Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00064/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

MICHAEL JOSEPH WIEBER, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

CHARLES L. RYAN, 

 Respondent. 

No. CV 11-00064-TUC-CKJ (BPV) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On January 20, 2011, Petitioner, Michael Joseph Wieber (“Petitioner”), an inmate 

confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex, East Unit, in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro 

se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in state custody (“Petition”), pursuant 

to title 28, U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1). Wieber raises nine Grounds for relief in the 

Petition. On May 2, 2011, Respondents filed an Answer with Exhibits A through T, and 

Reporters Transcripts attached. (Doc. No. 10). A reply was filed by Petitioner on June 2, 

2011. (Doc. No. 11). 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 1 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-2- 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition in its entirety. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Indictment, Trial and Sentencing 

On April 26, 2004, Petitioner was arrested for the robbery of Harbor Freight Tools 

store in Tucson, Arizona. Petitioner was charged and convicted by a jury of armed 

robbery, two counts of kidnapping and aggravated assault. (Answer, Ex. A.). The trial 

court conducted a bench trial on the allegation of prior convictions, finding two prior 

convictions proven. Petitioner was sentenced to presumptive, enhanced, concurrent terms 

of imprisonment totaling 15.75 years. (Answer, Ex. A.). 

B. Direct Appeal 

Wieber, through counsel, timely filed an appeal raising three arguments: 1) 

insufficient evidence supported his conviction on Count 2, kidnapping, because evidence 

of the physical restraint element was absent; 2) the State’s allegation of prior convictions 

was not proven by sufficient evidence; and 3) he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment right to a jury trial on the allegation of prior convictions. (Answer, Ex. B, 

Opening Brief.). Simultaneously with his direct appeal, Wieber filed a notice of petition 

for post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 2 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-3- 

Procedure, which was stayed pending the result of his direct appeal. (Answer, Ex. F). 

On August 21, 2006, the Arizona court of appeals issued a memorandum decision 

finding: 1) the restraint element of the kidnapping element was proven, 2) Wieber had no 

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on his prior convictions, and (3) evidence of one 

prior conviction was insufficient. (Answer, Ex. C.). Accordingly, the appellate court 

affirmed Wieber’s convictions but remanded for the trial court to clarify its sentencing 

order by determining if the court had relied on a defective prior conviction in sentencing 

Wieber. (Id.). Wieber did not petition the state supreme court for review and the mandate 

was issued on October 3, 2006. (Answer, Ex. E). On remand, the trial court found six 

prior convictions proven, and it affirmed its previous sentencing order on January 8, 2007. 

(Answer, Ex. D). Petitioner did not file further appeal of this order. See (Answer, Ex. Q). 

C. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On June 15, 2007, after remand, Wieber’s counsel filed PCR asserting newly 

discovered evidence of juror misconduct. (Answer, Ex. H). The petition claimed that 

during jury selection at Wieber’s trial, “a juror failed to answer honestly the material 

question of whether he knew the defendant.” (Id. at 5.). The trial court, on October 18, 

2007, summarily dismissed the petition, finding: (1) the claim was precluded because it 

could have been raised at trial, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); (2) the evidence did not 

qualify as “newly discovered”; (3) The Juror didn’t answer falsely when he averred during 

voir dire that he did not know Wieber; and (4) Wieber failed to show prejudice. (Answer, 

Ex. I). Wieber filed a pro se motion on January 1, 2008 requesting a rehearing, arguing 

that contrary to Wieber’s intention and instructions Rule 32 counsel filed a PCR petition 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 3 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-4- 

alleging newly discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e) instead of a constitutional claim 

under Rule 32.1 (a). (Answer, Ex. J). On January 24, 2008, the trial court denied Wieber’s 

motion for rehearing as untimely, noting that a constitutional claim alleged under Rule 

32.1(a) would not have constituted an exception to Rule 32.1’s timeliness requirement. 

(Answer, Ex. K). Wieber did not petition for review of this decision. 

D. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 

On March 10, 2008 Wieber filed a second notice of PCR alleging that in his first 

petition for PCR his Rule 32 counsel had failed to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. (Answer, Ex. L). The court granted Wieber a change of counsel, and new 

Rule 32 counsel filed a notice in lieu of petition averring counsel could find no good faith 

basis for PCR. (Answer, Ex. M). Wieber filed a pro se petition for PCR claiming 

ineffective assistance of Rule 32 counsel (Alex Haveri) for failure to allege the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel (Eric Larsen) in Wieber’s first PCR petition. (Answer, Ex. N). 

Wieber alleged trial counsel (Larsen) had been ineffective on numerous grounds, he 

alleged Rule 32 counsel (Haveri) had been ineffective for raising the juror misconduct as 

newly discovered evidence instead of a constitutional claim and he requested an 

evidentiary hearing. (Answer, Ex. N). 

 On June 10, 2009, the trial court summarily dismissed Wieber’s pro se petition for 

PCR, finding Haveri’s ineffectiveness was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2) as adjudicated 

on the merits in his prior PCR application and, alternatively, Haveri’s decision on what to 

include in the first PCR petition was a tactical decision and did not fall below a standard 

of reasonableness. (Answer, Ex. O). 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 4 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-5- 

 On July 13, 2009, Wieber filed a petition for review in the Arizona court of appeals 

asserting (1) the trial court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Wieber’s 

Rule 32 IAC claim, (2) Rule 32 counsel (Haveri) was ineffective for raising a single claim 

in the first Rule 32 petition under the wrong legal principle and against Wieber’s explicit 

direction and consent and without investigating facts, and (3) the trial court abused its 

discretion by relying on facts outside the record. (Answer, Ex. P.). On November 20, 

2009, the appellate court granted review but denied relief finding no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s summary denial of relief. (Answer, Ex. Q). Wieber did not petition for 

review to the state supreme court, and the mandate was issued on January 20, 2010. 

E. Federal Habeas Petition 

Wieber filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in District Court on January 20, 

2011. (Doc. No. 1). Petitioner raises nine grounds for relief. However, it is unnecessary to 

discuss the merits of each individual Ground because it is this Court’s recommendation to 

dismiss for untimeliness. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

Because Wieber filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness 

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 5 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-6- 

2244(d)(1). 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

 The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state 

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute of limitations is 

tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). 

 An application contemplated by section 2244(d)(2) is properly filed "when its 

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 

filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits 

upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing 

fee." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (footnote omitted). The United States 

Supreme Court has held that untimely state post-conviction petitions are not “properly 

filed” under AEDPA, and do not toll AEDPA's statute of limitations. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). 

The AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. 

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct.2549 (2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only 

upon a showing of (1) a diligent pursuit of petitioner’s rights; and (2) extraordinary 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 6 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-7- 

circumstances that stood in petitioner’s way, preventing timely filing. Id. (citing Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418). Tolling is appropriate when "extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Id.; see also, Miranda v. 

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)(stating that "the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.") 

(citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). "When external 

forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). The extraordinary circumstances requirement is a 

"high hurdle," see Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1289, and policy considerations counsel 

against equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). A petitioner 

seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Petitioner must also establish a "causal 

connection" between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely 

petition. Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). 

C. Analysis 

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in this 

Court is untimely. Wieber had until one year after his conviction and sentence became 

final to file his federal petition. 

1. Limitation Period Under § 2244 (d) (1) (A) 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final on March 9, 2007, sixty (60) 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 7 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-8- 

days after the trial court, on remand from the Arizona Court of Appeals, affirmed its 

previous sentencing order on January 8, 2007, when the time for filing an appeal to the 

Arizona Supreme Court expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Burton v. Stewart, 549 

U.S 145, 156 (2007) (holding AEDPA’s limitation period does “not become final until 

both [the] conviction and sentence” have become final); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 

894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001)(Judgment becomes final either by the conclusion of direct review 

by the highest court, including the United States Supreme Court, or by the expiration of 

the time to seek such review.); Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file his petition for 

writ of habeas corpus within one year of the date his convictions became final, i.e., one 

year from March 9, 2007, which was March 9, 2008, absent statutory tolling. 

2. Statutory Tolling 

The limitations period was tolled immediately, however, by the pendency of 

Petitioner’s petition for post conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). There was no 

gap between the conclusion of direct review, and Wieber’s properly filed notice of 

petition for post-conviction review. See Isley v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 

1054 (9th Cir. 2004)(State petition is “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2) when properly filed notice of post-conviction relief is filed.). Thus, the issue 

is not when direct review became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A), rather, this Court must 

determine how long Wieber’s petition for post-conviction relief was “pending” for 

purposes of tolling the limitations period pursuant to § 2244(d)(2). 

Statutory tolling continued through the conclusion of the first post-conviction 

proceeding that concluded on October 18, 2007, the date the trial court denied postCase 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 8 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-9- 

conviction relief. The next question is whether Wieber is entitled to any further statutory 

tolling from October 19, 2007 when the limitations period began until the filing of his 

present §2254 petition on January 20, 2011, a period of nearly three years. 

3. Motion for Rehearing 

Wieber next filed a pro se motion for rehearing to the trial court. On January 24, 

2008, the trial court denied the Wieber’s motion as untimely. The motion was not properly 

filed and does not toll the statute of limitations. 

4. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

Wieber filed a second PCR notice on March 10, 2008 (Answer, Ex. L), but this 

filing did not toll the statute of limitations because it was not properly filed. See Pace, 544 

U.S. at 417 (holding that "[b]ecause the state court rejected petitioner's PCR petition as 

untimely, it was not 'properly filed,' and he was not entitled to statutory tolling under § 

2244(d)(2)"). In the order dismissing Wieber’s second PCR proceeding, the court found 

that the claims were untimely because the issue concerning juror misconduct had 

previously been raised and litigated in his first PCR proceeding, and merely 

recharacterizing it as ineffective assistance of counsel instead of newly discovered 

evidence did not lend the claim any more merit1

. (Answer, Ex. O). The Ninth Circuit has 

held that when subsequent PCR applications are deemed untimely, the habeas court will 

not construe the new petition as part of the first “full round” of collateral review, even if 

 

1

 The State court’s alternative ruling on the merits does not toll the statute of limitations for the purpose of the 

AEDPA. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not 

undermined where, as here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”)(citing Harris v. Reed, 489 

U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989)). 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 9 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-10- 

the second petition attempted to correct deficiencies in the first petition. King v. Roe, 340 

F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Saffold, 536 U.S, at 222). Accordingly, Wieber was 

entitled to statutory tolling up to the conclusion of his first PCR proceeding, which ended 

on October 18, 2007. He had one year from this date to file his §2254 petition, however, 

Wieber filed his present §2254 petition on January 20, 2011. It is the finding of this Court 

that the petition is untimely. 

 Even if the Court were to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of 

Wieber’s second PCR preceding the petition would still be untimely. Wieber’s first PCR 

was denied on October 18, 2007, and, therefore, he had until October 20, 2008, to timely 

file his §2254 petition. Wieber filed the petition on January 20, 2011, 822 days after the 

conclusion of his first PCR motion. If the Court tolled the statute of limitations during the 

pendency of Wieber’s second PCR motion that was filed on March 10, 2008, and the 

mandate issued on January 20, 2010, that would toll 681 days out of the needed 822 days. 

Even with all possible concessions in Petitioner’s favor the §2254 petition is still 141 days 

over the statue of limitations. 

5. Equitable Tolling 

Petitioner argues equitable tolling is appropriate because the private prison facility 

where he was detained did not have an adequate prison library. (Doc. No. 11 P. 6). In 

some cases inadequate legal materials can be an “impediment” which justifies untimely 

filing, or can form a basis for equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner argues that the Hinton, Oklahoma prison facility impeded 

his ability to timely file his §2254 petition because it was lacking Federal Reporters that 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 10 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-11- 

would allow Petitioner to look up relevant case law. (Doc. No. 11 P. 10). The Court finds 

the argument unpersuasive because Petitioner had access to the AEDPA statute and with 

the required diligence should have known of the one year statute of limitations period. 

Petitioner also argues that since he is preceding pro se, lacks legal experience and 

has little education equitable tolling is appropriate. (Doc. No. 11 P. 6). However, 

Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law or lack of legal assistance does not toll the 

statute of limitations. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 

petitioner’s inability to calculate the limitations period is not extraordinary circumstances 

that toll the statute.). “It is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an 

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 

223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fiser v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th

Cir. 1999). Petitioner has not met the "high hurdle" of demonstrating extraordinary 

circumstances that impeded his timely filing. Accordingly, this Court finds no cause to 

equitably toll the limitations 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the 

record, DISMISS this action in its entirety as untimely. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed R. Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 11 of 12
DLA PIPER LLP (US)

PHOENIX

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

-12- 

parties should use the following case number 4:10-CV-00064-CKJ

 If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

 Dated this 27th day of June, 2011. 

Case 4:11-cv-00064-CKJ Document 12 Filed 06/28/11 Page 12 of 12