Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00422/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00422-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR M. CONTRERAS,

Petitioner,

v.

R. RACKLEY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17CV422-AJB(JMA)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Hector M. Contreras, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated 

this habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] His First 

Amended Petition (“FAP”), filed April 14, 2017, is the operative pleading. [Doc. 

No. 6.] Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss contending Petitioner has not 

exhausted either of the two habeas claims raised in the FAP. [Doc. No. 11.] 

Alternatively, Respondent contends these claims do not present a federal 

question. [Id.] The Motion to Dismiss is opposed by Petitioner. [Doc. No. 15.] 

The Court has reviewed the FAP and the parties’ briefs and, for the following 

reasons, RECOMMENDS the Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia GRANT 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

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I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted on March 4, 1997, in the Superior Court of California, 

County of San Diego County, for possession of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Pen.

Code, §12021(a)(1), reenacted as § 29800(a)(1)). [Lodgment No. 1, p. 5 of 16.]

Because of his two strike priors he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 27 

years to life. Seventeen years later he filed a petition for resentencing, pursuant 

to the Three Strikes Reform Act (“TSRA”) (Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.126 et seq.). In 

the petition for resentencing, Petitioner argued his conviction did not bar him from 

relief under the TSRA because he was convicted of possessing a firearm, 

whereas the TSRA disqualifies an inmate from recall only if he was “armed with” 

or “used” a firearm in committing the offense. [Lodgment No. 2, Appendix 3, p. 14 

of 22.] That petition was denied on October 4, 2014. [Lodgment No. 1, p. 5 of 16.]

In doing so, the trial court found that Petitioner had “ready access” to the weapon 

and, therefore, was armed with a firearm at the time of the offense and was not 

eligible for relief under Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.126. [Lodgment No. 2, Appendix 3, 

p. 14 of 22.]

Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing was not supported by the evidence. [Lodgment No. 1.] On November 

10, 2015, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, 

affirmed the judgment, finding substantial evidence to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that Petitioner was “armed” at the time of the offense. [Lodgment No. 

2, Appendix 3, pp. 12-20 of 22.] Specifically, the Court of Appeal found Petitioner 

had “ready access” to the firearm he possessed and was, therefore, statutorily 

ineligible for re-sentencing. [Id.] On December 22, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition 

for Review in the California Supreme Court, raising the same claim rejected by 

the Court of Appeal. [Lodgment No. 2.] The California Supreme Court denied that

Petition on January 27, 2016. [Lodgment No. 3.]

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Thereafter, Petitioner initiated this case. In the FAP, Petitioner raises two 

claims, namely that his due process rights and his equal protection rights were 

violated by the erroneous finding that that he was “armed” within the meaning of 

Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.126 and, therefore, was ineligible for relief.

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent now moves to dismiss the FAP, arguing the claims are 

unexhausted and the FAP fails to state a federal Constitutional claim. [Doc. No. 

11.]

A. Petitioner’s Claims are Unexhausted. 

A state prisoner’s federal habeas petition may not be granted if state 

remedies are unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement a petitioner must first provide the state courts with a “’fair 

opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on his [or her] 

constitutional claim.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). In most 

instances, a claim is exhausted once it is presented to a state’s highest court. 

See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). “A petitioner has 

satisfied the exhaustion requirement if he has ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim 

to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it....” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is fairly presented if it is presented in the 

federal habeas petition in a manner that is the “substantial equivalent” of how it 

was presented in the state courts. Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 

1295 (9th Cir. 1982); Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964). 

“The state courts have been given sufficient opportunity to hear an issue when 

the petitioner has presented the state court with the issue’s factual and legal

basis.” Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 

added); See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (legal basis); 

and Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1998) (factual basis). 

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The petitioner must reference specific provisions of the federal constitution 

or statutes or cite to federal case law. See Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668, 

670 (9th Cir. 2000) as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001)). A petitioner 

must “alert the state courts to the fact that he [is] asserting a claim under the U.S. 

Constitution.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) A “mere 

similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish 

exhaustion.” Id. 

In his Petition for Review to the Supreme Court, Petitioner presented one 

argument – that he lacked the requisite general intent, as defined by Cal. Crim. 

Jury Instruction 205, for the armed allegation because he did not act intentionally 

or on purpose. [Lodgment No. 2, pp. 5-10 of 22.] The firearm in question was 

discovered after Petitioner was pulled over for a traffic violation. [Lodgment No. 

1, p. 6 of 16.] It was discovered that he was driving on a suspended driver’s 

license. [Id.] Alex Gutierrez was in the front passenger seat and Jesus Padilla 

was in the left rear seat. [Id.] The rear and middle rear seats were taken up by a 

large speaker enclosure that extended a few inches past the front edge of the 

seat and encroached on the left rear seat. [Id. at p. 7 of 16.] The firearm, a 

sawed off shotgun, was located on the floor of the rear seat. [Id.] It was not 

loaded and no ammunition was found, either in the car or on Petitioner. [Id.] 

Petitioner argued to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeal erroneously 

determined Petitioner had “ready access” to the firearm because he needed “only 

to reach down into the floorboard well from his driver’s seat” or to transfer to the 

rear seat. [Lodgment No. 2, p. 8 of 22.] Neither action was possible, Petitioner 

argued, given the configuration of the vehicle and speaker system and the 

presence of the other occupants. [Id.] He contended he should, therefore, have 

not been found to be ineligible for resentencing under the TSRA. 

Here, Plaintiff presents two claims, citing due process and equal protection 

violations. [Doc. No. 6.] Both claims are predicated on his argument that the 

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record does not support a finding Petitioner was “armed” because the weapon 

was not loaded and there was no ammunition present. [Id. at pp. 6-7 of 25.] 

Neither of these claims are the “substantial equivalent” of the claim Petitioner 

presented to the California Supreme Court, which was based solely on California 

law and relied on a different factual theory as to why the “armed” element was 

not satisfied by the facts of Petitioner’s case. Consequently, the claims made by 

Petitioner in this case are unexhausted.

B. Petitioner’s Claims Do not State a Federal Constitutional Claim

A federal habeas corpus petition must allege a deprivation of federal rights 

to present a cognizable claim pursuant to § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). A state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas 

corpus relief only if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. Absent 

a constitutional violation, a federal court may not challenge a state court’s 

interpretation of its laws or rules. Id., 502 U.S. at 68; see also Wainwright v. 

Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 

1985). Federal courts are only concerned with errors of state law if they rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, “a federal court is limited to deciding 

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 

States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Although Petitioner has filed his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, his 

argument as to both claims is that the state courts incorrectly interpreted and 

applied California law, which he now contends was a due process and equal 

protection violation. A state law issue, however, cannot be transformed into a 

federal question simply by alleging the denial of a federal right. Langford v. Day, 

110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). As such, the claims presented in the FAP 

are not cognizable under federal habeas law. 

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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS District Judge Battaglia 

GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; The undersigned submits this Report 

and Recommendation to District Judge Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 16, 2018, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed 

with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 23, 2018. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1991).

Dated: February 1, 2018

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