Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01068/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01068-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DODSON,

2:04-cv-1068-MCE-CMK

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC. dba,

DOLLAR TREE #1203, et al.

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present motion, Plaintiff Robert Dodson

(“Dodson”) seeks attorney’s fees and litigation expenses pursuant

to both state law and 42 U.S.C. § 12205 of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as a result of a favorable judgment by

this Court on July 25, 2006. Plaintiff requests $52,250.00 for

fees incurred by various attorneys, $3,480.00 for paralegals, and

$9,663.41 in costs and litigation expenses, for a total of

$65,393.41. Plaintiff further seeks a total of $1,095.15

pursuant to a Bill of Costs. 

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Case 2:04-cv-01068-MCE -CMK Document 99 Filed 12/14/06 Page 1 of 12
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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Defendant Dollar Tree (“Dollar Tree”) opposes Plaintiff’s

requests, claiming that the fees, expenses, and costs sought are

unwarranted, unreasonable, and, or, excessive.1

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from Plaintiff’s claim that he

encountered various architectural barriers when attempting to

visit Double Tree’s 98 Cents ‘n Deals Store at Sacramento,

California. Plaintiff is a quadriplegic unable to walk, stand or

use his arms. As a result, Plaintiff must use an electronic

wheelchair when traveling about in public.

On June 28, 2006, a one-day court trial was held, which

resulted in judgment in favor of Plaintiff. On July 25, 2006,

the Court granted Plaintiff’s injunctive relief on four of seven

issues: 1) placement of the entry door’s ISA sign; 2) provision

of two handicapped-accessible checkstands; 3) Closure of the

second primary entrance; and 4) fire exit requirements. On

September 11, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking

litigation expenses in the amount of $9,663.41, as well as

attorneys’ fees totaling $52,250,00 and paralegal fees in the

amount of $3,480.00, itemized as follows:

Lynn Hubbard 55.65 hours at $300/hr

Adam Sorrells 63.15 hours at $250/hr

 8.40 hours at $175/hr 

Scott Hubbard 24.10 hours at $175/hr

Mark Emmett 70.40 hours at $200/hr

Paralegals 46.60 hours at $75/hr

Case 2:04-cv-01068-MCE -CMK Document 99 Filed 12/14/06 Page 2 of 12
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3

Additionally, as stated above, Plaintiff further requested

taxable costs in the amount of $1,095.15 pursuant to a Bill of

Costs.

STANDARD

Plaintiff's Complaint alleged violations of federal and

California law. Plaintiff's federal claim arose under the ADA,

while her state law claims arose under the California's Unruh

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, California Health & Safety Code §

19953, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §

54-55. 

Section 12205 of the ADA authorizes a court, in its

discretion, to "allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation

expenses, and costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A prevailing

plaintiff under a statute so worded "should ordinarily recover an

attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust." Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d

1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 429 (1983). A plaintiff who enters a legally

enforceable settlement agreement is considered a prevailing

party. Id.

Section 55 of the California Disabled Persons Act provides

that "the prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to

recover reasonable attorney's fees." Cal. Civ. Code § 55. 

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4

Also, under California Health & Safety Code § 19953, "[a]ny

person who is aggrieved or potentially aggrieved by a violation

of this part . . . may bring an action to enjoin the violation. 

The prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover

reasonable attorney's fees." 

ANALYSIS

Dollar Tree first asks the Court to follow the Central

District's recent decision in Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F.

Supp. 2d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2005), which denied attorneys' fees in

an ADA case where the plaintiff had neither provided

pre-litigation notice of his intent to sue nor afforded the

defendant, prior to suit, a reasonable opportunity to cure any

alleged violations. As even the Doran court recognized, however,

there is no Ninth Circuit precedent requiring an ADA plaintiff to

provide notice before filing suit. Id. at 1031. Indeed, in

Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir.

2000), the Ninth Circuit held squarely to the contrary. 

Moreover, as Doran further concedes, repeated efforts by Congress

to amend the ADA to provide pre-suit notice have uniformly

failed. Id. Consequently, even assuming Plaintiff failed to

provide Dollar Tree with adequate notice of its ADA shortcomings

before instituting this lawsuit, the Court declines to rely on

the reasoning of Doran in altogether denying Plaintiff's instant

request for fees or expenses. 

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5

This Court must therefore determine the extent to which

attorneys' fees and litigation expenses are recoverable. In

making that assessment, the Court must identify the applicable

"lodestar" for calculating attorneys' fees. Under the lodestar

method, a court multiplies the number of hours the prevailing

attorney reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable

hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Ketchum v.

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (expressly approving the use

of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar). Courts

may then adjust the lodestar to reflect other aspects of the

case. See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975); see also Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25

(1977). That adjustment can go either upwards or downwards

depending on the circumstances present. Van Gerwen v. Guar. Mut.

Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Turning first to the number of hours reasonably billed, 

the Court finds that the amount claimed by Plaintiff for certain

tasks are unreasonable and must be adjusted accordingly. 

Plaintiff’s counsel has filed literally hundreds of ADA lawsuits

similar to this one. Those cases share similar pleadings,

discovery requests and motions. Certain documents generated in

this matter, such as the Complaint and discovery requests, are

almost identical to those generated in other cases, and the

reasonable fee claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel in performing those

tasks must therefore be reduced. 

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6

After analyzing the billing entries generated by Plaintiff’s

counsel, the Court will strike from the award the 1.7 hours Lynn

Hubbard billed for drafting the Complaint, the 2.0 hours Scott

Hubbard billed for drafting Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions,

and the 2.0 hours Scott Hubbard billed for drafting Plaintiff’s

Request for Production of Documents. 

Even more significant than the fees generated by Plaintiff’s

Complaint and discovery requests were fees incurred in drafting

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. After analyzing the

Plaintiff’s billing entries, the Court identified 24.1 hours

credited to the time spent on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. The 24.1 hours credited is highly dubious since the

motion here is nearly identical to the unsuccessful Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff’s attorneys in Jones v.

Dollar Tree, Case No. 2:04-cv-2002-MCE-KJM (December 2005). As

such, the Court supports Defendant’s recommendation that fifty

percent of the hours spent on the motion should only be

compensated. Accordingly, Lynn Hubbard’s compensation for time

spent on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be

reduced to 12.05 hours. 

Another general classification of fees sought by Plaintiff

will also not be permitted. Plaintiff seeks compensation for 8.4

hours of travel time by Adam Sorrells to Sacramento from Chico. 

This is despite the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel, Adam Sorrells,

has a history of working with Lynn Hubbard’s Chico-based law firm

in filing similar ADA cases in the Sacramento Division of the

Eastern District. 

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7

No evidence has been presented suggesting that Plaintiff’s

counsel tries more cases in Chico than in Sacramento, or that

Plaintiff’s counsel maintains offices outside the Sacramento area

for any reason other than his own convenience. Assuming Sorrells

charges his regular paying clients for travel time, this does not

justify shifting these expenses to Dollar Tree since a paying

client can negotiate travel expenses in advance. Martinez v.

Longs Drugs Stores, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-1843-DFL-CMK, 2005 WL

3287233 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005). More specifically,

Dollar Tree did not have a paying client’s choice of seeking

other representation if travel expenses were deemed too costly. 

Consequently, Dollar Tree should not be required to shoulder

Sorrells’ travel expenses to Sacramento, and as such, will not be

compensated for the 8.4 hours of travel time. 

Finally, Defendant asserts that $921.50 should be disallowed

from Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees attributed to clerical work. 

Upon reviewing counsel’s billing entries, the work deemed by

Defendant to constitute overhead was performed by paralegals;

thus, Defendant argues that certain paralegal costs should be

disallowed because they were "clerical/secretarial" in nature.

Although secretarial costs are deemed by courts within this

Circuit to constitute overhead, the Court will permit recovery of

time expended by paralegals. (See Shaffer v. Superior Court, 33

Cal. App. 4th 993 (1995)). Defendant failed to demonstrate,

however, that the tasks represented by the billing entries in

question were not properly performed by paralegals. Accordingly,

the Court will require Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff for

paralegal services. 

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8

The above analysis all pertains to the reasonableness of the

number of hours for which compensation is sought. The second

step of the lodestar analysis requires that the rate sought to be

charged per hour also be reasonable. Courts generally calculate

reasonable hourly rates according to the prevailing market rates

in the relevant legal community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984). The general rule is that courts use the rates of

attorneys practicing in the forum district, in this case, the

Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (1993); Davis v. Mason County,

927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 899

(1991). 

The burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory

evidence that the requested rates are "in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Blum,

465 U.S. at 895 n.11. A court will normally deem a rate

determined this way to be reasonable. Id.

Previously in White v. Save Mart Supermarkets, the Court

awarded the Plaintiff’s attorney, Lynn Hubbard, $250.00 per hour,

limited associate attorney compensation to $150.00 per hour and

confined paralegal services to $75.00 per hour in cases of this

nature. No. 2:03-cv-2402-MCE-KJM, 2005 WL 2675040, at *3 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 20, 2005). 

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9

Consequently, after deducting the unreasonable hours expended in

this matter and adjusting the hourly rate, Lynn Hubbard’s

compensation should be reduced from $16,695 to $10,475, Adam

Sorrells’ compensation should be reduced from $17,257.50 to

$15,787.50, Scott Hubbard’s compensation should be reduced from

$4,217.50 to $3,015.00, and Mark Emmett’s compensation should be

reduced from $14,080.00 to $10,560.00. 

As outlined above, after adjusting for reasonable attorney

rates and for reasonable hours expended, a lodestar figure for

professional fees in this matter is calculated to be $43,317.50. 

However, Dollar Tree further claims that Plaintiff’s attorney

fees should be reduced to reflect the fact that Plaintiff

ultimately prevailed on only four of seven issues. In assessing

whether the lodestar figure should be adjusted, the Court must

consider the extent to which Plaintiff prevailed on the demands

presented, especially if she did not succeed on such demands in

their entirety. Schwarz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 73

F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995). In cases achieving partial

success, courts must follow a two-part analysis in deciding

whether to reduce an attorneys' fee award: 

First, the court asks whether the claims upon which the

plaintiff failed to prevail were related to the plaintiff’s

successful claims. If unrelated, the final fee award may

not include time expended on the unsuccessful claims. If

the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then the

court must apply the second part of the analysis, in which

the court evaluates the ‘significance of the overall relief

obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours

reasonably expended on the litigation.’ If the plaintiff

obtained ‘excellent results,’ full compensation may be

appropriate, but if only partial or limited success’ was

obtained, full compensation may be excessive. Such

decisions are within the district court’s discretion.

Id. at 901-02. 

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10

In determining whether the unsuccessful and successful claims are

related,

...the test is whether relief sought on the unsuccessful

claim is intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely

distinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave

rise to the injury on which the relief granted is premised. 

Thus, the focus is to be on whether the unsuccessful and

successful claims arose out of the same course of conduct.

Id. at 903, quoting Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 

1141 (9th Cir. 1986). If a court finds the unsuccessful claims

to be unrelated to the successful claims, it may either attempt

to identify specific hours that should be eliminated or simply

reduce the award to account for the limited success. Id. at 904.

In the present matter, the Court finds it appropriate to

reduce the lodestar figure based on Plaintiff’s limited success. 

Plaintiff succeeded on four of seven claims, in which the

remaining three claims were not related to the successful four

claims, since each was a distinct alleged violation requiring

separate evidence. See White v. GMRI, 2:04-cv-0465-DFL-CMK slip

op. at 11-12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19,2005)(finding that “alleged

violations are premised on different facts and require the

application of different sections of the ADA Accessibility

Guidelines to determine liability”). The facts and evidence

needed for claims pertaining to the pressure required to open the

front door, for example, are completely separate from claims

relating to handicapped-accessible checkstands, or to claims

relating to the entry door’s ISA sign. 

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11

Because it is impossible to apportion attorneys’ fees between the

unsuccessful claims from the successful claims with any degree of

certainty, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s award of attorneys’ fees

by 3/7, or forty three percent, to account for his limited

success. Forty three percent of the $43,317.50 lodestar is

$18,626.52. Total fees awarded for Plaintiff’s claimed attorney

fees will thus be $24,690.98. 

Lastly, Plaintiff may recover, as part of the award of his

fees in this matter, litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C §

2205. The term "litigation expenses" in Section 12205 has been

interpreted to include "the same out-of-pocket expenses that are

recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Robbins v. Scholastic Book

Fairs, 928 F. Supp. 1027, 1037 (D. Or. 1996). Under Section

1988, Plaintiff recover those out-of-pocket expenses that "would

normally be charged to a fee paying client." Harris v.

Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff seeks a total of $9,663.41 in litigation expenses. 

Of that amount, Defendant contests $7,442.50 sought for expert

fees and costs submitted by Plaintiff’s expert, Joe Card. 

Specifically, Defendant claims that Mr. Card’s charges relating

to travel and inspection should be reduced by 50% because a

similar inspection was conducted in Jones v. Ralph’s. 2:04-cv2002-MCE-KJM (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006). However, Plaintiff fails

to address the fact that the Dollar Trees in Jones and in this

matter are in different locations. Thus, the Court does not find

an issue of double billing in regards to Mr. Card’s work. 

Consequently, the Plaintiff will be awarded the full amount

sought for Mr. Card’s services.

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 Specifically, the costs at issue include: fee for subpoena 2

of building records, fee for subpoena of records, costs for

creating trial binders and exhibits, and the rental cost for

audio visual equipment for the PowerPoint presentation at trial. 

 As such, $363 will be disallowed from the Bill of Costs 3

for expenses relating to the audio-visual equipment. Thus the

Bill of Costs will be reduced to $732.15 from the $1,095.15

requested.

12

Defendant further asserts that certain litigation expenses

amounting to $932.15 should be disallowed because they were also

included in the Bill of Costs. The Court found that Plaintiff 2

has double billed for the aforementioned items. However, the

Court will only disallow $569.15 from the $932.15 requested

because the expenses relating to the rental of audio-visual

equipment is an appropriate litigation expense.3

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,690.98 and reasonable

litigation expenses in the amount of $9,094.26 for a total of

$33,785.24. Additionally, the Plaintiff is entitled to $732.15 in

taxable costs pursuant to her Bill of Costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 13, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-01068-MCE -CMK Document 99 Filed 12/14/06 Page 12 of 12