Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03478/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03478-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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CLD-149 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 15-3478 

___________ 

RONALD GOODE, 

Appellant

v. 

LOUIS GIORLA, Commissioner of Philadelphia Prison System; 

MICHELLE FARRELL, Warden of Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility;

CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER CURRAN-FROMHOLD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; 

M. SATTERFIELD, Medical Personnel; K. MCKINNEY, Medical Personnel; 

PA PATEL, Medical Personnel 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-05603) 

District Judge J. William Ditter, Junior

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

February 19, 2016 

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 

(Filed: February 25, 2016) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

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Pro se appellant Ronald Goode appeals from the judgment of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in his § 1983 action. As the appeal 

does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision of the 

District Court.

I.

Goode initiated this § 1983 action in 2013 against Louis Giorla, Commissioner of 

the Philadelphia Prison System, and various other personnel at Curran-Fromhold 

Correctional facility (“CFCF”), claiming that he was denied adequate medical treatment 

in connection with a hand injury he suffered while confined as a pre-trial detainee at the 

facility.1

Goode fractured his right hand around 5:00 P.M. on June 23, 2013, after falling

from a table in his cell which he used to access the top bunk. Goode advised a 

corrections officer of the injury and submitted a sick call request the same day, claiming 

to be in “serious pain.” Defendant M. Satterfield,2a nurse at the Philadelphia Prison 

System, attended to Goode’s injury at approximately 9:00 P.M. on the following day, at 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 At the time of the injury, Goode was awaiting trial on attempted murder and related 

charges arising from a 2011 incident. 

2 Nurse M. Satterfield is the only remaining defendant in this action. On September 9, 

2014, the District Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Louis Giorla, 

Commissioner of the Philadelphia Prison System, and Michelle Ferrel, Warden of CFCF. 

On September 29, 2015 the District Court dismissed Physician’s Assistant Defendants

McKinney and Patel because Goode failed to properly serve them. We find no error in 

either decision.

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which time Goode advised Satterfield that he desired to see a doctor because he believed 

his hand was broken. Satterfield advised Goode that no doctor was on duty at the time 

and instead referred Goode to see another nurse or physician’s assistant the following 

day. Satterfield did not otherwise treat Goode’s hand, and this is the only occasion on 

which Goode Saw Satterfield in connection with his hand injury. 

Goode was seen by Physician’s Assistant McKinney about 14 hours after seeing 

Satterfield, and seen by Physician’s Assistant Patel the following day. Ultimately, Goode 

was diagnosed, and treated, at Temple University Hospital for a fractured second 

metacarpal bone (bone of the index finger).

Goode filed his initial complaint on October 2, 2013, and on September 29, 2015, 

the District Court granted Satterfield’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all 

claims against him with prejudice. Goode filed a notice of appeal from this order on 

October 13, 2015. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district 

court award of summary judgment and apply the same test the district court should have 

utilized – whether the record “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Giles v. Kearney, 

571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). In applying this test, we must accept evidence 

presented by the non-movant as true and draw all justifiable factual inferences in his 

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favor. Id. We may summarily affirm the District Court’s award of summary judgment 

where “it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented or that subsequent 

precedent or a change in circumstances warrants such action.” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2015).

The District Court correctly ruled against Goode’s § 1983 claim because Goode 

failed to present evidence from which any reasonable fact-finder could conclude that 

Satterfield acted with deliberate indifference. A deliberate indifference claim, under 

either the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment,3requires “acts or omissions sufficiently 

harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Kost v. 

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 1993). This requires proof beyond simple 

negligence, and “medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 

because the victim is a prisoner.” Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)).

The District Court accurately characterized Satterfield’s conduct as an 

“inadvertent failure to provide care” or “negligent diagnosis,” and accurately observed 

that a denial or delay of medical treatment becomes actionable only when “it results in 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.

Goode’s claim against Satterfield rests solely on Satterfield’s decision to not 

immediately treat his hand when first seeing him, and to not immediately refer Goode to a 

 

3 The District Court analyzed Goode’s claim under the Eighth Amendment. As a pre-trial 

detainee, his claim is more properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard 

v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen pretrial detainees challenge their 

conditions of confinement, we must consider whether there has been a violation of the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The standard is the same under 

both amendments. Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir.1993).

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doctor’s care4 – which apparently would have been impossible, or at least highly 

burdensome, because no doctor was on staff at the time. Even if a doctor was available, 

however, Satterfield’s decision to refer Goode for treatment the following day – instead 

of treating him immediately – reflects an exercise of professional judgment and, as a 

consequence, cannot constitute deliberate indifference. Montilla v. Prison Health Servs., 

Inc., 457 F. App'x 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (Observing “that courts will disavow any 

attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment[,] 

which remains a question of sound professional judgment.”) (internal quotations 

omitted).

Moreover, an inmate claiming deliberate indifference based on a delay in 

treatment “must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the 

detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Hill v. Dekalb Rg'l Youth 

Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir.1994) (overruled on other grounds). 

So even if Satterfield’s conduct rose to the level of deliberate indifference, Goode’s claim 

would still fail because he has offered no verified medical evidence of any detrimental 

effect attributable to the delay.

For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

decision.

 

4 When asked in his deposition why he was suing Satterfield, Goode stated: “The reason 

why is because I explained to him that it felt like my hand is broke and I would like to see 

a doctor. He told me that a doctor is not on. And . . . even understanding the policy, the 

doctor is supposed to be on call 24 hours a day.” Plaintiff’s Dep., p. 16. 

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