recommended Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendants 

Correa, Merritt, and Carlson be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient causal 

connection between his susceptibility to Valley Fever and the conduct attributed to those 

individuals in the first amended complaint. 

In a few cases in this district, defendants have sought to revoke a plaintiff’s IFP status 

where imminent danger properly was pleaded in the original complaint but later dissipated and 

was not pleaded in an amended complaint due to changed circumstances. In such a situation, 

those courts held that the imminent danger analysis is limited to the pleadings at the 

commencement of the action and need not be reexamined when later, amended complaints are 

filed. See, e.g., Bradford v. Usher, No. 1:17-cv-01128-DAD-SAB, 2019 WL 4316899, *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 12, 2019) (“imminent danger for purposes of § 1915(g) is to be measured at the time of 

the commencement of the action and that a determination that the imminent danger exception has 

been satisfied need not be subsequently reexamined until and unless an appeal is filed”); Merino 

v. Gomez, No. 2:21-cv-0572 JAM KJN P, 2021 WL 4988875, *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2021) (same, 

citing Bradford, 2019 WL 4316899, at *4 & Simmons v. Wuerth, 2020 WL 1621368, at *1 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 2, 2020)), recommendation aff'd, 2021 WL 6052166 (Dec. 21, 2021); see also Lamon v. 

Mey, No. 2:21-20-cv-1474 TLN KJN P, 2021 WL 2679058, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2021) 

(“The determination of whether plaintiff is in imminent danger of serious physical injury is 

determined at the time of filing the complaint, and is not reevaluated based on allegations in an 

amended complaint,” and finding the exception did not apply because plaintiff had been 

transferred from the facility associated with the imminent danger). 

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In Bradford v. Usher, the magistrate judge granted plaintiff IFP status, finding plaintiff 

had accrued three or more strikes, but also finding plaintiff made a showing of imminent danger 

of serious physical injury related to a lack of adequate medical care for deep vein thrombosis

(DVT). Bradford, 2019 WL 4316899, at *1. The magistrate judge also screened plaintiff’s 

complaint, finding the allegations failed to state cognizable claims for alleged exposure to and 

contraction of Valley Fever and for a lack of adequate medical care for DVT. Id. The plaintiff 

was granted leave to file a first amended complaint. Id. Following screening of the first amended 

complaint, the court adopted findings and recommendations that the action proceed only on 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims concerning his alleged exposure and contraction of Valley 

Fever. Id. Thereafter, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations to revoke 

plaintiff’ IFP status because the case was proceeding only on plaintiff’s claim concerning 

exposure to and contraction of Valley Fever as asserted in the operative complaint, rather than the 

DVT claim upon which the imminent danger exception finding rested. Id. The plaintiff filed 

objections and a motion seeking injunctive relief. Id. at *2. As to the latter, the magistrate judge 

issued findings and recommendations to deny injunctive relief. Id. The plaintiff filed objections. 

Id. In his Order of September 12, 2019, District Judge Dale A. Drozd considered whether the 

imminent danger exception was to be assessed at the time the action commenced with the filing 

of the original complaint or whether the operative complaint was to be considered for purposes of 

section 1915(g). Id. at *2-3. Judge Drozd concluded “the imminent danger for purposes of § 

1915(g) is to be measured at the time of the commencement of the action and that a determination 

that the imminent danger exception has been satisfied need not be subsequently reexamined until 

and unless an appeal is filed.” Id. at *4. In that action, because the magistrate judge had 

previously found the plaintiff made a showing of imminent danger, a second showing was not 

required. Id. Judge Drozd declined to adopt the findings and recommendations to revoke 

plaintiff’s IFP status and the plaintiff was permitted to continue litigating that action in forma 

pauperis. Id.

In Merino v. Gomez, the magistrate judge ordered service of plaintiff’s original complaint 

asserting Eighth Amendment failure to protect/threat to safety claims against two correctional 

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officers and the warden. Merino, 2021 WL 4988875, at *1. Subsequently, defendants moved to 

dismiss the claim against the warden and also moved to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status. Id. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted and plaintiff was given leave to file an amended 

complaint because the allegations against the warden were vague and conclusory and the 

allegations against the correctional officers for routinely disregarding inmate safety concerns 

were not supported by specific facts. Id. The plaintiff filed two separate pleadings in response, 

one addressing the claims against the correctional officers and the other addressing the claim 

against the warden. Id. In resolving the motion to revoke IFP status as it concerned the imminent 

danger exception, the magistrate judge noted that the “availability of the imminent danger 

exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some 

earlier or later time.” Id. at *3. Citing to Bradford, Simmons, and Andrews, the magistrate judge 

stated “[i]mminent danger is measured at the commencement of the action, and is not reevaluated 

based on allegations in an amended complaint.” Id. The magistrate judge found plaintiff did not 

demonstrate that he faced an imminent danger of physical injury in his original complaint. Id. at 

*4. Thus, the magistrate judge recommended the motion to revoke IFP status be granted in that 

action. Id. at *5. 

The undersigned finds the holdings in Bradford and Merino persuasive. The imminent 

danger exception assessment is measured at the commencement of the action and does not require 

subsequent reevaluation of an operative or amended complaint. Thus, the imminent danger 

exception asserted in Plaintiff’s original complaint need not be reexamined. See Cox v. Daram, 

No. 2:21-cv-01778-DJC-JDP (PC), 2023 WL 4542155, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2023) 

(acknowledging some courts have assessed imminent danger “at the time the operative complaint 

was filed” but determining “[t]he plain language of the imminent danger cause in § 1915(g) 

indicates that imminent danger is to be assessed at the time of filing of the original complaint 

[citations]” and that “the conditions that existed at some earlier or later time are not relevant”);

Harding v. Mencias, No. 2:21-cv-00922 KJM DB P, 2023 WL 3477872, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 

2023) (“although courts appear to disagree over whether the imminent danger analysis looks to 

the original complaint or an amended complaint, ..., the undersigned has determined that the 

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correct test weighs conditions at the time of the original complaint’s filing ...”); Blackwell v. 

Covello, No. No. 2:20-cv-1755 KJM DB P, 2022 WL 4078848, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2022) 

(agreeing with magistrate judge that “the court assesses the threat of imminent danger based on 

conditions when the original complaint was filed” and finding that “[i]n combination with 

plaintiff’s allegations of his multiple medical conditions, [the allegations that Mule Creek State 

Prison was not complying with CDCR directives re COVID-19] suffice to demonstrate a threat of 

imminent danger at the time the complaint was filed,” thus declining “to adopt the finding that 

plaintiff failed to adequately allege a threat of imminent harm at the time the complaint was filed 

and the recommendation that his in forma pauperis status be revoked”). Based upon the 

foregoing, Defendants’ reliance upon Gonzales v. Podsakoff, No. 1:15-cv-00924, and that Court’s 

sua sponte revocation of the plaintiff’s IFP status following amendment, is not persuasive. 

In Ray v. Lara, plaintiff filed his complaint alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments and a motion to proceed IFP. Ray, 31 F.4th at 695. The district court screened the 

complaint and denied IFP, finding plaintiff was barred because he had accrued three or more 

strikes and “did not qualify for the imminent danger exception because he failed to establish a 

nexus between his complaint and alleged imminent danger.” Id. at 696. The plaintiff was ordered 

to pay the full filing fee, and when he failed to contest the three-strikes determination or to pay 

the filing fee, the action was dismissed. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found plaintiff alleged 

imminent danger of serious physical injury in his motion to proceed IFP on appeal, appointed 

counsel to represent plaintiff, and “directed the parties to address whether § 1915(g) requires a 

nexus between a plaintiff’s claims and alleged imminent danger.” Id. Addressing a matter of first 

impression, the Ninth Circuit held “that the PLRA requires a nexus between the alleged imminent 

danger and the violations of law alleged in the prisoner’s complaint.” Id. at 700. “[I]n order to 

qualify for the § 1915(g) imminent danger exception, the three-strikes prisoner must allege 

imminent danger of serious physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct 

alleged in his complaint and redressable by the court.” Id. at 701. In that case, it concluded Ray 

did not qualify for the imminent danger exception because he alleged the defendant censored and 

confiscated his prison mail and the assertion concerning imminent danger was “due to his prison 

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housing conditions, which he does not allege are unlawful. Ray provides no basis to believe that 

censorship of his mail contributes to danger he faces as a high-risk inmate housed in

general population.” Id. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. Id. at 702. 

The undersigned is not persuaded by Defendants’ assertion that the holding in Ray

requires the Court to find otherwise, given the procedural posture here. As noted above, the 

undersigned concludes the imminent danger exception is measured at the time this action was 

commenced. Assessing whether Plaintiff’s alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury is 

fairly traceable and redressable after the original claim to which the assertion was tied has been 

dismissed following screening of the first amended complaint is an improper reevaluation. 

Bradford, 2019 WL 4316899, at *4; Merino, 2021 WL 4988875, at *3; see also Cox, 2023 WL 

4542155, at *2; Harding, 2023 WL 3477872, at *3; Blackwell, 2022 WL 4078848, at *1-2. 

In this case, although Plaintiff is a “three-striker,” his original complaint sufficiently 

alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury that the Court can and did consider in 

concluding the section 1915(g) bar did not attach in this instance. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IFP status 

should not be revoked, and Defendants’ motion should be denied. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS:

1. Plaintiff’s sur-reply (Doc. 69) filed August 7, 2024, be STRICKEN; and

2. Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status (Doc. 62) be DENIED.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 

this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of service of these 

Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. The 

document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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