Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520-1143/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH COLEMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GAVIN NEWSOM, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:90-cv-0520 KJM DB P

ORDER

Christopher Lipsey, Jr. (“Plaintiff Lipsey”), is a plaintiff/intervenor in this class action, 

which is now in the remedial phase. Before the court is Lipsey’s motion to compel defendant

Kathleen Allison (“Secretary Allison”), the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), to comply with requests for production of documents. This court 

held oral argument on the motion on September 3, 2021. Attorney Kate Falkenstien appeared for 

plaintiff. Deputies Attorney General Namrata Kotwani and Adriano Hrvatin appeared for 

Secretary Allison. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants in part and denies in part 

plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

Due to the rate of suicides and attempted suicides by California inmates, the court in this 

class action ordered CDCR to undertake suicide prevention and reduction programs supervised by 

the court’s Special Master. (ECF No. 1830 at 3.) In 2006, the court approved a CDCR directive 

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to prisons to conduct welfare checks every 30 minutes in the prisons’ administrative segregation 

units, including short term and long term restrictive housing units, psychiatric services units, 

Security Housing Units, and Condemned Housing Units (collectively “security housing units”). 

Starting in 2013, some California prisons implemented Guard One, an electronic 

monitoring system, in security housing units. In 2015, Chief Judge Mueller ordered the use of 

Guard One to track correctional officers’ compliance with the inmate welfare checks required in 

the security housing units with the goal of reducing inmate suicides. 

In 2020, Chief Judge Mueller permitted Plaintiff Lipsey to intervene in this action. (ECF 

No. 6487.) In his complaint in intervention, Plaintiff Lipsey alleges that defendants’ use of Guard 

One violates his Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of sleep. (ECF No. 6941.) In June 

2021, Chief Judge Mueller ruled that because Plaintiff Lipsey’s claim presents questions of fact 

directly relevant to the implementation of the remedial plan in this case, he may conduct 

discovery limited to the Eighth Amendment claim in his complaint in intervention. (ECF No. 

7191.) 

In June, Plaintiff Lipsey served requests for production of documents on Secretary

Allison. Secretary Allison objected to the eleven requests at issue on the grounds that they are 

overly broad and seek documents irrelevant to Plaintiff Lipsey’s Eighth Amendment claim.

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(ECF No. 7254-7.) On July 30, Lipsey filed the present motion to compel. (ECF No. 7254.) 

Secretary Allison filed an opposition (ECF No. 7280) and Plaintiff Lipsey filed a reply (ECF No. 

7287). 

1 Secretary Allison asserts other objections to some requests, such as vagueness, overbreadth, and 

protection through the attorney/client privilege. The first two objections are simply unexplained 

boilerplate that this court will not consider. See Ramirez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 

409 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“it is well-settled that all grounds for objection must be stated with 

specificity” (citing Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.1981)); Allianz Ins. Co. v. 

Surface Specialties, Inc., No. Civ.A.03–2470–CM–DJW, 2005 WL 44534, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 7, 

2005) (“The familiar litany of general objections, including overly broad, burdensome, or 

oppressive, will not alone constitute a successful objection [nor will it] . . . fulfill the objecting 

party's burden to explain its objections.”), cited in Ramirez, 231 F.R.D. at 409. With respect to 

the privilege objection, Plaintiff Lipsey states that the parties can address that issue if the 

Secretary chooses to assert it for any documents this court orders the Secretary to produce. (See

ECF No. 7254 at 9 n.2.) 

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MOTION TO COMPEL

Plaintiff Lipsey’s motion challenges Secretary Allison’s relevance objection to the eleven 

document requests. Plaintiff Lipsey propounded each of these requests to obtain information he 

contends is relevant to rebut any defense that the implementation and continued use of Guard One 

serves legitimate penological objectives. Secretary Allison argues the existence of a penological 

objective is not relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis of Plaintiff Lipsey’s claim. 

I. Legal Standards for Motion to Compel

Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party seeking discovery may 

move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(a)(3)(B). The court may order a party to provide further responses to an “evasive or 

incomplete disclosure, answer, or response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “District courts have 

‘broad discretion to manage discovery and to control the course of litigation under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 16.’” Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)).

The party moving to compel bears the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery 

requests are the subject of the motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed, (3) why 

the party believes the response is deficient, (4) why any objections are not justified, and (5) why 

the information sought through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action. McCoy v. 

Ramirez, No. 1:13-cv-1808-MJS (PC), 2016 WL 3196738, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2016); Ellis v. 

Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-5646-AWI-SMS PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). 

The purpose of discovery is to “remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can 

obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” United States v. Chapman

Univ., 245 F.R.D. 646, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted). Rule 26(b)(1) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers guidance on the scope of discovery permitted:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 

information that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and 

proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of 

the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 

parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 

the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 

the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 

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benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be 

admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

“Relevance for purposes of discovery is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of 

Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998). “The party seeking to compel discovery has the 

burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). 

Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be 

prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. 

Ochoa, No. 07cv200 JM (PCL), 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (internal 

citation omitted).

II. Discussion

A. Relevance Objection

Generally, Secretary Allison objects to the eleven requests at issue because each request 

“calls for the production of documents that exceed discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro., because it seeks documents that are not relevant to Lipsey’s claim. Specifically, this 

request seeks documents . . . not relevant to whether [Guard One] . . . caused sleep deprivation.” 

(See, e.g., ECF No. 7254-7 at 6.) Despite her argument that the penological objectives of Guard 

One are not relevant, the Secretary has refused to stipulate that defendants will not raise the issue. 

While this court recognizes the Secretary’s positions appear in conflict, Secretary Allison’s 

refusal to stipulate was part of the parties’ negotiations prior to this motion to compel. This court 

will not consider it in determining the relevance of the penological justification for Guard One. 

1. Applicable Legal Standards

Discovery meets the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) if it “is relevant to any 

parties’ claim or defense” or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence.” See United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 954 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘The relevance 

standard is applied more liberally in discovery than it is at trial.’” Hankey v. Home Depot USA, 

Inc., No. 2:19-cv-0413-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 3060399, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2020) (quoting N. 

Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. MultiPlan, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 

2018)).

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The Supreme Court has described the Eighth Amendment as “the constitutional limitation 

upon punishments: they cannot be ‘cruel and unusual.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-

46 (1981) 

Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, 

although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173, 96 S.Ct., 

at 2925, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, 

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 

L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 

U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). Among “unnecessary 

and wanton” inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without 

penological justification.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S., at 183, 

96 S.Ct., at 2929; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 

290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

Id. at 345-46 (footnote omitted). In the context of medical care, the Court noted that it has held 

conduct unconstitutional because it was “repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which 

are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 

society.’” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (citations omitted). 

An Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions requires a prisoner to “satisfy a 

two-part test. Grenning v. Miller–Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014). The objective part 

of the test requires a showing that “the defendants deprived the plaintiff of the ‘minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002)). The second part of the test is subjective. The prisoner must show “the defendants ‘acted 

with ‘deliberate indifference’ in doing so.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes “general rights against excess noise and prison conditions 

that deprive inmates of ‘identifiable human need[s],’ such as sleep.” Rico v. Ducart, 980 F.3d 

1292, 1298 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff Lipsey’s allegations, if proven, could 

meet the objective component of the Eighth Amendment test. 

The second, subjective, part of the Eighth Amendment test

requires a showing that the defendant knew of an excessive risk to 

inmate health or safety that the defendant deliberately ignored. 

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 734 (9th Cir. 2000). Whether an 

official possessed such knowledge “is a question of fact subject to 

demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 

circumstantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Knowledge of a risk of harm can be inferred where that risk is 

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“obvious,” but prison officials are not liable if they respond 

reasonably to the risk. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th 

Cir .2010).

Grenning, 729 F.3d at 1239. 

2. Are the Penological Objectives of Guard One Relevant to the Eighth 

Amendment Analysis?

The relevance question asks this: may defendants contend that Guard One serves a 

legitimate penological objective in defending against Lipsey’s Eighth Amendment claim? For the 

reasons set forth below, this court finds this penological objective issue may be relevant to the 

defense of Plaintiff Lipsey’s Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, discovery to gather evidence 

on that issue is appropriate. 

There is little case law directly addressing this relevance question. The Supreme Court’s 

decision in Turner v. Safly, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) provides some background to courts’ 

consideration of the issue. In Turner, the Court held generally that where a prison regulation 

“impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89. Specifically, the Court held that a prison’s 

limitation on inmate-to-inmate correspondence did not violate the First Amendment because the 

limitation was content neutral and because it was reasonably related to the legitimate interest of 

prison security and safety. The Court also examined a restriction on the right to marry. The 

Court held that the prison’s concerns of security and rehabilitation were not reasonably related to 

restrictions on that right. Id. at 99-100. 

In Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), the Court considered whether Turner’s 

reasonable relationship test should be applied to a claim that a prison regulation classifying 

prisoners by race violated prisoners’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. The 

Court held that strict scrutiny is the test for race-based prison regulations. In arriving at that 

conclusion, the Court discussed its past consideration of prison regulations. It noted that the 

reasonable relationship test was not used in Eighth Amendment cases. “Rather, the question in an 

Eighth Amendment case is whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s 

health and safety.” Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511-12 (citations omitted). “Mechanical deference to 

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the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment would reduce that 

provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 

F.2d 189, 193-194 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.), cited in Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511. Notably, the 

Court’s consideration of Eighth Amendment issues did not result in a holding that penological 

justifications are irrelevant to Eighth Amendment claims. Rather, the Court noted that such a 

justification would not, alone, defeat an Eighth Amendment claim. 

In 2014, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he precise role of legitimate penological interests 

is not entirely clear in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of 

confinement.” Grenning, 739 F.3d at 1240. The court examined Supreme Court precedent and 

found lack of clarity on the issue. The Ninth Circuit court also recognized that it had considered 

possible penological interests when ruling on Eighth Amendment issues in the past. 

The Supreme Court has written that the test of Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78 (1987), which requires only a reasonable relationship to a 

legitimate penological interest to justify prison regulations, does not 

apply to Eighth Amendment claims. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 

499, 511 (2005) (“[W]e have not used Turner to evaluate Eighth 

Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment in prison. We 

judge violations of that Amendment under the ‘deliberate 

indifference’ standard, rather than Turner's ‘reasonably related’ 

standard. This is because the integrity of the criminal justice system 

depends on full compliance with the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal 

citations omitted). The existence of a legitimate penological 

justification has, however, been used in considering whether adverse 

treatment is sufficiently gratuitous to constitute punishment for 

Eighth Amendment purposes. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 

346 (1981) (“Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain 

are those that are ‘totally without penological justification.’ ” 

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976))). In both 

Chappell, 706 F.3d at 1058, and Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090, we 

referred to possible legitimate penological interests when 

considering allegations that continuous lighting violated the Eighth 

Amendment.

Id. (full internal citations omitted); see also Perez v. Moore, No. 18-CV-04856-SI, 2020 WL 

2793647, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2020) (Case law is not clear “how the existence of a 

legitimate penological purpose for officials’ actions affects an Eighth Amendment claim in 

general.”).

The Ninth Circuit in Grenning did not further consider the issue. Rather, the court held 

that “[e]ven if it were possible for a defendant to defeat an Eighth Amendment conditions of 

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confinement claim at summary judgment by showing a legitimate penological interest, 

Defendants have failed to make such a showing in this case.” 739 F.3d at 1240-41. 

To the extent the Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson limits the use of penological 

justification in the defense of an Eighth Amendment claim, in at least two Ninth Circuit cases 

decided after Johnson, the court did consider whether or not a prison had a penological 

justification for conduct challenged under the Eighth Amendment. In Chappell v. Mandeville, 

706 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), the court considered whether the defendants were entitled to 

qualified immunity in a case raising an Eighth Amendment challenge to continuous lighting 

during contraband watch. The court held that “no court had ruled on whether contraband watch 

constitutes a legitimate penological purpose that would justify continuous lighting.” Therefore, 

defendants “did not have fair notice that their actions were unconstitutional.” 706 F.3d at 1059. 

More recently, in a case involving an Eighth Amendment claim of sexual assault, the 

Ninth Circuit held “that a prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she 

proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological 

justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for 

the staff member's own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or 

demeaning the prisoner.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations 

omitted). 

Secretary Allison argues that Bearchild is inapplicable because it simply reflects what 

courts have held – that the lack of penological justification applies only where the conduct was 

egregious and gratuitous. The Secretary contends that Judge Karlton interpreted the Eighth 

Amendment standards in that way in an order issued in the present class action in 2014. 

However, neither the decision in Bearchild nor Judge Karlton’s decision in this case require this 

court to hold at the discovery phase that penological justification may not be part of the Eighth 

Amendment equation in this case. 

In his 2014 order, Judge Karlton considered, among other things, whether defendants had 

sufficiently remedied the Eighth Amendment violations the court found in 1995. Coleman v. 

Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (ECF No. 5131). In making that determination, 

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Judge Karlton considered whether there were ongoing objectively unconstitutional conditions. 

Judge Karlton held that 

the presence of a legitimate penological justification for conditions 

of confinement challenged under the Eighth Amendment may be 

considered in determining whether the challenged condition 

constitutes punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See

Grenning, 739 F.3d at 1240 (discussing Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 

F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) and Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 

1090 (9th Cir. 1996)).

(ECF No. 5131 at 11.) Judge Karlton also quoted the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Grenning that 

“‘[t]he existence of a legitimate penological justification has . . . been used in considering 

whether adverse treatment is sufficiently gratuitous to constitute punishment for Eighth 

Amendment purposes.’” (Id.) 

Even if the penological justification issue is only available to determine whether or not 

defendants’ conduct was gratuitous, this court will not make a determination that defendants’ 

conduct does or does not meet this standard. It is enough at the discovery phase to find that 

defendants could raise the penological justification for the use of Guard One to counter plaintiff’s 

showing that sleep deprivation caused by the use of Guard One was objectively so severe that it 

meets the first Eighth Amendment factor. The factual and legal basis for that argument is better 

decided at the summary judgment stage. Further, as the court noted in Grinnell, the Ninth Circuit 

did look to the penological justification when considering challenges to continuous lighting in 

Chappell and in Keenan. In those cases, the court did not limit the inquiry to conduct that was 

“gratuitous.” 

This court recognizes that Chief Judge Mueller ordered the use of Guard One in the 

remedial phase of these proceedings. Secretary Allison argues that Chief Judge Mueller’s order 

establishes a “law of the case” that Guard One serves a legitimate penological interest. “Under 

the law of the case doctrine, a court will generally refuse to reconsider an issue that has already 

been decided by the same court or a higher court in the same case.” See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1484, 1488–89 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez v. 

Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 

Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013) . The Ninth Circuit recognized an exception to the law-of-the-case 

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doctrine where “substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.” Gonzalez, 

677 F.3d at 390 (citing Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1489). 

In making the law-of-the-case argument, the Secretary fails to recognize Chief Judge’s 

Mueller’s order is not a ruling on an Eighth Amendment claim. Rather, it is part of the fluid 

remedial process in this case and was based on the information available at the time. In an 

ongoing remedial phase, changes to remedies based on new facts may be necessary. See, e.g., 

Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 516 (2011) (“When a court attempts to remedy an entrenched 

constitutional violation through reform of a complex institution, such as this statewide prison 

system, it may be necessary in the ordinary course to issue multiple orders directing and adjusting 

ongoing remedial efforts.”). In granting Plaintiff Lipsey’s motion to intervene, Chief Judge 

Mueller found that Lipsey’s claim is “directly relevant to the implementation of the remedial plan 

in this case.” (ECF No. 6488.) While suicide prevention is undoubtedly a legitimate penological 

goal, whether Guard One serves that goal is a question that can be revisited in this case. 

In fact, Chief Judge Mueller has reconsidered the use of Guard One since she originally 

ordered it in 2015. Based on concerns that the use of Guard One was affecting inmates’ sleep,

Chief Judge Mueller amended the way in which Guard One is used. (See ECF No. 5487 (in 2016 

court approved stipulation limiting use of Guard One to only every hour at Pelican Bay State 

Prison).) 

This court recognizes that consideration of the penological justifications for Guard One 

must necessarily include the fact Guard One’s use has been ordered by the court. Nonetheless,

while it likely does not, alone, constitute a defense to the Eighth Amendment claim, the case law 

described above shows that the issue is potentially available to defendants as part of a broader 

defense that, objectively, Guard One does not have an unconstitutional impact on sleep. 

Accordingly, this court finds that whether or not Guard One serves legitimate penological 

objectives may be relevant to the court’s analysis of Plaintiff Lipsey’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

Because broad fact-finding is permitted at the discovery phase, this court will grant Plaintiff 

Lipsey’s motion as to discovery requests that seek information relevant to the penological 

justification issue. 

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B. Discussion of Individual Requests for Production at Issue

Request For Production No. 35:

All documents relating to any investigation, analysis, evaluation, or 

study of any impact on inmate suicides or attempted suicides caused 

or alleged to be caused by the Guard One system or welfare check 

program.

Response To Request For Production No. 35:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

seeks documents that are not relevant to Lipsey’s claim. Specifically, 

this request seeks documents concerning the efficacy of Guard One 

and CDCR’s long-standing policies requiring welfare checks on 

inmates placed in segregated housing and security housing units.

Lipsey’s claim alleges that the Guard One system disturbs his sleep, 

not that it causes suicide. The efficacy of welfare checks is monitored 

by the Coleman Special Master and is not relevant to Lipsey’s claim. 

Defendants further object to this request to the extent that it seeks the 

production of documents that are protected by attorney-client 

privilege.

Discussion of Request No. 35

Plaintiff Lipsey argues that [b]ecause Guard One ostensibly prevents suicide by ensuring 

compliance with welfare checks, Lipsey is entitled to see any studies or investigations that the 

CDCR has undertaken about whether Guard One in fact accomplishes that objective.” This court 

agrees. This request seeks information at the heart of the “legitimate penological objective” 

inquiry. If Guard One has been effective in preventing suicide, defendants may be entitled to 

argue that it serves a penological objective and is, therefore, not the sort of sleep deprivation that, 

objectively satisfies the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 

Secretary Allison next argues that information about the efficacy of the Guard One checks 

is also irrelevant because its efficacy is monitored by the Special Master. After considering 

defendants’ similar arguments in opposition to Plaintiff Lipsey’s motion to intervene, Chief Judge 

Mueller permitted Plaintiff Lipsey’s claim to go forward, recognizing that the additional 

information garnered through the claim may be relevant to the use of Guard One. (ECF No. 

6487.) In opposition to Plaintiff Lipsey’s request for broader discovery, defendants again argued 

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that the use of Guard One is fully monitored by the Special Master and Plaintiff Lipsey has access 

to the Special Master’s findings. (See ECF No. 7165.) While Chief Judge Mueller noted, but did 

not directly address, defendants’ contention, she granted Plaintiff Lipsey’s motion for further 

discovery. (ECF No. 7191.) Judge Mueller’s decisions demonstrate a willingness to consider 

evidence beyond that collected by the Special Master. 

This court will compel the Secretary to respond to Request for Production of Documents 

No. 35. 

Request For Production No. 36:

All documents relating to the CDCR’s adoption of the Guard One 

system, including but not limited to communications with class 

counsel, communications with the supplier or manufacturer of the 

Guard One system, internal analyses of the costs and benefits of the 

Guard One system, or other internal communications regarding 

adoption of the Guard One system.

Response To Request For Production No. 36:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

seeks documents that are not relevant to Lipsey’s claim. Specifically, 

this request seeks documents concerning the adoption of the Guard 

One system, which is not relevant to whether, once implemented, it 

caused sleep deprivation. Defendants also object to this request on

the grounds that documents related to a cost-benefit analysis of the 

Guard One monitoring system have no bearing on Lipsey’s limited 

claim in intervention. Defendants further object to this request to the 

extent that it seeks the production of documents that are protected by 

attorney-client privilege.

Without waiving these objections, and after a reasonable search and 

diligent inquiry, Defendants will produce documents that discuss the 

adoption of Guard One.

Discussion of Request No. 36

Defendants agreed to produce documents regarding the adoption of Guard One but 

refused to produce those showing any cost/benefit analysis in doing so. (ECF No. 7254 at 16; 

ECF No. 7280 at 13 n.4.) 

Any cost/benefit analysis of Guard One relates only to an argument that Guard One was 

not the best welfare check system available. Plaintiff Lipsey fails to show any legal basis to find 

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that the availability of alternatives to the Guard One system is relevant to any defense that the 

system serves a legitimate penological objective. The fact that there may have been welfare 

check alternatives that may not have disrupted inmate sleep and/or were more financially 

sensible, should not affect the court’s consideration of the efficacy of Guard One. Therefore, this 

court will not compel defendants to provide information about the costs and benefits of Guard 

One and of any alternatives considered. 

Request For Production No. 41:

Documents sufficient to show the cost of CDCR’s purchases of 

equipment used to carry out the Guard One system.

Response To Request For Production No. 41:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

seeks documents that are not relevant to whether the Guard One 

system causes sleep deprivation. Defendants also object to this 

request to the extent that it seeks the production of documents that 

are protected by attorney-client privilege.

Discussion of Request No. 41

For the reasons described in this court’s discussion of Request No. 36, documents 

regarding the costs of implementing Guard One are not relevant to any penological justification 

defense. Plaintiff Lipsey’s motion to compel a response to Request No. 41 is denied. 

Request For Production No. 42:

All documents concerning CDCR officers’ compliance or lack of 

compliance with the welfare check program before the introduction 

of the Guard One system, including but not limited to any evidence 

of falsified records of welfare checks.

Response To Request For Production No. 42:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

seeks documents that are not relevant to whether the Guard One 

system causes sleep deprivation. Defendants also object to this 

request on the grounds that it is duplicative of other requests 

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regarding implementation of Guard One, and to the extent that it 

seeks the production of documents that are protected by attorneyclient privilege.

Without waiving these objections, and after a reasonable search and 

diligent inquiry, Defendants produce the reports by the Coleman 

Special Master and his suicide prevention expert that concern 

CDCR’s officers’ compliance with the Guard One policy.

Discussion of Request No. 42

Plaintiff Lipsey requests documents regarding the efficacy of welfare checks prior to the 

introduction of Guard One. Secretary Allison agreed to provide documents regarding compliance 

with Guard One. Secretary Allison’s provision of those documents is not responsive to Plaintiff 

Lipsey’s request. This court agrees that information regarding compliance with the welfare check

system used prior to the use of Guard One is relevant to compare whether Guard One is serving 

its purpose - ensuring better compliance with welfare checks. 

Request For Production No. 43:

All documents concerning compliance with the Guard One Order, 

including but not limited to communications with class counsel and 

internal communications regarding the requirements of the Guard 

One Order.

Response To Request For Production No. 43:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad, vague, and ambiguous as to the term compliance, and calls for 

the production of documents that exceed discovery permitted under 

Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Defendants also object to this request on

the grounds that it is duplicative of other requests regarding use of 

Guard One and to the extent that it seeks the production of documents 

that are protected by attorney-client privilege.

Without waiving these objections, and after a reasonable search and 

diligent inquiry, Defendants produce the reports by the Coleman 

Special Master and his suicide prevention expert that concern 

CDCR’s officers’ compliance with the Guard One policy.

Discussion of Request No. 43

Secretary Allison agreed to provide documents regarding officers’ compliance with the 

Guard One system ordered by the court. Plaintiff Lipsey simply argues the relevance of such 

documents. He does not argue that Secretary Allison’s production of the specified documents is 

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inadequate. (See ECF No. 7254 at 17-19; ECF No. 7287.) Plaintiff Lipsey bears the burden of 

showing why any discovery response is deficient. McCoy, 2016 WL 3196738, at *1. Because he 

fails to meet that burden, this court will not order the Secretary to produce further responses to 

Request No. 43. 

Request For Production No. 47:

All documents concerning training of CDCR officers or employees 

relating to suicide, including but not limited to policy manuals, 

internal memoranda, training presentations, or audio or video 

training programs.

Response To Request For Production No. 47:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

seeks documents that are not relevant to whether the Guard One 

system causes sleep deprivation.

Discussion of Request No.47

Secretary Allison agreed to produce documents relevant to the training of officers on the 

use of Guard One. (See ECF No. 7280 at 14.) This court agrees with the Secretary’s argument 

that documents regarding training on suicide prevention generally are not relevant to Plaintiff 

Lipsey’s contention that Guard One, not other suicide prevention measures, violates the Eighth 

Amendment. The Secretary will not be ordered to provide further documents responsive to 

Request No. 47. 

Requests For Production Nos. 48, 49, 50, and 51:

Request Nos. 48 and 49 seek documents “identifying suicides or attempted suicides” of 

inmates subject to Guard One. Request Nos. 50 and 51 seek documents “identifying suicides or 

attempted suicides” of inmates subject to the welfare checks used prior to the implementation of 

Guard One. Secretary Allison interposes the same objection to each request: 

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

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seeks documents that are not relevant to whether the Guard One 

system causes sleep deprivation.

Secretary Allison argues these requests are overbroad because they seek documents that 

total a 25-year time period from the initiation of the welfare check system in 2006 to the present. 

She also argues they are not relevant. (See ECF No. 7280 at 13-16.) 

The court finds that documents regarding the rate of suicide, or attempted suicide, among 

inmates who were and/or are subject to the Guard One security checks seeks information relevant 

to any assertion that Guard One reduces inmate suicide and therefore serves a penological 

objective. Further, information on suicides prior to the use of Guard One would provide a basis 

for comparison to show Guard One has, or has not, improved the rate of inmate suicid e.

However, this court is concerned that Plaintiff Lipsey seeks documents “identifying” 

suicides and attempted suicides. It appears that Lipsey may seek to identify individual prisoners. 

This court finds such information unnecessary to any possible defense that Guard One has 

improved the suicide rate and would unnecessarily invade inmates’ privacy. 

With this court’s limitation on Request Nos. 48, 49, 50, and 51, the Secretary would be 

compelled to provide documents apparently identical to documents sought in Request No. 35. 

Any duplication does no harm to the Secretary who need only provide the responsive documents 

once. Therefore, this court will compel the Secretary to respond to Request Nos. 48, 49, 50, and 

51 by providing: (1) all documents with information on the number of suicides and attempted 

suicides during the time Guard One was used in security housing units; and (2) all documents 

with information on the number of suicides and attempted suicides of inmates in security housing 

units who were subject to court-ordered welfare checks prior to the implementation of Guard 

One. 

Request For Production No. 56:

Documents sufficient to identify any persons who conducted any 

training related to the Guard One system, the welfare check program, 

inmate sleep, suicide, or excessive noise.

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Response To Request For Production No. 56:

Defendants object to this request on the grounds that it is overly 

broad and calls for the production of documents that exceed 

discovery permitted under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. Pro., because it 

seeks documents that are not relevant to whether the Guard One 

system causes sleep deprivation. Defendants further object to this 

request on the grounds that it is entirely duplicative of Request Nos. 

45, 46, and 47. Without waiving these objections, and after a 

reasonable search and diligent inquiry, Defendants do not have any 

documents responsive to this request in their possession, custody, or 

control.

Discussion of Request No. 56

Above, this court grants Plaintiff Lipsey’s motion to compel the Secretary to provide 

information about the substance of officer training in the use of the Guard One system. This

court finds the identity of officers who conducted that training to be too attenuated to provide 

potentially relevant information. The Secretary will not be compelled to provide documents 

responsive to Request No. 56. 

For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 

Plaintiff Lipsey’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 7254) is granted in part and denied in part as 

follows:

1. Within 30 days of the filed date of this order, Secretary Allison shall provide Plaintiff 

Lipsey with documents responsive to Document Production Request Nos. 35 and 42.

2. Also within 30 days, Secretary Allison shall provide Plaintiff Lipsey with the 

following documents responsive to Document Production Requests Nos. 48, 49, 50, and 51:

a. all documents with information on the number of suicides and attempted 

suicides during the time Guard One was used in security housing units; and 

b. all documents with information on the number of suicides and attempted 

suicides of inmates in security housing units who were subject to court-ordered welfare 

checks in security housing units prior to the implementation of Guard One.

2. Plaintiff Lipsey’s Motion to Compel further responses to Document Production 

Request Nos. 36, 43, and 47 is denied.

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3. Plaintiff’s Lipsey’s Motion to Compel responses to Document Production Request 

Nos. 41 and 56 is denied. 

Dated: September 9, 2021

DLB:9

DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/cole0520.lipsey MTC/

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