Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00358/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00358-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brian Keith Herron,

Petitioner, 

v. 

J.T. Wartle, Warden, 

Respondent.

No. CV-13-00358-TUC-JGZ (EJM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Brian Keith Herron’s pro se First Amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 6). Petitioner 

challenges the disciplinary hearing officer’s imposition of sanctions for infractions 

Petitioner committed while incarcerated, including loss of good conduct time and 

monetary restitution. Id. Respondent filed a Return and Answer (Doc. 13), and Petitioner 

filed a Reply (Doc. 19). Also pending before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion for 

Temporary Injunction (Doc. 31) and Motion for Request of Time Frame (Doc. 32). 

Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Injunction requests the Court to order Respondent to 

stop withdrawing funds from Petitioner’s account to be credited toward the restitution. 

(Doc. 31). Respondent filed a Notice of Non-Response to Petitioner’s Motion for 

Temporary Injunction and Motion for Request of Time Frame. (Doc. 33). 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the proper respondent in an action for 

habeas corpus is the Petitioner’s custodian, who at the time this action was filed was 

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Louis W. Winn, Jr. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435–36 

(2004). The Court takes judicial notice that Louis W. Winn, Jr. is no longer warden of 

United States Penitentiary—Tucson (“USP—Tucson”). The Court will substitute the new 

Warden of USP—Tucson, J. T. Shartle, as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Markovich for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 6), and deny Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary 

Injunction (Doc. 31) and Motion for Request of Time Frame (Doc. 32) as moot. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at U.S. Penitentiary McCreary in Pine Knot, 

Kentucky. In light of Petitioner’s incarceration at USP—Tucson in Tucson, Arizona at 

the time of the Petition’s filing, this Court retains jurisdiction to consider the Petition. 

See Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990) (“jurisdiction attaches on the initial 

filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and 

the accompanying custodial change.”). 

Petitioner is currently serving a 420 month sentence for attempted bank robbery, 

armed bank robbery, escape, assault on a United States officer, and assault on a person 

assisting a United States officer. (Doc. 13 Ex. A Attach. 2). Petitioner’s projected release 

date is December 5, 2033. Id. 

Petitioner filed his pro se First Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 13, 2013. (Doc. 6). Petitioner challenges a disciplinary 

conviction that resulted in a loss of good conduct time (“GCT”) credits and monetary

restitution. Petitioner alleges three grounds by which his due process rights were 

violated:1 (1) “sanctions of loss of good time credits for reasons not directly related to the 

infraction was/is in bad faith and retaliation and does in fact impose an atypical and 

1

 Petitioner presents all three arguments in one ground for relief. 

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significant hardship upon [Petitioner]”; (2) the monetary restitution assessed is not 

directly related to the infraction and is arbitrary because monetary fines were not 

approved or codified under the Code of Federal Regulations or implemented into the 

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) program to be imposed by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer 

(“DHO”) at the time of Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing; and (3) the monetary restitution 

was arbitrarily calculated without proper receipts and documentation. (Doc. 6 at 4-5). 

Petitioner requests that the Court issue an order expunging the BOP disciplinary hearing 

sanction of monetary restitution in the amount of $2138.20 and restore his loss of 94 days 

GCT. Id. at 10. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2009, Petitioner was being transported to his cell by Officers Brown 

and Reynolds. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 6 [Incident Report]). After his handcuffs were 

removed and the cell door was shut, Petitioner became disruptive and destructive. Id. He 

broke off pieces of his walker and threatened to attack Officer Brown, and then used the 

piece of his walker to break apart his bed. Id. Petitioner “then used a long piece of metal 

from his bed as a hammer type of tool, breaking light fixtures, windows in his room, the 

shower light, and part of his call system that is tied to the nurse’s station.” Id. While 

destroying the items in his room, Petitioner stated: “you got me, and now I’m gonna get 

you,” “come on in here, and I’ll get you, motherfucker,” and that he “was from the pen” 

and “a gangster.” Id. Petitioner was charged with BOP Code No. 104, possession, 

manufacture, or introduction of a weapon; Code No. 203, threatening another with bodily 

harm; and Code No. 218, destroying, altering, or damaging property valued in excess of 

$100. Id. 

 Officer Brown completed an Incident Report (No. 1865559) on May 6, 2009 at 

1:36 p.m. Id. A copy of the incident report was delivered to Petitioner that same day. Id. 

Lieutenant Testerman investigated and advised Petitioner of his rights. (Doc. 13 Ex. B 

Attach. 2 at 8). Petitioner chose to make the following statement during the investigation: 

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“I destroyed the room, I was mad but I didn’t say anything.” Id.

2 Petitioner did not 

request any witnesses. Id. 

The Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) referred the incident to the DHO for 

further hearing based on the eyewitness accounts of staff and the evidence presented, and 

because Petitioner allegedly stated that he destroyed the room because he was mad. (Doc. 

13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 7). The UDH recommended that the DHO impose suspended 

sanctions from two prior incident reports, and additionally disallow the maximum amount 

of GCT, impose 30 days of disciplinary segregation, restrict commissary and phone 

privileges for 60 days, and order restitution for the damage caused. Id. 

 On June 2, 2009, Petitioner had a DHO hearing before DHO Kevin Nikes. (Doc. 

13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 2-5 [Discipline Hearing Officer Report]). DHO Nikes advised 

Petitioner of his rights before the DHO hearing, and he indicated that he understood 

them. Id. at 3. Petitioner requested a staff representative, Dr. Weiner, who stated that she 

spoke with Petitioner prior to the DHO hearing. Id. at 2. Petitioner denied the charges 

against him and made the following statement: 

I came back from 10 building and I went back to my floor. 

3/2 I asked for lunch and they said we need to check your cell 

first. And then the officer said “no you can wait to eat, your 

[sic] not special.” I took that as a sign of him being 

disrespectful and talking to me like a child. I attempted breaking the light. I disassembled the trapeze bed parts by 

taking the screws out. I didn’t manufacture a weapon, I didn’t 

take apart anything to make a weapon. The officer wasn’t 

even there, I didn’t threaten anyone. 

Id. at 2. Petitioner also had two witnesses testify on his behalf.3 The first witness was 

Nurse Hedges, who stated “I saw inmate Herron with a metal object in hand, knocking 

out the glass windows in a cell.” Id. The second witness was inmate Chad Sigman, who 

stated “I only observed the damage after inmate Herron had destroyed the room.” Id. 

2

 Petitioner disputes that he made this statement. (Doc. 19 at 16 ¶ 3). 

3 Petitioner denies that he requested any staff or inmate witnesses. (Doc. 19 at 16 ¶ 4). 

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In addition to the testimony of Petitioner and the two witnesses, DHO Nikes also 

considered documentary evidence, including photographs of the damage, Officer 

Reynold’s memorandum, and staff emails. Id. at 2-3. DHO Nikes found Petitioner guilty 

of the prohibited acts of possession, manufacture, or introduction of a weapon (Code No. 

104), threatening another with bodily harm (Code No. 203), and destroying, altering, or 

damaging property valued in excess of $100 (Code No. 218). Id. at 2, 4. DHO Nikes 

imposed sanctions for each offense as follows: Code No. 104: loss of 40 days GCT, 60 

days disciplinary segregation, and loss of commissary, phone, and visiting privileges for 

90 days; Code No. 203: loss of 27 days GCT, 30 days disciplinary segregation, and loss 

of commissary and phone privileges for 60 days; Code No. 218: loss of 27 days GCT, 30 

days disciplinary segregation, loss of commissary and phone privileges for 60 days, and 

$2138.20 monetary restitution. Id. at 4. On July 22, 2009, DHO Nikes signed the DHO 

report and it was delivered to Petitioner on August 7, 2009. Id. at 5. 

Petitioner states that he filed an Administrative Remedy Appeal (552794-R1)4 and 

a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal (552794-R2) (BP-10),5 and was denied at 

both levels.

6 (Doc. 19 at 5). Petitioner alleges he gave his Central Office Administrative 

Remedy Appeal (552794-A1) (BP-11) to the mail room officer at USP—Tucson on 

November 5, 2009 (Doc. 19 at 17 ¶ 6), but that he did not received a response from the 

Central Office regarding this appeal (Doc. 19 at 5); (see Doc. 19 at 22 [copy of Central 

Office Administrative Remedy Appeal dated November 5, 2009]). The BP-11 is not 

stamped with a date reflecting its receipt, and Respondent contends Petitioner never filed 

it. (Doc. 13 at 12). 

4 Respondent notes this appeal was filed on August 17, 2009 and was rejected because it was filed with the incorrect region. (Doc. 13 at 12, citing Ex. A. Attach. 5 at 

9). 

5 Respondent states this appeal was filed on August 31, 2009. (Doc. 13 at 12, citing Ex. A. Attach. 5 at 9 (CM/ECF pg. 10)). 

6

 The record does not contain copies of either of these appeals. 

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According to Respondent, “[i]n March and April 2011, Petitioner filed 632303-F1 

[Administrative Remedy Appeal] and 632303-R1 [Regional Administrative Remedy 

Appeal]... Both were rejected, and Petitioner did not pursue them as required [by filing a 

Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal.” (Doc. 13 at 12) (citing Ex. A. Attach. 5 

at 13). 

 On October 7, 2011, Petitioner filed another Administrative Remedy Appeal, 

contending the BOP was wrongfully withholding funds from his inmate trust account and 

demanding a full refund of the monies withheld (660692-F1) (BP-9).7 (Doc. 6 at 20 

[Request for Administrative Remedy]; Doc. 19 at 5). On November 2, 2011, the Complex 

Warden denied the Appeal, noting “[t]he time frame to appeal the severity of the 

sanctions imposed by the DHO has long passed.” (Doc. 6 at 21). On November 14, 2011, 

Petitioner filed a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal (660692-R1) (BP-10), which 

was denied on December 8, 2011.8 (Doc. 6 at 22 [Regional Administrative Remedy 

Appeal]; Doc. 19 at 5). On February 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a Central Office 

Administrative Remedy Appeal (660692-A2) (BP-11), which was denied on March 1, 

2013.9

 (Doc. 6 at 24 [Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal]; Doc. 19 at 5). 

Petitioner filed several Freedom of Information Act requests requesting copies of 

purchase orders and receipts for the replacement of the damaged items that he was 

ordered to pay restitution for, and copies of the records relied on by DHO Nikes in 

determining the amount of restitution. (Doc. 6 at 5 ¶ 5).10 In a letter to Petitioner dated 

August 25, 2011, Richard W. Schott, Regional Counsel for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

stated that “staff have made a thorough search for the records you requested [for the 

purchase orders and receipts], and no documents could be located.” (Doc. 6 at 15). In a 

7

 The BP-9 was stamped received on October 17, 2011. 

8

 The BP-10 does not have a date stamp reflecting its receipt. 

9

 The BP-11 was stamped received on March 12, 2012. 

10 Petitioner does not provide evidence showing when the FOIA requests were filed. 

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second letter to Petitioner dated December 15, 2011, Mr. Schott noted that records relied 

upon by the DHO in determining monetary restitution were located and could be released 

to Petitioner. Id. at 16-17. 

 Petitioner instituted the current proceeding on May 17, 2013. (Doc. 1). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Jurisdiction 

“Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction,’ ... and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), overruled in part on other 

grounds by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). 

“Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under § 2255 in the 

sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a 

sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.” Id. at 

864. Therefore, a proper characterization of the petition is necessary to determinate 

jurisdiction. Id. 

Additionally, the judicial power of this and all federal courts is limited to actual 

cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 

(1968); Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1997). “A petition for writ of 

habeas corpus is moot where a petitioner’s claim for relief cannot be redressed by a 

favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus. Salazar-Torres v. Benov, 

2014 WL 4960586 (E.D. Cal.) (citing Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (9th 

Cir. 2005)); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998). 

Here, Petitioner does not claim that the sentencing court imposed an illegal 

sentence; rather, he seeks relief with respect to disciplinary proceedings while 

incarcerated at a federal facility. As such, Petitioner is challenging the manner, location 

or condition of the execution of his sentence. See e.g., Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 

349 (1st Cir. 1999) (§ 2241 petition is appropriate vehicle to challenge the correctness of 

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a jail-time credit determination, once administrative remedies have been exhausted); 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a prisoner may seek a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for ‘expungement of a disciplinary finding from 

his record if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole’”) 

(quoting Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989)); Tucker v. Carlson, 925 

F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991) (a prisoner’s challenge to the “manner in which his 

sentence was executed...[is] maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus filed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d at 1269 (“Habeas corpus 

jurisdiction is also available for a prisoner’s claims that he has been subjected to greater 

restrictions of his liberty, such as disciplinary segregation without due process of law”). 

Such a challenge must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court. At the time of 

filing the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at USP—Tucson in Arizona. Accordingly, 

this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

B. Exhaustion 

i. In general 

As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 

judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241. Ward v. Chavez, 

678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). “The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust 

administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is 

not a statutory requirement.” Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), 

overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1995). “Nevertheless, 

‘[p]rudential limits like jurisdictional limits and limits on venue, are ordinarily not 

optional.’” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006)). 

Courts may require prudential exhaustion if “(1) agency 

expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a 

proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 

the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 

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administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely 

to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to 

preclude the need for judicial review.” 

Id. (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court 

ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings 

until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. 

Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Exhaustion may be 

excused if pursuing an administrative remedy would be futile. Fraley v. United States

Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993). 

If a prisoner is unable to obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to 

appeal in a timely manner, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his habeas 

corpus claim. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Francis, 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990)); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 

571 (9th Cir. 1986). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require the 

petitioner to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the 

alleged constitutional violation. See Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause 

and prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986) 

(cause and prejudice test applied to procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State 

Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 906–08 (9th Cir. 1986) (cause and prejudice test 

applied to pro se litigants). 

ii. BOP Administrative Procedures 

The BOP has established an Administrative Remedy Program “to allow an inmate 

to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 

C. F.R. § 542.10(a). Before filing a formal administrative grievance, an inmate is to “first 

present an issue of concern informally to staff, and staff shall attempt to informally 

resolve the issue....” 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. A request for informal resolution is submitted 

using a BP–8 form. See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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The formal grievance system under the Administrative Remedy Program consists 

of three levels of review: 

In the first level of review, an inmate files a formal Administrative Remedy 

Request written on a BP–9 form. The BP–9 form must be submitted to the Warden within 

20 calendar days following the date on which the basis for the request occurred. 28 

C.F.R. § 542.14(a); see also Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1219 (“The BP–8 and BP–9 are linked. 

Both forms involve a complaint arising out of the same incident, and both forms must be 

submitted within 20 calendar days of the date of that incident.”). However, if the inmate 

is appealing a DHO decision, the BP–9 is submitted to the Regional Director rather than 

the Warden. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(2). 

Second, if an inmate is dissatisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate may 

submit an appeal on a BP–10 form to the appropriate Regional Director within 20 

calendar days of the date the Warden signed the response to the inmate’s Administrative 

Remedy Request. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). 

Third, “an inmate who is not satisfied with the Regional Director’s response may 

submit an Appeal on the appropriate form (BP–11) to the General Counsel within 30 

calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the response.” 28 C.F.R. § 

542.15(a). 

The deadlines contained within this process may be extended upon request by the 

inmate and a showing of a valid reason for delay. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a); 28 C.F.R. § 

542.14(b). An appeal is considered filed on the date it is logged in the Administrative 

Remedy Index as received. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. Once an appeal is filed, a Regional 

Director shall respond within 30 days; General Counsel shall respond with 40 days. Id. 

“If the inmate does not receive a response within the time allotted for reply, including 

extension, the inmate may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level.” 

Id. 

Here, Respondent states that “Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to the Incident Report, the DHO hearing, and the sanctions imposed.” (Doc. 

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13 at 13). Respondent further asserts that “[t]he only issue as to which Petitioner can be 

said to have exhausted his administrative remedies is the withholding of moneys to pay 

the properly ordered restitution.” Id. This argument appears to be based on Respondent’s 

contention that Petitioner only completed all three levels of appeal for administrative 

remedy no. 660692, in which Petitioner claimed funds were being wrongfully withheld 

from his inmate trust account and demanded a full refund. (See Doc. 6 at 20). 

 Although Petitioner’s scattered and repetitive approach to seeking administrative 

remedies makes the record somewhat unclear, he does appear to have appealed at every 

level. Petitioner provides a copy of the BP-11 form for appeal no. 552794, which 

Petitioner avers he submitted for mailing on November 5, 2009. (Doc. 19 at 17 ¶ 6; 22). 

In appeal no. 552794, Petitioner claimed that he was not provided with receipts or 

documentation to support the restitution order, and that the sanctions of loss of GCT and 

monetary restitution were not directly related to the infractions that Petitioner was 

charged with. (Doc. 19 at 22). These are the same arguments that Petitioner now makes in 

his § 2241 petition. Based on the record before the Court, it appears that Petitioner sent 

his BP-11 form for appeal no. 552794, irrespective of whether the Central Office actually 

received it. Further, there is no record that General Counsel ever responded to 

Petitioner’s BP-11 appeal. As such, it was appropriate for Petitioner to consider “the 

absence of a response to be a denial at that level” when he filed his § 2241 petition. See

Martin v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2011 WL 6057508, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“If General 

Counsel fails to respond within 40 days, the inmate can assume that the appeal was 

denied and proceed with a lawsuit.”). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

has recognized that: 

the requirement of exhaustion of remedies [is to] aid judicial 

review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve the court’s time because 

of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and allow the administrative agency

an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of 

administrative proceedings. 

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Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). In this case, the factual record is

adequately developed, and nothing in the record suggests that further administrative 

review would result in any changes. Accordingly, the Court finds the Petitioner’s claims 

exhausted; however, even if the exhaustion is faulty, it shall be excused and the Court 

will reach the merits. 

C. Due Process 

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated because (1) the sanction 

of loss of GCT is not directly related to the infraction and was made in bad faith and 

retaliation against Petitioner; (2) the monetary restitution assessed is not directly related 

to the infraction and is arbitrary because the DHO did not have the authority to impose 

monetary fines at the time of Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing; and (3) the monetary 

restitution was arbitrarily calculated without proper receipts and documentation. (Doc. 6 

at 4-5). 

“Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives 

written notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison 

officials and the reasons for disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v. Keeny, 831 F.2d 183, 186 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–66 (1974)). Additionally, 

“[t]he inmate has a limited right to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence 

when permitting him to do so would not unduly threaten institutional safety and goals.” 

Id. (citations omitted). “Prison disciplinary proceedings[, however,] are not part of a 

criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings 

do[] not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. 

Once the minimal procedural requirements of Wolff are met, the district court must 

ask “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion 

reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent, Mass. Corrections Inst. v. Hill, 472 

U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985). “[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some 

evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.” Id. “Ascertaining 

whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, 

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independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. 

Indeed, “[t]he standard is ‘minimally stringent’ only requiring ‘any evidence in the record 

that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’” Cato v. Rushen, 

824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 454–56) (emphasis added in 

Cato). 

i. Loss of Good Conduct Time 

Petitioner asserts that DHO Nikes imposed a loss of 94 days GCT, but that this 

sanction was not directly related to the infractions Petitioner was charged with and that 

the sanction was imposed in bad faith and retaliation against Petitioner. (Doc. 6 at 4). 

Petitioner also claims the loss of GCT imposes “an unlawful and significant hardship 

upon him that unlawfully affects his duration of confinement and his release date.” Id. 

Section 3625(b), Title 18, of the United States Code governs the timing of federal 

prisoners’ release from custody, including their eligibility for good conduct time. This 

section was enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, 18 

U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (“SRA”), “a comprehensive law that 

reformed federal sentencing practice and directed the newly create United States 

Sentencing Commission ‘to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing’ in district 

courts.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 481–82 (2010). The SRA was part of the 

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (“CCCA”), which repealed the previous 

statutes governing “good time.” Pub. L. No. 98-473; see also Brown v. McGrew, 2013 

WL 6512948, * 4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2013) (reviewing enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) 

and amendments thereto). “For inmates serving a sentence for offenses committed on or 

after November 1, 1987, but before September 13, 1994, the Bureau will award 54 days 

credit toward service of sentence (good conduct time credit) for each year served.” 28 

C.F.R. § 523.20(a). “This amount is prorated when the time served by the inmate for the 

sentence during the year is less than a full year.” Id. “For inmates serving a sentence for 

offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 26, 1996, all yearly 

awards of good conduct time will vest for inmates who have earned, or are making 

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satisfactory progress . . . toward earning a General Educational Development (GED) 

credential.” 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(b). 

On April 26, 1996, Section 3624(b) was amended by the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”). See PL 104–134, April 26, 1996, 110 Stat 1321. Section 3624(b) provides 

in relevant part: 

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a prisoner who is serving a term 

of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of 

imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner’s life, may 

receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence, 

beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each 

year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the 

end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by 

the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has 

displayed exemplary compliance with institutional 

disciplinary regulations. Subject to paragraph (2), if the 

Bureau determines that during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such institutional regulations, the 

prisoner shall receive no such credit toward service of the 

prisoner’s sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the 

Bureau determines to be appropriate. In awarding credit 

under this section, the Bureau shall consider whether the 

prisoner, during the relevant period, has earned, or is making 

satisfactory progress toward earning, a high school diploma 

or an equivalent degree. Credit that has not been earned may 

not later be granted. Subject to paragraph (2), credit for the 

last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment 

shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the 

sentence. 

(2) Notwithstanding any other law, credit awarded under this 

subsection after the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act shall vest on the date the prisoner is released 

from custody. 

18 U.S.C. § 3624(b); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(c). Unlike previous amendments, GCT 

awarded to an inmate under the PLRA does not vest under any circumstances until “the 

date the prisoner is released from custody.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(2). “Thus, under the 

PLRA, all of a prisoner’s cumulative good-conduct time can be taken by the BOP as a 

sanction for a prison disciplinary action.” Brown, 2013 WL 6512948 at *4 (citing 18 

U.S.C. § 3624(b)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(e); Gary v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2010 WL 

1611020, *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2010). 

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Here, Petitioner’s conviction stems from a December 23, 2002 offense. (Doc. 13 

Ex. A Attach. 2 at 2). As such, the PLRA applies to his sentence. Petitioner’s violation 

for BOP Code No. 104 is classified as a greatest severity prohibited act. (Doc. 13 Ex. B 

Attach. 1 at 18 [BOP Program Statement]). The prison can sanction a prisoner who 

commits a greatest severity prohibited act by “[d]isallow[ing] ordinarily between 50 and 

75% (27–41 days) of good conduct time credit available for [a] year[.]” Id. at 17

[Sanction B.1]. For PLRA inmates committing greatest category offenses, Sanction B.1 is 

mandatory. Id. at 14 [BOP Program Statement § 541.13(a)(1)]. Pursuant to these

regulations, the DHO imposed a sanction disallowing 40 days of GCT for Petitioner’s 

violation of BOP Code No. 104. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 4). 

Petitioner’s violations for BOP Code Nos. 203 and 218 are classified as high 

severity offenses. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 1 at 20 [BOP Program Statement]). The prison 

can sanction a prisoner who commits a high severity prohibited act by “[d]isallow[ing] 

ordinarily between 25 and 50% (14–27 days) of good conduct time credit available for [a] 

year[.]” Id. [Sanction B.1]. For PLRA inmates committing high category offenses, 

Sanction B.1 is mandatory. Id. [BOP Program Statement § 541.13(a)(2)]. Pursuant to 

these regulations, the DHO imposed a sanction disallowing 27 days of GCT for each 

offense. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 4). 

Petitioner has not pointed to any rules, regulations or other authority stating that 

the DHO could not impose Sanction B.1 to disallow a total of 94 days GCT for the three 

infractions Petitioner committed. As the court noted in Brown, “[i]ndeed, such a rule 

would appear to conflict with the PLRA, which states that good-conduct time does not 

vest until a prisoner is released from prison, and thus the DHO can sanction a prisoner 

either by forfeiting good-conduct time that the prisoner has already earned or 

prospectively disallowing good-conduct time that a prisoner has not yet earned.” Brown, 

2013 WL 6512948 at *5 (citations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Petitioner also 

fails to provide any evidence as to how this sanction was imposed in bad faith or in 

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retaliation against him. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s claim 

regarding the loss of 94 days GCT must fail. 

ii. Monetary Restitution 

Petitioner presents three arguments regarding the validity of the monetary 

restitution. (Doc. 6 at 4-5). Petitioner first asserts that the monetary restitution sanction 

imposed was not directly related to the infractions he was charged with and is therefore 

arbitrary. Second, Petitioner argues that fines were not approved by the C.F.R. or B.O.P. 

for the DHO to impose at the time of Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing. Third, Petitioner 

alleges a lack of proper receipts and documentation to support the restitution amount. 

1. Relation of Sanction to Infraction 

 Petitioner contends that the monetary restitution award is arbitrary because it is not 

directly related to the infractions he was charged with. (Doc. 6 at 4-5). Petitioner also 

states that “[t]he sanctions [...] are not directly related to the infraction(s), as stated by 

DHO Nikes in his Report.” (Doc. 19 at 11). 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner appears to be confused by the 

language used in the DHO report. Under “Reason for Sanction or Action Taken,” and in 

reference to Petitioner’s charge of destroying government property, DHO Nikes wrote: 

“Although not directly related to the infraction, privileges were taken to deter the inmate 

from this behavior in the future.” (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 4). DHO Nikes was 

referring to the fact that, in addition to a loss of GCT and monetary restitution, Petitioner 

was also sanctioned to a loss of commissary and phone privileges for 60 days. These are 

the sanctions DHO Nikes was referring to in noting that the loss of privileges was not 

directly related to Petitioner’s infraction for destruction of government property. DHO 

Nikes was not stating that monetary restitution was unrelated to the infraction. Further, 

the BOP Program Statement specifically authorizes the DHO to “impose a loss of 

privilege sanction not directly related to the offense, provided there is a belief that the 

imposed sanction ... is viewed as having a significant impact on the inmate’s future 

behavior.” (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 1 at 33). 

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Regarding the monetary restitution award, Petitioner was charged with BOP Code 

No. 218, destruction of government property valued in excess of $100, and was 

sanctioned to pay $2,138.20 in restitution. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 2 at 4). Code No. 203 

is classified as a high category offense. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 1 at 20). The prison can 

sanction a prisoner who commits a high category prohibited act by ordering the prisoner 

to make monetary restitution (Id. [Sanction E]), and the BOP Program Statement 

specifies that the DHO “shall impose and execute one or more of” the sanctions listed for

high category offenses (Id. at 14). 

Petitioner has not pointed to any rules, regulations or other authority stating that 

the DHO could not impose Sanction E to require Petitioner to make monetary restitution 

for his violation of BOP Code No. 213. Nor has Petitioner presented any argument as to 

how the sanction of monetary restitution fails to relate to his actions of destroying 

government property and the costs to repair or replace that property. Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s claim that the restitution sanction was 

arbitrarily imposed be denied. 

2. Authority of DHO to Impose Restitution 

Petitioner contends that “monetary fines were not yet approved and codified under 

the Code of Federal Regulations or implemented into the BOP program statement(s) to be 

imposed by DHO’s at the time of said disciplinary hearing.” (Doc. 6 at 5). 

Pursuant to the BOP Program Statement manual, “[t]he DHO may direct that an 

inmate reimburse the U.S. Treasury for any damage to U.S. Government property that the 

individual is determined to have caused or contributed to.” (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 1 at 

32). This provision went into effect November 3, 2007 (Id.), and was thus applicable at 

the time of Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing on June 2, 2009. Further, as noted in Section 

1. above, the BOP Program Statement specifically lists monetary restitution as one of the 

sanctions that may be imposed for high category prohibited acts. (Doc. 13 Ex. B Attach. 

1 at 20 [Sanction E]). 

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Petitioner provides no evidence to support his claim that the DHO lacked the 

authority to impose a monetary restitution sanction against him, and the BOP Program 

Statement specifically authorizes the DHO to impose restitution for high category 

prohibited acts. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s claim 

regarding the authority of the DHO to impose restitution be denied. 

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Petitioner asserts that the staff emails DHO Nikes used to calculate the amount of 

restitution “DO NOT state any cost for repair/replace light fixtures and windows but yet 

DHO Nikes stated in his report ... that staff e-mails itemize their costs to be $600.00 

dollars.” (Doc. 6 at 5). Petitioner further contends the restitution amount was arbitrarily 

calculated without proper receipts and documentation. Id. 

At the DHO hearing, DHO Nikes reviewed photographs of the damaged cell and 

staff emails itemizing the cost to repair or replace the items Petitioner destroyed. (Doc. 13 

Ex. B Attach. 2 at 3). Copies of the photographs and staff emails are included with the 

DHO report. Id. at 9-14. The items to be repaired or replaced included: nurse call system 

$158.20, walker $40.00, bed trapeze $1,340.00, and light fixtures and windows $600.00. 

Id. at 3. The total cost to repair and replace the items was $2,138.20, the amount that 

Petitioner was ordered to pay in restitution. Id. 

Petitioner cites Howard v. Copenhaver, 2015 WL 404092 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 

2015), yet the Court’s finding in that case undermines Petitioner’s arguments. In Howard, 

the petitioner argued there was insufficient evidence of the value of the television he was 

ordered to pay restitution for. The Court disagreed, noting the Hill “some evidence” 

standard was met where an officer provided a written statement of the value and Best 

Buy provided a price quote. Id. at *5. Moreover, the Court noted that “regardless of 

whether Petitioner was provided proof of the value of the television, any such error was 

harmless as Petitioner has not provided any argument that the television was not worth 

over $100.”11 Id. Here, as in Howard, the “some evidence” standard was met through the 

11 In Howard, the petitioner was charged with destroying government property 

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staff emails submitted to DHO Nikes detailing the costs to replace or repair the items 

Petitioner destroyed. In addition, while Petitioner may find the emails unsatisfactory to 

establish the proof of the replacement and repair costs, Petitioner has provided no 

evidence that these charges are inaccurate, and there is simply no requirement that 

purchase orders or receipts are required to meet the “some evidence” standard.12 

In sum, the Court finds that “some evidence” supports the DHO’s findings and 

“the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the [DHO] were without 

support or otherwise arbitrary.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985). 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s claim. 

D. Conclusion 

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the due process requirements as 

delineated by Wolff were met in this case. Additionally, the Court finds that the DHO 

findings were supported by “some evidence” as required by Hill, supra. Therefore, the 

undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 6) be denied. 

Finally, “the plain language of [28 U.S.C.] §2253(c)(1) does not require a 

petitioner to obtain a [certificate of appealability] in order to appeal the denial of a §2241 

petition.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2008). “Nor is there any other 

statutory basis for imposing a [certificate of appealability] requirement on legitimate 

§2241 petitions. Although state prisoners proceeding under §2241 must obtain a 

[certificate of appealability], see §2253(c)(1)(A), there is no parallel requirement for 

federal prisoners.” Id. Accordingly, because Petitioner is a federal prisoner bringing a 

legitimate §2241 petition, a certificate of appealability is not required. 

having a value in excess of $100, the same violation Petitioner in the present case was 

charged with (BOP Code No. 218). 

12 Petitioner contends Officer Reynolds told him that “the bed trapeze is not broken—nursing staff put the screws back in it and put it back together—the next inmate 

that was placed into that cell is using it.” (Doc. 19 at 4). This is unsubstantiated hearsay 

and is insufficient to overcome the evidence presented of the replacement and repair costs 

for the items Petitioner destroyed. See Howard, 2015 WL 404092 at *5 (“The some 

evidence standard is a low threshold, and will be met even when evidence to the contrary 

is presented.”). 

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IV. RECOMMENDATION 

For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order: 

 (1) SUBSTITUTING J.T. Shartle, Warden, as Respondent for Louis W. Winn, 

Jr. pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 43(c)(2) of 

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; and 

 (2) DENYING Petitioner’s First Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 6). 

 (3) DENYING Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Injunction (Doc. 31) as 

moot. 

 (4) DENYING Petitioner’s Request for Status (Doc. 32) as moot. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District 

Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-13-

358-TUC-JGZ 

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court shall 

send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 1st day of September, 2015. 

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