Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01294/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX LANGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIM NICKERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 3:12-cv-1294-GPC-WMC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND

(ECF No. 8)

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is defendants TimNickerson, JamesBlackmon, HenryRamelli,

Mr. Perkins, Mr. Newsom, GregCox, Diane Jacob, PamSlater-Price, Ron Roberts, and

Bill Horn’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Alex Lange’s

(“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In their motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants contend that all

causes of action are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations. 

Defendants also request judicial notice be taken of documents contained in Superior

Court of San Diego County File No. 37-2011-00054131 related to an earlier action

brought by Plaintiff.

The Court finds judicial notice is appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence

201(d) as to Exhibit A, consisting of certified records of Superior Court of San Diego

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County. (ECF No. 8-2, Mot. Dism. Ex. A.) Having considered the parties’

submissions and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend and with prejudice as to all

causes of action because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

It is therefore unnecessary to address the defenses of untimeliness and other immunity

issues.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 28, 2012, plaintiff Alex Lange (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,

filed his currently operative FAC. (ECF No. 3.) On February 20, 2013, Defendants

filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 8.) The Court set

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for a hearing on June 14, 2013. As such, any response

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was due on or before May 31, 2013. See S.D. Cal.

CivLR 7.1.e.2. Having failed to receive a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as unopposed. (ECF No. 9.)

On June 21, 2013, the Court vacated its Order Granting Defendants’ Unopposed

Motion to Dismiss after discovering that the Court received a response from Plaintiff

on May 28, 2013, which wasinadvertently not docketed on the CM/ECF system. (ECF

No. 10.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Response wasfiled on the CM/ECF system nunc pro

tunc to May 28, 2013 and the Court set July 5, 2013 as the deadline for Defendants to

file a reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss. (Id.) The Court has not received a

reply from Defendants.

BACKGROUND

Defendants are a mix of San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputies and members of

the San Diego County Board of Supervisors. Plaintiff asserts various civil rights and

Defendants alternatively argue that Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 1

12(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because an arrest based on probable cause is not

actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 183. See Cal. Pen. Code § 847 (providing in part that a peace

officer is immune from liability for false arrest if the arrest is lawful). 

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tort causes of action arising from his arrest by the sheriff deputy defendants. On May

30, 2010, defendant Tim Nickerson (“Deputy Nickerson”) received a radio call

regarding a reported residential burglary in progress near the intersection of Fruitvale

Road and Tangelo Way, Valley Center, California. (Mot. Dism. Ex. A. at 27, San

Diego County Sheriff’s Dept. Arrest Rep.) A couple who was in escrow to purchase

the vacant home at 29059 Tangelo Way reported a burglary because the wife had

driven by the home earlier and found two unknown males unloading boxes into the

garage who refused to identify themselves or tell her what they were doing on the

property. (Id.) Upon arrival at the house, Deputies Nickerson and Perkins observed

that the garage door had damage to the top consistent with forced entry. (Id.) 

While Deputy Nickerson was taking the reporting witness’ statement, a white

GMC Sonoma pulled up to the house with a load of furniture in the bed. (Id.) The

driver was Richard Meyer, and Plaintiff identified himself as “Alex.” (Id.) Plaintiff

told Deputy Nickerson that he is “currently in possession of [the house].” (Id.) Upon

further questioning, Plaintiff refused to answer without a lawyer. Officer Nickerson

placed Plaintiff under arrest for felony vandalism of the garage door and trespassing. 

(Id.) Mr. Meyer was released upon questioning. (Id.) 

 On October 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed a claim against the County of San Diego

for being “arrested without a verified complaint” in contravention of his Fourth

Amendment rights. (Id. at 25, Claim Against the County of San Diego.) Plaintiff’s

claim was rejected on December 6, 2010. (Id. at 26, Not. Reject. Claim.) On May 4,

2011, Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendants in the Superior Court of the State

of California alleging the same causes of action as in this case: false arrest and

imprisonment, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deprivation of

property rights, and malfeasance in office. (Id. at 11, Super. Ct. Compl.) 

Defendants filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s state-court complaint on November 17,

2011, on the basis that Plaintiff’s complaint did not state sufficient facts to constitute

a cause of action against defendants and defendants are immune fromliability pursuant

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to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e) and Penal Code section 837. (Id. at 37,

Defs.’ Gen. Dem. & Dem. to Pl.’s Compl.) The Superior Court sustained Defendants’

demurrer without leave to amend asto all causes of action and a Judgment of Dismissal

was entered on May 3, 2012. (Id. at 59, Super. Ct. J. Dism.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable

legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (holding“Rule12(b)(6)

authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”). 

Dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where it “appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). 

A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In

reviewing the motion, the Court must assume all factual allegations to be true and must

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. North Star v.

Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). Legal conclusions,

however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual

allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to

dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. MGIC Indem.

Corp. v Weisan, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

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DISCUSSION

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are precluded by the doctrine of res

judicata because Plaintiff has already litigated the same claims in state court in

Superior Court Case No. 37-2011-00054131 filed on May 4, 2011. (ECF No. 6, Mot.

Dism. at 2.) The state court sustained Defendants’ general demurrer to the complaint

without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice on May 3,

2012. (Id.) Plaintiff did not appeal the judgment. (Id.) Defendants argue the state

court’s judgment was on the merits and, as such, the resolution of Plaintiff’s claims in

state court bars this action. (Id.) The Court concludes Plaintiff’s claims are barred by

the doctrine of res judicata. 

Courts are required to acknowledge the legitimate and binding authority of the

decisions of other courts. Congress has explicitly required fullfaith and credit be given

by a federal court to a previous state court decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (explaining that “Congress has specifically required

all federal courtsto give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts

of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so”). Accordingly,

California law determines the claim-preclusive effect that a judgment entered a

California case has upon the federal action. Id. 

Under California res judicata law, a final judgment of a state court precludes

further proceedings if they are based on the same cause of action; unlike the federal

courts, which apply a transactional nucleus of facts test, California courts employ the

primary rights theory to determine what constitutes the same cause of action for claim

preclusion purposes. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009). Res

judicata precludes a plaintiff from litigating a claim if (1) the claim relates to the same

‘primary right’ as the claim in the prior action, (2) the parties in the second action were

parties or privies to the other proceeding, and (3) the prior judgment was final and on

the merits. Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing

Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985)).

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A. Plaintiff’s Instant Claims Relate to the Same “Primary Right” as His

State Court Claims.

For purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata, “the cause of action is the

right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or

the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced.” Boeken v. Philip Morris USA,

Inc., 48 Cal. 4th 788, 798 (2010). In other words, “one injury gives rise to only one

claim for relief.” Id. Thus, “under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor

is the harm suffered,” and “[w]hen two actions involving the same parties seek

compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.” Id.

Here, the same plaintiff, Mr. Lange, is seeking redress for the same primary

right—an underlying claim for false arrest—as in his Superior Court action. In other

words, Plaintiff’s claims are grounded in the same alleged injury and the same wrong

by Defendants and therefore, the same primary right is at stake. See Eichman v.

Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1175 (1983). This civil action stems from the

same factual and legal claims that were asserted before the state court. In fact,

Plaintiff asserts verbatim the same six causes of actions and substantively the same

facts in support of his claims in both lawsuits. (Cf. FAC with Mot. Dism. Ex. A.) Both

complaints allege, inter alia, that Deputy Nickerson arrested Plaintiff “without a

verified complaint or probable cause”; defendants Blackmon, Ramelli, Perkins, and

Newsom each agreed or consented to the false arrest and imprisonment; Defendants’

actions resulted in the loss of his property left at 29059 Tangelo Way; and Defendants

abrogated their “duty to the public treasury” by executing an arrest without probable

cause. (FAC ¶¶ 60, 65, 70, 73; Mot. Dism. Ex. A, Super. Ct. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 18, 21, 23-

24.) As such, the instant federal claims relate to the same ‘primary right’ as were

litigated in the state court. See Mir, 844 F.2d at 651. 

B. Parties to the Instant Action Were Parties or Privies to the Prior Action.

Further, the parties in the instant action were parties or privies to the state court

proceeding. Even when the parties are not identical, privity may exist if “there is

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‘substantial identity’ between parties, that is, when there is sufficient commonality of

interest.” In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); see

also Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding privity when the

interests of the party in the subsequent action were shared with and adequately

represented by the party in the former action); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627

F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that [a] ‘privy’ may include those whose

interests are represented by one with authority to do so.”). 

The Court finds that res judicata applies against all of Plaintiff’s claims as to all

Defendants—the original Sheriff’s Deputies named in Plaintiff’s state court complaint

as well as the additional five members of the County Board of Supervisors named as

defendants in his First Amended Complaint—because the original defendants

adequately represented the newly-added defendants in the state action, and the County

Board membersshould have reasonably expected to be found by the state adjudication

as agents of the same government. Dyson v. State Personnel Bd., 213 Cal.App.3d 711,

725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding “agents of the same government are in privity with

each other, since they represent not their own rights but the right of the government”).

C. The Superior Court’s Prior Judgment Was Final and on the Merits.

A judgment on a general demurrer precludessubsequent action arising out of the

same facts as alleged in the original complaint. See McKinney v. County of Santa

Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 794 (1980) (holding“[a] judgment on a general demurrer

will have a preclusive effect on a new action in which the complaint states the same

facts which were held not to constitute a cause of action on the former demurrer”);

Goddard v. Sec. Title Ins. & Guarantee Co., 14 Cal. 2d 47, 51 (1939) (noting that a

demurrer which issustained for failure of the facts alleged to establish a cause of action

is a judgment on the merits if the same facts are pleaded in the second action). 

The state court issued an order sustaining Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s

complaint. (Mot. Dism. Ex. A at 56-57, Super. Ct. Minute Order.) The Court found

that Plaintiff’s causes of action against individual employees for false arrest and

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imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deprivation or property

rights, and malfeasance in office failed as a matter of law. (Id. at 57.) Specifically, the

Superior Court agreed with Defendants that, as public employees “instituting . . . any

judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of [their] employment” by

arresting Plaintiff, Defendants are immunized under Government Code § 821.6 against

all causes of action arising from conduct under the statute. (Id. at 56 (citing Gov. Code

§ 821.6).) The judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s action was entered on May 3, 2012. 

(Id. at 59.) The Court finds that the state court’s prior judgment was final and on the

merits. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Plaintiff failed to state a claim because the causes of

action alleged in his complaint and the factual underpinnings of those allegations are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. His claims in the instant case (1) relate to the

same ‘primary right’ asthe claim in the prior action, (2) the partiesin the second action

were parties or privies to the other proceeding, and (3) the prior judgment wasfinal and

on the merits. Mir, 844 F.2d at 651 (citations omitted). Having found that Plaintiff’s

claims are precluded, the Court need not address whether the pleadings show that

Plaintiff’s arrest was based on probable cause and whether Plaintiff’s state claims and

all claims against new defendants are time-barred.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED: August 14, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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