Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00991/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 According to the State, the Petitioner lured an 11-year old girl to a convenience store,

promising to buy her ice cream, and subsequently took her to an elementary schoolyard, ordered her to

remove her clothes, and fondled her breasts and buttocks. When the girl said she would tell her mother,

Petitioner pulled a gun, held it to her head and told her that he would kill her if she told anyone. (Answer,

Ex. C.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Walter Reese, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Meg Savage, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV 04-00991-PHX-ROS (JCG)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Walter Reese, who is presently confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex Eyman-Cook Unit in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) and Respondents’ Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Answer). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and dismiss the action.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 27, 2001, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse, a class

3 felony and dangerous crime against children, and one count of attempted aggravated

assault, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children.1

 (Answer, Ex. A.) The plea

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agreement required, subject to court approval, that Petitioner be placed on lifetime probation

for the sexual abuse conviction. (Answer, Ex. A.) 

On January 9, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for the

aggravated assault and consecutive lifetime probation for the sexual abuse conviction.

On October 11, 2002, following several extensions of time, Petitioner timely filed in

Superior Court for Maricopa County, his first petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer,

Ex. B.) The Petition alleged that "life time probation should be ruled unconstitutional as no

other crime other than a sex offense receives a life time probation term." The Petitioner

argued that probation in conjunction with a prison sentence violated Arizona state statutes

A.R.S. §13-604.1 and §13-901 (Ex. B at 2), and that Arizona statutes did not permit

imposition of a term of probation in addition to a prison sentence upon a person convicted

of committing a dangerous crime against children. The Petitioner concluded that it was the

responsibility of state courts to correct "federal constitutional errors" and asked that the court

set aside the life time probation as an error by the state court or to impose probation within

the guidelines of a class three felony. (Id. at 3.)

On February 11, 2003, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner's first post-conviction

petition for relief, reasoning: 

It is not unconstitutional to single out sex offenses for lifetime

probation. Defendant cites no authority that suggests otherwise. As

to the second argument, the statute A.R.S. §13-903(E) and State v.

Jones, 124 Ariz. 24 (1979) clearly allow for probation terms

consecutive to prison terms. (Answer, Ex. E.)

On March 4, 2003, Petitioner timely filed a petition for review from the trial court's

denial of post-conviction relief with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. F.) On

May 10, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Div. I, summarily denied review. (Answer, Ex.

I.)

On May 14, 2004, Petitioner timely filed in federal court a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. The Petition claims that the state sentence violates the

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petition, p. 5.) However, in the following

section, statement of supporting facts, Petitioner asserts that he brings only one issue – that

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the sentence of lifetime probation is unconstitutional; "With no other crime than the original

charge Defendant seems that his punishment falls under the scope of cruel and unusual scope

of the constituted law given to all man (person)." (Petition, p. 5.) 

Respondents assert that the Petition should be denied because: (1) Petitioner failed

to exhaust in state courts all claims raised in the Petition; (2) Petitioner procedurally

defaulted and is therefore precluded from raising these claims; and (3) Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate cause and prejudice. 

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Remedies

Before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the petitioner must

exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). To accomplish exhaustion, it is required that the

petitioner fairly present his claims within the state courts in a procedurally correct manner.

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.

1999), cert.denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Because the exhaustion requirement refers to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time he files an action for federal habeas relief,

exhaustion is also satisfied if the habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing his

claim in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Accordingly, if a petitioner's claims are

procedurally barred under state law, the claim is exhausted due to the petitioner's procedural

default of the claim. Procedural default occurs when a petitioner never presented a claim in

state court and is now barred from doing so by state court procedural rules. Castille, 489

U.S. at 351-52.

Respondents correctly argue that the Petitioner failed to exhaust his claim by first

presenting to the state courts his claim of a federal constitutional violation. Exhaustion

required that the Petitioner apprise the State that he was making a claim under the United

States Constitution and describe "both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on

which his claim is based" so that the state courts could have a fair opportunity to apply

controlling legal principles to those facts. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.

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2003). Petitioner must have referenced specific provisions of the federal constitution or

cited to federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a federal constitutional

violation. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner did neither.

Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief fails to reference any federal constitutional

provisions. It makes no mention of federal legal theory. Instead, Petitioner cites state

statutes and argues that their application is unconstitutional. The only reference to federal

law is a concluding sentence of the petition which refers to federal habeas law and states:

"Primary responsibility is on the State courts to correct Federal Constitutional errors which

taint state conviction, and it is unseemly in our dual system of government for Federal Court

in Habeas Corpus Proceeding by state prisoner to upset court conviction without opportunity

to state courts correct constitutional violation [sic]." (Ex. B, p. 3.) This statement contains

neither a legal standard or references a specific provision of the federal constitution under

which the state courts could analyze Petitioner’s claims. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S.

152, 162-163 (1996) (mere reference to "Constitution of United States" insufficient to

preserve a claim). Consequently, the reference is insufficient to preserve Petitioner's claim.

Respondents also assert that Petitioner failed to exhaust because he did not appeal the

Arizona Court of Appeals decision to the Arizona Supreme Court. However, pursuant to

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), Arizona state prisoners need not

seek discretionary review by the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust their federal

claims. Swoopes has not been overruled by Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). In

Baldwin, which was a case appealed from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court addressed

the question of what constitutes notice of the federal nature of a claim sufficient to satisfy the

fair presentment requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In laying the groundwork for

its decision, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o provide the State with the necessary

'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court

(including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that

court to the federal nature of the claim." 541 U.S. at 29 (citations omitted). Respondents

argue that these general statements of the law of exhaustion support a finding that Swoopes,

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at least insofar as it addresses the need for habeas petitioners to seek review in a the highest

state court, is no longer valid.

This Court does not believe that these general statements in Baldwin provide a basis

for concluding Swoopes is overruled. Swoopes was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit

for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 119 S. Ct. 1728 (1999). In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit, like the Baldwin Court,

reiterated the general rule stated in O'Sullivan that, "in order to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement for federal habeas relief, state prisoners must file for discretionary review in a

state supreme court when that review is part of ordinary appellate review." Swoopes, 196

F.3d at 1009 (citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at —, 119 S. Ct. at 1733). The court recognized,

however, that the Supreme Court in O'Sullivan had "acknowledged an exception to the

exhaustion requirement," by making it clear the "'the creation of a discretionary review

system does not, without more, make review' in a state supreme court 'unavailable.'"

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009 (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at —, 119 S.Ct. at 1734)(emphasis

added in Swoopes). The Ninth Circuit proceeded to review Arizona's discretionary review

system and found considerations that compelled a finding that, in other than capital cases,

appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court was unnecessary. Specifically, the court found that two

Arizona cases, State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), and State v. Sandon,

161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), made it clear that, "in cases not carrying a life sentence

or the death penalty, review need not be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order

to exhaust state remedies." Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. The Swoopes court concluded,

"post-conviction review before the Arizona Supreme Court is a remedy that is 'unavailable'

within the meaning of O'Sullivan." Id. Baldwin does not, implicitly or explicitly, suggest

that the Swoopes court's analysis is flawed or that the holding has been overruled. Also

strongly suggestive of the continued vitality of Swoopes is that the Ninth Circuit continues

to cite Swoopes for the proposition that Respondents suggest was overruled. See Castillo v.

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2

 The Court also declines to certify to the Arizona Supreme Court, the question of whether the

opportunity to seek discretionary review is available, pursuant to Rule 31.19, Ariz. R. Crim. P. There is no

need to certify this question to the Arizona Supreme Court as it is a state sentencing question addressed to

a federal court through a habeas petition and Ninth Circuit precedent controls this Court's decision.

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McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d

210 (3rd Cir. 2004).2

If a petitioner fails to fairly present a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, he may be able to return to state court to present the claim. When a

petitioner's return to state court, pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, would be futile,

the claim is considered procedurally barred. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989).

Petitioner cannot now timely present his claims to the state courts. His state post-conviction

action would be time-barred. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P; Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975,

987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A procedurally defaulted claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate "cause

and prejudice," or that failure to consider the claim will result in a "fundamental miscarriage

of justice." Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004). Petitioner does not demonstrate or

allege either. Therefore, his claim is barred.

B. Merits

Even if the Petitioner's claim were not procedurally barred, his claim should be denied

on the merits. Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief only

on the grounds that the prisoner's confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994). General improprieties

occurring in state proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness

and consequently violated the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas

court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions."). The Supreme Court

has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

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independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).

When reviewing a state criminal conviction, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas

corpus only if a state court proceeding: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert.denied, 125 S.Ct. 415 (2004). Under 28 § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary

to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth" in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision

but "nevertheless arrives at a result different from" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of

clearly established Federal law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle" from a Supreme Court decision "but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In considering whether a state court has

unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411; See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002). In conducting habeas review, it is "presum[ed] that state courts know and follow the

law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The question presented in a state

prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is "whether the state proceedings satisfied due

process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Petitioner's primary contention is that the sentence imposed by the state trial court,

specifically lifetime probation after serving fifteen years in prison, is unconstitutional. The

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Petitioner suggests that the imposition of lifetime probation violates the cruel and unusual

punishment clause in the Eighth Amendment. 

The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence establishes "gross

disproportionality" as the controlling principle in assessing petitioners' claims. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). Challenges to the proportionality of sentences are to be

assessed by applying objective criteria, including: "(1) the gravity of the offense and the

harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction; and may include (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime

in other jurisdictions." Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994)(citation

omitted), cert.denied, 514 U.S. 1026 (1995); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

(holding that proportionality review occurs with reference to current standards and should

be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent). However, "[c]omparative

analyses of sentences for other crimes is only appropriate in the rare case in which a

threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference

of gross disproportionality." United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citation omitted), cert.denied, 165 F.3d 1277 (1999). Moreover, in reviewing sentences

imposed under state law, deference to state legislatures is warranted "unless [the court is]

confronted with a rare case of a grossly disproportionate sentence." Cocio v. Bramlett, 872

F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1989) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court had the discretion both to impose lifetime probation and to

accept a plea agreement that included a term of lifetime probation. See State v. Lee, 191

Ariz. 542, 544 (1998) (noting that a judge is imbued with "wide latitude" to approve or reject

a plea bargain). Under Arizona law, probation is governed by A.R.S. § 13-901, et seq.,

which permits the imposition of lifetime probation for the conviction of a designated felony

offense or an attempt to commit such offense as "the court believes is appropriate for the

ends of justice." A.R.S. § 13-902(E) (2001). Probation, imposed in accordance with a

suspended sentence, is not necessarily limited by the maximum possible prison term. See

Demarce v. Willrich, 203 Ariz. 502, 505-06, 56 P.3d 76, 79-80 (App. 2002).

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Petitioner pled guilty to sexual abuse, an offense under chapter 14 of the criminal

code, and one that is subject to a term of statutory probation not less than that specified in

A.R.S. § 13-902(A) "up to and including life." A.R.S. § 13-902(E). Rule 17.1(a), Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, governs plea agreements. Rule 17.1(a) allows the court to

accept a plea of guilty. Rule 17.4(a) permits the parties to negotiate and agree on "any aspect

of the case." Rule 17.4(d) further provides that a "court shall not be bound by a provision

in the plea agreement regarding the sentence or the term and conditions of probation to be

imposed . . . ." It is the court's purview to ensure that the "ends of justice and the protection

of the public are being served by" a plea agreement. Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145

(1995).

It is this Court's recommendation that the District Court defer to the state court's

interpretation of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions"). Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, even a state court's misapplication

of state sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief. See Christian v. Rhode,

41F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994)(citation omitted). Here, there appears to be no fundamental

unfairness resulting from the state court’s interpretation of its sentencing laws and its

determination that there was no misapplication of the state sentencing laws. Therefore

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

Additionally, Petitioner's sentence is not excessive. "[O]nly extreme sentences that

are grossly disproportionate to the crime" violate the Eighth Amendment. United States v.

Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

858 (1992). In its decision in State v.Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 379, 79 P.3d 64, 66 (Ariz. 2003),

cert.denied, 541 U.S. 1037 (2004), the Arizona Supreme Court resolved to some extent the

issue of what may constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment

for non-capital sentences. There, the court stated that in reviewing gross disproportionality,

the court should examine the specific circumstances and facts of a given case. The court

employed several factors in its analysis of gross disproportionality, including: (1) the

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victim's consent or willingness to participate in the act; (2) the absence or presence of

violence; (3) the defendant's criminal record; (4) the defendant's level of maturity; (5) societal

norms and behavior; and (6) the scope of the statute. The court held that a sentence only

violates the constitution when "it is so disproportionate to the offenses that it shocks the

moral sense of the court and the community." 206 Ariz. at 388, 79 P.3d at 75.

Having examined the controlling United States Supreme Court and Arizona state court

precedent, this Court concludes that Petitioner's sentence of lifetime probation is neither

extreme nor grossly disproportionate to his crimes under either the state or federal law or

statute. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991);

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381-82 (2000). Accordingly, it is recommended that the

District Court find that appellant has failed to state a claim for which federal relief could be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir.

1989). 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DISMISSING the action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Future pleadings should bear the action

number: CV 04-991-PHX-ROS.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 10th day of March, 2006.

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