Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02596/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02596-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LANCE WILLIAMS, 

CDCR #AG-2394, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

DANIEL PARAMO; J. PULIDO; 

RUCKER, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-02596-MMA-BLM 

ORDER: 

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[Doc. No. 2] 

AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 

LANCE WILLIAMS (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required to commence a civil action at 

the time he filed this action; instead, he has filed a Motion for Leave to proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount 

of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 

 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

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a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008); see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(noting that when court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, 

the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central 

question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure 

to state a claim.’”) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) 

from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he alleges he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing.”). 

“The exception’s use of the present tense, combined with its concern only with the 

initial act of ‘bring[ing]’ the lawsuit, indicates to us that the exception applies if the 

danger existed at the time the prisoner filed the complaint.” Id. at 1053 (citing United 

States v. Jackson, 480 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the use of tenses in 

statutes generally is significant and “one would not refer in the present tense to something 

that had already happened” (citing The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1)). “In other words, 

the availability of the exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the 

complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Id. at 1053. 

III. Discussion 

 As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and 

has ascertained that it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced 

‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

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Plaintiff claims that “he had a well-known gang member” placed in his cell. 

(Compl. at 3.) As a result, Plaintiff claims that he is “under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff also acknowledges that this alleged gang 

member was later “moved out” of Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at 4.) 

In order to qualify for § 1915(g)’s exception, the danger allegedly faced at filing 

must be real, proximate, and/or ongoing. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055-56; see also 

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he harm must be imminent 

or occurring at the time the complaint is filed.”). Speculative and non-specific allegations 

of potential danger, the possibility of retaliation, and incidents of past harm are 

insufficient. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1057 n.11. 

Plaintiff does allege he is currently housed with a “validated gang member” but 

provides no specific factual allegations as to why he is in imminent physical danger. 

Plaintiff’s claims are simply too conclusory to plausibly show how or why he remained in 

any “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing. Id. at 1057 n.11 

(conclusory claims of imminent danger are insufficient to meet § 1915(g)’s exception). 

And while Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court 

docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 

under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. That is the case here. 

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff Lance Williams, identified as CDCR 

#AG-2394, has had at least seven prior prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the 

grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. 

They are: 

1) Williams v. Aparicio, et al., Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-08640-PA-KK (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., Dec. 16, 2014 Report and Recommendation [“R&R”] to dismiss 

Complaint sua sponte for failing to state a claim as time-barred) (Doc. No. 8)1

; (Feb. 5, 

2015 Order Accepting R&R and dismissing action with prejudice (Doc. No. 9) (strike 

one); 

2) Williams v. L.A. County, et al., Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-08039-PA-KK (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., Jan. 7, 2015 Order to Show Cause [“OSC”] Why Action Should not be 

Dismissed as Untimely) (Doc. No. 11); (March 9, 2015 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal) 

(Doc. No. 16)2

 (strike two); 

3) Williams v. Allard, et al., Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-00037-PA-KK (C.D. Cal., 

West. Div., March 27, 2015 OSC Why Action Should not be Dismissed as time-barred) 

(Doc. No. 5); (April 8, 2015 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal) (Doc. No. 6) (strike three); 

4) Williams v. Kerkfoot, et al., Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-07583-GW-KK (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div. Jan. 22, 2015 Final R&Rs re dismissal of action as time-barred) (Doc. 

No. 18); (May 15, 2015 Order Accepting R&R) (Doc. No. 21) (strike four); 

                                               

1

 See Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissals for failure to 

state a claim because claims were time-barred may be counted as strikes pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

2

 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A prisoner may not 

avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunity to 

amend.”). 

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5) Williams v. Young, et al., Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-08037-PA-KK (C.D. Cal., 

West. Div. May 19, 2015 Memorandum and Order Dismissing Action as Untimely) (Doc. 

No. 17) (strike five); 

6) Williams v. Winsaver, et al., Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-01228-CMK (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 30, 2016 Order Dismissing Complaint for failing to state a claim with leave to 

amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (Doc. No. 9); (Oct. 11, 2017 Order noting 

Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41) (Doc. No. 15) 

(strike six);3

 and 

7) Williams v. Young, et al., Appeal No. 15-55967 (9th Cir., Sept. 18, 2015) 

(Order) (“We deny appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis because we ... find 

the appeal is frivolous.”) (Doc. No. 8) (strike seven).4

 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d 

at 1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

                                               

3

 See Harris, 863 F.3d at 1143 (“[W]hen (1) a district court dismisses a complaint on the 

ground that it fails to state a claim, and (2) the court grants leave to amend, and (3) the 

plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under 

§ 1915(g).”). 

4

 See Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that appellate 

court’s denial of prisoner’s request for IFP status on appeal on grounds of frivolousness 

constituted a “strike” under § 1915(g) “even though [it] did not dismiss the appeal until 

later when the [appellant] did not pay the filing fee.”).

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(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).5

IV. Failure to Exhaust 

Finally, even if Plaintiff were entitled to proceed IFP, the Court notes that his case 

would nevertheless be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) based on his admitted failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies prior to the filing of his Complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only 

permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing similar 

screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of all complaints filed by prisoners “seeking 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”). 

                                               

5

 Plaintiff has also been denied leave to proceed IFP, or has had his IFP status revoked 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), on multiple occasions in the Central and Eastern 

Districts of California, and those decisions have been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals. See Williams v. Villescaz, et al., Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-01230-CKD (E. D. 

Cal. Feb. 24, 2016 Order Revoking IFP as Barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) (Doc. No. 20); 

Williams v. Just, Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-02143-WBS-CKD (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016 

Order Granting Motion to Revoke IFP per § 1915(g)) (Doc. No. 23), aff’d, Appeal No. 

16-16210 (Ninth Cir., Aug. 17, 2017) (Mem.) (Doc. No. 23-1); Williams v. DeGeorges, 

Civil Case No. 2:16-cv-00025-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016 Order Denying IFP 

per § 1915(g)) (Doc. No. 6), aff’d, Appeal No. 16-16106 (Ninth Cir., Aug. 17, 2017) 

(Mem.) (Doc. No. 10-1); Williams v. Sharp, Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-02542-GEB-KJN 

(E.D. Cal., July 14, 2016 Order Adopting F&R and Granting Motion to Revoke IFP as 

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Doc. No. 16), aff’d, Appeal No. 16-17105 (Ninth Cir. 

Aug. 17, 2017) (Mem.) (Doc. No. 20-1); Williams v. Garcia, et al., Civil Case No. 2:16-

cv-06744-PA-KK (C.D. Cal., West. Div. Nov. 22, 2016) (Order Denying IFP as barred 

by § 1915(g)) (Doc. No. 9), aff’d, Appeal No. 16-56854 (Ninth Cir. Aug. 17, 2017) 

(Mem.) (Doc. No. 10-1); Williams v. Logan, et al., Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-02084-MCEAC (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2017 Order Adopting F&R and Granting Motion to Revoke IFP 

per § 1915(g)) (Doc. No. 21), and Williams v. Escalante, et al., Civil Case No. 2:17-cv01139-KJN (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2017 Order denying IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) (Doc. No. 8). 

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While the “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), a prisoner’s complaint may be subject to dismissal for 

failure to state a claim when an affirmative defense appears plainly on its face. Id. at 215; 

see also Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting that where 

“a prisoner’s failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint,” his complaint is 

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for 

dismissal[.]”), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

 Here, Plaintiff plainly concedes on the face of his Complaint that administrative 

remedies have been filed but not exhausted. See ECF No. 1 at 7. Indeed it would appear 

impossible for Plaintiff to have exhausted the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation’s multi-step administrative grievance process as the claims arising from 

incidents alleged to have occurred only days or a few weeks prior to filing this action. See 

Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s 

“[e]xhaustion requirements apply based on when a plaintiff filed the operative 

complaint.”). 

III. Conclusion and Order 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) as barred by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

2) DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure 

to pay the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a); 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: March 1, 2018 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

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