Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01425/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01425-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

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and Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND OCHOA, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

DARRELL G. ADAMS, et al., )

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Respondents. )

 )

1:06-CV-01425 AWI NEW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS 

[Doc. #7]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by guilty

plea on May 5, 1995, to assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2).

See Lodged Doc. No. 1. In addition, several sentencing enhancements were found to be true. Id. On

May 30, 1995, Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state

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U.S. District Court

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prison. Id. Petitioner did not appeal the conviction.

Petitioner filed five post-conviction challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment in the

state courts, as follows:

1. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court;

Filed: March 24, 2000; Denied: April 21, 2000;

2. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court;

Filed: December 9, 2003; Denied: December 22, 2003;

3. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court;

Filed: September 21, 2005; Denied: October 3, 2005;

4. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeals;

Filed: October 31, 2005; Denied: December 16, 2005;

5. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court;

Filed: January 3, 2006; Denied: September 20, 2006.

See Lodged Docs. Nos. 2-11.

On October 16, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. On January 24, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for violation of the

one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On February 9, 2007, Petitioner

filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." See

also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990). 

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

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4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

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state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on October 16, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

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other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, Petitioner was sentenced on May 30, 1995, and Petitioner did not

file an appeal. Pursuant to Rule 31(a) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty (60) days

in which to file a notice of appeal. Rule 31(a), Cal.R.Ct.; People v. Mendez, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301,

302, 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1086, 969 P.2d 146, 147 (1999). Because Petitioner did not file a notice of

appeal, his direct review concluded on July 29, 1995, when the sixty-day period for filing a notice of

appeal expired. 

The AEDPA is silent on how the one year limitation period affects cases where direct review

concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has held that if a petitioner whose

review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas corpus petition within one year of

the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

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899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d 782, 784 (9 Cir.), cert. denied,

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118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations period would begin to run on

April 25, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9 Cir. 2001). Thus, Petitioner had one year th

until April 25, 1997, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. However,

Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until October 16, 2006, over nine years beyond the due

date. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

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state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9 th th

Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court petition and the

filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is tolled during the pendency

of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue.").

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996. Although

Petitioner filed five post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim in the state courts, those petitions did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. The first

collateral challenge was not filed until March 24, 2000, almost three years beyond the expiration of 

the limitations period. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral challenges

had no tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not th

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d

1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Therefore, the petition

is untimely.

D. Commencement of the Limitations Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) 

In his opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner claims the limitations period

should not commence until after the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (emphasis

added), the limitation period runs from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” In Apprendi, the Supreme

Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior conviction) that exposes a

defendant to a sentence in excess of the relevant statutory maximum must be found by a jury, not a

judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. However, the Supreme Court did not hold Apprendi to be retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) (“No

Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that Apprendi has retroactive effect.”); United States

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v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9 Cir.2002) (the ruling in Apprendi does not apply th

retroactively to initial petitions for collateral review). Therefore, the limitations period did not

commence on the date Apprendi was decided.

E. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

Here, Petitioner vaguely mentions the possibility of the existence of a mental condition.

Mental incompetency has been considered to be an extraordinary circumstance beyond a prisoner's

control. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th

Cir.1998) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003).

If in fact Petitioner is arguing his mental condition was such an extraordinary circumstance, his

claim for equitable tolling should be rejected because it is completely unsupported by any facts.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

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document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be

submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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