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Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 12, 2002 Decided February 28, 2003

No. 01-5374

& No. 01–5375

MARY R. WATERS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD,

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND

ROBERT J. CORTER, JR., MAJOR GENERAL,

DIRECTOR, U.S. DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY,

APPELLEES

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00332 & No. 01cv00472)

Claude D. Convisser argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs in this case filed

actions against the Secretary of Defense and the Director of

the Defense Commissary Agency on behalf of themselves and

a class of more than 9,000 people who bag and carry groceries

for customers at United States military commissaries around

the world. We affirm the district court’s denial of the

plaintiffs’ request to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. We vacate, however, the district court’s denial of the

plaintiffs’ claims for money damages under the Fair Labor

Standards Act, because exclusive jurisdiction over those

claims lies in the United States Court of Federal Claims.

I

Military commissaries are grocery stores that serve active

and retired military personnel and their dependents. The

commissaries are operated by the Defense Commissary Agency, a component of the Department of Defense. The commissaries do not regard the plaintiffs as their employees and do

not pay them a salary or other compensation; the grocery

baggers work solely for tips from the customers for whom

they bag and carry groceries. The plaintiffs also allege that,

in order to receive a commissary’s permission to work for

tips, baggers are required to perform additional work for

which they receive neither salary nor tips. Among other

duties, this work includes gathering shopping carts and collecting litter.

The plaintiffs contend that, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., they are employees of the commissaries and must be paid the minimum wage,

compensated for overtime hours, and provided with other

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benefits prescribed by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207.

In 1978, Congress expressly addressed the FLSA status of

commissary baggers. In relevant part, Public Law 95-485

reads as follows:

[A]n individual who performs bagger or carryout service

for patrons of a commissary of a military department

may not be considered to be an employee for purposes of

the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by virtue of such

service if the sole compensation of such individual for

such service is derived from tips.

Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-485, § 819, 92 Stat. 1611,

1626 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203 note).

Two groups of commissary baggers filed class action complaints in the United States District Court. The first count of

lead plaintiff Mary Waters’ complaint sought a declaratory

judgment that Public Law 95-485 is unconstitutional because

it denies persons performing bagger and carryout services

the equal protection of the laws. The remaining counts of

Waters’ complaint, and all of the counts of the complaint filed

by lead plaintiff Calvin Davis, charged that the defendants

are liable to the plaintiffs under the FLSA for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, and liquidated damages.1

 The

district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss

both the constitutional and FLSA claims, and the plaintiffs

filed the instant appeal.

II

The plaintiffs contend that Public Law 95-485 violates the

equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment because it unfairly carves out commissary

baggers from the protections accorded other workers under

the FLSA.2

 We review this contention de novo. LaRouche

v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Because the

plaintiffs do not assert that commissary baggers constitute a

1 The complaints also sought attorney’s fees and costs.

2 Both the plaintiffs and the government agree that the district

court had jurisdiction over this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

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suspect class, or that Public Law 95-485 infringes upon

fundamental constitutional rights, we must uphold the statute

if it has any rational basis. As the Supreme Court said in

FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.:

[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the

wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas

of social and economic policy, a statutory classification

that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes

fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against

equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

basis for the classification.

508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348

U.S. 483, 488–89 (1955).

The government proffers such a rational basis here. It

notes that Congress enacted Public Law 95-485 following a

decision by the Civil Service Commission that commissary

baggers were Defense Department employees for purposes of

the FLSA. See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 102 (1977)

(discussing unpublished Civil Service Commission decision).

According to the government, Congress decided to override

the Commission’s ruling because it feared the decision would

make commissary bagger positions more difficult for military

dependents to obtain. As the government explains, tips from

commissary bagging provide an important source of supplemental income for these individuals, who often find it difficult

to obtain other employment because they are relatively shortterm residents of the area in which they are stationed.

Appellees’ Br. at 8, 15–17. If commissary baggers were

covered by the FLSA, the government contends, the dependents of service personnel would be displaced by local civilians who would take the work as a route to more permanent

positions. Id. at 16–17.

The plaintiffs dispute whether this concern truly was Congress’ motivation, and, even if it was, whether excluding

baggers from FLSA coverage is really necessary to accomplish that purpose. Although our examination of the legislative record makes clear that preserving opportunities for

dependents of military personnel was indeed a purpose of

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Public Law 95-485, see infra notes 3–5, we need not dwell on

the point because ‘‘it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional

purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged

distinction actually motivated the legislature.’’ Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314. All that is required is that

there be ‘‘plausible reasons for Congress’ action.’’ Id. at 313–

14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor need we determine whether the vehicle chosen by Congress is necessary to

accomplish its purpose. To uphold the statute, all we must

decide is that there is ‘‘any conceivable rational basis’’ for the

legislative classification. Id. at 309.

There is no doubt that Congress could rationally conclude

that excluding baggers from FLSA coverage would enhance

the employability of spouses and other dependents of service

personnel. The transient nature of service life necessarily

limits the employment opportunities of military dependents,3

and many do earn supplemental income working as grocery

baggers.4

 It would be rational for Congress to conclude that

if baggers were covered by the FLSA, local civilians would

successfully compete to fill the positions on a more permanent

basis, leaving fewer opportunities for military dependents

newly arriving from other posts.5

 Nothing more is required

3 See A Bill to Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings

on H.R. 6256 Before the House Subcomm. on Labor Standards,

Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 3 (1978) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Rep. Daniel) (indicating that

spouses of service personnel reported ‘‘[t]ime after time TTT that

they are virtually unemployable because they are short-term residents’’).

4 See Subcommittee Hearings at 34 (statement of Maj. Gen.

Burkett) (‘‘The typical bagger is a military dependent, either a wife

or a teenager, son or daughter, off-duty military personnel, or

retired military.’’); Waters Decl. ¶ 10 (Dec. 2000) (stating that

approximately 32 of the 53 individuals registered to serve as

baggers at the Fitzsimons Army Center Commissary are military

dependents, and that 18 of the remaining 21 are active-duty personnel, active reserve personnel, or military retirees).

5 See Subcommittee Hearings at 4 (statement of Rep. Daniel) (‘‘If

the baggers’ jobs are absorbed by civil service, TTT they will become

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to uphold the statute. As the Supreme Court has instructed,

our ‘‘standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint’’:

The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to

infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial

intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how

unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.

Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314 (quoting Vance v.

Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).

Finally, the plaintiffs suggest that excluding them from the

protection of the FLSA is simply unfair. But ‘‘classifying

governmental beneficiaries [ ] ‘inevitably requires that some

persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored

treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact

[that] the line might have been drawn differently at some

points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.’’ Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315–16 (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,

179 (1987)). Where the line is not drawn to disadvantage a

suspect class, Congress’ decision to prefer one group of

potential beneficiaries over another survives judicial scrutiny

as long as it is minimally rational. Id. at 313. We conclude

that the classification at issue in this case satisfies that test.

III

In addition to a declaration that Public Law 95-485 is

unconstitutional, the plaintiffs seek unpaid minimum wages,

unpaid overtime, and liquidated damages under the FLSA.

They contend that even if the law is constitutional, it excludes

from FLSA coverage only those individuals who perform

‘‘bagger or carryout service,’’ and that because they perform

additional duties that are not excluded, they are entitled to

entry level jobs for those intent on career progression. Those who

now perform this service will be frozen out.’’); id. at 17 (statement

of Rep. Aspin) (noting that commissaries ‘‘will naturally prefer to

hire persons who won’t be pulled off the job’’).

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full protection under the FLSA. The district court rejected

the plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation, holding that Congress

did not intend ‘‘to provide any FLSA coverage to grocery

baggers, even if they performed duties in addition to bagging

and carrying.’’ Waters v. Rumsfeld, No. 00-0332, Mem. Op.

at 15 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2001).

Before we may examine the merits of the district court’s

holding, we must first assure ourselves that the district court

had jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.

The ‘‘Little Tucker Act’’ grants United States district courts

concurrent jurisdiction with the United States Court of Federal Claims over civil actions or claims against the United

States

not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the

Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of

an executive department, or upon any express or implied

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tortTTTT

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Under the (Big) Tucker Act, claims

‘‘exceeding the $10,000 jurisdictional ceiling TTT are within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.’’ Goble v.

Marsh, 684 F.2d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see United States v.

Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 72 (1987); Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762

F.2d 1065, 1071 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985).6

6 The Tucker Act grants the United States Court of Federal

Claims jurisdiction

to render judgment upon any claim against the United States

founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress

or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any

express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in

tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). As the Supreme Court has explained, the

understanding that claims for more than $10,000 are within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims ‘‘is not based

on any language in the Tucker Act granting such exclusive jurisdiction to the Claims Court. Rather, that court’s jurisdiction is

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The district court concluded that, in light of the nature of

the plaintiffs’ demands for unpaid wages and overtime, they

necessarily sought money damages in excess of $10,000. No

party disputes this point. However, that fact does not necessarily divest the district court of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs

may ‘‘remain in District Court under the Tucker Act even if

their damages exceed $10,000 in amount, as long as they

waive any claims in excess of $10,000.’’ Goble, 684 F.2d at 15;

see Stone v. United States, 683 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

It is apparently on this ground that the district court took

jurisdiction, stating in a footnote: ‘‘In the event that the

Court does not dismiss their action, Plaintiffs would amend

their Complaint to limit their claims to $10,000 in money

damages.’’ Waters, Mem. Op. at 13 n.12 (citing Davis Plaintiffs’ Opp’n to Defendants’ Mot. to Dismiss at 19).

On appeal, the plaintiffs—who below had no objection to

the district court deciding their FLSA claims—now argue

that the court was without jurisdiction to do so because they

did not in fact waive claims for amounts in excess of $10,000.7

On the other hand, the government—which in the district

court resisted a finding of jurisdiction on the ground that the

Tucker Act gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Federal

Claims—now argues that the plaintiffs effectively waived

claims for amounts over $10,000 so as to vest jurisdiction in

‘exclusive’ only to the extent that Congress has not granted any

other court authority to hear the claims that may be decided by the

Claims Court.’’ Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48

(1988).

7 In the district court, the plaintiffs argued that the Tucker Act’s

grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims does not control

this case because, in their view, the Act applies only to complaints

seeking damages from appropriated funds of the United States.

The Defense Commissary Agency, the plaintiffs asserted, is a ‘‘nonappropriated funds instrumentality.’’ The district court did not

decide whether the plaintiffs were correct about the applicability of

the Tucker Act to non-appropriated funds instrumentalities, because it ruled that the Defense Commissary Agency does in fact

receive appropriated funds. Waters, Mem. Op. at 12. The plaintiffs do not appeal that ruling.

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the district court under the Little Tucker Act. The irony of

the parties’ reversal of positions aside, we have an independent obligation to determine jurisdiction de novo. See Lepre

v. Dep’t of Labor, 275 F.3d 59, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

In Goble v. Marsh, this circuit held that, for a district court

to maintain jurisdiction over a claim that might otherwise

exceed $10,000, a plaintiff’s waiver of amounts over that

threshold must be ‘‘clearly and adequately expressed.’’ 684

F.2d at 17. In Goble, although the plaintiffs had waived their

backpay claims in excess of $10,000, we held those waivers

insufficient because they ‘‘did not expressly disclaim’’ damages over $10,000 that would accrue after the filing of the

complaints and before final judgment. Id. at 16.

The plaintiffs in the instant case did not expressly disclaim

monetary damages over $10,000. Rather, the language upon

which the district court apparently relied for its conclusion

that the plaintiffs had waived claims over that amount reads

as follows:

In the alternative that this Court holds that the plaintiffs’

claims in federal district court are subject to [the Little

Tucker Act], the plaintiffs request leave to submit consent forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216 limiting their

claims to not more than $10,000 each. Any consent

forms which plaintiffs moved this Court to provide to

potential class members also would include this $10,000

cap.

Davis Plaintiffs’ Opp’n at 19. On appeal, plaintiffs’ counsel

submits that he did not intend by this language to waive all of

his clients’ claims in excess of $10,000, but only to ask the

court to give each plaintiff an opportunity to decide whether

to consent to such a limited recovery in order to remain in

district court: ‘‘In fact, the plaintiffs-appellants were not

prepared to amend their Complaint to limit their claims to

$10,000 in money damages; their counsel only sought leave

for each one to decide on his or her own whether to file

consent forms so limiting their damages and allowing him or

her then to proceed in the District Court.’’ Appellants’ Opp’n

to Appellees’ Mot. to Transfer at 3. This explanation is

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consistent with the language from the plaintiffs’ district court

pleading quoted above, as well as with additional language on

the same page of the same pleading. See Davis Plaintiffs’

Opp’n at 19 (stating that the plaintiff ‘‘may bring herself into

conformity with the jurisdictional limitation TTT by filing a

consent form TTT acknowledging a cap on her damages of

$10,000’’) (emphasis added).

We conclude that the plaintiffs did not ‘‘clearly and adequately express’’ an intent to waive their FLSA claims in

excess of $10,000. Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims

has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims, and the

district court was without jurisdiction to rule on their merits.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

determination that Public Law 95-485 is constitutional under

the Fifth Amendment. However, we vacate the judgment

with respect to the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, remand those

claims to the district court, and direct that court to transfer

them to the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.8

8 The government initially moved to transfer this appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), that court—with certain exceptions not relevant

here—has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of any case in

which the jurisdiction of the district court was founded ‘‘in whole or

in part’’ on the Little Tucker Act. Id. § 1295(a)(2). Section

1295(a)(2) is inapplicable here, however, in light of our conclusion

that the district court’s jurisdiction was not properly based on the

Little Tucker Act in any part. At oral argument, both parties

agreed that if we so concluded, the appropriate disposition would be

to transfer the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims to the Court of Federal

Claims.

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