Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15672/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15672-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA HERNANDEZ, on 

behalf of herself and all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAMS, ZINMAN &

PARHAM PC,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-15672

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00731-SMM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 17, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed July 20, 2016

Before: John T. Noonan, Ronald M. Gould,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

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2 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

SUMMARY*

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The panel reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the defendant in an action under the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Act requires that within five days of “the initial 

communication” with a consumer about the collection of a 

debt, a debt collector must send the consumer a notice 

containing specific disclosures. The panel held that this 

requirement, set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), does not 

apply only to the initial debt collector that tries to collect, but 

also applies to subsequent collectors that communicate about 

the same debt.

COUNSEL

Aaron D. Radbil (argued), Greenwald Davidson PLLC, 

Boca Raton, Florida, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Victoria Orze (argued), Anne L. Tiffen, and Charles H. 

Oldham, Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix, Arizona, for 

Defendant-Appellee.

Kristin Bateman (argued), Attorney; Nandan M. Joshi, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; To-Quyen Truong, Deputy 

 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 3

General Counsel; Meredith Fuchs, General Counsel; 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Washington, D.C.; 

for Amicus Curiae Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

Burke W. Kappler, Colin Hector, and Thomas E. Kane, 

Attorneys; David C. Shonka, Principal Deputy General 

Counsel; Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, General Counsel; 

Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus 

Curiae Federal Trade Commission.

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) 

requires that within five days of “the initial communication” 

with a consumer about the collection of a debt, a debt 

collector must send the consumer a notice containing 

specified disclosures. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). The question 

presented here is whether the phrase “the initial 

communication” as used in the FDCPA means the first 

communication from the initial debt collector that tries to 

collect, or whether it means the first communication a 

consumer receives from any collector about a debt, including 

subsequent collectors that communicate about the same debt.

Applying well-established tools of statutory 

interpretation and construing the language in § 1692g(a) in 

light of the context and purpose of the FDCPA, we hold that 

the phrase “the initial communication” refers to the first 

communication sent by any debt collector, including 

collectors that contact the debtor after another collector 

already did. In other words, if there are multiple debt 

collectors that try to collect a debt, each one must send the 

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4 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

required notice after its first communication with the alleged 

debtor about the debt. Because the district court held 

otherwise, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

This case began with a loan that Maria Hernandez took 

out to finance an automobile purchase. After Hernandez 

stopped making payments on the loan, Thunderbird 

Collection Specialists, Inc. (“Thunderbird”), a debt 

collector, sent her a letter seeking to collect the debt. 

Hernandez did not respond to the letter.

Following Thunderbird’s unsuccessful attempt to collect 

Hernandez’s debt, Thunderbird retained the law firm 

Williams, Zinman & Parham PC (“WZP”) as counsel to 

assist in its collection efforts. In December 2011, WZP sent 

Hernandez a collection letter, which was its initial 

communication with her. The letter notified Hernandez that 

WZP, a debt collector, represented Thunderbird regarding a 

debt incurred by Hernandez with the original creditor.1 

 

 1 The parties agree that WZP qualifies as a debt collector under the 

FDCPA. In addition to identifying itself as a “debt collector” in its 

December letter, WZP conceded in its briefing and at oral argument that, 

when communicating with Hernandez, it was acting as a “debt collector” 

for purposes of the FDCPA. WZP’s concession accords with the 

Supreme Court’s recognition that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys 

who,” like WZP, “‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection 

activity.” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). This is so even 

if the attorney is acting on behalf of a debt-collector client. See Fox v. 

Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 

that “[a]ttorneys, like all other persons, are subject to the definition of 

‘debt collector’ in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)” and concluding that the 

defendant attorney acting on behalf of a client debt collector was subject 

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 5

While it informed Hernandez that she could dispute the debt 

or request additional information about the original creditor, 

it did not tell her that she could do so only in writing.

Hernandez filed the instant lawsuit against WZP in the 

United States District Court for the District of Arizona as a 

putative class action, alleging that WZP violated the FDCPA 

by sending a debt collection letter that lacked the disclosures 

required under § 1692g(a) of the FDCPA. That section 

provides in full:

(a) Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial 

communication with a consumer in 

connection with the collection of any debt, a 

debt collector shall, unless the following 

information is contained in the initial 

communication or the consumer has paid the 

debt, send the consumer a written notice 

containing—

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt 

is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, 

within thirty days after receipt of the 

notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or 

 

to the FDCPA’s requirements). WZP has not argued either before the 

district court or on appeal that it was exempt from § 1692g(a)’s 

requirements because it was acting as an agent for Thunderbird, so we 

need not address that question.

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6 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

any portion thereof, the debt will be 

assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies 

the debt collector in writing within the 

thirty-day period that the debt, or any 

portion thereof, is disputed, the debt 

collector will obtain verification of the 

debt or a copy of a judgment against the 

consumer and a copy of such verification 

or judgment will be mailed to the 

consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s 

written request within the thirty day 

period, the debt collector will provide the 

consumer with the name and address of 

the original creditor, if different from the 

current creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).2 We refer herein to the written notice 

containing these disclosures as a “validation notice.”

Hernandez alleged that WZP’s failure to notify her that 

any dispute about the debt had to be in writing to obtain 

verification of it, or that any request had to be in writing to 

 

 2 Pursuant to § 1692g(b), if a consumer exercises her rights by 

disputing the debt in writing or sending a written request under 

§§ 1692g(a)(4) or (5), the debt collector must “cease collection of the 

debt” until it “obtains verification of the debt . . . or the name and address 

of the original creditor” and mails this information to the consumer. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 7

obtain the name and address of the original creditor, violated 

§§ 1692g(a)(4) and (a)(5), respectively.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 

on Hernandez’s FDCPA claims. In its motion, WZP did not 

address whether its letter lacked the content required by 

§ 1692g(a). Rather, it contended that it was not required to 

comply with that provision because Thunderbird’s March 

letter was the “initial communication” sent to Hernandez 

with respect to the debt at issue and therefore the sole 

communication triggering § 1692g(a)’s requirements. The 

district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor 

of WZP.

Hernandez timely appealed, contending that § 1692g(a) 

imposes the requirement to send a validation notice on each 

and every debt collector that communicates with a consumer 

about a given debt.3

 

 3 Hernandez is joined in this interpretation by the Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau, which has delegated rulemaking authority under the 

FDCPA, and the Federal Trade Commission, which shares concurrent 

authority to enforce the FDCPA with the Bureau. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692l 

(setting forth administrative enforcement and rulemaking authority 

under the FDCPA); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(a), 5512(b)(1) 

(establishing the Bureau to regulate the provision of consumer financial 

products and services and delegating authority to the Bureau to 

promulgate rules as necessary to administer consumer financial laws). 

In their brief as amici curiae, these agencies argue that § 1692g(a) should 

be interpreted to apply to WZP’s initial communication to Hernandez, 

and they urge us to defer to their interpretation should we find the 

statutory text to be ambiguous.

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8 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

II.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of 

§ 1692g(a), as well as its rulings on cross-motions for 

summary judgment based on that interpretation. Clark v. 

Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 

1168 (9th Cir. 2006).

III.

The sole dispute on appeal is whether the phrase “the 

initial communication” as used in § 1692g(a) refers only to 

the very first communication sent about a debt or instead to 

the first communication sent by each and every debt 

collector that seeks to collect it, including those collectors 

that take over collection efforts from a prior debt collector. 

Although this question has divided the district courts, it is an 

issue of first impression for this court, and it has not yet been 

addressed in a published opinion by any of our sister 

circuits.4

In answer to this question, we hold that although the 

sentence in § 1692g(a) in which the phrase “the initial 

communication” appears is ambiguous when read in

isolation, when the sentence is read in the context of the 

FDCPA as a whole and in light of the statute’s remedial 

 

 4 Two of our sister circuits declined to apply § 1692g’s requirements 

to a subsequent debt collector, but they did so in unpublished decisions 

without explaining the basis for their construction of the statute. See Lee 

v. Cohen, McNeile & Pappas, P.C., 520 F. App’x 649 (10th Cir. 2013) 

(unpublished); Oppong v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 326 F. App’x 663 

(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished).

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 9

purpose, it is clear that the validation notice requirement 

applies to each debt collector that attempts to collect a debt.

A.

In ascertaining the meaning of § 1692g(a), we begin, as 

always, with the statutory text. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United 

States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). Because we must 

“presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means 

and means in a statute what it says there,” id. (quoting Conn. 

Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)), if we 

find that the statutory meaning is plain and unambiguous, 

then our “sole function . . . is to enforce it according to its 

terms,” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 

(1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 

485 (1917)).

In deciphering the meaning of a statute, we “do not look 

at its words in isolation.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Local 

Lodge 964 v. BF Goodrich Aerospace Aerostructures Grp., 

387 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, we determine 

“[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory [text] . . . by 

reference to the [text] itself, the specific context in which 

that [text] is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 

whole.” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 

2009) (all but first alteration and ellipses in original) 

(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 

(1997)). To that end, we “pursue consistency not only within 

a particular provision but also among the provisions of the 

FDCPA,” Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 

460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006), in order to produce an 

understanding of “the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent 

regulatory scheme’ and to ‘fit, if possible, all parts into a 

harmonious whole,’” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 

1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting 

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10 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 

133 (2000)).

If the operative text is ambiguous when read alongside 

related statutory provisions, we “must turn to the broader 

structure of the Act,” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 

(2015), and to its “object and policy[] to ascertain the intent 

of Congress,” United States v. Real Prop. Located at 475 

Martin Lane, Beverly Hills, Cal., 545 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 

1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Dolan v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or 

phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, 

considering the purpose and context of the statute, and 

consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the 

analysis.”). “The words of a statute are, of course, dead 

weights unless animated by the purpose of the statute.” 

Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2000).

When an examination of “the plain language of the 

statute, its structure, and purpose” clearly reveals 

congressional intent, “our ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” 

Real Prop., 545 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Campbell v. Allied 

Van Lines, Inc., 410 F.3d 618, 622 (9th Cir. 2005)). But if 

the plain meaning of the statutory text remains unclear after 

consulting internal indicia of congressional intent, we may 

then turn to extrinsic indicators, such as legislative history, 

to help resolve the ambiguity. BF Goodrich, 387 F.3d at 

1051–52 (explaining that only if holistic analysis of the 

statutory text “leaves ambiguity—or, indeed, if it reveals 

it—may we turn to extrinsic indicia of legislative intent.”); 

see also Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 

1118 (9th Cir. 2015) (“If the statutory text is ambiguous, we 

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 11

employ other tools, such as legislative history, to construe 

the meaning of ambiguous terms.”).

B.

The text of § 1692g(a) does not alone reveal which 

party’s interpretation is correct. In the FDCPA, Congress 

did not define the term “the initial communication” or the 

word “initial.” Congress did define “communication” to 

mean “the conveying of information regarding a debt 

directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). This definition of “communication” 

is broad enough to sweep into its ambit both the March letter 

from Thunderbird and the December letter from WZP.

WZP argues that, regardless of the lack of formal 

definition in the FDCPA, the meaning of § 1692g(a)’s 

phrase “the initial communication” is clear. WZP contends 

that by using the definite article “the” preceding “initial 

communication,” Congress plainly contemplated that only 

one initial communication with a debtor about a given debt 

would trigger the validation notice requirement. According 

to WZP, under this definition, it was not obligated to send a 

validation notice because, as the second collector to attempt 

to collect the debt, it did not send Hernandez the very first 

(i.e., “the initial”) communication about the debt.

When the phrase “the initial communication” is viewed 

in isolation, WZP is correct that the use of “[t]he definite 

article ‘the’ instead of the indefinite ‘a’ or ‘an’” preceding 

initial communication appears to “indicate[] that Congress 

meant for a single” communication to trigger the validation 

notice requirement. Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 

285 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States 

v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 

(“Congress’[s] use of the definite article ‘the,’ when 

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12 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

referring to ‘the judgment,’ carries the message that there is 

one identifiable document.”). This is because the definite 

article “the” “particularizes the subject spoken of,” 

suggesting that Congress meant to refer to a single object 

(here, a single initial communication). Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1647 (4th ed. 1968) (providing as an example that 

“‘[t]he’ house means only one house”).

The meaning of the phrase “the initial communication” 

is less clear, however, when the phrase “the initial 

communication” is read in conjunction with the phrase “a 

debt collector” that follows in the same sentence. Gale v. 

First Franklin Loan Servs., 701 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 

2012) (refusing to take a “blindered view of” a statute by 

construing its language “in isolation”); see also Sturgeon v. 

Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016) (“Statutory language 

‘cannot be construed in a vacuum.’” (quoting Roberts v. SeaLand Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2012))). Congress 

provided that within five days of “the initial communication, 

. . . a debt collector” must send a validation notice. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (emphases added). In contrast with its 

particularization of “initial communication,” Congress’s use 

of the indefinite article “a” preceding “debt collector” gives 

that term “generalizing force,” Gale, 701 F.3d at 1246 

(quoting In re Cardelluci, 285 F.3d at 1234), and thus 

suggests that Congress may have intended to impose the 

validation notice requirement on any debt collector subject 

to FDCPA requirements. See Black’s Law Dictionary 3 (4th 

ed. 1968) (providing that “[t]he article ‘a’ . . . is often used 

in the sense of ‘any’”); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. 

Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (explaining that by using “the indefinite article 

‘a’” in the phrase “a mark or trade name in commerce that is 

likely to cause dilution,” Congress “indicate[d] that any 

number of unspecified, junior marks may be likely to dilute 

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 13

the senior mark” (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(c)).

Ultimately, nothing in § 1692g(a) limits its application 

to only the first debt collector that communicates about a 

debt. At the same time, nothing in the section clarifies 

whether “the initial communication” refers to the first 

communication ever sent about the debt or the first 

communication sent by each and every debt collector 

seeking to collect it. As WZP argues, Congress’s use of the

phrase “a debt collector” could mean that whichever debt 

collector sends the very first communication about a debt 

must comply with § 1692g. Or, as Hernandez argues, it 

could mean that each debt collector must comply with 

§ 1692g upon sending its first communication about the 

debt. Either interpretation is consistent with the language of 

§ 1692g(a), and the section is therefore ambiguous when 

viewed apart from its statutory context.5 See Ileto, 565 F.3d 

at 1134 (looking to statutory context to clarify ambiguity 

because the term in question, viewed in isolation, “ha[d] a 

spectrum of meanings”).

C.

Because the text of § 1692g(a) is ambiguous when read 

alone, “we must turn to the broader structure of the 

[FDCPA]” to determine which initial communication 

 

 5 The operative dictionary definition of “initial” does not clarify this 

ambiguity. The word “initial” simply means “[t]hat which begins or 

stands at the beginning.” Black’s Law Dictionary 923 (4th ed. 1968). In 

this context, it could demarcate either the first communication ever sent 

(i.e., the beginning of collection efforts on a given debt) or the first 

communication sent by each and every debt collector (i.e., the beginning 

of each individual debt collector’s efforts).

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14 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

triggers the validation notice requirement—the first ever 

sent or the first sent by any debt collector, whether first or 

subsequent. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. “A provision that may 

seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 

remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of 

the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that 

is compatible with the rest of the law.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of 

Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). 

Viewing the text of § 1692g(a) in the context of the FDCPA 

as a whole makes clear that the validation notice requirement 

applies to each debt collector that tries to collect a given 

debt. This interpretation is the only one that is consistent 

with the rest of the statutory text and that avoids creating 

substantial loopholes around both § 1692g(a)’s validation 

notice requirement and § 1692g(b)’s debt verification 

requirement—loopholes that otherwise would undermine 

the very protections the statute provides. See King, 135 S. 

Ct. at 2492–93 (rejecting an interpretation that would create 

the problem Congress designed the statute to avoid).

Examining the full text of the FDCPA reveals that 

Congress used the phrase “a debt collector” throughout the 

statute to impose obligations and restrictions on all debt 

collectors throughout the entire debt collection process. For 

instance, the FDCPA:

 regulates the time and place at which “a debt 

collector” may communicate with a consumer, 

15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a);

 bars “a debt collector” from communicating with 

third-parties about a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b);

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 15

 proscribes harassment and abuse by “A debt 

collector,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d;

 bars “A debt collector” from using “false, deceptive, 

or misleading representation[s]” in connection with 

the collection of any debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; and

 prevents “A debt collector” from using “unfair or 

unconscionable means” to collect a debt, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692f.

None of these provisions contains any language suggesting 

that Congress intended to exempt successive debt collectors 

from their requirements. And the FDCPA’s broad definition 

of “debt collector” plainly encompasses those persons who 

take over debt collection efforts from another. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” to include, with 

specified exceptions, “any person . . . who regularly collects 

or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed . . . 

or due another” (emphasis added)).

Had Congress intended to distinguish between the 

obligations that attach to initial and subsequent debt 

collectors, “it would have said so explicitly.” Trs. for Alaska 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 919 F.2d 119, 122 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Instead, Congress made clear the broad reach of these 

obligations by imposing civil liability on “any debt collector

who fails to comply with any provision” of the FDCPA. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (emphasis added).

WZP attempts to show that Congress intended to cabin 

§ 1692g(a)’s requirements to the initial communication sent 

by the initial debt collector, but those attempts are 

unavailing. First, WZP argues that Congress’s use of the 

definite article in the phrase “the thirty-day period” in 

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16 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) of § 1692g demonstrates “that 

the statute contemplated one ‘initial communication’ and 

one thirty-day period for dispute.” WZP’s argument is 

unpersuasive because the phrase “the thirty-date period” 

must be looked at in relation to subsection (a)(3). In 

subsection (a)(3), Congress provided that the validation 

notice must contain “a statement that unless the consumer, 

within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the 

validity of the debt, . . . the debt will be assumed to be valid 

by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). The term 

“the thirty-day period” logically refers back to the term 

“thirty days after receipt of the notice” in subsection (a)(3), 

while “the notice” refers back to the validation notice that 

must be sent by “a debt collector” following “the initial 

communication.” See Gale, 701 F.3d at 1246 (looking at the 

preceding sentence to determine what was meant by “[t]he 

use of the definite article” in a statutory provision); see also 

Oxford English Dictionary 258 (1st ed. 1884) (providing that 

the word “the” “[m]ark[s] an object as before mentioned or 

already known, or contextually particularized (e.g. ‘We keep 

a dog. We are all fond of the dog.’)”); Webster’s New Int’l 

Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 2368 (3d 

ed. 1976) (defining “the” as “a function word to indicate that 

a following noun . . . refers to someone or something 

previously mentioned or clearly understood from the context 

of the situation <if anyone pays you a dollar for that picture, 

take [the] dollar>”). Thus, Congress’s use of the definite 

article in the term “the thirty-day period” serves as an 

internal reference to other statutory subsections, not as an 

indicator of the total number of dispute periods that 

Congress intended to provide debtors. Congress’s use of the 

term “the thirty-day period” therefore does not shed light on 

whether there can be only one notice and one period for 

dispute.

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 17

Next, WZP contends that Congress’s distinction between 

“the initial written communication” and “subsequent 

communications” in § 1692e(11)—the only other FDCPA

provision that uses a term similar to “the initial 

communication”—shows that Congress knew how to 

impose requirements on communications after the first one 

had that been its intent. Section 1692e(11) prohibits “[a] 

debt collector” from “fail[ing] to disclose in the initial 

written communication with the consumer . . . that the debt 

collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any 

information obtained will be used for that purpose, and 

[from] fail[ing] to disclose in subsequent communications 

that the communication is from a debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e(11) (emphases added). Contrary to WZP’s 

contention, the fact that Congress chose to regulate both 

“initial” and “subsequent communications” in § 1692e(11) 

in no way suggests that it intended to limit the term “the 

initial communication” to the first communication ever sent 

about a debt. Section 1692e(11) can readily be interpreted 

to regulate the initial and subsequent communications sent 

by each and every debt collector that communicates about a 

debt. Indeed, the language of § 1692e(11) supports that 

interpretation because the fact that it plainly differentiates 

between “initial” and “subsequent” communications 

suggests Congress knew how to distinguish between initial 

and subsequent debt collectors had that been its intent. See 

United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 235 (1985) 

(discerning from statutory language that Congress “knew 

how to provide for the computation of time periods under the 

[Speedy Trial] Act relative to the date of an indictment” and 

that it would have so provided in the statutory section in 

question had that been its intent). That Congress chose not 

to is consistent with the FDCPA’s broad imposition of 

requirements on all debt collectors throughout the lifecycle 

of a debt.

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18 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

WZP’s restrictive interpretation that there is only a single 

“initial communication” about a debt also creates a 

significant structural problem in the Act. As several district 

courts have pointed out, restricting the validation notice 

requirement to the initial debt collector produces a loophole 

that would, in practice, undermine consumers’ efforts to 

verify their debts and Congress’s mandate that collection 

efforts halt until verification occurs. See, e.g., Janetos v. 

Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, No. 12-C-1473, 2013 WL 

791325, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2013); Stair ex rel. Smith v. 

Thomas & Cook, 254 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D. N.J. 2008); Turner 

v. Shenandoah Legal Grp., No. 3:06-CV-045, 2006 WL 

1685698, at *11 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2006). “Congress’[s] 

intent in enacting § 1692g was to provide an alleged debtor 

with 30 days to question and respond to the initial 

communication of a collection agency.” Camacho v. 

Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Once a consumer disputes the validity of an alleged debt or 

requests information about the original creditor in writing in 

response to a debt collector’s validation notice, the debt 

collector must “cease collection of the debt” until 

verification has been provided. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). But 

nothing in the statute prevents the debt collector from 

passing the debt on to a subsequent debt collector in lieu of 

responding to the verification demand. This is so because 

§ 1692g(b) gives a debt collector a choice upon receiving a 

request for validation: “the collector ‘may provide the 

requested validations and continue [its] debt collection 

activities, or it may cease all collection activities.’” 

Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 940 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (alteration omitted) (quoting Jang v. 

A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

If a debt collector determined that collecting on a debt was 

“not worth the effort,” the collector would be at liberty to 

“sell the account.” Id. And if the collector did sell the debt, 

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 19

the debt collector that purchased it, on WZP’s reading, 

would be permitted to collect free from § 1692g’s strictures, 

and the consumer would be effectively unable to obtain the 

information necessary to verify or dispute her debt. Such a 

loophole would render § 1692g almost a nullity, and we 

therefore decline to endorse WZP’s interpretation. See N.Y. 

State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419–20 

(1973) (“We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their 

own stated purposes.”).

WZP argues that this loophole could be closed by other 

provisions of the FDCPA. That argument is not persuasive. 

Although WZP cites a range of FDCPA provisions, it fails 

to explain how any of them would allow a consumer to 

verify and effectively dispute a passed-on debt. Congress 

must have believed that those other provisions were not 

sufficient; otherwise, it would not have separately enacted 

the validation notice and debt verification requirements. 

Indeed, the implication of WZP’s argument is that § 1692g 

is superfluous. We decline to interpret the Act in a way that 

renders one of its central consumer-protective provisions 

inoperative. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 

(2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ 

that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, 

if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 

superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).

WZP also predicts that the loophole would be closed by 

judicial interpretation. It contends that courts faced with the 

loophole would likely hold that any subsequent debt 

collector found to be in privity with a previous collector must 

itself halt collection efforts until verifying the debt. That 

argument is flawed in several respects. First, it presumes the 

existence of a privity relationship between the collectors. 

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20 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

Even if WZP is correct that a subsequent debt collector must 

respect any dispute received by a previous one with which it 

is in privity, this proposition provides no assistance when a 

privity relationship between the initial and subsequent 

collectors does not exist. Furthermore, WZP points to no 

interpretation of any provision in the Act that would require 

courts to hold that subsequent collectors must respect 

disputes received by prior ones. We know of no statutory 

interpretation principle that would allow us to interpret a 

statute in a manner that creates a nonsensical loophole just 

because courts might be able to apply a common law 

principle to close the loophole in a subset of cases. Rather 

than resorting to speculative stopgaps, we adopt the 

interpretation that itself maintains the Act’s intrinsic 

structural integrity.6

 

 6 WZP’s interpretation that only the very first communication about a 

given debt triggers the validation notice requirement causes additional 

problems if that first communication comes from the original creditor 

rather than a debt collector. A creditor’s letter to a debtor appears to fall 

within the FDCPA’s broad definition of a “communication.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692a(2) (defining “communication” as “the conveying of information 

regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any 

medium”). Because “a ‘creditor’ is not a ‘debt collector’ under the 

FDCPA,” Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)), however, the creditor is not 

required to send a validation notice following that initial communication. 

As a consequence, it is possible that under WZP’s interpretation, no one 

would be required to send the consumer a validation notice if the original 

creditor were the first entity to communicate about the debt, because the 

sole “initial communication” triggering the validation notice 

requirement would have been sent by an entity exempt from the Act’s 

requirements. Our interpretation of the statute avoids this problem

because each debt collector would be required to send a validation notice 

with its own first communication about the debt irrespective of whether 

the original creditor previously communicated about the debt.

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 21

D.

Interpreting “the initial communication” to refer to the 

first communication by any debt collector is also more in 

keeping with the FDCPA’s declared purpose of protecting 

consumers from abusive debt collection practices. Congress 

enacted the FDCPA in 1977 against a backdrop of “abundant 

evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt 

collection practices by many debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692(a). As the Act itself states, Congress’s goal was “to 

eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 

collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain 

from using abusive debt collection practices are not 

competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent 

State action to protect consumers against debt collection 

abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). As a “broad remedial 

statute,” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2011), the FDCPA must be liberally construed 

in favor of the consumer in order to effectuate this goal of 

eliminating abuse. See Clark, 460 F.3d at 1176; accord 

Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(“Because the FDCPA . . . is a remedial statute, it should be 

construed liberally in favor of the consumer.”).

Contrary to WZP’s arguments, the remedial purpose of 

the FDCPA is furthered by giving consumers updated 

information about their debts and renewed opportunities to 

verify them as the debts change hands. Each time a debt is 

resold between collectors, information about the debt may 

be lost and misinformation introduced. See Fed. Trade 

Comm’n, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying 

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22 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

Industry 42 (2013)7 (“[T]he information that collectors have 

about these debts may become less accurate over time, 

making it more likely that collectors will seek to recover 

from the wrong consumer, recover the wrong amount, or 

both.”). Records of consumers’ disputes are among the 

information that may be lost in transfer. See Gov’t 

Accountability Office, Credit Cards—Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt 

Collection Marketplace and Use of Technology 44 (2009)8

(explaining that “important account information—such as 

results of disputed account investigations . . . —may not 

always be transferred to debt buyers”). As a consequence, 

the likelihood that a debt collector will seek to collect from 

the wrong consumer or in the wrong amount increases as the 

debt is resold. And the corresponding need for collectors to 

inform consumers of their validation rights and to respond to 

requests for verification becomes more acute as the debt 

changes hands. WZP is therefore incorrect when it argues 

that there is no salutary benefit to be gained by requiring 

each successive debt collector to send a new validation 

notice with its first communication.

Restricting the validation notice obligation to the first 

communication by the first debt collector would also restrict 

consumers’ ability under § 1692g(b) to dispute the validity 

of their debts, obtain information to verify them, and protect 

themselves against the collection of invalid debts. This is 

because the rights provided under § 1692g(b) can only be 

 

 7 Available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buyingindustry/debtbuyingreport.pdf.

 8 Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09748.pdf.

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 23

exercised during the thirty-day period provided under 

§ 1692g(a) and linked to “the initial communication” as used 

in that provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (setting forth the 

consumer’s rights upon notifying “the debt collector in 

writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection 

(a)”). WZP’s interpretation would consequently restrict 

consumers to a single window of opportunity to halt 

collection efforts in order to verify their debts. That window 

would be of no assistance to a consumer who later suspects 

she is being improperly dunned by a misinformed successive 

collector.

We decline to read the Act in a way that is antithetical to 

Congress’s express intent to protect consumers from abusive 

debt collection practices.

E.

Because Congress’s intent to require each debt collector 

to send a validation notice with its initial communication is 

clear from the statutory text, we believe it is unnecessary to 

resort to external sources to interpret § 1692g(a). See BF 

Goodrich, 387 F.3d at 1051–52. But to the extent that any 

ambiguity remains, the external indicia of Congress’s intent 

eliminate it.

The Senate Report’s description of the validation notice 

provision suggests that Congress intended it to apply to each 

debt collector’s first communication. The Report provides 

that “[a]fter initially contacting a consumer, a debt collector 

must sen[d] him or her written notice” with the required 

information. S. Rep. No. 95-382, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 

(1977). The Senate Report’s use of the prepositional phrase 

“[a]fter initially contacting a consumer”—along with the use 

of “a” before “debt collector”—removes any doubt created 

by § 1692g(a)’s use of the definite article “the” to qualify 

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24 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

“initial communication” by making clear that a debt 

collector’s validation notice obligation attaches after it 

“initially contact[s] a consumer.” Construing “the initial 

communication” to exclude initial communications by 

subsequent debt collectors would conflict with this 

expression of legislative intent.

Consistent with the FDCPA’s remedial nature, the 

legislative history also shows that Congress’s sole goal in 

enacting § 1692g(a) was consumer protection. The Senate 

Report projected that § 1692g would “eliminate the 

recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong 

person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has 

already paid.” S. Rep. No. 95-382 at 4. Calling it a 

“significant feature” of the FDCPA, id., Congress “added the 

validation of debts provision specifically to ensure that debt 

collectors gave consumers adequate information concerning 

their legal rights,” Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 

869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (citing S. 

Rep. No. 95-382 at 4). Nothing in this legislative history 

suggests that Congress thought consumers needed less 

protection from successive debt collectors or less 

information as their debts passed from hand to hand.

Congress also gave no indication that anything in 

§ 1692g was intended to minimize the burden that the 

validation notice requirement would impose on debt 

collectors. To the contrary, Congress appeared to believe 

that the validation requirement would impose no burden at 

all. The Senate Report stated that requiring debt validation 

would “not result in additional expense or paperwork” 

because “the current practice of most debt collectors is to 

send similar information to consumers.” S. Rep. No. 95-382 

at 4. Requiring all debt collectors (without differentiation as 

to their initial or successive status) to send the same required 

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HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM 25

information in their initial communications is consistent 

with these legislative expressions because it would provide 

continuing protection for consumers without disadvantaging 

an ethical collector.

WZP does not attempt to counter this legislative history, 

and we generally view an official committee report as a 

reliable indicator of congressional intent. See Hertzberg v. 

Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“This circuit relies on official committee reports when 

considering legislative history.”). Although the Senate 

Report does not expressly define the meaning of “the initial 

communication,” its discussion of § 1692g’s purpose 

extinguishes any doubt that Congress intended the validation 

notice provision to protect consumers throughout the entire 

lifecycle of a debt.9

IV.

Having applied the tools of statutory construction, we 

hold that the FDCPA unambiguously requires any debt 

collector—first or subsequent—to send a § 1692g(a) 

 

 9 Because application of the tools of statutory construction yields a 

clear answer to the question presented in this case, our inquiry is at an 

end without consideration of the interpretation advanced by the 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade 

Commission. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If [by] employing traditional tools of 

statutory construction, [we are able to] ascertain[] that Congress had an 

intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and 

must be given effect.”). Indeed, because the interpretation proffered by 

those agencies is the same interpretation that we arrive at in “interpreting 

the statute from scratch,” “there is no occasion to defer and no point in 

asking what kind of deference, or how much” deference is owed. 

Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002).

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26 HERNANDEZ V. WILLIAMS ZINMAN & PARHAM

validation notice within five days of its first communication 

with a consumer in connection with the collection of any 

debt. The district court thus erred in concluding that, 

because WZP was not the first debt collector to 

communicate with Hernandez about her debt, it had no 

obligation to comply with the statutory validation notice 

requirement.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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