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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2012 Decided July 27, 2012

No. 11-5146

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., FORMERLY KNOWN AS PHILIP

MORRIS INCORPORATED, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, DIRECTLY AND AS

SUCCESSOR TO THE TOBACCO INTEREST OF AMERICAN

BRANDS, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:99-cv-02496)

Noel J. Francisco argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Robert F. McDermott, Peter J.

Biersteker, Miguel A. Estrada, Amir C. Tayrani, Michael B.

Minton, Bruce D. Ryder, and A. Elizabeth Blackwell. Dace C.

Martinez entered an appearance.

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Sarang Vijay Damle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Michael F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark

B. Stern and Alisa B. Klein, Attorneys. R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Howard M. Crystal and Katherine A. Meyer were on the

brief for appellees Tobacco-Free Kids Action Fund, et al.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE,Chief Judge: Appellant tobacco companies seek

review of a district court order clarifying an injunction requiring

appellants to disclose marketing data to the government. 

Appellants claim that the clarification of the injunction actually

effects a modification of the requirements. Our jurisdiction over

this interlocutory appeal is dependent on the district court

having modified the injunction. Because we conclude that it did

not, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

In 1999, the United States brought a civil action against

appellants under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968. 

Alleging that the tobacco companies had engaged in a decadeslong conspiracy to “deceive the American public about the

health effects of smoking,” the government sought disgorgement

of profits and injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. First

Am. Compl. at ¶ 3, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,

449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 99-cv-2496, ECF No.

274). In 2006, after this Court ruled that disgorgement was not

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an available remedy under the statute, see United States v. Philip

Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the district

court issued Order #1015, which granted injunctive relief

against the tobacco companies in order to prevent future RICO

violations. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.

Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (Order #1015). On appeal, we largely

affirmed the district court’s decision, vacating and remanding

only with regard to a handful of peripheral issues not relevant to

this appeal. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566

F.3d 1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Some of those issues are still

before the district court on remand.

The injunction included provisions requiring appellants to

make disclosure to the government of various marketing data:

16. Each Defendant shall be required to disclose all

disaggregated marketing data to the Government in the

same form and on the same schedule which Defendants

now follow in disclosing disaggregated marketing data

to the Federal Trade Commission. Defendants must

disclose such data to the Government for a period of

ten years from the date of this Final Judgment and

Remedial Order.

17. Disaggregated Marketing Data shall be maintained in

the databases and formats maintained by Defendants,

and all reports generated from such Disaggregated

Marketing Data shall be made available to the

Government.

18. In addition, each year's Disaggregated Marketing Data

shall be separately maintained in a format suitable for

downloading (e.g., comma separated value (CSV) file,

compressed in a ZIP or similar format). All data fields

shall be specified.

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19. All Disaggregated Marketing Data shall be deemed

“confidential” and “highly sensitive trade secret

information,” as defined in Orders # 7 and # 36, and

shall be subject to the provisions of those Orders.

Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 944–45 (Order #1015). 

Neither appellants nor the government sought reconsideration or

appellate review of the data-disclosure requirement during the

original litigation; therefore, these paragraphs were not

considered by this Court in the prior appeal of Order #1015.

After remand, the parties disagreed as to the meaning of

“disaggregated marketing data.” Appellants asserted that they

were only required to disclose the same disaggregated marketing

data that they already disclose to the Federal Trade Commission

(“FTC”). The data appellants currently provide to the FTC

include the total number of cigarettes sold and given away in the

United States, and the yearly amount spent on advertising in

categories such as newspapers, magazines, and point-of-sale

advertisements. However, the district court had defined the term

“Disaggregated Marketing Data” in a glossary appended to its

remedial order. That definition reads: 

Data that has been broken down by type of marketing

(including sales data), brand, geographical region (to the

smallest level of geographic specificity maintained by each

Defendant), type of promotion or marketing used, number

of cigarettes sold, advertising in stores and any other

category of data collected and/or maintained by or on behalf

of each Defendant. This breakdown of marketing data is

required by the FTC but kept confidential. The FTC only

publishes only the aggregated data.

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Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47. Appellants also

argued that they were only required to submit the data to the

Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and that the DOJ could not

share it any further under the confidentiality requirements in

Paragraph 19. The government contended that it should be

allowed to share data obtained from appellants under the final

order with “other appropriate Executive Branch agencies,”

subject to the confidentiality orders listed in Paragraph 19. 

Given the inability of the parties to agree on the parameters

of the disclosure requirement, the government filed a motion for

clarification with the district court. The district court agreed

with the government’s understanding of the disclosure

requirement, reasoning that the term “Disaggregated Marketing

Data” must be read in conjunction with the definition in the

glossary and a similar definition found in the text of the prior

opinion. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 778 F. Supp.

2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2011). In addition, the court concluded that the

narrow reading of the confidentiality provision requested by

appellants would undermine the explicit transparency objective

of Order #1015 and “preclude the Government from sharing

such information with experts whose opinion they were seeking,

as well as with other Government entities with an obvious

interest in the data,” such as law enforcement and experts in the

fields of marketing and statistics. Id. 

After considering the motion, the response of the tobacco

companies, and the entire record, the district court entered Order

#20-Remand, which granted the government’s motion. More

specifically, the order explicitly provided that the term

“Disaggregated Marketing Data” was as defined in the glossary

attached to the court’s original opinion. This had the effect of

requiring the companies to furnish the full range of

disaggregated marketing data sought by the government under

its understanding of the injunction. Finally, the new order

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explicitly provided that the government could disclose the data

to other governmental entities, subject to the confidentiality

provisions of the final order. The tobacco companies filed the

present appeal, seeking reversal of the district court’s Order #20-

Remand and arguing that it was an unlawful modification of the

existing injunction beyond the jurisdiction of the district court

at this stage of the proceedings.

II.

A.

Appellants contend that the order under review constitutes

a modification of the injunction beyond the jurisdiction of the

district court. Appellants contend that the new order

“completely rewrites” the data-disclosure requirements of the

original injunction. They rely specifically on the language of

Paragraph 16, which required the companies to “disclose all

disaggregated marketing data to the Government in the same

form and on the same schedule which Defendants now follow in

disclosing disaggregated marketing data to the Federal Trade

Commission.” Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (Order

#1015). Under Order #20-Remand, appellants must disclose

all marketing data broken down by type of marketing or

promotion use[d] (including sales data), geographical

region (to the smallest level of geographic specificity

maintained by each Defendant), number of cigarettes sold,

advertising in stores, and any other category of data

collected and/or maintained by or on behalf of each

Defendant.

Philip Morris, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (Order #20-Remand). 

Under the new requirements, appellants argue, a significantly

larger amount of data must be disclosed. They contend that the

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original language is clear: it requires the tobacco companies to

disclose disaggregated marketing data “in the same form” and

“on the same schedule” as the data provided to the FTC. Data

provided “in the same form,” they contend, must be the same

data.

In support of their interpretation of the original language,

appellants point to the district court’s explanation in the original

opinion, which stated that the requirement was for appellants to

“provide their disaggregated marketing data to the Government

according to the same schedule on which they provide it to the

FTC.” Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (emphasis added). 

They reason that the word “it” in that sentence can only refer to

the data provided to the FTC, showing that the data provided to

the DOJ is to be the same. Appellants suggest that the revision

to the confidentiality provision effects a change as well: the

opinion stated that the data “will be disclosed only to the

Department of Justice,” id. at 932 (Order #1015), but now the

court states that there are no “Court-imposed restrictions on the

dissemination of [the] data,” other than the confidentiality

provisions provided for in earlier orders. Philip Morris, 778 F.

Supp. 2d at 13 (Order #20-Remand). Appellants note that the

government sought a broad disclosure requirement during the

original litigation, but the district court instead adopted the

language used in the injunction. The government cannot now

attain the broader disclosure, appellants argue. 

Appellants’ argument in support of this position begins with

the proposition that this court in our prior comprehensive review

of the original injunction in this case upheld the injunction, save

some minor terms not at issue in the current controversy. 

Therefore, they contend, the district court was without authority

to modify any other terms of the injunction. As they view it,

any possible authority to make such modification must emanate

from either Rule 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. They assert that the court could not have been acting

under Rule 59(e), titled “Motion to Alter or Amend a

Judgment,” because that subsection requires filing no later than

28 days after the entry of the judgment—a period well over in

this case. As to Rule 60, Relief From a Final Judgment or

Order, that rule sets forth a litany of grounds establishing a high

bar for modification. The companies contend that none of those

enumerated grounds exist in this case. The government’s

response is simple: This is not a modification; it is a

clarification of the existing duties under the original injunction.

B.

Before we address the merits of the companies’ appeal, we

must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over the case. 

See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83

(1998). As a general norm, courts of appeal have jurisdiction to

review “final decisions of the district courts of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While making an alternate argument

that Order #20-Remand constitutes such a final decision,

appellants’ primary jurisdictional proposition is that this order

comes within the exception created by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). 

That section provides for jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory

orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or

dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify

injunctions.” The exception to the normal finality requirement

created by that section “is a limited one, and the Supreme Court

has ‘construed [it] narrowly.’” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v.

District of Columbia, 671 F.3d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)

(brackets in Salazar)). As we observed in Salazar, the scope of

the exception “is now relatively clear.” Id. Briefly put, if the

interlocutory order at issue clearly grants or denies a specific

request for injunctive relief, it is appealable without further

showing. See id. at 1264 (collecting cases). If the order does

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not grant or deny a request to dissolve an injunction, it may still

be appealable “if it has the ‘practical effect’ of doing so.” Id. at

1262 (quoting Carson, 450 U.S. at 83). Generally, a “practical

effects” order is within the jurisdiction of the court for

interlocutory review only if the appellant can show (1) that the

order “might have a ‘serious, perhaps irreparable,

consequence,’” and (2) “that the order can be ‘effectually

challenged’ only by immediate appeal.” Id. (quoting Carson,

450 U.S. at 84). The difficulty in applying these relatively

straightforward requirements occurs in a case such as this where

the district court has entered an order having some possible

practical effect on the existing injunction, but where the district

court’s action causing such an effect may not be a modification

of the existing order, but rather is, at least arguably, only a

clarification in different language of the obligations theretofore

imposed.

While we do not have precedent directly parallel to the case

before us, other circuits have approached the question with the

same caution employed in the Carson analysis. With specific

relevance to the modification-or-clarification question, some

have noted the danger that plunging into the details of the

disputed district court action “would collapse the jurisdictional

inquiry into a decision on the merits.” Birmingham Fire

Fighters Ass’n 117 v. Jefferson Cty., 280 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th

Cir. 2002); see also Pimentel & Sons Guitar Makers, Inc. v.

Pimentel, 477 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2007). As those

circuits have reasoned, to do otherwise would “thwart[] the

purpose of § 1292(a)(1),” which is “deliberately careful in

limiting the availability of interlocutory review of orders

concerning injunctions.” Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n, 280

F.3d at 1293. We agree. 

Although we further recognize, as have other circuits, that

“we are not governed by the district court’s own characterization

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of the order as an ‘interpretation’ or ‘clarification,’ as

distinguished from a ‘modification,’” we also agree with their

narrow and careful approach to the making of a distinction as

mandated by the language and purpose of § 1292(a)(1). Id. at

1292 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951,

956–57 (7th Cir. 1999)). Like the other circuits, we recognize

that the scope of the injunction is to be “determined by the

independent judgment of this Court,” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists

& Aero. Workers v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 849 F.2d 1481, 1485

(D.C. Cir. 1988). Nonetheless, we must approach the question

with the purpose of fulfilling the statutory goal of not “letting

piecemeal appeals, cloaked in the guise of jurisdictional

inquiries, come in through the back door,” Birmingham Fire

Fighters Ass’n, 280 F.3d at 1293. The functional approach

followed by, inter alia, the Eleventh Circuit, is to look “not to

the form of the district court’s order but to its actual effect.” Id.

(quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 907 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir.

1990)). Again consistent with the other circuits, we conclude

that “an order modifies the original decree when it actually

changes the legal relationship of the parties to the decree.” Id.

The order before us has not done so. As with the orders before

the Birmingham Fire Fighters and Gautreaux courts, this order

makes no actual change in the legal relation of the parties to the

decree, and for jurisdictional purposes, we conclude that it is a

clarification, not a modification.

We recognize, as did the Birmingham Fire Fighters court,

that a district court’s interpretation of an injunction could

conceivably be so “blatantly or obviously wrong” that it

amounts to a modification. Id. But we further agree with the

Birmingham Fire Fighters and Gautreaux courts that if the order

does not either by its terms or by the court’s blatant or obvious

misinterpretation of the injunction effect such a change in

relationship, then it is not a modification, and we do not have

jurisdiction over the attempted interlocutory appeal.

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This approach, beyond its consistency with other circuits,

is also one dictated by logic. Because a district court in many

cases—as in this one—must retain jurisdiction over an

injunction for the purpose of ensuring compliance for some

extended period of time, the chances are not only real but

overwhelming that the parties will differ at times on their

interpretation of the original injunction. It would seem

inescapable that in an injunction of the scope and length of the

one before the district court in this case, the parties will at least

be able to tease out some ambiguity. As we have observed with

ironic applicability to the case before us, “some will find

ambiguity even in a ‘No Smoking’ sign.” Int’l Union v. Gen.

Dynamics, 815 F.2d 1570, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Given the

length and breadth of the injunction in the present case, were we

to hold that Order #20-Remand worked a modification

activating interlocutory appealability, we might well expect a

regular pummeling of our docket with other supposed

modifications.

The district court’s interpretation of the data-disclosure

requirement does not change the terms or force of Order #1015,

and it is certainly not “obviously wrong.” Appellants cannot

credibly dispute the proposition that the disputed language in

Order #1015 used a term, “Disaggregated Marketing Data,” that

the district court explicitly defined in the glossary using the

same language it added to the injunction itself in Order #20-

Remand. See Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 944. Adding to

the order the full definition of a term already defined in the

glossary does not “substantially change[] the terms and force of

the injunction,” Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154, and the district

court’s refusal to render superfluous that glossary definition is

far from a blatant misinterpretation.

Appellants’ confidentiality argument fares no better: the

original text of Order #1015 did not limit the data to only being

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viewed by the DOJ. Appellants cite language in the opinion

stating that the data “will be disclosed only to the Department of

Justice,” but that language, in context, deals with whether the

data would be made public or not—and that same portion of the

opinion states, as does Order #20-Remand, that the data is

subject to the appropriate protective orders. See Philip Morris,

449 F. Supp. 2d. at 932. Limiting appellants’ disclosure

obligation to the DOJ is not the same as limiting what DOJ can

then do with the disclosed data once it is disclosed to it.

We could continue to play semantics with appellants

regarding the meaning of the word “it.” We might possibly even

play the same game with the questionable proposition that

requiring disclosure of data in the same “form” as the FTC data

is the same as requiring disclosure of the same “scope.” But no

matter how the language is parsed, it could not compel the

conclusion that the district court blatantly misinterpreted the

injunction. 

As an alternative jurisdictional basis, appellants suggest that

Order #20-Remand constitutes a final order under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, which provides for jurisdiction of the courts of appeal

over “final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 

This statute is plainly inapplicable. It is well established that “a

decree is final, for the purposes of an appeal . . . , when it

terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the

case, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution

what has been determined.” St. Louis, IM&S Ry. Co. v.

Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1883). Order #20-

Remand does no such thing. It only elaborates on the meaning

of preexisting injunctive provisions; it does not purport to take

any action against a party or enforce any new legal

consequences. The basic nature of an order purporting to clarify

an existing injunction is inconsistent with that description of a

final decree. The order purporting to modify does not terminate

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litigation or fix the obligations of the parties, or for that matter,

impose sanctions for some violation. It simply makes clear in

different language what has been previously been said. It is only

if the purported clarification becomes such a modification as to

create new rights or obligations that we have jurisdiction. See,

e.g., Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823,

830 (11th Cir. 2010); Major v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 561 F.2d

1112, 1115 (4th Cir. 1977). This is not because such a

modification would necessarily create finality in itself, but

because it falls within a statutory exception rendering it

unnecessary to make that determination. Perhaps it might be

possible for an order that actually worked some modification to

be final in the sense required for jurisdiction under § 1291, but

this order works no such modification, and we have no

jurisdiction. 

* * *

Our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal is properly

examined under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Because Order #20-

Remand does not “grant[], continu[e], modify[], refus[e] or

dissolve[] injunctions, or refus[e] to dissolve or modify

injunctions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we dismiss the appeal for

want of jurisdiction. 

So ordered.

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