Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_01-cv-20991/USCOURTS-cand-5_01-cv-20991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN W. SMYKLA,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

SHERIFF HENNESSEY, Et Al., 

Defendants.

 

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No. C 01-20991 JF (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL

DISMISSAL AND SERVICE

Plaintiff Martin W. Smykla filed this pro se civil rights complaint when he was

incarcerated at the San Francisco County Jail as a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff's most

recent address notification to the Court shows that he now resides in Napa, California. 

Upon an initial review of the complaint, the Court concluded that Plaintiff's allegations

were sufficiently vague that it could not be determined from the complaint whether

Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any of his claims, as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, or whether the claims he had raised administratively

were the same as those he sought to pursue in this action. The Court dismissed the

complaint with leave to amend to cure these pleading deficiencies. Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint, which the Court now reviews.

**Original filed 6/28/06**

Case 5:01-cv-20991-JF Document 17 Filed 06/28/06 Page 1 of 11
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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that for fourteen months, from May 2001 through July 2002,

Dr. Vivas of the San Francisco County Jail acted with deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff's medical needs by failing to provide him with prompt and appropriate care for

a serious sinus infection. He states that by the time he was sent to the hospital to see a

doctor on June 28, 2002 his sinuses were so impacted that an examination could not be

performed and he had to be returned to the jail with a prescription that would alleviate

his symptoms sufficiently for a proper examination. When Plaintiff signed his

amended complaint on July 11, 2002 he still had not received an examination. Plaintiff

alleges that he filed numerous medical grievances regarding his need for medical

attention and he has attached copies of those grievances to his complaint. 

Plaintiff further alleges that from May 7, 2001 through October 7, 2001 he was

housed at County Jail #1 in overcrowded conditions which meant that inmates had to

sleep on the floor, tensions among inmates increased, the dorms were "unsanitary,"

"badly ventilated, very noisy day and night, and unhealthy in every way," and that there

was no opportunity for outdoor exercise and little indoor exercise. Plaintiff attaches to

his complaint prisoner grievances and city claim forms he filed regarding the

overcrowding.

Plaintiff's final claim is that after he filed grievances and sought legal recourse

regarding his medical care and the overcrowding, members of the San Francisco

Sheriff's Department retaliated against him. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages. He names as Defendants Dr.

Vivas and Sheriff Hennessey.

//

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Case 5:01-cv-20991-JF Document 17 Filed 06/28/06 Page 2 of 11
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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any

cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person

acting under the color of state law committed a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Plaintiff's Claims

1. Claims for injunctive relief

Because Plaintiff no longer is incarcerated at the San Francisco County Jail, all

of his claims for injunctive relief are DISMISSED as moot. 

2. Inadequate medical care

When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, the proper

inquiry is whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16

(1979). Even though pretrial detainees' claims arise under the Due Process Clause, the

Eighth Amendment serves as a benchmark for evaluating those claims. See Carnell v.

Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (Eighth Amendment guarantees provide

minimum standard of care for pretrial detainees). Therefore, the appropriate standard

for evaluating constitutional claims brought by pretrial detainees is the same one used

to evaluate convicted prisoners' claims under the Eighth Amendment, that of

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"deliberate indifference" to an inmate's needs. See id. (deliberate indifference standard

is applicable to pretrial detainees' medical claims).

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.

1992). A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two

elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A "serious"

medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical

condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of

chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a "serious"

need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. A prison official is deliberately indifferent

if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that

risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994); see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegation that he suffered from a severe sinus

infection which Dr. Vivas did not treat for fourteen months is sufficient to state a claim

for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, and that he has sufficiently pled

the exhaustion of his administrative remedies with respect to this claim.

3. Overcrowding

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, see Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), and overcrowding itself is not a violation of the

Eighth Amendment, Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982). However,

Case 5:01-cv-20991-JF Document 17 Filed 06/28/06 Page 4 of 11
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under certain circumstances overcrowding can result in specific effects which can form

the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. But a prison official violates the

Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged

must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and (2) the

prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, see id. (citing Wilson,

501 U.S. at 297).

The routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting is inadequate to satisfy the

objective prong of an Eighth Amendment inquiry; only "those deprivations denying

'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the

basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In determining whether a deprivation of a basic

necessity is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth

Amendment claim, a court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the

deprivation. See id. Plaintiff alleges that because of overcrowding inmates had to

sleep on the floor, tensions among inmates increased, the dorms were "unsanitary,"

"badly ventilated, very noisy day and night, and unhealthy in every way," and that there

was no opportunity for outdoor exercise and little indoor exercise. Amend. Compl. at

6-7. Standing alone, the nature of these deprivations as pled is not sufficiently serious

to meet the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation. This is

highlighted when Plaintiff's allegations regarding the duration of the deprivations are

considered as well. He states that the overcrowding occurred from May through

October 2001, and also states that during that five-month period there were three

different occasions when Sheriff Hennessey remedied the overcrowding. But he does

not say how long each remedial period lasted. Thus, the duration of the alleged

deprivations cannot be inferred from Plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff's conclusory

allegations regarding the nature of the deprivations and their duration do not satisfy the

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objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. 

Plaintiff also has failed to meet the subjective component of an Eighth

Amendment claim. The fact alone that during the five-month period Sheriff Hennessey

on three occasions remedied the overcrowding defeats the assertion that he acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference

only if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards

that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Even

if Sheriff Hennessey failed to remedy the overcrowding on a permanent basis, as a

matter of law the actions he is alleged to have taken during the five months at issue

negate a finding that he acted with deliberate indifference. See Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in

good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing

conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a

tumultuous cellblock.").

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for

overcrowding in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because further amendment of

this claim would be futile, the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. Retaliation claim

Plaintiff's final claim is that unidentified jail officials retaliated against him for

pursuing legal recourse with respect to his medical and overcrowding claims. This

conclusory assertion does not meet the elements of a claim for relief. See Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Within the prison context, a viable

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First

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Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal."). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege, nor has he attached grievance

forms which show, that he exhausted his administrative grievances with respect to this

claim. Because a claim that was not exhausted prior to bringing a civil rights action

must be dismissed, see Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005), this claim

is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may

proceed. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, a copy of the amended complaint in this matter (docket no.

9), all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order on Defendant Dr. Vivas at the San

Francisco County Jail. The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff. 

2. Plaintiff's claims of overcrowding and retaliation are DISMISSED.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, Defendant

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or shall notify

the Court that Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a

motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall

conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendant is advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor

qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendants are of

the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so

inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendant no later than thirty (30) days from the date

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Defendant's motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice

should be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which

they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment

under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted,

end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted

when there is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if there is no real

dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party

who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a

motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations

(or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as

provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant's

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in

opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case

will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)

(holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing

triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is

cautioned that failure to file an opposition to Defendant's motion for summary

judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and

granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d

52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir.

1994). 

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

Plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

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1For Plaintiff's information, the proper manner of promulgating discovery is to send 

demands for documents or interrogatories (questions asking for specific, factual

responses) directly to Defendants' counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33-34. The scope

of discovery is limited to matters "relevant to the claim or defense of any party . .

." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery may be further limited by court order

if "(I) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is

obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or

less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by

discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(2). In order to comply with the requirements of Rule 26, before deciding to

promulgate discovery Plaintiff may find it to his benefit to wait until Defendants

have filed a dispositive motion which could include some or all of the discovery

Plaintiff might seek. In addition, no motion to compel will be considered by the

Court unless the meet-and-confer requirement of Rule 37(a)(2)(B) and N.D. Cal.

Local Rule 37-1 has been satisfied. Because Plaintiff is incarcerated he is not

required to meet and confer with Defendants in person. Rather, if his discovery

requests are denied and he intends to seek a motion to compel he must send a

letter to Defendants to that effect, offering them one last opportunity to provide

him with the sought-after information.

9

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or

Local Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.1

5. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on

Defendant, or Defendant's counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true

copy of the document to Defendant or Defendant's counsel.

6. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court and the parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the

Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

7. Extensions of time are not favored, although reasonable extensions will be

granted. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than ten (10) days

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prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

6/28/06

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This is to certify that on a copy of this order was mailed to the

following:

Martin W. Smykla 

1983953 

NA-206184-4(Q7.8) 

2100 Napa Vallejo Hwy. 

Napa, CA 94558-6292 

Dr. Vivas

850 Bryant Street

San Francisco County Jail #1 

San Francisco, CA 94103

6/29/06

Case 5:01-cv-20991-JF Document 17 Filed 06/28/06 Page 11 of 11