Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01349/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01349-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1362 Indian Tribal Controversy

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SILVIA BURLEY, as chairperson 

of the California Valley Miwok 

Tribe; and the CALIFORNIA 

VALLEY MIWOK TRIBE, as a 

federally recognized tribe of 

the Miwok people,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ONEWEST BANK, FSB; MERIDIAN 

FORECLOSURE SERVICE; DEUTSCHE 

BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY; 

and DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY,

 Plaintiff,

v.

SILVIA BURLEY; ANJELICA PAULK; 

TYLER PAULK; RASHEL REZNOR; 

MILDRED BURLEY; and TRISTIAN 

WALLACE,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

CIV. NO. 2:14-1349 WBS EFB

CIV. NO. 2:14-1567 WBS EFB

Case 2:14-cv-01349-WBS-EFB Document 17 Filed 08/26/14 Page 1 of 13
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Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On July 31, 2014, the court issued an Order to Show 

Cause why these actions should not be dismissed for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Having considered the parties’ 

submissions in response to that Order, the court will dismiss the 

first action, Burley v. OneWest Bank, FSB, Civ. No. 2:14-1349 WBS 

EFB, for lack of jurisdiction, and will remand the second action, 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Burley, Civ. No. 2:14-1567 

WBS EFB, to San Joaquin County Superior Court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1447.

I. Factual & Procedural History1

Silvia Burley is the chairperson of the California 

Valley Miwok Tribe (“the Tribe”), which is a federally-recognized 

Indian tribe. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) In 2002, the Tribe purchased a 

parcel of land in Stockton, California. (Id. ¶ 16.) Shortly 

after doing so, the Tribe issued a resolution authorizing Burley 

to obtain a loan for the property and to take title to the 

property on behalf of the Tribe. (Id. ¶ 17.) Burley refinanced 

the property on behalf of the Tribe in 2006 and 2007, and 

quitclaimed the property to the Tribe in 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 19-24.) 

Burley and the Tribe allege that they are waiting for 

funds owed to them by the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund2 and that 

 

1 Except where otherwise noted, the court draws its 

account of the factual and procedural history from the Complaint 

in the Burley v. OneWest Bank, FSB action. (Docket No. 1.) 

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the California Gambling Control Commission is holding $10 million 

in escrow on behalf of the Tribe. (Id. ¶ 33.) In the meantime, 

however, Burley and the Tribe failed to make payments on the 

property. (See id. ¶ 34.) As a result, OneWest Bank, FSB 

(“OneWest”) recorded a Notice of Default on February 19, 2010 and 

initiated foreclosure proceedings. (Id.) A Trustee’s Deed Upon 

Sale recorded in San Joaquin County on November 6, 2013 reflects

that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) 

purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. (Id. ¶ 41.) 

These events precipitated two separate lawsuits. In 

the first case, Burley and the Tribe sued OneWest, Deutsche Bank, 

and Meridian Foreclosure Service in this court, asserting a 

federal claim for “violation of tribal immunity” and six statelaw claims. (Docket No. 1.) In the second case, Deutsche Bank 

filed an unlawful detainer action in San Joaquin County Superior 

Court against Burley and several members of the Tribe, who 

subsequently removed on the basis that the action implicated the 

Tribe’s sovereign immunity and thereby arose under federal law. 

(Notice of Removal, Civ. No. 2:14-1567 (Docket No. 1).) The 

court related the cases pursuant to Local Rule 123 and ordered 

the parties to show cause why it should exercise jurisdiction in 

either action. 

II. Discussion

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and 

may exercise only that power authorized by the Constitution or 

 

2 The Revenue Sharing Trust Fund redistributes money from 

Indian tribes in California that operate gaming establishments to 

those, like the Tribe, that do not. (See id. ¶ 33.)

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statute. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 

546, 552 (2005); K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 

1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011). Jurisdictional defects may not be 

waived, and the court has an independent and continuing 

obligation to ensure that it may exercise jurisdiction over the 

action. Mashiri v. Dep’t of Educ., 724 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

As a preliminary matter, there is no basis for 

diversity jurisdiction in either action. Federal courts have 

original jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different 

states in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 

exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Allapattah 

Services, 545 U.S. at 552. Because OneWest Bank has its 

principal place of business in California, it is a citizen of 

California and is not diverse from plaintiffs, who are citizens 

of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). And while Deutsche 

Bank is diverse from each of the defendants in its unlawful 

detainer action, it seeks “less than $10,000” in damages, (Not. 

of Removal Ex. 1), which fails to satisfy the $75,000 amount in 

controversy required for diversity jurisdiction. 

Likewise, the court does not have jurisdiction over 

either action by virtue of the fact that the Tribe or its members 

are parties. There is no federal statute providing for original 

jurisdiction over actions to which a federally recognized Indian 

tribe is a party. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 

841 (1989) (noting that “Congress has expressly provided by 

statute for removal when it desired federal courts to adjudicate 

defenses based on federal immunities” and observing that Congress 

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had not done so with respect to tribal sovereign immunity). And 

while Burley and the Tribe contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 confers 

jurisdiction, that statute only permits courts to exercise 

jurisdiction over actions in which an Indian tribe asserts a 

claim independently arising under federal law. Gila River Indian 

Cmty. v. Henningson, Durham, & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 714 (9th 

Cir. 1980). Therefore, the court may exercise jurisdiction only 

if either action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

A. Burley v. OneWest Bank, FSB

The Supreme Court has “long held that the presence or 

absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the wellpleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of 

the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions 

Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (citation, alterations, and 

internal quotation marks omitted). A defense is not part of a

plaintiff’s well-pleaded claim. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, 

a plaintiff may not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule on 

the basis of an anticipated federal-law defense, even when that 

defense is the central issue in the case. Id. (citing Franchise 

Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for So. Cal., 463 U.S. 

1, 14 (1983)). 

Burley and the Tribe assert that this action arises 

under federal law because it implicates the Tribe’s sovereign 

immunity. Tribal sovereign immunity is a federally-created 

doctrine that bars suits against Indian tribes absent a clear 

waiver of immunity or Congressional abrogation. Okla. Tax Comm’n 

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v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 

(1991). It is undisputable that tribal sovereign immunity may 

provide a federal defense to claims brought against an Indian 

tribe or its members. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. 

Techs, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Graham, 489 U.S. at 841 

(citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165 

(1977)). But no case has recognized a freestanding claim for 

“violation of tribal sovereign immunity”; rather, the cases 

suggest that tribal sovereign immunity may enter a case “only by 

way of defense.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State 

Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988). And 

insofar as tribal sovereign immunity operates as a defense, it is 

not an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction. See

id.

Burley and the Tribe attempt to circumvent the wellpleaded complaint rule by asserting a claim for “violation of 

tribal immunity.” (Compl. ¶¶ 46-51.) This claim simply asks the 

court to determine that defendants’ efforts to foreclose on 

tribal property are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign 

immunity. For instance, the last paragraph of this claim asserts 

that because the Tribe’s “sovereign immunity extends to its 

governmental commercial activities, both on reservation and off . 

. . any suit against Silvia Burley and the tribe should be 

dismissed.” (Id. ¶ 51.) And while each of plaintiffs’ six 

state-law claims concludes with a request for damages or 

injunctive relief, (see id. ¶¶ 61, 70, 82, 94, 99, 107), their

claim for “violation of tribal immunity” does not request any 

specific relief, (see id. ¶ 51). In the absence of a request for 

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damages, an injunction, or another equitable remedy, the court 

construes this claim as a request for declaratory relief.

The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes federal courts 

to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any 

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further 

relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). But while 

the Declaratory Judgment Act “enlarge[s] the range of remedies 

available in the federal courts,” it “does not extend their 

jurisdiction.” Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 

U.S. 667, 671 (1950); see also Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 

16 (“Skelly Oil has come to stand for the proposition that, if, 

but for the availability of the declaratory judgment procedure, 

the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state 

created action, jurisdiction is lacking.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

As a corollary to this principle, a federal court may 

exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action only if 

the declaratory judgment defendant could have brought an 

affirmative claim for relief arising under federal law. 

Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 16-19; Janakes v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 768 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1985). Because tribal 

sovereign immunity would enter such an action only by way of 

defense, see Morongo Band, 858 F.2d at 1386, the court lacks 

jurisdiction to declare that Burley and the Miwok Tribe are 

immune from suit. 

Morongo Band is instructive. There, the Morongo Band 

of Mission Indians leased property from one of its members. 858 

F.2d at 1379. The California State Board of Equalization levied 

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on funds held by the Morongo Band, which were due to the lessor 

as rent under the lease. Id. The Morongo Band sued the Board in 

federal court on the theories, among others, that the Board’s 

levy was barred by a federal statute governing liabilities 

arising from the lease or sale of Indian tribal lands, that the 

levy was preempted, and that it was entitled to retain the funds 

because the lease was invalid under federal law. Id. at 1383. 

The Ninth Circuit held that the Morongo Band’s action

did not arise under federal law. It first held that none of the 

theories alleged by the Morongo Band arose under federal law, as 

they merely anticipated defenses that it could assert in response 

to a coercive action by the Board to recover the money it claimed 

it was entitled to. Id. The court then held that a coercive 

action by the lessor against the Morongo Band would sound in 

breach of contract and thereby arise under state law, even if the 

lease “was entered into under authority conferred by federal 

statutes.” Id. at 1385-86. Likewise, the court held that a 

coercive action by the Board to enforce its tax levy would arise 

under state, not federal law. Id. Although the court recognized 

that the Morongo Band’s immunity to such a levy may present 

“[f]ederal questions,” it concluded that the Morongo Band’s 

assertion of its sovereign immunity was not an adequate basis for 

jurisdiction because those “federal-law issues would arise only 

in defense.” Id.

This case, like Morongo Band, arises from the ownership 

of a piece of property by an Indian tribe and its members. Any 

action by defendants to recover that property would arise under 

state law; in fact, Deutsche Bank has already filed an unlawful 

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detainer action in state court to remove plaintiffs from the 

property. See infra II.B. Although plaintiffs may wish to 

assert tribal sovereign immunity as a defense to a coercive 

action to recover the property, the existence of a federal 

defense does not suggest that those coercive actions--or this 

action--would arise under federal law. Accordingly, the court 

lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claim for breach of 

tribal immunity and, in the absence of any other basis for 

subject matter jurisdiction, must dismiss this action. 

B. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Burley

In this case, Deutsche Bank initiated an unlawful 

detainer action in San Joaquin County Superior Court against 

Burley and several other members of the tribe, who then removed 

on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. In California, 

the owner of real property may bring an unlawful detainer action 

to oust an occupant of that property. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1161. 

There is no serious dispute that unlawful detainer claims 

typically arise under state law, even when they are brought 

against members of Indian tribes.3 See Round Valley Indian 

 

3 The Supreme Court has suggested that “[a]n action 

involving an Indian tribe’s--as opposed to an individual tribe 

member’s--possessory rights of trust land would . . . create a 

question of federal common law.” Hunter, 907 F. Supp. at 1348 

(citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 

677 (1974)). But the Tribe is not a party to Deutsche Bank’s 

unlawful detainer action, which seeks only to remove individual 

members of the Tribe from the property. As such, the action does 

not implicate any federal interest in protecting Indian trust 

land and the court need not determine whether the applicability 

of federal common law constitutes an independent basis for 

jurisdiction. See Hunter, 907 F. Supp. at 1349; see generally

Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) 

(explaining that federal common law may provide an independent 

basis for federal jurisdiction only in situations involving 

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Housing Auth. v. Hunter, 907 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 

(“Landlord-and-tenant actions are state law issues.”) And 

“[b]ecause landlord-tenant disputes are matters of state law, an 

action for eviction cannot be the basis for federal question 

jurisdiction.” Id.

Relying principally upon Grable & Sons Metal Products, 

Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), 

Burley and the other members of the Tribe argue that Deutsche 

Bank’s unlawful detainer action arises under federal law because 

it “implicate[s] important federal rights and defenses.”4 There, 

the Supreme Court held that, in certain instances, federal courts 

may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a state-law claim 

that “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue” that is 

“actually disputed and substantial.” Id. at 314. But Grable

does not stand for the proposition that “federal courts may 

exercise jurisdiction over any state-law claim that ‘implicate[s] 

significant federal issues.’” Cal. Shock Trauma Air Rescue v. 

State Comp. Ins. Fund, 636 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 312). 

Instead, Grable permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction over 

a state-law claim “only if it satisfies both the well-pleaded 

complaint rule and passes the ‘implicate[s] significant federal 

 

“uniquely federal interests” and citing cases). 

4 Burley and the other members of the Tribe also argue 

that this action arises under federal law because it is barred by 

the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. Even assuming that Burley and 

other members of the tribe are entitled to assert the Tribe’s 

sovereign immunity as a defense to claims brought against them 

individually, the Tribe’s sovereign immunity does not provide an 

independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See supra II.A. 

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issues’ test.” Id. (alteration in original).

Grable illustrates the application of this rule. 

There, the IRS seized the plaintiff’s real property in order to 

satisfy a tax delinquency and sold the property to the defendant. 

545 U.S. at 310. The plaintiff then brought an action to quiet 

title to the property in which it asserted that the sale was 

invalid because the IRS had failed to comply with a federal 

statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a), governing the terms of notice 

required before conducting such a sale. Id. at 311. While the 

plaintiff’s claim concededly arose under state law, the Supreme 

Court held that federal jurisdiction was appropriate because its 

claim to superior title necessarily turned on the construction of 

federal law and implicated important issues of federal tax law. 

Id. at 314-16. 

Here, by contrast, Deutsche Bank’s unlawful detainer 

claim does not “necessarily raise a stated federal issue.” Id.

at 314. Viewed in isolation, Deutsche Bank’s unlawful detainer 

claim does not implicate any question of federal law; although 

Burley and the other members of the Tribe might attempt to raise 

tribal sovereign immunity as a defense, Deutsche Bank’s claim

does not turn on that defense or any other issue of federal law. 

A recent case from this district, California ex. rel 

Harris v. Rose, makes this point clear.

5 Civ. No. 2:13-675 LKK 

DAD, 2013 WL 2145968 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013). There, the 

 

5 As the court noted in Rose, its holding that tribal 

sovereign immunity was not embedded in the plaintiff’s state-law 

causes of action is consistent with the holdings of other 

district courts in California. Id. at *4—5 (citing California v. 

Huber, Civ. No. 11-1985, 2011 WL 2976824 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 

2011). 

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defendants attempted to remove a state-law enforcement action to 

collect unpaid excise taxes on the sale of cigarettes on the 

theory that the state’s enforcement action necessarily implicated 

federal limitations on a state’s power to regulate the conduct of 

individuals in Indian country. Id. at *4. The court held that 

California’s claims did not do so because a claim to enforce its 

tax laws did not “require proof of the ability to regulate 

conduct on tribal land.” Id. Although the court anticipated 

that the defendants may attempt to raise tribal sovereign 

immunity as a defense to such a claim--as Burley and the other 

members of the Tribe do here--it nonetheless held that the 

availability of this defense was not sufficient to satisfy Grable

because California could prove its claims without reference to 

federal law in the absence of such a defense. Id.

As in Rose, the resolution of Deutsche Bank’s unlawful 

detainer action does not necessarily turn on any construction of 

federal law; as a result, its unlawful detainer claim does not 

satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule and Grable does not 

support jurisdiction. See Cal. Shock, 636 F.3d at 542. 

Accordingly, the court must remand this action to San Joaquin 

County Superior Court. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the action captioned 

Burley v. OneWest Bank, FSB, Civ. No. 2:14-1349 WBS EFB, be, and 

the same hereby is, DISMISSED for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Plaintiffs in that action have twenty days to file 

an amended Complaint, if they can do so consistent with this 

Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the action captioned 

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Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Burley, Civ. No. 2:14-1567 

WBS EFB, be REMANDED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447. The Clerk of 

the Court is hereby directed to remand this action to the 

Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County 

of San Joaquin. 

Dated: August 25, 2014

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