Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01672/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01672-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brock Everett Elson,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-1672-PHX-DJH (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated at the time in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Buckey, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on August 24, 2015 (Doc. 1). Subsequently, counsel for Petitioner appeared and 

filed a Supplemental Memorandum (Doc. 15) in support of the Petition. On February 

26, 2016 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 22). Petitioner filed a Reply on March 

25, 2016 (Doc. 23).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows:

On the afternoon of February 8, 2010, [the victim] was at her 

boyfriend's house when two men came to the door and asked about 

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a for-sale sign in the front yard. After [the victim] telephoned her 

boyfriend, she saw Elson pointing a gun at her head. She jumped 

away just before he pulled the trigger, and he shot her in the 

shoulder.

(Exhibit AA, Mem. Dec. 10/22/13 at 2.) (Exhibits to the Supplement to the Petition, 

Doc. 15, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) The assault purportedly emanated 

from a relationship between the other man at the door, Grant Moody (Petitioner’s coindictee) and the daughter of the estranged wife of the victim’s boyfriend. Petitioner 

maintained that he had participated only because of threats from Moody.

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On March 18, 2010, Petitioner was indicted in Pinal County Superior Court on 

one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (Exhibit A, 

Indictment.) 

Petitioner, through counsel, moved to dismiss the indictment and remand to the 

grand jury, arguing the grand jury had not been properly instructed. (Exhibit C.) The 

motion was granted and the matter was remanded. (Exhibit D, Notice.) 

On June 10, 2010, Petitioner was again indicted on attempted first degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 

Moody was indicted on similar charges. (Exhibit E, R.T. 6/10/10 at 132-133.)

Petitioner again moved to dismiss and remand. (Exhibit G.) The motion was 

denied. (Exhibit J, Order 1/26/11.) 

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial on September 25, 2012. (Exhibit O, M.E. 

9/25/12.) The court dismissed the conspiracy charge as unsupported. (Exhibit Q, 

M.E.10/2/12 at 2.) Petitioner was acquitted of attempted first degree murder, but found 

guilty of aggravated assault, a dangerous offense. (Exhibit S, Verdict.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to a presumptive term of 7.5 years. (Exhibit X, 

Sentence.) 

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. Counsel was appointed, but filed a notice of 

inability to find an issue for appeal, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), and related state authorities. Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief, 

arguing claims of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, lack of jurisdiction, failure to 

preserve evidence, instructional error, and denial of due process. (Exhibit Z.) 

In a decision filed October 22, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected 

Petitioner’s claims and sustained his conviction and sentence. (Exhibit AA, Mem. Dec. 

10/22/13.) Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court, and the 

mandate was issued on April 10, 2014. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit BB) on July 18, 

2014. Counsel was appointed, but eventually was unable to find a tenable issue for 

review. Petitioner alleges, and Respondent does not deny, that counsel eventually filed a 

Notice of No Colorable Claim, and the court dismissed the Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief on December 15, 2014. (Supplement to Petition, Doc. 15 at 7. See also Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 4.) Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 24, 2015 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

In Ground One, he claims the State, during the grand jury 

remand process, violated his due process rights, the prohibition 

against double jeopardy, and principles of collateral estoppel, which 

deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and violated Petitioner’s Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In Ground Two, Petitioner 

contends that the State failed to collect and preserve exculpatory 

evidence in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that the State’s failure to 

preserve and disclose exculpatory evidence, in violation of the Due 

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Process Clause, was prejudicial and “reversible constitutionally due 

to the trial court’s refusal to give a Willits1 instruction, which 

impinged further on [the] right to be considered innocent.” In 

Ground Four, he asserts that he was denied a fair trial and due 

process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which resulted 

in the conviction of an actually innocent person.

(Order 1/14/16, Doc. 16 at 2.)

Response - On February 26, 2016, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 22), relying on the exhibits provided by Petitioner. (Id. at 2, n. 2.) Respondents 

argue that the Petition is untimely (id. at 5, et seq.), concede that the claims were 

properly exhausted (id. at 7), and argue that the claims are without merit (id. at 8, et seq.)

Reply - On March 25, 2016, Petitioner filed through counsel a Reply (Doc. 23). 

Petitioner argues procedural and substantive actual innocence (id. at 2-5); that evidence 

obtained in violation of Miranda cannot be used in evaluating his actual innocence (id. at 

3-4); that the paucity of the evidence against him establishes his actual innocence (id. at 

5); his state remedies were properly exhausted (id. at 5-6); and any failure to properly 

exhaust is excused because caused by ineffective assistance of PCR counsel (id.). 

Petitioner also argues the merits of his claims. (Id. at 6, et seq.)

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

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2. Commencement of Limitations Period

a) Conviction Final 

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending through October 22, 2013, 

when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision (Exhibit AA). 

Thereafter, Petitioner had 30 days to petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 31.19(a).

Arizona applies Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to extend “the time to 

file an appeal by five days when the order appealed from has been mailed to the 

interested party and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.” State v. 

Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). Here, there is no indication that 

the Memorandum Decision was delivered to Petitioner or his counsel by any means other 

than mailing. Accordingly, Petitioner’s time to seek review by the Arizona Supreme 

Court expired 35 days after the appellate court decision, or on Tuesday, November 26, 

2013. 

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court, and the mandate 

was issued on April 10, 2014. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) However, the Ninth Circuit has 

held that, for purposes of finality under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), an Arizona mandate is 

irrelevant. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (2007). Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

conviction became final on Tuesday, November 26, 2013.

b) Conclusion re Commencement

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running on Wednesday, November 27, 

 

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Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply.

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2013, and without any tolling expired on Wednesday, November 26, 2014. 

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on August 24, 2015. The Petition 

indicates that it was submitted for e-filing on the dame date. (Doc. 1 at 11.) 

As determined in subsection (2) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than November 26, 2014, making his Petition 

almost nine months delinquent.

4. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Mailbox Rule - For purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), the federal 

prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s state filings are deemed 

“filed” (and tolling thus commenced) when they are delivered to prison officials for 

mailing. In Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit noted: 

[I]n Saffold v. Newland, 224 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2000), we squarely 

held that the mailbox rule applies with equal force to the filing of 

state as well as federal petitions, because "[a]t both times, the 

conditions that led to the adoption of the mailbox rule are present; 

the prisoner is powerless and unable to control the time of delivery 

of documents to the court." Id. at 1091. 

Id. at 575. 

Similarly, the “mailbox rule” applies to determining whether an Arizona 

prisoner’s state filings were timely. Although a state may direct that the prison mailbox 

rule does not apply to filings in its court, see Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1090 

(9th Cir. 2014), Arizona has applied the rule to a variety of its state proceedings. See e.g. 

Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 908 P.2d 56, 59 (App.1995) (notice of direct appeal); 

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State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999) (PCR notice); State 

v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 23, 106 P.3d 1035, 1038 (App. 2005) (petition for review to 

Arizona Supreme Court).

Application to Petitioner - Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running 

on November 27, 2013. Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was commenced no later than July 

18, 2014, when he filed his PCR notice (Exhibit BB). Because it does not affect the 

outcome, the undersigned presumes that this notice was delivered to prison officials for 

mailing on the date it was signed, July 10, 2014 (id. at 3), and thus should be deemed 

filed as of that date. At that time, 225 days of Petitioner’s one year had passed, leaving 

140 days available. 

The proceeding remained pending until December 15, 2014, when the PCR court 

dismissed the proceeding. Thus, Petitioner’s habeas limitations period was tolled from 

July 10, 2014 through December 15, 2014. It commenced running again on December 

16, 2014, and expired 140 days later, on May 5, 2015.

Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas petition, filed August 24, 2015 was over three 

months delinquent.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

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omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

6. Actual Innocence 

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find actual innocence because of the 

scantiness of the evidence against. him. (Reply, Doc. 23 at 5.) 

New Evidence of Innocence Required - However, a finding of procedural 

"actual innocence" is not to be based upon a finding that insufficient evidence to support 

the charge was presented at trial, but rather upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See 

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U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank 

robbery case, without evidence that insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish 

actual innocence). “It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means 

factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 

623 (1998). 

Thus, it is not sufficient for a petitioner to simply argue that the prosecution has 

not adduced sufficient evidence of his guilt. Rather, the burden is on the petitioner to 

offer new reliable evidence of his innocence. “To meet this standard, [the Petitioner] 

must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.’ ” Griffin v. 

Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Moreover, 

a petitioner may not simply allege that such evidence exists, but must present it to the 

habeas court, through affidavit of the witness, etc. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 

1342, 1352-1353 (8th Cir. 1997). Moreover, that evidence must be reliable, “whether it 

be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

As Chief Judge Kozinksi observed in his special concurrence in Lee v. Lampert,

"[t]he Court certainly did not hold that a petitioner may invoke Schlup whenever he 

wants a trial do-over.” 653 F.3d 929, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinksi, C.J, specially 

concurring). That is essentially what Petitioner requests now: a do-over of the trial 

without a proffer of any new reliable evidence. 

Petitioner cites Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986) and In re Winship, 

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) in support of his contention that deficiencies in evidence of 

guilt are sufficient. However neither of these cases involved an assertion of actual 

innocence. The referenced portion of Murray was addressing the prejudice prong of a 

cause and prejudice exception to the procedural default standard. Winship addressed the 

standard of proof required at trial, not in habeas proceedings after a conviction. 

Miranda Violation Insufficient to Establish Actual Innocence - Petitioner 

attacks as unreliable his own confession to arresting officers that he committed the 

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assault, albeit under duress from his co-indictee. Petitioner challenges this evidence, not 

as false, but as obtained in violation of Miranda. (Reply, Doc. 23 at 3-4.) Petitioner 

argues that the United States Supreme Court has not provided clear direction that such 

unconstitutionally obtained evidence can be considered. The Supreme Court has clearly 

held that Sixth Amendment Miranda claims may be asserted on habeas review. See 

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993)

However, in the unique context of procedural actual innocence, the Court in 

Schlup directed:

In assessing the adequacy of petitioner's showing, therefore, the 

district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would 

govern at trial. Instead, the emphasis on “actual innocence” allows 

the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of 

relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial. 

Indeed, with respect to this aspect of the Carrier standard, we 

believe that Judge Friendly's description of the inquiry is 

appropriate: The habeas court must make its determination 

concerning the petitioner's innocence “in light of all the evidence, 

including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due 

regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to 

have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after 

the trial.”

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28. Thus, the prophylactic purposes of Miranda are not 

sufficient to preclude consideration of Petitioner’s confession. Rather, Petitioner must at 

least offer new evidence to show that the confession is actually unreliable. Cf. 

Washington v. Small, 2010 WL 785233, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010) (allegations of 

unreliable involuntary confession not new evidence of actual innocence). 

Here, Petitioner proffers nothing, new or old, beyond the technical violation of 

Miranda to suggest his confession is not reliable. The trial court’s suppression was not 

based upon any involuntariness, but upon the technical violation:

Based on the evidence presented, the Court FINDS that the totality 

of the circumstances establishes that Defendant's post arrest 

statement to the police was made voluntarily, but was the result of 

interrogation that continued after he initially asserted his 5th 

Amendment right to counsel. 

(Exhibit M, Order 9/19/12 at 1.) 

Therefore, Petitioner fails to proffer the kind of trustworthy new evidence 

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necessary to establish a claim of procedural actual innocence, and thus cannot avoid the 

procedural bar.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running on November 27, 2013, and expired on May 5, 

2015, making his August 24, 2015 Petition over three months delinquent. Petitioner has 

shown no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual 

innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed 

with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is plainly barred by 

the statute of limitations, the Respondents’ other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed August 24, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: May 17, 2016

15-1672r RR 16 04 29 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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