Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-04261/USCOURTS-ca3-16-04261-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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ALD-153 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 16-4137 & 16-4261

___________

IN RE: DESPINA SMALIS, Debtor

ERNEST SMALIS, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW 

DEPARTMENT; ALLEGHENY COUNTY LAW DEPARTMENT; 

COUNTY BOARD OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENT APPEAL & REVIEW

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-00693)

District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab

____________________________________

Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, 

and on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Affirmance

March 9, 2017

Before: MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 27, 2017)

_________

OPINION*

_________

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM

Ernest Smalis appeals pro se from the District Court’s August 25, 2016 order, 

which affirmed three orders entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

Western District of Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm 

the District Court’s order. 

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 

of this case, we discuss that background only briefly. In 2015, Smalis filed a pro se 

adversary action in the Bankruptcy Court against the City of Pittsburgh School District, 

the City of Pittsburgh Law Department, the Allegheny County Law Department, and the 

Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals, and Review (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as “the Appellees”). His complaint sought the recoupment of 

certain real estate taxes paid on two commercial properties, alleging that the properties 

had been over-assessed and that the Appellees had violated his federal due process rights

by failing to provide him with annual property assessment notices for those properties 

while he was in prison from 1999 to 2010. He alleged that this adversary action was 

related to a bankruptcy case that his ex-wife, Despina Smalis (“Ms. Smalis”), had 

commenced under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005.

Two of the Appellees ultimately moved the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss Smalis’s 

complaint. On April 25, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court granted those motions and 

dismissed the case in its entirety, explaining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

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Smalis’s claims because they were not “related to” Ms. Smalis’s bankruptcy case under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334(b). Smalis moved for reconsideration of that dismissal, 

but the Bankruptcy Court denied that motion on May 11, 2016. He then filed another 

motion attacking the April 25, 2016 order (as well as the May 11, 2016 order); the 

Bankruptcy Court denied that motion on May 19, 2016.

Thereafter, Smalis filed a pro se appeal in the District Court,1 challenging all three 

of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders. On August 25, 2016, the District Court affirmed each 

of those orders. Smalis then filed the appeal that is now before us.2

 The Appellees 

oppose this appeal and have moved to summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

 1 As a general matter, a notice of appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order must be filed in 

that court no later than 14 days after the entry of the order being appealed. See Fed. R. 

Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1). However, if a party timely moves the bankruptcy court to 

reconsider that order, the 14-day appeal period does not being to run until the bankruptcy 

court enters an order disposing of that motion. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1)(D). In 

this case, Smalis timely moved the Bankruptcy Court to reconsider its April 25, 2016

order. The Bankruptcy Court denied that motion on May 11, 2016, thereby giving Smalis

until May 25, 2016, to file a notice of appeal challenging the April 25 order. Because he

filed his notice of appeal on May 23, 2016 (challenging not only the April 25 order, but 

also the May 11 and May 19 orders), his appeal was timely as to all three orders.

2 In a civil action like this one, a party seeking to appeal from a district court’s final order 

generally must file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of that order. See Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). However, a district court may reopen the time to appeal for a 

period of 14 days if the following conditions are satisfied: (A) the party seeking to 

appeal did not receive proper notice of the order in question within 21 days after its entry; 

(B) that party files a motion to reopen the time to appeal within 180 days after the order is 

entered or within 14 days after that party receives notice of that entry, whichever is 

earlier; and (C) the district court finds that no party would be prejudiced. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(6). On November 16, 2016, Smalis filed in the District Court a document titled 

“Notice of Appeal, Restore App[e]llant[’]s Appeal Rights.” The District Court Clerk’s 

Office docketed this filing as a notice of appeal from the District Court’s August 25, 2016

order, and the appeal was assigned C.A. No. 16-4137 in our Court. On November 28, 

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II.

The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 158(a)(1), and we now have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291. 

“Because the District Court sat below as an appellate court, [we] conduct[] the same 

review of the Bankruptcy Court’s order[s] as did the District Court.” Baroda Hill Invs., 

Ltd. v. Telegroup, Inc. (In re Telegroup, Inc.), 281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). In other 

words, “we review the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo, its factual 

findings for clear error, and its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof.” In re Goody’s 

Family Clothing Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010). We may take summary action if 

this appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

In order for a bankruptcy court to have jurisdiction over a lawsuit, that lawsuit 

must at least be “related to” a bankruptcy case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334(b); Binder 

v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154, 163-64 (3d Cir. 

2004). “We have held that a [lawsuit] falls within the bankruptcy court’s ‘related to’ 

 

2016, Smalis filed in the District Court a document titled “Motion for Leave to Amend 

Notice of Appeal, Restore Appellant[’]s Appeal Rights[] Motion Requesting Enlargement 

of Time[] to Appeal [the District Court’s August 25, 2016 Order].” The District Court 

construed this new filing as a motion to reopen the time to appeal and granted that relief 

on November 29, 2016, thereby giving Smalis until December 13, 2016, to file a timely 

appeal. On December 5, 2016, he filed a new notice of appeal challenging the District 

Court’s August 25, 2016 order. This new notice of appeal was assigned C.A. No. 16-

4261 and consolidated with Smalis’s appeal at C.A. No. 16-4137. Because both of 

Smalis’s notices of appeal were filed before the December 13, 2016 deadline, they each 

are timely. That said, given that they challenge the same District Court order, there is, as 

a practical matter, only one appeal before us.

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jurisdiction if the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the 

estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Schubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar 

Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 405 (3d Cir. 2009) (certain internal quotation marks 

omitted). In other words, “[a]n action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter 

the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or 

negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the

bankrupt estate.” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 591 F.3d 

164, 171 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 

1984)). “Conceivability is determined at the time a lawsuit is filed.” Nuveen Mun. Tr. 

ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 

294 (3d Cir. 2012). 

In this case, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that Smalis’s lawsuit against the 

Appellees was not “related to” Ms. Smalis’s bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Court 

explained that Ms. Smalis’s bankruptcy estate had already been fully administered, and 

that neither she nor the estate retained any interest in either of the two properties at issue 

in Smalis’s lawsuit.3

 The Bankruptcy Court further explained that the administration of 

the estate had resulted in a surplus to Ms. Smalis after distributions were made to her 

creditors; therefore, Smalis’s lawsuit would have no effect on those creditors. To the 

extent that Smalis sought to bring his lawsuit on behalf of the estate, the Bankruptcy 

 3 Years before Smalis filed this lawsuit, one of those properties had been sold by the 

Bankruptcy Trustee, and Ms. Smalis had released her interest in the other property as part 

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Court questioned his standing to do so, and observed that he “appears to be pursuing 

these claims for his own benefit in this forum only because he has been unable to obtain 

relief elsewhere.” (Bankr. Ct. Mem. Op. entered Apr. 25, 2016, at 7.)4

 On appeal, the 

District Court agreed with the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis, and concluded that Smalis 

failed to demonstrate that he had standing to bring his lawsuit on behalf of the estate.

For substantially the reasons provided by the Bankruptcy Court and the District 

Court in their respective opinions, we agree with those courts that Smalis’s lawsuit was 

not “related to” Ms. Smalis’s bankruptcy case, and that the Bankruptcy Court thus lacked 

jurisdiction over his claims. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in affirming the 

Bankruptcy Court’s April 25, 2016 order dismissing Smalis’s lawsuit. Nor did the 

District Court err in affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s two subsequent orders rejecting 

Smalis’s post-judgment attacks on the April 25, 2016 order. Because this appeal does not 

present a substantial question, we hereby grant the Appellees’ motion for summary 

affirmance, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s August 25, 2016 order. 

 

of a settlement with Smalis. 4 As the Bankruptcy Court noted, Smalis had previously challenged the tax assessments 

for one of the properties in Pennsylvania state court. That lawsuit, which ended in 2013, 

was unsuccessful. He also previously raised the lack-of-notice claim in a civil rights 

complaint filed against the Appellees in the District Court. In 2014, the District Court 

dismissed that complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1341. We later affirmed that dismissal. See Smalis v. Allegheny Cty. Bd. of 

Prop. Assessment, Appeal & Review, 632 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).

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