Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00754/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00754-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 See http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/facility.asp?fid=153 (Last visited Apr. 25,

2011). 

2

 “Doc.” refers to the docket number of filings in this case. 

3

 On March 23, 2011, CCA filed an Answer in the District of Alaska; however, the

Answer has not been filed in this Court.

TERMPSREF

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bradley D. Proctor, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Corrections Corp. of America, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 11-0754-PHX-RCB (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Bradley D. Proctor, an Alaskan inmate who is now confined in the Hudson

Correctional Facility (HCF), a GEO Group, Inc., facility in Hudson, Colorado,1

 filed a pro

se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Alaska state court. (Doc. 12-4.)2

On March 17, 2011, Defendant Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) removed this

action from Alaska state court to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska

based on federal question and diversity subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 12-3.) In an Order

filed April 14, 2011, the District of Alaska transferred this action to this District based on

venue.3

 (Doc. 12-1.) CCA has filed a motion for attorney substitution, which will be

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 2 -

granted. (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to seek remand of this case

to Alaska state court, which has been superceded by an amended motion for extension of

time, to which Defendant CCA has responded. (Docs. 19-21.) Plaintiff has not filed a reply.

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied. The Court will order Defendants Cox, Crane, and Miracle

to answer the Complaint and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without

prejudice. 

I. Removal to Federal Court was Proper

Plaintiff seeks an extension of time to file a motion for remand contending that

removal of his state law claims was improper. (Docs. 19, 20.) A defendant may remove any

civil action brought in state court over which the federal court would have original

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). That is, a civil action that could have originally been

brought in federal court may be removed from state to federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A federal court has original jurisdiction “of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1331. Plaintiff alleges a federal constitutional violation in his Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, thus, subject matter jurisdiction is proper in federal court. Further, a federal

court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over closely related state law claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Alaska state court on December 7, 2010. A copy of

the Complaint and summons was received by CCA’s statutory agent on February 25, 2011,

and CCA removed the case to federal court on March 17, 2011. (Doc. 12-3, 12-5.) The

Complaint in this case facially supports that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court

because Plaintiff alleges violation of his federal constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441,

1442. Further, Defendant CCA removed the action from state court within 30 days of

receiving notice of the filing of this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Because the case was

properly removed to federal court, Plaintiff’s amended motion for extension of time to seek

remand will be denied.

/ / / 

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 3 -

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951. 

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

///

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Spring Creek Correctional Center is a prison operated by the State of Alaska. See

http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/institutions/sccc/sccc.jsf (last visited May 25,

2011). 

TERMPSREF - 4 -

III. Complaint

Plaintiff’s claims concern events that occurred while he was confined in CCA’s Red

Rock Correctional Center (RRCC) in Eloy, Arizona, pursuant to a contract between the State

of Alaska and CCA. Plaintiff arrived at RRCC on November 23, 2008, and is and was a

resident of Alaska at relevant times. Plaintiff alleges six state law claims and one federal

constitutional claim in his Complaint. Plaintiff sues CCA and the following employees of

RRCC: Dr. William Crane; Virginia Cox, Registered Nurse; Lois Miracle, Nurse

Practitioner; John Doe Florez; John Doe DeLash; and Jane Doe Alfano. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive relief.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Complaint: When Plaintiff arrived at

RRCC, he was 49 years old and weighed between 280 and 300 pounds. Plaintiff arrived at

RRCC from Spring Creek Correctional Center,4

 where medical staff had prescribed

assignment to a bottom bunk due to previously incurred debilitating injuries to his right ankle

and left knee. Upon Plaintiff’s arrival at RRCC, Plaintiff informed officials of the bottom

bunk assignment, but he was assigned to a top bunk and was told that CCA did not honor

out-of-state recommendations for assignment to a bottom bunk. Both Plaintiff’s weight and

his ankle and knee disabilities made it difficult for him to climb into and out of an upper

bunk. In addition, only a “flimsy plastic chair” rather than a ladder was provided to him to

climb into an upper bunk. (Doc. 12-4 at 6.) 

During the early morning of December 4, 2008, Plaintiff was climbing down in the

dark from the top bunk using the plastic chair when the chair gave way and Plaintiff fell head

first into the cell’s stainless steel sink. The next morning, Plaintiff reported to security staff,

who referred him to medical staff. Plaintiff was examined by Nurse Cox, who gave him a

24-hour ice permit. Later that day, Defendant DeLash issued Plaintiff a disciplinary write-up

for engaging in mutual combat, although Plaintiff was the only person charged. The next

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 5 -

day, Unit Manager Florez reassigned Plaintiff to a bottom bunk. 

On December 9, 2008, Dr. Crane memorialized Plaintiff’s assignment to a lower bunk

in his medical file, but did not see Plaintiff. On December 11, 2008, Plaintiff asked to see

medical personnel because he was continuing to suffer from “a pronounced facial

disfigurement, numbness, headaches, dizziness, blurred vision, spasms, and pain” resulting

from the fall. (Id. at 7.) On December 20, 2008, Nurse Practitioner Miracle saw Plaintiff and

noted the pronounced facial disfigurement. She told Plaintiff that they needed to get x-rays,

but that x-rays had to be approved by Dr. Crane, which would not happen until after the

holidays. Plaintiff was not x-rayed until January 14, 2009, after he filed two written requests

for treatment. The x-rays revealed serious trauma to Plaintiff’s face and resulted in him

being referred for treatment to an outside specialist. Up to that point, Plaintiff had only been

prescribed aspirin and had only seen a physician once. 

On January 26, 2009, Dr. Afshin examined Plaintiff and determined that he required

reconstructive facial surgery. Dr. Afshin told Plaintiff that the surgery would be more

complicated and would require re-breaking bones due to the lapse of time since the injury.

Dr. Afshin also told Plaintiff that nerve damage might be permanent due to the time that had

elapsed. On January 29, 2009, Dr. Afshin performed surgery, including the insertion of

titanium plates into the damaged area, at a facility outside of RRCC. Dr. Afshin prescribed

post-surgical antibiotics and pain medications for Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff was returned

to RRCC without the antibiotics or pain medications. Plaintiff did not begin receiving

antibiotics until February 1, 2009. Plaintiff informed medical staff that he was in severe

pain, but they refused to dispense the prescribed pain medication. Plaintiff continued to

suffer severe pain for about a week as a consequence. 

On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff asked about scheduling his follow-up surgery, a

septoplasty. An April 18, 2009 response stated that he was approved for septoplasty in the

distant future. On May 22, 2009, the septoplasty was performed, which involved the

insertion of two shunts in Plaintiff’s nostrils that were sewn together inside his nasal passage.

Because the procedure was extremely painful, Plaintiff was given morphine and Demoral by

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 6 -

his surgeon during and immediately after the procedure. The surgeon asked Plaintiff’s

escorts if it was permissible to prescribe codeine for post-surgical pain and was told that it

was. However, upon Plaintiff’s return to RRCC, Defendant Cox changed the prescription

to ice several times a day with aspirin. On May 25, 2009, Plaintiff submitted several written

requests concerning pain and discomfort caused by the shunts. The next day, Plaintiff was

seen by Dr. Crane, who refused to override Cox’s substitution of ice and aspirin for codeine.

On June 1, 2009, Florez responded to Plaintiff’s May 25 written requests by saying that he

would speak to “Alfano” in medical. Because of the continuing pain, Plaintiff asked to have

the shunts removed prematurely. Plaintiff suffers from occasional facial numbness and eye

twitching where he was injured. Since the injury, Plaintiff has also suffered from memory

loss, impaired cognitive function, and bouts of anxiety and depression. 

III. Failure to State a Claim Under § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional

claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of

a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to medical care.

Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a violation of

the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show

that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v.

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure

to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d

at 1096 (quotations omitted).

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 7 -

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate

indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally

denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to

the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference

must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

A. CCA

Plaintiff sues CCA, a private corporation for violation of federal rights. Claims under

§ 1983 may be directed at “bodies politic and corporate.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 686, 688-89 (1978). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress

intended municipal corporations and other local government units to be included among

those persons to whom § 1983 applies. Id. at 2035. That proposition has been extended to

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 8 -

corporations that act under color of state law. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal. Inc. v. Pacific

Tel. & Tel Co., 890 F.2d 184, 189 (9th Cir. 1989) (willful joint participation of private

corporation in joint activity with state or its agent taken under color of state law). 

There are four ways to find state action by a private entity for purposes of § 1983: (1)

the private actor performs a public function, (2) the private actor engages in joint activity

with a state actor, (3) a private actor is subject to governmental compulsion or coercion, or

(4) there is a governmental nexus with the private actor. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088,

1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the public function test, “the function [performed by the private

actor] must traditionally be the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc.

v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); see Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093; Lee v. Katz,

276 F.3d 550, 554-555 (9th Cir. 2002). A privately owned corporation that operates prisons

pursuant to a contract with a state performs a public function that is traditionally the

exclusive prerogative of the state. Further, to state a claim under § 1983 against a private

entity performing a traditional public function, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his

constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated

or endorsed by the private entity. See Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997);

Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Wall v. Dion, 257 F.

Supp.2d 316, 319 (D. Me 2003); see also Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727

(4th Cir. 1999); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990);

Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989); Iskander v. Village of Forest

Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). 

CCA performs a traditional public function, i.e., operating a prison. However,

Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that CCA promulgated or endorsed a policy or custom

that resulted in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights. Plaintiff does not allege

specific facts against CCA to support that it promulgated or endorsed a policy or custom that

resulted in a violation of his federal rights. Plaintiff instead appears to predicate liability

solely on respondeat superior. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a

defendant’s position as the employer of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 9 -

constitutional rights does not make it liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor, 880 F.2d at

1045. Because Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim against CCA under § 1983, his federal

claim against it will be dismissed.

B. Florez, Alfano, and DeLash

Plaintiff sues three CCA employees, DeLash, Florez, and Alfano. The only facts

alleged against DeLash is that he issued Plaintiff a disciplinary charge the day after Plaintiff

was injured. The only facts alleged against Florez is that he reassigned Plaintiff to a lower

bunk the day after Plaintiff fell and responded to Plaintiff’s written requests on May 25, 2009

regarding the pain he was suffering following the septoplasty. The only mention of Alfano

is Florez’s statement in his June 1, 2009 response to Plaintiff that he would check with

Alfano about Plaintiff’s May 25, 2009 requests. 

None of these facts is sufficient to state a claim against these Defendants for violation

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to medical care. While Plaintiff adequately alleges that he

had a serious medical need following his fall and in connection with the subsequent

surgeries, he fails to allege facts to support that any of these Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. Accordingly, these Defendants will be dismissed.

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendants Cox, Miracle, and Crane acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. While Cox’s alleged initial failure to

recognize the seriousness of Plaintiff’s injury amounts to no more than negligence, Plaintiff

sufficiently alleges that her refusal to provide him prescribed pain medication after his

surgeries, despite his repeated requests due to pain, sufficiently states an Eighth Amendment

violation. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Crane endorsed Cox’s substitution of ice and aspirin for

prescribed pain medication following a painful procedure and sufficiently alleges that Crane

endorsed Cox’s substitution of ice and aspirin and that it was medically unacceptable under

the circumstances. Plaintiff alleges that despite recognizing that x-rays were needed, Miracle

failed to ensure that he was promptly x-rayed, even after the holidays had passed, for two

weeks. Accordingly, the Court will require a response from Defendants Cox, Miracle, and

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 10 -

Crane to the Complaint. 

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay the

balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result in

dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendant CCA’s motion to substitute counsel is granted. (Doc. 18.)

(2) Plaintiff’s amended motion for extension of time to seek remand is denied. 

(Doc. 20.)

(3) Defendants CCA, DeLash, Florez, and Alfano, and John or Jane Does are

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 11 -

dismissed without prejudice.

(4) Defendants Cox, Crane, and Miracle must answer the Complaint. 

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. 12-4), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Cox, Crane, and Miracle.

(6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver

of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant

within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 12 -

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendant must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 13th day of June, 2011.

Case 2:11-cv-00754-RCB Document 22 Filed 06/13/11 Page 12 of 12