Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01310/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01310-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SCOTT HARRISON,

Plaintiff,

v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEYS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-CV-1310 JLS (BGS)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 11)

Presently before the Court is Defendant Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (“MSJ,” ECF No. 11.) Also before the Court 

are Plaintiff David Scott Harrison’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s MSJ, (“MSJ 

Opp’n,” ECF No. 14), and Defendant’s Reply in Support of its MSJ, (“Reply ISO MSJ,” 

ECF No. 15). The Court vacated the hearing on the matter and took it under submission 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After considering the parties’ arguments and the 

law, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for improper withholding of public documents, 

records, and writings pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).1(See 

generally Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) On February 10, 2015, Plaintiff wrote a letter 

to Judge Larry A. Burns. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) The letter addressed Plaintiff’s belief that his 

federal conviction was invalid, and Plaintiff sent a copy of this letter to the Office of the 

United States Attorney, Southern District of California, San Diego County Office. (Id.) On 

March 10, 2015, Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Michael G. Wheat responded 

to the letter, noting that Plaintiff’s letter to Judge Burns served “no legitimate purpose” and 

that Plaintiff has a long “history of engaging in various forms of harassing and threatening 

communications.” (Id. Ex. B.) Wheat concluded the letter by stating that he was “sending 

a copy of [Plaintiff’s] letter and this response to the appropriate investigative agencies so 

that they are aware of, and can monitor your activities.” (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Plaintiff responded 

to Mr. Wheat’s letter by asserting that he would file a FOIA request “concerning acts you 

claim in your letter to have taken against me” and that he would contact United States 

Attorney Laura E. Duffy concerning the same. (Id. ¶ 5, Exs. C, D.) Plaintiff filed his FOIA 

request with Duffy, requesting four categories of records. (Id. ¶ 6, Ex. E.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff requested

all records, documents, information, writings, and tangible 

things, including electronically stored and/or transmitted:

1. that identify each and every one of the “appropriate 

investigative agencies” suggested in the March 10, 2015, 

letter; provide also street addresses;

2. that identify each and every other agency that was provided 

information about me due to my letter of February 10, 2015 

(copy attached), as addressed to Judge, Larry A. Burns; 

provide also street addresses;

 

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5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.

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3. that identify each and every law enforcement agent, non-law 

enforcement and other persons, department/agency 

employees, heads, functionaries, office holders, officials, 

public servants, and all other persons and citizens, to whom 

were sent information, at the identified agencies (see, #1 and 

#2, above) and to any other location; identify also, the agency 

and location each identified individual is attached to; provide 

also the street address for each identified individual; and

4. from November 14, 1988 through March 10, 2015, provide 

copies of all “harassing and threatening 

communications, . . . vexing, harassing, or threatening 

letters[]” suggested by the March 10, 2015, letter that I have 

ever sent. Identify in each communication and/or letter the 

offending part, and identify to whom, and the address sent to, 

of any communication and/or letter I am accused of sending.

(Id. Ex. E.)

On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff was notified that his FOIA request had been rerouted 

to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit at the Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys (“EOUSA”) in Washington, D.C. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. F.)

On April 9, 2015, the EOUSA rejected Plaintiff’s FOIA request, finding that “[t]he 

Freedom of Information Act only applies to records already in existence and does not 

require an agency to conduct research, create new records, or answer questions presented 

as FOIA requests.” (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. G.) Plaintiff appealed the denial of his FOIA request to the 

Director, Office of Information Policy on April 16, 2015. (Id. ¶ 9, Ex. H.) On August 31, 

2015, the Office of Information Policy affirmed, on partly modified grounds, the denial. 

(Id. ¶ 10, Ex. I.) The letter suggested contacting the Office of Government Information 

Services (“OGIS”) for mediation services to resolve FOIA disputes as a non-exclusive 

alternative to litigation. (Id.) On September 16, 2015, Plaintiff wrote to the OGIS for help 

resolving the dispute. (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. J.) But on October 7, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter 

from the EOUSA notifying him of its receipt of his “Freedom of Information Act/-Privacy 

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Act request dated September 16, 2015.” (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. K.) And on October 8, 2015, the 

OGIS notified Plaintiff of receiving his request for mediation services. (Id. ¶ 13, Ex. L.) 

On October 30, 2015, Plaintiff notified the OGIS that the EOUSA was processing the FOIA 

request, and thus Plaintiff no longer needed mediation services. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. N.)

On November 16, 2015, the EOUSA informed Plaintiff that “[a] search for records 

located in the United States Attorney’s Office(s) for the Southern District of California has 

revealed no responsive records regarding the above subject.” (Id. ¶ 16, Ex. O (emphasis in 

original).) Plaintiff appealed this decision on November 21, 2015. (Id. ¶ 17, Ex. P.) The 

Office of Information Policy affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s FOIA request on January 6, 

2016, and again offered mediation services through the OGIS. (Id. ¶ 18, Ex. Q.) On January

15, 2016, Plaintiff again sought mediation services through the OGIS. (Id. ¶ 19, Ex. R.) 

And on April 14, 2016, the OGIS informed Plaintiff that the “EOUSA confirmed the field 

office completed a search and determined there were not responsive records.” (Id. ¶ 20, Ex. 

S.) 

Plaintiff filed this FOIA case against Defendant on May 31, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) 

Defendant answered on September 28, 2016. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant filed its MSJ on 

November 3, 2016. (ECF No. 11.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary 

judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is 

appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect 

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine dispute of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When the Court considers the evidence

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presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls 

on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden by 

identifying the “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’” that show an absence of dispute 

regarding a material fact. Id. When a party seeks summary judgment as to an element for 

which it bears the burden of proof, “it must come forward with evidence which would 

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” See C.A.R. 

Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must 

identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

324. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as 

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “by her own 

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 

designate ‘specific facts’” that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] 

on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

II. Summary Judgment in FOIA Cases

“The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to facilitate public access to 

Government documents.” U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). The 

purpose of the Act is “‘to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency 

action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Id. (citing Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 

361 (1976)). “Consistently with this purpose, as well as the plain language of the Act, the 

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strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the 

withholding of any requested documents.” Id.

Courts faced with a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case generally must 

conduct a two-step inquiry. Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). The first 

step assesses whether the agency involved met its investigative obligations under FOIA. 

Zemansky v. U.S. E.P.A., 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985). An agency can prove that it 

met its obligations by showing that it conducted a search “reasonably calculated” to 

uncover all relevant documents requested under FOIA. Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 

797 F.3d 759, 770 (9th Cir. 2015). “An agency can demonstrate the adequacy of its search 

through reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Affidavits submitted by an agency to demonstrate the 

adequacy of its response are presumed to be in good faith.” Id. (quoting Ground Saucer 

Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). “In evaluating the adequacy of 

the search, the issue ‘is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly 

responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was 

adequate.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Lahr v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 

964, 987 (9th Cir. 2009)).

The second step requires the court to consider whether the agency has adequately 

demonstrated that any information not disclosed to the FOIA requester is protected by at 

least one of the enumerated exemptions. Id. at 769. 

“Summary judgment is the procedural vehicle by which nearly all FOIA cases are 

resolved.” Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1094 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005) (quotations omitted). “Courts are permitted to rule on summary judgment in 

FOIA cases solely on the basis of government affidavits describing the documents sought.” 

Lion Raisins v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on 

other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987 (9th 

Cir. 2016). “[I]f there are genuine issues of material fact in a FOIA case, the district court 

should proceed to a bench trial or adversary hearing. Resolution of factual disputes should 

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be through the usual crucible of bench trial or hearing, with evidence subject to scrutiny 

and witnesses subject to cross-examination. The district court must issue findings of fact 

and conclusions of law.” Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that it conducted an appropriate search for records responsive to 

Plaintiff’s FOIA request, and determined that it did not possess any such records.2(MSJ 5, 

ECF No. 11-1 (citing Declaration of Katherine L. Parker (“Parker Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–6, ECF No. 

11-2).) Specifically, AUSA Katherine Parker conducted the following search in response 

to Plaintiff’s FOIA request:

4. In late October 2015, EOUSA assigned Mr. Harrison’s FOIA 

request to my office to search for responsive records. At that 

time, I reviewed Mr. Harrison’s FOIA request in order to 

determine where and how to search for records. 

5. Because all of the records that Mr. Harrison was requesting 

were related to a March 10, 2015 letter from Assistant U.S. 

Attorney Michael Wheat to Mr. Harrison, I determined that the 

best way to search for responsive records would be to speak with 

Mr. Wheat directly to determine what documents existed. 

6. I telephoned Mr. Wheat about the FOIA request and we spoke 

about what Mr. Harrison was requesting. We discussed whether 

there were any records related to the “appropriate investigative 

agencies” referenced at the end of the March 10, 2015 letter. Mr. 

Wheat explained to me that he had not forwarded Mr. Harrison’s 

February 10, 2015 letter (or his own responsive letter) to any 

investigative agencies, and had not otherwise notified any 

agencies about Mr. Harrison’s letter to Judge Burns. He said 

there were no records responsive to items 1, 2, and 3. Based on 

that conversation, I concluded that there were no records 

responsive to requests 1, 2, and 3 in Mr. Harrison’s FOIA 

 

2 Thus, Defendant does not argue that responsive documents were appropriately withheld under one of the 

enumerated FOIA exemptions. 

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request, and that there would be no other searches I could 

conduct that might reveal responsive documents. 

7. I did not search for records responsive to request No. 4 in 

Plaintiff’s FOIA request, and I did not discuss request 4 with 

AUSA Wheat, because my understanding was that Mr. Harrison 

had withdrawn item #4 and was only seeking documents 

responsive to items 1, 2, and 3.

(Parker Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, ECF No. 11-2.) Defendant argues this search was reasonable in light 

of the nature of the request. (MSJ 6, ECF No. 11-1 (citing, e.g., Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 

460 F.3d 92, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he ‘adequacy of an agency’s search is measured by 

a standard of reasonableness, and is dependent upon the circumstances of the case.’” 

(quoting Schrecker v. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).)3

The Court disagrees. The core of Plaintiff’s FOIA requests seek to identify to whom 

Mr. Wheat sent copies of his and Plaintiff’s letter for alleged monitoring purposes. So Ms. 

Parker went straight to the source, “determin[ing] that the best way to search for responsive 

records would be to speak with Mr. Wheat directly to determine what documents existed.” 

(Parker Decl. ¶ 5.) Ms. Parker called Mr. Wheat regarding Plaintiff’s FOIA request and 

Mr. Wheat explained that he had not forwarded his or Plaintiff’s letter to any investigative 

agencies, nor otherwise notified any agency about Plaintiff’s letter to Judge Burns. (Id.

¶ 6.) Based on Mr. Wheat’s explanation, Ms. Parker concluded there were no records 

responsive to Plaintiff’s three FOIA requests. (Id.)

This is inadequate. Calling Mr. Wheat to discuss the matter is certainly part of an 

adequate search. But the Court is not convinced that it alone is sufficient, especially where, 

as here, Mr. Wheat and his conduct are the subject of Plaintiff’s FOIA request. Nor has 

 

3 Defendant also argues that there is no basis for discovery in this case based on Plaintiff’s then-pending 

“Motion for Leave to Take Discovery from Defendant.” (MSJ 6, ECF No. 11-1 (citing ECF No. 10).) 

However, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion on November 16, 2016. (ECF No. 13.) Accordingly, the 

Court does not consider these arguments in this Order.

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Defendant identified a single case where a phone call or conversation has been held 

sufficient under FOIA, much less a case where that conversation included the subject of 

the FOIA inquiry. This Court declines the opportunity to be the first.

Of course, the Court has no reason to doubt the good faith of Ms. Parker or Mr. 

Wheat, and it may indeed be the case that these documents do not exist for the very reason 

submitted by Mr. Wheat. But that is not the issue here. The issue is the adequacy of the

search conducted by Defendant, and the Court finds that Defendant’s declaration fails to 

meet that mark.

To be sure, Ms. Parker concluded that “there would be no other searches [she] could 

conduct that might reveal responsive documents.” (Id. ¶ 6.) But Ms. Parker does not explain 

why she concluded that an additional search would be fruitless. The Court will not credit 

this conclusion without further explanation. See Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 770 (“An agency can 

demonstrate the adequacy of its search through reasonably detailed, nonconclusory

affidavits submitted in good faith.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Defendant, the 

moving party, has failed to meet its burden and thus the Court DENIES Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment.4

In his response in opposition, Plaintiff argues that this case cannot be decided 

without discovery. (MSJ Opp’n 6–7, ECF No. 14.) The Court disagrees.

As discussed above, “Courts are permitted to rule on summary judgment in FOIA 

cases solely on the basis of government affidavits describing the documents sought.” Lion 

Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1082. Moreover, “in [FOIA] cases courts may allow the government 

to move for summary judgment before the plaintiff conducts discovery.” Lane v. Dep’t of 

Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). While discovery may be 

appropriate in some cases, see, e.g., id. at 1135 (discussing possibility of discovery for 

violation of a separate act by improperly accessing a personnel file), Plaintiff fails to 

 

4 For this reason the Court does not reach Plaintiff’s arguments that genuine issues of material fact prevent 

the Court from granting Defendant’s MSJ. (See MSJ Opp’n 6–7, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff is of course free 

to re-raise these arguments if Defendant again moves for summary judgment. 

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demonstrate that discovery is appropriate in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that 

discovery is “necessary in this exceptional case, so that the truth may be untangled from 

the web of lies spun by Mr. Wheat” and that “Mr. Wheat must answer, under oath, for his 

actions.” (MSJ Opp’n 6–7.) In other words, Plaintiff seeks to discover whom Mr. Wheat 

contacted regarding Plaintiff’s letter. But this is exactly what Plaintiff unsuccessfully 

sought in his three FOIA requests. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to convince the Court that 

discovery is appropriate, much less necessary, in this case. Cf. Lane, 523 F.3d at 1135 

(“[T]his circuit has affirmed denials of discovery where, as here, the plaintiff’s requests 

consisted of ‘precisely what defendants maintain is exempt from disclosure to plaintiff 

pursuant to the FOIA.’” (quoting Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983))).

Instead, at this juncture the Court will allow Defendant an opportunity to again move 

for summary judgment and attach any revised declarations responsive to this Court’s Order. 

See, e.g., Jarvik v. C.I.A., 741 F. Supp. 2d 106, 122 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Even if an agency’s 

affidavits regarding its search are deficient, courts generally do not grant discovery but 

instead direct the agency to supplement its affidavits.”). Whether Plaintiff will eventually 

be entitled to discovery may depend on Defendant’s ability to submit evidence that it 

conducted an adequate search. See, e.g., id. at 122 (“Only if the agency has not undertaken 

an adequate search for responsive documents is discovery appropriate.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 11). Defendant SHALL file a renewed Motion for Summary 

Judgment, if any, on or before thirty (30) days from the date on which this Order is 

electronically docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2017

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