Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00789/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00789-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JONATHAN GRIGSBY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

M. MUNGUIA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0789 GEB AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges that defendants Munguia, Serrano, Lee, 

Balque, and Baker used excessive force against plaintiff in violation of plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment rights. ECF No. 1. Pending before the court are: (1) plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment, ECF No. 26; (2) plaintiff’s motion to compel, ECF No. 27; (3) plaintiff’s request for 

production of documents, ECF No. 35; (4) plaintiff’s motion and/or clarification regarding 

request for production of documents, ECF No. 37; (5) plaintiff’s motion for a discovery 

conference, ECF No. 38; and (6) plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 34. 

I. Motion for Default Judgment 

 On December 15, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion entitled “Motion for Summary Judgment 

Default.” ECF No. 26. Upon reviewing plaintiff’s motion, the court finds that the motion is in 

content a motion for a default judgment rather than summary judgment, and will therefore 

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analyze it pursuant to the rules governing default judgments.1 Default may be entered by the 

clerk when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, a 

defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment. 

Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 

disfavored, but may be granted in the court’s discretion under certain circumstances not present 

here. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The undersigned need not 

consider the Eitel factors because there has been no default. The procedural history of the case 

demonstrates that no defendant has failed to defend. 

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a default judgment because defendants failed to 

respond to his complaint within sixty days of the court’s September 29, 2014 order.2

 Plaintiff’s 

argument is based on his assumption that the court’s order, ECF No. 14, required defendants to 

respond to the complaint within sixty days of the date of the order. ECF No. 26. However, the 

court’s September 29, 2014 order merely required defendants to respond to the complaint within 

the time period provided by Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 14 at 2. 

Rule 12 provides, in relevant part, that where a defendant has waived service under Rule 4(d), a 

responsive pleading is due within sixty days after the request for the waiver of service of 

summons was sent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). In this case, the requests for waiver were sent on 

October 7, 2014, and executed waivers were returned on behalf of all defendants on December 1, 

2014. The waivers indicate that defendants were to file an answer or Rule 12 motion within sixty 

days of October 7, 2014. ECF No. 19. Defendants’ answer was timely filed on December 8, 

2014. ECF No. 21. 

 In defendants’ opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendants explain that the source of 

plaintiff’s confusion lies with the service of the answer. ECF No. 28. Defendants served their 

December 8, 2014 answer on plaintiff at Salinas Valley State Prison. See ECF No. 21 at 7. 

However, plaintiff was transferred out of Salinas Valley State Prison on November 3, 2014. ECF 

 

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 Defendants request that plaintiff’s motion be stricken for failure to comply with the rules 

governing summary judgment motions. Defendants’ request is denied. 

2

 While plaintiff refers to ECF No. 14 as the “September 29, 2014 order,” the court notes that the 

order was filed on September 30, 2014. 

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No. 28 at 2. Thus, when plaintiff filed his motion for default judgment on December 15, 2014,3

he had apparently not yet received service of the answer at his new address.4 Defendants indicate 

in their opposition that plaintiff was sent another copy of the answer on January 5, 2015. 

 Because defendants timely answered the complaint, there is no basis for finding that any 

of the defendants are in default. Furthermore, any problems with service have been resolved. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment is denied. 

II. Plaintiff’s Discovery Motions 

Plaintiff filed a motion to compel, a request for production of documents, a motion and/or 

clarification regarding the request for production of documents, and a motion for a discovery 

conference. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff is informed that court permission is not necessary 

for discovery requests and that neither discovery requests served on an opposing party nor that 

party’s responses should be filed until such time as a party becomes dissatisfied with a response 

and seeks relief from the court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery 

requests between the parties shall not be filed with the court unless, and until, they are at issue. 

In this case, the discovery and scheduling order provides that the parties may conduct 

discovery until April 17, 2015. ECF No. 25 at 5. The order specifies that with respect to written 

discovery requests, the parties have forty-five days after the request is served to respond to the 

request. Id. at 4. With these timelines in mind, the court turns now to plaintiff’s discovery 

motions. 

A. Motion to Compel 

 On December 22, 2014,5 plaintiff filed a motion to compel seeking a response to a letter 

plaintiff sent to defendants on December 8, 2014, as well as a response to his complaint. ECF 

No. 27. For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff’s request for a response to his complaint is 

denied as moot. 

 

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 The proof of service attached to plaintiff’s motion is dated December 15, 2014. The motion 

was filed by the clerk on December 17, 2014. ECF No. 26. 

4

 The court notes that plaintiff filed a notice of change of address with the court on November 5, 

2014 and November 13, 2014. ECF No. 17, 18. 

5

 Plaintiff’s motion was filed by the clerk on December 29, 2014. ECF No. 27. 

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With respect to plaintiff’s request for a response to his letter, plaintiff explains that he 

received a letter from defense counsel Harper stating that she represents “Fairbanks, Lee, Mungia, 

Serrano, and Baker.” ECF No. 27. Because plaintiff did not name Fairbanks in his lawsuit, he 

sent a letter to defense counsel on December 8, 2014 requesting clarification as to whether 

Fairbanks is actually defendant Balque. On January 12, 2015, defendants filed an opposition to 

plaintiff’s motion, explaining that defendant Balque’s name had been legally changed to 

Fairbanks and that plaintiff was mailed a letter with this information on December 12, 2014 and 

again on January 5, 2015. ECF No. 31 at 2. Because plaintiff has already received the requested 

information, plaintiff’s motion is denied as moot. 

B. Request for Production of Documents 

 On February 9, 2015, plaintiff filed a request for production of documents with the court.6 

ECF No. 35. Plaintiff is reminded that requests for production of documents must first be served 

on the opposing party and are not to be filed with the court unless a dispute has arisen. At the 

time plaintiff filed this request, defendants’ forty-five day period for responding to the request 

had not yet expired. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff’s motion could be construed as a motion 

to compel production of documents, the motion is denied as premature. Moreover, defendants 

have indicated in their statement of clarification that they will respond to plaintiff’s request 

pursuant to the timeline set forth in the discovery and scheduling order. See ECF No. 36. 

C. Motion and/or Clarification Regarding Production of Documents 

On March 5, 2015, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion Clarification [sic] 

Regarding Production of Documents.” ECF No. 37. Plaintiff states that on February 27, 2015 

and March 3, 2015 he requested certain documents from defendants. To the extent that this 

motion seeks to compel production of these documents, it is denied as premature because it was 

filed before the forty-five day period for responding had expired. Defendants have indicated that 

they are in the process of responding to plaintiff’s discovery requests. ECF No. 39. 

 

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 This document was filed by the clerk on February 17, 2015. ECF No. 35. The court notes that 

the docket refers to this document as a motion to compel, and that defendants filed a statement 

clarifying that it is a request for production of documents, ECF No. 36. 

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D. Motion for a Discovery Conference 

On March 17, 2015, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion for Rule 26(f) Meeting.” 

ECF No. 38. Plaintiff states that he and defendants have not had a meeting and that he has not 

heard from defendants regarding a settlement. Defendants responded to plaintiff’s motion, 

explaining that the parties in this case are not required to have a discovery conference or 

formulate a discovery plan, and suggesting that plaintiff write a letter to Deputy Attorney General 

Harper should he wish to confer regarding defendants’ discovery responses. ECF No. 39 at 2. 

Defendants are correct that no discovery meeting is required in this prisoner civil rights 

action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(vi), (f)(1). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff seeks a 

court-ordered discovery meeting, the motion is denied. However, plaintiff is encouraged to 

correspond with Deputy Attorney General Harper regarding defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s 

discovery requests. 

III. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

Plaintiff also requests appointment of counsel. ECF No. 34. The United States Supreme 

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners 

in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain 

exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s 

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in 

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse discretion in declining to appoint counsel); Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 

1983). In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. 

Plaintiff has been able to articulate his requests for discovery and the legal issues appear to be 

relatively straightforward. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel will therefore be 

denied. 

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 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment (ECF No. 26) is denied; 

2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 27) is denied; 

3. Plaintiff’s request for production of documents (ECF No. 35) is denied; 

4. Plaintiff’s motion and/or clarification regarding production of documents (ECF No. 

37) is denied; 

5. Plaintiff’s motion for a discovery conference (ECF No. 38) is denied; and 

6. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 34) is denied. 

DATED: April 13, 2015 

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