Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01116/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14CR2625/16CV1116-LAB

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

vs. VACATE SENTENCE

DARRYL ANGELO WILSON,

Defendant.

Darryl Angelo Wilson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was to sentenced to 120 months in custody in July 2015. His

sentence was enhanced because he had previously been convicted of two “controlled

substance offenses,” which denominated him a Career Offender under the Sentencing

Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”), § 4B1.1(a) and § 4B1.2

(defining the term). Wilson waived his right to appeal in exchange for sentencing

concessions from the government, so his sentence became final when the Court signed the

Judgment on July 13, 2015. 

Wilson has now filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that the Supreme

Court’s recent ruling in Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)

requires that his sentence be vacated. In Johnson, the Court held that part of the Armed

Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) – in particular, language in the so-called “residual

clause” that authorized a sentence enhancement based on a finding that a defendant’s prior

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conviction “present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” – was

unconstitutionally vague and could not be relied on to support a sentence enhancement.

But the holding in Johnson doesn’t implicate the definition of “controlled substance

offense” in section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines because that definition does not

include the forbidden residual clause language. Instead, section 4B1.2(b) says a “controlled

substance offense” is one that prohibits manufacturing, importing, exporting, distributing,

dispersing, or offering to sell a controlled substance or possessing a controlled substance

with the intent to do the same. Enhancing a defendant’s sentence because he has been

convicted of a prior controlled substance offense is proper when the elements of the prior

conviction match the generic definition of “controlled substance offense” under the section

4B1.2(b) definition. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).

Before he was sentenced in this case, Wilson was convicted of selling cocaine in

violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11352(a), and of conspiring to distribute

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). PSR at 10. This Court previously found

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that both offenses matched the generic federal definition of a “controlled substance offense”

– the federal offense categorically and the state offense under the modified categorical test

of Taylor. See United States v. Lee, 704 F.3d 785, 790 (9th Cir. 2012) (violation of H&S

§11352(a) by selling cocaine base falls squarely within the definition of“controlled substance

offense”); United States v. Stewart, 761 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (treating 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) as a “controlled substance offense”); United States v. Carr, 56 F.3d 38 (9th Cir.

1995) (same). See also United States v. Shumate, 329 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“controlled substance offense” includes conspiring to commit the offense; § 4B1.2,

comment (n.1)). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

“PSR refers to the Presentence Report filed in Wilson’s case on February 19, 2015. 1

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Johnson is inapposite to Wilson’s case – the Court didn’t rely on any version of any

“residual clause” in imposing his sentence. His motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 27, 2016

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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