Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-05124/USCOURTS-caDC-22-05124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 7, 2024 Decided August 9, 2024

No. 22-5124

GHULAM ALI,

APPELLANT

v.

MICHAEL REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-01899)

Daniel S. Volchok, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on 

the briefs was Amy Lishinski and Allison Schultz, appointed by 

the court.

Ghulam Ali, pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.

Rosa M. Koppel and Carolyn Wheeler were on the brief 

for amicus curiae the Disability Rights, Education, and 

Defense Fund, et al. in support of appellant.

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 1 of 43
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Johnny H. Walker, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. On the brief were Brian P. Hudak, Jane M. 

Lyons, and Sean M. Tepe, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

Ghulam Ali has worked as a career Environmental 

Protection Agency (“EPA”) economist since 1997. EPA had 

long been aware that Ali suffered from severe allergies and had 

provided him a workspace that for years had accommodated 

his health needs. Yet in 2011, EPA placed a worker known for 

wearing heavy perfume in the cubicle right next to Ali. Ali 

complained about the consequences to his health and ability to 

work. After agreeing that Ali’s allergies were a disability that 

qualified for accommodation, EPA offered Ali a take-it-orleave-it accommodation of 100% telework. Ali rejected that 

accommodation, sought to engage the EPA in accommodation 

discussions, and, when those efforts failed, filed suit under the 

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791. 

Whether, under these circumstances, offering only 100% 

telework, with no in-office alternative, was a reasonable 

accommodation for Ali’s disability depends on the resolution 

of myriad factual disputes. But the district court did not allow 

Ali’s claim to reach a jury, instead concluding as a matter of 

law that Ali caused a breakdown in discussions with EPA and 

therefore bore sole responsibility for any failure to settle on an 

appropriate accommodation. 

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We reverse. We have previously held that an employee 

who renders an employer unable to provide an 

accommodation—say, by withholding relevant information 

that the employer requested—cannot complain that the 

employer denied a reasonable accommodation. See Ward v. 

McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31–32 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But Ali 

provided all the information that EPA requested. Ali also 

proposed accommodations, which EPA rejected or ignored. 

Then Ali, like EPA, rejected a proposed accommodation—one 

that would force him to leave the workplace permanently. The 

relevant question therefore is whether EPA’s final proffered 

accommodation was reasonable. As to that question, there is 

ample record evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to 

rule for either party, making the district court’s entry of 

summary judgment in favor of EPA improper.

I

The Rehabilitation Act aims to “maximize opportunities 

for individuals with disabilities” to participate in “competitive 

integrated employment” and to “ensure that the Federal 

Government plays a leadership role in promoting the 

employment of individuals with disabilities[.]” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 701(b)(2)–(3). The Act aimed to combat discrimination 

against the “millions of Americans [who] have one or more 

physical or mental disabilities[.]” Id. § 701(a). As amended, 

the law recognizes that “disability is a natural part of the human 

experience [that] in no way diminishes” individuals’ rights to 

“live independently[,]” “enjoy self-determination[,]” “make 

choices[,]” “contribute to society[,]” “pursue meaningful 

careers[,]” and “enjoy full inclusion and integration in the 

economic, political, social, cultural, and educational 

mainstream of American society[.]” Id. 

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The Rehabilitation Act’s “basic tenet is that the 

Government must take reasonable affirmative steps to 

accommodate the handicapped, except where undue hardship 

would result.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 28 (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2 

F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Those steps include

implementing workplace accommodations for federal 

employees, whom the Rehabilitation Act, since 1992, protects 

according to the same “standards applied under” the American 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. See

29 U.S.C. § 791(f); Ward, 762 F.3d at 28.1 

The ADA, for its part, prohibits most non-federal

employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application 

procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 

employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). A “qualified individual” is an individual “who, 

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 

essential functions of the employment position that such 

individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). One form of 

prohibited discrimination is to “not mak[e] reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations 

of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability[.]” Id.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A).

Federal employees may sue to enforce their rights under 

the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). To prevail, an 

employee must allege and prove that: (1) he is disabled, (2) his 

employer had notice of the disability, and (3) the employer

denied his request for a reasonable accommodation. Stewart v. 

St. Elizabeths Hosp., 589 F.3d 1305, 1307–1308 (D.C. Cir. 

1 Where relevant, this opinion accordingly cites ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act cases without distinction. 

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2010). The employee bears the “initial burden” of showing that 

a reasonable accommodation is possible. Carter v. Bennett, 

840 F.2d. 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Once that showing is made, 

an employer may still avoid liability by showing that the 

proposed accommodation would impose an “undue hardship” 

on the employer’s operations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(A), 

12112(b)(5)(A); see 29 U.S.C. § 791(f); Barth, 2 F.3d at 1189. 

An employer fully satisfies its statutory obligation by offering

an accommodation that is reasonable, even if it is not the one 

preferred by the employee. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 

F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Reasonable accommodations “include * * * making 

existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and 

usable by individuals with disabilities[.]” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12111(9). They also include “job restructuring, part-time or 

modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 

acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 

appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, 

training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers 

or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for 

individuals with disabilities.” Id.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 

regulations further specify that “reasonable accommodations” 

include “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work 

environment * * * that enable an individual with a disability 

who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that 

position,” as well as “[m]odifications or adjustments that 

enable * * * [an] employee with a disability to enjoy equal 

benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by [the 

employer’s] other similarly situated employees without 

disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)–(iii). 

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In practice, “[w]hether an accommodation is ‘reasonable’” 

is often a fact-intensive question “determined by a close 

examination of the particular circumstances.” Jankowski Lee 

& Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1996); see

Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 

385 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Whether or not something constitutes a 

reasonable accommodation is necessarily fact-specific * * * 

[and] must be [determined] on a case-by-case basis.”). That is 

because “[f]ew disabilities are amenable to one-size-fits-all 

accommodations.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 31.

Because an appropriate accommodation will often turn on

specific facts concerning the employee’s disability and the 

employer’s workplace, the employee and employer frequently 

need to share information to find a workable solution. Ward, 

762 F.3d at 31; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (Employers may 

need “to initiate an informal, interactive process with the 

individual * * * in need of the accommodation * * * [to] 

identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and 

potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome 

those limitations.”). We have described this “interactive 

process” as “‘a flexible give-and-take’ between employer and 

employee ‘so that together they can determine what 

accommodation would enable the employee to continue 

working.’” Ward, 762 F.3d at 32 (quoting EEOC v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005)); see 

Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1167 & n.4. (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (similar). 

EEOC guidance elaborates on the process of identifying a 

reasonable accommodation. In many cases, “the appropriate 

reasonable accommodation may be so obvious” that no “stepby-step” dialogue will be needed. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 

§ 1630.9. For instance, when “an employee who uses a 

wheelchair requests that his or her desk be placed on blocks to 

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elevate the desktop above the arms of the wheelchair and the 

employer complies, an appropriate accommodation has been 

requested, identified, and provided[.]’” Id.

In other cases, “neither the individual requesting the 

accommodation nor the employer can readily identify the 

appropriate accommodation” without dialogue. 29 C.F.R. pt. 

1630 app. § 1630.9. In such cases, the EEOC guidance advises 

that the employer “should”:

(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine 

its purpose and essential functions;

(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to

ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed 

by the individual’s disability and how those 

limitations could be overcome with a reasonable 

accommodation;

(3) In consultation with the individual to be 

accommodated, identify potential accommodations 

and assess the effectiveness each would have in 

enabling the individual to perform the essential 

functions of the position; and 

(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be 

accommodated and select and implement the 

accommodation that is most appropriate for both the 

employee and the employer.

Id. 

While freely sharing information will often facilitate 

finding an appropriate accommodation, the withholding of 

information by an employee or employer may stymie such 

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efforts. Yet “[n]either party should be able to cause a 

breakdown in the [interactive] process for the purpose of either 

avoiding or inflicting liability.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 32 (quoting 

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 805). So if an employee 

withholds requested information that is relevant to determining 

the existence of a disability or the appropriate accommodation 

for it, that employee may bear responsibility for the breakdown 

of the interactive process, which would foreclose a failure-toaccommodate claim. Id. at 32–33 (affirming grant of summary 

judgment to employer where employee did not respond to 

repeated requests for medical information, such that “no 

reasonable juror could have found that the [employer], rather 

than [the employee], was responsible for the breakdown”); 

Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1307–1308 (employee could not mount 

failure-to-accommodate claim where employee resigned 

without ever providing requested medical information needed 

to document disability). By the same token, “an employer who 

fails to engage in the interactive process runs a serious risk that 

it will erroneously overlook an opportunity to accommodate a 

statutorily disabled employee, and thereby violate the ADA.” 

Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) 

(en banc).

II

A

Ghulam Ali works as an economist in EPA’s Office of 

Science and Technology. He has long suffered from severe 

allergies that “may result in, among other things, bleeding, 

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itchy skin, rashes, face and arm swelling, as well as difficulty 

breathing, seeing, walking, and sleeping.” J.A. 258.2 

For about ten years, Ali worked in a private office at the 

EPA. Ali v. McCarthy, 179 F. Supp. 3d 54, 67 (D.D.C. 2016), 

aff’d, 727 F. App’x 692 (D.C. Cir 2018). But following an 

office reshuffling around 2007, Ali was temporarily allowed to 

work from home for a few months before being permanently 

moved to a cubicle. 

Ali sued, claiming, among other things, that EPA failed to 

accommodate his allergies. Ali, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 61–63.

Ali’s failure to provide requested medical information, 

however, showed that he “voluntarily abandoned the 

interactive process,” and doomed his reasonableaccommodation claim. Id. at 79–80. 

Ali then returned to work in the cubicle without further 

incident for over four years. But in 2011, EPA moved a coworker known for sporting particularly pungent cologne to the 

desk next to Ali. J.A. 6, 100. The cologne triggered Ali’s 

allergies and also made another colleague nauseous. J.A. 6, 

234.

On November 17, 2011, Ali emailed two supervisors 

about his allergic reactions and asked to be moved to a private 

office or a small conference room. Though Ali’s email did not 

mention the heavily cologned colleague, one of the supervisors 

emailed back in less than an hour to ask if the co-worker’s 

cologne was “the source” of the allergies, which Ali promptly 

confirmed. J.A. 235. Ali’s supervisor also offered the 

“immediate remedy” of relocating Ali to an “unoccupied cube” 

2

In recounting the facts, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Ali, as he is the party opposing summary judgment. 

Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1165. 

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in a different section, while she worked on a more “permanent 

solution.” J.A. 235. 

Ali responded that the new cubicle was also “very 

perfumy” and that other free cubicles were located near printers

that separately triggered his allergies or had “problems of one 

kind or another.” J.A. 236. He reiterated his request to “move 

to some sort of a room instead of a cubicle[,]” while also 

mentioning that “management” had told him that the heavily 

perfumed colleague would be moved if the cologne became an 

issue. J.A. 236. 

EPA did not respond to Ali’s email. Two months later, 

Ali formally requested an accommodation under the 

Rehabilitation Act based on his allergies, attaching multiple 

doctors’ letters documenting his disability. When his 

supervisor twice asked for more current medical information, 

undisputed evidence shows that Ali promptly supplied it. 

On June 21, 2012, EPA, in a letter signed by one of Ali’s 

supervisors, Denise Hawkins, “determined [Ali] to be a person 

with a disability” based on his allergies. J.A. 205; see J.A. 206 

(“Your exposure to various kinds of allergens that include not 

only environmental allergens but also volatile organic 

compounds and products like paint, petroleum derivatives, 

perfumes, any kind of fragrances or odors, and several other 

materials, can cause detrimental effects on your health and lead 

to chronic diseases like asthma, chronic dermatitis and severe 

effects on the immune system.”).

The same letter stated that “[a]t this time I would like to 

meet with you to explore and discuss what accommodation, if

any, may be effective[.]” J.A. 206. The letter advised that 

Hawkins, “[a]fter discussing th[e issue] with” Ali, would have 

“the authority to determine what reasonable accommodation, if 

any, will be offered.” J.A. 206 (emphasis added). Then, “[a]t 

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the appropriate time,” Hawkins would “submit an offer of 

reasonable accommodation” to Ali. J.A. 206.

Yet that same day—without meeting with Ali or engaging 

in any further discussion with anyone—Hawkins sent Ali a 

letter that “[a]pproved” Ali’s request for an accommodation. 

The only accommodation offered was: “Permission to work at 

home full time.” J.A. 208.3

Ali had not requested to work from home, nor spoken to 

anyone at EPA about potential telework. He later testified that 

EPA, at the time it made its offer, did not “know[] anything of 

what the situation is at my home.” J.A. 71, H’rg Tr. 49:9–10. 

Ali, after all, had successfully worked in the office for the four 

years prior to the heavily perfumed colleague’s arrival next to 

his cubicle. 

Ali responded by letter to EPA’s offer, stating that he had 

“thought about working from home” and that it was “not a good 

option.” J.A. 213. He reiterated his request for a private room 

and proposed locations where one might be available. After 

receiving no response, Ali followed up by email on July 5th

and July 11th to reiterate his request. There is no record of any 

response from EPA to those emails. 

In subsequent months, Ali also tried speaking directly with 

Hawkins about the situation. Hawkins testified that she offered

him support for working from home, such as by offering to 

supply him with a printer for home use, or allowing him to 

explore hybrid work options. Ali also told an Equal 

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor that he had 

3 While both the letter and approval form are dated June 21, 

2012, the record does not indicate whether they were delivered to Ali

simultaneously. 

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advised Hawkins that he could not work from home because 

printing at home exacerbated his symptoms. EPA Br. 28–29.

Ali tried moving among cubicles, including ones farther 

from the heavily perfumed employee, but continued suffering

symptoms. EPA also offered Ali an air filter, but Ali asserted

that air filters had not sufficed to trap his allergens in the past,

and so he continued to request a new office. 

Ali also tried a different tack: He directly asked his coworker to stop wearing cologne. But the co-worker refused. In 

addition, Ali sent follow-up emails in January 2013 identifying 

two purportedly empty rooms in a different division’s office 

area and asking to be moved to them. EPA did not respond. 

Finally, in March 2013, Ali sent an email complaining 

about a different colleague’s “scented products” and asking 

that the colleague be moved. J.A. 241. An EPA supervisor 

responded five days later that Ali “ha[d] been offered a 

reasonable accommodation of 100% telework and ha[d]

declined the offer.” J.A. 241. The supervisor offered to 

“reopen that discussion if [Ali] would like to reconsider” 

telework, but argued that moving the colleague would not help 

because all the cubicles “share[] the same common space and 

recirculated air.” J.A. 241. Ali responded that proximity to 

contamination mattered to his allergies and emphasized that he 

“would be glad to discuss or settle the issues.” J.A. 241. It 

does not appear that EPA responded to that offer for further 

discussion. Ali continued sending emails as late as June 2014 

reiterating his request for a contained room and identifying

spaces he thought were available. J.A. 242.

B

Ali filed a formal complaint with EPA’s Office of Civil 

Rights in September 2012 that alleged EPA denied him a 

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reasonable accommodation and asserted unlawful-retaliation, 

hostile-workplace, and other discrimination claims. At an

agency hearing, Ali testified that he rejected the offer of 100% 

remote work for several reasons. He said, first, that he “didn’t 

want to take a chance on that situation again” because the last 

time he had teleworked, “[l]awyers got involved.” J.A. 70–71, 

Hr’g Tr. 45:8–46:4. Ali added, secondly, that his house was 

“not suitable for working from home” permanently because he 

lacked an “office space set up.” J.A. 71, Hr’g Tr. 46:15–20. 

Third, he explained that he could “not print things” at home 

because he “get[s an] allergic reaction to emissions from 

printers[,]” and would have nowhere to go if that happened at 

home. J.A. 71, Hr’g Tr. 47:1–4. Finally, Ali explained that his 

job requires him to be “in touch with other people, talking to 

them, brainstorming and that sort of thing, and get[ting] some 

feedback from these people.” J.A. 71, Hr’g Tr. 47: 13–19. Yet 

if he is excluded from working in the office, he “won’t be able 

to go to the office” and “won’t be able to become a team 

leader[]” or “communicate with other people.” J.A. 71, Hr’g 

Tr. 47:6–9. 

Hawkins testified that Ali’s requested accommodation of 

a single office was impracticable because there were no vacant 

offices available in her division. See J.A. 104–105, Hr’g Tr. 

181:5–182:22. Hawkins also said that telework “would be 

more effective than a private office” because there was “no 

evidence that the air inside an office would be any different 

from air circulating around a cubicle.” J.A. 44. She 

commissioned an air-quality test that she said showed “no 

appreciable difference between the quality of the air in an 

office and in a cubicle.” J.A. 103, H’rg Tr. 176:10–19.4 

4 The report found that “carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, 

relative humidity and temperature readings” were all within 

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Hawkins also testified that “privacy issues” prevented her or 

other managers from asking that Ali’s perfumed colleague stop 

wearing his cologne. J.A. 102, Hr’g Tr. 172:15–173:5.

The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of EPA, and 

the EEOC upheld that decision on appeal. J.A. 25.

C

Ali then filed suit pro se, alleging that EPA failed to 

accommodate his disability and discriminated against him in 

several ways. The district court granted EPA summary 

judgment on all claims. As to Ali’s Rehabilitation Act claim, 

the district court concluded that Ali “failed to act in good faith 

during the interactive process” because he “rejected telework” 

without providing any explanation. J.A. 267–268.

Ali appealed, and EPA moved for summary affirmance. 

We summarily affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment with respect to all claims other than those under the 

Rehabilitation Act. Order 1–2, Mar. 15, 2023.

III

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review “grants of summary judgment de novo[.]” 

Waggel v. George Washington University, 957 F.3d 1364, 1371 

(D.C. Cir. 2020). We view all evidence “in the light most 

favorable to the” nonmoving party and draw all reasonable 

“acceptable ranges” both by the cubicle and in a private EPA office. 

J.A. 216–217. It also found that fungal levels were about twice as 

high in the cubicle area than the office, but that both levels were 

within generally acceptable ranges. J.A. 216–217. 

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inferences in that party’s favor. Id.; accord Talavera v. Shah, 

638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may 

be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

IV

The district court erred in dismissing this case on the 

ground that Ali had caused a breakdown in the interactive 

process. EPA never requested any information that Ali 

withheld, nor is there any evidence that Ali otherwise interfered 

with EPA’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligation to offer a 

reasonable accommodation or to engage in discussions with 

him about a proper accommodation. Instead, this case turns on 

the reasonableness of EPA’s proposed final accommodation, 

which it offered without first meeting with Ali to discuss 

accommodation options. On this record, answering those 

questions depends upon the resolution of disputed material 

facts that a jury must resolve. The district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to EPA accordingly was in error.

A

There is no dispute in this case that Ali is a qualified 

individual with a disability, or that Ali had been successfully 

working in a cubicle in the office for over four years before 

EPA moved the strongly scented employee next to him. As a 

result, the Rehabilitation Act required EPA to offer Ali a 

reasonable accommodation for his disability. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791(f); see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). So the only question 

in this case is whether, as a matter of law, EPA offered such an 

accommodation, or whether the reasonableness of the offered 

accommodation turns on the resolution of materially disputed

facts and circumstances, and so must be resolved by a jury. 

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Yet the district court’s decision centered around the 

interactive process between Ali and EPA and, in particular, 

found that Ali had caused it to break down. That framing, 

however, has confused a procedural means with the substantive 

accommodation ends mandated by the Rehabilitation Act. 

Nothing in the Rehabilitation Act requires that employers 

or employees follow a specific process for identifying a 

reasonable accommodation, interactive or otherwise. Rather, 

EEOC regulations and our prior cases recognize that some kind 

of back-and-forth between employer and employee “may be

necessary” to enable the employer “[t]o determine the 

appropriate reasonable accommodation[.]” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(o)(3) (emphasis added); see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–32. 

That is because “[f]ew disabilities are amenable to one-sizefits-all accommodations.” Ward, 762 F.3d at 31. And an 

employer will often need information about (i) the particular 

nature of an individual’s disability, (ii) the effect of the 

disability, the workplace’s design, or the employer’s practices 

on the employee’s ability to work productively, and (iii) the 

type of accommodation sought. That is information “typically 

possessed only by the individual or her physician.” Id. at 31. 

Employees, for their part, may need information about the 

employer’s resources, capabilities, and successful past 

accommodation processes for analogous disabilities, as well as

the impact of various accommodations on the proper 

functioning of the workplace. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 

§ 1630.9; Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th

Cir. 2000). 

“[I]nteractive process” is the label federal regulations and 

case law have given to this exchange of information, which 

often can facilitate the identification of an appropriate 

accommodation. Ward, 762 F.3d at 31; see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 

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app. § 1630.9. The interactive process, though, “is not an end 

in itself[.]” Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 347 

(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 

1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)). It is a means to the end of 

“determining what reasonable accommodations are available”

that will allow a qualified individual with a disability “to 

perform the essential job functions of the position sought.” Id.

(quoting Rehling, 207 F.3d at 1016); see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–

32 (explaining that the need for and extent of information 

sharing varies from case to case). 

Precisely because this process may be necessary to enable 

a reasonable accommodation, we have held that an employee 

that materially obstructs the informational exchange—for 

example, by withholding relevant medical information—

cannot prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim. Ward, 762 

F.3d at 31–35; Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1306–1307. That is 

because an employer that is still reasonably waiting for 

information relevant to the formulation of an appropriate 

accommodation cannot be blamed for “not making [a] 

reasonable accommodation[].” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A);

see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–35; Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1306–1307. 

For example, in Ali’s previous lawsuit, we affirmed dismissal 

of his failure-to-accommodate claim because, after EPA 

requested “medical documentation” that would substantiate 

Ali’s disability and allow EPA to evaluate accommodations,

“Ali never provided the additional documentation that the EPA 

requested despite follow-up communication from” EPA. 

Pruitt, 727 Fed. App’x at 695–696. Ali thereby “abandon[ed] 

the interactive process,” depriving EPA of information needed 

to offer an accommodation, and “never reengaged in [the 

informational exchange] before filing suit.” Id. at 696. 

In contrast, the record in this case does not establish that, 

as a matter of law, Ali frustrated the interactive process and 

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18

caused a breakdown in the employer-employee dialogue. And 

it certainly does not establish that Ali prevented EPA from 

offering a reasonable accommodation. 

To start, Ali provided all the information that EPA 

requested of him. See, e.g., J.A. 205 (noting that Ali provided 

additional medical information when “additional 

documentation was requested”). EPA nowhere argues that Ali 

withheld information needed to formulate an accommodation. 

Quite the opposite. EPA readily determined that Ali was a 

qualified individual with a disability and understood that a 

reasonable accommodation would have to address his 

workplace allergens. With all requested information in hand, 

EPA was able to formulate and to offer Ali what it evidently

considered to be a reasonable accommodation: “[p]ermission 

to work at home full time.” J.A. 208. 

Where Ali and EPA disagree is whether EPA’s proposed 

accommodation was reasonable. Ali’s suit therefore turns on 

who is right about that question—not on some antecedent 

process failure.

In holding otherwise, the district court faulted Ali for his 

supposed “unwillingness to explain his rejection of the 

telework offer[.]” J.A. 269. There are two problems with this

assignment of blame. First, whether Ali explained his rejection

is a disputed material fact. The EEO Counselor who 

investigated Ali’s complaint wrote that Ali did inform EPA that 

he could not work from home because printing at home, with 

the attendant exposure to printer chemical fumes, would 

exacerbate his symptoms. EPA Br. 28–29; but see J.A. 47 

(Hawkins’ statement that Ali “did not mention these reasons” 

to her). 

Second, EPA never asked Ali whether he had additional 

reasons for rejecting telework. In fact, the record does not 

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19

indicate that EPA spoke with Ali at all about an appropriate 

accommodation between the time it determined he qualified for

one and its proffer of the 100% telework accommodation. 

Instead, EPA presented its offer as an apparent fait accompli, 

without ever discussing with Ali the effectiveness or 

reasonableness of 100% telework for Ali’s work. EPA did so 

despite having told Ali that it would “meet with [him] to 

explore and discuss what accommodation, if any, may be 

effective,” and that it would make its accommodation offer

only “[a]fter discussing this with you,” J.A. 206 (emphasis 

added). 

To be sure, nothing in the law obligated EPA to engage in 

an interactive process with Ali to the extent it was able to offer 

a reasonable accommodation without doing so. What matters 

here is that EPA’s promise to work with Ali and then prompt 

breaking of that commitment does not remotely evidence, as a 

matter of law, that it was Ali who caused some sort of 

breakdown in the interactive process. And to the extent that 

EPA claims it needed more information from Ali, a reasonable 

jury could find, on this record, that it was EPA that jumped the 

gun by acting without discussing options in advance with Ali.

Notably, in subsequent communications, Ali repeatedly 

tried to reengage EPA in discussions about alternative 

accommodations. For instance, he followed up on June 28, 

July 5, and July 13, 2012, to reiterate his request for a private 

working space. EPA appears, on this record, not to have 

responded to any of these follow-ups. Later on, when Ali once 

again complained about a colleague’s cologne triggering his 

allergies, a supervisor responded that “[y]ou have been offered 

a reasonable accommodation of 100% telework and have 

declined the offer.” J.A. 241. That supervisor indicated a 

willingness to “reopen that discussion if [Ali] would like to 

reconsider” the telework offer, but not otherwise. J.A. 241. In 

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20

response, Ali expressed his eagerness “to discuss or settle the 

issues,” J.A. 241, but there is no evidence that EPA replied to 

Ali’s invitation for dialogue. A jury could reasonably conclude 

from this series of communications that EPA believed it had 

fully complied with all statutory obligations by offering Ali 

telework and that further conversation was unnecessary. 

The dissenting opinion argues that EPA’s failure to ask for 

Ali’s reasons for declining telework is irrelevant because “it is 

the party who ‘fails to communicate’ and does not share 

information who bears the blame for breaking down the 

interactive process.” Dissenting Op. 8 (quoting Ward, 762 

F.3d at 32). But we have never previously affirmed summary 

judgment for the employer on interactive-process grounds 

where an employee failed to volunteer information, rather than 

provide requested information. Contrast Ward, 762 F.3d at 

32–33 (“The interactive process broke down” when the 

employer “set forth in writing precisely the information it 

needed” and the employee “did not respond but instead 

resigned six days later”); Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1307–1309 

(similar). This is especially true when it was the employer that 

broke its promise to talk with the employee—and so to hear the 

employee’s views—before formulating a final accommodation 

proposal. After all, EEOC guidance contemplates that the 

employer “should” identify accommodations “[i]n consultation 

with the individual to be accommodated[.]” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 

app. § 1630.9. 

The dissenting opinion also argues that EPA’s failure to 

engage Ali in further discussions before offering telework was 

reasonable because “EPA knew that Ali had asked to work 

from home in the past.” Dissenting Op. 2–3. But the record 

suggests that Ali’s prior work-from-home stint played no role 

in EPA’s accommodation offer. Denise Hawkins—the 

supervisor who proposed Ali’s permanent work-from-home 

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21

accommodation—averred that she did not “know of any time 

that Mr. Ali tried to telework,” and that she “was not an EPA 

employee in March 2007,” and so “ha[d] no knowledge of any 

actions taken or not taken at that time.” J.A. 47, 49. Given that 

evidence, a reasonable jury could choose not to credit 

arguments by EPA that the accommodation proposed by 

Hawkins was grounded in the belief that permanent telework 

was a reasonable solution based on the 2007 experience.

In any event, this record does not establish as a matter of 

law that Ali failed to communicate, given evidence a 

reasonable jury could credit that he remained in nearcontinuous communication with supervisors, and it was the

EPA that frequently failed to respond. In addition, Ali, after 

receiving EPA’s accommodation offer, may reasonably have 

expected that EPA would make good on its same-day 

representation that Hawkins would reach out to him to “discuss 

what accommodation, if any, may be effective.” J.A. 206. 

Of course, EPA could rest on its offer of telework if that 

offer was reasonable as a matter of law within the meaning of 

the Rehabilitation Act. After all, “‘[a]n employer is not 

required to provide an employee th[e] accommodation he 

requests or prefers[;] the employer need only provide some 

reasonable accommodation.’” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 (quoting 

Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

But the consequence of making Ali a take-it-or-leave-it offer 

without first discussing it with him is that EPA, and not Ali, 

must bear the risk that evidence may show its offer was 

unreasonable. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 (“[A]n employer 

who fails to engage in the interactive process runs a serious risk 

that it will erroneously overlook an opportunity to 

accommodate a statutorily disabled employee, and thereby 

violate the ADA.”). For present purposes, our only point is that 

Ali’s effort to reengage with EPA and EPA’s brushing off of 

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22

those entreaties negates any inference that Ali was responsible 

for some kind of process failure.5

B

1

EPA argues, in the alternative, that its 100% telework offer 

fully satisfied the Rehabilitation Act, as a matter of law, since 

the proposed accommodation was “plainly reasonable.” EPA 

Br. 12–16, 22–33. That is also the primary ground on which 

the dissenting opinion would affirm. Infra at 1–6. But because 

a jury could find on this record that EPA’s proposed 

accommodation was not reasonable, the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment cannot be upheld on that basis.

6

5 The district court analogized “[t]he breakdown * * * in 

process * * * to what occurred in Luolseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 

F.3d 731, 732–737 (5th Cir. 1999).” J.A. 269. There, an employer 

withdrew a previously offered accommodation while offering 

alternative arrangements. Id. at 733–734. The employee “stayed 

silent, and quit.” Id. at 738. The employee thereby failed to engage 

in the interactive process at all. As a consequence, the employee

could not proceed with a failure-to-accommodate claim since there 

was no suggestion that the employer “would not consider other

possible accommodations if [the employee] brought them to its 

attention.” Id. at 739. Luolseged could not be more different from

the situation here, where Ali repeatedly pressed other possible 

accommodations, while EPA refused to budge from its telework 

offer. 

6 The district court resolved the case only on the ground that 

Ali pretermitted the interactive process. This court, though, may 

affirm based on any ground preserved in the record, even if not relied 

upon by the district court. For that reason, we address EPA’s

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23

Deciding the reasonableness of a given accommodation

not uncommonly involves context-based decisions ill-suited 

for summary judgment. See Dean v. University at Buffalo Sch. 

of Med. and Biomed. Sciences, 804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 

2015). As a result, “the same accommodation might be 

appropriate for one disability and inappropriate for another,” or 

appropriate for one employee or one workplace and not for 

another. Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, 

52 F.4th 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he same disability 

may require different accommodations for different 

employees[.]”); see also Jankowski Lee, 91 F.3d at 896; Turner 

v. Hershey Chocolate United States, 440 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 

2006); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 833 

(4th Cir. 1994); McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of 

Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1993); Frye v. Aspin, 

997 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 

558, 562 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Oftentimes, this kind of “fact-specific” question “must be 

resolved by a factfinder.” Noll v. IBM Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 94

(2d Cir. 2015). Yet there may be cases where the undisputed 

evidence establishes that a proffered accommodation is so 

plainly effective as to permit summary judgment. See Noll, 787 

F.3d at 93–94 (finding no issue of material fact where IBM 

offered a deaf employee “several accommodations[,]” 

including “ASL interpreters, * * * transcripts [of certain 

videos] upon request, and * * * [the ability to] view certain 

videos (such as the CEO’s Annual Broadcast) with captioning” 

to be able to learn from training videos). But so long as 

sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find that a 

proposed accommodation is unreasonable, summary judgment

alternative argument. United States ex rel. Health v. AT&T, Inc., 791 

F.3d 112, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

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24

on the basis of that accommodation is improper. See 

Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1165. 

Here, there is sufficient record evidence to allow a 

reasonable jury to find that EPA’s telework offer was not a

reasonable accommodation for Ali. Ali testified below that he 

could “not print things” at home because he “get[s] allergic 

reaction[s] to emissions from printers[,]” and would have 

nowhere to go if that happened at home. J.A. 71. Ali also 

emphasized that, if he were absent from the office, he would 

not “be able to become a team leader” or “communicate with 

other people[,]” both of which are important to his job, which

requires him “to be in touch with other people, talking to them, 

brainstorming and that sort of thing, and get some feedback 

from these people.” J.A. 71. In addition, Ali pointed out that 

his home was “not suitable for working” there permanently

because he lacked an “office space set up[.]” J.A. 71. Lastly, 

Ali expressed concern about the durability of such an 

arrangement because the last time he was allowed to work 

remotely in 2007, “[l]awyers got involved.” J.A. 70–71.7

Given all that evidence, a reasonable jury could decide that 

100% remote work would not “enable [Ali] to perform the 

essential functions of [his] position.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). 

Ali’s concern that full-time remote work would prevent 

him from communicating with colleagues and becoming a team 

leader has particular salience under the Rehabilitation Act. 

Forcing an employee who was hired for an in-person position 

and who had successfully worked in-person for almost fifteen

7

In Ali’s prior lawsuit, he said that working from home had 

caused him to be “subjected to ridicule,” with colleagues accusing 

him of “touring a foreign country” or being “on vacation.” Ali, 179 

F. Supp. 3d at 65.

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25

years to switch to full-time telework as a condition of 

accommodating his disability may materially alter that 

employee’s conditions of employment and prospects for equal 

work and advancement. These concerns sit at the heart of the 

Rehabilitation Act’s aim of integrating disabled employees

into the workplace and eliminating segregation and the stigma 

it creates. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3)(F) (“[D]isability is a 

natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes 

the right of individuals to * * * enjoy full inclusion and 

integration in the economic, political, social, cultural, and 

educational mainstream of American society[.]”); id.

§ 701(b)(2) (The Rehabilitation Act aims to “maximize 

opportunities for individuals with disabilities * * * for 

competitive integrated employment[.]”); Olmstead v. L.C. ex 

rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (“Unjustified isolation 

* * * is properly regarded as discrimination based on 

disability.”); Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 

(The Rehabilitation Act protects against “the continuing 

stigma” of having “at one time had a disability,” which may 

persist even after medical treatment).

Recall that an employer’s statutory obligation is to not 

“discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 

disability in regard to * * * the hiring, advancement, or 

discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, 

and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(a); see 29 U.S.C. § 791(f). One particular form 

of discrimination outlawed by the ADA and the Rehabilitation 

Act is to “limit[], segregat[e], or classify[] a job applicant or 

employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or 

status of such applicant or employee because of the disability 

of such applicant or employee.” Id. § 12112(b)(1); see 29 

U.S.C. § 791(f). An employer cannot comply with its statutory 

obligation to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee by 

simultaneously violating the employer’s statutory obligation to

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26

avoid unreasonably limiting or segregating that same 

employee. See Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. 

Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059–1060 (7th Cir. 1999) 

(Employer’s offer that employee work alone at a new location 

was “unreasonable accommodation” that may violate ADA’s 

prohibition on segregation.); cf. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 

§ 1630.2(o) (Though reassignment to a different position may 

constitute a reasonable accommodation, “[r]eassignment may 

not be used to limit, segregate, or otherwise discriminate 

against employees with disabilities by forcing reassignments to 

undesirable positions or to designated offices or facilities.”);

Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234, 240–241 (4th 

Cir. 2021) (“[R]eassignment is the ADA’s accommodation of 

‘last resort’ and * * * should be held ‘in reserve for unusual 

circumstances.’”) (quoting Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., 

LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1014 (4th Cir. 2020)).

Of course, remote work may well be a reasonable 

accommodation in many cases. See EEOC, Work at 

Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation (Feb. 3, 

2003), https://perma.cc/3CYS-RZ4A. But “[n]ot all persons 

with disabilities need—or want—to work from home.” Id. 

Offering a willing employee a remote-work option is very 

different from forcing remote work on an unwilling employee 

as the sole option for accommodating that employee’s 

disability. In the latter case, the factual record would have to 

justify the reasonableness of such forced segregation, such as 

by showing the absence of an integrative reasonable 

accommodation. Cf. Duda, 133 F.3d at 1059–1060 

(Employee’s claim “that he was forced to transfer to a new 

location and to work alone * * * is a clear claim of forced 

reassignment or of an unreasonable accommodation” for a 

disability); Wirtes, 996 F.3d at 241 (“[O]ther reasonable forms 

of accommodation [should] take precedence over 

reassignment” so as “keep[] [disabled employees] in their 

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present job[s] rather than “hurl[] them into an unfamiliar 

position.”) (formatting modified).8 

In short, whether proposed by the employer or requested 

by the employee, the reasonableness of telework cannot be 

presumed. Instead, like many accommodation judgments, the 

reasonableness of a telework accommodation turns on whether 

it will enable a specific employee “to perform the essential 

functions of [his] position” in a specific workplace, which will 

often be a fact-sensitive inquiry. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); 

see Owens, 52 F.4th at 1335. The same principle applies to 

determining whether a telework accommodation will 

unreasonably segregate or limit that employee by virtue of his 

disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). As a result, requiring

an employee who has successfully worked in the office for 

years to leave the workplace permanently as the sole means for 

accommodating a disability—without first discussing it with 

him or exploring integrative alternatives—risks running afoul 

of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA’s integrative mandates, 

depending on the fact-specific record in each case.

Having said that, it always remains an employee’s burden 

to establish that some reasonable accommodation exists. 

Carter, 840 F.2d at 65. As a result, an employee who objects 

to remote work will need to show the feasibility of some other 

option. Id. And an employer willing to offer remote work but 

not some other accommodation may show that another 

8 The ADA and Rehabilitation Act also require employers to 

make reasonable accommodations so that a disabled job applicant 

could perform the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B); 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791(f). We need not address here whether imposing remote work 

as an upfront accommodation for a job applicant might differ from 

offering it as an accommodation to an employee already hired for 

and previously performing in an in-person position.

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accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the 

operation of [its] business[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(5)(A). 

There may therefore be cases where the absence of a feasible 

integrative accommodation makes remote work a reasonable 

option, even if the employee objects to it. All we decide here 

is that, at the summary-judgment stage and on this record, Ali 

met his burden to come forward with sufficient evidence 

showing that remote work was not a reasonable option.

9

The dissenting opinion reasons that, because Ali worked 

from home for several months in 2007, EPA’s 2012 permanent 

telework offer must have been reasonable. See infra at 2–5. 

We agree that a reasonable jury could accept that argument. 

But we disagree that it must do so as a matter of law on this

record. Specifically, whatever the circumstances that allowed 

Ali to work from home for a few months five years earlier, they

do not, as a matter of law, negate Ali’s evidence that, as of 

2012, (i) he lacked an adequate home-office set-up, (ii) printing 

would be a health problem, and (iii) working from home would 

9 As to the existence of reasonable alternatives, Ali represented 

below that various private spaces were available in which he could 

work, while EPA maintains that office spaces were not available. 

Similarly, EPA introduced an air-quality assessment showing “no 

appreciable difference between the quality of air in an office and in 

a cubicle,” J.A. 103, while Ali’s doctor suggested that Ali could 

“limit his occupational exposure to all allergens [by working] in an 

isolated office environment,” J.A. 206. Those factual disputes are 

for a jury to resolve. The dissenting opinion would resolve them 

now, suggesting that allergens throughout the office or on Ali’s 

commute would prevent him from working as effectively there as he 

could at home. Infra at 1–2. But that conclusion ignores that Ali 

worked successfully in EPA’s shared office space for four years, 

until EPA chose to locate an employee known throughout the office 

for his powerful perfumes right next to Ali. 

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compromise his ability to communicate and brainstorm with 

colleagues.10 

Nor does the record demonstrate that the 2007 telework 

stint was undisputedly successful or replicable. Ali testified 

that, in 2007, he was “able to manage” telework for a relatively 

“short” period. J.A. 174–175. Then too, he lacked “an office 

set up,” but nonetheless made do by putting a computer on a 

table “because [he] didn’t have any option.” J.A. 174. 

Importantly, Ali also testified that he “didn’t have a lot of 

work” in 2007, but that he does “nowadays.” J.A. 175. And 

EPA ultimately required Ali to return to the office, casting 

doubt on whether telework actually allowed Ali to perform his 

job effectively in 2007. 

2

EPA asks us to ignore Ali’s testimony enumerating many 

reasons why EPA’s proposed telework accommodation was 

not reasonable on the ground that these “post-hoc concerns” 

were not communicated to it before this litigation. EPA Br. 

28–32. This argument fails for two reasons.

First, nothing in the Rehabilitation Act or precedent 

imposes a duty on the individual with a disability to turn over 

10 The dissenting opinion argues that EPA did not offer Ali a 

“permanent telework” accommodation, but rather a “flexible” mix of 

in-person and telework as needed. Dissenting Op. 5. But EPA itself 

repeatedly referred to its accommodation as involving “[p]ermission 

to work at home full time,” J.A. 208, “100% working from home,” 

J.A. 54, or “100% telework,” J.A. 241. In any event, the fact that 

EPA now says that it would have allowed Ali to work in the office

occasionally says nothing about its willingness to accommodate his 

disability in the office. On that point, its sole accommodation offer 

remained work-from-home.

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each piece of evidence before litigation or else lose the chance 

to use it. If EPA sought to elaborate the grounds for its 

rejection of Ali’s proposed private-office accommodation, it 

could of course introduce evidence beyond what it 

communicated to Ali before litigation—like its litigation

argument that the temporary telework in 2007 supported the 

reasonableness of the accommodation. We see no reason why 

Ali should be held to a different standard. 

Keep in mind too that, during the workplaceaccommodation process, employees with disabilities rarely 

proceed with lawyers in tow. The process is meant to be 

“informal” and constructive. Ward, 762 F.3d at 32 (quoting 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). Employees may not understand at this 

early juncture what additional information is needed from 

them, much less that they should spontaneously offer 

information that the employer never requested. Especially in a 

case like this, where the employer elected to offer its proposed 

accommodation without engaging the employee in discussions 

as it had promised to do. Further, some of Ali’s reasons for 

why 100% telework might not constitute a reasonable 

accommodation—a compromised ability to work with 

teammates or to take on leadership roles—involve fairly 

commonplace concerns that EPA does not claim surprised it.

Of course, as noted earlier, an employee who renders their 

employer unable to offer a reasonable accommodation by 

withholding necessary information or concealing relevant facts

can hardly complain of being denied one. See Ward, 762 F.3d 

at 32. But EPA’s argument on its alternative ground for 

affirmance is about the reasonableness of its proffered 

accommodation as a matter of law, not a breakdown in the 

interactive process. 

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EPA may ultimately convince a jury that its 100% 

telework offer was reasonable. But, given the evidence in this 

case, EPA has given us no reason to hold that a jury could not 

conclude otherwise. 

Second, and in any event, there is record evidence that Ali 

communicated at least one of his concerns regarding EPA’s 

proposed telework accommodation to EPA. During his 

interview with an EEO counselor, Ali told the counselor that 

he had told Ms. Hawkins “that the telework option would not 

work because if he had to print [at home] then his symptoms 

would get worse.” EPA Br. 28–29. Hawkins maintains that 

Ali did not tell her as much. Resolution of that fact dispute is 

for juries, not for summary judgment. 

EPA responds that this evidence is irrelevant because (1) 

Ali’s specific disability involved allergic reactions to a coworker’s perfume rather than printer fumes; (2) Ali did not 

show he needed to print at home; and (3) EPA could have found 

ways to accommodate any printing needs consistent with Ali’s 

working remotely. EPA Br. 29–30. None of these arguments 

allows resolution of this case at summary judgment.

On the first point, EPA itself recognized Ali’s disabling 

allergies are triggered by “exposure to various kinds of 

allergens that include not only environmental allergens but also 

volatile organic compounds and products like paint, petroleum 

derivatives, perfumes, any kind of fragrances or odors, and 

several other materials.” J.A. 206. In fact, a report EPA 

commissioned identified “copiers and printers” as one source 

of “volatile organic compounds.” J.A. 219–220. And EPA 

agreed with Ali’s doctor’s recommendation that Ali should 

“limit his occupational exposure to all allergens in an isolated 

office environment.” J.A. 206. Ali’s complaints that led to 

EPA’s accommodation offer also specifically identified 

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32

“fumes from printers” as a “toxic” irritant. J.A. 236. That all 

adds up to record evidence that would allow a reasonable jury 

to conclude that the disability recognized by EPA included 

exposure to printer fumes.

As for the second point, EPA’s argument that Ali 

introduced no evidence he would need to print at home is flatly 

contradicted by EPA’s own evidence. Ali’s supervisor, Denise 

Hawkins, told an EEO counselor that “Ali would need to print 

articles from the Internet whether he worked at home or at the 

office.” J.A. 47. She also stated that EPA was willing to 

provide Ali a home printer if he lacked one, further rebutting 

any inference that Ali did not need to print as part of his regular 

job duties.11 

On EPA’s third argument, perhaps EPA could have found 

ways to solve any printing problem—but perhaps not. The 

record is not conclusive either way. Since we must draw all 

reasonable inferences in Ali’s favor at this stage, EPA’s 

argument about unoffered and unexamined alternatives cannot 

support summary judgment in its favor. 

In short, Ali adduced ample evidence that would allow a 

reasonable jury to find that 100% telework was not a 

reasonable option, including evidence that it would isolate him 

at work and prevent him from collaborating with colleagues, as 

well as evidence about potential inadequacies and health 

hazards in any work-from-home setup. There is evidence that 

11 While Ali would also need to print at work, Ali testified at his 

deposition that, when in the office, he had been able to print files “far 

away” from his desk, and that printing at home would not provide 

that option. J.A. 89–90. It is therefore not the case that Ali “offered 

no plausible reason why he would have fared better if he was printing 

from a private office.” Dissenting Op. 3. Ali in fact offered an 

explanation that a reasonable jury could credit (or not).

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Ali communicated at least one of these concerns to EPA prior 

to the lawsuit, and the remainder are sufficiently evidenced to 

be presented to a jury. Accordingly, EPA’s 100% telework 

offer was not so plainly reasonable as to overcome all of the 

disputed material facts in the record and allow summary 

judgment in EPA’s favor.

3

EPA finally suggests that we may affirm because “Ali 

effectively accepted EPA’s initial, informal offer of a 

reasonable accommodation in the form of changing cubicles.” 

EPA Br. 16. EPA argued in the district court that Ali “rejected” 

that very same accommodation. Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF.19) at 7. EPA’s argument is therefore 

forfeited. See Elliott v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 596 

F.3d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010 (“[W]e will not consider for the 

first time on appeal arguments that a [party] entirely failed to 

raise in the trial court.”); Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 135 

(D.C. Cir. 2000).

In any event, there is record evidence that EPA proposed 

changing cubicles as only a temporary solution. One of Ali’s 

supervisors offered that option following Ali’s initial 

complaint as “an immediate remedy” meant for “the mean 

time[,]” while EPA “implement[s] a permanent solution.” J.A. 

235. Beyond that, Ali repeatedly tried switching cubicles and 

explained that doing so did not solve his problem. J.A. 236. 

There is accordingly record evidence that would allow a 

reasonable jury to conclude either that EPA never formally 

offered cubicle-switching as its permanent reasonable 

accommodation or that any such offer was not a reasonable 

accommodation in the circumstances of this case. 

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 33 of 43
34

V

After determining that Ali had a qualifying disability, EPA 

offered Ali a 100% telework option that a jury might or might 

not find reasonable. The central question in this case, in other 

words, turns on a quintessential factual dispute that needs to be 

resolved by a jury. While EPA and Ali might have explored 

other accommodation options, we cannot conclude as a matter 

of law that any failure to do so rested solely on Ali or that Ali’s 

conduct prevented EPA from formulating a reasonableaccommodation proposal. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to EPA and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

12

So ordered.

12 This court appointed Daniel S. Volchok of Wilmer Cutler 

Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP to present arguments in favor of Ali’s 

position. He was assisted on the briefs by Amy Lishinki, Julie Aust, 

Allison Schultz, and Joshua Feinzig, also of Wilmer Hale. We thank 

each of them for their able assistance in presenting this case.

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 34 of 43
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I would uphold the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Environmental Protection Agency. 

With several “ifs” and “buts,” the Rehabilitation Act

requires federal agencies to adapt the working conditions of its

qualified, but disabled, employees. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f); 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). Ghulam Ali, an economist

working at EPA, sought among other relief $300,000 in

damages, claiming that EPA violated those provisions.

The material facts are these. Ali began working at EPA in

1997. In 2011, he told his supervisors that a colleague’s cologne

was causing him to experience allergic reactions. He formally

requested to be moved to a private office in early 2012. EPA

instead offered to let Ali work from home. Ali rejected that

offer. Because the evidence shows that EPA’s proposed

arrangement would have enabled Ali to “perform the essential

functions of [his] position,” EPA was entitled to summary

judgment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); see 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(8). 

EPA determined that Ali needed an accommodation

because he suffered “detrimental effects on [his] health” from

“exposure to various kinds of allergens.” The agency accepted

Ali’s doctor’s suggestion that he “limit his occupational

exposure to all allergens in an isolated office environment.” In

EPA’s building, however, the shared HVAC system made air

quality largely identical everywhere. And even if Ali had a

private office, he would need to take public transportation to get

to the office and then regularly pass through heavily trafficked

common areas, bathrooms, hallways, and elevators. In such

settings, Ali would have no way to avoid encountering allergens. 

For these reasons, EPA proposed that Ali work at home where

he would have “more control” over the air quality.

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 35 of 43
2

Ali had already worked from home in the past. In 2007,

EPA authorized Ali to telework for approximately six months

after he experienced an allergic reaction. In his deposition, Ali

testified that he “was able to work from home” and “sustain

[him]self during that time period”—in other words, that he “was

able to manage it.” He also testified in an administrative

proceeding that working from home “became pretty nice.” In

fact, Ali found it so “nice” that, when ordered to return to the

office, he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission claiming that EPA was failing to

accommodate him by refusing to allow him to keep working

from home. Ali cannot dispute that EPA reasonably

accommodated him in 2007 by letting him work remotely.1

So why was EPA’s identical work proposal no longer

reasonable in 2012? Ali has no rational answer and neither does

the majority opinion. The mere fact that Ali had more work to

do in 2012 does not by itself explain how or why completing

that work at home would have been unreasonable in ways that

it had not been five years earlier.

In 2012, as in 2007, Ali would have been able to perform

the essential functions of his position while working from home. 

Had he worked remotely, he would have avoided the

“detrimental [health] effects” from allergens in the office that

led to his accommodation request. And EPA knew that Ali had

1

 The majority opinion points to Ali’s claim in an earlier lawsuit

that his coworkers “ridicule[d]” him for working from home in 2007. 

Majority Op. 24 n.7 (citation omitted). That unsubstantiated

allegation cannot be used at the summary-judgment stage. See Durant

v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 36 of 43
3

asked to work from home in the past.2 Teleworking thus

promised to “address” and “mitigat[e]” the challenges Ali faced

as a result of his disability by reducing his risk of exposure to

allergens. Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc., 897 F.3d

232, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2018). That is exactly the kind of

reasonable accommodation that the law demands. See id.

Ali claims that there were enough downsides to EPA’s

proposal that a jury should get to decide whether it was

reasonable. But none of these alleged downsides is sufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact. For example, Ali

testified that he “didn’t want to take a chance on” remote work

again given the dispute he previously had over returning to the

office. That is a complaint about the accommodation process,

not a claim that he could not have carried out any of his duties

from home. 

Ali’s most substantial argument about why telework was

inadequate is that he would be unable to print materials from

home lest he experience an allergic reaction to emissions from

the printer. But Ali offered no plausible reason why he would

have fared better if he was printing from a private office. That

failure is critical. 

Ali claimed that printer fumes in the office repeatedly

caused him to suffer adverse reactions. He regularly needed to

go to the printer to collect materials he had printed. Moving him

to a private office would not have changed that. His cubicle was

already located “far away” from the printers. So Ali’s risk of

2

 Ali’s immediate supervisor in 2012 testified that she was not

aware of the events of 2007. But she formulated EPA’s offer with

“input” from and in coordination with the director of Ali’s division,

who believed that remote work was the “best option” in part because

she knew of Ali’s prior desire to work from home.

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4

exposure to printer emissions if he had a private office would

have been the same as, or perhaps even greater than, if he had

worked from home. And Ali would have had more flexibility at

home to control the location of the printer.3

His remaining objections have even less force. Ali did not

explain how or why telework would inhibit his career

development and communication with coworkers in 2012, but

not in 2007. Cf. Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C.

Cir. 2015). It is true that remote work has the potential to isolate

employees from their colleagues. See, e.g., Langon v. Dep’t of

Health & Hum. Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

But, again, Ali had already worked from home for an extended

period and yet he identified no professional setbacks he

experienced as a result. To the contrary, at that time he opposed

EPA’s efforts to bring him back into the office and insisted that

he wanted to keep working from home. And Ali’s own

proposal—working out of a private office in a different

division—also would have physically isolated him from his

colleagues in the building.

Similarly, Ali’s insistence that his home’s lack of a

designated office space made it unsuitable for telework falls

short in light of his prior experience. He admitted that he

“manage[d]” to work without a formal office setup for many

months by setting up a table with a computer in his living room. 

Ali described that experience as “pretty nice” and made it clear

to EPA at the time that he wanted to keep that arrangement. His

later and unexplained change of heart cannot create a genuine

3

 The majority opinion credits Ali as testifying that he would not

be able to print “‘far away’ from his desk” at home. Majority Op. 32

n.11 (quoting J.A. 89–90). But Ali never testified that he would be

unable to situate a printer far from his home work area.

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 38 of 43
5

dispute of fact. Cf. Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026,

1030 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

Even if working from home on a longer-term basis may

have presented different challenges than his prior stint, Ali never

articulated as much. He also never discussed with EPA the

particulars of what working from home would entail. So Ali

“cannot benefit from this uncertainty” by assuming that EPA

would not have found ways to help him telework effectively. 

EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 472 (5th Cir. 2009). 

EPA told Ali that it was amenable to “consider[ing] other

accommodations” if full-time remote work did not prove to be

effective. For instance, EPA was “willing to buy [Ali] a printer

or any other equipment that he needed so that he could do his

job.” And Ali was informed that EPA was “completely

flexible” on allowing him to work in-office some of the time. 

To frame EPA’s proposal as only offering Ali “permanent

telework,” as the majority does, Majority Op. 3, 20–21, 27–28,

obscures EPA’s willingness to tailor the work-from-home

accommodation to Ali’s needs.

In any event, Ali was entitled to a reasonable

accommodation, not a “perfect” one. Noll v. IBM Corp., 787

F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015). EPA did not bear the responsibility

of “alleviating any and all challenges” Ali’s disability presented. 

Hill, 897 F.3d at 238. Nor was Ali entitled to refuse to work

from home unless he was given a “state-of-the[-]art” home

office setup. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9. The

majority opinion uncritically credits most of Ali’s complaints

about EPA’s offer as sufficient to create doubt about whether the

offer was reasonable.4

 But the majority opinion nowhere

4

 Ali’s last objection—which the majority sensibly ignores—is

that his wife did not “want [him] to work at home.” In the face of

repeated questioning, Ali would not give a single reason for his wife’s

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6

explains why the only other option on the table—a private

office—would have been reasonable in light of its logistical

complications and conjectural benefits. Work from home may

not have been everything Ali desired, but any reasonable jury

would find that EPA satisfied its duty under the Rehabilitation

Act to extend Ali a reasonable accommodation.

Because EPA’s offer was reasonable, it is irrelevant that Ali

would have preferred a private office. An employer need not

provide an employee’s “request[ed] or prefer[red]”

accommodation but must only “provide some reasonable

accommodation.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,

1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (emphasis added) (citation

omitted). The employer has “ultimate discretion” to select its

preferred reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.

§ 1630.9. If one option is “less expensive,” for example, or

“easier . . . to provide,” the employer is free to select it for that

reason. Id. EPA rejected Ali’s request for a private office

because none was available in his division. That was reason

enough for EPA to insist on its own, reasonable proposal. It had

no duty to determine whether other EPA divisions elsewhere in

the building had vacant offices or to evict another employee

from his or her office to make room for Ali. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.9(d); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1177

(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

That suffices to resolve this case. As the district court

rightly held, however, the so-called interactive process provides

an additional basis for granting EPA summary judgment.

An interactive process between employer and employee

“may be necessary” to discuss the nature of the employee’s

opposition. If Ali cannot veto an otherwise reasonable

accommodation, see infra, then neither can his wife.

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 40 of 43
7

disability and identify potential accommodations. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(o)(3). The process is not itself a ground for holding

liable an employer that has offered the employee a reasonable

accommodation. See Brigham v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 57

F.4th 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases). But the

interactive process does matter if the employee causes the

process to break down. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31–35

(D.C. Cir. 2014). An employer has not failed to “mak[e]

reasonable accommodations,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), if the

employee abandoned the process before a resolution could be

reached or did not engage in the process in good faith. 

That describes this case. EPA acted reasonably in working

with Ali to find a suitable accommodation, but then Ali shortcircuited the interactive process. The same day Ali informed

EPA officials that he had an allergic reaction, one of them

offered him the “immediate remedy” of relocating to a different

cubicle. Another helped him prepare and submit a formal

accommodation request. And when Ali provided stale and

vague medical documentation, his supervisor gave him the

opportunity to submit more detailed information. EPA then

extended him an accommodation offer—the precise “end” that

the interactive process is meant to achieve. Sansone v. Brennan,

917 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2019).

In response, Ali delivered a handwritten note that said, “I

thought about working from home. It is not a good option.” 

The note offered no explanation but simply reiterated his

demand for a private office. Once Ali rejected the offer, EPA

“was not . . . required to extend another” or to negotiate further. 

Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1013 (4th

Cir. 2020). 

Even so, EPA continued to try to help Ali. It asked Federal

Occupational Health to conduct an air-quality assessment in a

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 41 of 43
8

private office and Ali’s cubicle. It turned out that both locations

had similar and acceptable levels of various chemicals, volatile

organic compounds, and fungi. This indicated to EPA that there

was “no appreciable difference” in air quality between a cubicle

and an office.

EPA also explored other ways to alleviate Ali’s symptoms. 

Management extended him a “standing offer” to move to

another cubicle, and so he tried a number of different cubicles

until he settled on one that he preferred. He was also offered an

air filter for his cubicle, which he declined.

These active and persistent efforts to understand Ali’s

medical condition, help him through the accommodation

process, and then seek to find a reasonable solution “bore all the

hallmarks of good faith” on EPA’s part.5 Ward, 762 F.3d at 34. 

Ali, by contrast, rejected multiple suggestions without any

explanation and thus “obstructed the process.” Id. at 32 (citation

omitted).

The majority faults EPA because it “never asked Ali” why

he rejected the telework offer. Majority Op. 18. But it is the

party who “fails to communicate” who bears the blame for

breaking down the interactive process. Ward, 762 F.3d at 32

(citation omitted). One side cannot stay silent and sit on

relevant information, even if the other side has not specifically

requested that information. See EEOC v. Methodist Hosps. of

Dall., 62 F.4th 938, 950 (5th Cir. 2023); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259

5

 Although EPA’s letter recognizing Ali’s disability suggested

that his supervisor would meet with him to discuss the situation before

offering an accommodation, it seems that no such discussion happened

before EPA sent Ali its telework offer that same day. Even so, Ali

made no mention of wanting a meeting (much less of expecting one)

when he responded to EPA’s offer by rejecting it out of hand.

USCA Case #22-5124 Document #2069138 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 42 of 43
9

F.3d 48, 53–54 & n.11 (1st Cir. 2001); Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144

F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1998). Only Ali could say why

work from home was not to his liking, but he chose to keep that

knowledge to himself instead of sharing it with EPA to keep the

process going. EPA therefore was not obligated to probe

beyond Ali’s unexplained and emphatic rejection of the remote

work offer.6

 See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d

318, 333 (3d Cir. 2003); Hypes ex rel. Hypes v. First Com.

Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

Ali cannot show that EPA denied him a reasonable

accommodation, so I would affirm the district court’s order

granting EPA summary judgment.

6

 Ali and EPA dispute whether he informed EPA of his concerns

about being able to print from home. Even if he raised the issue at

some point before filing suit, there is no indication that he did so in

conjunction with his note turning down EPA’s offer.

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