Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04322/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04322-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LEARNING TECHNOLOGY 

PARTNERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNIVERSITY OF THE INCARNATE 

WORD, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-4322-PJH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION 

 Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of a portion of the court’s 

pretrial order. Having read the papers filed in conjunction with the motion and carefully 

considered the arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, 

the court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion as follows. 

 Through this motion, plaintiff Learning Technology Partners (“plaintiff” or “LTP”) 

asks the court to reconsider the portion of its pretrial order holding that plaintiff is 

precluded from alleging that the exclusivity provision of the parties’ contract was 

breached prior to 2013. See Dkt. 116 at 5-6. The court based its ruling on an 

interrogatory response of plaintiff’s, where it was asked to identify all facts related to the 

alleged exclusivity breach, and responded that “the breach began no later than 2013.” 

See id. (citing Dkt. 83-2, Ex. F at 7). 

 At the pretrial conference, the court noted that plaintiff was now contending that 

the first breach may have occurred as early as 2010, or even earlier, and asked plaintiff’s 

counsel why they did not supplement the interrogatory response. Plaintiff’s counsel 

Case 4:14-cv-04322-PJH Document 140 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 8
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responded by telling the court that he did not know of the earlier breach until taking 

defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. See Dkt. 133 at 64. The court then asked “when 

you took the depositions and realized that the conduct preceded this date” (referring to 

2013), “did you supplement your disclosures to assert the breach?” Id. at 69. Plaintiff’s 

counsel answered that he did not, because of the discovery judge’s “standing order that 

says you can’t supplement your disclosures after 30 days before the close of discovery.” 

Id. The court expressed skepticism that “a judge of this court would preclude people 

from” supplementing their responses, especially in light of Rule 26(e)’s imposition of a 

duty to supplement; and indeed, the discovery order in question expressly referenced 

Rule 26(e)’s duty to supplement, and then provided that “[i]n addition to the general 

requirements of Rule 26(e)(1), the parties will supplement and/or correct all previously 

made disclosures and discovery responses 28 days before the fact discovery cutoff 

date.” See Dkt. 34 at 2. Thus, the discovery order did not preclude the parties from 

supplementing their responses, but rather required the parties to supplement 28 days 

before the close of discovery, and reiterated the parties’ separate and ongoing duty to 

supplement. 

 On this motion, plaintiff takes a different tack. Rather than arguing that it was 

precluded from supplementing its interrogatory response, it now argues that there was no 

need to supplement the response, because the information about the pre-2013 breach 

was already known to defendant. In its motion for reconsideration, plaintiff provides a 

bullet-pointed list of evidence purporting to show defendant’s knowledge of the pre-2013 

breach theory. 

 The first piece of evidence is the original complaint filed in this case in August 

2014, which alleged that defendant’s chief technology officer “discussed the use of the 

competing service Blackboard in a YouTube video posted in 2011.” Dkt. 123 at 4 (citing 

Dkt. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 42(a)). However, despite making this allegation in the complaint, it 

appears that plaintiff has abandoned its contention that defendant’s use of Blackboard in 

2011 (or earlier) constituted an exclusivity breach. In fact, in this very motion, plaintiff 

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cites to the deposition testimony of its own Rule 30(b)(6) witness (which will be discussed 

further below), and describes it as follows: “UIW asked what LTP considered to be 

breaching conduct, and LTP identified two violations: (1) the use of Blackboard in 2014, 

and (2) ‘the use of Apex early on.’” Dkt. 123 at 4-5 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, 

in its request for leave to file this motion for reconsideration, plaintiff argued that it sought 

reconsideration in order to present evidence “that it alleged that UIW breached the 

exclusivity provision as early as 2010 by using a competing product called Apex Learning 

for its online high school, UIW Prep.” Dkt. 117 at 2 (emphasis added). Indeed, plaintiff’s 

motion for leave made no mention of a pre-2013 use of Blackboard, only a pre-2013 use 

of Apex. It appears that plaintiff is attempting to muddle the issue by treating Blackboard 

and Apex interchangeably, at least for purposes of this motion. However, if plaintiff 

intends to show that defendant was on notice of its theory that the pre-2013 use of Apex 

constituted an exclusivity breach, it cannot make that showing by pointing to an allegation 

regarding the pre-2013 use of Blackboard. Thus, the court finds that the complaint’s 

reference to a YouTube video demonstrating the use of Blackboard is irrelevant to the 

current motion. 

 Next, plaintiff points to a discovery dispute that occurred between May and June 

2015. Plaintiff argues that it filed a motion to compel, in part to obtain documents 

showing defendant’s use of Apex, and that “UIW agreed to and did produce some 

invoices.” Dkt. 123 at 4. Plaintiff also attaches one of the invoices, which “demonstrates 

UIW’s use of Apex back to 2010.” Id. However, while defendant surely knew that it used 

Apex at least as early as 2010, there is no indication that plaintiff gave notice to 

defendant that it considered such use to be an exclusivity breach. In fact, plaintiff cites a 

portion of its motion to compel where it stated that it “has evidence that the software it 

provided to UIW was linked at least to that of its competitors, Datatel and Apex” (Dkt. 123 

at 4 (citing Dkt. 29 at 11)), but there is no indication that it now considers defendant’s use 

of Datatel to constitute a breach. Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why this discovery 

dispute would have put defendant on notice that its use of Apex was considered to be a 

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breach, but its use of Datatel was not. Thus, the court finds the production of Apexrelated documents to bear little relevance to the current motion. 

 Next, plaintiff cites to the previously-mentioned deposition of its Rule 30(b)(6) 

designee, Reda Athanasios. And as mentioned above, when asked what LTP 

considered to be breaching conduct, Athanasios “identified two violations: (1) the use of 

Blackboard in 2014, and (2) ‘the use of Apex early on.’” Dkt. 123 at 4-5 (internal citation 

omitted). Indeed, the deposition transcript bears this out, as Athanasios was asked to 

identify the conduct that constituted a breach of section 7.6 of the parties’ contract, and 

he said “I’m referring to the use of Apex early on and the use of Blackboard later on.” 

Dkt. 126, Ex. 2 at 65:18-19. Putting aside the fact that Athanasios’ reference to “early on” 

does not put defendant on notice that plaintiff was claiming a breach as early as 2010, 

defendant also points out another issue with Athanasios’ deposition testimony. Later in 

the same deposition, Athanasios was asked if he was “aware of any actual breaches of 

exclusivity provision prior to 2013,” and he said “No.” Dkt. 130, Ex. I at 228:25-229:2. 

Thus, while the deposition testimony does indicate that plaintiff considered defendant’s 

use of Apex to be a breach, it is at best vague as to timing, and at worst, it disclaims any 

breach prior to 2013. The court will revisit the effect of this testimony after considering 

the other evidence presented by the parties. 

 Next, plaintiff argues that “UIW’s questions during depositions and requests for 

admissions demonstrate that UIW understood that LTP alleged that the use of Apex 

Learning by UIW Prep back to 2010 was part of the allegations in this case.” Dkt. 123 at 

5. Plaintiff’s reference to “questions during depositions” appears to refer to the same 

testimony mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the court need not address that 

testimony again here. The referenced requests for admissions do show that defendant 

asked plaintiff to admit that it “knew of UIW’s use of Apex Learning for UIW Prep no later 

than” 2010, 2011, 2012, or 2013. Dkt. 126, Ex. 3 at 4-5. These requests for admission 

do indeed establish that defendant believed its use of Apex, going back to 2010, to be 

relevant to the case in some way, but they do not establish that defendant understood 

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that its use of Apex was considered by plaintiff to be a breach of the exclusivity provision 

of the parties’ contract. Thus, the court finds the requests for admission to be of limited 

value to the present motion. 

 Next, plaintiff argues that defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified in her 

deposition that “UIW’s main campus operated online-only classes since at least 2010.” 

Dkt. 123 at 5. However, plaintiff does not adequately explain how this testimony reflects 

any understanding that plaintiff alleged a breach of exclusivity, based on the use of Apex, 

dating back to 2010. Instead, the testimony reflects only what it says, that defendant 

“operated online-only classes since at least 2010.” Thus, the court finds this deposition 

testimony to be irrelevant to the present motion. 

 The next three pieces of evidence cited by plaintiff all come from the pretrial 

papers. Specifically, plaintiff points to its own trial brief, to defendant’s trial brief, and to 

defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s motions in limine. However, these documents were 

filed well after the close of discovery, and plaintiff cannot rely on them to establish that 

defendant had adequate notice of its theory of breach at a time when it mattered – i.e., 

when it could still seek discovery in an attempt to defend against the allegation. In 

precluding the pre-2013 evidence of breach, the court held that plaintiff “is not permitted 

to change its theory of the case on the eve of trial,” and the court will not reconsider that 

ruling on the basis of documents that were filed on the eve of trial. Thus, the court finds 

the trial briefs and the motion in limine papers to have no bearing on the current motion. 

 Finally, plaintiff seeks to introduce its written mediation brief as further evidence 

that it provided notice of its breach theory to defendant. However, this court’s local rules 

specifically prohibit the parties from disclosing their mediation briefs to the assigned 

judge. ADR L.R. 6-12(a)(2). Accordingly, the court will not consider plaintiff’s mediation 

brief. 

 Thus, having considered all of the evidence cited by plaintiff, the court is left with 

the deposition testimony of plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, who testified that the use of 

Apex “early on” constituted a breach, and who also testified in the same deposition that 

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he was not aware of any breach prior to 2013. However, before determining whether this 

testimony is sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the challenged portion of the pretrial 

order, the court will first consider the evidence cited by defendant. In particular, the court 

finds highly relevant a sequence of events occurring between May and June 2015. 

 Defendant cites to an email exchange between its counsel and plaintiff’s former 

counsel on May 5, 2015, in which they discuss the substance of an apparent telephone 

call between them. Plaintiff’s counsel wrote: “You told me during our call that LTP’s 

software was linked to Apex for UIW Prep. You told me that this was done with LTP’s 

authorization. My client informs me that this is not true.” Dkt. 130, Ex. C at 1. 

Defendant’s counsel then responded: “With respect to Apex, my understanding is that it 

was used at the same time as Izio.” Id. 

 About a month later, on June 4, 2015, plaintiff responded to a set of interrogatories 

propounded by defendant. One of them asked plaintiff to “[s]tate all facts related to your 

allegations in paragraphs 41-42 of the complaint that UIW breached section 7.6 of the 

contract” (referring to the exclusivity provision). Dkt. 130, Ex. E at 6. After making a 

number of objections, plaintiff then answered that “UIW breached section 7.6 by using 

other providers of Content Management and Learning Management systems for several 

distance education Content Management and Learning Management Systems,” and then 

specifically addressed the alleged breach related to UIW Prep. Specifically, plaintiff 

stated that it “believes the breach began no later than 2013, when UIW stopped enrolling 

students in the UIW Preparatory School IZIO classes.” Id. at 7. There is no mention of 

Apex, even though counsel had discussed defendant’s use of Apex “at the same time as 

Izio” one month beforehand. Interestingly, while there is no mention of Apex in the 

interrogatory response, the response does specifically mention defendant’s use of 

Blackboard “starting in at least in [sic] June 2014.” Id.1 

 

1

 The court also notes that there is no mention of the 2011 YouTube video showing 

defendant’s use of Blackboard, which provides further support for the conclusion that 

plaintiff abandoned that allegation sometime after including it in the complaint. 

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 The timing of these interrogatory responses clarifies the court’s understanding of 

the issue. Whereas the court previously understood the issue as centering around 

plaintiff’s failure to supplement an already-existing interrogatory response under Rule 

26(e), the new evidence shows that the issue is actually about plaintiff’s failure to provide 

a complete interrogatory response in the first instance. And while plaintiff’s subsequent 

Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony does attempt to re-insert Apex into the case, it cannot 

overcome plaintiff’s failure to mention either Apex, or any pre-2013 breach, in its 

interrogatory response. 

 Finally, even if the issue were limited to plaintiff’s failure to supplement, the court 

notes that, in this case, the language of Rule 26(e) does not support plaintiff’s position 

that, if the pre-2013 breach theory was already known to defendant, there was no duty to 

supplement. The rule provides that a party has a duty to supplement: 

(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the 

disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or 

corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other 

parties during the discovery process or in writing, or 

(B) as ordered by the court. 

 

 The court notes that subsection (B) does not contain any exception for a scenario 

where “the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to 

the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” In other words, if the court 

orders supplementation under subsection (B), all incomplete or incorrect information must 

be supplemented, regardless of the other party’s knowledge. And as mentioned above, 

Judge Laporte ordered the parties to “supplement and/or correct all previously made 

disclosures and discovery responses 28 days before the fact discovery cutoff date.” Dkt. 

34 at 2. As the fact discovery cutoff date was August 14, 2015, the deadline for 

supplementation was July 17, 2015. Thus, even if plaintiff believed that defendant was 

aware of its pre-2013 breach theory, it still had a duty to supplement its interrogatory 

response by that date, per Judge Laporte’s order. In light of plaintiff’s failure to disclose 

Case 4:14-cv-04322-PJH Document 140 Filed 01/28/16 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

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Case 4:14-cv-04322-PJH Document 140 Filed 01/28/16 Page 8 of 8