Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00119/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00119-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWAIN D. MOORE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0119 GEB GGH P

vs.

WARDEN CAMPBELL, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his conviction for attempted murder

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 664), with true findings of premeditation, personal gun use (Cal. Penal

Code § 12022.5(a)), and infliction of great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(e)).

This action is proceeding on the original petition filed January 18, 2006. 

Petitioner originally raised five claims for relief: 1 ) conviction obtained pursuant to an

unconstitutional search and seizure; 2) ineffective assistance of counsel; 3) sentence violates

Eighth Amendment; 4) jury instruction error; and 5) trial court improperly denied petitioner’s

motion for a new trial.

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On March 7, 2006, the court granted petitioner’s motion to voluntarily dismiss

claim five. On November 3, 2006, the court dismissed claims one and three. On April 4, 2007,

the court dismissed claim two and ordered respondent to file a response to claim four, i.e. jury

instruction error. On May 4, 2007, respondent filed an answer. On May 24, 2007, petitioner

filed a reply.

Because the one jury instruction issue does not require a rendition of the facts, the

undersigned will only discuss the instructive issue. After carefully considering the record, the

court recommends that petitioner’s claim alleging jury instruction error be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

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on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

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Petitioner raised his jury instruction error claim on direct appeal. The California

Court of Appeal issued a reasoned opinion denying this claim. Respondent’s April 6, motion to

dismiss, attachment B. The California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s appeal. Id.,

Attachment D. Accordingly, the court considers whether the denial of the claim by the California

Court of Appeal was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (when reviewing a state

court’s summary denial of a claim, the court “looks through” the summary disposition to the last

reasoned decision). 

III. Discussion

Legal Standard

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475

(1981); see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). The standard of review for a federal habeas court “is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States

(citations omitted).” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. In order for error in

the state trial proceedings to reach the level of a due process violation, the error had to be one

involving “fundamental fairness.” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 482. The Supreme Court has defined

the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly. Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct.

at 482.

Analysis

Due process “requires the prosecution to prove every element charged in a

criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970)). “Any jury instruction that

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‘reduce[s] the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden ... is plainly

inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.’ ” Gibson, 387 F.3d at

820 (alterations in original) (quoting Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104, 93 S. Ct. 354

(1972)).

Petitioner argues that CALJIC 2.51 reduced the burden on the prosecution to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat-of-passion sufficient to establish attempted

voluntary manslaughter. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows:

CALJIC 2.51 provides: “Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need

not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a

circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant

is guilty. Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not guilty.”

Defendant claims our opinion in People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121

(Maurer) is dispositive. It is not. In Maurer, we found giving CALJIC No. 2.51

was improper where the defendant was charged with violating section 647.6,

misdemeanor child annoyance. (Maurer, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1124-1125,

1127.) Because one of the elements of the crime of child annoyance is that the

defendant’s conduct was “motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest

in” the child (id. at pp. 1125, 1126-1127), motive is an element of the offense. 

Consequently, we concluded the jury was erroneously instructed that motive was

both an element of the crime and not an element of the crime. (Id. at p. 1127.) 

Finding the error prejudicial, we reversed the conviction. (Id.. at pp. 1131-1132.)

Defendant argues that although voluntary manslaughter does not include the word

“motive,” “it is clear that ‘motive’ is the legal cynosure of the crime of voluntary

manslaughter.” Thus, he asserts the jury was effectively given contradictory

instructions when told motive was not an element of the crime while the burden

was on the People to negate heat of passion. We disagree that the jury was

misdirected.

“[M]otive is the ‘reason a person chooses to commit a crime,’ but it is not

equivalent to the mental state such as intent’ required to commit the crime.

[Citation.].” (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 738.) Similarly, in People v.

Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, the court stated, “‘Motive, intent, and

malice–contrary to [defendant’s apparent] assumption–are not separate and

disparate mental states. The words are not synonyms. Their separate definitions

were accurate and appropriate.’ [Citation.] Motive describes the reason a person

chooses to commit a crime. The reason, however, is different from a required

mental state such as intent or malice.” (Id. at p. 504.)

Here the trial court properly defined the mental states for murder and

manslaughter to the jury. The court also properly defined the separate and distinct

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concept of motive. Since the instructions did not use the terms “motive” and

“intent” interchangeably, it is not reasonably likely the jury understood the terms

to be interchangeable. (People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 739.)

In reviewing a claim of instructional error, we look at the jury instructions as a

way to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. 

(People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 639.) We conclude the instructions as a

whole delivered a correct interpretation of the law, and defendant fails to show

any reversible instructional error on the issue of motive.

Respondent’s April 6, motion to dismiss, attachment B, pp. 8-10.

The California Court of Appeal found that no instructional error occurred. Except

in the situation noted, and others like it, where the reason something happened is a mandated part

of the crime, the jury need not find motive. For example, a person who has been domestically

abused may have motive to kill the abuser, but the crime of voluntary manslaughter requires that

the person have the sufficiently disturbed objective state of mind at the time of the crime, i.e.,

heat of passion, regardless of the circumstances which led to that state of mind. While the

motive may well explain to the jury why something happened, and lend credibility to a defense

overture for voluntary manslaughter, that is the end of use of motive in such a crime. The denial

of this claim by the California Court of Appeal was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, petitioner’s jury instruction error claim

should be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s jury instruction

error claim be denied and judgment be entered.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/31/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

mo119.hab

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