Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00345/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00345-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS PRATT, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF

PHARMACY, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 05-0345 DFL PAN

 MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

 Plaintiff Thomas Pratt (“Pratt”) failed the pharmacist

licensing examination on three occasions. In this action, he

accuses the California State Board of Pharmacy and several of its

employees of race discrimination in violation of the United

States Constitution. In a supplemental state law claim, he

alleges negligence by defendant Applied Measurement

Professionals, Inc. (“AMP”), a firm that consulted on the content

and grading of the test. AMP now moves for summary judgment on

the basis that it did not breach a duty of care. Pratt has

requested a continuance because, during the briefing on this

motion, he was waiting for a ruling on his motion to compel

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further discovery that was pending before the assigned Magistrate

Judge. For the reasons stated below, AMP’s summary judgment

motion is GRANTED and Pratt’s request for a continuance is

DENIED. 

I.

Pratt is an African-American male who has taken and failed

the California State Board of Pharmacy (“CSBP”) license exam on

three occasions -- June 2002, January 2003, and June 2003. 

(First Am. Verified Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 1, 4.) Each of the exams

that Pratt took contained two parts: (1) a multiple choice

section (“Part 1”); and (2) a short-answer essay section (“Part

2”). (Id. ¶ 4.) Pratt passed Part 1 of each test, but failed

Part 2. (Id.) 

AMP is a consulting company that, among other things,

provides examination consulting services. (Def.’s Ex. 1.) In

2000, AMP agreed to assist CSBP in creating the CSBP license

exam. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1.) Under

a contract with CSBP, AMP created a document entitled “Job

Analysis Study of the California Pharmacist” (“Study”) (Id. ¶

10.) The Study served to “describe the job activities of the

California pharmacist in sufficient detail to provide a basis for

the development of a professional, job-related licensing

examination.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Ultimately, the Study led to the

creation of a “Detailed Content Outline” which set forth the

material to be covered in the exam. (Compl. ¶ 5.) 

Both parties agree that Part 1 of the exam derived from the

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 The Magistrate Judge ordered AMP to provide Pratt with 1

“the essay/short answer questions and his answers thereto that

were graded as incorrect on the June 2002 [CSBP] Examination as

well as the portions of the answer keys as to only those

questions graded as incorrect on plaintiff’s June 2002

examination.” (1/6/2006 Order at 2.) Pratt’s motion was otherwise

denied. (Id. at 3.)

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Study and the Detailed Content Outline. (SUF ¶ 26; Pl.’s Opp’n

to SUF ¶ 26.) However, Pratt alleges that Part 2 was not based

on any reliable methodology or content outline. (Compl. ¶ 6.) 

Therefore, Pratt alleges that AMP breached a duty “to take

appropriate steps to rectify the unreliability of Part Two.” He

further contends that “by grading the exam and recommending a

passing score, AMP breached its duty of care to Pratt and caused

Pratt damages.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) 

On October 4, 2004, AMP filed a motion for summary judgment. 

On the same day, Pratt filed with the magistrate judge a motion

to compel further responses to a request for production of

documents. Pratt filed an amended motion to compel on October

13, 2005. Pratt’s motion sought: (1) the names and addresses of

the judges that contributed to setting the passing score for the

2002 and 2003 exams; (2) the correct and incorrect item responses

for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 exams; and (3) diskettes of each

candidate’s individual response to every essay item for the 2001,

2002, and 2003 exams. (Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 3-7.) Pratt’s

motion was granted in part and denied in part on January 6, 2006,

after oral argument on the summary judgment motion. 

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II.

A. Request for Continuance

In response to AMP’s motion for summary judgment, Pratt

requests a continuance, arguing that he cannot oppose the motion

without the documents he seeks through his motion to compel.

(Opp’n at 15.) Specifically, Pratt’s attorney asserts that his

expert, Walter Haney, “is uncomfortable giving an opinion in this

case until he has had an opportunity to[] review all of the

documents in this case, including the tests, answer keys, and

computer files.” (Saacke Decl. ¶ 25.) No explanation of this

discomfort is provided by the expert or by counsel. No

explanation is given as to why the expert is unable to give any

opinion whatsoever unless the motion to compel is granted. 

Under Rule 56(f), a party seeking a continuance must show:

“(1) that [the party has] set forth in affidavit form the

specific facts that [it] hope[s] to elicit from further

discovery; (2) that the facts sought exist; and (3) that these

sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary judgment

motion.” California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir.

1998). 

Although Pratt did not cite Rule 56(f) or file a Rule 56(f)

motion, he filed a motion to compel. The court will consider

that the motion to compel satisfies the first two requirements of

Rule 56(f). Nevertheless, Pratt has not demonstrated that the

facts he seeks are essential to resist AMP’s summary judgment

motion. Indeed, he makes no effort to make this demonstration. 

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Rather, as the discussion below makes evident, the discovery

sought by the motion to compel was not at all necessary to the

resolution of the issues presented by the summary judgment

motion. Therefore, Pratt’s request for a continuance is DENIED. 

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

In the usual negligence case, the standard of care is that

of the “ordinary prudent or reasonable person.” Trucker v.

Lombardo, 47 Cal. 2d 457, 464 (1956). A professional has a

somewhat heightened standard of care and “is required to make

reasonable use of his superior knowledge, skills and experience

within the areas of his expertise.” Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 289. Pratt argues that AMP breached a duty of care to

him by failing to: (1) ensure that the content of the exam was

based on the responsibilities of California pharmacists; (2)

establish a proper grading methodology; and (3) ensure that the

scores on the exam accurately reflected the applicants’

abilities. However, Pratt fails to come forward with sufficient

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that AMP did not

act as a reasonable testing organization. 

1. Basis for the Exam

Pratt argues that Part 2 of each exam was not job-related

because it did not correlate with the Study AMP performed. As a

result, Pratt contends that AMP’s negligence caused the exams to

be unreliable and invalid. The facts presented do not support

this claim. AMP’s Exhibit 4 contains the Test Specifications

outline for Part 2 of the exam. AMP’s Vice President of Research

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 Complexity levels are numbers that indicate the difficulty 2

of each particular testing category. 

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and Development, Steven Nettles, declares under oath that this

outline was “used in connection with all three of the

examinations taken by [Pratt].” (Nettles Decl. ¶ 11.) This is

supported by AMP’s exhibits 5, 6, and 7. Those exhibits include

the psychometric evaluations of the three exams that Pratt took. 

Table 3 in each evaluation lists the content categories included

on each exam. These lists match the content categories listed on

the Test Specifications outline exactly. 

Nettles also declares that the Test Specifications outline

relates directly to the Study. (Nettles Decl. ¶ 11.) AMP’s

exhibits support this assertion; the outline cites section

numbers to reference complexity levels listed on page 20 of the 2

Study. (Def.’s Exs. 1, 4.) This evidence shows that AMP used

the Study for Part 2. It was, therefore, incumbent upon Pratt to

rebut this evidence. He failed to do so. He merely states that

it is his “belief that the [Test Specifications outline] was

created after the essay examinations were given” since the

outline was not dated. (Opp’n at 4.) Pratt’s “belief” is not

evidence, and AMP’s exhibits 5, 6, and 7 contradict his “belief”

anyway. The discovery sought in the motion to compel -– the

judges’ personal information and the exam responses -- even if

obtained, would not assist Pratt in rebutting AMP’s evidence on

this issue. Accordingly, because there is no factual dispute,

AMP is entitled to summary judgment on Pratt’s claim that Part 2

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of the exam was not based upon AMP’s Job Analysis Study.

 Pratt also argues that the Test Specifications outline is

not sufficiently detailed to provide for a reliable exam. (Opp’n

at 5.) Pratt complains that the outline contains “no complexity

level separated into categories of recall, application and

analysis, no mean complexity determination, and [does] not

account for the two-point weighted items.” (Id.) These points

are irrelevant. As discussed above, the outline referred to page

20 of the Study which set forth the complexity levels for the

different essay question categories. Moreover, Pratt presents no

evidence that failure to include such detail on the outline

demonstrates a breach of the duty of care. The facts sought

through the motion to compel do not address what is required in a

Test Specifications outline. There is no reason why Pratt’s

expert could not have addressed this topic. But he did not, and

all that is left is bald assertion. 

2. Grading Methodology

Pratt contends that AMP created an unreliable grading

methodology because AMP: (1) misapplied the procedure that it

used to establish passing scores; (2) failed to reduce the

passing point scores to account for test error; and (3)

recommended using a higher passing point than called for by the

Study. These contentions are also unsupported by the evidence

presented. 

a. Procedure to Establish Passing Scores

For each exam, AMP conducts a “passing point” study to

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determine the score that examinees must achieve to pass the exam. 

(Def.’s Ex. 8, p. 1.) To do this, AMP uses the Angoff method,

which rates the difficulty of the exam in light of what is

expected of the examinees. (Id.) The procedure requires a group

of judges, who are pharmacists, to “render an expected

performance rating for each test item.” (Id.) A judge’s rating

indicates the number of minimally competent practitioners

(“MCPs”) out of 100 that they believe will correctly answer the

item. (Id. at 3.) 

In Part 2 of the exam, some questions are worth two points

rather than one because they address “two specific issues that

must be addressed together.” (Opp’n at 7.) No partial points

are allowed for those questions. (Id.) When the AMP judges

analyze these sorts of questions, they assign a rating to each

part of the two-part question. (Id.) Thus, the first part of a

question could receive a high difficulty rating, while the other

part receives a low rating. 

Pratt argues that AMP’s application of the procedure is

improper. Pratt claims that the judges should assign one rating

for each overall question, rather than for each part of each

question. (Opp’n at 11.) To support this, Pratt points to the

language by Angoff which says that judges should rate each

“item.” (Id. at 10.) Pratt interprets “item” to mean

“question.” (Id.) Therefore, he concludes that the judges

should rate each question as a whole, rather than parts of

questions. (Id.) Pratt insists that AMP’s failure to do so was

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negligent.

Pratt’s argument is entirely unfounded. Angoff’s use of the

word “item” does not imply that judges should not evaluate

questions by their parts. One question could have two “items” to

evaluate. Even assuming that AMP did not accurately apply the

Angoff method, Pratt presents no evidence establishing that AMP

failed to act as a reasonable testing organization in applying

its own method. Angoff’s method is merely a suggested method,

not the only method. (See Pl.’s Ex. N.) 

Again, there is a gaping hole in plaintiff’s case because

neither his expert nor anyone else qualified to venture an

opinion explains why AMP’s method is negligent. And, as before,

there is nothing in the pending discovery request that bears on

this issue of methodology. 

b. Reducing Passing Point Scores to Account for Test

Error

Pratt also claims that the grading methodology was faulty

because AMP did not reduce the passing point for the June 2002

and January 2003 exams to account for test error. (Opp’n to SUF

¶ 68.) To support this, Pratt cites his Exhibit S. (Id.)

However, Exhibit S merely discusses one method for reducing

passing points to adjust for statistical error. The exhibit does

not suggest that failing to follow that particular method is

negligent. As AMP points out, “[m]any methods exist for

determining and selecting a passing point. Likewise, many

methods exist for adjusting the passing point based on the data.” 

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(Reply to Opp’n to SUF ¶ 68.) Pratt has not shown that AMP’s

method was unreliable or invalid. Again, Pratt’s expert could

have provided an expert opinion on this issue without the

evidence sought through the motion to compel. 

Also, Pratt presents no evidence showing that AMP actually

set the passing points. AMP claims that it provided the CSBP

with a recommended range of passing scores and the CSBP made the

final determination of what score would apply. (Id.) There is

no rebuttal to this evidence. 

c. Recommendation to Use a Higher Passing Point

Pratt also argues that AMP was negligent when it recommended

that CSBP “completely disregard the established passing point and

use a higher passing point than the study called for.” (Opp’n to

SUF ¶ 36, citing Pl.’s Ex. F.) Pratt mischaracterizes AMP’s

recommendation. As Pratt’s Exhibit F demonstrates, AMP merely

proposed another method to calculate the passing point so that

the passing rate would be similar to the previous year’s rate. 

(Pl.’s Ex. F.) AMP noted that this “equipercentile cut” would

be “just one more option to consider.” (Id.) Pratt presents no

evidence that this option was less reliable than any other

option. Nor does Pratt demonstrate that suggesting this option

constitutes negligence. While Pratt’s expert could have provided

a declaration on this issue without the discovery subject to the

motion to compel, he did not do so. 

3. Accurate Reflection of Applicants’ Abilities

Finally, Pratt contends that the CSBP licensing exams he

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took were not reliable because they did not accurately reflect

applicants’ abilities. To support this contention, he claims

that: (1) AMP did not maintain and evaluate an item bank of past

exams; and (2) the reliability coefficients for the exams were

lower than .80. As discussed below, these contentions, even if

true, are irrelevant to the issue of AMP’s negligence. 

a. Item Bank

Pratt claims that the exams did not accurately reflect

applicants’ abilities because AMP did not maintain and evaluate

an item bank for the exams. (Opp’n to SUF ¶ 24.) Pratt claims

that this is a minimum requirement for a valid examination

according to the California Examination Validation Policy. (Id.) 

However, Pratt misreads the policy. The relevant paragraph of

the policy states: 

The number of items in an examination should be

sufficient to ensure adequate content coverage and

provide reliable measurement. Both subject matter

expert judgment and empirical data should be used to

establish the number of items within an examination. 

The empirical data should include results from

occupational analysis and item and test analysis. The

item bank for an examination should contain a

sufficient number of items such that: (1) at least one

new form of the examination could be generated if a

security breach occurred, and (2) items are not exposed

too frequently to repeating examinees. 

(Pl.’s Ex. C.) Generally, the policy requires an examiner to

ensure adequate content coverage and reliable measurement of

abilities. The policy does not explicitly require an item bank

and says nothing about using an item bank to assure validity. 

Even if an item bank were required, the purpose of an item bank

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under the policy is to deal with a breach in exam security and to

keep repeat examinees from having too great an advantage. But

there is no contention here that there was a breach of exam

security, and given that plaintiff is a repeat examinee, the

absence of an item bank, if true, would have worked to his

advantage. Nor does plaintiff provide any evidence that failure

to maintain an adequate item bank is below professional standards

or somehow vitiates the exam that is given. Pratt’s expert

submitted no opinion on this topic even though the discovery

sought in the motion to compel did not relate to the item bank. 

b. Reliability Coefficient

The “reliability coefficient” measures the correlation

between the actual exam and a hypothetical exam that truly

measures the test takers’ abilities. The score can range between

0 and 1.00. Pratt points out that the reliability coefficients

for the exams he took were .76, .70, and .74. (Opp’n at 2.) He

claims that the score should be at least .80, and that AMP admits

that the score should be .85. (Id.) However, once again, Pratt

fails to support these claims with any evidence, expert or

otherwise.

The Ebel text cited by Pratt states, “The reliability of a

good objective test is expected to vary with the number of items

it includes and with the range of abilities in the group tested.” 

(Pl.’s Ex. E.) Ebel suggests that a .80 might be the expected

score in certain circumstances, but that the score might be lower

if the examinee class is more homogenous than normal and the exam

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has fewer questions. (Id.) Also, AMP only states that a score

of .85 is a “highly acceptable reliability coefficient.” (See

Def.’s Ex. 5, p. 9; Ex. 6, p. 8; Ex. 7, p. 8.) It never states

that a lesser score is insufficient. (Id.) 

Pratt could have provided an expert’s declaration confirming

that scores of .80 or .85 are required for a reliable exam, but

he did not do so. Such a declaration would not have required the

evidence sought through the motion to compel. 

III.

For the reasons stated above, Pratt has failed to produce

sufficient evidence to support his negligence claim. The

arguments he raised in support of this claim did not relate to

the evidence sought by the motion to compel. Therefore, AMP’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Pratt’s request to

continue is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/31/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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