Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-07150/USCOURTS-caDC-22-07150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2024 Decided July 9, 2024 

No. 22-7150 

SAAD ALJABRI, DR., 

APPELLANT

v. 

MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ AL SAUD, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:20-cv-02146) 

Lindsay Harrison argued the cause for appellant. With her 

on the briefs were Jason P. Hipp and Andrianna Kastanek. 

Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for appellees. With 

him on the brief were William W. Taylor, III, Margarita K. 

O=Donnell, Gregory G. Rapawy, Barry J. Pollack, Jessica N. 

Carmichael, Mitchell R. Berger, Benjamin D. Wood, and Alexandra E. Chopin. 

Before: RAO and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, 

Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #22-7150 Document #2063679 Filed: 07/09/2024 Page 1 of 14
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS. 

CHILDS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Dr. Saad Aljabri 

(“Plaintiff”) served in the government of Saudi Arabia for 

thirty-nine years primarily as an expert in national security and 

counterterrorism. Because of his close contacts with U.S. 

intelligence officials and his role as a trusted advisor to former 

Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of the Interior Mohammed 

bin Nayef (“bin Nayef”), Plaintiff alleges that a group of 

individuals led by current Saudi Prime Minister and Crown 

Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud (“bin 

Salman”) plotted to kill Plaintiff after he relocated to Canada. 

In response to various motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, the 

district court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over 

most of the defendants, and Plaintiff had failed to state a claim 

against two others, Mohammed Alhamed and Layla 

Abuljadayel (together the “U.S.-based students”).1

 Aljabri v. 

al Saud, Civ. A. No. 20-2146, 2022 WL 4598519, at *17–19 

(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2022). Plaintiff appeals. Upon de novo

review, we affirm dismissal of the claims against bin Salman 

and the U.S.-based students; vacate the district court’s 

dismissal of claims against Bader Alasaker and Saud Alqahtani 

(together the “top aides”); and remand for jurisdictional 

discovery. 

I. 

As alleged in his amended complaint, Plaintiff began 

working for the Saudi government in 1976, rising to become a 

senior official of the Saudi Ministry of Interior and an advisor 

1

 In a separate order, the district court dismissed Bijad Alharbi for 

Plaintiff’s failure to timely effect service under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(m). 

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to bin Nayef.2

 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Plaintiff helped 

Saudi Arabia become a key counterterrorism partner to the 

United States while developing close cooperative relationships 

with U.S. intelligence officials. In 2015, Plaintiff was 

terminated from his government position partly due to this 

relationship. 

The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia is first in the line of 

succession to replace the king. On June 20, 2017, bin Salman 

usurped the position of Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia from bin 

Nayef, who was placed under house arrest. Bin Salman 

believed he needed the support of the United States to ascend 

to the Saudi throne and bin Nayef was an impediment to that 

happening based on his relationships with U.S. officials. 

During the month preceding this change in the Saudi 

power structure, Plaintiff became concerned for his well-being 

because of his relationships with bin Nayef and the U.S. 

intelligence community, and prior conflicts with bin Salman. 

So, on May 17, 2017, Plaintiff fled from Saudi Arabia to 

Turkey. Upon learning about Plaintiff’s departure from the 

country, bin Salman used various measures to lure Plaintiff 

back to Saudi Arabia. These efforts included sending text 

messages demanding Plaintiff’s return, prohibiting his son and 

daughter from leaving the country to attend school, ending 

another son’s scholarship payments, initiating a Red Notice 

request with INTERPOL for Plaintiff’s arrest, and other 

threatening behavior. When Plaintiff learned bin Salman was 

pressuring Turkey to return him to Saudi Arabia, Plaintiff fled 

to Toronto, Canada, on September 12, 2017, but Plaintiff told 

bin Salman he was traveling to Boston, Massachusetts. 

2

 At the pleading stage, we accept all facts stated in the applicable 

amended complaint as true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 

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When Plaintiff did not return to Saudi Arabia, bin Salman 

set out to find him. Bin Salman activated a network of Saudi 

students in the United States through bin Salman’s self-funded 

Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Foundation 

(“MiSK”). Importantly, Alasaker was the executive director of 

MiSK and Saud Alqahtani was a member of MiSK’s board of 

directors.3

 The top aides used MiSK to cultivate a network of 

Saudi students in the United States by coordinating with 

student clubs and hosting leadership events and/or cultural 

programs. Plaintiff claimed that the top aides used MiSK to 

recruit spies from its student clubs. Bin Salman and Alasaker 

activated three student spies, Youssef Alrajhi, and the U.S.-

based students, to find Plaintiff. These students allegedly 

gained information regarding Plaintiff’s location by speaking 

with his family living in the United States. 

By December 2017, bin Salman knew Plaintiff was in 

Canada. Bijad Alharbi, an acquaintance of Plaintiff through 

their connection to bin Nayef, traveled to Toronto to persuade 

Plaintiff to return to Turkey, where he would be less lonely and 

could visit his family. 

Almost a year later, on October 15, 2018, bin Salman 

devised a plan to kill Plaintiff because he refused to return to 

Saudi Arabia. Bin Salman activated the “Tiger Squad,” a 

private death squad made up of about fifty intelligence, 

military, and forensic operatives from different branches of the 

3

 Plaintiff identified Bader Alasaker as “one of . . . bin Salman’s closest aides” and said Alasaker “is known as . . . bin Salman’s ‘invisible 

hand.’” Amend. Compl. ¶ 40 (JA.45) (note omitted). Plaintiff called 

Saud Alqahtani bin Salman’s “top aide,” “chief propagandist,” “one 

of his chief enforcers,” and “right-hand man.” Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 

48, 49 (JA.50), 55 (JA.53). 

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Saudi government.4

 The Tiger Squad first tried to enter Canada 

individually, acting as tourists, but were stopped when customs 

found forensic tools in their luggage and group photos proving 

that the individuals knew each other. Ultimately, only one 

member could enter Canada, thereby foiling the plot. 

Bin Salman did not give up. In May 2020, he obtained a 

fatwa—a ruling by religious authorities—endorsing the killing 

of Plaintiff. To execute the fatwa, bin Salman planned to send 

agents by land through the United States to Canada. In fact, a 

Canadian security agency warned Plaintiff about credible and 

imminent threats to his life that same year. Canadian Law 

Enforcement considered the threat so concrete that an 

“Emergency Response Team” was stationed outside Plaintiff’s 

house, and he was instructed to cancel all meetings. Other 

sources also warned Plaintiff of credible attempts on his life 

and the continued existence of a high level of threat. 

After surviving the failed attempts on his life, Plaintiff 

filed a complaint on August 6, 2020, against bin Salman, other 

Saudi officials, several U.S.-based individuals, MiSK, both 

known Tiger Squad members, and eleven unknown John Doe 

members of the Tiger Squad. He alleged claims for: (1) 

attempted extrajudicial killing in violation of the Torture 

Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, (2) conspiracy 

to commit an extrajudicial killing, which constitutes a tort 

committed in violation of the law of nations under the Alien 

Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and (3) a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. After bin Salman, Alrajhi, 

Alhamed, Abuljadayel, Saud Alqahtani, Ahmed Alassiri, 

Mishal Fahad Alsayed, Khalid Ibrahim Abdulaziz Algasem, 

4

 For further descriptive context, Plaintiff asserts that the members 

of the Tiger Squad carried out the infamous 2018 assassination of 

Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, 

Turkey. 

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Saud Abdulaziz Alsaleh, Bandar Saeed Alhaqbani, Ibrahim 

Hamad Abdulrahman Alhomid, Alasaker, and MiSK moved to 

dismiss the complaint, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on 

February 4, 2021, to supplement his allegations. Bin Salman, 

Alrajhi, Alhamed, Abuljadayel, Hani Fakri Hamed, Saud 

Alqahtani, Alassiri, Alsayed, Algasem, Alsaleh, Alhaqbani, 

Alhomid, Ahmed Abdullah Fahad Albawardi, Bader Mueedh 

Saif Alqahtani, Alasaker, and MiSK then moved to dismiss the 

amended complaint. 

On September 30, 2022, the district court dismissed (1) the 

claims against bin Salman, Alasaker, Saud Alqahtani, Alassiri, 

MiSK, Alrajhi, Hamed, Alsaleh, Alsayed, Algasem, 

Alhaqbani, Alhomid, Albawardi, and Bader Alqahtani for lack 

of personal jurisdiction; and (2) the claims against the U.S.-

based students for failure to state a claim. In reaching this 

determination, the district court was unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s 

allegations that bin Salman purposefully targeted the United 

States by plotting to kill Plaintiff and thereby harming U.S. 

intelligence interests, or, through the actions of third parties, 

“directed an agent of his to look for [Plaintiff] in the United 

States.” Aljabri, 2022 WL 4598519, at *8. However, even if 

Plaintiff could “aggregate factual allegations concerning 

multiple defendants in order to demonstrate personal 

jurisdiction over” bin Salman, id. (citation omitted), the district 

court found that due to the burden on bin Salman to litigate in 

the United States and Saudi Arabia’s greater procedural and 

substantive interest, the court’s exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over bin Salman would not meet “traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at *13 (quoting

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 

U.S. 102, 105 (1987)). As to Alasaker, Saud Alqahtani, 

Alassiri, and the members of the Tiger Squad, the district court 

reiterated that their involvement in a plot to kill Plaintiff did 

not target the United States. Moreover, none of their contacts 

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related to the lawsuit, and the court’s exercise of jurisdiction 

over them would not comport with “traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice.” Id. at *14 (quoting Asahi, 480 

U.S. at 105). In the same vein, the district court also 

determined that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute did 

not provide “specific” personal jurisdiction over MiSK, 

Alrajhi, or Hamed because Plaintiff failed to sufficiently align 

their alleged business activities in D.C. with the plot against his 

life. Id. at *15–16. 

Next, the district court addressed Plaintiff’s assertion that 

dismissal should not occur without jurisdictional discovery. 

Specifically, Plaintiff requested discovery on communications 

between and among bin Salman, Alasaker, Saud Alqahtani, 

Alassiri, MiSK, the Tiger Squad, and other individuals based 

in the United States; information regarding the Tiger Squad’s 

travel in the United States; a list of contacts for MiSK, Alrajhi, 

and Hamed; and details regarding bin Salman’s May 2020 

directive to his agents to kill Plaintiff. The district court denied 

Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery on the basis that 

any information revealed in the discovery would not change the 

court’s conclusion that exercising personal jurisdiction over 

bin Salman, Alasaker, Saud Alqahtani, Alassiri, and the Tiger 

Squad defendants would be unreasonable. The district court 

further found that Plaintiff’s requests were “overly broad,” 

conjectural, speculative, and burdensome to the court. Id. at 

*17 (citation omitted).

Finally, the district court concluded that despite the failure 

of the U.S.-based students to raise an objection to personal 

jurisdiction, thereby waiving that defense, Plaintiff did not 

adequately allege any claim against either individual. Id. at 

*18. The district court observed that the claims against the 

U.S.-based students “hinge[d] on a theory of secondary 

liability—that is, that Alhamed and Abuljadayel are liable 

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because they conspired and aided and abetted bin Salman’s plot 

to kill [Plaintiff].” Id. In this regard, dismissal was appropriate 

because the amended complaint’s allegations did “not allow the 

Court to infer that either Alhamed or Abuljadayel had any 

relationship with bin Salman, much less that they knew that 

their alleged conduct was supposedly assisting a plot by bin 

Salman to kill a former Saudi official.” Id. at *19. Simply put, 

the alleged facts did not show that the U.S.-based students 

knew of a plot to kill Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff timely appealed the district court’s decision. 

II. 

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim de novo, accepting as 

true Plaintiff’s factual allegations and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in his favor. Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 

36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192 

(D.C. Cir. 1995); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

In addition, we review the district court’s denial of 

jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. 

Mutond, 62 F.4th 587, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2023). 

A.

 We turn first to a contention by bin Salman that 

notwithstanding the district court’s personal jurisdiction 

decision, he is now entitled to absolute head of state immunity 

after his elevation to the position of Prime Minister of Saudi 

Arabia on September 27, 2022.5

 

5

 Although the district court issued its opinion three days after bin 

Salman’s appointment to Prime Minister, the court was not made 

aware of that occurrence by the parties. See Appellees’ Br. 18. 

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Head of state immunity is an extension of the common law 

doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Manoharan 

v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “[C]ommon 

law foreign immunity distinguishes between two types of 

immunity: status-based and conduct-based immunity.” Lewis 

v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019). “Status-based 

immunity is reserved for diplomats and heads of state and 

attaches ‘regardless of the substance of the claim.’” Id.

(citation omitted). “[T]he rationale of head-of-state immunity 

is to promote comity among nations by ensuring that leaders 

can perform their duties without being subject to detention, 

arrest or embarrassment in a foreign country’s legal system.” 

Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation 

omitted). “A head-of-state recognized by the United States 

government is absolutely immune from personal jurisdiction in 

Accordingly, the district court did not address the head of state 

immunity issue. In the D.C. Circuit, “it is the general rule that a 

federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon 

below,” but “the matter of what questions may be taken up and 

resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the 

discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of 

individual cases.” Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 

940 F.2d 685, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (cleaned up). “We have stated 

that in exercising this discretion we will look to factors such as 

whether the issue in question has been fully briefed by the parties 

and whether decision of the issue would be aided by the development 

of a factual record in the district court.” Id. Based on our review of 

the briefing and the current factual record, we exercise our discretion 

to consider head of state immunity during this appeal. See Porup v. 

CIA, 997 F.3d 1224, 1238–39 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Because ‘our 

review . . . is de novo[,] . . . we have the same record before us as did 

the district court [and] we are just as capable of evaluating the 

[CIA]’s [declarations] . . . as is the court below.’ Thus, rather than 

remanding solely for the District Court to pass upon segregability, 

we will exercise our discretion to make such a determination in the 

first instance.” (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)). 

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United States courts unless that immunity has been waived by 

statute or by the foreign government recognized by the United 

States.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“Conduct-based immunity is afforded to ‘any public 

minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts 

performed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising 

jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the 

state.’” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 145 (cleaned up). “With respect to 

conduct-based immunity, foreign officials are immune from 

‘claims arising out of their official acts while in office.’” 

Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 774 (citations omitted). “This type of 

immunity stands on the foreign official’s actions, not his or her 

status, and therefore applies whether the individual is currently 

a government official or not.” Id. 

 To determine whether a foreign official is entitled to 

immunity, we conduct a two-part test. Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC 

v. Muzin, 12 F.4th 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2021). First, we assess 

whether the U.S. State Department has filed a suggestion of 

immunity in the case. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 

(2010). If the Executive Branch has spoken, we defer to its 

determination, and we lack jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. 

If the Executive Branch has not weighed in, we independently 

assess whether “all the requisites for such immunity exist[].” 

Id. (citation omitted). Out of respect for the Executive 

Branch’s constitutional role in foreign relations, however, our 

review relies heavily on State Department “policy and 

practice,” as shown in “suggestions of immunity and 

statements of interest in other cases.” Broidy, 12 F.4th at 798. 

If we find the Executive Branch’s policies favor giving that 

individual head of state status, we again lack jurisdiction. 

Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312. 

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 Here, pertinent to our analysis, Saudi Arabia, through its 

embassy, requested a suggestion of immunity from the U.S. 

State Department on October 8, 2020. The record does not 

indicate that the State Department has responded to this request 

for a suggestion of immunity. However, the State Department 

filed a suggestion of immunity regarding bin Salman in Cengiz 

v. bin Salman, Civ. A. No. 20-03009, ECF No. 53 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 17, 2022), which states in relevant part that “Mohammed 

bin Salman, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia, is the sitting head of government and, accordingly, is 

immune from . . . suit.” JA.342. The Cengiz suggestion of 

immunity further states, “bin Salman possesses immunity from 

. . . suit as the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

while he holds that office.” JA.343 ¶ 1. Furthermore, “this 

determination is controlling and is not subject to judicial 

review.” Id. Because the Cengiz suggestion of immunity is 

filed in a different case, it is not enough to satisfy the first step 

of the Samantar analysis—and obviously, no suggestion has 

been filed here. However, we place great weight on the Cengiz

suggestion in our analysis of the second step of the foreign 

immunity test. See Muzin, 12 F.4th at 798. To this point, bin 

Salman still holds the office of Prime Minister—and Plaintiff 

has not meaningfully suggested that bin Salman’s status has 

changed since the Cengiz statement—thus, we will follow the 

State Department’s prior suggestion of immunity and affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against bin 

Salman. 

B. 

 We next turn to Plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to 

jurisdictional discovery to supplement his allegations. The 

federal courts “are courts of limited jurisdiction” and cannot 

hear cases without, among other things, personal jurisdiction 

over the parties. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Generally, to have personal 

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jurisdiction over a defendant, the Fifth Amendment requires 

that defendant have “minimum contacts” with the United States 

that satisfy “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 48, 54 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). However, it is not always easy for a 

plaintiff to show a defendant’s minimum contacts in a 

complaint. 

 The Supreme Court has held that “where issues arise as to 

jurisdiction . . . , discovery is available to ascertain the facts 

bearing on such issues.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 

437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978). In this regard, if allowed 

jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs facing motions to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction can potentially uncover 

revealing information they would not have known otherwise. 

See Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 48–49. Moreover, the 

burden to demonstrate entitlement to jurisdictional discovery is 

not onerous, only requiring that a plaintiff “have at least a good 

faith belief that such [jurisdictional] discovery will enable it to 

show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant.” Williams v. Romarm, SA, 756 F.3d 777, 786 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Here, the district court abused its discretion in not allowing 

jurisdictional discovery on the record before it. Plaintiff 

alleged a good-faith belief that communications between 

Alasaker, Saud Alqahtani, and the U.S.-based Saudis could 

establish the minimum contacts necessary to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over him. JA.330. That said, we acknowledge that 

the district court was properly cautious when considering 

Plaintiff’s jurisdictional discovery requests “in light of other 

factors” bearing on “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger 

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citation 

omitted). Nevertheless, while the district court properly denied 

most of his requests, it abused its discretion in finding 

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Plaintiff’s claims regarding the communications between 

Alasaker, Saud Alqahtani, and the other U.S.-based Saudis 

were clearly frivolous. See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., 529 

F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[A] request for 

jurisdictional discovery cannot be based on mere conjecture or 

speculation.”). Within the 179 pages and 414 paragraphs of his 

amended complaint, Plaintiff set forth allegations of his death 

being the object of a broad conspiracy involving Saud 

Alqahtani, Alasaker, and the U.S.-based Saudis. Evidence of 

an agreement between those defendants could both establish 

minimum contacts with the United States and affect the 

fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction over Saud 

Alqahtani and Alasaker. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 

Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying 

Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery 

regarding the communications between these individuals. 

***** 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all 

claims against Saudi Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman 

bin Abdulaziz al Saud, albeit for a different reason: his 

immunity from suit. See Parsi v. Daioleslam, 778 F.3d 116, 

126 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Ordinarily, a court of appeals can affirm 

a district court judgment on any basis supported by the record, 

even if different from the grounds the district court cited.”). 

However, we hold that the district court did abuse its discretion 

in denying Plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery 

outright. We therefore reverse the district court’s order 

denying jurisdictional discovery, vacate the judgment of 

dismissal with respect to Bader Alasaker and Saud Alqahtani, 

and remand for jurisdictional discovery described above. The 

district court may exercise its broad discretion to control the 

scope of discovery and the burden on high-ranking Saudi 

officials. We express no opinion on the other jurisdictional 

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issues, and we affirm the dismissal of claims against 

Mohammed Alhamed and Layla Abuljadayel for the reasons 

given by the district court, supra at 7–8. Still, the jurisdictional 

discovery may reveal facts which could cure the defect in the 

claims against Alhamed and Abuljadayel. Thus, we remand 

with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice to 

refiling by Plaintiff. 

So ordered. 

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