Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08045/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

Fl LED 

Unit d Scares Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cfrruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 21 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RODNEY O. SKURDAL, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appellant/ 

Cross-Appellee, 

EXETER DRILLING COMPANY, 

a Nevada corporation, 

Defendant-Cross-Claimant -

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

TNEMEC COMPANY, INC., 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Cross-Claim-Defendant, ) 

Cross-Appellee, ) 

and 

LTV ENERGY PRODUCTS COMPANY, 

a Delaware corporation, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Nos. 89-8045 

89-8048 

(D.C. No. C87-0415-J) 

(District of Wyoming) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and 

BRATTON, Senior District Judge.** 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 1 
This litigation arises out of an oil field accident in 

Wyoming wherein Rodney o. Skurdal, an employee of Exeter Service 

Company, was seriously injured in a rig-down operation of drilling 

Rig No. 34 owned by Exeter Drilling Company. Skurdal thereafter 

brought suit against Exeter Drilling Company, seeking damages for 

his injuries which he claimed were caused by Exeter Drilling 

Company's negligence. 

By an amended complaint, Skurdal later added two defendants, 

i.e., LTV Energy Products Company and TNEMEC Company, Inc. In the 

amended complaint, Skurdal alleged that a paint thinner known as 

TNEMEC No. 15 was being used as an antifreeze for the compressor 

air system on the drilling rig at the time of the accident, and 

that TNEMEC had manufactured the paint thinner which had been sold 

to Exeter Drilling Company by LTV Energy Products Company (LTV). 

Skurdal further alleged that this paint thinner had been held out 

by TNEMEC and LTV as an appropriate antifreeze, which it was not, 

and that the accident occurred as a result of the use of this 

product. 

Exeter Drilling Company filed an answer denying any liability 

to Skurdal and also later filed cross-claims against TNEMEC and 

LTV seeking contribution and indemnification should Skurdal 

prevail in his claim against Exeter. All claims against LTV were 

later withdrawn when LTV went into bankruptcy proceedings. 

Exeter Drilling Company filed a motion for summary judgment 

on Skurdal's claim, claiming that under Wyoming's Worker's 

Compensation law, it, Exeter, was Skurdal's statutory employer and 

accordingly was immune from suit by Skurdal. That motion was 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 2 
denied, the district court holding that Skurdal was employed by 

Exeter Service Company and was not an employee of Exeter Drilling 

Company. Exeter Drilling Company filed a second motion for summary judgment on the ground that since it had no employees it 

could not, and did not, "assume any affirmative duties with 

respect to the maintenance of Rig No. 34." That motion was also 

denied. 

On November 22, 1988, TNEMEC filed a motion for summary judgment on Skurdal's claim against it in his amended complaint and 

also on Exeter Drilling Company's cross-claim against it for 

contribution or indemnity. The basis for TNEMEC's motion, both as 

to Skurdal and Exeter Drilling Company, was that there was insufficient evidence to show that TNEMEC's paint thinner was, in fact, 

being used on the rig at the time of the accident. As concerns 

Skurdal only, TNEMEC also argued that the applicable statute of 

limitations barred Skurdal's claim. Affidavits were filed in support and in opposition to the motion. TNEMEC's motion for summary 

judgment was heard on December 9, 1988, and the case was at that 

time reset for a jury trial on May 15, 1989. 

One week prior to trial, on May 8, 1989, the district court 

granted TNEMEC's motion for summary judgment on Skurdal's claim 

against it on the ground that it was time barred by the applicable 

statute of limitations. 1 The next day, May 9, 1989, the district 

court granted TNEMEC's motion for summary judgment on Exeter 

Drilling Company's cross-claim against it, holding that there was 

insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact 

1 Skurdal did not appeal this decision. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 3 
as to whether TNEMEC's paint thinner was actually being used on 

the rig at the time of the accident and whether any possible 

freezing of the equipment on the rig was a cause of the accident. 

The following day, May 10, 1989, five days prior to the 

scheduled jury trial, Exeter Drilling Company filed a motion for 

partial summary judgment on Skurdal's claim and, in the alternative, a motion in limine. In this regard, it was Exeter Drilling 

Company's position that since the district court had ruled in 

favor of TNEMEC on Exeter's cross-claim and held that there was 

insufficient evidence that TNEMEC's paint thinner was being used 

by Exeter at the time of the accident or that any possible freezing caused the accident, Skurdal should be foreclosed from offering any evidence at trial against Exeter that TNEMEC's paint thinner was actually being used on the rig at the time of the accident 

and that freezing was a cause of the accident. By its motion, 

Exeter Drilling Company sought a partial summary judgment as to 

any claim Skurdal might make on the alleged use of TNEMEC's paint 

thinner, and, by its motion in limine, an order precluding Skurdal 

from offering at trial any evidence concerning the use of TNEMEC's 

paint thinner. 

On the next day after Exeter Drilling Company filed its motion for summary judgment and motion in limine, counsel for Exeter 

called Skurdal's counsel and informed the latter of his desire for 

a conference call with the judge to "talk about the motions filed 

the previous day." The conference call was then placed. 

At the conference call, the district judge 

indicated that he didn't know the purpose of the call, 

-4-

initially 

but after 

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 4 
being advised by Exeter Drilling Company's counsel as to the 

reason for the call, the district judge indicated that he would 

hear the motion for partial summary judgment and motion in limine 

at once, even though Skurdal's counsel protested and quite clearly 

indicated that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) a motion for summary 

judgment must be "served at least ten days before the time set for 

hearing." When the judge indicated that he was going to grant 

Exeter Drilling Company's motion for partial summary judgment, 

Skurdal's counsel indicated that the judge might as well resolve 

the "entire case" since Skurdal's sole theory of the case, at that 

time, was based on Exeter Drilling Company's alleged use of 

TNEMEC's paint thinner and the freezing of the compressor which 

caused the accident. At that hearing, the district court 

proceeded to verbally grant Exeter Drilling Company's motions for 

summary judgment. On May 16, 1989, the district court entered a 

written order confirming its verbal order of May 11, 1989, granting Exeter Drilling Company's motions, and on the strength of 

counsel's statement that Skurdal's claim against Exeter was at 

that time based solely on its alleged use of TNEMEC's defective 

paint thinner, entered summary judgment for Exeter on the "entire 

case." The district court also granted the motion in limine. 

Skurdal filed a notice of appeal on May 19, 1989. In this 

court, that appeal is numbered 89-8045. By his appeal, Skurdal 

seeks reversal on the sole ground that the district court erred in 

granting Exeter Drilling Company's motion for partial summary 

judgment one day after it was filed. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 5 
Exeter Drilling Company filed a notice of appeal on May 31, 

1989, and that appeal in this court is numbered 89-8048. By its 

appeal, Exeter Drilling Company seeks reversal of the two orders 

of the district court denying its earlier motions for summary 

judgment and also seeks reversal of the summary judgment entered 

for TNEMEC on Exeter's cross-claim for contribution and indemnity. 

No. 89-8045 

In this appeal, Skurdal seeks reversal of the district 

court's order dismissing Skurdal's "entire case" against Exeter 

Drilling Company entered when Skurdal's counsel indicated, after 

the district court granted Exeter's motion for partial summary 

judgment, that his case against Exeter was based solely on the 

premise that Exeter used TNEMEC No. 15 as an antifreeze and that 

No. 15 did not perform as an antifreeze resulting in a freezing of 

the air compressor unit causing a toppling of the rig. Counsel's 

statement was uttered when the district judge granted Exeter 

Drilling Company's motion for partial summary judgment, so the 

immediate issue is whether the district judge erred in granting 

Exeter's motion for summary judgment on the day after the motion 

was filed. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides, inter alia, that "[t)he motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least 10 days 

before the time fixed for the hearing." We have repeatedly held 

that noncompliance with the time provision of Rule 56(c) deprives 

the district court of authority to grant summary judgment. 

Prospero Associates v. Burroughs Corp., 714 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 

1983); Franklin v. Oklahoma City Abstract & Title Co., 584 F.2d 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 6 
964 (10th Cir. 1978); Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853 (10th 

Cir. 1976); Spence v. Otting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975); Adams 

v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 

1973); and Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 

480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973). 

Certainly the general rule is that a district court cannot 

hold a hearing on, let alone grant, a motion for summary judgment 

until ten days after the motion is served. Waiver is an exception 

to this general rule, but counsel for Exeter Drilling Company 

concedes that counsel for Skurdal did not waive the ten-day provision. As indicated, Skurdal's counsel objected to the forthwith 

hearing on Exeter Drilling Company's motion for summary judgment. 

Another exception to the general rule is the lack of prejudice to 

the non-moving party, i.e., Skurdal. We think Skurdal was 

prejudiced. Certainly his claim against Exeter Drilling Company 

was summarily rejected. Skurdal should have been allowed time to 

file opposing affidavits to Exeter Drilling Company's motion, as 

is required by Rule 56(c). 2 

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is 

remanded with directions that the district court vacate its order 

granting Exeter Drilling Company's motion for partial summary 

judgment and dismissing Skurdal's "entire case" against Exeter. 3 

2 We reject Exeter Drilling Company's suggestion that since 

Skurdal filed affidavits in opposition to TNEMEC's motion for summary judgment that Skurdal had ample opportunity to respond to the 

same arguments Exeter Drilling Company asserted in its motion, and 

Skurdal, therefore has not been prejudiced by the district court's 

failure to follow the time requirements of Rule 56(c). 

3 Counsel notes that Skurdal has not appealed the order of the 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 7 
No. 89-8048 

By its cross-appeal, Exeter Drilling Company seeks a ruling 

from us that the district court erred in denying two prior motions 

of Exeter for summary judgment. The first motion filed by Exeter 

Drilling Company for summary judgment was based on the ground that 

Exeter was Skurdal's statutory employer and under Wyoming's 

Workman's Compensation law, it was accordingly immune from suit by 

an injured employee. 

The second motion for summary judgment was based on Exeter 

Drilling Company's belief that it, as the mere owner of the rig, 

did not, and could not, "assume any affirmative duties with 

respect to the maintenance of Rig No. 34." 

As indicated, both of those motion were denied. However, 

neither of those orders is a "final decision" and accordingly cannot be reviewed in the present proceeding. The denial of a motion 

for summary judgment is not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 

1291. See Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975); Medical 

Development Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th 

Cir. 1973); Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1972), 

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). 

district court granting Exeter Drilling Company's motion in limine 

and suggests that such precludes Skurdal from challenging, on appeal, the dismissal of his action on motion for summary judgment. 

The granting of a motion in limine is of course not a "final decision" appealable under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. Consistent with our 

holding that the district court's granting of Skurdal's motion for 

partial summary judgment and an order dismissing Skudal's "entire 

case" was in error, the district court, on remand, should, 

however, vacate its order granting Exeter Drilling Company's motion in limine, and start anew. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 8 
In support of our holding that the denial of Exeter Drilling 

Company's two prior motions for summary judgment cannot be 

reviewed in the present appeal, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 

v. Jones, 433 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1970). There the district court 

entered summary judgment for the defendants on two of the three 

claims asserted by the plaintiffs in their complaint. As to the 

third claim, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for 

summary judgment. The judgment was entered pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b). On appeal, we affirmed the summary judgments 

entered for the defendants on plaintiffs' first two claims for 

relief. As to the third claim, we declined to consider 

plaintiffs' argument that the district court erred in denying 

their motion for summary judgment on their third claim, with the 

comment that an order which denies a motion for summary judgment 

is not appealable. 

Exeter Drilling Company does appeal the dismissal of its 

cross-claim against TNEMEC, and that is a "final decision" subject 

to review by us. As indicated, the district court dismissed 

Exeter Drilling Company's cross-claim against TNEMEC on the ground 

that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

TNEMEC paint thinner was in fact being used on the rig at the time 

of the accident and whether any possible freezing was a cause of 

the accident. In thus ruling, we believe the district court 

erred. 

In opposition to TNEMEC's motion for summary judgment on 

Exeter Drilling Company's cross-claim, it was Exeter's position 

that it was using TNEMEC's paint thinner as an antifreeze at the 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 9 
time of the accident and offered several affidavits from persons 

employed on or about the rig in question which indicated that 

TNEMEC's paint thinner was being used as an antifreeze at the time 

of the accident, and that the freezing of the compressor unit was 

a cause of the accident. The fact that TNEMEC offered an affidavit which may have cast doubt on the question did not justify 

the granting of summary judgment. On the contrary, such only 

pointed up that there was a genuine dispute on the question of 

whether TNEMEC's paint thinner was being used as an antifreeze at 

the time of the accident. 4 

The judgment of the district court granting TNEMEC summary 

judgment on Exeter Drilling Company's cross-claim is reversed. 

Entered for the Court 

ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS 

Circuit Judge 

4 An officer of Exeter Drilling Company, Terrence McKnown, who was 

also an employee of Exeter Service Company stated in his affidavit 

that at that time Exeter was purchasing its "paint thinner" only 

from TNEMEC. A "driller," Ryan Drevlow, and a "tool pusher," Tom 

Collins, in their depositions stated that a thinner was being used 

as an antifreeze in the compressor unit at the time of the accident. An officer of TNEMEC stated in a letter addressed to 

Exeter Drilling Co. that its "paint thinner" was not "packaged" as 

described by the "driller" and the "tool pusher". On such state 

of the record, summary judgment in favor of TNEMEC on the basis 

that TNEMEC's paint thinner was not being used by Exeter Drilling 

Company at the time of Skurdal's mishap was improper. Further, 

the affidavits in support of TNEMEC's motion for summary judgment 

in Exeter Drilling Company's cross-claim did not rule out Exeter's 

theory that it was using TNEMEC's paint thinner which was supposed 

to prevent freezing, but did not, and that the resultant freezing 

caused the accident. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 89-8045 Document: 010110053425 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 10