Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01064/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01064-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Carlos Rios, Civil No. 10cv1064 MMA (PCL)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Doc. No. 18)

v.

Matthew Cate et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Carlos Rios is proceeding pro se with a First Amended Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations under the American with Disabilities Act, the Equal Protection

Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Worker’s Compensation Act. (Doc.

5, at 4-8.) Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on the basis

that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff filed two

replies in opposition to Defendants’ motion. (Docs. 23 and 28.) For the reasons stated below,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (RJDCF), sued Defendants Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, George Neotti, Warden of RJDCF, Rex Gregory, prison

administrator, Junior Togurao, prison superintendent, J. Cabrera, prison supervisor, J. Keema, prison

supervisor, and one unnamed defendant. (Doc. 5, at 2-3.) He sued all defendants both in their

individual and official capacities. (Id. at 3.) He challenges the Prison Industry Authority’s

implementation of a policy that restricts employment opportunities and pay raises to those inmates

that have high school diplomas or general equivalency diplomas (GEDs). (Id. at 4.) Claiming that he

has a mental disability that prevents him from getting a pay raise, Plaintiff argues that Defendants

deliberately and recklessly disregarded his rights under the American with Disabilities Act. (Id. at 4-

6.) Plaintiff states that he used the inmate grievance process with the prison to make a disability

accommodation request and to complain about the unfair policy, but that Defendants’ failure to

process his grievances violated Plaintiff’s Due Process, Equal Protection, and Eighth Amendment

rights. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff also claims that the policy requiring a GED is cruel and unusual

punishment and inflicts mental distress and aggravates Plaintiff’s mental illness. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff

requests injunctive relief, damages including a retroactive pay raise, and punitive damages from

each defendant. (Id. at 10.) 

Plaintiff claims to have properly exhausted all available administrative remedies with the

prison. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss includes a letter from the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which stated that because prison inmates

“are not considered ‘employees’ as defined by the laws enforced by the EEOC” they would not

consider Plaintiff’s discrimination charge. (Doc. 28, at 8.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) expressly enumerates a list of six defenses that can be asserted in a

motion to dismiss, including for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Under 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable legal

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theory or for failure to state sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must assume the truth of all factual

allegations and construe them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis,

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, and

matters of which the court takes judicial notice. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9thCir. 2003). 

Additionally, the court may hypothesize facts, “consistent with the complaint, that would make out a

claim.” Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). However, legal

conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. 

Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, “[i]f the pleadings

establish facts compelling a decision one way, that is as good as if depositions and other expensively

obtained evidence on summary judgment establishes the identical facts.” Weisbuch v. County of Los

Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

1. Plaintiff Has Stated ADA claims against All Defendants in Their Official Capacities.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his rights under the American with

Disabilities Act (ADA) by denying him a pay raise for not having a GED, which he is unable to

obtain because he has a mental disability. (Doc. 5, at 4-6.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ADA

claims fall under Title I of the ADA and, as such, Plaintiff is required to file a timely charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 18-1, at 4.)

Defendants cite to the Ninth Circuit court case Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d

1169 (9th Cir. 1999), which states that Title I of the ADA applies specifically to employment

situations. Id. at 1176-78. Plaintiff, however, cites to the United States Supreme Court case

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998), which held that Title II of the

ADA applies to claims made by state prisoners. Id. at 209. Under Title II of the ADA, there is no

requirement to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC before exercising a private right of

action. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1172. 

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At first glance, it is not clear whether Plaintiff’s ADA claims should be analyzed under Title

I or Title II of the ADA. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual

with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,

the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title I applies to

governmental employers such as state prisons. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1172. Title II of the

ADA “prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability,

or excluding such an individual from participation in, or denying the individual the benefits of, any

of the entity’s services, programs, or activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to

inmate claims in state prisons when they concern the prison’s services, programs, or activities.

Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209. 

The Eastern District of California case of Bowen v. Trieber, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal.

2006), held that Title I and not Title II applies to inmate claims of employment discrimination

within the prison system because only Title I applies to employment situations. Id. at 1214-15.

However, while it is true that Title I and not Title II applies to employment situations, see

Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1172-73, this Court believes that the district court in Bowen wrongly held

that prison inmates working for the Prison Industry Authority are to be considered “employees”

under the ADA. Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss includes a letter from the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which stated that because prison inmates

“are not considered ‘employees’ as defined by the laws enforced by the EEOC” they would not

consider Plaintiff’s discrimination charge. (Doc. 28, at 8.) This evidence shows that Plaintiff’s ADA

claim should not be analyzed under Title I of the ADA. Moreover, one of main purposes of the

Prison Industry Authority according to the California Penal Code is “[t]o operate a work program

for prisoners.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801 (emphasis added). This evidence shows that Plaintiff’s

ADA claim regarding his job with the Prison Industry Authority, which by definition is a public

entity given the authority to run prison programs, should be analyzed under Title II of the ADA.

Thus, Plaintiff’s ADA claims will be considered under Title II of the ADA, which does not have an

exhaustion requirement with the EEOC. 

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To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is a qualified individual with

a disability, (2) who was denied the benefits of a program of a public entity, and (3) that such

discrimination was the result of the individual’s disability. Weinreich v. L.A. County Metropolitan

Transp. Authority, 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). Also under Title II, a plaintiff cannot sue an

individual defendant in his individual capacity but can request declaratory or injunctive relief

against a state official in his official capacity. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155-56 (9th Cir.

2002).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the opportunity for advancement into a preferential

job classification and was denied a pay raise due to his lack of having and inability of obtaining a

GED due to his mental disability. Plaintiff has sued all Defendants both in their individual and

official capacities. The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated ADA claims against all Defendants in

their official capacities but that his ADA claims against Defendants in their individual capacities

should be dismissed. Plaintiff is also not entitled to damages for his ADA claims but he may be

entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA

claims should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

2. Plaintiff Has Failed to State Equal Protection Claims against All Defendants.

Plaintiff states that he used the inmate grievance process with the prison to make a disability

accommodation request, but that Defendants’ failure to process his grievances violated Plaintiff’s

Equal Protection rights. (Doc. 5, at 6-7.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state an Equal

Protection claim because he did not plead that he was treated differently than other similarly situated

persons. (Doc. 18-1, at 5.) 

To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for a member of a protected class, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class and (2) that the defendant

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his membership in a

protected class. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998). A mental disability is

not a quasi-suspect classification. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,

442 (1985). Although disabled persons do not constitute a protected class, the Equal Protection

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Clause prohibits irrational and invidious discrimination against them. Dare v. California, 191 F.3d

1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, Plaintiff as a disabled person is not a member of a protected class. Plaintiff may

nonetheless establish a viable Equal Protection claim if he could show that he was intentionally

treated differently from other similarly situated individuals and that there was no rational basis for

the discriminatory treatment. However, Plaintiff fails to claim that he was treated differently from

other inmates when he asserts that his right to Equal Protection was violated. Thus, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claims should be GRANTED. 

3. Plaintiff Has Failed to State Due Process Claims against All Defendants. 

Plaintiff states that he used the inmate grievance process with the prison to make a disability

accommodation request, but that Defendants’ failure to process his grievances regarding the pay raise

violated Plaintiff’s Due Process rights. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Due Process rights have not

been violated. (Doc. 18-1, at 6.) 

A prison grievance is a procedural right only; it does not confer any substantive right protected

by the Due Process Clause. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison official’s

failure to process an inmate’s grievance does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the

procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.

1996). Here, Plaintiff alleging that Defendants’ violated his Due Process rights by failing to process his

grievances is not actionable under § 1983. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Due

Process claims against all Defendants should be GRANTED.

4. Plaintiff Has Failed to State Eighth Amendment Claims Against All Defendants. 

Plaintiff states that he used the inmate grievance process with the prison to make a disability

accommodation request, but that Defendants’ failure to process his grievances violated Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights. (Doc. 5, at 6-7.) Plaintiff also claims that the policy requiring a GED is cruel and

unusual punishment and inflicts mental distress and aggravates Plaintiff’s mental illness. (Id. at 8.)

Defendants argue that being denied a pay raise does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment under

the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 18-1, at 6.) 

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To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must set forth facts showing that the alleged

deprivation was “‘sufficiently serious’” enough to be considered “cruel and unusual punishment.”

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)). “‘[O]nly those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’” Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d

614, 623 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal citations and

quotations omitted)). 

Here, being deprived of a pay raise is not sufficiently serious enough to amount to cruel and

unusual punishment. As Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, Defendants’ motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against all Defendants should be GRANTED.

5. Plaintiff Has Failed to State Claims against All Defendants under Workers’ Compensation Act.

Plaintiff mentions in his First Amended Complaint that his rights under the Workers’

Compensation Act have been violated. (Doc. 5, at 8.) However, Plaintiff never explains what part of

the Act was violated or what set of facts support this allegation. As such, the Workers’ Compensation

claims against all Defendants should be dismissed and Defendants’ motion should be GRANTED on

this part.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends the following: (1) the ADA claims

against all Defendants in the individual capacities should be dismissed; (2) all Equal Protection

claims should be dismissed; (3) all Due Process claims should be dismissed; (4) all Eighth

Amendment claims should be dismissed; and (5) all Workers’ Compensation Act claims should be

dismissed. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Michael

Anello, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. Any written objections to this Report and

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Recommendation must be filed with the Court and a copy served on all parties on or before January

14, 2011. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before January 21, 2011. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of this Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 30, 2010

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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