Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04027/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04027-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSEPH BRUMMER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-4027 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

MARY HENNESSY, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On December 9, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 7) on February 9, 2006.

Respondents contend the petition must be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. Petitioner filed a reply to Respondents’ answer

to the petition on February 27, 2006. See Docket No. 8.

I Procedural History

On August 24, 2000, Petitioner was charged by

indictment with burglary in the first degree (Count 1), two

counts of armed robbery (Count 2 and Count 3), one count of

aggravated assault (Count 4), and one count of first degree

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murder (Count 5). Answer, Exh. A. A jury found Petitioner

guilty of all charges in May of 2001. Id., Exh. I. On July

27, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive terms of

ten and one half years imprisonment on the first three charges,

a presumptive term of seven and one half years on the aggravated

assault conviction, and to a term of life imprisonment pursuant

to his conviction on the charge of first degree murder, with no

possibility of release for 25 years. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. K. The Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in a

memorandum decision issued April 20, 2002. Id., Exh. L.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which denied review on October 29, 2002. Id., Exh. N.

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

in the Arizona trial court on November 27, 2002. Id., Exh. O.

Petitioner was appointed counsel, who averred to the trial court

that he could find no tenable issues to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf. Id., Exh. P. Petitioner was given leave to file a pro

se petition for relief, in which he asserted that he was

entitled to relief because he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel, because the trial court erred with regard

to the introduction of evidence, and because the government had

withheld exculpatory evidence. Id., Exh. Q.

The Arizona trial court considered the merits of

Petitioner’s claims regarding the alleged failure to disclose

exculpatory evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel and

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denied these claims on the merits. Id., Exh. R. The Arizona

court concluded that Petitioner’s claims regarding the

introduction of evidence in error were precluded for his failure

to raise these claims in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. R.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which denied review on June 17, 2005. Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court only with regard to his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims. Id., Exh. U. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review

on October 31, 2005. Id., Exh. V. 

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel. Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective because

counsel raised the issue of a witness’ use of drugs, causing the

trial court to reverse a prior ruling and disallow the witness’

testimony because of the probative value was outweighed by

potential prejudice. Petition at 5. Petitioner also contends

counsel was ineffective for not having an expert witness testify

as to the potential effects of long term drug use on an

individual who identified Petitioner as the perpetrator of the

crimes, and for not calling an expert to testify about an

identification witness’ vision. Id. at 6-7. Petitioner further

contends that the trial court deprived him of his right to due

process by allowing “unfair testimony”; specifically, that after

his counsel had questioned a witness about drug use, the trial

court reversed a prior ruling regarding Petitioner’s previous

“bad acts,” i.e., the trial court allowed testimony regarding

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Petitioner’s drug use to be given, unfairly prejudicing the

jury. Id. at 8.

II Discussion

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court reached a

decision contrary to clearly established federal law, or one

involving an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, or unless the state court decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2005). A state court decision may not be

set aside as “contrary to clearly established federal law”

unless “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than this

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519

(2000). 

Under § 2254(d), federal courts are required to examine

a state court’s ruling with regard to an issue raised in a

federal habeas petition with great deference. See Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 359-60 (2002). With

regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is

the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court

applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively

unreasonable manner. An ‘unreasonable application of federal

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law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’”

Id. at 25 (emphasis added)(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064. 

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, [the defendant] must

demonstrate that (i) counsel’s performance

was objectively deficient and (ii) counsel’s

deficiency prejudiced the defense, depriving

petitioner of a fair trial with a reliable

result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984). To demonstrate constitutional

deficiency, [the defendant] must show that

counsel’s performance was completely

unreasonable, not simply wrong. Similarly,

to show unconstitutional prejudice, [the

defendant] must demonstrate that but for

counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the

proceedings would have been different. [The

defendant] bears a heavy burden in that he

must overcome the presumption that his

counsel’s actions were sound trial strategy,

in the context of his case.

Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir. 2000) (some internal

citations omitted). See also Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979,

1005 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005).

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

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hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the

extent that reasonable professional judgments support the

limitations on investigation.” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066. Therefore, with respect to the performance prong

of the relevant test, the reviewing court must determine

whether, in light of the circumstances as they existed at the

time of counsel’s actions, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

[C]ounsel’s performance is deficient if he

fails to either conduct a reasonable

investigation or provide strategic reasons

for not doing so.... Deficient performance

alone, however, is not enough to render

counsel’s representation constitutionally

ineffective. [The petitioner] must also

establish prejudice, by “show[ing] that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.”

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 873 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In denying Petitioner’s claim that he had been deprived

of the effective assistance of counsel, the Arizona Superior

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Court analyzed each of Petitioner’s specific claims of counsel’s

alleged error under the standard stated in Strickland. See

Answer, Exh. R. The trial court analyzed each of Petitioner’s

claims of error and determined that counsel’s performance was

not below the prevailing professional standard and that any

alleged error was not prejudicial to Petitioner. Additionally,

the Superior Court stated, with regard to counsel’s examination

of a witness which caused the trial court to reverse a prior

ruling: 

Although it was defense counsel’s examination

of witness Roesch that led the Court to

reconsider its original ruling excluding

evidence of membership in the Aryan

Brotherhood, it appears that this was a

tactical decision. It is clear, in any

event, that this evidence had no effect on

the verdicts. No one claimed that Defendant

was, in fact, a member of the Aryan

Brotherhood. Similarly, defense counsel’s

decision not to request a jury instruction

addressing the evidence was tactical in

nature and does not support a claim of

ineffective assistance.

Id., Exh. R at 3.

The Court concludes that the state court’s decision

regarding Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The state

court analyzed each of Petitioner’s allegations of error under

Strickland’s prejudice requirement and its flawed performance

standard and concluded that Petitioner’s counsel was not

incompetent and that any alleged failure was not prejudicial.

Therefore, the state court’s decision was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, or one involving an

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unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, and

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim

that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003).

Compare Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528, 123 S. Ct. 2527,

2538 (2003).

III Conclusion

The Arizona state court’s conclusion that Petitioner

was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel was not

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding and,

therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on his claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Brummer’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

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court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 14th day of March, 2006.

 

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