Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-55970/USCOURTS-ca9-10-55970-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARY TATUM,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

STEVEN MOODY, LAPD Detective;

ROBERT PULIDO, LAPD Detective,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 10-55692

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-04707-

PJW

MARY TATUM,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEVEN MOODY, LAPD Detective;

ROBERT PULIDO, LAPD Detective,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 10-55970

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-04707-

PJW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Patrick J. Walsh, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 9, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed September 17, 2014

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2 TATUM V. MOODY

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Marsha S. Berzon,

Circuit Judges, and Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Berzon

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, entered

following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, in an action

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Los

Angeles Police Department detectives failed to disclose

compelling exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor while

plaintiff was incarcerated pretrial, and did so with deliberate

indifference to, or reckless regard for, the truth or plaintiff’s

rights. 

Plaintiff was incarcerated for 27 months pending trial on

charges arising from a series of demand-note robberies. The

charges were dismissed after plaintiff’s defense counsel

obtained exculpatory material which defendants failed to

disclose. The panel held that plaintiff’s claim was covered by

the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, and

* The Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by

designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TATUM V. MOODY 3

not by the Fourth Amendment. The panel held that the

Constitution protects a plaintiff from prolonged detention

when the police, with deliberate indifference to or in the face

of a perceived risk that their actions will violate the plaintiff’s

right to be free of unjustified pretrial detention, withhold

from the prosecutors information strongly indicative of his

innocence. The panel held that the jury’s determination that

defendants acted with deliberate indifference or reckless

disregard for plaintiff’s rights satisfied the standard

applicable to violations of due process and that the jury

instructions described a cognizable constitutional claim. 

Because the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, it

likewise affirmed the award of fees to plaintiff, as the

prevailing party.

COUNSEL

Amy Jo Field (argued), Deputy City Attorney; Carmen A.

Trutanich, City Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for

Defendants-Appellants.

John Burton (argued), Law Offices of John Burton, Pasadena,

California; Maria Cavalluzzi, Cavalluzzi & Cavalluzzi, West

Hollywood, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 TATUM V. MOODY

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

A jury found Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”)

detectives Steven Moody and Robert Pulido liable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Michael Walker’s

constitutional rights by (1) acting with deliberate indifference

to, or reckless disregard for, Walker’s rights or for the truth,

in (2) withholding or concealing evidence that (3) strongly

indicated Walker’s innocence of the crimes for which he was

held, and was reasonably likely to have resulted in dismissal

of the charges against him if revealed. Indeed, dismissal of

the charges is exactly what happened when Walker’s defense

counsel finally obtained the exculpatory material, after

Walker had endured pretrial incarceration for over two years.

Walker, now deceased, was incarcerated pending trial on

charges arising from a series of demand-note robberies of

small retail businesses in Los Angeles. Detectives Moody

and Pulido were responsible for investigating the crimes. 

They knew, before Walker was bound over for trial, that

additional demand-note robberies, perpetrated with the same

distinctive modus operandi as those for which Walker was

being held, had occurred in the same part of Los Angeles

after Walker was in police custody. Pulido also knew that

another man, Stanley Smith, had confessed to some of those

later crimes after Walker’s arrest. The spate of demand-note

robberies in fact ended only upon Smith’s apprehension.

Moody and Pulido never disclosed any of this

information—not the continuing crime spree, not the

similarities of those continuing crimes to the crime for which

Walker was being detained, not Smith’s arrest, and not

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TATUM V. MOODY 5

Smith’s confession—to the prosecutor pursuing the case

against Walker. Instead, the two officers falsely asserted in

police reports written by Moody and approved by Pulido that

the “crime spree caused by the ‘Demand Note Robber’”

ceased with Walker’s arrest. When, twenty-seven months of

pretrial detention and repeated discovery requests later,

Walker’s defense attorneys finally learned of Smith’s arrest

and conviction, Smith’s fingerprints were matched to those

found at the scene of one of the robberies attributed to

Walker. As soon as the prosecutor was made aware of this

evidence, he dropped the charges against Walker. A

California court thereafter declared him factually innocent,

but only after he had been deprived of his liberty for over two

years.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the jury found that

Moody and Pulido failed to disclose this compelling

exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor, and did so with

deliberate indifference to, or reckless regard for, the truth or

for Walker’s rights. We affirm.

I.

A. The Southwest Division investigation

Between June 27 and August 15, 2005, the Southwest

Division of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”)

received reports of thirteen “demand-note” robberies. In each

robbery, the perpetrator entered a small business and

presented a handwritten note demanding money from the

cashier.

During this period, Pulido supervised the “robbery table”

at the Southwest Division. Pulido, Moody’s direct

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6 TATUM V. MOODY

supervisor, assigned him to investigate the thirteen demandnote robberies that had been reported at that time.

By the time the sixth demand-note robbery was reported,

Moody and Pulido began to suspect that the robberies were

being committed by a single individual. Until the recent

spree, demand-note robberies had been rare in the area. Each

of these recent robberies, however, followed the same script:

the robber, who appeared to be working alone, would enter a

business posing as a customer; present a note to the cashier

demanding money, sometimes threatening violence or

displaying what looked like a firearm; take cash; and then flee

on foot. Although the precise language of the demand notes

varied from one robbery to the next, the messages were

similar. The suspect in each of the robberies also shared a

general physical description: “male black, black hair, brown

eyes, 5’6” to 5’7”, 160 to 180 pounds, age varying from 25 to

45.”

On August 13, the twelfth demand-note robbery in the

Southwest Division occurred at an EB Games store. The

thirteenth occurred two days later at a nearby Blockbuster. 

On August 16, Walker went to EB Games and was arrested

after employees identified him as the perpetrator of the

robbery three days before. Police took Walker to the

Southwest station, where they determined that he did not have

a demand note on him. After agreeing to speak to Moody and

waiving his Miranda rights, Walker maintained that he did

not have any involvement in the EB Games robbery and

consented to a search of the apartment where he stored his

personal property. Moody conducted the search but found no

evidence of the crime or any other robbery.

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TATUM V. MOODY 7

Nonetheless, Moody and Pulido concluded almost

immediately that Walker had committed all thirteen demandnote robberies that had then been reported to the Southwest

Division. Just two days later, however, events transpired that

should have led them to reconsider that theory: someone

attempted to rob the Golden Bird, a restaurant in the

Southwest Division, with a demand note. The description of

the perpetrator of this crime matched that of the suspect who

had committed the previous thirteen robberies, and the modus

operandi was the same.

When Pulido learned of the attempted robbery at the

Golden Bird, he assigned the case to Moody for investigation. 

Moody was “surprised” to hear about this incident; the first

thing that came to his mind when he read the report of the

incident was that the Golden Bird robber might be the same

suspect that had committed the previous robberies. Moody

discussed this theory with Pulido, who also expressed

surprise that another, similar robbery had occurred in the

same area, even though they had a suspect in custody.

Thatsame day, yet another demand-note robberyoccurred

at a different location in the Southwest Division, a Burger

King restaurant. Pulido assigned investigative responsibility

for that robbery to an officer other than Moody; that officer

issued a crime alert. As Pulido later testified, Moody “should

have” seen the crime alert in the normal course of business.1

1 While under oath during a discovery hearing on October 22, 2007,

Moody stated that he had learned of the Burger King robbery on the same

day that he learned about the attempted robbery at the Golden Bird. He

also stated that he was responsible for investigating the Burger King

robbery. At trial, however, Moody testified that he did not know about the

Burger King robbery in its immediate aftermath. When confronted with

the discrepancy between that statement and his testimony at the discovery

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8 TATUM V. MOODY

Pulido also testified at trial that, within days of Walker’s

arrest, he was aware of “the Burger King robber and the

Golden Bird robber, who had the same general descriptions

and the same MO [as the person] . . . committing demandnote robberies.”

B. The Robbery Homicide Division investigation

During this same period, detectives Freddy Arroyo and

Brett Richards were investigating a series of demand-note

robberies, beginning with one that occurred on June 30, 2005. 

Arroyo and Richards were assigned to the Robbery Homicide

Division (“RHD”) of the LAPD, a specialized unit whose

investigative responsibility covered the entire city. The RHD

demand-note robberies shared a similar suspect description

with those being investigated by the Southwest Division. The

suspect was generally described as a “[m]ale black, 35 to 40

years old, . . . thin to medium build.” The modus operandi for

these robberies was also similar to those in the Southwest

Division: the suspect would present a demand note to the

cashier and sometimes simulate a handgun and threaten to

shoot the victim.

Arroyo was assigned to the South Bureau of the RHD,

which includes the Southwest Division. While investigating

the demand-note robberies in the South Bureau, Arroyo

generally spoke to Pulido at least once a week. Pulido knew

about the RHD’s investigation of demand-note robberies by

the end of August. And during the end of August and

beginning of September, Arroyo and Pulido spoke “almost on

hearing, Moody acknowledged that he had formerly testified under oath

to knowledge of the Burger King robbery, but that he had “testified in

error.”

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TATUM V. MOODY 9

a daily basis.” Nevertheless, Arroyo testified at trial, he had

no recollection of Pulido telling him that the Southwest

Division had investigated a similar series of demand-note

robberies that culminated in an arrest. Nor did Pulido notify

the RHD about the attempted robbery of the Golden Bird

when it occurred. He did, however, inform Arroyo about the

Burger King robbery, which was then transferred to Arroyo

for investigation.

On September 15, Stanley Smith was arrested while

fleeing from a Blockbuster he had just robbed using a demand

note. At trial, Arroyo did not recall whether Smith had

specifically admitted involvement in any of the demand-note

robberies in the Southwest Division that occurred before

Walker’s arrest. Nor does the record reveal whether Smith

was ever asked about his potential involvement in those

thirteen robberies. But Smith did confess to committing

roughly two robberies per week, and specifically identified

five of these robberies, including the Burger King robbery in

the Southwest Division that occurred just days after Walker’s

arrest.

The spree of demand-note robberies in the Southwest

Division ended with Smith’s arrest. Based on Smith’s modus

operandi, Arroyo suspected that Smith was responsible for all

the recent demand-note robberies. Smith was ultimately

convicted of several of the robberies attributed to him.

Arroyo notified Pulido of Smith’s arrest almost

immediately. Although the RHD circulated a bulletin to all

LAPD divisions regarding Smith’s arrest, Moody testified

that he did not see it.

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10 TATUM V. MOODY

C. The criminal case against Walker

Neither Moody nor Pulido ever informed the prosecutors

responsible for Walker’s case about the August 19, 2005

Golden Bird and Burger King robberies. Instead, between

August 18 and September 8, Moody conducted a number of

photographic line-ups, in which four eyewitnesses identified

Walker as the perpetrator of several of the demand-note

robberies. Two of these identifications were less than certain:

one witness identified Walker “because of the complexion”

and qualified her answer by indicating, “[It] looks the most

like him, but I’m not saying it’s him, but looks like him.” 

Another witness tagged Walker as the robber but noted a

discrepancy between his photograph and her memory of the

suspect: “The one that I think looks more [like the

perpetrator] is [Walker]. The guy is the same . . . but he is

shaven.”

In late September—at which time Pulido both knew that

demand-note robberies had continued in the area after

Walker’s arrest and also that RHD had arrested Smith for

these later crimes—Moody drafted a report concerning his

investigation of the EB Games robbery. Prosecutors

routinely relied on such reports to make their charging

decisions. That report, which Pulido approved, that Walker

was under investigation for thirteen demand-note robberies in

the Southwest Division. Moreover, the report stated the

following in bold font: “Since the arrest of Walker the

crime spree caused by the ‘Demand Note Robber’ has

ceased.”

On October 25, at the prosecutor’s request, Moody

conducted a live line-up. Two of the four witnesses who had

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TATUM V. MOODY 11

identified Walker in the photographic line-up tagged him as

the demand-note robber. The other two did not.

Moody prepared another follow-up report on November

11. That report repeated—verbatim, and again in bold

type—the assertion that the demand-note robberies had

ceased since Walker’s arrest. Pulido approved this report as

well.

Walker had his first preliminary hearing, for charges

relating to the EB Games robbery, on October 7, well after

Smith’s arrest. Moody testified at this hearing, along with

one eyewitness to the EB Games robbery. By the time of the

first hearing, Moody and Pulido knew that demand-note

robberies had continued in the days following Walker’s

arrest, and at least Pulido knew that Smith had been arrested. 

Nevertheless, neither officer informed the prosecutor of this

exculpatoryinformation. Bail was initially set at $50,000, but

was raised to $1,100,000 when additional robbery charges

were added to the felony complaint. Walker had a second

preliminary hearing in September 2006, at which he was held

to answer for charges relating to several of the other demandnote robberies.

California Penal Code § 1054.1(e) requires pretrial

disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The Code also provides

that “[b]efore a party may seek court enforcement of any of

the disclosures required . . . , the party shall make an informal

request of opposing counsel for the desired materials and

information.” Id. § 1054.5(b). If opposing counsel fails to

provide the requested information within fifteen days, then

the party may seek a court order. Id. Upon a showing that

opposing counsel has not complied with § 1054.1(e), the

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12 TATUM V. MOODY

court may make any order necessary to enforce the disclosure

requirement. Id.

Relying upon the assertions in Moody’s reports that the

demand-note robberies had ceased upon Walker’s arrest,

Walker’s defense attorneys, Alla Eksler and Meredith

Rudhman, initially did not make informal discovery requests

regarding whether the demand-note robberies had in fact

continued after that time. Sometime after the first hearing,

however, Walker’s defense attorney learned that Walker’s

fingerprints did not match the fingerprints obtained from the

scene of the EB Games robbery. As their investigation

increasinglysuggested Walker’s innocence, his lawyers made

the required informal discovery requests, asking the

prosecutor to double-check the accuracy of Moody’s

statements. Walker’s attorneys did not receive anything

through informal discovery. Instead, the government

responded, eventually, by objecting to the request as too

burdensome, although the record does not reflect exactly

when it did so.

Rudhman then filed a formal discovery request on

February 8, 2007. Again, the prosecution opposed this

request as too burdensome, but the court eventually granted

the request and ordered the production of reports of similar

robberies in the area after Walker’s arrest. Sometime in late

May or earlyJune, Walker’s attorneys finally received reports

of the Golden Bird and Burger King robberies. Eksler

obtained a second formal discovery order on September 5. 

On October 4, she received “a number of reports of note

robberies, a few before Mr. Walker’s arrest and many after

his arrest that were the same type of modus operandi or the

same type of robberies.” Strikingly, the demand note from

one of the robberies with which Walker was charged shared

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TATUM V. MOODY 13

the same misspelling as the demand note from one of these

robberies: The notes both urged the recipient to hurry and

hand over money, so that the robber would not “strat [sic]

shooting.”

After requesting additional police records, Eksler learned

of Smith’s arrest. She then arranged for a comparison of

Smith’s fingerprints with those recovered from the scene of

the EB Games robbery. The fingerprints matched. Eksler

notified the prosecutor of this match on November 26, and

Walker’s case was dismissed the same day. At that point,

Walker had been in jail for 27 months. Afterward, Eksler

filed a motion for a finding of factual innocence, which the

court granted.

D. Walker’s § 1983 suit

Walker subsequently brought this § 1983 suit against

Moody and Pulido, raising two claims.

Walker first argued that Moody and Pulido had deprived

him of liberty without due process of law by failing to

disclose material exculpatory evidence. At trial, the district

court gave the jury the following instructions:

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides that no public

official shall deprive any person of liberty

without due process of law.

When someone has been arrested and

charged with a crime, the due process clause

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14 TATUM V. MOODY

of the Fourteenth Amendment requires public

officials, such as police officers and

detectives, to disclose all the information and

evidence in their possession which may tend

to show that the accused person did not

commit the crime. In other words, the

Constitution compels police officers and

detectives to disclose exculpatoryinformation

along with any evidence which tends to show

the accused’s guilt. Withholding or

concealing exculpatory information violates

the accused’s right not to be deprived of

liberty without due process of law.

In order for evidence to be “exculpatory,”

it must be:

(a) favorable to the accused; and

(b) material to his guilt or innocence.

Evidence is “material” if there is a

reasonabl[e] probability that it would have

caused a different result in the case.

The court also read the jury a related instruction:

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 22

In order to prevail on his claim that

defendants Steven Moody and Robert Pulido,

or either of them, concealed or failed to turn

over exculpatory evidence, the plaintiff must

prove that:

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TATUM V. MOODY 15

(1) defendants Steven Moody and Robert

Pulido, or either of them, concealed or

failed to turn over exculpatory evidence;

and

(2) defendants Steven Moody and Robert

Pulido, or either of them, acted with

deliberate indifference to or reckless

disregard for the plaintiff’s rights or for

the truth in withholding evidence from

prosecutors.

To act with “deliberate indifference”

means to make a conscious choice to

disregard the consequences of one’s acts or

omissions.

Conduct is in reckless disregard of the

plaintiff’s rights if, under the circumstances,

it reflects complete indifference to the

plaintiff’s rights, or the defendant acts in the

face of a perceived risk that his actions will

violate the plaintiff’s rights under federal law.

The jury returned a verdict for Walker on this claim,

answering affirmatively when asked whether Moody and

Pulido “violated plaintiff Michael Walker’s constitutional

rights by withholding or concealing evidence that tended to

show that plaintiff was innocent of the criminal charges

against him.” The jury awarded compensatory damages of

$106,000.00.

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16 TATUM V. MOODY

Walker also claimed that Moody and Pulido had

maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause and for

the purpose of violating his constitutional rights.2 The jury

 

2

 As to this claim, the district court instructed the jury as follows:

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 23

In order to prevail on his malicious prosecution

claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that:

(1) the defendants StevenMoody or Robert Pulido,

or either ofthem, caused Plaintiffto be prosecuted;

(2) they did so with malice and without probable

cause;

(3) they did so for the purpose of violating the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and

(4) the criminal proceeding terminated in the

plaintiff’s favor.

“Probable cause” exists when, under all of the

circumstances known to the officers at the time, an

objectively reasonable police officer would conclude

there is a fair probability that the plaintiff has

committed or was committing a crime.

If the plaintiff was held to answer following a

preliminary hearing in the underlying criminal action,

you are to presume that there was probable cause to

arrest the plaintiff, unless plaintiff proves by a

preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution of

the plaintiff was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury,

fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct taken in

bad faith.

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TATUM V. MOODY 17

returned a verdict against Walker on the malicious

prosecution claim, which Walker did not appeal.

Moody and Pulido then moved for judgment as a matter

of law, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). The

court denied the motion, and awarded Walker costs and

attorney’s fees. Moody and Pulido now appeal both the

denial of judgment as a matter of law and the award of

attorney’s fees.

We review de novo the denial of a renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law, “view[ing] the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and

draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Barnard v.

Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013).

II.

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against

individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate

federal constitutional or statutory rights. Section 1983 is not

itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Hall v. City of L.A., 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moody and

Pulido challenge the judgment against them on the ground

that the Constitution does not confer on Walker the right that

the jury found them to have violated. We hold that the

Constitution does protect Walker from prolonged detention

when the police, with deliberate indifference to, or in the face

of a perceived risk that, their actions will violate the

“Malice” means to act with ill will, or spite, or for the

purpose of causing a constitutional injury to another.

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18 TATUM V. MOODY

plaintiff’s right to be free of unjustified pretrial detention,

withhold from the prosecutors information stronglyindicative

of his innocence, and so affirm.

1. Moody and Pulido first assert that “the Fourth

Amendment, not the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment[,] governs a pretrial loss of liberty.” Not so.

Rivera v. County of Los Angeles squarely rejected that

proposition earlier this year. 745 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2014). 

As Rivera explained, “[p]recedent demonstrates . . . that postarrest incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth

Amendment alone.” Id. 389–90 (citing Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979); Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668,

683–85 (9th Cir. 2001)).3 On that ground, Rivera rejected a

claim, brought under § 1983, that the plaintiff’s post-arrest

incarceration on the basis of a warrant naming another man,

after jailors should have known of the error, violated the

Fourth Amendment. Id. Rivera forecloses Moody and

Pulido’s Fourth Amendment-based argument here.

3 A plurality of Supreme Court justices suggested otherwise in Albright

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The plurality reasoned that “[t]he Framers

considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the

Fourth Amendment to address it,” rather than the Fourteenth. Id. at 274

(emphasis added); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27

(1975). Rivera issued long after Albright and Gerstein and is binding on

us. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc).

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) is

not inconsistent withRivera. Galbraith concerned onlythe initial decision

to arrest and prosecute, while Rivera and this case concern post-arrest

incarceration. See Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1122–23. It is Rivera’s analysis

that controls here.

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TATUM V. MOODY 19

Walker’s claim can be characterized as one, like Rivera,

of mistaken identity: Moody and Pulido took him for the

robber, who was actually Stanley Smith. On a similar basis,

the Second Circuit characterized a lawsuit, like this one,

seeking compensation for an extended pre-trial detention

“stemming directly from . . . law enforcement officials’

refusal to investigate available exculpatory evidence” or to

disclose it to the prosecutors, as “a case of mistaken identity.” 

Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 208, 199 (2d Cir.

2007).

Even if one rejects the precise analogy, Rivera made clear

that “there is no principled distinction between claims of

mistaken identity and other claims of innocence.” 745 F.3d

at 391 n.4 (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145–46). “When . . . a

person asserts that he is a victim of mistaken identities, he in

effect is pressing a claim of innocence in fact—a claim not

analytically distinct from any other factual defense (say, an

alibi defense or a defense premised on a lack of specific

intent) tendered by a person whom the police arrest in

pursuance of a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate.” 

Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999).

As there is no “principled distinction between” Walker’s

case and the case of mistaken identity considered in Rivera,

745 F.3d at 391 n.4, we conclude that his claim is covered by

the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, and

not by the Fourth Amendment.4

4 Contrary to our conclusion in Rivera, the Second Circuit has held that

certain constitutional protections against post-arrest detention are

grounded in the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. See Russo,

479 F.3d at 209. Russo considered the seven-month detention of a suspect

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20 TATUM V. MOODY

2. The jury found that Moody and Pulido withheld or

concealed exculpatory evidence from the prosecutors with

deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for Walker’s

rights or for the truth. Moody and Pulido argue that the

Fourteenth Amendment offers no protection from such

misconduct unless the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial is

compromised. Describing Walker’s claim as one based on

the right to disclosure of certain exculpatory evidence first

recognized in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), they

assert that the right is not implicated where, as here, a

defendant never goes to trial, let alone suffers a wrongful

conviction.5

in the face of strongly exculpatory evidence that investigating officers

failed to pursue or to disclose to prosecutors. See id. at 206.

Although Russo traced the constitutional right against such

misconduct to the Fourth Amendment, its analysis was little differentfrom

the approach we take to asserted deprivations of due process. That case

evaluated whether the defendants’ conduct “‘shock[ed] the conscience,’”

id. at 210 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846

(1998))—a standard originallydeveloped tomeasure “the cognizable level

of executive abuse of power” necessary to sustain an action vindicating

the right to due process, Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, and which we typically

employ in that context, see, e.g., Gantt v. City of L.A., 717 F.3d 702, 707

(9th Cir. 2013). And Russo’s analysis of the prolonged detention claim

abjured any reference to probable cause, which Moody and Pulido

characterize as the “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment. In any event,

several other circuits analyze claims of the sort considered in Russo as

violations of due process, not the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part II.2.

5

Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2011), reserved the related

question of whether a defendant acquitted at trial can claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 a violation of his Brady rights. See id. at 941 (Gwin, J.,

specially concurring); id. at 940 (Gould, J., concurring). We do not

answer that question today.

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TATUM V. MOODY 21

The premise of Moody and Pulido’s argument is

incorrect. To resolve this appeal, we need not decide the

scope of the protections established byBrady and its progeny,

because Walker’s claim sounds in the right first alluded to in

Baker, 443 U.S. 137, not Brady. Where, as here,

investigating officers, acting with deliberate indifference or

reckless disregard for a suspect’s right to freedom from

unjustified loss of liberty, fail to disclose potentially

dispositive exculpatory evidence to the prosecutors, leading

to the lengthy detention of an innocent man, they violate the

due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Baker assumed, without deciding, that,

depending on what procedures the State

affords defendants following arrest and prior

to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a

valid warrant but in the face of repeated

protests of innocence will after the lapse of a

certain amount of time deprive the accused of

“liberty . . . without due process of law.”

443 U.S. at 145 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2) 

(omission in original). In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, we

answered the question Baker had reserved, explaining that

“‘continued detention after it was or should have been known

that the detainee was entitled to release’” can violate the

Fourteenth Amendment. 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th

Cir. 1993)). Usually, claims of such a violation fall into “at

least one of two categories: (1) the circumstances indicated to

the defendants that further investigation was warranted, or

(2) the defendants denied the plaintiff access to the courts for

an extended period of time.” Rivera, 745 F.3d at 390–91.

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Walker asserts a variant of the first of those two

categories. Moody and Pulido’s silence in the face of

compelling exculpatory evidence breached their duty of

disclosure to authorities competent to act on the information. 

Although Moody and Pulido’s failure to disclose is one step

removed from a failure to investigate, that difference is not

pertinent where, as here, the suppressed exculpatory evidence

was potentially dispositive—and, indeed, proved dispositive.

Under § 1983, “a [person is] responsible for the natural

consequences of his actions.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,

187 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, a § 1983

defendant is liable for “setting in motion a series of acts by

others which the actor knows or reasonably should know

would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” 

Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 430 (9th Cir.

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, “the natural

consequence[]” of Moody and Pulido’s conduct was that

Walker remained in detention until the exculpatory

information was disclosed to the prosecutors and then to

Walker’s lawyers. Moody and Pulido enhanced the

likelihood of that outcome because they not only failed

accuratelyto disclose the continuation of the crime spree after

Walker’s arrest, they affirmatively misrepresented the truth

as to that fact in reports on which the prosecutors and defense

counsel relied, writing that the robberies ended with Walker’s

removal from the streets; they also failed to report Smith’s

arrest for the later robberies.

In this sense, Moody and Pulido “concealed from the

prosecutors, andmisrepresented to them, facts highlymaterial

to—that is, facts likely to influence—the decision whether to

prosecute [Walker] and whether (that decision having been

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TATUM V. MOODY 23

made) to continue prosecuting him.” Jones v. City of

Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1988). Indeed, once the

prosecutors were alerted that the spree of demand-note

robberies had in fact continued after Walker’s detention and

the connection to the parallel investigation of Stanley Smith

was made, minimal additional investigation of physical

evidence already in the government’s possession was enough

to secure Walker’s release. Where a simple fingerprint

comparison can secure the release of an innocent person, we

have held, failure to conduct such a comparison constitutes a

violation of due process, see Lee, 250 F.3d at 684,

particularly where the putative “investigation” requires only

review of “an easily available piece of physical evidence”

already in the government’s possession. Russo, 479 F.3d at

209.

Rivera held that a jailor has no duty to investigate the

repeated claims of innocence of a suspect held pursuant to a

court order. 745 F.3d at 392.6 In doing so, it reaffirmed the

longstanding rule that the Constitution usually does not

require a jailor to release a suspect committed by court order

 

6 Rivera considered a lawsuit brought against Los Angeles County, the

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, San Bernardino County, and

the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department on the claim that, inter

alia, Rivera was wrongly detained on a warrant naming another man. 

745 F.3d at 386–87. His claim of ongoing wrongful detention was

directed at the Los Angeles defendants, into whose custody the San

Bernardino defendants transferred himafter his arrest. Id. at 387, 391–92. 

As the Los Angeles defendants were just his custodians, Rivera’s analysis

of his claim prior to the preliminary hearing focused on that relationship. 

Thus, Rivera explained that “a jailor need not independently investigate

all uncorroborated claims of innocence if the suspect will soon have the

opportunity to assert his claims in front of a judge,” an opportunity made

available to Rivera the day after his transfer to the custody of the Los

Angeles defendants. Id. at 391–92 (emphasis added).

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to his custody. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280,

300 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on other grounds by Cohen v.

Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); Francis v. Lyman,

216 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1954). Hernandez v. Sheahan, on

which Rivera relied, reasoned that the contrary rule “would

create a substantial possibility that by presenting his

contention [of misidentification] over and over even a guilty

suspect would eventually find a deputy who did not

understand the weight of the evidence and let him go.” 

455 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2006). Such a result would

“frustrate the public interest in carrying out the criminal law.” 

Id. And, as Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rhodes—on

which Rivera also relied—indicated, the erroneous release of

a suspect would “normally subject [the jailor] to criminal

penalty if he voluntarily allows . . . a prisoner to escape.” 403

F.2d 2, 7 (10th Cir. 1968).

Those concerns have no application where, as here, the

defendants are investigating police officers accused of failing

to disclose potentially dispositive exculpatory information to

the prosecutors to whom they report.7 Unlike a jailor, “[o]ne

standard police function is to provide information to the

prosecutor and the courts. Thus, a police officer sometimes

may be liable if he fails to apprise the prosecutor or a judicial

officer of known exculpatory information.” Brady, 187 F.3d

at 114. Prosecutors, unlike jailors, wield the authority to

secure a suspect’s release by dismissing pending charges. 

And prosecutors, unlike jailors, have a global perspective on

the case and a rigorous understanding of the applicable law,

7 The jury’s instructions in this case did not suggest that Moody and

Pulido had some sort of independent duty to secure Walker’s release or

even to investigate his claims.

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TATUM V. MOODY 25

attributes that minimize the danger they will weigh the

evidence incorrectly.

Moreover, the preliminary hearings held in Walker’s case

did not afford him protection from Moody and Pulido’s

misconduct. In California, a criminal defendant arrested and

arraigned on a felony complaint, as Walker was, is entitled to

a preliminary hearing at which a judge “determine[s] whether

there is probable cause to conclude that the defendant has

committed the offense charged.” Galindo v. Super. Ct.,

50 Cal. 4th 1, 8 (2010). The protection that such hearings

provide against erroneous deprivations of liberty is only as

good as the information on which the decisions of the

prosecutor and judge are based. Absent a requirement that

police officers disclose to the prosecution compelling

exculpatory evidence in their possession without

unreasonable delay, the post-arrest hearings to which an

accused is entitled do not mitigate the risk that he may be

erroneously held to answer criminal charges that a prosecutor

would otherwise not pursue.

Before the first preliminary hearing in Walker’s case,

both Moody and Pulido knew that the spree of demand-note

robberies had continued after Walker’s detention. At least

Pulido knew that Smith had been arrested on suspicion of

having committed those robberies. And the police already

had physical possession of the evidence necessaryto establish

Smith’s presence at the scene of the EB Games

robbery—namely, his fingerprints. But as far as the record

shows, Moody and Pulido did not disclose any of that

knowledge to the prosecutors pursuing Walker’s case, either

before or after the initial preliminary hearing. To the

contrary, they affirmatively misrepresented—twice—highly

material facts: Moody’s report on the EB Games robbery,

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26 TATUM V. MOODY

completed prior to the first preliminary hearing, stated that

Walker’s detention brought the spate of demand-note

robberies to an end. And his second report, completed after

the first preliminary hearing, but before the second, reiterated

that misrepresentation. Pulido approved both documents. 

Prosecutors, relying on those reports, could not dismiss

charges on the basis of facts of which they were unaware. 

Correcting the error could be accomplished only by accurate

disclosure of information held by Moody and Pulido alone

and unknown to the prosecutors.

Nor did Moody and Pulido correct the misinformation

provided to the prosecutors, or provide accurate information

concerning Smith’s arrest and the consequent end of the

crime spree, during the two-year period Walker remained in

pretrial detention. A police officer’s continuing obligation to

disclose highly exculpatory evidence to the prosecutors to

whom they report is widely recognized in the circuits. Jones

v. City of Chicago, for example, sustained a judgment against

police officers who failed to tell prosecutors about strongly

exculpatoryevidence against a suspect whose trial had begun;

prosecutors later learned the truth of the matter and dropped

all charges against him. 856 F.2d at 988–91. “If police

officers have been instrumental in the plaintiff’s continued

confinement or prosecution,” Jones explained, “they cannot

escape liability by pointing to the decisions of prosecutors or

grand jurors or magistrates to confine or prosecute him. They

cannot hide behind the officials whom they have defrauded.” 

Id. at 994. Sanders v. English similarly held that an

investigating officer’s “deliberate failure to disclose . . .

undeniably credible and patently exculpatory evidence to the

prosecuting attorney’s office plainly exposes him to liability

under § 1983,” where that failure led to the prolonged

detention of a man who otherwise would have been released. 

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TATUM V. MOODY 27

950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992). Russo reversed the

grant of summary judgment to investigating police officers

whose willful failure to disclose to the prosecutor strong

exculpatory evidence might have violated the Constitution—

albeit the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth—

where their conduct enabled the prolonged detention of a man

who had been arraigned but might have been released had

prosecutors known the truth. 479 F.3d at 201, 209–10. And

Brady recognized, without deciding, the possibility that

investigating police officers might be liable for a prolonged

detention resulting “from the officers’ failure to deliver

material information to competent authorities.” 187 F.3d at

114.8

We emphasize the narrowness of the constitutional rule

we enforce today, which is restricted to detentions of

(1) unusual length, (2) caused by the investigating officers’

failure to disclose highly significant exculpatory evidence to

prosecutors, and (3) due to conduct that is culpable in that the

8

In a related context, Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff held that the

district court improperly excluded from evidence audio tapes containing

exculpatory information that investigating officers allegedly failed to

disclose to the prosecutor. 110 F.3d 352, 357–58, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). 

Sutkiewciz concluded that the tapes were relevant to the plaintiff’s claims

under § 1983 of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. “[E]ven

though an officer is not obligated to actively search for exculpatory

evidence,” the Sixth Circuit reasoned in part, “he has a duty to disclose

those facts and circumstances to the prosecutor.” Id. at 358.

In addition, several circuits recognize that “someone who is wrongly

imprisoned as a result of mistaken identity [may] state a constitutional

claim against his jailers based on their failure to ascertain that they had the

wrong man.” Gray v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 150 F.3d 579, 582

(6th Cir. 1998), as amended, 160 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1998); see also

Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563.

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officers understood the risks to the plaintiff’s rights from

withholding the information or were completely indifferent

to those risks. We explain each limitation in turn.

A. As to the length and process afforded by the state,

Baker held that mistaken detention for three days on the basis

of a seemingly valid warrant did not violate due process. See

443 U.S. at 145. As we explained in Lee, however, Baker

also “stated that the mistaken incarceration of an individual

in other circumstances may violate his or her right to due

process ‘after the lapse of a certain amount of time,’

‘depending on what procedures the State affords defendant[]

following arrest and prior to trial.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 684

(quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 144–45) (omission in original). 

In that case, we held actionable the one-day detention of a

mentally incapacitated man in the absence of probable cause,

reversing the district court’s dismissal of the claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See id. at 684–85.

Here, Walker was detained for 27 months after

preliminary hearings that, as noted, offered him no protection

from Moody and Pulido’s misconduct, because the

exculpatory information was withheld both before and after

the hearings. That period of time, under any measure, is

sufficiently lengthy to trigger the narrow due process right at

issue here. Russo, for example, held that a 217-day and even

a 68-day detention were lengthy enough to “carr[y]

constitutional implications.” 479 F.3d at 209.9

9 Although the district court did not instruct the jury as to this element

of the cause of action, Moody and Pulido failed to object to that omission,

as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51. “If a party does not

properly object to jury instructions before the district court, we may only

consider ‘a plain error in the instructions that . . . affects substantial

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TATUM V. MOODY 29

B. As to the significance of the evidence Moody and

Pulido withheld from the prosecutors, the district court

instructed the jury that “exculpatory” evidence was evidence

both “favorable to the accused” and “material to his guilt or

innocence.” Evidence is “material,” the district court

continued, “if there is a reasonabl[e] probability that it would

have caused a different result in the case.”

We can assume here that this sort of due process claim is

actually triggered by the failure to disclose evidence that is

not merely material but strongly indicative of the plaintiff’s

innocence. Although the jury was not specifically so

instructed, the evidence proved in fact nearly dispositive, not

merely material, to the prosecutor’s decision to continue

prosecuting Walker. Once disclosed to the prosecutor, the

withheld information did alter that decision. With minimal

further investigation, the evidence prompted the prosecutor to

drop all charges against Walker and led the judge to declare

Walker factually innocent. Thus, any instructional error—to

which Moody and Pulido in any case did not object—is

harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

C. In the context of a § 1983 suit against police officers

for a due process violation, official conduct violates due

process “only when [it] ‘shocks the conscience,’” a standard

satisfied in circumstances such as these by conduct that either

consciously or through complete indifference disregards the

rights.’” Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2)) (alteration in original). We hold

that the failure to instruct the jury as to this element of the cause of action

did not affect Moody and Pulido’s substantial rights. Indeed, it was

entirely harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. The length of Walker’s

detention went uncontested at trial and, on appeal, Moody and Pulido

concede that Walker “spent 27 months in jail.”

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30 TATUM V. MOODY

risk of an unjustified deprivation of liberty. Gantt, 717 F.3d

at 707.

Where actual deliberation is practical, then an

officer’s ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice

to shock the conscience. On the other hand,

where a law enforcement officer makes a snap

judgment because of an escalating situation,

his conduct may only be found to shock the

conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement

objectives.

Id. (quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir.

2010)).

Deliberation is impractical “where a suspect’s evasive

actions force the officers to act quickly,” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d

at 554, or when dealing with other “fast paced circumstances

presenting competing public safety obligations,” Porter v.

Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008). Examples of

such circumstances include chasing a fleeing suspect or

responding to gunfire in crowded public spaces. See Porter,

546 F.3d at 1139.

In contrast, “the decision whether to disclose or withhold

exculpatory evidence is a situation in which ‘actual

deliberation is practical,’” such that deliberate indifference to

individual rights—rather than intent to injure—is enough. 

Tennison v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 570 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Osborn, 546 F.3d at 1137). In Gantt, we

expressed approval of the following definition of deliberate

indifference:

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TATUM V. MOODY 31

Deliberate indifference is the conscious or

reckless disregard of the consequence of one’s

acts or omissions. It entails something more

than negligence but is satisfied by something

less than acts or omissions for the very

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge

that harm will result.

Gantt, 717 F.3d at 708.

The jury here received an instruction fully consistent with

the holding in Gantt. The district court explained that Walker

needed to demonstrate that Moody and Pulido “acted with

deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for the

plaintiff’s rights or for the truth in withholding evidence from

prosecutors.” The instructions went on to define “deliberate

indifference” as “a conscious choice to disregard the

consequences of one’s acts or omissions,” and “reckless

disregard” as “complete indifference to the plaintiff’s rights”

or action “in the face of a perceived risk” that the plaintiff’s

rights will be violated. This mens rea standard is a subjective

one and describes a culpable state of mind. The jury’s

determination that Moody and Pulido acted with deliberate

indifference or reckless disregard for Walker’s rights thus

satisfies the standard applicable to violations of due process.

* * *

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32 TATUM V. MOODY

In sum, we hold that the jury instructions described a

cognizable constitutional claim. The district court’s

enforcement of the jury verdict thus stands.10

10 Moody and Pulido do not independently appeal the denial of qualified

immunity on the ground that even if the jury was properly instructed, “the

right at issue was [not] ‘clearly established’ at the time of [their] alleged

misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). They have

thus forfeited any such objection for failure to assert it “specifically and

distinctly” in their opening brief. See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.

Lee Invs. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011).

Nor could Moody and Pulido have asserted that the right they violated

was not clearly established. They concede “that withholding exculpatory

evidence may cause constitutional injury not only at the criminal trial, but

during the pretrial stages of the criminal proceedings as well,” but they

argue that this rule applies only if their conduct violates the standards set

by the Fourth Amendment. Immunity, however, turns “on an officer’s

duties, not on other aspects of the constitutional violation.” Stoot v. City

of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 927 (9th Cir. 2009). Uncertainty regarding the

procedural niceties of privately enforcing the relevant constitutional

prohibition—including knowledge of the particular constitutional

provision implicated by the violation—does not immunize state officials

from liability. See Southerland v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d 127, 160 (2d Cir.

2011); Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1398 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Where, as here, officers recognize that their conduct “could ripen into” an

actionable violation on the basis ofsubsequent contingencies beyond their

control, they are not immune from suit. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 927. 

Commonsense confirms Moody and Pulido’s concession that the

withholding of exculpatory evidence can cause constitutional injury; that

concession recognizes “the almost tautological conclusion that an

individual in custody has a constitutional right to be released from

confinement after it was or should have been known that the detainee was

entitled to release.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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TATUM V. MOODY 33

III.

Moody and Pulido’s appeal from the award of attorney’s

fees is contingent on their appeal of the judgment. They have

not brought a particularized challenge to the calculation of the

attorney’s fees awarded to Walker by the district court or

alleged an abuse of discretion. See Corder v. Brown, 25 F.3d

833, 836 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] district court’s award of

attorney’s fees . . . is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court has discretion to

“award a reasonable attorney’s fee to prevailing parties in

civil rights litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

429 (1983). Because we affirm the district court’s judgment,

we likewise affirm the award of fees to the prevailing party,

Walker.

AFFIRMED.

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