Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00067/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00067-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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The magistrate judge’s order of July 22, 2006, as well as Defendants’ pleadings 1

spell defendant’s name “McCollough.” The complaint, as well as Plaintiff’s pleadings spell the

name “McCulah.” The court will adopt the spelling “McCollough” for the sake of consistency of

court documents. The court apologizes for any misspelling. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLOTTE ROSE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

BEVERLY HEALTH AND )

REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC. )

dba BEVERLY MANOR and BEVERLY ) 

MANOR CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL,)

SHAWN McCULAH, DIXIE TRISTAN, )

and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 06-0067 AWI DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO

STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S JURY

DEMAND AS MOOT

Documents # 49 and # 48-1

This is an action for damages by plaintiff Charlotte Rose (“Plaintiff”) against

defendant Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., dba Beverly Manor and Beverly

Manor Convalescent Hospital (“Beverly”) and individual defendants Shawn McCollough1

and Dixie Tristan (collectively, “Defendants”). In the present motion, Defendants move to

dismiss the complaint in its entirety or, in the alternative for summary judgment, on the

ground Plaintiff is judicially estopped from pursuing any claim that was pending at the time

of her bankruptcy proceeding that was not declared as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. 

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Plaintiff has challenged the jurisdiction of this court through a motion for reconsideration of

the magistrate judge’s order denying remand to the state court. Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration is addressed in a separate order. Venue is proper in this court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As will be discussed infra, Defendants’ motion is resolvable by reference only to the

pleadings and to documents filed by Plaintiff in the course of her bankruptcy proceeding

which may be judicially noticed. The court therefore need not convert the instant motion into

a motion for summary judgment and may proceed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, accepting as true all allegations set forth in the complaint. Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976).

Plaintiff was an employee of Beverly, working as a central supply clerk in Beverly’s

convalescent hospital located in Fresno. Plaintiff worked for Beverly from June of 1981 until

she was constructively discharged on January 27, 2005. Between 2003 and 2005 Plaintiff

was diagnosed with a heart condition called cardiomyopathy, which developed into

congestive heart failure. Plaintiff’s congestive heart failure resulted in a reduction in

Plaintiff’s work capacity, including a limitation of her lifting capacity to 30 pounds. The

complaint alleges that Plaintiff requested accommodation for her disability and received

none. She further alleges she was subject to retaliation and harassment by Beverly and by the

individual Defendants. Plaintiff alleges the retaliation and harassment created an intolerable

work environment and that her discontinuation of employment with Beverly constituted

constructive termination.

Plaintiff discontinued her employment with Beverly on January 27, 2005. On April

14, 2005 Plaintiff timely filed claims with the California Department of Fair Employment

and Housing (“DFEH”) alleging discrimination and violation of both federal and state

guaranteed civil rights against Beverly and individual defendant Tristan. On April 19, 2005,

DFEH issued notice of case closure and right to sue letters with respect to Plaintiff’s

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complaints against Beverly and Tristan. On or about September 15, 2005, Plaintiff filed a

civil rights complaint with DEFH against individual Defendant McCollough. A notice of

case closure and right to sue letter was issued as to individual Defendant McCollough on

September 28, 2005.

The only facts not set forth in the complaint that are relevant to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss are generally uncontested facts contained in documents filed in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy

case. A district court may consider materials in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that are not part

of the pleadings but that are ‘matters of public record’ of which the court may take judicial

notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001). “Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of

facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute in that they are either (1) generally known

within territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Biggs

v. Capital Factors, Inc., 120 F.3d 268, 1997 WL 415340 at *1 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s

bankruptcy case was filed in the Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of California,

which is within this court’s territorial jurisdiction. Where, as here, the fact at issue is the

existence of a statement in a declaration within a bankruptcy proceeding, and not the truth of

the statement itself, the accuracy of the fact at issue cannot be reasonably questioned. See id.

(recognizing that judicial notice may not be appropriate where the truth of the matter

judicially noticed is at issue). The court therefore grants Defendants’ request for judicial

notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding generally, and grants judicial notice in particular

of Plaintiff’s responses to Schedules “A” and “B” filed in that proceeding. See Duke Energy

Trading & Marketing, L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting

judicial notice of filings made in related bankruptcy proceeding).

Plaintiff filed a voluntary Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition on May 27, 2005. On

schedule “A” of the petition, which lists all real property assets belonging to the petitioner,

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Plaintiff indicated there were no real property assets. Schedule “B” lists personal property

assets. Specifically, at item 20, the petitioner is asked to describe “Other contingent and

unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, and

rights to setoff claims. Give estimated value of each.” Doc. # 49, Exh. 2. Plaintiff indicated

“none” in response to this question. Plaintiff did not otherwise indicate the existence of any

claims against Defendants anywhere in the information filed in connection with her Chapter 7

Petition. Based on information submitted by Plaintiff and her husband in the course of the

Bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court concluded there were no funds available from

the estate for distribution to creditors. A Report of No Distribution was issued, and

Plaintiff’s debts were discharged on September 8, 2005.

The complaint in the instant case was filed in Fresno County Superior Court on

October 5, 2005. Defendants filed notice of removal to this court on January 19, 2006. 

Plaintiff filed a motion to remand on February 9, 2006. The magistrate judge denied

Plaintiff’s motion to remand on July 22, 2006. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the

magistrate judges order denying remand. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is under

consideration and will be addressed in a separate order.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

the claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on

the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a

cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th

Cir.1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740

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(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g

denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts do not "assume the

truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations."

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9 Cir.1981). th

“As a general rule, ‘a district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’ [Citation.]” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, as previously noted a district court may consider

materials in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that are not part of the pleadings but that are

‘matters of public record’ of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal

Rule of Evidence 201. Id. Specifically, a district court may take judicial notice of public

records related to legal proceedings in both state courts and in the district court. See Miles v.

State of California, 320 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court taking judicial notice of

related state court proceedings). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ contend that Plaintiff may not maintain her action against Defendants

because Plaintiff failed to list the action against Defendants on any submission to the

bankruptcy court at any time during the bankruptcy proceeding up to the time the bankruptcy

court discharged Plaintiff’s debts. Defendants contend the doctrine of judicial estoppel

prevents Plaintiff from asserting a claim against Defendants when she had made a prior

representation to the bankruptcy court that there was no pending cause of action. 

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an

advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position. [Citation.]” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Hamilton”).

A court “may” consider three factors in determining whether to apply

the doctrine of judicial estoppel: (1) “a party’s later position must be clearly

inconsistent with its earlier position;” (2) “whether the party has succeeded in

persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial

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acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the

perception that either the first or the second court was misled;” and (3)

“whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an

unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not

estopped.”

Froshiesar v. Babij, 2004 WL 2360529 at *4 (D.Ore. 2004) (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at

783 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff asserts a number of arguments in opposition to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. The first two of these require little discussion. Plaintiff first contends that

Defendants cannot properly be considered as a motion to dismiss because it relies on facts

that are not part of the pleadings; that is, the motion relies on facts contained in bankruptcy

court filings. As previously discussed, the court may consider facts of which it may properly

take judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment. As noted, the court has determined that it may take judicial notice of filings in the

bankruptcy court where Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition was filed, the court may consider

those filings without converting Defendants’ motion to a motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants’ motion is procedurally improper is therefore rejected.

Plaintiff’s second contention is that the court may not consider Defendants’ motion to

dismiss because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. This contention is

addressed in the court’s memorandum opinion and order denying Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order denying remand, which is filed separately. 

The court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons

set forth in its separately filed memorandum opinion and order. That discussion need not be

repeated here.

Third, Plaintiff contends she did not misrepresent any facts to the court when she filed

her bankruptcy petition and filed the related schedules. The basis of Plaintiff’s contention in

this regard is that she had no “claims” when she filled out schedules “A” and “B” because she

had not yet filed the complaint in the instant case and because she had not yet obtained the

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right to sue letter as to individual defendant McCollough. The DFEH claims against Beverly

and individual Defendant Tristan were filed on April 14, 2005, and the right to sue letters

were issued five days later. The DFEH complaint was filed as to McCollough on September

15, 2005. Plaintiff contends she did not make any misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court

because she did not have a “claim” within the meaning of Question 20 until she filed the

instant complaint. In the alternative, Plaintiff contends she did not make any

misrepresentations with regard to individual defendant McCollough because she had no

claim against McCollough within the meaning of question 20 until she received the right to

sue letter with respect to McCollough on September 28, 2005, twenty days after her debts

were discharged pursuant to her Chapter 7 petition on September 8, 2005. The issue Plaintiff

presents, therefore, is whether she had “claims” she was obliged to report at the time she filed

her Schedule “A” and “B” statements, or during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Hamilton specifically applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in the context of a

party’s attempt to maintain an action against an insurance company based on a claim that

accrued prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition and where the claim was not listed as an

asset of the bankruptcy estate. The Hamilton court noted that “[i]n the bankruptcy context, a

party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan

or otherwise mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure statements. [Citation.]” 

Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783. 

In Hamilton, the plaintiff filed an insurance claim with defendant insurance company

for alleged losses resulting from water damage. Id. At 780. During the pendency of the

insurance claim, but before any complaint was filed in court, plaintiff filled a petition for

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. The plaintiff in Hamilton received notice of rejection of his insurance

claim on November 3, and filed his bankruptcy schedules on November 14. He did not

advise the bankruptcy court of any potential claim against the insurance company. Id. at 781. 

The plaintiff in Hamilton filed his complaint in court against the insurance company about

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three months after his bankruptcy petition was dismissed.

In Hamilton, a case that also involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the court noted

the obligation of the bankruptcy petitioner to list all assets on his bankruptcy schedules,

including any “pending” claims that may exist at the time of the filing of the petition or

during the pendency of the bankruptcy. See id. at 784 (11 U.S.C. § requires petitioner to list

assets and liabilities and creates a duty to amend submitted schedules to provide notice of

claims acquired since filing). Since the court in Hamilton found the plaintiff in that case had

a duty to report as bankruptcy assets claims that he had not filed as of the time the bankruptcy

proceeding was dismissed, this court must conclude that a “pending” claim, as that term is

used in Hamilton, includes claims that have accrued as of the time of the bankruptcy filing

regardless of whether they have been set forth in a complaint. 

This viewpoint is reinforced by the Hamilton court’s reliance on, and approval of,

their prior opinion in Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, 978 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“Hay”). In Hay, the court applied judicial estoppel to bar the claims of a bankrupt plaintiff

against a defendant bank where the plaintiff had “learned of the facts that led to the discovery

of [plaintiff’s] claims” during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings and prior to the

close of the bankruptcy case. Id. at 557. In Hay, the court noted with approval the district

court’s decision in Monroe County Oil v. Amoco Oil Co., 75 B.R. 158, 162 (S.D. Ind. 1987),

which held the debtor has a duty to disclose “any litigation that is likely to arise in a

nonbankruptcy context.” Id. (italics added).

Based on the case law reviewed, the court concludes Plaintiff in this case had a duty

to disclose to the bankruptcy court any potential claims she may have had against Defendants,

including both the claims against Beverly and Tristan, for which right to sue letters had been

issued, and the claims against McCollough, where the right to sue letter had not yet been

issued but where the claim that was later asserted had already accrued and the facts upon

which that claim would be based were known. Hamilton, Hay, and Monroe County Oil make

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it clear that the duty of the bankruptcy petitioner to disclose the existence of a potential claim

is not a formalistic duty predicated on the procedural status of a claim, but is a duty of candor

that accrues from the time the facts that give rise to the potential claim are known. Hay, 978

F.2d at 557. It is also clear from the discussion in the above cited cases that the subjective

intent of the bankruptcy petitioner at the time of the bankruptcy filing to pursue or not pursue

the claims is not relevant. The duty of the bankruptcy petitioner is to disclose all actual and

potential assets of the bankruptcy estate, not just those assets the petitioner may subjectively

chose to pursue. 

The crux of Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that she did not mislead the bankruptcy

court because she did not have any “claims” to list at question 20 on Schedule “B.”

Apparently, Plaintiff’s contention is that a “claim” does not exist until it is filed or in some

other way formalized or acted upon. Plaintiff presents no support for this hyper-technical

interpretation of the word “claim,” an interpretation that runs directly contrary to the way that

term is used in each of the cases cited above. Pursuant to Hay, the court finds the term

“claim” incorporates any potential cause of action that has accrued and whose facts are

sufficiently well known to the Plaintiff to indicate the existence of a potential asset. Hay, 978

F.2d at 557. Nothing in the cases examined supports the notion that a “claim” need not be

listed as a bankruptcy asset unless it has been formally acted upon.

Plaintiff also contends she did not mislead the bankruptcy court because she gave a

non-erroneous answer to question 20 which asked Plaintiff to declare all “Other contingent

and unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor,

and rights to setoff claims.” Plaintiff contends her answer was truthful because at the time

she submitted the answers to Schedule “B” she had no claims that were “contingent and

unliquidated.” The conjunctive emphasis is supplied in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’

motion to dismiss, not in the text of question 20. See Doc. # 58 at 5:1. 

In light of the foregoing discussion, the court must conclude Plaintiff’s construction

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of question 20 on Schedule “B” is both unreasonably strained and suspiciously self-serving. 

First, the wording of the question itself, which requires the petitioner to list “ contingent and

unliquidated claims of every nature” cautions against a reading of the question in the highly

restricted sense proposed by Plaintiff. The obvious thrust of the question is to elicit a

complete disclosure of all potential assets that could be marshaled to satisfy the bankruptcy

estate’s obligations. Further, the previously cited decisions in Hamilton, Hay, and Monroe

County, clearly indicate that in order for question 20 of Schedule “B” to harmonize with the

clear intent of governing case law, the word “and” in question 20 must be understood as

being disjunctive so that the petitioner is directed to list all contingent claims and all

unliquidated claims. Any more restrictive interpretation would be clearly contrary to

controlling case law.

The court finds Plaintiff had a duty to report her claims against Beverly, Tristan and

McCollough to the bankruptcy court and that she failed to do so. The court concludes that

absent countervailing equitable considerations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in

this case to prevent Plaintiff from advancing her claims against Defendants because she failed

to timely or adequately disclose those claims to the bankruptcy court.

Plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding any breach of duty to list her potential claims

against Defendants in her statements to the bankruptcy court, the doctrine of judicial estoppel

should not be applied in her case because her responses to the bankruptcy court did not

constitute intentional misrepresentations. In this regard Plaintiff avers she had no intention to

mislead, that she was reasonably unaware that she had any claims that would require

disclosure on the bankruptcy court’s schedules and that she made efforts to correct the

mistake when it was discovered.

Plaintiff presents no support for the implied contention that application of judicial

estoppel requires a finding of a particular subjective intent. The three categories of inquiry as

set forth above are (1) whether Plaintiff has made inconsistent representations; (2) whether a

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court accepted the previous representation; and (3) whether Plaintiff would benefit unfairly as

a result of making the current inconsistent representation. Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783 . Here,

there was a representation to the Bankruptcy court that Plaintiff had no potential claims and

an inconsistent representation to this court that she does have claims against Defendants. It is

undisputed that the bankruptcy court accepted the prior inconsistent claim and discharged her

debts in recognition of the absence of any assets. Finally, it is clear that Plaintiff does benefit

unfairly from the inconsistent positions because the discharge of her debts pursuant to her

earlier representation means she is not obliged to use the proceeds of her action against

Defendants, if any, to satisfy the debts of the bankruptcy estate. 

Whether Plaintiff’s intentions were innocent when she made the representation to the

bankruptcy court that she had no potential claims does not directly enter into the

determination of whether judicial estoppel applies. If evidence existed that Plaintiff had, in

fact, attempted in good faith to inform both the creditors and the bankruptcy court that

Plaintiff had pending claims, then a case could be made there was a good faith attempt to

adequately disclose the existence of the claims against Defendants. See Froshiesar, 2004 WL

2360529 at *8 (judicial estoppel not applicable where plaintiff’s good faith efforts during

bankruptcy proceeding is sufficient to constitute notice-in-fact of existence of claims). No

such evidence of affirmative efforts to notify the bankruptcy court of the existence of the

claims prior to discharge of Plaintiff’s debts is in evidence in the present case.

It is also irrelevant that Plaintiff has, or has attempted to, reopen her bankruptcy

proceeding. There is no authority that such actions, occurring after the discharge of the

Plaintiff’s debts, excuses the debtor’s failure to timely declare all interests of the bankruptcy

estate. It is important to note, however, that this court’s determination that judicial estoppel

operates in this case to prevent Plaintiff from advancing her claims on her own behalf does

not necessarily mean that an appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate may not advance

claims belonging to Plaintiff for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. See Bartley-Williams v.

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Kendall, 134 Wash.App. 95, 99-100 (Wash.App. 2006) (differentiating holdings in Hamilton

and related cases where the bankrupt sought to maintain a suit for their own benefit instead of

the benefit of the bankruptcy estate).

Finally, it is worth noting that, despite Plaintiff’s protestations of innocent intent,

even if subjective intent were a factor in the application of judicial estoppel, there is no

evidence in the present case of innocent intent. Plaintiff’s self-serving declaration

notwithstanding, Plaintiff has followed precisely the course of conduct she would have

followed had she desired to conceal her potential claim from the bankruptcy court so as to

secure the benefit of any settlement or judgment for herself without need to use the proceeds

to pay her debts. While the court does not impute any malfeasance to Plaintiff, the court

notes that it is not part of Defendants’ burden to show that Plaintiff was ill-intentioned. 

Plaintiff, for her part, cannot show that she was not ill-intentioned.

The court has considered of each of the factors set forth in Hamilton and concludes

that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies in this case to prevent Plaintiff from advancing

any claims against Defendants that accrued or were potential claims at the time Plaintiff’s

bankruptcy action was commenced.

THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED

as to the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint. The Complaint is therefore dismissed in its

entirety. The dismissal is with prejudice as to Plaintiff. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE

the CASE. Because Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety, Defendants’ motion to

strike Plaintiff’s jury demand is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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