Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00656/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00656-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER GRIER,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:16-cv-00656-GSA-PC

SCREENING ORDER

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE FOR 

PLAINTIFF TO FILE AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

ORDER FOR CLERK TO SEND 

PLAINTIFF A CIVIL COMPLAINT FORM

I. BACKGROUND

Alexander Grier (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed the Complaint

commencing this action at the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. (ECF No. 1.) On May 10, 2016, the case was transferred to the Eastern District of 

California. (ECF No. 3.)

On June 6, 2016, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. (ECF No. 7.) 

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Therefore, pursuant to Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of 

California, the undersigned shall conduct any and all proceedings in the case until such time as 

reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix A(k)(3).

The Complaint is now before the court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is an African-American male presently incarcerated at the California 

Rehabilitation Center in Norco, California. The events at issue in the Complaint allegedly 

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occurred at Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP) in Coalinga, California, when Plaintiff was 

incarcerated there in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names as defendants Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (Governor of 

California), Matthew Cate (Secretary, CDCR), Jeffrey Beard (current Secretary, CDCR), and 

P.D. Brazelton (Acting Warden, PVSP) (collectively, “Defendants”). 

Plaintiff alleges as follows. In January 2009, Plaintiff was transferred to PVSP, an area

known to contain the hyperendemic Valley Fever disease. Defendants knew of the substantial 

risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. On March 1, 2013, the federal receiver issued a directive for 

PVSP to transfer all inmates who were at high risk of contracting Valley Fever, also known as 

coccidoidmycosis. Due to racial discrimination, Plaintiff did not qualify as a person at high 

risk for contracting Valley Fever under the criteria used, which targeted inmates with HIV, 

lymphoma, organ transplant, chronic lung disease, and cancer. Plaintiff’s transfer was delayed 

for almost two years. Due to Defendants’ intentional racial discrimination, Plaintiff was not 

seen for review on October 2, 2013 or June 4, 2014, due to administrative error. 

On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff was given a skin test for Valley Fever. A follow-up was 

conducted on January 14, 2015, and Plaintiff’s test results came back positive for exposure to 

Valley Fever. Each Defendant knew that African-American inmates at PVSP and Avenal State 

Prison were nine times more likely to develop chronic disseminated coccidoidmycosis than 

their white counterparts, and they either intentionally or negligently failed to take action to 

protect Plaintiff.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983

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“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 

F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). “To the extent that the violation of

a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that 

guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 

color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him or her of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 

causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others 

which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 

harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

A. Supervisory Liability

All of the Defendants named by Plaintiff hold supervisory positions. Plaintiff is advised 

that “[l]iability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the 

defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

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to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each 

defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, to the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability upon any of the defendants in their supervisory 

capacity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim.

B. Racial Discrimination -- Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 

(1985); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may 

be established by showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based 

on his membership in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of 

Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th 

Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly 

situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a 

legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 

S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073 

(2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC 

v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). “Prisoners are protected under the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)(citation omitted). 

Plaintiff’s claim for racial discrimination by Defendants under the Equal Protection 

Clause fails. Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that he was intentionally 

discriminated against on the basis of his race, or that he was intentionally treated differently 

than other similarly situated inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. Mere conclusory statements, such as “due to racial discrimination” do not suffice.

///

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C. Safe Conditions of Confinement – Eighth Amendment – Valley Fever

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew that African-Americans have a greater chance of 

contracting Valley Fever, yet they allowed Plaintiff to remain at PVSP, where he was exposed 

to Valley Fever. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials are . . . prohibited from being 

deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Helling v. 

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847 (prison official violates Eighth 

Amendment if he or she knows of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and fails to 

take reasonable measures to avoid the harm). “Deliberate indifference occurs when ‘[an] 

official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’”

Solis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner may state “a 

cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that [prison officials] have, with 

deliberate indifference, exposed him to [environmental conditions] that pose an unreasonable 

risk of serious damage to his future health.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.

“The second step, showing ‘deliberate indifference,’ involves a two part inquiry.”

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). “First, the inmate must show that the 

prison officials were aware of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ to an inmate’s health or 

safety.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “This part of [the] inquiry may be satisfied if 

the inmate shows that the risk posed by the deprivation is obvious.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no ‘reasonable’ justification for the 

deprivation, in spite of that risk.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison officials who 

actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if 

they responded reasonably.”) (footnote omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that any of the Defendants knew of a risk of 

harm and failed to prevent it. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants should not have allowed him, an 

African-American inmate, to remain at PVSP. Plaintiff provides no factual allegations for the 

court to infer that any of the Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was at substantial risk of

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serious harm if he were not transferred away from PVSP. Plaintiff must plausibly allege that 

Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference in taking, or failing to take, the alleged actions. 

See Lua v. Smith, 2015 WL 1565370 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

While the Court recognizes that the exact circumstances required to state a claim under 

the Eighth Amendment based on Valley Fever exposure are not clear, it is well settled that 

exposure to, and contraction of, Valley Fever while housed at an endemic institution are not, by 

themselves, sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. In other words, the 

premise that the location of PVSP is so inherently dangerous due to the presence of Valley 

Fever cannot support a constitutional violation. See Hines v. Youssef, 2015 WL 164215, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting African-American asthmatic prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim 

arising from exposure to and contraction of Valley Fever); accord Williams v. Biter, 2015 WL 

1830770, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015). This premise is unacceptable where free citizens residing in 

the surrounding areas tolerate this increased risk, regardless of race or medical condition. “An 

individual who lives out of custody . . . anywhere in the Southern San Joaquin Valley is at 

relatively high risk of exposure to Coccidioides immitis spores,” and “[u]nless there is 

something about a prisoner’s conditions of confinement that raises the risk of exposure 

substantially above the risk experienced by the surrounding communities, it cannot be reasoned 

that the prisoner is involuntarily exposed to a risk society would not tolerate.” Hines, at *4.

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegations are speculative, at best, and do 

not state an Eighth Amendment claim against any Defendant. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to 

amend the Complaint to cure the deficiencies in his claims found by the court.

D. Negligence -- State Law Claim

Plaintiff brings a claim for negligence, which is a state law claim. Plaintiff is informed 

that violation of state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Section 1983 

does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Galen v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). To state a claim under § 1983, there must be a 

deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 

(1976); also see Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995); Gonzaga 

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University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002). Although the court may exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this instance, the court fails to find any cognizable 

federal claims in the Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff=s negligence claim fails.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. The court will dismiss the Complaint and give Plaintiff leave to file an amended 

complaint addressing the issues described above. 

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely 

give leave to amend when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the court will provide Plaintiff an 

opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file the First

Amended Complaint within thirty days.

The First Amended Complaint must allege constitutional violations under the law as 

discussed above. Specifically, Plaintiff must state what each named defendant did that led to 

the deprivation of his constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. As discussed above, there is no respondeat superior liability, 

and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of 

her rights by their actions. Id. at 676-77 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 

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titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original 

signed under penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to 

amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint curing the 

deficiencies identified by the court in this order, within thirty (30) days from 

the date of service of this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and 

refer to the case number 1:16-cv-00656-GSA-PC; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to file a First Amended Complaint within 30 days, this case shall 

be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2017 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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