Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02351/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1446nr Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMADOR, individually and on 

behalf of other members of the 

general public similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

RMJV, LP, an unknown business 

entity d/b/a Fresh Creative Foods,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-02351-BTM (MSB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND, DENYING MOTION TO 

STRIKE, AND DENYING JOINT 

MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING 

DATE

[ECF Nos. 8, 11, 17, 18] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Answer 

(ECF No. 8), Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 11), and a Joint Motion to 

Continue Hearing Date on both of the foregoing motions (ECF No. 17). For 

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the unopposed Motion to Remand

and REMANDS this action to the San Diego County Superior Court. The Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and the Joint Motion to Continue Hearing 

Date as moot. (ECF Nos. 8, 11, 17). 

//

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II. BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action 

lawsuit against Defendant, defining the class as “all current and former 

California-based . . . hourly-paid and non-exempt employees (either directly or 

through a staffing agency or labor contractor) employed by Defendant during the 

period from four years preceding the filing of this Complaint to final judgment.” 

(ECF No. 1-2 “Compl.” ¶ 12). The Complaint alleges: (1) unpaid overtime in 

violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1198; (2) unpaid meal period 

premiums in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a); (3) unpaid rest 

period premiums in violation of California Labor Code 226.7; (4) unpaid 

minimum wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197; (5) final 

wages not timely paid in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202; (6) noncompliant wage statements in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202; 

and (7) unlawful business practices in violation of California Business & 

Professions Code § 172,00, et seq. 

Defendant removed the action to federal court pursuant to the Class Action 

Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1446, and 1453. Plaintiff moved to 

remand the controversy to state court, arguing that Defendant failed to proffer 

sufficient evidence to satisfy CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement. (See

ECF No. 11-1 at 11). On February 22, 2019, Defendant submitted a Notice of 

Non-Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1447. (ECF No. 18). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are always under an independent obligation to examine 

their own jurisdiction,” which exists only if authorized by the Constitution or 

federal statute. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Congress 

designed the terms of CAFA specifically to permit a defendant to remove certain 

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class or mass actions into federal court . . . [and] intended CAFA to be 

interpreted expansively.” Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Generally, courts “strictly construe the 

removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 

566 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “no antiremoval presumption attends cases 

invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class 

actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. 

Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (citation omitted).

Under CAFA, federal courts have jurisdiction over any civil action if: (1) the 

class has more than 100 members; (2) minimal diversity exists between class 

plaintiffs and defendant(s); and, (3) the controversy exceeds $5 million exclusive 

of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2(A), (d)(5)(B). The removing 

defendant “bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million when federal jurisdiction 

is challenged.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. To that end, the parties may submit 

declarations, affidavits, or other “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 

the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Id. (quoting Singer v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). Speculation and 

conjecture will not suffice; rather, “CAFA’s requirements are to be tested by 

consideration of real evidence . . . using reasonable assumptions underlying the 

defendant’s theory of damages exposure.” Id. at 1197-98. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Because Defendant’s sparse one-line statement of non-opposition gives no

reasons for remanding the action, the Court relies on Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Remand to determine whether remand is appropriate. See Santoyo v. 

Consolidated Foundries, Inc., 16-cv-2232-BRO, 2016 WL 5955851 at *1 n.3 

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016) (“Though Defendants do not oppose this Motion, the 

Court is under a continuing duty to determine its own subject matter jurisdiction. 

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Thus, the Court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction or 

whether this case should be remanded . . .”) (citing Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 

80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996)); Jenkins v. Apple, Inc., No. 11-CV-01828-LHK, 

2011 WL 2619094, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (one sentence statement of 

non-opposition left court “to consider only Plaintiffs’ motion to remand”). Plaintiff

does not dispute that the action involves more than 100 employees, or that 

minimal diversity exists. Plaintiff only argues that Defendant failed to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 

million. The Court agrees. 

Defendants estimate that the amount-of-controversy ranges from 

$6,713,585 to $7,438,275. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 51). In support of removal, Defendant

proffered the Declaration of Patricia Duenas Padilla, the Director, Human 

Resources, and Administration of RMJV, LP, doing business as Fresh Creative 

Foods. (ECF No. 1-6 “Padilla Decl.” ¶1). Padilla’s Declaration provides 

information about employees’ average hourly pay, the number of non-exempt 

employees who worked during the class period, and the approximate number of 

workweeks those employees worked. (See Padilla Decl.) Defendant uses these 

figures in its calculations. However, after Plaintiff moved to remand, Defendant

supplied no other summary-judgment-like evidence to support the figures or

calculations in its Notice of Removal, which largely rely on assumptions. For 

instance, Defendant assumed a 50% violation rate for meals and break-times, 

i.e., 2.5 missed meal periods and 2.5 missed rest breaks per five-day work week, 

and assumed one hour of unpaid overtime wages per workweek. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 

28, 33). Similarly, Defendant assumed that all shifts worked by class members 

were eight hours or more, and that every class member was entitled to a meal 

and rest period for every shift worked. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 32). 

The Court finds that these calculations, among others, are premised upon 

speculations and unverified “average” figures lacking in any factual 

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underpinnings. Such guesswork does not constitute summary-judgment-like 

evidence or meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Ibarra, 

755 F.3d at 1198-99 (“[A] pattern and practice of doing something does not 

necessarily mean always doing something.”); Roth v. Comerica Bank, 799 

F.Supp.2d 1107, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (listing cases and remanding because 

defendants failed to proffer summary-judgment-like evidence to support 

assumptions); Sanders v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 16-cv-2837-CAB-NLS, 

2017 WL 5973566 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (remanding because “without 

evidence to support this violation rate, the use of a 50% violation rate (or virtually 

any violation rate for that matter) is completely arbitrary and little more than 

speculation and conjecture”); Weston v. Helmerich & Payne Inter. Drilling Co., 

13-cv-01902-LJO-JLT, 2013 WL 5274283 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding 

preponderance of the evidence standard was not met where defendant 

“provide[d] no factual underpinning for the assumption that a meal and rest break 

violation occurred one time per week or why an overtime violation should be 

presumed to occur for four hours every week” and remanding despite 

defendant’s reliance on a less than 100% violation rate). In sum, the dearth of 

summary-judgment-like evidence and abundance of speculation and 

assumptions, combined with Defendant’s notice of non-opposition, leads the

Court to conclude that removal jurisdiction has not been established and remand 

is appropriate. 

//

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V. Conclusion

The Court REMANDS this matter to the San Diego County Superior Court. 

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and the Joint Motion to Continue 

Hearing as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2019

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