Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01562/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01562-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD CATHEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:10-cv-1562-BAM

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY’S FEES

(Doc. 25) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s counsel, Sengthiene Bosavanh, Esq., filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).

1

(Doc. 22.) Donald Cathey (“Plaintiff”) and the Commissioner 

of Social Security (“Defendant”) were served with the motion. (Doc. 25-1, pg.1). The motion 

advised Plaintiff that any objections must be filed with the Court within fourteen days. (Doc. 25, 

pg. 2). In keeping with the role resembling that of a trustee for Plaintiff, the Commissioner filed 

a response to Ms. Bosavanh’s motion. (Doc. 28). See generally, Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 

 

1 The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (See, Docs. 11 and 29).

Case 1:10-cv-01562-BAM Document 31 Filed 06/11/15 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

789, 798 n. 6 (2002). Plaintiff did not file any objections. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought the underlying action seeking judicial review of a final administrative 

decision denying his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) On

June 5, 2012, the court entered a judgment against the defendant and remanded the case for 

further proceedings. (Doc. 21). Subsequently, Plaintiff’s counsel was awarded attorney’s fees 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the amount of $6,742.53. (Doc. 24.) Ms. 

Bosavanh now seeks an award of attorney fees in the amount of $8,657.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 406(b). In support of the motion, Ms. Bosavanh filed evidence indicating that Plaintiff was 

awarded $34,826.00 in retroactive disability benefits. (Doc. 25-2, pg. 1). She is seeking 25% of 

the retroactive benefits awarded for attorney’s fees.

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in 

which they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides the 

following in relevant part: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 

attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment 

a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 

of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social 

Security may ... certify the amount of such fee for payment to such 

attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due 

benefits .... 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting 

provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits 

awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 

Case 1:10-cv-01562-BAM Document 31 Filed 06/11/15 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

1147 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 789, 802). However, the 

Commissioner has standing to challenge the award, despite the fact that the Section 406(b)

attorney's fee award is not paid by the government. Craig v. Sec ‘y Dep't of Health & Human 

Servs., 864 F.2d 324, 328 (4th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 

807. The goal of fee awards under Section 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent 

claimants while ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly 

depleted. Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 

The twenty-five percent (25%) maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts 

are required to ensure that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808–09

(Section 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, 

Section 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). 

“Within the 25 percent boundary ... the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the 

fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 

1148 (holding that Section 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a 

requested fee is reasonable” but “provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due 

benefits awarded”). 

Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under § 

406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ ... ‘looking 

first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’ ” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 

1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). The United States Supreme Court has identified 

several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a contingent-fee 

agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court: (1) the character of the 

representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in 

Case 1:10-cv-01562-BAM Document 31 Filed 06/11/15 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 

benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 

attorney's record of hours worked and counsel's regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent 

cases. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807–08).

Here, Plaintiff and counsel have entered into an agreement that provides for attorney’s 

fees in the amount of 25% of the past-due benefits. (Doc. 25-3, pg.1). The Court has considered 

counsel's representation of Plaintiff and the results achieved by counsel. There is no indication 

that a reduction of the award is warranted due to any substandard performance by counsel in this 

matter. Counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff. There 

is also no evidence that Ms. Bosavanh engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in excessive 

delay. Thus, the $8,657.00 represents 25% of the past-due benefits paid to Plaintiff and is not 

excessive in relation to the past-due award. See generally Deardon v. the Comm’n of Soc. Sec., 

No. 1:12-cv-120-BAM, 2014 WL 6612036, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Nov. 20, 2014) (granting attorney’s 

fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of $16,474.00); Taylor v. Astrue, No. 1:06–cv–

00957–SMS, 2011 WL 836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Mar.4, 2011) (granting petition for an award of 

attorney's fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of $20,960.00); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 

1:09–cv–00490–LJO–DLB, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Feb.9, 2011) (recommending an 

award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of $34,500.00). In making this 

determination, the Court recognizes the contingent-fee nature of this case and counsel's 

assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under such terms. See Hearn v. Barnhart, 

262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D.Cal.2003) (“Because attorneys like Mr. Sackett contend with a 

substantial risk of loss in Title II cases, an effective hourly rate of only $450 in successful cases 

does not provide a basis for this court to lower the fee to avoid a windfall.”). 

Case 1:10-cv-01562-BAM Document 31 Filed 06/11/15 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

An award of Section 406(b) fees, however, must be offset by any prior award of 

attorney's fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Here, 

Plaintiff's counsel has already been awarded EAJA fees in the amount of $6,742.53.00. 

Therefore, any Section 406(b) fees awarded must be off-set by $6,742.53.00, and refunded to 

Plaintiff. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the fees sought by Ms. Bosavanh pursuant to Section 406(b)

are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of $8,657.00 

is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff's counsel is ordered to refund $6,742.53 of the Section 406(b) fees awarded to 

Plaintiff as an offset for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve this order on Plaintiff, Donald Cathey at 440 

E. Lincoln Ave., Fresno, California 93706.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:10-cv-01562-BAM Document 31 Filed 06/11/15 Page 5 of 5