Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-01474/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-01474-43/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 With this Order, the Court adopts a convention it has been using in its other cases with

respect to claim construction orders; namely, to give each order a numerical title based on its order

of construction. This is the Fifth Claim Construction Order the Court has issued in this case since

2003. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Boston Scientific Corp., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

Cordis Corp.,

Defendant.

 /

NO. C 02-01474 JW 

FIFTH CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER;1

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON INFRINGEMENT / NONINFRINGEMENT RE: DEFENDANT’S

TRUFILL DETACHABLE COIL SYSTEM AS

TO CLAIMS OF THE ‘385 AND ‘498 PATENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Boston Scientific Corporation and Target Therapeutics, Inc. (“Target”) (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Cordis Corporation (“Defendant”) alleging infringement of a

number of patents relating to methods and devices for treating vascular medical problems. Presently

before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to whether Defendant’s

TRUFILL Detachable Coil System (“DCS”) infringes Claims of the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents. 

The Court has conducted several hearings on these and other motions whereby the parties

have been permitted to supplement their original papers. Based on the papers submitted to date and

the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court issues its Fifth Claim Construction Order and

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 1 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 A complete background of the technology is contained in the Court’s October 8, 2003

Claim Construction Order. (hereafter, “CC Order,” Docket Item No. 177.) 

2

II. BACKGROUND

On March 26, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant infringes U.S.

Patents Nos. 5,895,385 (“the ‘385 Patent”), 6,010,498 (“the ‘498 Patent”), and 6,238,415 (“the ‘415

Patent”). At issue with respect to the present motions is whether Defendant’s DCS infringes claims

of the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents. 

A. The Patented Technology

The Court provides a brief summary of the relevant technology as disclosed with respect to

the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents.2

 The prior art taught an extra-vascular approach for surgically occluding,

and therefore treating, brain aneurysms. The approach had many risks because it is highly invasive

and required general anesthesia. The prior art also taught an endo-vascular approach in which the

aneurysm was entered through the use of a catheter. Under this approach, a balloon attached to the

end of the catheter was introduced into the aneurysm, inflated, and detached, leaving it to occlude

the aneurysm while preserving the parent artery. However, the balloon approach carried a risk that

the aneurysm might rupture due to over-distension of the aneurysm. 

The ‘385 and ‘498 Patents describe medical devices and methods directed to an endovascular approach for, inter alia, forming an occlusion inside an aneurysm, which avoids the risks

involved with using other methods. These patents summarize the invention as follows: 

An artery, vein, aneurysm, vascular malformation or arterial fistula is occluded through

endovascular occlusion by the endovascular insertion of a platinum wire and/or tip into the

vascular cavity. The vascular cavity is packed with the tip to obstruct blood flow or access of

blood in the cavity such that the blood clots in the cavity and an occlusion is formed. The tip

may be elongate and flexible so that it packs the cavity by being folded upon itself a multiple

number of times, or may pack the cavity by virtue of a filamentary or fuzzy structure of the

tip. The tip is then separated from the wire mechanically or by electrolytic separation of the

tip from the wire. The wire and the microcatheter are thereafter removed leaving the tip

embedded in the thrombus formed within the vascular cavity. Movement of wire in the

microcatheter is more easily tracked by providing a radioopaque proximal marker on the

microcatheter and a corresponding indicator marker on the wire. Electrothrombosis is 

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 2 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 (Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of

Infringement, hereafter, “Plaintiffs’ SB,” Docket Item No. 639; Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in

Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, hereafter, “Defendant’s SB,” Docket Item No. 642.)

3

facilitated by placing the ground electrode on the distal end of the microcatheter and flowing

current between the microcatheter electrode and the tip.

(‘385 Patent, Abstract; ‘498 Patent, Abstract.) 

B. Prior Claim Construction and Motions

In its October 7, 2003 Order, the Court construed claim terms of the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents. 

In that Order, the Court found that “all methods of detachment (mechanical or electrolytic) claimed

in these patents are limited to a ‘forceless letting go.’” (Id. at 6.) Specifically, the Court construed

“detachable” to mean “attached but capable of being detached or disconnected without any axial

force and without significant radial force” and “detaching” to mean “disconnecting without any axial

force and without any significant radial force.” (Id. at 15.) 

On March 15, 2004, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to whether

Cordis’ DCS infringes Claims 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, and 38 of the ‘385 Patent and

Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of the ‘498 Patent. (Docket Item Nos. 316, 326.) Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment also contained an invitation for the Court to reconsider its earlier ruling of the

meaning of detachment within the context of the two patents. Plaintiffs formalized this request in a

Motion for Reconsideration dated May 17, 2004. (Docket Item No. 492.) 

In its July 26, 2004 Order, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration because

it found that detachment did not require a “forceless letting go.” (See Docket Item No. 592.) 

Accordingly, the Court re-construed “detachable” to mean “attached but capable of being detached

or disconnected” and “detaching” to mean “disconnecting.” (Id. at 12.) Since the Court’s claim

construction changed, the Court permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs with respect to their

cross-motions for summary judgment, which allowed them to address issues left unresolved by the

Court’s prior orders.3

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 3 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

C. The Allegedly Infringing Technology

The accused Cordis DCS has a coil that is attached to a “delivery tube” via a “gripper.” 

(Declaration of Amanda M. Kessel in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment of

Infringement, hereafter, “Kessel Decl.,” Ex. 4 at CNV 0034441, Docket Item No. 307.) Like

embodiments of the invention disclosed in the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents, the DCS coil is made of

platinum, and it detaches to form an occlusion in a vascular cavity. (See id. at CNV 0034445.) 

The accused Cordis DCS delivery tube is a hollow tube that is filled with fluid before being

inserted into the body. (Declaration of Donald K. Jones in Support of Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment of Noninfringement ¶¶ 4-5, hereafter, “Jones Decl.,” Docket Item No. 310.) 

The method of detachment is accomplished by hydraulically expanding the gripper, which builds

pressure within the delivery tube and reduces the friction holding the coil in place. (Kessel Decl.,

Ex. 5 at CNV 0034464, Ex. 6 at CNV 00344628; Jones Decl. ¶ 5.)

Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to

whether Cordis’ DCS infringes Claims 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, and 38 of the ‘385

Patent and Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of the ‘498 Patent. 

III. STANDARDS

A. Standards and Procedures for Claims Construction

1. General Principles of Claim Construction

Claim construction is a matter of law, to be decided exclusively by the Court. Markman v.

Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 387 (1996). When the meaning of a term used in a claim

is in dispute, the Court invites the parties to submit their respective proposed definitions and a brief,

outlining the basis for their proposals. In addition, the Court conducts a hearing to allow oral

argument of the respective proposed definitions. After the hearing, the Court takes the matter under

submission, and issues an Order construing the meaning of the term. The Court’s construction

becomes the legally operative meaning of the term that governs further proceedings in the case. 

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Court recognizes

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 4 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

that claim construction is a fluid process, wherein the Court may consider a number of extrinsic

sources of evidence so long as they do not contradict the intrinsic evidence. However, the Court

acknowledges that greater weight should always be given to the intrinsic evidence. Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

2. Construction from the View Point of an Ordinarily Skilled Artisan

A patent’s claims define the scope of the patent: the invention that the patentee may exclude

others from practicing. Id. at 1312. The Court generally gives the patent’s claims their ordinary and

customary meaning. In construing the ordinary and customary meaning of a patent claim, the Court

does so from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, which

is considered to be the effective filing date of the patent application. Thus, the Court seeks to

construe the patent claim in accordance with what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have

understood the claim to have meant at the time the patent application was filed. This inquiry forms

an objective baseline from which the Court begins its claim construction. Id.

The Court proceeds from that baseline under the premise that a person of ordinary skill in the

art would interpret claim language not only in the context of the particular claim in which the

language appears, but also in the context of the entire patent specification, of which it is a part. Id.

at 1313. Additionally, the Court considers that a person of ordinary skill in the art would consult the

rest of the intrinsic record, including any surrounding claims, the drawings, and the prosecution

history—if it is in evidence. Id.; Teleflex, Inc. v. Fisosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.

Cir. 2002). In reading the intrinsic evidence, a person of ordinary skill in the art would give

consideration to whether the disputed term is a term commonly used in lay language, a technical

term, or a term defined by the patentee. 

3. Commonly Used Terms

In some cases, disputed claim language involves a commonly understood term that is readily

apparent to the Court. In such a case, the Court considers that a person of ordinary skill in the art

would give to it its widely accepted meaning, unless a specialized definition is stated in the patent

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 5 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

specification or was stated by the patentee during prosecution of the patent. In articulating the

widely accepted meaning of such a term, the Court may consult a general purpose dictionary. 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. 

4. Technical Terms 

If a disputed term is a technical term in the field of the invention, the Court considers that

one of skill in the art would give the term its ordinary and customary meaning in that technical field,

unless a specialized definition is stated in the specification or during prosecution of the patent. In

arriving at this definition, the Court may consult a technical art-specific dictionary or invite the

parties to present testimony from experts in the field on the ordinary and customary definition of the

technical term at the time of the invention. Id. 

5. Defined Terms

The Court acknowledges that a patentee is free to act as his or her own lexicographer. 

Acting as such, the patentee may use a term differently than a person of ordinary skill in the art

would understand it, without the benefit of the patentee’s definition. Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at

1582. Thus, the Court examines the claims and the intrinsic evidence to determine if the patentee

used a term with a specialized meaning.

The Court regards a specialized definition of a term stated in the specification as highly

persuasive of the meaning of the term as it is used in a claim. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316-17. 

However, the definition must be stated in a clear words, which make it apparent to the Court that the

term has been defined. See id.; Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. If the definition is not clearly

stated or cannot be reasonably inferred, the Court may decline to construe the term pending further

proceedings. Statements made by the patentee in the prosecution of the patent application as to the

scope of the invention may be considered when deciding the meaning of the claims. Microsoft

Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1349 (2004). Accordingly, the Court may also

examine the prosecution history of the patent when considering whether to construe the claim term

as having a specialized definition.

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 6 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

In construing claims, it is for the Court to determine the terms that require construction and

those that do not. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, the Court is not required to adopt a construction of a term, even if the parties have

stipulated to it. Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir.

2005). Instead, the Court may arrive at its own constructions of claim terms, which may differ from

the constructions proposed by the parties.

B. Summary Judgment

The standard for summary judgment does not change in a patent case. Conroy v. Reebok

Int’l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment “is to

isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-24 (1986). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying the evidence which it believes demonstrates the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The non-moving party must then identify

specific facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” thus establishing

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence through the

prism of the evidentiary standard of proof that would pertain at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight that particular evidence is

accorded. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1992). The court

determines whether the non-moving party’s “specific facts,” coupled with disputed background or

contextual facts, are such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. In such a case, summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson,

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 7 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

477 U.S. at 248. However, where a rational trier of fact could not find for the non-moving party

based on the record as a whole, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

C. Infringement

“A determination of infringement requires a two-step analysis.” Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp.,

419 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). First, the claim must be construed; second, the claim must be

compared to the “accused device or process.” Id. (citing Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys.,

Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). While claim construction is an issue of law,

infringement is a question of fact. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,

970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Due to the factual nature of the infringement inquiry, a court must take

great care in determining whether a patent is infringed by way of summary judgment. SRI Int’l v.

Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985). However, summary judgment on the issue

is appropriate when the comparison of the properly construed claim with an uncontested description

of the accused device reflects an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chemical Eng’g Corp.

v. Essef Indus., Inc., 795 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

The moving party bears the burden of proving infringement or non-infringement by a

preponderance of the evidence. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products, Inc., 793

F.2d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986). To establish infringement, every limitation in a claim as

construed by the court must be infringed. Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d at 1576. Even if an accused

device does not literally infringe a claim limitation, it may nonetheless be found to infringe under

the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17

(1997). 

IV. DISCUSSION

With respect to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs contend that on

the basis of undisputed evidence, the Defendant’s accused DCS device, literally infringes Claims 7,

8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, and 38 of the ‘385 Patent and Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of the

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 8 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Unless otherwise indicated, all bold typeface is added by the Court for emphasis.

9

‘498 Patent, or that it infringes those Claims under the doctrine of equivalents. Defendant contends

that on the basis of undisputed evidence, the Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden to prove that the

accused DCS device infringes the asserted patent Claims literally or under the doctrine of

equivalents for two principal reasons: First, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs cannot prove that the

accused DCS device, literally or equivalently, infringes the “wire” limitation, which is contained in

each of the asserted Claims. Second, Defendant contends that in addition to no proof of

infringement of the “wire” limitation, Plaintiffs cannot prove that the DCS device infringes the “no

preferred geometric form” limitation of Claims 15 and 38 of the ‘385 Patent. The Court begins with

an examination of Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent.

A. Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent

1. Construction of the Word “wire”

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that further construction of the term “wire” is

required.

Claim 7 provides:4

An apparatus for use in occluding a body cavity comprising:

a wire; and

a detachable elongate distal tip coupled to said wire, said elongate

distal tip being a relaxed coil capable of being multiply folded upon

itself. 

The Court’s last consideration of the meaning of the word “wire” in this case was in the

October 7, 2003 Order. In that Order, the Court construed the word “wire” as it is used in Claims 7,

8, 10, 15, 32, 35, and 38 of the ‘385 Patent and Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of the ‘498 Patent to mean,

a “thin, flexible, continuous length of metal, usually of circular cross section.” (CC Order at 9.) 

Subsequent to the October 7, 2003 Order, the Court has considered the construction of “wire” and

other words and phrases in the Guglielmi family of patents in a case entitled: Regents v. Micro

Therapeutics, Inc., No. C-03-05669. Plaintiffs in this case were Third-Party Defendants in the

Regents case.

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 9 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 (See Docket Item No. 270.)

6

 (See Docket Item No. 482.)

10

In the August 24, 2005 Order in the Regents case, the Court stated:

The parties have agreed that the terms “guidewire” and “wire” should be construed

synonymously for purposes of claim construction. This Court construes the term

“wire” to mean “a thin, flexible, continuous length of metal, usually of circular crosssection that collectively includes both guidewires and tips and simply wires without

distinct tip structures.”

* * *

Further, both parties agree that the definition of “wire” should include “a thin,

flexible, continuous length of metal, usually of circular cross-section.” This

additional language is consistent with the term’s use in the specifications, the claims

and the prosecution histories of the patents-in-suit. Therefore, this Court adds the

parties’ agreed-upon language to the explicit definition set forth in the specification.5

Subsequently, in the March 2, 2007 Order of the same case, the Court determined that with

respect to a particular Claim, a further definition of “guidewire” was required:

The Court construes “guidewire” as it is used in Claim 1 of the ‘136 Patent to mean: 

Part of an apparatus of the invention which is a thin, flexible, continuous length of

metal, of circular cross-section which has a detachable tip.6

The specifications used by the Court as a basis for its construction in the Regents case

describe a “wire” in materially the same way as the specifications of the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents

involved in this case. Of primary importance to its construction is the following statement in each of

the specifications:

The term “wire” should be understood to collectively include both guidewires and

tips and simply wires without distinct tip structures.

(See e.g., ‘578 Patent, Col. 4:8-10; ‘385 Patent, Col. 4:5-12; ‘498 Patent, Col. 4:16-21) 

In both the Court’s 2003 construction in this case and its 2005 construction in the Regents

case, the Court construed “wire” as a “length of metal.” These definitions recognize that the

ordinary and customary meaning attributed to “wire” is that it is a strand of metal. See WEBSTER’S

NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY, 2098 (2d ed. 1983). Nothing in the specification,

including the claims, indicates explicitly or implicitly, that the inventors intended to impart a novel

meaning to the composition of “wire.”

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 10 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 With respect to the “distal tip” limitation of Claim 7, Defendant does not dispute that the

accused DCS device infringes that limitation.

8

 The Court defers consideration of whether the “wire” limitation of the other asserted

Claims is infringed

9

 The inclusion of a detachable tip in the definition of “wire” in the first paragraph of Claim

7 would render redundant the “detachable elongate distal tip” limitation contained in paragraph 2.

11

Accordingly, the Court adopts substantially the same definition of wire as was used in the

Regents case. As used in Claims 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, and 38 of the ‘385 Patent

and Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of the ‘498 Patent, the term “wire” means: a thin, flexible,

continuous length of metal, usually of circular cross-section that collectively includes both a

wire which has a detachable tip and simply a wire without distinct detachable tip structure. 

The language of each claim enumerated must be examined to determine if the wire which is

claimed includes or does not include a detachable tip structure. Unless otherwise ordered, the

words “wire” and “guidewire” are synonymous, in the enumerated Claims. 

2. Infringement Analysis

 The Court proceeds to examine whether Defendant’s DCS infringes the “wire” limitation of

Claim 77

 of the ‘385 Patent.8 Applying the above construction to Claim 7, it is clear from the

language of the Claim that the inventors used the word “wire” to mean: a thin, flexible, continuous

length of metal, usually of circular cross-section without a distinct detachable tip structure.9 

a. Literal Infringement of “wire” Limitation

A finding of literal infringement requires that the asserted claims, as properly construed,

cover or read on the accused device. Morton Int’l Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1468

(Fed. Cir. 1993). A claim reads on an accused device only if the device embodies every limitation

of the claim. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

For literal infringement, each limitation must read on an element of the accused device exactly; any

deviation will preclude a finding of literal infringement. Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d

542, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 11 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 The ‘385 and ‘498 Patents both note in their specifications that “[t]he term ‘wire’ should

be understood to collectively include both guidewires and tips and simply wires without distinct tip

structures.” (See, e.g., ‘385 Patent, Col. 4:5-12.)

12

In its October 8, 2003 Order, the Court found a lack of support in the specification for

Plaintiffs’ argument that the term “wire” should be defined to include a hollow object. (CC Order at

9.) Therefore, the Court did not adopt a definition of “wire” that would describe a “wire” as

“sometimes being hollow” in its construction. (Id.) The accused Cordis DCS contains a “hollow

delivery tube” that functions as a guidewire.10 (Jones Decl. ¶¶ 4, 22.) Since the accused DCS

delivery tube is hollow, the “wire” limitation does not read on the delivery tube exactly and without

deviation. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s DCS does not literally infringe the “wire”

limitation of Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent.

b. Infringement of “wire” Limitation Under Doctrine of Equivalents

The doctrine of equivalents prevents “fraud on the patent,” which is when an accused

infringer appropriates the benefit of the invention by making insubstantial changes that avoid the

literal scope of the claims. EMI Group North America, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 896 (Fed.

Cir. 1998.) The doctrine recognizes the constraints of patent claims by allowing a patentee to find

infringement against such a substantially equivalent invention. Id.

In this case, there are three issues raised by doctrine of equivalents analysis: (a) whether the

DCS delivery tube is substantially equivalent to a “wire,” (b) whether DCS delivery tube may still

infringe under the doctrine of equivalents even if it performs an additional function, and (b) whether

a finding of equivalence would vitiate the meaning of “wire” in light of the Court’s construction of

the claim term.

i. substantial equivalence

Defendant contends that its delivery tube does not infringe the “wire” limitation under the

doctrine of equivalents because it is not substantially equivalent to a “wire.” (Defendant’s SB at 4.)

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 12 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 The specifications of the ‘385 Patent specifically notes “[t]he term ‘wire’ should be

understood to collectively include . . . guidewires.” (‘385 Patent, Col. 4:5-12.) 

13

For an element of an accused device to be substantially equivalent to a claim limitation, it

must not substantially change the way in which the function of the claimed invention is performed. 

Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1196 (1994). A patentee may prove

substantial equivalence by showing that an element of the accused device “performs substantially

the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the claim limitation. 

Id.; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). This test, called

the function-way-result test, forms the baseline for analysis of equivalence because “if two devices

do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they

are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.” Id.

The primary function of the “wire” limitation of Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent is to act as a

“pusher,” of the distal tip, which is coupled to it. The way it performs that function is through its

flexibility and trackability when used in the vascular system of the body. The result is delivery and

accurate placement of the attached tip at or in the intended site in the body. 

The function of the “wire” is confirmed by the specification, which states that the wire is for

“disposing the [distal portion] into the vascular cavity.” (‘385 Patent, Col. 4:47-52.) Plaintiffs’

expert also notes in his declaration that the “wire” functions as a pusher because it is “a structure

used to push an implant through a catheter and position it at [the] desired occlusion site.” 

(Declaration of Dr. Charles Strother in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration ¶ 16,

hereafter, “Strother Decl.,” Docket Item No. 319.) 

Defendant does not dispute that one of the primary functions of the accused DCS device is to

act as a “pusher.” Rather, Defendant represented to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) that

the DCS delivery tube has the “combined functionality of a guidewire and a mini infusion

microcatheter” and that its “pushability and trackability” are comparable to that of a guidewire.11

(Kessel Decl., Ex. 6 at CNV 0034626; Jones Decl., Ex. 4 at CNV 0034442.) Further, in a statement

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 13 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 Defendant stated that the DCS device”was designed to mimic the coil pushing

performance of Target’s GDC delivery wire” (Kessel Decl., Ex. 5 at CNV 0034462) and that

“[b]oth DCS and GDC utilize a stiff proximal section for excellent pushability and kink resistence,”

and “a flexible distal section for excellent trackability in tortuous anotomy.” Id. Although

infringement may not be based on a product-to-product comparison, reliance on Defendant’s

statement about the functionality of its device as a “wire” is proper. 

14

to the FDA regarding the “delivery system” of the DCS, Defendant notes that the delivery tube is

designed to function in the same way as a wire.12 Thus, the DCS performs its function as a pusher

by mimicking the flexibility and trackability of a “wire” and the intended result is identical to that of

the patented invention, delivery and accurate positioning of a distal tip to which it is coupled.

ii. additional functionality

Defendant contends that its delivery tube does not infringe the “wire” limitation under the

doctrine of equivalents because an additional essential function of the “wire” is to “transmit force or

energy” to the implant. (Defendant’s SB at 2; Supplemental Declaration of John M. Collins in

Support of Defendant Cordis’ Motion for Summary Judgment of Noninfringement ¶ 12-14, Docket

Item No. 643.) Defendant contends that the DCS delivery tube performs this function in a

substantially different way from a “wire.” (Defendant’s SB at 6.) 

First, Claim 7 does not disclose a function of the “wire” with respect to detachment. 

Although that function might be relevant to other patent claims, at most, the “transmission of force

or energy” is an additional function performed by the DCS device. “Infringement under the doctrine

[of equivalents] does not vanish merely because the accused device performs functions in addition to

those performed by the claimed device.” Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870,

877 (Fed. Cir. 1993). If a defendant has appropriated the material features of the patent,

infringement will be found even when those features have been supplemented and modified so as to

constitute an improvement. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d

1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

Second, to the extent the specification discloses a function of the “wire” with respect to

detachment, there is no support in the specification for Defendant’s description of that function, i.e.,

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 14 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 Only one embodiment of the invention is accomplished by the wire transmitting force or

energy: the embodiment employing an electrolytic detachment mechanism. The ‘385 and ‘498

Patents also disclose mechanical detachment. 

14 A requirement of “mechanical” detachment means that force or energy is involved. 

However, there is no disclosure that mechanical force or energy must be transmitted by the “wire.”

15

“transmission of force or energy.” Claim 7 does contain a limitation that the “distal tip” must be

“detachable.” Even if a requirement that a tip be detachable is inherent, the Claim does not limit

“detachable” in any way which would require the wire to function to “transmit force or energy.” 

Nor is there any disclosure in the specification of a requirement that the “wire” transmit force or

energy.13 Thus, the Court need not analyze whether the DCS functions in the same way as a “wire”

to transmit force or energy. 

If the Court were to regard a function of the “wire” limitation in Claim 7 as facilitating

detachment, the way it must be regarded as doing so is by “mechanical or electrical detachment.”14

The result is to accurately place the implant in the body cavity. Defendant’s delivery tube performs

substantially the same function, by similarly facilitating detachment. It accomplishes detachment

substantially the same way because it uses mechanical detachment. Mechanical force is applied by

expanding the gripper, which builds pressure within the delivery tube and reduces the friction

holding the coil in place. (Kessel Decl., Ex. 5 at CNV 0034464, Ex. 6 at CNV 00344628; Jones

Decl. ¶ 5.) While the DCS creates this force hydraulically using fluid inside its delivery tube, the

combination of more than one element or step to perform a single function does not avoid

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The accused DCS device achieves the same result

as the “wire,” namely detachment of the implant. The DCS’s hydraulic mechanism of detachment

may constitute an improvement on Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent; however, the improvement does not

dispel infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s contention regarding additional functionality

does not overcome the substantial equivalency of the DCS delivery tube and the “wire” limitation of

Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent.

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 15 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

iii. vitiation of a claim limitation

Defendant contends that a finding that its hollow delivery tube device infringes the “wire”

limitation of Claim 7 is impermissible because non-hollowness is an express structural limitation of

a “wire.” (Defendant’s SB at 8.) 

The doctrine of equivalents may not be used to vitiate an express structural claim limitation. 

Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In this case, the

Court was asked previously to consider whether the inventors used “wire” in a manner which

included “hollow” objects. In its October 8, 2003 Order, the Court found a lack of support in the

specification that the inventor used the term “wire” to include a hollow object. (CC Order at 9.) 

However, in its claim construction, the Court did not state a determination that by “wire” the

inventors meant a “solid” or “non-hollow” strand of metal. Under the doctrine prohibiting claim

vitiation, the Court must find that the doctrine of equivalents is being used to ignore a feature

missing from the accused product which the claim, when properly interpreted, expressly requires to

be present as an essential feature of the patented device. Thus, for the doctrine of claim vitiation to

preclude use of the doctrine of equivalents to cover Defendant’s hollow delivery tube, the Court

must construe the claim to require, as an express limitation, a solid or non-hollow “wire.” One of

ordinary skill in the art must also have understood that a solid or non-hollow “wire” would have

been necessary for the invention to achieve its essential function or to avoid the prior art. Therefore,

the Court’s previous finding of lack of support for the inventors’ use of “wire” to mean a non-hollow

object is not a finding that a non-hollow structure is essential to perform the function of “wire” of

the invention. 

Defendant relies on Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc. for the proposition that a court

may infer a claim limitation from the specification and then find that the limitation would be vitiated

by improper reliance on the doctrine of equivalents. 9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In Hoganas, the

Federal Circuit construed “straw-shaped” as a necessarily being a “hollow” shape. Id. at 951. The

Federal Circuit found this interpretation was consistent with the specification because it would, for

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 16 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 17

example, permit the escape of steam, a feature that was relevant to the invention in Hoganas. Id.

The Federal Circuit then affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the doctrine equivalents. Id.

at 955. It did so, in part, because “[a] conclusion that a solid fiber is equivalent to a hollow

‘straw-shaped’ element would eviscerate the plain meaning of that phrase.” Id. However, the

Federal Circuit also made findings that prosecution history estoppel applied, and that the accused

device did not function in the same way as the “straw-shaped” limitation.

This case is distinguishable from Hoganas. First, there is no issue of prosecution history

estoppel. Second, the Court finds that the DCS delivery tube functions in a substantially similar way

to a “wire.” Finally, the specifications and the claims of the ‘385 and ‘498 Patents make no mention

of a requirement for a solid or non-hollow “wire.” 

In sum, the Court finds that the DCS delivery tube: (1) performs substantially the same

function as a “wire” because it allows delivery and accurate positioning of a distal portion at a

desired location within the body; (2) performs that function in substantially the same way as a

“wire” because it mimics the “pushability” and “trackability” of a guidewire or delivery wire; and

(3) accomplishes the same result as a “wire” because it allows for placement of the distal portion so

as to form an occlusion in a body cavity. (Strother Decl. ¶ 12.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment that the accused DCS device 

infringes Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 

B. Claim 15 of the ‘385 Patent

Claim 15 states:

In an apparatus having a wire for forming an occlusion in a body cavity having a

fluid flowing therein, the improvement comprising:

a deformable object temporally coupled to said wire for disposition

into said cavity having no preferred geometric form when disposed

into said cavity, said deformable object substantially impeding

movement of said fluid in said cavity to thereby form said occlusion, 

whereby said cavity is occluded by said object.

Claim 15 is written in a “Jepson” format. A Jepson format is one in which the preamble

describes prior art and then claims an “improvement” over the prior art. Dow Chemical Co. v.

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 17 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 18

Sumitomo Chemical Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). When a Jepson format is used, the

preamble is a limitation because it defines, in part, structural limitations of the claimed invention. 

See Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

The preamble to Jepson-type Claim 15 recites a “wire” as a structural limitation and recites a

functional limitation of the “wire,” i.e., “for forming an occlusion.” Thus, the construction of the

word “wire” as used in Claim 15 must include a capability of the “wire” itself to “form” an

occlusion. The Court’s construction of the word “wire” allows the “wire” to perform this function if

the Court applies the construction which includes the tip. However, the body of the claim introduces

an ambiguity. The Claim recites “a deformable object temporally coupled to said wire for

disposition into said cavity.” The structure that meets this limitation is also the distal tip. Thus,

Claim 15 is arguably ambiguous in that it discloses coupling a tip (deformable object) to a wire

which already has a tip. The Court defers further consideration of Claim 15, pending any further

proceedings that the parties may wish to initiate with respect to the arguable ambiguity.

C. Claim 38 of the ‘385 Patent

1. Construction of Claim 38

The motions with respect to Claim 38 of the ‘385 Patent require construction of the phrases:

“a deformable object;” “having no preferred geometric form when disposed into said cavity;” and

“capable of being multiply folded upon itself.” 

Claim 38 of the ‘385 Patent provides: 

In a method for forming an occlusion in a body cavity having a fluid flowing therein by

disposing a wire at least adjacent to said body cavity, the improvement comprising:

disposing a deformable object into said cavity having no preferred

geometric form when disposed into said cavity, said deformable

object capable of being multiply folded upon itself, said deformable

object substantially impeding movement of said fluid in said cavity to

thereby form said occlusion, whereby said cavity is occluded by said

object.

All of the highlighted phrases are limitations on the “object” which must be used to practice

the claimed method. Two of these phrases has been previously construed by the Court.

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 18 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 19

a. “a deformable object” 

In its October 7, 2003 Order, the Court construed the word deformable as follows:

The Court construes “deformable object” to mean “an object that can assume a

different shape or form.” This is the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed

terms.

(CC Order at 19.) In the written description, the inventors discuss the phrase “a deformable object”

in the context of a description of an embodiment and depict in Figure 1 of the drawings a “coil”

which is “easily deformed:”

Although prebiased to form a cylindrical or conical envelope, secondary coil 28 is

extremely soft and its overall shape is easily deformed. When inserted within the

microcatheter (not shown), secondary coil 28 is easily straightened to lie axially

within the microcatheter. Once disposed out of the tip of the microcatheter, secondary

coil 28 forms the shape shown in FIG. 1 and may similarly be loosely deformed

to the interior shape of the aneurysm.

(‘385 Patent, Col. 7:54-61.)

Upon reconsideration, the Court finds nothing in the specification, including the claims,

which indicates explicitly or implicitly that the inventors intended to impart a novel meaning to

“deformable.” The record contains no evidence that “deformable” has a peculiar meaning in the

field of art encompassed by the ‘385 Patent. The Court concludes that the meaning which would

have been attributed to this word by those of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of invention

is its ordinary and customary meaning. 

The ordinary and customary meaning attributed to “deformable” is capable of being changed

in shape as by pressure or stress. See WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY, 477 (2d

ed. 1983). In its previous construction, the Court included the ability to changed in “form.” The

Court withdraws that word from its construction and now adopts a construction of “a deformable

object” as: a flexible object, which is capable of assuming a different shape. 

b. “having no preferred geometric form when disposed into said cavity” 

The phrase “having no preferred geometric form when disposed into said cavity” has not

been previously construed by the Court. There are several aspects of the phrase which require

consideration. 

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 19 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 20

First, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “geometric” is to have a regular form

according to the rules or principles of geometry. See WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY

DICTIONARY, 765 (2d ed. 1983). Nothing in the specification indicates that the inventors intended

any specialized meaning of “geometric.” Therefore, the Court uses the ordinary and customary

meaning in its construction of the subject phrase. Second, with respect to the phrase “no preferred

geometric form,” it is clear that the inventors intended to impose a negative limitation, i.e., that a

feature (a preferred geometric form when disposed into said cavity) not be present in the “object.” 

The word “preferred” is a commonly used word, with a variety of meanings depending upon

the context in which it is used, among which are: to set above something else in one’s liking,

opinion, etc.; to hold in greater esteem; to incline toward. See WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH

CENTURY DICTIONARY, 1419 (2d ed. 1983). Closely analogous words are: predilection, inclination,

predispostion, and bias. Further, a “preference” connotes someone making a choice of one thing

over another. The issue becomes whether, in the method disclosed in Claim ‘385, the phrase “no

preferred” refers to the lack of preferences of the practitioner of the method, or whether the phrase

refers to a characteristic of the “object” being used to perform the method. 

The Court questions the permissibility of a claim limitation that relies on the subjective

preference of a person who is performing a method. However, assuming for sake of analysis that it

is permissible to disclose as a claim limitation that a device not have a user’s preferred “geometric

form when disposed,” the patent documents must clearly indicate from among which group of

alternative forms the absence must be judged, otherwise the claim is arguably indefinite. The

specification does not teach what preferred geometric form a practitioner might not prefer when the

implant is disposed in a cavity. Therefore, the Court declines to adopt a practitioner-based definition

of “no preferred geometric form when disposed” because it would make the claim ambiguous and

therefore arguably indefinite. 

In addition, the phrase “preferred geometric form” or its opposite could be used to describe

an innate characteristic of an object. In this context, “preferred geometric form when disposed”

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 20 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 For example, one commonly understood device which has a preferred geometric form is a

spring. A spring is commonly understood to be a device such as a length of metal that returns to its

original form after being forced out of shape. See WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY

DICTIONARY, 1760 (2d ed. 1983). Thus, a spring-loaded hinge contains a circular coil of wire which

may be in a relaxed state while the door is closed. When the door is pushed opened, the geometric

form permits the spring to absorb the force and store energy by tightening its coils. When the dooropening force is released, the geometric coil structure of the spring causes it to return to its original

state, closing the door in the process

The hypothetical spring device highlights the importance of defining the function which the

device performs or must not perform when construing the limitation “no preferred geometric form

when disposed in [a] cavity.”

21

would be a description of an object having and exhibiting a predetermined or an innate physical

shape when deployed. The shape would be “preferred” in the sense that the object would have been

fabricated in a fashion to exhibit a particular geometric shape and the object retains and exhibits that

shape after it has been deployed unless force is applied to deform the object from its “preferred”

geometric shape. Depending on the amount of force applied, even while the device is being

subjected to force, it may retain its preferred geometric form and may “attempt” to assume its predeformed shape.15 In the same context, an object having “no preferred geometric form when

disposed” would be one which exhibited no innate physical shape when deployed. The Court

examines the specification of the ‘385 Patent for any discussion of “no preferred geometric form

when disposed in [a] cavity” and the function of that limitation.

In the specification, the inventors do not use the phrase “no preferred geometric form when

disposed in [a] cavity.” However, there is discussion of the function of the deformability and

conformability of occlusive coils. In their description of prior art, the inventors criticize balloon

embolization because the method requires the cavity to conform to the shape of the balloon. The

inventors’ state that an ideal device is one which adapted itself to the irregular shape of the cavity:

Furthermore, an ideal embolizing agent should adapt itself to the irregular shape

of the internal walls of the aneurysm. On the contrary, in a balloon embolization

the aneurysmal wall must conform to the shape of the balloon. This may not lead to a

satisfactory result and further increases the risk of rupture.

(‘385 Patent, Col. 2:5-10.) Thus, one of skill in the art would have understood that one of the

reasons the inventors would include a limitation of “no preferred geometric form when disposed”

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 21 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 See e.g., Claim 1: “. . .wherein said separable distal tip section has no memory of its

predisposed shape other than at most a relaxed simple helical shape. . .;” 

Claim 14: “said elongate tip portion being a relaxed coil having no substantial memory of

its predisposed shape other than at most a relaxed simple helical shape. . .;” 

Claim 24: “a detachable elongate distal tip portion coupled to and extending from said wire

for a predetermined lineal extent, said detachable elongate distal tip portion being adapted to being

22

would be to have an occlusive implant which adapts itself to the irregular shape of the internal walls

of the body cavity as opposed to one which applies force to the internal walls of the cavity and

reshapes the cavity to a preferred geometric shape of the implant.

The inventors did not use the phrase “geometric form” in the specification to describe an

embodiment of an occlusive object. However, as noted above, the inventors do discuss an occlusive

coil which is prebiased to form “a cylindrical or conical envelop,” but when deployed deforms to the

interior shape of the aneurysm: 

Although prebiased to form a cylindrical or conical envelope, secondary coil 28 is

extremely soft and its overall shape is easily deformed. When inserted within the

microcatheter (not shown), secondary coil 28 is easily straightened to lie axially

within the microcatheter. Once disposed out of the tip of the microcatheter, secondary

coil 28 forms the shape shown in FIG. 1 and may similarly be loosely deformed to

the interior shape of the aneurysm.

(‘385 Patent, Col. 7:54-61.) One of skill in the art would have understood that the inventors are

describing a coil embodiment of an occlusive implant which, before deployment, might exhibit a

pre-biased geometric form, namely a cylindrical or conical envelop. However, the coil embodiment

would easily straighten when inserted into and while being moved through a microcatheter. As the

coil is disposed out of the tip of the microcatheter, initially it would assume its pre-biased cylindrical

or conical shape. However, similarly to the way it would straighten to conform itself to the shape of

the microcatheter, as it encounters the walls of the aneurysm, the coil embodiment would loosely

deform itself from its pre-biased geometric envelop to instead assume a shape based on the interior

walls of the aneurysm.

In every apparatus claim of the ‘385 Patent which describes an occlusive tip and in every

method claim in which a tip was used, the inventors state that the tip is “relaxed,” with “no memory

of a predisposed shape” other than a “simple helical” (conical) shape.16 Thus, one of skill in the art

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 22 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

packed into said body cavity to form said occlusion in said body cavity, said elongate distal tip

portion including a first flexible, shapeless segment having substantially no memory of its

predisposition shape other than at most a relaxed, simple helical shape for disposition into said

cavity and a second segment for coupling said first segment to said wire, said second segment being

adapted to be electrolyzed upon application of current. . .”

Claim 24: “A method for forming an occlusion within a body cavity having fluid disposed

therein comprising the steps of . . .disposing a relaxed wire into said body cavity, said relaxed wire

having no substantial memory of its predisposed shape other than at most a relaxed, simple

helical shape...”

23

would have understood that the inventors used the phrase “no preferred geometric form” to mean

that when the “object” (tip) is deployed into the body cavity it assumes a shape based on the shape

of the cavity and its deployed shape is not a geometric pattern which has been deliberately

manufactured into it.

Therefore, the Court construes the term “a deformable object . . . having no preferred

geometric form when disposed into said cavity” to mean: a flexible object, which is capable of

deforming itself, and which does not exhibit a predetermined regular shape when placed into

the cavity.

c. “capable of being multiply folded upon itself”

In its August 21, 2006 Order, the Court construed the subject phrase as follows:

The Court construes (i) “capable of being multiply folded upon itself” to mean

“capable of being folded upon itself more than one time.”

The Court maintains that construction in this case. 

2. Infringement Analysis

Having now construed Claim 38, the Court proceeds to consider the proffered evidence with

respect to infringement of Claim 38 by the accused DCS coil.

Defendant presents declaration testimony of Donald Jones, a principle engineer employed by

Defendant. Jones testified that the DCS coil is “prebiased” to take a “preferred geometric form”

when it is deployed in a body cavity. (Declaration of Donald K. Jones in Support of Defendant’s

Supplemental Brief ¶ 4, Docket Item No. 644.) However, the declaration also states that at times,

“the DCS coils may not be able to assume completely their prebiased shape or form.” (Id.) This

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 23 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 24

ambiguity is further obscured by Defendant’s “Product Information Portfolio,” which notes that its

coils “thanks to their softness and shape offer an excellent conformability to the aneurysm shape.” 

(See Declaration of Roland H. Schwillinski in Support of Plaintiffs’ Reply in Further Support of Its

Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 1 at CNV 0050874, Docket Item No. 393.) 

Plaintiffs contend that Jones’ declaration testimony is also contradicted by his own

admission when he was deposed as the Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness. (Plaintiffs’ Further

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Docket Item No. 654.) While Mr.

Jones stated that “the coils themselves take a random path” to give a three dimensional shape, he

also noted that the coil “is shaped in a fashion that gives it a predetermined shape.” (Kessel Decl.,

Ex. 11 at 145.) Thus, it remains unclear whether the DCS coil has a preferred geometric form when

disposed inside a body cavity.

Accordingly, the Court finds that, without more, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether

the DCS coil infringes the “no preferred geometric form” limitation of Claim 38 of the ‘385 Patent. 

Since the Court has construed Claim 38 in this Order, this construction was not considered by the

parties’ experts. The parties are invited, if they wish, to renew their motions with respect to Claim

38 with supplemental declarations from their respective experts.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment that Defendant infringes

Claim 7 of the ‘385 Patent under the doctrine of equivalents.

Pending further proceedings based upon this Order, the Court DENIES, without prejudice to

being renewed Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment that Defendant infringes Claims 15, 16,

17, 19, 22, and 38 of the ‘385 Patent.

//

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 24 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 25

The Court DEFERS ruling at this time on Motions addressed to Claims 8, 10, 13, 32, and 35

of the ‘385 Patent and Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of the ‘498 Patent. The Court invites the parties to

make a separate motion addressed to these Claims in light of this Order.

Dated: January 18, 2008 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 25 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Allison H Stiles astiles@goodwinprocter.com

Amanda Marie Kessel akessel@goodwinprocter.com

Christopher T. Holding cholding@goodwinprocter.com

David T. Pritikin dpritikin@sidley.com

Edward V. Anderson evanderson@sidley.com

Georgia Kloostra VanZanten gvanzanten@sidley.com

Hugh A. Abrams habrams@sidley.com

J. Anthony Downs jdowns@goodwinprocter.com

Julie Lynn Fieber jfieber@flk.com

Lisa Anne Schneider lschneider@sidley.com

Lisa Anne Schneider lschneider@sidley.com

Marc A. Cavan mcavan@sidley.com

Matthew Thomas Powers mpowers@sidley.com

Michael Francis Kelleher mkelleher@flk.com

Michael G. Strapp mstrapp@goodwinprocter.com

Patrick Eugene Premo ppremo@fenwick.com

Patrick Shaun Thompson pthompson@goodwinprocter.com

Paul F. Ware pware@goodwinprocter.com

Roland Schwillinski rschwillinski@goodwinprocter.com

Stephanie Pauline Koh skoh@sidley.com

Susan E. Bower sbower@sidley.com

Teague I. Donahey tdonahey@sidley.com

Tracy Jean Phillips tphillips@sidley.com

Dated: January 18, 2008 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Elizabeth Garcia

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:02-cv-01474-JW Document 1105 Filed 01/18/08 Page 26 of 26