Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06276/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DRAKE M. WARD, et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

MACK WIMBISH, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6276 REC/DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND

DIRECTING PLAINTIFFS TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE FILING

DATE OF THIS ORDER

On April 18, 2005, the court heard the four motions to

dismiss filed by (1) defendants Judge John I. Quinlen, Judge

Catherine D. Purcell, Sherrie Leonard, and Susan Hogue (Yeargan);

(2) defendants Judge Kenneth C. Twisselmann III and Judge Frank

A. Hoover; (3) defendant Bill Lockyer; and (4) defendants Mack

Wimbish, Mark Arnold, Edward Jagels, David Boyd, Sam Smith, John

Nobles, James Newell, Pamela Belmore, Perry Patterson, Patrick

Glennon, Jason Belasis, and the County of Kern. No written

opposition to these motions to dismiss were filed by plaintiffs,

who are proceeding in pro per. Plaintiff Drake M. Ward appeared

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1The allegations of the FAC imply that the conspiracy arose in

part to retaliate against or to deter Ward from testifying in a

civil action filed by Dorothy Barnes in federal court. The court

has reviewed electronically the dockets of the United States

District Courts in the Northern, Eastern, Central and Southern

Districts of California and can find no reference to any action

filed by Dorothy Barnes.

2

at oral argument.

On May 2, 2005, the court heard defendant Bryan Hefner's

motion to dismiss. No written opposition to the motion was filed

by plaintiffs and neither plaintiff appeared at oral argument.

A. Background.

On September 17, 2004, Drake D. Ward “an individual, and as

next friend to; JENNEVIE M. SANCHEZ, an individual” filed a

Complaint against a number of defendants in their official and

individual capacities. The Complaint was 41 pages long and

contained 260 paragraphs. Defendants Judges Quinlen and Purcell

and Leonard and Yeargan filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint

as did defendants Mack Wimbish, Mark Arnold, Edward Jagels, David

Boyd, Sam Smith, John Nobles, James Newell, Pamela Belmore, Perry

Patterson, Patrick Glennon, and County of Kern. However, before

those motions could be heard, plaintiffs filed a First Amended

Complaint as of right pursuant to Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

The First Amended Complaint (FAC) is 51 pages long and

contains 351 paragraphs. The FAC alleges:1

1. This is a civil action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 for

damages by a common law husband and wife

against various law enforcement and court

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3

officials arising from the husband having

been criminally charged on 3 occasions with

various crimes including spousal abuse

against his handicapped wife. Plaintiffs

allege Defendants deprived them of liberty

and property without due process of law by

means of an on going conspiracy and malicious

prosecution to retaliate against the husband

for testifying against two defendant officers

in a criminal hearing, and to deter him from

freely testifying in federal court against

those officers. In furtherance of the

conspiracy, Plaintiffs allege that after they

filed the original complaint, named

defendants deprived them of liberty without

due process of law by the use of force and

false charges against Plaintiffs in an

attempt to coerce them to drop the said

complaint, and to deter Plaintiffs from

testifying against the original defendants in

federal court in violation of the First,

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2. Plaintiff(s) further allege the County of

Kern and its supervisors described herein,

are liable for: (1) a pattern or practice of

unconstitutional false arrests, false

reports, and illegal searches and seizures by

Kern County Sheriff’s Department (KCSD)

officers, (2) a pattern or practice of

unconstitutional malicious prosecutions by

Kern County District Attorney (KCDA) public

prosecutors, and (3) a pattern or practice of

unconstitutional inadequate representations

by Kern County Public Defender (KCPD) defense

attorneys, all under color of state law in

violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

Named as defendants in both their official and individual

capacities are:

Kern County Sheriff Mack Wimbish;

Kern County Public Defender Mark A. Arnold;

Kern County District Attorney Edward R. Jagels; and

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4

California Attorney General Bill Lockyer.

Named as defendants in their individual capacities are:

John I. Quinlen, Judge of the Kern County Superior Court;

Catherine D. Purcell, Judge of the Kern County Superior

Court;

David Boyd, Sam Smith, John Nobles, James Newell, and Pamela

Belmore, and Jason Belasis, Kern County Sheriff’s Department

deputies;

Perry Patterson, Deputy District Attorney;

Patrick Glennon, Deputy Public Defender;

Sherrie Leonard and Susan Yeargan, deputy clerks of the Kern

County Superior Court Clerk’s Office;

Officer Brian Hefner of the California Highway Patrol;

County of Kern. 

Judge Kenneth C. Twisselmann II, presiding Judge of the Kern

County Superior Court; and 

Judge Frank A. Hoover, judge of the Kern County Superior

Court.

The FAC also names as Does 1-99. 

The FAC alleges in confusing order various actions and

inactions arising from the arrest and prosecution of Ward in four

separate criminal actions. 

The first of these criminal actions, either DA Case No.: COM

0504780 or Superior Court Case No. KM015073A, involves Ward’s

arrest in September 2003 and prosecution for being under the

influence of a CNS stimulant in violation of California Health &

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2Defendants have requested that the court take judicial notice

of certified copies of the docket in People v. Ward, Case No.

KF002758A. The certified copy of the docket states that Ward

was arrested on December 3, 2004 and pleaded guilty to a violation

5

Safety Code § 11550(a) and inflicting a corporal injury on

Jennevie Sanchez in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5. 

Ward was arrested by defendants Boyd, Smith and Nobles. The

prosecutor was defendant Patterson. Ward’s attorney was

defendant Glennon. The case was tried by defendant Quinlen. 

Ward was found guilty of the violation of Section 273.5 but

acquitted on the charge of violation of Section 11550(a). 

Following his conviction, Ward, attempting to act in pro per,

filed a motion for new trial, which was set to be heard before

Judge Purcell. Judge Purcell continued Ward’s motion for new

trial and set it for hearing before Judge Quinlen. That motion

was withdrawn by defendant Glennon and a new motion for new trial

was filed by Glennon. The motion for new trial was denied. It

is not clear from the Complaint what sentence was imposed on

Ward. A notice of appeal was filed. 

The second criminal action alleged in the FAC involved

Ward’s arrest in January 2004 by Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy

Newell, after Ward had been stopped by CHP Officer Hefner, for

being under the influence of a CNS stimulant in violation of

Section 11550(a) and his subsequent prosecution. No Superior

Court case number is alleged in the FAC. Ward alleges that he

pleaded no contest to this charge on February 25, 2004 and is

appealing the motion denying his motion to withdraw that plea.2

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of Health and Safety Code § 11377(a) on December 8, 2004. Because

the dates of Ward’s arrest and no contest plea alleged in the FAC

are different from those set forth on this docket sheet and no

Superior Court case number is alleged, it is unclear whether the

parties are referring to the same criminal action. While the court

need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters that

are properly subject to judicial notice, see Sprewell v. Golden

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988, amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.

2001), the court cannot determine at this juncture whether the

certified copies involve the same criminal action alleged in the

FAC. Therefore, the court does not take judicial notice of these

certified copies at this juncture. However, the court will require

plaintiffs to allege the specific Superior Court case numbers of

the criminal proceedings against them at issue in this action in

the Second Amended Complaint, to the extent that such criminal

actions remain relevant after taking into consideration the various

rulings herein. 

6

The third criminal action involves Ward’s arrest on April 7,

2004 by Kern County Sheriff’s Deputies Newell and Belmore for

possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Health & Safety

Code § 11364. The Complaint alleges that this charge was

dismissed by the court on July 2, 2004.

The fourth criminal action involves Ward’s arrest on

December 3, 2004 and subsequent charge of violation of Health &

Safety Code § 11550(a) and for violation of Penal Code § 148(a). 

It appears from the FAC that those charges are still pending.

The FAC alleges both causes of action and counts. The First

Cause of Action also alleges Overt Acts One through Five. The

Second Cause of Action alleges Overt Act Six. The Third Cause of

Action alleges Overt Act Seven. The Fourth Cause of Action

alleges Overt Act Eight. The Counts alleged in the FAC are as

follows:

1. Count One for violation 

of § 1983 “illegal entry and search” by

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plaintiffs Ward and Sanchez against

defendants Boyd, Smith and Nobles arising out

of the search of plaintiffs’ residence on

September 18, 2003;

2. Count Two for violation of § 1983 “false

arrest and imprisonment” by plaintiff Ward

against defendants Boyd, Smith, Nobles,

Wimbish and the County of Kern arising out of

Ward’s arrest on September 18, 2003 and

subsequent conviction;

3. Count Three for violation of § 1983

“inadequate representation” by plaintiff Ward

against defendants Glennon, Arnold and the

County of Kern arising out of Glennon’s

representation of Ward in the criminal

proceedings;

4. Count Four for violation of § 1983

“malicious prosecution” by plaintiff Ward

against defendants Patterson, Jagels and the

County of Kern;

5. Count Five for violation of § 1983 “false

arrest, and illegal search and seizure” by

plaintiff Ward against defendants Newell,

Patterson, Quinlen, Everett, and the County

of Kern arising out of Ward’s arrest in

January 2004;

6. Count Six for violation of § 1983 by Ward

against defendants Quinlen and Purcell for

denial of right to a fair hearing;

7. Count Seven for violation of § 1983 “to

have the freedom to redress the court of

grievances” by plaintiffs Ward and Sanchez

against defendants Glennon, Arnold and the

County of Kern;

8. Count Eight for violation of § 1985(2)

“conspiracy to interfere with federal

witness’s right to testify” by plaintiff Ward

against all defendants;

9. Count Nine for violation of § 1986

“failure to prevent conspiracy” by plaintiff

Ward against defendants John Does Five

through Nine;

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3Because plaintiffs are proceeding in pro per, they are not

entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 1988.

Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991).

8

10. Count Ten for violation of Section 1983

by plaintiffs Ward and Sanchez against

defendants Newell and Belmore for illegal

entry and search arising from the search of

their trailer on April 7, 2004;

11. Count Eleven for violation of Section

1983 by plaintiffs Ward and Sanchez against

defendants Newell and Belasis for illegal

search and seizure on December 3, 2004;

12. Count Twelve for violation of Section

1983 by plaintiffs Ward and Sanchez against

defendants Lockyer, Wimbish, Jagels, and the

County of Kern for denial of due process.

The FAC prays for compensatory damages of $ 1 million,

punitive damages of $ 1 million, and reasonable attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.3 In addition, the FAC seeks

compensatory damages of $1 million for “municipal liability” and

the following relief against Attorney General Lockyer and Kern

County:

1. A declaratory judgment that the policies,

practices, and acts complained of herein is

[sic] illegal and unconstitutional.

2. A permanent injunction enjoining said

defendants from engaging in the practice of

unlawful search of Kern County citizens homes

by misrepresentation to gain permission from

an otherwise opposing party.

3. A declaratory judgment that the practice

of false arrest and imprisonment of [sic]

where probable cause does not exist and is

based upon an opinion of the defendants is

illegal and unconstitutional.

4. A permanent injunction enjoining said

defendants from engaging in the practice of

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false arrest and imprisonment where probable

cause does not exist and is based upon an

opinion of the defendants.

The moving defendants seek dismissal of the FAC pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A. Governing Standards.

Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires

that a pleading set forth a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Under Rule

8(a)(2), a pleading must give fair notice and state the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). A

complaint that is verbose, conclusory and confusing does not

comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.,

651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). However, before a district

court’s dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend will be

affirmed, the district court must have first adopted less drastic

alternatives, such as advising plaintiff of the deficiencies in

the pleading and giving leave to amend to correct them. Id. 

Furthermore, the court must construe a pro se plaintiff’s

pleadings liberally in determining whether a claim has been

stated. Ortez v. Washington County, State of Or., 88 F.3d 804,

807 (9th Cir. 1996); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.Supp. 1132, 1137

(9th Cir. 1987). In addition, “in apprising the sufficiency of

the complaint we follow ... the accepted rule that a complaint

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

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appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

B. Failure to Comply with Rule 8(a)(2).

All defendants move to dismiss the FAC because of the

failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2).

Defendants’ motions on this ground are well-taken. As noted

supra, the FAC is extremely lengthy and very confusingly pleaded. 

The FAC combines counts, overt acts, and causes of action, making

it difficult to determine which allegations apply to which

defendant. Because of the number of criminal prosecutions, the

absence of Superior Court case numbers makes it difficult to

follow the allegations pertaining to the specific criminal

proceedings at issue. The FAC is unclear about which claims are

being made by which plaintiff. The FAC includes alleged

quotations of comments made by various defendants and unnecessary

adjectives and descriptive commentary. Paragraphs 25-27 allege

events predating the gravamen of the FAC which have no bearing

upon the statement of a claim against any of the defendants. To

the extent that various causes of action and defendants are not

otherwise dismissed from this action with prejudice, see

discussion infra, plaintiffs will be required to comply with Rule

8(a)(2) when filing the Second Amended Complaint, taking into

account the court’s rulings herein and the requirements of Rule

8(a)(2) set forth above.

C. Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Judges Quinlen and

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4The moving defendants seek dismissal on the ground that they

are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. However,

because the FAC alleges that plaintiffs are suing these defendants

in their individual capacities only, this ground for dismissal is

moot.

11

Purcell and Defendants Leonard and Yeargan; Motion to Dismiss by

Defendants Judge Kenneth C. Twisselmann III and Judge Frank A.

Hoover.

These defendants move to dismiss the FAC on several grounds,

each of which is discussed under separate heading.4

1. Judicial Immunity.

Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for

damages in their judicial acts. “A judge will not be deprived of

immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will

be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear

absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-357 (1978). A clear absence of all jurisdiction means a

clear lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mullins v. U.S.

Bankruptcy Court, Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). Judicial immunity is

not lost by allegations that a judge conspired with a third

party. As long as the judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions

taken within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, immunity

applies. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). 

However, judicial immunity for state judges does not extend to a

claim for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief. See

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5The case upon which defendants rely in asserting that they

are entitled to judicial immunity from liability for injunctive or

declaratory relief applies to federal judges only. See Moore v.

Brewster, 98 F.3d 1240, 1243-1244 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 1118 (1997). 

12

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-542 (1984).5

All of the allegations in the FAC against Judges Quinlen and

Purcell are based on judicial actions taken by them in the course

of presiding over criminal proceedings against Drake Ward and/or

Jennevie Sanchez or presiding over civil actions the rulings in

which are alleged by Drake Ward to have had an effect on the

criminal prosecutions against him. All of the allegations in the

FAC against Judges Twisselmann and Hoover are based on judicial

actions taken by them with respect to various motions and/or

writs filed in connection with the criminal proceedings against

Ward. 

Therefore, to the extent that this action seeks monetary

damages against defendants John I. Quinlen, Catherine D. Purcell,

Kenneth C. Twisselmann III, and Frank A. Hoover, this action is

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend on the basis

of absolute judicial immunity.

2. Quasi-Judicial Immunity.

Named as defendants in their individual capacities are two

clerks of the Kern County Superior Court. 

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from

damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that

are an integral part of the judicial process. See Morrison v.

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Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445

U.S. 962 (1980); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir.

1978). 

Here, the only allegation in the FAC against defendant

Yeargan is that she omitted “from her official reports the

objections made by Mr. Ward [to Judge Quinlen hearing a criminal

matter against him]” and that she falsely certified that

defendant had stated that there was no legal cause why judgment

should not be pronounced against Ward. The only allegations

against defendant Leonard are that he returned two notices of

appeal attempted to be filed by Ward with a letter stating that

there is no notice of appeal from a plea of no contest or not

guilty without a certificate of probable cause and that defendant

Leonard refused to process the notices of appeal after Ward

submitted them with a “Notice to the Clerk of Error and Good

Cause to Continue Appeal”. 

Because these allegations involve tasks that are an integral

part of the judicial process, the court dismisses the causes of

action against defendants Sherrie Leonard and Susan Hogue

(Yeargan) with prejudice and without leave to amend on the ground

of absolute quasi-judicial immunity to the extent that the FAC

seeks damages against these defendants.

3. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine; Application of Heck v.

Humphrey.

Defendants also move to dismiss the allegations of the FAC

which allege that the judges committed error in making various

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rulings in the criminal proceedings against Drake Ward pursuant

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey.

a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. 

As explained in Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-292 (9th

Cir. 1995):

As courts of original jurisdiction, federal

district courts have not authority to review

the final determinations of a state court in

judicial proceedings ... This is true even

when the challenge to a state court decision

involves federal constitutional issues ....

In Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir.

1986), the Ninth Circuit further commented:

Although the federal district court may not

exercise appellate jurisdiction over the

judgment of a state court, a district court

does have jurisdiction over a 'general'

constitutional challenge that does not

require review of a final state court

decision in a particular case ... This

distinction between a permissible general

constitutional challenge and an impermissible

appeal of a state court determination may be

subtle, and difficult to make.

In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had refused to

admit Feldman to the District of Columbia bar, because he had not

graduated from law school, a prerequisite to admission under the

District's bar rules. Feldman filed a complaint in the federal

district court, claiming that the highest court in the district's

refusal to admit him to the bar violated his constitutional

rights. The United States Supreme Court held that the federal

district court had jurisdiction to determine the

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constitutionality of the district's bar rule, because such a

determination did not require a review of "a state-court judgment

in a particular case.' Id. at 486. However, the district court

had no jurisdiction to review Feldman's constitutional challenge

to the application of the bar rule in his particular case. Id.

at 486-487. The Supreme Court further explained that "[i]f the

constitutional claims presented to a United States district court

are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a

judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for

admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence

being called upon to review the state court decision.' Id. at

483-484 n.16. In Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th

Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004), the Ninth Circuit

held:

Rooker-Feldman is a powerful doctrine that

prevents federal courts from second-guessing

state court decisions by barring the lower

federal courts from hearing de facto appeals

from state-court judgments. If claims raised

in the federal court action are ‘inextricably

intertwined’ with the state court’s decision

such that the adjudication of the federal

claims would undercut the state ruling or

require the district court to interpret the

application of state laws or procedural

rules, then the federal complaint must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction ....

“Where the district court must hold that the state court was

wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues

presented in both courts are inextricably intertwined.” Doe &

Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th

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Cir. 2001).

Here, the FAC contains numerous allegations that erroneous

rulings were made by the various defendants in the criminal

proceedings against plaintiffs. 

To the extent that the FAC seeks relief based on these

allegations of error, these claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine and are therefore dismissed against these

defendants. 

b. Heck v. Humphrey.

According to the allegations of the FAC, one of the counts

in one of the criminal proceedings against Drake Ward resulted in

a conviction and imposition of sentence which has not been

overturned, another of the criminal proceedings resulted in a no

contest plea, the withdrawal of which is allegedly to have been

improperly denied, and yet another is still pending. 

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court

held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus ... A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that

has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner

seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district

court must consider whether a judgment in

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favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, would

not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to

proceed, in the absence of some other bar to

the suit.

512 U.S. at 486-487. 

The allegations in the FAC made by Ward with respect to his

conviction of infliction of corporal injury, and the charge

resulting in the no contest plea, and the criminal proceeding

that is still pending are such that this court’s consideration of

those claims would necessarily the invalidity of his convictions

and/or sentence. Essentially, Ward complains that he was

arrested without probable cause, that evidence was falsified,

that the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge conspired to make

various rulings, that defense counsel, as part of the conspiracy,

did not provide an adequate defense, and that the judges on the

Appellate Panel of the Kern County Superior Court made erroneous

rulings in connection with appeals or petitions made by Ward. 

All of these claims against the judges specifically named as

defendants or sued as John Does Five through Nine are barred by

Heck v. Humphrey to the extent that those claims are made in

connection with the prosecution of Ward for inflicting corporal

injury in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5, with the

prosecution of Ward for being under the influence of a stimulant

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in which Ward pleaded guilty and is now appealing the denial of

his motion to withdraw that plea, and with the prosecution of

Ward arising out of his arrest on December 3, 2004.

4. Abstention - Younger v. Harris.

Noting that the allegations of the FAC imply that

proceedings in state court pertaining to the unsuccessful attempt

to withdraw the guilty plea are ongoing, the moving defendants

argue that this court should abstain from the exercise of subject

matter jurisdiction with respect to claims arising from Ward’s

conviction in that criminal case pursuant to Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Younger and its progeny teach that federal courts may not,

where circumstances dictate, exercise jurisdiction when doing so

would interfere with state judicial proceedings. See Middlesex

County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431

(1982). A district court must abstain and dismiss a suit on the

basis of Younger where: (1) state proceedings are ongoing; (2)

important state interests are involved; and (3) the plaintiff has

an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims in the state

proceedings. Id. at 432. As recently held in Gilbertson v.

Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004): 

Younger principles apply in an action for

damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which

the federal plaintiff brings a constitutional

challenge to a state proceeding when that

proceeding is ongoing; the state proceeding

is of a judicial nature, implicating

important state interests; and the federal

plaintiff is not barred from litigating his

federal constitutional issues in that

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proceeding. This is because a federal court

would necessarily have to determine whether

the federal plaintiff’s constitutional rights

were violated, and any such determination

would have the same practical effect on the

state proceedings as the injunctive relief

condemned in Younger and the declaratory

relief constrained in Samuels.

To rule on the constitutional issue in these

circumstances would implicate the state’s

interest in administration of its judicial

system, risk offense because it unfavorably

reflects on the state courts’ ability to

enforce constitutional principles, and put

the federal court in the position of making a

premature ruling on a matter of

constitutional law. Thus, the interests of

comity counsel restraint.

However, when damages are at issue rather

than discretionary relief, deference - rather

than dismissal - is the proper restraint. To

stay instead of to dismiss the federal action

preserves the state’s interests in its own

procedures, the federal plaintiff’s

opportunity to seek compensation in the forum

of his choice, and an appropriate balance of

federal-state jurisdiction.

From the allegations of the FAC, Ward has filed appeals of

his conviction of corporal injury on a spouse and of the denial

of his motion to withdraw the no contest plea. Essentially, he

alleges that the no contest plea was coerced and that the denial

of the motion was the result of the alleged conspiracy. As ruled

above, these claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity

against the defendant judges to the extent that the FAC seeks

damages. However, because absolute judicial immunity does not

bar claims for discretionary relief, the court concludes that

abstention and dismissal of these claims against the moving

defendants pursuant to Younger v. Harris is also appropriate. 

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5. John Does Five through Nine. 

As noted, the FAC contains allegations in Paragraphs 132 and

146 against John Does Five through Nine, each of whom is alleged

to be a judge of the appellate division of the Kern County

Superior Court. Count Eight and Count Nine purport to state a

claim against John Does Five through Nine. It is clear from the

allegations in the FAC that John Does Five through Nine are

entitled to dismissal of this action on the basis of absolute

judicial immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Heck v. Humphrey,

and Younger v. Harris.

Accordingly, the FAC is dismissed with prejudice and without

leave to amend against defendants Judges John I Quinlen,

Catherine D. Purcell, Kenneth C. Twisselmann III, Frank A.

Hoover, and John Does Five through Nine. The FAC is dismissed

against defendants Sherrie Leonard and Susan Yeargan with

prejudice and without leave to amend to the extent that the FAC

seeks monetary damages from these defendants.

D. Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Mack Wimbish, Mark

Arnold, Edward Jagels, David Boyd, Sam Smith, John Nobles, James

Newell, Pamela Belmore, Perry Patterson, Patrick Glennon, Jason

Belasis and County of Kern.

These defendants move to dismiss the FAC for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Each ground will

be discussed under separate heading.

1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine; Application of Heck v. 

Humphrey.

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The County Defendants move to dismiss the First, Second,

Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh and

Twelfth Counts as barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and/or

the application of Heck v. Humphrey. 

As discussed supra, Heck v. Humphrey bars the claims alleged

in the FAC pertaining to Ward’s arrest, trial and conviction for

corporal injury, his arrest, criminal proceedings and guilty

plea/no contest plea to possession of paraphernalia, and the

criminal proceedings which appear to be pending. 

However, Heck v. Humphrey does not bar those claims alleged

in the FAC relevant to the criminal charges against plaintiffs

for which Ward was acquitted or which were dismissed by the

Superior Court. In addition, the FAC also alleges that defendant

Newell participated with defendant Hefner in an unlawful search

of plaintiff’s vehicle and person on January 3, 2004, which

unlawful search did not result in the seizure of any evidence. 

The allegations of the FAC concede that the initial stop of

plaintiff by defendant Hefner was lawful. Nonetheless, it is

alleged that defendants Hefner and Newell subsequently searched

plaintiff’s vehicle without probable cause. Thereafter,

according to the allegations of the FAC, plaintiff’s arrest for

violation of the Health and Safety Code resulted from defendants’

determination that plaintiff was under the influence of a

narcotic substance because of his elevated pulse rate. In Heck,

the Supreme Court gave as examples of cases in which a

plaintiff’s action, even if successful will not demonstrate the

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invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff:

For example, a suit for damages attributable

to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie

even if the challenged search produced

evidence that was introduced in a state

criminal trial resulting in the § 1983

plaintiff’s still outstanding conviction. 

Because of doctrines like independent source

and inevitable discovery ..., and especially

harmless error ..., such a § 1983 action,

even if successful, would not necessarily

imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was

unlawful. In order to recover compensatory

damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must

prove not only that the search was unlawful,

but that it caused him actual, compensable

injury ... which we hold today, does not

encompass the ‘injury’ of being convicted and

imprisoned (until his conviction has been

overturned).

512 U.S. at 487 n.7. In Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015

(9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held:

[A] § 1983 action alleging illegal search and

seizure of evidence upon which criminal

charges are based does not accrue until the

criminal charges have been dismissed or the

conviction has been overturned. Such a

holding will avoid the potential for

inconsistent determinations on the legality

of a search and seizure in the civil and

criminal cases and will therefore fulfill the

Heck Court’s objectives of preserving

consistency, and finality, and preventing ‘a

collateral attack on [a] conviction through

the vehicle of a civil suit.’ ....

Because of the allegation in the FAC that no evidence was seized

pursuant to the search of plaintiff’s vehicle and person,

plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on this allegedly unlawful

search will not invalidate plaintiff’s subsequent conviction. 

Therefore, this claim is not barred by Heck. 

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As discussed supra, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the

numerous allegations in the FAC that erroneous rulings were made

in the four criminal proceedings at issue in this litigation. 

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims against these

moving defendants are based on allegedly erroneous rulings made

in the criminal proceedings, those claims are dismissed. 

2. Consent to Search.

Defendants move to dismiss the First Cause of Action on the

ground that the allegations of the Complaint establish that the

defendants requested permission to search the residence where

both plaintiffs lived and that plaintiff Jennevie Sanchez

consented to the search of the residence after defendants told

Sanchez that they believed Ward was under the influence of drugs.

These allegations involve the first of the criminal

proceedings brought against Ward. There is no question that the

Complaint alleges that Sanchez consented to the search. However,

there are also allegations that defendants Boyd, Smith and Nobles

“knowingly provided fraudulent information” to Sanchez that

“misled” Sanchez into believing that Ward was under the influence

of drugs and that drugs were inside their home, and that “[w]hile

Ms. Sanchez was in a highly emotional stated induced by the

events described above, defendant officers obtained permission

from Ms. Sanchez to search said residence.” These allegations

suffice to state a claim notwithstanding the allegations that Ms.

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6In addition, these defendants argue the allegations of

malicious prosecution are mere legal conclusions that do not state

a claim. However, the FAC is replete with allegations that Ward

was charged and prosecuted pursuant to a conspiracy to retaliate

against him for testifying against officers and to prevent him from

proceeding with this lawsuit. Whether or not Ward can prove these

allegations is a question of fact, not pleading. Therefore,

dismissal of the FAC on this ground is denied.

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Sanchez consented to the search.6

3. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity.

Defendants Jagels and Patterson move to dismiss the Fourth,

Fifth and Eighth Counts on the ground of absolute prosecutorial

immunity. 

In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), the Supreme

Court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability

for damages for their conduct in "'initiating a prosecution and

in presenting the State's case" insofar as that conduct is

'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.'" When prosecutors perform administrative or

investigative functions that do not relate to an advocate’s

preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial

proceedings, they are not entitled to absolute immunity. Burns

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-496 (1991). The official seeking

absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity

is justified for the function in question. Id. at 486. 

In Imbler, the Supreme Court stated that “the duties of the

prosecutor in his role as advocate ... involve actions

preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart

from the courtroom.” 424 U.S. at 431 n.33:

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A prosecuting attorney is required,

constantly, in the course of his duty as

such, to make decisions on a wide variety of

sensitive issues. These include questions of

whether to present a case to a grand jury,

whether to file an information, whether and

when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an

indictment against particular defendants,

which witnesses to call, and what other

evidence to present. 

Id. Imbler further noted that a prosecutor’s effort to control

the presentation of a witness’ testimony is “a task fairly within 

his function as an advocate.” Id. at 430 n.32. In Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993), the Supreme Court

emphasized that 

[w]e have not retreated ... from the

principle that acts undertaken by a

prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of

judicial proceedings or for trial, and which

occur in the course of his role as an

advocate ..., are entitled to the protection

of absolute immunity. Those acts must

include the professional evaluation of

evidence assembled by the police and

appropriate preparation for its presentation

at trial or before a grand jury after a

decision to seek an indictment has been made.

However, the Supreme Court held in Buckley:

The question ... is whether the prosecutors

have carried their burden of establishing

that they were functioning as ‘advocates’

when they were endeavoring to determine

whether the bootprint at the scene of the

crime had been made by petitioner’s foot. A

careful examination of the allegations

concerning the conduct of the prosecutors

during the period before they convened a

special grand jury to investigate the crime

provides the answer ... The prosecutors do

not contend that they had probable cause to

arrest petitioner or to initiate judicial

proceedings during that period. Their

mission at that time was entirely

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investigative in character. A prosecutor

neither is, nor should consider himself to

be, an advocate before he has probable cause

to have anyone arrested.

It was well after the alleged fabrication of

false evidence that a special grand jury was

empaneled. And when it was finally convened,

its immediate purpose was to conduct a more

thorough investigation of the crime - not to

return an indictment against a suspect whom

there was already probable cause to arrest

... Under these circumstances, the

prosecutors’ conduct occurred well before

they could properly claim to be acting as

advocates. Respondents have not cited any

authority that supports an argument that a

prosecutor’s fabrication of false evidence

during the preliminary investigation of an

unsolved crime was immune from liability at

common law, either in 1871 or at any date

before the enactment of § 1983. It therefore

remains protected only by qualified immunity.

509 U.S. at 274-275. In Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997),

the Supreme Court held that a state prosecutor was entitled to

absolute immunity for submitting an unsworn information charging

the respondent with burglary and motion for an arrest warrant,

but was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for her

act of submitting a “Certification for Determination of Probable

Cause” in which she personally vouched, under penalty of perjury,

for the truth of the facts set forth in the Certification. 522

U.S. at 130-131. The Supreme Court found that, in swearing to

the facts, the prosecutor had stepped outside the bounds of

advocacy and had assumed the role of a testifying witness. In so

ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the

execution of the certificate 

was just one incident in a presentation that,

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viewed as a whole, was the work of an

advocate and was integral to the initiation

of the prosecution. That characterization is

appropriate for her drafting of the

certification, her determination that the

evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a

probable-cause finding, her decision to file

charges, and her presentation of the

information and the motion to the court. 

Each of these matters involved the exercise

of professional judgment; indeed, even the

selection of the particular facts to include

in the certification to provide the

evidentiary support for the finding of

probable cause required the exercise of the

judgment of an advocate. But that judgment

could not affect the truth or falsity of the

factual statements themselves. Testifying

about facts is the function of the witness,

not of the lawyer. No matter how brief or

succinct it may be, the evidentiary component

of an application for an arrest warrant is a

distinct and essential predicate for a

finding of probable cause. Even when the

person who makes the constitutionally

required ‘Oath or affirmation’ is a lawyer,

the only function that she performs in giving

sworn testimony is that of a witness.

522 U.S. at 130-131. 

Here, with two exceptions, see discussion infra,

the allegations of the FAC that establish that defendant

Patterson is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for the

actions or inactions allegedly taken by him against plaintiff in

the criminal prosecutions at issue. All of the actions or

inactions were taken by defendant Patterson in his role as a

prosecutor. As noted supra, absolute immunity is not lost by

allegations that a prosecutor conspired with a third party. See

Ashelman v. Pope, supra, 793 F.2d at 1078. 

The two exceptions are based on the following allegations:

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61. Without justification, probable, or

legal cause, defendant PATTERSON testified

falsely as a complaining witness against Mr.

Ward under penalty of perjury, that all the

information in complaint DA Case: COM

0495026, was by his belief true and correct

that Mr. Ward was in violation of H&SC §

11550(a), and PC § 273.5(a)

...

175. Defendant PATTERSON falsely testified

as a complaining witness against Mr. Ward

under penalty of perjury, that all the

information contained in complaint DA Case:

COM 0504780, was by his belief true and

correct that Mr. Ward did use or be under the

influence of a controlled substance in

violation of H&SC § 11550(a)

The allegations in paragraphs 61 and 175 allow the inference

that Deputy District Attorney Patterson swore out the complaint

against plaintiff Ward in those cases under penalty of perjury. 

Because of that inference and given the holding in Kalina, the

court cannot conclude that defendant Patterson is entitled to

absolute prosecutorial immunity for this action based on the

allegations in paragraphs 61 and 175 of the FAC as a matter of

law.

Relying on absolute prosecutorial immunity, District

Attorney Jagels also moves to dismiss the allegations against him

in paragraphs 283-284 of the Fourth Count that “[p]rior to

September 18, 2003, [Jagels] ... developed and maintained

policies or customs of the Kern County District Attorney

exhibiting deliberate indifference to Mr. Ward’s Constitutional

right to be informed of the nature of the charges against him and

to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard and the denial of

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said rights ... [and] failed to properly train officers, or

employees ... as to their legal duties to not violate Mr. Ward’s

Constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charges

against him and to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard ...

[and i]f training was provided, it was inadequate in relation to

the tasks that the officers, or employees were required to

perform and deficiencies in the training program were closely

related to the damages to the Plaintiffs.” 

Defendant Jagels is entitled to dismissal of this action

against him on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. In

Modahl v. County of Kern, 2003 WL 1870878 (9th Cir. 2003), the

Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Jagels, holding in

pertinent part:

Modahl’s complaint alleged that Jagels, as

the district attorney, condoned or ratified

alleged coercive questioning, failed to

properly train or supervise his subordinates,

causing a failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence and the creation of unreliable child

witness testimony, and conspired to fabricate

evidence and to conceal exculpatory evidence. 

Upon de novo review of the district court’s

order, we affirm the grant of absolute

immunity to District Attorney Jagels on these

claims. 

Jagels, as district attorney, is considered a

state official for purposes of § 1983

liability while preparing to prosecute and

when prosecuting violations of state law, and

also when training personnel for and when

developing policy regarding the preparation

for prosecution of violations of state law. 

Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 360,

366 ... (1998). A state prosecutor is

entitled to absolute immunity from liability

under § 1983 for violating a person’s federal

constitutional rights when he or she engages

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in activities ‘intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.’ 

Imbler v. Pachtman, .... A prosecutor is

granted only qualified immunity, however, if

he or she is performing investigatory or

administrative functions, or is essentially

functioning as a police officer or detective. 

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons ....

Modahl argues that Jagels’ ‘nonadvocatory

conduct’ and administrative actions caused

violations of his constitutional rights. 

However, our record reveals that Jagels’

management and supervision of his staff

involved actions preliminary to the

initiation of prosecution and actions in

preparation of the initiation of the criminal

process and for trial. These actions fall

within the sphere of prosecutorial duties,

which are granted absolute immunity.

See also Hamilton v. Dailey, 777 F.2d 1207, 1213 n. 5 (7th Cir.

1985):

Counts IV and V charged State’s Attorney

Richard M. Daley and Cook County with

negligently failing to train and supervise

their employees, in allowing the acts alleged

in the previous counts to take place. Since

absolute immunity protects prosecutorial

decisions, supervision of the prosecutors who

make these decisions is similarly immune.

Here, because the allegations of the FAC, with the possible

exceptions discussed supra, demonstrate that Patterson is

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, it follows from the

cases cited above that Jagels is also entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity. 

4. District Attorney Defendants as State Officers. 

Defendants Patterson and Jagels further move to dismiss the

allegations against them on the ground that neither was acting on

behalf of the County of Kern at the time these prosecutions

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occurred.

A state official acting in his official capacity is not

considered a “person” against whom a claim for money damages

pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1985 might be asserted. Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Carmen v.

San Francisco Unified School Dist., 982 F.Supp. 1396, 1404

(N.D.Cal. 1997), aff’d, 237 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028-1031 (9th

Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held that a California district

attorney is a state officer when deciding whether to prosecute an

individual. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit followed the holding

by the California Supreme Court in Pitts v. County of Kern, 17

Cal.4th 340 (1998), wherein the California Supreme Court,

utilizing the analysis set forth in McMillan v. Monroe County

Alabama, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), analyzed California law and held

that a district attorney is a state official for purposes of

Section 1983 liability while acting in his prosecutorial

capacity. However, in Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291

F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 701

(2003), the Ninth Circuit held the district attorney was not

preparing to prosecute or prosecuting criminal violations when

the district attorney obtained and executed a search warrant in

order to investigate allegations of welfare fraud. 291 F.3d at

564-565. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit analogized to the

cases discussing entitlement to absolute prosecutorial immunity,

relying on the holdings in Fletcher v. Kalina, supra, that a

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prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct in

preparing a sworn declaration in support of an arrest warrant,

and in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, supra, that a prosecutor is not

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity when he allegedly

fabricated evidence during the investigation by retaining a

dubious expert witness. The Ninth Circuit held in pertinent

part:

Relying on Fletcher and Buckley, and

recognizing the significant factual

distinctions between this case and Pitts, we

find that the District Attorney was engaging

in investigatory, and not prosecutorial, acts

when he obtained and executed a search

warrant over the Tribe. This conclusions

compels our finding that the District

Attorney acted as a county officer when

obtaining and executing a search warrant

against the Tribe.

291 F.3d at 565.

Consequently, defendants Jagels and Patterson are entitled

to dismissal of the allegations against them in their individual

capacities on this ground to the extent that Patterson and Jagels

are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from liability.

5. Public Defender Defendants.

Assistant Public Defendant Glennon and Public Defender 

Arnold move to dismiss the allegations against them.

In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme

Court held that when an assistant public defender is performing

the traditional role of an attorney for a client, the public

defender is not acting “under color of state law” for purposes of

suit under Section 1983. 454 U.S. at 318-319. Although

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concluding that an assistant public defender does not act under

color of state law when exercising his or her independent

professional judgment in a criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court

cautioned that a public defender might be found to act under

color of state law while performing administrative or

investigative functions. Id. at 325. 

Here, the allegations against defendant Glennon establish

that all of plaintiffs’ claims against Glennon arise out of the

exercise of Glennon’s professional judgment in his representation

of Ward in the the criminal proceeding in which he was appointed

to represent him.

However, in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984), the

Supreme Court held that state public defenders are not immune

from liability under Section 1983 for intentional misconduct,

under color of state law, by virtue of alleged conspiratorial

action with state officials that deprive their clients of federal

rights. 

As noted, the FAC alleges in paragraph 1 that the defendants

conspired to charge and prosecute Ward in retaliation against him

for testifying against two “defendant officers” in a criminal

hearing, which was subsequently dismissed, and to deter Ward from

freely testifying in a civil rights action filed in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation

in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a

motion to dismiss. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

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268 (9th Cir. 1982); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th

Cir. 1980). The Complaint must allege facts from which it may be

inferred that an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights may be inferred. See Woodrum

v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989); see also

Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1983):

‘Complaints will be sustained against private

persons who conspire with immune public

officials if the allegations of conspiracy

are sufficiently specific.’ ....

... The factual basis need not be extensive,

but it must be enough to avoid a finding that

the suit is frivolous ... Appellants must at

least allege that ‘the defendants had

directed themselves toward an

unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual

understanding,’ and provide some facts

‘suggesting such a “meeting of the minds.”’

Furthermore, it is not enough that a judge’s rulings be arguably

unconstitutional or erroneous to support an allegation of

conspiracy. Such an allegation must be supported by specific

allegations of conspiratorial actions, apart from the judge’s

rulings on motions. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202,

1205 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, the allegations that Glennon conspired with the other

defendants is not supported by any facts inferring a meeting of

the minds. First of all, it is noted that Glennon obtained an

acquittal on one of the charges against Ward. Furthermore, for

example, Ward alleges in paragraph 83 that Glennon’s crossexamination of Sanchez resulted in evidence from which the jury

could have inferred that Ward acted in self-defense being

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concealed from the jury and that “[t]he only possible reason for

the acts of defendant GLENNON ... was that he was not defending

Mr. Ward, but was defending the misconduct of the defendant

officers.” In paragraphs 90-93, Ward alleges that defendant

Patterson objected to the admission of certain testimony as

hearsay, that Glennon failed to argue to the contrary and that

defendant Quinlan sustained Patterson’s objection. In paragraph

102, Ward alleges that defendants Quinlen, Patterson, Glennon,

Boyd, Smith, and Nobles “conspired to set up an unconstitutional

policy wherein defendant GLENNON would not cross-examine

defendants BOYD, SMITH, and NOBLES to any degree that would

reveal misconduct by the defendant officers ... [and that]

GLENNON pretended to defend Mr. Ward while he did in fact

actually defend the defendant officers.” In paragraph 103, it

is alleged that defendants Quinlen, Patterson, Glennon, Boyd,

Smith, and Nobles “conspired to set up an unconstitutional policy

wherein Defendant PATTERSON will maliciously prosecute accused

defendants with H&SC § 11550(a) based solely upon the OPINION of

the arresting officer, and without probable cause.” In paragraph

113, Ward alleges that Glennon conspired with defendants

Patterson and Quinlen to remove a motion for new trial that Ward

attempted to file pro se from the record. In Count Three, it is

alleged in pertinent part:

265. Upon information and belief, defendant

GLENNON has worked out of the same small town

court system of the East Kern Judicial system

for many years, and its [sic] reasonable to

believe that after so many years of working

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with the same officers year in and year out

that a public defender such as defendant

GLENNON would build a friendship with those

officers. It’s also reasonable to believe

that when such a friendship is certain to

occur after so many years, that when it comes

time to reveal misconduct of that friend to a

community of jurors, the defendants [sic]

representation is most certain to be

compromised, unless adequate safeguards and

monitoring by supervisors has been put in

place. 

266. Upon information and belief, defendants

QUINLEN, PATTERSON, GLENNON, BOYD, SMITH,

NOBLES, and each of them, conspired to set up

an unconstitutional policy wherein defendant

GLENNON would not cross-examine defendants

BOYD, SMITH, and NOBLES to any degree that

would reveal misconduct by the defendant

officers. Defendant GLENNON pretended to

defend Mr. Ward while he did in fact actually

defend the defendant officers. In addition,

defendants conspired to practice the said

policy during the cross-examination of Ms.

Sanchez.

Count Eight also alleges the conspiracy in conclusory fashion. 

Although Ward alleges specific acts that he believes were in

furtherance of the conspiracy, the only allegation from which a

meeting of the minds between Glennon and the other defendants may

be inferred to retaliate against Ward because of his testimony in

the Barnes v. Ash matter and to deter Ward from testifying in the

alleged federal civil rights action filed by Dorothy Barnes is

the allegation that Glennon must have been a friend of the deputy

sheriffs because he had practiced in the area for a long time. 

That is not a sufficient allegation on which to hang a claim of

conspiracy to make Glennon a state actor. Consequently, the

claims against defendant Glennon are dismissed with leave to

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amend to allege with the required specificity the basis upon

which plaintiffs rely in contending that defendant Glennon had a

meeting of the minds with the other defendants with regarded to

the alleged conspiracy. 

Count Three is also alleged against Public Defender Arnold. 

Count Three alleges that Glennon denied Ward’s request to have

expert witnesses called to testify on his behalf at trial and

denied Ward’s request to file Ward’s pro se discovery motion

“under an unconstitutional policy or custom promulgated and

administered by defendant ARNOLD, wherein public defenders are

not allowed to call an expert witness ... in misdemeanor cases”

and “under an unconstitutional policy or custom promulgated and

administered by defendant ARNOLD, wherein public defenders rely

on a ‘Universal Discovery Motion’ drafted by defendant ARNOLD and

posted at some location within his office that compels the

prosecution to disclose all evidence to his deputy public

defenders.” Count Three further alleges:

270. Prior to September 18, 2003, it was

clearly established that an accused

misdemeanor defendant has a right to call

expert witnesses on their behalf at trial, to

have pre-trial motions heard, to crossexamine arresting officers, to redress the

court for grievances, and to have adequate

representation by an attorney.

271. Prior to September 18, 2003, defendants

ARNOLD, and the COUNTY developed and

maintained policies or customs of the Kern

County Public Defender exhibiting deliberate

indifferences to the Constitutional rights of

Mr. Ward to have expert witnesses called to

testify at misdemeanor trials, to have pretrial motions heard, to cross-examine

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arresting officers, to redress the court for

grievances, and to have adequate

representation by an attorney and the denial

of said rights.

272. Prior to September 18, 2003, defendants

ARNOLD, and the COUNTY failed to properly

train officers, or employees, under their

authority, as to their legal duties to not

violate Mr. Ward’s Constitutional right to

due process, in particular, to have an expert

witness called to testify in his defense at

trial, to have pre-trial motions argued on

behalf of his defense, to have adverse crossexamination of the arresting officers, to

have access to the court redress the court

[sic], and to have representation by an

attorney. If training was provided, it was

inadequate in relation to the tasks that the

officers, or employees were required to

perform and deficiencies in the training

program were closely related to the damages

to the Plaintiffs.

Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Arnold,

asserting that Arnold did not represent Ward, that Ward merely

complains about how Arnold distributes the Public Defender’s

budget and trains his staff. Defendant argue that none of these

acts are completed under color of state law. Alternatively,

citing Rowe v. Schrieber, 139 F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1998),

defendants argue that Arnold may not be held liable here because

there is no clearly established right to have the resources of

the public defender’s office administratively allocated in a

specific manner or to have certain administrative decisions made.

However, a fairly recent decision from the Ninth Circuit is

relevant to the resolution of this issue. 

In Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003), the Ninth Circuit, en banc,

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addressed “whether the head of a county public defender’s office,

as the administrative head of an organization formed to represent

criminal defendants, may be held accountable under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for a policy that leads to a denial of an individual’s right

to effective representation of counsel.” 319 F.3d at 466. 

Miranda was convicted of capital murder. His conviction was

overturned pursuant to a habeas petition. Miranda then sued in

federal court Rigsby, the assistant public defender who had

represented him and Harris, the head of the Clark County Public

Defender’s Office. The district court dismissed the complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. The Ninth Circuit reversed. In pertinent

part, Miranda’s complaint alleged that the assistant public

defender’s representation was ineffective because of the policies

promulgated by the Public Defender of (1) administering a lie

detector test to all defendants and allocating minimal resources

for preparation of defense to those clients who appear guilty

because they failed the polygraph; and (2) of assigning the

least-experienced lawyers on the staff to capital cases without

training or experience in the special demands of such cases. The

Ninth Circuit ruled that the Complaint effectively alleged that

the Public Defender made no particularized decisions through the

exercise of independent professional judgment in the defense of a

client because of the allegations that these policies rendered

the Public Defender deliberately indifferent to Miranda’s

constitutional rights, including the right to the effective

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assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal

of the action against Rigsby pursuant to Polk County on the

ground that Rigsby was not a state actor. In reversing the

dismissal of the claim against Harris, the head of the Public

Defender’s Office, the Ninth Circuit ruled in pertinent part:

The situation with respect to Harris, the

administrative head of the County Public

Defender’s Office, is different. Insofar as

this case is concerned, he was not acting

under any of the ethical standards of the

lawyer-client relationship to which Rigsby

was bound. The nature and context of

Harris’s function was administrative. He

was, according to the complaint, acting

solely as the administrative head of the

agency, responsible for allocating the

office’s finite resources. Also according to

the complaint, he instituted certain policies

as part of his administrative functions that

resulted in the miscarriage of justice

represented by the plaintiff’s death

sentence. We deal with each of these

policies in turn.

...

The policy in question, for purposes of this

appeal, is an alleged policy that subjected

each client to a polygraph test and then

allocated the resources of the office

according to the result of that test. 

According to the complaint, ‘if a client

failed a polygraph examination, as determined

by the subjective assessment of the polygraph

examiner, minimal investigation would be

conducted and a limited defense would be

provided.’ Thus, if a client appeared on the

basis of a polygraph to be lying about his

innocence, he would be provided minimal

resources to develop a defense. Construed in

a light most favorable to the plaintiff, this

allegation means that those clients who

claimed innocence, but appeared to be guilty,

were provided inadequate resources to mount

an effective defense.

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In evaluating the viability of the claim, we

must first determine whether Harris’s

implementation of such a standard constitutes

state action for purposes of § 1983. As we

have seen, Rigsby, in undertaking the actual

defense of Miranda, entered into an attorneyclient relationship that placed him in a role

that exempts him from liability under § 1983

as a state actor. Harris, however, is

alleged to have been acting as the

administrative head of the office in

determining how the resources of Clark County

would be distributed.

In allocating the county’s funds, Harris was

performing essentially an administrative role

on behalf of Clark County. It was a function

similar to that performed by the head of

every government administrative office. See,

e.g. Nev.Rev.Stat. chs. 180.080, 260.010,-

040,-070,-075 (requiring of state and county

public defenders expenditure reports and

providing for institution and regulation of

public defender offices). It therefore

materially differs from the relationship

inherent in a public defender’s

representation of an individual client. Polk

County, 454 U.S. at 322 n.13, 324-25 ... The

conduct alleged falls within the type of

administrative action adumbrated by the

Supreme Court in Polk County, when it

recognized the possibility that a public

defender’s ‘administrative and possibly

investigative functions’ would constitute

state action. Id. at 325 ...; see also

McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54 ... (reaffirming

that the Public Defender may be a state actor

with respect to administrative or

investigatory functions). We thus conclude

that Harris was acting on behalf of Clark

County in determining how the overall

resources of the office were to be spent, and

he qualifies as a state actor for purposes of

§ 1983. 

That conclusion also is mandated by

principles enunciated in Monell, in which the

Court held that counties and municipalities

are amenable to § 1983 liability for

constitutional deprivations resulting from

application of governmental custom or policy. 

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The resource allocation policy alleged in

this case constitutes a viable claim and

subjects Harris to suit as a policymaker on

behalf of Clark County ....

The remaining question is whether the alleged

policy resulted in deprivation of the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights to

effective representation of counsel. That

constitutional guarantee is of effective

representation of all defendants, regardless

of guilt or innocence ... Here, according to

the plaintiff, if the criminal defendant

appeared on the basis of the polygraph test

to be guilty, the office sharply curtailed

the quality of the representation by limiting

the investigatory and legal resources

provided. The policy, while falling short of

complete denial of counsel, is a policy of

deliberate indifference to the requirement

that every criminal defendant receive

adequate representation, regardless of

innocence or guilt ... This is a core

guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and a right

so fundamental that any contrary policy

erodes the principles of liberty and justice

that underpin our civil rights ....

We recognize, of course, that allocation of

resources must be made upon some criteria and

not all result in denial of effective

representation. We hold only that the

determination cannot be based solely or even

principally on polygraph results. In so

holding, we express no opinion on whether the

result of a polygraph test may be used as one

of a number of factors employed in

determining the extent of investigative

resources to devote to a particular

defendant’s case. We hold only that

polygraph results cannot be determinative.

319 F.3d at 469-470. 

Based on the court’s review of Miranda, the court concludes

that the alleged policies of relying upon a “universal discovery

motion” and of precluding a defendant represented by a public

defender from filing pro se motions in the criminal action are

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not actionable against defendant Arnold. Because Ward was

represented by counsel in the criminal proceeding, he had no

constitutional right to file motions or other documents in the

criminal case pro se. See Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d

683, 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 923 (2001). The use

of by the public defender of a “universal” discovery motion

cannot be seen as an administrative decision based on allocation

of resources similar to that at issue in Miranda. Therefore, to

the extent that the FAC’s claim against defendant Arnold is based

on these allegations, the FAC is dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend. 

More problematic issue is the alleged policy of not allowing

the use of expert witnesses in misdemeanor cases. Arguably,

based on Miranda, that allegation may be actionable against

Arnold. Consequently, defendant Arnold’s motion to dismiss the

FAC with regard to this claim is denied without prejudice. 

6. County Policymaker.

Defendants argue that the allegations of the FAC against the

County of Kern should be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed

to identify a County policymaker.

In so arguing, defendants contend that the Kern County

Sheriff is not a County policymaker for purposes of Section 1983

when performing his law enforcement function. Defendants rely on

Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (2004).

Municipalities can be held liable under Section 1983 for

actions which result in a deprivation of constitutional rights. 

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Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A

municipality, however, cannot be held liable on a respondeat

superior theory. Id. at 691. To hold a local government liable

for an official’s conduct, a plaintiff must establish that the

government official “(1) had final policymaking authority

‘concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular

constitutional or statutory violation at issue’ and (2) was the

policymaker for the local governing body for the purposes of the

particular act.” Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028

(9th Cir. 2000). However, states and state officers sued in

their official capacities are not considered persons under

Section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by

virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1989). When

determining whether an official acted on behalf of the state or

on behalf of the county, the court employs the analytical

framework set out in McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781

(1997). In McMillan, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama

sheriff could not be sued under Section 1983 for intimidating

witnesses into making false statements and suppressing

exculpatory evidence because the sheriff was exercising state

authority. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court

inquired “whether governmental officials are final policymakers

for the local government in a particular area or on a particular

issue.” 520 U.S. at 785. 

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Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, supra, involved a Section

1983 claim against the County of Los Angeles alleging an

unconstitutional search and seizure. The California Supreme

Court addressed whether sheriff’s department employees sued in

their official capacities for the unlawful acts of their

subordinate officers may be held liable for constitutional

violations carried out under their department’s own regulations,

policies, customs or usages by persons having “final policymaking

authority.” Prior to Venegas, the Ninth Circuit held that

sheriffs act as agents of the County, not the state. See Bishop

Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2002),

vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 701 (2003)(sheriff acted as a

county officer when executing a search warrant); Brewster v.

Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 814 (2002)(sheriff acts for the County when investigating

crime in the County). However, after examining Bishop Paiute

Tribe and Brewster in light of McMillan and California caselaw,

including Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340 (1998) and

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166

(1998), the California Supreme Court concluded that “California

sheriffs act as state officers while performing state law

enforcement duties such as investigating possible criminal

activity.” 32 Cal.4th at 839. 

The question before the court is whether this court is bound

by Venegas or by Brewster. Defendants argue that the

identification of final policy-making authority is a pure

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question of state law, citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,

485 U.S. 112, 124, 126 (1988):

[T]he identification of policymaking

officials is a question of state law ... Thus

the identification of policymaking officials

is not a question of federal law, and it is

not a question of fact in the usual sense.

....

...

[A] federal court would not be justified in

assuming that municipal policymaking

authority lies somewhere other than where the

applicable law puts it. ....

Defendants also cite McMillan:

[O]ur inquiry is dependent on an analysis of

state law ... This is not to say that state

law can answer the question for us by, for

example, simply labeling as a state official

an official who clearly makes county policy. 

But our understanding of the actual function 

of a governmental official, in a particular

area, will necessarily be dependent on the

definition of the official’s function under

relevant state law.

520 U.S. at 786. Defendants also note that the Ninth Circuit

holds that “[w]hen interpreting state law, federal courts are

bound by decisions of the state’s highest court.” Nelson v. City

of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1206-1207 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 981 (1998).

It is unclear that the Ninth Circuit will agree that whether

the sheriff acted for the state or for the County is solely an

issue of state law, thereby compelling the Ninth Circuit to

follow Venegas notwithstanding the holdings in Brewster and

Bishop Paiute Tribe. In Weiner v. San Diego County, supra, 210

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F.3d at 1029, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the district

attorney acted as a state, rather than county, official when he

decided to proceed with criminal prosecution of an accused

following the grant of a new trial. In reaching its conclusion,

the Ninth Circuit noted that the California Supreme Court in

Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340 (1998), held that a

district attorney was a state official for purposes of § 1983

liability while acting in his prosecutorial capacity. The Ninth

Circuit then stated:

The California Supreme Court is the ultimate

interpreter of California state law ... This

does not mean, however, that we must blindly

accept its balancing of the different

provisions of state law in determining

liability under § 1983. In McMillan, the

Court stated that ‘our inquiry is dependent

on an analysis of state law,’ which does not

mean ‘that state law can answer the question

for us by, for example, simply labeling as a

state official an official who clearly makes

county policy. But our understanding of the

actual function of a governmental official,

in a particular area, will necessarily be

dependent on the definition of the official’s

function under relevant state law.’ ... We

must, therefore, examine California’s

constitution, statutes, and case law.

210 F.3d at 1029. The Ninth Circuit’s statement in Wiener

precludes this court from applying Venegas, given the holdings in

Brewster and Bishop Paiute. This court is bound by the Ninth

Circuit’s rulings until overturned or distinguished by the Ninth

Circuit. 

Finally, defendants assume that the only potential

policymaker in this litigation is the Sheriff. However, the Kern

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County Public Defender is also a defendant in this action and

could be found to be a policymaker on behalf of the County. 

Therefore, the motion to dismiss as against the County of

Kern is denied on this ground.

7. Claims Against Wimbish, Arnold, and Jagels in Their

Individual Capacities.

As noted above, Kern County Sheriff Mack Wimbish, Kern

County Public Defender Mark Arnold, and Kern County District

Attorney Edward Jagels are sued in their individual capacities as

well as in their official capacities. 

These defendants move to dismiss the FAC against them on the

ground that it does not allege that any of these defendants

completed any act that resulted in the deprivation of plaintiffs’

constitutional rights. 

As explained in Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989):

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon

a showing of personal participation by the

defendant ... A supervisor is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates

if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them. There is no

respondeat superior liability under section

1983.

The FAC suffices to withstand a motion to dismiss on this

ground. The FAC alleges that each of these defendants failed to

adequately supervise and train their subordinates. “It is well

established that a governmental officer may be held liable for

damages for his failure to adequately supervise or train his

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subordinates.” Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied on this ground.

E. Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Attorney General Bill

Lockyer.

The FAC alleges that Attorney General Lockyer “is

responsible for the direct supervision over the Kern County

District Attorney and the Kern County Sheriff in all matters

pertaining to the duties of their respective offices”. Count

Twelve alleges in pertinent part:

343. Prior to December 16, 2003, it was

clearly established that a United States

citizen has a right to self-defense and to

due process of law. Defendant LOCKYER knew

that an error existed in jury instructions

CALJIC No. 5.56, which failed to account for

the circumstances in Mr. Ward’s case where

the counter assault was so sudden and

perilous that no opportunity was give [sic]

to Mr. Ward to decline further to fight and

he could not retreat with safety, and said

error denied Mr. Ward, Ms. Sanchez, and other

U.S. citizens the right to self-defense and

due process of law.

344. Prior to December 16, 2003, defendant

LOCKYER repeatedly allowed said jury

instruction to be used against United States

citizens in violation of the Fourth, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution.

345. Prior to September 18, 2003, defendants

LOCKYER, WIMBISH, JAGELS, and the COUNTY

developed and maintained policies or customs

of the Kern County Sheriff’s Department, and

Superior Court of California exhibiting

deliberate indifference to the Constitutional

rights of the Plaintiffs to be free from

false imprisonment and loss of consortium

without due process of law.

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346. Prior to September 18, 2003, defendants

LOCKYER, WIMBISH, and the COUNTY of KERN

failed to properly train officers, or

employees, under their authority, as to their

legal duties to not violate Plaintiffs’

Constitutional right to be free from arrest

for self defense and without due process of

law. If training was provided, it was

inadequate in relation to the tasks that the

officers, or employees were required to

perform and deficiencies in the training

program were closely related to the damages

to the Plaintiffs. 

Defendant Lockyer moves to dismiss the FAC against him on

various grounds.

1. Person. 

To the extent that the FAC is alleged against Lockyer in his

official capacity, the FAC does not state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Lockyer, as an official of the State of

California, is not a “person” within the meaning of the federal

civil rights statutes. Hafer v. Malo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991).

Therefore, this action is dismissed against defendant

Lockyer with prejudice and without leave to amend to the extent

that Lockyer is sued in his official capacity. 

2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine; Application of Heck v.

Humphrey.

Lockyer also moves to dismiss the allegations against him

that he failed to correct an allegedly defective jury instruction

and that he failed to properly train officers of the Kern County

Sheriff’s Department and the Kern County District Attorneys’

Office on the ground that such claims necessarily imply the

invalidity of Ward’s conviction and, therefore, are barred by the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Heck v. Humphrey. See discussion

supra.

To the extent that the FAC alleges that Lockyer failed to

correct an allegedly defective jury instruction, the court rules

that this claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Heck

v. Humphrey. Such a claim, arising in connection with Ward’s

conviction of corporal injury in violation of Penal Code § 273.5,

which conviction is on appeal, cannot be heard by this court.

Even were this claim not barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and Heck v. Humphrey, the court would dismiss it for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) are prepared by

the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal, of the

Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Although not mandated by

statute, their use is recommended by the Judicial Council of

California. Cal. Standards Jud. Admin. § 5. From the court’s

research, CALJIC 5.56 was revised in 2004 in response to People

v. Quach, 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301 (2004), which case and

revision occurred after Ward’s conviction of corporal injury. 

The court rules that Attorney General Lockyer owed no duty to

Ward to revise CALJIC 5.56 because, as noted, the CALJIC

instructions are not drafted by the Attorney General. 

Furthermore, nothing prevented Ward’s counsel, defendant Glennon, 

from arguing that CALJIC 5.56, as in effect during Ward’s trial,

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7In so ruling, the court is expressing no opinion whether the

giving of CALJIC 5.56, as in effect during Ward’s trial, was error.

52

was in error or incomplete.7 

Therefore, the allegations against defendant Lockyer based

on CALJIC No. 5.56 are dismissed with prejudice and without leave

to amend.

To the extent that the FAC alleges that Lockyer “developed

and maintained policies or customs of the Kern County Sheriff’s

Department, and Superior Court of California exhibiting

deliberate indifference to the Constitutional rights of the

Plaintiffs to be free from false imprisonment and loss of

consortium without due process of law” and that Lockyer “failed

to properly train officers, or employees ... as to their legal

duties to not violate Plaintiffs’ Constitutional right to be free

from arrest for self defense and without due process of law”, the

court concludes that these allegations are barred by Heck v.

Humphrey and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent that these

allegations pertain to the criminal proceedings against

plaintiffs for which plaintiffs were convicted or pleaded guilty

and which convictions have not been overturned. Consequently, to

this extent, these allegations against defendant Lockyer are

dismissed. 

Consequently, these allegations against defendant Lockyer

are dismissed.

F. Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Bryan Hefner.

The FAC sues California Highway Patrol Officer Bryan Hefner

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in his his individual capacity. The FAC alleges in pertinent

part:

158. On January 3, 2004 ... defendant HEFNER

made a routine stop of Mr. Ward’s vehicle for

an expired registration tag. A temporary

moving permit for the vehicle was in his

possession but his insurance card was

expired.

159. Defendant HEFNER issued Mr. Ward a

citation for no proof of insurance and stated

he was going to impound his vehicle. Before

a tow truck arrived, Mr. Ward unloaded his

personal property from his vehicle to a

parking lot. Defendant HEFNER granted Mr.

Ward permission to go make a phone call. Mr.

Ward sought to have current paperwork brought

in order to avoid having his vehicle

impounded. He left his drivers license in

possession of defendant HEFNER and walked

about a block to a liquor store.

160. During that time, defendant NEWELL [of

the Kern County Sheriff’s Department] arrived

at the location of defendant HEFNER. Upon

discovery that Mr. Ward had been pulled over,

defendant NEWELL conspired with defendant

HEFNER to arrest Mr. Ward in retaliation for

testifying against two KCSD officers

[defendants of this action]. Subsequently,

defendant HEFNER transferred possession of

Mr. Ward’s drivers’ [sic] license to

defendant NEWELL. In no way did Mr. Ward

consent to defendants’ said actions.

161. Mr. Ward’s first contact with defendant

NEWELL was at the time he left the store,

defendant NEWELL used Mr. Ward’s license to

identify him. He exited his vehicle saying

in a nasty voice, ‘Why did you lie to that

CHP officer?’ he pointed to the license and

stated, ‘You don’t live at this address, you

live up [Residence Street]’, Mr. Ward denied

the allegation and walked back to his

vehicle, which was now loaded onto the bed of

a tow truck. Defendant NEWELL rejoined with

defendant HEFNER and instructed the tow truck

to unload Mr. Ward’s vehicle in order that he

could search it.

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162. Without warrant, legal, or probable

cause, defendant NEWELL and HEFNER conducted

a search of Mr. Ward’s vehicle and his

person. Thereafter, Mr. Ward’s vehicle was

seized. At no time did Mr. Ward consent to

the defendants search and seizure, and no

drugs or anything illegal was found.

163. Defendant HEFNER asked Mr. Ward if he

had lied about his residence address. Mr.

Ward denied the allegation and explained that

he was the owner of more than one residence,

and the address listed on his driver’s

license was his main residence. Defendant

NEWELL in a loud, angry voice stated, ‘you’re

a liar’ and ‘I don’t like liars’. Defendant

HEFNER in an angry voice said ‘I’m driving up

to that address tomorrow, and if your [sic]

not there I’m arresting you.’

164. While Mr. Ward was in a highly

emotional state induced by the events

described herein above, defendant NEWELL

ordered Mr. Ward away from defendant EVERETT

[sic] to check his pulse rat e, and then

alleged that Mr. Ward was under the influence

of a CNS Stimulant because his pulse rate was

elevated.

165. By reason of the actions of defendants

NEWELL and EVERETT [sic] hereinabove

described the defendants intentionally and

knowingly induced an emotional state in Mr.

Ward, which caused his pulse rate to elevate,

and defendant NEWELL used said pulse rate for

his evaluation of drug use.

166. Without warrant, legal, or probable

cause, defendant NEWELL arrested Mr. Ward for

violation of H & SC § 11550(a) being under

the influence of a controlled substance.

...

170. Defendant NEWELL submitted a false

incident report to the Kern County Criminal

Justice system, wherein defendant knowingly

omitted from his official report and

otherwise failed to reveal that he and

defendant HEFNER caused Mr. Ward to have an

elevated pulse rate, in order to falsely

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infer Mr. Ward was in violation of H&SC §

11550(a).

...

173. Defendant NEWELL and HEFNER have

willfully failed and refused to inform any

other person or governmental entity, by

official report or otherwise, of the true and

complete facts of the arrest of Mr. Ward on

January 3, 2004.

The FAC further alleges that plaintiff pleaded guilty to

possession of paraphernalia, that his motion to withdraw that

guilty plea has been denied, and that his petition for writ of

mandate to compel the Clerk’s Office to process his appeal from

the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea has been

denied. Count Five of the FAC is alleged by plaintiff Drake Ward

against defendants Newell, Patterson, Quinlen, Hefner and the

County of Kern for false arrest and illegal search and seizure in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendant Hefner moves to dismiss the allegations in the FAC

against him pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, supra.

To the extent that the FAC alleges that Hefner participated

in an unlawful arrest of plaintiff leading to his guilty plea to

the charges for which he was arrested, the FAC is dismissed

against him pursuant to Heck. 

However, as discussed above, the court concludes that

defendant Hefner is not entitled to dismissal of the claim that

defendants Newell and Hefner unlawfully searched Ward’s vehicle

and person. Because of the allegation in the FAC that no

evidence was seized pursuant to the search of plaintiff’s vehicle

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and person, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on this

allegedly unlawful search will not invalidate plaintiff’s

subsequent conviction. Therefore, this claim is not barred by

Heck v. Humphrey. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. The Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Judge John I.

Quinlen, Judge Catherine D. Purcell, Sherrie Leonard and Susan

Hogue (Yeargan) is granted. This action is dismissed without

leave to amend as against these defendants. This action is

dismissed without leave to amend against John Does Five through

Nine.

2. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Bill Lockyer is

granted in part and denied in part. 

3. The Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Mack Wimbish,

Mark Arnold, Edward Jagels, David Boyd, Sam Smith, John Nobles,

James Newell, Pamela Belmore, Perry Patterson, Patrick Glennon,

Jason Belasis, and the County of Kern is granted in part and

denied in part.

4. The Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Bryan Hefner is

granted in part and denied in part.

5. Plaintiffs shall file a Second Amended Complaint in

accordance with the rulings set forth herein within 30 days of

the filing date of this Order. Failure to timely comply will

result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

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668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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