Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02295/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02295-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY A. HAZLE, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:08-cv-02295-GEB-KJM

)

v. ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

) MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

MITCH CROFOOT, individually and as ) JUDGMENT, GRANTING DEFENDANT

Parole Officer of the CDCR; BRENDA ) WESTCARE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

WILDING, individually and as Unit ) JUDGMENT, and DENYING

Supervisor of the CDCR; MATTHEW ) PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

CATE, individually and as Secretary) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT*

of the CDCR; SCOTT KERNAN, )

individually and as Chief Deputy )

Secretary of Adult Operations of )

the CDCR; TIM HOFFMAN, individually)

and as Director of the Division of )

Adult Parole Operations in )

California; DEPUTY COMMISSIONER )

JALLINS, individually and as )

deputy commissioner; and WESTCARE, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Pending are three motions for summary judgment or summary 

adjudication concerning Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated

his rights under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues these rights were violated when he was

required to participate in a “12-step” drug rehabilitation program

containing religious components as a condition of his parole.

Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment 

(“Partial Mot.”) on December 23, 2009. Plaintiff seeks a ruling in

this motion that Defendants Mitchell Crofoot (“Crofoot”), Brenda

Wilding (“Wilding”), and Richard Jallins (“Jallins”) are liable for

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violating his rights under the Establishment Clause by not relieving

Plaintiff from a condition of his parole requiring him to attend a 

12-step program with religious components after Plaintiff objected to

the religious components. Defendant Westcare California, Inc.

(“Westcare”) also filed a motion for summary judgment (“Westcare

Mot.”) on December 23, 2009, in which it argues Plaintiff is unable to

establish a causal connection between Westcare’s activities and his

Establishment Clause claim. Westcare also argues in its motion that

Plaintiff’s request for a taxpayer’s injunction enjoining Defendants

from using state resources and funds to require parolees to

participate in 12-step programs with religious components is moot. 

Lastly, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment

(“Cross Mot.”) on January 26, 2010, in which he seeks a ruling that

Westcare liable for violating his Establishment Clause rights. For

the following reasons, Plaintiff’s partial motion seeking to establish

the liability of Crofoot, Wilding, and Jallins is GRANTED; Westcare’s

motion is GRANTED; and, Plaintiff’s cross-motion against Westcare is

DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiff “was incarcerated at California Rehabilitation

Center, Norco, from February 27, 2006 to February 27, 2007, on charges

pertaining to possession of illegal substances.” (Westcare’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Westcare SUF”) ¶ 1.) “[Plaintiff] was released . . . on

February 26, 2007, [and placed] on parole with the single condition

that he attend and complete a 90-day [‘12-step’] residential drug

treatment program.” (Id. ¶ 2; Statement of Undisputed Facts In

Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Partial

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Mot. SUF”) ¶ 1; Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of

Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Cross Mot.

SUF”) ¶ 12.) Defendant “Mitch Crofoot was [Plaintiff’s] parole agent

at the time Plaintiff [participated in the drug treatment program].” 

(Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 4.) 

Westcare “contracts with the [California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)] as a regional Substance Abuse

Services Coordination Agency (“SASCA”) for Parole Region I in

California.” (Westcare SUF ¶ 11; Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 1.) As a SASCA,

“Westcare creates a network of treatment facilities for parolees with

drug-related convictions, and coordinates with the State to place

parolees in these programs.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 3.) “Westcare’s

standard form contract with residential providers prohibits the

providers from requiring the ‘SASCA participants to attend religious

events or participate in religious activities. Any such participation

is entirely optional for the SASCA participants and contractors may

not impose a penalty for lack of participation.’” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶

6.) A residential treatment facility is required to abide by the

above provision in order to contract with Westcare. (Cross Mot. SUF ¶

7; Smith Dep. 24:23-26:6.) “Empire Recovery Center (“Empire”) is a

non-profit corporation which contracts with Westcare to provide

substance abuse treatment and re-entry services to parolees upon

release from prison.” (Westcare SUF ¶ 6.) “Empire is an independent

contractor under the terms of the contract with Westcare.” (Westcare

SUF ¶ 7.)

“Prior to his release on parole in February 2007, 

[Plaintiff] told correctional authorities and Westcare representatives

that he was an Atheist, and requested placement in a treatment

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facility that did not contain religious components to fulfill the

condition of his parole.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 13.) “A Westcare

representative advised him that he should ask to be assigned to

[Empire].” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was assigned to Empire

in Redding, California. (Partial SUF ¶ 2; Westcare SUF ¶ 4.) Empire

utilizes a 12-step recovery program, developed by Alcoholics Anonymous

and Narcotics Anonymous, which includes references to God and a higher

power. (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 14; Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 3.) 

“While at Empire, [Plaintiff] notified Westcare 

representatives and told them that he objected to the religious 12-

step program used by Empire, and asked to be transferred to a secular

alternative.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 15.) “[Plaintiff] also asked

[Crofoot] whether he could fulfill his parole requirement through a

secular recovery program.” (Partial Mot. ¶ 7; Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 16.) 

“[Plaintiff] told Crofoot that he objected to participating in the

Empire program because he was an atheist.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 6.) 

“Crofoot told [Plaintiff] that he needed to continue at Empire while

Crofoot looked into the issue of whether secular programs were

available, and told [Plaintiff] not to leave the Empire class in the

meantime.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 17.) “Crofoot called Westcare to ask

whether a non 12-step program was available for [Plaintiff].” (Cross

Mot. SUF ¶ 18.) “Westcare informed Crofoot that there were no secular

treatment programs in the Northern California area.” (Westcare SUF ¶

24.) “While waiting to hear back from Crofoot, [Plaintiff] contacted

Westcare and again explained that he was an atheist and asked whether

he could attend a secular program in lieu of Empire’s religious 12-

step program.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 19.) “Westcare representative Dawn

Hall told [Plaintiff] that the only other available program was a

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faith-based program called Cornerstone, and that if he ‘didn’t like

Empire, he really wasn’t going to like it at Cornerstone.’” (Cross

Mot. SUF ¶ 20.) “After making inquiries, Crofoot told [Plaintiff]

that there were no programs that were ‘non 12-step.’” (Partial Mot.

SUF ¶ 9.) “Crofoot told [Plaintiff] that he could file an

Inmate/Parolee Appeal [known as a “602 Appeal”], but that in the

meantime [Plaintiff] should continue to participate in the Empire

Program or he would be returned to prison.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 10.) 

“[Plaintiff] presented Crofoot on April 3, 2007 with a 602 Appeal that

set forth the basis for his objection to participation in the Empire

program.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 11) Plaintiff’s 602 Appeal states:

As an Atheist I object to forced participation in

any spiritual/religious activities. I am currently

required to attend 90 days on in-patient treatment

at the Empire Recovery Center in Shasta County. I

have been told by my parole officer that I must

complete the 90 days of spiritual treatment because

there are no available secular recovery

alternatives. [¶] Since the CDC cannot provide me

with a secular alternative to 12-step based

treatment I would like the in-patient treatment

stipulation removed from my parole conditions so

that I may return home ASAP.

(Heller Decl. Partial Mot. Ex. B; Heller Decl. Cross Mot. Ex. L.) 

Plaintiff also attached to his 602 Appeal a document further

explaining his beliefs as an Atheist and a summary of judicial

opinions in support of his request. (Id.)

“According to Crofoot, representatives of Empire told 

Crofoot on April 6, 2007, that [Plaintiff] ‘has been disruptive,

though in a congenial way, to the staff as well as other students.’” 

(Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 12; Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 30.) “Crofoot’s

understanding from the Empire representatives was that [Plaintiff]

‘was not being loud; he wasn’t throwing things around; he wasn’t

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stomping around; he wasn’t being boisterous and that sort of thing.’”

(Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 13; Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 31.) “He was ‘sort of

passive aggressive.’” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 13; Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 31.) 

“Crofoot spoke with his Unit Supervisor, Defendant Brenda Wilding, and

concluded that the right thing to do was to refer Plaintiff to [the

Board of Parole Hearings (the “BPH”)] on a parole violation for

failing to participate in the BPH-ordered program.” (Partial Mot. SUF

¶ 15.) “Wilding understood that [Plaintiff] objected to participating

in the Empire [] program because he was an atheist.” (Partial Mot.

SUF ¶ 20.) “Wilding understood that Crofoot told [Plaintiff] that

[Plaintiff] had to either participate in the [program] or be returned

to prison.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 21.) “Crofoot and Wilding decided

together that [Plaintiff] needed to be returned to prison so that he

could argue his case before the BPH.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 16.) 

“Crofoot arrested [Plaintiff] on April 6, 2007 and booked him into the

Shasta County Jail.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 17.) “After arresting

[Plaintiff], Crofoot called the [California Rehabilitation Center (the

“CRC”)], explained the circumstances pertaining to [Plaintiff],

explained that he was requesting that [Plaintiff] be returned to

custody, and obtained an oral order of return authorized by Deputy

Commissioner Richard Jallins.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 18.) “After the

oral order of return was authorized from Deputy Commissioner Jallins,

[Plaintiff] was sent back to prison.” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 19.) The

“oral order questionnaire/authorization” signed by Crofoot and

approved by Jallins, states in the Comments section: “Refusing to

participate in residential program. Causing problems with staff that

is effecting [sic] the other residents.” (Heller Decl. Partial Mot.

Ex. C; Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 34.) 

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“[Plaintiff] was incarcerated for more than 100 days, the 

bulk of which he spent in state prison in Norco, California.” (Cross

Mot. SUF ¶ 35.) “On June 27, 2007, while Plaintiff was still in

prison, he received a response from CDCR to his 602 appeal, denying

the appeal.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 36.) The response to Plaintiff’s 602

Appeal states:

It would behoove you to take advantage of the tools

that are offered to you to help you with your

addiction, behavior, and adjustment to society.

Per your Agent of Record, Mr. Crofoot, he has made

attempts to locate treatment facilities to

accommodate your preference, per Mr. Crofoot,

Empire Recovery was the best suited for you. Your

negative behavior toward staff caused you to be

discharged from that program leaving your Agent of

Record no other choice but to return you to CRC for

further treatment. Therefore, your request is

denied.

(Heller Decl. Partial Mot. Ex. I.) The response is signed by William

Crisologo, Associate Chief Deputy Commissioner, Board of Parole

Hearings. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case on September 29, 

2008. After Plaintiff filed his Complaint, on November 18, 2008, 

the CDCR issued Directive No. 08-06, which states:

Case law filed on September 7, 2007 in the United

States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

established that placement of a parolee into a

religious based substance abuse program at the

objection of the parolee was unconstitutional. As

such, the Division of Adult Parole Operations

(DAPO) cannot compel a parolee to participate in

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), Narcotics Anonymous (NA)

or any other religious-based substance abuse

treatment program as a condition of parole. [¶]

Effective immediately, Parole Agents assigned to

DAPO, shall not require that a parolee attend AA,

NA, or any other religious based program if the

parolee refuses to participate in such a program

for religious reasons. Under these circumstances,

the parolee shall be referred to an alternative

nonreligious program.

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(Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 37; Heller Decl. Cross Mot. Ex. O.) “Westcare did

not receive a copy of this directive until it was produced in

discovery in this action.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 38.) “Westcare does not

know what the term ‘alternative nonreligious program’ as used in the

Directive means.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 39.) “The Directive has not

altered the way in which Westcare conducts business.” (Cross Mot. SUF 

¶ 40.) “To date, Westcare continues to contract solely with

residential providers that use the 12-step program ‘in some form or

fashion.’” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 41.)

II. Legal Standard

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If

this burden is satisfied, “the non-moving party must set forth . . .

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626,

630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis

omitted). “All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the

non-moving party.” Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir.

2009). “Here, cross-motions for summary judgment are at issue. [The

Court] evaluate[s] each motion separately, giving the nonmoving party

in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” A.C.L.U.

of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2006).

//

//

//

//

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//

III. Analysis

A. Hazle’s motion for summary judgment on whether Defendants

Crofoot, Wilding, and Jallins are liable for violating Hazle’s

Establishment Clause rights

Plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment finding that

Defendants Crofoot, Wilding, and Jallins (the “Parole Defendants”) are 

liable for violating his Establishment Clause rights by requiring him

to participate in a 12-step drug rehabilitation program that contained

religious components. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the Parole

Defendants violated his First Amendment right under the Establishment

Clause as follows: (1) “requiring him, upon threat of arrest or

incarceration, to continue participating in a ‘12-step’ program that

contained religious components”; (2) “rejecting his requests to

fulfill the treatment condition of his parole through a secular and

non-religious program”; and (3) “arresting and incarcerating him based

on his resistance.” (Partial Mot. 7:15-20.) The Parole Defendants

respond, arguing it was Plaintiff’s “disruptive behavior” and “not

[Plaintiff’s] self-professed status as an Atheist [that] caused his

dismissal from his substance abuse program, . . . arrest[,] and

subsequent reincarceration . . . .” (Parole Defs.’ Opp’n to Partial

Mot. 4:1-10.) 

“For the government to coerce someone to participate in

religious activities strikes at the core of the Establishment Clause

of the First Amendment, whatever else the Clause may bar.” Inouye v.

Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit

articulated the following test in Inouye v. Kemna “with regard to

determining whether [Plaintiff] was [subject to] governmental coercion

of religious activity . . . : ‘first, has the state acted; second,

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does the action amount to coercion; and third, is the object of the

coercion religious rather than secular?’” Id. at 713. “First,

[Crofoot] acted in his official state capacity as a parole officer to

order [Plaintiff into a 12-step program that contained religious

components]. That the state did not run the program itself is ‘of no

moment.’” Id. (quoting Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir.

1996)). It is undisputed that Crofoot, Wilding, and Jallins were

acting in their official state capacities when they required Plaintiff

to participate in the 12-step drug treatment program as a condition of

his parole, and subsequently removed and incarcerated him for not

participating in the program. 

Further, the Parole Defendants’ “action was clearly

coercive: [Plaintiff] could be imprisoned if he did not attend and he

was, in fact, ultimately returned to prison in part because of his

refusal to participate in the program.” Inouye, 504 F.3d at 713

(emphasis added). The Parole Defendants argue Plaintiff was returned

to prison because he was “disruptive” in the program. This argument

rings hollow in light of the undisputed facts showing Plaintiff was

only “disruptive” in the program “‘in a congenial way’” and “was ‘sort

of passive aggressive.’” (Partial Mot. SUF ¶¶ 12, 13.) It is also

undisputed that Plaintiff communicated his objection to participation

in the Empire program and that Crofoot told Plaintiff he “should

continue to participate in the Empire Program or he would be returned

to prison.” (Id. ¶ 10.) It is further undisputed that Crofoot and

Wilding concluded that “the right thing to do” was to refer Plaintiff

to the Board of Parole Hearings “on a parole violation for failing to

participate in the BPH-ordered program.” (Id. ¶ 15.) It is also

undisputed that Deputy Commissioner Jallins authorized Plaintiff to be

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returned to prison because of Plaintiff’s failure to participate in

the program. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 24.)

“The final element requires somewhat more discussion.” 

Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479. It is undisputed that “Empire used a 12-step

program that included references to God and a ‘higher power.’”

(Partial Mot. SUF ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff’s following averments in

his declaration have not been controverted:

Shortly after arriving at Empire, I discovered that

Empire used a “12-step” recovery program based [on]

the principles of Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) and

Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”), which contains

religious components. Among other features, the

“12-step” method used by Empire made references to

God, involved acknowledgment of a “higher power,”

and included prayer. [¶] I am an atheist, and was

one in 2007. The substantial religious components

to the “12-step” program administered by Empire

conflicted with my beliefs. Prior to my release on

parole, I had notified correctional authorities of

my Atheism, and requested placement in a treatment

facility that did not contain religious components.

(Hazle Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) The Parole Defendants do not dispute that the

Empire’s 12-step program contained religious components. “As such, on

this summary judgment record and given the lack of dispute between the

parties in question, . . . the third prong of [Plaintiff’s]

Establishment Clause test has been met as well.” Inouye, 504 F.3d at

713-14. Therefore, “the program runs afoul of the prohibition against

the state’s favoring religion in general over non-religion,” because

of the program’s use of a religious concept of a Higher Power through

references to God and prayer. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 480. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment against the Parole

Defendants is granted.

///

///

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B. Plaintiff and Westcare’s cross motions for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim 

Westcare and Plaintiff each seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim. Westcare argues Plaintiff

“cannot establish a causual connection between Westcare’s alleged acts

and the violation of [Plaintiff’s] rights.” (Westcare Mot. 6:3-4.) 

Westcare further argues “Plaintiff has no evidence to support coercion

on the part of Westcare.” (Westcare Mot. 9:10-11.) Plaintiff argues

Westcare “set in motion” the series of events leading up to the

violation of his rights by “contract[ing] exclusively with 12-step

facilities.” (Plt.’s Opp’n to Westcare Mot. 19:5-23.) Plaintiff also

argues Westcare is liable for “ignor[ing]” Plaintiff’s “objections to

the religious components of the program” once it became aware of them. 

(Plt.’s Opp’n to Westcare Mot. 22:20-23:2.)

It is undisputed that Westcare contracts with the State of

California to “create a network of treatment facilities for parolees

with drug-related convictions, and coordinates with the State to place

parolees in these programs.” (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 3.) It is also

undisputed that Westcare does not have the authority to require a

parolee to attend or remain within a specific residential treatment

facility once there. (Westcare SUF ¶ 15.) It is further undisputed

that parolees can be transferred to treatment facilities in other

counties to fulfill their parole conditions upon the approval of the

parolee’s parole agent. (Cross Mot. SUF ¶ 22.) Since Plaintiff has

not controverted Westcare facts with specific facts showing that

Westcare had authority to require Plaintiff to attend or remain within

a specific residential treatment facility, Westcare’s motion is

granted, and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

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C. Westcare’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Injunction

Westcare also seeks summary judgment of Plaintiff’s request

for an injunction, arguing that CDCR Directive No. 08-06, issued

November 18, 2008, moots Plaintiff’s request. (Westcare Mot. 11:4-5.) 

The Directive states:

Case law filed on September 7, 2007 in the United

States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

established that placement of a parolee into a

religious based substance abuse program at the

objection of the parolee was unconstitutional. As

such, the Division of Adult Parole Operations

(DAPO) cannot compel a parolee to participate in

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), Narcotics Anonymous (NA)

or any other religious-based substance abuse

treatment program as a condition of parole. [¶]

Effective immediately, Parole Agents assigned to

DAPO, shall not require that a parolee attend AA,

NA, or any other religious based program if the

parolee refuses to participate in such a program

for religious reasons. Under these circumstances,

the parolee shall be referred to an alternative

nonreligious program.

(Heller Decl. Cross Mot. Ex. O.) Plaintiff responds, arguing Westcare

has not met its burden of showing that his claim for an injunction is

moot. (Opp’n to Westcare Mot. 23:22-23.)

“A case m[ay] become moot if subsequent events ma[ke] it 

absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior c[annot]

reasonably be expected to recur.” United States v. Concentrated

Phosphate Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). Here, the uncontroverted

Directive adopts a new policy that complies with the Ninth Circuit’s

holding in Inouye. Such a conclusive change in policy, absent any

indication that it was promulgated only in response to ongoing

litigation, is sufficient to render the request for an injunction

moot. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2000)

(finding that a “memorandum represent[ing] a permanent change” in

policy, that was “unequivocal in tone,” and “fully supportive of First

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Amendment rights,” mooted plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief). 

Therefore, this portion of Westcare’s motion is granted.

IV. Conclusion

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s partial motion for 

summary judgment on Defendants Crofoot, Wilding, and Jallins’

liability is granted, Westcare’s motion for summary judgment is

granted, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on

Westcare’s liability is denied. Further, Westcare’s prevails on its

argument that Plaintiff’s request for an injunction is moot.

Dated: April 6, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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