Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02466/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02466-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 05:552 Right to Privacy Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GARY TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEFENSE FINANCE & ACCOUNTING 

SERVICE; UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA; DAVID S. BALDWIN; 

HARRY M. WYATT III; MARK 

GROVES; TERESA MCKAY; DOES 

ONE through TEN,

Defendants.

NO. CIV. 2:12-2466 WBS DAD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

These motions for summary judgment come before the 

court on the following four claims: (1) a claim against defendant 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS”) for violations of 

the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; (2) a claim against defendants 

Major General David S. Baldwin, Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt 

III, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Groves, and Teresa McKay, the 

director of DFAS, for deprivation of due process in violation of 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) a Bivens claim against Wyatt and McKay; and 

(4) a claim against the United States of America for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Each of these claims arises

from plaintiff Gary Taylor’s allegations that defendants 

attempted to recoup over $140,000 in pay (“the overpay debt”) 

that plaintiff lawfully earned as a colonel in the California Air 

National Guard (“CANG”). Although the court for the following 

reasons grants defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the 

four claims at issue, it expresses no opinion with regard to the 

validity of the overpay debt itself, and enters this Order 

without prejudice to any subsequent claims, not disposed of in 

this Order, properly seeking an adjudication of the validity of 

the overpay debt. 

I. Factual & Procedural History

In 2003, plaintiff took a leave of absence from his job 

as an airline pilot to serve as a full-time military technician 

for CANG. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC” ¶ 15 (Docket No. 21).) 

In 2009, plaintiff was promoted to Commander of the 144th Fighter 

Wing of the Fresno Air National Guard (“FANG”). (Id.) The Air 

Force required the 144th Fighter Wing to provide pilots to serve

4380 individual eight-hour alert duty periods each year. (Id. ¶

29.) The 144th Fighter Wing attempted to fulfill this obligation

by permitting aircraft technicians – including plaintiff – to 

serve alert duty periods and to collect dual compensation for 

doing so. (See id. ¶¶ 30-32.)

In May 2010, an audit team from the National Guard 

Bureau audited the 144th Fighter Wing and noted that some pilots 

“may have received pay twice in one day.” (Pl.’s Ex. 16 (Docket 

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No. 48-4).) Plaintiff then requested a legal review from CANG to 

determine whether the 144th Fighter Wing’s practice of dual 

compensation had violated any military regulations. (Pl.’s 

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PSUF”) ¶ 10 (Docket No. 48-2).) 

Although Colonel Greg Strickland, the CANG Staff Judge Advocate, 

concluded that FANG had acted “reasonably and within their proper 

authority,” (Pl.’s Ex. 10 (Docket No. 48-4)), plaintiff was 

removed from his position as the commander of the 144th Fighter 

Wing on July 28, 2010. (FAC ¶ 36.) 

In June 2010, Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, 

the director of the Air National Guard, attended a conference in 

Dallas, Texas at which plaintiff was present. (See Pl.’s Exs. 

12, 12A (Docket No. 48-4).) Wyatt told an audience at the 

conference “that the pilots in Fresno were under investigation, 

that they were guilty, and that they would be court-martialed.” 

(See PSUF ¶ 14.) A confidential informant averred that Wyatt 

also walked into a conference room at that event and stated that 

“one of you . . . made three times more than me and I’m a three 

star general” while staring directly at plaintiff. (Pl.’s Ex. 

12.) Wyatt then told the audience that plaintiff had made 

approximately $350,000 and that “this guy might want to get a 

lawyer.” (Pl.’s Ex. 12A.) 

On August 31, 2010, the National Guard Bureau issued a 

preliminary draft report of its findings during the audit of the 

144th Fighter Wing. (Pl.’s Ex. 16 (Docket No. 48-4).) Derrick 

E. Miller, the author of the report, stated in an attached 

memorandum that Wyatt had ordered the audit. (Id.) The report 

concluded that the 144th Fighter Wing had paid approximately 

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$2,475,000 in improper dual compensation over the prior six 

years, and that “due to ineffective and inadequate internal 

controls . . . dual compensation risks could not be properly 

mitigated.” (Id.) The report also recommended that the 

California National Guard “instate recoupment actions” for the 

money that was overpaid. (Id.) 

In October 2010, Charles Piller, an investigative 

reporter for the Sacramento Bee, began to write a series of 

articles about alleged corruption in the California National 

Guard. (Pl.’s Ex. 54 (Docket No. 48-3).) On December 19, 2010, 

The Bee published a piece in which it was alleged that the pilots 

of the 144th Fighter Wing were “dozing for dollars” and 

improperly receiving dual compensation. (Pl.’s Ex. 55 (Docket 

No. 48-3).) The article noted that Taylor was relieved of his 

command of the 144th Fighter Wing, that he was “on pace to earn 

$316,000,” and that “[a]uditors estimated that more than 40 

percent of his recent income was improper.” (Id.) The article 

quoted John Crocker, a Colonel in the California National Guard, 

who stated that “[t]here is a minimum an appearance that 

(commanders) self-enriched” and that Brigadier General Mary J. 

Kight, the Adjudant General of the California National Guard, 

“had lost full faith and confidence in Taylor’s leadership 

skills.” (Id.) 

On March 10, 2011, The Bee published another piece 

which criticized the promotion of four of the accused pilots in 

the 144th Fighter Wing to command positions. (Pl.’s Ex. 57 

(Docket No. 48-3).) This article quoted Wyatt, who commented 

that he had “great faith and confidence in the men and women of 

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the 144th Fighter Wing” and that it was “unfortunate that the 

alleged actions of a few have brought discredit to those men and 

women.” (Id.) During that month, Colonel Larry McKoane, a 

former commander of the 144th Fighter Wing, attended an Air 

National Guard Core Values Conference in Portland, OR, where he 

avers that Wyatt spent the majority of his presentations 

describing the alleged misconduct by the 144th Fighter Wing. 

(Pl.’s Ex. 69 (Docket No. 48-3).) Sabrella Bacon, an attendee at 

a May 2011 Executive Safety Summit in Orlando, FL, states that 

Wyatt devoted almost all of his presentation on “Ethics and 

Leadership” to discussing the alleged dual compensation 

violations. (Pl.’s Ex. 68 (Docket No. 48-3).) Bacon states that 

when she told another attendee that she was “embarrassed” by 

Wyatt’s statements, that person responded that she “had heard it 

all before at a previous conference.” (Id.) 

On November 18, 2011, plaintiff retired from military 

service and received an honorable discharge. (See FAC ¶ 66; U.S. 

& DFAS Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 66 (Docket No. 40-1).) On 

December 12, 2011, Colonel Mark Groves, the Comptroller of the 

144th Fighter Wing, informed plaintiff that he would submit the 

debt that plaintiff was allegedly overpaid (the “overpay debt”) 

to DFAS for recoupment and provided him with a sample letter of 

indebtedness. (Pl.’s Ex. 30 (Docket No. 48-4).) That letter 

informed plaintiff that if he disagreed with the overpay debt, he 

could appeal the validity of the debt, request a waiver of the 

debt, or apply to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military 

Records, which was authorized to correct the record of the debt. 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s attorney then attempted to obtain his military 

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records from Groves, who instructed him that he would need to 

contact DFAS in order to obtain those records. (See Pl.’s Exs. 

31-32 (Docket No. 48-4).) 

On May 17, 2012, plaintiff received a letter from DFAS

informing him that the overpay debt amounted to $142,698.58 and 

instructing him to repay the debt by June 16, 2012. (Pl.’s Ex. 

33 (Docket No. 48-4).) On June 6, 2012, plaintiff’s wife was 

denied credit while shopping for a refrigerator at Sears. (See 

Pl.’s Ex. 35 (Docket No. 48-4).) Plaintiff then obtained a copy 

of his credit report from Experian, which stated that plaintiff 

was past due on the overpay debt, that the account had been 

closed and referred for collection, and that plaintiff was more 

than 120 days past due on the account. (See Pl.’s Ex. 36 (Docket 

No. 48-4).) On July 12, 2012, the Treasury Department contacted 

plaintiff’s mother, sought to ascertain his whereabouts, and 

asked for his phone number. (See Pl.’s Ex. 39 (Docket No. 48-

4).) On July 24, 2012, plaintiff received a letter from the 

Treasury Department stating that his account had been referred 

for collection, that he now owed $182,956.29, and that he would 

incur additional penalties if he did not repay the debt within 

ten days. (Pl.’s Ex. 40 (Docket No. 48-4).) 

After DFAS instructed him to repay the overpay debt, 

plaintiff’s attorney wrote a series of letters to DFAS (Pl.’s Ex. 

38 (Docket No. 48-4)), to the Treasury Department, (Pl.’s Ex. 41

(Docket No. 48-4)), and to Baldwin, McKay, and Colonel Sami Said, 

the commander of the 144th Fighter Wing, (Pl.’s Ex. 42 (Docket 

No. 48-4)), requesting plaintiff’s records and an administrative 

hearing. The National Guard Bureau responded on September 20, 

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2012, and stated that it had forwarded plaintiff’s requests for 

processing by the appropriate agencies. (Pl.’s Ex. 43 (Docket 

No. 48-4).) 

In December 2010, DFAS determined that it had 

erroneously referred plaintiff’s debt for collection and ordered 

the Treasury Department to stop collections and recall the 

account. (Pl.’s Ex. 45 (Docket No. 48-4). DFAS then contacted 

Taylor and informed him that his debt was prematurely forwarded 

to the Treasury Department for collections, that it had requested 

removal of his debt account from the credit bureaus, and that it 

had removed all interest and fees associated with the overpay 

debt. (Pl.’s Exs. 46-47 (Docket No. 48-4.) Although DFAS 

maintained that the overpay debt remained valid, it assured 

plaintiff that it would suspend collection efforts until 

plaintiff’s legal challenges to the validity of the debt were 

resolved. (Pl.’s Ex. 46.) 

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 28, 2012 

(Docket No. 1), and filed an amended complaint on January 29, 

2013 against CANG, FANG, the California National Guard (“CNG”), 

DFAS, Wyatt, Baldwin, Groves, McKay, and Colonel Sami S. Said. 

The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against CANG, FANG, and 

CNG for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, (Docket No. 26), 

dismissed plaintiff’s claims against Said for failure to effect 

service, (Docket No. 36), and substituted the United States for 

Wyatt on plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claim pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C § 2679(d)(1) (Docket 

No. 31). Plaintiff brings four remaining claims: (1) a claim for 

damages and injunctive relief under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §

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552a, against DFAS; (2) a claim under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) et seq., for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against the United States; (3) a Bivens claim 

against McKay and Wyatt; and (4) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against Wyatt, Baldwin, Groves, and McKay. Defendants now move 

for summary judgment on each of plaintiff’s remaining claims.

1

(Docket Nos. 39-40.)

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

 

1 Defendants style these motions as “motions for 

dismissal and summary judgment” and argue both that plaintiff 

fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that plaintiff has 

not provided evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (See generally Federal 

Individuals’ Mot. for Dismissal & Summ. J. (“Indiv. Mot.”) 

(Docket No. 39); U.S. & DFAS Mot. for Dismissal & Summ. J. (“U.S. 

Mot.”) (Docket No. 40).) 

Because all parties submit and rely upon materials 

outside the pleadings and had a “reasonable opportunity to 

present all the material pertinent to the motion,” the court must 

construe these motions as motions for summary judgment. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(d); Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 

1996) (“A motion to dismiss made under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) must be treated as a motion for summary 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 if either party 

to the motion to dismiss submits materials outside the pleadings 

in support or opposition to the motion, and if the district court 

relies on those materials.” (citations omitted)). 

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burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, 

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 252.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.2 Id. at 

 

2 On a motion for summary judgment, “[a] party may object 

that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be 

presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “[T]o survive summary judgment, a party 

does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that 

would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the 

requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.” Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Block v. 

City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001)) 

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255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id.

A. Privacy Act

The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, seeks to “protect the 

privacy of individuals through regulation of the collection, 

maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by federal 

agencies.” Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 567 F.3d 408, 413 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The

Privacy Act does so in part by authorizing “civil relief to 

individuals aggrieved by failures on the Government’s part to 

comply with [its] requirements.” Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 

(2004). 

Plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim against DFAS is premised 

on four separate statutory provisions: (a) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2), 

 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the non-moving 

party’s evidence is presented in a form that is currently 

inadmissible, such evidence may be evaluated on a motion for 

summary judgment so long as the moving party’s objections could 

be cured at trial. See Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 

433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Shubb, J.).

Plaintiff objects to several of the defendants’ 

statements of undisputed fact on the basis that they are vague, 

rely on personal knowledge, or call for speculation. (See Pl.’s 

Objections & Resp. to U.S.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts 

(Docket No. 47-1).) These objections are all duplicative of the 

summary judgment standard itself, and the court will overrule 

them. See Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-20. Further, for the 

edification of the parties, this court pays no attention to the 

parties’ statements of undisputed facts in ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment. Instead, the court looks to the evidence 

itself (whether in the declarations, depositions, or discovery 

responses) referenced in the moving or opposing papers to 

determine whether there are disputed issues of material fact.

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which permits any individual “to request amendment of a record 

pertaining to him”; (b) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1), which requires 

federal agencies to permit any individual access to a “record or 

to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the 

system”; (c) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(c), which prohibits an agency 

from “fail[ing] to maintain any record concerning any individual 

with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness” as 

is necessary to assure that individual is treated fairly; and (d) 

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(12), which prohibits a federal agency from 

disclosing any individual’s record to a consumer reporting agency 

without his or her consent. (FAC ¶¶ 78-82.) 

1. Record Access

The Privacy Act permits a civil claim for a denial of 

access to records only when an agency “refuses to comply with a 

request under subsection (d)(1) of this section.” 5 U.S.C. §

552a(g)(1)(B). Subsection (d)(1), in turn, requires an agency to 

furnish access to records “upon request by any individual.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). A number of courts, including those in this 

district, have held that this language requires a plaintiff to 

exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to bringing a 

claim under Section 552a(d)(1). See, e.g., Tangirala v. Potter, 

Civ. No. 2:06-384 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 2633239, at *18 (E.D. Cal. 

Jun. 25, 2008) (“Challenges to access, accuracy or amendment of 

federal agency records must be administratively exhausted before 

they may be pursued in federal court.” (citations omitted)); 

Haase v. Sessions, 893 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The first 

two causes of action for amendment of records and for access to 

records incorporate exhaustion requirements.”); Sterrett v. Dep’t 

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of Navy, No. 09-CV-2083-IEG (POR), 2010 WL 330086, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) (“[T]here is no doubt the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is a prerequisite before a federal court 

can review a Privacy Act claim seeking access to documents.”). 

And “[a]lthough the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly held” that 

administrative exhaustion is a prerequisite to bringing a claim 

under the Privacy Act’s record-access provisions, id., it has 

held that identical statutory language – requiring a “request” 

and “refusal” – in the Freedom of Information Act incorporates an 

exhaustion requirement. In re Steele, 799 F.2d 461, 465-66 (9th 

Cir. 1986). 

In order to request records under the Privacy Act, an 

individual must “address requests for access to records to the 

appropriate Privacy Act Officer,” 32 C.F.R. § 324.10, and must 

describe the record “well enough to enable it to be located with 

a reasonable amount of effort on the part of an employee familiar 

with the file,” 32 C.F.R. § 310.18(b)(1)(i). Plaintiff contends 

that he “sent a request for production of all records and 

documents” on June 15, 2012, and a second request on August 27, 

2012. (FAC ¶ 70; Pl.’s Exs. 38, 42.) Plaintiff addressed his 

June 14, 2012 request for records to “DFAS-Indianapolis” and 

requested “an opportunity to inspect and review all documents 

supporting [DFAS’s] claim against [plaintiff].” (See Pl.’s Ex. 

38.) Plaintiff then addressed his August 27, 2012 request to 

Baldwin, McKay, and Said, rather than the appropriate Privacy Act 

officer. (See Pl’s Ex. 42.) And while that letter requested 18 

separate documents, (see id.), DFAS found that those requests 

were frequently “too vague . . . to understand,” were not 

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intelligible, and asked for information that DFAS did not 

possess. (Outlaw Decl. ¶ 20; Outlaw Decl. Ex. 6.) In short, 

neither letter complied with the requirements for a “request” 

under the Privacy Act.

In spite of these deficiencies, DFAS routed these 

letters to Gregory Outlaw, the Privacy Act officer for DFAS, who 

“coordinated a search for records responsive to Mr. Taylor’s debt 

in accordance with his request.” (Outlaw Decl. ¶ 13.) The DFAS 

Claims and Debts office was able to locate 41 pages of documents 

that were responsive to his requests, (id. ¶ 14), and Outlaw sent 

these documents to plaintiff on March 28, 2013 along with a 

letter explaining the reasons that he had denied some of 

plaintiff’s record-access and record-amendment requests (id. ¶

20; Outlaw Decl. Ex. 6.) That letter specifically apprised 

plaintiff of his right to appeal that denial, informed plaintiff 

of how to file that appeal, and notified plaintiff that he had 

sixty days to do so. (Outlaw Decl. Ex. 6.) Plaintiff did not 

file that appeal,3 (see Outlaw Decl. ¶ 22), and he has therefore 

 

3 Plaintiff argues that it would have been inappropriate 

to file an appeal directly with Outlaw, as this appeal would have 

violated the California Rules of Professional Conduct’s 

prohibition on communicating directly with an adverse party who 

is represented by counsel. (Pl.’s Opp’n to U.S. Mot. at 18:23-

19:2.) The court finds this argument to be pretextual. 

California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-100(C)(1) contains a 

specific exception for “[c]ommunications with a public officer, 

board, committee, or body,” such as the appeal that Outlaw 

invited plaintiff to file. (See Outlaw Decl. Ex. 6.) In 

addition, plaintiff could have contacted the United States 

Attorney, who represented DFAS at this time and who would have 

consented to filing the appeal with Outlaw. (See Himel Decl. ¶

5.) As a result, plaintiff’s alleged concern with the propriety 

of filing an appeal with Outlaw does not excuse his failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. 

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not exhausted his administrative remedies.

Nor would it have been futile for plaintiff to appeal 

the denial of his records request. The Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not 

required where exhaustion would have been futile.” Leorna v. 

U.S. Dep’t of State, 105 F.3d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 

United Farm Workers of Am. v. Ariz. Agr. Emp’t Relations Bd., 669 

F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)). But, as plaintiff concedes, 

“[t]he futility exception applies only when there is a certainty 

of an adverse decision or further pursuit of administrative 

remedies would be clearly useless.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to U.S. Mot. at

20:11-12 (citing M.K. v. Tenet, 99 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 

2000).) 

There is no evidence that an appeal would have been 

futile. Plaintiff claims that when he attempted to dispute the 

debt with the DFAS Protest Audit department, they refused to 

speak with him over the phone and did not respond to his written 

communications. (PSUF ¶ 65; Pl.’s Ex. 41.) Whatever 

difficulties plaintiff experienced in communicating with the 

Protest Audit department are immaterial to whether plaintiff’s 

appeal to Outlaw, who was the designated Privacy Act officer 

rather than a member of the Protest Audit department, would have 

been futile. In fact, the letter that Outlaw sent plaintiff 

specifically notes that Outlaw could not fulfill all of 

plaintiff’s requests because plaintiff had not submitted the 

enclosures that his earlier requests had mentioned. (Outlaw 

Decl. Ex. 6.) Had plaintiff simply sent those enclosures 

alongside his appeal, it is entirely possible that Outlaw could 

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have fulfilled some or all of plaintiff’s requests for records. 

(See Outlaw Decl. ¶¶ 18-19 (noting that Outlaw denied plaintiff’s 

records request in part because he failed to provide sufficient 

“documentary evidence” supporting that request).) Whether or not 

it is likely that an appeal would have been fruitful, plaintiff 

has not shown a certainty of an adverse decision and therefore 

cannot show that exhaustion of his administrative remedies would 

have been futile. See M.K., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 21. 

Nor does equitable estoppel relieve plaintiff from the 

burden of exhausting his administrative remedies. The Ninth 

Circuit has held that administrative exhaustion requirements are

“akin to a statute of limitations” and are therefore subject to 

equitable estoppel. Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Equitable estoppel relieves a 

plaintiff of the exhaustion requirement only when “the 

defendant’s wrongful actions prevent[ed] the plaintiff from

asserting his claim.” Id. at 1123 (citing Santa Maria v. Pac. 

Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Although plaintiff contends that DFAS “misled” him 

about how to protest the debt itself, this is immaterial to the 

question of whether DFAS prevented him from filing a request for 

records under the Privacy Act. Nor does plaintiff’s extensive 

reliance on Liguori v. Alexander, 495 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 

1980), (see Opp’n to U.S. Mot. at 21-25), establish that estoppel 

is appropriate. There, a civilian employee at West Point made an 

oral request to amend his records under the Privacy Act, which 

Army regulations allowed at that time. Id. at 646. An employee 

relations officer incorrectly advised the plaintiff to pursue his 

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Privacy Act request through the Army’s grievance procedure, 

rather than through its established Privacy Act procedure. Id.

at 646-47. Although defendants then attempted to argue that the 

plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the 

court held that the defendants were estopped from arguing that 

plaintiff had failed to exhaust, as the plaintiff had initiated a 

valid Privacy Act request and failed to pursue his administrative 

remedies only because he relied on the Army’s incorrect advice. 

Id. at 647. 

As discussed above, plaintiff’s claim is unlike that of 

the plaintiff’s in Liguori because he failed to comply with 

applicable Privacy Act regulations. (See Pl.’s Exs. 38, 42.) 

Nor is there any evidence that DFAS obstructed plaintiff’s 

Privacy Act request. Indeed, despite plaintiff’s failure to 

address his records requests to the Privacy Act officer or to 

specify the records he sought to access, DFAS went out of its way 

to re-rout those requests to Outlaw, coordinate a search for all 

potentially responsive records, provide those records to 

plaintiff, inform plaintiff of the reasons it could not provide 

him with other records, and invite him to appeal. (See Outlaw 

Decl. Ex. 6.) Because plaintiff has not shown that DFAS’s 

actions prevented him from pursuing his request for records under 

the Privacy Act, DFAS is not estopped from asserting that 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See

Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122. Accordingly, the court must grant 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s record 

access claim. 

2. Record Amendment & Record Defect

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Two of plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims are premised on 

the theory that DFAS violated Section 552a(g)(1)(c) by 

inaccurately maintaining that plaintiff owed the overpay debt, 

and that DFAS violated Section 552a(d)(2) by failing to permit 

plaintiff to amend this record of the overpay debt. (See FAC ¶¶

80, 82.) But while “[t]he Privacy Act allows for the amendment 

of factual or historical errors[,] [i]t is not . . . a vehicle 

for amending the judgments of federal officials or of other 

parties as those judgments are reflected in records maintained by 

federal agencies.” Rogers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 607 F. Supp. 

697, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Blevins v. Plummer, 613 F.2d 

767, 768 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)); see also, e.g., Rosen v. 

Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the 

Privacy Act cannot be used to “open the back door to judicial 

review” of agency decisions). 

Here, plaintiff claims that DFAS’s record of the 

overpay debt is inaccurate because “military regulations and 

federal law . . . specifically allow[] for any and all pay earned 

by plaintiff.” (FAC ¶ 51; see also Pl.’s Exs. 1-11 (detailing 

regulations relating to dual compensation)). Even if this were 

so, plaintiff cannot prevail on his record amendment and record 

defect claims because the determination that plaintiff owed the 

overpay debt is “not subject to collateral attack” under the 

Privacy Act. Rogers, 607 F. Supp. at 700. 

Douglas v. Agricultural Conservation & Stabilization 

Service, although not binding here, is particularly instructive. 

33 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1994). There, a federal agency offered the 

plaintiff a land conservation contract for 4.2 acres of land, 

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even though plaintiff maintained that she owned six acres of 

eligible property. Id. at 784. The plaintiff then brought a 

Privacy Act claim and asked the district court to order the 

defendant to correct its records to show that she owned six acres 

of eligible land. Id. The court held that the plaintiff could 

not obtain such an order because “the Privacy Act does not permit 

relitigation of the substance of agency decisions.” Id. at 785. 

Although the court conceded that the data on which the agency 

relied was “contestable” and that another agency had concluded 

that the plaintiff owned six acres of eligible land, it 

nonetheless held that the plaintiff could not use the Privacy Act 

to amend the defendant’s record that the plaintiff owned only 4.2 

acres of eligible land because that record “accurately 

reflect[ed] an administrative action.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s claim, like that of the plaintiff in 

Douglas, does not dispute DFAS’s record of the overpay debt so 

much as its underlying determination that he owed the debt. But 

the Privacy Act presupposes “a distinction between ‘records’ and 

‘decisions’”, id., and plaintiff cannot use his record-amendment 

claim as a “skeleton key for reopening consideration” of the 

determination that plaintiff owed the overpay debt. Rogers, 607 

F. Supp. at 699. Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’

motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s record amendment and 

record defect claims.4 

 

4 While plaintiff’s record amendment and record defect 

claims collaterally attack the validity of the overpay debt, 

plaintiff has not sought to cancel the overpay debt or to 

challenge its validity directly at any point in this action. The 

court therefore need not, cannot, and does not, reach the 

question of whether the overpay debt itself is valid. 

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3. Wrongful Disclosure

Plaintiff’s final Privacy Act claim alleges that DFAS 

wrongfully disclosed its record of the overpay debt to credit 

reporting agencies in violation of Section 552a(b)(12). (FAC ¶

78.) In order to prevail on this claim, the Privacy Act requires 

plaintiff to show that one or more employees of DFAS “acted in a 

manner which was intentional or willful” in disclosing these 

records. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4); Rose v. United States, 905 F.2d 

1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1990); see Swisher v. Collins, 409 Fed. 

App’x 139, 141 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court 

properly granted summary judgment when plaintiff failed to adduce 

proof that defendants willfully violated the Privacy Act). 

Intentional or willful agency conduct “is that 

amounting to more than gross negligence.” Wilborn v. Dep’t of 

Health and Human Servs., 49 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1995), 

abrogated on other grounds by Doe, 540 U.S. at 618 (citing Rose, 

905 F.2d at 1260). “An agency acts in a willful or intentional 

manner ‘either by committing the act without grounds for 

believing it to be lawful, or flagrantly disregarding others’ 

rights under the Act.” Id. (citing Covert v. Harrington, 876 

F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Although no party disputes that DFAS erroneously 

disclosed plaintiff’s debt to a consumer credit agency, DFAS 

contends that this disclosure occurred as a result of a 

programming error, rather than as a result of willful or 

intentional conduct. Phillip Tincher, the director of Accounts 

Receivable for DFAS, avers that DFAS conducted a diagnostic 

review of its computer systems after plaintiff initiated this 

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action and discovered that an automated debt management system

had identified plaintiff’s debt as delinquent and automatically 

referred the debt to the credit bureaus. (Tincher Decl. ¶¶ 12-

13.) Once DFAS identified this error, it recalled the debt from 

the credit bureau and the Treasury Department, waived all 

interest, penalties, and administrative fees on the debt, and 

“correct[ed] the programming issue.” (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Although 

this programming error may have been negligent, there is no 

evidence that it was willful or intentional. Cf. Alexander v. 

FBI, 541 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that a 

“coding error” in Lotus Notes resulting in nondisclosure of emails during discovery did not constitute evidence of deliberate 

misconduct).

Plaintiff contends that DFAS’s conduct was intentional 

because it “was on notice the records were false,” (Opp’n to U.S. 

Mot. at 19:23), and because “[s]omewhere in this, human beings 

were involved” (id. at 27:11). Read very charitably, these 

statements appear to assert a theory akin to res ipsa loquitur: 

that is, that DFAS had a record of plaintiff’s debt; that DFAS 

knew the records were false; that an individual person was 

involved in the disclosure of the records; and that this 

unidentified person must have acted willfully at some point in 

this process. But while res ipsa loquitur is a viable theory of 

negligence, it cannot be used to prove intentional or willful 

conduct. Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 724 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (“refus[ing] . . . to extend the doctrine to prove an 

intentional tort”); see also Paige v. U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Admin., 818 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15 (D.D.C. 2010) (“To the extent 

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Plaintiff relies on the common law tort doctrine of res ipsa 

loquitur to support a Privacy Act violation, courts have long 

held such arguments to be meritless.”). Absent specific evidence 

of willful or intentional conduct, plaintiff cannot survive 

summary judgment on his wrongful disclosure claim.5 See Wilborn, 

49 F.3d at 602. Accordingly, the court must grant defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment on this claim. 

B. Bivens Claim

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the Supreme Court held that 

a violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent while 

acting under the color of his federal authority gives rise to a 

cause of action for damages. The court has subsequently extended 

the Bivens cause of action to apply to violations of the Fifth 

Amendment as well. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979). 

 

5 Although plaintiff belatedly now contends that he is 

entitled to conduct further discovery to obtain evidence of 

willfulness, (see Pl.’s Opp’n to U.S. Mot. at 27:15), his request 

for further discovery is unavailing because plaintiff has not 

“identified with greater particularity” the evidence he believes 

he would obtain in discovery. Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1013 

n.29 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s case for discovery is premised 

principally on his assertion that “there were human beings 

involved,” (Pl.’s Opp’n to U.S. Mot. at 27:15), which fails to 

specify what facts plaintiff hopes to find or how those facts 

will constitute evidence of willfulness sufficient to defeat 

summary judgment. See California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 

(9th Cir. 1998) (noting that a request for further discovery 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) must show “that the facts sought 

exist” and “that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to 

resist the summary judgment motion”). Because the evidence of 

willfulness plaintiff seeks is “almost certainly nonexistent or 

is the object of pure speculation,” id. at 779-80 (citation 

omitted), the court will not permit plaintiff to reopen these 

proceedings in order to conduct further discovery on the issue of 

willfulness. 

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The decision to extend a Bivens cause of action to 

other factual and legal contexts depends on a two-part inquiry. 

First, the court must determine “whether any alternative, 

existing process” is capable of vindicating the Constitutional 

right at issue. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 

The Court has explained that “[w]hen the design of a Government 

program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers 

adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that 

may occur in the course of its administration, we have not 

created additional Bivens remedies.” Schweiker v. Chillicky, 487 

U.S. 412, 423 (1988). The existence of an alternative remedial 

process therefore “amounts to a convincing reason for the 

Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding 

remedy in damages.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.

Second, even if no such process exists, the court must 

determine whether any “special factors counseling hesitation” 

militate against recognizing a Bivens cause of action. Id.

(citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). “Even where 

Congress has given plaintiffs no damages remedy for a 

constitutional violation, the Court has declined to create a 

right of action under Bivens when doing so ‘would be plainly 

inconsistent with Congress’s authority in the field.’” W. Radio 

Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)). 

Here, plaintiff premises his Bivens claim on the 

allegation that Wyatt and McKay violated plaintiff’s Fifth 

Amendment rights by seeking to deprive him of money that he 

lawfully earned. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Indiv. Mot. at 3-7.) This

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claim is unavailing because plaintiff could dispute the 

overpayment notice by filing a claim with the Air Force Board for 

the Correction of Military Records (“Correction Board”). The 

Correction Board is authorized by statute to “correct any 

military record,” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a), including any pay claim, 

10 U.S.C. § 1552(c)(1). The Supreme Court has explicitly held 

that a military Correction Board is an alternative remedial 

process that militates against recognizing a Bivens cause of 

action. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303 (holding that the remedial 

process set forth by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 

including the establishment of a Correction Board, “provides for 

the review and remedy of complaints and grievances” by members of 

the military).

If plaintiff did not prevail before the Correction 

Board, he would also be entitled to seek judicial review under 

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 702; 

Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 539 (1999) (holding that a 

member of the military “may challenge a [Correction Board’s] 

decision . . . as final agency action under the Administrative 

Procedure Act”). The APA “expressly declares itself to be a

comprehensive remedial scheme” for Bivens purposes, and the 

availability of review under the APA “where no other adequate 

alternative remedy exists further indicates Congress’s intent 

that courts should not devise additional, judicially crafted 

default remedies.” W. Radio Servs., 578 F.3d at 1122-23 

(citations omitted). 

Plaintiff contends that the availability of review by 

the Correction Board and under the APA is inadequate because Air 

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Force Instruction 36-2603 required plaintiff to exhaust other 

administrative remedies prior to submitting his claim to the 

Correction Board. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Indiv. Mot. at 9.) But the 

Supreme Court has held that an administrative exhaustion 

requirement does not render the administrative process inadequate 

such as to justify a Bivens cause of action. See Schweiker, 487 

U.S. at 424 (holding that the procedure established by the Social 

Security Act, which requires administrative exhaustion prior to 

seeking judicial review, was an adequate process that foreclosed 

recognition of a Bivens remedy). And even if plaintiff were 

correct that he could not exhaust his administrative remedies 

because he never received the service records he requested, this 

would not entitle him to a Bivens cause of action. See, e.g., 

Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding 

that plaintiff could not sustain a Bivens claim even when he 

alleged that his complaints were “ignored by every officer up 

through the chain of command, thus preventing his access to 

proper UCMJ review”). 

In short, even if plaintiff were correct in his 

assertion that his administrative remedies “do not provide 

complete relief,” Bush, 462 U.S. at 388, the availability of 

administrative review by the Air Force Correction Board and 

judicial review under the APA constitute an alternative remedial 

scheme that forecloses plaintiff’s Bivens claim. See Wilkie, 551 

U.S. at 537. Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment on this claim. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In relevant part, § 1983 provides:

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Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or 

other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any 

person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of 

federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory 

rights. Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

Here, plaintiff contends that Baldwin, Groves, McKay, 

and Wyatt deprived him of due process in two distinct ways.

6 

First, plaintiff alleges that Wyatt, McKay, Groves, and Baldwin 

injured his reputation and that they damaged his credit score by 

referring the overpay debt to the Treasury Department for 

collection. (FAC ¶ 92.) Second, plaintiff alleges that he was 

deprived of procedural due process because he never received a 

hearing or an opportunity to challenge the validity of the 

overpay debt.7 (Id. ¶ 93.) In order to prevail on either 

 

6 Plaintiff contends that defendants “deprive[d] [him] of 

his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.” (FAC. ¶

92.) But because § 1983 applies only to action under color of 

state law, his claim actually arises under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, which proscribes state action that deprives an 

individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of 

law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

7 At various points in his Opposition, plaintiff also 

contends that Wyatt “made sure that everyone in the military 

heard his version [of] the facts” about plaintiff’s conduct, 

thereby ensuring that “had plaintiff been subject to court 

martial, he could have never received a fair trial.” (Opp’n to 

Indiv. Mot. at 7:5-6, 12:6-8.) This assertion cannot give rise 

to a § 1983 claim because plaintiff was never subject to court 

martial or to any proceeding in which he could have been deprived 

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claim, plaintiff must first show that he was deprived of “a 

liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution.” 

Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 

(1972)). 

1. Plaintiff’s Reputation & Credit Rating

Although plaintiff claims to have a constitutionally 

protected interest in his reputation, both the Supreme Court and 

Ninth Circuit have repeatedly held that injury to one’s 

reputation alone does not constitute a deprivation of liberty or 

property. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) 

(denying that “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible 

interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ 

sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process 

Clause”); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 

1999) (en banc) (noting that “reputation alone is not an interest 

protected by the Constitution”). While plaintiff cites several 

passages from the dissent in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 

(1991), in order to argue that he has a protected interest in his 

reputation, (see Pl.’s Opp’n to Indiv. Mot. 10-11), the Supreme 

Court held the exact opposite: that Siegert’s interest in his 

reputation, like plaintiff’s interest, “lack[s] any 

 

of liberty or property. See Raduga USA Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

State, 284 Fed. App’x 404, 405 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The requirements 

of procedural due process . . . attach only to the deprivation of 

constitutionally protected liberty and property interests.”) 

(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 569). In fact, there is no evidence 

that the military took any disciplinary action against plaintiff, 

and plaintiff does not dispute that he received an honorable 

discharge in 2011. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff’s §

1983 claim is based on this allegation, the court must grant 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

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constitutional protection.” Id. at 234. 

In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow

exception to this rule -- namely, that reputational injury, 

combined with “depriv[ation] . . . of a right previously held 

under state law,” an “alteration of legal status,” or a similar 

infringement of a protected liberty interest, is cognizable under 

§ 1983. 424 U.S. at 708-09. Plaintiff relies on this “stigmaplus” exception to argue that, as a result of his reputational 

injuries, he was unable to obtain future government employment or 

to obtain credit. But as the Court has clarified, impairment of 

“future employment opportunities,” “out-of-pocket loss,” or other 

sorts of incidental damage that “flows from the injury to . . . 

reputation” do not constitute deprivations of liberty or 

property. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234. 

For instance, in Krainski v. Nevada, the plaintiff 

alleged that her university had “tarnish[ed] her educational 

transcript and record” by finding that she had violated the 

student conduct code. 616 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). The 

court acknowledged that, had the university suspended or expelled 

her for her conduct and thereby caused damaged for her 

reputation, she would have suffered a deprivation of liberty or 

property. Id. By contrast, the court held that the alleged 

“loss of future income” and “psychological trauma” that she 

suffered as a result of this reputational injury were “materially 

indistinguishable” from the injuries at issue in Paul v. Davis

and were not sufficient to satisfy the “stigma-plus” exception. 

Id. 

Likewise, even if plaintiff were correct that he had 

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suffered consequential harm to his future employment 

opportunities and credit as a result of the alleged injury to his 

reputation, that harm would not be cognizable under § 1983. And 

while plaintiff contends that defendants acted with malice when 

they tarnished his reputation, it is well-established that their 

state of mind is irrelevant to the stigma-plus inquiry. Siegert, 

500 U.S. at 234 (denying that plaintiff could satisfy the stigmaplus test if “the defendant acted with malice” because the

“decision in Paul v. Davis did not turn . . . on the state of 

mind of the defendant”). To the extent that plaintiff’s § 1983 

claim relies on damage to his reputation, defendants are entitled 

to summary judgment. 

Insofar as plaintiff’s alleged injury to his credit 

rating is distinct from injuries to his reputation, that injury 

is also not cognizable under § 1983. Plaintiff has not cited, 

and the court cannot identify, a single case from the Supreme 

Court or the Ninth Circuit stating that an individual has a 

constitutionally protected interest in his credit rating. The 

closest the Supreme Court comes to reaching this conclusion is in 

Connecticut v. Doehr, where the Court held that a Connecticut 

statute permitting pre-judgment attachment of real property 

without notice or hearing unconstitutionally deprived individuals 

of property in part because of the potential harm to their credit 

rating. 501 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1991); see also Tri-State Dev. Ltd. 

v. Johnston, 160 F.3d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Doehr to 

invalidate Washington’s attachment statute and noting the effect 

of pre-judgment attachment on individuals’ credit ratings). But 

this concern with the effect of attachment on one’s credit rating 

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is distinct from recognizing a freestanding property interest in 

one’s credit rating. 

General Electric Company v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010), is instructive. There, General Electric (“GE”) 

argued that a unilateral administrative order by the EPA 

directing GE to clean up hazardous waste constituted an unlawful 

deprivation of property because it would imperil GE’s credit 

rating and ability to raise capital. 610 F.3d at 119. The court 

held that GE had no protected interest in its credit rating. It 

first rejected GE’s contention that Doehr had recognized a 

property interest in one’s credit rating, and held that while 

Doehr recognized that “partial impairments of property rights may 

well warrant due process safeguards,” Doehr did not recognize 

that injury to one’s credit score, “standing alone, merit[s] due 

process protection.” Id. at 120. The court then held that 

“stripped of its reliance on Doehr,” the injury that GE claimed 

to its credit rating was essentially a reputational injury that 

“is foreclosed by Paul v. Davis.” Id.

As in Jackson, plaintiff has not demonstrated that any 

injury he suffered to his credit score because of the referral of 

the overpay debt to the Treasury Department and to the credit 

bureaus constituted a deprivation of a protected property or 

liberty interest. To the extent that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is 

premised on injury to his credit score, the court must grant 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

2. Procedural Due Process

“A procedural due process claim has two elements: 

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property 

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interest and denial of adequate procedural protection.” 

Krainski, 616 F.3d at 970 (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 

F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, plaintiff contends that he 

was denied procedural due process because he was deprived of a 

hearing or an equivalent opportunity to challenge the validity of 

the overpay debt before defendants attempted to recoup the debt. 

Although the overpay debt constitutes a protected 

property interest, see Schwarm v. Craighead, 552 F. Supp. 2d 

1056, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (Shubb, J.) (noting that “it is 

undisputed that money constitutes a property interest protected 

by the Fourteenth Amendment” (citation omitted)), plaintiff has 

not shown that he has been deprived of any sum of money. To the 

contrary, plaintiff has not repaid any portion of the overpay 

debt. In contrast to “cases where the government garnishes a 

plaintiff’s wages or levies the plaintiff’s bank account,” 

Schwarm, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1084, defendants have not yet forced 

plaintiff to repay the overpay debt; in fact, DFAS specifically 

ordered the Treasury Department to cease any efforts to collect

the debt. (See Pl.’s Ex. 45.) 

Nor does the mere notification that plaintiff owed the 

overpay debt constitute a deprivation of property. See, e.g., 

Schwarm, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-84 (holding that letters to 

individuals accused of writing bad checks that they must pay the 

amount of the bad check, a “bad check fee,” and a “diversion fee” 

or face criminal prosecution did not constitute a deprivation of 

property); cf. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San 

Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a county’s 

notification to a church that it had violated local zoning 

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ordinances did not constitute a deprivation or liberty or 

property absent any action by the county to enforce those 

violations in court). 

Plaintiff contends that he was deprived of the overpay 

debt because defendants initiated recoupment efforts and referred 

his debt to the Treasury Department for collection. (Pl.’s Opp’n 

to Indiv. Mot. at 10:1-8.) In particular, plaintiff presents 

evidence that Groves referred his debt to DFAS for collection, 

(see Pl.’s Ex. 44), that the Treasury Department sent plaintiff a 

letter demanding repayment of the debt, along with interest and 

penalties, within ten days (see Pl.’s Ex. 40), and that the 

Treasury Department called plaintiff’s mother in order to 

determine his whereabouts (see Pl.’s Ex. 39). 

Even if all this were so, these actions would not give 

rise to a procedural due process claim because plaintiff was not 

“finally deprived of a property interest” in the overpay debt. 

Brewster, 149 F.3d at 985-86 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted); accord Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 

(1981) (noting that “some kind of hearing is required at some 

time before a state finally deprives a person of his property 

interests”), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. 

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Rather, the evidence establishes 

that DFAS recalled plaintiff’s debt account from the Treasury 

Department, (see Pl.’s Ex. 45), ordered that recoupment efforts 

cease (see id.), reversed all interest and collection fees (see

Pl.’s Ex. 46; see also Tincher Decl. ¶ 14), and requested that 

the credit bureaus delete his delinquent debt account (see Pl.’s 

Ex. 47). To the extent that plaintiff was deprived of any 

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interest in the overpay debt, that deprivation was temporary and 

was remedied promptly once it was discovered. See, e.g.,

Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(holding that an employee who was reinstated with back pay after 

being demoted suffered no final deprivation of a property 

interest). Because plaintiff has not been deprived of the 

overpay debt or any other property interest, the Due Process 

Clause does not entitle him to a hearing or any additional 

procedural protections. Brewster, 149 F.3d at 982; see also Town 

of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 764 (2005) (holding 

that an “entitlement to nothing but procedure” does not 

constitute a constitutionally protected interest). Accordingly, 

the court must grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

his procedural due process claim. 

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 

the Federal Tort Claims Act does not permit members of the 

military8 to recover for “injuries which arise out of or are in 

the course of activity incident to service.” 340 U.S. 135, 146 

(1950) (emphasis added). Although the contours of the term 

“incident to service” are imprecise, see McConnell v. United 

States, 478 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007), the meaning of the 

“arise out of” prong is far clearer: it “encompass[es], at a 

 

8 This limitation applies to claims brought by National 

Guard members in the same way that it applies to any member of 

the armed services. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. 

United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1973); Jackson v. United 

States, 110 F.3d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Members of the 

National Guard and the Reserves are service members under Feres.” 

(citation omitted)). 

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minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that are 

even remotely related to the individual’s status as a member of 

the military . . . .” Estate of McAllister v. United States, 942 

F.2d 1473, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Major v. United 

States, 835 F.2d 641, 644-45 (6th Cir. 1987)). 

Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claim alleges that General Wyatt and his subordinates 

publicly made “false and malicious statements” about plaintiff in 

June 2010, December 2010, and March 2011 (FAC ¶¶ 54, 55, 57; PSUF 

¶¶ 14-16, 31-33, 43), and that Wyatt and his subordinates 

“reported that plaintiff . . . owed money for work he did not 

perform,” and “destroyed his reputation and his credit rating” 

(id. ¶ 133). This conduct directly related to plaintiff’s 

service in the Air National Guard and his disputed claim that he

was entitled to dual compensation. For instance, plaintiff 

asserts that Wyatt told an audience at a conference in June 2010 

that plaintiff and other FANG pilots “were under investigation, 

that they were guilty, and that they would be court-martialed.” 

(PSUF ¶ 14.) Likewise, Colonel Crocker met in 2010 with Charles 

Piller, an investigative reporter with the Sacramento Bee, and 

told Piller that Brigadier General Kight “had lost full faith and 

credit in Taylor’s leadership skills” and the 144th Fighter Wing 

received dual compensation only because of inaccurate “guidance 

from [Colonel] Taylor.” (See Pl.’s Ex. 55.) 

Moreover, insofar as plaintiff’s evidence shows that 

Wyatt was personally involved in efforts to recover the overpay 

debt, that evidence shows that Wyatt initiated the audit of 

plaintiff’s service in May 2010, while plaintiff was still on 

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active duty and collecting military pay. (Pl.’s Ex. 16.) In 

fact, plaintiff concedes that he attempted to pursue an identical 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Wyatt

with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims 

Board in April 2011, while plaintiff was still on active duty.

(Pl.’s Exs. 28-29.) To the extent that Wyatt’s conduct and that 

of his subordinates arose out of and concerned plaintiff’s status 

as a member of the Air National Guard, plaintiff’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim is barred by Feres. See

Estate of McAllister, 942 F.2d at 1479-80. 

The fact that plaintiff is currently retired does not 

affect this result. While Feres does not bar claims by retired 

service members for injuries that occurred after their service 

had concluded, it does bar a claim if the “injured person was a 

member of the armed forces . . . at the time the injury was 

sustained.” McGowan v. Scoggins, 890 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 

1989). While plaintiff contends that the “injury . . . occurred 

on or about June 11, 2012,” when he discovered that DFAS had 

reported that the overpay debt was past due, (see Pl.’s Opp’n to 

U.S. Mot. at 14:3-5), this assertion appears to conflate the 

injury plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of Privacy Act 

violations -- which occurred after plaintiff retired -- and the 

emotional distress and resulting injury he allegedly experienced 

as a result of Wyatt’s conduct, which occurred while plaintiff 

was still on active duty and which arose from his military 

service. 

Even if plaintiff were correct that he continued to 

suffer harm from Wyatt’s conduct after his retirement, that harm 

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would be insufficient to overcome Feres so long as Wyatt’s 

tortious conduct took place before plaintiff retired. See Monaco 

v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 

Feres bars claims for “post-service injury resulting from inservice negligence”). Accordingly, because plaintiff’s 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim “arose out of” 

his military service, see Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, the court must 

grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.

The court notes, in conclusion, that although it must 

grant summary judgment on each of plaintiff’s four remaining 

claims, none of those claims require the court to adjudicate the 

underlying question of whether the overpay debt, or any portion 

thereof, is valid. Accordingly, the court does not decide that

issue today, and enters this Order without prejudice to a 

subsequent claim directly challenging the validity of the overpay 

debt or any other claim not otherwise disposed of in this Order. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motions for 

summary judgment on each of plaintiff’s remaining claims be, and 

the same hereby are, GRANTED. If plaintiff wishes to bring any 

additional claims, not disposed of in this Order, he shall do so 

in a separate action.

Dated: January 2, 2014

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