Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00586/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00586-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charlotte Brown,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Tucson Unified School District,

Defendant. 

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CV 04-586-TUC-RCC (JCG)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the defendant’s motion for summary judgment filed on

August 29, 2005. (Doc. No. 18.) The plaintiff filed a response on September 15, 2005 (Doc.

No. 27) and the defendant filed a reply on December 22, 2005. (Doc. No. 44.) The plaintiff

in this action, Charlotte Brown ("Brown"), claims retaliation and racial discrimination

pursuant to Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2 et. seq.)

and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 411401 et. seq., as well as negligent supervision

and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, Tucson

Unified School District ("TUSD"), argues that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because

plaintiff cannot prove the elements of her claims.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate

Judge Guerin for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate recommends the District

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order granting in part and denying

in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

//

//

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1

 References to the various statements of fact filed in this matter are abbreviated as

follows: Defendant’s Statement of Facts (DSOF), Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (PSOF),

Defendant’s Controverting Statement of Facts (DCSOF), Plaintiff’ Controverting Statement of Facts

(PCSOF), and Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Controverting Statement of Facts (DRPCSOF).

2

Factual and Procedural Background

Charlotte Brown is an African American Studies Department instructional technician

for TUSD. (DSOF 1, PCSOF 1.)1

 She was assigned to Reynolds Elementary School for the

2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years. (DSOF 2, PCSOF 2.) Brown did not suffer

discrimination or harassment at Reynolds between 2001 and April, 2003. (DSOF 4, PCSOF

4.) 

Toward the end of the 2002-2003 school year, Reynolds' teachers received a

memorandum asking them to identify African American students for purposes of the

following year's classroom assignments ("the Memo"). (DSOF 5, PCSOF 5.) The parties

disagree as to whether the memo also asked teachers to identify all students with behavioral

problems, or only African-American students with behavioral problems. (DSOF 5, PCSOF

5, DRPCSOF 5.) Although Brown was not an intended recipient of the Memo, she requested

and received a copy of the Memo because she planned to sit in on meetings regarding class

assignments for students with whom she had worked. (PSOF 12, DCSOF 12.) Brown

believed the memorandum to be racially insensitive and attempted to discuss the

memorandum with Pete Palazzo, the Reynolds' principal at the time. (DSOF 6, 7, PCSOF

6, 7.) After attempts to meet with Palazzo failed, Brown took the memorandum to the

African-American Studies Department Chair; Brown took no other action with respect to the

Memo. (DSOF 8, 9, PCSOF 8, 9.) 

On May 5, 2003, Palazzo sent a memorandum to the Reynolds' teachers stating that

the Memo's reference to African-American students was a "mistake." (PSOF 26, Exhibit 3;

DCSOF 26.) On or about May 8, 2003, Marla Motove, Chief Academic Officer, sent

Palazzo a letter admonishing him for his inadequate response to the Memo, and stating that

she believed the Memo to be in violation of TUSD policy prohibiting conduct which

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"denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his or her race or

color." (PSOF 27-29, DCSOF 27-29.) Motove further instructed Palazzo to apologize to the

African-American families at Reynolds, to discipline the staff member who sent the Memo,

to revise the student classroom assignment process to avoid the implication of racial animus,

and to hold a mandatory in-service training on discrimination and harassment at the

beginning of the 2003-2004 school year. (PSOF 30, DCSOF 30.) Palazzo sent an apology

letter to parents on May 8, 2003. (PSOF 31, DCSOF 31.)

A short time later the Memo became public and was discussed at length in the Tucson

newspapers. (DSOF 10, PCSOF 10.) It is unclear from the record how publication occurred,

but it appears that the first news article regarding the Memo was published one day after

Palazzo's apology letter was sent to parents. Nevertheless, staff members at Reynolds

generally regarded Brown as responsible for the negative attention that the school received

following the Memo's publication. Shortly after the Memo became public, teachers and staff

at Reynolds began to act with hostility toward Brown. The hostile conduct included the

following: one staff member made a comment while with a group of people, including

Brown, that they should not use the word "African-American"; five staff members shut doors

in Brown's face; one staff member refused to allow Brown to see a student with whom she

regularly worked; one teacher blocked Brown's entrance into a classroom by using an

intimidating posture; on two occasions, staff members closed their doors when they saw

Brown approaching; one teacher started keeping her door locked; one staff member yelled

at Brown in front of students; one staff member advised Brown that she should stay in her

office and keep a low profile; and one staff member left the room when Brown entered.

(PSOF 34-42, DCSOF 34-42.) In addition, Brown claims that she fell on campus, that a staff

member was alerted to the situation by a parent, and that the staff member refused to send

assistance. (PSOF 44.) The parties disagree as to whether the hostility shown by Reynolds

staff to Brown was racially motivated. (DSOF 39, PSOF 39.) Brown does not allege that

any of her supervisors demonstrated hostility toward her. (DSOF 41, PCSOF 41.)

Brown actively sought to end the treatment that she was receiving from her coCase 4:04-cv-00586-RCC Document 50 Filed 10/04/06 Page 3 of 21
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workers. She complained to her supervisors about the disrespectful conduct of her peers on

numerous occasions. (PSOF 45, 46, 49, 63, 64, 66, 67, DCSOF 45, 46, 63, 63, 66, 67.) On

September 29, 2003, Brown filed an internal claim with TUSD pursuant to Governing Board

Policy 4315. TUSD describes the claim as a retaliation claim; Brown describes her claim as

a retaliation and racial discrimination claim. (DSOF 19, PCSOF 19.) Nancy Woll, TUSD's

EEOC Compliance Officer, investigated the complaint, interviewing 35 faculty and staff

members and reviewing numerous documents. (DSOF 21, 22, PCSOF 21, 22.) In a report

dated October 24, 2003, Ms. Woll concluded that the Reynolds staff had violated TUSD's

policy by its treatment of Brown. (DSOF 23, PCSOF 23.)

On October 20, 2003, Brown filed a complaint with the EEOC. (DSOF, Exhibit D.)

In the section of the form complaint labeled "cause of discrimination," Brown checked the

"retaliation" box. (DSOF, Exhibit D.) In the EEOC complaint, Brown stated "I objected to

a memorandum that I believed to be racially discriminatory. It is a function of my position

to advocate for Respondent's black student population. Since voicing my concerns regarding

the memorandum, I have been subjected to a hostile work environment by my co-workers

and administrators. Although I have complained about my treatment, nothing has been done

to prevent the continuing harassment. I believe, and therefore allege, that but for my

complaining of the memorandum, I would not have been treated in this manner." (DSOF 38,

PSOF 38, DSOF Ex. D.) 

On November 3, 2003, after receiving Ms. Woll's report, Janet Jordan, the new

principal at Reynolds, circulated a memorandum to the entire Reynolds staff, reminding them

that TUSD policy prohibited retaliation and insisting that Reynolds staff members conduct

themselves in a collegial and professional manner. (DSOF 26-28, PCSOF 26-28.) 

TUSD also instituted sensitivity training at Reynolds. (DSOF 16, PCSOF 16.) The

first session occurred on October 1, 2003; an additional session occurred on October 8, 2003.

(DSOF 17, 18, PCSOF 17, 18.) 

Despite Jordan's admonishments to the Reynolds staff, Brown continued to feel that

she was being treated unkindly by her co-workers in November and December, 2003.

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2

 The parties did not brief the state discrimination claims. At oral argument, the parties

agreed that the same legal analysis applies to plaintiff's Title VII claims and Arizona Civil Rights

Act claims. 

5

(DSOF 29, PCSOF 29.) On January 27, 2004, Brown requested a transfer to a different

school site, agreeing that such a transfer would not be considered retaliation. (DSOF 30, 31,

PCSOF 30, 31.) Brown was transferred in February, 2004. (DSOF 32, PCSOF 32.)

On October 7, 2004, Brown filed an action in Pima County Superior Court against

TUSD asserting claims for: (1) racial discrimination/hostile work environment in violation

of A.R.S. § 41-1401 et seq. and Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §

2000(e-2) et. seq; (2) retaliatory employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Federal

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2) et. seq; (3) negligent supervision; and (4) intentional

and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. On October 26, 2004, TUSD removed the

action to the District Court of Arizona on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. On

August 29, 2005, TUSD moved for summary judgment against Brown on all of her claims.2

On January 10, 2006, a hearing on the motion was held before Magistrate Judge Guerin.

Summary Judgment Standard

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L. Ed. 2d

202 (1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir.

1987). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents "show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Material facts are those "that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106

S.Ct. at 2510. A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. 

A party moving for summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence of a

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genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54. The moving

party merely needs to point out to the Court the absence of evidence supporting its

opponent's claim; it does not need to disprove its opponent's claim. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). If a moving party has made this showing, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but . . . must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See also

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. at 2514; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d

1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "replace conclusory allegations

of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit." Lujan v. National

Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990). 

Discussion

In its Motion, TUSD argues that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate because

(1) Brown's objection to a memo regarding student placement is not protected activity within

the meaning of Title VII, (2) Brown did not suffer an adverse employment action sanctioned

by TUSD, (3) Brown has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her

race discrimination claim, (4) the actions Brown alleges constitute harassment against her

were not motivated by race, (5) Brown has not suffered from "severe and pervasive"

harassment within the meaning of Title VII, (6) TUSD took appropriate remedial action to

address the alleged harassment, (7) the actions contained in Brown's complaint do not

constitute extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to state a claim against TUSD for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, (8) Brown has no legal basis for a claim of

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (9) Brown cannot claim negligent supervision

in the absence of an actionable tort claim. 

The Magistrate recommends finding that TUSD is entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision. The Magistrate

recommends denying TUSD's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim of

retaliation. 

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A. Retaliatory employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2)

To state a prima facie case of employment retaliation under Title VII, Brown must

show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) TUSD subjected her to an adverse

employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the

adverse action. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Steiner

v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994)). TUSD argues that Brown's

retaliation claim must fail because she cannot show that she engaged in a protected activity

or that TUSD subjected her to an adverse employment action.

(1) Protected Activity

Title VII prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees who

oppose an employment practice that is in and of itself a violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-3(a); see also Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing EEOC v.

Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.1983)). In other words, an

employee's opposition of an employer's violation of Title VII is a "protected activity" within

the meaning of Title VII. It is not necessary that the employment practice actually be

unlawful; opposition clause protection will be accorded whenever the opposition is based on

a reasonable belief that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. See

Moyo, 40 F.3d at 985.

Brown alleges that she was mistreated after she complained about the school's use of

the Memo. TUSD argues that Brown's opposition of the Memo is not actionable because she

was not opposing an unlawful or seemingly unlawful employment action. TUSD asserts that

the Memo did not involve employment practices at all and that, although the Memo can be

read as identifying students on the basis of race, even read in that light, Reynolds' students

would not have a cause of action under Title VII, because they are not employees of TUSD.

Similarly, TUSD asserts that Brown could not have reasonably believed that in opposing the

Memo, she was opposing a violation of Title VII because there is no evidence that Brown

objected to the effect of the Memo on employees; instead, her opposition was directly aimed

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at objecting to the harm that she felt the Memo would do to students. In support, TUSD

points out that Brown believed that the Memo was "racially biased and in violation of the

District's policy"; she "found the [Memo] objectionable because she believed that it targeted

a specific minority group," and she believed that "the request to print AA for African

American and a red circle for behavior problem violated the law due to the reference to one

specific minority group." (PSOF 22, 23, 24, DCSOF 22, 23, 24.) In her EEOC complaint

Brown specifically stated that "I objected to a memorandum that I believed to be racially

discriminatory. It is a function of my position to advocate for Respondent's Black Student

Population." (DSOF 35, Ex. D.) In sum, according to TUSD, there is no evidence that

Brown believed, whether reasonably or not, that TUSD was discriminating against its

employees in the terms and conditions of their employment. Her focus was on protecting the

students and the students do not fall under the umbrella of protection afforded by Title VII.

Under the rule set forth in Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1995), however,

Brown's opposition to the Memo can be regarded as an opposition to a practice made

unlawful by Title VII. In Moyo, a corrections officer alleged that he was terminated for

protesting against and refusing to cooperate with the prison's practice of allowing showers

after work shifts to white inmates but not to black inmates working the same job shift. Id.

at 984. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and the Ninth

Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Moyo could state a claim for retaliation in one

of two ways. First, because "under the terms of [§ 704(a) of Title VII], requiring an

employee to discriminate as a condition of his employment is itself an unlawful employment

practice, Moyo could state a claim for retaliation if he could demonstrate at trial that he was

discharged for refusing to implement a policy that discriminates against blacks." Id. at 985.

Second, the Court concluded that Moyo could prevail if he could show that his belief that an

unlawful employment practice occurred was reasonable. "If Moyo reasonably believed that

the inmates were protected by Title VII, then his opposition to their treatment would be a

statutorily protected activity." The court held that the reasonableness of Moyo's belief that

an unlawful employment practice occurred must be assessed according to an objective

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standard - one that makes due allowance for the limited knowledge possessed by most Title

VII plaintiffs. The court further indicated that a reasonable mistake may be one of fact or

law and emphasized that the reasonableness of a plaintiff's belief that a violation occurred

should be broadly construed in light of Title VII's remedial purpose. Id. at 982. 

Applying the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in the present case, the Magistrate concludes

that there is a question of fact as to whether Brown reasonably believed she was engaging

in a protected activity. Like Moyo, Brown alleges that she believed that the Memo required

district employees to engage in discriminatory treatment by identifying African American

students for placement. Also, like Moyo, the impact of the alleged discriminatory treatment

was not to the plaintiff or other co-workers, but to those whom the plaintiff supervised.

Although Brown does not allege that employees were or could be fired for failing to comply

with the Memo's directive, it can be reasonably inferred that employee insubordination to

the Memo's directives could result in discipline. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, this court concludes that there is evidence from which a reasonable

juror could conclude that Brown reasonably believed that the Memo mandated her coworkers to unlawfully discriminate in their job performance by identifying African-American

students with behavior problems for purposes of classroom assignments. Accordingly,

Brown's opposition to the Memo can be considered an opposition to a Title VII employment

violation, and a reasonable juror could conclude that Brown was engaging in protected

activity. 

(2) Adverse Employment Action

The Ninth Circuit has adopted the EEOC definition of "adverse employment action,"

which recognizes "any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is

reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity,"

as an adverse employment action. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.

2000). Under this rule, lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, and changes in work

schedules are all regarded by the Ninth Circuit as reasonably likely to deter employees from

engaging in protected activity. See id. 

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3

 Although TUSD claims that the record does not support this claim (DCSOF 44), it is in

fact supported by Brown's deposition testimony and not contradicted by other evidence. (PSOF 44,

Exh. 1, pg. 84-85.)

10

Co-worker conduct does not amount to an adverse employment action if it is "mere

ostracism," id. at 1241, but it does constitute an adverse employment action if it rises to the

level of harassment. See id. at 1245. Co-worker harassment is actionable only if it is

"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create

an abusive working environment." Id. at 1245. In determining whether co-worker

harassment is sufficiently severe, the Ninth Circuit looks at the totality of the circumstances,

including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work

performance. See id.

The parties generally agree on the facts regarding the hostility that Brown experienced

at work. After the media buzz surrounding the Memo, staff members at Reynolds "shut

doors in [Brown's] face, refused her access to work with students, held covert meetings, made

nasty comments in front of students, failed to assist her when she fell on campus, shut doors

in her face while she was on crutches, left rooms when she walked in, and demonstrated a

general lack of respect." (PSOF 33, DCSOF 33.)3

 In addition, one staff member made a

comment while with a group of people, including Brown, that they "should not use the word

'African American' around here." (PSOF 34, DCSOF 34.) On one occasion, Brown felt

physically intimidated when a teacher physically blocked her entrance into a classroom by

using an intimidating posture; when Brown stated that she was there to pick up two students,

the teacher stated "no" and shut the door in Brown's face. (PSOF 37, DCSOF 37.) 

Of the factors identified in Ray v. Henderson, three weigh in favor of Brown. Brown's

ability to do her job was unreasonably interfered with in that she was denied access to

students on several occasions. See, e.g., McGinest v. GTE Service Corp. 360 F.3d 1103,

1114-15 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering whether co-worker harassment amounted to an adverse

employment action and giving weight to the fact that co-workers refused to work under

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plaintiff's direction, thereby affecting his ability to do his job). Brown felt physically

intimidated, albeit only on one occasion. The hostility that Brown experienced occurred

frequently – on approximately fifteen occasions over a period of eight months - from May,

2003, to December, 2003. The incidents consisted of doors being shut in Brown's face and

teachers prohibiting Brown from entering classrooms. While the conduct by Brown's coworkers was not so frequent or severe as some other cases, considered in its totality, it is

sufficient to rise to the level that a reasonable juror could conclude that there was an abusive

working environment which adversely effected Brown's employment. See, e.g., McGinest,

360 F.3d at 1115 (finding triable issue of fact regarding co-worker harassment where plaintiff

was involved in a serious automobile accident because, due to his race, both his supervisor

and garage personnel were unwilling to ensure that his vehicle received necessary

maintenance, and where plaintiff was forced to work in dangerous situations and barraged

with insults and abuse); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245 (finding a triable issue of fact regarding coworker harassment where plaintiff was targeted for verbal abuse related to those complaints

for a period lasting over one and half years, called a "liar," a "troublemaker," and a "rabble

rouser," and told to "shut up," subjected to a number of pranks, falsely accused of misconduct

and made an object lesson about the perils of complaining about sexual harassment in the

workplace); Knox v. State of Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1335 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a jury

finding of adverse employment action was supported by the facts where co-workers called

the plaintiff a "fucking bitch" and said that they would "get her" and make her life hell after

the plaintiff complained of sexual harassment).

TUSD argues that Brown cannot show an adverse action because she cannot

demonstrate that her supervisors orchestrated the harassment or acquiesced in the conduct

in such a way as to demonstrate that the co-worker harassment was condoned or encouraged.

An employer can only be liable for co-workers' retaliatory harassment where its supervisory

or management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment or (2) know about the

harassment and acquiesce in it in such a manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers'

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4

 Although Gunnell is a Tenth Circuit case, it has been cited with approval by this Circuit,

see Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244-45; Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000), judgment vacated

on other grounds by UAL Corp. v. Fielder, 536 U.S. 919 (2002), and the parties agreed at oral

argument that it should be applied in this case. In addition, Gunnell's holding is in keeping with

Title VII's requirement that the plaintiff must show that she was subjected to an adverse employment

action by the employer. Thus, it is reasonable for the Court to apply Gunnell in this case.

12

actions. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).4 Four

TUSD employees were arguably "supervisors" of Brown during the relevant time period:

Palazzo (PSOF 17, DCSOF 17), Langford (PSOF 19, DCSOF 19), Jordan (PSOF 47, DCSOF

47) and Hines (PSOF 67, DCSOF 67). Plaintiff has not alleged that those four individuals

were in any way involved in the alleged harassment. However, a reasonable juror could

conclude that supervisors' significant delays in responding to Brown's claims of harassment

amounted to acquiescence. Brown submits evidence that she was harassed from early May

2003 through January 2004. She alleges that she complained to Langford about the

retaliation the second week of May 2003 (SOF 45), to Palazzo at the end of the 2002-2003

school year and to Jordan before the 2003-2004 school year began. Although Jordan assured

Brown that she would support her (PSOF 49, DCSOF 49) and actively pursued sensitivity

training for Reynolds' staff (PSOF 52, 57, 59, DCSOF 52, 57, 59), this did not occur until

months after Brown's complaints of retaliation. TUSD notes that upon receiving Ms. Woll's

report of October 23, 2003, Jordan promptly sent a memorandum to the Reynolds' staff,

reminding them that TUSD policy prohibited retaliation and insisting that Reynolds' staff

members conduct themselves in a collegial and professional manner (DSOF 26-28, PCSOF

26-28); however, at that point Brown had been complaining of retaliatory treatment for over

five months. Moreover, Brown alleges that the retaliatory treatment did not cease despite her

continuing to report the treatment to Jordan and Hines. (SOF 86.) 

In sum, the Magistrate Judge concludes there is a material issue of fact as to whether

Brown reasonably believed she was engaging in a protected activity, whether the treatment

that Brown received amounted to an adverse action and whether her supervisors acquiesced

to her co-workers' treatment of her; therefore, the Magistrate recommends denying summary

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judgment on Brown's retaliation claim.

B. Racial Discrimination 

In order to prevail on a Title VII racial discrimination/hostile workplace claim, Brown

must demonstrate that she has exhausted her administrative remedies such that this Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over her claim. See Vasquez v. City of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

644 (9th Cir. 2001). Once she establishes jurisdiction, Brown's racial discrimination/hostile

workplace claim depends upon her ability to establish the substantive elements of the claim,

specifically that: (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature, (2)

the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. See Vasquez,

349 F.3d 634 at 642. Finally, because Brown has alleged harassment at the hands of coworkers, she must prove that TUSD knew or should have known of the conduct and failed

to take adequate remedial measures. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1528 (9th

Cir. 1995); see also Woodland v. Ryerson & Son, 302 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2002). 

The Magistrate recommends finding that Brown failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies, and that her claim for racial discrimination is therefore barred. In the alternative,

the Magistrate recommends finding that Brown has not created a material issue of fact as to

whether she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature, and has therefore

failed to state a claim for racial discrimination.

(1) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over all claims of discrimination that fall

within the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or an EEOC investigation that could

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 644. The

administrative charge requirement "serves the important purposes of giving the charged party

notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and decision." B.K.B.

v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). For

these reasons, Title VII requires that the charge be sworn, and that the EEOC send notice of

the charge to the named respondent. See id. (internal citations omitted).

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 The Attorney General's Office previously moved to quash the deposition of Judy

Drickey-Prohow, whom both parties intended to call as a witness on the issue of the AG's

investigation into Brown's EEOC complaint. The AG's motion was granted. Both parties agree that

entire record in this case may be considered by the Court in deciding the motion for summary

judgment, see TUSD Motion, pg. 2; Brown Response pg. 1.

14

The EEOC did not investigate a racial discrimination claim by Brown. (Attorney

General Reply in Support of Motion to Quash (stating that Brown's EEOC complaint alleged

only a charge of retaliation)).5

 Moreover, Brown's race discrimination claim could not

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that Brown did file. There is nothing in

Brown's EEOC complaint which could be fairly construed as giving TUSD notice that Brown

intended to allege a claim for race discrimination. As TUSD points out in its Motion, in the

section of the complaint form labeled "cause of discrimination," Brown checked only the

"retaliation" box, not the "race" box. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 645; BKB, 276 F.3d at 1100

(referring to the boxes checked on an EEOC complaint when evaluating the nature of the

complaint). Although Brown claims that it is "unclear" whether the responsibility for

checking the "race" box fell to her or to EEOC intake, Brown had the opportunity to review

the complaint and signed it, avowing its truth and accuracy. See AG's Reply in Support of

Motion to Quash (stating that pursuant to Arizona law, the EEOC drafts the charge for the

plaintiff but the plaintiff reviews it and signs it).

In determining whether a plaintiff has exhausted allegations that she did not specify

in her administrative charge, it is appropriate to consider such factors as the alleged basis of

the discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of

discrimination named in the charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to

have occurred. In addition, the court should consider plaintiff's civil claims to be reasonably

related to allegations in the charge to the extent that those claims are consistent with the

plaintiff's original theory of the case. See BKB, 276 F.3d at 1100. In the present case, in

addition to the fact that Brown checked only the "retaliation" box on her EEOC complaint,

the factual allegations of the EEO complaint do not include any mention of race

discrimination against Brown; the only mention of race in the EEOC Complaint is with

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respect to Brown's allegation that the Memo was racially discriminatory against the students.

Brown further stated that she had been mistreated because she objected to the memo; she did

not mention mistreatment due to her own race. The EEOC Complaint states:

I objected to a memorandum that I believed to be racially

discriminatory. It is a function of my position to advocate for

Respondent's black student population. Since voicing my

concerns regarding the memorandum, I have been subjected to

a hostile work environment by my co-workers and

administrators. Although I have complained about my

treatment, nothing has been done to prevent the continuing

harassment. I believe, and therefore allege, that but for my complaining of the memorandum, I would not have been treated

in this manner. (Emphasis added). 

(DSOF 19, Ex. D.) Because Brown specifically identifies her opposition to the Memo as the

cause for her hostile treatment at work and fails to allege racial discrimination or identify

instances of racial discrimination, the Magistrate recommends finding that subject matter

jurisdiction is lacking over Brown's claim of racial discrimination. 

(2) The conduct toward Brown was not motivated by race.

The Magistrate further recommends granting summary judgment to TUSD on the race

discrimination claim because Brown has failed to demonstrate a material issue of fact as to

whether the conduct toward her was racially motivated. Just as allegations of racial

discrimination are absent from Brown's EEOC complaint, the record as a whole lacks facts

to support Brown's claim that TUSD discriminated against her on the basis of her race. In

response to TUSD's argument that Brown has attributed her discourteous treatment

completely to her disclosure of the Memo, not to her race, Brown contends that the record

is replete with "a litany of behaviors to which Plaintiff was subjected reasonably attributable

to racial animus." Of that "litany," however, Brown specifically identifies only a single

example: "one staff member made a comment while with a group of people including

Plaintiff, that the word 'African-American' should not be used around here." Brown

Opposition, pg. 19. This single reference, without more, does not rise to the level of racial

discrimination. Brown testified in her deposition that she did not consider the term "AfricanAmerican" to be a racial epithet. (See DSOF 39, Ex. A, pg. 71.) Even if it were, the "mere

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utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee"

is not, by itself, actionable under Title VII." Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F.Supp.

1435, 1447 (E.D.Cal. 1995) (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).

Because Brown's claim is insufficient as a matter of law, the Magistrate recommends

granting summary judgment in favor of TUSD on Brown's racial discrimination claim.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arizona

law, Brown must demonstrate that (1) TUSD engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct,

(2) TUSD either intended to cause Brown emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the

near certainty that such distress would result from its conduct, and (3) that severe emotional

distress did indeed occur as a result of TUSD's conduct. See Ford v. Revlon, 153 Ariz. 38,

43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987). The trial court must determine whether the acts complained

of are sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim for relief. See Mintz v. Bell

Atlantic Systems Leasing, 183 Ariz. 550, 554, 905 P.2d 559, 563 (App. 1995) (citing Patton

v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 476, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (1978)).

Only when reasonable minds could differ in determining whether conduct is sufficiently

extreme or outrageous does the issue go to the jury. See id. (citing Lucchesi v. Stimmell, 149

Ariz. 76, 79, 716 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1986)). 

The "extreme and outrageous conduct" element of an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant's acts were "so

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 10 Ariz.App. 560, 562, 460 P.2d 666, 668 (1969) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d), overruled on other grounds, Godbehere v.

Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781, 784 (1989). Because the terms

"outrageous conduct" and "severe emotional distress" evade precise legal definition, the court

analyzes such claims on a case-by-case basis. See Coffin v. Safeway, 323 F.Supp.2d 997,

1003 (D. Ariz. 2004). 

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6

 Because of the way that Brown words the allegation – "In her request for a transfer away

from Reynolds, Plaintiff references the fact that she was taken by ambulance from Reynolds on

November 15, 2003 as a result of the impact of the retaliation and hostile work environment on her

health" – it is unclear whether TUSD's admission is intended as an admission that the hostile work

environment caused Brown to need an ambulance, or whether TUSD is admitting only that Brown

believed that to be the cause.

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Even when the facts of this case are construed in the light most favorable to Brown,

Brown has not satisfied the "extreme outrageous conduct" element of her claim. Accepting

Brown's allegations as true, her co-workers' conduct can be characterized as rude and

unprofessional. Her co-workers shut doors in her face, made inappropriate comments when

she walked into a room, refused her access to work with students, held covert meetings, made

nasty comments in front of students, failed to assist her when she fell on campus, shut doors

in her face while she was on crutches, left rooms when she walked in, and demonstrated a

general lack of respect. (PSOF 33, DCSOF 33.) It is undisputed that Brown received

medical treatment for the immense stress she felt as a result of her work environment. (PSOF

89, DCSOF 89.) Brown contends that the stress caused her to be taken by ambulance from

Reynolds, and TUSD does not dispute that contention.6

 (PSOF 88, DCSOF 88.) 

In support of her claim, Brown relies on Coffin v. Safeway, 323 F.Supp.2d 997, 999

(D. Ariz. 2004), in which a plaintiff alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress arising from her employer's sexual harassment at work: the plaintiff's supervisor

"used his position as a managerial supervisor at Safeway to sexually harass and discriminate

against her . . . sought sexual favors . . . [and] made numerous verbal remarks, sounds,

gestures to Plaintiff such as (1) 'you smell so good I could almost taste you' (2) 'I bet you

taste good' (3) 'I wish you would gain more weight because I like more meat on your butt.'

Also, . . . [the supervisor] "would frequently walk up behind her and while in close proximity

would tell [her] that he wanted to rub up against her body, and [the employer] did not take

any corrective measures to stop [the supervisor]." (internal citations omitted). 

Coffin is distinguishable for several reasons. First, Coffin concerned a motion to

dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and therefore the district court applied a lower

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standard of scrutiny. See Coffin, 323 F.Supp.2d at 1006-07 (challenge to sufficiency of

pleadings rejected; Rule 8, Fed.R.Civ.P, requires only a short and plain statement of the

claim showing pleader is entitled to relief; specific facts to meet the "high" standard of

conduct to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are not necessary at

the pleading stage). Second, the court in Coffin gave special weight to the fact that the sexual

harassment alleged by the plaintiff occurred at the hands of a supervisor with apparent or

actual authority over the plaintiff, a factor which is not present in Brown's case. See id. at

1003. Third and finally, the type of conduct alleged in Coffin is not factually similar to

Brown's case: Coffin involves verbal and physical sexual harassment that was both blatant

and offensive; Brown's claim involves retaliatory treatment consisting largely of hostile

shunning by co-workers.

TUSD argues that Brown's allegations are more analogous to the facts at issue in

Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High School District, 184 Ariz. 419, 428, 909 P.2d 486, 495

(App. 1995), in which the court granted a motion to dismiss a plaintiff's intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim against her employer, who had recommended that the plaintiff

employee's contract not be renewed, lawfully changed her duties, lawfully reduced her salary

and told her that "nobody likes [her]" and that "[she] piss[ed] people off." While Wallace

is certainly more similar to the present case than Coffin, it presents facts that are clearly less

egregious than the facts of the present case. 

Other decisions of this Court and the Arizona courts, however, demonstrate that

TUSD is entitled to summary judgment on Brown's claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. This Court has held that it is "extremely rare to find conduct in the

employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis

for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Spratt v. Northern

Automotive Corp., 958 F.Supp. 456, 461 (D.Ariz. 1996) (citing Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co.,

861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir.1988)). In other employment cases, conduct on the part of the

employer which appears far more outrageous than the conduct of the TUSD employees in

this case has not satisfied the "extreme and outrageous" conduct element of an intentional

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infliction of emotional distress claim at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g. Nelson v.

Phoenix Resort Corp., 181 Ariz. 188, 199, 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (App. 1994) (holding that

plaintiff could not prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where he

was called to work at 3:00 a.m., marched by armed guards out of his office and into the

lobby, and then fired in front of the news media); Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing

Intern., Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 905 P.2d 559 (App.1995) (granting motion to dismiss intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff's complaint alleged that employer

discriminated against her on the basis of sex in failing to promote her, that plaintiff was

hospitalized for severe psychological and emotional problems as a result of not being

promoted, that plaintiff's employer forced her to return to work against a physician's

recommendation, and that plaintiff's employer hand delivered a termination letter to her while

she was in the hospital); Stingley v. State of Ariz., 796 F.Supp. 424, 431 (D.Ariz.1992)

(denying summary judgment on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where

plaintiff employee was poked in the buttocks with a fork by her co-worker, who was

"checking to see if the meat was done," but also noting that other conduct by co-workers and

supervisors, including the use of racial epithets, giving the plaintiff a nickname related to her

breast size, calling plaintiff a "black bitch slut," and snapping plaintiff's bra did not amount

to outrageous conduct). Thus, the Magistrate recommends finding that Brown is not entitled

to take her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to the jury, and that the Court

grant summary judgment in favor of TUSD on this claim.

D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to prevail on her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Brown

must demonstrate that TUSD acted negligently such that it created a "zone of danger," i.e.

an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to Brown, and that as a result of being in the zone of

danger Brown suffered shock or mental anguish manifested by physical injury. See Quinn

v. Turner, 155 Ariz. 225, 227, 745 P.2d 972, 974 (App. 1987). 

As a threshold matter, the Magistrate notes that the "zone of danger/bodily harm"

element of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims makes it ill-suited for

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employment discrimination cases. Although its conceivable that a zone of danger could exist

in the workplace, such as if an employer negligently disregarded retaliation or sex/race-based

harassment by co-workers to the point that the plaintiff employee was at risk of being

physically harmed by co-workers, such a fact pattern seems unlikely. At any rate, the record

is devoid of evidence suggesting that Brown was ever placed in a zone of danger by TUSD:

to the contrary, Brown admitted in her deposition that she was never threatened with bodily

harm. See TUSD Reply, pg. 11, DSOF 39, Ex. A, pg. 72. Thus, summary judgment on this

claim is appropriate. 

E. TUSD is entitled to summary judgment on Brown's claim for negligent supervision

In order to state a claim for negligent supervision, Brown must demonstrate that she

was injured as a result of a TUSD employee committing a tort. Mulhern v. City of

Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 398, 799 P.2d 15, 18 (App. 1990). In its motion for summary

judgment, TUSD argued that Brown has alleged only two torts – intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress – and that both of those torts are alleged against employer

TUSD, not its employees. Accordingly, TUSD argues, Brown cannot prevail on her claim

for negligent supervision. Brown did not respond to TUSD's argument in her Opposition.

The Magistrate agrees with TUSD's analysis, and recommends finding that Brown cannot

state a claim for negligent supervision and that her failure to respond to TUSD's motion for

summary judgment on this ground constituted an abandonment of her claim. 

Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its

independent review of the record, enter an order: GRANTING in part and DENYING in part

the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18), dismissing Brown's claims of

racial discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and negligent supervision, and permitting Brown to present her claim of

retaliation to the finder of fact.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

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10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV 04-586-TUC-RCC.

DATED this 4th day of October, 2006.

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