Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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These motions were determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). Plaintiffs’ “counter-motion”

contained in their opposition to Defendants’ motion was taken off

calendar by a minute order on June 7, 2006, since it was not properly

noticed.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. HUNTER, D.V.M., )

individually, and as a class )

representative for all others ) 02:06-cv-0457-GEB-PAN(JFM)

similarly situated; HOWARD ELEY, )

individually, and as a class )

representative for all others )

similarly situated, ) ORDER*

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SHERIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF LOU BLANAS, )

in his individual and official )

capacity; JAN SCULLY, SACRAMENTO )

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; OFFICE )

OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF )

SACRAMENTO; COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; )

WILLIAM KEVIN SOWLES, in his )

individual capacity; DOES 1 )

through 100, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department (the

“Department”), Sheriff Lou Blanas (“Blanas”), Sacramento County

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District Attorney Jan Scully (“Scully”), Sacramento County District

Attorney’s Office (the “Office”), and County of Sacramento (the

“County”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) move to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative,

request a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Further,

Defendants move to strike numerous paragraphs from the Amended

Complaint under Rule 12(f). Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss

and motion for a more definite statement, but did not oppose the

motion to strike.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges six claims. 

In the first claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section

1983"), Plaintiff Robert E. Hunter, D.V.M. (“Hunter”) alleges several

unknown deputies “subjected [him] to unreasonable and excessive force”

while he was detained at the “[Sacramento County] Main Jail main detox

holding center.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 41.) Specifically, Hunter

alleges “several unknown doe Deputy defendants, for no reason, applied

excessive force to [him] causing excessive ‘popping’ sounds [to]

emanat[e] from his body, fracturing his elbow, causing nerve damage to

his wrist, severe contusions to his legs, tearing and stretching

tendons in his extremities, . . . and setting in motion events which

forced [him] to fear for his life and safety.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Hunter

further alleges that “[d]uring the time [he] was being subjected to

unreasonable and excessive force, Defendants, and each of them,

ratified the conduct of the other Defendant.” (Id. ¶ 41.)

In the second claim, brought under section 1983, Plaintiff

Howard Eley (“Eley”) alleges that while incarcerated at the Sacramento

County Main Jail, Defendant William Kevin Sowles (“Sowles”) “subjected

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[him] to unreasonable and excessive force” by using a “control hold[]”

on him “as a form of punishment” in accordance with “Sheriff’s

Department policy.” (Id. ¶¶ 55, 56, 61.) 

The third claim, a purported class action brought under

section 1983, which incorporates all prior allegations contained in

the Amended Complaint, alleges the Department, the County, and Blanas

in his official and individual capacities “are liable because of their

ratification, policy and custom of encouraging, tolerating,

permitting, and ratifying a pattern of illegal and excessive use of

force [at the Sacramento County Main Jail].” (Id. ¶ 199.) 

The fourth claim, a purported class action brought under

section 1983, which incorporates all prior allegations contained in

the Amended Complaint, alleges the Department, the County, and Blanas

in his official and individual capacities “deliberately violated the

‘liberty interest’ of each and every person who was arrested and was

not allowed to make a phone call no later than three hours after

arrest because the phone [in the detox cell] was in-operative or

[those arrested] were summarily beaten or verbally threatened [when

they asked to make a phone call].” (Id. ¶ 221, 227.)

The fifth claim, a purported class action brought under

section 1983, which incorporates all prior allegations contained in

the Amended Complaint, alleges the Department, the County, the Office,

and Blanas and Scully in their official and individual capacities

“selectively charged and/or prosecuted [Plaintiffs] because they are

not peace officers employed by the county . . . .” (Id. ¶ 252.) 

The sixth claim, a purported class action brought under 42

U.S.C. section 1985 (“section 1985"), which incorporates all prior

allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, alleges the

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4

Department, the County, the Office, and Blanas and Scully in their

official and individual capacities “conspired against . . . Plaintiffs

because they have been selectively charged and/or prosecuted because

they are not peace officers employed by the county . . . .” (Id. ¶

258.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all

material allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and are

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus.,

Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the

plaintiff is given the benefit of every reasonable inference that can

be drawn from the well-pled allegations of the complaint. Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). “[A]

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “A complaint may be dismissed

[under Rule 12(b)(6)] for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal

theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

1984). 

A. Standing

Defendants seek dismissal of the third and fifth claims,

arguing Hunter and Eley lack standing to bring them. (Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 9.) The third claim purports to be a class

claim for excessive force against the Department, the County, and

Blanas in his official and individual capacities. The fifth claim is

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entitled “Selective [E]nforcement and [P]rosecution” and also purports

to be a class action. (Am. Compl. at 30.) 

Standing is a concept “drawn directly from Article III,

Section 2 of the Constitution[,] . . . [and it] goes to the very heart

of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” In re Franklin Mut. Funds

Fee Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 451, 460 (D.N.J. 2005) (citation omitted). 

“It determines whether the court has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute

on the merits. Standing may not be assumed; . . . [it] is a threshold

inquiry, not a mere hurdle that can be cleared [by alleging injuries

to a class of plaintiffs].” Id. (citations omitted).

To establish standing a plaintiff must show: “(1) [he] has

suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;

and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000). Even when a claim is purportedly a class claim, the “named

plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they

personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by

other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and

which they purport to represent.’” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357

(1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40

n.20 (1976)). Accordingly, to establish standing to bring a purported

class claim, “at least one named plaintiff must have standing in his

own right to assert a claim against each named defendant . . . .” 

Henry v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 541, 544 (D. Nev.

2004).

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1. Third Claim

While the third claim does not identify a particular injury

suffered by either Hunter or Eley, it does incorporate by reference

all previous allegations in the Amended Complaint including the first

and second claims which allege Hunter and Eley were injured by the use

of excessive force. Those alleged injuries, however, must be fairly

traceable to the actions of the Department, the County, and Blanas in

order for either Hunter or Eley to have standing to bring the third

claim. 

Hunter’s injury is attributed to Doe Defendants who acted in

accordance with the County’s policy. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 35.) The

Department and Blanas allegedly ratified this policy of excessive

force at the Sacramento County Main Jail. (See e.g., id. ¶¶ 192, 194,

197, 199.) Taking these allegations as true, Hunter has individual

standing to assert a claim against the Department, the County, and

Blanas for excessive force. As such, Hunter has standing to

“represent a class claim against th[ose] defendant[s]” for excessive

force. Henry, 223 F.R.D. at 544.

Eley’s injury is attributed to the actions Sowles took when

following the Department’s policy “of using control holds as a form of

punishment.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 61.) The County and Blanas allegedly

ratified this policy. (See e.g., id. ¶¶ 194, 199, 208.) Taking these

allegations as true, Eley has individual standing to assert a claim

against the Department, the County, and Blanas for excessive force. 

As such, Eley has standing to “represent a class claim against th[ose]

defendant[s]” for excessive force. Henry, 223 F.R.D. at 544.

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Since Hunter and Eley have standing to assert the third

claim against each named defendant, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

third claim is denied.

2. Fifth Claim

Defendants argue Hunter and Eley lack standing to assert the

fifth claim because neither of them has alleged a cognizable injury. 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) The fifth claim of the Amended Complaint is

entitled “Selective [E]nforcement and [P]rosecution.” (Am. Compl. at

30.) To state a cognizable injury for selective enforcement and/or

prosecution, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that others similarly

situated generally have not been prosecuted for conduct similar to

that for which they were prosecuted, and (2) that their selection was

based on an impermissible ground such as race, religion or their

exercise of their first amendment right to free speech.” Am. Baptist

Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 762 (N.D. Cal.

1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

The Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegation that

either Hunter or Eley was selected based on an impermissible ground. 

Rather, Plaintiffs only allege similarly situated law enforcement

officials were not selected because of their status as county

employees. (Am. Compl. ¶ 225.) Since neither Hunter nor Eley allege

he was selected based on an impermissible ground, they both lack

standing to assert the fifth claim. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the fifth claim is granted. 

Furthermore, since Hunter and Eley both lack standing to

bring a claim for selective enforcement and/or prosecution, they may

not maintain the sixth claim which alleges a conspiracy to selectively

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charge and/or prosecute Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the sixth claim is

also dismissed for lack of standing. 

B. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

1. All Class Claims

Defendants also seek dismissal of claims three and four,

arguing “they fail to meet the basic prerequisites set out in [Rule]

23[(a) and (b)] . . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. at 13.) 

“Generally, a defendant can attack the merits of a proposed

class’s claim in a motion to dismiss even before the plaintiff moves

for class certification. However, if the defendant chooses to attack

a proposed class’s ability to meet the prerequisites of [Rule] 23(a)

or (b), the defendant should do so by opposing the plaintiff’s motion

for class certification.” Uyeda v. J.A. Cambece Law Office, 2005 WL

1168421, *5 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2005). Accordingly, the merits of

Defendants’ argument attacking Plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy the

prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (b) are not decided, since Defendants

have not shown these issues need to be reached before Plaintiffs move

for class certification. See id. at *6.

2. First and Second Claims

Defendants seek dismissal of the first and second claims,

arguing they “fail[] to identify the constitutional right” allegedly

violated. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) The claims, however, state Hunter and

Eley were “subjected to unreasonable and excessive force.” (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 41, 61.) This allegation is sufficient to provide

Defendants with notice of the constitutional right allegedly violated. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first and second claims

is denied.

////

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3. Third Claim

Defendants also seek dismissal of the third claim, arguing

it “does not specifically identify which conduct by which defendant

violated which right.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) While the third claim

does raise a generalized claim for excessive force, it fails to set

forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

[Plaintiffs] are entitled to relief” from each named defendant. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a). Therefore, Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement is granted as to the third claim. Plaintiffs are required

to plead in more definite terms the allegedly wrongful action of each

defendant named in the third claim and what right that action violated

which would entitle Plaintiffs to relief. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss the third claim is denied.

4. Fourth Claim

The Department and the County also seek dismissal of the

fourth claim, arguing the claim does not allege any individual acted

in conformity with a “custom, policy, or practice” and therefore no

basis has been asserted for a claim of municipal liability against

them. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) Further, Blanas seeks dismissal of the

fourth claim insofar as it is brought against him in his individual

capacity, arguing Plaintiffs have “failed to state facts sufficient to

allege [an] affirmative link” between any alleged injury and an action

taken by him. (Defs.’ Mot. at 13.)

a. Against the Department and the County

A plaintiff’s section 1983 claim alleging municipal

liability will survive a motion to dismiss “even if the claim is based

on nothing more than a bare allegation that [an] individual[’s]

conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice.” Shah v.

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County of L.A.,797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986). An allegation “that

a municipality itself violated someone’s rights or that it directed

its employee to do so” is sufficient to meet this minimum pleading

requirement. Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1185

(9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ allege in the fourth claim that Defendants

“deliberately violated the ‘liberty interest’ of each and every person

who was arrested and was not allowed to make a phone call . . .

because the phone [in the detox cell] was in-operative or [those

arrested] were summarily beaten or verbally threatened [when they

asked to make a phone call].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 221 (emphasis added).) 

The claim further alleges “[t]he Department . . . deliberately

violated [the liberty interests of Plaintiffs by] deliberately

turn[ing] off [the phone in the detox cell].” (Id. ¶ 227 (emphasis

added).) These allegations sufficiently articulate an official

policy, custom, or practice of the Department and the County to

support a municipal liability claim against them. Therefore, this

portion of the dismissal motion is denied.

b. Against Blanas in his Individual Capacity

 Under section 1983, “supervisory officials are not liable

for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted). But, “liability is imposed against a supervisory official

in his individual capacity for his . . . acquiescence in the

constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for

conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights

of others.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted). The fourth claim does not allege any link,

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Since the fifth and sixth claims have been dismissed, the 1

Court need not address the argument of Scully and the Office that those

claims should be dismissed as to them based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity.

11

even acquiescence or indifference, between the alleged violation of

Plaintiffs’ “liberty interest” in making a phone call and any conduct

on the part of Blanas. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the fourth

claim is granted as to Blanas in his individual capacity.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Blanas seeks dismissal of all damage claims against him in

his official capacity, arguing in a conclusory manner he was a state

actor entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Defs.’ Mot. at 12.) 1

This conclusory motion is denied.

II. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Defendants argue Plaintiffs should be required to provide a

more definite statement of each of their claims “to enable

[Defendants] to formulate a response.” (Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs argue

they have “plead[ed] sufficient facts” to defeat Defendants’ motion. 

(Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. at 4.) 

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement may be

made where the complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(e). The motion must point out “the defects complained of and

the details desired.” Id. “[A] motion for a more definite statement

must be considered in light of the liberal pleading standards of Rule

8(a) [which provides that] a [c]omplaint need only be a ‘short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief . . . .’” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D.

Cal. 1996) (citations omitted).

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Apart from the third claim, Defendants identify one alleged

defect in the remaining claims pled by Plaintiffs: the first and

second claims fail to identify the constitutional rights allegedly

violated. (Mot. at 7.) As discussed in relation to the motion to

dismiss, the first and second claims sufficiently allege what

constitutional right was violated. Therefore, those claims allege

sufficient facts for Defendants to frame a responsive pleading. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is

granted as to the third claim and denied in all other respects. 

III. Motion to Strike

Defendants argue numerous paragraphs of the Amended

Complaint should be stricken under Rule 12(f) because they are “wholly

unrelated to the injuries alleged by [Plaintiffs].” (Defs.’ Mot. at

5.) Plaintiffs raised no opposition to Defendants’ motion to strike. 

Plaintiffs were warned in the Order Setting Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Conference filed March 6, 2006, that failure to oppose a

motion “may be deemed consent to the granting of the motion and the

Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” While the motion to

strike is unopposed, it would be inappropriate to strike all the

paragraphs Defendants request. First, Defendants request to strike

certain paragraphs is mooted by the dismissal of the fifth and sixth

claims. Second, only “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter” is subject to a Rule 12(f) motion to strike. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted in part;

paragraphs 4-10, 37-40, 60, 74, 91-94, 100-104, 106-146, 152-171, 175-

191, and subparagraphs 5 and 7-19 of paragraph 208 are struck from the

Amended Complaint.

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part: the fifth and sixth claims are

dismissed, and the fourth claim is dismissed as to Blanas in his

individual capacity. Further, Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement is granted as to the third claim, and Defendants’ motion to

strike is granted in part.

Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint, which cures the deficiencies identified herein, within

fifteen days of the date on which this Order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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