Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08047/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1 The Court will treat the United States as the proper Defendant in this case

because the United States has moved to dismiss and appears to acknowledge that, if

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant McHugh were true, and he was acting in the scope of

his employment, then the United States would need to substitute itself as the Defendant in

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William O’Dale Poole, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John M. McHugh, Secretary, U.S.

Department of the Army, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-8047-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). The Court now

rules on this Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against individual Defendant, John M.

McHugh, alleging fraud and conspiracy claims. In that complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while

in the United States Army, he was wrongfully denied a promotion by the Army Board For

Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant McHugh

has “responsibilities for the acts of his subordinates, specifically the Army Board for

Correction of Military Records.” (Doc. 1 at 2). The United States1

 now moves to dismiss

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this action. See Osborn v. Haley 549 U.S. 225, 226-227 (2007) (“[w]hen the Attorney

General certifies that a federal employee named defendant in a state-court tort action was

acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time in question, the action ‘shall be

removed’ to federal court and the United States must be substituted as the defendant.”)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2)); 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2),(3).

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 The Court notes that Local Rule 7.2(i) allows the court to deem Plaintiff’s

failure to file a responsive motion as consent to grant Defendant’s Motion. LRCiv. 7.2(i).

However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will look to the merits of

Defendant’s Motion in making its decision. 

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Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.2

II. ANALYSIS

The United States argues that this case should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff has

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (2) the United States is entitled to

sovereign immunity and has not waived such immunity.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In order for an individual to bring a claim against the United States under the Federal

Tort Claims Act (FTCA), that individual must first present an administrative claim to the

appropriate Federal Agency and that claim must be denied either directly or constructively

by the agency’s failure to act upon the claim within six months. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Jerves

v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992). The FTCA only authorizes a suit after

a claimant has exhausted all administrative remedies. Jerves, 966 F.2d at 519. Failure to

exhaust prior to filing a FTCA claim is grounds for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Id.

Here, Plaintiff has made no allegation or statement to indicate that he filed an

administrative claim with any appropriate agency. Further, Major Linda A. Chapman, Chief

of the Eastern United States (U.S.) Torts Branch, U.S. Army Claims Service, has avowed that

her office “has found that no administrative claim was filed by [Plaintiff] under the above

mentioned statutes.” (Doc. 6-1 at 2). Because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative

remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s claims. 

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B. .Sovereign Immunity 

Further, even if Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, the United States

would be entitled to sovereign immunity in this case. Generally, the United States and its

agencies are immune from suit unless the United States has waived that immunity. Loeffler

v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988). One such waiver is contained in the FTCA. United States v.

Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (“the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under

circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort”) (emphasis

omitted).

However, 28 U.S.C. section 2680(h) precludes tort claims under the FTCA for “[a]ny

claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,

abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract

rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). “[C]laims against the United States for fraud or

misrepresentation by a federal officer are absolutely barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).” Owyhee

Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Moon v. Takisaki, 501

F.2d 389, 390 (9th Cir. 1974)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for fraud and conspiracy are

barred because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for these intentional

tort claims.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED granting the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). This case

is dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 8th day of August, 2012.

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