Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02690/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02690-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDALL E. ELLIS,

Petitioner,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden,1

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-02690-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison, has filed a pro 

se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the 

constitutionality of disciplinary proceedings against him. Dkt. 1.

Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero issued an order to show cause on October 27, 2015, 

before this matter was reassigned to the undersigned Judge. Dkt. 5. Magistrate Judge Spero 

specifically directed Respondent to file a response to the petition on or before January 25, 2016, 

and to address whether Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015) required dismissal of this 

action, stating as follows:

This Court’s jurisdiction over a petition for habeas relief from a 

prison disciplinary decision has been called into question by Nettles 

v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015). In his first response to the 

petition, respondent shall address, preferably by way of a motion to 

dismiss, whether (1) Nettles requires dismissal of the instant action, 

and (2) petitioner can or should bring his claims through a civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Id. at 1.

On January 25, 2016, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on the grounds that 

that Petitioner’s claim does not state a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief. Specifically, 

Respondent argues that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy for Petitioner’s claim because he 

has not shown that success in this action will necessarily accelerate his release from prison. Id. at 

 

1 Raymond Madden, the current warden of the prison where Petitioner is incarcerated, has 

been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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3-4. As further explained below, Respondent has also followed Magistrate Judge Spero’s 

instructions relating to addressing Nettles and its relevance to this matter. Id. at 3. Petitioner has 

filed an opposition to the motion, and Respondent has filed a reply. Dkts. 11, 12.

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss the petition.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 24, 1983, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of twenty-six

years to life with the possibility of parole. Dkt. 1-1 at 6. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on June 16, 2015. Dkt. 1. In 2013, 

prison officials at Pelican Bay State Prison, where Petitioner was previously incarcerated, found 

him guilty of a charge of promoting gang activity. Dkt. 1-2 at 2. Petitioner was assessed 30 days 

of credit loss. Id. at 7. 

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated during the disciplinary hearing 

because there was no evidence of his guilt, he was prevented from defending himself, and the 

hearing officer refused to accept his documentary evidence. Dkt. 1 at 5. In addition, Petitioner 

argues that the negative impact of the guilty finding “will have adverse consequences on 

Petitioner’s chances for parole.” Id.

Petitioner seeks reversal of the guilty finding on the disciplinary charge, expungement of 

the disciplinary action, appointment of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing.

2

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the petition must be dismissed as Petitioner’s due process claim 

does not properly invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Dkt. 10 at 3. Respondent asserts that 

Petitioner’s claim does not establish habeas jurisdiction because a successful challenge will not 

 

2

The Court will only consider Petitioner’s requested remedies of reversal of the guilty 

finding on the disciplinary charge and expungement of the disciplinary action. However, as for 

Petitioner’s requests for appointment of counsel and for an evidentiary hearing, the Court, in its 

discretion, finds that neither appointment of counsel nor an evidentiary hearing is warranted in this 

case. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard for appointing 

counsel in habeas cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (standard for determining whether evidentiary 

hearing is required).

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result in Petitioner’s release or otherwise shorten his confinement. Id. In opposition, Petitioner 

argues that habeas jurisdiction is proper because the disciplinary finding could add to the length of 

his confinement. Dkt. 11 at 5-7. Specifically, Petitioner argues such information will be included 

in his central file and may stigmatize him before the parole board and, in essence, affect whether 

he is found suitable for parole at future parole hearings. Id. at 6.

“‘Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a 

petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 

Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement 

or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough, 

547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). “An inmate’s 

challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under [section] 

1983.” Id. 

The Supreme Court has consistently held that any claim by a prisoner attacking the fact or 

duration of his confinement must be brought under the habeas sections of Title 28 of the United 

States Code. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 

641, 648 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). A claim that would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction or continuing confinement must be brought in a 

habeas petition. See id.

Traditionally, challenges to prison conditions have been cognizable only through a section 

1983 complaint, while challenges implicating the fact or duration of confinement must be brought 

through a habeas petition. Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). The two 

remedies are not always mutually exclusive, however. Id. at 1031.

A constitutional claim concerning the application of rules administered by a prison 

administrator that challenges the duration of a sentence is a cognizable claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (determining a 

procedural due process claim concerning loss of time credits resulting from disciplinary 

procedures and findings). In cases where the inmate has suffered a loss of credits, a petitioner 

may raise such a challenge in a federal habeas corpus action because it attacks the very fact or 

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duration of physical imprisonment and the relief sought is a determination of entitlement of 

speedier release. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99, 500 (1973). 

Nevertheless, where a successful challenge to a disciplinary hearing or administrative 

sanction will not necessarily shorten the overall length of confinement, then habeas jurisdiction is 

lacking. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2003). However, there is an absence 

of habeas jurisdiction where the challenge to the hearing results will not necessarily shorten the 

overall sentence. Id. at 859. In Ramirez, expungement of the disciplinary action was not shown to 

be likely to accelerate eligibility for parole; rather, success there would have meant only an 

opportunity to seek parole from a board that could deny parole on any ground already available to 

it. Id. Thus, the suit did not threaten to advance the parole date. Id.

Where one of the considerations for parole is a petitioner’s prison disciplinary history, the 

mere possibility that an inmate may be denied parole at some point in the future due to the 

discipline at issue does not amount to the denial of a liberty interest. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 

472, 484 (1995). A mere possible denial of parole due to a disciplinary conviction was 

insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest where “[n]othing in [the State’s] code requires the 

parole board to deny parole in the face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence, 

even though misconduct is by regulation a relevant consideration.” Id. at 487. “The decision to 

release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations,” and an inmate is generally “afforded 

procedural protection at this parole hearing in order to explain the circumstances behind his 

misconduct record.” Id. The Sandin Court held that “[t]he chance that a finding of misconduct 

will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due 

Process Clause.” Id.

Thus, an inmate must show that a disciplinary conviction will inevitably lengthen the 

duration of the incarceration. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. California law requires the Board of 

Parole Hearings (“Board”) to consider a wide range of factors in assessing whether an individual 

inmate is suitable for parole. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 2402(b)-(d). Indeed, the Board may 

consider factors as wide-ranging as the original crime, an inmate’s criminal and social history, his 

conduct in prison, any psychological evaluations, his efforts at rehabilitation, his remorse and 

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understanding of the crime and its effects of the victims, as well as any parole plans he may have. 

Id. In other words, any parole decision depends on “an amalgam of elements, some of which are 

factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based on their 

experience with the difficult task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.” Greenholtz v. 

Inmates of Nebraska Corr. & Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).

Here, Respondent argues that a successful challenge to the disciplinary finding would not 

affect the fact or length of Petitioner’s incarceration. This Court agrees. Habeas is not the proper 

avenue of relief for Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence. In this 

situation, losing time credits would not push back Petitioner’s release date or the date of his parole 

eligibility. If Petitioner were serving a determinate sentence, his claim would be cognizable in 

habeas because the loss of credits would have pushed back his release date, and success on his 

claim would necessarily shorten his time in custody. Therefore, in the instant matter, success on 

Petitioner’s claim would not “necessarily shorten” his sentence, see Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859, and 

habeas jurisdiction is absent.

In the motion to dismiss, Respondent points out that on January 20, 2016—three months 

after Magistrate Judge Spero issued the October 27, 2015 Order to Show Cause—the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc in Nettles, and ordered that the panel decision not be 

cited as precedent. Dkt. 10 at 3 (citing Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015), 

rehearing en banc granted, 810 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2016)). Thus, Respondent concedes that the 

three-judge panel’s decision in Nettles is not binding on this Court and does not require dismissal 

of the instant petition. Id. However, Respondent argues that the panel’s decision “remains 

persuasive authority and the Supreme Court precedent it relies on compels dismissal of the 

Petition here.” Id. Again, this Court agrees with Respondent.

In Nettles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sought to resolve the ambiguity of when an 

inmate seeking return of good time credits lost in a disciplinary action must pursue a habeas 

corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and when he must file a section 1983 complaint. 788 F.3d 

992. “[R]elief is available to a prisoner under the federal habeas statute only if success on the 

claim would ‘necessarily spell speedier release’ from custody, which Skinner [v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 

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521(2011)] suggested would include termination of custody, acceleration of the future date of 

release from custody, or reduction of the level of custody.” Id. at 1001 (quoting Skinner, 562 U.S. 

at 533-34).

Nettles, who had been sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, sought restoration of 

30 days of lost good time credits and expungement of the rule violation that resulted in the lost 

credits. 788 F.3d at 995-96. The Ninth Circuit opinion concluded that habeas jurisdiction was not 

established because neither restoring the lost credits nor expunging the rule violation would

necessarily result in Nettles being released from prison more quickly. Id. at 1002-04. The Court 

denied habeas jurisdiction because of Nettles’s indeterminate sentence: “Without knowing how 

many years Nettles will serve before the Board finds him suitable for parole or the length of his 

base term, we cannot conclude that the restoration of the lost good-time credits would necessarily 

affect the duration of Nettles’s confinement if and when the Board finds him suitable for parole.” 

Id. at 1004 (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit also rejected the reasoning that expunging 

the disciplinary violation would necessarily reduce Nettles’s term by removing “roadblocks to 

parole.” Id. at 1003. The court reasoned that the effect of expunging the rule violation and 

restoring the lost credits was insufficient to provide habeas jurisdiction:

While the 2008 rules violation report will likely have some effect on 

the Board’s consideration, there is no basis for concluding that the 

expungement of this report from the record will “necessarily spell 

speedier release for Nettles.” See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299 n. 13. 

Nor will it necessarily terminate Nettles’s custody, accelerate the 

future date of his release, or reduce his level of custody. See id. 

The effect of a rules violation on parole suitability is a matter of 

state law and regulation, and, under California law, a rules violation 

is merely one factor the parole board considers to determine whether 

a prisoner “constitutes a current threat to public safety.” Lawrence, 

82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 169, 190 P.3d at 5533; it is not determinative, see

Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 2281(b) (directing the parole board to 

consider “[a]ll relevant, reliable information” in determining 

suitability for parole). Here, the Board considered a range of 

relevant factors bearing on Nettles’s future dangerousness, including 

his inability to learn from prior imprisonments, his lack of insight 

and remorse regarding his crimes, and his argumentative and 

stubborn attitude. Even if successful, Nettles “will not necessarily 

shorten the length of his confinement” because “[t]he parole board 

will still have the authority to deny . . . parole on the basis of any of 

 

3

In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008).

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the grounds presently available to it in evaluating such a request.” 

See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859 (first alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). As Close pointed out, even when a 

challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings “may affect the 

duration of time to be served (by bearing on the award or revocation 

of good-time credits),” where “it is not necessarily so,” a challenge 

to such proceedings “raises no claim on which habeas relief could 

have been granted.” 540 U.S. at 754-55, 124 S. Ct. 1303 (emphasis 

added). Therefore, this claim is not cognizable in habeas.

Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1003-04 (footnote added).

4

 Although, as mentioned above, following the 

Ninth Circuit’s grant of rehearing en banc, Nettles is no longer binding precedent, this Court finds 

that its reasoning is persuasive. Nettles adds further support to the line of cases cited for the 

principle that habeas jurisdiction is not invoked by a mere possibility that a petitioner’s sentence 

will be shortened by the reversal of a disciplinary conviction. 

Here, in fact, Petitioner argues only that there is a possibility that such a challenge may 

affect the length of his incarceration because he anticipates that it will lead to a denial of parole. 

However, as mentioned above, in California, there is no state law requiring that parole be denied 

because of a disciplinary violation. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b)-(c). Misconduct in 

prison is one of many factors that determines parole suitability. Id. The California Code of 

Regulations sets out the factors showing suitability or unsuitability for parole that the parole 

authority is required to consider. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b). These include “[a]ll 

relevant, reliable information available,” such as:

the circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present 

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other 

criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and 

other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and 

after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any 

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special 

 

4 Nettles also considered the case of a prisoner who was attempting to challenge a gang 

validation decision and concluded that challenge could go forward in a habeas action. This was so 

because the Ninth Circuit panel in Nettles was “bound by the determination” of an earlier panel in 

Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir 1989), that “a prisoner can seek expungement of 

an incident from his disciplinary record when that would lead to speedier release from disciplinary 

segregation.” Nettles, 998 F.3d at 1005. Bostic had held that “[h]abeas corpus jurisdiction is also 

available for a prisoner’s claims that he has been subjected to greater restrictions of his liberty, 

such as disciplinary segregation, without due process of law.” Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1269. This 

portion of Nettles is not relevant to Petitioner’s case because he has been released from

disciplinary segregation and it does not appear that he is otherwise subjected to a greater 

restriction of his liberty as a result of the disciplinary decision. See Dkt. 11 at 2 (“Petitioner is 

now in General Population after having been held hostage in the SHU for more than 33 1/2 yrs.”).

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conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the 

community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner’s 

suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not 

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern 

which results in a finding of unsuitability. 

Id.

Though the Board must consider Petitioner’s 2013 disciplinary conviction along with a

myriad of factors, the claim that this disciplinary finding alone could impact the Board’s decision 

is too tenuous to invoke the protections of due process. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. Indeed, there is 

no showing that the disciplinary finding is so pivotal to the parole determination as to justify the 

conclusion that a sufficient nexus exists between it and the ultimate length of imprisonment. As 

such, there is an insufficient showing that reversal of the disciplinary conviction would necessarily 

affect the overall length of a Petitioner’s confinement. Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030-31. In other 

words, even if this Court were to reverse Petitioner’s disciplinary conviction, he might still be

denied parole on the other grounds listed above, and therefore success on his claim would not 

“necessarily shorten” his sentence. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859; see also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 

487. Moreover, at any future parole suitability hearing, Petitioner should be provided an 

opportunity to be heard and, if he is denied parole, a statement of reasons for the denial. See Cal. 

Penal Code § 3041.5(a)(2). If Petitioner receives adequate process at his future parole suitability 

hearings, then any alleged due process claim stemming from such a denial would not be 

cognizable on federal habeas review. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (a 

prisoner subject to California’s parole statute receives adequate process when he is allowed an 

opportunity to be heard and is provided with a statement of the reasons why parole was denied). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s challenge is properly brought under section 1983, rather than in habeas. 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. 

Accordingly, the Court lacks habeas jurisdiction. Therefore, Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED, and the petition is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal is 

without prejudice to bringing his due process claim in a civil rights action.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 

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petition. Dkt. 10. Petitioner’s due process claim is DISMISSED because it is not appropriate for 

federal habeas corpus review. This dismissal is without prejudice to bringing his due process 

claim in a section 1983 action.

The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the 

file. The Clerk shall also send Petitioner a blank civil rights complaint form with his copy of this 

Order.

This Order terminates Docket No. 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

June 28, 2016

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