Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00943/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00943-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John Rosseno, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00943-TUC-BPV

ORDER

Plaintiff, John Rosseno, filed this action for review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff presents four 

issues on appeal: (1) whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) provided legally 

sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician; (2) whether 

the ALJ erred by relying on the opinion of the non-examining medical records’ reviewer; 

(3) whether the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s symptom testimony not credible; and (4) 

whether the ALJ erred in failing to properly apply the Medical Vocational Rules. (Doc. 

21.) Before the court is an opening brief filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 21), and Commissioner’s 

memorandum in response (Doc. 28). Plaintiff filed no reply brief. 

The United States Magistrate Judge presides over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636 (c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, having received the written consent of both parties. (Doc. 9, 

11.) 

The Defendant’s decision denying benefits is affirmed. 

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I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and 

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on July 5, 2007, alleging disability as of June 14, 

2007 due to a “[d]eteriorated spine, mass in lungs, [HIV] positive.” 

Transcript/Administrative Record (Tr.) 208-215, 245. The application was denied 

initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 113-117, 123-139. Plaintiff appeared with counsel 

and testified before an ALJ at an administrative hearing on November 30, 2009. Tr. 41-

72. The ALJ issued a decision on January 13, 2010, finding Plaintiff not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 98-104. On March 18, 2011, the Appeals 

Council granted review and remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration of: (1) 

a treating physician’s opinion; (2) Plaintiff’s maximum residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); (3) whether Plaintiff is capable of performing his past relevant work; and (4) to 

obtain evidence from a vocational expert if warranted. Tr. 110-111. On December 14, 

2011, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before an ALJ at a supplemental 

administrative hearing. Tr. 73-90. The ALJ issued a decision on January 26, 2012, 

finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 27-35. 

This decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council 

denied review. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1) 

II. The Record on Appeal 

a. Plaintiff’s Background and Statements in the Record 

Plaintiff was 53 years of age on the December 13, 2006 alleged disability onset 

date, and 56 years of age on his date late insured, September 30, 2009. Tr. 28, 240. 

Plaintiff, a veteran with a high school equivalency degree and one or two years of 

college, worked in the recent past as a carpet cleaner, day laborer, electrical helper, and 

telemarketer. Tr. 44, 62, 246, 250. 

Plaintiff testified at a hearing before the ALJ on November 30, 2009 that activities 

such as sitting or standing cause sharp, shooting pain in his lower back extending in his 

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legs down to the knees. Tr. 48. Plaintiff can stand for about 40 or 50 minutes before 

needing to sit or lie down. Tr. 48-49. Plaintiff can also sit for about 40 or 50 minutes 

before needing to walk or move around for 20 or 30 minutes before he can sit again. Tr. 

49. Methadone, the only treatment he has been prescribed for his back pain, provides 

temporary relief but causes nausea if he doesn’t eat enough, and occasional headaches. 

Tr. 50-51. Plaintiff does things around the house like cleaning the kitchen, sweeping 

floors, laundry, dusting, and taking the trash out, but takes breaks during that time. Tr. 

56-57. Plaintiff had worked recently as a scorer at a skeet shooting tournament1

, but was 

able to alternate between sitting and standing. Tr. 59-60. Plaintiff did not think he could 

do the job on a full-time basis because of his tendonitis and consistent pain in his back. 

Id. Plaintiff also worked as a day-laborer as part of a clean-up crew on construction jobs 

but would get in trouble for sitting down on the job, and was fired one time for this but 

continued to work as a day-laborer at another construction site. Tr. 60. In June 2008 he 

was able to stay on one construction cleanup job for six weeks until it ended. Tr. 47. 

Plaintiff has no problems as a result of his human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) 

infection. 

The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s earning statements with him during the hearing, and 

Plaintiff agreed that in 1996 he worked a full-time job the entire year as a telemarketer. 

Tr. 65-66. He stopped working because “the company went belly up.” Tr. 66. In 1998 

Plaintiff worked again as a telemarketer for three months, then the “company went 

down.” Tr. 67. He worked as a telemarketer again in 1999 but that job ended because the 

call lists were repetitive and it “just didn’t work out with it.” Tr. 67-68. 

Plaintiff testified he would have a hard time with telemarketing now because he 

would have a “hard time sitting and standing” that he would “just have to go lay down” 

and there was no place to lie down and stretch his back out. Tr. 68-69. 

 

1

 Plaintiff testified at his supplemental hearing that he works these skeet tournaments for six to eight hours a day for seven days at a time, about three times per year. Tr. 77, 80. 

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Plaintiff testified at the supplemental hearing before the ALJ on December 30, 

2011, that the pain in his back comes and goes, but is mainly there. Tr. 81. When asked 

what makes it better, Plaintiff stated “just standing and sitting a lot. Standing and then 

laying down on my back and then standing again, but its - - I have to rotate.” Id. He lies 

down about three times a day for 20 to 45 minutes. Id. Plaintiff stated that he was told 

that physical therapy wouldn’t work, and surgery has not been mentioned. Tr. 82. 

A vocational expert (VE) testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a 

telemarketer is sedentary and semi-skilled. Id. The VE testified that a hypothetical 

individual would be able to perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a telemarketer when 

the ALJ posed the following hypothetical limitations: sedentary work with standing, 

walking or sitting for a total of six-hours in an eight-hour day, can frequently climb 

ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch; can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, 

scaffolds, and crawl; and should not be exposed to concentrated levels of fumes, odors, 

gases, unprotected heights, or hazardous, moving machinery. Tr. 86-87. 

The VE testified that the ability to do even sedentary work would be eliminated if 

a person could only sit for less than six hours in an eight hour day or if the person had to 

lie down for 20 to 45 minutes three times during a workday. Tr. 87-88. 

b. Relevant Medical Evidence Before the ALJ2

i. Treating Sources 

 There are few treatment notes in the record regarding Plaintiff’s back pain. The 

records from the Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) indicate that Plaintiff was diagnosed 

 

2

 The medical evidence demonstrates, in addition to Plaintiff’s chronic back pain at issue in this appeal, that Plaintiff is HIV positive, asymptomatic; was treated for pulmonary emboli secondary to deep vein thrombosis in June 2007, resolved; underwent 

left lower leg extremity varicose vein ligation and stripping in October 2009; was diagnosed with adhesive capsulitis of his left shoulder, resolved; was Hepatitis C positive, resolved; and had some hearing loss. See Tr. 30-31. The ALJ found these 

impairments not severe, and that there was no evidence that these conditions have 

resulted in significant durational exertional or nonexertional limitations, and that any minor limitations associated with these conditions have been considered in the RFC. Tr. 

30. Because Plaintiff does not argue that this finding was in error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court does not address these impairments. 

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in August, 2004, by Registered Nurse Elizabeth Graham, with “Chronic Low Back Pain 

by report of patient s/p [status post] MVA [motor vehicle accident] and HNP [herniated 

disc or herniated nucleus pulposus].” Tr. 467, 896. Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Neil 

Ampel, a staff physician in Infectious Diseases at the Southern Arizona VA Health Care 

System prescribed methadone to treat the pain, (Tr. 1046) and Plaintiff continued on the 

same medication and dosage for treatment of his pain throughout the period in question 

and continuing to the time of the ALJ’s decision. See generally Tr. 396, 460, 465, 467, 

469, 477, 474, 482, 836, 906-912, 1042-1045. 

 In April 2005, MRI of Plaintiff’s thoracic spine revealed several abnormalities, 

including mild to moderate multi-level degenerative disk changes throughout the thoracic 

spine; the findings were most significant at the T9-10 and T10-11 levels where moderateto-severe spinal canal stenosis was noted due to the presence of posterior diskosteophyte-complexes. Tr. 382. There was no evidence for cord compression and no 

significant neural foraminal stenosis. Id.

 The MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed no spinal canal stenosis or neural 

foraminal narrowing at the L2-3 level. At the L1-2 and L3-4 levels the MRI revealed 

multi-level degenerative disk changes without significant spinal canal stenosis and with 

mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing. Tr. 382-83. At the L4-5 level the MRI 

demonstrated severe disk dessication with near-complete disk collapse, resulting in mild 

spinal canal stenosis with moderate to severe right and moderate left neural foraminal 

stenosis. Tr. 383. At L5-S1 the MRI demonstrated moderate-to-severe disk dessication 

with moderate-to-severe loss of disk height resulting in mild-to-moderate spinal canal 

stenosis, and, in conjunction with mild facet arthropathy, moderate right and mild-tomoderate left neural foraminal stenosis. Tr. 382. 

 The record summary indicates that in August 2005 and February 2006, Plaintiff 

again saw Dr. Ampel and was diagnosed with lumbago and chronic low back pain. Tr. 

457, 459. The Court was unable to find the treatment notes from these visits in the MER. 

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 Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Chris S. Reust, a staff physician at the Immunodeficiency 

Clinic at the Phoenix VA Medical Center, on July 18 2007 for follow up with treatment 

for HIV after returning to Phoenix after several years’ absence. Tr. 408. Aside from a 

health summary report indicating that Dr. Reust treated Plaintiff once in 1999 (Tr. 405), 

there are no other treatment notes from Dr. Reust in the MER. In August 2007, Dr. Reust 

completed a physician statement indicating that, among other limitations, Plaintiff could 

only stand/walk for 2-4 hours and sit less than six hours, and noted that Plaintiff reported 

“he must change positions about every 30 minutes.” Tr. 257-56. Dr. Reust indicated that 

the objective findings on which the limitations were based was a CT of the thorax, with 

an anterior mediastinal mass, and a right lower lobe pulmonary embolism. Tr. 258. Dr. 

Reust did not indicate that he had reviewed the 2005 MRI at that time. 

 A second physician statement was submitted in 20083

, indicating that Dr. Reust 

had reviewed the 2005 MRI and that Plaintiff had multilevel degenerative disk disease 

and, among other limitations, could only sit for a total of less than 6 hours in an 8 hour 

work day, “one hour at a time” and must alternate sitting and standing about once each 

hour due to symptoms. Tr. 751-53. 

 In April 2008, Plaintiff reported to Vipul Singh, M.D., a staff physician at the VA, 

that he felt fine, but that “back pain is the main issue for a long time.” Tr. 705. Dr. Singh 

examined Plaintiff and noted “very tight erector spinae muscle on both sides” and 

recommended a physical therapy consult. Tr. 706. There is no evidence in the record of 

Plaintiff receiving any physical therapy at this time. 

 The record indicates that Plaintiff expressed an interest in reducing or 

discontinuing his methadone prescription in September 2009 (Tr. 803, 806, 808), but 

ultimately did not do so and was a “no-show” for a physical therapy appointment which 

 

3

 The report is undated, but per the Plaintiff’s prior counsel it was authored in 2008 and that date was accepted by the ALJ in her 2010 decision after she noted it was 

based on the 2005 MRI. Tr. 33. 

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had been scheduled in order to give Plaintiff “some therapeutic advantages from therapy 

prior to titrating off methadone” (Tr. 807, 854-55, 1042). 

 In February 2010, Geoffrey Smith, M.D., an Infectious Disease Fellow at the 

Southern Arizona VA HCS noted that Plaintiff reported his back pain was controlled on 

current medications. Tr. 974. On examination, Dr. Smith reported a normal gait. Id. 

 In October 2011 Plaintiff was assessed at the VA by Registered Kinesiotherapist 

(“RKT”) James Nance with “radicular symptoms to LLE [lower left extremity] and 

abnormal MRI findings”. Tr. 921-22. Mr. Nance recommended a neurosurgical consult to 

determine if traction would be safe for Plaintiff. Tr. 923. In November 2011, Plaintiff was 

seen by Mr. Nance for “lumbar radiculopathy” indicating to the therapist that he was 

“going for a disability claim on my back.” Tr. 919-20. 

ii. Non-Examining Sources 

 In July 2008, Dr. Maloney completed a Physical RFC Assessment, indicating that 

Plaintiff could stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour work day and sit with normal 

breaks for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour work day. Tr. 756-63. Dr. Maloney 

explained that this conclusion was based on Plaintiff’s chronic pain for which he is 

treated with methadone. See id. 

c. The ALJ’s Findings 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through September 30, 2009. Tr. 28, 29 ¶ 1. The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of June 14, 

2007. Tr. 29 ¶ 2. The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of back pain 

secondary to degenerative disc disease. Tr. 30 ¶ 3. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 31 ¶ 4. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual 

functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work and “he can stand, walk or sit for a 

total of 6 hours in each 8-hour workday; frequently climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, 

kneel and crouch; occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds and crawl; he should not 

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be exposed to concentrated levels of fumes, odors, gases, unprotected heights or 

hazardous moving machinery. Tr. 31-32 ¶ 5. The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of 

performing his past relevant work as a telemarketer as that job is actually and generally 

performed, and concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability from October 1, 2006 

through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. 34 ¶¶ 6, 7. 

III. Discussion 

a. Standard of Review 

 The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, 

a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal 

error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). “ ‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Robbins v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 

2006)). In determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the 

Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating 

a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id. (quoting Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882). The 

Court reviews only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and 

may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 

2003)). 

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show (1) he has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, (2) he has a severe impairment, and (3) his impairment meets or 

equals a listed impairment or (4) his RFC precludes him from performing his past work. 

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At step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant is able to perform other 

work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). 

b. Analysis 

i. The ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons to give limited 

weight to Dr. Reust’s opinion, and thus the Court does not 

credit Dr. Reust’s opinion as true. 

 In weighing medical source evidence, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between 

three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who treat the claimant; (2) examining 

physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining physicians, 

who neither treat nor examine the claimant. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011–12 (citing 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)). Generally, more weight is given to a 

treating physician's opinion. Id. The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence for rejecting a treating or an examining physician's 

uncontradicted opinion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). An ALJ 

may reject the controverted opinion of a treating or an examining physician by providing 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

 Opinions from non-examining medical sources are entitled to less weight than 

treating or examining physicians. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Although an ALJ generally 

gives more weight to an examining physician's opinion than to a non-examining 

physician's opinion, a non-examining physician's opinion may nonetheless constitute 

substantial evidence if it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record. 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). When evaluating medical opinion 

evidence, the ALJ may consider “the amount of relevant evidence that supports the 

opinion and the quality of the explanation provided; the consistency of the medical 

opinion with the record as a whole; [and] the specialty of the physician providing the 

opinion....” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial 

evidence because, in making the RFC determination, the ALJ erred by giving limited 

weight to Dr. Reust’s opinion. (Doc. 21 at 14-15) Plaintiff argues that Dr. Reust’s opinion 

was consistent with the MRI and Plaintiff’s consistent complaints of chronic back pain 

and with the prescription of methadone for treatment of that chronic back pain. (Doc. 21 

at 14-15.) Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the opinion of the nonexamining medical expert. (Doc. 21 at 16.) 

 The MER indicates that Dr. Reust examined Plaintiff twice, once in 1999 and 

again in 2007, though there is no indication Plaintiff sought or received treatment for his 

back pain from Dr. Reust. Tr. 405, 408. Dr. Reust completed an assessment in 2008, 

opining, among other limitations, that Plaintiff had the ability to sit for less than 6 hours 

in an 8-hour workday, one hour at a time. Tr. 751. 

 The ALJ gave this opinion “limited weight” because it was “too restrictive based 

on objective evidence” and that the VA progress notes establish that Plaintiff “has 

received little treatment for his back pain” and “was prescribed methadone for chronic 

pain for years prior to the alleged onset date and only conservative treatment has been 

provided since that time.” Tr. 33-34. 

 Before assigning weight to Dr. Reust’s opinion, the ALJ discussed the medical 

record and noted that aside from the MRI in 2005, no further imaging was done until 

2011, there was no intensification of treatment consistent with disabling back pain, and in 

2010 Plaintiff described his back pain as controlled on his current medication. Tr. 33. The 

ALJ provided sufficient reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in support of 

her assessment of Dr. Reust’s opinion. Though this discussion of the medical record did 

not appear in the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Reust’s opinion, it is sufficient to support the 

ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Reust’s opinion. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 

2001) (an ALJ must discuss and evaluate the evidence that supports findings, but need 

not do so under a particular heading). 

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 The ALJ noted in her decision that Plaintiff received little treatment for his back 

pain, although he had been prescribed methadone for years prior to the alleged onset date. 

Tr. 33-34. As correctly noted by the Commissioner, the providers who examined Plaintiff 

all primarily treated him for conditions other than his back disorder, including his HIV, 

which was essentially asymptomatic, with a good diet/appetite, a stable weight, and good 

tolerance of medications (Tr. 408, 427, 705, 770, 799, 808-809, 820, 823, 832, 836, 918, 

924, 928-929, 933, 953, 974-975); his June 2007 pulmonary embolism, which was 

successfully treated, with unlabored respiration and a blood oxygen level of 99% on room 

air, by July 2, 2007 (Tr. 421), and which Dr. Singh determined to be stable by April 2008 

(Tr. 706); and a shoulder complaint, which Plaintiff testified was improved with 

treatment including exercise (Tr. 60-61). None, however, including Dr. Ampel, who 

prescribed methadone for Plaintiff's back pain and eventually ordered a lumbar spine 

MRI in 2011, made any objective findings regarding Plaintiff's back functioning, with the 

exception of Dr. Smith, also treating Plaintiff for HIV, who noted a normal gait (Tr. 974), 

and a non-physician provider who likewise noted that Plaintiff was able to ambulate 

without difficulty (Tr. 503). Plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic low back pain, in 

August 2004, by a registered nurse based on his own report of symptoms. Tr. 467, 896. 

Since that diagnosis, the only medical evidence in the record that Plaintiff sought further 

treatment for his back pain during the period at issue is found in a summary of the record 

which indicates that in August 2005 and February 2006, Plaintiff again saw Dr. Ampel 

and was diagnosed with lumbago and chronic low back pain. Tr. 457, 459. It was not 

until July 2011 that Plaintiff complained again of persistent low back pain during an 

appointment for follow-up treatment for HIV. Tr. 933. 

 An ALJ may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are unsupported by 

rationale or treatment notes, and offer no objective medical findings to support the 

existence of a claimant’s conditions. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th

Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ found this to be true for Dr. Reust’s opinion. The Court finds 

that, because the ALJ’s decision giving limited weight to Dr. Reust’s opinion is 

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supported by specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record, the ALJ did not err in giving limited weight to Dr. Reust’s opinion . See id; 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

ii. The ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

 “[Q]uestions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are 

functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 

580 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 When assessing a claimant’s credibility, the “ALJ is not required to believe every 

allegation of disabling pain or other non-exertional impairment.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the ALJ may disregard selfserving statements if they are unsupported by objective evidence. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 

F.2d 1229, 1231. Where, as here, the claimant has produced objective medical evidence 

of an underlying impairment that could reasonably give rise to the symptoms and there is 

no affirmative finding of malingering by the ALJ, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the 

claimant’s symptom testimony must be specific, clear and convincing. Garrison,759 F.3d 

at 1014-15; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008); Orn, 495 F.3d at 

635; Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. “The ALJ must state specifically which symptom 

testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 (the ALJ must 

provide specific and cogent reasons for the disbelief and cite the reasons why the 

testimony is unpersuasive). 

 In assessing the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider ordinary techniques 

of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 

statements about the symptoms, and other testimony from the claimant that appears less 

than candid; unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek or follow a prescribed 

course of treatment; the claimant’s daily activities; the claimant’s work record; 

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observations of treating and examining physicians and other third parties; precipitating 

and aggravating factors; and functional restrictions caused by the symptoms. 

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. See also Robbins, 466 F.3d at 

884 (“To find the claimant not credible, the ALJ must rely either on reasons unrelated to 

the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between his 

testimony and his own conduct; or on internal contradictions in that testimony.”) 

 An ALJ's error may be harmless where the ALJ has provided one or more invalid 

reasons for disbelieving a claimant's testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were 

supported by the record. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 

(9th Cir. 2009); Carmickle v. Comm’r Social Sec. Admin, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162–63 (9th

Cir. 2008); Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195–97 (9th Cir. 

2004). In this context, an error is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ's decision and the error “does not negate the validity of the ALJ's 

ultimate conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197; see also Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162. 

 The ALJ found that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” Tr. 32. As the 

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explains, the manner in which this “boilerplate 

language” is used in the Commissioner’s credibility analysis “gets things backwards.” 

Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (Addressing identical language and 

finding that the “problem is that the assessment of a claimant's ability to work will often 

... depend heavily on the credibility of her statements concerning the ‘intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects’ of her symptoms, but the passage implies that ability to 

work is determined first and is then used to determine the claimant's credibility.”) As the 

Court found in Bjornson, the statement by the ALJ that Plaintiff’s statements were “not 

entirely credible” yields no clue to what weight the ALJ gave that testimony, and “fails to 

inform us in a meaningful, reviewable way of the specific evidence the ALJ considered in 

determining that claimant’s complaints were not credible.” Id. (citations omitted). 

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 If, however, “the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation ... and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record, our role is not to second-guess that decision.” Morgan v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. 

Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the mere use of the meaningless 

boilerplate language is not cause for remand if the ALJ’s conclusion is followed by 

sufficient reasoning. See e.g. Jones v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2012 WL 6184941, at 

* 4 (D.Or. 2012)(boilerplate language is a conclusion which may be affirmed if the ALJ’s 

stated reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s testimony are clear and convincing); Bowers v. 

Astrue, 2012 WL 2401642, at *9 (D.Or. 2012)(concluding that this language erroneously 

reverses the analysis, but finding such error harmless because the ALJ cited other clear 

and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony). Accordingly, despite the 

use of the boilerplate language which implies improper analysis, the Court considers 

whether the ALJ’s conclusion in this case is nonetheless supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. The Court concludes that it is. 

 The ALJ identified the testimony of the Plaintiff’s that he was considering, stating 

that the Plaintiff testified that after a skeet shooting tournament he is “very sore” and “has 

to lay down a lot.” Tr. 32 “It takes a couple of week[s] for him to get back to his normal 

state after working. He described a sharp pain in his back that comes and goes, but he is 

mainly in pain. He generally lays down three times a day. He has been told his back 

condition has gotten worse. Surgery has not been mentioned by his providers. He was 

told physical therapy would not work for him.” Id. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony 

not credible for numerous reasons: Plaintiff continued to work after he alleges he became 

disabled in June 2007; there has been no intensification of treatment consistent with 

disabling back pain; Plaintiff reported feeling well overall in 2010 and at that time 

reported that his back pain was controlled on current medication; there is no evidence that 

Plaintiff has been provided any medication for his complaint other than methadone and 

naproxen; there is no evidence that Plaintiff underwent regular treatment employing a 

regimen or therapy consistent with the severity of his back pain complaints; and Plaintiff 

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had no physical therapy for his complaints until 2011. Tr. 33. Additionally, the ALJ 

found that there is no record of diffuse atrophy or muscle wasting, a “common side effect 

of prolonged pain.” Tr. 33. 

 Regarding the latter rationale, the ALJ cited no medical opinion or authority to 

support her lay surmise about the significance of the absence in the record of findings of 

diffuse atrophy or muscle wasting. See Tr. 33. “[W]hile an [ALJ] is free to resolve issues 

of credibility as to lay testimony or to choose between properly submitted medical 

opinions, he is not free to set his own expertise against that of a physician who [submitted 

an opinion to or] testified before him.” McBrayer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

712 F.2d 795, 799 (2nd Cir. 1983); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th

Cir. 1999) (ALJ improperly relied on his interpretation of Plaintiff’s testimony over 

medical opinions); Gonzalez Perez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 812 F.2d 747, 

749 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The ALJ may not substitute his own layman's opinion for the 

findings and opinion of a physician....”). The ALJ’s finding in this case regarding muscle 

atrophy and weight loss was based on the ALJ’s own lay interpretation of Plaintiff’s 

treatment records, and undoubtedly a medical diagnosis by a lay witness does not 

constitute competent evidence. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 

1996) (citing Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Frank v. 

Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (“It would appear from this paragraph that 

the ALJ made his own medical conclusions about whether a patient would show signs of 

atrophy or muscle tone loss as a result of Frank’s alleged impairments”); but see Hollis v. 

Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the absence of objective 

factors indicating the existence of severe pain – such as muscular atrophy – can support 

an ALJ’s credibility determination). While the Court finds the ALJ’s reliance on this 

factor to be in error, “[s]o long as there remains ‘substantial evidence supporting the 

ALJ’s conclusions on ... credibility’ and the error ‘does not negate the validity of the 

ALJ’s ultimate [credibility] conclusion,’ such is deemed harmless and does not warrant 

reversal.” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (citing Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195–97). The 

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relevant inquiry in this context is whether the ALJ’s decision remains legally valid, 

despite such error, i.e. whether the ALJ’s remaining reasoning and ultimate credibility 

determination is adequately supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. The 

Court concludes that this error was harmless because the ALJ provided specific, clear and 

convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, for justifying the 

ALJ’s decision to disbelieve Plaintiff’s allegations. 

 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff continued to work after the date he alleges he 

became disabled. Tr. 32-33. Plaintiff engaged in work activity during the periods at issue, 

performing light day labor work such as sweeping, inventory, and telephone answering, 

though this work was performed intermittently and with effort. Tr. 45-47, 59-60, 62, 284, 

292. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ erred in relying upon this fact because 

such did not constitute substantial gainful activity, as noted by the Commissioner, daily 

activities still "may be grounds for discrediting the claimant's testimony to the extent that 

they contradict the claims of a totally debilitating impairment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added, citations and internal punctuation 

omitted). The ALJ appropriately considers a claimant’s work record in weighing a 

claimant’s credibility. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Here, even if Plaintiff's work activity 

did not constitute substantial gainful activity, the ALJ cited Plaintiff's work activity as 

evidence that Plaintiff’s ability to work was inconsistent with his allegations of disability 

after June 2007. 

 Second, the ALJ noted that there has been no intensification of treatment 

consistent with disabling back pain. Tr. 33. In fact, until Plaintiff sought care for his back 

pain in 2011, the only evidence of treatment for his back pain after his alleged date of 

disability is his continued prescription for methadone. Though he sought to discontinue 

his methadone treatment, he did not attend a physical therapy appointment in September 

2009 which had been scheduled in order to give Plaintiff “some therapeutic advantages 

from therapy prior to titrating off methadone.” Tr. 807, 854-55. “[I]f a claimant 

complains about disabling pain but fails to seek treatment, or fails to follow prescribed 

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treatment, for the pain, an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the complaint 

unjustified or exaggerated.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 638 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603). In this 

case, the ALJ properly inferred, from Plaintiff’s failure to seek more aggressive 

treatment, that his pain was not as disabling as reported. Additionally, the ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff reported feeling well overall in 2010, and at that time reported that his back pain 

was controlled on current medication. Tr. 33. Evidence that a disabling problem is 

controlled by medication may undermine claims that the problem is disabling and support 

an ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040. 

 The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s credibility determination is also 

supported by evidence of the daily activities in which Plaintiff engaged and his ability to 

care for his own needs and perform household tasks. See (Doc. 28 at 22). The Court does 

not consider these factors, however, as the Court reviews only the reasons provided by 

the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon 

which he did not rely. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (citing Connett, 340 F.3d at 874); Pinto 

v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2001) (the district court may not affirm the 

ALJ's decision “on a ground that the [ALJ] did not invoke in making [her] decision[.]”); 

Accord Varney v. Sec’y Health & Human Serv. (Varney II), 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 

1988) (“there may exist valid grounds on which to discredit a claimant's pain testimony.... 

But if grounds for such a finding exist, it is both reasonable and desirable to require the 

ALJ to articulate them in the original decision.”) (internal quotes and citation omitted). 

Nonetheless, the ALJ's articulated reasons for discounting Plaintiff's testimony are 

specific, clear and convincing, and supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

iii. The ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff could 

perform his past relevant work. 

 Plaintiff contends that his job as a telemarketer did not constitute substantial 

gainful activity, and thus could not constitute past relevant work. (Doc. 21 at 22.) 

Plaintiff argument is without merit, however, as Plaintiff fails to consider Plaintiff’s 

employment as a telemarketer in 1996. The ALJ obtained vocational expert testimony in 

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this instance to establish the requirements of Plaintiff's past relevant work and to 

determine whether he had sustained his burden of establishing that he was unable to 

perform such work with his limitations. The vocational expert relied upon the DOT in 

testifying that Plaintiff's past relevant work as a telemarketer, as typically performed in 

the national economy, was sedentary work (Tr. 86). She also testified that an individual 

with the RFC found by the ALJ in this case could perform that job (Tr. 86-87). 

 Work that a claimant performed within the last 15 years, which lasted long enough 

for him or her to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity, is considered past 

relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a), 416.965(a). The Commissioner's 

regulations provide evaluation guides for determining whether an individual is 

performing work at the level of substantial gainful activity. See id. §§ 404.1574, 416.974 

(2013). An individual's earnings from work activities in excess of certain specified 

monthly amounts is ordinarily deemed to show that an individual engaged in substantial 

gainful activity; earnings less than a certain amount will ordinarily show that an 

individual did not engage in substantial gainful activity. See id. §§ 404.1574(a)(1), (b)(2)-

(3), 416.974(a)(1), (b)(2)-(3); S.S.R. 83-33, 1983 WL 31255, *2; Program Operations 

Manual System DI 10501.015, (2001 WL 1931773). Earnings averaging more than 

$500.00 per month in 1996 ordinarily indicate substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1574(b)(2)(i), 416.974(b)(2)(i). Plaintiff testified, and the record establishes, that 

he earned almost $15,000.00 in 1996 as telemarketer (Tr. 65, 217), well above the 

amount indicating substantial gainful activity. Thus, the ALJ properly found that the 

residual functional capacity Plaintiff retained was consistent with the demands of his past 

relevant work, and that Plaintiff could perform that work. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 

416.920(e).

 The court finds the final decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and is free from prejudicial legal error. 

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 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The Commissioner’s decision denying benefits is AFFIRMED. 

 2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 1st day of December, 2014. 

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