Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00875/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00875-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN DARIO GARCIA,

CDCR #J-73373,

Civil No. 14cv0875 LAB (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF

LEAVE TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[Doc. Nos. 2, 3] 

AND

(2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

TO EFFECT SERVICE OF

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

R. BLAHNIK; E. ESTES; R. OLSON; J.

RAMIREZ; K.A. SEIBEL; J. CARIMAN;

E. BENYARD; S. RUTLEDGE; 

A.D. FLORES, Sr.; C. HERNANDEZ; 

E. MENDOZA; W. CANADA; and

JHON/JANE DOES 1-5,

Defendants.

Ruben Dario Garcia (“Plaintiff”), who is currently incarcerated at Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se,

has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc No. 1). 

Plaintiff claims Defendants, all RJD correctional officials, conspired against him

on multiple occasions between April 2012 and August 2013, by charging him with

disciplinary violations, failing to process his inmate grievances, and suspending his

privileges on the Men’s AdvisoryCounsel, in order to retaliate against himfor exercising

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his First Amendment right to petition for redress. See Compl. at 5-18, 19-21. Plaintiff

seeks injunctive relief as well as general and punitive damages. Id. at 25.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee; instead he has filed a Prison Certificate

of Funds and certified copies of his trust account statements, which the Court construes

as a request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc.

Nos. 2, 3). 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a

prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution

having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after 1

May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

(Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1,

2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds

$10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff has submitted a certified copies of his trust account statement pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The

Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement, as well as the prison certificate

issued by a senior accounting officer at RJD verifying his available balances, and has

determined that while he has had an average monthly balance of $26.67 and average

monthly deposits of $16.67 in his account during the 6-month period preceding the filing

of this action, Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay an initial partial filing

fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the

initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP (Doc. Nos. 2, 3) and

assesses no initial partialfiling fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the CDCR and forwarded to the

Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also requires that the Court review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss

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complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim,

or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallelsthe language of FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, courts

“have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to

construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773

F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however, “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation

claims are sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2

2005) (“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4)

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”).

/ / / 

Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is 2

cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a

defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D.

Cal. 2007). 

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Accordingly, the Court will direct U.S. Marshal service on Plaintiff’s behalf. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and

perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that

service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is

authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [Doc. Nos. 2, 3].

2. The Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s

prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments

from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s

income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED

TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint

(Doc. No. 1) upon Defendants and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal

Form 285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk is directed provide Plaintiff with

a certified copy of this Order and a certified copy of his Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and the

summons so that he may serve each named Defendant. Upon receipt of this “IFP 3

Plaintiff must, of course, identify the persons he currently lists only as 3

“Jhon/Jane Does 1-5,” whom he currently identifies only as “correctional officers” at

RJD, by their true names and substitute those individual persons by amending his

Complaint to identify each of these parties before the United States Marshal will be able

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Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and accurately

as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the instructions

provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt, the

U.S. Marshal is ORDERED to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon each

Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service will be

advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

5. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint

within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted

to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted

its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus,

has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that

Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant isrequired

to respond).

6. Plaintiff must serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered

by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff must include with the

original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in

which a true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants, or counsel for

to execute service upon any of them. See Compl. at 4; Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park,

160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and served within 120

days of the commencement of the action against them); FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C) &

4(m). Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642

(9th Cir. 1980). And when the plaintiff proceeds IFP, it is in most instances impossible

for the United States Marshal to serve a summons and complaint upon a party identified

only as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to

properly effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish

the information necessary to identify the defendant.”). However, the Court will not

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe Defendants at this time because where the

identity of an alleged party is not known prior to filing of an action, Ninth Circuit

authority permits plaintiffthe opportunity to pursue appropriate discovery to identify the

unknown Does, unlessit is clear that discovery would not uncover their identities, or that

his Complaint should be dismissed for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177

F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).

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Defendants, and the date ofsuch service. Any paper received by the Court which has not

been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be

disregarded.

DATED: August 29, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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