Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00224/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00224-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Isidoro Sanchez,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-17-00224-TUC-RM (DTF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Michael Isodoro Sanchez (Sanchez or Petitioner), confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition) and later filed an amended petition. (Doc. 1, 41.) Before the Court 

are the amended petition, Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Answer), Petitioner’s reply (Docs. 41, 50, 60.) This matter was referred to United States 

Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 12.) 

As more fully set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the district 

court, after its independent review, dismiss the amended petition.

BACKGROUND

Trial Court Proceedings

In June 2013, a grand jury indicated Petitioner on multiple counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor against two victims, ages 11 and 7. (Doc. 51 at 3-5.) The state alleged all 

offenses were dangerous crimes against children for sentence enhancement purposes and 

alleged victim harm as a sentence-aggravating factor. (Doc. 51 at 6-11.) On March 6, 2014, 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 1 of 28
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual conduct with one minor victim and attempted sexual 

conduct with the other minor victim in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. Id. 

at 13-16, 18-4. During the change-of-plea hearing, the trial judge reviewed the terms of the 

plea agreement and the consequences of pleading guilty with Petitioner. Id. at 38-49. The 

trial court specifically advised Petitioner that he was “to be sentenced to a partially 

aggravated term of 25 years” for count one and that he would be on lifetime probation for 

the attempt charge. Id. at 43. On April 3, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced accordingly. Id. 

at 65-66.

First Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

On May 21, 2014, Petitioner timely filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) as 

set forth in Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and was appointed 

counsel. Id. at 74-76, 78. Counsel subsequently filed a notice stating that after review he 

has been “unable to find any ground for Rule 32 relief,” and requested that Petitioner be 

allowed additional time in which to file a pro se petition. Id. at 80. In his subsequently filed 

pro se petition, Petitioner asserted claims of prosecutorial misconduct, newly discovered 

evidence, unlawful sentence, and ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). (Doc. 52 at 9-

21.) Petitioner also alleged a violation of his double jeopardy right. Id. at 14. On August 

18, 2015, the PCR court denied relief. Id. at 111-13.

On September 18, 2015, Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 53 at 3-65; Doc. 54 at 3-55.) On December 22, 2015, the court of appeals issued its 

memorandum decision granting review but denying relief. (Doc. 54 at 57-60.) The court of 

appeals determined:

Sanchez pled guilty to sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 

fifteen and attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen. 

Consistent with a stipulation in the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced 

him to a twenty-five year prison term on the first count to be followed by 

lifetime probation on the second.

In court-martial proceedings conducted by the United States 

Department of Defense, Sanchez had additionally been charged with and 

pled guilty to numerous sexual offenses involving children. The conduct 

resulting in those admissions occurred on various military bases, including a 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 2 of 28
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

base in Arizona. The plea agreement provided that Sanchez’s sentence for 

sexual conduct with a minor ‘may be consecutive or concurrent to the 

Sentence be will serve pursuant to his General Court-Martial, at the 

discretion of the United States Army Commanding General’ At sentencing, 

the trial court authorized the Cochise County Sheriff ‘to deliver [Sanchez] to 

the custody of the [Arizona] Department of Corrections,’ and authorized that 

department to ‘carry out [Sanchez’s] term of imprisonment.’

(Doc. 54 at 58, ¶¶1-2.) On May 24, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id. at 

62.

Second PCR Proceedings

On December 7, 2015, Petitioner filed a PCR motion requesting DNA testing 

pursuant to Rule 32.12 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 68-72. Petitioner 

was appointed counsel. Id. at 74. Counsel subsequently filed a notice stating that she had 

“reviewed the transcripts and trial file and [could] find no colorable claims” for PCR relief. 

Id. at 76. Petitioner was given additional time to file a pro se PCR petition. Id. at 81.

Petitioner filed a motion asking the PCR court to compel the prosecutor to “provide access 

to DNA, medical, and forensic evidence/reports.” Id. at 84-100. Petitioner’s motion was 

denied. (Doc. 55 at 3.)

On October 20, 2016, Petitioner filed a second pro se PCR petition in which he 

again asserted claims of prosecutorial misconduct, IAC and newly discovered evidence. 

Id. at 5-39. On January 10, 2017, the PCR court determined Petitioner’s claims were 

precluded and summarily dismissed his second PCR petition. It also denied his Rule 32.12 

motion. Id. at 41.

Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing under Rule 32.9(a) of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. Id. at 43-47. The PCR court ordered a response. Id. at 49. After a full 

briefing, the PCR court denied Petitioner’s motion for a rehearing. Id. at 51-52, 54-93, 95.

On April 17, 2017, Petitioner sought review of the PCR court’s denial of his second 

PCR petition, Rule 32.12 motion and motion for rehearing in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 56 at 3-63.) The court of appeals granted review but denied relief. Id. at 65-69. The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id. at 87.

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 3 of 28
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Third PCR Proceedings

On August 10, 2017, Petitioner filed another notice of PCR (his third) wherein he 

asserted claims against both of his previous PCR attorneys. Id. at 92-99. Petitioner was 

appointed an attorney (his third). Petitioner’s counsel subsequently filed a notice stating 

that she had been “unable to find any colorable claims” for Rule 32 relief and requested 

additional time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. Id. at 101, 103-106. The PCR court 

granted counsel’s request and ordered her to remain as advisory counsel. Id. at 108-109.

Petitioner requested new counsel. (Doc. 57 at 3-19.) Petitioner’s request was denied, 

and he was given additional time to file his pro se petition. Id. at 21. Petitioner sought 

another extension of time in which to file a pro se petition which prompted the PCR court 

to review Petitioner’s PCR notice and case file. Id. at 23-24. The PCR court determined 

that Petitioner “cannot show that his first Rule 32 counsel was ineffective because there is 

nothing in the record to support his assertion, and the [c]ourt finds that that claim is without 

merit and that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings[.]” The PCR court 

dismissed the proceedings. Id.

On August 1, 2018, Petitioner sought review of this ruling in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. Id. at 26-84. On October 12, 2018, the court of appeals granted review but denied 

relief. (Doc. 58 at 3-5.) Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Id. 

at 7-22, 24. On April 22, 2019, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id. at 27.

Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings

On May 16, 2017, Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.)

The matter was stayed twice pending resolution of Petitioner’s state court PCR 

proceedings. (Docs. 16, 29.) The second stay was lifted on May 17, 2019. (Doc. 38.) On 

June 5, 2019, Petitioner’s motion to file an amended petition was granted, and his amended 

petition was filed. (Docs. 36, 40, 41.) The amended petition alleges nineteen grounds for 

relief. (Doc. 41.)

As more fully set forth below, all but two and a portion of one of the claims alleged 

in the amended petition are either precluded by Petitioner’s guilty plea, procedurally 

defaulted without excuse or non-cognizable on federal habeas review. The exhausted 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 4 of 28
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claims are without merit.

TIMELINESS

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). The AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). See Furman v. Wood, 190 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitations period begins to run on the date when “the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

On May 24, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first PCR petition. 

(Doc. 54 at 62.) The habeas petition was filed on May 16, 2017. (Doc. 1.) The amended 

petition was filed on June 5, 2019. (Doc. 41.) The petition was timely filed but the amended 

petition was filed outside of the one-year limitation period set forth in the AEDPA and is 

untimely.

An amended habeas petition relates back to the date of the filing of the original 

petition when the “original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common 

core of operative facts.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). An amended petition 

“does not relate back [...] when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that 

differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Id. at 661-62. 

The district court twice stayed this matter pending the conclusion of Petitioner’s 

state court PCR proceedings. Respondents did not object to Petitioner’s amended petition.

Petitioner’s claims in both the petition and his amended petition relate to his guilty plea, 

the effectiveness of his several counsel and the state courts’ adjudication of his PCR 

petitions. This Court determines that the petition and the amended petition state claims that 

are tied to a common core of operative facts.

This Court will treat the amended petition as relating back to the timely filed original 

petition.

...

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 5 of 28
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

EXHAUSTION/PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A federal court may only consider a petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas 

corpus if “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Wooten 

v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner 

to fairly present his federal claims at the trial level and to “invok[e] one complete round of 

the State’s established appellate review process,” presenting the same federal claim to each 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 

(1999). In Arizona, a prisoner does not exhaust a claim for federal review in a non-capital 

case unless he has presented it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Castillo v. McFadden, 

399 F.3d 993, 998 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010–

11 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

A claim is only “fairly present[ed]” when a petitioner “clearly state[s] the federal 

basis and federal nature of the claim, along with relevant facts.” Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 

322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (“If state 

courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal 

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under 

the United States Constitution.”). “[T]he petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim 

explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal 

basis is ‘self-evident,’ . . . or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the 

same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds.” Lyons 

v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added; internal citations 

omitted), modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).

A corollary to the exhaustion requirement, the “procedural default doctrine” - which 

limits a petitioner from proceeding in federal court where his claim is procedurally barred 

in state court - “has its roots in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state 

court judgments based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds.” Dretke 

v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) 

(“When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 6 of 28
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”). 

There are two types of procedural bars, “express and implied.” Robinson v. Schriro, 

595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). A claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally 

defaulted, when a petitioner attempted to raise it in state court and the state court expressly

applied a procedural bar resting on an independent and adequate state law ground to avoid 

considering the merits of the claim. See Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802–05; see also 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating procedural default 

“applies to bar federal habeas review when the state court has declined to address the 

petitioner’s federal claims because he failed to meet state procedural requirements”) 

(internal quotation omitted). In determining whether the state courts have imposed a 

procedural bar, the district court reviews the “last reasoned opinion” of the state courts. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803; Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A claim is also technically exhausted, but implicitly procedurally defaulted, when a 

petitioner has not raised it in state court, but a return to state court to exhaust it would be 

futile considering state procedural rules. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848 (finding claims 

procedurally defaulted because habeas petitioner was time-barred from presenting his 

claims in state court); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (noting that claims are barred from 

habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now find 

the claims procedurally barred”). 

The district court may review a procedurally defaulted claim only if the petitioner 

alleges and proves cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. To establish “cause,” a petitioner must 

demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded [petitioner]’s 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (internal 

quotation omitted). To show “prejudice,” a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged 

constitutional violation worked to the prisoner’s “actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 

456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401, 

403 (9th Cir. 2012); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). And, to prove a 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 7 of 28
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” a prisoner must establish that, in light of new 

evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

Ground I – Due Process/Equal Protection 

Petitioner’s claim in Ground I is that his due process and equal protection rights 

were violated during his of-right PCR proceeding because “no Anders or comparable 

safeguard was followed.” (Doc. 41 at 10.) Petitioner contends this denied him the right to 

effective assistance of counsel. Id. Petitioner did not raise this claim until his third PCR 

petition. Id. 

The trial court summarily dismissed his successive notice of PCR relief. (Doc. 58 

at 3, ¶1.) Petitioner appealed and the Arizona Court of Appeals determined all of 

Petitioner’s IAC claims were precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 4, ¶¶6-8. The court of appeals also determined 

that Petitioner’s claim under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), was not cognizable 

under Arizona state law. Id. at ¶7. The court of appeals, relying on State v. Chavez, 243 

Ariz. 313, ¶1 (App. 2017), held that Anders review is “not required for pleading 

defendants.” Id. 

Petitioner did not present his claim alleged in Ground I until his third PCR 

proceeding. The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that all of Petitioner’s IAC claims 

were precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Accordingly, this Court determines that Petitioner’s claim in Ground I is technically

exhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50 (federal habeas 

review based by state court’s dismissal of state collateral appeal based on untimeliness 

under state procedural rule); Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[S]tate prisoners cannot subvert the exhaustion requirement by presenting their claims to 

the state court in a procedurally deficient manner.”). 

Petitioner argues in reply that Respondents waived the affirmative defense of 

procedural default. (Doc. 60 at 3.) Petitioner asserts:

Respondents intelligently chose to waive the affirmative defense of 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 8 of 28
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

procedural default in regard to the abrogated Rule 32.4(a), when they chose 

not to defend the district court’s sua sponte invocation of the procedural 

default defense.

Id. Petitioner contends Respondents should have presented “their position regarding the

amended Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) and the abrogated Rule 32.4(a) when they were ordered by 

the district court ... to respond to Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.” Id. at 4. 

(emphasis omitted.) 

Earlier in this habeas proceeding, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

district court’s decision denying Petitioner’s request for a stay. (Doc. 26.) As this Court 

understands Petitioner’s argument, Petitioner believes Respondents were required to allege 

their defense of procedural default when the district court ordered Respondents to file a 

response to his motion for reconsideration. (Docs. 27, 28.) Since Respondents did not raise 

their affirmative defenses in their response to the motion for reconsideration, Petitioner 

claims they have waived those defenses.

“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party, with limited exceptions, is 

required to raise every defense in its first responsive pleading, and defenses not so raised 

are deemed waived.” Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted.) “Rule 7(a) defines ‘pleadings’ as a complaint and answer; a reply to a 

counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim; and a third-party complaint and answer.” Id. 

Anything else is a motion or paper.” Id. See also, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(3) (“A State shall 

not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance 

upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the 

requirement.”)

Petitioner’s argument that waiver occurred when Respondents failed to raise their 

affirmative defense of procedural default in their response to his motion for reconsideration

is without merit. Respondents were not required to raise any affirmative defenses at that 

time. See, Morrison, supra. Moreover, a waiver of the exhaustion requirement by 

Respondents must be expressly made. See, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(3). This Court rejects 

Petitioner’s argument that Respondents waived their affirmative defense of exhaustion and 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 9 of 28
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

procedural default.

Petitioner argues that his claim in Ground I is not procedurally defaulted because 

“IAC of first Rule 32 counsel was raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals to establish cause 

for this ground[.]” (Doc. 41 at 6.) While counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to properly 

preserve a claim for review in the state courts can constitute cause to excuse a procedural 

default, Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000), “a claim of ineffective assistance 

[must] be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to 

establish cause for a procedural default.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). It 

is undisputed that Petitioner failed to timely present his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims in the state court. (Doc. 58 at 4, ¶6.) The court of appeals determined:

But the opportunity for [Petitioner] to raise a claim of ineffective assistance 

of post-conviction counsel has passed - he was required to raise that claim in 

a second, timely proceeding. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(2)(C). And we find no 

error in the court’s decision to dismiss the proceeding when [Petitioner] 

failed to timely file a petition.

Id. 

In reply, Petitioner argues that Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure is an inadequate state procedural ground because Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) was not 

firmly established at the time of Petitioner’s default. (Doc. 60 at 7.) Petitioner argues that 

Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) was not in effect at the time he was required to file his state court PCR 

petition alleging IAC but, rather, abrogated Rule 32.4(a) was in effect. Id. at 8. Petitioner 

argues that amended Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) “is a material change from the abrogated Rule 

32.4(a)” and that the abrogated Rule 32.4(a) did not provide him with notice “as to what 

‘of-right’ claim triggered the successive ‘of-right’ Rule 32 proceeding at the time of the 

purported time of default.” Id. at 9. Petitioner contends “[t]he plain language of the 

abrogated Rule 32.4(a) was vague and ambiguous as to what claim the successive Rule 32 

was for.” Id.

“To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural ground,” capable of barring federal habeas 

review, “a state rule must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Johnson v. Lee, 

136 S.Ct. 1802, 1805 (2016) (quoting Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011)). “A 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 10 of 28
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

State’s procedural rules are of vital importance to the orderly administration of its criminal 

courts; when a federal court permits them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal 

justice system.” Johnson, 136 S.Ct. at 1807 (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 447, 

525 (1997)). 

In State v. Petty, 238 P.3d 637 (Ariz. App. 2010), relied upon by Petitioner the court 

of appeals recognized that:

[F]or a pleading defendant, Rule 32 is ‘the only means available for 

exercising the [defendant’s] constitutional right to appellate review.’” (citing 

Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 889 P.2d 614, 616, supp. op. 182 

Ariz. 118, 893 P.2d 1281 (Ariz. 1995).) “Therefore, a pleading defendant ... 

is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on his first 

[of-right] petition for post-conviction relief, the counterpart of a direct 

appeal.” Id. (quoting State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357, 1360

(Ariz. App. 1995).) “The pleading defendant ‘must be afforded an 

opportunity to assert a claim regarding the effectiveness of the attorney 

representing him [in] the first petition for post-conviction relief, ... [and] the 

obvious method is by means of a second petition.’ (citing Pruett, 912 P.2d at 

1360; cf. State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006).)

238 P.3d at 640. As of 2010, the date of the decision in Petty, pleading defendants in 

Arizona were on notice that to assert an IAC claim of Rule 32 counsel, the IAC claim must 

be raised in a second PCR petition. See also, Pruitt, 912 P.2d at 1360 (“A pleading 

defendant’s first petition for post-conviction relief is a ‘direct appeal’ for purposes of time 

limits of rule governing filing of motions for post-conviction relief; therefore, a second 

notice of post-conviction relief for a claim of ineffectiveness of previous post-conviction 

counsel is timely if filed within 30 days of order and mandate affirming trial court’s denial 

of first petition for post-conviction relief.”).

Although in Petitioner’s case the court of appeals relied upon Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) in 

affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his second PCR petition, Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) was not

a newly adopted rule as Petitioner argues. At the time of Petitioner’s default, Rule 32.4(a) 

and case law interpreting Rule 32.4(a) was sufficiently clear as to what conduct was 

required to assert an IAC claim of first PCR counsel This Court concludes that Rule 32.4(a) 

adequately alerted Petitioner to the requirement that he raise any claim of IAC of his first 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 11 of 28
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PCR counsel in a timely successive PCR petition. Rule 32(a) was regularly followed by 

the Arizona courts. See Pruitt, supra; Perry, supra. Petitioner’s argument that the court of 

appeals relied upon an inadequate state procedural ground in affirming the trial court’s 

dismissal of his second PCR proceeding is without merit.

This Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that he can establish cause to excuse the

procedural default of the claim alleged in Ground I.

Petitioner argues that he has established prejudice because his “federal claims are 

all now subject to procedural default, to include his IAC of first Rule 32 counsel claim.” 

(Doc. 60 at 13.) Petitioner argues, “[t]he inadequacy of the abrogated Rule 32.4(a) has 

worked to Petitioner’s actual and substantial disadvantage infecting the entire proceeding 

with constitutional error.” Id. Petitioner’s argument is boiler plate language and insufficient 

to establish prejudice. 

Because Petitioner cannot establish both cause and prejudice to excuse his 

procedural default, this Court determines that the claim alleged in Ground I is procedurally 

defaulted without excuse and barred from federal habeas review.

Ground II – Due Process and Ex Post Facto Violations

In Ground II, Petitioner alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process 

and ex post facto rights based on the Arizona Court of Appeals having allegedly “arbitrarily 

and retroactively applied a new procedural rule of untimeliness to an of-right postconviction review proceeding.” (Doc. 41 at 18.) Petitioner takes issue with the state courts’ 

application of Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure to his case. Id. at 20-

28; Doc. 60 at 21-22. 

As pointed out by Respondents, federal habeas corpus is available only on behalf of 

a person in custody in violation of the U.S. Constitution or the law or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2010) (per curiam); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). “A federal court may not issue the writ on the 

basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

Furthermore, alleged errors of state law cannot be repackaged as federal errors 

simply by citing the due process clause. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 12 of 28
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1999). See also, Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2001) (“[W]e have long 

recognized that “a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due process.” (quoting Engle 

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982))). A state court’s interpretation of state law “binds 

a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Here, Petitioner has attempted to assert a federal claim by citing the due process 

clause when Petitioner’s claim is that the state courts improperly “invoked the amended 

Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C)” in denying his successive requests for PCR relief. See, Doc. 41 at 24 

(“The Az CAP Division Two (sic) made an unreasonable determination of fact and law 

when they applied the amended A.R.Cr.P. 32.4(a)(2)(A) and A.R.Cr.P. 32.4(a)(2)(C) as a 

procedural bar of untimeliness to deny relief in Petitioner’s PFR and excuse the superior 

courts (sic) errors.”). See also, Doc. 60 at 21. For the reasons stated above, this Court has 

determined that the Arizona courts relied upon an adequate independent state law ground 

in denying Petitioner’s successive PCR proceedings See, pp. 10-12, supra. This Court 

determines that Petitioner’s claim in Ground II does not allege a federal claim but rather is 

a claim based on the Arizona state courts’ application of a state procedural rule. 

The claim alleged in Ground II does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas 

relief.

Ground III - Due Process Violation, Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner styles his claim in Ground III as a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights “by the State’s unlawfully induced plea of guilty by way 

of a sham prosecution.” (Doc. 41 at 29.) Petitioner alleges the prosecutor withheld 

information regarding the military’s purported intent to impose a consecutive sentence for 

the offenses he committed against the same victims. Id. at 34. 

Petitioner presented this claim in his first PCR proceeding. Id. at 29. In his petition 

for review filed in the court of appeals, Petitioner argued the prosecutor violated disclosure 

obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), by concealing 

communication between the prosecutor’s office and the military prosecutors. (Doc. 53 at 

8-10; Doc. 54 at 59, ¶4.) The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim reasoning:

First, to the extent he attempts to incorporate by reference his petition below, 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 13 of 28
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that procedure is not permitted by our rules. See State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 

577, 821 P.2d26, 238 (App. 1991). And, in any event, we agree with the trial 

court that summary rejection was proper. By pleading guilty, [Petitioner] 

waived all non-jurisdictional defects save those related to the validity of his 

plea. See State v. Quick, 177 Ariz. 314, 316, 868 P.2d 327, 329 (App. 193). 

Thus, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are limited ‘to attacks 

on the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea, through proof that 

the advice received from counsel was not ‘within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’’ Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 

30 (1974), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).

(Doc. 54 at 59, ¶5.)

Regarding the first reason given by the Arizona appellate court, incorporation by 

reference requires a court to “read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document),” 

which the state courts are not required to do. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 31-32 (2004). 

Rule 32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits incorporation by reference 

in PCR proceedings. See State v. Hess, 290 P.3d 473, 476-77, ¶13 (Ariz. App. 2012); State 

v. Bortz, 821 P.2d 236, 238 (Ariz. App. 1991). Petitioner’s attempt to incorporate by 

reference his claim renders his claim(s) technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted

because Petitioner did not raise the claims in a procedurally appropriate manner under the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Maples v. Thomas, 545 U.S. 266, 280 (2012); 

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

As for the second reason provided by the Arizona appellate court, “a guilty plea 

represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly 

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he 

may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 

rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Id. By pleading guilty, a defendant 

“waives the right to assert on review all non-jurisdictional defenses, including deprivations 

of constitutional rights.” State v. Chavez, 407 P.3d 85, 90 ¶14 (Ariz. App. 2017) (citing 

Tollett). Consequently, by operation of law, Petitioner waived his due process claim alleged 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 14 of 28
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in Ground III when he entered into his plea agreement. See Doc. 51 at 21-23 (waiver clause 

in Petitioner’s plea agreement).

In reply, Petitioner argues that he was not “sufficiently aware of the relevant 

circumstances and likely consequences of state[‘]s plea.” (Doc. 60 at 24.) He argues that 

he was “induced” to plead guilty by the “real possibility of a concurrent sentence” and that 

an email in possession of the prosecution establishes that he was to receive a consecutive 

sentence from the military prosecution. Id. at 24-25. Petitioner argues that he “raised IAC 

of first Rule 32 counsel to establish cause and prejudice for a procedural default of this 

claim.” Id. at 23.

As set forth above, while counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to properly preserve a 

claim for review in the state courts can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default, 

Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451, “a claim of ineffective assistance [must] be presented to the 

state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a 

procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489. See, p. 9, supra; Doc. 54 at 59, ¶4. It is 

undisputed that Petitioner failed to timely present his IAC claims in the state court. This 

Court also rejects Petitioner’s argument that the state court’s application of Rule 

32.4(a)(2)(C) to bar his untimely claims is an inadequate and independent state law ground. 

See, pp. 10-12, supra. 

This Court determines that the claim alleged in Ground III is precluded from federal 

habeas review.

Grounds IV, V, VI and VII – Double Jeopardy, Due Process, Privileges and 

Immunities, Full Faith and Credit and Eight Amendment Violations

The underlying basis for the claims alleged in Grounds IV, V, VI and VII is the

state’s prosecution of Petitioner for what he claims are identical offenses that he pleaded 

guilty to in a military tribunal. (Doc. 41 at 36-45; Doc. 41-1 at 1-19.)

Ground IV: In Ground IV, Petitioner claims that his right to be free from double 

jeopardy was violated when he was prosecuted by the State of Arizona and the United 

States military for the same offenses. Petitioner also challenges the dual-sovereignty

doctrine. (Doc. 41 at 36.) Petitioner raised the claim regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 15 of 28
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in his first PCR petition. Id.; Doc. 53 at 6-7. This claim is properly exhausted. Castillo, 399 

F.2d at 998 n.3; Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010-11. 

This Court addresses the claim alleged in Ground IV on the merits, infra.

Grounds V, VI and VII: In Ground V, Petitioner asserts the State of Arizona violated 

his “right to be free from having a state law enforced against him that will abridge his 

privilege or immunities” when it prosecuted him for the “same offenses the [m]ilitary had 

already convicted and acquitted him of in a prior military tribunal.” (Doc. 41-1 at 1.) 

Petitioner’s claim in Ground V also involves allegations regarding the dual-sovereignty 

doctrine and double jeopardy. Since Petitioner raised a double jeopardy claim in his first 

PCR petition this Court will treat any allegations concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause 

in Ground V as exhausted. This portion of Ground V will be addressed on the merits along 

with the merits of the claim alleged in Ground IV.

However, regarding the remainder of Petitioner’s claim in Ground V, Petitioner 

admits in his amended petition that he did not raise the claim in the state court. Id. (“First 

Rule 32 counsel failed to raise this ground on Petitioner’s behalf.”). Petitioner admits the 

same with respect to the claims alleged in Grounds VI and VII. Id. at 7 (“First Rule 32 

counsel failed to raise this ground on Petitioner’s behalf.”); and 14 (same).

Because the Arizona Court of Appeals was not given the opportunity to rule on the 

claims alleged in Grounds V (except the Double Jeopardy Clause portion), VI (alleged full 

faith and credit violation) and VII (Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 

claim), these claims are not properly exhausted. See Baldwin, 541 U.S at 29. Any attempt 

by Petitioner to return to state court to exhaust these claims would be futile in light of Rule 

32.2 and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. These claims are therefore 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

This Court rejects Petitioner’s effort to have the district court excuse his procedural 

default by arguing that “IAC of first Rule 32 counsel was raised to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals to establish cause for this ground.” See Doc. 41-1 at 1, 7, and 14. While ineffective 

assistance of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default, Carpenter, 529 

U.S. at 451; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89, “a claim of ineffective assistance must be

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 16 of 28
- 17 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish 

cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489. 

Here, Petitioner failed to present his IAC claim in the state court in a procedurally 

appropriate manner as required by Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C). See Doc. 58 at 4, ¶¶6-8. This Court 

has determined that cause and prejudice has not been established to excuse the procedural 

default of the unexhausted claims alleged in Grounds V, VI and VII as discussed herein. 

See, pp. 10-12, supra.

The unexhausted claims alleged in Grounds V, VI and VII are precluded from 

federal habeas review

Grounds VIII and IX: Due Process Violation, Alleged Prosecutorial 

Misconduct and Investigation and Grand Jury

Ground VIII: In Ground VIII, Petitioner alleges his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights were violated by the state when the prosecution allegedly 

withheld exculpatory evidence. (Doc. 41-1 at 20.) Petitioner claims:

[T]he state’s withholding of the medical reports deprived him of the 

opportunity to effectively challenge the validity of the state’s Count 1 at all 

stages of the proceedings.

Id. Petitioner’s claim in Ground VIII involves Petitioner’s Rule 32.12(f) DNA motion that 

he filed in the trial court and the state courts’ resolution of that motion. Id. at 23-30. See 

also, Id. at 27 (“In an abuse of process, the superior court used an erroneous procedural bar 

to cover its own abuse of discretion and to excuse the states (sic) Brady violations. 

Petitioner showed the Az CAP Division Two in his [petition for review] how the superior 

court failed to hold the state accountable to A.R.Cr.P. 32.12(f) and failed to follow that rule 

itself, an abuse of discretion.”). 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim in Ground VIII is not truly a federal claim 

but is a challenge to the state courts’ application of Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure to his case and its ruling on his Rule 32.12(f) DNA motion. (Doc. 50 

at 15.) In reply, Petitioner argues his discussion of Rule 32.12(f) in his amended petition 

“is to support the conclusion that the Az CAP Division Two made an unreasonable 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 17 of 28
- 18 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determination of fact in adjudicating his federal claims.” (Doc. 60 at 55-56.)

Federal habeas is available only on behalf of a person in custody in violation of the 

U.S. Constitution or the law or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson, 

562 U.S.at, 5-6; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. “A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis 

of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41. Alleged errors of state law cannot 

be repackaged as federal errors simply by citing the due process clause. Poland, 169 F.3d 

at 584. See also, Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 222 (“[W]e have long recognized that “a ‘mere 

error of state law’ is not a denial of due process.”) (citation omitted). A state court’s 

interpretation of state law “binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw, 546 

U.S. at 76.

Petitioner alleges in Ground VII that the state courts erred in their ruling on his Rule 

32.12(f) motion for DNA filed pursuant to a state rule of criminal procedure. This Court 

agrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s claim in Ground VIII is a claim that the state 

courts did not correctly decide his Rule 32.12(f) motion for DNA. Accordingly, this Court 

determines that the claim in Ground VIII does not state a claim for federal habeas relief.

Ground IX: In Ground IX, Petitioner claims his Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment 

due process rights were violated “by the State’s one-sided investigation and false 

presentation of the facts to the grand jury and omitted information.” (Doc. 41-1 at 31.) 

Respondents argue this claim is non-cognizable on federal habeas review and waived. 

(Doc. 50 at 16.) Petitioner does not address this claim in his reply. (Doc. 60 at 2.)

The United States Supreme Court has not applied the Fifth Amendment right to an 

indictment by a grand jury to the states. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 

(1972) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)). This Court agrees with 

Respondents that for this reason Petitioner’s claim in Ground IX is non-cognizable on 

federal habeas. Moreover, as mentioned above, “a guilty plea represents a break in the 

chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty 

of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims 

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 18 of 28
- 19 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

guilty plea.” Id. By pleading guilty, a defendant “waives the right to assert on review all 

non-jurisdictional defenses, including deprivations of constitutional rights.” Chavez, 407 

P.3d at 90 ¶14. Consequently, by operation of law, Petitioner waived claim in Ground IX 

when he pled guilty. (Doc. 51 at 21-23 (plea agreement waiver of rights).)

This Court determines that the claims alleged in Ground VIII and IX are noncognizable on federal habeas review or have been waived.

Ground X: Due Process Violation, Application of A.R.S. §§ 13-1405, -705

In Ground X, Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

due process rights arguing that A.R.S. § 13-1405, which defines sexual conduct with a 

minor, is “unclear as to its application whether A.R.S. [§] 13-705 [governing sentences for 

dangerous crimes against children] could be applied in a first time felony proceeding.” 

(Doc. 41-1 at 36.) 

However, as pointed out by Respondents, a state court’s application of a state statute 

is a state law claim. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Accordingly, habeas relief is unavailable 

to remedy “a perceived error of state law[.]” Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41. A state court’s 

interpretation of state law “binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw, 546 

U.S. at 76. See also, Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (state appellate 

court’s refusal to reverse a sentence on state law grounds is not cognizable in federal habeas

proceeding). 

Additionally, the claim alleged in Ground X was waived when Petitioner pled 

guilty. As mentioned above, “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which 

has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. “When a criminal 

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with 

which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Id. 

By pleading guilty, a defendant “waives the right to assert on review all non-jurisdictional 

defenses, including deprivations of constitutional rights.” Chavez, 407 P.3d at 90, ¶14. In 

Arizona, a defendant’s guilty plea “’waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, 

including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except those that relate to the validity 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 19 of 28
- 20 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of [the] plea.’” State v. Leyva, 389 P.3d 1266, 1272, ¶18 (Ariz. App. 2017) (quoting State 

v. Banda, 307 P.3d 1009, 1012, ¶12 (Ariz. App. 2013)). By operation of law, Petitioner 

waived his claim alleged in Ground X when he pled guilty. (Doc. 51 at 21-23 (plea 

agreement waiver of rights).)

This Court determines that the claim alleged in Ground X is non-cognizable on 

federal habeas review and has been waived.

Ground XI – Due Process Violation, Sentence Enhancement

In Ground XI, Petitioner alleges that his sentence was enhanced under Arizona’s

dangerous crimes against children (DACA) statute without a jury determination. Petitioner 

claims that (1) the first time he was informed that Counts 1 and 2 were both dangerous 

crimes against children was at sentencing; (2) the trial court “stopped short” of identifying 

A.R.S. § 13-705 as the DACA enhancement statute; and (3) “any connection between 

A.R.S. § 13-1405 and A.R.S. § 13-705 remained anonymous in the record.” (Doc. 41-2 at 

1-7.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim is factually inaccurate and was waived. 

(Doc. 50 at 18.) 

This Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s claim is factually inaccurate. 

The plea agreement specified that Petitioner was pleading guilty to violating A.R.S. § 13-

1405 and that he would be sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-705. See Doc. 51 at 18-19. The 

plea agreement also specified that the sentencing range was for a first DACA offense under 

A.R.S. § 13-705(B), and expressly stated that Petitioner would be sentenced to 25 years. 

Id. at 20, ¶6. This Court also notes that Petitioner’s indictment refers to both A.R.S. §§ 13-

1405 and -705 and the State filed a DCAC notice that pertained to all charged offenses. 

(Doc. 51 at 3-11.) 

The claim alleged in Ground XI was waived when Petitioner entered his guilty plea. 

“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the 

criminal process.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. By pleading guilty, a defendant “waives the 

right to assert on review all non-jurisdictional defenses, including deprivations of 

constitutional rights.” Chavez, 407 P.3d at 90, ¶14. By operation of law, Petitioner waived 

the claim in Ground XI when he entered into his plea agreement. See Doc. 51 at 23-24 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 20 of 28
- 21 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(plea agreement waiver of rights).

Petitioner claims in reply that “the actual waiver occurs during the plea colloquy, 

which makes the plea hearing transcript the best available record for determining what 

rights were actually waived.” (Doc. 60 at 56-57.) The transcript of the change of plea 

hearing establishes that the trial court advised Petitioner that by pleading guilty he gives 

up certain constitutional rights ... “and [specifically the right] to have the jury determine 

any factors which could aggravate your sentence. If you enter a plea of guilty, the Court, 

not a jury will decide whether aggravating factors exist.” (Doc. 51 at 45.) Petitioner plead 

guilty. Id. at 46-47. At sentencing, the trial court identified emotional and physical harm to 

the victims as aggravating factors. Id. at 64-65. The trial court identified no mitigating 

factors. Id. at 65.

This Court determines that the claim alleged in Ground X is waived, factually 

inaccurate and precluded from federal habeas review.

Grounds XII – Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel re Plea 

In Ground XII, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

by “failing to effectively communicate the terms of the State’s plea offer to him.” (Doc. 

41-2 at 8-16.) Petitioner raised his claim in his first PCR proceeding and in his petition for 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 53 at 5-6.) This claim is properly exhausted

and will be addressed on the merits. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998 n.3; Swoopes, 196 F.3d 

at 1010-11.

Grounds XIII through XIX –Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel, Failure to 

Raise Claims

In Grounds XIII through XVIII, Petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claims that he alleges in Grounds III, IV, VIII, 

IX, X and XI of his amended petition. (Doc. 41-2 at 17, 24, 32, 43, 49.) In Ground XIX,

Petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered in effective assistance in failing to suppress an 

allegedly coerced statement he gave to police. Id. at 64.

In Petitioner’s third PCR petition, filed on August 1, 2018, Petitioner raised the IAC 

claims alleged in Grounds XIV and XVIII against his first PCR counsel but not his trial 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 21 of 28
- 22 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

counsel. (Doc. 57 at 41-43; Doc. 58 at 4, ¶¶6-8.) The court of appeals rejected these claims 

as untimely. (Doc. 58 at 4, ¶¶6-8.) As for the other IAC claims, these claims have not been 

raised in any prior proceeding. As such, none of the IAC claims alleged in Grounds XIII 

though XIX have been properly exhausted. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. 29, 33. Any attempt to 

return to state court to exhaust these claims would be futile in light of Rule 32.2 and 32.4(a) 

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. These claims are technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted.

As discussed, this Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that “IAC of first Rule 32 

counsel was raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals to establish cause...” (Doc. 41-2 at 17, 

24, 32, 43, 49, 56.) See, p. 9, supra. While counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to properly 

preserve a claim for review in the state courts can constitute cause to excuse a procedural 

default, Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 451; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89, a “claim of ineffective 

assistance [must] be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be 

used to establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489. Because 

Petitioner failed to present these IAC claims in the state courts in a procedurally appropriate 

manner as required by Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C), these claims are technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted without excuse. See also, pp. 10-12, supra.

This Court determines that the IAC of counsel claims alleged in Grounds XIII 

through XIX are precluded from federal habeas review. 

Summary

In sum, this Court determines that only the claims alleged in Ground IV, a portion 

of Ground V and Ground XII are properly exhausted. The balance of the claims alleged in 

the amended petition are precluded from habeas review as detailed above.

MERITS

As explained below, Petitioner’s exhausted claims are without merit.

Standard of Review under the AEDPA

Congress intended AEDPA to foster federal-state comity and further society’s 

interest in the finality of criminal convictions. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 

(2007) (“AEPDA’s] design is to ‘further the principles of comity, finality, and 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 22 of 28
- 23 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

federalism.’”) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003)). Congress’ very 

purpose in enacting the AEPDA was “to restrict the availability of habeas corpus relief.” 

Greenwalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1275 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds 

recognized by Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 645, 658-61 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In the AEDPA, Congress set forth “a difficult to meet and highly deferential 

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions must 

be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). (internal 

punctuation omitted). The district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus, “only on the 

basis of some transgression of federal law binding on state courts.” Middleton, v. Cupp, 

768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985).

The AEDPA limits the availability of habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the 

merits to circumstances where the state court’s disposition either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner bears the burden of proving his claims fit one of the criteria 

in paragraph (d). Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181; Lambright v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 

n.16 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law when the court 

has applied a rule of law that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court 

precedent or has encountered a set of facts that are “materially indistinguishable” from a 

Supreme Court decision and yet reached a different result than the Supreme Court. Early 

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Under § 2254’s “unreasonable application” 

clause, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applies clearly established 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 23 of 28
- 24 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

mean that the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

Richter explained:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented 

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fair[-]minded disagreement.

562 U.S. at 101. “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” 

Id. Section 2254(d)(1) sets “a daunting standard – one that will be satisfied in relatively 

few cases.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In determining whether the state courts’ resolution of a claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, the district court must review 

the last reasoned state court judgment addressing the claim. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 

1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803). The reviewing federal court is to 

be “particularly deferential to [its] state court colleagues.” Maddox, 366 F.3d at 1000. The 

federal habeas court presumes the state court’s factual determinations are correct, and the 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Ground IV and part of Ground V – Double Jeopardy/Dual-Sovereignty 

Doctrine

The underlying basis for the exhausted claims alleged in Grounds IV and V is the 

State’s prosecution of Petitioner for what Petitioner claims are the identical offenses that 

he pleaded guilty to in a military tribunal. In Ground IV, Petitioner claims that his right to 

be free from Double Jeopardy has been violated by the State and the military prosecuting 

him from the same offenses. He takes also issue with the dual-sovereignty doctrine. (Doc. 

41 at 36; Doc. 41-1 at 1-6; Doc. 60 at 26-54.) Petitioner argues:

Had the United States Supreme Court not invent their dual sovereignty 

doctrine (DSD) rule in the first place, then the State of Arizona would not 

have been allowed to follow with their prosecution for the same offenses that 

Petitioner was convicted and acquitted of in his prior military tribunal.

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 24 of 28
- 25 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Doc. 41 at 36.) 

Respondents point out that the United States Supreme Court recently rejected an 

argument just like that made by PetitionerUnit in Gamble v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 1960 

(2019). In Gamble, the ed States Supreme Court “consider[ed] ... whether to overrule a 

longstanding interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 

1963. Gamble recognized that the dual-sovereignty doctrine recognizes that, under the 

Double Jeopardy Clause, which provides that no person may be twice put in jeopardy ‘for 

the same offence,’ a crime under one sovereign’s laws is not ‘the same offence’ as a crime 

under the laws of another sovereign, and thus, a state may prosecute a defendant under 

state law even if the federal government has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a 

federal statue, or the reverse may happen. Id. The Court determined that Gamble’s evidence 

in support of his argument “did not establish that those who ratified the Fifth Amendment 

took it to bar successive prosecutions under different sovereigns’ laws – much less do so 

with enough force to break a chain of precedent linking dozens of cases over 170 years.” 

Id. at 1969.

Here, in rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the trial court determined, “At the time the 

Defendant entered his plea in the state court proceedings, he was aware that his sentence 

may run concurrent or consecutive to the sentence that would be served pursuant to the 

general court martial.” (Doc. 52 at 112.) The trial court continued, “[m]oreover, Arizona’s 

double jeopardy statute (A.R.S. Section 13-116) does not apply in the context of successive 

prosecutions in separate jurisdictions[]; accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief 

on this claim.” Id. at 113. (footnote omitted.) The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s 

Double Jeopardy claim and adopted the trial court’s reasoning that the Double Jeopardy 

Clause does not “apply to prosecutions in separate jurisdictions.” (Doc. 54 at 60, ¶7.)

Petitioner has not established that the state courts unreasonably applied federal law 

in rejecting his Double Jeopardy Clause claim. Petitioner’s reply argues: 

The Court in Gamble continues to ignore the origin of the U.S. government’s 

ultimate source of authority to undertake criminal prosecutions in their 

ultimate source of authority test analysis so as to hold that the U.S. and [s]tate 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 25 of 28
- 26 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

governments are separate sovereigns in the Double Jeopardy context.

(Doc. 60 at 26.) Petitioner’s argument is like that of the defendant in Gamble. Compare 

Gamble, 139 U.S. at 1969-70 (“Gamble’s core claim is that early English cases reflect an 

established common-law rule barring domestic prosecution for the same act under a 

different sovereign’s laws.”); with, Doc. 60 at 28 (“There simply are no express writings 

by the framers nor in the U.S. Constitution itself that warrants or sanctions the idea that the 

U.S. and [s]tate governments or two [s]tate governments may successively prosecute an 

individual for the same offense.”).

Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court rendered a decision that was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined 

by the United States Supreme Court on his Double Jeopardy Clause claim. In fact, the state 

courts correctly applied controlling United States Supreme Court precedent as announced 

in Gamble. 

This Court determines that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the claim 

alleged in Ground IV and the exhausted portion of the claim alleged in Ground V.

Ground XII - IAC of Trial Counsel 

The clearly established federal law governing IAC claims was set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

at 189. To establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland, “a 

defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.” Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). Deficient performance is established when 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688. 

In determining deficiency, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,

the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action must be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689. (Internal quotations 

omitted.) To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 26 of 28
- 27 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 694. “The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense 

counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 100. 

In Ground XII, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel failed to effectively 

communicate the terms of the plea agreement to him. (Doc. 41-2 at 8.) Petitioner claims 

that he did not get an opportunity to speak with his trial counsel in private about the plea 

during the change of plea hearing. Id. at 9-10. Petitioner further claims that trial counsel 

“coerced him into accepting the plea by telling him that it was the only plea he would be 

offered and that if he did not accept the plea then he would face sum (sic) 200 sum (sic) 

years at trial.” Id. at 1. 

In ruling on this claim the state PCR court held:

To establish deficient performance during plea negotiations, the Defendant 

must prove that his attorney either (1) gave erroneous advice or (2) failed to 

give information necessary to allow the Defendant to make an informed 

decision whether to accept the plea. State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413, 10 

P.3d 1193 (App. 2000)[.] In his statement attached to the Petition, the 

Defendant asserts that his attorney pressured him into signing the plea 

agreement, and “...failed to give information necessary to allow the 

Defendant to make an informed decision to accept the plea.” However, the 

Defendant’s assertions are not supported by the current record before the 

Court. In sum, the Court finds that the claims are without merit and that no 

purpose would be served by any further proceedings on these claims.

(Doc. 52 at 112.) In upholding the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals determined:

Although he claims counsel did not adequately explain the plea to him, he 

does not identify what information counsel could have provided him that 

would have prompted him to reject the state’s plea offer. Nor does he claim 

he would have rejected the plea had he been given more time to consider it.

(Doc. 54 at 60, ¶6.) 

Respondents point out that had Petitioner been convicted on the dismissed state 

charges he would have faced spending 200 years in prison. Petitioner admits he knew this. 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 27 of 28
- 28 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Doc. 41-2 at 10.) Petitioner admitted his guilt. See Doc. 51 at 64 (change of plea hearing

at which Petitioner admitted, “And I knew I should have stopped way earlier. I’m just, 

ashamed of everything I’ve done.”); Doc. 54 at 58, ¶2.) As pointed out by Respondents, 

even with the two consecutive 25-year prison terms from the state and military sentences, 

Petitioner reduced his time in prison to 50 years. 

This Court agrees with Respondents that the state courts’ determination that 

Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice was not unreasonable. See Moore, 562 U.S. at 

130-32 (where counsel recommended a plea in lieu of an uncertain trial and risked a much 

higher penalty, the state PCR courts’ disposition was reasonable for both the performance 

and prejudice prongs). 

RECOMMENDATION

The exhausted claims alleged in the amended petition (Ground IV, a portion of 

Ground V and Ground XII) are without merit. The remainder of Petitioner’s claims are 

either waived, non-cognizable on federal habeas review or procedurally defaulted without 

excuse. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the district court, after its 

independent review, DISMISS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. 

If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the 

parties should use the following case number: 4:17-cv-00224-RM.

Dated this 21st day of May, 2020.

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 65 Filed 05/21/20 Page 28 of 28