Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02316/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02316-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Barbara Jo Werline, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02316-PHX-JZB

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Barbara Jo Werline seeks judicial review and reversal of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her 

application for Social Security disability benefits.1

 Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based 

on legal error, the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff was born in October 1951. She has a high school education and has 

previously worked as a data entry clerk and telephone sales representative. 

 On July 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security disability 

insurance benefits, supplemental security income, and disabled widow’s benefits under 

Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. In her application, Plaintiff alleges 

 

1

 This matter is suitable for resolution based on the briefs. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f). 

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disability beginning June 1, 2007. Her application was denied initially on December 8, 

2010, and upon reconsideration on May 15, 2011. On March 9, 2012, she appeared with 

her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. 

 On July 26, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision final. 

II. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

 At the end of July 2007, Plaintiff went to the emergency room complaining of 

nausea, vomiting, leg pain, and weakness. A.R. 649. She was admitted to the hospital 

with acute renal failure due to diabetes and diabetic neuropathy of the legs. A.R. 394, 

397. She was discharged in good condition after several days, but returned later 

complaining of dizziness, weakness, increased pulse, and left leg pain. A.R. 349-56, 471-

72. Plaintiff was diagnosed with gastrointestinal bleeding with anemia. A.R. 623-645. In 

September 2008, Dr. Mark Tosca, her treating physician at the time, noted that the 

diabetes was “diet controlled.” A.R. 449. 

 Plaintiff saw Dr. Tosca in October, November, and December 2007. Dr. Tosca’s 

notes report that Plaintiff said she was “feeling a lot better” and “doing fairly well.” A.R. 

457. At the same time, MRIs and x-rays of the Plaintiff’s lower back revealed an old 

compression fracture in her mid-back and degenerative changes in her lower back. A.R. 

493-94, 499, 502, 513. 

 In December 2007, Plaintiff saw Dr. George C. Parides and complained of 

increased shortness of breath and wheezing. A.R. 344-45. She reported only wheezing 

upon “significant exertion such as yard work.” A.R. 344. Plaintiff stated that she did not 

feel she had “too much difficulty with shortness of breath when she [went] shopping or 

even walking from her car to [a doctor’s office].” Id. 

 In July 2008, Plaintiff saw Dr. Tosca, complaining of right left pain. She 

complained she could not rest much because she was caring for five children. A.R. 444-

47. 

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 In March 2009, Plaintiff saw Dr. Asim Khan for pain management. She was 

diagnosed with degeneration of the lower back with disc bulge, radiculopathy, and 

chronic pain syndrome. A.R. 511. On examination, Dr. Khan noted that Plaintiff was 

able to heel-walk, toe-walk, squat, and climb up on the examination table without 

difficulty. A.R. 514. Dr. Khan continued Plaintiff’s medication management and 

prescribed Methadone and epidural steroid injections. A.R. 511. In April 2009, Plaintiff 

reported she was doing well. A.R. 551. She reported her pain was better controlled with 

medication and she had no side effects. Id. However, she still had leg pain. Id. 

 In June 2009, Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Khan. A.R. 903-04. She reported 

improvement in her pain, functioning, and quality of life with epidural injections and 

medications. Id. 

 In December 2009, Plaintiff went to the emergency room because she was 

vomiting blood and was diagnosed with gastrointestinal hemorrhaging due to gastritis 

and esophagitis. A.R. 565. She also had gallstones and acute renal failure. She underwent 

an ileostomy to remove a portion of her colon and her gallbladder due to infection. A.R. 

722-23. During the surgery, she had a small heart attack. A.R. 724-27. In January 2010, 

Plaintiff followed up with her surgeon. A.R. 716. She reported being easily fatigued and 

having loose stools due to the length of the small intestine that was resected. Id. 

 In February 2010, Plaintiff saw Dr. Sy for follow-up care. A.R. 434-35. Dr. Sy 

noted that the Plaintiff had stopped smoking and was off her inhalers. A.R. 434. The 

Plaintiff’s physical exam was normal. The physician found a full range of motion in her 

back. By March 2010, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Fang that she was “nearly back to full 

activity” and that medication was helping with diarrhea. A.R. 718. 

 In March 2010, Plaintiff saw cardiologist Himanshu H. Shukla, M.D. A.R. 730-32. 

She reported walking for exercise one to two times a week. A.R. 730. She was also 

completing household chores. Id. Diagnostic tests showed Plaintiff had average exercise 

tolerance and a normal heart rate. Id. 

 In December 2010, Plaintiff underwent a consultative examination by Elizabeth A. 

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Ottney, D.O. A.R. 768-78. Plaintiff stated that her diabetes was controlled by her diet. 

A.R. 771. She also said she had never been hospitalized for back pain. A.R. 771. Dr. 

Ottney performed a pulmonary function test and found no evidence of acute respiratory 

illness and said that obstruction was unlikely. A.R. 768, 773. Dr. Ottney found Plaintiff 

had normal muscle strength, balance, coordination, stance, gait, range of motion, and 

motor skills. A.R. 773. Dr. Ottney opined that Plaintiff was capable of occasionally 

lifting 20 pounds and frequently lifting 10 pounds without any limitations in standing, 

walking, sitting, climbing ramps and stairs, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, 

reaching, handling, fingering, or feeling. A.R. 774-77. 

 In the same month, state agency physician Dr. James J. Green reviewed the record 

and opined that Plaintiff was capable of occasionally lifting 20 pounds and frequently 

lifting 10 pounds. A.R 50-52. 

 In January 2011, Dr. Shukla reported that Plaintiff had increased leg pain with 

walking, but no other new symptoms. A.R. 792. Plaintiff continued to exercise and 

participate in household chores. A.R. 793. In May 2011, state agency physician Dr. 

Christopher Mahoney confirmed Dr. Green’s opinion. A.R. 87. 

 In March 2011, treating physician Dr. Sy opined that Plaintiff could lift or carry 

fewer than 10 pounds occasionally and frequently, stand or walk less than two hours in an 

eight hour day, sit only three hours in an eight-hour day, and alternate sitting and 

standing every half hour. A.R. 908-10. She also found that Plaintiff could never climb, 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. A.R. 908-10. Dr. Sy found that Plaintiff could 

frequently handle and feel and occasionally reach and use fine manipulation with her 

hands, but was restricted from working around heights, machinery, extreme temperatures, 

chemicals, dust, or noise. A.R. 908-10. 

 In September 2011, Dr. Shukla reported a negative nuclear stress test. A.R. 890. In 

the follow-up, Plaintiff told Dr. Shukla that she was still exercising by walking a couple 

times a week and was able to complete household chores. A.R. 891. She denied chest 

pain, shortness of breath, or lightheadedness. A.R. 890. 

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 In May 2012, Plaintiff told consultative examiner Carol McLean, Ph.D., that she 

got up in the morning to get her grandchildren to school and then did chores. A.R. 978-

80. These chores included mopping, washing dishes using a dishwasher, laundry, and 

folding clothes. Id. Plaintiff told Dr. McLean that she bought groceries, made meals, and 

played games with her grandchildren. Id. 

III. Standard of Review 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F. 3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

IV. The ALJ’s Five-Step Sequential Evaluation 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the enquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical and mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

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three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 

found to be disabled. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment 

listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If 

so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step 

four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If 

not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If 

not, the claimant is disabled. 

 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since May 20, 2011. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following 

severe impairments: low back pain secondary to degenerative disc disease, peripheral 

vascular disease (PVD) of the lower extremities, noninsulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, 

gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) status post partial colon resection, arthritis of 

both knees, coronary artery disease (CAD) with hypertension and status post stent 

placement, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) with tobacco dependence. 

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the RFC to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The ALJ concluded that the claimant is capable of 

performing past relevant work as a data entry clerk and telephone sales representative. 

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V. Analysis 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC determination in step four was defective for two 

reasons: (1) the ALJ erroneously weighed medical source evidence; and (2) the ALJ 

improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility and discounted her subjective testimony. 

Plaintiff does not dispute steps one through three of the ALJ’s disability determination. 

The Court will address each argument below. 

A. Weighing of Medical Source Evidence 

 1. Legal Standard 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give the greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 

1995); 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating 

opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, frequency of 

examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective evidence). If it is 

not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating or examining 

physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 

(citing Embrey v. Brown, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A contradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons 

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

 An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions. [She] must set 

forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. 

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 The Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant met the 

statutory definition of disability and does not give significance to a statement by a 

medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(d). 

 2. Rachel Sy, D.O. 

 In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ examined the entire record and discounted 

the assessments of treating physician, Dr. Rachel Sy, D.O. A.R. 125. Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ committed legal error by improperly discounting Dr. Sy’s opinion. Doc. 23 

at 15-23. However, the ALJ afforded lesser weight to Dr. Sy’s opinions because (1) the 

opinions were inconsistent with medical records showing Plaintiff recovered well after 

surgery, A.R. 129; (2) Dr. Sy’s medical notes were contrary to her opinions, A.R. 129; 

(3) the opinions were not based on adequate clinical findings, A.R. 125; and (4) Dr. Sy’s 

findings were contradicted by the findings of examining physician Dr. Elizabeth A. 

Ottney, D.O. and non-examining physicians Dr. James J. Green and Dr. Christopher 

Maloney. A.R. 50-52, 768-78. 

 On March 28, 2011, Dr. Sy filled out a check box form where she opined that 

Plaintiff could lift or carry fewer than ten pounds occasionally and frequently, stand or 

walk fewer than two hours in an eight-hour day, sit only three hours in an eight-hour day, 

and alternate sitting and standing every half hour. A.R. 908-10. 

 The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Sy’s opinions are specific, legitimate, and 

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ discounted treating physician Dr. Sy’s 

opinion and afforded greater weight to the opinions of non-treating sources because Dr. 

Sy’s response to the March 2011 check box form was contrary to her own treatment notes 

and the medical record as a whole. 

 First, the ALJ found that Dr. Sy’s opinion was inconsistent with the medical 

record showing Plaintiff recovered well after surgery and responded effectively to 

medication therapy. A.R. 129. The ALJ’s statements regarding the weight she accorded 

Dr. Sy’s opinions are found on page 5 of his decision (A.R. 125) and his discussion of the 

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medical evidence is found on pages 5-9 (A.R. 125-129). The decision makes clear that 

the ALJ relied on record evidence to support all of the reasons listed in his discussion of 

Dr. Sy’s opinions. 

 The ALJ notes the following: a March 2009 general examination finding that 

despite reports of radiculopathy, Plaintiff was able to heel-walk and toe-walk without any 

difficulty and without the use of an assistive device (A.R. 127); physical exams were 

unremarkable and showed normal gait, no edema, and full muscle strength (A.R. 127); 

unremarkable cardiovascular and gastrointestinal follow-up exams (A.R. 127); in an 

October 2010 cardiologist exam, Plaintiff denied shortness of breath, dizziness, and 

fainting (A.R. 128, 789); treatment for Plaintiff’s conditions were conservative with 

routing prescriptions for medications, which she reported were effective and decreased 

her symptoms (A.R. 127-129); and a motor exam by Dr. Ottney where the Plaintiff was 

able to tandem walk, squat, hop, had a full range of motions in her major joints, and 

demonstrated normal fine and gross motor function (A.R. 129). The Court finds the 

ALJ’s explanation is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Second, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Sy’s opinion is inconsistent with her own 

medical notes, which indicate Plaintiff had recovered well from her surgeries and had 

normal physician examinations. A.R. 127. An incongruity between the treating doctor’s 

questionnaire and her medical records is a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting the 

doctor’s opinion of claimant’s limitation. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F. 3d 1035, 1041 

(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the ALJ’s finding that a physician’s questionnaire responses 

were inconsistent with the medical record when the physician’s own records did not 

provide support for the limitations set out in the questionnaire). The ALJ cited to several 

records showing an inconsistency between Dr. Sy’s original findings and her responses to 

the medical questionnaire. A.R 129. For example, the ALJ cited to medical notes from 

February 2010 where Dr. Sy opined that Plaintiff had a “full range of motion” in her 

extremities and had “no tenderness” in her back. Id. The ALJ also cited to Dr. Sy’s 

medical notes finding that the Plaintiff’s pain specialist was “not doing any intervention” 

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and the Plaintiff looked “comfortable.” A.R. 129, 807. Thus, this finding was a specific 

and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence for the ALJ to discount the 

treating physician’s opinions. 

 Third, the ALJ found that Dr. Sy’s opinions that Plaintiff had moderately severe 

limitations in several areas of mental functioning were contrary to Plaintiff’s mild 

psychological symptoms, positive response to psychotropic medication, and 

unremarkable mental status exams. A.R. 125. An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s 

opinion if the opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical 

findings. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F. 3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(finding that an ALJ properly discounted a treating physician’s opinion that was not 

based on the physician’s own clinical findings). Although Plaintiff’s mental status is not 

an issue in this appeal,2

 Dr. Sy’s opinions show that she was inclined to find moderately 

severe to severe limitations even without clinical findings to support such opinions. The 

ALJ found little support for Dr. Sy’s psychological findings and thus discounted her 

opinions. Thus, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision not to rely on Dr. Sy’s 

opinions.

 Fourth, Dr. Sy’s medical opinions were contradicted by the opinions of Dr. 

Elizabeth A. Ottney, D.O., an examining physician who found Plaintiff had greater 

abilities than those identified in Dr. Sy’s opinions. The ALJ noted that Dr. Ottney found 

Plaintiff had a “full range of motion of all major joints” and “full muscle strength in her 

upper and lower extremities.” A.R. 129. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Ottney opined 

Plaintiff ambulated with a “normal gait and pace.” Id. Dr. Ottney opined Plaintiff was 

capable of occasionally lifting twenty pounds and frequently lifting ten pounds without 

any limitations in standing, walking, sitting, climbing ramps and stairs, stooping, 

kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, handling, fingering, or feeling. A.R. 768-78. The 

ALJ accorded “great weight” to Dr. Ottney’s opinion because it was consistent with the 

 

2

 Plaintiff states in her Opening briefing that the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments is not “directly relevant to this appeal.” Doc. 23 at 28. 

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medical record as a whole showing Plaintiff responded well to conservative treatment and 

was not compliant in treatment recommendations. A.R. 130. 

 Dr. Sy’s opinions were also contradicted by state agency physicians Dr. James J. 

Green and Dr. Christopher Maloney. AR 50-52; A.R. 87. Like Dr. Ottney, Drs. Green 

and Maloney opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten 

pounds frequently. They also agreed that Plaintiff could sit and stand about six hours in 

an eight-hour workday. A.R. 130. 

 Dr. Sy’s opinions were contradicted by the opinions of three medical sources. 

Therefore, the ALJ therefore could discount Dr. Sy’s opinion for specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by placing “great weight” on 

the medical opinion of examining physician Dr. Ottney and “significant weight” to a 

portion of the opinions of Dr. Green and Dr. Maloney. Doc. 23 at 15. Although Plaintiff 

is correct that ALJs must generally accord the greatest weight to the medical opinion of a 

treating physician and reduced weight to non-treating and non-examining physicians, the 

contradicted opinions of treating physicians can be discounted for specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey, 849 

F.2d at 422). 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons, 

supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Dr. Sy’s opinions. The decision was 

not legal error. 

B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony 

 1. Legal Standard 

 In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and if so with no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

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severity of her symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the 

rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). General findings are 

insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what 

evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints. Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 

(9th Cir. 2010). The ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently 

specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit 

claimant’s testimony. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider a claimant’s reputation 

for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the 

claimant’s testimony and conduct, the claimant’s daily activities, the claimant’s work 

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, 

and effect of the symptoms of which the claimant complains. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 2. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility 

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. A.R. 129. Then, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC 

assessment. Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had made inconsistent statements regarding the 

effectiveness of her treatment. Id. The ALJ made these findings3

 on page 9 of his 

decision. A.R. 129. Plaintiff argues that her testimony was not inconsistent because 

epidural injections are not meant to provide permanent relief. However, Plaintiff testified 

at the hearing that she did “not experience any relief” after the epidural injections. A.R. 

31- 32. Thus, her testimony three years later that the injections were unhelpful was not 

 

3

 The ALJ explained that Plaintiff testified the epidural steroid injections did not help her pain symptoms. However, a review of the record indicates that Plaintiff told pain management specialist Dr. Asim Khan her radicular pain “improved significantly with epidural steroid injections and medication.” A.R. 129, 903. 

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credible. The ALJ correctly found Plaintiff’s statement was inconsistent with the medical 

record showing the injection provided her symptomatic relief. A.R. 129. 

 The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s statements of disabling limitations were 

inconsistent with the objective medical record. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medical 

record showed normal gait, muscle strength, and a full range of motion. A.R. 127, 129. 

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had mostly normal examinations and diagnostic 

findings. Id. The ALJ cited to the medical record showing Plaintiff had an unremarkable 

heart exam, controlled cardiac symptoms, and “mild” peripheral vascular disease. A.R. 

128. In addition, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal symptoms were mostly 

normal with only occasional heartburn, some difficulty swallowing, and “mild” 

esophagitis. Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not possess the professional 

qualifications for an independent analysis of the medical evidence. However, the ALJ did 

not independently analyze the medical evidence. The ALJ cited to physician notes and 

objective evidence in the record to support his findings. For example, the ALJ notes that 

Plaintiff’s stress tests were “negative” and an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy was 

unremarkable. A.R. 128. The ALJ also quoted the results of the pulmonary function test 

showing “unlikely” obstruction. Id. Lastly, the ALJ cited to Dr. Tosca’s treatment notes 

that indicated Plaintiff’s diabetes was “controlled” on a diet. Id. The ALJ therefore did 

not replace findings from diagnostic or physical examinations with his own assessments. 

 Third, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent because her 

symptoms are well managed by conservative treatment. The ALJ must carefully consider 

the type and effectiveness of treatment when evaluating symptoms, including pain. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). Impairments that can be controlled effectively with 

medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining SSI benefit eligibility. Warre 

v. Com’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ cited to 

objective evidence in the record showing Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal, cardiovascular, and 

diabetic symptoms were effectively managed with medication and diet. A.R. 128-29. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to fully address all of Plaintiff’s symptoms. (Doc. at 

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29.) However, in his decision, the ALJ cited to a June 2009 examination where the 

patient was “doing well” on her medication regimen and denied any side effects. A.R. 

127. 

 Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s symptom testimony less than credible based on 

her reported good activities of daily living. An ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily 

activities in weighing a claimant’s credibility. Orn, 495 F. 3d at 636. In Orn, the court 

reasoned that an “adverse credibility finding based on activities may be proper if a 

claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to 

the workplace.” Id. at 639. The ALJ noted that the claimant can perform standard 

household chores—including cooking, cleaning, mopping, laundry, and yard work. A.R. 

125, 129. The ALJ also cited to evidence that Plaintiff assists her grandchildren with 

homework, shops for groceries, and regularly provides childcare for five grandchildren. 

A.R. 129.4

 

 Plaintiff’s argues that the ALJ’s citations to the record do not support his findings. 

She argues that the ALJ made no finding that she spent a substantial part of a typical day 

engaged in activities inconsistent with the finding of disability. The Social Security Act 

does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits because 

home activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment 

of the workplace where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication. 

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1986). But if a claimant “engages in 

numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to the workplace, the 

ALJ may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings relating to 

those activities.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ stated 

that Plaintiff can perform “standard household chores, assist her grandchildren with 

 

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 The ALJ also cited to the exhibits that describe Plaintiff’s daily activities. A.R. 125, 

129. The evidence shows that Plaintiff does “household chores” and “play[s] games” with her grandchildren. A.R. 979. Also, the Plaintiff exercises 1-2 times a week by walking 15-30 minutes, mops, washes dishes, does laundry, folds clothes, does grocery shopping, and makes dinner. A.R. 730, 979. The Plaintiff told Dr. Tosca that she “can’t 

rest much because she is caring for 5 children.” A.R. 821. 

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homework, shop for groceries, and regularly provide childcare.” The ALJ then found that 

Plaintiff’s “level of activity is wholly inconsistent” with her testimony that she cannot sit, 

stand, or walk for brief periods. Id. 

 When “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d at 954 (finding that when an ALJ’s credibility determination is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, the reviewing court may not engage in 

second-guessing). Here, the ALJ’s credibility determination was proper. The ALJ gave 

clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Plaintiff’s 

testimony and used ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation. Thus, the ALJ’s reasons 

for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony are sufficient to meet the standard required 

by the Ninth Circuit. 

VI. Conclusion 

 The Court has considered the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. The Court concludes that the 

ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for 

discounting Dr. Sy’s opinions, and the ALJ’s decision is not based on legal error. The 

Court also concludes that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by 

substantial evidence for finding Plaintiff less than fully credible. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 19th day of March, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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