Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01207/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01207-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 “Doc. No.” refers to documents in this Court’s file.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

VALENTINO JAVIER ROMERO 

Petitioner, 

vs.

 DORA SCHRIRO, et al., 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 07-1207-PHX-SMM

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On June 19, 2007, Valentino Javier Romero, (“Petitioner”), an inmate confined

under Department of Correction custody in the Lewis-Stiner Arizona State Prison

Complex in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a

Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.)1

Respondents filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on September 27, 2007, with

exhibits A through U attached. (Doc. No. 10.) No reply was filed.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Convictions and Sentences:

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the background and facts of

Petitioner’s case as follows: 

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2 “Ex.” refers to the corresponding Exhibit contained in Respondents

attached Exhibits found at Doc. No. 10.) 

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On November 24, 1993, the State of Arizona (“State”) charged

[Petitioner] with five counts of aggravated assault and two counts of

endangerment for his involvement in a shooting incident between two

groups of people in a residential area. The State dismissed two of the

aggravated assault charges prior to trial. [Petitioner] was convicted by a

jury of all remaining offenses. 

(Ex. A.)2

On May 20, 1994, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 15 years’

imprisonment for the aggravated assault convictions and aggravated sentences of 3

years’ imprisonment for the endangerment convictions. (See Answer, at 3; Petition, at

1; and Ex. U, at 12.)

B. Appeal

Petitioner’s direct appeal of his conviction in the Arizona Court of Appeals was

denied on July 11, 1996. (Ex. A.) The court of appeals considered Petitioner’s claims

that (1) the trial judge’s statements during voir dire tainted the jury, preventing

Petitioner from receiving a fair trial, and (2) the trial court erred by giving the standard

jury instruction on deterring truthful testimony. (Id.) On July 11, 1996, the appellate

court affirmed the trial court’s decision. (Id.) Petitioner’s petition for review of the

appellate court’s decision was summarily denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on

December 6, 1996. (Id.) 

C. First and Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On September 19, 1994, while state review of his conviction was still pending,

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (See Ex. B, at 5) The trial court

appointed the Maricopa County Public Defenders Office to represent Petitioner, and,

subsequently, ordered substitution of counsel to order Petitioner represented by attorney

Michael L. Vaughn. (Id. at 6.) Attorney Vaughn filed an Amended Pro Per Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities on November 30,

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3

 Respondents cite to another petition for post-conviction relief filed by

Petitioner, acting pro per, alleging that his sentence was illegaly

enhanced and he was denied parole eligibility under State v. Tarango,

185 Ariz. 208 (1996). (See Answer, at 3, and Ex. K.) Respondents

refer to this as Petitioner’s first petition, but the petition is not contained

in the record before this Court and Respondents do not indicate when

it was filed. (Answer, at 3.) The date of filing is irrelevant for

purposes of any statutory tolling of the statue of limitations, however,

because the court of appeals consolidated the first and second petitions,

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1995, raising three issues: (1) newly-discovered evidence related to the suppression

of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2)

prosecutorial conduct related to the suppression of evidence and violation of Brady and

failure to inform the court of improper witness collaboration during trial; and (3)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Ex. B, at 2.) An evidentiary hearing was held

on the petition for post-conviction relief on June 28, 1996. (Ex. C.) The trial court

denied the petition in court as to claims of newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial

misconduct and ordered counsel to contact the court to arrange further scheduling as to

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Ex. C.) Subsequently, On October 17,

1996, Petitioner withdrew his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, explaining

that, upon further investigation, the matters alleged in the petition “were not

deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance, but were matters of trial strategy grounded

in a reasonable basis.” (Ex. D.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s requests to forbid

withdrawal of the ineffectiveness claims and to appoint counsel to review whether the

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim had merit. (Ex. E, K at 3.) The trial

court granted the motion to withdraw the claim and entered a final order denying the

petition on February 18, 1997. (Ex. E.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review from the trial court’s order. (Ex. F.) That

petition for review, (consolidated with another petition for review from the trial court’s

denial of a pro per petition for post-conviction relief 3

),was denied in a memorandum

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both of which were filed while Petitioner’s appeal was pending, and

ruled on the consolidated petitions after the conclusion of direct review.

(Ex. K.) 

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decision by the court of appeals on January 29, 1998. (Ex. K.) The supreme court

denied review of the consolidated petitions on February 23, 1999. (Ex. L.) 

D. Third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a third petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, on July 30,

1996. (Ex. G.) Petitioner raised the following claims: Petitioner was denied (1) “his

liberty interests and his rights under Rule 8 as well as his right to speedy trial under the

federal constitution...”; (2) “his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights by the failure of

appellate counsel to raise the issue that the denial of the motion to preclude....”; (3) his

due process rights “by the court instructing the jury, prior to the closing argument, upon

defense objections”; and (4) his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel by his

failure to raise the issue “that there was insufficient evidence under the sixth and

fourteenth amendments and hence the court erred in denying the motion for directed

verdict.” (Ex. G.) 

The trial court summarily denied the petition on August 7, 1997 and Petitioner

filed a petition for review with the appellate court. (Exs. H, I.) The court of appeals

denied review on March 2, 1999. (Ex. J.) 

E. Fourth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On January 30, 1998, Petitioner filed a fourth notice of petition for

post-conviction relief based on the affidavit of his wife that she had not been

interviewed by trial counsel. (Ex. M.) On March 9, 1998, the trial court referred the

claim to the Hon. Barry Schneider to determine whether, on its face, the claim would

constitute newly discovered material facts that would probably change the verdict.

Otherwise, the trial court noted, the claim was untimely and precluded pursuant to both

Rule 32.2 and A.R.S. § 13-4232. (Ex. O.) There is no minute entry in the record or

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other indication that the trial court denied the petition on the merits or as untimely. It

is immaterial, however, inasmuch as, thereafter, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied

a petition for review from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, on June 9,

1999, demonstrating that, in fact, the trial court denied the petition. (Ex. O.) 

F. Fifth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On November 8, 2004, Petitioner filed a fifth petition for post-conviction relief.

(Ex. P.) Petitioner argued that (1) Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

constituted a significant change in the law requiring a reversal of his sentence; (2) The

decision in Blakely is a significant change in the law for the purposes of Rule 32.1(g);

(3) The trial judge used the same aggravating factors to impose consecutive sentences

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution;

and (4) Blakely applies retroactively. 

On November 16, 2004, the trial court dismissed the petition. (Ex. Q.) The trial

court noted the petition was untimely, and that Blakely did not apply retroactively to

convictions that are final. The court further found that Petitioner’s Rule 32-of right

petition was dismissed on June 28, 1996, and he did not seek review, therefore his

conviction was final and he was not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g). (Ex. Q.) On

December 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the court had

improperly applied the time bar and erred in its finding that Apprendi v New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2002), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), do not apply

retroactively to convictions that are final. (Ex. R.) The court rejected the motion. (Ex.

S.) The Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which it denied on June 19, 2006. (Id. at Ex. T.)

G. First Federal Habeas

Petitioner’s first federal habeas petition was filed on August 25, 1995. (CIV 95-

01779 PHX-SMM (SLV), Doc. No. 1.) The petition was dismissed by order and

judgment of the District Court on May 29, 1996. (Id., Doc. No. 15, 16.) Petitioner was

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denied a certificate of appealability, (Id., Doc. No. 19), and the order was upheld by

the Ninth Circuit. (Id., at 20.) 

H. Second Federal Habeas

Petitioner’s second federal habeas petition, filed on December 17, 1998, was

dismissed without prejudice after a motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner was treated as

a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (CIV 98-02258 PHX-SMM (SLV), Doc. No. 1, 3, 4, 5.) 

I. Third Federal Habeas

Petitioner’s third federal habeas was timely filed on July 26, 1999, following the

conclusion of Petitioner’s direct review and state collateral proceedings of his first two

consolidated petition’s for review. (CIV 99-01341 PHX-SMM (SLV), Doc. No. 1) The

District Court considered the merits of three claims raised by Petitioner: (1) The trial

judge denied Petitioner due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when the

trial judge refused to grant Petitioner a new trial based on newly discovered evidence;

(2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) Ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. The District Court denied the petition on the merits, and entered judgment

dismissing the action. (Id., Doc. No. 13, 14.) 

Petitioner moved for a certificate of appealability, and both the District Court

and the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability. (Id.,

Doc. No. 15, 16, 17.) 

J. Present Federal Habeas

Petitioner filed this present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

June 19, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner

was denied his right to have a jury determine aggravating factors used to enhance his

sentence, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (2) the sentencing procedure used by

the trial court deprived Petitioner of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due

process; and (3) Petitioner’s sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. (Id.) 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under § 2244, a petitioner can file a second or successive habeas petition only

after obtaining an authorization order from a three-judge panel in the appropriate court

of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3); see also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 127

S.Ct. 793, 799 (2007) (per curiam). In order to obtain an authorization order, a

petitioner must make a prima facie showing that the claim was not presented in a

previous federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). In addition, the petitioner

must show that (1) the new claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that was

previously unavailable and that the Supreme Court made retroactive to cases on

collateral review; or (2) the factual basis for the new claim “could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” and the fact underlying

the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the whole evidence, show by clear and

convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2); §

2244(b)(3)(C); see also Burton 127 S.Ct. at 796. Absent approval from the Ninth

Circuit, the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider a second or

successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Burton, 127 S.Ct. at 799.

C. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ

of habeas corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final

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4 CIV 99-01341 PHX-SMM (SLV)

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by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). 

D. Analysis

1. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Consider the

Petition

Petitioner’s fourth habeas is a “second or successive” habeas for which he has

neither sought nor obtained authorization to file. Petitioner has twice brought claims

contesting the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state court.

Petitioner’s third federal habeas4

, was decided and dismissed on the merits, and

judgment entered accordingly. Therefore, under the AEDPA, Petitioner is required to

"move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to

consider the application" for habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner's

failure to comply with the "gatekeeping" provisions of section 2244 deprive this Court

of jurisdiction to consider his section 2254 claims. See Burton, 127 S.Ct. at 794-99.

2. The Petition is Untimely

Should the District Court find that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the

Petition, the Magistrate Judge further finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition

filed in this Court is untimely. Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and

sentence became final to file his federal petition. Petitioner’s state conviction in CR

93-09461 was based on the guilty verdict of a jury trial. Petitioner appealed his

conviction before the Arizona Court of Appeals, which found no error in the trial

court’s decision. Petitioner’s petition for review was denied by the Arizona Supreme

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5 Although the Court recognizes that Respondents have raised an argument

that equitable tolling is no longer available, in view of the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Bowles v.Russell, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the

Court need not resolve that issue because Petitioner does not assert or

satisfy the requirements for such tolling. 

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Court on December 6, 1996. His conviction therefore became final 90 days after his

petition for review was denied. See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.

2001). Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on March 6, 1997. Absent any

statutory or equitable tolling periods, Petitioner’s right to file a federal habeas petition

expired one year later on March 6, 1998. 

Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until June 19, 2007. Petitioner does not

argue and this Court does not find that he is entitled to any equitable tolling5

. Thus, the

Petition is untimely by over nine years unless statutory tolling applies and results in a

tolling of the limitations period for a sufficient length of time to bring the Habeas

Petition within the one-year limitations period. 

E. Statutory Tolling

The limitations period was immediately tolled with no lapse of time in-between

the direct review and the first statutory tolling event, because Petitioner’s first and

second petitions for post-conviction relief were initiated before his conviction became

final. The limitations period was statutorily tolled until the day the Arizona Supreme

Court issued its order denying review of the court of appeals denial of Petitioner ’s

consolidated petitions for review from the trial court’s denial of his first two petitions

for post-conviction relief. The supreme court’s order was filed on February 23, 1999.

(Ex. L.) 

Similarly, Petitioner’s third and fourth petitions for post-conviction relief

overlapped the earlier petitions. Respondents do not argue that these petitions were not

properly filed. (See Answer, at 10.) Because the record is not clear on whether these

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petitions were or were not “properly filed” in the state court, and because a resolution

of this issue is not necessary to resolve the issue of timeliness, this Court will assume

without deciding that the third and fourth petitions were properly filed within the

meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Thus, assuming the third and fourth petitions were properly

filed, the statutory tolling period continued until June 9, 1999, when the Arizona Court

of Appeals denied his petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his fourth petition

for post-conviction relief. Thus, Petitioner had a year from June 9, 1999, or until June

9, 2000, to file his federal habeas Petition. 

Petitioner’s fifth petition for post-conviction relief was filed on November 9,

2004, well over five years after the conclusion of the fourth petition for post-conviction

relief. 

This fifth petition could not toll the limitations period because it had already

expired, neither could it restart the already expired one-year limitations period. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Further, Petitioner’s federal habeas petitions have no tolling effect. See Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 191 (2001). 

Petitioner’s instant habeas, filed on June 19, 2007, was filed more than seven

years beyond the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and is thus untimely. 

The Magistrate Judge does not reach the Petitioner’s or Respondent’s alternate

arguments on the merits of this case.

III. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court DISMISS this action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

DISMISS this action as untimely. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party’s objection within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CV 07-1207-PHX-SMM

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

DATED this 26th day of September, 2008.

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