Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00361/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00361-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration; Re-Opening Case; Order of Dismissal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN L. OWENS,

Petitioner,

 v.

JENNIFER SHAFFER,

Respondent. 

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No. C 15-0361 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION;

RE-OPENING CASE; ORDER

OF DISMISSAL

On January 26, 2015, petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a writ of habeas

corpus challenging decisions of the Board of Parole Hearings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On

March 11, 2015, the court dismissed this action for failure to timely file a completed application

to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the filing fee. That same day, petitioner filed the $5.00

filing fee. Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The court reopens this case. However, for the reasons that follow, the petition is DISMISSED.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose

v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

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Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration; Re-Opening Case; Order of Dismissal

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A district court shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show

cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the

applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner raises two claims in his federal habeas petition. First, petitioner alleges that he

is being held beyond his maximum sentence. On November 2, 1988, petitioner was sentenced in

state court to an indeterminate term of 11 years to life with the possibility of parole. Although

difficult to understand, petitioner appears to be arguing that his sentence has been improperly

extended beyond March 27, 1996, which is the date the Department of Corrections calculated as

his projected maximum eligible parole date. 

However, petitioner is not yet entitled to release. Under California law, the duty to set

(or fix) a term of years for a life prisoner does not arise until after he is found suitable for parole. 

See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-71, 1096 (2005). Where, as here, the life prisoner

has not been found suitable for parole, there is no obligation to set a term or a parole release

date. See generally id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) (“[t]he panel shall set a base

term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole”). 

In addition, the question of whether petitioner’s term should be fixed is a state law

matter. Federal habeas relief is not available for an alleged state law error. See Swarthout v.

Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam). Petitioner cannot make a state law claim into a

federal one simply by labeling it “due process.” See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th

Cir. 1996). Thus, the court dismisses this claim for failure to state a cognizable federal habeas

claim.

Petitioner’s second claim is that the application of California’s “Marsy’s Law”

(Proposition 9), which was passed in 2008, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Habeas is the

“exclusive remedy” for the prisoner who seeks “‘immediate or speedier release’” from

confinement. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson,

544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). “Where the prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier

release,’ however, suit may be brought under § 1983.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting

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Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration; Re-Opening Case; Order of Dismissal

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Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82). 

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an

inmate may bring a habeas action only if success on the claim would “necessarily spell speedier

release.” Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2015). Habeas relief is therefore

proper when an inmate is seeking “termination of custody, acceleration of the future date of

release from custody, or reduction of the level of custody.” Id. at 1007. 

Here, petitioner claims that the increase of delays before subsequent parole eligibility

hearings pursuant to Marsy’s Law violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Prior to

the passage of Marsy’s Law, California Penal Code section 3041.5 provided for an initial parole

hearing and annual subsequent parole eligibility hearings, but allowed for longer periods

between parole hearings under certain conditions. For example, the Board could schedule the

next hearing two years (or five years for a prisoner convicted of murder) after a hearing at which

parole was denied if the Board found it was not reasonable to expect that parole would be

granted the following year. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2)(B) (West 2008). In 2008,

Marsy’s Law amended section 3041.5 to lengthen the default periods for subsequent parole

hearings for all prisoners to whom that section applied. As amended, section 3041.5 now

provides for a subsequent parole hearing to be scheduled in 3 to 15 years. See Cal. Penal Code

3041.5(b)(3).

Therefore, even if petitioner were to successfully litigate this claim, it would not

“necessarily spell speedier release” from custody. Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1001. That is, success on

this claim would not terminate petitioner’s custody, or necessarily accelerate the future date of

his release from custody, or reduce his level of custody. See id. (citing Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at

1299 & n.13). The result would only be a more immediate opportunity to be found eligible for

parole. Nettles concluded, “To the extent our cases have indicated that the writ of habeas corpus

may extend to claims that, if successful, would merely be likely to or have the potential to lead to

a speedier release, they are superseded by the Supreme Court’s rulings.” Id. Thus, petitioner’s

second claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable federal habeas claim.

CONCLUSION 

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Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Clerk shall re-open this case. 

Upon initial screening of petitioner’s petition, the court DISMISSES the petition for failure to

state a cognizable claim for relief. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the

file.

For the reasons set out in the discussion above, petitioner has not shown “that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _______________ RONALD M. WHYTE 

United States District Judge

9/23/2015

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