Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01876/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01876-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

•_j,jitcti SeaL~ GJ\..Itt of Appea.h 

'tenth Ci':""'~it 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JAN 0 - 1990 

;~OBERT L. HOECI<..ER 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN TURNBULL and BARBARA TURNBULL, 

His wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

LEONARD THEODORE WILCKEN; JOHN DOES I 

THROUGH X, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

LEONARD THEODORE WILCKEN, 

v. 

Third-PartyPlaintiff-Appellee, 

LORRAINE ROBINSON, 

Third-Party-· 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 88-1876 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 83-C-1379A) 

Submitted ori the briefs: 

B. Ray Zoll and Tom D. Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Third-party-Defendant-Appellant. 

George E. Mangan of George E. Mangan, APC, Rosevelt, Utah, for 

Third-party-Defendant-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 1 
Before TACHA, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and KANE,* District Judge. 

*Honorable John L. Kane, District Judge, United States District 

Court £or the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

By this appeal, the third-party-defendant-appellant 

(Robinson) seeks review of three orders of the district court. 

The first order, entered October 6, 1986, set aside a previously 

entered order of dismissal and the underlying stipulation of the 

parties. The second order, entered September 22, 1987, struck 

plaintiffs' (John Turnbull and Barbara Turnbull) pleadings, fully 

adjudicated the case on the merits, and. reserved to defendantthird-party-plaintiff-appellee (Wilcken) "the right to present 

evidence of waste, caused by plaintiffs and/or others who may be 

responsible, in failing to engage in discovery and to prosecute, 

and to receive a judgment for such sums as the Court finds 

reasonable." The third order, entered May 16, 1988, awarded 

attorney's fees and expenses for "waste'' by both Robinson and her 

former attorney (Johnson) to Wilcken. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 2 
A threshold question is whether there is appellate 

jurisdiction to review the orders of October 6, 1986, and 

September 22, 1987. Conceptually, the interlocutory order of 

October 6, 1986, merged into the order of September 22, 1987, 

which fully resolved all substantive issues on the merits. That 

order was a final judgment as to the merits within the meaning of 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though certain issues regarding the award of 

sanctions remained unadjudicated. Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330, 331 

(lOth Cir. 1982); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 

(1988). The time for filing a proper notice of appeal began to 

run upon the entry of the September 22, 1987, order. ·The 

thirty-day appeal .period prescribed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l) and 

28 U.S.C. § 2107 expired on October 22, 1987. Robinson's notice 

of appeal was not filed until May 26, 1988. A timely notice of 

appeal is an essential prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. 

Browder v. Director, D~p't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257. (1978). 

Because Robinson's notice of appeal was filed too late, we 

conclude that the court is ·without jurisdiction to review the 

first two of the challenged orders. Accordingly, the appeal is 

partially dismissed as to any issues respecting the merits of the 

action. 

In the September, 1987, order the district court also made 

certain findings that the case had a "history of delay and 

consistent refusal of the Turnbulls to cooperate or to answer 

discovery requests" and that there were specific violations of the 

rules and scheduling orders. Based on those findings,· the 

district court determined to impose sanctions, as provided by the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 3 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against both the plaintiffs and 

any "responsible persons." 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found 

that the Turnbulls were, in effect, unwitting strawmen for 

Robinson's efforts to retain de facto ownership of the disputed 

property. The district court found that plaintiffs "were not 

participants in the lawsuit" and their purported attorney (Mr. 

Johnson) "received his instructions and information'' from 

Robinson. From this, the district court concluded that because 

Robinson knew the Turnbulls were only nominal participants in the 

litigation, but nonetheless wanted the lawsuit to continue in 

order to accomplish her own ends, "she was substantially 

responsible for the delay." 

We have jurisdiction to review the May, 1988, order directing 

payment of attorney's fees and expenses as a sanction for 

violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for "waste" 

because an appeal from the award of sanctions may not be taken 

until the amount has been determined. See Phelps v. Washburn 

Univ. of Topeka, 807 F.2d 153, 154 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Robinson's argument on appeal, as we understand it, is that 

while the district court may have had ample justification to 

sanction the Turnbulls (by striking their pleadings, dismissing 

their claims, and entering judgment against them on Wilcken's 

counterclaim), the court was without authority to sanction her by 

the award of attorney's fees and expenses. 

argues that: ( l) there "is no evidence" 

Specifically, Robinson 

that she "induced or 

procured" the Turnbulls' "nonparticipation," (2) she believed that 

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Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 4 
she was acting in a "legally permissible way," and (3) she could 

not "foresee ... any failures to appear at pretrial conference, 

deficient discovery, or other 'waste.'" 

Robinson claims that there was no evidence to support the 

district court's implicit finding that she was the alter ego of 

the Turnbulls and, consequently, ultimately responsible for the 

misfeasance charged against them. The record shows that Robinson 

was present at the hearing but expressly declined to testify. 

The claimed lack of evidentiary support for this critical 

finding must be shown by analysis of the record made at the 

hearing. However, Robinson did not designate ·the transcript of 

the hearing as part of the record on appeal. In order to overcome 

the district court's finding, Robinson has the burden of showing 

that it is clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Bose 

Corp. v. Consumers Union of Unit.ed States, Inc., 466 u.s. 485, 498 

(1984). On the state of the record, Robinson has not met the 

burden. Accordingly, the district court's finding is affirmed. 

The district court apportioned the entire net amount of the 

fees and expenses billed by Wilcken's attorney (after some 

adjustments based on Robinson's objections) based on the "fault" 

of Johnson and Robinson. Payment was directed from each 

accordingly. The district court indicated that the award of fees 

and expenses as a sanction was based on ·the provisions of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 16(f), 37(b)(2), and 4l(b). 

We note that Rule 4l(b), in relevant part, authorizes 

dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute upon the motion of 

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Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 5 
a defendant. The rule provides no authority for the award of.fees 

under the circumstances of this case. 

Under some circumstances, courts have inherent power to 

impose sanctions against those who litigate in bad faith. Roadway 

Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980); United States 

Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1240-45 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). However, the district court in this case did not make 

a finding of bad faith or otherwise rely on an inherent power. 

The question now is whether the imposition of sanctions under 

or both Rules 16(f) and/or 37(b)(2) was correct. These·rules 

authorize sanctions, including the award of attorney's fees and 

reasonable expenses against offending counsel and parties for 

failure to participate properly at pretrial conferences and during 

discovery, respectively. See In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438 (lOth 

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985); Gates v. United 

States, 752 F.2d 516 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

The award of fees and expenses for noncompliance with the 

rules is discretionary, and the amount and impact of a monetary 

sanction should depend on the seriousness of the violation and 

where the f.ault lies, i.e., with counsel or client. In re Baker, 

744 F.2d at 1442. See also Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1259 

(lOth Cir. 1988). However, in the absence of a finding of bad 

faith, there must be a sufficient nexus between~noncompliance with 

the rules and the amount of fees and expenses awarded as a 

sanction. The rules, by their terms, limit assessments thereunder 

for the fees and expenses of the adverse party resulting from 

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Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 6 
noncompliance. Stillman v. Edmund Scientific Co., 522 F.2d 798, 

801 (4th Cir. 1975). 

In other words, violations of Rules 16(f) and 37(b)(2), even 

if repeated, will not necessarily support the award of the entire 

litigation costs of the adverse party. 

Here it appears that the district court applied the sanction 

provisions of Rules 16(f) and 37(b)(2) too broadly. The district 

court awarded the entire amount of Wilcken's attorney's fees and 

expenses without specifying how the amounts awarded were related 

to the violations of the rules. On remand, the court must 

determine which of the attorney's fees and expenses billed to 

Wilcken were the result of specific violations of the rules and 

adjust the award, if necessary. 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment awarding 

attorney's fees.against Robinson and in favor of Wilcken is 

VACATED and the matter REMANDED for redetermination of fees and 

expenses to be awarded as sanctions. 

The court will permit the parties to file a stipulation 

regarding the amount of attorney's fees and expenses which can 

properly be awarded £or noncompliance with Rules 16(f) and 

37(b)(2). If the stipulation is filed within fifteen days of the 

date of this opinion, the court will modify its judgment in 

accordance with the stipulation, and the mandate will issue. 

Otherwise, the mandate will issue as provided by F~d. R. App. P. 

4l(a). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1876 Document: 01019297269 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 7 
The appeal is DISMISSED in part, and the judgment of the 

United States District Court for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED 

in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED. 

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