Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00520/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00520-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Erica L. Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-00520-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Erica L. Smith’s appeal from the Social 

Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues that the 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding Plaintiff and her husband’s testimony 

to be non-credible and by improperly weighing the opinions of treating physicians Ramin 

Sabahi, M.D., and Nirmala Aryal, M.D. The Court now rules on Plaintiff’s appeal. 

I. Background 

 A. Procedural Background 

 On November 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for disability and disability 

insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of March 29, 2009. (Tr. 24).1

 On April 

1, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging the same 

onset date. (Id.) Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on February 28, 2011, and upon 

 

1

 Citations to “Tr.” are to the certified administrative transcript of record. (Doc. 19). 

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reconsideration on July 7, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff timely requested a hearing which was 

conducted before ALJ Philip E. Moulaison on February 28, 2012 in Phoenix, Arizona. 

(Id.) On March 27, 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 35). After 

Plaintiff’s request for review by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council was 

denied, she commenced this action in federal court on March 3, 2014. (Doc. 1). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Background 

Plaintiff was born in 1981 and lives with her husband and their three children in 

Avondale, Arizona. (Tr. 45). Plaintiff earned her GED certification before working for 

several years as a photographer/manager, cashier, housekeeper, meat cutter, customer 

service representative, cook, fast food worker, telemarketer, snack bar attendant, and 

waitress. (Tr. 47, 205). Plaintiff’s final day of employment was on October 9, 2008, when 

she was terminated from her position as a photographer/manager for violating company 

policy. (Tr. 46, 181). According to Plaintiff, she became disabled on March 22, 2009,2

after she “ha[d not] been able to find employment since” she was terminated in October 

2008. (Tr. 181). 

 Plaintiff’s daily activities consist of waking up and assisting her children prepare 

for school. (Tr. 193). After Plaintiff drives her children to school, she goes back home to 

“sit on the couch.” (Id.) After several hours, Plaintiff will stand up and get food from the 

kitchen. (Id.) Plaintiff will then sit on the couch until she drives to pick up her children 

from school. (Id.) Upon her return, Plaintiff will then “flip flop” on the couch until she 

goes to bed “around 1am – 3am.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that she can care for her personal 

hygiene and dress, in addition to “regularly” exercising four to five days per week. 

(Tr. 556, 585, 746). Plaintiff smokes tobacco and denies alcohol use. (Tr. 557). 

C. Medical Background 

Plaintiff claims that she suffers from an extensive list of impairments, including 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s alleged onset date coincides with a knee injury she suffered while 

jumping on a trampoline in March 2009. See (Tr. 26–27). The ALJ found this injury to be 

non-severe, which Plaintiff does not dispute. (Id.) 

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fibromyalgia, migraine and tension headaches, obesity, knee pain, anxiety disorder NOS, 

and depressive disorder NOS. (Doc. 25 at 2). Plaintiff also claims that she suffers from 

myalgia myositis, depression with anxiety, fatigue, and possible thyroid disorder. 

(Tr. 156, 158, 181). Plaintiff takes an equally extensive number of medications, 

including Tramadol, Trazodone, Effexor XR, Soma, Ibuprofen, Omeprazole, Ranitidine, 

Meclizine, Frova, Nortriptyline, Clindamycin topical, Retin-A gel topical. (Tr. 556–57). 

Plaintiff has sought treatment from a variety of sources for a range of ailments, dating 

back to 2008 when Plaintiff was treated for knee pain and depression. (Doc. 25 at 3). 

Physicians have prescribed Plaintiff the above-listed medications, in addition to 

recommending water therapy for physical pain. (Id. at 5). One physician determined that 

Plaintiff has no work-related mental limitations, (id. at 6), while another has deemed 

Plaintiff to be “intelligent [and] articulate,” (Tr. 677). 

II. Legal Standard 

The ALJ’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

750 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence” means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

 “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as 

would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v. 

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In determining whether 

there is substantial evidence to support a decision, the Court considers the record as a 

whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and the evidence 

that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “Where evidence is 

susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion which 

must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences 

logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citations omitted); see 

Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is 

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because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the 

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); 

see Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports 

the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On the other hand, the Court “may 

not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

 Notably, the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own 

judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. Rather, the Court’s inquiry is 

constrained to the reasons asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of 

those reasons. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show that, among other things, she is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The 

Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is: 

under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments 

are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but 

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

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 B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 

721. A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential process will end the inquiry. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, 

but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The 

five steps are as follows: 

 1. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether the 

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be considered severe, the impairment must “significantly limit[] 

[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(c). Basic work activities are the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs,” 

such as lifting, carrying, reaching, understanding, carrying out and remembering simple 

instructions, responding appropriately to co-workers, and dealing with changes in routine. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either have lasted for “a 

continuous period of at least twelve months,” be expected to last for such a period, or be 

expected “to result in death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (incorporated by reference in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to 

dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If 

the claimant does not have a severe impairment, then the claimant is not disabled. 

 3. Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without further inquiry. If not, 

before proceeding to the next step, the ALJ will make a finding regarding the claimant’s 

“residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] 

case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant’s “residual functional capacity” is the 

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most he can still do despite all his impairments, including those that are not severe, and 

any related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 

 4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the claimant 

can still perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make this 

determination, the ALJ compares its “residual functional capacity assessment . . . with the 

physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work he previously did, the 

claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step. 

 5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an 

adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s 

“residual functional capacity” and his “age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can perform other work, he is not disabled. If the 

claimant cannot perform other work, he will be found disabled. 

 In evaluating the claimant’s disability under this five-step process, the ALJ must 

consider all evidence in the case record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520b. This includes medical opinions, records, self-reported symptoms, and thirdparty reporting. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 06–3p, 71 Fed. 

Reg. 45593-03. 

C. The ALJ’s Evaluation under the Five-Step Process 

At step one of the sequential evaluation process the ALJ found that Plaintiff did 

not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 26). At step 

two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

“fibromyalgia; migraine and tension headache; and obesity.” (Id.) Under step three, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or equal any of the 

listed impairments in the Social Security regulations. (Tr. 29). 

 Before moving on to step four, the ALJ conducted a residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) determination in light of Plaintiff’s testimony and the objective medical 

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evidence. (Tr. 30). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC “to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can sit, stand, and walk for 

eight hours in an eight-hour day. She can only occasionally reach with her right upper 

extremity.” (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant 

work as a cashier, telephone solicitor, sales clerk, and fast food worker. (Tr. 34). 

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security 

Act. (Tr. 34). 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff makes three arguments for why the Court should set aside the ALJ’s 

decision. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed the following errors: 

(1) failing to give the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians “controlling weight,” 

(2) rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without providing clear and convincing 

reasons for doing so, and (3) rejecting Plaintiff’s husband’s testimony without sufficient 

explanation. (Doc. 25 at 11–14). The Court will address each argument in turn. 

A. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered and Weighed the Opinions 

 of Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians 

The Court first turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred when he did not 

give “controlling weight” to the opinions of Drs. Sabahi and Aryal, Plaintiff’s treating 

physicians. The Court will also consider Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly 

evaluated her treating physicians’ opinions, regardless of the weight attached. 

 1. Legal Standard 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of three types of physicians: 

(1) those who treat the claimant (“treating physicians”); (2) those who examine but do not 

treat the claimant (“examining physicians”); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat 

the claimant (“non-examining physicians”). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th 

Cir. 1995). As a general rule, the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater 

weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician, but less than a treating physician. 

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1454. 

 The opinion of a treating physician is generally entitled to controlling weight when 

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it is “well supported by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques 

and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. However, if a treating 

physician’s opinion “is not well-supported” or “is inconsistent with other substantial 

evidence in the record,” it should not be given controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. 

 Substantial evidence that contradicts a treating physician’s opinion may consist of 

either (1) an examining physician’s opinion or (2) a non-examining physician’s opinion 

combined with other evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31. In the case of an examining 

physician, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a 

treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the 

examining physician are not substantial evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (citing Murray 

v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1984)). To constitute substantial evidence, the 

examining physician must provide “independent clinical findings that differ from the 

findings of the treating physician.” Id. (citing Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th 

Cir. 1985)). Independent clinical findings can be either “diagnoses that differ from those 

offered by another physician and that are supported by substantial evidence . . . or 

findings based on objective medical tests that the treating physician has not herself 

considered.” Id. (citing Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

 The opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Such an opinion is only substantial evidence if 

supported by “substantial record evidence.” Id. 

If a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by the opinion of another 

physician, then the ALJ may discount the treating physician’s opinion only for “clear and 

convincing” reasons. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830); see Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The ALJ may disregard the treating physician’s 

opinion whether or not that opinion is contradicted.” (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 

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F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989))). If the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion 

is inconsistent with substantial evidence and is not to be given controlling weight, the 

opinion remains entitled to deference and should be weighed according to the factors 

provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. These factors include (1) the 

length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and 

extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which the opinion is supported by 

relevant medical evidence; (4) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; and 

(5) whether the physician is a specialist giving an opinion within his specialty. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c). But the ALJ may still reject a contradicted treating physician’s opinion for 

“specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 

F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

 Finally, “[a]lthough a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded the 

greatest weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the 

existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of disability.” Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). This is because the determination as to 

whether a claimant is disabled is an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner. See 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Thus, even if a treating physician’s opinion of disability is 

controlling, it does not necessarily lead to a finding of disability. See Magallanes, 881 

F.2d at 753 (rejecting a treating physician’s opinion of disability). 

 2. Analysis 

 a. Dr. Sabahi 

 Dr. Sabahi is Plaintiff’s treating rheumatologist. (Tr. 33). After examining Plaintiff 

on multiple occasions, Dr. Sabahi opined that Plaintiff could not perform work-related 

activities on a regular or consistent basis and concluded that Plaintiff’s tender point 

findings were consistent with fibromyalgia. (Id.) Dr. Sabahi opined that Plaintiff could 

only stand for two hours in an eight-hour day and sit for less than four hours. (Id.) The 

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ALJ gave Dr. Sabahi’s opinion “little weight” because it was “not consistent with the 

medical evidence of record, including his own treatment notes.” (Id.) The ALJ found that 

Dr. Sabahi’s opinion was unsupported by the objective medical evidence and appeared to 

be “based largely on [Plaintiff]’s subjective statements regarding her abilities[.]” (Id.) 

The ALJ also remarked that Dr. Sabahi “provide[d] no findings to explain or support the 

limitations he impose[d].” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by assigning Dr. Sabahi’s opinions “little 

weight” while allotting “great weight” to the opinion of Plaintiff’s examining physician, 

Melissa Linner, M.D. (Doc. 25 at 16). Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Sabahi’s opinion was 

entitled to “controlling weight” as the ALJ failed to “cite evidence of a conflict sufficient 

to warrant an assignment of less than controlling weight.” (Id.) Plaintiff insists that 

although Dr. Linner offered a differing opinion with respect to Plaintiff’s physical 

limitations, she relied on the same findings as Dr. Sabahi, and thus, her opinion did not 

rest on independent clinical findings. (Id. at 19). 

 To begin, the ALJ did not give “little weight” to Dr. Sabahi’s opinion as the result 

of Dr. Linnel’s differing opinions. Rather, the ALJ determined that the objective medical 

evidence did not support Dr. Sabahi’s opinion and that Dr. Sabahi did not make any 

clinical findings that would support the severity of his imposed limitations. (Tr. 33). An 

ALJ need not give “controlling weight” to a physician’s opinion if that opinion is “not 

well-supported” by the medical evidence. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. Thus, the ALJ provided a 

permissible reason for rejecting Dr. Sabahi’s opinion, and, if that reason is reasonably 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be upheld. 

 In this regard, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his review of Dr. Sabahi’s 

opinion. (Doc. 25 at 19–24). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by 

considering the lack of other objective evidence beyond the tender point findings as a 

reason to give “little weight” to Dr. Sabahi’s opinion. (Id. at 20–22). Plaintiff further 

contends that the ALJ erred by giving less weight to Dr. Sabahi’s opinion because he 

relied on Plaintiff’s reported symptoms “at face value” in the absence of “any indication 

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that the claimant was malingering or deceptive.” (Id. at 23) (citations omitted). 

 The ALJ did not err by considering the lack of objective evidence beyond 

Plaintiff’s tender points. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was a “severe 

impairment.” (Tr. 26). However, the ALJ noted that beyond the tender point findings, 

there was no objective medical evidence that supported the severity of Dr. Sabahi’s 

imposed limitations. (Tr. 33). This was not error. In the Ninth Circuit, “medical evidence 

is . . . a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling 

effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(c)(2)). To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by considering the 

lack of objective medical evidence because fibromyalgia does not lend itself to objective 

evidence, the Court disagrees. The ALJ did not reject the existence of Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia or discredit Dr. Sabahi’s opinion that Plaintiff suffered from fibromyalgia; 

rather, the ALJ reviewed the lack of objective evidence to explore the severity of 

Plaintiff’s limitations as opined by Dr. Sabahi. In doing so, the ALJ acted pursuant to 

Ninth Circuit precedent, and Plaintiff identified no evidence to rebut the ALJ’s finding. 

 As to the ALJ’s notation that “[t]he limitations Dr. Sabahi identifies appear to be 

based largely on the claimant’s subjective statements regarding her abilities and 

limitations[,]” (Tr. 33), the Court does not find error. An ALJ may reject a medical 

opinion that is based on a claimant’s subjective reports in lieu of objective medical data. 

See, e.g., Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). As set forth above, the ALJ properly found that the 

objective medical evidence did not support Dr. Sabahi’s stringent limitations. Plaintiff 

does not point to any objective evidence establishing that Dr. Sabahi did not unduly rely 

on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Thus, the Court will not “second guess” the ALJs’ 

decision in this regard.3

 

 3

 Even if the ALJ erred by stating that it “appeared” Dr. Sabahi relied too heavily 

on Plaintiff’s subjective statements, the error would be harmless. The ALJ provided 

several other reasons to give “little weight” to Dr. Sabahi’s opinion, such as the lack of 

findings to support his limitations and his inconsistent treatment notes. See (Tr. 33). As a 

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 For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err when reviewing 

and weighing Dr. Sabahi’s opinions. 

 b. Dr. Aryal 

 Dr. Aryal is Plaintiff’s treating neurologist. (Tr. 34). On February 17, 2012, Dr. 

Aryal opined that Plaintiff was unable to perform work activities on a regular and 

continuing basis. (Id.) Dr. Aryal opined that Plaintiff could stand for only two hours in an 

eight-hour day and sit for less than three hours. (Id.) The ALJ gave Dr. Aryal’s opinions 

“little weight” for three reasons. (Id.) First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Aryal’s opinions were 

inconsistent with the medical evidence of record for the same reasons as Dr. Sabahi. (Id.) 

Second, the ALJ found that the only abnormality Dr. Aryal ever noted in her treatment 

notes was a mild reduction in temperature sensation on a portion of Plaintiff’s face. (Id.) 

Thus, according to the ALJ, the stringent limitations levied by Dr. Aryal were 

unsupported by her clinical findings. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Arayal 

appeared to base her opinion on Plaintiff’s subjective statements rather than her own 

findings. (Id.) 

 For the reasons expressed for Dr. Sabahi, the Court does not find that the ALJ 

committed reversible error by affording Dr. Aryal’s opinion “little weight.” The ALJ 

properly noted that the objective medical evidence did not support the severity of Dr. 

Aryal’s limitations and appropriately concluded that Dr. Aryal did not make any findings 

that supported such stringent work-related limitations. Plaintiff fails to identify any 

document in the record establishing that Dr. Aryal made a finding that would support her 

imposed limitations or that Dr. Aryal did not unduly rely on Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by giving Dr. Aryal’s opinion “little 

weight.” 

 

result, the error would be harmless because the ALJ set forth other valid reasons for 

assigning “little weight” to Dr. Sabani’s opinion. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that reversal of an ALJ’s decision is prohibited based on an 

error that is “harmless,” i.e., “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” 

(quotations omitted)). 

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 3. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in 

considering and weighing the opinions of Drs. Sabahi and Aryal. 

B. Whether the ALJ Properly Discredited Plaintiff’s Testimony 

The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by finding 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony to be non-credible. (Doc. 25 at 26–31). 

 1. Legal Standard 

 An ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 

testimony regarding subjective symptoms is credible. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. First, as 

a threshold matter, “the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be 

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 

F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 

1991)). Second, if the claimant meets the first test, then “the ALJ ‘may not discredit a 

claimant’s testimony of pain and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of 

pain alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical evidence.’” Orteza v. 

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346–47). 

Rather, “unless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence 

thereof,” the ALJ may only find the claimant not credible by making specific findings 

supported by the record that provide clear and convincing reasons to explain her 

credibility evaluation. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283–84); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036.4

 

4

 To the extent the Government argues that the clear and convincing standard does 

not apply because Congress intended for courts to review an ALJ’s decision in a highly 

deferential manner, see (Doc. 26 at 4–5), the Court disagrees. In Burrell v. Colvin, the 

Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the same argument the Government now presents. 775 

F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, to the extent the Government argues that 

the clear and convincing standard does not apply because Plaintiff did not present any 

“objective medical evidence” that could reasonably produce her pain, the Court need not 

resolve this dispute here because the ALJ set forth sufficiently specific, clear, and 

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 In rendering a credibility determination the ALJ may consider several factors, 

including “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s 

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately 

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and 

(3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue. 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284). If the ALJ relies on these factors and her 

reliance is supported by substantial evidence, the Court “‘may not engage in secondguessing.’” Id. (quoting Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958). 

 2. Analysis 

In this case, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because: (1) the 

objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s testimony, (2) Plaintiff’s 

statements to her physicians were inconsistent with her testimony, and (3) Plaintiff’s 

daily activities and treatment programs undermined the alleged severity of her 

complaints. (Tr. 32). Particularly, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s physical examinations 

generally revealed a normal range of motion with full strength in all muscle groups which 

contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain. (Id.)

5

 The ALJ also observed that 

 

convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 

5

 When determining a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may properly consider the 

results of physical examinations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1)–(2), 416.929(c)(1)–(2). To 

the extent Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly looked for objective medical 

evidence for an impairment that does not lend itself to objective findings, the Court 

disagrees. See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be 

rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, 

the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s 

pain and its disabling effects.” (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2))). Here, the ALJ did 

not reject Plaintiff’s pain testimony solely based on the lack of objective evidence; rather, 

the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s daily activities and the inconsistencies between 

Plaintiff’s testimony and statements to her physicians. 

Similarly, an ALJ may favor the opinion of a physician over a claimant’s 

testimony. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161. Here, the ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. 

Linner, who opined that Plaintiff could sit for eight hours in an eight-hour work day, 

stand/walk for eight hours, and lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds 

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Plaintiff walks without a limp, can perform postural tasks, and has full grip strength, 

despite her allegations of constant pain and numbness in her extremities. (Tr. 32). The 

ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s regular exercise programs contradicted her testimony 

that she could not sit, stand, or walk for extended periods. (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ 

properly considered Plaintiff’s statements that she stopped working at her most recent 

employment for non-impairment related reasons. (Tr. 30); see Bruton v. Massanari, 268 

F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Nov. 9, 2001) (finding that an ALJ properly 

discredited a claimant’s testimony because he “stated at the administrative hearing and to 

at least one of his doctors that he left his job because he was laid off, rather than because 

he was injured”).6

 Finally, the ALJ noted the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s 

testimony that she did not cook or perform household chores and her statements to 

physicians that she prepares meals and does chores. (Id.) These reasons constitute 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony.7

 

frequently. (Tr. 32–33). These findings are supported by substantial evidence and directly 

contradict Plaintiff’s testimony that she could only walk twenty to thirty yards, stand 

fifteen minutes, sit for one hour, and lift eight to ten pounds. (Tr. 30–31). 

6

 Such evidence may, in fact, be “affirmative evidence” of “malingering.” See 

Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that ALJ properly found 

“affirmative evidence of malingering” because the claimant “reported that he wanted to 

do volunteer work but refrained for fear of impacting his disability benefits, and claimed 

disability dating from his last day of employment even though he admitted at the hearing 

that he left his job because his employer went out of business and probably would have 

worked longer had his employer continued to operate”). 

7

 Although an ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s testimony solely because the 

degree of pain alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical evidence, 

Orteza, 50 F.3d at 749–50, here, the ALJ provided additional reasons beyond the dearth 

of objective medical evidence that would support the alleged severity of Plaintiff’s pain. 

For example, the consideration of Plaintiff’s daily activities supports the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) as amended 

(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that a claimant’s ability “to take care of her personal needs, 

prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop for some groceries . . . may be seen as 

inconsistent with the presence of a condition which would preclude all work activity” 

(citation omitted)). 

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Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to 

discredit Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony and therefore will not “second guess” it. 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. 

 C. Whether the ALJ Properly Rejected Third Party Testimony 

Plaintiff’s final contention of error is that the ALJ erred in rejecting the testimony 

of Bobby Smith, Plaintiff’s husband. (Doc. 25 at 31–32). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did 

not provide sufficient reasons to discredit his lay testimony. (Id.) 

 In order to reject the testimony of a lay witness, an ALJ must provide “reasons that 

are germane to each witness.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, 

the ALJ found that Mr. Smith’s testimony “echoed those of the claimant” and rejected 

them “for the same reasons.” (Tr. 32). As set forth above, the ALJ properly rejected 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Accordingly, the ALJ appropriately rejected Mr. 

Smith’s testimony by pointing to those same reasons. See, e.g., Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 

(observing that an ALJ may properly reject lay witness testimony by referring to the 

reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony); id. at 1121 (noting that “[e]ven when an 

agency ‘explains its decision with less than ideal clarity,’ we must uphold it ‘if the 

agency’s path may reasonably be discerned’” (quoting Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 

Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004))). 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 12th day of September, 2016. 

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