Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03384/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03384-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURA ZESSI,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERIPRIDE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-03384-SI 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE 

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 14

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is scheduled for a hearing on August 16, 2019. 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for resolution 

without oral argument and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS the motion and GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. The amended complaint 

shall be filed no later than August 21, 2019.

BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges that plaintiff worked for defendant as an Account Service 

Representative from 2016-2018. Compl. ¶¶ 7-11. Plaintiff alleges that in June 2017, she was 

“having issues with her right hand” and her doctor “informed her that her right hand was broken.” 

Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s physician “provided her with a note explaining her disability” and plaintiff 

provided the note to defendant. Id. The doctor’s note included work modifications. Id.

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complaint alleges that plaintiff “was not capable of using her right hand during this time period per 

her physician’s orders.” Id. ¶ 9. 

 

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 Defendant seeks judicial notice of plaintiff’s physician’s note dated June 8, 2017. Dkt. 

No. 16. The note states, inter alia, that plaintiff “is placed off work from 6/5/2017 through 

6/8/2017” and “[t]his patient is placed on modified activity at work and at home from 6/9/2017 

through 6/14/2017.” Id. The note sets forth certain restrictions on plaintiff’s activities. 

Plaintiff does not oppose the request for judicial notice. The Court takes judicial notice of 

this document.

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According to the complaint, “[p]laintiff’s supervisor instructed her that she would not be 

able to work until she had filled out a form provided by Defendant concerning her injury.” Id. 

Plaintiff “made numerous attempts to work with the restrictions provided by her physician while 

she was in the process of having Defendant’s form completed.” Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff was told that she 

could not work until the form was completed, and plaintiff “explained that it would take some time 

for the form to be filled out by her physician.” Id. Defendant “kept pressuring Plaintiff about her 

injury,” and in June 2018, “[p]laintiff was notified that she was being terminated due to her current 

situation dealing with her disability.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11. 

The complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in violation 

of the Fair Housing and Employment Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.; (2) 

wrongfully termination in violation of public policy as set forth in the FEHA; (3) retaliation against 

plaintiff for asserting her rights under the FEHA; (4) disability discrimination in violation of the 

FEHA; (5) failure to accommodate in violation of the FEHA; and (6) failure to engage in the 

interactive process in violation of the FEHA.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2), and a complaint that fails to do so is subject to 

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to 

allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a Defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact 

pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ 

or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “While legal 

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conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations.” Id.

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must accept as true all facts alleged in the 

complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los 

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, courts are not required to accept as true 

“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). If a court dismisses 

a complaint, it must decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held 

that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, 

unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

As a general rule, courts may not consider materials beyond the pleadings when ruling on a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). However, 

courts “may take judicial notice of some public records, including the ‘records and reports of 

administrative bodies.’” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Interstate 

Nat. Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953)). Courts may not take judicial 

notice of facts in the public record that are subject to reasonable dispute. Lee, 250 F.3d at 690. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims on the ground that a broken hand is a 

temporary condition that does not constitute a disability under the FEHA. Defendant also contends 

that plaintiff does not allege that her alleged disability limited a major life activity, as required by 

the FEHA. Defendant argues that all of plaintiff’s claims are predicated on the existence of a 

disability, and thus that plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 

Plaintiff responds that a temporary condition can constitute a disability under the FEHA, and 

that many of the cases cited by defendant are distinguishable because they involve the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, which has a narrower definition of “disability” than the FEHA. Plaintiff also 

argues that the work modifications contained in her doctor’s note demonstrate that plaintiff was 

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limited in the major life activity of working.

The FEHA defines “physical disability” as including, but not limited to, “[h]aving any

physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that . . . : (A) 

Affects . . . [the] musculoskeletal [system, and] (B) Limits a major life activity.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 12926(m)(1)(A)-(B). “A physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 

anatomical loss limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity 

difficult.” Id. at § 12926(m)(1)(B)(ii). The phrase “[m]ajor life activities” is “broadly construed 

and includes physical, mental, and social activities and working.” Id. at § § 12926(m)(1)(B)(iii);

Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 5th 570, 588 (2016), review denied (Mar. 1, 

2017). 

To the extent defendant contends that a temporary condition cannot constitute a disability 

under the FEHA as a matter of law, the Court disagrees. Whether a temporary condition is disabling 

must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The applicable California regulation provides that the 

definition of a disability excludes:

conditions that are mild, which do not limit a major life activity, as determined on a 

case-by-case basis. These excluded conditions have little or no residual effects, such 

as the common cold; seasonal or common influenza; minor cuts, sprains, muscle 

aches, soreness, bruises, or abrasions; non-migraine headaches, and minor and nonchronic gastrointestinal disorders.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11065; see also Diaz v. Fed. Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1052-

53 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Since the Legislature did not choose to include duration as a factor, and since 

the FEHA definition of ‘disability’ is intended to be broader than the ADA definition, the 

Legislature did not intend for duration to be a factor in determining whether a plaintiff is disabled 

for purposes of the FEHA.”); Avila v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1249 n.5 (2008), 

as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 28, 2008) (recognizing that “temporary, non-chronic conditions 

may be disabilities under FEHA”). In Diaz, the court declined to find as a matter of law that 

plaintiff’s mental condition was not a disability under FEHA on the basis of the temporary nature 

of the condition. 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1046, 1051-52. There, the plaintiff missed more work than 

allowed by his employer’s attendance policy during a seven-month period. Id. at 1040-44. The 

plaintiff was diagnosed with depression and other mental conditions that limited the plaintiff’s life 

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activities and rendered him “temporarily totally disabled.” Id. When plaintiff attempted to return 

to work after receiving from his doctor a letter stating plaintiff “was fully capable of performing his 

duties,” his employer suspended him and subsequently terminated his employment for failing to 

meet defendant’s attendance requirement. Id. at 1044. Analyzing the plaintiff’s FEHA claims, the 

court found that the plain language of the FEHA and the 2001 amendment thereto by the Prudence 

Kay Poppink Act (“Poppink Act”) evinced the California legislature’s intent not to “categorically 

exclude temporary disabilities” or to include duration as a factor in determining disability; and the 

FEHA required only that a disability limit a major life activity for mental and physical conditions 

alike. Id. at 1046-52. 

However, the Court agrees with defendant that plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that her 

hand injury limited a major life activity. The complaint alleges plaintiff’s personal doctor informed 

her “that her right hand was broken” and “provided her with a note explaining her disability” that 

“included work modifications.” Compl. ¶ 8. However, the complaint does not actually allege that 

plaintiff’s broken hand limited any major life activity (including working), and the complaint does 

not contain any facts showing that plaintiff’s injury impeded her ability to perform her job. See

Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 47 (2006) (“It is insufficient for [the plaintiff] 

simply to allege a disability or to identify an injury or physical condition. To proceed as a physically 

disabled person under the [FEHA], [the plaintiff] must demonstrate his injury or physical condition 

(in this instance, a low back injury, whose existence is undisputed) makes ‘difficult’ the achievement 

of work or some other major life activity.”). Therefore, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to 

show that plaintiff’s hand injury qualifies as a disability under FEHA.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss and GRANTS plaintiff 

leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than August 21, 

2019 that alleges additional facts showing that plaintiff’s hand injury limited a major life activity.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2019 ______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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