Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08149/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RONALD LEE MANNING, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-8149 PCT MHM (MEA)

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On or about November 14, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 14) on April 1, 2009.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer on June 19, 2009. See

Docket No. 19.

I Procedural History

Petitioner and five co-defendants were charged with one

count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and one count

of conspiracy to commit first degree escape in an indictment

filed in Mohave County Superior Court on June 22, 2000. See

Answer, Exh. A. Petitioner was also charged with theft of a gun

and misconduct involving weapons. Id., Exh. A. The charges

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1 The specifics of the events are presented in great detail

in Cofsky v. Schriro, 2009 WL 733869 (D. Ariz.), Docket No. 07-8126

PCT FJM LOA.

2 An inmate at the Mohave County jail overheard two other

inmates, David Goldberg and Dennis Schilinsky, discussing the escape

of Mr. Goldberg, which including killing a guard if necessary. The

inmate reported what he overheard to officers. Mr. Schilinsky was

transferred to a Las Vegas jail, where he discussed the impending

escape of Mr. Goldberg with an inmate at that facility, who also

reported the information to authorities. See Answer, Exh. E.

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arose from a thwarted “jailbreak” of an inmate from the Mohave

County Detention Center on June 12, 2000. Id., Exh. A.1

Petitioner was not the incarcerated individual who was to be

freed from the detention center pursuant to the conspiracy.2

Petitioner and three of his co-defendants, Tracy Date,

Eugene Cofsky, and Sheri Cofsky, were tried together. See

Answer, Exh. B. In a verdict entered January 26, 2001,

Petitioner, Tracy Date, and Eugene Cofsky were found guilty of

conspiracy to commit first degree murder and conspiracy to

commit first degree escape. Id., Exh. B. The fourth defendant,

Sheri Cofsky, was acquitted on all charges. Id., Exh. B.

Additionally, the jury found Petitioner guilty of weapons

misconduct and acquitted Petitioner and Tracy Date on the charge

of theft. Id., Exh. B. 

On March 30, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to life in

prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years

pursuant to his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree

murder. Id., Exh. C. Petitioner was also sentenced to a

concurrent term of eight years incarceration pursuant to his

conviction on the charge of conspiracy to commit escape, and to

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a concurrent term of six years pursuant to his conviction for

weapons misconduct. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner alleged the

trial court erred by not entering a directed verdict on the

conspiracy charges based on insufficient evidence. Petitioner

further asserted the trial court erroneously instructed the

jury. Petitioner also argued the trial court erred by admitting

hearsay testimony regarding the statements of a co-conspirator.

Additionally, Petitioner maintained he was entitled to relief

because the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a

change of venue. Petitioner also asserted in his direct appeal

that the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress

evidence resulting from a traffic stop. Id., Exh. D. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences for conspiracy to commit first degree

murder and weapons misconduct in a memorandum decision. Id.,

Exh. E. However, the Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner’s

conviction for conspiracy to commit escape. Id., Exh. E at 7-8.

Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeals’

decision, to the extent his claims were denied, by the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id., Exh. F. The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review in the direct appeal on January 8, 2003. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner sought certiorari, which was denied by the United

States Supreme Court on May 27, 2003. See Manning v. Arizona,

538 U.S. 1064 (2003).

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 Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on June 27, 2003. Answer, Exh. H. Petitioner was

appointed counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings.

Id., Exh. I. 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 counsel filed a motion in that

action, seeking to change the trial judge assigned to the case,

Judge Conn. Id., Exh. I. Counsel argued in the motion that

Judge Conn should be removed from the case for cause. Id., Exh.

I. An evidentiary hearing regarding the motion was conducted

before Judge Weiss on April 22, 2004. Id., Exh. J. The motion

for a change of judge in Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings was

denied. Id., Exh. J & Exh. K.

Petitioner’s appointed Rule 32 counsel filed a brief in

support of Petitioner’s substantive claims for relief on March

14, 2005. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner asserted, inter alia, that

his trial counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally

ineffective. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner alleged his trial counsel

failed to advise Petitioner of a plea offer, which offer

Petitioner asserts he would have accepted. Id., Exh. L.

Petitioner also alleged counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel failed to challenge the allegedly multiplicitous

indictment and because counsel failed to object to Petitioner

appearing in front of the jury in shackles. 

The state trial court denied relief on the merits of

all of Petitioner’s Rule 32 claims, except his claim that trial

counsel did not inform him of a plea agreement. Id., Exh. M.

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The trial court concluded that, because Petitioner stood

convicted of only one conspiracy crime, Petitioner’s claim

regarding the multiplicitous indictment and his counsel’s

failure to object thereto did not provide a basis for relief.

Id., Exh. M. Additionally, the state trial court noted that the

jury had only seen Petitioner in shackles after it reached its

verdict and, accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for his

failure to object. Id., Exh. M.

After conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding

Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel failed to advise him

of a plea offer, the Mohave County Superior Court denied relief

on this claim. Id., Exh. M, Exh. N, Exh. O. In its order

denying this claim for post-conviction relief the trial court

noted Petitioner’s “well documented” “unwillingness” to accept

a plea offer prior to his trial. Id., Exh. O. The trial court

noted the testimony of Petitioner’s trial counsel at the

evidentiary hearing that counsel had informed Petitioner of a

plea deal offering a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment.

Trial counsel testified that he had advised Petitioner to take

the offer, and that Petitioner had not taken the offer because

Petitioner believed he could prevail at trial. Id., Exh. O. In

its written opinion denying Rule 32 relief the state trial court

discussed its reasons for discounting Petitioner’s testimony

that he had not known of the plea offer. The state court found

as a fact that Petitioner had known of the offer and rejected

it. Id., Exh. O. Alternatively, the trial court found as a

fact that Petitioner would not have accepted the offer. Id.,

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Exh. O.

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision

denying Rule 32 relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id.,

Exh. P. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in a summary

decision issued October 22, 2007. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner

sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review

in a decision issued February 12, 2008. Id., Exh. S.

Petitioner contends he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because:

1. The trial court erred when instructing the jury as

to the treatment of multiple offenses as part of a single

conspiracy. Petitioner asserts this error deprived him of his

rights pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

2. The trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion

for a directed verdict on the conspiracy counts. Petitioner

asserts this error deprived him of his rights pursuant to the

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. 

3. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth and

Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the testimony of a coconspirator, which testimony Petitioner asserts was hearsay.

4. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth and

Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial by denying his motion for

a change of venue.

5. The trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due

process of law and his Fourth Amendment rights by denying his

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motion to suppress evidence seized as the result of a traffic

stop.

6. The trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to

admit evidence without prior disclosure to the defense in

violation of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and

Petitioner’s right to due process of law.

7. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney

“improperly handled” a plea agreement providing for a sentence

of ten years imprisonment.

8. Petitioner’s counsel failed to object to an

allegedly multiplicitous indictment, in violation of

Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of counsel.

9. Petitioner’s rights to due process and a fair trial

were violated by Judge Conn’s hearing of Petitioner’s Rule 32

proceedings. Petitioner contends the judge should have recused

himself because Judge Conn was a potential witness and because

Judge Conn was biased.

10. Petitioner’s counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective because counsel did not object to the jury

instruction regarding the conspiracy charge.

11. Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to call a particular witness.

12. Petitioner’s counsel “improperly litigated” the

admission of hearsay testimony at Petitioner’s trial.

13. “Petitioner is entitled to relief from his

convictions pursuant to [Arizona v. Evanchyk and Arizona v.

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Phillips].”

14. Petitioner’s counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective because counsel failed to prevent or object to

Petitioner’s appearance before the jury in shackles.

15. Petitioner’s appellate counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective because he failed to properly

argue an absence of the requisite mens rea.

16. Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s performance was

unconstitutionally deficient appellate counsel erred by failing

to supplement his arguments with citations to Evanchyk and

Phillips, which were decided while Petitioner’s appeal was

pending.

II. Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

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3

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2009). 

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v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).3

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements,

a petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial

equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971).

“[S]tate courts have been given a sufficient opportunity to hear

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an issue when the petitioner has presented the state court with

the issue’s factual and legal basis.” Weaver v. Thompson, 197

F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999).

In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court reiterated that

the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the opportunity

to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541

U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the

petitioner did not present the federal habeas claim to the state

court as asserting the violation of a specific federal

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state

constitutional right or state law, the federal habeas claim was

not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541

U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d

1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1227

(2008). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-

13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to

support the federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,

6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2009). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

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satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at

2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632

(9th Cir. 2000); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating

a state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and

independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise

the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and

prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis, 222 F.3d at 632,

quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona courts. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state

rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims

raised in attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and

independent state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying

federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Cause and prejudice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

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relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses of conviction. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at

393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-

43 (9th Cir. 2001).

C. Standard of review regarding habeas claims properly

exhausted in the state courts

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2009); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-75, 127 S. Ct. 649,

653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir.

2009). 

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.

Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340,

123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007). The “presumption of correctness is equally

applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state

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trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455

U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

The “contrary to federal law” test

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Brown v. Payton,

544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered “contrary to

federal law” if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (stating the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding a habeas petitioner

entitled to relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

because the Ninth Circuit should not have reversed the state

court based on its failure to apply a “nothing to lose” test to

a claim properly analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington);

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-

47 (2008). See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233

(10th Cir. 2009). 

The “unreasonable application” test

“A state determination may be set aside under this

standard if, under clearly established federal law, the state

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4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: “A state

court’s decision may be an ‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law

if it ‘extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.’

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).” Cook v.

Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

1033 (2009).

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court was unreasonable in refusing to extend the governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529

U.S. at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74-75, 127

S. Ct. at 653. An unreasonable application of law is different

from an incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122

S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080

(9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, only United States Supreme Court

holdings, and not dicta or concurring opinions, at the time of

the state court’s decision are the source of “clearly

established federal law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable

application” prong of federal habeas review. Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S. Ct. at

653. Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has clearly

established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based on a

claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d

1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are “without

the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court precedent.

See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).4 

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The federal appellate courts have split on

whether Faretta, which establishes a Sixth

Amendment right to self-representation, implies

a right of the pro se defendant to have access to

a law library.[]. That question cannot be

resolved here, however, as it is clear that

Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid

that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant.

The ... court below therefore erred in holding,

based on Faretta, that a violation of a law

library access right is a basis for federal

habeas relief.

Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10-11, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408-09 (2005).

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Accordingly, if the Supreme Court has not addressed an

issue in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the

issue cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881, citing

Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006).5

If the issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in

the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a

writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the state court

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by

rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner. Cook

v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

129 S. Ct. 1033 (2009); Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123

(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).

A state court decision constitutes an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent only if the state court decision is

objectively unreasonable. That is, the state

court decision must be “more than incorrect

or erroneous.” Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d

1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). Whether a state

court’s application of a rule is reasonable

depends on the specificity of the rule.

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663,

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124 S. Ct. 2140, [] (2004). Where the

Supreme Court has not addressed an issue in

its holding, a state court adjudication of

the issue not addressed by the Supreme Court

cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal

law. Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9, 126 S.

Ct. 407, [] (2006). Accordingly, Stenson is

not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) unless the Washington court’s

decision “was contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of [the Supreme

Court’s] applicable holdings.” Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653,

[] (2006).

Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881.

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 951-52, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,

390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68 (2005). See also Larson v.

Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129

S. Ct. 171 (2008).

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts his constitutional rights were

violated by his conviction on both conspiracy to commit murder

and for conspiracy to commit escape. Petitioner alleges the

trial court’s failure to instruct the jury “as to the treatment

of multiple offenses as the objective of the same conspiracy”

violated his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights.

Respondents allow Petitioner properly exhausted this

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 This section provides: “A person who conspires to commit

a number of offenses is guilty of only one conspiracy if the multiple

offenses are the object of the same agreement or relationship and the

degree of the conspiracy shall be determined by the most serious

offense conspired to.”

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claim in the state courts. In his direct appeal Petitioner

asserted that two separate conspiracies were not established

and, accordingly, that the trial court erred by instructing the

jury on separate conspiracy counts. See Answer, Exh. D at 25.

The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed that “there was only one

conspiracy in this case....” Id., Exh. E. Citing Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated § 13–1003(C),6 the appellate court

determined that, because “the most serious offense conspired to

was First-Degree Murder....”, the appropriate remedy for the

error was to vacate Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to

commit escape. Id., Exh. E at 7-8. Accordingly, Petitioner

stands convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and

not convicted of conspiracy to commit escape.

The decision to vacate Petitioner’s conviction for

conspiracy was not contrary to clearly established federal law.

An appropriate remedy for the result of Petitioner’s standing

convicted of two conspiracy crimes was to vacate the conviction

and the concurrent sentence for the lesser-included offense. 

In Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S. Ct.

1241 (1996), the Supreme Court held that, where a defendant is

found guilty of two offenses and one is a lesser included

offense of the other, the remedy is for the trial court to

vacate one of the underlying convictions and any sentence based

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 In United States v. Cabaccang, a case concerning double

jeopardy arising from conviction on a lesser included charge, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: “when a jury convicts on

both a greater and a lesser included offense, Rutledge requires the

district court to enter a final judgment of conviction on the greater

offense and vacate the conviction of the lesser offense ....” 481

F.3d 1176, 1183 (2007).

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upon that conviction. See 517 U.S. at 1247-48, 1241 S. Ct. at

301-02.7 The Ninth Circuit previously recognized that, when a

defendant has been convicted and sentenced on multiplicatus

charges, “[t]he conviction as well as the sentence on one of the

two multiplicatus counts must be vacated, to ‘avoid both the

punitive collateral effects of multiple convictions as well as

the direct effects of multiple sentences.’” United States v.

Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other

grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.

2000). See also United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 947-

48 (9th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ approach to

Petitioner’s dual convictions was clearly constitutionally

permissible. Any double jeopardy to which Petitioner was

subjected was remedied and Petitioner is not being held in

violation of this constitutional prohibition. Petitioner was

afforded the relief to which he was entitled and, therefore, he

is not entitled to further relief based on his challenge to the

indictment or based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the

jury regarding a single conspiracy with multiple offenses.

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2. Petitioner contends the trial court violated his

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by not entering

judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy counts.

Respondents contend Petitioner did not properly exhaust

this claim in the state courts by asserting that the failure to

enter a directed verdict violated his federal constitutional

rights. 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of the conspiracy counts

and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal on these charges. Answer, Exh. D

at 12–14. In this portion of his appellate brief Petitioner did

not assert the violation of a federal constitutional right and

did not cite to any federal legal opinion. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the

state courts by presenting it as a claim asserting the violation

of a federal constitutional right. Because Petitioner

procedurally defaulted this federal habeas claim in the state

courts by failing to fairly present it to the state courts,

relief on the merits of the claim may not be granted absent a

showing of cause and prejudice for the procedural default. 

In reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends that his claims were never adjudicated “on the merits”

by the state courts because he was not allowed to fully and

fairly present his claims during an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner asserts that the state court’s denial of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims was an abuse of the

state court’s discretion. Petitioner further alleges that his

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unexhausted federal habeas claims were not raised in the state

courts as asserting the violation of a federal constitutional

right because his appellate counsel and post-conviction

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective. 

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural

default of some of his federal habeas claims in the state

courts. Under the “cause and prejudice” test, Petitioner bears

the burden of establishing that some objective factor external

to the defense impeded his compliance with Arizona's procedural

rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir.

2005). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v.

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567 (“We reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness

will constitute cause only if it is an independent

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constitutional violation”); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809

(6th Cir. 2004) (“[a]ttorney error does not constitute cause to

excuse a procedural default unless counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.”). The ineffective assistance of

post-conviction counsel does not constitute cause because “the

right to counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings

or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80

F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996).

“Cause” must be something external to the

petitioner. [] Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence is not cause, but attorney error

rising to the level of an independent

constitutional violation (in the form of

ineffective assistance of counsel) does

constitute cause. [] In several cases, we

have rejected arguments similar to Moormann’s

on the ground that, because there is no Sixth

Amendment right to counsel in state

post-conviction proceedings, there can be no

independent constitutional violation as a

result of post-conviction counsel’s

incompetence. 

Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1058 (internal citations omitted).

Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice regarding

this procedurally defaulted claim and, accordingly, the court

should not consider the merits of the claim.

3. Petitioner contends his Fifth and Sixth Amendment

rights were violated when the trial court admitted hearsay

statements by an alleged co-conspirator.

Petitioner asserts that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment

rights were violated by the trial court’s admission of the

testimony of Robert Olsen and David England, who testified as to

the out-of-court statements of an alleged co-conspirator Dennis

Schilinski. Petitioner raised this same claim in his direct

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appeal. See Answer, Exh. D at 25. The Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded that Mr. Schilinski’s statements were made in

furtherance of a conspiracy and, accordingly, that Mr. Olsen’s

and Mr. England’s testimony as to what Mr. Schilinski said was

not inadmissible hearsay. The state appellate court noted that,

pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (E), statements made by a

co-conspirator are not hearsay when “[t]he statement is offered

against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a

party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

Answer, Exh. D at 8. Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals

noted that in his direct appeal Petitioner had not argued that

Mr. Schilinski was not a member of a conspiracy to break Mr.

Goldberg out of the Kingman jail, but rather that Mr.

Schilinski’s statements amounted to “mere bragging, not meant to

further the conspiracy.” Id., Exh. D at 9. The Arizona Court

of Appeals also concluded that “Schilinski only disclosed the

actual details of the escape plan -- the timing, location, names

of two of the men involved, and so forth -- in order to enlist

the inmate’s help in making bail so that Schilinski could

participate in the jailbreak.” Id., Exh. D at 9. Therefore,

the appellate court reasoned, the statements were made in

“furtherance of the conspiracy,” and therefore admissible as

fitting a long-standing exception to the rule barring hearsay

testimony.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was not clearly

contrary to federal law or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent.

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 In Crawford the Supreme Court held that testimonial

hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. See Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54-57, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364, 1374 (2004).

However, Crawford specifically explained that “statements in

furtherance of a conspiracy” are “by their nature” not testimonial.

541 U.S. at 56, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. See also Ferguson v. Roper, 400

F.3d 635, 638-40 (8th Cir. 2005).

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In Ohio v. Roberts the United States Supreme Court held

hearsay statements are admissible if they fall within a firmly

rooted exception to the hearsay rule or on a showing of

particular indicia of reliability. See 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.

Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). The reliability requirement

can be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted

hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815, 110 S.

Ct. 3139, 3146-47 (1990).8 See also Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d

1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has held that a

firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule permits admitting

statements made by conspirators in furtherance of the

conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183, 107

S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987) (holding the co-conspirator

exception to the hearsay rule is “firmly enough rooted in [its]

jurisprudence that ... a court need not independently inquire

into the reliability of such statements.”). Additionally, when

the declarant is a co-conspirator, the party offering the

statement need not demonstrate that the declarant is

unavailable. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395-400,

106 S. Ct. 1121, 1128-29 (1986).

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Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion

that the challenged testimony was admissible was not objectively

unreasonable. See United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235

(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “co-conspirator statements are not

testimonial and therefore beyond the compass of Crawford’s

holding.”); Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 875 (5th Cir.

2006); Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635, 638-40 (8th Cir. 2005).

4. Petitioner asserts the trial court violated his

Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process of law by denying a change of

venue.

In his federal habeas action, Petitioner argues that

his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial

court’s failure to order a change of venue. Petitioner alleges

that pretrial publicity precluded finding a fair and impartial

jury and that seated jurors would “visit” the scene of the

thwarted alleged crime because the courthouse was the alleged

crime scene. Petitioner also maintains the state trial judge,

Judge Conn, possessed “disputed evidentiary facts” gathered ex

parte prior to Petitioner’s arrest. Petitioner alleges Judge

Conn “abdicated his courtroom security responsibilities to the

jail, [and] was a witness to increased security measures and

therefore could not fairly [p]reside over Petitioner’s case.”

Docket No. 1 at 18–19.

 In his direct appeal Petitioner argued that the trial

court erred in denying Petitioner’s pretrial motion for change

of venue. See Answer, Exh. D at 25. However, Petitioner did

not assert that this error was a violation of his federal

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constitutional rights. In denying the claim, the Arizona Court

of Appeals held that, because the record indicated the jurors

did not have preconceived notions about guilt, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Id., Exh.

E at 11.

In his pleading in support of this claim in his

counseled direct appeal, Petitioner did not assert that his

federal constitutional rights had been violated nor did he cite

to any federal legal opinion. Petitioner did not “fairly

present” this claim in the state courts and the claim is

procedurally defaulted. See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153,

1156-59 (9th Cir. 2003); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88

& n.17 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner did not “fairly present”

this claim to any Arizona court as a violation of his federal

constitutional rights. Because Petitioner has not shown cause

and prejudice regarding his procedural default of this claim,

the Court should not consider the merits of the claim.

5. Petitioner maintains the trial court violated his

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying his motion to

suppress evidence.

Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief on

the basis of any alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in an

action for federal habeas relief because he had the opportunity

to litigate this claim in the state courts. See Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976). 

A claim that the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights

were violated does not provide a basis for granting federal

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habeas relief from a state conviction if the petitioner had the

opportunity “for full and fair litigation” of the claim in the

state courts. See, e.g., Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326-27

(9th Cir. 1993); Patterson v. Runnels, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1092,

1097-98 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The relevant inquiry is whether the

petitioner was afforded a full and fair hearing of his claim in

the state court, not whether the state court reached a correct

decision regarding the legitimacy of the “search.” See

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996);

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner raised the legitimacy of the search in his

direct appeal. Because Petitioner had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate this claim in the state courts, federal

habeas relief may not be based on the claim.

6. Petitioner argues the trial court erred by admitting

into evidence two of the state’s exhibits without proper

disclosure to Petitioner. Petitioner asserts this violated his

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In Ground VI of the petition, Petitioner claims that

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the

trial court admitted into evidence two letters allegedly

handwritten by Petitioner, without proper disclosure of the

evidence to the defense and without proper forensic handwriting

analysis.

In his direct appeal Petitioner argued that the

admission of this evidence violated the Arizona Rules of

Evidence and, accordingly, that the admission of the evidence

was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. This portion of

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A claim is not “fairly presented” if the state

court “must read beyond a petition or a brief ...

in order to find material” that alerts it to the

presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S.

at 32, 124 S. Ct. 1347 (concluding that a

petitioner does not “fairly present” an issue for

exhaustion purposes when the appellate judge can

only discover the issue by reading a lower court

opinion in the case).

Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1771 (2009).

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the appellate brief does not mention the United States

Constitution or cite to any published federal opinion.

A petitioner fully and fairly presents a

claim to the state courts if he presents the

claim (1) to the correct forum,; (2) through

the proper vehicle; and (3) by providing the

factual and legal basis for the claim. Full

and fair presentation additionally requires

a petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional

guarantee and a statement of facts that

entitle the petitioner to relief.

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Petitioner did not “fairly present” this claim in the

state courts as alleging the violation of a constitutional right

and the claim is, therefore, procedurally defaulted. See Wooten

v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

129 S. Ct. 1771 (2009).9 Because Petitioner has not shown cause

and prejudice regarding his procedural default of this claim,

the Court should not consider the merits of the claim.

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7. Petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated because he proved by a preponderance of the evidence at

the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing that his trial counsel

ineffectively handled the last plea offer.

The allegation that a state court erred in state postconviction proceedings does not state a claim for federal habeas

relief based on the argument that such an error is a violation

of the petitioner’s federal right to a fair trial or due process

of law. See District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist.

v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009) (“Federal courts may

upset a State’s postconviction relief procedures only if they

are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights

provided.”); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 941-42; Franzen v. Brinkman, 877

F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989); Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333,

1339 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause the constitutional error he

raises focuses only on the State’s post-conviction remedy and

not the judgment which provides the basis for his incarceration,

it states no cognizable federal habeas claim.”); Jones v.

Duncan, 162 F. Supp. 2d 204, 217-18 n.21 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).

Petitioner has not established that Arizona’s postconviction relief procedures were fundamentally inadequate in

protecting his substantive rights. Therefore, federal habeas

relief is not warranted on the basis of this claim. 

8. Petitioner alleges his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel was violated because his trial

counsel failed to object to the multiplicitous indictment before

the start of trial.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

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deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at

25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). “A fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at

2066 (emphasis added).

To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance

was deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular

argument the petitioner must establish the argument was likely

to be successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by

his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,

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1144 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970

(9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s

deficient performance. To the extent that the indictment was

multiplicitous, Petitioner does not stand convicted in violation

of his right to be free of double jeopardy as one of his

convictions was vacated upon appeal. Accordingly, Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief from his standing

convictions and sentences based on a claim that his counsel was

ineffective with regard to a conviction that has been vacated.

9. Petitioner asserts Judge Conn should have recused

from Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings because he was a

relevant witness to issues raised in the post-conviction

proceedings and because he was biased and prejudiced.

Petitioner alleges these errors violated his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Petitioner arguably raised his federal habeas claim in

his action for state post-conviction relief. In Arizona the

state trial court judge who conducted the petitioner’s trial is

the initial judge before whom the petitioner’s first state

action for post-conviction relief is conducted. Petitioner’s

Rule 32 action asserted Petitioner had been denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner filed a motion seeking

the trial judge’s recusal from Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings.

On April 22, 2004, an evidentiary hearing was held on this

motion, before Judge Richard Weiss. See Answer, Exh. J.

Petitioner’s counsel called Judge Conn as a witness at this

hearing, along with Judge Conn’s court personnel and two

detectives.

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After conducting the hearing, Judge Weiss found that

Petitioner had asserted that Judge Conn was a necessary witness

to determine if Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to move under Rule 10.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure for a change of judge for cause. Judge Weiss also

found Petitioner had claimed Judge Conn could not be impartial

with regard to Petitioner’s Rule 32 claims due to the receipt of

extra judicial information. See id., Exh. K. Judge Weiss

denied the portion of the motion raising the Rule 10.1 issue,

concluding there was nothing in the record to demonstrate Judge

Conn had “any relevant testimony” regarding whether trial

counsel was ineffective, and had no “factual testimony to

present on this issue.” Id., Exh. K. 

Regarding the issue of Judge Conn’s alleged bias, Judge

Weiss denied Petitioner’s motion for recusal, finding that Judge

Conn was not a necessary and relevant witness with regard to

extra judicial security communications and that the evidence did

not demonstrate that Judge Conn was biased or prejudiced against

Petitioner. Id., Exh. K. Judge Weiss further found no

“inference of impropriety by any of the security based

extrajudicial information the Judge may have received” in the

matter, and that judges “likely are entitled to know about

threats concerning their person or their courtroom in advance.

[The conversations at issue] do not appear to specifically

implicate any particular defendant or codefendant.” Id., Exh.

K. Accordingly, Judge Conn proceeded in Petitioner’s Rule 32

proceedings, in which relief was denied. 

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10 In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted Judge Conn should

have recused himself from the trial because he could have been called

as a witness. Petitioner did not assert this claim as a federal

constitutional violation but as violation of state law nor is it the

same claim raised in his federal habeas petition.

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To the extent this claim is cognizable in a section

2254 action, and to the extent Petitioner exhausted this claim

in the state courts, Judge Weiss’ decision was not clearly

contrary to federal law.10 To be entitled to relief on a claim

that a judge was so prejudiced as to be violative of a habeas

petitioner’s federal constitutional right to due process of law,

the petitioner must establish the judge’s behavior rendered his

trial fundamentally unfair. See, e.g., Duckett v. Godinez, 67

F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The determination of judicial bias is a factual

question to which the federal courts defer on habeas review.

See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997)

(stating that state court’s finding of lack of judicial bias was

entitled to a presumption of correctness). To succeed on a

judicial bias claim, a petitioner must “overcome a presumption

of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.”

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1464 (1975).

The Supreme Court has stated that 

opinions formed by the judge on the basis of

facts introduced or events occurring in the

course of the current proceedings, or of

prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis

for a bias or partiality motion unless they

display a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.

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Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147,

1157 (1994).

The determination of judicial bias is a factual

question, and federal courts give deference to the state court’s

decision on such an issue when sitting in federal habeas review.

See Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 815 (9th Cir. 2008),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 243 (2009). Judge Weiss’ determination

that Judge Conn was not a necessary witness nor biased is

entitled to deference. Villafuerte, 111 F.3d at 632. Judge

Weiss’ findings and credibility determinations are supported by

the record, and are entitled to deference on habeas review. See

Ouska v. Cahill Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1053 (7th Cir. 2001).

The state court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

10. Petitioner alleges his Sixth Amendment right to

the effective assistance of counsel was violated because his

trial counsel failed to object to the jury instruction

permitting the jury to find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to

commit acts of which Petitioner had no knowledge.

As stated supra, to establish that his counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective Petitioner must establish that he

was prejudiced by his counsel’s defective performance.

Petitioner has not established prejudice because the conspiracy

conviction was vacated.

11. Petitioner maintains his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated by his trial counsel’s

ineffective handling of the “the jury[’]s guilty verdicts on

both conspiracy charges”.

This claim argues that Petitioner’s right to due

process of law was violated because his counsel was

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unconstitutionally ineffective. As stated supra, to establish

that his counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective Petitioner

must establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s defective

performance. Petitioner has not established prejudice because

the conspiracy conviction was vacated.

12. Petitioner contends his trial counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to

interview a witness and failed to call the witness to testify at

trial.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner

claimed trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview

co-conspirator Dennis Schlinski, and call him as a witness at

trial. See Answer, Exh. L at 9. Petitioner properly exhausted

this claim by raising it in his petition for post-conviction

relief, and his petitions for review to both the Arizona Court

of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. 

In finding that Petitioner failed to make a colorable

claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call

Schilinski as a witness, and finding that in fact calling

Schilinski as a witness would have had no likely impact on the

outcome of the case and probably would have enhanced the state’s

ability to show that a conspiracy in fact existed, the Court of

Appeals stated:

The [Petitioner] supports this claim with an

affidavit from Schilinski in which he avows

that he would have testified if requested at

the [Petitioner]’s trial and that he would

have testified that he never even knew the

[Petitioner] until after they were both

arrested and charged with conspiracy.

. . . .

Perhaps more to the point, testimony from

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Schilinski that he did not know of or

conspire with the [Petitioner], even if

believed by the jury, would not have

exonerated the [Petitioner] from guilt on the

conspiracy charge. Under A.R.S. 13–1003 (B),

a member of a conspiracy need not know the

identity of other persons who are also

members of the same conspiracy. The Court did

not specifically instruct the jury in this

case, but reading the conspiracy instructions

that were given as a whole made it clear that

there was no legal requirement that each

party to a conspiracy had to know the

identity of each other party to the

conspiracy. The [Petitioner] and Schilinski

could be members of the same conspiracy

without each knowing of the other. Calling

Schilinski as a defense witness would have

had no likely impact on the outcome of this

case and probably would have enhanced the

State’s ability to show that a conspiracy in

fact existed. The [Petitioner] has failed to

make a colorable claim for relief on his

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to call Schilinski as a defense

witness.

Exh. M at 3–5.

This decision was not clearly contrary to federal law.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on this claim.

13. Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment rights

were violated because his trial counsel failed to exclude

hearsay testimony.

Petitioner has not established prejudice with regard to

this claim of deficient performance. The argument Petitioner

contends his counsel should have raised was unlikely to be

successful; the state trial court determined in Petitioner’s

collateral attack that the challenged testimony not hearsay.

Accordingly, counsel’s failure to object to the testimony was

not unconstitutionally deficient. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d

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11 In Evanchyk v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 47 P.3d 1114,

1115-16 (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court considered “whether one can

be convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder when the

state does not prove that the killing was committed with premeditation

but only that it occurred in the course and furtherance of committing

one of the underlying felonies.” Id., 47 P.3d at 1117, 1119. The

Arizona Supreme Court concluded that proof of intent to commit the

underlying felony in a case of felony murder is not sufficient to

support a conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

Evanchyk, 47 P.3d at 1117, 1119. In reaching that conclusion, the

court relied on state legal precedent to articulate the elements of

conspiracy to commit premeditated first-degree murder as: “the state

must prove that the defendant had the intent to promote the offense

of murder and an agreement with another one that will do the actual

killing.” 47 P.3d at 1117. In Phillips, the Arizona Supreme Court

held the defendant could not be found guilty of premeditated murder

based on accomplice liability because the evidence did not show that

he intended to facilitate or aid in committing a murder. See 202

Ariz. 427, 436, 46 P.3d 1048, 1057 (2002). However, the Supreme Court

further held that the defendant had committed a felony and his

accomplice in that felony had murdered in the course of and to further

that felony and, accordingly, that the defendant was properly

convicted of felony murder.

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1434, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel’s failure to

take a “futile action” can never be deficient performance).

14. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief

pursuant to two Arizona state cases, i.e., Evanchyk v. Stewart

and Arizona v. Phillips.

In his state petition for post-conviction relief

Petitioner argued he was entitled to relief pursuant to two

Arizona Supreme Court cases, Evanchyk v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476,

47 P.3d 1114 (2002) and Arizona v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 47

P.3d 1048 (2002), which were decided while his direct appeal was

pending. Answer, Exh. L at 18. However, rather than

characterize this claim as a one seeking relief based on a

violation of a federal constitutional right, Petitioner’s

counsel argued that Arizona law, i.e., Evanchyk and Phillips,

required Petitioner’s conviction be vacated.11

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Even if Petitioner had properly exhausted the claim,

Petitioner’s situation is distinguishable from the petitioners

in Evanchyk and Phillips. Petitioner was charged and convicted

of conspiracy to commit premeditated first-degree murder, not

conspiracy to commit felony murder or premeditated murder based

on accomplice liability. In Petitioner’s case the jury

instructions required the jury to find both a specific intent to

kill and an agreement to kill. The principle stated in

Evanchyk, that proof of intent to commit the underlying felony

in felony a murder case is not sufficient for a conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder-does, not apply to Petitioner’s

situation. Accordingly, Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s failure

to cite Evanchyk was neither deficient performance nor

prejudicial and did not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel.

15. Petitioner assert he is entitled to habeas relief

because his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

by his trial counsel’s failure to ensure Petitioner had a fair

trial. Petitioner contends he did not get a fair trial because

his trial counsel did not object to Petitioner being shackled in

front of the jury.

To receive federal habeas relief based on a claim that

his right to due process of law was violated by being shackled

without justification, the petitioner must show that the

physical restraints “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict...” Rhoden v.

Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); see

also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S. Ct. 1340,

1345 (1986). Additionally, even if the restraint was

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unjustified or unexplained, to rise to the level of a

constitutional trial error the petitioner must make a showing

that he suffered prejudice with regard to the verdict. See

Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002); Gonzalez

v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. Cir. 2003). See also

Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 A criminal defendant has a constitutional

right to be free of shackles and handcuffs in

the presence of the jury absent an essential

state interest that justifies the physical

restraints. [] A claim of unconstitutional

shackling is susceptible to harmless-error

analysis, however. [] An unjustified decision

to restrain a defendant at trial requires

reversal only if the shackles or handcuffs

had “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 591 (9th Cir. 2004).

Because the jury did not observe Petitioner in shackles

until after a verdict was rendered, no constitutional error

occurred. Accordingly, counsel’s “failure” to object did not

deprive Petitioner of his right to due process or a fair trial.

Additionally, Petitioner has not established that counsel’s

alleged “failure” was prejudicial, i.e., that the jury would not

have found him guilty but for counsel’s failure to object and,

accordingly, counsel’s alleged failure did not deprive

Petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel.

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16. Petitioner alleges his appellate counsel’s

performance was unconstitutionally deficient because counsel

failed to effectively brief the issues of premeditation and

specific intent in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner

alleges appellate counsel erred by failing to supplement his

arguments with citations to Evanchyk and Phillips, which were

decided while Petitioner’s appeal was pending.

Petitioner raised this argument in his counseled action

for post-conviction relief. The Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded appellate counsel’s performance was not deficient nor

prejudicial because reliance on either Evanchyk or Phillips

would not have provided a basis for relief from Petitioner’s

convictions. This Court is bound by the state court’s

interpretation of it’s own law. See, e.g., Butler v. Curry, 528

F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, because the Arizona

Court of Appeals found these cases would not have provided

relief, Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged

deficiency in failing to cite to Evanchyk or Phillips. See

George v. Smith, 586 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2009); Amador v.

Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397, 412 (5th Cir. 2006)

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not properly exhaust some of his federal

habeas claims by fairly presenting them to the Arizona Court of

Appeals as federal constitutional claims in a procedurally

correct manner. Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the

claims and has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from,

his procedural default of these claims. Because Petitioner has

not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from, his procedural

default of these claims, the claims must be denied.

Additionally, with regard to the claims properly exhausted in

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the state courts, Petitioner has not established that the state

courts’ decisions denying the claims were contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Manning’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 15th day of January, 2010.

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