Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05180/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 2012 Decided December 14, 2012

No. 11-5180

KHAIRULLA KHAIRKHWA, DETAINEE, GUANTANAMO BAY

NAVAL STATION, AND SAMI AL HAJJ, AS NEXT FRIEND OF

KHAIRULLA KHAIRKHWA,

APPELLANTS

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01805)

J. Griffin Morgan argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Robert M. Elliot and C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr.

Dana Kaersvang, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Tony

West, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Heath Gershengorn,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert M. Loeb,

Attorney. Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #11-5180 Document #1410089 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 1 of 7
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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from

the judgment of the district court, Urbina, J., denying Khairulla

Khairkhwa’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Khairkhwa is a detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 

Khairkhwa v. Obama, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011). The

Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No.

107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), authorized the President to detain

individuals who were “part of” al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or

associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States

or its allies. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872

(D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir.

2010). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2012 affirmed the President’s authority to detain any “person

who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the

Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities

against the United States or its coalition partners, including any

person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly

supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.” Pub. L.

No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).

Khairkhwa, an Afghan national, became a senior Taliban

official in 1994, several years after Soviet troops withdrew from

Afghanistan. He admits as much but asserts that he was not a

part of the Taliban forces.1

 The evidence presented at a four-day

hearing before the district court showed otherwise.

 

1

 Although the district court discussed classified evidence, the

unclassified evidence set forth in this opinion is alone sufficient to

sustain the court’s denial of Khairkhwa’s petition. 

USCA Case #11-5180 Document #1410089 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 2 of 7
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Khairkhwa was a Taliban spokesman and senior district

administrator for several years, became governor of Kabul for

a brief period, and then served as the Taliban’s acting interior

minister from approximately 1996 to 1999. Khairkhwa, 793 F.

Supp. 2d at 16. He was one of ten members of the Taliban’s

highest leadership council, the Supreme Shura, which reported

directly to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and supervised

subordinate councils responsible for military operations. Id. at

32. Most of the members of senior Taliban shuras were also

military commanders. Id. at 33. Khairkhwa was no exception:

the district court found that he was a commander in the 1997 and

1998 Taliban assaults on the western Afghan city of Mazar-eSharif.2

 Id. at 21–32.

 

Mullah Omar appointed Khairkhwa governor of Herat

province in October 1999. He was still serving in that position

when the United States invaded Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. 

Id. at 16–17, 33. As governor of Herat, Khairkhwa distributed

funds to Taliban military and security forces. Id. at 35. He had

extensive knowledge of Taliban military facilities, personnel,

and weapons caches and capabilities. Id. at 33–35. After he was

captured, Khairkhwa provided detailed information of the

Taliban’s assessments of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles

and of the Taliban’s efforts to obtain and protect Stinger

missiles. Id. at 34–35. He also described each military facility

in Herat province, including its location, condition, special

characteristics or capabilities, and other sensitive information. 

Id. at 33–34.

2

 These were major battles fought during the Taliban’s violent

rise to power. Khairkhwa, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 21–22. Taliban forces

massacred thousands of the Hazara residents of Mazar-e-Sharif after

seizing the city in 1998. Id.

USCA Case #11-5180 Document #1410089 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 3 of 7
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The evidence showed, and the district court found, that

officials in Khairkhwa’s position possessed military authority

under the Taliban governance structure. Id. at 33. “[N]early all

senior Taliban leaders held both civilian and military positions”;

Khairkhwa’s predecessor, Mullah Abdul Razaq, was a senior

military commander while he was governor of Herat. Id. The

obvious inference to be drawn from all of this evidence, an

inference the district court correctly drew, is that it was more

than likely that Khairkhwa wielded authority over military

matters during his tenure as governor of Herat.

Khairkhwa admits that he met with senior Iranian officials

several times while serving as Herat’s governor. He does not

deny that at one such meeting in January 2000, the participants

discussed how to protect Afghanistan from United States

intervention. Relying in part on these admissions, the district

court found that Khairkhwa participated in another high-level

meeting with Iranian officials in early October 2001. Id. at

37–38. The Iranian delegation included the deputy commander

of the Iranian Foreign Intelligence Service and the head of the

Afghan Department of the Iranian Foreign Intelligence Service. 

Id. at 37. In anticipation of the U.S.-led military operation, the

Iranian officials offered military support for the Taliban’s

defense, including anti-aircraft missiles, other unspecified

equipment, and free passage for “Arabs” traveling between Iran

and Afghanistan. Id. at 37–38. The Taliban delegation also

included Abdul Manan Niazi, the governor of Kabul and

commander of the Taliban forces who committed atrocities at

Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998. Id. at 37.

The district court thought it significant that Khairkhwa was

appointed to represent the Taliban in these high-level military

meetings. To the court, the evidence showed that Khairkhwa

“was entrusted with significant military-related responsibilities

at the time of the outbreak of hostilities with the United States

USCA Case #11-5180 Document #1410089 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 4 of 7
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and strongly indicates that he was part of Taliban forces at that

time.” Id. at 40. The court properly rejected Khairkhwa’s

assertion that he was merely a security officer protecting the

Taliban delegation. Even if the evidence supported

Khairkhwa’s version, which it does not, this would still

“demonstrate that he possessed command authority over Taliban

forces on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion,” id. at 39.

The district court also found that Khairkhwa continued to

operate within the formal Taliban command structure after

Operation Enduring Freedom began in early October 2001, and

provided support to Taliban military forces. Id. at 40. 

Khairkhwa admitted, during a 2002 interrogation, that in early

November 2001 he traveled from Herat to the Taliban-controlled

Kandahar province in a convoy of vehicles full of weapons and

that he turned over the weapons to a local official. Id. at 40–41.

Khairkhwa was arrested in Chaman, Pakistan, at the home

of Abdul Manan Niazi, the same former Taliban governor who

commanded Taliban forces at Mazar-e-Sharif, and who joined

Khairkhwa in the October 2001 meeting with Iranian

intelligence officials. Id. at 44–45. The circumstances of

Khairkhwa’s capture, his close ties with Mullah Omar, and the

absence of anything showing that he dissociated himself from

the Taliban demonstrated that Khairkhwa remained part of the

Taliban forces at the time of his capture. Id. at 43–45.

Khairkhwa thinks the government had to prove more. By

his lights, the government also had to show that he “fought or

engaged in armed conflict or hostilities against the United States

or its allies” and that if he were released, he would pose a danger

to the United States in the future. Pet’r’s Br. 9. The decisions

of this court are to the contrary.

 

USCA Case #11-5180 Document #1410089 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 5 of 7
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In order to detain individuals who were part of the Taliban

or al-Qaeda forces, proof that the individuals also actively

engaged in combat against the United States and its allies is

unnecessary. Al-Bihani so decided, 590 F.3d at 872–74, as have

many of our other decisions. See, e.g., Uthman v. Obama, 637

F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d

1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d

8, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423,

427 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad, 608 F.3d at 11–12. Khairkhwa

calls the standard set forth in Al-Bihani “dictum” because the

detainee in that case actually “participated in hostilities.” Pet’r’s

Reply Br. 4. If by this he means the detainee fired a shot or

detonated an explosive, the distinction is unsupportable on the

evidence. Al-Bihani did not engage in combat in those

terms—he was a cook for forces associated with the Taliban; he

carried a firearm but never used it in “hostilities.” See 590 F.3d

at 869. Like Khairkhwa, Al-Bihani contended that he could be

detained only if he had committed “a direct hostile act, such as

firing a weapon in combat,” id. at 871. In rejecting that

contention, the court ruled that Al-Bihani’s role as part of forces

associated with the Taliban was enough to justify his detention. 

Id. at 872–73. All of our decisions citing the Al-Bihani standard

are consistent with this reading of the opinion.

 

Khairkhwa’s argument is in any event untenable. In

modern warfare, commanding officers rarely engage in hand-tohand combat; supporting troops behind the front lines do not

confront enemy combatants face to face; supply-line forces,

critical to military operations, may never encounter their

opposition.

 

As to Khairkhwa’s other point—that a person may not be

detained unless the evidence also shows that he would pose a

danger to the United States if released—Awad squarely rejected

the argument. 608 F.3d at 11. Khairkhwa recognizes this, but

USCA Case #11-5180 Document #1410089 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 6 of 7
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insists that Awad was wrongly decided. Pet’r’s Reply Br. 6. 

What he fails to recognize is that one three-judge panel of this

court may not overrule another three-judge panel. LaShawn A.

v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).

 

We find no clear error in the district court’s factual

determinations. Awad, 608 F.3d at 6–7. The evidence recited

above establishes that Khairulla Khairkhwa was at least more

likely than not a part of the Taliban forces.3

 See id. at 10–12;

see also Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1103–05; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at

872. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Khairkhwa’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

Affirmed. 

3

 We have considered and rejected Khairkhwa’s other

contentions.

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