Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01272/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01272-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES W. GRANGER, CASE NO. CV-F-05-1272 AWI DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION

 FOR RECONSIDERATION

ORDER VACATING OCTOBER 16, 2006

vs. HEARING DATE

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

ED ALAMEIDA, JR., et. al.,

ORDER REFERRING ACTION TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendants.

 / (Doc. #22)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint,

which alleges that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with timely medical care. 

On January 3, 2006 and January 18, 2006, Defendants filed two motions to dismiss. In both

motions, Defendants contended that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

filing suit. On February 21, 2006, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 23, 2006, Defendants

filed a reply. 

On June 26, 2006, Defendants filed a supplemental brief concerning new decisions by the

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit that were relevant to the exhaustion issue. Plaintiff did not file

any response to the supplemental brief.

On August 31, 2006, the court granted Defendants’ motion. Citing to Woodford v. Ngo, 126

S.Ct. 2378 (2006), the court found that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's

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deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively

without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386. The court

recognized that “[proper exhaustion] means ... a prisoner must complete the administrative review

process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to

bringing suit in federal court.” Id. (emphasis added). Applying this ruling to the facts of this

action, the court concluded that the rejection of Plaintiff’s appeal as untimely meant that Plaintiff had

not exhausted his administrative remedies. Pursuant to Ngo an inmate has not exhausted his

administrative remedies when his inmate appeal is rejected as untimely. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2386. The

court then granted Defendants motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

On September 11, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff complains

that he was never given the opportunity to respond to Defendants’ supplemental brief. Plaintiff

argues that he was prevented from presenting argument and facts to establish an exception to the

deadlines. On September 28, 2006, Defendants filed an opposition. Defendants contend that

Plaintiff has cited no grounds for reconsideration. Defendants point out that Plaintiff had the

opportunity to address Defendants’ supplemental brief after Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378

(2006) was decided. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d

1185, 1198 (9 Cir.1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9 Cir.1992). th th

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, however, and are not the place for parties to make new

arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip.,

Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9 Cir.1988). “A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a th

disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by

the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.” U.S. v.

Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). Motions to reconsider are

committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441

(D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9 Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party

th

must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior

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decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal.

1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. 1987). th

Pursuant to Rule 59(e), any motion to alter or amend judgment shall be filed no later than ten

days after entry of judgment. Rule 59(e), however, is an “extraordinary remedy, to 

be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona

Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9 Cir.2000). Amendment or alteration is th

appropriate under Rule 59(e) if (1) the district court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, (2)

the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3)

there is an intervening change in controlling law. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740

(9 Cir. 2001); School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. th th

1993). This showing is a “high hurdle.” Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9 Cir. 2001). A th

judgment is not properly reopened “absent highly unusual circumstances.” Id. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse

party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b). . The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being

exclusive of the preceding clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d

1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, “the clause is reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. 

When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the

“new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon

such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.” 

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, the court notes that the pending motion for reconsideration is set for oral

arguments to be heard on October 16, 2006. The court has reviewed the parties’ briefs and has

determined that this matter is suitable for decision without oral argument. Local Rule 78-230(h). 

Therefore, the court vacates the hearing date and takes the motion for reconsideration under

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submission.

At issue in the court’s prior order was whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his claims. On

December 15, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a CDC Form 602 concerning his medical treatment. This

appeal stated that beginning in October 2003, Plaintiff was sick with fever, nausea, night sweats,

vomiting, and Plaintiff began to loose weight rapidly and that on October 6, 2003, Plaintiff began

having chest pains, and attempted to see a doctor. The appeal stated that Defendant Benjamin Elrod

refused treatment and told Plaintiff his symptoms were not an emergency. The appeal stated

Plaintiff was eventually examined and sent to an outside medical facility, Mercy Hospital, and

treated for valley fever. The appeal stated that medical staff is inadequate and unprepared to deal

with inmates in an expedient and timely manner. The appeal also alleged Plaintiff received a bad

sunburn after was forced to sit in the hot sun for over three hours while a search was conducted. 

Defendant Benjamin Elrod again refused Plaintiff medical treatment. The appeal asked for a

complete investigation into the Facility medical staff, specifically, but not limited, to the actions of

Defendant Elrod, asked that medical staff be dealt with, and asked that all inmates on Facility D be

allowed adequate, appropriate, and expedient medical attention. 

On December 31, 2004, this appeal was bypassed at the informal level. On March 10, 2005,

Plaintiff’s appeal at the first level of review was partially granted. The first level response reviewed

Plaintiff’s medical treatment and found Plaintiff’s treatment for valley fever and the sunburn was

similar to that for other inmates, and was appropriate. The first level response also indicated that

Plaintiff’s allegations were being reviewed, and if staff misconduct was substantiated, the institution

would take appropriate action. The first level response stated that if Plaintiff was dissatisfied, he

could submit his appeal at the second level for review. 

On March 21, 2005, Plaintiff appealed to the second level. Plaintiff stated in this appeal that

the first level had not addressed all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations. On May 4, 2005, Plaintiff’s

second level appeal was screened out as untimely because Plaintiff was appealing an issue that

occurred in October 2003.

Defendants moved to dismiss this action for Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to filing suit. Citing to Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006), the court found that

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a prisoner is required to comply with the a prison systems’ procedural rules. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. at

2388. Plaintiffs’ second level appeal was screened out as untimely because Plaintiff did not file any

appeal within fifteen days of the alleged inadequate medical care in October 2003. Plaintiff never

appealed or responded to the Appeals Coordinator's reason for rejecting his second level appeal in a

follow-up appeal or an appeal to the Director’s Level. Thus, the court concluded Plaintiff had not

exhausted all available remedies.

In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff contends that he was not given an opportunity to

address Ngo and the arguments made in Defendants’ supplemental brief. Plaintiff claims he was

never given the opportunity to present evidence regarding the reasons Plaintiff filed his

administrative complaint and the manner in which Defendants precluded him from continuing his

appeals. Plaintiff requests an opportunity to present argument and facts that will establish an

exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

The court is at a loss to explain why Plaintiff did not file a supplemental brief concerning

Ngo after Defendants filed their supplemental brief, or at a minimum, ask the court for permission to

file such a brief. However, pursuant to this court’s local rules, the briefing for a motion includes a

motion, opposition, or reply. While supplemental briefing is appropriate in some situations, such as

a new relevant Supreme Court case, supplemental briefing should include the opportunity for all

parties to response to the new case authority. Because the court never specifically directed Plaintiff

to file a response to Defendants’ supplemental brief and Plaintiff claims he would like such an

opportunity, the court finds that reconsideration is warranted. Plaintiff will be given the

opportunity to address the application of Ngo on his case and Defendants’ motion to dismiss for

failing to exhaust administrative remedies.

ORDER

Accordingly, the court finds that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED;

2. The oral argument set for October 16, 2006 is VACATED;

3. The court’s August 31, 2006 order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

VACATED;

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4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to reopen this file;

5. Plaintiff may file a response to Defendants’ supplemental brief by October 30, 2006;

6. Defendants may file a reply to Plaintiff’s response by November 13, 2006;

7. This action is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck for further

proceedings, including the entry of Findings and Recommendations regarding

Defendants’ motion and the supplemental briefing. If the Magistrate Judge believes

oral arguments would assist him, the Magistrate Judge will set this matter for hearing. 

Otherwise, the Magistrate Judge will take the matter under submission as of

November 13, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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