Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00070/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Natacha Elizabeth Ruiz,

Plaintiff,

v.

Commissioner of Social Security

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-00070-PHX-DMF

ORDER

At issue is Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for Title II disability 

insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”). Plaintiff (“Claimant”) filed a 

Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking judicial review of the denial, and the Court now considers 

Claimant’s Opening Brief (Doc. 14), Defendant’s Response (Doc. 17), Claimant’s Reply 

(Doc. 18), and the Administrative Record (Doc. 13, “R.”). This Court has jurisdiction 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and with the parties’ consent to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will 

order the final decision of the Commissioner to be vacated and will remand this matter to 

the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

I. BACKGROUND

Claimant filed her application on December 17, 2014, alleging disability beginning 

March 28, 2014 (later amended to February 18, 2015), and was denied initially on July 9, 

2015,

1

and upon reconsideration on January 26, 2016. (R. at 10, 102) Claimant requested 

1 The ALJ misstates this date as July 1, 2000 in his decision. (R. at 10.) The correct date 

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a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was held on December 8, 

2017. (Id. at 10.) On April 18, 2018, the ALJ issued his decision finding Claimant not 

disabled (Id. at 10-19), which was upheld by the Appeals Council on November 8, 2018 

(Id. at 1-3). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found Claimant had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”):

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). She can 

occasionally climb ramps, stairs, and ladders but never ladders,2ropes or 

scaffolds. She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She can 

frequently reach, handle, fingers, and feel bilaterally. She must avoid 

concentrated exposure to hazards, including unprotected heights and moving 

machinery.

(Id. at 15) In support of these findings, the ALJ stated:

The residual functional capacity reached herein is supported by the objective 

medical evidence, the clinical findings, the longitudinal treatment record, the 

claimant’s activities of daily living and observations from treating and 

examining physicians. The claimant’s back condition, chronic pain and other 

conditions reasonably limit her to light work activity with additional postural, 

manipulative and environmental limitations. This is consistent with the 

findings and opinion of the consultative examiner and supported by the 

opinion of reviewing physicians. It is also consistent with the claimant’s 

reported and observed activity levels.

(Id. at 18)

In formulating the RFC, the ALJ gave “greater weight” to the opinions of nonexamining state agency consultative physicians, and only “little weight” to the opinions of 

Claimant’s treating physician. (Id. at 18.) The ALJ also discounted Claimant’s subjective 

pain and symptom testimony. (Id. at 16.) A vocational expert (“VE”) testified that an 

individual with the above RFC could perform past relevant work as a caseworker or 

receptionist. (Id. at 83.) The ALJ found Claimant not disabled based on this testimony.

(R. at 18.)

is found in R. at 102.

2 The ALJ appears to have made a typographical error here. When the ALJ posed the 

hypothetical RFC to the VE, he stated the individual could “occasionally climb[] ramps or 

stairs and ladders,” but could “never climb any ropes or scaffolds.” (R. at 82-83.)

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Claimant brings this appeal alleging the ALJ committed materially harmful errors 

in weighing the medical opinion evidence and discounting Claimant’s subjective pain and 

symptom testimony. (Doc. 14 at 1-2) Claimant states that this appeal “focuses on [her] 

spinal impairment.” (Id. at 3.) Thus, the Court will limit its review to substantial evidence 

and errors in the ALJ’s analysis regarding Claimant’s spinal impairments.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that a 

reviewing court may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, with or 

without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The district court reviews only those issues 

raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the decision only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.

2007). “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is 

relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion 

considering the record as a whole. Id.; see also Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1067 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he key question is not whether there is substantial evidence that could 

support a finding of disability, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

Commissioner’s actual finding that claimant is not disabled.”). The Court “must consider 

the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of 

supporting evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. “Where the evidence is susceptible to more 

than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 

conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled” under the Act, the ALJ employs a 

five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The burden of proof is on the claimant 

for the first four steps but shifts to the ALJ at the fifth step. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 

1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the claimant must show she is not presently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, she must show she 

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suffers from a “severe medically determinable” impairment(s). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

Third, she must show that the impairment meets or equals an impairment in appendix 1 of 

subpart P of 20 C.F.R § 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). However, if the claimant fails to 

satisfy step three, she can still make out a prima facie case of disability at step four by 

showing she is unable to perform any past relevant work and by meeting steps one and two. 

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ determines if the claimant met step four by assessing 

the claimant’s RFC. Id. At the fifth and final step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show 

that the claimant is able to perform other work that exists in the national economy based 

on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

404.1560(c)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

Claimant argues the ALJ committed materially harmful error by: (1) rejecting the 

medical source statements of Claimant’s treating primary care physician, instead granting 

“greater weight” to the opinions of two non-examining consultative state agency reviewing 

physicians (Doc. 14 at 1); and (2) rejecting Claimant’s pain and fatigue symptoms without 

providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 

record (Id. at 1-2). Each argument is addressed in turn.

A. The ALJ erred in rejecting Claimant’s treating physician’s medical 

opinions without providing specific, legitimate reasons

Claimant alleges the ALJ erred in rejecting her treating physician’s assessments, 

instead assigning greater weight to the opinions of state agency reviewers who neither 

examined her nor reviewed the entire medical record. (Doc. 14 at 8)

In assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must evaluate each medical opinion in the 

record, assign a weight to each, and resolve any conflicts or ambiguities between them. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, 

opinions of treating physicians are entitled to the greatest weight; opinions of examining, 

non-treating physicians are entitled to lesser weight; and opinions of non-examining 

physicians are entitled to the least weight. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. If an ALJ is to 

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depart from this hierarchy, the ALJ must articulate “specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence” when crediting the opinion of a non-examining 

physician over a controverted one of a treating physician. Id.

In determining how much weight to give any medical opinion, the ALJ considers 

whether the physician examined the claimant; the length, nature, and extent of the treatment 

relationship (if any); the degree of support the opinion has, particularly from medical signs 

and laboratory findings; the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; the 

physician’s specialization; and “other factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(c)(6). An 

ALJ satisfies the “substantial evidence” requirement by providing a “detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating [her] interpretation thereof, 

and making findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. The “opinion of a non-examining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the 

opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the “opinions of non-treating or non-examining 

physicians may [] serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with 

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957.

Claimant’s treating primary care physician, Dr. Kumar Daulat, completed 

assessment forms on February 18, 20153(R. at 379-381) and again on June 1, 20164(Id. at 

3 Dr. Daulat opined that Claimant could sit, stand, or walk for 3 hours. She could be on 

her feet for 15-20 minutes at a time. She could lift up to 10 pounds “frequently” (66% of 

workday) and 11-20 pounds occasionally (33% of workday). She could carry up to 5 

pounds “frequently” and 6-10 pounds “occasionally.” She could “rarely” (0-5% of 

workday) stoop, squat, crawl, climb, or reach. She could “continuously” (>66% of 

workday) grasp, push or pull controls, and perform fine manipulations. She could not use 

her feet for repetitive movements or pushing leg controls. She had “total” restrictions 

regarding unprotected heights, “moderate” restrictions regarding occupational driving and 

exposure to marked changes in temperature or humidity, and “mild” restrictions with being 

around moving machinery. She had “moderately severe” (11-15% off task) limitations due 

to pain.

4 Dr. Daulat’s assessment was that Claimant could sit, stand, or walk for 2 hours or less. 

She could carry and lift: up to 5 pounds “continuously” (>66% of workday), 6-10 pounds 

“frequently” (66% of workday), and 11-20 pounds “occasionally” (33% of workday). She 

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640-642), in which he opined on Claimant’s capacity to perform “work related activities.” 

These assessment forms called for Dr. Daulat to check appropriate boxes indicating 

Claimant’s ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, and use her hands and feet for work related 

activities. (Id. at 379-381, 640-642.) The forms also had Dr. Daulat assess Claimant’s 

limitations due to environmental conditions in the workplace and work related limitations 

as a result of Claimant’s pain and fatigue. (Id.)

The ALJ accorded Dr. Daulat’s assessments “little weight,” finding them “not 

supported by the greater record” and “not consistent with [Claimant’s] reported activity 

levels.” (Id. at 18.) The ALJ noted that “Dr. Daulat’s own progress notes show [Claimant] 

reported maintaining normal activities of daily living.” (Id.) The ALJ also stated that 

because Dr. Daulat is a family practitioner, he was “less qualified to assess [Claimant’s] 

physical capacity.” (Id.)

The Court concludes the ALJ’s reasons provided in his decision are not specific and 

legitimate. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. The ALJ provided no explanation of how “the 

greater record” conflicted with Dr. Daulat’s assessments, citing only to a single treatment 

record. The ALJ’s subsequent statement that Dr. Daulat’s assessments were inconsistent 

with Claimant’s “reported activity level” was similarly unsupported. The ALJ omitted any 

explanation of what evidence of Claimant’s reported activities conflicted with which 

portions of Dr. Daulat’s assessments. This lack of specificity is legal error. See Burrell v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014).

The sole record citation provided by the ALJ to indicate lack of support in the 

greater record for Dr. Daulat’s assessments was to a treatment record containing the

notation that Claimant’s “[f]unctional” capacity included “[n]ormal activities of daily 

could “rarely” (0-5% of workday) stoop, squat, crawl, climb, or reach. She could 

“frequently” handle/grip or grasp, “frequently” finger and perform fine manipulations, and 

“occasionally” push or pull controls. She could use her feet for repetitive movements or 

pushing leg controls. She had “moderate” restrictions regarding unprotected heights; 

occupational driving; and exposure to dust, fumes, and gases. She had “mild” restrictions 

with regards to being around moving machinery. She had “moderate” (10% off task) 

limitations due to pain and fatigue.

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living.” (R. at 419, cited in the ALJ decision as “(7F/37)”) However, that same description 

of Claimant’s functional capacity also contained Dr. Daulat’s contradictory statements that 

Claimant was “[n]ot able to perform usual physical activities for age,” and the doctor’s 

descriptions of Claimant’s specific limitations, including that she was only able to walk a 

block before suffering leg cramps, she was not able to stand for more than 20 minutes “in 

rotation,” could sit for no more than 20 minutes at a time, could not lift more than 2 

kilograms, and was subject to an unspecified limitation in driving. (Id.) The ALJ’s

unexplained reliance on a single note in Claimant’s treatment records by Dr. Daulat to the 

exclusion of other conflicting notations in the same section of the same treatment record 

runs afoul of the prohibition recognized by the Ninth Circuit against an ALJ “cherrypicking” evidence favorable to a finding of non-disability instead of considering that 

evidence “in the context of “diagnoses and observations of impairment.” Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014).

Further, the ALJ failed to address how Claimant’s ability to perform household 

related activities would transfer to an ability to carry out the requirements of full-time work 

identified in the RFC. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “daily activities may be 

grounds for an adverse credibility finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part 

of [her] day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are 

transferable to a work setting.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation 

omitted). However, “the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities does 

not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” Id. (quotation and 

alteration omitted). The ALJ did not inquire of Claimant at her hearing or detail in his 

findings the frequency or duration of Claimant’s referenced activities of daily living and 

failed to explain how Claimant’s ability to perform such activities of daily living 

transferred to a work setting. “We have repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially 

cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, 

because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a 

workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed 

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all day.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016.

The ALJ also discounted Dr. Daulat’s opinions because he found Dr. Daulat to be 

“less qualified” as a family practitioner “to assess [Claimant’s] physical capacity.” (R. at 

18.) Without any explanation for this conclusion, the ALJ’s statement is not a proper 

reason for rejecting Dr. Daulat’s opinions. Title 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) instructs how an 

ALJ weighs medical opinions, factoring in such considerations as whether the medical 

opinion source has examined a claimant, the nature and length of the treatment relationship 

between the medical opinion source and the claimant, how well-supported a medical

opinion is, consistency between a medical opinion and the claimant’s record, and the 

specialization of the medical opinion source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). The ALJ 

gave the opinions of two state agency non-examining consultative physicians “greater 

weight” in his decision. (R. at 18) The ALJ concluded without explanation that these 

opinions “were not inconsistent with the greater objective record, particularly regarding 

their finding that . . . [Claimant was] limited to less than the full range of light work activity, 

with . . . limitations, to the extent they support the residual functional capacity.” (Id.)

When an ALJ does not accord a treating source’s opinion controlling weight, § 

404.1527 provides that “[w]e will always give good reasons in our notice of determination 

or decision for the weight we give your treating source's medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). Here, the ALJ omitted any specific explanation of why he concluded the 

opinions of the two consultative non-examining reviewing physicians, both of whom were 

identified as specialists in internal medicine, should be accorded greater weight than those 

of Dr. Daulat, Claimant’s longtime primary care physician. The ALJ did not discuss or 

otherwise document application of the § 404.1527(c) factors. The ALJ’s reasons for giving 

greater weight to the opinions of the non-examining state agency medical reviewers failed 

to set out “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,” 

and the ALJ neither specified the relevant “conflicting clinical evidence” nor made findings 

in support of his summary conclusions. Accordingly, the ALJ erred by failing to 

adequately support his decision to reject the medical assessments of treating physician Dr. 

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Daulat and to instead rely on the opinions of non-examining physicians.

For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions 

of treating physician Daulat and in according “greater weight” to the opinions of nonexamining state agency medical reviewers.

B. The ALJ erred in rejecting Claimant’s symptom testimony

Claimant alleges the ALJ erred in rejecting her symptom testimony by failing to 

articulate specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 

record as whole. (Doc. 14 at 16) For the reasons provided below, the Court agrees.

“Because symptoms sometimes suggest a greater severity of impairment than can 

be shown by objective medical evidence alone,” the ALJ also considers a claimant’s 

subjective statements in determining the extent to which her impairments diminish her 

capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). “At the same time, the ALJ is not ‘required 

to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available 

for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).’” See Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 

(9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, before evaluating a claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ must 

first determine whether the claimant has presented “objective medical evidence” of an 

“impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Next, the ALJ evaluates 

the alleged “intensity and persistence” of the symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). 

Since pain and symptoms “are subjective and difficult to quantify,” a claimant’s pain and 

symptoms will only be determined to diminish a claimant’s work capacity to the extent that 

they can be “reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and 

other evidence.” Id. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(3). However, a claimant’s testimony “cannot be 

rejected solely because the objective medical evidence does not support the severity of her 

impairment.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

Unless there is evidence of malingering by the claimant, an ALJ may only discredit

pain or symptom testimony for reasons that are specific, clear, and convincing. Garrison, 

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759 F.3d at 1014-15. The Court reviews “only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the 

disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [s]he did not 

rely.” Id. at 1010. General findings pertaining to a claimant’s credibility are not sufficient. 

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, “the ALJ must 

specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what 

evidence undermines the testimony.” Id. In doing so, the ALJ need not engage in 

“extensive” analysis but should, at the very least, “provide some reasoning in order for [a 

reviewing court] to meaningfully determine whether [her] conclusions were supported by 

substantial evidence.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.

The ALJ may consider “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as 

the client’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, 

and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1996)); see 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). Additionally, while a “lack of medical evidence cannot form 

the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in [the] 

credibility analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, the ALJ cited no evidence of malingering and found Claimant had underlying 

impairments, which were severe in combination: (a) degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine; (b) status post fusion with failed back syndrome and 

sacroiliitis; (c) chronic pain syndrome; (d) irritable bowel syndrome; and (e) 

gastroesophageal reflux disease. (R. at 12) However, the ALJ discounted Claimant’s 

testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, 

finding it “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Id. at 16.)

First, the ALJ cited that Claimant had moved more than one time since her alleged 

onset date, including flying back to Chicago in order to close a mortgage; had sold 

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triplexes; and is active on her cellphone. (Id.) He reasoned that this evidence demonstrated 

“good cognitive functioning.” (Id.) Since the ALJ did not relate this evidence to 

Claimant’s spinal impairment, the subject of this appeal, the Court will not address this 

reason.

The ALJ also cites to the fact that Claimant underwent three lumbar spine surgeries, 

but then returned to work after each. (Id. at 17.) The Court does not find this reason 

convincing for two reasons. First, as noted by the ALJ, these surgeries were performed in 

2006, 2008, and 2010; thus, there is a significant time gap of five years between the last 

surgery and the alleged date of disability (February 18, 2015), which reduces the probative 

value of this evidence. (Id. at 16.) Second, despite these surgeries, Claimant still needed 

required extensive pain management. In fact, the ALJ states, “[Claimant] has experienced 

chronic back pain despite the surgeries and required opioid pain medication for many 

years.” (Id.) He further notes that in 2014 Claimant had a pain stimulator put in that was 

later removed due to worsening of the pain. (Id.) Moreover, he notes that Claimant

engaged in physical therapy and received epidural injections. (Id.) A treating physician 

assistant wrote on June 25, 2015, “[Claimant] has been through several injections and the 

spinal cord stimulatory in the past without adequate pain relief.” (R. at 585.) Because of 

this, the physician assistant arranged for Claimant to meet with the physician to discuss 

further interventional treatments. (Id. at 585.) Thus, the ALJ’s citation to Claimant

returning to work years before the alleged onset date does nothing to discredit her 

testimony regarding her pain and symptoms as of the alleged onset date.

The ALJ also noted that Claimant was “somewhat reluctant” to discuss her daily 

activities and “appeared guarded in her response to related questioning.” (Id. at 17.) The 

ALJ does not explicitly state that he disbelieved her because of these observations, nor did 

the ALJ cite any evidence of malingering. In any case, the Court does not find these 

observations and opinions concerning Claimant’s behavior sufficiently “clear and 

convincing” to warrant discount of her testimony. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 

594 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Sheer disbelief is no substitute for substantial evidence.”).

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The ALJ also found that Claimant “is functionally independent and maintains 

normal daily activities.” (R. at 17.) He noted that she drives a vehicle to shop and attend 

medical appointments, performs domestic chores, is independent in personal care, “surfs 

the internet,” and watches TV. (Id.) He further noted Claimant “does not require a cane 

or other assistive device despite her claim that she cannot stand or walk for more than 20 

minutes at a time.” (Id.) The ALJ concluded that “[t]hese activity levels are otherwise 

consistent with the restrictions and limitations outlined in the residual functional capacity.”

(Id.)

At the hearing, Claimant testified she has to alter positions because of her pain at 

night and that she then needs to nap four or five times during the day for between a half 

hour and an hour, depending on when her “pain comes back.” (Id. at 68.) She said she 

could wash dishes, although it took her a while, did not wash laundry but was able to put 

laundered clothes on hangers, and was able to dress and feed herself. (Id. at 64-65.)

Claimant stated she could walk back and forth in front of her house but was unable to do 

any yardwork. (Id. at 65) Claimant testified she could stand for up to 20 minutes at a time, 

walk for 15 to 20 minutes at a time, and sit for about 15 minutes before needing to stand 

or do something else. (Id. at 70.) Claimant’s description of her activities of daily living 

are consistent with her testimony of pain and fatigue. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, an 

“ability to talk on the phone, prepare meals once or twice daily, occasionally clean one’s 

room, and, with significant assistance, care for one’s daughter, all while taking frequent 

hours-long rests, avoiding any heavy lifting, and lying in bed most of the day . . . is 

inconsistent with an inability to function in a workplace environment.” Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1016. In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ALJ’s identification of “supposed 

inconsistencies between [the claimant’s] daily activities and her testimony” did not “satisfy 

the requirement of a clear, convincing, and specific reason to discredit [the claimant’s] 

testimony regarding her pain-related impairments.” Id. Similarly, here the ALJ erred by 

failing to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence 

for rejecting Claimant’s testimony about her pain symptoms and her level of limitation.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court holds the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. 

Daulat’s medical opinions and Claimant’s symptom testimony. Given that the ALJ’s RFC 

determination was based on these errors, the Court cannot deem the errors harmless.

VI. REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Claimant urges the Court to remand for payment of benefits or, alternatively, for 

additional proceedings. (Doc. 14 at 22) The Commissioner urges the Court to affirm the 

Commissioner’s final decision or, alternatively, to remand for further proceedings. (Doc. 

17 at 19)

In the Ninth Circuit, a remand with instruction to award benefits is appropriate if 

each of three circumstances exist: “(1) the record has been fully developed and further

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence ...; and (3) if the improperly

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant

disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. A court’s decision to remand a 

disability benefits case to the Social Security Administration for payment of benefits or for 

further proceedings is discretionary. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, remand for an award of benefits is granted only in “rare circumstances,” “where 

no outstanding issues remain and further proceedings would not be useful” and where “the 

record, taken as a whole, leaves not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of [the] 

proceeding.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100-01 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). See also Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2017), amended Jan. 

25, 2018 (“An automatic award of benefits in a disability benefits case is a rare and 

prophylactic exception to the well-established ordinary remand rule.”) Instead, generally 

the court will “remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In Treichler, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval its earlier decision to remand a 

case after an ALJ “erred in making inadequate findings to support his conclusion that the 

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claimant was not credible” and to allow “’further findings evaluating the credibility of 

[claimant’s] subjective complaints,’ while noting that on remand the ALJ could deny 

benefits if he made adequate findings.” Id. (quoting Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 642 

(9th Cir. 1995)). Moreover, this Court cannot conclude that the record provides “not the 

slightest uncertainty as to the outcome.” Id. at 1101.

Further proceedings are appropriate here because the ALJ must: (1) provide

specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Daulat’s medical opinions; and (2) set forth 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Claimant’s symptom testimony, 

providing specific citations to the medical record to support his conclusions.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 

VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings 

consistent with this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment.

Dated this 6th day of March, 2020.

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