Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01355/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01355-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS FLOYD BRISSETTE,

SR.,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 13cv1355 BTM(RBB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR TEMPORARY

v. RESTRAINING ORDER

DR. ESTOCK, B. STEPKE, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Thomas Floyd Brisette, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), has filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order. The Court held a hearing on the motion on August

30 and September 6, 2013. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion

is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison – Los Angeles County,

seeks to enjoin Defendants from (1) violating the terms of a prior settlement

agreement between himself and the CDCR; (2) denying him his narcolepsy

medication, as well as the medication and medical appliances he possessed

when he transferred to his current institution from Calipatria State Prison;

(3) denying Plaintiff accommodation of a typewriter; (4) denying Plaintiff 

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neurologic and orthopedic treatment; (5) allowing Dr. C. Wu to act as Plaintiff’s

primary health care provider; (6) transferring Plaintiff to another prison; and (7)

failing to follow the medical instructions prescribed by Dr. Straga, a neurologist

who treated Plaintiff when he was in Calipatria. 

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order

must establish that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of

equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his

claims. Based on the record before the Court, it appears that Plaintiff has not

exhausted his remedies regarding any of his claims except for his claim of

medical indifference with respect to the treatment of his narcolepsy. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") amended 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "Once within the discretion of the district

court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory." Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to

administratively appeal "any departmental policies, decisions, actions,

conditions, or omissions that have a material adverse effect on the welfare of

inmates and parolees." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a) (2011). In order

to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner

would proceed through several levels: (1) formal written appeal on a CDC 602

inmate appeal form, (2) second level appeal to the institution head or designee,

and (3) third level appeal to the Secretary of the California Department of

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Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.7. 

The attachments to the Complaint include a CDC 602 inmate appeal form

dated January 20, 2013, in which Plaintiff requested that (1) Dr. Wu not be

assigned as his primary care provider; (2) that he be able to see a neurologist,

a hearing specialist as well as an orthopedic specialist; and (3) that his medical

property and appliances be returned. (Doc. 1, p. 38 of 65.) Plaintiff’s first level

appeal was addressed by the institution in a letter dated February 14, 2013. 

(Doc. 1, p. 39-40.) The institution determined that Plaintiff was not treated with

deliberate indifference and denied all of Plaintiff’s requests. There is no

evidence that Plaintiff pursued his claims any further - the record does not

contain any second level or third level appeal. Therefore, it appears that these

claims are unexhausted.

Plaintiff arguably did exhaust his claim of medical indifference with

respect to his need for Provigil to treat his narcolepsy. At the third level of

review, the institution determined that there was no need for intervention at the

Director’s Level of Review because in response to Plaintiff’s appeal, he was

seen by his primary care provider, received a repeat sleep study and a multiple

sleep latency test, had his diagnosis of narcolepsy confirmed, and was

prescribed Provigil. (Doc. 1, p. 47-48.) The institution explained,

“Documentation is supportive of you receiving PCP evaluation and treatment

as determined medically indicated for history of narcolepsy including an active

prescription for Provigil.”

On January 31, 2013, two days after Plaintiff’s third level appeal was

denied, Plaintiff’s prescription for Provigil expired and was not renewed. 

(Finander Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff explains that he has not received Provigil since

the expiration of his prescription. Plaintiff fell on or about July 3, 2013, and was

prescribed Provigil by the emergency room doctor. However, prison medical

staff did not provide Plaintiff with Provigil.

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Dr. Finander, a physician employed by CDCR and stationed at California

State Prison – Los Angeles County, explains that after Plaintiff transferred to

California State Prison in January 2013, she reviewed the sleep study

performed on Plaintiff at Alvarado Hospital on May 24, 2012. Dr. Finander

concluded that the sleep study supports a finding that Plaintiff suffers from

Periodic Limb Movement or Restless Leg Syndrome, but is not consistent with

a diagnosis of narcolepsy. (Finander Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) 

As a result of her analysis, Dr. Finander determined that it would not be

proper to prescribe Provigil to Plaintiff. (Finander Decl. ¶ 5.) Dr. Finander

explains that Provigil is an amphetamine, can be addicting, and can have very

harmful effects on a patient’s heart. (Id.) Therefore, Dr. Finander made the

decision not to renew Plaintiff’s Provigil prescription. (Id.) Dr. Finander

disagrees with the emergency room doctor’s decision to prescribe Provigil, and

explains that the emergency room doctor apparently relied on Plaintiff’s oral

statements instead of sleep studies or other medical evidence of narcolepsy. 

(Finander Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff is not receiving Provigil

based on the medical opinion of Dr. Finander that Plaintiff des not suffer from

narcolepsy. Dr. Finander’s medical opinion may be different from that of Dr.

Straga or the emergency room doctor. However, a difference of medical

opinion is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). “To prevail on a claim involving choices

between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the

chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances’ and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to

[the prisoner’s] health.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.

2004)(quoting Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332). Plaintiff has not alleged facts

satisfying this standard. 

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As for Plaintiff’s motion to enjoin Defendants from transferring him to

another facility, Plaintiff has not shown that any transfer is being contemplated

or that irreparable harm would result from such transfer. For example, Plaintiff

has not established that his medical conditions cannot be treated or

accommodated at other institutions. Moreover, Plaintiff does not have a

constitutional right to be housed at a particular institution. See Olim v.

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-50 (1983).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for temporary

restraining order is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 9, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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