Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01502/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01502-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Motor Vehicle Product Liability

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Manuel Bernal and Paula Bernal, husband 

and wife, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Daewoo Motor America, Inc., a Delaware 

corporation, et al. 

Defendants. 

No. CV09-1502-PHX-DGC

ORDER SETTING TRIAL 

 A Final Pretrial Conference was held on August 26, 2011. Counsel appeared on 

behalf of Plaintiffs and Defendants. On the basis of the parties’ written submissions and 

the hearing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Trial in this matter shall begin on April 10, 2012 at 9:00 a.m.

 2. The trial shall last 12 days (April 10-13, 17-20, and 24-27, 2012). 

Plaintiffs shall be allotted 36 hours of trial time and Defendants shall be allotted 30 hours 

of trial time. The Court will keep track of each side’s time. Opening and closing 

statements, direct examination, and cross-examination shall be counted against the 

parties’ allotted time. 

 3. A final conference shall be held on March 20, 2012 at 4:30 p.m. in 

Courtroom 603, Sandra Day O’Connor Federal Courthouse, 401 West Washington Street, 

Phoenix, Arizona 85003. Out-of-state counsel may participate by telephone. 

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 1 of 65
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 4. The parties’ proposed final pretrial order was approved by the Court as the 

final pretrial order in this case. The order shall govern the presentation of evidence and 

other trial issues, and, pursuant to Rule 16(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice. Evidence, objections, legal 

arguments, and relief not requested or identified in the order shall not be available at trial, 

except to prevent manifest injustice. 

 5. The Court has considered Defendant Daewoo Motor Company, Ltd.’s 

(“DWMC”) motion in limine no. 1. Doc. 273. The motion will be denied. DWMC 

generally asks the Court to preclude Plaintiffs’ expert Byron Bloch from offering 

opinions or testimony on biomechanics, but fails to identify specific opinions that are the 

subject of its motion. DWMC’s motion does not comply with the Court’s order requiring 

that “[e]ach motion in limine shall include proposed language for the order in limine 

being sought from the Court, and the proposed language shall state with precision the 

evidence that is subject to the proposed order and the limitation or exclusion placed on 

the evidence.” Doc. 245 at 2. As Plaintiffs concede, “Mr. Bloch is not a medical doctor 

and will not attempt to testify as one.” Doc. 299 at 1. Whether particular opinions 

offered by Mr. Bloch are admissible must be ruled on during the course of his testimony 

and in response to objections by DWMC. Mr. Bloch’s testimony, like the testimony of 

all experts in this case, will be strictly limited to the contents of his timely expert report. 

 6. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 2. Doc. 274. The 

motion asks the Court to preclude Byron Bloch from offering any expert opinions that 

were not stated in timely expert reports. The Court’s Case Management Order made 

clear that Plaintiffs were required to provide “full and complete expert disclosures as 

required by Rule 26(a)(2)(A)-(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” by the 

deadline established by the Court. Doc. 24 at 2. The Case Management Order further 

explained: “As stated in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 (1993 Amendments), 

expert reports disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) must set forth ‘the testimony the witness 

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is expected to present during direct examination, together with the reasons therefore.’ 

Full and complete disclosures of such testimony are required on the date set forth above; 

absent truly extraordinary circumstances, parties will not be permitted to supplement their 

expert reports after these dates.” Id. at 3. 

 The Court normally would hold the parties to this requirement, but it is clear from 

the materials submitted by the parties that defense counsel asked Dr. Bloch questions 

during his depositions that allowed him to expand upon his expert reports. See, e.g.,

Doc. 345-4. Defense counsel could have limited their depositions and required Dr. Bloch 

to stand on his reports, but they instead allowed him to expand his explanations and 

opinions. To the extent defense counsel chose to do so, they clearly were on notice of his 

opinions and explanations, and the Court would find it unfair to hold that Dr. Bloch could 

not restate them. As a result, Dr. Bloch will be permitted to testify at trial about opinions 

stated in his timely disclosed expert reports and elicited by defense counsel during his 

depositions. DWMC’s motion is denied. 

 7. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 3. Doc. 275. The 

motion argues that Byron Bloch should be precluded from offering accident 

reconstruction testimony, but does not identify precise opinions that are the subject of the 

motion. As explained above, Dr. Bloch’s testimony will be limited to opinions stated in 

his timely-disclosed expert reports and elicited by defense counsel in his depositions. 

DWMC’s motion is denied. 

 8. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 4. Doc. 276. The 

motion argues that Plaintiffs should be precluded from presenting any evidence or 

testimony regarding seatbelt design, defects, or performance. Specifically, the motion 

asserts that no such testimony was included in any timely-disclosed expert report. 

 Following the final pretrial conference, Plaintiffs provided excerpts from the 

rebuttal report of Dr. Burton. Doc. 345, Ex. 1. The report does not assert that the 

seatbelts were defectively designed. Rather, it assumes the belts operated properly and 

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therefore finds the injury theories of the defense experts improbable. During Dr. 

Burton’s deposition, defense counsel had him expand on this analysis, an expansion he 

will be permitted to give at trial. Thus, Dr. Burton will be permitted to express opinions 

stated in his expert report and deposition during Plaintiffs’ rebuttal case. 

 Plaintiffs also provided the rebuttal report of Dr. Bloch dated November 12, 2010. 

Doc. 345, Ex. 3. The report was timely. Doc. 53. The report does assert, albeit briefly, 

that the seatbelts in the vehicle were defective. Defense counsel had Dr. Bloch expand 

on this analysis during his deposition on January 13, 2011. Doc. 345-4 at 1-8. Dr. Bloch 

will be permitted to give the opinions stated in his report and elicited by defense counsel 

in his deposition. DWMC’s motion will be denied. 

 9. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 5. Doc. 277. 

DWMC asks the Court to preclude Plaintiffs from calling defense experts during 

Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, to be followed by testimony from Plaintiffs’ rebuttal experts. 

DWMC argues that such a tactic allows Plaintiffs to get their rebuttal experts into their 

case-in-chief through a “back door” technique that is inconsistent with the Court’s Case 

Management Order. After hearing arguments at the final pretrial conference and 

considering the issue carefully, the Court will grant the motion. Plaintiffs’ accident 

reconstruction experts were disclosed only as rebuttal witnesses in response to defense 

experts. Permitting these rebuttal experts to testify during Plaintiffs’ case in chief would 

not be fair when the defense experts have not been permitted to state the full opinions that 

are being rebutted. Perhaps recognizing this fact, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated during the 

final pretrial conference that they would be willing to permit the defense experts to testify 

in full during Plaintiffs’ case in chief, to be followed by testimony from Plaintiffs’ 

rebuttal experts. Although this would avoid the problem of permitting rebuttal testimony 

when the testimony it is rebutting has not been presented to the jury in full, it would force 

Defendants to present a key portion of their defense out of order and out of context. The 

Court cannot conclude that Defendants should be forced to do so when the problem has 

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arisen from the fact that Plaintiffs did not disclose accident reconstruction experts until 

rebuttal reports were due. The Court concludes that the fairest result is to hold the parties 

to the order in which they chose to disclose their experts. Plaintiffs will be permitted to 

present the experts they disclosed in initial reports during their case in chief, Defendants 

will be permitted to present defense experts during their case in chief, and Plaintiffs will 

be permitted to present their rebuttal experts during their rebuttal case. Plaintiffs will not 

be permitted to call their rebuttal experts during their case in chief. 

 10. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 6. Doc. 278. The 

motion seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from playing the videotaped deposition testimony of 

defense experts during Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. The Court cannot at this time conclude 

that any videotape presentation of defense experts during Plaintiffs’ case in chief would 

be inappropriate, and therefore will deny the motion. Consistent with the ruling in the 

preceding paragraph, however, presentation of such videotape testimony will not permit 

Plaintiffs to call their rebuttal experts during their case in chief. 

 11. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 7. Doc. 280. The 

motion seeks to exclude introduction of Dolores Pacheco’s autopsy photographs. 

Plaintiffs respond that they do not intend to introduce autopsy photographs unless 

necessary to show the nature of her injuries that are unclear from review of the autopsy 

report and diagram and to rebut defense expert opinions as to the cause of her injuries. 

Doc. 305. The Court cannot rule on this issue now. Whether the photographs will be 

relevant at trial will depend on evidence presented during the course of trial. The Court 

notes its initial inclination to preclude the photographs as they do not appear relevant to 

the crashworthiness issues in this case, and the cause of Mrs. Pacheco’s death – partial 

ejection from the vehicle – is not disputed. But because the Court cannot conclude at this 

point that the photographs would be irrelevant or inflammatory in all events, DWMC’s 

motion will be denied. Plaintiffs should not display the photographs to the jury before 

obtaining the Court’s ruling that the photographs are admissible. 

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 12. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 8. Doc. 281. The 

motion argues that any evidence of Dolores Pacheco’s cancer treatment, or the fact that 

she had “beaten cancer,” should be excluded from trial. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence 

is relevant to the damages suffered by Mrs. Pacheco’s statutory beneficiaries – that it 

illustrates the loving and self-sacrificing relationship Mrs. Pacheco had with her family. 

The motion will be denied. The Court concludes that Mrs. Pacheco’s time spent with 

family is relevant to the jury’s understanding of Mrs. Pacheco’s relationship with her 

family, the loss of which gives rise to a portion of Plaintiffs’ damages claim. The Court 

will not permit Plaintiffs to emphasize Mrs. Pacheco’s cancer in order to evoke sympathy 

from the jury, but neither will it preclude the mention of cancer as part of the natural 

process of explaining Mrs. Pacheco’s relationship with her family. 

 13. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 9. Doc. 282. The 

motion asks the Court to exclude opinion testimony and documentation from Mexican 

highway patrol officers regarding any type of accident reconstruction. The motion does 

not seek to exclude the personal observation of the officers at the scene or testimony 

related to actual measurements they may have taken. Plaintiffs’ response agrees that 

portions of the officers’ accident report and testimony should be precluded, but argues 

that testimony properly within Federal Rule of Evidence 701 should be permitted. This is 

a matter the Court must resolve at trial. Rule 701 permits lay witnesses not only to give 

factual testimony, but also to express opinions or inferences that are rationally based on 

the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s 

testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Rule 701 makes clear that lay witnesses 

may not provide opinions based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

within the scope of Rule 702. Clearly, the officers will be permitted to testify concerning 

their observations at the scene. Whether they may testify concerning opinions based on 

their observations will depend on whether those opinions are rationally based on the 

perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony, and 

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whether the opinions are based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 

The Court must rule on these issues as the officers testify. DWMC’s motion in limine is 

denied. 

 14. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 10. Doc. 283. 

DWMC argues that the Court should exclude an April 2001 Product Knowledge Training 

Manual produced by Plaintiffs in this case. DWMC argues that no witness has testified 

that the Manual was created by either Defendant. DWMC also argues that the Manual is 

irrelevant and constitutes hearsay. Plaintiffs respond that the earmarks of authenticity 

contained in the Manual itself satisfy the requirements of Rule 901. 

 Rule 901 provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a 

condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). 

This evidence can include “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, . . . or other distinctive 

characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances.” Id. at 901(b)(4). The proof 

may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence; direct proof of authenticity is not 

required. Vol. 5, J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 901.03[8] 

(Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2008). The contents, appearance, or subject matter of a writing 

can constitute circumstantial evidence of a writing’s authorship. Id. at § 901.04[3][a]. 

 In this case, the Manual bears Daewoo’s logo, is professionally prepared, and 

contains extensive and detailed information about the vehicle at issue in this case and two 

related vehicles – information likely not known so comprehensively outside of Daewoo. 

The Manual states that it was created by or for Daewoo Motor America, Inc. (“Daewoo 

America”), and apparently contains Daewoo America’s correct business address. In 

addition, the fact that Daewoo ultimately went out of business explains why current 

representatives of the two Defendants in this case may not be familiar with the manual. 

Indeed, counsel for Daewoo America stated during the final pretrial conference that 

Daewoo America had only four employees when it was asked to authenticate the Manual. 

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 Given the internal indicia of authenticity in the Manual and the not-surprising fact 

that Defendants presently are unable to confirm its production, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 901(a) burden of presenting evidence sufficient to 

support a finding that that Manual is what Plaintiffs claim – a marketing brochure created 

by Defendants, or with information provided by Defendants, about the vehicle at issue in 

this case. The Court therefore will deny the motion in limine to the extent it asserts that 

the Manual lacks a sufficient evidentiary foundation. 

 The Court will also deny Defendants’ hearsay objection. Plaintiffs have indicated 

that they do not seek to introduce the Manual to prove the truth of the matters it asserts, 

but instead to show that Daewoo America knew more about the design and performance 

of the vehicle than it now admits, and to show that DWMC made inconsistent claims 

about the level of testing performed on the vehicle. Defendants may seek a limiting 

instruction that the Manual is not being admitted to prove the matters it asserts. 

 The Court concludes that the Manual is relevant to the claim against Daewoo 

America and is not precluded by Rule 403. Daewoo America will have a full opportunity 

to explain why the jury should not accept the Manual as authentic or, if it does, to show 

why the Manual does not establish Daewoo America’s knowledge of product defect. 

 The Court is less certain on whether the Manual is relevant against DWMC. 

Plaintiffs explained during the final pretrial conference that the Manual is relevant 

because it contains claims about vehicle testing that are inconsistent with positions taken 

by DWMC in this case – it states that more tests were performed, and were performed to 

higher standards, than DWMC has stated in this case. Plaintiffs argue that the manual 

therefore goes to the overall credibility of DWMC’s claims in this case. Plaintiffs do not 

claim that they ever read or relied on the contents of the Manual. Whether the marginal 

relevancy of the Manual on this credibility issue is outweighed by other considerations 

under Rule 403 is a matter that must be decided at trial. Plaintiffs should not make these 

arguments without first raising the issue with the Court. 

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 15. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 11. Doc. 284. 

The motion seeks to preclude Plaintiffs’ treating physicians from testifying at trial, 

arguing that they have not been designated as experts under Rule 26. Plaintiffs respond 

by citing what they consider to be the majority rule among federal courts in the United 

States. Neither side has cited the two most relevant authorities in this case. 

 First, the Court’s Case Management Order includes the following requirement: 

“Disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) must include the identities of treating physicians 

and other witnesses who have not been specially employed to provide expert testimony in 

this case, but who will provide testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 

705. A Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report is required for any opinion of such witnesses that was not 

developed in the course of their treatment or other factual involvement in the case.” 

Doc. 24 at 3. Thus, Plaintiffs may not call any treating physician to give expert 

testimony that was not contained in their Rule 26(a)(2)(A) disclosure. Nor may Plaintiffs 

call any treating physician to render an expert opinion that was not developed in the 

course of treatment unless that opinion was set forth in a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report. 

 Second, in Goodman v. Staples the Office Super Store, LLC, 644 F.3d 817 (9th 

Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit held that a treating physician is only exempt from 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s written report requirement to the extent that his opinions were formed 

during the course of treatment. For opinions formed outside the course of treatment, a 

written report is required. This case confirms the approach taken in the Case 

Management Order. 

 The Court cannot determine from the parties’ memoranda which treating physician 

opinions may fall within this ruling. As a result, the motion in limine will be granted to 

this extent: treating physicians may not provide expert opinions unless they were 

included in Plaintiffs’ disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), nor may they provide an expert 

opinion that was developed outside the course of treatment unless they produced an 

expert report that stated the opinion. 

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 16. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 12. Doc. 285. 

DWMC argues that Plaintiff should be precluded from offering any evidence related to 

other accidents or alleged similar incidents. DWMC’s motion fails to identify any 

specific evidence. Plaintiffs’ response appears to agree, and argues that a test performed 

by one of Defendants’ experts should be excluded. Plaintiffs also argue that they should 

not be precluded from offering evidence to show the feasibility of a safer alternative 

design. The parties appear to be talking past each other. The briefs do not address the 

same evidence, and therefore do not discuss the evidence with any level of specificity 

that would allow the Court to rule. DWMC’s motion will be denied and the Court will 

not enter any order based on Plaintiffs’ response that is not itself a motion. 

 17. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 13. Doc. 286. 

DWMC argues that Plaintiffs should be precluded from presenting the testimony of their 

life care expert, Dr. Paul Deutsch. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Deutsch is not a physician, 

did not consult with Plaintiff Manuel Bernal’s treating physicians, and in other respects 

failed to do the work necessary to create a reasonable life care plan. The motion will be 

denied. DWMC’s arguments go to the weight, not the admissibility, of Dr. Deutsch’s 

testimony. Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Deutsch is a board certified life care planner, a board 

certified rehabilitation counselor, and a board certified case manager with a master’s 

degree in rehabilitation counseling and a doctorate in counseling psychology with an 

emphasis in rehabilitation psychology. They assert he has spent 40 years practicing in 

this field, has authored 12 textbooks, and has authored 85 peer-reviewed journal articles 

and chapters relating to life care planning, rehabilitation planning, case management, and 

similar subjects. Doc. 314. The weight to be accorded Dr. Deutsch’s opinions is for the 

jury to decide. 

 18. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 14. Doc. 287. 

The motion argues that the Court should preclude Plaintiffs’ expert economist from using 

a net negative discount rate with respect to his lost earnings calculation and his cost of 

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future care calculation. The only case cited by DWMC, Hardenbrook v. UPS, 210 WL 

3613818 (D. Idaho Sep. 3, 2010), did not address a motion in limine or any other request 

to exclude evidence. Rather, the Court addressed a motion to reduce the jury verdict. 

Although the Court was troubled by the zero percent net discount rate used by the 

defense expert, the Court ultimately adopted that rate. DWMC has provided no authority 

upon which the Court can conclude that the calculations of Plaintiffs’ expert economist 

should be excluded. DWMC does not argue that the expert economist is unqualified. 

The motion will be denied. 

 19. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 15. Doc. 288. 

The motion seeks to exclude the lost earnings opinion of Plaintiffs’ expert economist 

because it suffers from several defects: an inaccurate annual income assumption, failure 

to consider the Arizona marketplace, failure to utilize a work life table, an assumption 

that Mr. Bernal would earn the same amount every year until retirement at age 66, and an 

unreliable earnings growth rate. Plaintiffs respond to each of these arguments, asserting 

that their expert’s opinions are reasonable. Plaintiffs note that their expert relied on Mr. 

Bernal’s W-2 forms and considered the Phoenix marketplace. They note that there is no 

standard work life table that economists rely on for Mr. Bernal’s category of work, and 

that their expert did not assume an unreasonable growth rate, assuming instead that Mr. 

Bernal’s income would remain constant over time. They also note that the expert relied 

on published data from the U.S. Department of Labor for calculating an earnings growth 

rate of 3.37 percent, and assumed a retirement age based on data from the U.S. Social 

Security Administration. The Court concludes that DWMC’s arguments go to the 

weight, not the admissibility, of Plaintiffs’ expert economist’s opinions. The motion will 

be denied. 

 20. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 16. Doc. 289. 

The motion seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from suggesting to the jury that DWMC failed to 

produce any evidence or committed any type of spoliation in this case. Plaintiffs respond 

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that they do not intend to present such evidence unless Defendants open the door by 

making claims about the amount of evidence produced. Doc. 317. The motion will be 

granted. If Plaintiffs conclude during the course of trial that DWMC has opened the 

door to the presentation of such evidence, Plaintiffs should raise the issue with the Court 

outside the hearing of the jury. 

 21. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 17. Doc. 290. 

The motion argues that if the Court does not preclude Plaintiffs’ seatbelt claim in 

response to DWMC’s motion in limine no. 4, the Court should preclude seatbelt evidence 

because Plaintiffs failed to preserve the vehicle in this case. The Court does not agree. 

The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs were culpable in failing to preserve the vehicle. 

The vehicle was damaged while in the possession of Mexican police. The motion will be 

denied. 

 22. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 18. Doc. 291. It 

argues that DWMC should be permitted to present evidence concerning the 

circumstances under which the vehicle at issue in this case was burned in a fire if the 

Court permits Plaintiffs to present a seatbelt claim. 

 Plaintiffs’ position on the seatbelt issue is not clear. In response to this motion, 

Plaintiffs state: “Defendants’ motion should be denied because the characteristics and 

performance of the seatbelts in the specific vehicle at issue are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ 

design defect claims, as no party is arguing that the seatbelts did not operate as 

designed.” Doc. 319 at 1. In their supplemental filing following the final pretrial 

conference, however, Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he defective nature of the survival space, 

which includes the performance of the restraint system has been disclosed[.]” Doc. 345 

at 1 (emphasis added). 

 Although Plaintiffs’ position is not clear, to the extent they contend that the 

seatbelt system was designed defectively or performed improperly, DWMC will be 

permitted to present evidence that it was unable to examine or test the system because the 

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vehicle was destroyed by fire before Defendants were aware of the lawsuit. To this 

extent, the motion will be granted. 

 23. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 19. Doc. 292. 

The motion asks the Court to exclude evidence of the 2001 recall under which 

Defendants added padding to the passenger’s side A-pillar and, voluntarily, to the 

driver’s side A-pillar. Plaintiffs argue in response that their theory in the case concerns 

defects in the vehicle’s roof structure, but they do not suggest that the recall concerned 

the roof structure. They argue that they had identified the A-pillars as key elements of 

the roof structure, but again, they do not argue that the recall concerned the structural 

integrity of the A-pillars. They argue that testing of the pillars was important, but they do 

not suggest that the recall concerned testing of the pillars. They also argue that the 

padding strengthened the pillars. The Court fails to see how this argument supports their 

structural defect theory. In short, although Plaintiffs throw out a number of off-target 

arguments, they do not identify any direct relevance of the recall to their crashworthiness 

theories in this case. The Court concludes that the marginal relevancy of the recall (to 

add padding to the pillars) is substantially outweighed by the risk of juror confusion and 

undue delay in the resolution of this trial. As a result, DWMC’s motion will be granted

and the evidence will be precluded under Rule 403. 

 24. The Court has considered DWMC’s motion in limine no. 20. Doc. 293. 

The motion argues that the Court should instruct the jury on the risk-benefit analysis 

approach to determining a defective product, rather than the consumer expectation test. 

DWMC argues that the average consumer has no reasonable expectation as to how a roof 

structure and windows should perform during a rollover accident, and that the consumer 

expectation test therefore should not be used. DWMC does not argue that the risk-benefit 

test is a better fit for the inquiry as to whether the vehicle design here was unreasonably 

dangerous, only that the consumer expectations test does not fit at all. Plaintiffs urge that 

the consumer expectation test is appropriate in this case, and that in close cases it should 

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not be excluded. Doc. 321. 

 DWMC cites several cases, but none serves as a basis for excluding evidence here. 

Czarnecki v. Volkswagen of America held that a consumer expectation instruction should 

be given “only as supported by the evidence.” 837 P.2d 1143, 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Golonka v. General Motors Corp. noted the 

following: 

The consumer expectation test works well in manufacturing defect cases 

because consumers have developed safety expectations from using properly 

manufactured products of the same general design. . . . In design defect 

cases, however, the consumer expectation test has limited utility as “the 

consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea 

how safe the product could be made.” . . . Consequently, when application 

of the consumer expectation test is unfeasible or uncertain in design defect 

cases, courts additionally or alternatively employ the risk/benefit analysis 

to determine whether a design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. 

65 P.3d 956, 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added; citations omitted). Golonka

does not entirely rule out the possibility that the consumer expectation test may apply in 

design defect cases, nor does it suggest that a court must always exclude the test even 

when application of the test is unfeasible or uncertain. In sum, these two cases suggest 

that courts should make jury instruction determinations after the evidence has been 

presented and that instructions not supported by the evidence should be excluded. 

 DWMC also cites to Brethauer v. General Motors Corp., which analyzed the 

Arizona Supreme Court’s treatment of the consumer expectation test in Dart v. Wiebe 

Manufacturing, Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985). Brethauer, 211 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2009). Brethauer recognized that “Dart tells us the consumer expectation test is 

inapplicable in situations when a consumer cannot form an expectation as to how safely 

the product could be made.” Id. Brethauer went on to state, however, that Dart does not 

mean “an ordinary consumer must have an expectation about the specifics of design 

before the consumer expectation test can be employed.” Id. Instead, Brethauer

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observed, “the consumer’s expectation referred to in Dart necessarily is an expectation of 

how safely the product could be made to perform.” Id. Brethauer went on to conclude 

that “an instruction on the consumer expectation test is warranted in cases when the 

ordinary consumer, through use of a product, has developed an expectation regarding the 

performance safety of the product.” Id. The court proceeded to find that a consumerexpectation instruction on design of safety seatbelts to be warranted, and that failure to 

give the jury instruction was error, id. at 1184, albeit not reversible error, id. at 1185. 

 DWMC argues that Brethauer can be distinguished because the product in that 

case – the seatbelt – is used by consumers every day and therefore the average consumer 

can develop an informed performance expectation. Doc. 293 at 2. In contrast, 

expectations regarding the performance of roofs and window glass during a crash cannot 

be formed because crashes are so infrequent. Id. at 2-3. The argument is flawed, 

however, because Brethauer involved performance of a seatbelt during a crash. 211 P.3d 

at 1177. Therefore, the infrequency of crashes does not appear to be a dispositive factor 

under Brethauer. The notion that the proper performance of a seatbelt during a crash 

may perhaps be more intuitive than the proper performance of a roof or window glass 

during a crash has some persuasive merit, but the mere fact that the latter performance 

may be less intuitive is insufficient under the cited case law to preclude the consumer 

expectation test at this point in the case. The Court must decide this issue after the 

evidence has been presented. The motion will be denied. 

 25. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 1. Doc. 250. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from asserting the “diving/torsoaugmentation theory” because Defendants did not affirmatively plead this defense in their 

answers. The Court does not agree, however, that the theory constitutes an affirmative 

defense. Plaintiffs argue that Manuel Bernal suffered traumatic neck injuries when the 

roof of the vehicle collapsed during the rollover. In response, Defendants assert that the 

neck injuries occurred when Mr. Bernal’s head came into contact with the intact roof of 

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the vehicle and his body weight caused compression in the neck and the resulting spinal 

injuries. Defendants’ theory is therefore a direct response to Plaintiffs’ alleged method of 

injury. Although Defendants will have the burden of proof on this issue to the extent 

they wish the jury to find their version of the events true by a preponderance of the 

evidence, the Court does not view this counter-argument as an affirmative defense in the 

traditional sense. 

Moreover, even if Defendants’ theory could be viewed as an affirmative defense, 

the Ninth Circuit has held that defendants may raise affirmative defenses late in the 

litigation, including at the summary judgment stage, provided the delay does not 

prejudice the plaintiff. See Panaro v. City of N. Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“A defendant may raise an affirmative defense at the summary judgment stage as 

long as the plaintiff does not suffer prejudice.”); Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 

981 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] has not argued that he suffered prejudice 

due to the defendants’ tardy assertion of this defense, the defense is not waived.”). As 

the Court previously found, Plaintiffs have been well aware of Defendants’ theory 

throughout this case. Doc. 244 at 2. Indeed, it was first mentioned in the litigation by 

Plaintiffs’ expert. Id. As a result, Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by Defendants’ assertion 

of the theory and the motion in limine will be denied. 

 26. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 2. Doc. 251. The 

motion asks the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence or argument 

apportioning damages between the alleged design defect and other causes. Plaintiffs 

argue that such a ruling is warranted because Defendants have not disclosed any evidence 

that would support an argument that Plaintiffs’ damages could be apportioned. This is, in 

effect, a motion for summary judgment. In a Celotex-type argument, Plaintiffs ask the 

Court to rule in their favor on the apportionment issue because Defendants have no 

evidence to support their side of such an argument. But Defendants are not obligated to 

produce such evidence to Plaintiffs unless it has been requested in discovery, and 

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Plaintiffs make no argument that Defendants have failed to produce such evidence in 

response to a discovery request. As a result, the Court is not able to preclude Defendants 

from making apportionment arguments on the basis of their failure to produce evidence 

supporting apportionment. Whether Defendants can present evidence on any particular 

aspect of the apportionment argument, and what jury instructions might be appropriate in 

light of such evidence, must be determined at trial. The motion is denied. 

 27. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no 3. Doc. 252. The 

motion asks the Court to preclude Defendants from asserting comparative fault in this 

crashworthiness case and from otherwise offering evidence of Mr. Bernal’s alleged 

speeding, failure to control the vehicle, inattention, or lack of sleep. The Court has also 

considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 4. Doc. 253. That motion asks the Court to 

preclude the same evidence under a defense of contributory negligence. 

 These motions raise difficult issues about the applicability of fault-comparison 

defenses in light of the Arizona common law rule that contributory negligence is not a 

defense in a product defect case and the Arizona statutory comparative fault law found in 

A.R.S. § 12-2506. These motions are also related to the apportionment issue raised in 

Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 2, which concerns apportionment between harms caused 

by product defect and those caused by other factors. Together, these motions raise the 

question of whether the jury will be asked to apportion, on any basis, the losses incurred 

in this case, or whether it will be asked to make an all-or-nothing decision in favor of 

either Plaintiffs or Defendants. 

As a general matter, Arizona moved away from the all-or-nothing approach to tort 

trials when it adopted a scheme of comparative fault in A.R.S. § 12-2506. The statute 

generally requires the jury to apportion fault among all persons who contributed to the 

loss, whether parties or not. Such an approach in this case would allow the jury to 

apportion fault between Defendants, if they found product defect, and Plaintiff Bernal, if 

they found that speeding or inattention contributed to the accident. 

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As Plaintiffs note, however, the Arizona Supreme Court, after the passage of 

A.R.S. § 12-2506, confirmed the common law rule that contributory negligence is not a 

defense in a product defect case. In Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 904 P.2d 861 

(Ariz. 1995), the court confirmed that contributory negligence is not a defense in a 

product liability case, explaining that the doctrine of strict product liability “allocat[es] 

the risk of loss to the manufacturers and sellers of [unreasonably dangerous] products.” 

Id. at 864. The court recognized that assumption of risk and product misuse are 

affirmative defenses in such actions, but made clear that neither defense can be construed 

as permitting contributory negligence. The court stated that “[c]ontributory negligence is 

not applicable to strict liability because, under the doctrine of strict liability, ‘no duty 

rests upon the ultimate consumer or user to search for or guard against the possibility of 

product defects.’” Id. at 865 (citation omitted). The court did apply Arizona’s 

comparative fault scheme to the misuse alleged in the case rather than treating misuse as 

a complete defense. Id. at 866. 

DWMC focuses its attention on Zuern v. Ford Motor Co., 937 P.2d 676 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1997), an Arizona Court of Appeals case decided after Jimenez that applied 

Arizona’s comparative fault scheme to an automobile product liability case. Zuern held 

that the jury could apportion fault between the manufacturer of the automobile and the 

driver who ran into the back of the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. at 682. Zuern acknowledged 

Jimenez, but Jimenez was not controlling because it concerned the contributory 

negligence of the plaintiff while Zuern concerned the comparative fault of a third party. 

Zuern applied A.R.S. § 12-2506 as written, noting that fault in the comparative fault 

statute includes negligence, strict liability, product liability, and virtually every other kind 

of fault. 

 The Court has had some difficulty in determining how to apply Jimenez and Zuern

in this case. The Court discussed this issue at some length with the parties during the 

final pretrial conference. Jimenez would appear to hold that the alleged fault of Mr. 

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Bernal cannot be considered by the jury in determining Mr. Bernal’s recovery from 

Defendants. Even if the jury were to find that he was speeding and inattentive, and that 

this contributed to his injuries, the jury must hold Defendants completely responsible for 

his injuries if a defect in the vehicle was a proximate cause of those injuries. By contrast, 

Zuern holds that the same rule does not apply to Mrs. Pacheco’s statutory beneficiaries. 

Mrs. Pacheco is not alleged to be at fault, so no issue of contributory negligence arises. 1 

But Mr. Bernal, like the driver who rear-ended the plaintiffs in Zuern, is alleged to be at 

fault. Under Zuern, therefore, the jury could reduce Mrs. Pacheco’s recovery from 

Defendants to the extent they find that her death was caused by Mr. Bernal’s alleged 

speeding or inattention. Jimenez and Zuern would thus lead to the anomalous result that 

Mrs. Pacheco’s losses can be reduced by Mr. Bernal’s fault, but Mr. Bernal’s losses 

cannot. The more culpable plaintiff recovers 100% of his losses and the non-culpable 

plaintiff has her losses reduced by comparative fault. 

 On closer reading, the Court concludes that Jimenez does not require this result. 

Jimenez relied on and cited to O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248, 251-52 (Ariz. 

1968), when noting that Arizona rejected contributory negligence as a defense to product 

liability. Jimenez, 904 P.2d at 864. Miller states the following: “We hold that 

contributory negligence, as defined above, is not a defense under the products liability 

doctrine and we emphasize that no duty rests upon the ultimate consumer or user to 

search for or guard against the possibility of product defects.” 447 P.2d at 253 (emphasis 

added). The contributory negligence “defined” in Miller was limited to that described by 

comment n of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”), namely: 

“negligence [that] consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to 

guard against the possibility of its existence.” Miller, 447 P.2d at 253 (citing 

Restatement). The full Restatement comment reads as follows: 

 

1 For purposes of this analysis, the Court focuses on the alleged fault of Mr. Bernal, not the alleged fault of Mrs. Pacheco in allegedly wearing her seatbelt improperly.

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Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is 

not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule 

applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence 

of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a 

failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the 

possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory 

negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to 

encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of 

assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict 

liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the 

danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product 

and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery. 

Miller, 447 P.2d at 253 (emphasis added) (citing Restatement). In relying on Miller in a 

case involving facts not distinguishable from Miller, Jimenez necessarily limited the type 

of contributory negligence at issue in its holding to that of Miller. Indeed, Jimenez used 

the same definition of contributory negligence as Miller and the Restatement. Jimenez, 

904 P.2d at 864 (“In [Miller] we explained the differences between contributory 

negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse: . . . ‘[F]ailure to discover a defect in the 

product which the plaintiff should, if he was reasonably diligent, have discovered’ is 

contributory negligence[.]”); id. at 865 (“These concepts distinguish misuse from 

contributory negligence, which involves careless use for a proper purpose.” (citing 

Restatement § 402A cmt. n)). 

In this case, Defendants do not contend that Mr. Bernal was negligent in failing to 

discover and protect against a defect in their product. Rather, they claim that Mr. Bernal 

was negligent in operating the vehicle, leading to the accident that caused his and Kevin’s 

injuries and Mrs. Pacheco’s death. This negligence cannot be characterized as merely a 

“failure to discover the defect in the product” or “guard against the possibility” of its 

existence. Jimenez, 904 P.2d at 864; Miller, 447 P.2d at 253. As a result, in an effort to 

harmonize Jimenez and Zuern, and to avoid the anomalous result they would produce in 

this case, the Court concludes that the kind of fault asserted by Defendants against Mr. 

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Bernal is not the narrowly defined contributory negligence addressed in Jimenez. Rather, 

it is more akin to the kind of such fault apportioned under Arizona law in Zuern. The 

Court also concludes apportionment of fault appears to be consistent with the intent of 

A.R.S. § 12-2506 as written, including its definition of fault to include negligence, strict 

liability, and product liability. A.R.S. § 12-2506(F)(2).

The Court recognizes that this holding can be viewed as inconsistent with the 

contributory negligence doctrine as defined in Arizona cases before Jimenez. In Cota v. 

Harley Davidson, 684 P.2d 888 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), for example, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals held that where the cause of action is product liability in a crashworthiness case, 

evidence that the plaintiff “had been drinking prior to the accident and that his 

motorcycle was in the wrong lane of traffic at the time of the collision” was properly 

excluded as irrelevant to either liability or damages. Id. at 895-96. But after Cota, 

Arizona adopted a comparative fault scheme in A.R.S. § 12-2506. Zuern applied that 

scheme to a product liability crashworthiness case. 

The Court also recognizes that Jimenez was decided by the Arizona Supreme 

Court and Zuern by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and that this Court is bound to follow 

decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court. But as explained above, following both cases 

could produce clearly anomalous and inequitable results in this case, and Zuern was 

decided after Jimenez and applied a clear Arizona statute. Moreover, none of the justices 

who decided Jimenez remain on the Arizona Supreme Court today, and the author of 

Zuern has been elevated to the Supreme Court. Where Arizona law is unclear, this 

Court’s task is to predict what the Arizona Supreme Court would say on the issue today. 

Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980) (“In the 

absence of controlling forum state law, a federal court sitting in diversity must use its 

own best judgment in predicting how the state’s highest court would decide the case.”). 

The Court concludes that Jimenez would likely be limited to the narrow definition of 

contributory negligence it adopted, and that the Supreme Court would apply the 

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comparative fault scheme of A.R.S. § 12-2506 in a case such as this. The Court finds it 

less likely that the Supreme Court would overrule Zuern given the clear direction of 

A.R.S. § 12-2506, and the Court does not believe the Supreme Court would endorse a 

scheme under which Mrs. Pacheco’s losses can be reduced by Mr. Bernal’s fault and Mr. 

Bernal’s cannot. 

As a result, the Court holds that principles of comparative fault apply in this case 

to the claims of all plaintiffs. Given this holding, it will not be necessary to discuss or 

apply common law principles of contributory negligence at trial. This case will proceed 

under the scheme adopted by the Arizona legislature in A.R.S. § 12-2506. Plaintiffs’ 

motion in limine no. 3 is therefore denied and motion in limine no. 4 is granted. 

 28. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 5. Doc. 254. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence or argument 

regarding alleged speeding by Plaintiff Bernal. This motion is based largely on the 

arguments rejected with respect to Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 3. As explained 

above, comparative fault principles will apply in this case. Plaintiffs also suggest, but do 

not argue vigorously, that Defendants’ evidence of speeding is unreliable and would be 

unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. The Court does not agree. Plaintiffs have not 

presented any persuasive argument that Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert is 

incapable of estimating the speed of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Nor can the 

Court conclude that evidence of speeding would be unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiffs given 

the Arizona law requiring the jury to apportion fault among all parties that contributed to 

the injuries. The motion will be denied. 

 29. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 6. Doc. 255. The 

motion asks the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any allegations contained in 

the Accident Report and any other testimony that Plaintiff Bernal was speeding or 

otherwise inattentive. Plaintiffs’ argument again relies on their assertion that 

comparative fault does not apply in this case, an assertion rejected above. Plaintiffs also 

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argue that the lay opinions of the Mexican highway patrol officers, as reflected in the 

Accident Report, are inadmissible under Rule 701. The Court agrees. Officer Hernandez 

testified that he received accident reconstruction training as part of his law enforcement 

duties. Doc. 255-2 at 20-21. He provided estimates of the vehicle’s speed when it left 

the roadway, as well as an opinion that the driver was inattentive or possibly asleep. 

These opinions appear from the deposition to be based on Officer Hernandez’s training. 

Because the opinions are based on “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 

within the scope of Rule 702,” they cannot be admitted as lay witness opinions under 

Rule 701. See Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). Officer Hernandez did not see the accident, and thus 

did not base his opinions on common perceptions people have from observing the 

operation of automobiles. Rather, Officer Hernandez determined the speed and the 

attentiveness of the driver after the fact on the basis of physical evidence at the scene. 

Because his opinions were based on the specialized knowledge of accident 

reconstruction, they properly fall within the scope of Rule 702 and cannot be given as lay 

opinions under Rule 701. Officer Hernandez was never designated as an expert by 

Defendants under Rule 702. 

The Court cannot reach the same conclusion, however, with respect to 

Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert, Ronald L. Woolley. Dr. Woolley also 

opined about the speed of the vehicle on the basis of mathematical calculations as well as 

the attentiveness of the driver on the basis of physical evidence at the scene. Dr. Woolley 

was identified as an expert under Rule 702. Plaintiffs do not argue that he is unqualified 

to provide such opinions. The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to the 

opinions of the Mexican highway patrol officers concerning the speed of the vehicle at 

the time of the accident and the attentiveness of the driver, whether those opinions are 

solicited during live testimony or are reflected in the Accident Report. The Court will 

deny the motion with respect to Dr. Woolley’s opinions concerning the speed of the 

vehicle and the attentiveness of the driver. 

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 30. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 7. Doc. 256. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from presenting evidence that Dolores 

Pacheco was improperly wearing her seatbelt, or that she was improperly seated prior to 

the accident. Plaintiffs contend that opinions to this effect amount to nothing more than 

unfounded speculation and should be excluded as unreliable under Rule 702. The Court 

does not agree. Defense experts Michael Carhart and Thomas McNish both opined that 

Mrs. Pacheco was improperly wearing her seatbelt at the time of the accident. Dr. 

McNish’s conclusions are based on the forces generated during the vehicle’s rollover, the 

effect of such forces on a properly restrained person as opposed to an improperly 

restrained person, and the final position of Mrs. Pacheco’s body at the end of the rollover. 

The Court cannot conclude that this opinion is based on insufficient facts or data or the 

product of unreliable principles or methods, nor that Dr. McNish applied the principles or 

methods unreliably. Plaintiffs do not contest the qualifications of Dr. McNish to opine on 

the subjects. Dr. Carhart based his opinion on a review of available photographs, 

deposition testimony, and interview statements. He evaluated the forces and rotational 

rates of the rollover, and opined that the final position of Mrs. Pacheco’s body was not 

consistent with proper seatbelt restraint. Doc. 340-4 at 20, 32-33. The Court cannot 

conclude that his opinions are based on insufficient data or facts, unreliable principles or 

methods, or the unreliable application of principles or methods. As with Dr. McNish, 

Plaintiffs do not dispute Dr. Carhart’s qualifications to testify on this subject. 

Plaintiffs note that Manuel and Kevin Bernal both testified that Mrs. Pacheco was 

properly seated and belted at the time of the accident, but this testimony is not a basis for 

excluding defense expert opinions. The jury will be called upon to decide the credibility 

of the witness testimony and opinions. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ arguments go to the weight, not the 

admissibility of the evidence. See Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1188 

(9th Cir. 2002). (“In most cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more 

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appropriately considered an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than its 

admissibility”). The motion will be denied. 

 31. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 8. Doc. 258. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence regarding the 

alleged severity of this accident based on the number of rolls, specifically evidence that 

that rollover in this case was more severe than 99% of all rollover accidents. 

Plaintiffs first argue that such evidence amounts to a product misuse defense, 

which has been dismissed in this case. The Court does not agree. The evidence is being 

admitted to rebut Plaintiffs’ argument that this accident was of a reasonably foreseeable 

variety and Defendants should have designed a vehicle to withstand such an accident. 

Defendants will argue that this was an extreme accident and that the damage and injuries 

do not fall within the reasonably foreseeable events against which Defendants reasonably 

could have offered design protection. This is not a product misuse argument. 

Second, Plaintiffs again argue that contributory negligence is not a defense and 

that the severity of the accident is therefore not admissible. As explained above, 

comparative fault principles will apply in this case. Moreover, the Court does not view 

the severity of the accident as primarily being addressed to Plaintiffs’ comparative fault. 

Rather, it is addressed to the question of whether the vehicle in question should have been 

designed to withstand the forces generated in this accident. 

Third, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ 99% argument asks the jury to compare 

this accident to others, and that other-accident evidence is admissible only if the other 

accidents are substantially similar. The Court does not agree that this is other-accident 

evidence. Defendants are not presenting the evidence to show that this accident was 

similar to others, but that it was dissimilar – that the forces generated in this accident 

were unusually severe. Defendants rely on data from the National Highway 

Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) based on the number of rolls in a 

rollover accident, data which suggests that this accident was more severe than 99% of 

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rollover accidents. Plaintiffs’ expert disputes the NHTSA data and Defendants’ argument 

that the accident was unusually severe, but this dispute of fact does not make Defendants’ 

evidence inadmissible. 

The Court concludes that a critical question in this case is whether the vehicle 

should have been designed to withstand the forces generated in this crash. The severity 

of the accident is clearly relevant. Plaintiffs do not challenge the qualifications of the 

expert who relies on the NHTSA data, nor do they challenge the existence of the NHTSA 

data. Plaintiffs do not contend that the NHTSA data is based on an incomplete or 

inaccurate sampling of rollover accidents. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. 

 32. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 9. Doc. 260. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence that the 

subject vehicle met or exceeded federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court to exclude evidence of the vehicle’s compliance 

with FMVSS 216, which prescribes minimum roof strength. In support of their motion, 

Plaintiffs cite cases from states other than Arizona. The motion will be denied. Arizona 

cases hold that compliance with national standards “may be considered in determining 

whether a product is defective.” Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 655 P.2d 32, 36 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1982). “Industry standards have also been found to be admissible in strict 

liability on the ground that these standards often constitute substantive evidence on the 

strict liability issue of whether a product is in a defective condition, unreasonably 

dangerous to the user.” Id. Plaintiffs may seek a limiting instruction concerning 

compliance with the federal standards – that such compliance is not an absolute defense 

to Plaintiffs’ claim, but only a factor the jury should consider in deciding whether the 

vehicle in this case was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 

 33. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 10. Doc. 262. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence of simulated 

rollover testing, arguing that the testing was performed on vastly different vehicles under 

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different speeds, angles, and conditions than occurred in this case. DWMC’s response 

makes clear that Defendants do not intend to present rollover evidence as a simulation of 

the accident that occurred in this case. Rather, Defendants intend to use data generated 

from rollover accidents in support of expert opinions concerning Plaintiffs’ allegation 

that the vehicle in this case was defectively designed and that Plaintiffs’ injuries were 

caused by the defective design. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[a] showing of 

substantial similarity is required when a plaintiff attempts to introduce evidence of other 

accidents as direct proof of negligence, a design defect, or notice of the defect.” Cooper 

v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 

But when evidence of data generated in rollover tests is not presented as direct evidence 

of lack of a defect, rules may be relaxed. 

The Court cannot conclude at this stage that Defendants’ rollover testing evidence 

should be excluded. That determination will depend upon the extent to which the 

evidence is used to suggest that the rollover tests replicate the accidents at issue in this 

case. If such a suggestion is made, the evidence likely will be excluded. If, however, the 

rollover testing is simply used to provide data relied on by defense experts in forming 

opinions applicable to this case, and the suggestion is not made to the jury that the 

rollover tests replicate what occurred in this case, the evidence likely will be admissible. 

The Court’s decision on this issue must be made in the context of trial, particularly in 

light of evidence produced by Plaintiffs’ expert and the manner in which the rollover 

testing data is intended to be used by defense experts. Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied. 

 34. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 11. Doc. 263. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence or argument 

that the design of the windshield header supporting the roof of the vehicle is state of the 

art. Plaintiffs cite evidence from their experts and defense experts suggesting that 

alternative designs were available, and argue that Defendants have failed to present 

evidence that the safer design proposed by Plaintiffs was not in existence or reasonably 

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feasible at the time of manufacture. The Court previously denied Plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment on the state of the art defense. Doc. 244 at 6-8. 

The parties have presented a sharp factual dispute regarding the design of the 

vehicle’s roof and its performance during the accident at issue in this case. Whether the 

evidence presented during trial will support a state of the art jury instruction cannot be 

determined at this time. Plaintiffs essentially ask the Court to pre-judge the evidence 

without having heard the testimony of the various experts. The Court will decide at the 

close of the evidence whether a state of the art jury instruction is warranted. Plaintiffs’ 

motion is denied. 

 35. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 12. Doc. 264. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence or argument 

that the warnings associated with the vehicle in this case were state of the art. Plaintiffs 

base their argument on the fact that Defendants have never produced evidence to support 

such a state of the art defense. DWMC argues in response that Plaintiffs have never 

asserted a failure-to-warn claim in this case. As a result, any state of the art defense to 

such a claim has not been the subject of discovery. 

The parties’ proposed final pretrial order does not assert a failure-to-warn claim. 

As a result, it appears that the warnings associated with the vehicle in this case will be 

irrelevant for all parties. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore granted. 

 36. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 13. Doc. 265. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from introducing evidence that some or 

all of Plaintiffs’ medical expenses were paid by a third party – the collateral source rule. 

DWMC does not oppose the motion. Doc. 335. As a result, the motion is granted. No 

party shall introduce evidence or arguments concerning the payment of Plaintiffs’ 

medical expenses by a third party, including Medicare, Medicaid, and other government 

programs. 

 37. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 14. Doc. 267. 

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Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering any evidence or argument 

pertaining to testing or statistics from simulations using unbelted crash dummies. 

Plaintiffs argue that such crash simulations are not sufficiently similar to this accident to 

be admissible. DWMC responds by stating “that evidence of testing on unbelted crash 

dummies in this particular case is not intended to somehow replicate the results of this 

particular rollover accident[.]” Doc. 336 (emphasis in original). Rather, defense experts 

will rely on such testing to rebut the assertion of Plaintiffs’ experts that laminated glass 

would have kept the occupants within the vehicle. Defense experts will assert that testing 

on unbelted dummies have demonstrated that laminated glass does not provide the “life 

net” that Plaintiffs’ expert asserts. 

The Court cannot conclude that testing on unbelted dummies will be presented by 

Defendants as a purported simulation of the accident in this case. As a result, it appears 

that the substantial similarity test does not apply. Moreover, Plaintiffs rely heavily on 

their expert’s assertion that laminated window glass would have prevented the complete 

ejection of Kevin Bernal and the partial ejection of Mrs. Pacheco during the accident. 

Testing which appears to refute the ability of laminated glass to provide such protection 

is clearly relevant for the jury’s consideration. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. As with the 

rollover testing discussed above, however, this ruling does not prevent Plaintiffs from 

objecting during trial if Defendants attempt to use the unbelted dummy testing in a 

manner which suggests that the testing replicates the events that occurred in this case. 

 38. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 15. Doc. 270. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from offering evidence or argument 

regarding industry custom, including roof design, windshield header design, and side 

glass designs of other vehicles. Plaintiffs argue that industry custom is not the same as 

state of the art, and cite a Washington case which precluded such evidence. DWMC 

notes that Arizona and other states have admitted industry custom as a relevant 

consideration in a product defect case on the question of state of the art. The primary 

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Arizona case cited by Plaintiffs, Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987), itself 

acknowledges that “customs of an industry may be relevant” to a state of the art defense. 

The Court cannot conclude at this stage that the industry customs evidence to be 

presented by Defendants is irrelevant. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. 

 39. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 16. Doc. 271. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule that the consumer expectation test and risk-benefit analysis 

are both applicable in this defective design case. The Court has already denied DWMC’s 

motion seeking to exclude the consumer expectation test. As the Court’s ruling on that 

issue made clear, the Court will rule on the appropriate jury instruction after hearing the 

evidence in this case. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. 

 40. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion in limine no. 17. Doc. 279. 

Plaintiffs move for an order that Arizona law applies to all claims and move to exclude 

evidence and testimony regarding “the nationality and immigration status of decedent 

Dolores Pacheco and the statutory beneficiaries.” Id. The Court has already ruled that 

Arizona law applies. Doc. 30. DWMC argues that “information regarding the Mexican 

citizenship of Dolores Pacheco and Paula Bernal was not before the Court at that time.” 

Doc. 339 at 3. The Court fails to see how Mrs. Pacheco’s citizenship is relevant to the 

wrongful death and loss of consortium claims, because these are not Mrs. Pacheco’s 

claims. E.g., Barragan v. Superior Court of Pima Cnty., 470 P.2d 722, 724 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1970) (“A wrongful death action is an original and distinct claim for damages 

sustained by the statutory beneficiaries and is not derivative of or a continuation of a 

claim existing in the decedent.” (citation omitted)). And although DWMC asserts that 

“Paula Bernal also confirmed that at the time of the accident her immigration status in the 

United States was not legal” (Doc. 339 at 2), DWMC fails to explain how this is relevant 

to Paula Bernal’s domicile. Domicile does not necessarily follow citizenship. See Lake 

v. Bonham, 716 P.2d 56, 58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (“In order to establish domicile in 

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Arizona a party must show ‘(1) physical presence and (2) an intent to abandon the former 

domicile and remain here for an indefinite period of time.’” (quoting DeWitt v. 

McFarland, 537 P.2d 20, 21 (Ariz. 1975)). Domicile is the weightiest factor when 

choosing the applicable law in personal injury cases, Garcia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 990 

P.2d 1069, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999), and DWMC has not shown that Paula Bernal’s 

domicile was anywhere other than Arizona. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.

2

 41. Attached to this order are the Court’s proposed voir dire questions. These 

questions will be discussed during the conference to be held on March 20, 2012. 

 42. Attached to this order are the Court’s proposed preliminary jury 

instructions to be given at the beginning of trial. These instructions will also be 

addressed at the March 20, 2012 conference. 

 43. The parties have been ordered to appear at a settlement conference before a 

Ninth Circuit mediator. As the Court made clear at the final pretrial conference, 

Defendants must comply with the order of Judge Burns requiring that a representative of 

insurers, with full authority, be present at the mediation. The parties promptly shall 

notify the Court if a settlement is reached. 

 44. At the close of the final pretrial conference, counsel for Defendant Daewoo 

America sought permission to amend its answer and assert a crossclaim against DWMC 

in this case. Such a request clearly is untimely and is denied. 

 Dated this 31st day of August, 2011. 

 

2 DWMC does not address surviving claims for Mrs. Pacheco for medical, funeral, and burial expenses as well as costs incurred in pursuing the claims (Doc. 32 at 9:12-14), but the figures are likely not significant when compared to the wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. 

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 31 of 65
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Manuel Bernal and Paula Bernal, husband ) 

and wife, individually and on behalf of ) No. CV09-1520 PHX DGC

Kevin Bernal, their minor son; Paula )

Bernal on behalf of her minor child Kenya )

Bernal; Paula Bernal, surviving daughter )

of decedent Dolores Pacheco and on behalf )

of the estate of Dolores Pacheco; Christoper )

Bernal, individually, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

 v. ) 

) 

Daewoo Motor America, Inc., a Delaware )

corporation, ) 

)

Defendant ) 

_______________________________________) 

COURT’S PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

AND VOIR DIRE

DATED: August 31, 2011

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 32 of 65
1.1A DUTY OF JURY (COURT READS AND 

PROVIDES WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS)

Ladies and gentlemen: You are now the jury in this case. It is my duty to instruct you

on the law. 

These instructions are preliminary instructions to help you understand the principles

that apply to civil trials and to help you understand the evidence as you listen to it. At the

end of the trial, I will give you a final set of instructions. It is the final set of instructions

which will govern your deliberations.

You must not infer from these instructions or from anything I may say or do as

indicating that I have an opinion regarding the evidence or what your verdict should be.

It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you

will apply the law as I give it to you. You must follow the law as I give it to you whether

you agree with it or not. And you must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes,

opinions, prejudices, or sympathy. That means that you must decide the case solely on the

evidence before you. You will recall that you took an oath to do so.

In following my instructions, you must follow all of them and not single out some and

ignore others; they are all important.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 33 of 65
1.2 CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

To help you follow the evidence, I will give you a brief summary of the positions

of the parties:

The plaintiff claims that their 2000 Daewoo Leganza was defectively designed such

that it was unreasonably dangerous and caused the injuries to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have

the burden of proving these claims.

Daewoo Korea and Daewoo America deny those claims and also contend that the

injuries to plaintiffs were not caused by any design defect. Daewoo Korea and Daewoo

America have the burden of proving these claims.

Plaintiffs deny Daewoo Korea’s and Daewoo America’s claims.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 34 of 65
1.3 BURDEN OF PROOF – PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

When a party has the burden of proof on any claim by a preponderance of the

evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim is more probably

true than not true.

You should base your decision on all of the evidence, regardless of which party

presented it.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 35 of 65
1.4 BURDEN OF PROOF – CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE

When a party has the burden of proving any claim or defense by clear and convincing

evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or defense is highly

probable. This is a higher standard of proof than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

You should base your decision on all of the evidence, regardless of which party

presented it.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 36 of 65
1.5 TWO OR MORE PARTIES – DIFFERENT LEGAL RIGHTS

You should decide the case as to each party separately. Unless otherwise stated, the

instructions apply to all parties.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 37 of 65
1.6 WHAT IS EVIDENCE

The evidence you are to consider in deciding what the facts are consists of:

1. the sworn testimony of any witness;

2. the exhibits which are received into evidence; and

3. any facts to which the lawyers have agreed.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 38 of 65
1.7 WHAT IS NOT EVIDENCE

In reaching your verdict, you may consider only the testimony and exhibits received

into evidence. Certain things are not evidence, and you may not consider them in deciding

what the facts are. I will list them for you:

(1) Arguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence. The lawyers are not

witnesses. What they will say in their opening statements, closing arguments,

and at other times is intended to help you interpret the evidence, but it is not

evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers

have stated them, your memory of them controls.

(2) Questions and objections by lawyers are not evidence. Attorneys have a duty

to their clients to object when they believe a question is improper under the

rules of evidence. You should not be influenced by the objection or by the

court’s ruling on it.

(3) Testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or that you have been instructed

to disregard, is not evidence and must not be considered. In addition

sometimes testimony and exhibits are received only for a limited purpose;

when I have given a limiting instruction, you must follow it.

(4) Anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session is not

evidence. You are to decide the case solely on the evidence received at the

trial.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 39 of 65
1.8 EVIDENCE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE

Some evidence may be admitted for a limited purpose only.

When I instruct you that an item of evidence has been admitted for a limited purpose,

you must consider it only for that limited purpose and for no other.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 40 of 65
1.9 DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact,

such as testimony by a witness about what that witness personally saw or heard or did.

Circumstantial evidence is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another

fact. You should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between

the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide how

much weight to give to any evidence.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 41 of 65
1.10 RULING ON OBJECTIONS

There are rules of evidence that control what can be received into evidence. When

a lawyer asks a question or offers an exhibit into evidence and a lawyer on the other side

thinks that it is not permitted by the rules of evidence, that lawyer may object. If I overrule

the objection, the question may be answered or the exhibit received. If I sustain the

objection, the question cannot be answered, and the exhibit cannot be received. Whenever

I sustain an objection to a question, you must ignore the question and must not guess what

the answer might have been.

Sometimes I may order that evidence be stricken from the record and that you

disregard or ignore the evidence. That means that when you are deciding the case, you must

not consider the evidence that I told you to disregard.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 42 of 65
1.11 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to believe

and which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or part of

it, or none of it. Proof of a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of witnesses who

testify about it.

In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account:

(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things

testified to;

(2) the witness’s memory;

(3) the witness’s manner while testifying;

(4) the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice;

(5) whether other evidence contradicted the witness’s testimony;

(6) the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the evidence; and

(7) any other factors that bear on believability.

The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of

witnesses who testify about it.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 43 of 65
1.12 CONDUCT OF THE JURY

I will now say a few words about your conduct as jurors.

First, keep an open mind throughout the trial, and do not decide what the verdict

should be until you and your fellow jurors have completed your deliberations at the end of

the case. 

Second, because you must decide this case based only on the evidence received in the

case and on my instructions as to the law that applies, you must not be exposed to any other

information about the case or to the issues it involves during the course of your jury duty.

Thus, until the end of the case or unless I tell you otherwise:

Do not communicate with anyone in any way and do not let anyone else communicate

with you in any way about the merits of the case or anything to do with it. This includes

discussing the case in person, in writing, by phone or electronic means, via e-mail, text

messaging, or any Internet chat room, blog, Web site or other feature. This applies to

communicating with your fellow jurors until I give you the case for deliberation, and it

applies to communicating with everyone else including your family members, your

employer, and the people involved in the trial, although you may notify your family and your

employer that you have been seated as a juror in the case. But, if you are asked or

approached in any way about your jury service or anything about this case, you must respond

that you have been ordered not to discuss the matter and to report the contact to the court. 

Because you will receive all the evidence and legal instruction you properly may

consider to return a verdict: do not read, watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or

commentary about the case or anything to do with it; do not do any research, such as

consulting dictionaries, searching the Internet or using other reference materials; and do not

make any investigation or in any other way try to learn about the case on your own. 

The law requires these restrictions to ensure the parties have a fair trial based on the

same evidence that each party has had an opportunity to address. A juror who violates these

restrictions jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a mistrial could result that

would require the entire trial process to start over. If any juror is exposed to any outside

information, please notify the court immediately.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 44 of 65
1.13 NO TRANSCRIPT AVAILABLE TO JURY

During deliberations, you will have to make your decision based on what you recall

of the evidence. You will not have a transcript of the trial. I urge you to pay close attention

to the testimony as it is given.

If at any time you cannot hear or see the testimony, evidence, questions or arguments,

let me know so that I can correct the problem.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 45 of 65
1.14 TAKING NOTES

If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember the evidence. If you do take

notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to

decide the case. Do not let note-taking distract you. When you leave, your notes should be

left in the courtroom. No one will read your notes. They will be destroyed at the conclusion

of the case.

Whether or not you take notes, you should rely on your own memory of the evidence.

Notes are only to assist your memory. You should not be overly influenced by your notes or

those of your fellow jurors.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 46 of 65
1.16 JURY TO BE GUIDED BY OFFICIAL ENGLISH

TRANSLATION/INTERPRETATION

 Languages other than English may be used during this trial.

The evidence to be considered by you is only that provided through the official court

interpreters. Although some of you may know [language to be used], it is important that all

jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the English interpretation.

You must disregard any different meaning.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 47 of 65
1.17 USE OF INTERPRETERS IN COURT

You must not make any assumptions about a witness or a party based solely upon the

use of an interpreter to assist that witness or party.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 48 of 65
1.18 BENCH CONFERENCES AND RECESSES

From time to time during the trial, it may become necessary for me to talk with the

attorneys out of the hearing of the jury, either by having a conference at the bench when the

jury is present in the courtroom, or by calling a recess. Please understand that while you are

waiting, we are working. The purpose of these conferences is not to keep relevant

information from you, but to decide how certain evidence is to be treated under the rules of

evidence and to avoid confusion and error.

Of course, we will do what we can to keep the number and length of these conferences

to a minimum. I may not always grant an attorney’s request for a conference. Do not

consider my granting or denying a request for a conference as any indication of my opinion

of the case or of what your verdict should be.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 49 of 65
1.19 OUTLINE OF TRIAL

Trials proceed in the following way: First, each side may make an opening statement.

An opening statement is not evidence. It is simply an outline to help you understand what

that party expects the evidence will show. A party is not required to make an opening

statement.

The plaintiff will then present evidence, and counsel for the defendant may

cross-examine. Then the defendant may present evidence, and counsel for the plaintiff may

cross-examine.

After the evidence has been presented, the attorneys will make closing arguments, and

I will instruct you on the law that applies to the case.

After that, you will go to the jury room to deliberate on your verdict.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 50 of 65
2.2 STIPULATIONS OF FACT

The parties have agreed to certain facts [to be placed in evidence as Exhibit __] [that

will be read to you]. You should therefore treat these facts as having been proved.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 51 of 65
2.4 DEPOSITION IN LIEU OF LIVE TESTIMONY

A deposition is the sworn testimony of a witness taken before trial. The witness is

placed under oath to tell the truth and lawyers for each party may ask questions. The

questions and answers are recorded. When a person is unavailable to testify at trial, the

deposition of that person may be used at the trial. 

The deposition of [witness] was taken on [date]. You should consider deposition

testimony, presented to you in court in lieu of live testimony, insofar as possible, in the same

way as if the witness had been present to testify.

Do not place any significance on the behavior or tone of voice of any person reading

the questions or answers.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 52 of 65
2.7 FOREIGN LANGUAGE TESTIMONY

Witnesses who do not speak English or are more proficient in another language testify

through an official court interpreter. Although some of you may know [language used], it

is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the

interpreter’s translation of the witness’s testimony. You must disregard any different

meaning.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 53 of 65
2.11 EXPERT OPINION

 Some witnesses, because of education or experience, are permitted to state opinions

and the reasons for those opinions.

Opinion testimony should be judged just like any other testimony. You may accept

it or reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’s

education and experience, the reasons given for the opinion, and all the other evidence in the

case.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 54 of 65
2.12 CHARTS AND SUMMARIES NOT RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE

Certain charts and summaries not received in evidence have been shown to you in

order to help explain the contents of books, records, documents, or other evidence in the case.

They are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts. If they do not correctly reflect the

facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, you should disregard these charts and

summaries and determine the facts from the underlying evidence.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 55 of 65
2.13 CHARTS AND SUMMARIES IN EVIDENCE

Certain charts and summaries have been received into evidence to illustrate

information brought out in the trial. Charts and summaries are only as good as the

underlying evidence that supports them. You should, therefore, give them only such weight

as you think the underlying evidence deserves.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 56 of 65
4.1 CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS – FAIR TREATMENT

All parties are equal before the law and a corporation is entitled to the same fair and

conscientious consideration by you as any party.

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 57 of 65
1

CIVIL VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS

1. Read statement of the case.

• Have any of you read or heard anything about this case from any source

whatsoever? 

• Given this brief description of the facts, is there anything about this case that

would cause you to believe that you could not consider the evidence fairly and

impartially according to the law?

2. Introduce self and staff: Lisa Richter, Tricia Lyons, Sara Cummings, Melissa Lou,

and Nancy Johnson Outley. Do any of you know me or any member of my staff on

any basis, social, professional or otherwise?

3. The Plaintiffs are represented by Julio M. Zapata, John Everroad and Scott Day

Freeman of the law firm of Fennemore Craig. Counsel please stand. 

• Do any of you know Plaintiffs’ counsel, or any of the employees in their office

on any basis, social, professional or otherwise?

• Counsel, please introduce your clients and those present at the counsel table.

Do any of you know these individuals on any basis, social, professional or

otherwise?

4. The defendant is represented by Larry Schmadeka and Scott Monson of the law firm

of Lee, Hong, Degerman, Kang & Waimey and Michael O’Connor and Jonathan

Weisbard of the law firm of Jennings, Strouss & Salmon. Counsel please stand.

• Do any of you know the Defendant’s counsel or any employees of their offices

Case 2:09-cv-01502-DGC Document 346 Filed 08/31/11 Page 58 of 65
2

on any basis, social, professional or otherwise?

• Counsel, please introduce your client and those present at the counsel table.

Do any of you know these individuals on any basis, social, professional, or

otherwise? 

• If a company or corporation: Have any of you ever had a business or

employment relationship of any kind with the defendant?

5. The witnesses who may be called during this trial are: (See Witness Tab):

• Do any of you know or think you might know any of these witnesses?

6. Do any of you have strong feelings either for or against a party who brings a lawsuit?

7. This is a civil case which is to be decided by the preponderance of the evidence [clear

and convincing on some issues]. This is different from a criminal case where the

government has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Does anyone have a

problem applying a lower burden of proof than used in a criminal case?

8. Have any of you or members of your family been a party or witness in any litigation

(excluding domestic relations, traffic, or probate)?

9. Do any of you or any of the members of your family have any legal training?

10. Have any of you worked for a car manufacturer or dealership?

11. Do any of you now or have you previously owned a Daewoo Leganza or Daewoo

vehicle?

12. Do any of you know anything about a Daewoo vehicle?

13. Have any of you read articles about the Daewoo vehicle?

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14. Have any of you or your family or close friends ever been sued or had a claim made

against you?

15. Does any member of the panel believe that a person should not be held responsible

for the consequences of his or her own negligence if that negligence injures them or

someone else?

16. Does any member of the panel believe that merely because a person is injured that

someone else must be at fault for that injury?

17. Has any member of the panel, or any members of your family or close friends, to your

knowledge, ever had any connection or dealings with any persons named so far,

including the parties, witnesses or attorneys?

18. Have you or a family member been involved in a rollover accident? If so, were they

injured? How seriously? Was the roof of the vehicle crushed? Did the side windows

shatter out of the vehicle? Did the seatbelt work properly?

19. Does anyone disagree with this statement: Auto manufacturers should exercise

reasonable care in design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting a user of the vehicle to

unreasonable risk of injury while using their vehicles?

20. Do any of you have any opinion whether or not autos, such as sedans, should be

equipped with laminated glass versus tempered glass?

21. Does anyone on the panel have an opinion whether or not autos, such as sedans,

should be equipped with a roof that does not crush into the occupant space during a

rollover accident?

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22. Has any member of the panel ever sustained a personal injury or had a relative who

sustained injuries or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident? Were you injured?

If so, explain the nature and extent of the injuries and damages.

23. Has any member of the panel ever been involved in a single vehicle accident? Were

you injured? If so, explain the nature and extent of the injuries and damages.

24. Has any member of the panel ever been involved in a lawsuit or a claim as a result of

injuries, death, and/or damages to yourself or a relative that were sustained in a motor

vehicle accident? If so, how was the lawsuit resolved?

25. The plaintiffs in this case are seeking more than $32,000,000 in damages. Are there

any of you who could not award that amount, no matter what the evidence showed?

26. The plaintiffs are seeking damages for pain, discomfort, suffering, disability,

disfigurement, and anxiety for past and future loss of consortium – loss of love, care,

affection, companionship, and other pleasures of the marital or family relationship,

lost earnings, reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment and services

rendered, and reasonably probable to be incurred in the future, loss of enjoyment of

life, and the wrongful death of Dolores Pacheco. Do any of you believe that damages

should not be awarded for pain?

27. Do any of you believe that damages sought by a plaintiff in a lawsuit should be

capped at a certain amount, regardless of the evidence? If so, what should the cap be

and why do you feel this way?

28. Have you or any family member ever been employed in the following professions:

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medical field (such as physician, nurse or paramedic); private investigation; law

enforcement (such as a police officer, state police, or sheriff’s deputy), or legal field

(such as a lawyer, paralegal or secretary)?

29. Have you or any of your family members had a job that involved accident

reconstruction, biomechanical work or the design of products?

30. Have any members of the panel driven on Mexican highways? If so, do you drive on

Mexican highways with any regularity?

31. Have you or any of your family members ever suffered any type of spinal injury? If

so, did it require continuing care?

32. Has anyone on the panel ever been disabled and unable to work for a period of time?

33. Have you or any member of your family been required (by job or family

circumstance) to provide daily care for a severely injured person?

34. Does any member of the panel have any feelings, whether they be positive or

negative, about products or vehicles manufactured in Korea?

35. Does any member of the panel believe that a motor vehicle should be designed in such

a way that any occupant in any accident should be uninjured?

36. Does any member of the panel have any negative feelings about the automotive

industry in general?

37. I will instruct you on the law at the conclusion of the case. If selected as a juror, you

will take an oath to follow the law. Do any of you think you would have trouble

following the law if you disagree with it?

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38. Ladies and gentlemen, we recognize that jury service is probably an inconvenience

for you, taking you away from your jobs and families and disrupting your daily

routine. Jury service is, however, one of the most important duties that citizens of this

country can perform. For this reason, from time to time we ask citizens to make

sacrifices and serve on juries, even when inconvenient. Prospective jurors can be

excused from jury service if the length of the trial or the daily schedule would impose

undue hardship. By undue hardship I mean more than inconvenience – I mean

genuine hardship that would be experienced by you or your family. This case is

expected to last ___ days. Would the length of the trial create an undue hardship for

any of you?

39. I expect to conduct trial on these dates and times:

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

Would this schedule create an undue hardship for any of you?

40. Do any of you have any other reason whatsoever, such as a physical difficulty, a

health problem or home problems that might interfere with your serving as a fair and

impartial juror in this case?

41. We have handed you a sheet with 10 separate questions. Please stand and answer the

questions. The last question asks about your prior jury service. With respect to any

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juries on which you have served, please indicate the nature of the case and the

outcome of the trial.

42. Did any of you know each other before this morning?

43. If there are any matters that you would rather discuss privately that may affect your

ability to be a fair and impartial juror, please let the Court know.

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1. Juror Number

2. The general location of your residence

3. Length of time at current residence

4. Education after high school, if any. State your major

5. Marital status

6. Number of children. Ages of children if under 18

7. Employment

A. Yourself – current job and types of jobs throughout lifetime

B. Spouse – current job and types of jobs throughout lifetime

8. Civil, social, fraternal, union or professional organizations. Offices held in them

9. Hobbies or recreational activities

10. Prior jury service – civil or criminal

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