Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00642/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00642-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sean L. Hargrow, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Federal Express Corporation, a Delaware

corporation doing business in Arizona;

John and Jane Does I-X; Black

Corporation I-X; White Limited Liability

Companies I-X, 

Defendants. 

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No. 03-0642-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion

to strike. Docs. ##53, 63. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in p art and

deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny Defendants’ motion to

strike as moot.

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled t o judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union,

24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts are material and

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“[o]nly disp ut es over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. Similarly, to preclude summary judgment the

disp ut e must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

II. Timing.

Defendants argue that some of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims and all of Plaintiff’s claims

under t he Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) are time-barred. Doc. #53. Title VII

requires a p laintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts to file his

EEOC charge within 300 days of the acts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Nat’l Railroad

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). In addition, a Title VII plaintiff must

bring a civil action within 90 days after receipt of the EEOC notice to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1); Doc. #1, Ex. 1. Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely complaint forfeit s his right to bring

a claim at a later time. Id. These procedural requirements of Title VII apply to the ADA.

42 U.S.C. 12117(a).

The time requirements for hostile work environment claims are less st ringent than

the requirement s for claims of discrete discriminatory acts because hostile work

environment claims are “composed of a series of separat e acts that collectively constitute

one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 (citation omitted). Hostile

work environment claims “ will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the

claim are part of t he same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls within the

time period.” Id. at 122. 

Plaint iff filed his first EEOC charge on May 24 and his second on September 16,

2002. Docs. ##53, 54. Based on t he 300-day limitation period described above, Plaintiff

may not recover for any discrete events of race discrimination or retaliation under Title VII

that occurred before November 20, 2001. Addit ionally, to the extent Plaintiff failed to file

a complaint within 90-days of his receipt of his notice of right to sue, claims addressed in

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1

 The Court will use the November 20, 2001 date for the 300-day t ime bar because it

is 300 days before Plaintiff filed his second EEOC charge on September 16, 2002. Plaintiff

filed an earlier EEOC charge on May 24, 2002, but he failed to bring this lawsuit within 90

days of the June 19, 2002 right to sue notice that was issued in response t o t hat charge.

As a result, the first EEOC charge did not preserve any claims and the Court will not use

it for purposes of calculating the 300-day bar date. 

2

 The parties failed to provide t he Court with any of the EEOC charges filed by

Plaintiff. That omission has made the Court’s task more difficult, but will not prevent a

ruling on Defendants’ motion.

3

 Plaintiff’s ADA claims might not have been exhausted when they were first

included in t he April 4, 2003 complaint (the Court cannot tell because the parties have not

provided the first EEOC charge), but Defendants do not seek relief on this ground. 

4

 Plaintiff requests equitable tolling of the limitations period. Doc. #56. Equit able

tolling is granted only in limited situations, and “courts have been generally unforgiving

. . . when a late filing is due to claimant s’ failure to exercise due diligence in preserving his

legal right s.” Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1996). Because

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t he not ice are also time barred. These time limitations do not apply to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 claims. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 169 (2002).1

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s ADA claims are time-barred because he

received his third EEOC right to sue letter on September 23, 2003 and failed t o file suit or

amend his complaint wit hin 90 days. Doc. #53. Even if the Court assumes that the third

EEOC charge raised ADA issues,2 Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on April 4, 2003, also

asserted ADA claims and was on file with the Court before the end of the 90-day period.

Doc. #1. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff failed to assert his ADA claims in

this Court during 90-day period.3

The following claims survive the time bar and will be addressed below: Plaintiff’s

ADA, Employment Protect ion Act, and § 1981 and Title VII hostile work environment

claims. Plaintiff’s § 1981 disparate treatment and retaliation claims also survive, as do his

Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation claims with regard to events after November 20,

2001.4

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Plaintiff offers no explanation for his failure to file within the st at ut ory period, the Court

cannot conclude that equitable tolling would be appropriate. 

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III. ADA Claims – Counts I and II.

To establish a prima facie case of discriminat ion under the ADA, Plaintiff must show

that he (1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) suffered an adverse

employment action because of his disability. See Snead v. Metropolitan Property &

Casualty Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001). Whether Plaintiff’s condition constitutes

a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) involves three inquiries: (1) whether his condition

is a physical or mental impairment, (2) whether he is limited in a major life activity, and

(3) whether the impairment substantially limits the identified major life activity. See

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998); Wong v. Regents of the University of

California, 410 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because he is not

disabled as defined by the ADA. Doc. #53. They argue that Plaintiff’s ankle injury did not

substantially limit him in a major life activity. Doc. #53. Plaintiff’s response does not

address this argument or produce any facts that would support a jury finding that

Plaintiff’s injury imposed a substantial limitation on a major life activity. See Doc. #56.

A party op p osing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Summary judgment must be granted if

Plaintiff “fails t o make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to [Plaintiff’s] case, and on which [Plaintiff] will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Because Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that his injury

substantially limited him in a major life activity, summary judgment will be granted on his

ADA claims.

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IV. Employment Protection Act – Count III.

The Arizona Employment Protection Act prohibits an employ er from terminating an

employee in retaliation for exercising his rights to workers’ compensation benefits. A.R.S.

§ 23-1501(3)(c)(iii). Plaintiff must show he was terminated because he filed a workers’

compensation claim or t hat his claim was a “substantial factor” in his termination. See

Thompson v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prod. Co., 927 P.2d 781, 787 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 

Defendants argues that Plaintiff can offer no evidence to support his claim of

retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim, Doc. #53, and Plaintiff

produces no evidence to rebut this argument. Because Plaintiff has failed to present

evidence that his termination was “because of” or “ substantially related to” the filing of

his worker’s compensation claim, summary judgment will be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322-24.

V. Title VII and § 1981 Hostile Work Environment Claim – Counts IV and VII.

To prevail on a T itle VII hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show that

(1) he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature, (2) t he conduct was

unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of his employment and create an abusive work environment. See Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether the conduct was

sufficient ly severe or pervasive, courts look at all the circumstances, “including ‘the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threat ening

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee’s work performance.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88

(1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Vasquez, 349 F.3d

at 642; Brook s v . City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We use a totality

of the circumstances t est to determine whether a plaintiff’s allegations make out a colorable

claim of hostile work environment.) These Title VII legal standards also ap p ly t o § 1981

actions. See Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Defendants argue that summary judgment is proper because the alleged misconduct

does not constitute severe or pervasive racial harassment. Doc. #53. Again, Plaintiff is

silent in his response. He fails to respond to Defendant s’ argument by producing evidence

in support of his hostile work environment claim. The Court accordingly will grant

summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. 

V. Disparate Treatment Claim under Title VII and § 1981 – Counts V & VIII.

A. Legal Standard.

To show disparate treatment, Plaint iff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. He must show that (1) he belongs to a protected

class, (2) he was qualified for the posit ion, (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment

action, and (4) non-minority employees with qualifications similar t o his were treated more

favorably. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production – but not

persuasion – then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the challenged action.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). If the

employer sufficiently articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, Plaintiff “must produce

evidence in addition to that which was sufficient for [his] prima facie case in order to rebut

the [employer’s] showing.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220 (citing Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890). 

B. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Disparate Treatment Claim. 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the first two elements of his prima

facie case. Doc. #53. The issues to be addressed by the Court , t herefore, are whether he

was subjected to an adverse employment action and whether similarly situated nonminority employees were treated more favorably.

 1. Adverse Employment Action.

Defendants argue that the complained-of actions do not constitute adverse

employment actions. Plaint iff resp onds with a list of the “numerous adverse employment

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5

 Some of these claims are time-barred under Title VII because they occurred before

November 20, 2001. These include (1) the incident involving Tim Christensen, (2) the

comment made by Kevin McHugh, (3) Plaintiff’s request to adjust his schedule to at tend

school, (4) Plaintiff’s request for time off to help his mother move, (5) Plaintiff’s receipt of

a warning letter for failing to pick up a package, and (5) the assignment of overtime hours

to Mike Holliday. Doc. #53. The Court has elected to discuss them in this section of the

order because they are not time-barred under § 1981.

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actions” he has suffered at the hands of Defendants, including two written reprimands, Tim

Christensen calling him “boy,” Kevin McHugh referring t o him as the “black one,” Bob

Gammin yelling and treating him with disrespect, denial of Plaintiff’s request for time off to

help his mot her move, the assignment of overtime hours to Mike Holliday, Defendants’

failure to give him a “Bravo Zulu” commendat ion award, and Defendants’ failure to

accommodate his work scheduling requests. Doc. #56. Plaintiff cites no case law to

support his claim that these constitute adverse employment actions.5

The Ninth Circuit has held that “not every employment decision amounts to an

adverse employment action,” explaining t hat “only non-trivial employment actions that

would deter reasonable employees from complaining about Title VII violations” are

act ionable. Brooks, 214 F.3d at1092; Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 651. Termination, negative

employment references, undeserved negative performance reviews, and denial of

promotions qualify as adverse employment actions. See Brooks, 214 F.3d at 1093; Yartzoff

v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). In contrast , “ mere inconveniences or an

alteration of job responsibilities” do not qualify. Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d

527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998). Likewise, stray remarks, unrealized threats, and tense personal

relationships are not actionable. See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1473, 1381 (10th

Cir. 1994); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9t h Cir. 1990); Summar v.

Potter, 355 F.Sup p .3d 1046 (D. Alaska.2005) (“Badmouthing” an employee, when it is not

in the context of a job reference, is not an adverse employment action).

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The Court finds that only Plaintiff’s written reprimands and termination qualify as

adverse employment actions. The rest of the alleged misconduct simply does not rise to

the level of adverse employment actions. 

Having reached this conclusion, the Court must briefly revisit its time-bar

discussion. As addressed above, Plaintiff may not assert a Title VII claim for any discrete

acts of alleged race discrimination or ret aliation that occurred before November 20, 2001.

Section 1981 does not share this time-bar. As a result, Plaint iff’s written reprimand for

failing to pick up a customer package – which occurred before November 20, 2001 – is not

actionable under Tit le VII, but may be asserted under § 1981. Plaintiff’s termination and

written reprimand for the fueling error occurred after this date and therefore are actionable

under both Title VII and § 1981. All three of these claims will be addressed below.

2. Similarly Situated Non-minority Coworkers.

To be similarly situated, coworkers must have been dealt with by the same

supervisor, subject ed t o the same standards, and engaged in similar conduct. See

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. If plaintiff fails to identify similarly situat ed, non-minority

employees who were t reated more favorably, he fails to satisfy the fourth element of his

prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

First, Plaintiff claims he was issued a written reprimand for his refusal to pick up a

customer package, while his co-workers Zappia (white) and Gooh (Asian) were not

disciplined when they refused to meet Plaintiff for an internal p ick-up . Doc. #56.

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Zap p ia, Gooh, and Plaintiff were subject

to the same supervisor. Doc. #53. Plaintiff contends that all three employees were given

direct orders by the same dispatcher and that a dispatcher is essentially “de facto

management,” Doc. #56, but Plaint iff provides no evidence to supports his contention that

dispatchers are “de facto management” or that he and the ot hers were subject to the same

supervisor. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642 (another employee cannot be similarly situated

to a plaint iff unless the other employee had the same supervisor.) Because Plaintiff has

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failed to produce evidence in support of the “similarly situated” prong of his prima facie

case, his disparate treatment claim based on the first written reprimand must fail under §

1981. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. As noted above, this claim is time barred under Title VII.

Second, Plaintiff was rep rimanded by Supervisor Fitzgerald for a fueling error.

Doc. #53. Plaintiff comp lains that he was disciplined more harshly than employees Diane

LaMonica and Ron Bennett, each of whom committed the same fueling error. Doc #56.

Defendant s argue that employees LaMonica or Bennett are not similarly situated to

Plaintiff because LaM onica, Bennett, and Plaintiff were all disciplined by different

supervisors. Doc. #53. LaM onica worked in the Texas division of Federal Express at the

time of her fueling error and was subject to a different supervisor and managing director.

Id. Bennett was disciplined by Supervisor Christensen for his error, while Plaintiff was

discip lined by Supervisor Fitzgerald. Id. In response, Plaintiff offers no facts or ot her

contradicting evidence to show that LaMonica and Bennett were subject t o t he same

supervisor. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 disparate treatment claims for his

second written reprimand must also fail. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s unlawful termination claim fails because he does not respond to

Defendants’ argument that similarly situated individuals were not treated more favorably

with regard to termination. Doc. #53. Because he has failed to come forward with evidence

to support the fourth element of his prima facie case, summary judgment will be granted on

his Title VII and § 1981 termination claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24.

VI. Retaliation – Counts VI & IX.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must establish that (1) he

undertook protected activity, (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment

act ion, and (3) there is a causal link between those two events. Vasquez, 349. F.3d at 650.

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of

the evidence. Id. 

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As noted above, only Plaintiff’s writ ten reprimands and termination qualify as

adverse employment actions. The Court accordingly will consider Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims only with respect to these actions. 

Plaintiff engaged in protected act ivity by filing two internal discrimination

complaints and three EEOC charges. Defendant s argue that Plaintiff cannot show the

required causal connection between these activities and t he alleged adverse employment

actions. Doc. #53. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot show p ret ext because he

lacks evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer retaliation. Id. Plaint iff argues

that the close proximity in time between his protect ed activity and his subsequent

reprimands and termination are sufficient evidence of causation and pretext. Doc. #56. 

In Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001), the Supreme

Court stated that temporal proximity between the defendant’s knowledge of protected

activity and an adverse employment act ion can constitute sufficient evidence of causality

to establish a prima facie case, but only if the t emp oral p roximity is “very close.” The

Supreme Court up held t he district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant

because the 20-month period between the defendant’s knowledge of the protected activity

and the adverse employment actions “suggest[ed] by itself, no causality at all.” Id. at 274.

 In this case, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on his writ t en rep rimand for failing to

pick up a customer package (which remains as a retaliation claim under § 1981 only) cannot

survive summary judgment. The written reprimand occurred before Plaintiff’s first internal

complaint and before his EEOC and court filings, and therefore cannot be said to have been

in retaliation for these protected activities.

With respect t o t he written reprimand based on the fueling incident, Plaintiff

engaged in the protected activity of filing his internal complaints of discrimination in July

and August of 2001, and Defendants issued a written reprimand to Plaintiff in January 2002.

Doc. #53. T hus, Defendants had knowledge of the protected activity five months before

Plaintiff was reprimanded. The Court finds that the time lapse between Defendant’s

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knowledge of the protected activity and the decision to issue a written reprimand is simply

too long to constitute sufficient evidence of causation to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation. Compare Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273-74 (20-month lap se, by itself, suggests no

causality); Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 (18-month lapse is too long to give rise to an

inference of causat ion) with Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir.

2004) (four days sufficient to infer causation). See also Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, 202

F.3d 913, 918-19 (7th Cir. 2000) (three-mont h interval insufficient for causation). As a result,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on his second reprimand must fail. 

Only one month elapsed between Plaintiff’s filing of his federal complaint on April

4, 2003 and his termination on May 12, 2003. Id. Under Ninth Circuit law, this evidence is

sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer

Prods., Inc., 202 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have held that evidence based on timing

can be sufficient to let t he issue go to the jury, even in the face of alternative reasons

proffered by the defendant.”); Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376 (sufficient evidence of causation

exist ed where adverse employment action occurred less than three months after protected

activity); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1986) (sufficient

evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than two

months after protected activity).

VII. Summary.

The Court will grant summary judgment on the following claims: all Title VII claims

arising before November 20, 2001 (time-barred); all ADA claims (failure to produce

evidence of a substantial limitation in a major life activity); Employ ment Protection Act

(failure to produce evidence of causal connection to workers compensation claim); Title

VII and § 1981 hostile work environment claims (failure to produce evidence of severe or

pervasive conduct); Title VII and § 1981 disparate treatment claims (failure to show an

adverse employment act ion or to produce evidence that similarly situated non-minority

employees were treated more favorably ); and the retaliation claim based on the written

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reprimands (first reprimand time-barred under Title VII, and failure to establish a causal

connection on first and second reprimands under Title VII and § 1981). The Court will

deny summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Title VII and

§ 1981 based on Plaintiff’s termination. 

VIII. Motion to Strike.

Because the Court did not rely on the exhibits Defendants seek t o strike, the Court

will deny their motion to strike as moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 53) is granted in part

and denied in part as set forth above. 

2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits and Portions of Plaintiff’s

Statement of Disputed Facts (Doc. #63) is denied as moot.

3. The Court will schedule a final pretrial conference by separate order.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2006.

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