Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01754/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01754-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE BOLDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. CAVAZOS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01754-BAM-PC

ORDER DISMISSING THIS ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 

WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED 

AND THAT THIS ACTION COUNT AS A 

STRIKE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g).

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).1 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff‟s February 1, 2016, third amended complaint, filed in 

response to the January 8, 2016, order dismissing the second amended complaint with leave to 

file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 26.)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

 

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Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge on November 7, 2012. (ECF No. 5.)

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1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a Plaintiff‟s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely consistent with‟ a defendant‟s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. 

II. Procedural History

The original complaint was filed in this action on October 29, 2012. Plaintiff alleged that 

Defendants improperly confiscated and disposed of his television. On March 21, 2013, an order 

was entered, dismissing the complaint and granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 

(ECF No 8.) On April 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) 

Plaintiff set forth claims of free exercise of his religious beliefs under the First Amendment, 

unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, due process (related to the grievance 

process), and unauthorized deprivation of property claims. On January 10, 2014, an order was 

entered, finding that the first amended complaint failed to state any claims for relief. This action 

was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 11.) 

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, and on March 20, 2015, this action was affirmed in part, 

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vacated in part, and remanded. On July 7, 2015, the formal mandate from the Ninth Circuit was 

entered in this case. (ECF No. 22.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff‟s free 

exercise, unreasonable search, due process (related to the grievance process), and unauthorized 

deprivation of property claims. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Plaintiff‟s due process claim 

alleging an authorized deprivation of property was properly dismissed. However, dismissal 

without leave to amend was improper because it was not clear that Plaintiff could not cure the 

defect through amendment. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, and on July 16, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 23.) On January 8, 2016, an order was 

entered, dismissing the second amended complaint and granting Plaintiff leave to file a third 

amended complaint. (ECF No. 26.) On February 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed the third amended 

complaint that is now before the Court. 

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In the third amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on February 10, 2012, during a 

mass cell search, Plaintiff‟s television “was disposed of by prison staff that were supervised by 

Sergeant J. Gonzales.” (Am. Compl. p. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that his television was disposed of 

pursuant to Title 15, Section 3190 of the California Code of Regulations, which defines property 

that is allowable. Section 3191 provides for disposal of property that is not allowable under 

section 3190. Plaintiff alleges that his property was operational and functional with a button that 

was broken. Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive a written notice in violation of tit. 15, § 

3287. Section 3287(a)(4) provides that inmates are to be given written notice for any items of 

personal and state-owned property removed from their cell. 

Plaintiff alleges that prison staff “cited no justifiable legitimate penological interest as a 

reason for the authorized deprivation and disposal of my television.” (Id. p. 4.) Plaintiff refers 

the Court to the cell search/property receipt attached to Plaintiff‟s complaint.2 Plaintiff alleges 

that “where at the question is asked „reason removed‟ prison staff left it blank, and se 

„dispositional comments‟ it is also blank.” (Id.) Attached to Plaintiff‟s complaint is a copy of a 

 

2 The Court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to 

in the complaint. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 

1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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Facility 3A cell search/property removed receipt dated February 10, 2012, for Plaintiff‟s cell. 

Although the sections titled “reason removed” and “disposition/comments” were left blank, in 

the section of the receipt that lists the specific items of property indicates under item number 4, 

“Broken TV – Taken.” 

IV. Discussion

In the January 8, 2016, order, the Court noted that an authorized, intentional deprivation 

of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 

532, n. 13 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985). An authorized 

deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. 

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 422, 436 ((1982); Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 

832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). Authorized deprivations are permissible if carried out 

pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Due Process Clause is violated only when the agency 

“prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without underlying statutory authority and 

competent procedural protections.” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 

1019 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal 

quotations omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 976 (2012). 

The remaining issue before the Court is the taking of Plaintiff‟s personal property, and 

the process associated with that taking. In the January 8, 2016, order, Plaintiff was advised that

so long as correctional officials complied with underlying statutory authority and competent 

procedural protections, due process was satisfied. Any claim related to the inmate grievance 

process was not before the Court. Regarding the taking of Plaintiff‟s personal property, the 

fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard 

before the government may deprive a person of a protected interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). The Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Greene is on point. In 

Greene, the Nevada Department of Corrections changed its policy, creating a ban on inmate 

possession of typewriters. 648 F.3d at 1017. The ban was system-wide, and all inmates were 

notified of the new policy. Id. Even though the plaintiff inmate in Greene was not given an 

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individual pre-deprivation hearing, the Ninth Circuit found that his due process rights were not 

violated because he had been notified of the ban and given ample time to comply with it. “With 

respect to the personal property of prisoners, that is all the process that is due.” See Id. at 1019; 

see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 5439, 556 (1974)(“[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights 

under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions 

imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed.”) 

In the order dismissing the second amended complaint, Plaintiff was advised that he had

not alleged any facts that support a claim that the underlying statutory authority for the 

deprivation of his property was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose or that 

he did not have any notice of the underlying statutory authority. In the second amended 

complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was not provided with any type of hearing before his 

television was disposed of. Therefore, Plaintiff did not state a claim for relief on his remaining 

claim of authorized deprivation of personal property. There were not enough facts alleged in the 

second amended complaint from which the Court could determine whether Plaintiff was 

deprived of due process. The Court therefore dismissed that claim with leave to file a third 

amended complaint. Plaintiff was directed to allege facts indicating what, exactly, happened. 

Plaintiff was told to allege why correctional officials took his television, i.e., whether was it 

inoperable, or unauthorized, and what specific process was used. Plaintiff referred to a “well 

established state procedure,” but did not identify that procedure. Plaintiff was specifically

directed to identify the statute, regulation, or prison policy that correctional officials used to take 

his property. A bare allegation that property was taken pursuant to established procedure 

without notice or a hearing, is insufficient to state a claim for relief. 

The facts of the third amended complaint indicate that Plaintiff was deprived of his 

television pursuant to regulation, and he was provided with notice of the reason for the 

deprivation. Plaintiff refers to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, section 3287. 

Section 3287(a)(4) provides that an inmate must be given written notice for any items of 

personal property removed from his cell and the disposition of such property. The fact that the 

notice was brief, “Broken TV – Taken,” does not subject officials to liability under the Due 

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Process Clause. As noted in Greene, Plaintiff, here, was aware of the regulation and given an 

opportunity to comply with it. That is all the process that is due. Greene, 648 F.3d at 1017. 

“[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these 

rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been 

lawfully committed.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Plaintiff alleges that his 

television had a broken knob, and should have been allowed to send it to be repaired. 

Correctional officials took Plaintiff‟s television because it was broken, and they notified him of 

the reason the television was taken. Plaintiff was not, therefore, deprived of due process. 

Further, Plaintiff alleges no facts indicating that the regulations at issue are not reasonably 

related to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for relief on his 

claim of a violation of the Due Process Clause. The balance of the third amended complaint 

restates the allegations of the second amended complaint regarding the participation of 

Defendants in the inmate grievance process. As noted, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal 

of Plaintiff‟s due process claim related to the grievance process. 

V. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff was previously notified of the applicable legal standard and the deficiencies in 

his pleading, and despite guidance from the Court, Plaintiff‟s third amended complaint fails to 

correct the deficiencies identified in the order dismissing the second amended complaint. Based 

upon the allegations in Plaintiff‟s original complaint, first amended complaint, second amended 

complaint and third amended complaint, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to allege 

any additional facts that would support a claim for a violation of the Due Process Clause and 

further amendment would be futile. See Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”) Based 

on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the Court finds that further leave to amend is not 

warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th. Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 

1446-1449 (9th Cir. 1987).

///

///

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted; and

2. This action count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

3. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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