Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01889/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01889-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL R. CUNNINGHAM,

Booking #18112771,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Dr. TRAN; ARNOLD FAJAYAN;

SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’S DEPT.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01889-WQH-AGS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Michael R. Cunningham (“Plaintiff”), while incarcerated at the San Diego County 

Sheriff Department’s George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, 

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims the Sheriff Department’s “Medical 

Services Division,” a medical supervisor, and a doctor at the Sheriff Department’s Vista 

Detention Facility (“VDF”) violated his Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical 

care in June and July 2018. (Id. at 1-5.)

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Plaintiff did not pay the fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his 

Complaint; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2016)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his San Diego 

County Sheriff’s Department Inmate Trust Account Activity statements from February 

28, 2018 through August 7, 2018. See ECF No. 2 at 6-7; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. 

Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show that while Plaintiff 

had an approximate average monthly deposit of $91.66 to his account, and carried an 

approximate average monthly balance of $32.55 over the past six months, he had only a 

$.14 available balance to his credit at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 6-7.

Based on this accounting, the Court assesses an initial partial filing fee of $18.33 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (b)(1), but notes Plaintiff may have insufficient 

funds with which to pay that initial fee at the time this Order issues. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact the initial filing fee assessed by this Order because his trust account 

statements suggest he may have “no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and 

instead directs the Watch Commander at GBDF, or his designee, to collect the entire

$350 balance of the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and to forward all payments 

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1).

///

///

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II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A 

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must review and sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint, and any 

complaint filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity, or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or 

seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 

purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need 

not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 

2012)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

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applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”). However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro 

se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Finally, the “[c]ourt[] must consider the complaint in its entirety,” including 

“documents incorporated into the complaint by reference” to be part of the pleading when 

determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading for all purposes.”); 

Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

While he was incarcerated at VDF on June 1, 2018, Plaintiff claims he informed 

Dr. Tran that he has psoriasis, a “skin disease.” (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff 

claims Tran advised him to purchase hydrocortisone cream at the canteen or “regular 

moisturizing lotion” if hydrocortisone was not available, but that the “jail no longer

provide[d] cream for [his] ailment.” (Id. at 3.)

///

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Plaintiff also claims to have complained of a persistent headache and soreness in 

his right side, and requested a CT scan due to a reported family history of aneurysms. (Id.

at 4, 13-15, 20.) He then filed no fewer than 31 separate Inmate Requests and

Grievance/Appeals over the next 5-week period, dated June 3, 2018 through July 10, 

2018, complaining of chronic pain and demanding to know why his “head CT scan” had 

been “deferred by Case Management.” (Id. at 4, 10-11, 13-17, 19-39, 42, 44.)

Defendant Arnold Fajayan, a Medical Supervisor, responded to these requests and 

“explained ... that [Plaintiff] would have to get a second opinion,” for which he would be 

“financially obligated” if he wanted further medical treatment because “a CT head scan 

[wa]s not medically indicated,” and his medical record indicated that he “present[ed] with 

[a] normal intact neurological exam based on onsite physician clinical findings” made 

during “6/1, 6/6, 6/13 & 6/28 evaluations.” (Id. at 5, 9, 12, 30.) 

Plaintiff’s attached exhibits, comprised on his various inmate appeals and their 

responses, confirm that while his doctors determined a CT head scan was not required, he 

had an X-ray for an “unrelated stomach issue” in May 2018, and was nevertheless 

examined by nurse practitioners and doctors on June 10, 13, 14, 18, and 28, and again on 

July 5 and 8, 2018 based on his repeated reports of head and side pain. For this he was 

prescribed Tylenol, Motrin/Ibuprofen, and Topomax, and advised to “finish [his] 

medication regimen,” but he claims “nothing was helping.” (Id. at 5, 16, 22, 35-38, 41, 

44.)

Plaintiff concludes that Dr. Tran, the County Sheriff Department’s Medical 

Services Division, and Medical Supervisor Fajayan all acted “deliberately indifferent to 

[his] medical needs,” and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 3-5.) He seeks 

injunctive relief in the form of a “further medical exam ... [to] be conducted at a 

hospital,” asks that “the bill ... be included,” and for $10,000 in damages. (Id. at 7.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

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Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Sheriff’s Department Medical Service Division

First, to the extent Plaintiff names the San Diego Sheriff’s Dept. Medical Services 

Division as a Defendant, he fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be 

granted. Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; 

therefore, a local law enforcement department (like the Sheriff’s Department or its 

Medical Service Division) is not a proper party. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 

F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is 

not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation 

omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 

1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights 

‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”).

“Persons” under § 1983 are state and local officials sued in their individual 

capacities, private individuals and entities which act under color of state law, and/or the 

local governmental entity itself. Vance, 928 F. Supp. at 995-96. The Medical Services 

Division of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department is managed by and/or a department of the 

County of San Diego, but it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See e.g., 

United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[M]unicipal police 

departments and bureaus are generally not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 

section 1983.”); Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 2013 WL 5946112 at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“Although 

municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell [v. Dep’t of 

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Social Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as 

the police departments, are not generally considered “persons” within the meaning of 

§ 1983.”); Nelson v. Cty. of Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 

(dismissing Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from section 1983 action “with prejudice” 

because it “is a subdivision of a local government entity,” i.e., Sacramento County); 

Gonzales v. City of Clovis, 2013 WL 394522 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding that the 

Clovis Police Department is not a “person” for purposes of section 1983); Wade v. 

Fresno Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 2353525 at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (finding the 

Fresno Police Department to not be a “person” under section 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff 

cannot pursue any § 1983 civil rights claims against the Medical Services Division of the 

San Diego Sheriff’s Department. See Boone v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 2:16-

CV-1293-GEB-KJN-PS, 2017 WL 117966, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) (“Because the 

Solano County Sheriff’s Department is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of Section 

1983, plaintiffs cannot maintain their claims against it under that statute as a matter of 

law.”).

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against the County of San Diego 

itself, his allegations are also insufficient. A municipal entity is liable under section 1983 

only if Plaintiff alleges his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant 

to the municipality’s policy or custom. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 

429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival 

Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). The County of San Diego may not be held 

vicariously liable under section 1983 simply based on allegedly unconstitutional acts of 

its employees. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 

436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 

tortfeasor.”); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, the 

municipality may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... 

inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 

U.S. 29, 36 (2010).

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E. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims—Defendants Tran & Fajayan

There is no question that medical officials employed by a municipal jail or state 

prison act “under color of state law” when they provide medical care to prisoners. See 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (“[G]enerally, a public employee acts under 

color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 

responsibilities pursuant to state law.”). 

Therefore, in order to determine whether Plaintiff has pleaded a plausible claim for 

relief against Defendants Tran and Fajayan based on their alleged denials of medical care, 

the Court must review Plaintiff’s Complaint and decide whether it contains sufficient 

“factual content that allows [it] to draw the reasonable inference” that “[the]

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution,” and thus, may be held “liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 678. 

Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two 

elements: (1) the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and (2) the nature of the 

defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to 

health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment 

violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), 

citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104. “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat 

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 

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836 F.3d 1239, 1248 (9th Cir. 2016). “The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor 

or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 

‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citing Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

At the screening stage of these proceedings, the Court will assume that both 

psoriasis, which Plaintiff describes as a “skin disease,” see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3, and 

chronic head pain, when coupled with an alleged family history of aneurysm, id. at 4, 13,

21, are sufficient to show objectively serious medical needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 

1059; Solomon v. Felker, No. 2: 08-CV-2544 KJN P, 2015 WL 1469165, at *12 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 30, 2015) (citing cases distinguishing between “mere dry-skin condition[s]”

which are insufficient to “rise to the level of an objectively serious medical condition,” 

and others, including eczema and involving cracked skin, sores, bleeding, itching, and 

elevated blood pressure, which can “constitute[] a serious medical need such that the 

failure to provide plaintiff with lotion would constitute deliberate indifference.”); 

Ramirez-Garcia v. Ryan, No. CV 12-2678-PHX-RCB, 2013 WL 5890734, at *2 (D. Ariz. 

Nov. 4, 2013) (assuming without discussion that inmate’s “severe headaches,” “repetitive 

vomiting,” and subsequent aneurysm were sufficiently serious medical needs for 

purposes of screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

However, even assuming Plaintiff’s psoriasis, headaches, and side pain were

sufficiently serious conditions, his Complaint nevertheless fails to include any further 

“factual content” to show that either Defendants Tran or Fajayan acted with “deliberate 

indifference” to his needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Hamby v. Hammond, 

821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th 

Cir. 2004)).

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Specifically, while Plaintiff claims Dr. Tran “refused to provide” medicated cream 

for his psoriasis, and Fajayan failed to authorize a head CT scan for his chronic pain, see

ECF No. 1 at 3-5, the multiple Inmate Requests and Grievance/Appeals he offers as 

exhibits in support belie “any reasonable inference” that either of them acted with 

“deliberate indifference” to his needs. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Compl., ECF No. 1 at 

10-11, 13-17, 19-39, 42, 44. Instead, these exhibits show that despite Plaintiff’s belief to 

the contrary, trained medical staff concluded “a CT head scan [wa]s not medically 

indicated,” because he “present[ed] with [a] normal intact neurological exam based on 

onsite physician clinical findings” made during at least seven separate examinations over 

the course of a five-week period, during which he was prescribed at least three different 

types of medication for pain. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5, 9, 12, 30.)

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain 

“sufficient factual matter,” and not just “labels and conclusions,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 

to plausibly show Defendant Tran and Fajayan’s “purposeful act or failure to respond to 

[his] pain or possible medical need,” and the “harm caused by [this] indifference.” 

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Nothing in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint shows either—and “[a] difference of opinion between a physician and the 

prisoner–or between medical professionals–concerning what medical care is appropriate 

does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on 

other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); 

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23. Instead, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “show that 

the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendant[] chose this course in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citation and internal quotations 

omitted); Hamby, 821 F.3d at 1092. He fails to do so.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint, considered together with 

the exhibits he has attached, fails to state a plausible Eighth Amendment inadequate 

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medical care claim against any named Defendant, and that therefore, it is subject to sua 

sponte dismissal in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided him 

with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant Plaintiff an opportunity 

to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s 

income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST 

BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Watch 

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, San Diego, California, 

92158.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 

pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint 

will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

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Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 

and 1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2018

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