Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01445/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01445-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRICK N. RILEY,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES,

Respondent.

 /

1:07-cv-01445 LJO SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 4, 2007. 

Petitioner is challenging his conviction of two counts of murder which occurred on September

12, 1994, in the Kern County Superior Court. (Petition, at 1.) Petitioner contends that he is

actually innocent of the murders, and therefore the delayed petition should be excused. 

Specifically, Petitioner contends that he accidentally caused the death of his pregnant wife, and

he therefore should have been charged with manslaughter and not murder. Petitioner further

contends, among other things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, the trial court

erred when it allowed a statement in violation of Miranda, and the jury was mis-instructed. 

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

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28 Cal. R. Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a decision 1

of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. 

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petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 4, 2007, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on September 12, 1994. The California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review in 1996. Thus, direct review became final 1

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 See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) 2

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 3

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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ninety (90) days. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 2

1159 (9 Cir.1999) (concluding period of "direct review" includes the period within which one th

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court); Smith v.

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year from 1996, absent th

applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of

th

Civil Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations

period.) Therefore, the statute expired sometime in 1997. Petitioner did not file the instant

petition until ten years later on October 4, 2007. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 3

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

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v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Here, Petitioner indicates that he filed his first state post-conviction collateral petition on

January 23, 2003, which is several years after the statute of limitations expired in 1997, and it has

no tolling effect. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to

tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256

(11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Accordingly, the

subsequent state post-conviction petitions likewise have no tolling effect, and the instant petition

is obviously untimely. 

Petitioner contends that he is actually innocence. Neither the Supreme Court nor the

Ninth Circuit has expressly held that there is an actual innocence exception to a violation of

section 2244(d)’s limitation period. Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002). To date,

the Ninth Circuit has only excused a violation of the limitation period in cases where the petition

was entitled to equitable tolling. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d at

1287-89, overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d

530 (9 Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 123 S.Ct. th

1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003).

However, even if the Court were to conclude that an actual innocence exception to a

violation of the limitations period existed, Petitioner has not met the standard for actual

innocence. Petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional error "has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622

(1998), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Petitioner must demonstrate that in

light of the evidence no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 329 (1995). Petitioner presents no such evidence. 

In addition, it appears that Petitioner is attempting to argue that because his petition

raises, in his opinion, serious constitutional violations, it must be reviewed. Petitioner is advised

that the merits of the federal petition are not relevant to whether extraordinary circumstances

exist justifying the late filing of the habeas petition; showing of extraordinary circumstances

related to filing of the petition itself is required. Helton v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections,

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259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11 Cir. 2001); Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868 (7th Cir.2005) th

(Even "[p]risoners claiming to be innocent . . . must meet the statutory requirement of timely

action."). 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as barred by the

one-year statute of limitations; and

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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