Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00846/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00846-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA – 14-846 LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

JOSEPH A SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

EQUINOX HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00846-LB 

ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA

(ECF No. 44)

STATEMENT

This is an employment case in which the plaintiff‘s nine causes of action charge the defendant 

with violating various labor laws. (Compl. – ECF No. 1-1.)1The plaintiff claims that the defendant 

fired him after he blew the whistle on those alleged violations; the defendant claims that the 

plaintiff was fired for violating a ―variety‖ of corporate policies. (Jt. Ltr. Br. – ECF No. 44 at 1-2.) 

Among other things, the plaintiff seeks damages for the ―emotional distress, humiliation, 

embarrassment, and mental anguish‖ that the defendant allegedly caused him. (Id. at 22 (¶¶ 94, 

97), 27 (¶ 11).) The alleged emotional-distress damages are tied to the claims for wrongful 

termination and defamation or libel. (Id.)

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1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (―ECF‖); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the tops of the documents.

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The defendant has subpoenaed the plaintiff‘s ―treating psychiatrist‖ to produce the following:

 Any and all DOCUMENTS and records pertaining to the care, 

treatment, and examination of PLAINTIFF, including but not 

limited to, doctors‘ reports, nurses‘ notes, licensed clinical social 

workers‘ reports and notes, progress notes, inpatient and outpatient 

charts and records, medical, neurological, psychiatric, and mental 

health records, emergency room and lab reports, and any other 

records pertaining to PLAINTIFF from July 2008 to and including 

the present.

(ECF No. 44 at 1.)

Citing California‘s psychotherapist-patient privilege (Cal. Evid. Code § 1014), and 

constitutional right to privacy (Cal. Const. art. I, § 1), the plaintiff seeks to quash the subpoena. He 

argues (in sum) that because he claims only ―garden variety‖ emotional distress, and disavows 

recovery for ―severe‖ psychological harm (among other things), he has not put his mental health in 

issue so as to waive the privilege or his right to privacy. (ECF No. 44 at 2-3.) The defendant 

counters that, especially by claiming that ongoing emotional distress kept him from finding 

another job, the plaintiff alleges more than ―garden variety‖ emotional distress, has put his mental 

condition squarely in issue, and thus has waived any right to shield his psychiatric medical records 

from discovery. (See id. at 3-6.)

ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(C), any party may serve a subpoena 

commanding a nonparty ―to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible 

things . . . .‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). The subpoena may command the production of 

documents that are ―not privileged‖ and are ―relevant to any party‘s claim or defense‖ or 

―reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

Upon a timely motion, the court issuing such a subpoena shall quash it if it determines that the 

subpoena ―requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver 

applies.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

This is a diversity case (ECF No. 1 at 3-5, ¶¶ 7-16), so state-law privilege rules apply. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 501. Confidential communications between a patient and her psychotherapist are 

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privileged under California law. Cal. Evid. Code § 1014. But there is no privilege ―as to a 

communication relevant to an issue concerning the mental or emotional condition of the patient if 

such issue has been tendered by . . . the patient[.]‖ Cal. Evid. Code § 1016. ―[S]ection 1016 of 

the Evidence Code compels disclosure of only those matters which the patent himself has chosen 

to reveal by tendering them in litigation.‖ In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 426 (1970). This patientlitigant exception ―allows only a limited inquiry into the confidences of the psychotherapistpatient relationship, compelling disclosure of only those matters directly relevant to the nature of 

the specific  ̳emotional or mental‘ condition which the patient has voluntarily disclosed and 

tendered in his pleadings or in answer to discovery inquiries.‖ Id. at 431; see also Vinson v. Super. 

Ct., 43 Cal. 3d 833, 838 (1987) (―[A] party who chooses to allege that he has mental and 

emotional difficulties can hardly deny his mental state is in controversy.‖).

California‘s constitution bestows a broad right of privacy. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; El 

Dorado Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Super. Ct., 190 Cal. App. 3d 342, 345 (1987). This right is 

―interrelated‖ with, but is ―broader‖ than the psychotherapist-patient privilege; the latter has been 

called ―one aspect of the [constitutional] right of privacy.‖ Davis v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal. App. 4th 

1008, 1013 (1992). The privacy right extends to discovery proceedings in civil actions. See San 

Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 1083 (2001). The right to privacy is not 

absolute; it may be abridged to accommodate a compelling public interest. Moskowitz v. Super. 

Ct., 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316 (1980). ―One such interest, evidenced by California‘s broad 

discovery statutes, is  ̳the historically important state interest in facilitating the ascertainment of 

truth in connection with legal proceedings.‘‖ Id. (quoting Britt v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 844, 857 

(1978)).

A plaintiff does not put his mental condition at issue, however, through a ―simple . . . 

harassment claim asking compensation for having to endure an oppressive work environment or 

for wages lost following an unjust dismissal . . . . To hold otherwise would mean that every person 

who brings such a suit implicitly asserts he or she is mentally unstable, obviously an untenable 

proposition.‖ Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 840. More generally, a plaintiff who brings only a ―garden 

variety‖ claim for emotional distress waives neither the evidentiary privilege nor her right to 

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privacy under California law. See Davis, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1017 (―garden variety‖ personal-injury 

action alleging general damages, including mental suffering, did not put plaintiff‘s mental state at 

issue); see also EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224-25 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (psychotherapistpatient privilege was not waived under California law where plaintiff brought only ―gardenvariety‖ claim for emotional distress and did not intend to rely on records or on testimony by a 

medical or psychiatric expert to support its claim). The ―Supreme Court [of California] has 

recognized that the extent to which a mental component [of injury] may be in issue in a particular 

suit depends upon the facts of a particular case.‖ Davis, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1016 (citing Roberts v. 

Super. Ct., 9 Cal.3d 330, 338-39 (1973)).

II. APPLICATION

Precedent indicates that Mr. Smith‘s allegations fall within the range of normal emotional 

distress incident to a more or less extrinsic underlying wrong — here, the claims for wrongful 

termination and defamation or libel. Such allegations do not put Mr. Smith‘s mental health 

sufficiently in issue to breach the psychotherapist-patient privilege or constitutional right to 

privacy. Significant here, in view of the case law, are Mr. Smith‘s express qualifications and 

disavowals concerning his claimed emotional distress. He writes that he ―is seeking only garden[-

]variety emotional[-]distress damages.‖ (ECF No. 44 at 3.) More important, he adds:

 Plaintiff has not brought a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 

distress.

 Plaintiff‘s emotional distress pertains to his claim of wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy.

 Plaintiff does not allege a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder.

 Plaintiff‘s Complaint does not allege unusually severe emotional distress damages.

 Plaintiff does not intend to offer medical records, medical testimony, or expert 

testimony to support a claim of emotional distress.

 Plaintiff does not intend to claim any medical damages as a result of Defendants‘ 

actions.

(Id.) To further secure his claims of privilege and privacy, he urges that his complaint ―be 

interpreted to allege that he suffered only the suffering and loss an ordinary person would likely 

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experience in similar circumstances.‖ (Id.) These qualifications are plainly meant to cabin Mr. 

Smith‘s emotional-distress allegations within the recognized bounds of the privilege and privacy 

right. See, e.g., Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. at 222-24; Verma v. Am. Express, 2009 WL 1468720, *2 

(N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (allowing plaintiff to limit initial claim of ―extreme and enduring‖ 

emotional harm to only ―garden variety‖ emotional distress so as to remain within the privilege).

The plaintiff‘s mental condition was more pointedly in issue in the workplace-harassment case 

of Serramonte, supra, and yet, citing the plaintiff‘s constitutional right to privacy, the district court 

quashed a subpoena to produce her medical records. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. at 222-24. The 

Serramonte plaintiff alleged ―sexual harassment by fellow employees and supervisors and ask[ed] 

the court to compensate her for  ̳emotional distress, indignity, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of 

self-esteem, and humiliation.‘‖ Id. at 222. Nevertheless, the Serramonte court refused to enforce a 

subpoena for her medical records. Id. at 222-24. That court wrote:

[T]he plaintiff has not brought a claim for either intentional or 

negligent infliction of emotional distress; she does not allege that 

she suffered a psychiatric injury or disorder as a result of the 

defendants‘ conduct; she does not claim to suffer from unusually 

severe emotional distress; and she does not intend to offer expert 

testimony regarding her emotional distress. Rather, she merely 

claims damages for emotional distress which she says she suffered 

as a result of defendants‘ actions as alleged in the complaint. The 

mental suffering Plaintiff claims ―does not exceed the suffering and 

loss an ordinary person would likely experience in similar 

circumstances,‖ and constitutes ―matters that are within the 

everyday experience of the average juror.‖ Johnson [v. Trujillo,

(Colo.1999) ], 977 P.2d 152, 157–58.

Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. at 224 (quoting Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 632 (N.D. 

Cal. 1999)) (final citation added in Serramonte). The Serramonte plaintiff therefore ―ha[d] not 

waived her right of privacy by asserting more than a garden-variety claim of emotional distress.‖ 

Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. at 224; see also Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1995) 

(plaintiff‘s claim of ―severe‖ emotional distress did not justify disclosing medical records).

The same result should obtain here. Allowing inquiry into Mr. Smith‘s medical records for the 

apparently ordinary emotional distress that he claims ―would defeat the purpose of the 

[psychotherapist-patient] privilege.‖ Davis, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1016. ―The privilege is too 

important to be brushed aside when the mental condition of the plaintiff may be only peripherally 

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involved.‖ Id. at 1017 (quoting Tylitzki v. Triple X Serv., Inc., 261 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (Ill. App. 

1970)). Especially considering that, in California law, the privilege is ―interrelated‖ with, and 

indeed is ―one aspect of the [constitutional] right of privacy,‖ see Davis, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1013, 

the court hesitates to open up Mr. Smith‘s medical records when his distress is not claimed to be 

unusually severe or analytically central to his claims.

The undersigned reached a similar decision in Pathak v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, 122 Fair 

Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 2014 WL 820065 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014).

A few concluding remarks are needed. First, this case is closer than other situations in which 

courts have shielded mental-health records from discovery under California‘s psychotherapistpatient privilege and constitutional right to privacy. Viewing this case from subtly different angles 

suggests markedly different conclusions. From one perspective, as the defendant has well argued, 

the plaintiff‘s allegations of ongoing mental distress that kept him from getting a job seem to put 

his psychological well-being in issue — maybe especially when one considers that this touches 

upon his duty to mitigate damages. Turn the matter only slightly, though, to view this case from 

the perspective of California‘s strong constitutional privacy right, and its related evidentiary 

privilege, and one hesitates to open up the plaintiff‘s records to discovery. The court thinks that, 

ultimately, the weight of express constitutional inscription must prevail.

This does not mean that the plaintiff‘s mental health is completely immune from inquiry. This 

is the second closing remark. The defendant justly insists that, having sought emotional-distress 

damages, and apparently claiming ongoing psychiatric disability that has kept him from securing 

new employment, the plaintiff cannot at the same time stymie all questions into his mental health. 

The plaintiff‘s mental health undeniably plays a role here. See Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 838 (―[A] 

party who chooses to allege that he has mental and emotional difficulties can hardly deny his 

mental state is in controversy.‖). Perhaps especially, again, insofar as the plaintiff‘s claimed 

emotional distress intersects with his obligation to mitigate his damages. The defendant must be 

allowed to question the plaintiff about the nature and extent of his distress — consistent, 

obviously, with the plaintiff‘s right to withhold protected communications and records.

Finally, the court will hold the plaintiff to his assertion that he has suffered only the emotional 

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distress that ―an ordinary person would likely experience in similar circumstances.‖ (See ECF No. 

44 at 3.) And, indeed, to all the disavowals he has made. (See id.) Should his claims later expand 

beyond the limits he has described, the court will entertain a renewed request to open attendant 

evidence to discovery. Cf. Verma, 2009 WL 1468720 at *2.

* * *

CONCLUSION

The court quashes the subpoena. At the hearing, the parties agreed that, because the plaintiff‘s 

medical records are already with the subpoena server, they should be delivered to plaintiff‘s 

counsel directly. Plaintiff‘s counsel must retain those records absent further order of the court.

This disposes of ECF No. 44.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2015

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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