Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17103/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN ARMSTRONG; JAMES

AMAURIC; RICHARD PONCIANO;

JACK SWENSEN; BILLY BECK; JUDY

FENDT; WALTER FRATUS; GREGORY

SANDOVAL; DARLENE MADISON;

PETER RICHARDSON; STEVEN HILL;

DAVID ROSE; DAVID BLESSING; ELIO

CASTRO; ELMER UMBENHOWER;

RAYMOND HAYES; GENE

HORROCKS; KIAH MINCEY; CLIFTON

FEATHERS; WILLIE JOHNSON; DAVID

BADILLO; JAMES SIMMONS; FLORA

ABRAMS; JOEY GOUGH; TIMOTHY

WHISMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR.; MICHAEL

MINOR; MATTHEW L. CATE; DIANA

TOCHE; CHRIS MEYER; KATHLEEN

DICKINSON; MARGARITA PEREZ,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12-17103

D.C. No.

4:94-cv-02307

CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Claudia Wilken, Chief District Judge, Presiding

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2 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

Argued and Submitted

May 20, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed September 26, 2014

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district

court’s order modifying the accountability provisions of an

earlier injunction ordering the State of California to take

specified steps to ensure that disabled inmates were provided

with needed accommodations.

The panel rejected the State’s contention that the

Modified Injunction was issued without notice and an

opportunity for it to respond. The panel further held that the

State waived its challenge to the statewide scope of the

injunction and also waived its argument that the injunction

conflicted with state law and the Collective Bargaining

Agreement between the State and prison employees. The

panel declined to exercise its discretion to consider these

arguments. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 3

The panel held that the Modified Injunction complied

with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The panel held that

the district court did not err in finding that a modification to

the accountability system was necessary because the State

had failed to fulfill the accountability requirements mandated

by its previous injunction to track inmates’ needs and ensure

the receipt of needed accommodations. The panel determined

that the Modified Injunction was narrowly tailored and no

broader than necessary to address the federal violations. 

The panel held that the district court exceeded its

authority in appointing an expert to resolve disputes between

plaintiffs and the State because this delegation of authority

was beyond the scope of the duties that may be assigned to an

expert appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706. 

The panel therefore vacated that portion of the Modified

Injunction and remanded to the district court with instructions

to revise the Modified Injunction in a manner consistent with

the panel’s opinion.

COUNSEL

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Jonathan

L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jay C. Russell,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Janelle M. Smith,

Deputy Attorney General, Jay M. Goldman (argued),

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco,

California, for Defendants-Appellants.

Donald Specter (argued), Warren George, Rebekah Evenson,

and PennyGodbold, Prison Law Office, Berkeley, California;

Michael W. Bien, Gay C. Grunfeld, Lisa Ells, Blake

Thompson, and Michael Freedman, Rosen Bien Galvan &

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4 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

Grunfeld LLP, San Francisco, California; and Linda Kilb,

Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., Berkeley,

California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

For more than two decades, disabled prisoners have been

mired in litigation aimed at bringing California’s prison

facilities into compliance with the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and

the U.S. Constitution. In this appeal, Defendants, officials

responsible for the state’s corrections system (collectively,

the “State”), challenge a 2012 order in which the district

court modified the accountability provisions of an earlier

injunction ordering the State to take specified steps to

ensure that disabled inmates were provided with needed

accommodations. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm

in part and vacate in part the district court’s order.

I.

In 1994, Plaintiffs, a class of disabled state prisoners and

parolees, filed an action against officials responsible for

California’s corrections system and parole proceedings,

seeking disability accommodations required by the ADA and

the RA.1 After a series of orders in which the district court

 

1

 The litigation was bifurcated, with parolees and applicants for parole

proceeding on a separate track from prisoners in general. See Armstrong

v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 855 (9thCir. 2001) (“Armstrong I”), abrogated on

other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504–05 (2005). 

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 5

and this court found the State to be in violation of these

federal statutes, the State produced a remedial plan intended

to ensure that disabled inmates had access to programs and

facilities in California’s prisons. Armstrong v.

Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“Armstrong II”). In March 2001, the district court entered a

permanent injunction directing enforcement of the remedial

plan (the “2001 Injunction”). Id.

By 2007, however, the State had failed to bring its

correctional facilities into compliance with the remedial plan

and the 2001 Injunction. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, No.

4:94-cv-2307 (N.D. Cal. Jan 18, 2007). Accordingly, the

district court issued another injunction (the “2007

Injunction”), which provided, in relevant part:

Within 120 days of the date of this Order,

defendants . . . shall develop a system for

holding wardens and prison medical

administrators accountable for compliance

with the Armstrong Remedial Plan and the

orders of this Court. This system shall track

the record of each institution and the conduct

of individual staff members who are not

complying with these requirements . . . .

Id.

In response to the 2007 Injunction, the State issued a

memorandum outlining tracking, investigation, and reporting

protocols designed to address the failings identified by the

This appeal concerns only those orders relating to accommodations for

prisoners.

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6 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

district court (the “2008 Memo”). The 2008 Memo provided

that allegations or reports of staff misconduct would be

investigated by a designated Hiring Authority, which would

render a decision in the matter. The Hiring Authority’s

decision would then be recorded in non-compliance logs,

which were to be provided to the district court and Plaintiffs’

counsel.

In 2012, Plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the State’s response

to the 2007 Injunction, filed a request for an order to show

cause why the State should not be held in contempt for failing

to comply with the injunction’s accountability requirements. 

In the motion, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that inmates were

continuing to be denied access to needed accommodations

and that the State had failed to investigate and record

numerous alleged violations of the remedial plan. In

opposition, the State argued that the 2007 Injunction required

institutions to track only instances of actual employee noncompliance, as found by the Hiring Authority, and not

unsubstantiated allegations. The State also argued that the

2007 Injunction did not require it to investigate or log

allegations that did not identify a particular staff member

responsible for the deprivation, that did not allege that the

deprivation resulted from misconduct, or that were later

remedied.

The district court disagreed with the State’s interpretation

of its investigation and logging obligations, but declined to

hold the State in contempt. Armstrong v. Brown, No. 94-cv2307 CW, 2012 WL 3638675, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,

2012). The district court concluded that “the 2007 injunction

implicitly required Defendants to include in the

accountability system requirements to investigate promptly

and appropriately all allegations of violations, regardless of

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 7

the source, and to record the outcomes of the investigations,

including whether or not the allegations were substantiated

. . . .” Id. The district court further found that the State’s

reporting practices did not comply with these requirements. 

Id. However, “in an abundance of caution,” the district court

concluded that the 2007 Injunction might not have stated

these requirements clearly enough and, instead of holding the

State in contempt, issued an injunction clarifying the State’s

accountability obligations (the “Modified Injunction”). Id.

The district court modified the injunction explicitly to

mandate that the State investigate and “track all allegations

of non-compliance with the [remedial plan] and the orders of

this Court.” Id. (emphasis added). The district court also

added dispute-resolution procedures, including that Plaintiffs’

counsel may review the investigations and that an expert

witness would resolve disputes between Plaintiffs’ counsel

and the State over compliance. Id. at *11–*12.

The State appealed the Modified Injunction on several

grounds. The State contends that the Modified Injunction is

invalid because it was issued without notice and an

opportunity for the State to be heard; that it violates the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”); that the statewide

scope of the injunction is unjustified by the evidence; that the

district court exceeded its authority in appointing an expert to

resolve disputes between Plaintiffs and the State; and that the

Modified Injunction conflicts with various provisions of state

law and with the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”)

between the State and prison employees.

II.

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo,

the factual findings underlying its decision for clear error, and

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8 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

the injunction’s scope for abuse of discretion. See Scott v.

Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir.

2002).

III.

The State contends that the Modified Injunction must be

vacated because it was issued without adequate notice and

opportunity to be heard. We disagree.

Before issuing injunctive relief, the court must provide

the affected party with notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Barnes, 792 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.

1986). The district court here did so. At a June 7, 2012,

hearing on Plaintiffs’ contempt motion, the district court

provided the State with oral notice that it intended to modify

the injunction. During that hearing, it identified its specific

concerns with the State’s accountabilitysystem and explained

the particular changes it intended to make. This oral notice,

which made the State aware of the changes contemplated,

was sufficient. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake

Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350–51 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding

that there was “at least some notice” when the court stated at

a hearing that it intended to modify a previous judgment);

Penthouse, 792 F.2d at 950 (holding that, although the district

court did not provide the defendant with formal notice of a

possible injunction, injunctive relief was proper because the

defendant was aware of the potential injunction based on

various filings by the parties and arguments at trial).

The district court also gave the State an adequate

opportunity to be heard. It permitted the State to respond

orally at the hearing and to submit a further written response. 

What’s more, the State had more than a month to prepare its

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 9

written submission. In its order modifying the injunction, the

court acknowledged receipt of the parties’ submissions and

stated that it had considered the arguments made therein, as

well as those made at the hearing. The State thus had “[t]he

opportunity to present reasons . . . why [the] proposed action

should not be taken.” See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). We, therefore,

conclude that the State had an adequate opportunity to

respond. See id.

The State’s arguments in support of its contention that it

did not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard are

unpersuasive. The State contends first that the district court’s

modification to the injunction was unfair because it was made

in response to a request by Plaintiffs to hold the State in

contempt, which required the State to make a different

showing than a motion to modify the injunction would have. 

We find no merit to this argument. Any unfairness that might

have resulted from modifying the 2007 Injunction in response

to the motion for contempt was cured when the court

informed the State that it was instead considering a

modification and gave the State an opportunity to respond in

writing to the proposed changes. Moreover, a district court

may sua sponte order or modify injunctive relief. See, e.g.,

Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 364 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th

Cir. 2004); see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1946

(2011) (recognizing the district court’s inherent power to

modify injunctive relief). The district court here was thus not

limited to ordering the relief requested by Plaintiffs and acted

well within its authority in modifying its previous order.

The State next contends that it had no meaningful

opportunity to respond because the Modified Injunction was

a foregone conclusion after the June 7, 2012, hearing and its

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10 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

terms were not open for debate. This contention, however, is

directly contrary to the district court’s express statement at

the hearing that it would give the State an opportunity to

weigh in and its statement in the order modifying the

injunction that it had considered the State’s arguments. The

State’s contention, that despite these clear pronouncements,

the district court ignored the State’s arguments is purely

speculative and warrants no further consideration. We,

therefore, reject the State’s contention that the injunction was

issued without notice and an opportunity for it to respond.

IV.

Plaintiffs assert that the State waived the arguments that

the statewide scope of the Modified Injunction is unsupported

by the evidence and that the Modified Injunction conflicts

with various state laws and the CBA. We agree.

“‘Although no bright line rule exists to determine whether

a matter [h]as been properly raised below, an issue will

generally be deemed waived on appeal if the argument was

not raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.’” Ruiz

v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir.

2012) (quoting In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.,

618 F.3d 998, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original)). 

We have no trouble concluding that the State waived the

argument that the injunction is invalid because it purportedly

conflicts with state law and the CBA. The State made no

mention of these alleged conflicts before the district court.

See id.; see also Komatsu, Ltd. v. States S.S. Co., 674 F.2d

806, 812 (9th Cir. 1982) (deeming an issue waived when the

appellant had “relied . . . exclusively” on other arguments

below).

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 11

Whether the State waived its challenge to the statewide

scope of the injunction is a closer question. We conclude,

however, that the State waived this argument as well. In its

submission to the district court, the State made some

contentions that are arguably relevant to its current challenge

to the scope of the injunction. It argued, for example, that

“there was neither a factual nor legal basis for the proposed

expansion.” It did not, however, make any of the specific

scope arguments that it raises on appeal; nor did it provide

any detail that would have permitted the district court to

evaluate its claim that systemwide changes were unwarranted. 

The only arguments it made were directed at purported

conflicts with the PLRA, a separate question. We, therefore,

conclude that the State did not preserve its challenge to the

statewide scope of the injunction. See Komatsu, 674 F.2d at

812.

Although “the rule of waiver is a discretionary one,” see

Ruiz, 667 F.3d at 1322 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted), we find no basis on which to exercise our discretion

in the State’s favor in this case. We have stated that we may

exercise our discretion to consider a waived issue under three

circumstances:

(1) in the exceptional case in which review is

necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice

or to preserve the integrity of the judicial

process, (2) when a new issue arises while

appeal is pending because of a change in the

law, and, (3) when the issue presented is

purely one of law and either does not depend

on the factual record developed below, or the

pertinent record has been fully developed.

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12 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The first

and second circumstances have no application here: An

exception is not necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice

or preserve the integrity of the judicial process, and there was

no relevant change of law while the State’s appeal was

pending. See id. The third circumstance might permit us to

consider whether the injunction conflicts with state law and

the CBA, because these are purely legal questions, but no

exception would permit us to consider the mixed factual and

legal question of whether the evidence was sufficient to

support the scope of the injunction. See id.

But even if we have discretion to review these arguments

notwithstanding the State’s waiver, we decline to do so. The

State has no excuse for its failure to raise these arguments

below. Unlike cases in which we have exercised our

discretion to consider arguments that were not raised below,

the State had ample opportunity to craft its response to the

district court. See, e.g., United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d

1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering on appeal of a habeas

petition the government’s argument that the petitioner had

procedurally defaulted because the district court had

summarily denied the petition, so that the government had no

opportunity to argue default). And there is no special feature

of this case that persuades us that we should consider the

arguments now raised despite the State’s waiver. Cf. In re

Neuton, 922 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a

pro se litigant did not waive an argument that he neglected to

develop fully before the district court because he had been

“led astray by the shifting legal theories” that had governed

the case).

In sum, we conclude that the State waived its argument

that the injunction conflicts with state law and the CBA and

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 13

that the evidence was insufficient to warrant systemwide

relief, and we decline to exercise our discretion to consider

those arguments.

V.

Two of the State’s challenges to the Modified Injunction

remain. First, the State contends that the Modified Injunction

is invalid in its entirety because it violates the PLRA. 

Second, the State contends that the section of the Modified

Injunction appointing the expert witness to resolve disputes

between the parties is invalid because the district court

exceeded its authority in ordering the expert witness to act in

this capacity. We hold that the Modified Injunction does not

violate the PLRA. We do agree with the State, however, that

the section setting forth the expert witness’ authority and

duties is invalid.

A.

The Modified Injunction mandates procedures for

investigating and recording alleged violations of inmates’

federal rights and the court’s orders, enforcing disciplinary

action where needed, and resolving disputes regarding these

matters. See Armstrong, 2012 WL 3638675, at *10–*12. As

to tracking, the Modified Injunction mandates that the State

track any allegations that any member of the Plaintiff class

did not receive access to services, programs, activities,

accommodations, or assistive devices required by the

remedial plan, the ADA, the RA, and other court orders. Id.

at *10. Every allegation must be tracked, regardless of

whether the alleged non-compliance was unintentional,

unavoidable, done without malice, done by an unidentified

actor, or later remedied. Id. The log must list the prison at

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14 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

which the incident occurred, the prisoner and employee(s)

involved, the date of the allegation, the date the investigation

was initiated and completed, the identity of the investigator,

the result of the investigation, the number of prior allegations

against the employee(s) involved, and the action taken, if any. 

Id. The district court further ordered that the logs must be

produced to Plaintiffs’ counsel monthly. Id. The mandate

that every allegation be logged directly responds to the

State’s practice of logging only certain reports. Id. at *8.

The district court also set out specific requirements

relating to the State’s investigation of alleged deprivations. 

Id. at *11. It mandated that the State must investigate all

allegations of employee non-compliance, commence the

investigation within ten business days of notice of the

allegation, and produce a written report on the investigation. 

Id. Like the reporting requirements, this mandate directly

responds to the State’s practice of only investigating some

allegations and the long delays in the commencement of those

investigations that did occur. Id. at *8–*9. The injunction

grants Plaintiffs’ counsel access to the written reports

produced as a result of these investigations and all documents

used in making the reports, with employees’ names replaced

with unique identifiers to protect their privacy. Id. at *11. 

The injunction also permits Plaintiffs’ counsel to interview

individuals who produced information relied upon in an

investigation. Id.

The Modified Injunction further provides for corrective

action and discipline. It mandates that when an investigation

reveals employee non-compliance, the State must comply

with the procedures set out in the 2008 Memo and the prison

systems’ operations manual, and that all disciplinary

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 15

determinations must be produced to Plaintiffs’ counsel, upon

request. Id.

Finally, the injunction delegates to the court’s expert

witness, appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706,

the power to resolve disputes between Plaintiffs’ counsel and

the State regarding the above matters. Id. at *11–*12.

Section D specifically deals with the expert witness’ duties. 

That section provides first that the parties shall initially

attempt to resolve any dispute through negotiation. Id. at

*11. It then provides specific procedures for resolving

disputes if negotiation is unsuccessful. Section D.2. provides:

If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute

informally, Plaintiffs’ counsel may request

that the Court’s expert review and resolve the

matter. Depending on the nature of the

dispute, the Court’s expert shall resolve

disputes about the production of information,

determine whether non-compliance occurred

or, if it did, whether corrective action should

be initiated. . . . Administrative decisions

made by the Court’s expert pursuant to this

section shall be final as between Plaintiffs and

Defendants.

Id. at *11. Section D.3. provides that the expert will exercise

similar authority with regard to whether certain incidents set

forth in the pleadings constitute non-compliance. Id. at *12.

We conclude that the Modified Injunction complies with

the PLRA. The PLRA provides, in relevant part that

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16 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

[p]rospective relief in any civil action with

respect to prison conditions shall extend no

further than necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve

any prospective relief unless the court finds

that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no

further than necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive

means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Under the PLRA, injunctive relief

must “heel[] close to the identified violation.” Armstrong I,

275 F.3d at 872 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court

may provide guidance and set clear objectives, but it may not

“attempt to ‘micro manage’” prison administration, id. at 873,

or order relief that would “require for its enforcement the

continuous supervision by the federal court over the conduct

of [state officers],” id. at 872 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (alteration in original)). The

overarching inquiry is “whether the same vindication of

federal rights could have been achieved with less involvement

by the court in directing the details of defendants’

operations.” Armstrong II, 622 F.3d at 1071.

The district court made the findings mandated by the

PLRA, Armstrong, 2012 WL 3638675, at *8, and those

findings were not erroneous.2See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). 

First, the Modified Injunction was necessary to correct the

2 While we conclude that the Modified Injunction complies in full with

the PLRA, we nonetheless vacate Section D of the Modified Injunction on

other grounds. See Part V.B., infra.

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 17

violations of Plaintiffs’ federal rights. The district court’s

finding on this point was supported by the facts before it

when it issued the 2007 Injunction and additional evidence

submitted in support of the contempt motion. In issuing the

2007 Injunction, the district court found a litany of ADA and

RA violations, which are not (and cannot be) contested in this

proceeding. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, No. 4:94-cv-2307

(N.D. Cal. Jan 18, 2007). It further found that an effective

accountability and tracking system was necessary to prevent

continued rights’ violations because the failure to track

disabled inmates’ grievances and thus to respond to

accommodation requests underlay the violations of their

federal rights. Id. This conclusion was sound and consistent

with other courts’ holdings. See, e.g., Armstrong II, 622 F.3d

at 1073–74 (noting the importance of tracking in ensuring

ADA compliance); Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42,

55–56 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the importance of

accountability in ensuring the long-term success of the health

care system in Puerto Rico’s prisons); see also Coleman v.

Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 896 (N.D. Cal. & E.D.

Cal. 2009) (three-judge panel) (affirming the importance of

accountabilityin preventing degradingand humiliating prison

conditions from becoming routine and permissible).

The evidence presented in the contempt motion

demonstrated that by 2012 – a full five years after the order

to track and record compliance with the remedial plan and the

court’s orders – there had been no meaningful improvement

to the State’s tracking and accountability system. The

evidence before the district court in support of Plaintiffs’

contempt motion demonstrated that the tracking and

accountability system developed by the State had failed and

that, as a result, class members still experienced delays in

having their grievances processed and redressed (if they were

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18 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

processed and redressed at all). The record shows numerous

instances at multiple institutions in which prisoners had

reported that they were deprived of a disability

accommodation, but no incident was logged. This systemic

failure to record alleged violations supports the district

court’s finding that the State’s accountability system was not

functioning as intended, i.e., to hold prison administrators

accountable and ensure that disabled inmates’ rights were

protected.3

While the State eventually investigated the allegations

identified by Plaintiffs in their contempt motion and

explained its reasons for failing to record them, these

investigations were commenced only after Plaintiffs filed

their motion to hold the State in contempt for failing to

investigate these precise alleged violations. For that reason,

these belated investigations do not persuade us that the State

was fulfilling its accountability obligations. In fact, the

timing of these investigations persuades us of just the

opposite: that the State has continued to shirk its duty to

investigate and track alleged violations of the remedial plan,

the court’s orders, and federal statutory law.

Based on the evidence before it, we hold that the district

court did not err in concluding that the State had failed to

3 The district court was clear that the question before it did not involve

whether the State had, in fact, failed to provide appropriate

accommodations to inmates with disabilities. Armstrong, 2012 WL

3638675, at *8. The district court’s only finding – and the only one we

affirm today – is that the evidence showed that the State’s accountability

system had failed and that modifications to the injunction were required. 

We, like the district court, do not comment as to whether the incidents

identified by Plaintiffs’ counsel in their contempt motion constitute

violations of the remedial plan, the RA, the ADA, or court orders.

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 19

fulfill the accountability requirements mandated by its

previous injunction. And because the accountability system

was not effectively tracking inmates’ needs and ensuring the

receipt of needed accommodations, the district court did not

err in finding that a modification to the accountability system

was necessary. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1946; Morales

Feliciano, 378 F.3d at 55 (noting that the district court was

within its discretion to order additional relief when its

previous orders had failed to protect inmates’ rights).

Our conclusion that the district court did not err in finding

a modification to the injunction necessary does not end our

inquiry. We must also consider whether the modifications it

ordered complied with the PLRA’s requirements that

injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and no broader or more

intrusive than necessary to correct the violations of federal

rights. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1). We answer that question in

the affirmative.

The Modified Injunction was narrowly tailored and no

broader than necessary to address the federal violations. The

changes ordered by the district court specifically tracked the

ways in which the State’s prior accountability system had

failed: The district court found that the system had failed

because the State had not investigated and logged all

allegations and so ordered the district court to investigate and

log all allegations. The district court further found that this

deficiency existed across California’s prison institutions, and

accordingly ordered relief that would apply to all of the

State’s facilities. The modification thus matched the

deficiency in both scope and kind. We, therefore, conclude

that the Modified Injunction was narrowly tailored and not

overbroad. See Clement, 364 F.3d at 1153 (concluding an

injunction that prohibited the prison from banning materials

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20 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

because their source was the internet was narrowly tailored

and no broader than necessary to remedy a policy that was

unconstitutional for the reason that it banned materials based

solely on their source).

We also conclude that the Modified Injunction was no

more intrusive than necessary to address the federal

violations. The changes relate only to accountability and

tracking. The Modified Injunction says nothing about how

the State should implement compliance with the remedial

plan or provide disability accommodations to prisoners; it

provides no mandates for how the prison should run its

facilities, house prisoners, or conduct its daily administration. 

In this order, as in previous orders, “the thorough and

extremely patient district judge did not attempt to ‘micro

manage’” the prison’s administration, Armstrong I, 275 F.3d

at 872, or involve herself closely or extensively in directing

the prison’s operations, Armstrong II, 622 F.3d at 1071.

We recognize that the district court gave the State several

specific instructions on how to implement its accountability

system. While this might in some cases be a cause for

concern, it was appropriate here. A court may, as the district

court did here, provide specific instructions to the State

without running afoul of the PLRA. See Armstrong I,

275 F.3d at 858–59 & n.15 (affirming an injunction that

included various specific instructions to the State, such as

requiring it to hire an ADA coordinator and provide certain

accommodations at parole hearings, among other mandates). 

While the injunction here might leave the State less discretion

than injunctions typically approved in the PLRA context, we

conclude that the level of intrusiveness is acceptable based on

the history and circumstances of the case.

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 21

Disabled inmates have been litigating to ensure that the

State provides them with needed accommodation for over two

decades – and yet the State still has a long, long way to go

before it meets its obligations to these prisoners. The

ongoing, intractable nature of this litigation affords the

district court considerable discretion in fashioning relief. See

Morales Feliciano, 378 F.3d at 54–55; see also Plata, 131 S.

Ct. at 1946 (noting that once the district court invokes its

equitable powers, its authority to modify a decree of

injunctive relief is particularly broad and flexible). Relief

that might have raised concerns about breadth and

intrusiveness in the first instance is acceptable in this context,

because the district court “has attempted narrower, less

intrusive alternatives – and those alternatives have failed

. . . .” See Morales Feliciano, 378 F.3d at 55.

The First Circuit confronted a similar situation in

litigation involving Puerto Rico’s prison system, where

constitutional violations pertaining to the delivery of health

care were “substantial in both scope and degree” and had

“defied correction for more than two decades.” Id. at 54. We

face the same problem here. As we have previously noted,

litigation in this matter has been ongoing for decades and the

State has “resisted complying with [its] federal obligations at

every turn.” Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir.

2013) (“Armstrong III”). Through a series of narrowlydrawn, carefully-crafted, and thorough orders, the district

judge here, like the district judge overseeing the Puerto Rico

prison litigation, “has tried more conventional methods, but

found them wanting.” See Morales Feliciano, 378 F.3d at 54. 

“This record of abject failure matters in the narrowness-needintrusiveness inquiry.” Id. at 55. Because the district court

has previously tried to correct the deficiencies in California’s

prisons’ compliance with the ADA and RA through less

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22 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

intrusive means, and those attempts have failed, relief

prescribing more specific mechanisms of compliance is

appropriate. See id. at 54–56; see also Plata, 131 S. Ct. at

1946.

As noted above, the core PLRA inquiry is “whether the

same vindication of federal rights could have been achieved

with less involvement by the court in directing the details of

defendants’ operations.” Armstrong II, 622 F.3d at 1071. 

The State, through its conduct over the past twenty years, has

proven that the same vindication of federal rights cannot be

achieved with less involvement by the district court. The

State has failed to suggest – let alone implement – any viable

means to ensure accountability and protect the Plaintiff class

that is narrower or less intrusive than the Modified

Injunction, despite ample time and opportunity to do so. 

Given that the State has failed to present the district court or

this court with “any realistic alternative” to the Modified

Injunction, we find its protestations that such alternatives

exist to be hollow. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1941; see also

Armstrong II, 622 F.3d at 1071 (noting that the State did “not

suggest any means to protect class members’ rights under the

ADA that [were] more narrow or less intrusive than those

ordered by the district court”). Based on these circumstances,

we conclude that the Modified Injunction complies with the

PLRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1); Armstrong II, 622 F.3d

at 1071.

B.

While we find no error with regard to the PLRA, we

cannot approve Section D of the Modified Injunction as it is

currently drafted. As noted above, Section D provides for

dispute-resolution procedures in the event that Plaintiffs’

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 23

counsel contests the State’s decision on the results of an

investigation into alleged non-compliance, the production of

information, or a decision on corrective action. Armstrong,

2012 WL 3638675, at *11–*12. Section D.1 provides that, in

the event of a dispute, Plaintiffs’ counsel shall provide notice

to the State, to which the State must respond within 10

business days, and the parties shall attempt to resolve the

matter through negotiation. Id. at *11. We find no error in

this provision.

Sections D.2 and D.3, however, present a more difficult

question. As described above, Section D.2 provides that the

expert witness shall resolve disputes between Plaintiffs’

counsel and the State about whether non-compliance has

occurred, the production of information, and the institution of

corrective action. Id. Section D.3 gives the expert witness

similar authority to decide whether certain incidents alleged

in the pleadings constitute non-compliance with the remedial

plan. Id. at *12. The authority delegated in Sections D.2 and

D.3 permits the expert to make findings that go to the very

heart of this litigation – compliance with the remedial plan –

and his authority includes responsibility for making findings

of fact and conclusions of law, as necessary to assess noncompliance. Sections D.2 and D.3 make these decisions by

the expert “final,” id. at *11–*12, and provide no mechanism

for review by the district court.

We conclude this delegation of authority to the Rule 706

expert is impermissible. A Rule 706 expert typically acts as

an advisor to the court on complex scientific, medical, or

technical matters. See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota

Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 603 (9th Cir. 2014);

FTC v. Enforma Natural Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1209

(9th Cir. 2004). The dispute resolution authority granted to

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24 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

the expert in this case is beyond the scope of the duties that

may be assigned to a Rule 706 expert. We have never

approved a Rule 706 expert to act in an adjudicative

capacity with such finality as prescribed in Sections D.2

and D.3 of the Modified Injunction. While we have approved

the appointment of non-judicial officers to make

recommendations and resolve disputes ancillary to complex

litigation, those appointments specifically limited the expert

to making recommendations subject to review by the district

court. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d

1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2002) (approving the appointment of a

technical advisor to assist the district court in monitoring

compliance); Stone v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 850,

852, 863 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving the appointment of a

special master to investigate, report, and make

recommendations to the city and the court).4

Our decision in Napsteris particularly instructive. There,

we approved the district court’s use of a technical advisor

after specifically noting that “[a]t no time did the technical

4 Our sister circuits have similarly approved the appointment of nonjudicial officers to act in advisory capacities only. See, e.g., SEC v.

Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1577 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that the courtappointed receiver was an officer of the court whose legal and factual

findings must be approved by the district court); Reilly v. United States,

863 F.2d 149, 157–58 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding no error in the district

court’s use of a technical advisor to instruct the judge on complex issues,

but noting that the delegation would have been impermissible if the

advisor made independent findings on facts outside the record); Ruiz v.

Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1159–63, amended in part, vacated in part on

other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that it was

permissible for the district court to appoint a special master to assist in the

implementation of its orders by holding hearings on disputed matters and

making recommendations to the district court, so long as the special

master’s findings were not accorded the presumption of correctness).

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ARMSTRONG V. BROWN 25

advisor displace the district court’s judicial role” and “[t]he

technical advisor never unilaterally issued findings of fact or

conclusions of law regarding Napster’s compliance.” 

Napster, 284 F.3d at 1097. Here, Sections D.2 and D.3 do

precisely what we suggested in Napster was impermissible: 

delegate to the Rule 706 expert the power unilaterally and

conclusively to make findings of fact and conclusions of law

regarding the State’s compliance with the remedial plan and

its federal obligations.

While the district court might have intended the expert’s

decision to be subject to review or appeal, that intention is not

reflected in its order. As currently drafted, the injunction

does not provide any mechanism for review of the expert’s

decisions by the district court and so risks permitting the

expert to “displace the district court’s judicial role.” Id. We

therefore cannot affirm this part of the Modified Injunction. 

See id.; see also Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889)

(“[The court] cannot, of its own motion, or upon the request

of one party, abdicate its duty to determine by its own

judgment the controversy presented, and devolve that duty

upon any of its officers.”).

We therefore must vacate Sections D.2. and D.3 of the

Modified Injunction and remand the matter to the district

court to remedy the errors we have identified. We are

confident that the able district judge can craft an appropriate

procedure under which a party dissatisfied with the expert’s

recommendations can obtain district court review of that

recommendation. For example, the district court may permit

the expert to function within the limits suggested by Napster,

by providing that the expert may present recommendations,

but may not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law. See

284 F.3d at 1097. The district court could also employ a

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26 ARMSTRONG V. BROWN

procedure similar to the one provided for in the Magistrates

Act, for review of a report and recommendation by a

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S. C. § 636. We also note that

the PLRA itself provides for the appointment of a special

master “[i]n any civil action in a Federal court with respect to

prison conditions . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f). Finally, we

observe that Rule 706 does not even necessarily apply to nontestifying experts, although district courts retain inherent

authority to appoint technical advisors in appropriate cases. 

See Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. California,

231 F.3d 572, 590–91 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). What is

important is that “[t]he role of a technical advisor . . . be

carefully defined and limited to reduce the risk that the

advisor will usurp the role of the court as factfinder . . . .” Id.

at 612 (Tashima, J., dissenting).

We do not mean to circumscribe the district court’s

discretion by the listing of these examples. What the district

court must do on remand is to revise Sections D.2 and D.3 of

the Modified Injunction to comply with our precedent.

VI.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm all portions of

the Modified Injunction, except Sections D.2 and D.3. We

vacate Sections D.2 and D.3 and remand to the district court

with instructions to revise the Modified Injunction in a

manner consistent with this Opinion. The parties shall bear

their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in

part.

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