Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02872/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02872-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Notice of Removal- Foreclosure

---

1

3:16-cv-2872-CAB-(NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK WARREN,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO & CO., WELLS 

FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-2872-CAB-(NLS)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

STAY FORECLOSURE

[Doc. No. 63]

On January 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for a Temporary 

Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction to restrain Defendants from 

foreclosing on and selling the real property located at 5934 Portobelo Court in San Diego, 

California. [Doc. No. 10.] A hearing on Plaintiff’s TRO Application was held on February 

16, 2017 [Doc. No. 18.] Following the TRO hearing, the Court issued an Order to Show 

Cause on the Preliminary Injunction. [Doc. No. 30.] Defendants filed their response in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s request [Doc. No. 34] and Plaintiff filed his reply [Doc. No. 36]. 

A hearing on the request was held on June 8, 2017. [Doc. No. 38.] On October 3, 2017, 

Plaintiff, aware that the Court would be issuing an order on the Preliminary Injunction in 

the near future, filed “Supplemental Facts in Support of the Court Granting an Injunction.” 

[Doc. No. 58.] Finally, on October 11, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte 

application for a preliminary injunction. [Doc. No. 59.] A month later, on November 9, 

Case 3:16-cv-02872-CAB-NLS Document 73 Filed 12/08/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 3
2

3:16-cv-2872-CAB-(NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2017, Plaintiff appealed the Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. 

[Doc. No. 62.] Plaintiff now moves for a stay of foreclosure until his appeal is resolved.

“‘[T]he factors regulating the issuance of a stay’ [are]: ‘(1) whether the stay applicant 

has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the 

applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will 

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public 

interest lies.’” Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). These 

factors are almost identical to the factors applicable to the determination of whether to issue 

a preliminary injunction. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.”). Thus, the instant motion is little more than a motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, and 

simply restates the same arguments that did not persuade the Court the first time around. 

Indeed, Plaintiff dedicates most of his motion to attempts at distinguishing cases cited in 

the Court’s order and incorporates by reference the same arguments Plaintiff made in 

support of a preliminary injunction.

As with his application for a preliminary injunction, the instant motion fails to 

demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to delay foreclosure of the Property any longer. The 

Court effectively already addressed the factors applicable to a stay pending appeal in detail 

in its order denying Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction. In that order, the 

Court found that: (1) Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits and prevent the sale of 

the Property; (2) Plaintiff will not suffer irreparable injury if foreclosure is not enjoined; 

(3) Defendant would not suffer serious hardship as a result of an injunction; and (4) the 

public interest is neutral with respect to an injunction. The Court’s reasoning for reaching 

these conclusions is equally applicable to Plaintiff’s motion for a stay, and the Court is not 

Case 3:16-cv-02872-CAB-NLS Document 73 Filed 12/08/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 3
3

3:16-cv-2872-CAB-(NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

persuaded by any of Plaintiff’s arguments to reconsider these findings. If anything, further 

delay of foreclosure is even less warranted now because Plaintiff obtained at least some of 

the relief he sought insofar as Defendant completed its review of his application for a loan 

modification. Accordingly, because the applicable factors do not support issuance of a stay 

pending appeal, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-02872-CAB-NLS Document 73 Filed 12/08/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 3