Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04636/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04636-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDGARDO M. RUIZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 02-4636 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California incarcerated at Mule Creek State

Prison, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the

reasons stated below, the petition is denied on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 1998, a jury convicted Petitioner of murder with a street gang

enhancement. The jury found that Petitioner committed the murder in the course of a

robbery and with the use of a firearm (Count One). Petitioner was also convicted of

robbery and attempted robbery (Counts Two and Three), as to which allegations of street

gang enhancements and firearm use were found true.

On December 18, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole for the murder, enhanced by four years for the firearm use. Prison terms were

imposed and stayed on Counts Two and Three.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in

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1 The facts in this section are derived from the opinion of the Court of Appeal

of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirming the judgment of the Superior

Court. See Answer, Ex. 6 (Oct. 24, 2000 Slip Op.).

2

an unpublished opinion filed October 24, 2000. The California Supreme Court denied

the petition for review on January 30, 2001.

On April 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Santa

Clara County Superior Court, which denied the petition on May 15, 2001. Petitioner

filed a renewed petition in the Superior Court, which denied the renewed petition on July

23, 2001. See Answer, Ex. 9. Petitioner unsuccessfully filed for habeas relief in the

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, which denied relief on

August 21, 2002. Id., Ex. 11.

On September 25, 2002, Petitioner timely filed the instant petition for writ of

habeas corpus. On March 24, 2003, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why a

writ should not issue. On June 13, 2003, Respondent filed an answer and supporting

documents (docket no. 10). On September 4, 2003, Petitioner filed a traverse (docket no.

19).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the commitment offenses are summarized as follows:1

These offenses occurred from July 1995 to October 1995 as part of a crime

spree by the Barrio Grande Terra (BGT) gang, a Norteno gang which included

[co-defendant Joseph Ryan] Hayes, Ruiz and Angel Sierra among its members.

Angel Sierra pleaded guilty to the second degree murder of Joshua

Hernandez, a number of robberies and a drive-by shooting, and to a street gang

enhancement. He is currently serving a sentence of 15 years to life in prison in

out-of-state confinement. Sierra, who the jury was advised was an accomplice as

a matter of law, testified in return for his plea and sentence. Ruiz confessed to the

attempted murder of David Browne (count three) and the robbery and murder of

Joshua Hernandez (counts one and two). Although Ruiz did not testify at trial, his

redacted confession was admitted.

Oct. 24, 2000 Slip Op. at 2.

//

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A. The July 28, 1995 Murder/Robbery

On July 28, 1995, Joshua Hernandez, Heath Liles, and David Browne went

to a San Jose bar, and on the way they stopped at an ATM where they each

withdrew some cash. At about 1:30 a.m., Browne and Hernandez began walking

back from the bar to Browne’s apartment at 633 South Eighth Street in San Jose. 

Liles, who had left the bar alone to go buy beer, testified that he believed both

Hernandez and Browne still had cash when they left the bar.

According to Browne, as they were walking back from the bar, they

noticed two young Hispanic males who were wearing beanie hats. As Browne

and Hernandez reached the foot of the stairs to Browne’s apartment, Browne

heard what sounded like two voices demanding money.

When Browne and Hernandez turned around, Browne saw two men, each

holding guns in their right hands, and each pointing the guns inches from Browne

and Hernandez’s heads. With his left hand, Browne struck at the wrist the

extended gun arm of the person in front of him. Browne used his right hand to

strike this person’s right elbow, and then Browne pushed the gunman. Browne

believed this person’s gun went off after Browne struck the person’s wrist. 

Immediately afterward, Browne also heard the other gunman’s revolver fire. The

gunmen then fled. Browne had not given them any money and he did not know if

Hernandez had done so.

After the gunman left, Browne saw that Hernandez was on the ground and

that he had been shot in the head. Browne called the police, and when they

arrived, Browne realized he had also been shot.

Eddie Wu, who lived nearby, testified that he heard someone in the alley

say “where is my money?” Afterwards, he heard two or maybe three gunshots. 

Wu looked out the window and saw someone using a cell phone and a man on the

ground.

Hernandez died from the gunshot wound to the head. The size of the

wound was consistent with a .22 caliber bullet. Officers examining the crime

scene found no secondary bullet strikes or bullet casings. Casings would be

ejected from a semiautomatic but not a revolver. The absence of casings could be

because the casing was lodged in the shooter’s clothing, stuck to the foot of

arriving emergency personnel, or jammed in the gun. There were athletic shoe

footprints in the dirt by Hernandez’s body. Hernandez was found with a pager,

ATM card, and identification but no cash.

Id. at 2-4.

B. Petitioner’s Statement to Police

In September 1995, police received an anonymous tip that Ruiz was

involved in Hernandez’s murder. Officer Donald Moore went to visit Ruiz in

juvenile hall on October 3, 1995.

While interviewing Ruiz, Moore asked Ruiz where he had been the night

of July 28, 1995. Ruiz stated that he knew exactly where he had been. Moore

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asked Ruiz if Browne would select him from a photo lineup. In response, Ruiz

stated “What’s in it for me?” Moore then gave Ruiz the Miranda warnings and

took an untaped statement. The jury was admonished that the statement could

only be considered against Ruiz, and not Hayes.

Ruiz stated that he shot Hernandez and said he did not mean to. Ruiz

started crying. He said that he had gone to the Santa Clara County Fair, then had

gone downtown with Angel Sierra. They saw Browne and Hernandez and talked

about robbing them. Although initially reluctant to participate, Ruiz ultimately

agreed. Ruiz had a .22 revolver and Sierra had a .380 automatic. After following

the victims into the alley, Sierra yelled “Stay there” and “Give me your money” or

“Give me your shit.” Sierra grabbed Browne and both Sierra and Ruiz had their

guns drawn. Hernandez handed Ruiz $17. According to Ruiz, Browne and Sierra

were wrestling over Sierra’s gun. Ruiz put his gun in his left hand and tried to

pull Sierra away from Browne. When Ruiz did this, Sierra’s gun went off,

striking Browne. Browne then struck Ruiz’s left hand and Ruiz’s gun went off

and struck Hernandez in the head. Only two shots were fired. After fleeing the

scene, Ruiz saw that Sierra’s gun had jammed and the bullet casing was stuck in

the gun’s ejection port.

Ruiz said he was a member of the BGT gang.

Ruiz was arrested that night and he showed Moore Sierra’s residence. 

Moore reinterviewed Ruiz that night, and obtained a taped statement redacted and

played for the jury. This statement was essentially the same as the first statement

as to the robbery and murder of Hernandez.

Ruiz also supplied additional information. He said that Sierra called him a

punk and tried to embarrass him into participating in the Hernandez robbery and

murder. He also briefly mentioned a 7-11 robbery and the use of masks. He said

that the .380 semiautomatic was later taken from Sierra at gunpoint.

On October 4, 1995, police searched Sierra’s apartment. A search of the

closet revealed Nike shoes with a sole design similar to that left at the murder

scene. Also found were a case for a handgun, .380 caliber ammunition in a box, a

ring stolen in a different robbery, some marijuana, and a letter written to Sierra. 

Ruiz’s thumbprint was on the ammunition box.

Gun expert Edward Peterson said the bullet recovered from Hernandez’s

brain was likely from a .22 long rifle but could have been a .22 short. Peterson

stated that Browne’s shirt hole was not made by a .22 or .25 bullet and probably

not a .32 either. He stated it could have been made by a .380 bullet or a .38.

Id. at 4-5.

C. Testimony of Sierra

Sierra pleaded guilty to lesser crimes in return for testifying truthfully at

trial, getting a lower sentence, and receiving out of state housing. The jury was

instructed that Sierra was an accomplice to all of the crimes as a matter of law.

In his testimony, Sierra confirmed Hayes’s leadership of the BGT gang,

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and Ruiz’s membership. According to Sierra, Hayes was usually the driver during

the crimes.

Regarding the robbery and murder of Hernandez, Sierra testified that on

the night of July 28, 1995, he went to the Tower of Power concert at the County

Fair. He saw Hayes, Ruiz, Ruiz’s girlfriend and Hayes’ mother and her husband. 

Sierra left with Hayes and Ruiz. After dropping off his half-brother at his home,

Hayes brought two guns wrapped in black beanies to the vehicle. Hayes drove

and the trio cruised around. They saw Browne and Hernandez in the street and

spoke of robbing them. Hayes said he was the driver so Sierra and Ruiz should do

it. Ruiz did not want to go but Hayes repeated that he was the driver. Hayes did

not threaten Ruiz. Rather, Hayes, as leader of the BGT, asked Sierra and Ruiz to

commit the robbery and they agreed.

Hayes took out the guns and Sierra took the .380 semiautomatic and Ruiz

took the .22 revolver. Sierra said that the .380 was his but that Hayes sometimes

retained it. Sierra identified the pistol case found in his closet as the .380 case and

said he kept ammunition in the case.

After taking the guns, Ruiz and Sierra ran up to the victims and demanded

their money at gunpoint. Browne reached for Sierra’s gun, which was cocked. 

The gun fired but the shell stuck inside. Ruiz tried to stop Browne by pulling

Sierra away. Ruiz’s gun fired and Sierra and Ruiz fled.

The two ran to the truck, and Sierra threw the stuck bullet casing out the

window. They told Hayes what happened. Ruiz said he had obtained some

money, though not very much, and they divided it up three ways. They all agreed

not to speak about the crimes, and to say that they were at the concert. 

When he was dropped off at home, Sierra took both guns and the beanies. 

A few days later, Hayes took back the .22 revolver and the beanies.

Id. at 7-8.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

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the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413

(2000). Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Id. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court's decision can

involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the

governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a

new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-07), overruled in part on

other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S.

433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state court’s application of governing federal

law must be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent

to “incorrect” application of law). 

In deciding whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the

highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a reasoned decision.

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LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives

no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim, there is a somewhat different standard of

review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In

such a case, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's

decision was objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Bailey v. Newland,

263 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000). If the state court only considered state law, the federal court must ask whether

state law, as explained by the state court, is “contrary to” clearly established governing

federal law. See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).

DISCUSSION

I. DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SEVER

In Claim One, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to sever his case from that of codefendant Hayes. Petitioner argues that redactions to his

confession intended to protect Hayes’ rights impinged upon Petitioner’s right to present a

defense. This claim does not merit federal habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

A federal court may only grant a writ of habeas corpus where the trial court’s

failure to sever separate counts “results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his

Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8

(1986) (applying harmless error analysis to misjoinder of defendants). See also Grisby v.

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997). “There is no prejudicial constitutional

violation unless ‘the simultaneous trial of more than one offense ... actually render[ed]

Petitioner’s state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process.’”

Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Featherstone v.

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2 Petitioner’s jury nullification argument is further discussed in Section V. 

See infra p. 23.

8

Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 943 (2001). “This

prejudice is shown if the impermissible joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. Factors that may be considered in

determining whether joinder is unduly prejudicial include the joinder of other crimes

where the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible and the joinder of a ‘weak’

evidentiary case with a ‘strong’ one. See id.

B. Analysis

This Court looks to the analysis of the Court of Appeal in evaluating Petitioner’s

claim. LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.7. 

Portions of Petitioner’s confession to the police were redacted for trial in order to

protect his codefendant, Hayes. Petitioner argues that his redacted statement, as

presented to the jury, harmed him in two ways: (1) he was precluded from presenting a

defense of duress because some of the content of his confession was excluded, such as

the facts that Hayes and Sierra were initially going to commit the robbery, that Hayes

embarrassed Petitioner and made him go in Hayes’ place, and that Hayes provided the

gun; and (2) the redaction diminished Petitioner’s ability to show mitigating

circumstances in an effort to obtain jury nullification on the special circumstance

allegation.2 (Pet., 19-20.)

The California Court of Appeal considered and rejected both arguments, finding

that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the redaction:

Ruiz contends that the unredacted confession shows that Hayes and Sierra

called Ruiz a punk and tried to embarrass him into robbing Hernandez and

Browne. Not only does such peer pressure by fellow gang members fall far short

of the kind of threat of immediate harm and demand to commit the crime that is

necessary to constitute duress, most of this evidence actually was in the redacted

version. The redacted version shows that Ruiz stated that he had been called a

“punk.” Moreover, Officer Moore testified that Ruiz stated, in his first untaped

statement, that he was reluctant to commit the robberies. Ruiz points to nothing in

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his unredacted statement reflecting that either Sierra or Hayes threatened him with

immediate bodily harm if Ruiz did not commit the crimes.

Ruiz also claims the unredacted version showed that Hayes gave him the

gun while the redacted version deleted that fact, and therefore he claims the

redacted confession made it appear as if he were the source of the gun. However,

Sierra expressly testified that Hayes was the source of the gun, and this was a fact

that the prosecutor conceded.

Ruiz also claims a separate trial would have allowed him to testify because

he would not have been intimidated by the fact that Hayes was present, and would

not have been afraid that Hayes, as the gang leader, might seek retribution if Ruiz

chose to testify. The fact is, however, Ruiz could have testified but chose not to. 

Moreover, Hayes already knew that Ruiz had confessed so Ruiz’s status as an

individual who refused to talk and who chose to protect the gang was hardly

unblemished. Ruiz’s claim that he could have presented other witnesses or

evidence had he had a separate trial is too speculative to be meritorious. In short,

all of Ruiz’s contentions either fail to show how the redactions could have

prejudiced him, or fail to adequately demonstrate why evidence he claims he was

deprived of was not available to him in spite of the fact that the confession was

admitted.

(Oct. 24, 2000 Slip Op. at 16-17.)

Here, Petitioner has not shown that joinder of defendants resulted in a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Petitioner cites to

excluded portions of his confession indicating that Hayes gave him the gun used in the

crime. (Pet., 20 and n.18 (citing 9 Clerk’s Tr. 2569)). However, there was no

contradicting evidence suggesting that Petitioner owned the gun. Trial counsel argued in

closing that Petitioner “had no real power or say in the gang. There is no evidence that

he ever had possession or control over the gun except for the night in question, or he

could take that gun home or that he kept in any place or he would take it with him. It

wasn’t his gun. He didn’t have that kind of position in the gang.” (21 Rep. Tr. 4355) 

The Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner was able to assert a duress defense

and argue mitigating circumstances as well as he would have if the unredacted

confession had been admitted into evidence. Even the prosecutor acknowledged that

Petitioner took part in the crime because he was sent by Hayes as one of his soldiers. See

20 RT 4239. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the joinder. The

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state courts’ determination is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. This claim is therefore denied.

II. REFERENCES TO EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

In Claim Two, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

eliciting statements from Sergeant Moore that an anonymous caller claimed to have

overheard Petitioner bragging about a homicide and that Petitioner was on probation

when the charged crimes occurred. Prior to Moore’s testimony, the trial court had

ordered exclusion of evidence of the anonymous caller and of Petitioner’s probation. 

Petitioner does not demonstrate that Moore’s testimony created prejudicial error, and this

claim does not warrant federal habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct

renders a trial "fundamentally unfair." See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("the touchstone of due process

analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the

culpability of the prosecutor"). Under Darden, the first issue is whether the prosecutor’s

remarks were improper and, if so, whether they infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v.

Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). A prosecutorial misconduct claim is

decided “‘on the merits, examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the

prosecutor's remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.’” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1017 (1995). To prevail on a claim for habeas

relief based on trial error, the petitioner must establish that it resulted in “actual

prejudice,” that is, that the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)

(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

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The first factor in determining the prejudicial effects of misconduct is whether the

trial court issued a curative instruction. When a curative instruction is issued, a court

presumes that the jury has disregarded inadmissible evidence and that no due process

violation occurred. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987); Darden, 477 U.S.

at 182 (the Court condemned egregious, inflammatory comments by the prosecutor but

held that the trial was fair since curative actions were taken by the trial judge); Tan, 

413 F.3d at 1115 (“we presume jurors follow the court’s instructions absent

extraordinary circumstances”). This presumption may be overcome if there is an

"overwhelming probability" that the jury would be unable to disregard evidence and a

strong likelihood that the effect of the misconduct would be "devastating" to the

defendant. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8; Tan, 413 F.3d at 1115-16 (finding trial fair

where jury received instructions five different times to consider only the evidence

presented, and not its sympathy for the victim’s life story). 

Other factors which a court may take into account in determining whether

misconduct rises to a level of due process violation are: (1) the weight of evidence of

guilt, compare United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19 (1985) (finding "overwhelming"

evidence of guilt) with United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (in

light of prior hung jury and lack of curative instruction, new trial required after

prosecutor's reference to defendant's courtroom demeanor); (2) whether the misconduct

was isolated or part of an ongoing pattern, see Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th

Cir. 1987); (3) whether the misconduct relates to a critical part of the case, see Giglio v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (failure to disclose information showing

potential bias of witness especially significant because government's case rested on

credibility of that witness); and (4) whether a prosecutor's comment misstates or

manipulates the evidence, see Darden, 477 U.S. at 182.

//

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B. Analysis

In the absence of a reasoned explanation of the decision by a state court

addressing Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court denial of this claim

was objectively unreasonable. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

Petitioner challenges Sergeant Moore’s testimony about an anonymous phone call

identifying Petitioner “as bragging about a homicide.” (10 Rep. Tr. 1583-84.) The trial

judge sustained trial counsel’s objection and instructed the jury as to the limited use of

that hearsay testimony to explain Moore’s conduct thereafter. (10 Rep. Tr. 1584.) The

trial court took curative action and the error cannot be said to have so infected the trial

with unfairness as to deny Petitioner due process. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. 

Furthermore, the Court finds harmless any error in eliciting Moore’s testimony

that “I knew at one time that [Lee Chavez] had been Mr. Ruiz’s probation officer.” (10

Rep. Tr. 1586.) Trial counsel’s objection to the reference to Petitioner’s probation

officer was sustained, and the testimony was stricken from the record. (10 Rep. Tr.

1586-87.) Trial counsel argued in closing that Petitioner was an “unsophisticated

teenager” and that there was “no evidence of a prior or extensive juvenile record and no

evidence of other crimes that he participated in.” (21 Rep. Tr. 4354.) Petitioner does not

show that any further testimony of his probation was elicited at trial. In light of the

limited scope of the erroneous testimony, the trial court’s curative action in striking the

testimony, defense counsel’s closing argument denying any evidence of prior record, and

the eyewitness testimony and confession providing strong evidence of guilt, the error in

Moore’s testimony did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence on the

outcome of the trial, and was therefore harmless. 

The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. This claim is

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therefore denied.

III. DENIAL OF MOTIONS

In Claim Three, Petitioner challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for a

mistrial and denial of his request for an admissibility hearing pursuant to section 402 of

the California Evidence Code. Petitioner claims that the denial of the Section 402

hearing denied him the right to cross-examine a government witness. This claim does

not merit federal habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a

specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the

result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v.

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). In order to obtain federal habeas relief on the

basis of an evidentiary error, a petitioner must show that the error was one of

constitutional dimension and that it resulted in "actual prejudice." Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the

record demonstrates that the trial error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946)).

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases

the accused has the right to “be confronted with witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. The federal confrontation right applies to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). For purposes of federal

habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation Clause

is whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. 

See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir.) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637

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(1993)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 851 (2002). 

The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross

examination, not cross examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever

extent, the defense might wish. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per

curiam). The Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing

reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns of harassment, prejudice,

confusion of issues, witness safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally

relevant. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). To determine whether

a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has been violated by the

exclusion of evidence on cross-examination, a court must inquire whether: “(1) the

evidence was relevant; (2) there were other legitimate interests outweighing the

defendant’s interests in presenting the evidence; and (3) the exclusion of evidence left

the jury with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness.” United

States v. Beardslee, 197 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted), cert. denied,

530 U.S. 1277 (2000). See Bright v. Shimoda, 819 F.2d 227, 229-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (no

constitutional violation where substantial cross examination permitted and excluded

evidence was of collateral nature), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 970 (1988).

B. Analysis

The last reasoned state court opinion on the denial of Petitioner’s motion for

mistrial is that of the Santa Clara County Superior Court on state habeas review. This

Court therefore looks to that court’s analysis in evaluating Petitioner’s claim. LaJoie,

217 F.3d at 669 n.7. The Superior Court addressed the trial error claims as follows:

Regarding Petitioner's other claims dealing with misconduct of the trial

judge, Petitioner again fails to show prejudice. Petitioner argues that the denial of

his mistrial motion, based on the fact that evidence was admitted showing that

Petitioner was on probation, was improper and caused "great prejudice" to his

case. However, Petitioner does not show how, in light of his admitted confession

and the eyewitness testimony, the admission of his probation status prejudiced his

case. Regarding the denial of his 402 hearing, Petitioner has not even shown how

a conversation between Officer Moore and his Probation Officer Chavez is

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relevant to his case. Without establishing relevance, prejudice cannot be

discussed.

Answer, Ex. 9 (July 23, 2001 Slip Op. at 13.)

Petitioner challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial upon

Sergeant Moore's testimony about the anonymous caller's tip that Petitioner bragged

about a homicide and about Petitioner's probation officer. As discussed in Section II.B

in the context of Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, supra, those trial errors

were harmless and did not cause actual prejudice. 

Petitioner also challenges the trial court's denial of a hearing pursuant to

California Evidence Code section 402, out of the jury's presence, about the contents of

Moore's conversation with Probation Officer Chavez. (Pet., 40-43.) Upon requesting the

Section 402 hearing, defense counsel argued that she needed to determine whether

Moore and Chavez's conversation was an appropriate area for cross-examination,

particularly in light of Moore's testimony that they used to work together "in the gang

unit." See 10 Rep. Tr. 1586. Defense counsel argued that she had no information as to

the content of Moore's conversation with Chavez after Moore had testified to it, and

wanted to ask Moore three or four questions about that conversation. (11 Rep. Tr. 1601.)

Defense counsel argued that the content of the conversation was relevant in order for her

to make a tactical decision as to whether to cross-examine Moore and to cure the

testimony that Petitioner had been on probation. Id. at 1601-03. 

The trial court denied the Section 402 hearing and held that "whatever Sergeant

Moore told probation officer Chavez is not relevant to this case, and that motion is

denied." Id. at 1603. Petitioner contends that he was denied the opportunity to crossexamine Moore as to his prejudicial testimony about the Petitioner's probation and

comment about gangs. Petitioner has not shown, however, how his proposed crossexamination would have supported his defense or otherwise had a substantial effect or

influence on the outcome of the trial.

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Considering the extent that Petitioner was permitted to cross-examine Moore at

trial to enable the jury to assess the witness’s credibility, and the tangential nature of the

proposed cross-examination, the trial court did not violate Petitioner's right to crossexamine Moore by denying the Section 402 hearing. See Bright v. Shimoda, 819 F.2d at

229-30. Even assuming that the trial court erred in denying the Section 402 hearing, any

such error was harmless. The trial court found that Moore's comment about Petitioner's

probation officer was not prejudicial: "Probation officer Chavez testified here in court

that he was present. He's known to the jury as a probation officer." (11 Rep. Tr. 1601.) 

Furthermore, the trial court struck Moore's comment about Petitioner's probation officer

from the record. (10 Rep. Tr. 1586-87.) 

Similarly, any error in limiting cross-examination as to Moore's comment about

Officer Chavez's work in the gang unit is harmless and inconsequential in light of

witness testimony and Petitioner's own admission about his involvement with the BGT

gang. 

The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. This claim is

therefore denied. 

IV. MIRANDA CHALLENGE

In Claim Four, Petitioner contends that Sergeant Moore failed to inform him that

he had a right to have an attorney present during his October 3, 1995 statement at

juvenile hall and his tape-recorded statement taken later that day at the police station

following his arrest, in violation of the Fifth Amendment under Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). This claim does not merit federal habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

Miranda warnings must be clear and not susceptible to equivocation. United

States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 2002). They must provide

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“meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which they can

comprehend and on which they can knowingly act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted); see, e.g., id. at 387-89 (holding that Miranda warnings were

confusing and thus inadequate when they followed administrative warnings that

informed the suspect he did not have the right to government-appointed counsel). 

Although “language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive

these rights in a free and aware manner,” United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d

1412, 1415 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 836 (1985), a court must consider the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether there has been a voluntary waiver. 

United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 751-52 (9th Cir., 1986). A defendant’s

voluntary waiver of Miranda rights can be established, despite his limited English

proficiency, where “the evidence seems to indicate that he understood his rights and

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived them.” Id. at 752.

B. Analysis

The last reasoned state court opinion on Petitioner’s Miranda challenge is that of

the Santa Clara County Superior Court on state habeas review. This Court therefore

looks to that court’s analysis in evaluating Petitioner’s claim. LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669

n.7. Evidence of whether Petitioner received adequate Miranda warnings and whether

he voluntarily waived those rights was litigated pretrial at a suppression hearing on

August 11, 1998. See Answer, Ex. 2, 5 Rep. Tr. 223-67. The Superior Court

summarized the relevant evidence as follows:

Petitioner's confessions were obtained in the following manner. Officer

Donald Moore received an anonymous phone tip that Petitioner was involved in a

street robbery that ended in the murder of one victim and the wounding of another

on July 29, 1995. On October 3, 1995, at around 10 A.M., Officer Moore went to

juvenile hall to speak with Petitioner who was being held there on unrelated

criminal activity. Officer Moore approached Petitioner and asked where he was

on the date in question. Officer Moore then asked if one of the victims could pick

Petitioner out in a photo line up. In response, Petitioner asked what was "in it" for

him if he talked to Officer Moore. At this point, Officer Moore fully Mirandized

Petitioner. Petitioner stated that he was willing to talk. Officer Moore took notes

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of his subsequent interview with Petitioner, and, at the end, had Petitioner review

his notes and sign off on them. Petitioner confessed to his involvement in the

street robbery and claimed that, during a struggle, his gun went off accidentally,

killing one of the victims.

Later that same day, at approximately 7 P.M. Petitioner was released from

juvenile hall, and was immediately met by Officer Moore and Sargent [sic] Zarate

who arrested Petitioner and took him to the police station for an interview. 

According to Officer Moore, during the trip to the station house, Petitioner

repeatedly expressed a desire to make statements regarding his involvement in the

robbery and shootings, but Officer Moore told Petitioner to wait until they reached

the station house.

The second interview at the station house was tape recorded. At the start

of the interview, Officer Moore reminded Petitioner that he gave a statement

earlier that day and that the statement was given voluntarily after Officer Moore

informed him of his Miranda rights. Officer Moore did not issue fresh Miranda

warnings specifically for this second interview. Petitioner statements during this

second interview were essentially the same as the statement made earlier that day.

(July 23, 2001 Slip Op. at 3-4.)

1. Petitioner's First, Unrecorded Statement

Petitioner argues that even if Sergeant Moore read the Miranda warnings as he

claimed, reading from a card in a single sequence without stopping (5 Rep. Tr. 239-240),

Petitioner did not understand the Miranda warnings as indicated by the later recorded

statement showing that he failed to understand other, shorter statements. (Pet., 51.) 

Moore acknowledged at the suppression hearing that Petitioner was seventeen years old

at the time of the interview and spoke with a Puerto Rican accent, though not a heavy

accent. Id. at 240. Moore further testified that he needed to repeat some questions that

Petitioner didn't understand and wanted to have clarified, but that language was not the

problem. Id.

The Superior Court rejected Petitioner's claim that he was not Mirandized before

giving his first statement to Moore. See Pet., 50-52. The Superior Court found that

"Petitioner submits a transcript of his subsequent tape-recorded interview in which he

repeatedly acknowledges to Officer Moore that Petitioner received Miranda warnings

earlier in the morning." Id. at 5 (citing Clerk's Tr. 2724A-2725.) The evidence indicates

that, despite his accent, Petitioner understood his rights and voluntarily, knowingly and

intelligently waived them. See Bernard S., 795 F.2d at 752 (substantial evidence

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supported finding that seventeen year-old with limited English proficiency understood

and validly waived his Miranda rights).

2. Petitioner's Second, Tape-Recorded Statement

Petitioner also claims that at the second interview later that day, Moore failed to

warn Petitioner of his rights to the presence of an attorney during the interview and the

appointment of an attorney if he could not afford one. Moore testified that at the police

station, he asked Petitioner "if he remembered me reading the rights to him, and I even

mentioned a couple of the rights in referring to my notes. I asked him if he remembered

me telling him he had the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you

in a court of law, and he said yes, he remembered that." (5 Rep. Tr. 231.) Petitioner

argues that Moore failed to give him the complete Miranda warning.

The Superior Court rejected Petitioner's argument that this second interview,

conducted about nine hours after the first statement, was conducted in violation of his

Miranda rights, holding under state law that the issuance of the Miranda warnings at the

earlier interview were sufficient to allow intelligent waiver at the subsequent interview. 

(July 23, 2001 Slip Op. at 5.) The Superior Court held that the subsequent interview was

"reasonably contemporaneous" with the first, that both interviews were conducted by the

same officer, that Moore reminded Petitioner of his prior waiver, and that Petitioner was

apparently familiar with the criminal process given that he was being held at juvenile hall

on an unrelated crime at the time of the first statement. Id. at 6.

This evidence indicates that Petitioner voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently

waived his Miranda rights upon giving the second statement. See Bernard S., 795 F.2d

at 752. The nine-hour lapse of time between Petitioner's interviews did not render the

earlier Miranda warnings ineffective. "A rewarning is not required simply because there

is a break in questioning." Guam v. Dela Pena, 72 F.3d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1995) (new

Miranda warnings not required upon resumption of questioning fifteen hours after

Miranda warnings were given when defendant was not in custody) (citing United States

v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1312 (9th Cir. 1995)). The state courts’ rejection of this

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claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United

States Supreme Court authority. This claim is therefore denied. 

V. JURY INSTRUCTION

Petitioner claims that his rights were violated by the trial court’s use of the model

jury instruction CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which provides: 

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their

deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on

penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of

the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation. 

(14 Clerk’s Tr. 3646.)

Petitioner claims that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 interfered with his Sixth Amendment

right to trial by jury and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, in that it

violated his right to a unanimous verdict; “chilled” the jury’s deliberations; and infringed

his right to jury nullification. This claim does not merit federal habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must

show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974) ("'[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable,

erroneous or even "universally condemned," but that it violated some [constitutional

right].'") (citation omitted). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but

must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in the

context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488

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3 The Ninth Circuit also noted that the California Supreme Court has not

found that CALJIC 17.41.1 violated any established federal constitutional right, but,

using its supervisory authority over the lower state courts, has discontinued use of the

instruction because of its “potential” to intrude on jury deliberations. Brewer, 378 F.3d at

957 (citing People v. Engelman, 28 Cal. 4th 436 (2002)).

21

U.S. 861 (1988).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “no Supreme Court case establishes that an

instruction such as CALJIC No. 17.41.1 violates an existing constitutional right.” 

Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 814 (2004).3

B. Analysis

This Court looks to the analysis of the California Court of Appeal in evaluating

Petitioner’s claim. LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.7. That court rejected Petitioner’s

arguments that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 either implicated his right to a unanimous verdict,

chilled free discussion during jury deliberations, or interfered with the jurors’ power of

nullification. See Oct. 24, 2000 Slip Op. at 17-21.

Petitioner argues that the instruction violates his right to a unanimous verdict by

inviting majority jurors to exercise undue pressure on minority jurors against dissenting,

in that the instruction allows the majority of jurors who may be frustrated with a

dissenting juror to report him or her to the court for misconduct. Criminal defendants in

state court have no federal constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Apodaca v.

Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972) (rejecting 6th Amendment right to jury trial

challenge to 10-2 state jury verdict). However, as California guarantees a unanimous

verdict under the state constitution, an instruction which interferes with that right could

conceivably raise a ground cognizable in federal habeas corpus if the instruction

rendered the trial as a whole so unfair as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). However, petitioner’s

argument is without merit. The instruction only authorizes the jury to report a juror who

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is refusing to deliberate or to follow the instructions, not a juror who is simply dissenting

from the majority. If the jurors were to report a juror to the court for dissenting, the jury

would not be following the jury instruction as written, as they are presumed to do. See

Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997). Because the instruction does

not authorize a jury to report, or a court to admonish or remove, a juror on the basis of

dissent, it cannot be said to interfere with the unanimity of a jury verdict. 

Petitioner also argues that the instruction impedes the jury’s free and open

exchange of ideas because it authorizes reporting a juror for refusing to deliberate or

follow instructions. The rights to a jury trial and to due process require that jury

deliberations remain private and protected from intrusive inquiry. Tanner v. United

States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987). Under this principle, there may be no inquiry into the

subjective reasoning or mental processes of jurors. Id. at 121; United States v.

Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999). In evaluating whether an ailing instruction is

unconstitutional, the court inquires whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the

jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72 & n.4. 

There is not a reasonable likelihood that this instruction would cause jurors to

report the internal mental processes or subjective reasoning of a juror. The instruction

merely authorizes the jurors to report either a juror’s refusal to deliberate, which is their

conduct and not their mental reasoning, or their expressed intention not to follow

instructions or to disregard the law, which is also not their internal subjective reasoning. 

Moreover, the instruction does not authorize reporting of every word or idea exchanged

by the jury, only those which violate the instructions or the law. As such, the instruction

helps the proper functioning of the jury by enabling the trial court to investigate jury

misconduct if necessary. There is not a reasonable likelihood that CALJIC No. 17.41.1

interfered with the private exchange of ideas among the jurors during deliberations. 

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As for Petitioner’s juror nullification argument, juror nullification is not a right

under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Brewer, 378 F.3d at 956

(“[n]or has the Supreme Court found a constitutional violation in removing jurors who

are unwilling or unable to follow the trial court’s instructions”) (citing Morgan v.

Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 730 (1992)). Jury nullification refers to the power of jurors to

ignore the law or facts and acquit a defendant. Although jurors have the power to engage

in nullification, they do not have a right to do so. Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076,

2005 WL 2649443 at *2 (9th Cir., Oct. 18, 2005). Indeed, nullification is contrary to the

duty of jurors to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find

them to be. Id. The courts do not have a duty to ensure the free exercise of this power. 

Id. Although courts have no means to undo nullification after the verdict of acquittal has

been made, they have the duty to forestall or prevent such conduct by firm instruction,

admonition or "where it does not interfere with guaranteed rights or the need to protect

the secrecy of jury deliberations, . . . by dismissal of an offending juror from the venire

or the jury." Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Any instruction that arguably impeded this non-existent right did not violate the

Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, so the purported violation cannot

support habeas relief.

Even if the instruction were erroneous, the error in this case was harmless under

the Brecht standard. The California Court of Appeal noted that “Appellant cites no

evidence suggesting that the instruction had an untoward effect on any juror, impaired

the jury deliberations, or had any effect on the jury’s verdict. In this regard, the record

does not disclose that the jury was ever deadlocked or that there were holdout jurors or

that a juror was accused of refusing to deliberate or follow. Thus, there is no basis to

support a finding that the instruction was prejudicial.” (Oct. 24, 2000 Slip Op. at 20-21.) 

The Court of Appeal thus held that any error in giving the instruction did not result in

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actual prejudice. Id. The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority.

See Brewer, 378 F.3d at 955-56. This claim is therefore denied.

VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL

A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal

defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391- 405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). In order to

prevail on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, therefore, it must be

established that counsel's performance was deficient, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88,

and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel's unprofessional

errors, the appeal would have prevailed. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). 

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous

issue requested by a criminal defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54

(1983); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller, 882 F.2d at

1434 n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Consequently,

appellate counsel ordinarily meets an objective standard of competence and causes his

client no prejudice where he declines to raise a weak issue. See id.

B. Analysis

The last reasoned state court opinion on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim is that of the Santa Clara County Superior Court. This Court

therefore looks to that court’s analysis in evaluating Petitioner’s claim. LaJoie, 217 F.3d

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at 669 n.7. 

Petitioner claims that appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal the issues in his

habeas petition, namely, the prosecutorial misconduct challenges in Claim Two, the

judicial error challenges in Claim Three, and the Miranda challenge in Claim Four. The

Superior Court held that Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice as to any of his

claims. (July 23, 2001 Slip Op. at 14-15.) Here, even assuming that appellate counsel's

performance was deficient for failing to raise these claims on appeal, Petitioner has not

demonstrated a reasonable probability that any of those claims would have prevailed on

appeal. The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. See Brewer,

378 F.3d at 955-56. This claim is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 10, 2005

 

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

Case 3:02-cv-04636-JSW Document 22 Filed 11/10/05 Page 25 of 25