Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02966/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02966-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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1 The underlying dispute arose out of an incident of

identity theft, wherein an unauthorized person opened several

credit accounts in plaintiff’s name. After attempting for

several years to have defendants remove the fraudulent account

from his credit report, plaintiff brought suit against

defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting

Act (the “FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and California’s

Identity Theft Statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.92 et seq. On

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH E. SMITH,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

CITIFINANCIAL RETAIL

SERVICES and CITIBANK (SOUTH

DAKOTA), N.A.,

Defendant(s).

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No. C06-2966 BZ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

A victim of identity theft, plaintiff sued defendants for

continuing to provide false information about his financial

status after he had reported the problem to them. For reasons

not completely clear to the court, what should have been a

simple matter to resolve resulted in a bitterly contested year

long litigation.1 It was resolved when plaintiff accepted

Case 3:06-cv-02966-BZ Document 115 Filed 08/02/07 Page 1 of 8
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November 8, 2006, defendants made a settlement offer of

$8,000. Plaintiff rejected this offer and continued with

discovery until he accepted defendants’ Rule 68 Offer of

Judgment. 

2

defendants’ Rule 68 Offer of Judgment of $75,000 with costs

and attorneys’ fees to be determined by the court. Plaintiff

then moved for an award of $200,156.25 in attorneys’ fees and

$5,954.16 in costs. 

In opposing plaintiff’s motion, defendants argue: (1)

that plaintiff’s hourly rates are excessive, (2) that there

should be a rate differential between Mr. Ogilvie and Ms.

Brewer, (3) that the hours worked are excessive, (4) that much

of the work should have been performed by an associate rather

than a partner, (5) that travel time should have been billed

at a reduced rate, (6) that billing for clerical tasks should

be disallowed, and (7) that plaintiff should not receive a fee

enhancement for those hours dedicated to work on the

California Identity Theft claim. Defendants did not oppose

plaintiff’s request for costs. 

Because his FCRA action against defendants has been

successful, plaintiff is entitled to recover “the costs of the

action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined

by the court.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(a)(2). 

Similarly, California’s Identity Theft Statute provides that a

successful plaintiff is entitled to recover “actual damages,

attorney’s fees, and costs.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.93(c)(5). 

“The most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly

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rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). As

the party seeking attorneys’ fees, plaintiff bears the burden

of submitting evidence to support the hours worked and rates

claimed. Id. at 433. 

The starting point for determining a reasonable fee is

the hourly rate counsel would have charged had the client been

able to pay the attorney’s usual rate. Gusman v. Unisys

Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1993); Columbus Mills,

Inc. v. Freeland, 918 F.2d 1575, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990)

(“evidence of a fee structure arrived at by private parties

negotiating at arms length is highly persuasive” evidence of

prevailing market norms). Although plaintiff’s counsel claim

that their current hourly rate is $525, they provide no

evidence that they have actually charged or been paid at that

rate. While counsel have represented that they were awarded

fees at a rate of $450 per hour in 2004, by Superior Courts in

Santa Clara and Los Angeles Counties, they do not specify the

type of case or the work they did. 

Where, as here, it is difficult to ascertain counsel’s

usual rate, a court may look to the rate charged by attorneys

of similar skill and experience for comparable legal services

in the community. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893-94

(1984); see also Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d

942, 946 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has provided some

evidence that other courts in the Northern District of

California have recently awarded rates similar to or higher

than those now requested. See Decl. of Richard Pearl in Supp.

of Pl.’s Mot. For Att’ys’ Fees (“Pearl Decl.”) ¶ 9. The cases

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2 Similarly unhelpful is defendants counsel’s

provision of evidence of attorneys’ rates on a national and

statewide basis, without any area of law specificity. See

Decl. of Kurt W. Melchior in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. For Att’ys’

Fees (“Melchior Decl.”) ¶ 21; Req. for Judicial Notice of

Decl. of Alan Charles Dell’Ario (“Dell’Ario Req.”).

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plaintiff cites, however, are not directly analogous to this

case, because they involve different or more complex claims

and/or attorneys of different experience associated with

different-sized firms.2 Analogous case law suggests that a

somewhat lower rate may be appropriate. See Schueneman v. 1st

Credit of America, LLC, 2007 WL 1969708, at *3 (N.D. Cal.)

(reducing by $25 the requested rate in a consumer debt

collection practices case and awarding $300 per hour to an

attorney with five years in the field and an additional

fourteen years litigation experience); Defenbaugh v. JBC &

Assoc., Inc., 2004 WL 1874978, at *5-*7 (N.D. Cal.) (in

consumer debt class action, awarding fees of $435 per hour to

attorney with over twenty years practice experience, and

awarding $400 per hour to an attorney with slightly less

practice experience). 

The purpose of awarding fees is to encourage vigorous

enforcement of civil rights and consumer-protection laws by

competent counsel. See Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645,

652-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Student Public Interest

Research Group v. AT & T Bell Laboratories, 842 F.2d 1436,

1449 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374,

383 (9th Cir. 1991). This case did not involve particularly

complex legal issues. While defendants’ intransigency

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3 During the discovery process, defendants were

noticeably reluctant to produce information and documents to

plaintiffs, forcing plaintiff to file several motions to

compel production of discovery information (see Docket no’s

51, 71), which required multiple telephonic and in-person

discovery conferences to resolve (see Docket no’s 63, 78, 80). 

See also Supplemental Decl. of Andrew J. Ogilvie in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. For Att’ys’ Fees (“Supp. Ogilvie Decl.”) ¶¶ 5, 6,

14. 

4 The differential between Mr. Ogilvie’s rate and Ms.

Brewer’s rate is justified by the fact that Ms. Brewer has six

years less experience than Mr. Ogilvie, and because of the

limited involvement of Ms. Brewer in this case. Ms. Brewer

only worked twenty-six and one-half hours on this case, on

non-complex matters, making it clear to me that her services

were not particularly central to this case.

5 Defendants also contest counsel’s billing of all

hours at a partner rate. Defendant’s Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Attorney Fee Motion (“Def.’s Opp.”) at 12. 

However, plaintiff’s counsel do not have any associates that

could have worked on this case. Decl. of Andrew J. Ogilvie in

Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Ogilvie Decl.”) ¶ 9. 

Defendants do not provide any authority, and I know of none,

for their proposition that “associate level work” performed by

a partner should be billed at an associate rate, even when no

associate is available. Therefore, I decline to reduce the

rate for work that could have been performed by an associate. 

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protracted the litigation process,3 such difficulty is

accounted for by compensating counsel for the many hours

expended. Although plaintiff’s counsel might be awarded $525

per hour in an appropriate case, I find that a rate of $450

per hour for Mr. Ogilvie and $400 per hour for Ms. Brewer4 is

reasonable and appropriate in this case.5 

 I further conclude that the total hours billed by

plaintiff’s counsel are not excessive, with one exception. 

Although the total amount of work conducted is perhaps more

than should be expected for a case such as this, that is

partly the result of defendants’ dilatory litigation tactics. 

Moreover, many of the charges identified by defendants as

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6 For example, although defendants cite the billing of

five and one-half hours for attending a case management

conference, defendants knew that the reason for this was that

both parties were required by Judge Wilken to arrive at court

by 1:30 p.m., and were required to stay until 5:30 p.m.

because their matter was the last item on calendar. Supp.

Ogilvie Decl. ¶ 9. Moreover, defendants admit that they spent

almost the same number of hours on this case as plaintiffs. 

Decl. of Regina J. McClendon in Opp. To Pl.’s Mot. For Att’ys’

Fees (“McClendon Decl.”) ¶ 28.

7 Defendants’ request for an hour reduction for travel

time is also unsupported. Defendants do not provide any

support, and I know of none, for their claim that travel time

is customarily billed at fifty percent by attorneys in the San

Francisco Bay Area, and that plaintiff counsel’s travel hours

should be reduced accordingly. I decline to make an hour

reduction for time partially spent traveling.

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excessive have been shown in plaintiff’s reply brief to have

been justified.6

 See, e.g. Supp. Ogilvie Decl. ¶ 9. 

It appears, however, that plaintiff’s counsel bills in

quarter-hour increments rather than in a more precise measure

of time. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed an across-the-board

reduction of attorneys’ fees when services were billed on a

quarter-hour basis without proper specificity. See Welch, 480

F.3d at 948-49. Plaintiff’s record of hours worked is replete

with quarter-hour, half-hour, and three-quarter-hour charges

for review of correspondence, telephone calls, and emails that

may have taken less time. See Ex. 1 to Ogilvie Decl. Because

of this excessive billing practice, I find that an across-theboard reduction of five percent of plaintiff counsel’s

requested hours is appropriate. See, e.g. Welch, 480 F.3d at

948-49 (affirming an across-the-board reduction of twenty

percent where quarter-hour billing resulted in inflated

hours).7 

Defendants also attack some of plaintiff’s billed work as

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clerical tasks that should be compensated at a reduced rate. 

It is inevitable that attorneys will spend some of their time

on quasi-clerical tasks. Here, that time is minimal. 

Plaintiff has provided sufficient detail to satisfy me that

the hours alleged to be clerical can indeed be billed at the

standard attorney rate.

Lastly, defendants contest plaintiff’s request for a fee

enhancement for all hours worked on plaintiff’s California

Identity Theft Statute claim. Plaintiff requested a

multiplier of 2.0 for the twenty-eight hours spent working on

this claim. Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees at 13. Although this

Court may not grant a fee enhancement under federal feeshifting statutes, see, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557, 566-67 (1992), California courts allow for fee

enhancements. See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1112, 1136-38

(2001) (allowing for fee enhancements to compensate for

contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors). 

However, the court in Ketchum emphasized the trial court’s

discretion in choosing whether to award a fee enhancement, and

affirmed that the party seeking the enhancement bears the

burden of proof. Id. at 1138. In this case, plaintiff’s

counsel have not shown that the California Identity Theft

Statute was particularly risky. Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel

only spent twenty-eight hours, out of 353.25 hours total,

working on the California Identity Theft Statute claim. 

Ogilvie Decl. ¶ 30. This indicates that the claim was neither

risky nor particularly important to plaintiff’s case. For

these reasons, I decline to award a fee enhancement for hours

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8 Because I have not relied on any of the contested

elements of the Declaration of Kurt Melchior, nor of

defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of the declaration on

Alan Charles Dell’Ario in making my decision, defendants’

objections thereto are OVERRULED as moot.

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spent pursuing the California Identity Theft claim. 

For the above-stated reasons,8

 I hereby ORDER that

plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART as follows:

(1) That plaintiff be awarded fees of $149,825 as set

forth in the attached schedule.

(2) That plaintiff be awarded costs of $5,954.16.

Dated: August 2, 2007

 

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

G:\BZALL\-BZCASES\SMITH\FEE.ORDER.wpd

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