Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02431/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02431-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Joseph Byrne,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-18-02431-PHX-JJT (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is John Joseph Byrne’s (“Petitioner”) “Petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Also pending is 

Petitioner’s “Motion to Concede the Habeas Corpus § 2254” (Doc. 26), which requests 

that the Court dismiss the Petition without prejudice. For the reasons set forth herein, the 

undersigned recommends that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 3, 2009, a jury sitting in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for 

Maricopa County found Petitioner guilty of (i) one count of molestation of a child; (ii) 

one count of sexual conduct with a minor; (iii) one count of sexual abuse; and (iv) four

counts of sexual conduct with a minor. (Doc. 14 at 3-7). On March 20, 2009, the trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to a total of thirty years in prison. (Id. at 9-14).

On August 12, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 1 of 9
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

convictions and sentences. (Id. at 35-50). Petitioner did not seek further review by the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at 52). 

On October 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(“PCR”), which the trial court deemed a PCR Notice. (Id. at 55-63, 67). The trial court

dismissed the PCR proceeding as untimely. (Id. at 65-67). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Doc. 15 at 3-4). The Arizona Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review and dismissed Petitioner’s subsequent Motion for 

Reconsideration. (Id. at 17, 35). 

On August 1, 2018, Petitioner initiated this action seeking federal habeas relief. 

(Doc. 1). The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition (Doc. 1). (Doc. 8). On 

May 22, 2019, Respondents filed their Limited Answer (Doc. 13). Instead of filing a 

Reply, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Concede the Habeas Corpus § 2254” (Doc. 26) that

requests the Court to dismiss this matter without prejudice. Respondents have not 

responded to the Motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

110 Stat. 1214, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within one year

of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 2 of 9
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state 

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. DISCUSSION

A. This Proceeding is Untimely 

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on

August 12, 2010. (Doc. 14 at 35-50). Petitioner had thirty days from August 12, 2010 to 

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 3 of 9
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review of the decision. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

31.19(a). Thirty days from August 12, 2010 is September 11, 2010. After adding five 

additional days pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a), the deadline was September 16, 

2010.

1

 Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations began running on September 17, 2010. 

See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

commences upon the expiration of the time for seeking review of petitioner’s judgment in 

a state’s highest court); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“Excluding the day on which Patterson’s petition was denied by the Supreme Court, as 

required by Rule 6(a)’s ‘anniversary method,’ the one-year grace period began to run on June 

20, 1997 and expired one year later, on June 19, 1998 . . . .”). Consequently, unless statutory 

or equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas petition expired on 

September 16, 2011, rendering the Petition filed in August 2018 untimely.

1. Statutory Tolling 

Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do 

not “restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the limitations period had 

expired on September 16, 2011, Petitioner’s PCR Notice filed on October 3, 2016 had no 

 

1

In calculating the date Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final, 

Respondents applied Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a), which provides that “[w]henever a party 

has the right or is required to take some action within a prescribed period after service of 

a notice or other paper and the notice or paper is served by a method authorized by Rule 

5(c)(2)(C) or (D), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, five calendar days shall be added to 

the prescribed period.” (Doc. 13 at 4). The undersigned is not aware of a published 

Arizona case holding that Rule 1.3(a) applies to Rule 31.19(a). However, because 

Arizona courts have broadly applied the rule expanding time limits by five days after 

service by mail and application of the rule does not affect the outcome, the undersigned 

has applied the rule. See, e.g., State v. Rabun, 782 P.2d 737 (Ariz. 1989) (applying Rule 

1.3(a) to Rule 31.3 deadline for notices of appeal); State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388 (Ariz. 

1978) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 32.9(c) deadline for petition for review from denial 

of motion for rehearing in PCR proceeding); and State v. Zuniga, 786 P.2d 956 (Ariz. 

1990) (holding that when parties first receive notice of a trial court’s order by mail, Rule 

1.3 extends the time to file an appeal of the order by five days, commencing from the 

date the clerk mails the order to the parties). Effective January 1, 2018, Arizona Rule of 

Civil Procedure 1.3 was amended to exclude from the five-days-after-mail rule “the 

clerk’s distribution of notices, minute entries, or other court-generated documents.” Ariz. 

R. Crim. Proc. 1.3(a)(5).

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 4 of 9
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

statutory tolling effect. Accordingly, this proceeding is untimely unless equitable tolling

applies.

2. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable

Regarding equitable tolling, Petitioner has the burden to show that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A petitioner’s pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005). In addition, a petitioner’s miscalculation of when the 

limitations period expired does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting 

equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Alexander v. Schriro, 312 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the 

petitioner] made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the 

limitations period. This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting 

equitable tolling.”).

There is no indication in the record that the circumstances of Petitioner’s 

incarceration made it “impossible” for Petitioner to timely file a federal habeas petition. 

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049 (finding that equitable tolling did not apply where there was 

“no indication in the record that [circumstances] made it ‘impossible’ for [prisoner] to 

file on time”); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 

(allegations that the petitioner lacked legal knowledge and had to rely on other prisoners 

for legal advice and in preparing his papers “cannot justify equitable tolling” as such 

circumstances are not “extraordinary”). Petitioner has failed to show the existence of 

“extraordinary circumstances” that were the proximate cause of the untimely filing of this 

proceeding. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (for equitable 

tolling to apply, a “prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the 

cause of his untimeliness”). Equitable tolling therefore is unavailable. Accordingly, this 

federal habeas proceeding is untimely.

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 5 of 9
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. The Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway Does Not Apply to Excuse the 

Untimeliness of the Petition

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway”

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. 

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires 

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 

(9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual 

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

To the extent Petitioner asserts the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, Petitioner

has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually innocent of 

his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order to present 

otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, a petitioner must 

produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the ‘narrow class of 

cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations omitted); 

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 6 of 9
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable

evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of 

innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding. 

See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. App'x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through 

the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming 

forward with ‘new reliable evidence’ ”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new 

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”).

B. Petitioner’s “Motion to Concede the Habeas Corpus § 2254” (Doc. 26), 

Docketed as a Motion to Dismiss

On September 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Concede the Habeas Corpus 

§ 2254,” which is docketed as a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26). In his filing, Petitioner 

states that he “request[s] this Court for the § 2254 Petition to be dismissed without 

prejudice . . . .” (Id. at 1). The undersigned liberally construes Petitioner’s filing as a 

motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.2 

 Under Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may 

voluntarily dismiss an action without a court order in two circumstances: (i) the opposing 

party has not yet filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment or (ii) all parties who 

have appeared have signed a stipulation of dismissal. Otherwise, an action may be 

 

2

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent 

with any statutory provisions or [the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases], may be 

applied to a proceeding under [the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases].” Rule 12, foll. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 7 of 9
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). A court 

should grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary dismissal unless the defendant shows it 

will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result. See Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 

F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir. 1987); Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 

145 (9th Cir. 1982). The decision to grant a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is 

“addressed to the district court’s sound discretion and the court’s order will not be 

disturbed unless the court has abused its discretion.” Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S., 100 

F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In this case, Respondents have not responded to Petitioner’s Motion (Doc. 26) and 

therefore have not shown that they will suffer legal prejudice if the Court grants 

Petitioner’s motion. Yet given the determination that the Petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations, the undersigned finds that the interests of judicial and litigant 

economy are better served by denying Petitioner’s Motion. If Petitioner files a second 

federal habeas action after the conclusion of his state court proceedings, any claims 

presented in the Petition will remain time-barred. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003) (28 U.S.C. 2244(d) “does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations 

period that has ended before the state petition was filed”); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 

482 (9th Cir. 2001). Hence, allowing Petitioner to dismiss the Petition without prejudice 

would delay the inevitable and cause Respondents to spend undue time and expense in 

responding a second time to the claims presented in the Petition. Finally, denying 

Petitioner’s motion and dismissing the Petition with prejudice on the ground that it is

time-barred advances AEDPA’s purpose to “further the principles of comity, finality, and 

federalism.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (emphasis added). It is 

therefore recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s “Motion to Concede the Habeas 

Corpus § 2254” (Doc. 26). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court deny Petitioner’s request to voluntarily 

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 8 of 9
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dismiss this action without prejudice as set forth in Petitioner’s “Motion to Concede the

Habeas Corpus § 2254” (Doc. 26), which is docketed as a Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 21st day of November, 2019.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:18-cv-02431-JJT Document 27 Filed 11/22/19 Page 9 of 9