Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00877/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY DON EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; WILLIAM B.

KOLENDER, Sheriff; JOHN/JANE

DOE #1, Chief Medical Officer, 

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 06cv877-JM (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS OR TO REQUIRE A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT [DOC. NOS.

27, 28] AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT [DOC.

NO. 40]

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 on April 13, 2006 [doc. no. 1]. On January 8, 2007, Evans

filed his Second Amended Complaint [doc. no. 18]. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants denied him adequate and meaningful medical

treatment, or delayed in providing that treatment, amounting to

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in

violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Second

Am. Compl. 7-8.) Evans filed a verification of his Second Amended

Complaint [doc. no. 20] on January 11, 2007.

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On March 19, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint or to Require a More Definite Statement,

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e),

along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the

Motion [doc. no. 27] and a Notice of Lodgment with six exhibits. 

Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Motion [doc. no. 28] on March

26, 2007, correcting the hearing date, time, and place. Defendants

argue the current action should be dismissed for four reasons. 

First, this suit is barred by res judicata because Plaintiff

previously brought an action against them in state court based on

the same facts. (Mot. to Dismiss 2.) Second, California’s twoyear statute of limitations has expired, thus barring Evans’s

claims. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a cause

of action for deliberate indifference. (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id.) In the

alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement,

alleging that the Second Amended Complaint is vague and conclusory,

and Defendants cannot properly prepare a responsive pleading. 

(Id.) 

Evans’s Opposition to Defendant[s’] Motion to Dismiss was

filed nunc pro tunc to June 15, 2007 [doc. no. 36]. Plaintiff also

filed a Notice of Lodgment [doc. no. 37] with ten exhibits. Evans

alleges: (1) His claims are not barred by res judicata because his

state action was brought under the California Tort Claims Act

rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations; (3) he has made sufficient

factual allegations to state a claim under § 1983; and (4) he

complied with the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation

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Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). (Pl.’s Opp’n 2, 4-9.) Plaintiff

requests that he be given leave to file a further amended complaint

to correct any deficiencies in his Second Amended Complaint. (Id.

at 3.) 

Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion

to Dismiss on June 25, 2007 [doc. no. 38]. On July 9, 2007, the

Court issued a Klingele/Rand Notice [doc. no. 41] warning Evans of

the pending Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust and allowing

him time to present any additional evidence demonstrating

exhaustion. Plaintiff submitted a response to the Klingele/Rand

Notice [doc. no. 47] which was filed nunc pro tunc to August 9,

2007.

On July 2, 2007, Evans filed a motion to file a third amended

complaint [doc. no. 40]. Defendants filed a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

File Third Amended Complaint [doc. no. 45] on August 9, 2007. The

Court found Plaintiff’s motion to be suitable for decision without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) [doc. no. 44]. 

The Court also finds Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to be suitable

for resolution on the papers. 

For the reasons set forth below, the district court should

DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In January 2004, Evans was housed as a pretrial detainee in

the San Diego County detention facility in Vista, California. 

(Second Am. Compl. 3.) On January 27, Plaintiff slipped and fell

while exiting the shower area of a housing unit. (Id.) Evans

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alleges that his right knee and leg were injured and he suffered

severe pain. (Id.) He was examined by a doctor on January 29,

2004, at which time it was noted that Plaintiff had pain above his

right knee and slight swelling of his right calf, but he was able

to walk “without much difficulty.” (Second Am. Compl. Ex. A at 3.) 

It was also noted that Evans was already taking Ultram and Tylenol

–- two pain relievers –- for another condition. (Id.); see

http://www.webmd.com/drugs/index-drugs.aspx (search for “Ultram”). 

Plaintiff was scheduled for a follow-up examination on February 1,

2004. (Second Am. Compl. Ex. A at 3-4.) Dr. John Gill examined

him on February 1, and prescribed Motrin and the use of a knee

brace. (Id. at 4-5.) 

On February 9, 2004, Evans was seen by Dr. Earl Goldstein for

another medical condition, and during the examination he complained

that he was still experiencing knee pain and requested a follow-up

exam. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was examined by Dr. William Sereda

that day. (Id. at 7.) An x-ray showed a normal right knee. (Id.

at 7, 9.) Evans was scheduled for a follow-up examination two

weeks later. (Id. at 8, 10.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Michele

Grad February 24, 2004. (Id. at 11.) Dr. Grad referred him to an

orthopedist. (Id.) 

On February 28, 2004, Evans was examined by Dr. Steven Lee, an

orthopedic specialist. (Id. at 12.) Dr. Lee suspected that

Plaintiff must have suffered a meniscus tear. (Id.) At that time,

Evans stated that he did not want surgery, and instead he chose to

explore nonoperative treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff was prescribed

Bextra and told to modify his activities. (Id. at 12-13.) Dr. Lee

also noted that if after six weeks of treatment Plaintiff’s

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symptoms remained and he wanted to undergo surgery, Evans would be

referred to the University of California at San Diego (“UCSD”)

hospital for an MRI. (Id. at 12.) 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Damon London on March 8, 2004, after

complaining that his right leg was swollen from the knee down, and

he was experiencing numbness in his leg. (Id. at 14.) Evans was

referred back to the orthopedic clinic. (Id.) He returned to Dr.

Sereda on March 15, 2004, at which time he stated that he wanted to

proceed with surgery. (Id. at 15.) He was seen again on March 26,

2004, by Dr. Grad; he complained that he needed stronger pain

medication, and he had a possible spider bite on his left leg. 

(Id. at 17.) The “spider bite” was actually an infection, for

which Evans was prescribed Cleocin. (Id.) Plaintiff requested

that his prescription for Ultram be continued for his knee pain

because Tylenol was not effective. (Id. at 19.)

Evans was seen by Dr. Gill on April 5, 2004, and he informed

the doctor that his pain had not improved despite the exercises,

and he requested that he be seen at UCSD hospital. (Id. at 26.) 

On April 10, 2004, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Lee. (Id. at

13.) His knee pain was still present, and Dr. Lee wanted Evans to

get an MRI; if the MRI was positive, surgery should be scheduled. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff was transferred to George Bailey Detention Center on

April 30, 2004. (Id. at 3; Second Am. Compl. 4.) On May 3, 2004,

Evans was taken to UCSD hospital and a MRI of his knee was taken. 

(Second Am. Compl. Ex. A at 2.) The MRI showed multiple

abnormalities including a probable sprain of the superficial fibers

of the medial collateral ligament, disruption of the meniscal

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femoral ligament, possible disruption of the medial patellar

retinaculum at the femoral attachment site, a small ganglion cyst

of the posterior cruciate ligament, and an oblique tear of the

medial meniscus. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen at the orthopedic

clinic on May 15, 2004, at which time the doctor noted that he

would benefit from surgery but it was not an emergency situation. 

(Id. at 29.) Evans also had an appointment at UCSD hospital on May

17, 2004. (Id. at 30.)

On June 1, 2004, Plaintiff was again seen regarding his

continuing knee pain and unrelated pain in his right wrist. (Id.

at 33.) It was noted that Evans needed a reevaluation by an

orthopedist for possible surgery on his knee. (Id.) He was seen

by an orthopedist on June 5, 2004, and the doctor recommended

surgical intervention. (Id. at 34.) Plaintiff was transferred

from George Bailey to state prison on June 10, 2004. (Second Am.

Compl. 5; see Second Am. Compl. Ex. A at 34.) Evans continued to

seek medical treatment for his knee pain at Centinela State Prison. 

(See Second Am. Compl. Ex. H at 56-66.) He underwent surgery on

July 8, 2005. (Id. at 52-54.) His knee later worsened again, and

he was recommended for a second knee surgery. (Id. at 32-33; see

Second Am. Pet. 6 (alleging that Evans underwent a second surgery

on December 22, 2006).) 

On June 4, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a claim to San Diego

County requesting monetary damages because he claimed his slip-andfall injury was caused by the lack of mats or anti-skid protection

on the floor of the shower area at the Vista detention facility. 

(See Pl.’s Lodgment No. 10(h), County Claim Form, File No. 040266

(June 4, 2004).) His claim was denied on July 9, 2004. (Pl.’s

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Lodgment No. 10(f), Notice of Rejection of Claim, File No. 040266

(July 9, 2004).) Evans submitted an amended claim in November

2004; it was rejected on December 1, 2004. (Pl.’s Lodgment No.

10©), Letter from County Counsel to Terry Evans (Dec. 1, 2004);

Pl.’s Lodgment No. 10©), Attach. Am. Claim, File No. 040266 (Nov.

24, 2004).) 

On February 14, 2005, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the San

Diego Superior Court against the County of San Diego, the San Diego

Board of Supervisors, and several individual defendants. (Defs.’

Lodgment No. 1, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Compl.

1-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Fed. 14, 2005).) Evans alleged three

causes of action -- general negligence, intentional tort, and

premises liability –- based on the allegedly unsafe condition of

the flooring in the shower area that caused him to slip and fall. 

(Id. at 4, 7-9.) Plaintiff’s state complaint also purported to

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff

filed an amended complaint in the superior court on April 21, 2005. 

(Defs.’ Lodgment No. 3, Evans v. County of San Diego, No.

GIN042737, Am. Compl. (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 21, 2005).) 

Evans’s amended complaint asserted the same causes of action that

were presented in his original complaint, and it also included a

claim that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

health, safety, and welfare. (Id. at 6.) He named as defendants

the County of San Diego; five individual members of the County

Board of Supervisors; William Kolender, Sheriff; Captain Collins,

Jail Commander of Vista Detention Facility; John Doe, Supervisor of

Maintenance at Vista Detention Facility; and Walt Eckard,

Administrative Officer. (Id. at 1-4.) 

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Defendants County of San Diego and County of San Diego Board

of Supervisors filed a demurrer, which the court sustained without

leave to amend on October 14, 2005. (Defs.’ Lodgment No. 2, Evans

v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Tentative Ruling for Oct. 7,

2005, at 1-2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2006); Pl.’s Lodgment No. 4

Attach., Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Notice of

Ruling on Demurrer 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2006).) The

superior court found that Evans had failed to allege the elements

supporting a cause of action under § 1983, and he failed to state a

claim on his other causes of action because the defendants were

immune from liability and because Plaintiff had not shown that

defendants were in control of the Vista detention center or

otherwise owed a duty of care to Evans. (Defs.’ Lodgment No. 2,

Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Tentative Ruling for

Oct. 7, 2005, at 1-2.) Defendants Kolender and Eckard also filed a

demurrer, which the court sustained on November 4, 2005. (Defs.’

Lodgment No. 4, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737,

Tentative Ruling for Nov. 4, 2005, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28,

2006); Pl.’s Lodgment No. 4 Attach., Evans v. County of San Diego,

No. GIN042737, Superior Court Mins. Nov. 4, 2005, at 1 (Cal. Super

Ct. Apr. 28, 2006).)

Defendants Captain Collins and the Doe defendant (later

identified as Timothy Jordan) were granted summary judgment on

March 30, 2006. (Pl.’s Lodgment No. 4 Attach., Evans v. County of

San Diego, No. GIN042737, Order for Entry of Judgment 2 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2006).) Because the superior court had either

sustained demurrers without leave to amend or granted summary

judgment for all defendants named in Evans’s first amended

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complaint, the court dismissed the complaint on April 28, 2006. 

(Id.) Plaintiff had previously filed a notice of appeal of the

court’s rulings on the demurrers and the summary judgment motions,

but he abandoned the appeal and it was subsequently dismissed. 

(Defs.’ Lodgment No. 5, Evans v. County of San Diego, No.

GIN042737, Notice of Filing 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 2006);

Defs.’ Lodgment No. 6, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737,

Notice of Failure to Clear Default 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr.

26, 2006).)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO A RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A claim can only be

dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n.7 (1980) (quotations and

citations omitted). The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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 The question is not whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where

there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))

(stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court may not generally consider materials

outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

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Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 12.34[2], at 12-72 (3d ed. 1997) (“The court may not

. . . take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum

opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not

constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). 

But “[w]hen a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

The Court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell,

14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002);

Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14

(9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

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of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the Court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the Court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment

of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave

to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

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plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES

JUDICATA.

Defendants first claim that Plaintiff’s action is barred by

the doctrine res judicata because his Second Amended Complaint

presents the same claim that was considered and rejected by the

superior court. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 6.) Evans contends that

his claim is not barred because his state lawsuit presented claims

under the California Tort Claims Act, while his federal lawsuit

presents a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Pl.’s Opp’n 6; Pl.’s

Mem. of P. & A. 9.) 

When a case has reached a final judgment on the merits, future

claims by the same parties or their privies are barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d

318, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition to barring claims that

were actually litigated, res judicata also “prevents litigation of

all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously

available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted

or determined in the prior proceeding.” Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.

127, 131 (1979). Res judicata “treats a judgment, once rendered,

as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the parties on

the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’” Robi, 838 F.2d at 321

(quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc., 575

F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978)). 

Claims that were litigated in a state court proceeding will be

barred by res judicata in a subsequent federal § 1983 suit to the

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same extent that they would be barred in the state court that

rendered judgment. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ.,

465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (stating that federal court

is bound by preclusive effects of state court judgment). 

Accordingly, the Court must apply the law of the state court that

issued the earlier judgment -- in this case California -- to

determine whether Plaintiff’s subsequent claim is barred. Palomar

Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th

Cir. 1993) (citing Southeast Res. Recovery Facility Auth. v.

Montenay Int’l Corp., 973 F.2d 711, 712-24 (9th Cir. 1992)).

“In order to bar a later suit under the doctrine of res

judicata, an adjudication must (1) involve the same ‘claim’ as the

later suit, (2) have reached a final judgment on the merits, and

(3) involve the same parties or their privies.” Brooks v.

Alameida, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting

Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

A. Same Claim

Plaintiff alleges that his state lawsuit was based on the

California Tort Claims Act, while the present suit is based on §

1983. (Pl.’s Opp’n 6; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. 9-10.) Defendants

contend that Evans’s claim is nonetheless barred because the

present suit is based on the same factual and legal allegations as

the prior state suit. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 6-7.) 

“California has consistently applied the ‘primary rights’

theory, under which the invasion of one primary right gives rise to

a single cause of action.” Robi, 838 F.2d at 324 (quoting Slater

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v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594, 126 Cal.

Rptr. 225, 226 (1975)). 

[I]f two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff

and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary

right is at stake even if in the second suit the

plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks

different forms of relief and/or adds new facts

supporting recovery. 

Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174, 197 Cal.

Rptr. 612, 614 (1983); accord Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666,

681, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (1994). 

“[T]he single most important factor in determining whether a

single course of conduct has violated more than one primary right

is whether plaintiff suffered injury to more than one interest.” 

Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750

F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 1984). For res judicata purposes, “injury”

refers to the invasion of a legally protected interest, rather than

the resultant physical or emotional harm. Migliori v. Boeing N.

Am., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citations

omitted). 

Here, Evans’s Amended Complaint presents a different claim

than was presented in his state action. In the state case,

Plaintiff complained that on January 27, 2004, the floor of the

jail shower area constituted a dangerous condition because it was

not equipped with skid-proof coating, and the jail officials failed

to warn inmates of the floor’s dangerous condition. (Defs.’

Lodgment No. 3, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Am.

Compl. 9-11.) Evans further alleged that the dangerous condition

of the floor was the cause of his slip-and-fall, and he suffered

serious physical injuries as a result. (Id.) 

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But in the state court, Plaintiff did not allege that the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by

failing to provide prompt and adequate medical treatment, as he

alleges in his federal case. Thus, his state cause of action was

based on the invasion of one primary right –- the right to be

protected from dangerous conditions –- while the federal cause of

action focuses on a different primary right –- the right to be

provided prompt and adequate medical care. It does not matter that

both injuries resulted in physical harm to Evans’s knee. See

Migliori, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (stating that separate wrongful

acts, each of which physically harms the plaintiff’s body, make up

separate causes of action); Weikel v. TCW Realty Fund II Holding

Co., 55 Cal. App. 4th 1234, 1246-47, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 32 (Ct.

App. 1997) (explaining that the invasion of one primary right

creates one injury, and accordingly it gives rise to a single cause

of action); cf. Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343-44 (9th Cir.

1980) (finding no res judicata effect when prior claim alleged

violation of the Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care

and subsequent claim alleged improper denial of inmate’s stategranted right to consult nonprison doctor at his own expense).

Defendants point out that Plaintiff’s complaint in the state

court action made reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted that

the defendants were liable under the federal statute for actions

they took under color of state law. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 6; see

Defs.’ Lodgment No. 1, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737,

Compl. 4-5.) Evans’s amended state complaint specifically alleged

that the defendants had acted with deliberate indifference to his

health and safety in violation of § 1983 and Evans’s rights under

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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Defs.’ Lodgment No. 3,

Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Am. Compl. 6-7.) 

After the County of San Diego filed a demurrer to his amended

complaint, Evans filed a motion to strike his claim for relief

under § 1983. (See Defs.’ Lodgment No. 2, Evans v. County of San

Diego, No. GIN042737, Tentative Ruling for Oct. 7, 2005, at 1;

Pl.’s Lodgment No. 3, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737,

Mot. to Strike 1-2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2006).) The court did

not grant his motion, instead finding that by moving to strike his

§ 1983 claim, Plaintiff appeared to “concede the merit of the

Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action.” (Defs.’ Lodgment

No. 2, Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Tentative

Ruling for Oct. 7, 2005, at 1.) 

Although Evans presented a § 1983 claim to the state court,

his § 1983 claim in the present federal suit is not precluded

because the two claims allege different injuries. Plaintiff’s

state action alleged that he was injured on January 27, 2004,

because Defendants were indifferent to his health and safety by

maintaining the hazardous condition of the floor. Evans’s federal

cause of action, however, focuses on the separate right to have

prompt and meaningful access to medical services to treat that

injury. These two primary rights constitute separate claims.

B. Final Judgment on the Merits

“In California, a judgment entered after the sustaining of a

general demurrer is a judgment on the merits, and, to the extent

that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not establish a cause

of action, it will bar a second action on the same facts.” Palomar

Mobilehome Park Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 364 (citing Crowley v. Modern

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Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 321, 322, 282 P.2d 33, 34 (1955)). 

Summary judgment also constitutes a final judgment on the merits

for preclusion purposes. Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 996 n.4

(9th Cir. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1125

n.3 (9th Cir. 1979)). All of the claims asserted by Plaintiff in

his state court lawsuit were resolved either through summary

judgment or by the sustaining of demurrers. (See Pl.’s Lodgment

No. 4 Attach., Evans v. County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Order

for Entry of Judgment 2.) Accordingly, Evans’s prior suit reached

a final judgment on the merits.

C. Same Parties

The third element is met when the parties to the former and

present cause of action are identical, or when they are privies. 

Privity is found when a person essentially holds the same position

or relationship that the person in the prior action held, thereby

“represent[ing] precisely the same right in respect to the subject

matter involved.” Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir.

2005). 

In both Evans’s state suit and the present federal suit, the

City of San Diego and Sheriff William Kolender were named as

Defendants. (Compare Defs.’ Lodgment No. 3, Evans v. County of San

Diego, No. GIN042737, Am. Compl. 1-3, with Second Am. Compl. 2.) 

Plaintiff’s state action also named five members of the San Diego

County Board of Supervisors, a San Diego County administrative

officer, the Commander of Vista Jail, and the Vista Jail’s building

and maintenance supervisor. (Defs.’ Lodgment No. 3, Evans v.

County of San Diego, No. GIN042737, Am. Compl. 2-3.) These

individuals, along with several others, were also named in Evans’s

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federal Complaint, but they were dismissed and not named in

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl. 1-12; Second

Am. Compl. 1-2; Order Sua Sponte Dismissing Compl. [doc. no. 10] 7-

8.) The County of San Diego and Sheriff Kolender were parties in

the prior suit and could be barred by res judicata if the same

claim had been presented against them in the present suit, but res

judicata cannot apply to the “chief medical officer” named as a

Defendant in the present suit because neither he nor his privy was

named in the previous state litigation. Regardless, as discussed

above, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not present the

same claim that was adjudicated in his prior state lawsuit, and

accordingly, Evans’s federal action should not be dismissed based

on res judicata.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS.

Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations. See 42

U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003). Federal courts must therefore apply

the state’s personal injury statute of limitations, as well as any

state law tolling provisions that are not contrary to federal law. 

Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Morales v. City of Los

Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000); TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

California law imposes a two-year statute of limitations for

personal injury actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (West Supp.

2005); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Although state law determines the length of the limitations

period, ‘federal law determines when a civil rights claim

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accrues.’” Azer, 306 F.3d at 936 (quoting Morales, 214 F.3d at

1153-54). “Under federal law, ‘a claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the

action.’” Id. (quoting Morales, 214 F.3d at 1154).

Defendants assert that Evans’s cause of action accrued on

January 27, 2004, when he was injured. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 7.) 

They argue that any actions that occurred before April 13, 2004,

two years before Plaintiff filed this action, are barred by the

statute of limitations. (Reply 2.) Plaintiff argues that his

claim did not accrue on January 27, 2004; instead, Evans contends

that because his claim is based on a continuing violation, the

statute began to run anew on each day that his knee remained

untreated. (Pl.’s Opp’n 7; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. 10-11.)

For continuing violations, the statute of limitations does not

begin to run until the violation or series of violations ends. 

Green v. L.A. County Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-81

(9th Cir. 1989). The theory of continuing violations is an

equitable doctrine that “prevent[s] a defendant from using its

earlier conduct to avoid liability for later illegal conduct of the

same sort.” O’Loghlin v. County of Orange, 229 F.3d 871, 875 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

To establish a continuing violation, Plaintiff must show “‘a

series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the

limitations period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system

both before and during the [limitations] period.’” Green, 883 F.2d

at 1480 (quoting Valentino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 65

(D.D.C. 1982)). “A continuing violation is occasioned by continual

unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original

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violation.” Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981)

(citing Collins v. United Airlines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594, 596 (9th

Cir. 1975)); see also Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir.

2001). “Mere ‘continuing impact from past violations is not

actionable.’” Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924

(9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d

757, 769 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that after his

knee was injured on January 27, 2004, Defendants failed to properly

treat his injury, which caused him pain, functional limitations,

and further injury. (Second Am. Compl. 7.) Evans does not purport

to state a cause of action for the original knee injury; rather, he

claims that it was Defendants’ failure to treat the injury that

constitutes deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (See id.

at 5-10.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue

on January 27, 2004, as Defendants argue. 

Evans’s allegations of deliberate indifference all relate to

the time that he was in the custody of the San Diego County Sheriff

as a detainee in the Vista jail and George Bailey Detention Center. 

(Second Am. Compl. 3-10.) The crux of his complaint is that he did

not receive arthroscopic knee surgery while in the sheriff

department’s custody between January 27, 2004, when he as injured,

and June 10, 2004, when he was transferred to the custody of the

California Department of Corrections (“CDC”). (See id. at 5-6.) 

He does not complain about any actions of CDC officials that

occurred after he was transferred to their custody. Accordingly,

the continuing violation that he alleges spans in time from January

27, 2004, to June 10, 2004. (Id. at 3-10.)

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Defendants argue that to find a “continuing violation” where

deliberate indifference to medical care has been alleged would make

the statute of limitations “meaningless.” (Reply 2.) Evans is not

complaining about the discrete failures of doctors who treated him. 

It is the aggregation of the failures to treat Plaintiff that gives

rise to his claim against the County of San Diego, Sheriff

Kolender, and Doctor Goldstein (“chief medical officer”). Because

Plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that he was denied

adequate medical care between January 27 and June 10, 2004, the

statute of limitations on his claim did not begin to run until June

11, 2004, the end of the alleged violation.

Other courts have applied a continuing violation analysis to a

deliberate indifference claim. See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316,

318 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that continuous violation doctrine

applied to defendants’ deliberate indifference for the span of time

that prison officials were aware of plaintiff’s injury and

allegedly refused to treat it); Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129,

1132 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he [arrestee’s] allegation of a failure

to provide needed and requested medical attention constitutes a

continuing tort, which does not accrue until the date medical

attention is provided.”); Neel v. Rehberg, 577 F.2d 262, 263-64

(5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (finding that where inmate alleged

that jail officials failed to provide medical treatment over a

three-month period, the continuous violation doctrine applied and

the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the end of

that period); see also Shomo v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 10213

(AKH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5488, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2005)

(stating that in a case alleging medical neglect, the unlawful

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1 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss also asserts that

Evans should be entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due

to “perpetual lockdowns” in the prison. (Pl.’s Opp’n 7; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A.

10.) Presumably, Plaintiff is claiming that prison lockdowns made it difficult

for him to prepare and file his federal Complaint. 

Equitable tolling under California law is applied to prevent the unjust

forfeiture of a plaintiff’s causes of action based on application of harsh

technical rules. Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370, 73 P.3d 517,

523, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 661 (2003) (citations omitted). Application of the

doctrine requires balancing the injustice to the plaintiff if his claim is

barred against the effect upon the public interests or policies inherent in the

statute of limitations. Id. at 371, 73 P.3d at 524, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 662

(citation omitted). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling applies. 

United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999). The only

evidence Evans provided to the Court is a letter he wrote to a judge of the

superior court on March 5, 2005, requesting an extension of time to file and

serve a complaint. (Pl.’s Lodgment No. 1, Evans v. County of San Diego, No.

GIN042737, Letter from Plaintiff to Judge Stern 1 (filed Mar. 18, 2005).) In

the letter Plaintiff asserts he was denied law library access due to prison

lockdowns. (Id.) Evans has not met his burden of establishing circumstances

warranting equitable tolling. He has not demonstrated that prison lockdowns

caused any period of delay in filing his federal Complaint. Additionally,

Plaintiff’s own statements that he had insufficient library access, without

more, are not enough to meet his burden. 

23 06cv877-JM (RBB)

practice does not end until the last day that prison authorities

had a duty to provide plaintiff with medical care).

The statute of limitations, accordingly, began to run on June

11, 2004. Plaintiff initiated the present lawsuit by filing his

Complaint on April 13, 2006, which is within the two-year

limitations period. Because Evans alleges a continuing violation

and some of the actions he complains of occurred within the

limitations period, he can “reach back in seeking to prove

liability and estimate damages[]” to the first date that Defendants

were aware of his injury and refused to treat it. Heard, 253 F.3d

at 318. Plaintiff’s case is not barred by the statue of

limitations, and thus Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should not be

granted on this ground.1

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VII. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT SHOWN THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO EXHAUST

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. 

Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id.

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

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Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A court ruling on a

motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of ‘matters of

public record.’” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001)). But “if the district court looks beyond the

pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that [the

plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record.” 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. “[When] the district court concludes

that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the

proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. at

1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3). 

Plaintiff submitted a claim and amended claim to the County of

San Diego requesting monetary damages for his knee injury. (Pl.’s

Opp’n 8; see Pl.’s Lodgment No. 10(h), County Claim Form, File No.

040266; Pl.’s Lodgment No. 10(e), Am. County Claim Form, File No.

040266 (Nov. 24, 2004).) Evans also sent a letter to the jail

commander and a letter to Sheriff Kolender complaining about his

slip-and-fall accident and requesting all necessary documents or

forms so that he could file a claim for damages. (See Second Am.

Compl. 14; Pl.’s Lodgment No. 10(I), Letter from Evans to Sheriff

Kolender (undated); Pl.’s Lodgment No. 10(j), Letter from Evans to

“Captain” (undated).) Defendants argue, nevertheless, that

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed for

failure to exhaust because, “Plaintiff makes no mention of any

requests made, grievances filed, or any other procedures that are

in place to address inmate complaints.” (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A.

10.) 

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The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be

pled and proven by the Defendants. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. To

prove that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies, the defendant must identify specific remedies that were

available to the plaintiff and provide evidence showing they were

not exhausted. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir.

2005); accord Raines v. Pickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (N.D.N.Y.

2000); see also Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir.

1999) (noting that the court was obligated to establish the

availability of an administrative remedy before dismissing

plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust). “[T]here can be no

‘absence of exhaustion’ unless some relief remains ‘available[.]’” 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 936-37. Defendants must come forward

with relevant evidence demonstrating that there were remedies

available to the prisoner. Id. at 937. Relevant evidence may

include “statutes, regulations, and other official directives that

explain the scope of the administrative review process; documentary

or testimonial evidence from prison officials who administer the

review process; and information provided to the prisoner concerning

the operation of the grievance procedure in this case . . . .” Id.

(citing Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Defendants have not presented any relevant evidence showing

that there were administrative remedies available to Evans. Ninth

Circuit cases have discussed the procedure set forth in the

California Code of Regulations regarding administrative grievance

procedures for inmates in state prisons, but those procedures did

not apply to Plaintiff until he was transferred into state prison

on June 10, 2004. See, e.g., Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047,

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1048-49 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 929-

30). The allegations in his Second Amended Complaint relate to the

time while he was held in the sheriff’s custody in San Diego County

jails prior to his transfer to state prison. Defendants have not

presented any evidence showing that there were administrative

grievance procedures available to Evans while he was housed in the

county jails. Plaintiff contends that the “appropriate action . .

. was to file [a] claim against the county or its agents,” (see

Pl.’s Opp’n 8), and Defendants have not presented any evidence

showing otherwise. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their

burden under Wyatt v. Terhune of proving that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust. Defendants Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust

should be DENIED.

VIII. PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT FAIL TO STATE A

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

Evans’s Second Amended Complaint alleges one cause of action: 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Second Am. Compl. 7.) 

Defendants contend, however, that his case must be dismissed for

failure to state a claim because the facts alleged in the Second

Amended Complaint, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,

do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. (Defs.’ Mem.

of P. & A. 8.) Defendants assert that at best Evans’s allegations

state a claim for medical negligence, but negligence alone is not a

constitutional violation. (Id. at 9.)

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that “‘involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . .’” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428

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U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (additional citations omitted). Accordingly,

the government has an “obligation to provide medical care to those

whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. Individuals who are

detained before trial are entitled to similar protection under the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Because Evans’s alleged

injuries occurred while he was a pretrial detainee, his claim must

be analyzed under a substantive due process framework. See id.

The due process analysis, however, does not differ greatly from the

Eighth Amendment standard: “With regard to medical needs, the due

process clause imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth

Amendment imposes: ‘persons in custody have the established right

to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their

serious medical needs.’” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d

1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977,

979 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

To maintain a claim for deliberate indifference under § 1983,

Plaintiff must establish two elements. “First, the plaintiff must

show a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to

treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”’ 

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the

need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overrruled on other grounds by WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). 

“Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he existence of

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important

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and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60). 

The second element, deliberate indifference, is pled if the

prisoner alleges facts that show “(a) a purposeful act or failure

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b)

harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. To be

found liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, a prison “official

must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

“This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison

doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison

guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care

or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). 

The indifference to medical needs must be substantial;

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence,

does not amount to a constitutional violation. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06);

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). 

“Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s

serious medical needs when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally

interfere with medical treatment.’” Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hutchinson v. United States,

838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988)). “Medical malpractice does not

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become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff’s injury was not a

“serious medical need.” Instead, they focus on the second element,

alleging that their actions did not demonstrate deliberate

indifference. Defendants contend that the facts show extensive

treatment of Evans’s injury: 

Plaintiff was injured on January 27, 2004, was examined

by at least eight different doctors inside and outside of

jail in the next several months before his transfer to

state prison in June of 2004. The doctors examined his

knee, prescribed numerous medications, recommended nonsurgical exercises for Plaintiff, took x-rays of his

knee, had an MRI of his knee done, and, finally,

recommended surgery.

(Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 9.) Defendants also claim that Plaintiff

cannot show deliberate indifference because he has not presented a

medical opinion or other evidence to support his belief that he

should have received knee surgery before being transferred to state

prison. (Id.; Defs.’ Reply 3.) Evans attempts to refute this

argument by asserting that although he was treated, his knee is now

worse than before and he suffers loss of mobility, severe

arthritis, scar tissue, chronic pain, and he must wear a knee brace

and use a cane because Defendants did not provide him with prompt

surgery after it was recommended. (Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. 13.)

“‘A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within

the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an

act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation

of which [the plaintiff complains].”’” Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Leer v.

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Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, to recover

damages against an individual defendant, “the inmate[] . . . must

prove (1) that the specific prison official . . . was deliberately

indifferent to the mandates of the [E]ighth [A]mendment and (2)

that this indifference was the actual and proximate cause of the

deprivation of the inmate[’]s[] [E]ighth [A]mendment right . . . .” 

Leer, 844 F.2d at 634 (citations omitted). The causation inquiry

focuses on “whether the individual defendant was in a position to

take steps to avert” the harm to the plaintiff, as well as what

“the duties, discretion, and means of each defendant” were at the

time. Id. at 633-34.

Plaintiff does not assert facts to suggest that any of the

Defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of

his rights. Instead, Evans contends that Defendant County of San

Diego has a policy, custom or practice of delaying or denying

adequate and meaningful medical treatment, including surgery, to

pretrial detainees. (Second Am. Compl. 9.) Plaintiff further

alleges that Defendants Kolender and “chief medical officer” acted

on behalf of the County in enforcing this policy. (Id. at 9-10.) 

The only allegations of personal involvement in Evans’s medical

treatment concern particular medical care providers not named as

defendants in this suit. (See id. at 3-6.) 

In the absence of a claim that Defendants were personally

involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights, Evans

can state a cause of action under § 1983 by alleging that a policy

existed that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Galen

v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007)

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(citations omitted); Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086,

1094 (9th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff attempting to prove that a

municipality is liable for constitutional violations committed by

its officials pursuant to official policy may establish such a

claim three different ways:

(1) by showing “a longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the

local governmental entity;” (2) “by showing that the

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a

final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy in the area

of decision;” or (3) “by showing that an official with

final policymaking authority either delegated that

authority to, or ratified the decision of, a

subordinate.”

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968,

984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the County of San Diego has a

policy of delaying meaningful medical treatment, such as

arthroscopic surgery, to pretrial detainees in the county jails. 

(Second Am. Pet. 9-10.) Defendants argue this claim is

insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss because Evans “does

not identify [the policies] or even suggest what they might be.” 

(Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 10.) 

“In [the Ninth Circuit], a claim of municipal liability under

section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if

the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the

individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom,

or practice.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d at 682-83

(quoting Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d at

624); accord Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484 n.10

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(1986). This Circuit’s “bare allegation” requirement has been

upheld by the Supreme Court. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-69

(1993); see Marsh v. San Diego County, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1053

(S.D. Cal. 2006) (discussing Leatherman). 

All that is required of a § 1983 plaintiff, just as federal

plaintiffs alleging other causes of action, is “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168;

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.

2002) (citations omitted); Nance v. Viergegge, 147 F.3d 589, 590

(7th Cir. 1998) (“Civil rights complaints are not held to a higher

standard than complaints in other civil litigation.”). In order to

prevail on this claim, Evans will have to prove that such a policy

exists and that the policy led to the deprivation of his

constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389

(1989); Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Although Evans’s allegations may prove to be unsubstantiated, he

has properly alleged the necessary elements of a § 1983 claim

against the County to survive a motion to dismiss. See Leatherman,

507 U.S. at 168-69 (stating that because the federal rules employ

only a notice pleading standard, litigants must rely on discovery

and summary judgment “to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner

rather than later”). 

He has also properly alleged claims against the other two

Defendants. Sheriff Kolender and the County’s chief medical

officer are sued in their individual capacities. (Second Am.

Compl. 2.) To state a cause of action against a government

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official sued in his individual capacity, it is sufficient to

assert that the official implemented the policies that allegedly

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Crawford-El v.

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595-96 (1998) (explaining that there is no

heightened standard of pleading or proof in civil rights cases

regarding motive of individual officers); see also Bacon v.

Kolender, No. 05cv0310 BTM (PCL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66274, at

*8-9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2007) (finding plaintiff’s complaint

sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of the sheriff when

it alleged that sheriff implemented the policies that plaintiff

claims violated his constitutional rights).

The Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

presents “no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” See Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim should

be DENIED.

X. DEFENDANTS’ RULE 12(e) MOTION TO REQUIRE A MORE DEFINITE

STATEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED.

Defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s [Second Amended Complaint] 

is too vague and ambiguous for Defendants to be able to frame a

proper responsive pleading[,]” and they request that the Court

require a more definite statement from Plaintiff. (Defs.’ Mem. of

P. & A. 11.) Evans states that if that Court agrees with

Defendants and finds his Second Amended Complaint to be vague and

conclusory, he requests leave to file another amended complaint to

cure any deficiencies. (Pl.’s Opp’n 8; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. 20.)

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“If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is

so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite

statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(e). “Rule 12(e) is designed to strike at unintelligibility,

rather than want of detail.” Woods v. Reno Commodities, Inc., 600

F. Supp. 574, 580 (D. Nev. 1984); Nelson v. Quimby Island

Reclamation Dist., 491 F. Supp. 1364, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 

A motion for a more definite statement should be denied if a

pleading meets federal standards by providing a “short and plain

statement” of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is only proper if the

complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot frame a

responsive pleading. See Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v.

Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Famolare, Inc.

v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal.

1981). The Court must deny the motion if the complaint is specific

enough to apprise Defendants of the substance of the claim being

asserted. See Bureerong v. Uyawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D.

Cal. 1996); FRA S.P.A. v. Surg-O-Flex of Am., 415 F. Supp. 421, 427

(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in

detail and finds that it is sufficient to meet the pleading

requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Evans

clearly alleges that although he saw numerous doctors in the months

following his injury, he was not given the recommended surgery

before he was transferred to state prison. (Second Am. Pet. 5-6.) 

He alleges that as a result, his knee was permanently and

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irreparably damaged. (Id. at 6, 7.) Further, he claims that

Defendants had a duty to provide him with prompt and adequate

medical care, including surgery, but they violated that duty

pursuant to a San Diego County policy of failing to provide

pretrial detainees with recommended surgeries. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Although Defendants complain that Plaintiff has not specifically

identified the policy that might be implicated here, Evans’s

allegations of municipal liability are sufficient to survive

dismissal, see Marsh, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54. Defendants’

Motion for a more definite statement should be DENIED. 

XI. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE

DENIED.

On July 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed a request to file a third

amended complaint [doc. no. 40]. Evans’s motion, however, does not

describe what changes he wishes to make to his Second Amended

Complaint or why further amendment is necessary. (See Mot. to

Amend 1.) Defendants filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion [doc. no. 45] on August 8,

2007. 

Plaintiff’s motion was not accompanied by a proposed third

amended complaint, but from Defendants’ Opposition it would appear

that Defendants were given a copy of the document. Defendants

assert that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint does not allege any

new or different facts, theories, or grounds for relief. (Defs.’

Opp’n to Mot. to Amend 1-2.) Instead, the third amended complaint

removes some of the factual detail regarding his medical treatment. 

(Id.)

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The Court should grant leave to amend freely “when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “‘[T]he rule favoring

liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly important for

the pro se litigant.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1131 (quoting

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). Here,

however, Plaintiff has not shown that amendment is appropriate.

A moving party is required to state the grounds for its motion

“with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); Waters v. Weyerhauser

Mortgage Co., 582 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1978). A “bare request”

to amend, without stating the particular grounds for the amendment,

is not a proper motion under Rule 15(a). Confederate Mem. Ass’n,

Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993); accord Evans v.

Pearson Enters., 434 F.3d 839, 853 (6th Cir. 2006); AT&T Corp. v.

Am. Cash Card Corp., 184 F.R.D. 515, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 

Plaintiff’s motion does not set forth any grounds for

amendment, nor is it accompanied by a proposed third amended

complaint. The Court does not know what changes Evans proposes to

make to his pleadings. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to file an

amended complaint should be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

XII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

the Second Amended Complaint or Require a More Definite Statement

should be DENIED. Plaintiff’s request to file a further amended

complaint should also be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

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before January 7, 2008. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 21, 2008. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATE: December 6, 2007 _____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Miller

All Parties of Record

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