Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04083/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04083-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER ARNOLD,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04083-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Pending before the Court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by Defendants 

County of Alameda and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern, individually and in his official capacity as 

Sheriff of the County of Alameda1(“Defendants”). Dkt. No. 15 (“Mot.”). For the reasons 

articulated below, the Motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff Jennifer Arnold filed this action in Alameda County Superior 

Court against Defendants and Does 1-25. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). On September 8, 2015, 

Defendants removed the action to this Court. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff asserts California negligence 

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants for injuries that Plaintiff sustained at the hands of 

Elias Michael Diamond, a criminal defendant who Defendants left unguarded after transferring 

him to Valley Care Medical Center (“VCMC”) where Plaintiff was working as a nurse. Compl. 

¶ 1. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Id.

For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the following as true: In November 2004, 

 

1 An action against Defendant Ahern in his official capacity is equivalent to suing the County 

itself. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, any references to 

Defendant Ahern in this motion will refer to his liability in his individual capacity.

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Diamond was arrested on suspicion of strangling and killing his roommate in the psychiatric home 

where they both resided. Id. ¶ 16. On August 29, 2014, Diamond was again arrested and taken 

into custody in San Leandro, California for indecent exposure. Id. ¶ 17. Diamond was charged 

with indecent exposure and remanded to the Santa Rita Jail, which Defendant Alameda County 

owns and the Defendants operate. Id ¶ 18. Sometime between September 2, 2014, and September 

7, 2014, Defendants transported Diamond from Santa Rita Jail to VCMC for medical treatment. 

Id. ¶ 19. Subsequently, when Diamond was transferred to Plaintiff’s floor during the evening of 

September 7th or the morning of September 8th, Defendants did not warn the VCMC staff that 

Diamond was in custody or mentally unstable. Id. ¶ 22. Further, Defendants did not guard 

Diamond. Id. ¶ 26. After Diamond was transferred to Plaintiff’s floor, he wandered out of his 

room only partially clothed. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff discovered Diamond, who appeared disoriented, 

and escorted him back to his room according to VCMC custom and practice. Id. When Plaintiff 

and Diamond entered his room, Diamond attacked Plaintiff, began to strangle her, and attempted 

to force oral copulation. Id. ¶ 24. As a result of the struggle, Plaintiff suffered physical injuries 

and emotional distress. Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff articulates four claims for relief: (1) violation of her Fourteenth Amendment

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants and Does 1-25; (2) supervisory liability under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Ahern and Does 1-25; (3) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against Defendant Alameda County; and (4) negligence against Defendants and Does 1-25.

On December 15, 2015, Defendants filed the pending motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as to all claims for relief.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants articulate six main reasons that their motion should be granted: (1) the Court 

can take judicial notice of Diamond’s Promise to Appear, which establishes that he was not in 

custody at the time of Plaintiff’s attack; (2) Plaintiff fails to plead an affirmative duty that 

Defendants breached in support of her negligence claim; (3) Defendant Ahern has statutory 

immunity to Plaintiff’s negligence claim; (4) Defendant Alameda County cannot be held liable for 

negligence except as provided by statute; (5) Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a special 

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relationship that would permit Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims; and (6) Plaintiff fails to allege a statecreated danger to permit Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Before turning to the substance of the motion, the Court considers Defendants’ request that 

the Court take judicial notice of Diamond’s Promise to Appear filed in his underlying criminal 

case in Alameda Superior Court. Dkt. No. 16, Ex. A. Defendants argue that a Promise to Appear, 

which California law provides “may be signed by a misdemeanor arrestee/detainee in order to 

secure his or her release, per California Penal Code section 853.6, subdivision (a)(1),” reflects that 

Diamond signed his name on September 5, 2014, at 4:32 p.m. Mot. at 3. Accordingly, 

Defendants contend that the signed Promise to Appear establishes as a matter of law that Diamond 

was released on September 5, 2014, at 4:32 p.m., and was not in custody when Diamond attacked 

Plaintiff several days later. Id.

The doctrine of judicial notice permits a court to take as true “a fact that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “In particular, a court may take judicial notice 

of its own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other cases.” United 

States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted). However, “a high 

degree of indisputability is the essential prerequisite to taking judicial notice of adjudicative facts 

and [] the tradition of taking judicial notice has been one of caution in requiring that the matter be 

beyond reasonable controversy.” Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, while a court may take notice of the 

existence of public court documents, it may not “draw inferences or take notice of facts that might 

reasonably be disputed.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court properly took 

judicial notice of existence of publicly-recorded, signed extradition waiver form, but “erred by taking 

judicial notice of disputed matters” in concluding that signer of form in fact validly waived his rights).

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ request to take 

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judicial notice of Diamond’s Promise to Appear. While the Court may properly notice that the 

signed Promise to Appear exists, the Court cannot “beyond reasonable controversy” infer from the 

document’s existence when, or even if, Diamond was released. See Rivera, 395 F.3d at 1151. 

Indeed, as Plaintiff asserts, Diamond’s Promise to Appear reveals nothing about Defendants’ 

general practice following an individual’s completion of a Promise to Appear or whether such 

practice was followed with Diamond. See Dkt. No. 23 (“Opp’n”) at 10. At the pleading stage, the 

Court cannot resolve such a disputed issue based on the existence of a document that is both 

“subject to varying interpretations” and “reasonably [] disputed.” See Corinthian Colleges, 655 

F.3d at 999; Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011); Lee, 250 F.3d 

at 689-690. 

Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the existence and facial content of 

Diamond’s Promise to Appear, but the Court will not infer Diamond’s custodial status during the 

relevant time period from the Promise to Appear. Rather, as required at the pleading stage, the 

Court will accept as true Plaintiff’s allegation that Diamond was in custody at the time of 

Plaintiff’s attack. See Compl. ¶ 22.

B. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but 

early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The legal 

standard that governs a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as that which governs a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion. Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable 

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela 

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads 

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 

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complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, 

Courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

“Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure neither expressly provides for, nor 

bars, partial judgment on the pleadings.” Plumlee v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 13-CV-00414-LHK, 2014 

WL 695024, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014). However, courts commonly apply Rule 12(c) to 

individual causes of action. Id. A court has discretion to permit leave to amend in conjunction 

with a Rule 12(c) motion and may dismiss causes of action rather than grant judgment. Id. If a 

court grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted unless such 

amendment would be futile. Pac. W. Grp., Inc. v. Real Time Sols., Inc., 321 F. App’x 566, 569 

(9th Cir. 2008).

C. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of Plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Amendment rights against Defendants and Does 1-25; (2) supervisory liability for 

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights against Defendant Ahern and Does 1-25; and 

(3) a Monell violation against Defendant County of Alameda. See Compl. ¶¶ 28-50; Opp’n at 3-5. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims for supervisory liability and a Monell violation are predicated on an 

underlying constitutional violation, resolution of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated her 

Fourteenth Amendment rights is determinative of Plaintiff’s remaining § 1983 claims. See Van 

Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also R.H. v. Los Gatos Union 

Sch. Dist., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2014), dismissed (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2014).

In support of her allegations of a § 1983 constitutional violation, Plaintiff asserts that 

Defendants’ failure to guard Diamond or to warn VCMC that Diamond was in custody and/or 

dangerous constituted deliberate indifference or callous disregard for Plaintiff’s safety. Id. ¶¶ 33-

36. Defendants move for a judgment that they cannot be held liable because neither the special 

relationship exception nor the state-created danger exception imposes liability on them as a result 

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of Diamond’s attack against Plaintiff. Mot. at 6-9. The Court agrees with Defendants.

“To state a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the conduct complained of 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the 

plaintiff of a constitutional right.” L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, as a 

general rule, “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not 

constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. 

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). The Ninth Circuit recognizes two exceptions to this general 

rule: (1) the “special relationship” exception; and (2) the “danger creation” exception. Grubbs,

974 F.2d at 121.

i. Special Relationship Exception

As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim based on the 

special relationship exception. See generally Compl; Opp’n at 3-5 (addressing only the statecreated danger exception). However, the Court will address this exception briefly.

Once the state creates a special relationship with an individual, “as in the case of custody 

or involuntary hospitalization,” the state can be liable for due process violations “premised on an 

abuse of that special relationship.” Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121. However, the Ninth Circuit has 

made clear that “[t]he special-relationship exception does not apply when a state fails to protect a 

person who is not in custody.” Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2011). This is 

because “when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty 

that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic 

human needs . . . it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth 

Amendment and the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. “The affirmative duty to 

protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its 

expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to 

act on his own behalf.” Id. In other words, “it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the 

individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, or other 

similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections 

of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms 

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inflicted by other means.” Id.

Plaintiff does not contend that Defendants restrained her in any manner. See generally 

Compl. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants transferred Diamond to VCMC and failed to 

guard Diamond or to warn the hospital staff of his dangerous nature, which resulted in Plaintiff’s 

attack. Id. ¶¶ 2, 19-26. The complaint includes no allegation that Defendants restrained Plaintiff’s 

“freedom to act on [her] own behalf,” and thus there was no special relationship between Plaintiff 

and Defendants. See generally id.; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot allege a § 1983 claim based on the 

special relationship exception.

ii. State-Created Danger Exception

However, Plaintiff does clearly allege that the state-created danger exception applies. See 

e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 19, 26, 32; Opp’n at 3-5. Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants affirmatively placed 

Diamond, or through their deliberate indifference allowed others to affirmatively place Diamond, 

in Plaintiff’s place of employment,” which resulted in Plaintiff’s attack. Compl. ¶¶ 32-36.

A finding of state-created danger requires two elements: (1) “affirmative conduct on the 

part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger” and (2) the state must have acted with 

“deliberate indifference” to a “known or obvious danger.” Patel, 648 F.3d at 974. “Deliberate 

indifference is a stringent standard of fault.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In the 

Ninth Circuit, deliberate indifference is “a higher standard than gross negligence because it 

requires a culpable mental state, meaning that the state actor must recognize an unreasonable risk 

and actually intend to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the 

plaintiff.” Campbell v. State of Washington Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 846 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Patel, 648 F.3d at 974).

Although Plaintiff contends that Defendants acted affirmatively by transporting Diamond 

to VCMC, see Compl. ¶ 32, Plaintiff fails to articulate non-conclusory facts to plausibly support a 

finding that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants 

affirmatively placed Diamond, or through their deliberate indifference allowed others to 

affirmatively place Diamond, in Plaintiff’s place of employment.” Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff further 

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alleges that Defendants deprived her of her rights “knowingly, maliciously, and with conscious 

and reckless disregard,” and “[a]s a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference and/or callous 

disregard,” Plaintiff was injured. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36. These allegations are conclusory and are not 

supported by the facts as pled. According to Plaintiff, Diamond was arrested on suspicion of 

strangling and killing his roommate over ten years ago. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff does not allege that 

Diamond was ever charged or that the officers who transported Diamond to VCMC were aware of 

his prior arrest. See generally id. Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that immediately prior to her attack, 

Diamond was arrested on charges of indecent exposure because he was found dressed in a bikini. 

Id. ¶ 17. Yet Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting an inference that wearing a bikini correlates 

with violent tendencies. In sum, nothing about an indecent exposure arrest or a more than tenyear-old suspicion of violent behavior plausibly suggests that Defendants recognized that 

Diamond posed a “known or obvious danger” to Plaintiff. Moreover, even assuming arguendo

that Defendants knew that Diamond posed a risk, the facts as pled do not plausibly indicate that 

Defendants acted with the intent to expose Plaintiff to such a risk. Accordingly, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff does not adequately allege non-conclusory facts to plausibly support a finding of 

deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff maintains that the facts of this case are “strikingly similar” to those in Grubbs, in 

which the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, finding 

that the state-created danger exception applied. Opp’n at 3-5. The Court disagrees.

In Grubbs, plaintiff L.W. was a registered nurse employed by the State of Oregon at a 

medium security custodial institution for young male offenders. Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 120. The 

defendants were L.W.’s employers at the custodial institution, who had hired L.W. and led her to 

believe that she would not be required to work alone with male sex offenders. Id. Despite these 

representations, defendants selected Blehm, a known sex offender who had failed all treatment 

programs at the institution, to work alone with L.W. at her clinic. Id. Once L.W. and Blehm were 

alone, Blehm raped and terrorized L.W. Id. L.W. brought a § 1983 action, and the defendants 

moved to dismiss, arguing that L.W.’s § 1983 claim failed because (1) she was never in 

defendants’ custody, (2) L.W.’s status as a state employee barred her claim, and (3) L.W. alleged 

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“mere negligence,” which is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim. Id. at 121-24. The district 

court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that victim custody is a prerequisite to a 

§ 1983 claim. Id. at 121. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal, emphasizing that although some courts had 

intermingled the special relationship and danger creation exceptions, “the distinction is 

important.” Id. As such, while custody is a prerequisite to the special relationship exception, 

“custody is not a prerequisite to the ‘danger creation’ basis for a section 1983 third party harm 

claim.” Id. at 122. With respect to the defendants’ state of mind, the Ninth Circuit declined to 

define the mental state required under § 1983 because L.W. had “alleged facts demonstrating 

official deliberate indifference in creating the danger.” Id. at 122-23. In finding a sufficient 

allegation of deliberate indifference, the Court noted that defendants allegedly assigned Blehm to 

work with L.W. despite knowing that: (1) Blehm was not qualified to work with her; (2) “Blehm 

had an extraordinary history of unrepentant violence against women and girls; (3) Blehm was 

likely to assault a female if left alone with her; (4) L.W. would be alone with Blehm . . .; and (5) 

[L.W.] would not be prepared to defend against or take steps to avert an attack because she had not 

been informed at hiring that she would be left alone with violent offenders.” Id. at 121. 

The Court finds that the underlying facts pled in Grubbs are fundamentally different from, 

and substantially more specific than, those alleged here. While the facts pled in Grubbs permitted 

the Ninth Circuit to reasonably infer that the defendants had knowledge of Blehm’s dangerous 

nature and acted with intent to expose L.W. to the risk, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations here fail 

to plausibly establish either prong of deliberate indifference. As such, the Court holds that Grubbs

does not support a finding that Plaintiff has adequately pled that the state-created danger exception

applies. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to plead either the special relationship exception or the statecreated danger exception to establish § 1983 liability for private violence, her claims for 

supervisory liability and a Monell violation must also fail. See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 

F.3d 831, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1996); see also R.H., 33 F.Supp.3d at 1154. The Court must thus 

dismiss Plaintiff’s three § 1983 claims.

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Without dispute, Plaintiff’s allegations describe a traumatic and terrifying attack by 

Diamond. But the complaint as now pled does not contain facts sufficient to meet the “stringent” 

deliberate indifference standard as to the County and the Sheriff’s department.

D. California Negligence Claim

Plaintiff also asserts a California negligence claim against Defendants and Does 1-25 for 

“failing to guard Diamond while he was at [VCMC], prior to and leading up to the time when he 

attacked Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶¶ 51-54. Defendants move for judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence 

claim because (1) Plaintiff has failed to articulate the existence of a duty that Defendants owed 

her; (2) a public entity such as Alameda County may not be held liable for injuries except as 

provided by statute; and (3) Defendant Ahern and Defendant Alameda County are immune under a

variety of state law immunities. Mot. at 3-6. 

Prior to addressing any applicable statutory immunities, the Court must first determine 

whether Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiff. See Williams v. State of California, 34 Cal. 

3d 18, 22 (1983) (“Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not 

even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and 

thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.”). Although Plaintiff’s complaint largely 

alleges a duty to guard Diamond, see generally Compl., Plaintiff also references a duty to warn, 

see id. ¶¶ 22, 33. See also Opp’n at 5-8. Because California recognizes both a duty to guard and a 

duty to warn, the Court will address both theories of negligence.

iii. Duty to Guard

Plaintiff contends that California Penal Code §§ 4011 et. seq. imposed a duty on 

Defendants to guard Diamond during his hospital stay. See Compl. ¶ 20. Thus, Plaintiff argues, 

Defendants were negligent in leaving Diamond unattended prior to Plaintiff’s attack. Id. ¶¶ 20-22, 

26; Opp’n at 7-8. Defendants counter that California Penal Code § 4011.7 establishes that 

Defendants had no duty to guard Diamond. Mot. at 6. The Court agrees with Defendants.

California Penal Code § 4011(a) states:

When it is made to appear to any judge by affidavit of the sheriff or 

other official in charge of county correctional facilities or district 

attorney and oral testimony that a prisoner confined in any city or 

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county jail within the jurisdiction of the court requires medical or 

surgical treatment necessitating hospitalization, which treatment 

cannot be furnished or supplied at such city or county jail, the court 

in its discretion may order the removal of such person or persons 

from such city or county jail to the county hospital in such county; 

provided, if there is no county hospital in such county, then to any 

hospital designated by such court; and it shall be the duty of the 

sheriff or other official in charge of county correctional facilities to 

maintain the necessary guards, who may be private security guards, 

for the safekeeping of such prisoner, the expense of which shall be a 

charge against the county.

Cal. Pen. Code § 4011(a) (emphasis added). However, California Penal Code § 4011.7 declares:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 4011 and 4011.5, when it 

appears that the prisoner in need of medical or surgical treatment 

necessitating hospitalization or in need of medical or hospital care 

was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of an offense 

constituting a misdemeanor, the court in proceedings under Section 

4011 or the sheriff or jailer in action taken under Section 4011.5 

may direct that the guard be removed from the prisoner while he or 

she is in the hospital. 

Cal. Penal Code § 4011.7.

Plaintiff acknowledges that Diamond was arrested and charged on September 29, 2014, 

with violation of California Penal Code § 314.1, a misdemeanor. See Compl. ¶ 18; Opp’n at 7-8. 

Thus, under the unambiguous language of California Penal Code § 4011.7, Defendants had no 

duty to guard Diamond during his hospital stay.

Plaintiff maintains that such an interpretation of § 4011.7 is illogical when viewed in the 

context of California Penal Code § 4011.5. Opp’n at 7-8. According to Plaintiff, because 

§ 4011.5 requires law enforcement to apply to a superior court judge if a prisoner’s medical 

condition prevents him from being returned to jail within 48 hours, the Court’s interpretation of 

§ 4011.7 would permit law enforcement to avoid their statutory duties by simply releasing 

misdemeanants during a hospital stay. Id. However, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff is 

correct, that argument is for the California legislature, not this Court. The Court is bound by the 

clear language of California Penal Code § 4011.7, which establishes that Defendants had no duty 

to guard Diamond, a misdemeanant, during his hospital stay.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants did not have a duty to guard Diamond.

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iv. Duty to Warn

In much less detail, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants were negligent for failing to warn 

anyone at VCMC about Diamond. See Compl. ¶¶ 22, 33. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that 

“Defendants failed to warn medical staff that Diamond was under their custody, and mentally

unstable [or dangerous], thereby depriving medical staff of the ability to take necessary 

precautions against being along with him.” See id. Defendants respond that the facts as pled do 

not establish a sufficiently specific threat to trigger a duty to warn. See Mot. at 5-6. The Court 

again agrees with Defendants.

As a general rule, “one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those 

endangered by such conduct.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203 (1982). 

However, “[a] duty to control the conduct of another or to warn persons endangered by such 

conduct may arise . . . out of what is called a ‘special relationship.’” Zelig v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 

27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1129 (2002). This duty may arise if “(a) a special relation exists between the 

actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s 

conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a 

right to protection.” Id. (internal citations omitted); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 

Cal. 3d 425, 435-36, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). In the context of a released offender, courts have 

imposed a duty to warn on a releasing agent when “the released offender poses a predictable threat 

of harm to a named or readily identifiable victim or group of victims who can be effectively 

warned of the danger.” Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 758 (1980).

Given the cursory nature of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court holds that Plaintiff has not 

sufficiently pled a duty to warn to survive Defendants’ motion. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does 

not indicate whether she believes that the duty to warn arose from a special relationship between 

Defendants and Plaintiff or between Defendants and Diamond. See generally Compl. Further, 

Plaintiff fails to adequately allege how or why Defendants should have known that Diamond 

“pose[d] a predictable threat of harm to a named or readily identifiable victim or group of victims

who [could have been] effectively warned.” See id. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations fail “to give 

fair notice . . . to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and her negligence claim 

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based on a duty to warn must be dismissed. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011).

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s briefing provides additional detail regarding her 

theory that Defendants had a duty to warn VCMC about Diamond. Plaintiff asserts that a special 

relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendants because under California Penal Code 

§ 4011, “[o]nce Diamond was transported to VCMC, the County remained responsible for paying 

for Diamond’s medical services, and guarding him.” Opp’n at 6. According to Plaintiff, this 

relationship “in which Defendants are hiring the hospital to provide medical care for prisoners in 

their custody” gave rise to a duty to warn and is akin to the special relationship found in Johnson 

v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 784 (1968). Id. Whatever the merits of that assertion might be, at this

stage the Court must limit its consideration to the pleadings, material submitted with or relied 

upon by the complaint, and material subject to judicial notice. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). The Court may not transpose 

Plaintiff’s allegations from her briefs into the complaint.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to 

support her theory that Defendants had a duty to warn.

Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a duty to guard or a duty to warn, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim.2

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2 As established above, the issue of statutory immunity does not arise until a duty of care is found. 

Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 22. Because Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a duty of care that 

Defendants owed her, the Court need not reach the issue of statutory immunity at this stage.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint 

consistent with this Order within 21 days, if she can do so consistent with her obligations under 

Rule 11. To successfully plead § 1983 claims in her amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege 

non-conclusory facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that Defendants (1) recognized that 

Diamond posed an unreasonable risk and (2) actually intended to expose Plaintiff to such risks 

without regard to the consequences to the Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

8/1/2016

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