Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03626/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03626-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GINGER MATSUMOTO-HERRERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03626-VC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 38

Continental Casualty's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. 

Mastumoto-Herrera's FEHA claims for age and disability discrimination based on Continental 

Casualty's decision to pass her over for the Operations Director position must go to trial. Her 

remaining claims may not.

Age and Disability Discrimination Claims Concerning the Operations Director Position

There is a genuine issue of fact on whether Continental Casualty's decision to pass over 

Matsumoto-Herrera for the Operations Director position was based partly on her age and 

disability, and whether the decisionmakers' subsequent explanation for passing her over was 

pretextual. The following evidence prevents the Court from concluding that no reasonable juror 

could find for Matsumoto-Herrera on this question:

 When Matsumoto-Herrera interviewed for the position, the decisionmakers were aware 

she was 53 years old and had just gone out on temporary medical leave. 

 The candidate they hired, Olga Brody, was 38 years old. 

 The job description for the Operations Director position stated that five years of 

managerial experience was "preferred." Brody had no experience directly managing 

employees, while Matsumoto-Herrera had more than five years.

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 Matsumoto-Herrera's managerial experience was with underwriting technicians – the 

people the Operations Director would be called upon to manage.

 Although the decisionmakers said in deposition that they were not convinced 

Matsumoto-Herrera had the "strategic skills" needed for the position, her performance

reviews (which were uniformly positive over the years) hinted that she had these skills.

 Although the decisionmakers touted Brody's "strategic skills" in their depositions, they 

spoke of this issue at a high level of generality, without providing clear examples or 

explaining with any specificity what they meant.

 Brody was fired a year later for inadequate performance. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, 

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Facts tending to show that the chosen 

applicant may not have been the best person for the job are probative as they 'suggest 

that [the explanation] may not have been the real reason for choosing [the chosen 

applicant] over the [plaintiff].'") (quoting Lindahl v. Air Franc, 930 F.2d 1413, 1439 

(9th Cir. 1991)); cf. Williams v. Edward Apffels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986).

To be sure, there is a good deal of evidence from which a jury could conclude that 

Continental Casualty's decision to pass over Matsumoto-Herrera for the Operations Director 

position was not discriminatory, and that the decision to hire Brody was merely a mistake. But the 

above-cited evidence constitutes "specific and substantial facts" to create a triable issue on pretext. 

See Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Remaining FEHA Discrimination Claims

Continental Casualty provides legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for eliminating 

Matsumoto-Herrera's Support Services Manager position and for not interviewing her for the 

administrative assistant position. The Support Services Manager position was eliminated as part 

of a restructuring of Continental Casualty's field operations by Andrew Cohen, who did not know 

that Matsumoto-Herrera held the position when it was eliminated. Matsumoto-Herrera was not 

interviewed for the administrative assistant position because, unlike those who were, she had not 

recently served as an administrative assistant, and because her prior salary was approximately 

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United States District Court

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$50,000 higher than the offered salary for that position, which caused concern that MatsumotoHerrera would leave promptly upon finding a higher paying position. Matsumoto-Herrera points 

to no evidence suggesting that these reasons for eliminating her position or for not interviewing 

her for the administrative assistant position were a "mask for prohibited [] bias." Guz v. Bechtel 

Nat'l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 353 (2000).

Matsumoto-Herrera also provides no evidence to create a triable dispute on her gender 

discrimination claims. Women were hired for both the Operations Director and administrative 

assistant positions. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).

Claim for Failure to Prevent Discrimination

There is no genuine issue of fact on whether Continental Casualty failed to prevent 

discrimination. Matsumoto-Herrera has provided no evidence suggesting that Continental

Casualty "failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination" and that "this failure caused 

[her] to suffer injury." Lelaind v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1103 

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Cal. Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI) 12.11). She notes that two Continental 

Casualty employees did not receive disability discrimination training, but there is no evidence 

either employee was involved in the decision to hire Brody, rather than Matsumoto-Herrera, for 

the Operations Director position. 

Claim for Wrongful Termination

As discussed above, Matsumoto-Herrera fails to raise a triable dispute on her claim that her 

position was eliminated in violation of FEHA. Therefore, her claim for wrongful termination also 

fails. See Haney v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 623, 641 (2004) (for

wrongful termination claim, plaintiff must show that "the alleged violation of public policy was a 

motivating reason for the discharge").

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Claims Relating to Interactive Process and Reasonable Accommodation

To survive summary judgment on her claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, 

Matsumoto-Herrera must establish a triable dispute on whether she initiated the process, identified 

 

1 Matusumoto-Herrera does not argue that her wrongful termination claim can somehow be linked 

to Continental's decision to pass her over for the Operations Director position. 

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the disability and resulting limitation, and suggested some reasonable accommodation. See Scotch 

v. Art Inst. of Cal.-Orange Cnty., Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1013 (2009). But MatsumotoHerrera never informed anyone at Continental Casualty of any limitation she had as a result of a 

disability beyond the need for time off, which Continental Casualty gave her. 

Nor does Matsumoto-Herrera provide any evidence that Continental Casualty failed to 

offer a reasonable accommodation. See id. at 1009-12. She did not propose any accommodation 

to Continental Casualty beyond her requests for time off. 

Claim for Violation of FMLA/CFRA

Matsumoto-Herrera provides no evidence of a connection between the decision to 

eliminate her Support Services Manager position and her request for medical leave. See

Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (for FMLA claim, 

plaintiff must "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her taking of FMLA-protected leave 

constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate her"); Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 

150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 885 (2007) (for CFRA claim, plaintiff must show that she "suffered an 

adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of her exercise of 

her right to CFRA leave"). She points out that she originally requested medical leave beginning

February 1, 2013, months before Continental Casualty decided to eliminate her position. But as 

noted above, Cohen, who drove the restructuring process that resulted in Matsumoto-Herrera's 

position being eliminated, did not know who held the Support Services Manager position. There 

is no evidence suggesting that anyone involved in the decision to eliminate the Support Services 

Manager position was aware of Matsumoto-Herrera's February 1 request for medical leave. 

Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Matsumoto-Herrera points to no conduct by Continental Casualty or any of its employees 

that "is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." 

Kelley v. Conco Cos., 196 Cal. App. 4th 191, 215 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996) ("A simple 

pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. . . . [T]he remedy is a suit 

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against the employer for discrimination.").

Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Nor does Matsumoto-Herrera point to evidence showing that she suffered "serious 

emotional distress," which would be necessary to support a claim for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress. See Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1377-78 (2010). Contrary to 

Continental Casualty's argument, Matsumoto-Herrera is not required to have seen a therapist or to 

have been treated with medication prior to her deposition to create a fact issue with respect to

emotional distress. But she must provide more than a conclusory declaration stating that her selfesteem has been "shattered" and that she continues "to feel a lack of self-worth and despair." See 

id. (tort requires "emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no 

reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it" (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2015

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

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