Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01166/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01166-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:623 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Pamela C Sullivan, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Bank of America NA, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-01166-TUC-JGZ (BGM)

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald’s Report and 

Recommendation (R&R) recommending that Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment be granted. (Doc. 94.) Plaintiff has filed an objection to the Report and 

Recommendation to which Defendant has replied. (Docs. 97, 99.) After considering the 

Report and Recommendation and the arguments raised in Plaintiff's Objection, the Court 

will overrule the objection and adopt Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 When reviewing a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, this Court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report ... to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1)(c); see also 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983)). Failure to object to a Magistrate 

Judge's recommendation relieves the Court of conducting de novo review of the 

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Magistrate Judge's factual findings; the Court then may decide the dispositive motion on 

the applicable law. Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing 

Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1974)). By failing to object to 

a Report and Recommendation, a party waives its right to challenge the Magistrate 

Judge's factual findings, but not necessarily the Magistrate Judge's legal conclusions. 

Baxter, 923 F.2d at 1394; see also Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(failing to object to a Magistrate Judge's legal conclusion “is a factor to be weighed in 

considering the propriety of finding waiver of an issue on appeal”); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 

1980)). 

DISCUSSION1

 The ADEA makes it unlawful “to discharge any individual ... because of such 

individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). ADEA claims that are based on circumstantial 

evidence of discrimination are evaluated under the three-stage burden-shifting framework 

laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Diaz v. Eagle 

Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Enlow v. Salem-Keizer 

Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004)). Under this framework, the employee 

must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Id. (citing Coleman v. 

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000)). In order to establish a prima 

facie case, the employee must demonstrate that she was (1) at least forty years old, (2) 

performing her job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) either replaced by substantially 

younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under 

circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Id. If the 

employee has justified a presumption of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer 

to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. 

Id. If the employer satisfies its burden, the employee must then prove that the reason 

 

1

 The factual and procedural history of this case are set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 60.) 

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advanced by the employer constitutes mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. 

 Here, the Magistrate concluded as a matter of law that Plaintiff cannot establish 

her prima facie case because she was not replaced by a substantially younger employee or 

discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age 

discrimination. The Magistrate further concluded that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that 

the Defendant’s stated reasons for her termination were pretextual. Plaintiff objects to 

the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendant Bank of America (BOA) is entitled to 

summary judgment. Plaintiff claims that the R&R incorrectly concluded that there was 

no material issue of fact as to whether: (1) Plaintiff was discharged under circumstances 

giving rise to an inference of age discrimination; and (2) BOA’s stated reason for 

termination was pretextual.2

1. No reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was discharged under 

 circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination 

 It is undisputed that Plaintiff was replaced by an individual nine years her senior, 

and therefore Plaintiff cannot prove the fourth element of her prima facie case by 

showing that she was replaced by a substantially younger employee. Plaintiff contends, 

however, that she was nonetheless discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise 

to an inference of age discrimination.3

 In support of this contention, Plaintiff first claims 

 

2

 Plaintiff also claims that the R&R incorrectly concluded that there was no material issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff was performing her job satisfactorily. (Doc. 97, pgs. 4-9.) However, the R&R did not reach that conclusion. The R&R states: “For 

purposes of establishing her prima facie case, the Court will again accept that Ms. Sullivan was performing adequately.” (Doc. 94, pg. 10.) Accordingly, the Court declines to consider this portion of Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R. 

3

 Plaintiff incorrectly frames her argument with respect to the fourth element of 

her prima facie case as “there was evidence showing that the employer had a continuing need for [the employee’s] skills and services in that their various duties were still being performed.” (Doc. 97, pg. 9.) In some cases, an inference of discrimination can be 

established by showing the employer had a continuing need for the employee’s skills and services in that the employee’s various duties were still being performed. Diaz, 521 F.3d 

at 1207-08. That test is only appropriate, however, in reduction-in-force cases, where a 

replacement has not been hired. Id. at 1208, n.2. Plaintiff was not terminated from BOA 

during a reduction in workforce. In addition, the arguments presented in Plaintiff’s Objection with respect to this element of the prima facie case are unrelated to demonstrating a continuing need for Plaintiff’s services. 

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that it was “common knowledge” among BOA employess that BOA had a custom and 

practice of setting unreachable goals and performance standards so that it could later 

justify adverse employment actions. The only proof submitted in support of this claim, 

however, is a statement by Plaintiff in a declaration and an undecipherable document 

titled “Southwest Region Review” which Plaintiff characterizes as “BOA performance 

statistics.” (Doc. 88, pg. 8; Doc. 88-1, pgs. 7-12.) Plaintiff has not established that she is 

qualified to opine as to the reasonableness of BOA’s performance standards, nor does she 

explain how the “Southwest Region Review” sets performance standards. Plaintiff’s 

proffered evidence does not give rise to an inference of discrimination. Furthermore, 

even if BOA did set unreachable goals and performance standards for its employees, such 

a policy would not automatically give rise to an inference of age discrimination absent 

evidence that the goals were specifically challenging for older employees. 

 Second, Plaintiff claims that the R&R improperly gave weight to the fact that 

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor and his supervisor were both older than Plaintiff. 

Although the R&R mentioned the ages of Plaintiff’s supervisors in its factual 

background, it did not give weight to their ages in analyzing whether Plaintiff had raised 

an inference of discrimination in her prima facie case. 

 Third, Plaintiff argues that the short temporal proximity between the protected 

activity (turning 40) and the adverse action (her termination, eight days later) constitutes 

a circumstance giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Plaintiff’s argument is 

based on citation to Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 

2002), which holds that in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff may demonstrate a causal link 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision where an adverse 

employment action follows on the heels of protected activity. Villiarimo has no 

relevance in this age discrimination disparate treatment case. Furthermore, it is 

undisputed that Plaintiff received notice of her termination 60 days earlier, when she was 

provided with a Transitional Assignment Agreement. (Doc. 76, Ex. 1, pg. 159.) 

 Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that the R&R disregarded evidence of a pattern and 

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practice of age discrimination by BOA. According to Plaintiff, four of the six other 

employees who shared Plaintiff’s job title and were over 40 have left BOA. The only 

admissible evidence submitted by Plaintiff on this issue, however, is BOA’s response to 

Plaintiff’s Interrogatory #17. (Doc. 88-1, pg. 43.) In the interrogatory and the response, 

the parties identify five, not six, other BOA employees who shared Plaintiff’s job title. 

(Id.) Of those five, only one was terminated: two retired, one resigned, and one is still 

employed by BOA. (Id.) Plaintiff has not produced evidence of a pattern or practice of 

discrimination. 

 Finally, Plaintiff argues that age discrimination can be inferred from the fact that, 

after leaving BOA, Plaintiff was hired for a management position at a smaller bank and 

has been an outstanding employee. The fact that Plaintiff is doing well at her current job 

does not tend to prove that BOA discharged Plaintiff under circumstances giving rise to 

an inference of age discrimination. At best, the evidence supports the Magistrate’s 

assumption that Plaintiff was performing her job satisfactorily. 

 Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff 

cannot establish her prima facie case because she was not replaced by a substantially 

younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances 

otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. 

2. No reasonable jury could conclude that BOA’s stated reasons for terminating 

 Plaintiff were pretextual

 Plaintiff claims that a material issue of fact exists as to whether BOA’s stated 

reasons for terminating Plaintiff were pretextual. In support of this claim, Plaintiff cites 

to “the five facts/factors listed in Section 1-B of these Objections,” ie. the five arguments 

Plaintiff presents in support of her claim that she was discharged under circumstances 

giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. (Doc. 97, pg. 14.) For the reasons 

previously stated, those arguments are without merit. Accordingly, the Court adopts the 

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that BOA’s reasons for 

Plaintiff’s termination were pretextual. 

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CONCLUSION 

 THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Macdonald (Doc. 94) is 

APPROVED AND ADOPTED; 

2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) is GRANTED; 

3. Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R (Doc. 97) is OVERRULED; 

4. This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall 

enter judgment and close the case. 

 Dated this 29th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps

United States District Judge

 

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