Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02496/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02496-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCIS T. FAHY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-02496 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

TO DISMISS 

In two separate motions, the State Bar Defendants and the

Judicial Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), based on

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposes the motions. 

Having considered all the papers filed by the parties, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motions.

BACKGROUND 

In 1990, Plaintiff was admitted to the California Bar. 

(Complaint at Paragraph 30.) The State Bar filed disciplinary

charges against Plaintiff alleging that he misappropriated client

funds held in trust in his State Bar Interest On Lawyer’s Trust

Account (IOLTA). (Id. at Paragraph 35.) After a hearing, a state

bar judge found Plaintiff culpable for misappropriation of funds

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and moral turpitude. (Id. at Paragraph 37.) Plaintiff sought

review in the State Bar appeals board and the California Supreme

Court; both denied his petitions. (Id. at Paragraphs 38-39.) He

then sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which

was denied. (Notice of Order of denial of petition for Writ of

Certiorari, October 9, 2007, at 1.) 

On May 16, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in this

Court for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief for

violations of his federal civil rights and alleging state law

claims of malicious prosecution, conspiracy, negligence, qui tam

and defamation. Plaintiff named as defendants the Supreme Court of

California, the State Bar of California, the justices of the

California Supreme Court, California State Bar judges and

California State Bar officials. All individual Defendants are

named in their official and individual capacities. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

I. Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist

at the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). A Rule 12(b)(1)

motion may either attack the sufficiency of the pleadings to

establish federal jurisdiction, or allege an actual lack of

jurisdiction which exists despite the formal sufficiency of the

complaint. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594

F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

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1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987).

Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes to

the power of the court to hear the case. Therefore, a Rule

12(b)(1) challenge should be decided before other grounds for

dismissal, because they will become moot if dismissal is granted. 

Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 874 (1975).

An action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend

unless it is clear that the jurisdictional deficiency cannot be

cured by amendment. May Dep’t Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637

F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980).

II. Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964

(2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to

state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

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F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

DISCUSSION 

I. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

Defendants argue that they are immune from Plaintiff’s suit

because of the immunity granted states, state agencies and state

officials by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment

provides, in relevant part, that the "judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 

. . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. XI. States are protected by the

Eleventh Amendment from suits by citizens in federal court unless

the defendant has waived immunity or Congress has exercised its

Fourteenth Amendment power to override immunity. Seminole Tribe v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A waiver requires an express

statement and must explicitly extend to suits in federal court. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Eleventh Amendment protection extends to suits brought against

state agencies, Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &

Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993), including the State Bar of

California, Hirsh v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., 67 F.3d 708, 715

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(9th Cir. 1995), and the state courts, Greater Los Angeles Council

on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). 

It also extends to suits for damages brought against state

officials acting in their official capacity. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a request for

prospective injunctive relief against a state official acting in

his or her official capacity. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664

(1974); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar individual capacity suits. 

Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff first argues that Defendants waived their Eleventh

Amendment immunity. This argument fails because there is no

evidence that the State expressly waived its immunity to suit in

federal court.

Plaintiff then argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity does

not apply because Defendants’ role is administrative enforcement of

attorney disciplinary regulations rather than judicial. However,

this argument is applicable only to judicial immunity, which is not

the same as the broader Eleventh Amendment immunity protecting

state agencies. 

Therefore, due to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the Supreme Court of

California and the State Bar of California, as well as Plaintiff's

official capacity claims for damages against the individual State

Bar Defendants and the California Supreme Court justices. 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims against individual Defendants in their

individual capacity and for prospective injunctive and declaratory

relief against individual Defendants in their official capacity are

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barred because under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction.

II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's complaint asks the Court to

review a state court decision, which review is barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to review state court orders and judgments. Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Only the United States

Supreme Court can review state court orders and judgments. Id.

This jurisdictional limitation on the district courts’ power is

known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id.

Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prohibit

district courts from considering a general constitutional challenge

to a State Bar rule of general applicability, it does bar

challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out

of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the

state court’s action was unconstitutional. Feldman, 460 U.S. at

483-486. A federal district court cannot review orders of a state

court relating to admission, discipline and disbarment of members

of its bar; these orders can only be reviewed by the United States

Supreme Court. MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846, 846 (9th Cir.

1969); Craig v. State Bar of California, 141 F.3d 1353, 1354 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

A federal action constitutes a de facto appeal of a state

judgment where “claims raised in the federal court action are

‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such

that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the

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state ruling or require the district court to interpret the

application of state laws or procedural rules.” Bianchi v.

Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 

All of the causes of action in Plaintiff's complaint arise

from the injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of his

disciplinary proceedings before the California State Bar and the

California Supreme Court's decision to deny review of his case. 

Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff's causes of

action in the instant complaint. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants fail due to a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction either under the Eleventh Amendment or

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or both. 

III. Judicial Immunity

The California Supreme Court Justices and the State Bar judges

and officials also argue that they are entitled to judicial

immunity and therefore the claims against them should be dismissed. 

Plaintiff counters that Defendants are not entitled to judicial

immunity because they were performing administrative acts. Judges

and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely free from

liability for acts performed in their official capacities. 

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). A judge

is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions

not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Hyland v. Wonder, 117

F.3d at 413 n.1 (holding that judge may lose protection of judicial

immunity when performing an administrative act). Whether an act by

a judge is a judicial one depends upon (1) the nature and function

of the act and not the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function

normally performed by a judge, and (2) the expectations of the

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parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his or her

judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-13. 

Prosecutors are protected by immunity from claims that rely upon

decisions made and actions taken by the attorneys within the scope

of their roles as advocates. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,

125-26, 130-31 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31

(1976). Judicial immunity does extend to damages suits against

state bar judges and prosecutors when such suits are based on

alleged wrongdoing in the administration of attorney discipline

functions. Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 715. 

Citing Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the

United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) and In re Attorney

Discipline System, 19 Cal. 4th 582 (1998), Plaintiff argues that

justices, judges and prosecutors are not eligible for immunity when

they act as enforcers of administrative systems. Defendants,

Plaintiff alleges, were acting to enforce State Bar disciplinary

and IOLTA regulations and are not protected by judicial immunity. 

Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. and In re Attorney

Discipline System were suits respectively challenging the

regulation of attorney advertising and the imposition of a fee on

attorneys to fund an attorney disciplinary system. Plaintiff’s

complaint, however, addresses his grievances about procedural

errors and improper rulings in his underlying state proceedings and

their review by the California Supreme Court justices. Although

Plaintiff includes language in his oppositions suggesting a facial

challenge to IOLTA and disciplinary regulations, his complaint is

about his personal disciplinary proceedings, which are judicial in

character. Thus, Defendants are immune from liability. 

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IV. Futility of Amendment 

As noted, in his oppositions Plaintiff indicates that he meant

to bring a general constitutional challenge to the disciplinary and

IOLTA regulations of the State Bar. However, an amendment to the

current complaint to allege a general constitutional challenge to

the disciplinary and IOLTA regulations of the State Bar would be

futile for the following reasons.

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

As described above, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where

“claims raised in the federal court action are ‘inextricably

intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the

adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling

or require the district court to interpret the application of state

laws or procedural rules.” Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898.

Any facial constitutional challenge to IOLTA or the State Bar

disciplinary regulations that Plaintiff could make is inextricably

intertwined with the State Bar court and the California Supreme

court’s judgments on Plaintiff’s discipline by the State Bar. 

Plaintiff admits he specifically raised such challenges in the

state proceedings: “Defendants claim that plaintiff[] could have

raised any constitutional challenges to its State Bar court

proceeding in their review department. He did.” (Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 22.) Thus,

Plaintiff would be asking the Court to review a state court

decision, which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

B. Collateral Estoppel 

California preclusion rules govern whether a prior state court

judgment precludes re-litigation of an identical claim in federal

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court. In California, collateral estoppel applies when “(1) the

party against whom the plea is raised was a party or was in privity

with a party to the prior adjudication, (2) there was a final

judgment on the merits in the prior action and (3) the issue

necessarily decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the

one that is sought to be remedied.” Smith v. Exxon Mobil Oil

Corporation, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1414 (2007). Application of

the doctrine must also comport with fairness and sound public

policy. Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 815, 835 (1999). 

Although the State Bar court cannot consider federal constitutional

claims, such claims can be raised in judicial review of the State

Bar court’s decision. Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713. California State Bar

disciplinary procedures fully comport with due process

requirements. Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of

California, 910 F.2d 560, 564-565 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff was a party in the prior state proceeding. The

California Supreme Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s petition for

review was a final decision on the merits. As noted above,

Plaintiff admits that he raised his constitutional objections in

the course of his State Bar proceedings. (Plaintiff’s Opposition

to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 22.) Plaintiff had a

fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the state proceeding; he

appealed his case to the California Supreme Court and then

petitioned for certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,

which was denied. 

C. First Amendment Challenge and IOLTA 

Plaintiff appears to argue in his oppositions that his actions

of failing to maintain client funds in an IOLTA account are

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protected by the First Amendment. He also appears to argue that

the State Bar’s presumption of willful misappropriation when a

client trust account falls below the amount credited to a client

violates his First Amendment rights. However, he offers no

explanation of how any spoken words or expressive conduct were

impacted. Plaintiff also alleges that the IOLTA regulations

interfere with his clients’ right to counsel, which is protected by

the First Amendment. However, he offers no support for this

allegation. 

D. Standing 

Plaintiff argues in his oppositions that he has standing to

allege a violation of the rights of third parties on a facial

challenge to IOLTA and State Bar disciplinary regulations because

the standing limitation is more relaxed in the First Amendment

context. 

A non-attorney may appear on his own behalf, but that

privilege is personal to him. McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d

286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966). A pro-se litigant has no authority to

appear as an attorney for anyone other than himself. Russell v.

United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962). 

A pro se litigant has standing to seek prospective injunctive

and declaratory relief on a facial challenge to a regulation if he

or she has an injury in fact and a real or immediate possibility of

a future injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 2004). This

future injury must be actual or imminent, not conjectural. Id. 

Plaintiff is currently not eligible to practice law in

California. He may not file a facial challenge to IOLTA and State

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Bar disciplinary practices on behalf of a class of attorneys. 

There is no need to consider his claim that the First Amendment has

a more relaxed standing requirement because he has proffered no

First Amendment challenge.

Further, no future injury to Plaintiff is clear or imminent. 

His oppositions imply that he is fearful of future disciplinary

hearings and that he will continue to tell clients what he thinks

is best about IOLTA accounts. However, because Plaintiff is

currently ineligible to practice law, such concerns are not

imminent. If and when he does become eligible to practice law

again, he will not be disciplined for talking to clients about

IOLTA accounts, only for misappropriation of client funds from

IOLTA accounts. Plaintiff has no standing to bring a facial

challenge to State Bar regulations. 

For all of the above reasons, an amended complaint would be

futile. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

GRANTED and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The clerk

shall enter judgment against Plaintiff and close the file. Each

party shall bear its own costs. The hearing, previously scheduled

for October 16, 2008, is vacated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/17/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCIS T. FAHY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-02496 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on October 17, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Francis Thomas Fahy

259 Oak Street

San Francisco, CA 94102

Dated: October 17, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW Document 30 Filed 10/17/08 Page 13 of 13