Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-03166/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-03166-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John Leo Davis, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Paul Penzone, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-17-03166-PHX-DLR (BSB)

ORDER AND REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend and a proposed amended pleading. 

(Docs. 14, Attachment 1.) Defendants Penzone and Vail do not oppose the motion to 

amend, but ask the Court to screen the amended pleading. (Doc. 17.) Because the 

motion to amend is unopposed, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. 

However, the Court screens the First Amended Complaint (FAC) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) and recommends that certain claims and Defendants 

be dismissed as discussed below. 

I. Background 

 On September 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) On October 30, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff in forma 

pauperis status and screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 6.) 

The Court dismissed without prejudice Counts One through Six and Counts Eight 

through Thirteen. (Id. at 19.) The Court ordered Defendants Penzone and Vail to answer 

Count Seven in their official capacity only. (Id.) 

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 Plaintiff has filed a proposed FAC in which he abandons the first six counts and 

Count Eleven of the original complaint (OC). (Doc. 14-1 at 2-23.) Plaintiff reasserts 

Counts Seven through Ten and Counts Twelve through Thirteen and renumbers them in 

the proposed FAC as follows: 

 Count One of the FAC was Count Seven of the OC 

 Count Two of the FAC was Count Eight of the OC 

 Count Three of the FAC was Count Nine of the OC 

 Count Four of the FAC was Count Ten of the OC 

 Count Five of the FAC was Count Twelve of the OC 

 Count Six of the FAC was Count Thirteen of the OC 

(Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 14-1 at 2-23.) With the exception of Count One of the FAC 

(formerly Count Seven of the OC), the Court dismissed the claims asserted in the FAC. 

(Doc. 6.) The Court also dismissed all of the defendants sued in their individual 

capacities. (Id.) The FAC adds some additional factual allegations, but as discussed 

below, those additional allegations do not cure the deficiencies noted in the Court’s 

October 30, 2017 Order. (Id.) 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 When screening a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court must dismiss a 

complaint, or any portion of a complaint, in which a plaintiff has raised claims that are 

legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

 Additionally, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does 

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient 

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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 

plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . 

a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations 

may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other 

“more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. But as the Ninth 

Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] 

‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. 

(quoting Erickson v.Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

 In his FAC, Plaintiff asserts six counts alleging violations of his civil rights against 

Defendants Penzone, Officer A7275, Sergeant Chipel, Lieutenant A3630, Murphy, Vail, 

Nurse Tiffany, Nurse Dee, Officer B3527, Kindell-House, Miceli, and Smith. (Doc. 14-1 

at 2-5.) To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the 

defendants (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or 

immunities and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 

1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game 

Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he 

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must 

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). As set forth below, the Court reviews 

Plaintiff’s claims in the proposed FAC under these standards. 

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 A. Count One 

 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights 

regarding his conditions of confinement. (Doc. 14-1 at 6-8.) Plaintiff included this same 

claim in Count Seven of the OC. (see Doc. 6 at 8-11.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

individual capacity claims against Defendants A7275, Chipel, A3630, Murphy, Vail, and 

Penzone because Plaintiff did not allege that he notified those Defendants of his alleged 

sleep deprivation when he filed his grievance appeals. (Id. at 10.) In the FAC, Plaintiff 

alleges Defendants “were all notified” through the grievance process that a Maricopa 

County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) policy had caused Plaintiff to become sleep deprived. 

(Doc. 14-1 at 7.) Plaintiff, however, does not allege that he ever notified any particular 

defendant of his alleged sleep deprivation. 

 Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that Defendants A7275, 

Chipel, A3630, Murphy, Vail, and Penzone were deliberately indifferent to his health or 

safety in their individual capacities. Thus, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s individual 

capacity claims against Defendants A7275, Chipel, A3630, Murphy, Vail, and Penzone. 

However, as the Court found in its October 30, 2017 Order, Plaintiff states an official 

capacity claim in Count One against Defendants Vail and Penzone. (Doc. 6 at 11.) The 

Court will require Defendants Vail and Penzone to answer Count One in their official 

capacity. 

B. Count Two 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated because he received inadequate medical care. (Doc. 14-1 at 9-11.) Plaintiff 

included this same claim in Count Eight of the OC. (Doc. 1 at 15; see Doc. 6 at 11-14.) 

The Court dismissed Count Eight of the OC. (Doc. 6 at 11-12.) As discussed below, the 

Court recommends that Count Two of the FAC be dismissed. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he has taken Tylenol with codeine for two years because of a 

shoulder injury. (Doc. 14-1 at 9.) He claims that on June 2, 2017, he filed a health needs 

request form, seeking to have his Tylenol with codeine renewed because it was expiring 

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on June 5, 2017, and Correctional Health Services (CHS) policy requires medication 

renewals to be submitted within a week of their expiration. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Tiffany saw him on June 3, 2017, and informed him that CHS’s new policy 

required detainees to be seen by a provider before medications can be renewed. 

(Doc. 14-1 at 9.) Plaintiff claims that he told Defendant Tiffany that he was a chronic 

care patient and his medication was expiring on June 5, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Tiffany responded, “Sorry, this is the new process.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends 

that CHS staff did not give him advance notice of the new process. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 

that he told Defendant Tiffany that a lapse in his medication would cause him to be in 

severe pain and to experience codeine withdrawals. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he asked 

Defendant Tiffany to schedule an appointment with a provider or to get a phone order for 

his medication, but she refused.1

 (Id.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of Defendant 

Tiffany’s deliberate indifference, he was in pain for two days and was without any pain 

medication. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Tiffany is liable in her individual 

capacity because Plaintiff made her aware of his serious medical needs and she acted 

with deliberate indifference by knowingly declining to take action. (Id. at 11.) 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of 

ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross 

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of Corr., 

220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 

 

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 Count Two of the FAC includes allegations related to grievances and grievance appeals that Plaintiff pursued in relation to his medication. (Doc. 14-1 at 10-11.) Those 

allegations mention several prison staff members. (Id.) The FAC does not name any of those staff members as a defendant. Therefore, the Court does not discuss those 

allegations in this report and recommendation. 

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F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical 

malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). A delay in medical care, without 

more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. 

See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a conclusion that Defendant Tiffany was 

deliberately indifferent to his health or that Plaintiff suffered serious harm by going 

without his pain medication for two days. (See Doc. 6 at 13.) Thus, the Court 

recommends that Count Two of the FAC be dismissed. 

C. Count Three 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dee assaulted him in violation of 

his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 14-1 at 12-13.) Plaintiff included this same 

claim in Count Nine of the OC. (Doc. 1 at 16.) The Court dismissed that claim. (Doc. 6 

at 14-15, 19) As discussed below, Defendant again fails to state a claim against 

Defendant Dee. 

 Plaintiff alleges that in July 2017, Defendant Dee was administering medication to 

Plaintiff through the trap door in his cell door and became very hostile towards Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 14-1 at 12.) Plaintiff contends that he crouched down so that his face was at the 

trap door and asked Defendant Dee for her name and badge number. (Id.) Defendant 

Dee allegedly replied that she was “done” with Plaintiff and that he would “find out [her] 

name when [his] meds stop.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that while his face was still by the 

trap door, Defendant Dee walked from the medication cart to the cell door and “slammed 

the trap closed,” which caused the trap door to hit Plaintiff on the nose and bruised his 

nose.

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 (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Dee was in “no imminent danger” from 

 

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 Count Three of the FAC includes allegations related to grievances and grievance appeals that Plaintiff pursued in relation to this incident. (Doc. 14-1 at 13.) Those 

allegations mention several prison staff members. (Id.) The FAC does not name any of those staff members as a defendant. Therefore, the Court does not discuss those 

allegations in this report and recommendation. 

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Plaintiff and that she slammed the door solely to injure Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant Dee is directly responsible for violating his rights by assaulting him. (Id. 

at 13.) 

 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to the use of excessive 

force against pretrial detainees that amounts to punishment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 

___ U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2002). Force is excessive if the use of force was “objectively 

unreasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the defendant, without 

regard to their mental state. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472-73. However, “[n]ot every push 

or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” 

violates the Constitution. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation 

omitted). As the Court previously concluded on its review of the OC, Defendant Dee’s 

action of slamming the trap door closed when Plaintiff’s face was near it does not 

constitute excessive force. (See Doc. 6 at 15.) Thus, the Court recommends that Count 

Three of the FAC be dismissed. 

D. Counts Four, Five, and Six 

 Plaintiff asserts that the conduct described in Counts Four, Five, and Six violated 

his rights of access to the courts under the First Amendment (Count Four), the Fourteenth 

Amendment (Count Five), and Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution (Count Six). 

(Doc. 14-1 at 14-21.) Plaintiff included these same allegations in Counts Ten, Twelve, 

and Thirteen of the OC. (Doc. 1 at 17, 19, 20.) The Court dismissed those claims. 

(Doc. 6 at 15-17.) The Court recommends that Counts Four, Five, and Six be dismissed 

for the reasons below. 

 In Counts Four, Five, and Six, Plaintiff alleges that he is a pro se litigant involved 

in several civil actions against the MCSO. (Doc. 14-1 at 14-21.) He claims that between 

June 26 and July 16, 2017, Defendant B3527 denied him “43 caselaws [sic], 5 statutes, 

and 8 query searches” that are related to his lawsuits. (Id. at 14, 16, 19.) Plaintiff 

contends that he explained the reason for these items to Defendant B3527, but Defendant 

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B3527 refused to give Plaintiff the requested materials. (Doc. 14-1 at 14, 16, 19.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he filed a grievance, institutional grievance appeal, and an external 

grievance appeal regarding Defendant B3527’s denial of the legal materials. (Id. at 14-

15, 17, 19-20.) He claims Defendant Kindell-House responded to the grievance and 

refused to provide Plaintiff with the materials, Defendant Miceli responded to the 

institutional grievance appeal and refused to provide Plaintiff with the materials, and 

Defendant Smith forwarded the external grievance appeal to an external referee, who 

concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations were “unfounded.” (Id. at 14-15, 17, 19-20.) 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant B3527 is directly responsible for violating 

Plaintiff’s rights by intentionally denying Plaintiff the legal materials and that Defendants 

Kindell-House, Miceli, Smith, and Penzone were all made aware of the violation, had the 

authority to correct it, and chose to act with deliberate indifference. (Id. at 15, 18, 20.) 

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of being denied legal research, “some” of his civil cases 

were dismissed and he was forced to appeal. (Id. at 16, 18, 21.) 

 Prisoners have a right to litigate their claims “without active interference by prison 

officials.” Silva v. DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011). An inmate’s right of 

access to the courts is protected under both “the First Amendment right to petition and 

the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.” Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103. 

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from actively interfering 

with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 

350 (1996). The right to be free from undue interference extends beyond the pleading 

stages. Silva, 658 at 1103. 

 However, to state a claim for undue interference a plaintiff must show that he 

suffered an “actual injury.” Id. at 1103-04. For example, Plaintiff must show an inability 

to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996); 

see also Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Mere ‘delay in being able to 

work on one’s legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation.’”) (citations omitted); cf. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104 (actual injury 

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alleged where plaintiff claimed that at least six pending lawsuits had been dismissed as 

the result of defendants’ actions). 

 Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant B3527’s refusal to provide him with 

the legal materials, “some” of his civil cases were dismissed. (Doc. 14-1 at 16, 18, 21.) 

Plaintiff, however, does not identify any particular case that was dismissed. Although 

pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), 

conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim against Defendant B3527 in Counts Four, Five, and Six. Because Plaintiff’s 

allegations do not support a claim that a constitutional violation occurred, he has also 

failed to state a claim in Counts Four, Five, and Six against Defendants Kendell-House, 

Miceli, Smith, and Penzone for failing to correct it. Thus, the Court recommends that 

Counts Four, Five, and Six be dismissed. 

IV. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend. However, based on 

review of the First Amended Complaint, the Court recommends that several claims and 

Defendants be dismissed. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 14) is 

GRANTED and the Clerk of Court shall file the First Amended Complaint lodged at 

docket 14-1 pages 2 through 23. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in accordance with the Court’s October 30, 

2017 Order, Defendants Penzone and Vail shall answer Count One in their official 

capacity only.3

 (See Doc. 6 at 19.) 

 

3

 Defendants Penzone and Vail have already answered Count Seven of the OC, which is the same as Count One of the FAC. (Doc. 15.) This Order does not require Defendants Penzone and Vail to file an answer to Count One of the FAC, but does not 

preclude them from doing so. 

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against 

Defendants Penzone and Vail be DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMEND that Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six 

and Defendants Officer A7275, Sergeant Chipel, Lieutenant A3630, Murphy, Vail, Nurse 

Tiffany, Nurse Dee, Officer B3527, Kendell-House, Miceli, and Smith be DISMISSED

without prejudice. 

 Dated this 21st day of March, 2018. 

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