Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00588/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00588-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEXTRON SYSTEMS, INC,

Plaintiff,

v

MICROSOFT CORP,

Defendant.

 /

No C-04-0588 VRW

ORDER

The patent-in-suit in this infringement action is United

Stats Patent No 5,794,259, which discloses an “apparatus and

methods to enhance web browsing on the internet.” The invention is

in the field of web browser technology, and, more particularly,

“tools for filling in forms” on web pages. Patent at 1:5-8. The

court held a claim construction hearing on May 25, 2005, pursuant

to Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 US 370 (1996). Based

on the hearing, the parties’ memoranda and the applicable Federal

Circuit law, the court construes the claims of the patent as

follows.

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I

The patent itself concisely explains its purpose and

background:

Often when browsing the [web], one encounters

forms to fill out, mostly for buying or

subscribing to services or products. these

forms are often long, asking for lots of

information, and tedious to fill out.

* * *

What is needed * * * is a system that

allows a user to link specific pre-stored data,

usually data unique to the user, with fields in

forms encountered on the Internet, such that a

pipeline is established for quickly and

efficiently filling fields in forms.

Patent at 1:13-16, 45-50.

The patent describes such a system involving four types

of entities: fields, field names, stored fill entities and tags. 

Although the court will have occasion below to construe some of

these terms more precisely, a rough description of these four

entities and how they interact will serve to frame the context of

the patent. “Fields” are the familiar blank spaces to be filled in

on web pages. Each field has a “field name”; this field name is

internal to the web page code and is not seen by the user. A field

name is different from a “field label,” which is typically text

visible to the user that is placed near the field to identify the

purpose of the field to the user. “Stored fill entities” are

pieces of text or data that have been stored on the computer with a

view toward entering them in a field on a web page. Each stored

fill entity is identified in the computer by a “tag” that describes

the content of the stored fill entity. When a form is encountered

in browsing the web and the system described by the patent is

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activated, the system compares the field names with the tags, and

if a match is found, it associates the stored fill entity having

the matching tag with the field having the matching field name. By

way of a concrete example, consider a field for a user to enter his

surname. The field name for the field might be “LastName.” If the

user, Mr Jones, has created a stored fill entity “Jones” with the

tag “LastName,” then the system can automatically associate “Jones”

with the surname field on the form.

What it means for a tag and a field name to “match” and

what it means to “associate” a stored fill entity with a field are

matters the parties hotly dispute. To these questions, and the

construction of other terms of the patent, the court now turns.

II

The construction of patent claims is a question of law to

be determined by the court. Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc,

517 US 370 (1996). The goal of claim construction is “to interpret

what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim.” 

Renishaw PLC v Marposs SpA, 158 F3d 1243, 1249 (Fed Cir 1998). In

determining what a patentee meant by a term or phrase, the court

looks first to the claim itself.

The claims of the patent provide the concise

formal definition of the invention. They are

the numbered paragraphs which “particularly

[point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject

matter which the applicant regards as his

invention.” 35 USC § 112. It is to these

wordings that one must look to determine

whether there has been infringement. Courts

can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to

give the patentee something different than what

he has set forth. No matter how great the

temptations of fairness or policy making,

courts do not rework claims. They only

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interpret them.

EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Phillips Petroleum Co, 849 F2d 1430,

1433 (Fed Cir 1988). 

“The claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the

claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases

with the actual words of the claim.” Renishaw, 158 F3d at 1248. 

“The words used in the claim are viewed through the viewing glass

of a person skilled in the art.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v Intuitive

Surgical, Inc, 326 F3d 1215, 1220 (Fed Cir 2003) (citing Tegal Corp

v Tokyo Electron Am, Inc, 257 F3d 1331, 1342 (Fed Cir 2001)). 

“Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent

applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and

accustomed meaning.” York Prods, Inc v Central Tractor Farm &

Family Ctr, 99 F3d 1568, 1572 (Fed Cir 1996). The court may, if

necessary, consult a variety of sources to determine the ordinary

and customary meaning of a claim term, including the claim terms

themselves, dictionaries, the written description, the drawings and

the prosecution history, if in evidence. Brookhill-Wilk 1, 326 F3d

at 1220. “Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source

of legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” 

Vitronics Corp v Conceptronic, Inc, 90 F3d 1576, 1582 (Fed Cir

1996). With respect to dictionary definitions, “[i]f more than one

dictionary definition is consistent with the use of the words in

the intrinsic record, the claim terms may be construed to encompass

all such consistent meanings.” Texas Digital Systems, Inc v

Telegenix, Inc, 308 F3d 1193, 1203 (Fed Cir 2002).

The court begins its construction of claim terms by

consulting intrinsic evidence of the meaning of disputed claim

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terms, which includes the claims, the specification and the

prosecution history (if in evidence). Lacks Industries, Inc v

McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc, 322 F3d 1335, 1341 (Fed Cir

2003) (citation omitted). “If upon examination of this intrinsic

evidence the meaning of the claim language is sufficiently clear,

resort to ‘extrinsic’ evidence, such as treatises and technical

references, as well as expert testimony when appropriate, should

not be necessary.” Digital Biometrics, Inc, v Identix, Inc, 149

F3d 1335, 1344 (Fed Cir 1998). “[I]f after consideration of the

intrinsic evidence, there remains doubt as to the exact meaning of

the claim terms, consideration of extrinsic evidence may be

necessary to determine the proper construction.” Id.

“[A] court may constrict the ordinary meaning of a claim

term in * * * one of four ways[:]” (1) “if the patentee acted as

his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the

disputed claim in either the specification or prosecution history;”

(2) if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished

the term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment,

expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular

embodiment as important to the invention; (3) “if the term chosen

by the patentee so deprives the claim of clarity as to require

resort to other intrinsic evidence for a definite meaning; and (4)

“if the patentee phrased the claim in step- or means-plus-function

format,” then “a claim term will cover nothing more than the

corresponding structure or step disclosed in the specification, as

well as equivalents thereto * * *.” CCS Fitness, Inc v Brunswick

Corp, 288 F3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed Cir 2002) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

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Limitations from the specification, such as from the

preferred embodiment, cannot be read into the claims absent an

express intention to do so. Teleflex, Inc v Ficosa North Am Corp,

299 F3d 1313, 1326 (Fed Cir 2002) (“The claims must be read in view

of the specification, but limitations from the specification are

not to be read into the claims.”). But “a construction that

excludes a preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’” 

C R Bard, Inc v United States Surgical Corp, 388 F3d 858, 865 (Fed

Cir 2004) (citing Vitronics, 90 F3d at 1583).

With these legal principles in mind, the court now turns

to the construction of the disputed claim language of the patent.

III

Independent claims 1 and 4 are at issue. The disputed

terms in these claims overlap significantly. Accordingly, except

where noted, the court construes like terms in the same manner. As

much of the claim language is in dispute, the court simply

rescribes the claims here and will identify the precise terms in

dispute as it construes them in turn.

1. A system for providing data for fields having coded

field names in forms downloaded as code from a

server on the Internet, comprising:

a central processing unit (CPU);

a display operable by the CPU;

stored fill entities associated with

tags accessible by the CPU; and

control code executable by the CPU;

wherein the CPU, executing the

control code, compares the coded

field names in the downloaded code

with the tags associated with the

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stored fill entities, retrieves fill

entities when a match is made, and

associates retrieved fill entities

with fields wherein the tags match

the field names, preparatory to

transmission to the server on the

Internet.

* * *

4. A method incorporating a computer having a display

screen, the method for providing data for forms

having fields with coded field names downloaded as

code from a server on the Internet comprising steps

of:

(a) associating fill entities with

tags;

(b) storing the fill entities

associated with the tags in a memory

of the computer;

(c) downloading a form as code from a

server on the Internet through a

browser using the computer;

(d) associating the tags of the

stored fill entities with coded field

names in the code of the downloaded

form; and

(e) causing the stored fill entities

with tags matching coded field names

in the code of the downloaded form to

be associated with the coded fields

to which the tags match.

Patent at 5:11-6:31.

A

Before turning to the actual claim language, a comment on

the structure of claim 1 is in order. Although the bulk of the

claim describes steps, the claimed subject matter is a “system.” 

But this claim is neither a method claim nor a means-plus-function

claim. Rather it is an apparatus -- a “machine” under 35 USC § 101

-- specifically, a computer system.

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Claim 1 is not a method claim, most obviously because it

does not use the word “method.” Furthermore, claim 1 describes a

“system” that “compris[es]” several structural components (viz, a

CPU, a display, “stored fill entities associated with tags” and

“control code”). The stepwise functional language of claim 1

(“wherein the CPU * * * compares * * *, retrieves * * *, and

associates * * *”) is simply a limitation, and functional

limitations are a proper way of limiting apparatus claims. See,

e g, K-2 Corp v Saloman SA, 191 F3d 1356, 1363 (Fed Cir 1999).

Nor is claim 1 drafted in means-plus-function form

pursuant to 35 USC § 112, ¶6. True, claim 1 is “a system for

providing,” and “system” can be a synonym for “means.” 

Nonetheless,

“a claim term that does not use ‘means’ will

trigger the rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶

6 does not apply.” CCS Fitness, Inc v

Brunswick Corp, 288 F3d 1359, 1369 (Fed Cir

2002). The use of the term “means” is “central

to the analysis,” Personalized Media

Communications, LLC v Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161

F3d 696, 703 (Fed Cir 1998), because the term

“means,” particularly as used in the phrase

“means for,” is “part of the classic template

for functional claim elements,” Sage Prods, Inc

v Devon Indus, Inc, 126 F3d 1420, 1427 (Fed Cir

1997), and has come to be closely associated

with means-plus-function claiming. See Apex,

Inc v Raritan Computer, Inc, 325 F3d 1364, 1373

(Fed Cir 2003); York Prods, Inc v Cent Tractor

Farm & Family Ctr, 99 F3d 1568, 1574 (Fed Cir

1996).

The presumption that a limitation lacking

the term “means” is not subject to section 112

¶ 6 can be overcome if it is demonstrated that

“the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently

definite structure’ or else recites ‘function

without reciting sufficient structure for

performing that function.’” CCS Fitness, 288

F3d at 1369 (quoting Watts v XL Sys, Inc, 232

F3d 877, 880 (Fed Cir 2000)). Our cases make

clear, however, that the presumption flowing

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from the absence of the term “means” is a

strong one that is not readily overcome. See,

e g, Al-Site Corp v VSI Int’l, Inc, 174 F3d

1308, 1318-19 (Fed Cir 1999); Personalized

Media Communications, 161 F 3d at 703-05.

Lighting World, Inc v Birchwood Lighting, Inc, 382 F3d 1354, 1358

(Fed Cir 2004).

Claim 1 recites sufficient structure to remove the

possibility that “system” is actually “means” in disguise. As

noted above, claim 1 describes a CPU, a display, control code and

more. The presumption against reading claim 1 under § 112, ¶6

remains unrebutted.

Accordingly, the court regards claim 1 as an apparatus

claim.

B

Turning to specific aspects of the claim language, the

court will construe disputed terms in the order in which they

appear in the claims.

“providing data”

Defendant contends that “providing data” means that the

system places data in fields on a form; plaintiff offers the more

expansive construction of “making data available.” Plaintiff’s

construction appears to accord with the dictionary definition of

“provide.” By contrast, defendant offers several reasons for its

construction, none of which persuades.

First, defendant offers a lengthy logical chain beginning

with step (d) of claim 4:

1. Step (d) associates fill entities with fields by

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virtue of the association between tags and field

names.

2. Step (e) must require something more than step (d).

3. Hence, “associates” in step (e) must refer to

something more than “associates” in step (d).

4. “Associates” in step (e) must mean “places retrieved

fill entities into fields.”

5. Step (e) is a step of claim 4.

6. Hence, claim 4 includes placing retrieved fill

entities into field.

7. Hence “providing” in the preamble of claim 4 must

mean “placing data into fields on a form.”

8. “Providing” in claim 1 must have the same meaning as

“providing in claim 4.

9. Hence, “providing” in claim 1 must mean “placing

data in fields on a form.”

There are several steps in this chain with which plaintiff takes

issue. But for present purposes, it suffices to note that the

inferential chain fails at the very first step: Stripped to its

grammatical bones, step (d) describes associating “tags * * * with

coded field names.” Step (e) describes associating “stored fill

entities * * * with * * * coded fields.” Step (d) may imply to a

human being that an association between a tag and a field name

implies an association between the corresponding stored fill entity

and field. But the patent is directed at computer processing, and

a computer would necessarily need separate instructions to achieve

both step (d) and step (e).

Second, defendant agues that plaintiff’s proposed

construction would render the claim “hopelessly indefinite” and

invalid under 35 USC § 112, ¶2. Although “where there is an equal

choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim,” and

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the narrower meaning will save the claim from invalidity, the

narrower construction is preferred, see Athletic Alternatives v

Prince Manufacturing, Inc, 73 F3d 1573, 1581 (Fed Cir 1996), there

is no “equal choice” here. Rather, the usual principle of claim

construction applies: Courts are not to ignore the plain meaning

of claim language in an attempt to save the claim from invalidity. 

See, e g, EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Phillips Petroleum Co, 849

F2d 1430, 1433 (Fed Cir 1988).

Third, defendant argues that “the specification

considered filling in forms to be the invention. * * * The fact

that the text of the patent consistently refers to ‘the invention’

as a system that fills in fields ‘suggests that the very character

of the invention requires the limitation be a part of every

embodiment’ because nothing else is disclosed.” Def Br (Doc #64)

at 12:23, 13:14-16 (quoting Alloc, Inc v ITC, 342 F3d 1361, 1370

(Fed Cir 2003)). But the “very character of the invention” is not

actual filling of fields, but rather the automation of part of that

task. Filling in fields is merely a limitation in a preferred

embodiment disclosed in the specification. As such, defendant’s

argument appears to run afoul of the principle that “limitations

from the specification, such as from the preferred embodiment,

cannot be read into the claims absent an express intention to do

so.” Teleflex, 299 F3d at 1326.

Moreover, the specification contemplates “activat[ing]” a

“bubble” with possible choices for stored fill entities. See

Patent at 4:15-25 & fig 2. Claim 2, which more specifically claims

such a bubble-based system, speaks of “fill[ing] the field,” while

there is no mention of field-filling in claim 1.

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Finally, defendant argues that the patent prosecution

history establishes that “providing” is limited to filling in

fields. It is true that claim 1 originally referred to a “system

for filling fields” and was amended to describe a “system for

providing data for fields.” See Def Br (Doc #64) Ex K (amendment). 

And it is also true that, even after amendment, the patentee

referred to the invention as one for filling in forms. See, e g,

id at 6 (referring to “automated filling of forms as taught in

Applicant’s invention”). The issue is close. On the one hand, the

file history supports defendant’s position because it discusses the

invention in terms of filling in fields. On the other hand, the

amendment to the actual claim language squarely supports

plaintiff’s position. Indeed, to accept defendant’s position would

require the court to read the amendment out of the claim, something

the court cannot do. “[T]he claim construction inquiry * * *

begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.” 

Renishaw, 158 F3d at 1248.

Accordingly, the court construes “providing data” as

“making data available.”

“coded field names”

Defendant contends simply that the coded field names are

the names of the fields. Plaintiff would provide that the coded

field names are “the names assigned to empty fields in (normally

hidden) markup language instructions (used to program a form) that

are used by the computer to keep track of data entered into the

fields.” Plaintiff devotes considerable attention to arguing that

the field names (identifiers internal to the computer) are

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different from the field labels (identifiers visible to the user),

but defendant does not dispute this. See, e g, Def Br (Doc #64) at

18:8-9, 17-19 (“Lextron and Microsoft generally agree that ‘coded

field names’ * * * are the names in the code that the computer uses

to access the data in the fields * * *. Field labels are the

visible text that identifies a field to a user on the screen. 

Field labels are optional, field names are not (the computer needs

the field name to access the data in the field).”).

The parties’ dispute centers not on the basic meaning of

“coded field names,” but rather on whether plaintiff’s additional

limitations are appropriate. Defendant posits that plaintiff seeks

to limit its claims to HTML (hypertext markup language, the

standard language for web pages) “through the back door” with these

limitations. Id at 17:7-8. Plaintiff may not disagree that its

constructions limit the claims to HTML; in fact, it contends that

just such a limitation is appropriate in light of (1) the patent

title’s reference to “Web Browsing on the Internet”; (2) the fieldof-invention reference to “the field of Internet World Wide Web

(WWW) browser technology”; (3) the references to web pages in the

specification; and (4) claim 4’s reference to a “browser.”

The trouble with plaintiff’s argument is that it looks

everywhere but the language of the claims themselves. There is

nothing about “coded field names” that requires a limitation to a

particular code language. The patentee certainly might have added

such a limitation, but it does not appear in the claims as written. 

Charitably read, plaintiff’s references to the specification could

be an invocation of the principle that the patentee may act as his

own lexicographer by defining claim terms in the specification. 

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But even this argument would be unavailing: The term “coded field

names” does not appear anywhere outside of the claims, and “field

names” is used repeatedly throughout the specification without

explicit definition.

That said, plaintiff points out that the prosecution

history reflects an amendment that added “coded” before “field

names” to overcome a rejection of the claim as unpatentable over

United States Patent No 5,450,537 (“Hirai”). Hirai also teaches a

method and apparatus for filling in forms -- such as paper forms

scanned into a computer -- but operates based on the text labels of

fields, not an encoded field name. To overcome Hirai, the patentee

here added “coded.” See Pl Br (Doc #43) Ex G at 9 (amendment). As

such, the court’s construction must reflect this limitation. 

Defendant’s proposed construction “the names of the fields” gives

no content to “coded.” Plaintiff’s proposed construction can be

used in part to give content to “coded” by explaining that the

names are “in computer language.”

Accordingly, the court construes “coded field names” as

“the names of the fields in computer language.”

“downloaded”

The parties seem to dispute the construction of this

term: Plaintiff proposes “obtained” and defendant proposes

“received.” The court sees no need to construe a term that has

entered the popular lexicon.

Accordingly, the court declines to construe this term.

/

/

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“code”

The dispute over this term is largely resolved by the

court’s construction of “coded field names”: Plaintiff advocates

here, as it did with “coded field names,” that the term should be

limited to a markup language (such as, but not limited to, HTML). 

The court has rejected this contention. Defendant’s construction -

- “representation of information” -- is not satisfactory, as it

strikes the court as unhelpfully vague and possibly misleading. In

any event, “code” may be sufficiently familiar (or immaterial) as

to require no construction.

Accordingly, the court declines to construe “code” at

this time. The parties may apply to the court for a construction

if it becomes necessary.

“Internet”

Plaintiff proposes to construe “Internet” as “the world

wide web.” Although the patent’s specification and title all

suggest that the invention is intended to apply to the world wide

web, there are at least two reasons to reject this construction. 

First, it is well known that the world wide web exists by virtue of

servers connected to (“on”) the Internet. Thus, the claim language

of “server on the Internet” is not at all inconsistent with

plaintiff’s proposed construction. Second, “Internet” is

capitalized in the claim language, suggesting the proper noun;

whatever “internet” might mean, there is only one “Internet.” (It

is because of this capitalization that defendant’s proposed commonnoun construction -- “an inter-network of networks” -- is obviously

incorrect.) In any event, the court is confident that, like

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For the Northern District of California

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“download,” “Internet” has entered the popular lexicon and needs no

construction.

Accordingly, the court declines to construe “Internet.”

“stored fill entities”

Insisting that the invention is directed toward filling

form fields, defendant proposes to construe this term as “stored

data to be placed in a form field.” The court has rejected this

limitation. Plaintiff proposes to construe this term as “stored

data filled into fields in forms so that it is available for later

use.” This construction appears to imply that the stored fill

entities are created in the first instance by (manual) completion

of the fields in a form. (Plaintiff elaborated at the hearing that

the manually filled-in forms would be forms from the Internet.) 

The court must reject this construction as well.

Plaintiff’s first argument in support of its construction

is that step (b) of claim 4 -- “storing the fill entities

associated with the tags in a memory of the computer” -- “clearly

refers to data that has been filled into a blank field in a form,

and thus it follows that the term ‘stored fill entities’ refers to

such data after it has been stored in a memory for later use.” Pl

Br (Doc #43) at 17:1-3. The court is bewildered by this assertion;

step (b) says nothing about where the data comes from; step (b)

describes only what is done with the data.

Plaintiff’s second argument is equally unavailing. The

specification provides that the invention described is “such that a

pipeline is established for quickly and efficiently filling fields

in forms.” Patent at 1:49-50. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he

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reference to ‘pipeline’ plainly conveys the idea that the data the

user has entered into fields in earlier forms is made available for

use in filling fields in later forms.” Pl Br (Doc #43) at 17:18-

20. Whatever “pipeline” means, it certainly does not “plainly” say

anything about the existence of some otherwise-unmentioned

previously filled-in form. Previously filled-in forms may be a

suitable source of the stored fill entities, but the patent in no

way limits the source of the stored fill entities in such a way;

indeed, the claims place no limitation whatever on the source of

the stored fill entities.

A minimal construction can be salvaged from plaintiff’s

proposal: “The plain wording of the claim language indicates that

‘stored fill entities’ are ‘fill entities’ that have been stored in

a memory of the computer for later use.” Pl Br (Doc #43) at 16:21-

22. The court agrees.

Accordingly, the court construes “stored fill entities”

as “fill entities that have been stored in a memory of the computer

for later use.”

“associated with”

This is the first instance of “associate,” a word that is

used in one form or another three times in claim 1 and four times

in claim 4. Defendant argues that “associate” is used in different

senses in these seven different contexts, and as such requires

several different constructions. Plaintiff proposes that

“associated” means “related to” throughout the patent. This is the

most appropriate sense of the verb “associate” found in plaintiff’s

dictionary reference. See Pl Br (Doc #43) Ex F (Webster’s

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Unabridged Dictionary) at 126 (defining “associate” as “to connect

or bring into relation”). While “related to” is hardly an

illuminating construction, that failing is more the product of the

patentee’s repeated use of the vague and flexible (and perhaps even

indefinite) term “associate” than it is any failure on plaintiff’s

part to propose a clean construction.

Defendant faces an uphill battle in challenging the

patentee’s presumably intentional use of “associate” throughout the

claims:

“[T]he same terms appearing in different

portions of the claims should be given the same

meaning unless it is clear from the

specification and prosecution history that the

terms have different meanings at different

portions of the claims.” Fin Control System

Pty, Ltd v OAM, Inc, 265 F3d 1311, 1318 (Fed

Cir 2001). If possible, th[e] court construes

claim terms “in a manner that renders the

patent internally consistent.” Budde v

Harley-Davidson, Inc, 250 F3d 1369, 1379-80

(Fed Cir 2001).

Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc v Weatherford

International, Inc, 389 F3d 1370, 1377 (Fed Cir 2004). Though

there may be no danger here of internal inconsistency from

differential constructions of “associate,” neither is there any

warrant in the intrinsic record for such differential

constructions.

Several of defendant’s differential constructions of

“associate” appear to depend entirely on its contention that the

claims require filling in the fields in the form. See Def Br (Doc

#64) at 30:18-31:3 (arguing that “associates” at the end of claim 1

must mean “placing the data into the fields” because the claim

requires “placing the fill entity in the field”); id at 32:3-7

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(same). The court has rejected defendant’s premise; the claims do

not require placing the data into the fields, and there is no basis

to limit “associates” by holding that “associates retrieved fill

entities with fields” means no more than “places retrieved fill

entities in fields.” Indeed, the patentee amended claim 1 to

change “places fill entities in fields” to “associates retrieved

fill entities with fields.” See Def Br (Doc #64) Ex K (amendment)

at 2. In short, defendant cannot point to evidence to overcome the

presumption that the patentee has used “associate” in the same

(albeit vague) sense throughout the claims.

Accordingly, unilluminating as it may be, the court

construes “associated with” to mean “related to.”

“tags”

A “tag” is an “identifier”; on this much the parties

agree. Defendant proposes “an identifier, such as an alphanumeric

field name, that identifies the fill entity.” Plaintiff proposes

“an automatically generated identifier that is distinct from the

field name and is used for matching against coded field names.” 

Plaintiff’s principal objection is that the example offered in

defendant’s proposed construction -- “such as an alphanumeric field

name” -- is confusing in light of the usage of the claim term

“field name” elsewhere in the patent. The court agrees with

plaintiff in this respect, but otherwise adopts defendant’s

proposed construction.

There are three further qualifications introduced by

plaintiff’s proposed construction, each of which the court cannot

accept. First, plaintiff proposes a limitation that the tag be

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“automatically generated.” While as a practical matter, it may be

true that the computer (not the user) generates the tag, there is

no support for this in the claim or the specification. The court

declines to introduce such an unclaimed limitation. Second,

plaintiff reiterates that the tag is “distinct from the field

name.” There is no need for this qualifier; it is clear from the

claim itself that tags and field names are different things. 

Third, plaintiff would specify that the tag “is used for matching

against coded field names.” This usage (or something akin to this

usage) is described elsewhere in the claim; the term “tag” itself

does not carry this meaning.

Accordingly, the court construes “tag” as “an identifier

that identifies the fill entity.”

sequencing in the last part of claim 1

Defendants assert that the events described in the

“wherein” clause of claim 1 must occur in the sequence recited in

the claim. Plaintiff contends that no specific order is required. 

Although claim 1 is not strictly a method claim, it recites steps,

so Federal Circuit precedent on methods is appropriately invoked

here:

“Unless the steps of a method actually recite

an order, the steps are not ordinarily

construed to require one. However, such a

result can ensue when the method steps

implicitly require that they be performed in

the order written.”

Altris, Inc v Symantec Corp, 318 F3d 1363, 1369 (Fed Cir 2003)

(quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc v Compuserve Inc, 256 F3d

1323, 1342-43 (Fed Cir 2001)).

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The grammar of the steps here requires that they be

performed in the sequence written. It is helpful to rescribe the

relevant portion of claim 1, with the steps enumerated:

wherein the CPU, executing the control code,

[1] compares the coded field names in

the downloaded code with the tags

associated with the stored fill

entities,

[2] retrieves fill entities when a

match is made, and

[3] associates retrieved fill

entities with fields wherein the tags

match the field names,

preparatory to transmission to the server on

the Internet.

Patent at 5:19-25.

Step [2] contains an adverb “when” that implies some

temporal sequence; in particular, step [2] occurs only when (i e,

after) a “match is made.” Step [1], which involves “compar[ing]”

is the only step that can be understood to produce a “match.” 

Hence, step [1] must occur before step [2].

Step [3] uses the past participle “retrieved” as an

adjective modifying “fill entities.” The use of the past

participle implies that some action -- here, retrieving -- has

already taken place. Step [2] supplies that past action. Hence,

step [2] must occur before step [3].

In sum, the three steps must occur in the sequence

written. Plaintiff’s principal objection is that the steps could

proceed in a different order in forms having multiple fields:

For example, in a form having two fields named

“first name” and “last name,” the “compares”

step could be performed for the “first name”

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field, followed by the “retrieves” and the

“associates” steps. Next, the “compares” step

could be performed for the “last name” field,

followed by the “retrieves” and the

“associates” steps.

Pl Br (Doc #43) at 33:23-26. The court sees plaintiff’s

hypothetical as a case of an embodiment that practices the

invention multiple times simultaneously or sequentially, not a case

of out-of-order execution of the recited steps. Even in

plaintiff’s hypothetical, with respect to each practicing of the

invention -- comparing, retrieving and associating for the “first

name” field, and then doing so for the “last name” field -- the

steps are taken in the order recited in the claim.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the steps of the

“wherein” clause of claim 1 must occur in the sequence recited in

the claim.

“compares”

The proper construction of “compares” is bound up with

the proper construction of “match” because the logic of the steps

in claim 1 implies that the product of the “comparing” step is a

“match.” Rather than separately construe these terms, the court

finds it more sensible to construe “compares” in terms of “matches”

and then to construe “matches” (see below). Plaintiff offers an

unobjectionable construction of “compares” that fits this scheme: 

“compares” means “looks for potential matches.”

Accordingly, the court construes “compares” as “looks for

potential matches.”

/

/

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United States District Court

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“the coded field names in the downloaded code with the tags” (claim

1) and “the tags of the stored fill entities with coded field names

in the code of the downloaded form” (claim 4)

In these two terms, the parties dispute whether the

“comparing” (or in claim 4 “associating”) step must be performed

with respect to all field names of the form. Plaintiff contends

that there is no basis in the claim language for a limitation of

“all field names” or “every field name” or “each field name.” In

support, plaintiff cites Dayco Products, Inc v Total Containment,

Inc, 258 F3d 1317, 1325, 1327-28 (Fed Cir 2001), which holds that

“plurality” (as in “a plurality of objects”) means “two or more.” 

Defendant argues that the use of the plural implies that all field

names must be processed (even if not all field names are ultimately

matched with a tag).

Dayco is not on point. In one respect, Dayco only

resolves a question of definition (“what does ‘plurality’ mean?”),

but the question here posed is one of syntax (“what does the use of

a plural noun signify?”). In another respect, Dayco concerns a

dispute over absolute quantities, specifically the minimum number

of “projections” the claim there required the patented hose

assembly to have. Here, the dispute is over partitive quantities,

specifically whether the claims read upon systems that process all

or merely some of the field names. That said, plaintiff’s main

point still stands: The claims do not use “all,” “each” or “every”

-- words that normally signify the meaning defendant would attach

to the claim term.

The court requested further briefing from the parties on

Federal Circuit precedent on the treatment of plural nouns. 

Plaintiff points to several cases, but none treats the precise

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question here; like Dayco, the cases define “plurality” or concern

absolute quantities, not partitive quantities. Defendant argues

that its construction is not based on the use of plural nouns as

much as it is on the claims as a whole. Based on the court’s own

search, the parties may not be to blame for the paucity of cited

caselaw.

The specification tends to support defendant’s position. 

For example, in the summary of the invention, the patent speaks of

filling “all of the fields in the form.” Patent at 2:15. 

Similarly, a preferred embodiment functions to “fill[] all of the

fields for which a match is made[, which] may be all of the fields

in the form.” Patent at 4:1-2. This implies that the invention

must operate on all fields in a form. But the fact that the

specification only describes filling all the fields of a form is

not dispositive; relying too heavily on the specification risks

importing limitations from the specification into claims that

contain no such limitation.

There may be something to defendant’s suggestion that

“[i]t is not the plural nouns, but the claim language itself that

describes processing fields.” Def Supp Br (Doc #72) at 4:10-11. 

And indeed, the claim preambles put the processing of fields into

the necessary context: Claim 1 claims a “system for providing data

for fields” (which happen to be “in forms”), while claim 4 claims a

“method for providing data for forms” (which happen to “hav[e]

fields”). Compare Patent at 5:11-12 with Patent at 6:13-14. The

object of claim 1 is to provide data for fields; claim 1 mentions

forms only in its preamble and only to provide context by using the

generic plural “forms.” By contrast, claim 4 is directed at

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providing data for forms, and claim 4 refers to a form throughout. 

While there is presumptively no basis in the use of a plural noun

for reading in “each” or “every,” when that noun refers to a

component part of a larger entity (as fields are components of

forms) and the claim reads upon the larger entity, it is natural to

understand the plural to imply “each” or “every.” In the case of

claim 1, the larger entity is but a sidelight. But in the case of

claim 4, the claim is concerned with providing data for forms and

one cannot provide data for a form without processing all its

constituent parts.

Accordingly, the court construes claim 1 as not requiring

comparing of all field names, but claim 4 as containing such a

requirement.

“retrieves”

The parties seem to dispute the construction of this

term: Plaintiff proposes “accesses” and defendant proposes “gets.” 

The term seems clear enough to the court without a construction.

Accordingly, the court declines to construe this term.

“fill entities”

The parties do not have a significant dispute over this

term: Plaintiff proposes “the fill entity associated with a tag”

and defendant proposes “the stored fill entity that the tag

identifies.” Plaintiff’s proposal uses “associated” and thus

better tracks the claim language.

Accordingly, the court construes “fill entities” as “the

fill entity associated with a tag.”

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“when a match is made”

As noted above, a “match” is the result of the

“comparing” step (or, in claim 4, step (d)). Plaintiff proposes

that a “when a match is made” means “when there is a suitable

association between a tag and a coded field name.” Defendant

proposes a construction of “when the tag is identical to the field

name.” Plaintiff bases its proposed construction on conventional

dictionary definitions. See Pl Br (Doc #43) at 27 (defining

“match” as “a pair suitably associated <carpet and curtains that

match>”). Defendant offers technical dictionary definitions from

the field of computer science. See Def Br (Doc #64) at 26

(“matching” is “the process of testing whether two data items are

identical”; “match” is “a condition in which the values of

corresponding components of two or more data items are equal”).

There are two problems with plaintiff’s proposed

construction. First, Markman holds that claim construction is a

question for the court. In context, construing “matching” as

“suitably associated” leaves it up to the jury to decide just what

“suitably” means. Second, the court finds plaintiff’s proposed

dictionary definition inappropriate because “suitably” is used in

an aesthetic sense. Rather, defendant’s proposed technical

dictionary definitions offer constructions appropriate to the field

of the invention. Both those definitions require an exact match --

an “identical” match, or one where “data items are equal.” The

court adopts defendant’s construction.

Accordingly, the court construes “when a match is made”

as “when the tag is identical to the field name.”

/

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“preparatory to”

Plaintiff contends that this term means only that the

recited procedures must be executed prior to submitting the form. 

Defendant contends that the final step of the claim makes the form

ready to be submitted. Defendant’s position seems to rest on its

contention that the claims require the filling in of form fields --

a result that would, indeed, appear to make the form ready to be

submitted. But the court has rejected this view of the claims. 

Moreover, “preparatory to” suggests only that certain (identified)

steps must occur before an event; it does not exclude the

possibility that other (unidentified) steps might intervene between

the last identified step and the event. Plaintiff’s construction

accurately captures this sense.

Accordingly, the court construes “preparatory to” to mean

that the procedures are executed prior to submitting the form.

sequencing of the steps of claim 4

Defendants assert that the events described in the

“wherein” clause of claim 1 must occur in the sequence recited in

the claim. Plaintiff contends that no specific order is required. 

The court has cited the relevant Federal Circuit authority above in

analyzing the same question with respect to claim 1. The recited

steps of claim 4 are:

(a) associating fill entities with tags;

(b) storing the fill entities associated with

the tags in a memory of the computer;

(c) downloading a form as code from a server on

the Internet through a browser using the

computer;

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(d) associating the tags of the stored fill

entities with coded field names in the code of

the downloaded form; and

(e) causing the stored fill entities with tags

matching coded field names in the code of the

downloaded form to be associated with the coded

fields to which the tags match.

Patent at 6:16-30.

The past participle “associated” in step (b) refers back

to the present particle “associating” in step (a). Hence, step (b)

must come after step (a). Steps (a) and (c) are not dependent on

any previous event. The past participle “stored” in step (d)

refers back to the present participle “storing” in step (b). 

Likewise, the past participle “downloaded” in step (d) refers back

to the present participle “downloading” in step (c). Hence, step

(d) must come after steps (b) and (c). Finally, step (e) must

follow step (d) because there is no way to associate fill entities

and fields until tags and field names have been associated.

Accordingly, the court concludes that steps (a), (b), (d)

and (e) must occur in that order; and that step (c) can occur at

any time before step (d).

“browser”

The parties list “browser” as a disputed term in their

joint claim construction statement, Doc #38 at 5, but do not brief

their dispute.

Accordingly, the court declines to construe “browser” at

this time. The parties may apply to the court for a construction

if necessary.

/

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IV

In sum, the court has construed many of the disputed

terms of the patent according to their plan language and by

reference to the intrinsic record. In several instances, the court

has declined to issue a construction but has invited the parties to

apply for a construction if it becomes necessary. If the parties

desire such further constructions, they should propose a schedule

to the court for such further proceedings. As set at the hearing,

the parties shall file dispositive motions to be heard on November

3, 2005, at 2:00 pm.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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