Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03009/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03009-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

ROSE L. FREEMAN AND JOHN SCOTT PLAINTIFFS

v. Civil No. 06-3009

DANNY HICKMAN, In his Official Capacity

as Boone County, Arkansas, Sheriff and

in his Personal Capacity;

JAMES D. WESSELS, In his Official Capacity

as Boone County, Arkansas, Deputy Sheriff/

Investigator and in his Personal Capacity;

JAMES L. WHITE, In his Professional Capacity

as Harrison Arkansas Daily Times Staff and

in his Personal Capacity;

D. JEFF CHRISTENSON, In his Professional

Capacity as Harrison Arkansas Daily Times

Publisher and in his Personal Capacity DEFENDANTS

O R D E R

Now on this 8th day of January, 2007, come on for consideration

the Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Of Separate Defendants

James L. White And D. Jeff Christenson (document #36) and the Motion

For Summary Judgment of defendants Danny Hickman and James D.

Wessels (document #38), and from said motions, and the responses

thereto, the Court finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that they suffered damages

arising out of a wrongful arrest and prosecution of plaintiff Scott

for failing to register as a sex offender, and out of a course of

conduct said to have been visited upon them because they are a white

woman and a black man involved in a relationship. The wrongs

complained of are said to arise under 42 U.S.C. §1983, for

violations of plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth,

Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

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While plaintiffs also assert, in ¶2, that they invoke the pendant jurisdiction of 1

the Court to hear claims arising under Arkansas law, the only such claim even colorably

asserted is a claim of false imprisonment, set forth in Count IV.

For example, ¶53 alleges that defendants, acting under color of state law, denied 2

plaintiffs "professional care while Plaintiffs were in the custody of the Boone County

Sheriff's Office and Defendant Jason Day." There is no indication how White and

Christenson, as employees of The Harrison Daily Times, could be responsible for

treatment of Scott and Freeman in jail, nor is there any allegation that Freeman was

even arrested.

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Constitution; and 18 U.S.C. §1961 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").1

Two defendants have been dismissed from the case, and the

remaining defendants now each contend that they are entitled to

dismissal of the claims as against them. 

2. The Court will take up the motions in the order presented.

In order to do so, it will first be helpful to summarize the

allegations of the Complaint, as they pertain to the movants. The

Complaint is a long, rambling, disorganized document, taking some 22

pages to assert what amounts to the allegation that Scott was

wrongfully arrested on a charge of failing to register as a sex

offender not because he was in fact a sex offender, but because he

was a black man in a relationship with a white woman. It jumps back

and forth chronologically while making allegations that appear to

run in chronological order. It refers to the defendants as a group

under circumstances where it is clear that fewer than all defendants

are actually intended. Causes of action are mentioned or alluded

2

to, even though the context of the document makes it apparent that

no claims for the legal cause of action associated with those terms

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For example, ¶36 alleges that Hickman and Wessels falsely arrested Freeman's sons 3

and a friend of the family, yet Freeman clearly has no standing to assert a claim on

behalf of a "friend of the family," and there is no indication that she is asserting any

claim on behalf of minor children. The Sixth Amendment is recited in ¶47, but there is

no allegation that would support a cause based thereon.

As best the Court can determine, Scott was not arrested after this notice was 4

placed on his door. The arrest in question appears to be the one that took place in

July, 2005.

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is being asserted. However, by sifting through the document the 3

Court has determined that a reasonable summary of the allegations as

against the moving parties herein under consideration is as follows:

* that on or about July 7, 2005, Scott was arrested by Boone

County Sheriff Danny Hickman, on a charge of failure to

register as a sex offender;

* that Scott was not a sex offender;

* that in December, 2005, the Circuit Court of Boone County,

Arkansas, ordered the case against Scott dismissed, based

on a ruling by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals;

* that on or about January 20, 2006, Hickman and Wessels

placed a sign on Scott's door stating "John Scott you need

to come to the Sheriff's Dept to Complete your Registry

M-F 8-4 -- If you do not talk to you [sic] by 1-25-06 I

will issue a warrant for your arrest. JW 741-8404" ;

4

* that on January 20, 2006, Hickman and Wessels arrested

plaintiff Freeman's sons, with the purpose of harassing

and intimidating Freeman and Scott because they have an

interracial relationship;

* that White and Christenson published in The Harrison Daily

Times a news article reporting false and unsubstantiated

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While the references in this regard are in the plural, to "plaintiffs," there is 5

no allegation that Freeman was ever arrested.

While this allegation is also levied against White and Christenson, and the 6

allegations of the Complaint appear to be that White and Christenson were in some way

responsible for the arrest of Scott, the Court disregards these allegations. Scott and

Christenson are not alleged to be employees or agents of the Boone County Sheriff's

Department, and thus have no responsibility for the development of appropriate arrest

or detention policies by the Boone County Sheriff. Nor is there any allegation that

Scott's arrest occurred because of any action by White or Christenson, such as a

complaint about Scott made by either White or Christenson. 

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information about Scott because of his relationship with

Freeman, and that they failed to verify Scott's sex

offender status;

* that Boone County failed to provide reasonable and

necessary medical care to plaintiffs while in jail; 5

* that defendants, acting in concert, "made efforts to

circumvent justice by implementing and advocating a tidal

wave of fear, intimidation, humiliation, and the continue

[sic] spread of threat of violent [sic] against

Plaintiffs";

* that Boone County had inadequate policies and practices

to prevent the wrongful execution of process against

citizens ; and 6

* that defendants associated in an "enterprise" and

"participated in predicate acts of racketeering" with the

intention of violating the civil rights of citizens by

causing them to have to spend time and money on court

appearances and fines; by discouraging thorough

investigation of allegations of racial profiling and

denial of due process; and by using "seemingly

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inconspicuous probable cause reasons to make

investigations involving minorities and pro se litigants,"

thereby injuring plaintiffs in their business or property.

3. Defendant James L. White ("White") is a reporter and

defendant D. Jeff Christenson ("Christenson") is the editor of The

Harrison Daily Times, a local newspaper. These defendants are

alleged to have published an article about the arrest of Scott by

the Boone County Sheriff's Office for failing to register as a sex

offender. White and Christenson move for judgment in their favor on

four bases:

* that, as a matter of law, they cannot be held liable on

a §1983 claim because they are not state actors;

* that plaintiffs lack standing to assert a RICO claim; 

* that they cannot be held liable for defamation because

Scott has admitted the truth of the article, or, in the

alternative, because they are protected by the "fair

report privilege"; and

* that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted as against them.

4. White and Christenson styled their motion as one for

judgment on the pleadings, leading plaintiffs to contest it on the

basis that the pleadings were not, at the time the motion was filed,

closed. F.R.C.P. 12(c) allows for a motion for judgment on the

pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as

not to delay the trial."

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The Court does not find it necessary to deny White and

Christenson's motion on this basis, however, because --

notwithstanding its title -- the motion is also brought pursuant to

F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and may properly be resolved on that basis alone.

5. The Court agrees that plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim pursuant to §1983 as against White and Christenson. That

statute provides a cause of action against a person who, 

under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.

42 U.S.C. §1983. 

"Acting under color of state law" requires action pursuant to

some "power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only

because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."

Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996). There is neither

allegation nor evidence that White or Christenson did anything

pursuant to a "power possessed by virtue of state law," or that they

are somehow "clothed with the authority of state law." They were

newspapermen, and as such cannot be held liable on the allegations

made pursuant to §1983. Their motion to dismiss those allegations

will be granted.

6. White and Christenson next contend that plaintiffs lack

standing to assert a RICO claim because such a claim requires an

allegation that some "injury to business or property" was caused by

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a RICO violation. Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Services, Inc.,

344 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2003). The RICO count does, however, allege

that "[p]laintiffs have been injured in their business or property

by the conduct of Defendants," and seeks damages measured by "loss

of benefits and income from termination of employment due to arrest

and false imprisonment."

The Court finds the RICO count wanting for a different reason.

As set forth in its Order dated May 9, 2006, to establish a RICO

claim, plaintiffs must prove the existence of an enterprise

affecting interstate or foreign commerce, U.S. v. Keltner, 147 F.3d

662 (8th Cir. 1998), and they have failed to allege such. The RICO

count -- as to all remaining defendants -- will, therefore, be

dismissed.

7. Finally, White and Christenson assert that they cannot be

held liable for defamation because Scott admitted the truth of the

article, or, in the alternative, because they are protected by the

"fair report privilege," which protects a reporter from liability

for reporting an official public action on a matter of public

concern "if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment

of the occurrence reported," Butler v. Hearst-Argyle Television,

Inc., 345 Ark. 462, 467, 49 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Ark. 2001). 

Resolution of this issue is somewhat complicated by the fact

that the Court does not have before it a legible copy of the article

said to have been published in The Harrison Daily Times. Appended

to the Complaint is a copy of part of a page from a newspaper, but

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Another exhibit to the Complaint is a document entitled "Harrison Daily Crimes," 7

but this is clearly not a copy of a newspaper page, nor can the Court find any

relationship to the allegations of the Complaint in its text.

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it is undated, there is no indication what paper it is from, and the

copy is illegible. However, the tenor of the Complaint is that the 7

article about which the plaintiffs complain reported that Scott was

a sex offender. This is alleged to be untrue.

Also appended to the Complaint is a copy of U.S. v. Scott, 270

F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2001), a case involving the plaintiff Scott

herein. Plaintiffs take the position that this court opinion

amounted to "a ruling and opinion . . . that Plaintiff John Scott

was never arrested or charged with being a sex offender therefore,

there was nor will be any reason to register as sex offender as

[sic] any time," and that it "definitely cleared" Scott of being a

sex offender.

The Court does not read Scott as favorably as the plaintiffs

do, and in fact finds that it supplies the basis upon which their

claim of defamation against White and Christenson must be dismissed.

In that case Scott had challenged the application of certain

conditions of supervised release to him when he was placed on

supervised release following a conviction for armed bank robbery.

The conditions were "tailored to sex offenses," and the Court of

Appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion to attach them to

Scott in the context of his supervised release for armed bank

robbery. The Court did not, however, find that Scott "was never

arrested or charged with being a sex offender." In fact, the

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opinion points out that in 1986 Scott was convicted of forcible rape

and sodomy of his nine year old stepdaughter. This is repeatedly

described in the opinion as a "sexual offense."

This information, offered by the plaintiffs, persuades the

Court that -- to the extent that the contours of the defamation

claim can be determined from the allegations of the Complaint -- it

is subject to dismissal.

8. In their Motion For Summary Judgment, defendants Hickman

and Wessels make three arguments:

* that Freeman has failed to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, because the Complaint makes no allegation

of any denial of her rights by these defendants;

* that Scott cannot show a violation of his constitutional

rights pursuant to any official policy, and therefore the

claims against these defendants in their official capacity

must be dismissed; and

* that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

as to the claims against them in their individual

capacity.

9. Summary judgment should be granted if the record, viewed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and giving them the

benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and that Hickman and Wessels are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696

(8th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is not appropriate unless all the

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The Court also notes that even if Freeman had mounted a contest to the motion, her 8

claims would have to be dismissed for the same reasons that Scott's claims must be

dismissed.

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evidence points toward one conclusion, and is susceptible of no

reasonable inferences sustaining the position of Scott and Freeman.

Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir. 1995). The burden

is on Hickman and Wessels to demonstrate the non-existence of a

genuine factual dispute; however, once they have met that burden,

Scott and Freeman cannot rest on their pleadings, but must come

forward with facts showing the existence of a genuine dispute. City

of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Electric Co-op, 838 F.2d 268

(8th Cir. 1988). 

10. As to the first contention of Hickman and Wessels, that

Freeman has failed to assert a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the Court is in agreement. While the Complaint is

confusing and repetitive, when one sifts through it and sorts out

what is really complained of, the focus is clearly on Scott rather

than Freeman. The allegations as to Freeman are basically that the

things that happened to Scott occurred because he is a black man in

a relationship with Freeman, a white woman. Freeman, in her

response to the motion of Hickman and Wessels, does not seriously

contend for any claims asserted on her own behalf. All of Freeman's

claims against Hickman and Wessels will, therefore, be dismissed.8

11. As to Scott's claims against Hickman and Wessels in their

official capacity, it is axiomatic that such claims are, in essence,

merely claims against their governmental employer, which cannot be

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held liable for constitutional torts on a respondeat superior

theory. There must be evidence that any constitutional tort was

committed pursuant to a policy or custom of the governmental

employer. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

There is no evidence of such a policy or custom in this case.

In addition, Hickman and Wessels offer the Affidavit of Wessels that

he was contacted, in July, 2005, by Sheriff Jimmy Russell of Taney

County, Missouri. Sheriff Russell informed Wessels that Scott had

been registered as a sex offender in Taney County, and provided

information that Scott had been convicted of sexual assault, rape,

and sodomy in 1986. Russell told Wessels that Scott had last

registered as a sex offender on September 7, 2004, and that he had

received information that Scott had moved to Boone County, Arkansas.

On the basis of Russell's information, Wessels and Hickman

caused Scott to be arrested for failing to register as a sex

offender. Wessels further averred that when questioned in a postMiranda videotaped interview, Scott admitted that he knew he was

supposed to register as a sex offender.

The averments of Wessels' Affidavit -- which stand

uncontroverted by plaintiffs -- prevent any inference favorable to

the plaintiffs that Scott's arrest was pursuant to an

unconstitutional policy or custom of the Boone County Sheriff's

Department, because there was a legitimate basis for the arrest.

The claims of Scott as against Hickman and Wessels in their official

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capacity will, therefore, be dismissed.

12. Hickman and Wessels claim that Scott's claims against them

in their individual capacities are subject to dismissal on the basis

of qualified immunity. That doctrine protects government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Two inquiries are made when the Court considers an issue of

qualified immunity. First, considered in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, do the alleged facts show the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional or statutory right? If so, was that right

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation? Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

In the case at bar, the Court finds no evidence that the

conduct of Hickman or Wessels -- arresting Scott on the basis of the

information provided to them by Sheriff Russell -- violated a

constitutional right. The Constitution is satisfied if Hickman and

Wessels had "arguable probable cause" to arrest Scott. Walker v.

City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2005). The information

conveyed by Sheriff Russell to Wessels clearly meets this standard,

and thus Hickman and Wessels are entitled to qualified immunity.

Although the issue was not specifically raised by Hickman and

Wessels, the Court has also considered whether Scott could survive

summary judgment on his colorable claim of false imprisonment, and

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finds that it could not. Under Arkansas law, false imprisonment is

defined as detention without sufficient legal authority. Limited

Stores, Inc. v. Wilson-Robinson, 317 Ark. 80, 83, 876 S.W.2d 248,

250 (1994). The Affidavit of Wessels, to the effect that Sheriff

Russell notified him that Scott was required to register as a sex

offender and that Scott agreed that he fell into that category, is

evidence of sufficient legal authority for Scott's detention. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion For Judgment On The

Pleadings Of Separate Defendants James L. White And D. Jeff

Christenson (document #36) is granted, and plaintiffs' claims

against these defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion For Summary Judgment of

defendants Danny Hickman and James D. Wessels (document #38) is

granted, and plaintiffs' claims against these defendants are

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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