Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05098/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2005 Decided May 27, 2005

No. 04-5098

VENETIAN CASINO RESORT, L.L.C.,

APPELLANT

v.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

(USDC) for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02980)

Kenneth J. McCulloch argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Richard Rosenberg, John J. Manier, and

Steven D. Cundra.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Edith M. Shine and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: EDWARDS, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

USCA Case #04-5098 Document #897012 Filed: 05/27/2005 Page 1 of 15
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EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C.

(“Venetian”) appeals the District Court’s dismissal of its

complaint against the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) on ripeness grounds.

The gravamen of this case is Venetian’s contention that EEOC

follows an unlawful rule or practice (“disclosure policy”) that

permits the agency unilaterally to release privileged documents

submitted to EEOC by a private party without first notifying the

party. Venetian argues that a substantial probability exists that

it will be harmed by this disclosure policy, because it has

already provided EEOC with confidential and proprietary

information in response to employment discrimination

complaints filed against it, and because EEOC seeks additional

trade secrets and/or confidential information from Venetian

through an administrative subpoena issued in connection with

EEOC’s investigation of these complaints. We hold that, with

respect to trade secrets and/or confidential documents presently

possessed by EEOC relating to a pending age discrimination

investigation, the case is clearly ripe for review.

The parties’ litigation positions have obscured the issues in

this case, so it is impossible to discern whether the alleged

disclosure policy in fact exists. When they were before the

District Court, the parties focused on an agency rule that is no

longer in force and never informed the District Court that

relevant portions of the Commission’s rules on disclosure of

information in “open” case files, contained in EEOC

Compliance Manual (“Manual”) Section 83, had been revised.

The parties’ arguments before this court regarding the contours

of the agency’s disclosure policies did not clarify matters.

Moreover, during arguments before this court, EEOC appeared

to take a different position on the disputed disclosure policy than

the position advanced by agency counsel before the District

Court. Because the record is deficient, the District Court’s first

task on remand will be to determine whether the purported

disclosure policy actually exists. 

USCA Case #04-5098 Document #897012 Filed: 05/27/2005 Page 2 of 15
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If EEOC does have a disclosure policy that allows the

agency to release documents that the submitting party has

identified as containing trade secrets and/or confidential

material, without first notifying the submitting party, then the

District Court must determine in the first instance whether such

a policy is lawful. The case will therefore be remanded for

further consideration by the District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

Venetian operates a hotel, casino, and resort in Las Vegas,

Nevada. In 1999, Venetian conducted a “mass hiring process,”

during which it employed approximately 4,400 persons out of

roughly 44,000 applicants. Am. Compl. and Pet. ¶ 4, reprinted

in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 6, 8. In the wake of this hiring

process, several applicants filed employment discrimination

complaints with EEOC against Venetian, alleging discrimination

based on age, race, and color in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000), and Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000). The

Title VII claims have since settled, leaving only the age

discrimination claims under the ADEA. See Stipulation of

Dismissal of Part of Pl.’s Am. Compl.

In response to the age discrimination charges, Venetian

provided EEOC with relevant information that it deems

confidential and proprietary. See Decl. of Richard Rosenberg in

Supp. of the Resp. by Pl.-Pet’r to the Mot. by Def.-Resp’t To

Dismiss the Compl. (“Rosenberg Decl.”) ¶ 5, reprinted in J.A.

71, 75. EEOC subsequently issued an administrative subpoena

for additional documents. Venetian petitioned to revoke or

modify the subpoena, citing confidentiality concerns. When

EEOC denied the petition, Venetian brought this action seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. 

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Venetian’s principal contention is that EEOC follows a

policy that authorizes the agency to disclose trade secrets and/or

confidential information to “charging parties” in actions before

EEOC without first notifying the party who submitted the

information, and that this policy is inconsistent with the Trade

Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000), the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 701-706 (2000), and

the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552

(2000). 

According to Venetian, this disclosure policy constitutes an

end run around the Commission’s regulations implementing

FOIA that provide that “confidential commercial information”

“provided to the Commission shall not be disclosed except in

accordance with [the] section” that requires “explicit notice of

a FOIA request for confidential commercial records” under

certain circumstances and, where such notice is provided,

opportunity for the party that submitted the documents to object

to their disclosure. 29 C.F.R. § 1610.19(a)-(b), (d) (2003). The

exemptions from the Commission’s FOIA regulations indicate

that “[s]pecial disclosure rules apply to the case files for

charging parties, aggrieved persons on whose behalf a charge

has been filed, and entities against whom charges have been

filed.” 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17(d) (2003). 

Both Venetian and EEOC agree that the special disclosure

rules for information in “open” case files are contained in EEOC

Compliance Manual Section 83, though their arguments before

the trial court were framed around an outdated version of the

Manual. Venetian’s argument turned in part on provisions in the

former Manual that expressly provided that an ADEA charging

party and his or her attorney could review the charging party’s

file so long as certain information, which did not include

confidential commercial information as defined under the FOIA

regulations, was removed from the file. See EEOC Compl. Man.

§ 83.1(a) (BNA1993), EEOCCompl. Man. § 83.6 (BNA 1988),

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reprinted in J.A. 104-07. EEOC failed to recognize and,

consequently, to alert the District Court that the Manual on

which Venetian relied was outdated. As a result, both parties

and the District Court focused on a disclosure rule that no longer

exists. 

The relevant provision in the current Manual does not

contain the explicit language authorizing disclosure to charging

parties and their attorneys. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 83.1(a)(1)

(BNA 2001). Neither party has presented a coherent

explanation of the current disclosure regime and, specifically,

the revised Section 83.1(a), but the provision appears to limit

disclosure of information contained in ADEA open files to

disclosures that are authorized in the Commission’s FOIA

regulations and the Privacy Act System of Records for ADEA

case files. See id. § 83.1(a). The Privacy Act System of

Records that relates to ADEA case files, permits, as one of six

“routine uses,” disclosure of “pertinent information to a . . . third

party as may be appropriate or necessary to perform the

Commission’s functions under the [ADEA].” EEOC Privacy

Act of 1974, Publication of Systems of Records, 56 Fed. Reg.

10,889, 10,889-90 (Mar. 14, 1991) (EEOC-1Age and EqualPay

Act Discrimination Case Files, routine use (a)). Such routine

use is distinct from the routine use of “closed” ADEA case files,

or files for which “the Commission has terminated its

investigation and has decided not to sue,” where the permissible

disclosure to employers, employees, or their representatives is

limited to “non-confidential and non-privileged information.”

Id. (EEOC-1 Age and Equal Pay Act Discrimination Case Files,

routine use (c)).

Counsel for EEOC unequivocally conceded before the

District Court that, under the Commission’s current disclosure

regime, special rules that do not require notice would apply to

Venetian’s documents with respect to their disclosure in

furtherance of the pending age discrimination investigation:

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THE COURT: [O]bviously opposing counsel has grave

concerns that the agency’s staff at this point in time could

reveal certain documents they have already produced . . . .

They could reveal them under existing regulations of the

agency in furtherance of the investigation . . . under which

they would be shown to third parties, whether they be

prospective counsel, to represent claimants, or prospective

witnesses . . . . 

. . . [D]o you read the regulations as they currently exist

permitting agency staff in furtherance of the investigation

to share with these types of individuals or entities

documents that have been produced by a party such as the

Venetian, even though they have been marked confidential

and designated as confidential, if it is in furtherance of the

investigation? Do you agree that that is permissible by

agency staff?

[EEOC COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor, I do, and we noted

that in one of our briefs. During our investigations, as part

of the investigative technique, investigators may share

limited information with parties, with a charging party or

the respondent, or with witnesses, to elicit more

information. . . .

I do want to argue, though, that it would seriously

interfere with our law enforcement responsibilities of

investigating and making findings if we had to stop and

give respondent-employers notice every time we decided to

provide a small amount of information.

Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (July 2, 2002) at 69-71, reprinted in J.A. 129,

133-35 (emphasis added).

On appeal, however, counsel for EEOC suggested that,

where the releasing party has indicated that the documents are

trade secrets and/or otherwise confidential, such information

would not be released in the course of an investigation or in any

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other context, without prior disclosure to the party that

submitted the material. See Recording of Oral Argument at

23:38-25:19, 26:29-:49. When pressed on the issue, however,

counsel expressed uncertainty regarding whether EEOC has any

policy on the disclosure of trade secrets and/or confidential

information in the course of an investigation and, if so, the

precise contours of that policy. See id. at 27:54-30:04.

Venetian maintains that the Commission in fact continues

its practice of disclosing confidential information to parties

incident to an ongoing investigation, without notice to the

submitting party. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 67, J.A. 33-34 (“One

of the [FOIA] exemptions from disclosure is ‘trade secrets and

commercial and confidential information.’ . . . EEOC makes this

category of information available to charging parties and their

attorneys, without any reference to the protections accorded by

the FOIA.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)); Rosenberg Decl. ¶ 8,

J.A. 77 (“EEOC’s own policies on the rights of persons who

submit information to EEOC is to ignore FOIA and the

Administrative Procedure Act when the document requester is

either the charging party, their attorneys, or their prospective

attorneys.”). Venetian seeks a declaratory judgment that the

alleged policy is contrary to law and an order enjoining EEOC

from releasing any confidential information submitted by

Venetian. See id. at 19 (“Sixth Cause of Action”), J.A. 24.

Venetian also seeks an injunction restraining EEOC from

requiring it to submit confidential information pursuant to the

administrative subpoena, until the Commission establishes a

lawful disclosure regime, and restricting the scope and content

of the subpoena in other ways. See id. at 35-43, J.A. 40-48.

Venetian is particularly concerned that “EEOC’s refusal to

maintain as confidential any data provided [by it] . . . will enable

labor organizations and competitors to obtain data and

information to which they have no right, and which they have

not otherwise been able to obtain, so that they can use such

information, to the detriment of [Venetian] and its employees,

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for purposes totally unrelated to EEOC’s enforcement of . . . the

ADEA.” Am. Compl. ¶ 6, J.A. 8-9. 

EEOC moved to dismiss Venetian’s Amended Complaint,

arguing, inter alia, that the case was not ripe for review.

Venetian opposed the motion and appended to its opposition a

declaration by Richard Rosenberg, one of its attorneys.

Rosenberg attested that Venetian has already submitted to

EEOC a position statement regarding the pending age

discrimination charges that “included confidential and

proprietary documents, and described internal processes of the

Venetian that are confidential and proprietary.” Rosenberg

Decl. ¶ 5, J.A. 75. EEOC filed responses, but refrained from

disputing any of Venetian’s allegations through declarations of

its own; its avowed strategy was to avoid turning the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Def.’s Reply

to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss at 2 n.1, reprinted in

J.A. 111, 112 (“Defendant does not attach a declaration

regarding the status of the charges . . . . Defendant wishes to

avoid any possibility that this [Motion To Dismiss] be converted

into a Motion for Summary Judgment.”).

The District Court granted EEOC’s motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure on ripeness grounds. Because issuance of an

administrative subpoena, which the Commission lacks the power

to enforce, does not constitute final agency action, the court held

that Venetian’s challenges to the scope and content of the

subpoena were not ripe. See Venetian Casino Resort v. EEOC,

Civ. A. No. 00-02980, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2004)

(“Mem. Op.”), reprinted in J.A. 137, 141-42. 

The court also held that Venetian’s claim “that information

already in possession of the EEOC will [unlawfully] be

released” was not ripe for review, because “[m]ere speculation

that the EEOC will disclose some of the limited information that

[Venetian] has already submitted is not enough to confer

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ripeness.” Id. at 6-7, J.A. 142-43. The court concluded that

“plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the EEOC’s subpoena

suggests that the withheld information is the confidential

information that, if disclosed, could be harmful to the plaintiff”

and that plaintiff’s challenge would not ripen until “either when

the plaintiff can allege a specific incident of improper disclosure

of confidential information already submitted . . . [or] when the

EEOC attempts to enforce the subpoena in district court.” Id. at

8, J.A. 144. 

II. ANALYSIS

In ascertaining whether a suit is ripe, courts must balance

the plaintiff’s interest in prompt consideration of allegedly

unlawful agency action against the agency’s interest in

crystallizing its policy before that policy is subjected to judicial

review and the court’s interests in avoiding unnecessary

adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting. See

Eagle-PicherIndus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir.1985).

The framework for assessing ripeness was established in Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), in which the

Supreme Court provided a two-pronged test that requires a

reviewing court to evaluate “both the fitness of the issues for

judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding

court consideration.” Id. at 149. Under the “fitness of the

issues” prong, the first question for a reviewing court is

“whether the disputed claims raise purely legal questions and

would, therefore, be presumptively suitable for judicial review.”

Better Gov’t Ass’n v. Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92 (D.C. Cir.

1986); see also Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d

486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Next, we consider whether the court

or the agency would benefit from postponing review until the

policy in question has sufficiently “crystallized” by taking on a

more definite form. See City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. &

Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The

“hardship” prong of the Abbott Laboratories test is not an

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independent requirement divorced from the consideration of the

institutional interests of the court and agency. See Payne, 837

F.2d at 493. 

In determining whether the District Court properly granted

EEOC’s motion to dismiss on ripeness grounds, we “construe

the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Barr v.

Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In this case, Venetian has alleged that

EEOC follows a disclosure policy that authorizes the agency to

release information that has been provided to the Commission

by Venetian, which has been designated as confidential and

proprietary by Venetian, to persons such as charging parties or

third persons incident to the ongoing age discrimination

investigation, without notice to Venetian. On the facts alleged,

the question whether the purported disclosure policy is lawful is

plainly ripe for review. 

The case is fit for review because it presents a clear-cut

legal question, i.e., whether the Commission’s disclosure policy

is inconsistent with the Trade Secrets Act, FOIA, or the APA.

Resolution of this question turns on an analysis of the pertinent

statutes and their construction by relevant case law. See Better

Gov’t Ass’n, 780 F.2d at 92. There is nothing to be gained by

deferring such considerations. The agency’s applicable Manual

and the Privacy Act System of Records that it incorporates are

in their final form and they were last revised years ago. See id.

at 93.

EEOC contends, however, that the case in not fit for review

because the agency’s position has yet to “‘crystallize[ ]’ through

implementation in a concrete factual setting.” Nuclear Energy

Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

According to EEOC, it is “incumbent on the Venetian to show

how the agency has used or imminently will use the policy and

so illuminate the consequences of the alleged dispute and

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‘crystallize’ the legal issues.” Appellee’s Br. 24. The argument

is without merit. Venetian has illuminated the consequences of

the dispute by alleging that long-standing agency policy

authorizes EEOC to disclose documents that Venetian has

designated as confidential and proprietary to charging parties

and their representatives absent prior notice to Venetian. And

trial counsel for EEOC confirmed the agency’s position in the

concrete factual setting of this case. Before the District Court,

EEOC counsel acknowledged that the agency may, incident to

an investigation, disclose documents designated as confidential

without providing notice to the party that submitted those

documents. See Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (July 2, 2002) at 69-71, J.A.

133-35. The only factual development left is disclosure of

Venetian’s confidential materials without notice to Venetian,

which, of course, is precisely what Venetian is seeking to avoid.

This case is distinct from Nuclear Energy Institute, relied

upon by EEOC. In Nuclear Energy Institute, appellant

challenged an existing Final Environmental Impact Statement

(“FEIS”) which had been used to support recommendations of

a particular nuclear waste repository insofar as that same FEIS

might be adopted in the future to support a different agency

action, such as the selection of an alternative for transporting

waste to the site. Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1312-13.

Because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicated that it

might supplement the FEIS or require such supplementation

prior to its use in other contexts, we concluded that “the relevant

agency positions have not yet ‘crystallized.’” Id. at 1313. Here,

in contrast, EEOC has said nothing to suggest that a procedural

or substantive evolution of its disclosure policy is pending or

expected. See Better Gov’t Ass’n, 780 F.2d at 93 (finding

interpretation of administrative guidelines fit for review where

agencies had said nothing to suggest that “further procedural or

substantive evolution is expected”).

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Our recent decision in Electric Power Supply Ass’n v.

FERC, 391 F.3d 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2004), is precisely on point. In

Electric Power, a trade association representing participants in

the power industry claimed that Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission orders permitting certain ex parte communications

violated the Sunshine Act. Id. at 1257. We found the case ripe

for review, because it presented a “straightforward legal

question” – whether the agency rule was unlawful. Id. at 1262-

63. Whether such ex parte communications had already taken

place was immaterial to our analysis.

 The hardship prong of the ripeness doctrine “is largely

irrelevant in cases, such as this one, in which neither the agency

nor the court have a significant interest in postponing review.”

Elec. Power, 391 F.3d at 1263. Regardless, it is clear that

disclosure, without notice, of documents that Venetian has

designated confidential and proprietary constitutes “a hardship

sufficient to outweigh any possible institutional interest in

deferring review.” Id. The disclosure policy bears directly on

whether Venetian will be notified prior to the release of

materials that it considers confidential and proprietary and,

consequently, whether Venetian will know to object to any such

impending disclosure before the agency acts to release

privileged material. In other words, Venetian alleges that the

disclosure policy denies purported statutory entitlements, i.e.,

notice and the opportunity to object prior to disclosure of its

trade secrets and/or confidential information. See Better Gov’t

Ass’n, 780 F.2d at 94-95. 

Moreover, as Electric Power underscored, given that the

alleged disclosure policy deprives Venetian of notice that a

privileged document may be disclosed, it makes no sense to

defer judicial review until after EEOC has disclosed a document

containing a trade secret or other confidential information. “The

mere statement of the suggestion exposes its absurdity.” Elec.

Power, 391 F.3d at 1264.

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EEOC disputes Venetian’s demonstrated hardship by

reading the operative complaint to plead that the Commission

has not yet obtained any sensitive documents from Venetian.

EEOC submits that allegations contained in the Rosenberg

declaration “change the factual underpinnings of the case” and

cannot be considered. See Appellee’s Br. 27-28. We disagree.

Although the amended complaint largely addresses

confidentiality concerns pertaining to the information that

EEOC currently seeks, it also appears to embrace the contention

that Venetian has provided the Commission with confidential

and proprietary information that pertains to EEOC’s

investigation of the age discrimination charges. See Am.

Compl. at 19, J.A. 24 (seeking “[o]rder enjoining the EEOC

from releasing any confidential information submitted by the

Venetian”); id. at 35, J.A. 40 (seeking order enjoining EEOC

from releasing “any of the documents and information furnished

by the Venetian” absent a FOIA request). In any event, the

undisputed Rosenberg declaration fortifies this reading. See

Rosenberg Decl. ¶ 5, J.A. 75 (“The position statements

[submitted to EEOC] included confidential and proprietary

documents, and described internal processes of the Venetian that

are confidential and proprietary.”). And given the present

posture of this case – a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) on

ripeness grounds – the court may consider materials outside the

pleadings. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117

F.3d 621, 624 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Alternatively, EEOC insists that, even in light of the

Rosenberg declaration, “the District Court was correct to

disbelieve the Venetian’s assertions and conclude instead . . .

that [Venetian], in fact, refused to turn over the sensitive

materials and so still retains them.” Appellee’s Br. 28. There is

no good reason to view Venetian’s undisputed assertions that it

has provided the Commission with confidential and proprietary

information as fanciful. Therefore, these factual allegations

cannot be simply “disbelieved” by the District Court. See

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Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Chao, 300 F.3d 867, 871 (D.C. Cir.

2002); Barr, 370 F.3d at 1199.

Nor does standing present an independent jurisdictional

barrier. As EEOC itself recognizes, we need not analyze

standing separately because “it is clear that [any challenge to

Venetian’s standing] is not an independent issue from ripeness.”

Appellee’s Br. 33. Venetian has standing, because it has

demonstrated that there is a substantial probability that the

alleged disclosure policy will harm its concrete and

particularized interest in retaining the confidentiality of

protected information. See Elec. Power, 391 F.3d at 1261-62;

Better Gov’t Ass’n, 780 F.2d at 96 n.53.

In short, the question whether EEOC’s disclosure policy is

lawful presents a live and focused dispute emanating from

agency action that is both final and consequential to Venetian.

The question is clearly ripe for review. Because we conclude

that the question is ripe with respect to documents already in

EEOC’s hands, we need not consider whether it would be ripe

with respect to information that EEOC seeks but has not yet

obtained from Venetian. Finally, the District Court was clearly

correct to dismiss Venetian’s remaining claims challenging the

scope or content of the administrative subpoena. See FTC v.

Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (“The agency, in issuing a subpoena, has undertaken no

final administrative action; a subpoena becomes an appealable

final order only after the subpoenaed party refuses to comply

and the agency requests and receives judicial enforcement.”).

* * * * *

As, noted above, the record of this case is deficient, in part

because the argument before the District Court was based on an

outdated version of the agency’s Manual and in part because the

Commission’s litigation position has been inconsistent. Before

the District Court, counsel for the Commission unequivocally

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acknowledged that EEOC investigators could – as they saw fit

– disclose documents designated as confidential to a third party

in the course of an ADEA investigation, without notice to the

party that submitted that information. See Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (July

2, 2002) at 69-71, J.A. 133-35. This is precisely the practice

that Venetian contests. At the appellate argument, however,

counsel for EEOC appeared to suggest the contrary, i.e., that,

where the releasing party has indicated that documents are

confidential and proprietary, such information would not be

released in the course of an investigation, or in any other

context, absent prior notice to the party that submitted the

materials. See Recording of Oral Argument at 23:38-25:19,

26:29-:49. The problem, of course, is that when EEOC’s

counsel was pressed on the issue, he expressed uncertainty as to

his client’s position. See id. at 27:54-30:04. It also remains

unclear what the disputed provision in the revised Manual

means. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 83.1(a)(1) (BNA 2001). That

the Commission has failed to advance a consistent litigation

position obviously cannot render a longstanding rule, policy, or

practice by which it determines whether to disclose confidential

documents in its possession unfit for review. On remand, the

District Court’s first task will be to ascertain the contours of the

precise policy at issue. If Venetian’s allegations turn out to be

correct, the District Court must determine in the first instance

whether the policy is contrary to law.

III. CONCLUSION

We hereby remand the case to the District Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.

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