Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00713/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00713-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARLUK KHAN MAYWEATHERS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05cv0713 WQH (CAB)

ORDER

vs.

R. Q. HICKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 120) of

Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo.

Background

On April 7, 2005, Plaintiff Karluk Khan Mayweathers, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, initiated this action by filing complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (Doc. # 1). On

January 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (Doc. # 41), which

is the operative pleading in this case. The TAC alleges that on February 18, 2005, Defendants

Hunt and Trujillo, employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”) at Calipatria State Prison, impermissibly used race as a factor in assigning Plaintiff

a cellmate, in violation Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from racial

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 The TAC also alleged claims against Defendants Hickman, Woodford, Giurbino, Bennett,

Ryan, Ochoa, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. However, on March

2, 2007, the Court dismissed these Defendants from the action (Doc. # 77).

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discrimination.1

On April 18, 2008, Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 109).

Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights when assigning Plaintiff a cellmate, and that Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. On May 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed the Opposition to the Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. # 113). On May 15, 2008, Defendants filed the Reply to the

Opposition (Doc. # 118).

On May 16, 2008, Magistrate Judge Bencivengo issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that this Court grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Magistrate Judge

concluded that Defendants Hunt and Trujillo are entitled to qualified immunity because a

“reasonable official would [] not have had reason to know that the use of race as a factor in

determining housing assignments, for purposes of inmate safety and prison security, would

clearly violate a prisoner’s equal protection rights.” R&R, p. 10. The Magistrate Judge also

concluded that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief fails because Plaintiff does not

demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he will suffer future harm (Doc. # 120).

On June 16, 2008, Plaintiff filed the Objections to the Report and Recommendation

(Doc. # 121). On June 18, 2008, Defendants filed the Reply to Plaintiff’s Objections to the

Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 122).

Standard of Review

The duties of the district court in connection with a Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28

U.S.C. § 626(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Morrison v. Cook, Civil

No. 97-57-ST, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14233, at *1-2 (D. Ore. April 27, 1999) (citing

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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.

1981)) (“When a party objects to any portion of the Magistrate’s Findings and

Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the

Magistrate’s report.”).

Discussion

A. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation’s finding that Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. Objections, p. 1. Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge

erred in finding that there is no clearly established constitutional right to be free from racebased housing policies in prison on grounds that (1) several international treaties explicitly

prohibit racial discrimination in all forms, (2) the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees prisoners’ the right to be free from discrimination, (3) strict scrutiny

is the applicable standard for all race-based government classifications, and (4) the evidence

cited to justify the race-based housing policy at issue in this case is not dispositive. Id. at 2-6.

The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for courts to apply in determining

whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. “The threshold inquiry a court

must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true,

establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002) (citing Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “[T]he next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was

clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

public official that his or her conduct was unlawful in the situation he or she confronted. Id.

at 202 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). The Plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that the right is clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See May

v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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i. International Treaties

 Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that Plaintiff “does

not cite to, or provide copies of, any specific authority” to support his claim that Defendants

should have known their conduct was unlawful because “racial segregation is illegal by

International Treaty.” Objections, p. 2 (quoting R&R, p. 7). Plaintiff contends that the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Convention

on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”), and the Convention

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”)

seek to eliminate racial discrimination in all forms, and that Defendants were aware, or should

have been aware, of these laws. Objections, p. 2-4. 

Defendants respond that regardless of the existence of the international treaties cited by

Plaintiff, racial segregation in the prison context “is distinctly different from” racial

segregation in society at large, and that “segregation inside prison walls may be necessary at

times for security and discipline.” Reply, p. 2. 

A treaty ratified by the Senate can only be enforced in the courts if it is self-executing

or if implementing legislation has been passed. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.

1976). The ICCPR is not self-executing and Congress has not passed implementing

legislation. Hawkins v. Comparet-Cessani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244. 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Jama

v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 364-65 (D.N.J. 1998). The ICCPR “does not create a private right

of action or separate form of relief enforceable in the United States courts.” Guaylupo-Moya

v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2005). The CAT does not give rise to a private right

of action. Akhtar v. Reno, 123 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (holding that because

the CAT is notself-executing, itsterms do not give rise to a private cause of action);see Rotar

v. PlacerCounty SuperiorCourt, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28212 (E.D.Cal. 2007). The ICERD

does not give rise to a private right of action. Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 101

(D.D.C. 2005); see Rotar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28212. The Court concludes that Plaintiff

has not demonstrated that he has clearly established rights under the ICCPR, CAT or ICERD

because none of these treaties give rise to a private right of action. 

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ii. Equal Protection

Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that it is not clear

whether “the Equal Protection Clause protected prisoners from having their race used as one

of many factors, for security purposes, in assigning cellmates.” Objections, p. 4 (quoting R&R,

p. 8). Plaintiff contends that “he was protected against invidious discrimination on the basis

of race under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment,” and that the prison

officials’ “vague” fear that integration “may result in violence” does not justify the suspension

of prisoners’ constitutional rights. Id. at 4. 

Defendants contend that the declarations of David Tristan and Robert Borg, and the

statistical evidence submitted by Defendants demonstrate“CDCR’s concerns about racial and

gang violence,” and support the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the use of race as a factor

in the housing decisions at issue in this case was constitutional. Reply, p. 2-3. 

The applicable standard in the Ninth Circuit at the time of the alleged constitutional

violation in this action was that a prison policy which used race as a factor had to be

“reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791,

799 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499

(2005)). Plaintiff relies on Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1979), to support

his contention that “the Equal Protection Clause protected prisoners from having their race

used as one of many factors, for security purposes, in assigning cellmates.” Objections, p. 4.

However, Stewart is distinguishable because in Stewart, the court emphasized that the

defendant prison officials failed to make any showing whatsoever that their stated fears of

racial and gang violence. Stewart, 473 F.Supp at 1187-88. In the present action, Defendants

have submitted evidence to demonstrate the prison’s concerns about racial and gang violence.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the prison policy at issue in this action was not “reasonably

related to a legitimate penological interest.” Johnson, 321 F.3d at 799. The Court concludes

that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that, at the time of the alleged constitutional violation,

the Equal Protection Clause clearly prevented the consideration of race as one of many factors,

for security purposes, in assigning cellmates. 

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iii. Strict Scrutiny 

Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that “[a]t the time of

the alleged constitutional violation, the applicable standard in the NinthCircuit wasthat a racebased prison policy only had to be reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”

Objections, p. 5; see R&R, p. 10. Plaintiff contends that “[s]trict scrutiny is the applicable

standard for all race-based government classifications,” and that this “law was clearly

established” at the time the events providing the basis for Plaintiff’s lawsuit occurred.

Objections. p. 5. 

Defendants contend the Magistrate Judge did not err in determining the standard of

review. Defendants state that while “strict scrutiny is now applied to race-based prison

housing regulations, the law was unclear” in 2005, when the housing decision about which

Plaintiff complains was made. Reply, p. 3 (emphasis in original). Defendants further contend

that the Magistrate Judge did not reach “the substantive issue of whether the CDCR’s housing

regulations passed strict scrutiny” because the report “assumed arguendo that Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were violated.” Id. at 4. 

As previously discussed, at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, the

applicable standard in the Ninth Circuit was that a prison policy which used race as a factor

had to be “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Johnson, 321 F.3d at 799.

At the time of the alleged constitutional violation, the applicable standard in the Ninth Circuit

was not strict scrutiny. The Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge did not err in

determining the standard of review. 

iv. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that Defendants have

provided extensive evidence outlining the safety and security concerns that supported the use

of race as a factor in determining housing compatibility. Objections, p. 6; see R&R, p. 8-9.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ “‘evidence,’ statistics and other boilerplate mixes apples

with oranges;” that Defendants failed to “cite any integrated cell violence;” and that a “ten

year study” demonstrates that “the rate of violence between inmates segregated by race in

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double cells surpassed the rate among those racially integrated.” Objections. P. 6 (emphasis

in original) (citing The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding of the Consequences

of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 Law & Society Review 743 (2002)). 

Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s argument is not relevant because the Magistrate

Judge assumed arguendo that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, and did not reach

the substantive issue of whether the evidence supported CDCR’s housing regulations. Reply,

p. 4. 

The Magistrate Judge assumed arguendo that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been

violated in determining whether Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. In

determining whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established, the Magistrate

Judge cited Defendants’ evidence of racially motivated violence and riots in the prison. The

Court concludes that the evidence submitted by Defendants supports the conclusion that

Defendants “could have rationally believed that considering race as a factor when determining

Plaintiff’s housing assignment was reasonably related to the penological goals of inmate safety

and prison security.” R&R, p. 9. The Court concludes that Defendants submitted sufficient

evidence to demonstrate the safety and security concerns that supported the use of race as a

factor in determining housing compatibility. 

B. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff contends that he “may be moved to another facility” due to the “current

overcrowding at CSP Solano.” Objections, p. 8. Plaintiff objects to the Report and

Recommendation’s conclusions that “even if [Plaintiff] is re-assigned to a different facility,

the likelihood of future harm is minimal because the CDCR has revised its housing

procedures;” that the “new regulations, which are being implemented in phases . . . specifically

state that race will no longer be considered as a primary factor in determining housing

assignments;” and that Plaintiff “lacks standing to sue on behalf of others” because he “is no

longer suffering his alleged injury of racial segregation.” Objections, p.8; see R&R, p. 11-12.

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Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not cite any housing move currently under

consideration or being recommended for him but instead “speculates” that he may be moved;

that Plaintiff fails to show a demonstrated probability or a reasonable expectation that he would

be incarcerated in a celled institution before integrated housing policies are implemented; and

that integrated housing regulations are already being implemented and are scheduled to be

effective in all CDCR institutions by January, 2009. Reply, p. 5. 

The record demonstrates that Plaintiff is no longer housed in a cell at Calipatria, but is

instead housed in a dormitory facility at Solano Prison. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence

to demonstrate that a future transfer is likely or imminent. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (“The speculative nature of [the plaintiff’s] claim of future injury

requires a finding that this prerequisite of equitable relief has not been fulfilled.”). The Court

concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a significant threat of irreparable injury that

would give rise to injunctive relief. 

Conclusion

The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation de novo. IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 120) is ADOPTED. The Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 109) is GRANTED.

DATED: October 21, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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