Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_92-cv-00596/USCOURTS-azd-4_92-cv-00596-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MIRIAM FLORES, individually and as

parent of Miriam Flores, a minor child, et

al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 92-596-TUC-RCC

ORDER “WO”

On Oct ober 31, 2005, the Court took under advisement a request made by Plaintiffs

for sanctions due to the State of Arizona's failure t o take action to comply with the Court

Order (Docket No. 296), that found that English Language Learners (“ELL”) programs must

be funded in a manner that is not arbit rary and capricious. Also, the Court took under

advisement the following motions: Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions and

Request for Accelerat ed Determination Re: Consideration of Federal Funds (Docket No.

303), and the Opposition of ACEC and AGC t o Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions (Docket

No. 300). 

The Court was also asked to preclude the State from requiring ELL students to pass

the Arizona's Inst rument to Measure Standards (“AIMS”) test as a necessary criteria to

receive a diploma and graduate from high school until the State has properly funded ELL

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programs for a sufficient p eriod of time to provide ELL students with a meaningful

opportunity to achieve the State's academic standards that are measured by the AIMS test.

Defendants have asked the Court for an advisory opinion to decide the status of

federal funds in relation to the determination regarding the adequacy of ELL funding.

Plaint iffs have asked the Court for attorney's fees for their continued efforts in trying to get

the State to comply with its legal obligations to fund ELL programs properly.

The Court has reviewed this case from its inception which was 1992. Thousands

of children who have now been impacted by the State's continued inadequate funding of

ELL programs had yet to begin school when Plaintiffs filed this case. After extensive

lawyering on both sides, the case finally resulted in Judge Marquez deciding in February

2000, that the method used by the State for funding ELL programs bore no rational

relationship to the actual cost of providing such programs and was inadequately funded

in an arbitrary and capricious manner that was violative of the Equal Education

Opportunity Act (“EEOA”) of 1974.

The legislature in the first instance decided after some prodding by both the Plaintiff

and the Court, that they would do a cost study for determining the amounts necessary to

achieve this purpose. In December of 2001, the legislature passed House Bill (“HB”) 2010.

This bill was to be an interim measure that would allow for t he study to be completed and

for the legislature to have time to pass the necessary legislation to comply with the Court's

order. Ultimately, with the Court's consent, the legislature gave itself nearly three years to

accomplish this process. In January 2005, Plaintiffs approached the Court to complain that

the study had yet to be completed and that they believed more than enough time had

passed for the legislature to complete its obligation. 

On January 28, 2005, the Court gave the State until the close of the 2005 legislative

session to comply with the Court's Order and essentially to fulfill its promise to set the

app rop riat e funding for ELL programs. When the Court issued that Order, it had already

been asked by t he Plaintiffs to apply sanctions for the State's failure to live up to its

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obligat ion. It was with that backdrop that the Court gave the legislature and the State one

last chance to comply with Judge Marquez' Order of February 2000.

Defendants allege that they take their obligation to establish adequate funding for

ELL programs very seriously. Defendants assert that due to good faith differences

between the States' executive and legislative branches as it pertains to the needs of the

ELL students, they were unable to enact the legislat ion contemplated by the January 28,

2005, Court order. Defendants argues that their non-compliance does not equate to

“indifference” as asserted by the Plaintiffs' Motion for sanctions.

The legislature passed HB 2718 at the end of the 2005 session, and the Governor

vetoed it because she believed it was inadequate to comp ly with the Court's Order. Not

much activity has transpired since. The legislature believes that it has complied with the

Court's Order. The Governor disagrees. Whether or not the legislative or executive branch

is right or wrong and whet her or not either has acted in good faith is of no moment because

nearly six years have passed since the Court issued t he original Order requiring the State

to establish adequate funding for ELL programs. 

The Court can only imagine how many students have started school since Judge

Marquez entered the Order in February 2000, declaring these programs were inadequately

funded in an arbitrary and capricious manner that violates ELL st udents' rights under the

EEOA. How many students may have stopped school, by dropping out or failing because

of foot-dragging by the State and its failure to comply with t he original Order and

compliance directives such as the Order issued on January 28, 2005? Plaintiffs are no

longer inclined to depend on the good faith of the Defendants or to have faith that without

some extraordinary pressure, the State will ever comply with the mandates of the respective

Orders issued by this Court. 

Plaintiffs cont end that after nearly six years, it is clear that using Court Ordered

deadlines is not an effective means for enforcing the State's compliance wit h t he EEOA of

1974 and this Court's declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs assert that the est ablishment of yet

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anot her deadline by this Court will not guarantee relief. As such, Plaintiffs argue, that this

Court must consider more meaningful sanct ions as a coercive measure to ensure the State's

full and swift compliance and provide ELL students with the rights to which they are

entitled under the law.

I. Motion for Injunctive Relief

Plaint iffs assert that in 1991, the State Board of Education adopted academic

standards that prescribed the content knowledge in subjects including reading, writing and

mat hematics that students should master at every grade level. Plaintiffs also assert t hat

after the adoption of the academic st andards, legislation was enacted that required the

State Board of Education to adopt a competency test as a p rerequisite to graduation from

high school. A.R.S. § 15-701.01(A)(3). The AIMS test is designed to measure student

achievement of the State Board adopted academic st andards in reading, writing and

mathematics. A.R.S. § 15-741. 

Plaint iffs contend, regardless of their performance, requiring ELL students to pass

the AIM S test to graduate while being denied the equal participation guaranteed to them

under federal law, is patently unfair. Plaintiffs assert that this case was filed to protect the

rights of ELL students under the EEOA to equal part icip at ion in instructional programs.

20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). As such, Plaint iffs argue that the relief this Motion seeks is necessary

to ensure that ELL students are not harmed any further by the State's intransigence as it

pertains to the Court's order and the law. 

Plaintiffs assert that regardless of AIMS test scores, ELL students have been

attending schools with ELL programs that this Court declared are illegally underfunded.

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue, it is unfair to those students that they be required to pass

a graduation test that is premised on a system in which all students have the same

opportunity to achieve the State's academic standards. Plaintiffs further argue that the

relief requested in this motion would be necessary even if ELL students as a group , were

performing as well as, or better than, their peers on the AIMS test. 

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1

In Debra P., the Court det ermined that, in part, the failures of black students taking

the test could be attributed to the unequal education they received during the period when

Florida maintained a dual school system based on race. 

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 Plaintiffs st at e that the ELL failure rate is more than three times the failure rate of

English proficient students. Plaint iffs contend that 82% of ELL students continue to fail

the AIMS test in reading and 81% ELL students continue to fail in writ ing. As such,

Plaintiffs argue without adequately funded programs, ELL students cannot be expected to

succeed t o the same extent as their peers until the language barriers that impede their equal

participation are removed as required by the EEOA. 

Plaintiffs argue that this Court should exercise its broad equitable powers t o p rotect

ELL st udent s from permanent and irreparable harm due to the State's continuing failure to

comply with t he Court's judgment and the EEOA. Plaintiffs argue that if past discrimination

is sufficient for the exercise of the Court's equitable powers, then the current discrimination

that is visited on ELL students by the State should be more than sufficient t o invoke the

Court 's equitable powers to protect ELL students. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S.

265, 276 (1990). 

Here, Plaint iffs argue that courts have enjoined the administration of high stakes

graduation tests when their application would be unfair or perpetuate past discrimination.

Debra P. v . Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). In, Debra P., the Court enjoined the

administration of the graduation test on bot h due p rocess and equal protection grounds.1

Plaintiffs argue that the applicat ion of Debra P., in this case is clear. Plaintiffs contend

that just as it was unfair to punish black students for deficiencies created by the dual

school system in Debra P., it would be equally unfair t o p unish ELL students for the

deficiencies caused by Arizona's continuing failure t o adequately fund ELL programs. As

such, Plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin t he State from requiring ELL students to pass

the AIMS test in order to graduate from high school. Additionally, Plaintiffs request t hat

the AIMS test not be used to preclude ELL students from graduat ing unt il ELL programs

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The Court then stated, “Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint did not include the

AIMS Challenge; nevertheless, the Court heard the parties' argument s and finds that

Plaintiffs failed to present evidence at trial to make a prima facie case of disparate impact.”

See also Lau v. Nicols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 

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“The State Board has also det ermined that in order to receive high school diplomas,

all students in the Arizona public school system, except those with certain disabilities,

must earn satisfactory AAS/Essential Skills scores on the AIMS tests, effective in 2000-

2001.” Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp 2d 937, 956 (D. Ariz. 1999). 

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have been adequately funded for a sufficient period of time so that ELL students will have

a meaningful opportunity to achieve the academic standards that are assessed by the

AIMS test. 

 Defendants assert that the AIMS issue raised by the Plaintiffs was rejected by the

Court in 1999. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs did not appeal that decision and

cannot now circumvent that ruling by claiming they are entitled to the same result as a way

of enforcing compliance with the Court's EEOA ruling. Defendants also contend t hat

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof as it pertains to the AIMS test. 

Defendants contend that the Court prefaced its January 2000 Order by noting that

the August 1999 trial “addressed only two specific issues ... 1) whether or not Defendants'

[sic] adequat ely fund and oversee the LAU program in NUSD, and 2) whether or not the

AIMS test disparately impacts minority students at NUSD.” Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp.

2d 1225, 1226 (D. Ariz. 1999).2

 Finally, Defendants argue that although Arizona is

ap p roaching t he first year in which passing the AIMS test will be a requirement for

graduation from high school for all students, this is a fact that Plaint iffs knew six years

ago.3 

Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are reduced to arguing that they are

entitled to relief because ELL students attend schools that this Court declared are illegally

underfunded. Defendants argue that this logic is incorrect for t wo reasons. First, it would

effect ively allow Plaintiffs to use their victory on their EEOA claim as a basis for getting

relief on the AIMS clam that they lost. Second, passing the AIMS test is not the only

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4

Debra P., 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981).

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Debra P., 730 F.2d at 1407 (citing Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. at 244, 267)

(M.D. Fla. 1979); cf. Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 251, 253-54 (W.D.

Tex. 1992) (upholding exit exam requirement and distinguishing Turlington because “In

this case, students in Texas have known for seven y ears that they must pass a

comprehensive examination before receiving their diplomas.”). 

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graduation requirement for Arizona students including ELL students. There are a number

of graduation requirements, for example, a minimum number of credits that students must

successfully complete. Defendants contend that under Plaintiffs' arguments, if the AIMS

test ing requirement is not imposed on ELL students this year, it should not have been

imposed at any time over the past 5 years. 

Defendants argue that granting relief requested by Plaintiffs might actually create

rather than eliminate impermissible disparate treatment and thus possibly raise equal

protection issues. Defendants contend the non-application of the AIMS test would raise

significant equal protection issues because ELL students would be exempt from passing

the AIMS test, however, the AIMS test graduation requirement would stand for all nonELL students. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs not only failed to present a prima facie claim, but

they failed to even explain how requiring ELL students to pass the AIMS test to graduate

violates due process and equal protection rights. Defendants argue that in Debra P., the

Court initially concluded that due process concerns were implicated because the testing

requirement was imposed at “the eleventh hour.”4

 Unlike Debra P., Defendants argue,

Ariz ona students have had nearly ten years notice that passing the AIMS test would

become a graduation requirement. Defendants further state that the underly ing district

court decision in Debra P. found four to six years sufficient.5

 Defendants contend that

Debra P. did find an equal protection violation that was based on the trial court's finding

that black students' poor performance on the exit exams was related to Florida's relatively

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“The level of education and academic achievement necessary to obtain a diploma

... is appropriately a judgment call for the person elected for that state responsibility and

those experienced persons responsible for educating and preparing students to achieve

the established level of competence. Any interference in this process is simply destructive

to the at t emp t s by the state to salvage its educational system, and this includes

interference by the federal judiciary.” 796 F. Supp. at 256. 

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recent operat ion of a school system segregated on the basis of race. However, Defendants

argue, no such claim has been made here. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to mention that, upon remand, the district

court lifted its injunction against the use of high stakes testing. Debra P. v . Turlington,

564 F. Supp. 177, 189 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd 730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984). Defendants state

the court did so because of its decision that the Florida test was “constitutionally

impermissible only if the disproportionate failure rate among black students is due to the

learning deficit s created by the past segregation of the Florida public schools or its

effects.” Id. at 188. 

Defendants argue student s have known for years that passage of the AIMS test

would eventually be required for graduation; students have five separate op p ort unities to

p ass the test; and the State has made available tutoring funds for remedial efforts designed

to help student s, including ELL students, who may need additional assistance.

Additionally, Defendants argue, under recently enacted legislation, st udents graduating

in 2006 or 2007 will be able to apply grades received in some high school classes to

augment their AIMS test scores. A.R.S. § 15-701.01. 

 Defendants state t hat the Tenth Amendment requires that the Court should give

due deference to the State's decision t o require students to pass the AIMS test.

Defendants argue that in the absence of proof of discrimination, courts are rightly reluctant

to int erfere with the great latitude given the States in the area of education. Defendants

state that even t he cases Plaintiffs cite acknowledge this principle. Also, Defendants argue

that the Williams court acknowledged this principle in its analysis. 6 Defendants submit

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that Plaintiffs have failed to prove the extraordinary circumstances that would warrant the

extraordinary interference they seek. As such, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion

seeks a remedy for a claim that they not only have not proved, but that has been rejected.

 Defendants' request that Plaintiffs' motion be denied. 

 As an alternative, Plaintiffs assert, Defendant's lack of concern for Arizona's ELL

students and lack of respect for t his Court's orders, the Court should enjoin the receipt of

federal highway funds. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to delay the p roposed sanctions for

at least 30 day s from the issuance of the Court's order so that the Defendants have an

opportunity to enact the remedial legislation that is required.

The Court views their request for injunctive relief as different and distinct from

determining that the AIMS test is biased or has a disparate effect . This is about requiring

something of ELL students for which the State has failed to provide the proper foundation

and for which the State still wishes t o require ELL students to nevertheless hold up the

walls. 

Plaintiffs submission that more than 80% of ELL students in high school have failed

the AIMS graduat ion test is adequate for injunctive relief in light of the egregious delay

in complying with the Court's Orders. Until Defendants make the appropriations required

for properly funding ELL programs, the State is requiring something of ELL students for

which the State has failed to provide the proper foundation. The Court's finding t hat t he

AIMS test be enjoined for ELL st udent s is based soley on the facts of this case, and the

February 2000 Order, and is not to be construed as any broad characterization of whether

or not the AIMS test has a disparate effect on limited English speaking students. 

II. Defendant's Request for Court to Make a Ruling

 Defendant s allege that monies made available through No Child Left Behind

(“ NCLB”) and other funds are now a significant part of the ELL landscape. Defendant s

argue t hat the Court should decide whether and to what extent those federal funds can be

used in determining the adequacy of ELL funding in Arizona. Defendants assert that in

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7

Flores, 172 F. Supp.2d at 1236-7(D. Ariz. 2000). 

8

No Child Left Behind Act, P.L. 107-110, Secs. 1114(a)(2)(B), 3115(g). 

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their resp onse to Plaintiffs' motion for injunction on January 9, 2002, they stated that the

NCLB “will significantly affect public education in general and the provision of language

acquisition programs.” Defendants contend that the issue of whet her HB 2010 should be

evaluated by considering all available funding for ELL programs, including that provided

by federal funds was not addressed by the Court. Defendants further argue that in the

Court's January 28, 2005, Order, it did not say whet her Federal funds may be considered

in deciding whether the State has “appropriately and constitutionally” funded its ELL

programs. 

Plaintiffs contend that federal funding was addressed at t he trial in this case and

discussed in the Court's judgment.7

 Plaintiffs state that Defendants request for the Court

to consider federal funding is an attempt to relitigate issues that the Court has already

decided. Plaintiffs argue that statutorily, federal funds must supplement and not supplant

t he St at e's obligation.8 Moreover, Plaintiffs argue if the Court were to take time to issue an

advisory opinion in this matter, its only outcome would be more delay and would not

resolve anything at all. 

The Court agrees. The Court sees this issue as a request to issue an advisory

opinion and declines to do the same. 

Plaint iffs state that the Court should award their attorney's fees due to Defendant's

non-compliance with the Court's judgment on January 28, 2000. Plaintiffs allege that for

nearly six years the State has done nothing to comply with the Court's judgment. Plaintiffs

argue that after the Court ordered t he State to perform a cost study in October of 2000, the

State took no action even though the cost study was performed. Also, Plaint iffs cont end

that they returned to the Court to establish a deadline for compliance in August of 2004

however, the cost study was not submitted. As a result , Plaintiffs state they returned

again t o the Court in an effort to ensure compliance. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the St at e

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has failed to comply and request the Court to award attorney's fees and costs for the work

related to enforcement of the Court's orders that they have performed on this case since

judgment was issued on January 24, 2000.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court has jurisdiction over the present action against Defendants by its order

dated January 28, 2005, and under the Declaratory Judgment Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-1831 et seq.,

A.R.S. § 12-864, and Rule 65 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

“Courts have inherent p ower to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through

civil contempt.” Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). This p ower has been

relied on to hold city and state legislatures in contempt. See Spallone v. United States, 493

U.S. 265, 276 (1990). “When a district court's order is necessary to remedy past

discrimination, t he court has an additional basis for the exercise of broad equitable

powers.” Id. However, these powers are not unlimited, and the Court is obliged to use the

“least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” Id. quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19

U.S. 204, 231 (1821). In devising a remedy, the Court must take into account the interests

of State and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the

Constitution. Id. 

A dist rict court has the power to adjudge in civil contempt any person who willfully

disobeys a specific and definite order of the court. Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263, 265

(9th Cir. 1984). However, the contempt does not need to be willful and there is no good

faith exception to the requirement of obedience to a court order. In re Dual-Deck Video

Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litigation, 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993). A court has wide

latitude in determining whether there has been cont emp tuous defiance of its order. Gifford,

741 F.2d at 266. A party should not be held in contempt if the “action appears to be based

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on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the [court's order].” quoting Vertex

Distrib., Inc. v. Falcon Foam Plastics, Inc., 689 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1982). “Substantial

compliance” with the court order is a defense t o civil contempt. Id. The party alleging civil

contempt must demonstrate the alleged contempt or violation of the court's order by clear

and convincing evidence, not a preponderance of the evidence. Id. While the set of rules

the court should use is easy to articulat e, t hey may be difficult to apply. Id. The court

should determine (1) that the party violated the court order, (2) beyond substant ial

compliance, (3) not based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the order, (4) by

clear and convincing evidence. Id.. The record in this case supports that the Plaintiffs

have passed this test. 

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

It is therefore t he judgement of the court that the State has failed to comply with this

Court's Order, and the Court will apply appropriate sanctions. The Plaintiffs have asked

the Court to enjoin the State from receipt of federal highway funds as a sanction. The

Court does not think this is an appropriate remedy. 

The American Council of Engineering Companies of Arizona and Associated

General Contractors of America, Arizona Chapter (“Intervenors”) argue that Plaintiffs'

motion for sanctions are not related to Arizona's highway funding. Also, Intervenors

assert that the Plaintiffs' request for sanctions is made without considerat ion or respect

of the limitations on the authority of the Court both as a matter of applicable law, inherent

powers of equity, and t he Constitution of the United States. Intervenors further argue that

if the relief sought by Plaintiffs is granted, it would have a direct, immediate, and significant

impact on Intervenors' member firms.

The Court must use the least possible power to the end proposed. The remedy the

Plaintiffs request, enjoining federal highway funds, has no relationship to ELL students.

If the Court were to enjoin federal educational funds, it would not only harm ELL students,

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it would hurt all students in the Arizona school system. Therefore, the Court will DENY

Plaintiffs' request to enjoin the receipt of federal highway funds as a sanction. 

During the October 2005 hearing, mention was made whether someone should go

to jail. Under the circumstances, this is not an appropriate remedy at this time.

The Court has been asked by the Plaintiffs to enjoin the state from requiring that

ELL students be subject to passing the AIMS test as a graduation requirement until such

time as ELL student's education have been funded at an appropriate level and have had

appropriate time to benefit from such funding.

The state of Arizona has spent a great deal of t ime dealing with the AIMS situation

and revised the test several ways to increase the passage rates of those students who are

required to take it. However, the State has failed to comp ly wit h t he Court's judgment for

almost six years by under-funding ELL programs, which would provide ELL students with

the necessary tools to pass the AIMS test. The Stat e's offering tutoring outside the

classroom and other things to all students for the purpose of p assing the AIMS test does

not remedy the fact that the under-funded ELL programs deprive ELL students of an equal

opportunity to pass the AIMS test in the first instance. 

The Court therefore GRANTS the injunction for relief requested by the Plaintiff and

orders that ELL students not be required to pass the AIMS test to secure their dip loma

until the St ate has properly funded ELL programs and there has been sufficient time to

allow ELL students to compete equally on the test. 

SANCTIONS

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that until Defendants fully comply with the mandates of the

February 2000 Order, the State is enjoined from requiring ELL Students to pass the AIMS

test as a requirement for graduating from high school. 

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FURTHER, it is ordered t hat upon full compliance, the State may file a motion to lift

the injunction and present evidence as to the reasonable time ELL students should remain

exempt from the AIMS test as a requirement for high school graduation.

FURTHER, it is ordered that the legislature has 15 calendar days after the beginning

of the 2006 legislat ive session to comply with the January 28, 2005 Court order. Everyday

thereafter and for the ensuing 30 days that t he St at e fails to comply with this Order, a

$500,000 per day fine for the next 30 days will be imposed unt il t he State is in compliance.

FURTHER, if after that , t he St at e has still not complied, the Court will impose a $1

million dollar per day fine for the following 30 days until the State is in compliance .

FURTHER, if after that, the State has still not complied, the Court will impose a $1.5

million dollar per day fine until the end of the 2006 legislative session.

FURTHER, if after that, the St at e has not complied by the end of the 2006 legislative

session, a $2 million dol l ar p er day fine will be imposed until the State has complied with

the January 28, 2005 Court order. 

FURTHER, it is therefore ordered that Defendants' are to pay Plaintiffs' reasonable

attorney's fees for the time period beginning after the January 28, 2005, Court order.

Plaintiffs counsel is to submit calculat ions for said attorney's fees and a proposed order

for the Court to approve. 

DATED this 15th day of December, 2005.

Case 4:92-cv-00596-RCC Document 335 Filed 12/16/05 Page 14 of 14