Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05199/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2007 Decided January 15, 2008 

No. 06-5199 

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 00cv00283) 

Kirsten L. Nathanson argued the cause for appellant. 

With her on the briefs were Harold P. Quinn, Jr. and Thomas 

C. Means. Joseph M. Klise entered an appearance. 

Blair M. Gardner was on the brief for amicus curiae 

National Council of Coal Lessors, Inc. in support of appellant. 

Kathryn E. Kovacs, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for federal appellees. With her on the brief 

was Robert Oakley, Attorney. 

Walton D. Morris, Jr. was on the brief for appellee 

Kentucky Resources Council, Inc. 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 1 of 16
2 

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: The Secretary of the Interior has 

interpreted the phrase “valid existing rights” in the Surface 

Mining Control and Reclamation Act to foreclose surface 

mining operations in sensitive areas. The National Mining 

Association challenges this reading of the statute, but we 

conclude that we must defer to the Secretary’s reasonable 

interpretation of this ambiguous phrase. 

I. 

In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control 

and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq., 

“to protect society and the environment from the adverse 

effects of surface coal mining operations,” id. § 1202(a). 

Section 522(b) of the SMCRA authorizes the Secretary of the 

Interior (“Secretary”) to prohibit surface coal mining 

operations on federal lands if he determines them to be 

unsuitable for that purpose. Id. § 1272(b). Section 522(e) bans 

outright surface mining in statutorily designated areas.1 Id.

 

1

 Subject to certain exceptions, § 522(e) designates the following 

areas: lands within the National Park System, the National Wildlife 

Refuge Systems, the National System of Trails, the National 

Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers 

System; federal lands within a national forest; areas that would 

adversely affect public parks or places included in the National 

Register of Historic Sites; areas within one hundred feet of the 

outside right-of-way line of any public road; and areas within three 

hundred feet of any occupied dwelling, public building, school, 

church, community, or institutional building, or within one hundred 

feet of a cemetery. See 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 2 of 16
3 

§ 1272(e). In this appeal, we are asked to determine how 

Congress intended that ban to work. The relevant text of 

§ 522(e) provides: “After August 3, 1977, and subject to valid 

existing rights no surface coal mining operations except those 

which exist on August 3, 1977, shall be permitted [in the 

statutorily designated areas].” Id. (emphasis added). 

Because one must show “valid existing rights” (“VER”) 

to start a surface mining operation in a § 522(e) area, the 

meaning of the phrase is critical. For decades, the Secretary 

and the courts have wrestled with how best to understand 

VER and determine what it protects. We need not recount this 

history. Suffice it to say that VER has occasioned a spectrum 

of agency interpretations, ranging from a relaxed “ownership 

and authority” standard, which required only that the miner 

show a property right in the coal, to a more exacting “all 

permits” standard, which called for a showing that surface 

mining licenses had been issued prior to the date § 522(e) 

took effect. See Valid Existing Rights, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,766, 

70,769–71 (Dec. 17, 1999) (recounting Secretary’s prior 

definitions of VER). 

In 1999, the Secretary and the Office of Surface Mining 

Reclamation and Enforcement promulgated a rule through 

notice-and-comment procedures offering yet another 

interpretation of VER. Id. at 70,831–32 (codified at 30 C.F.R. 

§ 761.5). This “1999 Rule,” as we will call it, was a setback 

for parties hoping to conduct new surface mining operations 

in § 522(e) areas. Under the 1999 Rule, a miner claiming 

VER protection must satisfy two conditions. First, he must 

produce a legally binding document that vested him with the 

right to mine the land at the time it came under § 522(e). 

Second, he must either prove that the owner of the land, by 

the time it came under § 522(e), had made a good faith effort 

to obtain all necessary permits for the mining, or else prove 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 3 of 16
4 

that the coal is immediately adjacent to a surface mining 

operation in existence on August 3, 1977 and is needed to 

ensure the economic viability of the mining operation as a 

whole. The Secretary prefaced this interpretation of VER with 

a 72-page preamble describing the agency’s long relationship 

with the phrase, explaining the rationale for the latest 

interpretation, and responding to objections raised during the 

notice-and-comment period. Significantly, the preamble 

acknowledges that the chosen VER interpretation protects 

3,062 more acres than the least restrictive alternative and 

predicts that “few persons will qualify for VER under this 

standard.” Valid Existing Rights, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,766, 

70,776, 70,778 (Dec. 17, 1999). 

The National Mining Association (“NMA”), an industry 

trade association with standing to bring suit on behalf of its 

members under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 

Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), challenged the 1999 

Rule pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia. The NMA argued 

that the 1999 Rule’s interpretation of VER was too narrow 

and shielded more land from surface mining than Congress 

intended. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

district court found the statute ambiguous, deferred to the 

Secretary’s interpretation as reasonable, and entered judgment 

for the Secretary. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Scarlett, 2006 WL 

1194224, *6–9 (D.D.C. May 4, 2006) (citing Chevron U.S.A. 

Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

The NMA appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm 

the district court’s judgment. 

II. 

This case begins with an unusual question created by a 

mistake in the language of the jurisdictional grant. We have 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 4 of 16
5 

an “independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists,” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 

500, 514 (2006), which we must discharge before ruling on 

the merits, Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 

127 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998)). 

The district court claimed jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. 

§ 1276(a)(1), which renders “[a]ny action by the Secretary 

promulgating national rules or regulations . . . subject to 

judicial review in the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia Circuit.” But there is no such court 

within the federal judiciary. The judgment the NMA has 

asked us to review comes from a court called “the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia.” See Act of 

June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 875, 895 (codified at 28 

U.S.C. §§ 88, 132(a)); see also In re Permanent Surface 

Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 516 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 

1981) (noting § 1276(a)(1)’s error); In re Surface Mining 

Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1350 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 

(same). Because the inferior federal courts are “creatures of 

statute,” Bath County v. Amy, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 244, 247–48 

(1871), we must pay careful attention to the legislative texts 

by which we are given authority. The district court did not 

address the mistake in the statute, so the task falls to us. 

“[C]ourts will not give independent meaning to a word 

where it is apparent from the context of the act that the word 

is surplusage,” Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 617 

F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted), so we will excise the word “Circuit” from the text of 

§ 1276(a)(1). We have no qualms about this erasure, for both 

Congress’s intent and the error impeding it are plain to see. 

See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.37 (6th ed. 2002) (“A 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 5 of 16
6 

majority of the cases permit the elimination or disregarding of 

words in a statute in order to carry out the legislative intent or 

meaning.”); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 

LEGAL PROCESS 1375 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 

Frickey eds., 1994) (“Courts on occasion can correct mistakes 

. . . when it is completely clear from the context that a mistake 

has been made.”). In § 1276(a), Congress subjected the 

Secretary’s behavior to judicial review in various district 

courts. It would be absurd to assume that Congress intended 

to shield the Secretary’s national rules against judicial review 

by granting jurisdiction to a nonexistent court. Cf. Ethyl Corp. 

v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, 

J., concurring) (“Congress has been willing to delegate its 

legislative powers broadly and courts have upheld such 

delegation because there is court review to assure that the 

agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits 

. . . .”). We read § 1276(a)(1) as granting jurisdiction to the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 

the present case, notwithstanding Congress’s erroneous 

inclusion of the word “Circuit.” Our jurisdiction to review the 

final decision of that court comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

III. 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 756 

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Because Congress has charged the Secretary 

with implementing the SMCRA, we review the agency’s 

interpretation of the statutory phrase “valid existing rights” 

under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Citizens Coal Council 

v. Norton, 330 F.3d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying 

Chevron to Secretary’s interpretation of the SMCRA). Where 

the statute is ambiguous, we defer to the agency’s reasonable 

interpretation of its meaning. By contrast, a clear expression 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 6 of 16
7 

of congressional intent will bind agency and court alike. 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 

The NMA urges that Congress inserted VER in § 522(e) 

to protect mineral owners’ property rights. As the NMA tells 

it, VER allows surface mining by those with a property right 

to mine coal. Were this true, the Secretary’s restrictive 

interpretation of VER in the 1999 Rule would violate a 

congressional directive, and we would be required to set it 

aside. But we do not read the statute so narrowly. Since 1977, 

VER has been interpreted by five different Administrations, 

each of which has found within its borders the room to 

establish a preferred policy. The NMA takes this history to 

mean that the agency’s current policy is entitled to less 

deference because it has changed over time, but the opposite 

is true. That Congress presented so wide a range of plausible 

interpretations to an agency with rulemaking authority shows 

a delegation to the executive branch of the power to make 

reasonable adjustments to the nation’s surface mining policy. 

A. 

Our Chevron analysis begins with asking whether 

Congress has delegated authority to an agency by leaving a 

statutory gap for the agency to fill. 467 U.S. at 843–44 (citing 

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). Our reading of the 

SMCRA’s language convinces us that VER is an ambiguous 

phrase.2

 We have in the past determined that the phrase is 

 

2

 We have noted that the legislative history of the SMCRA does not 

illuminate the meaning of VER. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 

839 F.2d 694, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf. Bank One Chi., N.A. v. 

Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) (Scalia, J., 

concurring) (“The text’s the thing. We should therefore ignore 

drafting history without discussing it, instead of after discussing 

it.”). 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 7 of 16
8 

subject to multiple and divergent interpretations. See Nat’l 

Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 748–51 (D.C. Cir. 

1988) (noting the ambiguity inherent in VER and deferring to 

the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of the phrase as 

encompassing so-called “continually-created valid existing 

rights”). 

The major source of VER’s ambiguity is the word 

“rights.” The NMA, reaching for its dictionary, notes that the 

word “right” could be taken to mean “property right.” See 

Appellant’s Br. at 34 (interpreting “rights” to mean “ ‘an 

interest or title in an object of property’ ”) (quoting BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (6th ed. 1990)); see also BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “right” as, 

inter alia, an “interest, claim, or ownership that one has in 

tangible or intangible property”). But according to the same 

dictionary on which the NMA relies, this is not the only 

meaning the word will bear. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 

(6th ed. 1990) (defining “right” as, inter alia, “[a] legally 

enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other 

shall do a given act, or shall not do a given act”); see also 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 

“right” as, inter alia, “[a] legally enforceable claim that 

another will do or will not do a given act”). In fact, this 

definition cuts against the NMA’s proposed interpretation of 

VER because it is not tied in all circumstances to property. 

Just as “right” can function as a proxy for property rights, 

it will also do service more generally. See, e.g., id.

(“[s]omething that is due to a person by just claim, legal 

guarantee, or moral principle”); 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH 

DICTIONARY 923 (2d ed. 1989) (“[j]ustifiable claim, on moral 

or legal grounds, to have or obtain something, or to act in a 

certain way”); WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

2147 (2d ed. 1952) (“[t]hat to which one has a just claim”). 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 8 of 16
9 

Under Chevron, we ask “whether Congress has directly 

spoken to the precise question at issue.” 467 U.S. at 842. By 

using a word with multiple and often vague meanings, it is 

hard for us to conclude that Congress has done that here. The 

word “right,” instead of answering a question, unhelpfully 

asks another one: To what is a person legally entitled? 

Similarly, “valid” could mean “[l]egally sufficient,” BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY 1586 (8th ed. 2004), which is equally 

unhelpful because it requires yet another question: Under law, 

what makes a miner’s rights sufficient? The dictionary 

counsels in favor of more deference to the agency, not less. 

See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 

Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989 (2005) (“[W]here a statute’s plain 

terms admit of two or more reasonable ordinary usages, the 

[agency’s] choice of one of them is entitled to deference.”);

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 

407, 418 (1992) (“The existence of alternative dictionary 

definitions of the word ‘required,’ each making some sense 

under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to 

interpretation.”) (citation omitted); AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 

F.3d 168, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he fact that the provision 

can support two plausible interpretations renders it ambiguous 

for purposes of Chevron analysis.”) (citation omitted). 

VER could be read, as the NMA suggests, as protecting 

“valid existing property rights.” But it could also encompass a 

narrower protection, as in the 1999 Rule. Nothing in § 522(e) 

suggests Congress intended to enact the former understanding 

over the latter. This case is thus the reverse of Friends of the 

Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Friends 

of the Earth, we found that Congress’s use of the word 

“daily” to modify the phrase “total maximum loads” removed 

any ambiguity that otherwise existed. See 446 F.3d at 144 

(“[B]y providing for the establishment of ‘total maximum 

loads,’ Congress could have left a gap for EPA to fill. Instead, 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 9 of 16
10 

Congress specified ‘total maximum daily loads.’ ”). In 

§ 522(e), by contrast, Congress enacted the ambiguous “valid 

existing rights” instead of the more precise “valid existing 

property rights.” If VER operates as a “term of art,” as the 

NMA suggests, it is as a tool by which Congress delegates 

policymaking authority through ambiguity.3 See, e.g., 

Seldovia Native Ass’n v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 

1990) (noting the Secretary’s interpretation of VER in 43 

U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782); Alekganik Natives Ltd. v. United 

States, 806 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting the 

Secretary’s interpretation of VER in 43 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1));

United States v. Garfield County, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 

1235–36 (D. Utah 2000) (noting Park Service’s interpretation 

of VER in 16 U.S.C. § 273(a)); cf. Felix Frankfurter, Some 

Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 

527, 545 (1947) (noting “a recent cartoon in which a senator 

tells his colleagues ‘I admit this new bill is too complicated to 

understand. We’ll just have to pass it to find out what it 

means.’ ”). 

 

3

 Academic commentary supports our reading of VER. We note 

that the Journal of Mineral Law & Policy, a publication of the 

University of Kentucky College of Law, dedicated an entire issue to 

analysis of VER as used in the SMCRA. See generally Valid 

Existing Rights Symposium, 5 J. MIN. L. & POL’Y 381 et seq.

(1990). Despite devoting 375 pages to the topic, the symposium 

participants reached no consensus on VER’s meaning. As stated by 

Professor Laitos, in whom the NMA’s briefing places great faith: 

“Typically, Congress never lists what interests it means to include 

within the ‘valid existing rights’ phrase. The task of interpretation 

thus falls on the executive branch (i.e., the Department of Interior) 

or the courts.” Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government 

Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV.

ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987). Of course, we cannot outsource the 

task of statutory interpretation to the professoriate, but we find it 

illuminating that scholars with expertise in this area have been 

similarly unable to distill a single, clear meaning from VER. 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 10 of 16
11 

Of course, not every statutory ambiguity gives rise to 

agency prerogative. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 

258 (2006); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 

640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But where Congress has indicated 

that it “would expect the agency to be able to speak with the 

force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills 

a space in the enacted law,” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 

U.S. 218, 229 (2001), its decision to leave “a gap for an 

agency to fill . . . is a delegation of authority to the agency to 

give meaning to a specific provision of the statute by 

regulation,” Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). So it is in this case. See 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(2) 

(empowering the Secretary to “publish and promulgate such 

rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 

purposes and provisions of [the SMCRA]”); Mead, 533 U.S. 

at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of 

delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express 

congressional authorizations to engage in the process of 

rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or 

rulings for which deference is claimed.”). It remains for us to 

determine whether the Secretary served as Congress’s faithful 

agent in giving meaning to VER’s ambiguities. 

B. 

Having satisfied ourselves that VER is ambiguous, we 

defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of the phrase if it “is 

based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 

467 U.S. at 843. All we ask of the agency is a reasonable 

interpretation. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 

1232, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 

330 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2003). By “consider[ing] the 

matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion” and demonstrating 

in its 72-page preamble that “the interpretation is arguably 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 11 of 16
12 

consistent with the underlying statutory scheme in a 

substantive sense,” we conclude that the Secretary has 

adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Kennecott 

Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 

1206 (D.C. Cir. 1996).4

The 1999 Rule remains true to the authority delegated to 

the Secretary in the SMCRA by protecting against the 

harmful effects of surface mining that Congress sought to 

ameliorate. Providing this protection is the primary aim of the 

statute. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (declaring that regulation of 

surface coal mining “is an appropriate and necessary means to 

minimize so far as practicable the adverse social, economic, 

and environmental effects of such mining operations”); id.

§ 1201(c), (k) (warning of deleterious effects of surface coal 

mining); id. § 1202(a) (stating that a purpose of the SMCRA 

is to “establish a nationwide program to protect society and 

the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal 

mining operations”); id. § 1202(f) (stating that a purpose of 

the SMCRA is to “strike a balance between protection of the 

environment . . . and the Nation’s need for coal as an essential 

source of energy”). Therefore it is not surprising that the 

Secretary has promulgated an interpretive rule that cuts 

against the interests of some miners. 

The NMA’s suggestion that the SMCRA effected robust 

protection of miners’ property rights is belied by the way 

 

4

 Given the overlap between step-two Chevron review and the 

arbitrary-and-capricious review called for by § 1276(a)(1) and the 

APA, see Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(collecting cases), the contention that the 1999 Rule violates 

§ 1276(a)(1) fails for similar reasons. In the preamble to the 1999 

Rule, the Secretary “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a 

satisfactory explanation for its action.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 12 of 16
13 

Congress used the word “property” in that statute. Of the 

twenty-nine instances in which “property” appears, only one 

refers to protecting the property rights of subsurface owners 

of the mineral estate. Id. § 1304(g) (concerning coal owned by 

the United States). Many uses of “property” concern the 

protection of surface or adjacent property owners against the 

harmful effects of surface mining, id. §§ 1201(c), 

1233(a)(1)(A), 1239(a), 1253(a)(15)(C), 1253(a)(17), 1257(f), 

1269(a), 1270(f), 1272(a)(3)(D), 1307(b), and several 

mentions of “property” run counter to miners’ property rights, 

in that they authorize government entry onto mined property 

to assess and remedy environmental degradation caused by 

strip mining, id. §§ 1237(a), 1237(b), 1240(b). 

Save for repeating its argument that VER is unambiguous 

and accusing the Secretary of “flip-flopping,” Appellant’s Br. 

at 53, the NMA provides little resistance on this front.5

 With 

the exception of the constitutional avoidance argument, 

discussed next, the NMA offers no basis for finding the 

Secretary’s interpretation unreasonable. If that argument fails, 

we must accord Chevron deference to the 1999 Rule. See 

Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 299 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (“Here, however, [petitioner] advances no additional 

argument beyond those already discussed as part of step one, 

and so we have no basis for finding the Commission’s 

interpretation unreasonable. In any event, the language of [the 

statute] plainly admits of the Commission’s interpretation, 

and it therefore is a permissible construction of the statute.”). 

The NMA asserts that the 1999 Rule runs afoul of both 

the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth 

 

5

 The NMA’s “flip-flopping” point ignores the agency’s obligation 

to “consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on 

a continuing basis,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64. 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 13 of 16
14 

Amendment, an argument raised to invoke the canon of 

constitutional avoidance. Because the judiciary must rightly 

presume that Congress acts consistent with its duty to uphold 

the Constitution, courts make every effort to construe statutes 

so as to find their constitutional foundations and thus avoid 

needless constitutional confrontations. See Edward J. 

DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 

Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Ashwander v. Tenn. 

Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 

concurring). This canon of constitutional avoidance trumps 

Chevron deference, see DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 574–77, and 

we will not submit to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if 

it “presents serious constitutional difficulties,” Chamber of 

Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But we 

do not abandon Chevron deference at the mere mention of a 

possible constitutional problem; the argument must be 

serious. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 

409 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The NMA’s arguments are not. 

Though its briefs are unclear, the NMA appears to argue 

that its procedural due process rights were violated because 

the 1999 Rule created no mechanism by which miners could 

comply with the good-faith permitting requirement had they 

not already done so by August 3, 1977. The NMA argues that 

United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985), and Texaco, 

Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531–32 (1982), require such a 

mechanism. But those cases dealt with a different type of 

legislative determination than we have here. In both Locke

and Texaco, a legislature addressed a dispute over dormant 

mines by creating a process that would allow miners to 

protect their claims. The issue in those cases was whether 

claimants had been improperly denied their rights to make 

their claims. In § 522(e), Congress chose a different means to 

address a problem: It prohibited new surface mining in 

sensitive areas for all but those who could show a valid 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 14 of 16
15 

existing right to mine the land. Congress created no process 

by which to abide, no regulatory regime with which to 

comply. It simply declared surface mining off limits for those 

who had no valid existing rights. Congress created no process 

that the NMA can successfully argue it was denied. 

The NMA also argues that the 1999 Rule precludes 

Chevron deference by working a taking of subsurface coal 

interests. A taking, however, is only unconstitutional if the 

government fails to pay just compensation, and the Tucker 

Act provides for such a remedy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). 

Miners can pursue their takings claims in the United States 

Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”). Given this 

protection, the NMA’s takings challenge raises no serious 

question about the 1999 Rule that would preclude Chevron 

deference. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 

474 U.S. 121, 127–28 (1985); Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. 

United States, 987 F.2d 806, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per 

curiam). 

This is not to say that the canon of constitutional 

avoidance can be ignored with respect to every argument 

sounding in the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court has 

recognized that the Claims Court is not a proper venue if a 

statute creates “an identifiable class of cases in which 

application of [the] statute will necessarily constitute a 

taking.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 128 n.5 (construing 

United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982)). 

Likewise, we have refused Chevron deference to an agency 

interpretation that created an “identifiable class” of takings 

victims. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that “Chevron deference to agency 

action that creates a broad class of takings claims, 

compensable in the Court of Claims, would allow agencies to 

use statutory silence or ambiguity to expose the Treasury to 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 15 of 16
16 

liability both massive and unforeseen,” which would impinge 

Article I authority). But the NMA has shown no “identifiable 

class” of miners whose takings claims would expose the 

Treasury to such liability. At oral argument, the NMA did not 

claim that the government would be on the hook for a 

“massive and unforeseen” sum, paid out to frustrated miners 

as just compensation. See Oral Arg. Recording at 14:45–

17:52. The record is devoid of evidence suggesting it is so. 

Given this implicit concession that the 1999 Rule will have 

relatively insignificant takings implications that can be readily 

addressed in the Claims Court, there is no serious 

constitutional problem to be avoided. “[T]he avoidance canon 

is not applicable when the statute or regulation would effect a 

taking, if at all, only in certain situations.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n 

v. Babbitt, 172 F.3d 906, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The usual 

Chevron analysis is therefore applied to the 1999 Rule, which 

results in our deferring to the Secretary’s reasonable 

interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term. 

IV. 

The district court properly accorded Chevron deference

to the Secretary’s interpretative rule. The judgment is 

Affirmed. 

USCA Case #06-5199 Document #1092385 Filed: 01/15/2008 Page 16 of 16