Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02049/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02049-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Defendant Debra Keller, who is proceeding pro se, removed this case from the Superior 

Court of Merced County on December 16, 2013. See Court‟s Docket Doc. No. 1. Defendant 

asserts that the basis for removal is the presence of a federal question. Specifically, Defendant 

contends Plaintiff sent a notice that expressly incorporates the “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure 

Act of 2009,” 12 U.S.C. § 5201. 

A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 

& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441) is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov‟t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 

the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 

F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means 

that “the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff

v.

DEBRA KELLER, and DOES 1 to 10, 

inclusive,

Defendant

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-2049 AWI GSA 

ORDER REMANDING MATTER TO 

THE MERCED COUNTY SUPERIOR 

COURT

Case 1:13-cv-02049-AWI-GSA Document 4 Filed 01/06/14 Page 1 of 3
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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a 

removed case “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 

(9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson 

v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is 

mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see

California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, the court 

“must dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a 

party has filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995).

“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the „well-pleaded 

complaint rule,‟ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff‟s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 

215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. 

Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the 

plaintiff‟s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation 

of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at 

1014. Thus, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense 

is anticipated in the plaintiff‟s complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense is the 

only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Wayne v. 

DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. Discover Bank,

129 S. Ct. 1262, 1278 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks somewhere 

inside the parties‟ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under federal law.”).

Here, Defendant has not shown that removal was appropriate. Plaintiff‟s Complaint is for 

an unlawful detainer action that is based entirely on state law. Defendant states that a notice by 

Plaintiff referenced § 5201. While that may be, the only cause of action that appears in the 

Complaint is a single claim for unlawful detainer. There is no federal question in Plaintiff‟s 

Complaint. 

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Because there is no federal question appearing in Plaintiff‟s Complaint, Defendant has

failed to invoke this Court‟s jurisdiction. Remand to the Merced County Superior Court is 

appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; 

Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257; Page, 45 F.3d at 133.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, per 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), due to this Court‟s 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this case is REMANDED forthwith to the Superior Court of 

Merced County.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-02049-AWI-GSA Document 4 Filed 01/06/14 Page 3 of 3