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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14-5306 September Term, 2015

 FILED ON: DECEMBER 18, 2015

REBECCA R. GRAY,

APPELLANT

v.

ANTHONY FOXX, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-02188)

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal of a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

was presented to the Court, and briefed and argued by counsel. The Court has accorded the

issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See

D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the District Court’s determination be affirmed. 

It is clear that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. Summary

judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A movant is entitled to

summary judgment when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable

inferences in the non-movant’s favor, could not return a verdict for the non-movant.” Walker v.

Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “[T]he defendant need only identify the ways in

which the plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to support a reasonable

jury to find in her favor on one or more essential elements of her claim.” Grimes v. District of

Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

We begin with a summary of the relevant facts, taken in the light most favorable to

Appellant, the non-movant below. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In April 1999, Rebecca Gray began working as a Human Factors Analyst for Innovative

Solutions International providing support services to the Federal Aviation Administration

USCA Case #14-5306 Document #1589288 Filed: 12/18/2015 Page 1 of 6
(“FAA”). In 2001, she accepted a position providing similar services for the FAA with L-3

Communications Titan (“Titan”), a subcontractor for Hi-Tec, which was a contractor for the

FAA. While working for Titan, Glen Hewitt of the FAA directed Gray’s day-to-day work and

received her work product. Hewitt, in turn, reported to Dr. Paul Krois, the Acting Program

Director for the FAA’s Human Factors Group. 

In July 2005, Gray applied for two positions with the FAA’s Human Factors Group. The

initial evaluation of qualified candidates rated Gray a 10 – the highest score given. One other

candidate, Michael Snow, also received a 10. Following a secondary evaluation, Gray’s total

evaluation score was lowered to an 8 because of problems with “[p]ersonal relations,”

“deadlines,” “multitasking,” and “effectiveness.” J.A. 161. This adjustment resulted in another

four candidates receiving higher evaluation scores than Gray. Snow, the highest rated candidate,

turned down the job offer, and Edmundo Sierra, a male in his early thirties, and Glen Gallaway,

another male, were selected for the positions. Gray contends that she possessed over thirty

years’ experience in the Human Factors field, including ten years operating her own business. 

Gray had also worked with the Human Factors Group for nearly seven years, while Sierra and

Gallaway had worked with the Human Factors Group for four and three years, respectively. 

Sierra and Gallaway possessed master’s degrees, while Gray possessed only a bachelor’s degree. 

Around the time of Gray’s application, the Human Factors Group employed only one woman. 

According to Gray, women who worked with the Human Factors Group were subjected to poor

treatment and were dissatisfied with the working environment. Additionally, during her time

with the FAA, Hewitt yelled and screamed at Gray. 

On December 6, 2005, Gray met with Joan Bauerlein, the FAA’s Director of Research

Engineering and Krois’s supervisor, to complain about her experience with the Human Factors

Group and suggest she was not being used to her full ability. Later, after learning that Sierra and

Gallaway were hired for the positions she applied for, Gray asked Hewitt and Krois why she was

not hired for the positions. According to Gray, they both claimed the position required an

aircraft certification background, a qualification that did not appear in the vacancy notices and

that Sierra and Gallaway did not possess. Additionally, Hewitt and Dino Piccione, another FAA

supervisor, told her she could do “nothing” to improve her prospects of being hired in the future. 

According to Gray, she filed an informal EEO complaint on January 6, 2006. On January

18, 2006, Russ Chew, the COO for the Air Traffic Organization, visited the Human Factors

office and met with members of the staff. Gray interrupted the meeting in ways that Hewitt

considered “inappropriate.” J.A. 207. Following the meeting, Piccione, Hewitt, and Krois

exchanged emails discussing what they considered to be Gray’s inappropriate conduct during the

meeting. Afterward, Krois met with a member of Hi-Tec’s team who promised to talk to a

member of Titan’s team about Gray’s behavior. Additionally, Gray was scheduled to present at

a discussion on Human Factors requirements on February 9, 2006, but she was removed from

speaking at the presentation and relegated to a notetaking position. Gray also was excluded from

meeting the new Human Factors Group director. Gray filed a formal EEO complaint on March

16, 2006. 

1

Gray’s brief claims she filed her formal complaint on March 26, 2006, but the actual date on the formal complaint is 1

March 16, 2006. J.A. 174.

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In 2007, Hewitt again documented what he considered to be Gray’s unprofessional

behavior. In April 2008, Hewitt informed Gray that her position with the FAA would be

eliminated due to budget restraints, and her last day with the FAA was April 30, 2008. On June

13, 2008, Gray filed another complaint with the EEOC. On December 9, 2011, Gray filed a

complaint in the District Court against the Secretary of Transportation (“the Secretary”), alleging

the following four counts: 1) unlawful failure to hire because of gender; 2) hostile work

environment; 3) unlawful failure to hire because of age; and 4) unlawful retaliation. 

Gray contends that she was not hired for the two positions for which she applied because

she is a woman. To state a prima facie case of discrimination using the burden shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), “a plaintiff must allege

she is part of a protected class under Title VII, she suffered a cognizable adverse employment

action, and the action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Walker, 798 F.3d at 1091. 

“If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden shifts to the employer to identify the legitimate,

non-discriminatory . . . reason on which it relied in taking the complained-of action.” Id. The

Secretary asserts that Gray was not hired because the two candidates who were hired possessed

better qualifications. When an employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

decision and moves for summary judgment, the McDonnell Douglas framework falls away, and

the court must simply determine whether “the employee produced sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual

reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of . . .

sex.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). To determine

whether a reasonable jury could find in Gray’s favor, we must consider “all the evidence,

including (1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the

employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination

that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements

or attitudes on the part of the employer).” Salazar v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 401 F.3d 504,

508 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prove pretext, Gray must show that

“the qualifications gap [is] great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson

v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 

Gray contends that her years of additional experience, both prior to and including her

time with the FAA, outweighed Sierra’s and Gallaway’s experience and education. However,

this alleged qualifications gap is not inherently indicative of discrimination. Additionally, Gray

contends the change in her candidate score demonstrates that “the selection process had been

corrupted in favor of Sierra and Gallaway.” Brief of Appellant, Gray v. Foxx, No. 14-5306

(D.C. Cir.), Doc. No. 1551442, at 22. Although “an unexplained inconsistency [in an application

process] can justify an inference of discriminatory motive,” Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085,

1093 (D.C. Cir. 2003), Gray presents no evidence that the two rounds of evaluations were not the

normal method for selecting candidates for these positions. Finally, Gray contends that the

relative numbers of male and female employees, as well as past complaints from women

revealed during the EEO investigation, support an inference of discrimination. However, the

significance of the relative number of employees who are members of the protected class is

limited because “[i]n individual disparate treatment cases . . . statistical evidence is less

significant because the ultimate issue is whether the particular plaintiff was the victim of an

illegitimately motivated employment decision.” Hairston v. Vance-Cooks, 773 F.3d 266, 274-75

USCA Case #14-5306 Document #1589288 Filed: 12/18/2015 Page 3 of 6
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Furthermore,

because we know little “about the nature, merit, or outcome of th[e]se complaints,” past

complaints have limited probative value and do not create a genuine issue of material fact about

whether Gray was passed over because of her sex. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 900; see also Hairston,

773 F.3d at 274 (finding no genuine issue of material fact where employee “relie[d] on

discrimination complaints filed in the past to establish institutional discrimination”).

Gray also contends that she was not hired for one of the positions for which she applied

because she is over the age of 40. The Secretary asserts that Gray was not hired because Sierra’s

qualifications were better than Gray’s. Accordingly, Gray must produce evidence sufficient for

a reasonable jury to find the Secretary’s reason pretextual and that the Secretary intentionally

discriminated against Gray because of her age. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198

(D.C. Cir. 2008). Gray’s evidence regarding her relative qualifications fails to support a claim of

age discrimination for the same reasons it fails to support a claim of sex discrimination. Gray’s

only additional argument in support of age discrimination is that Sierra, who was hired for one of

the two positions, is younger than she. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Gray,

do not establish that Gray “lost out because of [her] age.” Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,

310 F.3d 758, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.

308, 312 (1996)). Additionally, the fact that Gray applied for two positions and one of those

positions was filled by Gallaway, who was older than Gray, undercuts Gray’s claim of age

discrimination. See Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “a

replacement within the same protected class cuts strongly against any inference of

discrimination” but explaining that “[t]his does not mean that a jury could never infer

discrimination where the plaintiff was replaced by a member of the same protected class”).

Gray further argues that her removal from the presentation, exclusion from the meeting,

emails critical of her performance, and ultimate termination were in retaliation for complaining

about discriminatory treatment. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must

show “(1) that [s]he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that [s]he suffered a materially

adverse action by h[er] employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Jones v.

Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Once a plaintiff establishes the prima facie case,

the burden switches to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

action. Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Wiley v. Glassman, 511

F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). If the employer meets this burden, “the court

should proceed to the question of retaliation vel non. The court can resolve that question in

favor of the employer based either upon the employee’s failure to rebut its explanation or upon

the employee’s failure to prove an element of her case,” including whether an “employer took a

materially adverse action against” the employee. Id. An employer cannot retaliate against an

employee unless the employer has knowledge of the protected activity, and in order to survive

summary judgment, an employee must “offer circumstantial evidence that could reasonably

support an inference that they did.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 679.

Gray has not submitted any evidence to show that the actions she endured constitute the

type of materially adverse action to support a claim of retaliation. Gray’s removal from a

presentation does not qualify as a materially adverse action because Gray offers no evidence that

her removal “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Baird v. Gotbaum (Baird I), 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting

USCA Case #14-5306 Document #1589288 Filed: 12/18/2015 Page 4 of 6
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). Gray has submitted no

evidence that her removal “was anything other than a trivial harm, if that.” Wiley, 511 F.3d at

161. Furthermore, Gray’s filing of her formal EEO complaint after being removed from the

presentation undercuts any argument that a reasonable worker would be dissuaded from filing a

charge of discrimination after removal from the presentation. Likewise, Gray offers no evidence

that her exclusion from meeting the new director amounted to anything more than a trivial harm. 

Similarly, Gray cannot show that the emails were a materially adverse action. Although we do

not appear to have addressed this precise circumstance in the past, emails critical of an

employee’s performance are “akin to the sort of public humiliation or loss of reputation that we

have consistently classified as falling below the requirements for an adverse employment

action.” Baird I, 662 F.3d at 1249 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Gray filed her

formal complaint of discrimination after the emails were exchanged. Finally, Gray’s termination

in 2008 is too far removed from her protected activity to demonstrate a causal connection. See,

e.g., Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001) (“Action taken . . . 20 months

later suggests, by itself, no causality at all.”). Gray also offers no evidence, other than her own

statements, that the Secretary’s reason for her termination, a budget shortfall, was pretextual.

Finally, Gray submits that her tenure at the FAA was marked by conduct that created a

hostile work environment. To prevail on her hostile work environment claim, Gray must show

that she was subjected “to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making

this determination, “the court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency

of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Id. “[T]he standard for severity and pervasiveness is . . . an

objective one.” Baird v. Gotbaum (Baird II), 792 F.3d 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The only

evidence submitted by Gray to support her hostile work environment claim is that Hewitt yelled

and belittled her. However, Gray does not connect his remarks to any protected status. Gray

contends that Hewitt’s treatment of her led to anxiety and depression, but subjective harm is

insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim because the test for severity and

pervasiveness is an objective one. See id. Given the lack of evidence about the frequency and

specificity of Hewitt’s remarks, Gray has not shown conduct severe or pervasive enough to give

rise to a hostile work environment claim.

USCA Case #14-5306 Document #1589288 Filed: 12/18/2015 Page 5 of 6
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any

timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C.

CIR. R. 41.

PER CURIAM

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

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