Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-02083/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-02083-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MGD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Johnson,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-21-02083-PHX-MTL (ESW)

ORDER

Plaintiff Richard Johnson, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Eyman, Rynning Unit, brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 

Before the Court is the Second Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Ryan 

Thornell, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry 

(ADCRR). (Doc. 99.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond

pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Doc. 101), and 

he opposes the Motion. (Doc. 108.) 

I. Background

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he is Native American and that societies, 

including Warrior Societies, “play[] an integral part of Plaintiff’s Native Ways/Religious 

Beliefs.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that ADCRR’s designation of Warrior Society as

a Security Threat Group (STG) places a substantial burden on Native Americans, 

discriminates against Native Americans “based upon race and religious belief/Native 

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Ways,” and “inhibits and constrains . . . Plaintiff’s[] ability to express [his] Native 

Ways/Religious Belief.” (Id. at 9-12.) Plaintiff alleges he has been validated as a Warrior 

Society member without having committed any disciplinary infractions. As a result, 

Plaintiff has been placed in maximum custody confinement, where he has less access to 

rehabilitation programs, no access to “sacred items/religious items,” and cannot use a sweat 

lodge. (Id. at 9.) 

On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 

First Amendment religious exercise and RLUIPA claims for injunctive relief against 

Defendant ADCRR Director David Shinn, in his official capacity, and directed the Director 

to answer the claims.1 (Doc. 6.) The Court dismissed the remaining Defendant. (Id.)

In an Order dated January 16, 2024, the Court granted Defendant Thornell’s first 

Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues except Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief 

regarding religious smoke-generating/smudging practices while he is in maximum custody. 

(Doc. 79.) The Court directed the parties to participate in a settlement conference on this 

remaining injunctive relief issue. (Id.) 

The parties were unable to settle this remaining issue, and Defendant sought leave 

to file a second motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 85.) Defendant argued that an 

expanded record will show that Plaintiff, who is no longer in maximum custody, was able 

to smudge and did smudge in maximum custody and that Plaintiff has not, and will not, be 

able to show a genuine issue of fact from which a reasonable jury (or the Court) could find 

an ADCRR practice of not allowing Plaintiff, or Native Americans, to smudge while in

maximum custody. (Doc. 85 at 1.) Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion for 

leave to file a second motion for summary judgment, and the Court granted the motion for 

leave because it appeared the remaining issue may be resolved through an expanded record. 

(Doc. 89.) On June 26, 2024, Defendant filed his Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 

1 Current ADCRR Director Ryan Thornell was automatically substituted for Shinn 

when Thornell took over the position from Shinn. (Docs. 62, 63.) 

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which is now fully briefed. (Docs. 99, 108, 110.) 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 

movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 

produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 

1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 

to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 

favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 

it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 

citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 

all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 

materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

. . . . 

. . . .

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III. Relevant Facts

A. Plaintiff’s Incarceration and Classification

Plaintiff has been incarcerated by ADCRR since April 2004. (Doc. 100 (Def.’s 

Statement of Facts) ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was initially classified as medium custody, but over the 

past ten years, he has been transferred several times to maximum custody because of

disciplinary issues. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) 

In 2014, ADCRR validated Plaintiff as a member of the Warrior Society STG. (Id.

¶ 8.) At that time, as part of ADCRR’s goal of reducing prison gang violence, the validation 

of a prisoner as an STG member automatically resulted in the prisoner’s placement at 

ADCRR’s maximum custody facility at ASPC–Eyman, Browning Unit. (Id. ¶ 9.) In 2021, 

ADCRR revised its policy, and a prisoner’s STG validation no longer mandated the 

prisoner’s placement in maximum custody, and validation was only a factor to be 

considered in determining custody classification. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.)

In July 2022, Plaintiff was transferred to close custody, but after officers discovered 

a homemade handcuff key in Plaintiff’s possession, Plaintiff was returned to maximum 

custody. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff disputes the statement that officers found a homemade 

handcuff key and denies “possessing such contraband.” (Doc. 109 at 2 (Pl.’s Statement of 

Facts) ¶ 13; Doc. 109 at 13 (Pl. Decl.) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff’s classification was reviewed again, 

and on November 8, 2023, Plaintiff was returned to close custody at ASPC-Lewis, Morey 

Unit.2 (Doc. 100 ¶ 14.) 

B. ADCRR’s Policies on Smudging

Smudging involves the burning of sage, cedar, sweetgrass and other herbs, and 

wafting the smoke about as part of a religious ritual for cleansing and prayer. (Doc. 100 ¶ 

16.) ADCRR permits smudging unless specifically restricted by the custody level and 

2 Plaintiff was still in ASPC-Lewis, Morey Unit, at the time Defendant filed his 

Motion for Summary Judgment and throughout briefing on the Motion. After briefing was 

complete, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address on December 2, 2024, stating he is 

now housed at ASPC-Eyman, Rynning Unit, but he did not indicate his current 

classification there. (Doc. 112.) 

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security of a unit. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

ADCRR’s Department Order (DO) 109 prohibits smoking or vaping in enclosed 

areas and buildings, as well as within twenty feet from any building entrance or in areas 

where smoke could enter buildings through entrances, windows, or other means. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

In keeping with DO 109, smudging is not allowed indoors. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Prior to 2021, Browning Unit did not allow prisoners to keep their smudging herbs 

in their cells out of concern that prisoners might find a way to burn them indoors; prisoners 

were required to store the herbs and smudging shells, which could be used as weapons, in 

a sergeant’s office. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) Plaintiff disputes paragraph 19 of Defendant’s 

Statement of Facts “insofar as to his personal knowledge no smudging shell has been used 

as a weapon” and because Defendant has not provided “indisputable proof but only 

speculation with no certain knowledge.” (Doc. 109 at 2 ¶ 19.) 

Lighters are restricted items for security and health reasons, and prisoners, 

regardless of custody classification and housing location, may not possess lighters. (Doc. 

100 ¶ 21.) Prisoners have used lighters to start fires. (Id. ¶ 22.) The prohibition on lighters 

makes it less likely prisoners will create incendiary devices that could be used to harm 

other prisoners and staff. (Id. ¶ 23.) 

To accommodate smokers and Native Americans who wish to smudge, ADCRR has

installed electronic lighters in the open yards. (Id. ¶ 25.) For maximum custody prisoners 

seeking to smudge, correctional officers (COs) provide them with lighters during their 

outdoor recreation period. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff “does not dispute officers are suppose[d] to

provide inmates with lighters during their outdoor recreation period.” (Doc. 109 at 3 ¶ 26

(emphasis in original).) 

Browning Unit prisoners are provided with at least 2.5 hours of recreation time a 

day. (Doc. 100 ¶ 27.) Maximum custody prisoners in Browning Unit are provided 

recreation within security enclosures measuring 10 x 10 feet for individual recreation time 

and 20 x 40 or 50 x 90-foot enclosures for group recreation. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

Until 2020 or 2021, the chaplain would keep the smudging lighters in an office. (Id.

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¶ 29.) Lighters were also kept in the shift commanders’ office and in the control rooms, 

but this practice ended a year or two ago because officers were forgetting to return the 

lighters. (Id. ¶ 30.) For the last year or two, lighters have been included in the equipment 

carts that COs bring to recreation, and a lighter or two is still usually kept in the shift 

commander’s office. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff disputes paragraph 31 because he has never seen 

any lighters or any equipment carts while being turned out for recreation at Browning Unit. 

(Doc. 109 at 3 ¶ 31.) COs would sometimes provide a prisoner with a lighter of their own 

or from a fellow officer or COs can go to the shift commander’s office to retrieve one. 

(Doc. 100 ¶¶ 32, 33.)

If they are not in one of the group enclosures, prisoners seeking to organize a

communal smudging activity are required to make a request through the chaplain. (Id. ¶ 

34.) Plaintiff disputes paragraph 34, asserting that he “has requested a communal religious 

activity before but was told that due to his status as an STG inmate and being in maximum 

security, [his] request posed a security risk and was denied.” (Doc. 109 at 3 ¶ 34.) 

COs assigned to recreation are trained in their duties and instructed on the right of 

authorized Native Americans to smudge during their recreation time. (Doc. 100 ¶ 35.) 

Major Christina Brewer, who was a captain security chief at Browning Unit from 

December 2019 through July 2022, acknowledges that Browning Unit had a problem with 

some officers not following the policy of allowing Native American prisoners to smudge 

prior to 2021. (Id. ¶ 37.) Therefore, to address the problem, Major Brewer issued a 

memorandum on January 31, 2021, affirming that Native American prisoners were allowed 

to smudge during recreation. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 39.) The memorandum directed officers to retrieve 

the prisoners’ religious materials and provide them with a lighter to ignite their herbs. (Id.

¶ 39.) Plaintiff asserts that “officers prohibited him to exercise his religious practices 

during December 2019 through July 2022 on a consistent basis.” (Doc. 109 at 4 ¶ 37.)

To accommodate Native American prisoners’ requests to smudge, the Chaplaincy 

purchased lighters that were kept with the prisoners’ smudging materials stored in the 

Chaplaincy office, and Brewer had extra lighters placed in the yard office, so officers had 

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access to them in case they were needed during recreation. (Doc. 100 ¶¶ 40, 41.) Plaintiff 

asserts he does not have enough information to dispute these facts but if the chaplaincy 

purchased lighters for religious purposes, he “is unaware of this gesture,” and he is unaware 

that Major Brewer had extra lighters placed in the yard office for religious purposes. (Doc. 

109 at 4 ¶¶ 40, 41.) 

C. Plaintiff’s Smudging Requests and Grievances

Defendant asserts that ADCRR officials, including Deputy Security Operations 

Manager Ronald Towles and Captain Richard Michael Johnson, have repeatedly affirmed 

Plaintiff’sright to smudge, and COs have provided Plaintiff with the opportunity to smudge 

while at recreation. (Doc. 100 ¶ 36.) Plaintiff asserts he “does not dispute [paragraph 36] 

insofar that prison officials do affirm Plaintiff’s right to smudge, but in practice is another 

matter.” (Doc. 109 at 3 ¶ 36.) 

On November 5, 2019, while in the Browning Unit, Plaintiff began the grievance 

process in Case 20-013512, complaining that Chaplain Childs said Plaintiff could only 

smudge in the 10 x 10 rec cages and not in the “chute rec.,” that he had to store his 

smudging material with the chaplain, who would provide a lighter when needed, and that,

for over a month and a half, recreation had either been canceled or the chaplain was not 

around to access Plaintiff’s smudging materials. (Doc. 76 at 71.) The responses informed 

Plaintiff that he was on a list maintained by Chaplain Willis of prisoners approved to 

smudge, that Plaintiff needed to notify the chaplain when he wanted to smudge, that 

smudging materials would be secured in the lieutenant’s office, and that the chaplain had 

supplied the security lieutenant with lighters and prisoners’ smudging materials. (Id. at 69, 

70, 187, 189.) 

On September 13, 2020, while in ASPC-Eyman, SMU II, Plaintiff began the 

grievance process in Case 20-022699, in which he complained that the chaplain told him 

that the deputy warden said Plaintiff cannot smudge and so no lighter would be provided 

to Plaintiff; Plaintiff asked why he was not being allowed to smudge. (Id. at 185.) Plaintiff 

later clarified in his Grievance that he was only allowed to smudge in the “interactive rec. 

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cages,” not “chute rec.,” and, due to Covid, prisoners were not being sent to the interactive 

rec cages. (Id. at 184.) The deputy warden of Browning Unit responded that smudging 

was being offered in the chute recreation area and 10 x 10 recreation areas. (Id. at 181.) 

On January 27, 2021, while in Browning Unit, Plaintiff began the grievance process 

in Case 21-026141, in which he complained that Chaplain Willis was requiring Plaintiff to 

fill out an additional form to obtain a smudging shell because shells were now classified as 

a security threat item. (Id. at 168-69, 171-72.) Plaintiff wrote in his Grievance that the 

additional form was not an institutional/departmental official form, and it required him to 

acknowledge that smudging shells are a security threat, which Plaintiff refused to do 

because smudging shells are religious items, and he would not acknowledge they are 

anything else. (Id. at 166.) The Grievance Response said smudging shells would be 

considered on an individual basis upon written request and Plaintiff was to submit the 

necessary documentation to the chaplain for his request to be considered. (Id. at 167.) 

On March 7, 2021, while in APSC-Eyman, SMU II, Plaintiff began the grievance 

process in Case 21-028587, in which he complained that on March 5, 2021, a lieutenant 

instructed the rec crew that Plaintiff was prohibited from smudging, even after Plaintiff 

showed officers a grievance response from Deputy Warden Scott stating that smudging is 

allowed in the 10 x 10 rec cages. (Id. at 163.) On April 7, 2021, CO IV Altigieri responded 

that she had previously informed Plaintiff of dates on which he had smudged, that Plaintiff 

declined her offer of a lighter for smudging on March 4, 2021, and that Plaintiff did not 

request to smudge on March 26, 2021, when Altigieri gave the lighter to other Native 

Americans for smudging. (Id. at 162.) Altigieri also discussed the ways Plaintiff could 

obtain a lighter for smudging, such as sending her an inmate letter, asking the CO to call 

her on the radio or phone, or the CO could go to Altigieri’s office or the control room to 

get a lighter. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Grievance and Grievance Appeal on the issue of being 

denied smudging on March 4 or 5, 2021 and asking that officers be instructed on “Native 

Ways/religious beliefs” and to quit providing “excuse after excuse.”3 (Id. at 158, 160.) In 

3 Plaintiff stated in his Grievance Appeal that he had the wrong date in his Grievance 

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response to his Grievance, the Deputy Warden informed Plaintiff that officers were not 

prohibiting Plaintiff in any way from practicing his native/religious beliefs, but that 

Plaintiff refused to follow the proper steps to obtain a shell for smudging. (Id. at 159.) In 

response to Plaintiff’s Grievance Appeal, the Director’s office informed Plaintiff that the 

chaplain is available during Thursday recreation to offer approved inmates the opportunity 

to smudge, that the unit CO IV also made herself available to inmates needing a lighter to 

smudge, and that Plaintiff failed to substantiate his claim that staff were discriminating 

against him. (Id. at 157.) 

On April 13, 2021, while in the Browning Unit, Plaintiff sent a “Letter of Concern” 

to the ADCRR Director and Assistant Director about the certification and annual review 

of the Warrior Society STG, which Plaintiff said made the Warrior Society the equivalent 

of a terrorist organization, was highly prejudicial, and placed a substantial burden on Native 

Americans. (Id. at 129.) In his letter, Plaintiff explained the importance of maintaining 

Native Ways/Religious Beliefs, various practices, including smudging, and their purposes. 

(Id. at 129-133.) The response to this letter from Warden Hensley states that ADCRR has 

not classified the Warrior Society STG as the equivalent of a terrorist organization, but the 

Warrior Society has met the criteria of an STG under DO 806 for the past 25 years with 

documented instances of criminal behavior such as drug transactions, extortion and 

murders. (Id. at 128.) 

On May 11, 2021, while in the Browning Unit, Plaintiff began the grievance process 

in Case 21-030447, in which he complained that he was not ready for recreation turn out 

on May 10, 2021, and was not given standby. (Id. at 180.) Plaintiff also wrote about 

problems he had obtaining a lighter for smudging from CO Wilson, who told Plaintiff he 

was too busy to get a lighter or that Plaintiff did not need one. (Id.) The grievance response 

said a Town Hall meeting was held on July 14, 2021, and the issue of recreation times and 

standby notifications was discussed. (Id. at 177.) 

On May 24, 2022, while in the Browning Unit, Plaintiff began the grievance process 

and he was actually denied smudging on March 4, 2021. (Doc. 76 at 158.) 

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in Case 22-041521, in which he complained that for over a month, new officers had been

refusing to provide a lighter for smudging or that the lighters did not work. (Id. at 143.) 

The response states that the concern was forwarded to Capt. Brewer but there is nothing 

else in the response addressing Plaintiff’s complaint. (See id. at 142.)

On January 27, 2023, while in the ASPC-Winslow Central Detention Unit (CDU), 

Plaintiff began the grievance process in Case 23-051425, in which he complained that he 

was not allowed to smudge while in the CDU. (Id. at 141.) The response states that 

Chaplain Humphreys went to CDU on January 31, 2023, to conduct smudging with 

Plaintiff and that Plaintiff should submit an inmate letter with any religious needs so they 

can be conducted and scheduled. (Id. at 140.) 

On February 27, 2023, while in the Browning Unit, Plaintiff began the grievance 

process in Case 23-052228, in which he complained that he requested a lighter for 

smudging and officers told him it was not permitted in maximum custody and that Plaintiff 

needed to renounce if he wanted to exercise his religious practices. (Doc. 76 at 83.) The 

response states that officers will provide Plaintiff with a lighter in the recreation field when 

requested from Monday to Friday only. (Id. at 82.) In his Grievance, Plaintiff said, “that 

is not what is happening” and he has been told in the past that if he wants to exercise his 

religion unhindered, he needed to renounce his STG status and inform on other prisoners. 

(Id. at 81.) The response to Plaintiff’s second-level appeal of this grievance states that the 

shift commander will provide a lighter to staff on weekdays to allow the practice of 

smudging. (Id. at 73.)

On June 21, 2023, while in Browning Unit, Plaintiff wrote in an Informal Complaint 

that CO II Holmes told him he was too busy to pull Plaintiff out for recreation or get him 

a lighter. (Id. at 85.) The Court did not locate a response to this Informal Complaint. 

Defendant assertsthat CO IV Altigieri frequently visited the recreational enclosures, 

observed Native American prisoners smudging, and offered her personal lighter when 

requested. (Doc. 100 ¶ 44.) Plaintiff disputes this fact because he does not recall Altigieri 

frequently visiting the recreational enclosures, and Plaintiff says he will reverse his dispute 

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if Defendant can provide security footage verifying this fact. (Doc. 109 at 4 ¶ 44.) 

Sgt. Robert Comeau, who supervised recreation at Browning Unit from 2018

through December 2023, never refused to provide a lighter to a Native American prisoner,

although there were times when a prisoner might have to wait until the recreation turnout

was completed. (Doc. 100 ¶ 45.) Sgt. Comeau has watched Plaintiff obtain his smudging 

materials from his religious box and has provided Plaintiff with a lighter or observed other 

officers providing Plaintiff with a lighter on numerous occasions. (Id. ¶ 46.) 

CO Evan Baker, assigned to Browning Unit while Plaintiff was there, does not recall 

any time that he or another member of the recreation staff refused to provide a lighter, and 

most officers understood that refusing to do so could get them in trouble. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 48.) 

Baker personally provided or obtained a lighter for Plaintiff on numerous occasions. (Id. ¶ 

49.) 

Plaintiff was also able to smudge after he was transferred to ASPC-Lewis. (Id. ¶ 

50.) Close custody Native American prisoners are permitted to smudge during their 

recreation time, either individually or during group ceremonies. (Id. ¶ 51.) The chaplain’s 

office keeps records of the talking circle ceremonies, and those records show that Plaintiff

participated in a dozen talking circles where he smudged between his arrival at APSCLewis, Morey Unit, on November 8, 2023, and the end of May 2024. (Id. ¶ 52.) ASPCLewis Chaplain Sean Smith asserts that Plaintiff participated in Talking Circle Services 

with smudging on November 14 and 29, 2023; December 13, 19, and 26, 2023; January 8, 

22, and 29, 2024; February 28, 2024; March 4 and 18, 2024; and April 15, 2024.4 (Doc. 

100-1 at 71 (Smith Decl.) ¶ 12.) Smith asserts that Plaintiff attended Talking Circle 

Services on three dates in April 2024 and two dates in May 2024, but the prisoners chose 

not to smudge during those services. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

. . . .

. . . .

4 Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on June 26, 2024, which 

explains why there are no dates listed in the second half of 2024. 

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IV. Religious Exercise Legal Standards

A. First Amendment

“Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, ‘including its 

directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 

F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 

(1987)). To implicate the Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show that the belief at 

issue is both “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 

330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see Shakur, 514 F.3d 884-85 (noting the Supreme Court’s 

disapproval of the centrality test and finding that the sincerity test in Malik determines 

whether the Free Exercise Clause applies). 

If the prisoner makes this initial showing, the prisoner must then establish that 

prison officials substantially burdened the prisoner’s religious practice by preventing the 

prisoner from engaging in conduct which the prisoner sincerely believes is consistent with 

his or her faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. A regulation that burdens the First 

Amendment right to free exercise may be upheld only if it is reasonably related to a 

legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). This 

determination requires analysis of four prongs: (1) whether there is a valid, rational 

connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether 

there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prisoners; (3) the 

impact accommodation of the right will have on guards and other prisoners, and on the 

allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. Id. at 90. 

B. RLUIPA

Under RLUIPA, a government may not impose a substantial burden on the religious 

exercise of a confined person unless the government establishes that the burden furthers a 

“compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. 

' 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). 

RLUIPA requires a prisoner to show that the relevant exercise of religion is 

grounded in a sincerely held religious belief. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859, 862 

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(2015). Next, the prisoner bears the burden of establishing that a prison policy constitutes 

a substantial burden on that exercise of religion. Id.; Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994 (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). RLUIPA provides greater protection than the First 

Amendment’s alternative means test. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. 

If the prisoner satisfies these two showings, the burden shifts to the government to 

prove that the substantial burden on the prisoner’s religious practice both furthers a 

compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995.

V. Discussion

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s religious exercise, including smudging, is 

grounded in a sincerely held religious belief and not some other motivation. Therefore, the 

Court’s analysis focuses on whether Defendant has substantially burdened Plaintiff’s 

religious exercise and, if so, whether the burden is reasonably related to a legitimate 

penological interest under the First Amendment and furthers a compelling government 

interest under RLUIPA.5

In the First Amendment context, a substantial burden exists “where the state . . .

denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 

putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his 

beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18

(1981). In the RLUIPA context, a substantial burden is one that is “‘oppressive’ to a 

‘significantly great’ extent. That is, a ‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must 

impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Warsoldier v. 

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of 

5 The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff appears to frame the religious exercise 

right at issue as unfettered access to smudging. That is, there is no dispute that Plaintiff has 

a right to smudging. Plaintiff’s grievance documents, instead, reflect challenges to 

administrative requirements prior to smudging or challenges to occasions where 

circumstances prevented smudging. 

The Court does not view the right so narrowly. Nor does it constitute a substantial 

burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise to have access to smudging outdoors or on a 

schedule that is based on the availability of resources.

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Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). To substantially burden the practice 

of an individual’s religion, the interference must be more than an isolated incident or shortterm occurrence. Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998).

Defendant argues that the only policy and practice at issue is Plaintiff’s ability to 

smudge while he is in maximum custody. (Doc. 99 at 13.) Defendant contends that 

although Plaintiff has alleged that various, mostly unnamed, officers have refused to let 

him smudge during recreation, have not provided him with a lighter, or said they were too 

busy to do so, ADCRR’s policy clearly provides Plaintiff with the right to smudge, which 

supervisors have affirmed is the Department’s recognized practice, and several COs have 

testified that Plaintiff has been able to smudge. (Id.) Defendant also notes that Plaintiff’s 

claim for prospective relief became moot when Plaintiff was transferred on November 8, 

2023, to a close custody unit at ASPC-Lewis, but jurisdiction may still exist unless 

subsequent events make it absolutely clear that allegedly wrongful behavior could not 

reasonably be expected to recur. (Id. n.5.) 

Plaintiff responds there are genuine issues of material fact due to the “continuance 

of officers refusing to allow [him] to exercise his religious practices and expressions” and 

that “suggesting that a handful of officers were not allowing Plaintiff to exercise his 

religious practices and expressions should not be enough for this Court to conclude that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact.” (Doc. 108 at 2-3.) Plaintiff filed his response 

on September 23, 2024, and asserts that as recently as February through September 2023, 

he never saw any lighters brought to recreation as part of the equipment. (Doc. 108 at 6.) 

But Plaintiff’s statement that he did not see any lighters does not create an issue of fact. 

Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of whether lighters were brought and went 

unseen.

Nevertheless, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present 

case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” 

Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 864 

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(9th Cir. 2017) (“A request for injunctive relief remains live only so long as there is some 

present harm left to enjoin.”) (quoting Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 

1502 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). An exception to the mootness doctrine exists if a violation is 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citations omitted). This exception applies when “(1) the challenged action is too 

short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its expiration and (2) there is a reasonable 

expectation that the injury will occur again.” Id.

Here, there is evidence that Plaintiff has been in and out of maximum custody, where 

his complaints about the ability to smudge arose. Therefore, this appears to be a case where 

the exception to the mootness doctrine may apply, because Plaintiff may be subject to the 

conditions in maximum custody in the future, and the Court may consider Plaintiff’s 

request for injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff’s evidence shows that on June 21, 2023, he submitted an Informal 

Complaint asserting that CO II Holmes told him he was too busy to pull Plaintiff out for 

recreation or get him a lighter. (Doc. 76 at 85.) This is the most recent date for which 

Plaintiff indicates he was unable to smudge while in maximum custody. Plaintiff was 

transferred out of maximum custody on November 8, 2023, and it is unknown if Plaintiff 

is currently in maximum custody in the Rynning Unit. Even if Plaintiff is in or returns to 

maximum custody, Plaintiff does not dispute that ADCRR’s policy permits prisoners in 

maximum custody to smudge during recreation time and that maximum custody prisoners 

in Browning Unit are provided at least 2.5 hours of recreation time a day. The question, 

then, is whether in maximum custody the practice has been to prohibit Plaintiff from 

smudging such that it creates a substantial burden on his religious practice. Unfortunately, 

Plaintiff does not provide evidence of how often his religious practice requires him to 

smudge, and there is no evidence of how often Plaintiff has been prevented from smudging

other than a few occasions over a four-year period ending in mid-2023.

Plaintiff’s evidence of approximately 9 Informal Complaints or Formal Grievances 

filed between November 2019 and June 2023 provides few details on when Plaintiff 

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actually requested to smudge and was denied. Several of Plaintiff’s documents either 

complained about the designated location for smudging (in the interactive rec cages vs. the 

chute rec) or being required to fill out a form to obtain a smudging shell or the designation 

of the Warrior Society as an STG. (See Doc. 76 at 71, 129-133, 166-69, 171-72, 184-85.) 

As stated, those complaints only support a claim for unfettered access to smudging. There 

is no basis to conclude that requiring smudging to occur outside in secure locations 

constitutes a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise. 

Ultimately, only a few grievance documents provided specific dates when recreation 

was canceled, or someone was unable or unwilling to provide Plaintiff smudging materials 

(March 5, 2021, May 11, 2021, January 27, 2023, June 21, 2023). (Id. at 85, 141, 163, 

180.) 

Other grievance documents during those four years vaguely asserted that recreation 

was canceled for a period of time (in 2019 and again in 2020 due to the COVID-19

pandemic), the chaplain not being available to get smudging materials (in 2019), new 

officers not following policy (in 2022), lighters not working (in 2022), or officers telling 

Plaintiff he needed to renounce (in 2023). (Doc. 76 at 71, 81, 83, 184.) Absent additional 

facts specifying when and whether Plaintiff requested to smudge and was precluded from 

smudging, this evidence is too vague and conclusory to infer Plaintiff suffered a substantial 

burden to his religious practice or that he will be subject to those same conditions in the 

future such that he is entitled to injunctive relief. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 

509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[c]onclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and 

moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary 

judgment”); Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 952 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a conclusory, 

self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to 

create a genuine issue of material fact”).

Moreover, the responses to Plaintiff’s grievances affirmed Plaintiff did have the 

right to smudge during recreation time, or that Plaintiff did, in fact, smudge, was on a list 

of prisoners allowed to smudge, and the steps Plaintiff needed to take to smudge. (See

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Doc. 76 at 65, 68, 69, 73, 82, 140, 157, 159, 164, 181, 187, 189.) In addition, to address 

the problem of some officers not following the policy of allowing Native American

prisoners to smudge, Major Brewer sent a memorandum to security officers on January 31, 

2021, informing them that prisoners had a right to smudge during recreation and directing 

officers to retrieve the prisoners’ religious materials and provide them with a lighter to 

ignite their herbs. (DSOF ¶¶ 37-39.)

The most recent evidence of Plaintiff not being able to smudge occurred in 

Browning Unit in June 2023, when Plaintiff says CO Holmes was too busy to take Plaintiff 

to recreation or get him a lighter. Although Plaintiff asserts in his Response that as recently 

as February through September 2023, he never saw any lighters brought to recreation as 

part of the equipment, Plaintiff does not say that lighters were not available upon request. 

Finally, there is simply insufficient evidence showing how often Plaintiff believes he needs 

to smudge and how often he has been denied the ability to smudge to conclude that the 

incidents reflected in his grievance documents over a four-year period were anything more 

than isolated incidents or short-term occurrences or that there was a policy, practice or 

custom that prevents him from smudging while in maximum custody. Canell, 143 F.3d at 

1215 (substantial burden must be more than an isolated incident or short-term occurrence).

Based on this record, no reasonable jury could conclude that even if Plaintiff is 

returned to maximum custody, he faces substantial pressure to modify his behavior and 

violate his beliefs, and the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s 

remaining claim related to smudging. 

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

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IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 99).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 99) is granted, and the 

action is terminated with prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 10th day of January, 2025.

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