Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04954/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04954-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA M. PANTOJA-ROMERO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WATERFRONT APARTMENTS, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 02-4954 JSW (JL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(Docket #’s 44, 45 and 50)

Introduction

The parties’ cross-motions for attorney’s fees and costs were referred by the district

court (Hon. Jeffrey S. White) as provided by Civil Local Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 

Having considered the moving and opposing papers and arguments of counsel, this court

recommends that both motions be denied. 

Factual Background

Maria Pantoja- Romero (“Maria”) and her two minor daughters (“G” and “N”) filed suit

alleging discrimination and retaliation claims under the federal Fair Housing Act Amendment

(“FHAA”), Title II of the American With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), §504 of the Rehabilitation Act

and analogous state laws. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to accommodate G’s

disabilities and retaliated against them by threatening eviction. The Plaintiffs also alleged

discrimination based on national origin, familial status, ancestry, race

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 2 of 8

and disability, as well as complaints related to habitability and other state law claims.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, which Maria only partially opposed. In her

opposition brief, she conceded that her first and third claims for violation of the ADA and for

violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were moot because Defendants offered her

accommodation in the form of a new ground floor apartment close to her old residence. 

Plaintiff conceded that her fifth, sixth, and fifteenth claims under the Cal. Civ. Code §54.1 and

51 and Cal. Gov. Code § 12948 were moot as well. Plaintiff also requested that the court

dismiss the remaining federal claim under the FFHA, because a Supreme Court case raised

questions regarding the merits of this claim and Plaintiff could seek a remedy in state court.

Finally, Plaintiff agreed to dismissal of the remaining state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1367(c)(3). This statute provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a state law claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction. The court granted Plaintiffs request to dismiss her first, second, third, fifth,

sixth, and fifteenth claims with prejudice leaving only the state claims, which the court

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The parties filed cross motions for attorney’s fees and costs. At the hearing of the

motions, this court asked counsel to address two questions: first, when did the Defendants

offer the two bedroom apartment to Plaintiffs as evidenced by correspondence; second, what

impact does Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. Of Health and

Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) have on this court’s decision. 

The parties dispute when Defendants offered a better apartment

The parties disagree as to when Defendant offered the two bedroom apartment to

Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs say it was after the complaint was filed on October 17, 2005. Defendants

claim it was in the June 11, 2005 letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel, when Defendants offered

Plaintiffs an apartment that was “similar in size” to the apartment they currently occupied. 

Plaintiffs dispute that this response was adequate, because the apartment offered was only a

one bedroom. Defendants rejoined that if there was any uncertainty

about what “similar in size” meant, Plaintiffs’ counsel should have asked. There is nothing

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 3 of 8

 in the record except the June 11, 2005 letter that discussed either the offer of the apartment

or its size. Between the June 11th letter and the October 17th complaint most of the

correspondence between the parties involved habitability issues and Plaintiffs’ failure to

answer Defendants with specifics of those habitability issues so they could be remedied. 

The Buckhannon decision precludes fees and costs under federal law

At the hearing, Plaintiffs conceded that they could not recover attorney’s fees under

Buckhannon, but in the alternative they requested fees under the “causation or catalyst” theory

under state law, citing four cases in support of their position, only two of which are federal. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ Claim

Plaintiffs move for attorney fees as prevailing parties on the grounds that they obtained

their desired result, a better apartment, through this litigation, which entitles them to attorney’s

fees and costs under the catalyst theory. In Buckhannon the U.S. Supreme Court held that the

fee-shifting provisions of the FHAA and of the ADA require a party to secure either a judgment

on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree in order to qualify as the “prevailing party.”

Accordingly, Buckhannon holds the catalyst theory does not apply in federal court. Chief

Justice Rehnquist noted that fees may not be awarded on the catalyst theory where a plaintiff

achieves the desired result by causing a voluntary change in a defendant’s conduct without

court sanction of the agreement. 

In Buckhannon, Plaintiff operated assisted living residences which and had been

ordered to close by the state fire marshall who determined that the residents must be capable

of “self preservation.” Buckhannon sued for declaratory judgment that the “self preservation”

requirement violated provisions of the FHAA and the ADA. While the case was pending, the

state legislature eliminated this requirement, and the case was dismissed as moot on motion

by the state. Buckhannon moved for an award of attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under

the catalyst theory, like Plaintiffs in the present case.

Although the district court in Buckhannon sanctioned respondents under FRCP 11 for

failing to timely provide notice of the legislative amendment, the court declined to award

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 4 of 8

Plaintiff’s attorney fees under the catalyst theory.

In Buckhannon, Petitioners argued that attorney’s fees are necessary to prevent

defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment to avoid fees. Petitioners

claimed that rejection of the catalyst theory would deter plaintiffs with meritorious but

expensive causes from bringing suit. The Court rejected this contention: "We are skeptical of

these assertions, which are entirely speculative and unsupported by any empirical evidence."

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598, 608.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected the catalyst theory in Barrios v. California

Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 820 (2002). 

In that case, a paraplegic assistant baseball coach sued the California Interscholastic

Federation (CIF) and the California Interscholastic Federation Southern Section, claiming

discrimination under the ADA. Following a settlement, the coach petitioned for attorney’s fees

and costs as the prevailing party. 

The court awarded attorney’s fees because it found plaintiff to be the prevailing party,

not by virtue of his being a catalyst of policy change, but because his settlement agreement

afforded him a legally enforceable instrument (a contract), which under Fischer v. SJB P.D.

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000), made him a prevailing party. 

The court in Fischer explained that a material alteration of the legal relationship

between the parties occurs when plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent

decree or legally enforceable settlement against the defendant. The legal relationship is

altered because the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something he otherwise would not

have to do. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees because the parties not

only entered into a written settlement agreement but further agreed that the district court would

retain jurisdiction over the issue of attorney’s fees, thus affording continuing judicial oversight. 

In the case at bar Defendants offered Plaintiff a better apartment thereby entering into

an agreement. However, it is unclear when the offer was made and the final

agreement was not in writing, nor was it enforceable by the court. The settlement was entirely

private without judicial sanction. In addition, it did not completely dispose of the state law 

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 5 of 8

claims which are now pending in state court. 

Under Buckhannon and Barrios, Plaintiffs in the case at bar cannot obtain an award of

attorney fees, since federal courts no longer adhere to the catalyst theory. Federal courts will

only award attorney fees if the plaintiff obtains a judgment on the merits, a court ordered

consent decree, or a judicially enforceable settlement agreement. None of these

circumstances is present here. The agreement between the parties was reached outside

court and does not involve the court in any way. 

State law does not support a fee award to either side

Plaintiffs concede that they can’t recover fees under federal law. They assert that under

the causation and catalyst theory they are entitled to reasonable attorney fees based on four

cases, only two of which are federal. Plaintiff cites Crommie v. State of Cal., Public Utilities

Com’n, 840 F.Supp 719 (N.D.Cal. 1994), Mangold v. Cal. Public Utilities Com’n, 67 F.3d

1470 (9th Cir. 1995), Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.4th 604 (2004), and

Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 34 Cal. 4th 553 (2004). 

The Federal cases, Crommie and Mangold, are the same. The district court awarded

attorney’s fees after a trial in which plaintiff prevailed, under the state catalyst theory. In both of

these cases the parties won at trial on both their state claims and federal claims. In addition,

the case pre-date Buckhannon. In the case at bar Plaintiff did not prevail on the merits of the

federal claims, the settlement agreement was out of court, and the court dismissed all state

law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367. Thus, the state law claims were not

heard on the merits in this court and are pending in the California superior court. Accordingly,

this court must apply federal law, not state law, in deciding whether to award attorney fees

after the federal claims were dismissed as moot, and the state claims are still being heard. 

For the same reasons this case is distinguishable from the two California state cases

cited, Tipton-Whittingham and Graham. In Tipton, the Ninth Circuit requested that the

California Supreme Court resolve questions of law relating to an award of attorney fees

to a plaintiff who was the catalyst in motivating a defendant to modify its behavior. 

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 6 of 8

The California Supreme Court found after Buckhannon that California law continues to

recognize the catalyst theory and does not require “a judicially recognized change in the

legal relationship between the parties” as a prerequisite for obtaining attorney fees. In order to

obtain attorney’s fees under California law under such circumstances, a plaintiff must establish

(1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought;

(2) the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of

nuisance or threat of expense; and (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the

litigation prior to filing the lawsuit. Tipton-Whittingham, 34 Cal. 4th at 608.

However, in Tipton both state and federal claims became moot in the course of the

parties’ settlement agreement, and there were no state claims remaining. In the case at bar

only Plaintiffs’ federal claims were dismissed as moot, and the state claims are still pending in

superior court. Accordingly, the state claims have not yet been decided on the merits, and

federal law applies to the motion for fees in this court. 

Plaintiff also relies on Graham. The Court’s reasoning in Graham is very similar to that

in Tipton. In Graham the case became moot as well due to Defendants’ voluntary corrective

action. However, all claims were mooted and none remained to be decided in state court.

Graham, 34 Cal. 4th at 562. In the case at bar the court did not resolve any state claims, so

state law does not apply.

Even if this court found that the catalyst theory applies to the case at bar, the evidence

supporting Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees is weak. There is a genuine dispute when

Defendants offered and Plaintiffs accepted the better apartment. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate

any of the following: (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the

primary relief sought; (2) the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of

victory; and (3) Plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit. 

Further, the state claims were not mooted by the Defendants’ conciliatory conduct and remain

to be adjudicated in state court. 

If Plaintiffs win on their state claims in state court they can then move for reasonable

attorney’s fees and may well succeed under the catalyst theory reaffirmed in state cases by

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 7 of 8

Tipton and Graham. It is speculative but possible that if this court awarded attorney’s fees in

this action and the state court also awarded fees, there could be double recovery for

Plaintiffs. However, this possibility in no way shaped this court’s recommendation in the

pending motions. 

This court is bound by the holdings in Buckhannon and Barrios, because in the case at

bar only the federal claims were dismissed as moot and the state claims were dismissed

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and will be decided on the merits in state

court. Therefore, this court must apply federal law and deny Plaintiffs’ motion for fees and

costs.

Defendants’ claim

Defendants also move for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party, on the grounds that

they offered Plaintiffs a two bedroom apartment prior to this lawsuit being filed and, therefore,

Plaintiffs’ claims were made in bad faith and are frivolous, unreasonable and without

foundation. According to Defendants, since all of Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed, they can’t

possibly be prevailing parties and consequently cannot receive an award of attorney’s fees. 

Defendants claim that because their motion for summary judgment was granted, they are

entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. However under the rules set forth in Buckhannon and

Barrios, Defendants cannot be considered the prevailing party either. 

In order to qualify as the prevailing party in litigation under the FHAA or ADA, a party

must secure either a judgment on the merits, a court-ordered consent decree, or a judicially

enforceable settlement agreement. In the case at bar neither state nor federal claims were

decided on the merits, since all of the federal claims were dismissed as moot due to

Defendants’ conciliatory conduct, and the state claims were dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, even if Defendants were the prevailing

party, they still would not be entitled to attorney’s fees. 

The standards which apply to defendants seeking an attorney’s fee award in an ADA

case are different from those which apply to plaintiffs. An award of attorney’s fees to

a prevailing defendant in an ADA suit is appropriate only when plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous,

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C-02-4954 ORDER Page 8 of 8

unreasonable, or without foundation. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(3). If the claims were brought in

bad faith, that alone would justify an award of attorney fees to Defendants in this

case. Goodell v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 207 F.Supp. 2d 1124, 1126 (E.D. Cal., 2002).

In spite of Defendants’ allegations that Plaintiffs proceeded in bad faith and that their

claims were frivolous and without merit, an award of fees to a successful defendant in an ADA

action should be made only under the most compelling circumstances, in order to avoid

discouraging Plaintiffs from bringing a potentially meritorious claim for fear of having to pay

attorney’s fees if they fail. 

Here, Plaintiffs presented substantial evidence of potentially triable habitability issues

(i.e. cockroach infestation, exposed wiring, dilapidated staircase, and failure to reasonably

accommodate plaintiffs’ disabilities) from the outset of the lawsuit, and these claims are still

pending in state court. Once Plaintiffs accepted the ground floor two bedroom apartment

offered by Defendants, Plaintiffs requested in their opposition to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment that their federal claims be dismissed as moot and that their state claims

be dismissed pursuant to § 1367. Thus, even if Defendants were considered the prevailing

party in this action, they have not proved that Plaintiffs’ suit was frivolous, meritless, or without

foundation. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs should also be

denied. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby recommended that Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’

cross motions for attorney’s fees and costs are both denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 15, 2005.

__________________________________

JAMES LARSON

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:02-cv-04954-JSW Document 82 Filed 11/15/05 Page 8 of 8