Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02256/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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05cv2256

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARBARA TRIGUEROS and AMBER

TRIGUEROS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES,

Defendant.

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Civil No. O5-CV-2256-L(AJB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [doc. #19]

Defendant Southwest Airlines (“Southwest” or “defendant”) moves for summary

judgment in the above-captioned case. The motion has been fully briefed. Having carefully

considered the arguments of the parties and associated evidence, the Court enters the following

decision. 

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Barbara Trigueros (“Barbara”) and her daughter, Amber Trigueros (“Amber”)

(collectively “Trigueros” or “plaintiffs”) boarded a Southwest Airlines (“defendant” or

“Southwest”) airplane bound for Oakland on July 25, 2003. (Complaint at ¶ 6) Both plaintiffs

are African-Americans. A Caucasion male flight attendant, William Browne (“Browne”),

offered to check Amber’s carry-on bag as she entered the plane, but Amber declined the offer

and stowed her bag under her seat. Id. at ¶ 7. A Caucasian man, who was seated across from

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1 Plaintiffs were sitting in the front of the aircraft in rear-facing seats.

2 Plaintiffs allege Browne got his supervisor but David Castro Spears is not

Browne’s supervisor. Rather, Castro Spears is Southwest’s Operations Supervisor. See Browne

deposition, ¶ 16.

3 Jetway is another term for the passenger boarding bridge.

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plaintiffs,1 had a large briefcase that needed to be stowed. Id. at ¶ 8. Browne did not suggest

that the Caucasian male passenger’s briefcase be checked but instead asked a Caucasian woman

who was seated behind the male passenger if she would remove her bag so the briefcase could

be stored under her seat. She adamantly refused. Id. at ¶ 9.

Browne then told Amber that she would need to move her carry-on bag from underneath

her seat so the briefcase could be stowed appropriately. Amber refused. Id. at ¶ 10. Although

Browne asserted that the man with the briefcase was seated prior to plaintiffs, plaintiffs told

Browne that they had been seated first. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiffs contend that Browne became

agitated and left to get Southwest’s Operations Supervisor, David Castro Spears (“Castro

Spears”), an African American.2

 Castro Spears asked plaintiffs to step off the plane with him,

which they did. On the jetway,3

 Castro Spears stated to plaintiffs that based on what Browne

had told him, they were being uncooperative with flight attendant Browne. Id. at ¶ 13.

Plaintiffs returned to the plane and Amber spoke to a couple seated across from plaintiffs

explaining what had happened. Id. at ¶ 15. Upon hearing Amber’s conversation, Browne again

called Castro Spears who asked plaintiffs to step out of the plane. Id. Plaintiffs exited the plane

a second time with Castro Spears who “lectured”, “humiliated” and “harassed” them and “told

them to go back in the airplane and to ‘shut up.’” Id. at ¶ 16. As they returned to their seats this

second time, the large briefcase had been stowed safely in an area between Barbara’s seat and

the wall of the plane. (Browne Declar.¶ 19) Plaintiffs allege they were aware that other

passengers were staring at them and making comments, which caused plaintiffs embarrassment

and discomfort. (Complaint at ¶ 16) 

After their return to the plane, the flight commenced with plaintiffs in their selected seats

and with Amber’s carry-on bag stowed under her seat. During the flight, Browne did not ask

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plaintiffs if they would like something to drink until all the other passengers were served and the

crew was collecting trash. Id. at ¶ 19.

Plaintiffs bring claims alleging race discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act;

violation of California Civil Code §2103; slander; intentional infliction of emotional distress;

negligent infliction of emotional distress; and violation of Civil Code § 52.1. 

Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the court to enter summary judgment on

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327

(1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A fact is material when, under the substantive governing law, it

affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party does

not have the burden of proof at trial, it may carry its initial burden by “produc[ing] evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the

moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential

element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving party

bears the burden of proof on an issue — whether on a claim for relief or an affirmative defense

— the party “must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or

defense to warrant judgment in its favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th

Cir. 1986); see S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).

If the moving party fails to discharge its initial burden of production, summary judgment

must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence, even if the

nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

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144, 159-60 (1970); Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-03. When the moving party carries its initial

burden of production, the nonmoving party cannot “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his

pleading.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the non-movant must “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324 (internal quotations omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. 

A “genuine issue” of material fact arises if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Disputes over

irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). When ruling on a

summary judgment motion, the court cannot engage in credibility determinations or weighing of

the evidence; these are functions for the jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Playboy Enters., Inc.

v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2002). The court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Gibson v.

County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106

(2003). The court is not required “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable

fact,” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996), but rather “may limit its review to

the documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record

specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Discussion

1. Racial Discrimination under Unruh Civil Rights Act

a. Legal Standard

California Civil Code § 51, known as The Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act” or “the

Act”), provides in relevant part:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter

what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical

condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,

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4 A claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is based on racial discrimination in the

making and enforcement of contracts.

5 A claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, also known as a 42 U.S.C. §

2000(a) claim, is for discrimination in the denial of a public accommodation: 

All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,

facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public

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privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. 

CIV. CODE § 51(b). The purpose of the Unruh Act is "to compel recognition of the equality of

all persons in the right to the particular service offered by an organization or entity covered by

the act." Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 733 (1983); see

also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 738 (1982). The Act must be construed

liberally in order to carry out its purpose. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 28 (1985). 

Further, the Unruh Act is intended “as an active measure that would create and preserve a

nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by ‘banishing’ or

‘eradicating’ arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments.” Angelucci v. Century

Supper Club, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 146 (2007)(citing Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,

40 Cal. 3d 72, 75-76 (1985). “The Act . . . imposes a compulsory duty upon business

establishments to serve all persons without arbitrary discrimination.” Id. (citing Marina Point,

Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 738 (1982). Moreover, the Unruh Act “serves as a preventive

measure, without which it is recognized that businesses might fall into discriminatory practices. 

Id. (citing Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 75). “The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each person’s

inherent right to ‘full and equal’ access to ‘all business establishments.’” Id. (citing §51(b);

Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 75). Although the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination on the

basis of race, it does not prohibit business from enacting “reasonable regulations that are

rationally related to the services performed and facilities provided . . . as long as the policy is

applied alike to all persons.” Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1502 (1999)(citing

Harris v. Capital Grouth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1155 (1991)).

The standard of proof required in Unruh Act cases is the same as that used in 42 U.S.C. §

19814

 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)5 cases. See Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co., 28

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28 accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the

ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. 

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Cal. App. 4th 686, 694-95 (1994). Thus, a summary judgment motion in an Unruh Act case is

governed by the burden shifting provisions established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-88

(1989). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, plaintiffs have the initial burden of making a prima

facie case of discrimination. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186. Once plaintiffs have proven the

elements of a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to defendants to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802-03. If the defendant articulates a proper basis for its conduct, the burden shifts back

to plaintiffs in the third stage of the analysis to prove that defendant’s proffered reasons were

simply a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804-05. Notwithstanding the shifting burden of

production, plaintiffs retain the ultimate burden of proving that the challenged action was the

result of intentional discrimination based on impermissible motive. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-11 (1993) (refining the McDonnell Douglas test so that plaintiffs must

retain the ultimate burden of proving actual discrimination by the defendant).

b. Prima facie case

The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance

of the evidence. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Lyons v.

England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002) ; Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292

F.3d 654, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2002)(emphasizing the low threshold for a prima facie case and

holding that even an employee's self-assessment is relevant evidence). A plaintiff needs only to

offer evidence which “gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Lowe v. City of

Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community

College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991)(holding that “[t]he amount of evidence that

must be produced in order to create a prima facie case is very little”). 

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28 6 The Court uses the prima facie standard for a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. §

2000a as it is the most closely analogous statute.

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To establish a prima facie case6, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she "(1) is a member of

a protected class, (2) attempted to contract for services and afford [ ] herself of the full benefits

and enjoyment of a public accommodation, (3) was denied the full benefits or enjoyment of a

public accommodation, and (4) such services were available to similarly situated persons outside

his or her protected class who received full benefits or were treated better." Jackson v. Waffle

House, Inc., 413 F. Supp.2d 1338, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 

There is no dispute that, as African-Americans, plaintiffs are members of a protected

class, meeting the first prong of the prima facie test. 

Plaintiffs purchased tickets for their flight to Oakland from defendant. Plaintiffs have

demonstrated through their deposition testimony that they were denied the full benefits or

enjoyment of a public accommodation when they were singled out by being taken off the plane

twice for admonishment for (1) refusing to move a stowed carry-on bag after a Caucasian

woman was not removed from the plane when she strenuously refused to move her bag and (2)

talking to fellow passengers about the incident.

Plaintiffs acknowledge there is a lack of direct evidence of racial animus insofar as

defendant or its agents did not use racial slurs or act in an overtly racially discriminatory

manner. But plaintiffs point to their deposition testimony concerning the woman who first

refused Browne’s request to move her carry-on luggage as evidence of a similarly situated

Caucasian person who was treated differently and better than plaintiffs with regard to the

allegedly discriminatory acts.

With all inferences made in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and the minimal showing

necessary at the prima facie stage, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have presented sufficient

circumstantial evidence to permit an inference of a discriminatory motive based on their

allegations that defendant subjected them to treatment different from that accorded a similarly

situated white passenger on their flight. Accordingly, plaintiffs have established a prima facie

case of discrimination. 

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c. Proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

Because plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its alleged wrongful actions.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To meet this burden, "the defendant must clearly set

forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence," reasons for its [ ] decision which, if

believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that the [ ] action was not a result of

unlawful discrimination. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct.

1089 (1981). Defendant’s burden is one of production, not persuasion, thereby involving no

credibility assessment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142

(2000).

In this case, defendant states, through the deposition testimony of its employees, that it

was ensuring the safety of its employees and customers when plaintiffs were asked to leave the

plane for discussions with its Customer Service Representative after Amber refused to move her

carry-on bag from under her seat. Defendant contends that the seat Amber occupied was

uniquely appropriate for stowing the large briefcase that set the stage for the dispute. (Browne

declar. ¶¶ 5, 9, 10) In his declaration, Browne states “[t]he space under seats 1D and 1E was

the only space designed to fit a larger bag.” Id. at ¶5 (emphasis added) When Amber refused to

move her carry-on bag so that a male passenger’s large briefcase could be stowed under her seat,

defendant contends that Barbara reacted in a “confrontational tone” that was out of proportion to

the issue of where the briefcase would be stowed. (Browne Declar. ¶ 14) In his declaration,

Castro Spears states that “[w]hen a flight attendant, prior to departure, is concerned about a

passenger’s willingness to follow crew instructions, it is Southwest Airlines’ policy to have its

crew members and operations supervisors deal with the situation on the ground, prior to takeoff,

rather than during the flight.” (Castro Spears Declar. ¶ 3) Thus, defendant contends that the

reason for its agents’ action in removing plaintiffs from the plane twice was to “assess prior to

takeoff whether Plaintiffs, who [Browne] perceived as confrontational and upset, would be

willing and able to follow crew instructions during the flight.” (Reply memo. at 2; Castro Spears

Declar. at ¶ 3).

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Thus, defendant, through deposition testimony, provides a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions, namely that the actions Browne and Castro Spears took with respect to

plaintiffs were based on defendant’s safety policy. The Court notes, however, defendant’s

written policy has not been provided by defendant to the Court. Nevertheless, at this stage in the

analysis, defendant’s credibility is not at issue – defendant has the burden of production, not

persuasion. Defendant has made an adequate showing that its reason for the actions taken was

legitimate and nondiscriminatory.

d. Pretext for discrimination

If the defendant meets the burden of production by articulating a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, any presumption that the defendant discriminated

“drops from the case,” and the plaintiff must then show that the defendant's alleged reason for its

action was merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507-08.. 

A plaintiff can prove pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason

more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is not credible. Noyse v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir.

2007)(emphasis added)(citing Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000)(A plaintiff can prove pretext either "(1) indirectly, by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is 'unworthy of credence' because it is internally inconsistent or

otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely

motivated the employer.")); Burdine 450 U.S. at 256. 

Direct evidence is “evidence, which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory

animus] without inference or presumption.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

1221(9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Direct evidence typically consists of

clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the [defendant].” 

Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). Because direct evidence is

extremely probative, plaintiff needs to offer very little direct evidence to raise a genuine issue of

material fact; but, when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be

specific and substantial to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

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7 As defendant has appropriately noted, plaintiffs have presented no evidence with

their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Instead, plaintiffs use bullet points in

their memorandum in opposition to note the “material facts” for the court to consider. The facts,

as plaintiffs present them, reference Barbara’s and Amber’s depositions; however, the

depositions are not attached as exhibits to plaintiffs’ opposition. The Court notes that a trial

court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Orr v.

Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); see FED. R.CIV.P. 56(e); Beyene, 854 F.2d

at 1181. Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility, and this condition is satisfied

by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent

claims. Id. (Citations omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). “We have repeatedly held that

unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.” Orr, 285

F.3d at 773; see also, Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494 (9th Cir.1994); Hal Roach Studios,

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550-51 (9th Cir.1989); Beyene, 854 F.2d at

1182; Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir.1987); Hamilton v.

Keystone Tankship Corp., 539 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir.1976).

As the Orr court discussed:

In a summary judgment motion, documents authenticated through personal

knowledge must be "attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of

[FED.R.CIV.P.] 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits

could be admitted into evidence." Canada, 831 F.2d at 925. However, a proper

foundation need not be established through personal knowledge but can rest on any

manner permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) or 902. See FED.R.EVID. 901(b)(providing ten approaches to authentication); FED.R.EVID. 902

(self-authenticating documents need no extrinsic foundation).

Id. at 774 (internal citations omitted).

Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that affidavits be made on

personal knowledge, that the affiant be competent to testify to the matters stated therein, and that

sworn or certified copies of all papers referred to in an affidavit be attached thereto. See

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e).

Here, because Barbara’s and Amber’s depositions have been properly provided by

defendant, the Court will consider plaintiffs’ references to the record. Barefield v. Bd of

Trustees, 2007 WL 2221051 *5 (E.D. Cal. 2007)(“Once evidence has been authenticated by one

party, it has been authenticated with regard to all parties.” )

10 05cv2256

As noted above, plaintiffs lack any direct evidence of racial animus – defendant or its

agents are not alleged to have used racial slurs or to have acted in an overtly racially

discriminatory manner. Thus, plaintiffs are required to come forward with specific and

substantial evidence of pretext.7

 Here, as in Noyse, the “central dispute in this case is whether

[plaintiffs’] evidence [is] sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to pretext.” Noyse, 488 F.3d

at 1168. “[T]he burden on plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of fact as to pretext is ‘hardly an

onerous one.’” Id. at 1170 (quoting Payne v. Northwest Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.

1997). Plaintiffs must only show that a rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence, find that

the defendant's explanation was pretextual and therefore, its action was taken for impermissibly

discriminatory reasons. Because there is a lack of direct evidence showing discriminatory

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motive, plaintiffs must produce evidence to show that defendant's explanation for its actions is

not credible. Warren v. City of Calsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1995).

Although defendant’s proffered reason for removing plaintiffs from the plane is legitimate

and nondiscriminatory, plaintiffs contend that defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual in that it

is not worthy of credence. 

First, defendant notes in its statement of undisputed facts: 

Shortly after Plaintiffs boarded, flight attendant Browne realized that the large

briefcase belonging to the passenger in seat 2D still had to be stowed. For this

reason, and because the overhead bins were full, and because the space beneath

seats 1D and 1E was the only suitable space in the area, flight attendant Browne

indicated his intention to stow the briefcase underneath seats 1D and 1E where

Plaintiffs were seated . . . . The extended space beneath seats 1D and 1E was

particularly suitable for the briefcase, which was too large to fit properly under

any single seat.

(Statement of uncontroverted facts ¶¶ 8, 10 (emphasis added), citing Browne Declar., ¶¶ 9, 10,

13) But later in that same statement of undisputed facts, defendant notes that “[a]fter Plaintiffs

returned to their seats the second time, “flight attendant Browne was able to stow the briefcase in

an open space between Barbara Trigueros’ seat and the wall of the airplane.” (Statement of

uncontroverted facts ¶ 36) This open space was an apparently safe and appropriate stowage

area. With his admitted experience and knowledge of available and safe storage space on the

aircraft (Browne Declar. at ¶ 1), Browne could have defused easily and quickly any alleged

confrontation with plaintiffs if had he stowed the briefcase in the available alternative location

when the Trigueros stated they would not move Amber’s carry-on bag. A rational trier of fact

could well conclude that Browne’s failure to use another convenient, safe and readily available

stowage area and his unwillingness to allow plaintiffs to speak to other passengers caused the

situation to escalate. A rational trier of fact could also find that by escalating the situation and

requiring plaintiffs to leave the plane twice in front of other passengers, Browne’s actions were

not based on defendant’s policy but instead were racially motivated. It should also be noted that

Browne does not contend that plaintiffs’ attempted conversation with fellow passengers was

loud, disruptive, aggressive or otherwise suggestive of an inability to follow flight attendants’

directions.

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Further, as discussed above, although defendant contends that the actions Browne and

Castro Spears took with respect to plaintiffs was based on defendant’s policy, the Court notes

that defendant’s written policy has not been provided to the Court. In their declarations,

Browne and Casto Spears provide their general interpretation of defendant’s safety policy which

may or may not accurately reflect defendant’s written policy when confronted with the situation

here. Defendant’s written policy may be to avoid the escalation of tensions by taking alternative

actions that either do not feature the embarrassing removal of a passenger from the airplane or

otherwise singling out a passenger for admonishment for refusing to move a carry-on bag and/or

for talking to fellow passengers. 

Similarly, Barbara’s deposition testimony that a Caucasian woman was permitted to

assertively decline a request to move her under-seat stowed bag and was not taken off the plane

for admonishment is undisputed in the admissible evidence presented. This is a material fact

that a trier of fact must consider when determining whether defendant’s actions were

impermissibly discriminatory. 

Plaintiffs have raised specific and probative evidence of pretext, i.e., defendant’s

explanation is not credible because it is inadequately supported by evidence and is internally

inconsistent. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant’s demands to plaintiffs

that Amber’s carry-on bag be moved, to not discuss the incident with fellow passengers, and to

exit the plane twice for admonishment based on Browne’s discomfort were motivated by race

rather than by any alleged confrontational exchange with Browne and/or defendant’s safety

policy. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is

denied.

2. Violation of California Civil Code §2103

Plaintiffs have withdrawn their second cause of action for violation of California Civil

Code § 2103. (Opp. at 10) 

3. Slander

Plaintiffs have withdrawn their third cause of action for slander. (Opp. at 10).

/ / /

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4. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)

extreme or outrageous conduct engaged in with the intent of causing, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) severe emotional distress; and (3) causation.

Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991). For conduct to be outrageous, it must

be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.

Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the "recitation of the facts to an average

member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to

exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’" KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App.4th 1023, 1028 (1995). 

But "the tort does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,

or other trivialities." Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App.4th 488, 496 (1998).

Here, no reasonable juror could find that defendant’s conduct was outrageous or extreme. 

Further, although plaintiffs provide their deposition testimony regarding their emotional injury

occasioned by the incident at issue and it is understandable that plaintiffs would be upset

because of the incident, plaintiffs have not provided evidence of severe emotional distress. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

5. Negligent infliction of emotional distress

With respect to plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, "[n]egligent infliction of emotional

distress is not an independent tort; it is the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of

duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply. " Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc., 97 Cal.

App. 4th 120, 126 (2002). "[T]here is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to

another." Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (1993). "[U]nless the

defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an

object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of

some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty." 

Id. at 985. Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant assumed a duty in which the plaintiffs’

emotional state was an object. Thus, a plaintiff must show the existence of an independent duty,

which may be imposed by law, assumed by the defendant, or be based on a special relationship

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between the parties, Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 984-985. 

Here, plaintiffs have not and cannot allege an independent duty imposed by law, assumed

by defendant, or created by a special relationship between the parties that proximately caused

plaintiffs’ emotional distress. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

6. Violation of Civil Code § 52.1

Plaintiffs also allege violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1.

Civil Code section 52.1(a) provides: 

(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by

threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation,

or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of this state. . . .

 CIV. CODE §52.1(a).

Civil Code section 52.1 requires "an attempted or completed act of interference with a

legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion." Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334

(1998). To obtain relief under Civil Code section 52.1, a plaintiff need not allege the defendant

acted with discriminatory animus or intent: a defendant is liable if he or she interfered with the

plaintiff's constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion. Venegas v.

County of Los Angeles. 32 Cal. 4th 820, 841-843 (2004). The essence of a Bane Act claim is

that the defendant, by the specified improper means, i.e., "threats, intimidation or coercion",

tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the

law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.

Jones, 17 Cal. 4th at 334.

Defendant contends that there is no evidence that plaintiffs were threatened with violence

and therefore, plaintiffs cannot state a claim or survive summary judgment. Defendant primarily

relies on Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 68 Cal. App. 4th 101 (1998) to support its

argument. The Cabesuela court limited the scope of the Bane Act to violence, actual or

threatened, by reading the Bane Act in conjunction with Civil Code section 51.7, which sets

forth the "right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence . . . .” CIV.

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CODE § 51.7. But the California Supreme Court recently rejected the tying of section 52.1 with

section 51.7. See Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th at 841-843. 

"Violence" is not a word used in section 52.1(a). The statutory language is "threats,

intimidation, or coercion," which the Legislature meant to have a broader coverage than that

provided by section 51.7. See id. at 845-847. Although intimidation or coercion may be

accomplished by violence and threats may be accompanied by violence or may promise

violence, violence, or the threat of violence, is not a prerequisite to stating a cause of action

based on the Bane Act. Id. Thus, defendant’s argument that because Cabesuela is applicable

and plaintiffs have not shown that they were threatened with violence, the Court must find that

plaintiffs cannot state a claim or survive summary judgment on this claim is incorrect as a

general proposition. 

But the statute itself speaks of the threat of violence when the defendant’s alleged

wrongful action is based on speech alone:

Speech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to subdivision

(a) or (b), except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against

a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against

whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech,

violence will be committed against them or their property and that the person

threatening violence has the apparent ability to carry out the threat. 

CIV. CODE 52.1(j)(emphasis added). Thus, section 52.1(j) requires that violence in the form of

some physical force must be threatened when the threat or intimidations is based on speech

alone. 

Here, Barbara’s deposition testimony indicates that she felt Castro Spears was rude but

not threatening:

A. And it was at this point that Castro began saying things like “Well, see, I

don’t even know what’s going on, but I can make you guys not take this

flight. I can make you stay here and take the next flight.” . . .

Q. And what did Castro then say?

A. “Just get back on the plane and shut up.” He repeated that. And we got

back on the plane.

Q. Is there anything that Castro said to you when you were out on the jetway

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with him, that you haven’t already told me?

A. No. Not that I can think of right now. 

. . .

Q. Was Castro speaking to you in a raised voice in the jetway?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Was he shouting at you?

A. He wasn’t shouting, but he did raise his voice. He adjusted his volume

when I asked for his card though.

(Barbara Trigueros Depo. at 57-58).

Q. At any time, did the flight attendant or Castro physically threaten you?

A. No.

Q. Did they ever put their hands on you?

A. No. I consider a verbal threat was made by Castro when he said, “I can

make you catch the next plane if I want to,” I consider that threatening. 

There was no cause for it.

Q. Did – did either the flight attendant or Castro ever put his hands on you or

on Amber?

A. No.

(Barbara Trigueros Depo. at 67).

Amber’s deposition testimony also supports the fact that no threat of physical violence

was made. The first time the Trigueros were asked to step out of the plane into the jet way,

Amber testified that she explained what had happened with the flight attendant to Castro Spears.

Q. And when you explained this to Castro, what was his response, if any?

A. His response was, “I don’t care. I wasn’t there. Just, you know, do what he

says.”

Q. What was – what was the tone in which Castro was speaking to you and

your mother?

A. Nasty, rude, unprofessional.

(Amber Triguero Depo. at 37-38).

The second time the Trigueros were asked to step out of the plane into the jetway, Amber 

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testified: 

A. Anyway, so we’re outside. He says, “You know, you’re still talking.” At

that point we didn’t say anything. And then he says, “Yeah, you know, you

need to get back on the airplane, and you need to shut up.”

 And we’re just like wow, okay. My mom said, “You know, how would

you feel if your wife and your daughter were treated this way on an

airplane?”

 And he said, “You know what? If I want to, I can kick you off this

plane right now and make you catch a later one. I can make you catch

whatever one I want to let you catch later on today. I can make you get

your stuff and get off.”

 And I think at that point, I think we were just like, wow, seriously, this is

– this is happening right now. I can’t really tell you how it ended from –

from that moment I think we were both really shocked just, like, to think

we’re paying for this type of treatment.

 . . .

Q. Is – is there anything that you can remember Castro saying to you during

that second time out on the jetway, that you haven’t already told me?

A. Oh, my mom asked for a card. . . . 

 And, you know, that’s all I can remember. But that was pretty much the

gist of it. She asked him for a card, at which point he gave her a card, and

she got Will’s name.

. . .

A. I – I remember saying, “This is ridiculous. This is ridiculous.” I mean, I

think I was more in a thoughtful place just because how does somebody

else get to say no, but then I can’t say no. And it’s an issue, and I get

hustled and requested and told to go some – to go outside the plane, not

once,

but twice.

 I just was trying to, you know, understand why it was happening at that

point and why he was being so rude to us. I mean, what did we do to be

told, “Well, if I want to, I can make you get off this plane and get another

one later,” you know. Just – 

Q. When you were in the jetway this – this second time, did – did Castro raise,

speak in a raised tone of voice to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he shouting?

A. He was loud, yes. I mean, he wasn’t whispering, “I can make you get off.” 

No. He was saying that in – in voluminous tones.

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(Amber Triguero Depo. at 44-47).

Neither Barbara nor Amber manifest any sense of fear for their safety or anticipate some

form of physical violence but rather, both express surprise at Castro Spear’s alleged rudeness

and unprofessional behavior. Even reading the deposition testimony broadly, as a matter of law,

there was no threat of violence made against plaintiffs.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning

whether defendant’s actions, in this case, speech alone, show threats, intimidation, or coercion,

as those terms are commonly understood, that interfered with plaintiff’s constitutional rights

because there was no threat of violence. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is granted.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part

defendant’s motion for summary judgment [doc. #19]: the motion is denied as to plaintiffs’

Uhruh claim but granted as to all other causes of action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the

parties shall jointly contact Magistrate Judge Battaglia’s chambers, within five days of the filing

of this Order, to obtain a mandatory settlement conference date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

setting September 24, 2007 at 11:00 a.m. for the Final Pretrial Conference. IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that the parties shall jointly file a proposed pretrial order on or before September

17, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 29, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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