Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01757/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Willie Dewayne Stevens has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

In 2009, Petitioner rejected a plea offer stipulating to 12 years’ imprisonment. 

Prior to trial in 2010, Petitioner accepted a subsequent offer that resulted in 17 years’ 

imprisonment. Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to 

reject the initial offer. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that 

counsel had advised Petitioner to take the 12-year offer. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed. Because the state courts’ determination was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law, the undersigned will recommend that the Petition 

be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Willie Dewayne Stevens, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Laura Escapule, Arizona Attorney 

General, 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-14-1757-PHX-GMS (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTS OF THE CASE 

 The following factual background is taken from the presentence report. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. F.) 

 On June 14, 2009, at approximately 9:30 P.M., Petitioner lost control of his 2007 

Pontiac Grand Prix, causing a single-vehicle collision. Petitioner had three passengers in 

the car with him; his girlfriend in the front passenger’s seat, and her friends Ms. Puccetti 

and Ms. Hernandez, both riding in the back seat of the car. Before the collision Petitioner 

stated that he wanted to see how fast the car would go, and Ms. Puccetti saw the 

speedometer indicate a speed of 125 miles per hour shortly before the collision.1

 The 

collision occurred in a construction zone with a posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour. 

After Petitioner lost control of the vehicle, it went through the construction barricades 

and exited the roadway. After leaving the roadway and traveling a distance of 489 feet, 

the vehicle landed upside down in an irrigation canal. The interior of the vehicle began 

to fill with water and Petitioner, his girlfriend, and Ms. Puccetti were able to exit the 

vehicle. Ms. Hernandez, who was restrained by a seatbelt, was not able to get out of the 

vehicle. Ms. Hernandez was eventually removed from the vehicle by emergency 

personnel and was transported to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead at 12:07 

A.M. on June 15, 2009. Petitioner and the other two women were transported to the 

hospital where they were treated for non-life-threatening injuries and one passenger was 

admitted with a fractured sternum. 

 Ms. Puccetti told law enforcement officers that she saw Petitioner consume eight 

beers prior to driving that evening. When questioned by the officers, Petitioner admitted 

that he was the driver of the car at the time of the accident. The officers noticed an odor 

of alcohol coming from Petitioner at the scene of the accident and conducted a breath 

 

1 At the time that he entered his guilty plea, as a factual foundation for the plea, 

Petitioner’s counsel represented to the court that Petitioner was traveling at approximately 120 

miles per hour at the time of the accident and that his BAC was slightly below .08 two hours 

after the accident. (Doc. 10, Ex. D at 11.) 

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Intoxilyzer test later at the hospital, which showed a breath alcohol concentration of .068 

percent. A subsequent blood test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .129 percent 

and the presence of Vicodin. On June 15, 2009, Petitioner was booked on criminal 

charges arising from the accident. He told officers he had been traveling at 60 miles per 

hour at the time of the collision and that the fog lights from oncoming traffic had blinded 

him. (Id., Ex. F.) 

 A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned on June 22, 2009, charged 

Petitioner with: second-degree murder, a class 1 dangerous felony (Count 1); aggravated 

assault, a class 3 dangerous felony (Count 2); and endangerment, a class 6 dangerous 

felony. (Id., Ex. A.) 

B. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 

 1. Plea Proceedings and Sentencing

 Petitioner was represented by retained counsel in his criminal proceedings. (Doc. 

10, Ex. A, Ex. B, Ex. R.) On or about August 13, 2009, the State made an initial plea 

offer to Petitioner, which provided for a 12-year term of imprisonment in exchange for 

Petitioner’s guilty plea to one charge of second-degree murder. (Doc. 10, Ex. R at 12-14.) 

Mr. Hock, Petitioner’s defense counsel at that time, mailed a copy of this plea offer to 

Petitioner and verbally presented the offer to him on August 27, 2009. (Id., Ex. R at 13-

15, 21-22, 50-51.) 

 On September 18, 2009, during a pretrial settlement conference, the trial court 

explained to Petitioner that he faced a possible aggregate sentence of 50 years 

imprisonment if he was convicted on all counts at trial. (Id., Ex. R at 31-32, 51-52, 55-

56.) At the settlement conference, Petitioner was represented by Mr. Saldivar, an 

associate of Mr. Hock, who had assumed representation of Petitioner. (Id., Ex. B.) The 

trial court also explained to Petitioner the State’s initial plea offer. (Id., Ex. R at 32.) 

Despite being informed that he faced a possible 50-year sentence if he chose to go to trial 

and was convicted on all counts, Petitioner rejected the initial plea agreement. (Id., Ex. R 

at 20-21, 32, 41, 56.) Petitioner rejected the agreement because he maintained that the 

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crash was “an accident” and that “12 years was too much time for what happened.” (Id., 

Ex. R at 41.) 

 After Petitioner rejected the initial plea offer, Mr. Saldivar further investigated the 

crash in order to obtain a more favorable plea offer. (Id., Ex. R at 29-30, 38-39, 42.) The 

investigation, however, confirmed the State’s evidence against Petitioner, and Mr. 

Saldivar determined that no viable defense existed. (Id., Ex. R at 30, 35.) 

 The State’s prior plea offer had been revoked and the State refused to extend the 

prior plea offer stipulating a 12-year term of imprisonment. (Id., Ex. P at 2, Ex. R at 42.) 

When the State extended a second, different, plea offer to Petitioner a few days before his 

trial was scheduled to begin, Petitioner chose to accept the second offer rather than 

proceed to trial. (Id., Ex. R at 33-34, 54-55.) The second written plea agreement provided 

that Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of second-degree murder and serve a term 

of imprisonment ranging from 13 to 17 years. (Id., Ex. R at 33, 42, 54, Ex. C.) In the plea 

agreement, in exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss Counts 2 

and 3 of the indictment. (Id., Ex. C.) 

A change-of-plea hearing was conducted on March 15, 2010. (Doc. 10, Ex. D.) 

Petitioner was represented by counsel at the hearing and averred to the trial court that he 

had read the plea agreement, discussed it with his counsel, and signed the plea agreement. 

(Id.) During the hearing, the trial court thoroughly explained the terms of the plea 

agreement to Petitioner, including the sentencing provisions (id. at 5-6), and discussed 

the rights Petitioner was waiving by entering into the agreement (id. at 8-10.). The trial 

court determined that Petitioner knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into the 

plea agreement. (Id., Ex. D at 3-13, Ex. E.) Petitioner acknowledged that he understood 

the trial court’s statements regarding the plea agreement and the rights he was waiving by 

pleading guilty, and then Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to second-degree murder. 

(Id., Ex. D at 10-12, Ex. E.) 

 At sentencing on June 14, 2010, the trial court found that Petitioner’s actions were 

extremely reckless and displayed a tremendous disregard for human life, and sentenced 

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Petitioner to a slightly-aggravated term of 17 years imprisonment. (Id., Ex. G at 15-18, 

Ex. H.) 

 2. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

 The plea agreement signed by Petitioner waived his right to take a direct appeal of 

his conviction and sentence. 

 On July 15, 2010, Petitioner initiated a state action for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, by timely filing a notice of his 

“Rule 32 of-right proceedings” with the state trial court. (Doc. 10, Ex. I.) The state court 

appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his Rule 32 proceedings. Counsel averred to 

the trial court that she was unable to find any colorable claims for relief. (Id., Ex. J, Ex. 

K.) Petitioner asked the trial court to appoint “new counsel.” The court denied 

Petitioner’s request. (Id., Ex. M, Ex. N.) 

 Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se Rule 32 petition, arguing that he had been 

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel during his pretrial and plea 

proceedings. (Id., Ex. O, Ex. P.) Petitioner asserted counsel was ineffective because he 

did not challenge the search warrant that permitted a blood sample to be tested for 

alcohol and drugs. (Id., Ex. U at 2.) Additionally, Petitioner claimed that he had rejected 

the State’s initial plea offer because his trial counsel told him that “they would win the 

case” if Petitioner refused the offer and chose to proceed to trial. (Id., Ex. Q at 2.) 

Petitioner also asserted that his sentence was improperly aggravated because the trial 

court considered in aggravation a factor that was an element of the offense. (Id., Ex. U at 

2.) 

 An evidentiary hearing was conducted on December 9, 2011, with regard only to 

Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the allegation that 

Petitioner was poorly advised regarding the initial plea offer. (Id., Ex. U at 2.) At the 

hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Petitioner and the defense attorneys who had 

represented him during his criminal proceedings. (Id., Ex. R.) Petitioner’s first attorney, 

Mr. Hock, testified that he had discussed the circumstances surrounding the offenses with 

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Petitioner, and that he had explained the possible sentences that could be imposed if 

Petitioner were found guilty on all counts after a trial. (Id., Ex. R at 9-11.) Mr. Hock 

testified that he had informed Petitioner that he would likely receive an aggravated term 

of 22 years imprisonment if he was convicted at trial, because of the “egregious” facts 

surrounding the accident. (Id., Ex. R at 10-12.) Mr. Hock testified that he told Petitioner 

he did not think it likely that, if found guilty at trial, all of the sentences would be 

imposed consecutively, but that he believed an enhanced sentence would be imposed if 

convicted of second-degree murder. (Id., Ex. R at 10-12.) Mr. Hock testified that, 

although he saw Petitioner at a hearing on August 27, he did not at that time or ever 

advise Petitioner regarding the initial plea offer, although he had personally believed that 

the initial, 12-year plea offer, extended on or about August 13, 2009, was an extremely 

favorable offer. (Id., Ex. R at 13-15.) 

 Mr. Saldivar, Petitioner’s second counsel, testified that responsibility for 

Petitioner’s case as defense counsel was reassigned within the firm on or about August 

31, 2009. (Id., Ex. R at 15-16.) Mr. Saldivar was assigned to represent Petitioner, and he 

met with Petitioner approximately five times at the jail. (Id., Ex. R at 31.) Mr. Saldivar 

testified at the evidentiary hearing that, during those meetings, he told Petitioner that the 

12-year plea offer was “a good deal” and that he “should take it.” (Id., Ex. R at 31-32.) 

Mr. Saldivar testified that Petitioner had ignored his advice and rejected the offer because 

Petitioner felt that serving a term of 12 years’ imprisonment was too much time for what 

had occurred. (Id., Ex. R at 31, 34, 41.) Mr. Saldivar also testified that Petitioner told 

Mr. Saldivar that Mr. Hock had told Petitioner he should not take the initial plea offer 

because he “could get him probation.” (Id., Ex. R at 42-43.) When Mr. Saldivar relayed 

this comment to Mr. Hock, Mr. Hock replied that he had never made that statement to 

Petitioner. (Id., Ex. R at 30-31). 

 Mr. Saldivar testified at the hearing that he had investigated the crash further to 

attempt to obtain a better plea deal from the State. (Id., Ex. R at 29-30, 40, 42.) Mr. 

Saldivar testified that this further investigation only confirmed the State’s evidence 

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against Petitioner, and that the State refused to re-extend the 12-year offer. (Id., Ex. R at 

30-34.) A few days before trial the State presented the second plea offer and Mr. Saldivar 

discussed that offer with Petitioner. (Id., Ex. R at 34-35.) Mr. Saldivar explained to 

Petitioner that there was no viable defense to the charges against him and, as a result, 

Petitioner chose to accept the second plea offer rather than go to trial. (Id., Ex. R at 35, 

54-55.) 

 In contrast to Mr. Hock’s and Mr. Saldivar’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, 

Petitioner claimed that his former attorneys were lying about the events surrounding his 

criminal proceedings. (Id., Ex. R at 56.) Petitioner testified that he had wanted to accept 

the initial plea offer, but that his counsel convinced him to reject the offer by saying that 

Petitioner “had a 50/50 chance at trial” and that Petitioner would get the same sentence as 

offered in the plea agreement even if Petitioner were found guilty. (Id., Ex. R at 50-52.) 

At the evidentiary hearing, however, Petitioner acknowledged that, at the settlement 

conference, the trial court had explained the initial plea offer to Petitioner and outlined 

the possible sentences that he could receive if he was convicted. (Id., Ex. R at 49-51, 55-

54.) 

 After considering all the evidence presented at the hearing on Petitioner’s Rule 32 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court determined that Petitioner’s 

testimony at the evidentiary hearing was not credible. (Id., Ex. S at 3.) The trial court 

stated: 

On December 9, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

defendant’s second claim of ineffective assistance. Based upon the 

testimony presented at that hearing, the Court finds that the defendant’s 

factual claims that he was advised not to take the 12 year plea offer in the 

matter, that the settlement conference was merely a formality and that his 

attorney was confident they would win the case, are not supported by the 

record. In fact, the Court finds that the credible evidence presented at the 

hearing demonstrates that the defendant was advised by his lawyer at the 

time of the settlement conference that the 12 year plea was a good plea and 

that he should take it. The defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that his attorney’s advice fell below prevailing standards or 

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that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s advice in any way. 

(Id.) The Superior Court denied relief and dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. 

 Petitioner filed a timely petition for review of the trial court’s decision with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id., Ex. T.) The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s 

decision and affirmed in a six-page memorandum decision, finding that there was no 

basis to reject the Superior Court’s determination that Petitioner’s factual claims 

regarding the circumstances surrounding his rejection of the initial guilty plea were not 

credible. (Id., Ex. U at 8.) 

 C. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 Petitioner filed his federal habeas Petition on August 6, 2014. Petitioner asserts 

that he was denied the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner contends Mr. Hock’s performance was deficient because Mr. Hock “did not 

give him any comprehensive discussion” regarding the merits of the first plea offer. (Id. 

at 12.) Petitioner alleges that Mr. Hock told Petitioner to “reject the first plea offer” 

because the “state’s case was weak.” (Id. at 16.) Petitioner claims his second counsel, 

Mr. Saldivar, also advised him not to take the 12-year offer. (Id.) Petitioner claims that 

Mr. Saldivar advised him to take the second plea offer after Mr. Saldivar realized that the 

fee for the case would not be paid to Mr. Saldivar. (Id. at 17.) 

 On December 4, 2014, the State filed a Response to the Petition. (Doc. 10.) On 

December 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 12.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for habeas corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

 

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A. REVIEW OF CLAIMS UNDER THE AEDPA 

 The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision 

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the 

“last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that when the final state 

court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state 

court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d at 

441 (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, 

as a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fair minded disagreement. 

White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). See also Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1133-34. 

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in 

state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for fair 

minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] 

(2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is because it 

was meant to be.” [] 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a 

State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” 

for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state 

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it 

can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 

(2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect one. See

Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because 

the state court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” 

Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 

F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 998 

(9th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, 

“a state-court’s factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal 

habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Clark v. 

Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted) (quoting Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007). 

Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not harmless: “For reasons of 

finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based 

on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. 

Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). 

B. STRICKLAND AND INEFFECIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

CLAIMS 

 The Supreme Court established a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Strickland test 

applies to a federal habeas petitioner’s challenge to a conviction entered upon a guilty 

plea. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Washington v. Lampert, 422 

F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005). In such a context, “the ineffectiveness inquiry probes 

whether the alleged ineffective assistance impinged on the [petitioner’s] ability to enter 

an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 980. To 

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prevail on this claim, Petitioner must show that his counsel’s representation fell below the 

range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases and that he suffered actual 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s incompetence. Id. at 873. Because a petitioner’s failure 

to make the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the 

claim, the court need not address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 697–700. 

In Hill, the Supreme Court adapted the two-part Strickland standard to 

challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 

holding that a defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his guilty plea 

on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) his 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his] 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.” 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S. Ct. 366. 

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007). 

C. PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED HIS FEDERAL 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 

OF COUNSEL. 

 Petitioner contends that Mr. Hock, his criminal defense counsel, instructed him “to 

reject the first plea offer of 12 years.” (Doc. 1 at 16-17.) Petitioner argues that this advice 

constituted unconstitutionally deficient performance on the part of counsel, which 

prejudiced Petitioner by causing him to reject the State’s first plea offer and accept a 

second offer that resulted in a longer sentence. (Id. at 17-18.) 

 The state trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the claim 

presented in the federal habeas Petition. The state court heard from Petitioner, Mr. Hock, 

and Mr. Saldivar, Petitioner’s subsequent counsel. The trial court concluded that, as a 

matter of fact, Mr. Hock and Mr. Saldivar’s testimony was credible and that Petitioner 

was not telling the truth regarding the events surrounding his rejection of the initial plea 

agreement. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior 

Court’s ruling, finding: 

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Based on the record before us, Stevens has not persuaded us the trial court 

abused its discretion in rejecting his claim that counsel had rendered 

ineffective assistance in connections with plea negotiations. The court 

found Stevens’s “factual claims that he was advised not to take the 12 year 

plea offer in the matter, that the settlement conference was merely a 

formality and that his attorney was confident they would win the case, are 

not supported by the record.” The court added, “[i]n fact, ... the credible 

evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that Stevens was advised by 

his lawyer at the time of the settlement conference that the 12 year plea was 

a good plea and that he should take it.” Thus, the court concluded, because 

it did not find Stevens credible, he “failed to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that his attorney’s advice fell below prevailing standards or 

that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s advice in any way.” 

We defer to the trial court here because in ruling on this claim of ineffective 

assistance, the court necessarily was required to resolve conflicts in the 

evidence. It clearly rejected Stevens’s testimony, which was at the heart of 

his claim, and accepted as more credible the testimony of his attorneys, 

which belied that claim. Again, the trial court, not this court, is the sole 

arbiter of witness credibility in post-conviction proceedings. Fritz, 157 

Ariz. at 141, 755 P.2d at 446. We have no basis for interfering with the 

court’s ruling. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. U at 5-6.) 

 The state court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not denied his right to the effective 

assistance of counsel was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal 

law. The state court determined that Petitioner was not denied his right to the effective 

assistance of counsel because his counsel’s performance was not deficient. More 

specifically, the state court determined counsel’s performance was not deficient because 

counsel advised Petitioner to take the initial plea offer rather than risk going to trial and 

receiving a much lengthier sentence if convicted by a jury on all charges. As noted 

supra, the actual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed 

by a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and 

convincing evidence. Additionally, the state court found Petitioner was not prejudiced 

because the state trial court clearly outlined the consequences Petitioner faced if he 

rejected the plea offer. 

 Based on the record before the state court, Petitioner has not established that his 

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counsel’s advice regarding the initial plea agreement was deficient. Neither has 

Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to this Court that overcomes the state 

court’s factual findings regarding his counsel’s advice to Petitioner that he should take 

the initial plea agreement. Because Petitioner has not presented evidence sufficient to 

overcome the state court’s factual findings and, presuming the state court’s factual 

findings are correct, the state court’s determination that Petitioner was not denied his 

right to the effective assistance counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law, this Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 D. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims because the 

record is sufficiently developed to resolve Petitioner’s assertion that he was denied his 

right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 The state courts’ determination that Petitioner was not denied his right to the 

effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not 

find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. 

Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court will therefore recommend that the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 31st day of July, 2015. 

 

 

 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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