Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03212/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03212-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner’s three other claims were dismissed because they failed to state a cognizable basis

for relief.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALVIN T. KUTZER,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 05-3212 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE

(Docket No. 8)

On August 8, 2005, petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After

reviewing the petition, the Court found petitioner’s second claim, that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s advice that he plead guilty, to be cognizable.1

 The

Court ordered respondent to file an answer showing cause why the petition should not be

granted based on that claim, or in the alternative, a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds. 

Respondent chose the latter course, and has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. 

Petitioner has filed an opposition, and respondent has filed a reply. 

BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2000, petitioner pled guilty to one count of forcible lewd or

lascivious acts with a child under the age of fourteen, and one count of lewd or lascivious

acts with a child under the age of fourteen. On January 23, 2001, the trial court sentenced

petitioner to state prison for two concurrent terms of fifteen years to life. Petitioner did not

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

Under certain circumstances, §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) provide for the running of the

limitations period on a later date than the date on which the judgment became final. Neither party

contends, nor is there any apparent basis for finding, that §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(C) apply to the instant

case. Petitioner does argue, however, that the commencement of the limitations period should be

delayed pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D), which argument is discussed below. 

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Respondent notes that March 24, 2001, the sixtieth day, fell on a Saturday, and therefore the

final day is the following Monday, March 26, 2001.

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file a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. On February 19, 2004, petitioner filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Humboldt County Superior Court, which petition

was denied on May 25, 2004. Thereafter, on June 14, 2004, petitioner filed a habeas petition

in the California Court of Appeal, which petition was denied on July 28, 2004. Finally,

petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on August 17, 2004, which

petition was denied on July 20, 2005.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") became law

on April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) sets forth the “general

rule” that petitions challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within

one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”2

 Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196,

198 (9th Cir. 1998) 

In the instant case, as noted, petitioner did not seek direct review of his conviction or

sentence. Where a petitioner does not seek direct review of his conviction, the limitations

period begins running the day after the date on which the time to seek such review expires. 

See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002). In California, a defendant has

60 days after the date of the superior court judgment in which to file an appeal to the

California Court of Appeal. See Cal. Rule of Court 30(a)(1), 30.1. Here, the superior court

judgment occurred on January 23, 2001, and thus the time for seeking direct review in the

California Court of Appeal expired on March 26, 2001.3

 As a result, the limitations period

commenced on March 26, 2001 and expired one year later, on March 26, 2002. The instant

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A pro se federal habeas petition is subject to the “mailbox rule” set forth in Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), under which the petition is deemed filed on the date it is delivered

to prison authorities for mailing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001),

vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). August 1, 2005, the

date the petition was signed, is the earliest date that the petition could have been delivered to prison

authorities for mailing. The Court assumes for purposes of this discussion that the petition was

delivered to prison authorities on that date.

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Petitioner asserts that the factual predicate of his claims is contained in a police report

favorable to the defense and in a letter written by defense counsel that demonstrates a conflict of

interest. 

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In his verified petition, petitioner sets forth the facts constituting his explanation, which facts

will be considered as evidence. Cf. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir.

1995) (holding allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint should be treated as affidavit in opposition

to motion for summary judgment to extent such allegations are based on plaintiff’s personal

knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence). Respondent does not dispute these

facts in their motion or their reply. 

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petition is deemed filed on August 1, 2005,4 well over three years after the limitations period

had expired. Consequently, under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the instant petition would be untimely. 

Petitioner argues, however, that the commencement of the limitations period should be

delayed pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D). Section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides for a delay in the

running of the one-year limitations period until the date on which “the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” Under this provision, the limitations period begins “when the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their

legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and

internal quotations omitted). Here, petitioner argues the limitations period should be delayed

until January 2004, because, according to petitioner, it was then that he reviewed the case file

and first learned of the factual predicate of the claims in his petition.5

 Respondent argues that

with the exercise of due diligence, petitioner could have obtained and reviewed his case file

much earlier than January 2004, a date nearly three years after his conviction. 

Petitioner offers an explanation as to why he did not review the case file until January

2004.6

 Specifically, petitioner states the following. After he was sentenced in January 2001,

he requested that his defense counsel pursue an appeal on his behalf, and he assumed counsel

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In his opposition, petitioner states he had been told “appeals can take years.” 

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had done so.7 In September 2003, he discovered that no appeal had been filed, and,

consequently, requested and received the case file from counsel that same month. He did not

review the case file until January 2004, however, because his cell-mate had “an intense

hatred” for inmates with child molestation charges, and he was afraid his cell-mate would

discover he had such charges. In January 2004, he moved in with a different inmate, at

which time he reviewed the case file and learned of the factual basis for the claims presented

herein. 

Respondent argues that with due diligence petitioner could have discovered the factual

predicate for his claims in 1998. Respondent asserts that in 1998, at the preliminary hearing,

the police report was “mentioned” by an officer, and that it was included in discovery turned

over to defense counsel. As to the preliminary hearing, however, there is only a brief

reference to the report having been made, without any allusion to the report's allegedly

exculpatory content. (Resp.’s Ex. 6 at 31). Consequently, petitioner could not have

discovered the report's exculpatory nature from that passing comment. With respect to

discovery, assuming the report was included therein, petitioner's claim is that his attorney did

not disclose the report to him at that time, or, for that matter, until he turned over the case file

in September 2003; respondent points to no evidence to the contrary. Finally, respondent

makes no argument as to how petitioner could have discovered his attorney’s alleged conflict

of interest. Consequently, respondent has not shown petitioner could have discovered the

factual predicate of his claims in 1998. 

Respondent next argues that petitioner has not accounted for his failure to request the

case file before September 2003, approximately two years and eight months after he was

sentenced. As noted, petitioner explains that he had asked his attorney to file an appeal on

his behalf; petitioner believed counsel had done so and, understanding that such appeals “can

take years,” he did not check with counsel earlier. Respondent has cited no authority, and

this Court is aware of none, suggesting that due diligence requires an inmate to monitor the

progress of an appeal he has asked counsel to pursue. In the absence of such authority, the

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In light of this finding, the Court need not address petitioner’s additional arguments that the

running of the limitations period could be further delayed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and that

he should be excused from complying with AEDPA’s statute of limitations because of his “actual

innocence.” 

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Court finds petitioner, particularly given his incarcerated status, has adequately shown he

acted reasonably in trusting that his lawyer was pursuing his requested appeal, and thus it

was not for lack of diligence that he did not discover the factual predicate of his claims until

September 2003. Consequently, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D) and under the circumstances

presented herein, the running of the limitations period did not begin until September 2003. 

Although the instant petition was not filed until August 2005, nearly two years later,

statutory tolling renders the petition timely. The one-year limitations period is tolled for the

“time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

In California, the statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner's final

collateral challenge. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-23 (2002). In this case, the statute

of limitations was tolled between February 19, 2004, when petitioner filed his first state

habeas petition in the California Superior Court, and July 20, 2005, when his last state habeas

petition was denied by the California Supreme Court. Thus, approximately five months of

the limitations period, which period commenced in September 2003, had expired when

tolling began in February 2004, and approximately seven months of the limitations period

remained at the time statutory tolling ceased in July 2005. As the instant petition was filed

the following month, in August 2005, it is timely.8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on petitioner, within 60 days of the

date this order is filed, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted based

on the cognizable claim in the petition. Respondent shall file with the answer and serve on

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petitioner a copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been transcribed previously

and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with

the Court and serving it on respondent within 30 days of his receipt of the answer.

This order terminates Docket No. 8.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 7, 2006 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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