Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-03126/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-03126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR GUERRERO, EUGENIO

AGUILAR PAZ, FIDEL RAYO

HERNANDEZ and BAHUMAN

GONZALEZ,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 13cv3126 JM(BGS)

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS; DENYING MOTION FOR

A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

vs.

T-Y NURSERY, INC., and

STATEWIDE LABOR

CORPORATION ,

Defendants.

Defendant T-Y Nursery (“T-Y”) movesto dismiss the First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for a more definite statement pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Defendant Statewide Labor Corporation (“Statewide”) also

moves to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs Victor

Guerrero, Eugenio Aguilar Paz, Fidel Rayo Hernandez and Bahuman Gonzalez

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) oppose all motions. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the

court finds the matters presented appropriate for decision without oral argument. For

the reasons set forth below, all motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

The operative FAC, filed on April 18 2014, alleges twelve causes of action for

(1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq.;

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violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”),

29 U.S.C. §1801 et seq.; (3) failure to pay contractual wages; (4) failure to pay

minimum wage, Cal. Labor Code §§1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197; (5) failure to

provide meal periods, Cal. Labor Code §§226.7, 1198; (6) failure to pay promised

vacation benefits upon termination, Cal. Labor Code §227.3; (7) knowing and

intentional failure to provide accurate and complete itemized statements, Cal. Labor

Code §226; (8) failure to pay all wages due upon termination, Cal. Labor Code §201,

203; (9) failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures, Cal. Labor Code

§1198, 2802; (10) failure to provide copies of employment records, Cal. Labor Code

226; (11) unlawful competition, Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code §17200 et seq.; and (12)

private attorney’s general act, Cal. Labor Code §2698. With respect to the FLSA

claim, Plaintiffs seek to bring this claim on behalf of “themselves and for and on behalf

of other employees similarly situated.” (FAC ¶55).

Plaintiffs are agricultural workers with an employment relationship with

Defendants. Defendant T-Y operates agricultural nurseries in San Diego County and

employed Plaintiffs. (FAC ¶17). T-Y is in the business of cultivating plants, shrubs

and trees which are sold in interstate commerce. (FAC ¶31). Defendant Statewide is

in the business of agricultural production and labor contracting and supplies labor to

agricultural nurseries like T-Y. (FAC ¶¶16 - 18). 

In broad brush, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay full wages by,

among other things, requiring Plaintiffs to report to work and wait, off-the-clock, until

frost was no longer on the fields before Plaintiffs could begin to work. Defendants also

allegedly failed to provide legally-required accurate wage statements, pay minimum

wages, pay accrued vacation benefits, timely provide wage statements, furnish safety

devices, provide meal breaks, provide and maintain tools and equipment necessary to

perform their job, and timely pay wages upon termination. (FAC ¶¶41-48). Plaintiffs

also allege that Defendants exposed workers to unsafe and unhealthy work conditions

by, for example, failing to provide shade and cool-down recovery periods. (FAC ¶49). 

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Plaintiffs seek compensatory, statutory, and liquidated damages. Plaintiffs also seek

declaratory relief and an award of costs, including attorney’s fees.

Defendants seek to dismiss the first and second causes of action for violation of

FLSA and AWPA, respectively. T-Y also moves for a more definite statement.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

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the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The FLSA Claim

Defendants seek to dismiss the FLSA claim on the ground that Plaintiffs and

putative class members have failed to file written consentsto join the action asrequired

by 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The FLSA provides that “[n]o employee shall be a party

plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a

party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” Id. At the

outset, the court notes that FLSA collective actions and Rule 23 class actions have

separate procedures. In FLSA collective actions, a plaintiff must affirmatively opt-in

a FLSA action. Id.; Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 528 (9th

Cir. 2013). 

Defendants raise two distinct issues. First, with respect to maintaining a

collective action, the consents to sue by current or former co-employees of Plaintiffs

need not be filed with the complaint. Plaintiffs must timely seek leave from this court

to proceed as a collective action. At that time, Plaintiffs must file the consents from

putative class members. However, until the parties conduct discovery on the viability

of maintaining a collective action, any motion to maintain a collective action is

premature and the court therefore deniesthis portion of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

The second issue concerns whether the named Plaintiffs must file consents on their

own behalf. As noted by the parties, it does not appear that the Ninth Circuit has

addressed whether individual plaintiffs in a FLSA must file consents. The court notes

that consent can reasonably be found in this case: Plaintiffs have retained counsel and

commenced this action. Under virtually every conceivable circumstance, such conduct

demonstrates the consent of Plaintiffs to bring a FLSA cause of action. Even if not

actual consent, the court notes that all three Plaintiffs have filed written consents. (Ct.

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Dkt. 18, 20). Consequently Defendants’ arguments are moot and the court denies the

motion.

In sum, the court denies the motions to dismiss the FLSA claim.

The AWPA Claim

Defendants also move to dismiss the AWPA claim on the ground that the

complaint fails to adequately allege that the nature of Plaintiffs’ work at T-Y was

seasonal or temporary or that T-Y was an agricultural employer. Defendants contend

that the allegation that Plaintiffs are “seasonal agricultural worker(s) within the

meaning of 29 U.S.C. §1802(1), and/or individuals entitled to the AWPA’s

protections,” (FAC ¶56), are insufficient under Twombly to state a claim. Defendants

contend that additional factual allegations are required to state a claim.

AWPA only affords protection to migrant agricultural workers defined as an

“individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other

temporary nature.” 29 U.S.C. §1802(10). In pertinent part, the regulations define “on

a seasonal or other temporary basis” as meaning:

(1) Labor is performed on a seasonal basis where, ordinarily, the

employment pertains to or is of the kind exclusively performed at certain

seasons or periods of the year and which, from its nature, may not be

continuous or carried on throughout the year. A worker who moves from

one seasonal activity to another, while employed in agriculture or

performing agricultural labor, is employed on a seasonal basis even

though he may continue to be employed during a major portion of the

year. 

(2) A worker is employed on other temporary basis where he is employed

for a limited time only or his performance is contemplated for a particular

piece of work, usually of short duration. Generally, employment, which

is contemplated to continue indefinitely, is not temporary. 

29 C.F.R. §500.20(s). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are, in fact, year-round

employees not entitled to the protections afforded by AWPA to seasonal or temporary

workers.

The court deniesthe motion. Twombly has not eliminated the concept of federal

notice pleading. Twombly clearly stated that its discussion of pleadings “does not run

counter to Swierkiewicz v. Sorma N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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547 (notice pleading sufficient in a Title VII case); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (a complaint

need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief”). While a bare and simple notice allegation is generally not sufficient

to state a claim, a well-pleaded claim must not only provide notice but also “suggest

that the claim has at least a plausible chance ofsuccess.” In Re Century Aluminum Co.

Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013). The court concludes that additional

allegations provide context to the term “seasonal agricultural worker.” The FAC

alleges that T-Yoperated agricultural nurseries, Statewide supplieslabor to agricultural

nurseries and that “Plaintiffs cultivated plants, shrubs and trees which were produced

for movement in interstate commerce.” (FAC ¶31). Such allegations are minimally

sufficient to establish that Plaintiffs are “seasonal agricultural workers” for purposes

of AWPA.

The court also rejects (at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings)

Defendants’ argument that T-Y and Statewide are not covered under AWPA because

the nurseries operate continuously year round. Defendants’s argument is based on

Babitt Engineering & Machinery v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 152 Cal.App.3d

310 (1984). However, in Babbitt the court of appeals had factual findings to review. 

The issue there did not involve the review of a complaint under federal pleadings

requirements. 

1

The court also rejects Defendants’ arguments that the FAC’s allegations fail to

establish that T-Y is an “agricultural employer” and Statewide a “farm labor

contractor” for purposes of AWPA. The FAC provides context to this claim by

identifying that T-Y owns and operates a nursery, thus satisfying the statutory

The court notes that whether the work performed at the nursery is ordinarily

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seasonal work is a factually intensive inquiry not appropriately resolved on a motion

to dismiss. 

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requirement of 29 U.S.C. §1802(2). With respect to Statewide, the complaint alleges

2

that Statewide is in the business of labor contracting, supplied labor to T-Y and

employed Plaintiffs for the nursery. See 29 U.S.C. §1802(6) and (7).3

In sum, the court concludes that the FAC complies with Rule 8 and provides

Defendants with sufficient notice such that they can respond to the complaint and

conduct discovery.

The State Law Claims

Defendant T-Y contendsthat the FAC failsto adequately identifywhich Plaintiff

is alleging which cause of action. This argument appears to form the basis for both the

Rule 12(b)(6) motion as well as the motion for a more definite statement brought

pursuant to Rule 12(e). The court denies this motion because, in the heading of each

claim, the complaint identifies which Plaintiff is alleging the claim against which

Defendant. Accordingly, the FAC complies with Rule 8(a) and the court denies this

motion. The court notes that an evidentiary based motion may narrow the scope of 4

 29 U.S.C. §1802(2) provides: 2

The term “agricultural employer” means any person who owns or operates a

farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, gin, packing shed or nursery, or

who produces or conditions seed, and who either recruits, solicits, hires,

employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker. 

 29 U.S.C. §1802 provides: 3

(6) The term “farm labor contracting activity” means recruiting, soliciting,

hiring, employing, furnishing, or transporting any migrant or seasonal

agricultural worker. 

(7) The term “farm labor contractor” means any person, other than an

agricultural employer, an agricultural association, or an employee of an

agricultural employer or agricultural association, who, for any money or other

valuable consideration paid or promised to be paid, performs any farm labor

contracting activity. 

To the extent the state law claims are asserted on behalf of “other employees,” 4

(FAC ¶62, 66,77,10), the court concludes that Plaintiffs, except with respect to any

future collective action brought pursuant to the FLSA claim, lack standing to bring the

action on behalf of non-parties to the litigation. Plaintiffs are simply not seeking to

represent a class within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. In this sense, the court strikes

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Plaintiffs’ claims.

In sum, the court denies the motion to dismiss the FLSA claim (the first cause

of action), denies the motion to dismiss the AWPA claim (the second cause of action),

and denies the motion for a definite statement with respect to the state law claims (the

third through twelfth causes of action).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 29, 2014

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

the phrase “other employees” from the identified paragraphs. 

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