Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02866/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02866-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0256 Patent Non-Infringement (Correction of Named Inventor)

---

1

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN FIREGLASS, a California 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MODERUSTIC, INC., a California 

corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 122, 123)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff American Fireglass’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment of Defendant’s infringement and false advertising and unfair business practices 

claims. (“Pl. MSJ,” ECF No. 122). Defendant Moderustic, Inc. filed a Response in 

Opposition to (“Def. Opp’n,” ECF No. 129) and Plaintiff filed a Reply in Support of (“Pl. 

Reply,” ECF No. 131) Plaintiff’s Motion. 

Also before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff’s 

false advertising and unfair business practices claims. (“Def. MSJ,” ECF No. 123). 

Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to (“Pl. Opp’n,” ECF No. 125) and Defendant filed 

a Reply in Support of (“Def. Reply,” ECF No. 132) Defendant’s Motion.

///

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

 29
2

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court heard oral argument on March 7, 2019, and took the matter under 

submission. Having considered the parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the law, the Court 

(1) GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion and (2) GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion as follows.

BACKGROUND

Since 2005, Plaintiff American Fireglass has manufactured and sold pieces of broken 

tempered glass for use in fireplaces and fire pits. Declaration of Matt Doll (“Doll Decl.”) 

¶ 4, ECF No. 122-3. Defendant Moderustic is Plaintiff’s competitor and has manufactured, 

sold, and distributed fireglass for use in aquariums, fireplaces, and firepits through its 

website since April 2003. Declaration of Edgar Jaunzemis (“Jaunzemis Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–3, 

ECF No. 123-7. 

I. Defendant’s Related Patent Applications

The long journey toward the issuance of the patent at issue began on April 14, 2003 

when Defendant’s founder, Mr. Edgar Jaunzemis, filed patent application number 

10/413,620 seeking to patent a process related to tumbled or vibrated, polished, and broken 

tempered glass pieces. Pl. Ex. 28 at 1, ECF No. 83-29.1 Defendant eventually abandoned 

that patent application. See id. On December 28, 2005, Defendant filed patent application

11/319,957 (the “’957 Application”). Pl. MSJ at 8 (citing Pl. Ex. 10 at 93–94, ECF No. 

83-11). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) considered two prior art 

references: U.S. Patent No. 6,409,500 B2 (the “Georgantas Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 

5,486,135 (the “Arpaio Patent”). Id. at 8–9 (citing Pl. Ex. 9 at 1–3, ECF No. 83-10; Pl. Ex. 

4 at 9, ECF No. 83-5). 

///

 

1 Both parties previously filed Motions for Summary Judgement. See ECF Nos. 83, 104. Following the 

Court’s Claim Construction Order, ECF No. 111, the Court granted the parties’ requests to amend their 

motions and vacated the previous motions. ECF No. 118. Both parties cite to the exhibits attached to 

their previous motions. 

Pin citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF numbers digitally stamped at the top of each page.

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of

 29
3

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The PTO issued a final office action on March 26, 2008, rejecting all claims in the 

’957 Application because it would have “been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the 

art at the time the invention was made to modify the method of Georgantas with the 

tumbling and vibrating steps disclosed by Arpaio in order to polish glass fragments.” Id.

at 9 (quoting Pl. Ex. 11 at 6, ECF No. 83-12; Declaration of Charles Reidelbach 

(“Reidelbach Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 122-2).

Mr. Jaunzemis appealed the PTO’s decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and 

Interferences; the Board rejected most of Mr. Jaunzemis’ claims as obvious in light of the 

prior art, but reopened prosecution on six claims. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 12 at 8, ECF No. 83-13; 

Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 7). Mr. Jaunzemis repackaged his claims and, on July 12, 2011, the 

PTO issued U.S. Patent No. 7,976,360 (the “’360 Patent”). Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 14 at 1-18, 

ECF No. 83-15; Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 8). 

After the ’360 Patent issued, Plaintiff filed an inter partes review petition with the 

PTO. Id. at 10. The PTO re-examined the ’360 Patent and rejected all of the ’360 Patent 

claims as obvious in light of prior art. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 6, ECF No. 83-7). Defendant 

appealed that ruling to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed, and then reaffirmed, the PTO’s decision. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 22 at 21, ECF No. 83-23; Pl. Ex. 29 at 10, 

ECF No. 83-30). Defendant appealed those rulings to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed 

the PTO’s decision. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 30 at 3, ECF No. 83-31; Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 9). 

II. The ’505 Patent

On July 11, 2011, while the ’360 Patent was pending, Defendant filed another patent 

application as a continuation of the ’957 Application. Id. (citing Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 10). 

The PTO granted Defendant’s application, resulting in the issuance of the patent at issue, 

U.S. Patent No. 8,419,505 (the “’505 Patent”) on April 16, 2013. Id. at 11 (citing 

Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 12). 

During prosecution of the ’505 Patent, Plaintiff’s counsel sent several letters to 

Defendant’s attorney of record because Plaintiff believed Defendant had failed to disclose 

the prior rejection of the related ’360 Patent. Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff’s counsel 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of

 29
4

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

considered the failure to disclose the rejection to be inequitable conduct in violation of 

Defendant’s duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the PTO. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 19

at 1–3, ECF No. 83-20). After receiving these letters, and after the ’505 Patent issued,

Defendant filed a Request for Supplemental Examination. Pl. MSJ at 11 (citing Pl. Ex. 21, 

ECF No. 83-22). On reexamination, the PTO rejected all claims as obvious. Id. (citing Pl. 

Ex. 23 at 1, 4, ECF No. 83-24; Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 13). 

Defendant then submitted an amendment to narrow the ’505 Patent’s claims. Id. at 

12 (citing Pl. Ex. 24 at 6–7, ECF No. 83-25). After several exchanges between Defendant 

and the PTO Examiner, the PTO issued an ex parte reexamination certificate of the ’505 

Patent on November 26, 2014. Id. at 13 (citing Pl. Ex. 28 at 1–2, ECF No. 83-29; 

Reidelbach Decl. ¶ 16). 

The final ’505 Patent is described as follows: 

This invention is directed to the creation of smoothed, heattreated glass fragments. The invention places heat-treated glass 

fragments (i.e., glass that has been previously heated so that it 

will not crack or shatter under later heat) into a tumbling or 

vibrating apparatus. These glass fragments are then tumbled or 

vibrated for a period of time so that the surfaces of the glass 

fragments are smoother than prior to tumbling. The glass 

fragments are thereafter removed from either apparatus, resulting 

in smoothed, heat-treated glass fragments that are suitable for 

direct handling without hand protection.

Claim Construction Order at 5–6, ECF No. 111.

III. Defendant’s Enforcement Threats

Following the issuance of the ’505 Patent, Mr. Jaunzemis began contacting Plaintiff, 

Plaintiff’s dealers, and other glass sellers regarding alleged infringement of the ’505 Patent. 

Pl. MSJ at 16 (citing Doll Decl. ¶ 11). Defendant sent one such email on February 10, 

2015, to The Magic of Fire, a company that purchases fireglass from Plaintiff. ECF No. 

12-2. In that email, Mr. Jaunzemis stated that 

“Moderustic is proud to have been issued 2 U.S. Patent Numbers, 

7,976,360 B2 (in reconsideration), and 8,419,505 C1. . . . These 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of

 29
5

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

patents and applications cover our method of creating tumbled 

tempered glass for use in fireplaces and fire pits. . . . Since 

[Moderustic was] the first to file (with the patent office) we do 

hold the patent rights, and we may, if we so choose, [] enforce 

our intellectual property rights. . . . We need to see whether you 

are (allegedly) infringing as there may be legal repercussions.” 

Id. at 4–5. In October 2015, Defendant stated in a newspaper article, printed in The Sun 

Business, that Mr. Jaunzemis is “going after the companies he says are infringing on his 

patents” and that “he hopes to shut down competition and bring his annual sales up.” ECF 

No. 12-4 at 2. Throughout the patent application process for both the ’360 and ’505 

Patents, Defendant posted updates on its website about its patent rights, making various 

threats about potential enforcement. See Doll Decl. ¶ 16 (citing ECF No. 12-12 at 1–3). 

IV. Plaintiff’s References to Tumbling on Its Website

In 2005, Plaintiff began selling tempered glass fragments for use in firepits. Doll 

Decl. ¶ 4. Although Plaintiff originally tumbled many of its products, by November 2014 

it had completely “stopped tumbling the tempered glass fragments that it sold because 

tumbling slowed production and caused the glass fragments to become scratched and dull 

and less desirable.” Id. ¶ 9. During this shift in its production methods and beginning on 

or about March 1, 2010, Plaintiff “began removing references to tumbling its fireglass from 

its advertising and promotional material, including its web site.” Id. Plaintiff “mistakenly 

overlooked some products that appeared on its website” but “removed these remaining 

references to tumbling . . . immediately after it was brought to [Plaintiff’s] attention in 

August 2016.” Id.; see also Juanzemis Decl. ¶ 9–13.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary 

judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is 

appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of

 29
6

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine dispute of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When the Court considers the 

evidence presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and 

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls 

on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden 

by identifying the “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’” that show an absence of dispute 

regarding a material fact. Id. When a party seeks summary judgment as to an element for 

which it bears the burden of proof, “it must come forward with evidence which would 

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” See C.A.R. 

Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must 

identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 324. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt 

as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “by her own 

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 

designate ‘specific facts’” that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The 

non-moving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by 

“rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment of Defendant’s counterclaims. Pl. MSJ at 

19, 27. Defendant’s first counterclaim alleges that Plaintiff infringes the ’505 Patent. Id.

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of

 29
7

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 19; Answer to Compl. ¶¶ 12–25, ECF No. 22. The remaining counterclaims allege that 

Plaintiff’s website contains false statements that constitute unfair competition and false 

advertising under federal and California laws. Pl. MSJ at 27; Answer ¶¶ 26–52. 

Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant summary judge as to Defendant’s first 

counterclaim on the grounds that the claims in the ’505 Patent are (1) invalid because they 

cover only subject matter that would have been obvious at the time of invention to a person 

of ordinary skill in the art, Pl. MSJ at 19-26; and (2) Plaintiff does not infringe the ’505 

Patent because Plaintiff ceased tumbling its fireglass products before the patent was issued. 

Id. at 26–27. 

A. Obviousness 

“A patent is presumed to be valid, and this presumption only can be overcome by 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 

F.3d 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, 

Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see 35 U.S.C. § 282. A patent is invalid due 

to obviousness “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 

prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 

the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 

matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 

“Generally, a party seeking to invalidate a patent as obvious must demonstrate by 

clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the 

teaching of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled 

artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success from doing so.” In re 

Cyclobenzaprine Hyrdochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 

1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, the inquiry on 

summary judgment is whether a jury applying the clear and convincing evidence standard 

could reasonably find, based on the evidence produced by the accused infringer, that the 

claimed invention was obvious.” Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 796 F. 

///

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of

 29
8

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Supp. 2d 1025, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 

1339–1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 

“Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying findings of fact.” In re Kubin, 

561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). When determining whether a patent is invalid for 

obviousness, the district court must first make the following four underlying factual 

determinations: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the 

prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and 

(4) whether any relevant secondary considerations rebut obviousness. Graham v. John 

Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Secondary considerations are only relevant if there 

is a nexus between the secondary considerations and the claimed invention. Ormco Corp. 

v. Align Tech. Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311–1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Once a court makes these 

four underlying factual determinations, “the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject 

matter is determined.” Graham, 318 U.S. at 18. 

1. Scope and Content of the Prior Art

The relevant prior art for an obviousness inquiry is analogous prior art. In re Clay, 

966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A prior art reference is analogous if it is: (1) in the 

same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed; or (2) reasonably pertinent to 

the particular problem addressed by the claimed invention. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA 

Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “A reference is reasonably pertinent 

if . . . it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have 

commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his [or her] problem.” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Clay, 966 F.2d at 659). Whether a prior art reference is 

“analogous” is a question of fact. Id. (citing Clay, 966 F.2d at 658). 

Plaintiff argues that the Arpaio and Georgantas Patents are prior art because the 

PTO, as well as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, relied on these patents when 

they rejected the previous and related patent applications submitted by Defendant. See Pl. 

MSJ 22–24. Additionally, in its invalidity contentions, Plaintiff asserts that several prior 

art references that the PTO did not cite in its review are relevant prior art. See id. at 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of

 29
9

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24–25. These include: How to Tumble Polish Gemstones and Make Tumbled Gem Jewelry

by Jarome Wexler (“Wexler”), Pl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 83-4; a patent issued by the World 

Intellectual Property Organization to Garry McBride (WO0222519A1) (the “McBride 

Patent”), Pl. Ex. 8, ECF No. 83-9; Glass Association of North America Glazing Manual, 

Glass Association of North America published 1997 (the “GANA Glazing Manual”) Pl. 

Ex. 6, ECF No. 83-7; and Standard Specification for Heat-Treated Flat Glass––Kind HS, 

Kind FT Coated and Uncoated Glass, ASTM International, published February 1998 (the 

“ASTM Standard”) Pl. Ex. 7, ECF No. 83-8. 

Plaintiff also argues that a reference not included in its invalidity contentions is 

analogous prior art that supports the ’505 Patent being invalid as obvious. This prior art is 

a newsletter issued by the Clean Washington Center in November 1996 (the “Clean 

Washington Newsletter”). Pl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 83-6.

The Court finds that the relevant prior art includes the Georgantas and Arpaio 

Patents. The Georgantas Patent “disclos[es] a process for producing an attractive fire from 

a gas line embedded in a bed of broken, tempered glass pieces, which may be ‘abraded or 

polished so as to smooth over any sharp or pointed edges.’” Pl. MSJ at 8 (citing ECF No. 

98-2, at 7); see also Pl. Ex. 9. The Arpaio Patent relates to “a vibratory tumbling machine 

vessel for burnishing or cleansing metal, plastic or ceramic elements.” Id. at 9 (citing Pl. 

Ex. 4). These patents are pertinent to the problem addressed, Defendant cited them as 

references while prosecuting the ’505 Patent before the PTO, and Defendant does not 

dispute they are relevant prior art references. 

Similarly, the Court finds that the ASTM Standard and the GANA Glazing Manual 

are relevant prior art. Both prior art references describe processes for heating and cooling 

glass and the relevant specifications for such glass. These are both within the field of 

endeavor and reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’505 Patent. Moreover, 

Defendant does not dispute they are relevant prior art. See generally Def. Opp’n. 

Defendant does, however, dispute the remaining prior art references. Beginning 

with Wexler, Defendant argues that “obviousness cannot be established by combining the 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of

 29
10

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching, 

suggestion or incentive supporting the combination.” Id. at 31 (quoting In re Geiger, 815 

F.2d 686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis in original). This argument misses the mark. 

Determining whether there is a suggestion to modify and combine the prior art is not 

pertinent to whether the art is analogous. 

Wexler describes in detail the tumbling of gemstones and further describes glass as 

one of the products capable of being tumbled and polished. Pl. Ex. 3 at 4. Defendant 

concedes that Wexler shows that the practice of tumbling has occurred for many years to 

smooth the edges of glass fragments. Def. Opp’n at 30. Because Wexler teaches

smoothing the edges of glass fragments, it would have “commended itself to an inventor’s 

attention in considering” how to create safe-to-handle tempered glass fragments. See

Innovention Toys, 637 F.3d at 1321. The Court therefore finds Wexler to be relevant prior 

art.

Next, Defendant argues that the McBride Patent is not relevant prior art because it 

is not in the field of the inventor’s endeavor and not reasonably pertinent to the problem 

the inventor solved. Id. at 31 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567 

(Fed. Cir. 1984)). The ’505 Patent describes its field of invention as “recycling broken, 

normal tempered glass waste into smooth glass pieces useful in, for example, lapidary 

construction, art, and functional interior and exterior decorating.” Pl. Ex. 20 at 1:64–67, 

ECF No. 83-21. The McBride Patent’s field of endeavor is the manufacture of decorative 

concrete products using a process whereby an “exposed aggregate” is embedded in the 

concrete. Pl. Ex. 8 at 1. The aggregate is decorative in nature and “consisting at least in 

part of fragmented glass.” Id. at 3. The McBride Patent also discloses that it may be 

desirable to remove sharp edges by tumbling the glass in a rotating drum. Id. at 3–4. 

Although both the ’505 and McBride Patents pertain, in part, to decorative materials, the 

Court concludes that the McBride Patent is not in same field of endeavor. Whereas the 

’505 Patent solely pertains to tempered glass, the McBride Patent primarily concerns 

decorative concrete fabrication. 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 29
11

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The McBride Patent, however, does relate to a similar problem addressed by the 

’505 Patent. The McBride Patent specifically contemplates tumbling recycled glass to 

remove sharp edges before use as a decorative aggregate in a concrete molding. Id. This 

addresses an issue similar to that the ’505 Patent addresses and logically relates to the 

inventor’s concern, namely, removing sharp edges from decorative glass pieces. This is in 

accord with the January 16, 2014 PTO re-examination of the ’505 patent claims where the 

PTO considered the Arpaio and Georgantas Patents and found them to be reasonably 

pertinent to the problem addressed. See Ex. 23 at 4, ECF No. 83-24 (“Arpaio teaches a 

process for smoothing glass.”); see also Ex. 9 at 1, ECF No. 83-10; Ex. 23 at 11 

(Georgantas Patent reasonably pertinent to making smooth tempered glass). The Court 

therefore finds that the McBride Patent is relevant prior art.

Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should not consider the Clean Washington 

Newsletter as prior art. Def. Opp’n at 31. Plaintiff does not address the Clean Washington 

Newsletter in its Reply brief. See generally Pl. Reply. The newsletter describes in relevant 

part a process for “produc[ing] a more aesthetically appealing crushed glass” by using

“[g]lass processors that have either multiple rows of hammers that beat the glass into 

cubical shapes or a centrifugal action that tumbles the broken glass on itself to produce an 

autogenous shape.” Ex. 5 at 1, ECF No. 83-6. A problem the ’505 Patent addresses is 

making the recycled glass more aesthetically pleasing and, thus, the Court finds the Clean 

Washington Newsletter is reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed. 

Defendant argues that the Clean Washington Newsletter lacks credibility, lacks 

foundation, is hearsay, and would likely not be admissible at trial and, thus, is not 

appropriate for the Court to consider. Def. Opp’n at 31. Defendant fails to support these 

contentions with any authority or record evidence. See id. The Court, therefore, is not 

persuaded by any of Defendant’s conclusory legal assertions and finds that these do not 

create a material factual dispute regarding whether the Clean Washington Newsletter is 

prior art. 

///

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 29
12

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant also argues that, because Plaintiff did not disclose the Clean Washington 

Newsletter in its invalidity contentions, the Court should exclude it. Id. at 32. Failure to 

include an obviousness combination in the invalidity contentions, as required by patent 

local rules, is reason to exclude a reference from consideration as prior art. Volterra 

Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 

Plaintiff did not reference the Clean Washington Newsletter in any of its obviousness 

combinations in its invalidity contentions. See generally Pl.’s Claim Chart, ECF No. 83-1 

at 31–38. “Given that [Plaintiff] w[as] aware of the prior art in the file history from the 

outset of this case, [its] failure to include this theory in [its] invalidity contentions precludes 

[it] from proceeding on [any] obviousness combination[s]” that include the Clean 

Washington Newsletter. See id. 

A “citation to previously undisclosed references may be permissible,” however,

“where these references are used to support a theory of invalidity that has been disclosed 

in a party’s invalidity contentions.” Id. (emphasis in original). To the extent that Plaintiff 

uses the Clean Washington Newsletter to support only a theory of invalidity previously 

disclosed, the Court finds that the Clean Washington Newsletter is relevant prior art 

because it is reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the inventor. 

2. Differences Between the Prior Art and Claims at Issue

Having determined the scope and content of the prior art, the Court must next 

compare the prior art against the claimed invention to determine the specific differences, 

if any, that exist. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 

Plaintiff posits that every asserted claim in the ’505 patent is found in the prior art. 

Pl. MSJ 23–25. In its invalidity chart, Plaintiff identifies where each limitation is disclosed 

in the prior art. Pl.’s Claim Chart at 31–38. Defendant argues the prior art does not disclose 

all, or portions of, claims 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Def.’s Claim Chart, Def. Ex. B, ECF No. 

128-3. Defendant concedes that claims 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are disclosed in the 

prior art and that no differences exists; therefore, the Court will not address those claims. 

See id. 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 29
13

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a. Claims 1 and 7 

The first dispute is whether the following limitations in claims 1 and 7 differs from 

what is disclosed in the prior art: 

“wherein each heat-treated glass fragment is formed from 

standard tempered glass fragments from standard fully tempered 

glass that has a surface compression of at least 3,500 

pounds-force per square inch (PSI).” 

Pl. Ex. 20 at 9:63–10:2, 10:33–37. 

Plaintiff argues that the Georgantas Patent teaches forming tempered glass fragments 

from tempered glass. ECF No. 83-1 at 31 (citing Pl. Ex. 9 at 1:30–33, 2:38–41). Plaintiff 

next argues that the ASTM Standard discloses heat-strengthened glass having a surface 

compression between 3500 and 7500 PSI. Id. at 32 (citing Pl. Ex. 7 at 4). Finally, Plaintiff 

points to the GANA Glazing Manual as disclosing that heat-strengthened glass with a 

surface compression levels in the range of 3500 to 7500 PSI is most desirable for most 

uses. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 6 at 4). Defendant, on the other hand, argues that “absolutely no 

reference discloses this element.” Def. Claim Chart at 1 (emphasis omitted). 

The Court construed “heat-treated glass” to mean “any glass that is processed to 

create a surface compression such that the fraction pattern of the glass results in many small 

glass fragments.” Claim Construction Order at 8, ECF No. 111. “Heat-treated glass shall 

refer to, for example, fully tempered glass, heat-strengthened glass (also known as 

toughened glass), or any other glass heat processed to create a similar fracture pattern.” Id. 

The Court also construed “standard fully tempered glass” to mean “(i) having a surface 

compression of at least 3,500 PSI; (ii) being formed by cooling the heated glass so as to 

leave a center area of the heated glass hotter than surfaces; (iii) being formed by heating 

the glass only once to a temperature of at least 1000° Fahrenheit and rapidly cooling it to 

a temperature below 700° Fahrenheit.” Id. at 21–22.

For the type of glass used, the Georgantas Patent teaches using tempered glass that 

is baked three times in a controlled temperature and oxygen environment over a 

predetermined period of time and then broken to form smooth-edged pieces. Pl. Ex. 9 at 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 29
14

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2:35–38. The ’505 Patent, on the other hand, teaches using standard tempered glass which 

is not baked three times. Pl. Ex. 20. The Court finds that the ’505 and Georgantas Patents

do differ in the type of glass used. The Georgantas Patent concerns specially formulated 

tempered glass created by baking the glass three times, while the ’505 patent does not. 

Defendant has not, however, shown that this difference is material. Nothing indicates that 

this difference changes the process for creating the finished products in any way or would 

cause a person of ordinary skill in the art to not consider these Patents to address the same 

problem in the same field of endeavor. 

Concerning the heating and cooling process, the Georgantas Patent teaches rapid 

cooling of the outer surfaces, while the center is allowed to cool slowly. Pl. Ex. 9 at 3:63–

4:1. Specifically, it discloses that the heating process is “followed by rapid cooling of the 

outer surfaces via controlled air blasts or an oil-water cooling process, while the center is 

allowed to cool slowly.” Id. Plaintiff argues that this method is not actually different form 

the one described in the ’505 Patent. Plaintiff states that “[t]he use of air to cool heated 

glass has been known and previously described,” ECF No. 83-1 at 35, and that “[i]t is 

inherent that the center of the glass would be hotter than the surfaces that are cooled.” Id. 

While Plaintiff provides no citation for this statement, the Court agrees. The Georgantas 

Patent references U.S Patent No. 5,656,558 (the “’558 Patent”), which discloses a method 

for creating fire retardant safety glass. The ’558 Patent states: 

The high coefficient of thermal expansion of these glasses means 

that such glass panes possess, even at a high compressive stress 

of 120 N/mm2—irrespective of pane thickness—a temperature 

difference resistance (TUF), between the cold edge of the pane 

and the hot center of only about 200 to 220 K. The temperature 

difference resistance characterizes the property of a pane to 

withstand the difference in temperature between the hot center of 

the pane and the cold edge. 

’558 Patent, at 1:59–67 (emphasis added). This is exemplary of a hotter center of glass 

and cooler edge of glass.

///

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 29
15

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As for the temperature and PSI used, the Georgantas Patent teaches that “glass is 

preferably from 2.5mm to 20mm in thickness, and is baked at least three times at 

temperatures of about 1200° F for 30 minutes or more.” Pl. Ex. 9, at 2:35–38. The GANA 

Glazing Manual teaches heat-treating glass by uniformly heating the glass to approximately 

1150° Fahrenheit. Pl. Ex. 6 at 8. It also discloses an ideal surface-compression level of 

3,500 to 7,500 PSI. Id. at 9. The ASTM Standard specification for heat-treated glass 

reveals that heat-strengthened glass with a thickness of 1/4” (6mm) and less will have a 

surface compression of 3,500 to 7,500 PSI. Pl. Ex. 6, at 4. Each reference discloses a 

surface compression of at least 3,500 PSI and a temperature that is over 1000° Fahrenheit. 

The Court therefore finds that there are no material differences between these 

specifications and those found in the ’505 patent. 

Next, Defendant argues that no prior art discloses the phrase “substantially rounded, 

bead-like shape” in both claims 1 and 7. Def. Ex. B, at 1, 3, ECF No. 128-3. Plaintiff 

contends that Wexler; the Arpaio, Georgantas, and McBride Patents; and the Clean 

Washington Newsletter all disclose this term. Pl. MSJ at 33; Pl. Claim Chart at 18–19, 21–

22. 

The Court construed the phrase “substantially rounded, bead-like shape” as two 

separate terms. The Court defined “substantially rounded” as “smoothed in such a way 

that the glass fragments are free of sharp burs and suitable for direct handling.” Claim 

Construction Order at 22–25. The Court defined “bead-like shape” according to the 

parties’ stipulated construction as “having varying shapes and sizes.” Id.

The Georgantas Patent teaches that “[t]he formed pieces of the broken, tempered 

glass may be washed and sifted to remove any debris, and may be further abraded or 

polished to form glass pieces without sharp edges, if needed.” Pl. Ex. 9 at 2:38–41. It goes 

on to disclose that, “[t]o insure that no sharp edges or slivers remain, the broken pieces of 

tempered glass may be washed and then sifted to remove debris.” Id. at 4:16–20. In this 

manner, a bed of glass is formed from smooth pieces, which pieces are approximately the 

same size.” Id. Finally, the Georgantas Patent specification provides that “[w]hen the 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 29
16

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

glass is properly and tightly packed around a gas pipe, for example, in a wedge, mounded 

flat, or a beveled manner, the rounded pieces of the bed of glass will produce . . . myriad 

. . . sparkles from the flames burning near and over the top of the bed.” Id. at 4:23–27 

(emphasis added). 

The Arpaio Patent teaches a solution for the “need for a unit and/or combination unit 

for treatment(s) of diverse sizes and types of microsized lots of elements, in the burnishing 

and/or polishing thereof—also including one or more of deburring, polishing and/or other 

surface preparation of one or more of metal, plastic and/or ceramic (such as glass, etc.) 

elements.” Pl. Ex. 4 at 7:33–38 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8:16–22.

Wexler teaches how to tumble various materials, including glass. Wexler at 4. It 

teaching that, in the tumbling process, “[t]he purpose of the first grind is to remove all the 

rough surfaces, crevices, blemishes, etc. When the grind is completed you should have 

rounded stones of about the desired size.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Wexler also states 

that a vibrating tumbler is acceptable for use in lieu of a rotating tumbler. Id. at 12. 

Finally, the McBride Patent discloses tumbling glass for use in concrete molding. 

Specifically, it teaches that, “[b]ecause the glass fragments are exposed at the surface of 

the finished cast concrete product, . . . it may be desirable or necessary for safety reasons 

for sharp edges of the glass fragments to be removed prior to use.” Pl. Ex. 8 at 2:27–30. 

The McBride Patent teaches that the sharp edges “may be achieved by tumbling of the 

glass, [e.g.] in a rotating drum, to give the fragments a rounder form with fewer or no sharp 

edges or points.” Id. at 2:30–3:2 (emphasis added).

As noted, the Court defined “substantially rounded” to mean “smoothed in such a 

way that the glass fragments are free of sharp burs and suitable for direct handling” and 

“bead-like shape” to mean “having varying shapes and sizes.” See Claim Construction 

Order at 22. The Court finds that the Georgantas Patent teaches removing sharp edges; the 

Arpaio Patent specifies that its tumbling process removes burrs from glass; Wexler teaches 

removing sharp edges, crevices, and blemishes, and the McBride Patent discloses tumbling 

glass for safety reasons to remove sharp edges. Further Wexler and the Georgantas and

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 29
17

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McBride Patents all discuss rounded elements. In sum, the prior art teaches smoothing 

glass to remove burs and create a rounded shape, leaving the glass suitable for direct 

handling. Therefore, the Court finds no material differences exist between the ’505 Patent 

and the prior art regarding this limitation. 

Based on these findings, the Court determines that there are no material differences 

between the prior art and claims 1 and 7. 

b. Claims 2 and 8

Next, Defendant argues that absolutely no reference discloses the elements in claims 

2 and 8. Ex. B, at 1, 3. Claim 2 discloses “[a] method as recited in claim 1, wherein the 

plurality of heat-treated glass pieces [are] formed from tempered glass that has been heated 

to a temperature in the range of about 1,200° to 1,600° Fahrenheit and rapidly cooled to a 

temperature below 600° Fahrenheit.” ’505 Patent, at 10. Claim 8 discloses the same 

limitation but derives from independent claim 7. Id. Plaintiff does not address claims 2 or 

8 in its chart. 

As noted above, several prior art references, including the GANA Glazing Manual 

and the Georgantas Patent, disclose a process for heating and rapidly cooling the glass. Pl. 

Ex. 9, at 2:35–38; Pl. Ex. 6 at 8–9. The references do differ from the claims in that the 

references do not contain the exact temperatures and process for cooling that the ’505 

Patent claims contain. The Court finds these differences, however, are not material. This 

difference does not change the process in a meaningful way. 

c. Claims 3 and 9

Defendant contends that no reference discloses claims 3 and 9. Def. Ex. B, at 

2–3. Claim 3 states “[a] method as recited in claim 1, wherein each glass fragment is 

formed from toughened glass that has a surface compression of at least 4,500 pounds-force 

per square inch (PSI).” Pl. Ex. 20 at 10. Claim 9 discloses the same limitation but derives 

from independent claim 7. Id. As discussed above, both the GANA Glazing Manual and 

the ASTM Standards disclose heat-treated glass with surface compression between 3,500 

and 7,500 PSI. The 4,500 PSI found in claims 3 and 9 clearly falls within the range 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 29
18

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disclosed by the prior art references. Thus, the Court finds no differences between claims 

3 and 9 and the prior art. 

3. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff does not take any position as to the 

relevant skill in the art or submit any evidence pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in 

the art. See generally Pl. MSJ. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to produce 

evidence regarding the ordinary skill in the art creates a genuine issue of material fact. Def. 

Opp’n at 16 (citing Robotic Visions Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1325, 1336 

(C.D. Cal. 1997)). Defendant seems to suggest that the appropriate level of skill in the art 

is that of a glazier. See id. at 19.

Plaintiff responds by arguing that the subject matter of Defendant’s patent is easily 

understandable by the average person and, therefore, Plaintiff need not define the level of 

ordinary skill in the art. Reply at 10. In the alternative, Plaintiff points to the PTO’s finding 

that a person of ordinary skill in the art is not sophisticated. Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 23 at 4, ECF 

No. 83-24; Pl. Ex. 29 at 10, ECF No. 83-30).

In select circumstances, it is not required for a court to make a specific finding of a 

particular level of skill in the prior art, though this is usually the case when the prior art 

itself reflects the appropriate level. See Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 

F.2d 774, 779 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983). “[I]f the differences between the patent in suit and the 

prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole is obvious to a lay(person), a 

determination of the level of skill on the basis of expert testimony in the pertinent art would 

be useless.” Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 202, 205 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting 

Med. Lab. Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1981)). 

Although the PTO was able to make findings of obviousness regarding 

Mr. Jaunzemis’ prior patent applications without making an explicit determination of the 

level of ordinary skill in the art, “it is always preferable for the factfinder below to specify 

the level of skill it has found to apply to the invention at issue.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 

F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For this reason, the Court will make a determination of 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 29
19

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the level of ordinary skill in the art of fireglass. See Link Treasure Ltd. v. Baby Trend, Inc., 

809 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1214–15 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 

In making this determination, factors that the Court may consider include the type 

of problems encountered in art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with 

which innovations are made, sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of 

active workers in the field. Id. (quoting Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 663 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000)). Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them 

may predominate. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 

963 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 

Upon review of the factors, the Court finds that the Patent at issue and prior art 

include no advanced technology that require more than a basic knowledge of glass and 

tumbling. All of the prior art is easily understandable to an ordinary lay person of average 

intelligence and, thus, no advanced degree is necessary. And the technology and the 

process described in the ’505 Patent for transforming recycled tempered glass into the 

finished fireglass that is safe to handle is easily understandable as well. 

Based on these findings, “the Court assumes without deciding that the level of 

ordinary skill in the art of [fireglass] is that of an ordinary layman of average intelligence 

who is aware of the prior art.” See Link Treasure Ltd., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1215. Although 

Defendant seems to indicate that the ordinary skill is that of a glazier, the Court notes that 

its more general “finding of skill is the most favorable for [Defendant], as a less 

sophisticated person of ordinary skill is generally more favorable to a patent owner.” Id.

(citing Union Carbide Corp., 724 F.2d at 1573).

4. Secondary Considerations

Objective evidence of nonobviousness, often referred to as “secondary 

considerations” or the “objective indicia of nonobviousness,” may rebut a prima facie 

showing of obviousness. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18). These considerations include commercial 

success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others to achieve the invention, and 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 29
20

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

copying by others. Id. To rebut a showing of obviousness, there must be a “nexus”

between the invention claimed in the patent and the commercial success or other secondary 

consideration. Id. at 1311–12.

Defendant argues that two secondary considerations are relevant here and rebut any 

showing that the ’505 Patent is obvious. Def. Opp’n at 13. First, Defendant argues that 

commercial success is indicative of nonobviousness. Id. According to Defendant, “[p]rior 

to [] Jaunzemis’ invention, originally applied for in 2003, there was no fireglass market.” 

Id. Since then, the market for fireglass has increased exponentially. Id. As evidence of 

commercial success, Defendants point to public import data that purportedly shows a surge 

in sales following its Patent application. Id. at 13–14 (citing Declaration of Nickie 

Bonenfant (Import Genius), ECF No. 128-8). 

The Court has serious misgivings about whether this information actually shows 

commercial success.2 But even if it did, what is not clear from this data is whether “there 

is a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success.” See Ormco Corp., 

463 F.3d at 1311–1312. “[If] the commercial success is due to an unclaimed feature of the 

device” or if “the feature that creates the commercial success was known in the prior art, 

the [commercial] success is not pertinent.” Id. at 1312. Here, Defendant fails to show that 

the proffered data proves commercial success for products that “embod[y] the claimed 

features” of the ’505 Patent. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Phillip Morris 

Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). More importantly, based on the Court’s 

previous finding that there are no material differences between the ’505 patent and the prior 

art, see supra Section I.A.2, Defendant cannot show that its claimed commercial success 

 

2 Although the Court makes its determination without using this data, the Court notes its reservations about 

the appropriate weight to give the Import Genius data. The first pages of data clearly show imports from 

Plaintiff in particular beginning in 2017, but do not include total figures for each year or specific data that 

show the products in question actually incorporate the Patent claims at issue. Moreover, Plaintiff has 

expressly claimed that it discontinued tumbling its products by November 2014, making this data 

irrelevant to the question at hand. The remaining data purportedly show the overall market, but fail to 

include the weight of the product, what the product actually is, to whom the product was sold, and––most 

importantly––on which dates the products were shipped. 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 29
21

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

occurred for reasons not known in the prior art. Thus, Defendant’s argument of “the 

commercial success is irrelevant.” Ormco Corp., 463 F.3d at 1311–1312 (citing Brown & 

Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1130 (finding commercial success attributed to feature not present 

in the invention); Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1983) 

(finding commercial success not pertinent when patentee failed to show that “such 

commercial success as its marketed system enjoyed was due to anything disclosed in the 

patent in suit which was not readily available in the prior art”)).

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff copied the claimed invention which is 

indicative that the ’505 Patent is nonobvious. The Court is not convinced, however, that 

the record supports Defendant’s assertions that Plaintiff copied Defendant’s products. And 

even if Plaintiff did copy Defendant’s invention, “more than the mere fact of copying by 

an accused infringer is needed to make that action significant to a determination of the 

obviousness issue.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Cable Elec. 

Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028 (Fed Cir. 1985)). Defendant failed to show 

any facts––such as failed attempts to create the invention prior to the copying––to indicate 

that the alleged copying was because the invention was not obvious, rather than, for 

example, “a general lack of concern for the patent property.” Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. 

Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Cable Elec. Prods., 770 F.2d 

at 1028). This secondary consideration, therefore, does not support Defendant’s contention 

that the ’505 Patent is nonobvious. 

5. Obviousness Determination

After considering the Graham factors and making the requisite factual 

determinations, the Court concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary 

skill in the art to combine the relevant prior art, including Wexler, and the Arpaio, 

Georgantas, and McBride Patents, to create the claimed invention. 

To begin, the Court first notes that “[c]laims as allowed must be read and interpreted 

with reference to rejected ones and to the state of the prior art; and claims that have been 

narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of a patent by distinguishing the prior art cannot 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 29
22

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be sustained to cover that which was previously by limitation eliminated from the patent.” 

Graham, 383 U.S. at 33 (citing Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp., 282 U.S. at 185–86; 

Schriber-Schroth Co., 311 U.S. at 220–21). Plaintiff argues that “[i]ssues raised and 

previously decided in the [’360 Patent] are binding on the scope and interpretation of the 

’505 [P]atent.” Pl. Reply at 11 (citing Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 817 (Fed. 

Cir. 1990); and Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., 357 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

The Board of Patent Appeal and Interferences, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and the 

Federal Circuit all held that the ’360 Patent was obvious over the prior art. Pl. MSJ 22–

24. The ’505 Patent issued only by proposing a limitation as to the shape of the glass 

(“substantially rounded, bead-like shape”). Id.; see also Def. Opp’n at 26–28 (“[T]he 

amendment to add the limitation of the glass fragment having ‘a substantially rounded, 

bead-like shape’ overc[a]me[] the rejections on the record.”). Based on this history of the 

’505 Patent and other related patents, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ’360 Patent 

and the ’505 Patent are virtually identical—save the term “substantially rounded, bead-like 

shape.” See id. at 24. Indeed, even the inventor Jaunzemis acknowledges that the only 

difference between the ’360 and the ’505 Patent is the shape of the glass. Pl. Ex. 32, at 20, 

ECF No. 83-33. 

Despite this history, Plaintiff’s burden is more than just proving that a “substantially 

rounded, bead-like shape” is obvious over the prior art because all other elements were 

obvious in the ’360 Patent. Put differently, even if A + B is obvious and C is obvious, it 

does not automatically follow, at least as a matter of law, that A + B + C is also obvious. 

See Sabasta v. Buckaroos, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 937, 954 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (citing 

TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 336 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 

Instead, “[i]n evaluating a claim’s validity, the ‘determination of obviousness is made with 

respect to the subject matter as a whole, not separate pieces of the claim.’” Id. at 954–55 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Sanofi–Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1086 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103). 

///

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 29
23

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant argues that, despite aspects being found in the prior art, the ’505 Patent 

is not obvious when—as it must—it is considered as a whole. Def. Opp’n at 11 (citing 35 

U.S.C. § 103). According to Defendant, nothing in the prior art suggests a person of 

ordinary skill in the art at the time the Patent issued would have combined the elements. 

Def. Opp’n at 19–20. Specifically, it would not have been obvious to take the process for 

using standard tempered glass; tumble those glass fragments into a safe-to-handle, beadlike shape; and use them in a decorative fashion. Id.

The Court agrees that “the critical question is whether the invention as a whole was 

taught or suggested by the prior art, not merely whether individual elements or features of 

the invention are found somewhere in the prior art.” Id. But viewing the Patent in this 

light does not change the Court’s determination that the ’505 Patent as a whole is obvious. 

The Court concludes that, at the time the ’505 Patent issued, it would have been 

obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of the prior art into 

the process described in the ’505 Patent. The Court finds that the process for creating the 

standard tempered glass, breaking that glass, and using it in a decorative fashion described 

in the ’505 Patent is virtually identical to that found in the ’360 Patent. The Court agrees 

with the PTO’s numerous findings that this process is obvious to a person of ordinary skill 

in the art. The Georgantas Patent teaches a very similar process for using heat-treated 

glass, breaking that glass, and using it for decorative purposes––including for use in fire 

pits. Although the Georgantas Patent teaches using specially formulated tempered glass

(created by baking it three times), the Court finds that it would be obvious to a person of 

ordinary skill to take the teachings as they pertain to this specially formulated glass and to 

apply them to standard tempered glass. 

With this process as a baseline, the Court concludes that it would have been obvious 

to a person of ordinary skill in the art to tumble the glass pieces to form a substantially 

rounded, bead-like shape that is safe to handle. The prior art, including the Arpaio Patent 

and Wexler, clearly teaches the process of tumbling various materials––including glass––

to remove sharp edges. Faced with the problem of how to remove sharp edges on the 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 29
24

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

broken tempered glass pieces, an obvious solution for a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would be to tumble or vibrate those pieces using the processes described in the prior art. 

Moreover, the obvious shape of those pieces would be rounded pieces of various shapes 

and sizes. While Defendant vehemently denies this would be obvious, Defendant’s only 

evidence in support of the nonobviousness of the ’505 Patent is Mr. Jaunzemis’ declaration. 

See generally Jaunzemis Decl. But subjective evidence of obviousness from the point of 

view of the inventor is not evidence of nonobviousness sufficient to create a genuine 

dispute of material fact. See, e.g., Ryko, 950 F.2d at 718; Celanese Corp. v. BP Chem. Ltd., 

846 F.Supp. 542, 547 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (“[E]vidence of the patent’s ‘subjective 

obviousness' to the inventor . . . is direct evidence of nothing.”).

“Finally, the Court relies upon ‘[c]ommon sense [which] has long been recognized 

to inform the analysis of obviousness if explained with sufficient reasoning.’” Link 

Treasure Ltd., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 (quoting Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 

587 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The process for creating tempered glass, breaking 

that glass, and using it for decorative purposes was a known invention at the time of the 

’505 Patent. The addition of the shape of the glass and making it safe to handle is a “single, 

simple, element disclosed in prior patents.” Id. To an ordinary person in the art, familiar 

with the prior art described here, tumbling or vibrating the glass to create a substantially 

rounded, bead-like shape so the edges are smooth and safe to the touch would have been 

obvious. See id. (citing KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 420 (“Common sense teaches . . . that 

familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a 

person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like 

pieces of a puzzle.”)).

After a review of the Graham factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown, by 

clear and convincing evidence in the form of prior art, that the ’505 Patent is obvious. 

Combining the elements found in the prior art would have been obvious to a person of

ordinary skill in the art at the time the Patent issued. Accordingly, the ’505 Patent is invalid 

as obvious under section 103(a). 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 29
25

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Whether Plaintiff Infringes the ’505 Patent

Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment for non-infringement against 

Defendant’s ’505 Patent. Pl. MSJ at 28. Because the Court finds the ’505 Patent is invalid, 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringment of the ’505 patent is

DENIED AS MOOT. 

C. Defendant’s Remaining Counter Claims 

Defendant’s remaining counter claims are brought under the Lanham Act and 

California Unfair Competition Law on the grounds that Plaintiff’s statements on its website 

that several products are tumbled are false and constitute false advertising. Ans. 22, ¶ 28.

1. Lanham Act 

In the Ninth Circuit, liability under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is established 

by proving: 

(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial 

advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) the 

statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a 

substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, 

in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the 

defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate commerce; 

and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result 

of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from 

itself to defendant or by a lessening of the goodwill associated 

with its products.

Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(a)(1)(B)). “To demonstrate falsity within the meaning of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff 

may show that the statement was literally false, either on its face or by necessary 

implication, or that the statement was literally true but likely to mislead or confuse 

consumers.” Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 

1997).

Plaintiff does dispute that the claims on its website were literally false. Plaintiff 

contends that summary judgment is appropriate because the website references only 

applied to two products out of many and, thus, Defendant’s damages are “de minimus.” 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 29
26

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pl. MSJ at 27. Moreover, according to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to show that this fact 

would have impacted any consumer’s decision to purchase the product. Id. at 27–28. 

///

In searching the case law, the Court is unable to find any authority that absolves a 

defendant for making literally false statements on the account that they cause only de 

minimus harm. In addition to the lack of authority, this argument fails because “an inability 

to show actual damages does not alone preclude [] recovery” under the Lanham Act. Lindy 

Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds 

by SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Importantly, Plaintiff has failed to bring forth any evidence that supports its contention that 

Defendant suffered no harm and, therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to show 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to Defendant’s counter 

claims under the Lanham Act. 

2. California Unfair Competition Law

Defendant also brings claims under California Business and Professions Code 

sections 17200, et seq., the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Liability under 

this section and the Lanham Act are “substantially congruent.” Appliance Recycling 

Centers of Am., Inc. v. JACO Envtl., Inc., 378 F. App'x 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, a 

finding that Defendant’s Lanham Act fails “on the merits” is conclusive that its state law 

claims fail as well. Id. Because the Lanham Act and the UCL are substantially similar, 

the Court finds that the same reasoning applies for those claims and therefore DENIES

summary judgment as to Defendant’s claims under the UCL. 

II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant seeks summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims under the Lanham 

Act and the UCL on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to show that any statements made by 

Defendant were false, there is no evidence of injury, and there is no evidence of bad faith. 

Def. MSJ at 6–7. 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

 29
27

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Lanham Act 

In cases involving alleged false assertions of patent rights, the law of the regional 

circuit in which the district court sits governs claims of unfair competition. See, e.g., ProMold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, 

the Ninth Circuit’s standard for proving Lanham Act claims applies here. In addition to 

the five elements normally required to prove a Lanham Act violation, in the Ninth Circuit, 

“where Lanham Act claims . . . are based on a defendant’s representation that someone 

infringed his patent, plaintiff must show that defendant’s representation was made in bad 

faith.” Appliance Recycling Centers of Am., 378 F. App’x at 654 (quoting Fisher Tool Co. 

v. Gillet Outillage, 530 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

Plaintiff bases its false advertising claims on letters sent by Mr. Jaunzemis to it and 

its dealers. The letters threaten to sue for infringement of the ’360 and ’505 Patents, stating

in relevant part that “Moderustic is proud to have been issued 2 U.S. Patent Numbers, 

7,976,360 (in reconsideration) and 8,419,505 . . . . These patents and applications cover 

our method of creating tumbled tempered glass for use in fireplaces and fire pits.” ECF 

Nos. 12-2, 12-3. Plaintiff contends that these threats constitute false statements that caused 

its distributors to no longer buy from it, causing Plaintiff harm. 

The Court does not find that these statements were literally false. At the time 

Defendant sent these letters in 2015, the PTO had issued the ’505 Patent to Defendant. See

Pl. Opp’n at 5–6. And although the PTO had rejected the ’360 Patent, it was technically 

being reconsidered by the Federal Circuit at that time the letters were sent. Id. Thus, these 

statements are not literally false. 

“An advertisement that is not literally false may support a Lanham Act claim only if 

it is shown ‘that the advertisement has misled, confused, or deceived the consuming 

public.’” Appliance Recycling Ctrs. of Am., 378 Fed. App’x at 655 (quoting Southland 

Sod, 108 F.3d at 1140). The Court finds that no reasonable jury could find these statements 

to mislead, confuse, or deceive the consuming public when considered in their overall 

context. The letter clearly indicates that the ’360 Patent is in reconsideration. More 

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

 29
28

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

importantly, the ’505 Patent had been issued at the time the letters were sent, giving 

Defendant the right to enforce its legal rights as the Patent holder, regardless of the ’360 

Patent’s status. Thus, even if the letter misled the recipient into believing that Defendant

had an enforceable right as to the ’360 Patent, that right was duplicative of Defendant’s

right to enforce the ’505 Patent. 

The Court also finds that “Plaintiff[ has not] presented any evidence that defendant[] 

drafted or forwarded the letters in bad faith.” Fisher Tool Co., 530 F.3d at 1068. The 

letters clearly indicate that the ’360 Patent was “in reconsideration” and, although Plaintiff 

vehemently disagrees with the PTO’s issuance of the ’505 Patent, Defendant did in fact 

have the right to enforce its rights as the patentholder at that time. Without a showing that 

Defendant had some malicious intent, rather than simply asserting its rights as the 

patentholder, the Court cannot find bad faith present here. See id. at 1068–1069 (refusing 

to infer bad faith where the plaintiffs failed to bring forth any evidence other than the 

alleged misrepresentation). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendant with 

regard to Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims.

B. California Unfair Competition Law

In addition to the Lanham Act claims, Plaintiff also brings claims under the UCL. 

Because the Court has found the letters insufficient to support Plaintiff’s Lanham Act 

claims, see supra Section II.A., those same letters cannot support Plaintiff’s claims under 

California law. Cf. Appliance Recycling Ctrs. of Am., 378 Fed. App’x at 655. Accordingly, 

the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendant with regard to Plaintiff’s 

claims under the UCL. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

Motion as it relates to Defendant’s infringement claims and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion as 

///

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

 29
29

15-CV-2866 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

it relates to Defendant’s claims under the Lanham Act and the UCL. The Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2019

Case 3:15-cv-02866-JLS-BGS Document 145 Filed 03/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of

 29