Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00363/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00363-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 23:134 P.I.- Auto Negligence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD KOPAL and LISA KOPAL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARTEN TRANSPORT, LTD., et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 05-363 DFL KJM

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

Defendants Marten Transport and Leslie D. Bigby

(“defendants”) move to dismiss plaintiff intervenor Stevens

Transportation, Inc. (“Stevens”), arguing that Stevens’ claims

are barred by the statute of limitations. The parties only

lightly briefed the issues. For the reasons stated below, the

court: (1) denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Stevens’ first

cause of action in intervention; and (2) grants defendants’

motion to dismiss Stevens’ direct claim for negligence.

I.

In the underlying case, plaintiffs Ronald (“Kopal”) and Lisa

Kopal brought this action for an accident that occurred on March

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8, 2003. (Third Am. Compl. in Intervention (“TACI”) ¶¶ I-II.) 

At the time of the accident, Stevens employed Kopal. (Id. ¶ II.) 

Stevens paid Kopal’s medical expenses and disability benefits

resulting from the accident under its Employee Retirement

Insurance Security Act (“ERISA”) plan. (Id. at ¶¶ IV-V.) 

On July 11, 2005, the court granted Stevens’ motion to

intervene in the action. (7/11/2005 Order.) Accordingly,

Stevens filed a complaint-in-intervention on March 22, 2006, and

an amended complaint (“FACI”) on March 28, 2006, seeking to

recover the money it paid to Kopal and his health-care providers. 

(FACI ¶ VIII.) On April 7, 2006, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss Stevens’ amended complaint, arguing that Stevens could

not seek monetary damages under ERISA. (Mot. to Dismiss Am.

Compl. at 5 (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.

Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 122 S.Ct. 708 (2002)).) However, because

Stevens’ complaint was unclear as to whether it sought monetary

damages under a legal theory other than ERISA, the court

permitted Stevens to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TACI”) and

a Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities by May 31, 2006

(P&As), to clarify the basis of suit and the court’s

jurisdiction. The court then gave defendants a renewed

opportunity to make a motion to dismiss.

Stevens contends that its amended complaint makes two claims

under state law: an indirect claim, based on the Kopal’s tort

claim, for “intervention seeking recovery of monetary benefits

paid to date,” and a second, direct tort claim for “recovery of

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monetary damages incurred as a proximate result of the negligence

of defendants.” (P&As at 2.) Stevens clarifies that neither of

its claims implicates, or is based upon, ERISA. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Rather, on Steven’s view, the court’s jurisdiction is based

solely upon the diversity of the parties. (Id.) Finally,

Stevens asserts that its claims are not preempted by ERISA,

because they do not “have a requisite ‘connection with’ or

‘reference to’ an ERISA plan.” (P&As at 6 (citing Providence v.

McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004)).) (Id.) 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss which does not take

issue with Stevens’ contentions concerning jurisdiction or ERISA

preemption. Rather, defendants assert that Stevens’ claims are

untimely under the applicable state statute of limitations. 

(Mot. to Dismiss Third Am. Compl. at 2.) 

II.

A. Stevens’ First Cause of Action

Both parties agree that the statute of limitations for the

Kopals’ negligence action is two years and that the same statute

of limitations applies to Stevens’ complaint-in-intervention. 

(Mot. at 4, Opp’n at 3.) According to defendants, however, it is

not enough that the Kopals’ complaint was timely; rather,

defendants contend, Stevens’ claim in intervention must also have

been filed within two years of the accident.

California law is more flexible and sensible than defendants

give it credit for. California law recognizes that when a claim

in intervention is brought that is the same as the underlying

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claim, it suffices to satisfy the purposes of the statute of

limitations that the underlying claim be timely filed because

defendant has been put on notice of the nature and extent of its

liability. However, when the derivative claim is materially

different than the underlying claim, then it does not suffice

that the underlying claim has been timely filed. See Basin

Constr. Corp., 199 Cal.App.3d at 824-25 (Where intervening

plaintiff seeks damages different from those sought by original

plaintiff, the complaint in intervention does not relate back.).

Here, Stevens only seeks to recover the amount of benefits

it paid as a result of defendants’ alleged negligence. Kopal

also makes a claim for these same damages. Unlike the subrogee

in Basin Construction Corp., supra, Stevens seeks no additional

damages. Because Stevens’ claim is not a separate cause of

action from the Kopals, but rather is based on the same set of

facts, the same legal theory, and involves a lesser subset of the

exact same damages, the first claim in intervention is timely

given that the Kopals’ complaint was timely. See Quiroz v.

Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1278 (2006) (complaintin-intervention filed after the limitations period is timely

where it makes the same claim as the underlying claim); Andersen

v. Barton Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 166 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-85 (1985)

(in workers’ compensation action employer’s action in

intervention is interchangeable with the employee’s action;

statute of limitations satisfied if either employer or employee

timely files); Harrison v. Englebrick, 254 Cal.App.2d 871, 874

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(1967) (same). 

B. Stevens’ Direct Claim for Negligence

At oral argument, Stevens contended that Cal. Labor Code 

§ 3853 allows Stevens to bring its own, direct claim for

negligence at any time prior to trial, regardless of the two-year

statute of limitations. However, even if § 3853 applied to the

first claim – which is itself uncertain given that the claim is

not based on the workers’ compensation scheme – it does not apply

to direct actions. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Selma Trailer & Mfg.

Co., 210 Cal.App.3d 740, 751 (1989) (noting that § 3853 allows

the intervenor to avoid the statute of limitations for personal

injury actions that would otherwise apply if they filed

independent lawsuits). 

Because a two-year statute of limitations applies to a

negligence claim in California, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1,

Stevens’ direct claim for negligence is time-barred. 

III.

For these reasons, the court: (1) denies defendants’ motion

to dismiss Stevens’ first claim in intervention; and (2) grants

defendants’ motion to dismiss Stevens’ direct claim for

negligence.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2006

 /s/ David F. Levi 

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge 

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