Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00268/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00268-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Johnny Gabriel Valenzuela, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

D. Hurley, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-0268-PHX-RCB (JFM)

ORDER

Plaintiff Johnny Gabriel Valenzuela brought this civil rights action pro se under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Mesa Police Officers Dustin Hurley and Steven Cervantes for alleged

excessive force (Doc. 1). Plaintiff is now represented by counsel (Doc. 8). Before the Court

is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 38) and

Plaintiff’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause why no opposition to the summary

judgment motion was filed and why the motion should not treated as unopposed (Doc. 36).

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to show good cause. But even when considering

Plaintiff’s untimely opposition that was filed in conjunction with the response to the Order

to Show Cause, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Their summary judgment

motion will be granted, their Motion to Strike will be denied as moot, and the action will be

terminated.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claim arose on January 2, 2011, when Defendants stopped the car in which

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Defendants also filed a response to Plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show Cause

(Doc. 37). The Order to Show Cause did not direct Defendants to file a response to

Plaintiff’s response, and the Court will not consider Defendants’ filing.

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he was riding and ordered him out of the car (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleged that when he stepped

out of the car, Defendants tasered him in the thigh; forced him face down onto the ground;

and then punched, kicked, and kneed him in the back and head, nearly rendering him

unconscious (id.).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim is

barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (Doc. 15). Plaintiff failed to

file a response to the motion; however, after the motion was filed, Plaintiff filed discovery

notices (Docs. 17, 31). Because Plaintiff’s filings indicated an intent to litigate the action,

the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why no opposition to summary judgment was filed

and why the summary judgment motion should not be treated as unopposed (Doc. 33). 

On February 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed his response to the Order to Show Cause and a

response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Docs. 35-36). Defendants submitted

their reply in support of summary judgment, which included objections and a Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s references to unsupported facts within his summary judgment response

(Doc. 38).1

II. Response to Order to Show Cause

In the response to the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff’s counsel states that in midSeptember 2009—when Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment—he was in

the middle of an eight-week criminal trial that consumed all of his attention and,

consequently, the deadline for filing the response to the motion was not calendared (Doc. 36

at 1-2). Plaintiff’s counsel assumes responsibility for the oversight and asserts that his client

seeks to litigate this case and should not be penalized for counsel’s error (id. at 2). There is

no affidavit from counsel attached to the response. 

The Ninth Circuit has characterized good cause to mean, at a minimum, “excusable

neglect.” Electrical Specialty Co. v. Road Ranch Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir.

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1992) (citing Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)). Inadvertence or

oversight of counsel does not constitute good cause for failure to diligently prosecute a cause

of action. See Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Johnson

v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (in addressing good cause

standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, stating that “carelessness is not

compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief”). 

Even if Plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show Cause was properly supported by

an affidavit from counsel, it fails to establish good cause. As set forth in the Order to Show

Cause, defense counsel received electronic service of the motion (Doc. 33 at 2-3). The

docket also reflects that a week after the motion was filed, Plaintiff’s counsel signed the

parties’ joint Report of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting, which referenced the pending summary

judgment motion (Doc. 17 at 5). Further, the Court’s October 2011 discovery order

referenced the pending summary judgment motion (Doc. 18 at 1). In light of these notices

after service of the motion, that Plaintiff’s counsel was involved in a criminal trial and

inadvertently failed to calendar the response deadline is insufficient to show good cause for

failing to timely respond to Defendants’ motion.

III. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion

As stated, with his response to the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff submitted his

untimely opposition brief to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Plaintiff’s response

wholly fails to comply with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure governing

summary judgment. The Local Rule requires the party opposing summary judgment to

submit a separate statement of facts that sets forth numbered paragraphs that correspond to

the movant’s numbered paragraphs and to indicate whether each fact is disputed or not.

LRCiv 56.1(b). Plaintiff did not submit a separate statement of facts.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A) requires a party to support its assertions

by citing to particular parts of the materials in the record. See Carmen v. San Francisco

United Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (in a summary judgment analysis the

court is “not required to comb the record”). Throughout his response brief, Plaintiff refers

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to answers given at his deposition; however, Plaintiff did not submit the deposition transcript

with his response, and he does not cite to where in the record the deposition testimony may

be found. Indeed, Plaintiff does not submit any documentary evidence in support of his

opposition to summary judgment.

Defendants object to and move to strike many of the allegations in Plaintiff’s response

on the ground that the response does not cite to the record and the allegations are

unsupported (Doc. 38 at 8-9).

Despite Plaintiff’s untimely and procedurally deficient response, the Court

nonetheless finds that even if it considers the unsupported response, Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment. Defendants’ Motion to Strike will therefore be denied as moot.

IV. Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323.

If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant

to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material

and that the dispute is genuine. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250

(1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,

and the dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmovant. Id.; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its

favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

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resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities

Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). 

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence, and draw all

inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255.

B. Arguments 

1. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants submit a separate Statement of Facts (DSOF), which is supported by

(1) affidavits from both Defendants and from another Mesa police officer and a Mesa Fire

Department paramedic; (2) copies of Plaintiff’s Plea Agreement; and (3) a certified copy of

the transcript from Plaintiff’s guilty plea proceeding (Doc. 16, Exs. 1-6). Defendants’ DSOF

sets forth the following facts:

At approximately 1:15 a.m. on January 2, 2011, Defendants observed a car driving

with two broken taillights and initiated a traffic stop of the car in which Plaintiff was in the

passenger seat (DSOF ¶¶ 2-4). When they approached the car, they saw that Plaintiff had

something in his hands and gave multiple verbal commands to show what was in his hands

(id. ¶¶ 6-7). Plaintiff did not comply, and Hurley saw Plaintiff place what appeared to be a

baggie with a white powdery substance on the seat next to him (id. ¶¶ 8-9). Hurley told

Cervantes what he saw, and he asked Plaintiff to step out of the car multiple times; Plaintiff

refused to get out (id. ¶¶ 11-13). Cervantes then opened the car door and told Plaintiff to get

out, but Plaintiff still refused (id. ¶¶ 14-15). Cervantes reached into the car to assist Plaintiff

out, and Plaintiff grabbed the baggie and ripped it open, causing the white substance to spill

on his lap (id. ¶¶ 16-17). Cervantes grabbed Plaintiff’s arm to assist him out of the car, and

Plaintiff pushed him away and started throwing punches and yelling at him (id. ¶¶ 18-19).

Hurley walked around the car to help Cervantes, and Plaintiff began punching and hitting

both Defendants in their chests with his fists (id. ¶¶ 20-21). Plaintiff was wearing a thick

down jacket, and Defendants could not get a hold of him while he was punching them (id.

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¶ 23). Fearing that the situation was escalating and unsure of whether there were any

weapons in the car or on Plaintiff, Hurley decided it was necessary to tase Plaintiff, and he

told Cervantes to back away (id. ¶¶ 22, 24). Hurley deployed his taser, and the prongs

contacted Plaintiff’s upper thigh (id. ¶ 25). The taser did not have great effect because of

Plaintiff’s jacket, but Plaintiff locked up long enough to roll out of the car, at which point

Defendants were able to lay him on the ground on his stomach (id. ¶ 26). Plaintiff then

began kicking and throwing punches at Defendants, and they were unable to get his hands

cuffed (id. ¶ 27). Hurley tried to subdue Plaintiff by using the taser as a drive stun, to no

avail (id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff rolled on his side and continued to fight Defendants, so Cervantes

sat on Plaintiff’s legs while Hurley positioned himself on Plaintiff’s upper body and tried to

grab his arms to handcuff him (id. ¶¶ 29-31). Hurley could only get one arm because

Plaintiff was still fighting with his left arm; Hurley told Plaintiff to stop resisting several

times (id. ¶¶ 32-33). Hurley delivered super scapular strikes to Plaintiff’s upper shoulder

area using the soft bottom of his fist, but because Plaintiff was moving so much, the strikes

landed on the side of Plaintiff’s head (id. ¶¶ 34-35). Hurley was then able to handcuff

Plaintiff (id. ¶ 36). Paramedics who arrived on the scene determined that Plaintiff did not

need to be transported to a hospital, and he was released to police custody for booking (id.

¶¶ 40-41).

On May 9, 2011, Plaintiff pled guilty to possession of a dangerous drug and

aggravated assault on a police officer—charges arising out of the January 2, 2011 incident

(id. ¶ 43). 

In their motion, Defendants argue that the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint

contradict his guilty plea because he alleges that Defendants assaulted him with the taser and

beat him for no apparent reason (Doc. 15 at 6). Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s aggravated

assault conviction necessarily implies that the officers did not use excessive force against him

(id.). They note that Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim arises out of the same acts that led to

his guilty plea and, for this reason, they contend that success in this case would imply the

invalidity of his conviction and his claim is therefore Heck barred (id. at 6-7).

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2. Plaintiff’s Response

In his response, Plaintiff concedes that he did not immediately respond to commands

to exit the vehicle because he was trying to hide drugs (Doc. 35 at 2). He also admits that

when he exited the vehicle, he momentarily struggled with one of the Defendants (id.).

Plaintiff asserts that when he was shot with a taser by the other Defendant, he fell face first

to the ground, began to writhe and twitch in response to the electric shock, and he lost control

of his body and could not hear any additional commands from Defendants (id.). According

to Plaintiff, even though he was subdued, Hurley then jumped on his back with both knees

and pummeled the left side of Plaintiff’s head and face with a closed fist (id. at 2-3). Plaintiff

claims that he suffered “significant physical injuries,” including a 50% loss of sight in one

eye (id. at 3). 

Plaintiff argues that his claim is not Heck barred because the facts in this case do not

compare to the facts in Heck, which involved a claim for malicious prosecution, not

excessive force (id. at 3-4). Plaintiff notes that if the excessive force by Defendants occurred

after the criminal actions for which Plaintiff was convicted, and if his criminal actions ceased

prior to the use of excessive force, then Heck does not apply (id. at 4). Plaintiff claims that

is the case here—that Defendants’ use of excessive force occurred after Plaintiff was

subdued by the use of the taser gun (id.). Plaintiff states that he does not recall what

happened after he hit the ground, and thus, he was not physically or mentally capable of

resisting arrest (id.). Plaintiff states that his next recollection was someone striking him in

the back (id.). 

Plaintiff concludes that on this record, there are disputed issues of fact, including

(1) whether Plaintiff ceased resisting arrest, (2) whether Defendants used excessive force

after Plaintiff ceased resisting arrest, and (3) whether the force used by Defendants was

justified (id. at 5). Plaintiff insists that Heck is not dispositive of this matter and Defendants

are not entitled to summary Judgment as a matter of law (id.). 

3. Defendants’ Reply

In reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s response presents arguments that are

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contrary to the allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 38). They note that in his Complaint,

Plaintiff averred that he was immediately tasered, rushed to the sidewalk, and then subjected

to excessive force; however, in his summary judgment response, he states that he

momentarily struggled with Defendants before he was tasered and then stopped struggling

(id. at 3). Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony bars Plaintiff’s claim

under Heck because he testified that he did not commit the crime of aggravated assault,

despite his plea for aggravated assault (id. at 3-6; Ex. A, Pl. Dep. Nov. 22, 2011).

C. Analysis

A claim that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of an

arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard. Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The inquiry is “whether the officers’ actions are

‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without

regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). To recover

damages for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal,

or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512

U.S. at 486-87. “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence

that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. In other words,

if the conviction or sentence arises out of the same facts that underlie the alleged unlawful

behavior for which damages are sought, the § 1983 suit must be dismissed. Smithart v.

Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). If a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,

a district court must therefore consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if so, the complaint must be

dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

 A conviction for aggravated assault does not necessarily bar an excessive-force claim.

To determine whether the Heck-bar applies, the Court must consider (1) the precise factual

basis for Plaintiff’s aggravated assault conviction as compared to the factual basis for the

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claim of excessive force and (2) the relative timing of the two events. See Smith v. City of

Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). If the facts underlying the alleged

excessive force are separate and distinct from those that gave rise to the assault conviction,

the excessive-force claim is not barred. For example, in Smithart, the plaintiff pled guilty

to assault with a deadly weapon; he drove his truck at police officers. 79 F.3d at 952. He

filed a § 1983 claim alleging that after he exited his truck, the officers provoked him into a

confrontation that they escalated unnecessarily and then they assaulted him. Id. The Ninth

Circuit held that the assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction and the excessive-force claim

did not arise out of the same facts. See id. Therefore, success on the excessive-force claim

would not demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction against the plaintiff, and his claim was

not barred by Heck. Id. at 952-53.

If the alleged excessive force and the plaintiff’s conviction stem from the same facts,

however, Heck bars the excessive-force claim. This was the case in Cunningham v. Gates,

where the plaintiff was found guilty of charges arising out of a robbery and a shoot out. 312

F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit determined that Cunningham’s

excessive-force claim was barred by Heck because his provocative act of firing on the police

and the police response that he claimed was excessive were so closely interrelated—there

was no break between his acts and the police response. Id. at 1155.

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff pled guilty to aggravated assault against a police

officer (Doc. 16, Ex. 5 & Ex. 6 at 6). Nor is there any dispute that the assault stemmed from

the incident on January 2, 2011 (Doc. 16, DSOF ¶¶ 7-26; Doc. 35 at 2). Specifically, the

aggravated assault charge was based on Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ attempts to

remove Plaintiff from the vehicle and secure him in handcuffs (Doc. 16, DSOF ¶¶ 16-36).

In failing to file a controverting statement of facts, Plaintiff does not specifically dispute

Defendants’ factual assertions as to how the incident unfolded. Plaintiff claims, however,

that Defendants’ use of force occurred after he stopped resisting (Doc. 35 at 4-5). But

Plaintiff does not deny that after he was on the ground, he was fighting Defendants and

attempting to throw punches; rather, he states that he does not recall what happened at that

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moment (id. at 4). Further, Plaintiff does not deny that he continued to fight Defendants and

throw punches after he felt someone striking or stepping on his back (see id. at 4-5). Plaintiff

does not indicate when he allegedly stopped resisting, and he presents no specific facts or

evidence to suggest that he stopped fighting and resisting before Defendants used force to

try to subdue him. As such, there are no facts or evidence to show that there were separate

factual bases for his assault conviction and the alleged excessive force. See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324 (nonmovant must “designate specific facts showing” a material factual dispute).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Heck is applicable here, even though the underlying

conviction is excessive force and not malicious prosecution. The legal premise set forth in

Heck is the same; that is, success on Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his aggravated-assault conviction. Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendants is therefore barred by Heck and will be dismissed without prejudice. See Heck,

512 U.S. at 486-87; Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 584, 585 (9th Cir. 1995)

(dismissal pursuant to Heck must be without prejudice). 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 38).

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 38) is denied as moot.

(3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) is granted.

(4) Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 489 (1994).

DATED this 26th day of March, 2012.

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