Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00119/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00119-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DROPBOX INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-00119-HSG 

Re: Dkt. No. 144

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

EGNYTE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00120-HSG 

Re: Dkt. No. 84

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

Plaintiff Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. (“Synchronoss”) filed related actions against 

Defendants Dropbox, Inc. (“Dropbox”) and Egnyte, Inc. (“Egnyte”), alleging infringement of 

United States Patent Nos. 6,671,757 (“the ’757 Patent”); 6,757,696 (“the ’696 Patent”); and 

7,587,446 (“the ’446 Patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Patents”). See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).1 

The parties propose ten groupings comprising 23 claim terms for construction. See Dkt. No. 154-

2 (“Amended Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement (JCCS)”) at 2–3.

2

 Id. This 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all docket references are to Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. v. 

Dropbox Inc., et al., No. 4:16-cv-00119. 

2 Discrepancies exist between the parties’ briefs and the Amended JCCS in identifying claims 

from the Asserted Patents associated with the terms proposed for construction. Any claim 

references in this order reflect the Amended JCCS. The parties clarified at oral argument that the 

Court need not construe the term “transaction identifier module assigning a universally unique 

identifier to each user of transaction objects in said data store.” See Amended JCCS at 3; Hr’g Tr. 

at 71:4-25, 72:1-5.

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order follows claim construction briefing,3a technology tutorial, a claim construction hearing, and 

one round of supplemental claim construction briefing.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman v. 

Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). “The purpose of claim construction is to 

determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” O2 Micro Int’l 

Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

Generally, claim terms should be “given their ordinary and customary meaning”—i.e., “the 

meaning that the terms would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 

invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quotation 

omitted). There are only two circumstances where a claim is not entitled to its plain and ordinary 

meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when 

the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during 

prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

When construing claim terms, the Federal Circuit emphasizes the importance of intrinsic 

evidence such as the language of the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution 

history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17. The claim language can “provide substantial guidance as 

to the meaning of particular claim terms,” both through the context in which the claim terms are 

used and by considering other claims in the same patent. Id. at 1314. The specification is likewise 

a crucial source of information. Id. at 1315–17. Although it is improper to read limitations from 

the specification into the claims, the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a 

disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim 

construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive.” (quotation omitted)); see also Merck & Co. v. 

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[C]laims must be construed so as 

to be consistent with the specification . . .”).

 

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Egnyte and Dropbox advance virtually identical arguments in their respective responsive briefs.

See Dkt. No. 93, No. 4:16-cv-00120. Egnyte “amended its constructions and evidence in support 

to conform completely to Dropbox’s proposed constructions and evidence.” Amended JCCS at 2. 

The Court therefore refers to Dropbox’s brief on behalf of Defendants. 

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Despite the importance of intrinsic evidence, courts may also consider extrinsic evidence—

technical dictionaries, learned treatises, expert and inventor testimony, and the like—to help 

construe the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–18. For example, dictionaries may reveal what 

the ordinary and customary meaning of a term would have been to a person of ordinary skill in the 

art at the time of the invention. Frans Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr 

Inc., 744 F.3d 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Terms generally carry their ordinary and customary 

meaning in the relevant field at the relevant time, as shown by reliable sources such as 

dictionaries, but they always must be understood in the context of the whole document—in 

particular, the specification (along with the prosecution history, if pertinent).”). Expert testimony 

can also help “to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is 

consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent 

or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. 

Extrinsic evidence is, however, “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally 

operative meaning of claim language.” Id. at 1317 (quotation omitted).

II. AGREED TERMS

The parties agree on the construction of sixteen terms within twelve groups. Amended JCCS, 

Ex. A. In light of the parties’ agreement, the Court adopts the constructions of these terms as set 

forth in the following table.

Asserted Patent Claim Term Agreed Construction

’757 Patent

“sync engine” / “[first /

second] sync engine” / “device

sync engine”

[claims 1, 16, 24]

“software that transmits or receives 

difference information”

’757 Patent

“difference information”

[claim 1]

“information that comprises only the

changes to one system’s data which 

have occurred on that system, and 

instructions for implementing those

changes”

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’757 Patent

“difference transaction” / 

“change transaction”

[claim 1]

“the sending or receipt of difference

information”

’757 Patent

“difference transaction 

generator”

[claims 1, 16, 24]

“software that compares a current state

of the data to a previous state of the data

to generate difference information, and 

then places the difference information 

into a difference transaction”

’757 Patent

“application specific format” 

[claims 14, 28]

“format that is specific to a particular

program or application”

’757 Patent

“universal format”

[claim 14] 

“application independent 

format” [claim 28]

“format that is independent of a specific

program or application”

’696 Patent

“unique transaction identifier”

[claims 9, 16]

“identification value assigned to a

transaction that is unique within the

synchronization system”

’696 Patent

“unique identification”

[claim 6] “identification value that is unique

within the synchronization system”

’696 Patent

“change transactions”

[claims 9, 10]

“the sending or receipt of difference

information”

’446 Patent

“difference information”

[claims 1, 11]

“information that comprises only the

changes to one system’s data which have

occurred on that system, and instructions 

for implementing those changes”

’446 Patent

“device engine”

[claim 11]

“software that transmits or receives 

difference information”

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’446 Patent

“universal data format”

[claim 19]

“format that is independent of a specific

program or application”

III. DISPUTED TERMS

A. “a previous state of said data” / “copy of a previous state of said data” (’757

Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

“a previous version of the data or 

previous information about the data 

before the changes to the data occurred”

“a copy of a previous version of the data that is 

used in a comparison against a copy of the current 

version of the data to generate difference 

information”

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction.

The parties dispute the scope of the terms to be construed. Synchronoss argues that the 

terms “a previous state of said data” and “copy of a previous state of said data” can include “data 

about the data being synchronized.” Dkt. No. 144 (“Op. Br.”) at 7 (citing ’757 Patent, 12:12-14).

4

 

Synchronoss’s construction consequently includes not just previous versions of the data to be 

copied, but also “information about the data being synchronized that would permit the device 

engine to determine if data has been updated and, if so, what data packages to update.” Id. at 8. 

Synchronoss primarily relies on the FusionOne Synchronization Platform Architecture Guide (v1)

to support its construction. See id. at 7; Dkt. No. 143-5 (“the Architecture Guide”). Synchronoss 

characterizes the Architecture Guide as “contemporaneous architecture documentation from the 

original patentee” that sheds light on the specification. See Op. Br. at 7–8. Synchronoss relies on 

the Architecture Guide’s reference to hash values to argue that “a complete copy of the data” is 

not needed for a change comparison. Id. In addition, Synchronoss argues that Defendants’ use of

the term “version” in their construction improperly conflates “version” with “state.” Id. 

Defendants contend that Synchronoss’s construction is overly broad. According to 

Defendants, it is the comparison of two versions of a file that generates the “differences,” and not 

 

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Emphasis added unless otherwise noted.

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other “information about the file.” Dkt. No. 150 (“Resp. Br.”) at 2. To support their construction, 

Defendants rely on (1) the specification; and (2) an alleged contradiction between Synchronoss’s 

current position in this litigation and its statements in a recent inter partes review (“IPR”) 

proceeding. Id. at 2–3. In addition, Defendants argue that the Architecture Guide does not 

address how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim terms. Specifically, 

Defendants stress that the guide (1) was never made publicly available; (2) post-dates the relevant 

priority date by 4 years; and (3) at no point references the ’757 Patent. Id. at 4–6.

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction. That construction finds better support in the 

intrinsic record. The specification suggests that differencing information is generated by 

comparing a prior version of the data against a more current version. See ’757 Patent, 12:18-21 

(“Delta module 9505is a differencing engine which calculates differences in data between the 

output of the application object 910 and the copy of the data which is provided in an application 

object store (AOS) 920.”), 14:38-42 (“The device engine uses the local application object store

920 to keep track of the last synchronized version of each application’s actual data, which is then 

used for the next data comparison by the delta module on the next sync request.”), 12:12-14 

(providing that the “application object store” “stores a snapshot of the previous state of the data 

from the application object 910 in the device engine”). The ’757 Patent does not indicate that

differencing information is generated by using other data, beyond the previous version of that

data. And the specification itself does not state that hash values are either used for comparison, or 

are part of the “previous state of said data.” The specification’s only reference to a “[h]ash” 

provides: “File items typically have the following additional field tags . . . Hash. . .” ’757 Patent, 

44:45-56. Defendants’ construction, moreover, does not improperly conflate “version” and 

“state,” as the specification uses these terms interchangeably. Compare ’757 Patent, 14:38-42

(“The device engine uses the local application object store 920 to keep track of the last 

synchronized version of each application’s actual data, which is then used for the next data 

comparison by the delta module on the next sync request.”), with ’757 Patent, 12:12-14

 

5

“Delta module 950,” “application object 910” and “application object store (AOS) 920” 

correspond with the “Desktop Device Engine Diagram.” See ’757 Patent, Figure 9A. 

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(“Application object store 920. . . stores a snapshot of the previous state of the data from the 

application object 910 in the device engine.”).

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In addition, Synchronoss fails to effectively rebut Defendants’ critiques of the Architecture 

Guide. Synchronoss does not dispute that the Architecture Guide was developed almost four years 

after the ’757 Patent’s priority date. Rather, Synchronoss contends that it can properly rely on the 

Architecture Guide because that document was developed “approximately the same time” as the 

Asserted Patents. Dkt. No. 153 (“Reply”) at 1. But the authority that Synchronoss cites does not 

support that proposition. See Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 

309 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We may look, therefore, to the dictionary definition of the 

claim term ‘mobility’ as of the date the patents issued.”). In addition, Synchronoss does not

expressly address Defendants’ argument that the Architecture Guide does not itself reference the

’757 Patent, and has never been made publicly available. See Resp. Br. at 5–6; Markman, 52 F.3d 

at 986 (“[T]he focus in construing disputed terms in claim language is not the subjective intent of 

the parties . . . Rather the focus is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the 

time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.”). Synchronoss fails to provide

other evidence supporting that the Architecture Guide is in any way linked to the ’757 Patent. 

B. “management server” / “management dedicated network coupled device” / 

“synchronization agent management server” (’757 and ’696 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

“software or hardware component that 

manages a user’s account”

“a centralized server which controls behavior and 

characteristics of the entire network of device 

engines across all users”

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction.

Synchronoss admits that Defendants’ construction is taken “verbatim from the ’757

Patent’s specification.” Op. Br. at 9. Consequently, “Synchronoss does not contend that 

 

6

Synchronoss’s characterization of differencing information in an IPR proceeding casts further 

doubt on its proposed construction here. See Dkt. No. 150-2 (“Oral Arg. Tr.”) 21:15-23 (“[T]he 

copy is of a previous state of the data. . . it would have to retain state A and then later on maybe 

come back and do a comparison with the old version to see what changed. . .”), 22:3-9.

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Defendants’ proposed construction is incorrect, only that it is incomplete and confusing.” Id. 

Specifically, Synchronoss claims that the words “entire” and “all” in Defendants’ construction 

improperly import additional limitations into the specification. Id.; see Hr’g Tr. at 21:6-13. To 

support its construction, Synchronoss relies on (1) functional language from the specification, see

’757 Patent, 17:30 (“a management server that manages users’ accounts”),’696 Patent, 16:50 

(same); and (2) the Architecture Guide and the FusionOne Synchronization Platform Operations 

Guide (“Operations Guide”), see Dkt No. 143-6. Op. Br. at 9. Defendants’ criticisms of the 

Architecture Guide apply to both documents. See Resp. Br. at 7. Even considering the FusionOne 

documents, those documents are not inconsistent with Defendants’ construction. See Op. Br. at 9–

10 (quoting portions of a guide’s description of the management server).

As Synchronoss acknowledges, Defendants’ construction is taken directly from the 

specification’s definition of a “management server.” See ’757 Patent, 32:38-40 (“The 

management server is a centralized server which controls behavior and characteristics of the entire 

network of device engines across all users.”); Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 

F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“When a patentee explicitly defines a claim term in the patent

specification, the patentee’s definition controls.”). In contrast, Synchronoss’s construction 

describes functions that a management server could perform. The words “entire” and “all” are, 

moreover, not inconsistent with the claim language relied upon by Synchronoss. See Hr’g Tr. at 

24:4-12; ’757 Patent, 47:34-37 (indicating that the management server “authorizes access of 

difference information on the data store by the first and second sync engines”). For instance, 

claim 15 of the ’757 Patent expressly provides that the “apparatus of claim 1,” i.e. the system for 

synchronizing data between a first and a second system, could include “a plurality of sync engines 

on a respective plurality of systems, each of said plurality of engines being coupled to receive 

difference information. . .” ’757 Patent, 46:58-59, 47:56-67. More broadly, Synchronoss admits 

that any difference between the parties’ proposed constructions is immaterial to the claim’s 

construction. See Reply at 2 (“[T]he proposed constructions are effectively a difference without a 

distinction.”). 

///

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C. “[first / second] system” / “[first / second] device” / “device[s]” / “network 

coupled device[s]”/ “network coupled apparatus[es]” (’757 Patent, ’696 Patent, 

’446 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

“a collection of elements or components 

organized for a common purpose, and may 

include hardware components of a 

computer system, personal information 

devices, hand-held computers, notebooks, 

or any combination of hardware which may 

include a processor and memory which is 

adapted to receive or provide information 

to another device; or any software 

containing such information residing on a 

single collection of hardware or on 

different collections of hardware”

Plain and ordinary meaning –

“computer or computing device such as a 

personal computer, portable computer, desktop 

computer, server, smart telephone, cellular 

telephone, standard telephone, or personal data 

assistant (PDA)”

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction.

Synchronoss argues that the patentee acted as a lexicographer in defining the disputed 

terms. See Op. Br. at 11. Synchronoss accordingly highlights the ’757 Patent’s definition of 

“device”: 

[A] ‘device’ is defined as a collection of elements or components 

organized for a common purpose, and may include hardware 

components of a computer system, personal information devices, 

hand-held computers, notebooks, or any combination of hardware 

which may include a processor and memory which is adapted to 

receive or provide information to another device; or any software 

containing such information residing on a single collection of 

hardware or on different collections of hardware.

’757 Patent, 5:14-23. Synchronoss emphasizes that the ’696 Patent, 4:28-36, defines device

identically, and that the ’446 Patent, 1:8-11, incorporates the ’757 Patent in its entirety. 

Synchronoss argues that Defendants’ construction is “not incorrect, but incomplete to the extent 

that it limits the definition to hardware devices.” Op. Br. at 11. Defendants do not dispute that the 

Asserted Patents define “device” as set forth by Synchronoss. Resp. Br. at 8–9. Rather, 

Defendants contend that Synchronoss’s construction is flawed because (1) the Asserted Patents do

not define any grouped terms other than “device” (i.e. “system,” “network coupled device,” or

“network coupled apparatus”); (2) the ’757 Patent’s discrete use of each term in this grouping 

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suggests that their meanings are distinct; and (3) stand-alone software cannot be “coupled” to the 

internet, which favors limiting these terms’ application to hardware components or elements. See 

id. 

The Court adopts Synchronoss’s construction, which finds express support in the 

specification. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (holding that a claim is not entitled to its plain and 

ordinary meaning when the patentee acts as his or her own lexicographer); Vitronics Corp. v. 

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). To the extent that the specification does 

not expressly define terms in this grouping apart from “device”, the parties themselves agree that 

the grouped terms “present identical issues. . . [and] may be considered a single term” for 

purposes of claim construction. Standing Order for Patent Cases ¶ 5. Adopting Defendants’ 

construction would, moreover, not resolve this issue: like Plaintiff, Defendants offer one 

construction for every term in this group. Defendants’ third argument concerning stand-alone 

software does not apply here, as the Court understands the ’757 Patent’s use of the term 

“software” to reference software in combination with a hardware component or element. See 

Resp. Br. at 8; Hr’g Tr. at 30:7-9 (“[T]o the extent the [Court] understands that language to be 

software in combination with hardware, we think that’s . . . appropriate as a construction.”). 

D. “user identifier module” / “authentication module identifying a user coupled to 

the synchronization system” / “user authenticator module” / “user login 

authenticator” / “user data flow controller” (’696 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

user identifier module – “hardware or

software that identifies a user”

authentication module identifying a user 

coupled to the synchronization system –

“software that verifies a user’s access to the 

synchronization system”

user authenticator module – “software that 

verifies the authenticity of a user”

The terms are subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) 

Function: 

user identifier module – “Identifying a user”

7

authentication module identifying a user 

coupled to the synchronization system –

“Identifying and authenticating a user coupled 

to the synchronization system”

user authenticator module – “Authenticating 

users”

 

7

See infra n.9.

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user login authenticator – “software that 

authenticates a user’s log-in”

user data flow controller – “software that 

controls the transmission or reception of 

change transactions”

user login authenticator – “Authenticating 

user logins”

user data flow controller – “Controlling the 

flow of user data in the synchronization 

system”

Structure: No corresponding structure is 

disclosed in the specification for each claimed 

function

The Court finds that the terms are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).

The parties’ dispute turns on two inquiries: (1) whether these terms are means-plusfunction terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6); and if so, (2) whether the ’696 Patent identifies 

sufficient structure such that the claim terms survive as definite under section 112. 

To determine whether a claim invokes section 112, the Court must determine if the claim 

limitation is drafted in the means-plus-function format. “The use of the term ‘means’ triggers a 

rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 governs the construction of the claim term.” Robert Bosch, 

LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014). There is a general presumption that 

the limitation does not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) where the claim language does not recite the 

term “means.” Id. This presumption is not strong, and it is rebuttable. Williamson v. Citrix 

Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “The standard is whether the words of the 

claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning 

as the name for structure.” Id. “When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can 

be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails 

to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient 

structure for performing that function.”’ Id. (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 

(Fed. Cir. 2000)).

The parties agree that the word “means” does not appear in the claim language. Instead, 

Defendants argue that “module” is a well-recognized nonce word equivalent to “means.” Resp.

Br. at 15. Defendants identify two functions associated with the grouped terms: identifying users 

and authenticating users. Id. at 14. Defendants contend that the various prefixes associated with 

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the term “module”—e.g. “user identifier,” “authentication,” and “user authenticator”—do not 

impart sufficient structure to take the claim terms outside section 112’s ambit. Id. at 15 (citing 

Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351). Defendants argue that this analysis likewise applies to the non-

“module” terms in this group, i.e. “user login authenticator” and “user data flow controller.” See 

id. at 16, 19–21.8

The Court agrees with Defendants. In Williamson, the Federal Circuit found that section 

112 applied to the claim term “distributed learning control module.” 792 F.3d at 1350. In so 

doing, the Williamson court remarked that “[m]odule is a well-known nonce word that can operate 

as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para.6.” See id. (affirming the district court’s 

finding that “‘module’ is simply a generic description for software or hardware that performs a 

specified function” (quotation omitted)). The Williamson court further opined that “[g]eneric 

terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more 

than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the words 

‘means’ because they typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure. . .” Id. (quotation 

omitted). 

In concluding that section 112 likewise applies here, the Court finds persuasive

Defendants’ expert, Dr. Freedman. Dr. Freedman opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would understand these terms as reciting only authentication and/or identification functions, while 

“providing no structure for the purported ‘module’ that performs the function.” See Resp. Br. 14–

16, 19; Dkt. No. 150-5 (“Freedman Decl.”) ¶¶ 39–44 (“user identifier module”), 49–53

(“authentication module identifying a user coupled to the synchronization system”), 58–62 (“user 

authenticator module”). Dr. Freedman explains that the prefixes associated with Synchronoss’s 

constructions do not cure this structural void. See id. Dr. Freedman provides dozens of discrete 

ways a skilled artisan could understand hardware or software to authenticate and/or identify users, 

 

8

Synchronoss correctly observes that Dropbox separated its arguments regarding the term “user 

data flow controller.” See Reply at 9 n.2. Synchronoss requests that the Court strike Defendants’ 

proposed construction of that term under the Court’s Standing Order for Patent Cases. The Court 

declines to so do, as Defendants’ separate pagination in no way alters the parties’ arguments or 

their constructions.

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including for instance through “captive portal/web authentication” involving user authentication or 

identification, identification via a “MAC” or “Internet Protocol” address, or through passwords or 

passphrases, PIN codes, and/or multi-factor authentication. Id. Dr. Freedman also indicates that

that the terms “user login authenticator” and “user data flow controller” fail to name sufficient 

structure. See id. ¶¶ 68–72, 78–82.

In response, Synchronoss offers no contrary expert testimony. Synchronoss instead relies 

on (1) technical dictionaries to argue that each prefix is well understood in computer science; (2) 

specification language that purportedly favors its interpretation, see, e.g., ’696 Patent, 34:1-2, 

34:3-7; (3) district court cases finding that certain prefixes impart sufficient structure to “module”; 

and (4) Dr. Freedman’s elaboration of “nearly 20 different structures” that can identify or 

authenticate users. See Op. Br. at 13–15. 

Synchronoss’s arguments are unavailing. To begin, those Federal Circuit cases cited by 

Synchronoss largely pre-date Williamson, and therefore do not assume Williamson’s tightening of 

the means-plus-function presumption. See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996); TecSec, Inc. v. IBM, 731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). While the court in 

Williamson partly relied on Greenberg and TecSec, Synchronoss reads these cases so broadly as to 

vitiate Williamson’s subsequent, more stringent holding. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 

(overruling the characterization of the means-plus-function presumption as “strong,” partly 

because the doctrine had “resulted in a proliferation of functional claiming”). Synchronoss’s

repurposing of Dr. Freedman’s testimony likewise fails because it relies on this pre-Williamson

view. See Reply at 5. Indeed, accepting Synchronoss’s argument that a “broad class of 

structures” is sufficient for functional claiming contravenes Williamson’s understanding of 

Congress’s intent in enacting section 112: 

In enacting [section 112] Congress struck a balance in allowing 

patentees to express a claim limitation by reciting a function to be 

performed. . . while placing specific constraints on how such a 

limitation is to be construed, namely, by restricting the scope of 

coverage to only the structure, materials, or acts described in the 

specification as corresponding to the claimed function and 

equivalents thereof.

792 F.3d at 1347; see Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“That 

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various methods might exist to perform a function is precisely why the disclosure of specific 

programming is required.” (quotation omitted)). Synchronoss’s reliance on technical dictionary 

definitions suffers from a similar flaw: nearly all claim terms would fall outside section 112 if 

their component parts could be found in a technical dictionary. To the extent that Synchronoss 

cites cases discussing the structural character of certain prefixes, see Op. Br. at 12–13; Reply at 6,

these cases are non-binding, distinguishable, and again mostly pre-date Williamson. See VPS, 

LLC v. SmugMug, Inc., No. 10 CV 2142, 2012 WL 5471012, at *15–16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012) 

(analyzing the term “user identifier,” which the parties agreed had “sufficient structural meaning

for a person of ordinary skill in the art”); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-03999-

BLF, 2014 WL 5361976, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (deciding between discrete structural 

constructions for “certificate authenticator,” as the parties agreed this was a means-plus-function

term subject to section 112); Blast Motion, Inc. v. Zepp Labs, Inc., No. 15-CV-700 JLS (NLS), 

2017 WL 476428, at *12–18 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (finding that several “module’ terms”

survived under section 112 where the parties agreed that some disputed terms were sufficiently 

structural, and the court found the specification disclosed adequate corresponding structure for 

others).

Once section 112 applies, the Court’s analysis is two-fold. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–

52. First, the Court identifies the claimed function. Id. Synchronoss does not dispute that these 

functions are user identification and authentication. See Reply at 9; Resp. Br. at 17. Next, the 

Court determines what structure, if any, is disclosed in the specification that corresponds to these

functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. Even where structure is corresponding, it must also 

constitute “adequate corresponding structure to achieve the claimed function.” Id. “If the 

patentee fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure, the claim is indefinite.” Id.

Synchronoss argues that the proposed terms are not indefinite under section 112, relying 

principally on (1) written description from the ’696 Patent; and (2) Figures 15–17 of that patent. 

Op. Br. at 14–17; Reply at 9–10. With respect to the former, Synchronoss fails to show how the 

lines of the specification that it quotes imbue structure to “user identifier,” “authentication,” and 

“authenticator.” For instance, ’696 Patent, 34:1-2 reads: “[t]he device name and device class 

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uniquely identify a particular device type that is being synchronized. . .” See Op. Br. at 14. But 

the device name identifies device types—not users. Synchronoss also cites ’696 Patent, 42:6-11:

“An account is the root structure, which identifies information about the user’s account. It may 

have exemplary field tags . . . such as Name, Password, User-Name and Version.” Id. But this 

reference to information identification falls within a discussion of how “[d]ata package objects” 

are organized. ’696 Patent, 41:58-60. Whatever structure these lines of the specification disclose, 

that structure is not structure corresponding to the terms proposed for construction. See 

Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352 (explaining that “structure” must be “corresponding structure,” 

which is satisfied “if the intrinsic evidence clearly links or associates that structure to the function 

recited in the claim”) (quotation omitted)). At best, these portions of the specification show that 

other components of the claimed invention perform the functions of authentication and 

identification. See Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 978, 993–95 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (finding that the specification did not sufficiently describe a structure to perform the 

function of “updating” because the language relied upon by the plaintiff “simply describe[d] the 

claimed function”). Synchronoss’s vague references at oral argument to “C++ source code” 

likewise do not provide corresponding structure to the user authentication/identification functions. 

See Hr’g Tr. at 32:7-25, 33:1-17, 34:5-14.

So too with Figures 15 and 16. Synchronoss contends that “Defendants, by their proposed 

construction for ‘synchronization manager’ and ‘synchronization agent’ concede that Figures 15 

and 16 show an algorithm that is structure.” Reply at 9; see Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, 

Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The usage ‘algorithm’ in computer systems has broad 

meaning, for it encompasses in essence a series of instructions for the computer to follow. . .”

(quotation omitted)). Figure 15 “is a flow diagram illustrating a pull synchronization in 

accordance with the system of the present invention.” ’696 Patent, 4:14-16. Figure 16 is “a flow 

diagram illustrating a push synchronization in accordance with the system of present invention.” 

’696 Patent, 4:17-19. The ’696 Patent itself does not equate the phrases “synchronization,” 

“synchronization manager,” or “synchronization agent” with any of the “module” terms. These

flow diagrams, which correspond to two discrete claim terms, do not show an algorithm, i.e. a 

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step-by-step process, to perform the functions of identifying and authenticating users. See 

Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352–54 (holding that a graphic description of a “presenter display 

interface” was not “an algorithm corresponding to the claimed ‘coordinating’ function”); 

Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(finding that a mathematical equation that “describe[d] an outcome, not a means for achieving that 

outcome” failed to disclose structure); Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 

1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that no algorithm existed for the function of “controlling 

the adjusting means” where the specification merely provid[ed] functional language” and lacked 

“any step-by-step process” for performing that function).

Finally, Synchronoss elides that the “management server” is simply a “general purpose 

computer that can be programmed to perform various functions.” Resp. Br. at 12–13. The Federal 

Circuit “has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than 

simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor,” requiring instead an algorithm to perform 

the claimed function. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352; see Aristocrat Techs., 521 F.3d at 1333 

(“Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very 

different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular 

function does not limit the scope of the claim to the corresponding structure, material, or acts that 

perform the function. . .”). Dr. Freedman’s declaration sheds a final light on this issue; he notes an 

absence of “any algorithmic structure” for these terms. Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 45, 54, 64, 74, 83. 

Synchronoss relies on Figure 17 of the ’696 Patent as providing the requisite structure for

“user identifier module” and the “user data flow controller.” Op. Br. at 14; Reply at 9–10. Figure 

17 “is a diagram of the management server architecture in accordance with the present invention.” 

’696 Patent, 4:20-21. Synchronoss cites as structure that figure’s textual reference to an “add user 

module 1712,” a “user log-in from the welcome screen at 1710,” and “the module for ‘confirm 

account 1724.’” Op. Br. at 14–15; Reply at 9. But Synchronoss fails to explain, and Figure 17 

does not show, how or by what process the claimed system (1) adds a user, (2) logs-in a user, or 

(3) confirms an account. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352. While Synchronoss contends that the 

’696 Patent provides pseudo-code for performing the data flow implicit in the “user data flow 

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controller,” that code describes “pull synchronization” broadly. See Reply at 10 (citing ’696 

Patent, 34:49-35:66); ’696 Patent, 34:44-45. This is not corresponding structure. Thus, the Court 

concludes that the grouped terms are indefinite under section 112.9

E. “synchronization manager communicating with at least one interactive agent to 

control data migration between a first network coupled device and a second 

network device” / “synchronization agent” (’696 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

synchronization manager 

communicating with at least one 

interactive agent to control data

migration between a first network 

coupled device and a second network 

device – “software or hardware 

component that manages a user’s 

account and controls data migration 

among network coupled devices in 

communication with at least one 

software that transmits or receives 

change transactions to control data 

migration between a first network 

coupled device and a second network 

coupled device”

synchronization agent – “software that 

generates or incorporates the change 

transactions”

The terms are subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) 

Function:

synchronization manager communicating with 

at least one interactive agent to control data 

migration between a first network coupled 

device and a second network device –

“Controlling data migration between a first 

network coupled device and a second network 

coupled device.”

synchronization agent – “Controlling the flow of 

user data in the synchronization system”

Structure: “A hardware or software component 

configured to perform the algorithm set forth in 

Figures 15 and 16 of the ’696 Patent and the 

corresponding text.”

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction.

The parties’ dispute whether the grouped terms are means-plus-function terms subject to 

section 112. Synchronoss turns first to “synchronization manager communicating . . .”, and

requests that it be construed to incorporate its proposed construction of “management server.” See 

Op. Br. at 8, 18 (construing “management server” as “software or hardware component that 

manages a user’s account”). For support, Synchronoss relies on (1) claim language from the ’757 

and ’696 Patents suggesting that both the “synchronization manager” and “a management server” 

 

9 At oral argument, Synchronoss disputed Defendants’ pluralization of the term “user.” Hr’g Tr. at 

38:20-39:10. Defendants’ use of “user” does not impact the Court’s reasoning or its conclusion. 

See id. Even still, Defendants modified their construction at the hearing to “identifying a user.” 

Hr’g Tr. at 41:16-20. This order thus reflects that modification.

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communicate with agents and/or devices; and (2) the Architecture Guide, which refers to both 

“server managers” and the “Management Server.” See id. at 18.

The Court finds that Synchronoss’s construction lacks support in the intrinsic record. The 

’696 Patent does not expressly equate “management server” with the term as articulated here:

“synchronization manager communicating with at least one interactive agent to control data 

migration between a first network coupled device and a second network device.” See Hemslderfer 

v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]ifferent claim terms 

are presumed to have different meanings.”). To be sure, the abstract of the ’696 Patent states that 

“[t]he management server communicates with at least one interactive agent to control data 

migration between a computer to a network storage device.” But Synchronoss fails to explain 

how a person skilled in the art would derive from that written description sufficient structure for

the term “synchronization manager communicating. . .” The claim term merely describes a 

function the synchronization manager could perform, which is insufficient to show structure under 

section 112. See, e.g., Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–52; Ergo Licensing, LLC, 673 F.3d at 1365.

For the reasons discussed above, the Architecture Guide does not shed light on the claim terms as 

used in the ’696 Patent. 

The Court likewise finds persuasive Dr. Freedman’s testimony on this term. As Dr. 

Freedman opines, the word “synchronization” does not impart sufficient specific structure to the 

words “manager” or “agent,” which a person of ordinary skill would understand to be “generic 

descriptors for software or hardware that perform a specified function, or manage something, 

respectively.” Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 103–104. There are, moreover, “many ways in which a system 

could control data migration between devices,” including though a single computer process 

involving “logic to dispatch data between code modules within the same program,” or by using “a 

locking mechanism to prevent multiple users from accessing and modifying the same data at the 

same time.” See id. ¶ 106 (providing additional examples). Defendants, relying on Dr. 

Freedman’s testimony, argue that the term itself discloses the function of “controlling data 

migration between a first network coupled device and a second network coupled device.” Id. ¶ 

108; see Resp. Br. at 25. Synchronoss does not dispute that claimed function. See Reply at 10–

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11. The Court agrees, and therefore adopts Defendants’ construction. 

With respect to the term “synchronization agent,” Synchronoss argues that the term 

“agent” is understood by skilled artisans to mean “the managed nodes in a network.” Op. Br. at 

19. Synchronoss accordingly asserts that “these nodes are the device engines that transmit or 

receive the change logs / difference information from the devices.” Id. at 19–20 (citing ’696 

Patent, 13:28-38, 13:40-43). Synchronoss therefore contends that the Court should construe this 

term analogously to “sync engine.” Id. The parties have agreed to construe “sync engine” as 

“software that transmits or receives difference information.” See Amended JCCS, Ex. A.

The Court rejects Synchronoss’s construction of “synchronization agent.” Synchronoss 

again sidesteps the question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand 

“synchronization agent” as a name for structure—and in particular, structure corresponding to the 

parties’ agreed construction of “sync engine.” See Hemslderfer, 527 F.3d at 1382. Synchronoss 

fails to explain how the agent “generates or incorporates” change transactions, which Dr. 

Freedman opines can be completed in many ways. Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 112–114. As far as 

function, Plaintiff’s construction of “synchronization manger controlling. . .” is inclusive of the 

synchronization agent’s role of transmitting or receiving change transactions. Plaintiff 

acknowledges, moreover, that these disclosed functions are the same functions that device engines

perform. See Op. Br. 19 (“These nodes are the device engines that transmit or receive the change 

logs / difference information from the devices.”). Defendants’ identification of function is not 

inconsistent with that understanding. See Freedman Decl. ¶ 117. Finally, the Court finds it 

appropriate to adopt Defendants’ proposed structure, which is supported by the language of the 

specification.

F. “versioning modules” / “versioning information” (’696 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

versioning modules – “software that applies 

versioning information to objects in a 

change transaction”

versioning modules –

The term is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)

Function: “Applying a version number per 

object in the data package”

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versioning information – “information 

about modifications to data” Structure: “A hardware or software 

component configured to identify a DataPack 

file using specific rules based on the file name. 

The file name is of the form ‘UUID.VER’ 

where UUID is the identifier for the specific 

object and VER is the transaction version

number. The version number is of the form 

‘D0001’ with additional digits used for large 

version numbers. The ‘D000’ value may be 

reserved for the base version for the object.” 

versioning information – “A unique version 

number applied per object in the data package 

using specific rules based on the file name. 

The file name is of the form ‘UUID.VER’ 

where UUID is the identifier for the specific 

object and VER is the transaction version 

number. The version number is of the form 

‘D0001’ with additional digits used for large 

version numbers. The ‘D000’ value may be 

reserved for the base version for the object.”

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction.

The dispute here parallels other “module” terms. Synchronoss relies for its construction 

on: (1) technical dictionary definitions of the words “version” and “information,” arguing that 

these terms are “well understood in the art”; (2) specification language that it identifies as 

providing structure to “versioning module”; (3) district court cases finding that “communications 

module” and “data storage” module are structural terms; and (4) Dr. Freedman’s statement that

versioning can be accomplished through “approximately 17 structural ways.” See Op. Br. at 21–

23. Synchronoss also argues that Defendants improperly attempt “to import an embodiment 

disclosed in the specification into the construction” by assigning a version number in a particular 

format, “U0001.” Op. Br. at 22. 

The Court is not persuaded. To begin, that a technical dictionary defines one word in the 

claim term is not dispositive of structure under Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. The 

specification also fails to show that “versioning” is a name for structure corresponding to 

“versioning module.” Rather, the written description articulates the function identified by 

Defendants: “versioning module. . . applies a version number per object in the data package.” See 

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’696 Patent, 12:10-12 (“Device engine 860 includes a versioning module which applies a version 

number per object in the data package.”), 13:3-27 (discussing how the versioning module allows 

“multiple users accessing the same machine to each synchronize their own data set using the same 

device engine”). Synchronoss does not explain how one of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand the specification’s “exemplary pseudo-code” as corresponding structure. Op. Br. at 22 

(citing ’696 Patent, 40:55-63). Rather, the pseudo-code illustrates how the “data package 

transaction format may take a number of forms.” ’696 Patent, 40:55-56. That is consistent with 

Defendants’ identification of function.

Furthermore, Dr. Freedman’s testimony supports that the “version[ing]” prefix is not a 

name for structure, but rather describes a function. He explains that there are various structural 

choices available when applying “versioning” information, including by (1) generating and 

assigning version numbers sequentially or at random; (2) assigning uniqueness globally or limiting 

it to the scope of a “user, object, file, or directory”; (3) assigning versioning information in a 

“linear fashion,” or having it “track the same tree structure of the shared data”; or (4) formatting 

differently the version values by assigning numbers, “strings, hexadecimal values, or some other 

data types, including arrays of multiple values (e.g. ‘version vectors’).” Freedman Decl. ¶ 98. In 

rebutting Dr. Freedman’s testimony, Synchronoss again relies on inapposite, pre-Williamson case 

law. See Op. Br. at 22–23; supra Part III.D. The Court therefore adopts Defendants’ functional 

construction.

Having identified function, the Court looks to whether there is adequate corresponding 

structure. Defendants admit that a person of ordinary skill would associate some structure from 

the specification as corresponding with the function of applying a version number. See Freedman 

Decl. ¶ 101. Dr. Freedman explains that Defendants’ structural construction “corresponds to the 

claimed function of applying version numbers, because it describes the format of the version 

numbers that are assigned to each object.” Id. The Court finds that the specification supports 

Defendants’ identification of structure. See ’696 Patent, 38:48-54 (describing how “[a] DataPack 

file is identified using specific rules based on the file name”). 

Contrary to Synchronoss’s claim, Defendants’ construction of “versioning information”

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does not improperly limit that term to one disclosed embodiment. The specification itself does not 

show that Defendants’ construction incorporates an embodiment of the claimed invention. Rather, 

the specification situates versioning information within a broader structural explanation of the 

DataPack. See ’696 Patent, 37:62-65, 38:3-7 (“The general architecture of the package provides 

for transactions, application data, file data, files, objects and identifiers to be carried in the data 

package.”). As Defendants explained at oral argument, versioning information logically 

comprises an output of the versioning module. Hr’g Tr. at 65:17-66:10. To that end, Defendants 

also accounted for how their constructions comport with the exemplary pseudo-code relied on by 

Plaintiff. See id. at 65:5-10, 67:8-68:4; Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 

1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Even when guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format, 

the specification may define claim terms ‘by implication’ such that the meaning may be found in 

or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” (quotation omitted)). Thus, the Court also 

adopts Defendants’ construction of the term “versioning information.”

G. “transaction identifier module” (’696 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

“software for identifying a transaction”

The term is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) 

Function: “Identifying transactions in the

synchronization system”

Structure: None identified in the

specification

The Court finds that the term is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).

The parties’ arguments track those concerning other terms Defendants argue to be meansplus-function terms. Synchronoss relies on (1) the district court cases discussed in Part III.D; (2) 

technical dictionary definitions of “transaction,” “transaction_ID,” “identifier,” and “module,” 

arguing that these terms are well understood in the art; (3) written descriptions from the 

specification; and (4) Dr. Freedman’s statement that a transaction could be identified through 

“approximately 15 different structures.” See Op. Br. at 23–25.

The Court concludes that section 112 applies. Definitions of “transaction,” “identifier,” 

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and “module” do not shed light on how a person of ordinary skill might understand the phrase 

“transaction identifier module.” See Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 86–88; Aguayo v. Universal Instruments 

Corp., No. CIV.A. H-02-1747, 2003 WL 25787593, at *14 (S.D. Tex. June 9, 2003) (holding that 

section 112 applied where technical dictionaries did not define the entirety of the claim term

“component identifier,” that phrase was worded in “functional terms,” and the plaintiff’s expert 

declared he was “unaware of any structures” bearing the name “component identifier”).

Synchronoss, moreover, fails to explain how the cited descriptions in the specification impart 

corresponding structure to this term. See ’696 Patent, 45:49-56 (“[A] management server 

communicating with said network coupled devices and the storage server, including a transaction 

identifier and a user authenticator.”), 38:48-54 (describing how a “DataPack file is identified using 

specific rules based on the file name”), 37:62-63 (“A DataPack essentially contains a sequence of 

transactions describing the changes to information.”), 38:3-9 (indicating that the “general 

architecture of the DataPack” provides for “transactions”). These snippets of the specification 

show, at best, corresponding structure for the DataPack. The specification does not establish the 

requisite link between any structure inherent to the DataPack and the “transaction identifier 

module.” See, e.g., Williamson, 792 F.3d 1350–52. 

Dr. Freedman similarly opines that “the very function of identifying transactions is not 

standardized in the field of computer technology. Thus, a person of ordinary skill would not be 

able to discern any structure from the mere reference to a ‘transaction identifier module’. . .” 

Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 88–91. Dr. Freedman then lists over a dozen different ways of identifying a 

transaction. Id. For the reasons discussed in Part III.D, the Court finds unconvincing 

Synchronoss’s repurposing of Dr. Freedman’s declaration. See Op. Br. at 24–25. Plaintiff’s 

construction, moreover, coheres with Defendants’ understanding that the “transaction identifier 

module” identifies transactions. See Freedman Decl. ¶ 91. As for structure, Synchronoss does not 

identify any algorithm corresponding to this module. Dr. Freedman notes the absence of 

algorithmic structure: 

Nowhere in the specification is there any algorithmic structure for 

implementing the function of identifying transactions—no formula, 

prose, flow chart or pseudocode. Nor is there any other structural 

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guidance. The specification does discuss transactions in the context 

of data package files, see ’696 patent at 37:62-38:46, but it does not 

explain how those transactions are assigned identifiers or how they 

are identified within the synchronization system.

Id. ¶ 92. The Court agrees, and finds the term indefinite for lack of structure. 

H. “universally unique identifier” (’696 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

“A unique 128 bit value which may be 

assigned by the system provider”

“128-bit value consisting of 16 octets that 

guarantees uniqueness across space and time 

and is standardized by the Open Software 

Foundation”

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction.

Synchronoss argues that the patentee has acted as a lexicographer to define the term

“universally unique identifier.” Op. Br. at 25. Synchronoss cites the ’696 Patent specification at

38:34-35, which provides: “Each UUID has a unique 128 bit value which may be assigned by the 

system provider.” The cited text mirrors Synchronoss’s proposed construction. Synchronoss 

contends that Defendants attempt to improperly import limitations into the claim language. Op. 

Br. at 26. For instance, Synchronoss offers an example of a non-Open Software Foundation 

UUID, an ITU-T generated UUID. Id. 

Defendants do not dispute that Synchronoss’s construction describes a universally unique 

identifier, but instead contend that Synchronoss’s construction is not sufficiently specific. Resp.

Br. at 26–27. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s construction elides well-known and defining 

features of a UUID that their construction captures—for instance, a guarantee of universal 

uniqueness. Id.; see Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 29–37. Defendants also rely on language from the 

specification that refers to a “128-bit UUID as defined by standard” or a “UUID standard.” See 

Resp. Br. 26 (citing ’696 Patent, 41:7-9, 43:41-42). Finally, Defendants argue that Synchronoss’s 

citation to non-Open Software Foundation UUIDs is misplaced because the UUID standard 

“contemplates alternative methods of generating a UUID.” Id. at 27–28. 

The Court adopts Synchronoss’s construction, which finds express support in the 

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specification. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. In contrast, Defendants’ construction would require the 

Court to import extrinsic limitations into the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.

While hypothetical, Defendants indicate that there may some circumstance where a UUID is not 

universally unique. Resp. Br. at 27. Synchronoss’s construction also does not write-out UUID’s

uniqueness. That construction states, for instance, that a 128-bit value must be “unique.” 

I. “digital media file” (’446 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

plain and ordinary meaning– “a file 

comprising digital media content”

plain and ordinary meaning – “digital audio 

or video content in the form of an individual 

file such as an MPEG, MP3, RealAudio, or 

Liquid Audio file”

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction modified as follows: “digital audio or 

video content in the form of a file such as an MPEG, MP3, RealAudio, or Liquid Audio file.”

This dispute concerns the plain and ordinary meaning of “digital media file.” Synchronoss 

argues that a proper construction of “digital media file” includes text files and digital images in 

addition to audio and video content. Op. Br. at 26–27. In addition, Synchronoss takes issue with

Defendants’ insertion of “individual” in front of “file,” contending that this contradicts the 

specification and the patentee’s intent. Id. In response, Defendants distinguish the phrase “digital 

media content” from “digital media file.” Resp. Br. at 28. Defendants argue that the word 

“individual” connotes “a discrete complete media file” as opposed to “any file that happens to 

contain some media data.” Id. at 28 n.1. Both sides cite the specification as supporting their 

interpretation.

The Court ordered supplemental submissions on this issue following oral argument, as the 

parties initially failed to address how a person skilled in the art would interpret the term “digital 

media file.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Hr’g Tr. at 84:3-6, 90:9-23. The parties 

subsequently filed supplemental declarations. See Dkt. No. 166 (“Alpaugh Decl.”); Dkt. No. 167 

(“Freedman Suppl. Decl.”); see also No. 16-cv-00120, Dkt. No. 100 at 1 (stating that “Egnyte 

takes the position set forth by Dropbox”). Synchronoss’s expert, Mr. Christopher Alpaugh, speaks 

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primarily to the phrase “digital media,” emphasizing its considerable breadth. See Alpaugh Decl. 

¶¶ 18–33. Mr. Alpaugh relies on technical dictionaries, journal articles, and other patents that 

discretely define the words “digital,” “media,” and sometimes “digital media.” See id. These 

terms, however, are distinct from the composite term to be construed: “digital media file.” Partly 

as a result, Plaintiff elides the key inquiry: whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand the term “digital media file” to include files primarily comprising text, e.g. word 

processing documents, or whether that term refers instead to audio and video files that tangentially

contain text, e.g. the name of a song or title of a video. See Hr’g Tr. at 81:2-9. 

Dr. Freedman’s declaration, in contrast, directly responds to this inquiry. See Freedman 

Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4. Dr. Freedman explains how “Synchronoss’s proposed construction would 

encompass any type of file that happens to contain some digital media content,” contravening the 

ordinary meaning of “digital media file” to a person skilled in the art. Id. ¶¶ 4–5 (“But a person of 

ordinary skill would not consider a Microsoft Word document or PowerPoint presentation that 

happens to contain an embedded video to be a digital media file.”). Dr. Freedman continues that a 

person of ordinary skill would understand a “digital media file” to contain “primarily digital 

media, which is an encoded representation of analog audio and/or video input.” Id. ¶ 5. 

The Court finds that the specification supports Defendants’ position. Not only does the 

’446 Patent refer to digital media content as audio and video, but it also distinguishes between 

“digital music files” and other kinds of “data files” such as “documents.” See ’446 Patent, 1:43-44 

(“[D]igital media content can comprise a series of files such as MPEG, MP3, RealAudio, and the 

like. . .”), 3:21-26 (“Digital media comes in many forms. Two of the most common are Moving 

Picture Experts Group (MPEG 1, Audio 25 Level3 or ‘MP3’) encoded format and Liquid Audio 

format.”), 9:8-13 (“One example of media information which may be provided into personal 

information space is to utilize the aforementioned system on a public information server which 

allows transference of data files, such as executables, documents, or digital music files 

(MP3’s)”).

10

 

10 There is no dispute that the listed types of files are illustrative examples, and that other types of 

digital media files are not categorically excluded. See Hr’g Tr. at 83:1-21, 88:9-25, 89:5-90:8. At 

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And yet, Dr. Freedman does not defend Dropbox’s placement of the word “individual” in 

front of “digital media file.” Defendants do not offer any other evidence to show that a person of 

ordinary skill in the art would understand a “digital media file” to necessarily be an “individual” 

file, as opposed to a part or portion of a file. The Court nevertheless finds that it can omit the 

word “individual” from Defendants’ construction without altering the substantive meaning of the 

phrase “digital media file.” See Alpaugh Decl. ¶ 16 (noting that “the formatting of the file is a 

separate issue from the term digital media file”); Resp. Br. at 28 n.2 (clarifying that the term 

“individual” “simply emphasizes that a ‘digital media file’ is a discrete, complete media file like 

an MP3 or JPEG, not any file that happens to contain some media data”). Removing the word 

“individual” resolves Synchronoss’s objection to Defendants’ use of that term. 

J. “web browser” (’446 Patent)

Synchronoss’s Construction Defendants’ Construction

“a software application that allows a user 

access to an information store on the World 

Wide Web”

“software application, such as Microsoft 

Internet Explorer, for viewing and interacting 

with web pages on the World Wide Web”

The Court adopts Defendants’ construction modified as follows: “software 

application for viewing and interacting with web pages on the World Wide Web.”

The dispute here turns on two issues: (1) Synchronoss’s use of the words “information 

store”; and (2) Defendants’ inclusion of the exemplar “Microsoft Internet Explorer.” In support of 

its construction, Synchronoss cites to the specification’s express reference to an “information 

store.” See Op. Br. at 28–29; ’446 Patent, 7:52-54 (“In FIG. 3, a user 550 interacts with, for 

example, a browser application 100, such as a World Wide Web browser, which allows the user 

access to an information store.”). Synchronoss also takes issue with the phrase “Microsoft 

Internet Explorer,” arguing that this exemplar (1) will confuse the jury; and (2) contradicts Figure 

2 of the ’446 Patent. See id. Synchronoss claims that this figure distinguishes between a “web 

browser” and an Internet Explorer application. See id. 

 

trial, the Court will ensure that the jury is instructed accordingly. See id.

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In response, Defendants stress that Synchronoss took the opposite position in prior 

litigation. See Resp. Br. at 29 (citing Synchronoss Tech., Inc. v. NewBay Software, Inc.

(“NewBay”), No. 11-cv-04947-FLW, Dkt. No. 48-2 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2012)). Defendants argue 

that Synchronoss now tactically seeks to expand the term’s meaning to encompass Dropbox’s

“proprietary mobile application.” Id. Defendants contend that their construction of web browser 

reflects that term’s well-understood meaning in the relevant art. Id. at 30; see Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 

123–128. Defendants accordingly claim that Synchronoss’s construction omits the “core 

distinguishing feature” of “web browser,” i.e. “that it is a program to ‘browse’ the ‘web.’” Resp. 

Br. at 30.

The Court agrees with Defendants. The Court notes that Synchronoss adopted Defendants’ 

proposed construction almost verbatim in NewBay. See Dkt. No. 150-6 at 1 (proposing that the

claim term “web browser” be construed as “a software application, such as Internet Explorer, for 

viewing and interacting with the World Wide Web”). In NewBay, Synchronoss cited as 

supportive evidence specification language from the ’446 Patent at 2:12-20, 6:9-21, 7:52-56, and 

Figs. 1, 3. While Synchronoss claims that it disputed the defendant’s proposed construction in 

NewBay, which parallels Defendants’ construction here, Synchronoss’s prior position still casts 

doubt on its distinct construction of “web browser” in this action. See Reply at 14. The Court also 

finds that the specification is not inconsistent with Defendants’ construction, including the use of 

the phrase “interacting with web pages.” See Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 123, 126. 

As to the “Microsoft Internet Explorer” exemplar, however, Defendants offer little 

justification apart from references to Synchronoss’s prior litigation position. See Resp. Br. at 30. 

The Court concludes that it can omit “Microsoft Internet Explorer” without altering the meaning 

of “web browser” as proposed by Defendants. 

///

///

///

///

///

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court CONSTRUES the disputed terms as follows:

Grouping and Patent(s) Construction

“a previous state of said data”

“copy of a previous state of said 

data” 

(’757 Patent)

“a copy of a previous version of the data that is used in a comparison 

against a copy of the current version of the data to generate 

difference information”

“management server”

“management dedicated network 

coupled device”

“synchronization agent

management server”

(’757 Patent and ’696 Patent)

“a centralized server which controls behavior and characteristics of 

the entire network of device engines across all users”

“[first / second] system”

“[first / second] device”

“device[s]”

“network coupled device[s]”

“network coupled apparatus[es]”

(’757 Patent, ’696 Patent, and ’446 

Patent)

“a collection of elements or components organized for a common 

purpose, and may include hardware components of a computer 

system, personal information devices, hand-held computers, 

notebooks, or any combination of hardware which may include a 

processor and memory which is adapted to receive or provide 

information to another device; or any software containing such 

information residing on a single collection of hardware or on 

different collections of hardware”

“user identifier module”

“authentication module

identifying a user coupled to the 

synchronization system”

“user authenticator module”

“user login authenticator”

“user data flow controller”

(’696 Patent)

Terms indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)

“synchronization manager

communicating with at least one

interactive agent to control data

migration between a first network 

coupled device and a second 

network device”

“synchronization agent”

(’696 Patent)

Function:

synchronization manager communicating with at least one 

interactive agent to control data migration between a first network

coupled device and a second network device – “Controlling data 

migration between a first network coupled device and a second 

network coupled device”

Synchronization agent – “Controlling the flow of user data in the 

synchronization system”

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Structure:

“A hardware or software component configured to perform the 

algorithm set forth in Figures 15 and 16 of the ’696 Patent and the 

corresponding text.”

“versioning modules”

“versioning information”

(’696 Patent)

versioning modules 

 Function: “Applying a version number per object in the 

data package”

 Structure: “A hardware or software component configured 

to identify a DataPack file using specific rules based on the 

file name. The file name is of the form ‘UUID.VER’ where 

UUID is the identifier for the specific object and VER is the

transaction version number. The version number is of the 

form ‘D0001’ with additional digits used for large version 

numbers. The ‘D000’ value may be reserved for the base 

version for the object.” 

versioning information – “A unique version number applied per 

object in the data package using specific rules based on the file 

name. The file name is of the form ‘UUID.VER’ where UUID is the 

identifier for the specific object and VER is the transaction version 

number. The version number is of the form ‘D0001’ with additional 

digits used for large version numbers. The ‘D000’ value may be 

reserved for the base version for the object.”

“transaction identifier module”

(’696 Patent)

Term indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)

“universally unique identifier”

(’696 Patent)

“A unique 128 bit value which may be assigned by the system 

provider”

“digital media file”

(’446 Patent)

plain and ordinary meaning – “digital audio or video content in 

the form of a file such as an MPEG, MP3, RealAudio, or Liquid 

Audio file”

“web browser”

(’446 Patent)

“software application for viewing and interacting with web pages on 

the World Wide Web”

In addition, the Court SETS a further case management conference (“CMC”) for Tuesday, 

January 9, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. The Court DIRECTS the parties to consult the scheduling order 

currently in effect for upcoming deadlines that are triggered by this claim construction order. See 

Dkt. No. 133. The Court also DIRECTS the parties to meet and confer before the CMC to 

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discuss a proposed case schedule through trial, and to submit a joint CMC statement by Tuesday, 

January 2, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

12/7/2017

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