Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00140/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00140-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HAYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-CV-140 JLS (MDD)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION AND (2) 

REMANDING CASE

(ECF Nos. 11, 12, 15)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Michael Hayes’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (“Pl.’s MSJ,” ECF No. 11), Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Opposition to Plaintiff’s MSJ (“Def.’s Cross-MSJ & Opp’n,” ECF No. 12), and 

Plaintiff’s Reply Brief and Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-MSJ (“Pl.’s Reply,” ECF No. 

14). On December 19, 2016, Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin issued his Report and 

Recommendation on both parties’ MSJs. (“R&R,” ECF No. 15.) Defendant filed timely 

objections to Judge Dembin’s R&R on January 3, 2017. (“R&R Obj.,” ECF No. 16.) 

Plaintiff filed a timely response in opposition to Defendant’s objections on January 10, 

2017. (“R&R Obj. Opp’n,” ECF No. 17.) After considering the parties’ arguments and the 

law, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections and ADOPTS Judge Dembin’s 

R&R in its entirety.

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BACKGROUND

The R&R adequately details the administrative record in this case. (See R&R 2–13, 

ECF No. 15; see also ECF No. 9 (Administrative Record).) The Court will not repeat it 

here, but notes relevant facts were necessary in assessing Defendant’s objections. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Objections to a Report and Recommendation 

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition” of a 

magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the [report and 

recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, 

“[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s 

findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in 

original); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). “Neither the 

Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and 

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 

1121.

II. Judicial Review of Agency Action

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision 

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must affirm 

the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and 

applies the correct legal standards. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,

1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is a term of art that means “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999)). Put another way, it is “more than a 

scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 

2002) (quoting Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). If the evidence 

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is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the agency’s decision must be 

upheld. Id.; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

DISCUSSION

Defendant solely objects to Judge Dembin’s recommendation that the Court remand 

the case for further proceedings because the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not 

adequately address Plaintiff’s claim of right knee disability.1(See generally R&R Obj., 

ECF No. 16.) Judge Dembin concluded that the ALJ’s finding on Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) based on Plaintiff’s alleged right knee disability is not 

supported by substantial evidence. (R&R 19, ECF No. 15.) Specifically, Judge Dembin 

found that “[n]o physician has opined and no medical evidence is present in the record that 

supports the ALJ’s RFC finding of what Plaintiff can do physically.” (Id.) To be sure, the 

medical records contain several diagnoses regarding Plaintiff’s right knee. (See id. at 13–

20.) But Judge Dembin found that “notably absent in these records is any evidence about 

how Plaintiff’s right knee impairment affects Plaintiff’s current ability to function.” (Id. at 

17 (emphasis added).) Thus, Judge Dembin concluded that “the ALJ’s RFC assessment 

regarding Plaintiff’s knee impairment was not based on substantial evidence because the 

ALJ failed to develop the record about how Plaintiff’s knee impairment affects his ability 

to function.” (Id.)

Defendant argues that Judge Dembin erred because the RFC assessment is not a 

medical issue and thus no doctor’s opinion or testimony is conclusive on the issue; rather, 

the RFC assessment is based on the evidence as a whole. (R&R Obj. 2, ECF No. 16.) Thus, 

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s RFC after reviewing all the 

evidence in the record. (Id. at 3.)

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendant that no doctor’s opinion or 

testimony is conclusive on the issue, since where “the record contains conflicting medical 

 

1 Defendant “does not object to the portion of the R&R affirming the ALJ’s credibility assessment . . . .” 

(R&R Obj. 2 n.1, ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff likewise does not object to this portion of the R&R. (See generally

R&R Obj. Opp’n, ECF No. 17.) 

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evidence, the ALJ is charged with determining credibility and resolving conflict.” Benton 

v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). The problem in this case, as Judge Dembin 

notes, is that there is no medical evidence at all regarding the effect of Plaintiff’s right knee 

issues on his residual functional capacity. The ALJ solely relied on general diagnoses of 

Plaintiff’s right knee condition in assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (See 

R&R 15–17 (collecting evidence relied upon by the ALJ, including diagnoses such as 

osteoarthritis of the right knee, a torn meniscus, and post-surgical pain from a previously 

inserted surgical screw).) This is insufficient. As Judge Dembin correctly noted, “the ALJ’s 

RFC determination or finding must be supported by medical evidence, particularly the 

opinion of a treating or an examining physician.” Banks v. Barnhart, 434 F. Supp. 2d 800, 

805 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also de Lopez v. Astrue, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 

2009) (“When ‘the administrative record does not contain any opinion by a treating or 

examining physician regarding plaintiff’s RFC,’ the ALJ has a duty to obtain ‘such an 

opinion. Thus, the ALJ also did not fully and fairly develop the record in this regard.’ Here, 

the ALJ also failed to develop the record, and this is an additional reason to remand this 

matter, as discussed below.” (internal citation omitted)); Mendoza v. Barnhart, 436 F. 

Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“Moreover, the administrative record does not 

contain any opinion by a treating or examining physician regarding plaintiff’s RFC, and 

the ALJ failed to get such an opinion. Thus, the ALJ also did not fully and fairly develop 

the record in this regard.”). And Defendant fails to provide a single case upholding an 

ALJ’s RFC on substantial evidence grounds where the RFC was similarly devoid of any 

support from a medical opinion or other medical evidence specifically regarding a 

claimant’s physical ability to function in the workplace.

2 Without more, the Court declines 

 

2 Defendant also argues that “the residual functional capacity is not a medical issue.” (R&R Obj. 2, ECF 

No. 16 (citing statutory and regulatory authority).) But, again, Defendant does not explain how these 

authorities—or any others—demonstrate that an ALJ’s RFC assessment can be based on substantial 

evidence without a medical opinion or other medical evidence regarding a claimant’s ability to function 

in the workplace.

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to overrule Judge Dembin’s conclusion that “the ALJ incorrectly determined the record 

was sufficiently complete to allow him to reach a conclusion on this issue.” (R&R 19, ECF 

No. 15 (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).)

Finally, Defendant argues that Judge Dembin improperly relied on out-of-circuit 

cases stating that ALJs may not draw inferences in assessing the evidence, which, 

according to Defendant, is contrary to Ninth Circuit authority stating that ALJs are entitled 

to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence. (R&R Obj. 3, ECF No. 16 (citing 

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 632 (9th Cir. 1982).) The Court disagrees. Judge 

Dembin did not err by relying on Eighth Circuit cases as persuasive authority, especially 

because those cases speak directly to the issue at hand. (See, e.g., R&R 17, ECF No. 15 

(citing Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Because a claimant’s RFC is a 

medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence 

of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis added))).) Defendant is right that in the Ninth Circuit an ALJ “is entitled to draw 

inferences logically flowing from the evidence.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 

(9th Cir. 1982) (citing Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1972)). The problem, 

of course, is the predicate issue that here the ALJ was lacking substantial evidence from 

which to properly draw an inference.3 Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s 

objections.

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In addition, Defendant’s reliance on Sample is misplaced, since the Sample Court confronted a situation 

where the “ALJ considered each alleged medical infirmity in light of the expert opinions available.” 694 

F.2d at 642 (emphasis added).

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CONCLUSION

After conducting a de novo review, the Court is satisfied that Judge Dembin’s R&R 

is analytically sound. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections, 

ADOPTS Judge Dembin’s R&R in its entirety (ECF No. 15), and REMANDS the matter 

to the Social Security Administration for further review consistent with this Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2017

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