Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02984/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02984-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Service

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT T. VASQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

CHIEF EDWARD C. FLORES, et al., 

Defendant(s).

 

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No. C 06-02984 JW (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL

AND OF SERVICE; GRANTING

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; DIRECTING

DEFENDANTS TO FILE

DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE

REGARDING SUCH MOTION

On August 15, 2006, plaintiff, an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, filed an

amended pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various jail employees. 

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

DISCUSSION

A. Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify

any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must,

Case 5:06-cv-02984-JW Document 19 Filed 08/17/07 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Having reviewed the complaint, the Court finds cognizable plaintiff’s claims: (1)

that jail officials used excessive force in tightening waist chains around plaintiff and

leaving him locked to a chair: (2) that jail officials conducted body cavity searches of

plaintiff for purposes of sexual harassment; (3) interfered with his incoming and

outgoing mail; (4) deprived him of adequate medical care; and (5) deprived him of

adequate outdoor exercise time. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that jail officials “abused [their] authority” by taking and

destroying some of plaintiff’s personal property does not state a cognizable claim for

relief. Neither the negligent nor intentional deprivation of property states a due process

claim under § 1983 if the deprivation was random and unauthorized, however. See

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost

prisoner's hobby kit), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional

destruction of inmate's property). The availability of an adequate state post-deprivation

remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief because it provides sufficient

procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990). California

law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31

F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895). In addition,

plaintiff’s claim that he lost 90 days of “pro per privileges” for seeking to photocopy a

police report is not cognizable. Plaintiff cites no authority, and this Court is aware of

Case 5:06-cv-02984-JW Document 19 Filed 08/17/07 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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none, that such a loss violates his constitutional rights or any other provision of federal

law. 

Plaintiff names as defendants the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, and

its individual members, alleging simply that they are “legally responsible” for the

actions of jail officials. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth specific

facts as to each individual defendant’s conduct that proximately caused a violation of

his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff makes no

allegations regarding specific conduct by the Board of Supervisors or its individual

members, or regarding actions they should have taken, that caused the alleged

constitutional violations above. Naming the Board of Supervisors and its members on

the apparent theory that they are responsible for the actions and omissions of jail

employees and subordinates, will not suffice because it is well settled that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989) (holding liability may not be based solely on fact defendant is generally

responsible for actions or omissions of another). Moreover, naming the Board as a

whole does not suffice to state a cognizable claim against its individual members

because a defendant cannot be held liable based solely on his membership in a group;

rather, a showing of his individual participation in unlawful conduct is required. See

Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding instruction permitting

jury to find individual liable as member of team, without any showing of individual

wrongdoing, is improper).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2) is 

GRANTED. The total filing fee that will ultimately be due is $350.00. In view of

plaintiff’s income and account balance over the last six months, no initial partial filing

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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fee is due. Funds for the filing fee will be taken from income to plaintiff’s account in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(B)(1). A copy of this order and the attached

instructions will be sent to plaintiff, the prison trust account office, and the Court’s

financial office. 

2. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants the Santa Clara County Board of

Supervisors; Supervisors Donald F. Gage, Blanca Alvarado, Pete McHugh, James T.

Beall, and Liz Kniss; and Correctional Officers Armenta and Daigre are DISMISSED

for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

Furthermore, the first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint; any

claims from the original complaint not included in the first amended complaint are

waived, and any defendants not included in amended complaint are no longer

defendants to this action. See London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th

Cir. 1981) (causes of action not included in amended complaint are waived); Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992) (defendants not named in an amended

complaint are no longer defendants); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)

(original complaint properly ignored following amendment).

3. The clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States 

Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the August 15, 2006

amended complaint in this matter, all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order

upon Chief Edward C. Flores, Captain Toby Wong, Sergeant Semeca, Sergeant

Ferchetti, Lieutenant Conner, Correctional Officer Vargas, Correctional Officer

Martin, Correctional Officer Arndt, and Dr. Alexander Chorny at the Santa Clara

County Jail. The clerk shall also mail courtesy copies of the August 15, 2006

amended complaint and this order to the California Attorney General’s Office.

4. No later than ninety (90) days from the date of this order, defendants

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the

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United States District Court

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1

 The following notice is adapted from the summary judgment notice to be

given to pro se prisoners as set forth in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th

Cir. 1998) (en banc). See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14.

Order of Service

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claims in the amended complaint found to be cognizable above. 

a. If defendants elect to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds

plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a), defendants shall do so in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion pursuant to

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied Alameida v.

Terhune, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). 

b. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate

factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be

granted, nor qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any

defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary

judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. 

5. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on defendants no later than forty-five (45) days from the date

defendants’ motion is filed. 

a. In the event the defendants file an unenumerated motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b), plaintiff is hereby cautioned as follows:1

The defendants have made a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground you

have not exhausted your administrative remedies. The motion will,

if granted, result in the dismissal of your case. When a party you

are suing makes a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, and that

motion is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn

testimony) and/or documents, you may not simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or documents,

that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and

documents and show that you have in fact exhausted your claims. 

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United States District Court

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If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, the motion

to dismiss, if appropriate, may be granted and the case dismissed.

b. In the event defendants file a motion for summary judgment, 

the Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by 

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if

there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of

your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a

party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is

properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you

cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must

set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule

56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence

in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered

against you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of

defendants, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised

to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward

with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his

claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by plaintiff to the granting of the

motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651,

653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

6. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

7. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

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No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

8. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on

defendants, or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true

copy of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

9. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or

Local Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

10. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep

the court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in

a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

11. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be

extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

DATED: August 2, 2007 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PRISONER'S FILING FEE

The prisoner shown as the plaintiff or petitioner on the attached order has filed a civil

action in forma pauperis in this court and owes to the court a filing fee. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915, the fee is to be paid as follows:

The initial partial filing fee listed on the attached order should be deducted by the

prison trust account office from the prisoner's trust account and forwarded to the

clerk of the court as the first installment payment on the filing fee. This amount

is twenty percent of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to the

prisoner's account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint/petition or (b) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account

for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint/petition. 

Thereafter, on a monthly basis, 20 percent of the preceding month's income

credited to the prisoner's trust account should be deducted and forwarded to the

court each time the amount in the account exceeds ten dollars ($10.00). The

prison trust account office should continue to do this until the filing fee has been

paid in full. 

If the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the initial partial

filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, and carry

the balance forward each month until the amount is fully paid. 

If the prisoner has filed more than one complaint, (s)he is required to pay a filing fee for

each case. The trust account office should make the monthly calculations and payments

for each case in which it receives an order granting in forma pauperis and these

instructions.

The prisoner's name and case number must be noted on each remittance. The

initial partial filing fee is due within thirty days of the date of the attached order. 

Checks should be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court and sent to Prisoner

Accounts Receivable, U.S. District Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36060, San

Francisco, CA 94102.

cc: Plaintiff

Finance Office

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