Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02569/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC CHATMAN,

CDCR #BD-5474,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TOYOTA OF ESCONDIDO;

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA;

TOTOYA CORPORATION JAPAN;

RICK WHITTING, Sales Manager,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02569-GPC-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

ERIC CHATMAN (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and incarcerated at California 

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”), in Corcoran, California, filed a civil 

Complaint alleging personal injury and negligence on a State of California Judicial 

Council Form in this Court on December 26, 2017. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), 

but instead, filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). See ECF No. 2. He has 

since submitted a letter addressed to the Court and detailing the allegations raised in his 

Complaint. See ECF No. 4. His letter has been accepted for filing in light of Plaintiff’s 

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pro se status, and despite Local Rule 83.9, which prohibits such ex parte 

communications. See ECF No. 3.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the Plaintiff is a prisoner at the 

time of filing, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the 

entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. 

Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and 

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & 

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report showing his available balance and trust account activity at SATF. See 

ECF No. 2 at 5-6; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1119. This statement shows while Plaintiff had $100.33 deposited to his account over the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available

balance of zero at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 6. 

Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP,

and will assess no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

The Court will further direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to instead 

collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and 

forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

If a prisoner’s complaint “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity,” the Court “shall review” the pleading “as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” and “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, 

if [it] ... is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th 

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Cir. 2014). Here, Plaintiff seeks to sue a car manufacturer, one of its dealerships, and a 

sales manager for allegedly drugging and raping him while he was employed there

“around” January 1997. See ECF No. 1 at 1-5. Plaintiff does not seek redress from or 

name any governmental actors or entities as Defendants. Id. at 1-2. 

Therefore, § 1915A(a)’s screening provisions do not apply. See Chavez v. 

Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Section 1915A mandates early review 

... for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks relief from a governmental entity...”) 

(quoting § 1915A(a)); see also Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed. Appx. 939, 2007 WL 

106785 at *3 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that because a private defendant was not a 

“governmental entity” as described in § 1915A, prisoner’s complaint as to that defendant 

was not subject to dismissal under § 1915A).

However, because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his Complaint is still subject to sua 

sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant 

immune from such relief,” regardless of whether he seeks redress from a “governmental 

entity.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 

(2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or 

appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 

complaint that fails to state a claim.”). The purpose of § 1915’s screening provisions are 

“‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 920 n.1 (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health 

Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

As noted above, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks millions of dollars in general and 

punitive damages from Toyota of Escondido, Toyota Motor Sales USA, Toyota 

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Corporation Japan, and Rick Whitting, a Toyota sales manager, for allegedly drugging 

and raping him while he was employed by them as a salesman more than 20 years ago. 

See ECF No. 1 at 4-6. He asserts no federal jurisdictional basis for his claims, but instead 

merely provides the lurid details of Defendants’ purported offenses in a subsequentlyfiled letter addressed to the Court which also requests additional forms of relief—

including “100% of Toyota Corp.,” “child support,” and “taxes” because he “could have 

been infected with HIV” as a result of his sexual assault. See ECF No. 4 at 4-8.

C. Discussion

A preliminary review of Plaintiff’s Complaint shows that his claims are subject to 

sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because they are

duplicative of those raised, and since dismissed, in another civil action he filed in the 

Southern District of California in September 2017. See Chatman v. Toyota of Escondido, 

et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01853-BAS-JLB (“Chatman I”) (ECF No. 1). A 

court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, 

Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). A prisoner’s complaint is considered 

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [formerly § 1915(d)] if it “merely repeats 

pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 

(9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted). 

In Chatman I, Plaintiff alleged, as he does in this case, that the same Defendants, 

Toyota of Escondido, Toyota Motor Sales USA, and Rick Whitting, a Toyota Sales 

Manager, drugged and raped him while he was employed there between 1996 and 1998. 

See Chatman I, ECF No. 1 at 1-7. Plaintiff also filed several ex parte letters in Chatman I, 

as he has also done in this case, setting forth and repeating the details of Defendants’ 

purported offenses. Id., ECF Nos. 4, 6, 8, 10, 12. On November 8, 2017, Judge Bashant 

granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP in Chatman I, but sua sponte dismissed his case for 

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failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See ECF No. 18. Judge 

Bashant also denied Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading in that case, finding 

amendment would be futile. Id. at 9.

Because Plaintiff’s current Complaint alleges the same facts, is based on the same 

incidents, and re-alleges the same claims against the identical Defendants as did his 

previously-filed pleadings in Chatman I, the Court must dismiss this duplicative and 

subsequently-filed civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See 

Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 920 n.1; see also Adams v. Cal. Dep’t 

of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing whether the 

second action is duplicative of the first, [the court] examine[s] whether the causes of 

action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.”), 

overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).

III. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES this civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and DENIES leave to amend as futile. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 

F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend is not required if it is “absolutely clear 

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that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal 

citations omitted); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 n.8 (noting that if claims are frivolous, “there 

is by definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to 

amend.”). 

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous, 

and therefore not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and 

6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2018

 

2 While the Court has accepted Plaintiff’s letter for filing despite his failure to comply with 

the Court’s Local Rules, see ECF Nos. 3, 4, he is hereby cautioned that S.D. Cal. Local 

Civil Rule 83.9 provides that “attorneys or parties to any action must refrain from writing 

letters to the judge,” and that “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure 

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, 

any additional ex parte letters addressed to the Court in this matter will be rejected based 

on Local Rule 83.9, and because this Order terminates Plaintiff’s case.

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