Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06010/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06010-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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This case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Garland County, 1

 Arkansas and was properly removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

 Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). Diversity of citizenship exist, therefore, this 

 Court has original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Id.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, para. 8 (Doc. 6). 2

See Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 9) and 3

 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion 

 for Summary Judgment (Doc. 10).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

MISSY JONES, Individually and as Parent and

Next Friend of JESSICA JONES, a Minor PLAINTIFFS

v. CASE NO. 05-6010

SEARS, ROEBUCK, and COMPANY DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court this date has for consideration the Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 6) on Plaintiff’s tort claims based on

Arkansas State law. In its motion, Defendant contends Plaintiffs are 1

unable to meet their burden of proof under Arkansas premises liability

case law, and no genuine issues of material fact remain. Plaintiffs 2

allege that genuine issues of material fact exist, specifically

whether the “foreign substance” was present for a time long enough to

render Defendant negligent and whether Defendant committed a tort of

outrage. For the reasons that follow, we determine Defendant’s 3

motion is DENIED.

A. Background

Except as noted, the following facts are not disputed. This case

arises out of events occurring on March 5, 2004, at Defendant’s store

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At the time of the incident, Plaintiff Jessica Jones was 15 year old. 4

 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, para. 2 (Doc. 6).

Plaintiff Missy Jones stated that her daughter described the substance 5

 as cold and wet; however, Plaintiff Jessica Jones only described the 

 substance as wet in her deposition testimony.

2

in Hot Springs, Arkansas. Plaintiff Jessica Jones and her mother, 4

Plaintiff Missy Jones, entered the Defendant’s dressing room area for

Plaintiff Jessica Jones to try on a swimsuit. Upon entering the area,

both Plaintiffs noticed an odor. Plaintiff Missy Jones then entered

a second dressing room, while Plaintiff Missy Jones located a store

employee to inquire about the odor. Plaintiff Missy Jones returned

to the dressing area with a store employee. The store employee,

Regina Murders, contends she searched for any cause of the odor in all

dressing rooms except the one which was occupied by Plaintiff Jessica

Jones. Regina Murders claims she could not find the source of the

odor. Plaintiffs allege that an unidentified store employee stated

that the odor had been there for days and that air freshener had been

sprayed to mask the odor. Neither Plaintiff is able to identify the

employee, other than she was a white woman of medium build with short

hair. No employee has admitted that they made such a comment or that

air freshener had been used. 

Plaintiff Missy Jones departed the dressing area to obtain a

second swimsuit for her daughter to try on, while Plaintiff Jessica

Jones remained in the second dressing room. While Plaintiff Jessica

Jones was putting on the bottom part of the second swimsuit, she felt

something cold and wet on her leg. She stated human feces was on the 5

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swimsuit and was smeared onto her leg as she was putting on the

swimsuit. She called for her mother to help her. Store employees

gave Plaintiff Missy Jones rubbing alcohol and towels, and the

substance was removed. Plaintiff Missy Jones contends she came in

contact with the feces while attending her daughter.

B. Discussion

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court

must view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 562 (8th

Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the

absence of issues of material fact in the record and of establishing

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986). “Judgment

as a matter of law is appropriate only where the nonmoving party has

presented insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in his or

her favor. . . .” Harvey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33 F.3d 969 (8th

Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is improper if “a genuine issue of fact

or conflicting inferences can be drawn from the undisputed facts. .

. .” Jenkins v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty, 307 F.3d 741, 743 (8th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.1 (6th

Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). 

The Jenkins Court was faced with disputed facts regarding whether

a person was an employee in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act

case. In an affidavit, the plaintiff stated that the defendant played

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a role in how the plaintiff was to conduct his business; whereas the

defendant stated in its affidavit that it had no role in the business

decisions of the plaintiff. The Court held that the disputed fact was

material, because a reasonable inference can be drawn from the

evidence that the plaintiff was an employee, a finding of which “could

affect the result in the case.” Id. at 744. The Court ruled that the

“determination of whether [the plaintiff] is an employee is too close

to be made as a matter of law, so [the plaintiff] is entitled to reach

the jury on this issue.” Id. at 745. 

Arkansas law is applicable to this diversity case. See Id. at

971 (applying Arkansas law to a slip and fall case where the fall

occurred in a store located in Arkansas). An Arkansas property owner

“has a general duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the premises

in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of the invitees.” Id.

(quoting Mankey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Ark.

1993)). The presence of a foreign substance in the store, without

more, does not prove negligence. Id. (citing Mankey, 858 S.W.2d at

87). To prevail in a case against a property owner for failing to

maintain the store in a reasonably safe manner, the plaintiff must

show that (1). the substance was present as a result of the

defendant’s negligence, or (2). the substance was present for a long

enough period of time that the defendant knew or reasonably should

have known of its presence and failed to remove it. See Wilson v. J.

Wade Quinn Company, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Ark. 1997) (citation

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Plaintiff do not allege that the substance was present due to 6

 Defendant’s negligence.

Plaintiff Missy Jones recounts that her daughter told her the substance 7

 was cold and wet; however, Plaintiff Jessica Jones states only that it was 

 wet.

5

omitted). 

1. “Foreign Substance” Claim.

To prove Defendant had knowledge that a foreign substance was

present and/or the substance was present for sufficient that Defendant

should have known of its presence, Plaintiff presented an alleged 6

statement by an unidentified store employee that they had used air

freshener to cover the odor and the recollection of Plaintiff Jessica

Jones that the substance was cold and wet. 7

Defendant produced deposition testimony to show two employees

were unaware that any substance was present, and that neither employee

detected an odor that would have caused one to reasonably know that

a foreign substance was present. Defendant presented evidence,

through employee depositions, that the dressing rooms were supposed

to be checked every night by an employee and that a cleaning crew

cleaned the rooms every night. Defendant also presented evidence that

a store employee, Regina Murders, checked all of the dressing rooms

approximately 15 minutes prior to Plaintiffs entering the area. 

In Sanders v. Banks, 830 S.W.2d 861 (Ark. 1992), the plaintiff

slipped and fell on a substance she guessed was tobacco juice. She

described the substance as brown, slimy, and gelled. She reasoned

that the substance had to have been present for a long time, as it had

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gelled. However, the court found that “absent . . . evidence as to

how long it would have taken it to ‘gell’, even assuming, again

without evidence that it does gell, there was no evidence that the

substance which was allegedly on the floor had been there long enough

that store personnel should have had notice of it.” Id. at 863.

However, the Plaintiffs, in the case sub judice, presented evidence

that the substance was cold. Reason would have the substance being

present for sufficient time for it to become cold, absent additional

factors. 

Plaintiffs cite the Arkansas Supreme Court case Wilson v. J. Wade

Quinn Company, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 167 (1997), where the alleged

statement made by a store employee raised a question of fact. The

Wilson Court addressed the issue of an employee allegedly stating that

he thought “that” had been cleaned up, after the accident (the

plaintiff had fallen on a substance and was leaving a restroom after

cleaning himself up when he heard the employee’s comment). Id. The

court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed,

because the substance consisted of dirty water and mashed food

particles that was spread over a wide floor area, as if it had been

walked through for some time, and the employee’s statement “add[ed]

considerable weight to the possible conclusion that the store was

negligent by virtue of knowledge of the presence of the substance and

fail[ed] to remove it.” Id. at 169.

 

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It is not stated in the opinion whether the employee was identified. 8

7

The facts in Wilson are similar to the facts in the present case.

In Wilson, the alleged comment, coupled with the obvious appearance

of the foreign substance presents a factual question of whether an

employee was aware of the substance prior to the accident and whether

the substance was present for sufficient time for the defendant to

know of its existence. The same can be said in the present case. 8

The obvious appearance of the foreign substance, cold, together with

a statement purportedly made by an employee that the odor had been

present for days and air freshener was used to cover the odor,

presents a factual question of whether an employee was aware of the

substance prior to Plaintiffs coming in contact with it and whether

the substance was present for sufficient time that Defendant should

have known of its existence. 

Plaintiffs have failed to identify the person who allegedly made

the statement. Additionally, Defendant has provided evidence that

neither of two employees working in the dressing room area that day,

Colandra Wallace and Regina Murders, made such a comment. They

likewise, were not aware of an odor in the area or that air freshener

had been used. However, we find that the competing arguments

regarding whether such a comment was made by Defendant’s employee is

an issue of material fact, because a finding by the jury that an

employee did make such a comment could affect the result in the case.

th. Additionally, there is a factual issue as to whether the dressing

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room had been cleaned the night before the incident. This case is

admittedly close, and a jury may well return a verdict in favor of

Defendant. However, a close case should not be resolved on summary

judgment, as the facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in

light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Jenkins, 307 F.3d 741. 

2. Tort of Outrage.

Under Arkansas law, the tort of outrage “is essentially that of

intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Manning v.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc., 127 F.3d 686 (8 Cir. th

1997) (citation omitted). “[T]he Arkansas courts take a very narrow

view of the claims of outrage,” holding that “[t]he tort is clearly

not intended to provide legal redress for every slight insult or

indignity that one must endure.” Id. at 690 (citations omitted). The

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has found four elements that must be

proven to establish a tort of outrage:

1. the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew

or should have known that emotional distress was the likely

result of his conduct;

2. the conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community;

3. the actions of the defendant were the cause of the

plaintiff’s distress; and

4. the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was

so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to

endure it.

Id. (citing Doe v. Wright, 82 F.3d 265, 269 (8 Cir. 1996) (citing th

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Deitsch v. Tillery, 833 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Ark. 1992))). 

Our finding that there is a question of fact that remains

regarding Defendant’s knowledge of the substance or that the substance

was present long enough that Defendant should have know of its

existence, results in the presence of the same question of fact

regarding the first element of the tort of outrage. Accordingly, the

Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim of outrage is not subject to

summary judgment. 

C. Conclusion

The Court, after reviewing the pleadings and the evidence on

file, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party as required, finds that there remain genuine issues of

disputed material facts, including but not limited to, whether a store

employee made a comment about an odor being present for days, and

whether Defendant did clean the dressing room the night before the

incident. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

This case remains set for Jury Trial during the week of January 23,

2006, in Hot Springs, Arkansas.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20 day of December 2005. th 

 /S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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