Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01239/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01239-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD WILSON,

NO. CIV.S-05-1239 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

HARIA and GOGRI CORP. dba

JACK-IN-THE-BOX #551; OPT

GOLDEN HILLS VAC, LLC,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an award

of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $30,171.88. The

court decides the matter based on the papers and pleadings filed

herein and without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below,

the court awards $22,890.63 in fees and costs.

I. 

Procedural History

Plaintiff, Ronald Wilson, brought suit against defendants,

Haria and Gogri Corporation and OPT Golden Hills VAC, LLC,

pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

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The Unruh Act provides that any person who discriminates 1

in contravention of state law is liable for “attorney’s fees as may

be determined by the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3(a). 

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California Unruh Act. Plaintiff alleged that defendants denied

him full and equal enjoyment in the use of the Jack-In-The-Box

Restaurant in Vacaville, California.

On March 22, 2007, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment. With regard to the ADA claim, the court found

that there was no genuine dispute that plaintiff had

demonstrated the elements required to prove discrimination

stemming from an architectural barrier. 

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees under the ADA and state

law. Since the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to

attorneys’ fees and costs under the ADA, the court does not

address the standards for an award under California law.1

II. 

Standard

The ADA provides that “the court . . . in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s

fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. §

12205. The propriety of awarding attorneys’ fees turns on three

elements: (1) whether the party who seeks attorneys’ fees is the

prevailing party; (2) whether the court should exercise its

discretion to award the fees; and (3) what constitutes a

reasonable award.

A prevailing party is one who has “succeed[ed] on any

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3

significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)(citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). A party achieves prevailing party

status by establishing a “clear, causal relationship between the

litigation brought and the practical outcome realized.” 

Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1983)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the attorneys’ fees provision is stated in

discretionary terms, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily

recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would

render such an award unjust. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic

Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002)(citing Hensley, 461

U.S. at 429). The starting point for calculating the amount of

a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Fischer v. SJB-P.D.

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Hensley, 461

U.S. at 433). This lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable

and should only be enhanced or reduced in “rare and exceptional

cases.” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)). However, the

court may adjust the lodestar figure if various factors overcome

the presumption of reasonableness. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. 

The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the basis of the

Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

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Before the lodestar method developed, Kerr’s twelve factors 2

constituted the test for setting attorneys’ fee awards in the Ninth

Circuit. See Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. At present, the court uses

some of the Kerr factors in deciding the reasonableness of the

hours billed and the hourly rate. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 & n.3;

see also Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.9 (listing the Kerr factors

subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation). 

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difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether

the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the

"undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length of

the professional relationship with the client, and (12)

awards in similar cases. 

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.8 (9th Cir.

1996)(quoting Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975)). See also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 2

F.3d 1139, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002)(“The court need not consider all

. . . factors, but only those called into question by the case

at hand and necessary to support the reasonableness of the fee

award.” (citation omitted)).

III. 

Analysis

Plaintiff requests $30,171.88 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

For the reasons discussed herein, the court awards $22,890.63.

A. Prevailing Party

It is undisputed that plaintiff is the prevailing party in

this action. On March 22, 2007, the court granted plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment on all ADA and state law claims. 

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 Defendants also object to Lynn Hubbard’s declaration in 3

support of the motion for attorneys’ fees. Several of these

objections are to statements in Mr. Hubbard’s declaration that the

court does not rely upon. Therefore, the court need not address

these objections. Evidentiary Objections ¶¶ 3-5. Defendants’

other objections are to the itemization and documentation of

attorney time and costs submitted by Mr. Hubbard. The time sheets

listing the time attorneys and paralegals spent on legal tasks were

contemporaneously prepared by Mr. Hubbard’s law office, and Mr.

Hubbard states that he has personal knowledge as to the accuracy

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B. Discretion

A prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorneys’

fees unless special circumstances would render such an award

unjust. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. Defendants have not argued,

and the court does not find, that there are special

circumstances here that would make an award of attorneys’ fees

unjust.

C. Reasonable Fee

The starting point for calculating the amount of a

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 433. 

1. Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees for a total of

133.75 hours expended in this litigation. Decl. of Lynn Hubbard

(“Lynn Hubbard Decl.”) ¶ 4. In arriving at the lodestar figure,

the court should exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant,

or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 

Defendants argue generally that plaintiff’s fee request

includes unnecessary and excessively billed work. Defendants 3

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of the time sheets. See Lynn Hubbard Decl. ¶ 6. The court finds

these documents to be properly submitted in support of plaintiff’s

fee request. See Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1121 (noting that

contemporaneous time records are the preferred form of evidentiary

support for attorneys’ fees requests but that even fee requests

based upon reconstructed files are sufficient). The documentation

of costs is similarly based on personal knowledge. See Lynn

Hubbard Decl. ¶¶ 21-22. Accordingly, defendants’ evidentiary

objections to this documentation on the grounds of hearsay, lack

of authentication, best evidence, and lack of personal knowledge

are overruled.

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make two primary arguments. First, defendants argue that “the

pleadings and documents filed by Plaintiff’s counsel are boilerplate form documents.” Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys

Fees 3. Accordingly, defendants argue, plaintiff’s counsel

should not bill for the time it took to create the boiler plate

pleadings. 

This argument is unpersuasive. Even if the complaint is

boiler-plate, “[i]t is unclear to this court . . . why uniform

instances of misconduct do not justify uniform pleadings.” 

Wilson v. Pier 1 Imps., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (E.D.

Cal. 2006) (Karlton, J.)(finding that plaintiff Ronald Wilson

and attorney Lynn Hubbard were not vexatious litigants). Since

the complaint includes facts specific to defendants’ restaurant

and details regarding the alleged barriers encountered at the

property, the court concludes that the one hour counsel spent

drafting the complaint was not unreasonable. 

Second, defendants argue that the fee should be reduced

because “no motions were filed, and . . . this case was not

prosecuted” from November 2005, when defendant Haria and Gogri

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Corporation filed its answer, to October 2006, when plaintiff

filed his motion for summary judgment. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s

Mot. for Att’ys Fees 4. 

This argument is also unpersuasive. A review of the time

sheets submitted by plaintiff’s counsel show that legal work was

performed during that period. Ex. B, Lynn Hubbard Decl. For

instance, on December 21, 2005, Scott Hubbard wrote a letter to

defense counsel regarding insufficient discovery responses. Id. 

On April 5, 2006, Lynn Hubbard reviewed plaintiff’s amended

initial disclosures. Id. Similarly, on July 14, 2006, Lynn

Hubbard wrote a letter to defense counsel outlining the

remaining injunctive relief to be completed and disclosing

plaintiff’s intention to file a motion for summary judgment,

among other things. Id. In short, there is adequate

documentation to show that during the period of time that

defendants claim the case languished, plaintiff’s counsel was

performing legal work. 

Since defendants have not identified any tasks for which

the hours billed are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, the court concludes that the hours billed are

reasonable. 

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The court determines the reasonable hourly rate “according

to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community,” Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), which is typically the one

in which the district court sits, Davis v. Mason County, 927

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F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir.

1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.

1993). The party moving for attorneys’ fees “has the burden of

producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits

of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Jordan v.

Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-97 & n.11).

Plaintiff seeks a raise in the hourly rate awarded to ADA

attorneys in the Eastern District of California. Plaintiff asks

the court to increase the rate for lead counsel from $250 to

$325, for associate counsel from $150 to $200, and for

paralegals from $75 to $100. Additionally, plaintiff asks the

court to “increase [Scott Hubbard’s] hourly rate to $475 to

match his knowledge, expertise, and skill as an expert in ADA

law.” Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys Fees 4. 

To support his request for an increase in the hourly rates,

plaintiff cites a statistic from the United States Department of

Labor that inflation has increased 25% nationwide since 1998. 

Pl.’s Mot. For Att’ys Fees 4. This statistic is insufficient to

show that in this district, the relevant location for

determining reasonable hourly rates, there was a similar

increase in inflation and a corresponding increase in the

prevailing market rates for ADA attorneys. 

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Plaintiff has also provided the court with the declarations

of two attorneys practicing disability rights litigation in the

Eastern District who charge a higher hourly fee than the court

routinely awards. This evidence fails to establish that the

rates charged by these attorneys are the prevailing rates in the

Sacramento community. The court therefore finds that plaintiff

has failed to produce satisfactory evidence that the requested

rate increases are in line with those prevailing in the

community.

In his request that the court increase Scott Hubbard’s fee

to $475 per hour, plaintiff challenges the court to name another

party, attorney, or expert witness with greater knowledge of

disability law than Scott Hubbard. This burden does not lie

with the court. It is the plaintiff’s burden to produce

satisfactory evidence that the requested hourly rate is aligned

with prevailing rates in this community. Jordan, 815 F.2d at

1263. As stated above, plaintiff has failed to establish that

the prevailing rates in the Sacramento area are higher than the

rates that are routinely awarded. Plaintiff has also failed to

show that Scott Hubbard should be compensated above the market

rate for an associate attorney. The court therefore denies

plaintiff’s request to increase Scott Hubbard’s hourly rate to

$475.

Prevailing rates for ADA litigation in Sacramento are $250

per hour for an experienced attorney, $150 for an associate, and

$75 for a paralegal. See, e.g., Martinez v. G. Maroni Co., No.

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 Even if the court could properly consider these factors, 4

they are unpersuasive in a suit brought under the ADA, which

Congress chose to enforce through private litigation. See 42

U.S.C. § 12188. The purpose of the statute and fees provision was

clearly to encourage the kind of litigation defendants decry.

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human

Res., 532 U.S. 598, 644 (2001)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

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Civ. S-06-1399, 2007 WL 1302739, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2,

2007)(Levi, J.)(awarding Lynn Hubbard $250 per hour and his

associate $150); Martinez v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., No. 2:02-CV0745, 2006 WL 279309, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006)(England,

J.) (awarding Lynn Hubbard $250 per hour and Scott Hubbard

$150). Accordingly, the court will apply the hourly rates of

$250 for Lynn Hubbard, $150 for Scott Hubbard and Mark Emmet,

and $75 for paralegals. 

3. Lodestar adjustment

The lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable and should

only be enhanced or reduced in “rare and exceptional cases.” 

Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119. Defendants argue, but cite no

binding or persuasive authority to suggest, that the lodestar

should be reduced because plaintiff litigated established legal

issues instead of seeking the formation of new law. The novelty

and complexity of the issues litigated and the results obtained

may not be considered in the lodestar adjustment because these

factors are subsumed in the initial lodestar determination.4

See Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262. 

The remaining Kerr factors that may be considered in the

court’s determination of whether to adjust the lodestar do not

indicate that this is a rare or exceptional case requiring

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reduction or enhancement of the fee. The court therefore awards

plaintiff’s counsel the lodestar amount.

4. Litigation Expenses and Costs

The ADA provides that the prevailing party can recover

litigation expenses and costs in addition to attorneys’ fees. 

42 U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiff requests a total of $2,403.13 in

costs and other expenses, specifically: filing and service of

process fees, depositions, courier services, and other

litigation expenses. Lynn Hubbard Decl. ¶ 21. Defendants ask

the court to disallow plaintiff’s “unexplained and overly vague

and absolutely unsubstantiated demand for costs” because

plaintiff “has provided no evidence to support his claim for

expenses.” Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys Fees 9. 

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, plaintiff has provided the

court with an itemized list of the claimed litigation expenses

and costs. Ex. C, Lynn Hubbard Decl.

The only exception pertains to plaintiff’s request for

reimbursement of “other litigation expenses.” Plaintiff’s

itemization of expenses and costs lists the “other litigation

expenses” as a preliminary site report and an asset report. Id. 

Lynn Hubbard describes the preliminary site report in his

declaration, but fails to explain what the asset report is or

why it is required. Lynn Hubbard Decl. ¶ 22. Because the asset

report lacks sufficient documentation, the court will deduct

this expense. Plaintiff’s costs and expenses are therefore

reduced by $550. 

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In sum, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to

recover $1,853.13 in litigation expenses and costs.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court awards plaintiff’s

attorneys’ fees and costs in the following amounts: 

Lynn Hubbard: 55.2 hours @ $250/hr = $13,800

Scottlynn Hubbard: 9.55 hours @ $150/hr = $1,432.50

Mark Emmett: 12.3 hours @ $150/hr = $1,845

Paralegals: 52.8 hours @ $75/hr = $3,960

Litigation expenses and costs: = $1,853.13

Total attorneys’ fees and costs: $22,890.63

It is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees and costs is GRANTED in the total sum of

$22,890.63.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 20, 2007.

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