Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04948/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04948-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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Case Nos.: 13-CV-03400-LHK; 13-CV-4948-LHK

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GREGORY NICHOLAS STESHENKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUZANNE GAYRARD, et al.,

Defendants.

GREGORY NICHOLAS STESHENKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GERALDINE ALBEE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case Nos.:13-CV-03400-LHK

 13-CV-04948-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 73, 51

Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff Gregory Steshenko’s Second 

Amended Complaints in both Steshenko v. Gayrard, No. 13-3400, and Steshenko v. Albee, No. 13-

4948. As the briefing in both actions is identical, the instant order disposes of both motions. 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds these motions suitable for disposition without 

oral argument and VACATES the hearings set for April 2, 2015. Having reviewed the 

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submissions of the parties, the record in these cases, and the relevant law, the Court hereby 

GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ actions with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e). 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court begins by summarizing the factual background in Steshenko v. Gayrard, which 

involves Plaintiff’s application to programs at San Jose State University. Plaintiff is a 52-year-old 

unemployed electrical engineer seeking to re-enter the job market through professional re-training.

ECF No. 13-3400, Second Am. Compl. (“Gayrard SAC”) ¶ 22. In addition to a Master of Science 

degree in Electrical Engineering, Plaintiff earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Biochemistry 

and Molecular Biology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, in 2010. See id.

On November 23, 2012, Plaintiff applied to the Clinical Laboratory Scientist (“CLS”) 

Training Program at San Jose State University. Id. ¶ 28. The CLS Training Program is a one-year 

academic program combining theoretical training with an internship at a participating clinical 

laboratory. Id. ¶ 23. On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that his application was denied 

and that he would not be invited for an interview. Id. ¶ 30. According to Plaintiff, much younger 

applicants, in their 20s, with much more inferior academic credentials and work experience, were 

invited for interviews and subsequently admitted to the program. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he 

personally knew some of these applicants and observed how they “struggled” while taking the 

prerequisites for the program. Id. Plaintiff later raised these issues with the head of the CLS 

Training Program, Defendant Suzanne Gayrard. Id. However, Gayrard refused to explain the 

admission decision or to inform Plaintiff about the age statistics of the admitted applicants. Id.

Accordingly, Plaintiff concluded that he was discriminated against on the grounds of age. Id.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil 

Rights (“USDOE”). Id. ¶ 31.

On February 3, 2013, Defendant Tzvia Abramson, the head of the Stem Cell Internships in 

Laboratory Based Learning (“SCILL”) Program, invited Plaintiff to apply to the SCILL Program.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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Id. ¶ 32. The SCILL Program is a two-year Master of Science program with a year of theoretical 

training and a year of an internship at a participating research laboratory. Id. ¶ 24. On February 28, 

2013, Plaintiff applied to the SCILL Program. Id. ¶ 32. 

According to Plaintiff, after Abramson contacted Gayrard and learned about Plaintiff’s 

complaint to the USDOE, Defendants Abramson, Gayrard, and other university employees formed 

a conspiracy to retaliate against Plaintiff for his complaint. Specifically, the defendants 

“communicated and agreed that Plaintiff should not be invited for the SCILL admissions interview 

because of his complaints and his expressed intention to sue.” Id. ¶ 33. On May 3, 2013, 

Abramson notified Plaintiff that he was not selected as “a finalist for this round,” but that Plaintiff 

was on a waiting list for Fall 2013. Id. ¶ 34. Abramson also stated that she would not provide any 

information about Plaintiff’s ranking on that waiting list. Id. However, according to Plaintiff, there 

was no such thing as a waiting list and the SCILL Program had been “struggling to find . . . 

minimally qualified students willing to apply.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that all of the admitted 

applicants to the SCILL Program were young, and “their academic credentials were much inferior 

to those of Plaintiff.” Id.

On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff notified Gayrard that Plaintiff would file a lawsuit against 

Gayrard. Id. ¶ 35. According to Plaintiff, “Defendants decided to retaliate further” by denying 

Plaintiff’s admission to graduate studies at San Jose State University’s Department of Biological 

Sciences. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the CLS Training Program, the SCILL Program, and the participating 

laboratories “heavily discriminate on the grounds of age.” Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff further alleges: “No 

persons of the protected age have ever been admitted to either of [the CLS Training or the SCILL] 

programs. The age discrimination is rampant.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted his administrative remedies with the USDOE on June 

29, 2013. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff also alleges that he filed “several timely administrative claims with 

California State University Chancellor’s Office.” ECF No. 46 at 3. However, Plaintiff’s claims 

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were denied. Id. ¶ 8.

In Steshenko v. Albee, Plaintiffs alleges he suffered age discrimination in his application to 

San Francisco State University. On October 22, 2012, Plaintiff applied to the CLS Training 

Program at San Francisco State University. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 45, (“Albee SAC”) ¶ 

22. On March 19, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that his application was denied due to his late 

submission of his transcript and that he would not be invited for an interview. Id. ¶ 23. On June 

12, 2013, Plaintiff subsequently reapplied for the spring semester, to begin coursework in 2014. 

Id. ¶¶ 23–24. According to Plaintiff, sometime during July 2013 or August 2013, Defendant Albee 

and other university employees “assembled, communicated and finally decided that Plaintiff [was] 

not suitable for the CLS program because of his age, and therefore should not be invited to an 

admissions interview.” Id. ¶ 25 On August 28, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that his application was 

denied because “he did not meet the criteria for selection into the CLS program.” Id. ¶ 26. 

According to Plaintiff, much younger applicants, in their 20s, with much more inferior academic 

credentials and work experience, were invited for interviews and subsequently admitted to the 

program. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff concluded that he was discriminated on the grounds of age. In 

making this conclusion, Plaintiff also alleges that “[n]o persons of the protected age have ever 

been admitted to . . . this program” and that “[t]he age discrimination is rampant.” Id. ¶ 21.

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a timely administrative claim with the California State 

University Chancellor’s Office. Id. ¶ 8. However, Plaintiff’s claims were denied. Id. Plaintiff also 

alleges that he gave timely notices of the instant action to Defendants, the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, and the Attorney General of the United States. Id. ¶ 9. 

B. Procedural Background

1. Gayrard Procedural Background

On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Defendants. ECF No. 1. On 

October 22, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 12.

After the Court granted the parties’ motions to extend time to file a response to the motion to 

dismiss, on January 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 26. On January 24, 2014, 

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Plaintiff filed an addendum to his opposition. ECF No. 28. On January 31, 2014, Defendants filed 

a reply. ECF No. 29. The Court held a hearing on May 15, 2014. ECF No. 36. Plaintiff filed a 

supplemental letter brief on May 16, 2014. ECF No. 35.

On May 20, 2014, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (“May 20, 2014 

Order”), ECF No. 42. In the order, the Court granted with leave to amend Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Board of Trustees; Plaintiff’s § 1983 retaliation claim against 

Gayrard and Abramson; and Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim against Gayrard and Abramson. May 20, 

2014 Order at 20. The Court also granted with prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim based on due process and equal protection violations against Gayrard and Abramson; 

Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act claim against Gayrard and Abramson; and Plaintiff’s Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act claim against Gayrard and Abramson. Id. Finally, the Court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and thus 

granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims—FEHA claim, Bane Act 

claims, and IIED claim. Id. at 18–20. 

On May 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants.

ECF No. 45. On June 1, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

(“MTD”), ECF No. 49. On June 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a response. ECF No. 51. On July 10, 

2014, Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 53. 

On September 29, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. ECF No. 60. The Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendant Board of Trustees with the exception of Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act claim. The 

Court granted leave to amend only with respect to Plaintiff’s due process claims against 

Defendants Abramson and Gayrard. As to the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims against the 

individual Defendants, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 

retaliation claim as related to the SCILL program, but dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s other 

claims. The Court also dismissed Defendants Rech, Sneary, Boothby, and Wilkinson, as Plaintiff 

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had failed to secure Court approval or a stipulation to add new parties to the action. 

On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

of the Court’s September 29, 2014 order dismissing Defendants Rech, Sneary, Boothby, and 

Wilkinson. ECF No. 65. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on December 17, 

2014. ECF No. 72. 

On October 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed his SAC. ECF No. 64. Defendant Board of Trustees 

filed an answer on October 27, 2014. ECF No. 67. The individual Defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim that same day. ECF No. 66. Plaintiff filed an opposition on 

November 11, 2014, ECF No. 68, and Defendants filed their reply on November 18, 2014, ECF 

No. 69. On February 25, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’ motion, and dismissed Plaintiff’s 

due process claim with prejudice. ECF No. 76.

2. Albee Procedural Background

On October 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed an original Complaint. No. 13-4948, ECF No. 1. On 

March 26, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 14.

That same day, Defendants amended the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 15. After the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s motion to extend time to file a response to the motion to dismiss, on April 17, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 20. On April 23, 2014, Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 

21. The Court held a hearing on May 15, 2014. Plaintiff filed a supplemental letter brief on May 

16, 2014. ECF No. 23.

On May 20, 2014, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 29. In the 

order, the Court granted with leave to amend Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s 

claims against the Board of Trustees and Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim against Albee. (“May 20, 

2014 Order”), ECF No. 29 at 17. The Court also granted with prejudice Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims against Albee; 

Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act claim against Albee; and Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act claim against Albee. May 20, 2014 Order at 17. Finally, the Court declined to 

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and thus granted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims—FEHA claim, Bane Act claims, and 

IIED claim. May 20, 2014 Order at 17. 

On May 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants. ECF No. 31.

Plaintiff filed a corrected First Amended Complaint on June 29, 2014. (“FAC”), ECF. No. 34. On 

June 16, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (“MTD”), ECF No. 

33, which Plaintiff opposed on June 29, 2014, (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 35. On July 10, 2014, 

Defendants filed a reply. (“Reply”), ECF No. 36. 

On September 29, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. ECF No. 41. The Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendant Board of Trustees with the exception of Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act claim. The 

Court dismissed with leave to amend Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendant Albee and

dismissed with prejudice the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Albee. 

On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed his SAC. ECF No. 45. Defendant Board of Trustees 

filed its answer on October 27, 2014. ECF No. 47. That same day, Defendant Albee filed a motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim. ECF No. 46. Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 

11, 2014, ECF No. 48, and Albee filed a reply on November 18, 2014, ECF No. 49. On February 

25, 2015, the Court granted with prejudice Albee’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process 

claim.

3. Instant Motions to Dismiss

On December 19, 2014, Defendants filed the instant, identical motions to dismiss pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). No. 13-3400, ECF No. 73; No. 13-4948, ECF No. 51. Plaintiff filed 

identical oppositions, No. 13-3400, ECF No. 77; No. 13-4948, ECF No. 55, and Defendants filed 

identical replies, No. 13-3400, ECF No.81; No. 13-4948, ECF No. 60. Defendants also filed 

requests for judicial notice, No. 13-3400, ECF Nos. 76, 83; No. 13-4948, ECF Nos. 54, 61, and 

motions for leave to file a supplemental reply brief, No. 13-3400, ECF Nos. 90; No. 13-4948, ECF 

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No. 68.1Plaintiff filed oppositions to Defendants’ motions for leave to file a supplemental reply 

brief, No. 13-3400, ECF Nos. 91; No. 13-4948, ECF No. 69.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The clerk of each district court shall require the parties initiating any civil action, suit or 

proceeding in such court . . . to pay a filing fee of $350 . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Section 

§ 1915(a)(1) provides:

[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, 

prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or 

criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security 

therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a 

statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is 

unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

The determination of whether a plaintiff is indigent and therefore unable to pay the filing 

fee falls within the court’s sound discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 

(9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). A party need not be completely 

destitute to be eligible for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 

Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). The affidavit supporting an IFP motion is sufficient if it alleges 

facts showing that the plaintiff, because of poverty, cannot pay or give security for court costs and 

still be able to provide herself and her dependents with “the necessities of life.” Id. at 339.

However, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the 

allegation of poverty is untrue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A).1 See Igbinadolor v. TiVo, Inc., No. 

 

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The Court GRANTS Defendants’ unopposed requests for judicial notice, No. 13-3400, ECF Nos. 

76, 83; No. 13-4948, ECF Nos. 54, 61, and has taken notice of the adjudicative facts contained 

therein. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689–90 (9th Cir. 2001) (matters of public 

record); MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986) (court records); see also

Fed. R. Evid. 201(d).

The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motions for leave to file a supplemental reply brief. 

No. 13-3400, ECF Nos. 90; No. 13-4948, ECF No. 68. As discussed in the Court’s order denying 

Plaintiff’s administrative motions to seal the exhibits submitted in support of his oppositions to the 

instant motions, Plaintiff failed to provide copies of the exhibits to defense counsel prior to the 

deadline for filing a reply. See ECF No. 74. As those exhibits are central to Plaintiff’s opposition, 

the Court grants Defendants’ motions.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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08-CV-2580, 2009 WL 3253946, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct.6, 2009) (“Dismissal of the case is required 

upon a showing that the allegation of poverty is untrue,” and “[t]he only discretion the court has is 

whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice.”); Oquendo v. Geren, 594 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 

(D.D.C. 2009) (“[D]ismissal is mandatory in the face of untrue allegations of poverty.”); Berry v. 

Locke, No. 1:08cv697 (JCC), 2009 WL 1587315, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2009) (“Courts that have 

considered [28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) ] have held that dismissal is mandatory when a court finds that 

allegations of poverty in an IFP application are untrue; the court also has the discretion to dismiss 

the case with prejudice.”); Bell v. Dobbs Int’l Serv., 6 F.Supp.2d 863, 864 (E.D. Mo.1998) (“As is 

explicitly addressed in the statutory language, the fact that plaintiff paid the filing fee after her IFP 

application was denied does not preclude application of the provision to dismiss her case based on 

a false allegation of poverty.”). 

Where the applicant has knowingly provided inaccurate information on his or her IFP

application, the dismissal may be with prejudice. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 

F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 2002); Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612–13 (11th Cir. 1997); 

Romesburg v. Trickey, 908 F.2d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1990); Thompson v. Carlson, 705 F.2d 868, 

869 (6th Cir. 1983). 

III.DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ actions with prejudice based on two apparent 

misrepresentations in Plaintiffs’ IFP applications in these cases: (1) Plaintiff’s failure to disclose 

his ownership of a home with substantial equity; and (2) Plaintiff’s failure to accurately disclose 

his marital status and any income flowing therefrom. As the Court finds that Plaintiff knowingly 

failed to disclose his ownership of a home, the Court does not reach Defendants’ second argument. 

The Court begins by describing Plaintiff’s prior IFP applications in other actions. In 2004, 

Plaintiff filed an IFP application in Steshenko v. Christey, No. 04-3626, ECF No. 2. In that August 

25, 2004 application, Plaintiff disclosed that he was married, and that his spouse had a gross 

income of $2,111 a month. Id. Plaintiff also disclosed the fact that he owned a house with an 

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estimated market value of $369,000 and a monthly mortgage of $1450. Id. On November 10, 

2004, District Judge Fogel denied Plaintiff’s IFP application noting that Plaintiff and his wife had 

a combined income of $30,732, a balance of over $5000 in their bank account, and owned a home 

worth $369,000. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff then paid his filing fee on November 19, 2004. The Court 

granted a motion to dismiss with prejudice in Christey on May 20, 2005. ECF No. 54.

In 2009, Plaintiff filed an IFP application in Steshenko v. McKay, No. 09-5543. ECF No. 2. 

In that November 23, 2009 IFP application, Plaintiff checked “No,” to the question “Are you 

married?” and left blank the spaces for a spouse’s name, employment, and monthly salary or 

wages. Id. Plaintiff also checked “No,” to the question “Do you own or are you buying a home?”

and left blank the spaces for estimated market value and amount of mortgage. Id. On November

24, 2009, Magistrate Judge Seeborg granted Plaintiff’s IFP application. Following an eight-day

jury trial and a jury verdict in favor of the McKay defendants, the Court entered the judgment on 

April 1, 2015. ECF Nos. 998, 1002. Plaintiff has since appealed that verdict. ECF No. 1000.

In 2012, Plaintiff filed an IFP application in the Eastern District of California, in a motion 

to quash related to Steshenko v. McKay. See No. 12-mc-00062-MCE-GGH, ECF No. 2. In that 

August 9, 2012 IFP application, Plaintiff circled “yes” to the question “Do you own any real 

estate, stocks, bonds, securities, other financial instruments, automobiles or any other thing of 

value.” Id. Under “If ‘Yes,’ describe the property and state its value,” Plaintiff wrote only “Car 

Scion XB 2005, present value $2500.00.” Id. In describing his unemployment status, Plaintiff 

wrote “I’m a long-term unemployed, and presently surviving on the food stamps and the monthly 

loan from my family. The loan is to be repaid when I find a job.” Id.

In 2013, Plaintiff filed the two IFP applications at issue in the instant order. Both IFP 

applications are identical. Question 5 of the IFP applications asks “Do you own or are you buying 

a home?” Plaintiff checked “No” and wrote “N/A” in the spaces for “Estimated Market Value” 

and “Amount of Mortgage.” Plaintiff also checked “No,” for “Are you married?” and wrote “N/A”

for spouse’s name, place of employment, and monthly salary or income. 

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Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff knowingly and intentionally omitted material 

information from four IFP applications, two of which are presently before this Court. Plaintiff 

declared, under penalty of perjury, that the information provided in his IFP applications was true 

and correct. In his 2009 IFP application in McKay, 2012 IFP application in the Eastern District of 

California, 2013 IFP application in Gayrard, and 2013 IFP application in Albee, Plaintiff failed to 

disclose that he owned a home. Plaintiff had previously disclosed his ownership of the property at 

3030 Marlo Court, Aptos, California, and its then-market value of $369,000 in his 2004 IFP 

application in Christey. In District Judge Fogel’s denial of Plaintiff’s IFP application in Christey, 

Judge Fogel specially referenced Plaintiff’s ownership of a $369,000 home as indicative of 

Plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing fee. Following that initial IFP application and denial, Plaintiff 

has omitted any mention of the property he owns in his subsequent four IFP applications.

As a threshold matter, the Court concludes that Plaintiff continues to own the property at 

3030 Marlo Court, Aptos, California, which is also Plaintiff’s current residence. Defendants have 

submitted public records evidencing Plaintiff’s ownership of the property at 3030 Marlo Court. 

See RJN, Exh. 8. According to Santa Cruz County Records, Plaintiff first recorded a grant deed 

naming, “as his sole and separate property,” the residence on August 10, 1999. ECF No. 54-8.

That same day, Plaintiff recorded a deed of trust to secure a note in the amount of $139,000. Id. In 

July 2004, Plaintiff granted a deed of trust to GMAC Mortgage to secure a 30 year note in the 

amount of $130,000, which fully reconveyed the 1999 deed of trust. Id. As of 2004, Plaintiff 

estimated the value of the home at $369,000. Defendants also submitted an estimated value of the 

property at $733,797 as of December 12, 2014. According to Defendants, “[e]ven if the property 

appreciated as much as 10% from 2013 when the complaint was filed, to December 2014, the 

value in 2013 was $667,088.” Mot. at 5. 

In opposition to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff does not affirmatively disclaim any 

ownership interest in the property, but instead refers to the fact that he transferred an interest in the 

property to his mother in 2009 “as surety for the family loan that she provided to him to put him 

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back to work.” Opp. at 2. Plaintiff submitted an unrecorded transfer grant deed showing that 

Plaintiff conveyed the property to his mother on November 20, 2009. The conveyance, however, 

is marked as “exempt from Documentary Transfer Tax” because “[t]his conveyance is to secure a 

debt, R & T 11921.” Plaintiff further argues that his mother further transferred “the interest in the 

property” to other family members “after her personal ability to loan money to Plaintiff was 

exhausted.” The Court finds this explanation troubling and insufficient. 

Here, whether or not Plaintiff transferred an interest in the Aptos property to his mother, he 

still retained ownership of the property and was obligated to disclose that ownership on four 

separate IFP applications. Plaintiff failed to do so. Even assuming the property was worth the 

same amount in 2009, 2012, and 2013 as it was in 2004, Plaintiff had valued the property at 

$369,000. Had Plaintiff properly disclosed his ownership of a property worth hundreds of 

thousands of dollars, this Court would have denied Plaintiff’s IFP applications in Gayrard and 

Albee. The Court explicitly noted Plaintiff’s lack of home ownership as a factor weighing in favor 

of granting IFP status. See No. 13-3400, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff therefore misrepresented material 

information to this Court.

Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff fully comprehends that he retains ownership of the 

Aptos property. As discussed above, Plaintiff does not ever actually disclaim his ownership of the 

Aptos property. Instead, Plaintiff describes a “transfer” of an “interest” as “surety for the family 

loan[s]” that he has received over the last several years to pay for living expenses. See No. 13-

3400, ECF No. 77, ¶ 4. Plaintiff refers to his mother’s “interest in the property,” which she has 

since purportedly transferred to other family members. As Defendants note, however, the 

unrecorded transfer deed is marked as “exempt from Documentary Transfer Tax” because “[t]his 

conveyance is to secure a debt, R & T 11921.” The reference to R& T 11921 is to California 

Revenue and Taxation Code § 11921, which provides that real estate transfer taxes do not apply to 

“any instrument in writing given to secure a debt.” Under California law, Plaintiff’s conveyance of 

an interest in his property as surety for a debt created a mortgage, and there was no transfer of 

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ownership. See, e.g., Jensen v. Friedman, 79 Cal. App. 2d 494, 498–99 (Ct. App. 1947). Based on 

Plaintiff’s representations and argument, the Court concludes that Plaintiff knowingly created a 

mortgage and retained his ownership interest in the property. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has referred to “family loans” covering his living expenses in both 

IFP applications at issue in the instant order, as well as the 2009 McKay IFP application and the 

2012 Eastern District of California IFP application. In the Eastern District of California IFP 

application, Plaintiff explained “I’m a long-term unemployed, and presently surviving on the food 

stamps and the monthly loan from my family. The loan is to be repaid when I find a job.” No. 12-

mc-00062, ECF No. 2. In the instant IFP applications, Plaintiff again stated that his monthly 

expenses are “partially [met] by a family loan extended by the [sic] family members.” Plaintiff is 

presumably referring to continued family loans that he is expected to repay once he finds 

employment. That Plaintiff is expected to repay these family loans, and that he has affirmatively 

stated this expectation is further evidence of Plaintiff’s understanding that he did not transfer 

ownership of his Aptos property in exchange for monthly payments from his family, but rather 

solely as security for these loans. 

The Court is also troubled by Plaintiff’s lack of explanation for his material omissions to 

this Court. To the extent Plaintiff might have believed that he was not obligated to disclose his 

ownership of the Aptos property because of the 2009 mortgage created in favor of his mother, the 

Court finds this excuse would be insufficient. In Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 

547–48 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal 

with prejudice under § 1915(e)(2) where the plaintiff failed to disclose that he owned a home with 

$14,000 worth of equity. In Mathis, the plaintiff claimed that he “did not disclose the equity in his 

home because he did not own it ‘free and clear.’” Id. at 547. As in Mathis, the Court concludes 

that such a claim would be unreasonable. Here, Plaintiff has neither argued that he does not retain 

ownership of a home worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, nor provided any basis for the 

conclusion that Plaintiff is somehow unaware of his interest in the property. The IFP applications 

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ask simple, straightforward questions, and Plaintiff is not only college educated, but also has 

advanced degrees. Plaintiff has also felt comfortable providing “additional statements” on IFP 

applications and could have explained that he had transferred an interest in the property to his 

mother. See, e.g., No. 9-5543, ECF No. 2 (2009 IFP application with “Additional Statement of 

Applicant” typed at end of form). Instead, Plaintiff chose to omit any mention of the property

altogether.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff intentionally and knowingly omitted material 

information about his financial status. Plaintiff’s failure to disclaim his ownership of the property, 

his description of the transfer as “surety for a debt,” his invocation of Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 

§ 11291, and Plaintiff’s prior statement that he is expected to repay the “family loans” that he is 

receiving, all indicate to this Court that Plaintiff fully understands that he retains an ownership 

interest in the property. As Plaintiff has made untrue allegations of poverty, the Court has no 

choice but to dismiss these actions. See Igbinadolor, 2009 WL 3253946, at *1; Oquendo, 594 F. 

Supp. 2d at 11; Berry, 2009 WL 1587315, at *5.

The only remaining issue is whether this dismissal should be with prejudice. To the 

Court’s knowledge, Plaintiff has filed five separate IFP applications. Plaintiff disclosed his 

ownership of the Aptos property and its market value in only one of those five IFP applications, 

which was also the only IFP application which the Court denied. Since that denial, Plaintiff has 

filed for IFP status four times and omitted any mention of his Aptos property. The Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s repeated, material omissions and misrepresentations constitute a fraud on the Court. 

See, e.g., Emrit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 13-5951, 2014 WL 3841015, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014) 

(omission of $31,000 inheritance a “fraud on the Court” that warranted dismissal with prejudice 

under § 1915(e)(2)); Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547–48. Plaintiff is well-educated and is an experienced 

litigant. Not only had Plaintiff previously filed a complete, correct IFP application in 2004, but 

over the last decade Plaintiff has filed dozens of motions, several complaints, and represented 

himself in an eight-day jury trial. Plaintiff does not claim ignorance or innocent mistake, and in 

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light of the 2004 IFP application and Plaintiff’s significant experience before the Court, such a 

claim would ring hollow. 

The Court therefore exercises its discretion to dismiss these actions with prejudice. See 

Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543–44 (7th Cir. 2011); Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306–308; Thompson, 

705 F.2d at 869. Here, Plaintiff has knowingly, repeatedly omitted material information on his IFP 

applications. “[W]here one attempts to ‘defraud the government’ with a perjurious IFP affidavit, 

dismissal with prejudice may be the only effective sanction.” Mullins v. Hallmark Data Systems, 

LLC, 511 F. Supp. 2d 928, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306–07). Plaintiff 

knowingly misrepresented his financial status in no less than four separate IFP applications, two of 

which are presently before this Court. These representations are substantial and material. Whether 

or not the Aptos property is worth $369,000 or $667,088, Plaintiff had substantial equity in his 

home at the time he filed his IFP applications in 2009, 2012, and 2013. In making the conscious 

decision to omit that information in order to attain IFP status, Plaintiff committed a deliberate 

fraud on the Court. In Gayrard and Albee, the Court explicitly relied on Plaintiff’s lack of home 

ownership as a reason to grant Plaintiff’s IFP applications. In light of Plaintiff’s deliberate 

concealment of material information, the Court concludes that a dismissal with prejudice “is the 

only appropriate sanction.” Emrit, 2014 WL 3841015, at *3. 

IV.CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss with 

prejudice. 

The Clerk shall close the case files.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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