Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02452/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02452-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY TEVAGA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOE MCGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04-2452 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Danny Tevaga, a prisoner of the State of California currently incarcerated

at Salinas Valley State Prison, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This Court ordered Respondent to show

cause as to why five claims raised in the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer, a memorandum of points and authorities in support

thereof, and exhibits. Petitioner did not file a traverse. This order denies the

petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties agree on the following procedural history: on December 15,

1999, a jury in the Superior Court of the State of California, Santa Clara County, 

found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder with the special circumstance of

being an accomplice to robbery. The jury found true an enhancement that the

robbery-murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in

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association with a criminal street gang. On March 9, 2000, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to a term of 25 years-to-life in state prison, with the

possibility of parole. Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Sixth

District, which affirmed the conviction in an unpublished, reasoned opinion filed

on September 26, 2003. On December 23, 2003, the California Supreme Court

denied a petition for review. On June 21, 2004, Petitioner filed his first petition

for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. On October 27, 2004, this Court

dismissed the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas

relief, but granted leave to amend. On November 29, 2004, Petitioner filed the

instant amended petition.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Petitioner was tried with co-defendants Falala Lelei and Christian Valdes. 

The jury found all three defendants guilty of the first-degree murder of Herbert

Kay, a NASA scientist who lived in Palo Alto, California, with his wife and twin

daughters. The facts of the case are summarized from the California Court of

Appeal opinion as follows:

A. The Murder

On June 12, 1997, Jonathan S. graduated from Ronald

McNair Intermediate School (the school) in East Palo Alto. Later

that day, Jonathan, his brother Usupo S., Valdes, Tevaga, Lelei,

Simanu, Malone and Jeff Tito, and Tapuloa met at the school to

play basketball and drink. There was conflicting testimony

concerning whether anyone talked about committing a robbery.

However, Usupo told a police officer that there was discussion

about a robbery. Malone also testified that he heard Simanu talk

about something at the school, and, as a result, he wanted to leave

the group.

They played basketball and drank for a few hours until it

started to get dark. Then everyone left in Valdes’ Isuzu Rodeo.

There was conflicting testimony about who was with Valdes in the

Rodeo at any one time. However, it is undisputed that Valdes drove

Malone, Jeff, and Jonathan home and brought Tevaga, Lelei,

Simanu, Tapuloa, and Usupo to Buchanon Court in East Palo Alto.

There, this smaller group continued to drink and also smoked some

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marijuana. Although Usupo and Malone testified that no one talked

about wanting to commit a robbery as they drove in the Rodeo or

later at Buchanon Court, Malone admitted to police that while

riding in the Rodeo, he heard Simanu tell Tevaga that he wanted to

rob someone. Usupo also told police that at Buchanon Court, they

decided to commit a robbery and planned to drive around and look

for a victim. At trial, Usupo said that he lied to police about this. 

After a while, Valdes drove everyone to University Avenue

in Palo Alto. They continued to drink as they cruised around. At

one point, they turned onto a side street and stopped so that some of

them could urinate. Usupo testified that he did not see Kay before

Valdes parked the Rodeo. However, Simanu told police that he saw

Kay before Valdes parked.

After parking, Valdes stayed in the Rodeo, and everyone

else got out. Usupo took a foot-long piece of broomstick with him.

He testified that after urinating, he dropped the stick and started

walking down the street to find the others. He saw Kay coming

toward him and heard one of his friends say, “Get him” in Samoan.

Usupo approached Kay and punched him in the head, knocking him

down. Simanu appeared, and he and Usupo went through Kay’s

pockets, looking for money. Kay screamed that he did not have

any. Simanu took Kay’s keys and a hairband. During this time,

Tevaga, Lelei, and Tapuloa, joined Usupo and Simanu and punched

and kicked Kay. Lelei also beat him with Usupo’s broomstick until

it broke.

After a while, Usupo said they should go, and he and Tevaga

returned to the Rodeo. When the others did not follow, they walked

to the corner, called for them, and went back to the Rodeo. No one

came, so they went to get the others. Simanu and Lelei were still

kicking Kay. Usupo and Tevaga told everyone to leave, and

Tapuloa followed them. Simanu and Lelei stayed behind and

dragged Kay from the street, hiding him behind a bench. There,

they continued to kick him for a while. Before leaving, Simanu

stepped on Kay’s chest. He and Lelei then joined the others. At one

point, Simanu saw a police car and threw the items he had taken

into a trash bin. Valdes then drove everyone away from the area.

Kay died from massive head, face, and neck trauma caused

by multiple, overlapping blunt force injuries that broke bones and

cartilage in his face, skull, and neck, crushed his larynx, and caused

his brain to swell. There was little or no evidence of serious injury

to his lower chest and body. 

Later that night, Malone was on the sidewalk in front of his

friend Wayne Selu’s garage and saw Tevaga. Malone asked about

spots on Tevaga’s shoes, jeans, and shirt. Tevaga said they were

blood. He explained that they had robbed somebody in Palo Alto,

and he had kicked the victim and could not stop.

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The next morning, Selu saw Valdes, Lelei, and Simanu

outside Lelei’s house. There was blood on Simanu’s and Lelei’s

clothing, and one of them said they had attacked a white guy. Lelei

mentioned using a stick.

Either that night or the next night, David Jimenez overheard

Tevaga talking to someone at a movie theater. Tevaga said that

“they tried robbing somebody or they jumped somebody” and “they

don’t even know if they killed him or not.”

The following Sunday, Selu saw Tevaga at church, and

Tevaga told him “he’d been involved in beating somebody up and

it got pretty messy.” He said they had gone too far, and he was

sorry.

After their arrests, defendants gave statements to the police.

Lelei admitted kicking Kay a few times and hitting him in the

mouth once. He said that someone else had used a broomstick. He

explained that Kay was already unconscious, so there was no use

beating him more if he was not going to feel the pain. Later, he

helped hide Kay’s body. 

Valdes admitted driving the Rodeo to the scene but said he

stayed inside.

Tevaga said he was drunk the night of the incident and could

not remember much of what happened. He then claimed full

responsibility for the incident, saying he was the only one to harm

Kay. He said there was no reason to attack Kay and did not realize

he was going to kill him. Later, however, Tevaga told police that he

and others were at a playground drinking and decided to go to Palo

Alto. They parked to relieve themselves, and later someone hit

Kay. Tevaga joined the others and kicked Kay in the chest and

head. After a while, he advised everyone to leave before the police

came. He said he then ran back to the Rodeo and could not

remember anything that happened after that.

B. The Defense

There was evidence that defendants drank a lot of malt

liquor and smoked marijuana before the murder. Dr. Stephen Pittel

testified as an expert concerning the effects of alcohol and drugs on

a person. Given the body weights of Tevaga and Lelei, the amounts

of alcohol and marijuana they said they consumed, and the time

frame in which they did so, Pittel opined that their blood alcohol

levels would put a person in a “confusional,” if not stuporous, state.

He testified that increased intoxication decreases a person’s ability

to make good judgments, accurately perceive what is happening,

and consider alternate courses of conduct. A person in a

“confusional” state of intoxication manifests the following

symptoms: “Disorientation and mental confusion; dizziness,

exaggerated emotional states, exaggerated emotional reactions, or

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acting upon those states; great mood swings or emotional

instability; disturbances of sensations, like double vision;

disturbances of perception; decreased pain sets; impaired balance

and muscular coordination and staggering gait and slurred speech.”

He opined that such a person would lack rational thought.

People v. Falala Lelei, et al., No. H021125, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9267,

at *2-10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 26, 2003) (footnotes omitted). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

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can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other

grounds, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks

to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the Petitioner’s

claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision

on a Petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on

the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an independent review of the

record. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

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state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for the

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts five claims for

relief: (1) the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by not allowing certain cross-examination of witness

Sivao; (2) the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendment by admitting evidence of an alleged co-conspirator’s

confession; (3) the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments by admitting an involuntarily-made confession in

evidence against Petitioner; (4) the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due

process by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of

involuntary manslaughter; and (5) the trial court committed cumulative error, in

violation of Petitioner’s right to due process. 

DISCUSSION

1. Exclusion of Sivao’s Testimony

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment by preventing him from asking witness

Jonathan Sivao certain questions during cross-examination. The claim is without

merit.

Undisputed testimony during the trial indicated that Christian Valdes

transported Jonathan Sivao, Malone Tito, and Jeff Tito to their respective homes

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in his Isuzu Rodeo after the larger group finished drinking and playing basketball

at Sivao’s school. People v. Falala Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS

9267, at *4. The testimony was disputed as to whether other individuals,

including Iapesa Simanu and Petitioner, were in the Rodeo with Sivao during this

trip. After Sivao took the stand, defense counsel asked him if he heard anyone in

the Rodeo discuss a robbery. Id. The prosecution objected, arguing that this line

of questioning called for hearsay. Id. The defense suggested that Sivao would

testify that he did not hear anyone in the Rodeo discuss a robbery and thus the

line of questioning could not, by definition, elicit hearsay. Id. The defense noted

that Sivao’s testimony would serve to impeach Tito Malone’s earlier testimony

that, while in the Rodeo, he heard Simanu tell Petitioner he wanted to rob

someone. Id. The trial court sided with the prosecution and rejected defense

counsel’s argument that Sivao’s testimony could be impeaching, noting that

Sivao could not remember whether Simanu was in the Rodeo or not. Id. 

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court

erred in preventing Sivao from answering whether he heard anyone in the Rodeo

discuss a robbery. The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the

excluded testimony was irrelevant and noted that

Jonathan [Sivao] conceded that Simanu could have been in the

Rodeo, and Usupo S. previously testified that Simanu was in the

Rodeo along with him, Jonathan, and others. Thus, evidence that

Jonathan did not hear Simanu talk about a robbery in the Rodeo has

some tendency, circumstantially, to prove that Simanu did not do

so.

Id. at *36. 

The court concluded, however, that the trial court’s error was harmless

because “the potential probative value for purposes of impeachment was limited.” 

Id. First, the court noted that

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To achieve impeachment, the defense had to place Jonathan,

Malone, Simanu, and Tevaga in the Rodeo at the same time.

However, Jonathan testified that Malone was in the Rodeo, but he

could not remember whether Simanu was there and did not even

suggest that Tevaga might have been there too. And although

Usupo said that Simanu was in the Rodeo, he contradicted

Jonathan's testimony that Malone was there.

Id. at *36-37. Next, the court concluded that Sivao’s testimony would not

definitively establish that Simanu did not tell Petitioner he wanted to rob

someone, only that Sivao did not hear such a comment. Thus, the court felt

Sivao’s testimony was “circumstantial evidence” that supported two inferences,

either that Simanu did not make the comment or that Sivao simply did not hear it.

Id. at *37. 

The court also felt the “conflicting and confusing” testimony about who

was in the Rodeo, and when, limited the potential impeachment value of Sivao’s

testimony. Id. The court noted that Sivao testified that Valdes needed more than

one trip to transport the entire group from the school to Buchanon Court, while

Malone testified Valdes only made one trip but later suggested on crossexamination that Valdes made more than one trip. Id.

 Next, the court suggested that Petitioner and his co-defendants could still

impeach Malone’s testimony because Usupo had testified that he, Simanu, Sivao,

and others were in the Rodeo but that Malone and Jeff Tito were not. Id.

Usupo’s testimony thus contradicted Malone’s testimony that he heard Simanu

make a comment to Petitioner about a robbery. Id. Usupo also testified that he

did not hear anyone in the Rodeo talk about committing a robbery. Thus, the

court concluded, “Usupo provided the sort of impeachment testimony counsel

sough to elicit from Jonathan [Sivao].” Id. at *38. 

Finally, the court noted that, even if Sivao’s testimony was admitted to

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impeach Malone, other evidence suggested Petitioner and his confederates

discussed and planned the robbery beforehand. Id. Usupo testified that someone

talked about committing a robbery while the group was drinking and playing

basketball at the school. Id. Usupo also testified that at Buchanon Court later

that evening, he, Simanu, Lelei, Tapuloa, Valdes, and Petitioner planned to drive

around and look for a victim to rob. Id.

Given these factors, the court concluded that it was not “reasonably

probable the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to any defendant

had the court permitted Jonathan [Sivao] to say he did not hear anyone in the

Rodeo talk about robbing someone.” Id. Because the trial court’s error in

excluding Sivao’s testimony was harmless, the court denied Petitioner’s claim. 

A. Legal Standard

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review

unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465

U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir.

1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478

U.S. 1021 (1986). 

“State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to

establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South

Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). This latitude is limited, however, by a defendant’s constitutional rights

to due process and to present a defense, rights originating in the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. See id. “While the Constitution [] prohibits the

exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that

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are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, wellestablished rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its

probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 1732; see

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 42 (holding that the exclusion of evidence does not violate

the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in

the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”). 

Similarly, the Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from

imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns of

harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety or interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

673, 679 (1986). A trial court’s limitation on cross-examination does not violate

the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony, prejudices the

defendant, and leaves the jury without sufficient information to evaluate the

biases and motivation of the witness. See United States v. Bridgeforth, 441 F.3d

864, 868 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of a trial court’s evidentiary

error, Petitioner must show that the error was one of constitutional dimension and

that it was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). He

would have to show that the error had “‘a substantial and injurious effect’ on the

verdict.’” Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht,

507 U.S. at 623). 

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court

committed a harmless error under state law in preventing Sivao from answering

certain questions was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

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controlling federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial court erred in its

application of California’s evidence code does not necessarily give rise to a

federal due process violation. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)

(noting that habeas is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged error in

the interpretation or application of state law); Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355,

1357 (9th Cir. 1995). Even if we assume that the trial court’s misapplication of

state law deprived Petitioner of due process and was thus of constitutional

dimension, furthermore, the error did not have a “substantial and injurious” effect

on the verdict and thus was harmless within the meaning of Brecht. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 623. 

In its analysis of harmless error, the Court of Appeal did not apply Brecht

but rather cited People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818 (1956), where the California

Supreme Court described a similar test: “a ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be

declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including

the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more

favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the

error.” Id. at 836. The state court’s reasoning that a different verdict was not

reasonably probable but for the trial court’s error informs the Brecht analysis.

 As the Court of Appeal noted, Sivao’s proposed testimony was of only

limited impeachment value. Sivao could not remember whether Simanu was in

the Rodeo and never suggested that Petitioner was in the car. Sivao did testify

that Tito Malone was in the car, but that account contradicted Usupo’s testimony

that Malone was not in the car. There was also conflicting testimony as to how

many trips Valdes needed to transport the entire group between the school and

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Buchanon Court. The conflicting and varied accounts of who was in the Rodeo

with Sivao limits the potential impeachment value of Sivao’s testimony that he

did not hear anyone in the Rodeo talk about a robbery. 

Sivao’s testimony, furthermore, would not have definitely established that

Simanu did not tell Petitioner he wanted to rob someone. Rather, the jury could

have concluded Simanu made the comment but that Sivao did not hear it, or did

hear it but had since forgotten it. The value of Sivao’s excluded testimony is thus

limited because the jury could have drawn different inferences from it.

Petitioner and his co-defendants had other avenues available to them to

impeach Malone’s testimony, even with Sivao’s testimony excluded. Usupo

testified that Malone was not in the Rodeo with him, Simanu, and Petitioner. He

also testified that no one in Rodeo spoke of committing a robbery. This

testimony directly contradicted Malone’s testimony that he heard Simanu make a

comment to Petitioner in the car. Usupo thus provided the type of impeachment

content that Petitioner sought from Sivao’s excluded testimony. 

 Finally, even if Sivao’s testimony had been admitted, other evidence in

the record tended to suggest Petitioner and his friends had planned the robbery in

advance. Usupo testified that there was discussion of a robbery while the group

was still at Sivao’s school, well before anyone got into the Rodeo. After Valdes

had transported some individuals back to Buchanon Court, furthermore, there

was further discussion there of driving around to look for someone to rob.

In sum, the impeachment value of Sivao’s testimony was limited by

confusing and conflicting accounts as to who was in the Rodeo and the likelihood

the jury would draw conflicting inferences from the testimony. Petitioner could

still impeach Malone’s testimony even after Sivao’s testimony was erroneously

excluded. And other evidence substantially supported the prosecution’s

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contention that Petitioner and his friends planned the robbery. It cannot be said

that Petitioner has established that the trial court’s limitation on this testimony

violates some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our

people as to be ranked as fundamental, see Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 42, or that it

prejudiced Petitioner by leaving the jury without sufficient information to

evaluate the biases and motivation of the witness, see Bridgeforth, 441 F.3d at

868. Moreover, even if any constitutional error in the trial court’s exclusion of

Sivao’s testimony had been established, it would be harmless under Brecht. See

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Because the error did not have a “a substantial and

injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict, the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling

federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. Id.

2. Admission of Simanu’s Statement

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s admission of Simanu’s incriminating

statement into evidence violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to confront witnesses against him and present a defense. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

The trial court allowed Palo Alto Police Officer Scott Wong to relate a

redacted version of what Simanu told him during Simanu’s custodial

interrogation. People v. Falala Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9267,

at *11. Valdes’ defense counsel objected, arguing that allowing this testimony

violated the defendants’ right to confrontation because Simanu was not present in

the courtroom and would not independently testify. Id. The trial court rejected

defense counsel’s objection, ruling that the testimony was allowed under the

California Evidence Code’s hearsay exception for statements against the

declarant’s pecuniary, proprietary, penal, or social interests. Id. Wong then

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related a redacted version of Simanu’s statement:

Simanu said he saw Kay walking on the street before the vehicle

stopped. Thereafter, he got out and urinated. Later, he took keys

and a hairband from Kay and then moved him from the street to an

area behind a bench. As he left, he kicked and stepped on the Kay's

chest. When he got back into the vehicle, he saw a police patrol car.

He got out, hid, and then threw the items he had taken into a trash

bin.

Id. The Court of Appeal, citing to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),

concluded that the trial court’s admission of Simanu’s statement did not violate

Petitioner’s constitutional rights. The court began by describing the Roberts

standard:

As defendants correctly note, Simanu’s statement was

properly admitted only if it came within “a firmly rooted hearsay

exception” or contained “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness” such that adversarial testing would be expected to

add little, if anything, to its reliability. (citations omitted)

We need not determine whether a statement against the

declarant’s penal interest comes within a firmly rooted hearsay

exception because we conclude that Simanu’s statement passes

muster under the alternative test for reliability: It contains

particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

Id. at *13-14.

The court noted that a “genuinely self-inculpatory” statement is itself one

of the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” that render a statement

admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at *15. The court found that this

“guarantee” applied to Simanu’s “genuinely self-inculpatory” statement:

Simanu's statement was highly self-incriminating. It not only

placed him at the scene of the crime before, during, and after it

occurred but also, and more specifically, established that he saw

Kay before the attack, got out of the Rodeo, stole property from

Kay, kicked and stepped on him, hid his body, and finally discarded

the stolen property.

Id. at *16. 

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Finally, the court rejected Petitioner’s contention that Simanu’s statement

was presumptively unreliable because Simanu made it during custodial

interrogation. The court noted that any statements Simanu made about other

defendants may well have been presumptively unreliable in the context of

custodial interrogation, because “a suspect has a strong motive to minimize his or

her involvement, spread or shift the blame to others, and curry favor with

authorities.” Id. at *16-17. The court reiterated, however, that Simanu’s

redacted statement only implicated him and made no mention of Petitioner or his

co-defendants. Id. at *17. The court concluded: 

[W]hatever might be said about the reliability of other parts of

Simanu’s statement that were not admitted below, we do not

consider the parts that were admitted here presumptively unreliable.

On the contrary, they were inherently reliable because they dealt

with only his presence and conduct before, during, and after the

incident, subjects he knew about first hand; and they were highly

self-incriminating. Indeed, the particular statement defendants find

so prejudicial - i.e., that Simanu saw Kay before the vehicle parked

– prevented Simanu from asserting an alibi defense and increased

his potential criminal liability because it tended to show that when

Simanu saw Kay from the Rodeo, he decided to attack and rob him.

Id. at *17-18.

A. Legal Standard

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in

criminal cases the accused has the right to “be confronted with witnesses against

him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is

to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive

guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). It commands, not

that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:

by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Id. The Clause thus reflects a

judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence, but about how

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reliability can best be determined. Id. at 61. 

The Confrontation Clause applies to all out-of-court testimonial statements

offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., “testimonial hearsay.” See id. at

51. While the Supreme Court has not articulated a comprehensive definition of

testimonial hearsay, “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to

prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;

and to police interrogations.” Id. at 68. 

Out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial hearsay are

barred under the Confrontation Clause unless (1) the witnesses are unavailable,

and (2) the defendants had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 

Id. at 59. The reliability of such statements, for Confrontation Clause purposes,

depends solely upon these two factors. See id. at 68. Thus, the Court’s prior

holding in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56, that such statements may be admitted so long

as the witness is unavailable and the statements have “adequate indicia of

reliability,” i.e., fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear

“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” is overruled by Crawford. See id.

In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court held that a federal court may not

grant habeas corpus relief to a prisoner based on a constitutional rule of criminal

procedure announced after his conviction and sentence became final unless the

rule fits within one of two narrow exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,

310-316 (1989). Crawford announced a “new rule” for purposes of Teague

analysis, and that rule does not come within the exception to the Teague

non-retroactivity rule for “watershed rules.” Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct.

1173, 1184 (2007) (applying Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-316). Crawford therefore

does not apply retroactively on collateral attack. Id.

Confrontation Clause claims are subject to harmless error analysis. See

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United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying harmless

error analysis to claim). In the context of reviewing a state court conviction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this means that relief is in order only if the admission at

issue “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.’” Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir.), amended, 408 F.3d

1127 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)),

rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 

B. Analysis

In its analysis of Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal applied

the then-controlling Roberts standard. After the court’s decision, the Crawford

Court substantially revised the analysis for determining whether the admission of

out-of-court statements violates the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541

U.S. at 60. Crawford, however, announced a “new rule” that does not apply

retroactively on habeas review. See Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1184 (applying

Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-316). Consequently, the instant claim is governed by the

federal law in effect prior to Crawford, under which the admission of a hearsay

statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause if it either falls within a

“firmly rooted” hearsay exception, or bears “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66- 68; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,

816 (1990). The California Court of Appeal concluded that Simanu’s statement

had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that rendered it admissible under

Roberts. The California courts’ application of the Roberts standard was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling federal law at the time

the decision was rendered. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails. 

Simanu’s statement was genuinely “self-inculpatory” and thus bears one

of the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” that render a statement

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 The Court of Appeal, finding that Simanu’s statement bore

“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” did not decide whether the

California hearsay exception for statements against the declarant’s penal interest

under which the trial court admitted Simanu’s statement was “firmly rooted” for

Roberts purposes. In its pre-Crawford jurisprudence, the Supreme Court had

held that “due to the sweeping scope of the label, the simple categorization of a

statement as a “‘declaration against penal interest’ . . . defines too large a class

for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,

127 (1999), quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986). 

19

admissible under Roberts. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605

(1994) (“the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory... is itself one

of the ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ that makes a statement

admissible under the Confrontation Clause.”). Simanu’s statement placed him at

the scene of the crime before, during, and after the assault on Kay. He admitted

seeing Kay from the Rodeo and stealing property from him later during the

assault. After the first attack, Simanu moved Kay’s limp body behind a bench

and kicked and stepped on Kay as he left. After spotting a police car, Simanu

then hid and later disposed of the stolen items in a trash bin. 

Based on this record, this Court agrees with the California court’s

assessment that Simanu’s statement was “highly self-incriminating.” People v.

Falala Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9267, at *16. The statement

placed Simanu at the scene of the crime and implicated him in the assault,

robbery, and an effort to cover-up the crime. Given the highly self-incriminating

nature of the statement, adversarial testing through cross-examining would be

expected to add little to its reliability. The trial court properly admitted the

“genuinely self-inculpatory” statement and there was no violation of Petitioner’s

rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66-68;

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.1

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As Respondent concedes, Simanu’s statement, taken during a custodial

interrogation, would almost certainly qualify as inadmissible “testimonial

hearsay” under Crawford unless Simanu was unavailable to testify at trial and

Petitioner had an opportunity to cross-examine him beforehand. See Crawford,

541 U.S. at 51. As described above, however, Crawford does not apply

retroactively and thus affords Petitioner no basis for relief. See Bockting, 127 S.

Ct. at 1184. 

Under both the Roberts and Crawford standards, furthermore, Petitioner is

not entitled to relief unless he shows the trial court’s alleged error had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

See McClain, 377 F.3d at 222; Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1022. Even if the trial

court had erred in admitting Simanu’s statement, Petitioner’s claim would fail

under this harmless error analysis. The redacted version of Simanu’s statement

concerned only Simanu’s actions and whereabouts and made no reference to

Petitioner or other suspects whatsoever. Additionally, there was a substantial

amount of other evidence which linked Petitioner to the crime, including

Petitioner’s own confession to the crime. Based on this evidence, it cannot be

said that the admission of Simanu’s statement had a substantial and injurious

effect.

The Court of Appeal properly applied Roberts in concluding that the trial

court did not err in admitting Simanu’s statement. However, even if the trial

court did err in admitting the statement, it cannot be said that the admission had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.”

Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993). The state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling federal law and

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Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

3. Admission of Petitioner’s Statement

Petitioner claims that the police applied “religious coercion” to induce

involuntary statements from him during his custodial interrogation, and that the

trial court violated his due process rights by admitting those statements into

evidence. Pet. at 6. Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

Following his arrest and at the start of custodial interrogation, Petitioner

waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and agreed to

speak with police detectives Luis Verbera and Mike Denson. People v. Falala

Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9267, at *20. At the beginning of the

interview, Petitioner said he kicked Kay in the chest but was too intoxicated to

remember anything else. Id.

Later, after Verbera informed Petitioner that his friends had confessed

their roles in the murder, Petitioner said he would “fall for each and every one of

them” and claimed that he was the only one who beat and kicked Kay, and that

his other friends had stayed in the Rodeo. Id. Verbera told Petitioner he doubted

this story and that he knew Petitioner’s friends were involved. Id. Petitioner said

his friends would never “rat” on him. Id. at *21. Verbera responded that

Petitioner’s friends were not “ratting” on him but rather “needed to get things off

their chests and felt bad for Kay’s family.” Id. Verbera said he would be

preparing a report for court and Petitioner asked if his friends would also appear

in court. Id. The Court of Appeal reported the ensuing discussion as follows:

At that point, the following exchange took place:

“Verbera[:] I, I don’t know at, everybody standing side by side or

exactly the procedure... They told us what you did, what I, I, I

mean, we could go through all the names and what each of them

did okay. We’re not bullshitting you because you know why? At

this point, it’s locked in. But I want you, one, to get it off your

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chest. Two, to confirm what they’re saying is the truth okay. But

the first thing that we have to think of for you, are you a Christian?

[¶] Tevaga[:] I’m Mormon. [¶] Verbera[:] Oh, you’re a Mormon.

Okay. And you guys, you believe in the Ten Commandments. [¶]

Tevaga[:] Yeah I believe, I believe all that stuff. [¶] Verbera[:]

Okay, okay. That’s the first thing, is our soul. We have to be, be in

peace with our soul. And if [sic] means that we’re in peace with

our soul, but we have to face the consequences, that’s okay.

Because we have to. And you think about your family and how you

were raised, right? And what would your father say right now?

What would he tell you right now? [¶] Tevaga[:] He would be

mad.” (Italics added.)

Tevaga then asked to see pictures of his friends, but Verbera

told him to wait. Tevaga said, “You know it’s hard for me to

believe that you know.” Verbera replied, “You know what, of

course it is. You know why? Because they’re your homeboys.

Because you said one thing very true, you loved them more than

what some of their families did, right? And you would do anything

for them. Well they said the same thing and they sat there, big guys

like you or smaller guys like you and they cried. And they cried for

a few reasons. Because that love they have for the, for the

homeboys, that love they have for their own family, the love they

have for their church, for God, or for the Lord, and what the, the,

the sorrow they felt for having those two girls growing up without a

dad. On Father’s Day. And that’s really sad.... And that’s how they

felt. Just like you’re feeling. And they said okay it’s not ratting, but

I need to get this off my chest. And if we talk about it, and it makes

you feel better, and if you want to write a, a letter of sorry to, to the

family we’ll let you do that. Because all that is part of our healing

and it’s part of our religious belief system to ask the Lord for

forgiveness. Right? Part of the commandment. And we can get it

off our chest. We talk about it, is one way. Another way we even

write an apology, whatever you want. But we need to go through

those steps right now. Because it’s for you, it’s for you to feel

better about yourself... In all honesty on Judgment Day, whether

you believe in Judgment Day or not, there’s going to be one thing

that’s going to be looked at. Were you able to ask for forgiveness?

Were you able to take this pain out of your soul and at least

alleviate it some way, right? ... And if you made a mistake, you

made a mistake. You said it yourself. What did you say? You didn’t

want to kill him, right? [¶] Tevaga[:] Yeah. I didn’t want to kill

him.” (Italics added.)

Thereafter, Verbera suggested that perhaps Tevaga was not

looking for some one to kill that night, but instead something just

went wrong, he got excited and did not realize what happened.

When Tevaga agreed, Verbera asked him to elaborate. Tevaga said

he first wanted to hear the taped statements of his friends or at least

see their pictures. Verbera said he had to check on the legality of

playing the tapes but showed him pictures. After Tevaga saw some

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pictures, Verbera asked him to start from the beginning. The

interrogation continued for another half an hour.

Id. at *21-25. 

After reviewing the evidence, including a videotape of Petitioner’s

confession, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim that Detective

Verbera’s religious comments, including those italicized above, amounted to

coercion, rendering his confession involuntary and thus inadmissable at trial. 

The court found that Verbera’s religious comments, although questionable, were

not “either inherently or actually so coercive as to overcome Tevaga’s resistance

and become an additional motivating force.” Id. at *25. The court noted that the

detectives questioned Petitioner for over thirty minutes and that Petitioner

“substantially incriminated himself by admitting his presence at the scene and his

assaultive conduct towards Kay” before Verbera made any religious comments. 

Id. at *27.

After Verbera made his first religious comment, furthermore, the court

observed that: 

Tevaga did not suddenly break down or immediately open up and

volunteer new incriminating details about what happened. On the

contrary, the videotape reveals no appreciable change in Tevaga’s

demeanor, general emotional state, or attitude as a result of

Verbera’s comments. Indeed, the detectives still had to pre§

Tevaga to elicit a more truthful version of events.

Id. at *27-28. The court “simply disagree[d] with Tevaga’s view that Verbera’s

comments had a visible effect on him.” Id. at *28. 

Given that Petitioner made “substantially incriminating” statements prior

to Verbera’s religious comments and the visual evidence suggested Petitioner

was unmoved by the comments, the court concluded that Verbera’s “few and

brief” religious remarks did not amount to coercion and denied Petitioner’s claim. 

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Id.

A. Legal Standard

Involuntary confessions in state criminal cases are inadmissible under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). The

voluntariness of a confession is evaluated by reviewing both the police conduct in

extracting the statements and the effect of that conduct on the suspect. Miller v.

Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1999). Absent police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is

no basis for concluding that a confession was involuntary in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986);

Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494

U.S. 1031, and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1061 (1990).

 To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider

the effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). “The test is whether,

considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the

statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so

that the suspect’s will was overborne.” United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d

1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14

(1963)). 

A confession is only involuntary if the police use coercive activity to

undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will. Derrick v. Peterson, 924

F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 853 (1991). Encouraging a

suspect to tell the truth is not coercion. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486,

494 (9th Cir. 1997). Nor do appeals with religious themes or overtones

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necessarily constitute coercion. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028

(9th Cir. 1993) (Mormon defendant’s will not overborne when interrogator, a

Mormon bishop, described spiritual implications of defendant’s crime and

reminded him of religious imperative of confessing and making restitution);

Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussion of religion and

interrogator’s offer to get priest for defendant did not amount to coercion).

Voluntariness of a confession is not a factual issue entitled to a

presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but is a legal question

meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Miller

v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 116; Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc) (federal court not bound by state court finding that confession is

voluntary), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1031 (1992). A federal habeas court must

review de novo the state court’s finding that a confession was voluntarily given. 

Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d at 818.

B. Analysis

Having examined the record and viewed the videotape of Petitioner’s

confession, we conclude Detective Verbera’s religious comments were not

sufficiently “coercive” such that Petitioner’s will was overborne and his

confession rendered involuntary. See Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1366. As such

the California courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, controlling federal law, and Petitioner’s claim fails. 

We concur with the Court of Appeal’s judgment that Petitioner made

deeply self-incriminating statements well before Verbera ever made a religious

comment and that the religious comments were not an additional motivating

force. At the beginning of the interrogation, Petitioner volunteered that he only

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kicked Kay in the chest, but later, in response to Verbera’s assertion that his

friends had told the police “everything,” Petitioner indicated he would take full

responsibility for the assault on Kay. People v. Falala Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal.

App. Unpub. LEXIS 9267, at *20. The detectives and Petitioner discussed

whether Petitioner’s friends were “ratting on him,” and Detective Denson

explained that the friends only “needed to get things off their chests.” Id.

Petitioner inquired whether he would be in court with his “boys.” Id. Only then,

after assuring Petitioner than neither he nor his partner were lying, did Verbera

make his first religious comment by inquiring as to Petitioner’s religion and

referencing the Ten Commandments. Id. By this juncture, Petitioner had already

substantially incriminated himself by admitting being on the scene and saying

that he was the only one to attack and ultimately kill Kay.

During the subsequent conversation, Verbera used a variety of techniques

to encourage Petitioner to tell the truth about his role in the crime. Verbera

appealed to Petitioner’s strong feelings of affection for his friends and family. 

He assured Petitioner that his friends confessed to the police to alleviate some of

their guilt over the murder. Verbera pointed out that Kay’s murder had left Kay’s

twin daughters without a father. The detective explained that he thought

Petitioner did not intend to kill Kay and that it was all a mistake, and that perhaps

things had gotten out of hand. Verbera asserted that Petitioner would feel better

and could alleviate some of his own guilt and suffering if he confessed his role in

the crime. 

Verbera certainly infused several of his appeals with religious overtones. 

He asserted that Petitioner should confess and ask forgiveness because that is

“part of our religious belief system to ask the Lord for forgiveness.” Id. at *23. 

Verbera claimed that on “Judgement Day,” whether Petitioner was honest or not

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is “one thing that’s going to be looked at.” Id. at *24. Nonetheless, these

religious comments were brief and only a marginal element of Verbera’s overall

interrogation technique. Petitioner did not break down or immediately confess

following Verbera’s religious comments, furthermore, but rather confessed only

after the detectives played him a brief recording of Petitioner’s co-defendant

Falala Lelei speaking with the police, and showed Petitioner pictures of other

friends who were also cooperating with the police. 

After viewing the videotape of Petitioner’s confession, see Resp’t Ex. 53,

this Court concurs with the Court of Appeal’s assessment that Verbera’s religious

comments elicited “no appreciable change in Tevaga’s demeanor, general

emotional state, or attitude as a result of Vebera’s comments.” Id. at *27-28. 

Petitioner remains generally impassive throughout the interrogation and does not

react in any noticeable manner after Verbera makes his religious comments. His

tone is flat and unemotional when he responds to Verbera’s questions about his

religion and the Ten Commandments. Indeed, Petitioner appears most animated

when the detectives offer to show him pictures of the friends who have

purportedly cooperated with the police. 

In sum, the evidence in the record, including the videotape, do not support

Petitioner’s assertion that Verbera’s few and brief religious comments rendered

his will overborne and motivated his confession. Rather, the evidence tends to

suggest Petitioner confessed only after he was convinced that his friends had also

spoken to the police and that he would not be “ratting out” his “boys” by

confessing to Verbera.

Having reviewed all the evidence and considered the totality of the

circumstances, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that Verbera or Denson

obtained Petitioner’s confession “by physical or psychological coercion or by

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improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborne.” See Leon

Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1366. Petitioner exercised his own free will in confessing

his crime. See Derrick, 924 F.2d at 818. As such the California courts’ rejection

of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

controlling federal law, and his claim fails. 

4. Refusal to Instruct on Involuntary Manslaughter

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser

included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Petitioner’s claim is meritless.

 Petitioner presented evidence at trial that he was voluntarily intoxicated at

the time of the crime. People v. Falala Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.

LEXIS 9267, at *47. Petitioner claims that his intoxication precluded him from

having the specific mental state required for a conviction of murder, Pet. at 8, and

as a result, the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the lesser included offense of

involuntary manslaughter, Petitioner concludes, forced an “all-or-nothing” choice

on the jury of convicting on first-degree murder or acquitting Petitioner

altogether if they found his intoxication prevented him from forming the requisite

mental state. Id. Petitioner believes this choice favored conviction because the

jury was disinclined to excuse him of all culpability for Kay’s murder.

In evaluating Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s

claim on the basis of harmless error, concluding that any “error was harmless

because the factual question to be posed by instructions on involuntary

manslaughter was resolved against Tevaga and Lelei under other, properly given

instructions.” People v. Falala Lelei, et al., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9267,

at *48. The court noted:

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The court instructed the jury on, among other things, first

degree premeditated murder, first degree robbery felony-murder,

second degree murder based on commission of an unlawful act

dangerous to life (implied malice), robbery, assault by means of

force likely to produce great bodily injury, and aiding and abetting.

The court further instructed the jury that it could consider

evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether

defendants formed the specific intent required for first degree

premeditated murder, robbery felony-murder, liability as an aider

and abettor, and the gang enhancement. (See CALJIC Nos. 4.21 &

421.2.) The court emphasized that the jury could not convict

defendants unless the circumstances not only were consistent with a

finding that they possessed the requisite specific intents or mental

states but also “cannot be reconciled with any other rational

conclusion.”

Id. at *48-49. In considering the claim, the Court of Appeal also noted that

because voluntary intoxication does not negate the general intent required for

assault and battery and Petitioner’s argument was that because the evidence of

Petitioner’s commission of the misdemeanor battery coincided with that of the

other defendants, the misdemeanor was dangerous, this supported an instruction

on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. Id. at *53. The court noted that

battery may be a predicate for involuntary manslaughter, which may be a lesser

offense of murder, which occurs when a killing is committed ‘in the commission

of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful

act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution

and circumspection.’ (citation omitted). Id. The Court of Appeal then determined

In our view, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question that

would have been posed by this theory of involuntary manslaughter

by convicting Tevaga of first degree murder and finding true the

robbery-murder special circumstance allegation. Simply put, the

jury found that he killed during the commission of a felony:

robbery. . . . To make such findings, the jury rejected evidence and

argument suggesting that Tevaga killed during the commission of a

misdemeanor. 

Id. at 53-54. 

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The jury convicted Petitioner and his co-defendant on first-degree murder,

thus finding that they had formed the requisite specific intent for that offense. Id.

at *48-49. The jury implicitly rejected Petitioner’s defense that voluntary

intoxication prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent. Id. The

Court of Appeal was not persuaded by Petitioner’s claim that the jury was faced

with an unpalatable “all-or-nothing” choice between convicting on murder or

acquitting:

As noted, the court also instructed the jury on second degree

murder based on implied malice. Defendants acknowledge that

evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate implied malice.

(citations omitted) Thus, even if the jury found that defendants did not form

specific intent because they were too intoxicated, it was not faced with an

all-or-nothing choice between first degree murder and acquittal, at least

concerning Tevaga and Lelei, both of whom admitted joining the others in

repeatedly hitting and kicking Kay while he was on the ground. The jury’s

implicit rejection of second degree murder confirms the integrity and reliability

of the jury’s finding that defendants acted with the requisite specific intent.

Furthermore, apart from determining guilt, the jury also had to decide the

gang allegation. As noted, the jury was permitted to consider the evidence of

voluntary intoxication in determining whether each defendant possessed the

requisite specific intent to promote their gang. Thus, this allegation also posed

essentially the same question that would have been posed by instructions on

involuntary manslaughter instructions - i.e., whether or not defendants formed

specific intent due to voluntary intoxication. In finding the allegations true, the

jury again resolved this issue against each defendant. Moreover, because the

allegation did not involve a determination of guilt, it is unlikely the jury might

have been tempted to find it true simply to prevent defendants from escaping all

liability. Therefore, the gang determination further supports the reliability of

jury's findings of intent required for the murder convictions. Id. at *51-52. In

sum, the court concluded, “we are satisfied any alleged error in refusing to

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instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense was

harmless, in that we find no reasonable probability that the error affected the

outcome.” (citations omitted). Id. at *56-57.

A. Legal Standard

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a

ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v.

Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that

the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. See id. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend

upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). Due process does not

require that an instruction be given unless the evidence supports it. See Hopper

v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982). The omission of an instruction is less likely

to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d

at 475-76 (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155). Thus, a habeas petitioner

whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an

"'especially heavy burden.'" Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.

1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). 

In general, the failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser-included

offenses in a non-capital case does not present a federal constitutional claim. See

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d

1092, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1998); Turner, 63 F.3d at 819 (citing Bashor v. Riley,

730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)). However,

“the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the

case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the general rule.” Solis, 219

F.3d at 929 (citing Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1240). Solis suggests that there must be

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substantial evidence to warrant the instruction on the lesser included offense. See

Solis, 219 F.3d 929-30 (no duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as lesser

included offense to murder because evidence presented at trial precluded a heat

of passion or imperfect self-defense instruction; no duty to instruct on

involuntary manslaughter because evidence presented at trial implied malice); see

also Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (no duty in

death penalty case to instruct on second degree murder as a lesser included

offense because the evidence established that the killer had acted with

premeditation, so if the jury found that the defendant was the killer, it necessarily

would have found that he committed first degree murder).

B. Analysis

The Supreme Court has held that the failure to instruct on a lesserincluded offense in a capital case is constitutional error if there was evidence to

support the instruction. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that this holding does not extend to noncapital cases. Solis, 219 F.3d at 929; Bashor v. Riley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th

Cir. 1984). As such, Petitioner claim for federal habeas relief based on the trial

court’s failure to instruct on the lesser-included offense of involuntary

manslaughter fails. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also

Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001) (The question under §

2254(d) “is not whether [the conviction] violates due process as that concept

might be extrapolated from the decisions of the Supreme Court. Rather, it is

whether [the conviction] violates due process under ‘clearly established’ federal

law, as already determined by the Court.”). 

The Ninth Circuit has noted, however, that the trial court’s failure to give

instructions on the defendant’s theory of the case may violate due process. See

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Solis, 219 F.3d at 929. This Court finds that the trial court’s failure to provide an

instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on a theory of misdemeanor

battery did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights because the evidence

presented at trial supported the conviction of murder during the commission of a

robbery. Id. at 929-30.

However, even if the trial court erred in failing to provide adequate jury

instructions on Petitioner’s theory of the case, Petitioner’s claim would fail under

the requisite harmless error analysis. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (a habeas

petitioner is not entitled to relief for an instructional error unless the error “‘had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”). 

As the Court of Appeal noted, Petitioner’s contention that the trial court’s error

left the jury with an all-or-nothing choice between first-degree murder or

acquittal is incorrect. The trial court instructed the jury on second-degree murder

based on implied malice, but the jury still chose to convict on first-degree

murder, notwithstanding evidence of Petitioner’s intoxication. That the jury

convicted on first-degree murder even with the lesser charge of second-degree

murder available undermines Petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s failure to

instruct on involuntary manslaughter was prejudicial. Further, the jury’s finding

that Petitioner committed the murder during the commission of a felony, robbery,

reflects that there was no prejudice in failure to instruct on involuntary

manslaughter instruction based on an underlying misdemeanor battery. 

The jury’s finding on the gang enhancement also confirms their implicit

rejection of Petitioner’s defense that he did not have the requisite mental state for

murder. The jury was allowed to consider Petitioner’s evidence of voluntary

intoxication in deciding whether he had the specific intent to promote his gang

during the commission of the murder. In finding the gang enhancement true, the

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jury resolved that Petitioner’s intoxication did not negate his specific intent. 

The jury’s finding on the gang enhancement also refutes Petitioner’s

theory that the jury was improperly influenced by an “all-or-nothing” choice

before them. As the Court of Appeal noted, the gang enhancement did not

involve a determination of guilt and thus it is unlikely the jury would find the

enhancement true simply because they were concerned Petitioner would

otherwise escape all criminal liability. Rather, the jury was more likely to find

the enhancement true because they found Petitioner had the required mental state,

notwithstanding his intoxication defense. 

The jury rejected Petitioner’s voluntary intoxication defense in finding

him guilty of first-degree murder, with a gang enhancement, and declined to

convict instead on the second-degree murder alterative. Petitioner has not

established that the failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails. 

5. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims the cumulative effect of the alleged errors described

above deprived him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner

argues that the trial court’s errors “compound and reinforce” each other and that

even “if the courts find these errors shown are harmless individually, it should

find them cumulatively prejudicial.” Pet. at 9. Petitioner’s claim is meritless.

Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal to the California Court

of Appeal, but did raise it in his petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. The California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. 

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A. Legal Standard

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a

defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where

multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge every

important element of proof offered by prosecution).

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the

government’s case is weak. See United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381

(9th Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1180 (9th Cir.

2002) (noting that the only substantial evidence implicating the defendant was

the uncorroborated testimony of a person who had both a motive and an

opportunity to commit the crime). However, where there is no single

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir.

2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d

1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Analysis

Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s alleged constitutional errors

are sufficiently prejudicial to warrant federal relief. As discussed above, only

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in admitting Sivao’s testimony gives

rise to a possible violation of his constitutional rights, and that error was found

harmless under Brecht. By definition, a single harmless error alone doesn’t rise

to the level of a “cumulative” error. In any event, the government’s case against

Petitioner was very strong and it cannot be said that the exclusion of Sivao’s

testimony sufficiently prejudiced Petitioner’s defense such that reversal is

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necessary. See Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381. 

The California Supreme Court’s summary denial of Petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling federal law,

and his claim for habeas relief fails. 

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of

Respondent and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 5, 2007

 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TEVAGA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MCGRATH et al,

Defendant.

 /

Case Number: CV04-02452 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 5, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Danny Toatele Tevaga P-72747

Salinas Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960

Glenn R. Pruden

Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Dated: September 5, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:04-cv-02452-JSW Document 22 Filed 09/05/07 Page 37 of 37