Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02730/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02730-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DREW GARDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; 

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 

OFFICER J.J. FISCHER; TEHAMA 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 

TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT DEPUTY 

INVESTIGATOR ED McCULLOUGH; 

KENNETH MILLER; and DOES 1 -

50,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02730 JAM CMK

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART STATE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants California 

Highway Patrol (“Defendant CHP”) and J.J. Fischer’s (“Defendant 

Fischer”) (collectively, “State Defendants”) motion to dismiss 

(Doc. #34) Plaintiff Drew Gardner’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #33). Also before the Court is 

Defendants Tehama County (“Defendant County”) and Ed McCullough’s 

(“Defendant McCullough”) (collectively, “County Defendants”) 

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motion to dismiss (Doc. #36) the FAC. Plaintiff opposed both 

State Defendants’ (Doc. #35) and County Defendants’ (Doc. #41) 

motions. Both State Defendants and County Defendants replied 

(Doc. #42; Doc. #43). For the following reasons, State 

Defendants’ motion is granted in part, and denied in part, and 

County Defendants’ motion is granted in part, and denied in 

part.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a 

Jeep Wrangler that had been reported stolen. FAC ¶¶ 17-18. Upon 

seeing a police car, the driver of the Jeep abandoned the car and 

told Plaintiff to do the same. FAC ¶ 19. Defendant Fischer, an 

officer with Defendant CHP, apprehended Plaintiff and took him 

into custody. FAC ¶ 20. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was booked 

into Tehama County Jail. FAC ¶ 27. 

Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendant Fischer wrote a 

Patrol Report (“Report”). FAC ¶ 21. In the Report, Defendant 

Fischer wrote that, during Plaintiff’s booking, he had 

confiscated a “clear white baggie with a white crystalline 

substance” - which tested positive for methamphetamine – from 

Plaintiff’s jacket. FAC ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that this 

statement was one of many lies that Defendant Fischer made while 

writing the Report. FAC ¶¶ 21-28. 

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for June 3, 2015.

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The following day, January 3, 2014, Defendant McCullough – a

deputy investigator with the Tehama County Sheriff’s Department –

was tasked with conducting an investigation of this incident. 

FAC ¶ 31. Defendant McCullough interviewed Plaintiff, who told 

him that he was a passenger in the car and had been offered a 

ride by Charles Jacob Steele, whom “he had just met at a mutual 

friend’s house.” FAC ¶ 33. Plaintiff informed Defendant 

McCullough that, prior to his arrest, they had stopped at a car 

dealership and a gas station, and that witnesses at both 

locations could confirm that he was not the driver of the stolen 

vehicle. FAC ¶¶ 34-35. McCullough followed up on both of these 

leads, and spoke with a witness at the car dealership. FAC ¶ 36. 

The witness picked Plaintiff out of a photo line-up, and 

identified him as the passenger of the vehicle. FAC ¶ 37. At 

this time, Defendant McCullough “failed to alert anyone at the 

Tehama [County] District Attorney’s office, the Tehama County 

Jail, or the Shasta County Sheriff’s department” of these 

exculpatory findings. FAC ¶ 38.

On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff was charged with: (1) unlawful 

driving or taking of a vehicle; (2) receiving stolen property –

motor vehicle; (3) driving under the influence; (4) bringing 

contraband into the jail; (5) possession of a controlled 

substance; and (6) carrying a dirk or dagger. FAC ¶ 41. 

Plaintiff was arraigned on these charges, Defendant Miller was 

assigned to be his public defender, and the Court ordered him 

detained on $315,000 bail. FAC ¶ 43.

///

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On January 8, 2014, Defendant McCullough resumed his 

investigation and visited the gas station at which Plaintiff 

claimed to have stopped before his arrest. FAC ¶ 44. He 

obtained video surveillance from the date of the incident, and 

observed that Plaintiff was the passenger in the vehicle. FAC 

¶¶ 44-45. Defendant McCullough wrote up a report of his findings 

(“the McCullough Report”), but this report “was not sent or was 

not timely sent” to the Tehama County District Attorney’s Office. 

FAC ¶ 45. Plaintiff further alleges that the McCullough Report 

“failed to make its way to the Tehama County District Attorney’s 

Office” during the period that Defendant Miller represented 

Plaintiff, which ended on February 25, 2014. FAC ¶¶ 48-49.

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff (represented by Defendant 

Miller) waived his right to a preliminary hearing. FAC ¶ 48; 

Doc. #40, Ex. B. On February 7, 2014, Plaintiff’s mother 

retained private counsel to represent Plaintiff. FAC ¶ 50. On 

February 25, 2014, Plaintiff fired his public defender, Defendant 

Miller. FAC ¶ 48.

Plaintiff’s retained counsel conducted an investigation and 

discovered substantially the same exculpatory information that

Defendant McCullough had learned through his official 

investigation. FAC ¶¶ 50-54. On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff’s 

retained counsel sent a letter summarizing his findings to the 

Tehama County District Attorney’s Office. FAC ¶ 55. That same 

day, the Tehama County District Attorney provided Plaintiff - and 

retained counsel - with a copy of the McCullough Report. FAC ¶

56. On March 17, 2014, the three vehicle-related counts against 

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Plaintiff were dropped. FAC ¶ 57. Plaintiff remained in custody 

on the three booking-related pending charges. FAC ¶ 58.

On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff “persuaded Sargeant [sic]

Baulkin at the Tehama County Jail to look at the booking video.” 

FAC ¶ 59. The video showed that Plaintiff was not wearing the 

jacket in which Defendant Fischer claimed to have found a “baggie 

of meth” during booking. FAC ¶ 59. Instead, the video showed 

that Defendant Fischer carried the jacket into the booking room. 

FAC ¶ 59. On April 21, 2014, the remaining counts relating to 

Plaintiff’s booking were dismissed. FAC ¶ 60. Plaintiff was 

released that same day, after spending 110 days in custody. FAC 

¶ 60.

On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the FAC, which includes 

the following causes of action: 

(1) Fourteenth Amendment due process violation for 

deprivation of liberty against Defendant Fischer and Defendant 

McCullough, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983; 

(2) Fourteenth Amendment due process violation for 

deprivation of liberty against Defendant CHP and Defendant 

County, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(3) Fifth Amendment due process violation for unlawful 

arrest against Defendant Fischer and Defendant McCullough, 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(4) Fifth Amendment due process violation for unlawful 

arrest against Defendant CHP and Defendant County, brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(5) Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual 

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punishment against Defendant Fischer and Defendant McCullough, 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(6) Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual 

punishment against Defendant CHP and Defendant County, brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(7) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant CHP; 

(8) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant County; 

(9) intentional withholding of evidence against Defendant 

McCullough; 

(10) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) 

against Defendant Fischer; 

(11) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) 

against Defendant Fischer, Defendant Miller, and Defendant 

McCullough; 

(12) false imprisonment against Defendant CHP, Defendant 

Fischer, Defendant McCullough, and Defendant County; 

(13) professional negligence against Defendant Miller; and 

(14) malicious prosecution against Defendant Fischer. 

As Defendant Miller is not a moving party on the motions 

before the Court, only the facts relevant to the State 

Defendants’ motion and the County Defendants’ motion are 

summarized above.

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

County Defendants request that the Court take judicial 

notice of two documents which are not attached to the FAC: 

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(1) Defendant Fischer’s Probable Cause Declaration, dated January 

2, 2014; and (2) Plaintiff’s Waiver of Preliminary Hearing, dated 

January 21, 2014. County Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

(“CDRJN”), Doc. #37. Plaintiff opposes County Defendants’ 

request, arguing that the consideration of documents not included 

in the complaint is improper on a motion to dismiss. Opp. at 3.

As a general rule, the Court “may not consider any material 

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee 

v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, the Court may take judicial notice of “matters of public 

record,” provided that they are not subject to reasonable 

dispute. Id. at 689. Similarly, on a motion to dismiss, the 

Court “may consider evidence on which the “complaint necessarily 

relies if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the 

document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party 

questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) 

motion.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 

(9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

The first document offered by County Defendants – Defendant 

Fischer’s Probable Cause Declaration – meets the standard set 

forth by the Ninth Circuit in Daniels-Hall: it was referenced in 

the FAC at paragraph 30, it is central to Plaintiff’s claim, and 

its authenticity is not questioned. The second document offered 

by County Defendants – Plaintiff’s Waiver of Preliminary Hearing 

– is a public court record and is not subject to reasonable 

dispute. Accordingly, County Defendants’ request for judicial 

notice is GRANTED.

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B. Discussion

1. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

a. Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of 

Action - § 1983 Claims against Defendant CHP

State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s second, fourth, 

sixth, and seventh causes of action against Defendant CHP must be 

dismissed because CHP is not a “person” amenable to suit under 

§ 1983. State Mot. at 5. State Defendants note that, for 

purposes of a § 1983 action, states and state agencies are not 

defined as “persons” and therefore cannot be sued under the 

statute. State Mot. at 6. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant 

CHP is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, but maintains 

that CHP can be sued under Monell, as a governmental entity. 

Opp. to State at 2. In their reply, State Defendants argue that 

Monell applies only to municipal entities, and not to the State 

of California or its agencies, including CHP. State Reply at 2.

In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows:

Every person, who under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended “municipalities 

and other local government units to be included among those 

persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 

436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, in Will v. Mich. Dept. of 

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State Police, the Supreme Court expressly limited the reach of 

Monell, noting that “it does not follow that if municipalities 

are person then so are states.” 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). Thus, 

the Court held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in 

their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. at 

71. Therefore, neither the State of California nor its state 

agencies can be subject to a § 1983 Monell claim. See Orsoco v. 

Cal., 2013 WL 3146820, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (holding 

that “defendants State of California and CHP cannot be sued under 

section 1983,” even under a Monell theory of liability); Townsend 

v. State of Cal., 2010 WL 1644740, at *6 (E.D. Cal. April 21, 

2010) (noting that “the State and CHP, an arm of the State, are 

not subject to section 1983 claims.”).

The parties do not dispute that CHP is an agency of the 

State of California. Cal. Gov. Code § 11000. As a state agency, 

CHP is neither a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, Will, 491 

U.S. at 71, nor amenable to suit under Monell.

State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s second, 

fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, to the extent those 

claims are brought against Defendant CHP, is therefore GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with 

prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it 

is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved 

by amendment.” (citing Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th 

Cir. 1996)).

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b. Tenth and Eleventh Causes of Action – IIED

and NIED – against Defendant Fischer

State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s tenth and eleventh 

causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) 

against Defendant Fischer must be dismissed because he is immune 

from liability under California Government Code § 820.2. State 

Mot. at 6-7. Specifically, State Defendants argue that, under 

§ 820.2, Defendant Fischer is not liable for the injuries that 

result from his discretionary decisions, including his decision 

to arrest Plaintiff. State Mot. at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant Fischer is not entitled to immunity under § 820.2, 

because that statute applies only to discretionary policy 

decisions and not to operational decisions, such as decisions to 

arrest. Opp. to State at 6-7. In reply, State Defendants note 

that Plaintiff’s authority only concerns § 820.2 immunity for 

false arrest, not IIED or NIED. State Reply at 3. However, 

State Defendants do not provide any additional authority, and 

appear only to have repeated their argument, verbatim, from their 

opening brief in support of the motion to dismiss. Compare State 

Reply at 3 (lines 15-20), with State Mot. at 7 (lines 7-13).

California Government Code § 820.2 provides that, “[e]xcept 

as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable 

for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or 

omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested 

in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The Ninth 

Circuit has held that “section 820.2 immunity does not apply to 

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an officer’s decision to detain or arrest a suspect.” Liberal v. 

Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Gillan v. 

City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2007)). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows: 

Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions

[which have] . . . been [expressly] committed to 

coordinate branches of government, and as to which 

judicial interference would thus be unseemly. A 

police officer’s decision to detain or arrest a 

suspect is not a basic policy decision, but only an 

operational decision by the police purporting to apply 

the law.

Id. at 1084-85 (alterations in original) (internal 

citations omitted). 

As such, it is beyond dispute that § 820.2 immunity does not 

apply to false arrest or false imprisonment. See Opp. at 6; 

reply at 3. However, the Ninth Circuit has not reached the 

precise issue of whether § 820.2 immunity applies to claims for 

IIED or NIED, when such claims arise from false arrest or false 

imprisonment. See Liberal, 632 F.3d at 1091.n2. 

The cases cited by State Defendants do not support their 

argument that § 820.2 immunity applies to IIED and NIED claims. 

See Mot. at 7 (citing Posey v. State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 836 (1986) 

and Bonds v. Sate of Cal. (ex rel. Cal. Highway Patrol), 138 

Cal.App.3d 314 (1982)). In Posey, the court held that the 

“inspection and removal of disabled vehicles are discretionary 

acts and are therefore covered by the statutory immunities as set 

forth in Government Code section 820.2.” Posey, 180 Cal.App.3d 

at 848. Similarly, in Bonds, the court held that a “decision to 

remove or not to remove a stranded vehicle, without more, is thus 

a discretionary action and comes within the immunity described in 

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Government Code section 820.2.” Bonds, 138 Cal.App.3d at 322 

(citations omitted). Neither of these cases involved IIED or 

NIED (or even false arrest) claims and they are inapplicable to 

the case at bar.

Given the lack of applicable Ninth Circuit authority on this 

point, and in light of State Defendants’ failure to cite any 

authority addressing the applicability of § 820.2 to IIED and 

NIED claims, the Court finds that State Defendants have failed to 

meet their burden in moving to dismiss the IIED and NIED claims 

arising from false arrest. 

State Defendants’ reliance on § 818.8 is also misplaced. 

California Government Code § 818.8 provides that “[a] public 

entity is not liable for an injury caused by misrepresentation by 

an employee of the public entity, whether or not such 

misrepresentation be negligent or intentional.” However, § 818.8 

immunity applies only to misrepresentations that interfere with 

financial or commercial interests. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 

2d 782, 800 (1968) (“In short, ‘misrepresentation,’ as a tort 

distinct from the general milieu of negligent and intentional 

wrongs, applies to interferences with financial or commercial 

interest.”). Neither party claims that a misrepresentation 

occurred regarding a financial or commercial interest, and 

§ 818.8 is, therefore, inapplicable. See Opp. at 7; Reply at 3. 

Similarly, State Defendants’ reliance on § 820.8 is 

unavailing. California Government Code § 820.8, in pertinent 

part, provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, 

a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act 

or omission of another person.” However, State Defendants do not 

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explain which other person’s act or omission Defendant Fischer is 

seeking immunity from. Opp. to State at 7; see also State Reply 

at 3. Therefore, § 820.8 also does not apply.

For the reasons stated above, State Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s tenth and eleventh causes of action, to the 

extent those claims are brought against Defendant Fischer, is

DENIED. 

c. Twelfth Cause of Action – False Imprisonment – against Defendant CHP

State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of 

action for false imprisonment must be dismissed, to the extent it 

is brought against Defendant CHP, because Plaintiff fails to 

identify a statutory basis for liability against Defendant CHP as 

required by California Government Code § 815. State Mot. at 6. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that California Government 

Code § 815.2(a) provides a statutory basis for liability against 

Defendant CHP under the doctrine of respondeat superior, such 

that it can be held liable for Defendant Fischer’s false 

imprisonment of Plaintiff. Opp. to State at 4-5.

California Government Code § 815(a) provides that, “[e]xcept 

as otherwise provided by statute: . . . [a] public entity is not 

liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or 

omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other 

person.” Accordingly, “in California all government tort 

liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute 

or ‘enactment.’” Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 

Cal.App.3d 792, 802 (1986) (citations omitted). The existence of 

a statutory duty (along with all other facts essential to the 

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existence of statutory liability) must be pleaded with 

particularity. Id. (citing Susman v. City of L.A., 269 

Cal.App.2d 803, 809 (1969)). Accordingly, “[s]ince the duty of a 

governmental agency can only be created by statute or 

‘enactment,’ the statute or ‘enactment’ claimed to establish the 

duty must at the very least be identified” in the complaint. Id. 

With regard to the twelfth cause of action against Defendant 

CHP, Plaintiff has failed to identify a statutory basis for 

Defendant CHP’s tort liability. Comp. ¶¶ 112-20. This 

deficiency is fatal to his claim. See Ramsey v. City of Lake 

Elsinore, 270 Cal. Rptr. 198, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (approving 

dismissal of claim where the plaintiff “did not identify any 

statute, ordinance or resolution on which the City’s liability 

could be based”); see also Helstern v. City of San Diego, No. 13-

cv-0321, 2013 WL 3515963, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) 

(dismissing claim, noting that, although the plaintiff 

“identifie[d] the statute her complaint is missing” in her 

opposition brief, “these statutes belong in [her] complaint, 

where the negligence claim is actually asserted”).

Accordingly, State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

twelfth cause of action, to the extent it is brought against 

Defendant CHP, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

///

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///

///

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2. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

a. First Cause of Action - § 1983 (Fourteenth 

Amendment – Due Process Clause) against 

Defendant McCullough2

County Defendants argue that Defendant McCullough is 

entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff’s first 

cause of action, which alleges a violation of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought pursuant to § 1983. 

County Mot. at 7. Specifically, County Defendants argue that 

neither Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, nor his 

substantive due process claim, is cognizable, because Defendant 

McCullough is entitled to qualified immunity. County Mot. at 7. 

Plaintiff responds that Defendant McCullough is not entitled to 

qualified immunity, because his conduct violated Plaintiff’s 

clearly established constitutional rights. Opp. to County at 5.

The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government 

officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 

(2012). In evaluating a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, 

district courts consider two related questions: First, “taken in 

 

2 To the extent that Plaintiff sues Defendant McCullough in his 

official capacity, these are claims against Defendant County. 

Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff sues the Tehama County 

Sheriff’s Department, these are claims against Defendant County. 

For purposes of consistency, the Court reads any claims asserted 

against Defendant McCullough in the FAC as claims against him in 

his individual capacity. Although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure does permit a plaintiff to plead potentially 

inconsistent claims for relief, it does not permit him to plead 

duplicative claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Fontana v. Alpine Cnty., 

750 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

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the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, 

[whether] the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a 

constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 

(2001). Second, if the allegations establish that a 

constitutional violation occurred, courts must consider whether 

the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. 

Id.

Accordingly, the Court first considers whether Plaintiff has 

alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant McCullough 

violated his constitutional rights. In the context of 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff’s claims 

are two-fold: (1) procedural due process; and (2) substantive due 

process. In light of Plaintiff’s waiver of his right to a 

preliminary hearing, his procedural due process claim is a nonstarter; it cannot be said that “the procedures attendant upon 

[Plaintiff’s pretrial detention] were constitutionally 

insufficient.” Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 

454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989). Rather, Plaintiff merely 

failed to take advantage of the procedures to which he was 

entitled. For this reason, Plaintiff cannot maintain a 

procedural due process claim against Defendant McCullough, and 

County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of 

action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as Plaintiff 

has attempted to state a procedural due process claim against 

Defendant McCulllough.

However, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim warrants 

a closer look. The Ninth Circuit has held that the Fourteenth 

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Amendment provides “a constitutional right to be free from 

continued [pretrial] detention after it was or should have been

known that the detainee was entitled to release.” Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001). In a recent case 

– discussed at length in both parties’ briefs – the Ninth Circuit 

considered a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim in 

factual circumstances both similar to, and different from, the 

case at bar. Mot. at 9; Opp. at 6 (both citing Tatum v. Moody, 

768 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2014)).

In Tatum, the plaintiff (Walker) had been detained, pretrial, for over two years on robbery charges that were eventually 

dismissed. Tatum, 768 F.3d at 809. Walker brought a § 1983 

action against the investigating police officers, alleging that 

their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors 

violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

at 809. At his civil trial, Walker presented evidence that two 

investigating police officers had failed to inform prosecutors 

that robberies – strikingly similar to those allegedly committed 

by Walker – continued to occur after Walker was taken into 

custody. Id. at 809-811. The investigating officers also made 

affirmative misrepresentations to the court and the prosecutor 

that the string of similar robberies had ceased since Walker’s 

arrest, and failed to inform prosecutors when another man was 

arrested for the subsequent robberies. Id. at 812. The Tatum

court held that a due process violation may occur when an 

individual is subject to “prolonged detention when the police, 

with deliberate indifference to, or in the face of a perceived 

risk that, their actions will violate the plaintiff’s right to be 

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free of unjustified pretrial detention, withhold from the 

prosecutors information strongly indicative of his innocence[.]” 

Id. at 814-815. However, the court specifically noted “the 

narrowness of the constitutional rule we enforce today, which is 

restricted to detentions of (1) unusual length, (2) caused by the 

investigating officers’ failure to disclose highly significant 

exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, and (3) due to conduct that 

is culpable in that the officers understood the risks to the 

plaintiff’s rights from withholding the information or were 

completely indifferent to those risks.” Id. at 819-820. In 

Tatum, the Ninth Circuit went on to discuss each of these 

“limitations,” as they applied to the specific circumstances of 

Walker’s detention. Id. at 820-821. 

As Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for a substantive due process 

violation entails a necessarily fact-intensive inquiry, the 

application of Tatum to the present case requires a comparison 

between the circumstances of Plaintiff’s detention and that of 

Walker in Tatum. With regard to the first element, Plaintiff was 

detained for 110 days. FAC ¶ 60. Although this period is 

substantially shorter than the 27 months of pretrial detainment 

seen in Tatum, it is of sufficient length to “carr[y] 

constitutional implications.” See Tatum, 768 F.3d at 820 (noting 

that “a 68-day detention [was] lengthy enough to ‘carr[y] 

constitutional implications’”) (citing Russo v. City of 

Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 209 (2d Cir. 2007)). As noted by the 

Supreme Court, “[t]he consequences of prolonged detention may be 

more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest . . . 

[because] [p]retrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, 

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interrupt his source of income, and impair his family 

relationships.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). 

County Defendants acknowledge that the length of Plaintiff’s 

confinement “appears constitutionally significant.” Mot. at 10. 

The first Tatum “limitation” is no bar to Plaintiff’s substantive 

due process claim.

With regard to the second element, Plaintiff alleges that 

the McCullough Report contained the following information: 

(1) Plaintiff’s claim that he was the passenger, not the driver, 

of the stolen vehicle; (2) an eyewitness’ testimony that 

Plaintiff was the passenger, not the driver, of the stolen 

vehicle; (3) physical evidence that listed the name and address 

of the man the eyewitness believed to be the driver; and 

(4) surveillance video from a gas station, showing Plaintiff 

exiting and re-entering the passenger seat of the stolen vehicle. 

FAC ¶¶ 33, 36, 37, 44. This information was “not merely material 

but strongly indicative of the plaintiff’s innocence.” Tatum, 

768 at 820 (emphasis in original). Just as in Tatum, the 

relevant charges were dismissed quickly after the information 

contained in the McCullough Report was brought to the attention 

of the prosecutor. FAC ¶ 57; Tatum, 768 at 820 (noting that, 

“with minimal further investigation, the evidence prompted the 

prosecutor to drop all charges against Walker and led the judge 

to declare Walker factually innocent”). Although it was 

ultimately Plaintiff’s private investigator who brought the 

information to the prosecutor’s attention, the information was 

largely the same as that contained in the McCullough Report, and 

the eventual dismissal of the vehicle-related charges supports 

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Plaintiff’s argument that the report was strongly exculpatory. 

As County Defendants acknowledge, the second Tatum factor “weighs 

in [Plaintiff’s] favor.” Mot. at 10.

Before moving to the third Tatum element, the Court briefly 

notes that Plaintiff was not immediately released from custody 

upon the dismissal of the vehicle-related counts. These counts 

were dismissed on March 17, 2014, but Plaintiff remained in 

custody for approximately one additional month, on the bookingrelated charges. FAC ¶¶ 57-58. Plaintiff alleges that, on April 

1, 2014, he “persuaded Sargeant [sic] Baulkin at the Tehama 

County Jail to look at the booking video,” which disproved 

allegations that the booking officer “found the baggie of meth in 

the jacket pocket.” FAC ¶ 59. (The video shows he was not 

wearing a jacket.) FAC ¶ 59. Finally, on April 21, 2014, the 

booking-related counts were dismissed and Plaintiff was released 

from custody. FAC ¶ 60. At this early stage in the litigation, 

it is simply too early to determine whether the dismissal of the 

vehicle-related charges had a “domino effect,” making it easier 

for Plaintiff to access the booking video and ultimately be 

released from custody. What is clear from the face of the FAC is 

that between January 2, 2014 (when Plaintiff was taken into 

custody) and March 12, 2014 (when the exculpatory information 

finally made its way to the prosecutor) Plaintiff was largely 

ignored by those that had placed him in custody. After this 

date, events unfolded quickly and Plaintiff was released within a 

matter of weeks. The question of whether Defendant McCullough’s 

failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence “caused” Plaintiff’s 

prolonged pretrial detention may well become a question for the 

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jury; at the very least, it is an issue that is better addressed 

at the summary judgment stage, after full discovery has been 

conducted. 

As to the third Tatum element, the Ninth Circuit noted that, 

“[i]n the context of a § 1983 suit against police officers for a 

due process violation, official conduct violates due process only 

when it shocks the conscience, a standard satisfied in 

circumstances such as these by conduct that either consciously or 

through complete indifference disregards the risk of an 

unjustified deprivation of liberty.” Tatum, 768 at 820-821 

(citations omitted). In this case, as in Tatum, “the decision 

whether to disclose or withhold exculpatory evidence is a 

situation in which actual deliberation is practical, such that 

deliberate indifference to individual rights – rather than intent 

to injure – is enough. Id. at 821 (citations omitted). In 

Tatum, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the issue of an 

individual officer’s mens rea is generally a question for the 

jury. Id. at 821 (noting that “[t]he jury’s determination that 

[the individual officer defendants] acted with deliberate 

indifference or reckless disregard for Walker’s rights . . . 

satisfies the standard applicable to violations of due process”). 

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant McCullough acted with either 

“deliberate indifference . . . [by making] a conscious choice to 

disregard the consequences” of his acts, or with “reckless 

disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and the truth, either by a 

complete indifference to his rights or acting in the face of a 

perceived risk that their actions would violate Plaintiff’s 

rights under federal law.” FAC ¶ 65. These allegations are 

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sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and the third Tatum

“limitation” does not bar Plaintiff’s substantive due process 

claim against Defendant McCullough.

Under the three-prong Tatum inquiry, Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to show that Defendant McCullough’s conduct 

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. However, because 

Defendant McCullough has asserted a defense of qualified 

immunity, the Court must next consider whether the constitutional 

right in question was “clearly established” at the time of the 

violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Plaintiff 

appears to argue that it has long been “clearly established” that 

a criminal defendant’s “due process rights are implicated [when] 

the state withholds exculpatory evidence from the defense.” Opp. 

at 6 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This 

characterization of the right at issue is too broad, especially 

given the fact that Brady concerns post-conviction, not pretrial, 

confinement. See Fontana v. Alpine Cnty., 2011 WL 676922, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that “plaintiffs who prevail in 

an underlying criminal action have no Brady-related due process 

claims under § 1983”). As County Defendants correctly note, the 

inquiry into whether a right is clearly established “must be 

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 

broad general proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 

198 (2004). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot rely on the Ninth 

Circuit’s ruling in Tatum, as that opinion was filed on September 

17, 2014, six to eight months after the alleged violation 

occurred. 

Nevertheless, well before the time of the alleged violation, 

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the Ninth Circuit had clearly established the “constitutional 

right to be free from continued [pretrial] detention after it was 

or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to 

release.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th 

Cir. 2001). This right is stated in a sufficiently narrow 

manner, and, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant 

McCullough’s conduct violated this clearly established right. 

Despite County Defendants’ attempt to muddy the waters, this is 

not a complicated case: if Plaintiff’s allegations are correct, 

Defendant McCullough learned that Plaintiff was most likely not 

the driver of the stolen vehicle on January 8, 2014, and sat on 

this information, while Plaintiff languished in Tehama County 

Jail. The right to be free from continued pretrial detention, 

after it is known the detention is unjustified, is clearly 

established, both in Ninth Circuit case law and in basic 

principles of common humanity. At the motion to dismiss stage, 

Defendant McCullough is not entitled to the defense of qualified 

immunity on Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim.

County Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Tatum on the 

grounds that Defendant McCullough did not affirmatively 

misrepresent facts to the prosecutor – is unpersuasive. County 

Mot. at 11. In Tatum, the investigating officers did 

affirmatively misrepresent the fact that the string of similar 

robberies had ended. Tatum, 768 at 817. However, by 

incorporating “failure to disclose highly significant exculpatory 

evidence to prosecutors” into its ultimate three-part inquiry, 

the Ninth Circuit indicated that this fact was not integral to 

its ruling. Id. at 819. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

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McCullough did precisely that. Under Tatum, it is immaterial 

whether Defendant McCullough affirmatively told the prosecutor 

that he had confirmed that Plaintiff was the driver of the stolen 

vehicle, or merely failed to disclose the information he had 

learned that proved the contrary. Either is sufficient to 

establish that he violated Plaintiff’s rights.

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s waiver of his right 

to a preliminary hearing bars his substantive due process claim. 

County Mot. at 10. However, as noted above, Plaintiff's waiver 

of the preliminary hearing bars his procedural due process claim, 

but not his substantive due process claim. In Tatum, the Ninth 

Circuit noted that due process claims based on prolonged pretrial 

detention generally “fall into at least one of the two 

categories: (1) the circumstances indicated to the defendants 

that further investigation was warranted, or (2) the defendants 

denied the plaintiff access to the courts for an extended period 

of time.” Tatum, 768 at 816. The Court went on to characterize 

Walker’s claim as a “variant of the first of those two 

categories,” noting that the officers’ “silence in the face of 

compelling exculpatory evidence breached their duty of disclosure 

to authorities competent to act on the information.” Id. at 816. 

In light of this bifurcated approach, a plaintiff need not allege 

that he was denied “access to the courts for an extended period 

of time” while being detained pre-trial. Rather, a separate and 

cognizable due process claim can be stated by alleging that 

investigating officers withheld compelling exculpatory evidence. 

Thus, the availability (and waiver) of a preliminary hearing in 

this case is immaterial as to the substantive due process claim; 

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Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant McCullough failed to 

promptly inform the prosecutor of the exculpatory information he 

obtained in his investigation are sufficient to establish a 

substantive due process claim. 

Finally, to the extent that County Defendants invoke the 

doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity on Defendant McCullough’s 

behalf, this argument is misplaced. County Mot. at 5. In this 

context, quasi-judicial immunity applies to ministerial officers, 

such as jailors or prison officials, who carry out a court order 

of confinement. Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 2013); Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 391 

(9th Cir. 2014). Unlike a ministerial prison official, Defendant 

McCullough had a duty to investigate the facts underlying the 

court’s order of confinement. It is the breach of this duty 

which supports Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, and the 

doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity is inapplicable.

For all of these reasons, County Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action, brought pursuant to 

§ 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, is DENIED, insofar as Plaintiff states a substantive 

due process claim against Defendant McCullough.

b. Second Cause of Action - § 1983 (Fourteenth 

Amendment – Due Process Clause) against 

Defendant County

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s second cause of 

action, brought pursuant to § 1983 and alleging that Defendant 

County violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to 

sufficiently allege his Monell claim. County Mot. at 13. 

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Specifically, County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s 

“conclusory and formulaic allegations that a policy, custom or 

practice exists, without more, [are] insufficient” to satisfy the 

requirements of Monell. County Mot. at 13. Plaintiff maintains 

that the allegations are not conclusory and argues further that, 

even if they were, conclusory allegations as to a municipal 

policy are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Opp. to 

County at 9-10 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)).

Although a municipality can be sued under § 1983, “it cannot 

be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the 

constitutional injury.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166. 

Accordingly, to state a claim for municipal liability under 

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that an official policy or 

custom existed; (2) that the plaintiff suffered constitutional 

injury; and (3) the existence of a causal link between the 

policy/custom and the plaintiff’s injury. Id. Moreover, each of 

these elements must be alleged with “sufficient particularity” 

and general or conclusory allegations will not suffice. See, 

e.g., Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 

1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a Monell

claim, on the grounds that “the complaint did not allege a 

deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity”); see 

also, Hass v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2014 WL 1616440, 

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss where 

one element of Monell claim was alleged in conclusory manner).

In support of his second cause of action, Plaintiff makes 

the following allegations:

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70. The actions described above committed by 

Defendants J.J. Fisher and Ed McCullough either 

(1) flowed from an explicitly adopted or a tacitly 

authorized municipal policy of Defendants California 

Highway Patrol and the Tehama County Sheriff’s 

Department; (2) implemented or executed a policy, 

statement, ordinance, regulation or decision 

officially adopted or promulgated by those entity 

Defendants; or (3) were pursuant to a custom of said 

entity Defendants.

FAC ¶ 70.

In support of his eighth cause of action (which, as 

discussed below, is not viable as a stand-alone § 1983 claim 

because it fails to name a specific constitutional right that has 

been violated, but nevertheless contains allegations which can 

support Plaintiff’s other Monell claims), Plaintiff makes the 

following allegations:

96. Both before and after January 2, 2014, the Tehama 

County Sheriff’s Department tolerated, permitted, 

failed to correct, and exonerated practices on the 

part of their deputies including Deputy McCullough and 

others in their unjustified, unreasonable, 

unconstitutional, and illegal uses of police protocol 

resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s, and other 

persons similarly situated, constitutional rights, 

especially their liberty rights, as hereinabove 

described.

97. Defendant Tehama County Sheriff’s Department took 

no steps to appropriately discipline, remediate, 

counsel, retrain or terminate the employment of, or 

otherwise correct the officers and employees with 

regard to the safe an[d] appropriate use of police 

procedures regarding traffic stops, arrests, and 

detentions. As a result, the Tehama County Sheriff’s 

Department, under color of law, approved or ratified 

such conduct, and maintained the custom and practice 

of deliberate indifference to unjustified, 

unreasonable, and illegal deprivation of 

constitutional rights and other forms of 

unconstitutional conduct.

FAC ¶¶ 96-97.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, these allegations are 

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conclusory. Although Plaintiff uses Monell buzzwords, such 

as “policy” and “custom,” he supplies no supporting factual 

allegations whatsoever. Conspicuously absent from the FAC 

are any detailed allegations as to the specific policy or 

custom that Defendant County implemented or allowed to 

exist, or how exactly Defendant County’s training program 

was constitutionally deficient. In the absence of 

supporting factual allegations, Plaintiff’s Monell claim for 

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment is not viable. See Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247

(approving the dismissal of a Monell claim, on the grounds 

that “the complaint did not allege a deliberate County 

policy with sufficient particularity”). 

Leatherman, cited by Plaintiff, merely holds that a 

“heightened pleading standard” – akin to that applied to 

claims grounded in fraud, pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – does not apply to Monell

claims. This does not contradict the requirement that a 

plaintiff plead a municipal policy in a non-conclusory 

manner, and, to the extent it does, Leatherman was overruled 

by the Supreme Court’s subsequent rulings in Twombly and 

Iqbal. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

Accordingly, County Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action, brought pursuant to § 1983 

for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as Plaintiff 

has attempted to state a Monell claim against Defendant County.

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c. Third and Fourth Causes of Action - § 1983 

(Fifth Amendment) against Defendant 

McCullough and Defendant County

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, 

which allege a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, must be dismissed because claims for unconstitutional 

pretrial detention are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment 

alone. County Mot. at 7. Plaintiff does not respond to this 

argument. Because “post-arrest incarceration is analyzed under 

the Fourteenth Amendment alone,” County Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent these causes of action are 

brought against Defendant McCullough or Defendant County. Rivera 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389-90 (9th Cir.).

d. Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action - § 1983 

(Eighth Amendment) against Defendant 

McCullough and Defendant County

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, 

which allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment, must be 

dismissed because the Eighth Amendment only protects those who 

have been convicted of a criminal offense. County Mot. at 7. 

Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. Because “[c]laims 

by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment,” 

County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth 

causes of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent 

these causes of action are brought against Defendant McCullough 

or Defendant County. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th 

Cir. 1998).

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e. Eighth Cause of Action - § 1983 – against 

Defendant County

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s eighth cause of 

action must be dismissed because it is brought pursuant to § 1983 

but is “not based on any identifiable constitutional or statutory 

provision, and thus is without legal foundation.” County Mot. at 

13. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. It is wellestablished that “Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating 

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Tatum, 768 F.3d at 814. 

Without naming a specific constitutional right that has been 

violated, Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action cannot stand on its 

own, and County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s eighth 

cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. However, the 

allegations contained therein – which roughly take the shape of a 

“failure to train” Monell claim – can be (and were) considered 

with regard to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Monell claim, 

alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

f. Ninth Cause of Action – Intentional 

Withholding of Evidence – against Defendant 

McCullough

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ninth cause of 

action for intentional withholding of evidence must be dismissed 

because Defendant McCullough is immune under California 

Government Code § 821.6. County Mot. at 15. Plaintiff responds 

that Defendant McCullough is not immune under § 821.6 because he 

was not “instituting or prosecuting” a judicial proceeding. Opp. 

to County at 13.

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Section 821.6 of the California Government Code provides 

that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his 

instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative 

proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts 

maliciously and without probable cause.” As noted by one 

California court, “the provision encompasses conduct during an 

ongoing prosecution and not solely that leading up to the 

institution of a prosecution.” Randle v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 456 (Ct. App. 1986). Accordingly, 

public employees are entitled to immunity under § 821.6 for “the 

suppression of evidence . . . by the [investigating] police 

officer in failing to bring the report to the prosecutor’s 

attention[.]” Randle, 186 Cal.App.3d at 457. As this is exactly 

what Plaintiff alleges Defendant McCullough did, County 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action 

is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

g. Eleventh Cause of Action – NIED – against 

Defendant McCullough

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of 

action for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be 

dismissed because Defendant McCullough is immune under California 

Government Code § 821.6. County Mot. at 15. Plaintiff responds 

that the “injuries caused by [Defendant McCullough] were not from 

‘instituting or prosecuting’” a judicial proceeding within the 

meaning of §821.6. Opp. to County at 13.

As noted above, § 821.6 of the California Government Code 

immunizes public employees from suits for injuries caused by the 

employee's “instituting or prosecuting” a judicial or 

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administrative proceeding. Randle, 186 Cal.App.3d at 456. One 

California court has noted that “[a]n investigation before the 

institution of a judicial proceeding is part of the prosecution 

of a judicial proceeding for purposes of the statute[.]” Gillan 

v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048 (2007), as 

modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 21, 2007). Moreover, immunity 

under § 821.6 “extends to other causes of action arising from 

conduct protected under the statute, including . . . intentional 

infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 1048. As Defendant 

McCullough’s investigation is the source of Plaintiff’s claim for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, he is entitled to 

immunity under § 821.6. County Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND, insofar as the claim is brought against Defendant 

McCullough.

h. Twelfth Cause of Action – False Imprisonment 

– against Defendant McCullough and Defendant 

County

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of 

action for false imprisonment must be dismissed because County 

Defendants were “entitled to rely on CHP Officer Fischer’s 

facially-valid probable cause declaration to detain Gardner in 

jail” until his arraignment and, after Plaintiff’s arraignment, 

he “was held in jail pursuant to a court order requiring bail for 

release, and was promptly released after the charges were 

dismissed.” County Mot. at 14. County Defendants cite 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 262.1 and California Penal 

Code § 847(b) in support of their argument. Plaintiff responds 

that these statutes only pertain to “peace officers making an 

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arrest,” and argue that “Plaintiff’s claims are based on 

McCullough’s investigatory actions, not any alleged ‘arrest’ of 

Plaintiff by this defendant.” Opp. to County at 12.

Under California law, false imprisonment is the “unlawful 

violation of the personal liberty of another, the interference 

being absolutely unlawful and without color of legal authority.” 

Novoa v. Cnty. of Ventura, 133 Cal.App.3d 137, 142 (Ct. App. 

1982). In relevant part, California Penal Code § 847(b) provides 

immunity to “any peace officer . . . [for] false imprisonment 

arising out of any arrest [if] the arrest was lawful, or the 

peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to 

believe the arrest was lawful.” Section 262.1 of the California 

Code of Civil Procedure provides that a “sheriff or other 

ministerial officer is justified in the execution of, and shall 

execute, all process and orders regular on their face and issued 

by competent authority, whatever may be the defect in the 

proceedings upon which they were issued.” 

Prior to Plaintiff’s arraignment, County Defendants could 

reasonably rely on the probable cause declaration submitted by 

Defendant Fischer, which appeared valid on its face. CDRJN, Ex. 

A. As a jailer is only “liable for false imprisonment if he knew 

or should have known of the illegality of the imprisonment,” 

County Defendants are entitled to immunity for the time Plaintiff 

spent in custody until his arraignment. Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 717-18, (1974); see also, Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 847(b) (quoted above). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this 

short-term, pre-arraignment detention did arise from Plaintiff’s 

arrest.

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After Plaintiff’s arraignment, the Tehama County Superior 

Court ordered Plaintiff held on $315,000 bail. FAC ¶ 43. 

Accordingly, as Plaintiff did not make this payment, County 

Defendants were entitled to execute this court order by 

continuing to detain Plaintiff. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 262.1. 

Plaintiff does not provide any authority for his position 

that the protections of § 262.1 are limited to “peace officers 

making an arrest pursuant to process that is regular on its 

fac[e].” Opp. to County at 12. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 

applied § 262.1 to a sheriff executing an order of confinement, 

finding that immunity applied because the sheriff had no duty to 

investigate the facts underlying the order of confinement. 

Clemmons v. City of Long Beach, 283 F. App'x 487, 488 (9th Cir. 

2008). In light of the Tehama County Superior Court’s order that 

Plaintiff be detained, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for false 

imprisonment against the Sheriff or any other County officer with 

the authority to release Plaintiff.

Although Defendant McCullough certainly had a duty to 

investigate the facts underlying the order of confinement, 

Plaintiff has not – and cannot – allege that the deputy sheriff 

tasked with investigating the underlying charges had the 

authority to release him. Rather, Defendant McCullough’s duty 

was to turn over compelling exculpatory information to the 

prosecutor, and the alleged breach of this duty is appropriately 

raised in Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim. For this 

reason, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for false 

imprisonment against Defendant McCullough.

Although Defendant County can be held liable pursuant to 

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§ 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, on a theory of 

respondeat superior liability, such a claim must be supported by 

a valid state law claim against an individual County employee. 

As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant 

McCullough for false imprisonment, he has necessarily also failed 

to state a claim against Defendant County. Therefore, County 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action 

is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as the claim is 

brought against both Defendant County and Defendant McCullough. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, as to Defendants CHP and 

Fischer, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND State 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second, fourth, sixth, 

and seventh causes of action against Defendant CHP; DENIES State 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s tenth and eleventh 

causes of action against Defendant Fischer; GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND State Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s twelfth 

cause of action against Defendant CHP; 

As to Defendants Tehama County and McCullough, the Court 

DENIES County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first 

cause of action insofar as Plaintiff states a substantive due 

process claim against Defendant McCullough; GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second 

cause of action against Defendant County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third and 

fourth causes of action against Defendant McCullough and 

Defendant County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County 

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth causes 

of action against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County; 

GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action against Defendant 

County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action against Defendant 

McCullough; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action against 

Defendant McCullough; and GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action 

against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County. 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be filed within 

twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendants’

responsive pleadings are due within twenty (20) days thereafter. 

If Plaintiff elects not to file a Second Amended Complaint, the 

case will proceed consistent with this Order:

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2015

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