Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03132/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ERNEST G. MOORE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

, lJL .. 5 

&.OBERT L. HOECK13R 

Clerk 

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No. 91-3132 

(D.C. No. 90-CV-3430) 

(D. Kansas) 

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION; and 

WARDEN, USP-LEAVENWORTH, 

Respondents-Appellants. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Ernest Moore appeals from the district court's 

dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he complains of 

false imprisonment. He contends he was entitled to mandatory 

parole in February 1989 and discharge in June 1990 from his 

federal prison sentence. The case is pending before us upon Mr. 

Moore's application for a certificate of probable cause. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-3132 Document: 010110128842 Date Filed: 07/05/1991 Page: 1 
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Mr. Moore was sentenced in 1977 to a twelve-year federal 

prison term for attempted bank robbery. In August 1983, with 

sixty-eight months of his sentence remaining, he was released on 

parole. In 1985, Mr. Moore was convicted of two felonies in 

Oregon and sentenced to a twenty-five year state prison term. The 

U.S. Parole Commission lodged a parole violation warrant as a 

detainer with state prison officials. In August 1988, the state 

transferred Mr. Moore to the United States Penitentiary at 

Leavenworth to serve the remainder of his state sentence, as 

authorized under 18 u.s.c. § 5003. 

On July 18, 1989, after a parole revocation hearing, the 

Commission issued the following order regarding Mr. Moore: 

1. Revoke parole. 

2. None of the time spent on parole shall be credited. 

The unexpired portion of the original sentence shall 

commence upon release by parole or mandatory release 

from the state sentence or upon re-parole from the 

original federal sentence. 

3. Continue to a presumptive re-parole on April 17, 

1991 after the service of 72 months. 

Defendant asserts he was entitled to mandatory reparole in 

February 1989 and to discharge in June 1990 from his federal 

sentence. His calculations suffer from several errors, but the 

fatal flaw is his assumption that the remainder of his federal 

sentence, his parole violator term, has been running concurrently 

with his state sentence since 1985. Contrary to defendant's 

assertion, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 85 (1976), does not hold 

that when the Commission revokes parole the original sentence is 

reinstated and runs concurrently with the new sentence; it merely 

recognized that the Commission has the option to grant 

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retroactively the equivalent of concurrent sentences. Id. at 87. 

The defendant also confuses the Commission's grant of credit 

for fifty months he had served on his state sentence for purposes 

of determining reparole eligibility with a grant of credit for his 

violator term. Under 28 C.F.R. § 2.21(c), the Commission must 

consider time spent in custody for reparole guideline purposes, 

but the provision specifically states this does not affect the 

expiration of the violator term. Defendant seeks an explanation 

of "when a parole violator ... is serving a violator term as 

opposed to a reparole guideline term .. II There is no such 

thing as a "reparole guideline term;" the reparole guidelines 

simply provide that time in custody should be considered in 

calculating the appropriate date for reparole. The violator term 

is the remainder of the sentence after parole has been violated. 

Defendant has not been falsely imprisoned beyond the term of 

his federal sentence because the Commission decided, in accordance 

with 28 C.F.R. § 2.47(e)(2), that the violator term would not 

commence until parole or release from the state sentence or 

reparole from the federal sentence. Defendant has not been 

released from confinement for his state offenses, 1 and his 

tentative federal reparole date was April 1991. Therefore, his 

1Defendant erroneously insists his transfer to the federal 

penitentiary in Leavenworth constituted a release from his state 

sentence. The record shows the state contracted with the federal 

prison to board the defendant for the remainder of his state 

sentence. 

Defendant's appellate brief also states the transfer violated 

Or. Rev. Stat. § 421.210 (1989). That section merely authorizes 

the transfer of inmates to contract institutions. 

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remaining federal sentence of sixty-eight months cannot have 

expired yet. Nor is he eligible for parole from his violator term 

yet. Although 28 C.F.R. § 2.53(d) provides that a prisoner whose 

violator term is five years or more is eligible for mandatory 

parole upon completion of two-thirds of the violator term, that 

section is not applicable yet because defendant has not served 

that portion of his violator term. 

Finally, defendant complains that the district court "failed 

to explain what constitutes execution of a violator warrant and, 

whether under the circumstance of appellant's case, the warrant 

was executed." The defendant apparently argued to the district 

court that the warrant was executed and his violator term began 

running when he was moved to a federal prison in 1988. The 

district court correctly concluded the federal authorities did not 

execute the warrant at that time; they only took custody of the 

defendant as a state boarder. 

As a consequence of these conclusions, we hold Mr. Moore has 

failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal 

right necessary for the issuance of a certificate of probable 

cause under 28 u.s.c. § 2253. His application for such a 

certificate is DENIED, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), 

and the appeal DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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