Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-md-02555/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-md-02555-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Dispute

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: COCA-COLA PRODUCTS 

MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES 

LITIGATION (NO. II) 

Case No. 14-md-02555-JSW (MEJ)

DISCOVERY ORDER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 134-36

INTRODUCTION

The parties filed three Joint Discovery Letters. Dkt. Nos. 134-36. Having considered the 

parties‟ positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court issues the 

following order.

BACKGROUND1

This Multi-District Litigation consists of several class actions in which Plaintiffs allege 

Defendants The Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., BCI Coco-Cola 

Bottling Company of Los Angeles, and Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Sonora, California 

(collectively, “Defendants”): (1) failed to identify phosphoric acid, a labeled ingredient in CocaCola (or “Coke”), as an artificial flavor and a chemical preservative; and (2) issued packages and 

labels containing allegedly misleading statements and omissions, including: (a) Coke‟s ingredient 

list not identifying phosphoric acid as an artificial flavor or chemical preservative; (b) a Coke label 

statement: “no artificial flavors. no preservatives added. since 1886” (the “Pemberton Claim”2); 

 

1 A complete factual background is set forth in the presiding judge‟s Order re: Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment. See Summ. J. Order at 1-3, Dkt. No. 116. This background is largely taken 

from the parties‟ letters.

2

The Pemberton Claim is named after John Pemberton, the inventor of Coca-Cola. Plaintiffs 

allege the Pemberton Claim is part of a “campaign [] designed to mislead [the public] into falsely 

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and (c) a Coke label statement: “original formula” (the “OF Claim”). 

On July 10, 2015, the Court ordered discovery proceed in phases, limiting Phase II to class 

certification issues. Case Management Conference Minutes, Dkt. No. 69. On June 10, 2016, 

Plaintiffs served upon Coca-Cola Phase II discovery requests comprised of (a) Interrogatories; (b) 

Requests for Admission; (c) Requests for the Production of Documents and Other Things 

(“RFPs”); and (d) a Notice of Deposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The parties‟ 

disputes relate to this discovery.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding 

any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party‟s claim or defense and proportional to the 

needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Factors to consider include “the importance of the 

issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties‟ relative access to relevant 

information, the parties‟ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 

whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. 

Discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. However, “[t]he parties and 

the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and 

consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee‟s note to 2015 

amendment. Thus, there is “a shared responsibility on all the parties to consider the factors 

bearing on proportionality before propounding discovery requests, issuing responses and 

objections, or raising discovery disputes before the courts.” Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 2016 

WL 736213, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016); Goes Int’l, AB v. Dodur Ltd., 2016 WL 427369, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (citing 2015 advisory committee‟s note for proposition that parties 

share a “collective responsibility” to consider proportionality and requiring that “[b]oth parties . . . 

tailor their efforts to the needs of th[e] case”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to 

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 

 

believing that Coca-Cola was not artificially flavored or chemically preserved.” Consolidated 

Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, Dkt. No. 79.

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Rule 26(c) “confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is 

appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 

20, 36 (1984). “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including an order (1) 

prohibiting disclosure or discovery; (2) conditioning disclosure or discovery on specified terms; 

(3) preventing inquiry into certain matters; or (4) limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to 

certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes Defendants repeat the same two arguments in all three 

discovery letters: (1) Plaintiffs‟ requests to compel are untimely because they seek compliance 

after the discovery cut-off date; and (2) Plaintiffs‟ requests go to merits discovery, not class 

certification discovery and therefore fall outside the scope of Phase II discovery.

With regard to the first argument, the Court does not find much merit. While the Phase II 

discovery cut-off date was September 23, 2016, the parties expressly stipulated to extend the 

deadline to file an application to compel this discovery until October 14, 2016, and the presiding 

judge entered their stipulation into an Order on September 16, 2016. See Stip. at 3, Dkt. No. 130; 

Order Adopting Stip., Dkt. No. 131; compare Civ. L.R. 37-3 (motions to compel should not be 

filed more than seven days after the discovery cut-off date). Defendants argue Plaintiffs have been 

on notice of their objections to the discovery since July 2016, that the stipulation to extend the 

motion to compel deadline was “an accommodation to Plaintiffs‟ counsel[,]” and that they 

“expressly reserved [the] right to argue that Plaintiffs‟ arguments were untimely.” Dkt. No. 134 at 

3 and 3 n.12. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that Plaintiffs were required to 

move to compel Defendants‟ discovery responses by an earlier deadline. The fact that Defendants

“expended significant effort to design and carry out a discovery plan targeted to the categories of 

documents that it agreed to produce” (FDA Compliance Letter at 4) does not stop Plaintiffs from 

seeking discovery and filing a discovery letter to compel evidence on the schedule the parties

agreed on and the Court ordered. Requiring parties to move to compel earlier than the deadline for 

doing so might have the unintended consequence of discouraging efforts to negotiate a mutually 

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agreeable resolution, lest a party be accused of delaying its way into waiving its right to compel 

further responses. 

As to the second argument, the line between merits and class certification discovery is not 

always bright. California district courts have recognized that “„discovery can certainly be relevant 

both to class certification issues and to the merits.‟” Yingling v. ebay, Inc., 2010 WL 373868, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (quoting Ho v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 2007 WL 1394007, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. May 9, 2007)). This is because discovery going to the merits of a plaintiff‟s claim also often 

has “significant bearing on issues such as predominance and commonality under Rule 23.” 

Lindell v. Synthes USA, 2013 WL 3146806, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (“Discovery relating 

to class certification is closely enmeshed with merits discovery, and in fact cannot be 

meaningfully developed without inquiry into basic issues of the litigation.” (quoting Gray v. First 

Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1990)). In Lindell, the Court noted that as the 

United States Supreme Court has “require[ed] that putative plaintiffs „affirmatively demonstrate [] 

compliance‟ with Rule 23. . . . Courts must liberally apply discovery rules during a bifurcated 

class discovery phase to permit plaintiff to meet that burden.” Id. at *4 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)); see also Martinelli v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 WL 

4055040, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2016) (on a motion to compel, acknowledging that “[w]hether 

the requested evidence will suffice to prevail on the question of class certification is simply not the 

question. Rather the issue presented is one of discoverability.”). Accordingly, the Court considers 

the parties‟ merits versus class certification arguments on a dispute-by-dispute basis below.

The Court now turns to the parties‟ letters.3

A. Letter at Dkt. No. 134 (“FDA Compliance Letter”)

Plaintiffs move to compel Defendants to produce (1) “all communications” with the U.S. 

Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and other governmental entities concerning the 

lawfulness of Coke‟s labeling and the classification of phosphoric acid under federal or state laws

 

3

In reviewing these letters, the Court found Plaintiffs overused footnotes. This practice buries 

critical arguments, citations, and other meaningful aspects of the parties‟ disputes and obfuscates 

the arguments contained in those footnotes. 

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and regulations, and (2) “all documents” concerning whether the disputed aspects of Coke‟s 

labeling complied with federal or state laws and regulations. FDA Compliance Ltr. at 1, 3, Dkt. 

No. 134. Defendants object to Plaintiffs‟ request, arguing Plaintiffs seek discovery that goes to 

the merits not class certification. Id. at 4. 

Plaintiffs argue this information relates to commonality and predominance considerations 

under Rules 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3), contending the information “will likely show class wide 

materiality of the claim and that the claims treatment by the governmental authorities would be 

common for all class members.” Id. at 1-2. Defendants respond that “[m]ateriality . . . turns on 

consumers’ decision-making” and thus documents about communications with the FDA and 

internally are not relevant. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 

The Court finds this information is properly discoverable at the class certification 

discovery phase. If Coke possesses communications with the FDA or other governmental entities 

warning Coke its representations were misleading, this evidence may be useful common proof to 

determine what consumers were likely to understand. See Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 

2016 WL 1535057, at *3, 5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2016) (finding meaning of message conveyed by 

defendant‟s packaging and advertising significant to issue of commonality and predominance); see 

also Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 2013 WL 685372, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (“The 

FDA‟s 2009 industry guidance statement is relevant to the issue of whether these labels could be 

deceptive or misleading to a reasonable consumer[.]”); Rojas v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 2013 WL 

5568389, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“Of course, the FDA‟s views are „relevant to the issue of 

whether these labels could be deceptive or misleading to a reasonable consumer‟” (quoting Ivie, 

2013 WL 685372, at *12)). For example, Plaintiffs seek “[a]ll communications with FDA or other 

governmental entities regarding the removal of the Pemberton Claim from containers of CocaCola[,]” which could reveal whether Defendants had reason to believe the inclusion or exclusion 

of that claim would affect a reasonable consumer. Martinelli, 2016 WL 4055040, at *4 (allowing 

discovery of documents that “could speak to the effect of the alleged misrepresentation on a 

reasonable consumer.”). 

Similarly, nonprivileged documents concerning whether Defendants‟ advertising and 

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labeling on their products complied with state and federal laws and regulations could be 

persuasive evidence supporting commonality and predominance. See Onstar Contract Litig. v. 

Gen. Motors Corp., 2009 WL 3424196, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2009) denying reconsideration 

sub nom Morris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2010 WL 956026, at *5-7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2010) 

(internal communications regarding proposed FCC rule change relevant to class certification; such 

discussions could demonstrate the defendant‟s beliefs as to the common impact of the rule change

and whether defendant believed disclosure was necessary). For instance, Plaintiffs request “[a]ll 

communications with the FDA or other governmental entities regarding whether phosphoric acid 

is a preservative” (RFP No. 22, Dkt. No. 134-2), which could reveal evidence that Coke had 

reason to believe its products were misbranded and should have provided different labeling. That 

said, RFP Nos. 1(g) and 1(s) are somewhat overbroad, requesting: (g) “All documents relating to 

whether aspects of Project Pemberton complied with federal or state laws or regulations”; and (s) 

“All documents relating to whether the Pemberton Claim on containers of Coca-Cola complied 

with federal or state laws or regulations.” Id. No. 1. These requests appear to go beyond the 

allegations in the Complaint, which relate to the alleged violations of specific laws and 

regulations. 

In sum, the Court finds the information sought above discoverable, except for RFP Nos. 

1(g) and 1(s). The parties shall meet and confer by November 4, 2016 and agree on a production

responsive to 1(g) and 1(s) that is tailored to the laws and regulations at issue in Plaintiffs‟ 

Complaint. Defendants shall produce all requested discovery by December 2, 2016.

B. Letter at Dkt. No. 135 (“Communications Letter”)

Plaintiffs seek (1) communications with marketing, advertising, or promoting consultants, 

agencies, experts, or professionals retained by Coca-Cola regarding (a) the Pemberton and OF 

Claims, (b) the disclosure or non-disclosure of any artificial flavoring‟s or preservatives‟ presence 

in Coke, and (c) consumers‟ perception of Coke‟s healthiness; and (2) documents concerning 

consumer views‟ of Coke‟s healthiness and ingredients and the impact of the various claims and 

omissions at issue on consumers, which would include any internal and external communications 

and any internal or third-party reports, memoranda, or other documents regarding those topics. 

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Communications Ltr. at 1, Dkt. No. 135. 

Again, the dispute comes down to the scope of class certification discovery. According to 

Defendants, Coca Cola searched its centralized consumer research repository and produced the 

one study in its possession concerning the impact of the Pemberton Claim on consumers and also 

produced research concerning consumers‟ attitudes toward preservatives, artificial flavoring, and 

Coca-Cola‟s general healthiness. Id. at 4-5. Coca-Cola represents it also produced all documents 

associated with these studies that were saved in the repository, including, where available, the 

study design, the contract to conduct the research, and documents outlining the study‟s objective. 

Id. at 5. Defendants object to producing “all communications about the studies already 

produced[,]” arguing such communications have no relevance to class certification, which they 

contend turn on whether consumers “hold consistent views and share common understandings of 

Coke‟s label claims[,]” not what Defendants‟ employees said about those claims. Id. (emphasis in 

original). They also object to Plaintiffs‟ request to produce information about Coke‟s private 

internal communications about its marketing strategies and why they removed the Pemberton and 

OF Claims from the label. Id. at 4.

Plaintiffs broadly argue that “[i]f Defendants documented or discussed specific reasons 

underscoring their labeling decisions and ingredient list disclosures, those materials are relevant to 

commonality, predominance, typicality, and class-wide materiality[,]” and “[i]f Defendants 

understood or believed that there would not be differing definitions or perceptions concerning 

Coke‟s representation of „no artificial flavors. no preservatives added‟, those discovery responses 

inform commonality, predominance, and typicality.” Id. at 2. They contend “[t]he same 

reasoning holds true for Defendants‟ internal or external communications regarding Project 

Pemberton and consumers‟ view of that campaign, Coke‟s labeling and packaging, and/or Coke‟s 

alleged healthiness and ingredients[.]” Id. at 2-3. 

Both parties rely on Martinelli v. Johnson & Johnson, in which the discovery magistrate

held that “marketing research and data that the defendants may possess which bears on whether 

consumer choice of product to purchase is affected by the product claim in question is relevant and 

discoverable.” 2016 WL 4055040, at *4. Defendants agree; indeed, they have produced much of 

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that very information. See id. at 4. The question is whether Defendants‟ internal and external 

communications about these studies and marketing strategies should be discoverable at this stage.

The Court agrees with Defendants that many of those requests are broad and would impose 

a burden not “proportional to the needs of the case.” Communications Letter at 4 (citing Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26). For instance, Plaintiffs‟ request for “[a]ll communications with marketing, 

advertising, or promoting consultants, agencies, experts, or professionals retained by Defendants 

regarding Project Pemberton” (RFP No. 1(d)) goes beyond what could be needed to support class 

certification; documents responsive to that request could include irrelevant communications like 

bids between advertising agencies, bills, etc. Similarly, Plaintiffs also request documents such as 

“[a]ll internal reports, memoranda, studies, surveys, research, or analysis regarding the removal of 

the Pemberton Claim from containers of Coca-Cola.” RFP No. 1(aa). This broad request could 

also include information completely unrelated to Plaintiffs‟ claims, such as memoranda about how 

to manufacture Coke products after removing the Pemberton Claim or a description about how 

Coke products will look now without the Pemberton Claim—none of which is seemingly relevant 

to commonality or predominance. 

But rather than that information, Plaintiffs appear to seek discovery about how Defendants

perceived their own representations, how they intended consumers to perceive those

representations, and how they understood customers to perceive those representations. Such

inquiries are relevant because Plaintiffs could use such evidence as common proof that Defendants

chose to advertise in a certain way to impact its consumers‟ choice. If Defendants believed their

representations would cause consumers to react in a certain way, and developed the 

representations to achieve that result, that evidence could be probative common proof of whether 

Defendants expected a reasonable person to rely upon the representations in deciding to purchase 

the product. See Martinelli, 2016 WL 4055040, at *3-4 (rejecting argument that “internal 

documents and communications regarding what they may have intended to communicate to 

consumers on the product labels is simply not probative of what a reasonable consumer actually 

understood” and finding “internal marketing materials” relevant to class certification as 

“[w]hatever information, marketing data, research and analysis defendants possess that shows 

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whether consumers favorably respond to sales strategies centered on such a claim is relevant to 

whether that reasonable person standard is satisfied.”).

4

 As Martinelli indicates, discoverable

information includes Defendants‟ communications describing their analysis and strategies—not 

only their final “consumer research.” See Communications Letter at 1-2 n.5-6; see also Ang v. 

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 2014 WL 1940178, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (finding as 

relevant discovery for “information about defendant‟s marketing and labeling decisions” including 

its “intent, motive, and knowledge”).

The Court once again finds that much of the information Plaintiffs seek could be relevant 

and is properly discoverable; however, as noted, the Court is concerned that some of the requests 

could result in retrieval of information Plaintiffs do not need and likely do not want, wasting 

Defendants‟ time and resources as well. Accordingly, using the Court‟s analysis above, the parties 

shall further meet and confer on the requests in this letter by November 4, 2016 and agree on a 

production tailoring and narrowing the production, due by December 2, 2016. In doing so, the 

parties are not limited to only those materials arising out of the class period. See Communications 

Letter at 3 n.14 (indicating Defendant withheld some pre-class certification discovery). Indeed, 

Pre-class period discovery is often relevant, particularly in misleading advertising cases. See, e.g.,

Ogden v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 620, 627-28 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (permitting pre-class 

 

4

The cases cited by Defendants are unhelpful. In Harris v. comScore, Inc., the discovery judge

found that “comScore‟s internal communications are less relevant to that issue than how the 

software actually impacted the putative class” and ultimately did not order that discovery because 

“[p]laintiffs have access to the source code, which, in conjunction with the discovery responses 

mandated in this order, should demonstrate how the software impacted the members of the 

putative class.” 2012 WL 686709, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2012) (emphasis added). The court did 

not find internal communications completely irrelevant but, rather, given the discovery it had 

otherwise ordered, found the discovery of those communications essentially unproportional to the 

needs in that case. See also id. at *7 n.4 (the court, however, exempted “communications between 

comScore and its employees” as source code was “not responsive” to that request, thus indicating 

internal communications could be relevant); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(i) (court must limit 

discovery that can be obtained from some more convenient, less-burdensome source). 

As to Kastroll v. Wynn Resorts, Ltd., 2011 WL 4916623, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2011), while the 

court there held the “internal communications . . . [did] not pertain to the class certification or in 

any way aid the plaintiff in determining the members of the class,” it did not explain why it 

reached that conclusion. Context of course matters to a relevance determination; there is no 

indication Kastroll was a false advertising case such as this one or that these cases share similar 

elements of their claims. 

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period discovery regarding defendant‟s marketing and labeling decisions, but finding “information 

such as sales numbers, advertising expenditures, profits, costs, or other information not tied to the 

marketing decisions is not relevant beyond the limitations period”); Ang, 2014 WL 1940178, at *2

(agreeing with Ogden that information about defendant‟s pre-class period marketing and labeling 

decisions in food misbranding case would relevant); see also In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., 

2012 WL 3791716, at *5 (C.D. Cal. March 12, 2012) (“It is also beyond dispute that discovery is 

not limited to the class period.”). Accordingly, as the parties tailor Defendants‟ required 

production, they are not limited to only the class period.

Finally, Defendants‟ production need not include discovery that is not in their possession, 

custody, or control. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). While Plaintiffs argue Defendants did not 

request responsive information from Coke‟s numerous franchise bottlers (Communications Letter 

at 3 n.14), it is not clear who those franchise bottlers are, or whether Coke exercises possession, 

custody, or control over the information held by those entities (id. at 5 (indicating these nonparties 

are not subsidiaries of Coke)). Nor is it clear those franchise bottlers are likely to have useful 

information at this stage. While Defendants are of course required to comply with their Rule 34 

obligations, Plaintiffs have not established any basis at this stage to require Defendants to seek and 

produce information from the bottler franchisees. This dispute is thus premature. 

C. Letter at Dkt. No. 136 (“Marketing and Sales Data Letter”)

The third letter involves a dispute over Plaintiffs‟ discovery requests for internal reports, 

memoranda, studies, surveys, research and analysis of the claims and the effects of the labels and 

marketing on sales, revenues, profits, market share and prices. Marketing & Sales Data Ltr. at 1-2, 

Dkt. No. 136. Plaintiffs concede Defendants agreed to produce certain sales, revenues, and profits 

data in response to several of their requests but note Defendants refused to produce any data 

regarding market share. Id. at 2 n.5. They also explain that Defendants have refused to produce 

anything but “non-privileged final versions of any study or analysis” or “non-privileged consumer 

research undertaken.” Id. at 2. Finally, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants‟ representation that they 

undertook a reasonable search for responsive documents. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs again note 

Defendants admit that they have not searched for or collected documents from Coca-Cola‟s 

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“numerous franchisee bottlers, asserting that they have no obligation to do so.” Id.

First, as to market share data, Coke contends that “market share is not relevant to any 

theory of damages under which Plaintiffs could recover.” Id. at 5. They assert that “[t]his is not a 

case in which a competitor alleges that Coca-Cola‟s conduct caused it to lose market share[,]” but 

rather it “is a putative consumer class action in which Plaintiffs allege that, if Coke had been 

labeled differently, they would not have bought the product or would have paid less.” Id. They 

contend market share is not relevant to that determination. Id. Plaintiffs respond that “market 

share is relevant to the benefit Defendants may have received from the labeling practices, with 

either the maintenance, relative maintenance or growth of market share via the labeling practices 

improperly benefitting Defendants.” Id. at 2. Additionally, they contend “market share is an 

additional data point that can be juxtaposed with other information to assess, objectively, the 

class-wide materiality of the label statements.” Id.

Plaintiffs have not articulated how this information is relevant to any issue at class 

certification. Nor have they provided any legal authority supporting their position that this 

information should be discoverable. Assuming arguendo Defendants‟ market share changed as a 

result of the labeling at issue, Plaintiffs do not show how the change would relate to the 

commonality or predominance analysis. Given Defendants‟ challenge to the market share inquiry 

and Plaintiffs‟ inability to explain why this evidence is relevant to their claims or to class 

certification, the Court finds that any potential relevance the information might have would not 

justify its production under proportionality principles at this time. The Court accordingly does not 

find it discoverable during this phase of discovery.

5

Second, as to the effects of the disputed labeling claims on Coke‟s sales, revenues, profits, 

and prices, Defendants argue that they have already searched for “studies and analyses that 

examined those issues” and could find none. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs contend Coke in fact refused to 

produce anything but “non-privileged final versions of any study or analysis” or “non-privileged 

 

5

Potentially, Plaintiffs could be seeking this information to help them assess damages, but in that 

case, especially given the other information available to Plaintiffs, market share does not strike the 

Court as particularly useful to that analysis at the class certification stage.

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consumer research undertaken.” Id. at 2. They seek Coke‟s internal communications that discuss 

the impact of the various challenged claims and omissions on Coke sales, revenues, profits, and 

prices. Id. Finally, they note that Defendants‟ refusal to fully respond to these discovery requests 

improperly inhibits Plaintiffs‟ ability to obtain [] evidence to calculate the form of monetary relief 

pertinent to [Rule] 23(b)(3) class certification.” Id. at 3.

Having reviewed Plaintiffs‟ requests, with the exception of the market share data, the 

Court generally finds this information discoverable at this stage. See Brown v. Hain Celestial 

Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 5800566, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) (finding pricing information 

relevant in false advertising case and reiterating findings made in prior Order, Brown v. Hain 

Celestial Grp., Inc., 2012 WL 3283289, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012)); Lanovaz v. Twinings N. 

Am., Inc., 2015 WL 3627015, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2015) (“damages plaintiff now seeks—

profits from the mislabeling—are damages available under the consumer protection statutes”); see 

also Kumar v. Salov N. Am. Corp., 2016 WL 3844334, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (at class 

certification, “plaintiffs must be able to show that their damages stemmed from the defendant‟s 

actions that created the legal liability” (quoting Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 

(9th Cir. 2013)); Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2015), 

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2410 (2016) (while “differences in damage calculations do not defeat class 

certification” acknowledging that a model for determining class-wide damages must measure 

damages resulting from the class‟s asserted theory of injury). The effects of the disputed labeling 

claims on sales, revenues, profits, and pricing information is relevant to the class certification 

damages inquiry. 

Accordingly, Defendants‟ non-final studies, analyses, and/or communications about the 

effects of the disputed labeling claims on their sales, revenues, profits, and prices are generally 

discoverable, although realistically not all such non-final materials will be relevant; while some 

non-final materials may contain important information about the effects of the disputed labeling 

claims, others may not. Thus again, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer to exclude any 

irrelevant and unhelpful materials and lessen Defendants‟ burden. Defendants‟ responsive 

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production is due by December 2, 2016.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court thus GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART the parties‟ discovery requests. The parties shall comply with the specific requirements 

outlined above with regard to each discovery letter; all meet and confer sessions must take place 

by November 4, 2016, and all discovery must be produced by December 2, 2016 as indicated 

above. While the Court does not require the parties to meet and confer in person, they shall at 

minimum meet and confer by video telephonic or web-based means. 

Finally, during their meet and confer, the parties should keep in mind the following two 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) an important factor in weighing discovery requests is “the 

parties‟ relative access to relevant information” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)), and (2) the parties must 

construe the rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 

proceeding” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). It is incumbent on Defendants, the parties from whom discovery 

is requested, to work with Plaintiffs to narrow the information sought, which in turn will reduce 

the burden of production for Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

 

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Plaintiffs again raise the issue of obtaining discovery from the franchisee bottlers, but they 

provide no information about the bottlers‟ role in relationship with Defendants or why they 

believe information from those entities would be relevant to their claims. Defendants, on the other 

hand, expressly state that the bottlers‟ are “independent entities” from Coca Cola, rather than 

subsidiaries, and indicate there is no reason to believe they have information relevant to these 

requests that Defendants do not. Marketing & Sales Data Ltr. at 4.

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