Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00184/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Wayne Marietta, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-184-TUC-DCB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 1). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court,

this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report and

Recommendation. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court dismiss the Petition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of Sexual Conduct with a Minor

and Attempted Sexual Conduct with a Minor. (Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 10), p. 2 & Exh.

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The appellate court decision on direct review and on review of Petitioner’s postconviction relief proceeding indicate that Petitioner stands convicted of sexual conduct and

attempted sexual conduct with his minor stepdaughter. (See Answer, Exh. A, ¶1 & Exh. F,

¶2). Petitioner’s Petition and the trial court’s ruling in Petitioner’s post-conviction relief

proceeding indicate that Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Sexual Conduct with a

Minor Under the Age of Fifteen. (Petition, p. 2; Answer, Exh. E, p.1).

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A, ¶1 & Exh. F, ¶2).1

 He was sentenced to a presumptive 20-year prison term on the sexual

conduct conviction, to be followed by lifetime probation on the attempted sexual conduct

conviction. (Id.).

Petitioner appealed his convictions by challenging:

1. the admission of certain expert testimony;

2. the denial of his motion for a change of trial judge;

3. the admission of alleged hearsay statements;

4. the trial judge’s attempt to rehabilitate two jurors during voir dire;

5. the admission of other-act evidence; and 

6. the jury instruction on reasonable doubt.

(Answer, p.2 & Ehx. A). 

On March 29, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals found all the claims either

precluded or meritless and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id.). Petitioner

sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court which was denied without comment. (Answer,

p.2 & Exhs. B, C).

On August 31, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Answer,

Exh. D). Thereafter, appointed counsel filed a notice stating that after thoroughly reviewing

the record, he could find no meritorious ground for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Exh.

F, ¶3; Petition, Exh. C). In May 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief (hereinafter “PCR Petition”) wherein Petitioner argued that his constitutional rights

were violated because some of the male jurors did not reveal during voir dire that they had

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 Petitioner’s PCR Petition has not been made part of the instant record. The record

reflects that Petitioner also claimed in his PCR Petition that the testimony presented at trial

was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. (See Answer, Exh. E, p.2). The instant action

may be resolved without the PCR Petition given that Respondents concede that Petition

raised in his PCR Petition: (1) that some of the jurors failed to disclose that they had been

molested as children; and (2) that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. (See Answer, p. 3).

3

The trial court’s August 2008 Order is not part of the instant record.

4

Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule

based upon any ground:

(1) Raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion

under Rule 24;

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a).

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been victims of molestation as children.2

 (Answer, Exhs. E, F, G; see also Petition, p. 4). 

In August 2008, the trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s claim regarding juror

misconduct as precluded.3

 (Answer, Exh. F, ¶5 & Exh. G, p.30). Thereafter, the trial court

“later set aside that ruling and allowed the state to file a response to the petition and

[Petitioner]... to file a reply.” (Answer, Exh. F, ¶5). 

On November 4, 2008, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Answer, Exh.

E). The trial court held that Petitioner’s claim regarding juror misconduct was precluded by

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(1).4

 (Id. at p.2). The trial court further found that Petitioner failed

to provide the court with competent evidence of juror misconduct and, thus, there was no

colorable basis to allow a hearing on that issue. (Id.). Additionally, the trial court denied

as precluded, Petitioner’s claim that evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support

a guilty verdict because that claim could have been raised on direct appeal and was not. (Id.).

Petitioner sought appellate review of the trial court’s denial of his PCR Petition.

(Answer, Exh. G). On June 23, 2009, the appellate court issued its opinion granting review

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The appellate court stated: 

Because [Petitioner]... had sixty days from the entry of judgment and sentence

in which he could have moved, pursuant to Rule 24.2, Ariz.R.Crim.P., to

vacate the judgment of conviction based on the same information he is

asserting here, his failure to have done so was indeed a waiver of this claim.

The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in ruling this claim precluded

pursuant to Rule 32.2.

(Answer, Exh. F, ¶7 (footnote omitted)). The appellate court noted that: “The trial court’s

minute entry states the claim is precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(1). Although we find it

precluded pursuant to a different provision of Rule 32.2, the finding of preclusion is

nonetheless correct.” (Answer, Exh. F, ¶7 n.3).

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but denying relief. (Answer, Exh. F). In pertinent part, the appellate court stated that the

trial court’s ruling was “sustainable on any of several grounds[]” and held that Petitioner’s

juror misconduct claim was precluded under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 as waived.5

 (Id. at ¶7).

The appellate court also agreed with the trial court’s alternative ruling denying the claim

because Petitioner failed to present competent evidence of juror misconduct and a colorable

allegation of prejudice. (Id. at ¶¶8-12). Petitioner sought review of the appellate court’s

decision and, on December 4, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without

comment. (Answer, Exhs. H, I).

II. FEDERAL PETITION

Petitioner seeks habeas relief on one ground:

Jury bias existed violating...his due process right to a fair trial and an impartial

jury. Evidence withheld from the court and defense during voir dire

questioning denied Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments [sic] rights.

Statements made by some of the male jurors to the other jurors during the jury

deliberations influanced [sic] the verdict of the other jurors.

(Petition, p.6).

Respondents concede that the Petition is timely filed. (Answer, p.3). Respondents

argue that Petitioner’s claim is barred from federal review under the independent and

adequate state ground doctrine.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard: Exhaustion & Procedural Default

1. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner provide the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “‘fairly present[ed]’ his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. See also Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a claim raised

in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365-66.

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of the

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The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are exceptions

to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain available for claims

that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1172 (2006). The issue of waiver must be

affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir.

2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

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conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Thus, “[a] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court

for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the

proper forum..., (2) through the proper vehicle..., and (3) by providing the proper factual and

legal basis for the claim....” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

2. Procedural Default

In some instances, a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court

did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). A claim is procedurally

defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons

such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial

reaffirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

Additionally, procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state

court and it is clear the state court would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for

procedural reasons. Id. Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal

habeas court may determine whether state remedies remain available.6

 See Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination

often involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

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Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies

when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal

constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred, inter

alia, on any claim which could have been raised on direct appeal or could have been raised

in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain claims7

which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. Moreover, a state

post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v.

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from

preclusion under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)).

Both of these instances of procedural default provide an independent and adequate

state-law ground for the conviction and sentence and thus prevents federal habeas corpus

review. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine prevents state prisoners from obtaining

federal review by allowing the time to run on available state remedies and then rushing to

federal court seeking review. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-732.

A federal court may not consider a claim that is procedurally defaulted unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default, or demonstrates a

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162

(1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495 (1986); Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750; Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Generally, “cause” sufficient “to excuse a

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default exists if the petitioner ‘can show that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at

1027 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Prejudice is defined as actual harm resulting from

the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). If the

petitioner fails to establish cause sufficient to excuse a procedural default, the court “need

not consider whether he suffered actual prejudice.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13. 

To fall within the narrow class of cases that implicates a fundamental miscarriage of

justice, a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence” which

“can be shown when a petitioner presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot

have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was

free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.

The Supreme Court has stated that “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “‘To be credible,...a

claim [of actual innocence] requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was not presented at trial.’” Cook,

538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

 3. Conclusion

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default/bar are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default [or a fundamental miscarriage of justice]...the district

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court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

B. Analysis

The Arizona appellate court, which was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion

on Petitioner’s juror misconduct claim, held that Petitioner had waived the claim, and thus

the claim was precluded from review under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. (Answer, Exh. F, ¶7). Rule

32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal procedure precludes post-conviction relief “upon

any ground[]...[t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral

proceeding.” Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). “When a state-law default prevents the state court

from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in

federal court.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977);

Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-492 (1986)). See also Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“The independent and adequate state ground doctrine prohibits the federal courts

from addressing the habeas corpus claims of state prisoners when a state-law default

prevented the state court from reaching the merits of the federal claims.”). “Preclusion of

issues for failure to present them at an earlier proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent of federal law because they do not depend upon a

federal constitutional ruling on the merits.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1025 (footnote omitted)

(quoting Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly determined that Arizona regularly and consistently applies its procedural default

rules such that they are an adequate bar to federal habeas review of a claim. See Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and

adequate); Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (previous version of Arizona’s

preclusion rules “adequate”); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).

 Consequently, the Arizona appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s claim was waived

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) constitutes an independent and adequate state-law bar

to federal habeas review of his claim. Further, the state court’s alternative finding that

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Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief on the issue does not vitiate this

procedural bar to federal habeas review. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (“[A] state court

need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very

definition, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to

honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the

state court also relies on federal law.”)(emphasis in original); Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d

960, 964& n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A state court, however, does not vitiate a procedural bar

ruling by addressing the merits of a claim in the alternative.”); Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333

(same).

Petitioner has neither alleged nor established cause and prejudice to excuse his

procedural default. (See Petition; Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 11)). Likewise, he has not raised

the miscarriage of justice exception. (See id.). On the instant record, Petitioner’s Petition is

barred from federal habeas review pursuant to the independent and adequate state ground

doctrine. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Federal court review of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred

pursuant to the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. 

V. RECOMMENDATION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) as barred from federal

habeas review under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 10-

184-TUC-DCB.

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Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 20th day of July, 2011.

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