Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04377/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04377-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

RS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ADIL HIRAMANEK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-04377-RMW 

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

REASSIGNMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Plaintiff Adil Hiramanek requests reassignment of his case to another district court judge. 

Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff’s complaint generally asserts statutory and constitutional violations by court 

reporters and California state court officials (including a challenge to the state statute under which 

plaintiff was declared a vexatious litigant) and challenges to federal court procedures that, 

according to plaintiff, unconstitutionally interfere with his right to appellate review. See Dkt. No. 

1, 1-1. Plaintiff’s purported bases for recusal can be grouped into three categories: (1) the 

undersigned’s prior employment as a state court judge; (2) a purported financial interest in the 

case; and (3) the undersigned’s rulings in another pending case filed by plaintiff, No. 

5:13-cv-00228, which plaintiff characterizes as biased, based on ex parte communications with 

defendants, or potentially affected by his current complaint. Plaintiff presents no sufficient basis 

for recusal. 

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5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

RS

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff moves for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144.1Section 455 provides that a 

judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” Section 144 provides for reassignment where a party files a “timely and sufficient 

affidavit” averring that the judge before whom the case is pending “has a personal bias or 

prejudice” either against the party or in favor of any adverse party. If a judge finds a § 144 motion 

timely and the affidavit legally sufficient, the judge must proceed no further and another judge 

must be assigned to hear the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 144; United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 

(9th Cir. 1980). 

“Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking disqualification bears 

a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. 

C 07-00915 JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Reiffin v. Microsoft 

Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021–22 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). “The test for creation of apparent bias 

sufficient to require dismissal under [Section 455] is an objective one: ‘whether a reasonable 

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned.’” Herrington v. Sonoma Cnty., 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). In this context, the 

“reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,” but rather a 

“well-informed, thoughtful observer” who “understand[s] all the relevant facts” and “has 

examined the record and law.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted). This standard does not mandate recusal upon the mere “unsubstantiated 

suspicion of personal bias or prejudice.” Id. at 913 (citation omitted). In addition, Section 455(a) 

is “limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires as the basis for recusal 

something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course 

 

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To the extent that plaintiff also seeks disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 351, plaintiff has not 

complied with the procedural requirement of “fil[ing] with the clerk of the court of appeals for the 

circuit a written complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting” alleged improper 

conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).

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5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

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of [proceedings].” Id. at 913–14.

Plaintiff’s motion here does not provide a legally sufficient basis for recusal. Accordingly, 

the court did not ask that the matter be reassigned.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Prior Service as a State Court Judge 

Plaintiff asserts that his case must be reassigned because the undersigned was previously a 

state court judge in Santa Clara County.2 However, plaintiff has not shown that the undersigned 

was involved in any of plaintiff’s litigation before the Santa Clara County Superior Court. See, 

e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295 (1963) (California Supreme Court 

Justice recused from hearing case he previously heard while sitting as a judge on a lower court). 

There is no general requirement for “federal judges to recuse themselves from cases heard by 

other judges on the state courts where they sat previously.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Vann, No. 

C 13-1148 YGR, 2013 WL 1409880, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2013). Thus, the undersigned’s 

prior judicial service on the Santa Clara County Superior Court does not provide a basis for 

recusal here.

B. Financial Interest in the Litigation 

Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned and the undersigned’s spouse “derives 

financial/retirement benefits from his ex-employer/state defendant, and is substantially interested 

in/affected by the outcome, on Plaintiff’s billion dollar damage claim.” Dkt. No. 15 at 11. Even 

accepting this allegation as true, which it is not, the receipt of unspecified “financial/retirement 

benefits” is wholly separate from the issues in this case. The case has nothing to do with financial 

payments, or eligibility thereto, from the state or county. Any judgment reached in this case will 

have no plausible effect on either the undersigned or the undersigned’s spouse’s receipt of 

financial benefits from the state or county. Accordingly, the (nonexistent) “financial/retirement 

benefits” do not provide a basis for recusal. 

 

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The undersigned served on the Santa Clara County Superior Court from 1989 to 1992. 

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ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

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C. Bias and Ex Parte Communications 

The remainder of plaintiff’s assertions can be characterized as complaints with the 

substance of the rulings made in another pending case, No. 5:13-cv-00228. Specifically, plaintiff 

suggests that the undersigned has relied on ex parte communications to rule on matters and that 

the rulings evidence a “lack of impartiality,” “ongoing advocacy for state defendant,” and engage 

in “bizarre reasoning, devoid of facts, law or merits.” Dkt. No. 15 at 21. 

Plaintiff’s declaration contains no legally sufficient allegations of any ex parte 

communications. The allegations are entirely conclusory and not supported by facts relevant to 

the conclusion plaintiff seeks to draw. For example, plaintiff states that “CASAs [Court 

Appointed Special Advocate, a.k.a. Child Advocate, including [the undersigned’s spouse] 

participated in 57% of [juvenile dependency cases].” Dkt. No. 15-1 ¶ 15.

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 That may be true. 

Plaintiff then concludes that “Some of extra judicial knowledge procured by [the undersigned], as 

expressed in his written orders in this litigation, comes from sources outside the litigation, 

including apparently [the] spouse.” Id. The fact that unspecified CASAs participate in juvenile 

dependency cases suggests absolutely nothing about ex parte communications regarding plaintiff’s 

case. 

Plaintiff also argues that recusal is warranted because Claim 3 of his complaint relates to a 

ruling the undersigned made in the co-pending case, No. 5:13-cv-00228, revoking plaintiff’s in 

forma pauperis status for an appeal. See Dkt. No. 15 at 13; Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 102-06. Claim 3 of 

plaintiff’s complaint asserts that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals practice of referring to a 

district court the question of whether a party should be able to maintain in forma pauperis status 

on appeal violates the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 47. See generally Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 91-115. 

Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned “will be a potential witness on that claim#3,” and thus recusal 

is required. Dkt. No. 15 at 13. Plaintiff’s argument is legally insufficient. A sitting judge “may 

 

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The court notes that plaintiff’s declaration does not comply with Civil Local Rule 7-5(b), which 

requires that “[a]n affidavit or declarations may contain only facts, must conform as much as 

possible to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), and must avoid conclusions and argument.” 

(emphasis added). The declaration is largely additional conclusions and argument, in excess of the 

25 page limit on motions. Civ. L.R. 7-2(b). 

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ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

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not be compelled to testify concerning the mental processes used in formulating official judgments 

or the reasons that motivated him in the performance of his official duties.” United States v. Roth, 

332 F. Supp. 2d 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 

(1941). Nor may a judge be compelled to testify regarding official matters unless “there exists a 

sufficient basis to conclude that the judge ‘possess[es] factual knowledge . . . and [is] the only 

possible source of testimony on that knowledge.’” Bliss v. Fisher, 714 F. Supp. 2d 223, 223-24 

(D. Mass. 2010) (quoting United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir. 1978)). 

Plaintiff has provided no reason why the undersigned could be a witness in this action.

None of plaintiff’s remaining allegations, even if taken as true, constitute grounds for 

recusal, insofar as they are all covered by the “extrajudicial source” doctrine, which requires “as 

the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the 

judge during the course of [proceedings].” Holland, 519 F.3d at 914. “[J]udicial rulings alone 

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 554 (1994).

III. ORDER

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s request that the undersigned be recused from 

acting on this case is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for a hearing is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request 

for the undersigned to produce his Senate confirmation record is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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