Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05020/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05020-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Linda S. McMahon became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE ARKANSAS

SHELLY BRAGG PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-5020

LINDA S. MCMAHON, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R

Plaintiff Shelly Bragg appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

September 19, 2006, an amended judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the

Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 17). Plaintiff now

moves for an award of $1,207.43 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal

Access to Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 7.30 attorney hours of

work before the court at an hourly rate of $156.25 in 2005, and $163.75 in 2006, and $35.17 in

expenses. (Doc. # 11). Defendant has filed a response, objecting to the hourly rate requested and

certain hours claimed. (Doc. # 15).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Case 5:06-cv-05020-JRM Document 18 Filed 02/09/07 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

2

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

Case 5:06-cv-05020-JRM Document 18 Filed 02/09/07 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

3

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Case 5:06-cv-05020-JRM Document 18 Filed 02/09/07 Page 3 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

4

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at an hourly rate of $156.25 in

2005, and $163.75 in 2006, for the 7.30 hours which she asserts she devoted to the representation

of plaintiff in this court. The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the

claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be

increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify

hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of theConsumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 11)

and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned

believes her argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. 

The Commissioner has raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. We agree that

the requested hourly rate is excessive and find that an award based upon an hourly rate of

$150.00 per hour, reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly

fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990).

Thus, based upon the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of

attorney's fees in this case is $150.00 per hour.

Case 5:06-cv-05020-JRM Document 18 Filed 02/09/07 Page 4 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

5

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claimsshe spent working on this

case. Defendant argues that the 0.55 hour submitted on October 10, 2005, through December 2,

2005, was work performed prior to the filing of the Complaint with this court. Plaintiff's counsel

seeks a total of 2.42 hours of work from October 10, 2005, through January 27, 2005. The

Complaint was not filed in this court until February 1, 2006. (Doc. # 1). We note, time spent at

the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728

F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time submitted on the above referenced

dates was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we

will allow 2.00 hours. Accordingly, 0.42 hourmust be deducted from the total compensable time

sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.83 hour on February 1, 2006 (receive electronically filed

notice of Braggs’ filing), from which we deduct 0.83 hour; 0.25 hour on March 9, 2006 (letter

to US Attorney of service with all attachments), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.25 hour on

March 9, 2006 (letter of service to Commissioner with attachments), from which we deduct 0.25

hour; 0.25 hour on March 9, 2006 (letter of service to General Counsel with all attachment), from

which we deduct 0.25 hour; and 0.25 hour on March 9, 2006 (letter of service to Attorney with

all attachments), from which we deduct 0.25 hour. This time cannot be compensated under the

EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work

which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). 

Accordingly, we deduct 1.83 hours from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Case 5:06-cv-05020-JRM Document 18 Filed 02/09/07 Page 5 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

6

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $35.17 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage and photocopies. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $35.17

to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 5.05

(7.30- 2.25) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, and $35.17 in expenses for

a total attorney's fee award of $792.67. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out

of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9 day of February 2007. th

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 5:06-cv-05020-JRM Document 18 Filed 02/09/07 Page 6 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>