Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01598/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01598-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ZARAGOZA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09cv01598-DMS (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

PETITIONER’S MOTION TO STAY

vs.

MIKE MARTEL, et. Al.,

Respondent.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Dana M.

Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 19, 2006, Paul Zaragoza (“Petitioner”) was convicted after a jury trial of first

degree robbery (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211, 212.5(a)), carjacking (CAL. PENAL CODE § 215(a)),

residential burglary (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459, 460), assault with a semi-automatic firearm (CAL.

PENAL CODE §§ 12021(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (CAL. PENAL CODE §§

12021(a)(1)). 

A. State Court Proceedings: Direct Appeal

On March 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the state appellate court in which

he raised four claims (D048251). He claimed: (1) insufficient evidence supported his burglary

conviction because he claims he did not enter the victim's trailer to obtain his car keys; (2)

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insufficient evidence supported his carjacking conviction because he claimed he did not take the

vehicle from the person or immediate presence of the victim; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel

for failing to explain the significance of a witness's testimony in closing argument; and 

(4) imposition of an upper term sentence for carjacking without a jury trial violated his

constitutional rights. (Lodgment 3.) The state appellate court denied Petitioner’s appeal in an 11-

page opinion on April 16, 2008. (Lodgment 6.) On May 21, 2008, Petitioner sought further direct

review from the California Supreme Court on only one issue, his fourth: whether his upper term

sentence for carjacking deprived him of his constitutional rights. (Lodgment 7.) On June 25,

2008, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. (Lodgment 8.) 

B. Federal Court Proceedings: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On July 22, 2009, Petitioner, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) by a person in custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc.

No. 1.) In his Petition, Petitioner included the same four grounds for relief he alleged to the state

appellate court. On November 9, 2009, Respondent Mike Martel (“Respondent”) filed a Motion to

Dismiss, arguing that the Petition was “mixed” - i.e. containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. (Doc. No. 8.) On July 6, 2010, Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. issued a Report

and Recommendation to District Judge Dana M. Sabraw recommending that the Court (1) find the

Petition is “mixed,” (2) provide Petitioner with a list of options on how to proceed, and (3) grant

the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.) On August 26, 2010, Judge Sabraw issued an Option Order

adopting in part and denying in part the recommendation. (Doc. No. 13.) [hereinafter “Order”]

C. Judge Sabraw’s Option Order

In his Order, Judge Sabraw provided Petitioner with four options: (1) demonstrate

exhaustion of the three unexhausted claims, (2) voluntarily dismiss his entire Petition and return to

state court to exhaust, (3) formally abandon unexhausted claims and proceed with his exhausted

claim, or (4) file a motion to stay the federal proceedings while exhausting unexhausted claims in

state court. (Doc. No. 13.) On September 17, 2010, Petitioner chose the fourth option provided, to

stay the federal proceedings. (Doc. No. 14.) Respondent filed a Response in opposition of

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay on October 12, 2010. (Doc. No. 16.)

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II. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY & ABEYANCE

On September 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion requesting “Stay and Abeyance” for his

“mixed” Petition. In his motion, Petitioner requested a stay and abeyance to exhaust his

unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 14.) The stated goal of his motion was to “eventually raise as

exhausted claims” those which were previously unexhausted. (Doc. No. 14.) In addition,

Petitioner included in his motion a request for a copy of the original Petition and also attached

documentation attempting to prove his indigence. (Doc. No. 14.) The government filed a response

in opposition of Petitioner’s motion on October 12, 2010. (Doc. No. 16.) 

A. Two Stay Options: (1) Stay & Abeyance, or (2) Withdrawal & Abeyance

In his order, Judge Sabraw outlined the two methods available to Petitioner to stay the

federal proceeding: (1) the “stay and abeyance” procedure, and (2) the “withdrawal and abeyance”

procedure. (Doc. No. 13.) As explicitly articulated by the Ninth Circuit in King, these two

methods are separate and distinct procedures for “staying” federal proceedings in the context of

“mixed” habeas corpus petitions. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In the Response filed in opposition of Petitioner’s Motion to Stay, Respondent alleged that,

regardless of the stay method Petitioner selected from the Order - whether it be a “stay and

abeyance” procedure or a “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure - both should be denied by the

Court. (Doc. No. 16.) Respondent asserted that any claim Petitioner makes for “stay and

abeyance” fails for lack of good cause, and that any claim Petitioner makes for “withdrawal and

abeyance” fails because the unexhausted claims do not “relate back” to the exhausted claims. 

(Doc. No. 16.) 

i. “Stay and Abeyance” from Rhines

The “stay and abeyance” procedure is one where a petitioner asks a federal court to stay, or

hold, a mixed petition in its entirety while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust the

unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). The test, or threshold inquiry, for

whether or not a petitioner is entitled to this type of procedure is articulated in the Rhines case. 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-278. Under the Rhines standard, to be entitled to “stay and abeyance,” a

petitioner must demonstrate (1) that “there are arguably meritorious claim(s) which he wishes to

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return to state court to exhaust, (2) that he is diligently pursuing his state court remedies with

respect to those claim(s), and (3) that good cause exists for his failure to timely exhaust his state

court remedies.” (Doc. No. 13 (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-278).)

ii. “Withdrawal and Abeyance” from Kelly

The “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure is a three-step process where a petitioner 

(1) voluntarily withdraws the unexhausted claim(s) from his habeas petition in federal court, (2)

asks a federal court to stay the proceedings and hold the fully-exhausted, remaining petition in

abeyance while he returns to the state court to exhaust, and then, (3) once his previously

unexhausted complaints are now exhausted, a petitioner returns to federal court to seek permission

to amend his petition to include the newly exhausted claim(s). King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002)). This process is commonly

known as the “Kelly Procedure.” King, 564 F.3d at 1136. Although this procedure does not

require a petitioner to demonstrate good cause for his previous failure to timely exhaust, as

explained by Judge Sabraw, the Kelly Procedure requires “the newly exhausted claim(s) either be

timely under the statute of limitations or ‘relate back’ to the claims in the fully-exhausted

petition.” (Doc. No. 13 (citing King, 564 F.3d at 1143).) To “relate back” to claims found in the

fully-exhausted petition, the claims must share a “common core of operative facts.” King, 564

F.3d at 1143 (citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005)).

B. Petitioner appears to have chosen the“Stay and Abeyance” option pursuant to

Rhines.

From the caption of Petitioner’s motion - “Request for Stay and Abeyance for Mixed

Petition” - it appears Petitioner elected the Rhines “stay and abeyance” procedure provided to him

as an option in Judge Sabraw’s Order. (Doc. No. 14.)

i. Petitioner’s motion fails because he did not demonstrate good cause.

As noted above, Rhines establishes the requirements petitioners must meet for an order to

stay and abey a mixed habeas petition. Here, Petitioner’s motion contains nothing more than a

bare-bones request to stay and abey while he returns to state court. Indeed, nowhere in

Petitioner’s moving papers does he address the three main components described in Rhines despite

Judge Sabraw’s specific order requiring such a showing. (Doc. No. 14.) 

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Since Petitioner alleges no facts in support of his motion for stay and abeyance, he fails to

meet the Rhines standard. Accordingly, it is recommended his motion should be denied.

C. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner is attempting to assert the “Withdrawal

and Abeyance” procedure articulated in Kelly, his motion still fails because his

unexhausted claims do not “relate back” to his already exhausted claims.

Although appearing on its face to be a motion for “stay and abeyance,” a brief review of

the alternative option seems justified because “withdrawal and abeyance” was the alternative

option provided to Petitioner in Judge Sabraw’s Order. As noted above, a “withdrawal and

abeyance” is commonly known as the three-step Kelly Procedure. Although this procedure does

not require a petitioner to demonstrate good cause for failing to timely exhaust, it does require that

newly exhausted claims either be timely under the statute of limitations or “relate back” to the

claims in the fully-exhausted petition. 

Here, Petitioner filed a petition involving four claims - one exhausted and three

unexhausted. As previously determined, Petitioner’s sole exhausted claim is claim number four. 

In this claim, Petitioner alleged, with respect to the carjacking, his constitutional rights were

violated by the imposition of an upper term sentence without a jury trial. This was the only claim

presented to the California Supreme Court. Petitioner’s three unexhausted claims are as follows: 

(1) insufficient evidence supported his burglary conviction because he claims he did not enter the

victim's trailer to obtain his car keys; (2) insufficient evidence supported his carjacking conviction

because he claimed he did not take the vehicle from the person or immediate presence of the

victim; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel in closing argument for failing to explain the

significance of certain testimony.

As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of presenting or demonstrating these other

claims “relate back.” See generally King, F.3d at 1135-43. In his motion, Petitioner fails to

demonstrate, or assert any facts to support, how his unexhausted claims “relate back” to his sole

exhausted claim. Because Petitioner carries the burden and because Petitioner fails to offer any

argument or analysis, he does not satisfy the necessary threshold for invoking the Kelly Procedure.

/ / /

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/ / /

III. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner cannot support his motion under either Rhines or

Kelly. Therefore, it is recommended Petitioner’s motion for a stay be DENIED.

It is further recommended Petitioner be given thirty days (30) to dismiss the unexhausted

claims and proceed on the single remaining claim that is exhausted, or his petition may be

dismissed in its entirety as a mixed petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 23, 2011 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than March 9, 2011. The parties are advised failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2011

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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