Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00314/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00314-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(e)(1) states:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed correct. The applicant shall

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARL PORTIS, Civil No. 06cv0314-DMS (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

v. CORPUS

J. MARSHALL, Warden,

Defendant.

I. Introduction

Petitioner Earl Portis (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in San Diego

Superior Court, in Case No. D042304. In accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), this Court issues the

following Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court respectfully recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Background

A. Statement of Facts

Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1), factual determinations by the state court are presumed

correct unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.1

 Petitioner has

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have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (2006).

2

The Court of Appeal decision was filed as Lodgment 6 by Respondent, however it did not

include pages 2 and 4. Therefore, this Court relied on the unpublished decision reported online at

www.lexis.com. Any further references to the decision will be cited to the Lexis reporter.

3

California Health and Safety Code § 11352(a) reads in part:

[E]very person who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or

gives away, or offers to transport, import into this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give

away, or attempts to import into this state or transport [a] controlled substance . . . unless

upon the written prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian licensed

to practice in this state, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three,

four, or five years.

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not attempted to rebut the factual findings made by the state court. The following facts, therefore,

are taken verbatim from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Petitioner’s case.

FACTS

On September 4, 2002, San Diego Police Officer Steven Dyer was working

undercover in a narcotics operation. Around 9:00 p.m. he went with marked $ 20 bills

to the area of the Aztec Liquor store on El Cajon Boulevard. There, he spoke with

Johnele Stills and told her he was looking for “40,” street terminology for $40 worth of

rock cocaine. She told him to wait at the side of the store and she walked toward her

house. She returned in about five minutes and told Dyer “her man” who “usually ‘serves

up,’” was out. She told Dyer that if he gave her the money she knew a spot close by to

get the drugs. He refused to give her the money. When Portis walked by, Stills

approached and hugged him like they knew each other. Dyers heard Stills ask Portis if

he could “get us a 40.” Portis responded, “Yeah. It’s coming. It’s coming.” Portis went

and waited near the entrance of the liquor store. Stills told Dyer that Portis was going

to “get it for us.” On several occasions Portis held a cellular telephone near his face.

Dyer gave Stills the marked bills. Portis flagged down a car Alexander Weir was

driving. The car pulled into the parking lot. Stills and Portis met with the driver. Stills

returned to Dyer and handed him the rock cocaine. Dyer advised detectives waiting

nearby and they arrested Stills on the street and arrested Portis and Weir in the Aztec

liquor store. Weir had the marked $ 20 bills in his pocket. A large amount of rock

cocaine and marijuana was found in the trunk of the car Weir was driving.

Portis testified [at trial]. He denied saying, “It’s coming. It’s coming” and

denied connecting Stills with Weir in the drug transaction. . . .

People v. Portis, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3664 *1, *2-3 (4th Dept. 2004).2

B. State Court Proceedings

On April 11, 2003, after a court trial, Petitioner was found guilty of one count of California

Health and Safety Code § 11352(a)3, for the sale of cocaine base. (Lodgment 2 at 311-12.) On June

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Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11352(a) (West 2006).

4

The lodgments do not indicate the date the petition was filed, but the petition includes a

declaration of service by mail dated August 23, 2004. This Court requires no further due diligence

because the timing of the petition does not affect the Petition currently before this Court.

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6, 2003, a sentencing hearing was held, and Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial. (Lodgment 1

vol. 2 at 260.) The motion for a new trial was denied and Petitioner was sentenced to eight years

imprisonment. (Lodgment 1 at 319, 321.)

On June 9, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal (Lodgment 1 at 266), and on November

6, 2003, Petitioner filed an opening brief for appeal of the conviction in the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment 3.) Petitioner’s appeal asserted that his

conviction was based on circumstantial evidence insufficient to support a conviction. (Lodgement 3

at 10-23.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on April 15, 2004, finding that

there was sufficient evidence from which to draw a reasonable inference that Petitioner aided and

abetted the sale of rock cocaine. People v. Portis, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3664, *5 (Cal. Ct.

App. Apr. 15, 2004).

On June 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review before the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner argued that the appellate court misapplied state and federal law in its

decision, and that there was not sufficient evidence that Petitioner had aided or abetted a drug sale. 

(Lodgment 7 at 5-8.) On June 30, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied that petition for

review without discussion or citation. (Lodgment No. 8.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego Superior Court4

asserting that by not listening to the audio surveillance tape recorded by police in conjunction with

the narcotics operation, the trial court made an evidentiary error. The petition also claimed that the

evidence introduced at Petitioner’s trial contradicted the recollections of witnesses, and therefore

Petitioner did not receive a fair trial. (Lodgment 9.) On October 28, 2004, the Superior Court denied

the petition finding that claims raised on appeal cannot be raised in state habeas petitions, absent

special circumstances. (Lodgment 10 (citing In re Huffman, 42 Cal. 3d 552, 554-555 (1982); In re

Terry, 4 Cal. 3d 911, 927 (1971)).) Denial of the petition was also based on California law that

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5

The lodgments, again, do not indicate the date the petition was filed, but included is a

declaration of service by mail dated November 11, 2004. This Court requires no further due diligence

because the timing of the petition does not effect the Petition currently before this Court.

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issues that should have been raised on appeal but were not, cannot subsequently be raised in state

habeas petitions. (Lodgment 10 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 765 (1993); In re Dixon, 41 Cal.

2d 756, 759 (1953).) The court further found that Petitioner failed to offer any special

circumstances warranting review of his claims. (Lodgment 10 at 2.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, asserting that his conviction by the trial court was not supported by

sufficient evidence, that the trial court abused its discretion by not listening to the entire police

surveillance tape and by denying Petitioner’s expert witness, and that ineffective assistance of

counsel in the trial and the appeal denied him due process of law.5

 (Lodgment 11.) The California

Court of Appeal denied the petition on January 21, 2005. (Lodgment 12.) In addressing the claim of

insufficient evidence, the court found that the claim was considered and rejected on direct appeal,

and thus could not be reconsidered. (Lodgment 12 at 12 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 765

(1993)).) On the issue of the police surveillance tape, the Court of Appeal found that the issue could

have been raised on appeal and therefore could not be first raised in a habeas petition. (Lodgment

12 (citing In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813, 829 (1993)).) The Court of Appeal also held that Petitioner

had not stated a prima facie case for relief on that claim. (Lodgment No. 12 at 2-3.) Similarly, on

the issue of the exclusion of the expert witness, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner failed to

offer any facts or evidence to support that claim. (Lodgment 12 at 3.) As for the claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner failed to state facts and

submit evidence to show that the attorneys’ performance was deficient or to show how any

deficiencies prejudiced the trial or appellate result. (Lodgment 12 at 4.)

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court

on February 28, 2005, raising the same five issues raised in the petition to the Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District: (1) violation of due process by a conviction on insufficient evidence, (2)

judicial bias by the trial court in failing to review the full police surveillance tape, (3) judicial bias in

denying Petitioner’s expert witness, (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (5) ineffective

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assistance of appellate counsel. (Lodgment 13.) On January 18, 2006, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 14.)

On December 12, 2005, Petitioner filed another petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Superior Court of California. (Lodgment No. 15.) Petitioner asserted judicial misconduct in the

form of discourteous and disparaging remarks, the court’s failure to listen to the complete police

surveillance tape, and the denial of defendant’s proposed expert witness testimony. (Lodgment 15.)

The Superior Court denied the petition on January 24, 2006. (Lodgment No. 16.) The Superior

Court found that on the issues of the audiotape and expert witness, Petitioner could not raise the

issues of errors in evidentiary rulings through the habeas process because they should have been

raised on appeal. (Lodgment 16 at 3-4.) Regarding the disparaging remarks, the Superior Court

found that Petitioner provided only “unsubstantiated, self-serving statements” that were insufficient

to prove his claims. (Lodgment 16 at 4 (citing In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 945 (1992)).)

C. Federal Court Proceedings

On February 13, 2006, Petitioner filed the current petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. (Petition, Docket No. 1.) 

Petitioner asserts the same five claims raised in his petition before the California Supreme Court: (1) 

violation of due process due to a conviction on insufficient evidence, (2) judicial bias by the trial

court in failing to review the full police surveillance audio tape or transcript thereof, (3) trial court

judicial bias in denying Petitioner’s expert witness, (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (5)

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After this Court granted an enlargement of time for

response, the Respondent filed an answer to the Petition with an accompanying memorandum of

points and authorities in support and lodgments, on May 5, 2006. (Docket Nos. 8, 9, 10.) On July 5,

2006, Petitioner filed his traverse. (Traverse, Docket No. 12.) By Order of this Court, the case was

deemed submitted on the papers without oral argument. (Docket No. 3.)

III. Standard of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. section 2254(a), allows for federal review of “the judgment of a State court

only on the ground that [the habeas petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). The Antiterrorism and Effective

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Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). The current petition was filed in 2006, and is governed by the

AEDPA. As amended by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either section 2254(d)(1) or section

2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court interprets section 2254(d)(1) as follows:

[T]he unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.

In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a

governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in which the

principle was announced. In order for a federal court to find a state court’s application

of our precedent unreasonable, the state court's decision must have been more than

incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been objectively

unreasonable.

Wiggins v. Smith, 535 U.S. 510, 520-1 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted). As for section

2254(d)(2), “a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after

review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually

unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, the AEDPA requires that deference be given to state court

findings of fact, with state court factual determinations presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts

them by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court to review, a federal court

“looks through” the silent state court decision to the “last reasoned opinion” issued in the state’s

courts. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 805 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does

not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of

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the record “to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal

law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In Petitioner’s case, the last reasoned state court opinion on his claims regarding the police

surveillance tape and the proposed expert witness is the San Diego Superior Court’s decision on his

second state habeas petition, dated January 24, 2006 and filed with this Court as Lodgment 16. As

for the remaining claims in the instant petition, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

state petition for writ of habeas corpus without comment. Therefore, in reviewing Petitioner’s

claims of insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court looks to the reasoned

opinion by the California Court of Appeal dated January 21, 2005 - filed with this Court as

Lodgment 12 - which denied Petitioner’s first state habeas petition. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

IV. Discussion

A. Insufficient Evidence Claim

As his first ground for relief, Petitioner asserts that insufficient evidence was presented at

trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted the sale of cocaine. Petitioner

contests that the evidence at trial established no more than his presence at the scene. (Petition at 27-

28.) The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim because it had been considered on

direct appeal and Petitioner offered no new arguments which would justify a reconsideration of the

decision reached on appeal. (Lodgment 12 at 2.) Respondent argues that this decision was a

reasonable application of federal law because the decision relied on the same court’s earlier opinion

which applied the federal standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims, from Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). (Respondent’s Memorandum at 9.)

The federal constitutional right to due process “protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When a habeas petitioner claims

that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support a conviction, a federal court

determines whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 301, 319 (1979). Deference is provided to the trier of facts’

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weighing of the evidence by reviewing “all of the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the

prosecution.” Id. (emphasis in the original). With the additional layer of deference established by

the AEDPA, Petitioner must demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal contradicted clearlyestablished Supreme Court precedent by rejecting Petitioner’s claim because no rational trier of fact

could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262,

1274-5 (9th Cir. 2005).

With the evidence provided by the prosecution at trial, a rational trier of fact could have

found Petitioner guilty of facilitating the drug sale beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution

offered the testimony of multiple officers involved in the undercover operation who placed

Petitioner at the scene. (Lodgment 2 at 31-32 (testimony of Officer Kim Collier placing Petitioner at

the scene), 53-60 (testimony of Kathleen Bergman placing Petitioner at the scene), 86-87 (testimony

of Officer Joseph Harper placing Petitioner at the scene), 124-128 (testimony of Officer Steven Dyer 

placed Petitioner at the scene).) There was testimony that Petitioner acted as a middleman in the

drug sale by speaking with the undercover buyer and then motioning to the seller to summon him

towards the buyer. (Lodgment 2 at 57, 87, 126-7, 131-133.) The trial court stated that the conviction

rested primarily on the reliability of witnesses and the transcript of the police surveillance tape. 

(Lodgement 2 at 308-310.) A reasonable trier of fact could have found the defense testimony

offered by the Petitioner, as well as testimony by another party accused of being involved in the

same transaction, to be less believable than the testimony of the police officers. Thus a reasonable

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of facilitating the cocaine sale, thereby aiding in a

violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11352(a). In rejecting Petitioner’s claim that there

was insufficient evidence with which to convict him, the California Court of Appeal reasonably

applied clearly-established federal law, as established by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 301 (1979).

B. Claims of Judicial Bias in Making Evidentiary Determinations

Petitioner’s second and third claims for relief assert judicial bias by the trial court, in failing

to review the full police surveillance tape in his case and in excluding Petitioner’s expert witness

from his trial. (Petition at 21-23.) Respondent answers that both of these claims are procedurally

barred from federal review. (Respondent’s Memorandum at 5-8.) 

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1. Procedural Default

The last reasoned state court decision regarding Petitioner’s claims of his second and third

grounds for relief is the San Diego Superior Court’s denial of his second state petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. (Lodgment 16.) The Superior Court denied both claims, stating that matters which

should have been raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a petition for habeas corpus except upon

a showing of special circumstances. (Lodgment 16 at 3 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993) and

In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953)).) The Superior Court also denied Petitioner’s claims because

decisions by the trial court regarding the exclusion of evidence cannot generally be reviewed by way

of habeas petition. (Id. (citing In re Winchester, 53 Cal.2d 528 (1960)).) 

Federal courts are precluded from reviewing the merits of a habeas claim when the state

court has denied relief for the same claim on the basis of an independent and adequate state

procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1990). For a state procedural rule to

be “independent,” the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law. 

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). To be “adequate,” the state procedural rule must

be strictly or regularly followed and consistently applied. Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1392

(9th Cir. 1996). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, the Ninth Circuit determined that:

the ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of the California state bar is upon the State

of California. . . Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that

defense in issue shifts to the petitioner.

322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 2003).

Respondent has pled a California state procedural bar preventing claims that could have been

raised on direct appeal from being raised in a state habeas petition. (Respondent’s Memorandum at

6.) However, Respondent is unable to meet his initial burden, under Bennett v. Mueller, of

adequately pleading that this procedural bar is an adequate state ground which precludes federal

review. California’s procedural bar against raising issues in a habeas petition if those issues were

not raised on appeal is known as “the Dixon rule.” See In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953), see also

In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 765 (1993) . Respondent urges that the Court find California’s Dixon

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rule to be an independent and adequate state basis for dismissal. Respondent relies on the Ninth

Circuit’s decisions in Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000), and in Bennett v. Mueller,

322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003). However, those decisions established that California’s state

procedural bar relating to untimely habeas petitions constitutes an independent state ground. The

Ninth Circuit has yet to decide that decisions invoking the Dixon rule are precluded from federal

review. 

Petitioner’s conviction was in 2003, and both of his state habeas petitions were decided after

the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998). In Park v.

California, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]he California Supreme Court has adopted in

Robbins a stance from which it will now decline to consider federal law when deciding whether

claims are procedurally defaulted.” 202 F.3d at 1152. The Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s

second habeas petition states that “Petitioner fails to offer any special circumstances warranting

review of his claim”. (Lodgment 16 at 3.) By this statement, the Superior Court implies that

Petitioner has not pled a ‘fundamental constitutional error’ in his state habeas petition. 

‘Fundamental constitutional error’ is a special circumstance and thus an exception to the Dixon rule. 

Prior to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Robbins, state courts that considered a claim of

‘fundamental constitutional error,’ could be presumed to have done so by reference to federal law,

thus resulting in a decision based on state law but interwoven with federal law. Park v. California,

202 F.3d at 1152. Since the Robbins decision, no such presumption ought to be made. Therefore, if

Petitioner’s claims were read by the Superior Court such that Petitioner did not challenge imposition

of the Dixon rule based on a fundamental constitutional error, then the denial of Petitioner’s state

habeas petition may have been based only on state law. Thus, an independent state ground for

denying Petitioner’s claim has been pled. 

The adequacy, however, of the state procedural ground used to deny Petitioner’s claim is not

sufficiently pled to preclude federal review. In Bennett v. Mueller, in 2003, the Ninth Circuit could

not conclude that the application of California’s untimeliness rule had been well-established and

consistently applied since the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Robbins. 322 F.3d at

583. The Ninth Circuit has not yet recognized the Dixon rule as an affirmative defense of

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procedural default in habeas corpus proceedings. “[T]he ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of

the California state bar is upon the State of California.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d at 585-86. 

Respondent does not present any California case law decided since Robbins that demonstrates a

consistent application of the Dixon rule. The only state court case cited by Respondent on this point

is In re Seaton, 34 Cal. 4th 193 (2004), however that decision considered a habeas petition rather than

a criminal appeal and as such it does not “well-establish” or “consistently apply” the Dixon rule. By

the same reasoning used in Bennett v. Mueller, this Court finds that Respondent has not adequately

pled that the Dixon rule is an adequate state ground which precludes federal review of Petitioner’s

claims. 

The Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s second and third grounds for relief are not

precluded from federal review.

2. Review of Petitioner’s Second and Third Claims for Relief

Petitioner’s second ground for relief asserts that the trial court exhibited judicial bias by not

listening to the police surveillance audio tape in its entirety or reading the entire transcript of the

surveillance tape. Petitioner’s third ground for relief asserts that the trial court’s refusal of his expert

witness was also a result of judicial bias. Habeas relief may be granted on claims of judicial bias

because judicial bias implicates the federal right to due process. “The right to a fair trial is a ‘basic

requirement of due process’ and includes the right to an unbiased judge.” Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d

285, 287 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). However, there is a

“general presumption that judges are unbiased and honest.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 938 (9th

Cir. 1998) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Moreover, upon federal habeas

review, a state court’s “finding of lack of bias is entitled to a presumption of correctness.” 

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997).

The last reasoned state court decision on these claims was the San Diego Superior Court’s

denial of Petitioner’s second state habeas petition. (Lodgment 16.) That decision was focused on

applying the Dixon rule and therefore did not address the merits of Petitioner’s claims. In such

instances, the Ninth Circuit has held, a federal court reviews the claims de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan,

313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). “Nonetheless, under AEDPA, factual determinations by the

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 The California Code of Evidence Section 352 reads: 

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption

of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or

of misleading the jury. Cal. Evid. Code § 352 (Deering 2006).

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state court are presumed correct and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. 

a. Trial Court’s Decision to Not Listen to the Audio Tape

Petitioner first claims that the trial court exhibited judicial bias when it refused to listen to

the entire surveillance tape in the courtroom and did not review the entire transcript of that tape. 

The trial court determined that it would not listen to the entire tape in open court for an hour,

asserting discretion “under 352.”6 (Lodgment No. 2 at 147.) California’s Code of Evidence Section

352 allows the trial court judge discretion to determine if the value of the evidence is substantially

outweighed by its consumption of time. The trial court judge in Petitioner’s case applied the

discretion expressly granted by this state law. 

Petitioner states that the trial court judge abused his discretion under California’s Code of

Evidence Section 352 by listening to only four or five minutes of the one hour surveillance tape.

(Petition at 21.) The trial court judge held that reliance on the transcript of the surveillance tape was

sufficient and that listening to the hour-long tape was an undue consumption of time. In light of the

fact that the transcript of the hour-long tape totaled ten pages in length, the trial court judge

determined that much of the tape held no probative value. (Lodgment 2 at 147.) Portions of the tape

were played in open court. (Lodgment No. 2 at 141, 144-45.) A witness whose testimony was

impeached by way of the tape was given the opportunity to review the defense’s entire transcript

prior to testifying. (Lodgment No. 2 at 148-9.) Petitioner makes no claim that the unheard portions

of the tape were more probative than time consuming. 

“Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.” 

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 531 n.4 (1997) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653

(1990)). “To succeed on a judicial bias claim . . . a [habeas] petitioner must ‘overcome a

presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.’” Rothwell v. Hubbard, 77

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Fed. Appx. 394, 396 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 

Petitioner does not present any facts in his habeas petition that suffice to overcome a presumption of

judicial neutrality. Petitioner has not demonstrated judicial bias in violation of the U.S. Constitution

or federal law.

b. Exclusion of Petitioner’s Expert Witness

Petitioner next claims that the exclusion of a proposed expert witness evinced bias on the

part of the trial judge. Petitioner asserts that the expert witness would have testified to the poor

functioning of the narcotics operation and provide his opinion, as a retired Assistant Chief of Police,

of how the operation ought to have transpired. (Petition at 22-23.) Under California rules of

evidence:

If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is

limited to such an opinion as is:

(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the

opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and

(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and

education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at

or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may

be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his

testimony relates . . .

Cal. Evid. Code § 801 (Deering’s 2006).

At Petitioner’s trial, the trier of fact was the judge. The judge found that the expert’s opinion

about the adequacy of the police reports in Petitioner’s case would not have assisted the trier of fact

in better understanding police procedure for narcotics operations. (Lodgment 2 at 203-05.) The

judge also held that under California Code of Evidence Section 352 the testimony of the expert

witness was an undue consumption of time, in light of the “minimal relevance” of the proof he

would offer. (Lodgment 2 at 295.) On this claim as well, the trial court judge applied the discretion

expressly granted him by state law. Petitioner does not present the Court with evidence sufficient to

overcome the presumption that this judicial determination regarding the application of the state law

was made honestly. The presumption of judicial impartiality is clearly-established federal law, and

petitioner has not demonstrated judicial bias in violation of the U.S. Constitution or federal law.

///

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner raises the same claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his federal habeas

petition as were raised in his state habeas petition. (Lodgment 13 at 12-14.) Petitioner bases his

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on five grounds: (1) trial counsel was deficient in

failing to object to “improper closing remarks,” (2) trial counsel failed to prepare for trial properly in

order to adequately impeach inconsistent statements of government witnesses, (3) trial counsel failed

to pursue a misidentification defense, (4) trial counsel failed to object during the prosecution’s

cross-examinations, and (5) trial counsel failed to argue that phone calls which were made and

evidenced at trial “were not involved in the buy-bust operation.” (Petition at 23-24.) 

Petitioner’s brief in support of his federal habeas petition identifies the correct controlling

United States Supreme Court case for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). By that decision, the Supreme Court articulated two

requirements necessary to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, “the

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

“Deficient performance is performance which is objectively unreasonable under prevailing

professional norms.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir., 1990). Second, “the defendant

must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The

goal of the Court in conducting the Strickland analysis is to find “whether the result of the

proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369

(1993).

 The last reasoned state court decision on this claim was issued by the Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, on the state habeas petition filed by Petitioner. The Court of Appeal

applied the test from Strickland v. Washington in assessing Petitioner’s claims. (Lodgment 12 at 4.) 

The Court of Appeal ruled that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel failed

because Petitioner did not demonstrate deficient performance by his trial counsel and also because

Petitioner did not demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance affected the outcome of his trial. 

(Id.) Thus it is this Court’s role to examine whether the Court of Appeal’s decision was an

unreasonable application of the clearly established Strickland test. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).

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Petitioner’s first assertion about his trial counsel’s performance - regarding “improper

closing remarks” - would be difficult to prove even if Petitioner specified which remarks by the

prosecution Petitioner believes his defense attorney should have objected to. Without such

specification, Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating deficient performance that is

“objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d at 702. 

Petitioner also fails to describe how his defense counsel’s performance caused him prejudice. “A

petitioner must ‘affirmatively prove prejudice.’ [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 693. This requires showing

more than the possibility that he was prejudiced by counsels’ errors. Rather, he must demonstrate

that the errors actually prejudiced him.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon

review of the trial record, the Court does not find that any of the prosecution’s closing remarks were

obviously improper. (Lodgment 2 at 296-298.) The closing argument reviewed the evidence

presented to the court over the course of the trial, and spoke to the credibility of the prosecution

witnesses. (Id.) The veracity of Petitioner’s testimony at trial was questioned by the prosecutor, but

these remarks were based on Petitioner’s undisputed acts preceding his arrest rather than on

Petitioner’s character. (Lodgment 2 at 298.) The Court of Appeal’s decision that Petitioner failed to

meet his burden of showing prejudice is a reasonable application of the Strickland test.

Petitioner’s second assertion is that his trial counsel failed to properly cross-examine and

impeach the prosecution’s witnesses with prior inconsistent statements. Petitioner provides no

specific instances where his trial counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses was objectively

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Nor does Petitioner provide any references to the

prior statements that he believes his trial counsel should have used to impeach the prosecution

witnesses’ testimony. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific

facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus the Court

of Appeal was not unreasonable in determining that, under Strickland, Petitioner failed to meet his

burden of demonstrating deficient performance of counsel.

The third example of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Petitioner is the failure of his

defense attorney to pursue a misidentification defense. On this claim, too, it is Petitioner’s burden to

“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

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sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quotation omitted). Again Petitioner fails to

elaborate on what he perceives his counsel’s shortcomings to have been. Petitioner states only that

it was deficient for his attorney not to pursue a misidentification defense, but does not provide any

support for his claim that such a defense was viable. “[T]he court strongly presumes ‘that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 

at 27 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Thus it was not an unreasonable application of

Strickland for the Court of Appeal to deny Petitioner relief based on its finding that Petitioner

“failed to show what defense his trial counsel failed to present and what evidence existed to support

the defense.” (Lodgment 12 at 4.)

Next the Court considers Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object during the prosecution’s cross-examination. Petitioner does not specify the crossexamination of any particular defense witness or witnesses, only that defense counsel failed to make

objections. Petitioner has not met the requirements of the Strickland standard with such a claim,

because he can demonstrate neither that his counsel's performance was deficient nor that the

deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688. Therefore

the Court of Appeal reasonably applied Strickland when it rejected Petitioner’s claim.

Petitioner’s final claim as to the ineffective assistance of counsel is that his defense attorney

failed to argue that the telephone calls between Petitioner and his cousin were not drug-related. 

Respondent answers this claim with a reference to the trial transcript in which Petitioner’s trial

counsel did in fact argue that a call to Weir was not related to the drug sale. (Answer at 18-19.) 

These references negate Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner can not demonstrate prejudice from a failure

to advance an argument if that argument was in fact made at trial. Thus it was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law for the Court of Appeal to deny Petitioner’s request for

relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

E. Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

because Petitioner did not show that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudiced

the result of his appeal. Petitioner bases his federal claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

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counsel on seven assertions: (1) that appellate counsel did not argue that the recording on the police

tactical tape was inconsistent with the trial testimony of police witnesses, (2) that appellate counsel

did not argue 

on appeal that the police witnesses perjured themselves, (3) that appellate counsel did not argue that

the telephone calls between Petitioner and his cousin were not drug-related, (4) that appellate

counsel did not raise the issue that the police who testified at trial were not the same persons heard 

on the tape, (5) that appellate counsel failed to argue that someone else may have made statements

on the tape that were attributed to Petitioner at trial, (6) that appellate counsel did not raise on appeal

that Petitioner was identified as a suspect on the tape because he matched the description of black

male, and (7) that appellate counsel was ineffective because he conceded that the evidence at trial

may have shown that Petitioner knew that his cousin dealt drugs. (Petition at 25-27.) The Court

reviews the state court’s ruling to determine if that decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). 

“The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is

that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray,

477 U.S. 537, 535-36 (1986). Petitioner must first show that his appellate counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He then must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. To establish prejudice, Petitioner

must demonstrate that he would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s errors. Smith, 528 U.S.

at 285. “[T]hese two prongs partially overlap when evaluating the performance of appellate counsel

. . . Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remain above an objective standard of competence

(prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) for the same reason - because she

declined to raise a weak issue.” Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1028-9 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

 Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989).

Petitioner’s first claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel asserts deficient

performance because “[a]ppellate counsel would not raise on direct appeal that the whole entire

tactical tape of the police officers were [sic] contrary to the testimony of the six officers during

trial.” The brief filed on Petitioner’s behalf by his appellate counsel undermines Petitioner’s claim,

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in that the brief discusses the trial defense “that the tape contradicted many of the officer’s

recollections regarding the operation.” (Lodgment 3 at 5.) The brief also makes use of consistencies

between the tape and the trial testimony, such as when appellate counsel argues that “[t]he police

transcript and officer Harper’s testimony both showed that appellant met Weir after the latter had

walked away from the car and that Weir and Stills walked back to Weir’s car together.” (Lodgment

3 at 6.) Appellate counsel thus demonstrates a familiarity with both the transcript of the surveillance

tape and with the testimony recorded in the trial transcript. Appellate counsel’s use of both to make

a strong appellate argument that Petitioner was convicted only on circumstantial evidence exhibits

reasoning which satisfies the Sixth Amendment requirement that counsel “bring to bear such skill

and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688. Thus, on this ground Petitioner has not shown that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied

the Strickland standard to his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner’s next claim is that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not raise

on direct appeal that the police officers who testified in his case perjured themselves. Petitioner’s

claim would be strengthened if he provided any examples of these alleged perjuries. The Supreme

Court has held that appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but

rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)). 

Appellate counsel for Petitioner pointed out some inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution

witnesses, but without accusing those witnesses of perjury. The decision to claim inconsistencies in

testimony, but not claim perjury, exhibits professional competence rather than objectively

unreasonable performance. The Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel was not contrary to clearly established federal law on the ground that

witness perjury was not raised on appeal.

Petitioner’s third claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel alleges that his appellate

counsel was deficient in not raising a claim that phone calls made between Petitioner and his codefendant were unrelated to the drug transaction that Petitioner was convicted of facilitating. This

ground lacks merit because the brief filed in Petitioner’s appeal raises this precise claim that

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Petitioner faults his counsel for ignoring. The brief argues that:

the [trial] court’s conclusion that the telephone call to Weir involved

narcotics violates the proscription against the use of circumstantial

evidence where that evidence is reasonably susceptible of the accused’s

innocence. Here, all of appellant’s conduct throughout the buy/bust

operation was more consistent with waiting for a ride from his cousin

than it was with operating a narcotics business, and the telephone call to

appellant’s cousin was no more indicative of criminal activity that

anything else he had done to that point.

(Lodgment 3 at 17.) The brief goes on to argue that “as no one overheard the conversation, there is

no actual evidence the discussion centered on the transaction at all.” (Lodgment 3 at 19.) Petitioner

cannot demonstrate that his appellate counsel was deficient in not raising a claim that his counsel did

in fact raise.

Petitioner’s fourth ground for claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is that

appellate counsel did not raise the issue that the police who testified at trial were not the same

persons heard on the surveillance tape. As stated above, the Court believes that appellate counsel

did demonstrate a familiarity with both the transcript of the surveillance tape and with the testimony

recorded in the trial transcript. “A reasonable tactical choice based on an adequate inquiry is

immune from attack under Strickland.” Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Furthermore, Petitioner does not demonstrate prejudice from the ommission of this argument upon

appeal of his conviction. The evidence of Petitioner’s statement on the surveillance tape (“It’s

coming, it’s coming”) was the critical evidence in Petitioner’s case, as was testimony of Petitioner’s

gestures to the actual seller of cocaine. (Lodgment 6 at 5 (Court of Appeal affirming conviction

because “[i]t was reasonable to infer from [the] sequence of events, highlighted with Portis’s

statement ‘It’s coming. It’s coming,’ and Portis waving over the car Wier was driving that Portis

facilitated the sale of rock cocaine.”)) The result of Petitioner’s appeal would not have been

different depending on whether or not the recorded statements of the police were attributed to the

correct officers. Petitioner’s fourth ground does not state a claim which shows that the Court of

Appeal’s denial of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

The fifth ground on which Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel is

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that appellate counsel failed to argue that someone else may have made statements on the tape that

were attributed to Petitioner. Petitioner offers no argument as to the likelihood that the appellate

court may have reviewed the trial court’s fact finding on this point if it had been raised by his

counsel. Petitioner therefore does not demonstrate prejudice on this ground, because he does not

demonstrate any possibility of success of overcoming upon appellate review the trial testimony of

the police witness who heard Petitioner say “It’s coming, it’s coming.” (Lodgment 2 at 126

(testimony of Officer Steven William Dyer).) Rather than claim that someone else may have made

this statement, appellate counsel instead argued that such evidence was only circumstantial evidence

of the crime. (Lodgment 3 at 12 (“appellant’s reported comment, ‘yeah, it’s coming, it’s coming,’

tended only to show that appellant knew his cousin was a dealer”).) Counsel’s choice to argue

against the weight of this evidence rather than to deny the evidence, constituted reasonably effective

assistance. Thus on his fifth ground for claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,

Petitioner has not shown that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the Strickland standard in

denying him habeas relief.

Next, Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not raise on

appeal that Petitioner was identified as a black male on the police surveillance tape. “[T]he weeding

out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” 

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). As Respondent argues with reference to the

transcript of the police surveillance tape, Petitioner was not arrested based solely on an identification

as a black male. These references show that the arresting officers also identified Petitioner by his

location (“in front of the store”), his size (“Kind of large built”), and the clothing that he wore

(“He’s got a T-shirt that’s green but it has gray sleeves and white shorts”). (Respondent’s

Memorandum at 22 (quoting Lodgment 2 at 192).) On this ground as well, Petitioner has not

demonstrated that his appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and therefore the Court of Appeal’s denial of this claim was in conformity with

clearly-established federal law.

Petitioner’s last ground for claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is that

appellate counsel conceded that the evidence at trial may have shown that Petitioner knew that his

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cousin dealt drugs. As referenced above, appellate counsel made this concession in an attempt to

dispute the strength of evidence that appellate counsel identified as “the most damaging evidence,

appellant’s reported comment, ‘yeah, it’s coming, it’s coming.’” (Lodgment 3 at 12.) The

concession that this evidence may have shown that Petitioner knew that his cousin dealt drugs was

an argument from appellate counsel that the evidence showed nothing more, that the evidence “did

not render appellant a participant in the transaction.” Id. This argument was made to support the

major claim on appeal that Petitioner’s conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence. 

Thus this concession was made by appellate counsel in the course of reasonably effective assistance

of counsel. As Petitioner himself has continuously mimicked his appellate counsel’s argument by

claiming that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence throughout two state habeas

petitions and the current federal petition, this ground appears to the Court to be a disingenuous

argument. More importantly, the ground is without merit because it neither demonstrates that

appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor that it was

prejudicial to Petitioner’s case. On this final ground, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s

decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established federal law on

the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this action be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for

Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, the Honorable Dana M. Sabraw, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) (2006) and Local Rule 72.1(d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than January 29, 2007, any party may file and

serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 26, 2006 

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Honorable Dana M. Sabraw

 all parties 

 

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