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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FIL .... J 

United States Court of Appeal! Te"th Circuit 

PUBLISH MAR 3 0 1993 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ELMER LEO LaBARON, CAROL A. CHRISTENSEN,) 

SAUNDRA GARDNER BROWN, ELNORA ) 

CHRISTENSEN CHANDLER, BRUCE C. ) 

HENDRICKS, DIXIE CHRISTENSEN MALONE, ) 

CHRISTENIA HULLINGER, EARLS. DENVER, ) 

KENT DENVER, GERALDINE BUCKALEW, ) 

ROBERTA L. DENVER, and SUSAN DENVER ) 

GILBERT, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and LOUIS w. 

SULLIVAN, Secretary of the United 

States Department of Health and Human 

Services, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 92-4019 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 91-C-609 J) 

Kent A. Higgins, Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Andrew C. Mergen, Department of Justice (Roger Clegg, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General and Edward J. Shawaker, Department of 

Justice, with him on the brief), Washington, D.C., for DefendantsAppellees. 

Before KELLY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District Judge.t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

t The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge 

for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4019 Document: 010110199086 Date Filed: 03/30/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs-appellants had received health services from an 

Indian Health Service (IHS) clinic since 1987. In early 1991, 

IHS announced and published its determination that the services 

had been provided to the Plaintiffs in error and its plan to 

terminate such services. According to IHS, Plaintiffs were 

"mixed-blood" Utes, not entitled to receive such services due to 

the Ute Termination Act of 1954. 1 

Plaintiffs claim that the IHS acted improperly by not 

granting a pretermination hearing. In addition, Plaintiffs claim 

that the Ute Termination Act violates their equal protection 

rights. The district court granted the government's motion to 

dismiss, agreeing that the Ute Termination Act applies to these 

Plaintiffs. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we 

reverse. 

I. Jurisdiction 

Defendant claims that the improperly captioned notice of 

appeal confers appellate jurisdiction only over Elmer Leo LaBaron . 

The notice of appeal named "Elmer Leo LaBaron et al." as the 

appellant, failing to complete the caption with the other 

1 Codified at 25 U. S.C. §§ 677-677aa, the Ute Termination Act 

directed the tribe to prepare a proposed roll of full- and halfblood members to be approved by the Secretary and finally 

published in the Federal Register. After the mixed-blood list was 

developed and the federal restrictions on the property o f the 

mixed-blood Utes were released, the Act provided that "such 

individual shall not be entitled to any of the services performed 

for Indians because of his status as an Indian." 25 U.S.C. §677v. 

Sec tion 667g made clear that "such rolls shall be final for the 

purposes of this subchapter, but said section shall not be 

construed .. . as preventing future membership in the tribe, 

after August 27 , 1954, in the manner provided in the constitution 

and bylaws of the tribe." 

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Plaintiffs listed on the initial complaint. In Torres v. Oakland 

Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988), the Court held that 

parties must be specifically named as appellant in the notice of 

appeal to confer jurisdiction as to those particular individuals. 

However, this court has recognized that an appellant may cure an 

improper caption before the deadline for filing the notice of 

appeal has passed. Hubbert v. City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769, 771-72 

(10th Cir. 1991). 

Because this appeal involves an agency of the United States, 

the rules would allow the notice of appeal to be filed within 

sixty days after the date of entry of the judgement or order 

appealed from. Fed. R. App. P. 4. Defendant claims that the 

corrective docketing statement, filed on February 18 "was 

therefore not received before 60-days had elapsed from the 

district court's December 18th judgment." However, sixty days 

from the date of the judgment would end on February 16, a Sunday. 

The next day, February 17, was a holiday. The docketing statement 

was filed the following day and thus is timely to cure any defect 

in the notice of appeal. 

II. Procedural Due Process 

A. The nature of Plaintiff's interest 

Plaintiffs claim that the termination of benefits without an 

opportunity to be heard violated their procedural due process 

rights. Relying on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the 

Plaintiffs argue that, as recipients of government assistance, 

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they had a right to a hearing before those benefits were 

terminated. If Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to present 

evidence, they content that they would establish their eligi bility 

to receive health benefits. 

Goldberg involved the termination of public assistance 

payments without any opportunity for the recipient to present 

evidence or make a record. The Court posite d that whether a pretermination hearing was constitutionally required "depends upon 

whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs 

the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Goldberg, 397 

U. S. at 262-63. In the case of welfare, the Court determined, 

"termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over 

eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by 

which to live while he waits. " Id. at 264. After considering the 

government's claimed interests, the Court concluded that "the 

interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of 

public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his 

payments not be erro neously terminated, clearly outweighs the 

State's c ompeting concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal 

and administrative burdens . " Id. at 26 6. 

IHS c ontends that no interest in a continuation of these 

benefits arose because the services were mistakenly extended to 

Pla intiffs. According to the IHS, the Ute Termination Act clearly 

eliminates any claim of eligibility the Plaintiff's may have had 

to the services. We find Board of Regents v. Ro th, 408 U.S. 5 64 

(1972 ) instructive. There, the Court determined that there may be 

a protected interest in "those claims upon which people rely in 

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their daily lives." Id. at 577. Moreover, property interests 

"are created and their dimensions are defined by .. 

understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 

claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id. Plaintiffs claim 

that they had been receiving certain medical benefits and 

developed an expectation that such health care would continue to 

be available . Once assistance has been extended, a court 

considering the nature of the recipient's r i ghts may consider that 

individual's interest in "uninterrupted assistance." Fox v. 

Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1974). 

Clearly, health benefits have similar characteristics of 

urgency and necessity as welfare payments. If monetary sustenance 

is critical to the recipient, Goldberg. 397 U. S . at 264, services 

necessary to maintain physical health represent another critical 

benefit. See id . at 264 (medical care recognized as one purpose 

of welfare payments). The nature of health care benefits, coupled 

with the fact that the Plaintiffs had already received such 

benefits, leads us to conclude that some pre-termination hearing 

was necessary. 

B. Procedural process due to Plaintiffs 

The Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to both notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

348-49 (1976) . This court is satisfied that timely and sufficient 

notice was provided to the Plaintiffs. Notice was published in 

the Federal Register, posted in the clinic .patronized by 

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Appellate Case: 92-4019 Document: 010110199086 Date Filed: 03/30/1993 Page: 5 
Plaintiffs, and mailed to all patients whom IHS believed might be 

affected. 

The missing component in this case was the opportunity for 

the Plaintiffs to be heard. A recipient in danger of losing 

benefits is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to state his 

position. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269. Plaintiffs contend that, 

given a chance, they will be able to show tribal membership. An 

informal setting will suffice, id., so long as both Plaintiff's 

eligibility and the government's interest in termination are 

properly considered . The hearing should "be tailored to the 

capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard," id. at 

268-29, but should include a opportunity for a recipient to state 

his position orally in a setting that ensures fairness. Mathews, 

424 U.S. at 348. An impartial decision maker should "state the 

reasons for his determination." Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271. 

IHS contends that the benefits were provided in error and 

that a hearing is unnecessary because the Plaintiffs clearly would 

not be entitled to continued medical care. This argument begs the 

question, however, because Plaintiffs counter that they could 

prove eligibility if given the chance. The IHS assumes the 

outcome of the hearing to support its conclusion that the hearing 

is not necessary. We hold, however, that a hearing is required 

because of the nature of the Plaintiffs' right, even if the final 

result is a termination of benefits. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4019 Document: 010110199086 Date Filed: 03/30/1993 Page: 6 
III. The Ute Termination Act 

Plaintiffs also. raise several equal protection challenges to 

the Ute Termination Act. Because we have decided that the 

Plaintiffs are entitled to a hearing and may be able to establish 

eligibility for health benefits, this argument is premature. 

REVERSED . 

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