Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01447/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01447-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Susan G. VINETTE, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

SUN HEALTH CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 04-1447-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.

45], Plaintiff's Motion to Exceed Page Limitation re: Response [Doc. No. 53], and

Defendants' Motion to Strike Declaration of Susan Vinette. [Doc. No. 59] After considering

the parties' arguments, the Court issues the following Memorandum of Decision and Order.

Because the Court finds that oral argument would not be helpful, the Court issues its Order

without oral argument.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed.

Plaintiff Susan Vinette was employed as a laboratory assistant by Defendant Sun

Health from June 17, 2001 to April 2, 2004. (Pl.'s Statement of Facts ("SOF"), ¶ 2; Def.'s

SOF, ¶ 2; Ex. M to Def.'s SOF.) Her duties included drawing blood from patients and

processing the drawn samples for testing in the hospital laboratory. (Pl.'s SOF, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff

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1

Until approximately September 2003, Melissa Dettrick was Plaintiff's supervisor.

(Pl. Dep. 90:4-18.) At that time, Lisa Wills became Plaintiff's supervisor. (Id. at 90:10-20.)

During all of Plaintiff's employment, Judith Grout was the assistant administrator, a higherlevel employee than Dettrick or Wills. (Id. at 91:19-92:8.) Both a supervisor and the

assistant administrator sign an Employee Corrective Action Form. (See Exs. E, F, G, I, J, M

to Def.'s SOF.)

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has hepatitis C, and disclosed that information to Defendant in her employment application.

(Id.)

From December 2002 until August 2003, Plaintiff underwent treatment for her

hepatitis C. (Pl. Dep. 61:20-23.) During some of the treatment period, Defendant granted

Plaintiff intermittent FMLA leave and modified Plaintiff's work schedule to allow her two

consecutive days off work to recuperate from her treatment. (Id. at 79:19-80:2, 81:7-82:20.)

Plaintiff committed five mislabeling or misidentification errors from December 2002 until

July 2003. (Exs. E, F, G, I, J to Def.'s SOF.) On each occasion, Plaintiff was counseled by

her supervisor1

 and signed an Employee Corrective Action Form indicating that she

understood that if she committed additional infractions, she could be subject to suspension

without pay or discharge. (Id.) After the final mislabeling incident in July 2003, Plaintiff

went on full-time FMLA leave. (Pl. Dep. 214:7-18.) Plaintiff returned to work in October

2003. (Id. at 90:10-18.)

On March 31, 2004, Plaintiff and a co-worker, Melanie Kuelbs, tied three

phlebotomist trays to the racks they were placed on as an April Fool's Day prank on another

co-worker. (Id. at 127:15-24, 129:12-130:12.) Following the incident, Plaintiff was

terminated for the prank and for another misidentification, which was committed by Kuelbs

after Plaintiff had improperly failed to log out after using the lab computer program. (Ex.

G to Pl.'s SOF, Ex. M to Def.'s SOF, Pl. Dep. 133:7-21.) Kuelbs, who had no prior

disciplinary history, was counseled and received an Employee Corrective Action Form. (Ex.

G to Pl.'s SOF; Ex. M to Def.'s SOF; Kuelbs Dep. 73:7-10; Wills Dep. 105:20-22.)

//

//

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B. Procedural Background

On July 15, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court alleging two counts: (1)

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and (2) intentional

infliction of emotional distress. [Doc. No. 1] After the completion of discovery, Defendant

filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2006. [Doc. No. 45] Plaintiff filed

her Response on March 1, 2006 [Doc. No. 55], as well as a Motion to Exceed Page

Limitation re: Response [Doc. No. 53]. Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's Motion. The

Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Exceed Page Limitation and consider the entirety of

Plaintiff's Response. Defendant filed its Reply on March 30, 2006 [Doc. No. 61], as well as

a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Declaration under the sham affidavit doctrine [Doc. No. 59].

Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's Motion to Strike.

The Court's exercise of jurisdiction over Count I is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

because the matter in controversy arises under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over Count II,

a state law claim, because it shares a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the federal

claim. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Venue is proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Before ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court first turns to

Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Declaration. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's

Declaration ("Declaration"), submitted as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in

support of her Response to the Motion to Summary Judgment, is a "sham" affidavit and

should not be considered by the Court. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's Motion

to Strike.

A. Plaintiff's Failure to Respond to the Motion to Strike

Rule 7.2(i) of the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona ("Local Rules") states that "if the opposing party [to a motion] does not serve and

file the required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent

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to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily."

Therefore, because Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion to Strike, Plaintiff is deemed

to have consented to the granting of the Motion to Strike. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(i),

which allows this Court to summarily dispose of a motion in such a situation, Defendant's

Motion to Strike will be granted.

Alternatively, the Court concludes that the Motion to Strike should be granted on its

merits. 

B. Merits of Defendant's Motion to Strike

The Ninth Circuit has held that "a court may disregard a 'sham' affidavit that a party

files to create an issue of fact by contradicting the party's prior deposition testimony." Leslie

v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the non-moving party may

explain or clarify her prior testimony, and "minor inconsistencies that result from an honest

discrepancy, a mistake, or newly discovered evidence afford no basis for excluding an

opposition affidavit." Messick v. Horizon Indus., Inc., 62 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1995).

Therefore, the Court will not apply the sham affidavit doctrine where the non-moving party

shows that a valid explanation exists for the inconsistency. The Court must make a factual

determination that the contradiction is a "sham" before it may apply the sham affidavit

doctrine. Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991).

Defendant moves to strike the Declaration as a result of numerous averments by

Plaintiff that contradict her sworn deposition testimony. The Court will address alleged

contradictions that pertain to significant facts in this case.

1. Paragraphs 6, 8

In paragraph 6 of her Declaration, Plaintiff avers that her Hepatitis C symptoms began

in October 2002, and that those symptoms included "extraordinary fatigue, skin rash,

discoloration and lesions on [her] skin, persistent nausea, blurry vision, sleeplessness and a

general inability to engage in normal activities that were previously part of [her] normal

routine." (Decl. ¶ 6.) At her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that the blurred vision

and nausea occurred during her treatment, not before the treatment began. (Pl. Dep. 61:1-8.)

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Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that her hepatitis C symptoms consist only of sporadic

"tiredness" and "high enzyme levels." (Id. at 98:11-99:9.) Plaintiff further testified that

when she was not on treatment, she had no side effects from her hepatitis C. (Id. at 59:19-

23.) Plaintiff also testified that she had no symptoms at all after she completed her treatment.

(Id. at 226:22-227:2.) Plaintiff further testified that her hepatitis C has no impact on her daily

activities. (Id. at 194:25-195:2.) Moreover, Plaintiff was provided an opportunity at her

deposition to list more symptoms of her hepatitis C, but testified that there were no others to

report. (Id. at 98:18-19.) Only in her Declaration did Plaintiff list additional symptoms and

limitations on her everyday activities. 

Plaintiff further avers in her Declaration at paragraph 8 that she experienced blurred

vision, fatigue, and nausea before her treatment began, which directly contradicts her

deposition testimony that (a) she experienced those symptoms during treatment and (b) her

testimony that when she was off treatment, she experienced only fatigue and high enzyme

levels. (Pl. Dep. 61:1-8; 98:11-99:9.) 

The issue of what symptoms Plaintiff experienced and when she experienced them is

of particular import in this case. At her deposition, Plaintiff answered specific and exacting

questions, and Plaintiff did not correct or supplement her deposition as allowed by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, in her Declaration, Plaintiff attempts to contradict

her deposition testimony. The Court concludes that the inconsistencies outlined above

cannot be classified as minor ones "that result from an honest discrepancy, a mistake, or

newly discovered evidence," nor are they merely attempts to explain her previous testimony.

See Messick, 62 F.3d at 1231. Because of the significant discrepancies regarding the details

of Plaintiff's condition, the Court concludes that paragraphs 6 and 8 of Plaintiff's Declaration

are a "sham" intended to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity of her

disease. 

//

//

//

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2. Paragraph 10

Plaintiff avers in her Declaration that "there were several occasions in which I fainted

while trying to climb the stairs [at work]." (Decl. ¶ 10.) However, in her deposition, Plaintiff

repeatedly asserted that she fainted only once at work. (Pl. Dep. 59:15-16 ("I fainted upstairs

one time."); 61:12-13 ("Q: What about the fainting; how often did that occur? A: One time

at work.")) Plaintiff's Declaration thus directly contravenes her deposition testimony, and the

Court concludes that this portion of Plaintiff's Declaration is a "sham" intended to create a

genuine issue of material fact as to the severity of Plaintiff's disease.

3. Paragraph 12

In her Declaration, Plaintiff avers that her supervisor, Lisa Wills, took Plaintiff's calls

on Monday mornings when Plaintiff would call in sick. (Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff further states

that, over time, Wills' tone became "progressively harsher and disapproving," and Wills

would make comments like "What do you want me to do about it?" and "Whatever" and "I

guess you have to do what you have to do." (Id.) However, Plaintiff testified at her

deposition that Wills "was really nice to me up until I got fired" and that no one other than

three of Plaintiff's co-workers made rude comments to her. (Pl. Dep. 241:6-14.) Thus, when

she was directly questioned as to whether anyone other than the three co-workers made

comments, Plaintiff responded negatively at her deposition. (Id.) Only in her Declaration

did Plaintiff provide detailed information as to how rudely Wills spoke to her. (Decl. ¶ 12.)

In light of these directly contradictory statements, the Court finds Plaintiff's Declaration is

a "sham" intended to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether accommodations

were made to Plaintiff.

Conclusion as to Motion to Strike

"If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact

simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly

diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of

fact." Leslie, 198 F.3d at 1157 (internal punctuation and quotation omitted). The Court

concludes that the level of discrepancy between Plaintiff's deposition testimony and

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statements in her Declaration rise above the level of minor inconsistencies. In response to

direct questioning at her deposition on key issues, Plaintiff responded in one way and then

later averred contrarily in her Declaration. Plaintiff did not file a Response to the Motion to

Strike, nor did she amend or supplement her deposition or Declaration. Plaintiff therefore

has not attempted to explain or clarify her contradictory statements in the Record. In light

of these inconsistencies, the Court finds the affidavit was filed for the purpose of creating a

genuine issue of material fact in an effort to preclude summary judgment. 

The Court will therefore grant Defendant's Motion to Strike for failure to respond

pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(i) and on the Motion's merits. Consequently, the Court will

disregard the Declaration of Susan Vinette in its analysis of the pending Motion for Summary

Judgment. 

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law

determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the

evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party." Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

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at trial." Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment

"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda

Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

B. Discussion

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to both of Plaintiff's claims,

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. The Court addresses each claim in turn.

1. ADA

Plaintiff bases her ADA claim on three grounds: disparate treatment, reasonable

accommodations, and hostile work environment. Also, Plaintiff argues in her Response to

the Motion for Summary Judgment that a finding by an Arizona Department of Economic

Security ("ADES") administrative law judge that Plaintiff "was discharged for other than

misconduct in connection with the employment" collaterally estops the litigation of the issue

of whether Plaintiff was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance. [Doc. No. 55 at 1.]

Before discussing the three grounds of Plaintiff's ADA claim, the Court first addresses

Plaintiff's collateral estoppel argument.

a. Collateral estoppel

Federal courts must look to state preclusion law to determine the preclusive effect of

state judicial proceedings on a subsequent federal court action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Here,

Arizona law specifically provides that any finding of fact or law by an administrative law

judge of ADES "is not conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or

proceeding and shall not be used as evidence in any separate or subsequent action or

proceeding between an individual and the individual's present or former employer brought

before a[] court or judge . . . of the United States." A.R.S. § 23-672.01. Thus, the findings

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of the ADES' administrative law judge are not entitled to preclusive effect in this Court, nor

are they admissible evidence in this case. The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff's contention

that a finding by an ADES administrative law judge has preclusive effect in this litigation.

 b. Prima facie case under the ADA (disparate treatment and reasonable

 accommodation)

Under the ADA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee

based on the employee's disability. Discrimination can occur where there is disparate

treatment or when an employer fails to make reasonable accommodations for an employee's

disability. See McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2004). To

establish a prima facie case under the ADA for discrimination, Plaintiff must demonstrate

that: (1) she is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is a qualified individual

able to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation; and (3)

she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Allen v. Pacific Bell,

348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

i. Whether Plaintiff is disabled under the ADA

A disability is "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).

 A. Disability under Section 12102(2)(A)

Subsection (A) involves three inquiries: (1) whether Plaintiff's hepatitis C is a physical

impairment, (2) whether the life activities curtailed by such impairment are "major life

activities," and (3) whether the impairment "substantially limits" the major life activities at

issue. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998); Frasier v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032,

1038 (9th Cir. 2003).

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff's hepatitis C is a physical impairment. A physical

impairment is defined as any "physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more

of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;

respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary;

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2

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether a plaintiff has to be disabled when the

adverse employment action was taken against him or her. Other Circuits have required such

a showing. See e.g., Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998);

Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (8th Cir. 1996). The Court need not

reach this issue, however, for reasons stated infra.

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hemic and lymphatic; skin, and endocrine." 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i). However, "[m]erely

having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA." Toyota Motor

Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002). Rather, Plaintiff's physical impairment

must substantially limit any of her major life activities, and the impairment must be

permanent or long term.2

 Id. at 198. 

"'Major life activities' . . . refers to those activities that are of central importance to

daily life." Id. at 197. Functions "such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working" constitute major life

activities. 29 CFR § 1630.2(i). In this case, Plaintiff indicates nowhere in her pleadings

specifically which major life activities are substantially limited by her hepatitis C. Of the

major life activities listed in the Code of Federal Regulations, supra, working is the only

major life activity that Plaintiff apparently contends is substantially limited.

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he inability to

perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life

activity of working." 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Instead,

a plaintiff must allege that she is unable to perform in a broad class of jobs. Id. "To be

substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from

more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing

one's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from

a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is

not precluded from a broad range of jobs." Id. at 492. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that she

is unable to perform in a broad class of jobs. To the contrary, Plaintiff contends in her

Complaint that she "was able to perform her job when she was working." (Compl. ¶ 11.) In

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addition, Plaintiff testified at her deposition that her hepatitis C did not affect her ability to

work in any way after her treatment ended, and the treatment had actually been unsuccessful

in curing her condition. (Pl. Dep. 195:6-14, 226:22-227:2.)

To determine whether Plaintiff is substantially impaired, the Court must make an

individualized assessment of Plaintiff's impairment. Id. at 198-99 (also noting that a case-bycase determination is particularly important "when the impairment is one whose symptoms

vary widely from person to person"). The Ninth Circuit has held that, at the summary

judgment stage, a court can consider medical testimony and/or the plaintiff's own declaration

when determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Head v.

Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, discovery has been

completed, and Plaintiff provides no medical testimony. Rather, in her Response to the

instant Motion, Plaintiff emphasizes the Head case, which holds that medical evidence is not

required at the summary judgment stage so long as a plaintiff's declaration is not self-serving

and contains sufficient detail to convey the existence of the impairment. Id.; [Doc. No. 55

at 11-12.] Plaintiff argues that her Declaration therefore suffices at the summary judgment

stage, as her Declaration amply "details her disability." [Doc. No. 55 at 11-12.] The Court

therefore concludes that Plaintiff relies on her Declaration, rather than medical testimony,

to support her contention that she is disabled under the ADA. However, as a result of the its

finding that Plaintiff's Declaration is a "sham," the Court has stricken Plaintiff's Declaration.

In the absence of a Declaration by Plaintiff, the Court can consider medical testimony, but

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3

Plaintiff attached to her Statement of Facts a "Certification by Health Care Provider,"

which was completed by Plaintiff's physician in March 2003 and thereafter provided to

Defendant in support of Plaintiff's FMLA request. (Ex. J to Plaintiff's SOF.) In the

Certification, Plaintiff is described as undergoing treatment for hepatitis C, and "[s]evere side

effects are indicated." (Id.) However, it is not clear who "indicated" the side effects, and the

side effects are not listed or detailed. (See id.) Additionally, the physician wrote "N/A" in

response to "Please list any functions of the employee's job that cannot be performed." (Id.)

(emphasis in original) Thus, even if the Court were to consider this documentation, which

is not sworn testimony, the documentation does not demonstrate that Plaintiff's major life

activity of working is substantially limited by her hepatitis C.

4

The Court notes that, even if it were to consider the only evidence regarding

Plaintiff's symptoms, Plaintiff's deposition testimony, Plaintiff still would not demonstrate

a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working. At her deposition, Plaintiff

testified that, when she was symptomatic, her symptoms consisted of sporadic "tiredness"

and "high enzyme levels." (Pl. Dep. 98:11-99:9.) Plaintiff also testified that she fainted once

at work. (Id. at 59:15-16; 61:12-13.) In addition, Plaintiff testified that she experienced

constant blurred vision, nausea, anemia, and shortness of breath when she was on her

hepatitis C treatment, from December 2002 until August 2003. (Id. at 61:1-23.) However,

that testimony does not show that Plaintiff is unable to perform either a class of jobs or a

broad range of jobs in various classes. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92 (quoting 29 CFR §

1630.2(j)(3)(i)-(ii)). Also, an inability to do one particular job is not enough to show a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. Furthermore, although the

Supreme Court has held that the substantial limitation must be permanent or long term,

Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence to demonstrate that

any substantial limitation any major life activity is permanent or long term. Indeed, Plaintiff

testified at her deposition that her condition does not affect any of her daily activities. (Pl.

Dep. 194:25-195:2.) Finally, Plaintiff notes that co-workers noticed that her mislabeling and

misidentification errors took place during her treatment for hepatitis C, but this does not cure

the lack of pertinent evidence the Court has just identified. 

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no such testimony has been presented to the Court.3

 Thus, Plaintiff has failed to provide the

Court with any evidence on which to make a finding of a "disability."4

 

In addition, the Court notes that a plaintiff must "present specific evidence about

relevant labor markets to defeat summary judgment on a claim of substantial limitation of

'working.'" Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 796 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, because Plaintiff has "failed to present evidence of the jobs from which she was

precluded and of the relevant labor markets for that class of jobs," summary judgment is

appropriate. See id. (upholding summary judgment in such a situation)

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 Consequently, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's impairment does not substantially

limit a major life activity. Plaintiff is therefore not disabled within the meaning of the ADA

unless there is a record of such an impairment under Section 12102(2)(B), or she is regarded

as having such an impairment under Section 12102(2)(C).

 B. Disability under Section 12102(2)(B)

A disability under the ADA can also exist where there is a record of an impairment

that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); see 29 CFR §

1630.2(k). As stated above, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that her physical

impairment substantially limits any major life activities. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that she

is not impacted or limited by her condition:

Q [by defense counsel]: And does your hepatitis C currently limit or impact

 any of your daily activities?

A [by Plaintiff]: Not to my knowledge.

(Pl. Dep. 194:25-195:2.) Therefore, a record of Plaintiff's impairment here is insufficient to

establish a disability under Section 12102(2)(B), nor does Plaintiff claim disability status

under this section.

 C. Disability under Section 12102(2)(C)

A disability also exists under the ADA where an individual is regarded as having an

impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).

There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this

statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has

a physical impairment that substantially limits one ore more major life

activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,

nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.

In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions

about the individual - it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting

impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting

impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2000).

Although Plaintiff does not advance this argument in her Response, by implication

Plaintiff alleges that because Defendant allowed her to work under a modified schedule

through the FMLA, Defendant regarded her as disabled because her major life activity of

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Plaintiff had received five previous Employee Corrective Actions for mislabeling or

misidentifying specimens. (Exs. E, F, G, I, J to Def.'s Statement of Facts.) 

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working was limited. However, Plaintiff has made no showing that her major life activity

of working was misperceived as substantially limited in the eyes of Defendant per Sutton.

The Ninth Circuit has held that an employer who follows lifting restrictions imposed

by a doctor does not equate to regarding someone as disabled. See Thompson v. Holy

Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1997). It logically follows, therefore, that an

employer who modifies an employee's work schedule based on a physician's certification

similarly does not equate to regarding someone as disabled. 

Thus, because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as

substantially limited in the performance of any major life activity, Plaintiff cannot be

considered disabled under Section 12102(2)(C).

 D. Conclusion on whether Plaintiff is disabled under ADA

Absent a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a

record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment, Plaintiff is not

subject to the protections of the ADA. Because Plaintiff has failed "to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, and on which [she]

will bear the burden of proof at trial," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Citadel Holding

Corp., 26 F.3d at 964, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's ADA claim.

The Court notes that, even assuming Plaintiff could show she was disabled and a

qualified individual under the ADA, Defendant has proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for terminating Plaintiff's employment. Thus, with regard to her reasonable

accommodation and disparate treatment claims, Plaintiff could not show that the adverse

employment decision was made based on her disability or that it was pretextual. See Allen,

348 F.3d at 1114; see also Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir.

1996). Rather, Defendant offers a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff:

Plaintiff had a history of mislabeling and misidentification errors5

 and she potentially

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compromised patient and staff safety with her April Fool's "prank" of tying phlebotomy trays

together. The Court notes the particular importance of protecting the safety of patients by

health care industry employers such as Defendant.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation and

disparate treatment claims under the ADA fail as a matter of law, because Plaintiff has failed

to prove an essential element of those claims. The Court now proceeds to Plaintiff's hostile

work environment claim.

c. Hostile work environment under the ADA

Plaintiff also claims that she suffered a hostile work environment in violation of the

ADA. The Ninth Circuit has not recognized such a claim, and has expressly declined to

decide whether such a claim exists. See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th

Cir. 2003). However, other courts have either explicitly found that the ADA encompasses

a disability-based harassment claim, see Flowers v. S. Regional Physician Servs., Inc., 247

F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001), or have acknowledged the possibility of a hostile work

environment claim under the ADA, see e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern

Penn., 168 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir. 1999). In each instance, courts have applied the analysis

employed in Title VII cases. For purposes of this Motion, the Court assumes, without

deciding, that such a claim exists and that the applicable analysis is that of Title VII claims.

To establish a prima facie case for hostile work environment based on disability,

Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was

subjected to verbal or physical harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her disability

or her request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of her employment and to create an abusive working environment; and

(5) that Defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt

effective remedial action. See Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235-36. 

The Court concluded in this Order, supra, that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence

sufficient to raise a fact question as to whether she is disabled under the ADA. Thus, Plaintiff

cannot prove that she is a qualified individual with a disability, the first element of the prima

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Plaintiff also alleges that supervisor Wills was rude to her, but that allegation appears

only in Plaintiff's Declaration, which has been stricken. Even if Court were to consider those

alleged comments, however, they would not rise to the level of changing the terms and

conditions of Plaintiff's employment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.

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facie case for hostile work environment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's hostile work environment

claim fails as a matter of law. 

Alternatively, even if Plaintiff could show she was disabled under the ADA, the Court

notes that the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive such that the working

environment was abusive. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that, because Plaintiff was

allowed to take time off because of her condition and the "attention" she received, coworkers would not ask her to participate in signing farewell cards or ordering out for lunch

and would make rude comments to Plaintiff. (Pl. Dep. 103:7-17; 107:4-23.) The Court

concludes that although some of her co-workers may not have been pleasant to Plaintiff, none

of their conduct rises to the level of pervasive or abusive. Offhand comments or isolated

incidents, unless extremely serious, "will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms

and conditions of employment.'" Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

Furthermore, the Court will not require Defendant to ensure that all of its employees get

along with one another; to do otherwise would be to wrongly interpret the ADA (and Title

VII) as a "general civility code for the American workplace." See Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). In addition, there is no evidence that

Plaintiff ever complained of her co-workers' conduct to a supervisor. Thus, the Court

concludes that Plaintiff's co-workers' conduct is insufficiently severe to support a hostile

work environment claim and summary judgment is appropriate as to that claim.6

d. Conclusion on ADA claim

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed "to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the

burden of proof at trial," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for

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In her Response, Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that Defendant is liable for

intentional "and/or"negligent infliction of emotional distress [Doc. No. 55 at 2]. However,

Plaintiff did not allege negligent infliction of emotional distress in her Complaint, and

Plaintiff does not argue negligent infliction of emotional distress in her Response. The Court

will consider only those counts that are present in the Complaint and therefore will not

address negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA claim on all grounds: reasonable accommodation,

disparate treatment, and hostile work environment.

2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant is liable under Arizona law for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.7

To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arizona law,

Plaintiff must prove three elements. First, Defendant's conduct must be capable of being

characterized as "extreme and outrageous." Watts v. Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 P.2d

1032, 1035 (Ariz. 1980) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46). With regard this first

element, "liability has only been found where the conduct has been so outrageous in

character, so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as so atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the

case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would

arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'" Id. (citing

comment d to § 46 of Restatement (Second) of Torts). Thus, the conduct necessary to sustain

an intentional infliction of emotional distress "falls at the very extreme edge of the spectrum

of possible conduct." Id. Additionally, "[i]t is extremely rare to find conduct in the

employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis

for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Mintz v. Bell Atlantic

Sys. Leasing, 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. App. 1995) (quoting Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co.,

861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990)). When reasonable

minds could differ as to whether conduct is sufficiently extreme or outrageous, the issue goes

to the jury. Id. at 563.

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In addition to the first element, Plaintiff must show that Defendant must either intend

to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will

result from his conduct and that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of

defendant's conduct. Watts, 619 P.2d at 1035 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46).

In support of her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Plaintiff argues in

her Response as follows:

[sic] the fact of the case at bar, as stated in Plaintiff's] Declaration raise

material issues of material facts as to whether [Defendant] is liable to

[Plaintiff] for intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Defendant's] conduct

was extreme and outrageous. [Plaintiff] was forced to endure the threat of

termination, discomfort and pain and the humiliation of her colleagues. Lisa

Wells and Judy Grout, both supervisors were aware of what they were doing.

[Plaintiff] did suffer both emotional distress and the aggravation of her already

compromised condition.

[Doc. No. 55 at 19.]

Thus, Plaintiff identifies Defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct as "threat of

termination, discomfort and pain and humiliation of her colleagues." Id. However, Plaintiff

provides no further evidence beyond that conclusory statement, and Plaintiff's Declaration

has been stricken. After carefully reviewing the entire Record in this case (with the

exception of Plaintiff's stricken Declaration) in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court

is unable to locate a single instance of conduct that "falls at the very extreme edge of the

spectrum of possible conduct." See Watts, 619 P.2d at 1035. Liability for tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress "clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,

annoyances, petty oppressions . . ., and . . . plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and are

required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that

are definitely inconsiderate and unkind." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d.

Also, although Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that her emotional distress was

"severe" (Compl. ¶ 25), Plaintiff has failed to provide a scintilla of evidence regarding the

severity of the emotional distress she has suffered. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and case law applying Rule 56 require that Plaintiff come forward with supporting

facts or evidence at the summary judgment stage. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 586-87. Plaintiff has introduced no such evidence. 

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Because Plaintiff has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish at least two

essential elements of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court

concludes that summary judgment as to this claim is appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 45] is

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court will enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Exceed Page Limitation re:

Response [Doc. No. 53] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike Declaration of

Susan Vinette. [Doc. No. 59] is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike

Plaintiff's Declaration, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts [Doc. No. 55].

DATED this 21st day of June, 2006.

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