Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06464/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06464-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Although CCSF is the named party in this matter, the San

Francisco Community College District ("District") filed the motion

before the Court. The District argues as though it is the named

defendant, even though it has not been joined or made an

appearance. None of the parties, including Lauser, identifies any

difference between CCSF and the District. In short, CCSF and the

District appear to be the same party. The Court therefore

addresses the District's Motion as though it were filed by CCSF.

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE C. LAUSER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY COLLEGE OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAN

FRANCISCO BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION

TRADE COUNCIL UNIONS AND UNITED

BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND

JOINERS OF AMERICA LOCAL UNION NO.

22, 

Defendants.

 

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No. C-07-6464 SC

ORDER GRANTING CCSF

AND UNION DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS TO DISMISS;

GRANTING CCSF'S

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Lawrence Lauser ("Plantiff" or "Lauser") brought

this action pursuant to sections 7, 8, and 9 of the National Labor

Relations Act ("NLRA") 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and section 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §

141 et seq. Compl., Docket No. 1. Lauser alleges that Defendant

City College of San Francisco ("CCSF")1 wrongfully terminated his

employment and violated the terms of a collective bargaining

agreement. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Lauser further alleges that Defendants

San Francisco Building and Construction Trade Council Unions and

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the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local

Union No. 22 (collectively "Unions" or "Union Defendants")

breached their duty of fair representation. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. 

Before the Court are three motions. First, CCSF moved to

dismiss, claiming that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that

Lauser failed to state a claim. Docket No. 10 ("CCSF Mot."). 

Lauser filed an Opposition, and CCSF filed a Reply. Docket Nos.

20, 23. The Union Defendants also moved to dismiss on

jurisdictional grounds. Docket No. 4 ("Union Mot."). Lauser

opposed this motion as well, and the Unions replied. Docket Nos.

14, 15. Finally, CCSF moved for sanctions against Lauser pursuant

to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Docket No. 26

("Sanctions Mot."). Lauser opposed sanctions, and CCSF replied. 

Docket Nos. 29, 30. 

The Court took all three motions under submission without

oral argument. Having considered all of the parties' arguments,

the Court GRANTS CCSF's Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS the Unions'

Motion to Dismiss, and GRANTS CCSF's Motion for Sanctions.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired as a permanent employee of CCSF in

January 2003. Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that over the course

of his employment, he made numerous safety complaints and informed

his superiors of numerous building code violations. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges that CCSF fired him in July 2007 in 

order to silence him and to punish him for "blowing the whistle"

on CCSF's purported illegal activities. Id. 

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The Unions were the collective bargaining representatives for

Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 7. According to Plaintiff, after CCSF

terminated his employment, he demanded that the Unions represent

him in arbitration against CCSF, which they refused to do. Id. ¶

8. 

In their motions, CCSF and the Unions argue that CCSF is a

political subdivision of California and is therefore excluded from

the definition of "employer" in the NLRA/LMRA statutory scheme. 

Absent those statutes, Defendants claim, this Court has no subject

matter jurisdiction. CCSF also claims that, as an instrumentality

of the state, it is immune from suit under the 11th Amendment.

III. JURISDICTION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that the

Court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

"A party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction has the burden

of proving the actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction." 

Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996). In

reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may look beyond the

pleadings and "review any evidence, such as affidavits and

testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of

jurisdiction." McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th

Cir. 1988). In essence, "jurisdictional attacks can be either

facial or factual." White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

2000). Where the attack is factual, "the party opposing the

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to

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"However, where the jurisdictional issue and substantive

issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is

dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits,

the jurisdictional determination should await a determination of

the relevant facts on either a motion going to the merits or at

trial." Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077. Here, the question of

jurisdiction is not intertwined with the merits. The Court can

resolve the jurisdictional question without addressing any of the

facts relating to Lauser's claim that CCSF terminated his

employment to silence him.

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satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." 

Savage v. Glendale Union High School Dist., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040

n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Unlike a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6),

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion does not require the Court to presume the

truthfulness of the allegations in the Plaintiff's complaint. 

See White, 227 F.3d at 1242; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).2

B. NLRA/LMRA Jurisdiction

 Lauser alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to sections 7, 8, and 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§

157-59, and section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Compl. ¶ 2.

None of the three cited sections of the NLRA contains a grant

of jurisdiction. Section 7 establishes the rights of employees to

organize and participate in collective bargaining, but does not

establish the means of protecting those rights. See 29 U.S.C. §

157. Section 8 defines the requirements for employers and labor

organizations, as well as what acts constitute unfair labor

practices, but does not establish an employee's right to bring

suit for alleged violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 158; Hadley v. Haw.

Gov't Employees Ass'n, No. 05-0660, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803,

at *11 (D. Haw. March 13, 2006) ("29 U.S.C. § 158 does not contain

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any grant of federal jurisdiction."). Finally, section 9 governs

the process for employees to select representation, but, again,

does not create a cause of action in the district court. See 29

U.S.C. § 159. Section 10 of the NLRA provides remedies for unfair

labor practices in the form of review by the National Labor

Relations Board ("NLRB"). Id. § 160. The only authority vested

in the district court in section 10 is to review and enforce NLRB

decisions, or to order injunctive relief upon the NLRB's petition. 

See id. § 160(e), (f), (j). Lauser does not allege any action by

the NLRB, let alone ask the Court to review or enforce such

action, so the cited sections of the NLRA do not provide the Court

with jurisdiction.

The LMRA confers jurisdiction upon the district courts to

hear "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting

commerce. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 301(a). However, the LMRA

incorporates relevant definitions from the NLRA. See id. §

142(2); Hadley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11. The term "employer"

is defined as follows in the NLRA: 

The term "employer" includes any person acting

as an agent of an employer, directly or

indirectly, but shall not include the United

States or any wholly owned Government

corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or

any State or political subdivision thereof, or

any person subject to the Railway Labor Act,

as amended from time to time, or any labor

organization (other than when acting as an

employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of

officer or agent of such labor organization.

29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Thus, "section 301(a) of the [LMRA], 29

U.S.C. § 185(a), does not grant this court jurisdiction over the

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claims of an individual employed by a political subdivision of a

state." Ayres v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 666 F.2d 441, 444

(9th Cir. 1982).

CCSF argues that it is a political subdivision of the State

of California, and that section 301(a) therefore does not give the

Court jurisdiction over the dispute. Federal law governs whether

or not a state-created entity is a "political subdivision" under

29 U.S.C. § 152(2). NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S.

600, 602-03 (1971) ("Natural Gas"). The term "political

subdivision" is not defined in the NLRA. The Supreme Court has

not explicitly created a test for determining whether an entity is

a political subdivision of a state either, but it approved in

Natural Gas of the test used by the NLRB. Id. at 605. Under that

test, political subdivisions are entities that are "either (1)

created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or

administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by

individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the

general electorate." Id. at 604-05; see also Ayres, 666 F.2d at

442.

Under the above criteria, CCSF qualifies as a political

subdivision. CCSF was created pursuant to a provision in the

California Consitution. See Cal. Const. Art. IX § 14 ("The

Legislature shall have power, by general law, to provide for the

incorporation and organization of school districts, high school

districts, and community college districts, of every kind and

class, and may classify such districts."). Lauser argues that

CCSF is a creation of the City of San Francisco rather than the

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3The Court grants CCSF's request for judicial notice. See

Docket No. 8.

4Lauser asks the Court to allow further discovery on the

jurisdictional question. However, Lauser already claims to have

significant evidence on this issue, see Opp'n to CCSF Mot. at 5,

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State of California. If this is the case, it is only because

California has vested cities with the authority to exercise the

State's power of creating school districts. See Cal. Const. Art.

IX § 16(a). What's more, pursuant to the San Francisco Charter,

CCSF's Governing Board is elected by the voters, with vacancies

filled by the mayor. See San Francisco Charter § 8.101, attached

as Exhibit A to CCSF's Request for Judicial Notice.3 By statute,

community colleges in California are part of the state's public

school system, and are subject to the supervision of a statewide

Board of Governors which prescribes standards for the creation and

operation of all such schools. Cal. Ed. Code § 66700. As such,

CCSF was created by the state and is administered by people

responsible to the electorate or to public officials. See Natural

Gas, 402 U.S. at 604-05. The Natural Gas court also considered

factors beyond the NLRB test, at least some of which are present

here. For example, the fact that members of the CCSF Governing

Board receive only nominal compensation — $500 per month —

supports the Court's finding that CCSF is a political subdivision

of the state, and is therefore excluded from the definition of the

term "employer" in Section 2(2) of the NLRA. See San Francisco

Charter § 8.101; Natural Gas, 402 U.S. at 607; 29 U.S.C. 152(2). 

The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over Lauser's NLRA and LMRA

claims against CCSF.4

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but failed to submit any such evidence to the Court. In light of

the cited portions of California Constitution and Education Code,

the Court sees no benefit to additional discovery.

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For similar reasons, Lauser's claims against the Union

Defendants are outside the Court's jurisdiction. The NLRA

definition of "employee" excludes any individual who is employed

by any "person who is not an employer as defined" in the statute. 

See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). As set forth above, CCSF is not an

employer for NLRA or LMRA purposes, so Lauser is not an "employee"

in statutory terms. See Hadley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803 at

*12. The statutory definition of "labor organization" turns in

part on the definition of "employee." "'Labor organization' is

defined (in part) as 'any organization . . . in which employees

participate and which exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with

employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of

pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.'" Id. (quoting

29 U.S.C. § 152(5)) (emphasis in original). Because Lauser is not

an employee and CCSF is not an employer, the Union Defendants are

not labor organizations under the statute. LMRA jurisdiction

extends to "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 301(a). Any agreement

between CCSF and the Union Defendants falls outside of this

provision, so the Court lacks jurisdiction over Lauser's NLRA/LMRA

claim against the Union Defendants.

In opposing both the CCSF Motion and the Union Motion, Lauser

relies heavily on Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.

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1975), for the proposition that he can maintain his suit

regardless of whether the parties fit the precise statutory

definitions of "employer" and "employee." That is a flawed

application of Alvares. The question in Alvares was whether the

the parties to a suit brought under section 301 of the LMRA must

be an employee and employer as defined in the statute. See

Alvares, 514 F.2d at 162. The Court here lacks jurisdiction not

because of who the parties to the suit are, but because of who the

parties to the alleged collective bargaining agreement are. The

very passage from Alvares that Lauser quotes acknowledges this

distinction:

The State Trustees argue, however, that

plaintiffs fail the "betweenness" requirement

of § 301 jurisdiction because neither a labor

union nor an employer is a party to this

lawsuit. The dispute here, as the dismissal of

the State Association and the State Employers

Council from the case underscores, is between

the members of Local 32 on one hand and the

State Trustees on the other. But that does not

foreclose federal jurisdiction. As the Supreme

Court held in Smith v. Evening News

Association, 1962, 371 U.S. 195, § 301 refers

to "contracts" between an employer and a labor

organization not to "suits" between them.

514 F.2d at 162 (emphasis added). Alvares merely held that where

a suit falls within section 301(a), the actual litigants need not

meet the statute's definitions. In that suit, the parties were

the members of a union (but not the union itself) and the trustees

of a labor-management trust fund organized under section 302(c) of

the LMRA. Id. at 159-60. Because the suit was for violation of

an agreement and fell within section 301(a), it did not matter who

the parties were. Id. at 162. Lauser's supporting authority also

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recognizes the distinction between parties to the contract and

parties to the suit:

Section 301 jurisdiction is not dependent upon

the parties to the suit but rather the nature

or subject matter of the action. Jurisdiction

exists as long as the suit is for violation of

a contract between a union and employer even

if neither party is a union or an employer.

Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing

Alvares, 514 F.2d at 162-64). Here, there is no contract between

an employer and a labor organization, so section 301 does not

create jurisdiction. 

C. Other Bases for Jurisdiction

Beyond the NLRA and LMRA, Lauser asserts that the Court has

jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1337. Compl. ¶ 2. The former provision gives the district courts

"original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C §

1331. Other than the NLRA and the LMRA, however, Lauser has

identified no Constitutional provision, law, or treaty of the

United States as a basis for his claim. According to the

Complaint, CCSF's termination of Lauser "violated the terms of the

collective bargaining agreement applicable to [Lauser] and also

constitutes a violation of the public policy of the State of

California. . . ." Compl. ¶ 5. Neither the alleged collective

bargaining agreement or California public policy is sufficient to

provide jurisdiction under section 1331. Section 1337(a) vests

the district courts with "original jurisdiction of any civil

action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating

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commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and

monopolies." 29 U.S.C. § 1337(a). Again, however, Lauser's

argument fails, as the only acts of Congress in question are the

NLRA and the LMRA, which do not give the Court jurisdiction for

the reasons described above.

IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

"Under the eleventh amendment, agencies of the state are

immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief

brought in federal court." Mitchell v. Los Angeles County Cmty.

Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). Under Mitchell, a

court must consider the following factors to determine if a

governmental agency is an arm of the state entitled to immunity:

"whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds,

whether the entity performs central governmental functions,

whether the entity may sue or be sued, whether the entity has the

power to take property in its own name or only the name of the

state, and the corporate status of the entity." Id. 

The court looks to state law in consideration of these factors. 

Id.

CCSF also asserts that, under Mitchell, it is an

instrumentality of the State of California and is therefore immune

from suit. CCSF made the same argument before the Ninth Circuit

in Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College District, 26 F.3d

968 (9th Cir. 1994), and prevailed. The Cerrato holding is clear

and leaves little room for interpretation:

As a threshold matter, the defendants argue

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5In urging the Court to consider evidence relating to the

Mitchell factors, Lauser conflates the "political division" aspect

of CCSF's challenge to LMRA jurisdiction with the "instrumentality

of the state" aspect of CCSF's sovereign immunity argument. 

Blurring these does not change the outcome. 

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that the Eleventh Amendment bars this court

from hearing Cerrato's section 1983 claims.

They argue that such a result is compelled by

Mitchell . . . in which we held that

California community college school district

was a state entity that possessed Eleventh

Amendment immunity from section 1983 claims.

We agree with the defendants that the Eleventh

Amendment bars us from hearing Cerrato's

claims against the SFCC district. In general,

the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court

from hearing claims by a citizen against

dependent instrumentalities of the state. We

have held that community college districts are

dependent instrumentalities of the state of

California. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction

to hear Cerrato's claims against the district.

Id. at 972 (citations omitted). Lauser argues that the Court

should ignore Cerrato and apply the Mitchell factors here because

the Cerrato court's analysis was cursory.5 The Court sees no

benefit in doing so, as Cerrato established CCSF's Eleventh

Amendment immunity as a matter of law. Had Cerrato involved a

different defendant, Lauser might have a basis for distinguishing

the facts of the present case and applying Mitchell. However,

this Court cannot deviate from a binding ruling from the Ninth

Circuit on the precise legal question under consideration. As

such, even if CCSF were an employer and the Court had jurisdiction

over the LMRA claim or the claim against the Union Defendants,

CCSF would still be immune from suit.

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6CCSF has complied with the procedural requirements

established in the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(1)(a). See

Declaration of Randy Riddle, Docket No. 27, ¶¶ 2-5, Ex. D.

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V. SANCTIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) requires that, to

the best of an attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, when

the attorney submits a pleading, motion or other paper, "the

claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,

modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Rule 11(c)(2) allows a party to bring a

motion for sanctions where he believes the opposing counsel has

violated Rule 11(b). 

CCSF moves the Court to impose sanctions on Lauser's counsel,

Frank Sarro, because the question of subject matter jurisdiction

should have been clear from well-established law and the parties

could have avoided the expense of preparing these motions.6

Filing a complaint in federal court where there is no factual

basis for the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction may be

sanctionable conduct under Rule 11. See Orange Prod. Credit Ass'n

v. Frontline Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Lauser's response to the Sanctions Motion is largely repetition of

his arguments against CCSF's Motion to Dismiss, and is equally

without merit. 

On February 12, 2008, Randy Riddle, counsel for CCSF, sent a

letter to Mr. Sarro, raising the same issues ultimately addressed

in the CCSF Motion, and citing the relevant provisions of the

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NLRA, the LMRA, and the decisions in Ayres and Mitchell. Riddle

Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A. Mr. Riddle asked Mr. Sarro to dismiss the

Complaint by February 15, 2008, or else CCSF would file the Motion

to Dismiss and the Sanctions Motion. Id. Ex. A. Mr. Sarro

responded by letter on February 18, 2008, refusing to withdraw the

Complaint. Id. ¶ 3, Ex. B. In his letter, Mr. Sarro stated,

"Plaintiff is not aware of any binding Ninth Circuit precedent

holding that City College of San Francisco is immune from suit

under the circumstances here." Id. Ex. B.

On February 19, 2008, CCSF filed its Motion to Dismiss. In

addition to the authorities Mr. Riddle had cited in his initial

letter to Mr. Sarro, the supporting brief included citation to the

Ninth Circuit's holding in Cerrato, discussed above, which held

that CCSF is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See

26 F.3d at 972. A week later, Mr. Riddle sent Mr. Sarro a letter

attaching a copy of the Sanctions Motion informing Mr. Sarro that

if Lauser did not dismiss his Complaint with prejudice in the next

21 days, pursuant to Rule 11's safe harbor provision, CCSF would

file the Sanctions Motion with the Court. Riddle Decl. ¶ 5, Ex.

D.

Rather than withdrawing his Complaint, Lauser opposed both

CCSF's Motion to Dismiss and the Sanctions Motion. There was no

basis for opposing the Motion to Dismiss. Based on Cerrato alone,

it should have been clear that CCSF was immune from suit. 

Lauser's claims were therefore not "warranted by existing law,"

and he advanced no argument, frivolous or otherwise, for

"extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for

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establishing new law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). 

Mr. Sarro's refusal to acknowledge the existing body of law

resulted in the parties expending significant resources to

litigate CCSF's Motion to Dismiss and the Sanctions Motion. In

such circumstances, sanctions are appropriate. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that it

lacks jurisdiction over this dispute. The Court therefore GRANTS

CCSF's Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS the Union Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss, GRANTS CCSF's Motion for Sanctions, and ORDERS as

follows:

1. Lauser's claim against CCSF is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Lauser's claim against the Union Defendants is dismissed

with prejudice.

3. No later than 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, June 11, 2008,

CCSF shall submit to the Court an affidavit including an

itemized accounting of its reasonable attorney's fees

and costs expended in the preparation and filing of its

Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Sanctions, and all other

expenses directly resulting from Plaintiff's violation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2008

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-06464-SC Document 31 Filed 06/06/08 Page 15 of 15