Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01965/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01965-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gerald D. Kirkish, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Mesa Imports, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-1965-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Plaintiff Gerald Kirkish was employed by Honda Cars of Mesa, an automobile

dealership operated by Defendant Mesa Imports, Inc. (“Mesa Imports”), from

approximately July 2003 until his employment was terminated on August 9, 2007. On

October 27, 2008, Kirkish filed his Complaint (doc. # 1) alleging that Mesa Imports

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) by inquiring into his

medications. The Complaint was amended on February 25, 2009, to include a second

ADA claim that Mesa Imports unlawfully discriminated against Kirkish on the basis of

his disability. (Doc. # 6). 

Now pending before the Court are the parties cross-motions for summary judgment

(doc. ## 39, 44). Mesa Imports moves for summary judgment on both claims. Kirkish

moves for summary judgment only on the claim that Mesa Imports’ inquiry into his

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medications violated the ADA. For the following reasons, Mesa Imports’ Motion is

granted and Kirkish’s Motion is denied.

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence shows there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must produce sufficient evidence to persuade the

Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.

v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Conversely, to defeat a motion

for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show that there are genuine issues of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A material fact

is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and a factual

issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nature of this

responsibility varies, however, depending on whether the moving party or the nonmoving

party would bear the burden of proof at trial on the issues relevant to the summary

judgment motion. If the nonmoving party would bear the burden of persuasion at trial,

the moving party may carry its initial burden of production under Rule 56(c) by

producing “evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case,” or by

showing, “after suitable discovery,” that the “nonmoving party does not have enough

evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1105-06; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.

Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving

party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense by more than simply showing

“there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Where the record, taken as a whole,

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Id. 

The nonmoving party’s evidence is taken as true and all inferences from the

evidence are drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Eisenberg v. Ins.

Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). If the nonmoving party

produces direct evidence of a genuine issue of fact, the court does not weigh such

evidence against the moving party’s conflicting evidence. Rather, the motion for

summary judgment is denied. Id. 

II. Undisputed Facts

Since approximately 1994, Kirkish has suffered from peripheral neuropathy, also

known as small fiber neuropathy, a painful nerve disorder that causes numbness, burning,

and stinging sensations primarily in Kirkish’s feet and to a lesser extent in his legs. In

around 2003, after several unsuccessful attempts to control the pain, Kirkish began

treating with Dr. Eric Shreder in Gilbert, Arizona. Dr. Shreder prescribed, and Kirkish

began to take, various pain medications, including Neurontin. The prescribed medical

information sheet for Neurontin warns of possible side effects of drowsiness, dizziness,

unsteadiness, and fatigue, and instructs the patient to “use caution engaging in activities

requiring alertness such as driving or using machinery.” Kirkish’s dose of Neurontin

began at one pill a day, but was increased over time to four pills a day. Although the

combination of medications has generally proved effective, it has not entirely eliminated

the pain he feels in his feet and legs. 

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1

Honda Cars of Mesa relocated and changed its name to San Tan Honda in November

2007, but is still operated by Mesa Imports.

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In July 2003, Kirkish was hired as a Fleet/Internet Manager at Honda Cars of

Mesa,1

 an automobile dealership operated by Mesa Imports. Fleet/Internet Managers sell

new and used cars and are therefore required to drive dealership vehicles for various

reasons, including taking customers on test drives and moving vehicles from one location

to another. Because driving vehicles safely is an essential part of the job, which Kirkish

admits, Mesa Imports generally does not employ salespeople who are not “insurable”

under the company’s insurance policy. Therefore, when Kirkish was hired, he was

required to provide Mesa Imports with his driver’s license so that its insurance company

could obtain his Motor Vehicle Report and verify his insurability. Mesa Imports also

includes a prescription drug use policy in its Employee Handbook. The policy requires

all employees who take prescription drugs that “may adversely affect judgment,

coordination or the ability to perform assigned job duties” to notify their supervisors, who

“will decide whether to allow the employee to remain at work or to make other suitable

arrangements as allowed by law.” 

Throughout his employment at Honda Cars of Mesa, Kirkish was in at least the top

half of all salespeople and usually in the top third. In fact, he was named Salesman of the

Year in 2004. He had no accidents and received no tickets while driving a dealership

vehicle and never exhibited any other poor or unsafe driving behaviors. Until 2007, there

were no concerns whatsoever with his job performance. 

In 2007, although there was no noticeable decrease in Kirkish’s sales figures and

no discernible change in his physical capabilities, some of his co-workers became

concerned with his sales performance. In or around March 2007, Kirkish misinformed

customers on two separate occasions within a short period of time that they could receive

both a rebate and a special finance rate. Mesa Imports’ incentive offer had previously

included both the rebate and special rate. However, shortly before Kirkish’s misquotes,

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the incentive program was changed to include one incentive or the other, but not both. 

Another employee, Mark Gieger, made the same mistake during the time period in which

Kirkish erred. Kirkish eventually received a written disciplinary warning for the two

misquotes, but no further action was taken. Finally, on one other occasion, Kirkish could

not remember the name of a customer to whom he had sold a car a few days prior. 

However, he had contact with dozens of customers and prospective customers on a

weekly basis. Despite these explanations for his shortcomings, Terry Treece, Kirkish’s

Team Leader, claims to have noticed a “distinct change” in Kirkish and was concerned

that something was affecting his cognitive abilities.

Throughout his employment, Kirkish had openly discussed his nerve disorder and

medications with co-workers and supervisors. Specifically, he explained to co-workers

that he experienced “numbness, tingling, and burning sensations” in his feet and that he

was taking pain medication to control the condition. Therefore, Treece was aware that

Kirkish was taking pain medications. Suspecting that the medications were having a

negative effect, Treece asked Kirkish to consider consulting his doctor, but Kirkish

declined to discuss his medications. Still concerned about the possible impact on his

sales abilities and armed with a new concern about his ability to operate a vehicle safely

while on the medications, Treece consulted Barry Bauman, a Sales Manager. At

Bauman’s direction, Treece voiced his concerns to Richard Cvijanovich, Mesa Imports’

General Sales Manager, and explained that Kirkish was taking prescription pain

medications. After consulting with Bud Thurston, owner and President of Mesa Imports,

and Monte Yocum, the General Manager, Cvijanovich asked Kirkish what medications he

was taking so that he could determine whether Kirkish could safely operate the

company’s vehicles in conformity with the company’s prescription drug use policy. 

Although Kirkish initially agreed to share information regarding his medications with

Cvijanovich, he later changed his mind for privacy reasons and offered instead to ask his

doctor to respond to Mesa Imports’ concerns. 

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Thereafter, Mesa Imports contacted Seth Huber, a representative of its insurance

company. Mesa Imports informed Huber that Kirkish was taking prescription pain

medications and expressed its concern about his ability to drive. Huber advised Mesa

Imports to obtain a medical release indicating that Kirkish is able to drive safely while on

the medications. Therefore, on April 6, 2007, Mesa Imports sent Kirkish a letter

informing him that he would not be permitted to drive the company’s vehicles until the

company “received a release from a health care professional attesting to [his] ability to

safely operate a motor vehicle.” Kirkish submitted a request for a release to Dr. Shreder,

who, instead of providing a release, responded with an April 17, 2007, letter indicating

that Kirkish is currently taking Neurontin, that he “understands the risks and hazards of

driving are severe while under this medication,” and that he “currently does not suffer

from any symptoms, although the side effects are attached to the medication.” 

Upon receiving Dr. Shreder’s letter, Mesa Imports asked Kirkish to provide

prescription information for Neurontin, which he refused to do. Mesa Imports therefore

contacted its insurance company for the second time. Tom Leander, an underwriter and

risk manager for the insurance company, researched Neurontin’s side effects and advised

Mesa Imports that Kirkish would be considered “uninsurable” while taking Neurontin. 

Based on that advice and an FMLA certification from Dr. Shreder, Mesa Imports placed

Kirkish on FMLA leave. Mesa Imports explained that Kirkish would need to submit a

medical release before returning to work and provided him with a “Return to Work” form

for his doctor to complete. On May 23, 2007, Dr. Shreder completed the “Return to

Work” form, certifying that Kirkish had no work-related restrictions, but indicating that

his “medication limitations” were “as described on the package inserts.” Because Kirkish

refused to disclose his package inserts, Mesa Imports told him that he would need to

submit a second “Return to Work” form clarifying his medication limitations. 

When Mesa Imports did not receive clarification, it asked Kirkish for permission

to contact Dr. Shreder directly. On June 25, 2007, after Kirkish had authorized the

inquiry, Mesa Imports asked Dr. Shreder whether it was safe for him to drive the

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company’s vehicles, to which Dr. Shreder responded that he “could drive safely so long

as he is controlled on his medication.” On June 28, 2007, unable to obtain an unqualified

certification that Kirkish could drive vehicles safely while on Neurontin, Mesa Imports

sent Dr. Shreder a letter explaining the reason for its inquiry and asking Dr. Shreder to

certify, in an enclosed “Return to Work” form, that “Mr. Kirkish is medically able to

safely perform the essential functions of his job, including driving, without creating a

safety risk to himself or others.” Because Mesa Imports had yet to receive a response on

July 23, 2007, it required Kirkish to submit the “Return to Work” form by no later than

August 9, 2007. On August 9, 2007, Kirkish submitted the completed form in which Dr.

Shreder had certified the language quoted above. However, one hour later, Mesa Imports

received a faxed copy of the same form, cancelling the certification and stating that “Dr.

Shreder will not authorize driving. Mr. Kirkish is on his own recognisence (sic).” During

discovery, Dr. Shreder explained that he cancelled the certification because it was too

much of a “blanket statement.” 

On August 15, 2007, Mesa Imports sent Kirkish a letter terminating his

employment as of August 9, 2007, because his doctor “would not release [him] to drive,

and because driving is an essential function of [his] job . . . .” By that time, Kirkish had

already filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination under the ADA. Kirkish informed the

EEOC that his medical condition does not limit any of his major life activities. This

action followed.

III. Analysis

A. Improper Medical Inquiry in Violation of ADA 

The ADA prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to undergo a medical

examination and from inquiring “as to whether [an] employee is an individual with a

disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or

inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(d)(4)(A). This prohibition applies to all employees, regardless of whether they

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qualify as “disabled” under the ADA. Indergard v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 582 F.3d

1049, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2009); Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Health

Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, although an inquiry into an

employee’s prescription medications is not technically an inquiry into the disability itself,

it qualifies as a disability-related inquiry for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). See

Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir.

1997). 

Mesa Imports challenges Kirkish’s claim on the bases that he is not “disabled”

under the ADA and, alternatively, that its inquiry into his prescription pain medications

was job-related and consistent with business necessity. Kirkish’s sole argument in

support of its cross-motion for summary judgment is that the inquiry was not job-related

or driven by business necessity. As mentioned, an employee need not be disabled under

the ADA to be protected under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), so Mesa Imports’ first

argument is foreclosed. This claim therefore turns on whether Mesa Imports’ inquiry was

job-related and consistent with business necessity. See Fredenburg, 172 F.3d at 1182

(concluding that the defendant bears the burden of making the requisite showing of

business necessity). 

Medical inquiries are job-related and consistent with business necessity when an

employer has good cause to determine whether an employee is capable of performing his

or her job-related functions. See Yin v. State of California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir.

1996). In this case, it is undisputed that selling cars and driving cars are two essential

functions of Kirkish’s job as a car salesperson. Mesa Imports does not argue that it had

cause to determine whether Kirkish was capable of selling cars while taking his

medications. In any event, Mesa Imports had no concerns with Kirkish’s sales

performance other than his two misquotes regarding sales incentives and his one-time

inability to recall the name of a customer to whom he had sold a car. 

Mesa Imports argues only that it had good cause to determine whether Kirkish was

capable of driving safely, the other essential function of his job, and to address the related

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concern about his continued “insurability” under the company’s insurance policy. 

“[E]nsuring that the workplace is safe and secure” is a legitimate business necessity.

Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2003). Therefore, in

the context of jobs that require driving, verifying the ability of an employee to drive

safely qualifies as a business necessity. See EEOC v. J. B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 128 F.

Supp. 2d 117, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (a policy of screening employees who will operate

vehicles for medications which may impair their ability to drive is undoubtedly jobrelated). 

Here Kirkish had openly discussed his nerve disorder and medications with coworkers and supervisors throughout his employment. Specifically, he explained to coworkers that he experienced “numbness, tingling, and burning sensations” in his feet and

that he was taking pain medications. Therefore, prior to inquiring into Kirkish’s

medications, Mesa Imports was aware that he was taking prescription pain medications,

which have possible side effects that include drowsiness. In light of this knowledge, it

was reasonable for Mesa Imports to be concerned about Kirkish’s driving ability. See

Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 2001) (“legitimate safety

concerns” about driving ability existed where the plaintiff had openly “complained of

severe pain and difficulty walking to the point of requiring ‘narcotic’ medication” and

where the employer had received complaints about plaintiff’s reckless driving). Although

a history of drowsiness, accidents, or other poor driving behavior would certainly provide

an additional basis for good cause, it is not necessary. Common sense suggests that an

employer should not have to wait for an accident to occur to justify taking preventative

steps. See Wice v. General Motors Corp., No. 07-10662, 2008 WL 5235996, at *3, 2008

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106727, at *7-8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2008). The fact that Kirkish was

taking prescription pain medications was sufficient to give rise to a legitimate concern

about his ability to drive safely. Because Mesa Imports’ inquiry was job-related and

consistent with business necessity, it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this

claim.

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2

 Although not raised in the parties’ briefs, the ADA was amended by the ADA

Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The amendment was

effective January 1, 2009. Because the alleged acts of discrimination occurred before

January 1, 2009, and because the amendment does not apply retroactively, Kirkish’s claim

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B. Discrimination in Violation of ADA 

Pursuant to the ADA, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against “a

qualified individual” because of a disability in regard to job application procedures,

hiring, discharge, compensation, training, and “other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A section 12112(a) discrimination claim is

analyzed under the burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49-50 (2003). 

Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie

case of discrimination. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden

shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its

actions. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the

defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

1. Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Kirkish must

demonstrate that (1) he is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he is a

“qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA, and (3) he suffered an adverse

employment action because of his disability. Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 511

F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 1999). Mesa Imports moves for summary judgment on the ground that Kirkish has

failed to establish the first two elements of his prima facie case.

a. Disability

Kirkish is “disabled” under the ADA if he has a “physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities,” he has a “record of such an

impairment,” or he was “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).2

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will be analyzed under the law in effect in 2008. See Becerril v. Pima County Assessor’s

Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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Kirkish maintains only that he was “regarded as having such an impairment,” which

requires him to show that Mesa Imports subjectively believed that he had an impairment

and subjectively believed that the impairment substantially limited one of his major life

activities. Walton v. United States Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2007)

(following Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)); EEOC v. United

Parcel Service, Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 2002). If an employee has no direct

evidence of the employer’s subjective belief that he was substantially limited in a major

life activity, the employee must demonstrate that the perceived impairment objectively

limits the major life activity to a substantial degree. Walton, 492 F.3d at 1006.

Kirkish argues only that Mesa Imports perceived an impairment that substantially

limited his thinking abilities. As a preliminary matter, thinking qualifies as a major life

activity under the ADA. See Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th

Cir. 2005). As for whether Mesa Imports perceived an impairment, any physiological,

mental, or psychological disorder qualifies as an “impairment” under the ADA. 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). The evidence clearly indicates that Kirkish’s co-workers and

supervisors were aware that he suffered from peripheral neuropathy and was taking

prescription pain medications. Therefore, Mesa Imports perceived an impairment. 

However, there is insufficient evidence that it believed the impairment substantially

limited Kirkish’s thinking abilities. Terry Treece, Mesa Imports’ Team Leader, claims to

have noticed a “distinct change” in Kirkish and was concerned that his medications were

affecting his cognitive abilities. Although Treece perceived Kirkish’s cognitive problems

to be serious enough to voice the concerns to Cvijanovich, Cvijanovich did no more than

issue a written disciplinary warning to Kirkish with respect to his two misquotes and

inquire into his medications. The extent of the perceived limitation on Kirkish’s thinking

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abilities is not reflected in Mesa Imports’ decision to terminate his employment, because,

as Kirkish admits, he was terminated for his inability to drive, not his inability to think. 

There is also insufficient evidence to support an objective determination that

Kirkish’s thinking abilities were substantially limited. A major life activity is

substantially limited if an individual is “unable to perform” the activity or is

“significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration” under which the

individual can perform the activity compared to an average person in the general

population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). Here the record indicates only that Kirkish misquoted

customers on two occasions shortly after Mesa Imports’ sales incentives changed, and

that he failed to recall the name of one customer to whom he had sold a car. These

cognitive shortcomings were by no means significant, especially in light of the facts that

another employee also misquoted a customer on sales incentives and that Kirkish had

contact with dozens of customers each week. There is no other evidence of a substantial

limitation on Kirkish’s thinking abilities. Throughout his employment, there was no

noticeable drop in Kirkish’s sales figures, no impaired speech, and no signs of significant

memory loss. In short, nothing suggests that the limitation on Kirkish’s thinking was

severe enough to qualify as “substantial” within the meaning of the ADA. Cf. Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the inability to think three

times in a five month period due to insulin reactions was not a substantial limitation on

thinking). Therefore, Kirkish has failed to produce sufficient evidence that he is

“disabled” under the ADA.

b. Qualified Individual

Under the ADA, a “qualified individual” is an “individual with a disability who,

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The

individual must satisfy the “requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related

requirements of the employment position . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Here, both

parties admit that driving is an essential function of Kirkish’s position as a car

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salesperson. The dispute centers on whether he was capable of performing that function. 

Mesa Imports argues that because Dr. Shreder refused to certify, without qualification,

that Kirkish could drive safely while on his medications, he was incapable of driving for

purposes of the ADA. Kirkish, on the other hand, maintains that he was capable of

driving because he exhibited no driving problems throughout his employment and,

although Dr. Shreder refused to certify unqualifiedly that he could drive safely, Dr.

Shreder imposed no restrictions on his driving. 

The ADA does not require an employer “to permit an employee to perform a job

function that the employee’s physician has forbidden.” Alexander v. Northland Inn, 321

F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2003). Therefore, an employer may rely on the written advice of

an employee’s physician. Id. In this case, in his April 17, 2007, letter, Dr. Shreder stated

that Kirkish “understands the risks and hazards of driving are severe while under this

medication,” and that he “currently does not suffer from any symptoms, although the side

effects are attached to the medication.” On May 23, 2007, Dr. Shreder completed a

“Return to Work” form, certifying that Kirkish had no work-related restrictions, but

indicating that his “medication limitations” were “as described on the package inserts.” 

On June 25, 2007, when Mesa Imports asked Dr. Shreder whether it was safe for Kirkish

to drive the company’s vehicles, Dr. Shreder responded that he “could drive safely so

long as he is controlled on his medication.” Finally, on August 9, 2007, although Dr.

Shreder initially certified that “Mr. Kirkish is medically able to safely perform the

essential functions of his job, including driving, without creating a safety risk to himself

or others,” he later changed his mind, stating that “Dr. Shreder will not authorize driving. 

Mr. Kirkish is on his own recognisence (sic).” While these statements do not

unqualifiedly release Kirkish to drive, they also do not expressly forbid driving. In light

of evidence indicating that Kirkish had no accidents, speeding tickets, or any other

driving problems throughout his employment with Mesa Imports, and that Dr. Shreder did

not expressly restrict or forbid Kirkish’s driving, a reasonable jury could find that Kirkish

was qualified to drive. However, as explained above, because there is insufficient

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evidence that Kirkish was “disabled” under the ADA, Kirkish has failed to establish his

prima facie case of disability discrimination.

2. No Evidence of Pretext

Mesa Imports argues that even if Kirkish had established his prima facie case of

discrimination, Mesa Imports is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment in its favor

because Kirkish has produced no evidence of pretext. As explained, if an employee

successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the burden

shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its

actions. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden then shifts back to the employee to

demonstrate that the employer’s reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

Here Mesa Imports has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating Kirkish’s employment. Specifically, Mesa Imports terminated Kirkish’s

employment because Dr. Shreder would not unqualifiedly release him to drive while

taking his medications and because driving is an essential function of his job. That reason

is legitimate for two reasons. First, Mesa Imports has a policy of requiring all prospective

and current employees to disclose prescription medication use so that it can verify the

employee’s driving ability. Second, Mesa Imports also has a policy of declining to

employ anyone who is not insurable under the company’s insurance policy. The evidence

establishes that Kirkish was not insurable while taking his medications unless his doctor

provided a medical release. Perhaps the obvious should be stated that the ADA does not

apply to an insurer’s underwriting of risks. The reason is also nondiscriminatory, because

there is no evidence that Mesa Imports discriminatorily applied its policies to Kirkish and

not others, or that its policies screen out individuals with disabilities. 

 The burden therefore shifts back to Kirkish to produce evidence that Mesa

Imports’ proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. However, Kirkish has

entirely failed to address pretext in his response to Mesa Imports’s motion. He has

therefore identified no genuine issues of material fact as to pretext. 

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Because Kirkish has not established a prima facie case of discrimination under the

ADA, and alternatively because he has failed to produce any evidence of pretext,

summary judgment in Mesa Imports’ favor will be granted on the ADA discrimination

claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. # 39) is granted and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 44) is

denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment in favor

of Defendant and that Plaintiff take nothing. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 1st day of February, 2010.

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