Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00374/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allan S. MacDonald, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. CIV 03-0374-PHX-SMM (VAM)

ORDER

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/MOTION TO AMEND

Under consideration are Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed July 30, 2004

(#31), seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,

etc. and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, filed August 15, 2005 (#114) seeking to file Plaintiff’s

lodged Third Amended Complaint. 

Background - Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed June 18, 2004 (#29), arose

out of his medical treatment while incarcerated at the Maricopa County Jail-Madison Street

from December 14, 2002 to July 1, 2003. The Second Amended Complaint included four

counts: (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by failing to properly fund and staff

jailhouse medical services, and to properly respond to known deficiencies; (2) Due Process

violations by punishment of pretrial detainees; (3) deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs by failing to properly treat Plaintiff’s end stage liver disease, tumor, and knee injury; and

(4) state tort claims, including medical malpractice.

Case 2:03-cv-00374-SMM-VAM Document 125 Filed 09/30/05 Page 1 of 12
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1

Brock, Fulton; Kunnsek, Andy; Wilcox, Mary Rose.

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Allyn, A.R.; Haggard, Tracy; Saldivar; and Uphold, D.D..

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Brooks, L.P.N., P.; Chaffee, M.A., D.; Gallardo, R.N., Stephanie; Gan, M.D., Dr.

Victor; Malta, M.A., C.; Pinnkey, L.P.N., S.; Scalzo, Dr.; Steinhauser, M.D., Dr. Gail; and

Thompson, Claire E..

4

Following the filing of the dispositive motions by Defendant Correctional Health

Services arguing that Maricopa County was the proper party, Plaintiff filed a Motion (#64) to

supplement his motion for reconsideration. The motion to supplement was denied as moot on

the basis that the supplement simply restated prior arguments. (Order 3/3/05, #72.)

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The Second Amended Complaint named the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,

individual board members,1

 Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, individual Sheriff’s

 Office employees,2

 Correctional Health Services, and individual Correctional Health Services

employees,3

 including an Unknown Managed Care Director and an Unknown Quality

Assurance Coordinator.

In the Screening Order, the Court noted that “Local government bodies, such as Arizona

counties, are persons under § 1983 and may be sued for constitutional injuries.” (Order 7/14/04,

#30 at 3.) Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and the

individual supervisors as improper parties, on the basis that all jail operations were the

responsibility of the County Sheriff, who is independent of the Board of Supervisors. (Id.)

Service was deferred on the “unknown” defendants. (Id. at 3-4.)

Motion for Reconsideration - Plaintiff subsequently sought reconsideration of the

screening order, including the dismissal of the Board of Supervisors.4

 (Motion 7/30/04, #31.)

Defendants filed a Response (#67) on February 14, 2005. Defendants state:

Admittedly, the Arizona statutory scheme is not a model of clarity.

While the Arizona legislature has delegated the responsibility of operating

the jails to the Sheriff, not the Board of Supervisors, they have delegated

the responsibility of inmate health care to the counties, not the sheriffs. .

. . The correct party that plaintiff should have sued is Maricopa County

and/or the Board of Supervisors. . . . If this Court dismissed these

defendants on the mistaken basis only that they were not responsible for

inmate health care then they should be reinstated, and defendants would

waive any objection to this amendment.

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Board of Supervisors members: Wilson, Max; and Stapley, Don.

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Sheriff’s Office employees: Hendershott, David; and Sheridan, Jerry.

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Maricopa County employees: Smith, David; Wilson, Sandi; and Weisbuck, M.D., Dr.

Jonathan.

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Correctional Heath Services employees: Campbell, Trisha; Butler, R.N., Diane; and

Fream, R.N., Lechtie.

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(#67 at 2.) In their Addendum, filed February 22, 2005, Defendants correct this statement,

noting that only Maricopa County would be the proper party, and the Board of Supervisors is

a non-jural entity.

In an Order filed March 3, 2005, the Court ordered a response from Defendants. (Order

3/3/05, #72.) Defendants filed a subsequent Response (#82) on March 28, 2005, to largely the

same effect and Plaintiff filed a Reply (#83) on April 4, 2005. 

Motion to Amend - Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, filed August 15, 2005 (#114) seeks

to file Plaintiff’s lodged Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s proposed Third Amended

Complaint restates essentially the same four claims, but does so in only two counts. Count I

alleges that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs based upon: (1) failure to properly

fund jailhouse health care; (2) failure to properly respond to known deficiencies; (3) adoption

of policies that reflect deliberate indifference; and (4) failure to properly treat Petitioner’s

ailments, including his end stage liver disease. Count II alleges state tort claims of negligence

and medical malpractice.

Most significantly, Plaintiff’s proposed Third Amended Complaint seeks to: (1) replace

the Board of Supervisors with Maricopa County; (2) eliminate the “unknown” defendants; and

(3) add additional individual members of the board of supervisors5

 and individual employees

of the Sheriff’s Office,6

 County,7 and Correctional Health Services.8

Defendants challenge the amendment on two bases: (1) undue prejudice resulting from

the delay in amendment; and (2) futility because of the applicable two year statute of

limitations. (#116 at 2-3.) 

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Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Reply (#121). This motion is

granted to the extent that Plaintiff’s Reply, filed September 9, 2005 (#120) shall be deemed

timely filed.

Plaintiff replies that the addition of Maricopa County is simply an attempt to reassert the

claims dismissed on screening, based on the now apparent reality that medical services in the

county jails are indeed the responsibility of the Board of Supervisors, and not the Sheriff.

Plaintiff replies that he did sue Maricopa County through its Board of Supervisors, and but for

the error of the Court in dismissing the Board of Supervisors in the screening order, and the

misnomer between the Board and the County, Defendants were aware of the suit, and thus his

amendment relates back to his original filing. Plaintiff further argues that any statute of

limitations would be tolled because of his imprisonment, citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-502.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants do not object to the other newly named defendants, and

thus he should be permitted to add and serve them.

Under Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motions to amend are generally

considered favorably as permitting an adjudication of a claim on its merits, and leave to amend

should be “freely given when justice so requires.” 

If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be

a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his

claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared

reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of

the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the leave sought

should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Futility - Untimeliness - Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s amendment would be futile

because he is not entitled to relation back of the amendment and the new claims would be

untimely. “Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to

amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Court must consider

whether Plaintiff’s amendments would clearly be barred as untimely.

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The Ninth Circuit has long held that for claims arising in Arizona, the relevant statute

of limitations is A.R.S. § 12-542(1), which provides a limitation of two years. De Luna v.

Farris, 841 F.2d 312, 313 (9th Cir. 1988). The precedent of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

provides that the statute of limitations in a section 1983 action begins to run when the plaintiff

knows, or has reason to know, that he has been injured. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128

(9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of events occurring between December

2002 and July 1, 2003 (Third Amended Complaint at 4.) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, he is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

because of his imprisonment. The statute he relies on, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-502, was amended

in 1996 to delete the provision for such tolling. See Arizona Session Laws, 1996, Ch. 175. 

However, Plaintiff may be entitled to tolling while he was exhausting his administrative

remedies. Arizona statutes do not explicitly provide that the statute of limitations in a civil

rights suit is tolled while a plaintiff is exhausting his administrative remedies. See Ariz. Rev.

Stat. §§ 12-501 & 12-502. On the other hand, the opinions of the Arizona courts indicate that

the statute of limitations regarding a civil complaint may be tolled during a plaintiff’s

exhaustion of administrative remedies. Compare Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Doherty, 200

Ariz. 515, 522, 29 P.3d 862, 869 (2001), and Third & Catalina Assoc. v. City of Phoenix, 182

Ariz. 203, 207, 895 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1994) (“we agree with the appellant that it properly

exhausted its administrative remedies in full compliance with the law and public policy. The

statute of limitations was tolled during this process.”), with Stulce v. Salt River Project Agric.

Dist., 197 Ariz. 87, 90-92, 3 P.3d 1007, 1010-12 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the statute of

limitations is not tolled by the plaintiff’s compliance with Arizona’s notice of claim statute).

Further, three United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded that the statute of

limitations on a prisoner’s section 1983 claim could be equitably tolled, pursuant to federal law,

while the prisoner is exhausting his administrative remedies because the plaintiff would

otherwise be prohibited from vindicating his federal rights. See Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485,

490 (7th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000); Lake v. Arnold, 232

F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir. 2000); Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1993). Cf.

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Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of complaint without

prejudice because plaintiff did not offer any reason why the statute of limitations might be

tolled); Grant v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 163 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998) (declining

to reach the issue).

Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) provides that an amendment of

parties relates back to the filing of the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same

occurrence, and there was adequate notice of the original complaint within the time for service

of the original pleading. 

Here, the same core facts are alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, as in the Second

Amended Complaint, meeting the requirements of Rule 15(c)(2), as required by Rule 15(c)(3).

And, at least with respect to proposed defendant Maricopa County, there can be little doubt that

adequate notice has been provided to avoid prejudice. The Maricopa County Attorney has been

involved in this action since service of the Second Amended Complaint, which named the

county’s Board of Supervisors, and has in fact argued for the last nine months that the county

is the proper party. 

As to the individual defendants, however, Plaintiff offers no reason to believe that these

defendants had any notice of this suit. Consequently, relation back of the Amendment for the

individual parties may not be available, and these claims may be barred if tolling for exhaustion

is unavailable. 

Nonetheless, the Court cannot say, based upon the face of the complaint and the facts

available in this context, that amendment of the complaint is time barred. Therefore, the Court

cannot conclude that the amendment is futile.

Prejudice from Delay - Defendants also argue that they have been prejudiced by

Plaintiff’s undue delay in pursuing his amendment. In Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d

1385 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit upheld a denial of leave to amend, noting that the

plaintiffs had delayed filing the amended complaint for eight months beyond the time they

should have known of the existence of the claims. However, “[d]elay alone does not provide

sufficient grounds for denying leave to amend: ‘Where there is lack of prejudice to the opposing

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party and the amended complaint is obviously not frivolous, or made as a dilatory maneuver in

bad faith, it is an abuse of discretion to deny such a motion.’” Hurn v. Ret. Fund Trust of

Plumbing, Heating and Piping Indus. of S. California, 648 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981). 

To establish prejudice, Defendants assert that they have defended this suit based upon

the fact that Maricopa County had not been sued. Indeed, Defendants have filed a motion to

dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the County was the proper party

for Plaintiff’s claims against Correctional Health Services. However, the defense of the

remaining defendants is not based upon such an assertion. Defendants fail to explain additional

discovery that would be required to defend the County, or why it would now be rendered

unproductive. In fact, it is doubtful that Defendants would need any further significant

discovery, given the unlikelihood that Plaintiff possesses any documents or information relevant

to the claim. 

Nor is there any indiction that Plaintiff has acted in bad faith. Plaintiff has persistently

tried to pursue a claim against the County. Defendants have admitted that “the Arizona

statutory scheme [as to which party is responsible for inmate health care] is not a model of

clarity,” and even encouraged the addition of the County to the suit, responding to the Motion

for Reconsideration that the County and/or the Board “should be reinstated, and defendants

would waive any objection to this amendment.” (#67 at 2.)

Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion to Amend, deny the Motion for

Reconsideration as moot, deny the Motion for Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration as

moot, and screen the Third Amended Complaint.

SCREENING OF THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint for claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, or fail to state a claim, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. In screening complaints,

however, the Court is obliged to liberally construe the Plaintiff’s complaint:

The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed . . .

[A] pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held

to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

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lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it

appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972)).

As with Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims liberally construed

all state cognizable claims. The propriety of suit against the County and the Board of

Supervisors, and their purported creation of an official county policy or custom resulting in

Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, are at least sufficiently developed to state a cognizable claim.

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint continues to state cognizable claims of deliberate

indifference as to the remaining defendants, and state law tort claims as to the medical

professional defendants. There are no longer any unknown or fictitiously named defendants.

As discussed above, supra at 4-6, Plaintiff’s claims against some of the newly added

defendants may be barred by the statute of limitations. However, such a matter is not

appropriate for decision on screening. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276-

77 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissal on statute of limitations grounds disfavored where matters outside

the complaint may not be considered and where equitable tolling may apply). 

PENDING DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

In the meantime, the parties have a variety of dispositive motions pending which attack

a complaint that is no longer in existence. Rather than attempt to discern how the parties would

want the Court to construe their briefs in light of these changes, the Court will deny these

motions without prejudice to their refiling within an appropriate deadline to be determined by

the Magistrate Judge.

/ / / 

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/ / / 

/ / / 

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Likewise, Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed July 1, 2005 (#106), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to

Respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 8, 2005 (#107), are rendered

moot along with the dispositive motions they address, and will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration,

filed July 30, 2004 (#31) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference of this case only as to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration, filed July 11, 2005 (#108).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling on Motion for

Reconsideration, filed July 11, 2005 (#108) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference of this case only as to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Defendants’ Response to Motion for Leave

to Amend, filed September 9, 2005 (#121) .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to

Reply to Defendants’ Response to Motion for Leave to Amend, filed September 9, 2005 (#121)

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference of this case only as to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, filed August 15, 2005 (#114).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, filed August

15, 2005 (#114) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, lodged

on August 15, 2005 shall be filed by the Clerk of Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Arpaio, Allyn, Haggard, Salidvar,

Uphold, Correctional Health Services, Brooks, Chaffee, Gallardo, Gan, Malta, Pinnkey, Scalzo,

Steinhauser, and Thompson, having already appeared herein and having been served with the

lodged complaint, shall file their answer to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint within twenty

(20) days of the filing of this Order.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service on Defendants Maricopa County,

David Smith, Sandi Wilson, Dr. Jonathan Weisbuck, M.D., David Hendershott, Jerry Sheridan,

Max Wilson, Don Stapley, Trisa Campbell, Diane Butler, R.N., and Lechtie Fream, R.N., 

Fulton Brock, Andy Kunnsek, and Mary Rose Wilcox shall proceed as follows:

(1) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including

both summons and request for waiver forms for said Defendant(s).

(2) Plaintiff shall complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of the

Court within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(3) The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of the

Third Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(4) The United States Marshal shall notify said Defendants of the

commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule

4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to said Defendants shall include a copy

of this Order. The Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers

that are returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of

summons is not returned by any such Defendant within thirty days from the date the request for

waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, Third Amended Complaint

and this Order upon such Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Within ten days after personal service is effected, file the return of

service for the Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a

waiver of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred

in effecting service upon the Defendant. The costs of service shall be

enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and shall include the

costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the

Summons, Third Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing

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new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to

Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless

otherwise ordered by the Court.

(5) Defendants who agree to waive service of the Summons and Third

Amended Complaint shall return signed waiver forms to the United State Marshal, and

not to Plaintiff.

(6) Said Defendant(s) shall answer the Third Amended Complaint or

otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions

of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(7) Any answer or responsive pleading shall state the specific Defendant(s)

by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, responsive pleading, or

other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant(s) by name on whose behalf

it is filed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Correctional Health Services’

Motion to Dismiss, filed January 19, 2005 (#58) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as

moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Correctional Health Services’

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Filed January 31, 2005 (#60) is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference of this case only as to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 30, 2005 (#102).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

filed June 30, 2005 (#102) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference of this case only as to

Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, filed

July 1, 2005 (#106).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery

Pending Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 1, 2005 (#106) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference of this case only as to,

Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed July 8, 2005 (#107).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to

Respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 8, 2005 (#107) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as moot.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2005.

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