Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01456/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01456-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Plaintiff did not file written opposition but appeared at the 1

hearing and was permitted to argue in opposition to the motion.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RASHAD MUSTAFA SHADEED, No. CIV.S-06-1456 FCD DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER AND

BOARD OF PRISON TERMS, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

_____________________________/

This matter is before the court on defendant Mary

McNamara’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeared on his

own behalf at the hearing on the motion. Laurel Headley appeared on

behalf of defendant McNamara. Having considered all written

materials submitted in connection with the motion, and after hearing

oral argument, the undersigned will recommend that the motion be 1

granted and that defendant McNamara be dismissed with prejudice.

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A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. See North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d

578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint or of any claim

within it “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990); see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749

F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, the court accepts as true all material allegations in the

complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In a case where the plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation

to construe the pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)(en banc). However, the court’s liberal

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential

elements of a claim that are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d

469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff initiated this action by paying the appropriate

filing fee and filing his complaint on June 30, 2006. The complaint

is difficult to decipher and consists of 84 pages. Most of those

pages consist of plaintiff’s handwritten allegations or his medical

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records from various correctional facilities. The complaint names a

number of defendants and its allegations are wide-ranging. There are

ten enumerated “claims.” Only two of those claims concern defendant

McNamara who, as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in the Northern

District of California, apparently represented plaintiff in a 

criminal prosecution during the years 1997 and 1998. Claim four

alleges that plaintiff was the victim of housing discrimination in

1996-97 in San Francisco and that defendant McNamara failed to

investigate that alleged discrimination. Claim six vaguely alleges

that defendant McNamara coerced plaintiff into pleading guilty in the

criminal case in which she represented him and rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel in this regard.

Liberally construed, claims four and six are state law

claims for legal malpractice. However, as defendant McNamara

accurately points out, those claims are barred by the applicable

statute of limitations. California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.6

governs claims against an attorney for wrongful acts or omissions

arising from the performance of professional services, other than

actual fraud which is not alleged here. Under § 340.6 the statute of

limitations expires “one year after the plaintiff discovers, or

through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the

facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from

the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6. See Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.

4th 1194, 1206 (2001). Here, plaintiff filed his complaint nearly

eight years after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. There

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appearing no basis for tolling the statute of limitations, the

undersigned therefore will recommend that claims four and six brought

against defendant McNamara be dismissed as time-barred.

The court also sees no plausible connection between

plaintiff’s housing situation and defendant McNamara’s representation

of plaintiff in criminal proceedings that were pending against him in

1997 and 1998. The court is aware of no legal authority that would

have required plaintiff’s federal public defender to investigate a

civil housing dispute in connection with her representation of

plaintiff in an unrelated criminal proceeding. Nor has plaintiff

identified any such authority. The court also notes that an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is more properly pursued in a

post-conviction relief proceeding such as a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, not in a civil action such as the instant one. For

these reasons as well, the undersigned will recommend that defendant

McNamara’s motion to dismiss be granted and claims four and six be

dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

Granting leave to amend would be futile under these

circumstances. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296

(9th Cir. 1990); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d

729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the undersigned will recommend

that defendant Mary McNamara be dismissed from this action with

prejudice.

Next, plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. 

However, plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis such that the

court has discretion to request an attorney to represent him. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Nor is this a Title VII action in which the

court may appoint counsel. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc’y of San

Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, even assuming

either of those standards applied, there has been no showing

demonstrating plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits

warranting the appointment of counsel. See Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of

Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon,

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, the request for

appointment of counsel will be denied.

Finally, plaintiff recently filed a very brief handwritten

“motion to expedite and change of venue.” (Doc. no. 22.) However,

the motion is unsupported by any meaningful discussion of the

applicable law and facts, nor has it been noticed for hearing as

required by the local rules. Moreover, plaintiff does not indicate

what it is he desires to have expedited nor does he indicate

precisely where he desires this action be transferred. For all of

these reasons, plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s request

for appointment of counsel and “motion to expedite and change of

venue” are denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss be

granted and that defendant Mary McNamara be dismissed from this

action with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten days after being

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served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 

Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 6, 2006.

DAD:th

Ddadl\orders.prose\shadeed1456.f&r

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