Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01184/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01184-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Property Damage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM L. MAGERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUZANNE M. JONES,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-001184-GEB-EFB

ORDER DIMISSMISSING ACTION DUE 

TO LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

Defendant Suzanne M. Jones seeks to have Plaintiff 

William L. Magers judicially estopped from alleging in his 

diversity subject matter jurisdiction allegation in this lawsuit,

a value for tools he previously owned that differs from the 

$18,597.15 value he averred his personal property had in his 

earlier filed bankruptcy petition. Defendant argues this estoppel 

“unequivocally establishes that the value of [P]laintiff’s claims 

in this [federal diversity jurisdiction] case do not . . . meet 

the jurisdictional limit [required] to establish diversity 

jurisdiction . . . under [28 U.S.C.] § 1332(a).” (Def.’s 

Supplemental Br. (“Suppl. Br.”) 1:21-25, ECF No. 51.) Plaintiff 

has not responded to the jurisdictional challenge.1

 

1 On January 8, 2016 Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) challenging subject 

matter jurisdiction in this case. (Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, ECF Nos. 41 & 

42.) On January 12, 2016, the Court vacated the trial date initially set for 

this case “[i]n light of the nature of [Defendant’s] jurisdictional 

challenge.” (Order Vacating Trial Date, ECF No. 46.) On February 3, 2016 the 

Court DENIED Defendant’s motion on the grounds that Rule 12(c) had not been 

shown to be the proper motion to decide the jurisdictional issue, (Order Den. 

J. on the Pleadings, ECF No. 49); and scheduled supplemental briefing on 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists over this action, (Order Scheduling 

Br., ECF No. 50). Defendant subsequently filed a supplemental brief arguing 

that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. (Def.’s Supplemental Br. (“Suppl. 

Br.”), ECF No. 51.) 

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint filed on May 15, 

2014, that after he moved out of Defendant’s residence, Defendant 

denied him access to retrieve tools he inadvertently left there. 

(Pl.’s Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges

Defendant eventually agreed to allow Plaintiff to retrieve his 

tools but the tools were stolen from Defendant’s residence before 

Plaintiff could retrieve them. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff further 

alleges that Defendant is liable for Plaintiff’s “damage[s] in an 

amount not less than $120,000, which represents the fair market 

value of [Plaintiff’s referenced] . . . tools.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

JURISDICTION STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[; 

t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and 

statute . . . . It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside 

this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the 

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen 

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 

(internal citations omitted). “[A] district court ha[s] a duty to 

establish subject matter jurisdiction . . . sua sponte, whether 

[a] part[y] raise[s] the issue or not.” United Investors Life 

Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 

2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any 

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action.”)

A . . . jurisdictional attack may be facial 

or factual. In a facial attack, the 

challenger asserts that the allegations 

contained in a complaint are insufficient on 

their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By 

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contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger 

disputes the truth of the allegations that, 

by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal 

jurisdiction.

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2004) (internal citations omitted). Defendant’s jurisdictional 

argument is factual since she challenges the veracity of 

Plaintiff’s amount in controversy allegation.

“In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the 

district court may review evidence beyond the complaint . . . .” 

Id. If, as here, “the defendant questions the jurisdiction” of 

the federal court, the plaintiff “must carry the burden” of 

establishing jurisdiction. Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, 142

F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 1944). To establish diversity 

jurisdiction “the matter in controversy [must] exceed[] the sum 

or value of $75,000 . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

CONSIDERATION OF DOCUMENTS BEYOND THE PLEADINGS

Defendant includes in her jurisdictional argument her 

request that the Court take judicial notice of Exhibits One 

through Four, which are attached to Defendant’s brief. (ECF Nos. 

53-56). (Def.’s Supplemental Req. for Judicial Notice in Supp. of 

Suppl. Br. (“RJN”), ECF No. 52.) Exhibit One is a “copy of 

Plaintiff’s Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition filed in the United 

States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California,” 

(id. at 2:14-16.); Exhibit Two is a “copy of salient portions of 

Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript, dated March 30, 2015[,]” (id.

at 2:17-18); Exhibit Three is a “copy of Marysville Plumbing, 

handwritten Employee Tool Inventory, dated November 2010, which 

was produced by Plaintiff in response to Defendant’s Request for 

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Production of Documents[,]” (id. at 2:19-22); Exhibit Four is a 

“copy of [the] Declaration of Custodian of Records from 

Marysville Plumbing and Building Supply, Inc. in response to 

Defendant’s Subpoena Duces Tecum . . . [that verifies]

Plaintiff’s employment in 2010 [the year that Plaintiff’s 

Employee Tool Inventory, Exhibit Three, is dated,]” (id. at 2:23-

26).

Defendant contends judicial notice of Plaintiff’s

bankruptcy petition is “proper” since “it is of public record and 

directly relate[s] to the central issue in this case.” (Id. at 

2:1-3.) “[W]e may take notice of proceedings in other courts, 

both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex 

rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 

F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotations 

omitted). Defendant has shown that Plaintiff’s bankruptcy 

petition directly relates to the federal subject matter 

jurisdiction issue. Therefore judicial notice is taken of 

Defendant’s Exhibit 1.

Defendant also contends judicial notice should be taken 

of the remaining portions of her request since Plaintiff’s prior 

employment documents, Exhibits Three and Four, were produced in 

response to Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents, and

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Exhibit Two, was given under 

oath. (RJN 2:4-12.) Defendant has shown that judicial notice 

should be taken of these documents; therefore, the request is 

granted.

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DISCUSSION

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s personal property 

valuation averment made in his bankruptcy petition should 

judicially estop Plaintiff from using a different value for said 

personal property as the basis for satisfying the required 

diversity subject matter jurisdiction amount in controversy in 

the instant lawsuit.

“Judicial estoppel . . . precludes a party from gaining 

an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second 

advantage by taking an incompatible position.” Rissetto v. 

Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 

1996).

The policies underlying preclusion of 

inconsistent positions are general 

considerations of the orderly administration 

of justice and regard for the dignity of 

judicial proceedings. . . . Judicial estoppel 

is intended to protect against a litigant 

playing fast and loose with the courts. . . . 

Because it is intended to protect the dignity 

of the judicial process, it is an equitable 

doctrine invoked by a court at its 

discretion.

Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991).

Defendant’s evidence shows that when Plaintiff gave

deposition testimony in this lawsuit on March 30, 2015, he was 

asked how he arrived at the $120,000 estimation of the tools’ 

value alleged in his complaint, which supports his diversity 

subject matter jurisdiction assertion. (Ex. 2—Magers’ Depo. 

77:18-23, ECF No. 54.) Plaintiff responded, that he arrived at

the $120,000 valuation by looking at the “itemized lists” of 

tools he “submit[ted] to [prior employers]” for insurance 

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purposes, the “very last” of which “was Marysville Plumbing.”

(Id. at 77:24-78:16.) Defendant has supplied the Court with the 

last itemized list that Plaintiff referenced in this deposition 

testimony, which is a “Handwritten Inventory of Tools” dated 

November 2010. (Ex. 3 “Employee Tool Inventory”, ECF No. 55.)

This itemized list evinces that Plaintiff owned the tools at 

issue in this case at least as early as 2010. Plaintiff alleges 

these tools were stolen around February 2013. (Compl. ¶ 12.) 

Defendant has further shown that when Plaintiff filed his 

bankruptcy petition in November 2011, Plaintiff averred that the 

total value of his personal property at that time was $18,597.15. 

(Ex. 1 “United States Bankruptcy Court Voluntary Petition” 7, ECF 

No. 53.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition belies the

$120,000 tools valuation alleged in the instant lawsuit, which

Plaintiff evinces was the value of his tools between November 

2010 and February 2013. Further, in Schedule B of Plaintiff’s 

bankruptcy petition, in which Plaintiff itemized his assets at 

the time of filing, Plaintiff failed to list his tools and marked 

“NONE” in the tools category. (Id. at 10, 12.)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s $120,000 tool valuation, used as 

the basis for his exceeding the $75,000 amount in controversy

requirement in his diversity jurisdiction allegation, is 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s averment in his bankruptcy petition 

that the entirety of his personal property amounted to only 

$18,597.15. In Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case, the Bankruptcy Court 

issued a Discharge of Debtor order in reliance on the 

truthfulness of the facts asserted by Plaintiff in his bankruptcy 

case; therefore, Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting

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incompatible facts concerning valuation of his tools in the 

instant lawsuit. Since the sole basis of diversity jurisdiction 

in Plaintiff’s complaint is contingent upon his $120,000 tool 

valuation, which he is now estopped from asserting, the federal 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction.

Dated: May 20, 2016

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