Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01984/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01984-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEANETTE LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-01984 WHA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this social security appeal, this order finds that the ALJ exercised proper discretion in

weighing the testimony on record and that the ALJ’s partially favorable decision was supported

by substantial evidence. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On September 3, 2003, plaintiff Jeanette Lopez applied for disability insurance benefits,

alleging she was unable to work since September 10, 2002, due to right shoulder impingement

and right AC joint arthritis (AR 64–66). Her application was denied both initially and upon

reconsideration (AR 35–39). An administrative hearing was timely requested (AR 40).

On July 28, 2005, plaintiff had a hearing before ALJ Richard Laverdure (AR 15–20). 

The ALJ rendered a partially favorable decision on March 23, 2006, finding that plaintiff was

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entitled to benefits between September 3, 2003, and May 17, 2004, but as of May 18, 2004, she

had lost that entitlement (AR 20). Plaintiff requested administrative review (AR 10). The

Appeals Council denied the request (AR 5). Plaintiff filed an action before this Court on April

9, 2007, seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The parties now make crossmotions for summary judgment.

2. TESTIMONY AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.

At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff testified that she had been under medical care

since 2000 to treat pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arm (AR 245). She also testified that

her arm was completely numb, prohibiting her from driving, and that her neck was immobile

(AR 244). Although plaintiff indicated that surgery in 2003 gave her 25% increased mobility in

her testimony, she reported continued pain, including a pinched nerve in the neck, a flare-up in

the right shoulder, and radial and carpal tunnel syndrome (AR 246–247). Plaintiff stated that

she had trouble writing with her right arm and an inability to move her head (AR 248). She

began taking Oxycontin at night and Motrin during the day (AR 230). She also took Cymbalta

and Neurontin for the pain. Plaintiff also testified that even though she returned to part-time

work, she had no medical improvement in her conditions (AR 250).

3. MEDICAL EVIDENCE.

The medical evidence was summarized in the ALJ’s decision (AR 17–19). This order

will also briefly review both plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms and the findings of each

physician who examined her. Due to continued right shoulder pain, plaintiff had right shoulder

arthroscopic acromioplasty and arthroscopic rotator cuff repair on November 7, 2003. On

November 11, 2003, Calvin Pon, M.D. examined plaintiff and diagnosed the following: (1)

chronic neck pain, probably secondary to cervical disc disease; (2) history of right shoulder

acromioclavicular joint arthritis with right shoulder impingement; and (3) history of bilateral

carpal tunnel release in the early 1990’s (AR 127). Dr. Pon also noted no restriction in

standing, walking, or performing fine manipulative tasks with either hand (ibid.). However, Dr.

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Pon reported that plaintiff should avoid all lifting, carrying, and reaching with her right upper

extremity (ibid.).

On March 24, 2004, treating orthopedist Kirk Jensen, M.D. noted that plaintiff was

totally, temporarily disabled and needed to continue with physical therapy (AR 151). Roughly

two months later, on May 17, Dr. Jensen reported that plaintiff “ha[d] done exceedingly well”

with most of the shoulder pain diminishing and her range of motion improving (AR 188). 

Three days later, treating physician Barbara McQuinn, M.D. examined plaintiff and reported

that she was “Permanent and Stationary with regards to her neck and arm disabilities” and

“precluded from repetitive use of both arms/hands” (AR 203–204). Nonetheless, in a progress

report a month later in June, Dr. Jensen wrote that “[plaintiff] reports that she is doing much

better” (AR 186). Additionally, on January 27, 2005, Dr. Jensen wrote that plaintiff reported

that “she is about 75% better.” Plaintiff denied giving Dr. Jensen any percentage regarding her

improvement at the hearing (AR 259). Plaintiff began a real estate and mortgage-banking

program on July 19, 2004, and started working on a part-time basis in November 2004, as a

loan officer (AR 250–252).

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD.

A decision denying disability benefits must be upheld if it is supported by substantial

evidence and free of legal error. The claimant has the burden of proving disability. The

district court must “review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence

that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” “The ALJ is responsible for

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving

ambiguities;” thus, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

the decision of the ALJ must be upheld. Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla,” but

“less than a preponderance.” It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–1040

(9th Cir. 1995).

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Disability claims are evaluated using a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In the

first four steps, the ALJ must determine: (I) whether the claimant is working, (ii) the medical

severity and duration of the claimant’s impairment, (iii) whether the disability meets any of

those listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, and (iv) whether the claimant is

capable of performing his or her previous job; step five involves a determination of whether the

claimant is capable of making an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). In

step five, it is the burden of the Secretary to prove that the claimant can perform other gainful

work. If the ALJ chooses to use a vocational expert, hypothetical questions asked “must ‘set

out all of the claimant’s impairments.’” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir.

2001)(internal citation omitted).

The use of the Medical-Vocation Guidelines, at step five is proper “where they

completely and accurately represent a claimant’s limitations” and the claimant can “perform the

full range of jobs in a given category.” Although “the fact that a non-exertional limitation is

alleged does not automatically preclude application of the grids,” the ALJ must first determine

whether the “claimant’s non-exertional limitations significantly limit the range of work

permitted by his exertional limitations.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101–1102 (9th Cir.

1999).

2. THE ALJ’S FIVE-STEP ANALYSIS.

At step one of the analysis, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not perform substantial

gainful activity from September 2002 until November 2004 (AR 16). The ALJ cutoff the period

of disability at November 2004 because plaintiff’s counsel failed to submit any documents

showing plaintiff’s income after that date (ibid.). Next, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe

right shoulder impingement and right AC joint arthritis, post repair (ibid.). At step three the

ALJ found that none of plaintiff’s impairments, considered separately or cumulatively, met or

equaled any of the impairments listed in the Social Security regulations (ibid.). In step four, the

ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity as of May 18, 2004 to work lightly

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and reach “frequently” (AR 19). The ALJ then concluded that, as of May 18, 2004, plaintiff

was able to return to her past work (ibid.).

3. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

In his decision, the ALJ found at step four of the sequential evaluation process that

plaintiff always had the functional capacity for a range of light work, but that prior to May 17,

2004, she had additional non-exertional limitations that restricted her use of her dominant upper

arm precluding her from all work until May 17, 2004 (AR 18). After May 17, the ALJ found

that the additional limitations ceased to the point that she could return to her former

employment (AR 19). The ALJ based his decision off Dr. Jensen’s examination on May 17,

2004, and the testimony of the vocational expert (AR 18–19). The vocational expert testified

that someone who could reach “frequently” could perform the plaintiff’s past hybrid work (AR

19). 

Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ improperly accorded weight to Dr. Jensen’s medical

report and erroneously rejected Dr. McQuinn’s opinion. In the progress report dated May 17,

2004, Dr. Jensen noted that plaintiff was doing “exceedingly well” (AR 188). Plaintiff contends

that the statement cannot be credited because no comparison points were given by Dr. Jensen,

and ultimately, no opinion was rendered by him regarding plaintiff’s ability to return back to

work. Plaintiff’s medical consultations with Dr. Jensen and her work history, however, provide

substantial evidence for supporting the ALJ’s decision. Dr. Jensen’s reports from March 2004

to January 2005 show that plaintiff made significant progress in her rehabilitation over time. 

Plaintiff went from being “totally, temporarily disabled” in March, to “exceedingly better” in

May, to “much better” in June, and finally “75% better” in January (AR 151, 188, 186, and

184). These reports showed consistent recovery to warrant the ALJ’s finding. In addition,

although plaintiff claims that her disability continued past May, she was able to enroll in classes

in July and started working in November. These facts only add to the substantial evidence that

the ALJ based his decision on.

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The ALJ also exercised proper discretion in choosing to give less weight to the

assessment given by Dr. McQuinn. The ALJ is trusted with “determining credibility, resolving

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. In

this matter, the ALJ found Dr. McQuinn’s “sit/stand option” without basis because the case

involved a cervical and upper extremity condition (AR 18). Given the inconsistencies with Dr.

Jensen’s status reports, the ALJ was well within his authority to choose to discredit Dr.

McQuinn’s opinion, and instead, follow Dr. Jensen’s. Substantial evidence showing, the ALJ’s

determination that the disability ended on May 18, 2004 must be upheld.

4. NO OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF SIDE-EFFECTS.

Allegations of side-effects need not be considered if no objective evidence is offered to

support the allegations. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). For the

period between January 6, 2005 and April 19, 2005, plaintiff has offered no evidence, other than

her own statements, supporting her allegation that side-effects from the use of Cymbalta and

Neurontin prohibited her from working. The ALJ properly used his discretion to find that

plaintiff’s testimony was “not fully credible with respect to the extent of her limitations” (AR

18). Additionally, Dr. McQuinn’s progress report on May 20, 2004 indicates that plaintiff only

used Neurontin “sparingly,” but that it “help[ed] with sleep” (AR 201). Plaintiff has offered no

objective proof to demonstrate how the alleged side-effects impacted her work during the day. 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider the side-effects caused by her use of

Oxycontin. Plaintiff, however, only took Oxycontin at night to sleep and took Motrin during

the day for pain. Plaintiff has not shown how the side-effects from a drug she took at night to

sleep impacted her ability to work the next day. Plaintiff argues that because she wasn’t able to

take Oxycontin during the day, due to the side-effects, that she experienced more pain, thereby

impacting her ability to work. Nonetheless, plaintiff has offered no evidence from Dr.

McQuinn or any other doctor to demonstrate that her pain was so debilitating that it prohibited

her from working. Accordingly, this order finds that the ALJ did not err in failing to consider

plaintiff’s allegations of side effects.

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5. PLAINTIFF’S DISCREDITED PAIN TESTIMONY.

An ALJ is not required “to believe every allegation of disabling pain,” but he should

give specific reasons for discrediting such an allegation. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th

Cir. 1989). In the instant action, the ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony to be “somewhat

questionable” (AR 17). He based this opinion on the inconsistencies between Dr. Jensen’s

progress report, noting that plaintiff was doing 75% better, and plaintiff’s testimony (AR 18). 

Although plaintiff denied ever giving any such assessment and claimed that Dr. Jensen was

generally more optimistic with regards to her condition (ibid.), the ALJ was entitled to choose

to give more weight to the progress report. The ALJ also noted that plaintiff exaggerated her

prior income level before becoming disabled after comparing her testimony to her actual wage

reports from her employment (AR 16). 

The ALJ’s decision also indicates that plaintiff’s testimony regarding her pain was not

ignored, and was ultimately one of the factors in awarding disability benefits from September

10, 2002, to May 17, 2004. The decision found plaintiff’s testimony “generally credible” with

respect to her allegations of medical impairments, but “not fully credible with the extent of her

limitations” due to the inconsistencies in evidence, including plaintiff’s own testimony (AR 18). 

Thus, it was within the ALJ’s authority to choose to discredit plaintiff’s testimony based on the

contrary evidence on record that was specifically highlighted by the ALJ.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2007 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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