Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01510/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01510-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ADOBE LUMBER. INC., a

California corporation,

Plaintiff,

 v.

F. WARREN HELLMAN and WELLS

FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustees

of Trust A created by the

Estate of Marco Hellman; F.

WARREN HELLMAN, as Trustee of

Trust created by the Estate of

Marco Hellman; THE ESTATE OF

MARCO HELLMAN, DECEASED;

WOODLAND SHOPPING CENTER, a

limited partnership; JOSEPH

MONTALVO, an individual;

HAROLD TAECKER, an individual;

GERALDINE TAECKER, an

individual; HOYT CORPORATION,

a Massachusetts corporation;

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a

Pennsylvania corporation;

OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL

CORPORATION, a New York

corporation; and CITY OF

WOODLAND, 

Defendants. /

NO. CIV. 2:05-1510 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

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Plaintiff Adobe Lumber, Inc. brought this action

against several defendants for cost recovery, declaratory relief,

contribution, indemnity, nuisance, and trespass pursuant to the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; the Hazardous Substance

Account Act (“HSAA”), Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25300-25395;

and California common law. Defendant City of Woodland (“City”)

now moves for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s CERCLA and

HSAA claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1998, plaintiff purchased four parcels of land in

Woodland, California, and on one of the parcels sits a commercial

building and parking lot known as the Woodland Shopping Center. 

(See Riemann Decl. (Docket No. 356) ¶¶ 2-3.) Between 1974 and

2001, Suite K of the Woodland Shopping Center housed a dry

cleaning business called “Sunshine Cleaners,” which was operated

by defendants Harold and Geraldine Taecker. (Pearlman Decl.

(Docket No. 422) Ex. L at 2:8-12.) 

Suite K of the Woodland Shopping Center is bordered on

the west by a public alley called Academy Lane, beneath which a

sewer main owned by the City runs north to south. (Id. Ex. G

(“City’s Resp. Req. Admis.”) at No. 3.) A floor drain in Suite K

connects to the City’s sewer main through a lateral pipe. 

(Pearlman Decl. Ex. T (Docket No. 423) at 113:2-116:9.) The

lateral pipe is comprised of a four-inch cast iron pipe that runs

beneath the concrete area of the Woodland Shopping Center that

connects to a four-inch vitrified clay pipe (“VCP”) under Academy

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Lane, which in turn connects to the sewer main under Academy Lane

(an eight-inch VCP pipe). (Id. Ex. R (“Krasnoff Rebuttal

Report”) at 9-10; id. Ex. Z (“Larson Expert Report”)at 8.) From

1974 until approximately 1991, the Taeckers used the floor drain

to dispose of wastewater containing the dry cleaning solvent

perchloroethylene (“PCE”), a volatile organic chemical that is

considered a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA. (Pearlman Decl.

(Docket No. 422) Ex. M (“Taeckers’ Supp. Resp. Req. Admis.”) No.

6); see 40 C.F.R. § 302.4.

As alleged in the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”),

plaintiff retained an environmental consultant in August 2001 to

conduct a limited subsurface investigation in the area around

Suite K and determine whether the Taeckers’ activities had

affected the soil or groundwater. (TAC ¶ 34.) This

investigation revealed the presence of volatile organic

compounds, including PCE. (Id.) According to plaintiff, this

subsurface contamination resulted from the leakage of PCE from

the “sewer main on Academy Lane.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff

contends that the sewer was “especially likely to leak due to . .

. its age, the large number of joints, grout (mortared) joints,

and defects in the sewer system” and that the City’s “management

and maintenance of the sewer system was re-active, minimal[,] and

inadequate.” (Pl.’s Stmt. Disputed Facts Nos. 38-39.)

After several communications with the Taeckers and the

California Regional Water Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”),

plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the Taeckers in January 2002,

and several other parties were later joined as third-party

defendants. (See TAC ¶ 37.) That action (“Adobe I”) was

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subsequently dismissed without prejudice when plaintiff initiated

the instant lawsuit on July 27, 2005. See Adobe Lumber, Inc. v.

Hellman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

The defendants in this action include the City, the

Taeckers, former owners of the Woodland Shopping Center, and the

manufacturers and distributors of the dry cleaning solvent and

equipment used at Suite K. (See TAC ¶¶ 3-18.) With respect to

the City, plaintiff alleges claims of declaratory relief and cost

recovery under CERCLA; declaratory relief, contribution, and

indemnity under the HSAA; and nuisance and trespass under

California common law. (Id. ¶¶ 53-106.) On October 2, 2008, the

court granted the City’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s trespass

claim. (See Docket No. 186.) On September 8, 2009, the court

denied the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on

plaintiff’s CERCLA and HSSA claims, determining that the sewer

main on Academy Lane was a “facility” within the meaning of

CERCLA. (See Docket No. 360.) 

Witness discovery in this case closed on September 1,

2009 pursuant to the court’s January 22, 2009 Scheduling Order. 

(Docket No. 330.) On October 13, 2009, parties exchanged expert

reports, at which point the City allegedly realized for the first

time that plaintiff intended to hold it liable for leaks from the

lateral pipe, rather than solely the sewer main. (Whitesides

Decl. (Docket No. 410) ¶ 3.) The City now moves for partial

summary judgment on its liability for the sewer lateral in

plaintiff’s CERCLA and HSAA claims pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56.

II. Discussion

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Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material fact is one that could affect

the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could

permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the

initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence

that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the

non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials

in its own pleading,” but must go beyond the pleadings and, “by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56,] set out

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; Valandingham v.

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). In its inquiry,

the court must view any inferences drawn from the underlying

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but may

not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

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1 Plaintiff’s contention that Rule 8 challenges cannot be

brought on summary judgment or should be taken only as a Rule

12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is refuted by cases

6

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

The City contends that it is entitled to summary

adjudication on its liability for the lateral pipe because

plaintiff did not plead this theory of liability in its TAC in

violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and failed

to otherwise provide adequate notice of the City’s potential

liability for leakage from the lateral pipe. Rule 8(a)(2)

requires that the allegations in a complaint must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quotation omitted). 

Ninth Circuit precedent is clear that, “where . . . the

complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations to

state a claim, raising such claim in a summary judgment motion is

insufficient to present the claim to the district court.” Navajo

Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008);

see also Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963,

968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the complaint did not

satisfy the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) because the

complaint “gave the [defendants] no notice of the specific

factual allegations presented for the first time in [the

plaintiff’s] opposition to summary judgment”); Wasco Prods., Inc.

v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Simply put, summary judgment is not a procedural second chance

to flesh out inadequate pleadings.”).1

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where the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld courts’ decisions

to disallow new claims raised on summary judgment. See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1080; Pickern, 457 F.3d at 968-69. 

7

The City argues that the TAC alleges the sewer main on

Academy Lane as the sole basis of the City’s liability in this

action and therefore that plaintiff’s present attempt to assert

that the City is liable for discharge of PCE from the lateral

pipe should be disallowed. Admittedly, the TAC makes no

distinction between the sewer main on Academy Lane and the

lateral pipe that originates from Suite K. (See TAC ¶¶ 30-33.) 

Rather, the TAC references the “sewer main on Academy lane” (TAC

¶¶ 14, 30, 32-33), “the City’s management and maintenance of its

sewer system” (id. ¶ 30), “portions of [the City’s] sewer lines

associated with dry cleaning operations” (id. ¶ 31), and “the

sewer line on Academy Lane” (id. ¶¶ 31-33) as the basis for the

City’s liability.

Viewing these references in context, plaintiff’s

generic allegations did not adequately put the City on notice

that it could be held liable for discharges from the lateral

pipe. For instance, in summarizing the City’s liability in the

TAC, plaintiff pleads that “the City owns property adjacent to

the Site, commonly known as Academy Lane, on which a public sewer

main is located, and that releases from the sewer main on the

City’s property have migrated onto and contaminated the Site.” 

(Id. ¶ 14.) It is uncontested that the only pipe referred to as

the “sewer main” has been the city main that runs north to south

on Academy Lane. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph

thirty of the TAC expressly relates to the maintenance and repair

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of “the public sewer main on Academy Lane.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Within

the context of this paragraph, plaintiff’s allegation that “the

City’s management and maintenance of its sewer system of the

years has been reactive, minimal, and inadequate” would only put

the City on notice that plaintiff was referencing the City’s

general practice of failing to maintain Woodland’s sewers, rather

than referring to more faulty parts of the sewer line that the

City might be liable for. (Id.)

The TAC’s reference to “portions of [the City’s] sewer

lines related to dry cleaning operations” in paragraph thirty-one

similarly does not appear to refer to the City’s alleged

liability for anything other than the north-south sewer main. 

(Id. ¶ 31.) This paragraph of the TAC begins by the City “knew

or should have known that the Taeckers were using PCE in their

dry cleaning operations” and should have known that “leaking

sewer lines . . . were and are a major source of PCE

contamination of ground water.” (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently

alleges that “even though the City knew or should have known that

portions of its sewer lines associated with dry cleaning

operations were a potential, if not likely, source of PCE

contamination of groundwater, the City failed to inspect the

sewer line on Academy Lane or take any other precautions or

actions to prevent or mitigate the release of PCE from that sewer

line to soil and groundwater.” (Id. (emphasis added).) The

reference to sewer lines associated with dry cleaning operations

appears to simply be an attempt to demonstrate that the City

should have known that dry cleaning operations were using its

sewer main and that it failed to prevent the release of PCE from

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the sewer line on Academy Lane. Nothing in the TAC would lead

the City to believe that it was being sued for anything other

than the sewer main.

Plaintiff’s response to the City’s first motion for

summary judgment reinforced this interpretation. (Docket No.

346.) The City’s first summary judgment motion expressly

distinguished between the lateral pipe and the sewer main to

argue that the sewer main was not a “facility” within the meaning

of CERCLA:

Here, the distinction between public sewers and private

pipes connected thereto is pivotal, as it is undisputed

that wastewater contained PCE was deposited via the

boiler room floor drain into the lateral pipe connecting

Suite K to the CITY sewer under Academy Lane. Although

the lateral pipe owned by ADOBE and its predecessors

falls within the meaning of “facility,” because it leads

into the sewer main, the municipal main itself does not

and thus CITY lacks liability under CERCLA even if some

PCE entered the soil or groundwater via the sewer main

rather than entirely from the drain, the lateral pipe or

surface spills.

(City’s Mem. I/S/O First Mot. Summ. J. (Docket No. 346) at 9:4-

10.) In its Opposition to that motion, plaintiff never asserted

that the lateral pipe was also a basis of liability to the City

and only argued that the sewer main qualified as a facility. 

(See Docket No. 354.) In fact, plaintiff went so far as to

acknowledge ownership of the lateral pipe, arguing that “the

sewer pipe on Academy Lane constitutes a CERCLA facility along

with the Woodland Shopping Center property and the sewer lateral

located theron [sic].” (Pl’s Opp’n City’s First Mot. Summ. J. at

19:24-26 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff also acknowledged a

distinction between the main and the lateral in its Statement of

Undisputed Fact, stating that “[t]he floor drain in Suite K

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connects by way of a sewer lateral, to the sewer on Academy

Lane.” (Pl.’s Statement Undisputed Facts (Docket No. 355) ¶ 27.) 

These statements all support the notion that nothing in the TAC

was meant to reference the sewer lateral, but rather only the

sewer main.

The TAC’s vague allegations, which fail to distinguish

between the sewer main and lateral pipe despite plaintiff’s

knowledge about the distinction between the sewer main and

lateral since the dismissal of Adobe I in 2005 are insufficient

to give notice to the City as to its liability. (See Whitesides

Decl. (Docket No. 410) Ex. B (Krasnoff Depo.).) While plaintiff

need not plead all detailed facts in the TAC, it must plead some. 

See Pickern,457 F.3d at 968-69. A plaintiff may not make vague

and generic allegations in her complaint and simply add facts as

discovery goes along without amending the complaint because to do

so “would read the ‘fair notice’ requirement out of Rule 8(a) and

would seriously undermine the rule’s goal of encouraging

expeditious resolution of disputes.” Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports

(U.S.), Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 

The City did not have notice of any allegations about

the lateral pipe until October of 2009, nearly four years into

the litigation, after witness discovery had closed, and after it

had already presented one motion for summary judgment. While

plaintiff contends that the City could have discovered its

liability for the lateral pipe if it asked about it during

witness discovery, plaintiff’s responses to the City’s first

motion for summary judgment and the vagueness of the TAC indicate

that the City should have had no reason to believe discovery on

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2 This Order is without prejudice to the right of the

plaintiff to file a new action against the City to recover on any

claims not contained in the TAC in this action, including a claim

for liability based on leakage from the lateral pipe.

11

the lateral pipe was necessary. As a result the City was

prejudiced because it was unable to depose percipient witnesses

relating to the lateral pipe or adjudicate this issue on its

first motion for summary judgment. In such a situation, the

court must grant the City’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claim for liability against the City for discharge

from the lateral pipe, since the TAC gave the City inadequate

notice of the claim. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1080;

Pickern, 457 F.3d at 968-69; Wasco Prods., 435 F.3d at 992. The

proper avenue for plaintiff to legitimately allege the City’s

liability for the lateral pipe would have been through a motion

to amend the TAC, rather than simply asserting a theory of

liability of which the City had no notice. See Pickern, 457 F.3d

at 969. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City’s motion for

partial summary judgment with respect to its liability for any

release of PCE from the lateral pipe that connected the floor

drain at Suite K of the Woodland Shopping Center to the sewer

main on Academy Lane be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.2

DATED: March 4, 2010

 

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