Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01990/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN DARIO POMPA-ALVAREZ,

 Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent.

 

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Case No. 13-cv-1990-GPC

Related Case No. 11-cr-1718-GPC

ORDER (1) DENYING 18 U.S.C. §

2255 MOTION TO VACATE

SENTENCE AND (2) DENYING

MOTION TO DISMISS

INDICTMENT 

[Dkt. Nos. 47, 50.]

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Ruben Dario Pompa-Alvarez, (“Petitioner”) a federal prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a motion to vacate his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. [Dkt. No. 47 .] Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment pursuant 1

to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 7(e)(1)(B)(3) and the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [Dkt. No.

50.] For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s § 2255 Petition [Dkt.

No. 47] and DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, [Dkt. No. 50].

BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2011, Petitioner was arrested for possessing than 37 pounds of

All docket citations refer to the docket numbers as filed in Petitioner’s criminal 1

case, 11-cr-1718-GPC. 

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cocaine in his vehicle in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). [Dkt. No. 11.] On May 3,

2011, Petitioner consented to prosecution by Information rather than by Indictment.

[Dkt. No. 12.] On May 23, 2011, Petitioner signed a fast-track Plea Agreement,

agreeing to enter a guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or

more of cocaine, the single charge in the Information. [Dkt. No. 17.] According to

terms ofthe plea agreement, Petitioner waived his rights to appeal and collateral attack.

Specifically, the plea agreement stated:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement, defendant

waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or collaterally attack the

conviction and sentence, including any restitution order, unless the Court

imposes a custodial sentence above the greater of the high end of the guideline

range recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time

of sentencing or statutory minimum term, if applicable. 

[Dkt. No. 17 at ¶XI.] Furthermore, the Plea Agreement contained a “DEFENDANT’S

WAIVER OF TRIAL RIGHTS,” provision, by which the Petitioner waived the right

to (A) continue to plead not guilty and require the Government to prove the elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; (B) a speedy and public trial by jury; (C) the

assistance of counsel at all stages of trial; (D) confront and cross-examine adverse

witnesses; (E) present evidence and to have witnesses testify on behalf of defendant;

and (F) not testify or have any adverse inferences drawn from the failure to testify. [Id.

at ¶ IV.] Petitioner initialed each page of the Plea Agreement and signed the final page

under penalty of perjury [Id.]

On May 24, 2011, Petitioner executed a “Consent to Rule 11 Plea in a Felony

Case” before Magistrate Judge William McCurine. [Dkt. No. 15.] On June 8, 2011,

Judge Irma Gonzalez accepted Petitioner’s plea of guilty. [Dkt. No. 21.] On September

23, 2011, Judge Gonzalez sentenced Petitioner to thirty-three months in prison and

three years of supervised release. [Dkt. No. 30.] On November 9, 2012, pursuant to

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of

appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. [Dkt. No. 35.] On

November 21, 2011, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for untimeliness.

[Dkt. No. 39.]

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On August 26, 2013, Petitioner filed the present Motion to Vacate his sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on grounds of: (1) an involuntary guilty plea, (2) ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to move for a jury trial, and (3) ineffective assistance

of counsel for failure to file timely notice of appeal. [Dkt. No. 47.] On August 29,

2013, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, alleging a Due Process

violation under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). On September 16, 2013,

Petitioner’s case was transferred to the undersigned Judge. 

DISCUSSION

I. § 2255 Motion to Vacate Sentence 

A. Legal Standard for Petition for Habeas Corpus

Section 2255 authorizes this Court to “vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence”

of a federal prisoner on “the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To

warrant relief under section 2255, a prisoner must allege a constitutional or

jurisdictional error, or a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete

miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of

fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (quoting Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).

B. Statute of Limitations

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) statute,

the opportunity to file successive motions under § 2255 isstrictly limited. The AEDPA

amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by providing for a one-year limitation period for prisoners

to file motions under § 2255. The section states, in pertinent part:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by

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governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a

motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;

or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). As it pertains to subsection (A), a conviction becomes “final”

when “a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal has been

exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari

finally denied.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6 (1987); see also United

States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have adopted, for §

2255 purposes, the definition offinality . . . applicable to state prisonersseeking federal

habeas relief.”). Under the Ninth Circuit appellate rules, a criminal defendant’s notice

of appeal must be filed within fourteen days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App.

P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).

Applying subsection (1) ofthe AEDPA statute oflimitations, the Court finds that

Petitioner filed his §2255 motion to vacate his sentence on August 26, 2013, 23.5

months after Judge Gonzalez imposed Petitioner’s final sentence on September 12,

2011 and over twenty three months after Petitioner’s period for appeal had lapsed.

[Dkt. No. 29.] Furthermore, the Court findsthat Petitioner’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit

does not reset the clock for AEDPA purposes. See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d

1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If the one-year limitations period were made contingent

on the resolution of a petitioner’s attempt to file an untimely notice of appeal, a

petitioner could indefinitely delay the commencement ofthe one-year period by simply

waiting to file such notice until after the normal expiration date. Sanctioning this

procedure would undermine the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions.”).

Even if the Court were to consider the Ninth Circuit’s November 21, 2011 Order

dismissing Plaintiff’s appeal as untimely as the “date on which the judgment became

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final” for the purposes of the statute of limitations, the Ninth Circuit’s Order was still

issued twenty-one months prior to Petitioner’s § 2255 motion to vacate his federal

sentence. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s § 2255 Petition is barred

by the statute of limitations and DENIES the petition as untimely.

C. Ground One- Involuntary Plea Agreement

Notwithstanding the untimeliness of Petitioner’s motion to vacate his sentence,

the Court additionally findsthat petition has not met the requirementsfor habeasrelief.

Petitioner argues that his impoverished background and very limited education caused

himto enter the plea agreement. (Dkt. No. 46 at 4). Petitioner further claims that he was

not advised of his Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), trial rights (“Boykin

rights”), which violated his Constitutional right to Due Process. 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that courts must

address a criminal defendant personally and in open court to ensure that the plea is

voluntary and not caused by force threats or other promises (beside promises included

in the Plea Agreement). Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Under Boykin, the trial judge must make

an affirmative finding that a plea of guilty is intelligent and voluntarily. Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969). Furthermore, a defendant must have a sufficient

present ability to “consult a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding

and have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d

1176, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 1996). 

The Court finds Petitioner’s involuntariness claim unsupported by the record.

The Court notes that Petitioner initialed each page of his plea agreement, which states,

in pertinent part:

Defendant’s Representation that Guilty Plea is Knowing and Voluntary

Defendant represents that:

A. Defendant has had a full opportunity to discuss all the facts and

circumstances of this case with defense counsel, and has a clear

understanding of the charges and the consequence of this plea. 

B. No one has made any promises or offered any rewards in return for this

guilty plea, other than those contained in this agreement or otherwise

disclosed to the court;

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C. No one has threatened defendant or defendant’s family to induce this

guilty plea; and

D. Defendant is pleading guilty because in truth and in fact defendant is

guilty and for no other reason. 

[Dkt. No. 17 at 5.] Moreover, the record reflects that at his change of plea hearing on

May 24, 2011, Petitioner stated before U.S. Magistrate Judge McCurine that he wished

to withdraw his former plea of “not guilty” to “guilty” of Count 1 of the Information.

[Dkt. No. 40 at 3.] The plea hearing then transpired as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. Gentlemen, each of you has the right to enter your plea

before a district judge. However, you have each signed a two-page consent

waiving that right so that you can enter your plea before me, a magistrate judge.

On your signature page of your consent, there is a signature that appears above

either the word "defendant" or your typed name. Please confirm that that

signature is your own and that you signed the consent in the presence of your

attorney.

THE INTERPRETER: Yes as to all.

THE COURT: And are you each satisfied with the work your attorney has done

in your behalf?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes as to all.

THE COURT: And to each defense counsel, are you satisfied your client

understands the consent?

. . .

MS. AGUILAR: Yes as to Mr. Pompa and Mr. Salgado.

THE COURT: All right. Then on the strength of these consents, I will proceed.

Gentlemen, you have the following constitutional rights as they relate to your

trial. You may continue to insist on your innocence. Your trial will be speedy

and public in front of a judge and jury or in front of a judge without a jury at

your choice. You can be represented by an attorney at all proceedings, including

trial. If you cannot afford an attorney, I will appoint one to represent you at no

cost to you. You can cross-examine every witness who testifies against you. You

can put on your own defense. You can subpoena witnessesto your trial to testify

for you. On the other hand, you do not need to testify or cooperate with the

government, and you will not be penalized when you exercise these rights.

By pleading guilty today, you will be giving up these particular rights, you

will not have a trial, and a guilty plea will be entered. Understanding that, is it

still your desire to plead guilty this morning?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes as to all.

[Dkt. No. 40 at 4.] The record thus reflects that Petitioner was addressed in open court

before Magistrate Judge McCurine to ensure that the plea was voluntary and not caused

by threats or other promises. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. In addition, Judge McCurine

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advised Petitioner of the specific rights waived with a plea of guilty. Furthermore, the

record demonstratesthat Petitioner and his Counsel believed that the plea of guilty was

in the best interest of the Petitioner. The Court finds no reason to believe that Petitioner

did not have the present ability to have a reasonable degree of understanding of the

proceedings against him, and Petitioner does not assert that he did not have a factual

understanding of the proceedings against him. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Petitioner’s motion to vacate his federalsentence under section 2255 on the ground that

he was not advised of his rights under Boykin. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s second ground for habeas relief claims that because insufficient

evidence existed to support a conviction,Petitioner’s counsel wasineffective for failing

to move for a jury trial. [Dkt. No. 47 at 5.] Similarly, Petitioner’s third ground for relief

claims ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to file a timely notice

of appeal. [Dkt. No. 47 at 7.]

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show both (1)

deficient performance under an objective standard ofreasonableness, and (2) prejudice. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate deficient

performance, “[t]he challenger’s burden isto show 'that counsel made errorsso serious

that counsel was not functioning asthe “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that “but for

counsel's unprofessional errors,” there is a reasonable probability “the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); see

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792 (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not

just conceivable”). “Because failure to meet either [Strickland] prong is fatal to [an

ineffective assistance of counsel] claim, there is no requirement that we ‘address both

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.’” 

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Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697); see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (“Without proof of both deficient

performance and prejudice to the defense . . . the sentence or conviction should stand.”)

(citation omitted).

Reviewing courts must apply a “strong presumption” that “counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range ofreasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689; see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1400-01 (2011) (courts must give

“attorneys the benefit of the doubt” for proceeding as they did).

In regards to Petitioner’s counsel failure to move for a jury trial, the Court finds

that Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial by entering a plea of guilty. The transcript

from Petitioner’s change of plea hearing reflects that Petitioner was advised by

Magistrate Judge McCurine that a guilty plea would waive his right to a jury trial, yet

accepted that consequence to his plea. [Dkt. No. 40 at 4:9-5:3.] Furthermore, the

transcript reflects that Petitioner affirmed that he believed a plea of guilty was in the

his best interest and that he was satisfied with the work his attorney had done for him.

[Dkt. No. 40 at 11:5-11:14.] Applying the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” the Court finds that

Petitioner’s counsel acted reasonably in not moving for a jury trial given that Petitioner

had knowingly consented to waive his right to a jury trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. 

Likewise, in regards to Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to file for appeal, the Court

finds that Petitioner’s claims have not sufficiently fulfilled the two prongs necessary

to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the Court notes that Petitioner waived

his ability to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement. The plea agreement states, in

pertinent part:

Defendant waives Appeal and Collateral Attack

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement,

defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or

to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence, including any

restitution order, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above

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the greater of the high end of the guideline range recommended by

the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing

or statutory mandatory minimum term, if applicable. . .

If defendant breaches this plea agreement, at any time, in any way,

including but not limited to, appealing or collaterally attacking the

conviction or sentence, the Government may prosecute defendant for

any counts, including those with mandatory minimum sentences,

dismissed or not charged pursuant to this plea agreement.

Additionally the Government may use any factual admissions made

by defendant pursuant to this plea agreement in any such prosecution.

[Dkt. No. 17 at 10] (emphasis in original). Moreover, Judge McCurine addressed

Petitioner’s waiver of his right to appeal or collateral attack at Petitioner’s change of

plea hearing, in pertinent part below:

THE COURT: So all of you gentlemen also have a provision in your

plea entitled "The Defendant Waives Appeal and Collateral Attack."

. . .

THE COURT: Okay. For Misters Salgado, Pompa, and Reyes, you

have the same provision but with slightly different wording. You are

giving up your right to appeal and collaterally attack your guilty plea,

conviction, and sentence as long as the sentence you actually receive

is not greater than the mandatory minimum term in your matter or the

high end of the guideline range the government recommends at your

sentencing, whichever of the two numbers is greater. Do you

understand this waiver?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes as to the three.

THE COURT: Now, to defense counsel, did you go over the plea

agreement with your client in the Spanish language before the client

signed the plea?

. . .

MS. AGUILAR: Yes with respect to Mr. Pompa and Mr. Salgado.

And, your Honor, I would just add, with respect to the appellate

waiver, the ten-year minimum mandatory -- the appellate waiver at

the ten-year minimum mandatory would only be if safety valve didn't apply.

THE COURT: Okay. And that’s for --

MS. AGUILAR: For both Mr. Pompa and Mr. Salgado.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you understand that?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes as to Mr. Pompa.

. . .

THE COURT: Okay. Now, counsel, are you satisfied your client

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understands everything in the plea agreement?

MS. AGUILAR: Yes, your Honor.

. . .

THE COURT: To -- and do you believe, counsel, that the plea

agreement is in your client's best interests?

. . .

MS. AGUILAR: Yes, your Honor. 

[Dkt. No. 40 at 8.] The record therefore reflects that Petitioner confirmed waiver of

right to appeal: (1) in his Plea Agreement and (2) verbally before Magistrate Judge

McCurine. Petitioner’s counsel would have violated the terms of Petitioner’s plea

agreement, had counsel filed an appeal. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s

counsel acted reasonably in not filing an appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his

Constitutional rights based on his counsel’s failure to file an appeal on his behalf. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Having found Petitioner’s section 2255 motion to vacate both time barred and

insufficient to demonstrate Petitioner’s entitlement to habeas relief, the Court hereby

DENIES the motion. 

II. Motion to Dismiss Indictment

In addition to his § 2255 Petition, Petitioner has filed a motion entitled,

“Appellant’s Brief pro se, under Apprendi’s law to Dismiss with Supporting

Memorandum of law.” [Dkt. No. 50.] The Petitioner has no right or basis to file a

Motion to Dismiss the Indictment following his conviction and sentence. The Court

will construe the motion as a second section 2255 petition, which is untimely. In

addition, it lacks merit. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Applying Apprendi to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the statute under

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which Petitioner pled guilty, courts have found that before a defendant can be

sentenced above the basic statutory maximums set forth in § 841(c)(1)(C), the drug

quantities required for the higher maximums must be charged in the indictment and

found by a jury. See, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156-57 (4th Cir.

2001) (en banc); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-66 (5th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1326-30 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado,

220 F.3d 926, 929-34 (8th Cir. 2000). 

A. Quantity and Type of Controlled Substance

Petitioner’s first Apprendi claim is that the type and quantity of the controlled

substance are absent from the Government’s Indictment. [Dkt. No. 50 at 1.] The

Court first notes that Petitioner waived prosecution by Indictment and consented to

proceeding by Information in open court. [Dkt. No. 12.] The Court’s review of the

Information filed in the Petitioner’s case demonstrates that the Information is

explicit as to the type and quantity of the controlled substance Petitioner was

charged with possessing under section 841(a). The Information states:

On or about April 4, 2011, within the Southern District of California,

defendant Ruben Dario Pompa-Alvarez, did knowingly and

intentionally possess, with intent to distribute, 5 kilograms or more, to

wit: approximately 17.0 kilograms (37.40 pounds) of cocaine, a

Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United

States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

[Dkt. No. 11.] Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Information used to charge

Petitioner stated the quantity and type of the controlled substance (17.0 kilograms of

cocaine) and DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment to the extent that

it is based on the Government’s purported failure to include the quantity and type of

the controlled substance. 

B. Maximum Sentence

Second, Petitioner argues that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable

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doubt all the elements of an offense before a jury before he may receive a sentence

beyond the maximum sentence. [Dkt. No. 50 at 4.] Petitioner’s maximum sentence for

the offense in the indictment is life imprisonment.[Dkt. No. 40 at 6.] Petitioner was

sentenced to 33 months in custody with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and supervised

release of three years. [Dkt. No. 30.] The Court finds that Petitioner was not sentenced

to a term beyond the maximum sentence, which is life in prison. Therefore, the Court

finds Petitioner’s motion to dismiss indictment under Apprendi’s lawto be inapplicable

to the facts of Petitioner’s case and DENIES the Motion to Dismiss Indictment. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion to Vacate

his federal sentence. [Dkt. No. 47.] The Court also DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to

Dismiss Indictment. [Dkt. No. 50.] The Clerk of the Court shall close both Petitioner’s

criminal case, No. 11-cr-1718-GPC, and Petitioner’s civil case, No. 13-cv-1990 GPC.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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