Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00176/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00176-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENZO GREGGE, JR., No. 2:09-CV-2561-GEB-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MATTHEW KATE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 41). 

Defendants argue, among other things, that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies

prior to filing suit. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges generally that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

health and safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he claims that he was

exposed to and eventually contracted “Valley Fever” while at Pleasant Valley State Prison. As

to defendant Kate, plaintiff alleges he is liable because “[h]e is legally responsible for the care,

custody, treatment, training, discipline, and employment of inmates. . . .” As to defendant Yates,

plaintiff claims that he is liable by virtue of his role as prison warden. 

B. Procedural History

On May 14, 2010, the court dismissed the complaint at the screening stage,

concluding that plaintiff had not stated a claim for relief against the named supervisory

defendants. Plaintiff appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in

an unpublished memorandum disposition issued on July 22, 2011. The court stated:

Gregge’s complaint, liberally construed, did not seek to allege a

respondeat superior theory of liability. Rather, Gregge alleged that

defendants implemented a policy that resulted in the denial of his

constitutional rights. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,

1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Supervisory liability exists even without

overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials

implement a policy so defective that the policy itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional

violation.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). . . .

Following issuance of the mandate on August 15, 2011, the court directed service of the action

on defendants. 

II. STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss based on a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is properly the subject of an unenumerated motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). “In deciding a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

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pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. Where the court looks beyond the

pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss, which is “. . . a procedure closely

analogous to summary judgment,” the court must assure that the plaintiff has fair notice of his

opportunity to develop a record. Id. at 1120 n.14 (referencing the notice requirements outlined in

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d

409 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants bear the burden of establishing that the plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. If the court

concludes that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the unexhausted claim should

be dismissed without prejudice. See id. at 1120; see also Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative

remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory

regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling

Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of

the complaint, compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies

while the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). The

Supreme Court addressed the exhaustion requirement in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and

held: (1) prisoners are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint

because lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the

defendants; (2) an individual named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be named in the

grievance process for exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable procedural

rules that a prisoner must follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not by the

PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some, but not

all, claims are unexhausted. 

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The Supreme Court also held in Woodford v. Ngo that, in order to exhaust

administrative remedies, the prisoner must comply with all of the prison system’s procedural

rules so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits. 548 U.S. 81, 89-96 (2006). Thus,

exhaustion requires compliance with “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90. 

Partial compliance is not enough. See id. Substantively, the prisoner must submit a grievance

which affords prison officials a full and fair opportunity to address the prisoner’s claims. See id.

at 90, 93. The Supreme Court noted that one of the results of proper exhaustion is to reduce the

quantity of prisoner suits “because some prisoners are successful in the administrative process,

and others are persuaded by the proceedings not to file an action in federal court.” Id. at 94. 

A prison inmate in California satisfies the administrative exhaustion requirement

by following the procedures set forth in §§ 3084.1-3084.8 of Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations. In California, inmates “may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or

omission by the department or its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

These regulations require the prisoner to proceed through three levels of appeal. See Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b), 3084.2, 3084.7. A decision at the third formal level, which is also

referred to as the director’s level, is not appealable and concludes a prisoner’s departmental

administrative remedy. See id. Departmental appeals coordinators may reject a prisoner’s

administrative appeal for a number of reasons, including untimeliness, filing excessive appeals,

use of improper language, failure to attach supporting documents, and failure to follow proper

procedures. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.6(b). If an appeal is rejected, the inmate is to

be provided clear instructions how to cure the defects therein. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3084.5(b), 3084.6(a). Group appeals are permitted on the proper form with each inmate clearly

identified, and signed by each member of the group. See Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.2(h). 

Currently, California regulations do not contain any provision specifying who must be named in

the grievance. 

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In this case, defendants begin with the Ninth Circuit’s remand in which the court

stated that plaintiff’s claim is based on the alleged implementation of a “policy that resulted in

the denial of his constitutional rights.” They then argue that plaintiff never raised this particular

claim in his inmate grievances. According to defendants’ evidence, the only inmate grievance

plaintiff filed concerning his contraction of Valley Fever was appeal no. PVSP-08-01095. 

Defendants’ evidence further reflects that, in that appeal, plaintiff did not complain about the

implementation of policies. Rather, he stated:

I have a grievance with being transferred to Pleasant Valley State

Prison (December 22, 2005) after numerous reported cases of Valley Fever

infecting inmates and staff here at P.V.S.P. Now I have contracted this

infection. I have one of the worst cases of Valley Fever (coccimeningitis). 

For relief, plaintiff requested:

I wish to be transferred out of this region. Also that I be

monetarily [sic] compensated for pain, suffering, and all medical costs –

including medications – upon, or after, my release from prison. 

After his appeal was denied at the informal level, plaintiff requested:

I still wish to be transferred out of this region. Also, that I be

monetarily [sic] compensated for pain, suffering, and all medical costs –

including medications – upon, or after, my release from prison. 

Plaintiff repeated this request for relief through the ascending levels of administrative review. 

On this record, the court agrees with defendants that plaintiff has not exhausted

his claim, as that claim has been defined by the Ninth Circuit. Specifically, a review of the

relevant grievance reveals that plaintiff never complained about the implementation of defective

policies. Rather, he complained about having contracted Valley Fever and requested a transfer to

another prison and monetary compensation. In his opposition, plaintiff concedes that his

grievance did not mention allegedly defective policies, but argues that this defect should be

excused in light of the court’s obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally. The failure to

specify the basis of his grievance, however, is not a question of poor pleading practices which

can be corrected at this stage of the proceedings. Rather, it is a question of whether the grievance

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adequately put defendants on notice of the alleged basis of liability such that corrective action

could be considered prior to the filing of a lawsuit. Because plaintiff’s grievance failed to do so,

he did not adequately exhaust administrative remedies. 

The court finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the

claim raised in this lawsuit and, for this reason, the case should be dismissed in its entirety.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be granted and that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 19, 2012

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

It is not necessary to address plaintiff’s request, contained in a motion for leave to 1

amend, that defendant Kate be voluntarily dismissed. 

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