Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01146/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 At the time of filing, Petitioner was confined in the Arizona State

Prison, South Unit, in Florence, Arizona. At this time it is not clear

that Petitioner remains confined. 

2 “Doc. No.” refers to documents in this Court’s file. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RAYMOND G. OCHOA,

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES L. RYAN, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-1146-PHX-GMS (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

On June 19, 2008, Petitioner, Raymond G. Ochoa, filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody1

, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. §

2254. (Doc. No. 1.)2

 The Court called for an answer to the Petition. (Doc. No. 4.)

On August 25, 2008, Respondents filed an Answer with Exhibits A through E

attached. (Doc. No. 7.) A Reply, including attached exhibits 1-9, was filed by Ochoa

on September 24, 2008. (Doc. No. 9.)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

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For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

On November 25, 2003, Ochoa was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement in

Maricopa County Superior Court, case# CR2003-017682, of attempted kidnapping

and sexual assault of a spouse. (Answer, Exs. B and C.) On January 5, 2004, Ochoa

was sentenced to a 6.5-year term of imprisonment and lifetime probation. (Answer,

Ex. D.) 

B. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On July 22, 2007, Ochoa filed his first notice of post-conviction relief,

claiming that the imposition of lifetime probation was unlawful and a violation of his

federal and state constitutional rights. (Answer, Ex. E.) On August 23, 2007, the trial

court dismissed the notice as untimely, finding that the notice and petition failed to

set forth and substantiate any exceptions to the timeliness requirements of

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). (Petition at 13.) Alternatively, the trial court found no merit

to Ochoa’s arguments that a sentence of lifetime probation constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment or violates defendant’s rights to due process or equal protection

of the laws. (Id at 13-14.) 

On May 9, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Ochoa’s petition for

review from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (Petition at 15.) 

C. Federal Habeas Petition and Amended Petitions

Ochoa filed his first petition for post-conviction relief in District Court on June

19, 2008. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner raises five grounds for relief. In Ground One, he

alleges that his First Amendment right to redress of grievances was violated by

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 24(c) and 32.9(c) and that lifetime probation

was illegally imposed. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment

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due process and double jeopardy rights were violated by imposing lifetime probation.

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of counsel was violated by appointment of a public defender who failed to

object to violations in application of sentencing guidelines. In Ground Four, he

alleges that his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual

punishment was violated by imposition of an illegal enhanced sentence of lifetime

probation. In Ground Five, he alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process

and equal protection amendment rights were violated by the state’s failure to correctly

apply sentencing guidelines and illegal enhancement of Petitioner’s sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Ochoa filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1).

The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute

of limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

An application contemplated by section 2244(d)(2) is properly filed "when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document,

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3 Although the Court recognizes that Respondents have raised an

argument that equitable tolling is no longer available, in view of the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bowles v.Russell, 127 S.Ct.

2360 (2007), the Court need not resolve that issue because Ochoa

does not satisfy the requirements for such tolling. 

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the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and

the requisite filing fee." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (footnote omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has held that untimely state post-conviction

petitions are not “properly filed” under AEDPA, and do not toll AEDPA's statute of

limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA's limitations period may be

equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 3

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997),

overruled, in part, on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly)

163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.1998). Tolling is appropriate when "extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time." Id.; see also, Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2002)(stating

that "the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir.2003). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir.1999). The extraordinary circumstances requirement is a "high hurdle," see

Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1289, and policy considerations counsel against

equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). A petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v.

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DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). Petitioner

must also establish a "causal connection" between the extraordinary circumstance and

his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d

1056, 1061 (9th Cir.2007).

C. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in

this Court is untimely. Ochoa had until one year after his conviction and sentence

became final to file his federal petition. 

1. Limitation Period Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were based upon a guilty plea, and thus,

under Arizona law, Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings were “of-right.”

See Rule 32.1, Az.R.Cr.P. Accordingly, AEDPA’s statute of limitations did not begin

to run until the conclusion of Petitioner’s Rule 32 “of-right” proceedings. See

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that “[b]ecause a

Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right

proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for

seeking such proceeding or review.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (stating that

a judgment becomes final at the later of either the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review). Petitioner's conviction and sentence

became final on April 4, 2004, ninety (90) days after the trial court sentenced Petition,

and Petitioner failed to file a notice of post-conviction relief. See Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P. (stating that defendant has 90 days after the entry of judgment and

sentence in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding to file a notice of post-conviction relief).

Although direct review is not normally complete until the time for filing a writ of

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has expired, see Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999), certiorari can only be sought following a decision or denial

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of discretionary review by the state court of last resort, i.e. the Arizona Supreme

Court. See SupCt.R.13. Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file his petition for

writ of habeas corpus within 1 year of the date his convictions became final, i.e., one

year from April 4, 2004, absent statutory tolling.

2. Statutory Tolling

The filing of the notice of petition for post-conviction relief did not toll the

limitations period because untimely pleadings summarily dismissed by the state courts

are not "properly filed" and do not result in statutory tolling of the 1-year statute of

limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that "[b]ecause the state court rejected

petitioner's PCR petition as untimely, it was not 'properly filed,' and he was not

entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)"). Additionally, the filing of the

second petition or subsequent pleadings could not restart the statute of limitations

because it had already lapsed. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003). Thus, the statute of limitations ran a total of 1537 days from April 4, 2004,

until Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 19, 2008.

Petitioner was required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 365 days,

excluding time where the statute of limitations was properly tolled. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). Thus, Petitioner did not file his federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus within the 1-year statute of limitations. Unless there is a basis for

equitably tolling the limitations period, Petitioner's habeas petition, filed on June 19,

2008, is untimely. This Court must recommend denial of Petitioner's petition for writ

of habeas corpus as untimely filed. 

3. Equitable tolling

Ochoa does not make a sufficient showing that there are “extraordinary

circumstances” that caused the untimely filing of his Petition. “A pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting

equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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Petitioner cites supplemental exhibits (to be provided) in support of this

assertion, but these supplemental exhibits were not provided. 

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Petitioner asserts that he was not advised of any procedural requirements pertaining

to the AEDPA at sentencing from state appointed counsel, or agents of the State, or

from the Arizona Department of Corrections, but discovered it through due diligence

and was informed of the rules in August of 2008.4

 (Doc. No. 9 at 12.) The Ninth

Circuit has indicated that a petitioner's inability to access information about the statute

of limitations deadline may warrant equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt, 233 F.3d

1146, 1148 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (remanding case to district court for development

of facts concerning whether AEDPA materials were unavailable in the prison law

library and the legal significance of such a finding). 

The record as submitted in this case, however, does not demonstrate that

Petitioner's ability to access the relevant limitations provisions of the AEDPA or other

necessary legal material was eliminated, rather, Petitioner seems to be asserting that

he was not advised of the information, or that it was not provided directly to him, but

not that he did not have access to the material, or that he was denied such material

after requesting it. Petitioner has not, at this time, sufficiently alleged that, due to

circumstances beyond his control it was impossible to file a petition on time.

Accordingly, this Court finds no cause for equitably tolling the limitations period in

this case. 

D. Procedural Default/Merits.

Because the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss this

petition as untimely, he does not reach the Petitioner's or Respondent’s alternate

arguments on procedural default or on the merits of this case. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, DISMISS this action in its entirety as untimely. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

A party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use

the following case number: CIV 08-1146-PHX-GMS.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 30th day of September, 2009.

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