Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01392/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01392-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Veolia Transportation Services, Inc.,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Lydia Evanson and Greg Evanson, husband 

and wife; John Does I-VII, 

Defendants.

No. CV 10-01392-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is Plaintiff Veolia Transportation Services, Inc.’s (“Veolia”) 

Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 94). Although Defendants’ response to Veolia’s motion was 

due November 14, 2011, no response has been filed. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court will grant Veolia’s motion and enter default against the Evanson Defendants. 

I. Background

 This action relates to several anonymous emails sent to Veolia employees, the 

Phoenix Mayor, the Phoenix City Council, City of Phoenix employees, and various 

media organizations between June 3, 2010 and July 1, 2010. The anonymous emails 

were sent from several different email addresses, 

including veoliaemployees@yahoo.com. The anonymous emails contained information 

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critical of Veolia and attached internal correspondence between Lydia Evanson 

(“Evanson”), a former Veolia employee who was terminated on April 8, 2010, and her 

former supervisor. 

 Veolia filed its complaint in this Court on July 1, 2010, alleging violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2701, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with business 

relationship, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, defamation, false light, conversion, and trespass to chattels related to the 

anonymous emails and the information disseminated therein (Doc. 1). Because the 

allegedly actionable emails were sent anonymously, Veolia named “John Does I-VII” as 

defendants in its complaint (Id.). 

The Court granted Veolia’s motions for pre-service discovery in order to ascertain 

the identity of the proper defendants to this action (Docs. 9, 28, 39, 62). In its pre-service 

discovery efforts, Veolia served Evanson with a subpoena duces tecum on August 8, 

2010 (Doc. 74-8). The subpoena requested production of documents related to 

identifying the sender of the anonymous emails, as well as requests for production, 

inspection, and copying of Evanson’s computer hard drives, email files and folders, and 

other devices (Doc. 74-7). 

 On August 10, 2010, Evanson executed a sworn declaration that she had never 

used any of the email addresses from which the anonymous emails were sent and had no 

knowledge related to the email addresses or the identity of any person who used the email 

addresses (Doc. 74-9). On that same day, Evanson had her computer hard drive imaged 

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by Lightsone Solutions, a consulting firm specializing in computer forensics. Lighstone 

sent Evanson an email on August 31, 2010, indicating that if she did not pay for the 

image that was taken of her computer hard drive by September 3, 2010, the image would 

be destroyed (Doc. 75-6). On September 7, 2010, a new hard drive was installed on 

Evanson’s computer. On September 8, 2010, Lightstone again informed Evanson via 

email that the image of her computer hard drive would be destroyed that day if she did 

not pay for it (Doc. 75-7). Evanson’s attorney responded to that email requesting that the 

image not be destroyed because there was a “reasonable chance that [Evanson] will need 

access” to the image (Id.). Nonetheless, due to Evanson’s failure to pay Lightstone, the 

image was destroyed on September 8, 2010. Veolia was not given notice that Evanson’s 

hard drive had been imaged, that the image was set to be destroyed, or that a new hard 

drive had been installed on Evanson’s computer. 

 As part of its pre-service discovery, Veolia also subpoenaed Yahoo! Inc. in order 

to obtained the IP addresses used to access 

the veoliaemployees@yahoo.com address. Using the IP address from Yahoo! Inc., 

Veolia subpoenaed the internet service provider associated with that address, Hughes 

Network Systems, LLC, and learned that the IP address which was used to access 

the veoliaemployees@yahoo.com address belonged to an account registered to Evanson 

at her home address, with Evanson’s personal email address as the contact email for the 

account (Doc. 75-3). At a deposition on June 28, 2011, Evanson admitted that she took 

the internal emails which were attached to the anonymous emails, as well as other 

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documents, from Veolia when she was terminated (Doc. 95-1). She also admitted that 

she logged into the veoliaemployees@yahoo.com account on June 5, 2010 (Id.). 

 Veolia issued a second subpoena to Evanson seeking documents related to the 

anonymous emails as well as production of Evanson’s computer hard drive and other 

devices (Doc. 75-4). Evanson informed Veolia in a June 13, 2011 letter that Evanson’s 

computer’s hard drive “crashed in approximately October/November 2010” and that the 

hard drive was replaced after computer technicians failed to repair it (Doc. 75-8). On 

July 5, 2011, Veolia had Evanson’s computer imaged by Evolve Discovery, a forensic 

consulting firm. The imaging showed that (1) the hard drive was replaced on September 

7, 2010; (2) the internet browsing history for Internet Explorer had been deleted on July 

4, 2011; (3) Google Chrome had been uninstalled from the computer and its browsing 

history had been deleted; (4) all sent emails from MS Outlook had been deleted by the 

user; (5) other emails in MS Outlook had been deleted by the user; and (6) all sent emails 

from Evanson’s AOL email account had been deleted by the user (Doc. 75-9). 

 Veolia filed an amended complaint naming Evanson1

 as defendant on July 22, 

2011(Doc. 73). On October 27, 2011, Veolia filed the currently pending motion, asking 

that Evanson be sanctioned for her “knowing and deliberate spoliation” of evidence, 

including her email records and computer hard drive (Doc. 94). Evanson has not 

responded to Veolia’s motion. 

 

1

 Veolia also named Lydia Evanson’s husband, Greg Evanson, as a defendant for 

community property purposes only. 

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II. Motion for Sanctions

 Veolia seeks sanctions against Evanson for her spoliation of evidence, including 

the deletion of the image of her computer’s hard drive, her internet browsing history, and 

her sent email files. The Court has discretion to sanction a party who causes the 

spoliation of evidence. See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 

2006). Destruction of evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as 

evidence in pending litigation constitutes spoliation. See United States v. Kitsap 

Physicians Svs., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, failure to “preserve 

electronic or other records, once the duty to do so has been triggered, raises the issue of 

spoliation of evidence and its consequences.” Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 

F. Supp. 2d. 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dept. Of Housing & 

Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003)); see also Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (noting 

willful destruction of electronic files constituted spoliation). 

“A party seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence must prove the following 

elements: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it 

when it was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompanied by a 

‘culpable state of mind;’ and (3) the evidence that was destroyed or altered was ‘relevant’ 

to the claims or defenses of the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated 

evidence[.]” Surowiec, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (quoting Goodman v. Praxair Servs., 

Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009)). Veolia has sufficiently established that 

Evanson’s actions led to the spoliation of evidence and warrant sanction. 

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First, Evanson’s duty to preserve her computer’s hard drive and electronic data 

arose when she was served with Veolia’s subpoena on August 8, 2010 seeking production 

of this information. See id. (quoting Morford v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:09–cv–

02251–RLH–PAL, 2011 WL 635220, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 11, 2011)) (noting that duty to 

preserve arises “not only during litigation, but also extends to the period before litigation 

when a party should reasonably know that evidence may be relevant to anticipated 

litigation”). The subpoena was issued in relation to the litigation that had already been 

pending for more than a month. From the facts presented, Evanson took several actions 

to destroy evidence after August 8, 2010: her hard drive was replaced on September 7, 

2010, and she caused the image of her hard drive prepared by Lightstone to be destroyed 

on September 8, 2010 by failing to pay for the image and failing to notify Veolia that the 

image would imminently be destroyed. Indeed, her attorney’s email to Lightstone 

requesting that the image of her hard drive not be destroyed because Evanson would 

likely need the image indicates Evanson’s knowledge of her duty to preserve this 

evidence. Further, after she received a second subpoena for her electronic files and prior 

to the imaging of her computer done on July 5, 2011, it is a fair inference from Veolia’s 

forensic examination showing that Evanson’s sent email folders and internet browsing 

history had been deleted by the user, that Evanson affirmatively destroyed this evidence. 

 Second, Veolia has established that Evanson acted with a culpable mind when she 

took actions that led to the spoliation of evidence. Although courts “have not been 

uniform in defining the level of culpability–be it negligence, gross negligence, 

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willfulness, or bad faith–that is required before [finding that] sanctions [for spoliation of 

evidence] are appropriate[,]” id. at 1006 (quoting Ashton v. Knight Transp., Inc., 772 F. 

Supp. 2d 772, (N.D. Tex. 2011)), the Court finds that Evanson acted at least willfully 

here, and likely in bad faith. Evanson was aware of Veolia’s subpoena and had obtained 

counsel prior to her destruction of the evidence; indeed, it seems likely that she had her 

hard drive imaged for purposes related to this litigation. That after receiving Veolia’s 

subpoena and having her hard drive imaged, Evanson then installing a new hard drive 

and refused to pay the imaging company to maintain the image of her hard drive amounts 

to a willful destruction of that evidence. Similarly, the fact that Evanson deleted her sent 

email files and internet browsing history immediately prior to Veolia’s forensic 

investigation of her computer pursuant to a second subpoena indicates she was acting in 

bad faith by affirmatively deleting this information. Nor has Evanson provided any 

reasonable explanation for her failure to preserve the spoliated evidence; she has not even 

responded to Veolia’s motion for sanctions to posit any alternative interpretation of the 

evidence presented by Veolia’s forensic examination of her computer. The timing and 

character of Evanson’s actions is therefore sufficient to establish Evanson acted with a 

culpable state of mind. 

 Finally, Veolia has sufficiently shown that the evidence destroyed was likely 

relevant to Veolia’s claims. Although proof of relevance is difficult where the evidence 

has been completely destroyed, the spoliation itself and surrounding circumstances 

permit a fair inference that the evidence was highly relevant to this litigation. Evanson 

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had possession of the emails which were forwarded by the anonymous sender, and she 

admitted to accessing the email account of one of the email addresses from which the 

anonymous emails were sent. It is thus a fair inference that the evidence Evanson deleted 

likely contained information relevant to the central issue of this case – identifying the 

anonymous email senders. The fact that Evanson deleted her computer’s hard drive, her 

internet browsing history, and her sent email files, coupled with her sworn affidavit that 

she had never accessed any of the anonymous emails that was later contradicted by her 

deposition testimony, also supports the conclusion that the deleted evidence was related 

to this case and prejudicial to Evanson. Accordingly, the Court finds that an award of 

sanctions is appropriate in these circumstances. 

III. Entry of Default

 As a sanction for Evanson’s spoliation of evidence, Veolia requests that the Court 

enter default judgment against Evanson.2

 The Court may, in its discretion, enter default 

judgment as a sanction under its “inherent power . . . to levy sanctions in response to 

abusive litigation practices.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958. Entry of default as a sanction is 

only warranted where the party “engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that 

undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings” or “has willfully deceived the court and 

engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.” Id.

(quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. V. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 

1995)). Accordingly, “a finding of ‘willfulness, fault, or bad faith’ is required” for 

 

2

 Veolia also requests entry of default judgment against Greg Evanson, since he is named 

for community property purposes only. 

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terminating sanctions for spoliation of evidence to be proper. Id. 

Here, the Court finds Evanson’s conduct was willful. Although she had received 

subpoenas requesting relevant documents, electronic files, and images of her computer’s 

hard drive and other devices, she still took action to destroy some of the requested 

material. Further, she allowed the image of her computer’s hard drive taken by 

Lightstone Solutions to be destroyed, even though her lawyer indicated that the image 

would likely be needed by Evanson. Indeed, on the facts presented, it is a fair inference 

that Evanson’s spoliation was intentionally done, in bad faith, for the purpose of 

destroying evidence that would likely be harmful to Evanson in this litigation. Because 

Evanson was on notice that the image of her computer’s hard drive, sent email folders, 

and internet browsing history would be relevant to the litigation, her destruction of these 

constitutes at a minimum willful spoliation. See Kitsap Physicians, 314 F.3d at 1001

(noting that destruction of evidence is willful spoliation if party has “some notice that the 

documents were potentially relevant to the litigation before they were destroyed”). 

In addition to a finding of willfulness, the Court also considers the following 

factors in determining whether to enter default judgment as a sanction for the spoliation: 

“(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 

manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public 

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 

sanctions.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958. After weighing the factors, the Court concludes entry 

of default is an appropriate sanction for Evanson’s spoliation of evidence. 

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 First, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s 

need to manage its docket favor entry of default here. This action was filed more than a 

year ago. Evanson’s misrepresentations regarding her access to the 

veoliaemployees@yahoo.com email address, as well as her destruction of likely relevant 

evidence to this litigation, has unreasonably delayed the prosecution of this case. 

Further, the risk of substantial prejudice to Veolia if default is not entered against 

Evanson is great. The evidence Evanson destroyed was likely directly relevant to 

Veolia’s ability to establish the central issue of its case—the identity of the anonymous 

emailers—because Evanson has already admitted that she accessed one of the email 

addresses from which the anonymous emails were sent, indicating at least her knowledge 

of the sender’s identity. In these circumstances, failing to grant default would cause 

Veolia to suffer substantial prejudice because Evanson’s destruction of evidence has 

“impair[ed Veolia’s] ability to go to trial” and “threaten[ed] to interfere with the rightful 

decision of the case.” Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 353-54 (internal citations omitted). 

The Court will not force Veolia to “rely on incomplete and spotty evidence” at trial 

because of Evanson’s actions in destroying relevant evidence. See id.; see also Leon, 464 

F.3d at 960 (finding sanction of default judgment appropriate where spoliation of 

electronic files “‘greatly impeded resolution of the case’ by obscuring the factual 

predicate of the case and consuming months of sanction-related litigation” (citing Malone 

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

 While the policy favoring disposition of cases on the merits would generally 

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weigh against entry of default, the spoliation here has substantially impeded any effort to 

decide this case on the merits. Nor does the availability of less severe sanctions make 

entry of default inappropriate here. Nothing short of entry of default is adequate to 

correct the substantial prejudice that would result to Veolia if it were required to 

prosecute its case without the evidence destroyed by Evanson. Indeed, because the 

evidence that was destroyed here was so likely so central to Veolia’s case, an adverse 

inference instruction would effectively establish Evanson’s liability. Although granting 

default is an extreme sanction, the Court finds it to be necessary here to both protect 

Veolia from prejudice and to sufficiently deter destruction of electronic data, which is 

often easily accomplished and highly prejudicial. See Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Am. 

Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 170 (D. Colo. 1990) (“One who anticipates 

that...production of damning evidence[] will produce an adverse judgment[] will not 

likely be deterred from destroying that decisive evidence by any sanction less than the 

adverse judgment he ... is tempted to thus evade.”). 

The Court accordingly finds that entry of default is an appropriate sanction in 

these circumstances. However, Veolia has not identified the amount of damages sought 

in this motion. Where the evidence of damages is not a sum certain, the Court cannot 

enter default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The Court will therefore set a default hearing 

at which Veolia may present evidence of the damages it seeks. Veolia has also requested 

its attorneys’ fees and costs, but has similarly failed to include any evidence of the 

amount of fees and costs sought. Accordingly, this request will be denied without 

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prejudice to filing a separate motion for attorneys’ fees and costs outlining the amount 

sought. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 94) is 

granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office enter default against 

Defendants Lydia and Greg Evanson. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Summary Adjudication 

and Award of Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 96) is denied as moot, without prejudice to refilling 

a separate motion for attorneys’ fees presenting evidence of the specific amount claimed. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting a default hearing on the amount of 

Plaintiff’s damages for December 19, 2011, at 3:30 p.m. 

 Dated this 28th day of November, 2011. 

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