Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04077/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04077-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

DAVID WEBB, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ELIJAH SWENSEN; TRAVIS KEARL; 

ALICIA MARIE WASHINGTON; 

MICHAEL ASHMENT, Ogden City Chief 

of Police, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 15-4077

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00148-DB-DBP)

(D. Utah)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

This matter is before us on Appellant David Webb’s response to the court’s show 

cause order regarding appellate jurisdiction. The court questioned the finality of the 

district court’s order dismissing Webb’s complaint without prejudice. In his response, 

Webb contends that the following clerical notation on the district court docket is a final 

order terminating the case: “Civil Case Terminated. Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead no 

longer assigned to case.”

Except in limited circumstances that do not apply here, this court’s appellate 

jurisdiction is restricted to review of final decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also United 

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 (1974); Albright v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 4, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-4077 Document: 01019439815 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 1 
2

1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995). A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the 

merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute judgment.” Cunningham v. 

Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).

In this case, Magistrate Judge Pead issued a report and recommendation, 

recommending that Webb’s complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state 

a claim. Magistrate Judge Pead noted that Webb would be able to file an amended 

complaint and even specified what an amended complaint needed to include in order to 

remedy the pleading deficiencies. Magistrate Judge Pead further recommended that 

Webb’s pending motions for service of process and to appoint counsel be denied without 

prejudice to renewal following the filing of an amended complaint.

On March 2, 2015, the district court adopted the recommendation, dismissed 

Webb’s complaint without prejudice, and denied the pending motions without prejudice. 

Webb subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint and renewed his 

motions for service of process and appointment of counsel. These motions were pending 

when, on April 30, 2015, the district court clerk entered the notation “Civil Case 

Terminated. Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead no longer assigned to case.” The motions 

remain pending.

“Whether an order of dismissal is appealable generally depends on whether the 

district dismissed the complaint or the action.” Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 

449 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). Dismissal of the complaint “is 

ordinarily a non-final, nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be 

available).” Id. But, because terminology can be mistaken, we have said that in 

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evaluating finality, “we look to the substance and objective intent of the district court’s 

order” and endeavor to determine whether the district court intended to dismiss the 

complaint or the entire action as well. Id.; see also id. at 451 n.8 (noting that “a dismissal 

without prejudice may or may not be final, depending on if it is intended to dispose of the 

cause of action” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).

Here, the district court’s terminology and intent coincide. The district court stated 

that the complaint was dismissed without prejudice and the district court clearly intended 

Webb to have an opportunity to amend his complaint. As a result, the district court’s 

March 2 order was not final and appealable. The April 30 notation, which was not 

entered by a judge, was not a final decision “end[ing] the litigation on the merits” and 

appears to have been the result of a clerical error.

This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The clerk of the district court is 

directed to correct the district court docket.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

by: Jane K. Castro

 Counsel to the Clerk

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