Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01002/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01002-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARCHIE CRANFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUDREY KING, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01002-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING SIGNED FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

(ECF No. 18)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 7 & 18.) Plaintiff has 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) No other parties have appeared 

in the action. 

Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he 

was given leave to amend (ECF No. 8). On October 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a first 

amended complaint (ECF No. 16). On October 27, 2014, the Court struck Plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint because it was unsigned. (ECF No. 17.) The Court instructed 

Plaintiff to file a signed amended pleading within thirty days. (Id.) The Court also noted 

that the unsigned first amended complaint was substantively deficient, advised Plaintiff 

of the legal standards applicable to what appeared to be Plaintiff’s claims, and instructed 

Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies in his amended pleading. (Id.) 

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On November 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a signed first amended complaint. (ECF No. 

18.) Aside from the signature, the pleading is identical to that which the Court found 

substantively deficient. (Compare ECF Nos. 16 & 18.) The Court, therefore, will repeat 

the substance of ECF No. 17.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

As stated, Plaintiff’s allegations are identical to those presented in his prior, 

unsigned pleading. He does not attribute any conduct to any named Defendant. His 

allegations are difficult to understand. He appears to allege he was assaulted by a fellow 

patient at CSH, and later assaulted by friends of the initial assailant. He grieved the 

assaults but was not moved to a single room as he should have been to prevent further 

threats. He does not request any specific relief.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court’s order striking Plaintiff’s unsigned pleading provided the legal 

standards applicable to what appeared to be Plaintiff’s claims, and instructed him to cure 

the noted deficiencies. (ECF No. 17.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s signed first amended 

complaint is identical to the prior, deficient pleading. The Court will again identify the 

legal standards applicable to, and deficiencies in, Plaintiff’s complaint.

A. Procedural Deficiencies

The signed first amended complaint fails to name Defendants liable for the 

conduct alleged, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), and fails to demand any relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(3).

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to do so, he should identify 

the Defendants against whom he intends to proceed, as well as the relief requested.

B. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

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588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Plaintiff has not named the Defendants who allegedly violated his rights nor 

explained how any unnamed Defendants participated in, directed, or failed to respond to 

a known rights violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th 

Cir. 1991); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff 

may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the 

supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her 

subordinates.”).

Plaintiff twice has been advised of this deficiency. If he chooses to amend he 

must allege facts linking each named Defendant to a violation of his rights. 

C. Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment provides the standard for evaluating the 

constitutionally protected interests of individuals who have been involuntarily committed 

to a state facility. Rivera v. Rogers, 224 Fed. Appx. 148, 150–51 (3d Cir. 2007); see

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312 (1982). In determining whether the 

constitutional rights of an involuntarily committed individual have been violated, the court 

must balance the individual’s liberty interests against the relevant state interests, with

deference shown to the judgment exercised by qualified professionals. Youngberg, 457 

U.S. at 320-22. 

Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected 

by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 315. He is “entitled to 

more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 

conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that 

courts ensure that professional judgment was exercised. Id. at 321-22.

A “decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be 

imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from 

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accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 

person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 322–

23. The professional judgment standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that 

required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of conscious indifference amounting to gross 

negligence.” Ammons v. Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citations and emphasis omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges that he twice was assaulted by fellow patients, and that 

unspecified Defendants should have, but did not, place him in a single room to prevent 

further threats. These allegations do not include sufficient facts for the court to analyze 

the claim under the above standards. Plaintiff does not explain the nature and extent of 

any risk, who posed the risk, when and to what extent any Defendant with knowledge of 

the risk was able to, but failed to, respond, and how this caused harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff 

implies that Defendants were aware of assaults on him because Plaintiff filed complaints 

regarding the assaults. However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that any 

Defendants were aware of these complaints. 

The Complaint does not indicate that any Defendants exhibited a conscious 

indifference amounting to gross negligence. See Ammons, 648 F.3d at 1029. While 

Plaintiff has a liberty interest in safe conditions of confinement, Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 

315, and care that is professionally acceptable, id. at 321, his allegations are not 

sufficient to state a claim under applicable standards.

Plaintiff twice has been advised of this deficiency. If he chooses to amend, he 

should allege facts demonstrating how named Defendants were indifferent to his safety 

and thereby caused him harm. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The signed first amended complaint does not name Defendants, demand any 

relief, or state any cognizable claim.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended 

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complaint that cures the noted deficiencies. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Although 

accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, Plaintiff may not 

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's signed first amended complaint (ECF No. 18) is DISMISSED for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his signed first amended complaint filed 

November 4, 2014, 

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service 

of this order, and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and 

failure to prosecute. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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