Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04006/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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F I L~ D 

Unit.ed Sta.t'a?B Court of Appeals 

Tenth ('ir<'ui~ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MA'( 1 5 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEE 

Clerl: 

JOHN A. DAHLSTROM; MARYLIN H. ) 

DAHLSTROM; ALEXCO, a limited ) 

partnership; TRACY BANCORP, a ) 

Utah corporation; and TRABANC, ) 

a Utah corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ) 

CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

No. 91-4006 

(D.C. No. 87 -CV- 719-S) 

(D . Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, District 

Judge.** 

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered on behalf 

of the defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver 

for the First Republic Bank of Dallas. The court held that 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, Senior District Court Judge for the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-4006 Document: 010110249171 Date Filed: 05/15/1992 Page: 1
plaintiffs' state common law claims against Republic for estoppel, 

bad faith, duress, and conspiracy could not be asserted against 

the FDIC under the doctrine of D'Oench, Duhme & co. v. FDIC, 315 

U.S. 447 (1942), and 12 u.s. c . § 1823(e). This ruling was based 

upon the district court's finding that the plaintiffs' claims were 

grounded in oral agreements undocumented in Republic's records. 

We agree with the district court's analysis and affirm. 1 

This action was originally commenced against Republic on 

various federal statutory and state common law claims allegedly 

arising from or related to certain loan and security agreements 

between plaintiffs and Republic. Plaintiffs sought to have 

enforcement of the loan agreements estopped; to have their 

obligations declared unenforceable; to reduce or eliminate the 

amounts owing on the agreements; to have all liens and 

encumbrances arising out of the agreements declared void; to have 

the loan agreements reformed; and damages. Generally, the state 

common law pendent claims were that Republic engaged in secret, 

conspiratorial oral side agreements, and made fraudulent 

representations to plaintiffs in connection with loans made to 

them for the purpose of acquiring the stock of Tracy Collins Bank 

& Trust. Plaintiffs contended the object of Republic's actions 

was to bring Tracy Collins to ruin so that Republic could acquire 

it below the market price. 

1 The court had previously dismissed all federal claims 

asserted by plaintiffs, and no appeal was taken from that 

dismissal. Because the court proceeded with the case thereafter 

without a specific ruling, we infer that the court exercised its 

discretion under united Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 

(1966), and retained jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. 

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After Republic was declared insolvent, FDIC, as receiver, 

succeeded to Republic's interests in this action. The FDIC filed 

a motion for summary judgment, contending the common law claims 

were unenforceable and barred under the doctrine of D'Oench and 

§ 1823(e) . 

The motion was initially referred to a magistrate judge and 

ultimately determined by the district court upon objections to the 

magistrate's report. The district court held all the claims 

asserted by the plaintiffs arose from the claimed oral side 

agreements and were barred by D'Oench, Langley v. FDIC , 484 U.S. 

86 (1987), and§ 1823(e). The court stated: 

The court is of the opinion that the pleadings in 

this matter demonstrate that the alleged agreements and 

misrepresentations, if any, were oral side agreements 

not included in the loan documents. The loan documents 

are silent with respect to Republic's alleged agreement 

with the First Security defendants [other parties 

dismissed prior to the summary judgment) to try to 

obtain the stock of Tracy Collins a t distressed prices, 

Republic's alleged intent to prevent the sale of Tracy 

Collins to Zions, [an alleged transaction plaintiffs 

made that was frustrated by Republic) and Republic's 

alleged promise to make future loans. 

R. II, 567. 

Plaintiffs asserted summary judgment was improper because 

there were disputed issues of material fact. They contended 

Republic had made a "credit bid" to buy Tracy Collins; therefore, 

all the plaintiffs' debts to Republic were satisfied. 

Nevertheless, plaintiffs submitted no concrete evidence of the 

existence of this so-called "credit bid." 

The only effort they made was in an affidavit executed by 

John A. Dahlstrom, in which he stated: "RepublicBank Dallas [sic) 

purported to make a credit bid for the stock of Tracy Collins Bank 

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and Trust Company . . . . " R. II, 588 (emphasis added). 

Nonetheless, the district court found no evidence of the 

transaction and held that plaintiffs had failed to show "the 

obligations to Republic have been totally satisfied." 

Finding no disputed material facts, the district court 

concluded plaintiffs' claims were barred and summary judgment was 

rendered. This appeal ensued. 

Critical to plaintiffs' appeal is their contention that the 

so-called "credit bid" actually existed. They admit they produced 

no documentation of the bid, but they seek to avoid this default 

by claiming the documentation was "sealed" by a state court. 

Assuming the validity of that assertion, nothing in the record 

indicates that plaintiffs made any attempt to obtain that 

documentation by subpoena or otherwise. Nevertheless, they now 

ask this court to accept the unsupported and self-serving claim of 

John Dahlstrom as evidence of a fact upon which their whole case 

rests. That request rings hollow in the absence of any effort 

either to produce documents essential to the defense or to 

indicate an effort to obtain the evidence was impeded in any way.

2 

Under these circumstances, we believe plaintiffs' arguments 

are disingenuous. For example, they baldly assert, "The evidence 

in the record indicates that Republic collected its notes and 

satisfied its claims against [plaintiffs] by making a credit bid 

for collateral which included all the common stock of Tracy." 

2 Plaintiffs do not assert, for example, they filed an 

affidavit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) showing that they needed 

documents in the custody of the state court to properly respond to 

the motion for summary judgment, nor do they contend an effort to 

obtain the documents directly from the state court was denied. 

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There is no evidence 

statement. They 

whatever in 

claim, "The 

the record to support this 

credit bid fully satisfied 

appellants' obligations to Republic." They argue neither D'Oench 

nor § 1823(e) applies because "[the credit bid] clearly modifies 

Republic's original loan, it is in writing, was executed by 

Republic, was approved by the Republic Board, and has from its 

inception been a record of Republic." This whole cloth contention 

is supported only by reference to Mr. Dahlstrom's statement that a 

"purported" credit bid was made. (Apts. Opening Brief at 13). It 

is particularly noteworthy that even Mr. Dahlstrom's affidavit is 

silent about (1) modification, (2) a written instrument, (3) 

execution, (4) Board approval, and (5) "a record of Republic . " 

A party resisting a motion for summary judgment cannot rest 

on the pleadings or otherwise sit on its hands. It must come 

forward and with "specific facts" show there are genuine issues 

for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

1523 (10th Cir. 1992). 

See also Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F. 2d 

The only assertion made by plaintiffs in 

opposition to FDIC's motion for summary judgment was the claim of 

a purported credit bid. That qualified assertion is not a 

specific fact. It there fore does not s atisfy the plaintiffs' 

burden of going forward. As a result, defendant's motion for 

summary judgment was uncontroverted, and a factual base for each 

of plaintiffs' arguments about the inapplicability of D'Oench is 

nonexistent. 

Without legal support, plaintiffs als o a rgue tha t their state 

claims are not subj e ct to the D'Oench doctrine be c a u s e they are 

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tort claims arising out of Utah law. Nevertheless, courts have 

held claims founded upon state law, or claims sounding in tort are 

subject to the D'Oench bar. Capizzi v. FDIC 937 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 

1991) (The assertion of a D'Oench defense to a claim grounded in 

state law results in the application of federal, not state, law to 

the claim.). "D'Oench bars defenses and affirmative claims 

whether cloaked in terms of contract or tort," Timberland Design. 

Inc. v. First Serv. Bank for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 50 (1st cir. 

1991) . 

A number of other perplexing issues exist in this case which 

are unanswered in the record. For example, plaintiffs admit prior 

to the filing of the complaint an involuntary petition in 

bankruptcy was filed against them. They do not explain, 

therefore, how they have standing to proceed in this action as any 

claim they assert would be an asset of their bankruptcy estate. 

Nor do they disclose why their personal representative in 

bankruptcy is not a party in this case or whether they obtained 

leave of the bankruptcy court to pursue this action. They also 

contend that Republic filed a claim in the bankruptcy case to 

which they objected without response from Republic. They state, 

therefore, that any debt they owe to Republic has been discharged. 

Nonetheless, there is no documentation whatever of these asserted 

facts. Finally, they do not attempt to reconcile their contention 

that the debt has been discharged with their claims in the 

complaint for reformation of the obligation. Fortunately, because 

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of our disposition of the case, we do not have to seek answers to 

these conundrums. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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