Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05131/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05131-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 1, 2000 Decided January 5, 2001

No. 98-5131

Independent Petroleum Association of America, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv02544)

L. Poe Leggette argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Laura S. Morton and Stephen M.

McNabb. E. Edward Bruce, Nancy L. Pell and Thad S.

Huffman entered appearances.

Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

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James F. Simon, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and

Sean H. Donahue, Attorney.

Before: Sentelle, Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: In the consolidated cases of

Independent Petroleum Association of America v. Babbitt

and Samedan Oil Corp. v. Deer, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir.

1996), we held that (1) a policy letter written by an Associate

Director of the Minerals Management Service clarifying the

royalty consequences of take-or-pay settlement payments was

not a rule subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of

the Administrative Procedure Act; and (2) the decision of an

Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior in

Samedan Oil Corp., MMS-94-0003-IND (Sept. 16, 1994), was

arbitrary and capricious. On remand, the District Court

granted in part Samedan Oil Corporation's ("Samedan") motions for entry of an order implementing the mandate of this

Court and for injunctive relief, Independent Petroleum Ass'n

of Am. v. Babbitt, 971 F. Supp. 19, 35-36 (D.D.C. 1997), but

denied a similar motion made by the Independent Petroleum

Association of America ("IPAA"), see id. at 30, 35. The

District Court concluded that IPAA was not a party to

Samedan's case and that IPAA's remaining claim--a "general

challenge to the authority of [the Department of the Interior]

to charge" royalties on nonrecoupable take-or-pay settlement

payments--did not challenge final agency action. Id. at 26.

Accordingly, the District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction

over IPAA's claim and therefore dismissed its complaint.

IPAA now returns to this Court asking us to reverse the

lower court's decision. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The instant appeal continues a long history of litigation

focusing on whether the Department of the Interior ("DOI")

should be permitted to collect royalties from gas-producing

companies that lease land from DOI when those companies

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receive payments based on their take-or-pay settlement

agreements with gas pipelines.1 DOI initially took the position that under its gross proceeds rule, see 30 C.F.R.

ss 206.151, .152(h), .153(h) (1987), gas producers owed royalties for receiving such payments. In 1988, the Fifth Circuit

rejected this position, holding that "[r]oyalty payments are

due only on the value of minerals actually produced, i.e.,

physically severed from the ground. No royalty is due on

take-or-pay payments unless and until gas is actually produced and taken." Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v.

Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1988). DOI subsequently

amended the gross proceeds rule to reflect this holding,

"remov[ing] the requirement to pay royalties on take-or-pay

payments at the time the payment is made" but continuing to

require royalties "when make-up gas is taken." Revision of

Gross Proceeds Definition in Oil and Gas Valuation Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 45,082, 45,083 (Nov. 8, 1988). In a May 3,

1993 letter, the Associate Director of DOI's Minerals Management Service ("MMS") sought to clarify the gross proceeds rule, stating that "some or all of a settlement payment

is or will become royalty bearing if production to which

specific money is attributable occurs." Letter from James W.

Shaw, Associate Director for Royalty Management, MMS,

addressed to "Payor" (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter May 1993

letter]. In other words, according to the letter, "the only

relevant question is whether or not the gas which was originally spoken for in the settled contracts is eventually sold to

someone." Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt

("IPAA I"), 92 F.3d 1248, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis in

original).

In August 1993, the Independent Petroleum Association of

America, an association of roughly 5,000 independent explorers and producers of natural gas and oil, responded to the

letter by filing a suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent DOI

__________

1 For a detailed explanation of the statutes and regulations that

form the basis for this litigation and the history of the take-or-pay

settlements at issue, see Independent Petroleum Association of

America v. Babbitt ("IPAA I"), 92 F.3d 1248, 1251-53 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

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from collecting royalties on unrecoupable take-or-pay settlement payments. IPAA's complaint argued, inter alia, that

(1) DOI adopted a new rule through the May 1993 letter

without following the notice-and-comment procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5

U.S.C. s 553, and (2) DOI's efforts to collect royalties based

on the settlement agreements violated the statutes governing

the royalties owed under DOI leases. In 1994, in an effort to

"simplify ... some of the procedural aspects of [ ] the IPAA

Litigation," DOI and IPAA entered an agreement whereby

MMS would issue up to 10 orders to companies to pay

royalties based on their settlement agreements. Agreement,

Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, No. 93-2544

(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1994). The companies could then appeal

these orders to an Assistant Secretary of DOI, who would

issue decisions that could become "appropriate vehicles to

seek judicial review on the merits of the May [1993] Letter."

Id. at 5.

Later that year, MMS issued an order to Samedan Oil

Corporation requiring it to pay royalties on settlement payments made by Southern Natural Gas Company. Samedan

appealed the order to DOI's Assistant Secretary for Indian

Affairs. The Assistant Secretary upheld the order based on

the policies articulated in the May 1993 letter. See Samedan

Oil Corp., MMS-94-0003-IND (Sept. 16, 1994). Samedan

appealed to the District Court seeking judicial review of the

Assistant Secretary's decision. Then, as we explained in

IPAA I, "the District Court consolidated Samedan's challenge

with IPAA's challenge to the May 1993 letter." IPAA I, 92

F.3d at 1255. After the District Court granted summary

judgment for DOI in both cases, Samedan and IPAA appealed to this Court.

On appeal, we reversed the District Court's granting of

summary judgment, holding that (1) the May 1993 letter was

not a "rulemaking requiring APA notice-and-comment procedures," id. at 1256, and (2) the Assistant Secretary's Samedan decision was "arbitrary and capricious in light of DOI's

adoption of the Diamond Shamrock holding," id. at 1260.

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Accordingly, we held that DOI was precluded from collecting

royalty payments from Samedan. See id.

On remand, IPAA and Samedan filed motions with the

District Court seeking an order implementing the "mandate

of the court of appeals" and a permanent injunction against

DOI from collecting royalties from Samedan. Independent

Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 971 F. Supp. 19, 23

(D.D.C. 1997). The District Court granted Samedan's motion

for injunctive relief, see id. at 36, and denied IPAA's motion

to implement this Court's mandate, see id. at 30, 35. In

denying IPAA's motion, the District Court ruled that our

decision in IPAA I only addressed IPAA's claim concerning

MMS's May 1993 letter, not its "wide-ranging" complaint

concerning DOI's efforts to collect royalties based on take-orpay settlement agreements. See id. at 26. The District

Court explained that our holding concerning the Assistant

Secretary's Samedan decision extended only to Samedan, not

to IPAA. Noting that IPAA had not sought to join Samedan's case, the District Court reasoned that IPAA could not

"be considered a true party to Samedan's case, but must

stand or fall on its own." Id. Consistent with this reasoning,

the District Court reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to

hear IPAA's broad challenge to DOI's royalty policy. Although recognizing that further administrative review would

be futile in light of DOI's insistence that it would continue to

apply the policies underlying the May 1993 letter, the Court

ultimately ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because IPAA does

"not face any final actions which [it] may challenge." Id. at

30. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed IPAA's claim.

IPAA appeals from this ruling.

II. ANALYSIS

DOI contends that the issues raised by IPAA are not

properly before this Court. Following the District Court's

dismissal of its claim, IPAA filed a motion pursuant to Rule

59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asking the

District Court to amend its judgment, arguing that "nothing

in the law of the D.C. Circuit conflicts" with adopting a

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futility exception to the finality requirement. Independent

Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 178 F.R.D. 323, 324

(D.D.C. 1998) (mem.). IPAA suggested that in its case

"futility should create finality and subject matter jurisdiction." Id. The District Court denied this motion, concluding

that our Circuit has constrained the futility exception to the

requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before

seeking judicial review. See id. at 324-25. The Court noted

that IPAA's argument "conflate[d] the doctrines of finality

and exhaustion," id. at 324, and held that "futility cannot

create agency action for purposes of jurisdiction," id. at 326.

IPAA's Notice of Appeal states that IPAA appeals from the

District Court's order "denying plaintiffs' motion to alter or

amend the judgment dismissing the complaint." DOI points

out that the arguments IPAA makes on appeal deal solely

with the District Court's dismissal of its complaint, not its

Rule 59(e) motion. Because IPAA's Notice of Appeal refers

only to the District Court's denial of this motion without

referencing the dismissal of its complaint, DOI suggests that,

in light of Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, IPAA's arguments concerning the dismissal of its

claim are not properly before us.

Under Rule 3(c), a notice of appeal must "designate the

judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed." Fed. R.

App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Nevertheless, a party's failure to designate

the proper order it intends to appeal is "not necessarily fatal."

Martin v. FERC, 199 F.3d 1370, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As

we have explained, "a party may demonstrate its intention to

appeal from one order despite referring only to a different

order in its petition for review if the petitioner's intent can be

fairly inferred from the petition or documents filed more or

less contemporaneously with it." Id. (internal quotes omitted). Furthermore, without a showing of prejudice by the

appellee, technical errors in the notice of appeal are considered harmless. See McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 102

(6th Cir. 1985) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181

(1962)).

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We conclude that the arguments raised by IPAA concerning the District Court's dismissal of its complaint are properly

before us. IPAA's intention to appeal from the actual dismissal is clear. In the Non-Binding Statement of Issues to

be Raised, IPAA explicitly stated one issue as "[w]hether ...

the district court erred in dismissing appellants' complaint

with prejudice on the grounds that they had not complained

of 'final' agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. s 704."

J.A. at 300. It is also worth underscoring that DOI does not

claim that it was prejudiced by IPAA's referring to the wrong

order in its Notice of Appeal. See Martin, 199 F.3d at 1373

(noting that appellee did not "claim to suffer any prejudice").

Not only did DOI fully brief the merits of the District Court's

dismissal of IPAA's claim, but its earlier filings demonstrate

that it understood the true nature of IPAA's appeal. For

example, in one responsive document it noted that one issue

before the Court is "the import of this Court's decision in

IPAA v. Babbitt and whether injunctive relief is appropriate."

Federal-Appellees' Consolidated Response to Appellants' Response to Order to Show Cause at 5, Shell Offshore, Inc. v.

Department of the Interior, No. 98-5116 (D.C. Cir. 2000)2; cf.

Foman, 371 U.S. at 181 ("[B]oth parties brief[ed] and argue[d] the merits of the earlier judgment on appeal....");

Martin, 199 F.3d at 1373 (FERC's responses "indicate that

the agency was aware from the outset that [petitioner] meant

to seek review of the Certificate Order."). We therefore

proceed to consider the substance of IPAA's contention that

the District Court erred in dismissing its complaint for failing

to challenge final agency action.

IPAA argues that its claim originally included a challenge

to the Samedan decision and that in IPAA I we reversed the

District Court's order granting summary judgment against

IPAA in its challenge to Samedan. IPAA suggests the

District Court ignored this mandate by refusing to enter a

__________

2 Originally, IPAA's current appeal was consolidated with Shell

Offshore, Inc. v. Department of the Interior. Shell and DOI filed a

joint motion to stay all proceedings in the Shell cases. On August

8, 2000, this Court granted the motion.

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judgment in its favor and subsequently dismissing its complaint. According to IPAA, by reopening questions already

determined in earlier phases of this litigation, the District

Court violated the mandate rule. Further, IPAA contends

that the Samedan decision constitutes a final agency action

that provides the basis for a justiciable claim. In response to

IPAA's arguments, DOI submits that (1) IPAA's complaint

did not challenge final agency action; (2) IPAA does not have

standing to challenge the Samedan decision; and (3) IPAA's

claim is not ripe for review.

As we have explained before, "we have no difficulty dismissing a case based on one jurisdictional bar rather than

another." Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87

F.3d 1379, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We therefore need not

identify every ground for holding that a claim is not justiciable. See id. at 1385. We conclude that the District Court

properly dismissed IPAA's complaint because of the lack of

final agency action. Cf. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S.

Trade Representatives, 970 F.2d 916, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(explaining that the absence of a final agency action "removes

any need for considering the government's other jurisdictional argument").

Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 704, provides for judicial review of final agency action--that

is, for a court to have jurisdiction over a case brought

pursuant to s 704, the complaint must challenge a final action

of an agency. See Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 918. As we

stated in DRG Funding Corp. v. Secretary of Housing &

Urban Development, 76 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996), "[t]he

requirement of a final agency action has been considered

jurisdictional. If the agency action is not final, the court

therefore cannot reach the merits of the dispute." Id. at 1214

(citation omitted). The APA defines agency action to include

"the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,

sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure

to act." 5 U.S.C. s 551(13). In determining whether such

action is final, we consider "whether the agency's position is

'definitive' and whether it has a 'direct and immediate ...

effect on the day-to-day business' of the parties." Ciba-Geigy

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Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 801 F.2d

430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v.

Standard Oil Corp. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980) (internal

quotes omitted)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178

(1997) (An agency action is final if it "mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process" and is "one by

which rights or obligations have been determined, or from

which legal consequences will flow." (citations and internal

quotes omitted)).

IPAA's complaint not only does not challenge final agency

action, it is not at all clear what agency action IPAA purports

to challenge. The complaint states that IPAA challenges

DOI's "efforts to collect" royalties on take-or-pay settlement

payments. What those "efforts" entail is less than clear.

What is clear, however, is that these "efforts" are not final

agency actions fit for judicial review.

At best, IPAA's characterization of DOI's "efforts" seems

analogous to the National Wildlife Federation's ("NWF")

attempt to challenge the Bureau of Land Management's

("BLM") "land withdrawal review program" in Lujan v.

National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). NWF

used the term "program" to describe BLM's activities in

complying with the Federal Land Management Policy Act of

1976, 43 U.S.C. s 1701 et seq. The Lujan Court explained

that "[t]he term 'land withdrawal review program' ... does

not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a

completed universe of particular BLM orders and regulations." Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890. Accordingly, the Court

concluded that the program was not "an identifiable action,"

id. at 899, and therefore held that NWF's claim could not be

reviewed under the APA. See id. 892-93. Like the "program" in Lujan, the "efforts" that IPAA seeks to challenge

do not refer to any particular action taken by DOI, much less

to any particular order, regulation, or completed universe of

orders or regulations. Cf. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d

559, 566 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("This is not a justiciable

challenge because the program of timber management to

which the environmental groups object does not mark the

consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process ... or

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constitute an identifiable action or event." (internal citations

and quotations omitted)); Foundation on Econ. Trends v.

Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a

plaintiff's complaint concerning the Department of Agriculture's "germplasm preservation program" did not challenge

agency action under the APA). Instead, IPAA seeks to

litigate the type of "generic challenge" the Lujan Court

refused to hear. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891 n.2.

IPAA itself seemed to recognize this shortcoming when it

entered an agreement with DOI to "simplify ... some of the

procedural aspects of [ ] the IPAA Litigation." Agreement,

Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, No. 93-2544

(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1994). That agreement recognized that MMS

would issue up to 10 orders to companies to pay royalties

based on their settlement agreements. The companies could

then appeal these orders to an Assistant Secretary of DOI

who would issue decisions that could become "appropriate

vehicles to seek judicial review"--that is, those orders would

provide the foundation for justiciable test cases. Id. at 5. Of

course, the order issued to Samedan provided the basis for

one of those cases. See Independent Petroleum Ass'n of

Am., 971 F. Supp. at 24.

Now IPAA claims that it is challenging DOI's Samedan

decision. That decision, however, is never mentioned in

IPAA's complaint. Indeed, DOI issued the Samedan decision

over a year after IPAA filed its complaint in this case. IPAA

never amended its complaint to add a claim challenging that

decision. Nor did IPAA seek to intervene when Samedan

appealed the Assistant Secretary's decision. Although

IPAA's case was later consolidated with Samedan's case, the

two cases continued to be separate. See Cella v. Togum

Constructeur Ensemleier en Industrie Alimentaire, 173 F.3d

909, 912 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting consolidation does not merge

suits into a single case). Simply because IPAA and Samedan

were represented by the same counsel and filed a joint brief

on appeal, their individual cases were not somehow merged

into one--they remained separate and distinct.

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Alternatively, IPAA avers that in IPAA I the parties

litigated the Samedan decision by implied consent through

their cross-motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(b). According to Rule 15(b), "[w]hen issues not raised

by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of

the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had

been raised in the pleadings." Id. The Rule's implied consent provision is normally invoked when evidence concerning

an issue not addressed in the pleadings is introduced at trial

without objection. See 6A Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d s 1493 (2d ed.

1990). In such cases, we uphold a trial court's determination

of whether parties impliedly consented to try an issue unless

the court abused its discretion. See Kirkland v. District of

Columbia, 70 F.3d 629, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

It is an open question whether the Federal Rules permit

parties to impliedly consent to "try" issues not raised in their

pleadings through summary judgment motions. In Harris v.

Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339

(D.C. Cir. 1997), we wrote that "[b]ecause a case decided on

motion for summary judgment does not reach trial, ... Rule

15(b) does not apply." Id. at 344 n.3. Yet, in Kulkarni v.

Alexander, 662 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1978), we noted that Rule

15(b)'s "general principle has been applied to motions for

summary judgment." Id. at 762. We need not decide that

general question. In this case there is no clear evidence in

the record that DOI consented to allow IPAA to challenge the

Samedan decision--certainly no proof sufficient to reverse

the District Court's ruling that IPAA did not challenge the

Samedan decision. See Independent Petroleum Ass'n of

Am., 971 F. Supp. at 25-26. In fact, this case's history is

sprinkled with references made by IPAA that its case is

distinct from Samedan's. For example, in the proceedings

leading up to this Court's decision in IPAA I, IPAA distinguished between "the Association's generic challenge to

[DOI's] interpretation and enforcement of their royalty value

regulations" and "Samedan's challenge to a particular order

to pay additional royalties owed under the terms of its lease."

Joint Motion for Enlargement of Page Limitations at 2, IPAA

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I, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (No. 95-5210) (emphasis

added). Likewise in its IPAA I brief, IPAA specifically

described two suits: IPAA's challenge to the May 1993 letter

and "[t]he second suit ... brought by Samedan Oil Corporation ... challeng[ing] a 1994 decision of Interior Department

Assistant Secretary Deer." Appellants' Brief at 4, IPAA I,

92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-5210 & 95-5245). DOI

also recognized that the two cases were distinct in IPAA I, as

its brief provided separate procedural backgrounds for

IPAA's suit "challenging the propriety of the MMS Associate

Director's May 1993 letter" and Samedan's effort to seek

"judicial review of the Assistant Secretary's [Samedan] decision." Appellee's Brief at 11, 16, IPAA I, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-5210 & 95-5245). Given this history, we

cannot possibly find that the parties impliedly consented to

litigate the Samedan decision.

IPAA argues that the mandate rule precludes the District

Court--and now this Court--from holding that it never challenged the Samedan decision. Specifically, IPAA points to

language in our IPAA I decision suggesting that it had

challenged the Agency's decision. Under the mandate rule,

"an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from

the mandate issued by an appellate court." Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948). The mandate

rule is a "more powerful version" of the law-of-the-case

doctrine, which prevents courts from reconsidering issues

that have already been decided in the same case. LaShawn

A. v. Barry ("LaShawn II"), 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 & n.3 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d

496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing the law-of-the-case doctrine). As this Court explained in LaShawn II, this doctrine

applies to jurisdictional issues, whether those issues were

decided " 'explicitly or by necessary implication.' " LaShawn

II, 87 F.3d at 1394 (quoting Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation,

Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Nevertheless, courts

are "not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case

where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio."

United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33,

38 (1952); see also LaShawn II, 87 F.3d at 1395 n.6 (explainUSCA Case #98-5131 Document #566838 Filed: 01/05/2001 Page 12 of 14
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ing that courts are not "bound by decisions on questions of

jurisdiction made sub silentio in previous cases 'when a

subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue' to the

Court" (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984))).

Although some portions of the IPAA I decision may be

read to suggest that IPAA challenged the Samedan decision,

the question of whether IPAA had challenged that decision

was not before us, nor decided by us, even by implication.

Any confusion read into our earlier opinion stems from the

fact that this issue was not cleanly raised. Now that we are

able to consider IPAA's claim standing alone, we are able to

make a precise determination concerning its content and its

justiciability. Indeed, as explained above, its content is clear,

and it is not justiciable. Consequently, the District Court

stood on firm ground in considering whether IPAA had

challenged final agency action and holding that it did not.

Like the District Court, we do no harm to the law of this

Circuit nor the law of this case by considering this issue

today, with the question placed squarely before us uncluttered by other claims or cases.

In a footnote buried on the nineteenth page of its reply

brief, IPAA makes one last effort to litigate its claim, requesting leave to amend its complaint to include a challenge to the

Samedan decision. See 28 U.S.C. s 1653. We deny this

request. IPAA points out that this Court granted leave to

amend following a motion made at oral argument in DKT

Memorial Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for International Development, 810 F.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The unique

circumstances of DKT belie its applicability in other cases.

DKT's singular holding was limited to the facts of a discrete

case dealing with international affairs. See id. at 1238-39.

In that case, leave to amend was constrained to a single

factual allegation--a factual allegation that the plaintiffs inadvertently omitted--that clarified the plaintiffs' standing in an

area where "current precedent does not conclusively indicate

whether" such a party has standing. Id. at 1239. The DKT

Court made plain that the appellants' omission had been

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inadvertent and that, based on the facts of the case, granting

leave to amend was in the public interest. See id.

While it is possible that, like the appellants in DKT, IPAA's

failure to amend its pleading at an earlier stage in this

litigation may have been "more inadvertent than deliberate,"

id. at 1239, unlike in DKT, IPAA fails to articulate what

"interest of justice" would be served by allowing it to amend

its complaint now, roughly seven years after it filed the

original complaint and six years after DOI issued the Samedan decision. Additionally, in contrast to the DKT appellants, who merely sought to amend their claim to add a single

factual allegation, IPAA seeks to add an entirely new claim.

However, as we have said before, new claims "cannot set sail,

initially, on appeal if courts are to operate with reasonable

speed and efficiency." Shipbuilders Council of Am. v. United States, 868 F.2d 452, 456 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Finally, we question whether IPAA's amendment would

"convert their action into a justiciable case." Id. Instead,

permitting IPAA to amend its claim likely would lead this

Court into a jurisdictional morass. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-54 (1967); Student Loan Mktg.

Ass'n v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Shell

Oil Co. v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1186, 1201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1995);

Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 983 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir.

1993); Shipbuilders Council, 868 F.2d at 456; Radiofone,

Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,

opinion). Accordingly, we are compelled to deny IPAA's

request.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the District Court's judgment is

Affirmed.

USCA Case #98-5131 Document #566838 Filed: 01/05/2001 Page 14 of 14