Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-20-03023/USCOURTS-ca10-20-03023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

BILLY J. REYNOLDS, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

KRISTI MILLER, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 20-3023 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-03091-SAC) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Defendant Billy J. Reynolds, a Kansas state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. For the same reasons as the district court, we 

DENY his request for a COA and DISMISS this matter. 

Petitioners have one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by 

the conclusion of direct review” to file a habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

“Direct review” of a conviction does not end until the availability of direct appeal in the 

state courts and request for review in the United States Supreme Court have been 

*

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 17, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 20-3023 Document: 010110362403 Date Filed: 06/17/2020 Page: 1
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exhausted; where a prisoner declines to seek review in the Supreme Court, the limitation 

period begins to run the day after the ninety-day period for seeking review in the 

Supreme Court expires. See Harris v. Dinwiddie, 642 F.3d 902, 906 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011).

The district court dismissed Reynolds’ § 2254 petition as untimely. 

To appeal, Reynolds must first obtain a COA, which is available only if he can 

make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). Reynolds must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the 

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). The district 

court concluded Reynolds failed to file his petition within the one-year limitations period 

and thus did not reach the merits of the petition. When a district court disposes of a 

petition on procedural grounds, like timeliness, a COA will issue only when the petitioner 

meets a two-part standard, showing not just that “jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,” but also 

“that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 478; see Coppage v. McKune, 534 F.3d 1279, 1281 

(10th Cir. 2008) (“If the application was denied on procedural grounds, the applicant 

faces a double hurdle.”).

In 2010, Reynolds pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated indecent liberties 

with a child. After his sentencing to life in prison with no possibility of parole for twentyfive years, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court conducted an 

Appellate Case: 20-3023 Document: 010110362403 Date Filed: 06/17/2020 Page: 2
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evidentiary hearing and denied the motion in February 2012. Reynolds appealed; the 

Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on October 25, 2013, and the Kansas 

Supreme Court denied review on August 14, 2014. Reynolds then had 90 days to file a 

petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court; he did not do so, and his 

one-year limitations period to file his habeas petition began to run on November 13, 

2014, the day after the 90-day period expired. Reynolds did not file his § 2254 petition 

until April 12, 2018, clearly beyond the one-year limitations period.1

 No jurist of reason 

would find it debatable that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. For this 

reason, we DENY his request for a COA and DISMISS this matter. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge 

1

 Reynolds also filed a pro se motion to set aside his conviction on December 9, 

2015, which like this § 2254 petition argued he had not personally pled guilty. The trial 

court construed that motion as a motion to withdraw plea and denied it as untimely and 

successive. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. See State v. Reynolds, 404 P.3d 355 

(Table), 2017 WL 4453229, *1 (Kan. App. Oct. 6, 2017). This second motion is not 

relevant, however, as it does not impact the statute of limitations analysis; even if such a 

filing tolled the period, it was not filed during the period. Cf. Harris, 642 F.3d at 906 n.6.

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