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Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3599

JAMES MELTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

TIPPECANOE COUNTY,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division at Lafayette.

No. 4:11‐CV‐46 — Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 31, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 22, 2016

____________________

Before MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER,

District Judge.



KANNE, Circuit Judge. After he disregarded an order from

his supervisor that he could not change his schedule to make

up for missed time, Plaintiff James Melton was discharged

from his job at the Tippecanoe County Surveyor’s Office.

                                                 

 The Honorable Pamela Pepper, of the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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Melton later filed suit against the County, alleging that dur‐

ing his time there, he had arrived early and worked through

lunch every day and was not compensated for overtime in

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court

granted summary judgment to the County because Melton

had not designated sufficient evidence to find that he

worked more than forty hours in a workweek. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Melton worked in the Tippecanoe County Surveyor’s Of‐

fice from July 6, 2009, through his termination on September

1, 2010. Regular work hours in the Surveyor’s Office were

from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. with a one‐hour floating lunch

break. On May 13, 2010, Melton asked his supervisor in an

email if he could take a class during work hours and “make

up the 4 hours a week by only taking 1/2hour [sic] lunches

and coming in 1/2hour [sic] early on T,R,F.” His supervisor

responded by email that Melton could take the class, but due

to concerns about supervision and being able to keep track

of time, he could not make up the missed time. Instead, he

would have to treat the time as unpaid or as vacation time.

Melton acknowledged his supervisor’s answer, responding

“[t]hat is fine with me.”

When his class began the week of August 23, 2010, Mel‐

ton worked through lunch on one day and came in early

three days that week. Melton was paid for the additional

time worked, but he was also terminated for failing to follow

his supervisor’s order that he could not work extra time.

   

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No. 14‐3599 3

B. Procedural Background

Each week while he was employed at the Surveyor’s Of‐

fice, Melton would certify a timecard reporting the hours he

worked. According to County records, Melton was paid for

all of the hours that he certified he worked. Not so, accord‐

ing to Melton. Melton filed suit in state court alleging viola‐

tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §

207(a), and the Indiana Wage Claim law, Ind. Code § 22‐2‐9‐

2(a). The County subsequently removed the case to federal

court.  

In his complaint, Melton alleged that his timecards did

not accurately reflect the hours he worked because when he

put his actual time worked on his timecard, the office secre‐

tary would reduce his hours to 37.5, telling him that he could

not be paid for more than 37.5 hours in a workweek. Specifi‐

cally, Melton claimed that he was not compensated for (1)

time worked before 8 a.m. even though his supervisor told

him to come to work early every day and (2) time worked

through all or part of his floating lunch each day.

In support of his claim that he was not properly compen‐

sated, and in response to discovery requests, Melton pro‐

duced a spreadsheet created from memory that purports to

show the dates and times he worked during the whole of his

employment with Tippecanoe County.  

The County moved for summary judgment on several

grounds. In particular, it argued that Melton “was paid for

the time he certified ... , his recollection of uncertified time is

demonstrably unreliable, and ... he did not take those steps

available to him to put Tippecanoe County on notice of any

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allegedly inadequate compensation.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ J.

22.)

In response, Melton refused to address the County’s ar‐

gument that his “memory is unreliable,” calling it a “prema‐

ture argument” that “concerns credibility to be decided at

trial.” (Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 7 n.2.) Instead, Mel‐

ton addressed the County’s argument that it did not have

knowledge of Melton’s additional work hours by designat‐

ing the following testimony from his deposition as evidence

that he worked hours for which he was not compensated: (1)

that he submitted time sheets with more than 37.5 hours to

the secretary; (2) that she would return a “corrected version”

with 37.5 hours; (3) that she told him he would not be paid

for hours worked beyond 37.5; (4) that Melton was told by

his supervisor on three occasions that he was required to be

at work before 8:00 a.m.; and (5) that he spoke with his su‐

pervisor three times about working hours that were not be‐

ing paid. Melton did not point to any evidence regarding

unpaid lunch hours nor did he rely on his spreadsheet as ev‐

idence of his unpaid hours.

In reply, the County noted that Melton had only desig‐

nated evidence related to “about twenty unpaid minutes per

day before work” and no evidence of working through

lunch. Therefore, the County argued, Melton only had evi‐

dence upon which a reasonable juror could find, at the most,

an additional one hour and forty minutes of time worked in

a week. Because that additional time would only account for

a workweek of 39.2 hours, the County argued that Melton

could not establish a FLSA violation, which requires the

plaintiff to show uncompensated hours in excess of forty per

week.  

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No. 14‐3599 5

The district court agreed, and it granted summary judg‐

ment to the County. The district court found that Melton had

only designated an additional one hour and forty minutes of

uncompensated time. That time, the district court found,

was insufficient to establish a FLSA violation because Melton

had not shown that he worked in excess of forty hours per

week. The district court then declined to exercise supple‐

mental jurisdiction over Melton’s state‐law claim and dis‐

missed it without prejudice. Melton appealed.  

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Peretz v. Sims, 662 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2011). Be‐

cause our review is de novo, “we may affirm on any ground

supported in the record, so long as that ground was ade‐

quately addressed in the district court and the nonmoving

party had an opportunity to contest the issue.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In reviewing whether the movant is entitled to a grant of

summary judgment, we take all facts and draw all reasona‐

ble inferences in favor of the non‐moving party. Peretz, 662

F.3d at 480; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986). When opposing a properly supported mo‐

tion for summary judgment, the non‐moving party must

“cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” or

“show[] that the materials cited do not establish the ab‐

sence ... of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  

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FLSA provides that “no employer shall employ any of his

employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours un‐

less” it pays the employees overtime pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).

But, an employee who brings suit pursuant to FLSA “has the

burden of proving that he performed work for which he was

not properly compensated.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery

Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946), superseded on other grounds by

Portal‐to‐Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62.

Where the employee alleges that his employer kept inac‐

curate records, he “has carried out his burden if he proves

that he has in fact performed work for which he was im‐

properly compensated and if he produces sufficient evi‐

dence to show the amount and extent of that work as a mat‐

ter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 687. At that point,

“[t]he burden then shifts to the employer to come forward

with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or

with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference

to be drawn from the employee’s evidence.” Id. at 687–88.

Here, Melton has called into question the accuracy of the

County’s records by alleging that the secretary told him he

could not be paid for more than 37.5 hours per week. Melton

testified that she would always “correct” his timecards to

37.5 hours if he claimed more.1 By calling into question the

accuracy of the County’s records, Melton had to “produce[]

sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that

work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 687.  

                                                 

1 This “fact” is belied by hard evidence, which shows that Melton was

paid for more than 37.5 hours in several different weeks. We assume,

however, that Melton’s testimony that the secretary would correct his

timesheets to 37.5 hours is sufficient evidence to withstand summary

judgment as to the accuracy of the County’s records.

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No. 14‐3599 7

A. Evidence of Working through Lunch

We note first that in his complaint, Melton alleged that he

“would work through all or part of his lunch break.”

(Amended Compl. ¶ 20.) He did not, however, in his re‐

sponse to the County’s motion for summary judgment, des‐

ignate any evidence to support his claim, nor did Melton re‐

ly on his own spreadsheet as evidence of his unpaid lunch

hours or respond to the County’s argument that his spread‐

sheet was demonstrably unreliable.2

Instead of rehabilitating the spreadsheet as competent

evidence of his work hours or even addressing its reliability,

Melton’s response was that the County’s argument was

“premature” and an issue of “credibility to be decided at tri‐

al.” Melton is wrong. That is because  

“[d]ocuments or objective evidence may contradict

the witness’ story; or the story itself may be so in‐

                                                 

2 In response to the County’s statement of facts, Melton wrote:  

Melton was told on multiple occasions that this extra

time was required. See (Melton Dep. pp. 25, 33–35) (Mr.

Melton was told on three (3) occasions by [his direct su‐

pervisor] that he was required to be at work prior to 8:00

a.m. to go to the worksite). Moreover, with regard to

lunches, the testimony cited by the County does not

support the alleged fact. The only testimony regarding

lunches taken by Mr. Melton is from [a co‐worker] who

acknowledges that he rarely worked with Mr. Melton

out in the field and did not pay attention to his lunch

habits when working in the office. See (Deposition of [co‐

worker] pp. 21–22).

(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4.) Nowhere does Melton cite testi‐

mony indicating that he did work through lunches. The only specific

facts designated relate to hours worked before 8 a.m.

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ternally inconsistent or implausible on its face that

a reasonable factfinder would not credit it.” ...

[That] principle is equally applicable to summary

judgment, and we may state it thus: testimony can

and should be rejected without a trial if, in the cir‐

cumstances, no reasonable person would believe it.

Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).  

In other words, a plaintiff alleging a violation of FLSA

may not rely on “unsupported ipse dixit [that] is flatly refut‐

ed by the hard evidence proffered by” the defendant. See

Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 690 (7th Cir. 2010) (al‐

teration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).

The County was permitted to “negative the reasonableness

of the inference to be drawn from” Melton’s spreadsheet, Mt.

Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687–88, which it did convincingly. Mel‐

ton cannot survive summary judgment where the County

negated the reasonableness of his claim of unpaid lunchtime

hours, and he failed to rehabilitate his demonstrably implau‐

sible deposition “testimony by spreadsheet.”

Melton testified at his deposition that the source of in‐

formation for the spreadsheet was his own memory. Relying

on the employee’s recollection is permissible given the un‐

likelihood that an employee would keep his own records of

his work hours. See Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687; see also

Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 362 (2d Cir. 2011).

But relying on recollection does not mean the plaintiff may

survive summary judgment where his recollection “is flatly

refuted” by other evidence in the record, Turner, 595 F.3d at

690, or his story is so “internally inconsistent or implausible

on its face” that “no reasonable person would believe it.”

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Seshadri, 130 F.3d at 802. At the very least, an employee rely‐

ing on his own recollection to prove a violation of FLSA

must have a reasonably reliable story; FLSA plaintiffs are

still bound to the requirements of Rule 56.

We note first that there are several weeks in Melton’s

spreadsheet where he seeks compensation for purportedly

uncompensated hours. But contemporaneous County rec‐

ords show that many of those hours were compensated. We

take, as an example, the pay period from June 1, 2010,

through June 15, 2010. Melton’s County time card indicates

that on June 3, 2010, he worked 7.5 “regular hours” and 1

“other compensable hour[]” for a total of 8.5 hours worked

that day. His spreadsheet indicates that he worked 8.5 hours

that day but that one hour was unpaid. The same occurs on

June 8, 2010. County records show that he worked and was

paid for 8.5 hours; his spreadsheet indicates that he worked

8.25 hours, and that the .75 hours worked beyond the 7.5 was

unpaid. It is neither a just nor reasonable inference to draw

that Melton is entitled to compensation for hours already

compensated.  

Moreover, in his complaint, Melton alleged that he

“would work through all or part of his lunch.” But there is

not a single day on his spreadsheet where he accounts for tak‐

ing any portion of a lunch break. Instead, he blindly seeks

compensation for every single day’s lunch. His spreadsheet

also indicates—and he claims—that he was never paid for

more than 37.5 hours. That claim is blatantly contradicted by

the County’s payroll records, which show several occasions

where Melton was compensated for hours worked beyond

37.5.

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As discussed, Melton chose not to respond to the Coun‐

ty’s attack on the implausibility of his lunch‐hours claim in

his spreadsheet. He did so at his own risk. Because Melton’s

spreadsheet “testimony can and should be rejected ... [be‐

cause] no reasonable person would believe it,” Seshadri, 198

F.3d at 802, he has not produced sufficient evidence to show

“the amount and extent” of the hours he worked through

lunch “as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Mt.

Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687. Therefore, the County is entitled to

summary judgment on claims arising from allegedly unpaid

lunchtime hours worked.

B. Evidence of Arriving Early

Melton did, however, provide sufficient evidence upon

which a reasonable juror could conclude that he worked

hours before 8:00 a.m. (at the behest of his supervisor) for

which he was not compensated. Even crediting this testimo‐

ny, however, does not save Melton’s case. That is because the

time he worked before 8 a.m. is insufficient to establish that

there is a material dispute of fact.  

In his opposition to summary judgment, Melton said he

was told he would not be paid for hours worked beyond

37.5, but that he needed to come in before 8:00 a.m. In his

spreadsheet, he alleges forty‐five minutes per week worked

before 8:00 a.m.—an additional .75 hours of time, which only

brings his total workweek hours to 38.25. In his deposition,

he testified that he came in about twenty minutes early every

day—1 hour and 40 minutes of additional time. Ignoring the

inconsistency, and even under his more generous estimate,

Melton has not produced sufficient evidence to show that

there is a dispute of material fact. Neither an additional 45

minutes nor 1 hour and 40 minutes per week to his 37.5 reg‐

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No. 14‐3599 11

ular hours is sufficient to show that he worked in excess of 40

hours per week—the threshold requirement for FLSA to ap‐

ply.  

Melton argues that the district court (and presumably

this court) cannot rely on this theory because the County did

not raise it at the summary judgment stage until its reply. It

is true that the specific argument advanced by the County—

that Melton had only designated 39.2 hours per week—was

not put forth until its reply. But there was no error in relying

on the argument because Melton had a “meaningful oppor‐

tunity to come forward with all of [his] evidence” of uncom‐

pensated lunch hours—a central issue in the case. Sublett v.

John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J. 20 (“[W]hen Mr. Melton worked through lunch, he

claimed the time and was compensated for it.”).

As we explained earlier, even if Melton had put forth his

evidence supporting his claim of overtime lunch hours, his

testimony by spreadsheet is so “internally inconsistent [and]

implausible on its face” that it cannot satisfy Melton’s bur‐

den to establish a prima facie FLSA case. Seshadri, 130 F.3d at

802. Melton knew that the County was arguing that his rec‐

ollection and spreadsheet were “unreliable,” and he certain‐

ly had a meaningful opportunity to address that argument.

Instead, he deemed it “premature.” It was not, and neither

was the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the County.

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