Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01409/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01409-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN REID, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

D.K. SISTO, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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CASE NO. 2:07-cv-01409-RSL-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. SUMMARY 

Petitioner Kevin Reid is currently incarcerated at the California State Prison, Solano in 

Vacaville, California. He pled guilty to second degree murder with a weapon enhancement in 

Contra Costa County Superior Court on September 16, 1981, and was sentenced to 16-yearsto-life with the possibility of parole. He has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, together 

with relevant portions of the state court record, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Docket 1.) 

Petitioner challenges Governor Schwarzenegger’s 2005 decision finding him unsuitable for 

parole, and reversing his November 2004 grant of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings of 

the State of California (the “Board”),1

 on the grounds that the Governor’s parole denial 

violated his federal due process rights. (See id. at 10-13.) 

 1 The Board of Parole Hearings replaced the Board of Prison Terms, which was abolished on 

July 1, 2005. See California Penal Code § 5075(a). 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition in which he contends that the Court 

should dismiss the petition because it was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations 

set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). (See 

Dkt. 12 at 5-9.) In the alternative, respondent asserts that petitioner’s claims are without 

merit. (See id. at 10-17.) Petitioner filed a traverse in reply to the answer in which he denies 

respondent’s contentions. (See Dkt. 15.) 

In addition, this Court directed respondent to supplement the record with briefing and 

portions of petitioner’s institutional record that support the Governor’s findings regarding 

petitioner’s disciplinary history in prison and “documented history of inappropriately 

managing his anger,” in the event that the information contained therein would assist this 

Court in evaluating petitioner’s due process claim. (See Dkt. 18.) Respondent produced the 

requested supplemental briefing and related exhibits, and petitioner filed a supplemental brief 

in response. (See Dkts. 21 and 22.) Respondent also argues, however, that this Court is 

barred from considering these documents because petitioner failed to attach them to his state 

habeas petition and they were therefore not part of the state court record. (See Dkt. 21 at 2.) 

Because the only authority cited by respondent in support of his contention is 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2), which relates to a federal court’s ability to hold an evidentiary hearing rather 

than expand the record, his argument is unconvincing. (See id.) Pursuant to Rule 7(a), a 

federal habeas court may expand the record to include additional materials relating to the 

petition. See Rule 7(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Accordingly, I recommend the Court 

reject respondent’s contention and review respondent’s supplemental filing. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 3 

In their supplemental briefing, respondent and petitioner requested that this case be 

stayed pending the resolution of Hayward v. Marshall, a case argued and submitted on June 

24, 2008, before a limited en banc panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008). (See Dkt. 

21 at 5; Dkt 22 at 2.) Hayward presents issues sufficiently similar to those in this case that it 

seems likely the en banc decision will have significant implications for the resolution of 

petitioner’s case. Presuming that a decision in Hayward would be forthcoming in a 

reasonable period of time, this Court entered an Order deferring submission of this Report and 

Recommendation until the filing of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision. (See Dkt. 23.) As of 

the date of this Report and Recommendation, however, Hayward remains undecided. 

Petitioner has therefore waited approximately thirty-two months for the District Court to 

address his claims. Fairness to the parties requires that this Court move ahead. If Hayward is 

decided while this Report and Recommendation is pending before the presiding U.S. District 

Judge, he will be able to take that decision into account in ruling upon this case. 

The Court, having thoroughly considered the record and briefing of the parties, 

recommends that the Court find that petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely, which is 

a fully sufficient basis for denial. But even if petitioner attempts to make, and if this Court 

permits him to make, a belated showing that his petition is timely, his petition must fail on the 

merits. Under either basis, this action should be dismissed with prejudice. 

II. TIMELINESS 

Like most California prisoners, petitioner used the state’s original writ system to 

present a collateral challenge to his confinement. “The supreme court, intermediate courts of 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 4 

appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas corpus jurisdiction.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 

F.3d 1003, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999); Cal. Const. art. VI, § 10. As a result, “California’s 

collateral review system differs from that of other States in that it . . . contemplates that a 

prisoner will file a new ‘original’ habeas petition” in each court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 

214, 220-21 (2002). Petitioner filed original habeas petitions in the Superior Court for Contra 

Costa County; in the California Court of Appeals; and in the California Supreme Court. (See 

Dkt. 12, Exs. E, F, and G.) For simplicity, the analysis which follows will refer to these 

petitions as State Petitions #1, #2 and #3, respectively. 

AEDPA provides that a state prisoner has one year to seek federal habeas corpus 

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Federal courts apply several ground rules in determining 

what time intervals “count” against this one-year limitations period. Where a petition 

challenges the denial of parole, the entire period between the date when the factual predicate 

of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, until the date 

of filing of the first state habeas petition, is counted. See id. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Redd v. 

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). If a California petitioner files a series of state 

petitions, the period between the denial of one and the filing of the next is not counted at all if 

the delay is “reasonable;” but that interval is counted in full if the delay is “unreasonable.” 

See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 197-98 (2006). Once the final state petition is denied, the 

entire interval between the denial of that petition and the filing of the federal petition is 

counted. See Galaza, 183 F.3d at 1006; Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). 

These various intervals are cumulated or “tacked” to determine whether a petitioner has 

complied with the AEDPA one-year limitations period. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 5 

The relevant time intervals in this case are illustrated in the following chart: 

Petitioner Received Notice of Governor’s Denial of Parole 

262 Days 

State Petition #1 Filed, Later Denied 

155 Days 

State Petition #2 Filed, Later Denied 

49 days - Reasonable Period 

State Petition #3 Filed, Later Denied 

61 Days 

Federal Petition Filed 

As indicated, 262 days elapsed before the filing of State Petition #1. 155 days elapsed 

between the denial of State Petition #1 and the filing of State Petition #2, but the 

reasonableness of this delay is at issue. Respondent acknowledges the 49-day interval 

between the denial of State Petition #2 and the filing of State Petition #3, but does not argue 

that this interval was “unreasonable.” (See Dkt. 12 at 9.) Finally, the interval between the 

denial of State Petition #3 and the filing of this federal habeas petition was 61 days. 

The parties in this case disagree regarding the timeliness of petitioner’s federal habeas 

petition. (See Dkt. 12 at 5-9; Dkt. 15 at 2-6.) Their first point of disagreement concerns the 

date on which AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to run against petitioner 

because the factual predicate of petitioner’s claim could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. (See Dkt. 12 at 2; Dkt. 15 at 2.) Specifically, respondent argues 

that because petitioner received a letter informing him of Governor Schwarzenegger’s parole 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 6 

denial dated March 30, 2005, together with a copy of the Governor’s decision, the statute of 

limitations began to run the next day, March 31, 2005. (See Dkt. 12 at 2.) In contrast, 

petitioner contends that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until 

April 12, 2005, because the Governor’s letter and decision were not actually faxed to CSPSolano, where petitioner was incarcerated, until 1:51 p.m. on April 11, 2005, as demonstrated 

by the fax date noted on the header of the Governor’s letter. (See Dkt. 15 at 1-2; Dkt. 12, 

Exhibit D at 1.) Because the Court finds that “due diligence” does not require petitioner to 

have discovered the Governor’s parole denial before he received a copy of the Governor’s 

letter and decision reversing the Board’s grant of parole, and petitioner’s assertion regarding 

the actual date these documents were faxed to petitioner’s institution appears accurate, this 

Court agrees with petitioner that the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 12, 

2005. See also Evins v. Curry, 2009 WL 649788, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations began to run after “[p]etitioner received the Governor’s decision to 

reverse the Board’s grant of parole.”). 

Starting April 12, 2005, a total of 262 days elapsed before petitioner filed State 

Petition #1 on December 29, 2005. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. 3; Dkt. 12, Ex. E.) 

It is undisputed that the interval between the denial of State Petition #1 and the filing 

of State Petition #2 was 155 days. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. 3 and 4; Dkt. 12, Ex. E at 1-6 and F; Dkt. 

15 at 5.) Respondent contends this was an unreasonable delay (see Dkt. 12 at 8-9; id. Exs. E, 

F, and G), and as a result this interval must be counted against the one-year limitations period. 

To date, the California Supreme Court has not provided any guidance as to what 

constitutes an unreasonable delay in filing a subsequent habeas petition under California law. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 7 

See King v. LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, when the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals certified several “questions of law concerning the timeliness of a 

California’s inmate’s petition for writ of habeas corpus” to the California Supreme Court in 

Chaffer v. Prosper, the state court denied certification. 542 F.3d 662, 663-66 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Evans v. Chavis that until the California Supreme 

Court indicates otherwise, federal courts must operate “on the assumption that California law 

. . . [does] not differ significantly from the laws of other States, i.e., that California’s 

‘reasonable time’ standard [does] not lead to filing delays substantially longer than those in 

States with determinate timeliness rules.” 546 U.S. at 199-200 (citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 

222-23). Thus, “an unjustified or unexplained” delay in filing that is substantially longer than 

the “shorter period[s] of time, 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for filing an appeal to 

the state supreme court” is “unreasonable” under California law. Id. at 201. 

In addition, after the California Supreme Court denied certification in Chaffer, the 

Ninth Circuit held that the prisoner was not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations 

period for the 115-day gap between the denial of his first state habeas petition in the superior 

court and the filing of his second in the California Court of Appeal, as well as for the 101-day 

gap between the denial of his second state habeas petition and the filing of his third in the 

California Supreme Court. 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (per curiam). Specifically, the Chaffer court 

held that the prisoner’s filing delays of 115 and 101 days were substantially longer than the 

“30 to 60 days” that most states allow, and “unexplained delays of this magnitude [did not] 

fall within the scope of the federal statutory word ‘pending’ [in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).]” Id. 

(citing Chavis, 546 U.S. at 201.) 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 8 

Although petitioner argues that the Chavis decision is inapplicable to his federal 

petition under Teague v. Lane, because Chavis announced a new “30-60 day rule” which does 

not apply retroactively on collateral review, his contention lacks merit. (See Dkt. 15 at 2-3.) 

Under Teague, “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new 

obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 

(1989). Put another way, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by 

precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id.; Whorton v. 

Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, Chavis did 

not announce a “new rule” within the meaning of Teague. Rather, Chavis applied the 

principles previously set forth in Carey v. Saffold, and asserted that the California Supreme 

Court “remains free to tell us if . . . we were wrong” about what constitutes a “reasonable” 

delay under California’s indeterminate timeliness rule. See Chavis, 546 U.S. at 199-200. 

Accordingly, Chavis applies to the instant petition. 

Here, petitioner’s 155-day delay between the denial of State Petition #1 and the filing 

of State Petition #2 was substantially longer than the “shorter period[s] of time, 30 to 60 days, 

that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court.” Id. at 201. 

Moreover, 155 days is substantially longer than the delays of 115 and 101 days which the 

Ninth Circuit held to be “unreasonable” in Chaffer. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048. 

Accordingly, petitioner’s 155-day delay is “unreasonable” under California law. 

In his traverse, petitioner also asserts several reasons to justify or explain his 155-day 

delay in filing State Petition #2, although he does not specify whether he believes these 

reasons entitle him to either statutory tolling or equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 9 

(See Dkt. 15 at 5-6.)2

 For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that petitioner is not 

entitled to tolling under either standard. 

In order to justify statutory tolling, it appears that a petitioner must provide a sufficient 

justification for the unreasonable filing delay based upon unique facts pertaining to that 

petitioner’s case. As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Chavis “that California 

would [not] consider an unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing delay ‘reasonable.’” 

Chavis, 546 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added). In addition, the Ninth Circuit held in Waldrip v. 

Hall that a petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling under Chavis “absent sufficient 

justification [for his substantial filing delay] based on unique facts pertaining to the individual 

petitioner. . . .” 548 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2008). Specifically, the Hall court considered the 

petitioner’s “attempts to explain or justify the delay in his state court filing,” but ultimately 

rejected each of the petitioner’s proffered reasons as unpersuasive. Id. at 736-37. See also 

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048 (holding that a petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling for 

filing delays substantially longer than 30-60 days where his “petitions offered no justification 

for the delays as required under California law. . . .”); Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1167 

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling, “given the lack 

of explanation or justification for [petitioner’s] delays” of ten, fifteen, and eighteen months, 

where the court had previously rejected petitioner’s contention that his filing delays were 

caused by his disabilities and lack of access to legal materials). 

 2

 Petitioner also attempts to justify or explain his delay in filing State Petition #1 in the Contra 

Costa County Superior Court. Specifically, he asserts that the paralegal who was helping him draft his 

petition suffered a fatal heart attack, requiring him to locate a second paralegal to assist him. (See id. 

at 5.) Although these circumstances are very unfortunate, they do not explain petitioner’s 155-day 

delay in filing State Petition #2, which is the delay at issue here. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 10 

Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable tolling is only available if “extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). The threshold “is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. Specifically, a petitioner bears the heavy burden of 

showing “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way,” preventing a timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 418 (2005). Finally, “[w]here a prisoner fails to show ‘any causal connection’ between 

the grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to file a timely 

federal habeas application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied.” Gaston v. Palmer, 417 

F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005), amended, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 First, petitioner cites his lack of formal legal education or training as a reason for his 

delay. (See Dkt. 15 at 5.) It is well-established, however, that a prisoner’s lack of legal 

sophistication or pro se status is not sufficient to justify tolling of the statute of limitations. 

See Lampert, 465 F.3d at 970; Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner does not present any reason why this Court should depart from this rule. 

Petitioner next asserts that he corresponded with an attorney regarding his petition for 

“about six weeks,” but the attorney ultimately advised petitioner to continue representing 

himself in the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. (See Dkt. 15 at 6.) 

Because there is no right to assistance of counsel during state habeas proceedings, however, 

the attorney’s decision not to represent petitioner did not constitute an “extraordinary 

circumstance” which prevented petitioner from timely filing his petition. See Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991); Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Even if an attorney-client relationship had been established, negligence by the attorney would 

not have excused petitioner’s unreasonable delay in filing his petition with the California 

Court of Appeal. See Hall, 548 F.3d at 737 (holding that negligence by petitioner’s counsel 

did not excuse petitioner’s filing delay or entitle him to statutory tolling); Frye v. Hickman, 

273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that attorney negligence in failing to timely file 

a habeas petition generally does not justify equitable tolling). Similarly, the fact that 

petitioner later located a prison paralegal who helped prepare and file his petition “ ‘does not 

relieve [petitioner] from the personal responsibility of complying with the law.’ ” Chaffer, 

592 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). 

 Finally, petitioner alleges that an institutional lockdown in May 2006 “further 

slow[ed] progress on petitioner’s research and preparation of the petition,” and the “[r]eceipt 

of mail is frequently delayed at petitioner’s institution.” (Dkt. 15 at 6.) Both of these 

circumstances “are hardly extraordinary given the vicissitudes of prison life, and there is no 

indication in the record that they made it ‘impossible’ for him to file on time.” Id. (citing 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009)). Specifically, federal courts have 

consistently found that lockdowns and the resulting restricted access to the prison law library 

are concerns shared by virtually all state prisoners. See Hall, 548 F.3d at 737 (holding that a 

prison lockdown prohibiting access to the law library did not explain or justify the petitioner’s 

filing delay, or entitle him to statutory tolling); Rosati v. Kernan, 417 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1132 

(C.D. Cal. 2006) (“limited access to the law library and . . . occasional prison lockdowns do 

not warrant equitable tolling since petitioner has not shown any causal connection between 

these events and his failure to timely file his habeas corpus petition.”). In addition, petitioner 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 12 

has failed to show “any causal connection” between the alleged delays in mail-room 

processing at CSP-Solano and his inability to file his petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d 

at 1034-35. For example, petitioner does not allege that he failed to receive timely notice that 

the superior court had denied his prior petition. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997. As a result, 

petitioner has failed to provide a sufficient justification for his filing delay to entitle him to 

statutory tolling based upon unique facts pertaining to his case, or make the requisite showing 

of diligence and extraordinary circumstances necessary to warrant equitable tolling. 

In sum, petitioner has failed to demonstrate a right to statutory or equitable tolling of 

the statute of limitations during petitioner’s unreasonable 155-day delay between the denial of 

State Petition #1 and the filing of State Petition #2. As a result, the intervals which are to be 

counted against the one-year limitation in AEDPA include: 

• 262 days prior to the filing of State Petition #1; 

• 155 days between the denial of State Petition #1 and the filing of State Petition 

#2; and 

• 61 days between the denial of State Petition #3 and the filing of this federal 

petition. 

The total of 478 days renders petitioner’s federal habeas petition untimely. 

 This finding provides a fully sufficient basis for this Court to deny this federal 

petition. But even if this Court permits petitioner to make a belated showing that his federal 

habeas petition was timely, and if petitioner succeeds in so showing, his federal petition must 

nevertheless fail on the merits, for the reasons discussed below. 

 

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 III. BACKGROUND 

On February 3, 1981, petitioner was drinking at a local tavern with another man, Reed 

Smith, when they met the victim, Rudy Damian. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. C at 12.) The victim, who 

was already intoxicated, purchased drinks for petitioner and Smith, and offered to get drugs 

for them. (See id. at 14.) The three men left the bar in petitioner’s truck, stopping at several 

locations to buy beer and gasoline, and to attempt to locate drugs. (See id.) As the evening 

wore on, and the men’s efforts to obtain drugs were unsuccessful, the victim’s behavior began 

to annoy petitioner. (See id.) After the three men drove to a remote location to drink beer, the 

victim made a comment that petitioner perceived as a homosexual overture. (See id.) 

Petitioner and Smith responded by hitting and kicking the victim until it appeared he would 

no longer survive. (See id.) Petitioner then obtained a knife from Smith and repeatedly 

stabbed the victim, who was either unconscious or already dead. (See id. at 14-15.) After 

tying a belt around the victim’s neck to drag the body off the road to a different location, 

petitioner and his accomplice left the scene to purchase more beer. (See id. at 15.) 

On September 16, 1981, petitioner pled guilty in Contra Costa County Superior Court 

to second degree murder with a weapons enhancement, and was sentenced to sixteen-years-tolife with the possibility of parole. (See Dkt. 1 at 3.) He did not appeal the judgment of 

conviction. Petitioner began serving his prison term on October 26, 1981, when petitioner 

was twenty-two years old. (See id.) His minimum eligible parole date was set for January 19, 

1990. (See id.) 

Petitioner’s eighth consecutive and ninth overall parole consideration hearing was held 

on November 1, 2004, and the Board found petitioner suitable for release on parole. (See Dkt. 

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12, Ex. C at 84.) The Board’s decision became final on March 1, 2005. (See id. at 95.) On 

March 22, 2005, however, the Governor exercised his authority pursuant to Article V, Section 

8, Subdivision (b) of the California Constitution to reverse the Board’s decision. (See id., Ex. 

D at 3.) See also Cal. Penal Code § 3041.2. At the time of the Governor’s denial, petitioner 

was forty-six-years-old, and had been in custody for approximately twenty-four years. 

Petitioner contends his 2005 denial by the Governor violated his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process rights. Thus, petitioner does not challenge the validity of his 

conviction, but instead challenges the Governor’s 2005 decision finding him unsuitable for 

parole. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

AEDPA governs this petition because it was filed after the statute’s enactment. See 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the 

California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

provides the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) (providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition 

by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is 

not challenging his underlying state court conviction.”). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition 

may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

petitioner demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition was either 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as 

determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or “based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the United States Supreme 

Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). In this context, Ninth Circuit 

precedent remains persuasive but not binding authority. See id. at 412-13; Clark v. Murphy, 

 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

Furthermore, in each case the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the state 

court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To 

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determine whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court looks to the last 

reasoned state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders upholding that judgment 

are presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 

(1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Finally, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are also bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

V. FEDERAL HABEAS CHALLENGES TO STATE PAROLE DENIALS 

A. Due Process Right to be Released on Parole

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the government 

is prohibited from depriving an inmate of life, liberty or property without the due process of 

law. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. A prisoner’s due process claim must be analyzed in two 

steps: the first asks whether the state has interfered with a constitutionally protected liberty or 

property interest of the prisoner, and the second asks whether the procedures accompanying 

that interference were constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 

454, 460 (1989); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, our first inquiry is whether petitioner has a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest in parole. The Supreme Court articulated the governing rule in this area in 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 

U.S. 369 (1987). See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 

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“the ‘clearly established’ framework of Greenholtz and Allen” to California’s parole scheme). 

The Court in Greenholtz determined that although there is no constitutional right to be 

conditionally released on parole, if a state’s statutory scheme employs mandatory language 

that creates a presumption that parole release will be granted if certain designated findings are 

made, the statute gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 

12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78. 

As discussed infra, California statutes and regulations afford a prisoner serving an 

indeterminate life sentence an expectation of parole unless, in the judgment of the parole 

authority, he “will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 

Title 15 Cal. Code Regs., § 2402(a). The Ninth Circuit has therefore held that “California’s 

parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillion, 

306 F.3d at 902. To similar effect, Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007), held 

that California Penal Code § 3041 vests all “prisoners whose sentences provide for the 

possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole 

release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due 

Process Clause.” This “liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but 

upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (2003). See also 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127. 

Because the denial of parole interfered with petitioner’s constitutionally-protected 

liberty interest, this Court must proceed to the second step in the procedural due process 

analysis and determine whether the procedures accompanying that interference were 

constitutionally sufficient. “[T]he Supreme Court [has] clearly established that a parole 

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board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to this interest if the board’s 

decision is not supported by ‘some evidence in the record.’” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (citing

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (holding the “some evidence” standard 

applies in prison disciplinary proceedings)). The “some evidence” standard requires this 

Court to determine “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. Although Hill

involved the accumulation of good time credits rather than release on parole, later cases have 

held that the same constitutional principles apply in the parole context because both situations 

directly affect the duration of the prison term. See e.g., Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 

1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (adopting the “some evidence” standard set forth by the Supreme 

Court in Hill in the parole context); accord, Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 

915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

“The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require 

courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact,” however. 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. Similarly, the “some evidence” standard is not an invitation to examine 

the entire record, independently assess witnesses’ credibility, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. at 

455. Instead, it is there to ensure that an inmate’s loss of parole was not arbitrarily imposed. 

See id. at 454. The Court in Hill added an exclamation point to the limited scope of federal 

habeas review when it upheld the finding of the prison administrators despite the Court’s 

characterization of the supporting evidence as “meager.” See id. at 457. 

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B. California’s Statutory and Regulatory Scheme

In order to determine whether “some evidence” supported the Governor’s decision 

with respect to petitioner, this Court must consider the California statutes and regulations that 

govern the Board and Governor’s decision-making. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Under 

California law, the Board is authorized to set release dates and grant parole for inmates with 

indeterminate sentences. See Cal. Penal Code § 3040 and 5075, et seq. Section 3041(a) 

requires the Board to meet with each inmate one year before the expiration of his minimum 

sentence and normally set a release date in a manner that will provide uniform terms for 

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to their threat to the public, as well as 

comply with applicable sentencing rules. Subsection (b) of this section requires that the 

Board set a release date “unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or 

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such 

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Id., 

§ 3041(b). Pursuant to the mandate of § 3041(a), the Board must “establish criteria for the 

setting of parole release dates” which take into account the number of victims of the offense 

as well as other factors in mitigation or aggravation of the crime. The Board has therefore 

promulgated regulations setting forth the guidelines it must follow when determining parole 

suitability. See 15 CCR § 2402, et seq. 

Accordingly, the Board is guided by the following regulations in making a 

determination whether a prisoner is suitable for parole: 

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life 

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the 

length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable 

for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the 

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prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 

released from prison. 

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information 

available to the panel shall be considered in determining 

suitability for parole. Such information shall include the 

circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present 

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in 

other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the 

base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, 

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the 

crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use 

of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be 

released to the community; and any other information which 

bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances 

which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for 

parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of 

unsuitability. 

15 CCR § 2402(a) and (b). Subsections (c) and (d) also set forth suitability and unsuitability 

factors to further assist the Board in analyzing whether an inmate should be granted parole, 

although “the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a 

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.” 15 CCR § 2402(c). 

 Under the California Constitution, any parole decision made by the Board regarding 

prisoners sentenced to indeterminate sentences based upon a conviction of murder is subject 

to review by the Governor within thirty days. See Cal. Const. Art. V § 8(b). Although the 

Governor may only affirm, modify, or reverse the Board’s decision based upon the same 

factors which the Board is required to consider, the Governor undertakes an independent, de 

novo review of the inmate’s suitability for parole. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1204 

(2008). The Governor therefore has discretion to be more stringent or cautious than the Board 

in determining whether a prisoner poses an unreasonable risk to public safety. See id. If the 

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Governor decides to reverse or modify the Board’s decision, he or she must “send a written 

statement to the inmate specifying the reasons for his or her decision.” 15 CCR § 3041.2(b). 

In examining its own statutory and regulatory framework, the California Supreme 

Court in In re Lawrence recently held that the proper inquiry for a court reviewing a parole 

decision by the Board or Governor is “whether some evidence supports the decision of the 

Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not 

merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings.” Lawrence, 

44 Cal.4th at 1212. The court also asserted that the decision must demonstrate “an 

individualized consideration of the specified criteria, but “[i]t is not the existence or 

nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; 

the significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current 

dangerousness to the public.” Id. at 1204-05, 1212. Furthermore, “although the Board and 

the Governor may rely upon the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a 

basis for a decision denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself 

provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record also 

establishes that something in the prisoner's pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her 

current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner's 

dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense remain 

probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public safety.” Id. at 1214. 

Finally, as long as the evidence underlying the decision has “some indicia of 

reliability,” parole has not been arbitrarily denied. See Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. As the 

California courts have continually noted, the discretion of the Board and Governor in parole 

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release matters is very broad. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1204. Thus, the penal code, 

corresponding regulations, and California law clearly establish that the fundamental 

consideration in parole decisions is public safety and an assessment of a prisoner’s current 

dangerousness. See id. at 1205-06. 

 C. Summary of Governing Principles 

 By virtue of California law, petitioner has a constitutional liberty interest in release on 

parole. The parole authorities, in this case, the Governor, may decline to set a parole date 

only upon a finding that petitioner’s release would present an unreasonable present risk of 

danger to society if he is released from prison. Where the parole authorities deny release, 

based upon an adverse finding on that issue, the role of a federal habeas court is narrowly 

limited. It must deny relief if there is “some evidence” in the record to support the parole 

authority’s finding of present dangerousness. The penal code, corresponding regulations, and 

California law clearly support the foregoing interpretation. 

VI. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS 

Petitioner contends that the Governor violated his state and federal due process rights 

by finding him unsuitable for parole without any evidence that he poses an unreasonable risk 

of danger to society if released from prison.3

 (See Dkt. 1 at 10.) Specifically, petitioner 

claims that the Governor found him unsuitable based upon the immutable facts of the 

commitment offense, as well as petitioner’s “non-violent, non-recent prison conduct record.” 

(See id. at 10 and 12.) In addition, petitioner contends that the Governor failed to afford him 

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We do not reach petitioner’s claim that his state due process rights were violated, as state 

claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991) (asserting that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.”).

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an individualized consideration of all relevant suitability factors, such as the significant stress 

caused by an incident prior to the date of petitioner’s commitment offense. Petitioner claims 

that in that incident, he was the victim of a sexual assault inflicted by three men armed with a 

knife. (See id. at 11.) See also 15 CCR § 2404(d)(4). Thus, petitioner does not challenge the 

validity of his conviction, but instead challenges the Governor’s 2005 decision finding him 

unsuitable for parole. 

Respondent argues that petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in being released on parole, and that the “some evidence” standard is inapplicable in 

this context. (See Dkt. 12 at 10-16.) Even if petitioner does have a protected liberty interest, 

respondent contends that the Governor adequately predicated his denial of parole on “some 

evidence” that petitioner was currently dangerous. (See id.) Accordingly, respondent asserts 

that petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the Governor’s 2005 decision. 

 VII. ANALYSIS OF RECORD IN THIS CASE 

A. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim

In his decision reversing the Board’s grant of parole, the Governor primarily relied 

upon the circumstances of petitioner’s commitment offense to deny parole, but also cited 

petitioner’s previous record of violence, criminal history, and recent disciplinary record in 

prison as evidence that petitioner continued to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society. 

(See id., Ex. D at 1-3.) The Governor’s findings tracked the applicable unsuitability and 

suitability factors listed in § 2402(b), (c), and (d) of Chapter 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations. See also Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214 (holding that “the aggravated nature of 

the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the 

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public unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or postincarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the 

implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of 

the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat 

to public safety.”) After considering all reliable evidence in the record, the Governor 

concluded that evidence of petitioner’s positive behavior in prison did not outweigh evidence 

of his unsuitability for parole. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 3.) 

With respect to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the Governor found that 

the murder was carried out in an “especially heinous” manner. (See id. at 3.) See also 15 

CCR § 2402(c)(1). Specifically, the Governor asserted that petitioner “stabbed Mr. Damian 

27 times, according to the autopsy report, and he did so after he and his crime partner had 

already hit and kicked this man - making the second-degree murder for which he was 

convicted especially grave.” (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 3.) Furthermore, the Governor noted that 

after the beating, which was so severe it appeared the victim would not survive, petitioner 

chose not to comply with his crime partner’s request to leave the scene, but instead began 

stabbing the victim. (See id.) The Governor characterized the murder as a “senseless and 

ruthless attack upon . . . an especially vulnerable victim given that he was impaired and 

outnumbered.” (Id.) As mentioned above, although he stated that “the gravity of this murder 

committed by [petitioner] is alone a sufficient basis for me to conclude at this time that his 

release from prison would pose an unreasonable public-safety risk,” the Governor also 

identified additional evidence of current dangerousness in petitioner’s pre- and postincarceration history that supported his finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole. (Id. 

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at 1-3.) See also Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214. 

 Specifically, in addition to the commitment offense, the Governor relied upon 

petitioner’s previous record of violence as a basis for denying parole. In particular, the 

Governor emphasized petitioner’s “documented history of inappropriately managing his 

anger,” a life-long problem which resulted in the commitment offense because “Mr. Reid told 

a mental health evaluator in 2000 that rage is what prompted him to murder the victim.” (Dkt. 

12, Ex. D at 2.) A prisoner’s previous record of violence is a factor tending to indicate 

unsuitability for parole if a prisoner “inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a 

victim, particularly if the victim demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.” 

See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(2). The Governor’s findings with respect to this factor were amply 

supported by the record. 

For example, the probation officer’s report notes that petitioner’s “violent tendencies” 

were first identified at a very early age, when “his parents sought professional help for his bad 

temper. . . .” (Dkt . 12, Ex. B at 20.) Petitioner met with a counselor for a period of time in 

the seventh or eighth grade, but admitted that the treatment did not work and “he really did 

not get a lot out of these counseling sessions.” (Id. at 16.) Petitioner was also arrested 

“roughly three years [prior to the commitment offense] for battery on a police officer, 

mayhem, and resisting arrest” in an incident that was cited in the Governor’s decision. (Id., 

Ex. D at 1; see id., Ex. C at 24-26.) Specifically, that incident arose from a police officer’s 

investigation of a tailgating incident at petitioner’s home. (See id., Ex. D at 1.) When the 

officer mistakenly referred to petitioner’s wife as his mother, petitioner “pushed the officer in 

the chest, knocking him backwards. After another officer arrived to the scene, [petitioner] 

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tried to throw punches and kick the officers, and ultimately bit one of them.” (Id.) Although 

these charges were ultimately dismissed when petitioner pled guilty to the underlying murder 

conviction, the petitioner’s conduct demonstrated a pattern of angry and violent behaviour 

that began at a young age and continued up until the commitment offense. 

The third factor relied upon by the Governor was petitioner’s prior criminal history. 

(See id. at 1.) The applicable guidelines provide that the parole authorities must consider “a 

prisoner’s past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is 

reliably documented.” See 15 CCR § 2402(b). The Governor observed that petitioner was 

“an admitted alcoholic and drug user, and no stranger to contacts with law enforcement” at 

the time of the commitment offense. In addition to petitioner’s arrest, the Governor cited 

petitioner’s “seven other convictions” for traffic offenses, including three convictions for 

driving under the influence and four convictions for driving on a suspended license. (See Dkt. 

12, Ex. C at 24; id., Ex. D at 1.) Although petitioner’s history of drug and alcohol abuse and 

his seven traffic convictions, without more, may not constitute “some evidence” that 

petitioner remained currently dangerous at the time of the Governor’s decision, his criminal 

history does support the Governor’s finding that petitioner has “consistently demonstrated 

disregard for – and an unwillingness or inability to curb his behaviour to – the rules of his 

environment.” (See id., Ex. D at 2.) 

The fourth factor relied upon by the Governor was petitioner’s disciplinary record in 

prison, which also reflects petitioner’s history of inappropriately managing his anger. (See id. 

at 1-2.) See also 15 CCR § 2402(c)(6) (providing that a prisoner’s negative “institutional 

behavior,” such as “serious misconduct in prison or jail” constitutes a factor tending to 

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indicate unsuitability for parole). The disciplinary record of a California prisoner is 

chronicled in the report forms placed in the prisoner’s “Central File.” When a prisoner’s 

“misconduct is believed to be a violation of law or is not minor in nature, it shall be reported 

on a CDC Form 115 (Rev.7/88), Rules Violation Report,” or a “CDC 115.” 15 CCR 

§ 3312(a)(3). In contrast, when “minor misconduct recurs after verbal counseling or if 

documentation of minor misconduct is needed, a description of the misconduct and 

counseling provided shall be documented on a CDC Form 128-A, Custodial Counseling 

Chrono,” or a “CDC 128A.” 15 CCR § 3312(a)(2). 

The Governor noted that during petitioner’s incarceration, he has received seven CDC 

115s for non-minor prison-rules violations, at least two of which “involved disrespectful or 

assaultive conduct” toward correctional officers.4

 (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 1; id., Ex. G at 71; 

Dkt. 1, Ex. 40 at 2; Dkt. 21, Exs. 1 and 2.) Specifically, petitioner was disciplined for making 

a racial comment to a correctional officer in September 1988, and for exhibiting aggressive 

and threatening behavior toward a correctional officer in May 1994. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 1; 

id., Ex. C at 33-34; Dkt. 21, Exs. 1 and 2.) Similarly, the Governor observed that when 

petitioner was disciplined for not following count procedures and possession of unissued 

property in 1985 and 1989, respectively, the correctional officers reported that petitioner “on 

both occasions, used profane and/or threatening language in response to their efforts to 

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Petitioner “admits that he received rules violation reports and counseling chronos . . . to the 

extent of his admissions reflected in the reports.” (See Dkt. 22 at 2.) He also “admits the Governor 

properly considered petitioner’s rules violation reports and counseling chronos in their entirety in 

reviewing petitioner’s parole grant.” (Id.) Petitioner’s sole contention concerning his disciplinary 

history is that his rules violations in prison were “not probative of petitioner’s dangerousness at the 

time the Governor conducted his review. . . .” (Id.) As discussed below, petitioner’s contention is 

unavailing. 

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counsel him.” (Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 2; Dkt. 21, Exs. 3 and 4.) 

Moreover, petitioner has received seven 128As for minor misconduct during his 

incarceration. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 2; id., Ex. C at 34; id., Ex. G at 26, 32, 45, and 55; Dkt. 

21, Ex. 5.) During one such incident in 1997, a correctional officer reported that petitioner 

became “belligerent, with an intimidating attitude” when he was counseled about the “No 

Dorm Visiting Policy.” (See Dkt. 21, Ex. 5 at 1.) 

Petitioner committed his most recent disciplinary violation in September 2003, only 

one year before his parole hearing and two years before the Governor’s decision. (See Dkt. 

12, Ex. C at 33-36 and 73-74.) Although the Governor acknowledged that the violation 

appeared “less-than serious” because it involved petitioner’s possession of a one-dollar bill 

from his recently deceased grandfather that had been glued into a book to keep for sentimental 

reasons, the incident still constituted a knowing and deliberate rule violation. (See id., Ex. D 

at 2.) The Governor could reasonably consider the 2003 violation, and then conclude that 

petitioner’s recent behavioral improvement in prison during “the last two years is not enough 

to outweigh the 20 years he consistently demonstrated disregard for – and an unwillingness or 

inability to curb his behavior to – the rules of his environment.” (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, 

petitioner’s aggravated commitment offense, previous record of violence, prior criminal 

history, and disciplinary record in prison provide “some evidence” to support the Governor’s 

conclusion that petitioner would pose a current public safety risk if released on parole. 

Contrary to petitioner’s argument that the Governor failed to consider or give 

appropriate weight to the parole suitability rules which favored petitioner, the Governor 

acknowledged that petitioner has expressed remorse for his crime, maintained solid 

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relationships with family and friends throughout his confinement, confirmed suitable parole 

plans for his release, upgraded vocationally by availing himself of training in masonry and 

electronics in prison, and held a variety of skilled institutional jobs. (Id.) See also 15 CCR 

§ 2402(d)(2), (3), (8), and (9). He observed that petitioner has consistently participated in 

self-help and therapy programs, including Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 

since 1984, Breaking Barriers, Victim Offender Reconciliation, Prison Outreach, and one-onone psychotherapy programs. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 2.) In addition, the Governor noted that 

petitioner’s most recent mental-health evaluation in 2003 assessed his risk of future 

dangerousness as “significantly lower than the average inmate.” (Id.) 

Petitioner’s contention that the Governor failed to acknowledge that petitioner was 

motivated to commit this murder by the significant stress he suffered as a result of a prior 

sexual assault inflicted upon petitioner by three men armed with a knife is similarly 

unavailing. (See Dkt. 1 at 11.) See also 15 CCR § 2404(d)(4) (providing that “significant 

stress” in a prisoner’s life which motivated him to commit the offense is a factor tending to 

indicate suitability for parole). The Governor did acknowledge petitioner’s motivation for the 

crime when he stated, “At some point, Mr. Damian made a comment that [petitioner] 

interpreted as a homosexual overture to him. [Petitioner] and his crime partner then hit and 

kicked Mr. Damian.” (Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 1.) Furthermore, the Governor’s failure to discuss 

petitioner’s allegations concerning an unreported, prior sexual assault in detail was not 

improper, as he has broad discretion to determine how suitability and unsuitability factors 

interrelate to support his conclusion of current dangerousness to the public. See Lawrence, 44 

Cal.4th at 1212. 

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Accordingly, it is an inaccurate characterization of the record to say that the Governor 

failed to consider evidence that favored petitioner, or found him unsuitable for parole without 

evidence of current dangerousness. (See Dkt. 1 at 10 and 12.) Petitioner’s argument that the 

Governor’s decision ran afoul of the governing regulations is unconvincing. Despite 

petitioner’s recent progress, the Governor determined that petitioner would currently present a 

public safety risk if released on parole. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. D at 3.) 

B. Contra Costa County Superior Court Decision

Petitioner’s habeas petitions filed in the California Court of Appeal and California 

Supreme Court contained the same claims as his Contra Costa County Superior Court 

petition, and both appellate petitions were summarily denied. (See id., Exs. E, F, and G.) 

Accordingly, this Court reviews the Contra Costa County Superior Court’s Order upholding 

the Governor’s decision to determine whether it meets the deferential AEDPA standards, as it 

was the last reasoned state court decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04. 

In its decision denying petitioner’s request for habeas relief, the superior court asserted 

that based upon its review of the record, “the Governor’s decision was supported by the 

requisite some evidence . . . [and] reflects an individualized consideration of the specified 

criteria and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.” (Dkt. 12, Ex. E at 5-6.) Specifically, the 

superior court concluded that “the record supports the Governor’s assessment that the 

commitment offense was especially heinous . . . Indeed, Petitioner does not seem to dispute 

that . . . [his] crime was especially heinous. Rather, petitioner complains that the Governor 

did not consider all relevant reliable factors concerning the commitment offense, specifically 

that the crime was motivated by a prior sexual assault on Petitioner.” (Id. at 5.) Without 

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expressing an opinion regarding the veracity of petitioner’s assertion that he was the victim of 

a prior sexual assault, the court asserted that it “[did] not believe that petitioner’s 

uncorroborated and post-commitment offense disclosure of an alleged sexual assault 

constitutes [the kind of] ‘reliable’ information” the Board or Governor is required to consider 

under the governing regulations. (Id.) See 15 CCR 2402(b) (requiring the Board to consider 

“all relevant, reliable information. . . .”). 

Furthermore, the superior court concluded that petitioner’s history of prison-rule 

violations and inappropriately managing his anger were legitimate considerations for the 

Governor to weigh in favor of parole denial, especially in light of petitioner’s admission that 

rage had prompted him to kill the victim. (See Dkt. 12, Ex. E at 6.) As a result, the state 

court found that the Governor’s decision to reverse the Board’s grant of parole was within his 

broad discretion. Because the Governor’s parole denial was supported by “some evidence” of 

current dangerousness, the superior court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. 

XIII. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, I recommend this Court find that (1) the petition must be denied as 

untimely under AEDPA; and (2) even if the petition is timely, the petition must fail on the 

merits because there was “some evidence” that petitioner’s release as of the date of the 

Governor’s decision, March 22, 2005, would have presented an unreasonable risk to public 

safety. As a result, I recommend the Court find that the Contra Costa County Superior 

Court’s Order upholding the Governor’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. The Court should therefore enter an Order 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, denying the petition (Dkt. 1), and 

directing that judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20) 

days of being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Either party may 

then respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen (14) days of being served a copy 

of such written objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 16th day of March, 2010. 

A 

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