Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02645/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02645-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY OVERBECK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2645-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) finding plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of receiving Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons 

discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, deny the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remand this matter under sentence four 

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born May 16, 1973, applied on October 30, 2012 for DIB, alleging disability 

beginning November 1, 2007. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 61, 273-79. Plaintiff alleged he 

was unable to work due to anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), head injuries, knee 

problems, and sleep apnea. AT 87-88, 390. In a decision dated June 12, 2014, the ALJ 

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determined that plaintiff was not disabled.

1

 AT 17-28. The ALJ made the following findings 

(citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2016.

2. The claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the 

following periods: November 2007 to June 2009 and May 2011 to 

May 2012.

3. However, there has been a continuous 12-month period(s) during 

which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity. 

The remaining findings address the period(s) the claimant did not 

engage in substantial gainful activity.

4. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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joint disease of the bilateral knees, traumatic brain injury, 

obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, a major depressive disorder, and 

post-traumatic stress disorder.

5. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1.

6. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c), except that he is able to 

perform simple, repetitive tasks in a non-public setting, with only 

occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors.

7. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

8. The claimant was born on May 16, 1973 and was 34 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged 

disability onset date.

9. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

10. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferrable job skills.

11. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

12. The claimant has not been under disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from November 1, 2007, through the date of 

this decision.

AT 19-28.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly considered the medical opinions of Dr. Edwards and Dr. Tobon when 

determining plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (2) failed to provide clear and 

convincing reasons for finding plaintiff’s testimony less than fully credible.

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ Properly Considered the Medical Opinions in the Record When 

Determining Plaintiff’s RFC

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly gave “partial to moderate weight” to the 

opinion of Dr. Edwards, an examining psychologist. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by

giving “little weight” to some of the mental limitations opined by Dr. Tobon, a treating 

psychiatrist.

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The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996).

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

1. Dr. Edwards

On March 7, 2013, Dr. Edwards gave plaintiff a consultative psychological examination. 

AT 707-13. During this examination, Dr. Edwards administered to plaintiff a number of 

psychometric tests, including trail making tests, the Wechsler Memory Scale IV and Adult 

Intelligence IV tests, and the Bender Gestalt Test II. AT 708-12. Dr. Edwards determined that 

these tests generally revealed “high average” to “superior” score results, including an above 

average full-scale IQ score of 125, but that plaintiff also had mild-to-moderate limitations in areas 

regarding memory-related skills. Id. Based on these tests, plaintiff’s medical records, and an

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interview with plaintiff, Dr. Edwards diagnosed plaintiff with a major depressive order, recurrent 

PTSD with panic attacks, post-concussion syndrome, and health and financial stressors, and gave 

him a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 45.

2 AT 712. With regard to mental 

limitations resulting from these impairments, Dr. Edwards opined that plaintiff had difficulties 

with memory that would limit his ability to understand, carry out, and remember simple 

instructions, but that such limitations “could probably be compensated for by provided brief 

written instructions so [plaintiff] can refresh his memory when needed.” AT 713. Dr. Edwards 

further opined that plaintiff’s mental impairments caused him limitations in his ability to respond 

appropriately to coworkers, supervisors, the public, and work situations. Id. Finally, he opined 

that plaintiff also had limitations in his ability to deal with changes in a routine work setting. Id.

The ALJ gave “partial to moderate weight” to Dr. Edward’s overall opinion. AT 24. 

More specifically, she determined that Dr. Edward’s medical opinions:

[A]re based on medical findings on examination of the claimant and 

are well-supported by medically acceptable and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques. However, Dr. Edwards’ determinations, 

including his assignment of a GAF score of 45, appear to be 

excessive based on other substantial medical evidence of record.

For example, on Disability Determination Explanation Forms, 

medical consultants employed by the state diagnosed the claimant 

with affective disorders, organic mental disorders, and anxiety 

disorders. The medical consultants determined that the claimant 

had no more than moderate difficulties in maintaining social 

functioning or in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. 

The medical consultants also opined that the claimant was able to 

perform simple tasks with limited public contact.

AT 24 (citations to the record omitted). 

Plaintiff asserts that these reasons were insufficient to support the ALJ’s assignment of 

reduced weight to Dr. Edwards’s opinion. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ merely 

reasoned that the aspects of Dr. Edwards’s opinion she found “excessive” were contradicted by 

 

2

The Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) is a scale reflecting the “psychological, social, 

and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic 

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at 34 (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM IV-TR”). A GAF score 

of 45 indicates serious symptoms or serious impairment in school, social or occupational 

functioning. DSM IV-TR at 34.

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the State agency physicians’ opinions without providing any explanation as to why she found 

those opinions more persuasive. This argument, however, mischaracterizes the ALJ’s discussion 

regarding the medical opinion evidence in the record. To be sure, the ALJ specifically discussed 

the reasons why he gave “great weight” to the State agency physicians’ opinions, including that 

they took into account plaintiff’s participation in a Master’s program and opined limitations that 

were fully supported by the medical examination findings of plaintiff’s treating physicians. AT 

24-25.

Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s reasoning that the other objective 

medical evidence in the record conflicted with the aspects of Dr. Edwards’s opinion the ALJ 

found excessive. Indeed, Dr. Edwards’s own clinical findings show that plaintiff obtained test 

results indicating he had above-average-to-superior mental functioning and mental impairments 

that generally caused him only mild-to-moderate limitations with regard to memory-related 

activities. AT 710-12. Such results conflicted with the aspects of Dr. Edwards’s opinion that 

indicated that plaintiff had serious impairments in mental functioning, such as his determination 

that plaintiff had a GAF score of 45. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that while Dr. Edwards’s 

medical findings were well founded and generally supported his opinion, certain aspects of his 

opinion were extreme in light of that evidence. This was a proper reason for discounting Dr. 

Edwards’s opinion to the extent determined by the ALJ. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating 

physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”).

Furthermore, as noted above, the ALJ also relied in part on the opinions of the nonexamining State agency physicians in determining that Dr. Edwards’s opinion conflicted with the 

other medical evidence. While the ALJ could not reject Dr. Edwards’s opinion based solely on 

the non-examining opinions, she was permitted to refer to them, along with the other objective 

medical evidence she discussed, in support of her determination that the functional limitations 

opined by Dr. Edwards were not fully consistent with the other medical evidence. See Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831 (holding that while “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself 

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of . . . a treating 

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physician,” it may be used by the ALJ to support his RFC determination when the opinion reflects 

other objective medical evidence in the record). Both non-examining physicians’ opinions 

contained mental limitations less severe than those opined by Dr. Edwards and were generally 

supported by the other objective medical evidence in the record, including Dr. Edwards’s own 

clinical findings. See AT 163-77, 179-95. Accordingly, the ALJ also properly drew on these 

opinions to support her conclusion that some of Dr. Edwards’s opined limitations were overlysevere in light of the medical evidence in the record.

2. Dr. Tobon

On December 27, 2013, Dr. Tobon filled out a one-page psychiatric medical source 

statement for plaintiff providing her opinion regarding the extent to which plaintiff’s mental 

impairments imposed work-related mental limitations. Therein, Dr. Tobon opined that plaintiff 

had “moderate” restriction in his ability to relate and interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the 

public, and a “mild” limitation in his “[a]bility to understand, remember, and carry out simple 

one-or-two job instructions.” AT 855. She further opined that plaintiff had “marked” restrictions 

in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex work instructions and in his 

“[a]bility to maintain concentration and attention for at least two hour increments.” Id. Dr. 

Tobon also determined that plaintiff had “marked to extreme” limitations in his “[a]bility to 

withstand the stress and pressures associated with an eight-hour work day and day-to-day work 

activity.” Id. Finally, she opined that plaintiff’s condition “could be long-term,” but also noted 

that plaintiff was “slowly responding to treatment and has had some progress to date.” Id.

The ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Tobon’s opinion with regard to Dr. Tobon’s 

determinations that plaintiff had “mild” limitations with regard to following simple instructions 

and “moderate” limitations in interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. AT 25. 

However, the ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Tobon’s opinion that plaintiff had “marked” 

limitations in his ability to perform complex tasks, maintain concentration for at least 2 hour 

increments, and handle workplace pressure and stress. Id. In support of this determination, the 

ALJ reasoned that Dr. Tobon’s opinions to which she assigned little weight:

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[A]re inconsistent with the evidence of record as a whole, including 

the claimant’s ability to participate in a Master’s program and get 

A’s and B’s for grades. These conclusions are also inconsistent 

with the medical consultants employed by the state.

In addition, during the hearing, Alfred Jonas, M.D., a psychiatrist 

and mental expert, testified that he reviewed that [sic] entire record 

and determined that there was nothing in the record to support Dr. 

Tobon’s opinion that the claimant’s concentration and susceptibility 

to stress were marked. Dr. Jonas also noted that Dr. Tobon had 

found the claimant to be markedly impaired for complex tasks, but 

recognized that he was capable of independently managing 

finances, even though the claimant thought that he was not able to 

do so, and there was no meaningful demonstration of such a marked 

impairment in the record. Dr. Jonas also recognized that the 

claimant could not be considered to have such marked impairments 

if he was in a Master’s program or working with canines.

Id. 

Plaintiff contends that these are not specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the 

aspects of Dr. Tobon’s opinion to which the ALJ gave little weight. More specifically, and 

similar to his argument regarding the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Edwards’s opinion, plaintiff 

asserts that the ALJ merely reasoned that Dr. Tobon’s opinion conflicted with those of the State 

agency physicians without explaining how these opinions conflicted. However, as discussed 

above with regard to Dr. Edwards’s opinion, the ALJ stated in her decision the reasons why she 

accorded great weight to the State agency physicians’ opinions and lesser weight to certain 

aspects of Dr. Tobon’s opinion. AT 24-25.

Moreover, the ALJ also determined that the aspects of Dr. Tobon’s opinion to which she

assigned “little weight” conflicted with the opinion of Dr. Jonas, a medical expert who testified at 

plaintiff’s hearing and opined that there was nothing in plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that 

plaintiff was markedly impaired in his ability to concentrate or handle stress. AT 25, 131. In 

forming his opinion, Dr. Jonas referred to plaintiff’s medical records and statements showing that 

he regularly attended 90-minute long therapy sessions and contributed throughout each session, 

attended a Master’s program and received A’s and B’s, had a “working memory IQ” score at the 

“high end of average,” and had been employed as a software advisor or consultant for several 

years after he received the head injuries that allegedly caused his memory problems. AT 126-27, 

131-33, 140, 142. Based on this evidence, Dr. Jonas opined that there is no basis in the medical 

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record to determine that plaintiff’s mental impairments would cause him to miss any work and 

that plaintiff was, at most, mildly impaired with regard to maintaining concentration, persistence, 

and pace. AT 131-32, 137-38. The ALJ assigned “great weight” to Dr. Jonas’s opinion and

reasoning, finding that it was consistent with the objective medical evidence in the record. AT 

26. In making this determination, the ALJ referenced plaintiff’s outpatient records from the 

Veterans’ Administration (“VA”) hospital from late 2013 through early 2014 indicating that 

plaintiff did not have concentration or comprehension difficulties and had organized thought 

processes. AT 26 (citing AT 1188-1230). The court’s review of this evidence demonstrates that 

the ALJ’s determination that it supported the more mild memory, concentration, and coping 

limitations opined by Dr. Jonas instead of Dr. Tobon’s more extreme opinion was reasonable. 

E.g., AT 1189, 1194, 1196. Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Jonas’s contrary opinion 

to discount the aspects of Dr. Tobon’s opinion to which she ascribed lesser weight as it was 

supported by substantial medical evidence from the record. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956-57 

(“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial 

evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in 

the record.”).

Furthermore, the ALJ also relied on Dr. Jonas’s opinion that Dr. Tobon’s opinions

regarding plaintiff’s ability to concentrate, remember, and cope with stress were internally 

inconsistent with Dr. Tobon’s other findings. AT 25, 131, 139-40. Specifically, Dr. Jonas found 

that Dr. Tobon’s opinion that plaintiff was markedly impaired in memory, concentration, and his 

ability to perform complex tasks conflicted with his other opinion that plaintiff was still capable 

of handling his own finances. AT 139-40. The ALJ agreed with Dr. Jonas and found that these 

aspects of Dr. Tobon’s opinion did conflict. AT 25. Such a determination constituted an 

additional proper reason for the ALJ to assign diminished weight to Dr. Tobon’s opinion that 

plaintiff had certain “marked” mental limitations as it was the ALJ’s role to resolve the conflicts 

present in Dr. Tobon’s opinion. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40 (“The ALJ is responsible for 

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.”). 

Accordingly, the ALJ provided multiple specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 

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Tobon’s opinion that plaintiff had certain “marked” mental limitations.

B. The ALJ Properly Assessed the Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the credibility of plaintiff’s 

testimony because she determined that it was only partially credible without providing clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so.

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek 

treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ 

in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional impairment. 

See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, 

on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 

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(9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ provided the following reasons in support of her adverse credibility 

determination:

[A]fter careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the 

claimant’s and his girlfriend’s statements concerning intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible for the reasons explained in this decision, as his activities 

and functioning have been inconsistent with the allegations. For 

example, although the claimant and his girlfriend indicated that the 

he had limitations with standing and walking, Dr. Schwartz and 

medical consultants revealed that he was able to stand and walk up 

to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. In addition, despite their 

allegations of the claimant having conflict with other students and 

instructor, he has been able to continue going to school with 

accommodations and has been completing his classes. In fact, the 

claimant testified that he tries to do 2 hours of homework every 

day. The claimant has revealed that he has a service dog for PTSD; 

however, I note that he did not have the dog at the hearing.

The claimant has also revealed that he was able to attend a group 

event at a temple with 15 to 20 other people without any significant 

problems. Although the claimant has conflicts with others, he has 

attended a Master’s program and has been completing his 

coursework with grades of A’s and B’s. I also note that the 

claimant’s testimony was frequently vague despite attempts to elicit 

answers to questions in more detail.

AT 26-27.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasons for finding his testimony not credible are not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

reasons related to plaintiff’s ability to attend a Master’s program and excel in his coursework 

ignores his testimony that he had experienced conflicts with his professors and other students, in 

addition to other difficulties. However, the ALJ expressly stated that she considered these alleged 

problems in arriving at her conclusion regarding plaintiff’s credibility and still determined that

they did not diminish plaintiff’s ability to perform certain mental work-related functions to the 

degree that plaintiff alleged. Indeed, the ALJ highlighted plaintiff’s statements that he has been 

able to complete his classes with A’s and B’s and do 2-to-4 hours of homework per night as 

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evidence that his claims that his mental impairments caused extreme cognitive limitations, such 

as restrictions on his ability to concentrate for extended periods of time or follow directions, were 

exaggerated. AT 26-27. Furthermore, the ALJ took into account plaintiff’s testimony regarding

his difficulties dealing with others in school by including in her RFC determination a limitation 

on plaintiff’s ability to interact with coworkers and supervisors, and a complete restriction from 

any public contact. AT 21. Nevertheless, she did not find plaintiff’s social difficulties to be as 

severe as plaintiff alleged. Such findings based on plaintiff’s testimony regarding his schoolrelated activities were reasonable and constituted substantial support for the ALJ’s adverse 

credibility decision. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even where 

[the claimant’s] activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for 

discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally 

debilitating impairment.”).

The ALJ also found that plaintiff frequently gave vague answers to the ALJ’s questions

during the hearing, therefore further diminishing plaintiff’s credibility. Indeed, a review of the 

hearing transcript demonstrates that at least some of plaintiff’s responses to the ALJ’s questions 

were unclear or not fully responsive. E.g., AT 70-72, 103. Plaintiff argues that his vague 

testimony actually corroborated his complaint that his mental impairments caused him difficulties 

in following instructions. However, the ALJ’s interpretation that the lack of clarity in plaintiff’s 

responses indicated evasiveness and a lack of candor on plaintiff’s part was still a rational 

determination under the circumstances. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (“Even when the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they 

are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”).

Finally, the ALJ also determined that plaintiff’s complaints regarding the extent of his 

physical limitations were not supported by the objective medical evidence in the record. 

Specifically, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s statements concerning limitations in his ability to 

stand and walk conflicted with the determination that plaintiff could stand and walk up to 6 hours 

in an 8-hour workday opined by Dr. Schwartz, an examining physician, and the two State agency 

physicians who reviewed plaintiff’s medical records. AT 26. Although lack of medical evidence 

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cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, it is 

nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Because the ALJ provided other clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

plaintiff’s testimony, it was not error for her to also consider this conflict between plaintiff’s 

testimony and the objective evidence in support of her adverse credibility determination.

C. The ALJ Improperly Discounted the VA Disability Determination When 

Determining Plaintiff’s RFC

While the issue is not addressed in the parties’ briefing, the court determines, after a 

review of the ALJ’s decision and the record as a whole, that the ALJ’s reasons for her assignment 

of reduced weight to the VA’s disability determination finding plaintiff 80 percent disabled under 

its disability guidelines are inadequate. See McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 

2002) (remanding for benefits based on ALJ’s failure to properly consider VA’s determination 

that the claimant was 80 percent disabled); Jones, 760 F.2d at 995 (“We review the Secretary’s 

decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and 

is based on proper legal standards.”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “an ALJ 

must ordinarily give great weight to a VA determination of disability” due to the marked 

similarities between the two administrations’ procedures and standards for determining disability. 

McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076. However, “‘because the VA and SSA criteria for determining

disability are not identical,’” an ALJ may “‘give less weight to a VA disability rating if he gives 

persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.’” Valentine v. 

Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McCartey, 298 

F.3d at 1076); see also Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We note that, on 

remand, the ALJ is not compelled to adopt the conclusions of the VA’s decisions wholesale, but 

if she deviates from final VA decisions, she may do so based only on contrary evidence that is 

persuasive, specific, valid and supported by the record.”).

Here, the ALJ discussed the VA’s disability determination and discounted that evidence 

for the following reasons:

////

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I note that claimant has at least an overall or combined rating of 80 

percent for VA service-connected impairments. However, based 

upon a review of the medical evidence of record, I give no 

significant weight to the VA disability rating for a number of 

reasons. First, the claimant’s service-connected disabilities were 

effective in July 2010, although the claimant has been shown to 

have a potential onset date of May 2012 due to his work history. 

Thus, there is no necessary correlation between the VA disability 

rating and the claimant’s ability to work. In addition, as discussed 

above, the medical evidence of the record as a whole demonstrates 

the claimant to have the ability to perform unskilled medium work. 

The VA disability ratings for the claimant’s service-connected 

disabilities therefore do not necessarily reflect the claimant’s 

functional limitations under SSA guidelines. Consequently, 

although I acknowledge the claimant’s service connected 

impairments as determined by the VA, less weight is given to the 

total disability rating related to those impairments.

AT 26 (citations to the record omitted). For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that the 

ALJ’s reasons for discounting the VA’s disability rating are not “persuasive, specific, valid and 

supported by the record.” Valentine, 574 F.3d at 695. 

First, the ALJ’s own findings regarding the time periods plaintiff did not engage in 

substantial gainful activity contradict her determination that the VA’s disability rating did not 

correlate with plaintiff’s ability to work during the relevant time period. When discussing the VA 

disability rating evidence, the ALJ noted that plaintiff’s onset date likely did not occur until May 

2012 due to plaintiff having performed substantial gainful activity during for several spans of 

time between the alleged onset date of November 1, 2007 and that later time. AT 26. However, 

earlier in her decision, the ALJ found that while plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful 

activity between November 2007 to June 2009 and May 2011 to May 2012, therefore 

disqualifying him from receiving benefits during those time periods, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,

there had been “continuous 12-month period(s) during which [plaintiff] did not engage in 

substantial gainful activity.” AT 19. Necessarily among these 12-month periods was the nearly 

two-year span of time between June 2009 and May 2011,

3 which was prior to the “potential onset 

date” the ALJ discussed in connection with discounting the VA’s disability determination. The 

 

3

The ALJ noted that plaintiff “worked at a part-time job with the military” in 2010, but appears 

to have determined that this work did not amount to substantial gainful activity based on the fact 

that she did not find that plaintiff was engaged in such activity at any time during 2010. AT 19.

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VA’s disability decision was effective July 12, 2010, AT 295, meaning it fell within this 

eligibility period and, in the very least, correlated with plaintiff’s ability to perform work during 

that time. Furthermore, plaintiff himself testified during the administrative hearing on May 8, 

2014 that he was continuing to receive VA benefits based on the July 12, 2010 disability rating, 

AT 85, further indicating that the VA continued to find him 80 percent disabled throughout the 

time since its initial determination on July 12, 2010. In short, the record does not support the 

ALJ’s determination that the VA’s disability rating did not correlate to plaintiff’s ability to work 

based on his work history during the relevant time period. Accordingly, the court finds the ALJ’s 

reasoning unpersuasive. 

Second, the ALJ discounted the VA’s disability determination because the rest of the 

record as a whole supported the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff could perform unskilled 

medium work. However, this reasoning largely relies on the ALJ’s RFC findings regarding 

plaintiff’s physical RFC, i.e., the evidence supporting ALJ’s determination that plaintiff could 

perform medium work, while the VA’s 80 percent disability rating was based primarily on 

plaintiff’s anxiety disorder, AT 295, a mental impairment. Moreover, the ALJ failed to point to 

any specific evidence from the medical record to support her reasoning that it undermined the 

VA’s disability rating. See Hiler, 687 F.3d at 1212 (holding that an ALJ may deviate from a VA 

disability decision “based only on contrary evidence that is ‘persuasive, specific, valid’ and 

supported by the record” (emphasis added)).

Finally, the ALJ discounted the VA disability rating because the VA’s disability 

framework “do[es] not necessarily reflect the claimant’s functional limitations under SSA

guidelines.” AT 26. This reason is also insufficient. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

clearly held that an ALJ is required to “ordinarily give great weight to a VA determination of 

disability” specifically “because of the marked similarity between [the VA and Social Security] 

disability programs.” McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076. While an ALJ may assign lesser weight to a 

VA disability rating, she may do so only on the basis of persuasive, specific, valid reasons 

supported by the record; not simply because the disability rating was determined under the VA’s 

evaluative framework. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning was in error. 

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In sum, the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the VA’s disability rating were not persuasive, 

specific, valid reasons supported by the record. Accordingly, the ALJ’s assignment of reduced 

weight to that determination was in error. See McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076.

D. The ALJ’s Error Requires Remand for Further Proceedings

When the court finds that the ALJ committed prejudicial error, it has the discretion to 

remand or reverse and award benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 

A case may be remanded under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where:

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 003, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, even when the “credit-astrue” criteria have been met, the court retains the “flexibility to remand for further proceedings 

when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Treichler v. Commissioner 

of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e generally remand for an 

award of benefits only in rare circumstances, . . . where no useful purpose would be served by 

further administrative proceedings and the record has been thoroughly developed.” (citations and 

quotation marks omitted)). 

Here, the ALJ’s error requires this matter to be remanded for further proceedings. While a 

VA disability rating of 80 percent, when credited as true, would ordinarily require remand for 

benefits, see McCartey, 298 F.3d 1072 (crediting VA’s 80 percent disability rating as true and 

remanding for award of benefits), and the record in this matter is extensive and generally well 

developed, there are a number of ambiguities and contrary evidence in the record that cause

serious doubt as to disability and convince the court that further administrative proceedings would 

be useful. For instance, while the VA gave plaintiff an 80 percent disability rating effective July 

12, 2010, the record indicates that plaintiff worked a part-time military job in 2010, e.g., AT 397. 

However, the record does not clearly indicate whether he worked that job for the entirety of 2010, 

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or just part of that year. Nor does it appear to provide any description of what that part-time work 

entailed. Furthermore, there exists medical evidence in the record throughout the relevant time 

span regarding the impact of plaintiff’s mental impairments that appears to conflict the VA 

disability rating in a manner that raises serious doubts as to whether plaintiff is disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. E.g., AT 708-12, 855, 953-57, 1189, 1194, 1196. It is 

the ALJ’s role to resolve such conflicts in the medical testimony and any ambiguities in the 

record. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156. Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to remand this 

action for further proceedings. 

On remand, the ALJ shall resolve the ambiguities discussed above and address the VA’s 

disability rating in a manner consistent with this order and the relevant legal standards. If the 

ALJ decides to give less weight to the VA’s disability rating, the ALJ shall give persuasive, 

specific and valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, this matter will be remanded under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further development of the record and for further findings addressing the 

deficiencies noted above. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is granted for purposes of 

readdressing the VA disability rating finding plaintiff 80 percent disabled effective July 12, 2010.

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is denied; and,

3. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Dated: October 15, 2015

11 overbeck2645.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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