Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05699/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05699-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAX JOSEPH LACIO, /

/

Plaintiff, /

/

v. /

/

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF /

CORRECTIONS, et. al, /

/

Defendants. /

 /

1:04-cv-05699-LJO-GSA (PC) 

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Docs. 1, 11, & 13)

I. SCREENING ORDER

Max Joseph Lacio (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. The Court granted

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 11, 2004 in the Central District of

California. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint was transferred to the Eastern District of California

and received on May 14, 2004. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on December 8, 2005. 

(Doc. 11.) Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on February 13, 2007. (Doc. 13.) 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is presently before the Court for screening.

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is currently a prisoner at Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) in Soledad,

California. Plaintiff was formerly incarcerated at North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”) at Delano,

California, and Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) at San Diego, California. 

Plaintiff complains of acts that happened at each of these facilities. 

Plaintiff names as defendants: Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) Mekemson of NKSP; Drs.

Cook and Helland at NKSP; SSA Medical Appeals Analyst T. Henschel at NKSP; V. A.

Williams, Mille Briggs, and Captain P. Enriquez at NKSP; Linda L. Rianda at NKSP; CMO

Friedman at CTF; Drs. Luca, Dayalan and Timothy Friedrichs at CTF; CMO Alan L. Menkes at

RJD; and Drs. Gianni and Jenkins at RJD.

Plaintiff alleges that: Plaintiff received bullet wounds as a result of a gun battle with

police; Plaintiff received major surgery for these injuries and was then sent to NKSP in March

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2000; Plaintiff continued to complain of pain, particularly in his right hand, arm, and shoulder;

NKSP medical staff gave Plaintiff only motrin and tylenol; Plaintiff notified CMO Mekemson

and Drs. Cook and Helland of his suffering, but received no useful treatment; Plaintiff requested

DDP placement and a transfer to another facility for proper treatment; T. Henschel decided that

Plaintiff needed to use his right arm and hand more often and that light duty restriction was

enough for Plaintiff’s needs; Williams, Briggs, Enriquez, and Rianda were all aware of Plaintiff’s

suffering, but failed to to take reasonable efforts to prevent Plaintiff’s pain; after Plaintiff spent

31 months at NKSP, Plaintiff was transferred to CTF; CMO Friedman at CTF knew of Plaintiff’s

pain but failed to provide corrective measures; Dr. Luca knew of Plaintiff’s pain and failed to

provide treatment; On May 5, 2003, Plaintiff received an x-ray for his right shoulder and hand,

revealing a fractured but healed scapula bone with bullet fragments lodged in the tissue, as well

as deformed bones in his right hand; Dr. Dayalan was aware of Plaintiff’s pain and x-ray results

but failed to schedule a follow-up to treat these old injuries, providing only minimal medical

treatment; Plaintiff was then transferred to RJD, where CMO Menkes, Dr. Gianni, and Dr.

Jenkins were aware of Plaintiff’s pain but failed to provide anything but the most minimal

treatment; upon Plaintiff’s transfer back to CTF, Dr. Friedrichs examined Plaintiff and also failed

to provide any treatment for Plaintiff’s medical condition. (Doc. 13, pp. 2-9.) The Court finds

that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against any Defendants.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that

complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant, as briefly as possible, what action that

defendant took or failed to take and why (e.g. to retaliate against plaintiff for filing inmate

grievances). In the subsections that follow, the Court will provide plaintiff with the legal

standards that, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, appear to be applicable. Plaintiff should utilize

the legal standards provided in this order for guidance when filing his amended complaint.

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

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U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts

that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a

plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a)

“The controlling principle appears in Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) ‘A party asserting a claim to

relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as

independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has

against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A

against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated

claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners

pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of

frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

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Plaintiff is advised that if he chooses to file an amended complaint, and fails to comply

with Rule 18(a), the Court will count all frivolous/noncognizable unrelated claims that are

dismissed therein as strikes such that he may be barred from filing in forma pauperis in the

future.

3. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s

federal rights.

D. Claims for Relief

1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges that the named defendants were deliberately indifferent to serious

medical needs. (Doc. 13, pp. 2-9.) To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction

of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate

medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison

official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2)

“the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

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1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in

which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the

delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada

Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Deliberate indifference can be manifested by

prison guards intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering

with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner

alleges a delay in receiving medical treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to

further injury. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada

Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). A difference of opinion

between medical personnel regarding treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference. 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . .

and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s

health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that at some point all of the defendants knew of Plaintiff’s medical needs

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but failed to provide any substantive treatment. (Doc. 13, pp. 2-9.) Plaintiff maintains that he

received only minimal medical treatment, which is a difference of opinion between the doctors

and himself. A difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference. Sanchez, 891

F.2d at 242. Plaintiff thus fails to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need.

2. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff names defendants Mekemson, Friedman, Enriquez, and Menkes, each of whom

holds a supervisorial position. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983

for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a

named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory

liability, plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants

either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force

of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal

pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. 

See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendants Mekemson, Friedman,

Enriquez, and Menkes personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights;

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a

policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. Plaintiff has thus failed

to assert a cognizable claim.

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II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed, with

leave to file a third amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time

to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than

thirty days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have

resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227

(9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal

rights, Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2007). Although accepted as true, the

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .

.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). 

 Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an

original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d

at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

The Court provides Plaintiff with one final opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies

identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his third

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot”

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complaints). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;

and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed for failure

to state a claim.

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 15, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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