Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00944/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00944-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMERY MILLIGAN,

Petitioner,

 v.

TOM CAREY, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-0944 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court; petitioner has elected not to file an optional

traverse. The case is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and discharging a

firearm causing serious bodily injury. He was sentenced to prison for forty years to life. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence and the California

Supreme Court denied petitioner’s application for review. 

As grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) His due process rights were

violated because the trial court refused to instruct the jury on antecedent threats; (2) the

trial court erred in using CALJIC 17.41.1, instructing the jury to report any juror who refused

to deliberate or follow the law; (3) defense counsel was ineffective in not pursuing a

diminished capacity defense and not requesting a competency hearing; and (4) the

prosecutor committed misconduct by asking a question on cross-examination which was

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not supported by any evidence, and in suggesting in closing argument that petitioner

manufactured a defense. 

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are taken from the opinion of

the California Court of Appeal. 

At the time of the murder appellant, a veteran of the United States Army

and Marines with extensive overseas combat experience, was 50 years old, five

feet four or five inches tall, and a chronic drug abuser. Since July 1996 he had

been enrolled in a methadone assistance program run by the Veteran’s

Administration. When tested for illicit drug use under the program, he never

tested clean. 

Carolyn Ballard lived in a two-story home in East Oakland with her

daughter Felicia, Frenchie, whom she considered as her brother-in-law, and

other relatives. Frenchie was six feet four inches tall, weighed 170 pounds and

was pretty well built. He taught neighborhood kids karate. 

On the evening of August 4, 2000, Ballard and others were "partying" at

the house with rock cocaine. The next morning appellant came by the house

and offered to sell a rock of cocaine to Angel, a 17-year-old girl who was staying

there temporarily. Felicia said he could not sell drugs in the house, they argued

and appellant kicked her. Appellant also argued with Gus, another male at the

house, threatening to shoot him. Appellant’s tone was very aggressive, angry

and violent.

Appellant left for a while with Nina Wiley to look for someone. Upon

returning, appellant smoked crack cocaine in Ballard’s second floor bedroom.

After taking a hit he became angrier, more aggressive, edgy, irritated, and

hostile. Angel and appellant got into a loud, heated argument over a missing

pair of tweezers. They were cursing; appellant threatened Angel.

Frenchie went up to the bedroom and ordered them to stop the cursing

and arguing because there was a child downstairs. Angel apologized. Frenchie

told appellant he would have to leave. Appellant responded he would do "what

the hell" he wanted, and would leave only if Ballard told him to. Frenchie tried

to get appellant but others came between them. Frenchie said: "The only reason

I’m not breaking your neck right now is there are people keeping me from getting

to you."

Appellant jumped up on the bed, took out his gun, and said: "You don’t

think I’ll shoot your mother fuckin[g] ass? I’ll shoot your ass." Frenchie dared

him to shoot. Ballard and others begged appellant not to shoot; she asked him

to leave. Everyone started walking down the stairs. Appellant was backing

down the stairs, gun in hand; Frenchie followed. Appellant fired the gun into the

stairs, asking Frenchie, "You want some of this?" Frenchie continued escorting

appellant downstairs, heading toward the door. Appellant held the gun at his

side; Frenchie was close behind.

When appellant reached the dining room he fired the gun toward the floor;

Frenchie moved a little to the left and said, "the mother fucker shot at me."

Appellant, a trained marksmanship instructor, fired again and hit Frenchie in the

leg. There was struggling over the gun. A couple of men started throwing

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appellant around. Appellant begged them to stop so he could help Frenchie. At

some point appellant also said he did not mean to do it.

 Appellant went upstairs to get his keys, then took off in his van with Angel

Appellant headed for home; he did not summon the police or an ambulance.

Others at the house administered to Frenchie and called for help. By the time

police officers arrived at the scene, Frenchie could not respond; he quickly bled

to death.

Officer Shannon picked up a call about the shooting, spotted the van and

started following it. Appellant was circling the block of his residence. Once

backup officers arrived, they pulled him over. Appellant told the arresting officers

he had been robbed and just grabbed a gun. When interviewed by homicide

investigators, appellant first claimed that someone else shot Frenchie. When the

investigators challenged this story appellant claimed he shot Frenchie in selfdefense. 

Ex. A at 1-3. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-409 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-413. A state court decision is an "unreasonable

application of Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it

correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

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"unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case." Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-806 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.

2000). 

DISCUSSION

1. Antecedent Threats

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because the trial court

refused to give a jury instruction on antecedent threats. The standard jury instruction in

California regarding antecedent threats reads:

Evidence has been presented that on [a] prior occasion[s] the alleged

victim [threatened] [or] [assaulted] [or participated in an assault or threat of

physical harm upon] the defendant. If you find that this evidence is true, you

may consider that evidence on the issue of whether the defendant actually and

reasonably believed that [his] [her] life or physical safety was endangered at the

time of the commission of the alleged crime.

In addition, a person whose life or safety has been previously threatened,

or assaulted by [another] [others], is justified in acting more quickly and taking

harsher measures for self protection from an assault by [that person] [those

persons], than would a person who had not received threats from or previously

been assaulted by the same person [or persons].

Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal, California Jury Instructions – Criminal,

198-199 (7th ed. 2003). 

In this case petitioner asserted that he acted in self-defense. The California Court of

Appeal has held that when there is evidence of antecedent threats by the victim against the

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defendant it is reversible error to refuse to give a pinpoint instruction regarding the impact

of such threats on the reasonableness of defendant’s actions. People v. Torres, 94 Cal.

App. 2d 146, 152-153 (1949). This position was subsequently confirmed by the California

Supreme Court. See People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 517, 521-522 (1954). This rule was

deemed necessary because the standard instructions on self-defense refer to the

defendant’s fear of "imminent" serious bodily injury or death and the "immediate"

circumstances of the event, which led the court to fear that a jury might believe it could not

consider much earlier events in determining whether a reasonable person in the shoes of

defendant would have believed in the need for self-defense. Torres, 94 Cal. App. 2d at

153. In short, the instruction relates not to events which were part of the crime, but to those

which were temporally removed from it. 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show

that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The instruction may not

be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as

a whole and the trial record. Id. A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does not

alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Dunckhurst v.

Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Virtually all of the events which petitioner contends show the need for the instruction

were part of the connected events leading to the crime, that is, were not the sort of threats

that would support giving the instruction. For instance, moments prior the shooting, the

victim told petitioner that he was going to “kick [his] ass,” ex. E at 860, and that “[t]he only

reason I’m not breaking your neck right now is there are people keeping me from getting to

you.” Id. at 71. Petitioner’s defense was that the shooting was triggered by these

immediate threats, not the antecedent threats. The trial court instructed the jury on selfdefense (CALJIC No. 5.12), and on threats and menaces (CALJIC No. 4.40). The jury was

instructed to consider the surrounding circumstances and was properly instructed on the

relevance of the victim’s current threats. Id. at 1053, 1063. These instructions adequately

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addressed the threats the victim made moments before petitioner shot him and thus

allowed the jury to consider petitioner’s defense. 

There was evidence of one genuine antecedent threat. Ballard testified that before

the day of the shooting the victim told petitioner that "he would snatch his head off his

shoulder, shove it up his ass, and his eyes would watch his heart take its last beat." Id. at

342, 344. However, petitioner testified to the contrary, saying that the victim never

threatened him before the day of the shooting. Id. at 927. And petitioner also testified that

previous events did not make him afraid of the victim at the time of the crime and that the

victim never did anything wrong to him before the day of the shooting. Id. In short, there

was no evidence that the purported prior threat, even if it occurred, had any impact on the

petitioner. 

Given petitioner’s testimony, including his denial that there was an antecedent

threat, the trial court’s refusal to give an antecedent threat instruction could not have

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The trial court’s failure to give an antecedent

threats instruction thus did not violate petitioner’s due process rights. Because there was

no constitutional violation, the state appellate courts’ rejection of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme

Court authority.

2. Jury Instruction CALJIC 17.41.1

Petitioner claims that using CALJIC 17.41.1 violated his right to due process and trial

by an impartial jury by inhibiting jury deliberation and invading jury privacy. CALJIC 17.41.1

provides:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their deliberations,

conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it

occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard

the law or to decide the case based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other]

improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the

Court of the situation.

Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal, California Jury Instructions – Criminal,

217 (6th ed. Supp. 1998).

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1 Juror nullification is not a right under the Constitution, laws or treatises of the United

States. Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting no right to jury

nullification in the context of federal habeas review); cf. United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d

1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal defendants are not entitled to jury nullification instructions).

Any instruction that arguably impeded this non-existent right did not violate the Constitution,

laws or treatises of the United States and cannot justify habeas relief.

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The Ninth Circuit has held that there is no "clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent" which establishes that an anti-nullification instruction such as

CALJIC 17.41.1 violates a constitutional right. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-956 (9th

Cir. 2004). A California appellate court’s rejection of a challenge to 17.41.1 therefore

cannot be be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court authority. See id. at 956. In light of Brewer, the trial court’s instruction pursuant to

CALJIC 17.41.1 cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief.1

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Two of petitioner’s claims are for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any claim

of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

result. Id.

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must establish two

things: deficient performance and resulting prejudice. First, an attorney’s performance

qualifies as deficient if it falls below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-

688. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. Second, prejudice has resulted if there is

"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceedings would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. If the petitioner cannot

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establish incompetence under the first prong of Strickland, then a federal court considering

a habeas ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not have to analyze prejudice under

the second prong. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). 

A. Diminished Capacity 

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective because he did not “submit into

evidence” a letter from the Department of Veterans Affairs saying that the department has

found him to be 100% disabled as a result of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). 

Am. Pet. at 12. He contends that this would have shown that he was unable to “form

malice and forethought.” Id. 

To whatever extent this is a claim that counsel should have pursued a diminished

capacity defense, it is without merit because California abolished the diminished capacity

defense in 1981. See Cal. Penal Code § 25; People v. Anderson, 28 Cal.4th 767, 783

(2002) (diminished capacity defense abolished); In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th 768, 774-776

(1994) (same). Because the defense is not available under California law, failure to

request it could not be ineffective assistance. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273

(9th Cir. 2005) (trial counsel cannot be found to have been ineffective for failure to make a

meritless argument).

If this claim is viewed as a contention that counsel should have introduced the letter

in evidence, that evidence would have duplicated testimony about petitioner’s military

service and PTSD, and the role they played in the shooting, which was elicited by defense

counsel. Ex. E at 479-487, 722-772. Defense counsel also argued to the jury that this was

a clear case of self-defense and explained that the evidence of PTSD was important

because it was relevant to petitioner’s state of mind when he was confronted by the threat

that produced his defensive action. Id. at 980-981. The letter would have been merely

cumulative.

For these reasons, the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claim was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. 

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B. Competence Inquiry

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a competency

hearing. Petitioner argues that he was suffering from PTSD, depression and suicidal

thoughts at the time of the trial. Because he was not taking his medication prior to the

shooting and resumed taking medication after his arrest, petitioner contends that he was

incompetent to stand at trial. He argues that defense counsel failed to properly investigate

petitioner’s medical records and mental capacity. 

A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent and he may not waive

his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently. See

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). The conviction of a defendant while legally

incompetent violates due process. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510 (9th

Cir. 1994). Due process requires a trial court to order a psychiatric evaluation or conduct a

competency hearing if the court has a good faith doubt concerning the defendant's

competence. See Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 510; see also Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628,

644 (9th Cir. 2004) (calling a claim of trial court error for failing to conduct a competency

hearing a "procedural incompetence claim"). This standard is "clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

See Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383

U.S. 375, 385 (1966)). 

A good faith doubt about a defendant's competence arises only if there is substantial

evidence of incompetence. See Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 510 (denial of motion for

psychiatric evaluation did not render trial fundamentally unfair where petitioner made single

conclusory allegation he suffered from mental illness). Petitioner points out that he was

mentally ill and was taking medication for that illness, but this is not enough in itself to

require the trial court to question his competency. After all, the logical conclusion from this

information would be that the mental illness was controlled by the medication, unless there

was some evidence from petitioner’s conduct that the illness was not under control. 

Petitioner has pointed to no such evidence. 

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In the absence of evidence sufficient to trigger a good faith doubt about petitioner’s

competence, the trial court did not violate due process by failing to sua sponte consider

competence, and petitioner’s counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing did not fall

below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. 

Therefore, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority.

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Two of petitioner’s claims are for prosecutorial misconduct. A defendant's due

process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial "fundamentally

unfair." See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.

209, 219 (1982).

A. Improper Question

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking a question

on cross-examination which was not supported by any evidence. The prosecutor asked

petitioner: "Didn’t you once tell Carolyn Ballard that if you ever shot a man and he lived that

the infection would get him because you soaked your bullets in dog feces?" To which the

petitioner responded: "No. I never said nothing like that." Ex. E at 895. The prosecutor did

not ask this question to Ballard or any other witness, so there was in fact no evidence in the

record to support the statement in the question that petitioner had made the “dog feces”

remark. Petitioner argues that the prosecutor asked the question to inflame the jury. Ex. B

at 8.

Improper questioning of a witness by the prosecutor is not in itself a violation of due

process. Rather, the relevant inquiry on habeas is whether the prosecutor’s behavior so

infected a trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. 

Here, the jury was instructed to "not assume to be true any insinuation suggested by

a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it

helps you to understand the answer." Ex. D at 234, Ex. E at 1051, (CALJIC No. 1.02). The

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prosecutor’s question was an isolated incident. Petitioner denied having said that he

soaked his bullets in dog feces, and there was no evidence that the victim died from an

infection caused by dog feces. 

Although the prosecutor’s question certainly seems to have been improper, it did not

render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Because there was no constitutional violation,

the state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. 

B. Suggesting Petitioner Manufactured Defense 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in suggesting to the

jury that petitioner and his counsel manufactured the defense. The prosecutor told the jury

that petitioner lied to the police and at trial, and that petitioner tailored his testimony to fit

the jury instructions. Ex. E at 961-962, 974-976, 1028-1029, 1037, 1041-1043. 

The jury was instructed that "statements made by the attorney’s during the trial are

not evidence." Id. at 1050-1051, Ex. D at 234 (CALJIC No. 1.02). The jurors knew that

they were the ultimate judges of credibility and fact. Ex. E at 1049. In light of these

instructions, the prosecutor’s comment did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Because there was no constitutional violation, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 10, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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