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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-11604

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

MARITZA IVETTE DELGADO TORRES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cv-02059-DCI

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-11604

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Maritza Delgado Torres, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s denial of her claim for disability insurance 

benefits. On appeal, she argues that the administrative law judge 

erred by determining that her subjective complaints of pain were 

not entirely consistent with other evidence in the record. She further argues that the Appeals Council erred in concluding that the 

additional evidence she submitted on appeal was not material to 

her claim. After careful review of the record, we affirm the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

I.

For purposes of Delgado Torres’s claims, the relevant period of review is between November 11, 2006, and December 31, 

2009—the date she alleges she became disabled and the date she 

was last insured, respectively. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (11th Cir. 2005). However, because Delgado Torres presented—and the district court considered—treatment records created prior to the alleged disability onset date, we start from the beginning. 

In 2001, Delgado Torres sustained a closed fracture in her 

right leg during an assault and subsequently underwent a manipulation procedure performed by Dr. James Ray. Two years later, she 

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20-11604 Opinion of the Court 3

informed Dr. W. Kevin Cox that she was experiencing pain in her 

right leg and that Dr. Ray had been treating her for her right leg 

injuries. Dr. Cox observed that Delgado Torres had mild swelling 

in her right leg and a decreased range of motion in her right ankle, 

but that her right lower extremity did not exhibit any other abnormalities. He noted that it was “unusual for someone to complain 

of persistent pain two years after a tibial shaft fracture” and explained that he had advised Delgado Torres that physical therapy 

would not help improve her pain. Dr. Cox did not impose any 

work restrictions. 

In 2007, Delgado Torres visited Dr. Alex Perdomo for a consultative examination of chronic back and right leg pain. During 

the examination, Delgado Torres reported that, approximately five 

years prior, Delgado Torres fractured her right tibia and fibula “after she apparently slipped and fell.” Her injury was treated with a 

cast, and she did not work for eight months. Delgado Torres later 

returned to work in the same field part-time, but was “unable to 

stand, walk, or sit for more than 15 to 20 minutes due to complaints 

of pain, mostly over the right knee and lower back area.” 

Dr. Perdomo observed that Delgado Torres could walk 

down the hallway with no assistive device and with no difficulty. 

She had sat comfortably during the exam and had gotten on and 

off the examining table with no problems. She had normal sensory, 

motor, and deep tendon reflexes, and had no neurological deficits. 

As such, Dr. Perdomo opined that Delgado Torres could stand, 

walk, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal 

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-11604

breaks and could frequently lift and carry, but should nevertheless 

limit herself to lifting no more than twenty-five to thirty pounds 

and should avoid repetitive bending, stooping, or crouching. 

Thereafter, a state agency physical consultant, Dr. Sunita Patel, reviewed Delgado Torres’s medical records. Dr. Patel concluded, among other things, that Delgado Torres could occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently lift 10 pounds; that she could 

stand, walk, or sit for six out of eight hours in a normal workday; 

and that she could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but not ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Describing Delgado Torres’s alleged 

symptoms as “partially credible,” Dr. Patel stated that her prior 

right leg fracture had healed and that Delgado Torres had no motor 

weaknesses or gait abnormalities. 

In 2009, Delgado Torres visited David J. Fleischmann, 

Ph.D., for a consultative examination. During the evaluation, Delgado Torres reported independently taking care of her own hygiene, grooming, and dressing; cutting coupons, reading mail, doing small loads of laundry, and sorting recyclables; driving on short 

trips to church or for weekly shopping; and going out on other errands and appointments. Dr. Fleischmann indicated that Delgado 

Torres would have no limitation with respect to understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions and no limitation with 

interacting with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. But Dr. 

Fleischmann also indicated that Delgado Torres would have low 

energy and drive to persist and initiate tasks, that she was pessimistic, and that she would avoid social and work situations.

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20-11604 Opinion of the Court 5

In 2014, Delgado Torres applied for disability benefits. Her 

disability report identified the following medical conditions: (1) fibromyalgia; (2) cervical and thoracolumbar disorder; (3) depression; (4) obesity; and (5) joint dysfunction. After her application 

was denied, Delgado Torres requested and received a hearing, and 

subsequently testified before an ALJ. 

At the hearing, Delgado Torres recounted much of her medical and work histories, including that she had broken her leg in 

2001 and worked as an interviewer conducting surveys and as a 

substitute teacher. She inquired as to whether the ALJ had received 

an additional medical record and statements from her mother and 

neighbor. The ALJ responded that she had only received one letter 

from Delgado Torres’s mother, dated June 20, 2017, but that the 

other documents would be scanned and added to Delgado Torres’s 

file following the hearing. 

A vocational expert testified that a hypothetical person of 

Delgado Torres’s health would be unable to return to Delgado 

Torres’s past relevant work. However, the expert explained that 

the same hypothetical person could work as a price marker, cashier, or a non-postal mailroom clerk. The ALJ asked the expert

whether, if the exertional level was reduced to “sedentary” but the 

other factors remained the same, there were jobs the hypothetical 

person could perform. The expert responded that the hypothetical 

person could work as a ticket checker, a document preparer, or a 

polisher of eyeglass frames. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-11604

On November 8, 2017, the ALJ issued her written decision, 

finding that Delgado Torres was not disabled during the relevant 

period, November 11, 2006, through December 31, 2009. 

At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

found that Delgado Torres had not worked since the alleged onset 

date. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Delgado Torres had the following severe impairments: “status post right leg fracture,” fibromyalgia, depressive disorder, and PTSD. 

At step three, the ALJ concluded that none of Delgado 

Torres’s impairments met the severity threshold of any of those 

listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, because the 

medical evidence did not support such a finding. Specifically, the 

ALJ found that Delgado Torres had a moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information; a mild limitation in interacting with others; a moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in adapting or managing herself. In support, the ALJ cited to Delgado 

Torres’s function report, in which she indicated that she was able 

to drive, shop, cook simple meals, complete certain household 

chores, and manage her finances. The ALJ further relied on the results of the psychological consultative examination, which revealed 

that Delgado Torres had good recall, logical and relevant speech 

and thinking capabilities, and the ability to understand and complete standardized psychological tests.

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20-11604 Opinion of the Court 7

At step four, the ALJ concluded that, during the relevant 

time period, Delgado Torres had the residual functional capacity 

to perform light work, but that she could “never climb ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds,” could “occasionally climb ramps or stairs, as 

well as occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl,” and 

“could perform simple, routine tasks, with occasional changes in a 

routine work setting.” The ALJ detailed Delgado Torres’s allegations regarding her conditions and their effects on her daily life, 

which Delgado Torres had explained in various documents, including pain questionnaires, function reports, and disability reports. 

Regarding Delgado Torres’s subjective testimony of pain, 

the ALJ determined that it was “not entirely convincing” in “light 

of the record as a whole.” For example, the psychological consultative examination obtained during the period at issue showed that 

Delgado Torres admitted to a normal range of daily activities. She 

was able to independently take care of “her own hygiene, grooming and dressing,” “drive on short trips wherever she needs,” go 

out on “errands and appointments,” and could cut coupons, read 

mail, and sort recyclables. Delgado Torres further indicated on the 

function report that she was able to drive, prepare her own meals, 

and perform routine household chores. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded “that the claimant’s testimony is consistent only to the extent that the alleged symptoms prevent her from performing beyond the light level of exertion.”

Concerning the corroborating statements submitted by Delgado Torres’s mother, the ALJ indicated that she afforded them 

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-11604

“only some weight” because they were “provided by non-medical 

professional sources.” The ALJ recognized that Delgado Torres 

had suffered a right leg fracture in 2001, but explained that objective medical evidence indicated that she “had recovered well from 

her original fracture” before the period relevant to her claim. The 

ALJ also noted that, while Delgado Torres claimed she was unable 

to stand or walk for more than 20 minutes, squat, or stand on her 

right toes, the consultative physical examiner had “observed that 

[she] had [a] full range of motion of the lower extremities,” had a 

normal range of motion and strength in all other major joints and 

muscle groups, and did not report experiencing generalized pain.

At step five, the ALJ considered the vocational expert’s testimony and Delgado Torres’s age, residual functional capacity, education, and transferrable work skills, and determined that Delgado 

Torres could have worked as a price marker, cashier, or non-postal 

mailroom clerk. 

The ALJ concluded that Delgado Torres “live[d] a full life, 

despite her allegations to the contrary,” and was not disabled. She 

stated that she was giving “great weight” to the psychological consultative examiner’s overall opinion and “significant weight” to the 

physical consultant’s opinion, as both were consistent with the 

other evidence in the record. Crediting the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ then determined that Delgado Torres was unable 

to perform any of her past relevant work. 

Delgado Torres sought review of the ALJ’s decision and submitted the following additional evidence to the Appeals Council: 

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20-11604 Opinion of the Court 9

(1) a statement from her neighbor indicating that Delgado Torres 

generally remained in her house, was not working in 2007 and 

2008, and had been advised to go to a free clinic in 2009; (2) a statement from Delgado Torres’s mother dated June 20, 2017, describing Delgado Torres’s conditions; (3) a statement from Delgado 

Torres’s mother dated May 30, 2014, stating that Delgado Torres 

could not work and that her mother paid her bills; (4) a statement 

from Delgado Torres’s mother dated July 26, 2017, describing Delgado Torres’s medical treatments; (5) a radiology report of a cervical magnetic resonance imaging test Delgado Torres underwent on 

May 3, 2013; and (6) medical bills and records related to treatment 

Delgado Torres received from 2001 to 2003 for her right leg fracture. The additional medical records indicated that Delgado Torres 

visited Dr. Ray approximately 14 times between December 2001 

and March 2003 and that the fracture was healing normally. The 

last record, which was dated March 3, 2013, stated that the fracture 

had “been well healed.” 

The Appeals Council denied Delgado Torres’s request for 

review. With respect to the statements from Delgado Torres’s 

mother and neighbor, and the medical and billing records from 

2001 to 2003, the Appeals Council stated that the evidence did not 

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that it would change the 

outcome of the decision.” It also concluded that the radiology report did not affect the decision regarding whether Delgado Torres 

was disabled during the relevant period because the case was decided through December 31, 2009, and the record documented a 

test performed in 2013. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-11604

Delgado Torres filed a pro se complaint in the district court. 

She asserted that the ALJ “failed to acknowledge pain as a severe 

impairment” and contended that the Appeals Council “did not adequately evaluate[] the new evidence” that she submitted. The 

Commissioner responded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence and that the Appeals Council properly concluded that the additional evidence Delgado Torres submitted was 

not relevant. The magistrate judge issued a final order affirming

the Commissioner’s decision. 

Delgado Torres appealed.

II.

When an administrative law judge denies an application for 

disability insurance benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we review the administrative law judge’s decision as the final 

decision of the Commissioner. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 

(11th Cir. 2001). Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the decision and 

whether the correct legal standards were applied. Winschel v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal marks omitted).

III.

Delgado Torres makes two arguments on appeal. First, she 

argues that the administrative law judge erred by determining that 

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20-11604 Opinion of the Court 11

her subjective complaints of pain were not entirely consistent with 

the record. Second, she argues that the Appeals Council erred in 

concluding that the additional evidence she submitted on appeal—

statements from Delgado Torres’s mother and neighbor, medical 

invoices from Dr. Ray, and a report of an MRI Delgado Torres underwent in 2013—was not material to her claim.

We begin with Delgado Torres’s first argument. In her view, 

the ALJ failed “to acknowledge pain as a severe impairment” and 

to give “serious consideration” to her subjective complaints of 

pain. Furthermore, Delgado Torres contends that subjective complaints of pain that are accompanied by supporting medical evidence can establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability 

benefits. We are unpersuaded. 

As an initial matter, pain itself is generally not categorized as 

a severe impairment—instead, it is categorized as a symptom. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also Rodriguez v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 118 F.4th 

1302, 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (categorizing pain as a symptom, not an 

impairment); Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)

(same); Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). 

In any event, in her decision, the ALJ gave serious consideration to Delgado Torres’s allegations of pain—citing her pain questionnaires, function reports, and the testimony she had provided at 

the hearing regarding her physical and mental symptoms. As part 

of that serious consideration, the ALJ recognized that Delgado 

Torres nevertheless engaged in “a normal range of daily activities” 

and was able to drive, prepare meals, complete personal care tasks, 

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12 Opinion of the Court 20-11604

run errands, attend appointments, mow the lawn, and perform 

household chores, among other things. The ALJ further noted that 

medical records and the reports of various providers reflected that 

Delgado Torres had recovered from her original fracture and had 

adequate physical and mental abilities, despite her allegations to 

the contrary. Thus, to the extent that the ALJ discredited Delgado 

Torres’s subjective complaints, she “clearly ‘articulate[d] adequate 

and explicit reasons’” for doing so. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 

1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 

(11th Cir. 1995)). 

Delgado Torres’s second argument—that the Appeals 

Council erred in concluding that the additional evidence she submitted was not material to her claim—is equally unavailing. 

Claimants are generally permitted to present new evidence 

at each stage of the administrative process, and the Appeals Council is required to consider such evidence if it is material and chronologically relevant. Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d 

1302, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2018). New evidence is material if there is 

a “reasonable possibility” that it would “change the administrative 

result.” Id. at 1309. Evidence is chronologically relevant if it relates 

to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s hearing decision. 

Id. While the Appeals Council must adequately evaluate new evidence and “apply the correct legal standards in performing its duties,” it is not required “to give a detailed rationale for why each 

piece of new evidence submitted to it does not change the ALJ’s 

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decision.” Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 784 

(11th Cir. 2014).

Here, the ALJ explained that the objective medical evidence 

predating the relevant period indicated that Delgado Torres “had 

recovered well from her original fracture.” The additional pre-2006 

invoices and records Delgado Torres submitted do nothing to undermine that conclusion—they merely recount information that 

the ALJ already possessed, such as the fact that Delgado Torres was 

treated by Dr. Ray. Similarly, the cervical MRI, which was dated 

May 3, 2013, occurred years after the period at issue and did not 

indicate anything pertinent to the period at issue. 

As for the additional statements provided by Delgado 

Torres’s mother and neighbor, they did not contain information 

that was meaningfully different from what Delgado Torres testified 

to at the hearing or included in the various documents she submitted to the agency. Moreover, the ALJ considered certain statements 

prepared by Delgado Torres’s mother and afforded them “only 

some weight” because they were not “provided by non-medical 

professional sources.” We cannot say there was a “reasonable possibility” that the additional statements from Delgado Torres’s 

mother and neighbor would have changed the administrative result. See Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309.

IV.

We AFFIRM the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

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