Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00317/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Lee Weber, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-0317-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Kevin Lee Weber filed a Petition and Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus challenging his convictions, pursuant to a plea agreement, in Maricopa County 

Superior Court for one count of burglary. His habeas petitions allege that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel and was subject to double jeopardy, an excessive 

sentence, and malicious prosecution. Respondents contend that his petition is untimely. 

As explained below, the Court recommends that Weber’s petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

 Following his June 2008 arrest, the State charged Weber with one count of 

burglary in the third degree, a class 4 felony. (Doc. 16, Exs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I) In 

June 2009, the Superior Court conducted a settlement conference where Weber was 

represented by a lawyer from the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, and private 

counsel who appeared as associate defense counsel under Knapp v. Hardy, 111 Ariz. 107, 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 1 of 7
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

523 P.2d 1308 (1974). (Doc. 16, Exs. J, K) Weber first indicated that he wanted to 

accept the State’s plea offer but during the ensuing change of plea colloquy, Weber 

indicated that he did not want to waive his right to a trial. (Doc. 16, Ex. K) In response 

to this statement, the Court set a trial date. (Id.) 

 During the August 2009 trial management conference, Weber was represented by 

counsel and Knapp counsel and stated, “I really don’t want to go to trial, though, Your 

Honor.” (Doc. 16, Exs. L, OO at 9:16-17) After a recess, the parties announced that they 

had negotiated a plea deal. (Doc. 16, Ex. OO at 9-10) Weber confirmed that he 

understood that he had “an absolute right to continue to plead not guilty,” and to proceed 

to trial. (Id. at 12:3-4) The Court then proceeded to list all of the rights that Weber was 

giving up by pleading guilty. (Id. at 12:7-25) Weber asked a question about postconviction relief and, after the Court answered, he confirmed that he understood the 

rights he was giving up and wanted to plead guilty. (Id. at 13:1-12) After hearing the 

factual basis for the plea, the State asked the Court to inform Weber that he was entitled 

to a hearing to prove his two prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 

15-16) The Court did so and then Weber confirmed that he understood the rights he was 

giving up by admitting to the prior convictions. (Id. at 16-17) The Court found that 

Weber had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily admitted to the burglary charge and 

that he had voluntarily and knowingly admitted to the two prior felony convictions. (Id. 

at 18:10-16) 

 On September 25, 2009, Weber was represented by counsel and Knapp counsel for 

sentencing. (Doc. 16, Exs. N, PP at 1) Weber asked the Court to appoint a new lawyer 

and go to trial. (Doc. 16, Ex. PP at 1:20-21) The Court noted that he had already twice 

changed his mind at the “very last second” about whether he wanted to take a plea or go 

to trial, and denied his request. (Id. at 4:13-25) Following testimony from a character 

witness for Weber, the Court sentenced Weber to a mitigated sentence of 9 years. (Doc. 

16, Ex. N) 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 2 of 7
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On October 22, 2009, Weber filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and he was 

appointed counsel. (Doc. 16, Exs. O, P) On March 3, 2010, Weber’s counsel notified the 

Court that he was unable to raise any viable claims and would not file a Petition. (Doc. 

16, Exs. Q, R) Over the next few months, Weber filed a series of motions to obtain 

transcripts from his bond revocation hearing, to request an extension for filing his Rule 

32 petition, for appointment of new counsel, and to file an amended petition. (Doc. 16, 

Exs. S, T, U, W, X) The Court denied his requests for transcripts and new counsel, and 

granted his request for leave to file an amended petition. (Doc. 16, Exs. Y, Z, AA) 

Accordingly, in December 2010, Weber filed a First Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 16, Ex. BB) After full briefing, the Court denied Weber’s First 

Amended Petition on May 18, 2011. (Doc. 16, Exs. CC, DD, EE) Specifically, the Court 

found that Weber failed to establish a colorable claim for relief because he did not show 

that his counsel should have requested and obtained a psychiatric or mental competency 

evaluation or that they should have more thoroughly investigated his mental competency 

before his change of plea. (Doc. 16, Ex. EE) 

 On December 22, 2011, Weber moved to file a delayed petition for review and, on 

December 30, 2011, he filed a Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 16, Exs. 

FF, GG) On January 24, 2012, Weber moved to withdraw his request to file a delayed 

petition for review and he also filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 16, Exs. 

HH, II) Seemingly without seeing Weber’s filings,1

 the Court dismissed Weber’s Second 

Petition and, based on the returned mail in the Court’s file, gave him until March 2, 2012, 

to file a petition for review of the dismissal of his First Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 16, Exs. JJ) On February 16, 2012, Weber moved for 

reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of his Second Petition and filed a second motion 

requesting a transcript of his June 2009 hearing. (Doc. 16, Exs. KK, LL) It appears that 

the Superior Court did not rule on either motion. (Doc. 16, Ex. QQ) 

 

1

 The Superior Court’s order of dismissal was entered on January 31, 2012, but it is dated January 24, 2012, the same day as Weber’s filings. (Doc. 16, Ex. JJ) 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 3 of 7
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On May 24, 2012, Weber petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. MM) On August 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals denied his petition for 

review because it was filed more than 30 days after the Superior Court’s final decision. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. NN) Weber did not move for reconsideration or attempt to appeal this 

order. (Doc. 16, Ex. RR) 

 On February 18, 2014, Weber filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court, and on July 15, 2014, he filed an Amended Petition. (Doc. 1, 8) Respondents 

were ordered to respond to the Amended Petition. (Doc. 11) His Petition and Amended 

Petition raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, double jeopardy, excessive 

sentencing, and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 1, 8) Weber does not raise any claims of 

actual innocence. (Id.) Respondents contend that the Petition is untimely and that he is 

not entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 16) The Court agrees and recommends that the 

Petition and Amended Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Weber’s Petition for Habeas Relief is Untimely. 

 A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If a defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, then 

the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a form of direct review and the 

conviction becomes “final” for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the Rule 32 ofright proceeding concludes. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a 

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) (internal quotation omitted); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (conviction pursuant to plea agreement is final on expiration of 

the time for seeking Rule 32 relief). 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 4 of 7
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The Superior Court gave Weber until March 2, 2012, to petition for review of the 

dismissal of his First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. He did not do so. 

Instead, he waited until May 24, 2012, to file a petition for review; the Court of Appeals 

denied his petition as untimely. The Court of Appeals’ rejection of Weber’s notice 

means that it “must be treated as improperly filed, or as though it never existed,” such 

that “for purposes of section 2244(d), the pendency of that petition did not toll the 

limitations period.” Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, 

Weber’s one year limitations period began on March 5, 2012,2

 and he was required to file 

his habeas petition in this court by March 5, 2013. Instead, he filed his first habeas 

petition nearly one year later, on February 18, 2014. Therefore, as he acknowledges, his 

habeas petition is untimely.3

Weber is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling. 

 Weber’s habeas petition is untimely unless he can show that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. To make such a showing, Weber must demonstrate both that he 

pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him 

from filing his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 

Weber’s Petition argues that his untimely petition should be allowed “because of 

the criminal justice systems environment and conditions.” [sic] (Doc 1 at 11) Weber’s 

Amended Petition expands on this argument and cites to a lack of legal resources or help 

from the state, the policies of the justice system, his work schedule, his transfer to another 

unit, and his issues with rest, noise, water, criminal neighbors, food, and exercise. (Doc. 

8 at 11) He does not further develop these arguments and he does not explain why he 

was able to file 12 motions between May 2010 and May 2012, and then nothing again 

until February 2014. (Doc. 16, Exs. S, T, U, W, X, BB, DD, FF, HH, KK, LL, MM) 

 

2

 The Superior Court’s filing deadline of March 2, 2012, was a Friday. 

3

 This conclusion does not change even assuming, as Respondents do, that 

Weber’s tolling extended until the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied his petition on August 31, 2012. As Respondents note, if Weber’s limitations bar began with the Court of Appeals’ denial, his habeas petition would still be untimely. 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 5 of 7
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

These arguments do not show that Weber acted diligently or that he encountered some 

extraordinary circumstance and, thus, are not persuasive. See, e.g., Chaffer v. Prosper, 

592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (habeas petition alleges delay from circumstances 

that “are hardly extraordinary given the vicissitudes of prison life, and there is no 

indication in the record that they made it ‘impossible’ for him to file on time.”); Norwood 

v. Lockyer, 390 Fed.Appx. 762, 763 (9th Cir. 2010) (equitable tolling standard not met for 

circumstances that are ordinary for prison life); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th

Cir. 2009) (habeas petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling because of limited library 

and copier access); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se 

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling”). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Kevin Lee Weber’s Petition and 

Amended Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the petition 

and amended petition are justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would 

not find the ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 6 of 7
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Dated this 15th day of April, 2015. 

Case 2:14-cv-00317-NVW Document 17 Filed 04/15/15 Page 7 of 7