Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02094/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02094-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. 

Pending before the Court is the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 

petition, which was served by mail on Petitioner at the address 

listed on the docket and filed on March 13, 2014. Although the 

thirty-day period for filing opposition to the motion has passed, no 

opposition has been filed.

///

ALLEN C. THOMPSON,

 Petitioner,

v.

RICK HILL, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION (DOC. 11)

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH 

PREJUDICE (DOC. 1), DIRECTING THE 

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT, 

AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Proceeding by a Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the 

ground that Petitioner filed his petition outside of the one-year 

limitation period provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the 

petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court....” 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permits respondents to file 

motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4 instead of answers if the 

motion to dismiss attacks the pleadings by claiming that the 

petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies or has violated the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 

418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate a motion to 

dismiss a petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (state procedural 

default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D.Cal. 

1982) (same). Thus, a respondent may file a motion to dismiss after 

the Court orders the respondent to respond, and the Court should use 

Rule 4 standards to review a motion to dismiss filed before a formal 

answer. See, Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12.

Here, Respondent’s motion to dismiss addresses the 

untimeliness of the petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The 

material facts pertinent to the motion are contained in copies of 

the official records of state judicial proceedings provided by 

Respondent in support of the motion to dismiss and as to which there

is no factual dispute. Because Respondent has not filed a formal 

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

answer, and because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in 

procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust 

state remedies or for state procedural default, the Court will 

review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

II. Factual Summary

 Petitioner challenges his conviction of armed robbery, 

kidnapping, discharge of a firearm, and being a felon in possession 

of a firearm. (Pet., doc. 1., 1; LD 2.)1 On February 10, 1997, and 

on February 10, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced in the Fresno County 

Superior Court (FCSC) to a determinate state prison term of eight 

years plus an indeterminate term of twenty-five years to life. (LD 

1, LD 2.) Petitioner did not appeal his sentence.

Petitioner subsequently filed eight pro se state postconviction collateral challenges regarding the judgment. The filing 

date of all the petitions has been determined by applying the 

“mailbox rule.” 2

 

1

“LD” refers to documents lodged by Respondent in support of the motion to 

dismiss.

2

Habeas Rule 3(d) provides that a paper filed by a prisoner is timely if deposited 

in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing. 

The rule requires the inmate to use the custodial institution’s system designed 

for legal mail; further, timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement setting forth the date of 

deposit and verifying prepayment of first-class postage. Id. Habeas Rule 3(d) 

reflects the “mailbox rule,” initially developed in case law, pursuant to which a 

prisoner's pro se habeas petition is "deemed filed when he hands it over to prison 

authorities for mailing to the relevant court.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 

276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). The mailbox 

rule applies to federal and state petitions alike. Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 

(9th. Cir. 2003), and Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813, 816 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

The mailbox rule, liberally applied, in effect assumes that absent evidence to the 

contrary, a legal document is filed on the date it was delivered to prison 

authorities, and a petition was delivered on the day it was signed. Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. at 275-76; Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2010); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. 

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On January 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the FCSC (LD 3), which was denied on February 10, 

2004 (LD 4). 

On July 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, 

Fifth Appellate District (CCA) (LD 5), which was denied summarily, 

without any statement of reasoning or authority, on August 12, 2004

(LD 6). 

On August 24, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court (CSC) (LD 7), which 

was denied on July 27, 2005, with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 

Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998) (LD 8).

On September 5, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the FCSC (LD 9), which was denied on October 18, 

2011, by an order stating, in part, that Petitioner had failed to 

explain his unreasonable delay in presenting his Cunningham claim, 

and citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 782-783 (1993) (LD 10). 

On October 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the CCA (LD 11), which was denied on November 16, 

2011, in part because Petitioner had failed to explain his delay of 

over fourteen years in seeking relief (LD 12).

 

Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1058 n.1 (C.D.Cal. 2001). The date a petition is 

signed may be inferred to be the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his 

petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. 

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). However, if there is a long delay between 

the alleged mailing and receipt by a court, a district court may attribute the 

discrepancy to various causes, including the court, the postal service, the prison 

authorities, or the prisoner himself. See, Koch v. Ricketts, 68 F.3d 1191, 1193 

n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (concerning analogous Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)).

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On April 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the FCSC (LD 13), which was denied on July 5, 2012, 

in an order citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 782-83 (1993) (LD

14, 2). 

On August 30, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the CCA (LD 15), which was denied on September 14, 

2012, in part because Petitioner had failed to explain adequately 

his delay in seeking relief (LD 16). 

On October 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the CSC (LD 17), which was denied on December 19, 

2012, in an order that cited In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780

(1998), and In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 (1993) (LD 18).

Petitioner filed his petition in the present action on December 

14, 2013.

III. The Running of the Limitation Period

A. Legal Standards

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which applies to all

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment.

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). Petitioner filed his petition for 

writ of habeas corpus here on December 14, 2013. (Doc. 1, 15.) 

Thus, the AEDPA applies to the petition.

The AEDPA provides a one-year period of limitation in which

a petitioner must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). It identifies the pendency of some

proceedings for collateral review as a basis for tolling the running 

of the period. As amended, subdivision (d) provides:

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

B. Analysis

Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitation period runs from

the date on which the judgment became final. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), 

the “judgment” refers to the sentence imposed on the Petitioner. 

Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S.147, 156-57 (2007). The last sentence 

was imposed on Petitioner on February 10, 1998. 

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), a judgment becomes final either upon

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

seeking such review in the highest court from which review could

be sought. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.

2001). The statute commences to run pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A)

upon either 1) the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in

the state court system, followed by either the completion or

denial of certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme

Court; or 2) if certiorari was not sought, by the conclusion of all 

direct criminal appeals in the state court system followed by the 

expiration of the time permitted for filing a petition for writ of 

certiorari. Wixom, 264 F.3d at 897 (quoting Smith v. Bowersox, 159 

F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1187 (1999)). 

Where, as here, the petitioner did not directly appeal from the 

judgment, the judgment became final within the meaning of § 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking appellate review from the 

state court expired. Gonzalez v. Thaler, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 

653-54 (2012). Under state law, Petitioner had sixty days to appeal 

the judgment. Cal. Pen. Code § 1237.5; Cal. Rules Ct., Rule 31(d) 

[now Rule 8.308(a)]. Thus, Petitioner’s judgment became final 

within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon the expiration of the 

sixty-day period for filing a notice of appeal, or on April 12, 

1998, the date that the period for seeking appellate review expired.

Therefore, the one-year limitations period began to run one day 

later on April 13, 1998, and expired one year later on April 12,

1999. Accordingly, absent any tolling, the one-year limitation 

period ran on April 12, 1999. Because Petitioner’s petition was not 

filed until December 14, 2013, the petition on its face was filed 

outside of the one-year limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 

and the petition is subject to dismissal.

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. Statutory Tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Once a petitioner is on notice that his habeas petition may

be subject to dismissal based on the statute of limitations, he

has the burden of demonstrating that the limitations period was

sufficiently tolled by providing pertinent dates of filing and

denial, although the state must affirmatively argue that the

petitioner failed to meet his burden of alleging the tolling

facts; simply noting the absence of such facts is not sufficient.

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner did not file his first state petition for

collateral relief until January 17, 2004, over four years after the 

statutory period had expired on October 12, 1999. Thus, the

statutory period had run by the time any application for collateral

relief was filed in the state courts. Under such circumstances, the 

pendency of state applications has no tolling effect. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that filing a 

state collateral petition after the running of the one-year 

limitations period of the AEDPA but even before the expiration of 

the pertinent state period of finality did not toll the running of 

the period under § 2244(d)(2)).

Respondent notes that in any event, the state courts expressly 

found that some of the petitions filed by Petitioner were untimely, 

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and thus they could not have tolled the running of the limitations 

period because they were not properly filed.

An application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review is “properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings, such as

provisions concerning the form of the document, the time limits upon 

its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and 

the requisite filing fee. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).

State time limits are conditions to filing, which render a petition 

not “properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 417. When a state court rejects a 

petition for post-conviction relief as untimely, the petition is not 

a “properly filed” application for post-conviction or collateral 

review within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2), and thus it does not toll 

the running of the limitation period. Id. Where a petition is 

untimely under California’s standards, none of the time before or 

during the court’s consideration of the petition is statutorily 

tolled. White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2010), 

cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010).

Here, Petitioner’s third, fourth, sixth and eighth state

petitions were expressly found untimely by the CSC and the FCSC 

because they were denied with citations to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 

4th 770, 780 (1998) and/or In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 782-83

(1993) and therefore could not toll the limitations period. Robbins

stands for the proposition that delayed and repetitious claims will 

not be condoned; a citation to Clark or to Robbins at 780 means that 

the state court found that the petition was untimely. Walker v. 

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Martin, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1124 (2011); Thorson v. Palmer, 

479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007). Because Petitioner’s third, 

fourth, sixth and eighth state habeas petitions were not “properly 

filed” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), they could not 

have tolled the federal limitations period. Bonner v. Carey, 425 

F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005).

In sum, in addition to having been filed too late to toll

the statute, Petitioner’s state petitions were not properly filed,

and thus they did not toll the limitations period for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGulielmo, 544 U.S. at 414-15. Thus, 

the running of the limitations period was not tolled pursuant to

§ 2244(d)(2) by Petitioner’s state court filings.

V. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

VI. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely 

filed be GRANTED; 

2) The petition be DISMISSED with prejudice; 

3) Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent; and

4) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court=s 

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-02094-LJO-SKO Document 13 Filed 07/08/14 Page 12 of 12