Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01419/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01419-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIM JOHNSTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 COVIDIEN, LP. and MEDTRONIC, INC.,

Defendants. /

No. C 19-01419 WHA

ORDER RE MOTION

TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this products-liability action, defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

and Rule 9(b). To the following extent, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

STATEMENT

In July 2011, plaintiff Kim Johnston underwent laparoscopic ventral parastomal hernia

repair surgery during which Parietex Parastomal Mesh, manufactured by defendants Covidien

LP and Medtronic Inc., was implanted. At some point after the surgery, plaintiff developed a

skin rash near the incision, hernia recurrence, abdominal pain, and mesh erosion and extrusion

from her body. In June 2015, due to this myriad of complications, plaintiff underwent

emergency surgery for high-grade small bowel obstruction which occurred due to the failure of

the Parietex product (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 12, 14, 16). 

The complaint alleges that, contrary to defendants’ representations, the Parietex product

has a high rate of failure, injury, and complication as evidenced by the numerous reports filed

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on an FDA database documenting serious adverse events associated with this product. 

The complaint further alleges that defendants represented to plaintiff and plaintiff’s physicians

that the Parietex product was a safe and effective product for hernia surgery. Plaintiff also

alleges that defendants consciously disregarded the foreseeable harm caused by the Parietex

product by failing to warn the general public or plaintiff of the numerous side effects and

complications associated with the product (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 20, 22–23, 26). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges eight claims: (1) strict liability — manufacturing defect;

(2) strict liability — failure to warn; (3) negligence; (4) breach of express warranty;

(5) violation of federal (Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act) and state (California, Delaware,

Massachusetts, and Minnesota) consumer protection laws; (6) negligent infliction of emotional

distress; (7) fraudulent concealment; and (8) negligent misrepresentation. 

Defendants now move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b). 

This order first addresses the appropriate substantive law that applies to plaintiff’s claims. 

Next, this order addresses the timeliness of each of plaintiff’s claims. Because this order finds

that all of plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, it does not reach the matters of plausibility,

attorney’s fees, or punitive damages. 

ANALYSIS

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when there are

sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that defendants are liable for the

misconduct alleged. Ibid. While a court “must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true,” it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Ibid. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140

(9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

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When a defendant moves to dismiss a claim because it is time-barred, that motion “can

be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d

677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). At the initial pleading stage, this order is concerned

only with the legal feasibility of the complaint, rather than the weight of the evidence that might

support it. See ibid.

Rule 9(b) requires that in all averments of fraud the circumstances constituting fraud

must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's

mind may be alleged generally. “Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what,

when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Rule 9(b) serves to give defendants notice of the

specific fraudulent conduct against which they must defend. See Bly–Magee v. California,

236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).

1. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS.

A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum state,

including its choice of law rules and its statute of limitations. Muldoon v. Tropitone Furniture

Co., 1 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 1993). In California, “the party seeking to dislodge the law of the

forum, bears the burden of establishing that the foreign jurisdiction has an interest, cognizable

under California conflict-of-law principles, in the application of its law to the dispute at hand.” 

McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, unless adequately

pleaded otherwise, plaintiff’s claims are examined under California law. 

Plaintiff’s opposition contends that dismissal based on timeliness is improper absent a

choice of law determination; however, at oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that

California law applies to plaintiff’s claims (Dkt. No. 18 at 9). In any event, this order finds that

plaintiff’s complaint provides no basis for dislodging the law of the forum. Plaintiff fails to

undertake a choice of law analysis or identify in which claims the other three referenced

states — Delaware, Massachusetts, and Minnesota — have an interest. The complaint merely

states that defendants are either incorporated in or have their principal place of business in the

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above-mentioned states (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 3–4). Plaintiff’s opposition contends that a choice of

law determination should not take place until there has been an “opportunity to develop

evidence” (Dkt. No. 18 at 9). In support of this contention, plaintiff cites a contract action,

Chinese Hosp. Assoc. v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 2018 WL 6069169 at *4 (N.D. Cal.

November 20, 2018) (Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley), to argue that a choice of law

determination must be made before determining limitations. This case is easily distinguishable. 

Here, unlike the cited decision, choice of law is not governed by an underlying agreement

between the parties. And, while plaintiff cites this decision to argue for the opportunity to take

discovery prior to a choice of law determination, the district court there performed the choice of

law analysis prior to any discovery. Plaintiff has failed to establish that California law should

not apply in this action. Accordingly, California law, including the California statute of

limitations, will apply to all of plaintiff’s claims. 

2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS.

The complaint presents the threshold issue of whether or not the statute of limitations

bars all of plaintiff’s alleged claims. Defendants contend, and this order agrees, that the longest

possible statutory period for any of plaintiff’s claims is three years (see Dkt. No. 10 at 5). 

In California, the limitations period usually runs from accrual, meaning from the last of when

the wrongdoing, harm, and causation essential to the cause of action occur. Aryeh v. Canon

Bus. Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1191 (2013). Because the wrongdoing, as pleaded, occurred

when defendants’ Parietex product failed and resulted in plaintiff’s June 2015 surgical repair,

that date presents the earliest point of accrual for the purposes of this order (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 16). 

Counting three years from that point, the longest applicable statute of limitations would have

run in June 2018. As plaintiff filed the initial complaint in March 2019, well after any

limitations period ran, the statute of limitations bars all of plaintiff’s alleged claims unless

plaintiff successfully shows a way to toll the statutory period.

A. Applicable Statute of Limitations. 

Under California law, products-liability claims are subject to a two-year statute

of limitations. See Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(applying California law and the former one-year personal injury statute of limitations). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges two products-liability claims: (1) strict liability — manufacturing

defect; and (2) strict liability — failure to warn. Both of these claims are subject to California’s

two-year personal injury statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1.

Plaintiff’s complaint further alleges claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress

and negligence. As an initial matter, there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of

emotional distress under California law. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965,

984 (1993). Thus, the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress will be considered

together with the general negligence claim. In California, the statute of limitations for

negligence resulting in personal injury is two years, directly mirroring the statute of limitations

for products-liability claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. Accordingly, both negligence

claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges fraudulent concealment. Our court of appeals, applying

California law, has held that an action against the manufacturer or supplier of a product for

fraudulent concealment resulting in personal injury is governed by the two-year personal injury

statute of limitations, Section 335.1. See Nodine v. Shiley, 240 F.3d 1149, 1153 n.2 (9th Cir.

2001) (decided under the former one-year personal injury statute of limitations). Defendants,

citing California Civil Procedure Code § 338(d), which applies a three-year statute of

limitations to “action[s] for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake,” and two unreported

district court decisions, contend that the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s fraudulent

concealment claim is three years (Dkt. No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff does not directly contest this

assertion but rather argues for a choice of law analysis, which this order has already addressed

(Dkt. No. 18 at 9). Concerning the applicable statute of limitations, a decision need not be

reached at this time as, even with a three-year statutory period, plaintiff’s claims would still fall

outside of the applicable statutory period absent tolling.

The complaint also alleges negligent misrepresentation, which “has either a two- or

three-year statute of limitations,” depending on whether the essence of the claim is negligence

or fraud. Fanucci v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

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(applying California law). Again, defendants’ motion to dismiss contends that a three-year

statute of limitations applies to this claim, and plaintiff does not directly oppose this contention. 

For the above-mentioned reasons, the applicable period need not be decided at this time.

Plaintiff’s complaint further alleges breach of express warranty. Our court of appeals,

applying California law, has held that a two-year statute of limitations governs all “personal

injury claims based on defective products regardless of the particular legal theory invoked.” 

Soliman, 311 F.3d at 971; see Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 26 (1954). 

At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that a two-year limitations period applies to this claim. 

Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims,

Section 335.1, governs plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim. 

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act. Disposition of a

state law warranty claim determines the disposition of a Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act claim. 

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008); see 15 U.S.C.

2310(d). Thus, the two-year personal injury statute of limitations similarly governs plaintiff’s

Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act claim.

Finally, the applicable statute of limitations for plaintiff’s claims brought under

California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act is three years. Cal. Civ. Code. § 1783. 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Time-Barred. 

On the face of the complaint, plaintiff’s claims appear to arise from injuries that

necessitated a 2015 surgical repair (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 16). Plaintiff’s claims, however, are subject to

at most a three-year statute of limitations, which is shorter than the nearly four years that have

passed since the procedure and the approximately three and a half years that have passed since

the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff’s claims are thus time-barred unless plaintiff successfully

shows a way to toll the statute of limitations. Perhaps in anticipation of this issue, plaintiff’s

complaint asserts numerous doctrines to toll the limitations period. This order only addresses

those clearly identified by plaintiff and supported by factual allegations. Specifically, this order

addresses the so-called “discovery rule,” fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel.

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(1) Delayed Discovery. 

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations. 

Under California law, the statute of limitations ordinarily begins to accrue “when the cause of

action is complete with all of its elements.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797,

806 (2005) (citation omitted). There is, however, an exception to this rule. Pursuant to the

discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until the time that a plaintiff discovers the

cause of action or has “reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured [him].” 

Id. at 807. “[P]laintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware

of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed

by such an investigation.” Id. at 808. Where the complaint, on its face, would be otherwise

time-barred, the plaintiff must plead specific facts to show both the time and manner of

discovery as well as the plaintiff’s inability to conduct earlier discovery despite reasonable

diligence to invoke the discovery rule. Ibid. 

Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges no facts demonstrating the time and manner in which

plaintiff discovered the claim. Instead, the complaint vaguely alleges that the relation between

plaintiff’s injury and the Parietex product was not discovered nor could have been discovered

“until a date within the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 30). 

The complaint contains conclusory allegations that plaintiff was unable to discover the claim

earlier despite reasonable diligence due to defendants’ “misrepresentations and omissions;”

however, the complaint merely alludes to “consultations with Plaintiff’s medical providers”

as evidence of plaintiff’s “diligent investigation” (id. at ¶¶ 30–31). Without addressing the

sufficiency of plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment allegations, this order finds that the discovery

rule does not apply as pleaded due to the dearth of alleged facts concerning the time and manner

of plaintiff’s discovery of the claim as well as plaintiff’s diligent investigation. At oral

argument, plaintiff’s counsel contended that they can plead facts sufficient to invoke the

discovery rule. To the extent that plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint, this order advises

plaintiff to include these factual allegations. 

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(2) Fraudulent Concealment/Equitable Estoppel.

Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants are estopped from asserting a limitations defense due

to their fraudulent concealment, through misrepresentations and omissions, from Plaintiff and

Plaintiff’s physicians of the true risks associated with the Parietex Product” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 31). 

The complaint, however, fails to clearly identify whether the applicable doctrine to toll the

statute of limitations is fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel. Accordingly, this order

will examine both doctrines. 

Our court of appeals, applying California law, explained that “[t]he rule of fraudulent

concealment is applicable whenever the defendant intentionally prevents the plaintiff from

instituting suit . . . .” Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted). “In order to establish fraudulent concealment, the complaint must

show: (1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances under which it was discovered;

and (3) that the plaintiff was not at fault for failing to discover it or had no actual or

presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.” Ibid. (quoting Baker v. Beech

Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 315, 321 (1974)). “In urging lack of means of obtaining

knowledge, it must be shown that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the facts could not

have been discovered at an earlier date.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Claims relying on fraudulent

concealment must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). See Snapp &

Assocs. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Malcolm Bruce Burlingame Robertson, 96 Cal. App. 4th 884, 890

(2002) (comparing the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to the California statutory rule of

delayed accrual for fraud cases), disapproved of on other grounds, Aryeh, 55 Cal. 4th at 1196. 

Plaintiff pleaded insufficient facts to support the tolling of the statute of limitations

based on fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff has alleged no facts as to the circumstances

under which the fraud was discovered. Rather, the complaint states that “[a]t all material

times, neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s physicians were aware of the [fraudulently concealed]

facts . . . .” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 112). This order finds that plaintiff has not met her burden to plead

fraudulent concealment with particularity and, thus, has not adequately pleaded fraudulent

concealment to toll the statute of limitations. 

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Under California law, equitable estoppel requires that: 

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) that

party must intend that his or her conduct be acted on, or must so

act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was

so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant

of the true state of facts; and (4) the party asserting estoppel must

reasonably rely on the conduct to his or her injury. 

Lukovsky v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“The defendant’s statement or conduct must amount to a misrepresentation bearing on the

necessity of bringing a timely suit . . . .” Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 384 n.18

(2003). 

Defendants argue, and this order agrees, that plaintiff’s assertion of equitable estoppel

rests on “vague allegations of fraudulent concealment” that are insufficient to support the

tolling of the statutory period (Dkt. No. 10 at 7). With respect to defendants’ knowledge,

plaintiff alleges that “[a]t all material times, Defendants knew or should have known” that the

Parietex product was unsafe and ineffective. Concerning defendants’ intent, plaintiff asserts

that defendants “willfully, intentionally, and maliciously concealed facts . . . with the intent to

defraud” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 105, 110). Plaintiff’s allegations are unsupported conclusory

statements that are insufficient to establish the tolling of the statutory period based on equitable

estoppel. 

Accordingly, plaintiff does not allege sufficient grounds for tolling the statute of

limitations. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED, without prejudice, to the extent

that they are based on conduct that took place prior to the applicable limitations period. To the

extent that plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint, this order emphasizes that plaintiff must

clearly and specifically plead the doctrine relied upon to toll the statute of limitations.

4. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Defendants submitted one exhibit and requested, albeit informally, judicial notice of

two websites in connection with their motion to dismiss. When reviewing a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim, a court considers only allegations contained in the pleadings,

exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Swartz v.

KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). “A judicially noticed fact must be one not

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subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial

jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources who accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FRE 201(b). 

Defendants, in accordance with their motion to dismiss, submitted the Parietex

Parastomal Mesh Instructions for Use (Dkt. No. 10, Exh. A). Defendants also, within their

motion to dismiss, requested judicial notice of FDA and U.S. Food & Drug Administration

websites, which purportedly provide factual statements about the use of hernia mesh products

in general and hernia surgeries (Dkt. No. 10 at 3). The exhibit and websites presented by

defendants are not necessary for resolving the motion to dismiss, so the request for judicial

notice is DENIED AS MOOT.

CONCLUSION

To the extent stated, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. By NOON ON

JUNE 27, plaintiff may seek leave to amend the dismissed claims by a motion noticed on the

normal 35-day calendar. Plaintiff must plead her best case. Her motion should affirmatively

demonstrate how the proposed amended complaint corrects the deficiencies identified in this

order, as well as any others raised in defendants’ motion but not addressed herein. The motion

should be accompanied by a redlined copy of the proposed amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2019. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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