Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01808/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01808-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL GARIBAY,

Petitioner,

 v.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden,

 Respondent. ___________________________

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No. C 03-1808 CW (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Raul Garibay, a state prisoner incarcerated at

Pleasant Valley State Prison, filed this pro se petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a

conviction and sentence imposed by the Santa Clara County Superior

Court. 

On January 19, 2006, the Court ordered Respondent to show

cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed

an answer to the petition and a memorandum of points and

authorities and exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner has filed

a traverse to the answer and exhibits in support thereof. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the

Court DENIES the petition on all claims.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 20, 2000, a jury found Petitioner guilty of rape,

inflicting corporal punishment on a cohabitant, forcible sodomy,

assault with a deadly weapon, assault by means of force likely to

produce great bodily injury, felony false imprisonment and

exhibiting a deadly weapon. On November 3, 2000, Petitioner was

sentenced to a total of sixteen years in prison.

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2

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a

written opinion on September 5, 2002. Petitioner sought timely

review of the appellate court's decision. The California Supreme

Court denied review on November 15, 2002. 

On April 23, 2003, Petitioner timely filed the instant federal

habeas corpus petition in this Court. In an Order dated December

31, 2003, the Court determined that the petition contained at least

three unexhausted claims. The Court dismissed the petition with

leave to amend. 

On January 14, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the

petition while he exhausted his claims in state court. In an Order

dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner's motion to stay was denied, and he

was ordered to file an amended petition and a renewed request for

stay within thirty days. Petitioner filed an amended petition on

June 4, 2004 containing only exhausted claims. He also renewed his

request for the Court to stay the petition.

On May 2, 2005, Petitioner informed the Court that the

California Supreme Court had denied his state habeas petition;

therefore, he filed his second amended petition containing his

newly-exhausted claims.

On August 25, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. On January 19, 2006, Petitioner's motion for relief

from judgment was granted and an Order to Show Cause was issued.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background as follows:

In July 1998, Christina met appellant. A few months

later she began living with him. In February 2000, they

were living in a converted garage apartment located

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1

 The facts regarding the admission of Petitioner's uncharged bad

acts are discussed in detail below. See infra Discussion Part I.A.1.

3

behind appellant's mother's house in San Jose. The

relationship was marked by appellant's fits of jealousy.

On the weekend of February 5 and 6, 2000, what started

out with Christina shoving appellant, ended with her

being punched in the back and in the head, then raped

and sodomized. Appellant shot her with a blowgun and

threatened her with a knife. He twisted her neck, which

had been injured previously by a former abusive

boyfriend, Eddie, and prevented her from leaving the

apartment several times.

When Christina persuaded appellant to take her to the

hospital for her neck injury, she told the nurse that

her black eye and other injuries had been sustained in a

car wreck. However, she soon changed her story and told

the hospital staff and the police that appellant had

sexually and physically assaulted her. A few days

later, at the request of the police and in their

presence, Christina placed a pretext telephone call to

appellant wherein he made several incriminating

statements.

In March 2000, Christina began to recant. She continued

to assert that appellant had physically abused her, but

claimed at the preliminary hearing that the sexual acts

were consensual.

People v. Garibay, H022283, 2 (Sept. 5, 2002) (Opinion) (footnotes

in original).

Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to admit evidence

of uncharged physical and sex assaults Petitioner committed against

Kathy, a former cohabitant and mother of his three children.1 Id.

at 2. Upon finding that the probative value of the evidence was

"very great," the trial court decided to allow testimony from Kathy

and their son, Jeremy. Id. at 3.

The jury was selected and sworn on September 5, 2000. Id.

The prosecution called Christina as their first witness. Id. 

While she continued to assert that appellant physically abused her,

she claimed that the sex acts were consensual. Id. 

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The appellate court outlines the trial testimony of the other

witnesses as follows:

Anita Ruiz-Contreras, a nurse with the Sexual Assault

Response Team (SART) and the Violence Intervention

Program (VIP) saw Christina on the afternoon of February

6, 2000. Christina told Ruiz-Contreras that appellant

had physically and emotionally abused her for nine

months and had sexually assaulted her once nine months

earlier. Christina consented to have her injuries

photographed. Ruiz-Contreras documented her injuries

and complaints of pain. At this time, Christina had a

black eye, pain around her left thumb, a red mark on her

neck, bruises on her right upper arm, a quarter-sized

abrasion on her elbow, neck pain, a bruise on her

coccyx, and a dime-sized abrasion and a half-dollar

sized abrasion on her left wrist.

Christina told her that appellant had choked her and

finally admitted that he had sexually assaulted her.

San Jose Police Officer Brian Anderson, accompanied by

Officer Marenom, spoke with Christina at Valley Medical

Center. He observed many of Christina's injuries and

heard her complaints of pain. She was visibly upset and

shaking during the interview.

Christina told Anderson that the incident started around

9:00 a.m. on February 5, when appellant accused her of

sexually gratifying herself. He punched her in the head

and in the back causing her pain. Appellant pulled off

her clothes, raped her, turned her over and then

sodomized her for eight to ten minutes. After using the

bathroom, Christina tried to leave. Appellant grabbed

her by the hair and threw her on the bed. Christina

curled up in a ball and huddled in the corner of the bed

because she feared that appellant would continue to beat

her. Eventually, appellant calmed down and around

2:00 p.m. went to get her some aspirin from the main

house.

When he returned to the apartment he started yelling at

her again and accused her of trying to leave. He

grabbed her by both arms and threw her on the bed. 

Appellant hit her in the back five to eight times. He

pointed a five-inch steak knife in her face and stated

he could kill her.

When they awoke the next morning Christina told

appellant she wanted to leave. Appellant told her he

was going to kill her. He grabbed her neck with one

hand and forced her head so far back with his other hand

that she thought her neck was breaking. After Christina

screamed for him to stop, he grabbed a blowgun. 

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2

 Christina testified that Detective Pritchard "steam rolled" her

into making the pretext phone call to Petitioner. RT 179.

5

Christina was shot on her left foot and on the back of

her left thigh with the blowgun. Appellant then removed

the blow darts from her body. He grabbed her by the

hair and threw her on the bed. Fearing for her life,

Christina had sex with appellant, and then threw up in

the bathroom.

Later that day, appellant calmed down and Christina

convinced him that she needed to go to the hospital for

her neck. They went to the hospital around 2:30 p.m. on

Sunday. From 9 a.m. on Saturday until 2:30 p.m. on

Sunday, when they went to the hospital, appellant would

not let Christina leave the apartment.

After Officer Anderson had interviewed Christina he took

her to SART and waited for her.

Patricia Crane, an expert in the area of examining

patients for evidence of possible sexual assault and

other physical trauma, documented Christina's injuries

and her account of the sexual and physical assaults

appellant perpetrated on her. Christina's account to

Crane was similar in detail to that which she had given

Officer Anderson. Crane also noted that Christina had

an anal laceration.

Detective Sean Pritchard of the Sexual Assault Unit,

accompanied by Officer Christina Thompson, interviewed

Christina on the morning of February 7, 2000. At that

time, Christina's injuries were very visible and she

reiterated that she had been beaten, raped and

sodomized.

Pritchard talked to Christina about making a pretext

phone call to appellant. Although she was nervous, she

cooperated with the officer and called appellant. 

During the ensuing call appellant made incriminating

statements.

Opinion at 6-8.

A tape of the phone call was played for the jury during

Christina's testimony.2

 RT 187. 

During the call, Christina told Petitioner she still felt like

"clay-do thrown up against the wall." CT 210. She asked Petitioner

why he had done it and told him that she hurt all over. CT 210. 

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Petitioner said he was sorry. CT 210. She told him that she had a

black eye from him hitting her in the face. CT 213. She also

mentioned that he kicked her with a certain pair of boots. CT 213. 

He said that he was wearing a different pair of boots. CT 213. She

asked him why he threatened her with a knife, and he said that he

did not want her to leave him. CT 214. She also asked him why he

used a "wad of Vaseline" and sodomized her while she begged him to

stop. CT 215. He answered that he "didn't know what got into

[him]." CT 215. When she reminded him that he told her he would

have shot her if the blow gun had been a real gun, he agreed. CT

215. 

Following the pretext phone call, Christina called

Pritchard about five times just to check in with him. 

On March 16, at about 4:00 p.m. Christina called

Pritchard and said that she wanted to recant her entire

statement. She told Pritchard that she did not want

appellant to go to jail for the rest of his life. When

Pritchard confronted her with the injuries she had

sustained, she admitted her statement about the physical

assault was true. He told her that he would take her

new statement and that if she changed her mind again she

should contact him.

On February 10, 2000, Pritchard interviewed appellant

after he waived his Miranda rights. Appellant said that

Christina had called him to tell him that the police

were coming for him because of what he had done to her. 

Appellant denied that he had beaten Christina and said

that the sex was consensual. When asked why Christina

would have made the claims she had made, appellant said

that it was because she was angry with him.

Diana Cunningham, the Victim Witness Coordinator for the

district attorney's office, spoke with Christina on

March 9, 2000. Christina told Cunningham she changed

her story because appellant needed counseling, not jail

or prison. Initially, Christina denied appellant

sexually assaulted her before the weekend of February 5,

but eventually she admitted he had.

. . . .

On September 20, 2000, the jury found appellant guilty

as charged in all seven counts and also found true the

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special allegation. He was sentenced to 16 years in

state prison.

Opinion at 8-9.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." William v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the [the Supreme] Court's decision but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of

the time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412.

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary

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to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). It also looks to any lower court decision examined or

adopted by the highest state court to address the merits. See

Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (because

state appellate court examined and adopted some of the trial

court's reasoning, the trial court's ruling is also relevant).

Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its

decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned

lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record is the

only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was

objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.

2002). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court

should conduct "an independent review of the record" to determine

whether the state court's decision was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; accord

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004).

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises six claims for relief, all of which have

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been exhausted for the purpose of federal habeas corpus review. 

The following claims were raised on direct appeal and denied by the

California Court of Appeal in a reasoned decision: that prior acts

of sexual assault and domestic violence were improperly admitted

into evidence; that the trial court erred in instructing the jury

that Petitioner could be found guilty based on propensity evidence

alone using California Jury Instructions Criminal (CALJIC) Nos.

2.50.01 and 2.50.02; and that the trial court erred in instructing

the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. The remaining three claims were

raised in Petitioner's state habeas petition and were denied

summarily: insufficiency of evidence to support the conviction;

prosecutorial misconduct; and ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. The Court now addresses the merits of his claims.

I. CLAIMS DENIED IN REASONED STATE COURT DECISION

A. ADMISSION OF PRIOR UNCHARGED ACTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

1. Background

The California Court of Appeal set forth the factual and

procedural background regarding the admission of Petitioner's prior

uncharged acts of sexual assault and domestic violence as follows:

Before trial, pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1108

and 1109, the prosecution filed a motion to admit

evidence of uncharged physical and sex assaults

appellant committed against Kathy, a former cohabitant

and mother of three of his children. The prosecutor

wrote that three days after the preliminary hearing in

this case, a second victim [Kathy] reported to the

police that between February 1995 and April 1999,

appellant raped her approximately 20 times. During 10

of these incidents appellant also sodomized her against

her will. Also, Kathy reported that some of these

incidents occurred in front of their children and that

she was physically assaulted approximately 15 times. 

Further, her bottom teeth were permanently damaged from

the assaults.

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 Unless otherwise indicated statutory references herein are to

the Evidence Code.

10

When the motion was heard on August 31, the prosecutor

discussed the similarities between the assault appellant

committed against Christina and those he committed

against Kathy. He argued that there was a similar

motive in each case, namely irrational jealousy. 

Further, he argued there was no risk of collaboration

between the victims because there was bad blood between

them. Moreover, by coming to court Kathy was exposing

herself to penalties because there was a child custody

hearing and an issue of welfare fraud that appellant

might raise during the trial. The prosecutor advised

Kathy that he would have to report the possibility of

fraud to the welfare department.

On the same day as one of his motions in limine,

appellant moved, pursuant to Evidence Code3 section 352,

to exclude the evidence that would be provided by Kathy

and their son Jeremy.

After hearing argument from both sides, the court

weighed several factors including the consumption of

time, the risk of confusing the jury, and the

prejudicial impact of the testimony. The court decided

to allow Kathy and Jeremy to testify pursuant to

sections 1108 and 1109, but directed the District

Attorney to limit the details and number of incidents. 

The court noted that while the prejudicial value of the

evidence was high, the probative value of the evidence

was "very great."

On September 5, 2000, the jury was selected and sworn.

Christina was called as the prosecution's first witness. 

She continued to assert that appellant physically abused

her, but claimed that the sex acts were consensual.

Nine-year old Jeremy, Kathy and appellant's oldest son,

testified that when they lived in the garage he saw

appellant hit Kathy on the chest more than once and that

Kathy cried when this happened. Appellant and Kathy

argued. Sometimes he would see appellant get on Kathy

to have sex. He knew that she did not like this because

she would say "ow, all the time." On one occasion he

saw appellant hit Kathy in the mouth causing her teeth

to become crooked.

On September 7, 2000, a hearing was held outside the

presence of the jury to determine how Kathy would

respond when asked whether she had ever committed

welfare fraud. Before she took the stand, defense

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2

 When the court asked whether the stipulation was acceptable to

the defense, defense counsel said, "I am completely thankful and

appreciate the District Attorney offering the stipulation. If the

Court is going to rule against me and against my request that she not

be allowed to testify at all because of the Fifth Amendment issue that

I've raised, if the Court is going to allow that she can testify on

direct, but I will allow her to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege

and if I am left with the choice of nothing or a stipulation I will

accept the stipulation. . . . [¶] By virtue of the District

Attorney's stipulation, I guess clearly that stipulation will allow me

to argue the credibility issue. But the problem I have with it is

that it will not get at the heart of her testimony. It will not --

because remember, Judge, it's not just about the testimony but as 780

it's demeanor, attitude towards the proceeding, towards me and yes,

all of that will be lost. [¶] A stipulation is an innocuous form or

arguably a watered-down form of what could be done effectively done on

cross. . . . [I]f my only choice is I don't get to ask her anything

about it because of the difficulty or accept the stipulation, that's

my last choice, I will accept the District Attorney's stipulation, but

want the Court to know that it is not my first choice."

11

counsel renewed his motion to exclude her testimony on

352 grounds. The court again considered the 352

objection observing that no evidence had been presented

that would change the previous ruling. Once again, the

court found that the probative value of the evidence was

not outweighed by the time considerations, the

prejudice, and confusion of the issues. The court

determined that it would allow the testimony subject to

a section 402 hearing.

Called as a witness at the hearing, Kathy, on the advice

of her attorney, invoked her Fifth Amendment right when

asked whether she had committed welfare fraud and when

asked about forms she filled out while she was on

welfare. After defense counsel had questioned Kathy and

made his argument, the trial court sustained Kathy's

exercise of the privilege.

Defense counsel renewed a previous objection that Kathy

should not be allowed to testify. He argued that Kathy

would be allowed to say damaging and inflammatory things

about appellant, but he would not be able to . . . cross

examine her about the alleged welfare fraud. The

prosecutor then proffered the following stipulation: 

"Katherine [Kathy] told the Prosecutor, George Chadwick,

in a private conversation that one, she and the

[appellant], Raul Garibay, are involved in a custody

court case. [¶] "Two, she expected Mr. Garibay to

raise the issue of the welfare fraud in that custody

case; and three, that while living with Mr. Garibay she

believes she violated welfare fraud laws."2

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 The following limiting instruction was read to the jury:

"Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen. Evidence may be introduced

through the testimony of this witness for the purpose of showing that

the defendant engaged in a sexual offense or other conduct such as

domestic violence on one or more occasions other than that are charged

in this case. If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual

offense or prior sexual violence, you may but you are not required to

infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual offenses

or domestic violence.

"If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may but

you are not required to infer that he is likely to commit or did

commit the offenses for which he's charged in this case. However, if

you find that the defendant committed the prior sexual offenses or

prior domestic violence, it is not sufficient by itself to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes charged in this

case.

"The weight and significance of the evidence, if any, are for you

to decide. For the limited purpose for which you may consider this

evidence, you must weigh it the same way or in the same manner as you

do all other evidence in the case, unless your [sic] otherwise

instructed, you are not to consider this evidence for any other

purpose."

4

 Kathy testified that there were other occasions when she was not

really in the mood and did not want to have sex, but agreed to do so.

However, she was not referring to those instances when she told

police that appellant raped her. 

12

On September 11, 2000, outside the presence of the jury,

the trial court said both counsel had been instructed

not to ask Kathy any questions that would elicit the

exercise of her privilege against self-incrimination. 

Before Kathy's testimony defense counsel again renewed

his objection to her testimony. The court then gave a

limiting instruction.3

Kathy testified that she had an eight-year relationship

with appellant. During this time appellant had raped4

her on several different occasions and forced her to

have anal sex on at least five occasions. Appellant

also punched her in the face, dislodging four of her

teeth, and hit her in the chest on one or two occasions

causing her pain. On the advice of counsel Kathy

invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to any

questions regarding her committing welfare fraud.

. . . .

Ruben Salazar, the custodian of records for the Santa

Clara County Department of Social Services, testified

that applications, including those submitted by Kathy,

were signed under penalty of perjury and witnessed by an

eligibility worker. Department of Social Services

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records indicated that Kathy filled out her first

application on June 4, 1992. Her most recent

application was made on August 27, 1998. In all but one

of the forms she had filled out, she claimed that

appellant was the father of the oldest and youngest of

her children and that he was an absent parent. Salazar

had no idea if Kathy had committed welfare fraud, but he

did acknowledge that appellant signed some of the

application forms during the time period that Kathy

reported his whereabouts were unknown.

At the conclusion of Salazar's testimony, the trial

court instructed the jury that the evidence introduced

through Mr. Salazar was permitted to show the activities

and conduct of Kathy. The evidence was admitted for the

limited purpose of determining her credibility.

Opinion at 2-6, 8-9 (footnotes and brackets in original).

Petitioner claims that the admission of his prior uncharged

acts of sexual assault and domestic violence under California

Evidence Code §§ 1108 and 1109 violated his right to due process. 

He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting such evidence, which he argues should have been excluded

under California Evidence Code § 352. Finally, Petitioner claims

that the restrictions on his cross-examination of Kathy violated

his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

California Evidence Code § 352 provides as follows: "The

court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission

will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or

of misleading the jury." Cal. Evid. Code § 352.

California Evidence Code § 1101, provides as follows:

(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections

1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's

character or a trait of his or her character (whether in

the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or

evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is

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inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on

a specified occasion.

(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of

evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or

other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or

whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful

sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not

reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim

consented) other than his or her disposition to commit

such an act.

(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of

evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of

a witness.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1101.

California Evidence Code § 1108 provides, in relevant part,

that "(a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of

a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another

sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section

1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1108.

California Evidence Code § 1109 is nearly identical to section

1108, except that it permits the admission of evidence of the

defendant's offenses involving domestic violence, subject to a

balancing test of the evidence's probative value against its

prejudicial effect, in accordance with section 352. Cal. Evid.

Code § 1109(a)(1).

2. Applicable Federal Law 

a. Due Process Clause 

Erroneous state evidentiary rulings are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceedings unless the admission of evidence

violated the petitioner's rights under the Constitution. Estelle

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v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment provides the framework for evaluating claims

based on alleged constitutional error in state court evidentiary

rulings. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). Permitting

a jury to hear evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may violate due

process. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6

(1983); Fritchie v. McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1981)

(citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967)). But a federal

court cannot disturb on due process grounds a state court's decision

to admit evidence of prior crimes or bad acts unless the admission

of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355,

1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).

The admission of other crimes evidence violates due process

where there are no permissible inferences the jury can draw from

the evidence (in other words, no inference other than conduct in

conformity therewith). See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384

(9th Cir. 1993); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

1991). The relevance of the evidence of other bad acts to motive

or intent, the opportunity for the jury to weigh the credibility of

the witness's account of the other bad acts, and the trial court's

use of a cautionary instruction to limit the jury's consideration

of the other bad acts all are factors a federal court may consider

to determine whether a due process violation occurred. See Houston

v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (admission of similar

prior bad acts to show motive and intent, coupled with limiting

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instructions, was appropriate); Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613

(9th Cir. 1990) (admission of uncharged crimes did not violate due

process where trial court gave limiting instruction to jury, jury

was able to weigh witness's credibility and evidence was relevant

to defendant's intent); Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 378 (9th

Cir. 1985) (admission of uncharged offenses does not violate

constitutional rights where jury had opportunity to weigh

credibility of complaining witness and judge admonished jury to

consider incident only as evidence of intent, not as evidence of

bad character). Juries are presumed to follow a trial court's

limiting instructions with respect to the purposes for which

evidence is admitted. Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th

Cir. 1997).

b. Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the

right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted

with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right

to confront is more than the right to be physically present. 

Instead, "the main and essential purpose of confrontation is to

secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." 

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore,

Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)). To prevail on a claim of a

violation of this right, a petitioner must establish that the state

courts denied his rights under the Confrontation Clause by

erroneously interpreting Supreme Court precedents or unreasonably

applying the precedents to the facts in his case. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

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3. Analysis

a. Due Process Violation

1) Constitutionality of Sections 1108 and 1109

Petitioner first claims that California Evidence Code §§ 1108

and 1109 are unconstitutional because they authorize the admission

of evidence of prior uncharged acts of sexual assault and domestic

violence solely to prove propensity. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's challenge

to sections 1108 and 1109 by citing to the California Supreme

Court's decision in People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903 (1999):

"In People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 . . .

(Falsetta), our Supreme Court addressed the

constitutionality of section 1108 . . . and upheld that

provision against due process challenge. [Citation.]" 

(People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1310.) 

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the

constitutionality of section 1109, the Courts of Appeal

have regularly applied the reasoning of the Falsetta

decision in upholding the constitutionality of section

1109 against similar due process challenges. (See e.g.,

People v. Johnson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 416-420,

review den. Apr. 12, 2000; People v. Hoover (2000) 77

Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026-1029, review den. Apr. 26, 2000;

People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1331-1334,

review den. May 10, 2000; People v. Jennings, supra, 81

Cal.App.4th at p. 1310; People v. Escobar (2000) 82

Cal.App.4th 1085, 1095, review den. Oct. 25, 2000.) We

agree with the reasoning in these cases and need not

repeat the discussion here. "In short, the

constitutionality of section 1109 under the due process

clauses of the federal and state [C]onstitutions has now

been settled." (People v. Jennings, supra, 81

Cal.App.4th at p. 1310.) Consequently, we reject

appellant's constitutional challenge to sections 1108

and 1109.

Opinion at 10.

While no federal court has specifically ruled on the

constitutionality of sections 1108 and 1109, several circuit courts

have upheld the use of propensity evidence under Rules 413 and 414

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5

 The California Supreme Court noted that section 1108 was adopted

after Rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and was modeled on it.

See Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th at 912. Rule 413 provides in pertinent

part: "(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an

offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of

another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may

be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."

Fed. R. Evid. 413(a).

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of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 See, e.g., United States v.

Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998). 

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of Rule

414, permitting admission of evidence of similar crimes in child

molestation cases. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018,

1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002). The

court held in LeMay that Rule 414 is not unconstitutional because

it is limited in its function by Rule 403. Id. at 1026-27. Rule

403 directs judges to exclude any evidence submitted under Rule 414

that is more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 1027. The court

reasoned that this balancing process eliminates any due process

concerns from Rule 414, stating: "As long as the protections of

Rule 403 remain in place to ensure that potentially devastating

evidence of little probative value will not reach the jury, the

right to a fair trial remains adequately safeguarded." Id. at

1026. 

The reasoning of LeMay applies equally to this case because

the California rules are analogous to the federal rules. Evidence

that is admissible under sections 1108 and 1109 is limited by

section 352. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108(a), 1109(a)(1). Section

352 parallels Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it

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permits a trial judge to exclude evidence when its probative value

is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Cal.

Evid. Code § 352. As the California Supreme Court held in

Falsetta, the requirement under section 352 to balance the

prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value

ensures that evidence admitted under section 1108 will not infringe

on the right to a fair trial guaranteed under the Due Process

Clause. 21 Cal. 4th at 913. 

Finally, the United States Supreme Court has never held that

the admission of evidence of prior crimes violates the right to due

process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 & n.5 (declining to rule on

the constitutionality of propensity evidence); Alberni v. McDaniel,

458 F.3d 860, 864-67 (9th Cir. 2006). Because habeas relief may

not be granted unless the state court decision was contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and there is

no Supreme Court precedent that admission of propensity evidence

violates due process, the decision of the appellate court cannot be

said to have contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law in upholding the constitutionality of

sections 1108 and 1109. See Alberni, 458 F.3d at 866-67 (under

AEDPA, habeas relief cannot be granted on claim Supreme Court has

reserved); id. at 874-75 (although habeas relief may still be

available after AEDPA on reserved issues, as to propensity evidence

there is insufficient Supreme Court authority of any kind to

clearly establish a due process right not to have such evidence

admitted) (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

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 2) Improper Character Evidence

Petitioner also claims that the testimony of Kathy and Jeremy

should not have been admitted because it was prejudicial under

section 352. Specifically, Petitioner argues that this evidence

was unduly consumptive of time, and the conduct did not result in a

conviction, was too remote in time, and its probative value was

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected

Petitioner's claim. The appellate court stated: 

Here, the trial court understood its duty under

section 352 and expressly found that although Kathy and

Jeremy's evidence was prejudicial, the likelihood of

confusing the jury was present and the consumption of

time was greater, the probative value was "very great." 

Further, the trial court went on: "The analysis that

Section 352 requires, I think, is supplemented by the

Falsetta case. It asks the Court to also examine

factors I think all of which you've discussed and argued

about during your arguments. [¶] The similarities, the

prejudicial impact, the likelihood of confusing and

misleading and distracting. The degree of certainty

with respect to the alleged 1108 evidence, its nature,

relevance, possible remoteness of the 1108 evidence. 

[¶] On balance, and weighing all the factors the Court

must do, I'm going to allow the District Attorney to use

the 1108 and 1109 evidence as he suggested, again

limited in detail so that it is not inflammatory as he

consented to and limited in number generally so that we

do not have to look at every single event and detail."

Opinion at 12.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision upon

finding that Kathy and Jeremy's testimony was properly admitted

because the trial court weighed the evidence and determined that

its probative value was high even though it was prejudicial:

. . . [T]he trial court had specifically considered

the consumption of time and implicitly found it not to

be a determinative factor in admitting the evidence. 

Further, there could be no confusion here as to why none

of these acts resulted in a conviction. Kathy testified

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that she had not told anyone about these acts before. 

While Kathy's eight-year relationship with appellant had

been over for two years, there is no support for

appellant's contention that one of the acts of physical

violence described by Kathy, having her teeth injured,

was remote because it happened early in their

relationship.

The trial court notes that the evidence would be

prejudicial, but determined that the inflammatory and

prejudicial nature of the evidence would be countered by

limiting the number and details regarding the prior

offenses. A review of the record reveals that the

prosecutor strictly adhered to this limitation when

presenting Kathy and Jeremy's evidence. As we noted

above, the prejudice referred to in section 352 applies

to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional

bias against the defendant as an individual and which

has very little effect on the issues. Here the pattern

of abuse suffered by Kathy and witnessed by Jeremy was

remarkably similar to that which Christina has suffered.

Finally, appellant argues that the testimony was

prejudicial because it led to exposing appellant to the

jurors as having committed acts of welfare fraud, which

reflected on his honestly and could have been used to

"resolve against him the issue of the credibility of

[his] denial" to the police that he committed crimes

against Christina. We agree with respondent that this

seems inconsistent with appellant's claims that he was

not able to show that Kathy committed welfare fraud. 

Further, it was never established that appellant

committed welfare fraud or was being investigated for

this offense. We fail to see how appellant was

prejudiced in light of the charge to the jury that the

evidence introduced through Mr. Salazar was permitted

only to show the activities and conduct of Kathy in

relation to Santa Clara County Department of Social

Services and was only to be used for the limited purpose

of determining the credibility or believability of

Kathy.

Thus, we conclude that the trial court sufficiently

articulated its reasons for admitting Kathy and Jeremy's

evidence under section 352, and properly permitted their

evidence to be presented and argued to the jury.

Opinion at 13-14.

Because the state court's balancing test was not contrary to

but consistent with federal law, the Court finds that Petitioner's

claim for habeas relief on this basis is unwarranted.

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Therefore, Petitioner's claim of a due process violation is

DENIED.

b. Confrontation Clause Violation

Petitioner asserts that Kathy's testimony should not have been

admitted because he was not permitted to cross-examine her

regarding her commission of welfare fraud, in violation of his

right to confront witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment. He also claims the stipulation that Kathy

believed she had committed welfare fraud while living with

appellant did not adequately protect his rights. 

Although the opportunity of cross-examination is central to a

defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the right is not

limitless. The United States Supreme Court, in Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), ruled that while a trial court may

not prevent a defendant from cross-examining the prosecution's

witnesses, it may place limits based on the need for fairness and

order in the proceedings. The Court stated:

It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge

from imposing limits on defense counsel's inquiry into

potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the

contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as

the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on

concerns about, among other things, harassment,

prejudice, confusion of issues, the witness' safety, or

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally

relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, "the

Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that

is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,

the defense might wish." 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (quoting Delaware v. Fenester, 474

U.S. 15, 20 (1985). 

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 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21,(1967).

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To prevail in this habeas challenge, Petitioner would have to

demonstrate that the appellate court's rejection of his claim of a

Confrontation Clause violation was based on an erroneous

interpretation of this law or was an unreasonable application of

the law to the facts in his case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He has

not done so.

The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in allowing Kathy to testify in the face of her

assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege, and that even if the

trial court erred in preventing Petitioner from pursuing this line

of questioning, it was harmless. Opinion at 15. The court stated,

"The most that appellant could have done on cross-examination was

establish that Kathy had made false statements on some of her

applications for welfare. The stipulation and appellant's witness,

Mr. Salazar, established this fact." Id. 

The United States Supreme Court in Van Arsdall stated that

"the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity

to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause

errors, is subject to Chapman6 harmless-error analysis. The

correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of

the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might

nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (footnote added). The

appellate court was not unreasonable in finding that it could say

just that. As the appellate court pointed out, the stipulation and

Petitioner's witness, Mr. Salazar, were sufficient to establish

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that Kathy had made false statements on some of her applications

for welfare. Any further impeachment of Kathy along the lines that

the defense attempted to pursue would have added little. 

The appellate court was not unreasonable in holding that

Petitioner was not denied his constitutional right to confront

witnesses when the trial court refused him permission to crossexamine Kathy concerning her commission of welfare fraud, or that

even if he was denied this right, any error was harmless under Van

Arsdall. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner's claim

of a confrontation clause violation fails, and his claim for habeas

relief on this basis is DENIED.

B. ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1. Background

Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated by

the trial court's reading of (a) CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02

because they were misleading to the jury and (b) CALJIC No. 17.41.1

because it interfered with the jury's secrecy and independent

deliberations. 

2. Applicable Federal Law

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under

state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas

corpus proceedings. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. To obtain

federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a

petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

(1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643

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(1974) ("[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction

is undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned,' but

that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant

by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146). 

The instruction "may not be judged in artificial isolation," but

must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole

and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In other words, the district court must evaluate

jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury

as a component of the entire process. See United States v. Frady,

456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145,

154 (1977)).

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is not how

reasonable jurors could or would have understood the instruction as

a whole; rather, the court must inquire whether there is a

"reasonable likelihood" that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violates the United States Constitution. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 & n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,

380 (1990).

A determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the

jury has applied the challenged instructions in a way that violates

the Constitution establishes only that a constitutional error has

occurred. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If

constitutional error is found, the Court also must determine that

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict before granting habeas relief. Id.

(citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

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3. Analysis

a. CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02

Petitioner argues that the trial court's reading of the July,

2000 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02 deprived

him of his due process rights because these instructions

"unconstitutionally permitted the jury to find him guilty of the

charged offenses based on a preponderance of the evidence burden of

proof." Furthermore, Petitioner argues that the instructions

constituted error not amenable to harmless error analysis.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires

the prosecution to prove every element charged in a criminal

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

364 (1970). This principle prohibits the use of evidentiary

presumptions in a jury charge that relieve the State of its burden

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.

391, 400-03 (1991). The State may adopt a rule that makes it

easier for it to meet the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt, so long as the rule does not shift or reduce the burden of

proof or otherwise violate a principle of fairness contained in the

Due Process Clause. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 54-55

(1996) (due process not violated by a rule excluding intoxication

as evidence to refute mens rea even though the rule made it easier

for the State to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt).

The trial court read the following July, 2000 revised version

of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 to the jury:

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual

offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that

the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual

offenses. If you find that the defendant had this

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disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer

that [he] was likely to commit and did commit the

[crimes] for which [he] is accused in Counts 1 and 3. 

[¶] However, if you find by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant committed prior sexual

offense[s], that is not sufficient by itself to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the

crime[s] charged in Counts 1 and 3. The weight and

significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to

decide. [¶] [Y]ou must not consider this evidence for

any other purpose.]

CT 291 (brackets in original).

The trial court also read to the jury the July, 2000 revised

version of CALJIC No. 2.50.02, which referred to Count 2 and

contained the same language as CALJIC No. 2.50.01, except "domestic

violence" was substituted for "sexual offenses." CT 293.

The appellate court correctly recognized that it must view the

challenged instructions in light of the record as a whole to

determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury

applied the challenged instruction in a way that allowed a

conviction on a lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The court concluded that "CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02, when

read along with the rest of the jury instructions regarding

standard of proof, was not misleading or likely to be misconstrued

in the manner appellant describes." Opinion at 16. The court

explained:

In determining the propriety of an instruction, we

consider the challenged language in light of the court's

entire charge to the jury as well as argument by counsel

and ask whether there is "a reasonable likelihood" the

jury understood the instructions as appellant asserts. 

(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 and fn. 4;

People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36.) Appellant's

jury was instructed that it should read all of the

instructions as a whole and each in light of all other

instructions. (CALJIC No. 1.01.) The jury was also

instructed that appellant was presumed innocent and the

prosecution had the burden of proving him guilty beyond

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a reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 2.90.) Reading the

instructions as a whole, it is not reasonably likely

that the jury would have been misled into believing it

could dispense with these instructions and leap from a

finding that appellant committed the prior sexual

offenses and acts of domestic violence by a standard

higher than a preponderance to the conclusion that he

had committed the same offenses against Christina. To

so interpret the language appellant attacks would be to

ignore the clear meaning of the other instructions

given, as well as the specific admonition in CALJIC Nos.

2.50.01 and 2.50.02 that prior sexual offenses and acts

of domestic violence were insufficient alone to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the

charged offenses. We presume that the jury followed the

instructions given, not that it ignored them. (See,

e.g., People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121.) 

We conclude that CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02 as

given did not result in appellant being convicted of the

current charges based solely on the prior sexual

offenses and domestic violence incidents to which Kathy

testified.

Opinion at 17.

The appellate court's decision was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court has made

clear that "instructions that might be ambiguous in the abstract

can be cured when read in conjunction with other instructions" and

the trial record. United States v. Jones, 527 U.S. 373, 391

(1991). 

Petitioner argues that the instructions used at his trial were

like those determined to be constitutionally infirm in Gibson v.

Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2004). In Gibson, the State

introduced evidence of the defendant's brutal, uncharged acts of

sexual assault and domestic violence to help prove charges of rape

and child molestation. Id. at 817. The jury was instructed with

the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, which did not caution the

jury that the inference it could draw from the prior offense was

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not enough to prove guilt of the charged crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. at 817-18. The problem was compounded by the use of a

modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which used the preponderance

of the evidence standard as the burden of proof for prior sexual

offenses. Id. at 822. The "interplay of the two instructions

allowed the jury to find that [the defendant] committed the

uncharged sexual offenses by a preponderance of the evidence and

thus to infer that he had committed the charged acts based upon

facts found not beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a preponderance

of the evidence." Id. (emphasis in original). The Gibson

instructions, carefully followed by the jury, would allow

conviction based on a finding of the preponderance of the evidence. 

See id.

The instructions read at Petitioner's trial were not the same

as the those used in Gibson and did not permit a conviction upon

less that proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed

with the July, 2000 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and

2.50.02, which added these paragraphs:

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence

that the defendant committed prior sexual offense[s],

that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime[s]

charged in Counts 1 and 3. The weight and significance

of the evidence, if any, are for you to decide. [¶] 

[Y]ou must not consider this evidence for any other

purpose.]

CT 291, 293 (brackets in original). Given the trial court's

explicit warning against confusing the lesser standard of proof for

prior misconduct with the required higher standard of proof for the

charged crime, the state court reasonably found no likelihood that

the jury applied the challenged instructions to convict Petitioner

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based on a preponderance of evidence or any standard below proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's

challenge to CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02 was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

this claim is DENIED.

b. CALJIC No. 17.41.1

Petitioner argues that the use of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 denied

the jury its nullification power and violated his due process

rights because it interfered with the jury's secrecy and

independent deliberations. 

Petitioner's jury was instructed pursuant to the January, 1998

version of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 as follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all

times during their deliberations conduct themselves as

required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it

occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses

an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other]

improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors

to immediately advise the Court of the situation.

CT 357 (brackets in original).

On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court

committed reversible error when it instructed the jurors with

CALJIC No. 17.41.1. He alleged that the instruction violated

various federal and state constitutional provisions by infringing

on the free speech rights of the jurors and undermining their

discretion to disagree and nullify. The California Court of Appeal

denied Petitioner's claim, stating: 

The California Supreme Court has recently determined

that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 "does not infringe upon

defendant's federal or state constitutional right to

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trial by jury or his state constitutional right to a

unanimous verdict . . . ." (People v. Engelman (2002)

__Cal.4th__,__ [written opn., p. 1] (hereafter

Engelman).) The court was not persuaded that, "merely

because CALJIC No. 17.41.1 might induce a juror who

believes there has been juror misconduct to reveal the

content of deliberations unnecessarily (or threaten to

do so), the giving of the instruction constitutes a

violation of the constitutional right to trial by jury

or otherwise constitutes error under state law." 

(Engelman, supra, __Cal.4th at [p. 7].)

The court explained: "[A]lthough the secrecy of

deliberations is an important element of our jury

systems, defendant has not provided any authority, nor

have we found any, suggesting that the federal

constitutional right to trial by jury (or parallel

provisions of the California Constitution, or other

state law) requires absolute and impenetrable secrecy

for jury deliberations in the face of an allegation of

juror misconduct, or that the constitutional right

constitutes an absolute bar to jury instructions that

might induce jurors to reveal some element of their

deliberations." (Engelman, supra, __Cal.4th at [pp. 6-

7].) The same can be said of defendant's claims in

terms of federal and state constitutional rights to due

process.

The court in Engelman found that "[t]he instructions as

a whole fully informed the jury of its duty to reach a

unanimous verdict based upon the independent and

impartial decision of each juror. (CALJIC No. 17.40

['The People and the defendant are entitled to the

individual opinion of each juror. [¶] Each of you must

decide the case for yourself. . . .']; CALJIC No. 17.50

[instructing that in order to reach a verdict, 'all

twelve jurors must agree to the decision'].)" 

(Engelman, supra, __Cal.4th at [pp. 7-8].) As the court

in Engelman noted, CALJIC No. 17.41.1 does "not contain

language suggesting that jurors who find themselves in

the minority, as deliberations progress, should join the

majority without reaching an independent judgment." (Id.

at [p. 8].)

The instruction in this case likewise conveyed the

necessity for each juror to exercise his or her

impartial, independent judgement. We reject the

argument that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 undermines the

independence of individual jurors because it might be

used to coerce "hold-out" jurors.

As to the argument that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 infringes

upon defendant's constitutional right to jury

nullification, it is without merit in light of People v.

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Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 449-463 (Williams). The

court in Williams declared: "Jury nullification is

contrary to our ideal of equal justice for all and

permits both the prosecution's case and the defendant's

fate to depend upon the whims of a particular jury,

rather than upon the equal application of settled rules

of law . . . ." (Id. at p. 463.) The court explained

that although the possibility of jury nullification

exists because of certain procedural aspects of our

criminal justice system, a defendant does not have a

constitutional right to that possibility. (Id. at 449-

51.)

. . . .

We have no reason to believe that CALJIC No. 17.41.1

improperly impacted the jurors' deliberations in this

case. There was no jury deadlock, there were no holdout

jurors, and there was no report to the court of any

juror refusing to follow the law. In fact the jury

deliberated for less than seven hours. Thus, any error

in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 would

not require reversal, regardless of the harmless error

standard employed.

Opinion at 18-21 (footnotes omitted).

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 543

U.S. 1037 (2004), the Ninth Circuit rejected a state habeas

petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC No. 17.41.1,

holding: "It is clear . . . that the California appellate court's

holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, because no Supreme

Court case establishes that an instruction such as CALJIC No.

17.41.1 violates an existing constitutional right." Id. at 955-56. 

Here, as in Brewer, Petitioner has pointed to no Supreme Court

precedent clearly establishing that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 -- either on

its face or as applied to the facts of his case -- violated his

constitutional rights. See id. at 957. 

Because the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's claim

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

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established Supreme Court precedent, this claim for habeas corpus

relief is DENIED.

II. CLAIMS DENIED SUMMARILY BY STATE COURT

A. INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

1. Background

Petitioner alleges that the evidence introduced to prove he

raped and sodomized the victim was legally insufficient because it

was based on the victim's withdrawn testimony, perjury and another

witness's irrelevant testimony. 

Petitioner did not raise this claim on appeal, and the state

supreme court denied the claim on habeas review without citation or

comment. Because there is no reasoned state court opinion which

discusses the claim, the Court conducts an independent review of the

record to determine whether the California Supreme Court's summary

denial of the claim was an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

2. Applicable Federal Law

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary

to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly

characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a

constitutional claim, which, if proven, entitles him to federal

habeas relief. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 324

(1979).

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 The Ninth Circuit has left open the question whether 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) requires an additional degree of deference to a state

court's resolution of sufficiency of the evidence claims. See Chein

v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Bruce v.

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2004). However, five other

circuits have concluded that a sufficiency of the evidence claim

presents a legal determination that must be evaluated through the

AEDPA standard of review embodied in § 2254(d)(1), and no circuit has

explicitly held that a state court's Jackson inquiry is exempt from

AEDPA's standard of review. Id. at 958-59 (O'Scannlain, J.,

concurring specially).

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A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction

does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d

335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993). The

federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.'" See id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443

U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338; Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988,

992-93 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1048, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); Bashor

v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838

(1984).7

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences,

a federal habeas court "must presume –- even if it does not

affirmatively appear on the record –- that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. A jury's credibility

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determinations are therefore entitled to near-total deference. Bruce

v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Except in the most

exceptional of circumstances, Jackson does not permit a federal

habeas court to revisit credibility determinations. See id. at 952

(credibility contest between victim alleging sexual molestation and

defendant vehemently denying allegations of wrong-doing not a basis

for revisiting jury's obvious credibility determination); see also

People of the Territory of Guam v. McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344, 1346-47

(9th Cir. 1994) (upholding conviction for sexual molestation based

entirely on uncorroborated testimony of victim). 

The prosecution need not affirmatively rule out every hypothesis

except that of guilt. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992)

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). The existence of some small

doubt based on an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of innocence

therefore is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise legitimate

conviction. See Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1994)

(three hypotheses regarding petitioner's fingerprints which

government failed to rebut unsupported by evidence and therefore

insufficient to invalidate conviction).

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence

may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d

1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). Mere suspicion and speculation, however,

cannot support logical inferences. Id.

3. Analysis

In order to prove Petitioner's guilt as to the crime of rape

under California Penal Code § 261(a)(2), each of the following

elements must have been proved according to the January, 1997 version

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of CALJIC No. 10.00, Rape -- Spouse and Non-Spouse -- Force or

Threats, which was read to the jury as follows: "(1) A male and

female engaged in an act of sexual intercourse; (2) The two persons

were [not] married to each other at the time of the act of sexual

intercourse; (3) The act of intercourse was against the will of the

alleged victim; [and] (4) The act was accomplished by means of force,

violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily

injury [to the alleged victim]." CT 311 (brackets in original). 

In order to prove his guilt as to the crime of forcible sodomy

under California Penal Code § 286(c)(2), each of the following

elements must have been proved according to the July, 1999 revised

version of CALJIC No. 10.20, Unlawful Sodomy by Force or Threats,

which was read to the jury as follows: "(1) A person participated in

an act of sodomy with an alleged victim; [and] [(2) The act was

accomplished against the alleged victim's will by means of force,

violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily

injury on [the alleged victim].]" CT 315 (brackets in original).

The evidence adduced at trial with respect to the rape and

sodomy charges is summarized above. See supra Statement of Facts,

Discussion Part I.A.1.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, and resolving any conflicting inferences in favor of the

prosecution, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. That is, a rational juror could have found

that Petitioner was guilty of the rape and sodomy charges even though

the victim claimed the sexual acts were consensual based upon: 

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Petitioner's incriminating statements during the pretext phone call;

testimony from the officers and the SART nurse who observed

Christina's demeanor and injuries shortly after the incident; and

Petitioner's prior similar bad acts. 

The state court's rejection of Petitioner's insufficiency of the

evidence claim was not objectively unreasonable. See Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853. Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is DENIED.

B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

1. Background

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

failing to disclose allegedly exculpatory information to the

defense. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor failed

to disclose material evidence about Kathy committing welfare fraud. 

Petitioner did not raise his prosecutorial misconduct claim on

direct appeal, and the state supreme court denied the claim on habeas

review without citation or comment. Because there is no reasoned

state court opinion which discusses the claim, this Court conducts an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court's summary denial of the claim was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

2. Applicable Federal Law

Prosecutorial misconduct is a cognizable claim in federal

habeas corpus review. The appropriate standard of review is the

narrow one of due process and not the broad one of exercise of

supervisory power. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986). 

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a

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prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial "fundamentally unfair." See

id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("the touchstone of

due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is

fairness of trial, not culpability of prosecutor"). 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the United States

Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 

Id. at 87. 

A defendant cannot claim a Brady violation if he was "aware of

the essential facts enabling him to take advantage of any

exculpatory evidence." United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690

(9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 200

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978)); see, e.g., United

States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1995) (where

government discloses all information necessary for defense to

discover alleged Brady material on its own, government is not guilty

of suppressing evidence). 

3. Analysis

Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor failed to provide

him with exculpatory material evidence in violation of Brady. The

record shows that Petitioner was fully aware of the facts

surrounding Kathy's fraudulent welfare applications. The prosecutor

submitted the following stipulation: "(1) Kathy and the defendant

are currently involved in a child custody case, (2) Kathy expected

that the defendant would bring up a possible Welfare violation,

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(3) Kathy believes that she may have violated Welfare Fraud laws

while living with the defendant." CT 222. At trial, the defense

called Mr. Salazar to testify about the welfare applications

submitted by Kathy. Thus, the Court finds no merit in Petitioner's

claim of prosecutorial misconduct relating to any alleged failure to

disclose material evidence about Kathy committing welfare fraud.

 The Court notes that Petitioner's six-page prosecutorial

misconduct claim also includes another allegation dealing with the

prosecutor's failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory evidence

relating to Christina. Petitioner states, 

The prosecutor, having discovered the evidence,

specifically the forced testimony of his "star"

victim/witness (Ms. Doe), a testimony whereupon he made

"verbal threats" to subject or cause to be subjected to

imprisonment [i]f she did not physically appear before

the court to aid in the prosecution of a person that the

prosecutor knew well in advance would be exonerated of

committing acts of rape, based on his victim/witness

repeated refusal to agree to testify to such. . . .

Second Am. Pet., Prosecutorial Misconduct at 6. These assertions

are too vague to establish a constitutional violation and may be

denied on that ground alone. 

A petitioner must state his claims with sufficient specificity. 

See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1990);

Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1979). It is

well-settled that "'[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported

by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.'" 

Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v.

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). Here, Petitioner's claim

relating to Christina's "forced testimony" is no more than a

conclusory assertion lacking any factual detail or reference to the

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record or any other document. Even when viewed in their most likely

context, his allegations do not support a claim for prosecutorial

misconduct. Accordingly, his claim for relief on this basis is

denied. See id. (affirming district court's denial of Brady claims

which did not meet specificity requirements on habeas review).

Therefore, the state court's denial of Petitioner's

prosecutorial misconduct claim was objectively reasonable. See

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim for habeas

relief on this ground is DENIED.

C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

1. Background

Petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel because of the defense strategy counsel pursued at trial,

specifically, failing to raise the affirmative defense of consent

and to argue that Petitioner was innocent.

Petitioner raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

for the first time on state habeas corpus review, where it was

denied summarily without citation or comment. Accordingly, the

Court reviews this claim under the standard set forth in Himes, 336

F.3d at 853.

2. Applicable Federal Law

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a

claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark

for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

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process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a

just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

counsel claim a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance,

that is, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is "clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States" for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-08. 

A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute

denial of effective assistance, see United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d

369, 375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981), and

tactical decisions are not ineffective assistance simply because in

retrospect better tactics are known to have been available. See

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 838 (1984). 

Tactical decisions of trial counsel deserve deference when:

(1) counsel in fact bases trial conduct on strategic considerations;

(2) counsel makes an informed decision based upon investigation; and

(3) the decision appears reasonable under the circumstances. See

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Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). The

investigation itself must be reasonable for an attorney's tactical

decision based on that investigation to be reasonable. Wiggins v.

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2003). A court must consider not only

the quantum of evidence known to counsel, but also whether the known

evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. 

Id. at 526-27. Evidence that the challenged trial conduct resulted

from inattention rather than from strategic considerations may also

be relevant to the inquiry. Id. at 524-25. See, e.g., McDowell v.

Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir.) (no ineffective assistance

where counsel's decision to concede guilt of felony murder but

contest defendant's intent to kill "best choice from a poor lot"),

amended, 116 F.3d 364 (9th Cir.), vacated in part by 130 F.3d 833,

835 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

3. Analysis

A court need not address the question of counsel's deficient

performance if it finds that the petitioner was not prejudiced

thereby. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Here, Petitioner has not

shown that as a result of any of his trial counsel's actions there

is "a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding

would have been different." Id. at 694. The tactical decisions of

his trial counsel deserve deference because the record shows that

reasonable decisions were made as part of his defense strategy. See

Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1456. Even if Petitioner disagrees with his

trial counsel's decisions, a difference of opinion as to trial

tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance. See

Mayo, 646 F.2d at 375. His counsel's decisions were informed,

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strategic choices which should be given deference, and the Court

finds that the state court's rejection of Petitioner's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not an unreasonable application of

Strickland. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Accordingly, this claim

for relief is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED as to all claims. The Clerk of the Court shall

terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/2/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARIBAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LEWIS,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV03-01808 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on February 2, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Pamela K. Critchfield

Frances Marie Dogan

State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Raul A. Garibay

P98953

Pleasant Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 8503

Coalinga, CA 93210

Dated: 2/2/07

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:03-cv-01808-CW Document 28 Filed 02/02/07 Page 44 of 44