Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02890/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02890-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 It is not clear to the court whether Mr. Driscal is associated with the State Bar of

California. While plaintiff has alleged Mr. Driscal’s status as defendant in connection with the

State Bar entities, plaintiff never specifies Mr. Driscal’s relationship to the latter, and Mr. Driscal

does not appear to be specifically represented by the moving defendants’ counsel and in

connection with the moving defendants’ counsel. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY MORRIS,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-2890 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AT

SAN FRANCISCO; SAFECO INSURANCE

COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Having

carefully read the parties’ papers and considered the relevant legal authority, the court

hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss, for the reasons summarized as follows.

BACKGROUND

This is an action by pro se plaintiff Gregory Morris (“plaintiff”) against multiple

persons and entities, generally alleging numerous violations of plaintiff’s civil rights and

other rights protected by federal disability laws. Among the alleged defendants are: the

State Bar of California; Mr. Robert Driscal;1

 the Board of Governors of the State Bar;

members of the Board of Governors (with the exception of Mr. Anthony Capozzi); the State

Bar’s Lawyers Assistance Program; and Doe defendants 16-20 and 26-60 (collectively the

“Bar defendants”). See Complaint for Damages; Request for Injunctive Relief; Request for

Declaratory Relief (“Complaint”), ¶¶ 13, 32, 34. 

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

A. Background Allegations 

Plaintiff was once an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the State of

California. See Complaint, ¶ 53. In 2002, plaintiff also owned a home located in Fresno,

California. See id. at ¶¶ 19, 90. Plaintiff’s home was insured for fire damage and limited

property damage/loss. Id. at ¶ 216. 

On August 15, 2002, there was a fire at plaintiff’s home. The fire was investigated

by plaintiff’s insurer and the Fresno Fire Department, among other persons and entities. 

See id. at ¶¶ 14, 20, 22. Subsequent to the investigations, on August 25, 2002, plaintiff

was arrested and charged with arson and insurance fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 91, 96. Ultimately,

after spending nearly two and one half years defending himself against these charges, the

charges were dismissed in December 2004. Id. at ¶ 99. Plaintiff alleges, however, that

exculpatory evidence was actually discovered during the investigations into the fire at

plaintiff’s home, but that the various investigating persons and agencies intentionally or

recklessly ignored and disregarded this evidence, with the aim of prosecuting plaintiff for

insurance fraud and arson. Complaint, ¶ 91. 

Subsequent to the above events, from October 2003 through August 2006, plaintiff

sought treatment from the California State Bar’s Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”) for

psychological illnesses that resulted from the events following the fire at his home. See

Complaint, ¶ 33. It appears that the Bar defendants provided some treatment, but then at

some point, abruptly withdrew assistance, despite the fact that plaintiff was entitled to

treatment services by virtue of his membership in the State Bar. See id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff

further alleges that this withdrawal of services occurred without first providing plaintiff the

opportunity to be heard regarding the withdrawal of services. According to plaintiff, he

consequently suffered a delay in diagnosis and treatment of a serious mental illness, which

“set in motion” a series of proximately caused events, including homelessness, the loss of

plaintiff’s business and profession, and plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. See id. at ¶

35. 

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Plaintiff’s complaint, which is drafted in a rambling, and at times incoherent

fashion, is less than clear in setting forth with clarity the precise nature of the claims alleged

against all defendants. The court has done its best to parse out the defined causes of action

that plaintiff is most likely alleging with respect to each relevant claim for relief. 

3

Meanwhile, on May 8, 2004, the State Bar had initiated disciplinary proceedings

against plaintiff as a result of plaintiff’s alleged misuse of client trust accounts, and on

February 17, 2006, the State Bar Court recommended that plaintiff be disbarred. See In

the Matter of Gregory A. Morris, Decision and Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment at 2,

46 (Feb. 17 2006). Plaintiff alleges that thereafter, on June 30, 2006, he was improperly

disbarred by the State Bar. 

According to plaintiff’s allegations, the State Bar’s disbarment proceedings took

place while plaintiff was mentally disabled due to brain injury and Post Traumatic Stress

Syndrome “superimposed on pre-existing Attention Deficit Disorder” – disabilities of which

the State Bar was aware. See Complaint, ¶53. Nonetheless, alleges plaintiff, and despite

having knowledge that plaintiff’s disabilities prevented him from participating in his own

defense, the State Bar failed to inform plaintiff of any right to counsel, or provide plaintiff

with notice or reasonable opportunity to be heard. See id. at ¶¶ 58-59, 64. 

As a result of the foregoing allegations, plaintiff filed the instant complaint on June 4,

2007, alleging twenty-two different causes of action against more than eighteen

defendants, including Doe defendants. In addition to the Bar defendants, the defendants

also include various individuals and entities associated with the City of Fresno’s fire

investigation personnel; two insurance companies; the Fresno County District Attorney’s

Office, and certain associated individuals; and two financial entities associated with

plaintiff’s mortgage and his deed. See generally Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Bar defendants include:2

 (1) a claim for violation of due

process and equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by virtue of the Bar defendants’

withdrawal of assistance from the LAP (First Claim for Relief); (2) a claim for violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act by virtue of the Bar

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 3 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim is confusing. Plaintiff alleges, for example,

that the Bar defendants wrongfully invaded plaintiff’s privacy by disclosing confidential

information without a warrant or a subpoena. See Complaint, ¶ 140(D). However, the claim

also alleges that all defendants violated plaintiff’s privacy “by doing the acts of Eighth cause

of action.” Id. at ¶ 137. This eighth cause of action is alleged as to private entities only,

though, and expressly excludes the Bar defendants, as they are public entities. Accordingly,

it is unclear to the court whether plaintiff in fact intends to state his privacy cause of action

against the Bar defendants. For purposes of the instant motion, however, and construing

plaintiff’s allegations liberally, the court will treat plaintiff’s privacy claim as having been

properly alleged against the Bar defendants. 

4

defendants’ withdrawal of assistance from the Lawyers Assistance Program (Second Claim

for Relief); (3) a claim for violation of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

failure to accommodate attorneys with mental disabilities in connection with disbarment

proceedings, and for violation of due process and equal protection in connection with the

disbarment of attorneys with mental disabilities (Third Claim for Relief); (4) a claim for

violation of right to privacy under the California Constitution (Ninth Claim for Relief);3 and

(5) a claim for obstruction of justice (Thirteenth Claim for Relief).

The Bar defendants now move to dismiss all of these claims against them.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Burgert v.

Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). 

In order to survive a dismissal motion, however, a plaintiff must allege facts that are

enough to raise his/her right to relief “above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). While the complaint “does not

need detailed factual allegations,” it is nonetheless “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the

‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ [which] requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. In short, a

plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” not

just conceivable. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. 

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 4 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

B. Analysis

The Bar defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against them on grounds that

(1) Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to all claims asserted against them, since each

Bar defendant agency is an arm of the state, and since no Bar defendant individuals have

otherwise been properly named in the complaint; (2) plaintiff’s claims are jurisdictionally

barred pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (3) plaintiff’s claims fail to state valid

claims for relief at any rate. The court need not reach all of these grounds to conclude that

plaintiff’s claims against the Bar defendants are properly dismissed for the multiple reasons

set forth below. 

Preliminarily, however, several claims may be summarily dismissed before even

getting to the merits of the above arguments, as plaintiff has conceded their invalidity. 

First, for example, the court hereby DISMISSES plaintiff’s second and third claims for relief,

to the extent they allege claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. See Complaint, ¶¶ 37-

88. The Rehabilitation Act only applies to “program[s] or activit[ies] receiving Federal

financial assistance . . .”. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 794a. Plaintiff, however, has failed to

allege that any of the Bar Defendants receives federal financial assistance, and has failed

to oppose defendants’ motion on this ground. 

Second, the court also DISMISSES plaintiff’s class action claims, as alleged in his

third claim for relief. See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 41, 54, 65. Pro se plaintiffs are not permitted

to bring class actions, a fact that plaintiff recognizes in his opposition brief. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(a); see also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th

Cir.1987) (holding that a pro se litigant may not appear as an attorney for others); Russell

v. U. S., 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962)(“A litigant appearing in propria persona has no

authority to represent anyone other than himself”). 

Third, the court also DISMISSES with prejudice plaintiff’s ninth and thirteenth claims

for relief, which allege (a) a claim pursuant to the California Constitution’s right to privacy,

and (b) a claim for obstruction of justice. See Complaint, ¶ ¶ 134-40, 204-07. Plaintiff

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 5 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The Bar defendants also note that, to the extent plaintiff meant to allege claims

against a Mr. James Driscoll, this Mr. Driscoll was an independent contractor for the LAP, is

un-associated with the State Bar, and is not represented by counsel for Bar defendants at any

rate. 

6

concedes in his opposition that he does not allege any “pendant state claims,” which would

include the ninth claim pursuant to the California Constitution, and obstruction of justice is a

criminal charge that does not provide a private cause of action. See Forsyth v. Humana,

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1482 (9th Cir.1997).

Finally, the court also notes that, to the extent plaintiff has alleged his claims against

individual Bar defendant Bob Driscal, such claims against Mr. Driscal must be DISMISSED,

for as the Bar defendants point out and plaintiff does not dispute, there is no State Bar

employee named Bob Driscal.4

 

Taking these initial rulings into account, the court now turns to the relevant issues

before it. 

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

As noted above, plaintiff has alleged claims against: the State Bar of California, the

Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, the State Bar’s Lawyer Assistance

Program, and numerous unidentified Does. The majority of these defendants, however,

are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their entities and agencies against

suits brought by citizens in federal court. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); Montana v. Goldin, 394 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.2005)(state

agencies are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, 475 (1994)(“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal

Government and its agencies from suit”); Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458-59 (9th

Cir.1985)(bar of sovereign immunity applies in suit against officers and employees of the

United States in their official capacities). It is well established that the State Bar, the State

Bar’s Board of Governors and, by extension, the State Bar’s Lawyers Assistance Program,

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

are arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Lupert v. California

State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir.1985)(the Eleventh Amendment's grant of

sovereign immunity bars monetary relief from state agencies “such as California's Bar

Association and Bar Court”); Hirsh v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., et al., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th

Cir. 1995). Indeed, plaintiff concedes as much with respect to the State Bar and the State

Bar’s Board of Governors. And while plaintiff attempts to argue that the LAP is not an arm

of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, he cites no satisfactory evidence or

case law in support of this point, and the authorities reviewed by the court suggest the

opposite. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6231 (establishing State Bar Board of

Governors’ authority to establish an Attorney Diversion and Assistance Program); Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code § 6238 (requiring LAP Oversight Committee makes annual reports to both the

Board of Governors and to the California State Legislature). Accordingly, the court

concludes that Eleventh Amendment immunity is applicable to the Bar defendant entities. 

Plaintiff may avoid this immunity doctrine, however, if he can establish that a

recognized exception to the doctrine applies. Eleventh Amendment immunity will not apply,

for example, if plaintiff can demonstrate (1) that the defendant has waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity; (2) that Congress has overridden it; or (3) that the suit is being

brought for injunctive relief against a state official. See Douglas v. Cal. Dept. of Youth

Authority, 271 F.3d 812, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, neither party disputes that the Bar defendants have not waived Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Nor has plaintiff alleged a valid claim for injunctive relief against any

valid individual state officials for, as mentioned previously, Bob Driscol is a non-existent

State employee and has been dismissed. And while plaintiff has alleged claims against

Does 16-20 and 26-60, see Complaint, ¶ 13, there are no claims for injunctive relief alleged

as to these Doe defendants. Indeed, to the extent plaintiff has alleged any request for

injunctive relief at all, these allegations appear to relate to plaintiff’s class action status –

which the court has already held is improper. 

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 7 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

This leaves only the question of Congressional abrogation of immunity. It has been

recognized that, in certain cases, Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity if

necessary to enforce the due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by section

five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). It is

undisputed, however, that Congress has not done so with respect to claims brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or for that matter, to claims brought pursuant to §§ 1985 and

1986. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989)(“We cannot

conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State

from being sued without its consent”); Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist.,

26 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1994)(applying Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims under

sections 1985 and 1986). Thus, plaintiff’s first claim for relief alleging a violation of section

1983, and plaintiff’s third claim for relief to the extent it includes a claim pursuant to section

1983 and makes passing reference to section 1985, cannot be alleged against the Bar

defendants, since no abrogation exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that Congress has abrogated Eleventh Amendment

immunity with respect to his claims under Title II of the ADA, as stated in his second and

third claims for relief. As a general matter, plaintiff has correctly recited the law. In United

States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court observed that Congress has “unequivocal[ly]

express[ed] [its] intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.” See 546 U.S. 151, 154

(2006). The court noted, however, that “insofar as [ADA] Title II creates a private cause of

action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth

Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Id. at 159. Thus,

applying this rule here, plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege conduct that violates the

Fourteenth Amendment, if his ADA claims against the Bar defendants are to fall outside the

boundaries of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Plaintiff, however, does not do so. Reading plaintiff’s complaint liberally, plaintiff has

alleged that the Bar defendants’ withdrawal of assistance via the LAP program, and the

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 8 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

underlying Bar proceedings that resulted in plaintiff’s disbarment (1) discriminated against

him on the basis of his mental disability and failed to accommodate his disability, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee; and (2) failed to

comport with constitutional due process requirements. See Complaint, ¶¶ 34-35, 38, 40,

41-42, 49, 67; see also Pl. Opp. at 25, 44, 46. However, as the Bar defendants point out,

the Supreme Court has held that mental disability does not qualify as a suspect class

warranting heightened treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. See Board of

Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001). Furthermore,

although plaintiff alleges that the Bar defendants’ actions constituted an improper “taking” in

violation of constitutional due process, plaintiff has not offered any authority for the

proposition that plaintiff’s participation in the LAP program is constitutionally protected such

that a due process claim may be premised upon withdrawal of such, or any authority which

supports the conclusion that the State Bar’s disciplinary and disbarment procedures,

standing alone, violate any recognized due process right. Indeed, plaintiff could not

suggest as much, since the relevant case law relied upon by the Bar defendants suggests

the opposite. See Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1990)(right to practice law

itself is not a fundamental right pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 358 (noting

that “review of state procedures for bar admissions” is guided by rational basis standard

and triggers no heightened scrutiny). Finally, although plaintiff has included numerous

conclusory allegations that the Bar defendants’ disciplinary proceedings violated plaintiff’s

procedural due process rights, plaintiff has failed to allege any particularized procedural

process violations that would satisfactorily allege such a claim with the requisite

particularity. 

Thus, plaintiff has alleged neither the deprivation of a constitutionally protected

property interest, nor that he is a member of a suspect class, nor an actionable violation of

procedural due process. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)(The

Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of their property or

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 9 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court

from granting prospective injunctive relief against an officer of the state who acts outside the

bounds of his authority. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968,

973 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, to the extent that plaintiff is able to allege valid claims for

prospective injunctive relief against state officers, such claims would normally be permitted to

go forward. As noted above, however, plaintiff has not alleged any valid claims for prospective

injunctive relief against the Doe defendants here (even assuming they could later be identified

as state officers). 

10

liberty by state actors without procedural due process). In sum, therefore, plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, such that the

court can satisfactorily conclude that Eleventh Amendment immunity has been abrogated

with respect to plaintiff’s ADA, Title II claims against the Bar defendant agencies. 

It should be noted, that with respect to the Doe defendants who plaintiff has named

in conjunction with the existing Bar defendant agencies, the same Eleventh Amendment

immunity extends to them, to the extent plaintiff has sued them in their official capacities for

money damages. See Complaint, ¶ 29; Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th

Cir.1992); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24-25 (1991)(holding that a defendant

official acting in his official capacity receives the same immunity as the government agency

to which he belongs). Accordingly, any such claims are also DISMISSED.5

 

To the extent that plaintiff alleges that these unidentified Doe defendants are being

sued in their “personal” or “individual” capacities, however, Eleventh Amendment immunity

does not apply, regardless whether plaintiff seeks monetary or injunctive relief. See

Cerrato, 26 F.3d at 973 (Court had jurisdiction to hear section 1983 claims over

government defendants in their individual capacities for money damages, since a victory in

such a suit is a “victory against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity that

employs him.”). Thus, plaintiff’s claims against Does 16-10 and 26-60, to the extent that

they are alleged in an individual capacity, would normally be allowed to go forward, at least

until plaintiff is able to determine the Does’ identifies through discovery and properly amend

his complaint to substitute identified parties for the Doe defendants. See Complaint, ¶¶ 13,

18; see, e.g., Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 643 (9th Cir.1980)(vacating district court’s

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 10 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

order dismissing Doe defendants prior to discovery). Ultimately, however, for separate

reasons discussed below in connection with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, these claims,

too, must be dismissed. 

In sum, plaintiff’s claims against the Bar defendant agencies, as alleged in plaintiff’s

first, second, and third claims for relief, are DISMISSED on grounds that Eleventh

Amendment immunity bars the claims. Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Bar

defendant Does, to the extent they are alleged in the Doe defendants’ official capacities,

are also DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the individual Bar defendant

Does, to the extent they are alleged in the Doe defendants’ personal capacities, while

normally permissible, will nonetheless be DISMISSED for the reasons that follow. 

2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Even if plaintiff’s claims against the Bar defendants were not barred on Eleventh

Amendment immunity grounds, the court would nonetheless lack subject matter jurisdiction

over the claims based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

bars federal district courts from "exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a

de facto appeal from a state court judgment." See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). A federal action constitutes

such a de facto appeal where "claims raised in the federal court action are 'inextricably

intertwined' with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims

would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of

state laws or procedural rules." Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In such circumstances, "the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state

court decision." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16; see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,

525 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, plaintiff's complaint purports to assert several federal claims against the Bar

defendants based on the defendants’ alleged withdrawal of LAP assistance, and based on

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 11 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

the defendants’ alleged discrimination against plaintiff and other persons with “mental

disabilities” arising from the defendants’ prosecution and disbarment of plaintiff, and the

rules and procedures governing same. See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 34, 41, 45, 46. However,

plaintiff's real challenge is to the state court decision ordering plaintiff disbarred due to

disciplinary issues. Plaintiff, for example, alleges that the Bar defendants’ withdrawal of

LAP assistance resulted in a series “of proximately caused events, including

homelessness, loss of plaintiff’s profession and business, loss of earnings and earning

capacity and severe emotional distress.” See Complaint, ¶ 35. Plaintiff also alleges that

the gravamen of his ADA claim against defendants is that “instead of providing [class

members] with due process of law, the Bar proceeds to disbar and otherwise discipline

members who are even less accommodated than persons with physical disabilities...”. See

id. at ¶ 41. To that end, plaintiff alleges that defendants were aware of plaintiff’ mental

disabilities, yet “proceeded to disbar him by default and allow the disbarment to become

final in the face of such knowledge.” Id. at ¶ 53. Plaintiff complains of the “sweeping and

inflammatory allegations of the complaints of clients, and the allegations of the complaint of

the Bar,” and furthermore complains that the Bar defendants “completely ignore[d] and

disregard[ed] clear evidence.” Id. at ¶ 61. 

Plaintiff’s opposition brief also makes patently clear that plaintiff’s primary grounds

for his claims against the Bar defendants are rooted in the State Bar’s disbarment

proceedings and the State Supreme Court’s final order disbarring plaintiff. See generally

Pl. Opp. Br. Thus, plaintiff is not pursuing a general challenge to the State Bar’s policies,

but is really seeking review of his individual claim. To the extent that plaintiff does have

allegations in his complaint that appear to pursue a general challenge to the Bar’s policies,

see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 31-88, the court concludes that these allegations are inextricably

intertwined with the request for review of the State Bar’s decision. Moreover, the vast

majority constitute class allegations which, as explained earlier, are dismissed due to

plaintiff’s pro se status. 

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

In sum, the relief plaintiff seeks is "inextricably intertwined" with the State Supreme

Court’s final decision following the State Bar disbarment proceedings. Plaintiff’s claims

against the Bar defendants are therefore DISMISSED on Rooker-Feldman grounds. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is unnecessary for the court to reach the remainder of

the Bar defendants’ arguments. The Bar defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint

against them is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s claims as to these defendants are hereby

DISMISSED. The dismissal is with prejudice, as the dismissal is grounded in the court’s

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and any amendment would be futile. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2008 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-02890-PJH Document 42 Filed 08/22/08 Page 13 of 13