Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02387/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02387-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUZANNE SAVEDRA YOUNGBLOOD,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2387 ALA HC

vs.

PLACER COUNTY PROBATION DEPT., et al., 

Respondents. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. In 1999, petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of Placer County for

cruelty to animals. She was sentenced to 92 days in county jail and five years of probation. 

I

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal summarized the facts underlying

petitioner’s conviction and sentence as follows:

On December 31, 1998, Officer Robert Carter of Placer County

Animal Control responded to a complaint that an excessive number

of cats were being kept under poor health and living conditions in

a small trailer. Officer Carter went to the property and saw a

residence with a small trailer near the garage. He smelled a strong

odor of ammonia which he associated with animal urine, when he

left his truck and started toward the residence.

Terrance Deveany, the owner of the property, responded when

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Officer Carter knocked on the door. Deveany told Officer Carter

the trailer belonged to the defendant. 

Officer Carter approached the trailer and looked inside through the

windows. He saw at least 35 cats in the trailer. At various places

in the trailer, he saw fecal matter and urine. Many of the cats were

sneezing and had eye discharge. Officer Carter telephoned the on

call magistrate and obtained a search warrant for the trailer. The

officer then called for a tow truck. As they were hooking the

trailer to the tow truck, the defendant arrived at the property. She

stated she was taking care of the cats and believed there were

between 80 and 90 in the trailer. She tried to give Officer Carter a

vial with medicined for the cats, but he would not accept it because

it was not adequately marked. The trailer was towed to the DeWitt

Center so it could be placed in the building before being opened to

prevent loss of control of the cats.

When the trailer was first opened at the DeWitt Center, Officer

Carter entered with a video camera and recorded the conditions

inside the trailer. The videotape was played for the jury.

The cats, 92 in all, were removed from the trailer and assigned

numbers for identification. Most of the cats appeared unhealthy. 

They were examined and treated by a veterinarian. Her initial

summary of the condition of the cats is as follows: “Most of the

cats were covered in urine and feces. There [were] many that were

malnourished, emaciated. Cats were sick with upper respiratory,

herpes virus. They had ear mites, fleas. There were cats with

neurologic[al] problems. There [were] cats that were missing

portions of their limbs or had deformed limbs. There [were] cats

with urine scald, and there [were] cats that were either blind or

partially blind in one or both eyes and cats that were missing eyes,

too.” The veterinarian also described other ailments suffered by

the cats. Many of the problems described by the veterinarian, such

as dehydration, chronic malnourishment, anorexia, urine scald, and

severe infection, occur as a result of inadequate care over a long

period. 

The defendant testified. She lived in Sacramento County. In

October 1988, she put the cats, about 35 to 40 at the time, in the

trailer and moved them to the Deveany property in Placer County

because Sacramento Animal Control officials told her she could

not have more than four cats. She lived with the cats at first, either

in the trailer or in a tent next to the trailer, feeding the cats and

cleaning up after them. She brought additional stray cats from the

Sacramento County neighborhood to the trailer. Eventually, she

moved back to Sacramento County and visited the trailer to care

for the cats. During the last two weeks before animal control

seized the trailer, the defendant was sick and did not visit the cats

as often. She contended that the messy conditions in the trailer

were a result of the removal of the trailer to the DeWitt Center. 

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She knew she had too many cats, but she asserted she was trying to

save their lives.

Answer, Ex. D at 2-4.

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal. Id. at 31. Petitioner sought review

of the California Court of Appeal decision in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. G. 

Petitioner’s request for review was denied without comment. Answer, Ex. H. 

II

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits

in state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court

“may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

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Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of

the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

A federal court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the

state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

court must independently review the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). As the

last reasoned state court opinion in this matter, this court will review the decision of the

California Court of Appeal. 

III

Petitioner alleges three claims concerning jury instructions. Petitioner contends

the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity resulting in a

violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights. Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury on the elements of Penal Code § 597(b). Petitioner further asserts that the

trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on an intervening superceding cause. 

A

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). Habeas corpus

is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768

F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v.

Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). However, a “claim of error based upon a

right not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal

habeas corpus relief where its impact so infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir.

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1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980)); See also Prantil v. California, 843

F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (To prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate that an

erroneous instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.”) The analysis for determining whether a trial is "so infected with unfairness" as to rise

to the level of a due process violation is similar to the analysis used in determining, under Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993), whether an error had "a substantial and injurious

effect" on the outcome. See Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled

on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815, 828 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). 

At trial, petitioner claimed that she was keeping the cats to avoid euthanasia. She

requested the jury be instructed on the defense of necessity. Petitioner claims that the trial

court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity violated her federal constitutional

rights. The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument. It held that the defense of

necessity was not available to petitioner under the facts of the case. Answer, Ex. D at 16-19. 

In support of its conclusion the California Court of Appeal stated that 

[n]eccessity is an affirmative public policy defense, in

effect a plea in avoidance and justification, which comes into focus

only after all elements of the offense have been established. When

public policy considerations do not support a defense of necessity,

the trial court need not instruct on that defense.

Since the defense of necessity is based on public policy, we

must look to public policy to determine whether the defense was

available to the defendant on the facts presented here. Aside from

constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested

with the responsibility to declare the public policy of the state.

The duties of a facility that acts as a depositary of living

animals are spelled out in the Civil Code. “A depositary of living

animals shall provide the animals with necessary and prompt

veterinary care, nutrition, and shelter, and treat them kindly.” The

Legislature has expressly stated the public policy of this state

concerning euthanasia of animals. If an animal is adoptable or,

with reasonable efforts, could become adoptable, it should not be

euthanized. However, if an animal is abandoned and a new owner

cannot be found, the facility shall thereafter humanely destroy the

animal so abandoned. Particularly relevant to this case and the

defendant’s assertions is a finding made by the Legislature in

1998: “The Legislature finds and declares that it is better to have

public and private shelters pick up or take in animals than private

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citizens.”

Answer, Ex. D at 17-18 (citations omitted). The California Court of Appeal held that keeping

the cats to prevent them from potentially being euthanized was contrary to public policy. Id. at

19. The California Court of Appeal concluded, therefore, that the trial court acted properly in

denying petitioner’s request for an instruction on the defense of necessity. Id 

 Because the omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a

misstatement of the law, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular

instruction bears an especially heavy burden. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

Petitioner has not overcome that burden. The defense of necessity is available when supported

by public policy. See U.S. v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Necessity is,

essentially, a utilitarian defense. It therefore justifies criminal acts taken to avert greater harm,

maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to be committed where the social benefits of the

crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the crime.”). Here, public policy requires

that stray animals be placed in shelters. Petitioner’s keeping the cats to prevent them from

potentially being euthanized was contrary to that public policy. Since petitioner’s actions

contradicted public policy, petitioner was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense

of necessity. 

Therefore, the refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury on the defense of

necessity was not a violation of federal law, was not an unreasonable application of law to facts

and did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 

B

Petitioner also maintains that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the

elements of Penal Code § 597(b). The trial court instructed the jury that “Penal Code § 597(b)

imposes criminal liability if there is proof of three elements as opposed to four.” Petition at 5. 

California Penal Code § 597(b) reads as follows:

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Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a) or (c), every

person who overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded,

overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance,

drink, or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly kills any

animal, or causes or procures any animal to be so overdriven,

overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured,

tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, drink, shelter, or to

be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having

the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise,

subjects any animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary

cruelty upon the animal, or in any manner abuses any animal, or

fails to provide the animal with proper food, drink, or shelter or

protection from the weather, or who drives, rides, or otherwise

uses the animal when unfit for labor, is, for every such offense,

guilty of a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or as a felony or

alternatively punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony and by a

fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). 

Cal. Penal Code § 597(b) (emphasis added).

The trial court instructed the jury that 

[e]very person who causes an animal to be deprived of necessary

sustenance, drink or shelter or who having care or custody of an

animal subjects the animal to needless suffering or fails to provide

the animal with proper food, drink [or] shelter in a criminally

negligent manner is guilty of cruelty to an animal. 

Answer, Ex. D at 5 (emphasis added).

The trial court also instructed the jury that 

[i]n order to prove such a crime each of the following elements

must be proved: One, that a person has custody or is responsible

for providing care to an animal; two, that person either (a)

deprived or caused an animal to be deprived of necessary

sustenance, drink or shelter, or (b) subjected an animal to needless

suffering in a criminally negligent manner, and (c) that act or

omission caused danger to an animal’s life.

Id. (emphasis added).

Petitioner alleges that the use of the disjunctive “or” instead of the conjunctive

“and” allowed the jury to find petitioner guilty based solely on the element of subjecting the cats

to needless suffering, whereas the statute requires the subjecting of needless suffering in addition

to the deprivation of sustenance, drink, or shelter. The California Court of Appeal rejected

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petitioner’s argument and held that the trial court interpreted the statute correctly. Answer, Ex.

D at 5-8.

The state court’s rejection of the petitioner’s claim is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner was not convicted of violating a federal

statute. Petitioner was convicted of violating a state statute. The California Court of Appeal

concluded that petitioner was correctly convicted under that state statute. The state court’s

conclusion in this regard may not be set aside in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. See

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (a federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or

application of state law); Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal courts are

“bound by a state court’s construction of its own penal statutes”); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877

F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (a federal court must defer to the state court’s construction of its

own penal code unless its interpretation is “untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal

review of a constitutional violation”). The interpretation of the California statute by the

California Court of Appeal is not untenable and does not amount to a subterfuge. Therefore, this

claim does not support habeas corpus relief.

C

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on

intervening superceding cause. Petition at 6. Petitioner argued to the California Court of Appeal

that conduct of Placer County Animal Control employees in moving the trailer with the cats

inside was an independent superseding cause of their injury. The California Court of Appeal

held that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction on intervening superceding

cause. Answer, Ex. D at 21-24. 

The trial court’s decision to deny the petitioner’s request that the jury be

instructed on intervening superceding cause was not contrary to a clearly established federal law

nor was it an unreasonably application of law to facts, or rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

While the transportation of the trailer with the cats inside may have contributed to the filthiness

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of the trailer, the transportation could not have possibly caused the cats to suffer from herpes,

eye and respiratory infections, urine scald, or malnourishment. 

IV

A

Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated due process by refusing to allow her

to present evidence that at least some of the cats found in petitioner’s trailer would have been

euthanized by Placer County Animal Control had petitioner not taken custody of those cats. 

Petitioner argued to the California Court of Appeal that this evidence was necessary both to her

defense and for effective cross examination of an animal control officer. The California Court of

Appeal rejected both claims. Answer, Ex. E at 19-21. 

Petitioner’s claim that evidence of euthanasia was necessary to her defense is

based, in part, on the claim that she was entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense of

necessity. The trial court ruled that evidence of euthanasia was not relevant to the issues in the

case. Answer, Ex. D at 19. The California Court of Appeal found that prohibiting evidence of

euthanasia did not violate petitioner’s right to a fair trial because petitioner was not entitled to a

jury instruction on the defense of necessity. Id. at 20. 

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment,

to present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687- 690 (1986);

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972). The

constitutional right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

862, 877 (9th Cir. 2003). "Even relevant and reliable evidence can be excluded when the state

interest is strong." Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, 

[w]here evidence has been excluded pursuant to a state evidentiary

law, we use a balancing test: In weighing the importance of

evidence offered by a defendant against the state's interest in

exclusion, the court should consider the probative value of the

evidence on the central issue; its reliability; whether it is capable

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of evaluation by the trier of fact; whether it is the sole evidence on

the issue or merely cumulative; and whether it constitutes a major

part of the attempted defense. A court must also consider the

purpose of the [evidentiary] rule; its importance; how well the rule

implements its purpose; and how well the purpose applies to the

case at hand. The court must give due weight to the substantial

state interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial efficiency, and

in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence.

Alcala, 334 F.3d at 877 (quoting Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985)). A state

law justification for exclusion of evidence does not abridge a criminal defendant’s right to

present a defense unless it is "arbitrary or disproportionate" and "infringe[s] upon a weighty

interest of the accused." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). See also Crane,

476 U.S. at 689-91 (discussion of the tension between the discretion of state courts to exclude

evidence at trial and the federal constitutional right to “present a complete defense”); Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner was not entitled to argue the defense of necessity because petitioner’s

actions did not conform to the requirement that the alleged act be supported by public policy. 

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate a violation of a decision by the United States Supreme

Court or an unreasonable application of the facts in issue. The exclusion of the evidence was not

“arbitrary or disproportionate” nor did it infringe upon a weighty interest.

B

Petitioner also maintains that evidence of euthanasia was necessary for cross

examination purposes. During testimony at petitioner’s trial, an animal control officer became

emotional while describing the death of one of the cats found in the trailer. Answer, Ex. D at 19-

20. Petitioner’s attempt to cross examine the witness regarding his emotional response to

euthanasia was denied. Id. at 20. On appeal, petitioner claimed this denial inhibited her right to

cross examine the witness. Id. The California Court of Appeal found that “[e]vidence of

euthanasia to impeach the officer’s credibility was so tangential to the issues legally involved in

this case that we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. The exclusion of evidence

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concerning euthanasia was well within the trial court’s authority.” Id. at 21. 

A state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the

ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory

provision, or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due

process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918,

919-920 (9th Cir. 1991). A federal court cannot disturb a state court's decision to admit evidence

on due process grounds unless the admission of the evidence was “arbitrary or so prejudicial that

it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.

1995); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292

F. 3d 939, 956 (2002) (a writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an erroneous admission of

evidence “only where the ‘testimony is almost entirely unreliable and ... the factfinder and the

adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its

shortcomings.’" (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)). In order to grant relief,

the habeas court must find that the error had "'a substantial and injurious effect' on the verdict." 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).

 The proposed use of the evidence was tangential to the issues presented in the

case. While the animal control officer’s testimony may have been key to the state’s case,

impeachment or testimony concerning his feelings regarding euthanasia would not have disputed

the allegations that petitioner confined 92 cats, many of which were diseased, to a small trailer. 

Given the limited probative value and relevance of any potential impeachment testimony, the

trial court’s refusal to admit the evidence cannot be deemed arbitrary or so prejudicial that it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

V 

A 

Petitioner claims that the California Court of Appeal refused to allow petitioner

to speak on the public policy issues present in her case. Petition at 5. The California Court of

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Appeal denied petitioner’s request for rehearing on the issue of public policy. Answer, Ex. F

(California Court of Appeal rehearing denial). 

Beyond the mere statement of this claim in her petition, no further evidence or

authority has been presented to this court. Petitioner did not address this contention in her

petition or in her traverse. Petition cites no law or authority on which the court is supposed to

analyze this claim. Finally, petitioner has not demonstrated how the denial of her request for

rehearing has impacted her case. Therefore, petitioner has failed to carry her burden of showing

violation of federal law, or an unreasonable application of law to facts, regarding her ability to

speak on public policy. 

B

Petitioner argues that the information did not provide adequate notice of the

theory of liability under which she was being charged, and did not provide notice “as to the

nature of the accusations against her.” Petition at 5. The California Court of Appeal held that

the accusatory pleading provided petitioner with adequate notice of the charges pending against

her. Answer, Ex. D at 8-10.

A criminal defendant enjoys a fundamental right under the Sixth Amendment to

notice of the nature and cause of the charges filed in order to permit preparation of a defense. 

See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .”); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196,

201 (1948) (“It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following

conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge

that was never made.”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (“A person's right to reasonable

notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in

court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence....”); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314

(1979) (“[A] person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a

meaningful opportunity to defend.”); Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The

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Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be informed of the

nature and cause of the charges made against him so as to permit adequate preparation of a

defense.”). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes this right applicable to

the states. See Cole, 333 U.S. at 201 (“No principle of procedural due process is more clearly

established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues

raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a

criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.”).

A court must begin its analysis by looking at the content of the accusatory

pleading to determine if a defendant has received adequate notice of the charges against him. 

See Cole, 333 U.S. at 198; Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1003 (“When determining whether a defendant has

received fair notice of the charges against him, we begin by analyzing the content of the

information.”); see also Lewis James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that to

determine whether the defendant had adequate notice, “the court looks first to the information,”

the “principal purpose of [which] is to provide the defendant with a description of the charges

against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense”) (citing Lincoln v. Sunn,

807 F.2d 805, 812 (9th Cir.1987)); cf. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 217 (stating that under the Fifth

Amendment's right to a grand jury indictment, “a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on

charges that are not made in the indictment against him”). “[T]o satisfy the Sixth Amendment,

‘an information [must] state the elements of an offense charged with sufficient clarity to apprise

a defendant of what he must be prepared to defend against.’” Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1003-1004

(citing Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.1986); Russell v. United States,

369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)). “An explicit citation to the precise statute at issue is best, but a

‘brief factual recitation in the information’ can also suffice.” Gautt 489 F.3d at 1004 (quoting

Givens 786 F.2d at 1381).

Petitioner was charged by way of felony complaint, which read . . .

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[o]n or about December 30, 1998, in the County of Placer, State of

California, the crime of CRUELTY TO ANIMALS-TORTURE,

TORMENT OR DEPRIVE, in violation of section 597(b) of the

Penal Code, a felony, was committed by Suzanna Savedra

Youngblood, who did willfully, unlawfully cause numerous

animals, to wit, 92 cats, to be deprived of necessary sustenance and

drink, and having charge and custody of said animals, did fail to

provide those animals with proper food, drink and shelter, and did

subject said animals to needless suffering.

Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal volume 1 page 1.

The felony complaint thus provided both a citation to the precise statute at issue

as well as a brief factual recitation. This allegation was sufficient to inform the petitioner of the

nature and cause of the charges brought against her so as to allow preparation of a defense as

required by the Sixth Amendment. 

C

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it refused to impose sanctions on

the prosecution for its failure to preserve evidence. Petition at 6. The California Court of

Appeal held that the animal control officers’ failure to preserve some trash bags and feed bowls

did not violate the officers’ duty to preserve evidence that might be expected to play a significant

role in the suspect’s defense. Answer, Ex. D at 10-15. 

Due process requires that the prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence within its

possession. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The failure to preserve evidence

violates a defendant’s right to due process only, however, if that evidence possessed

“exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a

nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably

available means.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th

Cir. 2001). A defendant must also demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith in failing to

preserve potentially useful evidence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Cooper,

255 F.3d at 1113; see also Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993). The presence or

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absence of bad faith turns on the government’s knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of

the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-57 n.*; see also

United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The exculpatory value, if any, of the evidence at issue here was minimal. The

presence of feed bowls inside the trailer was not in contention. The evidence of petitioner’s guilt

was based on the excessive number of cats confined to a small enclosure, their diseased and

filthy condition, and the condition of the trailer. Evidence of unlimited food and water would

not have refuted those facts.

Further, petitioner has made no showing that the officers acted in bad faith. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief

under § 2254 is denied.

DATED: August 28, 2007

/s/ Arthur Alarcón 

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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