Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05320/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05320-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 11, 2000 Decided June 30, 2000

No. 99-5320

American Federation of Government Employees,

AFL-CIO, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary of the

U.S. Department of Agriculture, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00893)

Anne M. Wagner argued the cause for appellants. With

her on the briefs was Mark Roth.

Alfred Mollin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

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David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, William

B. Schultz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Barbara C.

Biddle, Attorney, and Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Randolph and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: The Federal Meat Inspection

Act ("FMIA"), 21 U.S.C. s 604, and the Poultry Products

Inspection Act ("PPIA"), 21 U.S.C. s 455, require inspectors

appointed by the Department of Agriculture ("USDA") to

perform a "post-mortem inspection" of the carcasses and

parts of all livestock and birds processed for human consumption. The question in this appeal from the judgment of the

district court is whether the statutes permit federal inspectors to step back from the processing lines and perform their

inspection duties by overseeing inspections conducted by

plant employees.

I

Inspectors from the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection

Service ("FSIS") generally conduct post-mortem inspections

while stationed at fixed points along the slaughter processing

line. Using organoleptic methods, that is, relying on sight,

touch and smell, the inspectors examine the head, viscera, and

exterior of each carcass for signs of adulteration, such as

tumors, inflammation, parasites, and other diseases. See 9

C.F.R. pts. 310-11, ss 381.76-94. If the inspector detects no

signs of adulteration, the carcass is passed and marked with

the USDA legend. See 9 C.F.R. ss 310.8, 381.79. Under the

FMIA, if the inspector finds any lesion or other condition

"that might render the meat or any part unfit for food

purposes, or otherwise adulterated," the carcass (and its

parts) must be retained for veterinary disposition. 9 C.F.R.

s 310.3. A carcass or part found to "be unsound, unhealthful,

unwholesome, or otherwise adulterated" is condemned and

marked as such. Id. s 310.5. Similar procedures apply to

inspections under the PPIA. See id. ss 381.81-89.

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The method of inspection just described had remained

unchanged for decades. Then, in the mid-1990s, FSIS embarked on a comprehensive food safety initiative targeting the

agency's resources at what it perceived as a serious health

risk--foodborne pathogens, such as salmonella and E. coli,

which cannot be detected by organoleptic inspection. At the

same time it determined to make changes in the current

inspection process to combat these microbial causes of foodborne illness, FSIS addressed what it considered to be another failure of the present regulatory system--that it provides

processing plants with little incentive to detect and eliminate

unacceptable carcasses before presenting them for inspection.

For these reasons, FSIS decided to require "industry to

assume responsibility for producing safe products, reducing

foodborne pathogens, and ... to shift Agency inspection

resources to those areas which present the greatest public

health risk." John W. McCutcheon Decl. at p 10.

In July 1996, FSIS took the first step in implementing its

new initiative by promulgating the Pathogen Reduction/

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points ("HACCP") final

rule. See 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806 (1996). The rule "requires

plants to implement science-based process control systems as

a means of preventing food safety hazards, sets certain food

safety performance standards, and establishes testing programs to ensure those standards are met." Food Safety and

Inspection Service, HACCP-Based Inspection Models 1

(1998). It provides the industry with complete control over

production decisions and execution, subject only to the performance standards set by FSIS. FSIS believes that heightening the industry's responsibility for safe meat and poultry

products will increase "the incentives and flexibility establishments need to innovate and improve food safety." HACCP

Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,808.

Such advances, according to FSIS, cannot be achieved

without substantial changes to its approach to inspection. As

the agency put it, the roles of establishments and federal

inspectors need to be "realigned to accord with the HACCP

philosophy." Id. To design and test new inspection models,

FSIS initiated the Inspection Models Development Project

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(the "Models Project"). Under the regulatory framework

proposed in the Models Project, the task of separating normal

from abnormal carcasses and parts will be carried out solely

by industry personnel. Federal inspectors will be responsible

for monitoring the plant's performance in sorting and for

verifying its compliance with performance standards and

regulatory requirements. Under the new model, a finding

that a product is not adulterated will be based on FSIS's

determination that the establishment's food safety and sanitation control systems are preventing adulteration.1

Under the new inspection models, FSIS has said that

"slaughter process control will be an industry responsibility

subject to FSIS oversight and verification." HACCP-Based

Meat and Poultry Inspection Concepts: In-Plant Slaughter

Inspection Models Study Plan, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,381, 40,381

(1998). It explained, "[e]stablishment employees will conduct

anatomical and pathological examinations of carcasses, and

FSIS inspectors will oversee, evaluate, and verify the effectiveness and reliability of the establishments' slaughter process controls." Id. FSIS plans the transition to industrybased inspection to occur in stages. At the outset, establishment employees will only be responsible for identifying and

removing trimmable defects. They will later assume responsibility for generalized condemnable conditions. And at the

final stage, employees will perform "all tasks related to

slaughter control," with the inspectors' role limited to oversight and verification. Food Safety and Inspection Service,

HACCP-Based Inspection Models Project In-Plant Slaughter 10 (1998).

Draft guidance put out by FSIS gives some indication of

what oversight and verification entails. Though the descrip-

__________

1 The Models Project encompasses several phases. The first

phase involves collecting baseline data of current performance

under federal inspection in order to ensure that the new system

achieves similar standards. This is followed by a period of testing

the new inspection models at certain volunteer plants. Testing

began in three such plants in September 1999, and FSIS has set

tentative start-up dates for eighteen others.

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tions vary slightly depending on the class of animals, oversight amounts to inspectors observing establishment personnel as they process carcasses and remove unacceptable

products from the food supply. By verification, FSIS means

that inspectors will randomly sample and examine carcasses

that have been passed to determine if the establishment is

complying with the relevant performance standards.

The appellants are a group of federal meat and poultry

inspectors, their union, and the Community Nutrition Institute. They brought this suit to enjoin the Secretary from

"authorizing anything other than the carcass-by-carcass postmortem inspection by a federal government inspector." Brief

for Appellants at 5. Following cross-motions for summary

judgment, the district court ruled in the government's favor

on the basis that the word "inspection" did not clearly require

an organoleptic inspection. See American Fed'n of Gov't

Employees, AFL-CIO v. Glickman, No. 98-0893, Memorandum and Order (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1999).

II

The statutory language with which we are concerned, the

language supposedly allowing FSIS's oversight and verification regime, is as follows. For meat, s 604 of the FMIA

provides: "the Secretary shall cause to be made by inspectors

appointed for that purpose a post-mortem examination and

inspection of the carcasses and parts thereof of all [livestock]

to be prepared at any slaughtering, ... or similar establishment...." 21 U.S.C. s 604 (emphasis added). For poultry,

s 455(b) of the PPIA states: "[t]he Secretary, whenever

processing operations are being conducted, shall cause to be

made by inspectors post mortem inspection of the carcass of

each bird processed...." 21 U.S.C. s 455(b) (emphasis added).

The government does not deny that in the ninety or so

years since passage of the FMIA in 1907, "inspection" has

been taken to mean an organoleptic examination of the carcass, an inspection, that is, using the senses. Now the

government has discovered another meaning. A "federal

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employee has performed an inspection of a carcass," the

government tells us, "when he has watched a plant employee

conduct the kind of examination, organoleptic or otherwise,

that is necessary to determine whether the carcass is fit for

human consumption. And in making these observations, the

oversight inspector will observe all of the carcasses that pass

along the slaughter line." Brief for the Appellees at 29.

In other words, the government believes that federal employees fulfill their statutory duty to inspect by watching

others perform the task. One might as well say that umpires

are pitchers because they carefully watch others throw baseballs. The government thinks it can arrive at its position on

the basis that the word "inspection" is undefined in the

statutes. But the lack of a statutory definition does not

render a term ambiguous. See Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky,

Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1997).

It simply leads us to give the term its ordinary, common

meaning. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979);

Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And when

we treat the word "inspection" in that manner, it is easy to

see why there is nothing to the government's point that "an

oversight inspector will necessarily observe all carcasses and

parts that pass along the slaughter line." See John W.

McCutcheon Decl. at p 21. Every inspection entails an observation, but not every observation amounts to an inspection.

One may observe something without paying close attention to

it, and without giving it a critical appraisal, although that is

what these statutes demand. The military commander may

observe his troops without inspecting them. The foreman of

an assembly line may do the same with widgets.

Both statutes clearly contemplate that when inspections are

done, it will be federal inspectors--rather than private employees--who will make the critical determination whether a

product is adulterated or unadulterated.2 To the extent

federal employees are doing any systematic inspecting under

__________

2 "The term 'inspector' means: (1) an employee or official of the

United States Government ..., or (2) any employee or official of the

government of any State...." 21 U.S.C. s 453(k).

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the Models Project, they are inspecting people not carcasses.

Delegating the task of inspecting carcasses to plant employees violates the clear mandates of the FMIA and PPIA. See

Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). For that reason, we

reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the

district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.

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