Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-05648/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-05648-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES WANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

JERRY BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 11-cv-05648-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 56

INTRODUCTION

As I explained in my prior Order on Motion to Dismiss (“Prior Order”), pro se plaintiff 

Charles Wang’s claims arising from his alleged wrongful arrest on October 14, 2009 are timebarred, and so are his claims arising from his second alleged wrongful arrest on December 22, 

2009, unless the claims from the second arrest relate back to the first. I gave Wang an opportunity 

to amend. It is now clear that his claims arising from that second incident do not relate back. And 

there are a host of service and other problems with Wang’s claims. As a result, there is no need 

for oral argument on this matter, and the hearing set for September 16, 2015 is VACATED. 

Governor Brown and Secretary Beard’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and each defendant in 

this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk shall close the file. 

BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. First Arrest and Incarceration

According to Wang’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) , shortly after 12:00 p.m. on 

October 14, 2009, Wang’s parole officer, Carlos De Jesus, arrived at Wang’s residence and told 

him that he had been terminated from a class required by his special conditions of parole. FAC ¶ 

1 (Dkt. No. 37). Wang responded that he was planning to attend the class at 5:00 p.m. that 

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evening at A New Beginning, an authorized service provider where he had also attended class the 

week before. Id. Despite this explanation, De Jesus and an unidentified CDCR agent arrested 

Wang and placed him in county jail, where he remained incarcerated for approximately sixteen 

days. Id.

Wang received a “charge report” several days after his arrest. Id. In the charge report, De 

Jesus and “Supervisor Haas” accused Wang of “deliberately sabotag[ing] [his] enrollment 

process.” Id. Wang states that this accusation was false, and that in fact, before signing up for 

classes at A New Beginning, he attempted to sign up for classes at A Turning Point, where De 

Jesus had instructed him to go. Id. However, A Turning Point denied his application on the 

ground that they could not accommodate a client whose case was still on appeal. Another service 

provider, A Caring Place, denied Wang’s application for the same reason. Wang states that rather 

than deliberately sabotage his enrollment process, he “took the initiative to look for a service 

provider which [could] accommodate someone whose appeal is still in progress.” Id.

When Wang presented these facts to an independent commissioner, the commissioner 

“dismissed the false claims,” and Wang was released from jail. Id. Wang alleges that he “was 

wrongfully arrested and placed in county jail for a duration [of] about 16 days,” and that “[d]uring 

this period in jail, [he] was deprived of proper clothing, medical attention and dental care, and 

proper sleeping accommodation[s].” Id. Based on that incident, Wang brought four causes of 

action against De Jesus, “Supervisor Haas,” and a variety of other defendants, including Edmund 

G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, Dr. Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and Kamala Harris, Attorney General of California.

B. Second Arrest and Incarceration

The SAC reiterates substantially the same facts as alleged in the FAC but also includes 

additional allegations of a second wrongful arrest following Wang’s release from county jail. On 

December 22, 2009, De Jesus “initiated another similar arrest,” allegedly because he disagreed 

with the independent commissioner’s decision to dismiss the prior claims against Wang. SAC ¶ 7 

(Dkt. No. 55). De Jesus sent Wang to a different jail this time – Santa Rita Jail – “to avoid the 

same commissioner.” Id. Wang remained incarcerated for over two months, until March 2, 2010. 

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Id. ¶ 8. While there, he was attacked by other inmates, and although he repeatedly rang the 

emergency bell to get assistance, the “prison guard, Cox, did not open [the] door, until everyone 

started breakfast.” Id. ¶ 9. Following this incident, the “[m]edical center provided practically no 

treatment other than an emergency room visit.” Id.

The SAC also adds allegations with respect to Governor Brown, Secretary Beard, and 

Attorney General Harris. Wang claims that Governor Brown is “involved in formulating and 

implementing” the “unlawful policies and practices” at issue in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 

(2011). SAC ¶ 14. He states that Secretary Beard and Attorney General Harris “are supposed to 

ensure such illegal acts don’t happen, but it happened. Without corrective action, it will happen 

again and again.” Id. ¶ 13. In his opposition brief, Wang further contends that Governor Brown 

has an “iron grip” on the California prison system, and that Attorney General Harris, rather than 

use the Attorney General’s office to investigate the prison system, “allow[s] such injustice to 

permeate in state government.” Opp. at 4 (Dkt. No. 59).1

In addition to De Jesus, Supervisor Haas, Governor Brown, Secretary Beard, and Attorney 

General Harris, the SAC names as defendants David Land (who on April 27, 2015 allegedly 

accepted documents from a process server attempting to serve Attorney General Harris on Wang’s 

behalf), “Santa Rita Prison Guard Cox,” and “State Employees A-Z.”

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Knowledge of the procedural history of this case is helpful. Wang filed his original 

complaint on November 21, 2011. Dkt. No. 1. The complaint named five defendants – the 

“Governor of California,” the “Head of the [CDCR],” the “State Attorney General,” De Jesus, and 

Supervisor Haas – and alleged four causes of action under the United States and California 

Constitutions and unspecified provisions of the “California State Codes” arising from the October

 

1 Wang also alleges that as a result of the facts stated in the SAC, “all Californians” have been 

harmed, because he has “not [been] able to use my knowledge and skills to prevent California’s 

Central Valley and surrounding areas [from] turn[ing] into [a] desert (unless actions [are] 

implemented right away).” SAC ¶ 12. Wang contends that he “made this prediction as early as 

2008 knowing the current model is wrong and [is] causing the desertification.” Id.

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2009 arrest and incarceration.2 See id. ¶¶ 9-12. 

On May 16, 2012, the Hon. James Ware dismissed the case without prejudice under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) because Wang had failed to serve any of the defendants 

within 120 days of filing his complaint.3 Dkt. No. 20. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 

the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing the action without first giving Wang notice and an 

opportunity to show good cause why he had not effected service. Dkt. No. 28. 

On November 25, 2014, following remand from the Ninth Circuit, I issued an order 

instructing Wang to serve defendants and gave him 45 days to do so. Dkt. No. 32. I advised 

Wang that “failure to properly serve defendants by January 8, 2015 may result in dismissal of this 

action.” Id. 

On December 29, 2014, Wang filed a proof of service stating that Governor Brown had 

been served. Dkt. No. 33. Specifically, the proof of service stated that on December 18, 2014, the 

process server gave “Megan Sabbah” copies of the original complaint and several other documents 

from this action. Id. The proof of service described Sabbah as an “executive legal assistant” and 

identified the place of service as the “Mail Room” at “10th and L Streets,” Sacramento, CA 

95814. Id. No service was attempted on the other defendants because Wang believed that service 

on Governor Brown would effectuate service on all state employee defendants.

Following a case management conference on February 24, 2015, at which only Wang 

appeared, I issued an order explaining that the proof of service did not establish service on 

 

2

The four causes of action are titled as follows: (1) “Violation of U.S. Constitutional Rights and 

Rights in California State Constitution by Due Process Clause of XIV Amendment.” 

(2) ”Violation of U.S. Constitutional Rights and Rights in California State Constitution by Due 

Process Clause of IV Amendment, and California State Codes.” (3) “Violation of U.S. 

Constitutional and Rights in California State Constitution by Malicious Prosecution.” 

(4) ”Violation of U.S. Constitutional Rights and Rights in California State Constitution by VII 

[sic] Amendment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 9-12. Liberally construed, the 

causes of action seek to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Wang’s Fourth, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. The FAC and SAC allege the same four 

causes of action, word-for-word. See FAC ¶¶ 11-14; SAC at p.7-9.

3 Rule 4(m) provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is 

filed, the court – on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff – must dismiss the action 

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

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Governor Brown or any other defendant. Dkt. No. 36. I gave Wang specific instructions on how 

to effect service and gave him until April 7, 2015 to properly serve Governor Brown and the other 

defendants named in the action. I stated: “Given the unsuccessful efforts that Wang has made 

over four years to serve defendants, I will be inclined to dismiss any defendant who is not properly 

served as of the next case management conference . . . on April 28, 2015.” Id. I referred Wang, 

both at the case management conference and in the Order Regarding Plaintiff’s Proof of Service,

to this district’s Legal Help Center. Dkt. Nos. 35, 36.

On April 7, 2015, Wang had a process server attempt to serve Attorney General Harris. 

Dkt. No. 42. The proof of service, which Wang filed on April 27, 2015, states that the process 

server delivered the documents to David Land at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, 9th Floor, San 

Francisco, CA 94102. Id. The proof of service does not specify who Land is, where he works, or 

how he is associated with Attorney General Harris. Id. 

On April 17, 2015, Wang filed the FAC, asserting the same four causes of action as the 

original complaint and adding Sabbah as a defendant. Governor Brown, Secretary Beard, and 

Sabbah moved to dismiss. Dkt. No. 52. On July 6, 2015, I issued an order (1) dismissing Wang’s 

claims based on the October 2009 arrest and incarceration but allowing him leave to amend, 

including by adding claims based on the December 2009 arrest and incarceration; (2) dismissing 

Sabbah with prejudice; and (3) ordering Wang to serve De Jesus, Supervisor Haas, and Attorney 

General Harris by August 1, 2015. Prior Order at 10-11.

Wang filed the SAC on July 21, 2015, asserting the same four causes of action, adding 

Land, Cox, and “State Employees A-Z” as defendants, and amending his allegations as described 

above. Governor Brown and Secretary Beard moved to dismiss on August 4, 2015. Dkt. No. 56. 

Wang filed an opposition brief on August 18, 2015, along with two exhibits: (1) a letter dated July 

7, 2015 from Wang to defense counsel requesting information about De Jesus and Supervisor 

Haas and about how to serve state employees, and (2) defense counsel’s letter in response, 

declining to assist Wang and directing him to the district’s Legal Help Center. Dkt. No. 59. 

Governor Brown and Secretary Beard filed their reply brief on August 25, 2015. Dkt. No. 60. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 

1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is facially 

plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 

avoid . . . dismissal” under this standard. Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[I]t is within [the court’s] wheelhouse to reject, as implausible, allegations that are too 

speculative to warrant further factual development.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 

(9th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

I. GOVERNOR BROWN, SECRETARY BEARD, ATTORNEY GENERAL HARRIS, 

AND LAND ARE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE WANG HAS NOT 

PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THAT THEY PLAYED ANY PART IN HIS ALLEGED 

CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS.

In their motion to dismiss, Governor Brown and Secretary Beard argue that Wang has 

again failed to state a valid section 1983 claim against them, Attorney General Harris, or Land,

because there are no facts plausibly establishing that they played any part in Wang’s alleged 

constitutional deprivations. I agree, and DISMISS these defendants WITH PREJUDICE.

4

“[A] person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

 

4 Although Attorney General Harris, Land, “Santa Rita Prison Guard Cox,” and “State Employees 

A-Z” have not moved to dismiss, a court “may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a 

complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim” once the court has afforded the plaintiff “an 

opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion.” Wong v. Bell, 

642 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where the 

claimant “cannot possibly win relief,” such a dismissal may be made without notice. Omar v. SeaLand Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). Wang has already been granted leave to 

amend his complaint with respect to Attorney General Harris. See Prior Order at 8-9. It is also 

clear that Wang cannot possibly win relief against either Attorney General Harris or any of the 

other defendants who have not yet been served and/or moved to dismiss. 

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meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Supervisors are not liable under section 1983 “for 

actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-

46 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “a supervisor may only be held 

liable under if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional 

deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and 

the constitutional violation.” Id. “The requisite causal connection may be established when an 

official sets in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know 

would cause others to inflict constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In the Prior Order, I gave Wang an opportunity to amend his complaint with facts alleging 

the necessary personal involvement or causal connection between Governor Brown, Secretary 

Beard, and/or Attorney General Harris and the constitutional harms he allegedly suffered. Prior 

Order at 8-9. Wang has not done so. Like the FAC, the SAC contains no allegations that 

plausibly connect any of these defendants with either of Wang’s arrests and incarcerations or any 

other claimed violation of his constitutional rights. The only allegations in the SAC that 

specifically target the defendants state that Governor Brown is “involved in formulating and 

implementing” the “unlawful policies and practices” at issue in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 

(2011), and that Secretary Beard and Attorney General Harris “are supposed to ensure such illegal 

acts don’t happen.” SAC ¶¶ 13-14. These vague and conclusory statements fail to plausibly 

establish any personal involvement or causal connection between these defendants and the specific 

constitutional harms that Wang identifies in the SAC. 

Wang has had multiple opportunities to amend his claims against Governor Brown, 

Secretary Beard, and Attorney General Harris. It is clear that he has no plausible theories of 

liability against them. Because further amendment with respect to these defendants would be 

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futile, they are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.5 

In addition, although Wang named Land as a new defendant in the SAC, he alleges no 

facts connecting Land to either of the alleged arrests and incarcerations underlying his claims. 

Wang states only that Land accepted documents when the process server attempted to serve 

Attorney General Harris. See SAC ¶ 10. This does not provide a proper basis for suing Land in 

this action. He is also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

II. THE CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE DECEMBER 2009 ARREST AND 

INCARCERATION DO NOT RELATE BACK 

In the Prior Order, I dismissed the claims arising from Wang’s October 2009 arrest and 

incarceration because they were time-barred. Prior Order at 5-8. I found that claims arising from 

Wang’s December 2009 arrest and incarceration, on the other hand, might not be time-barred if 

they related back to the original complaint. Id. at 8. I reserved ruling on whether the claims 

related back, affording Wang an opportunity to plead them. Id. Wang has added allegations in the 

SAC regarding the December 2009 arrest and incarceration, and has also named “Santa Rita 

Prison Guard Cox” as a new defendant. 

Whether an amendment relates back in a section 1983 action requires a court to “consider 

both federal and state law and employ whichever affords the more permissive relation back 

standard.” Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Spitzer v. Aljoe, No. 13-cv-05442-MEJ, 2015 WL 

1843787, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015); Felarca v. Birgeneau, No. 11-cv-05719-YGR, 2014 

WL 7140262, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2014). The applicable state law is whichever provides the 

applicable statute of limitations, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A), which, in turn is the forum state, 

Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007).

 

5

Further, to the extent that Wang continues to base his claims on the October 2009 arrest and 

incarceration, the claims are time-barred for the reasons stated in the Prior Order. See Prior Order 

at 5-8. Like the FAC, the SAC contains no facts indicating that Wang is entitled to any tolling 

other than that provided under California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1 for the sixteen days he 

spent in county jail. And, as discussed below, to the extent that Wang now bases his claims on the 

December 2009 arrest and incarceration, the claims do not relate back to the original complaint 

and are thus time-barred as well. This provides additional justification for dismissing Governor 

Brown, Secretary Beard, and Attorney General Harris – and, indeed, the whole SAC – with 

prejudice.

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A. Federal Law

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1), “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates 

back to the date of the original pleading when:

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows 

relation back;

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the 

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set 

out – in the original pleading; or

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party 

against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and 

if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons 

and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 

defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been 

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s 

identity.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

Wang’s claims against Cox, who was not named in the original complaint or the FAC,

clearly do not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1). The notice and knowledge requirements prescribed 

by Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) and Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) must be satisfied “within 120 days after the

original complaint is filed.” Butler, 766 F.3d at 1202. There is no indication here that within 120 

days of when Wang filed his original complaint on November 21, 2011, Cox had either received 

notice of this action, or knew or should have known that it would have been brought against him 

but for mistake. Given that Wang’s original complaint neither described nor alleged claims based 

on Wang’s second arrest and incarceration, it is implausible that Cox had the requisite notice or

knowledge at the necessary time. The claims against him do not relate back under federal law. 

The question is slightly closer with respect to De Jesus and Supervisor Haas. But the 

December 2009 incident does not relate back with respect to them either.

An amended pleading arises out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” within 

the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) where it “will likely be proved by the same kind of evidence

offered in support of the original pleading.” ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 

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1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[t]o relate back, the 

original and amended pleadings must share a common core of operative facts so that the adverse 

party has fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct called into question.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). The relation back doctrine is “liberally applied” in the 

Ninth Circuit. ASARCO, LLC, 765 F.3d at 1004. Nevertheless, “[f]airness to the defendant 

demands that the defendant be able to anticipate claims that might follow from the facts alleged by 

the plaintiff.” Percy v. San Francisco Gen. Hosp., 841 F.2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 

Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the same conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence requirement is designed “to ensure that the original pleading provided 

adequate notice of the claims raised in the amended pleading”).

Under these principles, Wang’s claims arising from the December 2009 arrest do not relate 

back to those arising from the October 2009 arrest. His original complaint identified only the 

October 2009 arrest and incarceration. See Dkt. No. 1. It brought claims and sought relief only on 

the basis of that initial incident and made no reference to any subsequent one. See id. Although 

the two incidents are connected in that, according to the SAC, the second one occurred because De 

Jesus was upset by the outcome of the first, this tenuous link is not enough to satisfy the relation 

back standard under Rule 15(c)(1)(B). The incidents occurred approximately two months apart, 

resulted in different periods of incarceration in different jails, and involved different groups of 

actors (at least one of whom, Cox, was not named as a defendant in the original complaint). In 

these circumstances, the fact that the second incident was motivated by or in some ways similar to 

the first would not have been enough to enable De Jesus or any other defendant to anticipate that 

claims based on the second incident would follow. See Percy, 841 F.2d at 979-80 (pro se 

plaintiff’s original claim for wrongful termination under Title VII did not relate to his subsequent 

claim under section 1983 for denial of due process during his Civil Service Commission hearing, 

where “[e]ven the most liberal reading of [plaintiff’s] original complaint fails to provide the City 

with notice that, in addition to the circumstances surrounding his discharge based upon alleged 

racial discrimination, the City should have been prepared to defend a claim of a denial of due 

process in a subsequent Civil Service Commission hearing”).

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Wang’s claims arising from the December 2009 arrest do not relate back under federal law. 

B. California Law

They do not relate back under California law either. An amended complaint relates back to 

an original complaint under California law where the amended complaint “(1) is based on the 

same general set of facts as the original, (2) seeks relief for the same injuries, and (3) refers to the 

same incident.” Edwards v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. App. 4th 172, 180 (2001) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “In determining whether the amended complaint alleges facts that are sufficiently 

similar to those alleged in the original complaint, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant had 

adequate notice of the claim based on the original.” Pointe San Diego Residential Cmty., L.P. v. 

Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, 195 Cal. App. 4th 265, 277 (2011).

Wang’s claims against Cox, De Jesus, and Supervisor Haas arising from the December

2009 incident do not concern the same general set of facts, the same injuries, or the same incident 

as Wang’s original complaint. As stated above, the October 2009 and December 2009 incidents 

occurred approximately two months apart, resulted in different periods of incarceration in different 

jails, and involved different groups of actors. Given these differences, the tenuous connection 

between the two incidents is not enough to support relation back under California law. See 

Espinosa v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 409, 415-16 (1988) (plaintiff bringing police 

brutality claims based on a May 7 incident could not relate back an alleged attempt by the city on 

May 10 to intimidate a witness to the May 7 incident); Weiner v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 

525, 528-29 (1976) (alleged defamatory statement published in one newspaper on April 25 did not 

relate back to alleged defamatory statement published by same defendants in other newspaper on 

April 23); Pimentel v. Cnty. of Fresno, No. 10-cv-01736, 2011 WL 350288, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 

2, 2011) (prisoner’s claim that that prison negligently failed to assign him a lower bunk bed, 

causing him to fall and sustain certain injuries, did not relate to his claims that same prison 

subsequently failed to provide him with adequate medical care, thereby causing different injuries).

Because I found in the Prior Order that Wang’s October 2009 claims are time-barred, and 

because his December 2009 claims do not relate back to his original complaint, Cox, De Jesus, 

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and Supervisor Haas are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.6

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Governor Brown and Secretary Beard’s motion to dismiss is 

GRANTED, and all defendants named in this action are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.7 The 

Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2015

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

 

6

There are also dispositive service issues regarding De Jesus and Supervisor Haas. Wang initially

failed to serve any defendant – that is why Judge Ware dismissed the complaint without prejudice. 

See Dkt. No. 20. Once the case was remanded to me, I ordered Wang to serve all defendants 

within 45 days of November 25, 2014. Dkt. No. 32. When he failed to do so properly, I gave him 

specific instructions on how to effect service and ordered him to serve defendants by April 28, 

2015. Dkt. No. 36. As of the date of this order, Wang still has not served either De Jesus or 

Supervisor Haas. Defense counsel was not particularly helpful in responding to Wang’s request 

for help in serving process on these defendants (and on state employees in general), see Opp. Exs. 

1-2 (Dkt. Nos. 59-1, 59-2), but defense counsel did direct Wang to the district’s Legal Help 

Center, where Wang had been advised to seek assistance numerous times before. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 120 days after 

the complaint is filed, the court – on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff – must 

dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a 

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time 

for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

Wang has now had nearly ten months and multiple opportunities to serve De Jesus and Supervisor 

Haas, and he has not shown good cause for his continued failure to serve them. This provides 

additional grounds for dismissing De Jesus and Supervisor Haas. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

 

7

To the extent that Wang’s naming of “State Employees A-Z” can be construed as an attempt to 

bring his claims against additional defendants, those claims are also DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE as time-barred and implausibly alleged.

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