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Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14508

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-01183-RWS

SARA BOHANNON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

 (October 20, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Sarah Bohannon asserts that PHH Mortgage Corporation and the Federal 

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National Mortgage Corporation (“Fannie Mae”) wrongfully foreclosed on her 

property because PHH failed to provide Bohannon with a notice identifying Fannie 

Mae as the entity with full authority to negotiate, amend, or modify her mortgage, 

as Georgia law required. The district court held that (1) collateral estoppel barred 

Bohannon’s claims and (2) Bohannon failed to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted, both because the notice substantially complied with statutory 

requirements and because she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that the 

alleged violation caused her damages. On appeal, because Bohannon fails to 

challenge the district court’s holding regarding causation, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Sara Bohannon obtained a residential mortgage loan for her home from 

Georgia Telco Credit Union. Fannie Mae came to own the loan, with PHH serving 

as the servicer of the loan.1

 PHH sent Bohannon a letter informing her that her 

property was going to be sold at a foreclosure auction and that PHH was the entity 

with the full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify the terms of her mortgage. 

But Bohannon alleges that PHH, in fact, had only limited authority to negotiate, 

 1 At the motion to dismiss stage, we accept the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint 

as true and view them in the light most favorable to Bohannon. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 

693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).

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amend, or modify the terms of her mortgage and that Fannie Mae retained the full 

authority.

After sending Bohannon notice of the foreclosure, PHH held the foreclosure 

auction and purchased the property as, it claims, the highest bidder. Subsequently, 

PHH conveyed the property to Fannie Mae, which evicted Bohannon. 

Bohannon sued PHH and Fannie Mae in Georgia state court, alleging two 

claims of wrongful foreclosure. After PHH and Fannie Mae removed the case to 

federal court based on diversity jurisdiction,2 they moved to dismiss the claims. 

The district court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all claims. The

court relied on three alternative grounds to support its conclusion: (1) collateral 

estoppel barred Bohannon’s claims because she had previously litigated the issue 

 2 Bohannon argues on appeal that the district court should have remanded the case to the 

state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But it is clear that this case met the 

requirements for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Complete diversity of 

citizenship existed because Bohannon is a citizen of Georgia, PHH is a citizen of New Jersey, 

and Fannie Mae is a citizen of the District of Columbia. And, regardless of what Bohannon pled 

in the complaint about the amount in controversy, the amount exceeded $75,000 because she

sought to invalidate the non-judicial foreclosure sale of her property, at which her property sold 

for $180,510.84. See Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 973 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The 

value of injunctive or declaratory relief for amount in controversy purposes is the monetary value 

of the object of the litigation that would flow to the plaintiffs if the injunction were granted.”). 

The district court thus had subject matter jurisdiction.

Bohannon also argues, for the first time in her reply brief, that PHH and Fannie Mae’s 

removal to federal court was untimely. We ordinarily do not consider arguments raised for the 

first time in a reply brief. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal 

will not be considered by this court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

What’s more, Bohannon has waived this issue by failing to move to remand or otherwise

raise it in the district court. See F.D.I.C. v. Verex Assur., Inc., 3 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(“By well settled convention, appellate courts generally will not consider an issue or theory that 

was not raised in the district court.”).

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of PHH’s authority to foreclose on the property; (2) Bohannon failed to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted because PHH’s notice substantially 

complied with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2; and (3) Bohannon failed to state a claim 

for relief because her allegations were insufficient to establish causation. After the 

district court entered a judgment dismissing Bohannon’s claims, she appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

“To obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple, 

independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground for 

the judgment against him is incorrect. When an appellant fails to challenge 

properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its 

judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it 

follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian 

Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). That is the case here.

On appeal, Bohannon argues that the district court erred in holding that 

collateral estoppel bars her claims against PHH and that she failed to state a claim 

for relief because PHH’s notice of foreclosure substantially complied with 

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. But she fails to address in any way the district court’s 

third alternative holding that she failed to state a claim because she alleged

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insufficient facts to establish that PHH’s inadequate notice caused her damages.3

Bohannon has abandoned any argument that the district court erred in this 

alternative holding. See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1312 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (“As [the defendant] has not properly presented these arguments for 

review, they are waived on appeal, and we decline to consider them further.”). 

Therefore, the district court’s judgment is due to be affirmed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.

AFFIRMED.

 3 Bohannon appears to assert that the district court should have allowed her the 

opportunity to amend her complaint. But she never sought leave to amend in the district court or 

expressed an intention to do so. Furthermore, in her briefs on appeal she gives no indication as 

to how she would amend her complaint or why amendment would not be futile. Indeed, she 

appears to have conceded—in response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss arguing that she 

failed to allege the inadequate notice caused her damages—that she “was admittedly in default 

on the repayment of the underlying loan . . . .” Accordingly, we discern no error.

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