Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01576/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01576-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Sex Discrimination

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HALEMA BUZAYAN, an individual; No. 2:06-cv-01576-MCE-DAD

DR. JAMAL BUZAYAN, an individual; 

NAJAT ABDALLA DARRAT, an individual; 

MOHAMED BUZAYAN, by and through R. 

JAMAL BUZAYAN, as Guardian Ad Litem 

for a minor; YOUSEF BUZAYAN, by and 

through DR. JAMAL BUZAYAN, as 

Guardian Ad Litem for a minor; ALI 

BUZAYAN, by and through DR. JAMAL 

BUZAYAN, as Guardian Ad Litem,

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE CITY OF DAVIS; JAMES HYDE, 

individually and in his capacity as 

Chief of Police of the City of Davis 

Police Department; STEVEN PIERCE, 

individually and in his official 

capacity with the City of Davis Police 

Department; PHENG LY, individually and 

in his capacity as an officer of the 

City of Davis Police Department; BEN 

HARTZ, individually and as officer of 

the City of Davis Police Department; 

DAVID HENDERSON, individually and in 

his capacity as District Attorney for 

the Yolo County Office of the District 

Attorney;; PATRICIA FONG, individually 

and in her capacity as Deputy District 

Attorney for the Yolo County Office of 

the District Attorney and member of the 

Davis Police Department Advisory Board; 

DOUGLAS THORN, individually and in his 

capacity as counsel for Yolo County and 

the City of Davis,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

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2

Through the present action, Halema Buzayan and the Buzayan

family allege that their constitutional rights were violated as a

result of events stemming from hit-and-run charges levied against

Halema as a result of an incident which allegedly occurred on

June 7, 2005. Defendants City of Davis, James Hyde, the former

Davis Chief of Police, and two officers with the City of Davis

Police Department, Pheng Ly and Ben Hartz (collectively referred

to as “Defendants” unless otherwise noted), now move for partial

summary judgment as to the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth

and Thirteenth Causes of Action contained within Plaintiffs’

First Amended Complaint on grounds 1) that probable cause existed

for the arrest of Halma Buzayan; 2) that there is no evidence of

any discriminatory animus associated with the arrest; and 3) that

the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity in any

event with respect to any liability associated with the arrest. 

As set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment will be denied.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 7:40 p.m. on the evening of June 7, 2005,

Officer Ly was dispatched by the City of Davis Police Department

to the home of Adrienne Wonhof-Gustafson to investigate

Mr. Wonhof-Gustafson’s claim that her 2001 Mazda Protégé had

sustained damage as a result of a hit-and-run collision. 

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3

Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson told Officer Ly that after shopping at

Safeway earlier that evening, she noticed damage to the rear

bumper and found a note attached to her windshield from a witness

who claimed to have witnessed a collision. According to the

note, a blue Toyota Highlander was involved, license plate number

5GXT958. The witness who wrote the note left his name and

telephone number.

Officer Ly dialed the number on the note and spoke to a man

who identified himself as Marc Rowe. Mr. Rowe stated that he had

seen the Highlander back out of a parking spot after pulling in

very closely next to Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson’s Mazda. Although

Mr. Rowe did not profess to have seen any actual collision

between the two vehicles, he stated that after the Highlander

backed out and parked in a different space he saw scrape marks on

the Mazda’s bumper near where the Highlander had passed, so

believed that an impact had occurred. Mr. Rowe described the

Highlander’s driver as a “non-white” driver between 17 and 20

years of age. He saw two younger male passengers with the

driver.

After running a check on the license plate number provided

by Mr. Rowe, Officer Ly discovered that the plate matched a 2004

Toyota registered to Jamal Buzayan and his wife Najat Darrat at

1131 Pistachio Court in Davis. Officer Ly drove to the Buzayan

residence and ultimately found Mr. Buzayan at home at about

9:30 p.m. Ly explained that he was investigating a reported hitand run involving a blue Toyota Highlander, license plate number

5GXT958, which Buzayan confirmed was his vehicle. 

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4

After Mr. Buzayan asked Officer Ly if he wished to examine the

vehicle, they went into the garage. The license number of the

Highlander parked there matched the number provided by Marc Rowe

and had corner damage to the right front/passenger bumper. 

Ms. Darrat then appeared and, while she admitted driving the

Toyota to Safeway several times earlier in the day, denied being

at Safeway around 6:30 p.m. when Mr. Rowe observed the alleged

incident. Neither Mr. Buzayan or Ms. Darrat had noticed the

Toyota’s bumper damage previously. Officer Ly took pictures of

the damage.

When Officer Ly inquired with respect to any other drivers

in the household, he learned that the couple’s daughter, sixteenyear-old Halema, had a driver’s license. Officer Ly then asked

to speak to Halema, who denied driving the Highlander to Safeway

that day. Despite this denial, Officer Ly asked Mr. Buzayan and

Ms. Darrat to call Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson to discuss responsibility

for the incident, and to contact their insurance company. 

Officer Ly also gave the Buzayans’ insurance information to

Mr. Wonhof-Gustafson himself when he returned to talk with her

after discussing the matter with the Buzayans.

Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson admits that a member of the Buzayan

family called her shortly thereafter and agreed to pay for the

Mazda’s damage. An insurance representative prepared an estimate

and, according to Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson, she received a check

covering the necessary repairs, in full, within three days after

the incident. See Decl. of Adrienne Wonhof-Gustafson, ¶ 7. 

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5

Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson further maintains that she told Officer Ly

the evening of the accident she had no interest in pressing

charges as long as she was reimbursed for the damage to her

vehicle. 

When Officer Ly returned to talk to Marc Rowe a second time,

he showed Rowe a photo lineup which included Halema’s photo. 

Mr. Rowe identified Halema as the driver of the Highlander, but

his girlfriend, Carly Collins, could not make a positive

identification despite having also been present in the Safeway

parking lot when the purported incident occurred. Mr. Collins

did describe the driver as a “Middle Eastern” female about 17

years old with wavy, dark shoulder length hair. Collins told

Officer Ly that the girl had looked at the Mazda as she walked

past it after parking the Highlander.

According to Officer Ly, as a result of this investigation,

which all appears to have occurred the evening of the incident,

he concluded that Halema Buzayan had likely been driving the

Highlander and collided with the Wonhof-Gustafson Mazda on

June 7, 2005. Officer Ly did not arrest Halema, however, until

almost a week later, on June 13, 2005, when he returned to the

Buzayan/Darrat home at about 9:40 p.m with Officer Hartz and

transported Halema to the Davis Police Station for booking,

fingerprinting and questioning before releasing her to her

parents with a Notice to Appear. Halema’s arrest was effectuated

without any warrant.

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6

On July 14, 2006, Ms. Buzayan, through her father as

Guardian Ad Litem, filed suit against Defendants, alleging

seventeen causes of action. The Defendants filed a Partial

Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) and a Partial

Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f) and California Code of Civil

Procedure § 425.16. Since Ms. Buzayan had reached the age of

majority prior to filing the suit, the Court granted Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7), and granted Plaintiff

leave to amend the complaint. 

On November 3, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint

which substituted Ms. Buzayan as an individual, and added the

additional members of the Buzayan family as Plaintiffs. The

First Amended Complaint also added the Davis Enterprise, Debbie

Davis, Lauren Keene, the City of Davis, and individuals from the

Yolo County Office of the District Attorney as Defendants, and

included additional causes of action. As a result of Special

Motions to Strike and Partial Motions to Dismiss filed in early

2007, the media defendants (the Davis Enterprise, Debbie Davis

and Lauren Keene) were dismissed along with three causes of

action. After Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings directed to remaining claims in late 2007, Plaintiffs

sought and received permission from the Court on December 14,

2007 to file a Second Amended Complaint. As a result, the Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings was taken off calendar.

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 Those causes of action include the First Cause of Action, 1

against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure in

contravention of the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Cause of Action,

against Defendants for false imprisonment under state law, the

Thirteenth Cause of Action, against Defendants City of Davis Hyde

for so-called Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 given their

alleged ratification of Halema Buzayan’s unreasonable seizure by

Defendants Hartz and Ly, and the Fifth Cause of Action, for

conspiracy to deny constitutional rights in violation of

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1983, to the extent such claim is based

on Halema’s arrest.

7

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed on or about

January 3, 2008, omitted four additional causes of action set

forth in its predecessor. Defendants again moved to dismiss

certain causes of action, and were successful in eliminating

three causes of action in their entirety, and another five on a

partial basis. In addition, Defendant Douglas Thorne was

dismissed as a Defendant.

On September 25, 2009, Defendants filed the present Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment, alleging that because probable

cause existed for Halema’s arrest, all causes of action whose

merit depended on the lack of such probable cause necessarily 1

fail. Additionally, because Defendants also claim the evidence

shows no evidence of any discrimination against Halema Buzayan in

connection with her arrest, they request summary adjudication as

the Second and Fourth Causes of Action. Those claims are brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in arresting Halema on the

basis of her Muslim faith and/or Middle Eastern ethnicity. 

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8

Finally, with respect to Defendants Ly and Hartz, Defendants’

Motion asserts that said Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity in any event because they reasonably believed they had

good cause to effectuate Halema’s arrest.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant partial summary

judgment, or summary adjudication on part of a claim or defense. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a

claim...may...move...for a summary judgment in the party’s favor

upon all or any part thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v.

Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone

Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710

(E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

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9

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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10

Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury,

there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there

is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a

jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442,

448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts....Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

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11

ANALYSIS

A. Whether or Not Defendants Had Probable Cause to Arrest

Halema Buzayan Requires Factual Determinations Not

Amenable to Disposition on Summary Judgment.

Defendants contend that because probable cause existed for

Halema’s arrest, her rights under the Fourth Amendment for

freedom from unreasonable seizures cannot have been violated. 

Even in the absence of a search warrant, an officer may still

validly arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to

believe the person committed a crime. Tatum v. City & County of

San Francisco, 441 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Probable cause

exists if, at the time of arrest, the facts and circumstances

known to the officer through reasonably trustworthy information

suggested a fair probability that a crime has been committed. 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991; Blankenhorn v. City of

Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007). The determination of

probable cause, then looks to whether the totality of

circumstances points to a likelihood that criminal activity has

taken place.

The factual nature of this inquiry, as suggested by the need

to weigh evidence in determining whether the scales tip towards

probable cause, militates against a determination of probable

cause as a matter of law, on summary judgment, in all but the

clearest cases. After examining the evidence here, the Court

concludes that the present matter is not such a case.

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28 Defendants’ Objections to the Ferrari report are 2

overruled.

12

First, it is uncontroverted that the alleged eyewitness,

Marc Rowe, did not in fact observe actual contact between the

Highlander and Mr. Wonhof-Gustafson’s Mazda. That failure made

it all the more necessary to carefully examine the damage

sustained between the two vehicles before drawing any conclusion

that the Highlander had in fact collided with the Mazda.

In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiffs have

introduced a report prepared by a Consulting Mechanical Engineer,

Albert J. Ferrari, following his review of the damage to the

Buzayan Highlander in connection with an exemplar 2001 Mazda

Protégé. (See Report, Ex. I to the Decl. of Matt Springman in

Opp’n to Mot. Summ. J.). Mr. Ferrari also reviewed the police 2

report, photographs of the involved vehicles, and a collision

repair report. He concluded that the damage to the Toyota did

not match damage sustained by the Mazda, opining that the areas

of bumper and right front damage to each vehicle are inconsistent

both with respect to “location, elevation, severity, size, shape

and transferred paint.” Id. at p. 2.

Given these opinions, the reasonableness of Officer Ly’s

opinion that a collision had taken place between the two vehicles

is brought into question, particularly given the fact that the

witness had not seen any actual contact between the Mazda and

Toyota. That assessment therefore becomes a factual

determination not amenable to determination on summary judgment.

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 The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs also devoted 3

substantial time in their Opposition to the argument that Officer

Ly’s warrantless arrest of Halema, as a juvenile, was improper. 

Those arguments with respect to the mode of arrest, however, are

not pertinent with respect to whether probable cause existed to

make the arrest in the first place. Moreover, and in any event,

California Welfare and Institutions Code § 625(a) allows an

officer, without a warrant, to take a minor into temporary

custody. As the Court already determined in its previous

September 29, 2008 Memorandum and Order in this matter (Docket

No. 131, p. 15), Halema was released after her booking and

therefore comes within the purview of § 625(a).

13

The factual issues raised by Plaintiffs’ expert report

showing that the damage to the two vehicles did not match,

particularly when coupled with the lack of any eyewitness to an

actual collision, are further compounded by the photo lineup

prepared by Officer Ly that identified Halema as the driver of

the Highlander in the first place. Plaintiffs point to defects

in the composition of the lineup given the sharp contrast between

Halema’s smiling demeanor and the demeanor of the other included

individuals. Moreover, even given that discrepancy, Plaintiffs

correctly point out that only one of the two witnesses who

observed the driver of the Highlander in the Safeway parking lot

(Marc Rowe) were able to affirmatively identify Halema Buzayan as

the driver.

Defendants’ request for summary adjudication as to all

claims premised on the lack of probable cause to arrest Halema

(the First, Fifth, Ninth and Thirteenth Causes of Action) must

accordingly be denied.3

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14

B. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claims Also Cannot be

Decided as a Matter of Law.

In addition to maintaining that the existence of probable

cause nullifies much of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint,

Defendants also contend that there is no evidence from which any

discriminatory inference in arresting Halema can be drawn. Given

the totality of circumstances, that argument also fails.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

which underlies Halema’s discrimination claims founded on

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does prohibit selective

enforcement of laws against an individual on the basis of his or

her race or religion. In order to prevail on her Equal

Protection claims, Plaintiff must show that Defendants’ actions

against her were motivated by a discriminatory purpose and had a

discriminatory effect. Rosenbaum v. City & County of San

Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has pointed to enough

discrepancies to meet her burden, at least for purposes of

summary judgment. According to Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson, Officer Ly

went out of his way to describe Halema’s mother’s use of a

traditional Muslim dress that “covered her face.” WonhofGustafson Decl., ¶ 5. This description is at odds with other

evidence suggesting that Ms. Darrat was simply wearing a

headscarf, as opposed to something covering her head entirely. 

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15

Although Ly may have been trying to distinguish Ms. Darrat’s

apparel from that of her daughter, who was not wearing a

headscarf at the time of his interview, and from the individual

observed by Marc Rowe and Carly Collins, who was also not

reported as having her head covered, there is evidence suggesting

that Ly went on to make certain assumptions about the use of a

headscarf during his handling of this matter. When he was

questioning Halema at the police station following her arrest, he

opined that Ms. Darrat could not have been the driver because the

individual identified by the witnesses was not wearing a

headscarf and wearing blue jeans, something that Ms. Darrat, as a

“very traditional person”, would not have done. See Ex. H to

Springman Decl. (audio recording of Ly’s interrogation of Halema

Buzayan).

Case law shows that assumptions of fact based on a suspect’s

ethnicity may preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Marshall v.

Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1169-70 (10th Cir.

2003) (an officer’s unsupported evidence that an African-American

detainee was under the influence of crack, as opposed to another

drug, may be evidence of racial discrimination). Here, Officer

Ly’s assumptions about Muslim dress may similarly be evidence of

bias, particularly when viewed in conjunction with other apparent

irregularities surrounding Halema’s arrest.

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 Troubling too is the fact that while Officer Ly told the 4

Buzayans that Marc Rowe had seen an actual collision (Springman

Decl., Ex. E), he later admitted at deposition that Mr. Rowe had

not made any such representation. Springman Decl., Ex. A, 56:12-

14.

 Defendants’ objection to Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson’s 5

characterization in this regard is overruled. Moreover, while

Defendants further object to other portions of the WonhofGustafson Declaration, as well as other evidence proffered in

opposition to Defendants’ Motion, to the extent the Court has not

relied on such matters in ruling on the Motion, it is unnecessary

to specifically rule on Defendants’ Objections in their entirety

and the court declines to do so.

16

Additionally, as discussed above, despite the fact that no

witness observed any actual contact between the two vehicles,

there is no evidence that Officer Ly performed any analysis after

taking pictures of the two vehicles the evening of the incident

and before deciding to arrest Halema some six days later.4

Albert Ferrari’s opinion that the damage sustained by the two

vehicles was highly inconsistent with a collision, as discussed

above, makes that decision appear imprudent. Moreover, at least

according to Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson, Officer Ly seemed “overly

zealous” to press charges against Ms. Buzayan, even in response

to Wonhof-Gustafson’s desire not do so so if she was reimbursed. 

Wonhof-Gustafson Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. He did not indicate Ms. Wonhof- 5

Gustafson’s preference in that regard when preparing the police

report. Nor is there any evidence that he checked back with

Ms. Wonhof-Gustafson to see whether reimbursement had been made

before deciding to effectuate the arrest, despite her

confirmation that full reimbursement was received within three

days of the incident. Id. at ¶ 7.

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Even more significant is evidence that the Yolo County

District Attorney’s Office does not normally pursue charges for

hit-and-run misdemeanors where the alleged victim has been

compensated and does not wish to pursue charges. Springman

Decl., Ex. B, Dep. of David Henderson, pp. 42-44. 

The timing and manner of Halema’s arrest also raises

questions. Officer Ly waited six days after apparently

performing no investigation in the meantime, and then arrested

sixteen-year old Halema at approximately 9:30 p.m., apparently

after she had gone to bed. He refused to let her change out of

her pajamas before taking her to the police station for booking. 

Decl. of Jamal Buzayan, ¶¶ 15-16. Additionally, although

California Penal Code § 844 requires that a police officer

seeking admission into a private home to explain the purpose for

which admittance is desired, Ly told Halema’s father only that he

wanted to “talk” with her, despite the fact that he had already

decided to make an arrest. Id. at ¶ 12; Springman Decl., Ex. A,

Dep. of Pheng Ly, pp. 120-21.

On a motion for summary judgment, as stated above, all

reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the party

opposing summary judgment, here Plaintiffs. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255. Taken together, the series of events outlined above may

support an inference of discrimination. This is enough to defeat

summary judgment. Defendants’ request for summary adjudication

as to the Second and Fourth Causes of Action are therefore

denied.

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C. Defendants Ly and Hartz are Not Entitled to Qualified 

Immunity as to any Probable Cause Under the

Circumstances of this Matter. 

Defendants Ly and Hartz argue that even if probable cause

was lacking, they are still entitled to qualified immunity as to

the Fourth Amendment seizure claim, “because any reasonable

officer viewing the same facts and circumstances could have

reached the same decision to arrest [Halema].” Defs.’ Mem. in

Support of Summ. J., 12:19-23. 

Government officials like Defendants Ly and Hartz are

entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages unless their

conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Under the analysis

prescribed by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the

initial inquiry in assessing immunity goes to whether the

Defendants violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff, here

Halema. If such a violation is shown, the Court must next look

to whether the law governing Defendants’ conduct is clearly

established, and whether under that law a reasonable official

would have believed his conduct was lawful. Jeffers v. Gomez,

267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001).

The facts here do not permit the Court to resolve these

inquiries in favor of Defendants. As discussed above, Officer Ly

made the decision to arrest Halema without a witness who even

observed a collision, and in reliance on damage comparison

between the vehicles that Defendants’ expert later found to be

patently mismatched. 

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 6

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).

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Moreover, Defendants made the arrest in the face of evidence

suggesting that misdemeanor hit-and-run incidents where

reimbursement has been made are not ordinarily prosecuted,

despite the wishes of the alleged victim who did not wish to

pursue charges given her reimbursement for all damages, and in a

manner which may not have complied with California law as set

forth in Welfare and Institutions Code § 844. Given all those

circumstances, the Court concludes that qualified immunity is

inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 175) is DENIED.6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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