Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02555/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter Sharma, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-2555-PHX-ROS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Petitioner challenges his

criminal conviction in the Maricopa County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No. CR

2005-011597. (Doc. 1) Respondents have filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (the “Answer”) and Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 11, 12) As explained

below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends the Petition be denied as untimely.

I. Background

A. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing

On July 19, 2005, the State of Arizona filed an indictment in the Maricopa County

Superior Court, charging Petitioner with one count of Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, a

class two felony (Count 1), and three counts of Forgery, a class four felony (Counts 2, 3, and

4). (Doc. 11, Exhibit (“Exh.”) A) On February 17, 2006, Petitioner entered into a plea

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1

 The Honorable Warren J. Granville presided over the change of plea and sentencing

hearings. 

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agreement pursuant to which he pled guilty to Count 1 of the indictment.1

 (Doc. 11, Exhs.

FF, GG and HH) The agreement provided that Petitioner would plead guilty to Count 1; be

placed on supervised probation after his release from prison in a different matter; pay up to

$75,000 in restitution; and Counts 2, 3, 4, and various prior conviction and release-status

allegations would be dismissed. (Doc. 11, Exh. FF) 

At the sentencing hearing on April 28, 2006, the trial court entered a judgment of guilt

as to Count 1 and placed Petitioner on probation for five years, to begin upon his discharge

from prison in a different matter. (Doc. 11, Exhs. KK, LL and MM) The trial court also

ordered Petitioner to pay restitution to the victim. (Doc. 11, Exhs. MM) The restitution issue

was not finalized until almost two years later, on March 6, 2008, when the trial court issued

an order directing Petitioner to pay $56,216.37 to a title insurance company. (Doc. 11, Exh.

EEE)

B. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law.

See A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). Petitioner, however, retained his right to seek review in an “ofright proceeding” under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.1, 32.4. On May 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 11,

Exh. NN) The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in the post-conviction

proceedings. (Doc. 11, Exh. OO) Petitioner’s counsel subsequently filed a notice stating he

had reviewed the record and could find no claims to raise. (Doc. 11, Exh. TT) Counsel also

requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief. (Id.) The trial court granted Petitioner 45 days from October 18, 2006, the date of the

order, to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 11, Exh. UU) On January 4, 2007, the trial court

dismissed the post-conviction proceedings because Petitioner failed to file a petition. (Doc.

11, Exh. XX) Petitioner did not seek review of the trial court’s ruling in the Arizona Court

of Appeals. (Doc. 11, Exhs. MMMM, NNNN)

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2

 The trial court rejected Petitioner’s first two pro se petitions because they failed to

comply with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, but granted Petitioner further

extensions of time to correct the errors. (Doc. 11, Exhs. HHH, JJJ) 

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On November 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.

(Doc. 11, Exh. YY) The trial court again appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. (Doc. 11,

Exh. ZZ) Nine days after filing his second notice, Petitioner filed a third Notice of PostConviction Relief on November 29, 2007. (Doc. 11, Exh. AAA) On December 6, 2007, the

trial court issued a Minute Entry explaining it had received Petitioner’s third notice but

because he was represented by counsel, the court would not consider it. (Doc. 11, Exh. BBB)

The trial court simply ordered that it be forwarded to Petitioner’s counsel. (Id.) On April 9,

2008, Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice stating he had reviewed the record and could find

no meritorious claims to raise in a post-conviction petition. (Doc. 11, Exh. FFF) Counsel

also requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition, which the trial

court granted. (Doc. 11, Exhs. FFF, GGG)

On August 4, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,2

arguing he was denied a restitution hearing, and there was newly-discovered evidence the

victim did not own the property at issue. (Doc. 11, Exh. KKK) After briefing was completed,

the trial court dismissed the petition on November 12, 2008. (Doc. 11, Exh. NNN) The trial

court found Petitioner’s claims time-barred pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) because

they were not raised in his first post-conviction proceeding or in an objection to the

restitution order the trial court issued on August 28, 2006. (Id) In that August restitution

order, the trial court gave Petitioner until December 8, 2006, to object to the restitution award

of more than $56,000 to the title insurance company. (Id.) Petitioner did not object and the

trial court finalized the restitution order on December 8, 2006. (Doc. 11, Exhs. NNN, EEE)

Alternatively, the trial court found Petitioner’s allegations were factually inaccurate and

lacked merit. (Doc. 11, Exh. NNN) Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial

court’s dismissal of the petition. (Doc. 11, Exhs. MMMM, NNNN) 

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3

 The Honorable Michael W. Kemp presided over Petitioner’s probation violation and

disposition hearings.

4

 The referenced page numbers represent the page numbers appearing on the original

exhibit, not the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic filing system.

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C. First Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On May 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court.

(Doc. 1 of CV 09-1139-PHX-ROS (LOA)) Petitioner subsequently filed a Second Amended

Petition, arguing his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated and his plea was

coerced. (Doc. 8 of CV 09-1139-PHX-ROS (LOA)) The undersigned Magistrate Judge

issued a Report and Recommendation on December 28, 2009, recommending the petition be

denied as untimely and procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 15 of CV 09-1139-PHX-ROS (LOA))

The assigned District Judge adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied the petition

on January 19, 2010. (Doc. 16 of CV 09-1139-PHX-ROS (LOA))

D. Probation Violation

It appears Petitioner began serving his five-year probation sentence on June 14, 2009.

(Doc. 11, Exh. UUU) On November 18, 2010, his probation officer filed a Petition to

Revoke Probation based on Petitioner’s alleged failure to pay restitution as ordered and abide

by “Special White Collar Conditions of Probation.” (Id.) Petitioner, through counsel,

responded to the petition to revoke and denied the allegations. (Doc. 11, Exhs. VVV, WWW

and XXX) A violation hearing was held in Maricopa County Superior Court on January 21

and 28, 2011.3

 (Doc. 11, Exhs. YYY, BBBB) At the conclusion of the two-day hearing, the

trial court found Petitioner violated the special white collar conditions of his probation by

opening a bank account in July 2010 without prior approval, failing to account for income

deposited into his bank accounts, and having an encumbrance on his vehicle without

probation department approval. (Doc. 11, Exh. BBBB at 61-62,4

 CCCC) A disposition

hearing was held on February 4, 2011, at which the trial court revoked Petitioner’s probation

and sentenced him to the minimum prison term of four years in the Arizona Department of

Corrections. (Doc. 11, Exh. FFFF, GGGG)

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 The docket reflects the Petition was actually filed on November 29, 2012. (Doc. 1)

The November 27, 2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the Petition, doc. 1 at 9, and

reflects the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Petitioner, through counsel, filed a direct appeal of the trial court’s ruling, arguing the

four-year prison sentence imposed was excessive. (Doc. 11, Exh. HHHH) After briefing was

completed, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on October 4,

2011, affirming the trial court’s decision. (Doc. 11, Exh. KKKK) Petitioner did not seek

further review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 41, Exh. LLLL)

E. Current Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On November 27, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in this District Court.5

 (Doc. 1) Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in the Petition. In

Ground One, Petitioner alleges his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel

by improperly advising Petitioner to enter a plea agreement. In Ground Two, Petitioner

alleges prosecutors violated the Due Process Clause and committed misconduct when they

failed to failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges his plea

agreement was an invalid contract of adhesion. On June 20, 2013, Respondents filed their

Answer and supporting exhibits. (Doc. 11) Petitioner then filed his Reply on July 8, 2013.

(Doc. 12) 

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because it was not

filed within the statute of limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Alternatively, Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted. 

Because the information presented clearly establishes the Petition was filed after the

limitations period expired, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds the Petition is barred and

recommends it be denied on that basis. It is, therefore, unnecessary to address Respondents’

alternative argument.

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6

 The AEDPA, which was enacted on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas petitions

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997).

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A. Jurisdiction

Respondents concede that even though Petitioner previously filed a habeas petition

in this District Court challenging the same underlying State court conviction, the District

Court has jurisdiction over this matter. (Doc. 11 at 12-14) This Magistrate Judge agrees with

Respondents’ analysis that the instant petition is not a “second or successive application” for

which Petitioner was required to seek authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

before filing it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). In Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. __, 130 S.Ct.

2788, 2802 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that where “there is a ‘new

judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,’[citation omitted], an application

challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all.” Similarly, in

Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit, following

Magwood, held a petition is not “second or successive” under the AEDPA where it

challenges a new, intervening judgment.

Here, after Petitioner filed his first habeas petition in this Court in 2009, a new State

court judgment was issued revoking his probation and sentencing him to four years in prison.

This Magistrate Judge finds, therefore, the instant petition is not “second or successive” and

Petitioner was not required to obtain authorization from the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3) before filing it.

B. Statute of Limitations Legal Standards

 Turning to the issue of timeliness, the AEDPA6

 imposes a statute of limitations on

federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

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seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief

remains “pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) until it achieves final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

219-220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state

court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921,

925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition itself may not be filed until later. Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that

Isley’s state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely.”). Filing a new petition for post-conviction relief,

however, does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed.

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” that prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

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7

 Petitioner’s timely Notice of Appeal was filed on February 22, 2011. (Doc. 11, Exh.

NNNN)

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(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis 

1. Limitations Period

Here, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s probation and sentenced him to prison on

February 4, 2011. (Doc. 11, Exh. GGGG) Petitioner then filed a direct appeal in the Arizona

Court of Appeals.7

 After the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision on

October 4, 2011, Petitioner had thirty days to seek review of that decision in the Arizona

Supreme Court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals

issues its decision, any party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme

Court . . . .”). As a result of Petitioner’s failure to file a petition for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, the judgment became final upon the expiration of the thirty-day period for

seeking review, which was November 3, 2011. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Hemmerle

v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (judgment became final on the date the

petitioner allowed his time to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court to expire). The oneyear limitations period began to run the next day, November 4, 2011, and ran uninterrupted

until it expired on Monday, November 5, 2012. As indicated above, Petitioner submitted the

Petition to this Court on November 27, 2012, approximately three weeks after the deadline.

2. Tolling

Statutory tolling of the limitations period is inapplicable here. Petitioner had no

“application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim” pending during the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2).

Regarding equitable tolling, as referenced above, the limitations period set forth in §

2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling where a petitioner shows he has been pursuing his

rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely

petition. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562. Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by

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the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Equitable tolling is not available in most cases. Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”)

(citation omitted). An “external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have

said, merely ‘oversight, miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.’” WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1011(quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)).

A pro se petitioner’s ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not constitute

“extraordinary circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro se

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”); see

also Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 context,

rejecting movant/prisoner’s attempt to justify his lack of diligence on his pro se status and

lack of legal sophistication and stating: “we have never accepted pro se representation alone

or procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy

calls for promptness”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n.4 (“a pro se petitioner’s

confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”),

cert. denied, 558 U.S. 897 (2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

demonstrating it is warranted in his case. Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing, inter alia, Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562).

Here, Petitioner has failed to show extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and

prevented him from filing a timely petition. In the section of the Petition that directed

Petitioner to explain why the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) does not

bar the Petition, Petitioner cites an inapplicable United States Supreme Court case. (Doc. 1

at 9) Petitioner cites Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 927 (2012), which held that a habeas

petitioner established cause to excuse his procedural default by showing his attorney

abandoned him during post-conviction proceedings, thereby causing him to miss the deadline

for filing an appeal from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The case has no

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relevance to the Petition here is timely. 

Moreover, in his Reply, Petitioner makes no mention of the statute of limitations

defense asserted by Respondents. (Doc. 12) Petitioner argues factual issues relevant to the

merits of his claims, but presents no explanation for the untimely filing of the Petition. Thus,

Petitioner has presented no basis to apply equitable tolling.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner submitted the Petition

after the limitations period expired. In addition, this Magistrate Judge finds no basis to apply

statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Consequently, the Petition is barred by the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

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review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 16th day of January, 2014.

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