Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01278/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01278-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW DAVID BRUINS, II,

CDCR #K-70839,

Plaintiff,

vs.

M. WHITMAN, Associate Warden;

A. ACEVEDO, Facility Captain,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01278-BAS-NLS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Andrew David Bruins (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison 

(“CAL”) located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not prepay the filing 

fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action at the time he filed his 

Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 2.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

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entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the 

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 

a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of the trust fund 

account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period immediately 

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 

1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses 

an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past 

six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, 

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects 

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in 

which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until the entire 

filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his inmate 

trust account statement. (ECF No. 2 at 7-16.) Plaintiff’s statement shows that he had no 

available funds to his credit at the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 

No. 2) and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the 

entire $350 balance of the filing fees due for this case must be collected by the California 

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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the 

Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a complaint to “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

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common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 

see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 

1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Representation of other parties

Plaintiff’s Complaint is far from clear and contains virtually no factual allegations 

but it appears that he is attempting to bring some of these claims on behalf of an unnamed 

party. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states “I being a spouse of the program participant having 

become also appropriate person with whom the public entity should communicate.” 

(Compl. at 2.) Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he has no authority to represent the 

legal interest of any other party. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 1995); C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987); see 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed 

by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s original name, or if the party is not 

represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.”). Therefore, to the extent that 

Plaintiff is attempting to bring this action on behalf of another party, he cannot do so.

E. Claims against Whitman and Acevedo

While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Whitman 

and Acevedo liable in their roles as supervisors. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the 

named Defendants were actually aware of Plaintiff’s claims. There is no respondeat 

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th 

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Cir. 1993). Rather, “deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof 

that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick 

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-totrain claim ‘would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . .’”), 

quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 

(9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person deprives 

another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which 

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not stated a claim against 

these Defendants because he has failed to allege facts regarding what actions were taken 

or not taken by these Defendants which caused alleged constitutional violations. See 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and vicarious liability will not attach under 

§ 1983.”), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims 

against Whitman and Acevedo for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

F. Americans with Disabilities Act

It further appears that Plaintiff is seeking to bring a claim on behalf of another inmate 

pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. (See Compl. 

at 1-2.) The ADA applies in the prison context. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); U.S. v. 

Georgia 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, however, 

a plaintiff must allege:

(1) he ‘is an individual with a disability;’ (2) he ‘is otherwise qualified to 

participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, 

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programs, or activities;’ (3) he ‘was either excluded from participation in or 

denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or 

was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;’ and (4) ‘such 

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] 

disability.’

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing McGary v. 

City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thompson v. Davis, 295 

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any factual 

allegations to support an ADA claim.

Moreover, Plaintiff may not pursue an ADA claim against any of the individually 

named Defendants because there is no individual liability under Title II. See Heinke v. 

County of Tehama Sheriff’s Dept., No. CVI S-12-2433 LKK/KJN, 2013 WL 3992407, at 

*7 (E.D. Cal. Aug.1, 2013). The ADA’s definition of “public entity” does not include 

individuals. See Hardwick v. Curtis Trailers, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1037, 1038-39 (D. Or. 

1995) (individual liability is precluded under ADA Title II) (citing Miller v. Maxwell’s 

Intern., Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 

F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 

1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

a State official in [his or] her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of 

the ADA[.]”); Weathers v. Hagemeister-May, No. 1:13-CV-01932-AWI, 2014 WL 

309444, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 

state an ADA claim upon which relief can be granted.

G. Equal Protection

Plaintiff states as a cause of action “the loss of equal protection, 14th Amendment” 

but provides no factual allegations to support an equal protection claim. (Compl. at 3.) 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An 

equal protection claim is pleaded by alleging that a defendant intentionally discriminated 

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against the plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 

F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 

2001), or by alleging facts sufficient to plausibly show that similarly situated individuals 

were intentionally treated differently absent a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008); Lazy Y Ranch 

Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 

526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff does not allege he was discriminated against because he is a member of any 

protected class. Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082. He also fails to allege facts to show other 

prisoners “similarly situated” were treated differently and that any disparate treatment 

lacked a legitimate purpose. See McCollum v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 

880-81 (9th Cir. 2011) (Equal Protection claims require a plaintiff to “articulate which 

[other persons] were similarly situated or how he is similar to these [persons].”). Thus, 

without more, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations that Defendants denied him 

equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Compl at 2, are insufficient 

to state a claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 & n.3 (2007) 

(“labels and conclusions” are insufficient to state a claim for relief).

H. Leave to Amend

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any 

§ 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted, and that it must be dismissed sua sponte 

and in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro 

se, however, the Court having now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his 

complaint,” will also grant him an opportunity to fix them. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 

1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

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(ECF No. 2);

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph Diaz, 

Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) and GRANTS 

him thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 

original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

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5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form civil rights 

complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 22, 2019

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