Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02384/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02384-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEVEN LAWSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-02384-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on September 14, 2015 for a hearing on 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim based on a 

cognizable legal theory and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After careful 

consideration of the parties’ briefing and oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS IN 

PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth 

below. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Steven Lawson (“Plaintiff”) worked as a welding technician for Dimetrics 

Incorporated, which contracted with Defendant General Electric Company (“Defendant”) 

to have Plaintiff and other welders provide welding services on Defendant’s nuclear power 

plants throughout the United States and internationally, namely on Defendant’s Boiling 

Water Reactors (“BWRs”). Compl. ¶¶ 9, 19. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant: (i) failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate safety 

measures, id. ¶¶ 11, 20, 21, 25; (ii) violated safety protocol with regard to the condition of 

piping systems during repairs, id. ¶ 12; (iii) required Plaintiff to return to work while 

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knowing that repeated radiation exposure would prevent Plaintiff from being able to 

receive medical x-rays in the future, id. ¶ 13; (iv) disregarded the extent and severity of 

Plaintiff’s previous radiation exposure when sending Plaintiff to work in its nuclear 

reactors, id. ¶ 14; (v) purposefully misinformed Plaintiff and other employees about 

potential long term health effects of repeated radiation exposure, id. ¶¶ 15, 24; (vi) welded 

its BWRs improperly such that Plaintiff was exposed to excessive radiation while fixing 

the BWRs, id. ¶¶ 17, 18; (vii) failed to ensure proper and safe working conditions for 

Plaintiff and other employees, id. ¶ 21; and (viii) violated the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s (“NRC”) radiation exposure safety guidelines by engaging in a deceptive 

accounting of Plaintiff’s and other employees’ annual radiation exposure, id. ¶¶ 22, 23. 

Plaintiff suffers from brain degeneration with dementia, allegedly as a result of 

repeated exposure to excessive amounts of radiation. Id. ¶ 27. Defendant filed this 

Motion to Dismiss on July 24, 2015, on two separate bases: first, that Plaintiff’s six state 

law claims are based on standards of care and theories of liability that are preempted by the 

Price-Anderson Act; and second, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Mot. 

to Dismiss at 1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A. Failure to State a Claim

Rule 12(b)(6) requires a court to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff’s allegations 

fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A court 

may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for one of two reasons: (1) if it lacks a 

cognizable legal theory; or (2) if it lacks sufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility does not equate to probability, but it 

requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact 

as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts are not, 

however, “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or 

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 

court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A party may raise this defense by 

filing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1). 

“A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that it has 

satisfied the ‘case-or-controversy’ requirement of Article III of the Constitution [and] 

standing is a ‘core component’ of that requirement.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “To satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement, [a 

plaintiff] needs to show that he has suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to 

the challenged action of [the defendant], and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable 

decision.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, the court must accept as true 

all material allegations of the complaint and construe the complaint in favor of the 

complaining party. Lema v. Courtyard Marriott Merced, 873 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1267 

(E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975)). 

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Price-Anderson Preemption 

Congress established a “comprehensive federal framework” for the nuclear power 

industry in 1946 by enacting the Atomic Energy Act, which gave the Atomic Energy 

Commission authority to regulate nuclear power plants. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.; Roberts 

v. Florida Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). Congress enacted 

the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 “to protect the public and to encourage the development of 

the atomic energy industry.” Pub. L. No. 85-256, §1, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). The enactment 

addressed the issue of private utility companies’ reluctance to enter the field of atomic 

energy due to the “risk of potentially vast liability in the event of a nuclear accident.” See 

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64 (1978). The PriceAnderson Act fosters development of the nuclear industry by protecting both investors in 

the nuclear industry and victims of exposure through a system of liability limitation, 

indemnification, and insurance coverage requirements. The Act has been amended three 

times, including in 1988 when Congress created federal jurisdiction for public liability 

actions arising from nuclear incidents. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). 

1. Plaintiff Alleges a Public Liability Action Under the PriceAnderson Act 

Under Price-Anderson, a public liability action is “any suit asserting public 

liability.” 42 U.S.C. §2014(hh). Public liability means, in pertinent part, “any legal 

liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.” Id. at § 2014(w). A nuclear 

incident is “any occurrence ... causing ... bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss 

of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the 

radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or 

byproduct material.” Id. at § 2014(q). To fall under the purview of “nuclear incident,” the 

occurrence must either occur within the United States, or if it occurs outside of the United 

States, it must involve “source, special nuclear, or byproduct material owned by, and used 

by or under contract with, the United States.” Id.

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A “nuclear incident” need not be a large scale accident or other extraordinary 

occurrence, as evidenced by the legislative history of the language of the statute. Gassie v. 

SMH Swiss Corp., No. CV-97-3557, 1998 WL 71647 at *5-6 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 1998) 

(Congress changed language from “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” to “any nuclear 

incident” in 1988 amendment). Courts have construed the phrase “nuclear incident”

broadly, finding public liability actions regardless of the size of the occurrence or whether 

the incident involves atomic energy. See, e.g., Gassie at *6 (holding that tritium leaking 

from Swatch watches constitutes a nuclear incident under Price-Anderson). Thus, 

Plaintiff’s alleged exposure to radiation on the job is enough to constitute a nuclear 

incident in this case. 

2. Price-Anderson Is Not a Complete Preemption Statute

At issue in this case is the extent of the preemptive force of the Price-Anderson Act. 

Plaintiff contends that the Ninth Circuit has not conclusively spoken on the issue, unlike 

other circuits that have held that Price-Anderson categorically preempts state tort claims. 

In response to Defendant’s citation of two Ninth Circuit cases1, Plaintiff distinguished the 

cases by stating that the Court’s attention was not directed at the issue of preemption, but 

rather at whether Price-Anderson’s reach included claims that were absent physical injury. 

Defendant contends through briefing and oral argument that Price-Anderson is a complete 

preemption statute. 

It is well settled that “the safety of nuclear technology [is] the exclusive business of 

the Federal Government.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & 

Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 208 (1983). However, that statement does not extend so far 

as to preempt every claim related to nuclear power. The Price-Anderson Act, while 

creating the “public liability action” as a federal cause of action, also requires that the 

substantive rules of decision to be applied in such cases “shall be derived from the law of 

 

1

In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2002); Dumontier v. Schlumberger 

Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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the state in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with 

the provisions of” the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). 

Thus, Price-Anderson does not categorically preempt all claims in the field of 

nuclear safety; it merely preempts those that are inconsistent. See, e.g. Corcoran v. New 

York Power Auth., 935 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (state law claim for fraudulent 

concealment not inconsistent with Price-Anderson); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 273 F. 

Supp. 2d 1175 (D. Colo. 2003) (landowners’ trespass and nuisance claims not preempted 

by Price-Anderson); Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F. Supp. 211 (D. 

Me. 1996) (fraud, IIED and battery claims not preempted because safety standards had no 

bearing on defendant’s liability for intentional acts); Joseph v. Sweet, 125 F. Supp. 2d 573 

(D. Mass. 2000) (procedure of pre-filing screening of complaints by tribunal to decrease 

frivolous claims not inconsistent with Price-Anderson). 

3. Standards of Care That Conflict with Price-Anderson Are 

Preempted 

Courts have interpreted the effect of Price-Anderson’s “hybrid” provision as 

allowing state claims to proceed, but only so long as the measure of the defendant’s duty is 

proscribed by federal safety regulations setting forth radiation exposure limits. See, e.g., 

Roberts, 146 F.3d at 1308 (“federal safety regulations conclusively establish the duty of 

care owed in a public liability action”); O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 

1090, 1105 (7th Cir. 1994) (“federal regulations must provide the sole measure of the 

defendants’ duty in a public liability cause of action”); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation 

Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007); In re TMI Gen. Publ. Utils. Corp., 67 F.3d 

1103, 1115-16 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1154 (1996). The dose limits are an 

attempt to reconcile public and worker safety with the inevitable reality that “radiation 

workers of necessity will receive some low level radiation exposure because some 

exposure is an unavoidable aspect of working in a radiation area.” O’Conner v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 748 F. Supp. 672, 678 (C.D. Ill. 1990). 

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The Ninth Circuit has stated that “federal law preempts states from imposing a more 

stringent standard of care than federal safety standards.” Hanford, 534 F.3d at 1003. In 

Hanford, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the defendants were 

subject to strict liability, but only because at the time the incident occurred (the early 

1940s) there were no federal standards governing emission levels in existence. Id. at 1004. 

The court suggested, however, that if federal standards had existed, they would have 

preempted state-derived standards of care. Id. 

The reasonableness standard of care cannot remain the standard for a public liability 

action, because to allow a reasonableness standard would “put juries in charge of deciding 

the permissible levels of radiation exposure and, more generally, the adequacy of safety 

procedures at nuclear plants – issues that have explicitly been reserved to the federal 

government.” TMI, 67 F.3d at 1115, citing Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 212; see also

Hanford, 534 F.3d at 1003 (allowing jury to decide on basis of reasonableness standard 

“would undermine the purpose of a comprehensive and exclusive federal scheme for 

nuclear incident liability”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence claim may proceed, but it 

becomes the “public liability action” created by Price-Anderson, with the sole duty of care 

provided by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.2

Plaintiff alleges six state law causes of action based on theories of liability that are 

inconsistent with Price-Anderson. Plaintiff’s first cause of action – negligence – is not 

entirely preempted but asserts duties that are more stringent than the federal dose limits. 

See Compl. ¶ 31, 33, 41. Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action are preempted by 

Price-Anderson because they are based on the theory of strict liability. See O’Connor v. 

Boeing N. Am. Inc., Nos. CV-97-1554-DT et al., 2005 WL 6035255 at *43 (C.D. Cal. Aug 

18, 2005) (“Strict liability is inconsistent with Price-Anderson if it would enable a plaintiff 

 

2

Plaintiff alleges that the occupational radiation exposure limit applicable to Plaintiff is 5 

Rem (5000 MR) of radiation annually, as provided by 10 C.F.R. § 20.1201(a)(1). Compl. 

¶ 33. Defendant argues that the limits may be different depending on the specific dates of 

any nuclear incidents. Mot. to Dismiss at 2 n.1. This Court agrees with Defendant that the 

applicable limits will depend on the dates of the incidents. See TMI, 67 F.3d at 1108 n.10 

(court applying regulations in place at time of the accident).

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to recover from a defendant in a public liability action[] without first establishing that the 

defendant breached a federally imposed duty of care.”). Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action –

premises liability – is similarly preempted because the claim would enable Plaintiff to 

recover without Defendant having breached the dose limits. Plaintiff’s fifth cause of 

action – negligence per se – asserts statutory standards of care that are not the federal dose 

limits; therefore, it is preempted. See Compl. ¶ 64. Finally, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of 

action – loss of consortium – is a derivative claim, so it is also preempted to the extent that 

it is based on any of the preempted state law causes of action. See Koller v. Pinnacle W. 

Capital Corp., No. CV-06-2031-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 446357 at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb 6, 2007). 

B. Venue Under Price-Anderson 

Defendant also alleges that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s Price-Anderson claims. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the subject matter 

jurisdiction provision of Price-Anderson does not allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction 

over claims that do not allege a nuclear incident occurring in the Northern District. 

Plaintiff alleges that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to these 

claims occurred in this District.” Compl. ¶ 1. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff worked 

on Defendant’s nuclear power plants “through the United States, including California, 

New York, Vermont and internationally, including Spain.” Id. ¶ 3. 

The pertinent provision of the Price-Anderson Act states: 

With respect to any public liability action arising out of or 

resulting from a nuclear incident, the United States district 

court in the district where the nuclear incident takes place, or 

in the case of a nuclear incident taking place outside the United 

States, the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, shall have original jurisdiction without regard to 

the citizenship of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon 

motion of the defendant or of the Commission, or the 

Secretary, as appropriate, any such action pending in any State 

court . . . or United States district court shall be removed or 

transferred to the United States district court having venue 

under this subsection. Process of such district court shall be 

effective throughout the United States.”

42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (emphasis added). 

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Plaintiff contends that Congress did not intend Section 2210(n)(2) to be the sole 

source of federal jurisdiction. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1135 

(10th Cir. 2010); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1505 (10th Cir. 1997) 

(“[E]xclusive jurisdiction is not conferred unless conferred explicitly.”). In Kerr-McGee, 

the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Congress may have chosen to 

leave state courts with jurisdiction (instead of creating exclusive federal jurisdiction 

through Section 2210(n)(2)) for efficiency reasons. 115 F.3d at 1505. The Court noted 

that because Price-Anderson provides that the federal substantive rule of decision in a 

public liability action remains “based in part on state law,” it would make sense that 

Congress intended to leave some public liability action claims in state court. Id. 

Thus, what Defendant mischaracterizes as a bar to this Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction is actually a venue issue. Plaintiff alleges nuclear incidents in multiple 

districts; thus, analogizing to general venue rules, venue would be proper in any district 

where a nuclear incident occurred. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (“a civil action may 

be brought in ... a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to the claim occurred”). Accepting all material allegations of fact in the 

Complaint as true, this Court finds that venue is proper in the Northern District of 

California at this point in the proceedings. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that this Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over this case. However, the Price-Anderson Act preempts the 

standards of care asserted in Plaintiff’s state law causes of action; therefore Plaintiff’s 

claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendant’s motion to dismiss therefore is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

//

//

//

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Plaintiff may amend the complaint to assert a public liability action, or any cause of 

action that does not conflict with the Price-Anderson Act, and shall do so on or before 

October 7, 2015. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 09/23/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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