Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02396/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Chuks Odigwe, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

National Mentor Healthcare LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-11-02396-PHX-BSB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Plaintiff has filed a Motion Rescinding Consent for a Magistrate Judge to Preside 

over this Case and for Reassignment to a District Judge. (Doc. 159.) For the reasons 

below, Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.1

 

I. Background 

 This matter was removed to this Court on December 5, 2011 (Doc. 1), and 

assigned to the Honorable James A. Teilborg. (Doc. 3.) On December 7, 2011, Judge 

Teilborg recused himself from this matter and it was randomly reassigned to the 

Honorable Neil V. Wake. (Doc. 7.) After Judge Wake recused himself from this case, it 

was randomly reassigned to Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss. (Doc. 9.) In accordance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties, including Plaintiff, consented to magistrate judge 

 

1

 Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(3) provides that “the district 

judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge,” under this rule, the Court proceeds by a Report and Recommendation to the Honorable Stephen M. McNamee. See General 

Order 11-03. 

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jurisdiction. (Doc. 12.) After Judge Voss’s retirement, the case was randomly reassigned 

to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey.2

 (Doc. 101.) 

 On October 8, 2013, the Court dismissed this action as a sanction for Plaintiff’s 

failure to comply with the Court’s discovery orders. (Docs. 148, 149.) Plaintiff filed a 

notice of appeal on October 15, 2013. (Doc. 150.) The appeal was filed on October 16, 

2013. (Doc. 152.) On November 14, 2013 Judge Aspey recused himself because 

Plaintiff had accused him of lying and accepting bribes from Defendant. (Doc. 158.) On 

November 14, 2013, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade.3

 

(Doc. 158.) Plaintiff now seeks to rescind his consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction and 

requests reassignment to a district judge. (Doc. 159.) 

II. Discussion 

 A party to a federal civil case has, subject to some exceptions, a constitutional 

right to proceed before an Article III judge. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. 

Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). This right can be waived 

and the parties can consent to proceed before a magistrate judge. Id. at 542; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c)(1). As previously stated, after this case was randomly reassigned to a magistrate 

judge, Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Plaintiff concedes that he consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, but he wants to 

withdraw that consent because the magistrate judges previously assigned to this case 

were allegedly unfair and partial, discriminated against Plaintiff, and erroneously applied 

the law and rules. (Doc. 159 at 1.) Plaintiff specifically disagrees with the Court’s 

Orders dismissing this case and denying Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal. (Docs. 148, 154.) Plaintiff does not make any allegations of bias or impartiality 

 

2

 Before the case was assigned to Judge Aspey, it was mistakenly assigned to Judge Snow and the Court vacated that Order. (Docs. 99, 100.) 

3

 Plaintiff’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction remained in effect when the 

case was reassigned to different magistrate judges. See United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 

992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that section 636 does not require “continuing expressions of consent before a magistrate [judge] can exercise authority under a valid reference.”). 

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against the magistrate judge currently assigned to this case who has not issued any rulings 

in this case. 

 Although a party in a civil case does not have “an absolute right” to withdraw 

consent to trial and other proceedings before a magistrate judge, see Dixon v. Ylst, 990 

F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993), the court may vacate the reference of a civil matter to a 

magistrate judge “for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary 

circumstances shown by any party.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); see also Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 73(b)(3). These requirements are “strictly construed.” Montano v. Solomon, 2010 WL 

2403389, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Brook, Weiner, Sered, Kreger & Weinberg v. 

Coreq, Inc., 53 F.3d 851, 852 (7th Cir. 1995) (party’s legal successor bound by party’s 

consent to jurisdiction of magistrate judge)). 

 The factors relevant to the court’s consideration of a request to withdraw consent 

to magistrate judge jurisdiction include the timeliness of the request, whether granting the 

request would unduly interfere with or delay the proceedings, and whether the party’s 

consent was voluntary and uncoerced. United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 1983) (citing Carter v. Sea Land Servs., Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) 

(considering “inconvenience to the court and witnesses, prejudice to the parties, whether 

the movant is acting pro se, whether the motion is made in good faith, and whether the 

interests of justice would be served by holding a party to his consent”)). 

 Here, although Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, there is no evidence that 

Plaintiff’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction was involuntary or coerced. Plaintiff 

does not argue that his initial consent was involuntary. (Doc. 159 at 1.) Additionally, 

Plaintiff’s request to rescind his consent is untimely because it was made after the Court 

dismissed this matter. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s rulings does not 

constitute good cause or an extraordinary circumstance for withdrawing consent to the 

jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. See M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. McGill, 2011WL 

2464184, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jun. 21, 2011) (denying motion to withdraw consent stating that 

disagreement with magistrate judge’s rulings is not an extraordinary circumstance); 

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Graham v. Runnels, 2010 WL 3941428, *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (denying 

reconsideration of order denying plaintiff’s motion to withdraw consent). 

 Plaintiff has not presented evidence of “extraordinary circumstances,” and the 

Court does not find good cause at this time to vacate the reference to a magistrate judge. 

Because Plaintiff has not made a showing entitling him to withdraw his consent, the 

Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion to rescind his consent and for assignment to a 

district judge be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion Rescinding Consent for a 

Magistrate Judge to Preside over this Case and for Reassignment to a District Judge 

(Doc. 159) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 20th day of November, 2013. 

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