Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56784/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56784-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS J. CAMPION, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION

COMPANY, INC., a California

corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-56784

D.C. No. 

3:09-cv-00748-

JMA-NLS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Jan M. Adler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 10, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed December 31, 2014

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Susan P. Graber, and

John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

 Per Curiam Opinion;

Dissent by Judge Owens

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2 CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO.

SUMMARY*

Mootness / Class Certification

The panel dismissed, as moot, Douglas Campion’s appeal

from the district court’s order denying his motions for class

certification and leave to amend the judgment, and granting

Old Republic Protection Company, Inc.’s motion for partial

summary judgment in a diversity insurance coverage action.

After the district court granted partial summary judgment

in Old Republic’s favor, Campion and Old Republic reached

a settlement agreement, and the district court granted the

parties’ joint motion and stipulation for dismissal.

The panel applied the framework in Narouz v. Charter

Commc’ns, LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2010), and

held that the appeal was moot because Campion, the putative

class representative, had no financial interest or other

personal interest whatsoever in class certification, and he

lacked a personal stake where he had voluntarily settled his

individual claims. The panel held that although Campion

expressly retained his right to appeal the putative class

claims, that fact made no difference.

Judge Owens dissented from the majority’s holding that

the appeal was moot, and he would hold that Campion’s

appeal remained viable, even though he voluntarily settled his

individual claims, because he retained a personal stake in the

outcome – litigating like a private attorney general on behalf

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO. 3

of the proposed class. Judge Owens would reach the merits

and hold that Campion lacked standing to pursue injunctive

relief, and that the district court correctly denied class

certification.

COUNSEL

Yury A. Kolesnikov (argued) and Francis A. Bottini, Jr.

(briefed), Bottini & Bottini, Inc., La Jolla, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jay N. Varon (argued), Foley & Lardner LLP, Washington,

D.C.; Tammy H. Boggs (briefed), Foley & Lardner LLP, San

Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Douglas J. Campion appeals the district court’s orders

denying his motion for class certification, denying his motion

for leave to amend his complaint, and granting Defendant Old

Republic’s motion for partial summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, we dismiss Campion’s appeal as moot.

Campion brought a class action against Old Republic,

alleging several causes of action, including breach of

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, violations of the California Consumers Legal

Remedies Act, and violations of the California Unfair

Competition Law. In essence, Campion alleges that Old

Republic, a company that sells home warranty plans,

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4 CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO.

arbitrarily denied claims made by him and a putative class of

similarly situated policyholders of Old Republic plans, or

otherwise cheated him and this class out of benefits owed

under their policies.

Following the filing of this action and several years of

motion practice, the district court denied Campion’s motion

to certify a class of Old Republic policyholders and later

granted Old Republic’s motion for partial summary judgment

on Campion’s claims under the California Consumers Legal

Remedies Act. Those orders, as well as the district court’s

order denying Campion leave to amend his complaint after

the deadline, are now being appealed by Campion. But those

orders are not being appealed because there was a trial on the

merits or some dispositive motion filed. Nor is the case up on

appeal because Campion sought an interlocutory appeal.

Rather, after the district court granted partial summary

judgment in Old Republic’s favor, Campion and Old

Republic reached a settlement agreement and filed a joint

motion and stipulation for dismissal with the district court. 

In that motion and stipulation for dismissal, Campion and Old

Republic agreed to dismiss with prejudice Campion’s

individual claims in exchange for the full amount of those

claims. The parties also agreed to dismiss without prejudice

“any class action claims and representative claims” under the

Unfair Competition Law, one of several sets of claims alleged

in Campion’s complaint.

Campion agreed to dismiss the putative class claims

without prejudice but reserved whatever right to appeal it that

he had. The joint motion and stipulation for dismissal reads,

in part, “Plaintiff expressly reserves the right to appeal the

Court’s order denying class certification, the order precluding

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CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO. 5

Plaintiff from pursuing injunctive relief under the [Unfair

Competition Law] claim . . . and any other order in the case.” 

The district court granted the joint motion and stipulation for

dismissal, and Campion brought this appeal to seek review of

the district court’s various orders.

We do not reach the merits of any of the district court’s

orders, because the appeal is moot. After the rulings in Old

Republic’s favor and before Campion’s appeal, the parties

settled all of Campion’s individual claims. Campion

expressly released all of his claims against Old Republic. 

Although Campion expressly retained his right to appeal the

putative class claims, that fact makes no difference.

The test for whether an appeal is moot after the putative

class representative voluntarily settles his individual claims

is whether the class representative retains a personal stake in

the case. Narouz v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 591 F.3d 1261,

1264 (9th Cir. 2010). Campion argues that he has a personal

stake in getting the class certified because he maintains an

interest in the matter as a private attorney general. Our case

law, however, requires a more concrete interest. We have

found jurisdiction over an appeal of a denial of class

certification, after the putative class representative settled his

individual claims, only where the putative class representative

maintained a financial interest in class certification.

In Narouz, our leading case on this issue, we held that an

appeal is not rendered moot after the putative class

representative voluntarily settles his individual claims if the

class representative retains a personal stake that is financial

in nature. In Narouz, the putative class representative signed

a “Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release,”

providing for the full settlement and release of his claims. 

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591 F.3d at 1263. Later, the putative class representative

sought class certification for settlement purposes only, but the

district court denied the motion for class certification. Id. at

1263–64. Following the district court’s denial of that motion,

the class representative filed a stipulation and request for

dismissal with prejudice as to all of his individual claims,

pursuant to the settlement agreement. Id. at 1264. The

district court entered an order terminating the case the next

day, and the class representative appealed the denial of class

certification. Id.

In analyzing whether the appeal was moot in Narouz, we

considered whether the putative class representative had a

concrete personal stake. Id. at 1265. We specifically noted

the class representative’s “obvious financial interest in

obtaining a reversal of the district court’s decision.” Id. The

class representative “retain[ed] a continued financial interest

in the advancement of the class claims, because [he] [was] to

receive an award enhancement fee ($20,000) were the court

to approve the settlement.” Id. That is to say, if Narouz won

for the class on appeal, he would get $20,000 on top of what

he already had been paid.

We applied Narouz in Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney

Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012). In Evon, 688 F.3d at

1020, the plaintiff settled her substantive claim, but not the

amount of her attorney’s fees award. She had claimed more

than $90,000, obtained only $2,301.95 in district court, and

won a remand on appeal on the attorney’s fees issue. Id. at

1020, 1032–34. Her personal stake was indicated by our

remand for a recalculation, which might have been worth

almost $100,000 to her. Id. at 1032–34.

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CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO. 7

In considering whether the plaintiff retained a “personal

stake” in the class claim sufficient to defeat the defendant’s

argument that the appeal was moot, we held that the issue

“turns on the language of her settlement agreement.” Id. at

1021. We then block-quoted the settlement agreement. Id. at

1021–22. The second of the two provisions in the settlement

agreement set forth the plaintiff’s right to recover attorney’s

fees which, as noted, were disputed on appeal. Id. Because

the plaintiff retained a financial interest on appeal, we had no

occasion to address a situation where, as here, the plaintiff

lacked a financial interest.

Applying the Narouz framework here, the appeal is moot

because Campion has no financial interest or other personal

interest whatsoever in class certification. The papers and oral

argument make it clear that, no matter what happens on

appeal, Campion would not get a pennymore. Campion does

not stand to gain compensation for his claims because, under

the terms of the settlement, he received their full value. He

settled attorney’s fees and costs as well as his damages.

Campion cites Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d

1081 (9th Cir. 2011), and U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,

445 U.S. 388 (1980), for support, but those cases are

consistent with our analysis. In each of those cases, the

plaintiff’s individual claims expired involuntarily. When that

happens, the theoretical interest akin to a private attorney

general may, in some circumstances, suffice to meet Article

IIIrequirements. But when the plaintiff voluntarily settles his

or her individual claims, we have found no case that has held

that the “private attorney general” interest suffices; all cases

look to whether the plaintiff has the requisite financial, or

otherwise personal, stake in the outcome of the class claims. 

Indeed, we noted this same distinction between voluntary and

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involuntary expiration of individual claims in Evon, 688 F.3d

at 1021. We referred to “whether a named plaintiff retained

jurisdiction to appeal a denial of class certification after his

or her claims involuntarily expired” as a “related question” to

what happens when a plaintiff voluntarily settles the

individual claims. Id.

Campion concedes that he has no financial or other

personal interest in class certification. Because he settled his

individual claims, Campion lacks a personal stake in this

appeal. His appeal, therefore, must be dismissed as moot.

Appeal DISMISSED as moot.

OWENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

While I agree with the ultimate result in this case—

Campion loses—I dissent from the majority’s holding that

the appeal is moot. Under our current precedent, Campion’s

appeal remains viable, even if he has voluntarily settled his

individual claims, as he retained a personal stake in the

outcome—litigating like a private attorney general on behalf

of the proposed class.

The majority holds that when a named plaintiff

voluntarily settles his claim and no longer has a personal

financial stake in the litigation, he lacks Article III standing

to act on behalf of the class. But, according to the majority,

a plaintiff whose financial interest expires involuntarily

retains Article III standing. See Majority at 5–8.

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CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO. 9

In Narouz v. Charter Communications, LLC, we held

“that when a class representative voluntarily settles his or her

individual claims, but specifically retains a personal stake as

identified by [United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,

445 U.S. 388 (1980)], and [Deposit Guaranty National Bank

v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)], he or she retains jurisdiction

to appeal the denial of class certification.” 591 F.3d 1261,

1264 (9th Cir. 2010). As I understand the settlement in this

case, that is what Campion did—he reserved the right to

appeal the order denying class certification to act like a

private attorney general. The majority reads a “financial-innature” limitation on the personal stake language in Narouz. 

While a personal stake can be and usually is financial in

nature, nothing in Narouz or any other Ninth Circuit case that

the majority cites requires the personal stake to be financial.

Courts have recognized a personal stake as including the

vindication of the class’s interests, the procedural right to

represent a class, and the right to pursue class-wide injunctive

relief. See, e.g., Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403–05; CameronGrant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240,

1246–47 (11th Cir. 2003); Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216,

1226–27 (3d Cir. 1993); Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562,

1564–65 (11th Cir. 1984); McLaughlin v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d

918, 920–21 (5th Cir. 1977). We have held that a plaintiff

whose individual claims become moot may appeal the denial

of class certification so long as he retains “either an

individual economic interest . . . or a private-attorneygeneral-like interest in having a class certified if the

requirements of Rule 23 are met . . . .” Pitts v. Terrible

Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphases

added).

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Nor does our case law suggest that Article III standing to

appeal class claims turns on the voluntariness of the dismissal

of the individual claims. In Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney

Mickell, which the majority cites to support its distinction

between voluntary and involuntary dismissals, we actually

declined to adopt that distinction, reasoning instead that when

a plaintiff settles and voluntarily dismisses his or her

individual claims after the denial of class certification, we

retain jurisdiction to consider the class certification decision

so long as the language of the settlement agreement cannot

“be read to release [the] class claims.” 688 F.3d 1015, 1022

(9th Cir. 2012). Because the settlement agreement here

expressly reserved Campion’s class claims, Evon rejected the

result the majority adopts.

The majority reasons that the appeal in Evon was not

moot because we remanded that case for a recalculation of the

plaintiff’s attorney’s fees award. See Majority at 6. 

However, we did not suggest in Evon that our jurisdiction

turned on the potential for an increased fee award, and such

a holding would not have made sense when attorney’s fees

“are but an ancillary matter” for which jurisdiction exists

“even when the underlying case is moot.” Zucker v.

Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1329 (9th Cir.

1999). Moreover, the fees awarded in Evon pertained to the

plaintiff’s “individual claim,” 688 F.3d at 1020 (emphasis

added), and therefore could not have constituted “a financial

interest in class certification.” Majority at 5.

Iread Article III’s evolution since 1980 to suggest that the

Supreme Court someday will hold that a plaintiff who

voluntarily settles his claim must retain a financial stake in

the litigation to serve as a class representative—the “privateattorney-general-like” interest will not be enough. See, e.g.,

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CAMPION V. OLD REPUBLIC PROTECTION CO. 11

Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1991)

(recognizing that “if a security holder were allowed to

maintain a § 16(b) action after he had lost any financial

interest in its outcome, there would be serious constitutional

doubt whether that plaintiff could demonstrate the standing

required by Article III’s case-or-controversy limitation on

federal court jurisdiction”). In my view, the Supreme Court

should answer the question left open in Geraghty, 445 U.S. at

404 n.10. See, e.g., Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &

Co., 636 F.3d 88, 100 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing circuit

split on issue). But unless and until it does, I read our

precedent differently than my colleagues do.

This discussion is more academic than meaningful to

Campion, as I still think he loses. Unlike the majority, I

would reach the merits and hold that (1) Campion lacks

standing to pursue injunctive relief because his contract with

Old Republic expired before he filed suit, see Hangarter v.

Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021–22

(9th Cir. 2004), and (2) the district court correctly denied

class certification because Campion cannot represent an

injunctive-relief class when he lacks standing to pursue an

injunction, see Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037,

1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

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