Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01947/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01947-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Concetta Vasquez Anunciacion,

Petitioner

-vsChuck DeRosa, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-1947-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Federal Detention Center at Eloy, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 

1). On January 25, 2012 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 8). Petitioner filed a 

Reply on March 14, 2012 (Doc. 10). Pursuant to this Court’s Order, Respondents filed a 

Supplemental Answer (Doc. 14) on September 7, 2012. Petitioner has not filed a 

supplemental reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In an Order filed March 29, 2012, the Immigration Court described the factual 

background as follows:

The respondent is a 42 year old female, who was born in the 

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Philippines. She first entered the United States on March 6, 1993. 

She obtained lawful permanent resident ("LPR") status by assuming 

the identity of another person, Michelle Agustin Llacuna.

* * * 

Accordingly, prior to immigrating to the United States, the 

respondent assumed the entirety of Michelle Llacuna's identity. 

More precisely, she adopted all of Michelle Llacuna's biographical 

information, including Ms. Llacuna's: name; date of birth; place of 

birth; and parents' information. She additionally admitted that she 

knew that Michelle Llacuna was a real person because her father 

told her that Ms. Llacuna's family had sold Ms. Llacuna's personal 

information to the agency which provided the respondent with her 

false identity.

* * * 

On February 23, 2000, the respondent naturalized and was 

granted United States citizenship... In 2002, the respondent met her 

husband, Narciso Gonzalez Anunciacion ("Mr. Anunciacion") in the 

United States. And, on June 26,2004, she married him in Las Vegas,

Nevada, under her fraudulent name, Michelle Llacuna.

* * *

Following an application for a United States passport in May 

2008, government agents appeared at the respondent's house, 

requesting an opportunity to speak with Michelle Llacuna. Her 

husband refused to provide any information to the agents, stating 

that he wished to obtain an attorney. The agents left the· premises. 

After the agents departed, the respondent revealed her true name to 

her husband. 

Approximately two years later, the same government agents 

returned to the respondent's home and arrested her pursuant to a 

warrant. Apparently, under pressure from investigators, the Filipino 

agency that had provided the respondent with her false identity

revealed the names of its past clients, including the respondent. 

On October 19, 2010, the respondent was convicted of: False 

Personation in Naturalization Proceeding; Procurement of 

Naturalization Unlawfully; False Statement of Passport Application; 

and Furnishing False Information to the Social Security 

Administration, all offenses in violation of federal law. The District 

Court for the Central District of California subsequently 

denaturalized the respondent. 

(Doc. 11, Exhibit, Order 3/29/12 at 5-6.)

B. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

Removability - On October 28, 2010, following Petitioner’s conviction and 

denaturalization, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear (Exhibit D), charging 

Petitioner with being removable based on her denaturalization, convictions, etc.. 

(Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 8, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) At an initial 

hearing on December 6, 2010, the immigration court sustained all of the allegations of 

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the Notice to Appear, and found Petitioner removable. On March 4, 2011, the Service 

filed additional charges, alleging that Petitioner was removable based upon her 

conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude. (Exhibit G.) Petitioner did not 

contest the allegations, and on February 22, 2012, the Immigration Court sustained those 

allegations. 

Relief from Removal - Petitioner sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 

INA § 237(a)(1)(H), and an adjustment of status under INA § 245. On March 29, 2012, 

the immigration court found the Petitioner statutorily eligible for a waiver under § 237, 

but found as a matter of discretion that Petitioner did not merit relief, weighting 

“heavily” Petitioner’s “extensive history of fraud and criminality.” Consequently, the 

court in turn found Petitioner ineligible for an adjustment of status. Accordingly, 

Petitioner was ordered removed to the Philippines. (Doc. 11, Attachment, IJ Order 

3/29/12.) 

Review - Petitioner sought review from the Board of Immigration Appeals. In an 

Order filed August 24, 2012, the BIA affirmed the decisions of the immigration judge 

and dismissed the appeal. (Doc. 14, Supp. Ans. at Exhibit 2, BIA Dec. 8/24/12.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DETENTION

Petitioner was detained at the inception of the removal proceedings, and sought a 

redetermination of her custody status. On January 21, 2011, the Immigration Court 

found it sufficiently established that her offenses constituted two crimes of moral 

turpitude so as to subject Petitioner to mandatory detention, thereby denying the court of 

jurisdiction to release Petitioner. (Exhibit F, Attachment, IJ Order 1/21/11; Exhibit E, 

Order 12/1/10.) Petitioner appealed to the BIA, which found that the immigration judge 

had properly found her crimes to be separate offenses, and not part of one common 

scheme, and dismissed the appeal. (Exhibit F, BIA Dec. 3/21/11.)

/ /

/ /

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D. PRESENT HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing her Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 4, 2011, (Doc.1), during the 

pendency of her applications for relief. Petitioner’s Petition asserted a single grounds for 

relief, that she was not subject to mandatory detention because the immigration court and 

BIA had improperly concluded that her crimes did not constitute a single scheme of 

criminal misconduct.

Response - On January 25, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 8), 

arguing that Petitioner’s Petition amounts to an attack on her order of removal, and that 

this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim, and alternatively that the claim was 

still pending before the agency and thus was not ripe for review. 

Reply - On March 14, 2012, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10), arguing that even 

if otherwise subject to mandatory detention, she has been detained so long that her 

detention is a violation of due process, citing, Casas Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942 (9th

Cir. 2008), Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), etc. On April 10, 2012, 

Petitioner filed copies of the Immigration Judge’s denial of her application for relief 

from removal, indicating an intent to seek an appeal of that decision with the Board of 

Immigration Appeals. 

Order for Supplements - Liberally construing the Petition, and taking into 

account the new arguments raised in Petitioner’s Reply, the undersigned found the 

parties to be arguing apples and oranges. In part, that is because Petitioner has asserted 

new bases for relief in her reply. In light of the shifting nature of the underlying dispute, 

rather than requiring Petitioner to file an amended petition, the court directed 

supplemental briefing. (Order 8/31/12, Doc. 13.)

Supplemental Answer - On September 7, 2012, Respondents filed their 

Supplemental Answer (Doc. 14), arguing that Petitioner is now mandatorily detained 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that she was within the six month period in which 

detention is presumptively constitutional under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

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Petitioner has not replied, and the time to do so has now expired.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

In Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), the court observed that 

Athe Attorney General's authority over an alien's detention shifts as the alien moves 

through different phases of administrative and judicial review.@ Id. at 945. The Ninth 

Circuit concluded that the mandatory detention of criminal aliens under 8 U.S.C. '

1226(c) only continued through administrative removal proceedings, and that the 

discretionary detention under ' 1226(a) applied Aupon the dismissal of the alien's appeal 

by the BIA,@ where the Petitioner had appealed that ruling to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 

948. Had Casas not done so, his detention would have been under § 1231(a). Id. at 947.

Pre-Removal Order Detention - Here, Petitioner was originally detained 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which governs the detention of aliens in removal 

proceedings. Petitioner’s detention pursuant to that statute ended on August 24, 2012, 

when a final order of removal was entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals, without 

further appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (See Supp. Ans., Doc. 14, Exhibit 2, BIA Dec. 

8/24/12.)

A habeas petition may be rendered moot following a subsequent release from 

custody, absent other, collateral consequences that flow from the complained of 

imprisonment. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). While the existence of such 

collateral consequences is irrebuttably presumed in some habeas challenges to criminal 

convictions, see e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 

1459 (9th Cir. 1994), no such presumption applies to habeas petitions challenging 

immigration detention.

Petitioner’s attacks on her detention pursuant to § 1226(c), including her 

allegation that she was not subject to mandatory detention, and her allegations that her 

detention under that provision has simply gone on too long, have been rendered moot by 

the BIA’s dismissal of her appeal of her order of removability, and the resulting 

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imposition of detention pursuant to § 1226(a). 

Post-Removal Order Detention – Respondents argue that Petitioner is currently 

detained pursuant to § 1226(a). Here, however, there is no indication that Petitioner has 

sought judicial review of her order of removal. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes 

that Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs the 

detention of aliens subject to a final order of removal. That statute makes detention 

mandatory during the removal period (for 90 days after the final order of removal) and 

discretionary thereafter. 

Although then attacking her now terminated detention under § 1226(c), Petitioner 

argued that her detention has simply gone on too long. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the 

Supreme Court addressed the sometimes extended detention of aliens during removal 

processes. The Court acknowledged that there are due process limits beyond which 

detention fails to serve its purported purposes, and thus is not constitutionally 

permissible. "A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious 

constitutional problem." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Thus, the Court 

established a bright line rule that provides that after a six month opportunity to execute 

on its order of removal, the Government is required to show that the removal of the alien 

will be completed within the reasonably foreseeable future. The Court noted that the 

longer the alien remains in detention, the more immediate the anticipated removal must 

be. Id. at 701. “Detention for 6 months, including the 90-day removal period, is 

‘presumptively reasonable.’” Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).

Here, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on August 24, 2012 on dismissal 

of her appeal. Thus, her detention through November 23, 2012 is mandatory. Further, 

her detention through February 23, 2013 will be presumptively reasonable. 

Despite being afforded an opportunity to do so, Petitioner has failed to mount any 

other challenge to her present detention. 

Accordingly, the Petition is without merit and must be denied.

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the 

"district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order 

adverse to the applicant." However, such certificates are only required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). This case arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and does not attack a State court 

detention. Accordingly, no ruling on a certificate of appealability is required, and no 

recommendation thereon will be offered.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed October 5, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 9, 2012

11-1947r RR 12 08 30 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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