Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03129/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3129

___________________________

Tuwane English

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant

v.

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

____________

 Submitted: May 19, 2016

 Filed: August 24, 2016 

____________

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In November 2011, Tuwane English pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute

crack cocaine. The district court varied downward from an advisory guidelines range

based on English’s status as a career offender and sentenced him to 180 months in

prison. As English did not appeal, his conviction became final on April 12, 2012. See

Anjulo-Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 814, 816 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2008). 

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On September 16, 2013, English filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court1

 denied the

motion, concluding that it was time-barred by the applicable one-year statute of

limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), and, alternatively, that English was not entitled

to relief on the merits. English appeals. The district court granted a certificate of

appealability on two issues: whether the statute of limitations should be equitably

tolled, and whether English received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel

“incorrectly informed Mr. English of the potential 180 month sentence.” We conclude

the § 2255 motion was time-barred and therefore affirm. 

English filed his § 2255 motion five months after the one-year statute of

limitations expired. The limitations period is not jurisdictional and is therefore subject

to the doctrine of equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010);

Muhammad v. United States, 735 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2013). “[E]quitable tolling

affords the otherwise time-barred petitioner an exceedingly narrow window of relief.” 

Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2001). A movant seeking equitable tolling

must establish: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

Muhammad, 735 F.3d at 815, quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. We review a denial

of equitable tolling de novo, but review underlying fact findings for clear error. 

United States v. Hernandez, 436 F.3d 851, 854-55, 858 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 547

U.S. 1172 (2006). 

We conclude that English failed to establish that he diligently pursued the rights

protected by § 2255 relief. To be eligible for equitable tolling, he must show

“reasonable diligence,” not “maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653

(noting that the petitioner filed his pro se petition the day he learned the one-year

1

The Honorable Donald E. O’Brien, late a United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa.

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limitations period had expired). English argues he is entitled to equitable tolling

because of the following letter he wrote to Judge O’Brien on March 3, 2013, almost

six weeks before the one-year limitations period expired on April 12:

I am writing you to let you know that I am getting inaffect [sic] counsel

from my Attorney/Public Defender I’ve wrote several letter to him this

is my only way to correspond with him because I’m still in the hole

because of my Protective Custody I can’t call him and letter are the only

way to talk to him and he doesn’t respond to me at all I have court issues

coming up soon and I really need to speak with him before hand and he

wont talk to me I’ve been in the hole 9 months and I’ve wrote him at

lease once a month and he hasn’t responded at all to me period Is there

any way you could appoint me a new public Defender because I do [not]

know what more I could do about the situation I’ve even had my wife

my father and a few other family members call him for me and he just

will not talk to me I am looking for help to resolve this matter please.

In the Order being appealed, Judge O’Brien stated: “The Court forwarded this letter

to Mr. English’s trial counsel, Mike Smart. Mr. English wrote a similar letter on

March 17, 2013, stating that he had an ‘emergency’ and needed to talk to his public

defender. The Court also forwarded that letter to Mr. Smart.” Attorney Smart

testified at the evidentiary hearing, but neither counsel asked whether he received

these letters forwarded by the district court and, if so, how he responded.

At the evidentiary hearing, English testified that his March 3 letter was “his

request for a [§ 2255] petition to be filed.” The district court properly ruled that the

letter to the court could not be construed as a pro se motion for § 2255 relief. See

Rule 3, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings; cf. Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948,

950-51 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 933 (2003). Thus, the question is

whether the March 3 letter entitles English to equitable tolling of the § 2255 statute

of limitations. 

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The primary claim asserted by English in his untimely § 2255 motion was

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in promising he would receive a 120-month

sentence if he pleaded guilty. English knew the facts relating to that claim when the

district court imposed a 180-month sentence. Yet he waited seventeen months to raise

the claim in a § 2255 motion. There was nothing in the March 3 letter to alert the

district court, or attorney Smart if he received the forwarded letter, that English

wished to file a § 2255 motion. As the district court explained:

In early 2013, Mr. English was hoping to get a Rule 35 Motion from the

Government. He was also trying to get out of administrative segregation

(aka ‘the hole’) at prison. Finally, Mr. English had an ongoing issue

regarding fee payments in the District Court for Nebraska arising out of

his prior federal conviction in that state. . . . Based on the text of Mr.

English’s letters, about court issues coming up soon, it seems Mr.

English could have been hoping to talk to Mr. Smart about any one of

those three issues. However, there is no indication that Mr. English was

hoping to talk to Mr. Smart about Mr. Smart’s past (alleged) ineffective

assistance or that he wanted Mr. Smart to file a habeas petition.

English did not testify that he asked Smart to file a § 2255 motion, and he made no

showing of diligence other than to write letters to the district court complaining of

unrelated problems. Moreover, even if the forwarded letters should have alerted the

court or attorney Smart that English wished to discuss filing a § 2255 motion, English

failed to explain at the hearing why he waited six months after writing the letter before

he filed a pro se motion -- in proper form -- accusing Smart of ineffective assistance

in the guilty plea process. 

“Under long-established principles, [English’s] lack of diligence precludes

equity’s operation.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 419 (2005). Accordingly,

we conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that English’s § 2255 motion

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was time-barred. We need not address the district court’s alternative denial of § 2255

relief on the merits of English’s involuntary guilty plea claim.

The judgment of the district court in Case No. 5:13-cv-04089 is affirmed.

______________________________

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