Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00597/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00597-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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08cv597

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RD LEGAL FUNDING, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERWIN & BALINGIT, LLP, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 08cv597-L(RBB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In this diversity action for breach of contract and related state law claims, Plaintiff claims

it advanced to Defendants certain funds Defendants anticipated recovering as attorneys’ fees in

two different litigations, in exchange for an assignment, guarantee and a lien. Instead of turning

over the assigned funds to Plaintiff, Defendants allegedly converted them for their own use. 

Plaintiff filed a pleading styled as an “emergency motion for summary judgment,” seeking

summary adjudication of Defendants’ liability only. For the reasons which follow, Plaintiff’s

motion is DENIED.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to enter summary judgment on

factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

Case 3:08-cv-00597-L-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/15/08 Page 1 of 4
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Arpin v.

Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a “genuine

issue of material fact for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A

fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Id.

at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its own claims. “When the party

moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward

with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at

trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v.

Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). If the movant

meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show summary adjudication is not

appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, 324. 

In support of its motion Plaintiff filed a declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and four

exhibits. The declaration does not identify the exhibits, authenticate them or lay any foundation. 

Only admissible evidence may be considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Serv., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden as the moving party on a summary judgment

motion with respect to its own claims.

In the alternative, the court construes the emergency motion as a motion for a temporary

restraining order pursuant to Rule 65. In this context, “[t]he trial court may give even

inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of preventing irreparable

harm before trial.” Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff claims that it needs emergency relief because “Defendants have recently

indicated that they are unwilling to expeditiously return the funds at issue,” they are “currently

negotiating and/or settling several unrelated legal actions which will result in substantial income

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and profit for Defendants in the near future,” and there is a “high likelihood that [the] monies

received by Defendants will not be promptly assigned or transferred to [Plaintiff].” (Aff. of

Tyler R. Andrews, Esq.) If emergency relief is not granted, “Defendants would be free to collect

any pending legal fees or settlements free and clear of any judgments, liens, or awards of

damages against them,” and “would likely abscond with and/or misappropriate” the funds. (Id.)

A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief, including a temporary restraining order,

must show either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions going to the merits are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in the moving party's favor. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). “These two formulations represent two points on a sliding

scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success

decreases.” Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the moving

party must show the threatened irreparable harm is imminent. Sardi's Rest. Corp. v. Sardi, 755

F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1985); Caribbean Marine Servs., Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674

(9th Cir. 1988). 

Although Plaintiff asserts, on information and belief, that Defendants will receive

substantial funds in the near future, it does not state whether this is imminent. It is therefore

impossible for the court to ascertain whether Plaintiff’s claimed harm is imminent. In addition,

Plaintiff does not address the issue whether the claimed harm would be irreparable. Plaintiff’s

motion therefore does not meet the requirements for a temporary restraining order.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s emergency motion for summary judgment is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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COPY TO: 

HON. RUBEN B. BROOKS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:08-cv-00597-L-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/15/08 Page 4 of 4