Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03961/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03961-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT W. COPPLE, on behalf of himself

and others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ASTRELLA & RICE, P.C., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-3961 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to dismiss the First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Astrella & Rice, P.C., Baker, Burton & Lundy, P.C.,

Engstrom, Lipscomp & Lack, Girardi & Keese, J. Tynan Kelly, Kiesel, Boucher & Larson, LLP,

Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, M. Brian McMahon, O’Donnell & Schaeffer, LLP,

Michael J. Ponce, Francis O. Scarpulla, and Douglas A. Stacey (collectively “Attorney

Defendants”) (1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Also before the Court are requests for judicial

notice filed by both parties. 

Having reviewed the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, the record in this case, and

having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

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1 The public official is alleged to be the Honorable J. Richard Haden (“Judge

Haden”), the presiding judge in the Natural Gas proceedings. Judge Haden is not named as a

defendant in this action.

2

dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ requests for judicial notice, and

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Robert W. Copple (“Copple”) brings this putative class action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that the “Attorney Defendants entered into and implemented a conspiracy with a

public official to commit and to preserve and cover up, an extrinsic fraud that would allow, and

in fact did allow, Attorney Defendants to obtain for their own account $23 million or more in

excess of any amount to which Attorney Defendants might properly have been entitled under

applicable law,” as part of a class action settlement in In re Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III

& IV, Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, J.C.C.P. Nos. 4221, 4224,

4226 & 4228 (hereinafter “the Natural Gas proceedings”). (FAC, ¶¶ 20, 22(a).)1

More specifically, Copple alleges that Judge Haden preliminarily approved the

settlement and the form notice, which provided that “the law firms representing the class would

apply to the court for attorney’s fees and expenses in an amount that was unspecified but that

was not to exceed $60 million.” (FAC, ¶ 30(a).) The notice also stated that the attorneys’ fees

were to be “deducted from the consideration being provided” to the class. (Id., ¶ 30(b).)

According to Copple, the notice also advised class members to file any objections, exclusions or

requests to speak at the fairness hearing with the Clerk of the San Diego Superior Court. (Id., 

¶ 30(c)-(d).) The notice provided a physical address at which objections were to be filed and did

not state that any objections were required to be filed electronically. (Id., ¶¶ 30(e), 31.)

Copple further alleges that the Attorney Defendants filed a motion for fees and costs in

the amount of $60 million. (Id., ¶ 32.) Copple also alleges that one class member, Ernest M.

Thayer (“Thayer”), filed an objection asserting that the attorneys’ fees requested were far

beyond what was authorized under California law. (Id., ¶ 34.) Copple asserts that the Attorney

Defendants and Judge Haden conspired and agreed to direct class members to file objections

and oppositions with the clerk’s office and agreed to “treat as a nullity whatever opposition or

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objections they chose that were filed with the clerk’s office rather than electronically.” (Id., ¶

37(a)-(b).) The only objection specifically mentioned in the FAC alleged not to have been

considered by Judge Haden is Thayer’s objection. 

On or about December 10, 2003, Judge Haden approved the settlement and overruled

Thayer’s and other class members’ objections and awarded the Attorney Defendants the entire

$60 million requested. Copple alleges that while “no California appellate court has ever

approved the application to a lodestar of a multiplier greater than two,” Judge Haden’s fee

award reflected multipliers between three and four times what the Attorney Defendants

professed their lodestar amount to be. (Id. ¶ 35; See also Defendants’ Request for Judicial

Notice (“Defs. RJN”) Ex. C at 14, Ex. D at 9.) Thus, Copple asserts that the Attorney

Defendants and Judge Haden conspired and agreed to “provide Attorney Defendants with an

award of fees and costs, taken from monies that would otherwise belong to the class, in an

amount much greater than that allowed by California law.” (FAC, ¶ 37(c).) The record further

establishes that Thayer appealed the fee award, but his appeal was dismissed on procedural

grounds. (Defs. RJN, Exs. E-G.)

On or about September 7, 2004, the Attorney Defendants filed a motion before Judge

Haden to have Thayer declared a vexatious litigant. (FAC, ¶ 36.) Judge Haden granted the

motion, and Thayer successfully appealed. (Id.; see also Defs. RJN, Ex. A.) Copple alleges that

these facts show that the Attorney Defendants conspired with Judge Haden to “take whatever

steps might appear necessary to harass, discredit and/or block the efforts of, any member of the

settlement class ... who had filed meritorious opposition or objections with the clerk’s office,

rather than electronically, in order to minimize the possibility that any such member of the

settlement class might be able to successfully challenge the abovementioned award of fees and

costs.” (FAC, ¶ 37(d).) 

Copple also alleges that the Attorney Defendants and Judge Haden conspired and agreed

to “minimize the possibility that any member of the settlement class ... who had not objected to

the ... award of fees and costs might subsequently discover that the process leading to that award

had not been legitimate.” (Id., ¶ 37(e).) According to Copple, the alleged conspiracy violated

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his civil rights and the civil rights of the putative class in this case, which is defined to be the

Natural Gas settlement class, by depriving them of their pro rata share of approximately $23

million. (Id., ¶¶ 22(c)-(d), 42-43.) At oral argument, in response to the Court’s question,

Copple asserted that he was deprived of his constitutional right of access to the courts. (See

6/9/06 Tr. at 33:5-10.)

It is undisputed that Copple did not file an objection to the settlement in the Natural

Gas proceedings, did not appear at the hearing to raise an objection, and did not file a direct

appeal of the fee award. Copple alleges he did not do so because he did not discover and “could

not have discovered” the existence of the alleged conspiracy, “until on or after early September,

2005,” when he was advised by Thayer that Thayer had been declared a vexatious litigant by

Judge Haden. (FAC, ¶ 41.) Copple alleges that because he strongly believed “Mr. Thayer to be

an ethical attorney,” he had doubts about the integrity and legitimacy of the settlement process

in the Natural Gas proceedings and undertook an investigation of the circumstances leading to

that award. (Id.)

On September 29, 2005, Copple, through Thayer, filed the initial complaint. On March

31, 2006, Copple through new counsel, Joseph Wood filed the FAC. 

On April 12, 2006, the Attorney Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards.

A party moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may make a facial or a factual attack on

jurisdiction. A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in a

complaint. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A factual

challenge instead “attack[s] the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations despite

their formal sufficiency, and in so doing rel[ies] on affidavits or any other evidence properly

before the court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted); accord Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the

court “need not assume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citation omitted).

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When “the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going

to the merits of an action,” a jurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate. 

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The question of jurisdiction and the merits of an

action are intertwined where a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction

of the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). 

A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it

appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can show no set of facts supporting his or her claim. 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48

(9th Cir. 1978). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint is construed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the complaint are taken to

be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court, however, is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Cleggy v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Under Rule

12(b)(6), dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when it is clear “beyond doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Kimes v. Stone,

84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

B. Requests for Judicial Notice.

The Attorney Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of various records

from the Natural Gas proceedings, including the subsequent proceeding in which Judge Haden

declared Thayer a vexatious litigant. Copple requests that the Court take judicial notice of

Thayer’s objection from the Natural Gas proceedings. The existence of court records is a

proper subject of judicial notice. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.

1980). In addition, documents whose contents are referenced in a complaint and whose

authenticity no party questions are a proper subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Branch v.

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28 2 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923).

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Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of

Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The documents submitted by the Attorney Defendants are court records from the Natural

Gas proceedings. Accordingly, their request for judicial notice is GRANTED but only in part. 

The Attorney Defendants also ask the Court to accept facts set forth in these records as true. 

Copple disputes the truth of those facts. Because the “court may not take judicial notice of a

fact that is ‘subject to reasonable dispute,’” that aspect of the Attorney Defendants’ request for

judicial notice is DENIED. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)).

Copple asks the Court to take judicial notice of the objection Thayer filed in the Natural

Gas proceedings, which bears a “filed” stamp. In taking judicial notice of a court document,

this Court “may do so not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the

[document], which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.” Id. at 690 (internal

quotations and citation omitted). The Attorney Defendants do not dispute the existence or

authenticity of Thayer’s objection, nor do they dispute the fact that it was filed. Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS Copple’s request for judicial notice.

C. The FAC Shall Be Dismissed With Prejudice.

The Attorney Defendants argue that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over Copple’s claim because it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman2doctrine, which “prohibits a

federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto

appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.

2004) (citation omitted); see also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing

for lack of jurisdiction where Section 1983 claim amounted “to nothing more than an

impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions”) (citing MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d

540, 543 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In Kougasian, the Ninth Circuit explained the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: 

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3 The parties dispute whether the pleading standards of Rule 9(b) apply to the

claim of extrinsic fraud. The Court does not need to resolve that dispute, because under the

more liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a), Copple has sufficiently alleged the existence of

a conspiracy.

4 This opinion is bolstered by Mr. Thayer’s statement that, “I ... extensively

researched the issue of what was required to state a valid claim for relief, under the

circumstances of apparent improper collusion here presented, pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1983. 

That research led me to the following legal opinions ... and in particular Kimes v. Stone - a

case factually almost identical to the present one. ” (Declaration of Ernest Thayer in Support

of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Submission Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 54-6(b), ¶

2(c)(1).)

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If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly

erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state

court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars

subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other

hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly

illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does

not bar jurisdiction. ... Rooker-Feldman thus applies only when

the federal plaintiff both asserts as [an] injury legal error or errors

by the state court and seeks as [a] remedy relief from the state

court judgment.

Id. at 1140 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 

The Attorney Defendants argue that because Copple alleges that Judge Haden deviated

from the appropriate legal standard in awarding fees, and because Copple seeks to obtain for the

putative class a pro rata share of that allegedly excessive fee award, Copple’s claim is nothing

more than a de facto appeal of the fee award in the Natural Gas proceedings. If the Attorney

Defendants’ position is correct, the Court would not have jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. 

Copple counters that the Attorney Defendants, through the alleged conspiracy, committed an

“extrinsic fraud” and contends that he seeks redress from that legal wrong.3 If Copple’s position

is correct, then under the reasoning articulated in Kougasian, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

would not bar his claim. Although the Court believes that the allegations in the FAC are no

more than an artful attempt to plead around the Rooker-Feldman bar, assuming the Court has

jurisdiction, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.4

Copple asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), which provides a

means of redress to individuals who have been deprived of federal constitutional or federal

statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins,

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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this case, the Attorney Defendants are private parties, and, generally,

private parties do not act under color of state law. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th

Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court however, has noted that if engaged jointly with state officials

with respect to a challenged action, private persons are acting under color of law for Section

1983 purposes. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28; see also Price, 939 F.2d at 708 (noting that

“a person may become a state actor by conspiring with a state official” but that “‘merely

resorting to the courts ... does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge’”)

(quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28).

Here, Copple alleges that Judge Haden and the Attorney Defendants conspired and

agreed to treat the objection filed by Thayer as a nullity so that Judge Haden could award them

the full $60 million requested. Copple also attempts to show the existence of a conspiracy by

relying on the fact that the Attorney Defendants moved to declare him a vexatious litigant, and

that Judge Haden granted the motion. Copple heavily relies on Kimes,, supra, to support his

position. With one critical distinction, the Kimes case does involve facts similar to the

allegations made in this case. 

In Kimes, the plaintiff alleged that a group of attorney defendants conspired with a state

court judge by entering into a private extra-judicial agreement to transfer a case from one judge

to the judge that allegedly was part of the conspiracy. That transfer allegedly resulted in a ruling

that was fraudulent, without jurisdiction, and which allegedly deprived the plaintiff of a property

interest in an estate. Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1124-1125. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court

dismissal of the attorney defendants in that case. What distinguishes Kimes from this case is

that, there, the plaintiff attached to the complaint a letter between the attorney defendants which

circulated a ruling that purportedly was to have been drafted by the transferee judge and which

was substantially similar to the ruling ultimately issued by the judge. Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1125. 

Here, the FAC is devoid of any facts supporting the existence of an agreement between

Judge Haden and the Attorney Defendants to engage in this conduct, nor do the facts plead

reasonably support the inference of an agreement. When pressed at oral argument as to what

facts existed that supported the inference of a conspiracy, the only additional fact Copple

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brought to the attention of the Court was his belief that an ex parte chambers meeting must have

occurred. (6/9/06 Tr. at 41:2-45:25.) The basis for Copple’s belief was supported by nothing

more than his counsel’s “experience” that such meetings may occur during the course of

litigation, rather than any facts that would even support an inference such a meeting had taken

place during the Natural Gas proceedings. 

A further flaw in Copple’s argument is that, without evidence of an agreement, the fact

that the Attorney Defendants filed and Judge Haden granted the vexatious litigant motion, is

insufficient to establish one that the Attorney Defendants acted under color of state law. 

“[I]nvoking state legal procedures does not constitute ‘joint participation’ or ‘conspiracy’ with

state officials sufficient to satisfy section 1983’ s state action requirement.” Schucker v.

Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988). In the Schucker case, the plaintiff, like

Copple, asserted a claim under Section 1983 and alleged that a judge and a group of attorneys

conspired together to violate his rights. The core of the plaintiff’s allegations were that “in

accepting the law firms’ jurisdictional argument, in ordering him to make payments to his exwife in accordance with the state divorce decree, in allowing the law firms to serve an order to

show cause regarding contempt arising from his failure to make the payments, and in ordering

Shucker jailed for refusing to make payments, [the judge] became part of a conspiracy to

deprive him of his liberty and property.” Id. at 1204. 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action with prejudice because it agreed

with the district court’s conclusion that “Schucker’s conclusory allegations that [the judge]

conspired with the law firms are insufficient to support his section 1983 claims.” See also Fries

v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding dismissal of plaintiff’s section 1983

claim where plaintiff had included “only accusations and conclusory allegations that the

defendants conspired with [the judge] and influenced his decisions”). In this case, Copple’s

allegations of a conspiracy are, as in the Shucker case, nothing more than conclusory allegations.

Accordingly, the Court concludes he has failed to state a claim because he has not -- and

cannot -- sufficiently allege the Attorney Defendants acted under the color of law.

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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court finds that the allegations of the conspiracy that is the basis of

Copple’s argument of extrinsic fraud are entirely unsupported and are nothing more than an

artful attempt to plead around the Rooker-Feldman bar. However, even assuming this case is

not merely a de facto appeal of the Natural Gas fee award, over which the Court would not have

jurisdiction, because the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to show the Attorney Defendants

are state actors for purposes of Section 1983, and because Copple has not demonstrated that

amendment would be anything but futile, the FAC is HEREBY DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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