Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01941/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01941-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TITO ODILON LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

RANDY GROUNDS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 12cv1941 IEG(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF NO. 10]

Petitioner Tito Odilon Lopez, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [ECF No. 1, 5] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficiency of evidence

at trial. (Pet. 6, 19,1 ECF No. 1.) On December 11, 2012,

Respondent filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion [ECF No. 10], and a Notice of

Lodgment [ECF No. 11]. Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition on

the ground that it is untimely. (Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. # 1

1

 Because Lopez’s Petition is not consecutively paginated, the

Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system.

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Mem. P. & A. 4-7, ECF No. 10.) On January 14, 2013, Lopez filed a

document entitled Traverse and Objection to the Attorney

General[’s] Response and Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 12], which the

Court construes as his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. 

Respondent’s Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss [ECF No. 15] was filed on May 13, 2013. 

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion and

Memorandum in Support of the Motion, Petitioner’s Opposition,

Respondent’s Reply, and the lodgments. For the reasons expressed

below, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2006, following a jury trial in the San Diego

County Superior Court, Lopez was convicted of ten felony counts and

attendant enhancements: torture in violation of California Penal

Code section 206 (count one); assault and battery in violation of

California Penal Code sections 240 and 242 (count two); kidnapping

with the infliction of great bodily injury causing permanent

paralysis in violation of California Penal Code sections 207(a),

12022.7(b) and (e) (count three); forcible rape in violation of

California Penal Code section 261(a)(2) (count four); forcible oral

copulation with use of a deadly and dangerous weapon in violation

of California Penal Code sections 288a(c), 667.61(b)(c) and (e),

12022.3(a) (count five); assault by means of force likely to

produce great bodily injury in violation of California Penal Code

section 245(a)(1) (count six); assault with a deadly weapon in

violation of California Penal Code sections 245(a)(1),

1192.7(c)(23) (count seven); corporal injury to a spouse/roommate

with the use of a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal

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Code section 273.5(a) (count eight); corporal injury to a

spouse/roommate with infliction of great bodily injury causing

permanent paralysis in violation of California Penal Code sections

273.5(a), 12022.7(b) and (e), 12022.9 (count nine); making a

criminal threat in violation of California Penal Code section 422

(count 10); and false imprisonment with use of a deadly weapon and

infliction of great bodily injury causing permanent paralysis in

violation of California Penal Code sections 236, 237(a),

12022(b)(1), 12022.7(b) & (e), 12022.9 (count eleven). (Lodgment

No. 4, People v. Lopez, No. D049356, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal. Ct. App.

Feb. 5, 2008).) On August 28, 2006, the trial court sentenced

Lopez to an aggregate term of thirty years, eight months to life. 

(Id. at 2.)

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction. (Lodgment No.

1, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Lopez, No.D049356 (Cal. Ct.

App. Mar. 9, 2007).) On February 5, 2008, the California Court of

Appeal for the Fourth District, Division One, issued an unpublished

opinion modifying the judgment by striking the false imprisonment

charge and attendant enhancements in count eleven,2 and affirming

the conviction. (Lodgment No. 4, People v. Lopez, No. D049356,

slip op. at 3-4, 22.) Lopez filed a petition for review with the

California Supreme Court in case number S161709. (Lodgment No. 5,

Petition for Review, People v. Lopez, No. S161709 (Cal. Mar. 13,

2008).) On May 14, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied the

petition. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Lopez, No. S161709, order at

2

 Lopez argued, and the People conceded, that the false

imprisonment charge in count eleven must be stricken because it was

a lesser included offense of kidnapping in count three. (See

Lodgment No. 4, People v. Lopez, No. D049356, slip op. at 3.) 

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1 (May 14, 2008).) Lopez did not file a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (See Pet. 3, ECF

No. 1.)

Sometime between 2008 and June 23, 2009, Lopez collaterally

challenged the judgment by filing a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the San Diego Superior Court.3 (Pet. 3, ECF No. 1.) 

Lopez claimed that insufficient evidence supported his conviction

of forcible rape in count four because the victim gave inconsistent

testimony at the preliminary examination and trial. (Lodgment No.

7, In re Lopez, No. HCN 1042/SCN 225017, order at 1-2 (Cal. Super.

Ct. S.D. Cnty. June 23, 2009).) He also alleged his attorney was

ineffective for failure to file a motion to dismiss the forcible

rape charge. (Id. at 2.) The state court denied the habeas

petition on June 23, 2009, on the ground that Lopez failed to raise

these claims on appeal. (Id. at 2-3.)

On July 24, 2009, Lopez filed a habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal, raising the same two claims. (Lodgment

No. 8, Lopez v. Evans, No. D055563 (Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2009)

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) On September 23, 2009, the

court of appeal denied the petition, stating that a challenge to

the sufficiency of evidence is not cognizable on habeas corpus and

that Lopez failed to demonstrate he would have achieved a better

result but for the purported attorney error. (Lodgment No. 8, In

re Lopez, No. D055563, order (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2009).)

3 Lopez’s state habeas petition is not part of the Court’s

record. Respondent submits that the San Diego County Superior

Court has not provided a copy of that petition despite two

requests. (See Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. # 1 Mem. P. & A. 5

n.4, ECF No. 10.) 

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On October 26, 2009, Lopez filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 10, Lopez v.

Evans, No. S177420 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) (petition for writ of

habeas corpus).) The California Supreme Court denied Lopez’s

petition on April 14, 2010. (Lodgment No. 11, In re Lopez, No.

S177420, order (Cal. Apr. 14, 2010).) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Lopez’s Petition in this case was constructively filed on

August 5, 2012.4

 (Pet. 30, ECF No. 1.) Because Lopez filed his

Petition after April 24, 1996, it is subject to the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2244 (West 2012). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

Id. § 2254(a); see also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the

law of habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th

Cir. 1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–

4 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on

the date Petitioner handed a petition to prison authorities for

mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v.

Henry, 614 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Although the Petition was

filed on August 6, 2012, pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court

considers the Petition filed on August 5, 2012, the date Lopez

signed the Petition. 

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). Petitioner must allege that

the state court violated his federal constitutional rights. See

Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

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under § 2254(d)(1) — whether a state court decision is contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because

of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at

264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” Id.; see also Baylor

v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Childress v.

Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101

F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

[A] state court decision is “contrary to [the Supreme

Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from . . .

precedent.”

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000)). A state court unreasonably applies federal law if

its application is “objectively unreasonable,” which is “more than

[being] incorrect or erroneous.” Id. at 75.

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III. DISCUSSION

Respondent Grounds moves to dismiss Lopez’s Petition as

untimely, arguing that it was filed almost three years after the

statute of limitations had expired. (Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach.

# 1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No. 10.) Specifically, Respondent contends

that Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 14, 2008, and

thus the one-year statute of limitations, absent any tolling, would

have expired on August 14, 2009. (Id.) Even with statutory

tolling, Grounds argues that Lopez’s Petition is untimely by

sixteen months. (Id. at 6.) 

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions

is set forth in § 2244(d), which provides in relevant part:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1).

It is appropriate to dismiss a federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus with prejudice when it was not filed within the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

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478, 483 (9th Cir. 2001). Statute of limitations issues must be

resolved before the merits of individual claims. White v.

Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence on February 5, 2008. (Lodgment No. 4, People v. Lopez,

No. D049356, slip op. at 3-4, 22.) Lopez then petitioned the

California Supreme Court for review, and the court denied the

petition on May 14, 2008. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Lopez, No.

S161709, order at 1.) Lopez did not file a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 

United States Supreme Court Rule 13 provides that a petition

for certiorari must be filed within ninety days of the entry of an

order denying discretionary review by the state supreme court. See

S. Ct. R. 13. When a habeas petitioner seeks direct review by the

state’s highest court but does not file a petition with the United

States Supreme Court, the judgment becomes final when the

prisoner’s time to petition the Supreme Court expires. Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999).

Lopez’s judgment became final for the purposes of AEDPA on

August 14, 2008, ninety days after the California Supreme Court

denied his petition for review. See id.; see also S. Ct. R. 13. 

Pursuant to § 2244(d), the statute of limitations for federal

habeas corpus began to run on August 15, 2008, the day after the

judgment became final. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see Corjasso

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the

one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA begins to run the day

after the conviction becomes final). The one-year statute of

limitations period would have expired on August 15, 2009. See

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Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)) (“In computing any amount of time

prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of

the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time

runs shall not be included.”). Lopez’s federal habeas petition was

filed on August 5, 2012, almost twenty-eight months later. (Pet.

30, ECF No. 1.) Therefore, unless he is entitled to statutory or

equitable tolling, Lopez’s action is barred by AEDPA’s statute of

limitations.

A. Statutory Tolling

The one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a

federal habeas petition is statutorily tolled while “a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending . . . .” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). The interval between

the disposition of one state petition and the filing of another may

be tolled under “interval tolling.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214, 223 (2002). “[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for

‘all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting,

through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state

court remedies with regard to a particular postconviction

application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.

1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. The statute of

limitations is tolled from the time a petitioner’s first state

habeas petition is filed until state collateral review is

concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state collateral

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challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

Respondent argues that even with statutory tolling, Lopez’s

Petition is untimely. (Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. # 1 Mem. P. &

A. 5, ECF No. 10.) As discussed earlier, Lopez’s conviction became

final on August 14, 2008, ninety days after the California Supreme

Court denied his petition for review, and the statute began to run

on August 15, 2008. The exact filing date of Lopez’s state court

habeas petition is unknown, however, Respondent notes that it was

filed sometime before June 23, 2009, when the superior court denied

the petition. (Id.; Lodgment No. 7, In re Lopez, No. HCN 1042/SCN

225017 (order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1-2).) 

The earliest date statutory tolling would apply is August 14, 2008,

the day Lopez’s conviction became final. 

Even if the Court affords Petitioner the widest latitude and

assumes that the limitations period was tolled from that date, this

Petition is still untimely by more than a year. The California

Supreme Court denied Lopez’s habeas petition on April 14, 2010. 

(Lodgment No. 11, In re Lopez, No. S177420 (Cal. Apr. 14, 2010) 9

order denying petition en banc).) Because Lopez’s state collateral

review became final on that day, the AEDPA statute of limitations

began to run on April 15, 2010. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 (“[T]he

statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state

habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects

the petitioner's final collateral challenge.”) The limitations

period is not tolled after state post-conviction proceedings are

final and before federal habeas proceedings are initiated. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Therefore, the one-year limitations period

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expired on April 15, 2011. Lopez did not file his federal Petition

until August 5, 2012, twenty-eight months after the state court

denied his last state habeas petition and sixteen months after the

limitations period expired. Because he waited more than two years

to file his federal habeas petition after the state collateral

review of his conviction became final, Petitioner is not entitled

to statutory tolling. Unless Lopez can demonstrate he is entitled

to equitable tolling, his Petition is time-barred.

B. Equitable Tolling 

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations where “‘extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control made it impossible’” to file a timely

petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate when

the petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way’. . . .” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct.

2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005)); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007);

Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 548 F.3d 871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner seeking application of the doctrine bears the burden

of showing that it should apply to him. Lawrence v. Florida, 549

U.S. at 336 (observing that a petitioner must prove the two

requirements to receive equitable tolling).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (alteration

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in original) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005,

1010 (7th Cir. 2000). The failure to file a timely petition must

be the result of external forces, not the result of the

petitioner’s lack of diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Determining whether equitable tolling is

warranted is a ‘fact-specific inquiry.’” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799

(quoting Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Respondent argues that Lopez is not entitled to equitable

tolling because he did not diligently pursue his claims and he does

not allege that any extraordinary circumstances beyond his control

prevented a timely filing of a federal habeas petition. (Resp’t’s

Mot. Dismiss Attach. # 1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF NO. 10.) In

opposition, Lopez claims that he waited to file his federal

petition while his state court habeas petition was pending before

the California Supreme Court. (Pet’r’s Traverse & Objection Att’y

General[‘s] Resp. & Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 12.) Petitioner

alleges he relied on advice from “a jail attorney and other

inmates” that he was required to wait for the California Supreme

Court to issue a ruling before he could file his federal petition. 

(Id.) Lopez contends that he was eventually informed he could

inquire of the status of his state habeas petition, and he did so

on or about July 8, 2012. (Id.) Petitioner claims that he never

received the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition

until after his written inquiry to the court, and he was not aware

he could have requested an update earlier. (Id. at 2-3.) Lopez

attaches a copy of his request dated July 8, 2012, as well as the

copy of the envelope he received from the California Supreme Court

postmarked July 13, 2012. (Id. Attach. Ex. A.) Respondent replies

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that Lopez fails to establish he exercised reasonable diligence

under the circumstances because he did not take any steps to

inquire about the status of his state habeas petition prior to July

8, 2012. (Resp’t’s Reply 4, ECF No. 15.) 

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary

circumstances” he identified were the proximate cause of his

untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d at 799; Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). A state's failure to notify a prisoner

regarding a final decision in his case may support equitable

tolling. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). But

late notice, standing alone, is not sufficient, unless the

petitioner acts diligently in the matter. Id.; see also Drew v.

Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a

claim of equitable tolling where a § 2255 petitioner “provided no

evidence supporting his claim that he repeatedly attempted to

ascertain the status of his case from the Clerk's office, a burden

necessary to sustaining his claim of extraordinary

circumstances.”). 

Here, Lopez filed his state habeas petition with the

California Supreme Court on October 26, 2009. (Lodgment No. 10,

Lopez v. Evans, No. S177420 (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) 

He alleges he did not receive the court’s denial issued on April

14, 2010, and instead waited almost three years until July 8, 2012

to request a status update. (Pet’r’s Traverse & Objection Att’y

General[‘s] Resp. & Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 12.) The California

Supreme Court’s response to his inquiry was mailed to Lopez on July

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13, 2012, and Lopez filed the instant Petition on August 5, 2012. 

(Pet. 30, ECF No. 1.) 

Lopez bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to

equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. at 336. Even if

the Court accepts the late notice from the California Supreme Court

as an extraordinary circumstance justifying his delay in filing the

federal habeas petition, Lopez must still show he acted diligently

in pursuing his claims. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d at 997. To

the extent Petitioner claims that he did not file his federal

habeas petition earlier because he followed the advice from other

inmates and a jailhouse lawyer, he is not entitled to equitable

tolling. Lopez’s lack of legal knowledge and reliance on other

inmates does not excuse the lengthy delay in this case. See Ford

v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2009) (observing that the

equitable tolling “standard has never been satisfied by a

petitioner's confusion or ignorance of the law alone[]”). A

prisoner who relies on other inmates to assist him retains the

“‘personal responsibility of complying with the law.’” Chaffer v.

Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)

(holding that reliance on another inmate to prepare and file a

habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling); Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that

reliance on an incompetent jailhouse lawyer does not constitute

“cause” for failure to comply with a state procedural requirement).

A petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling if, for

example, “despite his diligence, he did not learn about the state

court's disposition of his state habeas corpus petition until

eighteen months after the petition had been denied.” Drew, 297

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F.3d at 1288 n.3 (discussing Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709

(11th Cir. 2002)). “Attempting to ascertain the status of his

petition for writ of certiorari [is] a burden necessary to

sustaining Petitioner's claim of extraordinary circumstances.” 

Belalcazar-Vallealla v. United States, No. 8:10–CV–1964–T–27TBM,

2010 WL 4735950, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2010) (citations

omitted) (rejecting an equitable tolling claim in the context of a

§ 2255 habeas petition where petitioner waited more than two years

to inquire about the status of his writ of certiorari). Lopez does

not demonstrate that he was diligent in learning the status of his

state habeas petition. 

Petitioner fails to explain what steps he took to pursue his

case during the thirty-two months that passed between the filing of

his petition with the California Supreme Court in October of 2009

and his request for an update in July of 2012. Petitioner concedes

that he made no efforts to check the status of his pending case

during that time. (Pet’r’s Traverse & Objection Att’y General[‘s]

Resp. & Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 12.) Under these circumstances,

Lopez failed to exercise due diligence, which is a prerequisite for

equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See LaCava v.

Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that petitioner

“did not exercise the requisite due diligence by allowing more than

twenty-one months to lapse from the filing of his petition for

allowance of appeal until he inquired with the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court's Prothonotary's Office as to its status.”); Conley v.

McEwen, No. 2:11–cv–0126 LKK–DAD P, 2012 WL 2401234, at *6 (E.D.

Cal. June 25, 2012) (holding that petitioner who waited 447 days

after the California Supreme Court denied habeas relief before

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filing a federal habeas petition did not make the requisite showing

of diligence to support equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations). Likewise, Lopez failed to establish that he is

entitled to the equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of

limitations.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED. This

Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States

District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 5, 2013. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before July 19, 2013. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district

court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir.

1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 6, 2013 __________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge 

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