Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01039/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01039-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD JONES,

CDCR #K-52736

Case

No. 

12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6)

(ECF No. 27)

vs.

CORRECTIONAL COUNSELOR

NICHOLS,

Defendant.

 

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

(ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF

No. 28) to which Defendant has filed a Reply (ECF No. 29.) 

I. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

In 2010, Plaintiff was housed at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”). (See SAC at 1, 1

Plaintiff has since filed a notice of change of address indicating that he is currently housed at 1

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.)

1 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3.) On April 2, 2010, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) in which

he was charged with “conspiracy to traffic a controlled substance into a state prison with

the intent to distribute.” (Id. at 3.) On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff was found “not

guilty” of these charges at a prison disciplinary hearing. (Id.) After the ruling in

Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, Defendant Nichols, as Plaintiff’s correctional counselor,

informed Plaintiff that “she would be taking him back to the Unit Classification

Committee (“UCC”) and recommend [that] his overnight family visits be denied

permanently.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Nichols “prepared the documents” and

“supplied all reports” to the UCC. (Id.) 

At the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff claims Defendant Nichols “acted as the

Correctional Counselor Supervisor knowing that she would have the final decision over

Plaintiff’s case.” (Id. at 4.) As a result, Plaintiff claims his “equal protection right to

have a fair and impartial [UCC] hearing by violating their own rules and regulations”

was violated. (Id.) Plaintiff claims the CDCR’s rules and regulations provide that a

person who has a “predetermined belief of the inmate’ guilt or innocence shall not hear

the charges or be present during deliberations.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he did not

receive a fair and impartial hearing because Defendant Nichols sat on the committee

determining his guilt or innocence and acted in the capacity of two different members

of the committee. (Id.) Plaintiff claims other inmates at CEN were given fair and

impartial hearings. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Nichols “made the final

decision to deny Plaintiff overnight family visits permanently.” (Id.) Plaintiff further

claims that the decision to deny Plaintiff overnight visits was in retaliation for the

previous disciplinary hearing on September 23, 2010, at which Plaintiff was found “not

guilty” of a conspiracy to traffic a controlled substance. 

II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth

2 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amendment equal protection claim; and (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for First

Amendment retaliation.2

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other

words, the plaintiff’s complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts

are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.

Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) .

In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to lessstringentstandards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly

pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, [courts]

continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d

1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).

/ / /

/ / /

The Court has previously dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 2

without leave to amend. (ECF No. 25 at 6.)

3 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Application to Plaintiff’s Complaint

1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim

Plaintiff alleges his right to equal protection was violated by the manner in which

his disciplinary hearing was conducted and claims “other inmates housed at Centinela

State Prison were allowed to have fair and impartial Unit Classification Committee

hearings.” (SAC at 5.)

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 472 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). If Plaintiff were

a member of a “suspect” class, he would have to show that the “defendants acted with

an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a protected

class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, there are no

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s SAC that would suggest that he is a member of a

“suspect class.” As Defendant correctly notes, prisoners are not a suspect class. See

Rodriquez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Where such a claim does not involved a “suspect class,” equal protection claims

arise under a “class of one” theory where the Plaintiff claims that he has been

“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000). Here, Plaintiff’s alleges that he has been denied equal protection with

his broad assertion that “other inmates housed at Centinela State Prison were allowed to

have fair and impartial Unit Classification Committee hearings.” (SAC at 5.)

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of a probation officer’s

report dated December 12, 2000. (ECF No. 27-1.) A court may take judicial notice of

undisputed matters of public record. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689

(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a court make take judicial notice of matters of public record

without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.) Plaintiff

4 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

does not object to Defendant’s requestfor judicial notice of the probation officer’s report

or dispute the validity of the report and thus, the Court grants Defendant’s request for

judicial notice.

In revoking Plaintiff’s overnight family visit privileges, Defendant relied upon

§ 3177(b)(1) which states that:

“Family visits shall not be permitted for inmates convicted of a violent offense

involving a minor or family member or any sex offense, which includes but is not

limited to the following Penal Code sections: 187 (when the victim is a family

member as defined by Section 3000 or minor); 192 (when the victim is a family

member or minor); 243.4; 261; 261.5, 262; 264.1; 266c; 266j; 273a; 273d; 273.5;

273.6; 285; 286; 288; 288a; 288.2; 288.5; 289; 289.5; 311.1; 311.2; 311.3; 311.4;

313.1; 314; or 647.6 .” 

CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3177(b)(1). In previous pleadings, Plaintiff had argued that

there was no rational basis to apply this regulation to him because he had not been

convicted of any penal code section listed. However, Plaintiff no longer presents these

arguments and does not challenge that there was a basis, based on his criminal history,

for applying this code section to him.

Instead, Plaintiff argues that there is no rational basis for revoking these privileges

because he had previously been receiving this privilege for fourteen (14) years. Plaintiff

argues that prior classification committees had accessto the same information and chose

not to ban Plaintiff from overnight family visits. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) The right to

overnight family visitsis not a fundamental right. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617,

621 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“It is well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional

right while incarcerated to contact visits.”) Therefore, the Court must apply the

deferential rational basis standard to Plaintiff’s claim. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,

319-21 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding

along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.”). Courts have long

held that there are legitimate security concerns with permitting contact or overnight

visits. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (“That there is a valid, rational

connection between a ban on contact visits and internal security of a detention facility

is too obvious to warrant extended discussion.”). 

5 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s reasoning would require them to allow him to

continue a privilege that he is not entitled to simply because they had erred in allowing

him this privilege previously in violation of their own regulations. Plaintiff does not

argue with the validity of the regulation nor does he present any claimthat thisregulation

is not applicable to his situation.

The plain language of the regulation states, in part, that “[f]amily visits shall not

be permitted for inmates convicted of a violent offense involving a minor or family

member or any sex offense.” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3177(b)(1). This language is

not discretionary. The classification committee, given the information which is

undisputed by Plaintiff, was obligated to revoke these family overnight visits. While

Plaintiff argues that his hearing was not fair and impartial because of the presence of

Defendant Nichols, it is clear from the record that regardless of who was on the

classification committee, they would be required to revoke these privileges. The Court

finds that Plaintiff fails to show that there is not a rational relationship to a legitimate

state purpose in revoking his family overnight visits. Thus, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims is GRANTED. 

2. First Amendment retaliation claim

To the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant Nichols retaliated against him, he must

allege facts to support the following five factors: “(1) an assertion that a state actor took

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment

right, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31

F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th

Cir. 2000); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997).

On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that he wasfound “not guilty” for a rules

violation in which he had been charged with conspiracy to traffic a controlled substance

into a state prison with the intent to distribute. (See SAC at 7.) Plaintiff claims that

6 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because he wasfound “not guilty,” Defendant Nichol retaliated against him by revoking

his overnight family visits. (Id.)

First, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint lacks allegations that he was

engaged in any “free speech” protected by the First Amendment. Instead, he sets forth

only conclusory allegations that Defendant retaliated against him because he prevailed

in a disciplinary hearing. Of fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment

“right[s] to file prison grievances,” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003),

and to “pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454,

461 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, there are no allegations regarding actions taken against

Plaintiff because he was attempting to file grievances or pursue civil litigation. 

Second, Plaintiff has the burden to allege facts to show that Defendant Nichol’s

alleged retaliatory action “did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. Restrictions curtailing forms of visitation have been found

to be legitimate penological goals. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003)

(“[F]reedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration” and

“some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison context”); see also

Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[I]t is well-settled that

prisoners have no constitutional right while incarcerated to contact visits or conjugal

visits.”). Plaintiff has plead no facts from which this Court could find that restricting

certain forms of visitation does not advance a legitimate penological goal.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is

GRANTED.

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

GRANTS Defendant Nichol’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6). (ECF No. 27.) Moreover, because the Court finds amendment of Plaintiff’s

claims would be futile at this time, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an

7 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile).

In a footnote on page 11 of his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffseeks

leave to amend his complaint to add J. Calderon as a defendant who conspired with

Nichols. However, for the reasons set forth above, no claim would be stated against

Calderon. Therefore, the amendment would be futile, and leave is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for the Defendant and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 14, 2014

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

8 12cv1039 BTM (BLM)

Case 3:12-cv-01039-BTM-BLM Document 31 Filed 10/14/14 Page 8 of 8