Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-56057/USCOURTS-ca9-16-56057-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL SKIDMORE, as Trustee for 

the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LED ZEPPELIN; JAMES PATRICK 

PAGE; ROBERT ANTHONY PLANT;

JOHN PAUL JONES; SUPER HYPE 

PUBLISHING, INC.; WARNER MUSIC 

GROUP CORPORATION;

WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.;

ATLANTIC RECORDING 

CORPORATION; RHINO 

ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56057

D.C. No.

2:15-cv-03462-

RGK-AGR

MICHAEL SKIDMORE, as Trustee for 

the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant,

No. 16-56287

D.C. No.

2:15-cv-03462-

RGK-AGR

OPINION

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 1 of 73
2 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

and

LED ZEPPELIN; JAMES PATRICK 

PAGE; ROBERT ANTHONY PLANT;

JOHN PAUL JONES; SUPER HYPE 

PUBLISHING, INC.; WARNER MUSIC 

GROUP CORPORATION, ATLANTIC 

RECORDING CORPORATION; RHINO 

ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc September 23, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed March 9, 2020

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and M. Margaret 

McKeown, William A. Fletcher, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, 

Carlos T. Bea, Sandra S. Ikuta, Mary H. Murguia, 

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Paul J. Watford, Andrew D. 

Hurwitz and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown;

Concurrence by Judge Watford;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Ikuta

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 2 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 3

SUMMARY*

Copyright

The en banc court affirmed the district court’s judgment 

after a jury trial in favor of Led Zeppelin in a copyright 

action alleging that the opening notes of Stairway to Heaven

infringed Taurus, a song written by guitarist Randy Wolfe 

and performed by his band Spirit.

In Part I, the en banc court held that the 1909 Copyright 

Act, which does not protect sound recordings, rather than the 

1976 Copyright Act, controlled its analysis because the 

copyright at issue was for the unpublished musical 

composition of Taurus, which was registered in 1967. The 

scope of the copyright in the unpublished work was defined 

by the deposit copy, which in the case of Taurus consisted 

of only one page of music. Accordingly, it was not error for 

the district court to decline plaintiff’s request to play sound 

recordings of the Taurus performance that contained further 

embellishments or to admit the recordings on the issue of 

substantial similarity.

In Part II, the en banc court held that proof of copyright 

infringement required plaintiff to show: (1) that he owned a 

valid copyright in Taurus; and (2) that Led Zeppelin copied 

protected aspects of the work. The en banc court explained 

that the second prong contains two separate components: 

“copying” and “unlawful appropriation.” A plaintiff may 

prove copying circumstantially by showing access and 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 3 of 73
4 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

striking similarity. The hallmark of “unlawful 

appropriation” is that the works share substantial 

similarities. Both an extrinsic and an intrinsic test must be 

satisfied for the works to be deemed substantially similar. 

In Part III, the en banc court addressed the district court’s 

exclusion of sound recordings of Taurus as relevant to prove 

access but too prejudicial because of the risk that the jury 

would confuse access with substantial similarity. The en 

banc court concluded that this evidentiary issue was moot 

because the jury found access.

In Part IV, the en banc court addressed three jury 

instruction issues: (1) the failure to give an inverse ratio rule 

instruction; (2) the sufficiency of the court’s originality 

instructions; and (3) the failure to give a selection and 

arrangement instruction. In Part IV.A, joining the majority 

of circuits, the en banc court rejected the inverse ratio rule, 

which requires a lower standard of proof of substantial 

similarity when a high degree of access is shown. The en 

banc court overruled circuit precedent to the contrary. In 

Part IV.B, the en banc court held that the district court 

properly instructed the jury on originality. In Part IV.C.1, 

the en banc court concluded that the failure to give a 

selection and arrangement instruction would be reviewed for 

plain error. In Part IV.C.2, the en banc court held that the 

district court did not commit plain error. In Part IV.C.3, the 

en banc court held that the district court did not commit any 

error because plaintiff did not present a selection and 

arrangement theory at trial. In Part IV.C.4, the en banc court 

held that, even though the district court did not instruct the 

jury on selection and arrangement, its instructions, as a 

whole, fairly and adequately covered plaintiff’s argument for 

extrinsic similarity between Taurus and Stairway to Heaven.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 4 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 5

In Part V, the en banc court held that the district court 

did not err in setting trial time limits, responding to a jury 

question, admitting expert testimony, or declining to award 

attorneys’ fees.

Concurring, Judge Watford wrote that he joined the 

court’s opinion, with the exception of section IV.C, because 

he saw no reason to decide whether plaintiff adequately 

preserved his request for a selection-and-arrangement 

instruction when, even if such an instruction had been given, 

no reasonable jury could have found infringement.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Ikuta, 

joined by Judge Bea, wrote that she dissented from Part 

IV(B) to (C) because, without plaintiff’s requested 

instruction on selection and arrangement, the jury was 

deprived of the opportunity to consider plaintiff’s central 

theory of the case, and the instructions given to the jury were 

misleading.

COUNSEL

Francis Malofiy (argued) and Alfred Joseph Fluehr, Francis 

Alexander LLC, Media, Pennsylvania, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Peter J. Anderson (argued), Law Offices of Peter J. 

Anderson, Los Angeles, California; Helene M. Freeman, 

Phillips Nizer LLP, New York, New York; for DefendantsAppellees.

Edwin F. McPherson and Tracy B. Rane, McPherson Rane 

LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae 123 

Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers; 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 5 of 73
6 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Nashville Songwriters Association International (NSAI); 

and Songwriters of North America (SONA).

Eugene Volokh, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, 

California; Danielle M. Aguirre and Erich C. Carey, 

National Music Publishers’ Association, Washington, D.C.; 

for Amici Curiae Recording Industry Association of 

America and National Music Publishers Association.

Sean M. O’Connor, Center for the Protection of IP, 

Arlington, Virginia; Lateef Mtima and Steven D. Jamar, 

Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice, Inc.

Professor Mark A. Lemley, Stanford Law School, Center for 

Internet & Society, Stanford, California, for Amici Curiae 

19 Intellectual Property Professors.

Kenneth D. Freundlich, Freundlich Law, Encino, California, 

for Amici Curiae Musicologists.

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Nicola T. 

Hanna, United States Attorney; Scott R. McIntosh and 

Daniel Tenny, Appellate Staff; Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Regan A. Smith, 

General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights; 

Jason E. Sloan, Assistant General Counsel; Jalyce E. 

Mangum, Attorney-Advisor; United States Copyright 

Office, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United States.

W. Michael Hensley, AlvaradoSmith, Santa Ana, California, 

for Amicus Curiae The Pullman Group LLC and Structured 

Asset Sales LLC.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 6 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 7

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, with whom THOMAS, Chief 

Judge, FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, MURGUIA, 

NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, join in full, and with whom 

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, joins except as to Part IV.C, and 

with whom HURWITZ, Circuit Judge, joins except as to 

Parts IV.C.3 and IV.C.4, and with whom BADE, Circuit 

Judge, joins except as to Part IV.C.3:

Stairway to Heaven has been called the greatest rock 

song of all time. Yet, hyperbole aside, nearly 40 years after 

the English rock band Led Zeppelin released its hit 

recording, the song is not impervious to copyright 

challenges. The estate of guitarist Randy Wolfe claims that 

Led Zeppelin and its guitarist Jimmy Page and vocalist 

Robert Plant copied portions of Taurus, a song written by 

Wolfe and performed by his band Spirit.

This appeal stems from the jury’s verdict in favor of Led 

Zeppelin and a finding that the two songs are not 

substantially similar. Like the jury, we don’t need to decide 

whether Stairway to Heaven has a place in the annals of 

iconic rock songs. Instead, we address a litany of copyright 

issues, including the interplay between the 1909 and 1976 

Copyright Acts, the inverse ratio rule, the scope of music 

copyright, and the standards for infringement.

The 1909 Copyright Act, which does not protect sound 

recordings, controls our analysis. The copyright at issue is 

for the unpublished musical composition of Taurus, which 

was registered in 1967. The unpublished work is defined by 

the deposit copy, which in the case of Taurus consists of only 

one page of music. We also join the majority of circuits in 

rejecting the inverse ratio rule and overrule our precedent to

the contrary. Finally, we are not persuaded by the challenges 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 7 of 73
8 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

to jury instructions and various other evidentiary and trial 

rulings. We affirm the district court’s entry of judgment in 

favor of Led Zeppelin and related parties.

BACKGROUND

Randy Wolfe, professionally known as Randy 

California, wrote the instrumental song Taurus in 1966 or 

1967. He was a guitarist in the band Spirit. Spirit signed a 

recording contract in August 1967 and released its first 

eponymous album—which included Taurus—a few months

later. Wolfe also entered into an Exclusive Songwriter’s and 

Composer’s Agreement with Hollenbeck Music Co. 

(“Hollenbeck”). In December 1967, Hollenbeck registered 

the copyright in the unpublished musical composition of 

Taurus, listing Wolfe as the author. As required for 

registration of an unpublished work under the 1909 

Copyright Act, which was in effect at the time, Hollenbeck 

transcribed Taurus and deposited one page of sheet music 

(the “Taurus deposit copy”), with the United States 

Copyright Office.

Around the same time, across the Atlantic, another rock 

band, Led Zeppelin, was formed by Jimmy Page, Robert 

Plant, John Paul Jones, and John Bonham. Led Zeppelin 

released its fourth album in late 1971. The untitled album, 

which became known as “Led Zeppelin IV,” contained the 

now iconic song Stairway to Heaven. Stairway to Heaven

was written by Jimmy Page and Robert Plant.

It is undisputed that Spirit and Led Zeppelin crossed 

paths in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The bands 

performed at the same venue at least three times between 

1968 and 1970. Led Zeppelin also performed a cover of a 

Spirit song, Fresh Garbage. But there is no direct evidence 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 8 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 9

that the two bands toured together, or that Led Zeppelin band 

members heard Spirit perform Taurus.

Wolfe passed away in 1997. After his death, Wolfe’s 

mother established the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust (the 

“Trust”)1 and served as the trustee until she passed away. 

Neither Wolfe nor his mother filed a suit regarding Stairway 

to Heaven. Michael Skidmore became a co-trustee of the 

Trust in 2006.

Fast forward forty-three years from the release of

Stairway to Heaven to May 2014. Skidmore filed a suit 

alleging that Stairway to Heaven infringed the copyright in 

Taurus, naming as defendants Led Zeppelin, James Patrick 

Page, Robert Anthony Plant, John Paul Jones, Super Hype 

Publishing, and the Warner Music Group Corporation as 

parent of Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. 

(“Warner/Chappell”), Atlantic Recording Corporation, and 

Rhino Entertainment Co. (collectively “Led Zeppelin”).2 

One may wonder how a suit so long in the making could 

survive a laches defense. The Supreme Court answered this 

question in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., which 

clarified that laches is not a defense where copyright 

infringement is ongoing. 572 U.S. 663, 668 (2014).

Skidmore alleged direct, contributory, and vicarious 

copyright infringement. He also sought equitable relief for 

a claim that he titled “Right of Attribution—Equitable 

1 Led Zeppelin does not challenge on appeal that all of Wolfe’s 

intellectual property rights, including the ownership interest in Taurus, 

were transferred to the Trust.

2 The case was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and later 

transferred to the proper venue, the Central District of California. 

Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 106 F. Supp. 3d 581, 589–90 (E.D. Pa. 2015).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 9 of 73
10 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Relief—Falsification of Rock n’ Roll History.” Skidmore’s 

claims are not based on the entire Taurus composition. 

Rather, Skidmore claims that the opening notes of Stairway 

to Heaven are substantially similar to the eight-measure 

passage at the beginning of the Taurus deposit copy:

The claimed portion includes five descending notes of a 

chromatic musical scale. These notes are represented on the 

piano as a set of adjacent black and white keys, from right to 

left. The beginning of Stairway to Heaven also incorporates 

a descending chromatic minor chord progression in A minor. 

However, the composition of Stairway to Heaven has a 

different ascending line that is played concurrently with the 

descending chromatic line, and a distinct sequence of pitches 

in the arpeggios, which are not present in Taurus.

Led Zeppelin disputed ownership, access, and 

substantial similarity. Led Zeppelin also alleged affirmative 

defenses, including independent creation, unclean hands, 

and laches.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 10 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 11

At the close of discovery, Led Zeppelin moved for 

summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in 

part and denied it in part. The district court dismissed the 

claims against defendants John Paul Jones, Super Hype 

Publishing, and Warner Music Group because they had not 

performed or distributed Stairway to Heaven within the 

three-year statute of limitations period preceding the filing 

of the complaint. The district court also granted summary 

judgment to Led Zeppelin on Skidmore’s “Right of 

Attribution—Equitable Relief: Falsification of Rock n’ Roll 

History” claim. Although the claim was “creatively termed” 

and “inventive” according to the district court, a right of 

attribution claim under the Copyright Act extends only to 

visual arts.

The district court also ruled that under the 1909 Act, the 

scope of the copyright was circumscribed by the musical 

composition transcribed in the Taurus deposit copy. Thus, 

only the one-page Taurus deposit copy, and not a sound 

recording, could be used to prove substantial similarity 

between Taurus and Stairway to Heaven.

The district court granted Led Zeppelin’s motion in 

limine to exclude Taurus sound recordings and expert 

testimony based on those recordings. The district court 

again concluded that the Taurus deposit copy, rather than 

any recordings of Spirit’s performance of Taurus, formed 

the sole benchmark for determining substantial similarity. 

The district court found that there were triable issues of fact 

relating to ownership, access, substantial similarity, and 

damages.

Against the backdrop of these rulings, the trial lasted five 

days. Two key issues predominated: access to Taurus by 

Led Zeppelin band members and substantial similarity.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 11 of 73
12 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

On the access question, the district court allowed 

Skidmore to play various sound recordings of Taurus for 

Page outside of the presence of the jury. Skidmore then 

examined Page on access in front of the jury. Page testified 

that he owned “a copy of the album that contains ‘Taurus,’ 

. . . in [his] collection,” while denying “any knowledge of 

‘Taurus.’”

The substantial similarity question pitted two expert 

musicologists against each other. Skidmore’s expert, 

Dr. Alexander Stewart, analyzed, one by one, five categories 

of similarities. Dr. Stewart acknowledged that a chromatic 

scale and arpeggios are common musical elements. But he 

found Taurus and Stairway to Heaven to be similar because 

the descending chromatic scales in the two compositions 

skip the note E and return to the tonic pitch, A, and the notes 

in the scale have the same durations. Then he pointed to 

three two-note sequences—AB, BC, and CF#—that appear 

in both compositions. In his view, the presence of successive 

eighth-note rhythms in both compositions also made them 

similar. Finally, he testified that the two compositions have 

the same “pitch collection,” explaining that certain notes 

appear in the same proportions in the beginning sequence of 

both works.

In sum, Dr. Stewart claimed that five musical elements 

in combination were copied because these elements make 

Taurus unique and memorable, and these elements also 

appear in Stairway to Heaven. Skidmore’s closing argument 

reinforced these points. Neither Dr. Stewart nor Skidmore’s 

counsel argued that the categories of similarities were 

selected and arranged to form protectable expression in the 

design, pattern, or synthesis of the copyrighted work. Nor 

did they make a case that a particular selection and 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 12 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 13

arrangement of musical elements were copied in Stairway to 

Heaven.

Led Zeppelin’s expert, Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, testified 

that the two compositions are completely distinct. To 

highlight the marked differences in the compositions, he 

presented the following exhibit, which juxtaposed the 

claimed portion of Taurus against Stairway to Heaven:3

Dr. Ferrara testified that the similarities claimed by 

Skidmore either involve unprotectable common musical 

elements or are random. For example, Dr. Ferrara explained 

that the similarity in the three two-note sequences is not 

musically significant because in each song the sequences 

3 The duration of the notes in the Taurus deposit copy are halved in 

this exhibit to allow a side-by-side comparison of the two compositions.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 13 of 73
14 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

were preceded and followed by different notes to form 

distinct melodies. He described the purported similarity 

based on these note sequences as akin to arguing that “crab” 

and “absent” are similar words because they both have the 

letter pair “ab.” He also testified that the similarity in the 

“pitch collection” is not musically meaningful because it is 

akin to arguing that the presence of the same letters in 

“senator” and “treason” renders the words similar in 

meaning.

At the close of trial, the district court discussed with 

counsel the intended jury instructions. The district court did 

not give the proposed instructions on the inverse ratio rule 

and the selection and arrangement of unprotectable 

elements. Skidmore objected to the district court’s decision 

to omit an inverse ratio instruction but did not do so as to the 

omitted selection and arrangement instruction.

The jury returned a verdict for Led Zeppelin. In special 

interrogatories, the jury found that Skidmore owned the 

copyright to Taurus and that Led Zeppelin had access to 

Taurus, but that the two songs were not substantially similar 

under the extrinsic test. Following the verdict, the district 

court entered a judgment and an amended judgment.4 

Skidmore did not file any post-judgment motions 

challenging the verdict, but timely appealed from the 

amended judgment.

Significantly, Skidmore does not make a substantial 

evidence claim. Instead, he focuses on a handful of legal 

4 The district court amended the judgment to include all defendants, 

including those to whom the district court granted summary judgment. 

Skidmore appeals from the amended judgment related to Led Zeppelin 

and related parties, but waived any argument regarding the defendants 

who prevailed at summary judgment.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 14 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 15

issues, challenging: (1) the ruling that substantial similarity 

must be proven using the copyright deposit copy; (2) the 

ruling that sound recordings could not be played to prove 

access; (3) various jury instructions; (4) the imposition of 

overall time limits for the trial; (5) the fact that the full 

version of Taurus was played in response to the jury’s 

request; and (6) the decision not to exclude or sanction 

Dr. Ferrara because of a claimed conflict of interest.

Warner/Chappell filed separate motions for attorneys’ 

fees and costs, which the district court denied. 

Warner/Chappell timely cross-appealed and the two appeals 

were consolidated.

A panel of our court vacated the amended judgment in 

part and remanded for a new trial. We granted rehearing en 

banc.5 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 

2018), reh’g en banc granted, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019).

ANALYSIS

I. THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT

The world of copyright protection for music changed 

dramatically during the twentieth century and those changes 

dictate our analysis here. The baseline issue we address is 

the scope of Wolfe’s copyright in the unpublished 

composition Taurus, which was registered in 1967, between 

the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) and 

5 In connection with en banc proceedings, we received thoughtful 

amicus briefs from a broad array of interested groups, including 

intellectual property and musicology scholars; songwriters, composers, 

musicians, and producers; recording companies and music publishers; 

rights holders; and the U.S. government. We thank amici for their 

participation.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 15 of 73
16 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

the sweeping copyright reform adopted in the Copyright Act 

of 1976 (“1976 Act”). We conclude that the 1909 Act 

controls and that the deposit copy defines the scope of the 

Taurus copyright.

THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR 

MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND 

RECORDINGS

Although it seems unthinkable today, musical 

compositions were not explicitly subject to copyright in the 

United States until 1831, when Congress added “musical 

composition” to the list of statutorily protected works. 

Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 

1909). Thus, the “musical composition,” which was 

understood to be a printed form of the music, joined the 

statutory protection afforded to dramatic compositions, 

maps, charts, engraving, photographs and other works.

Between 1831 and the early 1900s, a number of 

machines were invented that allowed mechanical 

reproduction of a musical composition. Goldstein v. 

California, 412 U.S. 546, 564 (1973). With the advent of 

player pianos at the turn of the century, the question arose 

whether copyright protection extended to the infringement 

of musical compositions by perforated piano rolls.6 The 

Supreme Court held that the copyright statute barred the 

unauthorized copying of a musical composition “in 

intelligible notation,” but that it would be “strained and 

artificial” to consider musical sounds coming from an 

6 A piano roll is “a roll, usually of paper, on which music is 

preserved in the form of perforations; it is recorded and played back 

mechanically on a player piano or pianola.” Piano(la) roll, The New 

Grove Dictionary of Jazz (Barry Kernfeld ed., 1994).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 16 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 17

instrument to be a copy. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. 

Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1908). Justice Holmes 

commented in his concurrence that “[o]n principle anything 

that mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds 

ought to be held a copy, or, if the statute is too narrow, ought 

to be made so by a further act.” Id. at 20.

Congress stepped in to remedy the situation, perhaps 

heeding Justice Holmes’s call. The Copyright Act of 1909—

landmark legislation that significantly revised copyright 

law—categorized mechanically-reproduced musical 

compositions, such as those played on player pianos and 

phonograph players, as “copies” of the original composition. 

1909 Act, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909) 

(repealed 1976).

The statute provided copyright protection against “any 

arrangement or setting of [the musical composition] or of the 

melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record 

in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from 

which it may be read or reproduced.” Id. Skidmore seizes 

on this language to argue that the new legislation extended 

copyright protection beyond sheet music. The text does not 

support this reading. Although the 1909 Act extended 

copyright protection against infringement beyond the mere 

reproduction of the sheet music, Congress did not provide 

that copyrighted works could be anything other than sheet 

music or, for an unpublished work, the musical composition 

transcribed in the deposit copy. 1909 Act §§ 5, 11.

The Court reinforced this principle in Goldstein v. 

California when it noted that the amendments insured that

composers of original musical works received adequate 

protection, and that “records and piano rolls were to be 

considered as ‘copies’ of the original composition . . . , and 

could not be manufactured” without a specified royalty 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 17 of 73
18 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

payment. 412 U.S. at 565–66. The Court emphasized that 

“composers were to have no control over the recordings 

themselves,” which Congress considered “a component part 

of a machine, capable of reproducing an original 

composition,” or “renderings of original artistic 

performance.” Id. at 566.

Requiring more formalities than the current copyright 

act, the procedures for obtaining copyright protection under 

the 1909 Act were very specific. Registration for an 

unpublished musical work could be obtained “by the deposit, 

with claim of copyright, of one complete copy of such work” 

with the Copyright Office. 1909 Act § 11. In contrast, 

protection for a published work could be secured by affixing 

a copyright notice “to each copy thereof published or offered 

for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright 

proprietor.” Id. § 9. Either way, distributing sound 

recordings did not constitute publication under the 1909 Act, 

so musical compositions were only published if the sheet 

music also was published. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. 

LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2000). Significantly, 

the Copyright Office did not even accept sound recordings 

as deposit copies. Indeed, “in order to claim copyright in a 

musical work under the 1909 Act, the work had to be 

reduced to sheet music or other manuscript form.” 1 M. 

Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (“Nimmer”) 

§ 2.05[A] (2017).

Sound recordings did not become subject to copyright 

protection until 1972, and then only for the sound recordings 

fixed on or after February 15, 1972. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). The 

amendment did nothing to change the requirements of the 

1909 Act or the status of the Taurus copyright.

The copyright requirements were changed dramatically 

by the 1976 Copyright Act, which provided that public 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 18 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 19

distribution of a sound recording qualified as publication of 

a musical composition. Id. § 101. In other words, 

composers could submit a recording rather than sheet music 

as the deposit copy for a musical composition. The catch, 

for this case, is that publication before the 1978 effective 

date is not covered by the new statute.

THE TAURUS DEPOSIT COPY

The 1967 deposit copy of Taurus is a single page of sheet 

music. Skidmore suggests that the copyright extends beyond 

the sheet music; that is, the deposit copy is somehow 

archival in nature and more of a reference point than a 

definitive filing. This approach ignores the text of the statute 

and the purpose of the deposit.

We have outlined copyright protection under the 1909 

Act as follows: “[A]n unpublished work was protected by 

state common law copyright from the moment of its creation 

until it was either published or until it received protection 

under the federal copyright scheme.” ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 

688 (quoting LaCienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 

952 (9th Cir. 1995)). The referenced federal copyright 

protection for unpublished works is found in the text of the 

statute: “copyright may also be had of the works of an author 

of which copies are not reproduced for sale, by the deposit, 

with claim of copyright, of one complete copy of such work 

if it be a . . . musical composition . . . .” 1909 Act § 11.

The text is clear—for unpublished works, the author 

must deposit one complete copy of such work. The purpose 

of the deposit is to make a record of the claimed copyright, 

provide notice to third parties, and prevent confusion about 

the scope of the copyright. See Data Gen. Corp. v. 

Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1161–62 (1st 

Cir. 1994) (the deposit requirement provides the “Copyright 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 19 of 73
20 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Office with sufficient material to identify the work in which 

the registrant claims a copyright . . . [and] prevent[s] 

confusion about which work the author is attempting to 

register”), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 

Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Report of the 

Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. 

Copyright Law 71 (1961) (one of the purposes of the deposit 

is “to identify the work” being registered).

Even before the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court stated that 

one objective of the deposit was to permit inspection by 

other authors “to ascertain precisely what was the subject of 

copyright.” Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557, 561 (1881). At 

the time that Taurus was registered, the Copyright Office’s 

practice regarding applications to register unpublished 

musical compositions was to consider “writ[ing] to the 

applicant, pointing out that protection extends only to the 

material actually deposited, and suggesting that in his own 

interest he develop his manuscript to supply the missing 

element.” Compendium of Copyright Office Practices

(“Copyright Office Compendium”) § 2.6.1.II.a (1st ed. 1967) 

(emphasis added). The inescapable conclusion is that the 

scope of the copyright is limited by the deposit copy.

The practical treatment of deposit copies underscores 

their importance. The 1909 Act prohibits destruction of 

copies of unpublished works without notice to the copyright 

owner. 1909 Act §§ 59–60. Buttressing this protection, the 

Register of Copyright’s policy is to retain access to the 

deposit copies of unpublished works for the full copyright 

term. See Report of the Register of Copyrights on the 

General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law at 80–81.

The cases Skidmore cites to suggest that the content of 

the deposit copy may be supplemented are not instructive. 

See, e.g., Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 20 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 21

30, 41–42 (1939) (addressing the failure to promptly submit 

a deposit copy for a published work); Three Boys Music 

Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486–87 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(addressing whether an incomplete deposit copy contained 

the “essential elements” of the musical composition such 

that subject matter jurisdiction was proper). Nor do the cases 

analyzing the 1976 Act illuminate the copyright scope 

question under the 1909 Act. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 

UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 276 (6th Cir. 2009); 

Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, 

Inc., 692 F.2d 478, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1982).

Although Skidmore offers a host of reasons why 

adherence to the statute complicates proof in copyright 

cases, these arguments cannot overcome the statutory 

requirements. For example, Skidmore claims that it is 

impractical to compare a sound recording of the infringing 

work to a deposit copy of the infringed work, even though 

that is precisely what happened here, and experts for both 

sides were confident in their analysis. Indeed, during the 

trial, Skidmore’s master guitarist, Kevin Hanson, performed 

the Taurus deposit copy as he interpreted it.

Skidmore also complains that restricting protection to 

the deposit copy disadvantages musicians who do not read 

music because it can be time consuming and expensive to 

make an accurate deposit copy. Apparently, that was not a 

problem here, as Wolfe’s work was transcribed for the sheet 

music deposit. Digital transcription and other technological 

advances undercut this argument, not to mention that for 

decades now, sound recordings have been accepted as the 

deposit copy. Finally, Skidmore offers conjecture about 

what might happen if a deposit copy were lost or destroyed. 

We need not play this “what if” guessing game because the 

statute is clear and unambiguous.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 21 of 73
22 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

The district court correctly concluded that under the 

1909 Act, which controls the copyright registration in this 

case, the Taurus deposit copy circumscribes the scope of the 

copyright. Because the deposit copy defines the four corners 

of the Taurus copyright, it was not error for the district court 

to decline Skidmore’s request to play the sound recordings 

of the Taurus performance that contain further 

embellishments or to admit the recordings on the issue of 

substantial similarity.

II. ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 

Proof of copyright infringement requires Skidmore to 

show: (1) that he owns a valid copyright in Taurus; and 

(2) that Led Zeppelin copied protected aspects of the work. 

Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 

2018) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 

499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). Skidmore’s ownership of a valid 

copyright in Taurus was not challenged on appeal.

The second prong of the infringement analysis contains 

two separate components: “copying” and “unlawful 

appropriation.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. Although 

these requirements are too often referred to in shorthand 

lingo as the need to prove “substantial similarity,” they are 

distinct concepts.

Because independent creation is a complete defense to 

copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove that a 

defendant copied the work. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46. In 

the absence of direct evidence of copying, which is the case 

here, the plaintiff “can attempt to prove it circumstantially 

by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s 

work and that the two works share similarities probative of 

copying.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. This type of 

probative or striking similarity shows that the similarities 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 22 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 23

between the two works are due to “copying rather than . . .

coincidence, independent creation, or prior common 

source.” Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 

788 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (omission in 

original) (quoting 4 Nimmer § 13.02[B]). A finding of such 

similarity may be based on the overlap of unprotectable as 

well as protectable elements. Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117.

On the other hand, the hallmark of “unlawful 

appropriation” is that the works share substantial

similarities. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th 

Cir. 2004). In our circuit, we use a two-part test to determine 

whether the defendant’s work is substantially similar to the 

plaintiff’s copyrighted work. Cavalier v. Random House, 

Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). The first part, the 

extrinsic test, compares the objective similarities of specific 

expressive elements in the two works. Id. Crucially, 

because only substantial similarity in protectable expression 

may constitute actionable copying that results in 

infringement liability, “it is essential to distinguish between 

the protected and unprotected material in a plaintiff’s work.” 

Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

second part, the intrinsic test, “test[s] for similarity of 

expression from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable 

observer, with no expert assistance.” Jada Toys, Inc. v. 

Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 

(9th Cir. 1994)). Both tests must be satisfied for the works 

to be deemed substantially similar. See Funky Films, Inc. v. 

Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 

2006).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 23 of 73
24 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

III. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGE—THE COPYING 

PRONG OF INFRINGEMENT

At trial, one of Skidmore’s key arguments was that Led

Zeppelin members heard either performances or recordings 

of Taurus before creating Stairway to Heaven, and thus had 

access for purposes of copying the music. To prove that 

point, Skidmore wanted to play several recordings of Taurus

during the testimony of Jimmy Page, claiming that observing

Page listening to the recordings would have enabled the jury 

to evaluate his demeanor with respect to access. Skidmore’s 

counsel explained that the recordings could be offered to 

prove access, even if the court excluded them for proving 

substantial similarity. The district court determined that 

although the sound recordings were relevant to prove access, 

Skidmore’s approach would be “too prejudicial for the jury” 

because it risked confusing access with substantial 

similarity. Hence the court excluded the recordings under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court instead permitted 

Skidmore’s counsel to play the recordings for Page outside 

the presence of the jury and then question him about the 

recordings in front of the jury.

Skidmore’s position is a curious one and defies common 

sense. There would have been very little, if any, probative 

value in watching Page’s reaction to listening to Taurus at 

the trial in 2016 to prove access to the song half a century 

ago. To prevent the jury from making an erroneous 

comparison for determining substantial similarity, the court 

properly excluded the sound recording, which contains 

performance elements that are not protected by the Taurus

deposit copy. Indeed, the court’s exclusion ruling displayed 

a clear understanding of the distinct components of copying 

and unlawful appropriation, letting the evidence in “as far as 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 24 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 25

access,” but “not . . . to compare the performance” to 

Stairway to Heaven.

In any event, the evidentiary question is moot. It turns 

out Skidmore’s examination of Page on access proved 

fruitful. When Page testified, he candidly admitted to 

owning “a copy of the album that contains ‘Taurus,’ . . . in 

[his] collection,” though still denying “any knowledge of 

‘Taurus.’” The jury found that both Page and Plant “had 

access to the musical composition Taurus before Stairway to 

Heaven was created.” Once the jury made that finding, the 

remaining questions on the jury verdict form related to 

substantial similarity of the works.

In answer to the question of whether “original elements 

of the musical composition Taurus are extrinsically similar 

to Stairway to Heaven,” the jury said no. Because the 

extrinsic test was not satisfied, the jury did not reach the 

intrinsic test. Although these findings ended the jury’s 

copyright analysis, Skidmore also challenges various trial 

rulings.

IV. THE JURY INSTRUCTION CHALLENGES

Three jury instructions are at issue in this appeal: (1) the 

failure to give an inverse ratio rule instruction; (2) the 

sufficiency of the court’s originality instructions; and (3) the 

failure to give a selection and arrangement instruction. We 

review for abuse of discretion the district court’s formulation 

of the instructions and review de novo whether the 

instructions accurately state the law. Louis Vuitton 

Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 941 (9th 

Cir. 2011). We consider the issued instructions as a whole, 

but reversal is not warranted if “the error is more probably 

than not harmless.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp, 270 F.3d 794, 

802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Caballero v. City of 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 25 of 73
26 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992)). “[W]hen a 

litigant in a civil trial fails to object to a jury instruction, we 

may review the challenged jury instruction for plain error.” 

Chess v. Dovey, 790 F.3d 961, 970 (9th Cir. 2015).

THE INVERSE RATIO RULE

Copyright infringement cases often boil down to the 

crucial question of substantial similarity. We have stated 

that “substantial similarity is inextricably linked to the issue

of access,” and have adhered to “what is known as the 

‘inverse ratio rule,’” which requires “a lower standard of 

proof of substantial similarity when a high degree of access 

is shown.” Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485 (quoting 

Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)). That 

is, “the stronger the evidence of access, the less compelling 

the similarities between the two works need be in order to 

give rise to an inference of copying.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d 

at 1124.

Skidmore proposed an inverse ratio rule instruction, but 

the court chose not to give the instruction. The court 

reaffirmed this decision when Skidmore raised the question 

again after the close of testimony: “We’re not going to give 

that instruction.” Because the inverse ratio rule, which is not 

part of the copyright statute, defies logic, and creates 

uncertainty for the courts and the parties, we take this 

opportunity to abrogate the rule in the Ninth Circuit and 

overrule our prior cases to the contrary. See e.g., Three Boys 

Music, 212 F.3d at 485–86; Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 

1353, 1361–62 (9th Cir. 1990).

The circuits are split over the inverse ratio rule, but the 

majority of those that have considered the rule declined to 

adopt it. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits 

have rejected the rule. Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 634–35 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 26 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 27

(7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the circuit has never endorsed the 

idea that “a ‘high degree of access’ justifies a ‘lower 

standard of proof’ for similarity”); Positive Black Talk, Inc. 

v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 371 (5th Cir. 

2004) (acknowledging the rule but explicitly not adopting 

it), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 

154; Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 460 

(11th Cir. 1994); Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187–

88 (2d Cir. 1961). Only our circuit and the Sixth Circuit 

have endorsed it. 7 See Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 

384 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Peters, 692 F.3d 

at 634 (similarly describing the split).

But even within our circuit, our embrace and application 

of the rule have had a “checkered application.” 4 Nimmer 

§ 13.03[D]. The very nature of the rule spawned uncertainty 

in its application. We first articulated the rule in 1977, 

holding that the high “degree of access” present in that case 

“justifie[d] a lower standard of proof to show substantial 

similarity,” though “[n]o amount of proof of access will 

suffice to show copying if there are no similarities.” Sid & 

Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 

562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded on other 

grounds by 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). In its next breath, the court 

in Krofft admitted that “it is impossible to quantify this 

standard,” so it is unsurprising that the court was unclear—

failing to explain whether the rule applied to the actual 

copying or unlawful appropriation prong of the infringement 

analysis. Id.; see David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse 

Ratio Rule,” 55 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 125, 136 (2008) 

7 The Federal Circuit has applied the rule, but only because it 

“applies copyright law as interpreted by the regional circuits, in this case 

. . . the Ninth Circuit.” Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 

439 F.3d 1365, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 27 of 73
28 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

(“[T]he court [in Krofft] was confused as to whether the 

[inverse ratio rule] applied to the element of actual copying 

or unlawful appropriation . . . .”).

A decade later, we reversed course and distanced 

ourselves from Krofft, relying on the Second Circuit’s 

rejection of the inverse ratio rule in Arc Music. See Aliotti v. 

R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

According to Aliotti, because the rule “ha[d] been employed 

by no Ninth Circuit case since Krofft and had been earlier 

criticized for ‘confus[ing] and even conceal[ing]’ the 

requirement of substantial similarity,” the court declined to 

“address the continuing viability of” the rule. Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Arc Music, 296 F.2d at 187–88). But 

Aliotti was a momentary detour. We later returned to the 

inverse ratio rule and, in a series of cases throughout the 

1990s and early 2000s, applied it in confusing ways.

Revitalizing Krofft, we several times affirmed that the 

rule guided our analysis of similarity. See, e.g., Three Boys 

Music, 212 F.3d at 485–86; Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218 & n.5;

Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361–62. Even so, we did not explain 

how to apply the rule. See Aronoff, supra, at 137 (applying 

the rule in the context of the unlawful appropriation analysis, 

“the court did not articulate how [access] is to be considered, 

or the weight it is to be given”).

The lack of clear guidance is likely due in no small part 

to our use of the term “substantial similarity,” both in the 

context of copying and unlawful appropriation, muddying 

the waters as to what part of the infringement analysis the 

rule applies. See 3 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright

(“Patry”) § 9.91 (2017) (“The inverse ratio theory confuses 

fundamental principles of infringement analysis: access is 

relevant only in establishing the act of copying, not in 

establishing the degree thereof. Once copying is established, 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 28 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 29

access is irrelevant and the inquiry shifts to the final stage of 

the infringement analysis, material appropriation.”). In 

Rentmeester, we pointed out the term’s dual use and 

ultimately stated that the inverse ratio rule “assists only in 

proving copying, not in proving unlawful appropriation.” 

883 F.3d at 1124.

Capping off this period of expansion, we even pushed 

past the rule’s outer limits set forth in Krofft, i.e., that “[n]o 

amount of proof of access will suffice to show copying if 

there are no similarities.” 562 F.2d at 1172. In Metcalf v. 

Bochco, though we did not explicitly name the rule, we held 

that because access was not disputed, we “could easily infer 

that the many [generic] similarities between [the works] 

were the result of copying, not mere coincidence.” 294 F.3d 

1069, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002).

Confusion followed in Metcalf’s wake. In one case, we 

tried to cabin Metcalf to cases where there was a clear 

“concession of access.” Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 

1170, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2003). In other cases, where access 

was assumed (though not conceded), we “side-stepped” 

Metcalf and held that the similarities between works were 

insufficient to support a conclusion of copying. Aronoff, 

supra at 139; see e.g., Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1081 n.4; 

Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th 

Cir. 2010). The result?—confusion about when to apply the 

rule and the amount of access and similarity needed to 

invoke it.

Our jurisprudence in recent years brought additional 

uncertainty. In 2000, we circumscribed the rule by 

explaining that it is not a two-way street: while the rule 

“requires a lesser showing of substantial similarity if there is 

a strong showing of access,” it does not mean that “a weak 

showing of access requires a stronger showing of substantial 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 29 of 73
30 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

similarity.” Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 486. In 2018, it 

seems, the rule goes both ways: it also provides that the 

“more compelling the similarities supporting an inference of 

copying, the less compelling the evidence of access need 

be.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.8 In the face of tangled 

precedent, the Rentmeester panel tried to carefully thread the 

needle, but ended up adding another indecipherable stitch.

Just two years ago, we again sowed doubt whether the 

rule ought to apply at all. In Williams v. Gaye, which dealt 

with the song Blurred Lines, the majority initially defended 

use of the rule against the dissent’s criticism because the rule 

is “binding precedent” that “we are bound to apply.” 

885 F.3d 1150, 1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018). But in an amended 

opinion, the court deleted all references to the rule. Williams 

v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). One commentator 

posited the rule was excised because it “is so controversial.” 

Edwin F. McPherson, Crushing Creativity: The Blurred 

Lines Case and Its Aftermath, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript 

67, 75 n.22 (2018).

As we struggled with the inverse ratio rule over the 

years, the Second Circuit rejected it as early as 1961, 

describing the idea as a “superficially attractive apophthegm 

which upon examination confuses more than it clarifies.” 

Arc Music, 296 F.2d at 187. The court reasoned that “access 

will not supply [similarity’s] lack, and an undue stress upon 

that one feature can only confuse and even conceal this basic 

requirement.” Id. at 187–88. Importantly, the Second 

8 The Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions Copyright § 17.17 

(2017)—Copying—Access and Substantial Similarity—and the 

Supplemental Instruction suffer from similar infirmities in trying to 

reconcile the case law.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 30 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 31

Circuit noted that there is “no such principle” in “the federal 

law of copyright.” Id. at 187.

The Second Circuit also identified the problematic 

implications of this principle where access is very high and 

similarity very low: “[t]he logical outcome of the claimed 

principle is obviously that proof of actual access will render 

a showing of similarities entirely unnecessary.” Id. 

However, “it does not follow that ‘more’ access increases 

the likelihood of copying.” Aronoff, supra, at 126. Yet that 

is what the rule compels. Complete access without any 

similarity should never result in infringement liability 

because there is no infringement. Even so, the rule suggests 

that liability may be imposed in such a case. “There is,” 

however, “simply no logic in presupposing that the midpoints of [the rule] give rise to a ‘ratio’ of access to similarity 

constituting proof of” infringement. Id. at 141. Indeed, even 

“[w]hen the inverse ratio rule is applied, we still don’t know 

how much similarity is required.” Patry § 9.91.

The flaws in the rule can be seen in the inconsistent ways 

in which we have applied the rule within our circuit, the logic 

of the circuits that have rejected the rule, and analysis by 

academics and commentators. See id. (“There is nothing 

positive that can be said about a rule that lacks any clarity at 

all: trying to get a jury to both understand the rule and apply 

it properly is totally impossible.”).

As a practical matter, the concept of “access” is 

increasingly diluted in our digitally interconnected world. 

Access is often proved by the wide dissemination of the 

copyrighted work. See Loomis v. Cornish, 836 F.3d 991, 

995 (9th Cir. 2016). Given the ubiquity of ways to access 

media online, from YouTube to subscription services like 

Netflix and Spotify, access may be established by a trivial 

showing that the work is available on demand. See Brooks 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 31 of 73
32 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Barnes, The Streaming Era Has Finally Arrived. Everything 

Is About to Change., N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2019 (In addition 

to Netflix, which “entertain[s] more than 158 million 

subscribers worldwide,” there are currently “271 online 

video services available in the United States”).

To the extent “access” still has meaning, the inverse ratio 

rule unfairly advantages those whose work is most accessible 

by lowering the standard of proof for similarity. Thus the 

rule benefits those with highly popular works, like The 

Office, which are also highly accessible. But nothing in 

copyright law suggests that a work deserves stronger legal 

protection simply because it is more popular or owned by 

better-funded rights holders.

Finally, the inverse ratio rule improperly dictates how 

the jury should reach its decision. The burden of proof in a 

civil case is preponderance of the evidence. Yet this judgemade rule could fittingly be called the “inverse burden rule.”

Although we are cautious in overruling precedent—as 

we should be—the constellation of problems and 

inconsistencies in the application of the inverse ratio rule 

prompts us to abrogate the rule. Access does not obviate the 

requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

defendant actually copied the work. By rejecting the inverse 

ratio rule, we are not suggesting that access cannot serve as 

circumstantial evidence of actual copying in all cases; 

access, however, in no way can prove substantial similarity. 

We join the majority of our sister circuits that have 

considered the inverse ratio rule and have correctly chosen 

to excise it from copyright analysis. In light of this holding, 

the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on 

the inverse ratio rule.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 32 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 33

THE ORIGINALITY INSTRUCTIONS

Although copyright protects only original expression, it 

is not difficult to meet the famously low bar for originality. 

Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“The sine qua non of copyright is 

originality”; “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade 

quite easily . . . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright 

protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 

. . . .”).

Even in the face of this low threshold, copyright does 

require at least a modicum of creativity and does not protect 

every aspect of a work; ideas, concepts, and common 

elements are excluded. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Feist, 

499 U.S. at 345–46. Nor does copyright extend to “common 

or trite” musical elements, Smith, 84 F.3d at 1216 n.3, or 

“commonplace elements that are firmly rooted in the genre’s 

tradition,” Williams, 895 F.3d at 1140–41 (Nguyen, J., 

dissenting). These building blocks belong in the public 

domain and cannot be exclusively appropriated by any 

particular author. See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[E]xpressions that are standard, stock, or 

common to a particular subject matter or medium are not 

protectable under copyright law”). Authors borrow from 

predecessors’ works to create new ones, so giving exclusive 

rights to the first author who incorporated an idea, concept, 

or common element would frustrate the purpose of the 

copyright law and curtail the creation of new works. See id. 

at 813 (“we must be careful in copyright cases not to cheat 

the public domain”); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 

1293 (9th Cir. 1985) (“General ideas . . . remain forever the 

common property of artistic mankind.”); 1 Nimmer 

§ 2.05[B] (“In the field of popular songs, many, if not most, 

compositions bear some similarity to prior songs.”). With 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 33 of 73
34 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

these background principles in mind, we review the district 

court’s instructions on originality, Nos. 16 and 20.9

Jury Instruction No. 16 explained “what a copyright is, 

what it protects, and what it does not protect.” 10 Relevant 

9 By filing proposed originality instructions and objecting to Led 

Zeppelin’s versions, Skidmore preserved his objection to the originality 

instructions given by the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1); C.D. 

Cal. Local Rule 51-1, -5.

10 Jury Instruction No. 16 reads in full as follows:

Plaintiff has filed a claim against Defendants for 

violation of the United States Copyright Act, which 

governs this case. In order for you to undertake your 

responsibility, you must know what a copyright is, 

what it protects, and what it does not protect.

Copyright confers certain exclusive rights to the 

owner of a work including the rights to:

1. Reproduce or authorize the reproduction of 

the copyrighted work;

2. Prepare derivative works based upon the 

copyrighted work.

3. Distribute the copyrighted work to the public; 

and

4. Perform publicly a copyrighted musical 

work.

Copyright only protects the author’s original 

expression in a work and does not protect ideas, 

themes or common musical elements, such as 

descending chromatic scales, arpeggios or short 

sequences of three notes.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 34 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 35

to this appeal, the instruction provided that “[c]opyright only 

protects the author’s original expression in a work.” This 

statement comes straight from the Supreme Court’s opinion 

in Feist. The instruction went on to state that copyright “does 

not protect ideas, themes or common musical elements, such 

as descending chromatic scales, arpeggios or short 

sequences of three notes.” Although this statement is 

derived from Smith, Skidmore objects to the list of 

unprotectable elements. In particular, he argues that 

characterizing the “descending chromatic scales, arpeggios 

or short sequence of three notes” as examples of “common 

musical elements” was prejudicial to him.

To put this instruction in context, it is useful to outline

the essence of the “common musical elements” or building 

blocks. The chromatic scale is one of two principal scales in 

Western music. It consists of twelve pitches separated by a 

half-step. On a piano, this means playing the white and 

black keys in order from left to right. Three or more notes 

or pitches sounded simultaneously are called chords, and an 

arpeggio, sometimes called a broken chord, is “[a] chord 

whose pitches are sounded successively, . . . rather than 

simultaneously.” Arpeggio, Chromatic, and Chord,

Harvard Dictionary of Music (Don Michael Randel ed., 4th 

ed. 2003).

To conduct a copyright infringement analysis, the 

factfinders ask “whether ‘the protectible elements, standing 

alone, are substantially similar’” and “disregard the nonAlso, there can be no copyright infringement 

without actual copying. If two people independently 

create two works, no matter how similar, there is no 

copyright infringement unless the second person

copied the first.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 35 of 73
36 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

protectible elements.” Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822 (quoting 

Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996)); see 

Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 

(9th Cir. 1994) (same). Jury Instruction No. 16 correctly 

listed non-protectable musical building blocks that no 

individual may own, and did not, as Skidmore claims, 

exclude the particular use of musical elements in an original 

expression.

For example, despite Skidmore’s challenge to the 

characterization of descending chromatic scales as

unprotectable, even his own expert musicologist, 

Dr. Stewart, agreed musical concepts like the minor 

chromatic line and the associated chords have been “used in 

music for quite a long time” as “building blocks.” This 

candid acknowledgement was echoed by Led Zeppelin’s 

expert. Dr. Ferrara described the “chromatic scale, 

descending or ascending,” as “a musical building block. 

This is something that no one can possibly own.” The 

commonality of descending scales and arpeggios has been 

reinforced by the Copyright Office, which lists “[d]iatonic 

or chromatic scales” and “arpeggios” as common property 

musical material. Copyright Office Compendium § 802.5(A) 

(3d ed. 2017). Emphasizing the importance of original 

creation, the Copyright Office notes that “a musical work 

consisting entirely of common property material would not 

constitute original authorship.” Id. Just as we do not give 

an author “a monopoly over the note of B-flat,” descending 

chromatic scales and arpeggios cannot be copyrighted by 

any particular composer. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 851.

We have never extended copyright protection to just a 

few notes. Instead we have held that “a four-note sequence 

common in the music field” is not the copyrightable 

expression in a song. Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 36 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 37

Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1976). In the context of 

a sound recording copyright, we have also concluded that 

taking six seconds of the plaintiff’s four-and-a-half-minute 

sound recording—spanning three notes—is de minimis, 

inactionable copying. See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195–96. 

One of our colleagues also expressed skepticism that three 

notes used in a song can be copyrightable by observing that 

of the “only 123 or 1,728 unique combinations of three 

notes,” not many would be useful in a musical composition. 

See Williams, 895 F.3d at 1144 n.6 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 

The Copyright Office is in accord, classifying a “musical 

phrase consisting of three notes” as de minimis and thus not 

meeting the “quantum of creativity” required under Feist. 

Copyright Office Compendium, § 313.4(B) (3d ed. 2017). 

At the same time, we have not foreclosed the possibility that 

“seven notes” could constitute an original expression. 

Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 852. To the contrary, our sister circuit 

observed decades ago that “the seven notes available do not 

admit of so many agreeable permutations that we need be 

amazed at the re-appearance of old themes.” Arnstein v. 

Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 

1936).

In view of our precedent and accepted copyright 

principles, the district court did not commit a reversible error 

by instructing the jury that a limited set of a useful three-note 

sequence and other common musical elements were not 

protectable.

The district court also instructed the jury on copyright 

originality in Jury Instruction No. 20, which states:

An original work may include or 

incorporate elements taken from prior works 

or works from the public domain. However, 

any elements from prior works or the public 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 37 of 73
38 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

domain are not considered original parts and 

not protected by copyright. Instead, the 

original part of the plaintiff’s work is limited 

to the part created:

1. independently by the work’s author, 

that is, the author did not copy it from 

another work; and

2. by use of at least some minimal 

creativity.

Despite Skidmore’s claim that the following language 

has no support in the law and was prejudicial—“any element 

from prior works or the public domain are not considered 

original parts and not protected by copyright”—this is blackletter law. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103. Reading this 

sentence with the preceding one—an “original work may 

include or incorporate elements taken from prior works or 

works from the public domain”—we conclude that Jury 

Instruction No. 20 correctly instructed the jury that original 

expression can be the result of borrowing from previous 

works or the public domain.

Skidmore appears to want less than the law demands. In 

his closing and on appeal, he argued that a work is original 

as long as it was independently created. Not quite. Though 

not demanding, originality requires at least “minimal” or 

“slight” creativity—a “modicum” of “creative spark”—in 

addition to independent creation. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46, 

362. Jury Instruction No. 20 correctly articulated both 

requirements for originality, that the work be created 

“independently by the work’s author,” and contain “at least 

some minimal creativity.” The court’s omission of the 

optional, bracketed language from the Ninth Circuit Model 

Jury Instruction 17.14 (2017)—which reads, “In copyright 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 38 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 39

law, the ‘original’ part of a work need not be new or 

novel”—was not a reversible error. The reference to 

“minimal creativity” in Jury Instruction No. 20 embraces 

this concept. Reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we 

conclude that the originality instructions were sound and 

were not prejudicial to Skidmore.

THE OMISSION OF A SELECTION AND 

ARRANGEMENT INSTRUCTION

1. Skidmore Forfeited His Objection to the 

Omitted Selection and Arrangement 

Instruction

The district court did not give what Skidmore 

denominates as a “selection and arrangement” instruction. 

Because Skidmore did not preserve his objection to the 

omission, we review for plain error.

Skidmore maintains that his objection was preserved by 

the timely filing of a proposed selection and arrangement 

instruction and by objecting to Led Zeppelin’s version. Not 

so. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d)(1)(B) provides 

that “a failure to give an instruction” must be both “properly 

requested . . . and . . . also properly objected [to].” An 

objection must be made “on the record,” “promptly after 

learning that the instruction or request will be . . . refused.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1), (c)(2)(B). Skidmore may have 

requested a selection and arrangement instruction, but he did 

not object to the district court’s decision to omit the 

instruction. In other words, Skidmore’s proffer of the 

instruction was necessary but not sufficient to preserve the 

objection. See United States ex rel. Reed v. Callahan, 

884 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (objection waived 

where “counsel offered the . . . proposed instructions” but 

“no objection was made to the failure to give them”); 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 39 of 73
40 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Monroe v. City of Phoenix, 248 F.3d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(objection waived where counsel “simply submitted a 

proposed jury instruction” but “failed to properly object at 

trial to the failure to give the proposed instruction”), 

abrogated on other grounds by Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 

(2007).

Nor is this the type of situation where “it is obvious that 

in the process of settling the jury instructions the court was 

made fully aware of the objections of the party and the 

reasons therefor and further objections would be 

unavailing.” Reed, 884 F.2d at 1184. According to 

Skidmore, he could not object to the refused instruction 

because the district court forbade oral objections. The record 

tells a different story. Skidmore’s myriad other objections, 

all allowed by the district court, undermine his account of 

the procedure at trial. For example, Skidmore requested the 

omission of an instruction on a topic not presented to the 

jury; objected to the wording of several jury instructions; and 

proposed a new jury instruction. The court’s response was 

to entertain extensive discussion from the parties about the 

instructions, letting them state their objections “for the 

record.” Further, the court asked Skidmore to draft the 

proposed new instruction and bring it in the next day.

A parallel omission situation is illuminating. Skidmore 

objected to the court’s refusal to include a jury instruction on 

the inverse ratio rule. The judge overruled that objection 

without suggesting that he would not entertain others. 

Indeed, when raising the inverse-ratio objection, counsel 

said “one last thing,” implying that he had no other 

objections. In contrast, Skidmore did not object to the 

court’s refusal to include a jury instruction on selection and 

arrangement during the extensive discussion counsel and the 

court had on jury instructions. Nor did Skidmore object to

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 40 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 41

the omission of the selection and arrangement instruction 

before the jury was summoned the next morning.

Skidmore was responsible for compiling the court’s final 

instructions, so he was well aware of what instructions were 

included and omitted. The court affirmatively engaged with 

Skidmore when he wanted to “make sure” that certain 

instructions had been included. Although Skidmore argues 

that the selection and arrangement theory was central to his 

infringement case, his conspicuous silence on the omission 

of what he claims to be a crucial instruction cannot be 

squared with the court’s willingness to discuss specific 

instructions. On this record, it was not “obvious” that an 

objection to the failure to give a selection and arrangement 

instruction would be “unavailing.”

In any case, there is a real possibility that the district 

court simply overlooked the instruction, and would have 

been willing to give one had the omission been brought to its 

attention. But absent notice and an objection, the district 

court cannot be expected to divine an objection to an omitted 

instruction. We do not impose such prescience on the 

district court in the face of the complicated, and often 

hurried, process of producing a final set of instructions. We 

noted long ago that the district court need not “rummage 

through . . . proposed instructions in an effort to discover 

potential objections to instructions not . . . given . . . .” 

Bertrand v. S. Pac. Co., 282 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1960). 

By not putting the district court on notice of an objection to 

a refused instruction, Skidmore forfeited his objection. 

Therefore, we apply plain error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

51(d)(2).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 41 of 73
42 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

2. The District Court Did Not Commit a Plain 

Error in Omitting the Instruction

Because Skidmore did not preserve his objection, we 

review the omission of a selection and arrangement 

instruction for “a plain error in the instructions . . . if the 

error affects substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2); see 

Chess, 790 F.3d at 970. Under plain error review of a civil 

jury instruction, we consider whether “(1) there was an error; 

(2) the error was obvious; and (3) the error affected 

substantial rights.” C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 

1018 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Even where these 

demanding requirements are met, “the decision whether to 

correct a plain error under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

51(d)(2) is discretionary,” typically invoked only where “the 

error seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings” “to prevent a miscarriage 

of justice.” Id. at 1018–19.

Even if there was an error in not giving the instruction, 

and even assuming the error was plain, we cannot conclude 

that it produced a miscarriage of justice. The district court 

did not err in withholding the studio version of Taurus from 

the jury. A selection and arrangement instruction would not 

have convinced the jury that Stairway to Heaven was 

substantially similar to the deposit copy of Taurus. 

Therefore, the failure to give the selection and arrangement 

instruction cannot have “likely prejudiced the outcome of the 

case,” or “seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Hoard v. Hartman,

904 F.3d 780 787 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We may also take “into consideration ‘the costs of 

correcting [the] error,’” id. (quoting C.B., 769 F.3d at 1018), 

and that factor clearly supports letting the jury verdict stand. 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 42 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 43

This case involved a lengthy trial, and there is little reason 

to have another trial that Skidmore cannot win.

“Rare is the case where the district court’s errors are so 

grave as to ‘seriously impair[ ] the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 791 

(alteration in original) (quoting C.B., 769 F.3d at 1019); see 

also Teixeira v. Town of Coventry ex rel. Przybyla, 882 F.3d 

13, 18 (1st Cir. 2018) (describing such errors as “hen’s-teeth 

rare”). This is not such a case. The district court did not 

commit a plain error in deciding not to give a selection and 

arrangement instruction.

3. Skidmore Did Not Present a Selection and 

Arrangement Theory

Finally, we conclude that the district court did not 

commit any error. The fatal flaw in Skidmore’s argument 

that he was entitled to a selection and arrangement 

instruction is that he did not present that as a separate theory 

at trial. To be sure, a copyright plaintiff may argue 

“infringement . . . based on original selection and 

arrangement of unprotected elements.” Metcalf, 294 F.3d 

at 1074 (quoting Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1446). The 

supposed centrality of a selection and arrangement theory is 

belied by the trial record. Skidmore never once used the 

words “selection” or “arrangement” during trial. But we do 

not rest our discussion on invocation of copyright 

vernacular; more importantly, Skidmore never presented the 

argument to the jury. Nowhere did Skidmore argue that the 

claimed elements were selected and arranged in a particular 

way to create the resulting four-bar passage in Section A of 

the musical composition in Taurus. Nor was there a word in 

Skidmore’s closing about the selection and arrangement 

theory. Notably, our decision here is based on the trial 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 43 of 73
44 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

evidence and not an appellate adjudication of 

copyrightability.

At trial, Skidmore’s copyright infringement claim was 

based on the combination of five elements: minor chromatic 

line and associated chords; duration of pitches of minor 

chromatic line; melody placed over the descending 

chromatic line consisting of combination of arpeggios and 

two-note sequences; rhythm of steady eighth note beats; and 

pitch collection.

Skidmore and his expert underscored that the presence 

of these five musical components makes Taurus unique and 

memorable: Taurus is original, and the presence of these 

same elements in Stairway to Heaven makes it infringing. 

This framing is not a selection and arrangement argument. 

Skidmore never argued how these musical components 

related to each other to create the overall design, pattern, or 

synthesis. Skidmore simply presented a garden variety 

substantial similarity argument. Yet, Skidmore relies on the 

handful of times that his expert musicologist, Dr. Stewart, 

referred to the “unique and memorable” parts of the Taurus

composition as a “combination” to argue that he made a 

selection and arrangement argument at trial, though not even 

this “combination” characterization was included in his 

closing.

Semantics do not characterize legal arguments—

substance does. Skidmore does not contest that the selection 

and arrangement must itself be original to merit copyright 

protection. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358. We have extended 

copyright protection to “a combination of unprotectable 

elements . . . only if those elements are numerous enough 

and their selection and arrangement original enough that 

their combination constitutes an original work of 

authorship.” Satava, 323 F.3d at 811. Put another way, what 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 44 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 45

a selection and arrangement copyright protects is the 

particular way in which the artistic elements form a coherent 

pattern, synthesis, or design. See L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. 

Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“original selection, coordination, and arrangement” that 

result in the overall “design” are protectable); Metcalf, 

294 F.3d at 1074 (“Each note in a scale . . . is not protectable, 

but a pattern of notes in a tune may earn copyright 

protection.”); United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 452 

(9th Cir. 1978); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 350–51; 

Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119.

Skidmore and his experts never argued to the jury that 

the claimed musical elements cohere to form a holistic 

musical design. Both Skidmore’s counsel and his expert 

confirmed the separateness of the five elements by calling 

them “five categories of similarities.” These disparate 

categories of unprotectable elements are just “random 

similarities scattered throughout [the relevant portions of] 

the works.” Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362 (quoting Litchfield v. 

Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984)). Labeling 

them a “combination” of unprotectable elements does not 

convert the argument into a selection and arrangement 

case.11 Skidmore’s selection and arrangement argument 

fails because a copyright plaintiff “d[oes] not make an 

argument based on the overall selection and sequencing of 

11 Skidmore misconstrues Swirsky’s observation that we have 

upheld “a jury finding of substantial similarity based on the combination 

of five otherwise unprotectable elements.” 376 F.3d at 849. There, the 

court was trying to fathom which aspects of a musical composition can 

be used for a similarity analysis, given that no definitive list of musical 

elements existed in the case law. Properly read, Swirksy left open the 

possibility that five or more different musical elements may be analyzed 

for a substantial similarity analysis, not that a set of five musical 

elements is always sufficient to find infringement. Id.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 45 of 73
46 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

. . . similarities,” if the theory is based on “random

similarities scattered throughout the works.” Metcalf, 

294 F.3d at 1074–75 (quoting Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 825); 

see also Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356 (same). Presenting a 

“combination of unprotectable elements” without explaining 

how these elements are particularly selected and arranged 

amounts to nothing more than trying to copyright 

commonplace elements. Satava, 323 F.3d at 811–12. 

Without such arrangement, there is no liability for taking 

“ideas and concepts” from the plaintiff’s work, “even in 

combination.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1122–23.

Skidmore misconstrues what the copyright law means by 

a “combination,” “compilation,” and “selection and 

arrangement” of unprotectable elements. The word 

“combination” cannot mean any “set” of artistic building 

blocks. We have explained that only the “new combination,” 

that is the “novel arrangement,” Universal Pictures Co. v. 

Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 363 (9th Cir. 1947) 

(emphasis added), and not “any combination of 

unprotectable elements . . . qualifies for copyright 

protection,” Satava, 323 F.3d at 811. Likewise, a protectable 

“compilation” is the precise “result[]” that is “formed by the 

collection and assembling of preexisting materials . . . that 

are selected, coordinated, or arranged.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Therefore, a selection and arrangement copyright is 

infringed only where the works share, in substantial 

amounts, the “particular,” i.e., the “same,” combination of 

unprotectable elements. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349, 350–51. A 

plaintiff thus cannot establish substantial similarity by 

reconstituting the copyrighted work as a combination of 

unprotectable elements and then claiming that those same 

elements also appear in the defendant’s work, in a different 

aesthetic context. Because many works of art can be recast 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 46 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 47

as compilations of individually unprotected constituent 

parts, Skidmore’s theory of combination copyright would 

deem substantially similar two vastly dissimilar musical 

compositions, novels, and paintings for sharing some of the 

same notes, words, or colors. We have already rejected such 

a test as being at variance with maintaining a vigorous public 

domain. See, e.g., Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362–63.

To the extent Skidmore’s combination theory was meant 

to encompass or be a variation on the theme of the selection 

and arrangement claim, the jury was adequately instructed, 

as noted below. To the extent Skidmore now claims the 

selection and arrangement theory was a separate claim, he 

never articulated that theory at trial. But, in any event, any 

omission was not in error. The trial court was not compelled 

to give the instruction, nor did it really matter in the end in 

light of the evidence and the jury’s finding that the relevant 

portions of the songs were not substantially similar.

Ultimately, failure to properly invoke a selection and 

arrangement argument is a death knell for Skidmore’s 

request for a selection and arrangement instruction. He is 

not entitled to an instruction based on a legal theory that was 

not presented to the jury. See Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 

867, 873 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he district court was under no 

duty to submit to the jury proposed instructions that contain 

. . . a theory not supported by the evidence . . . .”).12 The 

12 That both Skidmore and Led Zeppelin proposed their own version 

of a selection and arrangement instruction does not affect whether the 

district court was required to instruct the jury on the selection and 

arrangement theory. This just reflects the common practice of 

proposing, such as in this case several months ahead of trial, broad sets 

of jury instructions, trial exhibits, and witness lists that may cover an 

argument presented at trial. The court’s ultimate decision on instructions 

depends on the proof at trial.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 47 of 73
48 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

district court committed no error by declining to instruct the 

jury on selection and arrangement.13

4. The Jury Instructions Fairly Covered 

Skidmore’s Theory

Even though the district court did not instruct the jury on 

selection and arrangement, its instructions, as a whole, fairly 

and adequately covered Skidmore’s argument for extrinsic 

similarity between Taurus and Stairway to Heaven. As 

discussed above, Jury Instruction No. 20 explained to the 

jury that an “original work may include or incorporate 

elements taken from prior works or works from the public 

13 Led Zeppelin and several amici have argued that even if Skidmore 

is entitled to a selection and arrangement instruction, the standard to 

determine unlawful appropriation under this theory is “virtual identity,” 

not substantial similarity. We do not need to reach this issue because, as 

noted above, Skidmore has not made a sufficiency of evidence argument. 

But to be clear, we do not recognize a separate, heightened standard for 

proving actionable copying. The standard is always substantial 

similarity. Of course the degree of overlap in original expression that is 

required for the similarity to be substantial is determined by the range of 

possible protectable expression. See Apple Comput., 35 F.3d at 1443. 

More similarities are required to infringe if the range of protectable 

expression is narrow, because the similarities between the two works are 

likely to cover public domain or otherwise unprotectable elements. See 

Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Thus, for works where there is a narrow range of available creative 

choices, the defendant’s work would necessarily have to be “virtually 

identical” to the plaintiff’s work in order to be substantially similar. We 

have at times described this result as the work having a “thin” copyright. 

E.g., Apple Comput., Inc., 35 F.3d at 1446–47; see also Harper House, 

Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A 

factual compilation receives only limited copyright protection.”). A 

selection and arrangement copyright is not always thin. Compare L.A. 

Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 850 (broad selection and arrangement 

copyright) with Satava, 323 F.3d at 811 (thin selection and arrangement 

copyright).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 48 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 49

domain,” and that the “original part” of the work only 

requires “minimal creativity” by the author. This instruction 

was immediately followed by Jury Instruction No. 21, which 

explained that the taking of “original material protected by 

the copyright” in “significant” amounts constituted 

infringement. Accordingly, to determine whether the 

Taurus deposit copy was substantially similar to the musical 

composition of Stairway to Heaven, the jury needed to 

determine whether “any . . . musical elements that are 

original to Taurus . . . also appear in Stairway to Heaven.”

The instructions fairly and adequately covered Skidmore’s 

sole argument on substantial similarity, i.e., that there were 

“five things that these two songs ‘Taurus’ and ‘Stairway to 

Heaven’” shared.

V. VARIOUS REMAINING CHALLENGES

TRIAL TIME LIMITS

Based on pretrial proceedings and the scope of proposed 

testimony, before trial began, the district court advised the 

parties that each side would have ten hours of witness time. 

Neither party objected. Skidmore now complains the court’s 

inflexibility was a due process violation. During Led 

Zeppelin’s case in chief, the court advised that Skidmore’s 

counsel was exceeding his time limits. Skidmore requested 

“a little bit of leeway in getting additional time.” When the 

court gave Skidmore ten additional minutes for crossexamination of each of Led Zeppelin’s remaining witnesses, 

Skidmore’s counsel said, “[t]hat’s fair.” After Led Zeppelin 

concluded its case, Skidmore requested leave to call two 

rebuttal witnesses, though he did not identify them. There 

was no offer of proof and the request was denied.

The district court was not inflexible or unforgiving. 

Skidmore’s counsel was warned during the trial that he was 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 49 of 73
50 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

getting into “all kinds of background information and things 

that really aren’t relevant to this case.” The court gave extra 

time every day and in granting Skidmore extra time to 

examine defense witnesses, the court reminded counsel that 

his examination had been “repetitive,” included “many 

questions that were irrelevant,” and included “gaps . . .

where [he] could have been presenting evidence.” Although 

the court said there was “no excuse and no reason to give 

[Skidmore] more time,” the court did so anyway. Skidmore 

has shown no prejudice from these rulings. The district court 

did not abuse its discretion in limiting trial time by being up 

front about the limits and then being flexible at counsel’s 

request. See Monotype Corp. v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 

F.3d 443, 450–51 (9th Cir. 1994).

THE DISTRICT COURT’S RESPONSE TO JURY 

QUESTION

During deliberation, the jury asked to listen to “1. 

Plaintiff’s audio of Taurus (guitar)” and “2. Plaintiff’s audio 

of Stairway to Heaven (guitar).” During trial, Skidmore’s 

witness, master guitarist Kevin Hanson, performed two 

versions of the Taurus deposit copy—one with just the bass 

clef part and one with the treble and bass clef parts together. 

Skidmore’s counsel argued that the jury should hear the 

bass-clef-only version because that version was played 

repeatedly during trial whereas the version with both parts 

“was never played . . . in full.” When the court asked the 

jury which version it wanted to hear, one juror said “Bass 

clef,” while the jury foreperson followed up and said “full 

copy.” No other juror spoke up or countermanded the 

foreperson’s request. The district court directed that the full 

deposit-copy version be played and asked if that answered 

the jury’s question. The foreperson replied, “thank you.” 

Skidmore made no objection at that point and the jury heard 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 50 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 51

the “full copy,” which includes both clefs in the introduction 

to the songs. The jury made no follow-up request. Skidmore 

waived any objection to the claim that there was a conflict 

between jurors and any error was harmless.

ADMISSION OF DR. FERRARA’S TESTIMONY

Skidmore filed a motion for sanctions and to preclude 

Led Zeppelin’s expert musicologist, Dr. Ferrara, from 

testifying at trial. At his deposition, Dr. Ferrara testified that 

he had previously analyzed the similarities between Taurus

and Stairway to Heaven sound recordings for Rondor Music

(“Rondor”), a subsidiary of Universal Music Publishing 

Group. Universal Music Publishing Group was working for 

Hollenbeck, Spirit’s publisher. Dr. Ferrara explained that 

his analysis for Rondor had already been completed by the 

time he was contacted by Led Zeppelin’s counsel. Rondor 

waived any conflict and consented to Led Zeppelin retaining 

Dr. Ferrara as an expert witness.

As a preliminary matter, the district court denied 

Skidmore’s motion as improperly noticed, over the page 

limit, and untimely. On that basis alone, the district court’s 

ruling was not an abuse of discretion. But even without these 

infirmities, the district court did not err in denying the 

motion. Skidmore’s challenge is based on a purported 

conflict of interest that made it improper for Dr. Ferrara to 

testify for Led Zeppelin without disclosing the conflict or 

obtaining a waiver from Skidmore.

This argument fails because there was no conflict of 

interest. Although Rondor waived any potential conflict 

from having Dr. Ferrara testify on behalf of Led Zeppelin, 

even that is immaterial because Rondor does not have any 

interest in this litigation. Skidmore contends that Rondor’s 

parent, Universal Music, was working for Hollenbeck, an 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 51 of 73
52 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

entity that owed a fiduciary duty to Skidmore as a publisher 

of Spirit’s music. But a music publisher does not have a 

fiduciary relationship with its composers, absent special 

circumstances. See Cafferty v. Scotti Bros. Records, Inc., 

969 F. Supp. 193, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Skidmore made no 

showing of any special circumstances, or that Hollenbeck 

was a fiduciary of the Trust. Nor did Skidmore show that 

Dr. Ferrara had confidential information concerning 

Skidmore. See Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 300 

(9th Cir. 1996). Rondor retained Dr. Ferrara to obtain his 

opinion on two publicly available sound recordings, which 

he communicated telephonically to Rondor. All of this 

occurred before Dr. Ferrera ever had contact with Led 

Zeppelin’s attorneys. The district court did not abuse its 

broad discretion by permitting this expert testimony. See 

Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 

1980).

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Warner/Chappell cross appeals the district court’s denial 

of attorneys’ fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505. The 

Supreme Court counsels that a court has “broad leeway” to 

consider the relevant factors that promote the purposes of the 

Copyright Act, but the Court also has cautioned against 

giving substantial weight to just one factor, and directed the 

courts to “give due consideration to all . . . circumstances 

relevant to granting fees.” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 

Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1983, 1985 (2016).

Here, after weighing the factors and the circumstance of 

the case, the district court found that litigation misconduct 

and the degree of success swung solidly in favor of 

Warner/Chappell, that the need for compensation weighed 

slightly in favor of Warner/Chappell, but that motivation, 

frivolousness, and objective reasonableness weighed 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 52 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 53

strongly in favor of Skidmore. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 

94 F.3d 553, 558–59 (9th Cir. 1996). Warner/Chappell’s 

argument that litigation misconduct should form a sole, 

independent basis for consideration is contrary to the 

Supreme Court’s guidance in Kirtsaeng. The district court 

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an award of 

attorneys’ fees was not appropriate in light of the Copyright 

Act’s essential goals. Nor did the district court err in 

declining to award costs to Warner/Chappell.

CONCLUSION

This copyright case was carefully considered by the 

district court and the jury. Because the 1909 Copyright Act 

did not offer protection for sound recordings, Skidmore’s 

one-page deposit copy defined the scope of the copyright at 

issue. In line with this holding, the district court did not err 

in limiting the substantial similarity analysis to the deposit 

copy or the scope of the testimony on access to Taurus. As 

it turns out, Skidmore’s complaint on access is moot because 

the jury found that Led Zeppelin had access to the song. We 

affirm the district court’s challenged jury instructions. We 

take the opportunity to reject the inverse ratio rule, under 

which we have permitted a lower standard of proof of 

substantial similarity where there is a high degree of access. 

This formulation is at odds with the copyright statute and we 

overrule our cases to the contrary. Thus the district court did 

not err in declining to give an inverse ratio instruction. Nor 

did the district court err in its formulation of the originality 

instructions, or in excluding a selection and arrangement 

instruction. Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, there 

was no error with respect to the instructions. Finally, we 

affirm the district court with respect to the remaining trial 

issues and its denial of attorneys’ fees and costs to 

Warner/Chappell.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 53 of 73
54 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

The trial and appeal process has been a long climb up the 

Stairway to Heaven. The parties and their counsel have 

acquitted themselves well in presenting complicated 

questions of copyright law. We affirm the judgment that Led 

Zeppelin’s Stairway to Heaven did not infringe Spirit’s 

Taurus.

AFFIRMED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the court’s opinion, with the exception of section 

IV.C. I see no reason to decide whether Skidmore 

adequately preserved his request for a selection-andarrangement instruction because, even if such an instruction 

had been given, no reasonable jury could have found 

infringement here.

At trial, Skidmore predicated his theory of originality on 

Taurus’ selection and arrangement of five unprotectable 

musical elements in the first four measures of the song. 

Specifically, Skidmore contended that Taurus uniquely 

combined the following features: a five-note descending 

chromatic scale in A minor; a sequence of half notes and 

whole notes in the scale; a melody involving various 

arpeggios and note pairs; a rhythm of successive eighth 

notes; and a collection of pitches in distinct proportions. 

None of those elements is subject to copyright protection in 

its own right; they belong to the public domain from which 

all musical composers are free to draw. See, e.g., Granite 

Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th 

Cir. 1976); Copyright Office Compendium § 802.5(A) (3d 

ed. 2017).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 54 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 55

Skidmore can claim protection for the original selection 

and arrangement of those elements, but the scope of that 

protection depends on the “range of possible expression.” 

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 

(9th Cir. 1994). There are relatively few ways to express a 

combination of five basic elements in just four measures, 

especially given the constraints of particular musical 

conventions and styles. See Darrell v. Joe Morris Music 

Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam). For 

instance, once Randy Wolfe settled on using a descending 

chromatic scale in A minor, there were a limited number of 

chord progressions that could reasonably accompany that 

bass line (while still sounding pleasant to the ear).1

In light of the narrow range of creative choices available 

here, Skidmore “is left with only a ‘thin’ copyright, which 

protects against only virtually identical copying.” Ets-Hokin 

v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003); see 

also Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1439 (“When the range of 

protectable and unauthorized expression is narrow, the 

appropriate standard for illicit copying is virtual identity.”). 

In my view, this standard is separate from—and more 

demanding than—the “substantial similarity” test. As our 

cases have repeatedly recognized, the substantial-similarity 

framework applies only to works with broad copyright 

protection, while the virtual-identity standard governs thin 

copyrights. See, e.g., L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. 

Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2012); Mattel, 

1 Skidmore argues that Taurus’ omission of one note from the 

descending chromatic scale further contributed to the song’s originality. 

While this alteration may represent an original use of the descending 

chromatic scale, it does not change the limited scope of Taurus’ 

copyright. As with Skidmore’s selection-and-arrangement theory, there 

are only so many ways to modify a descending chromatic scale in four 

measures.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 55 of 73
56 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 

2003); Ets-Hokin, 323 F.3d at 766; Apple Computer, 35 F.3d 

at 1439.

Contrary to Skidmore’s contention, we have never held 

that musical works are necessarily entitled to broad 

copyright protection. We did state in Williams v. Gaye, 895 

F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018), that “[m]usical compositions are 

not confined to a narrow range of expression.” Id. at 1120. 

But we made that statement in the context of assessing the 

creative choices involved in composing an entire song, 

which of course could involve a broad range of expression. 

See id. at 1117–18, 1120. We had no occasion there to 

categorically exempt musical works from the same 

principles we use to assess the scope of copyright protection 

for all other works.

Given the thin protection afforded the selection and 

arrangement of basic musical elements at issue here, 

Skidmore could prove infringement only if the relevant 

passages of Taurus and Stairway to Heaven are virtually 

identical. They are not. Undeniable and obvious differences 

exist between the first four measures of both songs: The 

notes in the melodies are different; the use of the treble clef 

in conjunction with the bass clef is different; and the rhythm 

of eighth notes is different. Those facts preclude a finding 

of virtual identity. As a result, even if the district court had 

given the jury a selection-and-arrangement instruction, 

Skidmore’s infringement claim would have failed as a matter 

of law.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 56 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 57

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, joined by BEA, Circuit Judge, 

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The plaintiff’s theory of infringement in this case was 

straightforward: a four-bar musical passage of Taurus that 

combined an ascending line and a descending chromatic line 

in a unique and memorable way was substantially similar to 

the “iconic notes” of a musical passage repeated multiple 

times in the first two minutes and fourteen seconds of 

Stairway to Heaven. Both the plaintiff and defendant 

requested jury instructions on the key legal principle 

underlying this theory: that a combination of common 

musical elements can be protectable under copyright law, 

even if each individual element is too common on its own to 

be protected. Although this legal principle is well supported 

in our case law and had ample foundation in the evidence in 

this case, the district court failed to give any instruction on 

this theory to the jury. Without plaintiff’s requested 

instruction, the jury was deprived of the opportunity to 

consider the plaintiff’s central theory of the case, and the 

instructions given to the jury (to the effect that common 

musical elements were not protectable under copyright law) 

were misleading. Therefore, I dissent from Part IV(B) to 

(C).

I

It was the late 1960s when songwriter Randy 

“California” Wolfe wrote a new instrumental piece which he 

entitled Taurus after the astrological sign of a woman he 

loved and eventually married.1 Wolfe’s band, Spirit, played 

1 The origin of the song remains a bit of a mystery, as Skidmore 

alleged in his complaint that the song was inspired by Wolfe’s deep 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 57 of 73
58 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

the song regularly, and it became one of the band’s signature 

numbers. There was substantial evidence that Led Zeppelin 

was at least familiar with Spirit and their work. In 1968, for 

instance, Led Zeppelin opened for Spirit at a concert in 

Denver, and the two bands played the same concerts on other 

occasions. Randy Wolfe died in 1997, and his intellectual 

property passed into a trust.

When the Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that laches would 

not bar a copyright infringement lawsuit, see Petrella v 

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 668 (2014), 

Michael Skidmore, the trustee for Randy Wolfe’s estate, 

filed suit against Led Zeppelin. As stated in the original 

complaint, Skidmore’s theory was that the “iconic notes to 

‘Stairway to Heaven,’ that have enthralled generations of 

fans, sound almost exactly the same as” the “unique 2 

minutes and 37 second instrumental titled ‘Taurus.’”

At trial, Skidmore presented evidence to the jury to show 

the following: The deposit copy of Taurus is a single page, 

comprising 18 bars of music. Skidmore focused on a fourbar passage from this deposit copy, which Skidmore claimed 

was both unique and protectable, and which was 

substantially similar to a repeated musical passage in 

Stairway to Heaven. The four-bar passage in Taurus

(referred to as “Section A”) is followed by a seven-measure 

bridge (labeled “Section B”) in an AABAAB format. 

Section A had an ascending arpeggiated melodic line 

(identified in the treble clef) that included a series of twonote melodic phrases that move from A to B, B to C, and C 

to F sharp. This ascending melodic line is played over an 

arpeggiated descending chromatic line (identified in the bass 

affection for his bandmates from the band Spirit, some of whom had the 

astrological sign Taurus.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 58 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 59

clef) which skipped the note “E” in its descent before 

resolving harmonically.2 According to Skidmore’s experts, 

Section A of Taurus is memorable and unique. Although 

descending chromatic lines are commonly used in certain 

genres of music, Dr. Alexander Stewart testified that the 

composer of Taurus had “found a way to use it in a way that 

is unlike other works that use [a descending chromatic] line.” 

Specifically, most songs employing a descending chromatic 

line resolve the scale by passing through the fifth note of the 

scale (here, the note E), but Taurus stops short of the fifth 

note. Stewart also testified that the combination of two-note 

melodic phrases in the ascending line in Section A was 

“unique,” “distinct,” and “used in an original and creative 

way.” Skidmore’s experts discussed a number of other 

musical elements in Section A, including the rhythm, chord 

progression, and duration of pitches in the minor descending 

chromatic line. Finally, Skidmore presented expert 

testimony that the combination of the descending and 

ascending lines, along with the other musical elements, made 

Section A unique. Stewart testified that the combination of 

musical elements in Section A, including “an ascending line 

with unique AB, BC, C to F-sharp pairs” and “the 

descending line having a similar chord progression 

arpeggiated in a unique way” were “significant” and 

“unique” when taken together. And Kevin Hanson, another 

expert, testified that “the descending chromatic line, in 

conjunction with the other arpeggiated figures in the 

2 Led Zeppelin’s expert, Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, likewise testified 

that the focus of the case was on Section A of Taurus, which had 

“relevant similarities” to the “opening four measures of the guitar” that 

is played six times in the first two minutes and fourteen seconds of 

Stairway to Heaven.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 59 of 73
60 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

ascending melody . . . combined [to] form one piece of 

original music.”

In addition to offering evidence that Section A of Taurus 

was unique and original, Skidmore also presented evidence 

that the opening two minutes and fourteen seconds of 

Stairway to Heaven incorporated elements that were 

substantially similar to Section A of Taurus. Stairway to 

Heaven’s opening included a thirteen-second musical 

passage (also referred to as Section A) which is repeated six 

times, separated by a B section or bridge, in an AABABAA 

format. Stairway to Heaven’s Section A contained an 

ascending line which used a substantially identical pitch 

sequence as Section A in Taurus, as well as the same 

memorable two-note phrases. This ascending line played 

over a descending chromatic line, which likewise skipped 

over the fifth note in resolving the scale. In his closing 

argument, Skidmore asserted that “the only two songs in 

music history that are able to show that it skips the E was 

two pieces of work: ‘Taurus’ and ‘Stairway to Heaven.’” In 

addition to using the same pitch sequence, Stairway to 

Heaven used the same rhythm and metric placement.

Led Zeppelin’s defense was based on its argument that 

the musical elements in Section A of Taurus were too 

common to be protectable. Accordingly, it proposed the 

following jury instructions.3 Instruction No. 16 stated that 

“common musical elements, such as descending chromatic 

scales, arpeggios or short sequences of three notes” are not 

protected by copyright. Instruction No. 20 stated that “any 

elements from prior works or the public domain are not 

3 The numbering of these three instructions corresponds to the 

instructions eventually given by the court.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 60 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 61

considered original parts and not protected by copyright.” 

And Instruction No. 21 stated:

You must then disregard all musical elements 

that are not original to Taurus. Once you 

have disregarded all musical elements that 

are not original to Taurus, you must decide 

whether there are any remaining musical 

elements that are original to Taurus and also 

appear in Stairway to Heaven and, if so, 

whether they are substantial similarities or 

insubstantial similarities.

In response, Skidmore proposed two instructions to 

explain that while musical elements that are too common are 

not protectable under copyright law, such common elements 

could be protectable in combination under some 

circumstances.4 Proposed Instruction No. 35 read, in part, 

that “[a] combination of individually otherwise unprotected 

elements can be infringed upon.” Skidmore also proposed 

Jury Instruction No. 38, entitled “Combination of 

Unprotectable Elements,” which stated: “You may find a 

combination of unprotectable elements to be protectable.”

Led Zeppelin objected to both instructions and proposed

Instruction No. 29, which stated: “An author’s arrangement 

4 The majority refers to this instruction regarding the protectability 

of a combination of musical elements as a “selection and arrangement 

instruction.” While I use this terminology for convenience, the words 

“selection” and “arrangement” have no special significance in our 

precedent; the missing instruction could equally be termed a 

“combination instruction” or “compilation instruction.” See, e.g., Satava 

v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing that an original 

“combination of unprotectable elements may qualify for copyright 

protection”).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 61 of 73
62 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

and selection of unprotected elements is eligible for 

copyright protection only if those elements are numerous 

enough and their selection and arrangement original enough 

that their combination constitutes an original work of 

authorship.” Skidmore objected to this formulation of the 

instruction.

The district judge considered these objections, but did 

not allow the parties to make any arguments. Although the 

judge conferred with the parties outside of the presence of 

the jury to rule on various pretrial motions, he asked the 

lawyers to recess for 45 minutes while he prepared the jury 

instructions. After the recess, the judge addressed counsel, 

and stated: “This is not to discuss with counsel what 

instructions are going to be given and which aren’t. Both 

sides have fully briefed this on the instructions, their 

objections, their replies, et cetera, that I am confident that I 

can just come out and give the instructions.” The judge then 

appointed Skidmore’s counsel to act as “scrivener” to 

“prepare a clean set of instructions,” and dictated the 

approved jury instructions to Skidmore’s lawyer. The court 

included Led Zeppelin’s Instruction Nos. 16, 20 and 21, but 

did not include either Skidmore’s or Led Zeppelin’s version 

of the selection and arrangement instruction. Skidmore’s 

lawyer commented on the wording of two instructions. But 

when he raised a concern regarding the omission of an 

instruction on the inverse ratio rule, the court dismissed the 

question brusquely, saying that the issue was not addressed 

“because we weren’t giving that instruction,” and repeated, 

“[w]e’re not going to give that instruction.” The judge then 

ended the meeting. The court’s decision to omit any 

selection and arrangement instruction was not discussed.

On appeal, Skidmore argues that the court erred in not 

giving the jury the proposed instruction.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 62 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 63

II

“A party is entitled to an instruction about his or her 

theory of the case if it is supported by law and has foundation 

in the evidence.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Jenkins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 

206, 210 (9th Cir. 1994)). A district court errs when it 

“rejects proposed jury instructions that are properly 

supported by the law and the evidence.” Clem v. Lomeli, 566 

F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, “[j]ury 

instructions must be formulated so that they fairly and 

adequately cover the issues presented, correctly state the 

law, and are not misleading.” Duran v. City of Maywood, 

221 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting 

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 

1999)). “In evaluating jury instructions, prejudicial error 

results when, looking to the instructions as a whole, the 

substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly 

covered.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (cleaned up) (quoting In re Asbestos Cases, 847 

F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Skidmore’s request for an instruction that “a 

combination of unprotectable elements [is] protectable” is 

supported by both law and evidence.

First, as the majority agrees, the principle underlying 

Skidmore’s requested jury instruction is well-supported in 

law. Maj. Op. at 44–45. The Supreme Court has made clear 

that even a work “that contains absolutely no protectible . . .

expression” can meet “the constitutional minimum for 

copyright protection if it features an original selection or 

arrangement.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 

499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). We have applied this principle to 

musical elements. In doing so, we do not draw a distinction 

between a “combination,” “compilation,” and a “selection 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 63 of 73
64 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

and arrangement” of musical elements. Thus, in Three Boys 

Music Corp. v. Bolton, we upheld a jury finding of 

“infringement based on a unique compilation” of five 

unprotectable musical elements: “(1) the title hook phrase 

(including the lyric, rhythm, and pitch); (2) the shifted 

cadence; (3) the instrumental figures; (4) the verse/chorus 

relationship; and (5) the fade ending.” 212 F.3d 477, 485 

(9th Cir. 2000). Similarly, in Swirsky v. Carey, we 

disapproved of the district court’s approach to pulling 

“elements out of a song individually, without also looking at 

them in combination,” explaining that to “disregard chord 

progression, key, tempo, rhythm, and genre is to ignore the 

fact that a substantial similarity [between copyrighted and 

allegedly infringing works] can be found in a combination 

of elements, even if those elements are individually 

unprotected.” 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004). Even 

though “chord progressions may not be individually 

protected, if in combination with rhythm and pitch sequence, 

they show the chorus of [a work] to be substantially similar 

to [another work], infringement can be found.” Id.; see also 

Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying 

this principle to visual arts, and holding that “a combination 

of unprotectable elements may qualify for copyright 

protection” so long as the “combination constitutes an 

original work of authorship” and is “sufficiently original to 

merit protection”) (emphasis and citations omitted). 

Accordingly, the legal basis for an instruction that a 

combination of unprotectable elements may be protectable 

under copyright law is well-established.

Second, the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient 

for the court to instruct the jury on this principle. Both of 

Skidmore’s experts testified that Section A of Taurus was 

original and creative and gave Taurus a distinct and 

memorable sound. Both also testified that the combination 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 64 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 65

of musical elements present in Section A of Taurus was 

substantially similar to the six thirteen-second passages in 

Section A of Stairway to Heaven. This evidence is sufficient 

for a reasonable juror to conclude that Section A of Taurus

was protectable, and that the repeated appearance of a 

substantially similar musical passage in the first two minutes 

and fourteen seconds of Stairway to Heaven constituted 

infringement. Because Skidmore’s proposed instruction had 

a foundation in law and was supported by the evidence, the 

district court erred in declining to give it.

This error cut the heart out of Skidmore’s case. Without 

this instruction, the three instructions given by the court 

regarding the unprotectability of common elements 

(Instruction Nos. 16, 20 and 21) told the jury that a 

descending chromatic scale, arpeggios, and other common 

elements are not protected by copyright, and that the jury 

must disregard all such elements. In other words, the jury 

was told to disregard the precise elements that Skidmore’s 

experts testified had been combined in a unique and original 

way, and thus the district court improperly foreclosed the 

possibility that Taurus’s combination of a descending 

chromatic line (which skipped the note E) and an ascending 

line using memorable note pairs was protected. Therefore, 

while Instruction Nos. 16, 20 and 21 are correct statements 

of the law, they are misleading in omitting the principle that 

a combination of unprotected elements can be protected. As 

such, the jury instructions establish a legal principle that is 

erroneous, and if allowed to stand, establish a mistaken view 

of copyright protection. Reversal for a new trial is required.

III

The majority’s conclusion that “the district court did not 

commit any error” in failing to give the jury a selection and 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 65 of 73
66 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

arrangement instruction is wrong as a matter of law.5 Maj. 

Op. at 43. First, the majority makes a legal error in 

concluding that Skidmore was not entitled to a selection and 

arrangement instruction because “Skidmore never presented 

the argument to the jury.” Maj. Op. at 43. Rather, according 

to the majority, Skidmore’s copyright infringement claim 

was based on “disparate categories of unprotectable 

elements,” which the majority describes as the “minor 

chromatic line and associated chords; duration of pitches of 

minor chromatic line; melody placed over the descending 

chromatic line consisting of combination of arpeggios and 

two-note sequences; rhythm of steady 8th note beats; and 

pitch collection.” The majority claims that Skidmore “never 

argued how these musical components related to each other 

to create the overall design, pattern, or synthesis.” Maj. Op 

at 44.

The majority’s characterization of Skidmore’s case is 

belied by both the trial record and by common sense. 

Hanson testified that Section A of Taurus had the holistic 

musical design that the majority says is lacking from 

Skidmore’s argument; among other things, “the descending 

chromatic line, in conjunction with the other arpeggiated 

figures in the ascending melody . . . combined [to] form one 

piece of original music.” Stewart also testified that the 

combination of musical elements present in Section A of 

Taurus was “unique and original.” And in closing argument, 

contrary to the majority’s contention, Maj. Op. at 43, 

5 Because the majority concludes that the district court “did not 

commit any error” at all, Maj. Op. at 43, it is irrelevant to the majority’s 

decision whether Skidmore preserved his claim of error and, if not, 

whether the district court’s error was plain. Because the majority’s 

discussion of these points is unnecessary, I focus on the majority’s 

erroneous reasoning regarding the merits of the district court’s error.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 66 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 67

Skidmore reiterated that it was the combination of a 

descending chromatic line and ascending line that made 

Taurus unique and protectable. This is a paradigmatic 

“selection and arrangement” theory, similar to the one we 

approved of in Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 485 (upholding a jury 

finding of infringement based on a “unique compilation of 

[musical] elements”).

Moreover, the majority’s claim that Skidmore’s 

selection and arrangement argument fails because his theory 

was based on “random similarities scattered throughout the 

works,” Maj. Op. at 45 (emphasis omitted), is unreasonable 

on its face given the brief nature of the passage Skidmore 

argued was protected.6 As the majority acknowledges, Maj. 

Op. at 43, Section A of Taurus consists of only four bars of 

music. And Skidmore argued that the combination of the 

musical elements in this passage (the ascending melodic line 

is played over an arpeggiated descending chromatic line 

which skipped the note “E” in its descent) made it a unique 

piece of original music that was substantially similar to a 

specific thirteen-second passage in Stairway to Heaven. Nor 

does the trial record support the majority’s claim that the 

similarities were “scattered throughout” Section A of 

6 The concurrence’s claim that Taurus is entitled to meager 

copyright protection because there “are relatively few ways to express a 

combination” of notes “in just four measures,” and because there is only 

a “narrow range of creative choices available here,” Concurrence at 55, 

would come as a surprise to the experts who opined on Taurus – and 

indeed, would likely surprise any talented composer. Like words, 

musical notes are subject to a range of expression limited only by the 

imagination and skill of the artist. A poet may select and arrange a mere 

16 words (all of them common and unprotectable by themselves) so they 

are as memorable and unique as a Shakespeare play. See, e.g., William 

Carlos Williams, The Red Wheelbarrow, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 

WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, VOLUME I, 1909–1939 at 224 (A. Walton 

Litz & Christopher MacGowan eds., 1986).

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 67 of 73
68 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

Taurus; rather, Skidmore explained at trial that the various 

musical elements that were combined in an original way to 

form Taurus played “simultaneously.” There is simply no 

support in the record for the majority’s theory that 

Skidmore’s infringement claim was based on random 

“disparate categories of unprotectable elements” in Taurus 

that merely had counterparts in Stairway to Heaven. Maj. 

Op. at 45.

In short, the majority’s misunderstanding of the evidence 

and its conclusion that the musical elements identified by 

Skidmore “do not cohere to form a holistic musical design” 

as a matter of law, Maj. Op. at 45, provide a good lesson as 

to why, as an appellate body, we are foreclosed from 

determining whether an identified combination of musical 

elements is original. We are not well situated to determine 

whether a musical passage is original; such a determination 

should have been left up to a properly instructed jury. See 

Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 99 F.2d 

850, 851 (9th Cir. 1938). Nor should we determine whether 

the four bars at issue meet some judicially constructed 

standard for “holistic musical design.” Bleistein v. 

Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It 

would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 

to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth 

of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 

obvious limits.”). But without an instruction that a 

combination of unprotectable elements can be protectable if 

combined in an original way, the jury in Skidmore’s case 

was deprived of the opportunity to pass judgment on 

Skidmore’s selection and arrangement theory.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 68 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 69

IV

Although unnecessary to its resolution, the majority’s 

rulings on forfeiture and plain error are also wrong. Maj. 

Op. at 39–43.

A

First, Skidmore did not forfeit his objection to the district 

court’s omission of his selection and arrangement 

instruction. As we have previously explained, a party need 

not make a formal objection to the omission of a jury 

instruction if the party has made the district court “fully 

aware of a [party’s] position” with respect to a jury 

instruction, Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 

1371 (9th Cir. 1979), such as by raising the issue on multiple 

occasions, see Dorn, 397 F.3d at 1189, and the district court 

has made clear that it would not give the instruction, see id.

(holding that party did not have to object to the underlying 

jury instruction when the court was fully informed regarding 

the party’s position on the jury instructions and “any further 

objection would have been superfluous and futile”); Brown, 

603 F.2d at 1373 (holding that the party preserved its 

objection to a jury instruction when the court was aware of 

the issue and it was clear that the court would not change its 

mind).

Here, as in Brown, the judge was fully aware of 

Skidmore’s position on the requested jury instruction. 

Skidmore had proposed two jury instructions on the issue, 

and questioned witnesses at trial about the creative 

combination of various musical elements in Taurus. Led 

Zeppelin even cited Skidmore’s reliance on a selection and 

arrangement theory as the rationale for proposing a selection 

and arrangement instruction of its own, which it described as 

“crucial.” Moreover, as in Dorn, objecting would have been 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 69 of 73
70 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

pointless. The judge made clear that he had already heard 

all the argument he would need, and that he did not want to 

discuss which instructions “are going to be given and which 

aren’t” with counsel. Although the majority discounts the 

effect of the judge’s warning because Skidmore sought to 

clarify or correct the jury instructions on other issues, the 

judge brusquely silenced Skidmore when he mentioned the 

omission of an instruction on the inverse ratio rule. At that 

point, any objection would be “superfluous and futile as well 

as contrary to the court’s warning.” Dorn, 397 F.3d at 1189. 

We do not know what objections Skidmore would have 

raised if not for the court’s prefatory warning that began the 

conference and its sharp rejection of Skidmore’s request at 

the close of the conference; the majority thus reads too much 

into Skidmore’s effort to open the door to further discussion 

by assuring the court there would only be “one last thing.” 

Given the imbalance of power that exists between a judge 

and a litigant, we should be careful not to require a litigant 

to defy explicit warnings from the court. Accordingly, 

Skidmore preserved his challenge to the omission of a 

selection and arrangement instruction, and the majority’s 

review should have been de novo. See Gulliford v. Pierce 

Cty., 136 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1998).

B

Second, even if Skidmore had forfeited his objection to 

the omission of the selection and arrangement instruction, 

the district court’s failure to give this instruction – which had 

been requested by both parties – was plainly erroneous, and 

the majority’s conclusion to the contrary is wrong. Under 

our plain error jurisprudence, “[w]e may exercise our 

discretion to correct a district court on plain error review 

when the following factors are met: (1) the district court 

erred; (2) the error was obvious or plain; (3) the error 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 70 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 71

affected substantial rights; and (4) the error ‘seriously 

impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.’” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 

787 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 

1005, 1018–19 (2014)). An error affects substantial rights 

when it “affect[s] the outcome of the district court 

proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 

(1993); see also Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1139 

(9th Cir. 2020) (“We will usually find sufficient prejudice to 

warrant reversal where ‘it is impossible to determine from 

the jury’s verdict and evidentiary record that the jury would 

have reached the same result had it been properly 

instructed.’”) (quoting Hoard, 904 F.3d at 791)

We recently found the district court’s instructional error 

met this standard in Hoard, where the plaintiff brought a 

§ 1983 claim against an officer who allegedly had violated 

his right to be free from excessive force. 904 F.3d at 785. 

In that case, the district court (with plaintiff’s counsel’s 

approval) provided an erroneous definition of the word 

“sadistically” to the jury. Id. at 786. Because this definition 

“saddled [the plaintiff] with the unnecessary and 

exceedingly difficult burden of proving that the officer was 

not just cruel, but sadistic as well,” id. at 782, and made it 

difficult for the plaintiff to prevail, we held that “th[e] error 

likely prejudiced the outcome of the case and—left 

uncorrected—would contribute to a miscarriage of justice.” 

Id. at 787. Therefore, we vacated the district court’s 

judgment and remanded. Id.

Here, as in Hoard, all four prongs of the plain error test 

are met. For the reasons previously explained, the district 

court erred by failing to give the crucial selection and 

arrangement instruction requested by both parties. 

Moreover, this error was obvious or plain: Skidmore 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 71 of 73
72 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN

presented enough evidence at trial supporting the selection 

and arrangement theory which had been recognized by both 

parties as Skidmore’s central theory at trial. Omitting the 

instruction in spite of the parties’ consensus is an “error that 

is so clear-cut, so obvious, a competent district judge should 

be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.” United 

States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting United States v. Truman, 122 F.3d 1167, 

1170 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Hoard, 904 F.3d at 790 

(explaining that it must have been “sufficiently clear at the 

time of trial” that the instructions were erroneous for the 

error to be plain).

Moreover, the error was sufficiently prejudicial with 

respect to the outcome of the case, given that the omission 

of the instruction—which “saddled [Skidmore] with the 

unnecessary and exceedingly difficult burden of proving” 

that the four bars in Stairway to Heaven were substantially 

similar to Taurus without relying on the unique way in which 

musical elements in Taurus were combined— necessarily 

precluded the jury from finding in Skidmore’s favor. Hoard, 

904 F.3d at 782. Furthermore, by introducing testimony 

from two experts on the issue, Skidmore “introduced 

evidence from which a jury could have found” substantial 

similarity, Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1148 such that it is 

“impossible to determine whether the jury would have 

reached the same result had it been properly instructed,” id. 

at 1134. This is enough under our law to show that the error 

affected substantial rights.

Finally, as in Hoard, if “left uncorrected[, this error] 

would contribute to a miscarriage of justice.” 904 F.3d at 

787. It is clear that the district court’s failure to give a 

correct instruction deprived Skidmore “of a meaningful and 

fair opportunity” to present his claim. See id.; Bearchild, 

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 72 of 73
SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 73

947 F.3d at 1149 (“Because [plaintiff’s] ability to pursue his 

claim was fundamentally diminished by the jury instructions 

in this case, the final prong of the plain error test is 

satisfied.”). Skidmore had adduced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable juror to find that Taurus was protectable under 

copyright law, and that there was a substantial similarity 

between Stairway to Heaven and the Taurus deposit copy, as 

the district court’s prior rejection of Led Zeppelin’s 

summary judgment motion confirmed. Therefore, the 

omission of the selection and arrangement instruction not 

only “placed a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the 

[d]efendants,” Hoard, 904 F.3d at 792, but decided the case 

entirely. Accordingly, the district court’s error was plain, 

and just as in Hoard, we must vacate the district court’s 

plainly erroneous ruling.

***

The majority’s rulings on forfeiture, plain error, and the 

merits are redundant and inconsistent. If there is no error at 

all, the majority had no need to reach forfeiture or plain error. 

Instead, the majority touches all three doctrines and makes 

each of them worse. Nevertheless, my key concern is the 

majority’s erroneous legal ruling on whether the four-bar 

instrumental passage in Taurus was protectable and 

substantially similar to the “iconic” opening bars of Stairway 

to Heaven. Unlike the rulings on forfeiture and plain error, 

this substantive ruling weakens copyright protection for 

musicians by robbing them of the ability to protect a unique 

way of combining musical elements. Therefore, I dissent 

from Parts IV(B) to (C) of the majority opinion.

Case: 16-56057, 03/09/2020, ID: 11621937, DktEntry: 181-1, Page 73 of 73