Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02860/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02860-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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5:14-cv-02860-RMW

ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY’S FEES

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANA SCOTT KRULEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-02860-RMW 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Re: Dkt. No. 83

Plaintiff Krulee filed this purported class action asserting claims against defendants under 

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). See Dkt. No. 1. 

Krulee’s claims arise out of defendants’ communications attempting to collect Krulee’s delinquent 

credit card account that originated with First National Bank of Omaha (“FNBO”). Id. Receivables 

Performance Management, LLC (“RPM”) and Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC (“Jefferson 

Capital”) (collectively “defendants”), assignees of plaintiff’s credit card account, filed a motion 

pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (“FAA”), to compel arbitration. Dkt. 

No. 50. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration, and dismissed the case “without 

prejudice to proceed with the arbitration and without prejudice to an action confirming the 

arbitration award.” Dkt. No. 81. Defendants now move for attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 83. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Supreme Court has held that “[u]nder the bedrock principle known as the ‘American

Case 5:14-cv-02860-RMW Document 88 Filed 08/03/15 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Rule,’ each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides 

otherwise. Notwithstanding the American Rule, however, we have long recognized that federal 

courts have inherent power to award attorney’s fees in a narrow set of circumstances, including 

when a party brings an action in bad faith.” Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 

(2013) (alterations and citations omitted). Here, defendants rely on the existence of a contract, 

specifically the Terms and Conditions accompanying plaintiff’s credit card account, to support an 

award of fees. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The provision by which defendants seek fees applies to attorney’s fees “related to the 

collection of your account.” Dkt. No. 51-1 at 17. However, plaintiff in bringing his FDCPA claim 

did not seek a declaration that he does not owe the amount that was due on his account or assert

any claim that the defendants’ alleged violation of the FDCPA was a defense to any claim for the 

amount due on his credit card account. Therefore, the attorney’s fees defendants seek are not 

related to the collection of plaintiff’s account.

The relevant provision concerning attorneys’ fees in the Terms and Conditions is in the 

Arbitration Provision (Agreement to Arbitrate Claims). That provision states:

Any claim, dispute or controversy (whether in contract, tort or 

otherwise) at any time arising from or relating to your Account, any 

transferred balances or this Agreement (collectively, Claims), upon 

the election of you or us, will be resolved by binding arbitration . . . .

Id. at 13. The Arbitration provision further provides that “each party will bear the expense of their

respective attorneys’, experts’, and witness fees, regardless of which party prevails in the 

arbitration.” Id. Defendants successfully invoked the Arbitration Provision to obtain an order 

requiring arbitration. Since defendants elected to require plaintiff to arbitrate his FDCPA claim, 

the attorneys’ fees defendants incurred in obtaining the order requiring arbitration are 

appropriately governed by their agreement that each side bear its own attorney’s fees.

Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion for attorney’s fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dated: August 3, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-02860-RMW Document 88 Filed 08/03/15 Page 3 of 3