Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00715/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00715-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABE BEAUPERTHUY, et al. on behalf

of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

24 HOUR FITNESS USA, INC., a

California corporation d/b/a 24

Hour Fitness; SPORT AND FITNESS

CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC., a

California corporation d/b/a 24

Hour Fitness,

Defendants.

 

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No. 06-00715 SC

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL

PRODUCTION OF NAMES

AND ADDRESSES FOR

FACILITATED NOTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Gabe Beauperthuy, et al., ("Plaintiffs") have

filed a Motion to Compel Supplemental Production of Names and

Addresses for Facilitated Notice ("Motion to Compel"). See Docket

No. 176. Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendants 24 Hour Fitness

USA, Inc., and Sport and Fitness Clubs of America, Inc.

(collectively "Defendants" or "24 Hour Fitness"), to produce

additional names and addresses for facilitated notice pursuant to

the Court's Opt-In Order. Defendants filed an Opposition and

Case 3:06-cv-00715-SC Document 185 Filed 10/12/07 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs filed a Reply. See Docket Nos. 179, 182.

After reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court hereby

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' motion.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are exhaustively documented in

previous orders and filings. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part

and Denying in Part Pls.' Mot. for Facilitated Notice ("Order for

Facilitated Notice"), March 6, 2007, Docket No. 124; Opt-In Order,

May 9, 2007, Docket No. 145; Order Granting in Part and Denying in

Part Pls.' Mot. for Leave to File Mot. to Compel ("Order Granting

Leave"), August 28, 2007, Docket No. 174. The Court assumes the

parties' familiarity with the case and only discusses those facts

relevant to the issues now before the Court.

On August 28, 2007, the Court issued an Order Granting in

Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs Leave to File a Motion to

Compel Supplemental Production of Names and Addresses for

Facilitated Notice ("Order Granting Leave"). Docket No. 174. 

Pursuant to this Order, Plaintiffs have filed the Motion to

Compel.

III. DISCUSSION

In the Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs seek the following

relief: (1) an order compelling supplemental production of the

names of all persons employed by 24 Hour Fitness outside of

California between December 31, 1998, and the date that Defendants

were required to produce the list of names; (2) an order that

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants use their Payroll Department, rather than their Human

Resources Department, to generate the list of persons included in

the Opt-In Notice; (3) an order to show cause why certain persons

identified by Plaintiffs should not be included by Defendants on

the list of individuals to whom notice is to be sent; and (4) an

order that Defendants fully answer certain questions put forward

in a letter sent July 11, 2007, from Richard Donahoo, counsel for

Plaintiffs, to Lisa Chagala, Counsel for Defendants. The Court

addresses each in turn.

A. Supplemental Production of Names

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have provided a list of

names that excludes certain job titles that should have been

included and that Defendants have misinterpretted both the

definition of the class of employees covered under the Opt-In

Order and the dates for the Claims Period as defined in the same

Order. Mot. to Compel at ii.

1. Definition of Class Members

To begin, there appears to be some confusion regarding the

definition of the class members. On March 6, 2007, the Court

conditionally certified a FLSA collective class consisting of

persons who worked for 24 Hour Fitness as a General Manager,

Operations Manager or Fitness Manager in states outside

California. Order for Facilitated Notice at 19. Subsequently, on

May 9, 2007, the Court issued an Opt-In Order. Docket No. 145. 

In this Order, the collective class was defined as "all persons

who work or have worked for 24 Hour Fitness in any state in the

United States, except California . . . in any managerial position

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1

 Both parties agree that the conditionally certified class

is limited to club-level jobs. Defs.' Opp'n at 11.

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classified by 24 Fitness as exempt from overtime requirements." 

Opt-In Order at 2. 

In case the language of the Opt-In Order appeared to create a

larger class of eligible employees than the language of the March

6 Order, it did not. The relevant class is still General

Managers, Fitness Managers and Operations Managers.1

 In both the

initial Complaint and the Motion to Certify the Class, Plaintiffs

themselves stated that the proposed class consisted of General

Managers, Fitness Managers and Operations Managers. See Compl. at

2, Docket No. 1; Mot. to Certify Class at ii, Docket No. 69. 

Thus, there should be no confusion regarding the definition of the

collective class.

2. Opt-In Period

On May 9, 2007, the Court issued the Opt-In Order, which

allowed the Plaintiffs' claims to proceed as a collective action

under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29

U.S.C. § 216(b). See Opt-In Order at 2. In this Order, the Court

stated that the Claims Period was "during the time period between

December 31, 1998, and the present . . . ." Id. The parties now

dispute what was meant by "the present."

In the Opt-In Order, the Court stated that Defendants would

produce to Plaintiffs a list of the names and addresses of all the

current and former employees of Defendants who qualified under the

conditional collective class. Id. This list was to be produced

within sixty (60) days from the date of the Order. Id. The Order

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was issued on May 9, 2007. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs argue that the

claims period therefore ended on July 9, 2007, sixty (60) days

from date of the Order. See Mot. to Compel at 9. Defendants

assert that the claims period terminated on May 9, 2007, when the

Order was issued.

The Opt-in Order created a claims period that included

employees of the relevant class who were working for Defendants at

the time that the list was to be produced. Thus, the claims

period terminated July 9, 2007. Had the Court intended the claims

period to terminate on May 9, 2007, it would have so stated.

B. Method of Collecting Names and Addresses

Plaintiffs assert that the method used by Defendants to

gather the names and addresses of relevant employees was flawed. 

Mot. to Compel at 6. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that because

Defendants used their Human Resources department rather than the

Payroll department to generate the list of employees for the optin notice, employees who should have been included on the list

were left off. Id. at 8. 

One of the primary issues regarding the collective class is

whether employees who were labeled as managers were in fact

treated as exempt pursuant to the FLSA. It appears that the most

reliable method for determining whether an employee was in fact

treated, i.e. paid, as exempt would be examining how that employee

was labeled by the Payroll Department. This inference is

supported by evidence put forth by Plaintiffs. In particular,

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that it is possible for an

employee to be paid as an exempt employee by the Payroll

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Department but be listed as a non-exempt employee in the Human

Resources database. See Mot. to Compel at 8. 

Defendants counter that "Defendants' payroll system receives

data from the human resources information system. Accordingly,

searching the payroll system is superfluous." Opp'n at 16. It is

unclear from this argument, however, exactly what information is

shared between the two departments. The only information relevant

to the case at hand is whether an employee's status as exempt

under the FLSA is the same in both the Payroll Department and the

Human Resources Department. Plaintiffs have presented evidence

that this may not always be the case. If this is in fact correct,

some employees who are eligible to receive the opt-in notice will

be left out. Given that the most compelling argument Defendants

raise against using records from Payroll is that it would be

"superfluous," the Court hereby orders Defendants to cross-check

persons included in the Opt-In Order with the records contained in

Defendants' Payroll Department. 

C. Order to Show Cause Why Certain Persons Identified by

Plaintiffs Should Not Be Included on the Opt-In List

Plaintiffs move the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause why

the names of certain employees who have recently contacted

Plaintiffs' counsel and who are allegedly eligible to receive the

Opt-In Notice were nonetheless not included by Defendants on the

list provided to the Claims Administrator. Mot. to Compel at 6. 

In light of the clarifications contained in this Order regarding

the definition of the class and of the Claims Period, an Order to

Show Cause does not appear necessary. The Court is confident that

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Defendants will now fully comply with its obligations and provide

Plaintiffs and the Claims Administrator a complete list of

employees who qualify for the conditional class during the Claims

Period.

D. Answer to Questions from July 7, 2007, Letter

Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to fully

respond to questions 3 and 5 from a letter sent July 11, 2007,

from Richard Donahoo, counsel for Plaintiffs, to Lisa Chagala,

Counsel for Defendants. Included in the information sought by

Plaintiffs through these questions is a list of job descriptions

for a number of managerial positions at 24 Hour Fitness. See Mot.

to Compel at 10. Defendants, in response, state that "Defendants

did the best they could under the circumstances but were unable to

obtain job descriptions for all 187 job titles by September 5[,

2007]." Opp'n at 9. Part of the reason for the delay,

apparently, was the fact that "Defendants' primary in-house

contact was on vacation until September 5, and one of Defendants'

counsel was on vacation until September 10." Id. 

The Court reminds Defendants that an Order was already issued

by the Court to answer these questions. See Order Granting Leave

at 7 ("Defendants shall provide written answers to Questions 1, 3,

5, 6, and 8 in the July 11, 2007, letter . . .") (emphasis added). 

There was nothing ambiguous in this previous Order. Defendants,

for the second time, are ordered to fully answer these questions

and provide a full list of the requested job descriptions.

D. Meet and Confer

In the latest salvo of briefs filed with the Court each party

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 The Court notes, for example, than in the Defendants'

Opposition, they document their own efforts to meet and confer by

providing a list of fourteen (14) exchanges with Plaintiffs. As

should be clear from the above-cited definition, however, at least

six of these exchanges were not direct communications and are not,

therefore, examples of meeting and conferring.

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accuses the other of failing to meet and confer. See, e.g., Pls.'

Mot. to Compel at iv (stating that Defendants have not been

willing "to fully respond to Plaintiffs' attempts to meet and

confer . . ."); Defs.' Opp'n at 10 (stating "Plaintiffs failed to

fully participate in the meet and confer process"). The Court

reminds both parties that familiarity with, and adherence to, the

Civil Local Rules is not optional. The Court admonishes both

parties to reread Civil Local Rule 1-5(n). In particular, the

Court notes for the parties that Rule 1-5(n) states:

'Meet and confer' or 'confer' means to

communicate directly . . . . The mere

sending of a written, electronic, or

voice-mail communication . . . does not

satisfy a requirement to 'meet and

confer' or to 'confer.' Rather, this

requirement can be satisfied only through

direct dialogue and discussion . . . . 

Civil L. R. 1-5(n) (emphasis added). The parties' full

understanding of the definition of 'meet and confer' is suspect.2

With Rule 1-5(n) in mind, the Court orders both parties to

continue to meet and confer.

E. Special Master

Finally, Defendants have requested that the Court appoint a

Special Master to oversee discovery and other disputes. Opp'n at

17. Plaintiffs oppose this request. Reply at 9. The Defendants'

request for a Special Master is DENIED. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for an order

compelling supplemental production of the names of all persons

employed outside of California between December 31, 1998, and July

9, 2007, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for an order that

Defendants use their Payroll Department, rather than their Human

Resources Department, to generate the list of persons included in

the Opt-In notice is also GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for an

order to show cause why certain persons identified by Plaintiffs

should not be included by Defendants on the list of individuals to

whom notice is to be sent is DENIED. Plaintiffs motion for an

order that Defendants fully answer certain questions put forward

in the letter sent July 11, 2007, from Richard Donahoo, counsel

for Plaintiffs, to Lisa Chagala, Counsel for Defendants is

GRANTED. Finally, Defendants' request that the Court appoint a

Special Master is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2007.

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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