Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-mc-80230/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-mc-80230-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

IN RE EXPARTE APPLICATION OF 

MEDICAL INCORPORATED 

ASSOCIATION SMILE CREATE,

Applicant,

Case No.19-mc-80230-VKD 

ORDER RE EX PARTE APPLICATION 

FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1782

Re: Dkt. No. 1

Applicant Medical Incorporated Association Smile Create (“MIASC”) has filed an ex parte

application for an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorizing service of a subpoena for 

documents on Google LLC (“Google”). Dkt. No. 1. Although the proposed subpoena is directed 

to Google, MIASC will use the subpoena to obtain identifying and contact information for several 

individuals in Japan who have accounts with Google.

The Court grants in part and denies in part the application as discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the application, MIASC operates a dental clinic in Tokyo, Japan. During the 

months March-May 2019 five one- or two-star reviews were posted on the Google Map review 

page associated with the dental clinic. The reviews (as translated in MIASC’s application) 

describe poor dental care, rude employees, and difficulty scheduling appointments, among other 

complaints. Dkt. No. 2, Ex. A; Dkt. No.3, Ex. B.1 MIASC says it intends to assert claims for 

defamation and unlawful business interference in Japan against the person or persons who control 

 

1 MIASC characterizes these reviews as having “offensive comments.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. 

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the accounts that posted the reviews once MIASC ascertains their identities. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. 

MIASC seeks permission to serve a subpoena on Google seeking the following documents, which 

it says will allow it to identify the account holders:

1. All DOCUMENTS identifying the user(s) of ALL ACCOUNTS from 

the date each Google Account was created to the present, including all 

names, addresses (including postal codes), e-mail addresses (including 

email addresses used for recovery or other purposes), and telephone 

numbers.

2. All DOCUMENTS showing all names and addresses (including postal 

codes) of credit card holders registered on ALL ACCOUNTS.

3. All DOCUMENTS showing access log (including dates, times, IP 

addresses, and access type) of ALL ACCOUNTS from the date the 

foregoing account was created the present, including access log for each 

login (namely, login history).

Dkt. No. 6 at ECF 6-7.

MIASC’s application is supported by the declarations of Yuichi Funakoshi, Andrew 

Bartlett, and Taku Inoue. Dkt. Nos. 2-4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a district court may order the production of documents or 

testimony for use in a foreign legal proceeding, unless the disclosure would violate a legal 

privilege. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246-

47 (2004). The statute may be invoked where: (1) the discovery is sought from a person residing 

in the district of the court to which the application is made; (2) the discovery is for use in a 

proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3) the applicant is a foreign or international tribunal or 

an “interested person.” Id. at 246.

A district court is not required to grant an application that meets the statutory criteria, but 

instead retains discretion to determine what discovery, if any, should be permitted. Intel, 542 U.S. 

at 264. In exercising that discretion, the court considers several factors:

(1) whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign 

proceeding”;

(2) “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, 

and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. 

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federal-court judicial assistance”;

(3) whether the discovery request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proofgathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States”; and

(4) whether the discovery requested is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.”

Intel, 542 U.S. at 264–65.

A district court’s discretion is guided by the twin aims of § 1782: providing efficient 

assistance to participants in international litigation, and encouraging foreign countries by example 

to provide similar assistance to U.S. courts. Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz LLP, 376 

F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004). The party seeking discovery need not establish that the information 

sought would be discoverable under the governing law in the foreign proceeding or that United 

States law would allow discovery in an analogous domestic proceeding. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 

247, 261-63.

Applications brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 typically are considered on an ex parte

basis, since “‘parties will be given adequate notice of any discovery taken pursuant to the request 

and will then have the opportunity to move to quash the discovery or to participate in it.’” IPCom 

GmbH & Co. KG v. Apple, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting In re Republic 

of Ecuador, No. C10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), 2010 WL 3702427, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 

2010)). “Consequently, orders granting § 1782 applications typically only provide that discovery 

is ‘authorized,’ and thus the opposing party may still raise objections and exercise its due process 

rights by challenging the discovery after it is issued via a motion to quash, which mitigates 

concerns regarding any unfairness of granting the application ex parte.” In re Varian Med. Sys. 

Int’l AG, No. 16-mc-80048-MEJ, 2016 WL 1161568, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016). 

Unless the district court orders otherwise, the discovery authorized by the court must be 

obtained in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a); In re 

Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor’s Office, Tokyo, Japan, 16 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th 

Cir. 1994).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Requirements

MIASC’s application satisfies the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). First, the 

subpoena seeks discovery from Google, which has its principal place of business in this district. 

Second, MIASC requests this discovery for use in a civil action for defamation and unlawful 

business interference that it anticipates filing in Japan, as soon as it learns the identities of the 

Google account holders responsible for the negative review postings. This proceeding before a 

foreign tribunal appears to be within reasonable contemplation. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 259 

(adjudicative proceedings need not be pending or imminent, so long as they are within reasonable 

contemplation). Third, MIASC, as the putative plaintiff in the contemplated civil action, is an 

interested person within the meaning of the statute.

B. Intel Factors

Even if the Court has the authority to grant MIASC’s § 1782 application, that does not 

mean the Court is required to do so. Intel, 542 U.S. at 247. In determining whether judicial 

assistance under § 1782 is appropriate, the Court must consider the additional Intel factors.

1. Participation of Target in the Foreign Proceeding

Although this factor addresses whether the person from whom discovery is sought is a 

party to the foreign proceeding, “the key issue is whether the material is obtainable through the 

foreign proceeding.” In re Varian Med. Sys., 2016 WL 1161568 at *3 (internal quotations and 

citation omitted).

According to the application, Google will not be a party to the civil action MIASC plans to 

bring in Japan, and the documents MIASC seeks by subpoena are located in the United States. 

Dkt. No. 1 at 4. MIASC contends that such evidence is outside the reach of a Japanese court’s 

jurisdiction. Id. In these circumstances, the need for assistance pursuant to § 1782(a) is greater 

than it would be in circumstances where the foreign tribunal may order parties appearing before it 

or third parties within its jurisdiction to produce evidence. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. The Court finds 

that this factor weighs in favor of authorizing service of the subpoena.

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2. Receptivity of Foreign Tribunal to U.S. Judicial Assistance

Under this factor, the Court considers “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of 

the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or 

agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. “This factor 

focuses on whether the foreign tribunal is willing to consider the information sought.” In re 

Varian Med. Sys., 2016 WL 1161568 at *4. “[I]f there is reliable evidence that the foreign 

tribunal would not make any use of the requested material, it may be irresponsible for the district 

court to order discovery, especially where it involves substantial costs to the parties involved.” Id.

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Courts have denied requests for discovery where the 

foreign tribunal or government expressly says it does not want the U.S. federal court’s assistance 

under § 1782. See, e.g., Schmitz, 376 F.3d at 84-85 (affirming the denial of discovery where the 

German government expressly objected to the information sought due to concerns that it would 

jeopardize an ongoing German criminal investigation, as well as German sovereign rights); In re 

Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1040-41 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 

(concluding that this Intel factor weighed heavily against discovery where the Korean Fair Trade 

Commission filed an amicus brief stating that it had no need or use for the requested discovery). 

Here, MIASC represents that Japanese courts have been receptive in other matters to 

assistance in discovery from the United States, but the cases on which it relies do not actually 

support that proposition. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5. However, in the absence of evidence that Japanese 

courts would object to MIASC’s discovery of the information sought in the subpoena, or that they 

object more generally to the judicial assistance of U.S. federal courts, the Court concludes that this 

factor weighs in favor of authorizing service of the subpoena.

3. Circumvention of Proof-Gathering Restrictions

Under this factor, the Court considers whether MIASC’s request for discovery “conceals 

an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country 

or the United States.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. “‘A perception that an applicant has side-stepped 

less-than-favorable discovery rules by resorting immediately to § 1782 can be a factor in a court’s 

analysis.’” In re Varian Med. Sys., 2014 WL 1161568 at *5 (quoting In re Cathode Ray Tube 

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(CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C07-5944-SC, 2013 WL 183944, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013)). 

Courts have found that this factor weighs in favor of discovery where there is “nothing to suggest 

that [the applicant] is attempting to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.” In re 

Google, Inc., No. 14-mc-80333-DMR, 2014 WL 7146994, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 15, 2014); see 

also In re Eurasian Natural Resources Corp. Ltd., No. 18-mc-80041-LB, 2018 WL 1557167, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 30, 2018) (finding that the third Intel factor weighed in favor of discovery 

where there was “no evidence” of an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or 

policies).

Mr. Funakoshi, an attorney for MIASC who is licensed to practice in Japan, asserts that he 

is aware of no restrictions or policies under Japanese law that would limit the gathering of the 

evidence MIASC seeks here. Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 9. In the absence of contrary information regarding the 

procedures acceptable to a Japanese court for identifying the Google account holders, the Court 

concludes that this factor also weighs in favor of authorizing service of the subpoena.

4. Unduly Burdensome or Intrusive Discovery

Under this factor, the Court considers whether the discovery is sought is “unduly intrusive 

or burdensome.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265.

MIASC’s proposed subpoena to Google includes the three requests for documents 

reproduced above. These requests seek information identifying several Google account holders, 

including the entire login histories or access logs available for each of those accounts. MIASC 

relies on the declaration of Mr. Inoue, an attorney for MIASC who is licensed to practice in Japan, 

to explain why MIASC is unlikely to be able to identify the account holders from the contact 

information Google maintains about them, and why, in MIASC’s view, it is necessary to also 

obtain the account holders’ access log information. Specifically, MIASC explains that once it has 

obtained the access log information from Google, it can identify the IP addresses used by the 

account holders, and then it will be able to ask the ISP or ISPs who assigned those addresses for 

information identifying the user of the IP address. Dkt. No. 4 ¶¶ 5-7.

In this application, MIASC has demonstrated that it is unlikely to be able to obtain the 

identifying information it requires to proceed with a civil action in Japan unless it obtains at least 

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some access log information for each account holder. However, this discovery is certainly 

intrusive, at least with respect to the privacy interests of the Google account holders. Moreover, 

the Court questions whether the procedures typically available for addressing and resolving 

challenges to a subpoena served pursuant an ex parte application adequately protect the interests 

of the account holders here. As a practical matter, an individual in Japan may not be able to easily 

invoke the available U.S. judicial processes to object to the proposed subpoena, and it is not clear 

whether or to what extent Google may act to protect the privacy interests of its account holders. 

The Court is satisfied that its concerns can be addressed by limiting the scope of MIASC’s 

third document request. The Court will permit discovery of no more than six months’ of access 

log information for a particular account; MIASC may not seek all access log information from the 

date the account was created. In addition, the Court will adopt additional procedural protections to 

ensure that any objections an account holder may have to disclosure of his or her information are 

addressed by the Court before disclosure is made. Specifically, and as set forth below, Google 

must notify the Court of any objections it receives from an account holder, and it may not disclose 

objected-to documents to MIASC until the Court resolves those objections. 

IV. CONCLUSION

MIASC’s application meets the statutory criteria for an order authorizing service of the 

proposed subpoena. In addition, the factors that inform the Court’s exercise of its discretion under 

Intel favor authorizing service of the subpoena as modified in accordance with the Court’s 

instructions above with respect to the third document request.

Accordingly, the Court authorizes service of a modified subpoena on Google. This order 

does not foreclose a motion to quash or further modify the subpoena by Google following service 

or by the Google account holders or account users whose identifying information is sought. The 

Court orders MIASC and Google to comply with the following requirements to ensure all 

interested persons have an opportunity to contest the subpoena if they wish:

1. At the time of service of the subpoena, MIASC must also serve a copy of this order on 

Google. 

2. Within 10 calendar days of service of the subpoena and this order, Google shall notify 

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each of the account holders and account users within the scope of the subpoena that 

their identifying information is sought by MIASC, and shall serve a copy of this order 

on each such person.

3. Google and/or any person whose identifying information is sought may, within 21 days 

from the date of the notice, file a motion in this Court contesting the subpoena 

(including a motion to quash or modify the subpoena). 

4. Alternatively, any person whose identifying information is sought may, within 21 days 

from the date of the notice, advise Google in writing of any objections he or she has to 

disclosure of the information and the bases for any such objections. Within 10 days of 

receipt of any such objections, Google shall so advise the Court.

5. If any person contests the subpoena or objects to any portion of it, Google shall 

preserve, but not disclose, the information sought by the subpoena pending resolution 

of that contest or objection. 

6. Any information MIASC obtains pursuant to the subpoena may be used only for 

purposes of the anticipated action for defamation or unlawful business interference, and 

MIASC may not release such information or use it for any other purpose, absent a 

Court order authorizing such release or use.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2019

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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