Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01369/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01369-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 23, 2015*

Decided October 23, 2015

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1369

TIMOTHY L. HOELLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF BARRINGTON, 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin.

No. 14-cv-398

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Timothy Hoeller sued the Village of Barrington, Illinois, in the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. He alleges that when he lived in Barrington in 2011, village officers used 

excessive force to restrain him from hurting himself, violating his civil rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Hoeller’s lawsuit for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and improper venue. The district court’s analysis was correct, so we affirm.

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-1369 Page 2

According to Hoeller, village police came to his home in Barrington after 

receiving a tip that Hoeller had threatened suicide. The police attempted to escort him to 

a waiting ambulance, but he struggled against them. Hoeller was hurt when a sharp pen

and house keys in his pocket pressed against his chest. He filed several complaints with 

the village board, but it refused to admit wrongdoing or offer him money. Hoeller later 

moved to Wisconsin, and by letter mailed from there he asked the village board to 

answer his complaints by replying to his new address. It never did.

Over two years later, Hoeller sued the village in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

He apparently avoided the Northern District of Illinois, where Barrington is located,

because a standing order from that court’s Executive Committee requires him to seek 

leave before suing there. The village moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

and improper venue. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (b)(6). In an affidavit supporting the 

motion, the village manager stated that Barrington has no business, no property, no 

offices, and no employees in Wisconsin. Hoeller did not respond to the statements. The 

district court dismissed the case without prejudice. It reasoned that it lacked personal 

jurisdiction, that venue was improper, and that, given the filing restriction in Northern 

Illinois, justice did not require a transfer there under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

On appeal Hoeller principally argues that the district court had personal

jurisdiction over the village, but he is incorrect. Because § 1983 does not provide for 

nationwide service of process, see Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2008), the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin acquires personal jurisdiction only to the extent permitted 

by the law of Wisconsin and due process. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).

To meet that standard, the village must have had “minimum contacts” with Wisconsin 

or “reach[ed] out beyond” Illinois into Wisconsin. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

471 U.S. 462, 473–75 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing due process); 

Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wisconsin law). It did not. Hoeller 

concedes on appeal that his “personal injury” occurred in “Northern Illinois.” The only 

supposed contact between the village and Wisconsin that he (belatedly) identifies is his

move to Wisconsin and his letter to the village saying he had moved there. But his

“unilateral activity” of moving to the forum state or contacting a non-resident defendant 

from there does not satisfy the requirement that the village have contact with the forum 

state. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

Hoeller offers two replies, but neither is persuasive. First, he contends that his 

age, poor health, and residence in Wisconsin establish personal jurisdiction. But no 

authority suggests that the plaintiff’s age, health, and residence determine personal 

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jurisdiction over a defendant. Second, Hoeller argues that the district court should have 

permitted discovery into the merits of his claim. But without personal jurisdiction, the 

court cannot proceed to the merits. See Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251; N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. 

Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014).

We conclude by observing that Hoeller does not challenge the district court’s 

alternative ground for dismissal: improper venue. That ruling is correct: the village does 

not “reside” in Wisconsin, the conduct giving rise to Hoeller’s claim did not occur in 

Wisconsin, and the village is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b). Hoeller suggests that alternate forums are available in Illinois courts 

and other federal district courts. But the district court had no power to transfer the case 

to a state court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1447(c); Research Automation, Inc. v. SchraderBridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2010); Pope v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 

345 U.S. 379, 384 (1953). And its discretionary decision to refuse to transfer it to the 

Northern District of Illinois, in light of the filing restriction that he faces there, was 

justified. See Research Automation, Inc. 626 F.3d at 978.

AFFIRMED.

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