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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 4, 2019 Decided February 14, 2020

No. 18-5180

GARY L. JACKSON,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS B. MODLY, ACTING SECRETARY, THE UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:16-cv-02186)

Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on 

the briefs was Dawn E. Murphy-Johnson.

Gary L. Jackson, pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With her on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. 

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Rhonda L. Campbell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance.

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Before: HENDERSON and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Gary L. 

Jackson served in the United States Marine Corps from 1977 

to 1991. Almost thirty years after his honorable discharge from 

the Marine Corps, Jackson filed a pro se complaint against the 

Secretary of the Navy (Secretary) alleging that toward the end 

of his military career, his supervising officers discriminated 

against him because of his race and sex (he is a black male) in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 

VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. In addition to Jackson’s Title 

VII claim, the district court inferred other claims from his pro 

se complaint, including one under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and another under 

the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204. The district court 

ultimately dismissed all of Jackson’s claims and Jackson now 

appeals. 

As detailed below, we join the unanimous rulings of our 

sister circuits, concluding that Title VII does not apply to 

uniformed members of the armed forces, and therefore affirm

the dismissal of Jackson’s Title VII claim. We also affirm the 

dismissal of Jackson’s APA claim because it is untimely and 

the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to apply

equitable tolling. In so holding, we also recognize that our 

long-standing interpretation of the six-year statute of 

limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) as jurisdictional is no longer 

correct in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision 

in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015). And,

last, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the 

dismissal of Jackson’s Military Pay Act claim. 

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I. BACKGROUND

This case involves Jackson’s claims of discrimination that

he allegedly suffered toward the end of his service with the 

United States Marine Corps. Jackson served from 1977 until 

his honorable discharge on January 15, 1991. His complaint 

alleges that in 1988, while he was stationed at Henderson Hall, 

Marine Corps Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, assigned to

the Warehouse Chief position, he began to experience 

discrimination, harassment and retaliation from his superiors. 

For example, Jackson alleges that one of his superiors relocated 

him to another section of the warehouse stating that he 

“preferred that the number of Blacks not exceed the number of 

whites in any one section of the Warehouse.” Compl. 9. He 

also alleges that, among other things, his superiors intentionally 

delayed responding to his request to attend a training academy, 

placed false accusations in his military record and went to 

extraordinary lengths to prevent his reenlistment. Jackson 

alleges that, upon his discharge, one of his superiors said to 

another, “we finally got Staff Sergeant Jackson . . . That’s one 

less Black Staff Sergeant.” Id. After his discharge, Jackson 

alleges that he filed applications with the Board for Correction 

of Naval Records multiple times from 1990 until 2000 to 

remove derogatory material from his fitness record and thus 

make him eligible for reenlistment but his attempts were 

unsuccessful.

On November 19, 2014, Jackson filed a charge of 

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) against the Marine Corps. The EEOC 

responded that it lacked jurisdiction because Jackson’s 

complaint was against a branch of the military and therefore 

had to be filed initially with the Marines Corps. On December 

9, 2014, Jackson filed his employment discrimination claim 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the Marine

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Corps (EEO Office). The EEO Office dismissed his complaint 

under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(d)(1), stating that uniformed 

military personnel of any branch of the armed forces are not 

covered by Title VII. Jackson then appealed to the EEOC. The 

EEOC affirmed the EEO Office’s decision on July 19, 2016, 

also relying on § 1614.103(d)(1), and denied Jackson’s 

subsequent request for reconsideration.

On November 2, 2016, Jackson filed a pro se complaint in 

district court, alleging employment discrimination against the 

Secretary under Title VII. The Secretary moved to dismiss 

Jackson’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted the 

motion, dismissing Jackson’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jackson v. Spencer, 313 F. 

Supp. 3d 302, 311 (D.D.C. 2018). Construing Jackson’s pro se 

complaint in the most favorable light, the district court inferred

additional claims under the Military Whistleblower Protection 

Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Military Pay 

Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id. at 308. The 

district court dismissed all of Jackson’s claims, holding that 

Title VII did not apply to uniformed members of the armed 

forces, that the Military Whistleblower Protection Act does not 

contain a private right of action and that his other claims were 

untimely. Id. at 308–11. 

Jackson appealed pro se. We appointed counsel as amicus

to address whether Title VII applies to uniformed members of 

the armed forces. Amicus for Jackson (Amicus) raises 

arguments supporting Jackson’s Title VII, APA and Military 

Pay Act claims.1

1

 We thank Amicus for the outstanding effort—both on brief 

and in argument—and have found it to be of great assistance.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Title VII

We begin with the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s 

Title VII claim. Although the district court dismissed 

Jackson’s Title VII claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the 

district court should have dismissed the case for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).2

 We review the district 

court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 

de novo, “taking as true the allegations of the complaint.” True 

the Vote, Inc. v. IRS, 831 F.3d 551, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflects the 

American promise of equal opportunity in the workforce and 

shields employees from certain pernicious forms of 

2

 In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–16 (2006), the 

Supreme Court held that Title VII’s threshold requirement that an 

“employer” have at least fifteen employees is not jurisdictional but 

instead relates to the substance of the plaintiff’s claim for relief. The 

Court reasoned that Title VII’s jurisdictional provision merely 

requires that a claim be “brought under” that Title and held that, if a 

restriction like the fifteen-employee threshold for employers under 

Title VII is not “clearly state[d]” as jurisdictional, “courts should 

treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Id. at 515–16. 

Here, just as the issue of whether a person is an “employer” subject 

to the requirements of Title VII is nonjurisdictional, so is the issue of 

whether a person is a covered “employee.” Nothing about Title VII’s 

definition of employee or its provision extending protection to 

federal employees “clearly states” that such provisions are intended 

to be jurisdictional. See id. at 515; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 

2000e-16(a). The Secretary’s argument that Jackson is not entitled 

to the protections of Title VII as a uniformed member of the armed 

forces amounts to an argument that Jackson’s complaint fails to state 

a claim for relief.

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discrimination.” Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078, 1082–

83 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). As originally enacted, 

Title VII did not apply to the federal government. Barnes v. 

Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In 1972, however, 

the Congress extended the protections of Title VII to federal as 

well as state and local employees in the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, § 11, 86 Stat. 

103, 111–13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–16). As a result, 

Title VII now provides, as relevant here, that “[a]ll personnel 

actions affecting employees or applicants for 

employment . . . in military departments as defined in section 

102 of Title 5” and other federal departments “shall be made 

free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 

or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).

The issue before us is whether Title VII, specifically, the 

provision covering federal employees, § 2000e-16(a), applies 

to uniformed members of the armed forces of the United States 

military. We have never squarely addressed this issue. But see

Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (assuming 

arguendo Title VII does not apply to members of armed 

forces). But we note at the outset that every one of our sister 

circuits to address this question has concluded—albeit based 

on varying rationales and depths of analysis—that the answer 

is no. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th 

Cir. 2000); Coffman v. Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 

1997); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 

1996); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 959 (1988); Roper v. Dep’t of the 

Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987); Salazar v. Heckler, 

787 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1986); Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the 

Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928–29 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. 

Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 439 

U.S. 986 (1978).

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With this unanimous precedent from our sister circuits in 

mind, we begin our analysis with the text. See S.C. Pub. Serv.

Auth. v. F.E.R.C., 762 F.3d 41, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per 

curiam) (“In addressing issues of statutory interpretation, the 

court must begin with the text, turning as need be to the 

structure, purpose, and context of the statute.”); Janko v. Gates, 

741 F.3d 136, 139–40 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Here, the relevant text 

of Title VII provides that “employees or applicants for 

employment . . . in military departments as defined in section 

102 of Title 5. . . shall be made free from” unlawful 

discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).

At the outset of our textual analysis, we clarify—and 

ultimately reject—a textual hook other courts and the Secretary 

here erroneously rely upon to reach the conclusion that Title 

VII does not include uniformed members of the armed forces—

namely, the term “military departments.” The argument is 

based on Title VII’s reference to the definition of military 

departments in section 102 of Title 5 of the United States Code, 

which organizes the federal government. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 

et seq. Title 5 defines “military departments” as “The 

Department of the Army. The Department of the Navy. The 

Department of the Air Force.” Id. § 102. Title 10 of the United 

States Code—codifying the Congress’s structuring of the 

military—has the same definition of “military departments.” 

10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(8). Both Title 5 and Title 10 separately 

define the “armed forces” as “the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.” 5 U.S.C. § 2101(2); 10 

U.S.C. § 101(a)(4). Thus, other courts and the Secretary here 

conclude that, because the Congress treats “military 

departments” and “armed forces” as distinct terms, uniformed 

members of the armed forces are not covered by Title VII. See, 

e.g., Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928 (“The two differing definitions 

show that Congress intended a distinction between ‘military 

departments’ and ‘armed forces,’ the former consisting of 

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civilian employees, the latter of uniformed military 

personnel.”).3 

In fact, a quick review of the Congress’s structuring of the 

military in Title 10 shows that uniformed members of the 

armed forces are within the umbrella of the military 

departments. Several Title 10 provisions make clear that the 

term “armed forces” refers to the uniformed fighting forces 

within the three “military departments.” See 10 

U.S.C. § 101(a)(6) (defining “‘department,’ when used with 

respect to a military department” as including, inter alia, “the 

executive part of the department and all . . . forces”); 

id. § 7062(b) (“[T]he Army, within the Department of the 

Army, includes land combat and service forces and such 

aviation and water transport as may be organic therein.”); 

id. § 8061(4) (“The Department of the Navy is composed 

of . . . [t]he entire operating forces, including naval aviation, of 

the Navy and of the Marine Corps, and the reserve components 

of those operating forces.”). For example, the “Department of 

the Army” contains both civilian employees as well as the 

“Army”—defined as “combat and service forces.”4 See

id. §§ 101(a)(6), 7062(b). Thus, the military departments 

contain both civilian employees and the armed forces, see

Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1224 (“The great ‘military 

3

 It appears that other courts took the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous 

textual distinction in Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928, at face value without 

conducting their own textual analysis and based their decisions at 

least in part on that reasoning. See, e.g., Roper, 832 F.2d at 248;

Brown, 227 F.3d at 298 n.3; Randall, 95 F.3d at 343.

4

 “The Marine Corps is an organization within the Department 

of the Navy, which is one of the ‘military departments’ which 

Congress has defined. The Coast Guard is a military service and one 

of the armed forces of the United States which serves as a component 

of the Navy in time of war or when the President so directs.” 

Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1224 n.5. 

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departments’. . . referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 include not only 

uniformed personnel of various ranks and grades but also of 

thousands of men and women employed in civilian 

capacities.”), and, accordingly, that term on its own, contrary 

to what other courts have concluded, in fact supports an 

interpretation that Title VII covers uniformed members of the 

armed forces. 

Nevertheless, our analysis does not stop with the term

“military departments.” The Congress specifically chose to say 

“employees . . . in military departments as defined in section 

102 of Title 5.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (emphases added). 

The reference to section 102 of Title 5 is significant. First, the 

Congress explained that the civil-service legislation creating 

section 102, along with the rest of Title 5, was enacted to codify 

“the general and permanent laws relating to the organization of 

the Government of the United States and to its civilian officers 

and employees.” Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 

Stat. 378 (emphasis added). The Congress could have chosen 

to define “military departments” with reference to section 101 

of Title 10 that organized the United States military several 

years earlier, see Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 1028, 70A 

Stat. 1, 3–4, 84 Cong. Ch. 1041, but instead it chose to 

reference the title that was codified to organize the civilian 

officers and employees of the United States government. This 

choice, albeit not conclusive, is one indication that the 

Congress was referring to civilian employees within the 

military departments by referencing Title 5.

Second, and more importantly, in the same legislation that 

defined “military departments” under section 102 of Title 5, the 

Congress also defined “employees” under that title. 

See § 2105, 80 Stat. at 409. It defined “employee” as “an 

officer and an individual who is—(1) appointed in the civil 

service” by one of the various persons listed under that 

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provision. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a). It defined “civil service” as 

consisting of “all appointive positions in the executive, judicial, 

and legislative branches of the Government of the United 

States, except positions in the uniformed services.” 

Id. § 2101(1) (emphasis added). “[U]niformed services” 

means “the armed forces, the commissioned corps of the Public 

Health Service, and the commissioned corps of the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.” Id. § 2101(3)

(emphasis added). Putting all of these provisions together, we 

believe the Congress provided that “employees” in the “civil 

service” of the United States do not include the “armed forces.” 

Therefore, when the Congress amended Title VII against this 

backdrop six years later, § 11, 86 Stat. at 111–13, and 

specifically referenced section 102 of Title 5, it extended Title 

VII protections only to federal civilian employees within the 

military departments, not members of the armed forces that it 

considered to be outside the definition of employees in the 

federal civil service. 

It is true that Title VII has its own definition of 

“employee,” which it generally defines as “an individual 

employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). The 

Congress did not amend that definition in 1972 when it added 

federal employees to Title VII. But it likely saw no need to 

make a change. As manifested by Title 5’s definitions, it did 

not consider members of the armed forces to be federal 

employees within the civil service. Moreover, looking to Title 

5’s definition of employee to determine whether the Congress 

intended to include uniformed members of the armed forces 

under Title VII does not change the broad general definition of 

employee under Title VII; rather, it indicates that the Congress 

did not consider a uniformed member of the armed forces to be 

“an individual employed by an employer” within that general 

definition in setting Title VII’s scope. Id.

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Amicus argues that our reliance on Title 5’s definition of 

employee is barred by our decision in Spirides v. Reinhardt, 

613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Not so. In Spirides, we 

considered whether the plaintiff, who worked as a foreign 

language broadcaster for the Greek Service (a division of the 

United States International Communication Agency), was an 

“employee” covered by Title VII or an independent contractor. 

Id. at 827–30. In doing so, we rejected the defendant’s 

exclusive reliance on the definition of employee found in the 

civil service laws of Title 5 because independent-contractor 

status “calls for application of the general principles of the law 

of agency.” Id. at 831. There is no assertion here, however, 

that Jackson is an independent contractor, nor was Spirides a 

member of the armed forces. In this case, we look to the 

definition of employee in Title 5 not to displace the test for 

distinguishing independent contractors from employees but to 

determine whether “employees” in § 2000e-16(a) encompass 

uniformed servicemembers. Crucially, the Congress 

specifically chose to reference the civil service laws for 

“employees or applicants for employment . . . in military 

departments.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Thus, Title VII

defines military departments by express reference to the civil 

service laws. Put differently, unlike in Spirides, here we have 

reason to look to the definition of employee in Title 5 because 

the Congress explicitly directed us there. 

The Congress’s incorporation of the civil service 

definition of employee in Title 5, which does not cover 

uniformed members of the armed forces, comports with the 

unique nature of the armed forces as composed of

“individual[s]” not “employed by an employer” within the 

meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). When compared 

to traditional civilian employment, military service differs 

substantially. Those differences show that, at least in the 

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context of Title VII, uniformed members of the armed forces 

are not “employees” as defined by the statute. See id.

First, the manner in which uniformed members of the 

armed forces and the military terminate the work relationship 

is different from normal employment.5 Uniformed members 

of the armed forces are not free to leave their positions in the 

military in most instances. See Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223 n.4 

(“An enlisted man in the Army, for example, is not free to quit 

his ‘job,’ nor is the Army free to fire him from his 

employment.”). If an enlisted serviceman or a commissioned 

officer attempts to leave the military or refuses to work before 

the required time of service is completed, he can be punished

by court-martial. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 890, 892. Such 

a court-martial can result in imprisonment, see e.g., Ortiz v. 

United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2168 (2018) (“Courts-martial 

try service members . . . and can impose terms of imprisonment 

. . .”); United States v. Sanchez-Cortez, 530 F.3d 357, 358–59 

(5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (criminal defendant had previously 

been convicted and imprisoned by court-martial for 114 days’

confinement for being absent without leave in violation of 10 

U.S.C. § 886 (Art. 86 of the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice)), and, during times of war, desertion or attempted 

5 In this discussion, we borrow two factors we have previously 

used to distinguish between employees and independent 

contractors—the manner in which the work relationship is 

terminated and the intention of the parties—to emphasize the 

uniqueness of military service when compared to civilian 

employment. See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831. Of course, for the 

reasons explained supra, the employee versus independent 

contractor analysis in Spirides is different from the issue before us. 

Nevertheless, we find two of the factors from that analysis 

particularly helpful here to highlight how military service differs 

from the typical employment relationship.

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desertion can even result in the death penalty,

6 10 

U.S.C. § 885(c). We can think of no other occupation in which 

these types of restrictions are placed upon terminating the work 

relationship.7 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) 

(“The military is, ‘by necessity, a specialized society separate 

from civilian society.’” (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 

743 (1974))). 

Second, the parties here—service members and the 

government—intend their relationship to be distinct from 

traditional employment. Members of the armed forces 

volunteer to serve in the military, understanding that they must 

complete their service with all of its burdens, sacrifices and 

duties or face possible loss of liberty. Likewise, the 

government expects that uniformed members will complete 

their duties and follow orders and will not hesitate to enforce 

the consequences of members failing to do so. Id. (“To ensure 

that they always are capable of performing their mission 

6

 The last time the United States executed a soldier for desertion 

was 1945. See Lieutenant Commander Rich Federico, The Unusual 

Punishment: A Call for Congress to Abolish the Death Penalty 

Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for Unique Military, 

Non-Homicide Offenses, 18 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 21 (2013) (“The 

last soldier executed for desertion was Private Eddie Slovik in 

1945.”). Still, the fact remains that unlike other jobs, if a soldier 

attempts to leave the military in certain contexts, the consequence 

can be loss of freedom or even life.

7

 Amicus argues that professional basketball star LeBron James 

is not free to leave one team and play for another under the National 

Basketball Association’s rules and that federal employees can be 

required to work during government shutdowns. But Amicus misses 

the point. It is the threatened loss of liberty—or even life—that 

makes the relationship between uniformed members and the 

government in military service unique. LeBron James may be 

contractually barred from joining another team but he will not be 

jailed for walking off the court. 

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promptly and reliably, the military services ‘must insist upon a 

respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian 

life.’” Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 

757, (1975))).

Other aspects of military service make it unique from 

traditional employment. Although uniformed members 

currently volunteer to serve, were the government to reinstitute the draft pursuant to the Selective Service Act, 

individuals could be forced to join the military. See United 

States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 9 (1953) (“The Selective Service 

Act is a comprehensive statute designed to provide an orderly, 

efficient and fair procedure to marshal the available manpower 

of the country, to impose a common obligation of military 

service on all physically fit young men.”). Additionally, 

members of the armed forces are subject to a different set of 

laws and justice system from those governing civilian 

employees. See Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223 n.4 (“[T]he soldier 

is subject not only to military discipline but also to military 

law.”); Parker, 417 U.S. at 751–52 (discussing “very 

significant differences between military law and civilian law 

and between the military community and the civilian 

community” under Uniform Code of Military Justice). We 

therefore agree with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that,

because military service “differs materially” from “ordinary 

civilian employment,” uniformed members of the armed forces

are not employed by the government within the meaning of 

Title VII. Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223–24.

We do not, of course, hold today that, because military 

service is distinct from traditional employment, the military is 

free to discriminate. Indeed, pursuant to Marine Corps Order

(MCO) 5354.1E, the military is prohibited from engaging in 

unlawful discrimination, including in the employment

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context.8 See MCO 5354.1E vol. 2, ¶ 0108 (June 15, 2018). 

Likewise, we do not hold that, because military service is 

unique, uniformed members of the armed forces can never be 

considered “employees” of the federal government. The 

Congress is free to so define them. Here, it has not done that. 

In fact, it has done the opposite—the text, structure and context 

of § 2000e-16(a) demonstrate that the Congress did not intend 

uniformed members of the armed forces to come within the 

protections of Title VII.

Apart from the text and structure of Title VII, we also must 

take into account that every circuit court of appeals to address 

8 MCO 5354.1E provides in relevant part: 

0108 UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

Any conduct whereby a Service member or 

DOD employee knowingly and wrongfully and 

without proper authority but with a nexus to military 

service treats another Service member or DOD 

employee adversely or differently based on race, 

color, national origin, religion, sex (including

gender identity), or sexual orientation [constitutes 

unlawful discrimination]. Unlawful discrimination 

includes actions or efforts that detract from equal 

opportunity, with respect to the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of military service including, but not 

limited to, acquiring, assigning, promoting, 

disciplining, scheduling, training, compensating, 

discharging, or separating. This definition excludes 

justifiable conduct that discriminates on the basis of 

characteristics (including, but not limited to, age, 

height, and weight) that serve a proper military or 

other governmental purpose as set forth in other 

military policies.

MCO 5354.1E vol. 2, ¶ 0108 (June 15, 2018).

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this issue since 1978 has held that uniformed members of the 

armed forces are not included within the protections of Title 

VII,

9 see, e.g., Brown, 227 F.3d at 298 n.3 (collecting cases); 

in addition, the Congress has never amended Title VII to add 

uniformed members of the armed forces to the statute. The 

Supreme Court has held that “Congress’ failure to disturb a 

consistent judicial interpretation of a statute may provide some 

indication that ‘Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently 

affirms, that [interpretation].’” Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. 

Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1988) (quoting Cannon v. Univ.

of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979))). This indication is 

particularly strong if evidence exists of the Congress’s 

awareness of and familiarity with such an interpretation. See 

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599–602 

(1983). 

Although we recognize the limited value of congressional 

acquiescence as an interpretive tool, see Cent. Bank of Denver, 

N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 186 

(1994), we nevertheless find the Congress’s inaction for over 

forty years particularly significant for a couple of reasons. 

First, the Congress has amended various parts of Title VII over 

the years, including the specific provision at issue here, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), see Pub. L. No. 104–1, § 201, 109 Stat.

3 (1995); Pub. L. No. 105–220, § 341, 112 Stat. 936 (1998), 

but has never sought to override our sister circuits’ 

determination that uniformed members of the armed forces are 

not included under Title VII.10 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 

9

 The only court to conclude otherwise was the Eastern District 

of New York in Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1238 (E.D.N.Y. 

1986). That decision was later reversed by the Second Circuit. See

Roper, 832 F.2d at 248. 10 We also note that our sister circuits have interpreted other 

federal anti-discrimination laws in addition to Title VII not to apply 

to uniformed members of the armed forces. See Coffman, 120 F.3d 

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Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 n.66 (1982) 

(“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or 

judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that 

interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” 

(quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–581 (1978))).11 

Second, aware of the growing body of circuit decisions 

consistently holding Title VII inapplicable to uniformed 

servicemembers, the Congress has legislated close and 

systematic oversight of the military’s substitute system for 

addressing race and sex discrimination in the armed forces. See

10 U.S.C. § 481. In 1994 it required the Department of Defense 

to conduct a biennial survey and report to include “the 

effectiveness of current processes for complaints on and 

investigations into racial and ethnic discrimination” in the 

at 59 (Americans with Disabilities Act); Baldwin v. U.S. Army, 223 

F.3d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Spain v. Ball, 928 F.2d 61, 63 

(2d Cir. 1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Helm v. 

California, 722 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Kawitt v. 

United States, 842 F.2d 951, 953–54 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Doe v. 

Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1461–62 (11th Cir.1990) (Rehabilitation 

Act). 

11 We have recognized that this interpretive canon based on the 

Congress’s ratification of an interpretation is of limited usefulness if 

the Congress has neither re-enacted a statute nor amended the 

specific provision at issue. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Here, 

however, the Congress has amended the specific provision to make 

clarifications and add specific government agencies such as the 

Government Printing Office and the Smithsonian Institution. See

Pub. L. No. 104–1, § 201, 109 Stat. 3 (1995); Pub. L. No. 105–220, 

§ 341, 112 Stat. 936 (1998). We have also noted that for the canon 

to carry any weight, there must be “some evidence of (or reason to 

assume)” that the Congress is familiar “with the . . . interpretation at 

issue.” Pub. Citizen, 332 F.3d at 669. As explained infra, we have 

reason to assume the Congress’s awareness. 

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armed forces. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 554(a), 108 Stat. 2773 

(1994). Through four amendments, the Congress has 

intensified its attention to the special Equal Employment 

Opportunity processes and standards that apply to the armed 

forces. It acted first to add gender discrimination and make the 

surveys annual, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 571(c), 110 Stat. 2532 

(1996), second, to create four separate quadrennial surveys on 

race and sex discrimination in the active and reserve forces, 

Pub L. No. 107-314, § 561(a), 116 Stat. 2553 (2002), third, to 

add “harassment” and “assault” as subjects of interest in 

addition to “discrimination,” Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 570, 126 

Stat. 1752 (2013), and, last, to further define “assault” as 

“(including unwanted sexual contact),” Pub. L. No. 116-

92, § 591, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019). The Department of Defense 

is required periodically to submit “Armed Forces Workplace 

and Equal Opportunity Surveys” to the Congress. 10 

U.S.C. § 481(d)-(e). The Congress’s engagement with the 

efficacy of the military’s internal systems to combat sex and 

race discrimination provides added assurance of its awareness 

and approval of the inapplicability of Title VII itself to the

armed forces.12

12 We also find significant the Congress’s efforts to clarify 

whether members of the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps 

(PHSCC) were covered by Title VII. See Middlebrooks v. Leavitt, 

525 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that courts disagreed 

about whether the PHSCC was covered under Title VII and that 

“Congress responded to this debate by enacting the [HPEPA of 

1998], which added subsection (f) to 42 U.S.C. § 213 (2000)”). To 

effect this clarification, the Congress chose the following language: 

“Active service of commissioned officers of the [PHSCC] shall be 

deemed to be active military service in the Armed Forces of the 

United States for purposes of all laws related to discrimination on 

the basis of race, color, sex, ethnicity, age, religion, and disability.” 

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Nevertheless, Amicus argues that our conclusion here is 

controlled by our decision in Cummings v. Department of the 

Navy, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002). We disagree. In 

Cummings we held that members of the armed forces could sue 

the military for damages under the Privacy Act. Id. at 1054. 

Amicus relies on the fact that we construed the term “military 

department” in the Privacy Act to include uniformed members 

of the armed forces, see id., to argue that we must likewise 

interpret Title VII’s use of that term to include uniformed 

members. First, the Privacy Act’s language does not refer to 

employees of the military departments like Title VII; it defines 

the term “agency” to include, among other things 

“any . . . military department” for the purpose of the Privacy 

Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). Second, in Cummings, we noted 

that the Privacy Act contained specific exemptions that “would 

be unnecessary if military servicepersons were excluded from 

the Privacy Act altogether.” 279 F.3d at 1054 (quoting 

Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 n.5 

(D.D.C. 2000)). For example, it included one exemption for 

“evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion 

in the armed services.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(k)(7)). Title VII contains no such provision 

demonstrating an intent to protect uniformed members of the 

armed forces. Thus, Cummings is distinguishable and does not 

control our decision here. 

42 U.S.C. § 213(f) (emphasis added). The Congress could have 

simply said that the PHSCC officers are not covered by antidiscrimination laws but, instead, it specifically chose to ground the 

amendment in the term “Armed Forces” to delineate that such forces 

are not covered by the nation’s anti-discrimination laws. This 

legislation appears not only to recognize what circuit courts have 

held but also to go further, explicitly ratifying the view that 

uniformed members of the armed forces are not covered by antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII.

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Before concluding, we also note that some courts that 

reached the same conclusion we reach today have done so 

based on rationales that we decline to use. First, some courts 

have based their Title VII conclusion on the “Feres doctrine,” 

which doctrine originated in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 

135 (1950). See, e.g., Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th 

Cir. 1997). In Feres, the Supreme Court held that “the 

Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 

injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in 

the course of activity incident to service,” 340 U.S. at 146, 

despite language in the FTCA defining “employee of the 

government” to include “members of the military or naval 

forces of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Although 

Feres remains good law, it has been severely criticized. See

United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, 

J., dissenting) (“Feres was wrongly decided and heartily 

deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism it has 

received.’” (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 

580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984))); Lanus v. United 

States, 570 U.S. 932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 

of certiorari) (“There is no support for [Feres’s] conclusion in 

the text of the statute, and it has the unfortunate consequence 

of depriving servicemen of any remedy when they are injured 

by the negligence of the Government or its employees.”). 

Because we find sufficient independent bases to conclude that 

Title VII does not apply to uniformed members of the armed 

forces, we do not rely on Feres to reach our conclusion. For 

this reason, we do not extend the doctrine to Title VII. See 

Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 

(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While 

lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Feres, they are hardly obliged to extend the limitation . . . .”).

Second, some courts have relied on the EEOC’s regulation 

interpreting Title VII to exclude uniformed members of the 

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armed forces to deny such members’ claims under Title VII, 

basing their decision on the EEOC’s authority to promulgate 

rules interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). See Hodge, 107 

F.3d at 707–08; Brown, 227 F.3d at 298. The EEOC regulation 

states that its general prohibition against discrimination under 

Title VII, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Pay Act, 

and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act “does not 

apply to: (1) Uniformed members of the military departments 

referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.” 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.103(a), (d)(1). Amicus raises procedural and 

substantive challenges to the EEOC’s regulation treating Title 

VII as inapplicable to “uniformed members of the military 

departments” but we do not credit those arguments because the 

Commission’s reading is compelled by the statutory text. See

Hodge, 107 F.3d at 712.

Therefore, based on the text, structure and context of 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) as well as the Congress’s subsequent 

actions in light of the unanimous circuit precedent on the issue, 

we hold that Title VII does not apply to uniformed members of 

the armed forces. As such, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Jackson’s Title VII claim.

B. APA Claim

Amicus also appeals the district court’s dismissal of 

Jackson’s APA claim. The district court inferred an APA claim 

challenging the decisions of the Board for Correction of Naval 

Records regarding Jackson’s fitness records and his 

reenlistment code. Jackson, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 309. We first 

note that, despite the Secretary’s arguments to the contrary, the 

APA claim is properly before us. The district court liberally 

construed Jackson’s pro se complaint to include claims beyond 

Title VII. Indeed, the Secretary himself suggested in his

motion to dismiss that Jackson could be raising an APA claim. 

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Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 18. Moreover, although we 

appointed Amicus principally to address the Title VII claim, 

we did not otherwise limit the arguments or claims he could 

raise on appeal on Jackson’s behalf. Order No. 1762275 at 1

(No. 18-5180) (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 2018).

1.

The parties do not dispute that Jackson’s APA claim is 

time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2401(a) for all civil actions commenced against the United 

States. Instead, they dispute whether § 2401(a)’s statute of 

limitations is a jurisdictional bar—thereby divesting the court 

of jurisdiction as well as its ability to consider an equitable 

tolling argument—or whether it is non-jurisdictional.

The long-held rule in our circuit has been “that section 

2401(a) creates ‘a jurisdictional condition attached to the 

government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.’” P & V Enters. 

v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (quoting Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 

55 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Recently, however, especially after the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Kwai Fun Wong, which held the 

two-year statute of limitations in § 2401(b) to be 

nonjurisdictional, 575 U.S. at 407, the soundness of our 

precedent has been called into doubt. See, e.g., Jafarzadeh v. 

Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 19, 37 n.7 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Given the 

Supreme Court’s clear strictures on this issue, which have 

undermined the foundations of Spannaus and similar cases, the 

D.C. Circuit ought to reconsider its § 2401(a) precedents.”). 

Since Kwai Fun Wong, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held 

that, based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in that 

case, § 2401(a) is not jurisdictional.13 Chance v. Zinke, 898 

13 Even before Kwai Fun Wong, the Ninth Circuit held 

that § 2401(a) is not jurisdictional. Cedars–Sinai Med. Ctr. v. 

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F.3d 1025, 1033 (10th Cir. 2018); Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 

803 F.3d 809, 817–18 (6th Cir. 2015). Although we have 

previously “questioned the continuing viability” of our rule 

without addressing the issue directly, see Mendoza v. Perez, 

754 F.3d 1002, 1018 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing P & V 

Enters., 516 F.3d at 1027 & n.2; Felter v. Kempthorne, 473 

F.3d 1255, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Harris v. F.A.A., 353 F.3d 

1006, 1013 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2004)), we now do so. Accordingly,

we hold today that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kwai Fun 

Wong overrules our precedent treating § 2401(a)’s statute of 

limitations as jurisdictional.14 

Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770–71 (9th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit did 

the same, see Clymore v. United States, 217 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 

2000) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling has potential application 

in suits . . . governed by the statute of limitations codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(a).”), but subsequent Fifth Circuit precedent is less 

clear, compare Doe v. United States, 853 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 

2017), as revised (Apr. 12, 2017) (“Although courts may equitably 

toll § 2401(a), they do so ‘sparingly.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002))), 

and Louisiana v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 834 F.3d 574, 584 (5th 

Cir. 2016) (“Timeliness [under § 2401(a)] does not raise a 

jurisdictional issue in this court.”), with Gen. Land Office v. U.S.

Dep’t of the Interior, 947 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[Section 

2401(a)’s] timing requirement is jurisdictional, because it is a 

condition of the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity.”).

14 “[W]e cannot overrule a prior panel’s decision, except via 

an Irons footnote or en banc review . . . .” United States v. Emor, 785 

F.3d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “In an Irons footnote, named after 

the holding in Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 267–68 & n. 11 (D.C. 

Cir. 1981), the panel ‘seek[s] for its proposed decision the 

endorsement of the en banc court, and announce[s] that endorsement 

in a footnote to the panel’s opinion.’” Oakey v. U.S. Airways Pilots 

Disability Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 232 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Policy Statement on En Banc 

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“In recent years,” the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held 

that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court’s 

power” to hear a case—i.e., subject matter jurisdiction—“only 

if Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ as much.” Kwai Fun Wong, 

575 U.S. at 409 (alteration in original) (quoting Sebelius v. 

Auburn Reg’l Med. Cent., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)). 

Applying this “clear statement rule,” the Court has “made plain 

that most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” Id. at 410. In Kwai 

Fun Wong, the Supreme Court explained that “Congress must 

do something special, beyond setting an exception-free 

deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so 

prohibit a court from tolling it.” 575 U.S. at 410. Based on 

that rule, the Court held that the FTCA’s statute of limitations 

in § 2401(b) was “not a jurisdictional requirement.” Id. at 412. 

Applying the Court’s ruling in Kwai Fun Wong

to § 2401(a), we reach the same conclusion. First, our 

precedent treating § 2401(a) as a jurisdictional bar was 

grounded in the belief that the provision is “attached to the 

government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, and as such must 

be strictly construed.” Spannaus, 824 F.2d at 55. In Kwai Fun 

Wong, the Court flatly rejected this reasoning. 575 U.S. at 420 

(“[I]t makes no difference that a time bar conditions a waiver 

of sovereign immunity, even if the Congress enacted the 

measure when different interpretive conventions 

applied . . . .”). Second, like § 2401(b), § 2401(a) “does not 

speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 

jurisdiction of the district courts”; rather, it “‘reads like an 

ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of limitations,’ spelling out a 

litigant’s filing obligations without restricting a court’s 

authority.” Id. at 411 (first quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515; 

Endorsement of Panel Decisions at 1 (Jan. 17, 1996)). Our resolution 

here—recognizing the overruling of our precedent by the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Kwai Fun Wong—has been approved by the en 

banc court and thus constitutes the law of the circuit.

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then quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647 (2010)); 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (“[E]very civil action commenced 

against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint 

is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.”). 

Also like § 2401(b), § 2401(a)’s filing deadline appears in a 

section separate from the general jurisdictional grant of civil 

actions against the federal government, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346; 

Herr, 803 F.3d at 817, which the Supreme Court found to be 

an indication “that the time bar is not jurisdictional.” Kwai Fun 

Wong, 575 at 411. 

Third, we conclude that § 2401(a)’s origins in the Tucker 

Act do not make it otherwise jurisdictional. We find the indepth analyses and reasoning of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits 

on this point—differentiating between the separate provisions 

of the Big Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act—particularly 

cogent and persuasive. See Herr, 803 F.3d at 815–17; Chance, 

898 F.3d at 1031–33. As those courts explained, although the 

Supreme Court has affirmed the jurisdictional nature of the Big 

Tucker Act’s statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2501, its

affirmance was grounded solely in the doctrine of stare decisis; 

further, the Congress altered the Little Tucker Act’s statute of 

limitations—the provision from which § 2401(a) is derived—

by separating it from the jurisdictional grant and expanding its 

reach. See Chance, 898 F.3d at 1032–33; Herr, 803 F.3d at 

816–17. As the Sixth Circuit explains, this alteration 

“demonstrates that § 2401(a) was designed to serve as a 

standard, mine-run statute of limitations without jurisdictional 

qualities. That leaves us with a statute (§ 2401(a)) that does not 

clearly impose a jurisdictional limit.” Herr, 803 F.3d at 817. 

Accordingly, we hold that § 2401(a)’s time bar is 

nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling. Our 

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decisions to the contrary, see, e.g., Spannaus, 824 F.2d at 55, 

are thus overruled.15

2.

Having determined that § 2401(a)’s statute of limitations

is not jurisdictional, we turn to Jackson’s equitable tolling 

argument in support of his APA claim. The district court

considered the merits of Jackson’s equitable tolling argument

and we review its dismissal of Jackson’s APA claim de novo.

16 

See Chung v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). To demonstrate that he is entitled to the benefit of 

equitable tolling, Jackson must show “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 418 (2005). We have described the remedy of 

“equitable tolling as appropriate only in ‘rare instances 

where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own 

conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation 

period against the party and gross injustice would result.’” 

Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014)).

On appeal, Amicus argues that equitable tolling is 

warranted because Jackson’s “debilitating mental anguish as a 

result of the government’s misconduct prevented his timely 

filing of the APA claim.” Amicus Br. at 49. Amicus relies on 

our holding in Smith-Haynie v. D.C., 155 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 

1998), to argue that Jackson was “non compos mentis,” which 

ordinarily means “incapable of handling [one’s] own affairs or 

15 See supra note 14. 16 Because we hold that § 2401(a)’s statute of limitations is not 

jurisdictional, the dismissal of Jackson’s APA claim should be 

reviewed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim rather 

than Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

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unable to function [in] society.” Id. at 580 (second alteration 

in original).

Amicus’s equitable tolling argument does not meet the 

high threshold for applying this rare remedy. See id. at 579–80 

(“The court’s equitable power to toll the statute of limitations 

will be exercised only in extraordinary and carefully 

circumscribed instances.” (quoting Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 

845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988))). Although Jackson’s 

allegations, if true, indicate that he suffered mental and 

emotional harm as a result of being discriminated against, they 

do not rise to the level of non compos mentis. As we explained 

in Smith-Haynie, “[i]mpaired judgment alone is not enough to 

toll the statute of limitations.” 155 F.3d at 580 (quoting Hendel 

v. World Plan Exec. Council, 705 A.2d 656, 665 (D.C. 1997)). 

“The disability of a person claiming to be non compos mentis

must be ‘of such a nature as to show [he] is unable to manage 

[his] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend [his] legal 

rights or liabilities.’” Id. (quoting Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App.

202, 422 A.2d 389, 392 (Md. 1980)). Smith-Haynie references 

various facts indicative of non compos mentis, including being

“[un]able to engage in rational thought and deliberate decision 

making sufficient to pursue” a legal claim whether “alone or 

through counsel” or diagnosed with schizophrenia, “adjudged 

incompetent,” or appointed a caretaker or power of attorney. 

Id. (first quoting Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 5–6

(1st Cir. 1993); and then quoting Speiser v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 670 F. Supp. 380, 385 (D.D.C. 1986), 

aff’d, 818 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Jackson’s allegations of 

“pain, anger, depression, hopelessness and bewilderment,” the

“divorce from [his] wife caused by [his] difficult emotion [and] 

mental state,” “[l]oss of enjoyment of life,” “insomnia, distrust, 

depression, anxiety” and “financial hardship” as a result of the 

discrimination he suffered, Compl. 12, 17, although serious, do 

not rise to the level of non compos mentis such that he was 

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unable to manage his own affairs or comprehend his rights or 

liabilities.

Indeed, the allegations in his complaint demonstrate that 

Jackson was able to manage his affairs and comprehend his 

rights quite well. Jackson alleges that at the time of the alleged 

discrimination, he knew that he “had been subjected to 

wrongdoing and strongly desired justice.” Id. at 12. He alleges 

that “[f]or an extended period of time, I sought help from the 

Department of the Navy, Department of Justice, Attorneys, 

congressmen, news media, etc.” Id. at 12–13. He describes 

these efforts as a “massive undertaking.” Id. at 13. Indeed, 

after being discharged from the military, he filed applications 

with the Board for Correction of Naval Records regarding his 

fitness record and reenlistment code in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 

1994 and 2000. During this time, he sought legal assistance as 

well as assistance from others, including a United States 

Senator, to reenlist in the Marines. This conduct indicates that

he was capable of filing a timely APA claim. He is not entitled 

to equitable tolling, then, and the district court correctly

dismissed his claim.

C. Military Pay Act

Finally, we briefly address Jackson’s Military Pay Act 

claim. The district court construed Jackson’s request for 

reenlistment with back pay as a claim under the Military Pay 

Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204, but held that it lacked jurisdiction of that 

claim. Amicus initially appealed the dismissal of the claim but 

in its reply brief abandoned the claim on the ground raised by 

the Secretary—namely, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal 

of a Military Pay Act claim because the Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of such claims. 

Having considered that argument, we agree that we lack 

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jurisdiction to review the claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

So ordered.

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