Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02549/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02549-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Defendants request judicial notice of the July 9, 2004, decision of the Court of Appeal in the

prior suit, Phillips’ “Declaration in Support of Objection to Judge Presiding at Trial,” Phillips’ Petition

for Writ of Certiorari to the California Supreme Court, and Phillips’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RICHARD BOWLES, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-2549 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING

PLAINTIFF LIMITED LEAVE TO

AMEND; AND GRANTING ATTORNEY

FEES TO JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS

On October 20, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on defendants’ motions to dismiss. Having

considered the parties’ arguments, the Court GRANTS the judicial defendants’ motion to dismiss

without leave to amend, GRANTS the remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend,

and GRANTS the judicial defendants’ motion for attorney fees. If plaintiff’s amended complaint fails

to state a claim against the private defendants, plaintiff is informed that the Court will award attorney

fees to those defendants.

BACKGROUND

In 1996, plaintiff David Phillips (“Phillips”) and his brother retained Bowles & Verna LLP

(“B&V”) to represent them in a suit against Farmers Insurance for damage caused by a fire at their

home. Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 1, 2.1

 The Phillips brothers prevailed and obtained a judgment

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28 the United States Supreme Court. The Court GRANTS defendants’ requests. (Docket Nos. 17 and 22).

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for $7 million in their favor, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. Id. 

On April 21, 2000, Phillips filed suit in state court against, inter alia, B&V; firm partners

Richard Bowles, Michael Verna, and Robert Westerfield; and First America Title Insurance Company,

David Phillips et al. v. Richard Bowles et al., Contra Costa County Sup. Ct. No. C 00-01529. Id.

Steven Wasserman, Esq., represented B&V and the B&V firm partners in that action. Compl. 3:7. The

complaint alleged that the B&V attorneys committed malpractice because B&V charged excessive fees

and failed to recover a greater amount in damages in the suit against Farmers. Request for Judicial

Notice Ex. 1, 2. 

During the course of the malpractice litigation, Judge David Flinn presided over an evidentiary

hearing, Judge William Kolin ruled on one motion, and trial commenced before Judge Terrence

Bruiniers. On April 15, 2002, judgments were entered in favor of B&V. Id. Phillips appealed and the

judgments were affirmed by Justices Patricia Sepulveda, Maria Rivera, and Timothy Reardon. The

appellate court rejected Phillips’ complaints regarding each Superior Court judge’s rulings. Phillips

unsuccessfully petitioned the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. 

Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed the instant lawsuit against Richard Bowles, Michael Verna, Robert

Westerfield, Steven Wasserman, B&V, Judge Terrence Bruiniers, Judge William Kolin, Judge David

Flinn, Justice Patricia Sepulveda, Justice Maria Rivera, and Justice Timothy Reardon, alleging that all

defendants conspired with one another to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal district court does not have the authority to adjudicate the case before it when subject

matter jurisdiction is lacking. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Under

what is known as the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine, the United States District Court has no authority to

review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. See District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923) (holding district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts). Instead, the

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proper court in which to obtain such review is the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257;

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes not only review of decisions of the

state’s highest court, but also those of its lower courts. See Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court, 23 F.3d

218, 221 (9th Cir.1994). A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a challenge for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court.

Moccio v. Office of Court Administration, 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir.1996); Olson Farms, Inc. v.

Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir.1998) (“Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine, rather than

a res judicata doctrine.”).

DISCUSSION

1. Judicial immunity

The Court concludes that this action is barred as to the judicial defendants on the grounds of

judicial immunity. It is a well established principle that judges are immune from civil suits arising out

of the exercise of their judicial function. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). Judicial immunity

can only be overcome in two circumstances: (1) when the actions were not taken in the judge’s official

capacity; or (2) if the action is taken in complete lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 11 - 12. In the instant

action, the complaint challenges the issuance of allegedly improper orders by the judicial defendants;

the challenged conduct was all taken in the judges’ official capacities. 

Additionally, judicial immunity applies regardless of whether the judge is accused of acting

maliciously or corruptly, as long as it was within his jurisdiction. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554

(1967). Furthermore, it is well established that immunity applies regardless of whether the plaintiff

seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394,

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the judicial defendants’ motion

to dismiss without leave to amend.

2. Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

If in order to grant the relief sought, the district court must determine that a state court judgment

was erroneously entered or must take action that would render such a judgment ineffectual, the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. See MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal court review if the relief requested requires the “mere revision

of errors and irregularities” or asks the federal court to determine “the legality and correctness of the

judgments” of the state courts). 

The remaining defendants contend this action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because

plaintiff is merely attempting to have a federal court review the decisions of the state courts. Defendants

further argue that the plaintiff cannot avoid this jurisdictional bar by framing his claim as a

constitutional challenge. Plaintiff counters that Rooker-Feldman does not bar his claim because he is

not claiming that the state court committed an error; rather, he alleges that defendants conspired to

deprive him of his civil rights. Plaintiff also argues that he is not requesting the Court to review the

judgment of the state court, but is instead alleging that the conspiracy allowed B&V to steal more than

$4 million from him. 

The Court concludes that, as currently framed, plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. Although plaintiff generally asserts that defendants “conspired” to deprive him of

his civil rights, the complaint does not contain any specific factual allegations regarding how the private

attorney defendants allegedly conspired with the state court judges and justices. Instead, the complaint

merely claims that various positions advocated by the attorneys in the litigation were taken in order to

steal plaintiff’s money, and that the state court judges and justices repeatedly ruled against plaintiffs.

See, e.g., “Kolin deemed plaintiff’s election ‘not to ratify’ the extorted May 1998 agreement to be a

ratification of that extorted agreement,”Compl. 6:6-8; “Bruiners nevertheless granted a motion in limine,

sought by B& V, preventing plaintiff from informing the jury that . . . ..” Id.. at 24-25. These

allegations amount to an attack on the state court decisions, and as such, are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine.

The Court will allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint in an effort to state a claim

against the private defendants. As the Court informed plaintiff at the October 20, 2006 hearing, the

Court remains skeptical that plaintiff will be able to state a § 1983 claim against these defendants; in

order to do so, plaintiff must allege, with specificity, how the private defendants conspired with the state

court judges to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights and/or to steal plaintiff’s money. Simply citing to

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 Defendants also argue that the case should be dismissed based on res judicata. However,

plaintiff alleges that the state court decisions resulted from a conspiracy between the judicial defendants

and the attorneys to deprive him of his civil rights; such a claim, if properly pled, would not be barred

by res judicata. Defendant Wasserman also argues that he was not properly served because plaintiff was

not diligent in attempting to personally serve him and plaintiff did not leave the summons and complaint

with someone who was “apparently in charge of the office.” Cal. Code of Civil P. § 415.20(b). Because

plaintiff left the summons and complaint with the receptionist at Wasserman’s office and the

receptionist explained that she was not authorized to accept service on Wasserman’s behalf, the Court

finds that service was not proper. Plaintiff is ordered to properly serve Wasserman by November 6,

2006.

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advocacy positions taken by the attorneys, or adverse decisions by the judges, is insufficient. See

Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66

(9th Cir. 2006); see also Delman v. Friedman, No. 9920834, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14276, at *12 (N.D.

Cal. July 14, 2000). 2

3. Fees and costs

District courts have discretion to award attorneys fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs

in Civil Rights Act cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A party may recover attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 when his opponent acts in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Hall

v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1972). The purpose of awarding attorney fees is to deter frivolous and harassing

litigation. Id. at 230. Additionally, subjective bad faith is not required for an award of fees, and the

Court only needs to find that the plaintiff’s action was objectively groundless or without foundation.

See Christianburg v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 

Defendants argue that plaintiff should be sanctioned because he was aware there was no legal

or factual basis for his lawsuit. Plaintiff argues that sanctions should not be awarded because his claims

are true and the defenses raised by the defendants are wrong. 

The Court finds that sanctions are warranted with regard to the suit against the judicial

defendants. Plaintiff is a licensed attorney and the complaint against the judicial defendants was clearly

baseless due to judicial immunity. The attorney for the judicial defendants submitted a declaration

regarding the amount of time spent on the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay $2,240

to the judicial defendants. 

Furthermore, plaintiff is on notice that if plaintiff amends the complaint and fails to state a claim,

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the Court will order plaintiff to pay the attorney fees for defendant B&V, Richard Bowles, Michael

Verna, Robert Westerfield and Wasserman. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss; GRANTS

plaintiff leave to amend the complaint as to the private defendants, with any amended complaint to be

filed on or before November 17, 2006; and GRANTS the state judicial defendants’ request for fees

and costs in the amount of $2,240, such fees and costs payable on or before November 17, 2006.

(Docket Nos. 11, 13 & 19). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 30 , 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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