Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00304/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00304-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY T. RIVERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHIWALI PATEL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-00304-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 64

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint. 

Dkt. 64. The matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. 

Accordingly, the hearing set for November 16, 2016 is VACATED. Having read the 

parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, 

and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion, for the following 

reasons.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

This is the fourth motion to dismiss in this case. First, on June 2, 2016, the court 

dismissed with prejudice Rivera’s claim for wrongful discharge by Lawrence Livermore 

National Security (“LLNS”), as time-barred. Dkt. 38. Because LLNS was named only 

with respect to this first cause of action, LLNS was dismissed as a defendant. Id. at 6. 

Rivera filed a notice of appeal from this ruling, Dkt. 40, which the Ninth Circuit has 

dismissed without prejudice. Dkt. 65.

Second, on July 1, 2016, the court dismissed Rivera’s other claims, brought 

against the “federal defendants”: Shiwali Patel, Kimberly Davis Lebak, the National 

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Nuclear Security Administration (“NNSA”), the Department of Energy (“DOE”), the DOE 

Office of Hearings and Appeals (“OHA”), and the United States. See Dkt. 43 (the “July 1 

Order”). Rivera’s claim based on the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) was 

dismissed because there had not yet been a final agency decision. Id. at 8. Rivera’s

First Amendment claim against Lebak and Patel failed for lack of an implied Bivens

remedy on the facts alleged, as well as a failure to meet Twombly’s pleading standards. 

Id. at 9–11. The dismissal provided Rivera leave to amend the First Amendment claim, 

and the first amended complaint (“FAC”) followed on July 28, 2016. Dkt. 51.

Third, on September 19, 2016, the court granted a motion to strike the wrongful 

discharge claim from the amended complaint because the FAC had reasserted this 

dismissed claim against LLNS. Dkt. 63. (The motion to dismiss was denied as moot, as 

this claim had already been dismissed by the court. Id.)

The federal defendants now bring a motion to dismiss the remaining claims in 

Rivera’s FAC. Dkt. 64.

B. The First Amended Complaint

The court has reviewed the factual allegations in this case in its prior rulings on the 

motions to dismiss. In the FAC, Rivera asserts four causes of action: (1) wrongful 

discharge against LLNS (now stricken); (2) First Amendment violations by Patel and 

Lebak; (3) violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by NNSA, OHA, and the 

DOE; and (4) a new APA claim against the DOE for “failure to issue [a] decision within a 

reasonable time.” FAC ¶¶ 42–65. The NNSA and OHA are both components of the 

DOE. FAC ¶¶ 8–9. Patel is an OHA investigator, and Lebak is a site manager for the 

NNSA, which oversees LLNS. FAC ¶¶ 6–7.

Rivera is an engineer who was employed at LLNL for 29 years. FAC ¶ 11. On 

October 16, 2013, Rivera was dismissed from his position. FAC ¶ 36. The gist of the 

wrongful discharge and First Amendment claims is that Rivera’s dismissal, and other 

adverse actions taken against him, were in retaliation for protected disclosures that he 

made about potential safety violations at LLNL. The APA claims arise from an

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

administrative complaint brought by Rivera, which made similar allegations of retaliation. 

FAC ¶ 37. Rivera alleges that OHA failed to investigate or conduct a hearing on the 

merits of his administrative complaint, and that the DOE has taken over a year to decide 

his petition for Secretarial review of OHA’s decision affirming dismissal of his 

administrative complaint. FAC ¶¶ 40, 65.

The new allegations in the FAC focus on providing greater detail regarding 

Lebak’s role in Rivera’s termination. Rivera’s theory on the First Amendment claim 

against Lebak is that “[i]n retaliation for Rivera’s whistleblowing, Lebak authorized, 

directed, and conspired in the decision to terminate [Rivera’s] employment.” FAC ¶ 36.c.

To support this claim, Rivera alleges that on September 17, 2013, he informed 

Lebak about “LLNS acts of mismanagement and abuse,” including Rivera’s safety 

concerns about port glass failure in the High Explosive Application Facility (“HEAF”). 

FAC ¶ 35.a. Three days later, Rivera was escorted out of LLNL in light of his pending 

termination. FAC ¶ 35.b. Rivera notes that a November 22, 2013 report refers to “lower 

level incidents at the HEAF facility,” which he believes to refer to the protected 

disclosures that he made to Lebak. FAC ¶ 36.b.

Lebak “had general authority over LLNS to require action related to personnel 

matters.” FAC ¶ 36.d. Rivera infers Lebak’s intent to retaliate against him from two 

emails. In the first, dated December 5, 2013, Lebak wrote to NNSA’s Internal Affairs 

Director that “[b]ased on internal review of the subject allegation [by Rivera], I have no 

basis to require additional action from LLNS.” On September 25, 2013—shortly after 

Rivera was escorted out of LLNL—Lebak wrote to NNSA officials that “Mr. Rivera is now 

copying Bruce Held, you, me and others on his emails. He is well known in LLNL and 

NNSA Employee Concerns circles. I see evidence that the Lab is attempting to deal 

formally with his concerns . . . . Mr. Rivera has a multi-year history of communicating 

with a variety of issues with a large audience.” FAC ¶ 36.3. Rivera alleges that “LLNL, 

with Lebak’s concurrence, dealt ‘formally’ with Rivera’s concerns by terminating his 

employment.” Id. 

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Rivera also alleges that on December 2, 2013, a “contracting officer” told Lebak 

that Rivera “in April 2013 had alleged funding and charge account irregularities and ‘his 

termination was further retaliation for reporting . . . safety concerns at the [HEAF].’” FAC 

¶ 36.d. Who this “contracting officer” is, whether this statement was written or oral, and 

how Rivera knows of the statement are not clear from the FAC.

C. Rivera’s Administrative Complaint

On January 16, 2014, Rivera filed an administrative complaint pursuant to 10 

C.F.R. Part 708 (“Part 708”), alleging retaliation for protected disclosures. FAC ¶ 37. 

OHA accepted the complaint on March 10, 2014. FAC ¶ 39. On September 15, 2014, 

the complaint was dismissed by the investigator, Patel. See Decl. of Fred L. Brown 

(“Brown Decl.”), Dkt. 64-1 ¶ 3. Patel’s dismissal was upheld on appeal to OHA on March 

9, 2015. Id. 

The FAC makes new allegations regarding how Patel came to be the investigator 

of Rivera’s complaint. Rivera alleges that the investigator originally assigned to his case, 

Wade M. Boswell, “determined that Rivera’s complaint alleged facts sufficient to conduct 

an investigation,” including witness interviews. FAC ¶ 39.b. Boswell also indicated that 

there would be a formal hearing on the matter. FAC ¶ 39.d. However, the “DOE 

removed Boswell and replaced him with Patel in order to prevent the promised 

investigation and hearing from taking place.” FAC ¶ 39.f. Patel then “refused to conduct 

an investigation” or hold a hearing. FAC ¶¶ 40–41. 

Rivera filed a petition for Secretarial review on March 23, 2015, and a brief in 

support on July 15, 2015. Brown Decl. ¶ 4. As of the court’s July 1, 2016 Order and the 

filing of the FAC, the petition for Secretarial review was still pending. Rivera’s FAC thus

includes new allegations, in support of his fourth cause of action, that “no decision has 

been forthcoming” on Rivera’s petition for Secretarial review, even though it has been 

pending for over a year. FAC ¶ 41.a. The FAC alleges that this delay is “unreasonabl[e]” 

and seeks an order “compelling DOE to issue a final response to the petition by a specific 

deadline.” FAC ¶ 65.c.

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Recently, however, has been a significant new development on the status of 

Rivera’s petition for Secretarial review. On August 19, 2016, OHA issued an order 

vacating its prior decision, which had affirmed the dismissal of Rivera’s administrative 

complaint. Brown Decl. ¶ 4. OHA’s order indicates that “[u]pon further consideration,” 

OHA will “appoint a new OHA Investigator to investigate the Complaint and issue a report 

of investigation, to be followed by the appointment of an Administrative Judge” to conduct 

a hearing. Brown Decl. Ex. A. On September 7, 2016, in light of OHA’s action, the 

Secretary of the DOE dismissed Rivera’s petition for Secretarial review as moot. Brown 

Decl. ¶ 5.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 

authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and statutes enacted by 

Congress pursuant thereto. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 

541 (1986). Thus, federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack 

subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the applicable standard turns on 

the nature of the jurisdictional challenge. A defendant may either challenge jurisdiction 

on the face of the complaint or provide extrinsic evidence demonstrating lack of 

jurisdiction on the facts of the case. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Where there is a facial attack on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the standard is 

akin to the standard applied in determining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. That is, the factual 

allegations are presumed true, and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff does not set 

forth the elements necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. See Doe v. Schachter, 804 

F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The burden of establishing that a cause of action lies 

within this limited jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests for the 

legal and factual sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 

349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint 

include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the 

plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor 

Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be 

accepted by the court. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). The allegations 

in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and quotations 

omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded 

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 

complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id.

at 679.

B. Analysis

The court has already dismissed Rivera’s first claim with prejudice. Dkt. 38. For 

the reasons explained below, the court finds that each of other three claims in the FAC 

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

must be dismissed as well.1

1. Second Cause of Action: The First Amendment Claim

The First Amendment claims against Patel and Lebak are purportedly made 

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 

388 (1971) (“Bivens”). Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized First Amendment 

claims under Bivens in some circumstances, see Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 

F.3d 962, 967 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009), courts are not to imply a Bivens remedy when there is 

an “alternative, existing process for protecting the [plaintiff’s] interest.” Wilkie v. Robbins,

551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). Here, the alternative remedies available to Rivera preclude 

recognition of a Bivens claim.

As to the First Amendment claim against Patel, the court reaffirms its conclusion 

that this claim is precluded by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Western Radio Services. 

See July 1 Order at 9–10 (relying on W. Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 

1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009)). The FAC contains no significant changes regarding the 

claim against Patel. The only relevant new details concern the removal of the initial OHA 

investigator, which provides additional factual support for the alleged retaliatory motive. 

However, the legal theory remains the same: Patel “refused to conduct an investigation” 

of Rivera’s administrative complaint in retaliation for protected speech. FAC ¶ 41. 

This type of claim must be made under the APA, and not implied under Bivens.

“[T]he APA leaves no room for Bivens claims based on agency action or inaction.” W. 

Radio Servs. Co., 578 F.3d at 1123. Rivera’s claim is that an agency actor (Patel) 

refused to take action (conduct an investigation or hold a hearing) based on a retaliatory 

purpose. In these circumstances, the APA provides an “alternative, existing process” to 

vindicate plaintiff’s rights. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. Once the DOE has issued a final

 

1

Federal defendants object to certain exhibits, including emails referencing Rivera and 

Lebak, submitted by Rivera in opposition to their motion. See Dkt. 67 at 6. The court 

SUSTAINS the objection, in part. Rivera is not permitted to bolster his allegations by 

relying on documents that were not discussed or referenced in the FAC. Thus, the court 

will only consider the emails specifically referenced in the complaint and the materials 

that are part of the administrative record.

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

decision on Rivera’s administrative complaint, Rivera can challenge that decision and the 

investigative process as “arbitrary and capricious” or “without observance of procedure 

required by law” if it was, as he alleges, motivated by a retaliatory purpose. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), (D).

The First Amendment claim against Lebak fails for analogous reasons. Rivera 

alleges Lebak, acting with “hostility” toward Rivera and with a retaliatory motive, 

“authorized, directed, and conspired in the decision to terminate [Rivera’s] employment.” 

FAC ¶ 36.c. An alternative remedial scheme to vindicate Rivera’s rights—specifically, 

Part 708—is available for this claim. See Bricker v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 

879 (9th Cir. 1993); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.

The logic of Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bricker precludes recognition of a Bivens

remedy against Lebak. Part 708, entitled the “DOE Contractor Employee Protection 

Program,” creates “procedures for processing complaints by employees of DOE 

contractors alleging retaliation by their employers for disclosure of information concerning 

danger to public or worker health or safety, substantial violations of law, or gross 

mismanagement.” 10 C.F.R. § 708.1. Available remedies include reinstatement, back 

pay, and transfer. 10 C.F.R. § 708.36. Part 708 became effective on April 2, 1992. 

Criteria and Procedures for DOE Contractor Employee Protection Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 

7533 (March 3, 1992). Before Part 708 became effective, DOE contractor protections 

were governed by DOE Order 5483.1A, which did not provide formal procedures. See In 

re: David Ramirez, DOE Case No., LWA-0002 (March 17, 1994), 

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/lwa0002.pdf.

The predecessor to Part 708 was one of the alternative remedial schemes relied 

on by the Ninth Circuit in Bricker.

2

 In Bricker, the court declined to imply a Bivens

remedy because of “the comprehensive administrative remedial mechanisms available to 

the Brickers.” Id. at 879. In particular, DOE Order 5438.1A “establishes occupational 

 

2 Presumably, Rivera would also have be able to file a complaint with the Secretary of 

Labor under 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1).

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

health and safety standards for [DOE contractor] facilities and prohibits discrimination 

against an employee who files a complaint or otherwise exercises his or her rights under 

the order.” Id. at 877. Remedies include “rehiring or reinstatement of the employee, 

restoration of lost seniority, and back pay”—the same remedies available to Rivera under 

Part 708. Id. Rivera is pursuing his claims of retaliation using this alternative process. 

Rivera’s attempts to distinguish Bricker are not persuasive. The second cause of action 

thus must be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Third Cause of Action: The APA Claim

As the court already held in its July 1 Order, Rivera’s APA claim is—and 

remains—premature. Dkt. 43 at 7–8. There has still not been a final agency decision on 

Rivera’s administrative complaint. Indeed, OHA is currently in the process of conducting 

a new investigation of Rivera’s Part 708 complaint. As a result, the challenged action 

does not “mark the consummation of the agency’s decision making process.” Pac. Coast 

Fed’n of Fishermen's Ass’ns v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim under 

the APA. Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F.3d 936, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2013). This dismissal is 

without prejudice, however. Rivera may file a new complaint challenging the agency’s 

decision once the administrative process is finalized.

3. Fourth Cause of Action: The “Unreasonable Delay” Claim

Finally, Rivera’s fourth cause of action is moot. Section 706(1) of the APA

authorizes courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(1). However, the DOE has now taken action on Rivera’s petition for 

Secretarial review, dismissing it in light of the promised new investigation. As a result, 

there is nothing left for the court to “compel.” Although Rivera suggests that he should 

obtain damages for the delay, or a declaration of the unreasonableness of the delay, he 

cites no authority that these remedies are available for a § 706(1) claim. The court thus 

DISMISSES the fourth cause of action as moot.

///

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The 

dismissal is with prejudice, except as to Rivera’s third cause of action, the APA claim. 

Rivera may file a new complaint pursuant to the APA challenging OHA’s decision on his 

administrative complaint once there is a final agency action for this court to review. The 

case management conference set for November 17 is VACATED. The clerk shall close 

the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:16-cv-00304-PJH Document 68 Filed 10/31/16 Page 10 of 10