Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01164/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

Luis Alberto Cab-Suarez, 

Defendant-Movant. 

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CR 07-0270-PHX-EHC

CV 07-1164-PHX-EHC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Luis Alberto Cab-Suarez (“Movant”), has filed a pro se Amended Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. #17. On March 1, 2007,

Movant pleaded guilty to Count One of the Information, Illegal Reentry After Deportation

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), enhanced by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). Doc. #12. On May

21, 2007, Movant was sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for 27 months

followed by supervised release for 36 months. Id. After Movant filed his amended motion

to vacate on August 13, 2007, the District Court Judge screened the motion in an order filed

on August 30, 2007, and ordered the motion to be served upon Respondent. Doc. #18. 

Movant identifies four grounds for relief in his motion, though the first three are

variations of the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Movant alleges that his lawyer

failed to do anything about his sentence. Movant claims that his lawyer told him the sentence

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under the plea agreement would be four to six months but it turned out to be 27 months.

Movant further claims that his lawyer failed to give him a business card with his phone

number, failed to provide him with a copy of the plea agreement and did not know how to

answer his questions. In ground four, Movant contends that his sentence exceeded the

statutory maximum by three months. On October 25, 2007, Respondent filed a Response in

Opposition to Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Doc. #24. Despite being informed in the screening order of the opportunity to file a reply,

Movant has not filed one.

DISCUSSION

Respondent argues in its response that Movant's claims are foreclosed by a waiver of

collateral review in the plea agreement. Movant has not challenged the validity of the

waiver. Alternatively, Respondent contends that Movant’s claims fail on the merits. 

A. Waiver

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 198 (2005). A waiver of

appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to appeal

on the grounds raised and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. In addition to

a waiver of direct appeal rights, a defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255

action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub

nom. Abarca-Espinoza v. United States, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). A waiver of the right to bring

a § 2255 action likely would not include a claim that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea involuntary. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433

(expressing “doubt” that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously

induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular part of the plea bargain).

Here, Movant's express waiver in his plea agreement stated in relevant part:

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Defendant further waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court's

entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any right to appeal the

imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United

States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right

to collaterally attack defendant's conviction and sentence under

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other

collateral attack. Defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall

result in the dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack the

defendant might file challenging his conviction or sentence in

this case.

Doc. #13 at 4. Movant signed the plea agreement indicating that he understood and agreed

to all of its terms and conditions. Doc. #13 at 5-7. In addition, based on Movant's responses

to questions during the guilty plea proceeding, Magistrate Judge Irwin issued Findings and

Recommendations in which he found that Movant understood he was waiving the right to an

appeal or a collateral attack. Doc. #8 at 2. Judge Irwin further found that the guilty plea was

knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. Additionally, during the sentencing hearing, the

District Court found that Movant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and

waived his right to appeal. Doc. #24, Exh. C at 15-17.

Movant does not address the waiver of appeal rights in his motion. Moreover, he did

not file a reply to address Respondent's assertion of the waiver defense. The evidence in the

record supports a finding that Movant understood the waiver and entered the plea knowing

that he would not be permitted to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence.

The court will therefore recommend that the waiver be enforced and that Movant’s claims

be denied. In an abundance of caution, however, the court will also address the merits of

Movant’s ineffective assistance claims because, arguably, they challenge the voluntariness

of the plea, an issue that cannot be waived by a provision in the plea agreement. See Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth by

the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. The Strickland test also applies to challenges to guilty pleas

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A

defendant who pleads guilty based on the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel

fell below the level of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 56. To

satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, "the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.

Movant contends that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to do

anything when the sentence exceeded what had agreed to. Movant claims that he believed

he was entering an agreement that called for four to six months, and instead he received 27

months. At the sentencing hearing, the District Court asked the prosecutor why one

provision in the plea agreement provides for an offense level of 24 and another provides for

an offense level of 12. Doc. #24, Exh. C at 8-9. The Court questioned the wisdom of

including a provision that suggested Movant could receive as little as four months when the

Government knew he would not get such a sentence. Doc. #24, Exh. C at 10. Movant’s

lawyer agreed with the Court and explained that, based on the plea agreement, he told

Movant he would receive a sentence of six months. Doc. #24, Exh. C at 11. The lawyer

acknowledged that because Movant’s prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence, the

range increased to 27 to 33 months. Id.

Notwithstanding the discussion about whether a provision in the plea agreement

suggested a lower sentence than what Movant was likely to receive, the Court accepted the

plea and proceeded with sentencing. The Court found that the guilty plea was knowingly and

voluntarily entered and it accepted the plea agreement. Doc. #24, Exh. C at 16.

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Movant has not demonstrated that his lawyer’s performance with respect to the plea

agreement was deficient. The lawyer provided Movant with his best estimate of the sentence

Plaintiff would receive. The lawyer apparently believed that the probation officer would not

find that Movant’s prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence such that the offense

level would be increased. Although the lawyer was mistaken, Movant has not demonstrated

that his lawyer’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Even if

the court concluded that the lawyer’s estimate constituted deficient performance, Movant

fails to claim that he would not have accepted the plea agreement and proceeded to trial

absent his lawyer’s alleged error. For these reasons, the court finds that Movant has failed

to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard.

With regard to the other allegations of ineffective assistance, Movant has not satisfied

the Strickland standard. Movant claims that his lawyer failed to give him a business card

with his phone number, failed to provide him with a copy of the plea agreement and could

not answer his questions. Movant fails to demonstrate, or even allege, that absent these

errors he would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Movant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in grounds one through three are waived by the express waiver of a § 2255

motion in the plea agreement. Additionally, the court finds that the claims are without merit.

With respect to ground four, the court finds that the express waiver bars the claim contained

therein. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the motion to vacate be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in

Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #17) be DENIED;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 3rd day of July, 2008.

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