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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

C.D. MOSIER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

GARY MAYNARD, D.O.C.; DAN 

REYNOLDS, Warden, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 90-6199 

FILED 

United .StateS Court of Appals 

Tenth Circuit · 

JUL - 5 1e91 

&OBERT L. HOECKER. 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-14-T) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

C.D. Mosier, pro se. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, and Gay Abston Tudor, Assistant 

Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-6199 Document: 01019293808 Date Filed: 07/05/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant C.D. Mosier appeals from the grant of 

summary judgment to defendants-appellees in this civil rights 

action against Oklahoma prison officials. Mosier's complaint 

alleged that prison officials violated his first and fourteenth 

amendment rights to free exercise of religion and equal protection 

of the law by denying him an exemption to the prison grooming 

code. The district court ordered a special report pursuant to 

Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (lOth Cir. 1978). Defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss which the district court converted to a 

motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Mosier 

filed a response, whereupon the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants. We reverse and remand. 

I. 

In April 1986, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections granted 

plaintiff an exception to the grooming standards, based upon 

documentation concerning defendant's Native American heritage and 

1 his belief in the Native American religion. I R. doc. 1, app. 5. 

Plaintiff was not required to cut his hair provided that he kept 

it neat and clean, and pulled back in a pony tail, braided or 

1 The 1986 letter to plaintiff granting him an exception 

provided in part: 

Based upon the documentation you provided concerning 

your Indian heritage and your belief in the Native 

American Religion, the committee did vote to authorize 

an exception [to the prison grooming standards] in your 

case. 

I R. doc. 1, app. 5. 

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constrained in a cap anytime he was outside of his cell. Id. 

Subsequently, the plaintiff was transferred to another Oklahoma 

institution and was told to seek a new exemption under a new 

policy. Under the new policy, an inmate may apply for and receive 

an exemption if he can establish that: (1) the religion is 

recognized; (2) he is an adherent to the religion; (3) the 

practice of his religion is inhibited by a particular provision in 

the grooming code; and (4) the facility's interest in security 

does not outweigh his need to practice the religion. I R. doc. 

11, attach. H at 5. According to the policy, the exclusive means 

for establishing adherence to the religion is by: 

Providing names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 

reputable non-family members who are not under the 

custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, that 

can establish adherence to the religion or can provide 

documented evidence to establish adherence to the 

religion. 

I R. doc. 17 at 2-3. See also I R. doc. 11, attach H at 1; 

Appellees' Brief at 3-4. Plaintiff's application was referred to 

the prison chaplain for investigation. The chaplain recommended 

denial of the application on the grounds that plaintiff had not 

produced adequate external evidence that he was practicing his 

native religion. 

The chaplain acknowledged that plaintiff was one-quarter 

degree Native American. Also supporting plaintiff's application 

was the letter granting him the prior exemption, a statement from 

the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation concerning the 

importance of religious freedom and a personal statement of faith 

in which plaintiff indicated that according to Cherokee belief, 

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the body is an extension of the Great Spirit and must not be 

mutilated or defaced. Plaintiff expressed his belief that his 

hair was integral to his body, similar to a hand or a leg, and 

that to cut it would be cut himself off from God. 

The chaplain found that the Native American religion was 

recognized, but determined that a lack of external evidence 

existed concerning whether plaintiff actually practiced his 

beliefs. The chaplain distinguished the prior exemption policy 

under which plaintiff prevailed as one which relied primarily on 

Native American status rather than on practice of belief. Other 

factors cited by the chaplain to support his conclusion included: 

(1) plaintiff was not a member of the Cherokee nation; (2) 

plaintiff did not participate in the Native American religious 

group at the prison; and (3) plaintiff did not submit 

documentation from tribal sources or nonrelated family members 

attesting to the sincerity of his belief. 

Merely because plaintiff is not a member of the Cherokee 

nation or the Native American worship group at the prison does not 

mean that his belief is insincere. The Supreme Court has rejected 

the notion that membership in a religious organization is a 

prerequisite for religious convictions to be judged sincere. 

Frazee v. Department of Employment Sec., 489 u.s. 829, 834 (1989) 

(plaintiff was a Christian, but not a member of a particular 

Christian sect). Likewise, while practice or nonpractice of a 

particular tenet of a religion may be relevant to sincerity, it is 

not conclusive. Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 

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1988). Intrafaith differences are common and cannot be resolved 

by secular courts. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 u.s. 707, 715-16 

(1981). Likewise, we have recognized that a religious objection 

may arise from a "specific [religious] belief, whether as part of 

a personal faith or as a tenet of an organized group or sect." 

Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197-98 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 871 (1990). See also Frazee, 489 u.s. at 833 

(no requirement that claimant belong to a particular sect 

prohibiting practice at issue). 

In recommending denial of plaintiff's application for an 

exemption, the chaplain wrote: 

All supporting evidence does not specifically testify 

that Mosier actually practices his beliefs. What he 

believes very well could be true but there is no 

external evidence that he has been practicing his native 

traditional beliefs. 

I R. doc. 11, attach. c. at 2 (emphasis supplied). The Facility 

Classification Committee reviewed the matter and denied the 

application solely on the ground of insufficient evidence "that 

the inmate is a sincere adherent of the religion." I R. doc. 11, 

attach. E at 1. The Committee particularized its denial, pointing 

out that plaintiff did not submit external documentation 

concerning his sincere belief from reputable, nonfamily members 

who were not under the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Department of 

Corrections. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the warden. The warden 

replied that "[a]lthough I respect your right to your religious 

belief, it does not exempt you from the inmate grooming code." I 

R. doc. 11, attach. Fat 2 (emphasis supplied). The warden then 

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affirmed the Committee's decision on similar grounds, pointing to 

a lack of documentation concerning sincere adherence from a 

reputable nonfamily member who was not incarcerated under the 

jurisdiction of the department. Id. A deputy director of 

institutions then affirmed the denial. 

II. 

The district court determined that plaintiff did not qualify 

for an exemption because he "failed to provide the names[,] 

addresses and telephone numbers of non-family members that could 

establish his adherence to the religion or provide documented 

evidence to establish his adherence to the religion." I R. doc. 

17 at 3. The district court also determined that the grooming 

regulation was valid based on a statement contained in the 

defendants' motion to dismiss to the effect that the regulation 

"was 'established to promote an overall sense of pride and 

discipline and ensure the safety, health, and welfare of inmates." 

Id. at 4 (quoting I R. doc. 11 at 2). The district court relied 

on Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 

u.s. 987 (1988), which held that a prison could enforce a blanket 

restriction on hair length even if it conflicted with sincere 

Native American religious beliefs. Id. at 657, 659-60. 

In the context of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal in 

which the prison's justification was not challenged, we recently 

upheld a policy at a temporary detention facility requiring that 

all new inmates receive haircuts without opportunity for religious 

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exemptions. Hall v. Bellman, No. 90-6326, slip op. at 15-17 (lOth 

Cir. Jun. 5, 1991) [1991 WL 90172]. The justification for the 

policy was that "it prevents inmates from hiding weapons in long 

hair and from easily changing their appearance should they escape, 

and it facilitates good hygiene." Id. at 15. See also Iron Eyes 

v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding hair length 

policy on similar grounds). 

This case differs from Hall and Pollock in several important 

respects. First, the facility in this case is not a temporary 

detention facility. Second, plaintiff is not challenging that 

part of the grooming code concerning hair length, but rather the 

exemption policy established by the prison and its application. 

See Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 811 n.3, 816 (recognizing that 

exemption policy could be challenged, even if hair length policy 

upheld). Third, Hall involved upholding the hair cutting 

requirement on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) grounds; this case, like 

Pollock, involves summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Unlike Pollock, however, the defendants in this case have not 

produced any affidavits in support of their claimed justification 

for the grooming code. 

Based on the items in the record, we review the district 

court's grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether 

"the pleadings ... and admissions, together with the 

affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Genuine disputes 

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about material factual issues preclude summary judgment. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 248 (1986). We view the 

summary judgment evidence and its inferences in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, the party opposing the motion. 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). However, 

affidavits or other evidence offered by the party opposing the 

motion must create a genuine issue for trial; summary judgment 

will not lie if the opponent's evidence is "merely colorable" or 

anything short of "significantly probative" on a material issue. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 241-42. We recently held that a Martinez 

report may be treated as an affidavit, "but the court is not 

authorized to accept the factual findings of the prison 

investigation when the plaintiff has presented conflicting 

evidence." Hall, No. 90-6326, slip op. at 9-10. Here, the 

plaintiff's complaint concerning his religious beliefs also may be 

treated as an affidavit because it is based on personal knowledge 

and has been sworn under penalty of perjury; therefore, it meets 

the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Hall, No. 90-6326, 

slip op. at 9; McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 

1987). Factual statements contained in defendants' brief 

attributable to counsel, however, do not constitute summary 

judgment evidence; thus, given plaintiff's response, the district 

court could not grant summary judgment concerning the grooming 

code in sole reliance upon such statements. See lOA A. Miller, c. 

Wright & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2723 at 64 

(1983); 6 J. Moore, w. Taggart, J. Wicker, Moore's Federal 

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Practice~ 56.11[1.--8] (1991). See also Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 

730, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment could not be granted 

on reasonableness of prison grooming code where prison officials 

failed to produce any evidence to accompany asserted 

0 t'f' t' ) 2 JUS 1 1Ca 10n • 

III. 

Under the free exercise clause of the first amendment, an 

inmate must be accorded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his 

religion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 u.s. 319, 322 (1972). However, what 

constitutes a reasonable opportunity must be evaluated with 

reference to legitimate penological objectives of the prison; 

consequently, the reasonableness inquiry is less restrictive than 

what ordinarily might apply. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 

U.S. 342, 349 (1987). What might be viewed as an unreasonable 

infringement of a fundamental constitutional right were it to 

occur outside of prison may be valid in prison as long as the 

infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological 

2 Like the Swift court we recognize that prisoners have been 

singularly unsuccessful under Turner in challenging grooming 

codes, as well as dress and personal property codes, see, ~' 

Hall, No. 90-6326, slip op. at 13-17 (religious items worn around 

neck and hair length); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126, 128 

(1991) (religious items); Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 

331-33 (9th Cir. 1990) (facial hair), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 996 

(1991); Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 813-16 (hair length); Solomon v. 

Zant, 888 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1989) (facial hair); 

Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 73-76 (2d Cir. 1989) (beard 

length); Pollock, 845 F.2d at 658-60 (hair length); Deer v. 

Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525, 1527-29 (9th Cir. 1987) (dress 

regulations), but this does not obviate the need for facts upon 

which to base a reasonableness determination. Swift, 901 F.2d at 

731. 

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objectives, which include rehabilitation, deterrence and security. 

Id. at 348-49. Given a prison's need to constrain antisocial and 

potentially violent conduct, the latter objective frequently is 

determinative of accommodation issues. See Washington v. Harper, 

110 S. Ct. 1028, 1038 (1990). 

Several factors inform the reasonableness inquiry: (1) 

whether a valid and rational connection exists between the policy 

and a legitimate governmental interest advanced as justification; 

(2) whether, notwithstanding the policy, alternative means exist 

for the prisoner to exercise the right; (3) what effect an 

accommodation would have on guards, inmates and prison resources; 

and (4) whether an alternative is available which would 

accommodate the prisoner's rights at a de minimis cost to valid 

penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 u.s. 78, 89-91 

(1987); Hall, slip op. at 14; Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 184 

(lOth Cir. 1991); Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (lOth Cir. 

1990). Once the material facts have been established, by 

admission, stipulation, or trial, our review of a reasonableness 

inquiry is de novo. Hall, slip op. at 13; Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 

813. See also Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 

1990) (reasonableness inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact 

reviewed de novo), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 996 (1991). 

At this stage of the proceedings, the dispute concerns 

plaintiff's failure to prove the sincerity of his religious 

beliefs to the satisfaction of prison officials. Plaintiff 

contends that the district court improperly granted summary 

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judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists 

concerning his sincerity. He further contends that the prison's 

absolute requirement of external documentation concerning sincere 

belief from reputable, nonfamily members (not under the 

jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections) cannot be 

applied to bar an exemption on sincerity grounds when other 

uncontroverted evidence demonstrating sincerity exists. Plaintiff 

has declined to identify other persons to vouch for the sincerity 

of his beliefs, contending that (1) the letter granting his prior 

exemption was based upon his Native American heritage and 

religious beliefs, both of which have not changed, and (2) to 

provide this form of substantiation would intrude upon his 

personal relationship with God and require him to answer to others 

for his religious beliefs. I R. doc. 1, app. 4, attach. A. 

Plaintiff has, however, submitted four other forms of proof to 

establish his sincerity. 

"A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be 

interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation . 1 if 

it is based upon purely secular considerations; to have the 

protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in 

religious belief." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205, 215 (1972). 

Accord Thomas, 450 u.s. at 713. However, determining what 

constitutes "a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than 

not a difficult and delicate task." Thomas, 450 u.s. at 714. 

Nor do we underestimate the difficulty of distinguishing 

between religious and secular convictions and in 

determining whether a professed belief is truly held. 

States are clearly entitled to assure themselves that 

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there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free 

Exercise Clause. 

Frazee, 489 u.s. at 833. Without question, the prison may 

determine whether plaintiff's beliefs are sincere, meaning whether 

they are "truly held and religious in nature." Martinelli v. 

Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 

u.s. 1012 (1988). Some asserted religious claims may be "so 

bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be 

entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause." 3 Thomas, 

450 u.s. at 715. But apart from that narrow category, courts 

carefully avoid inquiring into the merits of particular religious 

beliefs in an effort to gauge sincerity. See, ~, United States 

v. Lee, 455 u.s. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas, 450 u.s. at 714-15; 

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). Scrutiny of 

the validity of particular beliefs largely is beyond our judicial 

function because "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, 

logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit 

First Amendment protection." Thomas, 450 u.s. at 714. But~ 

McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 995-96 (11th Cir. 1989) (ban on 

3 The plaintiff's desire not to cut his hair so as to conform 

with his Native American religious beliefs can hardly be deemed 

bizarre or incredible. See Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 810, 813 

(Sioux plaintiff's need to wear long hair was religious and 

sincerely held); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 359-60 (8th Cir. 

1975) (practice of wearing long-braided hair was rooted in Native 

American religious belief). See also Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 

116, 117-18 (6th Cir. 1982) (Cherokee plaintiff's belief that 

cutting hair would contravene his religion would be entitled to 

first amendment protection if belief was one of deep religious 

conviction) . 

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satanic worship justified because practices and beliefs posed 

security threats and were contrary to prison objectives). 

In this case, we are concerned with the sincerity with which 

an admittedly religious belief is held. See Callahan v. Woods, 

658 F.2d 679, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1981). A religious belief which is 

not sincerely held or a belief which is purely secular does not 

require the prison to consider accommodation. See, ~' Johnson 

v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) (professed 

vegitarianism not rooted in religious belief); McElyea, 833 F.2d 

at 198 (prison suggested that religious belief concerning kosher 

food was not sincerely held if prisoner did not partake of kosher 

diet at previous facility). 

Whether religious beliefs are sincerely held is a question of 

fact. See United States v. Seeger, 380 u.s. 163, 185 (sincerity 

of religious beliefs for conscientious objector status); LeFevers 

v. Saffle, No. 90-7088, slip op. at 4 (June 21, 1991)[1991 WL 

107047]; Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 810; Martinelli, 817 F.2d at 1504. 

Just as the grooming code would be evaluated under the Turner 

standards, so too is the exemption policy. See Kahey v. Jones, 

836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1988) (accommodation policy for kosher 

diet evaluated under Turner). The prison's policy of denying the 

sincerity of a prisoner's religious beliefs unless he submits 

reputable nonfamily references vouching for sincerity represents a 

very limited approach to this question of fact. The policy 

prefers one type of corroborative evidence to the exclusion of all 

other types of evidence, both direct and indirect. While there 

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may be a logical connection between the policy and the likely goal 

of insuring that exemptions reflect sincere beliefs, it is not 

clear if the policy accommodates personal nature of belief and the 

primacy of personal statements and conduct when one seeks an 

exemption. See Hobie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 

136, 144, 144 n.9 (1987) (relevant inquiry is whether faith is 

religiously based at time of assertion); McElyea, 833 F.2d at 

198-99 (prison chaplain's reliance on secondhand information 

concerning prisoner's past religious behavior was "not a 

reasonable method of determining religious commitment"). See also 

Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830, 833, 833 n.1; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-14; 

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184; Teterud, 522 F.2d at 360-61. We question 

whether the alternative suggested by plaintiff, consideration of 

his sincerity evidence without the outside references, could 

accommodate him at de minimis cost to the penological objectives 

of the prison. Of course, the reasonableness of a regulation is 

not subject to a higher standard of scrutiny because an 

alternative exists, but "the existence of obvious, easy 

alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not 

reasonable." Turner, 482 u.s. at 90; Salaam v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 

1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1988). 

In short, we think that plaintiff has raised a genuine issue 

of material fact about the reasonableness of the exemption policy 

and its application. This must be resolved by the district court 

after sufficient factual development and application of the Turner 

factors. See Frazier, 922 F.2d at 562 (case remanded for Turner 

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analysis); Ali v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 91 (4th Cir. 1990) (case 

remanded for further factual development on burden associated with 

adding prisoner's new name to prison's written records); Swift, 

901 F.2d at 733 (case remanded for additional factual and legal 

development concerning grooming policy). Summary judgment was not 

proper. This is not a case in which the plaintiff merely rested 

upon an allegation of sincere religious belief. Cf. Dunn, 880 

F.2d at 1198. Rather, the plaintiff came forward with 

significantly probative evidence concerning the validity of the 

regulation and his sincerity. On the latter issue the plaintiff 

included a prior determination by the corrections department that 

his beliefs were sincere enough for him to be granted an exemption 

in 1986, see Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1076 (6th Cir. 1989) 

(deviation from accommodation of longstanding practice based on 

security concerns may be pretextual), and a statement explaining 

his personal beliefs. Moreover, during this controversy, prison 

officials have acknowledged his "religious belief" and that 

"[w]hat he believes very well could be true." See supra p. 5. 

Given this evidence, we remand the case to the district court for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

4 In light of our remand, the district court should consider 

defendant's equal protection argument concerning selective 

application of the sincerity test to Native Americans. See 

Lafevers, No. 90-7088, slip op. at 7 (case reversed on first 

amendment grounds remanded for reconsideration of equal protection 

claim). See generally Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 688 

(7th Cir. 1991); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568-69 (9th Cir. 

1987). We express no opinion on that claim. 

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