Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01327/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEC l ~1 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECV~R 

Clerk 

THOMAS A. MOORE and EDWARD J~ ) 

MOORE, JR . , ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants/ ) 

Cross-Appellees, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

SUBARU OF AMERICA, a New Jersey ) 

corporation; RANDALL S. LOFTIS, ) 

doing business as Ran's Subaru, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appel lees/ ) 

Cross-Appellants. ) 

Nos. 88-1314 

88-1327 

88-1364 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. CIV-83-1141-R and CIV-84-2212-R) 

Garvin A. Isaacs, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Thomas A. Wallace, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Glen b. Huff and David A. Branscum of 

Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Caldwell, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with 

him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

Bert M. Jones and William D. Perrine of Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, 

Tucker and Ga.ble, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellan ts. 

Before McKAY, McWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1327 Document: 010110242007 Date Filed: 12/14/1989 Page: 1
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and set-off of prior 

settlement. 

I. Facts 

Plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident on 

August 17, 1982, in Shawnee, Oklahoma. They were rear seat passengers in a 1982 Subaru station wagon when the owner-driver suffered an epileptic seizure and crashed into a brick buildingr 

Although plaintiffs originally sought recovery only against the 

owner-driver of the vehicle, the complaint was later amended to 

include Subaru of America. The owner-driver of the vehicle was 

dismissed upon executing a settlement and/or a loan-receipt agreement with each plaintiff. 

At trial, plaintiffs Thomas and Edward Moore claimed a defective rear seat belt design and defective seating system rendered 

Thomas Moote a quadriplegic and caused serious injury to Edward 

.Moore. The trial was bifurcated and the jury found for plaintiffs 

on the issue of liability. On April 8, 1987, the jury rendered 

its verdict on the issue of damages in favor of Thomas Moore in 

. 

the amount of $1.5 million and in favor of Edward Moore in the 

amount of $40,000.00. Barbara Moore was not a party to the t~ial, 

having dismissed her case with prejudice the day before trial. 

On July 24, 1987, after ~ntering judgment on the jury verdict, the trial court set off the amounts received by plaintiffs' 

settlement with the owner-driver's insurance carrier. Edward 

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( Moore received $125,000.00 from the owner-driver's primary insurance carrier. Thomas Moore received $244,072.00 from the primary 

insurance carrier and $2,000,000.00 from the excess carrier in the 

form of a loan-receipt agreement. Finding that the purported 

loan-receipt agreement was subject to set-off, the trial court 

reduced $2,000,000.00 from the jury verdict for Thomas Moore and 

$125,000.00 from the jury verdict entered in favor of Edward 

Moore. Further orders were entered by the trial court on 

January 28, 1988, after timely Rule 59 motions by both parties. 

The trial court ordered prejudgment interest on the jury verdict 

prior to set-off. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay 

plaintiff's attorney fees and expenses as a sanction for discovery 

disputes and costs. On Februaiy 22, 1988, the trial court entered 

an Amended Judgment calculating prejudgment interest from-the date 

Subaru was joined and set off the additional amount of $244,072.00 

which Thomas Moore received from the primary insurer of the ownerdriver.1 The trial court found that plaintiff Thomas Moore should 

recover nothing because the verdict in his favor was less than the 

set-off amount and he was not entitled to post-judgment interest. 

The same was true for Edward Moore. 

Plaintiff Thomas Moore appeals the trial court's set-off of 

the loan-receipt agreement claiming that set-off is not allowed 

under Tndiana law and that Subaru waived the affirmative defense 

l Prejudgment interest foi Thomas Moore was calculated to be 

$513,750.00 for a total award of $2,013,750.00 less the total setoff of $2,224,072.00. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1327 Document: 010110242007 Date Filed: 12/14/1989 Page: 3
of set-off. Thomas Moore also alleges that the damages awarded 

are inadequate as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Thomas Moore and 

Ed\/ard Moore claim the trial court erred in not giving an 

instruction on punitive damages and.excluding evidence of implied 

admissions of liability by misconduct on discovery. Defendant 

presents a protective cross-appeal regarding the trial court's 

order and computation of pre-judgment interest prior to set-off 

and the trial court's error in evidentiary rulings. Because the 

relief defendant requests is dependent upon the outcome of plaintiffs' appeal, we will first address the three basic issues presented by the appellants. 

II. Standard.of Review 

The decisions by trial court judges which concern questions 

of fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous'' standard. A 

finding of fact is "clearly erroneous" .if the appellate court, 

after reviewing the record, finds no factual su~port for the decision. LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 

1987): Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 511 

(10th Cir, 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). When there 

are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice 

will not be reversed as clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer 

fity, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985): see Lone Star Steel Co. v. 

United Mine Workers, 851 F.2d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 1988). 

2 

Under the Tenth tircuit Rules of Court, Rule 28.2(d), 2 each 

The current local rules as amended were effective January 1, 

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party has a duty to state, in their initial briefs, where in the 

record each issue was raised and ruled upon. Rule 28.2(e) states: 

Whenever an appeal is based upon a failure to admit 

or exclude evidence, or the giving or refusal to give a 

particular jury instruction, or any other act or ruling 

for which a party must record an objection to preserve 

the right to appeal, the party shall state where in the 

record a proper objection was made to the ruling and 

whether the objection is recorded and ruled upon. 

The appellants here have failed to reflect where in the record the 

majority of issues contained in their briefs were'raised, ruled 

upon, and objections made. Furthermore, the appellants have 

failed to designate many parts of the record which they make general reference to in their briefs. Without the record before us 

to substantiate the general allegations of error, we must defer to 

the trial court's decisions in these areas. 

III. Set-Off of Loan-Receipt Agreement 

In order to determine if set-off was proper, we must first 

resolve the issue of whether Indiana or Oklahoma law applies to 

the loan-receipt agreement. The agreement states that Indiana law 

governs its terms. However, Oklahoma is the forum state-for this 

litigation. 

In actions where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the substantive law, including the choice of law rules, 

of the forum state is applied. Pound v. Insurance Co. of North 

1989. Although the parties may have prepared their briefs prior 

to the effective date, the former rules contained identical 

language. Current local rule 28.2(d) was formerly Rule 28.2(e), 

and current local rule 28.2(e) was formerly 28.2(f). 

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America, 439 F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 1971); Hackbart v. 

Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 522-23 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). Although the language of the loanreceipt agreement states that Indiana law governs the terms of the 

agreement. Indiana appears to be one of the few jurisdictions 

which recogn~zes these agreements as valid contracts which can 

circumvent set-off. American Transport Co. v. Central Indiana 

Railway Co., 264 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1970). We hold that the trial 

court correctly found under conflict of law principles that 

Oklahoma law applies to the facts of this case. 

The trial court found that Oklahoma law applied to the loanreceipt agreement under principles of either tort or contract law. 

When evaluating the facts of this case as a tort question, the 

Oklahoma choice of law rule requires application of the law of the 

state with the most sig~ificant relationship to the parties. 

White v. White, 618 P.2d 921, 924 (Okla. 1980); Brickner v. 

Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 637 (Okla. 1974). The trial court concluded 

that "the state with the most significant relationship to the 

accident is Oklahoma." Order, July 24, 1987, at 5. We agree. 

Even if the loan-receipt agreement issue is classified as 

contract, Oklahoma law applies. The Oklahoma choice of law rules 

for contracts require the forum court to apply the law of the 

state (1) cho~en by the parties,_ Pate v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 649 

P.2d 809, 811 (Okla. App. 1982); (2) where the contract was made 

or entered into, Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576 P.2~ 767, 768 (Okla. 

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1978); or (3) the place of performance if indicated in the contract, Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 

1985). The plaintiff and owner-driver chose the law of Indiana to 

apply to their agreement, and the loan was to be repaid (performed) in Indiana. The loan was entered into by Thomas Moore in 

Pennsylvania. Thus, under normal circumstances, a forum court 

applying Oklahoma choice of law rules for contracts would probably 

apply Indiaria or perh~ps Pennsylvania law, but under these three 

tests the forum court would not apply Oklahoma law. 

However, two additional considerations require the application of Oklahoma law to the set-off issue under the facts of this 

case. The.se two considerations stem directly from the reasoning 

of Pate v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 649 P.2d 809 (Okla. App. 

1982). In Pate, the defendant insurance company sought to enforce 

a contract provision requiring credit for settlement with any 

other tort-feasor. This contract was entered into in Arkansas, 

and the policy was valid under Arkansas law. The Pate court, however, concluded that although normally the law of the state where 

the contract was entered into applied, in this case it would not 

apply Arkansas law because Arkansas law was contrary to the law 

and public policy of Oklahoma, the state of enforcement. Id. at 

811. The Pate court pointed t◊ a specific Oklahoma statute which 

made invalid any insurance provisions which attempted the very 

kind of credit attempted by Pate's insurer. The Pate court also 

cited the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 

§ 6 (1971) which state that "the court will apply a local statute 

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in the manner intended by the legislature even when the local law 

of another state would be applicable under usual conflict-of-law 

principles." Id. at 812. This principle, adopted in Pate, is 

directly applicable to the present case. Oklahoma law requires 

set-off of any type of settlement and discharges the defendant 

from contribution to any other tort-feasor. Applying contrary 

Indiana law would not fulfill the intentions of the Oklahoma legislature in passing this statute. 

The second reason for applying Oklahoma law sterns from the 

Pate court's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 

Laws. Section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement requires the application of the law of the state with a materially greater interest in 

the determination of the issue if the application of the law of 

the state chosen by the parties would be contrary to the first 

state's fundamental policy. 3 The trial court found that "Oklahoma 

3 § 187. Law of the State Chosen by the Parties 

(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to 

govern their contractual rights and duties will be 

applied if the particular issue is one which the parties 

could have resolved by an expiicit provision in their 

agreement directed to that issue. 

(2) The law of the state ch,osen by the parties to 

govern their contractual rights and duties will be 

applied, even if the particular issue is one which the 

parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision 

in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either 

(a) the chosen state has no substantial 

relationship to the parties or the transaction and 

there is no other reasonable basis for the parties 

choice, or_ 

(b) application of the law of the chosen 

state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of 

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law applies because it has a materially greater interest in the 

validity of the loan-receipt agreement." Order, July 24, 1987, at 

7. Given the facts of this case, to hold otherwise would allow 

parties to circumvent forum state policy by selecting a state's 

law which is more favorable to the particular parties' position. 

The issue of whether the loan-receipt agreement should be set 

off against the jury verdict is governed by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, 

§ 832. Section 832(H) provides as follows: 

H. When a release, covenant not to sue or a similar 

agreement is given in good faith to one of two or more 

persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same 

wrongful death: 

1. It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors 

from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless 

its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against· 

others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the 

release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and 

2. It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given 

from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 832 (West 1988) (emphasis added). 

a state whiqh has a materially greater inberest 

than the chosen state in the determination of the 

particular issue and which, under the rule of 

§ 188, would be the state of the applicable law in 

the absence of an effective choice of law by the 

•parties. 

(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of 

intention, the reference is to the local law of the 

state of the chosen law. 

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws§ 187 (1988) (emphasis 

added). 

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The trial court made the following findings regarding the 

loan-receipt agreement between appellant Thomas Moore and the 

driver-owner's excess insurance carrier: 4 

Paragraph 4 of the agreement states that Thomas Moore 

"agrees to obtain the dismissal of his pending claim 

against David M. Diamond" and "covenants and agrees that 

he will never bring or prosecute or allow to be brought 

or prosecuted in his name or on his behalf any action, 

suit or proceeding of any kind or character against 

David M. Diamond." Further, the agreement, in paragraphs 1 & 2, provides that the loan is without interest 

and is "repayable only in the event and to the extent of 

one-half (1/2) of any net recovery" by Moore from the 

manufacturers and distributors of the station wagon and 

that Moore "agrees to institute and diligently and vi.gorously prosecute an action against the manufacturers 

and distributors" as security for the loan. The agreement, in paragraph 5, also provides that the "loan need 

not be repaid if _the action against Subaru is unsuccessful." 

Order, July 24, 1987, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 

We agree with the trial court that the purported loan-receipt 

agreement is not a valid loan transaction under Oklahoma law. 

Whether or not this "loan-receipt agreement" is a "release" or a 

"covenant not to sue," it is at least a "similar agreement" which 

is subject. to set-off under section 832 (H). To hold otherwise 

would result in circumventiorr of the plain reading_ of the _state 

policy as mandated by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 832. This conclusion 

is consistent with the reasoning of Pate. 

4 Because appellant failed to include the loan-receipt 

agreement as a part of the designated record, or any portions 

the trial transcript making reference to the terms of the 

agreement, we are bound by the trial court's findings. 

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In addition to the fact that the Oklahoma statute's language 

regarding "similar agreements" seems clearly to apply to this 

case, we note that judicial interpretation of similar "settlement" 

agreements further support our interpretation of this agreement. 

The loan-receipt agreement originated as a device by which 

insurers loaned funds to insureds pending litigation against a 

wrongdoer. See Luckenbach v. W.J. Mccahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 

D.S. 139 (1918). This type of agreement has been utilized by 

potential joint tort-feasors, their liability insurers, and 

injured parties. These agreements may be interpreted as valid 

loans, covenants not to sue, or releases, depending on the terms 

of the agreement. The issue here is whe~her the Oklahoma courts 

would treat the amount tendered as a valid loan, not subject to 

set-off, or as an absolute·payment in the course of a settlement 

agreement which is subject to set-off. 

The construction of a loan-receipt agr~ement involving cotort-feasors and an injured party has not been directly addressed 

by the Oklahoma Supreme- Court. Therefore, we look to analogous 

Oklahoma cases and the current status of the law in other jurisdictions with similar statutes to guide us iri determining how 

Oklahoma courts would decide the issue of loan-receipt agreements. 

See Cleere v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 669 P.2d 785, 788 

(Okla. App. 1983) ("~here Oklahoma has adopted uniform laws or 

laws from other jurisdictions, case law from those jurisdictions 

interpreting such laws are persuasive authority in our interpretation of such laws"). 

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In Cox v. ~elsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354, 357 n.3 (Okla. 

1978), the court stated: "Mary Carter agreements are similar to 

'loan-receipt agreements' and 'covenants not to execute. 111 Cox 

was a manufacturer's products liability action wherein the agreeing defendant remained a party to the action. Although Cox is 

distinguished from the case at bar because the settling defendant 

here was dismissed by plaintiffs, it is still relevant that the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court likened loan-receipt agreements and covenants not to execute to each other. 

In Braden v. Hendricks, 695 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Okla. 1985), the 

court emphasized that the common-law right of indemnity and rights 

of contribution among joint tort-feasors were codified at Okla. 

Stat. tit. 12, § 832 (i981). Oklahoma prohibits a settling tortfeasor from recovering contribution from a non-settling tortfeasor. Section 832(0) states:_ 

A tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with a 

claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from 

another tort-feasor whose liability for the injury or 

wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor 

in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is 

in exces$ of what was reasonable. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 832(0) (West 1~~8). In construing the 

present status of Oklahoma law; it is clear that the courts and 

legislators have prescribed rules which prevent a settling tortfeasor from realizing "windfall" profits to the detriment of the 

other joint tort-feasor. 

In Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (N.O. Iowa 1953), the 

court found that construin9 an agreement as a loan transaction 

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instead of a covenant not to sue would result in the non-agreeing 

tort-feasor contributing to or indemnifying the agreeing tortfeasor contrary to Iowa law. _S_e_e _a_l_s_o _C_u_l_l_e_n_v--' .._A_t_c_h_1_· _s_o_n~,_T_o~p~e_k_a 

& Santa Fe R. Co., 507 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1973). In Biven v. 

Charlie's Hobby Shop, 500 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Ky. 1973), the court 

denied the effect of the loan-receipt agreement as a valid loan 

and held valid the terms of the release given in consideration of 

absolute payment. In Alder v. Garcia, 324 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 

1963), we denied the joint tort-feasor's insurer the ability to 

recoup up to one-half of settlement between assignee-injured party 

and joint tort-feasor. This court found such payment would benefit the settling joint tort-feasor in violation of New Mexico's 

Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act. Id. at 485. The New 

Mexico Act, like Oklahoma, contained language prohibiting a settling tort-feasor from recovering contributions from another joint 

tort-feasor. Id. See also Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 832(D) (West 

1988). 

The appellant's argument that defendants waived the affirmative defense of set-off is without merit. An Oklahoma court has 

ruled that it is the duty of the trial court judge to calc~late 

settlement credit. See Cleere v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 669 

P.2d 785, 788 (Okla. App. 1983). This court has previously relied 

upon Oklahoma law in holding that the trial judge has the duty to 

deduct the amount of a prior settlement from a jury's verdict. 

See Parker v. O'rion Industries, Inc., 769 F.2d 647, 650 (10th 

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Cir. 1985). Appellant cited no. authority to support the contention that set-off is an affirmative defense. We therefore affirm 

the trial court's finding on the issue of set-off. 

IV. Inadequate Damages 

Appellan.t claims that the damages awarded are inadequate as a 

matter of law. Absent an award so grossly inadequate as to raise 

an irresistible inference that bias, prejudice, or passion invaded 

the trial or so as to shock the court's conscience, a jury's 

determination of damages will be upheld. Bennett v. Longacre, 774 

F,2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985); Acree v. Minolta Corp.,·748 F.2d 

1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1984). Appellant claims there was uncontro-

. verted evidence at trial establishing past and future medical 

expenses totaling $4,761,531.00. Appellant designated as part of 

the record a selection of four pages from the trial transcript of 

the testimony of an expert witness. Although these four pages do 

support the fact that there was testimony of past and future medical expenses in the amount claimed by appellants, appellants do 

not provide any evidence indicating passion or prejudice on the 

jury's part. See Black v. Hieb's Enterprises, Inc., 805 F.2d 360, 

362 (10th Cir. 1986). We are satisfied the trial court's analysis 

was substantially correct when it wrote: 

Plaintiffs say that their uncontroverted evidence 

at trial established that Plaintiff Thomas A. Moore's 

past and future medical expenses would total in excess 

of $4,000,000. Thus, Plaintiffs infer that the damages 

verdict in the amount of $1,500,000 in favor of Thomas 

A. Moore failed to take account of his pain and suffering and was therefore inadequate as a matter of law. 

Defendant's counsel cast doubt on Plaintiffs~ expert's 

calculation of future.medic~! expenses through extensive 

cross~examination. And although Plaintiffs' evidence of 

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Thomas A. Moore's damages was not directly controverted, 

it is quite possible that the jury did not find Plaintiffs' expert's testimony to be convincing. This was 

properly within the jury's province. Moreover, in making the argument that the damages awarded were inadequate in light of uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff 

Thomas A. Moore's medical expenses will total in excess 

of $4,000,000, Plaintiffs ignore the jury's duty, under 

the instructions given, to discount to present value any 

award for damages. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any 

evidence indicating passion or prejudice on the jury's 

part. See Black v. Hieb's Enterprises, Inc., 805 F.2d 

360, 362 (10th Cir. 1986). And the Court simply cannot 

say that the damage award to Thomas A. Moore was so 

grossly inadequate as to raise an irresistable [sic] 

inference that bias, prejudice or passion invaded the 

trial, id., citing Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 

1028 (10th Cir. 1985), or so as to shock the Court's 

conscience. Id. See also Acree v. Minolta Corp., 748 

F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Order, January 22, 1988, at 2-3.-

On appeal plaintiffs point out that the allegedly uncontroverted expert testimony as to future damages was already discounted to p~esent value when the $4,000,000 figure was calculated. However, plaintiffs fail to recognize that it is the 

jury's duty to judge the credibility of a witness's testimony in 

light of any doubts created by cross-examination. A battle 

between dueling experts is not necessary if sufficient lack of 

reliability is shown during cross-examination to justify a jury 

conclusion of smaller future damages. We refuse to alter a jury 

verdict without further proof of jury passion or prejudice. Thus, 

we affirm the trial court's ruling on adequacy of damages. 

V. Punitive Damages 

App~llant also claims that the trial court erred by failing 

to give a puriitive damages instructioh to the jury. However, the 

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appellant failed to follow Tenth Circuit Rule of Court 28.2(e) 

which requires that it be stated where in the record an objection 

was made and ruled on. Nevertheless, the trial court appears to 

have addressed the issues of damages and ~dequacy of damages. 

Therefore, we will also review the merits of this contention. 

Based on the record before us, we are satisfied that the trial 

court's handling of this issue was correct. 

Punitive damages are proper against the manufacturer of a 

product when the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects a 

reckless disregard for public safety. See Thiry v. Armstrong 

World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983). There must be sufficient evidence presented showing the manufacturer was aware of 

or culpably indifferent to an unnecessary-risk of injury before an 

instruction to the jury on punitive damages is proper. Id. Evidence cited by appellarit in.his brief supporting the claim for~ 

punitive jury instruction does not amount to sufficient evidence 

on which to predicate such an instruction. Appellant does not 

prove that Subaru was aware of or culpably indiffer~nt to any 

safety risks created by its seat belts. 

A lot of time and energy is spent on the argument that conduct during acrimonious discovery is evidence which would support 

punitive damages. In effect, appellant argues that obstructiveness in producing requested information constitutes an implied 

admission of punitive guilt. We are simply not persuaded by that. 

argument in this case. The relevant evidence properly went to the 

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jury on the liability issue. The trial court properly found that 

the evidence did not meet the threshold requirement for punitive 

damages. Again we adopt the.trial court's discussion of this 

issue: 

With respect to Plaintiffs' contention that ~he 

Court erred in refusing to instruct on the issue of 

punitive damages, the Court is satisfied that there was 

no evidence of conduct on the part of Defendant Subaru 

of America which reflected a reckless disregard for public safety, i.e. evidence that Subaru was aware of or 

culpably indifferent to an unnecessary risk of injury 

.from a lack of crashworthiness of the 1982 Subaru GL 

Sta~ion Wagon. Thiry v. Armstrorig World Industries, 661 

P.2d 515, 518 (1983). There was no evidence that 

Defendant or its employees possessed information indicating that the wagon posed an unnecessary risk of 

injury. There was no evidence of, for example, complaints concerning seat belt accessibility or the type 

of "failure" of the front seat claimed by Plaintiffs, or 

of suits in which such allegations were made. Accordingly, refusal to submit the issue of punitive damages 

to the jury was proper. Id. 

After the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion seeking a 

default judgment as a sanction for non-compliance with 

discovery requests and orders, Plaintiffs sought to 

introduce evidenca of what they contend were obstructionist tactics of Defendant throughout discovery as a 

tacit admission of its liability. See Plaintiffs' 

Supplemental Trial Brief. The Courtrefused admission 

of this evidence. In their motion for a new trial on 

the issue of damages, Plaintiffs urge specifically that 

Subaru's refusal to produce FMVSS test documents and 

design and safety memoranda constituted an implied 

admission that their design and manufacture was defective, and unreasonably dangerous, citing Norman v. 

Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970), State of Ohio v. 

Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833, 99 S. Ct. 114, 58 

L.Ed.2d 129 (1978), and Texaco, Inc. v. Layton, 395 P.2d 

393, 399 (Okla. 1964). 

Even if such evidence were properly admissible, its 

relevance is to the issue of liability, not to damages. 

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is for· a new trial on 

the issue of damagesr only, which was bifurcated from 

trial on the issue of liability. The evidence was properly excluded on grounds of relevance. 

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Order, January 22, 1988, at 3-5. 

The appellant makes other general allegations in his brief as 

to how the trial court erred. The fact remains that Tenth Circuit 

RL1le of Court 28.2(e) was not followed, and it is not stated where 

in the record an objection was made and whether it was ruled on. 

Furthermore, the designated record does not support the contentions that the trial court erred. Thus, we refuse to review these 

other general claims of error. 

VI. Cross-Appeal 

We have reviewed the appellee's cross-appeal which is presented to us as a protective appeal. Because we have not granted 

the relief the appellant requested, there ls no reason to address 

any of the issues raised on the cross-appeal. 

VII. Conclusion 

The trial court was correct in setting off the amount 

received under the loan-receipt agreement· from the jury verdict. 

Under the facts of this case, recognizing this agreement as a 

valid loan would violate Oklahoma policy which prohibits a settling tort-feasor from recovering contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement. The 

interpretation of the language of this loan-receipt agreement 

includes a "release," a "covenant not to sue," and a "similar 

agreement" which is subject to set-off under Oklahoma law. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1327 Document: 010110242007 Date Filed: 12/14/1989 Page: 18
The very limited record designated by appellants does not 

support their arguments concerning damages. We are persuaded that 

the trial court properly resolved each of the issues on damages. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1327 Document: 010110242007 Date Filed: 12/14/1989 Page: 19