Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07255/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07255-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED 

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For the Northern District of California

NITED 

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONNIE GENE BUSH

Petitioner,

v.

EDDIE YLST, Acting Warden, San Quentin

State Prison

Respondent.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-07255 MHP

MOTION TO DISMISS; REQUEST

FOR IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

Petitioner Ronnie Gene Bush (“Bush”), a California prisoner now incarcerated at San

Quentin State Prison, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section

2254. His petition is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2243 and Rule 4

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Jurisdiction to address a petition for writ of habeas corpus exists in the district of

incarceration and in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Although venue may be proper

in either district, when a prisoner challenges the execution of his sentence rather than the underlying

conviction or sentence itself the petition is preferably heard in the district where the prisoner is

confined. Campbell v. Mendoza-Powers, No. C06-5544 SI, 2006 WL 3050856 at *1 (N.D. Cal.

October 20, 2006) (Illston, J.). Venue lies in this district because petitioner is confined in this

district, in Marin County. 

BACKGROUND1

In 1984 petitioner Ronnie Gene Bush was convicted of conspiracy to kidnap for ransom or

extortion and attempted kidnapping for ransom or extortion in violation of sections 182, 209, and

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664 of the California Penal Code. Following his conviction, Bush was sentenced to life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole, with his minimum eligible parole release date set as

September 5, 1992. After that date, the Board of Prison Terms (“the Board”) was required to assess

Bush’s parole eligibility periodically in accordance with the criteria set forth in California Penal

Code section 3041(a). 

The Board held a series of parole eligibility hearings between June 25, 1991 and March 5,

2003 and determined seven times that Bush was ineligible for parole. After the fifth denial, on

November 17, 1999, Bush filed a writ of habeas corpus in Monterey County Superior Court. In

granting Bush’s petition, the Superior Court concluded that the Board’s arbitrary and unreasonable

application of Penal Code section 3041(a) violated Bush’s right to due process of law. Accordingly,

the court ordered the Board to hold another parole hearing that “comports with due process.” 

On December 20, 2001 the Board held a sixth evidentiary hearing in response to the Superior

Court’s order. However, the Board again found Bush to be ineligible for parole, concluding that he

would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if he were released from prison. In response to the

Board’s decision, Bush moved to modify the Superior Court’s writ of habeas corpus to order his

immediate release on parole, arguing, inter alia, that the Board’s findings at the December 2001

hearing were not supported by the evidence in the record.

On July 3, 2002 the Monterey County Superior Court issued an order granting Bush’s

request to be released on parole, concluding that “the Board’s readiness to make findings so at odds

with the record supports [Bush’s] claim that his parole hearing was a sham.” The Board appealed,

and on May 30, 2003 the California Court of Appeal issued an unpublished opinion reversing the

trial court’s order. See In re Bush, No. H024715, 2003 WL 21246781 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2003). 

Specifically, the Court of Appeal held that the lower court failed to give the Board’s findings the

deference that was warranted under the some evidence standard of review that California courts

apply in reviewing parole determinations. The Court of Appeal cited the threats of violence that

accompanied Bush’s criminal offense, his past criminal history, evidence that Bush lacked true

remorse for his crimes, and Bush’s failure to make plans for post-release employment as facts that

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were capable of supporting a finding that his release on parole was inappropriate under California

law. See id. at *19–28. Thus, without explicitly addressing Bush’s federal constitutional claims, the

Court of Appeal held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Bush parole at the

December 2001 hearing. Id. at *28

Following the summary denial of Bush’s petition for review by the California Supreme

Court, Bush filed a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2254 with this court on May 7, 2004. 

In his petition, Bush asserted that the Board’s December 2001 decision denying him parole violated

his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based

on these allegations, Bush requested that the court order his immediate and unconditional discharge

from state custody, or, in the alternative, that it issue an order compelling the Board to hold a new

hearing to determine his parole eligibility. 

Meanwhile, on July 27, 2004, Bush appeared before the Board at his eighth parole eligibility

hearing, from which the instant habeas petition arises. At that hearing, the Board found Bush

suitable for release on parole and, upon calculating his release date, it determined that he had been

eligible to be released from prison in 1997, seven years before the date of the hearing. That decision

became final on November 15, 2004. Nevertheless, at that time, the Board did not act upon its own

finding of suitability. Bush filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in Marin County

Superior Court seeking his immediate release from custody. On March 15, 2005, the Marin County

Superior Court granted that petition and ordered the Board to release Bush on parole. See Pet.’s

App. D at 4. Bush subsequently filed a motion with the Marin County Superior Court seeking a

modification of this order which would grant him outright release rather than release on parole.2

This motion was denied on August 4, 2006. See Pet.’s App. E.

Bush was released from state custody on parole under high control supervision on March 19,

2005. Pet. at 6–7. Given Bush’s release, on July 1, 2005 this court issued an order dismissing

Bush’s May 7, 2004 habeas petition without prejudice due to lack of exhaustion of state claims. 

While Bush had premised his claimed entitlement to release without parole on the same legal

theories that he asserted in state habeas proceedings, California courts had never had the opportunity

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to consider the merits of Bush’s constitutional claims in light of the Board of Prison Terms’ July

2004 suitability finding, nor had the state courts had the chance to consider the relationship between

the federal rights that Bush asserted in his federal habeas petition and the state interests that are

protected by the parole system.

Bush filed another habeas petition with this court on November 22, 2006. In it, Bush

challenges the Board’s July 27, 2004 decision to place him on parole rather than to release him

outright. To this end, he argues that at the time of the Board’s parole eligibility decision he had

already served twenty years in actual custody, seven-and-one-half-years longer than the twelve-andone-half-year term the Board had assessed. Pet. at 5–6. Bush, therefore, argues that he is entitled to

seven-and-one-half-years of excess custody credit, id., which must be applied to any parole term he

is assigned per California Code of Regulations section 2345 and California Penal Code sections

2900 and 2900.5. Pet. at 7:12–15 (citing interpretations of the relevant statutes in McQuillion v.

Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Randolph, 215 Cal. App. 3d 790 (1989); In re Reina,

171 Cal. App. 3d 638 (1985); In re Ballard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 647 (1981)).

Bush additionally contends that he is entitled to a number of good conduct credits. Though

Bush does not clearly state in his petition the exact number of good conduct credits to which he

believes he is entitled, he does at various times note that the total number of excess custody and

good conduct credits he had accumulated at the time of his release to be either greater than fifteen or

greater than sixteen. See Pet. at 2:17–19 (“at the time of his release . . . [Bush] had excess credits of

more than fifteen . . . years”); id. at 4:10–13 (“[T]he ruling by the superior court fails to give any

lawful reason as to . . . what happens to the more than sixteen . . . years of combined custody and

conduct credits that he had by the time that he was released.”). Even assuming the lesser of the two,

however, Bush argues that when added to the aforementioned excess conduct credits the total

number of credits to which he was entitled far surpassed any term of parole the Board was permitted

to assign him. See id. at 7. Bush asserts that because the Board assessed only a twelve-and-onehalf-year term and California Penal Code section 3000(b)(2) sets a maximum five year period of

parole for his offense, his twenty-nine years’ worth of time served and various credits precluded the

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Board from assigning any parole period whatsoever. See Pet. at 4:23–25.

Bush argues that the Board violated his federal due process rights, state law, and the Board’s

own regulations, id. at 4:20–22, and appears to also allege that the Board violated his federal rights

to equal protection under the law by failing to account for his custody credits and by depriving him

of state procedures which were created for the benefit of a class of which he is a member (i.e., state

prisoners who are later paroled). See id. at 4:1–9 (invoking Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393

(1985) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) for the proposition that when a state adopts

procedures applicable to a class, any member of the class is entitled to the benefit of those

procedures). Bush seeks to be released on his own recognizance or alternatively on reasonable bail. 

Pet. at 8:20–23. 

On December 1, 2006 in connection with his habeas petition, Bush moved for an expedited

hearing schedule to be set as his current sentence for parole violations will be completed in April

2007.3

 Pet. at 8:24–27. In light of Bush’s concerns that he could endure further irreparable harm

through his confinement, this court issued an order granting this motion on February 15, 2007. The

court ordered the respondent (“Ylst”) to file an answer, conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, within fourteen days. Ylst filed no answer, but instead filed a

motion to dismiss on February 28, 2007, within the fourteen day window mandated by the court. 

Ylst’s motion is premised on Bush’s failure to exhaust his state remedies. Therefore, the

instant round of pleadings implicate Bush’s activities in the state courts that occurred prior to his

filing for habeas in this court. These activities include (1) the Marin County Superior Court’s

issuance of its August 4, 2006 order, (2) Bush’s filing, and the court of appeal’s subsequent denial of

a habeas petition with the court of appeal, and (3) the California Supreme Court’s denial of Bush’s

habeas petition with that court. Ylst argues that Bush continues to have state remedies available

because (1) Bush concedes that he could file a petition for relief in Marin County Superior Court but

he has declined to do so, (2) the California Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Bush’s claims

because his petition was denied for procedural reasons, and (3) Bush cannot validly claim that he

should be excused from seeking relief in the superior court on grounds of futility. 

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On March 2, 2007 Bush filed a timely opposition to Ylst’s motion to dismiss. In his motion

Bush asserts that the superior court already ruled on the merits of his petition. Bush argues that

although the court of appeal denied his petition with leave to re-file in the superior court, this does

not mean that he was required to do so. Bush claims that the superior court had made clear that it

would not rule favorably on his petition “no matter how [Bush’s claim] was packaged or fashioned.” 

Pet.’s Opp. at 2. Under these circumstances, Bush argues he had no obligation to pursue a remedy in

the superior court. Bush further argues that the California Supreme Court necessarily evaluated the

merits of his petition because it instructed Ylst to file an answer addressing the petition’s merits. In

addition to opposing Ylst’s motion to dismiss, Bush requests that this court impose sanctions on

Ylst, claiming that Ylst’s motion was filed to cause unnecessary delay in violation of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11. Pet.’s Opp. at 5.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss will be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957); Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987). Allegations of material fact are taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory

or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The court need not, however, accept as true

allegations that are conclusory, legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable

inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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II. Exhaustion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218 (1996), any person “in custody” pursuant to

the judgment of a state court may seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court on the ground

that he or she is being held “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). AEDPA also provides that “an application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it

appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” Ngo v.

Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)) (original

alterations omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“State prisoners

must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”). To satisfy this requirement,

the petitioner must either (1) fairly and fully present each federal claim to the state’s highest court or

(2) prove that presenting such a claim would be futile because there is no state remedy available. 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Under Ninth Circuit law, a claim is fully and fairly presented to a state court only if it is

presented to the proper forum through an appropriate procedural vehicle and the petitioner informs

the state court of the factual and legal bases for the claim. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 668 (citations

omitted). Therefore, only if the highest state court available was alerted to the fact that petitioner

was asserting federal constitutional claims are those claims exhausted. See Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d

861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996). “[M]ere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust.” Johnson, 88 F.3d

at 830. The exhaustion requirement does not demand repetitious application to the state courts; a

petitioner need present his claims only once and need exhaust only one avenue of relief. See Turner

v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987). California requires the presentation of a claim to the

California Supreme Court via petition for discretionary review before state remedies are considered

exhausted. Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Constitutional claims have not been fairly presented to the state courts and therefore are not

exhausted if, for example, the claims in the federal petition and those presented to the state courts (1)

arose under different federal constitutional provisions (including different clauses in the same

constitutional amendment, e.g. the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment), see Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1982), (2) arose under the same

constitutional provision but are logically distinct or are based on different and unrelated lines of

precedent, see Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 830 (9th

Cir. 1982), or (3) one claim relied on state law while the other relied on federal law, even if the state

and federal provisions are facially identical, see United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Jordan, 747 F.2d

1120, 1126–27 (7th Cir. 1984).

III. Sanctions

Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney’s signature constitutes a

warranty that a pleading or motion is not “being presented for any improper purpose, such as to

harass or to cause unnecessary delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Rule 11 requires both notice and an

opportunity to respond to violators of the rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Unless the court orders Rule

11 sanctions sua sponte, an affected party must first serve its Rule 11 motion on the violator. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(1)(A). If the violating party does not withdraw or correct its offending paper

within twenty-one days, the affected party may then file its rule motion with the court. Id. 

The standard for determining whether a pleading, motion or other paper is either frivolous or

interposed for an improper purpose is one of objective reasonableness at the time of the attorney's

signature. Conn v. CSO Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Woodrum v.

Woodward County Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989)); Golden Eagle Dist. Corp. v.

Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986). In assessing whether the filing of a

particular paper was frivolous under Rule 11, the court should not consider the ultimate failure on

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the merits or the subjective bad faith of the signer, but rather whether the position taken was “legally

unreasonable” or “without factual foundation.” Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831

(9th Cir. 1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion of State Remedies

To determine whether Bush has exhausted his state remedies with respect to the claims he

now seeks to bring before this court, it is first necessary to clearly define his present claim and then

to evaluate whether Bush provided the California courts with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits

of his present claim. In Bush’s current petition, he affirms that “[t]his case presents a very narrow

issue of whether an inmate who receives a parole date, but is held in custody beyond the end of his

or her set term, is entitled to receive credits against the parole period for the excess time spent in

prison.” “[T]he issue for resolution herein is simply whether those excess credits apply to reduce the

parole period.” Pet. at 2:13–21. Bush asks this court to hold that the Board violated his due process

and equal protection rights, state law, and the Board’s own regulations by failing to properly account

for his custody credits. Id. at 4:1–9, 20–22. Bush further asks this court to order his release on his

own recognizance and to terminate his parole as a consequence of the Board’s alleged failure. Id. at

8:20–23. 

Bush bears the burden of establishing that the exhaustion requirement is met. Darr v.

Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 218–19 (1950). However, he has not submitted to this court any copy of his

previous petitions to the Marin County Superior Court, First Appellate Division Court of Appeal, or

California Supreme Court. He has merely provided the orders of those courts, which deny his

petitions and provide, to varying degrees, some characterization of Bush’s claims. See Pet.’s App.

Exh. E–G. This court must therefore rely in part on the description of Bush’s claims by the

California courts to assist in the interpretation of those claims.

Bush’s present round of petitioning the California courts began with his petition to the Marin

County Superior Court which was granted on March 15, 2005. It was this order which Bush moved

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to modify on or about June 1, 2005. At that time, Bush asked the superior court for a determination

on the “very narrow issue of the limits of the governor’s power to review non-murder parole grants.” 

Pet.’s App. Exh. E at 2. The question of the scope of the governor’s power to review parole is

plainly distinct from the question of whether excess custody credits apply to reduce a parole period,

and the parties do not dispute that raising the former is insufficient to exhaust claims related to the

latter.

In an earlier petition, though, Bush argued that his time in custody “exceeded the time for the

offense and the maximum period of parole.” Id. at 3. This earlier petition, case number

SC133488A, is identified by the superior court as arising out of one of Bush’s “prior unsuccessful

Board hearing[s].” Id. at 2. The superior court indicated that the earlier petition was filed in

Monterey County Superior Court in December 2003 and was transferred to Marin County Superior

Court in January 2004. Id. at 2–3. The parties agree that this earlier petition and the petition which

was granted on March 15, 2005, case number SC139055A, were both pending in Marin County

Superior Court simultaneously. See Pet.’s Opp. at 3; Resp’t.’s Reply at 3. Ylst claims that the

superior court granted Bush’s later petition and that Bush’s earlier petition remains open. Reply to

Pet.’s Opp. at 3. Bush concedes that it was this earlier petition that contained the claims which he

now argues exhaust his current claims but argues that the superior court directly addressed the merits

of the earlier petition’s claims in its order. Pet.’s Opp.at 3–4. Bush is silent as to whether his earlier

petition remains open in the superior court. Bush’s position that he has exhausted all available state

remedies therefore rests on whether his inclusion of an argument in a separate petition, filed several

years previously, and which has not been provided to this court, can be invoked in a later round of

petitioning to establish exhaustion. This court holds that it cannot.

At the time the earlier petition was filed, December 2003, Bush was still incarcerated and

had yet to appear for his July 27, 2004 parole eligibility hearing with the Board. See Bush v. Solis,

No. C 04-1823 MHP, 2005 WL 1592425 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2005) (Patel, J.). Since it was at

this hearing that the Board made the very determinations which Bush contests in his present habeas

petition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how he can validly claim that his argument made in

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the prayer of his December 2003 petition would have given the state courts “one full opportunity to

resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process,” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, with respect to issues specifically arising from his

July 27, 2004 Board hearing. 

Since 1999 Bush has contested his continued detention as constituting a violation of his

federal constitutional rights. In his 1999 petition Bush raised the claim that the Board violated his

due process rights by applying California Penal Code section 3041(a) arbitrarily and unreasonably. 

Bush v. Solis, 2005 WL 1592425 at *1. Section 3041(a) mandates that the Board hold parole

eligibility hearings, document conduct pertaining to the availability of post-conviction credit, and set

parole release dates in a uniform manner. But Bush’s current petition raises claims under California

Penal Code sections 1168, 2900, 2900.5, 3000, and 3041(b) and California Code of Regulations

section 2345. Bush has provided this court with no evidence that he presented the California courts

with any claims arising under these statutes nor with any claims arising from the operative facts

associated with his July 27, 2004 parole eligibility hearing. 

Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981), established that the exhaustion

requirement may be avoided by showing that it would be futile to pursue one’s claims in state court

in light of the prevailing decisions of that state’s highest court. It did not establish that exhaustion is

unnecessary upon a showing that it would be futile to pursue one’s claims in state court in light of an

unencouraging attitude, environment, or because of the prevailing decisions encountered in a state

trial court. Bush has demonstrated no evidence of futility apart from his assertion that the superior

court ruled on the merits of his case as it stood at that time. Pet.’s Opp. at 2:6–9, 4:14–18.

Bush, the nonmoving party here, has made no allegations of material fact which, taken most

favorably to him, could establish that he is entitled to relief. Ylst’s motion to dismiss is therefore

GRANTED. 

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II. Sanctions

Sanctions are not appropriate in this case for two reasons. First, Ylst was not afforded notice

as required by the safe harbor provision of Rule 11, which requires a party requesting sanctions to

first serve its Rule 11 motion on the alleged violator, and then to provide twenty-one days for the

alleged violator to withdraw or correct its offending paper before filing its motion with the court. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(1)(A). 

Second, there is no “blanket bar against motions to dismiss” filed in response to habeas

petitions. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). In this court’s order to show cause, it

commanded Ylst to file “no later than fourteen (14) days after the date of this order, an answer

conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why

a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued.” Bush v. Ylst, Order to Show Cause, Docket No. C

06-7255 MHP (Feb. 15, 2007) at 10. Rule 5 explains what an answer must contain: “The answer

must address the allegations in the petition. In addition, it must state whether any claim in the

petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a

statute of limitations.” Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts. But the Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases allows a judge who has issued an order to show cause to accept “an answer or other pleading .

. . or to take such other action as the judge deems appropriate.” See White, 874 F.2d at 602

(“Clearly, the rule allows for a response other than a formal answer meeting the dictates of Rule 5.”)

(emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit has also observed that “responding to a habeas petition

with a motion to dismiss is common practice.” White, 874 F.2d at 603 (citing Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478 (1986)).

Finally, given that the court finds Ylst’s contention that Bush failed to exhaust his state

remedies to have merit, the court does not agree with Bush’s contention that Ylst’s motion was

“legally unreasonable” or “without factual foundation.” The court therefore finds that Ylst was

entitled to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. Bush’s request for the issuance of sanctions

is DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ylst’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Bush’s request for the

issuance of sanctions is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 25, 2007 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are taken from the order issued in an earlier case brought by

petitioner, Bush v. Solis, No. C 04-1823 MHP, 2005 WL 1592425 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2005).

2. The record does not reveal the exact date Bush filed this motion, although it seems to be around

June 1, 2005, as the superior court order describes it being filed two-and-one-half months following

Bush’s release on March 19, 2005.

3. In Bush’s petition, filed November 20, 2006, he notes that he “has only five . . . months left to

serve.” Pet. at 8:9–10.

ENDNOTES

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