Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00001/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00001-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE UNITED SCREENERS ASSOCIATION

LOCAL ONE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-00001 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULINGS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON OCTOBER 14, 2005:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. See N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority.

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A. Covenant’s Motion to Dismiss Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action

The Court tentatively GRANTS Covenant’s motion without leave to amend these

causes of action. The parties each shall have ten (10) minutes to address the following

questions:

1. Based on the Plaintiffs’ opposition, the Court presumes Plaintiffs concede that

Covenant was not acting under color of state law. Would Plaintiffs also concede

that the Supreme Court’s decision in Correctional Services Corporation v.

Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) completely precludes their fourth and fifth causes

of action? See also Agyeman v. Corrections Corporation of America, 390 F.3d

1101 (9th Cir. 2004). If not, on what basis or bases do they contend that they can

maintain these causes of action? 

2. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ argument that they have an implied private

right of action under the ATSA and finds it to be unpersuasive in light of such

cases as G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Service, Inc., 958 F.2d

896, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1992); Bonano v. East Caribbean Airline Corp., 365 F.3d

81, 86 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[W]e join a long list of other courts that have concluded

that neither the [FAA] nor the regulations create implied private rights of

action.”); and Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 387, 389-93 (E.D.N.Y.

1996) (holding that private right of action for alleged violation of FAA’s drug

testing regulations and specifically citing enforcement provisions in 49 U.S.C. §

46101, et seq. as “strong indicia that Congress did not envision a private right of

action”) (citing inter alia, Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1993)),

aff’d in pertinent part and rev’d on other grounds, Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

147 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). Cf. Springs v. Stone, 362 F. Supp. 2d 686 (E.D. Va.

2005) (discussing ATSA in context of preemption but noting that “[a]t its core

and all around its edges, the ATSA is a legislative initiative aimed a [sic]

strengthening the security of this Nation’s transportation infrastructure ... ”). 

Do Plaintiffs have any contrary authority to show that a private right of action

does exist for alleged violations of the ATSA? 

B. City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Court tentatively GRANTS the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Rule

12(b)(6) as to Plaintiffs’ allegations that the City Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The

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Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss the

Section 1983 claim on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that would state a

claim. The Court tentatively denies the motion to the extent Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is

premised on alleged deprivations of rights under the NLRA. 

The parties each shall have fifteen (15) minutes to address the following questions:

1. Plaintiffs include the Commission and Mr. Martin as defendants in the body of

the SAC. However, these Defendants are not named in any of the specific causes

of action asserted. 

a. Are Plaintiffs asserting the first cause of action against the Commission

and Mr. Martin? If not, why should the Court not dismiss them from this

litigation?

b. Would Plaintiffs agree that the Airport Commission cannot be sued in its

own right? 

2. Is the Court correct in its understanding that Plaintiffs are not directly

challenging the validity of the Card Check Resolution and do not seek the Court

to declare it preempted by the NLRA or otherwise have it declared invalid? 

3. Plaintiffs support their Section 1983 claim by alleging that the City Defendants’

actions violated rights that they have under the NLRA, due process rights, equal

protection rights, and their first amendment right to freedom of association.

a. To establish a claim for violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff

must show “government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Nunez

v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998). What is the

life, liberty, or property interest that forms the basis of this aspect of

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action? Where in the SAC are the facts

supporting this allegation?

b. To establish an equal protection claim under Section 1983, Plaintiffs must

show they are members of a protected class. See Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998). With respect to this claim, what

is the protected class to which they allegedly belong and where in the

SAC are facts supporting this allegation?

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c. How do the City Defendants distinguish Radcliffe v. Rainbow

Construction Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001), in which the Ninth

Circuit permitted a Section 1983 claim (based on alleged violations of

section 7 of the NLRA) to go forward against governmental defendants?

d. Recognizing that it is not binding authority, how do Plaintiffs distinguish

Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1992), in which the appeals

court affirmed the district court’s determination that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against

government officials (based on alleged deprivations of rights under

sections 7 and 9 of the NLRA) to the extent the Section 1983 claim was

based on alleged interference with a free election?

e. What facts in the SAC support Plaintiffs’ claims that their right to

freedom of association (presumably the right to join a union and advocate

in favor of unionization) were abridged by the City Defendants’ actions?

4. To establish a Section 1983 claim against the City and County of San Francisco

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their injury was caused by an official policy or

custom of the City. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). Is the Court correct in its assumption that Plaintiffs claim that the Card

Check Resolution is the policy or custom in question? If not, what facts are

alleged in the SAC to show that the Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries have been caused

by a governmental policy or custom?

5. In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not address the City Defendants arguments that

they cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) because they do not

comprise a class “that requires special federal assistance in protecting civil

rights.” See McCalden v. California Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th

Cir. 1992). Do Plaintiffs concede this point? If not, on what basis do they

contend they can maintain this claim?

Dated: October 11, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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