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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FIL.ED 

U 'ted States Co"!1rt <?f Appeals n1 Tenth C1rcu1t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

.t,. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT M. BEATTIE, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DEPARTMENT, 

OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Defense Investigative Service, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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NOV 2 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-3139 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 89-CV-1526) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

James S. Phillips, Jr. of Phillips & Phillips, Chartered, Wichita, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Lee Thompson, United States Attorney, Stephen K. Lester, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Robert M. Beattie, a former fire fighter at the 

Boeing Military Airplane Company (BMAC), brought this civil rights 

action for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress various 

constitutional violations alleged in connection with a decision of 

the Defendant United States Air Force (USAF) denying him access, 

for security reasons, to the Air Force One project area at his 

BMAC plant. The government filed a motion for dismissal on 

mootness grounds and a motion for summary judgment on the merits. 

The district court granted the latter motion in a published 

opinion, see Beattie v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 753 (D. Kan. 

1991), and this appeal followed. 1 

We shall recount only those facts and allegations pertinent 

to our disposition of this appeal. A full account of the 

background of the case may be found in the district court's 

opinion. At the commencement of this action, Plaintiff retained 

his position with BMAC, but his promotional opportunities were 

allegedly impeded by his inability to enter the Air Force One 

area. In his Second Amended Complaint and the Pretrial Conference 

Order, Plaintiff also alleged damage to his reputation by the 

defamatory impression created by the Air Force One access denial, 

as well as unspecified harassment on the job by other BMAC 

employees. Plaintiff sought various forms of equitable relief to 

undo the USAF's decision and remedy the injury it allegedly 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 2 
caused. During the course of this litigation, however, Plaintiff 

unilaterally terminated his employment with BMAC, prompting the 

government's motion to dismiss the action as moot. The district 

court summarily denied the motion at the outset of its opinion, 

stating that it would, rather, "proceed to the motion for summary 

judgment as the defendant's cursory arguments for mootness appear 

flawed." Beattie, 759 F. Supp. at 755. 

The mootness question necessarily constitutes our threshold 

inquiry, because the existence of a live case or controversy is a 

constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the federal 

courts. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, __ , 110 

s. Ct. 1249, 1253 (1990). Since this requirement "subsists 

through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, ... it [is] 

not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed 

.••• The parties must continue to have a '"personal stake in 

the outcome"' of the lawsuit." Id. at 1253-54 (quoting City of 

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)(quoting Baker v. 

Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))). We must therefore determine 

whether Plaintiff's termination of his employment relationship 

with BMAC, within which the challenged USAF ruling had its only 

direct application, has mooted the parties' admittedly once-live 

controversy. 

It is significant that Plaintiff's claims are limited to 

equitable relief, because "while a plaintiff who has been 

constitutionally injured can bring a[n] ... action to recover 

damages, that same plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory or 

injunctive action unless he or she can demonstrate a good chance 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 3 
of being likewise injured in the future." Facio v. Jones, 929 

F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 

Nickolopoulos, 864 F.2d 301, 

1991); 

304 

see, e.g., Melvin v. 

(3d Cir. 1988)(receipt of 

requested parole deprivation hearing mooted claim for injunctive 

relief but not damages); Francis v. Fox, 838 F.2d 1147, 1149 and 

n.6 (11th Cir. 1988)(claim for unconstitutional denial of work 

release not mooted by subsequent parole because damages sought in 

addition to declaratory and injunctive relief). We continue to 

heed the Supreme Court's pertinent admonition, in O'Shea v. 

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974), that "[p]ast exposure to 

illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 

controversy regarding injunctive relief .. 

any continuing, present adverse effects." 

F.2d at 545; Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 

. if unaccompanied by 

See, e.g., Facio, 929 

857 (7th Cir. 1989). 

Likewise, with respect to declaratory relief, "we look beyond the 

initial 'controversy' which may have existed at one time [and] 

... decide 'whether the facts alleged •.. show that there is a 

substantial controversy ... of sufficient immediacy and reality 

to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Schepp v. 

Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting 

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 

(1941))(emphasis added in Schepp). 

The only immediate and direct adverse effects of the 

challenged USAF decision related to the conditions of Plaintiff's 

employment at the BMAC plant where the Air Force One project was 

located. Under the principles recited above, Plaintiff's 

termination of his employment at BMAC clearly mooted any claims 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 4 
/ for relief in this regard. See, e.g., Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 

180, 182 (5th Cir. 1990)(claims for equitable redress of 

discrimination regarding conditions of employment mooted by 

plaintiff's subsequent unchallenged discharge); Feit, 886 F.2d at 

857-58 (equitable First Amendment challenge to forest service 

policy prohibiting political protest by employees mooted by 

plaintiff's termination from forest service); Sandidge v. 

Washington, 813 F.2d 1025, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1987)(equitable First 

Amendment challenge to unfavorable job performance evaluation 

mooted by plaintiff's discharge); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 

671 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982)(plaintiff mooted equitable 

claims regarding alleged sex discrimination when he "voluntarily 

removed himself from the impact of the challenged practice by 

discontinuing his employment [and] abandoning his claim for 

damages"). Again, the absence of any claim for compensatory 

relief is critical to our mootness analysis here. 2 Cf. Bunch v. 

Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1986)(Title VII claim for 

denial of promotion not mooted by plaintiff's resignation because 

compensatory back-pay still available); Aiello v. City of 

2 We also note that the "capable of repetition, yet evading 

review" exception to mootness has no application here, as this 

particular controversy is neither likely to recur nor, by nature, 

so ephemeral as to elude the processes of judicial review. See, 

~, Feit, 886 F.2d at 858 n.12 and accompanying text; Backus, 

671 F.2d at 1103. See generally Johansen v. City of Bartlesville, 

862 F.2d 1423, 1426 (10th Cir. 1988)(outside of class action 

context, exception is limited to cases where "'(1) the challenged 

action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior 

to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable 

expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to 

the same action again'" (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 

147, 149 (1975)). 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 5 
Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845, 850 n.8 (3d Cir. 1980)(challenge to Fire 

Bureau regulations, pursuant to which plaintiff had been 

disciplined, not mooted by 

compensatory damages sought). 

plaintiff's retirement because 

Furthermore, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of continuing 

injury and collateral consequences are not sufficient to keep this 

case alive. Plaintiff asserted below that the challenged USAF 

decision (1) ultimately resulted in "Plaintiff's resignation from 

Boeing, which may be deemed a constructive discharge," Plaintiff's 

Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 13 

(Appellant's App. at 141); (2) damaged his reputation by creating 

a "defamatory impression," Pretrial Conference Order at 4 

(Appellant's App. at 17); see also Second Amended Complaint at 5, 

8 (Appellant's App. at 5, 8); and (3) "impaired his employment 

prospects," id. Plaintiff did not even plead a constructive 

discharge theory or include one in the Pretrial Order, much less 

substantiate such a claim on the record before us. As for injury 

to reputation, the following passage from the district court's 

opinion, though addressed directly to the related but separate 

question whether the USAF decision deprived Plaintiff of a liberty 

interest, also explains why that decision cannot be deemed 

defamatory: 

"A [security] clearance does not equate with passing 

judgment upon an individual's character." [Department 

of the Navy v.J Egan, 484 U.S. [518,] 528, 108 s. Ct. 

[818,] 824 [(1988)]. The Air Force informed BMAC that 

it was denying plaintiff access because of his "past 

history," in particular, his Soviet contacts that were 

the subject of the [Defense Investigative Service] 

report. These are nonspecific reasons which fall within 

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Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 6 
,I the Supreme Court's rationale in Egan. Because clearance 

may be denied for reasons ranging from past conduct to 

familial ties with a hostile country, the mere act of 

denying clearance does not imply "disloyalty or any 

other repugnant characteristic." 484 U.S. at 528-29, 

108 S. Ct. at 824-25. 

Beattie, 759 F. Supp. at 761. This analysis is entirely 

consistent with our discussion of a similar matter in Hill v. 

Department of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407, 1409, 1412 (10th 

Cir.)(quoting and interpreting same statements from Egan), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988). See also Jamil v. Secretary, Dep't 

of Defense, 910 F.2d 1203, 1209 (4th Cir. 1990)(revocation of 

security clearance "does not constitute an adjudication of one's 

character" ) . Finally, Plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations 

regarding the unspecified impairment of unidentified employment 

prospects are simply too speculative to support the exercise of 

f d 1 .. d" t· 3 e era Juris ic ion. See Feit, 886 F.2d at 857-58; Sandidge, 

813 F.2d at 1025-26; see also Westmoreland v. National Transp. 

3 We emphasize the quite limited character of the USAF decision 

in this case. The USAF determined only that Plaintiff should not 

be permitted access to BMAC's Air Force One project area. It did 

not generally revoke Plaintiff's security clearance, which could 

conceivably have had a more objectively demonstrable effect on 

specifiable employment opportunities with other firms requiring 

such clearances as a condition of hire. We do not mean to 

suggest, however, that demonstration of such adverse consequences 

would have any significance beyond the threshold question of 

mootness. As the district court's opinion aptly reflects, 

pertinent case law would present Plaintiff a virtually 

insurmountable task on the merits. See Hill, 844 F.2d at 1409, 

1411-13 (Egan removes any doubt regarding federal courts' lack of 

authority to review substance of security clearance decisions, and 

plaintiff's constitutional allegations advanced in connection 

therewith provided no independent basis permitting federal courts 

to pass on merits of such decisions); see also Dorfmont v. Brown, 

913 F.2d 1399, 1401-04 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 

1104 (1991); Jamil, 910 F.2d at 1205-06, 1209; Williams v. Reilly, 

743 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 7 
Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987)(possibility that 

plaintiff might be disqualified from potential future employment 

if challenged suspension of her commercial pilot certificate were 

disclosed held too speculative to create a cognizable interest in 

outcome of litigation sufficient to support federal jurisdiction); 

cf. Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1268-69 (10th 

Cir. 1989)(allegations that defendants placed "defamatory cloud" 

over plaintiff's "employment opportunities," without evidence of 

present harm to established business relationships, deemed mere 

"speculative future harm" too intangible to implicate liberty or 

property interest). 

For the reasons expressed above, we conclude that this case 

has become moot. Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED, and the 

cause is REMANDED to the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas with directions to vacate its judgment and 

dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. United States v. 

Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). 

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Appellate Case: 91-3139 Document: 010110097022 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 8