Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01745/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01745-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA,

CDCR #J-48500,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNKNOWN,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01745-AJB-AHG

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION:

1) FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEES REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

AND 

2) AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison

located in San Quentin, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil complaint 

seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction pursuant to three criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 04 

(misprision of felony), and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law). See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-2.1

 

1 None of these criminal statutes support a private cause of action. See Allen v. Gold 

Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claims 

brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 “because these are criminal statutes that do not 

give rise to civil liability.”) (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980)).

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Plaintiff’s suit, like many others he has filed in this court and others, essentially 

seeks to challenge the validity of his Alameda County criminal judgment and death 

sentence, on grounds that he has been the subject of a criminal conspiracy between 

judges and prosecutors to “frame [him] for a crime that [he] never committed.” Id. at 2.2

I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 

(“PLRA”) amendments to § 1915 require that every prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP must pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 

__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 

Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed without full prepayment 

of fees to submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets possessed and 

 

2

In fact, the Court takes judicial notice that over the course of the last 18 years, Plaintiff 

has filed 1,150 separate civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions, several recently in 

the Southern District of California, but the vast majority of which in the Northern District 

of California, where Alameda County is situated, where he was convicted by jury of first 

degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death in 1992, and where he 

remains incarcerated. See People v. Bonilla, 41 Cal. 4th 313 (2007);https://pcl.uscourts.gov 

/pcl/pages/search/results/parties.jsf?sid=b4c4fe94fb364b13923ca87ce7622c01(last visited 

Sept. 30, 2019); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (Courts “may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”) (citation and quotations 

omitted). 

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demonstrates an inability to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 

Cir. 2015). In support of this affidavit, prisoners must also submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required to commence a civil action, nor has he 

filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). For this 

procedural reason alone, his case cannot proceed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Andrews, 493 

F.3d at 1051.

And while the Court would typically grant him leave to file an IFP Motion, 

Plaintiff has abused that privilege and is precluded from doing so by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

unless he claims to face “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of 

filing. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting 

§ 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the 

prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). He 

makes no such allegations here. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of 

California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and 

October 31, 2011 alone, which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] 

complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court 

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recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer 

qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing In re Steven 

Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19.)).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Even if Plaintiff paid the full filing fee or were eligible to proceed IFP, however,

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of 

prisoner complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or 

fail[ ] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); See 

Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to 

‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation 

omitted). As noted above, in this case Plaintiff again seeks to challenge the validity of his

Alameda County criminal conviction and sentence, and to charge unidentified judges and 

prosecutors with federal crimes based on his prosecution and efforts to appeal. See

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-2.

As Plaintiff is now well aware, to the extent he seeks to render his capital 

conviction and sentence a nullity, a writ of habeas corpus is his sole federal remedy. 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) (“Release from penal custody is not an 

available remedy under the Civil Rights Act”); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack the legality 

of [a] conviction or sentence....”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 645 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 

16-6556); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“§ 1983 remains available for 

procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate 

or speedier release for the prisoner ... habeas remedies do not displace § 1983 actions 

where success in the civil rights suit would not necessarily vitiate the legality of (not 

previously invalidated) state confinement.”).

///

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The district court may dismiss a complaint “‘that merely repeats pending or 

previously litigated claims.’” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1995) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (re-codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 

1915A(b)(1)); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (duplicative or 

repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action is subject to dismissal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915 as malicious); Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1975) 

(dismissal of complaint as frivolous was not an abuse of discretion where plaintiff had 

filed other similar complaints); Ortega v. Ritchie, No. 18-CV-02944-HSG (PR), 2018 

WL 3744154, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018).

Because Plaintiff’s case is frivolous, leave to amend is denied. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that if claims are classified as 

frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to 

grant leave to amend”).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court:

(1) DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the $400 

civil filing and administrative fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

(2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1); 

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal in this case would not be taken in good faith 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

(4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2019

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