Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-01249/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-01249-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rudi Alfred Apelt, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-97-01249-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Construe Petitioner’s Request for a

Certificate of Appealability as a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 220). Respondents oppose the

motion. (Doc. 225.) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, Petitioner initiated this habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 2000,

the Court determined the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims, concluding that some were

procedurally barred and some entitled to merits review. (Doc. 71.) In 2002, following the

Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), this Court stayed

Petitioner’s sentencing-related claims pending successive state post-conviction proceedings

based on Petitioner’s alleged mental retardation and ineligibility for the death penalty.

(Docs. 147, 149, 151.) While state proceedings were ongoing, the Court ruled on Petitioner’s

conviction-related claims, concluding that he was not entitled to habeas relief. (Doc. 190.)

Subsequently, the state court determined that Petitioner was mentally retarded, vacated

Case 2:97-cv-01249-ROS Document 228 Filed 04/20/12 Page 1 of 4
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his death sentence, and resentenced him to life imprisonment, thus rendering moot

Petitioner’s pending sentencing-related habeas claims. Petitioner appealed his resentencing,

but it was affirmed. State v. Apelt, No. 2 CA-CR-2009-0256, 2010 WL 3528887 at *1 (Ariz.

App. Div. 2, Sept. 10, 2010) (unpublished memorandum decision). 

On May 23, 2011, this Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why the stay of his

sentencing claims should not be lifted, the claims dismissed as moot, and judgment entered.

(Doc. 214.) In response, Petitioner conceded there was no reason why the Court should not

lift the stay, dismiss the sentencing claims as moot, and enter judgment. (Doc. 216.)

However, Petitioner requested additional time to submit a motion for a certificate of

appealability (COA), which subsequently was filed on June 29, 2011. (Doc. 217.)

On September 13, 2011, the Court dismissed Petitioner’s sentencing claims as moot and

denied Petitioner’s amended habeas petition. (Doc. 218.) The Court also issued a COA on

one claim. The Clerk of Court entered judgment the same day. Despite the COA issuance,

Petitioner inexplicably failed to file a notice of appeal (NOA) pursuant to Rule 4 of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP). In December 2011, Petitioner filed the instant

motion asking the Court to construe his COA request as a premature NOA. (Doc. 220.)

Respondents filed a response, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Docs. 225, 226.)

DISCUSSION

FRAP 4(a) provides in relevant part that a NOA must be filed within 30 days after the

entry of judgment or an order disposing of a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule

59. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). It provides only two avenues for relief from that time limit.

First, a district court may extend the time to file a NOA if (i) a party so moves no later than

30 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a) expires, and (ii) the party demonstrates

“excusable neglect or good cause.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). Second, a district court may

reopen the time to file a NOA in limited circumstances when a party did not receive notice

of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). 

In this case, it is undisputed that Petitioner received notice of the entry of judgment and

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that he did not file a motion to extend the time for filing a NOA either before expiration of

the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1) or the additional 30 days provided by Rule

4(a)(5)(A). To overcome his neglect in failing to file a NOA, Petitioner asks the Court to

construe his motion for COA as a premature NOA under FRAP 4(a)(2). Respondents

counter that Petitioner’s COA request is not the functional equivalent of a NOA because it

failed to provide the notice required by FRAP 3(c). (Doc. 225 at 8.) 

Rule 3(c) provides that a notice of appeal must specify the appealing party, designate

the judgment or order being appealed, and name the court to which the appeal is taken. Rule

4(a)(2) provides that a notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order,

but before entry of judgment, is treated as filed on the date judgment is entered. If the Court

construes Petitioner’s COA request as a premature NOA, Rule 4(a)(2) requires that the

construed NOA be treated as timely filed. The question for this Court, then, is whether

Petitioner’s COA request is the functional equivalent of a NOA. Ninth Circuit precedent

dictates that it is.

In Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit adopted the

position of several other circuits that a certificate of probable cause (CPC) can serve “double

duty” as a notice of appeal. In particular, the court cited McMillan v. Barksdale, 823 F.2d

981, 983 (6th Cir. 1987), in which the Sixth Circuit reasoned that construing a CPC as a

NOA is consistent with the purpose of the rules governing NOAs because FRAP 3(c) directs

that an appeal should not be dismissed for mere “informality of form or title” and because

the rule’s advisory committee expressly approves “a liberal view of papers filed by indigent

and incarcerated defendants.” Subsequently, in Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th

Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit clarified that the “double duty” rule announced in Tinsley

applies equally to petitioners proceeding through counsel, as is the case here. 

Respondents do not address this authority nor argue that COAs should be treated

differently from CPCs. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (observing that

except for minor word substitution, Congress codified CPC standard into COA requirement).

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Accordingly, the Court will construe Petitioner’s COA request as a NOA. Because Petitioner

filed his COA request after this Court announced its intention to dismiss his habeas petition

but before formal entry of judgment, the Court finds that Petitioner’s construed NOA is

timely pursuant to FRAP 4(a)(2). See FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498

U.S. 269, 276 (1991) (determining that Rule 4(a)(2) permits a NOA from a nonfinal decision

to operate as a NOA from final judgment “when a district court announces a decision that

would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment”). 

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Construe Petitioner’s Request

for a Certificate of Appealability (Doc. 220) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall treat

Petitioner’s Certificate of Appealability, filed June 29, 2011, as a Notice of Appeal and shall

process said Notice of Appeal forthwith.

DATED this 20th day of April, 2012.

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