Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07348/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DELACRUZ, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 06-7348 CRB (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad,

California, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that prison officials refuse to provide him with an MRI for a back and

neck injury he sustained prior to incarceration. Plaintiff specifically alleges that

prison medical staff refuse to abide by his private physician's recommendation

that he receive an MRI. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint

"is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted," or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief." Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Case 3:06-cv-07348-CRB Document 3 Filed 02/26/07 Page 1 of 4
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate

indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on

other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc).

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications that a prisoner has a

“serious” need for medical treatment includes the existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual’s daily activities, and the existence of chronic and substantial pain. Id.

at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir.

1990)).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner

faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)

(equating standard to that of criminal recklessness). Consequently, proving

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negligence is not enough to establish liability under the Eighth Amendment. Id.

at 835-36 & n. 4. An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he

should have perceived but did not, cannot under our cases be condemned as the

infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. Instead, “the official’s conduct must have

been ‘wanton,’ which turns not upon its effect on the prison, but rather, upon the

constraints facing the official.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.

1998) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). Prison officials

violate their constitutional obligation only by “intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.

A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, a showing of nothing

more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of

treatment over the another is generally insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058, 159-160 (9th Cir. 2004);

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). In order to prevail on a

claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisonerplaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically

unacceptable under the circumstances and that they chose this course in

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Toguchi, 391 F.3d

at 1058; Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

The attachments to plaintiff's complaint show that in a letter dated August

16, 2005, plaintiff's pre-incarceration chiropractor, Jose L. Reynoso, wrote:

Based on examination findings of January 6th, 2004, this

patient, suffering from neck and back injuries, will require the

following: a bed mattress enforced with thicker padding, a

neck/cervical pillow for added neck support, and more comfortable

shoes. In addition, a lumbar MRI study is recommended.

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On December 18, 2005, plaintiff filed an appeal demanding that prison officials

provide him a "lower bunk chrono" and the MRI recommended by his

chiropractor. He noted that Dr. Aung had examined him on November 18, 2005

and wrongfully denied him an MRI. On December 21, 2005, three days after he

filed the appeal, Dr. Dayalan examined plaintiff and issued him a "low bunk

chrono" and medications. Dayalan did not refer plaintiff for an MRI or to see a

specialist on the ground that "it is not medically necessary." On February 3,

2006, Dr. Aung again saw plaintiff and concurred with Dayalan that an MRI or

referral to a specialist is not medically necessary. 

Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the prison doctors' medical judgment is not

enough to establish a claim for deliberate indifference under § 1983. See

Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344. That plaintiff's chiropractor recommended an MRI

nearly two years before the prison doctors examined plaintiff and determined that

an MRI is not medically necessary does not compel a different result. See

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058-60. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED under the

authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order, terminate all

pending motions as moot, and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Feb 26, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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