Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00768/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00768-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAKEITH L. MCCOY,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. HOLGUIN, ET. AL.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00768-ADA-HBK (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STAY AND 

CONSTRUED RULE 56(d) MOTION 

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF 

TIME TO FILE RESPONSE 

(Doc. No. 197)

DECEMBER 28, 2022 DEADLINE

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Application for Extension of Time and Second 

Application to Stay Proceedings” filed on October 3, 2022. (Doc. No. 197, “Motion”). Plaintiff 

seeks an extension of time to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and renews 

his request for an indefinite stay of this action. (Id.). In support, Plaintiff attaches his own 

Declaration. (Id. at 3-6). Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion on October 21, 2022. 

(Doc. No. 200). In support Defendant submits the Declaration of Deputy Attorney General 

Jeremy Duggan and an Exhibit evidencing service of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

on September 19, 2022. (Doc. No. 200-1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants an 

extension of time for Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment but 

denies a stay of this action and Plaintiff’s construed Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion. 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds against fifteen correctional officer-Defendants on his 

second amended civil rights complaint stemming from events that occurred at California 

Correctional Institution, Techachapi (CCI) on March 12, 2015. (Doc. No. 15). In summary, the 

second amended complaint alleges excessive use of force claims and failure to protect claims in 

connection with the March 12, 2015 incident. (See generally Id.). The alleged use of force 

occurred at various points while Plaintiff was being escorted from his cell in Facility A, building 

6 on the way to the law library and included the areas in the rotunda of building 6, outside the 

door in building 6, and dining hall number 4. (Id. at 6-14). The Court had appointed Plaintiff 

counsel and scheduled this matter for trial to commence on November 9, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 148, 

155). On September 25, 2021, after appointed counsel moved to withdraw, citing irreconcilable 

differences, the Court granted the motion and vacated the trial date. (Doc. No. 164). Plaintiff 

sought a new trial date, which Defendants did not oppose, but requested leave to file a belated 

motion for summary judgment to narrow the issues for trial. (Doc. No. 176). 

On September 7, 2022, after being granted leave, Defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment on behalf of eight of the correctional officer-Defendants.1 (Doc. No. 194). More 

specifically, these eight Defendants contend they neither used excessive force nor failed to protect 

Plaintiff on March 12, 2015 because they either were not working at CCI on the day of the 

incident or were assigned to other areas within CCI from which they had no view of the incidents, 

i.e., they were not present during any of the use of force incidents. (Doc. No. 200 at 1, 

5)(emphasis in original)(see also Doc. No. 194-2). On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff was 

transferred to Robert Presley Detention Center (“RPDC”) in Riverside for re-sentencing. (Doc. 

No. 197 at 3). Defendants served Plaintiff with a copy of their motion for summary judgment on 

September 19, 2022. (Doc. No. 200-1). 

Plaintiff files a second motion to stay the case until he returns from RPDC after 

resentencing so he may respond to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 197). Plaintiff 

1 The motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of Defendants Barron, Montanez, Mayfield, 

Moore, Arellano, Lomas, Moreno, and Delgado.

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states he left his legal property and discovery for this case at the prison’s receiving and release 

department and does not have his “interrogatories, documents, etc.,” which he requires to respond 

to the summary judgment motion. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff claims he is only permitted to write in 

pencil, the jail does not make copies for inmates, and access to law library takes precedence for 

criminal cases over civil cases like the instant one. (Id. at 3-5). Plaintiff also states he requires 

additional discovery because Defendants’ expert “made it clear that at least three supervising staff 

found that officers/Defendants during the incident” violated policy and it’s unclear to Plaintiff 

what polices were violated. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff generally claims Defendants have “made false 

accusations/declarations in their summary judgment motions which time is needed to adequately 

bring the falseness to light.” (Id. at 6). 

In response, Defendants attach the declaration of Deputy Attorney General Duggan 

providing proof of service of the pending motion for summary judgment, all attachments thereto, 

and case law to Plaintiff at the RPDC. (Doc. No. 200-1 at 1-5). Defendants explain they are 

unable to ascertain how long Plaintiff will remain at RPDC but state from past experience 

resentencing can take a few months to years. (Doc. No. 200 at 3). Defendants further note that 

before transfer to RPDC, Plaintiff had the opportunity to bring some of his legal documents, but

correctional officials would not have allowed Plaintiff to move entire boxes of legal materials. 

(Id.). 

Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff was able to file the instant motion, which is legible

in pencil (id. at 3) and that counsel can make copies of certain pleadings for Plaintiff if that 

becomes necessary (id. at 4). Regarding Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time, Defendants 

note that Plaintiff is essentially arguing that he requires further discovery to respond to the 

summary judgment motion and his motion is properly construed as being brought under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). (Id. at 4). Defendants submit that Plaintiff, as the moving party, 

has not sustained his burden for more time to oppose their summary judgment motion because he 

does not provide specific facts that are essential to oppose the summary judgment motion. (Id. at 

5). And, to the extent Plaintiff refers to “policies” that need discovered, he does not tie these 

policies to the summary judgment motion. (Id.). Noting that the discovery was opened on April 

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19, 2016 and closed on December 12, 2018, Defendants submit Plaintiff has had more than 

sufficient time to conduct full discovery in this case. (Id. at 5). 

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Stay

The Court is vested with broad discretion to stay a case. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 

705 (1997) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). The “party 

requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that 

discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009). As a general rule, “stays should not

be indefinite in nature.” Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 

1066-67 (9th Cir. 2007)(emphasis added). If a stay is especially long or indefinite, a greater 

showing is required to justify it and the court must “balance the length of any stay against the 

strength of the justification given for it.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Courts consider the following factors to determine if a stay is warranted: (1) the possible 

damage from the granting of a stay; (2) the hardship or inequity a party may suffer in being 

required to go forward; (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms of simplifying or 

complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from the 

stay; (4) the interests of plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation; (5)the 

convenience of the Court in the management to its cases and the efficient use of judicial 

resources. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)(listing above factors to 

consider)(citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); see also Hammond 

v. Mgmt & Training Corp., No. 1:13-cv-01209-AWI-JLT (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2013).

The Court does not find an indefinite stay of the case is warranted, e.g. until Plaintiff has 

his re-sentencing hearing and is transferred back to CDCR. It is unclear for how long Plaintiff 

will remain at RPDC. This case has been pending since 2015, has had multiple status

conferences, settlement conferences, and was previously scheduled for trial. (See generally 

docket). In fact, Plaintiff previously challenged the amount of time this case has been pending 

and the delayed trial. (See Doc. Nos. 175, 187). The Court’s July 1, 2022 Order granting 

Defendants’ motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment within 60 days was an effort 

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to potentially narrow the issues for trial and streamline this case for trial in the near future. 

While the Court understands the hardships Plaintiff identifies in his motion, these 

hardships do not warrant an indefinite stay in this case. As evidenced by Plaintiff’s recent motion

activity following his transfer to RPDC, Plaintiff can litigate this case. The Court experienced no 

issues with Plaintiff using a pencil to draft his motions. And, while criminal cases may take 

precedence for law library access, Plaintiff is not precluded access to the law library. During 

transfer from CDCR to the county facility, Plaintiff was permitted to bring some legal materials 

with him. Prior to his transfer, Plaintiff was aware the Court had granted Defendants’ motion to 

file a belated motion for summary judgement. And Plaintiff does not explain with any level of 

specificity what existing documents he claims he requires and does not have in order to oppose 

the Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Persuasive here is that the eight Defendants who 

moved for summary judgment do so on the basis that they were not present when the incident 

occurred. Given the age of this case, it is in the interests of justice that this case proceed as 

expeditiously as possible. Thus, Plaintiff’s second motion to stay is denied. 

B. Motion for Extension of Time to File an Opposition

The Order permitting Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment further directed 

Plaintiff to file an opposition to any summary judgment motion within thirty (30) days thereafter. 

(Doc. No. 187 at 4, ¶ 2). Defendants served their motion for summary judgment on September 19, 

2022. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time is timely.

To the extent Plaintiff states he requires additional discovery to respond to the motion for 

summary judgment the motion is considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). In 

pertinent it provides:

If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified 

reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the 

court may:

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain 

affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other 

appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Local Rule 260(b) similarly provides that a party may oppose a summary 

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judgment motion due to the need to conduct further discovery when the motion “provide[s] a 

specification of the particular facts on which discovery is to be had or the issues on which 

discovery is necessary.” The party moving under Rule 56(d) bears the burden of demonstrating 

the requisite basis for relief. Atay v. Cty. Of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 698 (9th Cir. 2016). The 

purpose of Rule 56(d) is “to prevent a party form being unfairly thrown out of court by a 

premature motion for summary judgment.” See Jackson v. Riebold, 815 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. The Assiniboine, 

323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003). To obtain a Rule 56(d) continuance, the nonmovant “‘must 

file an affidavit affirmatively demonstrating . . . how postponement of a ruling on the motion will 

enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a 

genuine issue of fact.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). The party 

seeking the additional discovery must demonstrate that the facts sought exist and that they 

sought-after facts are essential to resist the summary judgment motion. Id. Rule 56(d) does not 

condone a fishing expedition. The party seeking more discovery must also identify documents or 

specific facts he believes would contradict the opposing side’s evidence. Id.; see also Family 

Home and Finance Center, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 

2008) (reciting three requirements the non-movant must prove to garner delay or denial of motion 

for summary judgment under Rule 56(d)); see also Securities Exchange Commission v. Stein, 906 

F.3d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 2018) (reiterating that mere speculation about outstanding discovery 

needed is insufficient) Singh v. American Honda Finance Corporation, 925 F.3d 1053, 1076 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (finding no abuse of discretion when district court denied Rule 546(d) motion because 

non-movant provided only conclusory statements to support more time for discovery) . 

Further, a court should consider whether the moving party lacked diligence in pursuing 

discovery earlier. Emplrs. Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox

Co., 353 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004); Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 

n. 6 (9th Cir. 2001). If the moving party acted diligently but simply needs additional time to 

complete discovery, denying his request is an abuse of discretion. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488

F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding district court improperly denied request for additional 

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discovery where plaintiff had pursued discovery but opposing party caused delays); Garrett v.

City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1987)(finding district court 

improperly denied motion where plaintiff diligently pursued discovery but was unable to obtain 

complete responses prior to due date of response to the opposing party's summary judgment 

motion).

Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to conduct discovery in this case which has been 

pending since 2015. (See docket). Plaintiff has not shown with specificity how reopening 

discovery is necessary for him file a response to Defendants’ pending motion for summary 

judgment which is limited in scope. Plaintiff refers to policies Defendants are alleged to have 

violated, but he does not provide sufficient specificity for the Court to determine how discovery 

of these policies could further his cause when the motion concerns the personal involvement of 

each named Defendant concerning the use of force incident. To the extent Plaintiff requires 

unspecified “interrogatories” or “documents” to respond to the motion for summary judgment, as 

more fully set forth below, he may request the same from defense counsel who offered to make 

Plaintiff copies. Because Plaintiff fails to identify with any specificity what discovery he requires 

to respond to the motion for summary judgment, the construed Rule 56(d) motion is denied. 

However, considering Plaintiff’s Motion under Rule 6(b) due to his recent transfer from 

CDCR to RPDC, the Court finds good cause to extend the deadline for Plaintiff to file a response. 

Plaintiff shall file an opposition to Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment by 

delivering his response to the motion for summary judgment to correctional officials for mailing 

no later than December 28, 2022. This will afford Plaintiff time to confer with defense counsel 

as to what documents he requires and permit defense counsel to provide copies of the documents 

to Plaintiff. As set forth below, the Court will require the parties to confer by telephone within 

fourteen (14) days from date of this Order so Plaintiff may request what documents he requires 

and the copies may be provided to Plaintiff. . 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to stay (Doc. No. 197) and construed Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion 

are DENIED. 

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2. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a response to the motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. No. 197) is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file deliver his response to 

correctional authorities for mailing no later than December 28, 2022. 

3. Within fourteen (14) days of the date on this Order, Defense Counsel shall initiate 

a teleconference with Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be prepared to identify with specificity the 

documents, such as interrogatory responses or other documents obtained through discovery, that he 

requires copies of to respond to the motion for summary judgment. 

4. Within (7) days thereafter, Defense Counsel shall mail copies of the identified 

documents to Plaintiff and file a Notice of Mailing with the Court. If Plaintiff fails to identify any 

documents during the telephone conference, Defense Counsel shall file a Notice advising the Court 

of the same. 

Dated: October 27, 2022 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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