Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02653/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02653-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS EMIL SLIWINSKI,

ID #2046133,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PATTY MAYSENT, C.E.O., 

U.C. San Diego Health, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-2653-CAB-RBB

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On November 19, 2018, Thomas Emil Sliwinski (“Plaintiff”) who is currently 

incarcerated at Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge, Montana and proceeding pro se filed 

a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl, ECF No. 1.) In his 

original Complaint, Plaintiff claimed Patty Maysent, the C.E.O. of U.C. San Diego 

Health (“UCSD”), two UCSD doctors, a caseworker, several other unidentified doctors 

named only as John Doe #1, 2, and 3, and an “Unknown Mesh Mfg.” violated his Eighth 

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Amendment rights and committed acts of negligence with respect to his medical needs 

while he was a patient in their care from October 28, 2015, through January 3, 2016. (Id.

at 1-3.) He sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive 

damages. (Id. at 7-8.) 

Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence 

a civil action at the time he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 2.)

On February 13, 2019, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 5.) 

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the deficiencies 

of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (See id.) Specifically, Plaintiff was 

cautioned that any “[d]efendants not named and any claim no re-alleged in his Amended 

Complaint will be considered waived.” (Id. at 10 citing S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal 

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not 

re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).).

On March 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint “FAC.” (See 

ECF No. 6.) In his FAC, Plaintiff no longer names Defendants “John Doe 1, John Doe 2, 

John Doe 3 or Unknown Mesh Mfg in this matter. (See id. at 1-2.) Therefore, all the 

claims against these Defendants are deemed waived. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928. 

However, Plaintiff has added as a Defendant, “Dr. Todd Wilson Constantine.” (Id. at 1-

2.) 

II. Screening of FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 

F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is 

‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A 

complaint is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that he was “arrested by Homeland Security/Border Patrol” near 

the border between Mexico and the United States. (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff had “already 

been convicted of a crime when arrested and was a pretrial detainee being held by the 

Federal government.” (Id.) Plaintiff was “taken to UCSD under federal protection” and 

“admitted to the ‘west’ wing that holds Federal prisoners.” (Id.) Plaintiff was a “patient 

of UCSD” from approximately “October 28, 2015 until January 3, 2016.” (Id. at 1.)

Defendants Maysent, Kobayaski, Patel, Constantini, and Hall are alleged to be employees 

of UCSD. (See id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff states that he was subjected to “13 surgeries” 

conducted by Defendants. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to “give a level 

of health services reasonably designed to meet routine and emergency medical 

treatment.” (Id.) As a result, “no one can fix the damage that Defendants did to 

[Plaintiff] for their failure to obey the medical standards of the Federal and State laws of 

medical practice.” (Id. at 6.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 v. Bivens

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff purports to bring this action 

pursuant to “42 USC 1983.” (FAC at 1.) Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs 

can bring federal constitutional and statutory challenges to actions by state and local 

officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). But it is not merely 

a “font of tort law.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532 (1981), overruled on other 

grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely 

provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Therefore, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 

1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

However, Plaintiff claims that he was arrested by federal law enforcement officers, 

detained as a “pretrial detainee being held by the federal government,” and was “admitted 

to the ‘west’ wing that holds [f]ederal prisoners, pre trial detainees.” (FAC at 3-4.) 

However, to the extent Plaintiff invokes federal jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, see FAC at 1, he fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. 

This is due to the fact that Plaintiff seeks damages based on the allegedly unconstitutional 

actions of purported federal actors employed at UCSD, “the only possible action . . . is an 

action under the authority of Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 399 (1971)].” Id.; see also Morse v. N. Coast 

Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[B]y its very terms, § 1983 

precludes liability in federal government actors.”).

Thus, the Court will liberally construe his factual allegations as though they were 

pleaded to seek relief pursuant to Bivens, rather than § 1983. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 

F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting court’s duty to construe pro se prisoner’s pleadings 

liberally when screening complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (citation omitted).

“In Bivens, the Supreme Court ‘recognized for the first time an implied right of 

action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s 

constitutional rights.’” Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (citation 

omitted)). Bivens arose in the context of a Fourth Amendment violation, however, and the 

Court has “only expanded [Bivens’] ‘implied cause of action’ twice.” Id. (quoting Ziglar 

v. Abassi, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017)). The Court expanded Bivens to 

Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claims raised by a federal prisoner’s 

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decedents. Id. (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25 (1980) (concluding that “[a]

federal official contemplating unconstitutional conduct [in the context of an Eighth 

Amendment] medical care [claim]... must be prepared to face the prospect of a Bivens

action.”)).

However, the Court has expressly refused to extend liability for constitutional 

violations to federal agencies or private actors who contract with the federal government. 

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). Thus, even if Plaintiff 

had filed his FAC pursuant to Bivens, rather than pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to the 

extent he seeks to hold UCSD employees liable for damages incurred under color of 

federal law, he fails to state a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

A Bivens action may only be brought against a federal official in his or her 

individual capacity. See Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, Bivens does not authorize a suit for money damages against a private entity 

like UCSD or its employees. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66 n.2 (holding that FDIC v. 

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994), “forecloses the extension of Bivens to private entities.”);

Minneci v. Pollard, __U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (foreclosing Bivens relief 

where federal prisoner sought damages from privately employed prison personnel, and 

despite Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care allegations, on grounds that the 

“conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law,” and 

therefore “the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law.”).

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s FAC alleges constitutional violations

committed by Defendants, who are alleged to be employed by UCSD, he fails to state a 

plausible claim upon which Bivens relief may be granted. 

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failing to state a 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Because the Court finds 

further amendment futile, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

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Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of 

discretion where further amendment would be futile). 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2019

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