Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01318/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01318-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

COREY WAYNE ZIMMERMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 19cv1318-LL

AMENDED ORDER RE: CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 21, 22]

Plaintiff Corey Wayne Zimmerman brings this action for judicial review of the 

Social Security Commissioner’s (“Commissioner’s”) denial of his claim for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income. ECF No. 1. Before the Court are 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21 (“Pl.’s Mot.”)], Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 22 (“Def.’s 

Mot.”)], and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 23 

(“Pl.’s Reply”)]. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

/// 

/// 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

pursuant to Title II and Title XVIII, Part A of the Social Security Act, and supplemental 

security income pursuant to Title XVI. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 204-216. In both 

applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning November 2, 2014. Id. at 204, 209. 

On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff’s claims were denied by initial determination. Id. at 

137-141. On September 1, 2016, Plaintiff requested reconsideration. Id. at 142. On October 

19, 2016, Plaintiff’s application was denied on reconsideration. Id. at 143-47. On 

November 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing. Id. at 150-51. 

 On June 19, 2018, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

Robert Iafe. Id. at 39-82. On October 2, 2018, the ALJ issued a written decision in which 

he determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security 

Act, from November 2, 2014 through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 15-24. 

 Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 1. In a 

letter dated May 20, 2019, the Appeals Council found no basis for changing the ALJ’s 

ruling. Id. at 1-3. The ALJ’s decision thereafter became the Commissioner’s final decision. 

 On July 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action for judicial review by the federal 

district court. ECF No. 1. On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 21. On January 20, 2020, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 22. On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF No. 23. Defendant 

did not file a reply. See Docket. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS 

The ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process in his 

written decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 2, 2014, the 

alleged onset date. AR at 17. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

“degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and lumbosacral spine; and obesity.” Id. at 

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18. In contrast, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments of 

hypothyroidism and a knee condition “singly and in combination” did not pose more than 

a “minimal limitation in [Plaintiff]’s ability to perform basic work activities” and were 

therefore non-severe. Id. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s alleged depression was a 

non-medically determinable impairment. Id. 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. Id. 

In his RFC assessment, the ALJ found Plaintiff did have residual functional capacity 

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). Id. Specifically, 

the ALJ found that: 

[Plaintiff] can lift and carry 15 pounds occasionally and 10 

pounds frequently; and can stand and/or walk for 4 hours out of 

an 8 hour workday; can sit for 6 hours out of an 8 hour workday; 

can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb 

ramps and stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; 

and must avoid workplace hazards such as unprotected heights 

and dangerous machinery. 

Id. 

 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not capable of performing any past relevant 

work. Id. at 22. 

At step five, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained residual functional capacity to make a 

“successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy.” Id. at 23. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act permits unsuccessful applicants to seek 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of 

judicial review is limited. A denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is supported by 

substantial evidence and contains no legal error. Id.; see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 

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664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2003)). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a 

preponderance.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). It is 

“relevant evidence that, considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). “In determining whether the 

[ALJ’s] findings are supported by substantial evidence, [the Court] must review the 

administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674-75 

(quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)). This includes deferring to the 

ALJ’s consistency determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 

F.3d at 509. A court reviews “only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability 

determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Section 405(g) permits a court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing 

the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand 

the matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. 

ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rejection of his subjective symptoms testimony as 

legal error. See Pl.’s Mot. 

I. Subjective Symptoms Testimony 

a. Relevant Law 

The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test to determine “whether a claimant’s 

testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible[.]” See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 

504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which 

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could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Id. (quoting 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)). The claimant “‘need not show that 

her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has 

alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the 

symptom.’” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test and there is no evidence of malingering, 

“the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by 

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). General findings are insufficient; the ALJ “must identify what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” 

See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The ALJ’s 

findings must be “sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not 

arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider “[a claimant]’s reputation 

for truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily 

activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow 

a prescribed course of treatment.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 636 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). An ALJ may also consider “testimony from physicians and third parties 

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which [claimant] 

complains.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (citations omitted). If the ALJ’s finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, the court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

b. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptoms 

1. Plaintiff’s Exertion Questionnaire 

On or about September 6, 2016, Plaintiff completed an “Exertion Questionnaire” in 

connection with his applications, in which he described his symptoms and limitations. AR 

at 270-72. 

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According to Plaintiff, he experienced pain in his “legs, hips, back, neck, shoulders 

[and] arms.” Id. at 270. Plaintiff stated he had trouble ”walking, standing, sitting, writing, 

picking things up[,]” had issues with concentration, trouble sleeping, and experienced 

symptoms of fatigue and depression. Id. 

Plaintiff stated that on a typical day, he would “try to do exercise[,]” walk, clean the 

house, take his son to school, cook sometimes, take a shower, shave, go to the bathroom, 

and perform yardwork. Id. He qualified these activities—noting that he experienced pain 

performing them. Id. For example, Plaintiff noted that he could only perform chores for 

thirty minutes “depending on stiffness and pain.” Id. at 272. He stated that while he could 

walk (for an unspecified distance), afterwards, his joints became stiff and he experienced 

“aching pain from feet to neck” and “sharp pain” throughout his body. Id. at 270. 

Additionally, Plaintiff stated he could only lift and/or carry very light objects. Id. at 

271. Plaintiff stated he slept three to four hours every day and required rest periods lasting 

twenty to thirty minutes depending on pain throughout the day, and would take naps once 

or twice a day depending on pain and how much he had been up the night before. Id. at 

272. 

2. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony 

On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared at the hearing before 

the ALJ. Id. at 41-82. 

Plaintiff testified that he took Levothyroxine, Cyclobenzaprine, Hydrocodone, and 

Morphine Sulfate twice a day. Id. at 60-61. Plaintiff testified the side-effects from these 

medications required him to take two naps a day: the first for around two hours and the 

second for around a hour. Id. at 69. 

Plaintiff testified that he was “most comfortable at home” with his feet up, stating: 

Sitting makes my shoulder go numb, or makes my finger go 

numb, pain shooting down. And I find myself constantly moving 

side to side. Standing, I get a lot of pressure at my lower back[.] 

Id. at 69-70. Plaintiff testified he stayed in this position for about four to five hours in an 

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eight hour day because of the side-effects from his medication, pain, and depression. Id. at 

70.

Plaintiff testified that he could sit comfortably for about twenty to thirty minutes 

before having to “adjust” himself, and could stand for about twenty minutes before needing 

to sit down. Id. at 71. Plaintiff further testified that he could walk for about twenty or thirty 

minutes before needing to rest. Id. 

He testified that after walking: 

Normally what I would have to do is I’d have to kind of cram up 

in a ball and sit there and wait for either the pressure or the pain 

going down the leg to subside and then I just call it a day. If I’m 

at – if I try to push it and walk down to maybe the end of the 

block and I can’t make it I call my wife to come pick me up. 

Id. at 72. 

In regards to other physical limitations, Plaintiff testified that he could grab a gallon 

of milk, but would not be able to lift it with his left arm, although he could lift a little more 

with his right arm. Id. Plaintiff further testified he had problems reaching overhead and 

using his hands and fingers. Id. 

As directed to his daily activities, Plaintiff testified that he tried vacuuming, but 

would stop halfway because of pressure on his lower back. Id. at 73. Plaintiff further 

testified that he would attempt to help his wife in the kitchen, but would feel pain within 

ten to fifteen minutes. Id. Plaintiff testified that he could not help with the laundry because 

he had difficulty walking down stairs. Id. 

Plaintiff testified that he bathed lying down because he felt pressure on his lower 

back when standing and once he felt this pressure it would remain for most of the day. Id. 

at 63. Plaintiff testified that when grocery shopping “pain starts shooting down” his leg and 

feet to a point where his legs feel like they are “giving out” and he would have to “will it 

to force it” to keep moving. Id. at 67-68. 

/// 

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Finally, Plaintiff testified that he had been diagnosed with depression and some 

suicidal ideations resulting from pain and his qualify of life. Id. at 74. 

c. The ALJ’s Treatment of Plaintiff’s Testimony 

In his written decision, the ALJ made the following findings: 

In considering the claimant’s symptoms, the undersigned must 

follow a two-step process in which it must first be determined 

whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment(s)--i.e., an impairment(s) that can be 

shown by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic 

techniques--that could reasonably be expected to produce the 

claimant’s pain or other symptoms. 

Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) 

that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain 

or other symptoms has been shown, the undersigned must 

evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit 

the claimant’s functional limitations. For this purpose, whenever 

statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally 

limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated 

by objective medical evidence, the undersigned must consider 

other evidence in the record to determine if the claimant’s 

symptoms limit the ability to do work-related activities. 

The claimant, age 44, alleges that he cannot work due to back 

and neck problems (Exhibit 1E/2). He reported pain, which limits 

his walking, standing, sitting, and picking things up (Exhibit 5E). 

He reported the ability to perform daily activities including 

personal grooming tasks, drive his son to school, sweep, and do 

dishes, despite these activities causing him pain. He testified he 

has difficulty reaching overhead. He testified he has more pain 

when walking up a hill. He testified his pain medications take 

away pain, while he still has pressure. The claimant testified he 

walks up and down his 100-yard driveway to move around and 

exercise. 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; 

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however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 

in the record for the reasons explained in this decision. 

February 25, 2014 magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) of the 

cervical spine demonstrated moderate-sized disc protrusion at 

C5-C6 with mild central stenosis (Exhibit 1F). 

In January 2015, the claimant complained of lower back pain, 

which went to his feet (Exhibit 3F/8-10). Physical exam of the 

lumbar spine showed tenderness to palpation and severe pain 

with limited range of motion. Yet, he had a normal gait and 

normal muscle tone and strength in the lower extremities. He was 

prescribed pain medication. 

February 3, 2015 MRI of the lumbar spine demonstrated disc 

bulges, bilateral arthropathy at L4-L5 and L5-S1, with mild 

bilateral neural foraminal narrowing and no compression 

(Exhibit 2F). 

In March 2015, the claimant’s back pain was noted stable and 

relieved by over the counter medication (Exhibit 3F/14, 16). The 

doctor stated the claimant had been referred to physical therapy 

and pain management in the past, but was unable to go due to 

having no insurance. 

In October 2015, he stated that one month prior, he had been 

moving furniture during a move and hurt his neck, lower back, 

and knee (Exhibit 4F/l l-13). Physical exam showed back, neck, 

and knee pain, with decreased range of motion in the back. Yet, 

he had a normal gait and station. 

In January 2016, the claimant stated he did not undergo epidural 

injection for his back due to insurance issues (Exhibit 4F/4-6). 

Physical exam showed neck and back pain and a left limp. Yet, 

he had run out of pain medications for a month and a half. 

In April 2016, the claimant sought emergency room treatment for 

back pain, which went to his thighs (Exhibit 6F). Physical exam 

showed tenderness to palpation in the back, yet he had a normal 

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range of motion with negative straight leg raise bilaterally. He 

had a normal gait, with 5/5 strength despite pain. 

On July 28, 2016, the claimant underwent an orthopedic 

evaluation with Herman Schoene, M.D., for disability 

determination purposes (Exhibit 7F). He stated pain in his neck, 

back, upper and lower extremities, yet he was not taking any 

medications at the time. Upon physical exam, the claimant sit 

and stood with a normal posture. He had a normal gait and was 

able to get on and off the examining table without difficulty. He 

had full range of motion in his neck. There was no pain in his 

back, with some limited range of motion. Range of motion in his 

upper and lower extremities was within normal limits, other than 

a limited flexion of the shoulders. 

January 2017 physical exam showed despite neck, back, knee 

pain and a left limp, he had full 5/5 strength in the upper and 

lower extremities (Exhibit 10F/6). In January 2018, the claimant 

requested pain medication refills (Exhibit 10F/7-10). Physical 

exam showed tenderness and decreased range of motion in the 

cervical and lumbar back. 

The claimant reported he is 5 feet, 11 inches tall and weighs 230 

pounds (Exhibit 1E/2). The claimant’s body mass index (“BMI”) 

was 32.1, which is considered obesity. Records dating back to 

May 2015 indicate the claimant was obese (Exhibit 4F/25). In 

January 2018, he had a BMI of 34.3 (Exhibit 10F/8). The 

undersigned has considered this condition and finds no further 

restrictions than the above limitations. 

As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, 

and limiting effects of his symptoms, they are inconsistent 

because the objective medical evidence generally does not 

support the alleged loss of function. While the record indicates 

positive findings on radiographic scans and physical exams, 

which supports some limitations, the claimant also had a normal 

gait and motor strength of 5/5 (Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F/9, 4F/11, 18, 

23, 6F). The record also includes references to recommendations 

and treatment of physical therapy, epidural injection for the back, 

and orthopedic surgery evaluation (Exhibit 4F/8, 15, 10F/7). 

While the claimant testified to difficulty with overhead reaching, 

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the record does not support manipulative limitations where 

physical exams showed the claimant’s upper extremities were 

within normal limits (Exhibits 7F, 10F/6). 

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned has given great 

weight to the opinion testimony of the impartial medical expert, 

Ronald Kendrick, M.D. (Exhibit 11F). He assessed the claimant 

with the above residual functional capacity. Dr. Kendrick is 

board certified in orthopedic surgery, he has an awareness of all 

the evidence in the record, and he has an understanding of social 

security disability programs and evidentiary requirements. Most 

importantly, his opinion regarding the claimant’s functional 

limitations is highly persuasive because it is well supported by 

the objective medical evidence already discussed in this decision. 

The DDS state agency medical consultants, at both levels 

assessed a light exertional level, with limits to stand/walk for 2 

hours, and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; never climb 

ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and occasional remaining postural 

activities (Exhibits 1A/2A, 5A/6A). The undersigned gives 

partial weight to this assessment, where it is generally consistent 

with the record, yet the undersigned gives more weight to Dr. 

Kendrick’s opinion, where he had the opportunity to review the 

entire medical record, including the claimant’s testimony. 

Herman Schoene, M.D., orthopedic consultative examiner, 

assessed a medium exertional level, with limits to stand/walk, 

and sit for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday (Exhibit 7F). The 

undersigned gives little weight to this opinion, as it is generally 

inconsistent with the remainder of the record and Dr. Kendrick’s 

opinion, which indicate further restrictions. Dr. Schoene did not 

have the opportunity to review the entire record, including the 

hearing testimony. 

Meredith Chin, FNP-C, nurse practitioner, assessed the claimant 

limited to stand/walk, and sit for 3 hours out of an 8-hour 

workday, with manipulative limits, and would be absent more 

than four times per month (Exhibit 5F). This health provider is 

not an acceptable medical source under the Social Security Act 

(20 CFR 404.1513 and 416.913). Nevertheless, the undersigned 

has considered this statement in determining the severity of the 

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claimant's impairments and their effect on the claimant’s ability 

to function. There are no accompanying treatment records from 

nurse Chin and as discussed, the record does not indicate any 

manipulative limitations. Further, Dr. Kendrick testified that the 

claimant would miss four times of work per month was not 

supported by the record. 

The claimant was assessed with temporary disability from May 

2015 through February 2016 (Exhibit 4F/4-5). The undersigned 

gives little weight to this opinion because it was intended to 

reflect temporary limitations for short term disability and 

because it does not adequately address the nature and extent of 

the claimant's physical conditions, which have been confirmed 

by objective evidence and shown to impose the above 

limitations. 

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is 

supported by the opinion of Dr. Kendrick and the medical 

evidence. The above residual functional capacity involves a 

framework of light exertional work activity that is eroded by 

virtue of the limitation of standing and walking to 4 hours out of 

8-hour workday, lifting and carrying up to 15 pounds, which is 

more than the framework of a sedentary exertional level. 

Specifically, the above limitations address the claimant’s 

limitations resulting from his degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical and lumbosacral spine; and obesity. 

AR at 19-21. 

d. The ALJ Failed To Articulate A Clear And Convincing Reason For 

Rejecting Plaintiff’s Testimony 

The Parties do not challenge the ALJ’s step one determination. Neither Party alleges 

that the ALJ found Plaintiff was malingering. See Pl.’s Mot; Def.’s Mot. As a result, the 

Court must consider the second part of the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test: whether the ALJ 

gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective claims regarding 

his symptoms. 

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Here, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to specifically identify (apart from a single 

instance) which of Plaintiff’s statements the ALJ determined were not credible. This error 

prevents the Court from conducting a meaningful judicial review. See Reddick, 157 F.3d 

at 722 (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is 

not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”); Smolen, 80 F.3d 

at 1284 ([a]n ALJ “must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and 

what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.”). 

Instead, in this case, the ALJ merely summarized portions of Plaintiff’s disability 

report, exertion questionnaire, and hearing testimony and then vaguely referenced the 

entirety of this testimony as statements regarding the “intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects” of Plaintiff’s symptoms. AR at 19-20. 

The ALJ’s use of this boilerplate language—without identifying which of Plaintiff’s 

statements the ALJ found were not credible and why—is insufficient for this Court to 

determine whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. BrownHunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 491, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ erred in making a conclusory 

statement that claimant’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effect of [her] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [ALJ’s] 

residual functional capacity assessment” without identifying which of claimant’s 

statements the ALJ found were not credible and why); Treichler v. Comm’r of SSA, 775 

F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ erred in making conclusory statement that “the

claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of the

claimant’s symptoms were inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

assessment without identifying what parts of the claimant’s testimony were credible and

why); see also Isis A. v. Saul, No. 18cv01728-W-MSB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130801, at

*11-12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2019) (“The ALJ's generic references to Plaintiff's statements as

‘complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations,’ . . . did not specifically identify the

statements that the ALJ was discrediting.”) (adopted by Avina v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1728-

W-MSB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140324 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019)); Eldridge v. Berryhill,

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No. 17cv497-JLS-BLM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87985, at *22-23 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2018) 

(“The ALJ’s vague references to Plaintiff’s statements as ‘allegations of disabling 

limitations’ are not specific identifications of which statements are being discredited.”) 

(adopted by Eldridge v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-497-JLS-BLM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

113699 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2018)). 

As set forth above, Plaintiff testified to several different physical impairments. Even 

were the Court to read the ALJ’s opinion in this case generously however, the only time 

the ALJ specifically referenced Plaintiff’s testimony is a brief mention of Plaintiff’s 

subjective difficulties reaching overhead. See AR at 20-21. Aside from this single point of 

discussion, the ALJ’s decision completely fails to connect any other portion of Plaintiff’s 

testimony to the medical evidence that the ALJ found undermines it. 

Instead, the ALJ appears to have simply set forth his non-credibility conclusion 

followed with a summary of the medical evidence supporting his RFC determination. As 

the Ninth Circuit has stated however: 

[P]roviding a summary of medical evidence in support of a

residual functional capacity finding is not the same as providing

clear and convincing reasons for finding the claimant’s

symptom testimony not credible.

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (emphasis in original); see also Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 

(mere fact that ALJ “set out his RFC” and “summarized the evidence supporting his 

determination” is insufficient—a court “cannot substitute” it’s conclusions “for the ALJ’s, 

or speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions.”). This error prevents the Court 

from being able to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions was supported 

by substantial evidence. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494-95. 

The Court also does not find Defendant’s arguments for affirming the ALJ’s decision 

persuasive. Defendant argues first that the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective 

symptoms testimony because the ALJ found that “the weight of the medical evidence and 

the medical-opinion evidence did not corroborate” Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his 

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functional limitations. Def.’s Mot. at 4. Specifically, Defendant argues the ALJ properly 

discounted Plaintiff’s claims because they were “inconsistent” with the medical evidence. 

Id. at 7. 

However, the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony for being “inconsistent” with 

the “objective medical evidence” cannot—by itself—be legally sufficient to support the 

ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 679 (“[A]n ALJ may not 

disregard a claimant’s testimony solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by 

objective medical evidence[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Light v. 

SSA, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] finding that the claimant lacks credibility 

cannot be premised wholly on a lack of medical support for the severity of his pain.”). 

Defendant contends Plaintiff “overlooks that the ALJ did not just rely on the medical 

evidence,” but permissibly discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms testimony based on 

the opinion of impartial medical expert, Dr. Ronald Kendrick. Def.’s Mot. at 7. As such, 

Defendant argues the “ALJ was well-within the bounds of reason to rely on Dr. Kendrick’s 

sound and supported expert medical opinion[.]” Id. 

However, the ALJ did not specifically delineate Dr. Kendrick’s opinion as a reason 

for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. Indeed, Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms 

testimony is not referenced anywhere in the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Kendrick’s opinion— 

beyond a conclusion that Dr. Kendrick had “the opportunity to review the entire medical 

record, including the claimant’s testimony.” AR at 21-22. The Court is “constrained to 

review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.2003). 

For these reasons, this basis which Defendant now invokes for rejecting Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptoms testimony cannot be the one upon which the Court affirms the ALJ’s 

decision. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to infer 

ALJ rejected a claimant’s testimony based on medical findings, as the ALJ “never stated 

that he rested his adverse credibility determinations on those findings.”). 

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II. Remedy

The only remaining question for the Court is whether to remand for further

administrative proceedings or for the payment of benefits. 

“The decision of whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to 

award benefits, is within the discretion of the court.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682 (quoting 

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Remand for further 

administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful.” 

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The Ninth Circuit applies “a three-part credit-as-true standard, each part of which 

must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and 

award benefits[.]” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. The standard is met where: “(1) the record 

has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 

whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited 

evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on 

remand.” Id. (footnote and citations omitted). 

Even if all three requirements are met, the Court retains flexibility to remand for 

further proceedings “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the 

claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” BrownHunter, 806 F.3d at 495. 

Here, based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude the ALJ would have 

been required to find Plaintiff disabled if the ALJ had properly considered all of Plaintiff’s 

subjective claims. “The rare circumstances that result in a direct award of benefits are not 

present in this case.” Leon v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2017). Instead, the Court 

finds further administrative proceeds would serve a meaningful purpose so that all of 

Plaintiff’s testimony may be properly evaluated. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 6, 2020 

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