Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02164/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02164-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sonja Kajander, a single woman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, an Arizona Municipal

Corporation, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 2:09-CV-02164-JAT

ORDER

Five separate motions are currently pending before the Court: 1) Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. #33); 2) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Addendum (Doc.

#49); 3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. #37); 4) Defendant’s

Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #39); and 5) Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective Order (Doc. #51).

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Motion to Strike, grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions, and

denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for a Protective Order.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On January 8, 2002, Ms. Sonja Kajander (“Plaintiff”) filed her first complaint against

multiple defendants, including the City of Phoenix (“Defendant”), which asserted six

separate claims for relief: 1) false imprisonment; 2) intentional infliction of emotional

distress; 3) punitive damages; 4) gross negligence; 5) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 6) 42 U.S.C. §

1985. (Doc. #33, Exh. 1). These allegations stemmed from a January 11, 2001 incident

where officers arrested Plaintiff for allegedly shoplifting at a Fry’s Food and Drug (Doc. #33

at 2). On February 5, 2002, Defendants removed the lawsuit from Maricopa County

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

Superior Court to the United States District Court of Arizona (Doc. #33, Exh. 2).

District Court Judge Campbell ultimately dismissed or granted summary judgment on

each of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. #33, Exh. 2). Plaintiff appealed the Court’s summary

dismissal of her false imprisonment and § 1983 claims. (Doc. #33, Exh. 3). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed summary dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983

challenge, but reversed on the Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim (Doc. #33, Exh. 3).

Absent any remaining federal issue, the Court then exercised its discretionary authority to

remand this claim to Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. #33, Exh. 2). On March 17,

2008, Superior Court Judge Blakey granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false

imprisonment claim because “[she] had not shown . . . any genuine issues of material fact

that would dispute Defendants’ sworn affidavits outlining the bases for Plaintiff’s arrest.”

(Doc. #33, Exh. 4).

In October 2009, Plaintiff filed another Complaint in this Court regarding her 2001

altercation with police and store security personnel at Fry’s Food and Drug (Doc. #1). In this

pending Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief from the City of Phoenix, one of the defendants in

her original lawsuit. Her Complaint alleges both Defendant’s false imprisonment and

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through the officers’ use of excessive force. (Doc. #1 at 9).

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings because she believes the Superior

Court did not have jurisdiction to render a valid, final judgment (Doc. #37). Furthermore,

she requests a protective order for Defendant’s alleged discovery abuses (Doc. #51).

Defendant requests summary judgment on res judicata grounds (Doc. #33), the striking of

Plaintiff’s addendum (Doc. #49), and sanctions (Doc. #39).

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

II. Discussion

A. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant seeks summary judgment on both Plaintiff’s false imprisonment and 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims because res judicata precludes her from reasserting them. Summary

judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is mandated, “. . . against a party who

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Because the false imprisonment and § 1983 claims

were dismissed at the state and federal level respectively, the court in which the particular

dismissal occurred will dictate the relevant res judicata legal standard. See Ayers v. City of

Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990).

1. False Imprisonment Claim

State law governs the application of collateral estoppel to a state court decision. Id.;

Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). The Maricopa

County Superior Court decided Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. (Doc. #33, Exh. 5).

Accordingly, Arizona law will govern whether collateral estoppel is appropriate for this

particular claim. 

The party seeking to assert collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing the

requisite elements. See State Comp. Fund v. Yellow Cab Co. of Phoenix, 3 P.3d 1040, 1044

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, the City of Phoenix will have the burden of showing all

the elements of collateral estoppel.

 In Arizona, res judicata will preclude a claim when a former judgment on the merits

was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the

same parties was, or might have been, determined in the former action. Hall v. Lalli, 977

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

P.2d 776, 779 (Ariz. 1999); accord Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.

313, 323-24 (1971). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, occurs when: 1) the issue was

actually litigated in a previous proceeding; 2) the parties had a full and fair opportunity and

motive to litigate the issue; 3) a valid and final judgment is entered; 4) resolution of the issue

was essential to the decision; and 5) there is common identity of the parties. See Garcia v.

General Motors Corp., 990 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).

In the current case, the parties only dispute whether the Superior Court made a valid,

final judgment. The other requisite elements are clearly met. First, both Ms. Kajander and

the City of Phoenix were parties to the original 2001 dispute. Second, Judge Blakey

necessarily reached the false imprisonment issue because this claim was the only one before

the Superior Court. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff did not litigate her

claim, or that she was denied a fair opportunity to do so. The applicability of collateral

estoppel therefore hinges upon whether Judge Blakley’s summary judgment order constitutes

a valid, final judgment. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that this order did

constitute a valid, final judgment.

Judge Blakley granted Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on May 29,

2008 (Doc. #33, Exh. 5). Despite this order, Plaintiff contends that no valid, final judgment

exists. Plaintiff initially asserts the Superior Court was unable to make a final judgment

because this Court still possessed the case file. (Doc. #42 at 2). Even absent the physical

folder and its contents, the Superior Court could rule on the case’s merits.

After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the state law false imprisonment,

this Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because no federal question

remained. Accordingly, Judge Campbell properly exercised his discretion in remanding the

false imprisonment claim. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)

(“[W]hen the federal claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state

law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing

the case without prejudice.”). Therefore, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the claim.

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

This unambiguous procedural history also defeats Plaintiff’s other objections. First,

Plaintiff did not have to submit a new complaint to the Superior Court because this Court

simply remanded the original false imprisonment claim to the state court system. Second,

the Superior Court’s 150-day Order to Dismiss (December 2002) occurred after the case was

removed into this Court based upon a remaining federal question. This Order did not prevent

Judge Campbell from handling the case because the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims. The Superior Court Order did not restrict the Court’s authority to decide on the

claims.

Plaintiff’s current allegations arise from the very same set of facts as her original

complaint. In fact, this Complaint alleges her original lawsuit’s exact false imprisonment

claim. Because the Superior Court has fully and fairly adjudicated this very issue, the

Plaintiff cannot reassert her false imprisonment claim in this Court. 

2. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim of Excessive Force

Plaintiff also alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation based on Defendant’s alleged use

of excessive force. Defendant argues that res judicata bars this claim as well. No court has

ever ruled on Plaintiff’s specific claim of excessive force but Plaintiff has previously asserted

a § 1983 claim out of the same 2001 altercation. The Court must determine whether Plaintiff

could have brought this claim during her previous lawsuit because it arises from the same

transactional nucleus of operative facts. See Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. v. Assiniboine &

Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 2003). Res judicata precludes this claim because

Plaintiff could have asserted it in her previous lawsuit.

The doctrine of res judicata protects “litigants from the burden of relitigating an

identical issue” and promotes “judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). The doctrine bars a claim where

there is an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits, and privity between parties. See

Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). An identity of

claims exists if the two actions arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge Campbell’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

- 6 -

Burlington, 323 F.3d at 770.

An involuntary dismissal is an adjudication on the merits, unless otherwise specified.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). District Court Judge Campbell specifically noted that all of Plaintiff’s

claims were dismissed with prejudice (Doc. #33, Exh. 2, Docket No. 258).1

 Because a final

judgment was reached between these very same litigants, the only remaining issue to

determine is whether the § 1983 excessive force allegation arises from the same nucleus of

facts as Plaintiff’s original complaint.

Plaintiff’s original § 1983 count alleged “[the defendants’] denial of her due process

and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution and the Arizona

Constitution.” (Doc. #33, Exh. 3 at 11). This original claim stemmed from her January 2001

detainment at Fry’s Food and Drug by Phoenix police officers. (Doc. #33, Exh. 3 at 2).

Plaintiff currently asserts a § 1983 claim alleging that the police used excessive force during

that detainment and arrest. (Doc. #1 at 9). Both claims clearly involve the 2001 facts.

Plaintiff is now simply providing a more specific basis for obtaining relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This Court does not need to investigate the reasons why Plaintiff failed to raise this

specific § 1983 claim for purpose of res judicata; instead, the ultimate determination is

whether she could have raised the issue because it arose from the same nucleus of facts. See

Burlington, 323 F.3d at 770. Because Plaintiff’s current claim does aries from the same

nucleus of facts as her previous lawsuit against the City of Phoenix, res judicata bars

Plaintiff’s most recent 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenge. The Court therefore grants Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment.

B. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Addendum

Defendant requests the Court to strike Plaintiff’s addendum (Doc. #49) because of

improper filing. The Court has authority to strike “any part of a filing or submission on the

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Even if the Court allowed Plaintiff’s addendum, this supplement would not have

affected the Court’s order to grant summary judgment. Despite Plaintiff’s opposing

arguments, the Superior Court acquired jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim

and could make a valid, final judgment on the merits. After the Ninth Circuit remanded the

state issue, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because no remaining

federal claim existed. Accordingly, Judge Campbell properly exercised his discretion in

remanding the false imprisonment claim, and thus, the Superior Court possessed jurisdiction

to rule on the merits.

- 7 -

ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a statute, rule, or court order.” LRCiv

7.2(m). Plaintiff did not include the addendum with her response to Defendant’s motion and

accompanying facts. She could not supplement her response beyond the 30-day time period

allowed by Local Rule 56.1(d) without leave of the Court. LRCiv 56.1(d). Because she filed

without leave, the addendum is unauthorized and the Court will strike it. Therefore, the

Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Addendum.2

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Plaintiff requests judgment on the pleadings for two specific reasons: 1) the Ninth

Circuit reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment; and 2) the Court was

not permitted to remand the case to the Superior Court and therefore that court did not

possess subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. #37). The Court has already determined that the

Superior Court had authority to render a final judgment. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, in an exercise of its appellate authority, remanded the case back to this

Court. The remand was not a favorable judgment on the merits, and consequently, does not

carry a preclusive effect. Because the Court has granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on res judicata grounds, no determinations need to made regarding the merits of

Plaintiff’s allegations. For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings.

D. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 justifies sanctions “when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable,

or without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose.” Estate of Blue v.

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

County of L.A., 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997). A “frivolous” filing is one that is “both

baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman

Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990). Prior to filing a complaint, an

attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable factual investigation and to perform adequate

legal research that confirms whether the theoretical basis of the complaint is “warranted by

existing law or a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing

law.” Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)

(quoting Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.

1986)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). If the record supports a complaint being barred by the res

judicata or collateral estoppel effects of prior judgments, and a reasonable and competent

inquiry would have led to the same conclusion, Rule 11 sanctions are justified. Buster v.

Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1997).

Defendant seeks Rule 11 sanctions against both Plaintiff and her counsel in the form

of reasonable attorney’s fees (Doc. #39). The Court must analyze certain threshold issues

before actually ruling on the merits of Defendant’s Motion. First, Rule 11's safe harbor

provision does not restrict the Court’s ability to award sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)

(“The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the

court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or

appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets.”).

Defendant served Plaintiff with the Motion prior to filing with the Court. (Doc. #33 at 1,

n.1). Further, Plaintiff did not withdraw the Complaint within the 21-day time period;

instead, she filed a responsive pleading opposing the sanctions (Doc. #45).

Second, sanctions will be available only against Plaintiff’s counsel. Nothing in the

record suggests wrongful or illegitimate conduct by Plaintiff. The offending conduct

exclusively concerns her attorney’s failure to conduct a reasonable factual investigation and

adequate legal research. The doctrine of res judicata often presents difficult issues for

attorneys, law students, and non-lawyers alike. Plaintiff, however, was not responsible for

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

forming coherent and non-frivolous legal arguments. Her attorney bore this burden.

Therefore, the Court will not impose sanctions against Plaintiff for her attorney’s failures.

In her responsive pleading, “Plaintiff’s Response to a Legal Fiction - Defendant’s

Motion for Sanctions,” Plaintiff again attempts to argue her case’s merits (Doc. #45)

(emphasis added). In fact, nearly half of Plaintiff’s response presents her factual arguments

on the merits rather than actually contesting the sanctions. (Doc. #45 at 3-8). Plaintiff

mainly reasserts the same arguments she made in opposition of summary judgment.

Plaintiff first argues that “[she] was never afforded a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to

appeal the [state court] judgment in the Court of Appeals.” (Doc. #45 at 8, ¶ 5). Such an

argument is without merit and even deceptive because Plaintiff actually withdrew her appeal.

(Doc. #33, Exh. 7).

Furthermore, Plaintiff continues to argue that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction

to rule on the false imprisonment claim. (Doc. #45 at 9). Plaintiff asserts that, because the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this Court’s grant of summary judgment, the law of

the case doctrine restricted any other court from making a final judgment. (Doc. #45 at 9).

As noted earlier, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the false

imprisonment claim back to the Court because the evidence could not validly sustain

summary judgment at that time. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the claim. 

Absent any remaining federal question, Judge Campbell then exercised his

discretionary authority to remand the claim back to Superior Court. Neither this Court nor

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a valid, final judgment on Plaintiff’s false

imprisonment claim. See State of Cal. Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 847

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Once a decision of the district court is reversed, the judgment cannot serve

as the basis for a disposition on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel.”) (internal

citations omitted). Therefore, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over this claim and the law

of the case doctrine did not restrict its authority to grant summary judgment.

Even ignoring Plaintiff’s late response to Defendant’s Motion, the Court finds no

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 10 -

sustainable arguments to oppose sanctions. Plaintiff’s signed papers contain multiple

arguments directly contradictory to existing law. The Court has already noted several

problems with Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment. Primarily, counsel either ignores

existing precedent or distorts the record to support his client’s claims. Adequate research

would have demonstrated Plaintiff’s inability to reassert her claims. Plaintiff’s claims are

not based upon unresolved or ambiguous matters of law. The claims clearly implicate res

judicata; she seeks relief on claims either already fully determined (false imprisonment) or

those she could have previously asserted in her first complaint (42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive

use of force). 

Sanctions are indeed a harsh penalty when coupled with dismissal. However, Plaintiff

had the opportunity to voluntarily withdraw her Complaint after receiving proper notice of

Defendant’s Motion. Plaintiff continues to expend the Court’s precious resources by

reasserting meritless arguments. Her claims have also required Defendant’s response, which

undoubtedly created unnecessary costs. Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s current claims

to be both baseless and lacking reasonable investigation, Rule 11 sanctions are justified

against Plaintiff’s counsel.

“[T]he district court [has] wide discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 11.”

United States v. 87 Skyline Terrace, 26 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 1994). This discretion

includes the Court’ s authority to set a precise cut-off date for attorney’s fees and costs. See

Hendrix v. Naphtal, 971 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court will therefore award all

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs Defendant incurred from Plaintiff’s October 15, 2009

Complaint (Doc. #1). See Gaskell v. Weir, 10 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]here the

original complaint is the improper pleading, all attorney fees reasonably incurred in

defending against the claims asserted in the complaint form the proper basis for sanctions.”).

The Court limits these sanctions to Plaintiff’s counsel.

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 11 -

E. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective Order

Plaintiff requests a protective order (Doc. #51) under Rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure because she argues that Defendant’s request for admissions constitutes

an abuse of discovery. This issue is moot because the Court has already determined that

summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s claims for relief. The Court therefore does

not have to make a determination on Plaintiff’s Motion and it is accordingly denied.

III. Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #33) is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

Addendum (Doc. #49) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

(Doc. #37) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #39) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART awarding Defendant reasonable attorney’s

fees and costs associated with litigating Plaintiff’s false imprisonment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims as specified in this Order. Such fees shall be imposed only against Plaintiff’s counsel.

Within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, Defendant shall submit an motion for

attorney’s fees incurred in litigating these claims that complies with L.R.Civ.P.54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective

Order (Doc. #51).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING as moot Defendant’s second Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. #53).

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-02164-JAT Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 11 of 11