Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-01467/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-01467-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DIANA M. BAIRD,

Plaintiff,

v.

TECH PROVIDERS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:16-CV-1467-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. # 6). 

Defendants’ Motion is fully briefed. (Docs. # 14 and 15).

I. Background 

Defendant Tech Providers, Inc. (“TPI”) is a staffing company that places personnel at

various companies, including Southern Company Services. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 1, 9-10). Plaintiff, 

Diana M. Baird (“Plaintiff”), is a former employee of TPI.1(Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1, 9). On January 29, 

2015, Plaintiff signed an Agreement Concerning Employment with TPI which contained a noncompete clause. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 15). The Agreement Concerning Employment with TPI states that 

“Company [TPI] hereby employs Employee as an employee and Employee hereby accepts such 

employment with Company.”2(Doc. # 6-1 at 2). As an employee of TPI, Plaintiff was placed at

Southern Company Services on February 5, 2015. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1, 28).

 

1

 The court recognizes that this case involves a particularly sympathetic Plaintiff. Despite the court’s 

sympathy towards her health condition, it must fairly apply the law to the parties.

2

 Plaintiff did not attach the Agreement Concerning Employment to her Complaint. (See generally Doc. # 

1). However, the Agreement Concerning Employment is referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint (see Doc. # 1 at ¶ 15) 

and is central to Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants unlawfully threatened to abuse a legal process to force her 

into performing labor for TPI. (See Doc. # 1 at ¶ 20 (alleging that “[n]othing in the Agreement Concerning 

Employment contemplates that Baird is forced to remain a TPI employee”). Because the Agreement Concerning 

FILED

 2017 Mar-21 AM 11:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:16-cv-01467-RDP Document 21 Filed 03/21/17 Page 1 of 7
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In June 2016, after working for TPI at Southern Company Services for over 16 months, 

Baird resigned her employment with TPI. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 17). In July 2016, Plaintiff went to work 

for a different staffing company through which she was also placed at Southern Company 

Services. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 17).

On July 15, 2016, Claude Estes of TPI e-mailed Plaintiff to inform her that TPI believed 

that she was in violation of the non-compete agreement with TPI. (Doc. # 1 at p. 5). Estes also

informed Plaintiff that TPI planned to sue to enforce the non-compete agreement, including the 

provision in which she agreed to be responsible for TPI’s costs and attorneys’ fees in enforcing 

the agreement. (Doc. # 1 at p. 5). However, TPI offered Plaintiff the opportunity to come “back 

on board” with TPI if she so chose. (Doc. # 1 at p. 5). When Plaintiff refused the offer to return 

to work for TPI, on August 5, 2016, TPI filed suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County, 

Alabama asserting a breach of contract claim based on the non-compete clause in the Agreement 

Concerning Employment. (See Tech Providers, Inc. v. Diana M. Baird, Circuit Court of Shelby 

County, Alabama Case No. CV-2016-900646.00, Doc. # 2). 

On September 6, 2016, Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that TPI and Estes violated 

the prohibition against forced labor found in 18 U.S.C. § 1589. (Doc. # 1). 

II. Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Having said that, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the 

 

Employment has been attached to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, it was referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint, it is 

central to Plaintiff’s cause of action, and its authenticity is not in dispute, the court can consider the Agreement 

without converting Defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Fin. Sec. Assurance, 

Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007). (See also Doc. # 14 at 6 (discussing the legal effect of 

the Agreement Concerning Employment without contesting the authenticity of the Agreement attached to 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss)). The court has considered the Agreement Concerning Employment in ruling upon 

this motion. 

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speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that 

contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not 

meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and 

conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 

F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Under Twombly, a complaint must present plausible theories of liability and allege 

specific facts establishing each claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’” the complaint must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556.

The Supreme Court has identified “two working principles” for a district court to use in 

applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must 

assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to 

accept as true legal conclusions when they are “couched as [] factual allegation[s].” Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. at 1950. Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a 

motion to dismiss.” Id. Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under 

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one prong, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are wellpleaded and assume their veracity; and under the other prong, the court must proceed to 

determine the claim’s plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, 

to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its “judicial experience and 

common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts a single claim against Defendants. She contends that 

Defendants violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 

Section 1589 makes it illegal to provide or obtain the labor or services of a person:

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical 

restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats 

of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or 

threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or 

pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform 

such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or 

physical restraint.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(l–4). Section 1595 allows a victim to bring a civil action to enforce section

1589. Section 1595 provides that:

[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation may bring a civil action against the 

perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything 

of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have 

known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district 

court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys

fees.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The purpose of section 1595 is to provide a civil remedy for violation of the 

federal peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons statutes. Dlamini v. Babb, 2014 WL 

5761118, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1595; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1594). 

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A. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Any Abuse of Law or Legal Process

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated section 1589(c) by threatening to sue her for 

violating the non-compete clause in the Agreement Concerning Employment. However, that 

section defines the term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process” as “the use or 

threatened use of a law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner 

or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on another 

person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.” 18 U.S.C. § 

1589(c) (emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that the threat to sue to enforce the non-compete was 

a threat of legal process for a purpose for which the law was not designed. In particular, she 

argues, the non-compete agreement is void under Alabama law because it was signed before she 

started work at Southern Company Services. 

However, the operative relationship here is between Plaintiff and TPI. The Agreement 

Concerning Employment with TPI, which contained the non-compete clause, became effective 

when the parties’ signed that document. That agreement states that “Company hereby employs 

Employee as an employee and Employee hereby accepts such employment with Company.” 

(Doc. # 6-1 at 2). Thus, by its terms, the agreement was signed on the day that Plaintiff accepted 

employment with TPI regardless of when she received her first staffing assignment. 

Moreover, the threat to sue for breach of the non-compete agreement was not the use of a 

law or legal process for any purpose for which the law was not designed. Non-compete 

agreements which impose only a partial restraint on trade have long been enforceable under 

Alabama law. See Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Color & Equip. LLC, 451 F. App'x 823, 824 

(11th Cir. 2011). “Alabama law distinguishes between total restraints and partial restraints. 

Under Alabama law, a restraint is partial, and not total, if the restrained party can engage ‘as a 

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practical matter, in a meaningful pursuit of one's calling, notwithstanding the terms of the 

agreement.’” Id. (quoting Ex parte Howell Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 981 So.2d 413, 423 n. 4 

(Ala. 2006)). “If the restraint is merely partial, the restraint can be upheld if it is ‘properly 

restricted as to territory, time and persons’ and supported by sufficient consideration.’” Id. at 825 

(quoting Gafnea v. Pasquale Food Co., 454 So.2d 1366, 1368 (Ala. 1984)). Here, the noncompete agreement has a duration of twelve months and only applies to companies at which 

Plaintiff was placed by TPI. (Doc. # 6-1 at 4). Thus, in Plaintiff’s case, she is only prohibited by 

the non-compete agreement from working at Southern Company Services, either through direct 

employment or by assignment from another staffing company. Thus, the non-compete is facially 

reasonable in time and scope.

Alabama Code § 8-1-190 became effective on January 1, 2016. That statute repealed 

Alabama Code 1975, § 8-1-1, and codified the exceptions to the general prohibition on restraints 

on trade, including removing the prohibition on “partial restraints.” Ala. Code § 8-1-190. It also 

codified the concept of equitable modification, permitting a court to modify restrictions that are 

overly broad or unreasonably long to preserve the protectable interest at issue. Id.

Finally, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that TPI and Estes sought to “force” her to 

return to work for it is belied by the e-mail on which she bases that allegation and which she has 

set forth in full in her Complaint. (Doc. # 1 at 5). In that e-mail, Estes explained that Plaintiff 

was in violation of a contractual duty and offered to let Plaintiff return to work for TPI if she so 

desired, to avoid litigation over her breach of the non-compete. (Doc. # 1 at 5). 

In sum, a threat to sue to enforce a non-compete agreement (which one entered into and 

may have violated) does not constitute “the use or threatened use of a law or legal process ... for 

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any purpose for which the law was not designed ... .” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim.3

IV. Conclusion

For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim, and 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6) is due to be granted. A separate order will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this March 21, 2017.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

3

 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine. (Doc. # 6 at 7-11). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, the court need not address 

-- and expressly does not address -- whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine also forecloses Plaintiff’s claim.

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