Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01417/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Pierre Williams,

Petitioner

-vsUnknown Sterns, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-1417-PHX-DLR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Kingman, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on June 24, 2014 (Doc. 1). On January 6, 2015 Respondents filed their Limited 

Response (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply on February 2, 2015 (Doc. 12).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

During Williams' employment as a nurse at St. Luke's in 

2006, a patient ("C.C.") accused him of inappropriate sexual 

contact. The allegations were investigated and DNA samples taken, 

but the case was not prosecuted at the time. In 2008, a patient at 

Paradise Valley Hospital ("S.F.") accused Williams of inappropriate 

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sexual contact. An investigation ensued, and Williams was arrested 

in January 2009. 

Joshua Deason was Williams' cellmate for approximately six 

weeks. Deason was released from jail on March 1, 2009. On March 

5, 2009, Williams called a friend, John Swan, giving him contact 

information for Deason and instructing Swan to call him. Williams 

explained that Deason was supposed to get "some paperwork done 

for [him]." Williams told Swan to tell Deason there was money in it 

for him. In a conversation with his wife on March 11, 2009, 

Williams stated he would not be coming home "unless one of my 

witnesses drop[s] dead." 

During the early morning hours of March 19, 2009, someone 

threw a Molotov cocktail through S. F. ' s bedroom window while 

she slept. S.F. was able to extinguish the fire and exit her apartment, 

along with her mother. 

Following the arson, Swan spoke to Williams in code, 

reporting that a cocktail had been thrown through S.F.'s window, 

and that Deason would leave S. F. in the desert if necessary. 

Williams replied that Deason "didn't even do what he said he was 

going to do." Williams persuaded Swan to call S. F. and make up a 

"cockamamie" excuse to gain information. After Swan spoke with 

S. F., Williams instructed him to let Deason know, "I just spoke to 

[our] girl...stop bullshitting and do what he say.”

The fire investigator reviewed Williams' recorded jail 

conversations. Meanwhile, the detective investigating the sexual 

assaults contacted Deason's daughter and retrieved a piece of paper 

the daughter found in Deason's wallet that listed a physical 

description of S.F. and her address. This information was written on 

the back of Williams' change of counsel form. 

In May 2009, Williams was indicted on four counts of sexual 

assault, each a class two felony (counts 1 and 2 involved C. C.; 

counts 3 and 4 involved S. F.); one count of attempted first degree 

murder, a class two dangerous felony (count 5); one count of 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a class one dangerous 

felony (count 6); one count of aggravated assault, a class three 

dangerous felony (count 7) ; one count of endangerment, a class six 

dangerous felony (count B); one count of arson of an occupied 

structure, a class two dangerous felony (count 9); and one count of 

use of wire communication or electronic communication to facilitate 

an offense, a class four felony (count 10).

(Exhibit Y, Mem. Dec. at 2-4.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 11, and the Supplement, 

Doc. 14, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial. The State filed Motion in Limine (Exhibit 

HH), seeking to preclude evidence of the state’s initial decision to not prosecute on the 

allegations of C.C.. The motion was granted without opposition. (Exhibit II, M.E. 

5/18/10.)

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Petitioner was found guilty on the charges of aggravated assault and arson, but 

acquitted of the remaining charges. He was sentenced to presumptive terms of 7.5 years 

on the aggravated assault and 10.5 years on the arson. (Exhibit V, R.T. 12/15/10 at 25, 

et seq.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON ORIGINAL DIRECT APPEAL

On or about January 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a delinquent notice of appeal. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. (See Exhibit FF, Second 

PCR Pet. at 2.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding - On March 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit BB). On August 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro per Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit CC). The State moved (Exhibit DD) to dismiss 

without prejudice based upon a lack of certification pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5.1 

Based upon the lack of a certification, the proceeding was dismissed on August 26, 2011. 

(Exhibit EE, M.E. 8/26/11.) 

Petition for Special Action – Sometime prior to May 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a 

Petition for Special Action with the Arizona Court of Appeals, naming the trial judge as 

respondent. According to Petitioner, this petition raised his jurisdictional claims asserted 

in Ground Three. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 3.) On May 1, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily declined to accept jurisdiction. (Reply, Doc. 12, Exhibit E, Order 5/1/12.) 

Second PCR Proceeding – On May 10, 2012, Petitioner filed, through counsel, 

his second PCR Petition (Exhibit FF), seeking leave to file a delayed notice of appeal, 

 

1

The State argued that Rule 32.5 required “a defendant who files a petition for 

postconviction relief to include in the petition ‘every ground known to him or her for 

vacating, reducing, correcting or otherwise changing all judgments or sentences imposed 

upon him or her, and certify that he or she has done so." (Exhibit DD, Mot Dismiss at 1-

2.) Rule 32.5 was amended in 2013 to remove that requirement. See Ariz. Sup. Ct. 

Order No. R-13-009, available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/20/2013%20Rules 

%20Nov/R130009.pdf, last accessed 8/14/5.

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asserting that Petitioner had been refused access to resources to file such a notice until 

January 10, 2011, resulting in dismissal of the appeal as untimely. Without objection by 

the State, the Petition was granted, and Petitioner was granted leave to file a delayed 

notice of appeal. (Exhibit GG, M.E. 5/22/12.) 

E. PROCEEDINGS ON DELAYED DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner then filed his delayed direct appeal. Counsel filed an Opening Brief 

(Exhibit W) pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1969) and related state 

authorities, asserting an inability to find an issue to appeal. Petitioner then filed a pro 

per Opening Brief (Exhibit X), arguing: (1) prosecutorial misconduct in opening and 

closing statements; (2) an insufficient indictment; (3) improper amendment of the 

indictment; (4) lost jurisdiction as a result of the amendment; (5) lack of jurisdiction 

based on failure of the trial judge to take his oath of office; and (6) errors in the jury 

instructions.

On September 5, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum 

Decision (Exhibit Y), asserting a review of the “entire record” and an inability to find 

“fundamental error.” The court found any misstatements in the opening statements were 

rendered harmless, and their harmlessness was demonstrated by the acquittals, and the 

other claims of misconduct were baseless or harmless. Challenges to the indictment were 

waived by failure raise them, and rendered moot by the acquittal on the charge, and did 

not affect the guilty verdicts. The allegations regarding the judges’ oath were deemed 

unsupported, and under Arizona’s de facto officer doctrine, waived by failure to 

challenge them earlier. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit Z) with the Arizona Supreme 

Court, again raising claims of: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) improper amendment of 

the indictment; (3) the trial judge lacked jurisdiction because he hadn’t immediately 

upon appointment taken his oath of office, and his appointment then lapsed. On 

February 6, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Exhibit AA.) 

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F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 24, 2014 (Doc. 1). As summarized 

in the service Order, Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges a claim for prosecutorial 

misconduct in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that the 

indictment was insufficient. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges 

that the judge lacked jurisdiction because he had not taken the oath 

of office at the time of Petitioner’s trial. In Ground Four, Petitioner 

alleges that the judge ignored the law in charging the jury.

(Order 10/8/14, Doc. 5 at 2 (emphasis added).) 

Response - On January 6, 2015, Respondents filed their Limited Answer (Doc. 

11). Respondents argue that Ground 1 is without merit, Grounds 2 and 3 are not 

cognizable on habeas review, and Ground 4 is procedurally defaulted.

Reply - On February 2, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 12). Petitioner 

argues: (1) Ground Two is founded upon his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; (2) Ground Three is founded upon Article 6, Section 3 of the U.S. 

Constitution; (3) Petitioner has exhausted a variety of avenues to exhaust his claims 

regarding the lack of jurisdiction, including letters to various executive officers (the 

Governor, Attorney General, and County Attorney), and filed a Petition for Special 

Action with the Arizona Court of Appeals; (4) the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of 

his claims on insufficiency of the evidence are contrary to Ex-parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 

(1887), overruled by U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); (5) failure to fairly present the 

claim in Ground 4 under federal law was the result of his lack of legal resources and 

surprise at rejection of his state law claim; and (6) his claims of prosecutorial misconduct 

are supported by the record.

/ /

/ /

/ /

/ /

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND ONE: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

1. Arguments

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by: 

(1) telling jurors in opening statements that the only reason the state had not prosecuted 

the 2006 case until May 2011 was because the State was waiting on DNA evidence, a 

false claim because DNA testing results had been returned long before; (2) offering her 

own “testimony” in opening statements that Petitioner believed he had trial the day of the 

arson; (3) vouching for witnesses by arguing C.C. and S.F. had no motive to lie; and (4) 

a laundry list of citations to the record, devoid of argument. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6, 12-

14.)

Respondents argue that, as found by the Arizona Court of Appeals, this claim is 

without merit because there was no misconduct and any error was harmless. 

Respondents argue that the comments on the failure to prosecute earlier were not 

violative of the trial court’s order, any error was rendered harmless by trial counsel’s 

rebuttal in opening statements and the ultimate acquittal on the sexual assault charges. 

(Answer, Doc. 11 at 21-22.) With regard to the “testimony” on Petitioner’s belief as to 

the trial date, Respondents argue that any error was rendered harmless by refuting 

evidence presented by the defense, the prosecutor’s admissions on the topic in closing 

argument, and an instruction to the jury on counsel’s request. (Id. at 24.) With regard to 

the vouching, Respondents argue that the comments were not vouching, but proper 

comments on the evidence, and rendered harmless by the trial court’s instructions, and 

the harmlessness is demonstrated by the acquittal on the sexual assault and other charges.

(Id. at 24-25.) Finally, Respondents argue that Petitioner fails to show prejudice. (Id. at 

25-28.)

Petitioner replies that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, and in light of the weak 

evidence against Petitioner, prejudice has been shown. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 4.) 

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2. Standards of Review

Standard Applicable on Habeas - While the purpose of a federal habeas 

proceeding is to search for violations of federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every 

error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

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where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

3. Applicable Law on Prosecutorial Misconduct

Denial of Fair Trial - Generally, in assessing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 

on habeas, the appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus 

is "the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power." 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 

416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). “The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' 

[misconduct] ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Donnelly). See also, Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 

704 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In applying Darden, the Ninth Circuit has employed a two-step inquiry: (1) were

the prosecutor's actions improper; and (2) if so, was the trial rendered “fundamentally 

unfair.” Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir.2000). 

Prosecutorial misconduct must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial 

of the defendant's right to a fair trial." Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)(quoting 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 843 

(9th Cir. 1995). The misconduct is reviewed in the context of the entire trial. See Greer 

v. Miller, 483 U.S. at 765-66 (a single question, an immediate objection, and two 

curative instructions "clearly" indicated the prosecutor's improper question did not 

violate due process); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 639, 643 (1974).

But we do not grant habeas petitions solely because a prosecutor 

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erred. Our aim is not to punish society for the misdeeds of the 

prosecutor; rather, our goal is to ensure that the petitioner received a 

fair trial. We grant habeas relief for prosecutorial misconduct only 

when the misconduct prejudiced the petitioner. We determine 

whether the petitioner suffered prejudice by placing the improper 

comments in the context of the entire trial. To do that, we look to 

the weight of the evidence submitted against Trillo, the prominence 

of the erroneous comments in the entire trial, whether the 

prosecution misstated the evidence, whether the judge instructed the 

jury to disregard the comments, whether the comment was invited 

by defense counsel in summation, and whether defense counsel had 

an adequate opportunity to rebut the comments. In examining those 

suggested areas of concern, we evaluate whether there was a 

“reasonable probability” that the jury would have reached a 

different result without the offending comments. 

Trillo v. Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

Finally, when evaluating whether a prosecutor’s conduct denied a defendant a fair 

trial, the court must consider the cumulative effect of various incidents of misconduct. 

“Even when separately alleged incidents of prosecutorial misconduct do not 

independently rise to the level of reversible error, “[t]he cumulative effect of multiple 

errors can violate due process.” Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065, 1082 (9th Cir.2009).) 

Forms of Prosecutorial Misconduct – The courts have never enumerated a 

definitive list of actions which qualify as misconduct. See Generally Gershman, 

Prosecutorial Misconduct (2d ed.) (identifying 13 major categories of prosecutorial 

misconduct); id. at Chapter 11 (identifying 39 categories and subcategories of 

misconduct in summation).

But, Petitioner’s arguments touch upon two key areas: (1) asserting facts not 

supported by the evidence; and (3) vouching for witnesses. Even in these areas, 

however, explicit guidelines for determining misconduct are few, and generally focus, 

properly, on the effect upon the fairness of the trial.

Arguing Facts Not Supported by Evidence – “A prosecutor is not permitted to 

comment on matters outside the record. By going beyond the record, the prosecutor 

becomes an unsworn witness, engages in extraneous and irrelevant argument, diverts the 

jury from its proper function, and seriously threatens the defendant's right to a fair trial.” 

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Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra at § 11:32. See Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 

415 (1965) (error in permitting prosecutor to read statement of co-defendant in 

questioning, in the face of co-defendant’s insistence on right to not testify); Frazier v. 

Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (no error in inclusion of expected testimony in opening 

statements, even though witness ultimately insisted on right to not testify). 

Vouching - “Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a 

witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity, or suggesting that 

information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony.” United States v. 

Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993) (as amended). 

Bad Faith – Petitioner makes allegations that the prosecutors acted in bad faith. 

While bad faith may be relevant to finding misconduct, it does not mandate relief 

because “the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial 

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 

4. Ground 3A – Delay in Prosecution

a. Factual Background

Prior to trial, the State filed a Motion in Limine, seeking an order “precluding the 

defense from eliciting testimony through witnesses or during opening and closing 

arguments that the Maricopa County Attorneys' Office declined to file charges against 

the defendant and to preclude opinion testimony from any investigator regarding the 

believability of the victim.” (Exhibit HH, MIL at 3.) The State argued that such 

evidence was not relevant. The motion was granted without opposition. (Exhibit II, 

M.E. 5/18/10.)

During opening statements, however, the prosecutor raised the issue:

Now, the initial responders who came to the hospital are the 

ones who oversee the investigation. . . . Back in 2006, it was a 

Detective named Carl Martin. So he was the one who became 

assigned to investigate the crime of the male nurse who sexually 

assaulted [C.C.]. And he’ll tell you that these types of cases are 

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extremely hard to investigate and extremely difficult to prosecute. 

Back in 2006, he’ll tell you the Phoenix Crime Lab was backed up 

for months, so backed up that there was no way that biological 

evidence . . . could be analyzed in a quick manner. And you’ll hear 

that the DNA crime lab was so backed up that they had to send the 

specimens over to another lab for analysis. So without that 

information, Detective Martin’s hands were tied, and unfortunately 

for [C.C.], her case lay dormant. It lay silent, and this male nurse 

amazingly gets away with a crime. He’s a free man, and he still has 

his nursing license. And that’s where we are in 06. 

(Exhibit D, R.T. 5/26/10 at 176–77.)

During Petitioner’s subsequent opening remarks, defense counsel responded to 

the prosecutor’s statements resulting in an objection: 

MR. COUNTRYMAN: . . .[The prosecutor] says that, 

well, there was a . . . delay in the investigation. You heard the State 

tell you, I hope you wrote it down because if you didn’t, write it 

down now; the State told you in their opening statement there was a 

delay in the process of the DNA in this case and so it sat dormant; 

you heard that. Write it down because it’s not true. 

The delay in this case was because of Ms. Coulter’s 

refusal to cooperate with the Nursing Board. All she did was 

threaten a lawsuit and call News Channel 3. That was her reaction. 

And let me talk to you a little bit about the person she called to help 

her.

* * * 

And so there’s 2006 case which they claim was 

delayed. They said that to you, that it was delayed because of DNA. 

It is completely untrue. They didn’t file the case because of refusal 

to cooperate, and the lead detective in that case didn’t believe the 

victim; she wrote it in the – –

MS. WU: Objection

MR. COUNTRYMAN: They opened the door, Your 

Honor.

THE COURT: I don’t think so. We’ll discuss this 

after the - -

MS. WU: State moves to strike. State moves to 

strike.

THE COURT: Go to another area please, Mr. 

Countryman.

(Id. at 193, 197.) At the conclusion of opening remarks, the trial court instructed the 

jury:

THE COURT: Thank you, Countryman. 

Ladies and gentlemen, let me make two comments, 

and then I'll tell you what we're going to do next. I told you earlier 

that the statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence. The 

purpose of an opening statement is designed merely to give you a 

road map or to tell you what counsel expect the evidence might 

might [sic] show. 

You've still heard no evidence in the case; none. This 

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is just a guide by both parties to try to give you some framework or 

outline within which to put what the evidence is in the case. You've 

heard no evidence at all. You'll have to decide the case based on the 

evidence; excuse me. Arguments and statements of counsel are not 

evidence. I hasten to remind you about that.

(Id. at 208.) The jury was eventually excused, and the trial court addressed the parties as 

follows:

Hey, look; this is not nice new torpedo on the trial 

judge unexpectantly [sic]. Listen on both sides. On May 18th, I 

granted the State’s motion to preclude any mention of the prior 

charges reviewed but not filed for victim [C.C.] without opposition 

by the defendant. That was my ruling. 

So following that ruling, sure as heck, prosecutor gets 

up and argues to the jury: Well, reason we didn’t file any evidence 

is because there was a back–up in the crime lab and we wanted to 

process the DNA evidence, but the Phoenix Crime Lab says there is 

no way we’re going to get any evidence to you because it’s going to 

take like forever and forty–eight days, and we’ll never get it back to 

you, so we decided not to file charges; thereby giving Mr. 

Countryman the brilliant and perfect opportunity to say: No, the 

reason you didn’t file charges was because the detective reviewed 

[C.C.’s] testimony and thought that she was a liar and didn’t believe 

a word she said. 

Now what I’ve got is the State taking advantage of a 

ruling I made in the State’s favor to open the door to permit 

[defense counsel] to make an argument, which I specifically told 

him not to. 

(Id. at 210–211.) The state then argued that the motion was directed at evidence on the 

investigator’s “personal opinion of not believing [C.C.]” and the charging decision by 

the County Attorney’s Office. (Id. at 211-212.) The state argued that the prosecution’s 

opening statement was not to assert that the delay in testing was the “sole reasons that 

this case was not charged.” (Id. at 212.) After argument by the defense, the trial court 

concluded:

THE COURT: Listen, sit down. I heard the state's 

opening statement. Whether it was intentional or not, the impression 

clearly left in my mind and in the minds of the jury, and I don't want 

to have to order a transcript and go back and peruse every word, but 

the impression parlayed to me...that [the prosecutor] was saying 

because of the crime lab back-up, we decided not to file the charges 

on the [C.C.] matter. And I realize you can argue differently. 

I know there was an issue in your mind -- motion, sort 

of sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander argument; we tell the 

jury to ignore the decision to charge. 

You're also asking me to tell the jury to ignore the 

decision not to charge and just keep that out of the evidence. I think 

Mr. Countryman had to say what he said to the jury. I would have, if 

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I were in Mr. Countryman's position. The objection that [the 

prosecutor] made was overruled, so the argument will stand. I don't 

think anything more needs to be done here, but 1'm going to tell 

both sides right now that it's either – the charging decision is either 

going to be in the case or it's going to be out of the case, all right, 

but it's not going to be halfway in the case and halfway out of the 

case. All right. 

And if the State wants to argue that there was a crime 

lab back-up and somebody says it's going to take too long to get the 

stuff back, then as far as I'm concerned, it's fair game for Mr. 

Countryman to argue until the cows come home that the police 

didn't believe the victim, that the County Attorney didn't believe the 

police officer, that the County Attorney didn't believe the victim, or 

the County Attorney didn't believe in the County Attorney, or 15 of 

any other 80,000 reasons why the case wasn't charged, but it's either 

going to be in the case or out of the case. 

* * *

But I'm going to warn Ms. Wu and Mr. Telles, if you 

want to get into this in trial or you start talking about crime lab 

back-ups and delays in the face of the statement that's already been 

made to the jury that this is why we didn't charge, then we're going 

to have a problem precluding Mr. Countryman from representing 

his client in my court to rebut the inference that the charges weren't 

filed because of the crime lab back-up.

(Id. at 214-216.) 

In closing arguments, the prosecutor again posited a theory for failing to bring the 

charges in 2006. “Connie's incident happened four years ago. And you know that four 

years ago, it wasn't thoroughly investigated.” (Exhibit N, R.T. 6/15/10 at 129.) Defense 

counsel eventually objected (having reserved his objections as directed by the trial 

court), and asserted that not only was the reference to an incomplete investigation 

improper, but the remarks in opening statement about delayed DNA was improper and 

justified a mistrial. (Id. at 136-137.) Over objection by the prosecution that doing so 

immediately after the prosecution’s argument amounted to an admonishment of the 

prosecution, the trial court instructed the jury again on the issue: 

THE COURT: ...Folks, I want to say a couple things 

to you before we proceed. At the beginning of the case, I told you 

that you have to decide the facts from evidence presented in court. 

Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, documents, and other 

exhibits or facts agreed to by the parties. That’s on the top of page 

eight of your preliminary instructions. 

I also directed you that statements or arguments made 

by the lawyers in the case are not evidence. We talked about that. 

This applies to both the State’s and the defendant’s arguemnts [sic]. 

And I told you at the beginning of the trial, you have to make your 

decision based upon what you recall of the testimony. That’s what 

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you determine. It applies to both sides. Both arguments - - both 

counsel are entitled to take certain inferences, flexibility of their 

final arguments, but keep in mind, you’re the judges of what facts 

are, and the statements of either counsel are not evidence.

(Id. a 140). 

Defense counsel then proceeded with his closing arguments, and eventually 

addressed the issue again.

MR. COUNTRYMAN: . . . And what the State told 

you in their opening statement was, this 2006 case was delayed. 

Remember when they told you it was delayed because of the DNA, 

there was some delays in the DNA and it stopped this case from 

proceeding? Well, we know that wasn’t true, because we know by 

December 2006, the DNA results were done and you heard from 

Detective Martin, who was the investigating officer in that case, and 

now come fast-forward, and the State makes statements in their 

opening statements that they can’t prove, and now what they will 

tell you is that case wasn’t fully investigated. That’s their position 

now.

Well, we know that’s not true, as well. We know the 

DNA test was done and completed in December of 2006. We know 

Connie Colter was interviewed twice. We know James Williams 

was interviewed twice. We know all of the nurses were 

interviewed. We have - - no medical records were obtained. We 

know that everything - - oh, and by the way, Detective Nelson, who 

actually is the one who filed charges in this case in 2009 or 

submitted charges for filing, we know he didn’t do anything except 

get the DNA, pick up the DNA, and look at it and misinterpret it.

So once again, the State has stood up here in front of 

you and made a representation about a fact that is not true. And I 

would submit to you the case was not submitted and it wasn’t filed 

because there was no - - there was not enough evidence to charge it. 

And nothing has changed, and nothing has changed since that 

determination in 2006; nothing has changed on that case.

(Exhibit N, R.T. 6/15/10 at 146-147.) In addressing the testimony from the victim C.C., 

counsel argued: 

And then the State claims to you in their opening that the case 

wasn’t filed because of the DNA. Not true. You’ll have Exhibits 

63 and 64, and look at the dates.

The DNA is done in December of 2006. There is 

some follow-up tests ordered, but its basically done in about four 

months. Okay. And you’ll note that in that case, 2006 case was not 

filed until January of 2009. So the only inference from that we can 

take is that that case was proven to be false and nothing has changed 

since then.

(Id. at 155.) 

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 b. State Court Decision

The Arizona Court of Appeals found:

The trial court considered the prosecutor's statements and, as 

a curative measure, permitted defense counsel to tell jurors in his 

opening statement that the comments about the 2006 case were lies 

and that DNA results had in fact been received but not pursued by 

the police department based on a lack of cooperation by the victim. 

(Exhibit Y, Mem. Dec. at 7.) The court opined:

The trial court was in the best position to determine the 

effects of the prosecutor's comments on the jury. In reviewing acts 

of prosecutorial misconduct, the question "is whether the 

misconduct affected jury's ability to fairly assess the evidence." 

Because Williams was acquitted of the sexual assault charges, it is 

clear that any misstatements about the 06 matter did not prejudice 

Williams. 

(Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted).)

c. Application of Law

Misconduct - Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

misconduct because the record does not reflect a violation of the trial court’s order. 

(Answer, Doc. 11 at 21.) The undersigned is not convinced. 

It is true that the State’s motion was very specific in its request to preclude 

evidence on only two issues: (1) the Maricopa County Attorneys' Office decision to 

decline the prosecution in 2006, and (2) investigators’ opinions on the believability of 

C.C., and the trial court’s order simply granted that motion. (See Exhibit HH, MIL; 

Exhibit II, M.E. 5/18/10.) Had the prosecutor simply referenced delays in obtaining 

DNA results, it might be accepted that the comments were simply art of the res gestae. 

But, instead, the prosecutor explicitly referenced the fact that “these types of cases 

are...extremely difficult to prosecute.” (Exhibit D at 176.) It is also plain that the 

prosecution was attempting to interject into the minds of the jury the County Attorney’s 

Office rationale for not bringing the case earlier, despite having sought to preclude that 

very evidence as irrelevant. To the extent that the assertion did not violate the letter of 

the trial court’s order, it certainly violated its spirit and was a repudiation of the State’s 

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basis for seeking the order, i.e. the lack of relevance of such matters.

Nor does it appear that either the trial court or the Arizona Court of Appeals were 

convinced. The trial court concluded that the prosecution was “taking advantage of a 

ruling I made in the State’s favor,” by trying to interject the issue while at the same time 

seeking to preclude the defense from rebutting it. (Exhibit D, R.T. 5/26/10 at 214-216.) 

At a minimum, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered the prosecution’s references to 

the 2006 prosecution as “misstatements.” (Exhibit Y, Mem.Dec. at 7.) 

Prejudice – On the other hand, Petitioner proffers nothing to refute the 

determination of the Arizona Court of Appeals that there was no prejudice. 

The net effect of the proceedings on this issue is demonstrated by the fact that the 

jury acquitted Petitioner on the sexual assault charges, as well as other substantial 

charges. At least on these charges, the favorable result precludes a finding (at least in 

Petitioner’s favor) that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the 

offending statements. 

Even with regard to the offenses on which Petitioner was convicted, the 

culmination of events surrounding this issue demonstrate the Petitioner was not denied a 

fair trial. 

The defense was able to effectively turn the prosecution’s error to its benefit by 

forcefully asserting (“write it down”) to the jury the very thing that the prosecution had 

hoped to avoid, namely that the 2006 complaint had not been prosecuted for reasons 

other than delays in the DNA, including the intransigence and lack of credibility of the 

complainant. In addition, the defense was able to argue specifically that there had been 

no delay in the DNA. Indeed, defense counsel even sought, belatedly and 

unsuccessfully, to withdraw a successful objection when C.C. began to testify that the 

detective told her the DNA testing was delayed. (Exhibit E, R.T. at 64-65.) And, in 

closing arguments, defense counsel forcefully used the prosecution’s statements against 

it, pointing to the repeated failure to present evidence to support its asserted reasons for 

not prosecuting in 2006, and asserting that the real reason was “there was not enough 

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evidence to charge it.” (Exhibit N, R.T. 6/15/10 at 147.) 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that although not a panacea, 

appropriate instructions may avoid the harm from prosecutorial misconduct. See e.g. 

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 (1987) (“a single question, an immediate objection, 

and two curative instructions” sufficient to avoid due process violation). Here, the trial 

court repeatedly instructed the jury that the opening statements, and closing arguments, 

were not evidence. The final instruction on this issue came directly on the heels of the 

prosecution’s closing argument. 

In sum, rather than being denied a fair trial by the prosecutions’ references to the 

delay, the door was opened for the defense to paint the prosecution as attempting to 

explain away its weak case with factually unsupported excuses and to present powerful 

arguments on the lack of credibility of the prosecutor.

5. Ground 3B – “Testifying” About Trial Date

a. Factual Background

During opening statements, the prosecutor made the following statements 

regarding the plot to commit the arson:

Now, what is imperative, what ...the defendant continues to stress 

to [co-conspirator] Swan is that this has to be taken care of by 

March 19th. March 19th is the important day. It is the day when the 

defendant believes he was set for trial for sexual assault. And you'll 

hear that he was mistaken. 

You'll hear that before cases go to trial, there is pretrial 

conferences with the Court, there are status conferences with the 

Court, there is meetings with the Court and while they -- while, yes, 

there was a court proceeding on March 19, 2009, you'll hear that it 

wasn't a trial and that in actuality, it was just a pretrial conference 

with the Court. So although he got it wrong in his mind, it was what 

he thought was his trial date.

(Exhibit D, R.T. 5/26/10 at 186-187.) 

During trial, after an unrecorded conference with counsel, the trial court 

pronounced to the jury:

THE COURT: I'm entitled to instruct you that you should accept as 

a fact that the defendant, Mr. Williams, was present in the Maricopa 

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County Superior Court on March 19, 2009. Okay. You should take 

that as a fact established for purposes of the case. I'm taking judicial 

notice of that fact, and it is a fact.

(Exhibit J, R.T. 6/8/10 at 163.) Later, after the jury was excused, the trial court 

addressed counsel:

THE COURT: Sit down. I want to have a chat with 

you about two things. First thing is, I want the record to reflect an 

unrecorded bench conference when counsel asked to approach. 

Ms. Wu showed me a minute entry dated March 19th, 

2009. It was a minute entry of a complex case scheduling 

conference and reflected that Mr. Williams, Mr. Feldman, Ms. Wu 

were all present in my courtroom. Over Mr. Countryman's 

objection, I was asked to take and did take judicial notice of the 

Court's own record. I have confirmed with my clerk that this is an 

accurate minute entry, and that led up to my instructing the jury 

over Mr. Countryman’s objection that the defendant was present in 

court. I did not say my Court. It was in the Superior Court on March 

19th. That’s the first item.

(Id. at 181-182.) The following day, in cross-examination of Petitioner’s ex-wife, 

defense counsel elicited the following testimony:

Q. BY MR. COUNTRYMAN: And you know that this bond 

hearing finally got set; correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And this bond hearing was on March 19th; correct. 

* * * 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

Q. BY MR. COUNTRYMAN: Well, you went to a bond 

hearing on March 19th; didn't you? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you had conversations with Mr. Williams about the 

bond hearing that's going to take place; isn't that right? 

A. Yes.

Q. And in that period in January when he got arrested until --

up until March, that bond hearing, there was only a couple of 

months; isn't that right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And in that couple of months, Mr. Williams never told 

you he was going to trial on March 19th; did he?

A . No. 

Q. And you knew he wasn't going to trial on March 19th isn't 

that right? 

A. Correct. 

Q. The issue on March 19th was whether or not he was going 

to get bond set so you or you guys could get him out pending the 

charges; correct? 

A. Correct.

* * * 

Q. And James never told you he was going to trial; did he? 

A. No. 

Q. You did have conversations with James about speedy trial 

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rights? Do you remember talking to him about speedy trial rights? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you remember specifically talking to James about, 

well, if he exercised his speedy trial rights, he may be able to get to 

trial by June, something of that nature? 

* * * 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

Q. BY MR. COUNTRYMAN: Do you recall that? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And so James gave you no impression that on March 19th, 

that he was going to somehow miraculously have a trial two months 

after being charged; right? 

A. There was no trial for March 19th.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 6/9/10 at 38-41.) On redirect, the prosecution got the witness to admit 

that the bond hearing she remembered attending may have be in February. (Id. at 49-50.) 

Eventually, defense counsel argued that the representation of a belief of trial on 

March 19th hadn’t been proven and that (along with other deficiencies in the 

prosecution’s case) justified a dismissal of the arson related counts. 

And we have no information on what this plot was, Judge. 

Their theory of the case was that Mr. Williams wanted somebody 

killed by March 19th because he thought it was his trial date. They 

didn't present any evidence of that and I’m asking the Judge to 

preclude them from arguing that.

(Exhibit N, R.T. 6/15/10 at 9.) The motions were denied. (Id. at 12.) The Court also 

addressed the defense’s proffer of tapes of jailhouse conversations “to rebut the State's 

argument that Williams thought his trial date was coming up on March 19th.” (Id.) The 

prosecution challenged the proffer:

MR. TELLES: Well, Your Honor, as I state in my 

motion, and Mr. Countryman just acknowledged that any statement 

regarding the defendant's thought of his trial date was stated by Ms. 

Wu during her open evidence, which is not evidence, and he 

acknowledges that we did not present any evidence about whether 

or not it was a court date, what the State did is –

THE COURT: Well, there was already evidence that 

he knew there was a court date.

MR. TELLES: There was a court date, not a trial date. 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. TELLES: He wants to preset this evidence that 

he thought it was his trial which, first of all, it's cumulative. We 

already presented jail tapes. Second, he doesn't get to present selfserving hearsay statements in a way to circumvent having to testify. 

THE COURT: Look, time out. One of the teachable 

moments in this trial, I hope it's for Peggy's furture [sic] career 

where she's going to learn from this trial to be very, very careful 

what she says in opening statement because you can open the door 

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to a manner of things, and it happened at least on two occasions in 

Peggy’s opening in this case, and this is one of them.

And because the matter has been injected, in my view 

improperty [sic] to the jury, it behooves the State to come in here 

on the fourth week of trial and argue that, well, gee whiz, my 

prosecutor colleague just made a misstatemnt [sic] to the jury, 

forgive and forget; assume the rest of your argument is the 

statements of counsel are not evidence. 

I think Ken is entitled. That's fair game, and he can offer it 

for that purpose, and I’m not pursuaded [sic] by that argument. It's 

not going anywhere with me. So my question is: Mechanically, how 

do you want to proceed at this point?

(Id. at 13-14.) Eventually, defense counsel proposed to recall Petitioner’s ex-wife to 

address the issue:

MR. COUNTRYMAN: Well, I don't want to play it. 

That's my point. I don't want to play it. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. 

MR. COUNTRYMAN: So I'm just going to recall 

[Petitioner’s ex-wife], and -- but I won't even ask [her], if the Court 

is telling me that they are going to instruct the jury that they are not 

allowed to argue in closing that he thought it was trial. Then I’m 

not even going to raise that issue. 

THE COURT: I just heard Mr. Telles say that they 

are not going to argue that; right? 

MR. TELLES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Stop. Stop. 

MR. COUNTRYMAN: Okay. Then that's fine. Then 

I'll call [Petitioner’s ex-wife] and cover issues, and I don't think - - I 

won’t even offer the jail tapes now.

THE COURT: You're kinder than I am. My 30 years 

of trial experience tell me when I've had motions to strike opening 

statements, the absolute best thing that can happen to a lawyer is 

when the other lawyer says something in opening statement that he 

or she can’t prove, because there is nothing that's so diminishes a 

lawyer's credibility. 

And, Peggy, I really hope you learn from this by 

making statements to a jury in opening statement because the other 

side, a very good trial lawyer like Countryman, is going to take that 

and destroy you the next time that happens. 

So let's leave that where it is. 

MR. COUNTRYMAN: I'm not saying that's not going 

to happen, but I’m not going to deal with it through the tapes. I can 

deal with it otherwise.

(Id. at 16-17.) Defense counsel did recall Petitioner’s ex-wife.

Q. Okay. And you said he was frustrated. At any point in 

time, from the time he got in jail in January through the process, did 

he -- did his frustration level subside? 

A. Yes. He realized that he was going to be in there for at 

least six to nine months. 

Q. And he talked to you about that; isn't that right? 

A. Yes. 

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Q. And wasn't part of this frustration with his first attorney 

was, his first attorney filed a motion that changed his last day from 

June to October?

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

Q. BY MR. COUNTRYMAN: And he wanted to go to trial 

by June; is that right? 

A. He wanted to go to trial. 

Q. Okay. Now, in your conversations with James, did he ever 

tell you that he thought he was going to trial on March 19th, or the 

day of the hearing, on March 19th? 

A. We had a conversation, and it was about a pretrial for the 

19th. 

Q. But not a trial with witnesses? No? 

A. No. 

(Id. at 31-32.) 

At closing arguments, the prosecutor immediately addressed the March 19th issue, 

albeit without reference to a trial.

THE COURT: ...Ms. Wu, you may make your 

argument, ma'am

MS. WU: Thank you, Judge. The defendant wanted 

and needed for Sandra Fay to be killed. He needed her to be dead, 

because he knew that if she was still alive on March 19th, 2009, that 

he would not be able to go home after his court date.

MR. COUNTRYMAN: Objection; there is no 

evidence of that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Objection is overruled. Please 

continue. 

MS. WU: So he conspired to have Sandra Fay killed 

and a fire bomb was thrown through her window on March 19th in 

the middle of the night. On that night, Sandra Fay, she's asleep in 

her home, in the comfort of her own bed, with her mother who is 

visiting in the bedroom beside her, peaceful, quiet, just an everyday 

night at home, and then all of a sudden, she is woken up to a crash 

through her window and she opened her eyes and sees flames 

allover her room. 

There is fire on her curtains.

MR. COUNTRYMAN: Objection; there were not 

flames all over the room. Move to strike. 

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

Ladies and gentlemen, as I told you previously, 

statements of counsel are not evidence. They are just statements of 

counsel. Okay. Please keep that in mind.

Mr. Countryman, you and Ms. Wu are both going to 

be allowed some opportunity to have flexibility and freedom of 

counsel to argue. You've made two objections in the last seconds. 

At some point, it becomes very disruptive to the point that I may

instruct you to sit down and reserve your objections to the next 

possible recess, and object if you have to, but I'm going to ask both 

counsel to extend the courtesy to the other in their argument. 

Go ahead, Ms. Wu.

(Id. at 81-82.) Later in argument, the prosecutor circumscribed her argument:

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The day before March 19th, bad news. Swan hasn't heard from 

Deason; no confirmation that anything has been done. So he's 

worried; he's concerned. There is nothing he can do at this point, 

because his court day is tomorrow, so he says: You know what, let’s 

just wait and see what happens.

(Id. at 104.) But then again alluded to March 19th as the trial date:

You know, it's in code. You know that what he wanted was for 

Sandra Fay to be killed by March 19th. And about three and a half 

or four weeks ago, we made our opening statements and you heard 

me tell you that he thought March 19th was his trial date, but now 

we have heard all of the evidence and now we know that March 

19th was a court date. So March 19th comes and goes.

(Id. at 105.) After the prosecution concluded, defense counsel asserted his objections:

THE COURT: You wanted to see me. 

MR. COUNTRYMAN: Oh, yeah, Judge. I’m going to -- the 

Court told me to reserve my objections, so the Court -- I'm just 

going to interpose it now with the Court. 

THE COURT: Go ahead. Take your time. 

MR. COUTNRYMAN: First and foremost Judge, with 

regard to the State, I'm going to ask for a curative instruction with 

regard to this March 19th date. The State simply presented no 

evidence about that date. They told the jury in trial that - - in their 

opening statement, that he wanted her killed on March 19th 

because he thought it was his trial date and that he thought he had 

to that day. 

Now, she turned around and says that, well, we learned 

through the course of the case that was a pretrial and now they 

thought that much they needed her to pursue a case. They have 

never presented any information like that, Judge, and now they are 

vouching. It’s disingenuous and inappropriate. I'd ask for a 

curative instruction that the jury should disregard the State's 

argument with regard to the March 19th date and whether or not the 

State could pursue a case without a victim because, first of, it's not 

true.

Second of all, in this case, there are two victims, not one 

victim; and third of all, they presented nothing to say that they 

couldn't pursue a case without a victim, and they didn't present any 

evidence that anybody thought that. They didn't -- they presented 

tons of tapes. My client never said that and it's inappropriate. It's 

improper to change theories and vouch and now say, well, now, we 

believe that they couldn't pursue a case without the victim and he 

wanted her dead, so that's with regard to that.

(Id. at 133-135.) After addressing a number of other objections, counsel concluded:

So based on the completely inappropriate closing statement -- I 

mean, Your Honor, you shut me down. That's fine. You allowed me 

to reserve my objections at the break and that's fine, Judge, but Ms. 

Wu went way far afield in vouching, inappropriately arguing, in 

changing theories, which is vouching, and completely 

misinterpreting and misrepresenting the nature of the evidence in 

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this case based on this Court's prior instructions, Judge.

(Id. at 137-138.) As discussed with regard to Ground 3A, hereinabove, the trial court 

then deferred ruling on the motion for mistrial, and proceeded (over the prosecution’s 

objections) to issue a curative instruction before the defense made its arguments.

In closing arguments, defense counsel addressed the issue:

He doesn't like what his lawyer did in terms of the changes in 

his court date and pushing his court date offer. He did want to -- a 

bond. I think the State and I agreed, although the State claimed in 

their theory that the reason why he wanted to kill Sandra Fay was 

because he wanted her killed so she didn't show up to trial on 

March 19th. 

Well, that was completely disproved and I think the reason 

why that is extremely important is the evidence is going to be pretty 

overwhelming, and you'll see this, is Sandra Fay geting [sic] killed 

wasn't going to help him get released on March 19th. It wasn't 

going to help him get released on March 19th. What he needed 

from Sandra Fay is what Sandra Fay told him during the 

confrontation call.

(Id. at 171.)

b. State Court Decision

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim. The court found:

In terms of the alleged motive for the arson, Williams presented 

evidence that he did not believe he had trial on the day the Molotov 

cocktail was thrown through S.F.'s window.

(Exhibit Y, Mem. Dec. at 7.) The court rejected the claim, concluding:

And Williams had a full and fair opportunity to rebut the State's 

claimed motive for the arson.

(Id. at 7-8.)

c. Application of Law

Misconduct – The Arizona Court of Appeals made no finding on whether the 

prosecution had engaged in misconduct. But, the conduct, admonishments, and curative 

instructions by the trial court demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in repeated and 

blatant misconduct in making representations to the jury which were clearly not 

supported by any evidence in the case.

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Prejudice – The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced, citing the evidence controverting the prosecutor’s opening statements and 

closing arguments. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that this was an unreasonable 

determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of or contrary to Supreme 

Court law.

Further, the trial court issued repeated and pointed curative instructions. “A trial 

judge may cure the effect of improper prosecutorial comments by admonishing counsel 

to refrain from such remarks or by giving appropriate curative instructions to the jury.” 

United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 513 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotations omitted). 

Moreover, as noted by the trial court, a prosecutor’s attempts to offer or argue facts 

which are plainly unsupported by the evidence often backfires. Under the circumstances, 

the likely affect of the prosecutor’s persistence on this point was a loss of credibility with 

the jury, not a decision based on the prosecution’s unsupported assertions. 

6. Ground 3C – Vouching for Witnesses

a. Factual Background

During closing arguments, the prosecutor addressed various means for the jury to 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including their ability to recall details, their 

demeanor, and their motivations. (Exhbiit N, R.T. 6/15/10 at 182-184.) With regard to 

the latter, the prosecution argued:

And then you want to know who has motive to lie, who has a 

financial or who has some kind of gain in this case. [The victim 

C.C] has no motive to lie. Her case happened four years ago. 

Nothing happened four years ago, and she comes to court and she 

testifies? She didn’t sue the hospital; nothing happened in her case 

and she’s coming to court to tell you what she remembers. 

And the same goes for [the victim S.F.]. Although she had 

filed a lawsuit against the hospital, she wants justice. She wants to 

make sure that the defendant is held accountable for everything that 

he's done in the criminal arena and in the civil arena. She wants to 

make sure that she's covered. 

The nurses at the hospital, they don't have any -- they don’t 

really care what happens in this case. They told you what they saw 

and most of them told you they didn't see anything, they didn't know 

anything, they didn't hear anything. And that’s consistent with 

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[S.F.’s] testimony because she had told you that she told no one 

until the day she got home on the 28th. 

The defendant is the only person in this case who has a 

motive to lie. He told you in his -- he told Detective Nelson himself 

someone in this situation has a reason to be deceptive and the fire 

bomb itself proves that he's guilty. 

(Id. at 184.) 

b. State Court Decision

The Arizona Court of Appeals did not explicitly address this particular claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct. Petitioner raised it in his Opening Brief. (See Exhibit X, 

Opening Brief at 16.) 

c. Application of Law

Petitioner misapprehends the nature of vouching. Not every argument about the 

credibility of a witness, including their motives to lie or not lie, constitutes vouching. 

Rather, vouching occurs when the prosecutor’s argument for credibility is ”based upon 

matters outside the record,” United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (prosecutor arguing professional repercussions if investigating agent lied, 

when no evidence in record to support), or asserts the prosecutor’s own personal belief in 

the credibility of the witness, id. at 1147-1148. With regard to the latter, the improper 

message is: “I believe [do not believe] the testimony of Witness A. Therefore you should 

believe [not believe] Witness A too [either].” Id. at 1148.

Here, Petitioner points to none of the factual assertions regarding motivation 

argued by the prosecutor that were not supported by the record. 

Nor does Petitioner point to any language that asserted the personal belief of the 

prosecutor. If Petitioner’s argument were accepted, a prosecutor could never argue facts 

surrounding a witness’s credibility (e.g. a witness’s motives (or the lack thereof) to lie), 

at least in other than purely historical or abstract terms. The prosecutor could never 

recount the evidence and argue that the facts were relevant to assessing credibility. The 

undersigned has found no court limiting a prosecutor’s closing arguments to a purely 

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historical recitation. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show misconduct with regard to this portion 

of Ground 3.

7. Cumulative Effect of Alleged Incidents of Misconduct

As discussed hereinabove, the undersigned has concluded that the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct as asserted in Grounds 3A (delay in prosecution) and 3B (trial on 

March 19th), but not with respect to Ground 3C (vouching). 

Although the impact of the individual instances of misconduct have been 

addressed, the courts must consider the cumulative effects of misconduct. Wood, 693 

F.3d at 1116. 

Here, in the context of the entire trial, the undersigned finds no basis to conclude 

that Petitioner was denied a fair trial. 

As recounted by the Arizona Court of Appeals,2there was substantial evidence 

against Petitioner demonstrating his complicity in the arson, and that the intent was an 

assault on the victim, S.F.. This included the phone calls between Petitioner and his 

friend Swan, the Petitioner’s comments to his wife about a witness dropping dead, the

post-arson conversations between Petitioner and Swan, and Deason’s possession of a 

description of Swan and her address written on Petitioner’s change of counsel form.

In retrospect, the comments regarding the 2006 investigation had little 

prominence in the proceeding. The jury acquitted on the related sexual assault charges 

against the affected victim, C.C., and the other sexual assault charges with regard to the 

victim, S.F.. Although the prosecution argued that the arson and assault were proof of 

guilt on the assaults, thereby tying the sets of charges together, the jury could have 

 

2 Although Respondents have provided the trial transcripts, those transcripts do not 

include transcriptions of the recorded telephone calls introduced in evidence. 

Respondents have not otherwise provided transcripts of the calls, even though they 

constituted the bulk of the prosecution’s case on the arson and assault charges. 

Nonetheless, because Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ characterization of the calls was an unreasonable one, the undersigned accepts 

it. 

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concluded that Petitioner was perfectly innocent of the sexual assault charges and still 

been wholly convinced of guilt on the arson and assault. A wrongly accused defendant 

could be even more likely than a guilty one to want to do away with a complaining 

witness. 

And, although the prosecution plainly misrepresented the evidence, the trial court 

repeatedly, forcefully, and pointedly instructed the jury that counsel’s statements were 

not evidence. 

Defense counsel was not constrained in rebutting the misrepresentations, and in 

fact did so repeatedly, and forcefully.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned cannot find a reasonable probability 

that the jury would have reached a different verdict without the offending comments. 

Accordingly, Ground 3 is without merit and must be denied.

B. GROUND 2 - INSUFFICIENT INDICTMENT

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that the indictment was insufficient. Petitioner 

makes no specific arguments as to any federal constitutional principles in this ground. 

Instead he cites a series of state statutes, rules and cases, the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, and various cases in federal criminal prosecutions. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7, 7a7c). At most, Petitioner makes a concluding remark that “[t]his is a clear violation of the 

Petitioner’s U.S.C.A. V and XIV, as well as the correlative rights under the Az. Const.”3

(Id. at 7c.) 

Respondents argue that Ground 2 is founded upon state law violations and thus 

not cognizable on habeas review. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 7-8.)

In his Reply, Petitioner argues that he was denied his Equal Protection rights by 

the denial of a grand jury indictment, and he was denied adequate notice by the absence 

of an adequate grand jury indictment and lack of a preliminary hearing. (Reply, Doc. 12 

 

3 Although not addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that his 

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated by the “amendment” of 

Count 10 of the Indictment. (Exhibit X, Pro Per Opening Brief at 21.) .

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at 2.)

In evaluating a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition, the habeas court cannot rest 

upon a strict construction of the Petitioner’s language. "We must construe pro se habeas 

filings liberally, and may treat the allegations of a verified complaint or petition as an 

affidavit." Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003).

No Federal Right to Indictment – The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution generally provides that in federal prosecutions, “[n]o person shall be held to 

answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 

of a Grand Jury.” But this provision does not apply to state prosecutions. “Indictment 

by grand jury is not part of the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment that 

apply to state criminal defendants.” Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 

1993). Thus, Petitioner could have properly been prosecuted with no indictment, or a 

wholly defective indictment.

Petitioner argues in his Reply, that the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals 

was contrary to Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887). Under the “contrary to” clause [of 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives 

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state 

court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Here, Bain

dealt with a federal prosecution, which was subject to the Fifth Amendment grand jury 

right. Because Petitioner’s state prosecution was not subject to that right, Bain is 

materially distinguishable and the state court’s decision could not be contrary to that 

decision. 

No Denial of Fair Notice of Charges - On the other hand, “[t]he Sixth 

Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right to be clearly informed 

of the nature and cause of the charges in order to permit adequate preparation of a 

defense.” Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1989). “This guarantee is 

applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

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Id. at n.1 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273–74 (1948)). 

for purposes of AEDPA's “clearly established Federal law” 

requirement, it is “clearly established” that a criminal defendant has 

a right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and applied against the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be informed of any 

charges against him, and that a charging document, such as an 

information, is the means by which such notice is provided. To 

satisfy this constitutional guarantee, the charging document need not 

contain a citation to the specific statute at issue; the substance of the 

information, however, must in some appreciable way apprise the 

defendant of the charges against him so that he may prepare a 

defense accordingly.

Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007).

4

Although citing state law for the proposition, Petitioner argues that “[a]n 

indictment is insufficient as a matter of law when it fails to apprise the defendant of the

crime charged, indefinite, or fails to protect him from further prosecution for the same 

offense.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) However, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his ability 

to prepare a defense was denied because of inadequate notice of the nature and cause of 

the charges. At best, Petitioner complains that an “amendment” to Count 10 of the 

indictment rendered the indictment “ambiguous and indefinite.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Count 10 charged that Petitioner “unlawfully used a wire communication or 

electronic communication, namely a telephone, to facilitate the violation of any felony 

provision.” (Exhibit A at 5.) In preparing final instructions to the jury, the prosecution 

argued for an instruction that referenced the use of the wire or electronic communication 

in a “crime.” (Exhibit M, R.T. 6/14/10 at 88.) Defense counsel objected, the trial court 

opined that the actual crime be substituted, and defense counsel agreed. (Id. at 88-90.) 

The issue was again addressed, and the parties concluded to utilize the word “felonies” 

but to explicitly reference attempted murder and conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder. (Exhibit N, R.T. 6/15/10 at 22-23.) In charging the jury, the trial court 

 

4

It is unclear whether a violation of this portion of the Sixth Amendment is a structural 

error, or trial error subject to a harmless error analysis. See Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 

859, 871 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, judgment rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 1, 190 L. Ed. 2d 1 

(2014) (questioning prior holding of 9th Circuit based on intervening Supreme Court 

cases); and Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1 at n.2 (2014) (declining to address harmless error 

issue discussed below).

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summarized Count 10 as “use of wire communication or electronic communication to 

facilitate a felony violation in this case (alleged attempted murder and alleged 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder).” (Id. at 65.) The Court finally instructed:

The crime of use of wire communication or electronic 

communication requies [sic] proof that the defendant use any wire 

communication or electronic communication to fascilitate [sic] any 

of the following felonies: Conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder, and attempted murder.

(Id. at 73.)

Thus, liberally construed, Petitioner’s contention is that the indictment was 

deficient because it failed to identify the specific felonies being committed when the 

telephone was used, and that it was improperly amended by the jury instructions as the 

close of trial to add those allegations. 

Petitioner fails to suggest, however, that he was ever confused about the nature of 

the felonies contemplated within Count 10. “An indictment should be read in its 

entirety, construed according to common sense and interpreted to include facts which are 

necessarily implied.” United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1983)

(federal prosecution). The remaining counts of the indictment provided the context to 

provide Petitioner notice of the intended underlying offenses. See Echavarria-Olarte v. 

Reno, 35 F.3d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 1994) (allegation of conspiracy to commit drug crime 

sufficient where specific drug crime was alleged in the remainder of the indictment).

Petitioner was acquitted on Count 10. (This was not surprising given his acquittal 

on the two offenses that the trial court instructed were the underlying offenses, the two 

murder related charges.) However, Petitioner argues that because his use of the telephone 

was integral to the prosecution’s case showing his participation in the arson and 

aggravated assault, for which he was convicted, he was harmed by any defects in Count 

10. However, as recognized by the Arizona Court of Appeals, “the elements of the 

offenses alleged in counts 7, 9, and 10 are different.” The notice given by the indictment 

on the arson and aggravated assault charges was not dependent upon the notice of the 

wire communications offense in Count 10, even if they all would eventually rely upon 

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the same evidence. “An indictment must provide the essential facts necessary to apprise 

a defendant of the crime charged; it need not specify the theories or evidence upon which 

the government will rely to prove those facts.” United States v. Cochrane, 985 F.2d 

1027, 1031 (9th Cir.1993). Cf. U.S. v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1987)

(conviction for conspiracy to commit mail fraud not invalid even though the conviction 

on the separate mail fraud charge was unsupported by evidence of use of mails and 

therefore reversed, because other unlisted acts could provide necessary overt acts in 

furtherance of conspiracy). 

Accordingly, any complaint that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated by any original defect or subsequent amendment of Count 10 is without merit.

Improper Amendment – To a large extent, Petitioner simply complains that the 

“amendment” of Count 10 by the refining jury instruction denied his right to a grand jury 

indictment. As noted hereinabove, however, any right to a jury indictment arose under 

state law, and would not provide a basis for federal habeas relief. 

Indeed, a state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if 

he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). “We have repeatedly held that a 

state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the 

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. 

Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Further, it has long been understood that a state may violate its own law without 

violating the due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. Gryger v. Burke, 

334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948).

We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a 

denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state 

court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional 

question. 

Id., 334 U.S. at 731.

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Due Process - On the other hand, an error of state law may be “sufficiently 

egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed 

by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). To sustain 

such a due process claim founded on state law error, a habeas petitioner must show that 

the state court "error" was "so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal 

due process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). To receive review of what 

otherwise amounts to nothing more than an error of state law, a petitioner must argue 

“not that it is wrong, but that it is so wrong, so surprising, that the error violates 

principles of due process”; that a state court’s decision was “such a gross abuse of 

discretion” that it was unconstitutional. Brooks v. Zimmerman, 712 F.Supp. 496, 498 

(W.D.Pa.1989). 

However, Petitioner makes no assertion that any such state law error was 

egregious. At most, he asserts a simple error in determining whether the jury 

instructions amounted to an amendment, and whether that amendment was substantial 

enough to warrant reversal. See e.g. State v. Bruce, 125 Ariz. 421, 610 P.2d 65 (1980) 

(permitting amendments to conform to evidence unless amendment results in change to 

nature of offense charged or prejudice). 

Moreover, by upholding Petitioner’s convictions despite similar arguments, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has effectively found that no improper amendment was 

effected, and this federal habeas court is bound by that state court’s determination of 

state law.

Equal Protection - States are precluded under the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment from denying equal protection of their laws to similarly situated 

persons. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). But, mere misapplication of the law 

or judicial error does not trigger equal protection concerns. The Fourteenth Amendment 

to the Constitution in guaranteeing equal protection of laws, does not assure uniformity 

of judicial decisions or immunity from judicial error Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 

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554-555 (1962). “Were it otherwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would 

constitute a federal constitutional question.” Id. at 554-55. 

Ground 2 is without merit and must be denied.

C. GROUND 3 – JUDGE’S OATH

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that the judge lacked jurisdiction because he 

had not taken the oath of office at the proper times, resulting in the violation of his rights 

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8, 8a-8b.) 

Respondents argue that this claim is a state law claim and thus not cognizable on 

federal habeas review. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 7-8.)

Petitioner replies that his claim arises under Article 6, § 3 of the U.S. 

Constitution. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 2-3.) 

Factual Background – Petitioner argues that the trial judge was appointed to the 

bench by the Governor to serve a term beginning March 30, 1999 but he signed his 

Loyalty Oath of Office one week later, on April 7, 1999. Petitioner appended a copy of 

the Notice of Appointment and Loyalty Oath of Office as Exhibit C to Pro per Opening 

Brief (Exhibit X). Petitioner argued that the next oaths were not until 2007 and 2010.

Petitioner reasons that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-232 (1999) required that the oath of 

office for an appointed officer must be “taken, subscribed and filed” “at least one day 

before commencement of the term of office,” and that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-291(9) 

(1984) deems an office vacant if the appointee fails “to file the person's official oath or 

bond within the time prescribed by law.”5 

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s 

arguments, taking judicial notice of the filed oaths of office from 1999, 2007 and 2010, 

and finding:

The record does not support the suggestion that Judge Gaines 

 

5

Petitioner relies upon other versions of these state statutes, which differ slightly. The 

versions cited herein are those applicable at the time of the trial judge’s original 

appointment.

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commenced his judicial duties before signing the Loyalty Oath of 

Office in 1999 -- only that he signed the oath one week after the 

Governor appointed him. Moreover, Judge Gaines' April 2007 oath 

authorized him to serve during a term of office that encompassed 

Williams' trial and sentencing.

(Exhibit Y, Mem. Dec. at 9.) Moreover, the Court concluded that under the state’s “de 

facto officer” doctrine, any defect in the judge’s appointment was waived by not 

objecting prior to trial. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Lack of Jurisdiction as Violation of Due Process - Due Process (at least under 

the 14th Amendment) requires that a conviction be entered by a court with jurisdiction 

over the case. As early as Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886), the Court noted 

approvingly a Georgia District Court case which had eschewed “the argument that where 

a defendant has been regularly indicted, tried, and convicted in a state court, his only 

remedy was to carry the judgment to the state court of last resort, and thence by writ of 

error to this court.” Instead, the court had concluded: ‘This might be so if the proceeding 

in the state court was merely erroneous; but where it is void for want of jurisdiction, 

habeas corpus will lie, and may be issued by any court or judge invested with 

supervisory jurisdiction in such case. Id. at 254, quoting Ex parte Bridges, 4 F.Cas. 98, 

105 (D.C.Ga. 1875). 

Similarly, in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), the Court discussed the 

limits on habeas review of state law claims and found that “we may not review 

irregularities or erroneous rulings upon the trial, however serious, and that the writ of 

habeas corpus will lie only in case the judgment under which the prisoner is detained is 

shown to be absolutely void for want of jurisdiction in the court that pronounced it, 

either because such jurisdiction was absent at the beginning, or because it was lost in the 

course of the proceedings.” 237 U.S. at 327. 

While a lack of jurisdiction may be grounds to find a violation of due process, a 

federal habeas court is not free to overturn a state court’s finding that it had jurisdiction. 

In Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged 

that it was “axiomatic that we may grant the writ of habeas corpus upon the ground of 

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lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court.” 151 F.3d at 158. The problem lie not with 

finding that a lack of jurisdiction was a cognizable, federal due process claim, but with 

the federal court attempting to overrule a state appellate court’s determination that 

jurisdiction in fact existed under applicable state law. Thus, Wright’s claim was rejected 

because upon review of his challenge to the state court’s jurisdiction, “the Virginia 

Supreme Court, interpreting its own state laws and case law, concluded that it had ‘no 

merit.’” Id. “In fact, even if we were to conclude after an independent review that the 

state court's holding was incorrect, we are nevertheless bound by it as a final 

determination of state law by the highest court of the state.” Wright, 151 F.3d at 158. 

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals has concluded that under Arizona law, the 

trial judge had jurisdiction. That ends the matter for this federal habeas court.

Article 6 § 3 Requirement – In his Reply, Petitioner now argues that not only 

was the defect a violation of Arizona law, but of Article 6, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution. 

That provision requires that “all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States 

and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 

Constitution.” 

“A Traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.” 

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). For this reason alone, this 

claim should be denied.

Moreover, Article 6 § 3 does not mandate a time for the taking of an oath, but 

instead merely requires that one have been made. Petitioner’s allegations show that, at 

the relevant time, i.e. at the time of Petitioner’s trial, the trial judge had taken an oath to 

“support the Constitution of the United States.” (Exhibit X, Pro per Opening Brief at 

Exhibit C, 2007 Loyalty Oath of Office.) 

Thus, no violation of this federal constitutional provision has been shown.

Accordingly, Ground 3 is without merit and must be denied.

/ /

/ /

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D. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT: GROUND 4

In Ground 4, Petitioner argues that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the trial judge issued jury instructions 

defining the felony offenses underlying the wire communications charges in Count 10, 

and that doing so amounted to a comment on the evidence. Petitioner argues that the 

Arizona Court of Appeals failed to address this claim. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) In 

directing a response to this Ground, the Court described the claim as simply asserting 

“that the judge ignored the law in charging the jury.” (Order 10/8/14, Doc. 5 at 2 

(emphasis added).) 

Respondents argue that the facts were asserted in Petitioner’s Opening Brief on 

direct appeal, but they were only asserted as a violation of state law. Consequently, 

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to fairly present his federal claim, thus did not 

properly exhaust his state remedies, and has now procedurally defaulted on them. 

Petitioner replies that he had only Arizona law at his disposal, could not have 

anticipated the state’s failure to enforce its own law, and failure to address this claim will 

lead to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” because he was not afforded equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 4 (quoting Sawyer v. 

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)).) 

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

"A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, 

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(2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for 

the claim." Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petition must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to so alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

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constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Fair Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim 

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) 

that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

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properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 12.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

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trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, Petitioner’s claims in Ground 4 are not of the sort requiring a personal 

waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

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d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Although Petitioner’s direct appeal was delayed, he was allowed to file it and thus 

Paragraph (f) has no application. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has 

not asserted a change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), 

concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims 

Petitioner asserts in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

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4. Application to Ground 4

In the fourth assignment of error in his Pro per Opening Brief, Petitioner argued 

“Did the judge err in charging the jury with respect to matters of fact or commenting 

thereon as opposed to declaring the law.” (Exhibit X at 3.) In arguing this error, 

Petitioner relied upon Article 6 § 27 and Article 2 § 32 of the Arizona Constitution. (Id.

at 35-36.) Petitioner made no reference to any federal law or cases (federal or state).

Assertion of the facts of a claim, without making the federal violation clear, is not 

fair presentation of a claim, and does not result in proper exhaustion. Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

Moreover, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, Petitioner has now procedurally 

defaulted on his state remedies.

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on: (1) his limited access to legal materials; and (2) his surprise at the 

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state court’s failure to enforce state law. He also asserts that failure to address the claim 

will result in a miscarriage of justice.

Lack of Legal Resources - A pro se petitioner may be able to establish cause if 

he can establish a lack of access to the law, as opposed to a lack of knowledge of the 

law. See e.g. Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1992) (remanding for a 

determination of cause where a pro se petitioner’s incarceration in Nevada precluded 

access to Utah legal materials required to challenge a Utah conviction). The petitioner 

must establish, however, that the lack of access resulted in an inability to assert his 

claims. See e.g. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no “cause” 

where despite lack of resources generally, pro se prisoner had not shown personal 

deprivation, and had managed to file other adequate petitions.) 

Here, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he did not have access to specific 

legal resources necessary to identify his federal claims at the time, but to which he has 

since gained access.

Moreover, at the relevant time period, e.g. during his direct appeal when this 

claim should have been raised as a federal claim, Petitioner was represented by counsel, 

and thus not dependent upon the prison law library.

To the extent that Petitioner might argue that his appellate counsel was ineffective 

in failing to raise this claim (rather than filing an Anders brief), “[t]o constitute cause for 

procedural default of a federal habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must first have been presented to the state courts as an independent 

claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not presented 

such a claim to the Arizona courts.

Surprise – Petitioner argues he was unable to anticipate his lack of success on his 

state law claim. The “cause and prejudice” standard is equally applicable to pro se 

litigants. Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Idaho 

State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, any tactical or 

legal error by Petitioner would not establish cause. 

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Moreover, the exhaustion requirement does not permit a litigant to first exhaust 

his remedies on state law claims, and then if unsuccessful to pursue his federal claims. 

While a state might permit such a process, Arizona makes no provision for such 

bifurcated proceedings. To the contrary, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) 

(Preclusion) embodies the expectation that a defendant will bring all claims (without 

distinction between state or federal) on direct appeal (or an original PCR proceeding for 

those claims not raisable on direct appeal, e.g. ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 

unless excepted under Rule 32.2(b).). 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

E. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS CAUSE

Petitioner argues that failure to consider his claim will result in a miscarriage of 

justice.

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

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innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner makes no argument that he is actually innocent, but simply argues 

various errors and constitutional violations at trial. Accordingly his procedurally 

defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

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and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on in part on the merits and in part on 

procedural grounds. Under the reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims 

addressed on their merits are plainly without merit. With regard to the claims addressed 

on procedural grounds, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground 4 of the Petitioner's 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 24, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 24, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DENIED, and this action

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

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within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: August 18, 2015

14-1417r RR 15 04 17 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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