Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03834/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03834-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\CR.06\McClain834_msj.wpd

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ALLEN MCCLAIN,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

DEPUTY G. L. ARNOLD, et al., 

Defendants.

 

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No. C 06-03834 JF (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 18)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alameda County Deputy Sheriff G. L. Arnold,

Alameda County Sheriff Plummer, and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. 

In its initial review of the complaint, the Court found one cognizable claim against

Defendant Arnold for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and dismissed

the complaint with leave to amend as to Defendants Alameda County Sheriff

Plummer and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. The Court granted

Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies in his claims

against Defendants Plummer and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department within

thirty days. Plaintiff did not respond or file an amended complaint in the time

Case 5:06-cv-03834-JF Document 20 Filed 09/05/08 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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provided. Accordingly, all claims against Defendants Plummer and the Alameda

County Sheriff’s Department are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

Defendant Arnold filed a motion for summary judgment on November 5,

2007, on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has not established that Defendant was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; and (2) Defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity. Plaintiff did not file opposition to Defendant’s summary

judgment motion. After reviewing the complaint and motion, the Court concludes

that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment and will GRANT Defendant’s

motion. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

show that there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court will

grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders

all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law,

and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the

burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no

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Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue

for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party

need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Id. at 325. If the evidence in opposition to the motion is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). If the nonmoving

party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Id. at 323.

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed

material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts must be

viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. It is not the

task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable

fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party

has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that

precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, the district

court may grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See id.; see, e.g.,

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir.

2001). 

II. Legal Claim and Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that while he was detained at the Santa Rita Jail in Dublin,

California, Defendant Deputy Arnold wrongfully confiscated Plaintiff’s walking

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cane on April 26, 2006, and lied to Plaintiff that the doctor withdrew Plaintiff’s

medical “chrono” authorizing his use of the cane. Plaintiff alleges that a cane is

necessary because he suffers from vertigo and paralysis on his left side. Plaintiff

claims that Deputy Arnold conspired with a nurse, who is not named as a defendant

in this action, who knew of Plaintiff’s medical condition. Plaintiff alleges that

another medical staff member and deputy returned Plaintiff’s cane and verified

Plaintiff’s medical “chrono” for the cane. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s claim is

sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against

Defendant Arnold. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate indifference”

involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical

need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are

examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment. Id.

at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a purposeful act or failure to

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1

 Nurse M. Sadri is not named as a defendant in this action although Plaintiff

alludes to a conspiracy between her and Defendant Arnold. 

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1060. 

Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant is appropriate for summary judgment. First of

all, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claim that his vertigo

and paralysis constituted a “serious” medical condition, see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1059-60. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference and consciously disregarded an

excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health by taking away his walking cane. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. 

Defendants have submitted declarations and documentary evidence showing

the following facts: On April 26, 2006, Defendant Arnold observed Plaintiff

misusing his authorized cane by walking around with his cane hanging from his

shirt. (Arnold Decl. at 2.) Defendant had previously observed Plaintiff misusing his

cane and had warned him that he would bring it to the attention of medical staff if he

continued to do so. (Id.) On the same day, Defendant Arnold reported his

observations of Plaintiff misusing his cane to Nurse M. Sadri1

 during the daily sick

call, when inmates seeking medical attention are seen by a nurse. (Id.) Nurse Sadri

had treated Plaintiff on numerous occasions, usually during the daily pill call and

sick call, and had personally observed Plaintiff misusing his cane on previous

occasions. (Sadri Decl. at 2-3.) On the day at issue, Nurse Sadri conducted a

physical examination of Plaintiff, agreed with Defendant’s observations, and

believed that a cane was no longer medically indicated. (Id.) Toward the end of

sick call that day, Nurse Sadri brought Plaintiff’s misuse of his cane to the attention

of Dr. Horacio Campos, the Santa Rita physician, who determined that Plaintiff was

not properly using his cane and ordered the cane discontinued. (Id.) Defendant

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Arnold confiscated the cane pursuant to Dr. Campos’ order. (Arnold Decl. at 3.) 

Defendant has met his burden of showing an absence of evidence to support

Plaintiff’s case that he was suffering from a serious medical condition or that

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference thereto. The declarations provide

evidence that Plaintiff was able to move around without the use of the walking cane,

which he carried hanging from his shirt. Even assuming that Plaintiff’s vertigo and

paralysis constituted a “serious” medical condition, there is no evidence to support

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference in confiscating the

cane. The record shows that Defendant followed the policies and procedures of the

Sheriff’s Office in his actions leading to the confiscation of Plaintiff’s walking cane:

1) Defendant monitors all inmates who possess medically approved devices that can

be used as a weapon, such as Plaintiff’s cane; 2) after observing an inmate misusing

a medical devise, such as a cane, Defendant warns the inmate that failure to properly

use the devise will result in referral for reevaluation by medical staff; 3) if the

inmate’s behavior does not change, Defendant informs the medical staff of the

problem; and 4) only medical staff can discontinue an inmate’s medically approved

device. (Def.’s Motion at 10.) Pursuant to these procedures, Defendant observed

Plaintiff misusing his cane, as a medically approved device, on several occasions

and warned him against the continued misuse of the cane. (See supra at 5.) When

Plaintiff continued to misuse the cane despite the warning, Defendant informed

medical staff, i.e., Nurse Sadri, of the problem. (Id.) Defendant confiscated the

walking cane from Plaintiff only after Dr. Campos made the decision to discontinue

the cane. (Id.) Accordingly, Defendant did not act with deliberate indifference

when he followed the policies and procedures of the Sheriff’s Office in confiscating

Plaintiff’s walking cane after it was properly determined by medical staff to

discontinue it. Nor can it be said that Defendant acted with a conscious disregard to

an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health in confiscating the cane in light of the fact that

he had observed Plaintiff walking without the use of the cane on several occasions. 

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2 Plaintiff was advised pursuant to Rand v Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc), that to prevent summary judgment in favor of defendants he “must

set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradicts the facts shown

in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial.” May 1, 2008 Order at 4. (quoting Rand, 154 F.3d at 962-

63). “If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you.” Id.

3

 Because the Court finds that no constitutional violation occurred, it is not

necessary to reach Defendant’s qualified immunity argument. 

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

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Finally, the record clearly contradicts Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant “lied” that a

doctor had withdrawn the approval of the cane because it is well documented that

Dr. Campos did in fact order the cane discontinued. 

As noted, Plaintiff has not filed opposition to the motion for summary

judgment.2

 Where the plaintiff does not file an opposition to a motion for summary

judgment but has verified his complaint, the Court treats the allegations in the

verified complaint as an opposing affidavit to the extent such allegations are based

on plaintiff’s personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. 

See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). Here,

Plaintiff failed to sign his complaint, and therefore this Court cannot treat the

allegations in the complaint as an opposing affidavit. See id.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to

meet his burden of proof under Celotex and show that there is a genuine issue for

trial on his claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Arpin, 261

F.3d at 922. 

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

Consequently, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim.3

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Arnold’s motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. All claims against Defendants Plummer and the Alameda County

Sheriff’s Department are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

The Clerk of Court shall terminate Docket No. 18, enter judgment and close

the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

9/3/08

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