Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02451/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRON WOOLEY and JULIANA

WOOLEY, Parents of E.W., a Minor,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06cv2451 BTM(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING AS MOOT

vs. MOTION TO STRIKE

VALLEY CENTER-PAUMA UNIFIED

SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Local Educational

Agency,

Defendant.

Defendant Valley Center-Pauma Unified School District has filed a motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Complaint as well as a motion to strike. For the reasons discussed below, the

Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DENIES AS MOOT the motion to strike.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Myron and Juliana Wooley are the parents of E.W., a sixth-grader at Lilac

Elementary School. E.W. qualifies for special education due to diagnoses of autism, mild

mental retardation, speech and language impairment, motor delays, visual-perceptual and

attention deficits, and social skill delays. (Compl. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs allege that since the 2002-2003 school year, Defendant Valley CenterPauma Unified School District (“Defendant” or “District”) has failed to offer and provide a free,

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appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to E.W., as required by the Individuals With Disabilities

Educational Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, et seq. On November 4, 2005, Plaintiffs filed

a request for a due process hearing with the California Office of Administrative Hearing

(“OAH”). 

Plaintiffs and the District entered into a settlement agreement (“Agreement”) on

February 17, 2006. (Exh. A to Compl.) Pursuant to the Agreement, the District agreed to

the following: (1) to provide a one-to-one aide during the regular school day; (2) to develop

a plan for conducting and completing a comprehensive autism assessment, an occupational

therapy assessment, and a language and speech evaluation; (3) convene an Individualized

Educational Program team meeting to review the assessments and make an educational

program available for the remainder of the 2005-2006 school year and the 2006-2007 school

year; and (4) pay attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with the due

process action. In exchange, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the due process hearing against

the District and waive all claims made, or that could have been made, through the date of

execution of the Agreement. 

In a letter dated February 27, 2006, counsel for Plaintiffs claimed that the District had

breached the terms of the Agreement and that Plaintiffs were entitled to rescission of the

Agreement. (Exh. C to Comp.) 

On March 28, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a second due process hearing request with the

OAH. However, Plaintiffs withdrew their request on October 19, 2006 to seek relief in this

Court.

On November 6, 2006, Plaintiffs commenced this action. The Complaint asserts

causes of action for (1) rescission of the settlement agreement; (2) a compensatory

education; (3) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act; and (4) attorney’s fees and costs.

Pursuant to a stipulation filed on January 5, 2007, after the filing of Defendant’s

motions, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for rescission and violation of § 1983 and the

Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, the sole remaining claims are for a compensatory education

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and attorney’s fees and costs.

II. DISCUSSION 

Defendant seeks the dismissal of this case on the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs have

failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the IDEA; and (2) Plaintiffs have

failed to join the California Department of Education (“CDE”) and the OAH, indispensable

parties to the action. As discussed below, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs are required to

exhaust their administrative remedies and dismisses the case to allow Plaintiffs to do so.

Under the IDEA, states are required to offer parents of a disabled student procedural

safeguards, including an opportunity to present complaints regarding the student’s

identification, evaluation, placement, or FAPE and, when such complaints are filed, “an

impartial due process hearing . . . by the State educational agency or by the local educational

agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(6), (f). The IDEA also provides that a party aggrieved by the

findings and decision made in a due process case has the right to bring a civil action in a

state or federal district court within 90 days of the decision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). 

Ordinarily, judicial review under the IDEA is available only after the plaintiff exhausts

administrative remedies. Doe v. Arizona Dept. of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1997).

The exhaustion doctrine “embodies the notion that ‘agencies, not the courts, ought to have

primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.’”

Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting McCarthy

v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “Exhaustion of the administrative process allows for

the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full

exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual

record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to

correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.” Id. 

Exhaustion is excused in cases where resort to the administrative process would be

either futile or inadequate. Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303. A plaintiff alleging futility or inadequacy

of the IDEA administrative procedures bears the burden of proof. Robb v. Bethel School

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1

 Courts have held that IDEA’s exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional in nature.

Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir.

2002); E.J. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, motions to dismiss for

failure to exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies are properly brought under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1). A.H. ex rel. M.H. v. New Jersey Dept. of Educ., 2006 WL 3359644 (D.N.J. Nov.

20, 2006); Falzett v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 150 F. Supp. 2d 699 (M.D. Pa. 2001).

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is not

restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review evidence such as affidavits or

testimony to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v.

United States, 850 F.2d 558,560 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 1050 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiffs allege that they are excused from exhausting administrative remedies on the

grounds of futility and inadequacy. Plaintiffs allege that the administrative process is

inadequate because OAH ALJs lack the expertise and knowledge to make appropriate

decisions. 

The IDEA provides that the hearing officer conducting the due process hearing

“possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the provisions of this chapter, Federal

and State regulations pertaining to this chapter, and legal interpretations of this chapter by

Federal and State courts; possess the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in

accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice; and possess the knowledge and ability

to render and write decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice.” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii), (iii), (iv). Plaintiffs express doubt that the OAH ALJs meet this

criteria.

Plaintiffs argue that the OAH website, http://www.oah.dgs.ca.gov/

ALJ+Biographical+Information/default.htm, shows that only six out of eighty ALJs have any

special education training. (Compl. ¶ 6.) In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs

submit the biographical information posted on the OAH website for Judge Darrell Lepkowsky,

the ALJ who was assigned to conduct the second due process hearing. (Exh. B to Request

for Judicial Notice.)1

 Plaintiffs argue that Judge Lepkowsky’s biography does not indicate

that she has any experience or training in special education. 

However, the biographical information posted on the OAH website is not exhaustive.

The biographical information for each ALJ is very brief and generally consists of a summary

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2

 California Education Code § 56505(c)(1) provides that “[t]he hearing shall be

conducted by a person who shall, at a minimum, possess knowledge of, and the ability to

understand, the provisions of this part and related state statutes and implementing

regulations, the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.),

federal regulations pertaining to the act, and legal interpretations of this part and the federal

law by federal and state courts, and who has satisfactorily completed training pursuant to this

subdivision.” 

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of the ALJ’s education and employment history and sometimes lists honors and group

memberships. The biographical information does not purport to contain all relevant training

that the ALJ has received. Therefore, the fact that the biographies do not mention special

education training does not mean that the ALJs have not received such training.

Indeed, as pointed out by Plaintiffs, on the Frequently Asked Questions page

(http://www.oah.dgs.ca.gov/Special+Education/SE-FAQ.htm), the question “Is OAH ensuring

that the ALJs are properly trained pursuant to Education Code section 56505(c)?” is

answered “Yes.”2 Plaintiffs complain that the website does not explain how the ALJs are

trained. However, the website’s lack of specificity does not mean that the ALJs do not

receive adequate training.

The Complaint states that “the ALJs Decisions consistently show that the ALJs do not

understand special education law, and do not know how to write decisions, which has

resulted in every case Plaintiff’s attorney has taken to hearing with OAH being re-filed in

federal court.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) However, Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel’s opinion regarding

the shortcomings of decisions rendered by OAH ALJs is insufficient to establish that

exhaustion would be futile due to the inadequacy of the administrative process.

Moreover, if Plaintiffs believe that the ALJ assigned to hear the case is not qualified,

they may exercise a peremptory challenge or seek disqualification of the ALJ. See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 1, §§ 1034,11512(c) (2007). If Plaintiffs still believe the ALJ presiding over

their case is unqualified, Plaintiffs may raise the issue as a point of error on appeal to the

district court. Plaintiffs have not availed themselves of any of these procedures. 

///

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The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the

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futility or inadequacy of administrative procedures. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not excused from

exhausting their administrative remedies, and this case is dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The Court need not reach Defendant’s argument that the OAH and CDE are

indispensable parties. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk shall enter judgment

dismissing this case without prejudice.

In addition, the Clerk shall file under seal Document Nos. 1-9. The Court ORDERS

the parties to file redacted copies of the Complaint and the motion papers that do not reveal

the full name of the minor. The minor shall be identified as “E.W.” in the pleading caption

and the body of the documents. The Clerk shall amend the docket by removing the minor’s

full name and identifying the minor as “E.W.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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