Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01986/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01986-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN ENAL, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv1986 DMS (BGS) 

vs. ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Docket No. 9]

HMS HOST USA, INC., a Delaware

corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed an opposition

to the motion, and Defendant filed a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part

and denies in part the motion to dismiss.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Martin Enal is employed as a utility man for Defendant Host International, Inc. (Compl.

¶ 9.) He has been employed by Defendant since October 5, 1985. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he “enjoyed good working relationships with his co-workers, and received

favorable job performance reviews from his managers and supervisors” until sometime in 2008. (Id.

¶ 11.) At that time, he began experiencing problems with the utility man from another shift, Armando

de

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 Plaintiff is Filipino. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

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Guzman. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. de Guzman would not complete his work, and that

Plaintiff would have to complete Mr. de Guzman’s work in addition to performing his own work. (Id.)

Plaintiff complained about this situation to his immediate supervisor, Adriana Mejia. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Ms. Mejia did not resolve the issue to Plaintiff’s satisfaction, therefore Plaintiff complained to Jennifer

Lakin in Human Resources about the situation. (Id. ¶ 14.) Ms. Lakin said she would discuss the issue

with Ms. Mejia. (Id.)

The following day, Ms. Mejia assigned Plaintiff additional job duties. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff

alleges this was in retaliation for his complaints about Mr. de Guzman. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

In September 2008, Plaintiff alleges he was forced to bid on and accept a less desirable shift

while the more preferred shift went to Mr. de Guzman. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

Plaintiff alleges he was subject to other retaliatory and discriminatory employment practices,

including being falsely accused and written up for failing to abide by workplace rules and regulations,

and being ordered and forced to work overtime without pay. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges he complained

about these practices only to have them increase in rate, degree and intensity, creating “an increasingly

hostile work environment.” (Id. ¶ 19.) 

On April 2, 2009, Ms. Mejia gave Plaintiff a written reprimand for leaving perishable

merchandise unattended. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff was forced to seek the intervention of his Union to

represent him in that matter. (Id.) 

On May 29, 2009, Ms. Mejia ordered Plaintiff to the office of the General Manager, Joe Niknam,

where Plaintiff was given a verbal warning against insubordination and fighting in the workplace. (Id.

¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges the discrimination, harassment and retaliation continued through this time. 

On July 6, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and

Housing (“DFEH”) alleging claims of discrimination and harassment based on his race and national

origin,1

 and retaliation. The DFEH issued its Right-To-Sue Notice on July 20, 2010. 

On August 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed the present case in San Diego Superior Court alleging claims

for employment discrimination based on race and national origin, harassment and retaliation under

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California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, failure to pay overtime wages, and intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant removed the case to this Court on September 22,

2010. The present motion followed. 

II. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, sixth and seventh claims for

relief. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s first through fourth claims are time-barred, and the sixth and seventh

claims fail to state a claim. 

A. Standard of Review

In two recent opinions, the Supreme Court established a more stringent standard of review for

12(b)(6) motions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under this new standard, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950

(citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)). In Iqbal, the Court began this task “by

identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1951.

It then considered “the factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly

suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951.

B. Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation Claims

Defendant argues these claims should be dismissed because they are untimely. Specifically,

Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to file his complaint with the DFEH within the one year statute of

limitations. Plaintiff contends the continuing violations doctrine applies to the facts of his case, and

renders his claims timely. 

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California Government Code § 12960(d) sets out a one-year statute of limitations for filing a

complaint with the DFEH. Cal. Govt. Code § 12960(d). The continuing violations doctrine “is an

‘equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.’” Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal.

App. 4th 52, 63-64 (2000) (quoting West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 (3d Cir. 1995)).

To warrant application of the doctrine, “[t]he plaintiff must demonstrate that at least one act occurred

within the filing period and that ‘the harassment is more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts

of intentional discrimination.’” Id. at 64 (quoting West, 45 F.3d at 755) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges the unlawful employment practices began sometime in 2008 and

continued through at least May 29, 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21, 23-24.) Plaintiff alleges the “hostility in

Plaintiff’s work environment continued unabated” after May 29, 2009, (id. ¶ 25), but he fails to allege

any specific act that occurred after that date, and more importantly, any specific act that occurred after

July 6, 2009, which is one year prior to the filing of his DFEH complaint. Absent allegations of a

specific act that occurred within this time frame, Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the continuing

violations doctrine. Accordingly, these claims are untimely and must be dismissed. 

C. Emotional Distress Claims

The only other claims at issue in this motion are Plaintiff’s claim for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Defendant argues these claims should be dismissed because they are

duplicative of Plaintiff’s other claims, they are preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act, and the

conduct at issue was not extreme or outrageous.

Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims are based on the same conduct

underlying his discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims. However, reliance on the same facts

does not render the emotional distress claims duplicative of the other claims. The emotional distress

claims are based on an entirely different legal theory, and for that reason, are not duplicative. 

Nor are the emotional distress claims preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Flait

v. North Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 480 (1992) (stating trial court erred in concluding claim

of emotional distress arising from FEHA violation were barred by workers’ compensation act). 

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The Court also rejects Defendant’s argument that the conduct at issue is legally insufficient to

support Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims. To the extent these claims are based on Defendant’s acts

of discrimination and harassment, that conduct “will constitute the outrageous behavior element of a

/ / /

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress[.]” Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula

Hospital, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 618 (1989).

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Specifically, the Court grants the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s, first, second, third and fourth claims, and

denies the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth and seventh claims. 

In accordance with Plaintiff’s request, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a First Amended

Complaint that cures the pleading deficiencies set out in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned that if his First

Amended Complaint does not cure these deficiencies, his claims will be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend. The First Amended Complaint shall be filed on or before January 14, 2011.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 3, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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