Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00072/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00072-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Blankinship,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Union Pacific Railroad Company,

Defendant.

No. CV-21-00072-TUC-RM

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff James Blankinship’s (“Plaintiff” or 

“Blankinship”) Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. 82) from this Court’s September 

6, 2022 Order granting Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company’s (“Defendant” or 

“Union Pacific”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) and entry of final Judgment 

(Doc. 79). Defendant responded in opposition (Doc. 87), and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 90). 

For the following reasons Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied. 

I. Factual Background1

The Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) regulations require railroad 

conductors to pass a vision acuity examination which tests a conductor’s ability to 

distinguish the colors of railroad signals. (Doc. 68 at 2 ¶ 9; Doc. 72 at 2 ¶ 9); see also 49 

C.F.R. § 242.117(h)(3). Railroads are required to determine each individual meets the FRA 

visual acuity standards before certifying or recertifying that individual as a conductor. 49 

1 The facts as stated in the Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 78) are incorporated by reference into this Order. Nonetheless, this Order will briefly 

summarize the relevant factual history of the case. 

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C.F.R. § 242.117(b). If an individual fails to meet the visual acuity thresholds, on request, 

they would be subjected to further medical evaluations to determine the individual’s ability 

to safely perform as a conductor. Id. § 242.117(j). The further evaluation employed by 

Union Pacific consists of a Color Vision Field Test (“CVFT”) which measures the speed 

and accuracy of an individual’s ability to identify railroad signals. (Doc. 68 at 3 ¶ 17; Doc. 

72 at 3 ¶ 17.) In 2016, Defendant implemented a revised CVFT, known as the Light Cannon 

Test. (Doc. 68 at 5-6 ¶¶30-33; Doc. 72 at 4-5 ¶¶30-33.) The parties dispute whether the 

Light Cannon Test meets the FRA requirements that the testing be valid, reliable, and 

comparable. (Doc. 68 at 5-6 ¶¶30-36; Doc. 72 at 4-5 ¶¶30-36.)

Plaintiff underwent color vision testing for the FRA recertification process on three 

separate occasions before the implementation of the Light Cannon Test (Doc. 68 at 7 ¶ 38; 

Doc. 72 at 6 ¶ 38.) Plaintiff failed the initial examination in 2011 but passed the then 2011 

version of the CVFT. (Id.) In January 2017, Plaintiff failed the initial examination, then 

failed the newly implemented Light Cannon CVFT. (Doc. 68 at 7 ¶ 41; Doc. 72 at 6 ¶ 41.) 

Consequentially, it was determined that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for 

recertification, and he was removed from the conductor position. (Doc. 68 at 7-8 ¶¶ 42-44; 

Doc. 72 at 6 ¶¶ 42-44.)2

II. Procedural History 

In February 2016, Union Pacific employees initiated a class action alleging 

disability discrimination;

3

a class action in which the Court recognized Plaintiff to be a 

putative class member. (Doc. 31 at 2.) The initial class definition from the Harris complaint

focused on employees removed from service for reasons relating to a fitness-for-duty 

evaluation. (Doc. 68-26 at 17.) However, on August 17, 2018, the Harris plaintiffs 

narrowed the operative class definition when moving for class certification on the disparate 

treatment claim only and defined the class as: “All individuals who have been or will be 

2 Plaintiff took and failed a Second Light Cannon Test in February 2017. (Doc. 68 at 8 

¶¶45-46; Doc. 72 at 6 ¶¶ 45-46.) 

3 See Harris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 F.R.D. 616 (D. Neb. 2019), rev'd, 953 F.3d 1030 

(8th Cir. 2020).

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subject to a fitness-for-duty examination as a result of a reportable health event at any time 

from September 18, 2014 until the final resolution of this action.” (Doc. 68 at 9 ¶¶ 52-53; 

Doc. 72 at 6-7 ¶¶ 52-53; Doc. 68-27 at 2; Doc. 73-15 at 22.) Defendant’s Medical Rules 

define “reportable health event” as “a new diagnosis, recent event, or change in prior stable 

condition for... [s]ignificant vision change in one or both eyes affecting... color vision.” 

(Doc. 68 at 10 ¶¶ 54-55; Doc. 72 at 7 ¶¶ 54-55; Doc. 68-26 at 4-5, 44.) Plaintiff never 

experienced a reportable health event based on this definition at any time during his 

employment with Union Pacific. (Doc. 68 at 10 ¶ 57; Doc. 72 at 7 ¶ 57.)

On February 5, 2019, the District of Nebraska certified the class as defined in the 

August 17, 2018 class definition. Harris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 F.R.D. 616, 628 (D. 

Neb. 2019). However, on March 24, 2020, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District of 

Nebraska and denied class certification. Harris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 953 F.3d 1030 (8th 

Cir. 2020). Therefore, on April 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 68 at 10 ¶ 59; Doc. 72 at 7 

¶ 59.) On February 20, 2021 Plaintiff initiated this action (Doc. 1) with a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) filed on March 24, 2021 alleging violations under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Doc. 13). 

On June 7, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 66.) At 

issue in the Summary Judgment Motion was whether Plaintiff was excluded from the class 

definition on August 17, 2018 when the Harris plaintiffs more narrowly defined the 

operative class to include individuals “subject to a fitness-for-duty examination as a result 

of a reportable health event...” (Doc. 67 at 3-7.) Defendant argues Plaintiff was excluded 

from this updated definition because Plaintiff did not experience a reportable health event 

relating to his color vision. (Id. at 4.) If Plaintiff were excluded from the class definition, it 

would cease tolling from August 17, 2018, and Plaintiff’s FAC (“FAC”) would be per se 

untimely for the failure to file a charge of discrimination with EEOC within 300 days from 

when tolling ceased. (Id. at 4-7.)

On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response arguing that that the class definition 

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included color vision plaintiffs because the Amended Class Action complaint included all 

plaintiffs who experienced adverse employment actions related to a “Fitness-for-Duty 

evaluation,” and that Defendant used an incorrect interpretation of the term “reportable 

health event.” (Doc 71 at 5-6.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues that his FAC (Doc. 13) was 

timely because he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a charge of 

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 

300 days of the Eighth Circuit denial of the class certification. (Doc. 71 at 4-7.) 

After Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 76), on September 6, 2022, this Court granted 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78). The Court found the class 

definition in the original Harris complaint to be broad enough to include Plaintiff as a 

putative class member;

4 however, the class definition in the August 17, 2018 motion for 

class certification more narrowly defined the class to only include individuals “subject to 

a fitness-for-duty examination as a result of a reportable health event.” (Id. at 8.) Because 

Blankinship’s change in color vision was not a “reportable health event,” but rather he was 

tested based on the FRA recertification process, he was not included in the Harris

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Id. at 8-9.)5 As a result, Plaintiff’s two remaining

claims from his FAC (Doc. 13) were dismissed with prejudice as time barred for failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies within the allowable time. (Doc. 78 at 10.)6

On September 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed this pending Motion. (Doc. 82.) In his 

Motion, Plaintiff attaches 12 exhibits totaling 645 pages to argue that Plaintiff should be 

relieved from final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3) because 

Union Pacific committed a fraud on the Court. (Doc. 83 at 9.) Plaintiff claims Defendant 

grossly misrepresented the definition of the term “reportable health event” and the record 

and procedural history of Harris. (Id. at 10.) Blankinship asserts he, along with numerous 

4 The original complaint defined the class as individuals removed from service and/or 

suffered adverse employment actions for reasons related to a Fitness-for-Duty evaluation. 

(Doc. 68-26 at 17). 

5 The Court found, at latest, the tolling would have ceased on February 5, 2019 when the 

class was officially certified. Plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimination within 300 

days of this date. (Doc. 78 at 9, fn.9.)

6 Finding Plaintiff’s claims to be time barred, the Court declined to address the merits of 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 78 at 7.)

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other color vision plaintiffs, was included on the class list provided by Union Pacific. (Id. 

at 10-11; Doc. 84-6 at 115.) Plaintiff also presents testimonial evidence from Defendant’s 

Chief Medical Officer stating that no change or new diagnosis is required for the reportable 

health event policies to apply. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims Defendant misled 

the Court on the procedural history of Harris. (Id.) Plaintiff claims both sides submitted 

briefing indicating that color vision plaintiffs, such as Blankinship, were intended to be 

included among the class definition. (Id.) The District of Nebraska certified a class of over 

7,000 employees, including Blankinship, and Union Pacific continuously referred to the 

class of this size on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. (Id.; Doc. 84-12 at 3.) Yet now at summary 

judgment in this case, Defendant is attempting to redefine the class to remove Blankinship. 

(Doc. 83 at 11-12.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues relief from judgment is justified under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) and 59(e) due to either a mistake by the court, 

extraordinary circumstances, or clear error respectively. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff states that even 

if no fraud is found, relief from judgment is warranted based on the clear evidence that 

Plaintiff and other employees removed from service following a Light Cannon CVFT were 

members of the class certified by the District of Nebraska. (Id.) 

On October 4, 2022, Defendant filed its Response. (Doc. 87.) From the onset, 

Defendant claims it neither doctored, hid, nor was any uncovered new evidence found. (Id. 

at 1). Rather, Plaintiff is attempting a “prohibited second bite at the apple” by submitting 

almost 650 pages of exhibits that were not disclosed during the Opposition to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.) In argument, Union Pacific claims that it did not 

commit a fraud on the Court. (Id. at 3-4.) Defendant states that the Court simply resolved 

a dispute in its Order granting summary judgment and Plaintiff failed to meet his heavy 

burden to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence. (Id.) Additionally, Defendant 

claims that Plaintiff’s cited authority in support of a fraud showing is inapplicable because, 

unlike the cited authority, Defendant did not suppress any evidence from Plaintiff or the 

Court. (Id. at 5-6.) In any case, Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s Motion misrepresents the 

evidence. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant claims the evidence indicates: (1) the referenced 

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spreadsheet that includes the name of Plaintiff was not a class list (Id.; Doc. 84-5 at fn.1-

2, 4); (2) Defendant was careful to formally deny this list was a class list (Doc. 87 at 6-7; 

Doc. 88-1); (3) Plaintiff’s counsel’s corrected on the record the inaccurate statement 

claiming the list was a class list (Doc. 87 at 7; Doc. 88-2); and (4) the District of Nebraska 

rejected the list as a class list. (Doc. 87 at 7; Owen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:19CV462, 

2020 WL 6684504, at *5, fn. 2 (D. Neb. Nov. 12, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-3411,

2021 WL 1977771 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2021). Additionally, the spreadsheet in question was 

from February 2018, before the list was narrowed and when Defendant was meaning for 

the list to be overinclusive. (Doc 87 at 8.) Defendant claims Plaintiff misstates the 

deposition testimony of Defendant’s Chief Medical Officer. (Id. at 8-9.) The testimony did 

not state that no change is necessary in an employee’s medical condition for the reportable 

health policies to apply. (Id.) Defendant further argues that the briefing from the Harris

case is inapplicable and holds no value because this discovery predated the operative class 

definition from August 17, 2018. (Doc. 87 at 10-11.) Finally, Defendant states that Plaintiff 

provided no specific evidence of clear error nor any extraordinary circumstances to justify 

relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6), or 59(e). (Id. at 11-12.) 

Therefore, Defendant requests this Court to reject Plaintiff’s inaccurate accusations and 

deny his Motion. (Id. at 13.)

On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Reply. (Doc. 90.) Plaintiff reiterates that 

the District of Nebraska certified a class that included Blankinship and that Blankinship 

remained a member of the class until the Eighth Circuit reversed class certification on 

March 24, 2020. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 

less than 3 weeks later and clearly within 300 days. (Id.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues 

Defendant is representing to the Court that Plaintiff was excluded from the operative class. 

(Id. at 2). Plaintiff claims this is evidence of clear error and warrants the granting of 

Plaintiff’s Motion. (Id.) Plaintiff argues this misrepresentation by Defendant constitutes 

fraud on the court despite the lack of intentionally hidden facts, and the Court should use 

its inherent authority to remedy the fraud. (Id. at 2-4.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims the 

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disputed list, which included Blankinship, was considered a class list because all 

employees on the list were given notice of class certification. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff 

concludes his Reply by requesting that the Court remedy the mistake made because of 

Union Pacific’s misrepresentations. (Id. at 6.)

III. Applicable Law

A. Motion for Reconsideration 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(g)(1) guides the Court on the standards for a 

motion for reconsideration. The rule states,

The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order 

absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal 

authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with 

reasonable diligence. Any such motion shall point out with specificity the 

matters that the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the 

Court, any new matters being brought to the Court's attention for the first 

time and the reasons they were not presented earlier, and any specific 

modifications being sought in the Court's Order. No motion for 

reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written argument made 

by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the 

Order. Failure to comply with this subsection may be grounds for denial of 

the motion.

See also Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[Motions for Reconsideration] may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence 

for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”)

Motions for reconsideration should only be granted in rare circumstances. 

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). A motion for 

reconsideration is appropriate where the district court “(1) is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, 

or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 

Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also, Navajo Nation v. 

Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“Reconsideration is indicated in the face of the existence of new evidence, an 

intervening change in the law, or as necessary to prevent manifest injustice.”) Motions for 

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reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to rethink what the court had already 

thought through – rightly or wrongly.” Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F. Supp at 1351 (citations 

omitted). Nor should a motion for reconsideration be used to repeat any argument already 

presented to and rejected by the court. Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 

215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is left 

to the sound discretion of the trial court. Navajo Nation, 331 F.3d at 1046. In the District 

of Arizona, motions for reconsideration will be granted when:

(1) There are material differences in fact or law from that 

presented to the Court and, at the time of the Court's decision, 

the party moving for reconsideration could not have known of 

the factual or legal differences through reasonable diligence;

(2) There are new material facts that happened after the Court's 

decision;

(3) There has been a change in the law that was decided or 

enacted after the Court's decision; or

(4) The movant makes a convincing showing that the Court 

failed to consider material facts that were presented to the 

Court before the Court's decision.

Motorola, Inc., 215 F.R.D. at 586. 

B. Relief from Judgment 

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to relieve a party 

from final judgment under six circumstances: “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect...; fraud... misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party...;

or any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

A party seeking relief from judgment under fraud “must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or 

other misconduct,” and that the alleged fraud was not discoverable by due diligence. Casey 

v. Albertson's Inc, 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting De Saracho v. Custom 

Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Most fraud on the court cases 

involve a scheme by one party to hide a key fact from the court and the opposing party.” 

United States v. Est. of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011). But more generally, 

fraud on the court “must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to 

improperly influence the court in its decision.” Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 

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F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rules 60(b)(1) and 59(e) both allow a court to grant a party relief from judgement 

due to mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, the only difference between the two rules 

being the timing on when a party must file its motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (“A motion to 

alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the 

judgment.”); Siegler v. Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc., No. 318CV01681GPCMSB, 2019 WL 

6877594, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019). The mistake or inadvertence is not limited, and 

Rule 60(b)(1) allows the court to correct mistakes made by the court itself. Kingvision PayPer-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999). However, to amend a 

judgment from either mistake or inadvertence requires a showing of “clear error.” 

McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). This “clear 

error” must be definite such that the court is left with a “firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 

Rule 60(b)(6) acts as a catch-all provision that affords the court discretion to grant 

relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Henson v. Fid. Nat'l Fin., 

Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 439 (9th Cir. 2019). However, this equitable rule should be used 

sparingly and “is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 

from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment,” and not when a 

party has simply “ignored normal legal recourse[].” United States v. Alpine Land & 

Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is only 

available if “the moving party is able to show both injury and that circumstances beyond 

its control prevented timely action to protect its interests.” Id. 

IV. Analysis 

Plaintiff attaches nearly 650 pages of exhibits to his Motion. This newly presented

evidence is neither recently discovered nor does Plaintiff indicate why the information was 

not presented earlier. Plaintiff offers no valid reason why he could not have made these 

arguments and presented this evidence in his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 

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Summary Judgment. Rather, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to reargue his case after the 

Court’s Order dismissing his case with prejudice, which applicable law prohibits. See

LRCiv 7.2(g)(1);see also Kona Enterprises, 229 F.3d at 890. If motions for reconsideration 

were used to repeat arguments already presented and to ask the court to rethink what it

already thought through, cases would never reach a clear resolution. Defenders of Wildlife, 

909 F. Supp. at 1351. Regardless, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion. 

A. Fraud 

Plaintiff’s Motion argues that Defendant committed a fraud through

misrepresentations to the Court. However, the evidence shows that Defendant neither 

created a scheme to hide facts nor improperly influenced the Court’s summary judgment 

decision. The parties simply presented conflicting arguments on the relevant factual 

disputes, which is how cases typically proceed through litigation.

Plaintiff claims that throughout the Harris litigation, Defendant referred to the list 

it produced as the class list and limited it to the individuals subject to a fitness-for-duty 

evaluation following a reportable health event but altered this viewpoint in its summary 

judgment motion. (Doc. 83 at 10-12.) Plaintiff alleges that this misrepresentation 

constitutes fraud and Defendant should have been estopped from claiming that the list, 

which included Plaintiff, was not in fact the class list. (Id.) However, Defendant reiterates

that this list was meant to be overinclusive, the parties jointly understood the list was not 

the intended operative class list, and most importantly, the list was created before the 

Harris plaintiffs narrowed the operative class list when moving for certification on August 

17, 2018. (Doc. 87 at 6-8.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff claims Defendant misrepresented the definition of 

“reportable health event” to the Court based on Defendant’s Chief Medical Officer’s 

deposition testimony. (Doc. 83 at 11.) Plaintiff claims this testimony stated that no change 

in an employee’s medical condition is necessary for the reportable health event policies to 

apply. (Id.) Defendant argues in opposition that Plaintiff misstates the deposition 

testimony. (Doc. 87 at 8-10.) Defendant’s Chief Medical Officer never stated that no 

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change is necessary for the reportable health events policy to apply; instead, the testimony 

stated that the broader fitness-for-duty policy may apply if a regulatory evaluation reveals 

an undisclosed reportable health event. (Id; 84-4 at 14-15.) 

The Court does not find that Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct by contesting

Plaintiff’s interpretation of the relevant facts above or by arguing that Plaintiff was not a 

member of the certified class. 

B. Mistake

Plaintiff could be relieved from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) or 59(e) for a mistake

by the Court in its Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 78.) 

In that Order, the Court found that Plaintiff was not included in the Harris plaintiffs’ 

motion for class certification and therefore tolling of Plaintiff’s claims ended upon the 

filing of the motion for class certification on August 17, 2018, and granted Defendant’s 

Motion on that basis. (Id. at 9.)7 Plaintiff now asserts the Court made a mistake because

Plaintiff was clearly a member of the class as certified by the District of Nebraska on 

February 5, 2019, and he remained a class member until class certification was overturned 

by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 24, 2020. (Doc. 90 at 1.) Plaintiff claims 

that Defendant acknowledged Plaintiff was a certified class member in Defendant’s Eighth 

Circuit appellate briefing.8 This Court is and has been aware that Plaintiff was a putative 

class member in Harris. (See Doc. 31 at 2.)

The District of Nebraska did refer to the list produced by Union Pacific as a class 

list. Harris 329 F.R.D. at 627 (“The list in question in this case was given to plaintiffs by 

Union Pacific... Thereafter, Union Pacific supplemented this production to identify a total 

of 7,723 current and former employees that are on this class list.”) (emphasis added).

Additionally, Defendant did refer to the certified class as “more than 7,000 current and 

7 See Smith v. Pennington, 352 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 2003); Sawtell v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours 

& Co., 22 F.3d 248 (10th Cir. 1994).

8 See Defendant’s Appellate Brief in the Eighth Circuit, Doc. 84-12 at 3: 

The district court certified one of the largest Americans with Disabilities Act class 

actions in history—a sprawling, diverse class of more than 7,000 current and former 

Union Pacific employees claiming that the railroad violated the ADA by ensuring 

that people in safety-sensitive jobs are fit for duty and do not have a medical 

condition that could suddenly incapacitate them.

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former Union Pacific employees” in its Eighth Circuit appellate briefing. But the operative 

fact is that the Harris court’s Order certified the class as indicated in the August 17, 2018 

motion for class certification, and the class certification definition that this Court relied 

upon excluded Plaintiff. Id. at 628. As the Court previously stated, individuals subjected to 

vision-related fitness-for-duty examinations were included in the certified class; however, 

individuals, including Plaintiff, who were subjected to color vision testing because of the 

FRA recertification processes, and not because of a reportable health event, were not. (Doc. 

78 at 9, fn.8.) 

Undisputedly, Plaintiff was not included in the class definition when the Harris

plaintiffs moved for certification, and that remains true. Therefore, in accordance with 

Smith and Sawtell, tolling ceased once Plaintiff had adequate notice he was not included in 

the operative class definition. Smith, 352 F.3d at 894; Sawtell, 22 F.3d 253-54. This 

occurred on August 17, 2018, and because Plaintiff failed to file his charge with the EEOC 

within 300 days of this date, his FAC was correctly dismissed as time barred.9 The Court 

is not convinced that it made a mistake in its September 6, 2022 Order granting Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment.10

C. Any Other Reason Justifying Relief 

Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is inapplicable here. There are no

extraordinary circumstances to justify granting Plaintiff relief, nor are there any 

circumstances beyond Plaintiff’s control that prevented him from making these arguments 

in his Opposition to Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion. Given that relief from 

judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is to be reserved for extraordinary cases, and used sparingly, 

9 Even if Smith and Sawtell were to be rejected, and it was determined tolling did not cease 

until class certification on February 5, 2019, Plaintiff’s claims would still be time barred. 

10 That Order declined to address the merits of the parties’ ADA arguments. This Order 

will do the same. But the Court is aware of Owen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:19CV462, 

2020 WL 6684504 (D. Neb. Nov. 12, 2020). In that case the court avoided “getting into 

the weeds” on the complex question of class definition and tolling and instead skipped 

ahead to address the substantive review of the summary judgment motion. The court 

granted Union Pacific’s motion because even if the plaintiff were to establish a prima facie 

case of disability discrimination, Union Pacific displayed a nondiscriminatory reason for 

removing plaintiff from service due to safety concerns. Id. at 7. Additionally, the court 

determined that a fitness-for-duty evaluation was “a reasonable means of determining if an 

employee can safely do their job.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation omitted). 

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it would be inappropriate for the Court to grant Plaintiff relief under this theory. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. 82) is denied, and this case is to 

remain closed. 

Dated this 4th day of November, 2022.

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