Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08123/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08123-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

KayAnne Riley, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

City of Prescott, Arizona, a political 

subdivision; Marlin Kuykendall, individually 

and in his official capacity as Mayor of the City 

of Prescott, and Tana Kuykendall, husband and 

wife, 

 Defendants. 

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NO. CV-11-08123-PCT-JAT 

ORDER 

 

 

Pending before the Court is City of Prescott Defendants’ Motion for 

Reconsideration Regarding Sanctions for Spoliation (Doc. 319). For the following 

reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 On February 19, 2014, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 312) granting or denying 

several motions, including granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery Sanctions (Doc. 271 

at 12–21) related to Defendants’ alleged spoliation of certain email evidence, and 

denying Defendants’ Cross-Motion for similar discovery sanctions against Plaintiff (Doc. 

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285 at 23–25). On March 5, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 319) 

these two rulings.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Generally, motions for reconsideration are appropriate only if: (1) the movant 

presents newly discovered evidence; (2) the Court committed clear error or the initial 

decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) an intervening change in controlling law has 

occurred. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 

(9th Cir. 1993). A party should not file a motion to reconsider to ask a court “to rethink 

what the court had already thought through, rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc. v. 

Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983). “No motion for 

reconsideration shall repeat in any manner any oral or written argument made in support 

of or in opposition to the original motion.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. 

Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). The Court ordinarily will deny “a 

motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing 

of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier 

with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Here, Defendants present no newly discovered evidence or intervening change in 

controlling case law. Instead, Defendants suggest this Court committed “clear error 

resulting in a manifestly unjust ruling.” (Doc. 319 at 3). Specifically, Defendants rehash 

(id. at 3–8) their previous argument (Doc. 285 at 23–25) that because Riley’s behavior 

regarding the deletion of emails was allegedly more egregious than Defendants’ 

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behavior, sanctioning Defendants but not Riley is “manifestly unfair and unjust” (Doc. 

319 at 7). The Court notes that the only “new” aspect of Defendants’ argument is the 

increasingly misleading spin with which Defendants frame the “facts” of the case.1

Before its previous Order, the Court considered these and other material facts. 

Consequently, to the extent that Defendants’ arguments in the Motion to Reconsider are 

repetitions of its earlier written and oral arguments, the Court will ignore the repetitions. 

LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). 

 Additionally, Defendants argue that this Court’s Order creates an unjustified 

double standard because the Court speculates as to whether the Mayor’s unavailable 

emails are “relevant” to the case, but refuses to speculate on the relevance of Plaintiff’s 

destroyed emails. (Doc. 319 at 6–8). Defendants urge this Court to, for consistency’s 

sake and to avoid committing a manifest injustice, either sanction both parties, or neither 

party. (Id. at 8). 

 To the extent that this argument has not previously been made by Defendants and 

considered by the Court, however, the argument rests on a gross mischaracterization of 

the Court’s previous Order. The Court previously explained that a party seeking 

sanctions for spoliation of evidence must prove several elements, including that “the 

evidence that was destroyed or altered was ‘relevant’ to the claims or defenses of the 

party that sought the discovery of the spoliated evidence.” (Doc. 312 at 36 (quoting 

Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d. 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011)). 

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 For example, Defendants claim that “the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff Riley 

engaged in wholesale destruction of electronic communications.” (Doc. 319 at 5 (citing 

Doc. 312 at 36:18–19)). In fact, the Court only acknowledges that “Defendants’ allege

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Then, the Court carefully considered Defendants arguments, but found that “Defendants 

cannot be entitled to sanctions against Riley because Defendants have made no attempt to 

satisfy the third element, relevance.” (Doc. 312 at 37 (emphasis added) (citing Doc. 285 

at 23–25; Doc. 297)). The Court further explained that “Defendants have not made 

any showing regarding what, if any, evidence possibly could have been lost that may be 

relevant to Riley’s claims or Defendants’ defenses. Indeed, Defendants have not even 

speculated as to what relevant evidence may have been discovered in Riley’s email.” 

(Doc. 312 at 37 (emphasis added)). 

 In contrast, Plaintiff specifically alleged that the emails deleted by the Mayor were 

relevant because they discussed Plaintiff and her protected speech activities and directly 

or indirectly caused Plaintiff’s employer to take an adverse employment action against 

Plaintiff. (See id. at 24–32). Moreover, the Court specifically found that Plaintiff’s 

“speculation”2

 as to the potential relevance of the contents of the deleted and 

undiscovered emails was supported by the factual record. (Id. at 33). 

 Thus, the Court’s previous Order could not have been more clear about the 

difference between Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ spoliation claims: Plaintiff met the 

element of relevance while Defendants did not even attempt to do so. Therefore, the 

Court finds that its previous Order regarding spoliation and discovery sanctions does not 

contain clear legal error. Additionally, sanctioning Defendants’ conduct but not 

 

that Riley deleted numerous emails that may have been relevant to this litigation and 

even closed an email account.” (Doc. 312 at 36:18–19 (emphasis added)). 

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 The Court notes that because the contents of a deleted and undiscovered email 

cannot be known with certainty, permissible adverse inferences about the contents of the 

emails are inherently “speculative.” 

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Plaintiff’s conduct is not “manifestly unjust.” Defendants must show more than a 

disagreement with the Court’s decision; the Court should not grant a motion for 

reconsideration unless there is need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest 

injustice. See Motorola, Inc, 215 F.R.D. at 586. Such is not the case here. Defendants 

have failed to present this Court with cause to reconsider its February 19, 2014 Order 

granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery Sanctions and denying Defendants’ CrossMotion. For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration is 

denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 319) is 

DENIED. 

 Dated this 25th day of March, 2014. 

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