Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00477/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00477-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KELLY ALEXANDER, an individual, 

DONALD PORTER, an individual, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

HUSSAM KUJOK, an individual; 

HUSSAM KUJOK, M.D., INC.; MARK 

DEBRUIN, an individual; DEBRUIN 

MEDICAL CENTER, A.P.C.; GILBERT 

MARTINEZ, an individual; FAMILY 

MEDICINE AND AMBULATORY CARE 

CENTERS, INC.; DHEERAJ KAMRA, 

an individual; CAPITOL INTERNAL 

MEDICINE ASSOCIATES; THOMAS 

A. DEL ZOTTO, an individual; 

ROBERT W. LARSEN, an individual; 

and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-00477-MCE-CKD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Kelly Alexander and Donald Porter (“Plaintiffs” 

unless otherwise noted) seek damages and injunctive relief under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). The jurisdiction of this court 

is premised on federal question jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In 

addition to their federal claims under the ADA, Plaintiffs also assert pendant state law 

claims under 1) California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51, et seq.; 

Case 2:15-cv-00477-MCE-AC Document 77 Filed 01/21/16 Page 1 of 7
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2) California’s Disabled Persons Act, California Civil Code § 54, et seq.; 3) California’s 

Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1; and 4) common law negligence claims. Finally, 

Plaintiffs also assert a cause of action for violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794. Presently before the Court are virtually identical motions to drop or sever brought 

by three of the six doctors/medical entities being sued by Plaintiff Alexander.1

 Those 

Defendants include 1) Hussam Kujok M.D. and his medical practice, Hussam Kujok, 

M.D., Inc. (collectively “Dr. Kujok”); 2) Mark Debruin and his medical practice, Debruin 

Medical Center A.P.C. (“Dr. Debruin”); and 3) Robert W. Larsen, DPM (“Dr. Larsen”). 

All three Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ claims against them are separate and 

unrelated, and consequently lack the common questions of law or fact necessary to 

justify joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.2

 Arguing that they have 

therefore been misjoined, Defendants move to drop or sever their joint status as 

Defendants pursuant to Rule 21. Defendants thereby request that any claims against 

them be tried separately as opposed to adjudicated together in the same proceeding. 

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions to Drop or Sever are 

DENIED.3

 

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiffs, who are both profoundly deaf, use American Sign Language ("ASL") as 

their primary means of communication. Both are on SSI and their Medi-Cal coverage 

 1

 The second Plaintiff, Donald Porter, asserts claims only against Gilbert Martinez and his medical 

practice, Family Medicine and Ambulatory Care Centers, Inc. Neither Dr. Martinez nor his practice has 

moved to drop or sever and consequently Plaintiff Porter’s claims are not implicated by this Memorandum 

and Order. 

2

 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted. 

3

 Having determined that oral argument was not of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

Motion submitted on the briefing in accordance with Local Rule 230(g). 

4

 The facts in this section are drawn, in some cases verbatim, from the allegations as set forth in 

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. 

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was assigned to the Hills Medical Group, a large consortium of some 3,800 physicians. 

When their primary physician, Mark Moody, retired, both Plaintiffs needed to find a new 

doctor within the Hills Group. Plaintiffs Alexander and Porter were initially referred for 

that purpose to Drs. Kujok and Martinez, respectively. 

 Plaintiff Alexander was told by Dr. Kujok's office in April of 2014 that they were no 

longer accepting new patients once told she needed an ASL interpreter. Plaintiff's 

insurance agent then called and was ultimately told that Dr. Kujok was not willing to 

provide interpreting services. 

Following Dr. Kujok’s refusal to provide medical treatment with the aid of an ASL 

interpreter, Plaintiff Alexander sought care from several other Hills Physician Group 

doctors. In July of 2014, she was accepted as a patient by Dr. Debruin and scheduled 

an initial appointment on July 28, 2014. Dr. Debruin’s office informed Plaintiff that they 

would not schedule an interpreter. Although his staff later told Plaintiff that they would 

make the necessary arrangements, when Alexander presented for her initial visit she 

was told that no interpreter had been ordered. During the course of his evaluation, 

Dr. Debruin told Alexander that she could communicate well and didn't need an 

interpreter. When Dr. Debruin suggested they use notes, Alexander explained that ASL 

is not English and is not directly translatable. According to Plaintiff, particularly when 

technical terms are involved, use of ASL is critical for purposes of accurate 

communication. Dr. Debruin's insistence that Plaintiff could in that event communicate in 

writing caused Alexander to leave his office. 

Plaintiff Alexander was subsequently referred to a third potential primary care 

doctor, Dr. Kamra. Although Kamra’s office staff originally advised Plaintiff that an ASL 

interpreter would be provided, when she arrived for her appointment no interpreter was 

present. Plaintiff went ahead and saw Dr. Kamra anyway because the foot injury she 

was suffering from had already been exacerbated by delay occasioned by the abovedescribed interpreter issues. Alexander therefore felt she needed immediate attention 

and could not wait to reschedule. According to Plaintiff, her communication was 

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impeded without an interpreter and Dr. Kamra failed to correctly note Plaintiff’s allergy to 

iodine. 

Dr. Kamra did refer Plaintiff to a podiatrist, Dr. Del Zotto, to evaluate a foreign 

body in her left foot. Dr. Del Zotto told Plaintiff, however, that his business partner, 

Dr. Larsen, refused to provide interpreting services and that she would have to go to a 

different podiatrist. Plaintiff’s appointment with Dr. Del Zotto was accordingly cancelled. 

As a result of the conduct of the above-described physicians, Plaintiff Alexander 

claims that she encountered almost a year’s delay in obtaining treatment for her foot 

condition which both exacerbated her physical discomfort and caused emotional 

distress. 

 Through the motions to drop or sever now before the Court, Drs. Kujok, Debruin 

and Larsen argue that they have been misjoined as defendants and that any claims 

against them must accordingly be tried separately. 

STANDARD 

Rule 20(a) authorizes the joinder of defendants in a single proceeding under 

certain circumstances, stating that all persons 

may be joined in one action as defendants if (A) there is 

asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, 

any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences; and (B) any question of fact common to all 

defendants will arise in the action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Subsection (a)(3) of the Rule clarifies that to be so joined, 

”[n]either a plaintiff nor a defendant need be interested in obtaining or defending against 

all the relief demanded.” Id. at 20(a)(3). 

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ANALYSIS 

In interpreting the scope of joinder under Rule 20, the Supreme Court states that 

“joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged,” with a view to 

“entertaining the broadest scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.” United 

Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). Lower courts have therefore 

repeatedly recognized that Rule 20 “is to be construed liberally in order to promote trial 

convenience and to expedite the final termination of disputes, thereby preventing 

multiple lawsuits.” League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 

558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 

1330, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1974). To that end, “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed the 

lower courts to employ a liberal approach to permissive joinder of claims and parties in 

the interest of judicial economy.” Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 

(11th Cir. 2000). 

Moving Defendants opine that joinder should not be permitted because the 

alleged discrimination against Plaintiff Alexander occurred at different times and 

locations and involved different actors. Defendants accordingly urge the Court to find 

Plaintiff’s interactions with the various physicians to be “completely separate” with joinder 

therefore being inappropriate. 

As indicated above, however, the language of Rule 20 itself indicates that claims 

need not be coextensive in order for joinder to be proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(3). 

Plaintiffs argue that Plaintiff’s claims arose out of a series of related transactions or 

occurrences as she was transferred from one Hills Medical Group physician to another 

and encountered repeated obstacles in accommodating her disability so as to obtain 

effective care. Plaintiffs urge the court to find that because the treatment she endured 

was logically related, joinder should be permitted. As the Alexander court noted. “all 

‘logically related’ events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another 

generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence.” Alexander, 207 F.3d 

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at 1323, citing Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333. The Ninth Circuit has recognized a similarly 

expansive definition of transaction, even if not directly in the context of a Rule 20 

analysis. See, e.g., Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(defining “transaction or occurrence” as meaning “similarity in the factual background of 

a claim”); see also Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1960) 

(claims that have definite “logical relationship” arise out of same transaction or 

occurrence). 

Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains no conspiracy 

allegations no logical relationship is present and the claims against them should be 

viewed as entirely distinct. The Court disagrees. All the Defendant physicians are the 

members of the same medical group, and Plaintiffs allege that the Group’s practice of 

not providing interpreting services led the Defendants to act collectively as they did in 

uniformly failing to provide them with adequate accommodation. Moreover, the various 

referrals between Defendants produced the overall pattern of discrimination identified by 

Plaintiffs. Collectively, there is enough of a “similarity” between claims to find a common 

series of transactions and occurrences that, in turn, justifies joinder. 

Significantly, too, it would be an inordinate waste of judicial time and resources to 

litigate these claims separately against the various Defendants. Any minimal potential 

prejudice that could result to Defendants from joinder is far outweighed by the needless 

cost and effort to both the Court and Plaintiffs that separate trials would entail. 

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CONCLUSION 

For all the reasons set forth below, the Motions to Drop or Sever brought on 

behalf of Dr. Kujok (ECF No. 25), Dr. DeBruin ECF No. 36), and Dr. Larsen ECF No. 66) 

are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 20, 2016 

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