Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00299/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Riding Films, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

John and Jane Does I-CCL, and Black 

and White Companies I-CCL, 

Defendants. 

No. CV13-00299-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Riding Films, Inc., owns the copyright to a video entitled “Dawn Rider.” 

Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that the video has been illegally copied and disseminated 

online through a peer-to-peer file sharing network. Plaintiff has obtained the internet 

protocol (“IP”) addresses of each computer that participated in the group – referred to as 

a swarm – that uploaded the content to the internet and allowed others to download it. 

Because Plaintiff only has access to the IP addresses of alleged infringers, it has brought 

this motion for leave to take discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference to obtain the 

identities of the owners of the IP addresses. Plaintiff requests that the Court issue a 

subpoena to the internet service providers (ISP) requiring them to provide the identities 

of the individuals associated with the IP addresses. Doc. 6. 

 Plaintiffs request is a familiar one in federal court. It raises both the question of 

whether Doe defendants, identified with nothing more than their IP addresses, are 

properly joined and whether courts should permit discovery under such circumstances. 

Courts have dealt with the issue in several ways: denying the discovery requests, severing 

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all but the first Doe defendant, delaying the severance decision until after the Does have 

been identified, or approving both joinder and pre-service discovery. See e.g. Pac. 

Century Int=l, Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533, 2011 WL 5117424, at *2 (N.D.Cal. 

Oct. 27, 2011) (denying request to issue subpoenas); SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-3036, 

No. 11-4220, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3-4 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) (severing all but the 

first Doe defendant and allowing discovery for him alone); AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-

97, No. C-11-03067, 2011 WL 2912909 (N.D.Cal. July 20, 2011) (denying discovery 

request and declining to severe); Camelot Dist. Grp. v. Does 1-1210, No. 2:11-cv-02432, 

2011 WL 4455249 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 23, 2011) (allowing discovery and delaying the 

question of severance); Openmind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1-39, No. C 11-3311, 2011 WL 

4715200, at *5-8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (approving both joinder and pre-service 

discovery). Without any consensus in the case law, the Court will engage in its own 

analysis of the both the joinder issue and the pre-service discovery requests. 

I. Joinder. 

 Under similar facts, courts disagree on when a Court should, sua sponte, consider 

the question of joinder. Camelot declined to consider joinder until after further 

development of the record. 2011 WL 4455249 at *4. On the other hand, in Boy Racer, 

Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738, 2011 WL 3652521, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 

2011), the court considered joinder immediately because of the potential for lost filing fee 

revenue and a fear of incentivizing Plaintiffs to join too many Doe defendants. When 

defendants are unknown at the time of filing in the Ninth Circuit, courts are instructed to 

give the Plaintiff “an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants,” 

unless “discovery would not uncover the identities” or “the complaint would be 

dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Because the standard requires consideration of whether the complaint might be dismissed 

on other grounds, the Court finds that it must consider the appropriateness of joinder 

before any further development of the record. 

 Rule 20(a)(2) allows permissive joinder when a right to relief is asserted against 

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all defendants jointly or severally or if the right to relief “aris[es] out of the same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of related transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

20(a)(2). The rule also requires a common question of law or fact that is relevant to all 

defendants. Id. Where the test for permissive joinder is not satisfied, a court has 

discretion to sever the improperly joined parties “so long as no substantial right will be 

prejudiced by the severance.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Even when the test is satisfied, however, courts still have discretion to sever under 

Rules 20(b), 21, and 42(b). On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C10-4472, 2011 WL 

4018258, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 6, 2011). In exercising that discretion courts must 

“examine whether permissive joinder would comport with the principles of fundamental 

fairness or would result in prejudice to either side.” Id. (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats 

Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Courts may also consider factors such as the 

motives of the party seeking joinder and whether joinder would confuse and complicate 

the issues for the parties involved.” SBO Pictures, 2011 WL 6002620 at *3. 

 Courts are divided on whether the rights of action against participants in a 

“swarm” arise out of the same transaction or series of related transactions. Some courts 

have found that a swarm is not a series of related transactions because swarms may exist 

over a period of months and can involve large numbers of users downloading and 

uploading throughout that period. See SBO Pictures, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3; Third 

Degree Films v. Does 1-3577, No. C 11-02768, 2011 WL 5374569, at *3 (N.D. Ca. Nov. 

4, 2011). 

 Other courts have, at least preliminarily, found that merely alleging that all 

defendants were part of the same swarm and downloaded exactly the same file is 

sufficient to support a finding that the swarm constituted a related series of transactions 

or occurrences for the purposes of Rule 20. See New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-1474, 

No. C 11-2770, 2011 WL 4407222, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011); Digital Sin, Inc. v. 

Does 1-176, No. 12-CV-00126, 2012 WL 263491, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012). 

Digital Sin noted that a contrary ruling would present a significant obstacle to a plaintiff’s 

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ability to protect its copyright and found that requiring such a party to file hundreds or 

thousands of infringement action would not be cost effective or promote judicial 

economy. Digital Sin, 2012 WL 263491 *5, n. 6. Notably, the court in Digital Sin was 

not bound by Ninth Circuit case law requiring consideration of whether the case might be 

dismissed on other grounds at the time of the initial joinder decision, and it remained 

open to reconsidering the joinder issue later. Id at *5; see Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. 

The Court has already determined that it must address permissive joinder at this 

juncture. It now finds that the rights of action against different participants in the same 

online swarm do not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. This 

finding is based on the fact that a particular swarm can last for many months. During 

those months, the initial participants may never overlap with later participants. 

Additionally, because pieces and copies of the protected work come from various sources 

within the swarm, individual users might never use the same sources. Without a more 

definite showing that each defendant is transactionally related to all other defendants, the 

Court is reluctant to expand the scope of permissive joinder to cover a swarm that 

potentially accumulates many users over a long period of time. 

Furthermore, even if the Court found that these facts met the preliminary 

requirements for permissive joinder, there are substantial reasons to believe that joinder 

in this case would “confuse and complicate the issues for the parties involved.” SBO 

Pictures, 2011 WL 6002620 at *3. Allowing a case to proceed against such a large 

number of Defendants would invite many unrelated motions to present the different 

factual and legal defenses of each Defendant. Receiving, sorting, and responding to such 

a high volume of motions would require significant judicial resources. Scheduling and 

conducting hearings and discovery disputes among many parties would be almost 

impossible. Additionally, during discovery, each Defendant, who might appear pro se 

and not be an e-filer, would be forced to serve paper copies of all filings on all other 

parties, and would have the right to be present at all other parties= depositions, all of 

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which would be a significant burden on each Defendant litigant.1 Also, because of the 

potential prejudice to each unrelated Defendant, the Court likely would not undertake to 

conduct a trial for all Defendants at the same time. Thus, the Court would effectively 

sever these cases for trial, and conduct over a hundred separate trials with different 

witnesses and evidence, eviscerating any Aefficiency@ of joinder. Finally, all of these 

issues would needlessly delay the ultimate resolution of any particular Defendant=s case, 

which again weighs against efficiency and the opportunity for the Defendant to receive a 

prompt resolution of his or her case. Accordingly, the Court finds that joinder is not 

warranted. 

II. Severance.

Having concluded that joinder is not proper in this case, the appropriate remedy is 

severance of all but the first Defendant. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 

770 F.Supp.2d 332, 342 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Hard Drive Productions, 2011 WL 

3740473, at *15. Accordingly, the Court will retain unknown Defendant 1 (IP address 

No. 24.251.201.34) and severe all other Defendants. All claims against the additional 

unknown Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice. 

III. Discovery Request. 

 The remaining issue is the pre-service discovery request against the remaining 

Defendant. Courts are split on whether to allow discovery of this nature to go forward. 

Rule 26(d)(1) allows a court to authorize discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference for 

the parties’ convenience and in the interest of justice. Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a 

 1

 See Hard Drive Productions, 2011 WL 3740473, at *14 (summarizing similar 

management problems for 188 Defendants); see also On the Cheap, 2011 WL 4018258, 

at *4 (“The Court does not condone copyright infringement and encourages settlement of 

genuine disputes. However, plaintiff=s desire to enforce its copyright in what it asserts is 

a cost-effective manner does not justify perverting the joinder rules to first create the 

management and logistical problems discussed above and then offer to settle with Doe 

defendants so that they can avoid digging themselves out of the morass plaintiff is 

creating.”) 

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good cause standard to decide pre-service discovery requests, comparing the need for 

expedited discovery with potential prejudice to the responding party. See Semitool, Inc. 

v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Courts may 

consider whether the plaintiff: (1) can identify the missing party with sufficient 

specificity that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who 

could be sued in federal court; (2) has identified all previous steps taken to locate the 

elusive defendant; (3) suit against the defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss; and 

(4) has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood of being able to identify the 

defendant through the requested discovery, thus allowing for service of process. 

Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 

Pacific Century applied this test to similar facts and denied the plaintiff’s discover 

request. 2011 WL 5117424, at *2. The denial rested primarily on the chance that the 

owner of the IP address may not be the same person as the actual infringer because 

individual computers are often used by more than their owners. While that concern is 

legitimate, the Court finds that the potential for mistaken identification does not outweigh 

the interests of justice in identifying alleged infringers. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are 

sufficiently specific to conclude that there is a real person or entity associated with the IP 

address that can be sued in federal court. It also appears that Plaintiff has exhausted all 

other means for identifying the true owner or end user of the IP address and that this 

expedited discovery is likely to reveal that identity. It also appears that the complaint 

states a valid claim on its face. Accordingly, the Court will allow expedited discovery 

and issue a summons with respect to the remaining Doe Defendant. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. All Defendants with the exception of the first unknown party (IP Address 

No. 24.251.201.34) are severed from this action and the complaints against 

them are dismissed without prejudice. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to take discovery prior to the rule 26(f) 

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conference (Doc. 6) is granted with respect to the remaining Defendant.

Plaintiff may issue a subpoena for the ISP of Defendant 1 (IP Address No. 

24.251.201.34). 

 Dated this 16th day of May, 2013. 

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