Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04254/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04254-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THONG DANG,

Petitioner,

v.

S.W. ORNOSKI, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-4254 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Thong Dang, a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se action seeking a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for consideration

of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be

denied. 

BACKGROUND

Thong Dang was convicted in Orange County Superior Court of first degree murder and

was found to have used a firearm in the commission of the offense. In 1986, he was sentenced

to 25 years to life in prison. His habeas petition does not concern that conviction directly, but

instead focuses on a March 2, 2005 decision by a panel of the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT")

finding him not suitable for parole. 

The BPT identified several factors in support of its determination that Dang was not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety if he was released. The factors identified included the circumstances of the offense, preCase 3:05-cv-04254-SI Document 9 Filed 10/24/06 Page 1 of 15
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offense behavior, in-prison behavior, and inadequate parole plans. The specifics regarding the

crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are described in the

Discussion section later in this order.

Dang sought relief in the California courts. The Orange County Superior Court denied

his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2004 in a reasoned order. Resp. Exh. 6. The California

Court of Appeal summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the California

Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review.

Dang then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His habeas petition

alleged that his right to due process was violated because there was insufficient evidence to

support the decision and the decision-maker was biased. After an unsuccessful motion to

dismiss, respondent filed an answer. Petitioner filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for a

decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action occurred at San Quentin State Prison in Marin County, California, within this judicial

district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging

the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency Of Evidence Claim

1. Due Process Requires That Some evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in

the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1

(1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

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the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence

standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Furthermore, and of key importance, the parole board is not precluded from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole). The

familiar argument that the BPT cannot rely on these factors is based on the Ninth Circuit's

statements in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), that suggested that the value of

the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s

decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at

916-17. In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely

on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that

“[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of

rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and

prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916.

These statements were dicta and not clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme

Court, such that the state court's refusal to adopt the Biggs reasoning would be a decision

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set forth by the

Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit recently backed away from the Biggs statements, and

confirmed that these statements from Biggs were dicta and were inappropriate under § 2254.

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future

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parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

 What little guidance has come from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review

should be extremely deferential to the original decision-maker in the parole context. In addition

to the very low evidentiary standard that Superintendent v. Hill imposes, other Supreme Court

comments suggest that the judiciary should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive

nature of a parole board's decision. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. "No ideal, error-free way

to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will

continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors

combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of the actual parole

decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state

experimentation." Id.; see also id. at 8.

Past criminal conduct is not some arbitrary factor like eye color that has nothing to do

with present dangerousness. Recidivism concerns are genuine. See Ewing v. California, 538

U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (O'Connor J.) (noting a report stating that over 60% of violent offenders were

arrested again within three years of their release). California's parole scheme does not offend

due process by allowing the BPT to predict that an inmate presents a present danger based on

a murder he committed many years ago.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets the

criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to answer the

question, "'some evidence' of what?"

2. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A first

degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree murder

conviction yields a base term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The upshot

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The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and negative institutional

behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances tending to show suitability

for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful

motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered from battered woman's syndrome, lack

of criminal history, the present age reduces the probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

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of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set unless

various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPT panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect

to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the panel "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The regulation also

provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

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danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). The panel may

consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes.

See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix of base

terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years, depending on

some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve based only on the

matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence puts the cart before the

horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and regulations that requires him

first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the prisoner is

found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he panel shall set

a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The California Supreme

Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this federal habeas action. See

Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner

is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's

offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" but might violate due process

"where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or

violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense"). 

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 3. Some Evidence Supports The BPT's Decision In Dang's Case

The BPT identified several factors supporting its decision to find Dang unsuitable for

parole, i.e., the circumstances of the offense, pre-offense behavior, in-prison behavior, and

inadequate parole plans. That court upheld the decision in a reasoned order. Resp. Exh. 6. The

Orange County court determined that the BPT's determination that Dang was unsuitable was

supported and was based on factors the BPT was allowed to consider. The order is silent on the

evidentiary standard the court applied, although there is nothing to indicate that the court used

anything other than the some evidence standard. Because the Orange County Superior Court's

decision is the last reasoned decision, that is the decision to which 2254(d) applies. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

a. Commitment Offense

The BPT considered the circumstances of the murder and concluded that it was an carried

out in an especially cruel and callous manner. The BPT determined that there were multiple

victims attacked in separate incidents, the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner like an execution-style murder, the murder was done in a manner that showed

a callous disregard for another human being, and the motive was inexplicable. 

The first degree murder conviction stemmed from a home invasion in April 1985. Most

of the reports about the murder also mention a separate criminal episode four months earlier (on

January 1, 1985), in which Dang and his partners robbed a pool hall. During that robbery, they

fired a shotgun into the wall near the owner and tied up the owner. The home invasion was

described in an appellate court decision that the BPT read into the record:

On [April 19, 1985] Sam Dung and nine other people were playing cards for money in

the apartment of Anh Nguyen, when four armed and masked men forcibly entered. Dang

was identified as one of these men. He entered the room where the game was in session

and told the card players to remain where they were. One of the players told Dang, if you

want anything, just take it. The lights [went] off and Dang fired his gun into the dark

room and ran out. The lights came back on and Dang ran back into the room. One of the

men said, you guys, what are you doing here? We are all acquaintance[s]. The lights

went off again and Dang fired another shot into the dark room. This time striking Sam

Dung. Dang and his confederates fled without taking any money or property. Sam Dung

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died as a result of the wound. 

March 2, 2005 BPT hearing transcript ("RT"), pp. 18-19 (errors in source). One of Dang's crime

partners testified under a grant of immunity that they planned to rob the card players to pay their

rent and that he and Dang earlier had gambled at the same apartment. RT 19-20. The victim's

wife recognized Dang when she first opened the door to the robbers who had knocked at the

door of the apartment. Resp. Exh. 4, Life Prisoner Evaluation Report, p. 1.

A circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that the prisoner "committed

the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance exists are

that there were multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). The

BPT considered a circumstance and factors proper under California law. 

There was some evidence in the record to support the BPT's determination that the

circumstances of the murder indicated unsuitability. The record also supported a determination

that murder was committed in a very cruel and callous manner. The record supported the finding

that the motive for the killing was very trivial. Dang and his confederates went there to steal

money and no motive was offered for why Dang shot the victim. The victim was not offering

any resistance and one of the card players had told the robbers to take what they wanted. The

record showing that the victim had been shot in the base of the neck supported the determination

that the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner. There was evidence

in the record to support the belief that Dang had targeted the victim for retribution: Dang "was

angry with the victim because the victim had reported to police officers [Dang] and his friends

were gang members and involved in criminal activities." See Resp. Exh. 3, May 23, 1985

probation fitness report, at p. 7. The BPT identified more than the minimum elements of a first

degree murder when it determined that Dang committed the murder in a very cruel manner and

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with an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering, as Dang had shot the victim during

a home invasion robbery in which the victims had not offered any resistance and had shot the

victim in the base of the neck in execution-style manner. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071.

The BPT also found that multiple victims had been attacked in separate incidents based

on the evidence of the earlier pool hall robbery. The BPT saw these as part of related criminal

activities. This court has some concern about the earlier robbery and assault at the pool hall

being double-counted, as the record suggests that the pool hall activity resulted in additional

convictions and perhaps additional sentences. See Resp. Exh. 4, p. 2; see also Resp. Exh. 1

(judgment of commitment refers to an abstract of judgment for counts 2 and 3, but abstract of

judgment is not included in the exhibits). Even if the pool hall criminal activity should not have

been considered as a factor in determining whether the circumstances of the murder indicated

unsuitability, there were enough other factors present to provide some evidence to support the

determination of unsuitability based on the circumstances of the murder alone. 

b. Pre-Offense Behavior

The BPT also relied on Dang's pre-offense criminal and social history for its

determination that he was not suitable for parole. Even if the robbery and assault at the pool hall

was not properly considered in determining whether the circumstances of the commitment

offense showed unsuitability, that information could properly be considered as part of the

evidence showing Dang's escalating criminality.

The record provided support for the BPT's determination that Dang was engaged in an

escalating pattern of criminal activity. Dang was arrested for the murder before many other

criminal charges worked their way through the system, so there are not final dispositions on

several charges, see Resp. Exh. 7, but the record still shows a strong pattern of criminal activity

in the two years Dang was in California before being incarcerated. Dang was in a small street

gang that was busy with criminal activity. Dang admitted that he had committed nine auto

burglaries as a juvenile, was in a street gang. See RT 26-28. He had participated in the robbery

and assault on the pool hall owner, although Dang denied that he had a gun on that occasion.

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RT 54. However, he admitted that in yet another crime he had shot a man in the shoulder. See

RT 53. 

Consideration of and reliance on Dang's pre-offense criminal history was not improper.

Although the prisoner's "previous record of violence" on a victim is a specifically listed

circumstance and non-violent criminal history is not specifically listed as a circumstance that

tends to indicate unsuitability, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(2), the list of circumstances in §

2402(c) is non-exclusive, and § 2402(b) specifically allows the BPT to consider a great range

of relevant and reliable information, such as the prisoner's "past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented." Dang's extremely

serious prior criminal activity could be considered by the BPT as tending to show unsuitability.

The BPT also determined that Dang had a history of "unstable tumultuous relationships,

we're talking about the people you chose to associate yourself with once you came to this

country. . . . under unstable social history, the people that you associated with were certainly an

unstable social factor." RT 64. There was some evidence to support the determination that

Dang had an unstable social history tending to show unsuitability. Dang reported that he had

left Vietnam when he was 13, spent two years in a refugee camp, and came to the United States

when he was 15 (and committed the murder when he was 17). See RT 24-28. His siblings and

parents remained in Vietnam. He first lived in New Orleans and then moved to California

twelve months before he committed the murder. There was evidence in the record that he had

no stable home while in California, had not stayed in school, and had joined a street gang. Dang

urges that he should not be blamed for "his unfortunate history of being uprooted from his family

as a factor in denying him parole for having an unstable social history." Petition, p. 2. The BPT

was not immigrant bashing; instead, it looked at the circumstances of Dang's two years in the

United States objectively: whatever the cause of it, Dang had dropped out of high school, ran

away from his cousin's home, and had joined a criminal street gang. See RT 29-30; see also

Resp. Exh. 3, May 23, 1985 probation fitness report, pp. 6-7 (police officer related that the man

who had brought Dang to California "is not a relative of [Dang's] and wants nothing to do with

[Dang] at the present time. He reported to Officer Varner the minor was completely out of

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control and would not attend school. [Dang] has been in California since June of 1984 and has

subsequently become a transient.") 

c. In-Prison Behavior

The BPT found that Dang had not demonstrated sufficient positive change in prison.

Dang had received at least six CDC-115 rule violation reports, although the most recent one was

ten years before the hearing. See RT 39. Dang also had received six CDC-128(a) counselling

memos for minor infractions, the most recent of which occurred just three years before the

hearing and was for failing to report for an inmate count. See RT 40. The BPT also noted that

the psychological report was not particularly enthusiastic and had predicted that Dang would

present a mild to moderate degree of threat to the community. The BPT decision stated that the

psychologist's report indicated that Dang's level of dangerousness was decreasing but "also

shows that you have a ways to go." RT 65. 

Consideration of and reliance on Dang's prison behavior was not improper. His CDC115s properly could be considered under § 2402(c)(6), which states that serious misconduct in

prison tends to indicate unsuitability. His CDC-128s properly could be considered under §

2402(b) as pertaining to his social history and mental state. 

Dang's superficial understanding of his crime is certainly not a "serious mental problem"

within the meaning of the circumstance specifically listed as tending to show unsuitability, see

§ 2402(c)(5), but could be considered under § 2402(b), which specifically allows the BPT to

consider a great range of relevant and reliable information, such as the prisoner's "past and

present attitude toward the crime," social history and mental state. See RT 41-43 (psychologist's

report of December 8, 2004, noted that Dang seemed to have an inadequate grasp of how

harmful his criminal conduct had been to the victims and survivors).

 d. Parole Plans

The BPT's decision to find Dang unsuitable was based also on the BPT's belief that his

parole plans were lacking in certainty. Dang had not arranged for a place to live, other than a

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Salvation Army homeless shelter that might be able to take him for up to a week, but operated

on a first-come, first-served basis. And he had no job arranged, although the BPT did note he

had marketable skills. The BPT decision stated that Dang needed to have a plan for life in

California in case he was not deported, and needed some support letters from his family in

Vietnam saying he had a place to live and work if he was going to return to Vietnam. See RT

65.

The BPT properly could consider the uncertain nature of the parole plans in support of

its decision under § 2402(b), which allows the BPT to consider "any other information which

bears on the prisoner's suitability for release." The regulations do not require that a prisoner

have alternative plans lined up, i.e., one set for here and another in the event of removal from

the United States, but Dang had no firm parole plans in either place. Dang's statement indicated

his desire to stay in the United States, see RT 62, but he had no firm plan for parole if he did so.

And he had no letters indicating that his family would be receptive to housing him and giving

him a job if he returned to Vietnam. Dang's lack of planning looked a little less damaging

because he had an impressive $4,000 in the bank, see RT 41, but that is not enough to retire on

and there was still some evidence that the absence of firm plans for life on parole tended to

indicate unsuitability to be released on parole. In light of Dang's admission that before he was

incarcerated he had committed property crimes to pay for living expenses, his lack of effort to

make firm parole plans could reasonably be seen as greatly increasing the likelihood he would

return to criminal activity to support himself. 

e. There Was Enough Evidence To Support The Decision 

The BPT noted that Dang had various in-prison achievements, but concluded that the

positive factors did not outweigh the factors discussed above showing unsuitability. The factors

listed by the BPT in support of its determination that Dang was not suitable for parole had some

evidentiary support. And the factors were factors that could be considered in determining parole

suitability. The Orange County Superior Court's rejection of Dang's claim was not contrary to

or an unreasonable application of the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard. 

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B. Biased Decision-Maker Claim

Dang urges that the BPT was a biased decision-maker because it routinely characterizes

murders as exceptionally heinous, atrocious or cruel. This claim was rejected by the state courts.

Dang has not shown how the state court rejection of his claim was incorrect. 

Dang submitted scores of form declarations from other prisoners who uniformly said that

the BPT "cited the circumstances of my commitment offense as the primary reason for denying

parole, (i.e. the crime was particularly or especially cruel, callous, heinous or egregious)."

Petition, Attachment A (errors in source). This evidence does not prove a biased decisionmaker. It is not surprising that the same wording would be used because that wording is the

wording used in the regulation to describe the kind of crime that shows unsuitability. When a

decision-maker strays from the particular language in a legal standard, the decision then becomes

vulnerable to a claim that the wrong standard was used. See, e.g., Visciotti v. Woodford, 288

F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (state court erred by mischaracterizing a test as one "whether

a more favorable result was probable" instead of of a "reasonable probability" of a different

result), overruled by Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 23-24 (2002) (per curiam) (state court

identified the right test twice and its failure to use the modifier "reasonably" in front of

"probable" in other locations in the decision was an imprecision but not an error). The phrase

"some evidence" has been used seventeen times in this order; what may look to the prisoner like

a rote recitation is actually an application of the law to his case. The fact that the BPT focused

on the commitment offense also does not mean that it was a biased decision-maker, as the

commitment offense is a very important circumstance in evaluating a prisoner's parole

suitability. 

The generic nature of the form declarations makes them unhelpful. Without knowing the

particulars of each declarant's crime, one cannot say that the declarant's crime was improperly

described as especially cruel, heinous or atrocious. While there is some appeal to Dang's

argument that not all murders can be exceptionally cruel, heinous or atrocious, it also raises the

question of whether the parole standards must be lowered if the general trend is to more vicious

killings. For example, if all murders in one year are accomplished by torturing and then

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decapitating the victims, none of those murders could be called especially cruel, heinous or

atrocious under Dang's reasoning because torture and decapitation are the norm within that

group. Another reason why the declarations are not helpful is that there is no showing that the

same BPT panel heard all the declarants' cases as well as Dang's case. Different commissioners

comprise different BPT panels and different governors appointed different commissioners. A

habeas petitioner would have to show that the particular panel that heard his case was biased to

obtain habeas relief and Dang has come nowhere close to doing so. 

Dang has not shown that he fits within the narrow scope of the statute that allows

evidentiary hearings in federal habeas actions to further develop the factual basis for his claim,

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). See, e.g., Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000)

(“Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary

hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 20, 2006 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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