Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01742/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01742-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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ERI

WIL

U.S

of a

mat

fort

I.

(“C

 

has

Pro

IC LEE, 

P

vs. 

LLIAM MU

R

Petition

S.C. § 2254 

a firearm by

tter and bei

th below. 

BACKG

A. S

The foll

Court of App

a

c

o

a

t

o

d

k

g

b

s

 1 Willia

 been subst

ocedure. 

FOR TH

Petitioner, 

UNIZ, Ward

Respondent

ner Eric Lee

to challeng

y a felon. H

ng fully inf

GROUND 

STATEMEN

lowing fact

peal” or “st

On M

auto shop in

car. After a

other men a

and one ma

the passeng

of the car, h

defendant e

know where

gun in defen

both men on

shirts and p

 

am Muniz, t

tituted as Re

UNITED S

HE NORTH

OA

den,1

t. 

e (“Petitione

ge his 2011

Having read

formed, the 

NT OF FACT

ts are taken 

tate appellat

March 18, 2

n Oakland. 

about two h

approached 

an were on t

ger side. As

he saw one m

extend his ar

e defendant

ndant’s han

n the driver

ulled out w

 

the current 

espondent p

STATES D

HERN DIST

AKLAND D

er”) brings 

conviction

d and consid

Court here

S

from the op

te court”):

2010, Timot

 Jones’s bro

hours at the 

from the re

the driver si

s Jones look

man pull a 

rm, also ho

t had hidden

nd. Howeve

r’s side of th

weapons from

warden of t

pursuant to 

DISTRICT C

TRICT OF

DIVISION

Case No:

ORDER 

WRIT O

the instant 

n and senten

dered the pa

eby DENIE

pinion of th

thy Jones d

other was a

shop, defen

ear of Jones

ide and two

ked at the tw

gun from h

olding a gun

n his gun be

er, Jones’s b

he car had g

m their pan

the prison w

Rule 25(d)

COURT 

 CALIFOR

 C 13-0174

DENYING

OF HABEA

pro se habe

nce for carja

apers filed i

S the Petitio

he Californi

drove his car

a passenger 

ndant and th

s’s car. Def

o other men

wo men on 

his waistban

n. Jones did

efore seeing

brother saw

gone under 

nts waistban

where Petiti

) of the Fed

RNIA 

42 SBA (PR

G PETITIO

AS CORPU

eas action u

acking and 

in connectio

on for the r

ia Court of 

r to an 

in the 

hree 

fendant 

n were on 

his side 

nd and 

d not 

g the 

w that 

r their 

nds. The 

ioner is inca

deral Rules o

R) 

ON FOR 

US 

under 28 

possession 

on with this

reasons set 

Appeal 

arcerated, 

of Civil 

s

Case 4:13-cv-01742-SBA Document 21 Filed 12/03/15 Page 1 of 8
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Peo

carj

Peti

felo

for 

nin

term

mon

yea

con

one

sen

refl

dou

the 

peti

revi

t

a

J

g

p

r

b

i

h

a

p

a

ople v. Lee,

B. C

In 2011

jacking and

itioner adm

ony and “str

which he s

On July

eteen years

m of five ye

nths on the 

ars, doubled

nsecutive ter

e year each 

On dire

ntence on co

lect the imp

ubled for the

judgment a

ition for rev

iew in the s

two men on

Jone

and the man

Jones. One

get out of th

put his gun 

repeated the

brother then

ignition. D

hopped into

away. Jone

police, who

apprehende

2012 WL 6

CASE HIST

1, an Alame

d firearm po

mitted that h

rike” convic

erved priso

y 15, 2011, 

 in state pri

ears, double

firearm po

d for the prio

rms of five 

for the four

ect appeal, t

ount two (fir

position of a

e prior strik

as modified

view on Feb

state courts.

n the passen

s had the dr

n near him p

e of the men

he car, but h

inside the c

e demand th

n got out of

efendant ha

o the car, an

es and his br

o ultimately 

d defendan

6040118, *

ORY

eda Costa C

ossession by

e had suffe

ction for as

n terms. Id

the trial cou

ison, based 

ed for the pr

ssession by

or strike co

years for th

r prior priso

the state app

rearm posse

a concurren

ke convictio

d on Decemb

bruary 13, 2

.

2

nger side of

river’s side 

pointed the

n, possibly d

he refused t

car and plac

hat Jones ge

f the car. Jo

anded his gu

nd drove off

rother repor

recovered 

nt. 

1-2 (Cal Ct

County Supe

y a felon. Id

red five pri

ssault with a

d.

urt sentence

on ten year

rior strike c

y a felon con

onviction). I

he prior ser

on term enh

pellate cour

ession by a 

nt term of fo

on). Id. at *

ber 5, 2012

2013. Dkt. 

f the car also

 window do

ir semiauto

defendant, d

to do so. Th

ced it on Jo

et out of the

ones left his

un to one o

f. The othe

rted the car

the stolen c

t. App. Dec

erior Court j

Id. at *2. In

ior convicti

a firearm as

ed Petitione

rs on the ca

conviction),

nviction (on

Id. The cou

rious felony

hancements

rt modified 

a felon) and 

our years (th

*6. The sta

2. Id. The s

8-3 at 2. P

o had drawn

own. Defen

omatic firea

directed Jon

he other ma

nes’s stoma

e car. Jone

s keys in the

of his accom

er three gun

rjacking to t

car and 

c. 5, 2012) (

jury convic

n a bifurcate

ons, consist

s well as fou

er to an agg

arjacking co

, and a conc

ne-third the

urt also imp

y conviction

. Id.

the judgme

modified P

he full midd

ate appellate

state suprem

Petitioner di

n guns. 

ndant 

arms at 

nes to 

an then 

ach and 

s and his 

e

mplices, 

nmen ran 

the 

(footnotes o

cted Petition

ed court pro

ting of a pr

ur prior con

gregate term

onviction (th

current term

e middle ter

posed addit

n enhancem

ent to vacat

Petitioner’s 

dle term of 

e court then

me court de

id not seek 

omitted). 

ner of 

oceeding, 

rior serious 

nvictions 

m of 

he middle 

m of sixteen

rm of two 

tional 

ment, and 

te the 

sentence to

two years, 

n affirmed 

enied a 

collateral 

n

o

Case 4:13-cv-01742-SBA Document 21 Filed 12/03/15 Page 2 of 8
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On April 17, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, alleging that: (1) the trial 

court should have stayed or struck the concurrent sentence on count two (firearm 

possession by a felon) on the ground that it was a lesser included offense of count one 

(carjacking) (Claim One); (2) the trial court erred in imposing a five-year enhancement for 

his prior serious felony conviction (assault with a firearm) when the conditions for 

imposing such an enhancement were not met because the prosecutor failed to plead and 

prove this enhancement in the formal filings and in open court (Claim Two); and (3) his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the five-year 

enhancement (Claim Three). Dkt. 1 at 9.2

The Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the writ should not be granted. Dkt. 

5. In response, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. In the motion, Respondent did not 

dispute that Claim Two has been exhausted. However, Respondent argued that Claims One 

and Three were unexhausted because they were not properly presented to the California 

Supreme Court. Dkt. 8 at 3. Petitioner conceded that Claim Three was not exhausted and 

requested that the Court “waive[]” that claim. Dkt. 10 at 2. However, he argued that Claim 

One was fully exhausted. Id. 

On March 31, 2014, the Court liberally construed Petitioner’s aforementioned 

request to waive Claim Three as one to amend the Petition to dismiss Claim Three, and 

granted his request. Dkt. 11 at 3 n.3. The Court also granted Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss upon finding that the present Petition was a mixed petition with one exhausted 

claim (Claim Two) and one unexhausted claim (Claim One). Id. at 5-7. However, before 

actually dismissing the Petition, the Court directed Petitioner to make an election as to how 

to proceed with respect to his unexhausted claim. Id. at 7. Petitioner was instructed to file 

a notice in which he stated whether he elected to: (1) dismiss the unexhausted claim and 

proceed with only the exhausted claim; (2) terminate this action and return to state court to 

exhaust his unexhausted claim before filing a new federal habeas action containing a 

 2 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case 

management filing system and not those assigned by Petitioner. 

Case 4:13-cv-01742-SBA Document 21 Filed 12/03/15 Page 3 of 8
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petition with only exhausted claims; or (3) request a stay of the proceedings while he 

completes the exhaustion of his unexhausted claim in the California Supreme Court. Id. 

On April 24, 2014, Petitioner filed a notice in which he elected to “waive the 

review” of his unexhausted claim (Claim One) and proceed with only the one exhausted 

claim (Claim Two). Dkt. 12 at 1-2. The Court liberally construed Petitioner’s request as 

one to amend the Petition to dismiss Claim One, and granted his request. Dkt. 13 at 2. The 

Court then set a new schedule for the parties to file their briefs. Id. at 2-3. Respondent has 

answered the Petition. Dkt. 14. Petitioner did not file a Traverse. The matter is fully 

briefed and ripe for adjudication. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The instant Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant 

habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court proceeding 

unless the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or 

if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 

precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause is appropriate “if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. Habeas 

petitioners bear the burden of showing that a state court’s decision applied some Supreme 

Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). 

Case 4:13-cv-01742-SBA Document 21 Filed 12/03/15 Page 4 of 8
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On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit 

of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In applying the above standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the “last reasoned 

decision” by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The last reasoned decision in this case is the Court of Appeal’s unpublished disposition 

issued on December 5, 2012. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner claims that the five-year enhancement (for the prior serious felony 

conviction) imposed by the trial court pursuant to California Penal Code § 667(a)(1)3

 must 

be stricken from his sentence. Dkt. 1 at 6. Petitioner specifically contends that he was 

denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to notice and due process because the 

prior serious felony conviction enhancement was not pled in the information nor otherwise 

proven. Id. 

In considering Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court determined that the 

information contained sufficient allegations that he would be subject to an enhanced 

punishment for his prior serious felony if convicted of the serious felony of carjacking. The 

court explained as follows: 

The information alleged that he was being charged with a 

serious felony (carjacking) and he had been previously 

convicted of assault with a firearm in violation of section 245, 

subd. (a)(2). Under the heading, “CAL PRIOR-SERIOUS 

FELONY” and “2 STRIKES (ONE PRIOR),” the information 

further alleged that the prior assault conviction would subject 

defendant to sentencing pursuant to section “667(e)(1).” 

Concededly, the reference to “section “667(e)(1)” “is a less than 

precise directive to apply section 667, subdivision (a) 

enhancements.” (People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal. App. 4th 

1123, 1138.) Nevertheless, the information gave defendant 

notice that he would be subject to an enhanced sentence if 

(1) he was convicted of a serious felony and (2) it was 

determined he had been convicted of a previous serious felony. 

 3 California Penal Code § 667(a)(1) mandates imposition of a five-year enhancement 

for conviction of a serious felony by one who previously has been convicted of a serious 

felony. Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)(1). 

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Lee, 2012 WL 6040118, *3. 

As mentioned above, Petitioner admitted the prior conviction allegations. Resp’t Ex. 

2, Dkt. 18-7, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 604. In particular, Petitioner admitted that he 

had five prior felony convictions for which he had served five prison terms, and one prior 

felony conviction for which he was placed on probation. RT 604-609. At the sentencing 

hearing, Petitioner’s sentence was increased by five years pursuant to California Penal 

Code § 667(a)(1). RT 625. As noted by the state appellate court, although the information 

did not allege (and Petitioner did not admit to) a prior serious felony conviction pursuant to 

subdivision (a)(1), the information specifically alleged that Petitioner suffered a prior strike 

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 1170.12 

(c)(1) and 667(e)(1). The state appellate court thus determined that Petitioner had actual 

notice that his sentence would be enhanced, and that the trial court did not err in imposing 

the five-year enhancement: 

“[W]here the information puts the defendant on notice that a 

sentence enhancement will be sought, and further notifies him 

of the facts supporting the alleged enhancement, modification 

of the judgment for a misstatement of the underlying 

enhancement statute is required only where the defendant has 

been misled to his prejudice.” (People v. Neal (1984) 159 Cal. 

App. 3d 69, 73-74.) In this case defendant makes no claim that 

he was surprised when the court indicated it would impose the 

five-year enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision 

(a)(1), or that “preparation of his defense to meet the facts 

would have been different” if the information had specifically 

mentioned section 667, subdivision (a)(1). (Id. at p. 72.) We 

therefore conclude the trial court in this case did not err in 

imposing the five-year enhancement pursuant to section 667, 

subdivision (a)(1). 

Lee, 2012 WL 6040118, *4. 

Upon review of the Court of Appeal’s decision and the argument presented in this 

action, the Court finds that federal habeas relief is not warranted in this action. First, 

Petitioner’s claim that the enhancement was not pled in accordance with California Penal 

Code § 1170.1 is a state law claim, and is therefore not remediable on federal habeas 

review, even if state law were erroneously interpreted or applied. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 

562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011). 

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Second, Petitioner’s claim that his federal due process rights were violated is 

without merit. Under federal law, it is clearly established that a criminal defendant has a 

Sixth Amendment right to be informed of any charges against him by way of a charging 

document. See Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Cole v. 

Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)). However, recidivism and prior convictions that 

increase the maximum penalty need not be charged in order to comport with the 

constitutional right to fair notice because they are not considered an element of the offense 

charged. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1998); United 

States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 966 

(2001) (holding that Almendarez-Torres remains good law after Apprendi4 and provides 

that prior convictions, whether or not admitted by the defendant on the record, are 

sentencing factors rather than elements of the crime). Furthermore, Petitioner admitted to 

having the prior convictions, thereby waiving any constitutional claims he had regarding 

procedural defects. Accordingly, habeas relief on Claim Two is DENIED. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set out 

above, jurists of reason would not find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim debatable or 

wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the 

denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. The Petition is DENIED, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. 

Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

 4 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

Case 4:13-cv-01742-SBA Document 21 Filed 12/03/15 Page 7 of 8
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 2. The Clerk shall enter judgment, close the file, and terminate any pending 

matters. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 12/3/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.13\Lee1742.denyHC.docx

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