Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01212/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act (Definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELFINA MOTA; PAUL 

IHEANACHOR; SORRINA SALAZAR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TRI-CITY HEALTHCARE DISTRICT 

dba TRI-CITY MEDICAL CENTER; 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

DAVID SEIF, M.D.; ANESTHESIA 

SERVICES MEDICAL GROUP, INC. 

and DOES 1 through 30, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-1212-AJB-NLS

Related Case: 18-CV-2775-AJB-NLS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. Nos. 3, 20)

Pending before the Court is (1) Defendant United States of America’s (“United 

States”) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and (2) Defendants David Seif, M.D. 

(“Dr. Seif”), and Anesthesia Service Medical Group’s (“ASMG”) (Dr. Seif and ASMG 

collectively “ASMG Defendants”) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. Nos. 

3, 20.) Plaintiffs Delfina Mota (“Ms. Mota”), Paul Iheanachor (“Mr. Iheanachor”), and 

Sorrina Salazar (“Ms. Salazar”) (Ms. Mota, Mr. Iheanachor, and Ms. Salazar collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) filed oppositions to both motions to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 11-13, 23-25.)

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the instant matter suitable for 

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determination on the papers and without oral argument. For the reasons set forth more fully 

below, the Court GRANTS both the United States’ and ASMG Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

and are construed as true for the limited purpose of resolving the instant motion. See Brown 

v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiffs bring three causes of action, under California state law, for medical 

malpractice, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), and medical battery. At 

the heart of Defendants’ motions to dismiss are the claims for NIED and medical battery. 

Plaintiffs allege Defendants negligently managed Ms. Mota’s labor and delivery, such that 

there was an emergency C-Section without the benefit of anesthesia. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 19.)

Plaintiffs allege that on November 15, 2017, at approximately 11:51 am, Ms. Mota 

presented to co-defendant TRI-CITY HEALTHCARE DISTRICT dba TRI-CITY 

MEDICAL CENTER (“Tri-City”), and she was admitted for induction of labor. (Id. ¶ 16–

17.) Dr. Sandra Lopez, M.D. (“Dr. Lopez”) was the attending physician. (Id. ¶ 4.) Mr. 

Iheanachor (Ms. Mota’s fiancé, life partner, and father of the unborn child) and Ms. Salazar 

(Ms. Mota’s sister) accompanied Ms. Mota to Tri-City. (Id. ¶ 38–39). Mr. Iheanachor and 

Ms. Salazar remained at Ms. Mota’s side. (Id. ¶ 40). At approximately 11:06 pm, ASMG 

Defendants administered an epidural. (Id. ¶ 18.) When the fetal heartbeat became unable 

to be read, Dr. Lopez was notified, and she called for an emergency C-Section. (Id.) Ms. 

Mota consented to a vaginal delivery and the use of anesthesia, but she did not consent to 

a C-Section. (Id. ¶ 52). At or about the same time Dr. Lopez called for the C-Section, pages 

for ASMG Defendants to respond to the operating room were sent over the hospital paging 

system. (Id. ¶ 18, 23.) 

When Ms. Mota was rushed to the operating room, Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar 

requested to go in the operating room with her. (Id. ¶ 41–42.) However, both Mr. 

Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar were told they could not enter the room. (Id.) Mr. Iheanachor 

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and Ms. Salazar waited just outside the operating room door and in the waiting area 

respectively. (Id.) At this time, Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar heard multiple pages for 

ASMG Defendants to respond to the operating room; however, they did not see anyone 

respond to the pages. (Id.)

In the operating room, Dr. Lopez allegedly lost her sense of professionalism and 

control. Dr. Lopez began screaming, pounding on the table, and yelling for Lidocaine. (Id.

¶ 20–21, 25.) Ms. Mota’s epidural, administered six hours earlier, had the effect of numbing 

Ms. Mota from the waist down for the planned vaginal birth; however, it had no effect on 

the surgical site for the C-Section located on Ms. Mota’s lower abdomen. (Id. ¶ 23–24.) 

During this time, Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar could hear the yelling, banging, and 

chaos within the operating room. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 43.) 

Dr. Lopez instructed personnel to strap Ms. Mota down, and Ms. Mota’s four 

extremities were strapped to the operating table. (Id. ¶ 25.) Dr. Lopez then performed the 

C-Section without administering sufficient anesthesia. (Id. ¶ 54.) No one informed or got 

the consent of Ms. Mota. (Id. ¶ 52, 56.) Ms. Mota was conscious and awake, and she felt 

everything being done. (Id. ¶ 55.) Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar heard Ms. Mota 

screaming for help and for Defendants to stop cutting and hurting her. (Id. ¶ 44–45.) 

Additionally, Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar heard the pages for ASMG Defendants and 

the lack of response. (Id.) Mr. Iheanachor attempted to gain entry into the operating room, 

but medical staff held him back. (Id. ¶ 44.) 

After some time, Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar noticed Dr. Seif running full speed 

down the hallway and entering the operating room. They also noticed sleep lines on Dr. 

Seif’s face. (Id. ¶ 44–45.) Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar heard the ongoing chaos, and 

they were concerned for both Ms. Mota and the unborn child. (Id. ¶ 46.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs originated this action on or about July 18, 2018, as Case No. 37-2018-

00034758-CU-MM-NC in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, North 

County Division. Plaintiffs originally named as defendant Dr. Lopez, an employee of Vista 

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Community Clinic (“VCC”). Plaintiffs later named VCC as a defendant in their FAC filed 

September 10, 2018. The FAC alleges medical negligence against Dr. Lopez, VCC, TriCity, Dr. Seif, ASMG, and Does 1 through 30. 

On November 20, 2018, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of 

California certified, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), that Dr. Lopez and VCC were acting 

within the scope of their employment with respect to the events. Upon the certification, 

and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), the claims against Dr. Lopez and VCC were deemed 

tort actions against the United States. On December 10, 2018, the action was removed to 

this Court and assigned case number 18-cv-2775-AJB-NLS. The United States substituted 

Dr. Lopez and VCC, who were dismissed with prejudice on December 14, 2018. 

On February 5, 2019, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs 

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and the Court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. The Court granted the motion and remanded back to state court. 

Plaintiffs filed their FAC in state court. The United States then removed Plaintiff’s 

action to this Court on June 28, 2019. Additionally, the United States filed a Notice of 

Related Case, and pursuant to the “Low-Number” Rule, the action was transferred to this 

Court. 

III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

ASMG Defendants and Plaintiffs both requests judicial notice of several documents 

filed in this Court, and California state court. These documents include complaints filed in 

California state court regarding this instant matter, and an order issued by this Court in 

Related Case No. 18-cv-2775-AJB-NLS. (Doc. Nos. 3-3, 11-4.) Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if it is “not 

subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A fact is “not subject to reasonable 

dispute” if it is “generally known,” or “can be accurately and readily determined from 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2). 

Under this rule, a court may “take judicial notice of matters of public record without 

converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,” but it “cannot take 

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judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Khoja v. Orexigen 

Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018).

Under Rule 201, judicial notice of the documents filed in this Court and state court

is appropriate. “Courts have consistently held that courts may take judicial notice of 

documents filed in other court proceedings.” See NuCal Food, Inc. v. Quality Egg LLC, 

887 F. Supp. 2d 977, 984 (E.D. Cal. 2012). However, “[w]hile the authenticity and 

existence of a particular order, motion, pleading or judicial proceeding, which is a matter 

of public record, is judicially noticeable, veracity and validity of its contents . . . are not.” 

United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 974 (E.D. Cal. 2004). Based on 

this authority, the Court GRANTS both ASMG Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ requests to the 

extent they seek judicial notice of the existence of the documents. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 

complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss 

a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack of cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient 

facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 

88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). However, a complaint will survive a 

motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this 

determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual 

allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 

(9th Cir. 2007). Notwithstanding this deference, a reviewing court need not accept legal 

conclusions as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for 

a court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Assoc. 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume 

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

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relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.

V. DISCUSSION

A. The United States’ and ASMG Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs Mr. 

Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar’s Claims for NIED.

The Court will first address the United States’ and ASMG Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss Plaintiffs Mr. Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar’s NIED claims. California law 

recognizes that “there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress” 

in that “[t]he tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an 

essential element.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993). 

Whether a duty existed is a question of law. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. 

Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588 (1989). Under the theory of negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, there are two variations—bystander and direct victim.1 Wooden v. 

Raveling, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1035, 1037–38 (1998). This matter presents a bystander case as 

neither Mr. Iheanachor nor Ms. Salazar were physically impacted or injured. Instead, Mr. 

Iheanachor and Ms. Salazar allege they witnessed Ms. Mota’s injury at the hands of 

Defendants. 

In the absence of physical injury or impact to Mr. Iheanachor or Ms. Salazar, 

damages for emotional distress in a bystander case is recoverable only if Mr. Iheanachor 

or Ms. Salazar: 

(1) is closely related to the injury victim, (2) are present at the scene of the 

injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing 

injury to the victim, and (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that 

which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness.

Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667–68 (1989). At issue here are the first and 

second prongs.

 

1 Bystander cases refer to plaintiffs “not physically impacted or injured, but instead witnessed someone 

else being injured to due defendant’s negligence.” Wooden v. Raveling, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1035, 1037 

(1998). Direct victim cases refer to cases in which “the plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress is . . . based 

upon the violation of a duty owed directly to the plaintiff.” Id. at 1038.

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1. Plaintiff Mr. Iheanachor’s Claim for NIED.

As to Mr. Iheanachor’s NIED claim, the United States and ASMG Defendants both 

dispute the first element necessary for a NIED claim, arguing Mr. Iheanachor is not closely 

related to the injured victim, Ms. Mota. (Doc. Nos. 3, 20). 

California law bars a bystander’s recovery for NIED if the bystander is not closely 

related to an injured victim. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667 (“The class of potential plaintiffs 

should be limited to those who because of their relationship suffer the greatest emotional 

distress.”). Only relatives living in the same household, “or parents, siblings, children, and 

grandparents of the victim” should be allowed to recover for NIED. Id. at 668 n.10. The 

California Supreme Court has held unmarried cohabitants may not recover damages for 

emotional distress. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 277 (1988).

Here, Mr. Iheanachor is not closely related to Ms. Mota under controlling California 

authority. At all times relevant, Mr. Iheanachor was Ms. Mota’s fiancé and life partner. 

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 44.) Although the Court does not doubt the close relationship between Mr. 

Iheanachor and Ms. Mota, the Court is bound by California’s controlling bright-line rule

in rendering this decision. However, Mr. Iheanachor alleges he was fearful for injury not 

only to his fiancé but also his unborn child. (Id.) Under California law, children qualify as 

close relatives. See Thing, at 668 n.10. While it is possible Mr. Iheanachor feared for the 

safety of his unborn child, missing from the FAC are any allegations that Defendants 

directly caused harm to Mr. Iheanachor’s child during labor and delivery. Further, the child 

is not a party to the action, and no plausible harm or injury is implied through the 

allegations in Plaintiffs’ FAC. 

Thus, the first element to recover on an NIED claim is not satisfied as it pertains to 

Mr. Iheanachor because he was not at any time relevant related to the injured victim for 

the underlying medical malpractice claim. Because Mr. Iheanachor fails the first prong to 

a NIED claim as a matter of law, his claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

//

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2. Plaintiff Ms. Salazar’s NIED Claim.

As to Plaintiff Ms. Salazar’s NIED claim, the parties do not dispute that Ms. Salazar 

is closely related to Plaintiff Ms. Mota as her sister. However, the parties dispute the second 

prong of the NIED test. The second prong requires plaintiff to be “present at the scene of 

the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury 

to the victim.” Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 647. An essential component of recovery is an 

understanding perception of the injury-producing event. Golstein v. Superior Ct., 223 Cal. 

App. 3d 1415, 1427 (1990) (plaintiffs did not have a “contemporaneous sensory awareness 

of the causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury” when they 

saw child’s injuries after overdose of radiation). 

Here, all parties rely on Bird v. Saenz to illustrate that there was either an awareness 

of the injury-causing event or a lack thereof. In Bird, the California Supreme Court 

discussed the extent of a layperson’s ability to recover for NIED in medical malpractice 

suits:

In other NIED cases decided after Thing, and based on alleged medical 

negligence, courts have not found a layperson’s observation of medical 

procedures to satisfy the requirement of contemporary awareness of the 

injury-producing event. This is not to say that a layperson can never perceive 

medical negligence, or that one who does not perceive it cannot assert a valid 

claim for NIED. To suggest an extreme example, a layperson who watched as 

a relative’s sound limb was amputated by mistake might well have a valid 

claim for NIED against the surgeon. Such an accident, and its injury-causing 

effect, would not lie beyond the plaintiff’s understanding awareness. But the 

same cannot be assumed of medical malpractice generally. 

28 Cal. 4th 910, 917–18 (2002); compare Morton v. Thousand Oaks Surgical Hospital, 

187 Cal. App. 4th 926, 934–35 (2010) (plaintiffs who alleged to have medical expertise 

precluded from recovery because they insufficiently alleged expertise that allowed them to 

know and appreciate the medical treatment given to their mother was inadequate), with 

Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Center, 235 Cal. App. 4th 484, 490–91 (2015) 

(plaintiffs allowed to recover when they witnessed victim’s respiratory distress and aware 

that medical center’s conduct caused defendant’s death). 

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The court in Bird held that the plaintiff daughters were unable to succeed on a claim 

of NIED when they were present at the scene of the injury-causing event. Id. at 921–22. 

The court reasoned the plaintiffs were unable to perceive the defendants’ failure to 

diagnose and treat a damaged artery in a meaningful way because such circumstance was 

beyond the awareness of a lay bystander. Id. at 917. According to the court, “a rule 

permitting bystanders to sue for NIED on account of unperceived medical errors hidden in 

the course of treatment cannot be reconciled with Thing’s requirement that the plaintiff be 

aware of the connection between the injury-producing event and the injury.” Id. at 921.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Ms. Salazar was not in the operating room, and 

therefore could not have known the cause of the sounds she heard. (Doc. No. 3 at 7:5-10);

see Ra v. Superior Ct., 154 Cal. App. 4th 142, 149 (2007) (“[A]lthough [presence may be 

established] through nonvisual sensory perception, ‘someone who hears an accident but 

does not then know that it is causing injury to a relative does not have a viable bystander 

claim . . . even if the missing knowledge is acquired moments later.’”).

Here, Plaintiff Ms. Salazar alleges that she was a percipient witnesses to the injuryproducing event, Ms. Mota’s emergency C-section. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 45.) She stayed right 

outside the operating room, and could hear Ms. Mota “screaming for help, and for 

Defendants to stop cutting and hurting her.” (Id.) Ms. Salazar further argues that she “had

contemporaneous knowledge of the injury producing event, i.e. [Ms. Mota] being cut into 

without the benefit of sufficient anesthesia, as well as the resulting injuries to said Plaintiff 

through their sense of hearing.” (Doc. No. 11 at 16:6-10; 23 at 11:17-21.)

The instant case draws many comparisons to Bird. Ms. Salazar heard pages for 

ASMG Defendants over the hospital’s system. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 42.) Additionally, Ms. Salazar 

was present when medical personnel rushed Ms. Mota to the operating room. (Id.) Ms. 

Salazar also had a nonvisual sensory perception of chaos in the operating room. (Id. ¶ 46.) 

While it is plausible Ms. Salazar heard commotion in the operating room, the facts do not 

sufficiently allege Ms. Salazar appreciated the harm caused to the point of 

contemporaneous awareness. Hurlbut v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 207 Cal. App. 3d 388, 397 

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(1989) (“[T]here is an element of ‘certainty of injurious impact’ necessary to establish the 

requisite sensory perception of the injury-producing event.”). Ms. Salazar merely 

perceived endangerment and chaos, not harm. But “[p]erception of endangerment, while 

potentially stressful, is insufficient to cause legally cognizable harm[.]” Hurlbut, 207 Cal. 

App. 3d at 397. Ms. Salazar is a layperson, and the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ FAC are not 

sufficient to demonstrate an extreme example like the court in Bird suggested. See Bird, 28 

Cal. 4th at 918. Specifically, Ms. Salazar was not contemporaneously aware that Ms. Mota 

“was being cut into without the benefit of sufficient anesthesia.” (Doc. No. 11 at 16:8-9; 

23 at 11:19-20.) Therefore, Ms. Salazar has not pleaded a legally sufficient claim for NIED.

To conclude, Mr. Iheanachor’s NIED claim fails because as a matter of law, he is 

not closely-related to Ms. Mota. Thus, Mr. Iheanachor’s NIED claim is DISMISSED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Additionally, Ms. Salazar’s claim is DISMISSED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND because she has failed to plead facts demonstrating she was 

contemporaneously aware that the injury-producing event caused harm.

B. Plaintiff Ms. Mota fails to state a claim for medical battery against AMSG 

Defendants.

ASMG Defendants also seek to dismiss Ms. Mota’s medical battery claim for failure 

to state a claim. “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a 

doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.” Cobbs v. Grant, 8 

Cal. 3d. 229, 240 (1972). If a physician received consent for one treatment or procedure, 

and performs another, a battery occurs. Piedra v. Dugan, 123 Cal. App. 1483, 1495 (2004). 

Consent is not required where an emergency arises. Id. 

Plaintiff Ms. Mota, and ASMG Defendants dispute the appropriate elements that 

should be used for medical battery. Ms. Mota asserts that CACI No. 530B is most 

applicable. (Doc. No. 11 at 10:8-12.) On the other hand, ASMG Defendants assert CACI 

No. 530A is applicable. (Doc. No. 3 at 8:6-11.) As it pertains to ASMG Defendants, CACI 

No. 530A is the proper standard. The Directions for Use for CACI No. 530B indicate

CACI No. 530A is most appropriate: “If the claim is that defendant proceeded without 

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consent or deviated from the consent given, give CACI No. 530A.” 1 CACI 530B (2019). 

Under this standard, to establish a claim for medical battery a plaintiff must prove all of 

the following: (1) the defendant performed a medical procedure without consent, or the 

plaintiff consented to one medical procedure, but performed a substantially different one; 

(2) the plaintiff was harmed; and (3) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in 

causing plaintiff’s harm. 1 CACI 530A (2019). 

At the heart of this issue is whether ASMG Defendants either performed a medical 

procedure without consent, or whether ASMG Defendants performed a procedure that was 

substantially different than the one that was consented to.2 ASMG Defendants argue that 

the medical battery claim has no merit because ASMG Defendants—as the 

anesthesiologists—did not perform the alleged incision/C-section on Ms. Mota. (Doc. No. 

3 at 8:15-18.) ASMG Defendants further argue that even if they had performed the 

incision/C-Section the emergency exception applies to the lack of consent. (Doc. No. 3 at 

11:19-21.) Ms. Mota, however, argues that ASMG Defendants’ “failures in this case were 

acts of omission rather than acts of commission.” (Doc. No. 11 at 9:16.) Further, Ms. Mota 

undisputedly admits ASMG Defendants were not present in the room when the incision 

was made. (Id. at 10:16-17.) Ms. Mota asserts that if ASMG Defendants showed up and 

properly anesthetized her, no battery would have occurred. (Id. at 10:20-21.) Ms. Mota’s 

argument, however, is unavailing. 

Performance is essential to establish a medical battery claim. See Saxena v. Goffney, 

159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 324 (2008) (“[A] battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a 

doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.”). It is without question that 

ASMG Defendants did not perform the medical procedure that the medical battery claim 

relies on. Further, Ms. Mota does not present any case law to support whether an act of 

omission—here, failure to properly anesthetize—could give rise to a medical battery claim. 

 

2 Plaintiffs allege Ms. Mota consented to a vaginal delivery and the use of anesthesia. Ms. Mota also 

alleges she never consented to undergo a C-Section. Further, if she impliedly consented, such consent 

contained the implied condition of sufficient anesthesia. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 52.)

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Thus, construing the facts most favorable to Plaintiff, Ms. Mota cannot prove a medical 

battery claim against ASMG Defendants. ASMG Defendants simply did not perform the 

C-section or execute the incision. 

Because, as a matter of law, ASMG Defendants did not perform a procedure required 

for medical battery, the emergency exception is irrelevant and the Court declines to address 

this argument. Therefore, Plaintiff Ms. Mota’s medical battery claim against AMSG 

Defendants is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

VI. CONCLUSION

In sum, Mr. Iheanachor was not, at any time relevant, closely related to the injured 

victim, Ms. Mota. As such, his claim for NIED is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND. Additionally, Ms. Salazar was not present at the injury-producing event and 

aware that it caused harm to the injured victim. Although Ms. Salazar was present through 

hearing the chaos in the operating room, she was not contemporaneously aware, nor 

appreciated, that there was insufficient anesthesia. Therefore, her NIED claim is 

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Further, the Court GRANTS ASMG 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ms. Mota’s medical battery claim. Because it is undisputed 

ASMG Defendants did not perform the C-Section nor the incision and were not present in 

the room at the time in question, Ms. Mota’s medical battery claim against ASMG 

Defendants is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs will have 

twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to file their amended complaint. Failure 

to file an amended complaint consistent with this Order will result in dismissal of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2020

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