Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-05100/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-05100-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CONSUMER OPINION LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANKFORT NEWS CORP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-05100-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

RENEWED EX PARTE APPLICATION

FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW 

CAUSE

[RE: ECF 20]

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff Consumer Opinion LLC’s renewed ex parte 

application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and order to show cause is GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

 I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff owns and operates the consumer review website <pissedconsumer.com>. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants operate “reputation management” companies which may be hired to 

remove unflattering content about an individual or a business from websites such as 

<pissedconsumer.com> and to de-index such content from Internet search engines. Plaintiff 

claims that Defendants provide these “reputation management” services by means of a fraudulent 

scheme whereby Defendants: (1) create websites purporting to be legitimate news sites; (2) copy 

to those fake news sites whatever content their clients wish removed from the Internet; (3) backdate the copied content to give the appearance that the content first appeared on the fake news 

sites; and (4) demand that Google take down the “later” posted content as infringing the fake news 

sites’ copyrights. 

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Plaintiff filed this action on September 2, 2016, asserting violations of the takedown 

procedures of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512(f); violations of 

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; civil conspiracy; 

and abuse of process. Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on October 

20, 2016, along with an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and an ex 

parte motion to conduct early discovery. The motion for early discovery was granted, but the 

TRO application was denied without prejudice because it was unsupported by an affidavit or 

verified complaint as required for issuance of a TRO without notice to the adverse party. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (A TRO may be issued without notice to the adverse party only if “specific 

facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, 

loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.”). 

On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed the present renewed application for a TRO and 

order to show cause, supported by the affidavit of Michael Podolsky, one of its Managing 

Members. The renewed TRO application seeks to enjoin certain conduct with respect to those 

Defendants who are the registrants, owners, and operators of: (1) the domain names 

<frankfortherald.com>, <palastinetimes.com>, and <palastinetoday.com>, which allegedly are 

used to operate the fake news sites described above (“fake news domain names”), and (2) the 

domain names <profitmarketing.com>, <guaranteedremovals.com>, <thereputationfirm.com>, 

<gainpr.com>, and <reputationsavers.com>, which allegedly are used to operate the reputation 

management companies described above (“reputation management domain names”). Plaintiff 

does not know which of the numerous individual and entity defendants are the registrants, owners, 

and operators of those domain names. 

Plaintiff seeks three forms of injunctive relief.1 First, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a

mandatory injunction requiring Defendants to transfer the registrations of the fake news domain 

names from Internet Domain Service BS Corporation, located in Nassau, the Bahamas, to 

registrars located in the United States with whom the fake news domain names were registered at 

 

1 Because Plaintiff has not submitted a proposed order with its motion, the Court has drawn upon 

statements in Plaintiff’s brief to determine the scope of relief sought.

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the time this lawsuit was filed. Second, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue an order restraining 

Defendants from further transfers of the fake news domain names and the reputation management 

domain names and/or deleting evidence of their unlawful activity from those websites. Third and 

finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to restrain VeriSign, Inc., the non-party registry of all “.com” 

domain names, from permitting any further transfers of the fake news domain names and the 

reputation management domain names.

2

 II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for 

issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 

832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft, 887 F. Supp. 

1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an 

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 

to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A 

plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the 

merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that 

the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 

20. “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 

showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 

the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are 

satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

A preliminary injunction may be either a prohibitory injunction or a mandatory injunction. 

Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 

2 A domain name is created when it is “registered” with the appropriate “registry.” Office Depot 

Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2010). Such registration may be effected only 

through companies that serve as “registrars.” Id. at 698-99. Registrars accept registrations for 

new or expiring domain names, connect to the appropriate registry’s servers to determine whether 

the name is available, and register available domain names on behalf of registrants. Id. at 699. 

“VeriSign is the registry for the domain names ‘.com’ and ‘.net.’” Id. 

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The former “prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a 

determination of the action on the merits,” while the latter “orders a responsible party to take 

action.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). “In general, mandatory 

injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result and are not issued in 

doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held 

that a plaintiff seeking a mandatory injunction must establish that “the law and facts clearly favor

her position, not simply that she is likely to succeed.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 

(9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).

The Court may issue a TRO without notice to the adverse party only if (1) “specific facts 

in an affidavit or a verified complaint” show that immediate and irreparable injury will occur 

before the adverse party can be heard and (2) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing what 

efforts were made to give notice and the reasons why notice should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 65(b). In addition, this district’s Civil Local Rules require that “[u]nless relieved by order of a 

Judge for good cause shown, on or before the day of an ex parte motion for a temporary 

restraining order, counsel applying for the temporary restraining order must deliver notice of such 

motion to opposing counsel or party.” Civ. L.R. 65-1(b).

B. Notice

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of Michael Podolsky, who identifies himself as “a 

Managing Member of Consumer Opinion LLC, the Plaintiff in this action.” Podolsky Decl. ¶ 2, 

ECF 20-1. Podolsky states that he has performed his “own independent research” of the facts 

alleged in the FAC, the original TRO application, and the present renewed TRO application, and 

that those facts are true and correct to the best of his knowledge. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The declaration is 

signed under penalty of perjury. While Podolsky’s declaration is quite sparse, the Court concludes 

that his verification of the facts alleged in the FAC is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of Rule 

65(b). The motion itself, which is signed by Plaintiff’s attorney, explains that the TRO is sought 

without notice of Defendants to prevent Defendants from transferring the fake news domain 

names out of the Court’s jurisdiction or destroying evidence on those websites. See Defs.’ Mot. at 

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13-14, ECF 20. This explanation is sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Rule 65(b).

The Court thus concludes that Plaintiff has met the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65(b) and Civil Local Rule 65-1(b). The Court therefore turns to the merits of the TRO

application.

C. Analysis

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court begins its analysis by considering Plaintiff’s showing on the first Winter factor, 

likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff’s TRO application is premised on its claims under 

the DMCA and California’s UCL. The DMCA imposes liability on entities who abuse the 

statute’s takedown procedures, under which a copyright holder may direct a service provider to 

remove or disable access to online content that infringes the holder’s copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 

512(f); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016). As relevant here, the 

DMCA provides that any person who knowingly misrepresents that material or activity is 

infringing “shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the 

alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider 

relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity 

claimed to be infringing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). California’s UCL prohibits an individual or entity 

from engaging in an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17200. 

Based upon the scant evidence in the record, the Court concludes that while Plaintiff has 

made some showing that it may succeed on the merits of those claims, Plaintiff has not shown that 

it is likely to succeed. The only evidence submitted with the TRO application is the declaration of 

Michael Podolsky, discussed above, which verifies the facts alleged in the FAC. Podolsky Decl., 

ECF 20-1. The TRO application refers to documents appended to the FAC, which primarily 

consist of screen shots from the websites discussed above and DMCA takedown notices. 

However, those documents are not authenticated and therefore they are inadmissible. See Orr v. 

Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Authentication is a condition 

precedent to admissibility.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted omitted). When 

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evaluating a TRO, the Court has discretion to give otherwise inadmissible evidence “some 

weight.” Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (trial court evaluating 

a motion for preliminary injunction may give otherwise inadmissible evidence “some weight” in 

order to avoid irreparable harm before trial); Pac. Rollforming, LLC v. Trakloc Int’l, LLC, No. 

CIV. 07CV1897-L (JMA), 2007 WL 3333122, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2007) (applying Flynt in 

context of TRO application). The Court in the exercise of its discretion has given the documents 

appended to the FAC “some weight,” but it does not find the documents to be particularly 

probative because their origin and import is not adequately explained. Accordingly, while 

Plaintiff has submitted some evidence that it will succeed on its DMCA and UCL claims, that 

evidence is not substantial enough to show that success is likely. 

Having concluded that Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden on the first Winter factor, the 

Court necessarily concludes that Plaintiff also has failed to meet the higher burden of establishing 

that “the law and facts clearly favor” its position as required to obtain a mandatory injunction. See 

Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740 (emphasis in original). Consequently, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

application for mandatory injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring Defendants to transfer 

the registrations of the fake news domain names from the current registrar located in the Bahamas

to registrars located in the United States. 

2. Serious Questions Going to the Merits

As to Plaintiff’s application for prohibitory injunctive relief, however, Plaintiff may prevail 

even absent a showing of likelihood of success if Plaintiff can show that there are serious

questions going to the merits, the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor, and the other two 

Winter factors are satisfied. See Friends of the Wild Swan, 767 F.3d at 942. 

Plaintiff makes two requests for prohibitory injunctive relief. First, Plaintiff asks the Court 

to restrain Defendants from transferring the fake news domain names and the reputation 

management domain names to other registrars and/or deleting material from those websites. This 

request presumes that the fake news domain names will be returned to registrars located in the 

United States. As discussed above, the Court declines to order Defendants to transfer the fake 

news domain names from the registrar located in the Bahamas to registrars located in the United 

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States. Because Plaintiff has expressed no interest in requiring Defendants to maintain the fake 

news domain names with a foreign registrar, and those websites have been taken down, the Court 

treats Plaintiff’s request for an injunction prohibiting further transfer of domain names and/or 

deletion of material to apply only to the reputation management domain names. 

Plaintiff also asks the Court to restrain VeriSign from permitting any further transfers of 

the subject domain names during the pendency of the litigation.3 Those requests are addressed 

separately below.

a. Defendants

The Court concludes that although the verified allegations of the FAC and the 

unauthenticated documents appended thereto are not substantial enough to establish Plaintiff’s 

likelihood of success on its claims, they are sufficient to raise serious questions going to the merits 

of those claims. The FAC and appended documents provide some evidence that Defendants are 

utilizing fraudulent DMCA takedown notices to remove legitimate content from Plaintiff’s 

website. If proved, that conduct would subject Defendants to liability under the DMCA and 

California’s UCL.

Turning to the balance of hardships, Defendants’ conduct in transferring the registrations 

of the fake news domain names to a registrar in the Bahamas, and shutting down those websites, 

suggests that absent injunctive relief Defendants also may transfer the reputation management 

domain names out of this Court’s jurisdiction and/or remove incriminating content from those 

websites. Injunctive relief thus appears necessary to prevent injury to Plaintiff, and the Court does 

not perceive how Defendants would be prejudiced by an injunction prohibiting them from 

transferring the reputation management domain names from the current registrars. And clearly, 

“[s]imply prohibiting the destruction of evidence will not burden defendants.” Shutterfly, Inc. v. 

ForeverArts, Inc., No. CR 12-3671 SI, 2012 WL 2911887, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012). Under 

 

3

Plaintiff actually frames its request regarding VeriSign as an application for a mandatory 

injunction, asking the Court to “order Verisign to lock the domain names to prohibit any further 

transfers during the pendency of this litigation.” Defs.’ Mot. at 3, ECF 20. However, in the 

Court’s view the application properly should be construed as seeking prohibitory injunctive relief

because Plaintiff seeks to prohibit VeriSign from permitting transfers of the subject domain 

names.

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those circumstances, and given the limited scope of the injunctive relief in question, the Court 

concludes that the balance of hardships tips sharply in Plaintiff’s favor with respect to the 

requested prohibitory injunction directed to Defendants.

Both of the remaining Winter factors, the likelihood of irreparable harm and the public 

interest, also weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. A defendant’s secretion or dissipation of assets may 

establish a likelihood of irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief. See In re Estate of 

Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] district court 

has authority to issue a preliminary injunction where the plaintiffs can establish that money 

damages will be an inadequate remedy due to impending insolvency of the defendant or that 

defendant has engaged in a pattern of secreting or dissipating assets to avoid judgment.”). 

Moreover, it is in the public interest to prevent defendants in civil cases from avoiding liability or 

payment of money judgments by secreting assets or destroying evidence.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application for a TRO enjoining Defendants

from transferring the reputation management domain names to other registrars and/or deleting 

material from those websites.

b. VeriSign

In addition to seeking a TRO against Defendants, Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin 

VeriSign from permitting transfer of the subject domain names to other registrars. The Court 

lacks authority to issue a TRO against VeriSign. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a 

TRO “binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: 

(A) the parties; (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other 

persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in” (A) or (B) above. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). VeriSign is not a party to this action, and Plaintiff has not argued, let 

alone established, that VeriSign is in active concert with Defendants. 

Plaintiff cites Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini for the proposition that this Court may enjoin 

VeriSign. Zuccarini addressed the efforts of an assignee of rights against a judgment debtor to 

levy upon the judgment debtor’s domain name holdings. Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 

696, 698 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit held that the suit properly was brought in the district 

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in which VeriSign, the registry of the domain names, was located. Id. at 703. The case did not 

address the district court’s authority – or lack thereof – to issue a TRO against a non-party.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application for a TRO directed toward 

VeriSign.

3. Security

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that “[t]he court may issue a preliminary 

injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the 

court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been 

wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that 

Rule 65(c) invests the district court with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any.” 

Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted) (italics in original). “The district court may dispense with the filing of a bond when it 

concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her 

conduct.” Id.

As discussed above, it does not appear that Defendants will be prejudiced by a TRO 

prohibiting them from transferring the fake news domain names to other registrars or removing 

material from those websites. Under these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to issue 

that limited TRO without requiring Plaintiff to provide security.

 III. ORDER

Plaintiff’s TRO application is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth 

below.

(1) The TRO application is GRANTED as follows: Defendants, their officers, agents, 

servants, employees, and attorneys and all those in active concert or participation 

with them are ENJOINED from transferring the domain names referred to herein as 

the reputation management domain names (<profitmarketing.com>, 

<guaranteedremovals.com>, <thereputationfirm.com>, <gainpr.com>, and 

<reputationsavers.com>) from their current registrars to other registrars, and are 

ENJOINED from deleting material from those websites. 

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(2) The TRO application is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s request for an order 

requiring Defendants to transfer the domain names referred to herein as the fake 

news domain names (<frankfortherald.com>, <palastinetimes.com>, and 

<palastinetoday.com>) to registrars located in the United States and is DENIED 

with respect to Plaintiff’s request for an order directed against VeriSign, Inc.

(3) The TRO is granted without security;

(4) The TRO shall remain in effect for fourteen days, until December 1, 2016, unless 

otherwise ordered by the Court;

(5) Defendants are hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing and on or before 

November 29, 2016, why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and 

(6) A Show Cause Hearing regarding Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is 

SET FOR HEARING on December 1, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.

Dated: November 17, 2016 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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