Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01271/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01271-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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18cv1271-LAB (RBB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANA MIRIAM C. DICKENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

WORLD SAVINGS BANK, FSB, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18cv1271-LAB (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

In an earlier case, 17cv1610, Dickens v. NBS Default Services, LLC, et al., 

Plaintiff Ana Miriam Dickens, pro se, brought eleven claims in state court against 

Defendants NBS Default Services, LLC; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; and World 

Savings Bank, FSB. All claims arose out of or were closely related to a foreclosure 

sale of her home in this District. Defendants removed, then moved to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. The Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, 

identifying many defects. The Court told Dickens to file an ex parte motion to seek 

leave to amend if she thought she could correct the defects, and cautioned her 

that if she failed to seek leave to amend the case could be dismissed. She never 

sought leave to amend, however. 

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The Court construed her refusal to try to amend as an abandonment of her 

claims or an admission that she could not successfully amend, and dismissed the 

action with prejudice on April 9, 2018. 

Dickens did not appeal the dismissal, and the judgment in that case is now 

final. Instead, less than a month later, she filed an extremely similar pro se 

complaint again in state court. The case concerned the same property, was 

brought against the same Defendants, and was based on the same factual 

allegations. The only difference of any significance was that Dickens dropped two 

claims and added three: breach of written contract, breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing, and cancellation of written instruments. Although 

these claims were nominally brought under a different theory, the facts alleged in 

support of them—and in support of the complaint as a whole—are virtually 

identical. Dickens has added a few conclusory allegations (e.g., that Defendants 

planned to drive her into foreclosure so they could acquire her house at a bargain 

price, and acted with an intent to defraud and injure her), but nothing specific or 

substantial.

Defendants removed the case again, and moved to dismiss on the basis of 

res judicata, as well as failure to state a claim.

Jurisdiction

In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, Dickens argues that the Court 

lacks jurisdiction, because some of the Defendants, like her, are California citizens. 

The Court has a continuing obligation to confirm its own jurisdiction. East Bay 

Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1239 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018).

None of the named Defendants are California citizens. Defendants not only 

alleged their own citizenship, but also provided documentation of it. Wells Fargo 

is a citizen of South Dakota. NBS Default Services, LLC is a citizen of Delaware 

and Texas. And, as the Court found in the previous case, Wells Fargo, through a 

series of name changes and mergers, is the successor to World Savings Bank, 

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and is therefore the real party in interest.

1 (Docket no. 11 in case 17cv1610, at 

4:7–22.) The notice of removal makes the same showing of diversity jurisdiction 

here. Contrary to Dickens’ assertion, the citizenship of “Doe” defendants is 

disregarded for purposes of removal based on diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1441(b)(1). Furthermore, Dickens has never alleged that she knows who any of 

the “Doe” Defendants are, or even whether they exist.

Satisfied that it has jurisdiction, the Court can proceed to the merits.

Judicial Notice

Under Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2), at a party’s request the Court must take notice 

of adjudicative facts, if provided with the necessary information. Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss is accompanied by a request for judicial notice asking the Court 

to take notice of the same eight documents as in case 17cv1610, plus certain 

documents from the docket of that case. Dickens has not opposed any of the 

requests. She disagrees with representations made in some of the documents and 

argues about their effect. For example, she argues that the Notice of Trustee’s sale 

(Exhibit H) fails to credit her for payments she made and therefore overstates her 

default. She also argues that it is therefore defective and “of no force and effect.” 

But she does not question the authenticity of any of the documents. In fact, she 

cites and relies on many of the same documents herself. 

The Court can also take judicial notice of its own records. See United States 

v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. 

Ent’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015). She agrees that she and 

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1 When two entities merge before suit is filed, the citizenship of the successor is 

determinative for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Meadows v. Bicrodyne 

Corp., 785 F.2d 670, 672 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hoefferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. DivcoWayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543, 548–49 (7th Cir. 1975)).

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Defendants were parties to case 17cv1610, and has herself discussed the Court’s 

records in that case.

The only exhibit that is not properly the subject of judicial notice is Exhibit C, 

a letter from the Office of Thrift Supervision authorizing World Savings Bank, FSB 

to amend its charter and bylaws to change its name to Wachovia Mortgage. While 

the letter itself cannot be noticed, the fact of World Savings Bank’s name change 

is well-documented in public records and can be noticed. See, e.g., Campidoglio 

LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co., 870 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2017) (reciting the history 

of Wachovia and World Savings Bank); Rucker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 605 

Fed. Appx. 670 (9th Cir. 2015) (in the case caption, identifying Wells Fargo as 

“Successor by Merger with Wachovia Mortgage FSB formerly World Savings Bank 

FSB”). Furthermore, the Court held in case 17cv1610 that World Savings Bank 

had changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage and there is no reason to revisit that 

ruling here. 

The request for judicial notice is GRANTED IN PART as to Exhibit C, as 

noted. And the request is GRANTED as to all other exhibits. 

Legal Standards

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the 

outset” before a case is permitted to proceed. Id. at 558 (citation omitted). The 

well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the Court to infer “the mere possibility 

of conduct”; they must show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Supreme Court has rejected the “any set of facts” 

standard Dickens cites. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 

335 U.S. 41 (1957)).

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When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts all 

allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construes them in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National 

League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation 

omitted). But the Court is “not required to accept as true conclusory allegations 

which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” and does “not 

. . . necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are 

cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Because she is proceeding pro se, the Court construes Dickens’ pleadings 

liberally. See Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th 

Cir. 1988). But the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were 

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). And the Court will not assume she can prove facts she 

has not alleged. See Assoc. Gen’l Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State Council 

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Discussion: Res Judicata

“Res judicata is applicable whenever there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a 

final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.” Stratosphere Litig. 

L.L.C. v. Grand Casinos, Inc., 298 F.3d 1137, 1143 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 (2002) (“Res judicata . . . 

prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same 

parties . . . .”) A new claim is also subject to res judicata if it could have been 

brought in the earlier suit. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 

Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Mycogen, 28 Cal.4th at 897.

The application of this doctrine is “central to the purpose for which civil courts have 

been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdiction.” In 

re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 

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440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979)). It protects various important public and private 

interests, such as judicial economy, avoiding inconsistent results, shielding 

litigants from harassment by repetitive actions, and promoting finality. Montana, 

440 U.S. at 153–54; Mycogen, 28 Cal.4th at 897.

There is no question that requirements for application of res judicata are met

to most of Dickens’ claims, and she admits as much. (See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 

(Docket no. 8) at 8:3–9:1.) Instead, she argues that it does not apply to three new 

claims she added in her new case, for breach of written contract, breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and cancellation of written 

instruments. She argues that these are new claims whose factual basis could not 

have been discovered earlier, and that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment 

provides an exception to res judicata. She then argues that because of “fraudulent 

concealment,” the “manifest injustice” exception to res judicata applies and her 

entire case should be allowed to go forward. (Id. at 9:7–16.) She also appears to 

be arguing that the presence of three new claims salvages the rest of her claims 

too. (Id. at 9:1.)

The biggest problem with this argument is that Dickens’ new complaint is 

essentially a rehash of her old one. The general factual allegations are virtually 

identical. The old complaint’s introductory section has two paragraphs not found in 

the new one, and the new complaint has two paragraphs (which are later repeated) 

not found in the old one. But none of the differences are really substantial, nor are 

they based on any new facts.

Moreover, the factual allegations in support of each of the three claims 

consist of repetitions of earlier allegations, or unsupported conclusions. The new 

complaint does not support the three new claims with any new facts at all. It makes 

some new conclusory allegations about Defendants’ nefarious and fraudulent 

intent. But there is not even one new fact, much less a fact that could not have 

been discovered earlier. Furthermore, less than a month passed from the time 

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Dickens failed to amend and judgment was entered, and the time she filed this 

new complaint. Whatever she believes she discovered in that brief interim is not 

mentioned in her new complaint or in her opposition to the motion to dismiss.

What Dickens may mean is that she has new ideas about why Defendants 

are liable. But applying new legal theories to old facts, or recharacterizing claims

is not a way around res judicata. The well-established principle that claims that 

could have been litigated in the earlier action are also barred prevents it.

All of Dickens’ claims were either actually litigated, or could have been 

litigated in the earlier action. The Court holds that all of her claims are therefore 

barred by res judicata, and must be dismissed with prejudice.

Discussion: Failure to State a Claim

Even if the Court were not dismissing her claims for this reason, her 

complaint would be subject to dismissal without leave to amend, for failure to state 

a claim. The new complaint suffers from the same defects as the old one. Even 

liberal construction cannot salvage them. The heart of Dickens’ complaint is that 

Wells Fargo was not the beneficiary of the note, and NBS Default Services was 

not properly appointed as trustee. Therefore, she thinks, they were not entitled to 

conduct the non-judicial foreclosure on her house. But as in the earlier case, the 

judicially-noticed documents show otherwise. They show that Wells Fargo was the 

beneficiary, and completely undercut Dickens’ claims. Even after these and other 

defects were all pointed out to Dickens, she could not successfully amend. 

Furthermore, the fact that she quickly refiled in state court bespeaks forum 

shopping to avoid another adverse ruling here.

Dickens was given an opportunity to amend after having her complaints’ 

defects pointed out to her, and has not only failed, but without explanation has 

refused to do so. This suggests she could not do so no matter how much time or 

how many opportunities she was given. Nor have her pleadings suggested any 

way that she could successfully amend. Even if Dickens’ claims were not being 

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dismissed as barred by res judicata, they would be dismissed with prejudice for 

failure to state a claim. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992) 

(a court may deny leave to amend when the plaintiff has been given a previous 

opportunity to cure the defects and failed to do so); Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 

347 (9th Cir.1980) (a court’s discretion to dismiss a case with prejudice is 

especially broad “when the court has already given a plaintiff one or more 

opportunities to amend his complaint.”).

Conclusion and Order

Dickens’ claims are all barred by res judicata. And even if they were not, her 

complaint does not state a claim and cannot be successfully amended. The motion 

to dismiss is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2019

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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