Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00473/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00473-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 RT refers to the reporter’s transcripts from trial and the post-conviction

evidentiary hearing. The transcripts are attached to the Answer as exhibits (Doc. 11, Exs. D,

E, M, N, Q, S-V; Doc. 16, Ex. W.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pedro Imperial Vega, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-473-TUC-CKJ (DTF)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, Pedro Imperial Vega, while confined in the Arizona State Prison in

Florence, AZ, alleges he is being held unlawfully due to ineffectiveness of counsel at trial and

on direct appeal. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and supporting documents (Doc. 4), and Respondents’

Answer with supporting documents (Docs. 11, 16).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, molestation of

a child, and three counts of sexual abuse of a child under fifteen, for crimes committed against

his stepdaughter. (RT 12/9/02 at 2-3.)1

 The victim’s allegations are discussed in the record as

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2 The court of appeals included alleged facts from counts on which Vega was not

convicted, therefore, the Court did not include those facts in the summary.

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the “first set of allegations,” dating from July 1995 to February 1996, and the “second set of

allegations” dating from August 1996 to December 1999. The Arizona Court of Appeals

summarized the factual basis of the convictions:

[In February 1996,] Vega agreed with B. that she could put make-up on his face

if he could touch her “private area.”

Later, after the family had moved to another home, Vega took B. into his

room, where he tickled and touched her on her “breasts and [her] vagina area”

over her clothes. . . . While B. was at her grandparent’s house, on yet another day,

Vega grabbed B.’s breasts while she was working in the kitchen.

(Doc. 11, Ex. A at 2.)2

 When the consecutive sentences are added together, Petitioner was

sentenced to a total of twenty-seven years in prison. (RT 12/9/02 at 11-12.)

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were upheld on direct appeal. (Doc. 11, Ex. A.)

 The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id., Ex. F.) Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief (PCR). (Doc. 4, Ex. 3.) The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing and denied

the petition. (Doc. 11, Exs. G, M, N.) In ruling on Petitioner’s PCR petition, the court set forth

helpful background facts:

In 1996, the victim (B.) originally raised molest allegations, such which

formed the basis for Counts 1-3. Those allegations were originally charged in the

federal system, then dismissed after Petitioner’s attorney (Denise Shepard) in that

case learned that the victim had recanted such allegations, both to her mother, and

a priest, Father Daniel P. McLaughlin. Those charges were later reinstated in

state court (CR-53329, in which Petitioner was represented by Ralph Ellinwood),

but dismissed after Mr. Ellinwood learned of the recantations. Counts 4-8 arose

from allegations made by the victim in 2001.

. . . .

During trial, the victim testified that she recanted the first set of allegations

to her mother. Petitioner himself was aware of these recantations. Petitioner

alleges that Mr. Darby [trial counsel] was never made aware that this recanting

occurred. On December 9, 2002, Mr. Darby filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment,

in which he set forth the entire history of the victim’s recantations as well as the

convoluted route the case took through the federal and state court systems. . . .

This Court heard evidence on this motion on January 27, 2003, including

testimony from Father Daniel P. McLaughlin, Denise Shepard, Ralph Ellinwood,

and Pro Tempore Judge Fell [the state court prosecutor], and considered the

records and pleadings before it as well as said testimony prior to entering a denial

of the motion on February 10, 2003.

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(Id., Ex. G at 2.) The court of appeals granted review but denied relief. (Id., Ex. H.) The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of that decision on June 1, 2009. (Id., Ex. I at 7.)

Petitioner filed in this Court on August 24, 2009 (Doc. 1), and filed an Amended Petition

on September 10, 2009 (Doc. 4). Respondents concede that Petitioner’s Amended Habeas

Petition is timely. (Doc. 11 at 5.)

ANALYSIS

The petition is poorly organized, consisting of thirty-four numbered paragraphs setting

forth “numerous pieces of evidence” that trial counsel is alleged not to have presented.

Petitioner provides almost no argument and minimal discussion of the prejudice he alleges he

suffered based on counsel’s alleged deficiencies. However, it is apparent from the petition and

the answer, that Petitioner is alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) based on counsel’s

failure to “prepare, investigate, review available evidence, object, consult with experts, present

recantation evidence, and properly prepare for cross-examination.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) The separate

paragraphs recount specific alleged failings by counsel but are not necessarily individual claims.

To allow for a meaningful discussion of exhaustion and the merits of the claims, the Court

groups the paragraphs together by topic. (Respondents also re-grouped Petitioner’s claims for

purposes of the Answer, however, the Court finds their inconsistent numbering system, which

does not reference the numbering used in the petition, unhelpful.) To allow the District Court

and the parties to track the allegations, the Court notes the relevant paragraphs in the Amended

Petition from which each set of allegations is derived.

The claims as organized by the Court are:

Claim I: Trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence regarding the victim’s

recantations (Paragraphs 1-8, 11, 12, 18, 21, 26, 27, and 28);

Claim II: Trial counsel failed to interpret and apply the rape shield laws which precluded

evidence bearing on the victim’s credibility (Paragraphs 9, 10, 13-17, 19, 20, and 22);

Claim III: Trial counsel failed to challenge and rebut prosecution expert Wendy Dutton

(Paragraphs 23-25, and 29-32);

Claim IV: Trial counsel failed to object to admission of hearsay (Paragraph 33); and

Claim V: Trial counsel failed to object to commentary on Petitioner’s right to remain

silent and appellate counsel failed to raise claim on appeal (Paragraph 34).

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Because Respondents treat each of Petitioner’s separately numbered paragraphs as an

independent claim, they argue that many of the claims are not cognizable. Respondents do not

dispute the cognizability of Petitioner’s claims that counsel was ineffective regarding the

victim’s recantation; in understanding the rape shield law; in failing to challenge the expert’s

testimony; in failing to object to hearsay; and in failing to challenge testimony commenting on

Petitioner’s right to remain silent. (Doc. 11 at 13.) That list of claims covers generally the five

categories into which the Court has grouped all of Petitioner’s allegations. Although the

petition is minimal and lacks clarity, the Court does not find any of the five claims should be

cursorily dismissed for non-cognizability. To the extent specific allegations are insufficient, the

Court addresses them within each of the five claims.

Procedural Default

 Respondents argue that two of Petitioner’s claims were found precluded in state court

and many of Petitioner’s factual allegations were not fairly presented. Petitioner did not file a

reply brief, therefore, he did not address these assertions.

Principles of Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999);

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). If

a habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the state court, it may be

considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal claim presented and

considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986).

Exhaustion requires that a petitioner clearly alert the state court that he is alleging a

specific federal constitutional violation. SeeCasey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004);

see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (general appeal to due process not

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sufficient to present substance of federal claim); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70

(2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency of

evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury, and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked

specificity and explicitness required); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish

exhaustion.”). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing

specific provisions of federal law or case law, Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670, or by citing state cases

that plainly analyze the federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); cf. Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (mere

citation to a state case that conducts both a state and federal law analysis does not, by itself,

satisfy exhaustion).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner

is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR

petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided

only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the

petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition or not presented in a

timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. First,

a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.

Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in state court

and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501

U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the

district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state

remedy). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically”

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3 The Court does not have a copy of Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals because it was not included with the State’s Answer. (Doc. 11 at 28.) The

Court ordered the State to file a supplemental set of exhibits including that petition (Doc. 13),

however, the State re-submitted the Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court, not the

petition to the court of appeals (Doc. 16, Ex. Y). Regardless, it is clear that Petitioner raised this

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals because the court said he did so. (Doc. 11, Ex. H at 5.)

The Court cites only the ruling by the appellate court because, as that court noted, the PCR court

failed to rule on this claim. (Id.)

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exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see also Gray, 518

U.S. at 161-62.

State Court Procedural Default of Claims I & V

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claim of IAC for failing to present the victim’s

recantation was found precluded in state court (Claim I). (Doc. 11 at 9, 10.) The Court

disagrees. Petitioner argued in state court that the victim’s recantations were newly discovered

evidence and that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present the recantations.

The PCR court found the newly discovered evidence claim precluded because the issue was

raised on appeal. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 4, 8.) However, the court ruled on the merits of the related

IAC claim. (Id. at 4.) Claim I is exhausted and will be addressed on the merits.

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim of IAC for failing to object to a comment on

his right to remain silent was found precluded by the PCR court (Claim V). (Doc. 11 at 10.)

The Court disagrees. Petitioner fairly presented this claim to the PCR court and the appellate

court (Doc. 11, Ex. L at 15-16), and the court of appeals addressed it on the merits (id., Ex. H

at 5-6).3

 Therefore, Claim V was properly exhausted and will be addressed on the merits.

Fair Presentation of Claims I and II, in Part

Respondents allege that many of the factual allegations grouped under Claims I and II

were not fairly presented in state court. It is not entirely clear as to which factual allegations

they make this argument because they did not reference Petitioner’s numbering system. Further,

at one point during this argument Respondents focus on what they label as claim 1, subset (b)-

(f) and (i)-(p), and later in the same paragraph they address claim 1, subset (a), (b), (e), (g)-(i),

and (p)-(q) as the allegations at issue. (Doc. 11 at 12.) Regardless, the Court finds the factual

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allegations underlying Claims I (Paragraphs 1-8, 11, 12, 18, 21, and 26-28) and II (Paragraphs

9, 10, 13-17, 19, 20, and 22) were fairly presented. As alleged in the Amended Petition, the

factual allegations in Paragraphs 2-18 and 20-21, which comprise the bulk of Claims I and II,

were contained in exhibits admitted at the evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 16, Ex. X.) Additionally,

Paragraph 1 was raised in the PCR petition (Doc. 4, Ex. 3 at 13) and ruled on by the PCR court

(Doc. 11, Ex. G at 4). The PCR court found that Petitioner raised the allegations set forth in

Paragraph 22 at the evidentiary hearing and the court addressed it on the merits. (Id. at 6.)

Paragraph 26 is a reiteration of Paragraph 1, which was raised in the PCR petition, and

Paragraphs 27 and 28 are reiterations of Paragraphs 3-7 and 18, which were supported by

exhibits at the PCR hearing.

To the extent any of the allegations in these specific paragraphs were not raised before

the state court, they do not fundamentally alter the claims as raised in the PCR petition. Further,

as discussed below, the claims are without merit; therefore, they can be dismissed regardless

of exhaustion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Merits

AEDPA Standard for Relief

Petitioner’s habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the

“acknowledged purpose of ‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (2007) (quoting Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S.

at 333 n.7).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated

on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party’s claim

which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other nonsubstantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant state

court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991));

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of

the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became

final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme

Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a

petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see

Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless,

while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in

determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law

unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. 

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1). The

Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s clearly

established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

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Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from

a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06;

see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to

analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court

decision applying the correct legal rule to the facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit

comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see

Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974. 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may

grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme]

Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or “unreasonably

extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not

apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s application of Supreme

Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state

court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409; Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1939; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light

of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)

(Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering a

challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and

a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1939-40; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240.

However, it is only the state court’s factual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject

to § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42 (“The clear and

convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains only to stateCase 4:09-cv-00473-CKJ Document 17 Filed 10/19/10 Page 9 of 27
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court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its rationale.

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those

circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state court

decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853;

Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal court

nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing

Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state court did not

decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo, because in that

circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to accord deference.”

Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir.

2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Controlling Law for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

For IAC claims, the applicable law is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.

466 U.S. at 687-88. 

The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at

689. Thus, to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, deficient performance, a defendant must

overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be

considered sound trial strategy.” Id. For example, while trial counsel has “a duty to make

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary, . . . a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

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judgments.” Id. at 691. To determine whether the investigation was reasonable, the court “must

conduct an objective review of [counsel’s] performance, measured for reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms, which includes a context-dependent consideration of the

challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 523 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court recently

reiterated: “In judging the defense’s investigation, as in applying Strickland generally,

hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to ‘counsel’s perspective at the time’ investigative

decisions are made” and by applying deference to counsel’s judgments. Rompilla v. Beard, 545

U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Because an IAC claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the reviewing court “need

not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice

suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 at 697 (“if it

is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . .

that course should be followed”). A petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693.

To demonstrate prejudice, he “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

at 694. The calculus involved in assessing prejudice “should proceed on the assumption that

the decision-maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that

govern the decision.” Id. at 695. 

Inherent in the prejudice analysis demanded by Strickland is the principle that in order

to demonstrate that counsel failed to litigate an issue competently, a petitioner must prove that

the issue was meritorious. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). For

example, with respect to allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion, to

demonstrate prejudice a petitioner “must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is

reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been

granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson

v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Morrison, 477 U.S. at 373-74); see also

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Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, in evaluating a number

of the following IAC claims, this Court is informed by the holding of the Arizona Court of

Appeals on the merits of the underlying issues. 

Finally, under the AEDPA, federal review of state court decisions is subject to another

level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002). In order to merit habeas relief,

therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that the state court’s ruling that counsel

was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). 

Claim I: Trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence regarding the

victim’s recantations (Paragraphs 1-8, 11, 12, 18, 21, 26, 27, and 28)

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present

evidence that the victim was pressured to sustain the first set of allegations and, despite that

pressure, she recanted to her mother, counselors, police, and her priest.

In Paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 18, 27 and 28, Petitioner alleges that the victim was “pressured”

to maintain her allegations and testify in a certain manner by the State. Petitioner relies on four

exhibits submitted at the PCR evidentiary hearing, exhibits A, B, E and R. Exhibit A is a

therapist’s notes from the day the victim was first interviewed by the police. (Doc. 16-10 at 7.)

The therapist told the victim she was brave and “assured her that she had made a good

decision.” (Id.) Exhibit B is a report by Roxana Aguilar, a casemanager with the Pascua Yaqui

Tribe, to whom the victim first reported the molestation. (Id. at 8.) Aguilar recorded that, upon

being told about the molestation, Molly, the victim’s mother “hugged her daughter and told her

she believed her and that she was proud of her for telling the truth.” (Id.) Exhibit E is a therapy

note recording that when the victim asked her therapist, “what would happen if it was a dream,”

the therapist explained that “disclosing can be very difficult on someone especially when they

see all of the commotion it seems to cause.” (Id. at 12.) Exhibit R is an encounter note from

the social services agency stating, among other things, that Detective Jack Hale was concerned

“about Molly continuing to say that B[.] was recanting her story.” (Doc. 16-10 at 30.)

None of the exhibits on which Petitioner relies evidence pressure by the State on the

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victim to sustain her allegations. Exhibits A, B and E indicate only that the victim’s mother and

a therapist provided the victim support on the first day she came forward with the allegations,

and the therapist continued to do so. This does not constitute pressure nor are these people state

actors. Exhibit R indicates concern by a detective that the victim’s mother reported the victim

had recanted. There is no evidence that the victim was pressured not to recant by this detective

or that any message from the detective was conveyed to the victim. Petitioner was not

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to gather this information and present it at trial because there is

no factual support for his assertion that the victim was pressured by the State.

Petitioner alleges there were numerous recantations made by the victim and not presented

at trial, “to her mother, to counselors, to police, and to her priest” (Paragraph 1). In support,

Petitioner cites evidence that the victim told her therapist “it was a bad dream,” and she “had

made a terrible mistake” (Paragraph 7, citing Doc. 16-10 at 12). Petitioner’s son provided an

affidavit to the PCR court stating that after the first set of allegations were dismissed, he asked

the victim if Petitioner had really done what she said and the victim said no she had lied

(Paragraph 21). (Doc. 4, Ex. 3 at Ex. 3.) Petitioner’s son attested that he reported this

information to defense counsel but was not asked about it at trial. (Id.) Evidence of these other

recantations would have been cumulative because the victim testified at trial that she recanted

her first set of allegations to her mother, telling her it was a dream. (RT 10/23/02 at 28-29.)

As such, no prejudice resulted from a failure to present it. See United States v. Schaflander, 743

F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1984).

In Paragraph 8, Petitioner alleges the victim wrote in a diary that she “thinks the abuse

is a bad dream.” The PCR court found Petitioner failed to sustain his burden regarding this

allegation because there was no proof such a diary existed or what counsel’s knowledge or

actions were in relation to it. Petitioner has not presented any additional evidentiary support for

this allegation. Therefore, it fails because Petitioner has not established sufficient facts to

support it. Further, this allegation is duplicative of the recantation to which the victim testified

at trial – that she told her mother the abuse was a bad dream. Therefore, the allegation also fails

for lack of prejudice.

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Petitioner alleges counsel should have presented evidence that the victim asked her mom

what would happen to her if she was lying (Paragraphs 5, 6 and 27). This allegation leads to

the same inference as the explicit recantations, to which the victim testified at trial. That is, they

go to the credibility of the victim’s allegations, are cumulative, and denied for lack of prejudice.

The victim recanted to her priest, Father Dan (Paragraphs 1, 26). The PCR court made

a factual finding that Petitioner knew about this recantation prior to trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 4.)

The Court must defer to that finding because Petitioner has not rebutted it with clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The PCR court concluded that Petitioner had an

obligation to assist his counsel, and he could not hold counsel responsible for his failure to

reveal the information. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 4.) Therefore, the PCR court found that counsel’s

conduct was not below the standard nor was Petitioner prejudiced because he possessed the

relevant information. (Id.) Counsel’s decisions regarding investigation are properly based upon

the information supplied by the defendant, and a defendant’s actions are highly relevant in

assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The PCR

court’s ruling was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.

Petitioner alleges several other facts that he suggests are connected to pressure on the

victim or her recantations, however, they are not intertwined with any of his other assertions.

Therefore, the Court addresses each one separately. 

In Paragraph 2, Petitioner alleges that, at the time of his arrest, the victim overhead a

discussion by police officers that he had violated parole. Petitioner does not connect this factual

allegation to any other assertions or demonstrate how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

introduce this evidence. To the extent Petitioner is suggesting this tainted the victim’s view of

him, such an assertion is unfounded. The victim testified at trial that she knew Petitioner had

been in prison and was on probation, and she knew he was living in a halfway house. (RT

10/23/02 at 44-45.) Also, she testified that she knew Petitioner was a drug user and a drug

seller. (Id. at 47, 50.) Petitioner has not established a reasonable probability that he would not

have been convicted if this evidence had been presented.

In Paragraph 11, Petitioner alleges that exhibit J from the PCR evidentiary hearing

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4 It is evident that Petitioner considers the victim’s statements to the therapist, that

the abuse was a bad dream, to be a recantation. However, review of the therapy notes indicate

the therapist considered this statement to be a coping mechanism due to guilt not a statement

that she was not molested. (Doc. 16-10 at 12.)

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supports his allegation that the victim’s mother reported the victim had a dream of being raped

by a black woman. Petitioner contends this document should have been used to (1) impeach the

victim when she denied having sexual dreams and (2) establish that this dream took place after

the victim recanted the allegations of abuse, therefore, the dream could not have prompted the

recantation as suggested by the trial court’s ruling on Petitioner’s post-trial motion to vacate

judgment. First, the victim’s mother testified at trial that the victim told her she had a dream

about being raped in the desert by a woman. (RT 10/24/02 at 62-63.) The document itself is

a therapy report that establishes little more than the mother’s testimony – she reported the dream

not the victim. Further, the therapist wrote down that they discussed the word rape and the

victim knew it was violent and bad but did not see it as something sexual. (Doc. 16-10 at 18.)

For these reasons this document would not have been meaningful impeachment and Petitioner

was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to discover and use the document for that purpose.

Second, neither the exhibit relied upon by Petitioner, nor the mother’s testimony at trial,

established when the victim had this dream. (Id.) Although the therapy report at issue is dated

February 29, none of the evidence currently before this Court, including the trial testimony,

establishes when the dream took place or when a first recantation occurred.4

 Thus, Petitioner

fails to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to use this exhibit to establish a

timeline of recantations in relation to the dream. Further, the Arizona Court of Appeals

reviewed the trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate judgment. In affirming that decision,

the appellate court did not rely on the rape dream; rather, it concluded Petitioner knew about

the recantation and additional testimony on the subject would have been cumulative to the

victim’s own testimony on that topic. (Doc. 11, Ex. A at 7.) Petitioner has not established that

he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce exhibit J.

In Paragraph 12, Petitioner alleges “no one” discussed the relevance of the fact that the

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victim witnessed a murder in May 1996, and suggests this may have something to do with

pressure on the child. The cited exhibit is a record from the social service agency documenting

that the victim’s mother reported the victim had witnessed a fatal shooting. (Doc. 16-10 at 24.)

Petitioner does not articulate the relevance of this exhibit, assert what counsel failed to do, or

show how he was prejudiced by any alleged failing. This cursory allegation is entirely

insufficient to state an independent claim. To the extent this is part of the overall claim that

counsel failed to investigate and prepare, Petitioner has not alleged nor proven any prejudice.

The entirety of Claim I fails because Petitioner has not established prejudice. Although

Petitioner’s expert at the Rule 32 hearing testified that, in his opinion, it was “below the

standard” for Petitioner’s trial counsel to fail to investigate and present this evidence (RT

4/28/02 at 33-38), Petitioner has not affirmatively shown how such failures prejudiced him. The

PCR court’s denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.

Claim II: Trial counsel failed to interpret and apply the rape shield laws which

precluded evidence bearing on the victim’s credibility (Paragraphs 9, 10, 13-17, 19,

20, and 22) 

Petitioner argues that his attorney failed to “investigate, read, and interpret relevant case

law” regarding applicable exceptions to Arizona’s rape shield laws (Paragraph 22).

Specifically, Petitioner argues that his attorney’s failure to present and argue such exceptions

resulted in the exclusion of admissible evidence that could have provided an explanation for the

victim’s testimony, was relevant to her credibility, and would have changed the verdict.

Prior to trial, counsel moved to admit evidence that (1) the victim was molested by a

cousin named Ernest, which involved her being forced to put her mouth on his penis, and (2) she

was molested by another cousin. (Doc. 11, Ex. R at 2.) Counsel sought to introduce the

evidence to establish a basis for the victim’s nightmares (of being raped by a woman and being

molested by Petitioner), her prior knowledge of sexual subjects, and her fabrication against

Petitioner. (Id.) Petitioner argued it was admissible because it was relevant and the probative

value was not outweighed by the prejudice, and it was not subject to exclusion under Arizona

state statute § 13-1421 because it did not impugn the victim’s chastity. (Id. at 1-4.) At oral

argument on the motion, the court asked counsel to address State v. Oliver, 158 Ariz. 22, 760

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P.2d 1071 (1988). Counsel argued that the case comported with the long-standing rule that the

court should balance relevant evidence against possible prejudice. (RT 10/22/02 at 3.) The

court found the first allegation of a prior molest was not relevant because the allegations against

Petitioner did not involve fellatio, and, if relevant, the evidence was more prejudicial than

probative. (Id. at 13-14.) The court precluded the second allegation of prior molest, finding it

was not clearly proven as a molest and that the specific allegations were not remotely relevant

to the charges against Petitioner. (Id. at 13.) The court allowed introduction of the victim’s

dreams of a sexual nature. (Id. at 14.)

Petitioner argues the evidence was admissible pursuant to Oliver and that counsel failed

to so argue. A child molestation victim’s prior sexual history is generally inadmissable under

Arizona law. Oliver, 158 Ariz. at 26, 27, 760 P.2d at 1075, 1076 (citing State ex rel. Pope v.

Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 28, 545 P.2d 947, 952 (1976)). In Oliver, the court held that trial

courts should determine if evidence of the victim’s prior history is relevant under rule 401 and,

if it is, the court should determine if its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice under

Rule 403. Id. at 28, 760 P.2d at 1077. The court went on to hold that if a defendant raises a

defense of fabrication and the victim is so young that a jury might conclude the only basis for

the victim’s sexual knowledge is molestation by the defendant, then the victim’s prior sexual

history is relevant to rebut that inference. Id. If it is determined to be relevant, trial courts are

encouraged to determine to what prior sexual act(s) the victim has been exposed and if it is

sufficiently similar to the acts charged against the defendant to provide a basis for the victim

to fabricate the charge. Id.

The PCR court noted that counsel argued the prior molests of the victim were admissible

to show prior sexualization of the victim, which is within the Oliver exception to the rape shield

law. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 6.) However, the court ruled the evidence inadmissable after weighing

its probative value against its potential for prejudice. (Id.) Based on the record, the PCR court

found Petitioner had failed to carry his burden. (Id.)

The PCR court’s ruling was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.

First, Petitioner cannot demonstrate counsel’s performance was inadequate. Counsel argued

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that prior molestations of the victim should be admitted to prove sufficient knowledge to

fabricate the allegations against Petitioner. This is the exception under Oliver upon which

Petitioner now relies. Second, to the extent counsel did not discuss Oliver in his written motion,

Petitioner was not prejudiced because counsel and the trial court directly addressed the

applicability of Oliver to Petitioner’s case. Further, Oliver directs trial courts to balance the

probative value against the prejudicial impact of a victim’s prior sexual knowledge, which is

exactly the argument counsel made in his written motion.

Because the trial court precluded admission of this evidence, counsel’s performance was

not below a reasonable standard for failing to present evidence that the victim had been

previously molested (Paragraphs 9, 13-15, and 19). The allegations in Paragraphs 15 and 19

include an incident in which the victim was naked on top of a male family member, which

appears to be the second allegation of molest that counsel tried to introduce at trial (see RT

10/22/02 at 8). 

Petitioner also alleges counsel should have presented evidence through the victim’s

mother that the victim was exposed to sexual content on television and was over sexualized

(Paragraphs 10, and 19). Counsel presented evidence that the victim had a rape dream. Further,

he established on cross-examination that the victim knew the term “jacking off” as slang for

masturbation, and she knew the words penis and vagina and those were things she could see on

television. (RT 10/23/02 at 57-58.) In light of this specific evidence that counsel elicited at

trial, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present general evidence that the

victim was “sexualized.”

Further, Petitioner alleges counsel should have presented other evidence about the

victim: she had an active fantasy life and imaginary friends (Paragraph 16); the victim’s mother

had a boyfriend who “asked to be alone with the victim,” stalked the mother, and was kinky

(Paragraph 17); and the victim experienced hallucinations (Paragraph 20). First, Petitioner

makes no connection between the victim’s “fantasy life” and hallucinations, and the charges

against Petitioner. At trial, Petitioner established that the victim was experiencing nightmares

prior to the charged molestation, that she had a dream she was raped by a woman, and that she

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recanted the first set of allegations against Petitioner claiming the molestation was a dream. The

victim’s dreams were relevant and admitted. However, Petitioner did not present at trial, nor

does he now, any connection between the victim’s imaginary friends or hallucinations and the

charged molestation. Thus, he was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce such

evidence. Next, Petitioner does not allege, let alone prove, that the mother’s boyfriend was ever

alone with the victim or spent any time with her. Thus, there is no relevance to the evidence

related to the victim’s mother’s boyfriend.

In sum, Petitioner fails to establish that the PCR court’s denial of his claims – that

counsel was ineffective for failing to properly argue an exception to the rape shield law

(Paragraph 22) or to introduce evidence related to the victim’s prior molestations, sexualization,

fantasy life, and hallucinations (Paragraphs 9, 10, 13-17, 19, and 20) – was an objectively

unreasonable application of Strickland.

Claim III: Trial counsel failed to challenge and rebut prosecution expert Wendy

Dutton (Paragraphs 23-25, and 29-32)

Petitioner makes several allegations regarding trial counsel’s handling of the

government’s expert witness, Wendy Dutton. These claims fall into two groups. In the first

group of assertions, subgroup (a), Petitioner appears to be arguing that counsel should have

sought to preclude Dutton’s testimony in entirety because it was speculative and without

foundation (Paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 29 (in part)). In the second group of assertions, subgroup

(b), Petitioner argues that counsel failed to investigate and prepare for Dutton’s testimony,

including hiring a defense expert (Paragraph 32) and, if he had prepared, he could have:

attacked her testimony as lacking foundation (Paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 29 (in part));

impeached her with literature regarding false reporting (Paragraph 30); and explored the idea

of a victim recanting false allegations (Paragraph 31). Respondents do not argue exhaustion

with respect to this claim, and review of Petitioner’s PCR petition indicates that this claim was

fairly presented in state court. (Doc. 11, Ex. L.)

Subclaim (a)

Petitioner alleges trial counsel should have objected to Dutton’s testimony in entirety

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because it lacked foundation. The PCR court did not rule on this portion of the claim, therefore,

the Court’s review is de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

Petitioner has made no showing that Dutton’s testimony was not admissible under

Arizona law and that a challenge by counsel would have been successful. To prevail on a claim

that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for the exclusion of evidence, a defendant must

show that he was prejudiced because such a motion would have been meritorious (and if the

evidence had been excluded there is a reasonable probability it would have changed the verdict).

See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir.

1994) (“failure to make a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance”). The Arizona

Court of Appeals ruled that Dutton’s testimony was admissible under Arizona law:

Testimony about general social and behavioral science principles is admissible

to “assist the jury in deciding a contested issue, including issues pertaining to

accuracy or credibility of a witness’ recollection or testimony.” State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 473, 720 P.2d 73, 74 (1986). In this case, the victim’s credibility

was a central issue based on evidence of her recantation of the allegations to her

mother, and Dutton explained issues beyond the jury’s personal experience so

that it could put the credibility issue in context. Dutton’s testimony concerned

only general behaviors and did not go into the specific facts of this case. It was

therefore admissible. See id.; see also State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 628-29, 931

P.2d 1133, 1138-39 (App. 1996) (considering similar expert testimony by Dutton;

finding testimony relevant and not unfairly prejudicial).

(Doc. 11, Ex. H at 4.)

Petitioner has not argued nor proven that Dutton’s testimony would have been or should

have been excluded under Arizona law, and the court of appeals ruling forecloses such an

argument. Because a motion to preclude this evidence would not have been successful,

Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel not so moving. Therefore, Claim IV(a) fails.

Subclaim (b)

Petitioner alleges generally that counsel failed to investigate and prepare for Dutton’s

testimony. The PCR court found Petitioner had not established that defense counsel failed to

investigate Dutton or interview her prior to trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 3-4.) At the PCR

evidentiary hearing, Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he did not recall whether he

interviewed Dutton prior to trial (RT 4/28/08 at 14) and Petitioner has set forth no other

evidence to establish what counsel did or did not do to prepare for Dutton’s testimony. Thus,

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Petitioner fails to establish that the PCR court’s finding that counsel’s performance was not

deficient was objectively unreasonable. Below, the Court addresses the specific, albeit minimal,

allegations related to this claim.

To the extent Petitioner argues counsel should have challenged Dutton’s testimony as

speculative and not related to the facts of the case, counsel did that on cross-examination.

Counsel clarified with Dutton that she was “talking in generalities,” was not “talking about any

specifics in this particular case,” and that she had not examined the victim or spoken to any of

the fact witnesses, and did not know any facts of the case. (RT 10/24/02 at 20-21.) The jury

was not misled to believe that each of the general factors to which Dutton testified applied to

the particular case; rather, she was clear that she did not know the facts of the case. 

Further, some of the generalities to which Dutton testified that Petitioner challenges as

unfounded, in fact were implicated in the case. Thus, Petitioner’s argument that they were

speculative because there was no evidence of those generalities is not accurate. For example,

Petitioner argues there was no evidence at trial relevant to Dutton’s testimony about piecemeal

disclosure by the victim, or that the victim was embarrassed or disbelieved, which can lead to

the child not disclosing all the abuse. (Id. at 12-13.) Several pieces of testimony related to

these “generalities.” The victim testified that she didn’t discuss the abuse because she knew it

was wrong but it was her dad. (RT 10/22/02 at 17.) She also said she asked her mom not to

report the abuse because she didn’t want anyone to know. (Id. at 34-35.) The victim did not

promptly disclose the abuse, but eventually disclosed at least some of it to a counselor. (Id. at

26.) After other abuse occurred, she did not tell her mother right away. (Id. at 30.) Also on

cross-examination, counsel raised questions about details to which the victim testified but had

not provided to the police during her taped interview. (Id. at 55-58.) Thus, testimony at trial

indicated the victim was reluctant to disclose the abuse, did not want others to know about it,

and may not have revealed it all at one time. Also, as discussed below, the victim’s mother did

not want to believe the abuse occurred.

Similarly, Petitioner questions the relevance of Dutton’s testimony that several factors

may influence a victim to recant, including pressure from family, stress from the prospect of

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testifying in court, or other consequences of the disclosure. (RT 10/24/02 at 16.) The victim

testified that she felt bad for disclosing the abuse because the defendant got removed from her

house and the other members of the family were upset. (RT 10/22/02 at 27-28.) She also

testified that her mom kept asking her and hoping it was a dream and she eventually said it was

a dream so the defendant could move back in with the family. (Id. at 28-29.) Further, the

victim’s mom testified that when the victim told her about subsequent abuse the victim did not

want her to tell anyone and that she didn’t want to go through with the prosecution. (Id. at 70-

71.) This testimony indicates the victim did feel pressure to recant by her family and the

removal of the defendant from her home, and that she did not want to go through with a

prosecution. Because Dutton was not attempting to testify about the specifics of Petitioner’s

case, which counsel emphasized on cross-examination, there was no basis on which to challenge

it as speculative. Further, the specific areas of testimony that Petitioner challenges as

speculative were in fact implicated by testimony in the case and were relevant to the

prosecution’s evidence. Petitioner fails to establish he was prejudiced by counsel not

challenging Dutton’s testimony as speculative.

Petitioner contends that his counsel could have impeached Dutton with literature about

the predominance of false reporting, specifically one study finding that 35% of abuse allegations

are false and one finding that 50% of such allegations are false. Dutton was not subject to

impeachment about the prevalence of false reporting because she did not testify contrary to the

facts cited by Petitioner. (RT 10/24/02 at 3-44.) On cross-examination Dutton acknowledged

that children lie about child abuse and she discussed the primary reasons children make false

allegations. (Id. at 28-36.) Counsel also got Dutton to acknowledge that a child could maintain

a false abuse allegation for a long period of time. (Id. at 35-36.)

Petitioner also contends, based on collateral evidence, that Dutton defines a “recantation”

as recanting a true allegation of abuse, and that counsel failed to explore false allegations and

a child retracting a false statement to relieve their guilt. As discussed above, counsel did

explore with Dutton the fact that children make false allegations of abuse and the most common

reasons for those allegations. (Id. at 28-36.) Counsel did not explore the possibility that a child

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may retract a false allegation to unburden themselves from the lie. However, as discussed with

respect to Claim I, counsel was unaware of that evidence because Petitioner had not disclosed

that to him. Counsel’s performance cannot be found unreasonable for failure to act on

information known to the defendant and not revealed to counsel. The PCR court found that

cross-examination is a matter of trial strategy left to counsel and Petitioner did not establish that

counsel’s cross-examination regarding recantation and false allegations constituted error. (Doc.

11, Ex. G at 3, 4.) This finding was not objectively unreasonable.

Finally, Petitioner argues counsel should have consulted with an expert and possibly

called one to testify at trial. At the PCR evidentiary hearing, the expert attorney testified that

he believed defense counsel required an expert to assist in the case to counter Dutton and

address the issue of recantations. (RT 4/28/08 at 29-30.) While this testimony was relevant to

counsel’s performance, the PCR court found Petitioner failed to prove that counsel’s

performance was deficient for not consulting an expert because Petitioner did not put on

evidence regarding what an expert could have testified to that would have impacted the verdict.

(Doc. 11, Ex. G at 4.) As noted by the PCR court, the attorney that testified at the evidentiary

hearing was not qualified to proffer the potential opinions of an expert on child abuse and

recantation. Thus, Petitioner fails to affirmatively prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

failure to consult with an expert. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. The PCR court’s conclusion

that Petitioner failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice relating to counsel not

consulting an expert (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 4) was not objectively unreasonable.

Claim III is without merit.

Claim IV: Trial Counsel failed to object to admission of hearsay (Paragraph 33)

Petitioner alleges trial counsel failed to object to the admission of out-of-court statements

by the victim, which the prosecution introduced through the testimony of witness Nielsen.

Specifically, he asserts that Nielsen testified that the victim told him, “1) she and Mr. Vega

made a deal that she could use makeup in exchange for touching his private parts. 2) that the

alleged victim spoke of touching her private parts. 10/23/02, pp. 132-135” (Paragraph 33).

Respondents addressed this claim on the merits. However, a close review of this claim as raised

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in the PCR petition reveals it was not fairly presented to the state courts. In his PCR petition,

Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to respond to prosecution motions

seeking the admission of unspecified hearsay. (Doc. 4, Ex. L at 13.) In a separate claim of his

PCR petition, Petitioner argued that the admission of hearsay statements at trial (those alleged

in Paragraph 33 of the Amended Habeas Petition) denied him his right to confrontation.

Petitioner never argued in state court that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

admission of this hearsay evidence at trial on October 23, 2002. Thus, this claim was never

fairly presented. However, because Respondents did not argue exhaustion as to this claim, the

Court will address, and dismiss it, on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

The relevant trial testimony reads as follows:

Q: Can you tell us, to the best of your recollection, what she told you about

this tickling event?

MR DARBY: Objection. That calls for hearsay

THE COURT: Overruled You may answer

THE WITNESS: She told me that the night before that [sic] she had

basically made an agreement with Peter Vega, the stepfather

She asked him to put makeup on his face and he agreed to do so if she

would allow him to touch her private areas

Q (By Mr Roach): And did he actually, or did she report he actually

touched her private area?

MR. DARBY: Objection Calls for hearsay

THE COURT: Overruled. 

. . . .

Q: Can you tell me what it was she told you about being touched by Peter

Vega?

MR. DARBY: Objection

THE COURT: Prior inconsistent statement You may answer.

(RT 10/23/02 at 133-34.)

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5 The court of appeals also held that Nielsen’s testimony was admissible under state

evidentiary law. (Doc. 11, Ex. H at 6.) Petitioner’s claim in this Court is based solely on

counsel’s failure in light of the alleged inadmissibility of the testimony pursuant to the Due

Process clause; therefore, the Court does not address its propriety under state law. Further, this

Court will not review a state court’s determinations on state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 1995).

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As reflected in the trial transcript, counsel objected three times to the admission of the

testimony as hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections, and the PCR court confirmed its

ruling that the evidence was admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 8.)

Thus, there is no factual support for Petitioner’s allegation that counsel was ineffective.

Petitioner has not established that his counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was

prejudiced. Claim IV fails.

Claim V: Trial counsel failed to object to commentary on his right to remain silent

and appellate counsel failed to raise claim on appeal (Paragraph 34)

Petitioner argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to witness Nielsen

testifying that Petitioner did not deny the allegations against him, because that amounted to a

comment on his right to remain silent in violation of his constitutional due process rights. He

further alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that this testimony

violated his right to due process.

Review of the transcript makes clear that Petitioner’s due process rights were not

violated by Nielsen’s testimony. Nielsen testified that, before questioning Petitioner, he notified

him of his Miranda rights “line by line,” including his right to remain silent. (RT 10/23/02 at

135-36.) Petitioner acknowledged that he understood those rights and was willing to talk to the

officer. (Id. at 136.) Nielsen testified that, during the subsequent questioning, Petitioner neither

denied nor admitted the allegations against him. (Id. at 137.) Rather, Nielsen stated that when

Petitioner was asked about the molestation allegations, he provided explanations for them. (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals found that because Petitioner waived his Miranda rights

and did not assert his right to remain silent, Petitioner’s due process rights were not implicated.5

(Doc. 11, Ex. H at 5-6.) The court held that, therefore, counsel’s failure to object and raise the

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issue on appeal was neither deficient nor prejudicial. (Id.)

Nielsen testified that Petitioner was informed of his right to silence and he waived it.

Petitioner has not disputed the accuracy of that testimony. “[A] defendant who voluntarily

speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the

subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.” Anderson v.

Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980). Nielsen testified to the substance of Petitioner’s statements

when questioned about the molestation, that he neither admitted nor denied the allegations but

he did provide explanations. This is not a comment on silence, a right that Petitioner did not

invoke. Because this testimony was not violative of Petitioner’s due process rights, an objection

would not likely have been sustained nor was there a reasonable probability of prevailing on

appeal. Therefore, trial counsel’s lack of objection and appellate counsel’s decision not to raise

the claim on appeal were not deficient nor was Petitioner prejudiced. See Matylinsky v. Budge,

577 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that, if an objection would have been futile,

petitioner fails both Strickland prongs) (citing Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434-35 (9th

Cir. 1989). The state appellate court’s denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable.

Conclusion

The Court’s close review of the Amended Petition reveals that Petitioner made no

substantive allegation of prejudice with respect to most of the alleged deficiencies of counsel.

“When a defendant challenges a conviction [based on counsel’s ineffectiveness], the question

is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had

a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. In answering that question, a reviewing court

necessarily considers the strength of the state’s case. See Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 999

(9th Cir. 2005) (“even if counsel’s conduct was arguably deficient, in light of the overwhelming

evidence of guilt, [the petitioner] cannot establish prejudice”); Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d

835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1997) (where state’s case is weak, there is a greater likelihood that the

outcome of the trial would have been different in the absence of deficient performance). 

At the end of its analysis on all of the IAC claims raised by Petitioner, the PCR court

found that, in light of the following trial evidence against Petitioner, he was not prejudiced by

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any of counsel’s actions:

B.’s testimony; the fact that Petitioner failed to deny the molests to both B.’s

mother and the police; and that B.’s brothers each provided facts that provided

corroboration as to elements of her testimony. As an aside, this Court notes that

the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is enough to sustain a conviction for

child molestation, “unless the story is physically impossible or so incredible that

no reasonable person could believe it.” State v. Munoz, 114 Ariz. 466, 469, 561

P.2d 1238, 1241 (App. 1976). B.’s story was far more than that told in Munoz. Further support was provided by other witnesses, including her brothers, and the

examinations of Molly Vega and Petitioner himself. 

(Doc. 4, Ex. G at 7 (footnote omitted).) Petitioner has not even attempted to establish that this

finding was objectively unreasonable. Therefore, in addition to all of the specific arguments

regarding counsel’s performance and prejudice addressed above, Petitioner is not entitled to

relief because he failed to prove that the state court’s finding of no prejudice was objectively

unreasonable.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

DISMISS the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 4).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 09-473-TUC-CKJ.

DATED this 19th day of October, 2010.

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