Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01989/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01989-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Edward Briones,

Plaintiff

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Defendants

CV-09-1989-PHX-ROS (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

regarding Screening of Amended

Complaint

Plaintiff has filed a “First Amended Complaint” (#10) prior to service of an answer

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). The Court is required to screen that

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

This matter is before the undersigned on referral from the District Judge, and the

determination of the undersigned is dispositive of some of Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly,

the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation

pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. §28(b)(1)(B) and

(C). 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the Court to screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the Plaintiff has raised claims that

are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

42 U.S.C. § 1997 applies the same standard to such complaints even if the defendants are

not governmental entities, or officers or employees of a governmental entity. Id.

In screening complaints, however, the Court is obliged to liberally construe the

Plaintiff’s complaint:

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The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed. . . . [A]

pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can

only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears " 'beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.' " 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972)).

Original Complaint & Screening - Plaintiff’s original complaint named as

defendants: (1) former Director Dora Schriro; Central Office Administrators (2) Ickes, (3)

Haley, (4) Kimble, and (5) Stewart; mental health personnel (6) Hemmer, (7) Keen, (8)

Guzzo, (9) Finch, (10) Jendusa, (11) Anderson, (12) Rolima, and (13) Smith; (14) Captain

Kurtz; Sergeants (15) Grabowski and (16) Walker; (17) Corrections Officer (CO) II Gordon;

CO Is (18) Camacho, (19) Hage, and (20) Feister. Plaintiff asserted three counts alleging

threats to safety, inadequate medical care and denial of basic necessities and conditions of

confinement. 

On screening, the Court dismissed all defendants except (15) Grabowski, (4) Kimble,

and (5) Stewart, who were required to respond only to that portion of the Count III asserting

a claim on conditions of confinement based on allegations that he was housed in an outside

cage for more than 10 hours a day, every day for a week, in December 2007, during which

he was denied a jacket and lunch. (Order 12/2/9, #5.)

Proposed Amended Complaint - In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff again

names Defendants (1) Schriro, (17) Gordon, (2) Ickes, (3) Haley, (4) Kimble, (15) Grabowski

(or Grawboski), (14) Kurtz, (16) Walker, (19) Hage, and (18) Camacho. He adds (a)

Classification Officer Burke, and (b) Complex Warden Stewart. He omits (5) Administrator

Stewart, Mental Health Personnel personnel (6) Hemmer, (7) Keen, (8) Guzzo, (9) Finch,

(10) Jendusa, (11) Anderson, (12) Rolima, and (13) Smith, and (20) Feister. He now asserts

the following five counts: 

(I) denial of equal protection as a result of Defendants’ refusal to house Plaintiff on

a sex offender unit despite his having met the requirements, resulting in acute stress causing

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mental and physical deterioration;

(II) denial of procedural due process as a result of the same facts;

(III) denial of his Eighth Amendment rights as a result of disciplinary action taken

against him as a result of his refusal to return to a general population yard;

(IV) infliction of cruel and unusual punishment as a result of was being housed in an

outside cage for more than 10 hours a day, every day for a week, in December 2007; and

(V) denial of procedural due process as a result of the repeated taking of his personal

property as a result of his refusal to return to a general population yard, without providing

any notice, disciplinary hearing or opportunity to appeal.

Equal Protection Claim - Plaintiff’s Count I argues that despite Plaintiff’s

qualification for placement on a sex offender yard, defendants continued to place him on a

GP yard, resulting in a denial of equal protection. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must

show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff

based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

(9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff does not allege that the refusal to place him on a sex offender yard

was based upon Plaintiff’ membership in a protected class. Rather, at best Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants simply failed to recognize Plaintiff individually as being subject to such

placement. “[A] mere demonstration of inequality is not enough; the Constitution does not

require identical treatment.” McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1991).

“Although the Equal Protection Clause ensures similarly situated persons are treated alike,

it does not ensure absolute equality.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, and must be dismissed.

Procedural Due Process Claim - Plaintiff’s Count II alleges that he has been denied

due process as a result of Defendants’ refusal to house Plaintiff on a sex offender unit despite

his having met the requirements. In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first

decide whether Plaintiff was entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any

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constitutionally-required procedural safeguard.

Protected Interest - Liberty interests which entitle an inmate to due process are

"generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such

an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own

force (citation omitted), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995) (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, to determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections

afforded by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions

imposed and ask whether they "‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which

a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.'" Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin). 

To determine whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look

to prisoner's conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the

sanction will affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996). "Atypicality" requires not merely an empirical comparison,

but turns on the importance of the right taken away from the prisoner. See Carlo v. City of

Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims do not fit neatly in the traditional rubric surrounding claims

opposing removal from the general population and placement in segregation. To the

contrary, Plaintiff opposes his placement in the general population and sought placement on

a sex offender yard. To be sure, Plaintiff also complains that he suffered disciplinary

segregation as a result of his refusal to go where told. The essence of his complaint,

however, was the prison’s failure to put him on a segregated yard. 

Plaintiff allegations assert that the hardship imposed by his placement in the GP Yard

was his exposure to persistent threats to his safety as a result of his sex offender status, and

resulting subjection to isolation on disciplinary segregation. He asserts that the conditions

continued over a four year period. Those conditions are at least arguably significant and

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1

 Plaintiff does argue that he was not provided notice of a right to appeal at the

conclusion of several “DI-67" investigations. (First Amend. Compl. at 4-A.) However, he

attributes that to unknown COIIIs and COIVs. Thus, he fails to state a claim against any

existent defendant on that basis.

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atypical.

Process Due - If the Court determines that a protected liberty interest has been

implicated, Plaintiff must then specify what due process safeguard he was denied, and by

whom. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Procedural due process safeguards in a prison disciplinary hearing

require that the defendant receive: (1) written notice of the charges, no less than twenty-four

hours prior to the hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied

on and reasons for the disciplinary action and (3) a limited right to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence when it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or

correctional goals to allow the defendant to do so. Id. at 565-66.

Once these Wolff procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal

court is to review the statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making its

findings to determine if the decision is supported by “some facts.” Hanrahan v. Lane, 747

F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Due process requires simply “that there

be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing.” Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985).

Plaintiff does not argue as to any specific defendants that he was not provided with

some appropriate or required notice or opportunity to be heard.1

 To the contrary, he argues

that he was provided with a dozen investigations over a four year period. The heart of his

objection is that these hearings simply reached the wrong conclusion. This allegation can

be liberally construed as an assertion that there were not “some facts” to support the

conclusion. Accordingly, Count II adequately states a claim for a violation of procedural due

process.

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Plaintiff connects those violations to Defendants Gordon, Ickes, Burke, Haley, and

Schriro, who he alleges were not only aware of the situation, but “were directly involved

with the administrative functions and decision making processing of DI-67 screenings and

sex offender classification.” (First Amend. Compl. at 4-5.) 

Therefore, an answer to Count II should be required of Defendants Gordon, Ickes,

Burke, Haley, and Schriro. 

Eighth Amendment Claim - Plaintiff’s Count III is a reformulation of his original

Count I. The Court dismissed that claim on screening asa result of Plaintiff’s failure to allege

that an assault actually occurred while he was on the general population yard, citing Babcock

v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 269-70, 272 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff now recasts his claim as

arising from improper disciplinary conduct. 

In particular, Plaintiff asserts a denial of his Eighth Amendment rights as a result of

disciplinary action taken against him as a result of his refusals to return to a general

population yard. He argues that because his actions were justified by the risk of harm on the

GP yard, any discipline was necessarily an abuse of discretion. He argues that “inmates are

protected from punishment for refusing to perform unconstitutional assignments,” citing

Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1990), and alleges that the threat to his safety would

render his going to the GP yard a cruel and unusual punishment and thus unconstitutional.

He asserts his injuries were in the form of the loss of good time credits, parole credits and

various privileges. 

 If judgment in favor Plaintiff would invalidate the deprivation of good time credits,

the claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) unless Plaintiff can show

that the disciplinary conviction has been overturned in a habeas proceeding or by some other

process. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). If Plaintiff seeks the invalidation of

his sentence, or any relief which would result in immediate or speedier release, his exclusive

remedy is a petition for habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973).

Here, not only would invalidation of the disciplinary proceedings necessarily affect

the duration of Plaintiff’s detention, Plaintiff specifically requests relief in the form of a

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2

 It is true that in Fruit the Eighth Circuit avoided the habeas issue by characterizing

it as an exhaustion defense waivable by a defendant’s failure to assert the defense. 905 F.2d

at 1148 n. 3. However, Fruit predated Heck by four years, where the Supreme Court

clarified that Preiser was not an exhaustion decision, but merely held that certain claims by

state prisoners are not cognizable under [§ 1983], and must be brought in habeas corpus

proceedings.” 512 U.S. at 481.

3

 In the original screening Order, the Court also noted that the equivalent count in the

original Complaint also complaint about being denied a blanket, sheet soap, toothbrush, and

tooth paste, and alleged deprivation of pens, pencils, stamps, and envelopes with which to

write to his family and inmate letters. That portion of the original Complaint was dismissed

for failure to state a claim. (#5 at 12-13.) Plaintiff does not repeat those claims in his new

Count IV.

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speedier release, asking for an “order that the A.D.C. restore any and all good time credits

and parole class III credits lost.” (First Amend. Compl. at 8-A.) Plaintiff has not alleged that

the disciplinary proceedings have been overturned. Accordingly, this claim would be barred

by Heck and its progeny, and thus fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.2

Conditions of Confinement - Plaintiff’s Count IV continues to state a claim against

Defendants Grabowski, Kimble, and Stewart, based on allegations that he was housed in an

outside cage for more than 10 hours a day, every day for a week, in December 2007, during

which he was denied a jacket and lunch.3

Property Takings - For his Count V, Plaintiff alleges the denial of procedural due

process in the course of the repeated taking of his personal property as a result of his refusal

to return to a general population yard, without providing any notice, disciplinary hearing or

opportunity to appeal.

Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of two incidents. In the first instance, Plaintiff alleges

that he was deprived of his “pens, pencils, paper, envelopes, and stamps . . for about a month

until [Plaintiff] receive his property back.” (First Amend. Compl. at 7-7A.) In the second

instance, he alleges that the conduct was repeated two to three weeks after he got his property

back. (Id. at 7A.) Plaintiff does not specify whether the property was again returned.

However, because § 1983 only provides remedies for state action, and state action on

the taking of property is not complete until any state remedies are exhausted, the availability

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of adequate state post-deprivation remedies precludes a finding of a due process violation.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Arizona provides a post-deprivation remedy via a

suit for conversion against the state. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 et seq.; and Howland v.

State, 169 Ariz. 293, 297, 818 P.2d 1169, 1173 (App. 1991) (acknowledging prisoner’s right

to sue State and, in some circumstances, ADOC employees for conversion). 

Plaintiff makes no allegation that such remedies were not available to him.

Accordingly, Count V fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

SUMMARY - Counts I (Equal Protection), III (Eight Amendment) and V

(Deprivation of Property) fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted, and should

be dismissed. Count II (Procedural Due Process) adequately states a claim against

Defendants Gordon, Ickes, Burke, Haley, and Schriro. Count IV (Conditions of

Confinement) adequately states a claim against Defendants Grabowski, Kimble, and Stewart.

Accordingly responses should be required from those defendants.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, that

Counts I (Equal Protection), III (Eighth Amendment) and V (Deprivation of Property) of the

First Amended Complaint (#10) be dismissed, without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, that

Defendants Kurtz, Walker, Hage, and Camacho be dismissed, without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that service on Defendants Gordon, Ickes,

Burke, Haley, Schriro, Grabowski, Kimble, and Complex Warden Stewart be ordered, and

they be required to respond to the First Amended Complaint by entry of an order that

provides as follows:.

(1) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including both

summons and request for waiver forms for said Defendants.

(2) Plaintiff shall complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of the Court

within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(3) The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of such amended

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complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(4) The United States Marshal shall notify said Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants shall include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers that were

returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of summons

is not returned by Defendants within thirty days from the date the request for waiver was sent

by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, such amended Complaint and this

Order upon Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Within ten days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for the Defendants, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon the Defendants.

The costs of service shall be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and shall

include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the

Summons, such amended complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally

served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(5) Defendants who agree to waive service of the Summons and such amended

complaint shall return signed waiver forms to the United State Marshal, and not to

Plaintiff.

(6) Said Defendants shall answer such amended complaint or otherwise respond by

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(7) Any answer or responsive pleading shall state the specific Defendant(s) by name

on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, responsive pleading, or other

motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant(s) by name on whose behalf

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it is filed.

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

(14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections

to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of

a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th

Cir. 2007). 

DATED: February 10, 2010 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-1989-r RR 10 02 05 re Screen Amend Complaint.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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