Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01057/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01057-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TERANCE DAWSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:06-cv-1057-WKW [wo]

) 

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 29) filed

by Defendants City of Montgomery (“City”) and Guinn Timmerman (“Timmerman”). For

the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ summary judgment motion is due to be granted

in part and denied in part. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Terance Dawson (“Dawson”) filed a six-count pro se complaint against the

defendants on November 27, 2006. (Compl.) Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count One seeks

to redress the deprivation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from

illegal searches and seizures and unlawful detention and imprisonment. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25.)

Count Two alleges that his substantive and procedural due process rights were violated. (Id.

¶ 26.) The remaining four counts are state law tort claims for conversion, invasion of

privacy, slander, and outrage. (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) 

On May 29, 2007, a scheduling order was issued by the Magistrate Judge that, among

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other things, established deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions based on an

assumed trial date of February 25, 2008. (Doc. # 16.) On the same day, the Magistrate Judge

also issued a briefing order warning that the dispositive motion deadline would not be

extended “[a]bsent a showing of exceptional circumstances” and that “the court will not

automatically deem a party’s failure to conduct needed discovery . . . to be [a] valid bas[is]

for extending the dispositive motion deadline.” (Doc. # 17.) 

Almost seven months later and after the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines

had passed, the defendants filed a motion to continue the trial because they had not been able

to obtain needed discovery from Dawson. (Doc. # 19.) Based on the previous warnings and

the defendants’ failure to seek court intervention prior to the expiration of the deadlines, the

court denied the motion to continue and set a trial date for March 24, 2008. (Doc. # 20.)

Despite denying the motion to continue, the court set new deadlines for filing motions to

compel and stated that it expected the parties to abide by their Rule 26 discovery obligations.

(Id.) 

After Dawson was finally deposed a few weeks later, the defendants filed a motion

seeking an enlargement of the dispositive motion filing period and proposing an expedited

dispositive motion briefing schedule that would not affect the trial date. (Doc. # 22.) The

court reluctantly granted the motion “not in sympathy with defendants, but to test the merits

of the case at the summary judgment stage.” (Doc. # 23.) New deadlines were set allowing

the defendants to file a dispositive motion and giving the plaintiff time to respond. (Id.) The

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defendants were not allowed to reply. (Id.) On January 18, 2008, the defendants filed their

summary judgment motion (Doc. # 29), and the plaintiff responded (Doc. # 38) in opposition

on February 8, 2008.

II. FACTS

Dawson is employed as a data processing specialist with the State of Alabama.

(Dawson Dep. 6:6-8, Jan. 3, 2008.) Prior to that, he performed similar work for the

Department of Defense at Gunter Air Force Design Center. (Id. at 7:11-14.) He has a degree

in business administration from Alabama State University, (id. at 8:1-7), and is a former

member of the Montgomery City Council. (Id. at 60:13.) While he was on the city council,

he played a supportive role in helping terminate some police officers “for trumping up

charges on citizens and violating . . . their rights.” (Id. at 60:13-21.) Dawson implies this

may have provided motive for the event that forms the basis of his claims. (Id. at 60:16-21.)

On the night of November 26, 2004, Dawson was driving a Cadillac Sedan DeVille

in the vicinity of the intersection of Ann Street, Atlanta Highway, and Mt. Meigs Road in

Montgomery, Alabama. (Id. at 10:8-15, 13:22-23.) According to Timmerman, who is a

detective with the Montgomery Police Department (“MPD”), he observed Dawson’s vehicle

make an improper left turn from Ann Street into the oncoming traffic lanes of Atlanta

Highway. (Timmerman Aff. 1.) After radioing MPD to report a possible intoxicated driver

and to request assistance, he observed Dawson’s car take the next left from Atlanta Highway

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 The court takes judicial notice that Mt. Meigs Road intersects Atlanta Highway at an 1

angle of approximately forty-five degrees and less than four hundred feet west of where Ann

Street intersects Atlanta Highway. See Weaver v. United States, 298 F.2d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir.

1962) (explaining courts may properly take judicial notice of the location of streets).

Additionally, Atlanta Highway becomes Madison Avenue near the Mt. Meigs Road intersection.

 Dawson thinks it is possible he could have been on his cell phone at this time, (Dawson 2

Dep. 26:8-22), but he disputes Timmerman’s assertion that he turned into oncoming traffic lanes

and that he swerved onto the wrong side of the road. (See Dawson Aff. 3.) Dawson claims that

when he turned left onto Madison Avenue/Atlanta Highway from Ann Street, he turned into the

inside lane of the westbound lanes of traffic, which would properly place the median to his left. 

(Pl.’s Resp. Br. 5.) Timmerman’s testimony is in direct contradiction to this. He states that

Dawson “turned into, I believe it was, the westbound lane of Madison Avenue with the median

separating the east and westbound lanes on your right side, not on your left side.” (Timmerman

Dep. 16:12-17.) The court is mindful that it must view the facts, and all reasonable inferences

therefrom, in the light most favorable to Dawson at this stage of the proceedings. Peterson v.

Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007).

4

onto Mt. Meigs Road “at an extremely slow rate of speed.” (Id.) He next observed 1

Dawson’s vehicle make “several erratic movements,” including once swerving into the

oncoming traffic lane of Mt. Meigs Road. (Id.) 2

Timmerman, who was driving an unmarked police vehicle and not wearing a police

uniform, pulled up next to Dawson, flashed his badge, identified himself as a police officer

and ordered him to pull over. (Id. at 2; Pl.’s Resp. Br. 3.) Dawson pulled over into a parking

spot at a nearby Kentucky Fried Chicken. (Dawson Dep. 19:10-12.) Timmerman pulled into

a different parking spot, ordered Dawson to remain in his vehicle with his hands on the

steering wheel and again radioed MPD for a patrol unit to assist him. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. 3;

Dawson Dep. 32:13-20.) 

During the five to fifteen minutes it took for the uniformed patrol officers to arrive,

Dawson’s cell phone rang and Timmerman did not let him answer it. (Dawson Dep. 34:3-6;

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38:19-21.) Dawson also requested that he be allowed to use the restroom, but Timmerman

did not let him do so. (Id. at 56:22-23.) Dawson claims this led him to urinate on himself

“[j]ust a little.” (Id. at 57:14-22.) According to Dawson, Timmerman was loud and

belligerent and made offensive comments in front of people in the restaurant parking lot. (Id.

at 54:4-23.) Dawson testified that the offensive comments were generalizations of drug use

directed at “you people,” which he took to mean black people. (Id.) In his brief, Dawson

claims Timmerman also said he “looked like somebody who got high” and “somebody who

smoked crack cocaine.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. 4.) Timmerman strongly denies making statements

of this nature. (Timmerman Dep. 18:17-19:3, Jan. 3, 2008.)

Once the uniformed patrol officers arrived on the scene, they took over the

administration of the traffic stop. (Dawson Dep. 48:17-49:8.) One of the patrol officers took

a Coca-Cola bottle from Dawson’s vehicle. (Id. at 40:4-22.) The officer smelled the bottle

and indicated it did not contain alcohol. (Id.) The officers had Dawson exit his vehicle and

asked for his driver’s license, which he gave to them. (Id. at 41:1-5.) The officers asked

Dawson if they could conduct a pat-down search and he agreed to it. (Id. at 43:11-15.)

While Dawson’s hands were placed on the trunk of his car, the officers proceeded to pat him

down and search his pockets. (Id. at 41:7-20.) The only things found in his pockets were

keys and cash. (Id. at 41:21-22.) 

The officersthen administered “several field sobriety tests” on Dawson, (Timmerman

Aff. 2), which required him to count backwards on his fingers while standing on one foot.

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 When asked to list all the drugs prescribed to him over the past five years in an 3

interrogatory, Dawson only listed Viagra, Cialis, and a breathing machine. (Doc. # 30-9, at 5.)

6

(Dawson Dep. 42:15-19.) The defendants admit Dawson successfully passed all field

sobriety tests. (Timmerman Aff. 2.) Despite passing the sobriety tests, the officers asked to

search his vehicle – supposedly because of Timmerman’s allegations of drug use. (Dawson

Dep. 43:1-10.) Dawson agreed to a search of his vehicle and gave them “full permission”

to “check the hood, trunk, tires, rims, the vehicle.” (Id. at 43:7-10.) No alcohol or illegal

drugs were found on Dawson or in his vehicle. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Br. 4.) The officers

noticed that Dawson’s vehicle displayed two license plates, one of which was a handicapped

license plate that belonged to the vehicle’s previous owner. (Dawson Dep. 46:4-47:22.) The

officers installed the license plate registered to Dawson and then confiscated the handicapped

tag. (Timmerman Aff. 2.) 

A key factual dispute exists over whether there were prescription drugs or prescription

drug bottles found in Dawson’s vehicle. Timmerman asserts there were “several prescription

drug bottles” in the vehicle that were made out to Dawson. (Timmerman Aff. 2; Timmerman

Dep. 17:7-10.) The defendants provide no information as to the kind of medication or

whether the bottles actually contained any medication. Dawson flat out denies this assertion

and states, “No prescriptions were found in the Plaintiff’s vehicles [sic] or bottles of

prescriptions.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. 4.) In his deposition he claimed he could not recall what

medications were prescribed to him on the night of the traffic stop and referred the

defendants to his medical records. (Dawson Dep. 21:23-24:7.) Regardless of what may or 3

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 Dawson states that he “had sought other means of getting home.” (Dawson Aff. 5.) 4

7

may not have been prescribed to him, he denies that he was taking any prescription medicines

at the time of the traffic stop. (Id. at 33:11-12; Dawson Aff. 3.)

After smelling his beverage, conducting a pat-down search, conducting field sobriety

tests, and searching his vehicle, the two uniformed patrol officers appeared ready to let

Dawson go. (Dawson Dep. 50:4-6; Pl.’s Resp. Br. 16.) Dawson was not arrested, ticketed,

or cited for anything. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Br. 9.) Dawson got back in his vehicle, started

the engine, and put it in reverse. (Dawson Dep. 50:7-23.) Before he had a chance to leave,

Timmerman stopped him, told him he could not go anywhere, and ordered him to turn his

vehicle off. (Id.) After Dawson turned his vehicle off, Timmerman allegedly told him he

was not allowed to drive. (Id. at 51:2-4.) Dawson asked the two patrol officers why he was

not allowed to drive his vehicle. (Id. at 51:6-10.) They allegedly told him it was

Timmerman’s traffic stop, and, therefore, as the controlling officer, it was his decision to

make. (Id.; Dawson Aff. 5.) 

After denying him the use of his vehicle, the officers suggested Dawson find another

ride home, and he initially agreed to do so. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. 17; Timmerman Aff. 3.) For 4

reasons unclear to the court, Dawson either did not find another ride or changed his mind.

(Timmerman Aff. 3.) When finding another ride did not pan out, the patrol officers offered

to give him a ride home, but Dawson declined because he “did not feel comfortable after the

ordeal [he] had endured.” (Dawson Aff. 5.) Ultimately, Dawson left his vehicle parked at

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the restaurant and walked away. (Dawson Dep. 51:12.) His driver’s license was never

returned. (Dawson Aff. 4.)

Dawson contacted the police department the day after his traffic stop. (Pl.’s Resp. Br.

7.) He requested they return his driver’s license but his “request was refused.” (Id.)

Ultimately, he never got his license back and he had to pay a fee in order to acquire a

duplicate license. (Id.) Finally, after getting his duplicate license three days later, he

retrieved his vehicle after having to pay someone to take him there. (Id. at 7, 12.) 

III. JURISDICTION

 Because this case arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court exercises subject matter

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343 (civil rights). The court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and

the court finds adequate allegations supporting both. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). Under Rule 56, the moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). “[T]he court must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of

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the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.

1995). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no genuine

issue of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

Once the moving party has met its burden, “an opposing party may not rely merely on

allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must – by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule – set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine factual dispute

exists if a “‘reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United

States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)). After the

nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant

summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Count One - Illegal Search and Seizure

In Count One, Dawson allegesfour violations of his Fourth Amendment rights: illegal

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search of his person, illegal search of his vehicle, illegal seizure of his person, and illegal

seizure of his effects. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.) The Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part,

that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is

made applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Soldal v. Cook County,

Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).

1. Illegal Seizure of His Person

The temporary detention of an individual by law enforcement officers during a traffic

stop “constitutes a seizure of persons” under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, by the

very terms of the Fourth Amendment, the seizure of a driver during a traffic stop must not

be unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 810. “[T]he decision to stop an automobile

is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has

occurred.” Id.

By statute, driving while under the influence of alcohol or “any substance which

impairs the mental or physical faculties” is a traffic offense in Alabama. Ala. Code § 32-5A191(a) (1975). Timmerman asserts that he observed Dawson’s vehicle turning into the

wrong lane at an extremely slow rate of speed, and then making erratic movements, including

swerving into oncoming traffic lanes. (Timmerman Aff. 1.) These actions, if established,

are consistent with those of intoxicated drivers and are sufficient to establish probable cause

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to initiate a traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 216 Fed. Appx. 931, 934 (11th

Cir. 2007) (weaving is sufficient to establish probable cause because it indicates that the

driver may be under the influence of alcohol); United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940-

41 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). In fact, even without a suspicion of intoxication, Dawson’s

alleged driving likely constituted traffic violations in themselves sufficient to establish

probable cause. See Ala. Code § 32-5A-174 (setting minimum speed restrictions). 

Dawson argues Timmerman did not have probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and

provides a detailed account of his left turn that directly contradicts Timmerman’s account.

(Pl.’s Resp. Br. 11.) Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, his alleged driving actions

cannot establish probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, for Timmerman’s traffic stop

because Dawson has raised a genuine issue of material fact of whether he actually drove in

that manner. (Dawson Aff. 3-4.) Because it is clearly established that a police officer must

have some legitimate reason – whether it be probable cause or reasonable suspicion – to

initiate a traffic stop, Timmerman is not entitled to qualified immunity, and his summary

judgment motion is due to be denied with respect to this claim. See United States v.

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating “a traffic stop is a

constitutional detention if it is justified by reasonable suspicion under Terry or probable

cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred under Whren”).

Unlike Timmerman, the City is entitled to summary judgment. Municipalities are not

liable for § 1983 claims under a theory of respondeat superior. Gold v. City of Miami, 151

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F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). “[A] municipality may be held liable for the actions of a

police officer only when municipal ‘official policy’ causes a constitutional violation.” Id.

Because Dawson has failed to identify a municipal official policy or custom, his § 1983 claim

against the City fails, and the City is entitled to summary judgment on all of Dawson’s

§ 1983 claims.

2. Illegal Search of His Person and Vehicle

The defendants argue that Dawson’s claims alleging illegal searches of his person and

his vehicle must fail because he consented to the searches. A voluntarily consensual search

is constitutional. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001).

Determining whether consent is voluntary is a factual inquiry and is examined under the

totality of the circumstances. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2004).

Among the factors courts use to make this determination are “the presence of coercive police

procedures, the extent of the [suspect]’s cooperation with the officer, the [suspect]’s

awareness of his right to refuse consent, the [suspect]’s education and intelligence, and the

[suspect]’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.” Id. (quoting Purcell, 236

F.3d at 1281).

Dawson admits that the officers asked, and that he gave, his consent to conduct both

the vehicle and pat-down search. (Dawson Dep. 43:7-15.) There is no indication the officers

browbeat a coercion out of Dawson or used any other type of coercive police procedure.

Dawson was not restrained in any way or placed in the patrol car. The extent of Dawson’s

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cooperation could not have been more broad. He invited and “encouraged” the officers to

conduct a search in order to prove to them he had no alcohol or illegal drugs. (Id.) In his

own words, he gave them “full permission” to search his vehicle and challenged them to

“check the hood, trunk, tires, rims, the vehicle.” (Id. at 43:8-10.) It is clear that Dawson

believed – correctly as it turned out – that no incriminating evidence would be discovered

and therefore welcomed the search. In light of the totality of the circumstances, Dawson

voluntarily consented to the search of his person and his vehicle and the searches did not

violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 

3. Illegal Seizure of His Effects

Even after the patrol officers smelled Dawson’s drink, searched his pockets and his

vehicle, and subjected him to sobriety tests, they were unable to find evidence of alcohol or

illegal drug use. Dawson claims that at this time, he attempted to drive away in his vehicle

but was stopped by Timmerman, who told him he was not allowed to drive. (Dawson Dep.

50:7-23.) It was Timmerman’s professional opinion that, based on the erratic driving and

presence of prescription medicine bottles, Dawson was incapable of driving safely.

(Timmerman Aff. 3.) Dawson was forced to abandon his vehicle in the parking lot of a

restaurant and was unable to retrieve it for three days. There is no doubt Timmerman’s

refusal to allow Dawson to drive his vehicle interfered with his property in a meaningful way

and thereby constitutes a seizure, as does the taking of Dawson’s driver’s license. United

States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (“A seizure occurs when there is a

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meaningful interference with a person’s property.”).

Unless “brief and minimally intrusive,” the seizure of personal property must be

accompanied by probable cause. Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 558 (11th Cir. 1991); see

also Virden, 488 F.3d at 1321 (“Ordinarily, the seizure of personal property is per se

unreasonable unless the seizure is pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause.”). The

standard for determining when a seizure is protracted enough to require probable cause is

ambiguous and courts are reluctant to require probable cause “unless the length of detention

was so prolonged that it falls well outside the range” of permissible seizures. Lindsey,

936 F.2d at 559. The seminal Supreme Court case on the seizure of personal property

deemed a ninety-minute detention to require probable cause. United States v. Place,

462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983).

Even if the seizure of Dawson’s vehicle were to be considered brief and minimally

intrusive – which is unlikely given the three-day seizure – at this stage Timmerman cannot

establish even the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. In

Lindsey, a police officer seized gold jewelry from a passenger in a vehicle who had not yet

been arrested. Lindsey, 936 F.2d at 557. The vehicle had been in an accident and the officer

received information that the passenger had attempted to pay the other party $2,500 in cash

so they would not report the accident to the police. Id. Upon investigating the attempted

cover-up of the accident, the officer discovered $2,600 in cash along with gold jewelry worn

by the passenger. Id. While affirming the legality of the seizure of the cash because it

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 Timmerman arguably relied on mere suspicion anyway. In his deposition he tells 5

Dawson that, “I didn’t necessarily think you were intoxicated. I felt that there was something

affecting your ability to safely operate a vehicle.” (Timmerman Dep. 21:16-19 (emphasis

added).) This was after a thorough search of his vehicle revealed no alcohol or illegal drugs and

after Dawson had passed field sobriety tests.

 The defendants do not identify any other possible authority under which Timmerman 6

seized Dawson’s vehicle, such as Alabama’s impoundment statute, Ala. Code § 32-5A-139, or

the police officer community caretaking function. Riley v. State, 583 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1991). Therefore, the court declines to consider these potential sources of authority.

15

related to a violation of the state’s accident reporting law, the Eleventh Circuit held that

“mere suspicion of drug-dealing was not particularized enough to justify the seizure” of the

gold jewelry. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Furthermore, this suspicion “clearly failed to

establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to seize [the] jewelry,” and, therefore, the officer

was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

Timmerman provides two bases for his seizure – the erratic driving and the presence

of prescription medicine – and Dawson denies them both. (Dawson Aff. 3-4.) Without these

bases, Timmerman would have no other basis other than “mere suspicion” that Dawson was

incapable of driving and required a vehicle seizure. Consequently, regardless of whether 5

Timmerman is required to establish probable cause or the lesser standard of reasonable

suspicion, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Timmerman had any basis for

seizing Dawson’s vehicle and driver’s license in order to prevent him from driving. If 6

Dawson’s version of the facts is true, which the court must accept as such for the purposes

of summary judgment, then Timmerman would have no basis for seizing Dawson’s vehicle

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 This finding does not preclude the defendants from offering evidence at trial to rebut 7

the plaintiff’s allegations or later moving for judgment as a matter of law. See Lindsey, 936 F.2d

at 561 n.7. 

16

and is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.7

B. Count Two - Procedural and Substantive Due Process

Dawson argues that his procedural due process rights were violated by the defendants

“because no forfeiture proceedings were ever initiated against his vehicle, and no meaningful

post-deprivation remedy for the loss sustained by the Plaintiff was made available to him.”

(Pl.’s Resp. Br. 13.) The Eleventh Circuit has already rejected this very argument, however.

In Lindsey, the Eleventh Circuit held that a statute creating a civil cause of action for the

wrongful conversion of personal property provides “‘an adequate postdeprivation remedy

when a plaintiff claims that the state has retained his property without due process of law.’”

Lindsey, 936 F.2d at 561 (quoting Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987)).

All a state must provide is “some adequate postdeprivation remedy,” and a conversion statute

provides such. Id. 

Alabama has provided this type of statute, Ala. Code § 6-5-260, and Dawson even

invoked the tort of conversion in this action. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Therefore, the plaintiff

undoubtedly has access to an adequate post-deprivation remedy and cannot under any set of

facts succeed on a claim that the seizure of his vehicle by a law enforcement officer violated

his procedural due process rights. See, e.g., Browning v. City of Wedowee, Ala., 883 F. Supp.

618, 623 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (finding no procedural due process violation for law enforcement

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17

officers’ detention of the plaintiff’s gun because Alabama’s tort of conversion provides an

adequate post-deprivation remedy). The defendants’ summary judgment motion is due to be

granted against Dawson’s procedural due process claim. 

Likewise, Dawson’s substantive due process claim fails because “‘the constitutionality

of arrests by state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than due process

analysis.’” Fleming v. Dowdell, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152-53 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (quoting

Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000)). Therefore, Dawson’s

substantive due process claim is duplicative and the defendants’ summary judgment motion

is due to be granted with respect to it.

C. Counts Three through Six - State Law Tort Claims

In their brief in support of summary judgment, the defendants addressed Counts Three

through Six and pled various immunities and defenses. (Doc. # 30.) In his response to the

defendants’ summary judgment motion, Dawson filed a twenty-three page brief supported

by his own affidavit. (Doc. # 38.) Dawson’s response brief extensively, and almost

exclusively, rebuts the defendants’ arguments with respect to his illegal search and seizure

claim of Count One. One paragraph of the brief is devoted to the procedural due process

violation of Count Two. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. 12-13.) Dawson fails to address the defendants’

arguments with respect to any of his other counts, however. 

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party opposing

summary judgment “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). “[T]he non-moving party . . . bears the burden of coming forward

with sufficient evidence on each element that must be proved.” Earley v. Champion Int’l

Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990). If a party opposing summary judgment does

not set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, “summary judgment should, if

appropriate, be entered against that party.” Id. “There is no burden upon the district court

to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on

summary judgment.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.

1995). However,summary judgment is only proper when “the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). With this in mind, the court now addresses the

claims Dawson failed to support in his response to the defendants’ summary judgment

motion.

1. Count Three: Conversion

During discovery, the defendants requested Dawson produce a copy of the title and

registration to the Cadillac he was driving the night of the traffic stop. (Doc. # 30-9, at 2.)

Dawson responded that he was not in possession of these documents. (Id. at 5.) Alabama

law provides that “[t]he owner of personalty is entitled to possession thereof” and that “[a]ny

unlawful deprivation of or interference with such possession is a tort for which an action

lies.” Ala. Code § 6-5-260. Based on this statute, the defendants argue that because Dawson

has not proven that title and registration for the Cadillac are in his name, his action for

conversion must fail. 

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Defendants overlook the very next code section, however, which provides that “[m]ere

possession of a chattel . . . will give a right of action for any interference therewith, except

as against the true owner or the person wrongfully deprived of possession.” Ala. Code § 6-5-

261. Relying on this statute, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs with only

a possessory interest in a vehicle can maintain an action for conversion “against another who

is not the true owner or who has not wrongfully been deprived of possession.” Ex parte

Anderson, 867 So. 2d 1125, 1131-32 (Ala. 2003). The defendants do not assert they are the

true owners of the Cadillac or that they were wrongfully deprived of possessing it.

Therefore, Dawson’s failure to prove legal title is not fatal to his conversion claim.

In order to establish the tort of conversion, Dawson “‘must present proof of a

wrongful taking, an illegal assumption of ownership, an illegal use or misuse of another’s

property, or a wrongful detention or interference with another’s property.’” SouthTrust Bank

v. Donely, 925 So. 2d 934, 935 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Riscorp, Inc. v. Norman, 915 So. 2d

1142, 1152 (Ala. 2005) (emphasis added)). It has long been established in Alabama that a

plaintiff in a conversion action need not “prove a defendant appropriated the property to his

own use.” Russell-Vaughn Ford, Inc. v. Rouse, 206 So. 2d 371, 373 (Ala. 1968). In Rouse,

the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict of conversion when an automotive dealer

refused to return a car owner’s keys to him because it prevented the owner from using his

car. Id. Under Dawson’s alleged facts, Timmerman accomplished the same feat, except

instead of taking the car keys, he took his driver’s license and ordered him not to drive.

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Unless this was an authorized seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the court finds no

difference between the actions of Timmerman and the car dealer in Rouse. Therefore,

Dawson has established that genuine issues of material fact exist as to his claim of

conversion of the vehicle and driver’s license, and summary judgment for Timmerman is due

to be denied.

The defendants argue that even if Dawson can establish a prima facie claim of

conversion, they are entitled to discretionary function immunity. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Br.

20-23.) Discretionary function immunity for peace officers is established by statute.

Ala. Code § 6-5-338. The City’s immunity is dependant on whether Timmerman is entitled

to discretionary function immunity. Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 211 (Ala.

2003) (“It is well established that, if a municipal peace officer is immune pursuant to [Ala.

Code] § 6-5-338(a), then, pursuant to § 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is employed is also

immune.”). 

Immunity is extended to police officers when a tort claim is based on “exercising

judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to,

law-enforcement officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons.” Ex parte Cranman, 792

So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000). The police officer bears this burden of demonstrating the

plaintiff’s claims arise from a function that would entitle him to immunity. Ex parte Randall,

971 So. 2d 652, 662-63 (Ala. 2007). Once the police officer has shown this, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff, who may rebut the immunity if he shows the police officer “act[ed]

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willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a

mistaken interpretation of the law.” Id.

Timmerman meets his burden because investigating or arresting a person for driving

under the influence of alcohol is an exercise of judgment in the enforcement of the criminal

laws of the State. Eubanks v. Brook, 197 Fed. Appx. 819, 821 (11th Cir. 2006); Ex parte

City of Montgomery, 758 So. 2d 565, 570 (Ala. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by

Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 404. Dawson has the burden to rebut Timmerman’s immunity by

showing he acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her

authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Dawson’s complaint alleges

Timmerman’s actions “amount[ed] to an illegal misuse” of his vehicle and constituted a

“wrongful detention.” (Comp. ¶ 27.) Although Dawson makes no argument with regard to

conversion in his brief in opposition to summary judgment, he does allege facts supported

by his affidavit that, if true, could establish Timmerman acted in a willful or malicious

manner. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists and, at this time, Timmerman is

not entitled to discretionary function immunity for Dawson’s claim of conversion.

Under any scenario, however, the City would be entitled to summary judgment on

Dawson’s tort claim of conversion. If Timmerman were found to have merely acted in a

negligent manner, he would be entitled to peace officer immunity, which would

concomitantly entitle the City to the immunity as well. Howard, 887 So. 2d at 211. If

Timmerman were found to have acted in a willful or malicious manner, he would not be

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entitled to peace officer immunity, and neither would the City. The City would, however,

still be entitled to immunity under Alabama Code section 11-47-190, which “absolves a

municipality from liability for the intentional torts of its agents.” Altmayer v. City of Daphne,

613 So. 2d 366, 369 (Ala. 1993). Therefore, under either scenario, the City would be

immune from liability as to Dawson’s conversion claim.

2. Count Four: Invasion of Privacy

Dawson brings a false light invasion of privacy claim based on Timmerman calling

him a crack addict and a drug addict in front of other people in the restaurant parking lot.

(Compl. ¶ 28.) A false light claim consists of “putting the plaintiff in a false, but not

necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye.” Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So. 2d 700, 701

(Ala. 1997). 

In the context of a false-light claim, giving publicity is making a matter . . .

public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that

the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public

knowledge. Publicity is a concept more difficult to prove than [mere]

publication, which is an element of a defamation claim. The “publicity”

element is not satisfied by the communicat[ion of] a fact . . . to a single person

or even to a small group of persons. 

Regions Bank v. Plott, 897 So. 2d 239, 245 (Ala. 2004) (internal quotations and citations

omitted) (emphasis added). Here Dawson alleges at best that only a small group of persons

heard Timmerman’s alleged remarks. Therefore, he cannot prove the “giving publicity”

element of his false light claim, and summary judgment is due to be granted for both

defendants with respect to this claim.

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3. Count Five: Slander

Dawson accuses Timmerman of calling him a drug addict in front of people in the

restaurant parking lot. (Compl. ¶ 29; Dawson Dep. 54:4-23.) Specifically, he claims

Timmerman said he “looked like somebody who got high” and “somebody who smoked

crack cocaine.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. 4.) Dawson asserts that “[c]ustomers were able to hear

Timmerman’s tirade.” (Dawson Aff. 2.) He claims Timmerman knew the statements to be

untrue yet published the statements in order to embarrass or annoy Dawson. (Compl. ¶ 29.)

Regardless of whether Dawson is a public figure or private individual, he must still

establish a prima facie claim of slander, which requires him to show: “[1] that the defendant

was at least negligent, [2] in publishing [3] a false and defamatory statement to another

[4] concerning the plaintiff, [5] which is either actionable without having to prove special

harm (actionable per se) or actionable upon allegations and proof of special harm (actionable

per quod).” Delta Health Group, Inc. v. Stafford, 887 So. 2d 887, 895 (Ala. 2004). 

Based on the plaintiff’s version of the events, Timmerman was at least negligent in

allowing other people to hear the derogatory and unsupported comments of Dawson’s illegal

drug use. If it turns out that Timmerman never had probable cause to initiate the stop, or that

Timmerman did in fact know Dawson to be a former city councilman unpopular with the

City’s police department, then Dawson may also be able to show the comments were made

in a malicious or willful manner that were said in order to cause damage to Dawson’s

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political career or reputation in his community. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact

exists as to the first element of slander. 

Dawson has also created a genuine issue of material fact as to the publication element.

This element is usually satisfied “by proof of communication of the defamatory matter to

someone other than himself.” Id. (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Pendergrass, 494 So. 2d 600,

602 (Ala. 1986)). Although Timmerman denies making the statements, Dawson alleges

otherwise and, importantly for the purposes of this element, that customers in the parking lot

“were able to hear” the comments. (Dawson Aff. 2.) Although there is no evidence the

customers did in fact hear the comments, Dawson has proffered supporting circumstantial

evidence. In his affidavit, Dawson states that Timmerman’s comments were so loud they

attracted customers to the scene and that Timmerman had to disperse the crowd. (Id.) If

customers were attracted to the scene by Timmerman’s voice, this reaction indicates the

comments were heard and communicated to someone other than Timmerman.

If the comments were made, and the court must assume they were at this stage of the

proceedings, there is no doubt they concerned Dawson because they allegedly identified him

as an illegal drug user. The defendants do not contest that the alleged comments, if made,

were false and defamatory. There is absolutely no evidence that Dawson has ever used

illegal drugs, much less on the night in question. 

As for the last element, in order to constitute slander that is actionable per se, and

therefore relieve the plaintiff from having to prove special harm, the defamatory statement

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must contain an imputation “of an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude.”

Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1091 (Ala. 1988). While the

distribution of cocaine or marijuana is a crime of moral turpitude, mere possession for one’s

personal use is not. Ex parte Hall, 681 So. 2d 642, 644 (Ala. 1996). Timmerman’s alleged

comments only refer to personal use, therefore they do not constitute slander that is

actionable per se. 

In order to establish slander per quod, a plaintiff must prove special damages, which

“‘are the material harms that are the intended result or natural consequence of the slanderous

statement.’” Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 18 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Shook v. St. Bede

Sch., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (M.D. Ala. 1999)). The general rule concerning special

damages is “‘that they are limited to material loss capable of being measured in money.’”

Id. (quoting Shook, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if a

plaintiff “suffered mentally and emotionally as a result of the untrue statements,” he must

“produce substantial evidence of special damage.” Id. Dawson has produced no evidence

indicating he suffered a material harm capable of being measured in money damages, and

therefore he cannot establish the fifth element of his slander claim, and the defendants’

summary judgment motion is due to be granted accordingly. See, e.g., Casey v. McConnell,

__ So. 2d __, No. 2060324, 2007 WL 1575569, at *4-5 (Ala. Civ. App. June 1, 2007).

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4. Count Six: Outrage

Dawson claims Timmerman’s conduct was extreme, outrageous and caused severe

emotional distress. (Compl. ¶ 30.) In Alabama, the tort of outrage is only recognized in

three areas: “(1) wrongful conduct within the context of family burials; (2) an insurance

agent’s coercing an insured into settling an insurance claim; and (3) egregious sexual

harassment.” Stabler v. City of Mobile, 844 So. 2d 555, 560 (Ala. 2002). None of these

situations is remotely applicable to the situation at hand, and, therefore, Dawson cannot

establish a claim of outrage. The defendants’ summary judgment motion is due to be granted

accordingly.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ summary

judgment motion (Doc. # 29) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

1. GRANTED with respect to Dawson’s claims for denial of due process

(Count Two), invasion of privacy (Count Four), slander (Count Five),

and outrage (Count Six) for both defendants;

2. GRANTED with respect to Dawson’s claims of illegal seizure of his

person and illegal searches of his vehicle and person under Count One

for both defendants;

3. DENIED with respect to Dawson’s claim for illegal seizure of his

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vehicle and driver’s license under Count One for Defendant

Timmerman;

4. GRANTED with respect to Dawson’s claim for illegal seizure of his

vehicle and driver’s license under Count One for Defendant City of

Montgomery;

5. DENIED with respect to Dawson’s claim for conversion (Count Three)

against Defendant Timmerman; 

6. GRANTED with respect to Dawson’s claim for conversion (Count

Three) against Defendant City of Montgomery.

Therefore, it is ORDERED that Defendant City of Montgomery is

DISMISSED as a party to this action. The portion of Count One against Defendant

Timmerman pertaining to the seizure of Dawson’s vehicle and driver’s license and the

conversion claim against Timmerman are the only remaining claims, and the parties

shall prepare for trial accordingly.

DONE this 6th day of March, 2008.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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