Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01129/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01129-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE FELIX ORTIZ LEON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MERCED, a municipal 

corporation, MERCED POLICE 

DEPARTMENT OFFICER BRYAN 

SAELEE, Individually, MERCED 

POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF NORM 

ANDRADE, in his Official 

Capacity, and DOES 1 through 

50, jointly and severally,

Defendants.

No. 1:14-CV-01129-GEB-SAB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants City of Merced (“the City”), Merced Police 

Department (“MPD”) Chief Norm Andrade, and MPD Officer Bryan 

Saelee move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 

12(b)(6) for dismissal of Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). 

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that as a result of each 

Defendant‟s “tortious and constitutionally violative conduct, 

[he] was misidentified” and consequently mistakenly arrested and 

detained. (FAC ¶ 1, ECF No. 14.)

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I. Legal Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v. 

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007)). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all 

well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th 

Cir. 2012). However, “we do not accept legal conclusions in the 

complaint as true, even if cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071 

(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Statement of Facts

The following allegations in the FAC concern the 

motion. “MPD maintains a database of suspects,” which can only 

store one address for each person. (FAC ¶ 17.) The information in 

the MPD database is “forwarded to [various agencies], who . . . 

use such information to either arrest individuals . . . or to 

summon such individuals to court.” (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Officer Saelee “wrote . . . Plaintiff‟s address on a 

document he filed with the MPD in relation to a 2012 case 

involving the real suspect, Jose Ortiz,” and Saelee “caused the 

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address in the MPD database to be changed to falsely reflect 

Plaintiff‟s address.” (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) When Saelee did so, he 

“set[] into motion a chain of events that he knew or should have 

known would foreseeably lead to the address for the real suspect 

being changed and overwritten” in the MPD database to Plaintiff‟s 

address. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff was “arrested [on or about June 

18, 2013,] and thereafter falsely imprisoned in the Merced County 

Jail as a result of being wrongfully . . . identified as . . .

the real suspect.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff was arrested even though 

the real suspect “is a different height [and]. . . weight” than 

Plaintiff, has a different date of birth, and the Defendants 

“ha[d] access to an abundance of relevant, identifying 

information concerning the real suspect. . . including . . . 

finger prints, booking photos, prior reports, and addresses.” 

(Id. ¶ 1.)

On July 1, 2013, the Merced County Superior Court found 

Plaintiff “factually innocent” because “he unequivocally was not 

the suspect in the pending criminal matters.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

“Defendants Andrade and the City of Merced failed to 

institute reasonable quality control procedures . . . for 

requiring verification and corroboration [of information entered 

into the MPD database], to reduce the risk of innocent persons 

with the same or similar names having their address falsely 

entered into MPD‟s database as that of a suspect.” (Id. ¶ 17.) As 

a result, “a number of other individuals in the last several 

years. . . have been falsely arrested.” (Id. ¶ 28.)

///

///

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III. Discussion

A. Claims Against Saelee Concerning Plaintiff’s Arrest And

Detention

Saelee seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendment federal claims and Plaintiff‟s false arrest 

and false imprisonment state claims, all of which hinge on the 

allegation that Saelee is liable for Plaintiff‟s arrest and

subsequent detention in the Merced County Jail. 

Plaintiff alleges Saelee “knew or should have known 

that other law enforcement agencies would take action to arrest 

and confine” him based on Saelee‟s conduct since Saelee caused

Plaintiff‟s address to be associated with a criminal suspect and

knew government agencies used the MPD database to make arrests. 

(Pl.‟s Opp‟n Defs.‟ Mot. Dismiss FAC (“Opp‟n”) 29:7-9, ECF No. 

23.) However, Plaintiff alleges that the officers who arrested 

him lacked probable cause to arrest him since he and the real 

suspect do not share other identifying information such as date 

of birth, height, or weight. (FAC ¶ 30.)

Since Plaintiff alleges that the arresting officers 

lacked probable cause to arrest him, Plaintiff allegations fail 

to plausibly show that Saelee‟s entry of Plaintiff‟s address into 

the MPD database caused Plaintiff‟s arrest. Therefore, 

Plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, false arrest,

and false imprisonment claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

1. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Saelee argues Plaintiff‟s Fourteenth Amendment claims 

should be dismissed without leave to amend since Plaintiff‟s 

federal claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment. 

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Specifically, Saelee argues “the Fourth Amendment applies to ... 

pre-arraignment seizure[s]”. (Mot. 3:28-4:1, ECF No. 16.) 

However, “[p]recedent demonstrates . . . that postarrest incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment 

alone.” Rivera v. County of Los Angeles,745 F.3d 384, 389-

90(9th Cir.2014).

Saelee has not shown that the dismissal motion should 

be granted without leave to amend. Therefore, the motion is 

denied. 

B. Monell Claim

The City and Andrade seek dismissal of Plaintiff‟s 

Monell claim, arguing “to the extent Plaintiff fails to 

sufficiently allege. . . an underlying constitutional violation 

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Monell claim also 

fails.” (Mot. 6:21-23.)

Plaintiff argues his Complaint sufficiently alleges a 

Monell claim against the City and Andreade since he alleges they 

“failed to institute reasonable quality control procedures within 

the MPD for requiring verification and corroboration [of 

information in the database], to reduce the risk of innocent 

persons . . . having their address falsely entered into MPD‟s 

database” notwithstanding the “numerous procedures and 

information systems [that] are available. . . to address [this] 

risk,” and this failure amounts to deliberate indifference. 

(Opp‟n 21:19-26.)

To allege a claim under the municipal liability 

doctrine promulgated by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department 

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “a plaintiff must prove 

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“(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which 

he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that 

this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's 

constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of 

Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir.2011). 

Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly evincing that 

the MPD database policies were the “moving force” behind his 

alleged constitutional injury; and he alleges that the arresting 

officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. (FAC ¶ 30.)

Therefore, Plaintiff‟s Monell claim is dismissed.

C. California Constitution

Saelee argues Plaintiff‟s claim alleged under Article 

I, Section 13 of the California Constitution should be dismissed 

since it “fail[s] as a matter of law” because “California courts 

do not recognize []a claim[] for damages for violation” of this 

provision. (Mot. 8:22, 8:24-25.)

Plaintiff counters that “[a] damages claim under 

Article I, § 13 is cognizable because the California Supreme 

Court in Katzberg [v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.]. . . implicitly 

endorsed a damages action for the violation of the prohibition 

against unlawful searches and seizures” in Article I, Section 13 

of the California Constitution. (Opp‟n 26:4-6.)

Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution 

protects a person‟s “right. . . to be secure in their persons, 

papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches.” 

In Katzberg, the California Supreme Court stated “it is 

appropriate to employ the following framework for determining the 

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existence of a damages action to remedy an asserted 

constitutional violation”:

First, we shall inquire whether there is 

evidence from which we may find or infer, 

within the constitutional provision at issue, 

an affirmative intent either to authorize or 

to withhold a damages action to remedy a 

violation. . . . If we find any such intent, 

we shall give it effect. Second, if no 

affirmative intent either to authorize or to 

withhold a damages remedy is found, we shall 

undertake the „constitutional tort‟ analysis 

adopted by Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)] and its progeny. 

Among the relevant factors in this analysis 

are whether an adequate remedy exists, the 

extent to which a constitutional tort action 

would change established tort law, and the 

nature and significance of the constitutional 

provision. If we find that these factors 

militate against recognizing the 

constitutional tort, our inquiry ends. If, 

however, we find that these factors favor 

recognizing a constitutional tort, we also 

shall consider the existence of any special 

factors counseling hesitation in recognizing 

a damages action, including deference to 

legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse 

policy consequences, considerations of 

government fiscal policy, practical issues of 

proof, and the competence of courts to assess 

particular types of damages.

Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal.4th 300, 317 (2002).

The Katzberg factors do not favor Plaintiff‟s monetary 

damages claim alleged under Article I, Section 13 of the 

California Constitution since “[n]either the plain language of 

the [A]rticle I, [S]ection 13, nor the available legislative 

history indicate[s] an intent on behalf of the California 

Legislature to permit the recovery of monetary damages for its 

violation.” Manning v. City of Rohnert Park, No. C 06-03435 SBA, 

2007 WL 1140434, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007). Nor has

Plaintiff shown that he lacks an adequate remedy under 

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California‟s false arrest and false imprisonment law to seek 

damages for his alleged injury. See Brown v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 

1:06-cv-00121-OWW-TAG, 2008 WL 544565, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 

2008)(considering legislative history and Plaintiff‟s other tort 

claims when deciding Plaintiff could not bring a damages claim 

under the same constitutional section). 

Therefore, Saelee‟s motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s

general and compensatory damages claim alleged under Article I, 

Section 13 of the California Constitution without leave to amend 

is granted. 

D. Negligence

1. No Duty

Saelee seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s negligence claim

against him arguing solely that Plaintiff does not “identify any 

enactment or statute that impose[d] some legal duty on . . . 

Saelee.” (Mot. 10:2-3.) However, Saelee has not demonstrated that 

this argument is a basis for dismissal. 

Therefore, the motion is denied.

2. Immunity

The City seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s negligence 

claim that is alleged against it under California Government Code 

section 815.2, arguing that California law immunizes it from this

claim.

Plaintiff contends California law authorizes this claim

since he alleges that his injury resulted from a City employee‟s 

conduct while the employee was acting within the scope of his 

employment.

The City responds that holding it liable for its 

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employee‟s conduct “would be redundant to any claim asserted 

against an individual employee,” and since Plaintiff‟s negligence 

claim is also alleged against Saelee, “any separate claim for 

relief against the City. . . based on ... [Saelee‟s alleged 

conduct] would be . . . superfluous.” (Opp‟n 15-17.)

“California Government Code section 815.2, subdivision 

(a) makes a public entity vicariously liable for its employee's 

negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment.” 

Eastburn v. Reg‟l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1180 

(2003). “As long as [a plaintiff] is permitted to allege that the 

[City] employees were negligent, he must also be permitted to 

allege that the [City] is derivatively liable pursuant to 

California Government Code § 815.2(a).” AE ex rel. v. Cnty. of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Therefore, the City‟s motion is denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the stated reasons, each Defendant‟s dismissal 

motion is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. Plaintiff is 

granted ten (10) days from the date on which this order is filed 

to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in 

any claim dismissed with leave to amend. 

Dated: January 8, 2015

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