Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00050/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00050-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SONYA WOLF and NICHOLAS H., a

Minor, by and through his

Guardian Ad Litem ROGER CRAIG,

NO. CIV. S-06-0050 WBS KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS 

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, GERARDO

FLORES, individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin; CAROL CABRAL

individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin; MELISSA TORRES,

individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin; RONALD BROWN,

individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin; and Does 1-10

inclusive;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Sonya Wolf and Nicholas H. allege several

causes of action against defendants, including violation of

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, false imprisonment,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. (Compl.) Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), defendants County of San

Joaquin, Gerardo Flores, Carol Cabral, Melissa Torres, and Ronald

Brown now move for dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

Because the named defendants are entitled to immunity under state

law, the court concludes that the state law claims against all

defendants should be dismissed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On January 7, 2005, acting on an anonymous tip,

defendants Cabral, Torres, Flores, and Brown visited plaintiffs’

home to conduct a “safety check” on the family. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-

17, 25.) Specifically, defendants sought to ascertain whether

plaintiffs had food and basic utilities. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) 

Defendants did not, however, have a warrant for the desired

inspection. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff Wolf initially refused to let defendants into

her home. (Id. ¶ 18.) However, she offered to display evidence

of the family’s food supply in the window. (Id.) She also

pointed out to defendants that they could verify that she had

running water and electricity without entering her home by

testing external water and light fixtures. (Id.) She further

offered to flush the toilet so that defendants could hear that it

worked. (Id. ¶ 22.) The complaint also states that defendant

Torres was well aware that Wolf relied, at least in part, on her

fireplace for heat and maintained an ample supply of firewood

outside the house. (Id. ¶ 21.)

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The legal basis for any claim under the First Amendment 1

is unclear, but defendants have not moved to dismiss it.

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These offerings failed to satisfy defendants, who

continued to insist that Wolf let them in. Plaintiffs allege

that defendants eventually “threatened in a loud and demanding

voice[] to break down the door” and claimed to have obtained the

authority to do so. (Id. ¶ 22.) In light of defendants’

ultimatum, Wolf relented and opened the door “against her wishes

. . . .” (Id. ¶ 24.)

Once inside the home, defendants proceeded to make

several demands of Wolf. They required her to demonstrate that

various utilities were operational, to show them her food supply,

and to prove, through a display of the contents of her wallet,

that she had sufficient funds to procure additional food. (Id.

¶¶ 26-27.) Defendants next attempted to question Wolf’s children

about their family life over Wolf’s express objections. (Id. ¶¶

25, 28.) After they had completed this interrogation, defendants

left without taking further action.

Plaintiffs Wolf and Nicholas H. subsequently filed this

suit, which alleges four causes of action based on 42 U.S.C. §

1983: violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free

of (1) warrantless home invasions and (2) warrantless home

searches; (3) violation of Wolf’s First and Fourth Amendment 1

rights to be free of a warrantless search of her purse and

coerced revelation of the state of her personal finances; and (4)

violation of Nicholas’ Fourth Amendment right to be free of inhome warrantless seizure (detention for questioning). (Id. ¶¶

35-43.) Wolf also raises state law claims based on California

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Civil Code § 52.1, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional

distress. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 44-55.) Plaintiffs seek both compensatory

and exemplary/punitive damages as well as an award of costs and

attorneys’ fees. (Id. (Prayer for Relief).) By this motion and

based on statutory immunity for government officials, defendants

County of San Joaquin, Flores, Cabral, Torres, and Brown move to

dismiss plaintiffs’ claims based on alleged violations of state

law.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court

may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless “it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Dismissal is

appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to allege facts

that support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (complaint must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests”).

B. Section 821.6 Immunity

Under California law, “[a] public employee is not

liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any

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judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable

cause.” Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6. This immunity also covers the

investigatory stage of judicial proceedings. Amylou R. v. County

of Riverside, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1209-11 (1994) (holding that

“investigation is part of the prosecution of a judicial

proceeding” and applying § 821.6 to an arguably abusive

investigation of a witness to a crime where officers entered the

witness’ house uninvited to interview her). Additionally, by

operation of § 815.2(b), the county enjoys derivative immunity. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(b) (“[A] public entity is not liable for

an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”); see

also Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.

2002) (“California . . . has rejected the Monell rule and imposes

liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior

for acts of county employees; it grants immunity to counties only

where the public employee would also be immune.”).

Section 821.6 provides a sweeping immunity for “any

injury caused by the prosecution of the judicial proceeding . . .

.” Amylou R., 28 Cal. App. 4th at 1211 (emphasis added); see

also Rosenthal v. Vogt, 229 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 (1991)

(“Government Code section 821.6 extends to the pursuit of

proceedings within the scope of the employee’s assigned

employment; the immunity is not limited to activities lawfully

performed.”). As the California courts have observed, the

legislature provided such broad protection to encourage public

employees to fearlessly enforce their duties. See Amylou R., 28

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Cal. App. 4th at 1213 (“[I]n the end [it is] better to leave

unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject

those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of

retaliation.” (quoting Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 583

(1957))); Novoa v. County of Ventura, 133 Cal. App. 3d 137, 143

(1982). 

However, as plaintiffs point out, the legislature

reigned in this immunity, at least with respect to child abuse

investigations, when it enacted California Government Code §

820.21. See Comm. Rep., A.B. 1355, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995)

(commenting that this provision was designed to provide an

“effective check upon the arbitrary power or absolute immunity of

social workers”). In pertinent part, this section provides that

public officials who initiate or conduct child welfare

investigations are not cloaked with immunity for “conduct that

includes perjury, fabrication of evidence, failure to disclose

exculpatory evidence and obtaining testimony by duress [or undue

influence], if committed with malice.” Parkes v. County of San

Diego, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2004); see also Cal.

Gov. Code § 820.21. 

In another case related to the one now before the

court, Wolf v. County of San Joaquin, No. CIV. S-06-0047, 2006 WL

1153755, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2006), this court applied the

immunity exception in § 820.21 to deny defendants’ motion to

dismiss. However, in contrast to that action, plaintiffs here

have not alleged any conduct that would bring defendants’ actions

within the scope of § 820.21. Plaintiffs simply argue without

explanation that they “have alleged that the defendants engaged

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To the extent that plaintiffs believe “testimony” was 2

obtained from plaintiff Nicholas H. by duress or undue influence,

the court notes that the state law claims are not asserted by

this plaintiff. (See Compl. ¶ 15 (“NICHOLAS makes no claims

against defendants based on state law herein.”).)

Although plaintiffs have clearly alleged violations of 3

their federal constitutional rights by local government

officials, states are not required to provide citizens with civil

statutory remedies for such violations. Unless states elect to

provide additional remedies, plaintiffs are limited to the relief

available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gensburg v. Miller, 31

Cal. App. 4th 512, 518-19 (1994) (recognizing that § 1983 claims

might still be viable even when “any state or common law causes

of action [were] barred by section 821.6”).

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in a pattern of conduct which surely falls within each and every

one of the Civil Code Sections set forth in G.C. 820.21.” (Pls.’

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 9.) Yet the complaint is completely

devoid of any allegations of perjury, fabrication of evidence, or

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Additionally,

plaintiffs have not described any testimony obtained from

plaintiff Wolf by duress or undue influence. Consequently, the 2

court cannot apply California Government Code § 820.21 to this

case. 

III. Conclusion

Pursuant to the sweeping immunity provided in § 821.6

and the derivative immunity afforded to the county in § 815.2(b),

the court will dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims.3

Furthermore, because the court concludes that § 821.6 immunity

bars plaintiffs’ state law causes of action, it need not address

defendants’ other immunity arguments and contentions that

plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with

respect to certain defendants.

///

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims be,

and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

DATED: July 5, 2006

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