Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00243/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE ROE,

 Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-0243-W-(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART

AND DENYING-IN-PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE

DEFENSES [DOC. 30]

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative defenses from

the answer filed on behalf of Defendants Police Chief William Lansdowne, former

police officer Kevin Friedman (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), and the City

of San Diego. Defendants oppose. 

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See CIV. L. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiff’s motion to strike [Doc. 30].

I. BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2012, Plaintiff Jane Roe initiated this action against Police Chief

William Lansdowne, former Police Officers Anthony Arevalos and Kevin Friedman,

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and the City of San Diego. Plaintiff asserts three causes of action under Title 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983: (1) violation of civil rights; (2) unlawful custom and practice; and (3) violation

of civil rights due to city-wide policy. (See First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) [Doc. 8].) 

According to the FAC, Officer Arevelos sexually assaulted Plaintiff while he was

on duty. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Arevalos had a history of acting

inappropriately towards women while on duty, and thatChief Lansdowne andArevelos’

supervisor, Officer Friedman, were aware of the misconduct but did nothing to stop it. 

(Id., ¶¶ 14, 16.) Plaintiff further alleges that the San Diego Police Department, under

the City’s authority, routinely fails to discipline abusive and dishonest police officers. 

(Id., ¶ 29–30.) 

On July 27, 2012, the City, Chief Lansdowne and Officer Friedman answered the

FAC and asserted twenty-six affirmative defenses. (See Answer, [Doc. 27].) Plaintiff

now seeks to strike all of the affirmative defenses or, in the alternative, to require these

Defendants to re-plead any insufficiently pled affirmative defenses under the standard

set forth in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 1937 (2009). In opposition, Defendants agree to strike seven of their

affirmative defenses, but argue that the Twombly / Iqbal standard should not be applied

to affirmative defenses. (Opp. [Doc. 36], pp. 2, 4.) 1

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Id. “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697

F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, 12(f) motions are “generally regarded with

 Defendants agreed to strike affirmative defenses one, eight, sixteen, twenty, twenty- 1

three, twenty-four, and twenty-five. (Opp’n, p. 4:23 – 24.)

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disfavor because of the limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because

they are often used as a delaying tactic.” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.

Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Unless it would prejudice the opposing party,

courts freely grant leave to amend stricken pleadings. Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607

F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

An affirmative defense may be insufficient as a matter of pleading or as a matter

of law. Sec. People, Inc. v. Classic Woodworking, LLC, 2005 WL 645592, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. 2005). “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense

is whether it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshack, 607 F.2d at 827

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957)) (emphasis added); Simmons v.

Navajo, 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010); Schutte & Koerting, Inc. v. Swett &

Crawford, 298 Fed. Appx. 613, 615 (9th Cir. 2008). Fair notice generally requires that

the defendant state the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense. See Conley,

355 U.S. at 47. The defendant must articulate the affirmative defense clearly enough

that the plaintiff is “not a victim of unfair surprise.” Bd. of Trustees of San Diego Elec.

Pension Trust v. Bigley Elec., Inc., 2007 WL 2070355, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2007)

(citing Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir.1999). It does not, however,

require a detailed statement of facts. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47– 48. Furthermore, an

affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it clearly lacks merit “under any set of

facts the defendant might allege.” McArdle v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 657 F. Supp.

1140, 1149–50 (N.D. Cal. 2009).

In addition to these rules, Plaintiff urges the Court to evaluate Defendants’

affirmative defenses under the Twombly / Iqbal standard. Defendants oppose this

argument. District courts are split over this issue. 

2

District courts applying the Twombly / Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses include: 2

Dion v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace LLP, 2012 WL 160221, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012);

Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1171–73

(N.D. Cal. 2010); Wine Group, L.L.C. v. L And R Wine Co., 2011WL 130236 (E.D. Cal. Jan.

14, 2011); Vargas v. HWC Gen. Maint., LLC, 2012 WL 948892 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2012). 

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As an initial matter, this Court has twice evaluated this issue and refused to

extend the more stringent standard to affirmative defenses for several reasons. Most 3

significantly, the Ninth Circuit has continued to recognize the “fair notice” standard of

affirmative defense pleading even after Twombly and Iqbal. See Simmons, 609 F.3d at

1023; Schutte & Koerting, 298 Fed. Appx. at 615. This strongly suggests that the

Ninth Circuit does not believe the more stringent Twombly / Iqbal standard should be

applied to affirmative defenses.

Additionally, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Twombly and Iqbal is limited to

pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See 129 U.S. at 1950; 550

U.S. at 555. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the party stating a claim for relief provide “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In contrast, Rule 8(c) – applicable to

affirmative defenses – only requires a responding party to “affirmatively state” its

defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Iqbal suggests that the 

distinction in language between Rule 8(a)(2) and 8(c) is important. See 129 S. Ct. at

1950. Factual plausibility—which is the key difference between Twombly /

Iqbal pleading and “fair notice” pleading—is particularly suited to claim pleading

because Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the party “show[ ]” that it is entitled to relief. Id. 

(“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than mere

District Courts refusing to apply Twombly / Iqbal, and instead applying the “fair notice” 

standard, include: J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, 2011 WL 2132723, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2011);

Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 2011 WL 6934557, at *1–2 (D. Del. Dec.

30, 2011); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Estradda, 2011 WL 2413257, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011);

Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, LLC, 2010 WL 865380, at *2 (D. Colo. 2010);

Bartronics, Inc. v. Power-One, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 532, 537 n.5 (S.D. Ala. 2007). 

This Court has already declined to extend the Twombly/Iqbal standard on two 3

previous occasions. See Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Kohler

v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 2013 WL 544058 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013).

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possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Stating an

affirmative defense under Rule 8(c), however, does not require the pleader to “show”

entitlement to its defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Applying the same pleading 4

standard to claims and affirmative defenses, despite this clear distinction in the rules’

language, would run counter to the Supreme Court’s warning in Twombly that

legislative action, not “judicial interpretation,” is necessary to “broaden the scope” of

specific federal pleading standards. See 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14.

Finally, the Court is also persuaded by the District of Colorado’s recognized

distinction between the time plaintiff has to compose a complaint versus the time a

defendant has to answer it. See Holdbrook, 2010 WL 865380, at *2. As the court

explained, “it is reasonable to impose stricter pleading requirements on a plaintiff who

has significantly more time to develop factual support for his claims than a defendant

who is only given [21] days to respond to a complaint and assert its affirmative

defenses.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).

For these reasons, the Court willreviewthe sufficiency of Defendants’ affirmative

defenses under the “fair notice” pleading standard.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Second, Sixth, and Twenty-Second Affirmative Defenses - Good Faith,

Exercise of Discretion, & Qualified Immunity

Defendants’ second, sixth, and twenty-second affirmative defenses all relate to

qualified immunity and the relationship between a public entity and its employees. The

second affirmative defense alleges that the City and its agents, officers, and employees

acted “in good faith and with a reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful and

Nor does pleading non-affirmative defenses under Rule 8(b)(1) require any type of 4

“showing.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). Rule 8(b)(1) only requires the responding party to

“state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” Id. 

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necessary[;]” the sixth affirmative defense statesthatthe City and its agents, employees,

and police officers “are not liable forinjuries resulting from acts or omissions which were

an exercise of discretion in the absence of a statute declaring such liability[;]” and the

twenty-second affirmative defense asserts qualified immunity. (See Answer, pp. 4–5, 8.) 

Plaintiff argues that none of these affirmative defenses provide fair notice. The Court

disagrees with respect to the Individual Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated her civil rights. These

affirmative defenses put her on notice that the Individual Defendants will argue that

their alleged wrongful conduct – as outlined in the FAC – constituted an exercise of

discretion, was carried out in good faith, and/or under the protection of qualified

immunity. Indeed, ample case law describes the scope of these defenses, and at this

point in the litigation, the Individual Defendants need not elaborate further. 

Furthermore, the Court looks with disfavor on 12(f) motions to strike and will not grant

such motions “if the insufficiency of the defense is not readily apparent.” J & J Sports

Productions, Inc. v. Romero, 2012 WL 2317566, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2012). For

these reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to strike affirmative defenses two, six,

and twenty-two with respect to the Individual Defendants.

As for the City, though many government officials hold qualified immunity,

municipalities are not immune from liability for “good faith constitutional violations.” 

Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980). Similarly, a

“municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to

liability under § 1983,” because “municipalities have no immunity from damages

liability flowing from their constitutional violations.” Owen, 445 U.S. at 638, 657. 

Thus, although the Individual Defendants may assert qualified immunity, the City

cannot. Id.; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Arnold v. Cnty. of El Dorado, 2011 WL 902204

at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL

4344178 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) (“[G]iven the case law that municipal entities

qualify for neither absolute or qualified immunity, plaintiff is free to pursue the entity

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despite a finding of immunity for individuals, if she has otherwise pled a municipal

liability § 1983 claim.”) (citing Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir.1988)). 

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the second,

sixth, and twenty-second affirmative defenses with respect to the City.

B. Third and Fourth Affirmative Defenses - City Not Liable for

Employee’s Actions if No Statute or if Employee is Immune

Defendants’ third affirmative defense asserts that the City is immune from

liability stemming from the acts or omissions of a public employee when there is no

statute declaring such liability. (Answer, p. 4.) Similarly, the fourth affirmative defense

asserts that the City is not liable for its employee’s actions or omissions if the employee

is immune from liability. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that neither of these defenses provide fair

notice. The Court disagrees. 

Similar to the previously discussed affirmative defenses, the third and fourth

affirmative defenses put Plaintiff on notice that the City will argue that its liability is

essentially contingent on Plaintiff’s ability to prove the other defendants’ conduct was

unlawful. In short, these affirmative defenses are self explanatory, with the rules for

municipal liability under § 1983 well-developed in case law. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S.

658; Owen, 445 U.S. 622. Plaintiff will not be “the victim of unfair surprise” when the 

City asserts these affirmative defenses. See Bd. of Trustees of San Diego Elec. Pension

Trust v. Bigley Elec., Inc., 2007 WL 2070355, at *2. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the third and fourth affirmative defenses. 

C. Fifth Affirmative Defense - Not Liable for Punitive Damages

In the fifth affirmative defense, Defendants argue that the City and its agents and

employees are not liable for punitive damages. (Answer, p. 5.) Defendants’ denial of

punitive damages is not an affirmative defense, but rather is an assertion that Plaintiff

has not proved essential elements of her claim. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d

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1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met

its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”); Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., 2012

WL 1019824, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). Defendants already denied Plaintiff’s

allegations. (See Answer, ¶13.) This defense is redundant and unnecessary. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(f). Accordingly, the Court STRIKES WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND Defendants’ fifth affirmative defense. 

D. Seventh Affirmative Defense - Not Liable for Injuries from Judicial or

Administrative Proceedings

The seventh affirmative defense asserts that the City and its agents, employees,

and police officers “are not liable while acting within the scope of their duties for

injuries resulting from judicial or administrative proceedings.” (Answer, p. 5.) Plaintiff

argues that this defense is irrelevant because none of her alleged injuries stem from such

proceedings. Defendants respond that Plaintiff was prosecuted for driving under the

influence of alcohol and that Defendants are not liable for any attorney’s fees Plaintiff

incurred as a result of her arrest. (Opp., p. 9:15 – 21.) In other words, Defendants

interpret paragraphs twenty and twenty-four of Plaintiff’s FAC as seeking attorney’sfees

from defending her DUI prosecution. (Id., pp. 9:21, 26 – 28.) 

Upon reviewing the FAC, the Court finds that the FAC’s language does not

exclude the possibility that Plaintiff is seeking to recover damages from a DUI

conviction. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to assert this defense. The Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike the seventh affirmative defense. 

E. Ninth Affirmative Defense - Wrongful Acts Not Under Color of Law

The ninth affirmative defense asserts that the City and its agents, employees, and

police officers are not liable for violating Plaintiff’s civil rights because “the alleged

wrongful acts were not under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or

usage of the City of San Diego.” (Answer, p. 5.) Plaintiff contends that this statement 

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is not fair notice because Defendants did not supply any supporting facts. Defendants

respond that Plaintiff has not yet supplied “an inclusive list of all of the alleged acts that

constitute the alleged violation(s) of Plaintiff’s rights,” so Defendants assert this defense

against any possible allegation that Officer Arevelos acted under color of law during the

alleged sexual assault. Defendant argues that this affirmative defense goes to the first

element of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim–that defendants acted under color of law. (Id.) The

Court agrees with Defendants. 

This defense directly relates to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and the unanswered legal

and factual questions surrounding those claims. Defendants have given Plaintiff fair

notice that they plan to challenge any allegations suggesting that any of the defendants

acted wrongfully under color of law. Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion to

strike Defendants’ ninth affirmative defense.

F. Tenth Affirmative Defense - Necessary Force

The tenth affirmative defense states that “[a]t the time of the contact the

Defendant police officer attempted to persuade the Plaintiff to follow directions and in

doing so, only used force necessary for the occasion.” (Answer, p. 5.) Plaintiff contends

that she did not receive fair notice because Defendants failed to plead facts about the

alleged use of persuasion. 

The fair notice standard does not require defendants to provide a detailed

statement of facts. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48. Plaintiff argues in her motion that

defendants did notstate facts to support this defense, but this affirmative defense relates

to allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that former Officers

Arevalos and Friedman used “excessive and unreasonable force” against her during the

arrest. (FAC, ¶19.) Plaintiff’s complaint also states facts encompassing more than the

alleged sexual assault, including a “forced blood draw” at the police station. (Id., ¶10.) 

For these reasons, Plaintiff is on notice that Defendants will argue that they used only

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necessary force when arresting her and taking the blood draw. Consequently, the

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ tenth affirmative defense. 

G. Eleventh Affirmative Defense - Plaintiff’s Negligence

The eleventh affirmative defense states that Plaintiff’s negligence and

carelessness “proximately contributed to the happening of the alleged incident, injuries

and damages complained of, if any such exist.” (Answer, p. 5.) Plaintiff argues that this

affirmative defense does not provide fair notice as to which of her acts demonstrate

contributory negligence. 

Defendants respond that this defense goes to any failures on Plaintiff’s part to

mitigate her damages. However, negligence and failure to mitigate are two separate

legal doctrines. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts cmt. a (1965) § 918

(“[C]ontributory negligence either precludes recovery or is no defense at all to a claim

for compensatory damages. On the other hand, [the doctrine of avoidable

consequences] applies only to the diminution of damages and not to the existence of

a cause of action.”) Defendants’ affirmative defense does not give Plaintiff fair notice

because it fails to advise her whether Defendants will argue that she was negligent

before or afterthe alleged incident with Arevelos. Additionally, this affirmative defense

fails to give Plaintiff any indication regarding the conduct supporting the defense.

Consequently, the Court STRIKES Defendants’ eleventh affirmative defense WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

H. Twelfth and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses - Performing Duties

Required By Law & Reasonable Cause for Actions

Defendants argue in their twelfth and thirteenth affirmative defenses that the

City and its agents, employees, and police officers were “performing duties required by

law under conditions required by law” and “had reasonable cause” for their actions at

all relevant times. (Answer, p. 6.) Plaintiff argues that neither defense gives her fair

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notice. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that these simple identifications of Defendants’

defenses are insufficient to provide fair notice. 

Although Defendants’ pleading need not be supported by detailed factual

allegations, it must at least give notice of “the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley,

355 U.S. at 47. Therefore, the Court STRIKES Defendants’ twelfth and thirteenth

affirmative defenses WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

I. Fourteenth Affirmative Defense - Probable Cause

In the fourteenth affirmative defense, Defendants argue that“[a]tthe time of the

initial contact ... [and] [d]uring the contact, Defendant Police officers were acting

within the scope of their employment and had probable cause to believe that said

Plaintiff had committed a crime.” (Answer, p. 6.) Plaintiff argues this defense fails to

give her fair notice. Defendants respond that they will suffer prejudice without this

defense, because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived her of her rights against

unreasonable searches and seizures. 

The Court finds Plaintiff has fair notice. This defense specifically refers to the

Defendant officers’ contact with Plaintiff, which according to her complaint is one

discrete instance with two officers. (FAC, ¶¶ 8–12.) At this stage of the pleadings,

Defendants need not allege further facts. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

motion to strike Defendants’ fourteenth affirmative defense.

J. Fifteenth Affirmative Defense - Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants argue in their fifteenth affirmative defense that this Court lacks

jurisdiction over “certain claims.” (Answer, p. 6.) Plaintiff contends this defense does

not provide her with fair notice. In their opposition, Defendants admit that they are

proffering this affirmative defense in case “Plaintiff is claiming damages for battery or

any other state law claim.” (Reply, p. 14:18–20.) However, Plaintiff clearly brings her

three Federal law claims under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See FAC , ¶¶18, 28, and 33.) 

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Defendants’ attempt to preemptively assert this affirmative defense is

inappropriate. If Plaintiff later bringsstate law claims, Defendants may assert additional

affirmative defenses by amending their pleadings in compliance with Rule 15. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15; U.S. v. Global Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2008 WL 5264986 at *5 (C.D. Cal.

May 15, 2008) (“[I]f a Defendant seeks to add affirmative defenses, it must complywith

the procedure set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.”). Consequently, the

Court STRIKES Defendants’ fifteenth affirmative defenseWITHOUT PREJUDICE.

K. Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Affirmative Defenses - No

Liability as a Result of Exercising Discretion, While Exercising Due

Care, or for Acts or Omissions of Another Person

In the seventeenth affirmative defense,Defendants contend that any of Plaintiff’s

damages were the result of “the exercise of the discretion vested in the public

entity/defendants” and the California Government Code precludes liability for all of

these individuals. (Answer, p. 6.) Defendants cite two California statutes to support

their defense. (See Id.) Similarly, in their eighteenth affirmative defense, Defendants

cite two California statutes, arguing that public employees are not liable for actions they

take while enforcing the law and using due care. (Id., p. 7.) And for the nineteenth

affirmative defense, Defendants cite to one California statute and argue that public

employees are not liable for third-party actions. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that these defense are too ambiguous and do not give her fair

notice. However, Defendants cited the specific statutes upon which they will rely to

establish these defenses. Defendants need not provide more specificity at this stage of

the pleadings. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48. Consequently, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth

affirmative defenses. 

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L. Twenty-First Affirmative Defense - Statute of Limitations

Defendants’ twenty-first affirmative defense asserts that Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Answer, p. 7.) Under this same defense,

Defendants seem to argue that the applicable statute of limitations is California

Government Code § 901. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this defense does not provide her

with fair notice because she complied with California’s two-year statute of limitations

for personal injury claims, even though she never pled such claims. Defendants respond 

that Plaintiff could bring up new claims during discovery and “this affirmative defense

goes to any and all claims not yet identified.” (Opp., p. 19:2–5.) 

As previously discussed with respect to the fifteenth affirmative defense,

Defendants’ preemptive assertion of affirmative defenses is inappropriate. If Plaintiff

adds state law claims to this case, Defendants will have an opportunity to assert

additional affirmative defenses. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Defendants’ twentyfirst affirmative defense WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

M. Twenty-sixth Affirmative Defense - Joinder of Co-Defendants’

Affirmative Defenses

In their twenty-sixth affirmative defense, Defendants seem to desire to

incorporate their co-defendants’ affirmative defenses into Defendants’ answer. 

Defendants cite no authority for this practice. Plaintiff argues that this affirmative

defense is unintelligible. The Court agrees. 

Defendants’ preemptive assertion of affirmative defenses is inappropriate. If any

co-defendants should raise useful affirmative defenses to issues that arise later,

Defendants may seek to assert additional affirmative defenses by moving to amend their

pleadings in compliance with Rule 15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Accordingly, the Court

STRIKES Defendants’ twenty-sixth affirmative defense WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Forthe previously stated reasons, the CourtGRANTS-IN-PART and DENIESIN-PART Plaintiff’s motion to strike [Doc. 30] and ORDERS as follows: 

1. The Court STRIKES WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND affirmative

defenses two, six, and twenty-two with respect to Defendant City.

2. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative defenses two,

six, and twenty-two with respect to the Individual Defendants.

3. The Court STRIKES WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND affirmative

defenses five and twenty-six. 

4. The Court STRIKES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND affirmative defenses

eleven, twelve, and thirteen.

5. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative defenses three,

four, seven, nine, ten, fourteen, seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen.

6. The Court STRIKES WITHOUT PREJUDICE affirmative defenses

fifteen and twenty-one.

Defendants’ first amended answer, if any, is due on or before March 26, 2013.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 5, 2013

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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