Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_12-cv-00072/USCOURTS-akd-3_12-cv-00072-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 423
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Withdrawal 28 USC 157
Cause of Action: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

In re JOHANNA E. HAWTHORNE,

Debtor,

RENEE ELLISON and LOUIS A. 

BREUER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHANNA HAWTHORNE,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter is before the Court following the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

mandate which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the Court’s October 16, 

2012 dismissal of this case.1 The Court also addresses two motions by Plaintiffs: at 

Docket 102, Ellison/Breuer seek to substitute Plaintiff Louis Breuer for Defendant 

Johanna Hawthorne because Ms. Hawthorne died on May 20, 2014 and Mr. Breuer was 

appointed personal representative of her estate; at Docket 104, Ellison/Breuer seek to 

substitute or add Robert and Sharon Johnson as defendants because the Johnsons

received from Hawthorne, by Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure, the apartment building where 

the landlord-tenant disputes between Ellison and Hawthorne originated. Ellison/Breuer 

have briefed the motions; the Johnsons have appeared to oppose their addition to this 

 1 See generally Docket 64 (Court of Appeals Memorandum). See also Docket 44 (Judgment).

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 1 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 2 of 11

action.

2 Ellison/Breuer and the Johnsons have each extensively discussed the viability

of the remaining claims in this action in their briefing. Oral argument was not requested 

and was not necessary to the Court’s decision.3

The humble origins of this case belie its rather exceptional progression through the 

federal courts. The dispute originated in 2009 when Johanna Hawthorne, an elderly 

landlord, sought to evict Renee Ellison from a four-plex apartment unit in Palmer, Alaska. 

The tenancy began as a six-month lease in March 2009. The lease limited the occupants 

to one adult and three children. The lease also indicates that Ms. Ellison paid an initial 

$925.00 security deposit; but Ms. Hawthorne submitted an affidavit in support of her 2012 

summary judgment motion in which she testified that she “never received a security 

deposit” and had instead agreed to waive the deposit in exchange for landscaping work.4 

Ms. Ellison did not leave the premises when the six-month term expired in 

September 2009. On November 10, 2009, Ms. Hawthorne wrote to Ms. Ellison seeking 

to terminate the tenancy. Ms. Hawthorne indicated in the letter that she believed there 

were then two adults and six children occupying Ms. Ellison’s apartment. Ms. Hawthorne 

provided 30-days notice to vacate the property, but added that “as the holiday season is 

approaching,” Ms. Ellison could instead elect to remain in the unit through December 31, 

 2 See Docket 102–105, 111, and 114. 

3 The Court would generally allow supplemental briefing prior to dismissal of an action. But 

given that there is presently no one appearing in this action to advocate on behalf of the Estate 

of Ms. Hawthorne, and the fact that all issues have been extensively briefed, the Court finds

supplemental briefing unnecessary and unwarranted.

4 See Docket 19 (Memorandum), 19-2 (Lease), 19-4 (Letter), 19-6 (Log notes), 19-11 

(Hawthorne Aff.).

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 2 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 3 of 11

2009 with a $25 per month rent increase for that one month.

5 Mr. Breuer has alleged that 

Ms. Ellison tried to tender $775 to Ms. Hawthorne for rent for the month of December.6 

But there appears to be no admissible evidence in the record to support that allegation. 

In any event, Ms. Hawthorne filed a Forcible Entry and Detainer proceeding in state court 

on December 18, 2009.7 It appears undisputed that Ms. Ellison did not pay rent in 

December 2009 or January 2010, and did not vacate the apartment until January 25, 

2010, after the state court entered a Judgment for Possession for Ms. Hawthorne and 

ordered Ms. Ellison to pay $745 toward Ms. Hawthorne’s court costs.8 Mr. Breuer filed a 

Motion for Reconsideration on January 22, 2010.9 The state court denied the motion and 

no appeal was taken.10 

From there, the original dispute has evolved into a four-year federal court odyssey.

Ms. Ellison, whose interests Mr. Breuer is supposed to represent, has never 

directly participated in this adversary bankruptcy case. The only sworn statement by Ms. 

Ellison in the Court’s file is the verified First Amended Answer/Counterclaims that Ms. 

Ellison submitted in the state court eviction proceedings on December 27, 2010. In that 

verified statement, which the notary indicated Ms. Ellison signed on December 17, 2010,

 5 Docket 19-4 (Letter).

6 Docket 19 (Memorandum) at 2.

7 Docket 19-5. 

8 Docket 19-7 (Judgment for Possession). 

9 Docket 19-8 (Motion).

10 See Docket 19 at 12.

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 3 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 4 of 11

Ms. Ellison makes a number of statements, including the following two rather conclusory 

claims:

First Counterclaims – Unfitness of Premises (A.S. 34.03.100)

As her first counterclaim, Defendant states as follows:

21) At the inception of, or during the course of, the lease, Defendant 

requested that Plaintiff remedy the defects in the premises specifically 

enumerated and attached hereto as Exhibit C.11

22) On or about December 9, 2009, the Central Mat-Su Fire Department 

notified Plaintiff of specific fire hazards on or about the premises and 

ordered Plaintiff to correct such violations, and a copy of that order is 

attached hereto as Exhibit D.12

23) Plaintiff failed to make required repairs and put and keep the premises 

in a fit and habitable condition.

24) Plaintiff failed to maintain in good and safe working condition all 

electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, 

kitchen, and other facilities and appliances supplied or required to be 

supplied by a landlord.

25) Having been requested by Defendant, Plaintiff failed to provide and/or 

maintain locks and furnish keys reasonably adequate to ensure the 

safety of the defendant, her family, and her property.

26) Plaintiff failed to provide smoke detection devices and carbon monoxide 

detection devices as required by applicable law.

***

Third Counterclaim – Retaliatory Eviction (A.S. 34.03.310(b))

As her third counterclaim, Defendant states as follows:

 11 Exhibit C is a hand-written note titled “Things We’ve Asked To Be Fixed.” See Docket 28-5 at 

4.

12 Exhibit D is a December 2, 2009 report by the Mat-Su Fire Department documenting 

problems with the apartment’s carbon monoxide and smoke detectors. See Docket 28-6. But 

this is not evidence of a wrongful or retaliatory eviction because the termination of tenancy letter 

predated it by nearly a month.

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 4 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 5 of 11

31) Defendant re-alleges and incorporates as if fully rewritten here the 

allegations contained in Paragraphs 21-26.

32) Subsequent to, and on account of, Defendant’s complaints about the 

defects in the premises, Plaintiff retaliated against Defendant by 

increasing rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to 

bring an action for possession of the premises.

33) Defendant was unlawfully removed or excluded from the premises on 

or about January 25, 2010.

13

In August 2011, before Ms. Ellison’s counterclaims in the eviction action had been 

heard by the state court, Ms. Hawthorne filed for bankruptcy—listing Ellison/Breuer as 

creditors—which stayed the state court proceedings. 

On November 4, 2011, Ms. Hawthorne motioned in the bankruptcy court to 

abandon out of her bankruptcy estate the apartment building where Ms. Ellison had lived. 

On November 21, 2011, Mr. Breuer filed the adversary complaint in the bankruptcy 

court on behalf of himself and Ms. Ellison that initiated this case. That complaint is not 

verified. It repeated many of the conclusory statements from the state court 

counterclaims and added a claim for “Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment / Wrongful 

Eviction.” That claim asserted that the “[d]ebtor’s actions in evicting Plaintiff were in 

violation of the lease and applicable state law.”14 Ellison/Breuer also added Count 8 

(“Debtor has done willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff and/or her property such that 

Plaintiff’s claims are non-dischargeable”) and Count 9 (“Plaintiff Breuer’s claims for 

attorney fees already incurred in Case No. 3PA-09-2590CI is derived from Plaintiff’s 

 13 Docket 28-4 and 28-5 (Verified Answer). January 21, 2010 is the date that the state court 

judgment of possession awarded possession of the premises to Ms. Hawthorne.

14 In re Hawthorne, No. A11-00659-DMD, Docket 27.

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 5 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 6 of 11

claims against Debtor and, likewise, are non-dischargeable”). As pled, if Counts 8 and 9 

are dismissed in their entirety, then all of Ellison/Breuer’s claims against Ms. Hawthorne 

are dischargeable. 

On December 9, 2011—almost a year before this Court’s dismissal of this

adversary action, and over Ellison and Breuer’s opposition—the bankruptcy court granted 

Ms. Hawthorne’s motion to abandon the apartment building and removed the apartment

building out of Ms. Hawthorne’s bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled that “[t]he 

real property has no value for, and is a burden to, the bankruptcy estate.”15 Ellison/Breuer 

did not appeal the abandonment decision.16 

On January 3, 2012, Hawthorne received a final bankruptcy decree without any 

distribution to creditors.

17 Three days later the Johnsons took title to the apartment 

building by a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure.

18 Accordingly, there is no property that ever 

was, or could now be distributed from, Ms. Hawthorne’s bankruptcy estate, a point this 

Court could well have better articulated in the prior rulings it has made in this case.

On May 31, 2012, this Court granted Ellison/Breuer’s motion to withdraw the 

reference to the bankruptcy court, and this adversary action was moved to this Court.

19

The Court dismissed this action on the merits on October 16, 2012. The Court 

 15 See Docket 110-2 (Opp. to Abandonment); In re Hawthorne, No. A11-00659-DMD, Docket 34 

(Abandonment Order) (Bankr. D. Alaska Dec. 9, 2011).

16 Docket 110 (Opp.) at 2–3.

17 In re Hawthorne, No. A11-00659-DMD, Docket 37 (Bankr. D. Alaska Jan. 3, 2012).

18 Docket 110-1 (Deed in Lieu) at 11.

19 Docket 4 (Order).

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 6 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 7 of 11

dismissed Ellison’s Count 1 (Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment / Wrongful Eviction) 

and Count 5 (Retaliatory Eviction) as precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It 

granted summary judgment in favor of Hawthorne on Count 2 (Breach of Covenant of 

Good Faith). The Court found insufficient evidence of willful or maliciousness to allow for 

non-dischargeability of any recovery under Counts 3 (Unfitness of Premises) and 6

(Breach of Separate Reimbursement Contract). On Count 4 (Unfair and Deceptive Trade 

Practices), the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Hawthorne because the 

statute on which Ellison based the claim does not apply to residential landlord-tenant 

leases. The Court found no evidence of willful or malicious injury to Ellison, and 

accordingly granted Hawthorne summary judgment on Counts 8 and 9 (NonDischargeability). Having dismissed or granted summary judgment on Counts 1 through 

6, the Court granted summary judgment to Hawthorne on Count 7 (Attorney Fees). And 

the Court granted summary judgment to Hawthorne on Counts 10–12 (Equitable Liens),

finding them inapplicable (1) in light of the other rulings, and (2) when a former tenant 

seeks to recover against the landlord with regard to alleged conduct during the term of 

the rental agreement.20

Ellison/Breuer appealed, and on November 26, 2013 the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.21 The 

Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s rulings on Counts 2, 4, 8 and 9, adding (with regard 

to Counts 8 and 9) that “[v]iewed in the light most favorable to Ellison, there is no genuine 

 20 Docket 56, 57 (Transcripts).

21 See generally Docket 64 (Court of Appeals Memorandum).

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 7 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 8 of 11

issue of material fact relevant to Hawthorne’s willfulness and malicious intent with respect 

to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6.”22 Consistent with its order affirming this Court’s rulings on 

Counts 8 and 9, the last paragraph of the Court of Appeals’ decision does not identify

Counts 8 and 9 as reversed or remanded, either in whole or in part.

The Court of Appeals did not directly address Hawthorne’s willfulness or malicious 

intent with respect to Counts 1 and 5. But the Court does not find the Court of Appeals 

silence in this regard as inconsistent with its affirmation of this Court’s rulings on Counts 

8 and 9, which found all the Ellison/Breuer claims dischargeable. In its previous ruling on 

Counts 8 and 9, this Court considered the sparse evidence in the record regarding Ms. 

Hawthorne’s conduct as relevant to all of Ellison/Breuer’s claims.23 The only evidence 

Ellison/Breuer submitted on willfulness and maliciousness was Ms. Ellison’s verified 

answer in the state court eviction proceeding.24 This Court ruled that Ellison/Breuer did 

not raise the requisite showing of willful and malicious injury to create a triable issue of 

fact.25 The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling. Accordingly, the Ellison/Breuer claims 

against Hawthorne are all dischargeable; and recourse is limited to the bankruptcy estate, 

which was closed with no distribution to creditors nearly 4 years ago.

While upholding the dischargeability ruling on Counts 8 and 9, the Court of Appeals 

reversed this Court’s grant of summary judgment to Hawthorne on Counts 3 and 6, based 

on an assumption that Ellison/Breuer could obtain a pro-rata share of the property of the 

 22 Docket 64 at 3.

23 Docket 57 at 6–10.

24 Docket 28-4 and 28-5 (Answer).

25 Docket 57 (Transcript) at 10.

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 8 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 9 of 11

bankruptcy estate if they were to prevail on these claims.26 But this Court failed to clearly 

articulate that because Ms. Hawthorne received a discharge with no distribution to 

creditors, there can be no pro-rata share available to Ellison/Breuer. Hence this Court 

focused on Ms. Ellison’s lack of a willful and malicious injury—not as an element of Counts 

3 or 6—but as a finding that rendered those claims moot because they would be 

discharged and there would be no assets to satisfy any recovery.

The Court of Appeals’ memorandum disposition concludes, “[b]ecause we reverse 

in part the district court’s decision on the merits, we reverse and remand its grant of 

summary judgment with respect to Count 7 (seeking attorneys’ fees) and Counts 10, 11, 

and 12 (seeking equitable liens).”27 Notably, the mandate to this Court does not direct 

any action on Counts 8 and 9, but rather upheld this Court’s order granting summary 

judgment to Ms. Hawthorne on those two claims in their entirety.

In summary, the Court of Appeals ruled that this Court dismissed Counts 1 and 5

and granted summary judgment on Counts 3 and 6 on improper grounds; and that if

Ellison/Breuer happen to succeed on any of those claims, the Court could award fees 

(Count 7) or establish an equitable lien (Counts 10–12). But every Ellison/Breuer claim 

is dischargeable, as the Court of Appeals found; and there are no assets in the bankruptcy 

estate to satisfy any judgment.

It appears this case has continued on for so long solely due to the persistence of 

Attorney Louis Breuer. He named himself as a plaintiff in the adversary action because 

 26 Docket 64 at 4–5.

27 Docket 64 at 5.

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 9 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 10 of 11

he “was scheduled as a creditor of the debtor in this [Hawthorne’s] bankruptcy 

proceeding” by virtue of a “contingent, unliquidated, and disputed” claim for attorneys’

fees he has hoped to recover if he eventually prevails on one of Ms. Ellison’s claims and 

obtains a fee award.28 Because the case could not continue without a defendant after 

Ms. Hawthorne died, Mr. Breuer applied for and received an appointment from the state 

probate court as Ms. Hawthorne’s personal representative.29 So Mr. Breuer now seeks 

to appear for the defendant while also advocating for himself as a self-represented 

plaintiff, and as the attorney for Ms. Ellison.30 And he would like to join new defendants 

who have nothing to do with the underlying 2009 landlord-tenant dispute. Given that the 

Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal of Counts 8 and 9, none of these actions are 

appropriate, as there is no basis for this litigation to continue.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), a discharge “operates as an injunction against the 

commencement or continuation of an action...to collect, recover or offset any such 

[discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor.”31 This is frequently referred to as 

the “discharge injunction.”32 In the Bankruptcy Code, the term “debt” means liability on a 

claim.33 A “claim” includes: 

 28 Docket 26 (Amended Complaint).

29 See Docket 100 (Probate Court Documents) and 101 (Memorandum).

30 Docket 102 (Motion).

31 See also In re Zilog, Inc., 450 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006).

32 See generally Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002).

33 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 10 of 11
Case No. 3:12-cv-00072-SLG, Ellison v. Hawthorne

Order of Dismissal

Page 11 of 11

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 

liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 

disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or

(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 

gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an 

equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, 

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.34

The bankruptcy court ordered Ms. Hawthorne’s debts discharged on December 

21, 2011.35 In its April 4, 2012 Report and Recommendation regarding the withdrawal of 

the reference, the bankruptcy court explained that “[t]he plaintiffs’ state law counts cannot 

survive Hawthorne’s bankruptcy discharge, unless and except to the extent that any of 

those counts are found to be for ‘willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity 

or to the property of another entity.’”36 In dismissing Counts 8 and 9, this Court ruled, and 

the Court of Appeals affirmed, that all of the Ellison/Breuer’s claims are dischargeable. 

Accordingly, none survive, all are barred by the discharge injunction, and the action will 

be dismissed. 

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Motions at Docket 102 and 104 are DENIED as moot.

2. This action is DISMISSED. 

DATED this 26th day of October, 2015 at Anchorage, Alaska.

 /s/ Sharon L. Gleason

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 34 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

35 In re Hawthorne, No. A11-00659-DMD, Docket 35 (Bankr. D. Alaska Dec. 21, 2011).

36 In re Hawthorne, No. A11-00659-DMD, 2012 WL 1143656, at *5 (Bankr. D. Alaska Apr. 4, 

2012). Ellison/Breuer recognize this at least with respect to the equitable lien claims, all of which 

are pled in the Amended Complaint as applicable “[t]o the extent Plaintiff’s claims herein are held 

non-dischargeable.”

Case 3:12-cv-00072-SLG Document 115 Filed 10/26/15 Page 11 of 11