Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02858/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02858-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAY MAULDIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-02858 CKD

ORDER &

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying an application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social 

Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned will recommend that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be granted and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born in 1963, filed a Title II application on September 9, 2015 for disability and 

disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning February 23, 2009. Administrative 

Transcript (“AT”) 15, 21. Plaintiff alleged he was unable to work due to neck injury, back injury, 

left elbow surgery, hernia surgeries, bilateral carpal tunnel surgery, right shoulder surgeries, old 

finger injury, and old left shoulder surgery. AT 67. In a decision dated September 29, 2017, the 

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ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 15-23. The ALJ made the following 

findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act on December 31, 2014.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity during 

the period from his alleged onset date of February 23, 2009 through 

his date last insured of December 31, 2014.

3. Through the date last insured, had the following severe 

impairments: carpal tunnel syndrome; degenerative disc disease of 

the cervical and lumbar spine; torn right rotator cuff; and torn right 

biceps tendon.

4. Through the claimant does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to 

step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If 

so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 

disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work, except the claimant can 

occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, climb stairs; cannot crawl, climb 

ladders, or reach overhead; must avoid hazards, unprotected heights, 

and dangerous moving machinery; occasionally push and pull; and 

frequently perform handling.

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform 

any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on October 31, 1963 and was 51 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date last 

insured. The claimant subsequently changed age category to closely 

approaching advanced age.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding 

that the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job 

skills. 

10. Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the economy that the claimant could have performed. 

11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

at any time from February 23, 2009, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 

2014, the date last insured. 

AT 15-23.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted plaintiff’s subjective symptoms and limitations; (2) 

the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence; and (3) the ALJ”s residual functional 

capacity (RFC) assessment was not supported by substantial evidence. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

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evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

A. Credibility 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted his testimony about his subjective 

symptoms and limitations.

“Claimant alleges disability due to neck, back, left elbow, bilateral carpal tunnel, and right 

shoulder,” the ALJ’s decision stated. “At the hearing, the claimant testified he is in constant pain 

that affects his ability to drive, use arm, drive, lift, walk, and use hands.” AT 19.

At the April 2017 hearing, plaintiff testified that he had last worked as a heavy machine 

operator for a paving company, operating graders, excavators, and backhoes. AT 38-39; see AT 

54. Prior that, he worked for fourteen years as an equipment operator for another company. AT 

39. Plaintiff testified that he stopped working in 2009 due to a series of surgeries to address 

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medical issues: right and left carpal tunnel syndrome release in May and June 2009; rotator cuff 

repairs of the right shoulder in August 2009 and April 2010; and two more surgeries on the right 

shoulder in June 2012 and April 2014. AT 39; see AT 19-20 (summarizing medical history). 

Plaintiff testified that he could drive up to 60 miles but had to switch hands on the steering wheel 

due to “trouble hanging onto the steering wheel with my right arm” because his hand went numb, 

and tendonitis in his left elbow. AT 44-45. He testified that he had to use both hands to steer and 

operate manual controls. AT 48. Plaintiff testified that he could do yard work for an hour but 

then needed an hour to recover, and that his ability to work with tools was limited due to a lack of 

strength in his hands and arm. AT 47, 49. Plaintiff stated that his right shoulder surgeries had not 

provided relief for his symptoms and that his back was in constant pain. AT 47, 51. He testified 

that the medication Norco gave him general relief from pain in the back, legs, and shoulders, but 

that he had trouble sleeping due to hand numbness and pain in his back, arm, elbow, and/or hand. 

AT 50-51. He testified that he could sometimes walk up to a mile. AT 51. Plaintiff testified that 

he could not “keep his hand up long enough to type” for a desk job and could not reach high 

shelves in his home, though he could use the bottom shelf. AT 48, 54. 

The ALJ wrote that “the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of his . . . symptoms . . . are inconsistent because the claimant’s longitudinal 

medical history is not consistent with his alleged disability.” AT 19 (emphasis added). The ALJ 

then summarized the objective medical evidence during the relevant period from February 2009 

to December 2014, including plaintiff’s complaints of numbness and tingling in the extremities; 

cervical MRIs showing “multilevel degenerative changes”; reports of shoulder pain and a clinical 

assessment of pain and decreased range of motion; carpal tunnel release surgery on both hands 

due to numbness of the hands; multiple surgeries on the right shoulder, resulting in some 

improvement to range of motion; and a 2015 MRI of the right shoulder. AT 19-20. The ALJ 

found that the MRI images were consistent with the shoulder limitation in the RFC. AT 20. 

The ALJ then proceeded to consider the medical opinion evidence, much of which “is 

related to [plaintiff’s] Worker’s Compensation claim, where the physicians focused on whether 

the claimant could return to his past work[.]” AT 20. The ALJ’s decision acknowledged that 

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“since the Worker’s Compensation claims have different rules and guidelines, . . . it is not clear 

whether the physicians also considered whether the claimant could perform any work in either 

national or regional economies.” AT 20. The ALJ noted that two physicians who assessed 

plaintiff for Worker’s Compensation purposes concluded that he was “employable” with certain 

limitations or “employable to light work.” AT 20. The ALJ assigned various weights to the 

medical opinions in the record, but did not relate them back to plaintiff’s testimony or explain 

how the credited opinions undercut plaintiff’s statements about his symptoms. AT 20-21. 

“In sum,” the ALJ concluded, “the above residual functional capacity assessment is 

supported by the entire medical record and inconsistent statements of the claimant through the 

evidence.” AT 21 (emphasis added). 

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication,

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek 

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treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ 

in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional impairment. 

See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, 

on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 

(9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

In Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit held that 

an ALJ’s failure “to identify the testimony she found not credible” and “link that testimony to 

particular parts of the record supporting her non-credibility determination” was legal error. See 

also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ’s failure 

to “specifically identify the testimony” he found not credible was error; boilerplate statement that 

symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC was insufficient); 

Morsea v. Berryhill, 725 Fed. Appx. 463, 465 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) (unpublished) (ALJ “failed 

to identify the testimony from the claimant found not credible and explain what evidence 

undermined his testimony. Although the ALJ summarized claimant’s testimony and also 

summarized the medical evidence in the record, the findings were general in nature, which is 

insufficient for an adverse credibility determination.”), citing Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s subjective statements about his symptoms were 

“inconsistent because the claimant’s longitudinal medical history is not consistent with his 

alleged disability.” AT 19. But “[a]n ALJ’s vague allegation that a claimant’s testimony is not 

consistent with the objective medical evidence, without any specific findings in support of that 

conclusion is insufficient[.]” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). “The ALJ must identify the testimony that was not credible, and specify what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id., citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 

1998) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the ALJ failed to specify which parts of plaintiff’s 

testimony he deemed not credible, or supply clear and convincing reasons for discounting it.

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The Treichler court continued: 

Nor is the error harmless. Because the ALJ set out his RFC and 

summarized the evidence supporting his determination, the 

government argues that we can reasonably infer that the ALJ rejected 

Treichler’s testimony to the extent it conflicted with that medical 

evidence. But we cannot substitute our conclusions for the ALJ’s, or 

speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions. [Citation 

omitted.] Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the 

ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for us to meaningfully 

determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 

substantial evidence. [Citation omitted.] No such reasoning is 

present here. 

775 F.3d at 1103; see also Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (where ALJ “never identified which

testimony she found not credible, and never explained which evidence contradicted that 

testimony,” decision fails to meet ALJ’s responsibility to provide reasons for her adverse 

determination); Powers v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-00077 EPG (E.D. Cal., Order dated June 21, 2016)

(reversing and remanding for reassessment of claimant’s credibility where ALJ failed to specify 

clear and convincing reasons to discount it). 

The undersigned concludes that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.2

CONCLUSION

With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 

benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 

under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the 

“credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when

the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 

 

2 These findings and recommendations do not reach the remaining claims.

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403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide 

benefits.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the 

proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

Here, the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether plaintiff was disabled 

during the relevant period. On remand, the ALJ is free to develop the record as needed, including 

asking a vocational expert hypothetical questions about available jobs based on a revised RFC. 

The court expresses no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately be weighed, and 

any ambiguities or inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not instruct the ALJ 

to credit any particular opinion or testimony. The ALJ may ultimately find plaintiff disabled 

during the entirety of the relevant period; may find plaintiff eligible for some type of closed

period of disability benefits; or may find that plaintiff was never disabled during the relevant 

period, provided that the ALJ’s determination complies with applicable legal standards and is 

supported by the record as a whole. 

Thus, the undersigned recommends that this matter be remanded under sentence four of 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall assign a district judge to this 

action.

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) be granted; 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) be denied;

and

3. This matter be remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings and 

recommendations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 29, 2020

2/mauldin2858.ssi.ckd.cjra

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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