Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00286/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00286-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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 Contrary to LRCiv 15.1(a) and (b), the original amendment shall not be filed as an

exhibit to the Motion for Leave to Amend. Plaintiff's counsel corrected this error when he

lodged the proposed Amended Complaint on February 12, 2007.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor M. Padilla, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Bechtel Construction Company, a Nevada

corporation; Carpenters Local 408, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-286-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This matter arises on Defendant Carpenters Local 408's ("Local 408") Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings (docket # 30), filed on December 19, 2006; Plaintiff's Motion to

File Surresponse and Proposed Surresponse (docket # 35) to the second Reply to Response

to Local 408's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

Complaint1

 (docket # 41), filed on February 9, 2007; and various related pleadings.

The pleading that started the unauthorized escalation of filings between counsel

was Defendant Local 408's pleading titled "Reply." (docket # 32) The Court deems this

"pleading" to be a motion for summary disposition pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(c). Secondly,

Plaintiff's Motion to File Surresponse and Proposed Surresponse (docket # 35) is neither

authorized by Rule 7, FED.R.CIV.P., any other Rule of Civil Procedure, or the District's Local

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 "(c) Responsive Memorandum. The opposing party shall, unless otherwise ordered

by the Court and except as otherwise provided by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and Rules 12.1,54.2(b), and 56.1, Local Rules of Civil Procedure,

have ten (10) days after service in a civil or criminal case within which to serve and

file a responsive memorandum." 

LRCiv 7.2(c)

3

 This would include not counting January 2, 2007, a national day of mourning as

declared by President Bush for the passing of former President Gerald R. Ford.

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Rules nor will the Court exercise its wide discretion to further heighten the developing

acrimony and apparent absence of cooperation between counsel. Unprofessional conduct

between counsel serves no useful purpose. It does, however, increase the cost of litigation

to the overall detriment of the lawyers' clients and hinders a busy court's ability to manage

litigation and administer justice. Defendant Local 408's motion for summary disposition and

Plaintiff's Motion to File Surresponse and Proposed Surresponse will be summarily denied

and Plaintiff's Proposed Surresponse and Defendant Local 408's Response to Plaintiff's

Motion to File Surresponse and Proposed Surresponse (docket # 36; incorrectly labeled

"Reply") will be stricken as improvidently filed without the express prior leave of the Court.

A. UNTIMELY RESPONSE TO DISPOSITIVE MOTION

Plaintiff's counsel clearly gives little, if any, deference to the deadlines set forth

in both the October 18, 2006 Scheduling Order (docket # 23) and the District Court's Local

Rules. LRCiv 7.2(c)2

 requires a responsive pleading be filed "within ten (10) days after

service" of a motion. After calculating ten days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal

holidays3

 plus an additional three days for electronic mailing per Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D)

and Rule 6(e), Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Local 408's Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings was due no later than January 10, 2007. Plaintiff's January 15, 2007 Response was

untimely filed by five days. (docket # 33)

Plaintiff's counsel, presumably a Flagstaff sole practitioner, accepts no

responsibility for the untimeliness of his Response to Defendant Local 408's dispositive

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motion for allegedly being absent from his legal practice and office "from December 15,

2006 through January 15, 2007." (docket # 33 at 2) Rather, Plaintiff's counsel, without

providing a declaration under penalty of perjury, faults defense counsel and his client

because they supposedly "knew that Plaintiff['s counsel] could not timely respond to its

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which [was] filed on Tuesday [,] December 19,

2006." Plaintiff's counsel offers neither an explanation for how Defendant Local 408 or its

San Francisco counsel knew Plaintiff's counsel would be out-of-town during this period of

time nor provides any authority for the proposition that defense counsel was legally obligated

to wait to file his dispositive motion until it was convenient for Plaintiff's counsel to respond.

He also fails to explain why he did not make arrangements for emergency coverage of his

cases during his month-long absence. Plaintiff's counsel does not claim that he lacked access

to a computer, his or someone else's, to periodically check for e-filings that needed

immediate attention while he was out of his office. Also noticeably absent from his untimely

Response is any reason, much less a good one, why Plaintiff's counsel did not immediately

telephone defense counsel to seek a stipulation for a brief extension of time to respond when

he first learned of the filing of Defendant Local 408's dispositive motion. 

The Court has given much thought to how to fairly handle the shortcomings of

Plaintiff's counsel's representation of his client and the corresponding impact every possible

scenario would have on Plaintiff, defense counsel and his clients. The Court concludes that

it is unduly harsh to Plaintiff to summarily grant Defendant's dispositive motion solely

because Plaintiff's counsel's response was a mere five-days late. In light of the purpose of

the Federal Rules of Procedure to reform the “sporting” theory of trial and to allow for a

rational and well-balanced search for truth, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01(1947);

the public policy favoring resolution of disputes on the merits, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 181 (1962) (“It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere

technicalities.”); and the fact that the Court discerns no unfair prejudice to Defendants, and

defense counsel alleges none, by taking this action, the Court will exercise its discretion to

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 A Mulligan is "[a]n extra stroke allowed after a poor shot (esp. a tee-shot) in a

friendly game [of golf], not counted on the score card. Oxford English Dictionary, (2004

edition)

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consider Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint before considering Defendant

Local 408's dispositive motion. 

Before addressing the merits of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint,

the Court will emphasize two important points for the attorneys' future management of this

case for which they should plan accordingly.

First, due to the downward spiral of the lawyers' inability to communicate and to

cooperate with each other, the Court will order all counsel herein to reread the Standards for

Professional Conduct for practicing in the District Court of Arizona or future sanctions may

be imposed for non-compliance with these Standards or other rules. See, e.g., Standards for

Professional Conduct, # 17 ("We will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time and

for waiver of procedural formalities, provided our clients' legitimate rights will not be

materially or adversely affected."); Rule 11, FED.R.CIV.P.; LRCiv 83.1(f).

Secondly, the Court will not give Plaintiff's counsel any more "Mulligans"4

 to

correct substandard practice. It is not fair to adverse counsel or his clients. Plaintiff's counsel

must strictly comply with all deadlines, Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules

throughout the balance of this litigation. He is expressly warned that the Court may, in its

discretion, treat Plaintiff's counsel failure to timely respond to any motion or a failure to

timely comply with any order, Rule of Procedure or Local Rule to be Plaintiff's counsel's

consent to the granting of that Motion without further notice and, if appropriate, enter

judgment dismissing this action with prejudice pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i). Brydges v. Lewis,

18 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir.1995) (per

curiam); Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir.1995).

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Plaintiff's counsel shall also provide a complete copy of this Order to his client

within five days of counsel's receipt of this Order and shall timely file a Notice of

Compliance.

B. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint raises two procedural issues:

the untimeliness of the Motion and whether "good cause" exists to consider the merits of the

Motion.

1. Untimeliness

At the Rule 16 scheduling conference and in the Court's October 18, 2006

Scheduling Order (docket # 23), the Court made it explicit to counsel that the deadlines in

its order are real, are "to be taken seriously" by the parties and their counsel and would not

be extended except "upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the assigned trial judge."

(docket # 23 at 2) Moreover, in footnote 1, the Court warned counsel that, unlike state court,

"once a scheduling order is filed pursuant to Rule 16(b), the good cause standard controls

over the Rule 15(a) standard," citing Ninth Circuit authority. (Id.)

The Ninth Circuit has clarified why the Rule 16 deadlines should be taken

seriously:

In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state

systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient

treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the

deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the best way to encourage that

is to enforce the deadlines. Parties must understand that they will pay a price

for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders, and that failure

to do so may properly support severe sanctions and exclusions of evidence.

Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.2005); Hostnut.Com,

Inc.v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 2006 WL 2573201 *3 (D. Ariz. 2006). "Further, . . . rules

are rules - and the parties must play by them. In the final analysis, the judicial process

depends heavily on the judge's credibility. To ensure such credibility, a district [or

magistrate] judge must often be firm in managing crowded dockets and demanding adherence

to announced deadlines." Singh v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., 2006 WL 1867540 *2 (E.D. Cal

2006).

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 The Court notes that the parties' Rule 26(f) Joint Proposed Case Management Plan

(docket # 11) did not set forth a deadline for amendments to pleadings. This is unusual. The

Court speculates that this failure is, at least in part, because the formerly assigned District

Judge, prior to the consent of the parties, entered a pre-scheduling order that did not require

such a deadline be set forth in their Plan despite the express language of Rule 16(b)1(1)

mandating it. (Order entered on July 5, 2006; docket # 8)

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The Rule 16 Scheduling Order's deadlines, set in deference to the dates both

counsel orally requested at the scheduling conference,5

 required all amendments to pleadings

be filed by January 19, 2007. Plaintiff's February 9, 2007 Motion for Leave to Amend his

Complaint was untimely filed by 21 days. (docket # 41)

Had Plaintiff filed his motion to amend before the October 18, 2006 Scheduling

Order was entered, the Court would have certainly granted his motion. Under Rule 15(a),

leave to amend shall be “freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “In the

absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules require, be

‘freely given.’” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. at 182. None of the examples given in Foman

would have justified the denial of Plaintiff's leave to amend his Complaint before the October

17, 2006 Scheduling Conference.

2. Good Cause

Since the scheduling conference was held, Plaintiff must show "good cause" for

any amendment to his Complaint. Rule 16(b), FED.R.CIV.P.; Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1992); October 18, 2006 Scheduling Order (docket

# 23). 

Plaintiff's counsel argues that good cause exists to allow his amendment because

"justice so requires" whereupon he reiterates the crux of Plaintiff's allegations of

discrimination based upon national origin as alleged in his original Complaint, filed over a

year ago. (docket # 41 at 1-2) He then argues that amendment at this time is necessary

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because of the "resistence from Local 408 in providing [discovery] information about

referrals it made to [Defendant] Bechtel at the Springerville project near Plaintiff's home."

(Id. at 2) While he opines Defendants already have notice of his client's retaliation claim as

a result of his EEOC filing, Plaintiff's counsel "moves to amend the Complaint herein to

specifically allege the retaliatory failure to hire [Plaintiff] by Bechtel after his layoff" as

alleged in paragraph 15 of the proposed Amended Complaint. 

Although less than clearly stated, Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to

formally allege a retaliation claim in his Amended Complaint against Defendant Bechtel that

Plaintiff intended to litigate at the time he filed his EEOC Charge of Discrimination against

Defendant Bechtel on August 27, 2004. (docket # 49; Exh. B at 2) In fact, Defendant Local

408's Response acknowledges that Plaintiff's EEOC Charge expressly alleged a retaliation

claim: "[A]s an employee on a construction site, safety is important to me. I feel that because

I turned in [reported] safety issues, I was retaliated and discriminated against by my

supervisors [names omitted] when I was laid off on March 15, 2004." (docket # 48 at 3;

emphasis added)

Defendant Local 408 argues the motion should be denied because (1) the motion

to amend was untimely filed, (2) Plaintiff's proposed amendment is a futile attempt to raise

"new allegations" of retaliation that "were not raised in his EEOC charges" and "Padilla

cannot allege any credible cause of action" against Defendant Local 408 that was not timely

raised with the EEOC, and (3) the proposed amendment is an indirect, "bad faith attempt to

pursue frivolous, inappropriate, and irrelevant discovery." (docket # 48 at 3 and 4) Except

for the untimeliness argument, the Court disagrees.

A review of the file reflects that since the scheduling conference, discovery has

just begun, the Complaint has not previously been amended, no dispositive motions have

been filed or granted, a trial date has not been set, and allowing amendment will not

prejudice Defendants in light of their actual notice of Plaintiff's claims in the EEOC Charge

of Discrimination. This is not a situation in which the Court is giving "ineffective litigants

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 LRCiv 7.2(j) and Rule 37(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, require a

certification that complies with and contains the statement that "after personal consultation

and sincere efforts to do so, the parties and/or counsel have been unable to satisfactorily

resolve the discovery dispute."

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a second chance to develop their case." Reliance Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Land and

Exploration, 110 F.3d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff's motion to amend was filed only two days after this Court denied

without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion to Compel discovery for another procedural irregularity

by Plaintiff's counsel.6

 (docket # 40) The requested discovery sought by Plaintiff's counsel

reasonably relates to Plaintiff's retaliation claim against Defendant Bechtel. The discovery

motion argued that shortly after Plaintiff "made complaints about unsafe job conditions . .

. Bechtel continued to hire carpenters out of the 408 hall for employment at this Springerville

project [but] Plaintiff was unable to secure any employment with Bechtel despite his request

for work there near his home in St. Johns." This is not a request for discovery to create a

question of fact on a new claim for retaliation against Defendant Local 408; but rather, an

attempt to obtain legitimate discovery to prove Plaintiff's claim for discrimination and

retaliation against Defendant Bechtel. 

It is undisputed that federal subject matter jurisdiction over a Title VII

discrimination claim cannot be exercised until a plaintiff first exhausts administrative

remedies. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 (1980); Santa Maria v. Pacific

Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.2000). Exhaustion of administrative remedies occurs

when the complainant files a timely charge with the EEOC and gives the EEOC an

opportunity to investigate the charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 

A district court may exercise jurisdiction over charges of discrimination that were

a part of the EEOC's investigation or could be within the scope of an EEOC investigation that

could reasonably arise from the asserted charges. Knox v. City of Portland, 2006 WL 223

3482 *2 (D. Or. 2006) (citing EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F .3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994),

quoting Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990) (emphasis and footnote

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omitted); see also Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480

(9th Cir.1997). Further, district courts must construe any charges filed with the EEOC

liberally when determining whether a plaintiff's claims are reasonably related to those EEOC

charges of discrimination. Knox at *2 (citing Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at 1480).

 A complaint in federal court must satisfy only the minimal notice requirements

of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), that is, it need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Potter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir.

2003). Notice pleading requires a plaintiff to provide only the bare outlines of his or her

claim. “Except when specific pleading is required . . . evidentiary facts need not be set forth

in the complaint . . . [f]ederal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and

control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims . . . [t]hus, to the extent that a

complaint lacks detail that the defendants believe they need to investigate the claims and

prepare their defense strategy, they can obtain such detail readily through interrogatories or

early depositions.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 843 (2000).

While the Complaint (docket #1 ) fails to expressly use the words "retaliate" or

"retaliation" and it is certainly not a model for pleading Title VII claims, defense counsel can

hardly claim surprise or lack of notice that Plaintiff is pursuing a retaliation claim in this

lawsuit against Defendant Bechtel in light of the above-quoted language in Plaintiff's EEOC

Charge and defense counsel's express acknowledgment in the parties' Rule 26(f) Joint

Proposed Case Management Plan (docket # 11) of what Plaintiff must prove to establish a

question of fact on a retaliation claim: 

 For Plaintiff's retaliation claim, he must demonstrate a prima facie case by

showing (1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment

action and (3) a causal link between the two. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229

F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) . . . .

(docket # 11 at 8; emphasis added) 

Like the plaintiff in Knox, Plaintiff Padilla presented explicit allegations of

retaliation to the EEOC and described adverse employment actions he allegedly sustained.

Because of express Ninth Circuit authority requiring the liberal construction of EEOC

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charges when determining whether plaintiff's claims are reasonably related to those EEOC

charges, Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at 1480, this Court is compelled to conclude that Plaintiff's

allegations in his Complaint “reasonably related” to Plaintiff's allegations of unlawful

discrimination on the basis of race or national origin and retaliation expressly contained in

Plaintiff's EEOC charges against Defendant Bechtel. If Defendants desire more specificity

of exactly how they are alleged to have violated Title VII prior to the Final Pretrial order or

why Defendant Local 408 is a defendant in this lawsuit, they may timely implement

interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33, FED.R.CIV.P.,requesting those details. Nevertheless, the

Court's conclusion in this regard fails to resolve the untimeliness argument of Plaintiff's

motion to amend his Complaint.

Defendant Local 408's Response, footnote 2, correctly notes that Plaintiff does

not request a continuance of the January 19, 2007 amendment deadline and argues that

Plaintiff "fails to set forth facts relating to, much less meet the good cause standard for the

amendment of his Complaint under Rule 16(b)," citing Johnson, supra. Johnson, however,

provides the meaning of good cause vis a vis a requested amendment after an amendment

deadline has expired.

 [U]nlike Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith

of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing

party, Rule 16(b)' s “good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of

the party seeking the amendment . . . 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990) (“good cause” means scheduling

deadlines cannot be met despite party's diligence). Moreover, carelessness is not

compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief

(citations omitted) . . . Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party

opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the

focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification.

(citation omitted) If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Id. at 609.

In Johnson, the court concluded that good cause did not exist because the moving party's

failure to timely request a scheduling order amendment resulted from his own inaction.

Those are not, however, the facts of this case. 

It is true that Plaintiff's counsel has not asked that the deadline be extended;

nevertheless, he has been diligent in seeking amendment when placed in correct context.

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7

 Counsel are reminded that discovery in this case ends on August 6, 2007. (docket

# 23 at 3)

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Only two days after the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

discovery and shortly after Plaintiff's counsel realized that defense counsel was going to

argue herein that certain discovery should be denied as not relevant because Plaintiff had not

alleged a retaliation claim in his Complaint, he moved to amend the Complaint. (docket # 41)

Unlike state court, absent good cause, Yokohama Tire Corp. v. Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202

F.R.D. 612, 614 (D.Ariz.2001), the parties in a federal lawsuit "may not seek discovery from

any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f)." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(d).

Discovery in this case began after the October 16, 2006 scheduling conference, less than four

months before Plaintiff's filed his motion to compel discovery.7

For the reasons set forth above and in the interests of justice, the Court will sua

sponte authorize a one-time extension of the deadline for filing a motion to amend to

February 9, 2007, the date Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to Amend. The Court also

finds good cause to amend the Scheduling Order and grant Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Local 408's motion for summary disposition

(docket # 32) and Plaintiff's Motion to File Surresponse and Proposed Surresponse are

DENIED. Plaintiff's Proposed Surresponse (docket # 35-2) and Defendant Local 408's

Response to Plaintiff's Motion to File Surresponse and Proposed Surresponse (docket # 36;

incorrectly labeled "Reply") are hereby STRICKEN as filings unauthorized by the Court or

any rule of procedure.

/ / /

/ / /

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8

 All lawyers admitted to practice in this District Court signed the following

certification prior to admission: "My signature below indicates my confirmation to uphold

the oath upon admission and that I have read and will ascribe to the Standards for

Professional Conduct as adopted by the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona . . . ."

9

 It is likely this motion would have been denied without prejudice notwithstanding

Plaintiff's amendment motion because the motion required the Court to consider matters

outside the pleadings, e.g., Plaintiff's EEOC Charge of Discrimination. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c)

provides that if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,

"the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in

Rule 56 . . . ." The parties must comply with all aspects of LRCiv 56.1 and its subparts or

the motion will be denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all counsel8

 herein shall immediately reread

and comply with the Standards of Professional Conduct located at the District of Arizona's

website at www.azd.uscourts.gov, then clicking on link "Attorney Information," and then

clicking on link "Attorney Admissions Information." 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend his

Complaint is GRANTED. Pursuant to LRCiv 15.1(c), Plaintiff's Lodged Amended

Complaint (docket # 43) is deemed filed the date this Order is entered by the Clerk.

Defendants shall timely file an Amended Answer or otherwise file a Rule 12(c) motion.

Because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint supercedes the original Complaint, Kirk

v. Internal Revenue Service, 1998 WL 681457 * 1 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing London v. Coopers

& Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811 (9th Cir.1981) (claims not realleged in amended complaint are

deemed waived),

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Local 408's Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings (docket # 30) is DENIED without prejudice as moot.9

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel shall mail a true and

complete copy of this Order to his client within five days of counsel's receipt of this Order.

/ / /

/ / /

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Plaintiff's counsel shall file a Notice of Compliance by 5:00 p.m. (Arizona time) on

Thursday, March 8, 2007.

 DATED this 27th day of February, 2007.

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