Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03089/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR ARTURO OROPEZA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

J.D. STOKES, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-3089 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

(Docket No. 20)

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the California Board of Prison

Terms’ (“Board”) denial of parole after his July 21, 2004 parole suitability hearing. The

court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition, and petitioner filed a

traverse. Petitioner has also filed a motion for judicial notice, which the court discusses

below. 

BACKGROUND

On January 7, 1992, petitioner was convicted by a jury in Santa Clara County

Superior Court of second degree murder. Resp. Ex. B at 2 (Unpublished Opinion of the

California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, People v. Menchaca, et al., No.

*E-FILED - 3/25/08*

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Petitioner’s co-defendant, Gerardo Jerry Menchaca, was found guilty of second

degree murder and received a sentence of sixteen years to life. This court previously

denied habeas corpus petitions filed by petitioner and Menchaca challenging the

constitutional validity of their convictions. See Oropeza v. Clark, C 97-20736 RMW;

Menchaca v. Clarke, C 96-20295 RMW. 

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The Board has since denied parole at a third parole consideration hearing, in 2006. 

The Santa Clara County Superior Court granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

challenging the Board’s 2006 decision. The superior court decision is on appeal and has

been stayed by California Court of Appeal pending appeal. Petitioner’s motion for

judicial notice of the superior court decision is GRANTED. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b);

Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 828 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that records of

another court, but not its factual findings, are judicially noticeable). The court notes that

the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply because the superior

court decision addressed the constitutionality of the 2006 Board decision, not the 2004

decision challenged in this case. See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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H009479 (Oct. 7, 1993)).1

 He was sentenced to fifteen years to life in state prison. Id.

The murder occurred when, after an evening of drinking, petitioner – the passenger in a

car – and his co-defendant Menchaca – the driver – exchanged words and gestures with

the occupants of one car, and then initiated a confrontation with the occupants of a second

car. Petitioner was seen holding a knife. When the victim, who was a passenger in the

second car, exited the car to see why petitioner and Menchaca were blocking the car from

leaving, he was attacked. He died after having suffered twenty three stab wounds. Resp.

Ex. D at 12-19 (transcript of initial parole consideration hearing). 

At petitioner’s second parole consideration hearing, held on July 21, 2004,

approximately 12 years after his conviction, the Board found that petitioner was

unsuitable for parole. (Resp. Ex. 4 at 125.) Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition

in superior court challenging the parole denial, which was denied on March 8, 2005. 

(Resp. Ex. 5.) Petitioner also filed state habeas corpus petitions in the California Court of

Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Both of these petitions were denied

summarily, without citation or comment. (Resp. Exs. 6 & 7.) Petitioner filed the present

federal habeas corpus petition on July 29, 2005.2

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal habeas court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The court may not grant a petition with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication

of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States[.]” Id. § 2254(d)(1). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a

state prisoner challenging the denial of parole. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1126-27.

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. (Terry) Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412-413 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

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B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Applicable Legal Standards

a. The Requirements of Federal Due Process

“In analyzing the procedural safeguards owed to an inmate under the Due Process

clause, [a court] must look to two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural safeguards.” 

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2003). In the parole context, the second

prong of this test is satisfied if (1) the inmate has been afforded an opportunity to be

heard and, if denied parole, informed of the reasons underlying the decision and 

(2) “some evidence” supports the decision to grant or deny parole. See Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129 (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)).

“To determine whether the some evidence standard is met ‘does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses,

or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached’” by the parole board. 

Id. at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The “some evidence

standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record is not so devoid of evidence that the

findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Id. at 1129

(quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The “some evidence” standard of

Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law for purposes of § 2254(d). Id. 

b. State Law Standards for Granting Parole

California’s parole scheme sets out the criteria the BPT must evaluate when

considering whether a prisoner is suitable for parole. 

A prisoner’s first parole suitability hearing is to be held one year before his 

minimum eligible parole release date. Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(a). At the hearing, the

parole board “shall” set a release date, 

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unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or

offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date,

therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b).

Sections 2402, et seq., of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations set forth

the criteria the BPT panel must consider when determining whether a release date can be

set for a prisoner like petitioner, who was convicted of second degree murder and is

serving an indeterminate life sentence. The opening paragraph of section 2402(a) states:

Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner

will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

In making its determination whether a prisoner is suitable for parole, the panel may

consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 

§ 2402(b). Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include the nature of

the commitment offense and consideration of whether “[t]he prisoner committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Id. § 2402(c)(1). This

includes consideration of the number of victims, whether “[t]he offense was carried out in

a dispassionate and calculated manner,” whether the victim was “abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense,” whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner

which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether

“[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id.

Circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for parole include no

juvenile record, a stable social history, signs of remorse, the crime was committed as a

result of significant stress in the prisoner’s life, a lack of criminal history, a reduced

possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner’s present age, realistic plans for release or the

development of marketable skills that can be put to use upon release, and institutional

activities that indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. Id.

§ 2402(d).

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The parole regulations include a matrix of suggested base terms of incarceration

depending on the circumstances surrounding the murder and the relationship between the

murderer and victim. Id. § 2403. For those convicted of second degree murder, the

matrix of base terms ranges from a low of 15, 16 or 17 years, to a high of 19, 20, or 21

years. Although the matrix is to be used to establish a base term, this occurs only once

the prisoner has been found suitable for parole. Id. § 2403(a). 

The California Supreme Court has found that the statutory scheme places

individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s expectancy in early setting of a fixed

date designed to ensure term uniformity: 

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e.,

life-maximum) sentences should “normally” receive “uniform” parole dates

for similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies “unless

[the Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be set because

the particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises “public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing

in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a

continuing public danger.

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070 (2005) (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as

in original). Thus, “the Board, exercising its traditional broad discretion, may protect

public safety in each discrete case by considering the dangerous implications of a lifemaximum prisoner’s crime individually.” Id. at 1071. 

2. Discussion

a. Whether Some Evidence Supported the BPT’s Decision

California law makes clear that the “‘findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner

unsuitable for parole,’ are not that a particular factor or factors indicating unsuitability

exist, but that a prisoner’s release will unreasonably endanger public safety.” Hayward v.

Marshall, No. 06-55392, slip op. 35, 49 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2008) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the “some evidence” test is not whether some evidence supports the reasons

cited by the Board for denying parole, but whether some evidence indicates a parolee’s

release unreasonably endangers public safety. See id. “Some evidence of the existence

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of a particular factor does not necessarily equate to some evidence the parolee’s release

unreasonably endangers public safety.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the Board panel denied petitioner parole, finding that “the prisoner is not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if released from prison.” (Resp. Ex. 5 at 125.) Specifically, the panel based

its determination on the following:

Regarding the commitment offense, the offense was carried out in an

especially cruel and callous manner. The offense was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner. The victim was abused, defiled, and

mutilated during the offense. The offense was carried out in a manner

which demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. 

The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense. These conclusions were drawn from the Statement of Facts where

on the night of March 1st and Mach 2nd, 1991, the inmate and his

codefendant assaulted Richard Figueroa by stabbing him 23 times, 15 of

these stabbings were lethal wounds.

(Id. at 125-26.) The panel also found that the petitioner had not sufficiently participated

in beneficial self help programming with respect to alcohol abuse in light of the central

role of alcohol in the commitment offense. (Id. at 126.) The panel also noted that the

psychiatrist who examined petitioner did not completely support petitioner’s release, and

rated petitioner’s insight and judgment only as fair. (Id. at 126-27.) The Board further

found that petitioner’s parole plans were not sufficiently clear in that he did not have

letters demonstrating the job and housing offer that petitioner indicated he would have

upon his release. (Id. at 127.) Finally, the District Attorney and the victim’s next-of-kin

objected to his release. (Id. at 127-28.) The Board commended petitioner for his

engagement in Alcoholics Anonymous, work and vocation programs, academic programs,

tutoring and other programs helping others. (Id. at 128-29.) Nevertheless, the Board

found that “these positive aspects . . . do not outweigh the factors of unsuitability.” (Id. at

129.) 

In the present petition, petitioner argues that the facts surrounding his commitment

offense, the evaluation of the psychiatrist, his participation in prison programs, his use of

alcohol prior to conviction, and his parole plans do not support the denial of parole, and

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therefore the decision to deny parole therefore violated due process. This contention is

without merit. Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing, the court finds that the

reasons cited by the Board support its conclusion that petitioner was not suitable for

parole and “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety if released from prison.” See, e.g., Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.

2005) (nature and circumstances of prisoner’s crime, along with his psychiatric reports,

constituted evidence with sufficient reliability to support board’s denial of parole and

deferment of next parole suitability hearing for 5 years). The court therefore concludes

that the state court’s decision to uphold the BPT’s findings was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), nor was it contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, id. at § 2254(d)(1). 

The Court notes Ninth Circuit in Biggs v. Terhune expressed the concern that

“over time” the Board’s “continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the

circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment” would “raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003). 

More recently, the Ninth Circuit has recently criticized this statement as beyond the scope

of the dispute before the court, however: "Under AEDPA it is not our function to

speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. In

any event, to whatever extent the dicta in Biggs remains in force, the challenged parole

denial here took place after petitioner had served 12 years in state prison, which is less

than his minimum term of 15 years to implicate the concerns raised in Biggs. See, e.g.,

Irons, 479 F.3d at 661 (upholding reliance upon commitment offense to deny parole after

petitioner had served 16 years in prison, which was less than the minimum term); Sass,

461 F.3d at 1129 (same, for denials of parole after petitioner had served 11 and 12 years

in prison); compare Hayward, slip op. at 54-55 (after 30 years in prison, the unchanging

factor of the gravity of petitioner’s 25 year-old commitment offense, on its own, had no

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predictive value regarding his suitability for parole). More importantly, this case does not

raise the concerns addressed in Biggs because, as discussed above, there was evidence that

petitioner was unsuitable for parole for additional reasons besides the circumstances of the

offense and petitioner’s pre-offense behavior. 

b. Whether Third-Party Participants Rendered the Hearing Unfair

Family members of the victim attended petitioner’s parole suitability hearing and

made statements on the record arguing against granting petitioner parole. Under

California’s parole scheme, the next of kin or immediate family members of a victim who

has died may, upon request, appear at a parole suitability hearing to make a statement. 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2029(a). The listed categories of next of kin and immediate

family members consist of the victim’s spouse, children, parents, siblings, grandchildren

and grandparents. Id. § 2029(b). The regulations provide that up to two persons in these

categories may appear at the hearing, but “[m]ore than two persons may appear with the

prior approval of a panel member, the chairman, or the executive officer.” Id. § 2029(c). 

In the present petition, petitioner argues that the testimony of family members

violated state law and his federal constitutional right to due process. The federal writ of

habeas corpus is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Therefore, if any state regulations were violated, petitioner is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief as a result.

With respect to his due process claim, petitioner has cited to no clearly established

Supreme Court precedent which creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the

number or categories of persons who may appear on a victim’s behalf at a parole

suitability hearing. As explained above, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, the state

court’s denial of petitioner’s claim must be contrary to or an unreasonable application of

“clearly established” precedent from the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). Nor has he shown that the testimony of the victims’ family members

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deprived him of a fair and impartial hearing. As previously discussed, the Board’s

decision was amply supported by the evidence in the record.

The court finds that the state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding,

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), nor was it contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, id. § 2254(d)(1).

CONCLUSION

The court finds that petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state court proceedings and parole hearing. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice is GRANTED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

This order terminates docket number 20 and any other pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: RONALD M. WHYTE 

United States District Judge

3/21/08

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