Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00119/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Corey Lamont Holleman, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 15-0119-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Corey Lamont Holleman’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. Rather than filing an answer, Respondents filed a Notice of Lack 

of Jurisdiction (Doc. 16) contending that the petition is a successive petition that 

cannot be considered by the Court unless Petitioner first obtains an order from the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). As explained 

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below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent 

review of the record, dismiss the Petition without prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The Petition at issue is Holleman’s second in this Court raising claims 

associated with his June 15, 2007 conviction in the Pima County Superior Court, No. 

CR 20064587, for possession of a narcotic drug for sale. 

 Holleman filed his first petition (the “First Petition”) in 2010. See Holleman 

v. Hartsuck, No. CV 10-433-TUC-CKJ (D. Ariz. judgment entered May 15, 2013). 

In the First Petition, Holleman raised four claims. He asserted that (1) his Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated because he was not present during jury selection; 

(2) the trial court’s accomplice liability instruction violated his rights under the Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) the trial court’s jury instruction improperly shifted 

the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense; and (4) the trial court 

violated the rule of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), by finding the 

existence of prior convictions using a standard of proof below the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. The District Court denied the First Petition and 

dismissed the case with prejudice by Order dated May 15, 2013. See Holleman v. 

Hartsuck, No. CV 10-00433-TUC-JGZ, Doc. 22. 

 On March 25, 2015, Holleman filed the petition at issue in this case (the 

“Second Petition”). Doc. 1. In the Second Petition, Holleman alleges that his trial 

and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Id., pp. 6-7. 

 

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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

Respondents contend that the Second Petition is barred by the limitations on 

second or successive petitions found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA provides that a claim presented in a 

successive petition that was not raised in a prior petition must be dismissed unless it 

falls within two narrow categories of claims. Successive petitions are permitted to 

address new rules of constitutional law, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), or newly 

discovered facts that establish actual innocence, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). 

However, even if the claims qualify under the narrow categories, the AEDPA 

“gatekeeping provisions” provide that, “[b]efore a second or successive application 

permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the 

appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the 

application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 149 

(2007). 

 There is nothing in the record that indicates Holleman filed the required 

motion in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In fact, Holleman does not contend 

that he sought authorization for a successive petition. Rather, he argues that it was 

not necessary to seek authorization and offers the following quote from a Fifth 

Circuit decision: 

[S]ince passage of the AEDPA, the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth 

Circuits have concluded that a habeas petition refiled after dismissal 

without prejudice is neither second nor successive. 

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In re Gasery, 116 F.3d 1051, 1052 (5th Cir. 1997). Based on this holding, Holleman 

contends that the Second Petition, like that addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Gasery, 

is “merely a continuation of his first collateral attack [and] not a second or successive 

petition within the meaning of [§] 2244(b).” Petitioner’s Response (Doc. 17), pp. 2-

3. 

 However, as Respondents contend, Holleman’s argument is founded upon a 

faulty premise. As noted above, Holleman’s First Petition was dismissed with 

prejudice. As such, the authorization of the Second Petition is an issue for the Ninth 

Circuit to consider. Burton, 549 U.S. at 153 (the circuit court “may authorize the 

filing of the second or successive [petition] only if it presents a claim not previously 

raised that satisfies one of the two grounds articulated in § 2244(b)(2).”) Because the 

record establishes that the Second Petition is a successive petition and Holleman has 

neither sought nor received authorization from the Ninth Circuit for its filing, this 

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Second Petition. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

“The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a), Rules governing § 2254 

Proceedings. Because the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

conclude that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the Second Petition, the court must 

therefore determine whether to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner 

seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district 

court’s denial of her petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. 

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Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–336 (2003). Section 2253 controls the 

determination whether to issue a certificate of appealability and provides as follows: 

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on 

appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is 

held. 

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding 

to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against 

the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention 

pending removal proceedings. 

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from- 

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or 

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. 

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by 

paragraph (2). 

28 U.S.C. § 2253. 

 If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate 

of appealability when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the 

petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that 

matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or 

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that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 

463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)). 

 In this case, a certificate of appealability should be denied because there is no 

doubt that Holleman did not seek or obtain authorization to file the Second Petition 

and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction. Additionally, Holleman has cited no 

legitimate basis upon which he is entitled to continue pursuit of his claims. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, dismiss without prejudice Holleman’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) for lack of jurisdiction and deny a 

certificate of appealability. 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 15-0119-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely 

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file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 9th day of November, 2015. 

 

 

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