Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02301/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court is Defendants’, the City of Birmingham (“the 

City”) and Birmingham Police Officer Demarcus Davis (“Officer Davis”),

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff, Keith Avery

(“Avery”), brought this case alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and comparable state-law claims. For the reasons stated below, 

Defendants’ motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. BACKGROUND

On November 24, 2012, Avery attended a party at a YMCA in 

Birmingham where fights broke out and Birmingham police officers were 

called to restore order. (Avery Dep. at 30-31.) After the police arrived 

and asked the party guests to leave, Avery went across the street to the 

KEITH AVERY,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

DEMARCUS DAVIS, et al.,

Defendant.

2:14-cv-02301-LSC

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

FILED

 2016 Oct-13 PM 04:06

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-02301-LSC Document 23 Filed 10/13/16 Page 1 of 13
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Walmart parking lot, where other party attendees were “tearing up” the 

store. (Id. at 33, 38.) Officer Davis arrived at the YMCA after the fights 

had been subdued but while the building was still being cleared of 

partiers. (Davis Dep. at 29-31.) Officer Davis and other officers then 

heard shots ring out, and drove in the direction of the sound towards the 

back of Walmart where Avery and his friends were located. (Id. at 33-34.) 

While other officers dealt with the shooting suspects, Officer Davis drove 

around to the front of the Walmart in response to the store’s request to 

help clear out the vandalizing teenagers. (Id. at 35-36.) The store had 

been damaged so thoroughly that staff had to clear out all the teenagers 

and lock the doors for the night to prevent further destruction. (Id. at 40, 

Avery Dep. at 38-39.)

Meanwhile, Avery had decided to “just wait” in the parking lot to see 

if he could catch a ride home. (Avery Dep. at 37.) Officer Davis then 

turned his car around and parked in front of the Walmart with his blue 

lights flashing, directly facing two groups of teenagers who were 

gathered in the parking lot. (Davis Dep. 43-44, Avery Dep. at 53.) Avery 

was in one of the groups, and he stated that though the parking lot was 

poorly lit, he was standing under a light “so people could see [him].” 

(Avery Dep. at 40-41.) Before long, more fighting broke out, this time in 

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the Walmart parking lot. (Id. at 41.) According to Avery, a group of six or 

seven young men approached him and his two friends and a fight started. 

(Id. at 41-43.) Avery claims that though his friends were involved in the 

fight, he was not fighting. (Avery Dep. at 56.) Officer Davis, however, 

claims he saw Avery “exchanging punches” with one of the other men. 

(Davis Dep. at 53-54.)

The young men in the parking lot then began to run again, including 

Avery (Avery Dep. at 49.) According to Avery, the men started running 

because shots rang out. However, Davis disputes this, claiming that they 

started running because they saw police officers heading towards them. 

Avery admits that he was running behind one of the young men on the

opposing side of the fight, and conceded that it could have appeared to 

Officer Davis that he was chasing that young man. (Id. at 57-58.) Officer 

Davis claims that he responded to the situation by getting in between 

Avery and the young man that he appeared to be chasing. (Id.) With

Officer Davis in front of him, Avery claims that he continued to run

toward the other individual. According to Avery, he did not see Officer

Davis and had too much adrenaline to stop. (Id. at 59.) Officer Davis

alleges that Avery looked him in the eye and squared up into an offensive 

position. (Davis Dep. at 54.) Regardless, it is undisputed that Avery did 

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not stop running until Officer Davis punched him in the jaw. (Avery Dep.

at 60, Davis Dep. at 54.) 

Avery fell to the ground and briefly lost consciousness as a result of 

the punch, at which point Officer Davis attempted to arrest him. (Avery 

Dep. at 60.) When Avery regained consciousness, he tried to get back up, 

but was quickly slammed back onto the ground by Officer Davis, who 

placed a knee on his back to keep him down and while he handcuffed

him. (Id. at 60-63.) Officer Davis arrested Avery for an affray, and 

thereafter transported him to the Birmingham Police Department East 

Precinct. (Id. at 70-71, Davis Dep. at Ex. 3.) According to Avery, after he 

was arrested, he told Officer Davis that he had a broken jaw, but Officer 

Davis just responded by “cussing [him] out.” (Avery Dep. at 69.) After 

arriving at the precinct, Officer Davis took Avery to Cooper Green 

Hospital for a medical examination. (Id. at 76.) However, Avery refused 

care and was thereafter placed in the juvenile detention. (Id. at 78.)

Avery later had to have surgery to repair his broken jaw and claims that 

he still suffers from “aches, lock jaw,” problems sleeping, and an 

inability to chew food for long periods of time. (Id. at104-05, 110.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there 

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is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is 

“material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). There is 

a “genuine dispute” as to a material fact “if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The trial judge should not weigh the evidence 

but must simply determine whether there are any genuine issues that 

should be resolved at trial. Id. at 249.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must 

give deference to the non moving party by “considering all of the 

evidence and the inferences it may yield in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 

1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). In making a motion for 

summary judgment, “the moving party has the burden of either negating 

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case or showing that there 

is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving party’s case.” 

Id. Although the trial courts must use caution when granting motions for 

summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded 

not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of 

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the Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

327 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Avery brought this action under § 1983 against Officer Davis and the 

City, asserting that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by Officer Davis’s 

actions, which he alleges amount to false imprisonment, false arrest, 

malicious prosecution, harassment, and assault and battery. He also 

brought identical Alabama state laws claims against Officer Davis and the

City.1 The Court recognizes that the defendants filed a Motion to Strike 

Plaintiff’s Brief (Doc. 20) based on Plaintiff’s failure to list statements of 

fact in separately numbered paragraphs. Plaintiff has indeed failed to 

comply with the Uniform Initial Order’s Requirements for statements of 

fact. However, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to Strike, because 

striking the brief, while technically permissible, would not be in the 

interests of justice. Therefore, the Court will address the merits of the 

case as presented in the briefs. 

A. Claims against Officer Davis

 

1 Avery never specifies—in his complaint (Doc. 1) nor his “Brief in Denial and Response 

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docs. 14 & 15)—which Alabama state 

laws he is bringing his claims under. Therefore, the Court will only analyze state law 

immunity, which has been fully briefed by the parties. 

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i. § 1983 and Qualified Immunity 

Qualified immunity “offers complete protection for government 

officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct 

violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 

977 (11th Cir. 2012). In order for qualified immunity to be applicable, 

however, Officer Davis must establish that he was acting within the scope 

of his discretionary authority, which he can do by showing that his acts 

“are of the type that fell within [his] job responsibilities.” Holloman ex 

rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Police 

officers clearly act within their discretionary authority when they arrest 

someone, and Avery did not dispute that Officer Davis was acting within 

his discretionary authority leading up to Avery being punched and then 

arrested. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, the burden shifts to Avery to overcome the defense of 

qualified immunity. Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 

2008). In order to do so, Avery must show that (1) the officer’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right and (2) the allegedly violated right was 

clearly established. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2009). Hre, Avery claims that Officer Davis violated his constitutional 

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rights by using excessive force in the course of the arrest. These claims 

are based on allegations that Officer Davis (1) hit Avery, (2) threw Avery 

on the ground, and (3) placed his knee on Avery’s back and handcuffed 

him.

In excessive force cases, “qualified immunity applies unless 

application of the standard would inevitably lead every reasonable officer 

in [the position of the defendant officer] to conclude the force was 

unlawful.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1550 (11th Cir. 1993), 

modified by 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994)). This determination “turns on a 

number of factors” and “must be judged on a case-by-case basis.” Gold 

v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Post, 7 

F.3d at 1559). This abundance of case law makes it clear that the right to 

be free from excessive force during an arrest is clearly established. 

Here, Avery conceded that Officer Davis could have been under the 

impression that Avery was chasing the other young man when he stepped 

in between them. (Avery Dep. at 57-58.) However, Avery and Officer 

Davis dispute what happened next. According to Avery, he never noticed 

Officer Davis in front of him, and therefore did not stop running until he 

felt the hit. Conversely, Officer Davis claims that “Mr. Avery got in an 

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offensive position, squared up against me.” (Davis Dep. at 54.) Officer 

Davis also disputes Avery’s assertion that he never saw him, claiming that 

Avery looked him in the eyes. (Davis Dep. at 62.) Officer Davis does not 

contend that he called out to Avery to stop or anything else before 

striking him in the jaw. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, a jury could find that every reasonable officer in 

Officer Davis’s position would conclude that the force was unlawful and 

that, therefore, Officer Davis used excessive force when he hit Avery. 

Therefore, there is a dispute of material fact about whether or not 

Officer Davis used excessive force in arresting Avery. Therefore, summary 

judgment for Avery’s § 1983 claims against Office Davis is due to be 

denied. 

ii. State Law Claims 

Federal qualified immunity only protects individuals from suits 

based on federal rights and therefore does not protect Officer Davis from 

Avery’s state-law claims. Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 

1286 (11th Cir. 1998). However, Officer Davis asserts that he is protected 

by Alabama state-agent immunity. Under Alabama law, police officers 

“have immunity from tort liability arising out of [their] conduct in 

performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of 

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[their] law enforcement duties.” Ala. Code § 6-5-338 (1975). A police 

officer is immune from liability when “the conduct made the basis of the 

claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s . . . exercising 

judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, 

but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’ arresting or attempting to 

arrest persons.” Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Ala. 2008). 

Further, Alabama law also allows a police officer to “us[e] that 

degree of physical force which he reasonably believes to be necessary” 

when effectuating an arrest. Ala. Code, § 13A-3-27 (1975). A police 

officer “may be held liable only if more force is used than is necessary to 

effectuate the arrest.” Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848, 852 

(Ala. 1995). As discussed above, if the facts are taken in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no indication that hitting 

Avery was necessary in the circumstances. Officer Davis does not claim 

that he asked Avery to stop before hitting him, and Avery denies that he 

got into a fighting position. Therefore, a jury could find that Officer Davis 

used more force than necessary in restraining Avery and effectuating the 

arrest. Summary judgment on Avery’s state law claims against Officer 

Davis is due to be denied. 

B. Claims against the City 

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i. § 1983 

Avery’s “Brief in Denial and Response to Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment” only offers arguments and evidence as to Officer 

Davis’s liability. (Doc. 14 & 15.) While the brief mentions the City 

repeatedly, all of the arguments contained in the brief are about

qualified immunity for government employees sued in their individual 

capacity. The City can be sued under § 1983 if the “action that is alleged 

to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, 

ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by 

[the City’s] officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 

658, 690 (1978). Alternatively, the City can be sued if the practice is 

pursuant to a government “custom”, even if the custom has not received 

official approval. Id. Here, Avery has failed to allege that Officer Davis 

acted according to an official policy of the city or even an unofficial 

“custom” of police officers. He has simply contested the propriety of 

granting qualified immunity to Officer Davis for his individual actions. 

Because “grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in 

summary judgment are deemed abandoned,” Avery’s claims under § 1983 

against the City are deemed abandoned. Resolution Trust Corp. v. 

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Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment for 

these claims is due to be granted. 

ii. State-Law Claims 

Avery does not mention the City in his section on state-law claims in 

his brief. He simply makes arguments about Officer Davis’s liability for 

state-law claims. Avery’s state-law claims against the City are therefore 

deemed abandoned, and summary judgment for the City on Avery’s state 

law claims is due to be granted. See id. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary 

judgment as to Avery’s claims against Officer Davis is denied. Summary 

judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham as to Avery’s claims against 

the City is granted. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be 

entered. Further, Defendant’s motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Brief (Doc. 20) 

is DENIED. 

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DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of October 2016. 

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

186291

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