Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08105/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08105-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ronald Cooke, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Town of Colorado City, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-10-08105-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 On March 20, 2014, the jury in this case returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs 

Ron and Jinjer Cooke (collectively, the “Cookes”) and Plaintiff-Intervenor the State of 

Arizona (the “State”). (Doc. 584). Following this verdict, two issues remain outstanding.1

First, the Court must rule on the pending motions concerning the State’s desire to reopen 

the evidentiary record in this case and admit evidence discovered after the verdict was 

reached. Second, the Court must determine whether the State is entitled to equitable relief 

on its claims and if so, the extent of that relief. 

I. Motion to Reopen the Evidentiary Record

 The jury returned the verdict in this case on March 20, 2014. (Doc. 584). On June 

16, 2014, the State filed its “Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to Re-Open the 

Evidentiary Record” (Doc. 685). In this motion, the State requests that pursuant to 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 1 and 60(b)(2), (3), and (6) the Court permit 

 

1

 This Order and the accompanying Judgment do not address the Cookes’ claims 

because pursuant to the stipulation of the Cookes and Defendants (Doc. 701), the Court 

previously dismissed all of the Cookes’ claims. See (Doc. 702). 

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the State to file a motion to reopen the evidentiary record to admit newly discovered 

evidence. (Id. at 1). The State has attached this latter proposed motion to reopen the 

record as an exhibit to the first motion. The State’s newly-discovered evidence consists of 

the deposition of Helaman Barlow taken in a related case between the U.S. Department of 

Justice and Defendants. In that deposition, Barlow repeatedly admitted that he lied during 

his testimony both in his deposition and trial in this case. E.g., (Doc. 685-1 at 192, 213-

14). 

 The State contends that Rule 60 provides “for judicial relief predicated upon 

newly discovered evidence, the fraud of an opposing party, and principles of fundamental 

fairness” and argues that the interests of justice necessitate reopening the evidentiary 

record to admit Barlow’s testimony at his deposition. (Id. at 11). Rule 60(b) provides that 

“the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding” for reasons including newly discovered evidence that could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new trial, fraud, or “any other reason that justifies 

relief.” 

 At the time the State filed its motion, there was no final judgment, order, or 

proceeding in this case from which the Court could grant relief. Rule 60 is inapplicable 

here. The Court has searched the Rules and is unable to identify a specific rule under 

which the State’s motion may appropriately be brought. Nevertheless, “[w]hile it is not 

entirely clear which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts to reopen 

an evidentiary record prior to judgment, it is clear that district courts have the discretion 

to grant such a motion: such an application to reopen the record is committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court.” Romeo v. Sherry, 308 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138-39 

(E.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 478 (9th Cir. 1988) (court sua 

sponte reopened the evidentiary record after trial and before judgment). 

 In this case, the State was victorious on its claims against Defendants. Barlow’s 

deposition testimony regarding his perjury at trial is not needed to correct the trial record 

because implicit in the jury’s findings was a determination that Barlow’s trial testimony 

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was not credible. As the State was victorious despite Barlow’s testimony, there is no 

impetus for reopening the evidentiary record to admit additional evidence supporting the 

jury’s finding. The Court will deny the State’s motion. Because the State’s proposed 

motion will not be filed, the Court need not consider the State’s supplement to that 

motion (Doc. 696) and Defendants’ motion to strike the supplement (Doc. 698) is moot. 

II. Equitable Relief

A. Findings of Fact

 On March 20, 2014 the jury returned its verdict in this case making the following 

findings. First, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants2

violated the federal Fair Housing Act and the Arizona Fair Housing Act by 

discriminating against the Cookes in the provision of services or facilities because of 

religion. (Doc. 584 at 2). On this claim, the jury found that Defendants were jointly and 

severally liable for damages because they all committed the same unlawful act as, acted 

in concert with, or acted as an agent or servant of another defendant. (Id.) The jury found 

the damages to Ron Cooke to be $650,000 and the damages to Jinjer Cooke to be 

$650,000. (Id.) 

 Second, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants 

violated the federal Fair Housing Act and the Arizona Fair Housing Act by coercing, 

intimidating, threatening, interfering with, or retaliating against the Cookes in the 

enjoyment of their dwelling because (1) of religion or (2) the Cookes asserted rights, or 

encouraged others to assert their rights, protected by the federal Fair Housing Act or the 

Arizona Fair Housing Act. (Id. at 5). On this claim, the jury found that Defendants were 

jointly and severally liable for damages because they all committed the same unlawful act 

as, acted in concert with, or acted as an agent or servant of another defendant. (Id.) The 

jury found the damages to Ron Cooke to be $1,950,000 and the damages to Jinjer Cooke 

 

2

 Because each of the jury’s findings included all defendants in this case, the Court 

uses the term Defendants to refer collectively to the Town of Colorado City, City of Hildale, Hildale-Colorado City Utilities, Twin City Water Authority, and Twin City 

Power. 

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to be $1,950,000. (Id.) 

 Third, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants violated 

the Arizona Fair Housing Act by engaging in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full 

enjoyment of any right granted by the Act.3

 (Id. at 8). 

 

3

 At summary judgment and during trial, the Court assumed that the State’s 

pattern-or-practice claim against Defendants was a valid independent cause of action and none of the parties disputed its existence. However, the Court has an independent duty to ensure that it enters judgment according to the law. The Court concludes that there is no 

independent cause of action for a pattern or practice of discrimination; rather, a showing of pattern or practice establishes the attorney general’s standing to sue. This is evident from the plain language of the statute, which recites the requirements for standing but contains no elements of a claim under that section. It is further supported by courts’ interpretations of the similar language of the federal Fair Housing Act (“FFHA”). 

The language of the Arizona Fair Housing Act concerning a pattern or practice of discrimination closely tracks that of the FFHA: 

The attorney general may file a civil action in superior court for appropriate relief if the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that either: 

1. A person is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any right granted by this article. 

2. A person has been denied any right granted by this article and that denial raises an issue of general public importance. 

A.R.S. § 41-1491.35(A). 

Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public importance, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court. 

41 U.S.C. § 3614(a). 

Courts interpreting the FFHA have held that this provision confers standing to sue upon the attorney general. See, e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 

115, 122 (5th Cir. 1973). The confusion as to whether a pattern or practice claim exists is 

not uncommon. See United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1095 (N.D. 

Ohio 1980); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Miss. 1972). With respect to Title VII, which incorporates a statute very similar to the FFHA and Arizona Fair Housing Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), the Second Circuit Court of 

Appeals clarified that language concerning a pattern or practice “simply refers to a method of proof and does not constitute a ‘freestanding cause of action,’” Parisi v. 

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 The Court agrees with and adopts the jury’s findings in this case as its own. The 

Court also adopts the jury’s advisory finding with respect to Defendants engaging in a 

pattern or practice of resistance to rights protected under the Arizona Fair Housing Act. 

B. Conclusions of Law

 1. Civil Penalties

 A.R.S. § 41-1491.35 permits the Court to assess a civil penalty against the 

defendants in an action brought by the Attorney General under the Arizona Fair Housing 

Act for the purpose of “vindicat[ing] the public interest.” The amount of such a civil 

penalty must not exceed $50,000 for a first violation. A.R.S. § 41-1491.35(B)(3)(a). 

Although there are no statutory guidelines for applying this provision under the Arizona 

Fair Housing Act, an analogous provision exists in the federal Fair Housing Act 

(“FFHA”). See 41 U.S.C. § 3614(a). 

 The Court has discretion to determine the appropriate amount of a civil penalty 

such that the public interest is vindicated. See Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 

Mich., 13 F.3d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1993) (FFHA). The legislative history of the FFHA 

specifies factors that a court should consider in determining an appropriate amount: “the 

nature and circumstances of the violation, the degree of culpability, any history of past 

violations, the financial circumstances of that Defendant and the goal of deterrence, and 

other matters that justice may require.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 40 

(1988)). 

 Considering the finding that Defendants have engaged in a pattern or practice of 

 Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Chin v. Port Authority 

of N.Y., 685 F.3d 135, 148 n.8 (2d Cir. 2012)). Title VII discrimination analysis applies to FFHA discrimination claims. Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, the State’s pattern-or-practice claim against Defendants is not a 

separate claim and the Court will not enter judgment on it. The jury’s verdict in this 

regard was advisory and serves to confirm the attorney general’s proper standing to intervene in this case. The Court’s conclusion is of no practical distinction to this case, 

however, because the State remains as an intervenor-plaintiff on the claims for discrimination in providing services or facilities and for intimidation or interference with 

rights. A.R.S. § 41-1491.35 permits the Court to award relief to the State in this action 

because the State intervened under that statute. 

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resistance to rights protected under the Arizona Fair Housing Act, the goal of deterring 

Defendants from continuing this pattern or practice, and the serious injury caused by 

Defendants (as evidenced by the jury’s finding that the Cookes sustained $5.2 million in 

injuries), the Court concludes that the maximum civil penalty of $50,000 is appropriate. 

Because all of the Defendants discriminated against the Cookes and have been engaged 

in a pattern or practice of discrimination, the Court assesses a $50,000 penalty against 

each Defendant. 

 2. Injunctive Relief

 The State and Defendants have vigorously briefed and contested the appropriate 

scope of injunctive relief in this case. A.R.S. § 41-1491.35 permits the Court to “[a]ward 

preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or 

other order against the person responsible for a violation of [the Arizona Fair Housing 

Act] as necessary to assure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this article.” The 

Court has carefully considered the State’s proposed form of judgment (Doc. 687-1), the 

Defendants’ response (Doc. 689), and the State’s reply in support of its proposed form of 

judgment (Doc. 695). 

 The Court is mindful that the State has requested a permanent injunction that 

mandates, in part, the disbandment of the Colorado City Marshal’s Office and the Hildale 

City Police Department, the replacement of these law enforcement agencies with county 

sheriffs, the appointment of a monitor to observe and report on Defendants’ activities, 

training for Defendants’ employees concerning discrimination, and the securing of new 

water sources. But “[i]njunctive relief may be inappropriate where it requires constant 

supervision.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 

1992). 

 The State’s proposed relief, if granted, would burden both Defendants and the 

State with a layer of bureaucracy extending into potential perpetuity. The Court does not 

doubt that the disbanding of the local law enforcement and the appointment of a monitor 

would be effective at preventing future discrimination by Defendants. However, 

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considering all the facts of the case, more narrowly tailored injunctive relief is 

appropriate. 

 The Court will permanently enjoin Defendants from discriminating on the basis of 

religion in performing their official duties and retain jurisdiction in this case for ten years. 

If Defendants violate the injunction, the State or an aggrieved party will be able to move 

for an order finding Defendants in contempt and assessing appropriate remedies. This 

will lessen the burden of remedying any future discrimination vis-à-vis filing a new 

lawsuit. This injunction recognizes that because it has been proven that Defendants have 

engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, Defendants’ future conduct merits 

heightened scrutiny. 

 3. Attorneys’ Fees

 The State has requested an award of attorneys’ fees and taxable costs in this case. 

A.R.S. § 41-1491.35(B)(2) permits the Court to award “reasonable attorney fees and 

court costs.” The Court concludes that the State is entitled to its reasonable attorneys’ 

fees and taxable costs because the State prevailed on all claims in this lawsuit and 

considering the pervasiveness and severity of the Defendants’ discrimination, an award of 

fees and costs is necessary to deter such conduct in the future both by Defendants and by 

others who would engage in discrimination. 

III. Conclusion

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), which requires judgments to be 

set forth in a separate document, the Court has entered its judgment in a separate 

document filed contemporaneously with this Order. To the extent the judgment does not 

grant all of the relief discussed in this Order, 

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff-Intervenor State of Arizona’s Motion for 

Leave to File Motion for Leave to Re-open the Evidentiary Record (Doc. 685). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendants’ Joint Motion to 

Strike Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Notice of Supplement to Motion for Leave to Re-open the 

Evidentiary Record (Doc. 698). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State may move for an award of attorneys’ 

fees in accordance with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2. The motion for an award of 

attorneys’ fees shall be accompanied by an electronic spreadsheet, to be e-mailed to the 

Court and opposing counsel, containing an itemized statement of legal services with all 

information required by Local Rule 54.2(e)(1). This spreadsheet shall be organized with 

rows and columns and shall automatically total the amount of fees requested so as to 

enable the Court to efficiently review and recompute, if needed, the total amount of any 

award after disallowing any individual billing entries. This spreadsheet does not relieve 

the moving party of its burden under Local Rule 54.2(d) to attach all necessary 

supporting documentation to its memorandum of points and authorities filed in support of 

its motion. A party opposing a motion for attorneys’ fees shall e-mail to the Court and 

opposing counsel a copy of the moving party’s spreadsheet adding any objections to each 

contested billing entry (next to each row, in an additional column) so as to enable the 

Court to efficiently review the objections and recompute the total amount of any award 

after disallowing any individual billing entries. This spreadsheet does not relieve the nonmoving party of the requirements of Local Rule 54.2(f) concerning its responsive 

memorandum. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State is entitled to an award of its taxable 

costs and the State may file a notice of taxable costs in accordance with Local Rule of 

Civil Procedure 54.1. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2014. 

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