Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00463/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAMID KAZEROONI,

Plaintiff,

v.

GENA TORRES,

 Defendant.

Case No. 2:20-cv-00463-TLN-DB

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Gena Torres’s (“Defendant”) Notice 

of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1–2.) For the reasons set forth 

below, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot, and 

the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, County of 

Sacramento, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff Hamid Kazerooni (“Plaintiff”) brought an action for 

unlawful detainer against Defendant for possession of real property known as 210 Battlecreek 

Circle, Sacramento, California, 95835 (“the Property”). (ECF No. 1 at 9.) On March 2, 2020, 

Defendant filed a Notice of Removal removing this unlawful detainer action from the Sacramento

County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 

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II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005).

Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 

“presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 

rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. Federal 

question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter 

v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant removed this action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1-1

at 1.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim involves the federal Protecting Tenants at 

Foreclosure Act of 2009 (“PTFA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5220. (ECF No. 1 at 2–4, 8.) “[The PTFA]

provides protections to tenants who reside in properties subject to foreclosure, including the 

requirement that a 90-day notice to vacate be given to bona fide tenants.” Granite Ranch 

Opportunities, LLC v. Huaman, No. 2:13-cv-1958-KJM-AC, 2013 WL 12121093, at *1 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). 

Despite Plaintiff’s assertion, it is clear that the Complaint itself contains only a single 

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claim for unlawful detainer. (ECF No. 1 at 9–11.) The instant Complaint therefore relies solely 

on California state law and does not state any claims under federal law. Based on the wellpleaded complaint rule as articulated above, removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, 

cross-claim, or third-party claim raising a federal question. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; see 

also Vaden, 556 U.S. at 49; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d at 1042–43. Although

Defendant asserts that the PTFA is “not a defense” but is instead “the entire basis for the action,”

she is incorrect. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) “[D]efendant[’]s assertions of the ‘Protecting Tenants at 

Foreclosure Act’ are best characterized as defenses or potential counterclaims; neither of which 

are considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff’s 

complaint.” First Northern Bank of Dixon v. Hatanaka, No. 2:11-cv-02976-MCE-KJN, 2011 WL 

6328713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2011) (citation omitted). “[F]ederal district courts have held 

that a defense based on the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act cannot serve as a basis for 

removal jurisdiction.” Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Montoya, No. 2:11-cv-2485-MCE-KJN, 2011 

WL 5508926, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). 

In sum, while Defendant seems to contend that Plaintiff has violated the PTFA, this 

assertion relates only to an affirmative defense or potential counterclaim, which cannot be 

considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60-62. Because the Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is 

one for unlawful detainer, which arises solely under state law, this action does not arise under 

federal law. There being no apparent grounds for federal jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand 

this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. 

Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court ha[s] a duty 

to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the parties 

raised the issue or not.”).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 

2) is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2020

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