Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01598/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01598-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ZARAGOZA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv1598-DMS (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

MIKE MARTEL, et al.,

Defendant.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Dana M.

Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. 

INTRODUCTION

On July 22, 2009, Paul Zaragoza (“Petitioner”), a California state prisoner, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) by a Person in Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc.No.

1.] Respondent Mike Martel (“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) arguing: (1)

the Petition contains unexhausted claims, it is unexhausted because no federal claim was presented

to the California Supreme Court. [Doc. No. 8.]

Respondent has lodged portions of the state court record [Doc. No. 8-2.] Petitioner has not

filed an Opposition, or in the alternative, a Motion for Stay and Abeyance. 

For the following reasons, the Court finds all claims except one presented in the Petition

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are unexhausted. The Court therefore recommends Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of the Petition as a mixed petition pursuant to Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 

STATE PROCEEDINGS

On January 19, 2006, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of first degree robbery (Cal.

Pen. Code §§ 211, 212.5(a)), carjacking (Cal.Pen. Code § 215(a)), residential burglary (Cal

Pen.Code §§ 459, 460), assault with a semi-automatic firearm (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 12021(a)(1)),

and possession of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Pen. Code § 12021(a)(1)). On March 17, 2006,

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the state appellate court (D048251). The state appellate court

denied Petitioner’s appeal on April 16, 2008. On May 21, 2008, Petitioner continued his round of

direct review by filing with the California Supreme Court (S163785). The disposition date of that

appeal was June 25, 2008. 

DISCUSSION

Exhaustion Requirement

The court must first address whether Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is exhausted. See

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,510 (1982). The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is

generally a prerequisite to a federal court’s consideration of claims presented in habeas corpus

proceedings, and a petition containing unexhausted claims may be subject to dismissal. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833

(9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when a petitioner provides the state courts

with a “fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his [or her]

constitutional claim.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). The state courts are thus assured

of the “initial ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal

rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.

249, 250 (1971)). The burden is on Petitioner to show his or her federal habeas petition satisfies

the exhaustion requirement. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519. 

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised the following four claims before the California Court of

Appeal: 1) insufficient evidence supported his burglary conviction because he did not enter the

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victim’s trailer to obtain his car keys; 2) insufficient evidence supported his carjacking conviction

because he did not take the vehicle from the person or immediate presence of the victim; 3)

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to explain the significance of a witness’ testimony in

closing argument; and (4) imposition of an upper term sentence for carjacking without a jury trial

violated his constitutional rights. [Lodgement 3.] On April 16, 2008, Petitioner’s direct appeal was

denied. Thereafter, on May 21, 2008, Petitioner appealed one claim on direct review to the

California Supreme Court: Petitioner’s upper term sentence for carjacking violated his

constitutional rights. [Lodgement 7.] Petitioner’s habeas petition contains the following four

claims: 1) insufficient evidence existed to support his burglary conviction; 2) ineffective assistance

of counsel; 3) insufficient evidence existed to support his carjacking conviction; and 4) imposition

of the upper term for carjacking violated his constitutional rights. [Doc. No.1 at 13-25.] 

Accordingly, it is recommended the Court find the record demonstrates Petitioner’s habeas

petition is mixed. 

Stay and Abeyance As An Alternative

Respondent contends Petitioner’s petition should be dismissed because he has not fully

exhausted all claims within his petition. Alternatively, Respondent argues Petitioner must elect to

abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his exhausted claims. [MTD at 6.] In the instant

case, Petitioner has not responded to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. Moreover, as noted above,

the Court has preliminarily determined the petition contains unexhausted claims. Therefore, in

order to avoid the Court dismissing the petition, Petitioner may choose one of the following

options:

i) Demonstrate Exhaustion

Petitioner may file further papers with this Court to demonstrate that he has in fact

exhausted the claims the Court has determined are likely unexhausted. 

ii) Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state

court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition containing

only exhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner

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1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

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who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return[] to state court to exhaust his

claims”). 

Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration of

the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his

conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show statutory or equitable

“tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).1 The statute

of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and

acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with

the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.

2005) (holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately dismissed as

untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under consideration by the state

court, and therefore does not toll that statute of limitations), as amended 436 F.3d 993. However,

absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a federal

habeas petition is pending. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82.

iii) Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claim(s)

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claim(s) and proceed with his exhausted

one(s). See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating a petitioner who files a mixed petition may

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2

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under

§ 2254 shall be dismissed unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise

of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

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“resubmit [] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”). 

Petitioner is cautioned, once he abandons his unexhausted claim(s), he may lose the ability

to ever raise them in federal court. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 488 (2000) (stating a

court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first § 2254 petition renders any later petition

successive); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).2

iv) File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings

Petitioner may file a motion to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state court to

exhaust his unexhausted claim(s). There are two methods available to Petitioner, the “stay and

abeyance” procedure and the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure.

If Petitioner wishes to use the “stay and abeyance” procedure he should ask the Court to

stay his mixed petition while he returns to state court to exhaust. Under this procedure he must

demonstrate there are arguably meritorious claim(s) which he wishes to return to state court to

exhaust, that he is diligently pursuing his state court remedies with respect to those claim(s), and

that good cause exists for his failure to timely exhaust his state court remedies. Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). 

If Petitioner wishes to use the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure, he must voluntarily

withdraw his unexhausted claims, ask the Court to stay the proceedings and hold the fully

exhausted petition in abeyance while he returns to state court to exhaust, and then seek permission

to amend his petition to include the newly exhausted claims after exhaustion is complete. King v.

Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. May 5, 2009). Although under this procedure Petitioner is not

required to demonstrate good cause for his failure to timely exhaust, the newly exhausted claim(s)

must be either timely under the statute of limitations or “relate back” to the claim(s) in the fullyexhausted petition, that is, they must share a “common core of operative facts” with the previously

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exhausted claims(s). King, 564 F.3d at 1143, quoting Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED; 

2. The petition be DISMISSED for failure to exhaust all claims presented; and 

 3. Petitioner be granted thirty days in which to exercise one of his options presented

herein.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 26, 2010, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy to all parties. The document should be captioned,

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than August 9, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 5, 2010

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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