Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-05251/USCOURTS-caDC-22-05251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 2024 Decided October 18, 2024

No. 22-5251

MICHAEL S. OWLFEATHER-GORBEY, A/K/A TSUNAMI KHAN,

APPELLANT

v.

AVERY, CAPT, USP THOMPSON, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:22-cv-02193)

Sonia Geba, Student Counsel, argued the cause as amicus 

curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs were 

Erica Hashimoto, Director, and Eva Shell, Supervisory 

Attorney, both appointed by the court, and Alexis R. Casanas, 

Student Counsel.

Michael S. Owlfeather-Gorbey, pro se, was on the briefs 

for appellant.

Douglas C. Dreier, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Brian P. 

Hudak and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Kartik N. 

Venguswamy, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 1 of 25
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Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WILKINS and WALKER, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge WALKER.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge:

This is another suit brought by Michael Gorbey who is 

currently serving a twenty-two year sentence in federal prison. 

Gorbey v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 3d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2014). 

Following his sentencing in 2008, Mr. Gorbey quickly

distinguished himself as “a prolific litigator, filing scores of 

suits across the country.” Pinson v. Dep’t of Just., 964 F.3d 65, 

72 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Pinson II”); see also Gorbey, 55 F. Supp.

3d at 101. The allegations in this suit, like many of his others, 

relate to Mr. Gorbey’s dissatisfaction with the conditions in a

prison where he is incarcerated.

As a general rule, litigation is not cheap. But for a short 

time, Mr. Gorbey, as a federal prisoner, was able to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) and file his claims without paying the 

full filing costs up front under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Mr. Gorbey’s days of 

paying for filings in installments ended after three of his cases 

were dismissed as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] fail[ure] to 

state a claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Now, Mr. Gorbey must 

pay his filing fees in full before bringing any case in federal 

court unless he can show that he “is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“the threestrikes exemption”). Here, we consider another one of Mr. 

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Gorbey’s attempts to proceed IFP under the three-strikes 

exemption.

Before the District Court, and before us too, Mr. Gorbey 

alleges that he is under imminent danger of serious physical 

injury because prison officials have both repeatedly denied him 

necessary medical treatments for his worsening glaucoma that 

threatens blindness and instructed other prisoners to physically 

assault him. The District Court rejected Mr. Gorbey’s 

allegations that he is under an imminent danger of serious 

physical injury, denied his motion to proceed IFP, and 

dismissed his case without prejudice. 

We disagree with the District Court that Mr. Gorbey’s 

worsening glaucoma has not placed him under an imminent 

danger of serious physical injury. Therefore, we grant Mr. 

Gorbey’s motion to proceed IFP here, and reverse the District 

Court’s denial of Mr. Gorbey’s motion to proceed IFP so that 

his complaint may be docketed. 

But we also recognize that Mr. Gorbey’s complaint 

includes frivolous allegations against the United States 

Attorney General, the Director of the Administrative Office of 

Federal Courts, and the United States Senate Judiciary 

Committee Members. And because the PLRA mandates 

immediate dismissal of claims that are “frivolous,” we dismiss 

the claims against the aforementioned defendants. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1).

I.

A.

The District Court rejected Mr. Gorbey’s motion to 

proceed IFP without hearing from the government. Mr. 

Gorbey then appealed, and we ordered him to show cause 

regarding the nonpayment of his filing fee. Given the short 

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time frame between the District Court’s dismissal, Mr. 

Gorbey’s appeal, and our order to show cause, the allegations 

in all of Mr. Gorbey’s filings are consistent. Thus, we look to 

the allegations in both, Mr. Gorbey’s complaint and in his 

response to the order to show cause, when evaluating his 

motion to proceed IFP before our Court and whether the 

District Court erred in denying his motion to proceed IFP. 

Mr. Gorbey alleges that soon after he was transferred to 

USP Thompson, in April 2022, prison officials were aware of 

his litigious past and that he was at risk of losing his eyesight 

because of rapidly worsening glaucoma. Mr. Gorbey’s 

glaucoma, and the risks that it poses to his physical health, are 

well-supported through multiple exhibits that he includes in the 

record. See J.A. 70–84. In fact, one doctor feared that Mr. 

Gorbey “is at high risk for developing a condition known as 

‘Snuff-out’ syndrome,” which makes eye surgery a serious risk 

as it could “accelerat[e] the eventual outcome of blindness.” 

J.A. 72. Given the state of his glaucoma, Mr. Gorbey believes 

that he now needs medical marijuana. J.A. 75.

Generally, Mr. Gorbey alleges that USP Thompson prison 

officials began to target him because they were aware of his 

litigious past. And one way that USP Thompson officials 

targeted him was to deny “his prescribed glaucoma” medicine. 

J.A. 10. These denials, which Mr. Gorbey alleges began the 

moment he arrived at USP Thompson, were consistent with an 

alleged threat made by Captain Avery who visited Mr. 

Gorbey’s cell to specifically notify him that he was “in for a 

ride” because of his past lawsuits. J.A. 11. 

In response to these early incidents (Captain Avery’s 

threats and general denials of needed glaucoma treatments), 

Mr. Gorbey filed an informal complaint. J.A. 11. This 

informal complaint only made things worse. Mr. Gorbey 

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alleges that, after he filed the complaint, he was again 

threatened by another prison official. J.A. 11.

Mr. Gorbey further alleges, in great detail, that USP 

Thompson officials intentionally contributed to his worsening 

glaucoma as a form of retaliation. He specifically alleges that 

USP Thompson officials “continuously” failed to refill his 

medicine, J.A. 41, 116–17, on one occasion, contaminated his 

eye drops with pepper spray, J.A. 14, and generally did not

allow him to see an ophthalmologist even though prison 

officials were well-aware of his rapidly worsening condition, 

J.A. 40. Mr. Gorbey further alleges that when USP Thompson 

officials finally scheduled an ophthalmologist appointment, on 

September 1, 2022, he was actually sent to an optometrist. J.A. 

40–41, 124. At this ophthalmologist-turned-optometrist visit, 

Mr. Gorbey asserts that he received only electronic eye scans, 

which were inadequate given the rapidly worsening state of his 

glaucoma.

Mr. Gorbey’s filings also include allegations that USP 

Thompson officials compounded his medical problems by 

responding violently to his complaints that he needed better 

treatments. Specifically, Mr. Gorbey alleges that prison 

officials instructed a few of USP Thompson’s most violent 

inmates to attack him, and guaranteed that such attacks would 

occur by housing him with the prisoners who were most likely 

to heed the guard’s instructions to harm. See generally J.A. 

14–16, 35, 37–39, 58. After those inmates attacked and 

seriously injured him, Mr. Gorbey asserts that prison officials 

failed to adequately tend to these injuries. See generally J.A. 

17–18, 43–45, 64, 114, 123–24, 128.

Although the District Court rejected Mr. Gorbey’s motion 

without hearing from the government, we ordered the 

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government to reply to the allegations that Mr. Gorbey 

provided in his response to our order to show cause. 

While the government acknowledges that Mr. Gorbey is at 

serious risk of acquiring blindness, it contends that Mr. Gorbey 

does not qualify under the three-strikes exemption because his

worsening glaucoma is not related to his suit that arises under 

Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act. That is because, in the

government’s view, the only treatment that Mr. Gorbey will 

accept is medical marijuana. In support of this argument, the 

government provides three offerings: (1) Mr. Gorbey’s filings;

(2) an affidavit filed by Timothy Moisant, the Heath Services 

Administrator at USP Thompson, who avers that Mr. Gorbey 

has twice rejected eye surgery, J.A. 104; and (3) a court 

decision from almost five years ago that noted that Mr. Gorbey 

declined “the surgical procedure that a glaucoma specialist 

[had] determined [was] necessary to prevent the disease from 

causing him to lose his eyesight.” See Gorbey v. Mubarek, No. 

RDB-19-220, 2019 WL 5593284 at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2019). 

The government also disputes Mr. Gorbey’s allegation that 

he has not seen an ophthalmologist since his transfer to USP 

Thompson; Mr. Moisant avers that Mr. Gorbey’s September 1, 

2022, appointment was “an external ophthalmology consult, 

which included detailed testing, imaging, and scans of his eyes, 

updates to his diagnosis, and a review of his medications.” J.A. 

103.

Additionally, the government contends that Mr. Gorbey’s 

allegations that USP Thompson officials coordinated 

retaliatory prison assaults are insufficient to demonstrate an 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. Broadly, the 

government argues that only three of the alleged assaults are 

relevant—and as a matter of law, three assaults do not place a 

prisoner under an imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

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More narrowly, the government argues that the two inmates 

who are alleged to have assaulted Mr. Gorbey do not pose an 

imminent threat of serious physical injury. That is because, at 

the time his appeal was noticed, Mr. Gorbey was no longer 

forced to live with either alleged assailant. And as to

specifically one of the alleged assailants, the government 

argues that the past assaults did not result in “fractures, [] 

injuries to the soft tissues, [] no[r] damage to his sinuses or 

other structures,” therefore, Mr. Gorbey cannot show a serious 

physical injury. Government Br. at 41. The government does 

not respond to Mr. Gorbey’s allegation that prison officials 

coordinated these attacks.

B.

In the 1990s, Congress “established new standards for []

grant[ing] IFP status to prisoners, as opposed to other litigants” 

in response to floods of “meritless” lawsuits filed by federal 

prisoners proceeding IFP. See Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 

145 F.3d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1998). A few of the PLRA’s 

unique standards are relevant here. 

First, unlike other indigent persons whose filings are free, 

the PLRA requires indigent federal prisoners “to pay the full 

amount of [the] filing fees” in installments. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1)–(2). Second, under the PLRA, IFP status is 

limited to prisoners who have not had three “or more 

. . . action[s] or appeal[s] . . . dismissed . . . [as] frivolous, 

malicious, or [for] fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). After the third 

frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim dismissal, a 

prisoner must pay the full filing fee to proceed with a civil 

action or appeal, even if they are indigent. Id. In other words, 

after a prisoner receives the proverbial “third strike,” all future 

filing fees become payable in full upfront, else the civil action 

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or appeal be dismissed. See Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 

85–86 (2016). The PLRA includes an exception: an indigent 

prisoner with three strikes may nonetheless proceed IFP if “the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Finally, the PLRA makes clear that courts should not

entertain meritless actions “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or 

any portion thereof, that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). Courts “shall dismiss the case at any time if the 

court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue; or the 

action or appeal is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

II.

The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and its dismissal of Mr. Gorbey’s complaint 

and request to proceed IFP was a final judgment. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District 

Court’s dismissal de novo. Ladeairous v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 

1172, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

We use “traditional standards applicable to pleadings by 

pro se prisoners” when evaluating allegations used to establish 

an imminent danger of serious physical injury. Mitchell v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The

“factual allegations” must be “sufficiently specific for us to 

infer” the “actual existence” of an imminent threat, id., “both 

at the time [the prisoner] file[s] their lawsuit and at the time 

they notice their appeal,” Pinson II, 964 F.3d at 69. 

Additionally, the movant’s filings must “demonstrate a nexus 

between the harms [] allege[d] and the claims [brought].” Id. 

at 71. 

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Before we can evaluate Mr. Gorbey’s allegations of 

imminent danger of serious physical injury, we must resolve 

two issues that relate to the nature of our review.

The first issue is clear from the briefing: the government 

argues that we can consider information that rebuts the 

prisoner’s allegations of imminent danger, but the courtappointed Amicus in support of Mr. Gorbey’s motion disagrees. 

In Amicus’s view, Section 1915(g) does not permit an 

adversarial evidentiary inquiry, in part, because appellate 

courts are ill-equipped to resolve the inevitable evidentiary 

disputes that would result from the government’s rule.

We agree with the government. Even prior to the passage 

of the PLRA, Section 1915 was “designed largely to discourage 

the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, 

baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate 

because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat 

of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 11.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 

(1989). Accordingly, the statute grants courts “the unusual 

power to pierce the veil of [a] complaint’s factual allegations.” 

Id. And where the veil is pierced, we must reject “factual 

contentions [that] are clearly baseless.” Id. Though Amicus

correctly notes that courts of appeal usually do not resolve 

factual disputes, we have already explained that “Congress can, 

and in the PLRA did, assign atypical roles to courts in 

particular circumstances.” Pinson II, 964 F.3d at 70. Since this 

atypical role allows us to consider the movant’s “imminentdanger allegations newly offered on appeal,” it follows that we 

may also consider the government’s rebuttals, or simply take 

judicial notice of relevant facts. Id. Indeed, it would be odd to 

order the government to respond to Mr. Gorbey’s allegations, 

only to ignore the government’s rebuttals—especially those 

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that may tend to show that Mr. Gorbey’s assertions are “clearly 

baseless.” 

That said, judicial notice is not a one-way street. In this 

case, the government urges us to look to past cases dismissing 

Mr. Gorbey’s IFP motions alleging similar facts. Fair enough. 

But that also means we can take judicial notice of government 

reports about the state of USP Thompson in 2022, when Mr. 

Gorbey alleges that USP Thompson officials placed him in 

imminent danger by denying him necessary medical treatment. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Fed. R. Evid. 803(8); see also 

Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (taking 

judicial notice of a government report).

In one such report, the Bureau of Prisons “acknowledged 

significant concerns with the institutional culture at USP 

Thompson and a lack of compliance with its own policies.” 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ BEFORE THE U.S.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: EXAMINING AND 

PREVENTING DEATHS OF INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS IN 

FEDERAL PRISONS (2024) at *3, https://perma.cc/P9AWWDC5. Further, in June 2022, a period where Mr. Gorbey 

alleges that he was denied needed medical treatments, USP 

Thompson “had not had an on-site full time Staff Physician for 

over a year and nearly half of its 12 nursing positions were 

vacant ... this led to longer wait times for inmates to receive 

medical attention.” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,

EVALUATION OF ISSUES SURROUNDING INMATE DEATHS IN 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS INSTITUTIONS (2024) at *66, 

https://perma.cc/YST4-AEVR. In sum, notwithstanding Mr. 

Gorbey’s past frivolous lawsuits and the past court rulings that 

he was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury, these 

government reports lend credence to his allegations regarding 

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USP Thompson’s failure to provide necessary medical 

treatment for his glaucoma as of August 2022.

The second issue as to the nature of our review flies under 

the radar and was not briefed: When was Mr. Gorbey’s appeal 

noticed? Though both parties advance arguments under our 

well-established rule that “the conditions prisoners faced at the 

time of noticing their appeals determine their eligibility to 

proceed,” Pinson II, 964 F.3d at 69, the parties use different 

dates when making these arguments. The government’s brief 

frames its case using September 20, 2022, as the relevant date

because that is when we docketed the case, Government Br. at 

13; however, Amicus states that August 30, 2022, is the 

relevant date because that is when Mr. Gorbey dated his filings 

and, we can infer, the date that Mr. Gorbey asked prison 

officials to send his filings to this Court, Amicus Reply at 20. 

The date that Mr. Gorbey’s appeal was noticed is critical 

to our disposition here because there is a factual dispute as to 

whether Mr. Gorbey ever saw an ophthalmologist. The 

government does not dispute that, as of August 30, 2022, Mr. 

Gorbey had not seen an ophthalmologist in eighteen months. 

J.A. 40–41, 116–17. But Mr. Moisant’s affidavit states that Mr. 

Gorbey “had an external ophthalmology consult, which 

included detailed testing, imaging, and scans of his eyes, 

updates to his diagnosis, and a review of his medications” on 

September 1, 2022—two days after Mr. Gorbey presumably 

left his filings with USP Thompson officials, but nineteen days 

before we docketed his appeal. J.A. 103. Because Mr. 

Moisant’s affidavit is reasonably detailed and specific it is 

entitled the “presumption of regularity,” under which “courts 

presume” that public officers have “properly discharged their 

official duties” unless there is “clear evidence to the contrary.” 

United States v. Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926). 

Still, Mr. Gorbey asks us to accept his assertion that this 

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September 1, 2022, consult took place with an optometrist—

not an ophthalmologist. J.A. 40–41.

Luckily, we need not determine whose assertion carries the 

day. That is because, as the parties recognize, post-filing 

developments exceed the scope of our Section 1915(g) inquiry

with respect to whether Mr. Gorbey must pay the full filing fee 

to bring his complaint and notice his appeal. Pinson v. 

Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Pinson I). And it is 

well-established that we determine the date of a pro se

prisoner’s filings under the mailbox rule. See Anyanwutaku v. 

Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under the 

mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s appeal is noticed on the day 

that the prisoner delivers their papers to prison authorities for 

forwarding to the court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 

(1988). Applying that rule here, Mr. Gorbey’s appeal was 

noticed on August 30, 2022, thus all post-August 30, 2022, 

developments exceed the scope of our inquiry. See Pinson I, 

761 F.3d at 5. (As discussed further below, we have no need 

to decide, and express no views on, whether the court can 

revoke the IFP status of a prisoner and order him to pay any 

subsequent fees or costs based on post-filing developments that 

show he is no longer in imminent danger of serious physical 

injury.)

It makes good sense to apply the mailbox rule in this 

context. As Houston v. Lack explained, the mailbox rule 

applies to a pro se prisoner’s filing date because they “cannot 

take the steps other litigants can take to monitor the processing 

of their notices of appeal and to ensure that the court clerk 

receives and stamps their notices of appeal.” 487 U.S. at 270–

71. Nor do they have “lawyers who can take [the necessary] 

precautions for them.” Id. at 271. Indeed, pro se prisoner 

litigants sit in a uniquely vulnerable position, left with “no 

choice but to entrust the forwarding of [their] notice of appeal 

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to prison authorities whom [they] cannot control or supervise 

and who may have every incentive to delay.” Id.

This concern could not be more applicable to pro se

prisoner litigants who are “[u]nskilled in law, unaided by 

counsel, and unable to leave prison,” and seek to proceed IFP 

under the three-strikes exemption. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. 

It is also consistent with how we have already construed the 

three-strike exemption’s text—“the statute’s temporal 

reference point [is] the initial act of bringing a lawsuit.” Pinson

I, 761 F.3d at 5. For all intents and purposes, pro se prisoners 

bring their lawsuit when they “lose control over and contact 

with their notices” by delivering their papers to “prison 

authorities.” Houston, 487 U.S. at 275. And if ever there were 

a dispute as to when a pro se prisoner leaves their papers with 

prison authorities, prisons “have well-developed procedures 

for recording the date and time at which they receive papers for 

mailing and [] can readily dispute a prisoner’s assertions that 

he delivered the paper on a different date.” Id.

Having resolved the relevant issues bound up in our 

standard of review, we now turn to Mr. Gorbey’s arguments 

that he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

A.

We start with Mr. Gorbey’s argument that his worsening 

glaucoma places him under an imminent danger of serious 

physical injury. As to the sufficiency of Mr. Gorbey’s filings, 

we find no reason to disregard the parties’ agreement that Mr. 

Gorbey includes sufficiently specific facts allowing for an 

inference that he is at serious risk of losing his eyesight—a 

serious physical injury. We instead focus on the parties’

disagreement: Does Mr. Gorbey demonstrate a nexus between 

the harms alleged in his filings and the claims that he brings? 

Pinson II, 964 F.3d at 71. And on this question, the parties 

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disagree on both the law (what is the right standard?) and the 

facts (are the allegations in Mr. Gorbey’s filings sufficient?).

In Pinson II, we explained that the three-strikes exemption 

effectuates the PLRA’s goal “to filter out the bad claims and 

facilitate consideration of the good . . . by imposing more 

onerous burdens on prisoner-litigants that have thrice been 

bounced from court.” 964 F.3d at 71. This provision, Pinson

II continued, “is designed to provide a safety valve for the three 

strikes rule, permitting an indigent three-strikes prisoner to 

proceed IFP in order to obtain a judicial remedy for an 

imminent danger.” Id. (quoting Pettus v. Morgentahu, 554 

F.3d 293, 297 (2d. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up)) (emphasis in 

original). Accordingly, we held that “prisoners must 

demonstrate a nexus between the harms they allege and the 

claims they bring.” Id. Pinson II did not, however, articulate 

the standard that prisoner-litigants must meet to demonstrate 

the nexus between their alleged harms and claims brought. 

Since Pinson II, the circuits have split on the nexus test. 

Compare Pettus, 554 F.3d at 297 with Hall v. United States, 44 

F.4th 218, 231 (4th Cir. 2022). The government asks us to 

adopt the Second Circuit’s test that mimics “ordinary standing 

rules,” i.e., the prisoner-litigant’s complaint must “seek to 

redress an imminent danger of serious physical injury and that 

this danger must be fairly traceable to a violation of law alleged 

in the complaint.” Pettus, 554 F.3d at 297. Amicus counters 

that the Fourth Circuit’s approach—requiring traceability, but 

not redressability—is the better test. See Hall, 44 F.4th at 231–

32. We need not weigh in on the split because Mr. Gorbey’s 

allegations regarding his worsening glaucoma satisfy both 

standards. 

Under the Fourth Circuit’s traceability-only test, Mr. 

Gorbey easily wins: his worsening glaucoma is fairly traceable 

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to the unrebutted allegation that he has not seen an 

ophthalmologist while at USP Thompson. Tellingly, the 

government did not offer a counterargument to Mr. Gorbey’s 

contention that his allegations meet this test.

Under the Second Circuit’s redressability standard, the 

government’s briefing fails to respond to the crux of Mr. 

Gorbey’s position: USP Thompson officials have not allowed 

him to visit an ophthalmologist even though they are wellaware of his rapidly worsening glaucoma. Instead, the 

government’s primary argument focuses solely on Mr. 

Gorbey’s requests to use medical marijuana to treat his 

worsening glaucoma. Of course, we have no authority to grant 

such relief. And if this were all Mr. Gorbey requested, the 

government would prevail. But that is not all Mr. Gorbey 

seeks, in fact, his requests to see an ophthalmologist are just as 

clear as his request for medical marijuana.1

 The government’s 

decision to ignore this argument is quite curious.

At best, the government argues that Mr. Gorbey “does not 

want any of the other treatment he would be offered or that he 

would receive.” Government Br. at 38. And for support, the 

government directs us to Mr. Moisant’s declaration, that states 

Mr. Gorbey has twice rejected eye surgery, J.A. 104, as well as 

a 2019 court decision from the United States District Court of 

1 The dissent mischaracterizes Mr. Gorbey’s statement that he is in 

imminent danger of blindness from glaucoma due to his lack of 

marijuana alone. Dissenting Op. at 1. Instead, Mr. Gorbey contends 

that the lack of treatment he has had has caused his glaucoma to 

progress. Motion to Stay at 11 (Sept. 15, 2023). Additionally, Mr. 

Gorbey has stated that he was denied glaucoma medication and 

access to ophthalmological care. J.A. 10; J.A. 41.

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Maryland that discusses Mr. Gorbey’s refusal to receive eye 

surgery, Gorbey, 2019 WL 5593284 at * 5. 

This response stretches the redressability requirement too 

far: the question is whether the prisoner can “obtain a judicial 

remedy,” not whether the prisoner will hypothetically accept 

the relief to which they are entitled. Pettus, 554 F.3d at 297. 

And the government does not dispute that Mr. Gorbey can

obtain an injunction that allows him to visit with an 

ophthalmologist. Whether Mr. Gorbey will accept an

ophthalmologist’s recommendation(s) in the future is not our 

business. By the same token, the fact that he was 

uncomfortable with a surgery five years ago is similarly 

irrelevant.2

 What matters is, as of the date he noticed his appeal 

(and filed his complaint), Mr. Gorbey adequately alleges that 

his worsening glaucoma places him under an imminent danger 

of physical injury, and USP Thompson officials have not 

allowed him to visit an ophthalmologist. 

All agree that visiting with an ophthalmologist is a 

legitimate request given the worsening state of Mr. Gorbey’s 

glaucoma. Therefore, his request establishes the necessary 

nexus to the claims brought, and he is entitled to proceed IFP 

under the three-strikes exemption. Accordingly, we need not 

consider his arguments as to repeated prison assaults. See, e.g., 

Ibrahim v. Dist. of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(granting motion to proceed IFP based on one of two 

allegations of imminent physical injury); see also Chavis v. 

Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Nothing in the 

text of § 1915 provides any justification for dividing an action 

2 It is not our place, particularly at the threshold stage of deciding IFP 

status, to opine or make factual findings on what future treatments 

Mr. Gorbey will accept, contrary to the dissent’s belief that 

“marijuana [is the] ‘only’ remedy he will accept.” Dissenting Op. at 

2.

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 16 of 25
17

into individual claims and requiring a filing fee for those that 

do not relate to imminent danger.”).

B.

Even though we hold that Mr. Gorbey demonstrates an 

imminent danger of serious physical injury, and therefore can 

proceed IFP under the three-strikes exemption, our inquiry is 

not complete. The PLRA contemplates dismissal of “any 

portion of the complaint” that “is frivolous” as part of the 

screening function. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); see also

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). And 

just as we are attuned to Mr. Gorbey’s allegations that the 

continued denials of medical treatment for his worsening 

glaucoma place him under an imminent threat of serious 

physical injury, we recognize that Mr. Gorbey’s complaint 

includes far-fetched allegations that must be forcefully 

rejected.

Specifically, Mr. Gorbey alleges that federal judges, the 

Senate Judiciary Committee, and the President and Vice 

President are all in cahoots to prevent him from filing lawsuits. 

One judge, Mr. Gorbey’s filings state, rejected his motion to 

proceed IFP under the three-strikes exception and, in so doing, 

insinuated that he has no access to court, ever. J.A. 16. Mr. 

Gorbey describes two other courts, that also denied his IFP 

motions, as “hostile” “clown houses posing as court houses.” 

J.A. 20. And while “Cho-mo-Joe Biden” and “C. Harris 

President and Vice President from stolen elections” are not 

listed as defendants, Mr. Gorbey alleges that they are also in on 

the plot. J.A. 21. 

These allegations are clearly frivolous. Therefore, we 

dismiss Mr. Gorbey’s claims against the United States 

Attorney General, the Director of the Administrative Office of 

Federal Courts, and the United States Senate Judiciary 

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 17 of 25
18

Committee. Mr. Gorbey’s allegations of their concerted effort 

to abridge his right to access federal courts are “clearly 

baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

III.

In closing, we want to make the limitations of our holding 

clear. Mr. Gorbey is entitled to “bring a civil action or appeal 

a judgment” IFP because he “is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis 

added). This action is limited to the claims against Captain 

Avery and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In 

most plain terms, this means that Mr. Gorbey’s complaint will 

be docketed, and he can pay his filing costs in installments. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b).

But we express no views on whether proceeding IFP under 

the three strikes exemption can be revoked if circumstances 

change as the prisoner maintains their action. Section 

1915(g)’s text and our holdings make clear that an indigent

prisoner who is in imminent danger at the time of filing may 

bring their action or appeal and pay the filing fee in 

installments. Pinson I, 761 F.3d at 5 (Section 1915(g) is “a 

mere screening device” to determine whether the prisoner is 

under imminent danger “when he brings his action.”) (cleaned 

up). However, the granting of IFP status confers additional

benefits after the prisoner makes his initial installment payment 

towards the filing fee, including appointment of counsel at the 

court’s discretion and the printing of the record, printing of 

transcripts, and service of process at government expense. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)–(d); see also Rowland v. Cal. Men’s 

Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 198 (1993).

Therefore, we leave open an important question that the 

government raised in its briefing: Are courts free to revoke IFP 

status, initially granted on being placed under an imminent 

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 18 of 25
19

threat of serious physical injury, if circumstances change? See 

Government Br. at 27–28. Asked differently, does Section 

1915(g) cover the entire proceeding based on the initial 

imminent danger finding or does it simply ensure that the 

prisoner who is under an imminent danger is not blocked at the 

courthouse’s doors? Our circuit case law does not provide a 

clear answer. 

On one hand, we have recognized that courts have 

“discretionary authority to deny IFP status to prisoners” under 

the PLRA and “our more general supervisory authority to 

manage our docket so as to promote the interests of justice.” 

Butler v. Dep’t of Just., 492 F.3d 440, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

And, as a matter of procedure, district courts in our circuit and 

elsewhere have consistently revoked previously granted IFP

status upon learning new information about the financial status 

of the parties as the case unfolds. See Matthews v. Fed. Bureau 

of Investigation, 251 F. Supp. 3d 257, 264 (D.D.C. 2017) 

(collecting cases); Cf. Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 

939 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (revoking a previous motion granting IFP 

after a change in financial circumstances in the non-prisoner 

context). 

On the other hand, we have recognized that the threestrikes exemption plays an important role in easing “any 

constitutional tension that might result from denying access to 

the courts to prisoners facing life-threatening conditions.” 

Mitchell, 587 F.3d at 420. In some cases, revoking IFP status 

could result in the dismissal of a case brought to vindicate a 

fundamental constitutional right; in such a case, there would be 

a question whether the dismissal unconstitutionally restricts the 

indigent prisoner’s right to access the courts. See Thomas v. 

Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Tatel, J., 

concurring).

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 19 of 25
20

We have no reason to answer this complicated question 

here as Mr. Gorbey’s IFP status was never revoked. We simply 

recognize that the issue may need to be addressed in the future 

and provide notice to the parties of a few difficult questions 

that ought to be considered.

So ordered.

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 20 of 25
WALKER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part: 

Michael Gorbey is a federal prisoner. The government

provides him with extensive medical care.1 In the past, it has 

also offered Gorbey additional care that he refused.2

Gorbey has filed “scores” of lawsuits from prison.

3

 His 

“abusive litigating methods display a complete disregard for 

court decorum” and a “commitment to frivolously filing 

cases.”4 Because of that history, Gorbey must pay the court’s 

full filing costs up front, unless he “is under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury.”

5

 The district court decided that

Gorbey does not qualify for that “imminent danger” exception. 

On appeal, Gorbey alleges that he is in “imminent danger”

of blindness from glaucoma because his prison won’t let him 

smoke marijuana.6 Before his incarceration, he “smoke[d]

1 See JA 107 (“Between May 9 and December 8, 2022, Gorbey’s 

electronic medical records show no less than 20 discrete clinical 

encounters, which show regular treatment for glaucoma” and other 

ailments.).

2 See Gorbey v. Mubarek, No. 19-220, 2019 WL 5593284, at *3-5

(D. Md. Oct. 30, 2019); see also JA 72 (Gorbey’s doctor: “I fear that 

Inmate Gorbey’s past actions regarding his eye care have profoundly 

contributed to this poor prognosis.”).

3 See Pinson v. United States Department of Justice, 964 F.3d 65, 72 

(D.C. Cir. 2020).

4 Gorbey v. United States, No. 22-50330, 2022 WL 22298309, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2022). 

5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Pinson, 964 F.3d at 72. 

6 See Pinson, 964 F.3d at 71 (Because “an indigent prisoner with a 

history of filing frivolous complaints could, by merely alleging an 

imminent danger, file an unlimited number of lawsuits, paying no 

filing fee,” prisoners must show “a nexus between the harms they 

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 21 of 25
2

marijuana all his life.”7 During that time, according to Gorbey,

“his eyes became dependent on marijuana.”

8

 

In his filings, Gorbey repeatedly and emphatically 

attributes his declining eyesight to the interruption of his 

marijuana habit, while insisting that the government must 

provide him with marijuana — the “only” remedy he will 

accept:

9

 

• Gorbey wrote on his medical records that he “need[s]

medical marijuana” because surgery “fail[ed]” and 

“pills & eye drops” have “not help[ed].”10 

• Gorbey says “now only medical marijuana is safe & 

effective for Gorbey to use while eye drops & pills 

don’t help him & only cause other” medical 

problems.11

• Gorbey says when he was “deprived of marijuana it 

(caused) him to develop glaucoma.”12

• Gorbey says the “progressing extensive damages to 

both of [his] eyes” are “due to denials of marijuana.”13

allege and the claims they bring” to proceed in forma pauperis under 

the imminent danger exception. (cleaned up)).

7 Motion to Stay at 12 (Sept. 15, 2023).

8

Id.

9

Id. at 11. 

10 Response to Show Cause Order at 43 (Dec. 13, 2022) (emphasis in 

original). 

11 Motion to Stay at 11 (Sept. 15, 2023) (emphasis added). 

12 Id. at 12 (parenthetical in original) (emphasis added). 

13 Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 22 of 25
3

• Gorbey says that when he was “deprived of 

marijuana . . . he develope[d] glaucoma as a result.”14

• Gorbey argues he satisfies the imminent danger 

exception because of his “advancing glaucoma & 

[his] single personal medical (need) for marijuana!”15

• Gorbey repeatedly writes “because I’m den[ied] 

marijuana” on medical records showing his worsening 

glaucoma.16

• Gorbey describes himself as “not a good surgical 

candidate” and self prescribes a “need [for] medical 

marijuana.”17

Those claims are frivolous. Medical professionals say that 

marijuana is not an effective treatment for glaucoma.

18 Plus,

“we have no authority to grant such relief.”19 So Gorbey has 

not shown the required “nexus between the harms [he] allege[s]

14 Appellant Br. at 3 (Sept. 26, 2023) (emphasis added).

15 Id. at 11 (parenthetical in original) (emphasis added).

16 Gorbey Pro Se Appendix at 1, 2, 5 (Sept. 27, 2023) (emphasis 

added).

17 Gorbey Pro Se 28j Letter at 1 (June 3, 2024) (first emphasis in 

original, second emphasis added). 

18 See David Turbert & Dan Gudgel, Does Marijuana Help Treat 

Glaucoma or Other Eye Conditions, American Academy of 

Ophthalmology (Dec. 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/D697-Y7JD; 

Kathryn E. Bollinger, M.D. & Kevin M. Halenda, M.D., Should You 

Be Using Marijuana to Treat Your Glaucoma, Glaucoma Research 

Foundation (Jan. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q9JC-WX5Y; Henry 

Jampel, M.D., M.H.S., Position Statement on Marijuana and the 

Treatment of Glaucoma, American Glaucoma Society (Aug. 10, 

2009), https://perma.cc/4ANB-XSUK. 

19 Majority Op. at 15.

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 23 of 25
4

and the claims [he] bring[s].”

20

 He has not plausibly alleged 

the cause of an imminent danger;21 nor has he sought “to 

redress an imminent danger . . . fairly traceable to a violation 

of law.”22 

The majority agrees that “Gorbey believes that he now 

needs medical marijuana.”23 And it agrees that if marijuana is

“all Mr. Gorbey requested, the government would prevail.”24 

But according to the majority, “that is not all Mr. Gorbey 

seeks.”25 

I respectfully disagree. Gorbey provides little reason to 

believe he blames his worsening glaucoma on anything other 

than the absence of marijuana, nor is he willing to accept 

anything but what he calls the “only . . . safe & effective” 

treatment.

26

 I would take Gorbey at his word, buttressed by his 

refusal to accept the corrective surgery that has already been 

recommended “twice.”

27 Though Gorbey now “requests to see 

20 Pinson, 964 F.3d at 71. 

21 See Majority Op. at 14 (the Fourth Circuit’s nexus test requires 

“traceability, but not redressability”). 

22 See id. (quoting without adopting the Second Circuit’s nexus test)

(emphasis added).

I agree with the majority that we “need not weigh in on the split” 

between the Second and Fourth Circuits. Id.

23 Id. at 4 (citing JA 75).

24 Id. at 15.

25 Id.; see also id. at 6 (majority stating marijuana is not “the only 

treatment that Mr. Gorbey will accept”).

26 Motion to Stay at 11 (Sept. 15, 2023); see also infra pp. 2-3.

27 JA 104 (“Gorbey twice declined eye surgery in 2019 to address his 

worsening glaucoma”). 

USCA Case #22-5251 Document #2080603 Filed: 10/18/2024 Page 24 of 25
5

an ophthalmologist” again,

28 he is not seeking an 

ophthalmologist to provide ophthalmology care — he is 

seeking an ophthalmologist “only” to provide marijuana.29 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

decision allowing Gorbey to proceed without the full payment 

of his filing fee.30

28 Majority Op. at 15.

29 Motion to Stay at 11 (Sept. 15, 2023); see, e.g., Gorbey Pro Se 28j 

Letter at 1 (June 3, 2024) (Gorbey reiterating in his most recent filing 

that he believes he is “not a good surgical candidate” so he “need[s]

medical marijuana” (emphasis in original)).

Even if a few of Gorbey’s (many) filings contradict the very basis 

of Gorbey’s suit — that the denial of marijuana is his condition’s 

only cause, and marijuana is the only acceptable remedy — it seems 

curious to reward Gorbey for his filings’ internal inconsistencies. Cf.

Appellant Reply Br. at 13 (“[T]his entire litigation is not to just

obtain weed!”). If anything, those inconsistencies just undermine his 

credibility. After all, if “we can consider information that rebuts the 

prisoner’s allegations of imminent danger” when it is offered by the 

government — and I agree with the majority that we can — then we 

can also consider statements by the prisoner that rebut his own 

claims. Majority Op. at 9. 

30 I concur with the majority’s decision to dismiss Gorbey’s claims 

“that federal judges, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the 

President and Vice President are all in cahoots to prevent him from 

filing lawsuits.” Majority Op. at 17. 

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