Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00007/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAM BAILEY, IV, ) 

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CASE NO. 1:13-CV-007-WHA 

)

TONY PATTERSON, et al., ) 

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause of action is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas 

corpus relief initially filed pro se by James William Bailey, IV, (“Bailey”). In this petition, 

Bailey challenges a conviction for murder imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Henry 

County, Alabama on November 19, 2008. On December 19, 2008, the trial court sentenced 

Bailey as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole. 

On February 11, 2016, the undersigned entered a Recommendation that the petition 

be denied and this case dismissed. On February 23, 2016, counsel filed a notice of 

appearance on behalf of Bailey. Subsequently, counsel presented various items of newly 

discovered evidence in an effort to establish Bailey’s actual innocence. She also presented 

newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial conduct regarding the alleged withholding of 

exculpatory evidence. It is undisputed that none of the newly discovered evidence or 

claims related to such evidence have been presented to the state courts for review. 

Specifically, Bailey concedes that he has not filed a successive state post-conviction as 

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permitted by Rule 32.2(b)(2), Ala.R.Cr. P., where, as in this case, the relief is sought 

“within six (6) months after the discovery of the newly discovered materials facts[.]” Rule 

32.2(c).1 In their responses to Bailey’s claims based on newly discovered evidence, the 

respondents argue that Bailey must first exhaust these claims in the state courts by raising 

such claims via the remedy afforded under Rule 32. 

Based on the foregoing, the court entered an order allowing Bailey an opportunity 

to demonstrate why his claims related to newly discovered evidence should not first be 

presented to the state courts for review. Doc. No. 53. In his responses to the exhaustion 

argument, Bailey asserts he prefers that this court address the claims of actual innocence 

and prosecutorial misconduct arising from the newly discovered evidence because he does 

not believe the state courts will provide him a fair review of these claims. 

II. DISCUSSION

The law directs that this court shall not grant relief on a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus “unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 

(2010) (“A petitioner cannot bring a federal habeas claim without first exhausting state 

remedies[.]”). “An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available 

[to him] in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right 

under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(c). “The exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state 

 

1 All of the newly discovered evidence has come into counsel’s possession since February 23, 2016. See Doc. No. 

33 at 3. 

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courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial 

proceedings.... Under our federal system, the federal and state courts [are] equally bound 

to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. Because it would be unseemly in 

our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction 

without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, federal courts 

apply the doctrine of comity, which teaches that one court should defer action on causes 

properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent 

powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had the opportunity to pass upon the 

matter.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (internal citation, quotations omitted

and footnote omitted). The Court therefore determined that “[a] rigorously enforced total 

exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, 

thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error.” 

Id. at 418-419. Finally, the Court emphasized that the habeas statute “provides a simple 

and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be 

sure that you have taken each one to state court.” Id. at 420. 

In order to properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present the 

alleged constitutional violations on which he seeks relief through one “complete round of 

the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 828, 

845 (1999); Doorbal v. Department of Corrections, 572 F.3d 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“A state prisoner may not seek federal habeas review unless he has ‘exhausted the 

remedies available in the courts of the State’ ... [because he] ‘must give the state courts an 

opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a 

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habeas petition.’”), quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 467 (2009) and O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Pearson v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 273 F.

App’x. 847, 849-850 (2008) (“The exhaustion doctrine requires the petitioner to ‘fairly 

present’ his federal claims to the state courts in a manner to alert them that the ruling under 

review violated a federal constitutional right.”), quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

365-366 (1995). 

It is consistent with [the principles of comity, finality and federalism]

to give effect to Congress’ intent to avoid unneeded evidentiary hearings in 

federal habeas corpus, while recognizing the statute does not equate prisoners 

who exercise diligence in pursuing their claims with those who do not. 

Principles of exhaustion are premised upon recognition by Congress and the 

Court that state judiciaries have the duty and competence to vindicate rights 

secured by the Constitution in state criminal proceedings. Diligence will 

require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary 

hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law. “Comity ... 

dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a 

state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the 

first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief.” 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 

(1999). For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate 

federal rights, the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and 

presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails 

to do so, himself or herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair 

adjudication in state court, § 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary hearing to 

develop the relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s other 

stringent requirements are met. Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an 

alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made 

insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings. Yet comity is not served by 

saying a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim” where 

he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In 

that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2).

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437-437 (2000). 

Bailey acknowledges that he has not sought relief available to him under Rule 32 of 

the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure with respect to his claims of actual innocence 

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and prosecutorial conduct premised upon newly discovered evidence. It is clear that Bailey

acting with diligence could present these claims to the state courts via the post-conviction 

remedy provided by Rule 32. Bailey, however, requests that this court ignore his failure 

to exhaust state remedies and address the merits of his claims based on newly discovered 

evidence solely because he believes this court will provide a more favorable forum for 

review of his claims. This assertion is not persuasive. Although the law is well settled that 

“[f]utility of exhaustion is recognized ... as an exception to the exhaustion requirement of 

§ 2254(b)[,]” Howard v. Davis, 815 F.2d 1429, 1430 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 864 

(1987), Bailey’s assertion of futility is nothing more than his personal perception of futility. 

This purely non-objective perception of futility does not exempt Bailey from the 

exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Sundar v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1320, 1325 

(11th Cir. 2003) (“[P]erceived futility is no exception to the exhaustion requirement 

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982) (holding that a 

state prisoner with a claim he “believes will find favor in the federal courts ... may not 

bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim”). 

Upon review of the documents submitted by the parties, the court finds that Bailey 

has failed to properly exhaust an available state court remedy with respect to those claims 

arising from newly discovered evidence. In addition, Bailey has failed to establish that the 

state court remedy is unavailable or that such remedy is ineffective. Consequently, this 

court does not deem it appropriate to rule on the merits of Bailey’s claims related to newly 

discovered evidence without first requiring that he exhaust these claims through the state 

court remedy provided by Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 2254(1)(b)(2). Under the circumstances set forth herein, the court further finds 

that a stay of this case is appropriate pending the outcome of any state court proceedings 

initiated by Bailey on claims relative to newly discovered evidence as he has established

“good cause” for his failure to previously exhaust these claims in prior state court 

proceedings. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petitioner’s Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. No. 37) be GRANTED.

2. The proceedings before this court be STAYED pending exhaustion of the 

available state court remedy with respect to the petitioner’s claims of actual innocence and 

prosecutorial misconduct based on newly discovered evidence. 

3. The Clerk be DIRECTED to administratively CLOSE this case pending 

exhaustion of the petitioner’s available state court remedy for those claims related to newly 

discovered evidence.

2

 

It is further ORDERED that on or before July 13, 2016 the parties may file 

objections to the Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings 

and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, 

conclusive, or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered. Failure 

to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo 

 

2 The parties shall immediately advise the court upon Bailey’s exhaustion of the remedy provided by Rule 32, 

A.R.Cr.P. 

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determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the 

Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by 

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 

667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en 

banc).

 DONE this 24th day of June, 2016.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer

 TERRY F. MOORER

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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