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Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United State:s tt-~Urt: of Appeals 

Tenth Cir::ui: 

JAN 3d 19@0 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. .HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

IN RE: Wayne D. and Annie M. ) 

Thompson, ) 

) 

Debtors-Appellees. ) 

) 

JIM WALTER HOMES, INC., ) 

) 

Creditor-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 89-6016 

) 

ANN SPEARS, ) 

) 

Trustee-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-505-P) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Lawrence A. G. Johnson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Creditor-Appellant. 

James A. Conrady of James A. Conrady & Associates, Inc., Okmulgee, 

Oklahoma, for Debtors-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 1 
Jim Walter Homes, Inc. (Walter Homes) appeals from the 

district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of 

its motion to lift the automatic stay imposed by ll u.s.c. § 362. 

Walter Homes seeks to foreclose the mortgage it holds on the 

debtors' principal residence and complete sale of the property. 1 

This appeal raises the issue of the scope of the debtors' right to 

cure mortgage defaults under ll U.S.C. § l322(b). 2 

After Wayne and Annie Thompson (debtors) defaulted, Walter 

Homes filed an action in an Oklahoma state court to foreclose the 

mortgage and received a foreclosure judgment and an order of sale. 

The foreclosure sale was scheduled for November 13, 1986. On 

November 10, 1986, however, debtors filed a bankruptcy petition 

under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby staying the 

foreclosure sale under the automatic stay of ll U.S.C. § 362. 

In the bankruptcy court, Walter Homes moved for relief from 

the stay in order to proceed with the foreclosure sale. The 

bankruptcy court denied this motion and affirmed debtors' plan of 

reorganization, which provided for cure of the default on the 

Walter Homes mortgage debt and reinstatement of the original 

payment schedule pursuant toll U.S.C. § l322(b)(3) & (5). Walter 

Homes appealed to the district court, which affirmed. It now 

appeals to this court. Because the relevant facts are undisputed 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

2 In view of our disposition of the appeal, we need not address 

the other issue raised by debtors. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 2 
and we consider only legal issues, our review is plenary. First 

Bank v. Mullet (In re Mullet), 817 F.2d 677, 679 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

Walter Homes contends that because debtors filed their 

bankruptcy petition after the Oklahoma foreclosure judgment, they 

no longer had a right to invoke the chapter 13 cure provisions. 

We disagree. Section l322(b) provides a right to cure any 

default, but provides no express time limitation for the exercise 

of this right. 3 After a mortgagor's default, the mortgagee must 

initiate an often long and cumbersome mortgage foreclosure process 

in order to have its collateral applied toward the mortgage debt. 

Thus we must consider at what point during this state mortgage 

foreclosure process the federal bankruptcy right to cure 

terminates. As a practical matter, this determines the deadline 

by which debtors must file a bankruptcy petition in order to avail 

themselves of the bankruptcy cure provisions. 

3 11 U.S.C. §l322(b), in relevant part, provides: 

"[T]he plan may--

(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any 

default; 

(5) ... provide for the curing of any default 

within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any • • • 

secured claim on which the last payment is due 

after the date on which the final payment under the 

plan is due • " 

Chapters 11 and 12 also give debtors a right 

through reorganization plans. 11 U.S.C. 

l222(b)(3) & (5). 

to cure defaults 

§§ ll23(a)(5)(G), 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 3 
The courts have struggled with this problem and have adopted 

various approaches. See generally Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In 

re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1432 (6th Cir.) (summarizing the various 

approaches), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985); Annotation, Right 

of Debtor to "De-Acceleration" of Residential Mortgage 

Indebtedness Under Chapter 13 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 

U.S.C. § 1322(b)), 67 A.L.R. Fed. 217 (1984 & Supp. 1989). Even 

so, all circuits that have addressed the issue have agreed that 

contractual acceleration of mortgage debt upon default does not 

end the debtor's right to cure the mortgage default in bankruptcy 

by paying the amount of the original default, rather than the 

entire accelerated debt. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1374-77 

(3d Cir. 1987); Downey Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Metz (In re Metz), 

820 F.2d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987); Foster Mortgage Corp. v. 

Terry (In re Terry), 780 F.2d 894, 896 (11th Cir. 1986); Glenn, 

760 F.2d ·at 1431-36; In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 

1984}; Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 241-

42 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane), vacating 718 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 

1983) (panel}; DiPierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 26-

27 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Nelson, 59 B.R. 417, 419 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 

1985). 4 Beyond this point, however, there is little agreement 

between the circuits on when the right to cure ends. 

4 Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits modification of security interests 

in a mortgage on real estate that constitutes debtors' personal 

residence, but § 1322(b)(3} and (5) permit curing of any default. 

All of the cases above cited agree that if a residential mortgage 

is in default, triggering contractual acceleration of the mortgage 

debt, a chapter 13 plan to "deaccelerate" by paying the amount of 

the original default rather than the entire accelerated debt, is a 

permissible cure, not a prohibited modification. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 4 
The Sixth Circuit's approach in Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1435-36, 

was to draw a bright line cutoff, as a matter of federal law, at 

the date of sale of the property under state foreclosure 

proceedings. The Third and Seventh Circuits, Roach, 824 F.2d at 

1377-79, and Clark, 738 F.2d at 871, make the cutoff date depend 

upon the court's interpretation of the effects of the particular 

state law. Of course, if a mechanical application of state law 

were to be used in all respects, the right to cure would end at 

the time the mortgage debt is accelerated, a result which all 

circuits have disapproved as conflicting with 11 u.s.c. § 1322(b). 

The courts that purport merely to apply state law have 

themselves had difficulty fitting ~tate mortgage and foreclosure 

concepts to the bankruptcy power to cure. For example, the Roach 

court thought that the right to cure should end on the date of the 

judgment of foreclosure because "even if a mortgage survives the 

entry of judgment in New Jersey, the mortgagee possesses 

independent rights by virtue of its judgment." 824 F.2d at 1378. 

The Clark court, applying Wisconsin law, permitted cure beyond the 

foreclosure judgment date, because "[n]either equitable nor legal 

title passes until the foreclosure sale is held." 738 F.2d at 

871. In Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 

1988), interpreting analogous provisions in c~apter 12 and 

purporting to apply South Dakota law, the Eighth Circuit allowed 

cure only up until sale under the foreclosure judgment, not during 

a longer redemption period during which the mortgagor retained 

legal title, because it thought Congress intended to allow debtors 

to cure only until "[e]xtinguishment of the mortgage contract 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 5 
[which] works a substantial change in the relationship of the 

parties." Id. at 1084-85 & n.6. Approaching the problem from a 

purely state law point of view, therefore, has yielded several 

distinctly different cutoff events. In fact, it is often hard to 

determine exactly which state law event these courts consider to 

be controlling. 

The "state law" courts find themselves bogged down in 

formalistic notions of title and merger which survive more as a 

matter of history than as a matter of practical significance. See 

generally G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law §§ 1.1-

1.5, 4.1-4.3, 6.15-6.17 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter 

Real Estate Finance Law]. This is illustrated by decisions 

attempting to apply the Seventh Circuit's Clark holding that 

transfer of title determines the cutoff date for the bankruptcy 

cure provisions. Federal courts applying Illinois law have not 

been able to agree on when the mortgagor loses title. In re 

Schnupp, 64 B.R. 763, 765-66 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986), held that 

title passes at the end of the statutory redemption period, in 

spite of at least three prior cases holding that title passes at 

the date of the foreclosure judgment. Goldberg v. Tynan (In re 

Tynan), 773 F.2d 177, 178 (7th Cir. 1985); First Fin. Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n v. Winkler, 29 B.R. 771, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re 

Jenkins, 14 B.R. 748, 749-50 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981). 5 

A more useful starting point would seem to be the concept of 

property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. In the 

5 Illinois' new mortgage foreclosure statute may have removed the 

ambiguity. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assoc. v. Josephs (In re 

Josephs), 93 B.R. 151, 153-55 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 6 
context of property of the estate, the current Bankruptcy Code 

rejected the requirement of the former act that property be 

transferrable or reachable by creditors under state law in order 

for it to pass into the estate. These notions were overly 

formalistic and resulted in arbitrary line drawing. The 

Bankruptcy Code, therefore, settled on an expanded concept 

encompassing any interest under state law, legal or equitable. 4 

Collier on Bankruptcy~ 541.02[1] (L. King 15th ed. 1989). At the 

very least, a mortgage debtor must have some legal or equitable 

interest in property which enters the bankruptcy estate if he 

hopes to retain it through the bankruptcy cure provivions. See 

Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; In re Ivory, 32 B.R. 788, 791 (Bankr. D. 

Or. 1983). No court·has held that debtors can use the bankruptcy 

cure provisions to recover property in which they no longer have 

any interest under state law. 

Somewhere on the continuum of the mortgagor's interests under 

state foreclosure law we must draw a line beyond which there can 

be no cure of default. We hold that this issue is as much one of 

federal law, the proper construction of 11 u.s.c. § 1322(b), as is 

the determination that this section gives the debtor the right to 

reverse contractual acceleration of a mortgage in default. Our 

problem is that we have little help from the words of the statute 

or its legislative history, so we must try to reconcile the 

policies of § 1322(b) and state mortgage foreclosure law. Of all 

the various incidents of property ownership the mortgagor enjoys 

under state law, the most significant in considering the scope of 

the right to avoid foreclosure and retain mortgaged property 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 7 
through bankruptcy cure would seem to be redemption rights--the 

right to avoid ·foreclosure and retain mortgaged property by paying 

a specified sum of money. 

All states apparently permit redemption of mortgaged 

property, not simply until the date of the foreclosure judgment, 

but until a foreclosure sale. Real Estate Finance Law§ 7.1, ·at 

478. Oklahoma is no exception. See Lincoln Mortgage Investors v. 

Cook, 659 P.2d 925, 928 (Okla. 1982); In re Snow, 94 B.R. 198, 199 

(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988). About half of the states go beyond 

that, to allow a statutory period of redemption after sale. Real 

Estate Finance Law § 7.1, at 479. The concept of property of the 

bankruptcy estate is 

equitable rights of 

~ 541.07[3]. 

broad enough 

redemption. 

to include 

4 Collier 

statutory or 

on Bankruptcy 

After default and acceleration and until the foreclosure 

sale, the debtors' position essentially remains the same--they can 

retain the mortgaged property only through payment to the 

mortgagee of the full amount of the mortgage debt. Since the 

practical nature of the relationship between mortgagor and 

mortgagee under state law is unchanged over this period, the right 

to effect a federal bankruptcy cure should also be available over 

this entire period. Accord Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1435-36. A 

foreclosure sale, however, may introduce another party to the 

relationship--a good faith purchaser. We hesitate to further 

cloud the interests and expectations of a third-party purchaser 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 8 
through an expansive right of bankruptcy cure. See id. 6 

Moreover, statutory redemption has differing purposes than 

equitable redemption. The mortgagor's equitable period of 

redemption before sale exists solely to provide the debtor 

adequate time to try to refinance the property, Real Estate 

Finance Law § 1.3, which appears to be the same goal as the 

bankruptcy r~ght to cure. While an opportunity to refinance is 

also one of the purposes of statutory redemption, the principal 

objective of statutory redemption is to assure that the 

foreclosure sale brings a fair price. Id. § 1.4, at 10 & § 8.4, 

at 618. Purchase by an independent third party at a foreclosure 

sale raises enough additional concerns to justify ending the right 

to cure in bankruptcy at that point. 

If a state allows mortgagors the right to redeem until a 

foreclosure sale, we do not consider it trampling upon state law 

to allow the cure provisions of § l322(b) to extend to the date of 

6 We do not have before us and do not now decide whether the 

right to cure should continue during a state's extended statutory 

redemption period when the mortgagee purchases at the foreclosure 

sale. Often the mortgagee will purchase the property by bidding 

in the amount of the mortgage debt. See Real Estate Finance Law 

§ 1.4, at 10 & § 8.8, at 627. In such a case, the mortgagormortgagee relationship is essentially unchanged by the foreclosure 

sale, and an argument can be made that the right of bankruptcy 

cure should last until the end of any statutory redemption period 

state law would allow. See id. § 8.15, at 656-57; cf. Tynan, 773 

F.2d at 178 n.2 (distinguishing cases allowing cure after 

foreclosure sale on basis that mortgagee was purchaser). Of 

course, filing of a bankruptcy petition after the foreclosure sale 

but before the end of a statutory redemption period would raise 

the issue, which this circuit also has not addressed, whether a 

bankruptcy filing tolls the running of a statutory redemption 

period. See, ~, Roach, 824 F.2d at 1372 n.l; Tynan, 773 F.2d 

at 179-80; Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1436-41; Johnson v. First Nat'l 

Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 276-78 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 

1012 (1984). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 9 
the foreclosure sale. The policy at issue is how much time 

·debtors should be given to attempt to save their property. State 

law has already addressed this issue in the form of redemption 

rights. The right to cure in bankruptcy should resemble its state 

law analogue, but should not be stifled by archaic property and 

mortgage law concepts. In this case, because the debtors filed 

their chapter 13 petition during the equitable period of 

redemption before foreclosure sale, they had a right to cure the 

default on their home mortgage through their chapter 13 plan. 

AFFIRMED. 

Each side to bear its own costs and fees. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 10 
89-6016, In re Thompson 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment only. 

At issue in this case is whether debtors in a chapter 

thirteen bankruptcy may cure a default of a residential mortgage 

under 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b) following an Oklahoma State court's 

entry of a foreclosure judgment and order of sale, but prior to 

the actual sale of the property. 1 Purporting to interpret 

S 1322(b), the court holds that the right to cure a default of a 

residential mortgage extends through the equitable period of 

redemption until the foreclosure sale. Yet the court acknowledges 

that neither the statute nor its legislative history places any 

time limitation on the exercise of this right. What the court in 

truth does is assume a legislative role based on what it perceives 

as the demands of equity. While the court's rationale for its 

holding may be the reason why Congress should amend S 1322(b) to 

include a time limitation on the right to cure, such rationale is 

not the reason for this court to do so. The duty of reconciling 

the adverse views of mortgage lenders and borrowers is not 

1 The mortgagee, Walter Homes, moved the bankruptcy court to lift 

the automatic stay imposed by 11 u.s.c. S 362 in order to execute 

its foreclosure judgment and complete the sale. Over the 

mortgagee's objection, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtors' 

re9rganization plan. According to the bankruptcy court, the 

mortgagee's objection was defective for want of proper service on 

the trustee and for the mortgagee's failure to appear at the 

scheduled confirmation hearing. We are unable to address in this 

appeal the sufficiency of the mortgagee's objection, however, 

because the debtors have not provided this court with the 

documentation to support the bankruptcy court's findings. See 

Fed. R. App. P. lO(b)(3). The question of the objection's 

validity is presumably the "other issue" to which the court refers 

in footnote two of its opinion. 

Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 11 
judicial; rather, the Constitution vests Congress with the duty of 

establishing property rights in bankruptcy proceedings. See 

generally In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (6th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 474 u.s. 849 (1985} (discussing policy considerations 

behind§ 1322(b}}. As Chief Justice Marshall recognized long ago, 

until Congress chooses to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, state 

law controls. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 u.s. (4 Wheat.) 122, 

191-208 (1819}. 

Article I, § 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to 

establish uniform bankruptcy laws. This provision undoubtedly 

authorizes Congress to promulgate a federal statute delineating a 

time limitation on the right to cure a defaulted residential 

mortgage under§ 1322(b}. But Congress has chosen not to exercise 

its power in this regard. Instead, "Congress has generally left 

the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's 

estate to state law." Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 

(1979}. "[S]tate laws are thus suspended only to the extent of 

actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy [Code] 

.••• " Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918}. In the 

absence of an express conflict between state and federal 

bankruptcy law or a federal interest which requires state law to 

give way, the law of the state where the property is located 

controls questions of property rights. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 

Accordingly, because no conflict exists between state and federal 

law on the issue of when a debtor may cure a default on a 

residential mortgage in a chapter thirteen proceeding, the proper 

analysis must focus on any federal interest likely to be infringed 

due to the application of state law. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 12 
Addressing the affect of debt acceleration on the right to 

cure under § 1322(b), the court makes the curious statement that 

"if a mechanical application of state law were to be used in all 

respects, the right to cure would end at the time the mortgage 

debt is accelerated." However correct this statement may be, it 

is simply irrelevant to the proper analysis. The reason that a 

court is justified in deviating from state law is because of a 

legitimate and articulated federal policy to the contrary. No 

court has advocated, nor do I advocate, a "mechanical application" 

of state law in construing§ 1322(b). As explained in the 

preceding paragraph, any application of state law is impermissible 

where such law conflicts with a federal statute, its legislative 

history, or an underlying federal interest. 

Virtually every note secured by a mortgage contains an 

acceleration clause which permits the lender to accelerate 

payments upon default. But allowing state law to control the 

effect of an accel~ration and its curability in the context of 

chapter thirteen would render § 1322(b) all but meaningless for 

residential mortgagors. The Second Circuit ably explained the 

reason for rejecting a "mechanical application" of state law in In 

re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1982): 

[C]reditor's argument reduces in the end to an assertion 

that because she can accelerate her mortgage under state 

law, the [debtors] can cure only as provided be state 

law. This interpretation of S 1322(b) would leave the 

debtor with fewer rights under the new Bankruptcy Code 

than under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Defaulting 

mortgagors would forfeit their right to cure even before 

the start of foreclosure proceedings, before they hired 

lawyers and therefore before they knew anything about 

their rights under Chapter 13. Such a result would 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 13 
render the remedy in S 1322(b) unavailable to all but a 

select number of debtors. Such a result would be 

totally at odds with the overriding rehabilitative 

purpose of Chapter 13. 

Accord Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236, 

241-42 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane). Chapter thirteen is designed to 

encourage debtor rehabilitation rather than liquidation. H. R. 

Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-117 (1977), reprinted in 

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6076-78. Policy 

considerations thus dictate that S 1322(b) be construed to permit 

the curing of a mortgage debt acceleration in order to effectively 

preserve the relief Congress has provided debtors under chapter 

thirteen. 

The question of how far beyond acceleration the debtor's 

right to cure extends is more difficult. After acceleration and 

the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, the necessity of 

fashioning a federal rule to effectuate the purpose of chapter 

thirteen is less compelling. By that time, the debtor 'should have 

recognized the seriousness of the problem and obtained legal 

counsel. Allowing state law to control the right to cure beyond 

this point would not significantly impede a debtor's use of 

S 1322(b). See Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1086 

(8th Cir. 1988) (interpreting chapter twelve provision, 11 U.S.C. 

S 1222(b), identical to S 1322(b)). Yet without citing any 

congressional command or identifying any federal interest, the 

court today proclaims that the issue of where the right to cure 

should end "is as much one of federal law, the proper construction 

of 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b), as the determination that this section 

gives the debtor the right to reverse contractual acceleration of 

a mortgage in default." 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 14 
The Supreme Court has admonished lower federal courts that in 

bankruptcy law "undefined considerations of equity provide no 

basis for adoption of a uniform federal rule." Butner, 440 U.S. 

at 56. Neither does perceived difficulty in applying what the 

court refers to as "archaic" state property and mortgage law 

provide such a basis. See In re Roach, ·824 F.2d 1370, 1379 (3d 

Cir. 1987} (declining to ignore, "in the name of pragmatism," 

state law in applying S 1322(b} where such an approach was not 

grounded in the language of the statute}. Proper respect for 

federalism and state sovereignty demands that a federal court 

override state law only where Congress so intended. "The 

Bankruptcy Code was written with the expectation that it would be 

applied in the context of state law and that federal courts are 

not licensed to disregard interests created by state law when that 

course is not clearly required to effectuate federal interests." 

Id. at 1374. A federal court's desire for a uniform rule 

simplifying application of S 1322(b} is no substitute for proof 

that the use of state law would undermine a federal statutory 

scheme. Justice, 849 F.2d at 1087. 

Oddly enough, the court is willing to discuss the mortgage 

redemption laws of the fifty states to justify its result, but 

declines to address the problem of whether the right to cure 

should continue during a state's statutory redemption period when 

the mortgagee purchases at the foreclosure sale and the mortgagormortgagee relationship is essentially unchanged. Perhaps the 

court's approach will not be so easy to apply after all. In any 

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Appellate Case: 89-6016 Document: 01019297088 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 15 
' 

event, the law in this instance requires only that the court 

address the effect of an Oklahoma state court foreclosure judgment 

and order of sale on the right to cure under§ 1322(b). See In re 

Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to reach the 

question of whether the same result obtains in a state in which 

the effect of a foreclosure judgment is different than Wisconsin). 

For these reasons, I cannot join in the court's unwarranted 

exercise of judicial power.2 

2 In Oklahoma, a mortgagor in default is not divested of title to 

the mortgaged premises until the foreclosure sale is held. 

Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967) (mortgagor 

cannot be divested of title until foreclosure decree and sale); In 

re Anderson, 73 B.R. 993, 996 (Bankr. W.O. Okla. 1987) (plan 

proposing to cure mortgage default confirmed notwithstanding entry 

of foreclosure judgment prior to bankruptcy). Consequently, I 

believe the district court acted quite properly in affirming the 

bankruptcy court's confirmation of the debtors' plan. Because the 

sale of the mortgaged premises had not yet occurred at the time of 

the filing of the bankruptcy petition, title remained vested in 

the debtors and their contractual relationship with the mortgagee 

remained in tact. 

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