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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals 

'J'P.nth Circuit 

WALTER C. EWERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, 

JACK JETER, 

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MAY 101989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY 

OF CURRY and ANITA C. MERRILL and MICHAEL 

C. GATTIS, Individually and in their 

capacities as members of the Board of 

Curry County Commissioners, 

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Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. ) 

No. 84-2477 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

CIV-83-0238-JB 

Philip B. Davis, Legal Director, and Jeffrey J. Dempsey, 

Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, CrossAppellant 

Steven L. Bell and Arthur P. Brock of Atwood, Malone, Mann & 

Turner, P.A., Roswell, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant, CrossAppellee Board of Commissioners for the County of Curry 

George Cherpelis and Laurie A. Vogel, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

attorneys for Defendants-Cross Appellees Merrill and Gattis 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and SAM,* 

District Judge. 

. OPINION ON REHEARING 

*The Honorable David Sam, United States District Judge for the 

District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

I 

L 

Appellate Case: 84-2477 Document: 01019963586 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 1 
. PER CURIAM: 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this rehearing. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

I 

This matter is therefore ordered 

This matter is before the court pursuant to its order 

granting a limited rehearing by the panel in No. 84-2477, one 

judge voting to deny the petition for rehearing. 1 Rehearing was 

limited to the challenge of cross-appellant Walter c. Ewers to the 

district court's summary judgment dismissing his claimed property 

interest. The order directed the parties to address this court's 

discussion of the property interest claim set forth in our earlier 

opinion, Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners of Curry County, 

802 F.2d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 1986), and the applicability of 

Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1985). Pursuant to that 

order the parties have submitted briefs on rehearing on this issue 

and supplemental authorities. 

Our focus is thus solely upon the property interest claim of 

the plaintiff-cross appellant Ewers. That claim was dismissed by 

a summary judgment ruling of the district court. In our earlier 

opinion we declined to review the district court's summary 

judgment dismissing the property interest claim due to the absence 

of a complete record. 802 F.2d at 1250. A supplemental record 

1 

Judge Barrett voted to deny the petition for rehearing. 

2 

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.. has . been. filed, .. however., and .evidentiary matters _discussed below 

are before us for consideration. 

The facts concerning the property interest claim of Ewers are 

stated in detail in our opinion, 802 F.2d at 1243-45, and need not 

be restated at length. It will suffice to note that Ewers was 

hired in August 1977 as the County's first road superintendent. 

Ewers could only be terminated for good cause or if his job was 

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abolished and he was answerable to the County Commissioners. In 

November 1980, defendants-cross appellees Gattis and Merrill were 

elected to the Board. At a January 1981 Board meeting, Ewers was· 

excused from the meeting. Then by a two-to-one vote, with 

Commissioner Stockton in the minority, the job of road 

superintendent was abolished effective March 1, 1981, but this was 

changed to make the termination effective February 28, 1981. 

Ewers remained employed as road superintendent for about six 

weeks. Meetings were held at which criticisms were made and Ewers 

testified that he felt he had been defamed by the discussion. 

After the job of road superintendent was abolished the Board 

created a position of county manager. The manager was assigned 

tasks by the Board, many of which were the same that Ewers had 

performed. 

Ewers brought the instant suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

alleging his position had been abolished as a pretext to terminate 

him in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights; that 

the Board had deprived him of a liberty interest; and that it had 

deprived him of a property interest without due process. It is 

the latter claim alone that concerns us now. 

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.. The distr-ict. court. granted summary .judgment .dismissing Ewers' 

property interest claim, and certain others. The judge ruled that 

other claims based on the First Amendment and the liberty interest 

claim should be tried. A jury verdict for Ewers resulted, and 

judgment on it was appealed and reversed for reasons explained in 

our earlier opinion. 802 F.2d at 1245-1250. 

We turn to the reconsideration of the property interest claim 

which we had earlier declined to review for lack of an adequate 

record. The critical record materials are now before us and we 

consider the merits of the property interest claim. 

II 

The district court's summary judgment dismissing the property 

interest claim was explained in that court's Memorandum Opinion 

and Order, at 11-13. Noting that whether a property interest in 

employment exists is determined under state law, Board of Regents 

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the district judge said that New 

Mexico law is settled that in the absence of an employment 

contract for a definite term, an employee is terminable at will. 

However, there are exceptions, one being where personnel 

regulations or policies prescribe termination procedures. 

The court noted that Ewers avers that his termination was not 

in accordance with the procedures; that the personnel policies of 

the County are allegedly sufficient to create a property interest 

under the Curry County Personnel Policies. These policies the 

court cited as Exhibit AF to the defendants Merrill's and Gattis' 

motion for summary judgment. The court said that no express 

termination procedures were created, although a grievance 

procedure was provided and that the grievance procedure states 

4 

Appellate Case: 84-2477 Document: 01019963586 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 4 
.. that the decision rendered by the. County .Commission is final and 

binding. On these facts the court held the personnel policies 

were insufficient to create a property interest. 

In support of this ruling, the court relied primarily on 

DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D.Colo.1977), affirmed in No. 

77-1299 (10th Cir. 1978). The trial judge pointed out that in 

DeBono the Court 

employment where a 

employees appointed 

held that no property interest was created in 

state statute provided that officers and 

by a city manager may be removed at anytime 

for cause, the decision of the city manager in any such case being 

final. The district judge also cited Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, 

660 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 198l)(explaining the DeBono ruling), and 

Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1981). 

III 

In light of subsequent constitutional decisions, not 

available to the district court when its order was entered, we are 

convinced that the summary judgment must be set aside and the 

property interest claim remanded for further proceedings. 

As noted, the Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the 

summary judgment before trial relied on cases decided prior to the 

significant decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Our opinion in Bailey v. Kirk, 

777 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1985), followed the Loudermill ruling in a 

§ 1983 suit arising from Oklahoma. Although the defendants argue 

that the Oklahoma law distinguishes the Bailey case, that argument 

misconceives the significance of Bailey here. State law does 

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Appellate Case: 84-2477 Document: 01019963586 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 5 
.determine~he existence of .. property rights .. Nevertheless as the 

Court stated in Loudermill: 

While the legislature may elect not to confer a 

property interest in [public] employment, it may 

not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of 

such an interest, once conferred, without 

appropriate procedural safeguards. 

470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 

(1974)(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in 

part)). 

In Bailey, we explained that "we must now hold that a public 

employee, who could not be suspended except for cause, had a 

property interest in continued employment, even though the city's 

suspension provisions may not provide for a right of appeal." 777 

F.2d at 574. The property right in Bailey was grounded on a 

provision in the personnel policies of the city which provided 

that an employee could not be suspended without pay, demoted or 

removed from his position except for good and sufficient cause. 

777 F.2d at 569. Bailey points out that the property interest 

does exist, even though the personnel policies provide for no 

right of appeal. The earlier reasoning that the person relying on 

a personnel policy with a provision for finality, or without a 

review procedure, had to take the bitter with the sweet, was 

rejected in Loudermill emphatically. And that is the case here 

under the holding of Loudermill as a matter of federal 

constitutional law. This principle applies as a matter of federal 

law, regardless of whether the case arises in Oklahoma as in 

Bailey, or in New Mexico. 

In fact, in the federal district.court in New Mexico this 

principle subsequently has been applied, with reliance being 

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---~ .placed.-upon Bailey .v .. Kirk. •. I-n.Llewellyn v. Naranjo, No. 84-0318, 

( a Memorandum Opinion and Order rendered after Bailey was decided 

held that the plaintiff did have a property interest in employment 

by the county where a personnel policy provided that no permanent 

employee shall be discharged without cause. A pretermination 

right to hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 

was recognized, and the right was held to include notice and an 

opportunity to rebut the charges, citing Loudermill. Llewellyn at 

pages 7-8, 10-11. 

State courts in New Mexico have also applied the federal 

constitutional standard enunciated in Loudermill. In an action by 

a city employee challenging his reassignment, the New Mexico 

Supreme Court held that the employer's actions and the merit 

system and personnel rules constituted the independent source of 

Lovato 

(citing 

rules or understandings that create a property interest. 

v. City of Albuquerque, 742 P.2d 499, 501-502 (N.M. 1987) 

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). "Property 

protected 

Though the 

interests are not created by the Constitution; they are 

by the Constitution." Lovato, 742 P.2d at 502. 

personnel rules in Lovato specified that reassignments at any time 

are at the discretion of the employee's superior and are not the 

subject of a grievance procedure, the New Mexico Supreme Court 

rejected the argument that this foreclosed the due process issue. 

Id. Relying on Loudermill, the court held that Lovato had a 

constitutionally protected property interest and that the denial 

of a full hearing on his claims resulted in a deprivation of his 

right to due process. Id. See also Linney v. County 

Commissioners of Chaves County, 743 P.2d 637, 638-639 (N.M. Ct. 

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Appellate Case: 84-2477 Document: 01019963586 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 7 
App. 1987) (where county ordinance created a contract~al right in 

employment, under Loudermill the failure to provide a 

pretermination hearing was violation of due process); Gonzalez v. 

Gonzalez, 703 P.2d 934, 940 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (pursuant to 

Loudermill, the notice and opportunity to be heard must precede a 

deprivation of property and must be appropriate to the nature· of 

the case). 

In the instant case the Curry County Personnel Policies 

provide in pertinent part: 

TERMINATIONS 

Discharge: The County reserves the right to 

discharge employees for cause, without notice, for 

such reasons as misconduct, nonstandard job 

performance, insubordination or moral 

improprieties. Employees can not be discharged 

without cause, unless position is abolished. 

* * * 

VARIANCES 

* * * 

It is the policy of this County to·provide steady 

employment with job security at a fair living wage 

comparable to that paid for similar work in the 

community. (Emphasis added). 

By its explicit terms, that an employee cannot be discharged 

except for cause, the manual has used the language as in 

Loudermill which, without dispute, meant that the discharged 

employee "possessed property rights in continued employment." 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535, 538-539; see also Bailey v. Kirk, 777 

F.2d at 574. 2 

2 

We have noted our affirmance of a summary judgment against a 

property interest claim in Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 859 

Fn. cont'd to next page 

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Appellate Case: 84-2477 Document: 01019963586 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 8 
..... The .. defendants mistakenly rely upon prior New Mexico law 

which made the existence of a property interest dependent upon the 

procedural provisions conferred by the public employer. Francis 

v. Memorial General Hospital, 726 P.2d 852, 854 (N.M. 1986). The 

explicit principle in Loudermill and the New Mexico courts' 

incorporation of it in Lovato, Linney, and Gonzalez dispose of 

this argument. 

The terms of the manual in combination with other evidence 

before the court preclude a summary judgment on the issue of the 

property interest. While the defendants argue that Ewers' 

employment was not terminated, but rather that his job was 

formally abolished, this does not suffice to meet the summary 

judgment standard. Instead, the issue of whether abolishment was 

a pretextual way to terminate Ewers' protected interest in his 

employment remains disputed through the statements in two 

depositions. One is from the Chairman of the Board of 

Commissioners, Stockton. He visited with Ewers after his job was 

abolished and stated that while Ewers' position was formally 

abolished, Stockton felt that Ewers had been fired. Stockton 

Deposition, 24-25. Stockton also felt that the other two 

commissioners, the defendants, "didn't have any reason to abolish 

the job." Id. at 25. Gilbert A. Gutierrez, the Assistant 

District Attorney and County Attorney for the Commissioners, 

stated that his legal advice to the commissioners was that 

(Fn. continued): 

F.2d 142, 146 (10th Cir. 1988). However, we pointed out there 

that the controlling charter provisions confided power to make 

removals "solely for the good of the service." We feel this 

language distinguishable from that in the Curry County personnel 

manual, quoted above. 

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Appellate Case: 84-2477 Document: 01019963586 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 9 
.abolishments--Of .Ewer.' s position required an articulated rational 

( basis or factual support to justify its elimination. Gutierrez 

Deposition, 9-11. Prior to voting on abolishing the position, the 

commissioners did not articulate a reason or factual basis. Id. 

at 14-16. They further failed to follow Gutierrez' advice to 

develop a job description for the county manager piior to hiring 

someone for the position and never adopted a job description. Id. 

Where such material facts are in dispute a summary judgment is not 

appropriate. Zaccardi v. Zale Corporation, 856 F.2d 1473, 1476-

1477 (10th Cir. 1988); accord Gonzalez, 703 P.2d at 940-942. 

IV 

In sum, without deciding the merits of the property interest 

claim, in light of the personnel policy before us and the matters 

in the record as supplemented, we hold that the defendant Board 

and defendants Merrill and Gattis did not demonstrate that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as required by Fed. R. 

Civ P. 56(c). They have not shown their entitlement to summary 

judgment beyond a reasonable doubt, Mustang Fuel Corp. v. 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 36 (10th Cir. 1975), 

particularly because of the more recent decisions of the Supreme 

Court, the New Mexico courts, and our court. Accordingly, the 

summary judgment dismissing Ewers' property interest claim is 

reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings on that 

claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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