Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00026/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00026-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS B. CASTANEDA,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. FOSTON, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:12-cv-00026-AWI-BAM PC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S 

SURREPLY

(ECF No. 80)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

(ECF No. 95)

THIRTY-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Jesus B. Castaneda, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 5, 2012. This action proceeds on 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants Reeves, J. Brown, Trimble, Nelson and 

Martinez for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment and against Defendants 

Quezada, Lopez, Nelson, Martinez, Webster, Mendez and Stone for retaliation in violation of the 

First Amendment. 

On August 29, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint

without leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants contend 

that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is barred by claim and issue preclusion and Plaintiff’s 

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retaliation claim is prohibited by claim preclusion. (ECF No. 70.) Defendants also filed a request 

for judicial notice. (ECF No. 71.) 

On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 

73.) Plaintiff also filed a request for judicial notice. (ECF No. 74.)

Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition on October 1, 2014. (ECF No. 77.) 

Plaintiff filed a supplemental response to the motion to dismiss on October 14, 2014. (ECF No. 

79.) On October 16, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s supplemental response. 

(ECF No. 80.) Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion to strike. 

The motions have been submitted upon the record without oral argument. Local Rule 

230(l).

II. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the records in Plaintiff’s habeas 

corpus proceedings In re Castaneda, Fifth District Court of Appeal Case Number F066609. The 

records include the following: (1) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; (2) May 10, 2013 Informal 

Response filed by the Federal Receiver; (3) June 4, 2013 Informal Response filed by Plaintiff; (4) 

June 7, 2013 Supplemental Informal Response filed by the Federal Receiver; (5) August 8, 2013 

Order Denying the Petition; and (6) Docket Sheet obtained from Fifth District Court of Appeal’s 

website on August 25, 2014. 

Defendants’ request is unopposed. Further, a court may “take judicial notice of matters of 

public record outside the pleadings and consider them for purposes of [a] motion to dismiss.” Mir 

v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 

803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (court may take judicial notice of matters of public record 

outside the pleadings when considering a motion to dismiss). Accordingly, Defendants’ request 

for judicial notice is GRANTED. 

III. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) 

Pleasant Valley State Prison’s Clinical Case Management Review Committee’s Memorandum 

dated December 14, 2011; (2) October 3, 2013 letter signed by Plaintiff and S. Hosman, 

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Correctional Sergeant, Health Care Access, Pleasant Valley State Prison; and (3) Director’s Level 

Decision dated August 28, 2014. The Court did not rely on these documents in reaching the 

merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and they are immaterial to the Court’s findings and 

recommendations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED. 

IV. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Surreply

As noted above, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff responded and Defendants replied. (ECF Nos. 70, 73, 77.) Thereafter, on October 14,

2014, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants Motion 

to Dismiss.” (ECF No. 79.) Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s supplemental response because 

it was unauthorized. 

This Court’s Local Rules provide for a motion, an opposition, and a reply. Local Rule 

230(l). Neither the Local Rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the right to file a 

response to a reply. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Zanchi, 2011 WL 5838438, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

2011). Furthermore, the Court neither requested a response to Defendants’ reply nor granted a 

request on Plaintiff’s behalf to file one. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED, 

and Plaintiff’s supplemental response, filed October 14, 2014, shall be stricken from the record.

V. Findings and Recommendations Regarding Motion to Dismiss 

A. Relevant Allegations in Second Amended Complaint

The events in the second amended complaint allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was housed 

at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Plaintiff alleges as follows: On February 7, 2010, Plaintiff and his 

cellmate were assaulted by Correctional Officer Burns. Responding staff also joined in the 

assault. Thereafter, Plaintiff was placed in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“Ad-Seg”) and his 

cellmate was airlifted to the Fresno Regional Medical Center. The following day, Defendants 

Quezada and Lopez photographed, inventoried and boxed all of Plaintiff’s personal property, 

including Plaintiff’s PARASTEP I system, which is a microcomputer controlled functional 

neuromuscular stimulation system that enables independent, un-braced ambulation by people with 

a spinal cord injury.

On February 23, 2010, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendants Reeves and J. Brown. 

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During the interview, Plaintiff requested return of the PARASTEP. Plaintiff advised them of the 

physiological damage that would occur if he was denied access to the PARASTEP. Defendants 

Reeves and J. Brown refused to provide Plaintiff with the PARASTEP. Plaintiff suffered pressure 

sores and muscle atrophy. Plaintiff made multiple requests to medical personnel, but was told that 

custody personnel had taken steps to ensure that he was denied access.

On August 30, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison. On 

September 26, 2010, he submitted an appeal regarding denial of the PARASTEP. The appeal was 

denied at all levels.

On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff was transferred back to Pleasant Valley State Prison. On June 

22, 2011, Plaintiff submitted appeals to recover the PARASTEP. Plaintiff’s appeal was improperly 

screened, delayed, screened out and not responded to by staff.

On August 4, 2011, Dr. Duenas, a licensed physician, was aware that custody was 

interfering with Plaintiff’s prescribed medical treatment—the PARASTEP—for over 17 months, 

that this denial endangered Plaintiff’s life, that he was still in need of the treatment and that prison 

officials were refusing to provide it.

On July 19, 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Rowe in the satellite clinic. Plaintiff showed Dr. Rowe 

documentation regarding the PARASTEP and Dr. Rowe accessed Plaintiff’s medical records. Dr. 

Rowe noted that the PARASTEP was currently a prescribed course of treatment and that Plaintiff 

had medical authorization to possess and use the PARASTEP. Dr. Rowe called Defendant 

Martinez to the clinic and asked why Plaintiff was being denied access to the PARASTEP. After 

consulting with Defendant Nelson, Defendant Martinez told Dr. Rowe that Plaintiff was being 

denied access to the PARASTEP by custody because he had filed multiple appeals against staff. 

Dr. Rowe informed Defendant Martinez of the physiological damage that would result from 

interference with treatment. Defendant Martinez informed Dr. Rowe and Plaintiff that Plaintiff 

would continue to be denied access until his appeals were resolved or withdrawn.

On September 14, 2011, Plaintiff informed Defendant Trimble that custody personnel were 

interfering with his prescribed medical care. Plaintiff described the need for the device and the 

damage that prolonged deprivation could cause. Defendant Trimble had Defendant Nelson 

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interview Plaintiff. Plaintiff informed Defendant Nelson that custody personnel were denying 

Plaintiff’s access to prescribed medical care. Defendant Nelson consulted with Defendant Trimble 

and informed Plaintiff that the denial would continue.

On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with severe contractures (a shortening of 

the tendons and ligaments). On November 28, 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with severe 

osteoporosis. Plaintiff attributes the contractures and osteoporosis to the denial of the PARASTEP.

On December 10, 2011, Plaintiff was allowed to inspect the walker portion of the 

PARASTEP—the parawalker—which is a special electronically adapted walker that allows the 

user to stand and walk. It connects to the PARASTEP stimulator via a cable and contains hand 

controlled switch modules that allow the user access to the software. The parawalker allows the 

user to control the intensity of the stimulation and activate all functions. The parawalker was 

severely damage and useless.

On December 21, 2011, Plaintiff was escorted to a conference room by Defendant Mendez. 

The conference room was occupied by Defendants Webster, Nelson, Stone and an unidentified 

ISU officer. Defendant Stone informed Plaintiff that as a result of the appeals he had submitted 

requesting the PARASTEP they were no longer going to store the walker. Plaintiff informed them 

that he wanted the walker repaired before any decision on its disposition. Plaintiff further 

explained that he wanted the walker held pending treatment for osteoporosis and a consultation 

with Plaintiff’s personal physician. Defendants Nelson, Webster and Stone told Plaintiff that the 

walker would not be repaired and that the appeals/pain management committee had asked them to 

get rid of the walker. When Plaintiff refused to change his response, Defendant Webster looked at 

the escorting officer and asked him, “Did you hear him say for us to dispose of it?” Defendant 

Mendez responded, “Yes, I heard him say for us to dispose of it.” Defendant Stone informed 

Plaintiff that he should remember this the next time he thought about filing appeals against staff.

On December 22, 2011, Plaintiff submitted an appeal regarding the damage to the walker 

and the misconduct of Defendants Nelson, Webster, Mendez and two John Does. After several 

weeks of not receiving a response, Plaintiff submitted an inquiry regarding his appeal. The appeals 

coordinators refused to process the appeal or provide instructions.

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On February 13, 2012, Plaintiff received a response to a separate health care appeal. 

Attached to the appeal were memoranda authored by Defendants Webster and Mendez indicating 

that they had filed false reports that Plaintiff had asked for the walker to be destroyed.

Plaintiff again submitted an appeal regarding the memoranda. The appeal was cancelled as 

untimely. Plaintiff appealed the cancellation. On April 20, 2012, Guillen interviewed Plaintiff 

regarding his appeal. Foreman and Guillen responded to the appeal and had removed the original 

proof of service. Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at all levels. 

As noted above, this action proceeds only on Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Reeves, 

Brown, Trimble, Nelson and Martinez for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment and against Defendants Quezada, Lopez, Nelson, Martinez, 

Webster, Mendez and Stone for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment related to denial of 

access to his PARASTEP and destruction of his parawalker. 

B. Plaintiff’s Habeas Proceedings

On December 7, 2012, the Fresno County Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. The writ concerned arguments that, amongst other things, correctional 

officers improperly confiscated and destroyed Plaintiff’s Parastep Unit. (ECF No. 71, Request for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1, p. 34.)1 

On February 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Court of Appeal. (RJN, Ex. 1, p. 5.) In his petition, Plaintiff alleged the following grounds for 

relief: “Failure of Prison administration officials to properly process petitioners Administrative 

Appeals which led to Denial of Medical Care and ultimately the destruction of petitioners 

prescribed medical appliance. No officials were found violating policy.” (RJN, Ex. 1, p. 7.) As 

supporting facts, Plaintiff alleged that he was placed into Administrative Segregation on February 

7, 2010, and was denied access to medical care and his medical appliances, including the Parastep. 

His requests for these items were ignored. (RJN, Ex. 1, p. 8.) Plaintiff remained at Pleasant 

Valley State Prison until April 23, 2010, when he was placed at Salinas Valley State Prison 

(DMH). (Id.) Plaintiff returned to Pleasant Valley State Prison on June 17, 2011. (Id. at p. 9.) 

 

1

Page numbers correspond to the Court’s CM/ECF pagination. 

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Plaintiff attempted to recover the Parastep through appeals. (Id at pp. 9-10.) On August 3, 2011, 

Plaintiff submitted an ADA appeal challenging the prison administration’s determination that the 

Parastep was not covered by the ADA. (Id. at p. 10.) On November 1, 2011, Plaintiff was 

examined by Dr. Williams, who confirmed that the Parastep was a “medical necessity.” (Id. at pp. 

10-11.) On November 17, 2011, the Appeals/Pain Management Committee decided to exclude the 

Parastep from coverage under both the ADA and the ARP. (Id. at p. 11.) Following a bone 

density scan, Plaintiff again was brought before the Appeals/Pain Management Committee. The 

committee told Plaintiff that standing and walking was no longer possible and, because of the 

committee’s decision, the Parawalker would become contraband that Plaintiff would have to send 

home or it would be disposed of. Plaintiff also was told that he would be allowed to use the 

functional electrical stimulation portion of the Parastep. (Id.) On December 10, 2011, Plaintiff 

examined the Parawalker and noted that the buttons appeared broken. On December 21, 2011, 

Plaintiff was approached by Officer Mendez, who said that Plaintiff had to provide an address so 

they could mail the walker. Plaintiff explained to Officer Mendez that he needed the walker to 

undo the damage of the preceding 22 months and needed time to consult with his personal 

physician. Officer Mendez left and returned a short time later. Officer Mendez informed Plaintiff 

that Lieutenant Webster wanted to speak with Plaintiff about the walker. Plaintiff told Officer 

Mendez that he had already given him a response, but Officer Mendez refused to leave until 

Plaintiff came out to see Lieutenant Webster. Officer Mendez escorted Plaintiff to see Lieutenant 

Webster, Lieutenant Nelson, and Sgt. Stone. Plaintiff explained to them that he needed the walker 

and he needed time to consult with his personal physician. Plaintiff also asserted that the only 

reason they were trying to dispose of the walker was to try to cover-up the damage it had sustained 

during the time it was outside of his possession. At this point, Lieutenant Webster looked at the 

escorting officer and said, “Did you hear him say for us to dispose of it?” Officer Mendez 

responded, “Yes, I heard him say for us to dispose of it.” (Id. at pp. 12-13.) In February 2012, 

Plaintiff received a memorandum prepared by Lt. Webster and Officer Mendez that falsely stated 

Plaintiff requested the walker be destroyed. (Id. at p. 14.) 

Following submission of the petition for habeas corpus, the appeals court ordered briefing. 

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(ECF No. 71-1, RJN, Ex. 7.) 

On May 10, 2013, the Medical Receiver, J. Clark Kelso, filed an informal response to 

Plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN, Ex. 2.) The Medical Receiver 

addressed whether Plaintiff had shown that his current lack of the Parastep made his medical care 

inadequate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) The Medical Receiver found 

that “currently allowing Plaintiff to have and use a Parastep would itself be an excessive risk to his 

health” and his “lack of a Parastep cannot constitute inadequate health care resulting from 

deliberate indifference.” (Id. at p. 5.) The Medical Receiver indicated that “there [was] no 

objective clinical evidence to support [Plaintiff’s] implicit contention that his current lack of a 

Parastep means that an ‘excessive risk’ to his health . . . has been ‘consciously disregarded.’” (Id.

at pp. 5-6.) The Medical Receiver contended that a Parastep was medically contraindicated for 

Plaintiff because of significant osteoporosis diagnosed in November 2011. (Id. at p. 6.) 

Following the informal response from the Medical Receiver, Plaintiff countered with an 

Informal Response. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 3.) Plaintiff’s response addressed the Medical 

Receiver’s contention regarding osteoporosis. (Id. at pp. 24-25.) Plaintiff also argued that the 

Parastep had always been considered a medical necessity. (Id. at pp. 17-22.) 

On June 7, 2013, the Medical Receiver submitted a Supplemental Informal Response to 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which addressed the issue of whether the Parastep was 

contraindicated by Plaintiff’s osteoporosis. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 4.) Plaintiff filed a 

Supplemental Reply on June 19, 2013. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 5.) 

On August 8, 2013, the California Court of Appeal denied Plaintiff’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. The appellate court ordered that Plaintiff’s “medical claim regarding treatment 

with the Parastep device is denied based on the prison’s medical evaluation.” (RJN, Ex. 6, p. 85.) 

B. Legal Standard 

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a 

claim, and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 

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1762 (2012). A motion to dismiss on the basis of claim or issue preclusion may properly be 

brought under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984)

(affirming dismissal of complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds). 

Federal courts are required to give state court judgments the preclusive effects they would 

be given by another court of that state. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84, 104 S.Ct. 892 (1984) and 

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004)) (quotation marks omitted). A state 

habeas judgment may have preclusive effect on a later federal § 1983 action. Gonzales v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (2014).

Claim preclusion bars litigation of claims that were or could have been raised in a prior 

action. Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

Issue preclusion bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved 

in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context 

of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 530 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). “The prerequisite elements for applying the [preclusion] doctrine 

to either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1) A claim or issue raised in 

the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior 

proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine 

is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” Boeken v. Philip 

Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal.4th 788, 797, 230 P.3d 342 (2010) (internal quotation and citation 

omitted).

2. Discussion

Final Judgment on the Merits

Reasoned denials of California habeas petitions have claim-preclusive effect on section 

1983 litigation. See Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1231. Here, the California Court of Appeal denied 

Plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus in a written order. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 6.) There 

is no indication that Plaintiff appealed the appellate court’s decision. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state 

habeas action resulted in a final judgment on the merits by the California Court of Appeal. 

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Identity of Parties

In both his state habeas action and this action, Plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully 

denied access to his Parastep in 2010 while housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Plaintiff also 

accused prison officers of denying his appeals, interfering with his medical care and destroying his 

Parawalker. Plaintiff expressly referenced certain of the underlying defendants in this action, 

namely Defendants Nelson, Webster, Mendez and Stone. Although Plaintiff named a different

warden as respondent in his habeas action and did not identify all of the underlying defendants, 

this discrepancy is not determinative. California claim preclusion rules only require identity of the 

party against whom the doctrine of claim preclusion is being asserted. See Boeken, 48 Cal.4th. at

797; see also San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 

734 (9th Cir. 2009) (California’s preclusion rules require that “the party to be precluded must 

itself have been a party, or in privity with a party”); Furnace v. Giurbino, 2013 WL 6157954, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013) (“[U]nder California claim preclusion rules, the only identity of parties 

required is the identity of the party against whom claim preclusion is sought.”). Here, Defendants 

assert the doctrine of claim preclusion against Plaintiff. There is no dispute that Plaintiff was a 

party to the state habeas action. 

Same Cause of Action

Under California law, a final judgment of a state court precludes further proceedings if 

they are based on the same cause of action. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1268 (citing Maldonado, 370 

F.3d at 951) (quotation marks omitted). California courts employ the primary rights theory to 

determine what constitutes the same cause of action for claim preclusion purposes, and under this 

theory, a cause of action is (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding 

primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists 

in a breach of such primary right and duty. Id. (citing City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & 

Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2003)) (quotation marks omitted). If two actions 

involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant, then the same 

primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of 

recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. Id. (citing 

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Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal.App.3d 1170, 1174, 197 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1983)) (quotation 

marks omitted).

In his habeas action, Plaintiff alleged prison officials denied him medical care and access 

to the Parastep following his placement in Administrative Segregation in 2010. (ECF No. 71, RJN 

Ex. 1, p. 8.) Plaintiff also alleged that prison officials improperly destroyed his Parawalker. (Id.

at pp. 12-14.) Similarly, in this section 1983 action, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials denied 

him medical care and access to the Parastep following his placement in Administrative 

Segregation in 2010. Plaintiff also alleges that prison officials improperly destroyed his walker in 

retaliation for his appeals. 

Plaintiff asserts that the causes of action in his state and federal actions are distinct and do 

not involve same primary right. Plaintiff contends that his habeas action concerned a procedural 

matter regarding meaningful review of his administrative appeals, whereas his federal action 

concerns specific acts that amount to substantive constitutional violations. Plaintiff argues that 

because the actions involve different causes of action, his federal action is not barred by claim 

preclusion. 

Although the habeas action included allegations concerning the processing of his 

administrative appeals, the habeas action, like the instant action, also involved Plaintiff’s right to 

receive adequate medical care and the alleged harm resulting from his lack of access to the 

Parastep. The habeas briefing focused primarily on Plaintiff’s medical treatment with the 

Parastep. Indeed, the Medical Receiver’s briefing specifically addressed Plaintiff’s entitlement to 

the Parastep under the Eighth Amendment and whether prison officials were deliberately 

indifferent. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 3, pp. 17-22.) Plaintiff’s responsive brief also addressed his 

entitlement to the Parastep as a medical necessity. (ECF No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 3, pp. 17-22.)

Despite Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, the habeas action was not limited solely to the

issue of Plaintiff’s current lack of the Parastep. Plaintiff’s own habeas petition and filings 

included allegations regarding denial of the Parastep spanning from his Administrative 

Segregation placement in February 2010 to his current condition. Further, the Medical Receiver’s 

determination was based, in part, on findings from 2011 regarding Plaintiff’s osteoporosis. (ECF 

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No. 71-1, RJN Ex. 2, p. 6.) The appellate court denied Plaintiff’s “medical claim regarding 

treatment with the Parastep device based on the prison’s medical evaluation.” (ECF No. 71-1, 

RJN Ex. 6.) 

The Court finds that the injury and wrong in both the habeas action and federal action are 

identical; that is, Plaintiff was injured by the failure of prison officials to return his Parastep 

following its allegedly wrongful confiscation in February 2010 and by the eventual destruction of 

the walker by prison officials. The Court therefore finds that this action involves the same 

primary rights as his state habeas action. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claim be dismissed as barred by claim preclusion. 

The Court also finds that claim preclusion prohibits Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Although 

such a claim was not explicitly raised in his habeas action, the doctrine of claim preclusion not 

only prevents a party from relitigating claims that were raised in prior action, but also prevents 

litigation of claims that could have been raised in a prior action. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 

94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). It is evident that Plaintiff litigated the denial of his 

access to the Parastep, the filing of multiple administrative appeals, and the destruction of his 

walker without justification in his habeas action. These are the same allegations underlying his 

retaliation claim in this action. There is no indication that the Court of Appeal expressly refrained 

from addressing this issue. 

IV. Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike 

Plaintiff’s surreply is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s supplemental response, filed on October 14, 

2014, is STRICKEN from the record. Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint without leave to amend, filed on 

August 29, 2014, be GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 

file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Case 1:12-cv-00026-AWI-BAM Document 81 Filed 02/02/15 Page 12 of 13
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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the 

magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:12-cv-00026-AWI-BAM Document 81 Filed 02/02/15 Page 13 of 13