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Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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Case No.: 3:19-mc-80062-EJD

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DE NOVO REVIEW 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

WILLIAM DAVID BUSH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CARDTRONICS INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:19-mc-80062-EJD 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DE 

NOVO REVIEW 

Re: Dkt. No. 7 

Plaintiff William David Bush filed in this district an application to conduct discovery for 

litigation that is before courts in Mexico and that concerns ATMs in Mexico. Dkt. 1. The matter 

was assigned to a magistrate judge, who denied the application. Dkt. 6. Mr. Bush filed a 

declination to proceed before a magistrate judge, and now moves the court for de novo of the 

magistrate judge’s order. Dkt. 4, 7. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies the motion. 

As an initial matter, the court will not consider Mr. Bush’s motion under de novo review. 

He contends that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 42, the magistrate judge’s order 

was dispositive and should have been considered by a district judge. Dkt. 7 at 1. He is incorrect. 

The application is a series of discovery requests; it is not dispositive. As such, neither 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(A) nor General Order 42 prohibited the magistrate judge from considering and deciding 

the application. Because the application is for discovery, and not one of the enumerated matters in 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the court is compelled to review the magistrate judge’s order under the 

“clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review—not under de novo review. 

This standard of review is highly deferential to a magistrate judge’s decision. See United 

States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he text of the Magistrates Act 

suggests that the magistrate judge’s decision in such nondispositive matters is entitled to great 

deference by the district court.”). The Ninth Circuit has stated that a reviewing district judge “may 

not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & Cty. of S.F., 

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951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). For Mr. Bush to succeed here, the court must find that the 

magistrate judge’s order was “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Id. at 240. The “clearly 

erroneous” standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & 

Deposit Co. of Maryland, 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ 

when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, after reviewing the entire 

evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United 

States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). A decision is “contrary to law” when it 

applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to consider all the elements of an applicable standard. 

Na Pali Haweo Cmty. Ass’n v. Grande, 252 F.R.D. 672, 674 (D. Haw. 2008). The Court now 

considers whether the magistrate judge’s order was “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” 

To obtain discovery for a foreign proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, the applicant 

must first satisfy a three-part test. First, the applicant must show “(1) the discovery sought is from 

a person residing in the district court to which the application is made; (2) the discovery is for use 

in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3) the applicant is a foreign or international tribunal 

or an interested person.”̈ In re Ex Parte Application Varian Med. Sys. Int’l AG, 2016 WL 

1161568, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). But, the Supreme 

Court has “explained that Section 1782 ‘authorizes, but does not require, the District Court to 

provide discovery aid.’” Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 2016 WL 11529803, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 9, 2016) (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 266 (2004)). If 

an applicant can meet the statutory requirements, the Supreme Court has directed district courts to 

exercise discretion based on the four, non-exhaustive factors: 

(1) whether the “person from whom discovery is sought is a 

participant in the foreign proceeding”; (2) “the nature of the 

foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, 

and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or 

agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”; (3) 

whether the discovery request is an “attempt to circumvent proofgathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the 

United States”; and (4) whether the discovery requested is “unduly 

intrusive or burdensome.” 

In re Ex Parte Apple Inc., 2012 WL 1570043, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2012) (quoting Intel, 542 

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U.S. at 264-65). Thus, a district court may still deny or limit an application that satisfies the 

statutory factors, if it does not merit an exercise of discretion. 

Here, the magistrate judge denied Mr. Bush’s application because (a) he failed to satisfy 

the first statutory factor, and (b) the first and fourth discretionary factors “weigh[ed] heavily 

against granting the application,” so that “[e]ven if Mr. Bush’s application satisfied the minimum 

statutory requirements of Section 1782, the court would exercise its discretion to deny the 

application.” Dkt. 6 at 9. 

The Court first considers the magistrate judge’s ruling on the first and fourth discretionary 

factors. As to the first factor, the magistrate judge reasoned: “Mr. Bush says that Cardtronics, 

BlackRock, and Fiserv are all involved in the Mexican lawsuit. As such, the Mexican court can 

itself order any discovery of them that it deems appropriate. This factor weighs against granting 

the application.” Id. at 8. Mr. Bush did not address the magistrate judge’s ruling on this factor in 

his motion for review. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge; the magistrate judge’s 

reasoning here is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to the law. 

On the fourth factor, the magistrate judge found that “Mr. Bush’s sixteen requests are 

broad and do not appear to be tailored to his dispute with Cardtronics: they include (among other 

things) requests for all correspondence related to the ATM business in Mexico and/or the 

Caribbean (without further limitation) and for the Recipients’ internal discussions about how to 

respond to Mr. Bush’s prior complaints (which are presumptively confidential).” Id. at 8-9. 

Accordingly, the magistrate judge found that fourth factor weighed against granting the 

application. Id. at 9. In his motion, Mr. Bush broadly argues that the requested documents are not 

protected from discovery, that the companies at issue are publicly held, and that the requests are 

“of direct and subsequent connection” to his claims. Dkt. 7 at 3-4. The Court is not persuaded. 

The requests seek, for example, “all correspondence between [defendants’] organizations, via 

employees, subsidiaries, associates, representatives, or directors pertaining to Cardtronics Inc or 

Cardtronics Mexico or any other associated third party company in regard to the ATM business in 

Mexico and/or the Caribbean.” Dkt. 1 at 4. The breadth of this request is staggering. The Court 

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agrees with the magistrate judge that the discovery requests are unduly burdensome and intrusive. 

Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s ruling was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 

Finally, the Court agrees that these two factors weigh so heavily against granting Mr. 

Bush’s application that it should be denied even if he could satisfy the three-prong test of the 

statutory requirements. See Dkt. 6 at 9. Accordingly, the Court does not consider the magistrate 

judge’s finding as to the first statutory factor. 

The motion for de novo review is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 6, 2019 

______________________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

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