Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00001/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00001-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY A. SHARP,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID POMAVILLE, et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-0001-DLB

ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Anthony A. Sharp (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate in the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on December 29, 2014. 

He names David Pomaville, the Director of Administration for the Fresno County Department of 

Public Health, and Does as Defendants.1

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on January 16, 2015.

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions 

or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Coalinga State Hospital. The events at issue occurred 

while Plaintiff was detained in the Fresno County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that the Fresno County 

Department of Health was the medical provider at the time of the events.

In August 2013, Plaintiff was civilly detained at the Fresno County Jail. At that time, he 

suffered from severe pain, bleeding from his gums and severe headaches, all of which prevented 

him from eating. Plaintiff is a Type II diabetic who has to take his medication with food, but he 

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could not take his medication since he could not eat.

Plaintiff submitted numerous requests for emergency dental care to the Floor Nurse and 

complained repeatedly to the Sheriff’s Deputies. 

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on an unknown date,2Plaintiff was called to medical to see the 

nurse. Plaintiff explained the problem and the nurse looked into Plaintiff’s mouth. The nurse told 

Plaintiff that she could see the problem, which was a “small piece” coming from the gum. ECF

No. 1, at 5. The nurse told Plaintiff that she would put in a dental referral, but that it takes two to 

three weeks to be seen. 

While waiting to be seen, Plaintiff experienced severe pain, bleeding and dizziness because 

of his low blood sugar. He wasn’t given any medication for pain.

On another unknown date in 2013, another inmate submitted a dental request for a nonemergency. This inmate was seen the next day.

Plaintiff returned back to Coalinga State Hospital in September 2013, where he was seen

and diagnosed with an exposed nerve. The nerve was removed successfully and Plaintiff has had 

no further dental issues since that time.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was deliberately indifferent 

when he failed to provide emergency dental treatment. He alleges that Defendant knew, or should 

have known, that he was suffering and that he was a diabetic who needed to eat so that he could 

take his medication.

C. DISCUSSION

1. Linkage

As noted above, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of 

a link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of his 

federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 

2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). 

 

2 There are several blank spaces in his allegations where the month and day should be, i.e. “on _____ 2013.” ECF 

No. 1, at 5. 

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Here, Plaintiff names Defendant Pomaville and Defendant Does, but he does not 

specifically link any Defendants to the actions at issue. 

Insofar as he names Defendant Pomaville, the Director of Administration for the Fresno 

County Department of Public Health, he has not demonstrated that he was personally involved in 

the alleged denial of medical care, or that there was a sufficient causal connection between his 

conduct and the denial of medical care. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under 

section 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious 

liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 

693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she 

is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 

734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 F.3d at 989) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 

726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability 

exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials 

implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is 

the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Pomaville.

2. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff alleges that he is suing Defendant in his official capacity. “An official capacity 

suit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity.” Center for Bio-Ethical 

Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s official 

capacity claims against Defendant Pomaville is subject to dismissal as redundant, leaving Fresno 

County as the proper municipal Defendant. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 533 F.3d at 799 

(citation omitted).

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However, a local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its 

employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 

1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. County 

of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, a local government unit may only be 

held liable if it inflicts the injury complained of. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Gibson, 290 F.3d at 

1185. 

Generally, a claim against a local government unit for municipal or county liability 

requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ 

behind the constitutional violation . . . suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 

667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989). 

Alternatively, and more difficult to prove, municipal liability may be imposed where the local 

government unit’s omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d 

at 1186. Under this route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff must show that the municipality’s 

deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to commit 

the constitutional violation.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires a showing “that the municipality 

was on actual or constructive notice that its omissions would likely result in a constitutional 

violation.” Id.

Plaintiff has made no allegations to suggest that the denial of medical care was the result of 

a deliberate policy, practice or custom, and he therefore fails to state a claim against the Fresno 

County Department of Public Health.

3. Medical Care

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is protected from conditions of confinement which amount 

to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Simmons v. Navajo 

County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2010); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 

F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010). While pretrial detainees’ rights are protected under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard for claims brought under the Eighth 

Amendment has long been used to analyze pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims. 

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Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017-18; Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1242; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 

(9th Cir. 1998).

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 

2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 

2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain 

or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 

(citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which 

entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Plaintiff’s medical claim is based on his belief that the medical provider(s) failed to 

provide emergency dental care. Plaintiff told the nurse about his situation, and she agreed that 

Plaintiff needed dental care. However, she told Plaintiff that it would take two to three weeks 

before he could be scheduled. Under these facts, the nurse examined Plaintiff and referred him to 

a dentist for further treatment. The fact that it took longer than Plaintiff would have liked, without 

more, does not state a claim for relief. Delay may demonstrate deliberate indifference, but there 

must be facts to support a finding that the delay was something more than a scheduling issue. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff suggests that the treatment was deliberately indifferent because an inmate with a nonemergency issue was seen the next day, but this does not necessarily support an inference that 

there was a questionable motive behind Plaintiff’s treatment.

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To the extent that Plaintiff indicates that he was not given pain medication, he does not 

provide sufficient facts to permit the Court to determine whether this constitutes deliberate 

indifference.

Plaintiff may ultimately be able to state a deliberate indifference claim, but he has not 

alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any cognizable claims against any Defendants.

Plaintiff has not previously been provided with notice of the deficiencies in his claims and 

the Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, 

in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 

(9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit 

by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007).

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the mere 

theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 

(9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual 

allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . .” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

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file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order; 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without 

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 29, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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