Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00114/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00114-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-CV-0114 W (MDD)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [DOC. 15];

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [DOC. 20]; AND

(3) REMANDING CASE

Pending before the Court are two cross-motions for summary judgment brought by 

Plaintiff Gerald Miller and Defendant Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security. 

(Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. 15]; Def.’s Mot. [Doc. 20].) United States Magistrate Judge Mitchell 

Dembin has issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that this 

action be remanded for further proceedings. (R&R [Doc. 21].) Defendant has objected. 

(Def.’s Objs. [Doc. 22].) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment, DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment, and REMANDS the case for further proceedings.

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I. BACKGROUND

On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff Gerald Miller protectively filed an application for

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability 

beginning June 1, 2013. (R&R [Doc. 21] 2.) Mr. Miller’s application was denied, and he 

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) Following a 

hearing, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision on May 18, 2016. (Id.) On December 

11, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and declared the 

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (Id.) This 

civil action followed.

Mr. Miller filed a motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2018. (Pl.’s Mot.

[Doc. 15].) Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 6, 2018. 

(Def.’s Mot. [Doc. 20].) On July 19, 2019, United States Magistrate Judge Mitchell 

Dembin issued an R&R recommending that this case be remanded for further 

proceedings. (R&R [Doc. 19].) Defendant timely objected. (Def.’s Objs. [Doc. 22].)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show: (1) that she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

that can be expected to result in death, or that either has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of 12 or more months; and (2) that as a result of such inability, 

the claimant is incapable of performing any substantial gainful work existing in the 

national economy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). 

The Commissioner determines whether a claimant qualifies for disability pursuant 

to a sequential five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in any

substantially gainful activity. See id. at § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

See id. 

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Second, the Commissioner determines the medical severity of the claimant’s 

condition and its duration relative to the twelve-month requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1509. See id. at § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have “any impairment or 

combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental 

ability to do basic work activities[,]” then the claimant is not disabled. See id.

Third, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s condition meets or 

equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. See id. at § 

404.1520(d). If so, then the claimant is disabled; if not, then the Commissioner proceeds 

to the next step. See id.

Fourth, the Commissioner makes a finding of “residual functional capacity,” an 

assessment of the claimant’s condition that is used to determine whether the condition 

renders her unable to work. See id. at §§ 404.1520(e)–(f), 416.945. If the claimant can 

do work that she has done in the past, then she is not disabled. See id. If the claimant 

cannot do such work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step.

Fifth and finally, the Commissioner uses the above residual functional capacity 

assessment and several other factors to determine if the claimant is able to do any other

substantially gainful work existing in the national economy. See id. at § 404.1520(g); 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). If not, then she is disabled. If she is able to do other 

work, she is not disabled.

The Court may set aside a denial of benefits “ ‘only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.’ ” Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

“The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability.” See id. (quoting Burch 

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “Substantial evidence means ‘such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’ ” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Howard 

v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation as to a dispositive 

motion, the Court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition 

that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Did Not Properly Consider Plaintiff’s Diabetes.

As described in Judge Dembin’s R&R, the ALJ screened Plaintiff’s diabetes 

mellitus as “not severe” at step two of the five-step sequential disability analysis and did 

not discuss the impairment further. (R&R [Doc. 21] 9–12.)

“An impairment or combination of impairments may be found ‘not severe only if 

the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an 

individual’s ability to work.’ ” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Step two is merely a 

threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims . . . . It is not meant to identify 

the impairments that should be taken into account when determining the RFC.” Buck v. 

Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). According 

to the Ninth Circuit:

The Commissioner has stated that “[i]f an adjudicator is unable to determine 

clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on the 

individual’s ability to do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation should not 

end with the not severe evaluation step.” S.S.R. No. 85–28 (1985). Step two, then, 

is “a de minimis screening device [used] to dispose of groundless claims,” Smolen, 

80 F.3d at 1290, and an ALJ may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments only when his conclusion is “clearly 

established by medical evidence.” S.S.R. 85–28. Thus, applying our normal 

standard of review to the requirements of step two, we must determine whether the 

ALJ had substantial evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly established 

that [a claimant] did not have a medically severe impairment or combination of 

impairments.

Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005).

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The ALJ’s analysis as to Plaintiff’s diabetes is confined to step two of the 

analytical framework—the “de minimis screening device” “[used] to dispose of 

groundless claims.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. (Administrative Record (“AR”) [Doc. 12-2] 

48.) This analysis consists entirely of the following:

The claimant has been diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. (Exhibit 3F). 

Medical records from April 2014 indicate that the claimant’s diabetes was 

uncontrolled. (Exhibit 7F). The medical records from June 2015 indicate 

that the claimant had not been controlling his blood sugar well and had been 

sometimes forgetting to take insulin. The claimant complained of a tingling 

sensation in the feet at bedtime. However, he does not have weakness in his 

extremities. Furthermore, in January 2015, the claimant reported that the 

tingling had just started and it was intermittent initially. (Exhibit 15F). 

Similarly, the record contains no evidence of other symptoms due to the 

claimant’s [diabetes] that would result in more than minimal work-related 

functional limitations. Therefore, the claimant’s diabetes is nonsevere.

(AR [Doc. 12-2] 48.) In short, there is evidence in the administrative record that

Plaintiff suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes, was sometimes forgetting to 

take insulin shots and adequately control his blood sugar, and was suffering from

peripheral neuropathy. (AR [Doc. 12-8] 491–536.) 

Yet the ALJ summarily concluded at the outset that Plaintiff’s diabetes was 

nonsevere based on a screening device designed to dispose of de minimis problems 

and meritless claims. He did not analyze the impairment further. The only 

reasoning given was that: (1) “the tingling had just started and was intermittent 

initially[;]” and (2) “the record contains no evidence of other symptoms [of 

diabetes beyond those he had already described.]” (AR [Doc. 12-2] 48.) This was 

error. The resulting decision is not grounded in substantial evidence. See Webb, 

433 F.3d at 687. Defendant’s objections to Judge Dembin’s R&R are perfunctory 

and devoid of persuasive reasoning. Remand is the appropriate course. See INS v. 

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002); Moisa v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 

2005).

//

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 15] is GRANTED.

(2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 20] is DENIED.

(3) This case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2019

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