Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00191/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Defendant CDCR was not part of the original motion to dismiss because it was not served with

the Complaint until July 7, 2008. [See Doc. No. 15 at 2.] Additionally, although the Complaint also

named A.L. Cota as a defendant, this individual has not yet been served. On July 14, 2008, this Court

granted Plaintiff an extension until September 10, 2008, to serve A.L. Cota. [Doc. No. 18.]

1 08cv0191

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR PARRA, Jr., Civil No. 08cv0191 H (CAB)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING:

(1) DEFENDANTS COWAN,

HERNANDEZ, LIMON, AND LILES’

MOTION TO DISMISS THE

COMPLAINT; AND

(2) DEFENDANT CDCR’S MOTION TO

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

[Doc. Nos. 12, 14.]

v.

R. HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Victor Parra, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 23, 2008, Defendants P. Cowan, R. Hernandez, R. Limon, and

W. Liles, employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at R.J. Donovan

State Prison, moved to dismiss all claims against Defendants Limon and Liles, and certain claims against

Defendants Cowan and Hernandez. On July 10, 2008, Defendant California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), a state agency, moved to dismiss the Complaint as it pertains to

Defendant CDCR.1 Plaintiff did not submit an opposition. 

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2

 When a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the documents are part of the

complaint and may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). If the allegations

in the complaint are refuted by an attached document, the court need not accept the allegations as being

true. Id.

3

 The Complaint states the incident occurred on September 25, 2006, but based on Plaintiff’s

Exhibit A, it appears the incident actually occurred on September 28, 2006. 

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For the reasons that follow, this Court recommends Defendants’ motion be GRANTED. 

Furthermore, this Court recommends the state law causes of action against Defendant CDCR be

DISMISSED sua sponte without leave to amend, and that Defendant CDCR’s motion to dismiss

therefore be DENIED as moot. 

II. BACKGROUND

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated at R.J. Donovan State Prison (“Donovan”). The

Complaint and attached exhibits

2

 allege the following facts:

Plaintiff has an anxiety disorder and at the time of the incident was classified as having safety

concerns. (Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 11.) On or about September 28, 2006, Plaintiff, who had been housed in

administrative segregation, was ordered by Defendants Limon and Liles to double cell with inmate

Duran.3 (Complaint at ¶ 2.) Inmate Duran was classified as a general population inmate. (Complaint at

¶ 1.) Plaintiff had double celled with at least two other general population inmates in the past without

incident. (Complaint at ¶ 49.) Defendant Limon notified Plaintiff that Operational Plan #85 required

inmates to double cell, and that he would be issued a Rule Violation Report (“RVR”) if he did not sign

the agreement. (Complaint at ¶ 5; Plaintiff’s Exhibit A (“Exhibit A”).) 

Plaintiff told Defendant Limon that Inmate Duran was not compatible with Plaintiff because he

belonged to a different yard group. (Complaint at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was told that if he did not sign a

double-cell agreement he would be placed on a yard-hold and moved to Unit 8, where no yard, library, or

other state created services were available. (Complaint at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff agreed to double-cell with

inmate Duran, but would not sign the corresponding double-cell agreement form. (Complaint at ¶ 6.) 

On or about September 28, 2006, Plaintiff was placed on a yard-hold. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B at 3

(“Exhibit B”).) On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff was formally issued a RVR for “refusing an order to

double cell.” (Exhibit A.) On October 9, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to Unit 8. (Exhibit B at 3.) On

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October 10, 2006, Plaintiff received a copy of the RVR. (Exhibit A.) On October 30, 2006, a hearing

was held on the RVR and the reviewing officer found Plaintiff not guilty of refusing to obey an order to

double-cell because: (1) Plaintiff was in compliance with the order at the time of the hearing; and (2)

Plaintiff’s claims of incompatibility were not checked against all available sources of information

because the officers only checked against his administrative segregation file, not his central file. (Id.) 

The senior hearing officer determined that further disciplinary action against Plaintiff was unnecessary

and dismissed the RVR. (Id.) 

From on or about September 28, 2006, to January 1, 2007, while he was on a yard-hold and

during his subsequent housing in Unit 8, Plaintiff was not allowed in the exercise yard. (Complaint at ¶¶

6, 8, 24-25.) He was also denied access to the law library and recreational reading books. (Complaint at

¶ 43.) From January 1, 2007, to April 2007, Plaintiff was housed in Unit 7, where he was allowed less

than 5 hours in the exercise yard per week. (Complaint at ¶ 15.) 

III. DISCUSSION

With respect to the above facts, Plaintiff alleges numerous claims for violations of his rights

under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as several state law causes of

action. Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Defendants Limon, Liles, and the CDCR, and the

sixth, eighth, ninth, sixteenth, and seventeenth causes of action against Defendants Hernandez and

Cowan. Defendants do not move to dismiss the second, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth

causes of action against Defendants Hernandez and Cowan.

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion ‘can be

granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her

claim.'" Holley v. Crank, 400 F.3d 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). "All allegations

of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 

Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1989). The dispositive issue is "not whether a plaintiff will 

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Jackson

v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

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4

 In their Motion, in addition to addressing this claim, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s

housing assignment with Inmate Duran did not constitute a failure-to-protect under the Eighth

Amendment. (Motion at 6.) However, Plaintiff does not appear to raise such a claim in his Complaint. 

While Plaintiff does express concerns regarding his fear of assault by Inmate Duran, the totality of his

allegations demonstrate his claim is for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement related to the

denial of outdoor exercise. Specifically, he alleges Defendants Limon and Liled violated his rights under

the Eighth Amendment when they: (1) “enforced Operational Plan #85 and effectively deprive [sic]

Plaintiff of outdoor exercise yard from September 25, 2006 to April 2007,” (Complaint at ¶ 7); (2) were

“deliverate [sic] indifferent when they new [sic] Plaintiff would receive no yard and his mental illness

posed a risk in a 24 hour lockdown, like Unit 8,” (Complaint at ¶ 17); and (3) “deprived Plaintiff of a

basic human need of exercise in an outdoor yard ...,” (Complaint at ¶ 19). In any event, to the extent

Plaintiff sought to allege a failure-to-protect claim, this Court recommends the claim be DISMISSED

for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

1179-80 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, this Court need not address the failure-to-protect issue. 

4 08cv0191

Civil rights complaints are construed liberally. See Holley, 400 F.3d at 674. Moreover, courts

"have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt." Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d

1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). "However, a liberal interpretation of a

civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v.

Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal citation omitted). 

Furthermore, courts do not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

B. Count One

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendants Limon and Liles for cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. 

1. Eighth Amendment Deprivation of Humane Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Limon and Liles violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment

when they issued him a RVR, which he claims effectively deprived him of time in the outdoor exercise

yard.4 (Complaint at ¶ 7.) The Eight Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036,

1042 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, “[e]xercise has been determined to be one of the basic human

necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment,” and a long-term deprivation of outdoor exercise for

inmates is unconstitutional. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (declaring unconstitutional the deprivation of outdoor

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exercise for inmates held longer than four years); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d. 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994)

(holding a plaintiff made an objective showing of an Eighth Amendment violation where he was only

allowed outside for 45 minutes per week during a six-week period). However, “[t]he Eighth

Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual

‘punishments.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

299-302 (1991) (rejecting a reading of the Eighth Amendment that would allow liability to be imposed

on prison officials solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions). 

A plaintiff alleging deprivation of humane conditions of confinement must not only make an

objective showing that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” to form the basis for an Eighth

Amendment violation, but also a subjective showing that the prison official acted “with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The subjective requirement, relating to a prison

official’s state of mind, requires deliberate indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). “[T]he official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. “[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of

punishment.” Id. at 838. 

Finally, in order to show causation between the deliberate indifference and the Eighth

Amendment deprivation, a prisoner-plaintiff must demonstrate the individual defendant was in a

position to take steps to avert the harm, but failed to do so intentionally or with deliberate indifference. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). This inquiry requires “a very individualized

approach which accounts for the duties, discretion, and means of each defendant.” Id. at 633-34. 

Here, assuming arguendo Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of humane conditions that is

“sufficiently serious,” he fails to establish either deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants Limon

and Liles or a causal link between the alleged deliberate indifference and the Eighth Amendment

violation. Defendants Limon and Liles issued Plaintiff a RVR when he refused an order to double-cell. 

(Exhibit A.) Plaintiff claims the issuance of the RVR “effectively deprive [sic] Plaintiff of outdoor

exercise yard from September 25, 2006 to April 2007.” (Complaint at ¶ 7.) However, there are no

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5

 In particular, the Supreme Court noted “the view expressed in several of our cases that federal

courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile

environment,” especially with regard to “the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a

common subject of prisoner claims” under section 1983. Sandin, 515 U.S. 482-83. 

6 08cv0191

allegations in the Complaint which indicate that Defendants Limon and Liles, corrections officers, were

responsible for the alleged conditions in Unit 8 which form the basis of this claim, nor that they were

responsible for the decision to retain Plaintiff in Unit 8 for an extended period of time. 

Because Defendants Limon and Liles were not responsible for the conditions in Unit 8, and the

alleged restrictions on outdoor exercise time in particular, they could not have “fail[ed] to alleviate” the

risk so as to establish either deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Nor was the issuance

of the RVR by Defendants Limon and Liles the actual and proximate cause of the alleged Eighth

Amendment deprivation. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633-34. Accordingly, this Court recommends

Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and the Eight Amendment claim listed in Count One be

DISMISSED. 

2. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Limon and Liles retaliated against him in violation of the First

Amendment when they issued him a RVR in response to his refusal to sign the double cell agreement

form. (Complaint at ¶ 9.) Within the prison context, a claim of First Amendment retaliation contains

five basic elements: (1) a state actor took an adverse action against the plaintiff; (2) because of; (3) the

plaintiff’s protected conduct; and that such action (4) chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights; and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes

v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). In regards to the fourth element, the Ninth Circuit

has indicated an allegation of “harm that is more than minimal,” may suffice if a plaintiff fails to allege a

chilling effect. Id. at 567 n.11. Finally, Prisoner retaliation claims should be evaluated in light of Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), in which the Supreme Court expressed disapproval of excessive judicial

involvement in day-to-day prison management.5 Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, Plaintiff was issued an RVR when he refused an order to double-cell, pursuant to

Operational Plan #85. (Exhibit A.) While a prisoner’s First Amendment right extends to established

prison grievance procedures, see Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), Plaintiff’s refusal

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to comply with an order to double-cell, especially when evaluated in light of Sandin, is not protected

conduct for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. Accordingly, this Court recommends

Defendant’s motion be GRANTED and the First Amendment claim listed in Count One be

DISMISSED. Furthermore, it is appropriate to dismiss the First Amendment claim against Defendants

Limon and Liles without leave to amend because the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of

other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 

C. Counts Two and Three

In Counts Two and Three, Plaintiff again alleges claims against Defendants Limon and Liles for

violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, based on the conditions of his confinement in Unit

8. However, for the reasons discussed above in regards to Count One, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

deprivation of humane conditions of confinement against these defendants because Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate either deliberate indifference or that Defendants Limon and Liles were the actual and

proximate cause of the Eighth Amendment deprivation. Accordingly, this Court recommends

Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and the claims against Defendants Limon and Liles listed in Counts

Two and Three be DISMISSED. 

D. Count Four

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Limon and Liles violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they

transferred Plaintiff from his cell in Unit 6 to Unit 8. However, this claim is without merit because the

transfer of an inmate within a prison does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Rizzo v. Dawson,

778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985). As a result, this Court recommends Defendants’ motion be

GRANTED and the Fourth Amendment listed in Count Four be DISMISSED. Furthermore, it is

appropriate to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Limon and Liles without leave

to amend because the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d

at 1130.

E. Counts Five and Seven

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Limon and Liles violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights when they issued him a RVR because it resulted in a yard-hold and subsequent transfer to Unit 8,

which he claims imposed an atypical and significant hardship. In the prison context, the United States

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Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Although

prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555

(1974), “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges

and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system,” Jones v. North

Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (quotations omitted). 

“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the

expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485

(1995). As a result, constitutionally protected liberty interests are “limited to freedom from restraint

which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Id. at 484; See also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted

inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken

within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998)

(finding a two and a half year term in administrative segregation did not constitute an “atypical and

significant” hardship). The state does not create protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory

language in prison regulations. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-84.

Here, Plaintiff claims he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being placed on a

yard-hold or sent to Unit 8 because the conditions in Unit 8 constituted an atypical and significant

hardship. On or about September 28, 2006, Plaintiff was placed on a yard-hold when he allegedly

refused an order to double-cell. (Exhibit A.) On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff was formally issued a RVR

for his refusal to obey an order to double-cell, pursuant to Operational Plan #85. (Exhibit A.) On

October 9, 2006, he was transferred to Unit 8, which is apparently a punitive housing unit. (Exhibit B at

3.) While the RVR was pending, Plaintiff was denied outdoor exercise, access to the law library, and

recreational reading books. (Complaint at ¶ 43.) On October 30, 2006, a hearing was held on the RVR. 

(Exhibit A.) At the hearing, the reviewing officer found Plaintiff not guilty of refusing to obey an order

to double-cell, dismissed the RVR, and determined that further disciplinary action against Plaintiff was

unnecessary. (Id.) Thus, although Plaintiff claims the issuance of the RVR denied him outdoor exercise

for approximately 80 days, it appears he was denied outdoor exercise for only 32 days on account of the

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RVR, and that the decision to retain Plaintiff in Unit 8 after the hearing was unrelated to the original

RVR. 

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s yard-hold and subsequent 21-day stay in the punitive housing

unit, while the RVR was pending, did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life. The punishment of incarcerated prisoners, in response to a wide

range of misconduct, “falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (finding a prisoner’s placement in disciplinary segregation for 30 days was not

an atypical and significant hardship). Thus, the placement of a prisoner in a punitive housing unit or

ordering a yard-hold while a disciplinary report is pending does not constitute an atypical and significant

hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Cf. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981) (“To the extent [prison] conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”) However, assuming arguendo Plaintiff had a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being placed on a yard-hold or transferred to a punitive

housing unit for 21 days, based on the facts alleged, the process he received was adequate. 

The requirements of due process are “flexible and cal[l] for such procedural protections as the

particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Rather than rely on rigid

rules, the United States Supreme Court has established a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of a

particular process. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005). The framework requires

consideration of three distinct factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,

if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Importantly, the private interest at stake must be considered in the context of the prison system,

where prisoners have their liberty curtailed by definition, and thus procedural protections are necessarily

more limited. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225. In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court found that indefinite

solitary confinement in an Ohio “supermax” facility, which resulted in an automatic denial of parole,

created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 224. However, the Supreme Court found the

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state’s “informal, nonadversary procedures,” which did not allow calling witnesses, adequately

safeguarded an inmate’s liberty interest in not being assigned indefinitely to the supermax facility. Id. at

228-29. Allowing inmates a rebuttal opportunity “safeguard[ed] against the inmate’s being mistaken for

another or singled out for insufficient reason.” Id. at 226.

Here, Plaintiff was placed on yard hold on September 28, 2006, and subsequently transferred to

Unit 8 on October 9, 2006. (Exhibit A; Exhibit B at 3.) Plaintiff was provided a copy of the RVR on

October 10, 2006. (Exhibit A.) On October 30, 2006, a hearing was held on the RVR. (Id.) At the

hearing, the reviewing officer found Plaintiff not guilty of refusing to obey an order to double-cell,

dismissed the RVR, and determined that further disciplinary action against Plaintiff was unnecessary. 

(Id.) 

Given the government’s significant interest in prison security, and viewing the private interest in

the context of the prison environment, these procedural protections adequately protect against an

“inmate’s being mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient reason.” See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at

226. Indeed, the hearing officer here served such a purpose when he found Plaintiff not guilty of

refusing an order to double-cell, dismissed the RVR, and determined further disciplinary action against

him was unnecessary. (Exhibit A.) Thus, assuming arguendo Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in not being placed on yard-hold or transferred to Unit 8 while the RVR was pending, the

procedural protections he received were sufficient to safeguard that interest. Accordingly, this Court

recommends Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and the Fourteenth Amendment claims in Counts Five

and Seven be DISMISSED.

F. Count Six

Plaintiff claims Defendants Limon, Liles, Cowan, and Hernandez violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights under the Due Process Clause when they issued him a RVR for failure to comply

with Operational Plan #85, without first notifying him that he was expected to abide by Operational Plan

#85 and that failure to do so would result in a transfer to a harsh lock-up and 24-hour isolation unit. 

These allegations, however, are contradicted by both his allegations in relation to Count One and by his

own Exhibit A. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged he “was ordered to signed [sic] a double cell agreement or 

///

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he would be placed on Yard hold and move [sic] to Unit 8 where no yard, library or other created

services are available.” (Complaint at ¶ 3.) Exhibit A, the RVR itself, states in pertinent part:

On Thursday, September 28, 2006 . . .I informed Inmate PARRA . . . that he had been

assigned to Double Cell status by I.C.C. I informed Inmate PARRA of Operational Plan #85,

Single/Double Cell Procedures, which states, in part, “Inmates are not entitled to single cell

assignment, housing location of choice, or cellmate of choice. An inmate is expected to

share occupancy with another inmate in a cell setting...unless staff determines that an

inmate’s case factors or security concerns warrant single cell assignment. I informed Inmate

PARRA that he would have to get a cellmate due to the overcrowding situation in ASU. I

also informed Inmate PARRA that his refusal to get a cellmate would result in him being

issued a CDC-115 for “Refusing to Obey Orders to Double-Cell.” I further advised Inmate

PARRA that a “Yard Hold” would be in effect, due to this pending CDC-115. Inmate

PARRA indicated he didn’t want a cell-mate, and refused to double cell, stating, “NO.”

Inmate PARRA is aware of this report.

(Exhibit A.)

When a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the documents are part of the

complaint and may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). If the allegations

in the complaint are refuted by an attached document, the court need not accept the allegations as being

true. Id. Because the allegations in relation to Count One, as well as the information contained in

Exhibit A, directly contradict Plaintiff’s claim that he was not provided notice of the need to comply

with the order to double-cell, this Court does not accept Plaintiff’s allegation that he was not provided

notice as true. See id. Accordingly, this Court recommends Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s claim in Count Six be DISMISSED without leave to amend because the pleading could not

be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130..

G. Count Eight

Plaintiff claims Defendants Limon, Liles, Cowan, and Hernandez deprived him of his statecreated liberty interest in being classified as having “safety concerns” when they assigned him to double

cell with a general population inmate. However, prisoners do not have a constitutionally recognized

liberty interest in a particular security classification. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th

Cir. 1987); see also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this Court

recommends Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims in

Count Eight be DISMISSED without leave to amend because the pleading could not be cured by the

allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

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H. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges numerous state law causes of action against Defendants Limon, Liles, Cowan,

and Hernandez. Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendant CDCR liable for the actions of the individual

defendants on the basis of a state law cause of action for vicarious liability. 

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal

rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it

describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (emphasis added). A claim for violation

of state law is not cognizable under section 1983. See Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir.

1990); accord Ebmeier v. Stump, 70 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We take this opportunity to

emphasize that violations of state laws, state-agency regulations, and . . . state-court orders, do not by

themselves state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claims are not cognizable

under section 1983, and are only before this Court pendant to Plaintiff’s claims based on federal law. 

1. Defendants Limon and Liles

Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Limon and Liles must be

dismissed from the complaint because he fails to state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983. When

federal law claims are removed from a lawsuit before trial and only state law claims remain, the balance

of factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine will usually point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and to dismiss the claims without prejudice. 

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state

claims should be dismissed as well”). In view of this Court’s determination that Plaintiff fails to state a

cognizable claim for relief under § 1983 against Defendants Limon and Liles, this Court refrains from

determining the propriety of his state law claims against these defendants, sued in their personal

capacities, until such time as he files a viable federal claim. Accordingly, it is recommended the Court

decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants Limon and Liles and

that these claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). 

///

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6

 Because this Court recommends the state law causes of action against Defendants Limon and

Liles be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff has failed to state a viable federal claim against

these defendants, the Court does not discuss these defendants in relation to Counts Sixteen and

Seventeen.

7

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No state agency shall issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion,

bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, which is

a regulation as defined in Section 11342.600, unlessthe guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual,

instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule has been adopted as a

regulation and filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to this chapter.

13 08cv0191

2. Count Sixteen - Claims against Defendants Cowan and Hernandez

Plaintiff alleges a state law cause of action against Defendants Cowan and Hernandez for

enforcing Operational Plan #85 without first notifying him that he was expected to abide by Operational

Plan #85 and that failure to do so would result in punishment.6 However, for the reasons stated above in

relation to Count Six, this Court recommends Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims

in Count Sixteen be DISMISSED without leave to amend because the pleading could not be cured by

the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130..

3. Count Seventeen - Claims against Defendants Cowan and Hernandez

Plaintiff claims Defendants Cowan and Hernandez are liable for their alleged failure to comply

with California Government Code § 11340.5(a) prior to enforcing Operational Plan #85. Plaintiff,

however, fails to state a cognizable claim for relief against Defendants Cowan and Hernandez because

California Government Code § 11340.5(a) imposes a duty on a “state agency,” not on individuals.

7

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Cal. Govt. Code § 11340.5(a); cf. Donaldson v. Department of Real Estate of State of Cal., 134 Cal.

App. 4th 948, 966-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing whether the Department of Real Estate could

validly enforce certain regulations in light of § 11340.5(a)). Accordingly, this Court recommends

Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims in Count Seventeen be DISMISSED without

leave to amend because the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1130.

4. Defendant CDCR

Plaintiff alleges claims for vicarious liability under California Government Code § 815.2 against

Defendant CDCR, a state agency, based upon the alleged tortious acts of the individual defendants. 

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Plaintiff does not allege an independent basis of federal jurisdiction against the CDCR, but instead relies

upon his federal claims against the individual defendants to provide pendant jurisdiction. It is well

established that under the Eleventh Amendment, state agencies are immune from private damage actions

or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court, except to the extent a State voluntarily waives its

immunity or Congress authorizes such a suit. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Here, the California law in question does

not contain a provision authorizing suit in federal court, see California Government Code § 815.2, nor

was § 1983 intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985). Accordingly, this Court recommends the state law claims against Defendant

CDCR be DISMISSED sua sponte. Furthermore, it is appropriate to dismiss the state law claims

against Defendant CDCR without leave to amend because the pleading could not be cured by the

allegation of other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the matter, this Court recommends:

1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims listed in Counts One through Three, in relation to

Defendants Limon and Liles, be DISMISSED. 

3. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim in Count One be DISMISSED without leave to

amend.

4. Plaintiff’s claims in Count Four be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

5. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Five and Seven be DISMISSED.

6. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Six and Eight be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

7. The Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants

Limon and Liles and that Counts Nine through Sixteen, and Eighteen, in relation to Defendants Limon

and Liles, be DISMISSED without prejudice.

8. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Sixteen and Seventeen, in relation to Defendants Cowan and

Hernandez, be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

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9. All claims against Defendant CDCR be DISMISSED sua sponte without leave to amend.

10. Defendant CDCR’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as moot.

11. Plaintiff be given thirty days from the date the final order regarding Defendants’ Motion is

entered to file and serve a First Amended Complaint. Leave to amend should only be granted as to the

previously brought claims for the purpose of curing pleading deficiencies. No new claims should be

alleged. Plaintiff should be warned that the First Amended Complaint will be his final pleading.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 25, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 22, 2008

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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