Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00676/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00676-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TASHA R. FINLEY, 

Petitioner, 

v.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-08-0676-PHX-GMS (GEE)

 

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner Tasha

Finley, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. # 1.) On January 13, 2009, Magistrate

Judge Glenda E. Edmonds issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending

that the Petition be dismissed. (Dkt. # 23.) Petitioner filed objections to the R&R. (Dkt. ##

24, 25.) For the following reasons, the Court adopts the R&R of Magistrate Edmonds and

dismisses the Petition with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

On January 26, 1994, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder, attempted

armed robbery, first-degree burglary, kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

(Dkt. # 12 Ex. D.) On March 10, 1994, Petitioner was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment

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without the possibility of parole for 25 years pursuant to her first-degree murder conviction.

(Id. Ex. E.) Petitioner was also sentenced to 7.5 years pursuant to her attempted armed

robbery conviction, 10.5 years pursuant to her first-degree burglary conviction, 10.5 years

pursuant to her kidnapping conviction, and seven years pursuant to her conspiracy to commit

armed robbery conviction, each to run concurrently with the other sentences. (Id.) On

February 28, 1995, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner’s kidnapping conviction

and affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. (Id. Ex. I.) The R&R sets forth the

factual and procedural background of this case, to which neither party objected.

Accordingly, the Court adopts this background as an accurate recital.

In this § 2254 action, Petitioner asserts twelve different grounds for relief. (See Dkt.

# 1.) Magistrate Edmonds recommended that the Petition be dismissed because the Petition

is time-barred pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003)

(“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of factual and legal

issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”). District courts are not

required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of objection.”

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Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.”).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner filed objections to the R&R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (Dkt. # 24.)

Having conducted a de novo review of the record on all relevant matters, the Court rejects

Petitioner’s objections to the R& R.

The AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq., applies to this case because Petitioner’s federal

Petition was filed after the AEDPA’s effective date. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146,

1149 (9th Cir. 2003). The “AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitation on habeas

corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)

(“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to [a petition] for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”)). The limitation period

generally begins to run when the state conviction becomes final “by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A);

see White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Under the AEDPA . . . a state

prisoner must file his federal habeas corpus petition within one year of the date his state

conviction became final.”). However, while the date a conviction becomes final is the

normal commencement date for the habeas limitations period, the statute does provide an

exception for claims arising from changes in the law. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that

the period runs from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”

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While Petitioner does not object to the conclusion that she is time-barred if the

limitations period commenced when her conviction became final, Petitioner contends that

she is entitled to a later start date under § 2244(d)(1)(C) due to a “new rule” announced by

the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and Danforth v.

Minnesota, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008). (Dkt. # 24 at 1-2.) The Court, however,

agrees with Magistrate Edmonds’ conclusion that neither Crawford nor Danforth announced

a new retroactive rule within the purview of § 2244(d)(1)(C). As Magistrate Edmonds

explained, Danforth addresses only whether a state may extend broader effect to a new rule

than does federal retroactivity law. (See Dkt. 23 at 7); see also Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1031

(holding that “neither Linkletter [v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),] nor Teague [v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288 (1989),] explicitly or implicitly constrained the States’ authority to provide

remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal

habeas”). While the Supreme Court held, in Danforth, that “Crawford announced a ‘new

rule’ – as defined by Teague,”Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1031, the Court unambiguously held

in Whorton v. Blocking that the Court’s decision in Crawford “is [not] retroactive to cases

already final on direct review,” 549 U.S. 406, 407-09 (2007) (“Crawford announced a new

rule of criminal procedure that does not fall within the Teague exception for watershed

rules.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s objection is rejected and her claims are otherwise timebarred because her one-year limitations period under the AEDPA expired on October 28,

1997. (See Dkt. 23 at 5.) 

Petitioner also appears to argue that some of her claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” such that the “state must show that defendant knowingly,

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voluntarily, and intelligently waived the claim.” (Dkt. # 24 at 2.) Specifically, Petitioner

argues that she “cannot waive claims of ineffective assistance which were previously ignored

in her first notice.” (Id.) It appears that Petitioner is referencing the “sufficient constitutional

magnitude” exception, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 32.2 cmt., to the general rule that a defendant

may not raise any ground for relief in a Rule 32 petition that could have been raised in the

direct appeal or other collateral proceeding, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 32.2. While the Court

recognizes the existence of this exception under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, it does

not abrogate or modify the limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) for filing

federal habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 32.2. Therefore, to the

extent that Petitioner argues that her claims are immune from § 2244(d) because they can

only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, she is incorrect.

Finally, Petitioner argues that her lack of understanding of the legal system and her

lack of access to legal materials prevented her from filing a timely habeas petition. (Dkt. #

25 at 1.) These arguments in support of equitable tolling, however, were already addressed

by Magistrate Edmonds and are insufficient to toll the limitations period from October 28,

1997, the date on which the one-year limitations period expired, to April 7, 2008, the date

on which the Petition was filed with the Court. See Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th

Cir. 2000) (“[The petitioner] is young, has a limited education, and knows little about the

law. If these considerations delay the period of limitations until the prisoner has spent a few

years in the institutions’s law library, however, then § 2244(d)(1) might as well not exist; few

prisoners are lawyers.”). In respect to access to legal materials, Magistrate Edmonds noted

that “Prisoners . . . do not have a generalized constitutional right to legal materials or legal

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assistance.” (Dkt. # 23 at 5 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).) Moreover, “a

pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prisoner’s

misunderstanding of the law is insufficient to justify equitable tolling). 

In addition, Petitioner has not shown that her lack of understanding of the legal system

or limited access to legal materials were “but for and proximate cause[s]”of her delay in

filing her federal habeas petition. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2001); see

also Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Even if she

could, however, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate

that she “has been pursuing [her] rights diligently,” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005), and no such diligence is discernable from the record. Indeed, it appears that

Petitioner took no action whatsoever during a six-year period between the denial of her

untimely second Rule 32 petition (Dkt. # Exs. Z, AA) and her third Rule 32 petition (Id. Ex.

BB). Accordingly, Petitioner’s arguments fail.

CONCLUSION

Because Petitioner filed her habeas petitioner beyond the AEDPA limitations period,

and because she is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, her federal habeas petition is

barred. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. # 23) is

ADOPTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1) is

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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2009.

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