Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00649/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00649-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Brubaker, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

City of Tucson, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-10-00649-TUC-DCB

ORDER 

On November 5, 2019, the Court held the final pretrial conference to rule on motions 

in limine for trial, which was set to start on November 12, 2019. The Court granted the 

motion in limine to change the caption for trial to reflect that Plaintiff Stapeleton is 

deceased and the Pima County Defendants are dismissed from the case. The Court stated 

its intention to grant the Defendants’ Motion in Limine Re: Scope of Evidence and 

Damages to preclude evidence as follows: 1) forteiture of animals by Pima Animal Control 

Center (PACC); 2) criminal prosecution of Plaintiff for animal neglect and all related 

proceedings and findings, and 3) condemnation of Plaintiff’s home by the City Inspector. 

Defendants assert such evidence is not relevant to any claim, including damages. Plaintiff 

asked to supplement his Response to the Motion in Limine. The Court granted the request, 

set a briefing schedule for supplemental briefing, and reset the trial to March 3, 2020. After 

further review, the Court concludes that the evidence is not relevant to prove the merits of 

Plaintiffs’ claims or damages. 

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Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff seeks tort damages for the alleged violation of the 

Fourth Amendment related to an allegedly illegal search of his house. The issue regarding 

the scope of relevant damages has been addressed before in the Report and 

Recommendation, wherein the court explained: “‘Victims of unreasonable searches and 

seizures may recover damages directly related to the invasion of their privacy . . . but such 

victims cannot be compensated for injuries that result from the discovery of incriminating 

evidence and consequent criminal prosecution.’” (R&R (Doc. 103) at 28 (quoting Lingo 

v. City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2016)). The rationale is: “The evil of an 

unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not that it uncovers crime, which 

is no evil at all.” Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 157 (3rd Cir. 2000). 

The Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Lingo because there the unlawful entry was to 

the curtilage of the home, where officers smelled marijuana, giving them probable cause 

for an arrest. Here, Plaintiff asserts that officers entered his home without probable cause 

to search for drugs and then invited others, PACC and the City building code inspector, to 

investigate and find other violations: the building code and animal endangerment 

violations. These are differences without any legal distinction. The legally relevant fact is 

that the alleged Fourth Amendment violation occurred when Woolridge executed the 

search warrant which was allegedly invalid due to his and Defendant Preston’s judicial 

deception. Upon entering Plaintiff’s home, Defendant Tucson Police Department (TPD) 

Officer Woolridge found incriminating evidence and called PACC and the Richard Vidal, 

the City code inspector. This was a “fruit of the poisonous tree” situation, i.e., but for the 

allegedly illegal entry officers would not have known of the incriminating evidence. 

Plaintiff does not allege that PACC or Vidal, once inside, had no basis to conduct 

investigations. Instead, he argues the merits of his prosecution; he argues that the cats did 

have food and water and there was sufficient ingress and egress through his house. 

Under Lingo, Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for the alleged Fourth Amendment 

violation related to anything but the alleged illegal search: September 29 and October 1, 

2009. He cannot recover damages related to the seizure and forfeiture (euthanizing) of his 

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cats, his criminal prosecution for animal neglect, or the condemnation proceedings.

The harder question is the reach of his damage claims for the alleged trespass 

violations. It is important to note the posture of this claim. The Pima County Defendants 

were dismissed from the case because PACC officers, acting as City enforcement agents, 

(Order (Doc. 103) at 17), entered Plaintiff’s house based on a facially valid search warrant 

and, therefore, would have reasonably believed they were authorized to enter, id. at 29.

PACC officers were authorized to enter the property under A.R.S. § 13-402, as well as 

common law privilege, in “reliance on warrants and representations that are fair on their 

face.” Id. Plaintiff did not name Inspector Vidal of the City of Tucson Housing and 

Community Development Section (code enforcement). Had Vidal been named as a 

Defendant, the same law applying to dismiss PACC would apply to him. He too entered 

Plaintiff’s house based on reasonable reliance on a facially valid warrant.

The Plaintiffs theory of liability is that TPD Officer Woolridge, as the investigating 

officer and officer in charge on the scene, directed Vidal and PACC to investigate and 

prosecute him, but he did not allege malicious prosecution. He does not allege that either 

investigation was conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Instead, he 

complains that but for the allegedly illegal warrant, PACC officers and the Inspector would 

not have been in his home where incriminating evidence was discovered, which resulted 

in his prosecution for both the code violations and animal engenderment. Again, the 

Plaintiff did not allege a malicious prosecution claim; the Court notes that Plaintiff’s 

prosecution for animal endangerment did not proceed until almost a year later. As 

Defendants note, the Plaintiff also did not allege a conspiracy claim.

Even if Plaintiff could somehow bootstrap Woolridge to harms flowing from alleged 

trespasses by PACC and the building code inspector,1the Defendants correctly assert that 

damages in tort require a showing of proximate cause and damages for trespass are limited 

to: 1) the difference in value of the land before the harm and the value after the harm or the 

1 The Court shall revisit the question of damages in the event the evidence reflects that the 

independence of PACC or the Inspector was overborn by Woolridge in the context of their 

investigations on September 30, 2009 and October 1, 2009.

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reasonable cost of restoring the property to its prior state; 2) the loss of use of the land, and 

3) the discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant. Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 173 

Arizona 612, 621 (Ariz. App. 1992).

Losses flowing from the discovery and prosecution of the animal endangerment 

charges are not recoverable in trespass, including any emotional distress resulting from the 

forfeiture of the animals. At best, damages for trespass could include compensation for the 

loss of the use of the home caused2 by the alleged illegal entry on September 29 and 

October 1, 2009. He may seek damages for the discomfort and annoyance to him related 

to this alleged loss of use.

Nominal damages are available under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for the trespass.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion in Limine Re: Scope of Evidence and Available 

Damages (Doc. 142) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff is precluded from introducing 

evidence of or claiming damages resulting from the following: forfeiture of the animals by 

PACC and subsequent litigation; Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution for animal neglect and all 

related proceedings; the condemnation of Plaintiff’s home, except to the extent he can show 

damages for loss of the use of his home caused by the illegal search and/or trespass on 

September 29 and October 1, 2009.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

2 Damages in tort require a showing of cause in fact and proximate cause, defined under 

Arizona law as “that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any 

efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the injury would not 

have occurred.” Saucedo ex rel. Sinaloa v. Salvation Army, 24 P.3d 1274, 1278 (Ariz. App. 

2001).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall review and revise the proposed 

Jury Instructions to account for the rulings made herein. Revised jury instructions shall be 

filed by February 24, 2020.

Dated this 18th day of February, 2020.

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