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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10827

Summary Calendar

REGGIE RUFFIN,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Dallas County; 

CITY OF DALLAS; DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

CITY OF DALLAS MAYOR’S OFFICE; JAMES E. BUTT, City Attorney; 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,

Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CV-46

Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Reggie Ruffin, a non-prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 

appeals the dismissal, as frivolous and time-barred, of his pro se 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Ruffin sued in January 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 4, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 14-10827 Document: 00513067313 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/04/2015
No. 14-10827

2

2014, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with arrests in June 2009 and October 2010, and the resulting criminal 

proceedings, which were terminated in his favor in July 2010 and October 

2011.

Ruffin claims that he alleged causes of action against the defendants,

and he states, albeit in a conclusional fashion, that limitations should have 

been tolled during the pendency of a civil suit and because he continues to suffer damages from the defendants’ past conduct.

The district court may dismiss an IFP claim as frivolous if it is barred by

limitations, and we review such a dismissal for abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 1998). Even if the limitations 

periods did not begin to run until the proceedings were terminated in Ruffin’s 

favor, see Price v. City of San Antonio, 431 F.3d 890, 894 (5th Cir. 2005), Ruffin 

still waited more than two years before filing his § 1983 complaint. Further, 

although Ruffin claims that he continues to suffer damages from defendants’ 

past conduct, he points to no continuing wrongful conduct that would affect the 

accrual of his claims. His contention that he is entitled to tolling because of 

his pending state court suit is likewise without merit because he fails to show 

he was precluded from pursuing his federal suit. See Holmes v. Texas A&M 

Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1998).

Because the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint as 

time-barred, we do not address the merits of Ruffin’s complaint. Further, 

because this appeal does not present “exceptional circumstances,” see Cooper 

v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991), Ruffin’s 

motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-10827 Document: 00513067313 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/04/2015