Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05185/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 2011 Decided June 21, 2011

No. 07-5178

ARKAN MOHAMMED ALI ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD, INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 07-5185, 07-5186, 07-5187

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv01378)

Cecillia D. Wang argued the cause for the appellants. Lucas

Guttentag, Jennifer Chang Newell, Kate Desormeau, Steven R.

Shapiro, Paul Hoffman, James P. Cullen, Bill Lann Lee, Arthur

B. Spitzer, David Rudovsky and Erwin Chemerinsky were on

brief.

Stephen A. Saltzburg was on brief for amici curiae National

Institute of Military Justice et al. in support of the appellants.

William J. Aceves was on brief for amici curiae Human

Rights & Torture Treatment Organizations in support of the

appellants.

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Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Barbara L. Herwig,

Michael L. Martinez, Mark E. Nagle, Stephen L. Braga and

Ryan E. Bull, Attorneys, were on brief. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit

Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Four Afghan

and five Iraqi citizens captured and subsequently held in

Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, by the United States military

sued Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of the United States

Department of Defense, and three high-ranking Army officers1

(collectively, defendants) under the Fifth and Eighth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Alien Tort

Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Third and Fourth

Geneva Conventions, 6 U.S.T. 3316 and 6 U.S.T. 3516, seeking

damages and declaratory relief as the result of their treatment

while in U.S. custody. The district court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss all six claims and the plaintiffs appeal the

dismissal of their constitutional and ATS claims only. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

1

 Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of the

“Coalition Joint Task Force-7” from June 2003 to July 2004 and “the

highest-ranking U.S. military official in Iraq,” Am. Compl. ¶ 28; Janis

Karpinski, commander of the “800th Military Police Brigade,” which

was responsible for detention facilities in Iraq, from approximately

June 2003 to May 2004; and Colonel Thomas Pappas, commander of

the “205th Military Intelligence Brigade” who in November 2003

assumed command of the “Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center”

at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, Iraq. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. 

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I.

The amended complaint alleges the following facts. Arkan

Mohammed Ali is an Iraqi citizen who was held at Abu Ghraib

and other military facilities in Iraq for almost one year, from

approximately July 2003 to June 2004. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. He

alleges he was beaten to the point of unconsciousness; stabbed

and mutilated; stripped naked, hooded and confined in a wooden

phone booth-sized box; subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation

enforced by beatings; deprived of adequate food and water and

subjected to mock execution and death threats. Id. Thahe

Mohammed Sabar is an Iraqi citizen who was held at Abu

Ghraib and other military facilities in Iraq for about six months

from approximately July 2003 to January 2004. Id. ¶ 18. He

alleges he was severely beaten, sexually assaulted and

humiliated, deprived of adequate food and water, intentionally

exposed to dangerously high temperatures for prolonged periods

and subjected to mock executions and death threats. Id.

Sherzad Kamal Khalid is an Iraqi citizen who was held at Abu

Ghraib and other military facilities in Iraq for about two months

from approximately July 2003 through September 2003. Id.

¶ 19. He alleges he was frequently and severely beaten, sexually

assaulted and threatened with anal rape, deprived of adequate

food and water, intentionally exposed to dangerously high

temperatures and subjected to “mock executions, death

threats . . . and prolonged sleep deprivation enforced by

beatings.” Id. Ali H. is an Iraqi citizen who was held at Abu

Ghraib and other military facilities in Iraq for about four weeks

from August to September 2003. Id. ¶ 20. He alleges the U.S.

military intentionally withheld and delayed necessary medical

treatment, intentionally inflicted “pain after surgery by dragging

him from one location to another and forcefully ripping away

the surgical dressing,” intentionally exposed him to infection by

leaving his surgical wound half-bandaged and deprived him of

adequate food and water. Id. Najeeb Abbas Ahmed is an Iraqi

citizen who was held at Abu Ghraib and other military facilities

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in Iraq for two separate periods, the first from approximately

May 2003 to July 2003 and the second from approximately July

2003 through December 2003. Id. ¶ 21. He alleges U.S.

soldiers held a gun to his head, threatened him with death and

with life imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay, sexually assaulted

him, stepped and sat on his body while he was in extreme

restraints, humiliated him by chanting racial epithets while

videotaping and photographing him, held him in an outdoor cage

at temperatures exceeding approximately 120 degrees

Fahrenheit, intentionally deprived him of sleep for prolonged

periods, confiscated medication for his high blood pressure and

heart disease and intentionally deprived him of medical care

after he “suffered more than one heart attack and a possible

stroke in detention.” Id. Mehboob Ahmad is a citizen of

Afghanistan who was held by the U.S. military at the detention

facility located at Bagram Air Force Base (Bagram) and at other

military facilities in Afghanistan for approximately five months

from June to November 2003. Id. ¶ 22. He alleges U.S. soldiers

placed him in restraints and positions calculated to cause pain,

intimidated him with a vicious dog, questioned him while he

was naked, threatened his family and subjected him to sensory

deprivation. Id. Said Nabi Siddiqi is a citizen of Afghanistan

who was also held at military facilities in Afghanistan, including

Bagram and the Kandahar detention facility, from July to

August 2003. Id. ¶ 23. He alleges he was beaten, placed in

restraints and positions calculated to cause pain, subjected to

“verbal abuse of a sexual nature,” humiliated by being

photographed naked, denied water, intentionally deprived of

necessary medication, intentionally exposed to dangerous

temperatures for prolonged periods and deprived of sleep. Id. 

Mohammed Karim Shirullah is a citizen of Afghanistan who

was held at Bagram and other military facilities in Afghanistan

for approximately six months, from December 2003 to June

2004. Id. ¶ 24. He alleges he was beaten, placed in restraints

and positions calculated to cause pain, interrogated and

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photographed while naked, subjected to sensory deprivation and

placed in solitary confinement for an extended period, denied

medical care for injuries caused by abuse, intentionally exposed

to extreme temperatures for prolonged periods, doused with cold

water and deprived of sleep. Id. Haji Abdul Rahman is a citizen

of Afghanistan who was held at Bagram and other military

facilities in Afghanistan for approximately five months, from

December 2003 to May 2004. Id. ¶ 25. He alleges he was

questioned and photographed while naked, subjected to

complete sensory deprivation for twenty-four hours, placed in

solitary confinement and deprived of sleep. Id.

The plaintiffs originally filed separate actions in four

different jurisdictions—the District of Connecticut, the Northern

District of Illinois, the District of South Carolina and the

Southern District of Texas. By an order dated June 17, 2005, the

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases to

the district court of the District of Columbia for coordinated and

consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 5, 2006.

They allege the defendants:

(1) formulated or implemented policies and practices

that caused the torture and other cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment of Plaintiffs; and (2) had effective

command and control of U.S. military personnel in Iraq

and/or Afghanistan and knew and had reason to know

of torture and abuse by their subordinates and failed to

promptly and effectively prohibit, prevent and punish

unlawful conduct.

Id. ¶ 26. The plaintiffs asserted six causes of action in the

district court; five asserted claims for violations of (1) the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (2) the Fifth

Amendment and Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel

and unusual punishment, (3) the law of nations prohibition

against torture, (4) the law of nations prohibition against cruel,

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inhuman or degrading treatment and (5) the Geneva

Conventions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-59. The sixth cause of action

sought a declaratory judgment that defendant Rumsfeld violated

“the law of nations, binding treaties and the U.S. Constitution.”

Id. ¶¶ 260-63. In March 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss

the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state claims upon which

relief may be granted.2

On March 27, 2007, the district court dismissed the

plaintiffs’ amended complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) “and on the ground that the defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity.” In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig.

(Detainees Litig.), 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 119 (D.D.C. 2007).

Regarding the constitutional claims brought pursuant to Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971),3 the district court held the Fifth and Eighth

Amendments do not apply to “nonresident aliens who were

injured extraterritorially while detained by the military in

2

 Additionally, defendants Karpinski and Sanchez argued the

plaintiffs’ claims raise nonjusticiable political questions and defendant

Pappas argued the constitutional claims against him should be

dismissed because the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to connect him to

the alleged constitutional violations and all claims against him should

be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because it dismissed the

plaintiffs’ cases on other grounds, the district court considered these

arguments moot.

3

 “The holding in Bivens permits a plaintiff to bring an action in

federal court against a federal officer/employee for the violation of his

constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 389. A Bivens suit is the federal

counterpart of a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

a state or local officer/employee for the violation of the claimant’s

constitutional rights.” Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 652 n.2 (D.C.

Cir.), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008).

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foreign countries where the United States is engaged in wars.”4

Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 95. The court relied on the

United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Johnson v.

Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), and United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.

678 (2001), and on our holding in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d

981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).5

 The court 

4

 The district court also held that the plaintiffs’ Eighth

Amendment claim failed “not only because the plaintiffs are precluded

from invoking the Constitution . . . , but also because the Eighth

Amendment applies only to convicted criminals” and the plaintiffs

“were never convicted of a crime.” 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (citing

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)). On appeal the

plaintiffs contend their Eighth Amendment claim is cognizable.

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Eighth

Amendment claim on other grounds, we do not reach this argument.

5

 In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court held that German nationals

who were imprisoned at a U.S. army base in Germany and convicted

of war crimes committed during World War II had no habeas corpus

right under the U.S. Constitution. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court

held that a Mexican citizen whose residence in Mexico was searched

by agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration

could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. The Court explained that it had “rejected the claim that

aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign

territory of the United States” and described holdings such as Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-12 (1982) (illegal aliens residing in United

States protected by Equal Protection Clause), and Kwong Hai Chew

v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (resident alien “person” within

meaning of Fifth Amendment), and Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,

148 (1945) (resident aliens have First Amendment rights), and Russian

Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (foreign

corporation doing business in America entitled to just compensation

under Fifth Amendment for property taken by U.S. government), and

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident aliens

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further held that even if the plaintiffs could claim constitutional

protections, special factors would counsel against inferring a

Bivens remedy. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103-07. It

explained “that military affairs, foreign relations, and national

security are constitutionally committed to” the President and the

Congress and concluded “that authorizing monetary damages

remedies against military officials engaged in an active war

would . . . obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to act decisively

and without hesitation in defense of our liberty and national

entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights), and Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment protects

resident aliens), as “establish[ing] only that aliens receive

constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of

the United States and developed substantial connections with this

country.” 494 U.S. at 269, 271. In Zadvydas, the Court reaffirmed the

constitutional distinction between persons present in the United States

and persons outside the United States. The Court held that a federal

statute authorizing the Government to hold an alien who has been

ordered deported beyond the 90-day “removal period” within which

the alien is to be deported permits the Government to hold the alien for

only a “reasonable time.” 533 U.S. at 682. The Court explained the

statute would “raise serious constitutional concerns” if it allowed the

Government to hold indefinitely a deportable alien present in the

United States, id., but reiterated “that certain constitutional protections

available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens

outside of our geographic borders,” relying on Eisentrager and

Verdugo-Urquidez. 533 U.S. at 693. In Boumediene, we held that

both Supreme Court and our own precedent “hold[] that the

Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or

presence within the United States.” 476 F.3d at 991. The Supreme

Court reversed our decision in Boumediene and held, for the first time,

that alien detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, can assert a

habeas corpus right under the Suspension Clause of the U.S.

Constitution. 553 U.S. 723; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2

(Suspension Clause). As set forth infra p. 11-17, we distinguish the

Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision.

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interests.” Id. at 107, 105. Finally, the district court held that

qualified immunity protected the defendants from the Bivens

claims because, even if the plaintiffs possess constitutional

rights, “those rights were not clearly established at the time the

alleged injurious conduct occurred.” Id. at 108.

As to the Geneva Conventions claims and the alleged

violations of the law of nations brought pursuant to the ATS,6

the district court held that “the defendants are entitled to

absolute immunity pursuant to the Westfall Act,” according to

which Act the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346, 2671 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for a tort

committed by a federal official or employee within the scope of

his employment.7

 479 F. Supp. 2d at 114. The court concluded

the Westfall Act includes an intentional tort, id. at 110-11, and,

6

 The ATS provides: “The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed

in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 1350.

7

 The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort

Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563

(amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679), commonly referred to as

the Westfall Act, provides in pertinent part:

Upon certification by the Attorney General that the

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his

office or employment at the time of the incident out of

which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding

commenced upon such claim in a United States district court

shall be deemed an action against the United States under

the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the

United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The Westfall Act makes the FTCA remedy

“exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money

damages.” Id. § 2679(b)(1).

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relying on the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958),8

determined the defendants acted within the scope of their

employment because “detaining and interrogating enemy aliens”

was “incidental to their overall military obligations.” Id. at 114. 

The court further ruled that neither the ATS claims nor the

Geneva Conventions claims fell within one of the statutory

exceptions to the Westfall Act. Id. at 111-13. Accordingly, the

court substituted the United States as the defendant on the ATS

and Geneva Conventions claims and then dismissed those claims

because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies as required by the FTCA. Id. at 114-15.

The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ allegation that

Geneva Convention IV itself provides a private cause of action

and dismissed their claims for violations of the Convention for

failure to state a claim for relief. Id. at 115-17. Regarding their

claim for declaratory relief, the court held the plaintiffs lacked

standing because the named defendants no longer held their

official positions in Iraq or Afghanistan and therefore the

plaintiffs could not show “that they face a real and imminent

threat of being wronged again in the future” by those

8

 The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) provides in

part:

(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment

if, but only if:

(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;

(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time

and space limits;

(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve

the master, and

(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against

another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the

master.

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defendants. Id. at 118. Additionally, the court held the

plaintiffs, having sued the defendants in their individual

capacities only, could not seek declaratory relief.9 Id. at 118-19.

The plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal on May 24,

2007, challenging the district court’s dismissal of their

constitutional and ATS claims and its dismissal of their claim

for declaratory relief. They do not appeal the dismissal of their

Geneva Conventions claims.

II.

In reviewing the district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations of the

plaintiffs’ complaint and review the district court’s legal

conclusions de novo. Daniels v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d

936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We review the district court’s legal

conclusions de novo . . . [and] accept as true the facts that [the

plaintiffs] allege[] in [their] complaint in reviewing the district

court’s disposition of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.”

(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We

address seriatim the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, their ATS

claims and their claim for declaratory relief.

A. The Bivens Claims

Each plaintiff asserts two Bivens claims, namely, the

defendants tortured him in violation of his due process right

under the Fifth Amendment and the defendants’ conduct

constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.10 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-46. Our decisions in

9

 The court apparently overlooked the fact that the plaintiffs sued

defendant Rumsfeld in both his individual and official capacities. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 27.

10 The second claim also alleges the defendants’ conduct

constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth

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Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 129

S. Ct. 763 (2008), and Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527

(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009),

govern our resolution of these claims.

In Rasul I, four British citizens sued Secretary Rumsfeld

and several high-ranking military officials for damages arising

from their alleged illegal detention and torture at Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba between 2002 and 2004. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 649-50. 

Their complaint included claims under the Fifth and Eighth

Amendments, the ATS, the Geneva Conventions and the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.

We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional

claims, explaining that “Guantanamo detainees lack

constitutional rights because they are aliens without property or

presence in the United States.” 512 F.3d at 663 (citing

Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d,

553 U.S. 723 (2008)). Furthermore, we concluded the

defendants were protected by qualified immunity because, even

assuming arguendo the detainees possessed rights under the

Fifth and Eighth Amendments, those rights were not clearly

established at the time of their detention and alleged torture. Id.

Amendment. It is unclear, however, how this claim differs from the

plaintiffs’ first claim that the defendants violated the Fifth Amendment

by engaging in torture. Although an individual not yet convicted of

a crime must challenge his treatment or the conditions of his

confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth

Amendments rather than the Eighth Amendment, see City of Revere

v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490

F.3d 143, 168 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other ground sub nom. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (complaint failed to plead sufficient

facts to state claim for relief); Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94

F.3d 254, 259 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997),

he does not create two separate claims under either Due Process

Clause by alleging both torture and cruel and unusual punishment.

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at 665-67. After Rasul I issued, the Supreme Court reversed our

Boumediene decision and held the Suspension Clause extends to

nonresident aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay. Boumediene v.

Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The Court then vacated our

judgment in Rasul I and remanded for further consideration in

light of its intervening decision in Boumediene. Rasul v. Myers,

129 S. Ct. 763 (2008).

On remand, we reaffirmed our holding that the defendants

were protected by qualified immunity and explained it was not

necessary to determine whether the Fifth and Eighth

Amendments applied to the plaintiffs.11 Qualified immunity

shields a government official from civil liability if his conduct

“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Even if the

Rasul plaintiffs could assert rights under the Fifth and Eighth

Amendments, we explained, Boumediene did not alter the

conclusion that those rights were not clearly established at the

time of the defendants’ challenged conduct. Rasul II, 563 F.3d

at 529-30. The plaintiffs argue, as did the Rasul plaintiffs, that

the defendants should have known (that is, a reasonable person

would have known) their alleged misconduct violated the

Constitution because it “has long been settled that the

11 Another intervening Supreme Court decision—Pearson v.

Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16, 818 (2009)—held that a court can

decide a constitutional right was not clearly established without first

deciding whether the right exists. Before Pearson, courts followed the

Saucier procedure, under which they first had to determine whether

the alleged facts made out a violation of a constitutional or statutory

right before deciding whether the right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation. Id. at 815-16; see also Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

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Constitution forbids the torture of any detainee.”12 Appellants’

Br. 23; see Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 666. The proper inquiry,

however, is not whether the Constitution prohibits torture but

“whether the rights the plaintiffs press under the Fifth and

Eighth Amendments were clearly established at the time of the

alleged violations.” Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 666 (emphasis in

original). As the Supreme Court made clear in Boumediene, it

had “never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in

territory over which another country maintains de jure

sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.” 553 U.S.

at 770; see also Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 530 (“At the time of [the

plaintiffs’] detention, neither the Supreme Court nor this court

had ever held that aliens captured on foreign soil and detained

beyond sovereign U.S. territory had any constitutional

rights—under the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or

otherwise.”). As it was not clearly established in 2004 that the

Fifth and Eighth Amendments apply to aliens detained at

Guantanamo Bay—where the Supreme Court has since held the

Suspension Clause applies—it plainly was not clearly

established in 2004 that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments apply

to aliens held in Iraq and Afghanistan—where no court has held

any constitutional right applies. As we explained in Rasul II, the

Supreme Court in Boumediene “explicitly confined its

constitutional holding ‘only’ to the extraterritorial reach of the

Suspension Clause” and “disclaimed any intention to disturb

existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any

constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.”

563 F.3d at 529 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795). As in

12 The plaintiffs also cite several “military laws, regulations, and

training materials” prohibiting torture which, they contend, “reinforce

the constitutional prohibition against torture and serve to put military

commanders and personnel on notice of the sorts of actions that the

Constitution prohibits.” Appellants’ Br. 24-25.

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Rasul II, therefore, the defendants here are protected from the

plaintiffs’ constitutional claims by qualified immunity.13

The plaintiffs contend the Supreme Court in Boumediene

adopted a flexible approach that leaves open the possibility of

the extraterritorial application of constitutional provisions other

than the Suspension Clause and claim that our decision in Al

Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), accurately

interprets Boumediene. Because the three alien Bagram

detainees in Al Maqaleh sought habeas corpus relief, the

decision addresses only the applicability of the Suspension

Clause. We nonetheless noted that the Supreme Court’s

Boumediene decision “explored the more general question of

extension of constitutional rights and the concomitant

constitutional restrictions on governmental power exercised

extraterritorially and with respect to noncitizens.” Id. at 93. The

court discussed three factors the Supreme Court identified as

relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: “(1)

the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the

process through which that status determination was made; (2)

the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention

took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving

the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. at 94 (quoting

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766). The first factor weighed in favor

of extending the habeas corpus right to the three because, like

the Boumediene detainees, they were aliens held by the

American military. Id. at 95-96. According to the court, the

13 Even the plaintiffs recognize this and ask us to “abandon [our]

holdings to the contrary.” Appellants’ Br. 23. “That argument is

misplaced because we are, of course, bound to follow circuit precedent

absent contrary authority from an en banc court or the Supreme

Court.” United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 384 n.43 (D.C. Cir.

2006) (per curiam), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007).

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three received less due process than the Boumediene detainees.14

Id. The second and third factors, however, weighed against

them. Distinguishing Guantanamo Bay—where, according to

the Supreme Court, the United States has de facto sovereignty,

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755—the court concluded “the same

simply is not true with respect to Bagram.” Al Maqaleh, 605

F.3d at 97. The United States has not demonstrated an intent to

exercise sovereignty over Bagram “with permanence.” Id.

Moreover, “Bagram, indeed the entire nation of Afghanistan,

remains a theater of war.” Id. The same is true of Iraq. The

Supreme Court expressly stated in Boumediene that, if

Guantanamo Bay “were located in an active theater of war,

arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘impractical or

anomalous’ would have more weight.” 553 U.S. at 770. We

concluded “that under both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the

[habeas corpus] writ does not extend to the Bagram confinement

in an active theater of war in a territory under neither the de

facto nor de jure sovereignty of the United States and within the

territory of another de jure sovereign.” Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at

98. Thus, even under the plaintiffs’ view of Boumediene, we

have nonetheless held that the Suspension Clause does not apply

to Bagram detainees. They offer no reason—and we see none

14 The Al Maqaleh detainees’ status was reviewed by the

Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB), not the

Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that reviewed the

Boumediene detainees’ status. 605 F.3d at 96. According to the court,

“proceedings before the UECRB afford[ed] even less protection to the

rights of detainees in the determination of status than was the case

with the CSRT.” Id. The Al Maqaleh detainees had no representation

while the Boumediene detainees had “personal representative[s].” Al

Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 227 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605

F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Additionally, the Al Maqaleh detainees

were not permitted to speak in their defense but could submit only a

written statement and were not informed of the evidence against them

so that they lacked a meaningful opportunity to rebut the evidence. Id.

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17

ourselves—why the plaintiffs’ Fifth and Eighth Amendment

claims would be any stronger than the Suspension Clause claims

of the Bagram detainees.

The plaintiffs urge us to follow the now-optional Saucier

procedure and decide, first, whether they have “alleged a

deprivation of a constitutional right at all,” Pearson, 129 S. Ct.

at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted), although we may

ultimately conclude any such right was not clearly established

at the time of the defendants’ alleged misconduct.15 The Saucier

procedure, however, is not appropriate in most cases. Often “it

is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but

far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.” Id. In

such a case, deciding the existence of the constitutional right vel

non is “an essentially academic exercise,” id., that “runs counter

to the older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of

constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable,”

id. at 821 (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted), and results in the “substantial expenditure of

scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no

effect on the outcome of the case,” id. at 818. The Saucier

approach can also preclude an affected party from obtaining

appellate review of a decision that could significantly affect its

future actions. Id. at 820. If a court decides that the defendant

15 We recognize that the Saucier approach is “often beneficial”

and helps “promote[] the development of constitutional precedent.”

Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. As the Supreme Court explained, in some

cases “there would be little if any conservation of judicial resources to

be had” by deciding only the “clearly established” prong. Id. For

instance, it sometimes can be “difficult to decide whether a right is

clearly established without deciding precisely what the constitutional

right happens to be.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In

other cases, the explanation that a right was not clearly established

“may make it apparent that [the allegations] do not make out a

constitutional violation at all.” Id.

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18

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right but is entitled to

qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established

at the time, the “prevailing” defendant presumably would not be

able to appeal the adverse constitutional holding. Id. (citing

Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 96 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(“Normally, a party may not appeal from a favorable

judgment.”)); cf. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028-33

(2011) (official who prevails on qualified immunity in district

court may not be able to obtain appellate review,

notwithstanding availability of certiorari review to official who

prevails on qualified immunity on appeal). As in Rasul II, we

believe “[c]onsiderations of judicial restraint favor exercising

the Pearson option with regard to [the] plaintiffs’ Bivens

claims.” 563 F.3d at 530.

In Rasul II we had an alternative basis—apart from

qualified immunity—on which to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Bivens

claims—that “federal courts cannot fashion a Bivens action

when ‘special factors’ counsel against doing so.” 563 F.3d at

532 n.5. We determined the “danger of obstructing U.S.

national security policy is one such factor” that counsels against

allowing a Bivens claim to proceed.16 Id. The same rationale

applies here.17 The district court correctly concluded that

allowing a Bivens action to be brought against American

military officials engaged in war would disrupt and hinder the

ability of our armed forces “to act decisively and without

hesitation in defense of our liberty and national interests.”

Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 105. The Supreme Court

long ago recognized as much in Eisentrager:

16 We concluded that this alternative rationale was “also

unaffected by the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision.” 563 F.3d

at 532 n.5.

17 Again, the plaintiffs urge us to “abandon” our holding in Rasul

II on this point as well. Appellants’ Br. 35.

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19

Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid

and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the

prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but

with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise

more effective fettering of a field commander than to

allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to

submission to call him to account in his own civil

courts and divert his efforts and attention from the

military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at

home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy

litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and

military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the

United States.

339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950). And in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,

770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985), our court noted that “the

special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the

creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy

officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign

subjects causing injury abroad.” In Sanchez-Espinoza,

Nicaraguan citizens, none of whom resided in the United States,

sued, inter alia, the President, the CIA director, the then-current

as well as former secretaries of state and the then-secretary of

defense alleging they had “authorized, financed, trained,

directed and knowingly provided substantial assistance” to

Nicaraguan rebels who engaged in “summary execution,

murder, abduction, torture, rape, wounding, and the destruction

of private property and public facilities.” Id. at 205 (quoting

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 81). We concluded that “the danger of

foreign citizens’ using the courts in [such situation] to obstruct

the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that

we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage

remedy should exist.” Id. at 209. As in Rasul II, we see no

basis for distinguishing this case from Sanchez-Espinoza.

Accordingly, even if the defendants were not shielded by

qualified immunity and the plaintiffs could claim the protections

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20

of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, we would decline to

sanction a Bivens cause of action because special factors counsel

against doing so.

B. The ATS Claims

Rasul II also governs our resolution of the plaintiffs’ ATS

claims alleging violations of the law of nations. In addition to

their Bivens claims, the Rasul plaintiffs “brought three claims

for violations of the law of nations pursuant to the [ATS] based

on the defendants’ alleged infliction of ‘prolonged arbitrary

detention,’ ‘torture,’ and ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment.’ ”18 Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 654 (citations omitted). We

determined the defendants’ alleged tortious conduct—“the

detention and interrogation of suspected enemy

combatants”—was “incidental to [their] legitimate employment

duties” because it was “the type of conduct the defendants were

employed to engage in.” Id. at 658-59. Because the defendants

had acted within the scope of their employment, we held the

ATS claims “were properly restyled as claims against the United

States that are governed by the FTCA” and upheld their

dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.19 Id. at

660-61 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The

plaintiffs here bring similar claims against similar (and, in the

case of defendant Rumsfeld, identical) defendants. And like the

18 Specifically, the Rasul plaintiffs alleged “they were beaten,

shackled in painful stress positions, threatened by dogs, subjected to

extreme temperatures and deprived of adequate sleep, food, sanitation,

medical care and communication.” Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 654.

19 In Rasul II, we stated that we could “see nothing in the

Supreme Court’s [Boumediene] decision that could possibly affect our

disposition of” the plaintiffs’ ATS claims alleging violations of the

law of nations and “therefore reinstate[d] our judgment” with respect

to those claims. 563 F.3d at 528-29. The portion of Rasul I that treats

the ATS claims, therefore, remains controlling law.

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21

Rasul defendants who, we held, were acting within the scope of

their employment, the defendants here—who engaged in the

same conduct—were acting within the scope of their

employment as well. See id. at 654-61. The plaintiffs argue the

Westfall Act does not cover “egregious torts that violate jus

cogens norms” because the Act grants immunity for a

“ ‘negligent or wrongful act or omission’ ” only. Appellants’

Br. 46 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). The plaintiffs argue

“wrongful” is ambiguous and should be interpreted in light of

the Act’s legislative history which, the plaintiffs contend,

reveals “wrongful” was not intended to encompass egregious

torts that violate jus cogens norms. We explicitly rejected this

argument in Rasul I, where, while acknowledging the plaintiffs

had “plainly alleged ‘seriously criminal’ conduct,” we explained

that “the allegations of serious criminality do not alter our

conclusion that the defendants’ conduct was incidental to

authorized conduct.” 512 F.3d at 659-60. Accordingly, the

district court correctly held that the Westfall Act applied and

correctly substituted the United States as the defendant under the

FTCA.20 The FTCA “required the plaintiffs to file an

administrative claim with either the Department of Defense

(DoD) or the appropriate military department before bringing

20 The plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s holding that the

defendants acted within the scope of their employment. They contend

that, “[a]s a matter of law, torture can never fall within the scope of

employment of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and high-ranking U.S.

Army commanders.” Appellants’ Br. 56. They nonetheless recognize

the district court’s ruling is mandated by our precedent and “maintain

the issue here [only] to preserve it.” Id. They “respectfully submit

that this Court’s decisions . . . in Rasul II and Harbury [v. Hayden,

522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008),] are not well-founded and should be

reconsidered.” Id. at 57. We are of course bound by circuit precedent.

United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 384 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (“[W]e are . . . bound to follow circuit precedent absent

contrary authority from an en banc court or the Supreme Court.”).

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22

suit.” Id. at 661 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 14.1). “[W]e view the

failure to exhaust administrative remedies as jurisdictional.” Id.

As in Rasul, the “record is devoid . . . of any suggestion” the

plaintiffs filed an administrative claim with DoD or a military

department. Id. The district court thus properly dismissed the

ATS claims under FRCP 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs raise one argument not addressed in Rasul I

or II. The Westfall Act does not immunize a federal

employee/official from a suit “brought for a violation of a

statute of the United States under which such action against an

individual is otherwise authorized.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B).

The plaintiffs claim the ATS, under which they brought their

claims for violations of the law of nations, is a United States

statute that permits a private cause of action against a federal

employee/official. Therefore, the plaintiffs contend, their claims

fall within an exception to the Westfall Act and they should be

permitted to proceed against the individual defendants, not the

United States.

The district court in Rasul I rejected this argument,

explaining that the ATS21 “is strictly a jurisdictional statute” that

“does not confer rights nor does it impose obligations or duties

that, if violated, would trigger the Westfall Act’s statutory

exception.”22 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37-38 (D.D.C. 2006). The

21 The district court called it the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),

414 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38, another name for the ATS. See Estate of

Amergi ex rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.5

(11th Cir. 2010) (“The [ATS] is also known as the Alien Tort Claims

Act (ATCA), and the Alien Tort Act (ATA).” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

22 We did not reach the issue on appeal because the plaintiffs did

not appeal that part of the district court’s decision. See Rasul I, 512

F.3d at 661 n.11.

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23

Supreme Court has also rejected a similar argument. In United

States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 (1991), a former Army sergeant

and his wife sued the Army doctor who delivered their baby in

Italy, alleging the doctor’s negligence caused brain damage to

the baby. The United States sought to substitute itself as the

defendant pursuant to the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089,

which “provide[d] that in suits against military medical

personnel for torts committed within the scope of their

employment, the Government is to be substituted as the

defendant and the suit is to proceed against the Government

under the FTCA.” Smith, 499 U.S. at 162-63. While the

plaintiffs’ appeal was pending, the Congress enacted the

Westfall Act. The United States then relied on the Westfall Act,

rather than the Gonzalez Act, to substitute itself as the defendant

and the Supreme Court accordingly considered the Westfall

Act’s applicability. At the time, two courts of appeals had held

that the Gonzalez Act protected “only military medical

personnel who commit torts within the United States and not

those committing torts abroad.” Id. at 171. The Smith plaintiffs

argued their claim was therefore not precluded by the Gonzalez

Act and that their claim fell within the statutory exception to the

Westfall Act because the Gonzalez Act “authorized” their claim.

The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument. It

explained that it “need not decide whether a tort claim brought

under state or foreign law could be deemed authorized by the

Gonzalez Act” because the plaintiffs’ contention “that a claim

for malpractice involves ‘a violation of’ the Gonzalez Act[]is

without merit. Nothing in the Gonzalez Act imposes any

obligations or duties of care upon military physicians.

Consequently, a physician allegedly committing malpractice

under state or foreign law does not ‘violate’ the Gonzalez Act.” 

Id. at 174.

More importantly, the Supreme Court has clarified that “the

ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.” 

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004); id. at 729

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24

(“All Members of the Court agree that § 1350 is only

jurisdictional.”). Thus, as with the Gonzalez Act, nothing in the

ATS “imposes any obligations or duties of care upon” the

defendants. Smith, 499 U.S. at 174; accord Bancoult v.

McNamara, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The plain

language of [the ATS] . . . does not confer rights nor does it

impose obligations or duties that, if violated, would trigger the

[Westfall Act’s statutory violation] exception.”), aff’d on other

grounds, 445 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (dismissing complaint

on political question ground), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1166

(2007); Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 266-67

(D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing complaint on political question

ground but holding, alternatively, that ATS “cannot be violated

for purposes of [Westfall Act’s statutory violation exception]”),

aff’d on other grounds, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming

dismissal as political question), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1069

(2006). The plaintiffs ask us to ignore the Supreme Court’s

Sosa decision.23 We can no more ignore Supreme Court

precedent than could the district court. Accordingly, we hold

that the plaintiffs’ claim under the ATS alleges a violation of the

law of nations, not of the ATS, and therefore does not violate a

statute of the United States within the meaning of section

2679(b)(2)(B).24

23 The plaintiffs claim the statutory violation exception language

of the Westfall Act is ambiguous and we must therefore look to

legislative history to determine its meaning. Because Sosa issued after

the ATS was enacted, the plaintiffs contend, it “does not shed light on

what Congress meant to include in the statutory violation exception.” 

Appellants’ Br. 53.

24 Although the Supreme Court in Sosa stated that “the ATS is a

jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action,” it nonetheless

concluded “the statute was intended to have practical effect the

moment it became law” and explained that the statute’s jurisdictional

grant “is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that

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25

Notwithstanding Sosa’s plain statement that “the ATS is a

jurisdictional statute,” 542 U.S. at 724, the dissent believes the

ATS incorporates the law of nations and that a violation of the

law of nations thus constitutes a violation of the ATS sufficient

to satisfy the Westfall Act’s statutory violation exception. See

Dissenting Op. at 17-25. The respondent in Sosa advanced a

similar argument—“that the ATS was intended not simply as a

jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a new

the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest

number of international law violations with a potential for personal

liability at the time [the ATS was enacted in 1789].” 542 U.S. at 724.

The Court recognized only three violations—violation of safe

conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors and piracy—but

assumed that nothing “categorically precluded federal courts from

recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common

law.” Id. at 724-25.

At the same time the Court held a new cause of action could be

recognized under the ATS, however, it cautioned courts against doing

so, noting that a “series of reasons argue for judicial caution when

considering the kinds of claims that might implement the jurisdiction

conferred by the [ATS].” Id. at 725. The Court noted that its “general

practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising

innovative authority over substantive law” and stated it “would be

remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction

that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries.”

Id. at 726. The Court emphasized “that a decision to create a private

right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great

majority of cases.” Id. at 727 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,

534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87

(2001)). For that reason, the Court found itself “reluctant to infer . . .

a private cause of action where the statute does not supply one

expressly.” Id. Additionally, “the potential implications for the

foreign relations of the United States of recognizing [a new cause of

action under the ATS] should make courts particularly wary of

impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches

in managing foreign affairs.” Id.

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26

cause of action for torts in violation of international law.” 542

U.S. at 713. The Supreme Court rejected “that reading [of the

ATS as] implausible,” explaining that, “[a]s enacted in 1789, the

ATS gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of certain causes of

action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power

to mold substantive law.” Id. Moreover, the Court noted, the

positioning of the ATS “in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute

otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction,

is itself support for its strictly jurisdictional nature.”25 Id. The

Court therefore found it “unsurprising . . . that an authority on

the historical origins of the ATS has written that ‘section 1350

clearly does not create a statutory cause of action,’and that the

contrary suggestion is ‘simply frivolous.’ ” Id. (quoting William

R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts

Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev.

467, 479, 480 (1986)); see also Casto, supra, at 479 (“The

[ATS] is purely jurisdictional, and the first Congress

undoubtedly understood this to be the case.”).

The dissent’s citations to Sosa—and to Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)—confirm that the ATS is a

jurisdictional statute only and that any claim brought under the

ATS alleges a violation of the law of nations and the common

law, not of the ATS itself. See Dissenting Op. at 3-4, 12, 18-19.

The dissent contends that Supreme Court precedent

establishing “that the domestic law of the United States

recognizes the law of nations,” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30 (citing

25 In this respect, the ATS is easily distinguishable from section

301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29

U.S.C. § 185(a). See Dissenting Op. at 24. Section 301(a) is part of

an extensive statutory enactment and, although it speaks only to

federal jurisdiction, other provisions of the LMRA establish

substantive legal duties and rights. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 186-87.

The ATS, by contrast, is a stand-alone grant of jurisdiction only. 

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27

cases), “indicates that section 1350 itself effectively

incorporates the law of nations,” Dissenting Op. at 19. The Sosa

Court’s statement “that the domestic law of the United States

recognizes the law of nations,” however, is best understood to

refer to the common law of the United States, not its statutory

law. The most recent precedent the Court cited to support its

statement confirms this understanding. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at

730 (“ ‘[I]nternational disputes implicating . . . our relations

with foreign nations’ are one of the ‘narrow areas’ in which

‘federal common law’ continues to exist.” (ellipsis in original)

(emphasis added) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff

Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981))); see also Dissenting

Op. at 19 (quoting William A. Fletcher, International Human

Rights in American Courts, 93 Va. L. Rev. 653, 665 (2007)).

Sosa unequivocally holds that the ATS is a jurisdictional

statute only. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“All Members of the Court

agree that § 1350 is only jurisdictional.”). A claim brought

under the ATS therefore does not allege “a violation of a statute

of the United States” satisfying the Westfall Act exception. 28

U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B).

C. The Declaratory Judgment Claim

The plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the acts alleged in

their amended complaint are unlawful and violate the U.S.

Constitution, military rules and guidelines and the law of

nations. Am. Compl. ¶ 264(a). As discussed supra, however,

the plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable cause of action and

therefore have no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief.

Nor does the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201, provide a cause of action. It is a “well-established rule

that the Declaratory Judgment Act ‘is not an independent source

of federal jurisdiction.’ Rather, ‘the availability of [declaratory]

relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable

right.’ ” C&E Servs., Inc. of Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer

Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Schilling v.

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28

Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960)); see also Skelly Oil Co. v.

Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (“The

operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.

Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal

courts but did not extend their jurisdiction.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment of dismissal.

So ordered.

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