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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 1996 Decided December 24, 1996

No. 95-5187

F.J. VOLLMER COMPANY, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

JOHN W. MAGAW, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE TREASURY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cv03341)

Stephen P. Halbrook argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Fred E. Haynes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: WILLIAMS, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: This case presents a recurring question under the Equal Access to

Justice Act: In evaluating a claim for fees under the Act, what standard of reasonableness should a

court use to determine whether an agency's action was "substantially justified"? In the case before

us, this court previously overturned a decision by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,

holding the Bureau's action wasinconsistent with the governing statute and would have produced an

"incredible" result. The district court nonetheless found the agency's decision to have been

substantially justified and thus denied petitioner reimbursement for fees and expenses. Reviewing the

district court'sruling underthe deferentialabuse-of-discretionstandard, we conclude that the agency's

position was not substantially justified because it was wholly unsupported by the text, legislative

history, and underlying policy of the governing statute. Although we thus grant petitioner's request

for fees and expenses, we deny reimbursement at an enhanced rate and reduce the fee amount to

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reflect petitioner's less than complete success.

I

In an effort to restrict the availability of machineguns, Congress amended the Gun Control

Act in 1986, making it illegal to possess or transfer any machinegun except one lawfully possessed

before the amendment's May 19, 1986, effective date or one possessed or transferred "by or under

the authority of, the United States ... or a State...." 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994). The Gun Control

Act takes its definition of "machinegun" from the National Firearms Act. Id. § 921(a)(23).

According to that definition, machineguns include:

any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,

automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of

the trigger .... the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and

intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for

use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from

which a machinegun can be assembled ifsuch parts are in the possession or under the

control of a person.

26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (1994). A weapon's receiver is the frame "which provides housing for the

hammer, bolt or breechblock and firing mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward

portion to receive the barrel." 27 C.F.R. § 179.11 (1996). The group of parts used to convert a

non-automatic weapon for automatic fire is called a machinegun conversion kit.

At the time Congress amended the Gun Control Act, petitioner, F.J. Vollmer Co., a firearms

manufacturer, possessed 175 machinegun conversion kits. Under the terms of the 1986 amendment,

these kits were legally transferable machineguns. In order to determine which receivers the kits could

be combined with for sale as complete weapons, Vollmer submitted two transfer applications to the

Bureau. In both applications, Vollmer proposed combining machinegun conversion kits with

semiautomatic receivers, i.e., receivers designed as parts of weapons that shoot only one shot with

each pull of the trigger. The receivers in the two applications differed, however, in one crucial

respect. The receiver in the first application had been converted into a machinegun receiver after May

19, 1986, the effective date of the Gun Control Act's machinegun prohibition. In the second

application, Vollmer modified a similar receiver a second time, returning it to its original

semiautomatic state. The Bureau denied the first application, concluding that the receiver qualified

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as a prohibited machinegun and that its combination with a legally possessed machinegun conversion

kit could not alter its illegalstatus. Even though the receiver covered by the second application was

physicallyindistinguishable froma brand new, perfectlylegalsemiautomatic receiver, theBureau also

treated it as a prohibited machinegun because Vollmer had converted it into a machinegun receiver

after May 19, 1986. It thus denied Vollmer's second application as well.

The district court upheld the Bureau's denial of both applications. This court agreed with the

district court concerning the denial of the first application, but reversed the district court and

overturned the Bureau's denial of the second application for several reasons. F.J. Vollmer Co. v.

Higgins, 23 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1994). First, the Bureau offered no reasoning supporting its

once-a-machinegun-always-a-machinegun reading ofthe NationalFirearms Act. Id. at 451. Second,

although the Bureau asserted in court that its rejection of the application rested on its determination

that the twice reconfigured semiautomatic receiver was "potentially restorable" to being a machinegun

receiver, the Bureau made no findings of fact to support that claim. Id. Third, the Bureau's position

conflicted with its own enforcement manual, which allowed exclusion of a weapon fromFirearms Act

coverage through removal of the feature that led to its classification as a firearm under the Act. Id.

at 451-52. Finally, the Bureau's reading of the Firearms Act led to the "incredible" conclusion that

everysemiautomatic receiver manufactured afterMay19, 1986,must be considered readilyrestorable

to being a machinegun receiver and thus a prohibited machinegun under the Gun Control Act. Id.

at 452.

Vollmer then sought reimbursement for fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994). That Act provides that a "prevailing party"

in civilsuits against the United States not sounding in tort is entitled to fees and expenses unless the

Government's position was "substantially justified" or "special circumstances make an award unjust."

Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A party prevails when "actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters

the legalrelationship between the parties bymodifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly

benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992); see also Cooper v. United

States R.R. Retirement Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Including both the agency's action

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and the arguments defending that action in court, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1994), the

Government's position is substantially justified if it is "justified in substance or in the mainthat is,

justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from ... [having] a

reasonable basis both in law and fact." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The Government bears the burden of establishing that its

positionwassubstantially justified. Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing

Jones v. Lujan, 887 F.2d 1096, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Although the district court found that Vollmer was a prevailing party, it rejected Vollmer's

claim for fees and expenses, concluding that the Bureau's denial of the company'ssecond application

had been substantially justified. Vollmer now appeals.

II

Both parties agree that Vollmer is a "prevailing party" under the EqualAccessto Justice Act.

Both parties also agree, as do we, that the district court properly found that this court's previous

rejection oftheBureau'sinterpretation ofthe Firearms Act does not settle the question we face today:

whether the Government's position wassubstantially justified within the meaning ofthe EqualAccess

Act. The inquiry into the reasonableness of the Government's position under the Equal Access Act

"may not be collapsed into our antecedent evaluation of the merits, for the EAJA setsforth a "distinct

legal standard.' " Cooper, 24 F.3d at 1416 (quoting FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089 (D.C. Cir.

1986)).

Although the substantial justification inquiry differsfromthe merits determination, the court's

merits reasoning may be quite relevant to the resolution of the substantial justification question. In

some cases, the standard ofreview on the meritsisso close to the reasonablenessstandard applicable

to determining substantial justification that a losing agency is unlikely to be able to show that its

position wassubstantially justified. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200,

209 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act:

Court Awards of Attorney'sFeesfor Unreasonable GovernmentConduct(Part Two), 56 LA.L.REV.

1, 23-42 (1995). Thus we have held that where an agency's decision was overturned as unsupported

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by substantial evidence, the agency's position was not substantially justified because it "lacked a

reasonable factual basis." Cooper, 24 F.3d at 1417 (emphasis omitted). In contrast, whether agency

action invalidated as arbitrary and capricious might nevertheless have been substantially justified

depends on what precisely the court meant by "arbitrary and capricious." For example, a

determination that an agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to provide an

adequate explanation or failed to consider some relevant factor in reaching a decision "may not

warrant a finding that [the] agency's action lacked substantial justification." Wilkett v. ICC, 844 F.2d

867, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Rose, 806 F.2d at 1087-89). However, "a finding that an agency

acted arbitrarilyand capriciouslyby denying equal treatment to similarlysituated parties"we would

say clearly similarly situatedor by failing to enforce a rule where it plainly applied "rendersit much

more likely that the Government's action was not substantially justified." Id. (citing Rose, 806 F.2d

at 1089). Moreover, because "unreasonable" may have different meanings in different contexts, even

the presence of that term or one of its synonyms in the merits decision does not necessarily suggest

that the Government will have a difficult time establishing that its position wassubstantially justified.

See, e.g., United States v. $19,047.00 in United States Currency, 95 F.3d 248, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996)

(explaining why search found unreasonable under Fourth Amendment may be reasonable for Equal

Access Act purposes). Likewise, the absence of the word "unreasonable" does not necessarily

suggest that the Government's position was substantially justified. The relevance of a court's

reasoning on the merits to the reasonableness inquiry under the Equal Access Act thus depends on

the nature of the case.

In this case, whether the Bureau's position was substantially justified turns on the

reasonableness of the once-a-machinegun-always-a-machinegun reading of the Firearms Act that

informed the Bureau'srejection of Vollmer'ssecond application. Whether the Bureau's position was

substantially justified, however, is not an issue we review de novo. We limit our inquiry to

determining whether the district court abused its discretion in finding the once-a-machinegunalways-a-machinegun interpretation reasonable. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563. In the Equal Access Act

context, abuse-of-discretion review involvestwo steps. We first ask whether the district court relied

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on the proper legal standards. Did it, for example, define substantial justification in terms of

reasonableness? Did it recognize that the Government's position includes both the agency's action

and the arguments offered in court in defense of that action? Errors in these and other purely legal

determinations necessarily constitute abuses of discretion. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 116 S.

Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990).

If, as in this case, the district court made no errors in setting forth the legal standards under

the Equal Access Act, we then proceed to the second step, examining the district court's application

of those standards to the facts before it. In some Equal Access Act cases, that determination turns

largely on an assessment ofthe strength ofthe evidence supporting the Government'sstance; in other

cases, it may turn on a judgment about the reasonableness of the Government's interpretation of

statutes or regulations. Although in either case we give substantial deference to the district court's

decision, Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560-61; see also Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 403-04 (describing

"unitaryabuse-of-discretion standard" established byPierce); Trahan v. Brady, 907 F.2d 1215, 1217

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to purely legal substantial-justification

determination), our deference does not exempt the district court's substantial justification

determination fromappellate scrutiny. We will reverse the district court if its decision rests on clearly

erroneous factual findings or if it leaves us with " "a definite and firm conviction that the court below

committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant

factors.' " De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 11 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Josephson, 218

F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)); see also Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123,

127 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on same definition of abuse of discretion in reviewing Equal Access Act

decision).

Applying these standards, we conclude that the district court's decision in this case reflected

an error of judgment amounting to an abuse of discretion. Simply repeating arguments made by the

Bureau before the merits panel without offering any explanation why those arguments showed the

Bureau's position was reasonable, the district court largely failed to grapple with the reasoning

underlying this court's merits decision and its conclusion that the Bureau's position was not merely

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incorrect but unreasonable. Although the merits panel did not use the word "unreasonable," by

pointing out that the Bureau's approach required treating identical weapons in completely different

ways, it highlighted the fundamental unreasonableness of the Bureau's position. Although a brand

new semiautomatic receiver may legally be possessed and transferred, under the Bureau's

interpretation ofthe Firearms Act, a semiautomatic receiverthat has beenmodified into a machinegun

receiver and then restored to its original semiautomatic state may not be possessed or transferred,

even though its reconfiguration makes it indistinguishable from a brand new semiautomatic.

"[I]ncredible" wasthe word this court used to describe that result. F.J. Vollmer Co., 23 F.3d at 452.

In support of its argument that its distinction between new and remodified semiautomatic

receivers, although rejected by the merits panel, was nevertheless reasonable, the agency points out

that the Firearms Act treats machineguns differently from other firearms. The agency is certainly

correct that, unlike in the case of other weapons, the Firearms Act includes machinegun receivers and

machinegun conversion kits as machineguns in their own right. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (1994). The

agency offers no convincing explanation, however, why this difference should lead to different

proceduresfor removing machineguns as opposed to all other weaponsfromFirearms Act coverage.

According to the agency, for weapons other than machineguns, removal of the features that led to

the weapon's classification as a firearm suffices to remove the weapon from the Act's coverage.

FIREARMS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, ATF Order 3310.4B ¶ 83(e)(2). For machinegun receivers,

however, removal of the features causing their classification as machineguns does not remove them

from Firearms Act coverage, and thus the Gun Control Act's prohibition. Under the agency's

once-a-machinegun-always-a-machinegun policy, only complete destruction can remove machinegun

receivers from the Firearms Act's coverage. We can find nothing in the text of the Firearms Act to

support this difference in treatment.

Defending its once-a-machinegun-always-a-machinegun policy, the Bureau also argues that

Congress expected it to interpret the definition of machineguns as broadly as possible. The Senate

report on the 1968 amendment to the Gun Control Act that broadened the definition of machineguns

to include receivers and conversion kits, however, does not support the Bureau's argument. The

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report simply shows that Congress intended to treat machinegun receivers and conversion kits as

machineguns in their own right and that the same standards for ready restorability and

unserviceableness would apply to machinegun receivers and to complete machineguns. See S. REP.

NO. 90-1501 at 45-46 (1968). Indeed, we think the Bureau's broad definition of machineguns may

actually be inconsistent with Congressional intent. When Congress broadened the definition of

machinegunsin 1968, as well as when it enacted the prohibition onmachinegun possession or transfer

in 1986, it left the Firearms Act's definition of semiautomatic rifles unchanged, choosing not to

restrict the possession or transfer of any semiautomatics. Not until 1994, acting through a separate

amendment to the Gun Control Act, did Congress ban some semiautomatics, i.e., semiautomatic

assault rifles. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §

110102, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-98 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)). Because the Bureau's

positioninthis case would have prohibited the transfer of one group ofsemiautomaticsthose whose

receivers have been modified into machinegun receivers and then reconfigured to their original

stateit arguably would have conflicted with Congress's intention until 1994 to permit the transfer

of all semiautomatics, subject, of course, to the Firearms Act's general registration and taxation

provisions.

TheBureau arguesthat the reasonableness ofitsrejectionofVollmer'ssecond application also

finds support in the Firearms Act's coverage of both unserviceable and serviceable firearms. See 26

U.S.C. § 5845(h) (1994). Unserviceable firearms are incapable both of shooting and of being readily

restored to firing condition. Id. According to the Bureau, the guns at issue in this

casesemiautomatic receiversthat had once been converted into machinegun receiversare actually

more similar to serviceable machinegun receivers than are unserviceable receivers because, unlike

unserviceable receivers, they can be readilyrestored to serviceable machinegun receivers. Therefore,

the Bureau contends, treating unserviceable machinegun receivers as machinegunsasthe Firearms

Act doesyet excluding remodified semiautomatic receivers from the definition of machineguns is

illogical.

One problem with this argument is that the Bureau did not rely on it in rejecting Vollmer's

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second application. As its counsel acknowledged at oral argument, the Bureau's decision relied solely

on the fact that after May 19, 1986, the receiver had been modified into a machinegun receiver.

Although the Bureau did raise this argument before the district court, we do not see how it supports

the reasonableness ofthe government's position. The Firearms Act's provision covering unserviceable

firearms appliesto allfirearms; it does not distinguish between machineguns and other weapons, nor

between complete weapons and receivers. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(h). The Bureau's insistence that

machineguns, unlike all other firearms, must be destroyed in order to be removed from the Act's

coverage thus cannot rest on the Act's coverage of unserviceable firearms.

Having examined the Bureau's arguments from text, structure, legislative history, and

underlying policy, we find no reasonable basis for its once-a-machinegun-always-a-machinegun

interpretation of the Firearms Act. Nor are we persuaded by the district court's own explanations of

why the Bureau's position was nonetheless substantially justified. Although, as the district court

observed, theBureau had followed itsinterpretation ofthe Firearms Act since at least the early1980s,

we do not see how merely applying an unreasonable statutory interpretation for several years can

transform it into a reasonable interpretation. Like the Bureau, the district court also found support

for the Bureau'sinterpretation in United States v. Whalen, 337 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But

Whalen simply notes that the Firearms Act's registration provisions cover unserviceable as well as

serviceable firearms and that unserviceable machineguns therefore are machineguns under the Act.

Whalen, 337 F. Supp. at 1016-17. Whalen does not address the status of receivers of any sort,

whether machinegun receivers, semiautomatic receivers, or receivers converted from one form to

another.

Finally, the district court pointed out that the enforcement manual the merits panel relied on

to demonstrate the inconsistency of the Bureau's stance did not cover machineguns. Yet the first

example in the relevant section of the manual concerns the reconfiguration of a semiautomatic that

had been converted into a machinegun. FIREARMS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, ATF Order 3310.4B

¶ 83(f)(1). According to the manual, removal of the parts that converted the semiautomatic into a

machinegun would suffice to remove the weapon from coverage by the Firearms Act's definition of

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machineguns. Although the example does not address machinegun receivers in particular, we think

it undercuts the district court's assertion that the manual does not cover weapons that have been

converted into machineguns.

III

Having determined that the agency's positionwas not "substantiallyjustified" and that Vollmer

is thus entitled to recover fees and expenses, we next address the appropriate amount of

reimbursement. This requires that we resolve two questions: Is Vollmer entitled to reimbursement

of attorney's fees at an enhanced rate? Is the company entitled to reimbursement for all the hours its

attorney spent on the case even though it succeeded in overturning only the Bureau's denial of its

second transfer application?

In support ofitsrequest for reimbursement at an elevated rate, Vollmer citesthe EqualAccess

Act's provision for higher rates in cases involving "a special factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneysfor the proceedingsinvolved." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Interpreting

this clause narrowly, the Supreme Court has held that it refers to "attorneys having some distinctive

knowledge or specialized skill." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572. As examples, the Court has referred to "an

identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language." Id. We

have interpreted this to mean that fee enhancement is available only for lawyers whose specialty

"requir[es] technical or other education outside the field of American law." Waterman Steamship

Corp. v. Maritime Subsidy Bd., 901 F.2d 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted).

AlthoughVollmer's attorneyperformed ablyinthis case, we think hisspecializationin firearms

law does not require the sort of expertise Congress contemplated when it authorized higher fees in

special circumstances. To be sure, lawyers practicing administrative law typically develop expertise

in a particular regulated industry, whether energy, communications, railroads, or firearms. But they

usually gain this expertise from experience, not from the specialized training justifying fee

enhancement. If expertise acquired through practice justified higher reimbursement rates, then all

lawyers practicing administrative law in technical fields would be entitled to fee enhancements.

Because nothing in the Equal Access Act or itslegislative history, see H.R.REP. NO. 99-120 (1985),

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reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418 (1980), reprinted in 1980

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4993-94, indicates that Congress intended this result, we conclude that Vollmer's

attorney is entitled to reimbursement at the regular statutory rate of $75 per hour adjusted for the

increase in the cost of living.

Turning to the second issue, the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours

reasonably expended on the entire case only establishes a base for calculating the amount of

reimbursable fees. If the prevailing party achieved less than complete success, we must reduce that

base to reflect the degree ofsuccess achieved. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114; Commissioner, INS v. Jean,

496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990). As required by the Supreme Court, we assess a party's degree of success

by asking two questions: "First, did the [party] fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the

claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the [party] achieve a level of success that makes the

hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?" Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 434 (1983); see also Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir.

1993).

Claims are related if they "involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal

theories." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Under this standard, Vollmer's claims were closely related. The

weapon covered by its second application was a modified version of the weapon submitted with its

first application. Vollmer's challenges to the denial of both applications rested on similar arguments

about the reach of the Firearms Act's inclusion of machinegun receivers within the definition of

machineguns.

Proceeding to the second Hensley question, we "compute the appropriate fee as a function

of degree ofsuccess." George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35). The Bureau urges us to reduce Vollmer's fee significantly,

arguing that the market value ofthe remodified semiautomatic receivers Vollmer was able to sellwas

much less than the market value of the receivers it could have sold if the denial of itsfirst application

had been overturned. Comparing the prices of the guns Vollmer could have sold if its first transfer

application had been approved to those of the weapons it was able to sell, the Bureau claims that

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Vollmer is entitled to only 19% of the feesrequested. Because the Bureau's approach is just the sort

of formulaic method disapproved in Hensley, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435-36 & n.11, we would not

adopt its reasoning even if we could substantiate the Bureau's claims about firearm prices. If this

court had sustained the Bureau's denial of Vollmer's second application, the company would have

been unable to sell any ofits weapons. But because Vollmer successfully challenged the denial of that

application, it was able to sell the weapons, although presumably for less than it might have had it

prevailed on the first application. See Compl. ¶ 8 (alleging that company modified receivers to

machinegun configuration in order to "enhance the value of the firearms"). Vollmer's attorney thus

achieved a significant, though less than complete, victory for his client.

Although we reject the Government's formulaic approach, we do think some reduction is

appropriate to account for Vollmer's failure to overturn the denial of its first transfer application.

Even in cases where claims are interrelated, courts should proportion fees to the "significance of the

overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation."

Id. at 435. Had Vollmer's failure to set aside the Bureau's denial of its first application been only a

minor defeat, we would most likelyapprove itsfullrequest. But because Vollmer's failure to overturn

the denial ofitsfirst application reduced the "significance of the overallrelief obtained," id.; cf. Goos

v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380, 1387 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d

300, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and because Vollmer's attorneyno doubt devoted some portion of histime

to that claim, we think a reduction is appropriate. The magistrate judge who reviewed Vollmer's fee

petition concluded that reimbursement for 70% of the hours claimed equitably reflects the degree of

success achieved by the company, and Vollmer acknowledges as much. Reply Br. at 11. Agreeing

with the magistrate judge's assessment, we award Vollmer $29,272.84.

So ordered.

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