Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00493/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00493-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Mazet incorrectly contends that Hartford’s response was filed late. It was due and

filed on July 14, 2008. See LRCiv 7.2(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (e). 

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David L. Mazet, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Halliburton Company Long-Term

Disability Plan, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-04-0493-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it Mazet’s motion for remand to the plan administrator, or

alternatively for de novo review (doc. 78), defendants’ response (doc. 80),1

 and Mazet’s reply

(doc. 81). We also have before us defendants’ corrected sur-reply (doc. 89), Mazet’s surresponse (doc. 90) and errata to his sur-response (doc. 91), defendants’ request for leave to

file a supplemental brief (doc. 92) and Mazet’s objection (doc. 93). 

On February 5, 2008, we remanded this case to the plan administrator to recalculate

Mazet’s benefits during the “own occupation” period by including his deferred compensation

in his Pre-disability Earnings (doc. 76). We also directed the administrator to determine

Mazet’s eligibility for continuing benefits during the “any occupation” period based on the

Case 2:04-cv-00493-FJM Document 95 Filed 08/29/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Because Hartford exercised its discretion by indexing Pre-disability Earnings, we

reject Mazet’s argument that a de novo standard of review applies. Instead we apply an

abuse of discretion standard in reviewing Hartford’s decision on remand.

3

Mazat did not challenge this calculation in either his present motion or reply (docs.

78, 81). Instead, for the first time in his sur-response, he argues that Hartford’s indexing

- 2 -

revised calculation. Mazet argues in the present motion that “Hartford has failed again to

adjust (‘index’) [his] pre-disability earnings according to applicable ‘Consumer Price Index’

(‘CPI’), as required by the Plan.” Motion at 2. Mazet’s argument is premised on a

misinterpretation of the plain language of the Plan. 

A Plan participant is eligible for benefits during the “any occupation” period if he

cannot perform any occupation for which he is qualified that has an earnings potential greater

than 60% of his Indexed Pre-disability Earnings. Motion at 3. “Indexed Pre-disability

Earnings” is defined as “Pre-disability Earnings adjusted annually by adding the lesser of (1)

10%; or (2) the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index.” Id. 

Mazet now claims that “both ‘own occupation’ and ‘any occupation’ benefits are

required to be adjusted according to the CPI.” Id. This is incorrect. Mazet is not entitled to

“indexed benefits.” The term “Indexed Pre-disability Earnings” is only applicable in

determining whether a claimant is disabled. It is not a factor in calculating the benefit

amount. According to the plain language of the Plan, benefit payments during both the “own

occupation” and “any occupation” periods are based on “Pre-disability Earnings,” not

“Indexed Pre-disability Earnings.” Response at 2.

Contrary to Mazet’s argument, Hartford did index his Pre-disability Earnings for

purposes of determining his eligibility for continued benefits.2

 Hartford first determined that

Mazet’s monthly Pre-disability Earnings, including deferred compensation, was $4,954.29.

Motion, ex. 1. Then, it “indexed” the revised Pre-disability Earnings of $4,954.29 by adding

2.6% for 2002 and 1.3% for 2003, the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index.

Response at 5. According to Hartford’s calculations, Mazet’s Indexed Pre-disability

Earnings equaled $5,149.18. Id.3

 Therefore, Mazet is not eligible for continuing disability

Case 2:04-cv-00493-FJM Document 95 Filed 08/29/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

calculation is faulty. We will not consider another belated argument. See Weber v. Dept.

of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1060, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2008). 

4

Rather than relying solely on its 2003 employability assessment on remand, Hartford

performed an “updated assessment,” this time concluding that Mazet’s earnings potential was

$3,218.80. As Mazet contends, Sur-Response at 3, this is beyond the scope of our remand

order and, notwithstanding that it further buttresses the denial of continuing benefits, we do

not consider it now. 

- 3 -

benefits during the “any occupation” period if his earnings potential for 2003 exceeded

$3,089.51, or 60% of his Indexed Pre-disability Earnings.

Apparently recognizing his error, Mazet abandons his argument that Hartford failed

to index Pre-disability Earnings and instead asserts, for the first time in a footnote in his

reply, that Hartford incorrectly calculated his estimated 2003 earnings potential, attaching

as an exhibit a website page from the U.S. Department of Labor, a document not included

in the administrative record. Reply at 2 n.3. Because Mazet raised a new issue for the first

time in his reply brief, we granted Hartford’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply and allowed

Mazet an opportunity to file a sur-response (doc. 88). 

To reiterate, according to the terms of the Plan, Mazet is ineligible for continuing

benefits during the “any occupation” period if his earnings potential is greater than 60% of

his Indexed Pre-disability Earnings. We noted in our previous order that during the initial

claims process, Hartford determined that Mazet was capable of performing five occupations,

all of which had monthly earnings potential of $3,101.03 (doc. 76 at 5). Mazet did not

challenge this calculation. In fact he argued to the court that the labor market information

currently in the administrative record was not outdated and was a sufficient basis upon which

to calculate continuing benefits eligibility. (doc. 66 at 10 n.1). Based in part on Mazet’s

assertion, we limited the scope of our remand order and stated that the earnings potential

calculation of $3,101.03 "remains relevant to the continuing benefits eligibility determination

[on remand]." Id.4

 We will not entertain Mazet’s change of position at this point in these

protracted proceedings. At all events, many of these same arguments related to earnings

Case 2:04-cv-00493-FJM Document 95 Filed 08/29/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

potential were previously considered and rejected by our order dated August 19, 2005 (doc.

40). 

Because Mazet’s earnings potential ($3,101.03) is greater than 60% of his Indexed

Pre-disability Earnings (60% of $5,149.18 = $3,089.51), Hartford properly concluded that

Mazet is not entitled to benefits during the “any occupation” period. 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s motion for remand, GRANTING the

motion to the extent that it seeks review of Hartford’s decision on its merits, and

AFFIRMING Hartford’s decision (doc. 78). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING

defendants’ request for leave to file a supplemental brief (doc. 92). The clerk shall enter final

judgment.

DATED this 29th day of August, 2008.

Case 2:04-cv-00493-FJM Document 95 Filed 08/29/08 Page 4 of 4