Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02024/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02024-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL FLORES,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

OFFICER BRADLEY; OFFICER 

SULLIVAN,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-2024 AJB-RBB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT 

(Docs. No. 60, 63)

Before the Court is Counterclaimants San Diego Police Department and Officer 

Sullivan’s Motion for Default Judgment against Rafael Flores. (Doc. No. 60.) Flores, a 

state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has not opposed the motion. For 

the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ motion for default judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, Flores asserted an excessive force claim 

against the SDPD and Police Officers Bradley, Sullivan, Stanley, and Jones (collectively, 

“Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. No. 16.) This Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice as to SDPD and 

dismissed without prejudice as to Officer Jones, requiring an amended complaint from 

Flores within sixty days. (Doc. No. 31 at 4.) Because Flores failed to file an amended 

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complaint that cured certain deficiencies, the Court dismissed Flores’ claims against 

Officer Jones with prejudice as well. (Doc. No. 63 at 4.) The remaining Officers named in 

the Complaint filed an answer that included two counterclaims specific to Officer Sullivan 

and the City of San Diego1(collectively as “Counterclaimants”). (Doc. No. 32.) In this 

filing, Counterclaimants pled claims against Flores for negligent resisting arrest and assault 

and battery. (Doc. No. 32.) Counterclaimants sought a judgment against Flores for 

workers’ compensation benefits paid to Officer Sullivan and his future disability benefits 

and costs of medical care treatment, (Doc. No. 32 at 15–16), in the amount of $22,393.64, 

(Doc. No. 60 at 2).

Although Flores was served the counterclaims four separate times, (Docs. No. 37, 

43, 63 at 4–7), Flores has not filed a responsive pleading, (Doc. No. 63 at 7). He indicated 

to Defendants that he was no longer interested in pursuing his claims. (Id. at 6.) As a result, 

Counterclaimants filed a request for an entry of default judgment, which the Court Clerk 

entered. (Doc. No. 58.) In the following months, Counterclaimants filed the present action, 

a Motion for Default Judgment, and a Motion to Supplement. (Docs. No. 60, 63.) 

Service has not been effectuated to Flores, as his mail is repeatedly being returned 

as undelivered. (Docs. No. 62, 59, 56, 55.) His current mailing address represents he is in 

custody at the San Diego Central Jail, however, returned mail indicates he is not in custody.

(Doc. No. 62 at 4.) The Court is presently unaware of Flores’ location.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court, following default by a 

defendant, to enter default judgment in a case. It is within the sound discretion of the district 

court to grant or deny an application for default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the Court considers the following 

factors, commonly referred to as the Eitel factors: (1) “the possibility of prejudice to the 

 

1 The City of San Diego was not named as a Defendant in Flores’ Complaint. (See

Doc. No. 1 at 1-2.)

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plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 

standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. 

v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citation omitted).

Generally, once the court clerk enters default, the factual allegations of the complaint 

are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). However, although well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary 

facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 

1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4669.

III. DISCUSSION

Counterclaimants bring suit against Flores for negligent resisting arrest and assault 

and battery. The Court notes that Counterclaimants only address four of the seven Eitel

factors, nonetheless, the Court finds the Eitel factors favor granting default judgment. 

1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff

There is a possibility of prejudice to the Counterclaimants when denying default 

judgment would leave them without an alternate recourse for recovery. See PepsiCo Inc. 

v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Flores shows an 

unwillingness to participate by his own statement indicating he did not want to pursue his 

claims. His unwillingness to participate is also evidenced by not answering the 

counterclaims after being served four times and failing to participate in the case for almost 

a year, leaving default judgment as the Counterclaimants only option. (Doc. No. 63 at 9.)

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2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of Claim

Under the second and third Eitel factors, the Court must examine whether the 

Counterclaimants have pled facts sufficient to establish and succeed on its claims. See Eitel, 

782 F.2d at 1471. These factors require the complaint “state a claim on which the 

[counterclaimants] may recover.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Although 

Counterclaimants do not touch on this issue, the Court notes this factor favors an entry for 

default judgment. Counterclaimants assert two claims: assault and battery and negligent 

resisting arrest. Taking their allegations as true, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6), the Court finds 

that Counterclaimants have pled facts to succeed on their claims. 

“In order to establish a case of civil assault and battery, all that is necessary is that 

the evidence show that plaintiff’s injury was caused by defendant’s violence . . . .” Lopez 

v. Surchia, 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 315 (1952). “If the cause of action is an alleged battery

committed in the performance of an unlawful or wrongful act, the intent of the wrongdoer 

to injure is immaterial.” Id.

Counterclaimants offer the following evidence to support their claims: Officer 

Sullivan’s ulna in his right arm was broken during Flores’ arrest. (Doc. No. 63 at 2.) The 

counterclaim alleges that Flores fled as Officer Sullivan approached him, which caused 

Sullivan to pursue Flores. While ultimately, being taken into custody, Flores “violently 

resisted” a lawful arrest. (Doc. No. 32 at 15.) Despite Officer Sullivan’s numerous verbal 

commands, when he came into contact with Flores, Flores purportedly continued to 

struggle: violently pushing upwards on his hands and knees. (Doc. No. 63-2 at 19.) 

Throughout this ordeal, Officer Sullivan sustained a broken right arm and cuts to his left 

elbow. (Doc. No. 32 at 15.) Because Officer Sullivan’s injuries were caused by Flores’ 

resisting arrest, he is potentially liable for civil assault and battery. And because the acts 

were unlawful, the Counterclaimants do not need to prove Flores’ intent to prevail on an 

assault or battery claim.

As to Counterclaimants’ negligence claim, every citizen in California has a duty to 

submit to lawful arrest by a police officer. People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d 435, 446

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(1957). Counterclaimants adequately pleaded Flores’ breach of this duty by alleging 

Flores’ attempts to flee and his struggles with multiple officers. (Doc. No. 32 at 14-15.)

3. Sum of Money at Stake 

Counterclaimants did not address this factor, however, “the court must consider the 

amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 

238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. Default judgment is disfavored where the sum of money at stake 

is too large or unreasonable in light of defendant's actions. See Totten v. Hurrell, No. 00–

2718, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20259, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001) (stating that “the 

‘sum of money at stake’ factor [under Eitel] is meant to focus on the size of the award 

requested, as courts are hesitant to enter default judgments where large sums of money are 

at stake,” and finding an award of $19,977.74 not a “large money judgment” in today’s 

world). The Court considers Counterclaimants’ declarations, calculations, and other 

documentation of damages in determining if the amount at stake is reasonable. See Walters 

v. Shaw/Guehnemann Corp., No. C 03-04058 WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992, at *7

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2004) (finding plaintiff’s calculations of damages and attorney fees

reasonable, based on plaintiff’s sworn declarations and pay stubs and other documentation 

submitted by plaintiffs). See also Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 

2d 916, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding the evidence of Plaintiff’s invoice summaries, copies 

of invoices and underlying documents to reflect outstanding balances clearly specified the 

charges and damages Plaintiff requested, showing proportionality to the harm caused by 

the Defendant’s actions). 

In the present case, Counterclaimants seek recovery of $22,393.64, which includes

Officer Sullivan’s $7,563.04 medical costs and $14,830.64 industrial leave costs.

(Doc. No. 63-5 at 2.) Providing multiple invoices with billing statements, the Court finds 

Counterclaimants adequately prove up the amount sought. The sum of the amount is 

reasonable because it is supported by the evidence on the record, and this factor therefore 

weighs in favor of default. See, e.g., Walters, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992 at *8–9 (where 

the amount of damages was supported by pay stubs and other documentation).

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4. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The next pertinent Eitel factor considers whether there are disputed material facts.

“Upon entry of default, all well pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except 

those relating to damages.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 117. Here, Counterclaimants have 

alleged sufficient facts to support its claims as analyzed above. Moreover, because Flores 

failed to participate in litigation, the clerk entered default against him, submitting all well 

pleaded facts as true. Thus, there is no dispute of material facts and this factor favors the 

entry of default judgment against Flores. 

5. Excusable Neglect

There is no indication that Flores allowed its default to be taken as a result of 

excusable neglect. Flores has intentionally refused to participate in multiple stages of his 

own lawsuit, including providing his current address. (Doc. No. 63 at 9.) After being served 

with the complaint, Flores had four opportunities to motion this Court for time to respond 

or show any excusable neglect, but failed to do so. Instead, over the course of this litigation, 

Flores has chosen inaction without explanation. Consequently, this factor weighs in favor 

of the entry of default judgment.

6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits

Although default judgment is disfavored, a decision on the merits is impractical, if 

not impossible, when the defendant takes no part in the action. Penpower Technology Ltd. 

v. S.P.C. Technology, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Given that Flores has 

repeatedly failed to respond to the counterclaims, the general preference for resolution on 

the merits is not equally applicable. See, e.g., id. In sum, the relevant considerations weigh 

in favor of entry of default judgment against Flores. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Default Judgment against Flores, 

(Docs. No. 60, 63), is GRANTED. The Court awards $22,393.64. The Clerk is directed to 

enter judgment consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 2, 2017

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