Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00945/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00945-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AJAXO, INC., )

) 2:07-CV-945-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

BANK OF AMERICA TECHNOLOGY AND )

OPERATIONS, INC.; BANK OF AMERICA )

CORPORATION; and BANK OF AMERICA )

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for

copyright infringement of the “Wirelessproxy Utility Program TXU1-169-

798” (“Wirelessproxy”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),

arguing that Plaintiff does not have standing to assert this claim

since Plaintiff does not own the Wirelessproxy copyright.

“It is appropriate to address the question of standing in

deciding a motion to dismiss because ‘the elements of standing are an

indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, and accordingly must be

Case 2:07-cv-00945-GEB-GGH Document 23 Filed 11/21/07 Page 1 of 3
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supported at each stage of litigation in the same manner as any other

essential element of the case.’” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide,

Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Cent. Delta Water

Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002). “Under

the Copyright Act of 1976 . . ., ‘the legal or beneficial owner of an

exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an

action for any infringement of that particular right committed while

he or she is the owner of it.’” Id., quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).

Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that it obtained

registration of the Wirelessproxy copyright in 2005. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-

16.) Defendants disagree and request judicial notice be taken of

three U.S. Copyright Office records which show that Sing Koo (“Koo”),

not Plaintiff, obtained registration of the Wirelessproxy copyright. 

(See Defs.’ Req. for Jud. Not.) Plaintiff responded requesting

judicial notice be taken of two U.S. Copyright Office records which

show that, although Koo originally obtained the Wirelessproxy

copyright registration, Koo transferred the copyright to Plaintiff. 

(See Pl.’s Req. for Jud. Not.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot use this extrinsic

evidence in opposition to Defendants’ dismissal motion since this

evidence “directly contradicts the allegations in [Plaintiff’s]

complaint.” (Defs.’ Reply at 2:2-3.) This evidence reveals that Koo

transferred the Wirelessproxy copyright to Plaintiff in 2006, rather

than in 2005 as Plaintiff alleges in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

“It is well settled law that facts, of which judicial notice

may be taken, need not be alleged in the complaint, and that a court

may take judicial notice of such a fact even when the complaint makes

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an express allegation to the contrary.” Lang v. Am. Motors Corp., 254

F. Supp. 892, 894 (D.C. Wis. 1966). 

While, broadly speaking, it is true that, in

considering a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded

allegations in the . . . complaint must be taken

as true, there is an important exception to this

general rule. In the consideration of a pleading,

the court will read it as if it contained a

statement of all matters of which the court is

required to take judicial notice, even when the

pleading contains an express allegation to the

contrary.

Nev-Cal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 85 F.2d 886, 904 (9th

Cir. 1936). In accordance with the rationale of Nev-Cal, judicial

notice may be taken of the fact that Koo transferred the Wirelessproxy

copyright to Plaintiff on May 1, 2006.

Each party’s request that judicial notice be taken is

granted. See Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft

Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the

appropriateness of taking judicial notice of federal copyright

registrations). The documents of which judicial notice is taken show

that Koo obtained the registration of the Wirelessproxy copyright in

2005, then transferred the Wirelessproxy copyright to Plaintiff on May

1, 2006. Since Plaintiff has shown it has standing to sue for

infringement of the Wirelessproxy copyright, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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