Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02586/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02586-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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27 1 Citations to “AR” are to the administrative record.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alice Nevarez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

 

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No. CV-12-2586-PHX-LOA

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s decision

denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.

The parties, who have expressly consented in writing to proceed before the undersigned

Magistrate Judge per 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), have filed briefs in accordance with the Rules of

Practice (“Local Rules” or “LRCiv”) 16.1. (Docs. 22, 26 and 27) After review of the record,

briefing and applicable law, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

I. Procedural Background

On August 12, 2009, Plaintiff filed applications for Social Security Disability

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI, respectively,

of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and §§ 1381-1383c (AR1

 21, 177-186)

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2

 At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff amended her disability onset date to

November 9, 2007. (AR 43-44)

2

Plaintiff was 42 years of age when she filed the applications. (AR 177, 184) Plaintiff has a

high school education. (AR 46) Plaintiff reported in the applications she became disabled on

June 1, 2005.2

 (AR 177, 184) Plaintiff initially identified a pinched nerve in her right arm

as the condition that limits her ability to work. (AR 198) At the administrative hearing,

Plaintiff testified she is having ongoing problems with her neck, arms, and lower back,

including persistent pain. (AR 50-58) She also testified she suffers from depression, though

the medication she takes helps with that condition. (AR 59-60)

Plaintiff’s applications were denied by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

on November 23, 2009. (AR 116-123) Her request for reconsideration was denied on April

29, 2010. (AR 125-131) At Plaintiff’s request, doc. 132, a hearing was held on August 1,

2011, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Thomas Cheffins. (AR 39-79) In a written

decision, dated August 26, 2011, the ALJ ruled Plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits

because she “has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act

from November 9, 2007, through the date of this decision.” (AR 21, 18-33) 

Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision/Order on October 3, 2011.

(AR 15-16) On October 24, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review

of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-3) As a result of the denial, the ALJ’s decision became the

final decision of the SSA Commissioner. (AR 1)

On December 5, 2012, having exhausted the administrative review process, Plaintiff

sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision by filing a Complaint in this District

Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1) On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Opening

Brief pursuant to LRCiv 16.1, in which she seeks a remand for an award of disability benefits

or, alternatively, a remand for further administrative proceedings. (Doc. 22) On July 22,

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2013, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief. (Doc. 26) Plaintiff filed

a Reply Brief on August 8, 2013. (Doc. 27)

II. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review

A district court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by substantial

evidence and are free from reversible error. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir.

1998); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is more

than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. In determining whether substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, a district court considers the record as a whole,

weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions.

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ

is responsible for resolving conflicts, ambiguity, and determining credibility. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th

Cir. 1989). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.”

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21.

B. Sequential Evaluation Process

To be eligible for Social Security disability benefits, a claimant must show an

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.

1999). The claimant bears the initial burden of proving disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5);

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). A five step procedure is used to

evaluate a disability claim: 

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3 The term “residual functional capacity” means the most an individual can do after

considering the effects of physical and/or mental limitations that affect the ability to perform

work-related tasks. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1545(a)(1-2).

4

In step one, the Secretary determines whether a claimant is currently engaged

in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). In step two, the Secretary determines whether the claimant has

a “medically severe impairment or combination of impairments,” as defined

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled.

If the answer is yes, the Secretary proceeds to step three and determines

whether the impairment meets or equals a “listed” impairment that the

Secretary has acknowledged to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is met, the claimant is

conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the Secretary proceeds to step four. At

step four, the Secretary determines whether the claimant can perform "past

relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform such

work, she is not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the Secretary must show, at step five, that the

claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721.

III. ALJ Decision

Applying the five-step procedure in this case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 9, 2007, her alleged disability onset

date. (AR 23) The ALJ found Plaintiff has the following “severe” impairments within the

meaning of the regulations: right bicep tendonitis, status post cervical fusion, depression, and

neck pain. (Id.) The ALJ determined, however, Plaintiff does not have an impairment, or a

combination of impairments, that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 24) As a result, the ALJ

assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity3

 (“RFC”). (AR 25-30) The ALJ determined

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and §

416.967(b), but with limitations. (AR 25) Specifically, he found Plaintiff “is restricted from

ever climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds, or crawling; only occasionally pushing/pulling with

the right upper extremity; occasional overhead reaching with the right upper extremity;

frequent handling/fingering/feeling with the right upper extremity; and should avoid

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concentrated exposure to excessive vibrations and concentrated use of moving machinery.”

(Id.) Additionally, the ALJ found Plaintiff “can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks,

with occasional interaction with public and coworkers.” (AR 26)

In addition, the ALJ determined Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work,

but found, “[c]onsidering the [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

that the [Plaintiff] can perform.” (AR 31) Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded

Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from

November 9, 2007, through the date of the decision. (AR 32) Consequently, the ALJ ruled

Plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income. (AR

32-33)

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff contends in her opening brief the Commissioner’s decision should be

reversed and the case remanded for an award of benefits. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by

rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in the absence of clear and convincing reasons for

doing so supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff also argues the ALJ, in

determining Plaintiff’s work-related abilities, erred by relying on opinions from nonexamining State agency physicians. In the responsive brief, the Commissioner disputes each

of Plaintiff’s arguments and contends the administrative decision is supported by substantial

evidence and the ALJ applied the proper legal standards.

A. Discounting of Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

As noted above, Plaintiff first argues the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom

testimony without providing clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence

in the record. (Doc. 22 at 13-21) Plaintiff contends that because the ALJ made no finding

of malingering, he may not reject such testimony without satisfying this high standard. The

Commissioner argues in response that the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for finding

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony not credible. (Doc. 26 at 10-16)

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An ALJ must perform a two-step analysis when determining whether a claimant’s

testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d

1028, 1035-1036 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably

be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 1036 (quoting Bunnell

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A claimant need only show that her

medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce some degree

of the symptom alleged, not “that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the

severity of the symptom she has alleged.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir.

1996). Second, if a claimant satisfies this test, and absent any evidence of malingering, “the

ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1281.

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms

is credible, an ALJ may consider the following: “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements

concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid;

(2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed

course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. An ALJ

may also consider the claimant’s work record, and the observations of treating and examining

physicians and other third parties regarding “the nature, onset, duration and frequency of

claimant’s symptoms, and precipitating and aggravating factors, functional restrictions

caused by the symptoms, and the claimant’s daily activities.” Id. “If the ALJ’s finding is

supported by substantial evidence, the court ‘may not engage in second-guessing.’”

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278

F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that she has constant, severe pain in her

neck, shoulders, arms, and hands. (AR 50-53) She claimed she received no relief from the

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fusion surgery in her neck in April 2008 and subsequent steroid injections. (AR 54) She also

testified she suffers from pain in her lower back. (AR 55-57) As a result, Plaintiff testified

it hurts to lie down, to walk and to sit. (AR 57) Plaintiff further testified that even after a

lumbar nerve stimulator was implanted in 2010, her lower back has not felt good, and steroid

injections provided no relief. (AR 56-57) Plaintiff testified that during normal working hours

of an average day, she spends about half the day, or four hours, lying down. (AR 57)

In assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ found “that the [Plaintiff’s] medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;

however, the [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above

residual functional capacity assessment.” (AR 26) The ALJ then provided several reasons

for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (AR 26-28) After discussing those reasons,

the ALJ wrote, “I must conclude, based upon consideration of subjective allegations weighed

against the objective medical evidence and other relevant information bearing on the issue

of credibility that the [Plaintiff] exaggerates her physical and mental complications and so

such subjective allegations must be rejected as lacking credibility.” (AR 28)

One of the reasons relied on by the ALJ for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility involved

evidence of improper drug use and her statements about that issue at the hearing. (AR 27-28)

As the ALJ pointed out, Plaintiff’s pain management doctor, Brian Page, D.O., stated in his

notes from a November 24, 2009 office visit that he had “some major concerns at this point

regarding this patient.” (AR 650) He explained she cancelled procedures, received

medication from other providers, and was not able to provide a urine sample when requested.

(Id.) His office received notice from a pharmacy review that Plaintiff received pain

medication from another provider since Dr. Page saw her last. (Id.) Dr. Page added, “She

is certainly on probation as far as we are concerned.” (Id.) In another office visit report,

dated August 6, 2009, Dr. Page indicated he discussed an “opiate contract violation” after

Plaintiff ran out of pain medication after taking more than was prescribed and then took pain

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medication from her friend. (AR 326) Plaintiff said she understood the opiate contract

violation issue. (Id.)

In addition, the ALJ referenced a report from an office visit to Desert Bloom Family

Medicine on October 4, 2010. (AR 560-562) The report reflects that a urine drug screen

showed Plaintiff tested positive for cocaine, though Plaintiff denied any street drug use. (Id.

at 562) The same report indicates Plaintiff acknowledged she had a prescription for

morphine from another doctor while being prescribed Percocet from Desert Bloom. (Id.) The

provider at Desert Bloom explained Plaintiff can obtain narcotics from only one provider and

Plaintiff must disclose who she is seeing and what she is taking. (Id.) Notably, this discovery

by the Desert Bloom provider came less than a year after Dr. Page discovered Plaintiff was

receiving medication from other providers, and just over a year after Dr. Page had discussed

an opiate contract violation with Plaintiff.

The ALJ also cited a hospital record from St. Luke’s Medical Center in Phoenix, dated

June 1, 2011, in which Manesh Zaveri, D.O., a pain management physician who was treating

Plaintiff, expressed concern over another urine drug screen that showed Plaintiff had again

tested positive for cocaine. (AR 606) Plaintiff again denied using cocaine. (Id.)

At Plaintiff’s administrative hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Plaintiff if she had used

cocaine, after explaining that the medical file showed two lab tests in which she tested

positive for cocaine. (AR 61) Plaintiff testified she had not used cocaine. (Id.) When asked

if she could explain the positive tests, she testified that she has a son who is on drugs and,

by walking into his room, she must have exposed herself to the illicit drug. (Id.) When the

ALJ followed up on that question, Plaintiff said she must have inhaled it when she walked

into her son’s room. (AR 67) As the ALJ pointed out, however, Plaintiff told a provider at

Desert Bloom on February 16, 2011, that neither of her two sons smoked or abused alcohol

or illegal drugs. (AR 543) It should also be noted that when the ALJ asked Plaintiff at the

hearing about whether her doctor talked to her about violating the narcotics agreement and

receiving morphine from one doctor while receiving Percocet from another, Plaintiff claimed

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 It appears Plaintiff first had a temporary nerve stimulator implanted in June 2010 and

then, based on the positive results, a permanent nerve stimulator was implanted in August

2010. (AR 643-645)

5

 Plaintiff reported in a September 22, 2009 questionnaire regarding daily activities

dated that she could walk a mile, and reported in a February 16, 2010 questionnaire that she

could sometimes walk a mile and a half. (AR 213-215, 239) 

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she did not remember. (AR 67)

As discussed above, in evaluating a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may rely on

ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, including testimony by the claimant that

appears less than candid. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. This credibility finding by the ALJ is

reasonable in light of Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing explaining her two positive cocaine

tests and claim she had no recollection of her discussion with her doctor, Dr. Page, about

violating the narcotics agreement appear. Moreover, as the trier of fact who conducted the

hearing, the ALJ was in the best position to make the determination whether Plaintiff was

credible and truthful. The Plaintiff’s statements about, and evidence of, possible illegal drug

use, along with what appear to be repeated violations of the narcotics agreement, objectively

diminished Plaintiff’s credibility.

A second reason relied on by the ALJ for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility involves

inconsistencies between statements Plaintiff made at the administrative hearing about her

condition and information in the medical records. For example, when the ALJ questioned

Plaintiff about the results of her June 2010 surgery4

 in which a lumbar nerve stimulator was

implanted, Plaintiff testified she was doing well for a while but started to go downhill about

a month after the surgery. (AR 68) When the ALJ then questioned Plaintiff about her ability

to walk a mile, as Plaintiff had reported she could do5

, Plaintiff testified, “That was before

I got worse,” suggesting she became unable to walk that distance after the 2010 surgery. (AR

68)

The medical records pertaining to the surgical implant, however, reflect that on

November 30, 2010, more than three months after the permanent stimulator was implanted,

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Plaintiff reported that although she still had right arm discomfort, the stimulator gave her

good relief in the painful areas, and that her narcotic use had decreased. (AR 641) The

progress note by the surgeon who performed the procedure further indicated that overall,

Plaintiff was pleased with the nerve stimulator. (Id.) 

Based on these records, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony that she “got worse” after

the implant surgery, and Plaintiff’s suggestion that she could no longer walk a mile after the

surgery, “not consistent with the medical evidence.” (AR 27) Additionally, he found

Plaintiff’s statement that things “got worse” only a month after the surgery was not consistent

with Plaintiff’s treating records from more than three months after the surgery. (Id.)

As stated earlier, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms is a valid

basis to discount a claimant’s credibility. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Here, the ALJ

identified Plaintiff’s statements at the hearing regarding her condition shortly after the

surgery as inconsistent with what she told her own surgeon three months after the surgery.

Those inconsistencies suggest Plaintiff, through her hearing testimony, was attempting to

make her condition appear more restrictive than it actually was. 

Although the ALJ provided several additional reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s

symptom testimony, the Court finds the foregoing reasons sufficient to support the ALJ’s

credibility determination. The Court, therefore, need not address the remaining reasons

identified by the ALJ. The reasons discussed here satisfy the clear and convincing standard

and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court finds no error

in the ALJ’s credibility determination.

B. Reliance on State Agency Physicians

Plaintiff next contends the ALJ erred by relying on non-examining state agency

physicians when determining Plaintiff’s work capacity. Plaintiff asserts their opinions alone

may not serve as substantial evidence to deny benefits. Plaintiff further claims the

physicians’ assessments are not properly supported and, as a result, should not have been

accorded “greater weight” by the ALJ.

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The medical opinions of three types of medical sources are recognized in Social

Security cases: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine

but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor

treat the claimant (non-examining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.

1996). The opinion of a treating physician is generally entitled to more weight than the

opinion of a non-treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical

professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture” of a claimant’s medical

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

 “The opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining or a treating

physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). When the

opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians, however, “are consistent with

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record,” those opinions may serve as

substantial evidence. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ first explained there are no opinions in the record from treating or examining

medical sources indicating Plaintiff has greater limitations than those found by the ALJ. (AR

30) The ALJ, therefore, gave “greater weight” to the opinions of two non-examining

physicians, Ernest Griffith, M.D., and James J. Green, M.D. (AR 30) Dr. Griffith prepared

a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, dated November 18, 2009. (AR 446-

453) Dr. Green prepared a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment on April 26,

2010, as part of the reconsideration process after Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied.

(AR 91-93, 105-107) 

Dr. Griffith opined in his assessment that Plaintiff can lift and/or carry twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for a total of six hours in an eighthour workday; sit for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday; and is limited in her

lower extremities with regard to pushing and pulling. (AR 447) He stated Plaintiff can never

climb a ladder, rope or scaffolds, and that she can never crawl. (AR 448) He further

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6 “Brachial plexus” is a complex network of nerves that is formed chiefly by the lower

four cervical nerves and the first thoracic nerve, lies partly within the axilla (armpit), and

supplies nerves to the chest, shoulder and arms. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited March 20, 2014).

7 “Radiculopathy” means irritation of or injury to a nerve root (as from being

compressed) that typically causes pain, numbness, or weakness in the part of the body which

is supplied with nerves from that root. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited March 20, 2014).

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indicated that Plaintiff can occasionally reach with her right arm and can frequently do

handling, fingering, and feeling with her right hand. (Ar 449) He found no visual or

communicative limitations. (AR 449-450) The only environmental limitations the ALJ found

Plaintiff should avoid were concentrated exposure to vibration and hazards, such as,

machinery and heights. (AR 450)

Dr. Griffith explained the basis for the exertional limitations by referencing the

cervical diskectomies and fusions performed on Plaintiff in April 2008. (AR 447) He wrote

that the procedure provided Plaintiff relief from the pain in her upper right extremity for a

few months, but the symptoms returned along with biceps tendonitis. (Id.) Examination in

February 2009 disclosed full shoulder range of motion with possible signs of tendonitis. (Id.)

Attempts to determine the basis for recurrent radiating pain into the right upper extremity

disclosed no abnormality on a brachial plexus6

 CT, and only slight changes of a “C8/T1

radiculopathy”7

 on the right side. (Id.) A cervical spine MRI was unchanged from earlier

ones. Epidurals did not improve Plaintiff’s symptoms and examinations showed no hard

positive neurological signs of impairment in her upper extremities. (Id.) Finally, on the last

page, Dr. Griffith wrote that Plaintiff’s complaints seem to exceed the objective findings.

(AR 451)

Dr. Green’s assessment contained essentially the same limitations as Dr. Griffith’s

assessment with only slight differences. For example, Dr. Green found no crawling

restrictions even though Dr. Griffith determined Plaintiff should never crawl. (AR 92, 448)

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With respect to the limitations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to lift, carry, stand, walk and sit,

the two assessments were the same. (AR 91-93; 105-107; 446-453) At the end of his

assessment, Dr. Green provided the following explanation:

After a review of the medical records, the initial light RFC [assessment of Dr.

Griffith] is hereby affirmed. This 42 [year old] female had cervical

diskectomies from C5 to C7 in [April] 2008. She has right proximal upper

extremity pain, of unknown etiology. There isn’t evidence for radiculopathy.

Pain has been labeled as tendonitis.

(AR 93, 107)

The ALJ gave weight to Dr. Griffith’s and Dr. Green’s assessments because they were

“not inconsistent with the greater objective record, particularly regarding the finding that the

claimant has no significant limitations precluding all work, even taking into account the

problems with her right shoulder/arm, neck, back, and depression.” (AR 30) The ALJ found

the doctors “provided specific reasons for their opinions about [Plaintiff’s] functional

limitations.” (Id) The ALJ further stated the “opinions consistently opined that the claimant

would have the capacity to perform a range of light exertional work, with right extremity

overhead reaching restrictions and limited to simple work, and [were] soundly based on the

objective findings, progress notes and treating notes.” (Id) Finally, the ALJ found the

doctors’ opinions were consistent with the overall medical evidence of record. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims there are two problems with the ALJ’s reliance on the opinions of Drs.

Griffith and Green. First, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ may not rely on these opinions alone to

provide the substantial evidence upon which the ALJ’s decision was based to deny benefits.

The ALJ’s decision, however, clearly establishes that the ALJ was not relying solely on these

opinions to support his conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. The ALJ expressly noted that

his determination was based on several factors, including the medical treating and progress

notes, the objective clinical findings, the psychological evaluator’s assessment, the

assessments of Drs. Griffith and Green, and Plaintiff’s activities, all of which he discussed

in his decision. (AR 30) The Court finds the ALJ properly relied on other substantial

evidence to support his decision in addition to the assessments of Drs. Griffith and Green.

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Plaintiff’s second claim of improper reliance on the State agency physicians’ opinions

is based on Plaintiff’s contention that these opinions are not properly supported. Plaintiff

claims Dr. Griffith’s assessment contains “no explanation other than ‘Complaints seem to

exceed objective findings.’” (Doc. 22 at 22) Plaintiff, however, is mistaken. As discussed

above, Dr. Griffith explained that the medical evidence he relied upon to arrive at the

exertional limitations set forth in his assessment. (AR 447) He addressed Plaintiff’s fusion

and diskectomy surgery in April 2008 and how subsequent tests failed to show a basis for

Plaintiff’s recurring radiating pain in her right upper extremity. (AR 447) It appears Plaintiff

may have simply failed to see Dr. Griffith’s explanation for the limitations set forth in his

assessment. 

Likewise, as discussed above, Dr. Green’s assessment contained an explanation to

support his RFC assessment, again referencing Plaintiff’s 2008 surgery and subsequent pain

of unknown etiology in the right upper extremity. (AR 93, 107) He explained there is no

evidence of radiculopathy and the pain has been identified as tendonitis. (Id.) 

The Court finds the assessments of Drs. Griffith and Green are sufficiently supported

by reference to relevant medical evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court finds no error

in the ALJ’s reliance on these assessments to support his RFC determination.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and free from harmful legal error.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk

of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and terminate this

appeal.

Dated this 24th day of March, 2014.

Case 2:12-cv-02586-LOA Document 28 Filed 03/24/14 Page 14 of 14