Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02060/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chad Robert Lee Kitt, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

David Shinn, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-19-02060-PHX-DWL (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Chad Robert Lee Kitt’s (“Petitioner”) “First Amended 

“under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “First Amended Petition”) 

(Doc. 13). For the reasons explained herein, the undersigned recommends that the Court 

dismiss the First Amended Petition (Doc. 13) as untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2002, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on (i) eight 

counts of sexual conduct with a minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against 

children and (ii) three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, class 2 felonies and

dangerous crimes against children. (Bates Nos. 1-6).1 On December 16, 2002, Petitioner

1 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer 

(Doc. 15) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page 

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entered into a plea agreement in which Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of molestation

of a child and two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor. (Bates Nos. 15-18). 

The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Bates Nos. 19-20). On February 7, 

2003, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of forty years in prison, followed by 

lifetime probation. (Bates Nos. 21-25). 

On June 23, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”).

2

 

(Bates Nos. 28-30). The trial court dismissed the PCR Notice as untimely. (Bates Nos.

31-33). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

granted review, but denied relief. (Bates Nos. 34-46). Petitioner did not seek further 

review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Bates No. 47). 

In March 2019, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 1). The 

Court allowed Petitioner to file the First Amended Petition (Doc. 13). Respondents filed 

a Limited Answer on July 26, 2019 (Doc. 15). Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 16).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

110 Stat. 1214,3a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within one 

year of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

 

of the record.

2 Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a prisoner’s state filings are deemed “filed” 

when they are delivered to prison officials for mailing. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 

568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the clerk of court file-stamped the PCR Notice on June

26, 2017, but Petitioner dated it June 23, 2017. (Bates No. 30). The PCR Notice does 

not indicate whether it was mailed to the trial court via the prison mailing system, and if 

so, the date it was given to prison staff for mailing. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 

1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (to receive benefit of prison mailbox rule, petitioner must be 

acting without assistance of counsel and must deliver filing to prison officials for 

forwarding to clerk of court). However, as it does not affect the outcome and

Respondents have used June 23, 2017 as the PCR Notice’s filing date, the undersigned 

has given Petitioner the benefit of the prison mailbox rule for purposes of calculating the 

timeliness of this proceeding.

3 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas 

petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state 

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. This Proceeding is Untimely 

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).4 For purposes of the limitations period, “[f]inal judgment in a criminal 

case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S 147, 

156 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Typically “direct review” means a defendant’s direct appeal following his or her 

convictions and sentencing. But under Arizona law, a defendant in a non-capital case

who pleads guilty waives his or her right to a direct appeal. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–

4033(B). A plea-convicted defendant, however, is entitled to a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. 

Under Ninth Circuit case law, an Arizona defendant’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See 

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 

explained that “treating the Rule 32 of-right proceeding as a form of direct review helps 

make the Arizona Constitution’s guarantee of ‘the right to appeal in all cases’ a 

functioning reality rather than a mere form of words.” Id. at 717. Therefore, when an 

Arizona petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding is of-right, AEDPA’s statute of limitations does 

not begin to run until the conclusion of review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. See id.

Here, Petitioner was sentenced on February 7, 2003. (Bates Nos. 21-25). 

Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.4, the deadline for filing a PCR 

 

4 Ground Four of the First Amended Petition states: “A significant change in 

law/constitutional law/constitutional ruling which could not be raised prior to the filing of 

the untimely of-right Rule 32 Post-Conviction Relief Notice.” (Doc. 13 at 9). 

Respondents correctly observe that Petitioner has not asserted a claim based on a 

constitutional right newly recognized by the United States Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. (Doc. 15 at 7). Therefore, 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not provide a delayed limitations accrual date.

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notice in an of-right PCR proceeding is “ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentence . . . .” Ninety days after February 7, 2003 is May 8, 2003. Petitioner did not file 

a PCR notice within this timeframe. Therefore, Petitioner’s judgment of conviction 

became final on May 8, 2003 and the limitations period commenced on May 9, 2003. 

Consequently, unless statutory or equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline 

to file a habeas petition expired on May 8, 2004, rendering this federal habeas proceeding 

filed in 2019 untimely unless statutory or equitable tolling applies. See Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations commences upon the 

expiration of the time for seeking review of petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest 

court); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the 

“anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate 

the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations).

1. Statutory Tolling is Unavailable

Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do 

not “restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the limitations period had 

expired on May 8, 2004, Petitioner’s PCR Notice filed on June 23, 2017 had no statutory 

tolling effect. Accordingly, this proceeding is untimely unless equitable tolling applies.

2. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable

Regarding equitable tolling, Petitioner has the burden to show that extraordinary

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A petitioner’s pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005). In addition, a petitioner’s miscalculation of when the 

limitations period expired does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting 

equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see 

also Alexander v. Schriro, 312 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the 

petitioner] made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the 

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limitations period. This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting 

equitable tolling.”).

There is no indication in the record that the circumstances of Petitioner’s 

incarceration made it “impossible” for Petitioner to timely file a federal habeas petition. 

See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that equitable 

tolling was not warranted where the petitioner’s counsel failed to perfect a timely appeal, 

failed to inform the petitioner of the deadline for filing a state habeas petition, and failed 

to provide the petitioner with his case files in a timely manner, explaining that attorney 

negligence did not amount to “extraordinary circumstances” and did not prevent the 

petitioner from timely filing a federal habeas petition); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 

1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that equitable tolling did not apply where there was 

“no indication in the record that [circumstances] made it ‘impossible’ for [prisoner] to 

file on time”); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 

(allegations that the petitioner lacked legal knowledge and had to rely on other prisoners 

for legal advice and in preparing his papers “cannot justify equitable tolling” as such 

circumstances are not “extraordinary”). Petitioner has failed to show the existence of 

“extraordinary circumstances” that were the proximate cause of the untimely filing of this 

proceeding. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (for equitable

tolling to apply, a “prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the 

cause of his untimeliness”). Equitable tolling therefore is unavailable. Accordingly, 

because the limitations period was not statutorily or equitably tolled, this proceeding

is untimely. 

B. The Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway Does Not Apply to Excuse the 

Untimeliness of the Petition

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway”

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is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. 

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires 

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining 

the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner 

“must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

To the extent Petitioner asserts the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, Petitioner

has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually innocent of 

his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order to present 

otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, a petitioner must 

produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the ‘narrow class of 

cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations omitted); 

Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable 

evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of

innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding. 

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See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. App'x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through 

the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming 

forward with ‘new reliable evidence’ ”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new 

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Petition (Doc. 13) be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the First Amended 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 21st day of November, 2019.

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