Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03221/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03221-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

---

1

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DARNAA, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOOGLE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03221-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. Nos. 34, 37

This case concerns the removal and relocation of a music video, “Cowgirl,” on defendant 

YouTube’s video-sharing website. Currently before the court are defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

the First Amended Complaint and defendants’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the court’s 

order dismissing the original complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant YouTube, LLC, which is owned by defendant Google, Inc., operates a popular 

video-sharing website located at www.youtube.com, where users can share and watch videos. Dkt. 

No. 29, FAC ¶¶ 8, 13, 14. Users are required to agree to YouTube’s Terms of Service before 

posting videos to the website. Id. ¶ 22. The Terms of Service prohibit the use of automated 

systems to access the service: 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 1 of 17
2

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

You agree not to use or launch any automated system, including without limitation, 

“robots,” “spiders,” or “offline readers,” that access the Service in a manner that 

sends more request messages to the YouTube servers in a given period of time than 

a human can reasonably produce in the same period by using a conventional on-line 

web browser. 

Id. ¶ 30 (citing Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 1 at § 4(H)). The Terms of Service also require that any cause of 

action arising out of or related to YouTube’s services “COMMENCE WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR 

AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES.” Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 1 at § 14.

Plaintiff Darnaa, LLC is an independent music label that produces and promotes the music 

of the recording artist Darnaa. FAC ¶¶ 9, 10. Plaintiff alleges that the recording artist Darnaa was 

accepted into a Clear Channel Communications promotional program known as “massive artist 

integration program” linked to Clear Channel’s radio marketing program. Id. ¶ 28. The program 

was intended to promote traffic to Darnaa’s “Cowgirl” music video URL on the website YouTube. 

Id. Plaintiff asserts that Clear Channel is “a major advertising industry competitor of Google.” Id.

¶ 49.

On or about March 2, 2014, plaintiff posted the music video entitled “Cowgirl” featuring 

the recording artist Darnaa on YouTube. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that around March 21, 2014, 

plaintiff learned that defendants had removed the “Cowgirl” music video from the YouTube 

website. Id. ¶ 30. In response to an inquiry from plaintiff, YouTube explained that it had removed 

the music video because plaintiff had violated Section 4(H) of YouTube’s Terms of Service by 

using an automated system to manipulate the video’s view count. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. Plaintiff denied

any effort to artificially inflate the view count for the “Cowgirl” music video and protested the 

removal and relocation of the video. See id. ¶¶ 31, 42. On April 7, 2014, plaintiff filed a lawsuit 

against defendant Google in Los Angeles Superior Court, seeking damages and an injunction to 

restore the music video to the website with its original URL. Id.¶ 32. 

On or about April 28, 2014, plaintiff learned that “Cowgirl” music video was again

available on YouTube, but at a different URL and with its view count therefore reset to zero. Id. ¶ 

33. Plaintiff alleges that Clear Channel launched a second promotional campaign for the music 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 2 of 17
3

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

video, but that YouTube removed the video a second time on or about April 30, 2014. Id. ¶ 

34.YouTube reposted the music video again at a third URL, but plaintiff and Clear Channel made 

no further promotional efforts. Id. ¶ 35. 

On May 27, 2014, Google filed a motion to transfer venue of the state court action. Id. ¶

36. On August 28, 2014, the state court granted the motion and dismissed the case without 

prejudice. Id. ¶ 36. Google filed and served a Notice of Order regarding the dismissal on 

September 4, 2014. Id. The instant case was filed on July 10, 2015. Dkt. No. 1. On December 2, 

2015, this court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff’s claims were timebarred by the one-year limitations of actions provision in YouTube’s Terms of Service. Dkt. No. 

27. Leave to amend was granted. Id. at 7. 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 14, 2015. Dkt. No. 29. In the First 

Amended Complaint, plaintiff claims that defendants (1) breached the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing when they removed and relocated the “Cowgirl” music video and (2) 

intentionally interfered with plaintiff’s “beneficial economic relationship” with Clear Channel by 

“essentially making worthless the money and time spent on formulating and executing” the 

promotional campaign for the music video. Id. ¶¶ 38-46, 47-55.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on the grounds that it is barred 

by the limitation provision in YouTube’s Terms of Service and the Communications Decency Act. 

1. Limitation of Actions Provision

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the limitation of actions provision 

contained in the Terms of Service. Plaintiff claims the limitation period was tolled while plaintiff’s 

action was pending against defendants in state court. The parties agree that the California law 

governs the application of equitable tolling in this case. Dkt. Nos. 38 at 3, 42 at 5. California’s

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations “is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine” that is 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 3 of 17
4

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the 

purpose of the statute of limitations—timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s claims—has 

been satisfied.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 99-100 (2008)

(citations omitted).

“Where applicable, the doctrine will ‘suspend or extend a statute of limitations as 

necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.’” Id. (quoting Lantzy v. Centex Homes,

31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003)). “[T]he effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops 

running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has 

concluded. As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the 

end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time 

during which the tolling event previously occurred.” Lantzy, 31 Cal. at 370-71 (emphasis in 

original). In this case, plaintiff argues that contractual limitations period should be tolled for the 

period during which plaintiff’s state court action was pending. FAC ¶ 37. Such tolling would tack 

on enough time to the end of the limitations period to make the filing of this action timely.1Id.

Equitable tolling for the time a plaintiff pursued relief in an alternative forum requires a

showing of three elements: (1) timely notice, (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant, and (3) 

reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff. McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102. “The 

burden is on the plaintiff to show that equitable tolling is appropriate.” United States v. Marolf,

173 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th 

 

1

The details of how equitable tolling would apply to the relevant dates in this case are not 

perfectly clear to the court. Plaintiff calculates the “time span from the filing of the state court 

action to the Notice of Order” as “five months, 14 days,” and would toll the contractual limitations 

period for that amount of time. See FAC ¶ 37. Yet the court calculates the time between the April 

7, 2014 filing of the state court action and the September 4, 2014 Notice of Order as four months, 

28 days (150 days). Moreover, while plaintiff treats March 21, 2014—the date on which “the 

display of the subject video was removed for the first time”—as the accrual date, see FAC ¶ 37, 

defendants do not seem to accept that date, noting that “the FAC does not specify exactly when 

these relocations occurred,” see Dkt. No. 34 at 3. Defendants imply that accrual might have been 

triggered as early as February 2014. Id. at 8 (“the contractual limitations period” expired “no 

earlier than February 2015”). In any event, the parties do not dispute that equitably tolling the 

limitations period during the pendency of plaintiff’s state court action would make plaintiff’s 

claims in this case timely.

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 4 of 17
5

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Cir.1980)); see also In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 183 Cal. App. 4th 900, 913, as modified (Apr. 

23, 2010) (“petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of equitable tolling”); Judelson 

v. American Metal Bearing Co., 89 Cal. App. 2d 256, 266 (1948) (when a plaintiff’s claim 

depends upon equitable estoppel, “it must be pleaded in the complaint with sufficient accuracy to 

disclose the facts relied upon and the plaintiff must prove all of the elements constituting it”), 

quoted in Fanucci v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2009). (“Where, 

however—as here—a plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations is not a bar based on 

equitable tolling, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the applicability of such.”). 

While the issue of equitable tolling is fact-intensive and often addressed at a later stage in

litigation, a district court may grant a motion to dismiss if it is clear as a matter of law that plaintiff 

could not prevail on the issue. See, e.g., Estate of Blue v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 984 

(9th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of claims where “all facts necessary to decide whether 

equitable tolling applies are in the record”); Ervin v. Los Angeles Cty., 848 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal where record reflected lack of reasonable and good faith conduct).

a. Timely Notice to Defendant

There is no dispute between the parties about timely notice. “The timely notice 

requirement essentially means that the first claim must have been filed within the statutory period. 

Furthermore, the filing of the first claim must alert the defendant in the second claim of the need 

to begin investigating the facts which form the basis for the second claim. Generally this means 

that the defendant in the first claim is the same one being sued in the second.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 

4th at 102 n.2 (quoting Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924 (1983)). There is 

no dispute that plaintiff’s state court action against Google was filed within one year as required 

by Section 14 of YouTube’s Terms of Service. Similarly, there is no dispute that defendant 

Google, as YouTube’s parent company, was alerted to the need for defendants to begin 

investigating the factual basis of plaintiff’s claims.

b. Lack of Prejudice to Defendant

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 5 of 17
6

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

There is also no dispute about lack of prejudice to defendants. “The second prerequisite 

essentially translates to a requirement that the facts of the two claims be identical or at least so 

similar that the defendant’s investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly 

defend the second.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102 n.2 (quoting Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 925).

Plaintiff’s state court action alleged both intentional and negligent interference with prospective 

economic relations. See Dkt. No. 34-1, Ex. A. Plaintiff’s claims here are similar, but not identical. 

While the original state court complaint referenced YouTube’s Terms of Service, it did not contain 

allegations of contractual breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See id.

Furthermore, the complaint in this case includes allegations based on events after the state court 

complaint was filed—specifically the second and third removals and relocations of the music 

video. However, defendants do not claim that they suffered any prejudice.

c. Reasonable and Good Faith Conduct on Part of Plaintiff

Defendants argues that plaintiff cannot allege reasonable and good faith conduct sufficient 

to support the application of equitable tolling because plaintiff (1) voluntarily dismissed the 

original state court action and (2) waited over ten months after the state court dismissal to file this 

suit. Plaintiff responds that (1) it did not voluntarily dismiss the state court action and (2) the lapse 

of ten months alone does not establish unreasonable or bad faith conduct. “The third prerequisite 

of good faith and reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff is less clearly defined in the cases. 

But in Addison v. State of California . . . the Supreme Court did stress that the plaintiff filed his 

second claim a short time after tolling ended.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102 n.2 (quoting Collier, 

142 Cal. App. 3d at 926); see Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 321 (1978)). 

i. Voluntary Dismissal

The parties agree that defendant Google moved to transfer the state action from Los 

Angeles County to Santa Clara County based on a forum and venue selection clause. See, e.g., 

Dkt. No. 29 at Ex. 4 (August 28, 2014 Superior Court Minute Order). The parties also agree that 

the state court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. Id. But the parties do 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 6 of 17
7

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

not agree that the dismissal was voluntary. 

According to defendants’ counsel, the state court “found that transfer was appropriate 

under the circumstances,” but “offered Plaintiff’s counsel the option instead of voluntarily 

dismissing the action so that any claims Plaintiff wished to pursue against Google or YouTube 

could be filed as a new case in the proper forum.” Dkt. No. 34 at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 35, Decl. of 

Jacob T. Veltman). Defendants’ claim is that “Plaintiff’s counsel chose that route” at the hearing 

on the motion to transfer. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, disputes this account, stating that 

“[t]here was no such conversation between the state court judge and attorney Shapiro at the 

hearing of the motion to transfer” and that “at no time did [plaintiff’s counsel] ever communicate 

any such election to the judge.” Dkt No. 38 at 10-11 (citing Dkt. No. 39, Decl. of Michael R. 

Shapiro). 

The facts are in dispute, and evidence outside the pleadings “cannot normally be 

considered in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Therefore, the court declines to consider voluntary dismissal as a basis for rejecting 

plaintiff’s equitable tolling allegations in this case. 

ii. Ten Months Between Dismissal and Filing

Next, defendants argue plaintiff did not act reasonably or in good faith because plaintiff

waited over ten months from the date of the state court dismissal to file this action in federal court.

Under the third prong of equitable tolling, “plaintiff’s reasonable promptness in refiling is 

necessary for relief.” Kolani v. Gluska, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402, 410 (1998), quoted in Musaelian v. 

Sonoma Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. C 07-00806 SI, 2007 WL 1864342, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 

2007). While the case law provides no bright line rule for how long is too long, the court finds that 

plaintiff has not alleged facts showing reasonable and good faith conduct. 

Plaintiff suggests that in order to reject equitable tolling in this case, the court must find 

that plaintiff “operated unreasonably or in bad faith,” by, for example, engaging in procedural 

tactics such as forum or judge shopping or misleading defendants as to its intent to proceed. Dkt. 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 7 of 17
8

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

No. 38 at 7. Plaintiff relies on Collier to argue that “a plaintiff’s inaction on the second claim—as 

opposed to affirmative conduct—can seldom be said to have misled the defendant in a way that 

would negate equitable tolling on that claim” because “[c]omplete inactivity on the second claim, 

in fact, is what ‘equitable tolling’ is all about.” 142 Cal. App. 3d at 932. While affirmative 

misconduct may indeed be grounds for rejecting the doctrine of equitable tolling, no such 

allegations are at issue here. The question for the court is whether plaintiff has alleged facts that 

could show plaintiff’s ten-month delay in refiling constitutes reasonable and good faith conduct.

Collier offers little support for plaintiff’s position that the ten months does not “in and of 

itself” demonstrate unreasonable conduct. Dkt. No. 38 at 7. In fact, the Collier court found that 

plaintiff “acted most reasonably” when he filed his second administrative claim during the 

pendency of the first claim—not after the first claim was resolved, much less ten months after. 142 

Cal. App. 3d at 931-32. The Collier court noted “[p]erhaps, if a plaintiff delayed filing the second 

claim until the statute on that claim had nearly run, even after crediting the tolled period, his 

conduct might be considered unreasonable,” but found that it “need not decide” such a question. 

142 Cal. App. 3d at 926, 931-32. 

Plaintiff cites several cases applying equitable tolling, but all of the cases involve time 

gaps of substantially less than ten months; in some cases, there is no time gap between claims at 

all. See Oltman v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 538 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying equitable 

tolling where plaintiffs “promptly” filed in federal court on the same day the state court claims 

were dismissed); Berry v. Pac. Sportfishing, Inc., 372 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1967) (federal claim 

filed roughly three months after state court action was enjoined and only three days after statute of 

limitations would otherwise have run); Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 317 (plaintiffs, “anticipating an 

adverse ruling” in federal case, filed a state court complaint the week before their federal claims 

were dismissed); Tarkington v. Cal.Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1507

(2009) (second petition filed 13 days after denial of motion for reconsideration in first case); 

Downs v. Dep’t of Water & Power, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1102 (1997) (plaintiff filed state law 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 8 of 17
9

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

action “within three months” of outcome of administrative claim); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 1, 41 (1989) (second complaint filed “immediately 

following” voluntary dismissal in federal court). This court has not identified any authority finding 

a ten-month delay to be reasonable. Cf. Musaelian, 2007 WL 1864342, at *3(“This Court is not 

aware of any authority which would allow equitable tolling here, where plaintiffs waited eight 

months to refile.”).

Instead, the length of plaintiff’s delay suggests unreasonable conduct. See Audio Mktg. 

Servs., S.A.S. v. Monster Cable Prods., Inc., No. C 12-04760 WHA, 2013 WL 633202, at *7-8 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013) (finding no “good faith and reasonable conduct” where sixteen months 

elapsed between last decision in first case and plaintiff’s second filing); Bonifield v. Cty. of 

Nevada, 94 Cal. App. 4th 298, 306 (2001) disapproved of on other grounds by City of Los Angeles 

v. Cty. of Kern, 59 Cal. 4th 618 (2014) (finding that plaintiffs had not alleged “reasonable conduct 

on their part” where they “waited 146 days after dismissal of their federal action, knowing all 

along that they intended to file the action again in state court”); Kolani, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 411

(claims not saved by equitable tolling where plaintiffs “made no showing justifying the 78 day 

delay from dismissal of the federal suit to refiling in state court”). 

Plaintiff has been on notice of the factual bases for its claims at least since April 2014, as 

shown by its allegations in the First Amended Complaint. Furthermore, plaintiff must have read 

the one-year limitation of action provision no later than when it responded to YouTube’s motion 

to transfer the state court action. The provision was in all capital letters and in the section of 

YouTube’s Terms of Service immediately following the section containing the forum selection 

clause. Yet it was not until several months later that plaintiff filed the current action. Plaintiff has 

not alleged facts showing that it acted reasonably and in good faith. See Ervin, 848 F.2d at 1020

(declining to apply equitable tolling because plaintiff’s conduct was “neither reasonable nor in 

good faith” where record revealed that she had been in possession of defendant’s investigation file 

“for perhaps as much as a year and a half prior to her filing”).

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 9 of 17
10

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff does not provide any facts in its First Amended Complaint explaining the length 

of its delay despite being specifically advised by the court to do so. Dkt. No. 27 at 8.The motion to 

dismiss the First Amended Complaint is granted on the basis that the original federal complaint in 

this action was not filed within the one-year contractual limitations period in the YouTube’s

Terms of Service. 2

d. Leave to Amend

Although this court has already granted plaintiff the opportunity to allege equitable tolling, 

plaintiff requests leave to amend again in order “to explain what occurred during the 10 months 

here in issue.” In its brief in opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff offers for the first time an 

explanation for the delay in filing in federal court. Dkt. No. 38 at 11-13. A “district court should 

grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that 

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If granted leave, plaintiff would allege that its legal team reasonably and in good faith 

worked collectively and individually during the ten months. Dkt. No. 38 at 11-13. Specifically, 

plaintiff would allege that because plaintiff was originally seeking a temporary restraining order 

and preliminary injunction, the state court complaint had to be filed promptly such that there was 

little time to research the facts and law in depth. Id. Plaintiff would allege that its counsel did not 

begin seriously researching the facts and legal theories until after the state court claim was 

dismissed. Id. Plaintiff would allege that its counsel, Michael Shapiro, working alone, first had to 

put together a quality team, and that finding the right combination of lawyers took a few months. 

 

2

Plaintiff also argues that, even if the court does not apply equitable tolling, the court should 

decline to enforce the contractual limitations period because it is unconscionable. Dkt. No. 38 at 

12-17. This court addressed plaintiff’s arguments regarding the unconscionability of YouTube’s 

Terms of Service, including the contractual limitations period, in its December 2, 2015 order. See

Dkt. No. 27 at 3-6. Plaintiff argues that it has amended the complaint to add facts demonstrating 

the unconscionability of the contract. However, plaintiff’s new allegations merely rehash the 

arguments made in opposition to defendants’ first motion to dismiss—that plaintiff lacked 

meaningful choice and that nobody reads YouTube’s Terms of Service before agreeing to them. 

See Dkt. No. 19 at 5-9. The court declines to reconsider its ruling on unconscionability.

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 10 of 17
11

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Id. Plaintiff would then allege that the legal team explored and researched potentially viable

claims, before preparing and filing its selected claims in this action. Id. Plaintiff would then allege

that these tasks reasonably required 10 months to accomplish. Id. Plaintiff would further allege the 

absence of bad faith on its part. Id.

The court is not persuaded that these allegations support equitable tolling. For example, 

while plaintiff’s proposed amendments may explain why plaintiff rushed to file in state court, they 

do not explain plaintiff’s failure to investigate and research its claims during the nearly five-month 

pendency of the state action. Furthermore, plaintiff’s proposals do not explain why the legal team 

would need months to prepare a complaint based largely on the same facts as in the already-filed 

state court complaint. See, e.g., Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 

1997) (finding ten weeks “certainly sufficient time to commence an action”). In addition, the 

search for co-counsel, even for a solo practitioner, cannot justify several months delay. Cf. Audio 

Mktg., 2013 WL 633202 at *7-8 (finding it insufficient for plaintiff to allege that “it took some 

time” for a “small, family-owned business with a single location in Paris” to “locate and educate 

an American lawyer to handle its claim”); Miller v. IBM World Trade Corp., No. 06 CIV. 4452 

(DLC), 2007 WL 700902, at *5 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2007) (applying California law to reject 

equitable tolling because of unreasonable delay and stating that “time necessary to retain counsel 

cannot alone justify the year-long delay”). Lastly, plaintiff’s allegations as to its lack of bad faith, 

even if accepted as true, would not relieve plaintiff of its burden to plead reasonable conduct on its 

part.

Despite the fact that the court questions the plaintiff’s ability to successfully plead facts 

justifying equitable tolling, the court grants plaintiff an additional opportunity to do so.

2. Communications Decency Act

Defendants assert that even if the complaint is viewed as timely, plaintiff’s claims are 

precluded by the Community Decency Act. 

a. Section 230(c)(1)

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 11 of 17
12

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Section 230(c)(1) of the Act states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 

shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 

content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Section 230(e)(3) states: “No cause of action may be 

brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 

section.” “Bringing these two subsections together, it appears that subsection (c)(1) only protects 

from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks 

to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by 

another information content provider.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 

2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009). 

i. Provider or User of an Interactive Computer Service

Plaintiff does not contest that defendants are interactive computer service providers, and 

the court agrees that the YouTube website “provides or enables computer access by multiple users 

to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C § 230(f)(2) (defining “interactive computer service”). 

ii. Information Provided by Another Information 

Content Provider

While plaintiff does not contest that that the “Cowgirl” video is “information provided by 

another information content provider,” plaintiff appears to argue that the view count is not because 

it is “not material that third parties seek to post on line.” See Dkt. No. 38 at 18 (quoting Barnes,

570 F.3d at 1103). The court is not persuaded by this argument. There is no suggestion that 

YouTube’s users are unaware that their video views are counted—in fact, plaintiff alleges that the 

view counts are designed so that “each viewer can assess the popularity of the video by how many

previous views it has garnered.” YouTube does not become the “information content provider” 

merely because it makes decisions about how to present the view count; § 230(c)(1) shields 

defendants from “all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to 

content generated entirely by third parties.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.

iii. Treatment as Publisher or Speaker

Plaintiff also argues that plaintiff’s claims do not seek to treat defendants as a publisher or 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 12 of 17
13

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

speaker. Defendants argue that they are immune from suit on both of plaintiff’s claims because 

“removing content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct 

necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.” Id. 

at 1103. The question this court must resolve, however, is whether, for each claim asserted by 

plaintiff, the specific duties that defendants allegedly violated derive from defendants’ “status or 

conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’” Id. at 1102.

In Barnes, plaintiff asserted two causes of action based on Yahoo’s failure to remove 

unauthorized profiles posted her ex-boyfriend: (1) “negligent provision or non-provision of 

services which Yahoo undertook to provide” and (2) breach of “promise” to remove the profiles. 

Id. at 1098. The Ninth Circuit found that publisher immunity precluded plaintiff’s negligent 

undertaking claim because the duty Yahoo had allegedly violated derived “from Yahoo’s conduct 

as a publisher—the steps it allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the 

offensive profiles.” Id. at at 1103. With respect to the promissory estoppel claim, however, the 

Ninth Circuit found that the duty Yahoo had allegedly violated arose from “a contract—an 

enforceable promise—not from any non-contractual conduct or capacity of the defendant.” Id. at 

1107. The court explained that plaintiff’s tort claim derived “liability from behavior that is 

identical to publishing or speaking: publishing defamatory material; publishing material inflicts 

emotional distress; or indeed attempting to de-publish hurtful material but doing it badly.” Id.

Plaintiff’s contract claim, on the other hand, derived liability “not from Yahoo’s publishing 

conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something, which 

happens to be removal of material from publication.” Id.

This court concludes that plaintiff’s tort claim for intentional interference with prospective 

economic advantage is precluded by § 230(c)(1). It seeks to hold defendants liable for “an action 

that is quintessentially that of a publisher,” regardless of defendants’ alleged motive. Id. at 1003; 

see also Sikhs for Justice “SFJ,” Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (finding Title II discrimination claim precluded where plaintiff alleged that defendant’s 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 13 of 17
14

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

removal of Facebook page “was motivated solely by unlawful discrimination”). 

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

however, is not precluded by § 230(c)(1) because it seeks to hold defendants liable for breach of 

defendants’ good faith contractual obligation to plaintiff, rather than defendants’ publisher status.

Even though the claim is based on the same factual allegations as plaintiff’s intentional 

interference claim, the source of defendants’ alleged liability is different. The Terms of Service 

contain, as do all contracts, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing that defendants would not do

anything to unfairly interfere with plaintiff’s right to recover the benefits of the contract. 

Therefore, the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s implied covenant claim on 

the basis of § 230(c)(1).

b. Section 230(c)(2)

Section 230(c)(2) provides immunity to providers and users of interactive computer 

services for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 

material that the provider or user considered to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 

violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 

protected.” 42 U.S.C. 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Although users and providers have 

discretion to decide what is “objectionable,” it is not clear that videos removed because of 

suspected view count manipulation can be considered “objectionable” as that term is used in §

230(c)(2). The context of § 230(c)(2) appears to limit the term to that which the provider or user 

considers sexually offensive, violent, or harassing in content. See Song Fi Inc. v. Google, 108 

F.Supp 3d 876, 883-884 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

This court does not, however, need to reach the question of whether deliberately inflated 

view counts are “objectionable.” Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support its claim that 

defendants did not act in good faith, which is a requirement under § 230(c)(2) immunity. As 

acknowledged by defendants, “[r]emovals must still be ‘in good faith,’ so the provider must 

actually believe that the material is objectionable for the reasons it gives.” Dkt. 34 at 13 n.4.

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 14 of 17
15

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Despite defendants’ argument to the contrary, plaintiff alleges that defendants removed the 

video and view counts for reasons other than its belief that plaintiff manipulated the view count. 

Plaintiff makes the following assertions in support of its claim that defendants acted in bad faith:

 Plaintiff “did not engage in any activities to create an illegitimate view 

count” and “categorically denies” that it violated the Terms of Service. FAC

¶ 42. 

 Defendants had no basis for removing the video and its view count. Id. ¶ 43.

 Defendants falsely accused plaintiff of violating the prohibition against 

using an automated systems to inflate the view count of the video. Id. ¶ 44.

 Defendants restored the Cowgirl video under a different URL. Id.

 Defendants knew that plaintiff had not violated the Terms of Service and 

nevertheless removed the Cowgirl video on two occasions—ever after being 

advised of plaintiff’s “huge expenditure in advertising and promotion 

money.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.

 Defendants were able to track viewers and ascertain that “the large majority 

of the viewer accessing the ‘Cowgirl’ video on YouTube came to the video 

by clicking links embedded in various of the hundreds of Clear Channel 

Internet radio websites” Id. ¶ 50

 Defendants unfairly competed with Clear Channel, defendants’ advertising 

competitor, with whom plaintiff had a promotional contract. Id. ¶¶ 49, 50.

 Defendants sought to punish plaintiff because it failed to play “advertising 

ball” (agree to have advertising embedded in its video) with defendants. Id.

¶ 51.

The viability of plaintiff’s complaint depends on its ability to prove that defendants acted in bad 

faith, and the allegations of plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are marginally sufficient to plead 

bad faith. Therefore, the court declines to dismiss on the basis of § 230(c)(2) immunity.

B. Motion for Reconsideration

Defendants ask the court to reconsider its findings that “view counts” do not appear to fall 

within definition of “Content” in YouTube’s Terms of Service and that “[e]ven if view counts are 

considered ‘Content,’ it is not clear that Section 7(B) expressly authorizes the removal of the 

associated video ‘Content,’ as opposed to just the offending view count.”

1. Definition of “Content”

Upon reconsideration, the court concludes that video counts are “Content.” As defined by 

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 15 of 17
16

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Section 2 of YouTube’s Terms of Service, “Content” includes “the text, software, scripts, 

graphics, photos, sounds, music, videos, audiovisual combinations, interactive features and other 

materials you may view on, access through, or contribute to the Service.” Defendants argue that 

view counts are encompassed by the plain meaning of the catchall term “other materials you may 

view on . . . the Service.”3The court agrees. The California Court of Appeals has also found that 

“videos, the number of views of these videos, and the comments on the videos” are encompassed 

by the definition of “Content” in YouTube’s Terms of Service. Lewis v. YouTube, LLC, 244 Cal. 

App. 4th 118, 125-26 (2015) (considering the definition of “Content” in interpreting limitation of 

liability clause). Where “there is relevant precedent from the state’s intermediate appellate court, 

the federal court must follow [it] unless the federal court finds convincing evidence that the state’s 

supreme court would likely not follow it.” Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993, 994 

(9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff submits that “Content” does not include view counts because Sections 6 and 7 of 

the Terms of Service refer to “Content” as material submitted by the user, see Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 1 

§§ 6(A), 7(B), and view counts are not submitted by the user. However, the definition of Content 

is not limited to material submitted by a user; it includes materials “you may view on, access, or 

contribute to the Service.” Id. § 2. YouTube users may “view” the video view counts themselves 

and may contribute to view counts by watching the videos. Moreover, a user who used an 

automated system to enhance a view count would be contributing “Content” to the Service, 

although in violation of the Terms of Service. See id. § 4(H).

2. YouTube’s Right to Remove and Relocate Content

Section 7(B) of the Terms of Service reserve to YouTube the right to decide, in its sole 

discretion, whether particular Content violates the Terms of Service and, if so, to remove such 

Content or terminate the user’s account. Dkt. No. No. 29, Ex. 1 § 7(B). Since Section 4(H)

 

3 Defendants also argue that view counts are encompassed by the ordinary meanings of other 

terms used in the definition of “Content,” but because the court concludes that view counts are 

captured by the term “other materials,” it need not address these arguments.

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 16 of 17
17

15-cv-03221-RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 

FC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

prohibits the use of automated systems to enhance view counts, defendants assert that YouTube

cannot be sued moving the video in order to reset its view count or removing the video altogether 

based on its determination that the video’s view count had been manipulated. The court now 

agrees with defendants that the view count is content, and its enhancement by an automated 

system makes the view count subject to removal and the manipulator’s account subject to 

termination.

Plaintiff, however, claims that YouTube removed the video and its view counts without 

any legitimate factual basis and set the Cowgirl view count at zero on re-posting. As noted above, 

plaintiff categorically denies that it automatically enhanced Cowgirl’s view counts and asserts that 

YouTube’s claim that did is made in bad faith. Dkt. No. 27 at 51-63. If plaintiff can prove these 

facts, Section 7(B) does not apply. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s claims are dismissed as barred by the statute of 

limitations. Plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is 

dismissed with prejudice for the additional reason that it is precluded by publisher immunity under 

§ 230 (c)(1) of Communications Decency Act. With respect to its claim for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend to plead 

facts showing a basis for tolling of the contractual limitations period in YouTube’s Terms of 

Service. The court also reconsiders that portion of its December 2, 2005 Order finding that Section

7(B) of the Terms of Service Agreement did not clearly authorize YouTube to move plaintiff’s 

video to reset its view count. The court now finds that the Terms of Service authorize YouTube to 

move a video to reset its view count if YouTube in good faith actually believed that the view 

count was enhanced by an automated system.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2016

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-03221-WHA Document 56 Filed 11/02/16 Page 17 of 17