Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01327/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01327-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 09:0010 Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

In the Matter of the Arbitration

Between UNITED AUTO WORKERS, 

LOCAL 2350, 

CIV. NO. S-05-1327 WBS EFB

Petitioner,

v. FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW, AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES’

ASSOCIATION, SEIU LOCAL 1000,

AFL-CIO,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter, set for hearing on September 19, 2006,

was submitted to the Court for decision on the briefs without

oral argument. This court, having read and considered the

documentary evidence and the written submissions of the parties,

now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The grievant Mark DeBoer (“Grievant”) was employed

by respondent California State Employees’ Association (“CSEA”)

in the Legal Services Department for approximately twenty years

without being subject to formal discipline.

2. Grievant’s employment was governed by the

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Collective Bargaining Agreement (“Agreement”) between petitioner

United Auto Workers Local 2350 (“UAW”) and CSEA, from March 1,

2002, through October 31, 2006.

3. The arbitration provision in the Agreement governs

all grievances by CSEA employees pertaining to the

interpretation, application and/or violation of the Agreement.

4. Based on eight complaints entered against Grievant

over an eight month period, respondent terminated Grievant’s

employment on February 13, 2004.

5. Shortly thereafter, Grievant applied for

retirement, and began to receive benefits dating back to the

first business day following his termination.

6. Grievant’s retirement was governed by the CSEA

retirement plan (“Plan”), which is incorporated into the

Agreement by reference in Article 15, Section 1.

7. Grievant properly filed a grievance with

petitioner alleging wrongful termination, and based on Articles

10 and 11 of the Agreement, an arbitration hearing regarding

this grievance was held on November 16 and 17, 2004, by

Catherine Harris, Esq. (“Arbitrator”).

8. The parties submitted two issues to the

Arbitrator: 1) whether there was just cause for Grievant’s

termination and 2) if not, what should be the appropriate

remedy.

9. Both parties additionally stipulated at the

hearing that the Arbitrator was empowered to determine the

effect of Grievant’s subsequent retirement on the disposition of

the grievance.

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10. The Arbitrator found that none of the charges

respondent brought against Grievant constituted grounds for

termination.

11. The Arbitrator found that, by virtue of his

decision to retire, Grievant removed himself from the UAW

bargaining unit.

12. The Arbitrator found that it was beyond her

authority to order the reinstatement of a non-bargaining unit

retiree to a bargaining unit position.

13. The Arbitrator found that rescission of

Grievant’s retirement was therefore a condition precedent to his

reinstatement.

14. The Arbitrator found that rescission of

Grievant’s retirement was beyond her authority because 1)

Grievant’s retirement is administered by the Plan administrator,

who was not a party to the proceeding, and 2) neither party to

the proceeding conferred on the Arbitrator the power to make

that determination.

15. The Arbitrator therefore found that reinstatement

was not an appropriate remedy.

16. The Arbitrator additionally found that, because

Grievant had been receiving retirement allowance effective the

day immediately following his last day of compensation, an award

of back pay was inappropriate. 

17. The Arbitrator thus granted the grievance,

finding no just cause for termination, and ordered that the CSEA

remove all evidence of disciplinary action from Grievant’s

personnel file.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Petitioners brought this action to vacate the

Arbitrator’s award in part, and to modify or correct it to order

CSEA to reinstate Grievant and compensate him for lost earnings

due to wrongful termination. This court has jurisdiction of the

matter under 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (Federal Arbitration Act).

2. Section 10 provides, in relevant part, that a

district court may vacate an arbitrator’s award “where the

arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed

them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject

matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4).

3. Section 11 provides, in relevant part, that a

district court may modify or correct an arbitrator’s award so as

to effect the intent of the parties and promote justice “where

the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to

them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the

decision upon the matter submitted.” 9 U.S.C. 11(b).

4. Petitioner contends that the award should be

vacated and modified because 1) it exceeded the Arbitrator’s

authority, 2) it was contrary to public policy, and 3) it was

not mutual, final, and definite.. 

5. A district court’s review of an arbitral award is

limited and extremely deferential. See, e.g., Local Joint

Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. Riverboat Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d

524, 526 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v.

Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-8 (1960); United Steelworkers v.

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-85 (1960);

United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,

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596 (1960)); Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 359 v.

Arizona Mechanical and Stainless Inc., 863 F.2d 647, 653 (9th

Cir. 1988)).

7. Unless the arbitral decision “fails to draw its

essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” the district

court is bound to enforce the award and is not entitled to

review the merits of the contract dispute. New Meiji Mkt. v.

United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 905, 789 F.2d

1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363

U.S. at 597).

8. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4), a court may

overturn an arbitral award when arbitrators’ actions exceed

their authority, Riverboat Casino, 817 F.2d at 527 (citing Sheet

Metal Workers Int’l Assoc., Local 420 v. Kinney Air

Conditioning, 756 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1985)), and “clearly

go[] beyond the substantive issues submitted by the parties.”

Sheet Metal Workers, 756 F.2d at 745.

9. The issues submitted to the Arbitrator were

Grievant’s allegedly wrongful termination, what remedy, if any,

might be appropriate, and how Grievant’s retirement affected the

resolution of those issues. The Arbitrator’s determination that

Grievant’s retirement rendered reinstatement beyond her

authority was thus well within the bounds of the substantive

issues before her, and she did not exceed her authority in so

holding. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No.

359 v. Madison Indus. Inc., of Ariz., 84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th

Cir. 1996) (noting that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the

scope of issues submitted to him is entitled to the same broad

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deference afforded to his interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement); Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins.

Co., 44 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an

arbitrator need not limit his decision to the precise measure of

relief requested in the original grievance but instead is tasked

with “defin[ing] the relief that will compensate the grievant if

his claim is upheld”) (citing Hotel and Rest. Employees &

Bartenders Int’l Union v. Michelson’s Food Serv., Inc., 545 F.2d

1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1976)). 

10. A court may also overturn an award if the

arbitrator reached a decision that “actually violates the law or

any explicit, well defined and dominant public policy.” Am.

Postal Workers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

11. A party seeking to vacate an arbitrator’s award on

these grounds must demonstrate that the arbitrator’s award

exhibited a “manifest disregard of law,” such that the

arbitrator was aware of a governing legal principle but refused

to apply it. Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, L.P., 336 F.3d

1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v.

Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added).

12. Petitioner has failed to cite any specific law or

legal tenet violated by the Arbitrator’s award, and this court

is unaware of any such principle. Petitioner’s trial brief

contains only broad references to general notions of justice as

a basis for vacatur, which is a misstatement of the law. United

Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 43

(1987) (noting that a district court may only consider vacating

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an award that violated public policy “ascertained by reference

to laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations

of supposed public interests”).

13. Even if the Arbitrator had made miscalculations

in her evaluation of the legal issues, this would not be

sufficient to overturn the award. Am. Postal Workers, 682 F.2d

at 1285 (“An arbitrator’s award will not be vacated because of

erroneous findings of fact or misinterpretations of law.”).

14. The Arbitrator, in issuing her order and award,

engaged in a reasoned legal analysis of the issues submitted to

her by both parties, based on her legitimate understanding of

the principles of contractual interpretation. The award did not

constitute a manifest disregard of law or public policy, so as

to warrant vacatur or modification. Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt.

Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir.

1991) (noting that “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably

construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope

of his authority,” a court must uphold the award) (quoting

United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38

(1987)).

15. Petitioner finally contends that the Arbitrator

failed to execute a “mutual, final and definite award” as

mandated by statute. 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4).

16. “An award is mutual, definite and final if it

‘resolve[s] all issues submitted to arbitration, and

determine[s] each issue fully so that no further litigation is

necessary to finalize the obligations of the parties.’” 

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ConnTech Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ., 102 F.3d 677, 686 (2d

Cir. 1996). 

17. Petitioner’s sole basis for this argument is the

assertion that the Administrator “fail[ed] to decide a critical

question” of “proper recompense to the Grievant. . . .” 

Petitioner’s Trial Brief at 7. 

18. The Arbitrator’s decision addressed all eight

charges and determined that they did not constitute cause for

termination. (Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award at 35.) The

decision then addressed the appropriate remedy for Grievant, and

thoroughly detailed why the particular award was granted, instead

of the specific remedy sought by Petitioner. (Id. at 35-37.) 

The subsequent obligations of the parties are clear--Respondent

is to expunge all evidence of the termination from Grievant’s

personnel record. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the

Arbitrator’s award was “mutual, final and definite,” as mandated

by 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4). ConnTech Development Co., 102 F.3d at 686.

19. Because of the highly deferential standard of

review of arbitral orders, this court need not decide whether it

agrees or disagrees with the conclusion reached by the

Arbitrator. Riverboat Casino, 817 F.2d at 527; Local Joint

Executive Bd., 817 F.2d at 526 (citing Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at

568) (“It is not the court’s role to determine whether the

arbitrator has reached the same result the court would have

reached.”). 

20. The Arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the

Agreement, and there are no grounds on which it should be vacated

or modified. New Meiji Mkt., 789 F.2d at 1335.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the April 7, 2005,

arbitration award be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

DATED: October 12, 2006

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