Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01714/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01714-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jose Lewis Bosquez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01714-PHX-PGR (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On August 20, 2013, Petitioner Jose Lewis Bosquez filed a Petitioner for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising three grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) 

After considering the briefing on the motion, the assigned magistrate judge recommended 

that the Petition be denied because Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred and he 

did not establish a basis to overcome the bar. (Doc. 14 at 10.) 

 On March 10, 2015, the Court adopted the report and recommendation in part and 

dismissed Grounds Two and Three of the Petition. (Doc. 18 at 3-4.) The Court rejected 

the report and recommendation related to Ground One and referred the matter to the 

assigned magistrate judge for additional consideration of Ground One. Specifically, the 

Court directed the magistrate judge to address (1) whether Petitioner had attempted to 

return to the state court for a determination of whether he was responsible for the 

untimely filing of a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, (2) whether it 

would be futile for Petitioner to return to state court to seek to exhaust the claims asserted 

in Ground One, and (3) whether, if Ground One is procedurally defaulted, Petitioner 

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could show cause and prejudice to overcome that bar. (Id. at 3.) To facilitate 

consideration of Ground One, the magistrate judge directed the parties to file 

supplemental briefing addressing the issues identified in the Court’s March 10, 2015 

Order and the merits of Petitioner’s claim asserted in Ground One of his Petition. 

(Doc. 19.) The magistrate judge ordered Petitioner to file his supplemental brief by April 

17, 2015, and stated that Respondents could file a response within thirty days of service 

of Petitioner’s supplemental brief. (Id.) Petitioner did not file a supplemental brief by 

the April 17, 2015 deadline. In an abundance of caution, on May 8, 2015, the magistrate 

judge issued another order directing the parties to file supplemental briefing. (Doc. 20.) 

The magistrate judge directed Respondents to file a supplemental brief by June 8, 2015, 

and stated that Petitioner could file a response within thirty days of service of the 

supplemental brief. (Id.) 

 On May 11, 2015, Respondents filed a supplemental brief in accordance with the 

Court’s orders.1

 (Doc. 21.) Petitioner did not file a response and the deadline has passed. 

(See Doc. 20.) After consideration of the supplemental briefing, the magistrate judge 

finds that Petitioner’s claim in Ground One is procedurally barred and, in the alternative, 

lacks merit and, therefore, his habeas petition should be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 On June 23, 2010, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court case 

number CR2010-013094-001 on the following charges: (1) conspiracy to commit 

aggravated robbery, a class three dangerous felony (Count One); (2) armed robbery, a 

class two dangerous felony (Count Two); (3) kidnapping, a class two dangerous felony 

 

1

 Respondents state that their supplemental brief was in progress before the May 8, 2015 Order directing Respondents to file a supplemental brief. (Doc. 21 at 2.) Respondents state that because Petitioner did not file a supplemental brief by the April 17, 2015 deadline, he waived any additional arguments to excuse his procedural default of Ground One or on the merits of Ground One. (Doc. 21 at 2 n.1.) The Court does not 

need to resolve this argument because it extended the April 17, 2015 deadline. However, 

Petitioner did not file a supplemental brief or a response to Respondents’ supplemental brief. 

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(Count Three); (4) theft of a means of transportation, a class three dangerous felony 

(Count Four); (5) first degree murder, a class one dangerous felony (Count Five); 

(6) trafficking in stolen property in the second degree, a class three felony (Count Six); 

(7) two counts of hindering prosecution in the first degree, class three felonies (Counts 

Seven and Nine); and (8) tampering with physical evidence, a class six felony (Count 

Eight). (Doc. 11, Ex. A.) 

 The State later alleged that Petitioner committed the offenses while on release. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. D.) The State also alleged several aggravating circumstances, including the 

infliction or threated infliction of serious physical injury, the use or threatened use or 

possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument (a gun), the presence of an 

accomplice, that the offenses were committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved 

manner, and that the offenses were committed as consideration for the receipt, or in the 

expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. (Doc. 11, Ex. E.) 

 On February 28, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Counts One through Six of the 

indictment. (Doc. 11, Exs. F, G.) Before the sentencing hearing, Petitioner’s counsel 

filed a mitigation report with the trial court. (Doc. 11, Ex. I.) During the sentencing 

hearing on May 25, 2012, the court heard aggravation and mitigation evidence before 

sentencing Petitioner to seven-and-one half years’ imprisonment (presumptive) on Count 

One, ten-and-one-half-years’ imprisonment (presumptive) on Count Two, ten-and-onehalf years’ imprisonment (presumptive) on Count Three, seven-and-one-half years’ 

imprisonment (presumptive) on Count Four, natural life (aggravated) on Count Five, and 

three-and-one-half years’ imprisonment on Count Six. (Doc. 11, Ex. J at 29, 31-32; 

Ex. K at 3-4.) The court ordered that Petitioner’s sentences run concurrently. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. J at 32.) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 1. First Post-Conviction (Rule 32 of-right) Proceeding 

 By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona 

law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B). Petitioner, however, retained the right to seek 

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review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. On June 28, 2012, Petitioner filed a 

timely notice of post-conviction relief in the trial court pursuant to Rule 32. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. O.) On July 12, 2012, the trial court appointed post-conviction counsel. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. P.) On November 17, 2012, post-conviction counsel filed a petition for relief arguing 

that Petitioner’s sentence of natural life imprisonment violated Miller v. Alabama, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), because the trial court failed to give him an 

“individualized sentencing.” (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) On February 19, 2013, the court denied 

post-conviction relief, concluding that the trial court had considered mitigating evidence 

during sentencing and that Petitioner’s claim was not “colorable.” (Doc. 11, Ex. U (order 

dated February 14, 2013 and filed February 19, 2013).) 

 2. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On March 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief 

alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 11, Ex. V at 3.) On March 18, 

2013, the court dismissed the second notice of post-conviction relief because it was 

untimely and did not raise a claim that could be raised in an untimely or successive Rule 

32 petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. W at 1-2 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g),(h) and 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)).) 

 3. Appeal of Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 Petitioner then filed a “Delayed Petition for Review” in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 26-29; Doc. 21, Supp. Ex. AA.) The notice of filing the petition for 

review is dated April 26, 2013 in a hand written notation. (Doc. 1 at 26; Doc. 21, Supp. 

Ex. AA.) However, the notice is file-stamped received by the court on May 10, 2013. 

(Doc. 21, Supp. Ex. AA.) In the delayed petition for review, Petitioner stated that he 

sought review of the trial court’s decision entered on “2/14/2013” and challenged his 

sentence under Miller. (Doc. 1 at 27-31; Doc. 21, Supp. Ex. AA.) On May 20, 2013, the 

appellate court dismissed the delayed petition for review as untimely. The court stated 

that: 

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A review of the record in this matter indicates that the trial court dismissed 

the petition for post-conviction relief on March 18, 2013, and the petition for review was not filed until May 10, 2013. . . . Whether petitioner was without fault for the untimely filing is a question of fact. The trial court may, “after being presented with proper evidence, allow a late filing” if it finds that petitioner was not responsible for the untimely filing. 

(Doc. 1 at 30; Doc. 11 at X (emphasis added).) In this order, the appellate court did not 

identify that Petitioner had filed two post-conviction proceedings. Based on the appellate 

court’s reference to the March 18, 2013 dismissal of the post-conviction proceeding, it 

appears that the appellate court considered the delayed petition for review to relate to 

Petitioner’s second post-conviction proceeding that was dismissed on March 18, 2013. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. W.) The delayed petition for review, however, stated that Petitioner sought 

review of the trial court’s February 14, 2013 decision, and it raised the same claim 

asserted in the first petition for post-conviction relief (a Miller claim), not the second 

petition for post-conviction relief (ineffective assistance of trial counsel).2

 (Doc. 11, 

Ex. X; Doc. 11, Exs. Q, V.) 

 Nonetheless, even if Petitioner had intended for the delayed petition for review to 

be an appeal from the trial court’s February 19, 2013 denial of his first petition for postconviction relief, the delayed petition for review would have been untimely under Rule 

32.9(c) (whether it was considered filed on the date it was signed, April 26, 2013, or the 

date it was filed, May 10, 2013) because it was filed more than thirty days after the 

court’s February 19, 2013 decision. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (providing that a 

petition for review must be filed within thirty days of the final decision of the trial court 

on the petition for post-conviction relief). 

 C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

 On August 20, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court asserting several claims. Ground One, the only remaining ground for relief, asserts 

that Petitioner’s natural life sentence violates Miller. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 18.) In their 

 

2

 The trial court’s order denying review of the first petition for post-conviction relief is dated February 14, 2013 and filed February 19, 2013. (Doc. 11, Ex. U.) 

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supplemental brief Respondents argue that habeas corpus review of this claim is 

procedurally barred. (Doc. 21.) Despite the opportunity to do so (Docs. 19, 20), 

Petitioner has not filed a supplemental brief to support his Petition, or responded to 

Respondents’ supplemental brief, and the deadlines to do so have passed. (Id.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

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claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

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procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

III. Procedural Bar Applied to Petitioner’s Claim in Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his natural life sentence violates Miller. 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner presented this claim in his first petition for post-conviction 

relief, his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q at 2-4.) On February 19, 2013, 

the court denied post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. U (order dated February 14, 2013 

and filed February 19, 2013).) Petitioner did not immediately appeal the denial of his 

first-petition for post-conviction relief. Rather, on March 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a 

second notice of post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but 

not raising a Miller claim. (Doc. 11, Ex. V at 3.) On March 18, 2013, the court 

dismissed the second notice of post-conviction relief as untimely. (Doc. 11, Ex. W at 1-

2.) 

 Petitioner then filed a “Delayed Petition for Review” in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 26-29; Doc. 21, Supp. Ex. AA.) The delayed petition for review 

states that Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s decision entered on “2/14/2013” and 

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raises a claim under Miller. (Doc. 1 at 27-31; Doc. 21, Supp. Ex. AA.) Thus, it appears 

that Petitioner may have intended to appeal the trial court’s February 2013 denial of his 

first petition for post-conviction relief, which also raised a Miller claim. (Doc. 11, 

Exs. Q, U.) On May 20, 2013, the appellate court dismissed the delayed petition for 

review as untimely. (Doc. 1 at 30; Doc. 11 at X.) As previously noted, the appellate 

court’s order denying the delayed petition referred to the March 18, 2013 dismissal of the 

second post-conviction proceeding, and thus it appears that the appellate court considered 

the delayed petition for review to relate to Petitioner’s second post-conviction 

proceeding. (Doc. 11, Ex. W.) 

 Nonetheless, whether Petitioner was attempting to appeal the denial of his first or 

second petition for post-conviction relief, the delayed petition for review asserted the 

Miller claim that Petitioner presents in Ground One of the pending Petition. The 

appellate court found review of that claim precluded because the petition for review was 

untimely filed. (Doc. 11, Ex. X.) As noted in Section I.B.3, regardless of whether the 

delayed petition for review sought review of the first or second post-conviction 

proceeding, it was untimely under Rule 32.9(c) because it was filed more than thirty days 

after the court’s February 19, 2013 and March 18, 2013 decisions. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9 (providing that a petition for review must be filed within thirty days of the final 

decision of the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief). 

 In the May 20, 2013 order, the appellate court stated that whether “petitioner was 

without fault for the untimely filing [of his petition for review] is a question of fact.” 

(Doc. 11, Ex. X.) The court further stated that “[t]he trial court may ‘after being 

presented with proper evidence, allow a late filing’ if it finds that petitioner was not 

responsible for the untimely filing.” (Id.) (citing State v. Pope, 635 P.2d 846, 848 (Ariz. 

1981.) 

 In their Supplemental Brief, Respondents state that there is nothing in the state 

trial court record or docket indicating that Petitioner returned to the state trial court to 

determine the responsibility for his untimely petition for review. (Doc. 21, Supp. 

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Ex. BB.) Respondents filed a copy of the docket sheet in Petitioner’s criminal case. (Id.) 

The Court has reviewed the docket sheet and agrees that it does not reflect that Petitioner 

returned to the state trial court for further proceedings after the appellate court’s May 20, 

2013 order. (Id.) There is no indication that Petitioner sought a determination in the state 

court of whether he was without fault for the untimely petition for review under Rule 

32.1(f).3

 On July 10, 2013, the court of appeals sent the trial court a certified copy of the 

order dismissing the appeal. (Doc. 21, Supp. Exs. CC, DD.) 

 Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals court found that Petitioner’s failure to comply 

with Rule 32.9(c)’s deadlines for filing a petition for review from the denial of postconviction relief precluded consideration of his Miller claim, the same claim asserted in 

Ground One of the pending Petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. X; Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner did not 

seek further review of that decision. Additionally, there is no evidence that Petitioner 

returned to the state trial court to determine whether he was without fault for the untimely 

filing of his petition for review. Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of Ground 

One is barred because Rule 32.9(c) is an independent and adequate state law ground. See 

Simmons v. Schriro, 187 Fed. App’x 753, 754 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Arizona’s 

procedural rules, including its timeliness rules, are “clear” and “well-established”); 

Miloni v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1652578, *5 (D. Ariz. Jun. 7, 2006) (concluding that a 

procedural ruling based on Rule 32.9(c) is adequate). 

 Moreover, it would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state court to try to 

properly exhaust Ground One because a successive petition for post-conviction relief 

would be untimely, and this claim would be precluded from Rule 32 review because it 

could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a 

general rule, when [claims] are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 postconviction proceeding, subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) 

 

3

 Rules 32.2(b), 32.4(b), and 32.1(f) allow for an exception to the timeliness and preclusion rules if a petitioner shows that his failure to file a timely notice of appeal was without fault on his part. 

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(internal quotation omitted). Additionally, Petitioner’s claim does not implicate the 

exceptions to the timeliness or preclusion rules referred to in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 

32.2(b), which include being held in custody after the imposed sentence expired, the 

presentation of newly discovered material facts that probably would have changed the 

verdict or sentence, the failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or a notice 

of appeal that was not the defendant’s fault, a change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual 

innocence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d), (e), (g) and (h). 

 Although, as the Court noted in the March 10, 2015 Order (Doc. 18), Petitioner 

could attempt to qualify for Rule 32.1(f)’s exception to the timeliness and preclusion 

rules by showing that the failure to file a timely petition for review in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals was without fault on his part, there is no evidence that Petitioner returned to 

state court to try to make such a showing. Additionally, even if Petitioner could still 

return to state court to try to make this showing, Petitioner has not presented any 

evidence showing that the failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on his part. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(f). Accordingly, Ground One is 

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review unless Petitioner 

establishes “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome 

the procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons below, Petitioner has 

not established a basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

A. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). The 

standard for establishing a Schlup procedural gateway claim is “demanding.” House v. 

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The petitioner must present “evidence of innocence so 

strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 316. Under Schlup, to overcome the procedural hurdle created by failing to properly 

present his claims to the state courts, a petitioner “must demonstrate that the 

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constitutional violations he alleges “ha[ve] probably resulted in the conviction of one 

who is actually innocent,” such that a federal court’s refusal to hear the defaulted claims 

would be a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” House, 547 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Schlup, 513 at 

326, 327)). To meet this standard, a petition must present “new reliable evidence — 

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The 

petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. 

 “[A] convincing showing of actual innocence [as applied in Schulp] enable[s] 

habeas petitioner’s to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their 

constitutional claims.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) 

(holding “that actual innocence, if proved serves as a gateway through which a petitioner 

may pass whether the impediment is procedural bar, as it was in Schlup . . . , or expiration 

of the statute of limitations.”). However, even if a petitioner can satisfy the Schlup

gateway, this “does not by itself provide a basis for [habeas] relief.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

315. Instead, the gateway merely enables the petitioner “to have [an] otherwise barred 

constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

 Petitioner does not rely on Schlup to overcome the procedural bar to review of his 

claim asserted in Ground One. (Doc. 1.) In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his 

natural life sentence violates Miller. (Doc. 1 at 6.) This claim does not satisfy the 

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. See Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 

937 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding “that the miscarriage of justice exception is limited to 

those extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes that 

the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.”); Vernes v. Acton, 2008 

WL 4104161, at *4 (D. Mont. Sept. 3, 2008) (stating that “[b]y definition, genuine 

remorse and sentencing disparity cannot amount to a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” within the meaning of Schlup.”); Hughes v. Schriro, 2007 WL 163074, at *6 

(D. Ariz. Jan. 18, 2007) (noting that the petitioner did not assert that he was actually 

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innocent, and finding that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception did not apply 

to the petitioner’s claims that his sentence might have been mitigated if the court had 

known he was ill). Thus, Petitioner has not met Schlup’s high standard and this 

exception does not excuse the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of Ground 

One. 

B. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 1. Lack of Legal Knowledge and Resources 

 As noted in the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 14), liberally construing the 

Petition, Petitioner argues his lack of education and lack of legal knowledge to establish 

cause and prejudice. (Doc. 1 at 8.) However, Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of 

legal knowledge and assistance, and limited legal resources do not establish cause to 

excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 

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(9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to 

cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 

1988) (petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). 

 Petitioner does not assert any other basis to establish cause for his procedural 

default. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals’ May 20, 2013 order suggested that 

Petitioner could attempt to show that his failure to file a timely petition for review was 

not his fault, Petitioner does not present any evidence to make that showing. 

 2. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 

 Petitioner does not assert the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as 

cause for his procedural default. Additionally, as Respondents note in their Supplemental 

Brief (Doc. 21 at 5), Petitioner cannot rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), to argue that the 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel (in his second post-conviction 

proceeding) for failing to file timely a notice of appeal constitutes cause for the 

procedural default of Ground One. 

 The ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state court and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998). However, ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the 

ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent constitutional violation. 

Id. Accordingly, when no constitutional right to an attorney exists (such as in a postconviction proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state 

procedural default. Id. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no constitutional 

right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner 

cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations omitted). Thus, in Coleman,

the Court held that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel also could not establish 

cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state remedies and procedural default on a 

claim. Id. 

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 However, in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the 

Supreme Court established a limited exception to this general rule. The Court held that 

the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel “at initial-review collateral review 

proceedings” — while not stating a constitutional claim itself — may establish cause to 

excuse procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a postconviction proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to 

litigate such claims. Id. at 1315. In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 

2013), the Ninth Circuit held that the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth 

Amendment ineffective-assistance claims that have been procedurally defaulted by 

ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral proceeding. (Id.) 

 Because the Martinez cause standard applies only to defaulted ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, it does not apply to Petitioner’s Miller claim raised in 

Ground One. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot rely on Martinez and he has not shown 

cause for his failure to properly present his Miller claim to the state courts. Therefore, 

the Court does not consider whether Petitioner can establish prejudice. See Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (stating that the court does not need to consider 

prejudice when the petitioner does not demonstrate cause). 

 3. Ineffective Assistance of Rule 32 of-Right Counsel 

 The Court could assume that if Petitioner had filed a supplemental brief, he may 

have argued that counsel in his first post-conviction proceeding, a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding, was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of appeal. Petitioner’s first 

post-conviction proceeding was a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, which the Ninth Circuit 

has recognized as a “form of direct review.” See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 

(9th Cir. 2007) (concluding “that Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for pleaconvicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A).”). Accordingly, Petitioner had the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel in his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. See Ramon v. Ryan, 2010 WL 3564819, at 

*11 (D. Ariz. Jul. 23, 2010) (a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel 

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in a Rule-32 of right proceeding in Arizona) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 

(1985)). 

 However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to establish “cause” in this 

context is itself subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray, 477 U.S. at 492; 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). In other words, before an allegation of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be used to establish cause for a procedural default, 

it must have been presented to the state court as an independent claim. Edwards, 529 

U.S. at 451-53. Here, Petitioner never exhausted a claim of ineffective assistance of Rule 

32 of-right counsel because he never presented that issue to the state courts. 

Consequently, even if Petitioner had asserted this argument, he cannot rely on the alleged 

ineffective assistance of Rule 32 of-right counsel to establish cause for the default of 

Ground One. 

 For these reasons, Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the 

procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of Ground One. However, in an 

abundance of caution, Section IV, below, addresses the merits of Petitioner’s claim in 

Ground One. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (stating that “[a]n application for a writ of 

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). This review establishes that 

Ground One lacks merit and should be dismissed. 

IV. Review of Petitioner’s Claim in Ground One 

A. Federal Review of Claims Adjudicated on the Merits in State Court 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review of that claim is limited by § 2254(d). Under 

§ 2254(d)(1), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner 

shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly 

established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state 

court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it 

“involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was 

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the record before the state 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). This 

standard is “difficult to meet.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. It is also a “highly deferential 

standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be 

given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per 

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When evaluating state court 

decisions on habeas review, federal courts look through summary or unexplained higher 

state court opinions to the last reasoned decision on the claim. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 

F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determination.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. 

Federal courts may also grant habeas corpus relief when the state-court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

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presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 2014); see Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (the 

statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both trial courts and appellate 

courts). Additionally, a state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. 

 When a state court decision is deemed to be contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the erroneous state 

court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

“The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of an error with respect 

to sentencing, in other words the test is whether such error had a ‘substantial and 

injurious effect’ on the sentence.” Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441, at *3 

(N.D. Cal., Aug.18, 2006) (citing Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) 

(finding sentencing error harmless because even if the evidence of three prior convictions 

was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court's consideration of those 

convictions because it found four other prior convictions that would have supported the 

petitioner's sentence)). The Court will consider Plaintiff’s claim in Ground One under 

this standard. 

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B. Petitioner is not Entitled to Habeas Corpus Relief 

 In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his natural life sentence violates the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 

because he was denied an “individualized sentencing.”4

 (Doc. 1 at 6.) In Miller, the 

Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of 

their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 

punishments.’” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 

 Petitioner presented this sentencing claim to the trial court in his first petition for 

post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) The court rejected this claim because it found 

that the trial court “did consider [Petitioner’s] age, lack of maturity, and all of the other 

mitigation proffered by the [Petitioner] when it imposed the natural life sentence. 

Therefore, the Court finds that the [Petitioner] fails to set forth a colorable claim.” 

(Doc. 11, Ex. U.) Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it is contrary to or based on an 

unreasonable application of Miller. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, he is not 

entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

 In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the “Eighth Amendment forbids a 

sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for 

juvenile offenders.” 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court explained that “[m]andatory life 

without [the possibility of] parole for a juvenile precludes consideration” of the 

defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark features,” the defendant’s “family and 

home environment,” the “circumstances of the [underlying] homicide offense,” the fact 

that the offender “might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for 

incompetencies associated with youth,” and “the possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. at 

 

4

 Respondents state that Miller applies to this case. (Doc. 21 at 6 n.4.) The 

Supreme Court issued Miller on June 25, 2012, one month after Petitioner’s sentencing hearing. However, because Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were not yet final on direct review, Miller applies to his proceedings, regardless of whether Miller should be 

retroactively applied. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (new constitutional rules 

of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases that have become final before 

new rules are announced, unless they fall within exception to general rule). 

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2468. The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment requires that “a judge or jury must 

have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest 

penalty possible for juveniles.” Id. at 2475. 

 As the state court found, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Miller because the 

trial court considered Petitioner’s youth and other mitigating circumstances before 

imposing a sentence of life without parole. During the sentencing hearing, the court 

heard argument from defense counsel about mitigating circumstances, including support 

of friends and family, a dysfunctional childhood, prenatal exposure to drugs, childhood 

homelessness, mental health issues, the use of illegal drugs, his age at the time of the 

offense (seventeen), and evidence that he was functioning at a lower level than his 

chronological age. (Doc. 11, Ex. J at 25-28.) The trial court also heard from Petitioner 

who apologized for his actions and said that he believed he could change. (Id. at 28.) 

The trial court acknowledged that it considered all of the aggravation and mitigation 

evidence. (Id. at 32.) The trial court then sentenced Petitioner to a term of natural life 

imprisonment on Count Five, the first-degree murder conviction. (Id.) The court 

explained its reasoning for the sentence, stating: 

I am mindful when I impose a sentence, I’m instructed by law to consider a couple of things. I’m to look at the nature and circumstances of the 

offense, the character and background of the accused. When I look at the 

nature and circumstances of this offense, I’m morally offended. I can 

imagine no greater horror in life than to be locked in a trunk for a long period of time, to die from the elements. 

When I look at your character and background, you shouldn’t have had the 

experience growing up that you’ve had. It was clearly mitigated. But now I look at you today and I look at what you’ve done since you’ve become an adult. I think, is this man damaged goods? Is this man somebody who’s going to continue to terrorize society like you did in this case? Those are the questions I have to answer imposing this sentence. 

* * * 

Regarding Count 5. After reviewing all of the materials, everything in aggravating and mitigation, it is the determination of this Court you should never be released. Thereby, I impose a term of natural life. No credit for 

time served. 

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(Id. at 28-29, 32.) The record reflects that the trial court considered Petitioner’s 

“chronological age and its hallmark features,” and other mitigating circumstances before 

imposing a natural life sentence. (Id.); see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Thus, Petitioner’s 

natural life sentence did not violate the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Miller. See 

Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 869 (9th Cir. 2014) (assuming, without deciding, that a 

habeas corpus petitioner’s Miller claim was not defaulted and that Miller applied 

retroactively and concluding that because the sentencing judge considered mitigating and 

aggravating factors “under a [California] sentencing scheme that affords discretion and 

leniency, there is no violation of Miller.”); Ramos v. Wipson, 2014 WL 3130036, at *14-

15 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2014) (relying on Bell to support a conclusion that because the trial 

court considered argument on whether it should impose a life sentence or a twenty-fiveyears-to-life sentence and exercised its direction and made its sentencing decision after 

considering those arguments, no Miller violation occurred and, under the AEDPA, the 

court must defer to the trial court’s determination of petitioner’s sentencing claim). 

 Accordingly, Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s rejection of his Miller

claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on 

this claim. 

V. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, federal habeas corpus review of Ground One is procedurally 

barred and Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome that bar. Alternatively, 

Petitioner’s claim asserted in Ground One lacks merit and, therefore, Petitioner cannot 

show that the state court’s rejection of that claim was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, or that it was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court deny habeas corpus relief and dismiss 

Ground One. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 5th day of August, 2015. 

 

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