Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_02-cv-02001/USCOURTS-alnd-2_02-cv-02001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDWIN L. THOMAS, as personal ]

representative of the Estate of James ]

Edwin Thomas, a deceased minor, ]

]

Plaintiff, ] CASE NO.:

] 2:02CV2001-VEH

]

v. ]

]

EVENFLO COMPANY, INC., et al., ]

]

Defendants. ]

Memorandum of Opinion

I. INTRODUCTION

This case comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion In Limine to

Exclude the Testimony of Gary Whitman. (Doc. 69). 

This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Edwin Thomas, as personal

representative of the Estate of James Edwin Thomas, a deceased minor, against

Evenflo Company, Inc. (“Evenflo”) and Toys R’ Us, Inc. (“Toys R’ Us”). The case

arises out of the asphyxiation of Master Thomas while restrained in his Evenflo “On

My Way” five-point child restraint system (“CRS”). It is undisputed that the child

was placed in the restraint system by an adult caregiver and left unattended, in the

system, on the floor, in a room in the caregiver’s home. 

FILED

 2005 Aug-11 AM 10:10

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 1 of 34
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The Plaintiff has propounded as an expert witness Gary R. Whitman. Among

other things, Mr. Whitman has opined the following in his Rule 26 report:

1. James Edwin Thomas was in the subject Evenflo On-My Way

with its harness adjusted on his body.

2. The subject On-My-Way with James Thomas in it was placed on

the floor in the bedroom of Mary Brown’s house.

3. One side of the harness became disengaged and James Thomas

moved such that he had both of his legs on one side of the crotch

strap. His body slid forward causing the harness tie to load

against his neck. This loading resulted in his asphyxiation.

4. The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably

dangerous due to its crotch strap being too long for its intended

purpose of restraining the lower torso of a child of James

Thomas’s size. Evenflo knew or should have known of this

defect based on human subject fit studies. There were

technologically and economically feasible design alternatives for

this design at the time that the subject infant carrier was

manufactured.

5. The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably

dangerous due to its crotch strap being too far forward of the seat

back for its intended purpose of restraining the lower torso of a

child of James Thomas’s size. Evenflo knew or should have

known of this defect based on human subject fit studies. There

were technologically and economically feasible design

alternatives for this design at the time the subject infant carrier

was manufactured.

6. The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably

dangerous due to its failure to provide a buckle that spring ejects

the harness latch plates when the inserted latchplate is

disengaged. Evenflo knew or should have known of this hazard

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through hazard analysis and/or a Failure Modes and Effects

Analysis. There were technologically and economically feasible

design alternatives for this design at the time that the subject

infant carrier was manufactured. In fact, other buckles on the

market incorporate the spring eject feature.

7. The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably

dangerous because its design allows the carrier to be positioned

such that the infant is placed in a near upright seated position.

Evenflo knew of the hazard created by placing an infant child in

a near upright position but failed to minimize the potential

through proper design. There were technologically and

economically feasible design alternatives for this design. Other

infant carriers have incorporated such features.

8. The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably

dangerous because it fails to incorporate an on-product warning

cautioning the reader of the hazard created by placing an infant in

a near upright seated position. Evenflo knew of the hazard

created by placing an infant child in a near upright position, but

failed to minimize the potential through proper design and

warning.

9. The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably

dangerous because its design fails to incorporate an angle

indicator on the carrier to inform the installer when an acceptable

reclination angle has been achieved. Evenflo’s recognition of the

need for such an indicator is demonstrated by the reclination

indicator provided on the base. However, it is reasonable,

foreseeable, and in accordance with the instructions to use the

carrier both in and out of the car without the base. There were

technologically and economically feasible design alternatives for

this design at the time that the subject infant carrier was

manufactured.

Whitman Letter of July 1, 2003, at 9-10.

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The Defendants previously sought to strike the opinions of Mr. Whitman in a

Motion in Limine which was denied, without prejudice, by this Court, on March 15,

2005. The renewed motion is presently before the Court.

II. STANDARD FOR REVIEWING EXPERT TESTIMONY

In evaluating expert testimony, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

outlined the following analysis:

The starting point for our analysis is Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence, which controls the admission of expert testimony.It provides:

If scientific, technical, or otherspecialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,

if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,

(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and

methods reliably to the facts of the case. 

As the Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Daubert, Rule 702

compels the district courts to perform the critical "gatekeeping" function

concerning the admissibility of expert scientific evidence. 509 U.S. at

589 n. 7, 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 n. 7, 2798. The trial courts are also

required to play the same gatekeeping function considering the

admissibility of technical expert evidence. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147,

119 S.Ct. at 1174. This function "inherently require[s] the trial court to

conduct an exacting analysis" of the foundations of expert opinions to

ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.

McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257.

The importance of Daubert 's gatekeeping requirement cannot be

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overstated. As the Supreme Court framed it in Kumho Tire: "[T]he

objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of

expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing

testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in

the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the

practice of an expert in the relevant field." 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at

1176. The district court's role is especially significant since the expert's

opinion "can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the

difficulty in evaluating it." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2798

(quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)

("Weinstein")). Indeed, no other kind of witness is free to opine about

a complicated matter without any firsthand knowledge of the facts in the

case, and based upon otherwise inadmissible hearsay if the facts or data

are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in

forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Fed.R.Evid. 703.

Thus, it comes as no surprise that in determining the admissibility

of expert testimony under Rule 702, we engage in a rigorous three-part

inquiry. Trial courts must consider whether:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding

the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by

which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently

reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in

Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact,

through the application of scientific, technical, or

specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue. 

City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th

Cir.1998) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794). While

there is inevitably some overlap among the basic

requirements--qualification, reliability, and helpfulness--they remain

distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.

Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341.

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The proponent of expert testimony always bears "the burden to

show that his expert is 'qualified to testify competently regarding the

matters he intend [ed] to address; [ ] the methodology by which the

expert reach[ed] his conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and [ ] the

testimony assists the trier of fact.' " McCorvey, 298 F.3d 1253, 1257

(alterations in original) (quoting Maiz, 253 F.3d at 664). The burden of

establishing qualification, reliability, and helpfulness rests on the

proponent of the expert opinion, whether the proponent is the plaintiff

or the defendant in a civil suit, or the government or the accused in a

criminal case.

Turning first to the qualification of the expert, we observe that

experts may be qualified in various ways. While scientific training or

education may provide possible means to qualify, experience in a field

may offer another path to expert status. In fact, the plain language of

Rule 702 makes this clear: expert status may be based on "knowledge,

skill, experience, training, or education." (emphasis added). The

Committee Note to the 2000 Amendments of Rule 702 also explains that

"[n]othing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience

alone ... may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony."

Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.).

Of course, the unremarkable observation that an expert may be

qualified by experience does not mean that experience, standing alone,

is a sufficient foundation rendering reliable any conceivable opinion the

expert may express. As we observed in Quiet Technology, "while an

expert's overwhelming qualifications may bear on the reliability of his

proffered testimony, they are by no means a guarantor of reliability....

[O]ur caselaw plainly establishes that one may be considered an expert

but still offer unreliable testimony." 326 F.3d at 1341-42. Quite simply,

under Rule 702, the reliability criterion remains a discrete, independent,

and important requirement for admissibility.

Indeed, the Committee Note to the 2000 Amendments of Rule 702

expressly says that, "[i]f the witness is relying solely or primarily on

experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to

the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the

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opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The

trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply 'taking the

expert's word for it.' " Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000

amends.) (emphasis added); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (on remand), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.1995)

(observing that the gatekeeping role requires a district court to make a

reliability inquiry, and that "the expert's bald assurance of validity is not

enough"). If admissibility could be established merely by the ipse dixit

of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability prong would be, for all

practical purposes, subsumed by the qualification prong.

Thus, it remains a basic foundation for admissibility that

"[p]roposed [expert] testimony must be supported by appropriate

validation-- i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." Daubert, 509

U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. As the Supreme Court put it, "the Rules

of Evidence-- especially Rule 702--... assign to the trial judge the task

of ensuring that an expert's testimony ... rests on a reliable foundation."

Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2799.

When evaluating the reliability of scientific expert opinion, the

trial judge must assess "whether the reasoning or methodology

underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that

reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."

Id. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. To evaluate the reliability of scientific

expert opinion, we consider, to the extent practicable:

(1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested;

(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review

and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of

the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the

technique is generally accepted in the scientific

community. 

Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341 (citing McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256

(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97)). 

These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive; not all of them will

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apply in every case, and in some cases other factors will be equally

important in evaluating the reliability of proffered expert opinion. See

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150- 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1175-76; Fed.R.Evid.

702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.); see also Heller v. Shaw

Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir.1999) ("[N]ot only must each

stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, but each stage must be

evaluated practically and flexibly without bright-line exclusionary (or

inclusionary) rules.").

The same criteria that are used to assess the reliability of a

scientific opinion may be used to evaluate the reliability of

non-scientific, experience-based testimony. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at

152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176; see also Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750,

758 (7th Cir.1999) ("In determining whether an expert's testimony is

reliable, the Daubert factors are applicable in cases where an expert

eschews reliance on any rigorous methodology and instead purports to

base his opinion merely on 'experience' or 'training.' "). As the Supreme

Court explained in Kumho Tire:

In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to

ask, for example, how often an engineering expert's

experience-based methodology has produced erroneous

results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in

the relevant engineering community. Likewise, it will at

times be useful to ask even of a witness whose expertise is

based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to

distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his

preparation is of a kind that others in the field would

recognize as acceptable. 

526 U.S. at 151, 119 S.Ct. at 1176. Sometimes the specific Daubert

factors will aid in determining reliability; sometimes other questions

may be more useful. As a result, "the trial judge must have considerable

leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining

whether particular expert testimony is reliable." Id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at

1176. Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to case,

but what remains constant is the requirement that the trial judge evaluate

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the reliability of the testimony before allowing its admission at trial. See

Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.) ("The trial

judge in all cases of proffered expert testimony must find that it is

properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be

admitted." (emphasis added)).

The final requirement for admissibility of expert testimony under

Rule 702 is that it assist the trier of fact. By this requirement, expert

testimony is admissible if it concerns matters that are beyond the

understanding of the average lay person. See United States v. Rouco,

765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985) (expert testimony admissible if it

offers something "beyond the understanding and experience of the

average citizen"). Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the

trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the

parties can argue in closing arguments. See 4 Weinstein's Federal

Evidence § 702.03[2] [a].

Because of the powerful and potentially misleading effect of

expert evidence, see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2798,

sometimes expert opinions that otherwise meet the admissibility

requirements may still be excluded by applying Rule 403. Exclusion

under Rule 403 is appropriate if the probative value of otherwise

admissible evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential to

confuse or mislead the jury, see Rouco, 765 F.2d at 995, or if the expert

testimony is cumulative or needlessly time consuming. See, e.g., Hull v.

Merck & Co., Inc., 758 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam)

(finding that admission of speculative and "potentially confusing

testimony is at odds with the purposes of expert testimony as envisioned

in Fed.R.Evid. 702"); see also United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380,

1399 (3d Cir.1991) (finding expert testimony properly excluded because

its probative value was outweighed by concerns of "undue delay, waste

of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"). Indeed, "the

judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule

403 ... exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses."

Weinstein, 138 F.R.D. at 632; see also Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370

U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962). Simply put,

expert testimony may be assigned talismanic significance in the eyes of

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lay jurors, and, therefore, the district courts must take care to weigh the

value of such evidence against its potential to mislead or confuse.

U.S. v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 -1263 (11 Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted). th

III. ANALYSIS

A. Whitman’s Qualifications

The Defendants first argue that Mr. Whitman is not qualified to render the

opinions in his Rule 26 report. The Defendants offer no binding case law on point

regarding what factors this Court should consider when determining whether Mr.

Whitman is qualified. Instead they pick several non-binding District Court decisions

which they contend outline the framework of what courts consider when determining

whether an expert is qualified.

After careful review, this Court has found no Eleventh Circuit case which lays

out in detail the type of framework which the Defendants cite. “Daubert itself

stresses that "[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one." Id. at 594,

113 S.Ct. at 2797. "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and [there is no] definitive

checklist or test." Id. at 593, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 665

(11 Cir. 2001). th

The Court’s own review has discovered that, generally, the standard for

qualifying expert witnesses is liberal. See, e.g. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916

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F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6 Cir. 1977); th

Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enterprises, Inc., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9 Cir. 1994); Gardner th

v. General Motors Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 528 (10 Cir. 1974); see also, Collins By and th

Through Kay v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 675 F.2d 1185, 1194 (11 Cir. 1982) th

(recognizing Eleventh Circuits “liberal construction” of Rule 702). A witness may

be qualified as an expert if he possesses a specialized knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education. Fed. R. Evid. 702. Thus, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial

court to exclude expert testimony solely on the ground that the witness is not

qualified to render the opinion at issue because the witness lacks a certain educational

or other experiential background. See Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 360 (1st

Cir. 2004); see e.g. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co. , 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995);

In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 1990); Dickenson v.

Cardiac and Thoracic Surgery of E. Tennessee, 388 F.3d 976, 980-982 (6 Cir. th

2004). Similarly, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert

testimony solely on the ground that the witness is not qualified to render an opinion

because the witness lacks expertise in specialized areas that are directly pertinent to

the issues in question, if the witness has educational and experiential qualifications

in a general field related to the subject matter of the issue in question. See e.g. Maiz

v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 665 (11 Cir. 2001) (plaintiff’s economics expert was th

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qualified to offer opinion regarding plaintiff’s lost value damages arising from a real

estate investment scheme, because calculating economic loses resulting from

defendants’ conduct was sufficiently within his expertise; his lack of experience in

real estate development and resulting ignorance about how pilfered funds would have

been invested went to foundation for expert’s testimony, not to his qualifications). 

On the other hand, if a proffered witness’s qualifications are lacking, the trial

Court should exclude that witnesses as unqualified. See e.g. United States v. Paul,

175 F.3d 906, 912 (11 Cir. 1999) (proposed expert witness’s background did not th

qualify him as expert, and trial court did not abuse discretion by excluding his

testimony). In Paul, the Eleventh Circuit keyed on several factors to determine that

the attorney proffered was not qualified as a handwriting expert. The Court wrote:

The record reflects that Denbeaux had no skill, experience, training or

education in the field of handwriting analysis. The record shows that

Denbeaux has a law degree and that he is a law professor who teaches

evidence. Before 1989, he reviewed the literature in the field of

questioned document examinations, and then coauthored a law review

article critical of forensic document examiners' ability to reach the

correct conclusion in questioned document examinations. See D.

Michael Risinger, Mark Denbeaux and Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of

Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of

Handwriting Identification Expertise, 137 U. Pa. L.Rev. 731 (1989). His

skill, experience, training and education as a lawyer did not make him

any more qualified to testify as an expert on handwriting analysis than

a lay person who read the same articles.

At the time of the trial, Denbeaux had done virtually no further research

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or writing on the subject of the reliability of handwriting expertise since

the University of Pennsylvania published his law review article in 1989.

During cross-examination, he admitted that he was not a questioned

documents examiner, had received no formal training in the field, had

never attended seminars on handwriting analysis, had never worked in

a questioned documents laboratory and was not a member of any

professional organizations in the field. Further, because Denbeaux was

not an expert on the limitations of handwriting analysis, the district

court's exclusion of his testimony did not prejudice Paul. Denbeaux's

background did not qualify him as an expert, and his knowledge of the

subject matter is so limited that it was not an abuse of discretion for the

district court to exclude his testimony under Rule 702.

U.S. v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906, 912 (11 Cir. 1999). th

Still, only one of the five bases for qualifying a witness should be enough. The

Eleventh Circuit has held:

we observe that experts may be qualified in various ways. While

scientific training or education may provide possible means to qualify,

experience in a field may offer another path to expert status. In fact, the

plain language of Rule 702 makes this clear: expert status may be based

on "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." (emphasis

added). The Committee Note to the 2000 Amendments of Rule 702 also

explains that "[n]othing in this amendment is intended to suggest that

experience alone ... may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert

testimony." Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.).

U.S. v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 -1261 (11 Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). th

The Court having completed this review, it rejects the implication by the

Defendants that it must follow the factors the Defendants have laid out in order to

find that Mr. Whitman is not qualified. Instead, it will address Mr. Whitman’s

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qualifications as a whole to determine if he is qualified to make the statements in his

Rule 26 report.

Gary Whitman is presently employed as the Group Manager of Research and

Development for an engineering firm known as ARCCA, Inc. Professional

Biographical Outline of Gary R. Whitman, at 2. Mr. Whitman is employed as an

engineering consultant in the fields of occupant crash protection, crash safety, crash

survival, emergency escape, life support engineering, the design of child safety seats,

and the design of vehicle seat and restraint systems. Id. Whitman possesses a

Bachelor of Science Degree in mechanical engineering from Drexel University in

1979. Id. Since obtaining his undergraduate degree, Whitman has completed postgraduate work in Medical Science I, II, and III . Id. at 1-2. In addition, Whitman has

completed courses in anatomy and physiology. Id. at 2. 

Prior to his employment with ARCCA, Whitman was a civilian employed by

the United States Navy to provide consultation and other engineering-related services.

Id. Whitman led a technical engineering team while working with the design,

development, testing, and evaluation of advanced pilot and crew restraint systems for

Navy aircraft (including seats and seat belts). Id.; Whitman Depo., at 17-29. 

Whitman is a member of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).

Professional Biographical Outline of Gary R. Whitman, at 1. 

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Whitman has authored (and co-authored) a number of peer reviewed

publications concerning occupant seating and restraint systems, including child

restraint systems. Id. at 3-5. 

Whitman is co-holder of two patents dealing with occupant crash protection

systems for motor vehicles. United States Patent No. 6,155,601 and 5,553,924.

Whitman has conducted at least one program involving the design of child

safety seats and crash protection that was funded by the federal government through

the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA). NHTSA funded

a study directed byWhitman regarding the biofidelity oftheHybrid III three-year-old

child test crash dummy during sled testing and its ability to accurately predict the

injuriesto children in real world crashes. Professional Biographical Outline of Gary

R. Whitman, at 1; Gary Whitman, A Method for the Assessment of Tethered and

Untethered Child Restraint Systems Using the Hybrid III Three Year Old Dummy

(Abstract).

Whitman has been consulted by the Partnersfor Child Passenger Safety of The

Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP) and the American Academy of Pediatrics

(AAP) on child safety seat design, and child restraint research. Professional

Biographical Outline of Gary R. Whitman, at 1; Whitman Depo. at 100-101. 

Whitman received the Pennsylvania Governor’s Highway Safety Award for

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Occupant Protection in 1997. Professional Biographical Outline of Gary R.

Whitman, at 1.

Based on the review of the evidence, this is not the situation noted in the Paul

case where Mr. Whitman is no more qualified than a lay witness to render his

opinions. While the Court is well aware of its “gatekeeper” role: 

A district court's gatekeeper role under Daubert "is not intended to

supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury." Allison v.

McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir.1999). " 'Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction

on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of

attacking [debatable] but admissible evidence.' " Id. (quoting Daubert,

509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2786). 

Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11 Cir. 2001). th

The Court is convinced that Mr. Whitman has sufficient knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education to render each of the opinions in his Rule 26 report.

Accordingly, Mr. Whitman is qualified.

B. Whether the Methodology By Which Whitman Reaches His

Conclusions Is Sufficiently Reliable As Determined By the Sort of

Inquiry Mandated in Daubert.

When evaluating the reliability of scientific expert opinion, the trial

judge must assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying

the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or

methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 592-93,

113 S.Ct. at 2796. To evaluate the reliability of scientific expert opinion,

we consider, to the extent practicable:

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(1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested;

(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review

and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of

the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the

technique is generally accepted in the scientific

community. 

Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341 (citing McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256

(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97)). 

These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive; not all of them will apply

in every case, and in some cases other factors will be equally important

in evaluating the reliability of proffered expert opinion. See Kumho

Tire, 526 U.S. at 150- 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1175-76; Fed.R.Evid. 702

advisory committee's note (2000 amends.); see also Heller v. Shaw

Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir.1999) ("[N]ot only must each

stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, but each stage must be

evaluated practically and flexibly without bright-line exclusionary (or

inclusionary) rules.").

U.S. v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 -1263 (11 Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted). th

The Court will examine each opinion separately. 

1. Statement 1.

“James Edwin Thomas was in the subject Evenflo On-My-Way with its

harness adjusted on his body.”

This is not an expert opinion but a purported statement of fact. Mr. Whitman

is not a fact witness who can testify the information contained in this statement.

However, the information contained in this statement is undisputed and has been

relied upon by all parties and experts in this case. The statement is reliable.

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 17 of 34
18

2. Statement 2.

“The subject On-My-Way with James Thomas in it was placed on the

floor in the bedroom of Mary Brown’s house.”

For the reasons stated above, this statement also is reliable.

3. Statement 3. 

“One side of the harness became disengaged and James Thomas moved

such that he had both of his legs on one side of the crotch strap. His

body slid forward causing the harness tie to load against his neck. This

loading resulted in his asphyxiation.”

The Defendant states that this statement is unreliable because 

Whitman has cited no studies, tests, or publications on infant movement

within a stationary CRS to support his theory and has not provided a

known rate of error or basis to demonstrate that his methodology is

generally accepted. Most critically, the testing Whitman performed to

reach his conclusion did not represent the accident situation or the size

of the decedent.

Defendant’s Brief, at 19. 

The Plaintiff responds to these allegations by citing the Court to “Whitman’s

file” which he claims 

consists of all depositions of fact witnesses, notes, measurements and

photographs of two surrogate fit checks, photographs and measurements

of weighed dummy fit checks, peer reviewed articles supporting his

methodology, medical records, medical examiner records and

photographs, blue prints and drawings of the subject seat and numerous

other items that painstakingly document his support for his well

reasoned opinions. 

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 18 of 34
19

Plaintiff’s Brief, at 21 (citing Plaintiff’s Exhibit L, at 2). None of these items exist

at the cited location. 

The Plaintiff also insists that Whitman’s opinion has been “peer reviewed and

is accepted in the engineering community.” Plaintiff’s Brief, at 21 (citing Plaintiff’s

Exhibit N, at 150). Exhibit N is merely an article authored in part by Whitman. The

Plaintiff contends in his brief that Whitman followed the “scientific approach” set out

in his brief at pages 22 and 23, and at page 150 of Whitman’s article, but provides no

evidentiary support for same. In other words, while the Plaintiff establishes that there

was a scientific approach that could have been used, the Plaintiff cites no evidence

that establishes that Whitman used it. Because of that, it is impossible to establish

the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and whether

the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. 

The Plaintiff also notes that Whitman used another methodology in analyzing

all other possible scenarios for the cause of James Edwin Thomas getting into the

position that caused his death. Plaintiff’s Brief, at 24. However, again, the Plaintiff

offers no citation to the record for this assertion. 

As the Court stated when it afforded the parties a second opportunity to brief

this matter, “[t]he failure of the Plaintiff to respond to a section of Defendants’ brief,

or to cite to evidence in support of the Plaintiff’s position, will be deemed by this

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 19 of 34
20

Court to be a forfeiting of that issue by the Plaintiff.” Order of March 15, 2005, at 9.

Even if the Court gives the Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, there is no evidence that

Mr. Whitman has adopted any ofthemethodologies that the Plaintiff proposes for this

opinion.

In short, the Plaintiff has pointed to no specific methodology used by

Whitman. Even assuming the Plaintiff has done so, the Plaintiff cites no evidence of

said methodology’s known rate of error or a basis for determining if the method is

generally accepted . Statement 3 will be STRUCK.

4. Statements 4 and 5.

Statement 4

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous due

to its crotch strap being too long for its intended purpose of restraining

the lower torso of a child of James Thomas’s size. Evenflo knew or

should have known of this defect based on human subject fit studies.

There were technologically and economically feasible design

alternatives for this design at the time that the subject infant carrier was

manufactured.” 

Statement 5

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous due

to its crotch strap being too far forward of the seat back for its intended

purpose of restraining the lower torso of a child of James Thomas’s

size. Evenflo knew or should have known of this defect based on human

subject fit studies. There were technologically and economically

feasible design alternatives for this design at the time the subject infant

carrier was manufactured.”

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 20 of 34
21

Whitman performed two tests using three different CRSs, an exemplar of the

CRS at issue in this case, an Evenflo Cozy Carry, and a CRS manufactured by Graco,

and three different children. Whitman Depo., at 111-115. Based on these tests,

Whitman concluded that a 31⁄2 inch slot along with a shorter crotch strap would have

prevented the death of Master Thomas. Whitman Deposition, at 109.

In his first set of tests performed on June 12, 2003, Whitman placed an

eighteen pound child into the exemplar “On-My-Way” CRS and:

A. . . . unlatched one latch plate and detached that and found that with

the harness snug that the leg could be moved from one side of the crotch

strap to the other.

* * *

Q. And what were you able to determine from that?

A. That we were able to take the child’s leg and pull it up far enough

that it could move from one side of the crotch strap to the other.

Q. You actually manipulated the child’s leg?

A. That’s correct. The child didn’t voluntarily do that.

Whitman Deposition, at 111-12, 116-17.

Whitman did not take any pictures or videotape this aspect of his tests:

Q. Do you have any pictures of it where you actually disengaged it

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 21 of 34
22

and tried to maneuver the child’s leg over to the other side?

A. No, I don’t think I took any shots as I attempted to move the leg.

Q. Why not? It seems to me that’s the heart of the test, isn’t it.

A. I agree that probably would have been a good shot to shoot.

Whitman Deposition, at 122.

Whitman relied upon his own subjective beliefsin forming his opinion that the

tests demonstrated how the allegedly defective crotch strap allowed the decedent to

be asphyxiated:

Q. All right. To be clear on the On My Way test, with all of the

buckles engaged in the latch plate, you were unable to maneuver this

child’s leg over to one side of the crotch strap?

A. That’s correct.

Q. But with one of the latch plate - - excuse me, one of the shoulder

straps disengaged from the latch plate, you were able to take the child’s

leg and somehow maneuver it over to the side?

A. I maneuvered it to approximately where the crotch strap was to

satisfy myself that the child could do it. I didn’t go any further than

that because I did not want to create discomfort for the child.

Q. I don’t follow what you said.

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 22 of 34
23

A. I took one of the knees and brought it up towards the child’s chest.

Q. Bent the knee?

A. And bent the hip and was able to bring the leg up far enough that

the leg would be behind the crotch strap, which at that point it was

obvious the child would then move it to the other side of the crotch

strap.

Q. But all of this is with your assistance?

A. It is . . .

Whitman Deposition, at 124-25. (Emphasis added).

The Plaintiffs insist that this test could easily be reproduced because “[a]s part

of Whitman’s fit check methodology, and as performed in countless fit checks

Whitman has completed over the past twenty years, he carefully documented the size

of the child surrogates, the make and models of infant seats used, took photographs

of the fit study, and documented his observations.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 30. However,

all of the documentation to the first fit study is contained in Exhibits 15 and 16 to Mr.

Whitman’s deposition. As previously noted, the most crucial parts of the first fit

study were not fully documented. In these exhibits there are no pictures or videos of

the moving of the legs. Also, there are no measurements of same either in degrees,

or lengths, or otherwise. With the information provided by Plaintiff, it is impossible

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 23 of 34
24

to tell exactly (to within reasonable measurements) how the child’s leg was moved.

Whitman admitted during deposition that the purpose of his testing on the

exemplar “On-My-Way” CRS and the two other restraint systems was to satisfy his

own subjective belief that the crotch strap was too long and contributed to Master

Thomas’s death. Whitman Deposition, at 134 [“it was done to convince me that it

could be done by a child . . . And I convinced myself that was the case.”]; Id. at p.

137 [“And in this test, what I was trying to do was convince myself of what could

be done.”] However, Whitman failed to videotape or photograph the manipulation

of the child so that it could be exactly replicated by another expert or even shown to

the jury. Whitman Deposition, at 136, 145-46.

It is undisputed that Whitman never moved both legs to one side of the crotch

strap. Therefore, the test was never “finished”. Whitman assumed the child could,

on his own, continue to move the leg beyond the point where Whitman stopped

manipulating it. There is no objective evidence or test results that any child could do

so. 

The Plaintiff insists that Evenflo should not be able to challenge the fit tests

used in this case because its own engineers have said that they felt none was

necessary in order to reach a decision on defectiveness. However, such an argument

misses the mark. Despite Evenflo’s engineers’ opinion, the Plaintiff’s expert bases

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 24 of 34
25

his opinion on such a fit test. Therefore, criticism of the method of fit test used by

Mr. Whitman is fair game. 

Neither does the Plaintiff hit the mark by arguing that despite the methods used

by its expert, Defendant’s experts have used the same methods. While such an

argument may provide support for the use of fit checks in general, it is the method of

fit check that the Defendant, and ultimately the Court, finds fault with in this case.

There is no evidence that Defendant’s expert manipulated the legs of surrogates as

Mr. Whitman did.

Based on the lack on documentation of the actual movement of the leg in this

case, the court is convinced that statements 4 and 5 should be STRUCK. There is no

evidence that the methods used to arrive at the conclusions have been tested, and it

is clear that they cannot be recreated and therefore further tested. In addition, the

tests do not prove that an event would occur, only that they could occur. To that end

it is unclear what, it anything, the tests actually prove. There is also no evidence of

peer review of the method of fit check used by Mr. Whitman in this case. 

Whitman’s opinion that the distance from the crotch strap to the seat bite

should be shortened conflicts with the American Academy of Pediatrics’

recommendations. Whitman Depo., at 103-108. Where an expert’s opinion conflicts

with an industry standard, is not based on generally accepted methodology, or on any

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 25 of 34
26

methodology that has been subject to peer review, it is not reliable and is due to be

excluded. See e.g. Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 871 (7 Cir. th

2001). 

Statements 4 and 5 will be STRUCK. 

5. Statement 7.

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous

because its design allows the carrier to be positioned such that the

infant is placed in a near upright seated position. Evenflo knew of the

hazard created by placing an infant child in a near upright position but

failed to minimize the potential through proper design. There were

technologically and economically feasible design alternatives for this

design. Other infant carriers have incorporated such features.”

It is undisputed that Whitman tested the On-My-Way design in this case to

determine whether the seat could be propped up by the handle with a child in the seat.

Whitman Depo., at 132-135. Whitman used a weighted dummy of nearly the same

weight as the decedent and placed it into the seat with the handle rotated back past

the second detent. Id. at 59-61, 132-135. 

The Plaintiff cites to no notes, testing protocols, or forces applied during the

test. Once again, there is no citation showing that the theory has been subjected to

peer review and publication, the known or potential rate of error of the particular

scientific technique, and whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific

community. It is impossible to know whether the expert's theory can be tested

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 26 of 34
27

because there is no data regarding the test to allow it to recreated. The Plaintiff,

again, has not responded to this specific argument of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff merely cites the testimony of Defendant’s experts which it

contends is an admission of liability. Statement 7 will be STRUCK.

6. Statement 8.

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous

because it fails to incorporate an on-product warning cautioning the

reader of the hazard created by placing an infant in a near upright

seated position. Evenflo knew of the hazard created by placing an

infant child in a near upright position, but failed to minimize the

potential through proper design and warning.”

The Defendant argues that this opinion is not reliable because Whitman

followed no “generally accepted” methodology in determining that the Evenflo

warnings were defective. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant has mischaracterized

the opinion of Whitman. The Plaintiff contends that Whitman’s opinion is not one

of adequacy of warning, but instead of lack of warning and therefore the methodology

for inadequate warning does not apply. 

The Plaintiff’s argument fails to consider the express wording of the statement

that the carrier is unreasonably dangerous “because it fails to incorporate an onproduct warning cautioning the reader of the hazard created by placing an infant in

a near upright seated position”. This Court sees no distinction between complaining

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 27 of 34
28

of the lack of a warning of a specific danger and complaining of an inadequate

warning of a specific danger. In both cases the Defendant is charged with the same

responsibility in tort for “failure to warn”. Accordingly, it seems fair to hold the

Plaintiff’s expert to the same standard and methodology in both cases. Notably, the

Plaintiff can cite no authority for the proposition that its expert’s opinion should be

treated differently. 

Whitman, in depositions, was asked the following:

Q. Isn’t it fundamental in the warnings community that you want to

give a warning that you think will be read and heeded by the

population in general?

A. Yes, so I would agree that a human factors person, who designs

the detailed warning to make sure it’s the right color and font and

wording that’s going to attract attention and psychologically be

a warning that is effective as possible, would need to be designed

and tested in order to be introduced. I am only saying that such

a warning should be provided. 

Whitman Depo., at 182-183. Whitman acknowledges that certain testing and a certain

methodology would need to be done in this case, which has not been done. The

Plaintiff admits that Whitman is not a human factors expert. Whitman offers no

example of the type of warning that he would propose in this case. Statement 8 will

be STRUCK.

7. Statement 9.

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 28 of 34
29

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous

because its design fails to incorporate an angle indicator on the carrier

to inform the installer when an acceptable reclination angle has been

achieved. Evenflo’s recognition of the need for such an indicator is

demonstrated by the reclination indicator provided on the base.

However, it is reasonable, foreseeable, and in accordance with the

instructions to use the carrier both in and out of the car without the

base. There were technologically and economically feasible design

alternativesforthis design at the time that the subject infant carrier was

manufactured.”

The Plaintiff offers no citation for its assertion that “[t]he use of angle

indicators is already an accepted practice in the industry and angle indicators have

been used on infant seats for more than ten years to provide the necessary information

regarding proper reclination of the infant seat within the vehicle.” Plaintiff’s Brief,

at 43. Whitman could not identify one single CRS manufacturer that places an angle

indicator on both the base and the carrier. Whitman Depo., at 215. Further, there is

no evidence that Whitman has prepared a model of the alternative design, done

testing of the alternative design to show that it is safer or more feasible, or has even

drafted a proposed alternative design. Thus, his opinion amounts to nothing more

than a “bare assertion” and will be STRUCK.

C. Whether the Opinion Assists the Trier of Fact

1. Statements 1 and 2.

Statement 1

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 29 of 34
30

“James Edwin Thomas was in the subject Evenflo On-My Way with its

harness adjusted on his body.”

Statement 2

“The subject On-My-Way with James Thomas in it was placed on the

floor in the bedroom of Mary Brown’s house.”

These statements will assist the trier of fact, but are not normally expert

opinions. However, for the reasons noted above, they will be ALLOWED.

2. Statements 4 and 5.

Statement 4

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous due

to its crotch strap being too long for its intended purpose of restraining

the lower torso of a child of James Thomas’s size. Evenflo knew or

should have known of this defect based on human subject fit studies.

There were technologically and economically feasible design

alternatives for this design at the time that the subject infant carrier was

manufactured.” 

Statement 5

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous due

to its crotch strap being too far forward of the seat back for its intended

purpose of restraining the lower torso of a child of James Thomas’s

size. Evenflo knew or should have known of this defect based on human

subject fit studies. There were technologically and economically

feasible design alternatives for this design at the time the subject infant

carrier was manufactured.”

Even if these statements were notstruck as unreliable, they would be due to be

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 30 of 34
31

struck as not assisting the trier of fact. As noted above, the tests performed were not

performed to completion. To the extent the tests prove anything, they prove not that

an event would occur, only that it could occur. The Court is even unsure if the tests

show that much. Whitman admits he never actually maneuvered a surrogate’s legs

into the proper position. To that end it is unclear what, if anything, the tests actually

prove. These opinions would only serve to confuse the trier of fact and are therefore

due to be STRUCK.

3. Statement 6.

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous due

to its failure to provide a buckle that spring ejects the harness latch

plates when the inserted latchplate is disengaged. Evenflo knew or

should have known of this hazard through hazard analysis and/or a

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. There were technologically and

economically feasible design alternativesfor this design at the time that

the subject infant carrier was manufactured. In fact, other buckles on

the market incorporate the spring eject feature.”

Whitman testified that the buckle at issue complied in all respects with Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 213. Whitman Depo., at 161. He also testified that

the buckle functioned properly when he tested it. Id. at 43. Mary Brown (the

caregiver) testified that, when she placed Master Thomas into the system, she had no

trouble with the buckling system, she engaged the system, it seemed to work properly

for her, and she “heard it [the buckle] click two times like it’s going in the way it’s

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 31 of 34
32

supposed to go.” Brown Depo., at 28, 47-48.

Thus the evidence indicates that the buckle complied with federal safety

standards, functioned properly, and was operated correctly at the time of the accident.

Evidence of a defective design would therefore be irrelevant and only confuse the

jury, not aide it. The Court holds that this opinion would not assist the trier of fact

and therefore will be STRUCK. 

4. Statement 7.

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous

because its design allows the carrier to be positioned such that the

infant is placed in a near upright seated position. Evenflo knew of the

hazard created by placing an infant child in a near upright position but

failed to minimize the potential through proper design. There were

technologically and economically feasible design alternatives for this

design. Other infant carriers have incorporated such features.”

Even if Statement 7 was not already due to be struck, it would be struck

because the dummy used by Whitman in this test was 25 inches long, while Master

Thomas was 28 inches long. Whitman Depo., at 61. The dummy weighed 18 pounds

while Master Thomas weighed 17 pounds. Whitman Depo., at 61. In his deposition,

Whitman admitted that the limit for the subject CRS was 26 inches, which would

have meant that Master Thomas was over the recommended limit. Still, however,

Whitman used a dummy below the limit, and much shorter than Master Thomas, in

his tests. 

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 32 of 34
The Plaintiff’s only response to this argument is that Rule 702 does not require them to 1

place a live child into an admittedly dangerous seat position. See Plaintiff’s Brief, at 38.

33

Because the testing was admittedly done with a dummy of the wrong size and

weight, any results obtained therefrom could not assist the trier of fact. Statement 7

is due to be STRUCK.

1

5. Statement 8.

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous

because it fails to incorporate an on-product warning cautioning the

reader of the hazard created by placing an infant in a near upright

seated position. Evenflo knew of the hazard created by placing an

infant child in a near upright position, but failed to minimize the

potential through proper design and warning.”

Whitman admitted in deposition that he could not say with any degree of

certainty whether the caregiver would have heeded any warnings placed on the CRS

and that he had not done any testing regarding same. Whitman Depo., at 182-183.

Accordingly, any opinions as to whether warnings were needed will not assist the

trier of fact and are due to be STRUCK. 

6. Statement 9.

“The Evenflo On-My-Way is defective and unreasonably dangerous

because its design fails to incorporate an angle indicator on the carrier

to inform the installer when an acceptable reclination angle has been

achieved. Evenflo’s recognition of the need for such an indicator is

demonstrated by the reclination indicator provided on the base.

However, it is reasonable, foreseeable, and in accordance with the

instructions to use the carrier both in and out of the car without the

Case 2:02-cv-02001-VEH Document 113 Filed 08/11/05 Page 33 of 34
34

base. There were technologically and economically feasible design

alternatives forthis design at the time that the subject infant carrier was

manufactured.”

This statement will not assist the trier of fact. Whitman has made nothing more

than bare assertions regarding the angle indicator, with no showing that an angle

indicator on the seat would be a safer design, or would have prevented the accident.

Accordingly, this statement is due to be STRUCK.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, statements 3-9 of Whitman’s Rule 26 expert

report will be STRUCK. Gary Whitman shall be PRECLUDED from rendering

these opinions, or any statements based on these opinions. 

DONE, this 11 day of August, 2005. th

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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