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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UIIITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LARRY DEAN TURNER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Co'.lrt of Appeals 

TP.nth ~irttllit 

MAY 2 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-6341 

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION; 

JACK COWLEY 1 Warden; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1 

Respondents-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Ho. CIV-89-3-T) 

Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado, (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado, with her on the briefs) for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Larry Dean Turner, Lexington, Oklahoma, filed pro-se brief. 

M. Kent Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma (Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney and Vicki 

Zemp Behenna, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before AHDBRSOH, BALDOCK, and BBBL, Circuit Judges. 

AHDBRSOH, Circuit Judge. 

The central issue in this case is whether the United States 

Parole Commission had authority to issue a second parole violator 

warrant based upon appellant's felony conviction in state court, 

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when the Commission had previously executed a parole violator warrant, considered the underlying facts in the state charge, and had 

reinstated the appellant to supervision. The district court, in 

an able and detailed opinion, held that the Parole Commission 

properly issued the second warrant, and denied appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2241. We 

fully agree with the district court's analysis of the case, and 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Larry Turner was paroled on December 27, 1983, from a 15-year 

federal sentence for conspiracy and procuring another to commit 

perjury. On June 15, 1987, he was arrested and charged by 

Oklahoma state authorities with knowingly concealing stolen 

property. As a result of that charge, on July 2, 1987, the United 

States Parole Commission ("Parole Commission" or "Commission") 

issued a parole violator warrant, pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 4213, 

charging Turner with knowingly concealing stolen property (a 

bulldozer), as well as failing to report his state arrest to his 

federal probation officer within two days of the arrest. United 

States Marshals executed the warrant on July 8, 1987. Turner was 

taken into federal custody and transferred to the federal facility 

at El Reno, Oklahoma. Parole revocation proceedings pursuant to 

18 u.s.c. § 4214(a)(1) 1 followed. 

1 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1) provides that, once retaken, analleged parole violator must be accorded: 

(A) a preliminary hearing at or reasonably near the 

[footnote continued] 

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On July 10, Turner's parole officer conducted a preliminary 

interview with Turner at F.C.I. El Reno and determined that there 

was probable cause to believe that Turner had violated the conditions of his parole. On July 28, 1987, Turner was notified by 

letter that the Parole Commission had found probable cause to 

believe that he had violated his conditions of parole, and a 

revocation hearing was ordered. The specific charges set forth 

against Turner were the state felony offense and Turner's failure 

to report his arrest on the offense. Turner was then ordered 

transferred to the F.C.I. Texarkana for purposes of the revocation 

hearing, as well as for confinement if his parole was revoked. On 

September 16, 1987, a Parole Commission hearing panel conducted a 

revocation hearing, even though the state charge was still pending. 

The summary from the revocation hearing reflects that Turner 

appeared with counsel and testified in his own behalf. He admitted that he failed to report his arrest, but denied concealing 

[footnote continued) 

place of the alleged parole violation or arrest, without 

unnecessary delay, to determine if there is probable 

cause to believe that he has violated a condition of his 

parole; and upon a finding of probable cause a digest 

shall be prepared by the Commission setting forth in 

writing the factors considered and the reasons for the 

decision, a copy of which shall be given to the parolee 

within a reasonable period of time . . . . 

(B) upon a finding of probable cause under subparagraph (1)(A), a revocation hearing at or reasonably 

near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest 

within sixty days of such determination of probable 

cause except that a revocation hearing may be held at 

the same time and place set for the preliminary hearing. 

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stolen property. Following its review of the evidence, the panel 

found that Turner had violated his parole conditions by failing to 

report his arrest, but that the violation was insufficient to 

revoke parole. As to the felony charge, the panel concluded that, 

due to a number of inconsistencies in the testimony, there was 

"not sufficient evidence to support a preponderance finding." R. 

Vol. I, Tab 12, Exh. 9 at 7. The panel then recommended "that no 

decision be made on the knowingly concealing stolen property. It 

is recognized that this charge continues to be in limbo in state 

court and that additional information may be developed in form of 

a later conviction." Id. On October 5, 1987, the regional commissioner issued a Notice of Action stating that there was no 

finding sufficient for revocation and ordering Turner's reinstatement to parole forthwith. On the same date, the Parole Commission 

authorized the warden of the F.C.I. Texarkana to release Turner. 

He was released from federal custody on October 6, 1987 and taken 

into custody by state authorities. 

The following month, Turner was tried and convicted in state 

court on the knowingly concealing stolen property charge, and was 

subsequently sentenced to 20 years in state prison as required by 

Oklahoma law relating to defendants who have prior convictions. 

The Parole Commission was notified of Turner's conviction on 

December 7, 1987. Based on that conviction, the Commission then 

issued a second parole violator warrant. The Commission directed 

the United States Marshal not to execute this warrant, but to 

place it as a detainer against Turner while he served his state 

court sentence, and assume his custody after he is released from 

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that sentence. R. Vol. I, Tab 12, Exh. 16. After a dispositional 

record review on February 15, 1989, the Commission determined that 

the detainer should stand. R. Vol. I, Tab 12, Exh. 26. 

Turner unsuccessfully appealed that determination, then filed 

this habeas action in the district court. Because of the 

substantial questions raised in Turner's petition, we authorized 

the appointment of the federal public defender to represent Turner 

on appeal. We have been furnished with an excellent brief by the 

public defender, and briefs by Turner as well. 

The Parole Commission's decisions to grant or revoke parole 

will be reversed only if they are arbitrary, capricious or 

constitute an abuse of discretion. Misasi v. United States Parole 

Comm'n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (lOth Cir. 1987). However, the question 

of whether a Parole Commission's action lies within the permissible scope of the Commission's authority is a question of law to 

be reviewed de novo. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (lOth 

Cir. 1986) (review de novo where resolution of issue depends 

primarily on consideration of legal principles);~ Still v. 

United States Marshal, 780 F.2d 848 (lOth Cir. 1985); Maslauskas 

v. United States Bd. of Parole, 639 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1980). Our 

task is to interpret the statutory provisions and set aside the 

Commission's actions if, in light of the whole record, they are 

"in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, 

or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) (1977) (applicable to the Parole Commission under 18 u.s.c. § 4218(c)). 

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DISCUSSION 

The sole issue before us is whether the second warrant falls 

within the Parole Commission's statutory authority. 

In 1976, Congress established the Parole Commission under the 

Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 ("Act"), 18 

u.s.c. §§ 4201, et seq., 2 and set forth the factors and procedures 

governing the parole of federal prisoners. Within these statutory 

constraints, Congress granted the Parole Commission wide, 

discretionary authority to grant or revoke parole. S. Rep. No. 

369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976) ("[parole] is a matter of 

administrative discretion"); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 

1539, 1544-46 (9th Cir. 1986) (en bane); Taylor v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 734 F.2d 1152, 1155 (6th Cir. 1984); Timpani v. 

Sizer, 732 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1984); Stroud v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 668 F.2d 843, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1982); see 18 u.s.c. 

§ 4206(c) (for good cause, Commission may grant or deny release 

notwithstanding statutory guidelines governing release); 18 u.s.c. 

§§ 4214(a)(1)(A), (d) (within Commission's discretion to determine 

which action to take after finding that parolee violated parole 

conditions). 

The Act is silent as to the question of whether a second warrant may be issued on the same underlying violation of law for 

which a previous warrant has been executed and a revocation hearing has been held. Turner seizes on this silence as dispositive, 

2 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201, et seq., were repealed, effective November 

1, 1986, but continued in effect for five years after such date 

for those individuals, like Turner, who had been convicted of an 

offense before the effective date. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 

2027 ( 1984) 0 

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contending that our decision in Still v. United States Marshal, 

780 F.2d 848 (lOth Cir. 1985), establishes that the Commission is 

empowered to do only those acts expressly authorized by 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 4213 and 4214. We disagree. 

In Still, a parole violator warrant was issued and executed, 

and a preliminary interview held at which the Parole Commission 

found probable cause that Still had violated his parole. 

Thereafter, the Commission attempted to withdraw the parole violator warrant and to hold the warrant in abeyance pending the 

outcome of state charges upon which the parole violator warrant 

was based. 

The issue in Still was "whether the Commission may defer a 

parole revocation hearing by withdrawing a previously executed 

parole violator warrant." Id. at 851. We held that "the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in withdrawing the parole 

violator warrant and therefore delaying petitioner's revocation 

hearing ••.. " Id. at 853. That holding was based upon the 

majority's view that once a parolee is retaken by virtue of the 

execution of the parole violator warrant, the Act's procedural 

requirements are triggered and must be observed. Id. at 851. 

This view finds its basis in the due process safeguards announced 

in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471 (1972), which were codified 

in the Act. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court held that a parolee 

may not be deprived of his conditional liberty through the execution of a parole violator warrant, without the basic due process 

safeguards of notice, prompt hearing, counsel, confrontation, and 

the opportunity to present evidence. 

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While Still stands for the proposition that once taken into 

custody a parolee is entitled to the hearing procedures provided 

under the Act, it does not address whether or not full scale 

proceedings in accordance with the Act may be instituted twice 

with respect to the same underlying state criminal charge. Turner 

argues that Still impliedly reaches that question by stating, in 

dicta: 

We believe that a restrictive reading of the Act is 

mandated by the well-established principle of statutory 

construction that, in the absence of clearly expressed 

legislative intent, a statute should be construed to 

avoid difficult constitutional issues. In our view, a 

broad construction of the Act would raise serious due 

process questions in light of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 

u.s. 471, 92 s.ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 

Still v. United States, 780 F.2d at 851 (citations omitted). 

Contrary to Turner's position, our general statement in Still 

with respect to interpretations of the statute does not, and cannot, attempt to establish a rule that the Parole Commission is 

powerless to do anything not explicitly spelled out in the Act. 

For example, as Judge Logan pointed out in his dissent in Still, 

there is no express provision in the parole statutes for delay of 

execution of an issued warrant. Id. at 854 (Logan, J., dissenting). Despite this, the Supreme Court in Moody v. Daggett, 429 

u.s. 78 (1976), expressly held that the Parole Commission could 

issue a warrant against an incarcerated parole violator without 

executing it promptly and without triggering the right to a hearing. "The Moody Court held that the lack of an express provision 

in the statute and the general due process hearing rights found 

earlier for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471, 92 

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s.ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), did not require a contrary 

decision." Id. (Logan, J., dissenting). 

Nor, as Turner suggests, does Maslauskas v. United States Bd. 

of Parole, 639 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1980), address this situation. 

In Maslauskas, on an executed warrant, the Board "unqualifiedly" 

ordered that the parolee be reinstated to parole. On the same 

day, however, the Commission issued a second warrant, identical to 

the first, and lodged a detainer following the parolee's plea of 

guilty and sentencing on state charges. The court held that the 

Commission was without authority to issue the second warrant, but 

acknowledged that it did not address the type of question 

presented here, i.e., "whether the Board would have had the 

authority to issue a second warrant had its first order provided 

only for conditional reinstatement subject to reconsideration following the disposition of the underlying state charge." 

Maslauskas v. United States Bd. of Parole, 639 F.2d at 939 n.15. 

The panel, in this case, did condition Turner's reinstatement. At 

Turner's revocation hearing, the Parole Commission explicitly 

declined to make a decision on the alleged violation, stating that 

the facts were indeterminate as to Turner's knowing concealment of 

stolen property. The Commission then reinstated Turner to supervision pending the production of more conclusive evidence in the 

form of a state court conviction. 3 

3 The absence of any specific, conditional statement in the 

Notice of Action reinstating Turner to supervision is not 

determinative of the terms of the reinstatement or the 

Commission's findings. The record, as a whole, indicates that 

Turner's reinstatement was conditional. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (court 

shall review whole record in determining whether agency action is 

in excess of statutory authority). 

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Furthermore, in both Still and Maslauskas, no new evidence 

supported the issuance of a second warrant. Rather the second 

warrant was issued solely in anticipation of the trial court's 

verdict, on the same day as, or soon after, the withdrawal of the 

first warrant. In Turner's situation, however, the Commission 

issued the second warrant based on the new evidence of a state 

court conviction. The conviction alone established probable cause 

to issue a warrant. 18 u.s.c. § 4214(b)(l); S. Rep. No. 369, 94th 

Cong., 2d Sess. 26 ("By being convicted of a new offense, the 

parolee has violated the only mandatory parole condition.") 

(emphasis added). No provision in the Act indicates that the issuance of a warrant under§ 4214(b)(l) is an alternative, rather 

than an additional, manner of proceeding when the parolee is 

charged with a criminal offense. Nor does any provision foreclose 

the possibility of issuing a new warrant upon the production of 

new persuasive evidence of a violation. 

Turner also cites to the express options listed in 28 C.F.R. 

§ 2.44(b) 4 as the exclusive authorization for proceeding on parole 

violation warrants. We disagree. 

4 The regulation states, in relevant part: 

Issuance of a summons or warrant may be withheld until 

the frequency or seriousness of violations, in the 

opinion of the Commission, requires such issuance. In 

the case of any parolee charged with a criminal offense 

and awaiting disposition of the charge, issuance of a 

summons or warrant may be withheld, a warrant may be 

issued and held in abeyance, or a warrant may be issued 

and a detainer may be placed. 

28 C.F.R. § 2.44(b). 

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While the regulation explicitly grants authority to delay 

both the issuance and execution of the warrant for parolees 

charged with a crime, neither requires that the Commission take 

one of the listed actions. Rather, the provisions are permissive-

-the Commission "may" delay issuance of the warrant or issue it 

and then hold it in abeyance or place a detainer. See Moody v. 

Daggett, 429 u.s. 78 (1976). The enumerated options should not be 

read to limit the Parole Commission's discretion to take other 

necessary measures. 

To determine whether the issuance of the second warrant falls 

within Congress's intended scope of authority, we must read the 

entire statute in light of its underlying purposes and policies. 

See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1544-46, 1550-52 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (en bane); Trailways, Inc. v. I.C.C., 727 F.2d 1284, 

1289 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

Congress intended that the Commission exercise broad discretion utilizing a variety of tools to ensure that parole decisions 

are based on consideration of all relevant information. H.R. 

Conf. Rep. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20. A parolee's conviction subsequent to release is an important, and arguably necessary, factor in determining whether to revoke parole. 18 u.s.c. 

§ 4214(d); Moody v. Daggett, 429 u.s. at 89 (parolee's recent 

convictions are one of the most salient factors in making final 

decision concerning parole revocation). Turner's interpretation 

prohibits the analysis of this important evidence in making a 

"prediction as to the ability of (Turner] to live in society 

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without committing antisocial acts." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 

u.s. at 480, quoted in Moody v. Daggett, 427 U.S. at 89. 

Congress has clearly expressed its intent that the Commission 

should deny parole if a parolee's release would "jeopardize the 

public welfare." 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a)(2) (1976); s. Rep. No. 369, 

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (release of prisoner on parole must be 

"compatible with the general welfare of society"); id. at 18-19 

(parole system requires a recognition of the "responsibility for 

the protection of the larger society"); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 838, 

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 ("parole is the agency responsible for 

keeping in prison those who because of the need for accountability 

to society or for the protection of society must be retained in 

prison"). This major concern for public safety also underlies the 

Commission's authority to revoke parole. 

To find for Turner would substantially impair the 

Commission's ability to effectuate its congressional mandate to 

protect the public by restricting its discretion in initiating 

revocation proceedings and precluding it from reviewing all 

relevant evidence in making its final decisions. Turner's 

interpretation would force the Commission to forego any action on 

an issued warrant until after the state trial in order to preserve 

its authority to consider revocation in light of the court's 

verdict. It would prevent the Commission from taking the necessary steps to review a parolee's conduct as "soon as practicable 

after discovery of the alleged violation," 18 u.s.c. § 4213(b), to 

determine whether continued parole, pending the state trial, would 

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"jeopardize the public welfare." 18 u.s.c. § 4206(a); see also 18 

u.s.c. § 4209(a). 

In addition, such a restrictive interpretation would not 

generally benefit the parolee. Rather it would often work to 

prematurely, and perhaps unnecessarily, deprive the parolee of his 

liberty by forcing the Commission to resolve all doubts in favor 

of revocation at an early stage. Such a "restrictive approach 

would result in the revocation of parole in some situations in 

which later developments would bring about a different result." 

Franklin v. Fenton, 642 F.2d 760, 763 (3d Cir. 1980). We decline 

to support a reading of the statute which would effectively 

deprive the Commission of its ability to protect the public and 

could also result in unnecessary deprivation of parolee's liberty. 

Turner next contends that the Commission should disregard the 

state court conviction since certain evidence that the Commission 

viewed in its first revocation hearing was not presented to the 

jury, and the revocation hearing was, in essence, more fair than 

his trial. Specifically, Turner's counsel advised him not to 

testify at trial to avoid exposure of his prior criminal record, 

so the jury did not have Turner's version of the incident, whereas 

the Commission did. 

The Commission need not look behind the face of the conviction itself to review the evidence produced at trial or to 

determine the correctness of the jury's decision. We fully 

understand and sympathize with Turner's feeling that the state 

proceedings have dealt with him in an unusually harsh manner. 

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However, those are questions for the state appellate courts. 5 The 

Commission may take the conviction on its face as evidence of 

Turner's violation of the conditions of his parole and review the 

conviction, along with all other relevant evidence Turner wishes 

to submit, including his testimony, in making an independent 

determination whether to revoke parole. 6 Moody v. Daggett, 429 

u.s. 78 (1976) (permit Commission to consider events occurring 

after the issuance of the warrant); see Franklin v. Fenton, 642 

F.2d at 762-63; Thigpen v. United States Parole Comm'n, 707 F.2d 

973, 977 (7th Cir. 1983). 

Turner contended below, although he does not urge it on appeal, that double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and res judicata 

prevent the Parole Commission from holding two revocation hearings. However, "it is well-established that double jeopardy does 

5 Mr. Turner has pursued his claims of injustice in federal 

habeas corpus proceedings. We have recently concluded that no 

federal constitutional violations occurred in his state trial. 

Turner v. Cowley, No. 90-6296, (lOth Cir., April __ , 1991) (unpub. 

op.) • 

6 Turner argues that the "fact of his conviction does not 

necessarily mean that the Commission should now make a finding of 

guilt . . • . [O]ther information known to the Commission should 

outweigh a finding of guilt in a state trial for purposes of 

parole revocation." Appellant's Brief at 16. This argument is 

premature. The Commission has not yet determined whether the 

parolee has indeed violated his parole. That conclusion will 

result from the revocation hearing to be held after Turner's 

release from state prison. The Commission has made no indication 

that it will not review all the evidence, including Turner's 

testimony at that hearing, or that it will not reinstate Turner to 

supervision. 

Turner also contends that he should not be forced to serve 

his parole term in installments. This, too, is not ripe for 

adjudication since Turner's parole may not be revoked and he may 

never have to serve additional federal time. See Lake Carriers' 

Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) (court will review only 

actual controversies of "sufficient immediacy and reality"). 

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not apply to substantially identical parole . . . revocation hearings." United States v. Marmolejo, 915 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 

1990) (citing Garcia v. United States, 769 F.2d 697, 700 (11th 

Cir. 1985); Priore v. Nelson, 626 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1980); 

Thompson v. Reivitz, 746 F.2d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 471 u.s. 1103 (1985)). Nor do collateral estoppel or res 

judicata bar a second revocation hearing since, as the district 

court correctly noted, "the arguments under these facts would be 

essentially the same as a double jeopardy argument." R. Tab 19 at 

13-14; see United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 

1986); Thompson v. Reivitz, 746 F.2d at 400. Furthermore, 

Turner's argument fails because the Parole Commission panel never 

concluded the first hearing. Rather it reserved a final 

determination on revocation until after the state trial. Thus, 

there was no final judgment at the first hearing and the panel's 

refusal to revoke parole did not collaterally estop a future hearing on the same alleged acts. 

Turner has also filed a motion to supplement the record on 

appeal. Since we do not find that the record would be benefited 

by additional information, we deny his motion. 

CONCLUSION 

We hold that the Parole Commission has not exceeded its 

statutory authority in issuing a second parole violator warrant on 

the same underlying parole violation when, at the first revocation 

hearing, it made no conclusive finding on the violation and 

conditionally reinstated the parolee to supervision and where the 

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second warrant was based on the new evidence of a state court 

conviction. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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