Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06290/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06290-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID MAURICE GOMEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN A. K. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06290-OWW-LJO PC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. 110 and 112)

Plaintiff David Maurice Gomez (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s amended

complaint, filed October 21, 2003, against defendants Saddi, Bailey, and German on plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, and against defendant Luna on plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment medical care claim. On November 30, 2006, the Court issued an order stating:

On November 29, 2006, defendants Saddi, German, Bailey, and Luna filed a motion

to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Only

defendant Luna may move for dismissal at this juncture, as the pretrial dispositive

motion phase of this litigation is closed with respect to defendants Saddi, German,

and Baily. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Docs. 53, 91, 104. Accordingly, the motion shall

be treated as one by defendant Luna for dismissal of the claim against her on the

ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim against her. 

(Doc. 107.) Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on December 15, 2006.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse

party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983)

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

the Court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). The Ninth Circuit

has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding

clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, “the clause is

reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local

Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion.”

Defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey contend they should not be precluded from joining

defendant Luna in filing an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion because the Court did not previously

set a deadline by which they needed to file one, exhaustion of the available administrative remedies

is jurisdictional, and it is in the interest of judicial economy.

The scheduling order applicable to defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey was issued on

December 17, 2004. (Docs. 30, 33.) Defendant Luna waived service and filed an answer after all

those scheduling order deadlines had expired and after the Court had resolved defendants Saddi,

German, and Bailey’s motion for summary judgment. If defendant Luna had not been located and

served, this matter would have been set for jury trial following dismissal of the claim against

defendant Luna. When defendant Luna waived service and answered the complaint, a scheduling

order, clearly applicable to plaintiff and defendant Luna only as to plaintiff’s claim against Luna, was

issued on September 20, 2006. (Doc. 104.) It is under this scheduling order that defendants Saddi,

German, and Bailey argue they should be permitted to file a motion to dismiss. 

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Although the Court set a specific unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion deadline for defendant

Luna on September 20, 2006, but did not set a specific unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion deadline

for defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey on December 17, 2004, the addition of such a deadline

separate and apart from the pretrial dispositive motion deadline was the result of an administrative

change made to orders less than two years ago. The Court is unpersuaded that an administrative

change it made to its orders is grounds for a valid argument that prior to the change, defendants had

no opportunity to file an unenumerated Rules 12(b) motion. The Prison Litigation Reform Act was

enacted in 1996, and prior to the change in the Court’sscheduling order, defendants wishing to raise

the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust did so by filing a motion on or before the pretrial

dispositive motion deadline. Defendants had the same opportunity to file a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust as does every litigant subject to a scheduling order. The fact that at that time the

Court did not set a separate deadline is immaterial. Defendants’ argument they did not have an

opportunity to file a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust because the Court did not set an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) deadline is untenable.

Defendants’ argument that exhaustion is jurisdictional is likewise without merit. Exhaustion

is an affirmative defense and is not jurisdictional. Jones v. Bock, Nos. 05-7058, 05-7142, 2007 WL

135890, *11 (Jan. 22, 2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2392 (2006) (“[T]he PLRA

requirement is not jurisdictional . . . .”); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 n.9 (9th Cir. 2003)

(recognizing Ninth Circuit previously held the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional in

Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999) (overruled in part by Booth v. Churner, 532

U.S. 731 (2001))). 

Finally, defendants argue judicial economy concerns. A scheduling order may be modified

only upon a showing of good cause, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), and a showing of good cause requires a

showing of diligence in complying with the deadline, Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co.,

302 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002). The scheduling order applicable to defendants Saddi,

German, and Bailey provided that the pretrial dispositive motion deadline was July 19, 2005. (Docs.

30, 33, 53.) Defendants opted to file a motion for summary judgment, which was granted in part and

denied in part. If defendants wish to file a motion seeking relief from that scheduling order upon a

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showing of good cause, the Court will not preclude them from doing so. However, they will be

required to make the appropriate showing and will not be allowed to make an end run around the

Court’s scheduling orders and Rule 16(b) by suggesting that they were deprived of their opportunity

to move for dismissal for failure to exhaust. 

The Court did not err in issuing an order clarifying that defendants’ motion to dismiss would

be treated as one filed by defendant Luna only, and defendants’ motion for reconsideration, filed

December 15, 2006, is HEREBY ORDERED DENIED on that ground.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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