Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00135/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00135-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Gable, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00135-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Anthony Gable applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income on August 14, 2009, claiming to have been disabled as of April 28, 2009. 

Tr. 117-128. The Commissioner denied the application on February 22, 2010. Tr. 105-

108. Plaintiff requested a hearing (Tr. 55-56), and appeared before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April 28, 2011 (Tr. 28, 91). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 13-22. The ALJ’s 

decision became Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review on 

December 6, 2012. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1. The parties have not requested oral argument. 

For reasons that follow, the Court will vacate Defendant’s decision and remand for an 

award of benefits. 

I. Standard of Review.

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

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880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court cannot affirm the 

decision “simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); see Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. 

II. Analysis. 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is “the 

inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a five-step 

evaluation. The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four of showing that 

(1) he is not engaged in a substantial gainful activity, (2) he has a severe medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment meets or equals a 

listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from 

performing his past work.1

 If at any step the Commissioner determines that a claimant is 

or is not disabled, the analysis ends; otherwise it proceeds to step five. The 

Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the RFC to 

perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since his alleged onset date. Tr. 15. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

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 RFC is the most a claimant can do in light of the limitations caused by his impairments. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989); 

20 C.F.R. § 416.945 (a); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). 

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suffered from the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 

(“COPD”), deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”), and hypertension. Id. The ALJ determined 

at step three that none of these impairments or their combination met or equaled a listed 

impairment. Tr. 17. The ALJ then considered the entire record and determined that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with 

the following restrictions: lift and carry ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds 

occasionally; sit, stand, and walk for no more than six hours in an eight-hour workday; 

avoid working in areas with poor ventilation and around dust, fumes, odors, and gases. 

Tr. 17. The ALJ concluded that while Plaintiff is not able to perform his past relevant 

work (Tr. 20), he is not disabled because he has the RFC to perform a full range of light 

work (Tr. 21). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting his symptom 

allegations (Doc. 18 at 19-24) and by improperly weighing medical opinions (id. at 12-

19). Defendant contends the decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from 

legal error. Doc. 20 at 10. 

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony. 

Plaintiff testified that he is 49 years old, divorced, and has two adult children. 

Tr. 32. Plaintiff stated that he is right-handed and that he completed the tenth grade. 

Tr. 32-33. Plaintiff stated that he has a valid driver’s license and drives two or three 

times a week. Tr. 33. Plaintiff testified that he stopped working in April 2009 because a 

hospital admitted him for a heart attack after he reported chest pains. Tr. 33. Before 

then, Plaintiff stated that he worked as a truck driver and a forklift operator. Tr. 33-34. 

 Plaintiff testified that he suffers from COPD, a right ankle fracture, carpel tunnel 

syndrome, depression, anxiety, and concentration difficulties. Tr. 34-35. Plaintiff stated 

that he had venous thrombosis and was prescribed Coumadin for the condition. Tr. 35. 

Plaintiff testified that about four times a week he has migraine headaches that last 

anywhere between twenty minutes and a few hours. Tr. 40. Plaintiff stated that he had 

Osgood-Schlatter disease as a child and that it still causes him bone pain. Tr. 41. 

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Plaintiff testified that he takes the following medications: Advair, Spiriva inhaler, 

Nasonex albuterol nebulizer, Proair inhaler, Mucinex oral tablets, 80 milligrams of 

aspirin, Enalapril, Pantoprazole, Vicodin, acetaminophen, Prozac, and Xanax. Tr. 36-37. 

Plaintiff stated that he has to wear glasses, but is not concerned with his vision. Tr. 40. 

 Plaintiff testified that walking or sitting for too long exacerbates his pain. Tr. 41. 

Plaintiff stated that he had been using a walking cane for the past eight months. Tr. 42-

43. Plaintiff testified that he could climb one to three steps, but could not climb a flight 

of stairs. Tr. 37-38. Plaintiff stated that he could walk 30 to 50 yards – with or without 

his cane – before needing to stop and rest. Tr. 38, 42-43. Plaintiff testified that he can 

stand still for about an hour, and that he can sit for about 90 minutes before needing to 

stand. Tr. 38. Plaintiff stated that he could lift about 10 to 15 pounds and carry that same 

weight for a short distance. Id. Plaintiff testified that he could bend over, kneel, and 

squat, but reported having some trouble returning to a standing position after such 

movements. Tr. 39. Plaintiff described having problems reaching and pushing with his 

right arm, but stated that he did not have right-hand grip problems. Tr. 39. Plaintiff 

stated he has left-hand grip problems because of carpel tunnel syndrome. Id. Plaintiff 

described having an ongoing loss of feeling and sensation in his left hand. Tr. 39-40. 

Plaintiff stated that he is allergic to dust and most respiratory irritants. Tr. 40. 

 To relieve his pain, Plaintiff testified that he takes his anxiety medication, turns 

the lights off, sits in a recliner, and puts a towel on his eyes. Id. Plaintiff stated that over 

the course of a day he spends “[a] majority of the time” in a reclining chair. Tr. 46. He 

also stated that he spends most of his sitting time in a reclined position. Id. Plaintiff 

testified that reclining relieves his chest pressure, and alleviates his ankle pain and 

migraine headaches. Tr. 47. 

 Plaintiff described having panic attacks that occur about four times a month on 

anniversary dates of family deaths. Tr. 42. Plaintiff testified that his anxiety causes him 

to reduce the time he spends communicating with others and makes it difficult for him to 

meet new people. Tr. 48. Plaintiff stated that he has become introverted and sometimes 

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does not want to leave his apartment because he feels overwhelmed. Tr. 42, 46. Plaintiff 

stated that it could take him a few hours to pay bills because it is difficult for him to 

focus. Tr. 46. Plaintiff described suffering from short-term memory loss and stated that, 

due to these memory problems, a friend helps him write shopping lists and accompanies 

him to stores. Tr. 44-45. 

 Plaintiff testified that he could not work fulltime as a lobby attendant because he 

does not have the “physical capacity to take someone and show them where they have to 

go, and actually probably remembering where I’m sending them.” Tr. 47. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, 

and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the extent they are inconsistent 

with the RFC assessment. Tr. 34. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ evaluated 

Plaintiff’s testimony using the two-step analysis established by the Ninth Circuit. 

See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Applying the test of Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff’s 

impairments could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. Tr. 18. Given this 

conclusion, and because there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to 

present “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff not entirely credible. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. This clear and convincing standard “is the most demanding 

required in Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 

924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was “partially credible.” Tr. 20. Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ improperly rejected his symptom and disabling limitation. Doc. 18 at 

20. The Court agrees. 

 The ALJ appears to have partly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective complaints based on 

inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony. Tr. 18. After summarizing Plaintiff’s symptoms 

and functional limitation testimony (id.), the ALJ appears to have acknowledged 

Plaintiff’s limitations – “[d]espite these alleged limitations” – and proceeded to 

summarize Plaintiff’s daily activities testimony (id.). The ALJ provided no analysis of 

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how Plaintiff’s daily activities conflict with Plaintiff’s account of his pain and physical 

limitations. Defendant argues that the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s claims of disabling 

limitations because “Plaintiff’s own statements regarding his level of functioning 

indicated that Plaintiff was not as limited as he alleged.” Doc. 20 at 16. The Court 

cannot find, however, that the ALJ made this finding when the extent of the ALJ’s 

explanation was to summarize without analysis portions of Plaintiff’s daily activities. An 

ALJ may properly find a claimant incredible based on his daily activities, Curry v. 

Astrue, No. 09-CV-2580-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 3789535, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2010); 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005), but the ALJ must offer an interpretation of this evidence and 

explain why it suggests that the claimant’s symptom testimony is not credible. The ALJ 

did not do that here. 

 Defendant argues that the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence did not 

comport with Plaintiff’s symptom allegations and properly discredited Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints. Doc. 20 at 15. The ALJ did provide a lengthy summary of the 

medical evidence (Tr. 19-20), but the ALJ did not identify any contradictions between 

Plaintiff’s testimony and this medical evidence, nor did the ALJ make any findings based 

his recapitulation of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that the ALJ 

rejected Plaintiff’s testimony based on a finding that the objective evidence was 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony. See, e.g., Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 

(9th Cir. 2003) (The Court may not “affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on 

evidence the ALJ did not discuss.”). The ALJ did not present “specific, clear and 

convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not credible. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1281. The Court finds that the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without 

proper explanation or analysis was legal error. 

 B. Medical Opinion Evidence. 

 “The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-5p, 

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1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996). The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the 

opinions of treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. 

See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, an ALJ should give 

greatest weight to a treating physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinions of an 

examining physician than a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1), (2). A treating physician’s 

opinion is not necessarily conclusive of a physical impairment or the ultimate issue of 

disability. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (citing Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 

595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 Where the treating physician’s opinion is credible and uncontroverted, the ALJ 

must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. Id. “Where such an opinion is 

contradicted, however, it may be rejected for ‘specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.’” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). “The 

ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 

1989)). Further, “[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a 

treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by 

clinical findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 

1019 (9th Cir. 1992)).

 1. Dr. Mark Wagner, M.D. 

 Dr. Wagner, Plaintiff’s treating physician, completed a physical capacities 

evaluation on April 28, 2010. Tr. 810-14. Dr. Wagner determined that Plaintiff suffers 

from disabling pain due to a decreased lung capacity and severe headaches. Tr. 812-13. 

Dr. Wagner opined that Plaintiff’s pain and medication side effects moderately affect his 

attention and concentration capacities. Tr. 814. Dr. Wagner opined that in an eight-hour 

workday, Plaintiff could sit for four hours and stand or walk for one hour, but must 

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alternate between sitting and standing throughout the day. Tr. 811. Dr. Wagner opined 

that Plaintiff could never climb, crouch, crawl, or lift, or carry more than 10 pounds; 

could occasionally balance, stop, kneel, reach above shoulder level, and lift or carry 10 

pounds or less; and could not be exposed to unprotected heights, dust, fumes, gases, or 

marked changes in temperature and humidity. Tr. 812. Dr. Wagner also determined that 

Plaintiff is severely restricted from activities involving moving machinery, and that he is 

mildly restricted from driving automotive equipment. Id. In an April 29, 2010 letter, Dr. 

Wagner noted that he treats Plaintiff for COPD and migraine headaches and stated that 

Plaintiff “is unable to work due to impaired respiratory reserves and recurrent headaches 

affecting concentration.” Tr. 810. Dr. Wagner opined that Plaintiff “is unable to work in 

gainful employment and I do not see this changing in the foreseeable future.” Id.

 The ALJ gave Dr. Wagner’s treating physician’s opinion “little weight” (Tr. 20), 

finding that the Dr. Wagner’s opinion was “not supported by objective evidence” and 

“inconsistent with the record as a whole” (id.). The ALJ noted that “Dr. Wagner 

primarily summarized in the treatment notes [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints, 

diagnoses, and treatment, but did not provide objective clinical or diagnostic findings to 

support the functional assessment.” Id. Additionally, as to Dr. Wagner’s opinion that 

Plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ found that “[a]s an opinion on an issue reserved to the 

Commissioner, this statement is not entitled to controlling weight and is not given special 

significance[.]” Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving “little weight” to Dr. Wagner’s 

opinion. Doc. 18 at 15. Because Dr. Wagner’s opinion is inconsistent with the opinion 

of Dr. Alec Platt, M.D., Plaintiff’s other treating physician, the ALJ could have properly 

rejected Dr. Wagner’s contradictory opinion by offering specific and legitimate reasons. 

See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide specific 

and legitimate reasons because he “did not explain why Dr. Wagner’s opinion ‘is not 

supported by objective evidence’” and “did not ‘give good reasons’ for according the 

opinion of the treating source . . . no weight.” Doc. 18 at 15-16. Plaintiff submits that 

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objective evidence supports Dr. Wagner’s opinion, and points to chest x-rays indicating 

COPD (id. at 15 (citing Tr. 899)), pulmonary function studies showing “significant” 

limitations (id. (citing Tr. 832)), a polysomnogram indicating “severe” obstructive sleep 

apnea (id. (citing Tr. 377-84)), electrocardiogram results consistent with ischemia (id.

(citing Tr. 495-96)), and evidence indicating that Plaintiff underwent cardiac 

catheterization procedures (id. (citing Tr. 428-29, 491-92)). Although Dr. Wagner may 

have “had access” to this objective evidence (Doc. 18 at 15), Plaintiff has not pointed to 

anything in Dr. Wagner’s medical notes indicating that he relied on this evidence in 

rendering an opinion. That Dr. Wagner did not support his functional assessment with 

objective clinical or diagnostic findings is a specific and legitimate reason for the ALJ to 

have rejected his opinion. See Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(ALJ did not err in rejecting treating physicians’ opinion that “was in the form of a 

checklist, did not have supportive objective evidence, was contradicted by other 

statements and assessments of [the claimant]’s medical condition, and was based on [the 

claimant]’s subjective descriptions of pain”); Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1339-40 

(9th Cir. 1988) (ALJ properly rejected treating physician’s opinion, which was 

unsupported by medical findings, personal observations, or test reports).2

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Wagner’s opinion “on issues 

reserved to the Commissioner,” and submits that Dr. Wagner’s “assessment of [his] 

functional limitations is not such an opinion.” Doc. 18 at 16. Plaintiff is correct that a 

treating physician’s functional limitations assessment is not an issue reserved to the 

 

2

 Plaintiff notes that “[i]ronically, the ALJ, while rejecting Dr. Wagner’s opinions as based on subjective rather than objective evidence, rejected Dr. Vigderman’s opinion because he failed to consider [Plaintiff]’s subjective allegations.” Doc. 18 at 18. Plaintiff 

does not argue, however, that it was legal error for the ALJ to have rejected Dr. Wagner’s opinion for this reason. The Court found above that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and, notwithstanding the ALJ’s finding that “Dr. Wagner primarily summarized in the treatment notes [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints” (Tr. 20), the Court concludes that the ALJ’s other reasons for rejecting Dr. Wagner’s opinion are specific and legitimate and supported by substantial evidence. 

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Commissioner, but an opinion about whether a claimant would be able to perform 

fulltime work is such an issue. See Boardman v. Astrue, 286 Fed. App’x 397, 399 (9th 

Cir. 2008); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1). Accordingly, it was not error for 

the ALJ to have rejected Dr. Wagner’s opinion that Plaintiff “is unable to work.” As to 

Dr. Wagner’s functional limitations assessment, the Court finds that the ALJ provided 

specific and legitimate reasons, described above, for discounting that portion of 

Dr. Wagner’s opinion. 

 2. Dr. Alec Platt, M.D. 

 Plaintiff’s other treating physician, Dr. Platt, examined Plaintiff on October 1, 

2009. Tr. 831. Pulmonary function testing from that day demonstrated moderate 

obstruction, normal lung volumes, and moderate emphysema. Tr. 832. Dr. Platt 

diagnosed Plaintiff with moderate emphysema and COPD, with acute exacerbation; 

dyspnea; morbid obesity; hypertension; and seasonal allergies. Id. Dr. Platt opined that 

Plaintiff “certainly does have significant limitations based on his pulmonary function 

testing exam,” and determined that Plaintiff “is not disabled from any work” but “seems 

to be disabled from his prior job[.]” Id. The ALJ afforded Dr. Platt’s opinion 

“significant weight” because it “is generally consistent with the record as a whole[.]” 

Tr. 20. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in affording Dr. Platt’s opinion significant 

weight while rejecting Dr. Wagner’s opinion because, unlike Dr. Platt, Dr. Wagner 

offered specific opinions as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations. Doc. 18 at 17. The 

Court disagrees. The ALJ noted that Dr. Platt “did not specify any specific limitations” 

(Tr. 20), and found that “this is generally consistent with the record as a whole” (id.). An 

ALJ is generally required to give significant weight to the opinion of a treating physician, 

and thus the ALJ’s decision to rely on Dr. Platt’s opinion did not constitute legal error. 

 3. Dr. Robert Vigderman, M.D. 

Dr. Vigderman, a state agency medical consultant, examined Plaintiff on 

January 28, 2010. Tr. 770-775. He opined that Plaintiff could frequently carry 20 

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pounds and occasionally carry 25 pounds, could not run or climb steps on a regular basis, 

and otherwise had no functional limitations. Tr. 772-75. The ALJ gave Dr. Vigderman’s 

opinion “little weight’ because he found that the “assessment d[id] not adequately 

consider [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints[.]” Tr. 20. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Vigderman’s opinion is error. 

Doc. 18 at 18. Plaintiff submits that ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Wagner’s opinion because it 

relied on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is inconsistent with the ALJ’s rejection of 

Dr. Vigderman’s opinion because he failed to consider Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. 

The Court concludes, however, that any error in how the ALJ weighed Dr. Vigderman’s 

opinion is harmless because the ALJ imposed more limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC than 

Dr. Vigderman recommended, and these additional limitations benefit Plaintiff. 

See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (“the court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for 

harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was 

inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” (quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). 

III. Remedy.

 Having considered the record as a whole, the Court concludes that Defendant’s 

decision denying benefits should be reversed because the ALJ failed to proffer legally 

sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See Ryan v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008). The decision to remand for 

further development or for an award of benefits is within the discretion of the Court. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harmen v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000). This 

Circuit has held that evidence should be credited as true, and an action remanded for an 

award of benefits, where (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting evidence, (2) no outstanding issues remain that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ 

would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited as 

true. See, e.g., Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 

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1988); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 

F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 After applying the credit-as-true rule to improperly discredited evidence, no 

outstanding issue remains to be resolved before determining that Plaintiff is entitled to 

benefits. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause his alleged pain symptoms (Tr. 18), and Plaintiff 

testified that, due to his pain, he spends the majority of his days in a reclining chair 

(Tr. 46). The vocational expert testified that a person who is limited to spending all day 

in a reclining chair could not work. Tr. 50. 

 Because it is clear that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled if his 

evidence is credited as true, see Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593-95, the Court will remand the 

case for an award of benefits. See, e.g., D’Angelo v. Astrue, No. CV-06-3055-PHX-EHC, 

2007 WL 4617186, at *9 (D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 2007) (remanding for an award of benefits 

where the vocational expert testified that the claimant’s limitations would preclude all 

work). 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s decision denying insurance benefits is reversed. 

 2. The case is remanded for an award of benefits. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2013. 

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