Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00538/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00538-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD PHILLIPS, in his capacity as the 

administrator of the ESTATE OF TROY 

PHILLIPS,; TIFFANY PHILLIPS,

 Plaintiffs,

 

 vs.

COUNTY OF FRESNO; MARGARET 

MIMS; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER L. 

HER # 9899; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 

CASTRO; JOHN DOE AND RICHARD 

ROE, individually and in their official 

capacities as correctional and classification 

officers of the Fresno County Sheriff’s 

Department; EDWARD MORENO, M.D.; 

GEORGE LAIRD; PRATAP NARAYAN; 

NANCY POE and CARL COE, individually 

and in their official capacities as health care 

workers in the Fresno County jail system; 

and DOES 1-50,

 

 

 Defendants. 

1:13-cv-0538 AWI BAM

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS PORTIONS OF 

PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Doc. # 41

This is an action for damages by plaintiffs Tiffany Phillips and Richard Phillips in his 

capacity as administrator of the Estate of Troy Phillips (“Plaintiffs”) against defendants County 

of Fresno (“County”), various officials and officers of the Fresno County Sheriff‟s Department 

and various healthcare workers employed by the Fresno County (collectively, “Defendants”). 

This action arises out of the death of Troy Phillips (“Decedent”) as a result of injuries he 

sustained at the hands of a cell-mate while in the custody of the Fresno County Sheriff‟s 

Department as a pre-trial detainee. Currently before the court is Defendants‟ motion to dismiss 

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portions of Plaintiffs‟ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY – ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ PRIOR MOTION

The original complaint in this action was filed on April 15, 2013. On December 3, 2013, 

the court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part 

Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ complaint (“hereinafter, the “December 3 Order”). 

Doc. # 34. Plaintiffs‟ original complaint alleged ten claims for relief. With respect to those 

claims, the court‟s December 3 Order:

1. Deemed the first claim for relief to allege violation of rights of decedent Troy Phillips 

(“Decedent”) under the Fourteenth Amendment only (thereby ruling that claims under the 

Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments were not alleged in Plaintiffs‟ original complaint). So 

construed, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ first claim for relief was denied; 

2. Denied Defendants‟ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ second and third claims for relief 

for supervisor and entity liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Decedent‟s constitutional 

harms;

3. Granted Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ fourth claim for relief for violation 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”);

4. Denied Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ claims for wrongful death under 

California common law; and 

5. Granted Defendants motions to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ state law claims for survivorship, 

professional negligence, negligence, violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 and violation of 

California Government code § 815.6 in claims six, seven, eight, nine and ten, respectively.

Leave to amend was granted with respect to all dismissed claims.

Plaintiffs‟ FAC was filed on December 31, 2013. Plaintiffs‟ FAC alleges seven claims 

for relief. The first three of those claims are alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and are 

identical to the correspondingly numbered claims in Plaintiffs‟ original complaint. Plaintiffs‟

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claim for violation of the ADA is deleted from the FAC and the California common law claim 

for wrongful death against all Defendants takes its place as Plaintiffs‟ fourth claim for relief. 

Plaintiffs‟ first four claims for relief are not the subject of Defendants‟ motion to dismiss except 

to the extent Defendants contend that the claims against the individual Defendants in their 

official capacities under section 1983 are duplicative of the claims against County of Fresno 

under section 1983. Defendants also do not dispute that Plaintiffs have adequately stated a 

claim for wrongful death, but concede the claim is sufficiently stated only to the extent that 

Defendants‟ liability for Decedent‟s death is pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 

845.6, which is the basis of Plaintiffs‟ seventh claim for relief for violation of a mandatory duty.

The bulk of Defendants‟ motion to dismiss is aimed at Plaintiffs‟ fifth and sixth claims 

for relief which allege professional negligence and negligence, respectively, against both the 

County and certain individual Defendants. The court notes that Plaintiffs, in their opposition to 

Defendants‟ motion to Dismiss, concede the dismissal of their claim for plain negligence “based 

on the available relief [. . .], without conceding Defendants‟ points regarding immunity.” Doc. # 

44 at 3:9-10. Thus, the court will focus primarily on Plaintiffs‟ claim for professional 

negligence.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Overall, the background facts alleged in Plaintiffs‟ FAC are the same as those previously 

set forth in the court‟s December 3 Order. In re-alleging the claims for professional negligence 

and plain negligence, Plaintiffs have added a good deal of detail to the factual allegations 

previously alleged in the original complaint and has referenced those allegations more 

specifically in their amended claims. Plaintiffs‟ fifth claim for relief for professional negligence 

is alleged against individual Defendants Moreno (Director of Fresno County Department of 

Public Health (“FCDPH”)), Laird (Division Manager of the Correctional Health Division of the 

FCDPH), Narayan (Medical Director of the FCDPH), “Some Jail Healthcare Providers,” who are 

currently listed as “Nancy Poe and Carl Coe,” and the County. Plaintiffs allege that the 

supervisory and/or administrative Defendants, Moreno, Laird and Narayan, as well as “Some 

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Healthcare Providers, had responsibility for housing decisions of mentally ill inmates and had 

authority to assign mentally ill inmates to single-occupancy cells. Plaintiffs allege that “various 

Jail Healthcare Providers” visited Cuevas and Decedent in their cells and provided mental health 

services to them. Plaintiffs allege that managerial and administrative Defendants, Moreno, Laird 

and Narayan “actually did evaluate Mr. Cuevas and [Decedent] for mental health conditions, 

propensity for violence and special housing needs.” Doc. # 39 at 28:12-13. Plaintiffs also allege

that the Defendants “had a policy to withhold treatment through therapy or drugs of serious 

mental health issues [sic], and failed to provide mental health treatment for the severe

schizophrenia and other issues that Mr. Cuevas suffered from, leading directly to Mr. Cuevas‟ 

attack on [Decedent].” Doc. # 39 at 28:21 to 29:3. Plaintiffs allege that the Jail Healthcare 

Providers are responsible for the alleged delay in Decedent‟s treatment following Cuevas‟ attack.

 As noted previously, Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs‟ seventh claim for relief for 

breach of mandatory duty on the understanding that the court has previously determined that 

Plaintiffs adequately pled a claim for violation of the statutory requirement set forth in California 

Government Code section 845.6 for provision of emergency medical care to prisoners and on the 

understanding that the alleged violation of section 845.6 describes Defendants‟ liability for 

Plaintiffs‟ wrongful death claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

can be based on the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient 

facts under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

533-34 (9th Cir.1984). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must set forth factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Twombly”). While a court 

considering a motion to dismiss must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and must construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve factual 

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disputes in the pleader's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 

869 (1969), the allegations must be factual in nature. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a 

Plaintiffs‟ obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitlement to relief‟ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do”). The pleading standard set by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not 

require „detailed factual allegations,‟ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Iqbal”). 

The Ninth Circuit follows the methodological approach set forth in Iqbal for the 

assessment of a Plaintiffs‟ complaint:

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying 

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1950).

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are Construed to be Against the 

Individual Defendants in their Individual Capacities

Defendants point out that an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an individual 

defendant in his or her official capacity is the same as, and therefore duplicative of, a suit against 

the entity that employs the individual. While Plaintiffs acknowledge the distinction between 

Defendants in their official and individual capacities for purposes of an action pursuant to 

section 1983, Plaintiffs argue that where, as here, the defendants are named in both their official 

and individual capacities, a Plaintiffs‟ claim against a defendant need not be dismissed as 

duplicative of the suit against the entity. Since Plaintiffs‟ 1983 claims do not specify whether 

the claim is against the individual Defendants in their official or individual capacities, there is no 

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actual dispute, and the issue is not one of dismissal, it is an issue of construal of Plaintiffs‟

section 1983 claims. See Ashker v. California Dep‟t of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395(9th Cir. 

1997) (construing claims alleged against defendants in both their individual and official 

capacities as alleged in their individual capacities for purposes of claims pursuant to section 

1983). The court construes Plaintiffs‟ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be alleged against 

the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.

B. Statutory and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall 

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 

the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 

U.S. Const. amend. XI. Immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment further extends to 

suits by citizens against their own state. Holz v. Nenana City Pub. Sch. Dist., 347 F.3d 1176, 

1180 (9th Cir.2003). To overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar, either the State must have 

consented to waive its sovereign immunity or Congress must have abrogated it; moreover, the 

State's consent or Congress' intent must be “unequivocally expressed.” See Pennhurst State Sch. 

& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984). While California has waived its sovereign 

immunity so that it may be sued in its own courts under the California Tort Claims Act, such a 

waiver does not constitute a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. 

See BV Eng'g v. Univ. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1988); see also Atascadero 

State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (holding that Art. III, § 5 of the California 

Constitution did not constitute a waiver of California's Eleventh Amendment immunity). Since 

there is no general waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, “federal courts 

cannot assume that a state has waived its sovereign immunity unless the state has explicitly done 

so.” Hernandez v. McClanahan, 996 F.Supp. 975, 978 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 

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Plaintiffs correctly note that California Government Code § 844.6 expressly does not 

waive sovereign immunity in actions related to prisoner injuries except as provided in, inter alia, 

Government Code 845.6, which provides that an entity or employee acting in an official capacity 

“is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate 

medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Id. Thus, 

Plaintiffs are correct to the extent they contend that County of Fresno may be sued under section 

845.6 for the failure to provide emergency medical care when Decedent was attacked by Cuevas. 

Where Plaintiffs‟ contentions fail is with regard to County‟s liability for the assignment of 

Decedent to be housed with Cuevas. Plaintiffs contend that Decedent‟s injuries resulting from 

the failure to provide immediate medical care to Cuevas are actionable under section 845.6 

because the language of section 845.6 does not limit recovery for injuries only to those who were 

denied access to immediate medical care. 

Plaintiffs‟ provide no authority for their contention, a contention that seems to strain the 

common-sense reading of section 845.6. However, the court need not engage the question of 

whether California legislature intended section 845.6 to provide relief for third party victims of 

the non-provision of emergency medical care needed by someone else. While section 845.6 

mandate that a prisoner be provided immediate medical care “if the employee knows or has 

reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care,” the same provision1

specifically exempts, and therefor immunizes against, liability arising from the failure to 

correctly diagnose or provide mental health treatment as provided by subsections 855.8 and 856.

 

1

 California Government Code section 845.6 provides, in pertinent part:

“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee 

to furnish or obtain medical for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 

856, a public employee and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of employment, is liable 

if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to 

take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Id. (italics added.)

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Government Code section 855.8 provides, in pertinent part, “(a) Neither a public entity 

nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for injury resulting 

from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that a person is afflicted with a mental illness of addiction 

or from failing to prescribe for mental illness or addiction.” In a similar vein, Government Code 

section 856 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope 

of his employment is liable for any injury resulting from determining in 

accordance with any applicable enactment:

(1) Whether to confine a person for mental illness or addiction.

(2) The terms and conditions of confinement for mental illness or 

addiction.

[¶ ]

(c) Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for 

injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission in 

carrying out or failing to carry out:

(1) A determination to confine or not to confine a person for 

mental illness or addiction.

(2) The terms or conditions of confinement of a person for mental 

illness or addiction.

In sum, sections 855.8 and 856 immunize both the entity and its employees for failure to 

diagnose or prescribe treatment for mental illness and to confine or not confine for mental 

illness. See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.3d 298, 317 (2nd Dist. 1983). 

Correspondingly, these two sections do not shield from liability the negligent or wrongful 

treatment or confinement after a determination of mental illness has been made and treatment 

has been prescribed and/or conditions of confinement have been determined by appropriate 

authority. Id. The line that divides what is shielded from liability and what is not is the final

determination of mental illness, prescription for treatment, or proper condition of confinement 

made by a person with final authority to make such determination (usually a psychiatrist). See

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Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 448 (1976) (immunity under 

section 856 extends not only to the final decision “but to all determinations involved in the 

process of commitment” (italics in original)). Finally, it bears noting that the provisions of 

section 855.8 and 856, while set forth in a portion of the California Government code that 

regulates state mental health facilities, apply equally to the context of confinement in a jail 

facility. See, e.g., Johnson, 143 Cal.App.3d at 314 (decision to commit for mental illness is 

immunized but failure to properly carry out commitment is not).

Plaintiffs‟ claim for professional negligence fails to make a clear-cut allegation that a 

person of authority examined Cuevas and made a determination that Cuevas was to be housed 

separately and the determination was not acted upon or that a prescription for therapy was 

ordered and the order was either not acted upon or performed negligently. Rather, what the FAC 

suggests is that various persons were familiar with Cuevas‟ behavior and no order of segregation 

was made or no therapy was ordered. As noted above, decisions to impose a particular condition 

of confinement or to order or not order a particular therapeutic regimen is expressly immunized 

from liability under state law. The only actionable conduct occurred, if at all, when a person of 

authority determined that Cuevas was to be housed alone and that did not happen or when 

therapy was ordered for Cuevas and that did not happen or was wrongly carried out. 

The court notes that, at paragraph 93 of the FAC, Plaintiffs allege “[o]n information and 

belief, MORENO, LAIRD, NARAYAN, some JAIL HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS and 

COUNTY had a policy to withhold treatment through therapy or drugs of serious mental health 

issues, and failed to provide mental health treatment for the severe schizophrenia and other 

issues that Mr. Cuevas suffered from, leading directly to Mr. Cuevas‟ violent attack on 

[Decedent].” Doc. # 39 at 28:20-29:3 (emphasis added). But, as noted, Plaintiffs‟ allegation is 

ambiguous because it does not make explicit that the alleged policy specifically mandates the 

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withholding of prescribed medications or other therapeutic modalities when ordered by 

competent authority. It is also incomplete because there is no allegation that, because of such 

policy, Cuevas was co-housed with Decedent in contravention of an order from an authoritative 

person or that ordered therapy was withheld.

In sum, both the entity and individual Defendants are immune to state claims with regard 

to any failure to adequately diagnose Cuevas‟ mental condition or to make the determination that 

segregated housing was necessary because of his mental condition. The individual Defendants 

can only be held liable for the failure to carry out therapeutic orders or orders on the conditions 

of Cuevas‟ confinement after the orders were made by a person competent to do so. In essence, 

sections 855.8 and 856 immunize the discretionary determinations of mental health professionals 

and provide liability only for harms that arise from the failure to properly carry out the 

mandatory duties that may arise once the mental health professional has made a final 

determination regarding therapy or conditions of confinement. Because there is no allegation 

that any individual Defendant failed to carry out a term or condition of Cuevas‟s confinement or 

failed to deliver therapeutic intervention that was ordered by a competent authority, Plaintiffs‟ 

claim for professional negligence fails to state a claim for relief.

Should it occur that discovery uncovers facts indicating that a competent authority either 

ordered Cuevas housed alone or ordered a therapeutic intervention that was not delivered, the 

court agrees with Defendants insofar as it finds that such facts would not be separately 

actionable as a species of negligence. Rather, such a set of facts may create a mandatory duty. 

See Johnson, 143 Cal.App.3d 298 at 317 (section 845.6 creates liability under certain 

circumstances, which does not otherwise exist under common law”). Should it be shown that 

there was an order for isolation of Cuevas, the decision to house him with another prisoner is no 

longer discretionary and the individual Defendants would be prevented from relying on 

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Government Code § 820.2 to immunize them from immunity from liability arising from 

discretionary acts. Thus, Plaintiff‟s ability to demonstrate the existence of orders to house 

Cuevas separately from other prisoners would serve to bolster Plaintiffs‟ wrongful death claim 

on a theory of failure to carry out a housing order, but it would not create a separate claim for 

negligence.

The court concludes that Plaintiffs‟ claim for professional negligence fails to allege facts 

that would support a claim for relief that is separate or different from Plaintiffs‟ claims for 

wrongful death or breach of a mandatory duty. For that reason, Plaintiffs‟ claim for professional 

negligence will be dismissed as to all Defendants.

THEREFORE, for the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Defendants‟ claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that are alleged against the 

individual defendants are construed to be against the individual Defendants in their individual 

capacities. 

2. Plaintiffs‟ claim for Negligence under California Common Law is Deemed Abandoned 

and is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ claim for Professional Negligence is hereby 

GRANTED as to all Defendants. Plaintiffs‟ claim for professional negligence is hereby 

DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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