Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY COSBY,

NO. CIV. S-08-505 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

AUTOZONE, INC., JIM KULBACKI

and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

This case concerns the award of fees to plaintiff after a jury

trial. For the reasons discussed below, the court intends to award

fees to plaintiff in the manner described below. The court does not

calculate the amount at this time, however, because a issue remains

that will affect the final award.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 26, 2010, the court began trial in the above

captioned case. Plaintiff tried several claims under

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). On

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February 12, 2010, the jury reached a verdict. The jury found

for plaintiff on his claims of failure to engage in the

interactive process of accommodation and failure to provide

reasonable accommodation. The jury awarded plaintiff $174,000 in

economic losses and $1,326,000 in mental suffering damages. No

punitive damages were awarded. The jury found for defendant on

the remaining claims of failure to prevent discrimination based

upon his physical disability and retaliation for engaging in

protected activity, and disability discrimination-disparate

treatment. 

On April 21, 2010, plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees and

costs. On May 10, 2010, defendant filed an opposition to

plaintiff’s motion. This motion was heard on May 24, 2010.

Subsequently, the court ordered supplemental briefing on the

questions of (1) whether and/or under what conditions may the

court reduce the fees awarded to plaintiff by a percentage of

fees billed and (2) whether Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. __

(2010), should apply to the calculation of fees in the instant

case. The parties filed supplemental briefing on these

questions.

II. STANDARD

Under FEHA, "the court, in its discretion, may award to the

prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees and costs . . . .”

Cal. Gov't Code § 12965(b). The Americans with Disabilities Act

("ADA"), the federal analog for disability claims under FEHA,

provides for an identical test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (“In any

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action or proceeding under this title, the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . to pay a

reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . .”); see

also, Asberry v. City of Sacramento/Sanitation Dept., No.

S-01-2343 LKK/PAN, 2004 WL 3636054, *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2004)

(applying same test for fees under ADA and FEHA). The propriety

of awarding attorney's fees turns on three questions: (1) Is the

party to whom attorney fees will be awarded a prevailing party?;

(2) Should the court exercise its discretion to award the fees?;

and (3) What is a reasonable award?

The Supreme Court has articulated the standard for a

finding of “prevailing party” as whether the party has

“succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which

achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing

suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citing

Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978)). The Ninth

Circuit, in discussing whether a party has achieved “prevailing”

status, has noted that a party can achieve that status by

establishing a “clear, causal relationship between the

litigation brought and the practical outcome realized.”

Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1983).

Although the statutes use the terms “discretion” and “may,”

courts in interpreting the statutes have looked to the

legislative history and concluded that in the absence of special

circumstances, a prevailing party should ordinarily recover

attorney fees. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.

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1987); Cummings v. Benco Bldg. Serv's, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1383,

1387 (1992).

Both federal and California courts have adopted the

“lodestar” method for calculating attorney's fees. Hensley, 461

U.S. at 433; Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49 (1977). To

determine the appropriate fee amount, the court multiplies the

number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a

reasonable hourly rate. Id. However, California's law of

attorneys' fee awards under FEHA has diverged from federal law

as developed under civil rights fee-shifting statutes in that

the use of multipliers in calculating fees under 42 U.S.C. §

1988 does not control fee awards under FEHA. Flannery v. Calif.

Highway Patrol., 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 645-46 (1998) (stating

that there is no evidence that the California legislature

"intended or intends federal standards to apply to limit the

trial court's exercise of discretion in calculating the amount

of reasonable attorney fees under California fee-shifting

statutes generally or under the FEHA provision in particular"). 

Under California law, after developing the touchstone

lodestar amount, the trial court may then augment or reduce the

fee award in light of a number of relevant factors. Nichols v.

City of Taft, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1240 (2007) (citing

Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49 (1977)); Vo v. Las

Virgenes Municipal Water Dist., 79 Cal. App. 4th 440, 445-446

(2000). Those factors include: “. . .(1) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in

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 In Serrano v. Priest, the California Supreme Court listed 1

relevant factors that may weigh in favor of increasing or

decreasing the lodestar figure. 20 Cal. 3d at 49. The list is not

exclusive and a court may determine that other factors are relevant

in a particular case. See Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, 92 Cal. App.

4th 819, 834 (2001) (stating that there is “no hard-and-fast rule

limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial

discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation”).

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presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the

litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and]

(4) the contingent nature of the fee award. The purpose of such

adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the

particular action.” Nichols, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1240 (quoting

Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001)) (internal

citations omitted). “Of course, the trial court is not required 1

to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for

contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although

it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case. . . . In

each case, the trial court should . . . consider the degree to

which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk,

extraordinary skill, or other factors under Serrano [v. Priest].

. . . [A] trial court should not consider these factors to the

extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.”

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1138.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Prevailing Party

The jury awarded judgment to plaintiff in two of his

claims. It also awarded plaintiff damages in an amount of $1.5

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million. While the jury did award judgment to defendant in two

claims, it is clear that plaintiff is a prevailing party. In

fact, defendant does not oppose plaintiff’s motion on this

ground.

B. Discretionary Award

The court also finds that it may properly exercise its

discretion to award fees. No special circumstances exist here to

suggest otherwise.

C. Reasonable Fee

1. Attorney Billing Rate

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees at the following

rates: (1) Trial Counsel Lawrance A. Bohm (“Bohm”), $375 per

hour; (2) Joseph Earley, III (“Earley”), $400 per hour; and (3)

Charles Moore (“Moore”), $450 per hour. Defendant only opposes

the hourly rate for Charles Moore. However, the court finds both

Earley’s and Moore’s hourly rates to be excessive. Specifically,

there are no grounds for counsel who assisted trial counsel to

bill at a rate higher than that for which trial counsel billed.

For this reason, the court reduces Earley and Moore’s hourly

rates to $375.

2. Number of Hours

a. Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant raises several concerns about the number of hours

billed by plaintiff. First, defendant argues that it should not

be responsible for any fees incurred due to inefficiencies

resulting from Charles Moore’s replacement of Joseph Earley, III

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as co-counsel. Defendant does not, however identify any fees

that demonstrate such an inefficiency. Further, plaintiff argues

that there were no such inefficiencies. Accordingly, the court

finds that defendant is not entitled to a reduction in the

number of hours billed on this ground.

Second, defendant argues that there was no reason for both

Bohm and Earley to travel to Albuquerque, New Mexico to take the

deposition of Nicole McCollum. Plaintiff contends that it was

necessary for both counsel to attend this deposition because

“Earley’s attendance was required to assist with preparation,

strategizing the day before as well as on the spot.” Reply at 3-

4. Plaintiff continues to state that he reasonably believed that

he would require Earley’s assistance “as a back up in case there

was any problem attending or completing the deposition” “[d]ue

to the remote location of the deposition.” Plaintiff concludes 

noting that defendant had two counsel at every deposition. The

court is not persuaded that two counsel were necessary at this

deposition. Plaintiff has not explained why the remote location

of the deposition in any way required the attendance of two

attorneys. Further, plaintiff has provided no information asidw

from geography as to why this deposition required two counsel

when every other deposition only required one. For this reason,

the court deducts the hours billed by Earley to attend this

deposition.

Third, defendants argue that it was unreasonable for Earley

to spend 16.5 hours accompanying a witness from Northern

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California so that he could testify at trial. Plaintiff states

that it was necessary for Earley to do so because this witness

was suffering serious medical problems. Specifically, plaintiff

contends that the medical concerns “made interviewing and

preparing Mr. Gasero complicated and challenging.” Plaintiff has

not, however, provided any indication that Earley was doing

legal work while accompanying this witness. In particular,

plaintiff has not demonstrated that a paralegal would not have

been capable of performing the same tasks as Earley. For this

reason, the court reduces Earley’s lodestar for these 16.5 hours

to $100, the rate billed by paralegals.

Fourth, defendant argues that Bohm engaged in significant

“overkill” in his trial presentation. Specifically, defendant

contends that much of plaintiff’s trial brief concerned matters

outside the scope of the trial and most of his exhibits were not

used in the case. The court finds that plaintiff’s trial

preparation was not so excessive to cause a reduction in fees.

However, as described below, the fee request is reduced as a

result of numerous problematic time entries not identified by

defendant.

Fifth, defendant argues that many of the fees billed in

this case concerned work done in Kell v. AutoZone, and is

therefore not properly billed here. Defendant, however did not

identify which entries should be stricken on this grounds, but

rather challenges that the time spent on document review should

be reduced. The court is troubled by many time entries listed by

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plaintiff which appear to be related to the Kell matter. These

include numerous telephone calls with Kell (see, e.g., entries

dated 1/8/10, 1/10/10, 1/11/10, 1/14/10, 1/19/10, 1/21/10,

1/27/10, 2/2/10, 2/9/10). The court cannot determine from

plaintiff’s fee petition whether he has double-billed work done

in Kell and in Cosby. Nonetheless, the court declines to reduce

plaintiffs’ fees on this ground because the defendant and

counsel for defendant are identical in both cases and defendant

failed to identify any instances of double billing. The court

trusts, although somewhat reluctantly, that counsel for

defendant would have provided such evidence of double billing if

it existed.

b. The Court’s Concerns

There are several time entries in plaintiff’s application

that cause the court serious concern. These include time entries

for events at the court where the court knows that plaintiff has

over-billed and several entries which appear to the court to be

unreasonable. "[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney

documentation of hours expended; ‘padding' in the form of

inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to

compensation." Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001).

Even in civil rights cases, a trial court may "reduce the award

or deny one altogether" if the fee request "appears unreasonably

inflated." Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970, 990

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The California Supreme Court provided several examples of 2

situations warranting such reductions. Serrano, 32 Cal. 3d 635 n.21

(citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 902-903 (1979) (stating

that compensation is unavailable for hours spent litigating issues

on which plaintiff did not prevail or where attorneys' efforts are

unorganized or duplicative); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 345

(1979) (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion

by reducing fee award based on excessive time spent litigating a

relatively simple case); Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 227 (N.D.

Cal. 1981) (reducing fee award for “overreaching” on fee petition).

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(Cal. 2010) (quoting Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 635 2

(1982)); see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084,

1095 (2000). Here, it appears that plaintiff’s counsel spent

excessive time on various tasks related to the litigation, which

are described below. In an effort to compensate for the known

overbilling, duplication of effort as a result of having three

attorneys working on the case, as well as any additional

“padding” in the fee petition that the court was unable to

ascertain, the court will reduce plaintiff’s fees by 10% acrossthe board. See Cal. Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 730,

752-54 (1987) (reducing award by 50% based on duplication of

effort, requests for compensation for time spent on media

relations, and unnecessary adversarial “skirmishes”); see also

Schwarz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 73 F.3d 895,

905 (1995); Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1400 (9th Cir.

1992).

i. Known Exaggerated Fee Requests

Bohm

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 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel expressed that many 3

of these entries represent the correct number of hours, yet were

sloppy records. For example, when he wrote “Attend final pretrial

conference,” he included billing for hours preparing for the

conference. The court cannot correct for the sloppiness of

plaintiff’s counsel. Counsel testified under penalty of perjury

only that they engaged in certain conduct. It is not appropriate

for the court to infer preparation and other activity based on the

representations of plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument.

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(1) 10/26/09: Attend final pretrial conference : 1.1 3

(2) 1/29/10: Attend Cosby trial: 8.0

(3) 2/5/10: Attend Cosby trial: 8.0

(4) 2/12/10: Attend trial for jury deliberation and verdict:

8.0

Moore

(1) 1/28/10: Attendance at Cosby trial: 8.0

(2) 1/29/10: Attendance at Cosby trial: 8.0

(3) 2/5/10: Attendance at Cosby trial: 8.0

Torres (paralegal)

(1) 1/28/10: Attend trial: 8.0

(2) 1/29/10: Attend trial: 8.0

(3) 2/4/10: Attend trial: 8.0

Jennings (paralegal)

(1) 3/9/10-4/14/10: Research, verify and document Cosby Billing

records for attorney fee motion: 137.0

ii. Dubious Fee Requests

(1) 1/8/07: Research Regulations and Statutes Re Admin

Exhaustion: 2.8

(2) 3/6/08: Review court documents commencing removal and

instructions for further proceedings in federal court: 3.4

(3) 7/28/08: Review Status Order: 3.9

(4) 4/7/09: Review seven notices of deposition: 0.7

(5) 5/7/09: Prepare draft mid litigation statement (only law

and motion matter concerned whether a defendant should be

dismissed as “fraudulent”): 0.7

(6) 6/29/09: Review M. Nelson, M.D. Exhibits: 4.4

(7) 8/17/09: Review Deposition of Bonnie Shaw in preparation

for pretrial statement: 3.8

(8) 8/18/09: Review Deposition of Rick Smith in preparation for

pretrial statement: 5.2

(9) 8/19/09: Review Deposition of Kathy Pope in preparation for

pretrial statement: 1.4

(10) 8/19/09: Review Deposition of Dr. Marcia Nelson in

preparation for pretrial statement: 1.1

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(11) 8/19/09: Review Deposition of Nicole McCollum in

preparation for pretrial statement: 4.2

(12) 8/20/09: Review Deposition of Sheri Lemond in preparation

for pretrial statement: 3.4

(13) 8/21/09: Review Deposition of Steve Bender in preparation

for pretrial statement: 1.2

(14) 9/11/09: Review sample pretrial statements from other

federal cases pulled from PACER: 6.4

(15) 9/21/09-9/28/09: Prepare case summary: 19.4

(16) 11/13/09: Review Nazir v. United Airlines - For Opposition

to Defendant Reply: 5.6

(17) 1/22/10: Billed 19.1 hours in one day.

iii. Travel Time

(1) 5/25/09: Travel to Albuquerque, NM for McCollum Depo: 9.0

(2) 6/29/09: Travel to Ontario for Deposition of Rick Smith:

4.0

(3) 6/29/09: Travel time from Ontario: 4.0

The travel billing rates were not reduced by 50%. Rather,

plaintiff billed for travel at their full lodestar.

iv. Conclusion

As an initial matter, the court reduces the lodestar for

travel time by 50%.

Further, in light of the problems identified above, the

court intends to reduce the lodestar of all attorneys and

paralegals by 10%. The court finds that doing so is appropriate

in light of the problems it identifies above. This reduction is

in addition to any specific reductions discussed in this order.

3. Paralegal Hours

Defendant argues that the hours billed by plaintiff’s

paralegals should not be recovered because they performed

administrative functions for plaintiff’s office. Defendant also

argues that they should not be recovered because only one of the

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three paralegals is specifically trained as a paralegal. These

arguments are without merit. Plaintiff’s paralegals performed

functions specific to this case, such as interviewing witnesses

and attending trial. These fees are recoverable. Additionally,

the rate of $100 per hour for paralegal time is a reasonable

rate in Sacramento.

4. Expert Costs

Defendant argues that plaintiff should not recover costs

from its expert, Dr. Mahla, because his testimony concerned

plaintiff’s past and future economic losses resulting from his

termination. The jury found against plaintiff on grounds that

his termination was unlawful. Plaintiff does not provide any

substantive response to this argument. Plaintiff is only

entitled to recover fees and costs relating to claims upon which

it prevailed. Again, the parties do not provide sufficient

information upon which the court can decide whether these costs

should be awarded to plaintiff. Plaintiff is thereby ordered to

file a statement within twenty-one (21) days of the issuance of

this order explaining why Dr. Mahla’s expert report and/or

testimony were related to the claims upon which judgment was

entered in his favor. Defendant may file a response to this

statement within fourteen (14) days of service of plaintiff’s

statement.

D. Multipliers

Plaintiff seeks a multiplier of 2 of the lodestar rates for

attorneys’ fees incurred prior to trial. Plaintiff contends that

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he is entitled to an increase in attorneys’ fees because of “the

contingent nature of the fee award, the novelty and difficulty

of the issues presented, and the quality of representation.”

Application at 8. The court is not persuaded. “[T]he trial court

is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic

lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other

factors. . . . In each case, the trial court should . . .

consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for

contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under

Serrano [v. Priest]. . . . [W]hen determining the appropriate

enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to

the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar."

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1138.

As for the contingency risk, the court finds that the

hourly rate that counsel will be awarded is “higher than a fee

for the same legal services paid as . . . performed” in light of

the apparent padding and, thus, the risk is encompassed within

the original lodestar and a fee enhancement would be

inappropriate. See Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. As to

difficulty and novelty, there is no novelty in this case -

plaintiff did not change the law or expand the coverage of FEHA

or bring a sort of case that has never been brought before.

Further, prevailing parties are not entitled to a multiplier

merely because they were busy during trial - such is the norm.

Lastly, while plaintiff’s counsel achieved a great result for

their client, the quality of representation does not warrant

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enhancement of the lodestar in this case. Plaintiff’s counsel

did not demonstrate exceptional skills “beyond those that might

be expected of attorneys of comparable expertise or experience.”

Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1128, 1176 (1998);

see also Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1139 (“[A] trial court should

award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the

quality of representation far exceeds the quality of

representation that would have been provided by an attorney of

comparable skill . . . .”). Plaintiff has not shown that the

results obtained justify a fee enhancement. This is especially

so when it appears to the court highly likely that plaintiff has

padded his fee petition.

Defendant moves to decrease the fees sought by plaintiff by

50% because plaintiff lost on two of his claims. Defendant

contends that these claims were the ones that required the most

work. However, the only specific item that defendant challenges

as not appropriate on this ground is the expert report discussed

above. The court cannot determine which efforts plaintiff

exhausted in pursuing the unsuccessful claims. In fact, it

appears to the court that the unsuccessful claims are strongly

related to the successful ones. Because defendant cannot refer

the court to any specific entries that are problematic because

they only concern unsuccessful claims, the court declines to

reduce the amount of fees sought by plaintiff on this ground. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS that plaintiff

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SHALL FILE a statement within twenty-one (21) days of the

issuance of this order explaining why Dr. Mahla’s expert report

and/or testimony were related to the claims upon which judgment

was entered in his favor. Defendant may file a response to this

statement within fourteen (14) days of service of plaintiff’s

statement. Upon receipt of these briefs, the court will

calculate plaintiff’s fee award.

The court intends to stay the fee award in this case

pending resolution of defendant’s appeal. The parties may

indicate any objections to the court doing so along with their

briefing on the expert question.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2010.

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