Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03807/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03807-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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28 1 Murphy filed her opposition one week late. The Federal Defendants urge the court to

"disregard" Murphy's papers. Rep. Supp. Mot. Dism. at 1:19-20. The court declines to do so.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

DOH

E-FILED on 5/12/05

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CARY ANN MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et. al.,

Defendants.

No. C-04-3807 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re Docket No. 18]

Plaintiff Cary Ann Murphy ("Murphy") has sued the United States of America and the Department

of Veterans Affairs (collectively "the Federal Defendants") for disability discrimination, harassment, and

wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy. The Federal Defendants move to dismiss

the complaint. The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered the arguments of

counsel.1 For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the Federal Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Murphy's complaint alleges that she was a registered nurse working at the Department of Veterans

Affairs ("VA") facility in Palo Alto. Compl. ¶ 3. On October 1, 2001, she entered a state-sponsored

rehabilitation program ("the program") for drug addiction. Id. at ¶ 8. The program informed her that she

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2 At one point, the complaint states that the Federal Defendants sent the notice on "July 2,

2004" and informed Murphy that she would be fired "effective . . . July 11, 2003." Compl. ¶ 3. The court

assumes that the former date is a typo: other portions of the complaint allege that these events took place in

2003. See id. at ¶ 27.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

DOH 2

was required to stop nursing until further notice. Id. She relayed this information to her supervisor, Ms.

Paulson ("Paulson") through a series of phone calls in early October, 2001. Id. at ¶ 10. 

On February 25, 2002, Special Agent Paul Laurie ("Laurie") of the Inspector General's Office told

Murphy that Paulson was planning to fire Murphy "based on her alleged AWOL status and purported lack

of communication with the VA." Id. at ¶ 11. Murphy was unable to contact the VA. Id. at ¶ 12. In

March 2002, Murphy attempted "to process her written requests for an authorized Family Leave" but was

blocked by "active resistance from her superiors at the VA." Id. at ¶ 15. Murphy informed Paulson on

May 6, 2002 that she "could use her nursing license, but could not provide direct patient care." Id. at ¶ 19. 

Murphy "asked for any reasonable accommodations available," but Paulson ignored this request and

instead sent Murphy a Notice of Intent to Terminate Employment on May 9, 2002. Id. at ¶ 21. 

In September 2002, Murphy retained counsel. Id. at ¶ 26. On July 2, 20032, the Federal

Defendants informed her that they would terminate her employment effective July 11, 2003 "because of her

perceived disability as a drug addict." Id. at ¶ 27. On May 18, 2004, Murphy filed a discrimination claim

with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("the DFEH"). Id. at ¶ 30. She received

a Notice of Suit Rights on May 21, 2004. Id. at ¶ 31. On February 4, 2004, Murphy filed a Federal Tort

Claim with the Office of Regional Counsel ("the ORC"). Id. at ¶ 32. The ORC rejected the claim on

March 10, 2004. Id. 

On September 9, 2004, Murphy filed this complaint for (1) disability discrimination in violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("the ADA") and the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920 et. seq. ("the FEHA"); (2) harassment in

violation of the ADA and the FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of the ADA and the FEHA; (4)

discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ("the Rehabilitation

Act"); (5) discrimination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 C.F.R. §825.11 ("the

FMLA"); and (6) wrongful firing in violation of public policy. 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

DOH 3

II. ANALYSIS

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when a complaint exhibits either a "lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The court must accept the facts alleged in

the complaint as true. Id. "A complaint should not be dismissed 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Gilligan v.

Jamco Dev.Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957)).

Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to seek dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under

Rule 12(b)(1) "the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction" and "'must show in his pleading,

affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction.'" Tosco Corp. v.

Communities for a Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v.

McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926)).

A. Claims Under the ADA, the FEHA, and the FMLA

Murphy argues that the Federal Defendants violated the ADA, the FEHA, and the FMLA. Compl.

¶¶ 33-79, 92-95. However, "[t]he United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it has waived

its immunity . . . . In sovereign immunity analysis, any lawsuit against an agency of the United States . . . is

[also] considered an action against the United States." Balser v. Department of Justice, Office of U.S.

Trustee, 327 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine is jurisdictional: generally, courts have no

power to entertain claims against the federal government. See McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th

Cir. 1988) ("whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity against suits for damages is . . . a

question of subject matter jurisdiction"). Exceptions occur only where Congress waives the doctrine's

protections. See, e.g., U. S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). Such waivers "cannot be implied but

must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).

Neither the ADA, the FEHA, nor the FMLA includes a waiver of sovereign immunity. The ADA

excludes the United States from its provisions. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B)(i) ("the term "employer"

does not include . . . the United States [or] a corporation wholly owned by the government of the United

States). Likewise, the FEHA applies only to "the state or any political or civil subdivision thereof and

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

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cities." Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(d). The FEHA could not apply to the federal government because it

was enacted by the California Legislature and "only Congress can waive immunity . . . ." California v.

NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004). Finally, Murphy attempts to sue under Title I of

the FMLA. See Compl. ¶ 94 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). However, Title II of the FMLA applies to

federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 6381(1)(a) (defining "employee" to include "a physician, dentist, or

nurse in the Veterans Health Administration of the Department of Veterans Affairs"). Moreover, "the

absence of an express waiver of the government's sovereign immunity in Title II of the FMLA bars private

suits for violations of its provisions." Russell v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.

1999). Thus, the court dismisses Murphy's ADA, FEHA, and FMLA claims. 

B. Claim for Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of Public Policy

Murphy alleges that the Federal Defendants fired her in contravention of public policy. Compl. ¶¶

96-101. However, an employee wrongfully fired from a federal job may only state a claim under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). See Brown v. General

Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976) (Congress intended Title VII "to create an exclusive,

pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination");

Baqir v. Principi, 288 F. Supp. 2d 706, 709 (W.D. N.C. 2003) (former VA cardiologist's claim for

"wrongful discharge in violation of . . . public policy . . . [was] preempted by Title VII"). Thus, the court

dismisses Murphy's cause of action for wrongful firing in violation of public policy.

C. Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act

Murphy also alleges that the Federal Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act. Compl. ¶¶ 80-91. 

Unlike the ADA, the FEHA, and the FMLA, a federal employee may sue the government under the

Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (providing that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" in

Title VII "shall be available" to any federal employee complaining of discrimination against the

handicapped). Nevertheless, "the same exhaustion requirements of Title VII" apply to claims under the

Rehabilitation Act. Boyd v. U.S. Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1984). Under Title VII, a

federal employee "who believe[s] they have been discriminated against . . . must initiate contact with a

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3 The statute establishes an exception where a plaintiff proves "that he or she was not notified

of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them . . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2). Murphy does

not argue that this exception applies. Not could she: she alleges that she retained counsel in September

2002, well before she was fired again in July 2003. Compl. ¶ 26.

4 Murphy claims that "the Title VII administrative exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional." 

Opp. Mot. Dism. at 4:18-19. For support, Murphy cites Zipes v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

385, 393 (1982), Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708, and Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 767

(2d Cir. 2000). However, Zipes held only that "a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a

jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is

subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). Zipes did

not address the issue of what happens when a plaintiff never complains to the EEOC. Indeed, as

Sommatino itself makes clear, "[i]n cases where a plaintiff has never presented a discrimination complaint

to the appropriate administrative authority, we have held that the district court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction." Sommatini, 255 F.3d at 708 (emphasis added). Likewise, Francis reasoned that "[i]t is, of

course, logically possible that a total failure to present a particular claim to the EEOC raises a

jurisdictional bar to bringing that claim in district court . . . ." Francis, 235 F.3d at 767 (emphasis added). 

Murphy is thus mistaken.

5 Of course, this fact also compels the conclusion that Murphy could not state a claim under

Title VII itself. Murphy tries to avoid this outcome by citing Place v. Abbott Laboratories, 215 F.3d

803, 806 (7th Cir. 2000) for the proposition that "even if a plaintiff whose underlying discrimination claim is

barred for failure to exhaust his or her administrative remedy, that plaintiff may still prevail on a Title VII

claim that he or she was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination." Opp. Mot. Dism. at 5:4-

7. But Place noted only that "[a] plaintiff whose underlying discrimination claim fails may still prevail on a

claim that she was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination." Place, 215 F.3d at 806

(emphasis added). In fact, in Place, the plaintiff lost at trial, not because she had failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

DOH 5

Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory, or, in the case of personnel

action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a), (a)(1).3 

The Federal Defendants fired Murphy on May 9, 2002 and July 2, 2003. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 27. Yet

Murphy does not allege that she ever contacted a Counselor. In addition, the Federal Defendants filed a

declaration from an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Program Manager, Carmencita Lozano, who

stated that there is "no record of any EEO complaints filed by . . . Murphy." Lozano Decl. Supp. Mot.

Dism. ("Lozano Decl.") ¶ 1. Although the court cannot generally consider matters outside the pleadings on

a motion to dismiss, the same is not true for "[m]aterials outside the pleadings which relate to jurisdiction . .

. ." Pan American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 420 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The complete failure to file an appropriate administrative complaint under Title VII is a jurisdictional defect. 

See Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001).4 Thus, the court can properly take

note of Lozano's declaration. Because Murphy did not comply with the prerequisites for stating a claim

under Title VII, her Rehabilitation Act claim is dismissed.5 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

DOH 6

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the Federal Defendants' motion. Murphy's complaint is

dismissed. Although it appears that any attempt to amend would be futile, the court grants twenty days

leave to amend as a matter of right since no responsive pleading was filed within the meaning of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a). See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1995).

DATED: 5/12/05 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS —C-04-3807 RMW

DOH 7

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

David Scott Secrest secrest@batnet.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Claire T. Cormier claire.cormier@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered for

e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 5/12/05 /s/ DOH

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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