Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02075/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02075-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bianca Jimenez-Bencebi, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

State of Arizona, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-23-02075-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On June 10, 2024, the Court granted in part, and denied in part, a motion to dismiss 

filed by the State of Arizona (the “State”) and various state entities and employees 

(together, “Defendants”). (Doc. 17.) The Court also authorized Plaintiffs to file an 

amended pleading in an attempt to cure some of the deficiencies identified in the dismissal 

order. (Id.) Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a new pleading, the 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 21.) Defendants have, in turn, filed another 

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 25.) The motion is now fully briefed (Docs. 28, 32) and neither 

side requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is granted 

in part and denied in part.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

I. Overview

Bianca Jimenez-Bencebi (“Jimenez-Bencebi”) is the mother of L.J., K.J., K.A.J, and 

J.A.J., as well as non-party J.M.J., and Jiaro Abrego Zavaleta (“Zavaleta”) is the father of 

K.A.J. and J.A.J. Over time, the Arizona Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed 

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K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi’s care. However, a juvenile court 

later ruled in part against DCS in a severance proceeding, ordering reunification as to K.J., 

K.A.J, and J.A.J. (but not as to J.M.J.).

These developments provide the backdrop for this case, in which Jimenez-Bencebi, 

Zavaleta, L.J, K.J., K.A.J, and J.A.J. (together, “Plaintiffs”) have asserted a sprawling array 

of federal and state-law claims against Defendants. 

II. The June 10, 2024 Order

In the 72-page June 10, 2024 order, the Court dismissed some of those claims and 

Defendants. (Doc. 17.) More specifically, the Court (1) dismissed the Arizona Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) as a defendant, because it is a non-jural entity incapable of being 

sued (id. at 15-16); (2) dismissed all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims asserted against Faust and 

McKay in their official capacities, because such an official-capacity defendant is not a 

“person” under § 1983 (id. at 16-17); (3) dismissed Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s 

claims in Counts One, Three, Four, and Five, because those claims are barred by the statute 

of limitations (id. at 29, 32-36); (4) dismissed Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in 

Count Two as to Patchin, because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations (id.

at 29-36); (5) partially dismissed Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Count Two 

as to Davisson, because those claims are partially barred by the statute of limitations (id.

at 29-36); (6) dismissed Count One as to Davisson, for failure to state a claim (id. at 38-

39); (7) dismissed Count Two as to Davisson, for failure to state a claim (id. at 39-40); (8) 

dismissed Count Three as to Davisson, for failure to state a claim (id. at 40-41); (9) 

dismissed Counts Four and Five as to Davisson, Faust, and McKay, for failure to state a 

claim (id. at 42); (10) dismissed Count Three, because it is a § 1983 claim premised on 

state-law violations (id. at 44-45); (11) dismissed Count Four as to Patchin and Del Fiacco, 

for failure to state a claim (id. at 45-46); (12) dismissed Count Five as to Patchin and Del 

Fiacco, for failure to state a claim (id. at 46-47); (13) dismissed Count One as to Patchin 

and Del Fiacco, based on the doctrine of qualified immunity (id. at 51-57); (14) dismissed 

Count Two as to Del Fiacco, based on the doctrine of qualified immunity (id. at 61-63); 

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(15) dismissed Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Counts Six, Nine, and Twelve, 

because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations (id. at 65); (16) partially 

dismissed Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Counts Seven, Nine, and Thirteen, 

because those claims are partially barred by the statute of limitations (id. at 65-67); and 

(17) partially dismissed Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Count Eight, because 

those claims are partially barred by the statute of limitations (id. at 67).

1

III. The SAC

In the SAC, filed on July 19, 2024, Plaintiffs add an array of new allegations 

intended to cure some of the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. (Doc. 20-1 

[redlined version]; Doc. 21 [clean version].) 

DISCUSSION

Defendants advance the following six arguments in their motion to dismiss: “(1) 

L.J. lacks standing, (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity, (3) absolute immunity for 

testimony, (4) qualified immunity, and (5) failure to state a claim, and (6) failure to serve 

a Notice of Claim (‘NOC’).” (Doc. 25 at 2.) Each argument is addressed below.

1 The Court did not accept all of Defendants’ dismissal arguments. More specifically, 

the Court (1) declined to dismiss L.J. as a Plaintiff, because Defendants’ dismissal 

arguments as to L.J. were insufficiently developed (id. at 12-15); (2) declined to dismiss 

the State as a Defendant in Count Thirteen, because Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment 

argument was untimely raised (id. at 18-19); (3) declined to dismiss any claims or 

Defendants based on the doctrines of issue preclusion or claim preclusion (id. at 20-23, 24-

26); (4) declined to dismiss the § 1983 claims asserted by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. on 

untimeliness grounds, because those Plaintiffs are entitled to tolling as minors (id. at 28-

29); (5) declined to dismiss Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Count Two as to 

Del Fiacco on untimeliness grounds (id. at 31-32); (6) declined to fully dismiss JimenezBencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Count Two as to Davisson, because those claims are 

only partially barred by the statute of limitations (id. at 29-32); (7) declined to dismiss 

Count Two as to Patchin based on qualified immunity (id. at 57-61); (8) declined to dismiss 

the state-law claims asserted by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. on untimeliness grounds (id.

at 65); (9) declined to fully dismiss Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Counts 

Seven, Nine, and Thirteen, because those claims are only partially barred by the statute of 

limitations (id. at 65-67); (10) declined to fully dismiss Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s 

claims in Count Eight, because those claims are only partially barred by the statute of 

limitations (id. at 67); (11) declined to dismiss L.J.’s claims for non-compliance with the 

notice-of-claim statute (id. at 69); (12) declined to dismiss K.J.’s, K.A.J.’s, and J.A.J’s 

claims for non-compliance with the notice-of-claim statute (id. at 69-70); (13) declined to 

dismiss Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Counts Seven, Nine, and Thirteen for 

non-compliance with the notice-of-claim statute (id.); and (14) declined to dismiss 

Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s claims in Count Eight for non-compliance with the 

notice-of-claim statute (id.).

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I. L.J.’s Standing

In the SAC, L.J. is named as a Plaintiff in Counts One, Two, Three, Six, Seven, 

Eight, Nine, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 151, 166, 177, 202, 206, 216, 230, 

239, 248, 256, 267, 281.) 

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants move to dismiss all of L.J.’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of 

standing. (Doc. 25 at 2.) Defendants clarify that they are not arguing that L.J. lacks Article 

III standing—rather, they contend he is not a proper plaintiff as to any of the claims he is 

asserting. (Id.) Defendants also offer a claim-by-claim discussion of why each of L.J.’s 

claims should be dismissed. (Id. at 2-8.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue in somewhat conclusory fashion that Defendants are 

“clearly wrong.” (Doc. 28 at 3-4.) In support, Plaintiffs cite cases discussing the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs also contend that, under Arizona law, “State 

Defendants also had statutory and constitutional obligations to promptly achieve family 

reunification following a removal.” (Id. at 4.)

In reply, Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs’ imprecise arguments provide no 

additional legal theories allowing this Court to confer standing on L.J. and dismissal 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) Defendants further 

contend that Plaintiffs’ “focus on the parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the 

companionship of his or her child” is misplaced because “this Court already dismissed 

Jimenez’s and Zavaleta’s claims as time-barred.” (Id.) Next, Defendants argue that 

although “L.J.’s standing is premised on legal duties owed by state actors to make 

reasonable efforts to preserve the family after removal,” “L.J. was never removed so the 

various cases cited by Plaintiffs are inapplicable and should be disregarded.” (Id.) Next, 

Defendants accuse Plaintiffs of engaging in “a backdoor attempt to assert rights on behalf 

of Jimenez, not on behalf of L.J.” and emphasize that “[n]either the State Defendants, nor 

the state court at the urging of State Defendants, took any steps against L.J.” (Id.) Finally, 

Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs “did not address the remaining arguments 

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addressing L.J. as a potential Plaintiff—counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13,” Plaintiffs 

should be deemed to “have waived those arguments.” (Id. at 3.)

B. Analysis

The Court agrees with Defendants that all of L.J.’s claims are subject to dismissal. 

L.J.’s first claim, in Count One, is a claim that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson 

“unlawfully seiz[ed] and detain[ed] K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.” in violation of L.J.’s 

“Right to Freedom of Association under the First Amendment” and L.J.’s right to “Due 

Process under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments.” (Doc. 21 at 25.) But under Ninth 

Circuit law, a sibling like L.J. does not appear to have a cognizable First or Fourteenth 

Amendment right to familial association with another sibling. See, e.g., JP by and through 

Villanueva v. County of Alameda, 803 F. App’x 106, 109 (9th Cir. 2020) (“No viable lossof-familial-association claim exists for siblings under the First Amendment. A familial 

relationship grounds the loss of familial association claims under the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Thus far, that familial relationship has been limited to that between a parent 

and child. . . . [W]e [have] explicitly ruled that siblings do not possess a cognizable liberty 

interest to assert a loss of familial association claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. No 

basis exists to disregard this precedent simply because the claim is raised under the First 

Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted); Ward v. City of 

San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 283 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of § 1983 claims 

asserted by the “decedent’s siblings,” holding that the siblings did not “possess a 

cognizable liberty interest in their brother’s companionship,” declining to follow a contrary 

Tenth Circuit decision that “recognized a liberty interest in both parents and siblings,” and 

emphasizing that “[n]either the legislative history nor Supreme Court precedent supports 

an interest for siblings consonant with that recognized for parents and children”). See also 

Wright v. S. Ariz. Children’s Advocacy Ctr., 2022 WL 4591827, *4 (D. Ariz. 2022) 

(“Binding precedent precludes Plaintiffs’ argument that LAW’s siblings have standing to 

assert familial association claims.”); Southern v. City of Sacramento, 2022 WL 17822554, 

*2 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“Defendants argue that because Plaintiff is Decedent’s brother, he 

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does not have any association rights under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. They are 

correct.”); Monterrosa v. City of Vallejo, 2021 WL 516736, *11 (E.D. Cal. 2021) 

(“Defendants correctly argue the Ninth Circuit has held that siblings do not retain 

constitutionally protected rights to a familial relationship with each other. . . . As Michelle 

and Ashley are adult siblings attempting to plead a § 1983 claim for violations of their right 

to familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment, their claim is foreclosed by the 

Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ward.”) (cleaned up). 

The Court acknowledges that a recent unpublished decision by the Ninth Circuit, 

Mann v. City of Sacramento, 2022 WL 2128906 (9th Cir. 2022), suggests that a sibling 

may be able to assert a First Amendment-based familial association claim under § 1983 in 

at least some circumstances. However, Mann ultimately rejected such a claim asserted by 

a “non-cohabitating sibling[].” Id. at *1. See also id. (“Neither plaintiffs nor the district 

court point to any authority that has applied the Rotary Club factors and held that noncohabitating siblings have a First Amendment right to familial association.”). Here, the 

SAC alleges that L.J. “was living with his natural father in Puerto Rico when DCS began 

its wrongful interference with this family” and “remained living with his father in Puerto 

Rico” afterward. (Doc. 21 ¶ 23.) Thus, even under Mann, L.J.’s claim in Count One fails.

Turning to L.J.’s remaining claims, the Court notes as an initial matter that Plaintiffs 

make no effort to respond to Defendants’ claim-by-claim analysis. Instead, Plaintiffs 

merely cite a handful of cases that generally address the right of familial association, 

apparently with the hope that the Court will take it upon itself to identify the elements of 

each of L.J’s claims and analyze how those elements intersect with Plaintiffs’ cited cases. 

On this record, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have forfeited any defense 

of the remaining claims. 

The Court also agrees with Defendants that, on the merits, L.J. lacks standing to 

assert all of his remaining claims. Beginning with L.J.’s federal claims, Count Two is a 

§ 1983 claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson for making false statements during 

L.J.’s siblings’ judicial proceedings. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 153-66.) The only possible way such 

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conduct could have harmed L.J. is by interfering with L.J.’s familial-association rights, but 

as discussed in relation to Count One, L.J. does not have a cognizable constitutional right 

to familial association in this context. For the same reasons, L.J.’s claim in Count Three, 

which is a § 1983 claim that Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson interfered with L.J.’s Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment-based right to a preserved family relationship (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 167-

79), necessarily fails. 

L.J.’s claims in Counts Six, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Thirteen are all variants of statelaw negligence claims. As Defendants correctly note, one of the elements of such a claim 

is that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. (Doc. 25 at 6.) The Court cannot 

see how such a duty could possibly exist here, where L.J. did not even reside in Arizona 

during the operative timeframe and had no contact with any Defendant. Cf. Lorenz v. State, 

364 P.3d 475, 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (“Because Grandparents failed to establish the 

existence of a legal duty owed to them by DCS, the superior court properly dismissed their 

negligence claims.”). None of Plaintiffs’ cited cases recognizes a duty of care in this 

scenario. 

As for Count Seven, which is a claim for abuse of process, the Court agrees with 

Defendants that L.J. cannot assert such a claim where he “was never part of the judicial 

process” and “no dependency or severance petitions were filed regarding him.” (Doc. 25 

at 8.) Once again, Plaintiffs cite no case holding otherwise. Finally, as for Count Twelve, 

which is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court agrees with 

Defendants that “L.J. cannot meet the elements of this claim because there was no 

underlying ‘conduct’ that could be characterized as extreme and outrageous or that any 

State Defendant intended to cause L.J. emotional distress.” (Id.) None of Plaintiffs’ cited 

cases holds otherwise. 

II. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Count Six of the SAC is a claim for negligence per se. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 195-217.) Two 

of the Defendants named in Count Six are Faust and McKay. (Id. ¶¶ 198-203.) Count 

Thirteen of the SAC is a claim for negligent supervision, training, and retention. (Id. 

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¶¶ 269-82.) Three of the Defendants named in Count Thirteen are the State, Faust, and 

McKay. (Id. ¶ 270.) Although the previous iteration of the complaint alleged that Faust 

and McKay were being sued in both their official and individual capacities, the SAC 

clarifies that they are only being sued in their individual capacities. (Doc. 20-1 at 5; Doc. 

21 ¶¶ 17-18.)

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants “urge dismissal of Count Thirteen against the three State Defendants—

the State, Faust, and McKay—under principles of Eleventh Amendment immunity.” (Doc. 

25 at 8.) Defendants also contend that the State, Faust, and McKay did not “waive[] their

Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing [this] action from state court to federal 

court.” (Id. at 8-9.) According to Defendants, this is because “[s]tates, their agencies, and 

their officials in their official capacities are immune from damage suits under state or 

federal law by private parties in federal court unless there is a valid abrogation of that 

immunity or an unequivocal express waiver by the state.” (Id. at 9, citation omitted.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that “State Defendants[’] removal of this action from 

the state Superior Court to the federal District Court constitutes a waiver of any alleged 

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.” (Doc. 28 at 5.) Plaintiffs add: “State 

Defendants are attempting to gain an unfair litigation advantage by removing this matter 

from the state court and then seeking dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds 

for all state law claims. The tactic is contrary to state and federal law, including as 

articulated by the Supreme Court, and cannot be countenanced.” (Id. at 5-6.)

In reply, Defendants argue that “[t]he act of removing this matter to federal court is 

not clearly dispositive on application of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the state law 

claims” and that “if the State’s sovereign immunity has not been waived or abrogated in 

state court, then Eleventh Amendment immunity is not necessarily precluded in the federal 

matter.” (Doc. 32 at 3-4.)

B. Analysis

Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment-based dismissal request lacks merit. As an 

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initial matter, Defendants overlook that Faust and McKay are no longer being sued in their 

official capacities—as clarified in the SAC, Faust and McKay are now only being sued in 

their individual capacities. (Doc. 20-1 at 5; Doc. 21 ¶¶ 17-18.) It follows that Plaintiffs’ 

claims against Faust and McKay are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Pena v. 

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 474 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he eleventh amendment will not bar 

pendent state claims by Pena against state officials acting in their individual capacities.”); 

Eaglesmith v. Ward, 573 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The threshold question in this 

case is whether Eaglesmith brought this suit against Ward in his individual or official 

capacity. Ward is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity only if the suit was brought 

against him in his official capacity.”). It may be that Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims 

against Faust and McKay will ultimately fail for other reasons, but the Court limits its 

analysis here to the narrow Eleventh Amendment argument raised by Defendants. United 

States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375-76 (2020).

This leaves Plaintiffs’ claim against the State in Count Thirteen. Although “[t]he 

Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other 

states and by its own citizens as well, . . . [a] State’s decision voluntarily to invoke the 

jurisdiction of a federal court by removing an action from state court to federal court can 

waive Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Walden v. Nevada, 945 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 

2019) (citations omitted). However, “this general ‘voluntary invocation’ principle does 

not apply in all circumstances. Many states statutorily waive their immunity from suit on 

state-law claims in state court. The Supreme Court has held that, when a State that has 

enacted one of these statutes voluntarily removes a suit on state-law claims from state court 

to federal court, that State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.” Id.

(citations omitted). In contrast, “courts are divided on whether . . . a State defendant’s 

removal to federal court waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity if the State has not 

waived its immunity to suit in state court.” Bodi v. Shingle Springs Bank of Miwok Indians, 

832 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2016). See also id. at 1019 n. 11 (“Although, in Embury [v. 

King, 361 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2004)], we characterized Lapides broadly as setting forth 

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a straightforward, easy-to-administer rule that removal waives Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, we did not explicitly consider whether it applied when a State defendant retained 

its immunity from suit in state court, as it appears the State defendants there had not done. 

We have since observed that the question whether Lapides’s rule applies when a State 

defendant has not consented to suit in its own courts remains unresolved in this circuit.”) 

(cleaned up); Kendrick v. Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc., 910 F.3d 1255, 1260

(9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s holding in Lapides[] was limited. A state waives 

Eleventh Amendment immunity by removal only for state-law claims ‘in respect to which 

the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings.’ Here, the record 

does not reflect that Conduent waived immunity in state court. Accordingly, Lapides is 

not dispositive.”) (citation omitted). 

The parties disagree over whether the State has waived its immunity from suit in 

state court with respect to Count Thirteen (which, again, is a claim for negligent 

supervision, training, and retention). Defendants emphasize that, under Arizona law, “a 

public official performing a discretionary act encompassed within her public duties is 

shielded from liability for simple negligence” under the doctrine of “[c]ommon law 

qualified immunity.” Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 435 P.3d 462, 466-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2018). Meanwhile, Plaintiffs emphasize that “[g]overnment liability is the rule in Arizona 

and immunity is the exception.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 24 P.3d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 2001). 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have the better side of this complicated issue. 

As background, the Arizona Supreme Court “abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity 

for tort liability in 1963, concluding that the government and its employees should 

generally be responsible for injuries they negligently cause. . . . The legislature responded 

in 1984 by enacting the Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Act (the 

‘Act’), which specifies circumstances in which governmental entities and public 

employees are immune from tort liability. The Act leaves intact the common-law rule that 

the government is liable for its tortious conduct unless immunity applies.” Glazer v. State, 

347 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. 2015). See also Fleming v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 352 

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P.3d 446, 448 (Ariz. 2015) (“Since this Court abolished sovereign immunity in 1963, 

public entities . . . generally have been liable for injuries they negligently cause.”). 

Notably, the Arizona Supreme Court has indicated, in a decision issued following the 

enactment of the Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Act, that a plaintiff 

may bring an action for negligent supervision against the State. Pritchard v. State, 788 

P.2d 1178, 1179 (Ariz. 1990) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of “an action against the 

state alleging that the state was liable to him by reason of negligent supervision of the 

burglar, who was on parole”). Meanwhile, although Spooner holds that a public official 

may be entitled to common-law qualified immunity if sued for the negligent performance 

of a discretionary official act, Spooner also recognizes that such immunity is unavailable 

if the public official “knew or should have known that she was acting in violation of 

established law or acted in reckless disregard of whether her activities would deprive 

another person of their rights.” Spooner, 435 P.3d at 467 (citation omitted). 

These authorities indicate that the State has not categorically immunized itself from 

any state-court lawsuit involving a claim of negligent supervision. To the contrary, 

Arizona has “abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity for tort liability” and follows 

the rule “that the government and its employees should generally be responsible for injuries 

they negligently cause.” Glazer, 347 P.3d at 1144. True, the State may attempt to avoid 

liability in a negligence-based lawsuit in state court by invoking the doctrine of common

law qualified immunity, but applicability of that doctrine turns on the particular facts of 

the case. Spooner, 435 P.3d at 467. It follows, in the Court’s view, that the State cannot 

invoke the Eleventh Amendment as the basis for seeking dismissal of Count Thirteen. 

Because the State has consented, at least on a limited basis, to being sued in state court on 

a negligent supervision theory, that limited consent applies with equal force here now that 

the State has chosen to remove this action to federal court. The State remains free to defend 

itself against Count Thirteen by invoking the doctrine of qualified immunity, but it may 

not rely on the Eleventh Amendment as its basis for seeking dismissal. Walden, 945 F.3d 

at 1092 (when a state has “waive[d] [its] immunity from suit on state-law claims in state 

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court” and then “voluntarily removes a suit on state-law claims from state court to federal 

court, that State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit”).2

III. Absolute Immunity For Testimony

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that “[b]oth private individuals and government officials who 

serve as witnesses have absolute immunity from civil damages under § 1983 with respect 

to their testimony” and that “this immunity applies even where the witness commits 

perjury.” (Doc. 25 at 10.) Defendants also contend that some of the factual allegations 

underlying Counts One, Two, Six, and Seven refer to alleged false testimony by Patchin 

and Del Fiacco. (Id. at 11, citing Doc. 21 ¶¶ 140, 159-61, 215, 225.) Defendants conclude: 

“The controlling law is clear that State Defendants Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson are 

granted absolute immunity for any testimony in the juvenile court proceedings so those 

claims should be stricken from the SAC.” (Id.)

In response, Plaintiffs contend that, in Rieman v. Vazquez, 96 F.4th 1085 (9th Cir. 

2024), the Ninth Circuit “rejected absolute immunity for child protective service workers 

or social workers who fabricate evidence.” (Doc. 28 at 6.) Plaintiffs conclude: “Like the 

defendants in Rieman, State Defendants here are not entitled to absolute immunity for 

providing false information or false testimony to the juvenile court.” (Id. at 7.)

In reply, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs conflate the ‘act of testifying’ with the 

‘act of fabricating evidence’ to support the idea that State Defendants do not enjoy absolute 

immunity. This misstates the law. The cases cited by Plaintiffs focus on the provision of 

false information in documentation provided to the court. State Defendants never asserted 

the defense of absolute immunity connected to alleged false information provided to the 

court (count two); instead their argument is application of immunity when government 

officials serve as witnesses.” (Doc. 32 at 5.) 

B. Analysis

Defendants are not entitled to relief, at least at this juncture of the case, based on 

2 This conclusion makes it unnecessary to delve into the complicated issue of how to 

apply Lapides when a state defendant has not consented to suit in its own courts. 

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their “absolute immunity for testimony” argument. In Counts One, Two, Six, and Seven, 

Plaintiffs challenge a wide array of conduct by Patchin, Del Fiacco, and others. Those 

counts do not turn solely on Patchin’s and Del Fiacco’s alleged false testimony during 

juvenile-court proceedings. Thus, even assuming Defendants are correct that Patchin and 

Del Fiacco are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to any allegations premised on 

such testimony, it doesn’t follow that Counts One, Two, Six, or Seven are subject to 

dismissal. Defendants seem to acknowledge this point, as their only request for relief in 

relation to their “absolute immunity for testimony” argument is that any testimony-related 

allegations “be stricken from the SAC.” (Doc. 25 at 11.) This is not a proper request for 

relief in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Cf. Cooper v. Scripps Media, Inc., 2018 WL 

8131235, *3-4 (W.D. Mo. 2018) (“Defendant contends that Paragraph 43 of the Second 

Amended Complaint should be dismissed or struck . . . because it is vague, ‘runs counter 

to the intentional discrimination standards at issue in this case . . . and once again conflates 

and confuses the legal standards at issue.’ However, paragraph 43 is not a claim that can 

be evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6), and there is no basis for striking the paragraph under 

Rule 12(f). Defendant’s objection seems to be evidentiary in nature, and the Rules of 

Evidence do not apply to allegations in a complaint.”); Pinson v. Prieto, 2011 WL 

6370465, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“Defendants are not seeking to dismiss this entire claim, 

but rather only a single allegation regarding an assault prior to April 9, 2008. . . . There 

may come a later procedural point in this case at which it may be appropriate for defendants 

to again seek to strike certain allegations from the FAC. But at this point, defendants have 

failed to meet their burden to . . . warrant granting their motion for partial dismissal.”).

IV. Qualified Immunity

A. Legal Standard

The legal standard governing a claim of qualified immunity is set forth in the June 

10, 2024 order. (Doc. 17 at 48-51.)

...

...

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B. Count One

1. The June 10, 2024 Order

In Count One of the FAC, Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del 

Fiacco, and Davisson “for violating Plaintiffs’ Right to Freedom of Association under the 

First Amendment and Due Process under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to the 

U.S. Constitution for unlawfully seizing and detaining K.J., J.M.J., J.A.J. and K.A.J.” 

(Doc. 1-3 at 151.)

In the June 10, 2024 order, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 

against Davisson in Count One because the FAC contained only “unsupported and 

conclusory allegations” regarding her role as a supervisor and thus failed to “plausibly 

allege that Davisson personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights, set in motion the acts that led to the deprivation, or was 

aware of the deprivation and failed to act.” (Doc. 17 at 38-39.) In a separate portion of the 

order, the Court concluded that Patchin and Del Fiacco were entitled to qualified immunity 

with respect to Count One. (Id. at 51-57.) 

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that “Count One should be dismissed in its entirety as to Patchin 

and for all acts except post-May 11, 2022, for Del Fiacco and Davisson on the basis of 

qualified immunity.” (Doc. 25 at 11-12.)

Plaintiffs do not differentiate between Counts One and Two in their responsive 

argument on qualified immunity. (Doc. 28 at 7-10.) Instead, Plaintiffs generally argue that 

qualified immunity should be denied because (1) “without a reasonable investigation, DCS 

and its agents removed K.J. and J.M.J. with a Temporary Custody Notice (‘TCN’) in the 

absence of a court order or exigent circumstances”; (2) “without a reasonable investigation, 

contrary to reports received from others, . . . Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson moved to 

sever the parents’ parental rights to the minor Plaintiffs based on State Defendants’ false 

narrative”; and (3) the new factual allegations in the SAC establish that Davisson “[n]ot 

only . . . set in motion the false narrative about this family, but . . . also knowingly refused 

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to terminate the subsequent series of DCS actions, which she knew were false or not 

justified, and which she knew or should have known would cause . . . Patchin and Del 

Fiacco to inflict a constitutional injury on this family to the determent of the minor 

Plaintiffs.” (Id.)

In reply, Defendants argue that Davisson is entitled to qualified immunity as to 

Count One because the allegations regarding her role in issuing the TCNs are unsupported 

and conclusory. (Doc. 32 at 6.) As for Patchin and Del Fiacco, Defendants contend that 

“[t]his case is identical to” Fidler v. State of Arizona, 2024 WL 1553703 (9th Cir. 2024), 

in which “the Ninth Circuit found the DCS investigation to be reasonable by relying on the 

state court’s issuance of the temporary order.” (Id. at 6-7.) Defendants continue: “The 

seizure of all four children was affirmed by the state court, thereby, providing the same 

determination of reasonableness as seen in the Fidler matter. . . . Because of these findings 

in state court, Minor Plaintiffs cannot now establish that State Defendants’ conduct during 

the investigation was not ultimately reasonable.” (Id. at 8.) 

3. Analysis

As discussed in the June 10, 2024 order, Count One is best construed as challenging 

both (1) the removal of the children from Jimenez-Bencebi; and (2) the subsequent failure 

to reunite the children with Jimenez-Bencebi. 

a. Removal

The June 10, 2024 order explained that the FAC was insufficient to overcome 

Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity because it did “not allege that the removal 

of any of the children occurred without a court order” and the applicable liability standard 

under Keates v. Koile, 883 F. 3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2018), turns in part on whether a challenged 

removal occurred without a court order. (Doc. 17 at 54.) 

In an effort to remedy this deficiency, the SAC alleges that the first act of removal 

on September 14, 2018 (K.J. and J.M.J.) was accomplished without any “warrant, court 

authorized removal order, or any other court order” and was instead accomplished pursuant 

to a TCN. (Doc. 21¶¶ 39(a), 57.) As for the second act of removal on March 7, 2019

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(K.A.J.), the SAC alleges it was accomplished “via a [TCN]” and was carried out by DCS 

agents who were acting “at the direction and orchestraction [sic] of Patchin and Davisson.” 

(Id. ¶ 39(f).) As for the third act of removal on February 13, 2020 (J.A.J.), the SAC alleges 

it was accomplished when “Patchin served the parents with a post-hoc TCN.” (Id. 

¶ 39(m).)

These new allegations require reevaluation of the earlier qualified-immunity 

analysis. In Keates, the Ninth Circuit explained that “our case law clearly establishes that 

the rights of parents and children to familial association under the Fourteenth, First, and 

Fourth Amendments are violated if a state official removes children from their parents 

without their consent, and without a court order, unless information at the time of the 

seizure, after reasonable investigation, establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child 

is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, and the scope, degree, and duration of the 

intrusion are reasonably necessary to avert the specific injury at issue.” Keates, 883 F.3d 

at 1237-38. See also Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at *2 (“The right to familial association is 

violated when a defendant removes a child from his parents’ custody without their consent 

or a court order and absent reasonable cause to believe that the seizure is necessary to avert 

imminent, serious bodily harm.”). Although the FAC did not allege that the first part of 

this test (i.e., the challenged removals occurred “without a court order”) was satisfied, the 

SAC now alleges that each challenged removal occurred without a court order—as in 

Keates, the SAC alleges that each removal was premised on a TCN. Keates, 883 F.3d at 

1242 (“The TCN was central to the alleged constitutional violation, as it was the basis for 

Koile’s seizure and removal of A.K. . . . .”). 

Notwithstanding all of this, Defendants argue that “[t]his Court can infer from the” 

presence of ongoing dependency proceedings between 2018 and 2023 “that court orders 

were entered for each child continuing the child in DCS custody until May 25, 2023.” 

(Doc. 32 at 8 n.3.) This argument is unavailing. The SAC’s only allegations regarding 

judicial orders are that (1) in January 2020, the juvenile court issued an order severing 

Jimenez-Bencebi’s parental rights as to K.J. and J.M.J.; and (2) in May 2022, the juvenile 

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court issued an order upholding the severance of Jimenez-Bencebi’s parental rights as to 

J.M.J. but reversing the severance as to K.J. and denying severance as to K.A.J. and J.A.J. 

(Doc. 21 ¶¶ 39(j), 39(q).) The SAC does not allege that any additional judicial orders were 

issued and the Court does not possess enough independent familiarity with the state-court 

dependency process to presume they were issued. The Court also notes that, if such 

additional orders existed, Defendants could have attached them to their motion and asked 

that they be considered pursuant to the judicial-notice doctrine, but Defendants did not do 

so. Thus, on this record and at this stage of the case, the Court must accept the SAC’s 

allegation that the removal of K.J. and J.M.J. in September 2018 occurred without a court 

order (the only court orders regarding their status were issued in 2020 and 2022) and that 

no court ever approved the removal of K.A.J. in March 2019 or the removal of J.A.J. in 

February 2020. 

The remaining part of the Keates liability standard is that the “information at the 

time of the seizure” did not “establish[] reasonable cause to believe that the child is in 

imminent danger of serious bodily injury, and the scope, degree, and duration of the 

intrusion are reasonably necessary to avert the specific injury at issue.” Keates, 883 F.3d 

at 1237-38. Defendants argue that reasonable cause necessarily existed for each seizure 

here because “[t]he seizure of all four children was affirmed by the state court, thereby, 

providing the same determination of reasonableness . . . .” (Doc. 32 at 8. See also id. at 6 

[“[R]easonableness is confirmed by the state court’s act in approving the three 

removals.”].) This argument is easily rejected as to K.A.J. and J.A.J.—as discussed, the 

Court must accept at this stage of the case that no court ever affirmed or approved those 

removals.

The analysis is more complicated as to K.J. and J.M.J. because, as the SAC 

acknowledges, the juvenile court issued an order in January 2020 severing JimenezBencebi’s parental rights as to them. Defendants ask the Court to view this order as 

conclusive proof that the earlier removal of K.J. and J.M.J. from Jimenez-Bencebi’s 

custody in September 2018 was reasonable (and, thus, not actionable under Keates). An 

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initial problem with this approach is that the juvenile court later reversed the severance 

decision as to K.J. Defendants do not explain why this chronology establishes that the 

initial decision to remove K.J. without a court order was necessarily supported by 

reasonable cause to believe K.J. was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. 

That leaves J.M.J. Although the January 2020 severance order as to J.M.J. was later 

affirmed in May 2022, Defendants overlook that, under Keates, the propriety of the 

September 2018 removal must be assessed based on the information that was available at 

that time. Keates, 833 F.3d at 1237-38 (authorizing liability for removals without a court 

order “unless information at the time of the seizure, after reasonable investigation, 

establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious 

bodily injury, and the scope, degree, and duration of the intrusion are reasonably necessary 

to avert the specific injury at issue”) (emphasis added). See also Wallis v. Spencer, 202 

F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Officials may remove a child from the custody of its 

parent without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time 

of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent 

danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary 

to avert that specific injury.”). On this record, the Court cannot determine whether the 

January 2020 and May 2022 severance decisions relating to J.M.J. were based on new 

information that came to light following the September 2018 removal of J.M.J. Thus, those 

orders do not necessarily establish that the September 2018 decision to remove J.M.J. 

without a court order was supported by reasonable cause to believe J.M.J. was in imminent 

danger of serious bodily injury.3 

For these reasons, it may be possible for Plaintiffs to state a valid familial 

association claim under Keates based on the removals of K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. 

3 These details also distinguish this case from Fidler, which held that “Burns was not 

on notice that her conduct was constitutionally deficient” because “the state court accepted 

Burns’ investigation as sufficient to issue a temporary dependency order.” 2024 WL 

1553703 at *2. Here, there is no allegation or evidence that a state court ever issued a 

temporary dependency order—instead, there is merely an allegation that a state court issued 

a severance order as to two of the four children at issue more than a year after their removals 

and subsequently reversed that order as to one of the children.

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The next question is whether Plaintiffs have stated such a claim, sufficient to survive 

Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity, as to the three specific Defendants named 

in Count One—Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson. Beginning with Patchin, the relevant 

allegations are that she directed and orchestrated the removal (via a TCN) of K.A.J. in 

March 2019, personally served the TCN related to J.A.J.’s removal in February 2020, and 

“served as the DCS caseworker [related to Plaintiffs] at all times relevant between October 

2018 to March 2021.” (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 39(f), 39(m), 44.) These allegations are sufficient to 

overcome Patchin’s claim of qualified immunity as to the removal of K.A.J. in March 2019 

and the removal of J.A.J. in February 2020. They are insufficient, however, to overcome 

Patchin’s claim of qualified immunity as to the removal of K.J. and J.M.J. in September 

2018 because there is no allegation that Patchin had anything to do with that removal 

(which occurred before she began serving as Plaintiffs’ DCS caseworker). Turning to Del 

Fiacco, there is no allegation that she had any involvement in any of the removals and the 

SAC alleges that she did not even begin serving as Plaintiffs’ DCS caseworker until “after 

March 2021” (id. ¶ 45), which is more than a year after the final removal occurred. Thus, 

Del Fiacco is entitled to qualified immunity as to any familial association claim premised 

on the removals. Finally, although the SAC alleges that Davisson was involved in some 

of the challenged removals by virtue of her status as Patchin’s supervisor (id. ¶¶ 39(f), 

39(i), 39(p)), those allegations are too conclusory to support liability and overcome 

Davisson’s claim of qualified immunity. Cf. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at *2 (“The third 

amended complaint contains no allegations that Quigley personally participated in E.F.’s 

removal or placement with a foster family beyond supervising Burns. And the 

nonconclusory allegations demonstrate only that Kaplan-Siekmann reviewed some 

documents and submitted a report to the Arizona Department of Child Safety. This conduct 

does not constitute a plausible constitutional violation.”).

b. Failure To Reunite

The June 10, 2024 order explained that, to the extent Count One of the FAC was 

based on Defendants’ “failure to allow Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta to resume visitation 

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after, at a minimum, the juvenile court issued its May 2022 decision authorizing 

reunification,” although there was “a strong argument that it would violate clearly 

established law for a DCS employee to interfere with parental visitation under these 

circumstances, i.e., where the interference was not only unauthorized by court order, but 

directly contrary to a court order,” the claim failed because the FAC did “not allege who 

was responsible for these acts of interference” and instead “generically attribute[d] them 

to ‘DCS.’” (Doc. 17 at 55-56.)

In an effort to remedy this deficiency, the SAC contains various new allegations 

regarding Del Fiacco’s and Davisson’s responsibility for the alleged failure to comply with 

the May 11, 2022 order. (Doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 40-41.) However, there are no new allegations on 

this issue regarding Patchin (which is unsurprising given that, as discussed above, Patchin 

ceased being Plaintiffs’ assigned DCS caseworker in March 2021). Notably, Defendants 

do not argue in their motion that Del Fiacco and Davisson are entitled to qualified immunity 

with respect to this portion of Count One—they only seek a qualified immunity-based 

dismissal as to Patchin. (Doc. 25 at 12 [“Count One should be dismissed in its entirety as 

to Patchin and for all acts except post-May 11, 2022, for Del Fiacco and Davisson on the 

basis of qualified immunity.”].)4 The Court agrees that Patchin is entitled to qualified 

immunity as to this portion of Count One because there is no allegation that she was 

personally involved in the alleged violation. And because Defendants do not seek a 

qualified immunity-based dismissal of this portion of Count One as to Del Fiacco and 

Davisson, the qualified-immunity analysis need not go any further.

c. Qualified-Immunity Summary As To Count One

To the extent Count One is based on the wrongful removal of K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J., 

and J.A.J., it is dismissed in its entirety on the basis of qualified immunity as to Del Fiacco 

and Davisson and is dismissed in part (only as to K.J. and J.M.J.) on the basis of qualified 

immunity as to Patchin. To the extent Count One is based on the wrongful failure to reunite 

4 The Court notes that, later in their motion, Defendants seek the dismissal of this 

portion of Count One as to Del Fiacco and Davisson for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 25 

at 16.) That argument is addressed infra.

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K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. with their family following the issuance of the May 11, 2022 order, 

it is dismissed as to Patchin (but not as to Del Fiacco and Davisson) on the basis of qualified 

immunity.

C. Count Two

1. The June 10, 2024 Order

In Count Two of the FAC, Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del 

Fiacco, and Davisson “for violating Plaintiffs’ right to Due Process under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments for making misrepresentations and/or omissions to the court 

which were deliberate falsehoods and/or which demonstrated a reckless disregard for the 

truth.” (Doc. 1-3 at 153-54.)

In the June 10, 2024 order, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 

against Davisson in Count Two because the FAC merely “parrot[ted] legally conclusory 

language” and failed to “plausibly establish that Davisson was personally involved in the 

alleged constitutional deprivations or had knowledge of the wrongfulness of the acts that 

would lead to those deprivations.” (Doc. 17 at 39-40.) 

As for the other defendants named in Count Two, the Court concluded that Del 

Fiacco was entitled to qualified immunity because the FAC “merely parrot[ted] the 

language from case law that Del Fiacco acted with knowledge or indifference in ‘realleging’ Patchin’s statements” and failed to allege that Del Fiacco’s testimony to the 

juvenile court on January 10, 2022 was false. (Id. at 61-63.) In contrast, the Court 

concluded that “Patchin is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two at this stage 

of the proceedings.” (Id. at 57-61.)

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that “the Court should affirm the prior dismissal of Del Fiacco on 

Count Two . . . under qualified immunity protections and extend those same protections to 

Davisson” because “[a]gain lacking . . . are any allegations that Davisson knew the 

allegations were false.” (Doc. 25 at 12.) Defendants add: “Minor Plaintiffs seek to pin all 

the alleged damages on State Defendants, but they are only one piece of a complicated 

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puzzle. Even assuming Minor Plaintiffs’ allegations about an incomplete investigation and 

false reporting to the court are accurate, the juvenile court still had a duty to weigh the 

evidence and render its own orders. State Defendants may have initially removed custody, 

but that removal was reviewed by a court and due process was invoked.” (Id. at 14.)

As noted, Plaintiffs do not differentiate between Counts One and Two in their 

responsive argument on qualified immunity. (Doc. 28 at 7-10.) With that said, they appear 

to argue that qualified immunity should be denied as to Count Two because (1) “Patchin, 

Del Fiacco, and Davisson moved” for severance “without a reasonable investigation [and] 

contrary to reports received from others”; and (2) Davisson both “set in motion the false 

narrative about this family” and also “knowingly refused to terminate the subsequent series 

of DCS actions, which she knew were false or not justified.” (Id.)

In reply, Defendants argue: “Plaintiffs were specifically instructed to incorporate 

allegations in the SAC supporting the proposition that Davisson knew the information 

being conveyed to the state court was false to adequately plead judicial deception. 

Plaintiffs’ amended assertions that ‘Davisson directed, recommended, and authorized 

Patchin to make . . . false statements . . . in reports to the juvenile court . . . .’ remains 

factually insufficient to establish judicial deception. Plaintiffs still do not explain (1) that 

the statements were actually false, (2) how Davisson knew the reports were false, or (3) 

how she authorized the statement.” (Doc. 32 at 9.) As for Del Fiacco, Defendants argue: 

“Plaintiffs cannot establish that Del Fiacco knew any of the allegations were false, and 

their allegations remain focused on Del Fiacco ‘continuing the false narrative.’ This Court 

already stated that is insufficient.” (Id. at 10.)

3. Analysis

The Court agrees with Defendants that Davisson and Del Fiacco are entitled to 

qualified immunity with respect to Count Two. As in the FAC, the SAC only offers 

conclusory assertions regarding Davisson’s and Del Fiacco’s knowledge of the falsity of 

the assertions at issue. 

...

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V. Failure To State A Claim

A. Legal Standard

The legal standard governing a request to dismiss for failure to state a claim is set 

forth in the June 10, 2024 order. (Doc. 17 at 11-12.)

B. Counts Six, Eight, And Ten

1. The Parties’ Arguments

In Counts Six, Eight, and Ten of the SAC, Plaintiffs assert various negligence-based 

tort claims (negligence per se, gross negligence, and gross negligence) against a host of 

Defendants, including Faust and McKay. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 195-217, 232-40, 249-57.) 

Defendants contend that Faust and McKay should be dismissed from these counts because 

“the SAC is devoid of specific details regarding Faust or McKay or their respective 

knowledge or oversight of the juvenile dependency court case. In essence, the language of 

the SAC reads as a failure to properly hire, train, and/or supervise the DCS employees but 

fails to identify specific training, policy, or statutes that were violated by Faust or McKay, 

with the exception of an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 8-456 previously discussed [in 

relation to L.J.]. The language is vague and does not point to any specific knowledge or 

involvement by Faust or McKay.” (Doc. 25 at 14-15.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ dismissal arguments regarding Counts 

Six, Eight, and Ten are “disingenuous[]” because Arizona state courts follow a noticepleading standard. (Doc. 28 at 10-11.) In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that if the SAC 

“does not adequately provide fair notice of the nature and basis of Plaintiffs’ claims, then 

an opportunity to correct any such deficiency by amendment should be allowed.” (Id. at 

11.) Plaintiffs also contend that Count Six “clearly state[s] the laws McKay and Faust 

violated and why they were negligent per se.” (Id. at 12.)

In reply, Defendants argue that the SAC’s “vague assertions that these State 

Defendants violated A.R.S. §§ 8-451,-453 are not sufficient. Plaintiffs identified no 

specific policies or statutes that either Faust or McKay violated, with the exception of 

failing to properly train under A.R.S. § 8-802(D)(1). The SAC contains no allegations that 

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Faust or McKay had any involvement whatsoever with Plaintiffs. They were not alleged 

to have (1) provided oversight to any acts by other State Defendants, (2) participated in the 

investigation or removal of any of the children, (3) drafted or supplied documentation to 

the state court, (4) interfered in Jimenez or Zavaleta’s visits with the children, (5) testified 

during the state court proceedings, or (6) participated in reunification decisions regarding 

the family. Even incorporating by reference all the previous allegations does not salvage 

their claims against State Defendants Faust and McKay.” (Doc. 32 at 12.)

2. Analysis

The Court agrees with Defendants that the SAC fails to state a claim in Counts Six, 

Eight, or Ten against McKay and Faust. Although the SAC alleges that McKay and Faust 

each served as the Director of DCS during some of the relevant timeframes in this case 

(Doc. 21 ¶¶ 17-18), it does not contain a single non-conclusory allegation regarding their 

conduct or involvement in any of the challenged conduct. To the extent Plaintiffs contend 

that such details are unnecessary in state court, the Court must apply federal pleading 

standards here.

C. Counts Four And Five

1. The June 10, 2024 Order

In Count Four of the FAC, Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del 

Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay for “interfer[ing] with [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s] constitutional right to make medical decisions for their seized and detained 

children disallowing them from attending medical appointments while they were in State’s 

care.” (Doc. 1-3 ¶ 170.) Similarly, in Count Five of the FAC, Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 

claim against the same five Defendants for “interfer[ing] with [Jimenez-Bencebi’s and 

Zavaleta’s] constitutional right to be present during their seized and detained children’s 

medical appointments.” (Id. ¶ 175.) 

In the June 10, 2024 order, the Court concluded that Counts Four and Five failed to 

state a claim against Davisson, Faust, and McKay because it did not “allege that Davisson, 

Faust, and McKay were personally involved in interfering with, or aware of interference 

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with, Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s right to make medical decisions for their children 

or ability to be present during their children’s medical appointments.” (Doc. 17 at 42.) In 

a separate portion of the order, that Court noted that “[t]he only [specific] references to 

medical decisions in the FAC are that K.J. and J.M.J. received physical examinations at 

PCH after their removal on September 14, 2018, and that J.M.J. remained at PCH until 

September 20, 2018. . . . Because the FAC does not offer any allegation that Patchin and 

Del Fiacco participated in the decision to prevent Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta from 

making medical decisions for K.J. and J.M.J., or even that any medical decisions were 

made on behalf of L.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against 

Patchin and Del Fiacco in Count Four.” (Id. at 45-46.) Likewise, as for Count Five, the 

Court stated that “the totality of the FAC’s factual allegations on this topic are that J.M.J. 

and K.J. received physical examinations on September 14, 2018 and that J.M.J. received 

treatment for malnutrition. Although it is plausible, based on those facts, to infer that 

Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta were not present during K.J.’s and J.M.J.’s treatments, the 

FAC is silent on who (if anyone) prevented Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta from being 

present and whether L.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. underwent any medical treatments without their 

parents present. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Patchin and 

Del Fiacco in Count Five.” (Id. at 47.)

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that Counts Four and Five remain subject to dismissal because the 

SAC does “not incorporate[] any additional facts that State Defendants were responsible 

for (1) Minor Plaintiffs receiving any medical examinations, (2) without notice to Jimenez 

and Zavaleta, and (3) without permission for Jimenez and Zavaleta to be present.” (Doc. 

25 at 15.) Defendants also argue, in the alternative, that Counts Four and Five are subject 

to dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds. (Id. at 16.)

In response, Plaintiffs purport to identify many missed medical appointments and 

unconsented-to medical treatment: “For example, following J.A.J.’s seizure immediately 

after birth on February 13, 2020, neither [parent was] notified about, and both were 

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prevented from attending, J.A.J.’s numerous doctor visits, including the following: wellbaby examination 3-5 days after birth; well-baby examination one month after birth; wellbaby examination and vaccinations two-months after birth; well-baby examination and 

vaccinations four-months after birth; well-baby examination and vaccinations six-months 

after birth; nine-month checkup; 12-month checkup; 15-month checkup and vaccinations; 

18-month checkup and vaccinations; 24-month checkup; 30-month checkup; and 36-month 

checkup.” (Doc. 28 at 14.) Plaintiffs also contend that both parents were “prevented . . . 

from knowing about and being present for K.A.J.’s doctor visits after his removal on March 

17, 2019.” (Id.) Plaintiffs conclude: “Because the minor Plaintiffs’ vaccinations, wellbaby checks, and physical examinations were neither required by exigent circumstances 

and the parents’ parental rights were not severed, all Plaintiffs retained their full rights to 

notice, consent, and opportunity for parents to be present at all these medical events.” (Id.

at 15.)

In reply, Defendants argue that “[t]he general proposition that parents have a 

constitutional right to make medical decisions and attend medical appointments does not 

transform the deficiencies contained in the SAC because they have not alleged an actual 

‘interference’ or facts supporting that State Defendants infringed on these rights. Plaintiffs 

assert they were not allowed to attend well-baby checks and incorporate a long list of 

potential appointments in the Response, but do not provide any factual substance such as 

the actual date of the appointment, who attended the appointment, whether they were 

specifically notified about the appointment, and any potential reason why they failed to 

attend the appointment. Without these details, State Defendants cannot plausibly defend 

the cursory allegations.” (Doc. 32 at 12-13.) Defendants also reiterate their statute-oflimitations argument. (Id. at 13.)

3. Analysis

The Court dismissed Counts Four and Five of the FAC in large part due to the 

absence of concrete details regarding the medical appointments that Jimenez-Bencebi and 

Zavaleta did not consent to or attend. In an effort to address this deficiency, the SAC adds 

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the following new details: (1) “[a]fter K.A.J. was removed, [Jimenez-Bencebi and 

Zavaleta] were prohibited by Patchin and Davisson from attending any medical 

appointments for K.A.J., including well-baby examinations” (Doc. 20-1 ¶ 39(h); (2) 

“[o]nce J.A.J. was seized and removed, [Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta] were prohibited 

from attending any of J.A.J.’s medical appointments, including all well-baby 

appointments, immunizations, and other appointments” (id. ¶ 39(n)); (3) Jimenez-Bencebi 

and Zavaleta were prevented from “attending all [of K.J.’s and J.A.J.’s] baby wellness 

examinations, and be[ing] present for any immunizations . . . under the mismanagement of 

Supervisor Davisson” (id. ¶ 116); (4) “Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson interfered with 

[Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] constitutional right to make medical decisions for their 

seized and detained children by prohibiting them from attending their annual check-ups, 

well-baby examinations, and any other medical treatment needed while in DCS custody” 

(id. ¶ 186); and (5) “Patchin, Del Fiaccco, and Davisson interfered with [JimenezBencebi’s and Zavaleta’s] constitution[al] right to consent to medical treatment for their 

seized and detained children by disallowing them from attending their annual check-ups, 

well-baby examinations, annual immunizations, and any other medical treatment needed 

while in DCS custody” (id. ¶ 192).

Although the Court appreciates Plaintiffs’ attempt to add these new details, they 

remain insufficient to state a claim. Beginning with Count Four, it is true that “physical 

examinations of [a] child may not be undertaken for investigative purposes at the behest of 

state officials unless a judicial officer has determined, upon notice to the parents, and an 

opportunity to be heard, that grounds for such an examination exist and that the 

administration of the procedure is reasonable under all the circumstances.” Wallis v. 

Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Thus, “[b]arring a 

reasonable concern that material physical evidence might dissipate, or that some urgent 

medical problem exists requiring immediate attention, the state is required to notify parents 

and to obtain judicial approval before children are subjected to investigatory physical 

examinations.” Id. (emphasis added) This rule is not implicated by the new details alleged 

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in the SAC because there is no allegation that any of the medical appointments at issue—

annual check-ups, well-baby examinations, and annual immunizations—were undertaken 

for investigative purposes at the behest of any state official (let alone at the behest of any 

of the named Defendants).

5

 

As for Count Five, although Wallis holds that “parents have a right arising from the 

liberty interest in family association to be with their children while they are receiving 

medical attention” and “children have a corresponding right to the love, comfort, and 

reassurance of their parents while they are undergoing medical procedures,” id. at 1142, a 

plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim based on those principles must establish that the particular 

defendant being sued was responsible for the parent’s absence. The SAC is deficient as to 

this issue. Although the SAC contains conclusory assertions that Patchin and Davisson 

“prohibited” Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta from attending K.A.J.’s well-baby 

examinations and other medical appointments (Doc. 21 ¶ 39(h), that unspecified DCS 

employees “prohibited” Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta from attending J.A.J.’s well-baby 

examinations and other medical appointments (id. ¶ 39(n), that Davisson’s 

“mismanagement” resulted in Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta being prevented from 

attending K.J.’s and J.A.J.’s wellness examinations and immunizations (id. ¶ 116), and that 

Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson “prohibit[ed]” and/or “disallow[ed]” Jimenez-Bencebi 

and Zavaleta from attending various medical appointments (id. ¶¶ 186, 192), there are no 

facts alleged in the SAC to support those conclusions. Cf. Fidler, 2024 WL 1553703 at *3 

(“The third amended complaint includes no factual allegations that, if taken as true, show 

5 Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2021), contains passages 

that can be read as suggesting that a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment occurs whenever 

a child undergoes any sort of medical examination “without the Parents’ notice, consent, 

or an opportunity to be present.” Id. at 1149. However, the examinations at issue in 

Benavidez, similar to the examination at issue in Wallis, were court-ordered “medical 

examinations [that] included a full body inspection including the children’s genital and/or 

anal areas, obtaining urine to test, and drawing blood and/or vaccinations.” Id. at 1141 

(internal quotation marks omitted). At any rate, there is no allegation in the SAC that any 

of the named Defendants was responsible for scheduling the annual check-ups, well-baby 

examinations, and annual immunizations at issue here. Thus, even if it might be 

theoretically possible to assert a constitutional claim against some state official for causing 

such non-investigatory medical appointments to occur without parental consent, the SAC 

fails to state such a claim against Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, or McKay.

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that Burns, Quigley, Manjarrez, Saenz, or Edwards were responsible for (1) E.F. receiving 

medical examinations (2) without notice to Fidler and (3) without permission for her to be 

present. Fidler therefore did not state a plausible entitlement to relief in Claims Six and 

Seven.”).6

D. Count One

1. The Parties’ Arguments

As discussed above in Part IV.B.3, following the qualified-immunity analysis, the 

only remaining portions of Count One are (1) the wrongful-removal claim against Patchin, 

but only as to K.A.J. and J.A.J.; and (2) the failure-to-reunite claim against Del Fiacco and 

Davisson.

Defendants move to dismiss the failure-to-reunite claim “for failure to state a claim 

in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.” (Doc. 25 at 16.) Defendants elaborate:

The facts are suspect because the exact language in the May 11, 2022, order 

as outlined in the SAC only required ‘DCS to have a meeting with parents 

within 30 days to start the reunification process.’ (Doc. 21 ¶ 39(q).) The 

SAC does not state this meeting failed to occur. The second allegation [is 

that] ‘For the first six weeks . . . Del Fiacco and Davisson cancelled all of the 

parent’s supervised visits with their children.’ (Id. ¶ 40.) Again this does not 

explain if or how this may have been connected to the reunification process. 

Next, the allegation is that ‘Del Fiacco and Davisson waited for more than 

five months to take any affirmative steps towards implementing the 

reunification case plan’ (Id. ¶ 41) but, nevertheless, fails to explain the 

language in the original court order that was specifically violated. The final 

allegation is that ‘DCS’s heavy-handed involvement with this family 

continued until May 25, 2023, when the juvenile court dismissed the 

dependency action.’ (Id. ¶ 42.) Again, this demonstrates that the juvenile 

court remained involved with this family for one year after the May 11, 2022, 

order, so all orders regarding placement, visitation, and reunification services 

were being controlled by the juvenile court.

(Id.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the facts alleged in the SAC establish that “State 

Defendants clearly violated a court order for reunification” because “after the May 11, 

6 Given these conclusions, it is unnecessary to resolve Defendants’ alternative statuteof-limitations challenge to Counts Four and Five.

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2022, hearing the juvenile court changed the case plan to reunification and ordered DCS to 

have a meeting with the parents within thirty days of the May 11, 2022, ruling to start the 

reunification process” but “Del Fiacco and Davisson failed to follow the juvenile court’s 

order for reunification” because “[f]or the first six weeks after the 11 May 2022 order, 

DCS, through its agents Del Fiacco and Davisson, cancelled all the parents’ supervised 

visits with their children.” (Doc. 28 at 15.) Plaintiffs further contend that “[i]n direct 

violation of the juvenile court’s order, Del Fiacco and Davisson failed to take affirmative 

steps toward implementing the reunification case plan for five months.” (Id. at 15-16.)

In reply, Defendants argue that “[t]he Response imprecisely alleges that State 

Defendants violated an order for reunification entered on May 11, 2022, but a detailed 

review of the actual court language is not consistent with this claim. The order does not 

mandate State Defendants to reunify the Minor Plaintiffs in any set timeframe; instead it 

states they were required to conduct a meeting. . . . There are no allegations State 

Defendants failed to hold this meeting and even if it did allege this failure, nothing supports 

a potential constitutional violation simply because a meeting was not held in violation of a 

state court order.” (Doc. 32 at 8-9.)7 

2. Analysis

The Court agrees with Defendants that, to the extent Plaintiffs’ claim in Count One 

against Del Fiacco and Davisson is premised on a failure-to-reunite theory, it is subject to 

dismissal for failure to state a claim. Although it remains true, as noted in the June 10, 

2024 order, that “there is a strong argument that it would violate clearly established law for 

a DCS employee to interfere with parental visitation . . . where the interference was . . . 

directly contrary to a court order” (Doc. 17 at 55), the only specific allegations in the SAC 

regarding the juvenile court’s May 11, 2022 order are that it “changed the case plan from 

severance to reunification for K.J, K.A.J., and J.A.J.” and “ordered DCS to have a meeting 

7 Defendants also argue that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs were afforded due process through 

the state court proceedings, any alleged violations occurring after the state court took 

jurisdiction cannot equal a Fourteenth Amendment violation unless State Defendants took 

affirmative steps and failed to provide notice to Minor Plaintiffs and/or failed to provide 

them with the opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. 32 at 10.) This argument is forfeited because 

it was raised for the first time in a reply brief.

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with parents within 30 days of the May 11, 2022, ruling to start the reunification process.” 

(Doc. 21 ¶ 39(q).) However, there is no allegation in the SAC that DCS failed to participate 

in this court-ordered meeting within 30 days (let alone that Del Fiacco or Davisson were 

personally responsible for the failure to participate). 

As for the allegation that “DCS through Del Fiacco and Davisson, cancelled all of 

the parents’ supervised visits with their children” during “the first six weeks after the May 

11, 2022, order” (id. ¶ 40), the problem is that the SAC does not explain why this conduct 

violated the May 11, 2022 order. As noted, the SAC only identifies one specific directive 

in the May 11, 2022 order—that DCS meet with the parents within 30 days of the issuance 

of the order. Cancelling all supervised visits between the parents and children for the first 

six weeks following the issuance of the order would not violate that directive. Nor can the 

Court infer, on this record, that cancelling such visits would violate the May 11, 2022 

order’s broader directive to pursue “reunification.”

Finally, as for the allegation that “[i]n direct violation of the May 11, 2022, order, 

DCS and its agents Del Fiacco and Davisson waited more than five months to take any 

affirmative steps toward implementing the reunification case plan” (id. ¶ 41), the problem 

is that the SAC does not identify any provision in the May 11, 2022 order that required 

DCS to begin taking “affirmative steps toward implementing the reunification case plan” 

on any particular timeframe. Given this omission, the Court need not credit Plaintiffs’ 

conclusory assertion that a five-month period of delay constituted a “direct violation” of 

the order. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[A] court considering a motion to 

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). 

For these reasons, Count One is dismissed as to Del Fiacco and Davisson. The only 

portion of Count One that remains is the wrongful-removal claim against Patchin, but only 

as to K.A.J. and J.A.J.

...

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E. Count Two

As discussed above in Part IV.C.3, following the qualified-immunity analysis, the 

sole remaining Defendant in Count Two is Patchin.

In the portion of their motion seeking dismissal of Count Two under Rule 12(b)(6), 

Defendants only address the sufficiency of the allegations as to Del Fiacco and Davisson. 

(Doc. 25 at 17.) Because those Defendants have already been dismissed from Count Two 

based on qualified immunity, it is unnecessary to address Defendants’ additional dismissal 

arguments.

F. Count Three

1. The June 10, 2024 Order

In Count Three of the FAC, Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim against Patchin, Del 

Fiacco, and Davisson “for violating Plaintiffs[’] right to Due Process under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments for failing to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family 

relationship.” (Doc. 1-3 at 156.) However, in the body of Count Three, Patchin, Del 

Fiacco, and Davisson were only accused of violating the Arizona constitution and various 

Arizona statutes. (Id. ¶¶ 154-64.) Accordingly, the Court concluded that Count Three of 

the FAC was subject to dismissal because “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

(Doc. 17 at 44, citation omitted.) The Court continued: “Additionally, to the extent Count 

Three actually was—notwithstanding the FAC’s references to violations of Arizona law—

an attempt to hold [Defendants] responsible for federal constitutional violations related to 

the preservation of ‘the family relationship,’ any such claim would be duplicative of 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim . . . in Count One.” (Id. at 45.)

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants contend that Count Three should be dismissed because “[a] review of 

the red-lined version of the SAC easily demonstrates that Plaintiffs did not fix the 

deficiencies noted by this Court. This Court specifically articulated that Count Three 

referenced violations of state law and not violations of the U.S. Constitution and there are 

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no amendments to the body of Count Three that addresses this concern.” (Doc. 25 at 17.) 

In the alternative, Defendants argue that Count Three should be dismissed because, to the 

extent it is premised on the theory that the minor children had a constitutional right to be 

kept together in the same foster home, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lipscomb by and 

Through DeFehr v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992), establishes that there is no 

such clearly established constitutional right (and, thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity). (Id. at 17-18.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue as follows:

Federal and state laws require child welfare agencies to make ‘reasonable 

efforts’ to preserve the family and prevent the child’s removal. E.g., 42 

U.S.C. § 671(a)(15); A.R.S. §8-846 (2018); see also abundant case law cited 

herein. State Defendants’ have an affirmative duty to make reasonable 

efforts to preserve families. Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9 

(2019) (citing Marina P. v. ADES, 214 Ariz. 326, 333, ¶ 37 (App. 2007)); 

Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 186 ¶ 1 (1999). 

State Defendants had long-standing, clearly established statutory and 

constitutional obligations to quickly reunify this family. See, e.g., Marian P. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 236 ¶ 37 (App. 2007). Reasonable 

efforts include determining and placing the children in the best placement for 

working towards reunification. State Defendants foreclosed all efforts to 

reunite the children with their parents by the wrongful actions alleged in the 

complaint. As shown above, State Defendants’ actions clearly violated 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, as painfully set forth in the complaint.

(Doc. 28 at 17.)

In reply, Defendants argue that (1) “[t]he Response does not provide any 

clarification or legal authority establishing that failing to provide ‘reasonable efforts’ 

equates to a violation of the Constitution”; (2) “[t]he only court order Plaintiffs claim State 

Defendants failed to comply with is the May 11, 2022 order,” so “”[a]ny other assertions 

for violations of ‘reasonable efforts’ are protected by immunity”; and (3) “because there is 

no constitutionally protected right for siblings to be placed together, nor to be placed in a 

specific placement, as a matter of law, count three fails.” (Doc. 32 at 11-12.)

...

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3. Analysis

The Court agrees with Defendants that Count Three remains subject to dismissal. 

Once again, Plaintiffs seem to operate from the mistaken premise that a § 1983 claim may 

be based on alleged violations of state law. At any rate, Plaintiffs fail to identify any clearly 

established federal law establishing that any Defendant wrongfully interfered with any 

Plaintiff’s family relationship in a manner that is distinct from the familial-interference 

claim asserted in Count One. 

VI. Notice Of Claim

A. The June 10, 2024 Order

During the last round of motion-to-dismiss briefing, Defendants raised various 

arguments related to Arizona’s notice-of-claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). When 

analyzing those arguments, the Court stated that “the notice of claim at issue here, which 

was filed by Jimenez-Bencebi, Zavaleta, and L.J., is dated November 8, 2022” and that 

“[t]he notice of claim does not list K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. as claimants.” (Doc. 17 at 69.) 

The Court further concluded that “[a]lthough Defendants seem to suggest this omission 

means the state-law claims of K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. must be dismissed” on untimeliness 

grounds, “any such argument is mistaken” because “§ 12-821.01(D) provides that ‘a minor 

. . . may file a claim within one hundred eighty days after the disability ceases’” and thus 

“the deadline for K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. to file their respective notices of claim will not 

arrive until 180 days after each of their eighteenth birthdays.” (Id. at 69-70.)

B. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants clarify that they “wish[] to preserve any arguments pertaining to the lack 

of serving a Notice of Claim (‘NOC’) by any Minor Plaintiffs prior to commencement of 

the lawsuit.” (Doc. 25 at 18.) Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs cannot cure their failure 

by filing a notice of claim after filing this suit because Arizona law requires a notice of 

claim be filed before filing suit” but “recognize the impact for the failure to serve a NOC 

is for Minor Plaintiffs to dismiss the lawsuit, serve a NOC, and refile.” (Id.)

In response, Plaintiffs begin by disputing the Court’s earlier determination that their 

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notice of claim was only filed by Jimenez-Bencebi, Zavaleta, and L.J. and failed to identify 

K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. as separate claimants. (Doc. 28 at 17-18.) According to Plaintiffs, 

the notice of claim’s identification of Jimenez-Bencebi as “the mother of L.J., K.J., J.M.J., 

K.A.J. and J.A.J.” and provision of “detailed allegations concerning all five minor 

Plaintiffs” was sufficient to identify K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. as separate claimants. (Id.) In 

the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that “even if the [notice of claim] was not properly served, 

which it was, the minor Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to reserve a NOC and then 

pursue those claims here, as alleged, or refile their state law claims in a separate action.” 

(Id. at 18.)

In reply, Defendants argue: “This Court can review the plain language of the notice 

of claim and easily ascertain that it was only filed naming Jimenez and Zavaleta as 

claimants. Simply stating that Jimenez and Zavaleta are parents to the children does not 

change the plain language. The requirements to comply with the notice of claim statute 

are not complex so strict compliance is required.” (Doc. 32 at 13.)

C. Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court stands by its earlier determination that the only 

claimants identified in the notice of claim are Jimenez-Bencebi, Zavaleta, and L.J. 

Although K.J., J.M.J., K.A.J. and J.A.J. happen to be mentioned in the notice of claim, they 

are only identified as Jimenez-Bencebi’s minor children and are not identified as separate 

claimants. Indeed, the very first portion of the document includes the following:

NOTICE OF CLAIM PURSUANT TO A.R.S. § 12-821.01

CLAIMANTS: Bianca Jimenez-Bencebi

Jiaro Abrego Zavaleta

L. J., a minor (DOB 06/27/2005)

(Doc. 28-1 at 2.) The omission of K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J. from this official listing of the 

“CLAIMANTS” is telling and dispositive.

As for how to proceed, both sides seem to agree that one solution would be to 

dismiss K.J.’s, K.A.J.’s, and J.A.J.’s current state-law claims without prejudice. If K.J., 

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K.A.J., and J.A.J. later serve a timely notice of claim, this will unlock their ability to file a 

new action reasserting the state-law claims being dismissed here. Although this outcome 

is undoubtedly inefficient, it is compelled by Arizona’s strict rule that “[b]efore initiating 

an action for damages against a public entity, a claimant must provide a notice of claim to 

the entity in compliance with [§] 12-821.01.” Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. 

Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 491 (Ariz. 2007). 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss, without prejudice, all of the state-law claims 

in the SAC asserted by K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.

VII. Leave To Amend

In their response, Plaintiffs request leave to amend in the event of dismissal only as 

to their claims in Counts Six, Eight, and Ten against Faust and McKay. (Doc. 28 at 11.) 

In reply, Defendants argue that “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is proper as Plaintiffs 

failed to comply with the specific Court directives and prior amendment has been allowed.” 

(Doc. 32 at 1-2.)

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “advises the court that ‘leave [to 

amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “This policy is ‘to be applied 

with extreme liberality.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, leave to amend should be granted 

unless “the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) 

produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. 

Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, “[t]he district court’s 

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil. Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th 

Cir. 1989).

Applying these standards, Plaintiffs’ amendment request is denied. First, 

amendment would be futile here because Plaintiffs still have not provided any nonconclusory allegations regarding Faust’s and McKay’s conduct or involvement in any of 

the challenged conduct in this case. Nor have Plaintiffs purported to identify any new facts 

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that they could allege in a future pleading in an attempt to cure the deficiencies identified 

by Defendants. Second, in a related vein, allowing further amendment would produce an 

undue delay in the litigation. This action was initiated in state court in May 2023 (Doc. 1-

3 at 5), so it is already more than a year-and-a-half old. Additionally, this case has now 

generated two voluminous rounds of motion-to-dismiss briefing, and the Court is 

concerned that authorizing Plaintiffs to file yet another amended complaint—while will 

likely spur yet another round of motion-to-dismiss briefing—will inject even more delay 

into this case, such that it will remain stuck at the pleading stage more than two years after 

it was filed. Plaintiffs have had a full and fair opportunity to plead their claims and the 

time has come for this case to proceed to the next stage of litigation.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is granted in part 

and denied in part as set forth herein.

Dated this 9th day of December, 2024.

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