Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00882/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00882-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

TEQUAN SABRE! GRAHAM, # 256057, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13cv882-WHA

 ) (WO)

KARLA JONES, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed

by Alabama inmate Tequan Sabre! Graham (“Graham”). Doc. No. 1.

1 Graham challenges

matters related to (1) the revocation of his probation by theCircuit Court of Houston County

on December 13, 2010, and (2) his 2007 second-degree burglary conviction in that court and

resulting 20-year sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

2

Conviction, Sentence, and (Untimely) Direct Appeal

On November 5, 2007, Graham pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Houston County

to a charge of second-degree burglary, in violation of § 13A-7-6, Ala. Code 1975. On

November 28, 2007, Graham applied for probation. That same day, the trial court denied

1 Document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are those assigned by the Clerk of Court in this action. Page

references are to those assigned by CM/ECF

2 Much of the convoluted procedural history set out below is taken from memorandum opinions

of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued on September 23, 2011, and August 10, 2012. See

Doc. Nos. 9-10 and 9-14.

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Graham’s request for probation and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment, to be served

in a community-corrections program. However, on December 20, 2007, after it was

informed that the community-corrections program refused to allow Graham, the trial court

removed Graham from the program and ordered him to serve his 20-year sentence in a state

penitentiary.

On February 25, 2008, Graham filed a notice of appeal, which the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals dismissed as untimely filed. Doc. Nos. 9-2 and 9-5. That court issued a

certificate of judgment on April 17, 2008. Doc. No. 9-5.

Rule 32 Petition of May 6, 2008 (Regarding Conviction and Sentence)

On May 6, 2008, Graham filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of

the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure challenging his conviction and sentence. In the

petition, Graham alleged:

(1) His guilty plea was involuntary.

(2) His trial counsel was ineffective.

(3) The trial court lacked authority to remove him from community

corrections.

(4) He failed to timely appeal through no fault of his own.

Doc. No. 9-19 at 5-35.

After the State responded, the trial court summarily dismissed Graham’s Rule 32

petition. See Doc. No. 9-6 at 1.

Appeal from Denial of Rule 32 Petition of May 6, 2008

2

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Graham appealed from the denial of his Rule 32 petition. By order dated September

10, 2008, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to

issue specific written findings of fact regarding the merits of Graham’s claims and, if

necessary, to conduct an evidentiary hearing on those claims. Doc. No. 9-6.

While the case was on remand, Graham filed an amendment to his Rule 32 petition

presenting an additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Graham also filed a

motion with the trial court to reconsider its denial of his request for probation. On February

17, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on Graham’s motion to reconsider the denial

of his probation. Doc. No. 9-20 at 60-64. Following the hearing, the trial court granted

Graham’s request for probation, suspended his 20-year sentence, and placed him on

probation for three years. Id. at 63. Graham’s counsel then indicated that, with the grant of

probation, Graham wished to withdraw his Rule 32 petition. Id.

The trial court submitted its return to remand with the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on March 26, 2009. By order dated April 24, 2009, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals remanded the case a second time for the trial court to conduct a hearing and to

“make written findings of fact as to whether Graham knowingly and voluntarily decided not

to pursue his Rule 32 petition.” Doc. No. 9-7. On May 5, 2009, the trial court conducted

a hearing, at which Graham affirmatively indicated that he wanted to withdraw his appeal

from the summary dismissal of his Rule 32 petition since he had been granted probation. 

Doc. No. 9-21 at 13-20.

3

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The trial court submitted its second return to remand with the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on June 4, 2009. By order dated June 19, 2009, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals dismissed as moot Graham’s appeal from the summary dismissal of his

Rule 32 petition, and issued a certificate of judgment. Doc. No. 9-8.

Probation Revocation and Appeal from Revocation

On July 1, 2010, Graham’s probation officer filed a delinquency report alleging that

Graham violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the new offense

of receiving stolen property. See Doc. No. 9-23 at 6-9. A probation-revocation hearing was

held on December 13, 2010, after which the trial court revoked Graham’s probation and

reinstated his 20-year sentence. Doc. No. 9-24 at 3-33.

Graham appealed from the revocation of his probation, alleging:

(1) The State’s evidence was insufficient to warrant revoking his

probation.

(2) The record was unclear as to the reason for the trial court’s

revocation of his probation.

(3) The record was unclear as to whether the trial court had the

authority to sentence him to confinement for more than the

three-year probationary term.

Doc. No. 15-1.

In an unpublished memorandumopinion issued on September 23, 2011, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Graham’s probation,

finding:

4

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(1) There was ample evidence before the trial court for it to

reasonably conclude that Graham violated the terms of his

probation.

(2) It was clear from the trial court’s written findings that the court

found sufficient evidence Graham violated his probation by

committing a new criminal offense.

(3) It was clear from the record that the trial court was authorized

to reinstate Graham’s original sentence of 20 years’

imprisonment after revoking his probation.

Doc. No. 9-10.

Graham applied for rehearing, which was overruled on October 14, 2011. Doc. No.

15-2; Doc. No. 9-11. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama

Supreme Court, which that court denied on December 9, 2011, issuing a certificate of

judgment that same day. Doc. No. 15-3; Doc. No. 9-13.

Rule 32 Petition of February 18, 2012

On February 18, 2012, Graham filed a Rule 32 petition, claiming:

(1) The trial court erred in allowing evidence of collateral crimes at

the revocation hearing.

(2) The evidence at the revocation hearing was insufficient to

warrant revoking his probation.

(3) The trial court erred by not granting him credit for all time he

spent incarcerated for his second-degree burglary conviction.

(4) The trial court erred by ordering that he serve the remainder of

his 20-year sentence although he was resentenced (on February

17, 2009) to only three years’ imprisonment.

(5) Based on his assertions in claims (3) and (4), set out above, he

5

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was being held in custody after expiration of his sentence.

Doc. No. 9-22 at 5-26.

On March 1, 2012, without receiving a response from the State, the trial court

summarily dismissed Graham’s Rule 32 petition, finding:

- claims (1) and (2), set out above, were precluded under

Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(4) because they were raised and

addressed on Graham’s appeal from the revocation of his

probation;

- claim (3), set out above, was insufficiently pled; and

- claims (4) and (5), set out above, were meritless.

Doc. No. 9-22 at 32-33.

Appeal from Denial of Rule 32 Petition of February 18, 2012

Graham appealed from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, arguing:

(1) The trial court erred in not granting him credit for all time he

spent incarcerated on his burglary conviction.

(2) The trial court erred in ordering that he serve the remainder of

his 20-year sentence.

(3) He was being held in custody after expiration of his sentence.

Doc. No. 15-4.

In an unpublished memorandum opinion issued on August 19, 2012, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Graham’s Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 9-

14. Regarding Graham’s claim that the trial court erred in not granting him credit for all the

time he had spent incarcerated for the second-degree burglary conviction, the Alabama

6

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Court of Criminal Appeals held that the claim was not properly raised in a Rule 32 petition

but instead should be presented in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus. Doc. No. 9-14

at 5. The appellate court further held that, in any event, the claim was meritless. Id.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found Graham’s two remaining claims to

center on his assertion that he was “resentenced” on February 17, 2009, to three years’

imprisonment and placed on probation for those three years. Id. However, the appellate

court found Graham’s assertion in this regard to be “simply false” and that the trial court’s

placement of Graham on probation for three years did not alter his underlying 20-year

sentence. Id. at 5-6. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals went on to observe – in a

footnote – that the trial court lacked authority at the February 17, 2009, remand hearing to

suspend Graham’s 20-year sentence and place him on probation, as such actions were

beyond the scope of the remand order and therefore void and, more generally, because a trial

court’s authority to suspend a sentence and place a person on probation terminates once that

person has entered on service of his sentence. Id. at 6. However, the Alabama Court of

Criminals found that the placement of Graham on probation did not alter or amend his

underlying 20-year sentence and that, “because Graham is in the same position as he would

have been had the circuit court not exceeded its authority in 2009 – he is serving his 20-year

sentence in confinement,” it was unnecessary to set aside the trial court’s judgment of

February 17, 2009. Id. at 6-7.

Graham applied for rehearing, which was overruled on October 14, 2011. Doc. No.

7

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9-11; Doc. No. 15-2. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama

Supreme Court, which that court denied on November 9, 2012, issuing a certificate of

judgment the same day. Doc. No. 9-15; Doc. No. 18-6.

Rule 32 Petition of November 11, 2012

On November 11, 2012, Graham filed another Rule 32 petition, arguing:

(1) His trial counsel was ineffective for coercing him into

dismissing his original Rule 32 petition (the Rule 32 petition

challenging his conviction and sentence) in exchange for “a

three-year void sentence.”

(2) He involuntarily dismissed his original Rule 32 petition due to

the ineffectiveness of his counsel.

(3) The State breached its agreement to have himsentenced to three

years’ probation in exchange for dismissing his original Rule 32

petition.

(4) The trial court erred on remand when it sentenced him to

probation.

(5) The trial court erred in not granting him credit for all time he

spent serving a “null and void sentence.”

(6) His failure to appeal from the dismissal of his original Rule 32

petition was through no fault of his own.

Doc. No. 9-25 at 6-31.

On December 13, 2012, the trial court, without receiving a response from the State,

summarily dismissed Graham’s Rule 32 petition, finding that the petition was not

sufficiently specific, precluded, and failed to state a claim and that no material issue of fact

or law existed that would entitle Graham to relief under Rule 32. Id. at 5.

8

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Appeal from Denial of Rule 32 Petition of November 11, 2012

Graham appealed, reasserting the claims raised in his Rule 32 petition and also

arguing that the trial court erred in failing to address his prior convictions for sentencing in

violation of § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975. Doc. No. 15-5. In an unpublished memorandum

opinion issued on April 26, 2013, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

denial of Graham’s Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 9-16. In relevant part, the appellate court

held:

Claims (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) are all precluded because they are time-barred

pursuant to Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P. These claims arise from the May

5, 2009, proceeding regarding Graham’s first petition, which was dismissed

as moot in June of 2009. Graham had one year from June 19, 2009, to timely

raise these claims. As for claim (5), as this Court stated in its August 2012

memorandum, any claim regarding failure to be credited with the time served

on his sentence is a matter for a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a Rule

32 petition. Furthermore, this Court found in its August 2012 memorandum

that Graham’s illegal-sentence claim is without merit. Although the circuit

court did not have authority to place Graham on probation, that placement did

not alter or amend Graham’s underlying 20-year sentence. Thus, because

Graham was in the same position as he would have been had the circuit court

not exceeded its authority in 2009, this Court stated that it was unnecessary to

set aside the trial court’s judgment of February 17, 2009. Accordingly,

Graham is not entitled to relief. 

Doc. No. 9-16 at 6-7. Regarding Graham’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to

address his prior convictions for sentencing in violation of § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, the

appellate court held: 

That claim is not properly before this Court because the claim was not first

presented to the circuit court. See, e.g., Arrington v. State, 716 So.2d 237,

239 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that “[a]n appellant cannot raise an issue

on appeal from the denial of a Rule 32 petition which was not raised in the

9

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Rule 32 petition”). Accordingly, we will not address that issue.

Id. at 6.

Graham applied for rehearing, which was overruled. Doc. No. 9-9; Doc. No. 15-6. 

He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that

court denied on August 16, 2013, issuing a certificate of judgment the same day. Doc. No. 

9-17.

Graham’s § 2254 Petition

On November 20, 2013, Graham initiated this habeas action by filing a § 2254

petition asserting the following claims:

(1) The State presented insufficient evidence at the revocation

hearing that he committed the alleged new offense. Doc. No. 1

at 10, 14-17.

(2) “The record is unclear as to whether the court revoked Graham

because he picked up a new charge, or because [the court] was

reasonably satisfied that ... Graham committed a new offense.” 

Id. at 12, 14-17.

(3) The record is unclear as to whether he is being held after

expiration of his sentence. Id. at 13-20, 30-31, 47.

(4) The trial court failed to award him sufficient “credit for time

served in confinement.” Id. at 28, 44.

(5) The trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing

on his Rule 32 petition. Id. at 32-33.

(6) His counsel was ineffective for coercing him to dismiss his

original Rule 32 petition “in exchange for three years’ probation

under a void sentence.” Id. at 35.

10

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(7) He did not voluntarily dismiss his original Rule 32 petition. Id.

at 37.

(8) The State breached its agreement to have him sentenced to

probation “in exchange for dismissing his [original] Rule 32

petition.” Id. at 39.

(9) “[T]he trial court erred on remand from the Criminal Court of

Appeals.” Id. at 40.

(10) At sentencing, the trial court violated § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code

1975, by failing to “procedurally address [Graham’s] prior

convictions before declaring [him] ... a habitual offender.” Id.

at 42.

(11) He failed to appeal from the dismissal of his original Rule 32

petition through no fault of his own. Id. at 46.

Doc. No. 1 at 10-47.

3

The respondents argue that Graham’s claims either are procedurally defaulted for

purposes of habeas review or were properly adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, or

else involve questions of pure state law not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. Doc.

No. 9 at 12-24. After careful review of the parties’ submissions, the record, and the

pertinent law, the court finds that Graham is not entitled to habeas relief and that his § 2254

petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

3 The claims set out by Graham in his petition overlap in places, are repetitive, and are not always

presented in a clear and logical fashion. For organizational and analytical purposes, this court has

recast some of his claims in a more appropriate presentation.

11

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Adjudicated on Merits by State Courts

“When it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), Congress significantly limited the circumstances under which a habeas

petitioner may obtain relief.” Hardy v. Allen, 2010 WL 9447204, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 21,

2010). To prevail on a § 2254 claim adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, a

petitioner must show that a decision by the state courts was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) &

(2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 & 412-13 (2000).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law either if it fails to apply the

correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authorityto a case involving facts

“materially indistinguishable” from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a

different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-06; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A

state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it either correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is

objectively unreasonable, or it extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle

to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 

“Objectively unreasonable” means something more than an “erroneous” or “incorrect”

12

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application of clearly established law, and a reviewing federal court may not substitute its

judgment for the state court’s even if the federal court, in its own independent judgment,

disagrees with the state court’s decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). The reviewing court “must determine what arguments or theories

supported or ... could have supported[ ] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). “This is a ‘difficult to meet,’ and ‘highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131

S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (internal citations omitted).

Federal courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court based its

findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s determinations of

fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).

1. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Revocation of Probation

Graham claims that he State presented insufficient evidence at the revocation hearing

that he committed the offense of receiving stolen property in the second degree. See Doc.

13

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No. 1 at 10, 14-17.

4

Graham presented this claim on appeal from the revocation of his probation, where

it was addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals:

Graham contends that the evidence offered by the State was “legally

insufficient to reasonably satisfy the trial court that the alleged new offense,

to wit: receiving stolen property second degree, had been committed by

Graham.” (Graham’s brief at 11.) Specifically, Graham argues that the State

failed to offer any evidence as to the value of the property that Graham

allegedly received and sold. He contends that, since the crime of

second-degree receiving stolen property requires that the value of the items be

between $500 and $2,500, it is essential that the State offer evidence of the

items’ value in order for the circuit court to reasonably conclude that Graham

committed the offense. However, such proofis unnecessary for a circuit court

to revoke probation. This Court has held that “[i]t is not necessary in a

probation revocation hearing to provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt or

by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the lower court need only be

‘reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated the

conditions of his probation.’” Chasteen v. State, 652 So.2d 319, 320

(Ala.Cr.App., 1994), quoting Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 312 So. 2d

620 (1975). In Ringstaff v. State, 480 So.2d 50, 51 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985),

the appellant was arrested and charged with second-degree theft of property

for allegedly stealing a roast from a grocery store. At the hearing, the State

did not prove the value of the roast. However, this Court affirmed the

revocation of the appellant’s probation, stating:

“Because there was no evidence of the value of the roast, the

State failed to present a prima facie case of theft in the second

degree. However, the evidence supports a finding that

Ringstaff committed the misdemeanor offense of theft of

4 A fair reading of statements by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in its memorandum

opinions issued on August 10, 2012, and April 26, 2013 (see Doc. No. 9-14 at 6-7; Doc. No. 9-16

a at 7), indicates that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found the trial court lacked authority

to place Graham on probation in the first place, a finding which would render moot any proceedings

related to the revocation of Graham’s probation. However, because the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals also addressed the merits of various claims by Graham regarding his probation revocation,

this court will consider such claims presented by Graham in his § 2254 petition.

14

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property in the third degree in violation of Alabama Code 1975,

§ 13A-8-5. This served as a proper ground upon which to

revoke Ringstaff’s probation. In Wilcox v. State, 395 So. 2d

1054 (Ala. 1981), our supreme court held that an implicit

condition of every probation is that the probationer will not

commit another criminal offense while serving a suspended or

probationary sentence.”

Ringstaff, 480 So. 2d at 51.

As noted, the State presented evidence suggesting that, not only was

Graham in possession of stolen property, he also pawned property that he

knew to be stolen. A person commits the crime of receiving stolen property

in the third degree if the property in question does not exceed $500 in value. 

See § 13A-8-19, Ala. Code 1975. Thus, at a minimum, the State presented

sufficient evidence of third-degree receiving stolen property. While the same

evidence may not be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Graham is guilty of the charged offense, it is sufficient for a circuit court to

be reasonably satisfied that Graham violated the terms of his probation.

Grahamalso asserts that “it is rather apparent bythe evidence presented

that the theory of the State's case was that Graham was the actual thief.”

(Graham’s brief at 13.) Graham contends that the charges against him must

fail because “the actual thief cannot be guilty of receiving stolen property ....” 

(Graham’s brief at 13.) This contention is without merit. As noted above, the

State presented sufficient evidence for the circuit court to revoke Graham’s

probation. The State’s theory of the case is irrelevant as to whether the

evidence presented was sufficient to revoke his probation.

Additionally, Graham contends that the evidence was insufficient

because the State did not produce evidence that Graham had knowledge that

the items were stolen nor did the State present evidence that Graham was in

actual possession of the stolen items. However, the record belies this

contention. In Graham’s own recitation of the facts, he states that “[d]uring

the course of [Officer Truitt’s] investigation, Graham told him about some

merchandise that was stolen in Dothan and pawned in Enterprise, Alabama.

Graham told [Truitt] that someone else stole the merchandise, but that he

picked up the merchandise and pawned them (sic) in Enterprise.” (Graham’s

brief at 4.) The record reflects the same.

15

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Graham argues that the State failed to prove that he had exclusive

control over the storage room where some of the stolen items were found. 

However, testimony from Ruby Merrill, Graham’s landlord, established that

the storage room stayed locked and Graham had the only key. Moreover,

there was testimony suggesting that Graham admitted to pawning other stolen

items in Enterprise. Regardless, there was ample evidence before the circuit

court for it to reasonably conclude that Graham violated the terms of his

probation.

Doc. No. 9-10 at 3-5.

Asthe Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, the United States Supreme

Court has not established that due process in a probation revocation proceeding requires

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the probationer committed the alleged violation. See

United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 848 (11

th Cir. 1991) (there is no requirement in a

probation revocation hearing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed the alleged acts; all that is required is that the evidence reasonably satisfy the

judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions

of probation). Here, the evidence presented at Graham’s revocation hearing was more than

sufficient to sustain the conclusion that he committed a new criminal offense. Graham has

failed to demonstrate that the ruling on this issue by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

was contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court law, nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Therefore, Graham is not entitled to federal

habeas relief based on this claim.

16

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2. Trial Court’s Basis for Revocation

According to Graham, the record is unclear as to whether the trial court revoked his

probation “because he picked up a new charge, or because [the court] was reasonably

satisfied that [he] committed a new offense.” See Doc. No. 1 at 12, 14-17.

In Graham’s appeal from the revocation of his probation, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals addressed this claim as follows:

Graham also contends that the record is unclear as to whether his

probation was revoked because he was merely charged with a crime or

because the court was reasonably satisfied that he committed a crime. Graham

points to the judge’s statement at the conclusion of the hearing which was as

follows:

“From what I’ve heard, I do think that there is sufficient

evidence that the defendant violated probation by receiving a

new charge of receiving stolen property second degree, and his

probation is revoked.”

(R. 42.)

Graham then notes that the judge’s written order reflects that his

probation was revoked because he actually committed a new offense. Graham

argues that this Court should remand the case with instructions that the circuit

court “clarify the apparent ambiguity.” (Graham’s brief at 14.) Graham cites

Hunter v. State, 782 So.2d 845 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), and Williams v. State,

895 So.2d 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) in support of his argument. However,

each of those cases were remanded because this Court could not discern the

basis of the revocation from the written order. In the present case, the judge’s

written findings included an overview of the evidence adduced at the hearing

followed by the conclusion that the court found sufficient evidence that

Graham violated his probation “by committing new charge of RSP II.” (C.

21.) Because we find the court’s order revoking Graham’s probation to be

clear and unambiguous, Hunter and Williams are distinguishable. 

Accordingly, remanding the case for clarification is unnecessary.

17

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Doc. No. 9-10 at 5.

It is clear from the record that the trial court revoked Graham’s probation based on

his commission of a new criminal offense. Graham has failed to demonstrate that the ruling

on this issue by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was contrary to and/or involved an

unreasonable application of clearlyestablished Supreme Court law, nor has he demonstrated

that this decision on the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) &

(2). Therefore, Graham is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

3. Whether Graham Is Being Held after Expiration of His

Sentence

Graham also contends that the record is unclear as to whether he is being held after

expiration of his sentence. See Doc. No. 1 at 13-20, 30-31.

5

Graham raised this claim on appeal from the revocation of his probation, and again

in his Rule 32 Petition of February 18, 2012, and on appeal from the denial of that Rule 32

petition. In addressing the claim in Graham’s appeal from the revocation of his probation,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

Graham filed a motion to reconsider his revocation in which he

asserted the following:

“1) Defendant under a plea agreement was sentenced to a term

of twenty (20) years/community corrections on November 18,

5 Graham’s § 2254 petition also contains a claim that “the trial court erred to dismissal of

Petitioner's Rule 32 petition.” Doc. No. 1 at 47. A review of this claim reveals that it is essentially

a restatement of Graham’s claim that he is being held after expiration of his sentence.

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2007 for the offense of burglary.

“2) On or about August 2008, defendant filed a Rule 32

petition seeking relief for the State breach (sic) its agreement

when he was sent to prison and refused community corrections.

“3) On or about January 2009, Honorable Judge Little

re-sentenced defendant to three (3) years probation in exchange

that defendant drop his appeal of his Rule 32 petition.

“....”

(C. 25.) Graham then argued that the circuit court only had the “authority to

revoke three (3) years for which he was to serve on probation.” (C. 26.)

Graham states that it is “unclear from this record whether the [circuit] court

withheld sentencing, probated his original sentence, or sentenced him to a

probationary term.” (Graham’s brief at 16.) He asks this Court to remand his

case to the circuit court with instructions that it clarify his sentence. 

According to Graham, it would be illegal for the circuit court to sentence him

to anything beyond the remainder of his three years’ probation if the court had

in fact re-sentenced him to a probationary term. However, the only sentence

reflected in the record is Graham's original, 20-year sentence. Besides

Graham’s own assertion in his motion for reconsideration, the record is silent

as to anything related to his sentence. “A reviewing court cannot predicate

error on matters not shown by the record. Indeed, a silent record supports a

judgment. It is the appellant's duty to file a correct record.” Robinson v.

State, 444 So.2d 884, 885 (Ala. 1983) (internal citations omitted).

Doc. No. 9-10 at 6.

Addressing essentiallythis same claimin Graham’s appeal fromthe denial of his Rule

32 petition of February 18, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

Graham[ ] assert[s] in his petition that he was “resentenced” on February 17,

2009, to three years’ imprisonment and placed on probation for those three

years. According to Graham, because he was “resentenced” to three years’

imprisonment, when his probation was subsequently revoked, he could not be

ordered to serve 20 years’ imprisonment, but could only be ordered to serve

three years’ imprisonment. Those three years, Graham claims, have already

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expired and, thus, he is being held in prison after his sentence has expired. 

However, as the circuit court recognized in its order summarily dismissing

Graham’s petition, Graham’s assertion regarding his “resentencing” is simply

false.

The transcript ofthe hearing conducted bythe circuit court on February

17, 2009, reveals that Graham was not, as he believes, “resentenced” to three

years’ imprisonment for his burglary conviction. Rather, at the hearing, the

circuit court merely granted Graham’s motion for it to reconsider its denial of

the request that he had filed on November 27, 2008, the day of his sentencing

hearing, that he be granted probation on his 20-year sentence. The court’s

placement of Graham on probation for three years on February 17, 2009, did

not alter Graham’s underlying 20-year sentence. Rather, it simply resulted in

the remainder of that 20-year sentence being suspended and Graham being

placed on probation for three years. See Wrav v. State, 472 So.2d 1119 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1985) (“We have ... held that a grant of probation does not reduce

a sentence, but rather that the original sentence which was suspended remains

the same.”). Graham’s argument to the contrary is meritless.

Doc. No. 9-14 at 5-6 (footnote omitted).

Thus, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the record showed the trial

court did not resentence Graham to three years’ imprisonment when it granted probation,

thatGraham’s 20-year sentence remained in place, and that Graham’s sentence had therefore

not expired. Graham has failed to demonstrate that this ruling by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals was contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court law, nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the

State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Consequently, he is not entitled

to habeas relief based on this claim. 

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B. Procedural Default

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Before a § 2254 petitioner may obtain federal habeas corpus review, he must

“exhaust” his federal claims by raising them in the appropriate court, giving the state courts

an opportunity to decide the merits of the constitutional issue raised. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001). To exhaust a claim

fully, a petitioner must “invok[e] one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Alabama, a complete

round of the established appellate review process includes an appeal to the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that court, and a petition for

discretionary review – a petition for a writ of certiorari – filed in the Alabama Supreme

Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11

th Cir. 2001); Ala.R.App.P. 39 and

40. The exhaustion requirement applies to state post-conviction proceedings as well as to

direct appeals. See Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11

th

 Cir. 2003).

“[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurallybarred[,]... there is a procedural default

for purposes of federal habeas.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)

(citations omitted); see Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11

th Cir. 2003). The

procedural default doctrine ensures that “state courts have had the first opportunity to hear

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the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding.” Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 276 (1971).

2. Adequate and Independent State Ground for Denying Relief

Federal habeas review may also be unavailable for claims that a state appellate court

has rejected on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. Federal habeas review

reduces the finality of litigation and frustrates states’ “sovereign power to punish offenders”

and states’ “good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 487 (1986). When a state prisoner fails to follow state procedural rules, thereby

procedurally defaulting on a claim, the authority of federal courts to review the prisoner’s

state court criminal conviction is “severely restricted.” Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d

1166, 1173 (11

th Cir. 1991). “Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is barred by the

procedural-default doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and

expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, and that bar provides an adequate and

independent state ground for denying relief.” Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11

th

Cir. 1992).

By its very definition, the adequate and independent state-ground doctrine

requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for

the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. 

See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). Thus, by applying

this doctrine to habeas cases, [Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)]

curtails reconsideration of the federal issue on federal habeas as long as the

state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for

decision. In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without

sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.

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Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989).

3. Graham’s Procedurally Defaulted Claims

The following claims in Graham’s § 2254 petition are procedurallydefaulted because

the last state court to address the claims, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, denied

review of the claims on adequate and independent state procedural grounds:

• Graham’s counsel was ineffective for coercing him to dismiss his

original Rule 32 petition “in exchange for three years’ probation under

a void sentence.” Doc. No. 1 at 35.

• Graham did not voluntarily dismiss his original Rule 32 petition. Id.

at 37.

• The State breached its agreement to have Graham sentenced to

probation in exchange for dismissing his original Rule 32 petition.” Id.

at 39.

• The trial court “erred on remand from the Criminal Court of Appeals.” 

Id. at 40.

• Graham failed to appeal from the dismissal of his original Rule 32

petition through no fault of his own. Id. at 46.

Graham first raised each of the above claims in his Rule 32 petition of November 11,

2012, and he pursued each claim on appeal from the trial court’s denial of that Rule 32

petition. In affirming the trial court, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that each

claim was precluded as time-barred under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c).6 Doc. No. 9-16 at 6. The

appellate court noted that the claims arose from the May 5, 2009, proceeding regarding

 

6 Rule 32.2(c) provides (with exceptions inapplicable to Graham’s case) that Rule 32 petitions

shall not be entertained unless they are filed within one year after issuance of the certificate of

judgment by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c).

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Graham’s first Rule 32 petition, which was dismissed as moot on appeal on June 19, 2009

– the same date on which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of

judgment in the case. Id. Accordingly, under Rule 32.2(c), Graham had one year from June

19, 2009, to timely raise the claims. Id. Because he did not raise the claims until November

11, 2012, they were time-barred under Rule 32.2(c).

Rule 32.2(c) is firmly established and regularly followed by Alabama courts for

purposes of applying the doctrine of procedural default.7See Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11

th Cir. 2006); Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2005); Kuenzel

v. Commissioner, Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 690 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11

thCir. 2012). Consequently,

Graham’s above-listed claims are procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas

review.

8

In his appeal from the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition of November 11,

2012, Graham claimed, as he does in his § 2254 petition, that the trial court violated §

13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, by failing to address his prior convictions before declaring him

a habitual offender at sentencing. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that this

claim was not properly before the court on appeal because it was not first presented to the

trial court in Graham’s Rule 32 petition. See Doc. No. 9-16 at 6. Accordingly, finding the

7

In order to bar federal review, the state procedural bar must have been “firmly established and

regularly followed” at the time of the alleged default. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).

8 Although the respondents do not assert the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period as a time-bar

to these claims by Graham, it would appear these claims are untimely raised in Graham’s § 2254

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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claim to be procedurally barred, the appellate court did not address the merits of the claim. 

This procedural bar – that issues not raised in the lower court in a Rule 32 petition cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition – is firmly

established and regularlyfollowed byAlabama appellate courts. See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 913

So.2d 1113, 1144 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 224 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2003); Sims v. State, 869 So.2d 1181, 1184 (Ala .Crim. App. 2003); Arrington

v. State, 716 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Cleveland v. State, 570 So.2d 855, 857

(Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Morrison v. State, 551 So.2d 435, 437 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). 

Consequently, this claimin Graham’s § 2254 petition is procedurally defaulted for purposes

of federal habeas review.

9

 

Exceptions to Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner can escape the procedural-default doctrine either through

showing cause for the default and prejudice, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986),

or establishing a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” which requires a colorable showing

of actual innocence, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1995).

Cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can

show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded efforts to comply with the

state’s procedural rules or that the procedural default resulted from ineffective assistance of

counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). To

 

9

 This claim is also untimely raised in Graham’s § 2254 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors at trial worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, “infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” 

Frady, 456 U.S. at 170; see Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.

Prisoners asserting actual innocence as a gateway to review of defaulted claims must

establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at

327. This standard “is demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.”

10

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). A petitioner must show “factual innocence, not

mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998).

Here, Graham does not attempt to demonstrate cause for his failure to present his

defaulted claims to the state courts in compliance with applicable procedural rules. Nor does

he make the showing of actual innocence required to overcome his procedural default. 

Consequently, his procedurally defaulted claims are foreclosed from federal habeas review.

 

10

 As the Supreme Court observed in Schlup:

[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an

innocent person is extremely rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner

to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether

it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence – that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is

obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are

rarely successful.

513 U.S. at 324.

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4. Credit for Time Served

Graham also claims that the trial court failed to award him sufficient “credit for time

served in confinement.” Doc. No. 1 at 28, 44. Graham raised this claim in his Rule 32

petition of February 18, 2012, and again in his Rule 32 petition of November 11, 2012.

In Graham’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition of February 18, 2012, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

[T]his claim is not properly raised in a Rule 32 petition. It is well settled that

“[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper method by which to test

whether the State has correctly calculated the time an inmate must serve in

prison.” Graves v. State, 710 So.2d 535, 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). 

Therefore, if Graham wishes to challenge the amount of jail credit he

received, he should file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, even

if this claim had been properly raised in his Rule 32 petition, it is meritless. 

We have reviewed the record, including the attachments to Graham’s petition,

and it is clear that Graham has received all the jail credit to which he was

entitled, i.e., that time he spent incarcerated “prior to revocation.” 

§15-22-54(d)(3), Ala. Code 1975. Graham’s claim that he is entitled to

additional jail credit for time he spent in the county jail after his probation was

revoked but before he was transferred to the Department of Corrections is

meritless. Graham began serving his sentence after his revocation on

December 13, 2010. Regardless of where he was housed after that date, he

was still serving his sentence. He is entitled under § 15-22-54(d)(3) to jail

credit only for time he spent incarcerated prior to the date of the revocation of

his probation. Therefore, this claim is meritless. 

Doc. No. 9-14 at 5.

In Graham’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition of November 11, 2012,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals again noted, “any claim regarding failure to be

credited with the time served on his sentence is a matter for a [state] petition for writ of

habeas corpus, not a Rule 32 petition.” Doc. No. 9-16 at 6.

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As the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal found, Graham failed to raise his claim

regarding credit for time served in compliance with Alabama’s requirement thatsuch claims

be presented in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the circuit court of the

county where the defendant is incarcerated. See, e.g., Adcock v. State, 710 So.2d 938, 940-

41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); § 15-21-6, Ala. Code 1975. This procedural rule is firmly

established and regularly followed in Alabama. See, e.g., Adcock, 710 So.2d at 940-41;

Graves v. State, 710 So.2d 535, 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). Graham makes no attempt to

demonstrate cause for his failure to present this defaulted claim to the state courts in

compliance with applicable procedural rules. Nor does he make the showing of actual

innocence required to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, this procedurally

defaulted claim is foreclosed from federal habeas review.

Even if the independent state-ground doctrine were not a basis for finding Graham’s

claim to be procedurally defaulted, the claim was correctly rejected on the merits by the state

appellate court. As noted above, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Graham

received all the jail credit to which he was entitled – i.e., that time he spent incarcerated

“prior to revocation” – and that there was no merit to Graham’s claim he was entitled to jail

credit for time spent in the county jail after his probation was revoked but before he was

transferred to the Alabama Department of Corrections. See Doc. No. 9-14 at 5. Graham

fails to demonstrate that this ruling by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was contrary

to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law,

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nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. 

See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Consequently, he is not entitled to habeas relief based on

this claim.

C. Trial Court’s Failure to Conduct Evidentiary Hearing on Rule 32

Petition

Graham claims that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing

on his Rule 32 petition of February 18, 2012. Doc. No. 1 at 32-33.

The failure of a state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing addressing a state

post-conviction petition does not implicate the United States Constitution, asstates have no

obligation to provide this avenue of relief, and when they do, nothing in the Constitution

requires that an evidentiary hearing be held. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 6-8

(1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); Golston v. Attorney General of

the State of Alabama, 947 F.2d 908, 911 (11

th Cir. 1991). An attack on a state collateral

proceeding does not entitle a petitioner to federal habeas relief in respect to his conviction,

because it is an attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention itself.

See Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1275 (5th

 Cir. 1995). 

To the extent Graham bases this claim on alleged violations of state law (e.g., 

Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.9(a)),11 he is likewise entitled to no relief, because a state court’s

11 Rule 32.9 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, unless the trial court

dismisses the Rule 32 petition, a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine disputed

(continued...)

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interpretation of its own laws and rules provides no basis for federal habeas relief. Beverly

v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412 (11

th Cir. 1988). A federal court has no authority to re-examine state

court determinations on questions of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). 

Consequently, Graham is due no relief with respect to his claim that the trial court erred in

denying his Rule 32 petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED and this case be

DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this 

Recommendation or before April 6, 2016. A party must specifically identify the factual

findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made;

frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the

right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds

 

11

(...continued)

issues of material fact, but that in lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the court in its discretion may take

evidence by affidavits, written interrogatories, or depositions. Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.9(a).

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of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); 11th

Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11

th Cir. 1982). See also

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11

th

 Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Done this 23

rd day of March, 2016.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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