Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00489/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:3604(f)(3)(c) Fair Housing Amendments Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MELODY CHAPMAN, et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

Case No. 16-cv-489-BAS(AGS) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[ECF No. 14] 

 v. 

THE BLUFFS OF FOX RUN 

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 

 Defendant. 

Melody Chapman and her minor daughters M.C. and E.C. and Yaji Tramontini 

and her minor son N.L. (“Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against The Bluffs of Fox Run 

Homeowners Association (“The Bluffs”) alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act 

(“FHA”), California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Unruh 

Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”), and California Unfair Business Practices Act, Calif. 

Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq. (“UCL”). The Bluffs moves to dismiss the fourth 

cause of action alleging violations of the California Unfair Business Practices Act 

and to strike the prayer for punitive damages. (ECF No. 14.) 

// 

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The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND1

The Bluffs operates and manages the condominiums where the Plaintiffs live. 

(FAC ¶¶ 4, 12-13.) Plaintiffs allege The Bluffs enforced rules that discriminate 

against families with children by prohibiting children from playing in the common 

areas and posting signs that illegally discriminated against children. (FAC ¶¶ 15, 22.) 

Plaintiffs claim The Bluffs’ Board Member Edward Homer told Ms. Chapman 

and Ms. Tramontini that children were not allowed to ride bicycles in common areas 

and were not allowed to play in common areas with any type of toy that had wheels. 

(FAC ¶¶ 16-17, 19.) Plaintiffs further allege Mr. Homer told Ms. Chapman “this 

community is not meant for small children. Kids are supposed to play in the grass 

area next to the pool.” (FAC ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiffs also claim The Bluffs’ Board Member Elliot Hurwitz told Ms. 

Tramontini that “children were not to play in the common area . . . needed to be kept 

quiet,” and were not allowed to jump into the pool. (FAC ¶¶ 20-21.) 

As a result, Plaintiffs claim they have: 

suffered loss of important housing opportunities, violation 

of their civil rights, deprivation of the full use and 

enjoyment of their tenancy and emotional distress and 

physical injury, humiliation and mental anguish, fear, 

stress, including bodily injury such as stomach aches; 

headaches; general muscle aches and pain, sleep loss; 

feelings of depression, discouragement, anger and 

nervousness; and relives the experience; and other special 

damages. 

 

1 Plaintiff’s’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is the operative complaint in this action. 

(ECF No. 11.) 

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(FAC ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs claim The Bluffs “intentionally and recklessly violated 

Plaintiffs’ civil rights” and accordingly Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages. 

(FAC ¶ 26.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must 

accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe them 

and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill 

v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, 

it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it stops short of 

the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need 

not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the deference 

the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume 

that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants 

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. 

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Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). 

“The proper medium for challenging the sufficiency of factual allegations in a 

complaint is through Rule 12(b)(6) not Rule 12(f).” Consumer Solutions REO, LLC 

v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009). “Rule 12(f) does not 

authorize district courts to strike claims for damages on the grounds that such claims 

are precluded as a matter of law.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 

970, 974-5 (9th Cir. 2010). “However, where a motion is in substance a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion but is incorrectly denominated as a Rule 12(f) motion, a court may convert 

the improperly designated Rule 12(f) motion into a 12(b)(6) motion,” which, as the 

parties in this case agree, applies the same standards of proof and evidence. 

Consumer Solutions, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1021. 

As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint that has 

been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when 

“the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Violation of UCL 

The California Unfair Business Practices Act “prohibits, and provides civil 

remedies for, unfair competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or 

fraudulent business act or practice.’” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 

310, 320 (2011) (quoting Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). It contains “broad, 

sweeping language” that was ultimately curtailed by Proposition 64, which limited 

those who may enforce its provisions. Id.

The intent of Proposition 64 “was to confine standing to those actually injured 

by a defendant’s business practices and to curtail the prior practice of filing suits on 

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behalf of ‘clients who have not . . . had any . . . business dealing with the defendant.’” 

Id. at 321 (quoting Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s LLC, 39 Cal. 4th 

223, 228 (2006)). Thus, Proposition 64 limited standing for private individuals to 

those who “ha[d] suffered injury in fact and ha[d] lost money or property as a result 

of such unfair competition.” Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 1590 

(2008) (quotation marks omitted). “[A]n injury in fact is an invasion of a legally 

protected interest which is concrete and particularized . . . and actual or imminent, 

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 322 (quotation marks 

omitted). “Particularized” means that the “injury must affect the plaintiff in a 

personal and individual way.” Id. A plaintiff must also show he or she suffered an 

economic injury caused by the unfair business practice, which can include having a 

present or future property interest diminished or being deprived of property to which 

he or she has a cognizable claim. Id.

Plaintiffs allege The Bluffs discriminated against them in violation of the FHA 

and the FEHA. Thus, they allege invasion of a legally protected interest that affected 

them in a personal and individual way. They also allege they were unable to fully use 

their tenancy because their children were not allowed full access to the common 

areas. Thus, they allege diminution of a present or future property interest, which can 

constitute an economic injury. Hence, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the fourth cause 

of action is DENIED. 

B. Punitive Damages 

The Bluffs moves to strike the punitive damages allegations claiming these 

damages are not available as a matter of law. (Def.’s Mot. 8:27-28, ECF No. 14-3.) 

The Bluffs fails to show that the punitive-damages claims are “redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent or scandalous” as required by Rule 12(f). In fact, The Bluffs is claiming 

the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to rise to the level of punitive 

damages. Hence, the Court will construe to motion, incorrectly brought as a motion 

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to strike, as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

1. Punitive Damages under Federal Law (FHA) 

“[P]unitive damages may be assessed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a 

defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or if it involves 

reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Fair 

Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 916 (9th Cir. 2002). Punitive damages 

may be awarded “in a civil rights case where a jury finds a constitutional violation, 

even when the jury has not awarded compensatory or nominal damages.” Alexander 

v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 

(1974)). 

In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), the Supreme Court 

discussed the “reckless or callous indifference” standard in the context of 

employment discrimination, finding that to warrant punitive damages “an employer 

must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate 

federal law.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536. Thus, the required “recklessness” applies, not 

to the defendant’s awareness that it is engaging in discrimination, but to its 

knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law. Id. at 535. If the employer 

is simply unaware of the prohibition or believes its conduct to be lawful, this is 

insufficient for punitive damages. Id. The Kolstad standard has been found to be 

applicable to the Federal Housing Act context. See Badami v. Flood, 214 F.3d 994, 

997 (8th Cir. 2000); Alexander, 208 F.3d at 431. 

Oppressive conduct may also be a proper predicate for punitive damages in a 

civil-rights case. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 2005). “An act or 

omission is oppressive . . . ‘if done in a manner which injures or damages or otherwise 

violates the rights of another person with unnecessary harshness or severity as by 

misuse or abuse of authority or power or by taking advantage of some weakness or 

disability or the misfortunes of another person.’” Id. (quoting Fountila v. Carter, 571 

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F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1978)). Oppressive conduct focuses on the relative positions 

of power and authority between the parties. Id. at 810. 

In the FAC, Plaintiffs simply allege that The Bluffs “intentionally and 

recklessly violated their civil rights.” (FAC ¶ 26.) The facts alleged in the FAC fail 

to show an evil motive or intent. Plaintiffs fail to allege The Bluffs knew it was acting 

in violation of federal law, nor do they allege any abuse of authority or power. Since 

Plaintiffs allege little more than legal conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the 

“intentional and reckless” standard for punitive damages, they fail to state a claim for 

punitive damages that is plausible on its face. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

2. Punitive Damages under California Law (FEHA & UCRA) 

Punitive damages may be recovered under the California Fair Employment and 

Housing Act “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice[.]” 

Commodore Home Sys. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 215 (1982) (quoting Cal. 

Civ. Code § 3294(a)). Similarly, punitive damages under the Unruh Civil Rights Act 

are available upon the same showing. Los Angeles Co. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. 

Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 4th 261, 276 (2004); Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b)(1).

“Oppression” refers to “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust 

hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2). 

“Malice” means conduct “which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the 

plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful 

and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Id. 

 As discussed above, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that would support this 

standard. They fail to state facts that would support a finding The Bluffs was acting 

“in conscious disregard” of Plaintiffs’ rights or that The Bluffs intended to cause 

injury. The conclusory allegation that The Bluffs acted “intentionally and recklessly” 

is insufficient. Hence, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the allegations with regard to 

punitive damages is GRANTED. 

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to strike is converted into a 

motion to dismiss, and the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART. (ECF No. 14.) The motion is denied to the extent Defendant requests 

dismissal of the Fourth Cause of Action for a violation of the California Unfair 

Business Practices Act. The motion is granted to the extent Defendant requests 

dismissal of any punitive-damages allegations. 

Because Plaintiffs may be able to allege additional facts that will show they 

are entitled to punitive damages under the standards articulated above, they are given 

leave to amend. The scope of leave to file an amended complaint is limited to 

amending only as to punitive damages in order to allege additional facts that cure the 

defects identified in this order. Plaintiffs may not plead additional claims, add 

additional parties, or add allegations that are not intended to cure the specific defects 

the Court has noted. Should any amended complaint exceed the scope of leave to 

amend granted by this order, the court will strike the offending portions under Rule 

12(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may [act on its own to] strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter.”); see also Barker v. Avila, No. 2:09-cv-00001-GEB-JFM, 2010 

WL 3171067, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010) (striking an amendment to federallaw claim where the court had granted leave to amend only state-law claims). 

If Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they must do so no later than 

January 2, 2017. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 12, 2016 

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