Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-06128/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-06128-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

DANIEL LOPEZ, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

JOHN COWAN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 16-6128 SBA 

Related to: 

No. C 16-5864 SBA 

ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AND DISMISSING ACTION 

Plaintiff Daniel Lopez (“Lopez” or “Plaintiff”), acting pro se, brings the instant 

action against John Cowan (“Cowan”), Nate Loakes (“Loakes”), Timothy Broderick 

(“Broderick”) and Katrina Saleen (“Saleen”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each of these 

defendants is an attorney involved in state court litigation currently pending against Lopez 

in the San Francisco County Superior Court. This matter is presently before the Court on 

Lopez’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 3. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court DENIES Lopez’s request to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the complaint without 

prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND1

Attorney Cowan previously represented Lopez in a state court civil matter. Their 

relationship apparently soured as a result of a fee dispute, and Lopez thereafter allegedly 

began harassing and defaming Cowan. Cowan, then represented by attorney Broderick of 

 1 This case is related to Cowan v. Lopez, No. C 16-5864 SBA, which the Court 

remanded to state court. See Cowan v. Lopez, No. C 16-5864 SBA, 2016 WL 6069233 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2016). Lopez cites the Court’s remand order as the basis for this action. 

Dkt. 1 at 3. Therefore, for context, the Court takes judicial notice of the facts alleged in 

that action. See Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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the Broderick Saleen Law Firm (“Broderick Firm”), filed suit against Lopez. Cowan’s 

complaint alleges state law causes of action for defamation, willful misconduct under 

California Penal Code §§ 523 and 524, negligence, and injunctive relief. See John Cowan 

v. Daniel Lopez, S.F. Super. Ct. No. CGC-13-531107 (“Cowan action”). 

After Cowan filed suit, Lopez began harassing and defaming the Broderick Firm and 

its attorneys.2

 Posing as a former client of the Broderick Firm, Lopez posted numerous 

false and negative reviews of the firm on various internet sites. Broderick thus commenced 

a separate lawsuit against Lopez, asserting state law causes of action for defamation, 

intentional and negligent interference with contractual relations, intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, unauthorized access, and declaratory and injunctive relief. 

See Timothy Broderick v. Daniel Lopez, S.F. Super. Ct. No. CGC-13-546196 (“Broderick 

action”). 

During the course of the state court litigation, Broderick served Lopez with a request 

for production of tangible things. The request for production included a specific request for 

electronic devices capable of accessing the internet, such as his cell phone. Lopez objected 

to the request, though he did not contend that his phone contained Sensitive Security 

Information (“SSI”) or protected information. The parties met and conferred on agreed 

upon specific categories of information Broderick could obtain from the phone. None of 

the categories included any SSI. Lopez later reneged on their agreement and refused to 

produce his phone, resulting in Broderick filing a motion to compel. The superior court 

granted the motion and imposed sanctions against Lopez. Lopez sought to challenge that 

ruling by filing a petition for writ of mandate, prohibition or other relief and a request for 

stay with the California Court of Appeal. Id. Ex. H. On September 29, 2016, the Court of 

Appeal rejected all of Lopez’s requests. Id. The court of appeal held that Lopez failed to 

timely object to the challenged discovery request, and otherwise failed to demonstrate that 

 2 Attorney Loakes of The Ryan Law Firm later substituted in as counsel of record 

for Cowan in the Cowan action. 

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he was a “covered person” under federal regulations governing the disclosure of SSI or 

specify the specific type of SSI his phone allegedly contained. 

The Cowan and Broderick actions were consolidated and set for trial on October 17, 

2016, in Department 206 of the San Francisco Superior Court. However, Lopez removed 

the actions on October 11, 2016. See Cowan v. Lopez, No. C 16-5864 SBA. Although no 

federal claims were alleged in the state court pleadings, Lopez predicated the removal 

entirely on his assertion that information stored on his cell phone constitutes SSI and thus is 

protected from disclosure. The Court sua sponte reviewed the removal and the underlying 

state court pleadings, and concluded that Lopez had failed to demonstrate the presence of 

federal question jurisdiction. As such, the Court remanded the action on October 17, 2016. 

See Cowan v. Lopez, No. C 16-5864 SBA, 2016 WL 6069233, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 

2016) (order remanding action). 

On October 24, 2016, Lopez filed the instant action against Cowan, Loakes, 

Broderick and Saleen (an attorney with the Broderick Firm), along with a request to 

proceed IFP. He alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 predicated upon Defendants’ 

alleged violations of federal law restricting the disclosure of SSI—and specifically cites the 

California Court of Appeal’s ruling on his writ petition and this Court’s remand order in the 

prior action as the basis therefor. As relief, Lopez seeks damages in excess of $100,000, 

which represent legal expenses “while trying to defend the custody of SSI and extreme 

mental distress ....” Dkt. 1 at 4.3

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), federal courts are authorized to pre-screen claims 

filed IFP prior to service and to dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that: 

(1) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (2) the action is frivolous or malicious; (3) the action 

fails to state a claim; or (4) the action seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balisteri v. 

 3 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-12, the Court related the instant action to No. C 16-

5864 SBA. Dkt. 11. 

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). If a court denies leave to proceed 

IFP, the district court must grant leave to amend unless it finds that amendment would be 

futile. Rodriguez v. Steck, 795 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015). 

To determine whether an IFP complaint passes muster under § 1915, the Court 

applies the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). A 

complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the plaintiff 

fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

To maintain a claim pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading 

and proving two elements: (1) conduct that deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or 

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). Acting 

under color of state law means that the person who allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights 

executed such violation by exercising power conferred to that person by state law. West, 

487 U.S. at 49. “‘Section 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter 

how discriminatory or wrong.’” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 

835 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). 

Here, it is clear from the pleadings in this and the related action that none of the 

Defendants is alleged to have been acting under color of state law. Rather, the actions 

attributed to Defendants by Lopez were undertaken in their respective capacities as private 

lawyers engaged in state court civil litigation. As such, Lopez’s § 1983 claim fails as a 

matter of law. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (an attorney 

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“performing a lawyer’s traditional functions” cannot be considered to act under color of 

state law within the meaning of § 1983); Briley v. State of Cal., 564 F.2d 849, 855-56 (9th 

Cir. 1977) (holding that a private attorney is not a state actor and does not act under color 

of state law for Section 1983 purposes). 

Lopez’s claim also is not actionable by virtue of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 

That doctrine derives from the Petition Clause of the First Amendment and provides that 

those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune 

from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct.” Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 

590 F.3d 638, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, a party cannot be sued under § 1983 for filing suit or any litigation-related 

activities. See Empress LLC v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005); Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 

2000). Lopez’s claim derives from Defendants’ efforts during discovery in the underlying 

actions to obtain information from Lopez’s cell phone which he claims is protected from 

disclosure. Such actions fall squarely within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Kearney, 590 

F.3d at 646 (recognizing that discovery incidental to litigation is within the NoerrPennington doctrine). 

Finally, Lopez’s § 1983 claim impermissibly seeks to challenge the propriety of the 

state court decisions permitting Defendants to inspect his cell phone.4

 Under the RookerFeldman5

 doctrine, federal district courts are barred “from exercising subject matter 

jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. 

TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). Federal claims amounting “to nothing 

more than an impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions” are 

impermissible especially when “[s]uch an order would implicitly reverse the state trial 

court’s findings.” Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case, 

 4 As noted, the search excluded SSI, if any, contained on Lopez’s phone. 

5 The doctrine is based on D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 

(1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 

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Defendants’ request to inspect Lopez’s cell phone was expressly approved by the state 

courts. Thus, Lopez’s present claim that Defendants violated federal law by accessing his 

phone, amounts to a collateral attack on the state court rulings authorizing Defendants to 

inspect his phone. Rooker-Feldman prevents Lopez from attempting to do so. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that Lopez has failed to state a claim for which relief may be 

granted and that any amendment to the Complaint would be futile. Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP is DENIED 

and the action is DISMISSED without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending matters. The Court certifies that 

any appeal taken from this ruling would not be in “good faith” within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 11/10/16 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

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