Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04016/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS T~11th Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk JAMIE EDWARD HARTZELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

HONDA MOTOR COMPANY LTD.; 

AMERICAN HONDA MOTORS, CO., 

INC., a California 

corporation; HONDA RESEARCH 

AND DEVELOPMENT, LTD.; 

HONDA RESEARCH OF AMERICA, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-4016 

(D.C. No. 86-C-743W) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff-appellant Jamie Edward Hartzell filed a Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion on November 7, 1989, seeking relief from the 

district court's November 29, 1988 order denying his motion for 

new trial or judgment n.o.v. See Rec. vol. II, doc. 411 at 10 

(relying upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), (3) & (6). 1 Plaintiff 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) allows the court to "relieve a party or 

a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding .... " (emphasis added). At issue in this case is 

the October 19, 1988 judgment on the jury verdict. Rec. vol. I, 

(footnote continued to next page) 

Appellate Case: 90-4016 Document: 010110031881 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 1 
sought relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence which he 

claims was suppressed by defendants during discovery. 

Our review of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is for an 

abuse of discretion. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 

434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). Plaintiff raises numerous issues 

pertaining to the underlying judgment, but an appeal from the 

denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does not run to the underlying 

judgment. Id.; Devargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1258 (10th 

Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds, Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 

675 (10th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion for relief 

from the final judgment in this case was filed within the one-year 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

doc. 384. The judgment became final on November 29, 1988, the 

date the district court entered its order denying plaintiff's 

timely-filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a) (4). 

A motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)-(3) must be filed 

within one year after the final judgment is "entered or taken." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Given a timely-filed Rule 59 motion, the 

time-period for Rule 60(b)'s one-year limitation begins to run 

when the Rule 59 motion is denied. Nat'l Passenger R.R. Corp. v. 

Maylie, 910 F.2d 1181, 1183 (3rd Cir. 1990). Thus, the Rule 60(b) 

one-year time period concerning the October 19, 1988 judgment in 

this case began running on November 29, 1988, when the district 

court denied plaintiff's timely-filed motion for new trial and 

judgment n.o.v. Accordingly, the plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion 

(filed on November 7, 1989) is within the one-year limitation 

period. 

In addition to relief predicated on the grounds contained in 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) & (3), plaintiff also seeks relief on the 

grounds contained in Rule 60(b)(6). Application of Rule 60(b)(6) 

is not subject to a one-year time limitation, however, it is well 

established that "clause (6) and the first five clauses of Rule 

60(b) are mutually exclusive, with the result that clause (6) 

affords no basis for relief at any time available under either of 

the earlier clauses." Carr v. District of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 

926 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Thus, we consider plaintiff's Rule 

60(b) motion on grounds contained in (2) & (3). 

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Appellate Case: 90-4016 Document: 010110031881 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 2 
time limitation for motions under Rule 60(b)(2) & (3). See supra 

n.1. 

To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(3), plaintiff was required 

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants' conduct 

constituted fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct. 

Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 952 

(10th Cir. 1990). The district court found that: (1) defendants 

reasonably complied with the court's bench discovery order 

concerning the Pawling deposition documents, (2) defendants' 

corporate designee, Mr. Tanaka, referred to different documents 

from those now relied upon by plaintiff when Mr. Tanaka testified 

that preliminary testing documents had been destroyed, and (3) the 

photographs and the rack testing reports now relied upon by 

plaintiff were not the subject of a discovery request or order. 

Rec. vol. I, doc 420 at 2-5. Plaintiff has not convinced us that 

these findings are clearly erroneous; consequently, plaintiff 

cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is 

entitled to relief from judgment based upon claimed misconduct of 

the defendants. 

Newly discovered evidence may result in a new trial upon a 

Rule 60(b)(2) motion if the following conditions are met: (1) the 

evidence is newly discovered since trial; (2) the movant was 

diligent in discovering the new evidence; (3) the new evidence is 

not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the new evidence is 

material; and (5) a new trial (with the newly discovered evidence) 

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Appellate Case: 90-4016 Document: 010110031881 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 3 
would probably produce a different result. Graham v. Wyeth 

Laboratories, 906 F.2d 1399, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Concerning the Pawling deposition documents, the district 

court determined that some of the confusion about the scope of the 

discovery order concerning the Pawling deposition documents was 

attributable to the plaintiff. Rec. vol. I, doc. 420 at 4. 

Regarding the rack testing reports and the photographs, the 

district court determined that plaintiff did not make a request 

for production. This suggests that such evidence may not be newly 

discovered evidence. Rec. vol. I, doc. 420 at 5. Another problem 

concerns the materiality of some of the evidence. For example, 

some of the evidence concerns three-wheeled vehicles in contrast 

to the four-wheeled vehicle involved in this case. Admissibility 

of this evidence is problematic. After considering the admissible 

evidence in light of the triable issues in the case, plaintiff has 

not convinced us, nor did he convince the district court, that a 

new trial, with the newly discovered admissible evidence, would 

probably produce a different result. See Graham, 906 F.2d at 

1418. 

We have recognized that the trial judge is in a particularly 

good position to evaluate the merit of a motion for a new trial 

under Rule 60(b). Harris v. Illinois-California Express, 687 F.2d 

1361, 1375 (10th Cir. 1982). Given that the district court 

weighed the finality of the judgment aga~nst plaintiff's 

supporting evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) & (3), we cannot say that 

the district judge abused his discretion. See Ag Pro, Inc. v. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4016 Document: 010110031881 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 4 
Sakraida, 512 F.2d 141, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other 

grounds, 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-4016 Document: 010110031881 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 5