Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02073/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02073-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WELLS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA

STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-02073 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN PART AND

DENYING IT IN

PART

Defendants Board of Trustees of the California State

University, Rollin Richmond, Steven Butler and Dan Collen move

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary

judgment, or in the alternative for partial summary adjudication of

the claims against them. Plaintiff David Wells opposes this

motion. The matter was submitted on the papers. Having considered

the parties' papers and the evidence cited therein, the Court

grants Defendants' motion in part and denies it in part.

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1Both parties submitted numerous objections to the other

parties' evidence. To the extent that the Court relied upon

evidence to which there is an objection, the parties' objections

are overruled. To the extent that the Court did not rely on such

evidence, the parties' objections are overruled as moot. The

Court, however, notes that Defendants introducing new evidence in

connection with their reply is improper. Contratto v. Ethicon,

Inc., 227 F.R.D. 304, 309 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

2

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff began a coaching career at Humbolt State University

(HSU) in 1980; that career ended in 2004. While employed at HSU,

Plaintiff coached a combination of men's and women's cross-country

and track and field events. His employment was governed by

limited-term contracts; usually, the contract was for a one-year

term, but sometimes the term was two or three years. For over two

decades, after each term expired, Plaintiff's contract would be

renewed for another set term.

In late 1998 or early 1999, Plaintiff became concerned about

HSU's compliance with Title IX. He approached Mike Swan, who was

then the athletics director, and discussed his concerns,

specifically, the inequality between the funding of men's and

women's sports. Mr. Swan was non-responsive. Plaintiff then met

with John Costello, who was the Dean of the College of Professional

Studies, to discuss his Title IX concerns. Dean Costello referred

Plaintiff back to Mr. Swan. But Plaintiff's concerns were not

addressed.

Plaintiff then contacted the Office of Civil Rights. He

learned that, as a coach, he could not file a complaint regarding

possible violations of Title IX; only students could file

complaints. Plaintiff then started working with female student

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athletes to address HSU's non-compliance with Title IX. A group of

coaches and female student athletes met weekly off-campus. One

former female student athlete states that Plaintiff was "present at

most every meeting, providing guidance on procedures, tactics and

strategy to be employed in raising Title IX concerns in an

appropriate manner." Bossen Dec., ¶ 7. Eventually, three student

athletes filed an online complaint with the Office of Civil Rights. 

Following the filing of the complaint, and without a finding by the

Office of Civil Rights of a violation or an admission by HSU of 

any wrongdoing, HSU agreed to implement a Voluntary Resolution Plan

to resolve the Title IX issues raised in the complaint.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff, along with six other coaches, sent a

letter to the Vice President of Academic Affairs. Plaintiff states

that he wrote this letter. The letter objected to a proposed "tier

system." Under the tier system, sports would be ranked and certain

teams would be left without appropriate resources. The letter

linked the tier system to Title IX compliance: "We need to support

Title IX on our campus. It is right and just to lift male and

female athletes equally. It is in our best interest to follow

federal law." Tsao Supp. Dec., Ex. 17.

 In August, 2001, Diane Milunitovich was commissioned to

prepare a gender equity report for HSU. She concluded that HSU had

made a number of decisions that adversely impacted female student

athletes: "While these decisions do not appear to be intentional,

the combined impact could be viewed, at best, as a lack of

understanding of Title IX; or at worse, a pattern and practice of

discrimination." Cohune Dec., Ex. G, CSUH 1002.

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2Defendant Richmond, the third individual Defendant, became

president of HSU in July, 2001 or 2002. In his declaration,

Defendant Richmond states that he has been the president of HSU

since July, 2001. But Plaintiff cites to Defendant Richmond's

deposition, providing that he became president in July, 2002; in

their papers, Defendants also refer to July, 2002 as the relevant

date.

4

Following the gender equity report, a Coaches' Report to the

Academic Senate was prepared. Although the report does not state

who prepared it, Plaintiff states that he did. The report stated

that the critical issues facing the athletics department were

finances and equity for female student athletes, noting that HSU

was not in compliance with Title IX.

Around January, 2002, the athletics department, which had

previously been housed under the Academic Affairs Department, was

transferred to Student Affairs. Defendant Butler was the vicepresident of Student Affairs. At approximately the same time,

Defendant Collen became the athletics director.2 As the new

athletics director, Defendant Collen states that he began to notice

Plaintiff's various performance deficiencies: Plaintiff failed to

raise funds for his programs; he failed timely to update

administrative staff regarding his teams' performance; he failed to

recruit student athletes; and he failed to interact with colleagues

and staff in a professional and non-threatening manner. The

evaluation Defendant Collen prepared for Plaintiff for the period

from January, 2002 to June, 2002 several times noted, "Does not

meet expectations." Plaintiff's evaluation for the period from

January, 2002 to December, 2002 did not include any such comments. 

But the evaluation Defendant Collen prepared for Plaintiff for

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3Plaintiff asserts that all coaches' contracts were restored

from ten months to twelve months, except for his and that of the

women's crew coach. According to Plaintiff, this was another

example of Defendants targeting Plaintiff. 

5

January, 2003 to December, 2003 again several times noted, "Does

not meet expectations." 

In 2002, HSU, like other State universities and colleges,

suffered a reduction in State funding. The athletics department

was required to make a three to four percent budget reduction midyear for the 2002-2003 academic year. The athletics department had

to cut its budget by ten percent for the 2003-2004 academic year,

followed by another ten percent budget reduction for the 2004-2005

academic year. In response, the athletics department implemented,

over a period of time, the following: (1) across-the-board

reduction in administrative support for all sports; (2) reduction

in one group of faculty coaching contracts from twelve months to

ten months, with an opportunity for coaches to request a twelvemonth contract if they could submit proposals showing that they

could generate revenue in the summer months that exceeded their

salaries;3

 (3) reductions and eliminations of assistant coaching

positions; (4) reductions in the travel budget; (5) elimination of

the men's soccer head coach position by combining it with the

women's soccer head coach position; (6) elimination of sprints and

field events from the track and field program; (7) reduction of the

cross-country head position from 0.5 to 0.3 time; (8) reduction of

the track and field head coach position from 0.5 to 0.3 time;

(9) reduction of the women's crew head coach position from 1.0 to

0.6 time; and (10) maintenance of the previously reduced women's

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4

The facts supporting this allegation are largely missing;

instead, this section of Plaintiff's opposition contains "(cite)"

in the place where a citation to the record belongs.

6

softball head coach position as a 0.5 time position. These budget

cuts were the subject of debate at coaches' meetings and at

Intercollegiate Athletics Advisory Committee meetings. Plaintiff

asserts that these cost-cutting measures were aimed at track,

cross-country and crew, the sports headed by coaches who complained

about Title IX non-compliance and missing funds.4

Plaintiff states that, through his investigation of Title IX

non-compliance, he learned that the accounting of $1,500 raised by

a student athlete was improper. He then discovered that a cash

donation to track and field was not accounted for; Plaintiff claims

that he found almost $300,000 in untraceable, or missing, funds. 

He approached the administration with his concerns regarding

missing funds and fiscal mismanagement. After realizing that the

administration would not investigate, he filed a formal

whistleblower complaint with the CSU Whistleblower Office and

another complaint with the State Auditor. On March 16, 2004,

Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Butler, notifying him that he

had asked two different agencies to investigate fiscal

mismanagement, misrepresentation of financial issues, and threats

and retaliation towards those who questioned the fiscal activities

of the athletics department; Plaintiff sent a carbon copy of the

letter to Defendant Collen. 

Coaches' contracts are renewed by April 1 of each year; the

athletics department did not renew Plaintiff's contract that year. 

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Instead, it announced that the track and field and cross-country

positions would be reduced to a 0.6 total time base; previously,

each position had a 0.5 time base, for a combined 1.0 time base. 

The athletics department conducted a national search for the newly

structured track and field and cross-country head coach position. 

It informed Plaintiff of this search and encouraged him to apply. 

He did. The search committee, however, recommended hiring another

candidate. The rationale for not recommending Plaintiff was as

follows:

Lack of recent participation in recruiting activities; lack of

recent ability to work cooperatively and responsibly with

Athletics department administrative and support staff; lack of

recent participation in department wide fund-raising events,

such as the Auction and scholarship fund-raising through

Lumberjack Athletic Club.

Collen Dec., Ex. K.

None of the Defendants was on the search committee. Based on

the search committee's recommendation, a new track and field and

cross-country head coach was hired. And Plaintiff's employment

expired by the terms of his contract on May 31, 2004.

Investigations were conducted into Plaintiff's whistleblower

complaints. Dr. Peter Kenyon, a HSU professor of accounting,

concluded that, while the athletic department's financial

management practices needed to improve, he "found no evidence that

fiscal management practices by the administrators named in Wells'

complaint amount to corruption, malfeasance, bribery, theft, fraud

or other violations of state or federal laws or regulation." 

Richmond Dec., Ex. M. As to Plaintiff's contract not being

renewed, Dr. Kenyon concluded that he "was not able to resolve the

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question of whether the decision to not renew Wells' contract is

justified by poor job performance or is a way to punish him for

failing to submit quietly to administrative decisions." Id. After

issuing his report, Dr. Kenyon clarified that conclusion: "I did

not investigate the basis for the administrative decision to not

renew Wells' contract and I do not offer a finding on the propriety

of that decision in this report; I leave that for others." Id.

A supervising deputy attorney general at the California

Department of Justice conducted an investigation into the decision

not to renew Plaintiff's contract. That investigation concluded

that Plaintiff's "allegation that Mr. Collen, Dr. Butler and Dr.

Richmond retaliated against him in violation of the Whistleblower

Protection Act is not substantiated by the evidence." Richmond

Dec., Ex. N.

In addition, Defendant Richmond assembled a committee,

consisting of a student, a staff member and a dean, to look into

allegations of fiscal mismanagement by the athletic department. 

Although these investigations concluded that there was no

malfeasance in the athletics department, Defendant Richmond later

stripped the athletic department of control over its own financial

affairs. 

In May, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging eight

causes of action against Defendants. The Court dismissed the third

cause of action for conspiracy and the fifth cause of action for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy. In addition,

the Court dismissed the first and second causes of action against

Defendant CSU for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismissed the

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request for punitive damages against it. Defendants now move for

summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

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Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

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obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment

in their favor on all of Plaintiff's remaining claims: (1) his

claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the individual Defendants

for violation of his First Amendment right to free speech; (2) his

claim against Defendant CSU for retaliation for reporting Title IX

non-compliance; (3) his State claims against Defendant CSU for

violating the prohibition against the discharge of whistleblowers;

and (4) his State claim against the individual Defendants for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition,

Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's

request for punitive damages against the individual Defendants. 

I. Freedom of Speech Claims

A claim may be stated under section 1983 where a plaintiff

alleges retaliation by State actors for the exercise of protected

First Amendment rights. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). In order to sustain a claim for such

retaliation, Plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected

speech on a matter of public concern, (2) that Defendants took an

adverse employment action against him, and (3) that his speech was

a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action. Burch v.

Regents of the University of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1130

(E.D. Cal. 2006). 

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5The Supreme Court recently addressed the First Amendment

rights of public employees. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951

(2006). Although Defendants raise Garcetti in their moving papers,

they abandon their argument under Garcetti in their reply.

12

Because Plaintiff was a public employee, his speech is

protected only if it relates to a matter of public concern. 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).5 Matters of public

concern include issues of "political, social, or other concern to

the community." Id. It is undisputed that Defendants took adverse

employment action against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff can show that his speech was a substantial

motivating factor in the adverse employment action by introducing

evidence regarding the proximity in time between his speech and the

allegedly retaliatory action. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d

968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). "Depending on the circumstances, three

to eight months is easily within a time range that can support an

inference of retaliation." Id. In addition, Plaintiff can create

a genuine issue of material fact on this point by producing

evidence that Defendants expressed opposition to his speech, either

to Plaintiff or to others. Schwartzman v. Valenzuela, 846 F.2d

1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1988). In either case, Plaintiff must provide

evidence that Defendants knew of his protected speech. Keyser v.

Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2001). 

If Plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to

Defendants to demonstrate either that (1) their legitimate

administrative interests outweigh Plaintiff's First Amendment

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rights or (2) that they would have reached the same decision even

in the absence of Plaintiff's protected conduct. Burch, 433 F.

Supp. 2d at 1130. 

A. Speech Concerning Title IX

Plaintiff's first claim is that Defendants retaliated against

him for reporting that HSU was violating Title IX and for

organizing others to do the same. But, as Defendants point out,

Plaintiff provides no evidence that the individual Defendants were

aware of his Title IX speech or his involvement with the student

group that filed the complaint with the Office of Civil Rights. 

Nor does Plaintiff dispute that none of the individual Defendants

had responsibility for the athletics department when he made his

Title IX complaints to Mr. Swan and Dean Costello. In his argument

section, Plaintiff does not state that Defendant Butler was aware

of his complaints regarding HSU's non-compliance with Title IX. 

Plaintiff states only that Defendants Richmond and Collen were

aware of his complaints. The pages he cites from Defendants

Richmond's and Collen's depositions, however, do not support that

statement. Defendant Richmond's cited deposition testimony

concerns his response to an April, 2004 email from a professor

regarding cuts in the track and rowing programs and rumors

regarding corruption and dishonesty in the athletics department. 

There is no mention of Plaintiff's Title IX complaints, which

Plaintiff admits he voiced only from 1999 to early 2002. Plaintiff

does not include the pages of Defendant Colleen's deposition that

he cites. 

Plaintiff asserts in his statement of facts that his

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involvement in Title IX compliance issues was visible and obvious. 

But, again, he provides no evidence to support that assertion. He

states that he was prominently mentioned at the press conference

called to announce the filing of the female student athletes'

complaint to the Office of Civil Rights. However, the declaration

that he cites to support that statement only provides, "The filing

was announced at a press conference, attended by Coach Wells,

members of the public and officials from HSU. The local press

carried the story." Bossen Dec., ¶ 9. Plaintiff's declaration

only states that the press conference was well attended and that "I

was supported [sic] their efforts at the press conference." Wells

Dec., ¶ 30. Plaintiff states that Alan Exley was told that

associating with Plaintiff would damage his career. The pages

Plaintiff cites from Mr. Exley's deposition, however, describe the

reporting structure and personnel at HSU; there is no mention of

the consequences of associating with Plaintiff. Danielle Saylor

Bossen's statement that it is "difficult to believe" that Mr.

Collen, Dr. Butler or then-president Alistair McCrone were unaware

of Plaintiff's participation in the student athletes' Title IX

efforts also fails to support Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants

knew of his Title IX speech. Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d

1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (speculation does not rise to the level

of evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment).

Just as Plaintiff fails to provide evidence to show that the

individual Defendants knew of his Title IX complaints, he does not

dispute the individual Defendants' contention that they did not. 

All three individual Defendants submitted declarations with their

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motion for summary judgment, stating that Plaintiff never

complained to them personally about Title IX or gender equity

issues and that they were not aware that Plaintiff was a Title IX

proponent until this lawsuit began. Collen Dec., ¶ 15; Butler

Dec., ¶ 15; Richmond Dec., ¶ 7. 

Furthermore, as noted above, Plaintiff acknowledges that he

raised his Title IX concerns from 1999 to early 2002. Therefore,

any adverse action in 2004 is too attenuated. He did not bring

this suit until May 20, 2005. Thus, even assuming that there was

evidence to show that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's Title IX

speech, any adverse action that occurred before May 20, 2003 is not

actionable. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045,

1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the continuing violation theory and

holding that appellants cannot establish liability for events

occurring prior to the limitations period, even when they are

related to acts alleged in timely filed charges). And any adverse

action occurring after May 20, 2003, would not support an inference

of retaliation based on Plaintiff's Title IX speech.

Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the

individual Defendants on Plaintiff's first section 1983 cause of

action based on retaliation for his Title IX speech.

B. Speech Concerning Fiscal Mismanagement

Plaintiff's second section 1983 claim is that the individual

Defendants retaliated against him for reporting missing funds and

for complaining about the athletic department's fiscal

mismanagement. As Plaintiff notes, misuse of public funds,

wastefulness, and inefficiency in managing and operating government

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entities, such as HSU's athletic department, are matters of public

concern. Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir.

1995). And, unlike his Title IX speech, Plaintiff provides

evidence that Defendants were aware of his whistleblower complaint

and speech relating to fiscal mismanagement. He complained about

the missing funds, and in March, 2004, sent a letter to Defendants

informing them that he filed a whistleblower complaint. At the end

of that same month, Plaintiff was informed that his contract would

not be renewed and that he would need to reapply for the

restructured head coach position. He did, but Defendants awarded

the head coach position to another candidate. The proximity

between Plaintiff's complaint and the adverse employment actions

supports an inference that Plaintiff's speech was a substantial

motivating factor in the adverse actions. Defendants' argument

that there is no nexus between Plaintiff's complaints of fiscal

mismanagement and any adverse employment action is unconvincing. 

The temporal proximity, along with the protected speech and adverse

employment actions, is sufficient for Plaintiff to show a prima

facie case of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

 Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff makes a prima facie

showing, their interest in effectively managing personnel issues

outweighs Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court in

Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), established a

balancing test to determine whether a government employee's

interest in speaking outweighs the government employer's interest

in promoting efficiency and preventing disruption. Following

Pickering, courts have considered various factors when balancing

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these interests.

One factor is whether Defendants can "demonstrate actual,

material and substantial disruption." Roth v. Veteran's

Administration, 856 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Johnson, 48 F. 3d at 427 (noting that, in a case where the

plaintiff alleged unlawful activities, the defendant had to "show

actual injury to its legitimate interest, not mere disruption")

(emphasis in original). Defendants contend that they have made a

showing of both disruption and actual injury. They state that they

have shown that they have a legitimate interest in providing a safe

workplace for their employees free from Plaintiff's threats,

intimidation and aggression. The speech Defendants point to, as

causing disruption and actual injury, is the threats Plaintiff

allegedly made to his co-workers. The alleged threats, however,

are not the speech at issue; rather, Plaintiff's protected speech

regarding Defendants' alleged fiscal mismanagement is at issue. 

While Plaintiff's alleged threats are relevant to whether

Defendants would have made the same adverse decisions regardless of

Plaintiff's protected speech, they are not relevant to the

Pickering balancing test. Defendants have not demonstrated that

Plaintiff's complaints concerning missing funds and fiscal

mismanagement created a material and substantial disruption or an

actual injury to their legitimate interests. 

A related factor is the closeness of any working relationship. 

For example, in Brewster v. Board of Education, 149 F.3d 971 (9th

Cir. 1998), the plaintiff conceded that, as a teacher, he had a

close working relationship with the defendant principal that

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required frequent contact, trust and respect in order to be

successful. The court determined that this type of employment

relationship requires "a wide degree of deference to the employer's

judgment." 149 F.3d at 981 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52). 

But Plaintiff's employment relationship with the individual

Defendants is not comparable to the relationship of an elementary

school teacher and principal. 

Another factor is the point of the speech and the value of the

speech involved. Courts consider whether the employee's speech was

to bring wrongdoing to light and raise other issues, because they

are of public concern, or whether the speech was to further some

purely private interest. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1406. Here,

Plaintiff's speech concerned more than just the sports programs

that he oversaw; instead, it concerned the fiscal management of the

athletic department as a whole. Many of his complaints were made

not as a coach, but as a community member. For example, a

March 10, 2003 letter from Plaintiff and others begins by stating

that the senders are a group of community members concerned about

the leadership of the athletics department at HSU and the pervasive

pattern of fiscal mismanagement.

Defendants note that another factor considered is whether the

allegations were ultimately determined to be false; the

investigations that followed Plaintiff's complaints showed that

Defendants did not engage in fraud and were not grossly negligent

in maintaining the athletics department's finances. But, as

Plaintiff notes, following these investigations, Defendant Richmond

relieved the athletics department of its responsibility over its

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finances. More important, however, in weighing this factor is the

fact that the investigations were completed after Plaintiff's

contract was not renewed for the first time in over twenty years

and after he was informed he would have to reapply for his

position. It is not clear whether these investigations were

completed when Defendants passed over Plaintiff and hired a new

coach. 

Even giving full consideration to the government's interest in

the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to

the public, as the Court must, Defendants are unable to show that

the Pickering balancing test favors them, not Plaintiff. See

Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. 

Nor are Defendants able to show, as a matter of law, that they

would have failed to renew Plaintiff's contract, made him compete

for a re-structured position and failed to rehire him as coach even

in the absence of his complaints concerning fiscal mismanagement. 

As noted in Burch, the issue of whether defendants would have made

the same decision absent the forbidden consideration generally

presents a question of fact for the jury: "Summary judgment might

be warranted in cases where the plaintiff has conceded that he

would have been terminated regardless, where the defendants can

point to similarly situated individuals who were fired for

comparable reasons, or where a more qualified applicant was hired

in lieu of the plaintiff. Presented with such facts, courts can

say with confidence that defendants would have made the same

decision." Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. But, here, as in

Burch, the Court is not presented with such facts. 

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In Burch, the plaintiff did not dispute that the defendants

had discussions about not renewing his contract as the head

wrestling coach months before they were aware of his Title IX

activities. Burch allegedly was confrontational, failed to follow

policies and procedure and had philosophical differences with the

administrators over how to achieve Title IX compliance. Id. at

1131. The court found, however, that the fact that defendants were

contemplating not renewing the plaintiff's contract "does not show

that they would have taken the same action in the absence of any

protected activity." Id. (emphasis in original). 

Similarly, here, Defendants do not show that they would have

taken the same action in the absence of Plaintiff's complaints

about missing funds and fiscal mismanagement simply by providing

evidence that they contemplated restructuring his position, not

renewing his contract and conducting national searches before they

knew of his complaints regarding missing funds and his filing of a

whisteblower complaint. Plaintiff provides evidence that

Defendants did not always conduct national searches as Defendants

contend is their practice. Defendants also restructured the

women's crew head coach position, did not renew the head coach's

contract and planned to conduct a national search for a new head

coach. But, after the women's crew head coach complained,

Defendants cancelled the national search because, according to

Defendant Butler, she was a satisfactory employee. She had not

filed a whistleblower complaint. 

In sum, there is a disputed question of fact as to the reasons

for Plaintiff's termination. Therefore, the Court denies summary

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judgment for the individual Defendants on Plaintiff's second

section 1983 cause of action based on his speech concerning the

missing funds and fiscal mismanagement.

C. Defendant Richmond

Defendant Richmond is entitled to summary judgment in his

favor. A supervisor, such as Defendant Richmond, can be held

liable under section 1983 only if he or she was personally involved

in the constitutional deprivation or if there is a sufficient

causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d

1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff provides no evidence that

Defendant Richmond, as HSU's president, was directly involved in

the decision not to renew his contract or any other alleged

retaliatory action, nor does he dispute Defendants' evidence that

Defendant Richmond was not involved in any adverse employment

action. Plaintiff provides no evidence of a causal connection. 

Indeed, he fails to address Defendants' argument that, because

Defendant Richmond was not directly involved in any decision

affecting Plaintiff's employment, Defendant Richmond cannot be held

liable under section 1983. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant

Richmond summary judgment on Plaintiff's second cause of action.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as

to Plaintiff's section 1983 claims on the basis of qualified

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Defendants belatedly raise new arguments regarding qualified

immunity, and other issues, in their reply. As recognized in this

district, "It is well settled that new arguments cannot be made for

the first time in reply." Contratto, 227 F.R.D. at 309. Thus, the

Court did not consider, and does not address, those arguments.

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immunity.6

 The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

Supreme Court instructed in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001),

that when ruling on the qualified immunity issue, the court must

decide (1) whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right and (2) whether the right was

clearly established. 533 U.S. at 201. The Court also indicated

that the "dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted." Id. Thus, if the officer was not on notice that his

conduct was clearly unlawful then that officer is protected from

suit by qualified immunity. See id. 

 As discussed above, Plaintiff's allegations that he suffered

adverse employment actions based on his speech regarding fiscal

mismanagement, if proven, would constitute a violation of his

constitutional rights by Defendants. And clearly established law

forbids retaliation against public employees who have engaged in

protected speech by reporting possible misuse of public funds. 

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Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 979 ("at the time defendants acted, both the

constitutional protection of employee speech and a First Amendment

cause of action for retaliation against protected speech were

clearly established"); Keyser, 265 F.3d at 749.

Defendants' reliance on Brewster is unavailing. As explained

in Keyser, the Ninth Circuit in Brewster ruled that qualified

immunity was warranted because the balance of free speech and

workplace disruption in that case was both unprecedented and too

close to say that a violation was clearly established. 265 F.3d at

749. Unlike in Keyser, the government employer in Brewster pointed

to testimony of other employees that Brewster's allegations of

falsified records had caused disruption in the workplace. See id. 

Similarly, here, Defendants provide no evidence that Plaintiff's

allegations of fiscal mismanagement caused disruption in the

workplace; rather, as discussed above, Defendants point to

Plaintiff's coworkers' complaints concerning Plaintiff that are

unrelated to Plaintiff's protected speech at issue. In addition,

Brewster's allegations of falsified attendance records were

ultimately determined to be untrue. Here, it was not determined

that Plaintiff's allegations were false, only that there was not

"evidence of lying amounting to fraud or gross negligence." 

Richmond Dec., Ex. M.

Furthermore, as explained in Keyser, a person in Plaintiff's

position is more likely than an average citizen to be informed

about possible misuse of public funds, and thus his speech is

entitled to greater protection under the First Amendment. 265 F.3d

at 741. No reasonable officer could have believed that he or she

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could terminate Plaintiff for reporting possible misuse of funds

and fiscal mismanagement. See, e.g., id.; Roth, 865 F.2d at 1408;

Johnson, 48 F.3d at 427. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity.

II. Title IX Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff's fourth claim is that Defendant CSU retaliated

against him for reporting issues of Title IX non-compliance to his

superiors and to the Office of Civil Rights. The Supreme Court has

recognized that an implied cause of action exists under Title IX

for retaliation based on an individual's complaints of sex

discrimination. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167

(2005). But the Supreme Court did not provide guidance on how to

evaluate Title IX retaliation claims. Courts have applied Title

VII case law to Title IX retaliation claims. Burke, 433 F. Supp.

2d at 1125 (listing cases). Therefore, to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation under Title IX, Plaintiff must show that (1) he

engaged in conduct protected by Title IX; (2) he was subjected to

adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between

the protected conduct and the adverse employment decision. Id. As

discussed above, however, Plaintiff provides no evidence that

individual Defendants were aware of his Title IX conduct, nor does

he refute Defendants' evidence that they were unaware of his

conduct. Plaintiff states that he reported his Title IX concerns

to the Dean of the College of Professional Studies and the former

athletics director, Mike Swan. But it is undisputed that neither

Mr. Swain nor the Dean of the College of Professional Studies took

any adverse action against Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot

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establish the necessary causal link between his Title IX conduct

and Defendants' adverse employment actions. The Court grants

summary judgment in favor of Defendant CSU on Plaintiff's Title IX

retaliation claim.

III. Whistleblower Claims

Plaintiff's sixth and seventh claims are only against

Defendant CSU, not against the individual Defendants. Plaintiff

contends that Defendant CSU is liable for retaliating against him

as a whistleblower. Plaintiff's sixth claim is based on California

Government Code sections 8547.12 and 12653; his seventh claim is

based on California Labor Code section 1102.5.

A. Section 8547.12

California's Whistleblower Act was enacted to provide specific

remedies for State employees who report improper governmental

activities. Section 8547.12 of the Whistleblower Act pertains to

Defendant CSU. It provides, in part, that 

any action for damages shall not be available to the injured

party unless the injured party has first filed a complaint

with the university officer identified pursuant to subdivision

(a), and the university has failed to reach a decision

regarding that complaint within the time limits established

for that purpose by the trustees. Nothing in this section is

intended to prohibit the injured party from seeking a remedy

if the university has not satisfactorily addressed the

complaint within 18 months.

Cal. Gov't Code § 8547.12(c). 

Defendant CSU contends that Plaintiff's claim under section

8547.12 fails because it promptly had the Attorney General

investigate Plaintiff's complaint that he was retaliated against

for his whistleblowing activities and, based on that investigation,

it promptly reached a decision that the individual Defendants had

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not retaliated against Plaintiff. It cites Campbell v. Regents of

University of California, 35 Cal. 4th 311, 327 (2005), where the

California Supreme Court noted that an employee may not proceed

with a court action seeking damages against the university unless

that institution has failed to reach an administrative decision on

the action within specified time limits. Defendant CSU

acknowledges that section 8547.10 was at issue in Campbell, not

section 8547.12, which is at issue here. But Defendant CSU

contends that subsection (c) in both sections are identical, save

that one applies to the University of California system, while the

other applies to the CSU system. 

As Plaintiff points out, however, these two subsections are

not identical. Section 8547.10(c) does not contain the sentence,

"Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit the injured party

from seeking a remedy if the university has not satisfactorily

addressed the complaint within 18 months." In its reply, Defendant

CSU acknowledges that no court has addressed the difference between

sections 8547.10(c) and 8547.12(c) or the meaning of the term

"satisfactorily addressed." It urges the Court to interpret

section 8547.12(c) as providing that Plaintiff is not entitled to a

court remedy if it reaches an administrative decision within

eighteen months of receiving Plaintiff's complaint. Such an

interpretation, however, would ignore the word "satisfactorily." 

See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. FEHC, 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-97 (1987) ("a

court must look first to the words of the statute themselves,

giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according

significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in

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pursuance of the legislative purpose").

Nonetheless, the Court need not be the first to address the

differences, if any, between sections 8547.10(c) and 8547.12(c) or

to interpret "satisfactorily addressed." Plaintiff provides no

evidence that his complaint was not satisfactorily addressed. 

Plaintiff's disagreement with the results of the investigation is

not evidence that his complaint was not satisfactorily addressed. 

Plaintiff does not deny that his complaint was promptly

investigated. Nor does he contend that the investigative process

used by the deputy attorney general was unsatisfactory. After

informing Plaintiff of the results of the deputy attorney general's

investigation, Defendant CSU further informed Plaintiff that he had

fourteen working days to submit a response. He did not. 

Because there is no dispute of material fact, regardless of

how section 8547.12(c) is construed, the Court grants Defendant CSU

summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff's sixth claim to the

extent it is based on that section. 

B. Section 12653

Section 12653 is part of California's False Claims Act;

subsection (b) is the False Claims Act's "whistleblower" provision. 

So. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Sup. Ct., 30 Cal. App. 4th 713, 724

(1994). It provides, in relevant part, that an employer cannot

"discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, deny promotion to,

or in any other manner discriminate against, an employee in the

terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by

the employee on behalf of the employee or others in disclosing

information to a government or law enforcement agency or in

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furthering a false claims action." Cal. Gov't Code § 12653(b). 

Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that he suffered

adverse employment action because of any disclosure of Title IX

violations. Therefore, he does not have evidence to support a

cause of action based on any Title IX disclosure.

But Plaintiff does have evidence to support a cause of action

based on his disclosure regarding HSU's athletic department's

fiscal mismanagement. Obviously, disclosure of fiscal

mismanagement in a State school could prevent fraud on the public

treasury. Defendant CSU does not argue otherwise; instead, it

argues that Plaintiff had no reasonable suspicion of a false claim

and thus his cause of action fails as a matter of law. See LeVine

v. Weis, 90 Cal. App. 4th 201, 210 (2001) ("Plaintiff need not show

that a false claim was actually made; he need only show that he had

reasonably based suspicions of a false claim."). Plaintiff

provides evidence that he did have a reasonable suspicion that the

athletics department was mismanaging funds. Furthermore, although

Dr. Kenyon's investigation did not find criminal conduct relating

to the athletics department's fiscal management, he did find that

fiscal management needed to improve.

The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant CSU on

Plaintiff's claim under section 12653 to the extent that it is

based on his Title IX disclosures. But, because there is a dispute

of fact regarding Plaintiff's disclosures of fiscal mismanagement,

the Court denies summary judgment on Plaintiff's section 12653

claim to the extent that it is based on his disclosures of HSU's

athletics department's fiscal mismanagement.

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C. Section 1102.5

California Labor Code section 1102.5 forbids an employer from

taking retaliatory action against an employee for disclosing

information to a governmental agency about the employer's violation

of the law. To establish a prima facie case under section 1102.5,

Plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected activity,

(2) that he was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment

action by his employer, and (3) that there was a causal link

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 

Love v. Motion Industries, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (N.D.

Cal. 2004).

As discussed above, Plaintiff does not show a causal link

between his Title IX activity and any adverse employment action,

but he does present evidence of a causal link between his

complaints regarding fiscal mismanagement and the end of his

employment. Although Defendant CSU argues that only a formal

complaint constitutes "protected activity," the cases it cites do

not support that argument. Furthermore, it is undisputed that

Plaintiff filed a formal complaint regarding the athletics

department's fiscal mismanagement.

The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant CSU on

Plaintiff's claim under section 1102.5 to the extent that it is

based on his Title IX activity, but denies summary judgment on this

claim to the extent it is based on his disclosures regarding the

athletics department's fiscal mismanagement.

IV. Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress Claim

Plaintiff's eighth claim is against the individual Defendants

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for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants

contend that, as a matter of law, this claim fails because they did

not engage in any extreme or outrageous conduct and because

Plaintiff's claim is barred by discretionary immunity. Plaintiff

does not disagree; he states that he does not oppose Defendants'

motion with respect to his claim of intentional infliction of

emotion distress. Summary judgment for Defendants is granted on

this claim. 

V. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff requests punitive damages against the individual

Defendants. Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss

Plaintiff's punitive damage requests, arguing that he has failed to

provide any evidence that the individual Defendants acted with

malice or evil motive to stifle Plaintiff's speech or activities. 

As Defendants note in their reply, Plaintiff did not address this

argument in his opposition. Summary judgment for Defendants is

granted on Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 40) IN PART and DENIES IT IN PART. 

Specifically, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the

individual Defendants on Plaintiff's first section 1983 claim based

on his Title IX speech and GRANTS summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Richmond on Plaintiff's second section 1983 claim based

on his speech regarding fiscal mismanagement. But the Court DENIES

summary judgment in favor of Defendants Collen and Butler on

Plaintiff's second section 1983 claim and finds that these

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Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Regarding

Plaintiff's sixth claim against Defendant CSU, the Court GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of Defendant CSU to the extent that the

claim is based on section 8547.12(c); the Court GRANTS summary

judgment in favor of Defendant CSU to the extent the claim is based

on section 12653 and Plaintiff's Title IX disclosures, but DENIES

summary judgment on the claim to extent it is based on section

12653 and Plaintiff's disclosures regarding HSU's athletics

department's fiscal mismanagement. Regarding Plaintiff's seventh

claim against Defendant CSU, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in

favor of Defendant CSU to the extent that the claim is based on

Plaintiff's Title IX disclosures, but DENIES summary judgment to

the extent that the claim is based on Plaintiff's disclosures

regarding HSU's athletics department's fiscal mismanagement. 

Summary judgment for the individual Defendants is GRANTED on

Plaintiff's eighth claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress and Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/7/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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