Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00797/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00797-39/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHENZHENSHI HAITIECHENG 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CO., 

LTD., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

REARDEN LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00797-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE, MOTION TO AUGMENT 

THE RECORD, AND MOTION FOR DE 

NOVO DETERMINATION

Re: ECF Nos. 265, 283, 298

Non-party Virtue Global Holdings, Ltd. (“VGH”) has filed a motion to intervene. ECF 

No. 283. In addition, Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Shenzhenshi Haitiecheng Science and 

Technology (“SHST”) and VGH have moved for de novo determination of Magistrate Judge 

Kim’s report and recommendation regarding Defendant Rearden’s motion for default judgment

against SHST. ECF No. 265. In support their motion for de novo determination, SHST and VGH 

recently filed a motion to augment the record.1 ECF No. 298. The Court grants the motion to 

intervene, grants the motion to augment the record, and modifies Judge Kim’s recommended 

disposition in light of VGH’s continued participation in this case and the risk of inconsistent 

judgments if default judgment is entered against SHST now. 

I. BACKGROUND

This action involves a dispute over the ownership of physical and intellectual property 

known as the MOVA assets.2 In February 2015, SHST filed this lawsuit against Rearden seeking 

declaratory relief regarding its ownership of the MOVA assets. ECF No. 1. SHST also asserted 

 

1

SHST and VGH previously filed two additional motions to augment the record which the Court 

has already denied. ECF Nos. 266, 288, 296. 

2

The factual background of this case is discussed in detail in other pleadings. ECF Nos. 52, 117, 

141, 188.

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claims for false advertising, unfair competition, and interference with prospective business 

advantage. Id. In response, Rearden filed counterclaims for declaratory relief that it owns the 

MOVA assets, intentional interference with contract, intentional interference with prospective 

business advantage, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, conversion, 

trespass to chattels, theft of trade secrets, patent infringement, trademark infringement, copyright 

infringement, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, cybersquatting, and fraudulent conveyance. 

ECF No. 100. 

A. Bifurcation Order

On February 25, 2016, the parties jointly requested that the Court bifurcate the issues in 

this case so that the ownership claims would be adjudicated first. ECF Nos. 73, 75. Rearden 

explained that the “parallel claims for declaratory relief should proceed first, because the parties’ 

other claims are nearly all predicated on ownership of the MOVA Assets.” ECF No. 75 at 1-2. 

The Court granted the request on March 2, 2016. ECF No. 80 ¶ 1. The Court has since clarified 

that Rearden’s fraudulent conveyance counterclaim will be adjudicated alongside the ownership 

issues to be heard at trial in December 2016. ECF No. 269 at 11. 

B. Stipulated Substitution Order

At the case management conference on March 2, 2016, SHST’s counsel informed the 

Court that SHST had transferred its ownership in the MOVA assets to another entity. See Case 

Management Conference Tr. (March 2, 2016), ECF No. 89 at 7:24-8:3. The Court accordingly 

allowed the parties to amend the pleadings. Id. at 8:10-12. The amended pleadings clarified that 

VGH had purchased the MOVA assets from SHST in December 2015. ECF No. 93 ¶ 27. Based 

on this transfer, Rearden added a counterclaim for fraudulent conveyance under the California 

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. ECF No. 95 ¶ 424-433. 

On March 18, 2016, the parties stipulated that VGH would replace SHST as the Plaintiff in 

this action. ECF No. 92. The parties agreed that “[a]ll rights and defenses with respect to any and 

all claims asserted by former plaintiff SHST are reserved and shall apply equally as against Virtue 

Global.” Id. The parties further agreed that “all counterclaims presently asserted by Defendants 

against SHST shall continue as though pleaded against both Counterclaim Defendant SHST and 

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plaintiff Virtue Global.” Id. SHST agreed that it would remain in the case as a counterclaim 

Defendant and that it would not object to discovery relating to ownership issues based on the 

substitution of parties. Id. The Court granted the parties’ stipulated request on March 21, 2016. 

ECF No. 96. 

C. SHST’s Disappearance

Although SHST initiated this lawsuit, it has failed to participate in discovery since VGH 

was substituted in as plaintiff. On May 2, 2016, Rearden informed the Court that SHST had failed 

to verify its interrogatory responses. See Joint Letter Brief, ECF No. 132 at 2-4. In response, 

SHST’s counsel advised the Court that “[f]ollowing the sale of the MOVA Assets, SHST appears 

to have gone dormant.” Id. at 5. SHST’s counsel explained that “[d]espite diligent efforts, 

SHST’s counsel has not received any response to any of its multiple attempts to communicate with 

SHST” and that “[f]rom SHST’s silence, it appears that SHST no longer has any active business, 

no officers, no active board members, no employees, and no one else who can provide the 

verifications.” Id. On May 12, 2016, this Court ordered SHST to verify its interrogatory 

responses, but SHST failed to do so. ECF No. 162. SHST also failed to produce witnesses in 

response to Rearden’s deposition notices of five of SHST’s officers and directors, including Xiao 

Ping, the SHST legal representative who signed the documentation in which SHST allegedly 

purchased the MOVA Assets from MO2, LLC. SHST also failed to respond to additional 

interrogatories and document requests, and failed to provide verified responses to requests for 

admission. ECF Nos. 139-1, 193. 

D. Rearden’s Motions for a Default Sanction Against SHST 

Based on these discovery failures, Rearden moved for an entry of default judgment against 

SHST on May 6, 2016. ECF No. 139. On May 12, 2016, the Court ordered VGH to verify its 

responses by May 27, 2016 and cautioned SHST that, if it failed to verify its responses, the Court 

would revisit the issue of sanctions. ECF No. 141. SHST did not comply with the Court’s order. 

ECF No. 162. On June 21, 2016, the Court ordered SHST to pay attorneys’ fees for the sum

incurred in bringing the motion to compel as an alternative to a default sanction. ECF No. 199, 

223. The Court again ordered SHST to verify its interrogatory responses and requests for 

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admission, provide dates for the depositions for five witnesses, and respond to multiple document 

requests. ECF No. 199. The Court warned SHST that “failure to comply with the Court’s order 

by June 27, 2016 will most likely result in a recommendation to the District Court that the District 

Court issue a default judgment against SHST.” ECF No. 199. Again, SHST did not comply with 

the Court’s order, and Rearden renewed its motion for a default sanction against SHST on June 

30, 2016. ECF No. 215. 

E. Magistrate Judge Kim’s Report and Recommendation 

On July 21, 2016, Magistrate Judge Kim issued a report and recommendation in which she 

recommended that the Court grant Rearden’s motion for default judgment against SHST as a 

sanction for SHST’s failure to comply with the Court’s orders. ECF No. 252 at 1. At the outset, 

Judge Kim recommended that “no action be taken against Plaintiff Virtue Global Holdings Ltd 

(“VGH”)” because “the motion is directed solely against SHST.” Id. at 1-2. 

Judge Kim found that all five factors weighed in favor of a default sanction. First, Judge 

Kim reasoned that a default sanction was in the public interest because SHST’s “wholesale failure 

to participate in discovery makes a mockery of the system of litigation in this country.” Id. at 6. 

Second, Judge Kim found that the Court’s need to manage its docket also weighed in favor 

of a default sanction because the Court had already given SHST multiple opportunities to comply 

with discovery orders to no avail. Id. at 7. 

Third, Judge Kim found that “Rearden has sufficiently demonstrated that SHST’s 

disappearance has a significant risk of prejudice.” Id. at 11. Judge Kim explained that Rearden 

was prejudiced by SHST’s failure to respond to discovery requests because “the discovery is 

targeted to the key issues in this case—ownership of the MOVA Assets and the purported transfer 

from MO2, LLC to SHST and to VGH.” Id. at 10. In particular, Judge Kim explained that only 

SHST could provide discovery from Ms. Xiao Ping, the SHST legal representative who signed the 

documentation in which SHST allegedly purchased the MOVA Assets from MO2, LLC. Id. at 10. 

SHST argued that Rearden could obtain information about the transfer of the assets from MO2 to 

SHST from other sources, such as individuals from VGH and Digital Domain 3.0 (“DD3”) who 

allegedly negotiated the transfer to SHST, but Judge Kim noted that “the individuals whom SHST 

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identified are not legal representatives of SHST and cannot speak on SHST’s behalf.” Id. at 9. As 

a result, Judge Kim found that “there is a significant risk that any information conveyed by these 

individuals would be speculative or hearsay and thus not admissible as evidence.” Id. Moreover, 

Judge Kim pointed out that SHST’s counsel’s assertion that SHST had not produced many 

documents because its role in the transfer was limited “cannot substitute for binding admissions of 

the missing client” because “Rearden cannot test such representations by counsel without 

deposing representatives of SHST or by obtaining some type of representation under penalty of 

perjury.” Id. at 11. In addition, Judge Kim noted that VGH had previously represented to the 

Court that “there are no current directors, shareholders [or] employees of VGH with knowledge of 

SHST’s acquisition of the MOVA Assets from MO2, LLC.” Id. at 10. Finally, even if Rearden 

could obtain information from other sources, Judge Kim explained that “parties are not required to 

seek every avenue of information from non-parties when an opposing party fails to respond.” Id. 

Judge Kim gave the fourth factor—public policy favoring decisions on the merits—little 

weight because “a fair trial appears impossible where one key link in the transfer of MOVA Assets 

is missing.” Id. at 11. 

Lastly, Judge Kim found that less drastic sanctions would not “mitigate this unusual 

situation where a party has simply failed to participate in discovery.” Id. at 12. Judge Kim 

pointed out that the Court had already implemented less drastic sanctions—namely, imposing a 

monetary sanction and warning SHST that further failure to comply would result in default—

neither of which resulted in compliance with this Court’s orders. Id. Judge Kim concluded her 

report by finding that SHST’s conduct was willful. Id. at 13. 

F. Rescission Order

On August 11, 2016, the Court set aside the stipulated substitution order, finding that 

SHST’s representation that it would remain in the case as a counter-defendant and continue to 

participate in discovery was fraudulent. ECF No. 269 at 7-9. On August 24, 2016, the Court 

clarified that VGH was no longer a party to this case, explaining that “VGH needs to move for 

intervention or joinder to continue as a party in this action.” ECF No. 282. 

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G. Pending Motions

On August 8, 2016, SHST and VGH moved for a de novo determination of Judge Kim’s 

report and recommendation to enter a default sanction against SHST. ECF No. 265. In support of 

that motion, SHST and VGH filed two motions to augment the record that the Court has since 

denied. ECF Nos. 266, 288, 296. On August 24, 2016, VGH moved to intervene in this action. 

ECF No. 283. 

On September 28, 2016, the day before the hearings on the motion to intervene and the 

motion for de novo determination, SHST filed another administrative motion to augment the 

record. ECF No. 298. This time, SHST requested that the Court supplement the record with “new 

and material facts”—namely, evidence that counsel for SHST and VGH had “reestablished 

contact” with Ms. Xiao Ping, SHST’s legal representative, after six months of being unable to 

reach her “due to severe illness.” Id. In a supporting declaration, SHST’s counsel stated that he 

first heard from Ms. Xiao Ping via email on September 6, 2016 and then again on September 13, 

2016. ECF No. 298-5 ¶ 3. After a telephone call with Ms. Xiao Ping on September 23, 2016 and 

an in-person meeting with her on September 27, 2016, SHST’s counsel finally notified Rearden’s 

counsel and this Court about Ms. Xiao Ping’s reappearance on September 28, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. 

Ms. Xiao Ping also submitted a declaration in which she explains that she did not participate in 

this case because of her medical condition. ECF No. 298-4. Ms. Xiao Ping further declares that 

she has verified the interrogatory responses and that she is willing to give testimony but that she is 

unable to travel to the United States to do so. Id. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Intervene

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as a matter of right 

where the potential intervenor “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 

subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter 

impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately 

represent that interest.” The Ninth Circuit has summarized the requirements for intervention as of 

right under Rule 24(a)(2) as follows:

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(1) [T]he [applicant’s] motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must have 

a ‘significantly protectable’ interest relating to the property or transaction 

which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that 

the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its 

ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be 

inadequately represented by the parties to the action.

Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting California 

ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2006)). Proposed intervenors must 

satisfy all four criteria; “[f]ailure to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the application.” 

Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1) provides for permissive intervention at the 

court’s discretion where the potential intervenor “has a claim or defense that shares with the main 

action a common question of law or fact.” Permissive intervention “requires (1) an independent 

ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between 

the movant’s claim or defense and the main action.” Freedom from Religion Found., 644 F.3d at 

843 (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir.1992)). “Even if 

an applicant satisfies those threshold requirements,” however, “the district court has discretion to 

deny permissive intervention.” Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998). “In 

exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or 

prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). “[T]he court 

may also consider other factors in the exercise of its discretion, including ‘the nature and extent of 

the intervenors’ interest’ and ‘whether the intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by 

other parties.” Perry, 587 F.3d at 955 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 

1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977)).

In evaluating motions to intervene, “courts are guided primarily by practical and equitable 

considerations, and the requirements for intervention are broadly interpreted in favor of 

intervention.” United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004). “Courts are 

to take all well-pleaded, nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the proposed 

complaint or answer in intervention, and declarations supporting the motion as true absent sham, 

frivolity or other objections.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th 

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Cir. 2001).

B. Motions for De Novo Determination of Dispositive Matter Referred to Magistrate 

Judge

If a magistrate judge enters a recommended disposition on pretrial matters that are 

dispositive of a claim or defense, any party may file written objections to the proposed findings 

and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Under the Local Rules, the objecting party must file 

its objections as a “Motion for De Novo Determination of Dispositive Matter Referred to 

Magistrate Judge.” Civil L.R. 72-3. The objecting party may also file an “Administrative Motion 

to Augment the Record” in support of its motion. Id. “The district judge must determine de novo 

any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b). See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). “The district 

judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or 

return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. Unless the court grants an 

administrative motion to augment the record, the court’s review is limited to the record of the 

proceedings before the magistrate judge. Civil L.R. 72-3. 

III. DISCUSSION

VGH now moves to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, 

moves for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b). ECF No. 283. SHST and VGH also 

move for de novo determination of Magistrate Judge Kim’s report and recommendation to enter a 

default sanction against SHST. ECF No. 265. 

A. Motion to Intervene 

VGH argues that it satisfies all four requirements to intervene as of right. First, VGH 

argues that its motion is timely because it was filed the same day the Court clarified that VGH was 

no longer a party to this case and because “all of the claims that VGH currently plans to assert on 

intervention have been in this case since the filing of the original complaint in February 2015.” 

ECF No. 283 at 6. Second, VGH argues that it has a protectable interest because it “claims 

ownership of the MOVA Assets” and “the ownership of those assets is precisely what this case is 

about.” Id. at 7. Third, VGH argues that disposing of the action without VGH will impair VGH’s 

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ability to protect its ownership interest in the MOVA assets. Id. Finally, VGH argues that “there 

is no party to protect VGH’s interests in the MOVA Assets” because SHST has stopped 

participating in this litigation. Id.

Rearden does not dispute that VGH satisfies three of the four requirements for intervention 

as of right. See ECF No. 294 at 5. Rearden’s sole challenge to VGH’s motion to intervene is that 

it is not timely. Id. at 6-7, 9.

“Three factors should be evaluated to determine whether a motion to intervene is timely: 

(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other 

parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.” California Dep’t of Toxic Substances 

Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, Inc., 309 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Prejudice to the existing parties is “the most important 

consideration in deciding whether a motion for intervention is untimely.” United States v. State of 

Or., 745 F.2d 550, 552–53 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting 7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1916 (3d ed.)). 

“Although delay can strongly weigh against intervention, the mere lapse of time, without more, is 

not necessarily a bar to intervention.” United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th 

Cir. 2004); see also California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, 

Inc., 309 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he length of time that has passed since a suit was 

filed is not, in and of itself, determinative of timeliness.”). Courts have adopted a “nuanced, 

pragmatic approach” to timeliness. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 

1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“Timeliness is a flexible concept; its determination is left to the district court’s 

discretion.”). 

a. Stage of Proceeding

Rearden correctly points out that the advanced stage of this litigation weighs against 

intervention. ECF No. 294 at 7-9. This litigation began over a year ago, discovery is closed, 

dispositive motions have already been adjudicated, and trial is scheduled to begin in just a few 

months. In an ordinary case, the advanced stage of this litigation would have significant weight 

and would “strongly support[] a finding of untimeliness.” See, e.g., Lee v. Pep Boys-Manny Moe 

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& Jack of California, No. 12-CV-05064-JSC, 2016 WL 324015, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016). 

But the passage of time is not dispositive, and this is not an ordinary case. The Court must take a 

pragmatic approach to timeliness that considers the realities of the litigation. 

b. Reason for Delay 

VGH had a good reason for not moving to intervene earlier: it was already a party to the

case. VGH did not even have a protectable property interest that would have entitled it to 

intervene as of right until December 17, 2015 when it finally acquired the MOVA assets from 

SHST. Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 2016, the parties stipulated that VGH would replace

SHST as the plaintiff in this action. ECF No. 92. For the next five months, VGH did not need to 

move ‒ and could not have moved ‒ to intervene because it was standing in SHST’s shoes as the 

plaintiff by virtue of the stipulated substitution order. VGH was able to protect its alleged 

property interest in the MOVA assets because it was a plaintiff. The Court ultimately set aside 

that substitution order on August 11, 2016 based on SHST’s misrepresentations and fraud on the 

Court. ECF No. 269. Just two weeks later, and on the same day that the Court clarified that VGH 

was no longer a party to this case, VGH filed a motion to intervene. See ECF Nos. 269, 282, 283. 

It is hard to imagine how its request could have been more timely. 

VGH’s previous participation as a substitute plaintiff in this action distinguishes this case 

from the cases relied upon by Rearden. For example, the putative intervenor in In re Bernal had 

not participated in the litigation at all before moving to intervene because it was not even assigned 

the rights at issue until the court had already entered default judgment against its predecessor in 

interest. In re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595, 596–97 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit explained that 

allowing intervention in those circumstances would “[open] the floodgates to a possible abuse . . . 

by allowing parties to sleep on their rights, neglect their duties with respect to litigation, and 

thereafter avoid the consequences of such conduct by merely assigning the subject matter to a 

third party after defaulting.” Id. at 597-98 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In 

other words, the putative intervenor “was not even in the picture as far as [the plaintiff] and the 

bankruptcy court were concerned” until the litigation was completed. Id. 

The same is not true here. VGH did not sleep on its rights; it substituted in as plaintiff 

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only a few months after it acquired the rights at issue from SHST and it has fully participated in 

this litigation ever since. The other cases that Rearden relies on are distinguishable for the same 

reason. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 

1997) (holding that, by “wait[ing] twenty-seven months before seeking to interject itself into the 

case, only to move the court for full-party participation at a time when the litigation was, by all 

accounts, beginning to wind itself down,” the putative intervenor “slept on its intervention rights 

for more than two years” and, “[w]hen it awoke, it was unable convincingly to explain its delay”); 

United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district 

court’s denial of motion to intervene where the putative intervenor “[sought] to intervene in the 

remedies phase of a case that ha[d] been litigated for four years,” despite being “keenly aware of 

the litigation throughout its lifespan,” and where the district court found that it “ha[d] not 

explained why it delayed so long”). 

In response, Rearden argues that “VGH should not benefit in the timeliness inquiry from 

its substitution as Plaintiff in March” because the Court has since set aside the substitution order 

based on SHST’s fraud on the Court. ECF No. 294 at 7. Rearden contends that “VGH 

participated in that fraud, at least as much as SHST” because they are “represented by the same 

party representatives and the same outside counsel as SHST was before it.” Id. at 7-8. This 

argument fails because the Court set aside the substitution order based on SHST’s 

misrepresentations, not VGH’s. See ECF No. 269 at 7-9 (“[T]he Court grants Rearden’s request 

to set aside the order substituting VGH as Plaintiff because of SHST’s fraud on the Court.”). 

c. Prejudice 

Rearden argues that allowing VGH to intervene now will prejudice Rearden because: (1) 

Rearden has already expended significant time and resources litigating this case against SHST; (2) 

The ownership questions relating to the MOVA assets have rendered them impossible to market or 

sell; and (3) “VGH shares the same deficiencies as a party as SHST did before it” and “allowing 

VGH to intervene now would not eliminate or mitigate the prejudice of SHST’s default to 

Defendants.” ECF No. 294 at 10-14. 

This argument simply points to prejudice that would have occurred regardless of when 

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VGH moved to intervene in this action. “In the context of a timeliness analysis, prejudice is 

evaluated based on the difference between timely and untimely intervention—not based on the 

work the defendants would need to do regardless of when intervention was sought.” Pep BoysManny Moe & Jack, 2016 WL 324015 at *6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Therefore, Rearden must show that “the intervention would prejudice the existing parties because 

of the passage of time.” United States v. State of Or., 745 F.2d 550, 552–53 (9th Cir. 1984)

(emphasis added); see also, e.g., Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact 

that the State of Hawaii is filing its Motion now, rather than earlier in the proceedings, does not 

cause prejudice to Day and the other plaintiffs, since the practical result of its intervention . . . 

would have occurred whenever the state joined the proceedings.”). Even if VGH had moved to 

intervene in December 2015 as soon as it acquired the rights to the MOVA assets, Rearden still 

would have spent significant time and resources litigating against SHST, faced the same 

marketability issues caused by the ownership questions surrounding the MOVA technology, and 

encountered the same discovery issues caused by SHST’s eventual disappearance. Therefore, 

Rearden’s prejudice concerns “have little to do with timeliness” because “[t]hey do not suggest 

that their problems are materially different now than they would have been had [the putative 

intervenor] sought to intervene [sooner].” State of Or., 745 F.2d at 552-53. 

To the contrary, the fact that VGH’s re-entry into this case will not expand the current 

scope of litigation suggests that VGH’s delay does not prejudice Rearden. See Munoz v. PHH 

Corp., No. 1:08-CV-0759-AWI-BAM, 2013 WL 3935054, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2013) (finding 

“little-to-no prejudice to Defendants in permitting Ms. Villalon to intervene” because she 

“adopt[ed] the allegations of the FAC in its entirety” and, therefore, “[her] presence in this action 

does not expand the scope of this litigation”). When VGH substituted in as plaintiff, it asserted 

the exact same claims against Rearden that SHST did before it. See Compl., ECF No. 1; First 

Amended Compl., ECF No. 93. And VGH admits that “for the first trial, there are no additional 

claims or counterclaims to be plead.” ECF No. 295 at 7. Rearden has therefore been litigating 

against the same claims throughout the ownership phase of this litigation, and will continue to 

litigate against the same claims if VGH intervenes. In fact, Rearden has actually been litigating 

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those claims against VGH since March 2016. Since that time, VGH has actively litigated this 

case by answering Rearden’s counterclaims, producing discovery, and filing and responding to 

motions. See, e.g., ECF No. 111; ECF No. 119; ECF No. 151. Rearden has therefore been aware 

of VGH’s legal claims and positions for the past six months. 

The fact that VGH’s intervention will not expand the current scope of litigation also 

distinguishes this case from many of the cases that Rearden relies upon. Cf. Pep-Boys-Manny 

Moe & Jack, 2016 WL 324015 at *7 (denying intervention based on prejudice where the putative 

intervenor’s “pleading raise[d] new issues beyond the scope of the claims and defenses raised by 

Plaintiff” and there were “issues particular to [the putative intervenor’s] claim that likely would 

have to be litigated if the Court permit[ted] her intervention”); Henrikson v. Turbomeca, S.A., No. 

CIVS 06-1563 WBS DAD, 2007 WL 2215398, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2007) (denying 

intervention based on prejudice because “the pleadings would have to be reopened and 

defendants’ pre-answer motions re-litigated with respect to the [putative intervenor’s] complaint in 

intervention”); Retiree Support Grp. of Contra Costa Cty. v. Contra Costa Cty., 315 F.R.D. 318, 

323 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying intervention because “allowing intervention under these 

circumstances would both complicate and prolong the litigation”). 

Finally, Rearden argues the relationship between SHST and VGH counsels against 

intervention. ECF No. 294 at 11. To support this argument, Rearden relies on Snyder v. 

Floworks, Inc., No. C-04-02926 RMW, 2007 WL 2429451 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2007). In that 

case, the putative intervenor claimed that it had only recently discovered that an agreement it 

entered into nine years earlier—and which had been actively litigated for three years—was not 

valid, therefore giving it a property interest and a stake in the litigation. Id. The court found that 

this claim “strain[ed] credulity.” Id. at *3. In addition, the court considered it to be “critical” that 

the putative intervenor did not make this convenient discovery or move to intervene until after the 

court had already considered the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and entered 

judgment. Id. at * 4-5. And the putative intervenor admitted that its motion to intervene was 

designed to prevent the prevailing party from collecting that judgment. Id. Because “[b]oth [the 

losing party] and the [putative intervenor] would benefit from the invalidity of the Operating 

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Agreement,” the court expressed concern that the motion to intervene was “collusive.” Id. Here, 

in contrast, VGH seeks to intervene before an adjudication on the merits to contest the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation to enter default against its predecessor in interest. And, unlike the 

putative intervenor in Snyder, VGH’s motion to intervene is not based on a suspiciously-timed 

discovery of new information relating to its rights. Rather, VGH has been asserting its ownership 

claim over the MOVA assets since shortly after it allegedly acquired those assets from SHST in 

December 2015. The Snyder case is therefore distinguishable. 

***

In short, VGH has satisfied all of the requirements to intervene as of right in this action. 

VGH claims a protectable property interest in the MOVA assets, and disposing of this action 

without VGH’s involvement will undoubtedly impair its ability to protect that interest. Although 

VGH has moved to intervene at an advanced stage of the litigation, it was previously a party to 

this case by virtue of the stipulated substitution order, and it has adopted the same legal claims that 

its predecessor asserted at the outset. For that reason, Rearden is well-aware of VGH’s legal 

claims and positions. VGH also moved to intervene as soon as it was removed as the plaintiff in 

this case, and its re-entry into the case now will not expand the current scope of litigation. For all 

of these reasons, and because the requirements for intervention are broadly interpreted in favor of 

intervention, the Court grants VGH’s motion to intervene as of right. 

B. Motion for De Novo Determination 

SHST and VGH object to Magistrate Judge Kim’s recommendation to enter default 

judgment against SHST on the following two grounds: (1) entry of default against SHST is 

improper because Rearden has not been prejudiced by SHST’s failure to provide discovery; and 

(2) VGH is actively litigating overlapping claims and defenses and, therefore, entry of default 

against SHST creates a risk of inconsistent judgments. ECF No. 265 at 2. The Court therefore 

reviews those parts of Magistrate Kim’s recommendation de novo.3

 

3 Although SHST and VGH raised both of these arguments in their opposition to Rearden’s 

motion for default judgment, Judge Kim did not address the risk of inconsistent judgments in her 

report and recommendation. ECF No. 224 at 21. 

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1. Motion to Augment the Record

As a preliminary matter, the Court grants SHST’s motion to augment the record. This 

Court “has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a 

party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 

615, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2000). The discretion to consider new evidence should be exercised rarely

because the purpose of referral to a magistrate judge is to reduce the evidence and issues that must 

be considered by the district court. See Borden v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 

(1st Cir. 1987). The Court exercises its discretion to consider the evidence regarding Ms. Xiao 

Ping’s reappearance in this case because it was purportedly not available to the parties at the time 

they argued the motion for default judgment before Judge Kim and it is potentially relevant to the 

Court’s prejudice determination. 

After considering the new evidence, however, the Court refuses to give it any weight for 

several reasons. First, this allegedly new evidence was presented to the Court under suspicious 

circumstances that raise serious concerns regarding its credibility: SHST did not notify Rearden or 

this Court that it had been in contact with Ms. Xiao Ping until the eve of the hearing on the motion 

for de novo determination, even though SHST’s counsel admits that he was in contact with Ms. 

Xiao Ping more than three weeks earlier. ECF No. 298-5 ¶ 3. Second, the materials submitted 

paint an incomplete picture of both SHST’s absence thus far and its potential participation in this 

case going forward. For example, even if Ms. Xiao Ping was incapacitated, it is unclear why no 

one else at SHST—which has four other officers and directors according to its corporate 

disclosures—was able to notify SHST’s counsel about her medical condition. It is also unclear 

whether SHST’s counsel attempted to contact any person at SHST other than Ms. Xiao Ping. And 

Ms. Xiao Ping’s alleged willingness to testify in this case from China appears meaningless given 

that the Hague Convention prohibits American attorneys from taking depositions in China for use 

in foreign courts. See Judicial Assistance in China, Consulate General of the United States, 

available at http://guangzhou.usembassy-china.org.cn/judicial-assistance-in-china.html. Absent 

cross-examination and further discovery, Ms. Xiao Ping’s assertions have little value. Finally, the 

credibility of this new evidence must be evaluated against the backdrop of SHST’s and VGH’s 

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conduct throughout this litigation, which has created an environment in which the Court cannot 

accept their representations at face value.

4

 

2. Rearden is Prejudiced by SHST’s Disappearance

If a party fails to obey a discovery order, the court may enter default judgment against the 

disobedient party as a sanction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi). See In re Exxon Valdez, 102 

F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a default judgment sanction “is authorized only in 

extreme circumstances and only where the violation is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the 

party.” Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d at 432-33 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) 

(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment against the 

plaintiffs where they had refused to comply with discovery obligations and orders for more than 

two years, the court repeatedly warned the plaintiffs that failure to comply would result in 

dismissal, and the court had already imposed costs on the plaintiffs as a lesser sanction). “The 

most critical factor to be considered in case-dispositive sanctions is whether ‘a party’s discovery 

violations make it impossible for a court to be confident that the parties will ever have access to 

the true facts.’” Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 

1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Valley Eng’rs v. Electric Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 

1998)). 

The Court finds that SHST’s failure to participate in discovery and obey this Court’s 

orders have severely prejudiced Rearden and cast significant doubt on whether the true facts will 

ever come to light. Because of SHST’s disappearance, Rearden cannot question any SHST 

representative about SHST’s alleged purchase of the MOVA assets from MO2 in May 2013. Nor 

can it test any factual assertion that SHST’s counsel—who has not communicated with its client in 

over six months—has made on SHST’s behalf. This case presents an unusual situation in which 

the plaintiff, who was a party to an agreement that is central to key ownership issues in the case, 

has completely disappeared. As a result of this disappearance, the Court cannot be confident that 

 

4

In addition to the conduct recited in Judge Kim’s sanctions order, the Court detailed additional 

misrepresentations to the Court at the hearing held on August 4, 2016. See Tr. of Proceedings

(August 4, 2016), ECF No. 264 at 15:21-17:21. 

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the parties will ever have access to the true facts surrounding ownership of the MOVA assets. 

Perhaps most importantly, Rearden is unable to question Ms. Xiao Ping—the only SHST 

representative listed in the May 2013 asset purchase agreement through which SHST claims to 

have acquired the MOVA assets from MO2, LLC. ECF No. 122-18 at 17, 19, 38, 40. Rearden 

contends that Ms. Xiao Ping’s use of the company seal (“chop”) in that agreement is fraudulent, 

and has submitted expert testimony to support that contention. Decl. of Anna M. Han, ECF No. 

234. In response, SHST argues that the authenticity of the chop is irrelevant because the asset 

purchase agreement is governed by California law, under which a contract may be binding without 

a signature if the parties have partially performed. ECF No. 265 at 19 (citing 14 Cal. Jur. 3d 

Contracts § 158). 

This argument does not help SHST, because Rearden cannot question any SHST 

representative about whether SHST partially performed its obligations under the agreement. 

There is no evidence produced in discovery that SHST made any payment to MO2 to satisfy its 

obligations under the asset purchase agreement. Although payments were made to MO2 and

MO2’s counsel’s escrow account, those payments originated from an unknown entity called 

Victor Alliance Limited.5 Again, without any SHST representative, Rearden cannot inquire into 

the relationship between SHST and Victor Alliance Limited and whether the payments from 

Victor Alliance Limited constituted performance by SHST. As a result, important factual issues 

related to the validity of the May 2013 asset purchase agreement will likely go unanswered. 

SHST’s counsel and VGH argue that this does not prejudice Rearden because there are

other potential witnesses who have personal knowledge of the May 2013 transfer from MO2 to 

SHST. ECF No. 265 at 16-20. Specifically, they argue that the following witnesses can 

authenticate the May 2013 asset purchase agreement and confirm full performance by the parties: 

(1) Joseph Gabriel, vice president and general counsel for licensee DD3, who claims to have 

represented SHST in connection with its acquisition of the MOVA assets from MO2; (2) Greg 

LaSalle, who signed the agreement on behalf of MO2; (3) the transactional attorneys who 

 

5 VGH’s parent company, Digital Domain Holdings Limited (“DDHL”), later transferred money 

to this entity after purchasing the MOVA assets from SHST. 

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negotiated the agreement on behalf of LaSalle and MO2; (4) Amit Chopra, the executive director 

and chief operating officer of licensee DD3’s parent company, DDHL, and an agent of VGH, who 

claims to have been involved in funding SHST’s purchase of the MOVA assets from MO2; and 

(5) Daniel Seah, a DD3 director who received emails pertaining to DD3’s negotiations with MO2 

and LaSalle before SHST stepped in as the purchaser. Id. 

With the possible exception of Joseph Gabriel, none of these individuals represented SHST 

in the May 2013 transaction. Although Gabriel declares that he “represented SHST in connection 

with its acquisition of the MOVA property,” ECF No. 44-19 ¶ 8, his name is conspicuously absent 

from the May 2013 asset purchase agreement. As explained above, the only SHST representative 

mentioned in that agreement is Ms. Xiao Ping. Because SHST is nowhere to be found, Rearden 

has no way to test Gabriel’s assertion that he acted on SHST’s behalf. Moreover, SHST’s counsel 

and VGH propose Daniel Seah (a VGH director) as an alternative source of information, but VGH 

previously admitted in an interrogatory that “there are no current directors, shareholders and/or 

employees of VGH with knowledge of SHST’s acquisition of the MOVA Assets from MO2, 

LLC.” ECF No. 224-6 at 8, 9. At the very least, this discrepancy between VGH’s earlier 

interrogatory responses and its current position raises questions as to whether Seah actually has 

personal knowledge of the May 2013 transaction. In short, none of these individuals can speak on 

SHST’s behalf as to its involvement in the May 2013 transaction. And the Court doubts that the 

true facts surrounding the asset transfer from MO2 to SHST will come to light when one party to 

that critical agreement—who also happens to be the plaintiff in this action—is completely absent. 

SHST’s counsel and VGH argue that this does not matter because SHST played a 

“limited” role in the asset transfer as a holding company that stepped in at the “last minute” after 

Gabriel and others negotiated and did due diligence related to the deal. ECF No. 265 at 15-16. 

But Rearden has no way to test the truth of that assertion by SHST’s counsel—or any other 

assertion by SHST’s counsel—because it cannot depose SHST officers and directors about their 

involvement in the May 2013 agreement. In essence, SHST’s counsel and VGH ask the Court to 

take its word that SHST’s role was limited and leave it at that. The Court declines the invitation. 

As Judge Kim explained, “SHST’s representations by counsel in legal briefing for this motion 

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cannot substitute for binding admissions of the missing client.” ECF No. 252 at 11. 

SHST’s counsel and VGH also try to evade a finding of prejudice by arguing that the May 

2013 transfer from MO2 to SHST is “peripheral,” and that the real “case-dispositive issue” is the 

February 2013 transfer from OL2 to either Greg LaSalle or Stephen Perlman. ECF No. 265 at 9. 

Although both VGH’s ownership claim and SHST’s ownership claim depend on the purported 

transfer from OL2 to LaSalle in February 2013, they also necessarily depend on the May 2013 

asset purchase agreement between MO2 and SHST. If that agreement was invalid, SHST never

owned the MOVA assets, and VGH could not have acquired the MOVA assets from SHST. 

Abele v. Mod. Fin. Plans Servs., 300 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a party can 

only transfer rights that it possesses). The complete disappearance of a party to an agreement that 

is central to the key ownership issues in this case cannot be described as merely “peripheral.” 

3. Entry of Default Judgment Should be Delayed to Avoid Inconsistent 

Judgments

Although SHST’s conduct warrants a default judgment sanction, SHST is not the only 

other party to this lawsuit. And, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), “the court may 

direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the 

court expressly determines that there is no just reason for the delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

Because VGH continues to litigate the same claims and defenses previously asserted by SHST, the 

Court finds that entry of default judgment against SHST should be delayed to give VGH an 

opportunity to litigate its ownership claims on the merits.

There is just reason to delay the entry of default judgment when there are multiple 

defendants—only some of whom have defaulted—and the court has not yet adjudicated the claims 

as to the non-defaulting defendants. See 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2690 (4th ed.) (citing 

Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872)). This rule is rooted in the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872). In Frow, the plaintiff sought to hold 

multiple defendants jointly and severally liable for defrauding him of title to a single tract of land. 

Id. at 552-53. The Supreme Court held that the lower court should have delayed entry of default 

judgment against the single defaulting defendant until it had adjudicated the claims against the 

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non-defaulting defendants. Id. at 554. Based on Frow, “[i]t has long been established that, where 

there are several defendants, the transgressions of one defaulting party should not ordinarily lead 

to the entry of a final judgment, let alone a judgment fatal to the interests of other parties.” 

Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Frow, 82 

U.S. at 554) (holding that the non-defaulting defendant “should not be precluded by the default of 

[the codefendant] in the litigation from presenting those arguments and having them adjudicated 

on the merits”).

The purpose of the Frow rule is to prevent logically inconsistent judgments. See Frow, 82 

U.S. at 554 (explaining that “a final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant alone, 

pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous” because it could result in “one 

decree of the court sustaining the charge of joint fraud committed by the defendants” and “another 

decree disaffirming the said charge”); see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 

1257–58 (7th Cir. 1980) (explaining that “[t]he result in Frow was clearly mandated by the 

Court’s desire to avoid logically inconsistent adjudications as to liability”). Therefore, if the entry 

of default judgment might create a future risk of inconsistent rulings, the “proper procedure” is to 

“wait[] until completion of trial against the non-defaulting defendants before fixing damages and 

entering default judgments against [the defaulting defendant].” Garamendi, 683 F.3d at 1083 

(explaining that Frow has applied where “the entry of default judgment was inconsistent with or 

preceded the findings as to the non-defaulting defendants”). At that point, the court will be able to 

ensure that the judgment against the defaulting defendants is “fully consistent” with the judgment 

against the non-defaulting defendant. Id. 

Although the Frow rule was announced in a case where the plaintiff sought to hold the 

codefendants jointly and severally liable, the rule applies whenever “it is necessary that the relief 

against the defendants be consistent.” 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2690 (4th ed.); see also

United States Small Bus. Admin. v. Rocket Ventures II, L.P., No. C 10-04425 JSW, 2013 WL 

4835371, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013) (“Frow’s applicability turns ‘on the key question of 

whether under the theory of the complaint, liability of all the defendants must be uniform.’”)

(quoting Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1008 

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(N.D.Cal.2001)).

6

 “In Frow, the inconsistency flowed not only [from] the fact of allegation of 

joint liability, but the fact that there was a single res in controversy.” Shanghai, 194 F. Supp. 2d at

1009 (citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d at 1257, n. 40). But the Ninth Circuit 

has recognized that the relief against defendants must also be consistent when defendants are 

“similarly situated.” In re First T.D., at 532-33 (applying the Frow principle in the absence of 

joint liability, and holding that the bankruptcy court “violated the Frow principle and abused its 

discretion” by entering default judgment against some of the defendants where doing so “directly 

contradicted” the court’s prior summary judgment ruling). In In re First T.D., the Ninth Circuit 

explained that would be “incongruous and unfair to allow the Trustee to prevail against Defaulting 

Defendants on a legal theory rejected by the bankruptcy court with regard to the Answering 

Defendants in the same action.” Id. In that case, the defendants were similarly situated because 

“each transaction . . . followed an identical pattern with almost identical legal documents” and “the 

central legal issue concerning each transaction was the same.” Id. In subsequent cases, courts 

have explained that the Frow rule applies if “the case against each rests on the same legal theory” 

or if “the defendants have closely related defenses.” Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1082–

83 (9th Cir. 2012); Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1006–07 

(N.D. Cal. 2001). 

Here, the Court must delay entry of default judgment against SHST to avoid a risk of 

inconsistent judgments regarding which entity owns the MOVA assets. If the Court entered 

default judgment against SHST at this juncture, Rearden would prevail on its declaratory relief 

counterclaim against SHST as to ownership. However, VGH would continue to claim that SHST 

rightfully acquired rights to the MOVA Assets in February 2013 and that VGH rightfully acquired 

those rights from SHST in December 2015. Because VGH’s ownership claim is dependent on 

 

6 Rearden relies on Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 

2001) to argue that “the mere fact that there is some risk of inconsistent judgments will not 

preclude the Court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) to enter default judgment where there is “no just 

reason for delay.” ECF No. 280 at 22. However, Shanghai is distinguishable: In that case, the 

court explained that Frow “[did] not apply” because “differing judgments would not necessarily be 

illogical.” Id. at 1009-10. As a result, the court held that Shanghai was “an appropriate case to 

exercise such discretion” under Rule 54(b). Id. As explained below, this is not such a case. 

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SHST’s prior ownership, VGH would be trying to prove what this Court already rejected by 

entering default judgment against SHST. And it is possible that the Court might determine that 

VGH is in fact the rightful owner of the MOVA assets. Such a ruling would necessarily be 

inconsistent with the default judgment against SHST. The Frow rule therefore requires the Court 

to delay entry of default judgment to avoid such a result. 

Rearden argues that the Frow line of cases is distinguishable from this case because the 

defaulting party is a plaintiff, not a defendant; the defaulting and non-defaulting parties are 

related; the defaulting party was not absent for the entirety of the case, but rather litigated the case 

for over a year; the non-defaulting party appeared only after the defaulting party disappeared; and 

the same individuals represent both the defaulting and non-defaulting parties. ECF No. 280 at 12, 

17-18. However, none of these facts eliminate the risk of inconsistent judgments if this Court 

enters default judgment against SHST before adjudicating VGH’s ownership claims on the merits. 

And Rearden cites no authority to support its contention that, even though the primary purpose of 

the Frow rule still applies, the Court should nonetheless deviate from it. 

Rearden further argues that there is little to no risk of inconsistent judgments because 

VGH would likely be collaterally estopped from litigating the ownership issue if the Court enters

default judgment against SHST now. ECF No. 280 at 13, 19-11. However, Rearden did not raise 

this legal argument before Judge Kim. In fact, Rearden’s only response to SHST’s and VGH’s 

argument about the risk of inconsistent judgments appeared in the following brief footnote in their 

reply brief: 

VGH also argues that the court should delay entry of default judgment, 

citing Federal Rule 54. Cases discussing that Rule explain that under 

certain circumstances final default judgment can be delayed so as to not 

prejudice other, independent parties. VGH and SHST are related 

companies, have the same representatives, and are represented by the same 

counsel. VGH is only a party by virtue of the transfer of SHST’s rights in 

the Mova Assets, which transfer expressly acknowledged this case. This 

situation is one of their own making, and does not justify a delay in entry 

of a default judgment. 

ECF No. 158 at 5, n. 3. This footnote does not mention the likelihood of collateral estoppel as a 

reason to enter default judgment immediately. Now, in its opposition to SHST’s and VGH’s 

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motion for de novo determination, Rearden attempts to supplement this argument by analogizing

to several cases that address new legal issues such as collateral estoppel, privity, and alter ego 

liability. ECF No. 280 at 19-22. Although this Court has discretion to consider new legal 

arguments that were not presented to the magistrate judge, “the ordinary attitude should be to 

refuse to entertain objections based on legal arguments that were not presented to the magistrate 

judge.” 12 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3070.2 (2d ed.). This approach makes sense because “[t]he 

purpose of the Federal Magistrate’s Act is to relieve courts of unnecessary work.” Borden v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted) (holding that “the district court judge properly refused to consider an argument 

which could have been, but inexplicably was not, presented to the magistrate in the first 

instance”). Accordingly, “[p]arties must take before the magistrate, not only their best shot but all 

of their shots.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Rearden failed to 

present its collateral estoppel argument to Magistrate Judge Kim, despite filing three different 

briefs in support of its motion for default judgment. See ECF Nos. 139, 158, 215. The Court 

therefore refuses to consider it.

7

 

Finally, Rearden argues that there is no just reason for delay because “SHST’s 

disappearance . . . renders it impossible for VGH to offer sufficient proof of SHST’s ownership 

such that VGH’s ownership claims can stand.” ECF No. 280 at 19. The Court declines to enter 

default judgment based on this speculation as to whether VGH will be able to provide sufficient 

proof of ownership; that is an issue for the upcoming trial. 

 

7

The Court also notes that Rearden’s motions for default judgment were directed solely at SHST. 

See ECF No. 158 at 2 (“The motion for entry of default is against SHST.”); Report and 

Recommendation, ECF No. 252 at 1 (“Rearden’s motion was directed solely to SHST and not to 

VGH.”). Now, however, Rearden attempts to extend this default to VGH. ECF No. 280 at 21 

(“VGH will be reasonably bound by a default judgment against SHST.”). This extension to VGH 

directly contradicts Judge Kim’s explicit recommendation that “no action be taken against Plaintiff 

Virtue Global Holdings, Ltd. (“VGH”).” ECF No. 252 at 1. Because Rearden did not object to 

this recommendation, it is unclear whether it is even entitled to de novo review by this Court. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (requiring the district judge to “determine de novo any part of the 

magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to”). 

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***

In sum, SHST’s disappearance from this litigation warrants entry of a default sanction 

against it. However, the Court will delay entry of default judgment due to VGH’s continued 

participation in this case and the attendant risk of an inconsistent judgment. 

CONCLUSION

The Court grants VGH’s motion to intervene in this case as of right. VGH may file an 

intervenor’s complaint against Rearden within fourteen days of this Order. Because SHST’s 

discovery failures warrant a default sanction against it, the Court directs the Clerk to enter default 

against SHST. The Court will consider a motion for default judgment against SHST at the 

conclusion of this case on the merits. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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