Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00984/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

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18cv00984-GPC(JMA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP 

address 68.72.208.123,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv00984-GPC(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO 

SERVE A THIRD PARTY 

SUBPOENA PRIOR TO A RULE 

26(f) CONFERENCE [ECF No. 4]

Before the Court is an Ex Parte Application for Leave to Serve a Third 

Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference filed by Plaintiff Strike 3 

Holdings, LLC (“Plaintiff”). (ECF No. 4.) For the reasons discussed below, 

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant John Doe 

subscriber assigned IP address 68.72.208.123 (“Defendant”). (Compl., ECF No. 

1). Plaintiff alleges it “owns the intellectual property to the Blacked, Blacked 

Raw, Tushy, and Vixen adult brands (the “Brands”), including the copyrights to 

each of the motion pictures distributed through the Brands’ sites and the 

trademarks to each of the Brand’s names and logos.” Ex Parte Appl. at 1; 

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18cv00984-GPC(JMA)

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Compl., ¶ 32 & Ex. A. The Complaint alleges a claim of copyright infringement. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, using IP address 68.72.208.123, infringed 

Plaintiff’s copyrights by copying and distributing the constituent elements of 

Plaintiff’s copyrighted works using the BitTorrent protocol without Plaintiff’s

authorization, permission or consent. Compl., ¶¶ 35-40.

Plaintiff seeks leave of court to serve a subpoena pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 45 on Defendant’s internet service provider (“ISP”), AT&T, Inc., in order to 

learn Defendant’s identity. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Generally, discovery is not permitted without a court order before the 

parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Yet, “in rare cases, courts have made exceptions, permitting 

limited discovery to ensue after filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to 

learn the identifying facts necessary to permit service on the defendant.” 

Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 

(citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Courts grant 

these requests when the moving party shows good cause for the early discovery. 

Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Elec. Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that when the defendants’ identities are 

unknown at the time the complaint is filed, courts may grant plaintiffs leave to 

take early discovery to determine the defendants’ identities “unless it is clear that 

discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be 

dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. A district court’s 

decision to grant discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is a matter of 

discretion. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.

District courts apply a three-factor test when considering motions for early 

discovery to identify certain defendants. Id. at 578-80. First, the plaintiff should 

“identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can 

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determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal 

court.” Id. at 578. Second, the movant must describe “all previous steps taken to 

locate the elusive defendant” to ensure that the plaintiff has made a good faith 

effort to identify and serve process on the defendant. Id. at 579. Third, the 

plaintiff should establish that its suit against the defendant could withstand a 

motion to dismiss. Id. “[T]o prevent abuse of this extraordinary application of the 

discovery process and to ensure that the plaintiff has standing,” the plaintiff must 

show that some act giving rise to liability actually occurred and that the discovery 

is aimed at identifying the person who actually committed the act. Id. at 579-80.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Identification of Missing Parties with Sufficient Specificity

First, Plaintiff must identify Defendant with enough specificity to enable the 

Court to determine that the defendant is a real person or entity who would be 

subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Id. at 578. “[A] plaintiff identifies Doe 

defendants with sufficient specificity by providing the unique IP addresses 

assigned to an individual defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing 

conduct, and by using “geolocation technology” to trace the IP address to a 

physical point of origin. 808 Holdings, LLC v. Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing 

Hash, 2012 WL 1648838, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2012). 

Here, Plaintiff determined the ISP that had provided the subject IP address 

associated with Defendant was AT&T, Inc., and used geolocation technology to 

trace the IP address to an address located within this district. Compl., ¶¶ 8-9 & 

Ex. A; Fieser Decl., ¶¶ 7-9; Stalzer Decl., ¶ 11. Consequently, Plaintiff has 

identified Defendant with sufficient specificity and has satisfied the first factor of 

the test for permitting early discovery.

B. Previous Attempts to Locate Defendant

Next, Plaintiff must identify all previous steps taken to identify the Doe 

Defendant in a good faith effort to locate and serve it. See Columbia Ins. Co., 

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185 F.R.D. at 579. According to Plaintiff, it “has been unable to identify any other 

way to go about obtaining the identities of its infringers.” Ex Parte Appl. at 9. 

This is the case because although publicly available data allowed Plaintiff to 

identify the specific ISP used by Defendant as well as the city associated with the 

IP address, it did not permit Plaintiff to ascertain the identity of the subscriber or 

actual defendant. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff appears to have investigated and 

obtained the data pertaining to the alleged infringement in a good faith effort to 

locate Defendant. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-5698, No. C-11-04397 

LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128033, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011).

C. Ability to Withstand a Motion to Dismiss

Lastly, to be entitled to early discovery, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

Complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 

at 579.

1. Ability to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

Plaintiff alleges it “owns the intellectual property to the Blacked, Blacked 

Raw, Tushy, and Vixen adult brands, including the copyrights to each of the 

motion pictures distributed through the brands’ sites and the trademarks to each 

of the brand names and logos.” Ex Parte Appl. at 1; Compl., ¶ 32 & Ex. A. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, using IP address 68.72.208.123, infringed 

Plaintiff’s copyrights by copying and distributing the constituent elements of 

Plaintiff’s copyrighted works, Blacked, Blacked Raw, Tushy and Vixen, using the 

BitTorrent protocol without Plaintiff’s authorization, permission or consent. Id., ¶¶ 

35-40. The Court finds Plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case of copyright 

infringement against Defendant. 

2. Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdictional facts. See Columbia 

Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. Plaintiff, using geolocation technology, traced 

Defendant’s IP address to a point of origin within this District. Compl., ¶¶ 8-9 &

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Ex. A; Fieser Decl., ¶¶ 7-9; Stalzer Decl., ¶ 11. Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to show it can likely withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pink Lotus Entm’t, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, 

at *6-7.

3. Venue

“The venue of suits for infringement of copyright is not determined by the 

general provision governing suits in the federal district courts, rather by the 

venue provision of the Copyright Act.” Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 

1136, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Civil actions for copyright infringement “may be 

instituted in the district in which defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” 

28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(1) (West 2006). An individual “resides” for venue purposes 

in the district of his domicile. 17 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal 

Practice, § 110.39[2], at 110-76 (3d ed. 2011). A defendant is “found” for venue 

purposes where he is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. (footnote omitted); see

also Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“This circuit interprets [28 U.S.C. § 1400(a)] to allow venue in any judicial 

district where, if treated as a separate state, the defendant would be subject to 

personal jurisdiction.”). Plaintiff alleges venue is proper because Defendant 

allegedly committed the infringing acts complained of in this District. Thus, 

venue appears to be proper at this time.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint can likely survive a motion to dismiss. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 

Application is GRANTED as follows:

1. Plaintiff may serve a subpoena pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 upon 

AT&T, Inc. for the sole purpose of obtaining the name and address only of 

Defendant John Doe, based on the IP address listed for him in the complaint –

68.72.208.123. AT&T, Inc. shall have fourteen (14) calendar days after service 

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of the subpoena upon it to notify its subscriber that his/her identity has been 

subpoenaed by Plaintiff. The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed 

shall have thirty (30) calendar days from the date of such notice to challenge the 

disclosure to Plaintiff by filing an appropriate pleading with this Court contesting 

the subpoena. If AT&T, Inc. intends to move to quash the subpoena, it must do 

so prior to the return date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena 

must allow for at least forty-five (45) days from service to production. If a motion 

to quash or other customer challenge is brought, AT&T, Inc. must preserve the 

information sought by Plaintiff pending resolution of the motion or challenge.

2. The subpoena shall not seek Defendant’s telephone number, email 

address, or Media Access Control (MAC) address, as this information is not 

necessary for Plaintiff to identify and serve Defendant. 

3. Plaintiff may use the information disclosed pursuant to the subpoena 

only in pursuing this litigation.

4. Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this order with any subpoena served 

upon AT&T, Inc. pursuant to this Order. AT&T, Inc., in turn, must provide a copy 

of this Order along with the required notice to the subscriber whose identity is 

sought pursuant to this Order.

5. No other discovery is authorized at this time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2018

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