Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02688/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WAYNE SEKERKE,

CDCR #V-15331,

Civil No. 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

(ECF Doc. No. 14)

vs.

V. KEMP, Correctional Officer; A.

ANDERSEN, Correctional Officer; 

A. LAROCCO, Correctional Officer; 

J. LUNA, Correctional Officer; 

C. CRESPO, Correctional Officer; 

J. McGEE, Correctional Officer;

G. SAVALA, Correctional; Lieutenant; 

E. GARCIA, Correctional Captain,

Defendants.

In this case, Keith Wayne Sekerke (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the

California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, is proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants, all California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”),

violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights on April 1, 2011 by using excessive force

against him, failing to adequately treat his pepper spray exposure, and fabricating incident

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -1- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reports afterwards in order to justify a prison disciplinary conviction against him for assault on

a peace officer. (Compl. at 4-7.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants conspired against him in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986. (Id. at 8.) 

Defendants have filed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No.

14). Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 15), to which Defendants have filed

a Reply (ECF No. 17). In addition, the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a Sur-Reply (ECF No.

20). The Court has determined the matter is suitable for submission on the papers, and has held

no oral argument. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1).

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff divides his Complaint into three separate counts, each arising on, or as the result

of, an incident which occurred at RJD on April 1, 2011. (Compl. at 1, 4, 7, 8.)

In “Count 1,” Plaintiff claims his Eighth Amendment rights were violated on that day

when, after he left his cell to go the yard, several fellow inmates informed him that Defendant

Correctional Officers Larocco and Crespo were “trashing [his] cell because [his] cell mate went

to yard wearing unauthorized clothing and would not cooperate by turning it in.” (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff claims he “tried to talk to them to ask them not to punish [him] for what [his] celly

ha[d] done,” but Defendant Andersen, another Correctional Officer, “warded [him] off [by]

threatening [him] with pepper spray.” (Id.) Plaintiff then complained to Defendant Luna, a

Sergeant, but “he would not help or intervene.” (Id.)

Plaintiff then admits he “planned to make a point in return by going into their office and

trashing it.” (Id.) So, “after yard recall, [Plaintiff] ran into their office, shut the door,” and

blocked it with his foot while he “reached out and threw everything on the desk to the floor.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff then alleges to have removed his foot from the door and “got on [his] stomach

with [his] hands behind [his] back on the floor.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims “the whole reason [he]

blocked the door was to insure that no physical violence occurred,” and that he “had no

intentions whatsoever at any type of physical violence.” (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff claims he “only

wanted to do what they did to [him]” and he “figured as long as [he] got down, no violence

would occur.” (Id. at 4-5.) 

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -2- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff now “regret[s] that error in judgment,” and claims the actions which followed

violated his Eighth Amendment rights because Defendants responded in an “unjust,

unwarranted, malicious, sadistic, cruel and deliberate” way. (Id. at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff

claims Defendants Kemp and Andersen entered the office, and Kemp “put his right elbow onto

[his] back and began punching [him] in [his] left ribs with his left hand.” (Id.) Kemp then “got

back up and out of the waywhile C[orrectional] O[fficer] Andersen at point blank range sprayed

[Plaintiff] with ... O.C. pepper spray in the face and body.” (Id.) “Then, [] Kemp started beating

[him] with his expandable baton.” (Id.) Defendant Crespo “stood and held the door open while

all this happened.” (Id.)

Plaintiff then claims he was “dragged out by [his] feet.” (Id.) Defendants McGee and

Larocco arrived, and escorted him “out of the building to the holding cages outside.” (Id.) 

During the escort, Plaintiff claims to have asked Defendant McGee “if he would please take

[Plaintiff] to a shower so [he] could wash off the O.C. pepper spray.” Plaintiff admits he was

permitted to rinse his eyes in a drinking fountain, “but it didn’t help.” (Id.)

Once he was placed in a holding cage, Plaintiff claims Defendant Larocco “had [him]

strip naked and conducted a naked strip search outside in full view of several female staff.” (Id.

at 5-6.) “Several hours later,” Plaintiff claims Larocco took him to Ad-Seg, and Plaintiff “asked

again to be allowed to shower,” but Larocco “wouldn’t let [him].” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges

he was not permitted to shower until April 4, 2011, and to have suffered four days of “burning

on [his] skin, face, hands, arms and body” due to his O.C. exposure. (Id.) 

In “Count 2,” Plaintiff alleges his “Fourteenth Amendment due process” rights were

violated when Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and Larocco “fabricated stories

and ... their [incident] reports” following the April 1, 2011 incident. (Id. at 7.) Specifically,

1

Plaintiff attached no CDCR Form 837-C Staff Report authored byDefendant Larocco; however 1

it appears Defendant Larocco participated in Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings insofar as he was

assigned as Plaintiff’s Investigative Employee (“IE”) pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15

§ 3315(d)(1)(A). (Compl. at 47, 68-69.) As part of those duties, Larocco acted as a “fact finder for the

Senior Hearing Officer (G. Savala)” and his “function was to gather pertinent information, question staff

and/or inmates, and submit a written report.” (Id. at 68.) Larocco’s Report (CDC Form CDC 115A) is

also attached as an Exhibit to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Id. at 68-69.) Larocco’s CDC Form 115A includes 

statements from Plaintiff and inmate Swan, as well as statements from Defendants Andersen, Kemp, and

McGee. Defendant Kemp stated: “[Plaintiff] ran right in to the office and started destroying everything

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -3- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff refers to his own Exhibit D, which is a CDCR Form 837-A, Crime Incident Report Log

No. RJD-210-11-04-0166, completed by Correctional Lieutenant Ortiz, (id. at 20-25), and

supplemented byCDCR Form 837-C Staff Reports filed by Defendants Andersen (id. at 26-27),

Crespo (id. at 29), Kemp (id. at 30-31), and McGee. (Id. at 34.) Plaintiff contends these report

are “fabricated” insofar as they report he “sw[u]ng [his] fists [or] kick[ed] at anyone,” (id. at

7), because he was “on [hi]s stomach with [his] hands behind [his] back on the floor,” at the time

Defendants Kemp and Andersen entered the office. (Id. at 4.) In support, Plaintiff points to his

own Exhibit E, which includes a copy of CDC 115 Rules Violation Report Log No. F2-11-093,

charging him with assault on a peace officer in violation of CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15

§ 3005(d)(1). (Id. at 46.) During his disciplinary hearing, another inmate named Swan testified

that Plaintiff “got down into a prone position before staff entered the office and did not swing

or kick at staff.” (Id. at 47) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims he was found

guilty of assault on a peace officer, referred to ICC for program review and a SHU term

consideration, and assessed a 61 loss of behavioral credit based on “false allegations and

fabricated reports.” (Id. at 7, 48.)

In “Count 3,” Plaintiff allegesDefendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and Larocco

“all conspired and fabricated [their] reports charging [him] with false charges” in order to

“obstruct the due course of justice” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Compl. at 7-8.) Plaintiff

further contends Defendants Savala, Luna and Garcia “had knowledge of the conspiracies and

did not do anything about it,” and thus, are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Id. at 8.)

/ / /

he could. We had to push ou[r] way in as [Plaintiff] resisted by punching and kicking violently. It took

physical force, OC and baton strikes to get him under control.” (Id. at 68.) Defendant Andersen testified

similarly, stating Plaintiff “attempted to keep [them] out of the office as long as possible,” that [h]e

destroyed everything he could reach,” and adding Plaintiff “complied to no verbal orders,” thus, “it was

necessary to use physical, chemical and baton strikes to control him.” (Id.) Defendant McGee testified

that he “did not witness the actual incident or use force. [He] merely escorted [Plaintiff] for

decontamination and medical evaluation.” (Id.) Finally, inmate Swan testified Plaintiff “told [him]

earlier he was going to do it,” “said he did it before in H/U 9,” and that he was “going to go in the office

and trash it, and get down when the alarm went off, he did.” (Id.) Larocco’s IE Report further notes that

some staff members Plaintiff requested be interviewed were not because “none were present at the

incident,” and that all his questions for Defendants Kemp, McGee, Andersen, Luna and another

Correctional Officer named Baker were “answered by reports in 837 Crime/Incident Report RJD-210-

11-04-0166.” (Id. at 69.)

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -4- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff requests relief in the form of $200,000 in general and punitive damages, as well

as a permanent injunction appointing a “federally employed / appointed supervisor” who “is not

answerable to the State to insure ... inmates’ constitutional rights are protected,” the installation

of “surveillance cameras at all areas of the institutions recording at all times,” a “full RICO

investigation into CDCR’s custody staff,” and modifications to CDCR regulations prohibiting

“strip[] searche[s] in view of the opposite sex,” governing the use of O.C. pepper spray, and

requiring “adequate” decontamination protocols. (Id. at 10-11.)

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on grounds that Plaintiff’s

excessive force allegations against Defendants Kemp, Andersen, and Crespo are barred byHeck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), he has failed to state any Eighth Amendment claim as to

Defendants McGee and Larocco, he has failed to state a “due process claim for falsified

disciplinary reports,” and his allegations of conspiracy are “vague” and “lack factual support.” 

See Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14-1) (hereafter “Defs.’

P&As”) at 3-7. 

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence ofsufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside

Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s complaint must

provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id.

(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 679 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -5- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal

conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported bymere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (on motion to dismiss court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does

not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, claims asserted bypro se petitioners, “however inartfullypleaded,” are held

“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, courts “continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating

them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v.

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that courts “have an obligation where

the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and

to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.”)).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may

not generally consider materials outside the pleadings, except for exhibits which are attached. 

See FED.R.CIV.P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part

of the pleading for all purposes.”); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th

Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir.

1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal ... is the complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at

1197 n.1.

B. Heck Bar

Defendants first argue Plaintiff’s “excessive force claim against Defendants Kemp,

Andersen, and Crespo” in Count 1 is barred byHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because

a judgment in his favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his disciplinary conviction

for assault on a peace officer in violation of CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3005(d)(1). See Defs.’

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -6- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

P&As at 3-4. In his Opposition, Plaintiff claims Heck is inapplicable because the good-time

credits he lost as the result of his disciplinary conviction were restored. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4, 11. 

In their Reply, Defendants argue the Court may not look to new allegations or exhibits offered

in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, and that even if Plaintiff’s credits were restored, that

“does not mean that the underlying conviction was overturned,” because CAL.CODE REGS., tit.

15 § 3327 permits restoration of forfeited credits if inmates remain disciplinary-free for a

specified period after their disciplinary conviction. (Defs.’ Reply at 2.) Thus, Defendants argue

the restoration of Plaintiff’s credits does not by itself show, as he must to satisfy Heck’s

favorable termination requirement, that they were restored because his disciplinary conviction

for battery on a peace officer was overturned. (Id.) In fact, the Director’s Level Appeal of

Plaintiff’s CDC 115 disciplinary conviction, which Plaintiff also attached to his Complaint,

indicates that his administrative appeals were denied and that “[n]o changes or modifications

[were] required.” (Compl. at 38.) 

Regardless of the status of Plaintiff’s credit restoration however, this Court finds that

Plaintiff’s excessive force claims are not Heck-barred. “[A] state prisoner cannot use a § 1983

action to challenge the ‘fact or duration of his confinement,’ because such an action lies at the

‘core of habeas corpus.’” Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking damages

alleges constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or

sentence, the prisoner must first establish that the underlying sentence or conviction has already

been invalided on appeal, by a habeas petition, or terminated in his favor via some other similar

proceeding. Heck, 512 U.S. at 483–87. This “favorable termination” rule applies to prison

disciplinary proceedings, if those proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior

credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1997) (holding that claim for monetary and

declaratory relief challenging validity of procedures used to deprive prisoner of good-time

credits is not cognizable under § 1983); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005)

(explaining that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) no matter

the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -7- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) if success in that action would

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”) (emphasis omitted). 

Stated another way, a § 1983 claim is barred if the “plaintiff could prevail only by negating ‘an

element of the offense of which he has been convicted.’” Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148,

1153-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.6). However, when the § 1983 claim

does not necessarily implicate the underlying disciplinary action (or criminal conviction), it may

proceed. See Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 (2004).

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee and Larocco made “false

allegations” and prepared “fabricated reports” that he was resistant after trashing their office on

April 1, 2011. (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff further claims he was “subjected to a SHU term” and lost

custody credits as a result of his disciplinary conviction for assault on a peace officer in violation

of CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3005(d)(1), as set forth in the CDC 115 Rules Violation Report 2

Log No. F2-11-093, which he attaches an exhibit to his Complaint. (Id. at 46-48.) 

In several cases, the Ninth Circuit has applied Heck’s favorable termination requirement

to consider, and sometimes preclude, excessive force claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. For example, in Cunningham, the Ninth Circuit found § 1983 excessive force claims

filed by a prisoner who was convicted of felonymurder and resisting arrest were barred by Heck

because his underlying conviction required proof of an “intentional provocative act” which was

defined as “not in self defense.” 312 F.3d at 1152. A finding that police had used unreasonable

force while effecting the plaintiff’s arrest, the Court held, would “call into question” the validity

of factual disputes which had necessarily already been resolved in the criminal action against

him. Id. at 1154. However, in Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth

Circuit considered whether excessive force allegations of a prisoner who pled guilty to resisting

arrest pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1) were also barred by Heck and found that

“Smith’s § 1983 action [wa]s not barred ... because the excessive force may have been employed

against him subsequent to the time he engaged in the conduct that constituted the basis for his

CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3005(d)(1) provides that “[i]nmates shall not willfully commit or 2

assist another person in the commission of an assault or battery to any person or persons, nor attempt

or threaten the use of force or violence upon another person.”

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -8- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction.” Id. at 693. Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held Smith’s § 1983 action

“neither demonstrate[d] nor necessarily implie[d] the invalidity of his conviction.” Id.; see also

Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f [the officer] used excessive force

subsequent to the time Sanford interfered with [the officer’s] duty, success in her section 1983

claim will not invalidate her conviction. Heck is no bar.”); cf. Hooper v. County of San Diego,

629 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a conviction for resisting arrest under CAL.

PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1) does not “bar a § 1983 claim for excessive force under Heck [if] the

conviction and the § 1983 claim are based on different actions during ‘one continuous

transaction.’”).

Here, Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff’s excessive claims against them are

necessarily inconsistent with his adjudication of guilt for battery on a peace officer. Thus, this

Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s excessive force claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his

battery conviction under CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3005(d)(1). Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The

factual context in which the force was used is disputed. Plaintiff’s Complaint and its exhibits

contain allegations by both himand a fellow inmate witness that he was nonresistant when Kemp

and Andersen entered the office and used force against him. (Compl. at 4-5, 7, 47, 68-69.) 

Plaintiff’s own exhibits also contain allegations by Defendants Andersen, Kemp, and Crespo

which contradict Plaintiff’s version of events. (Id. at 21, 26-27, 29, 30-11, 46-48.) Thus, while

Defendant Savala, the hearing officer presiding over Plaintiff’s CDC 115 hearing, considered

this evidence and found it “substantiated” a charge of assault on a peace officer, (id. at 48),

Defendants Kemp, Andersen and Crespo may still be found liable if, as Plaintiff alleges, they

punched, kicked, and beat him with a baton while he lie on the floor “on [his] stomach with [his]

hands behind [his] back.” (Compl. at 4, 5); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 1, 7 (1992) (when

an inmate claims that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive

physical force, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”); Simpson v.

Thomas, No. 2:03-cv-0591 MCE GGH, 2009 WL 1327147 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2009)

(success on the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim would not necessarily

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -9- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

invalidate his disciplinary battery conviction because “[e]ven if Defendant acted unlawfully by

using excessive force, Plaintiff could still have been guilty of battery.”); accord Gipbsin v.

Kernan, No. CIV S-07-0157 MCE EFB P, 2011 WL 533701 at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Gabalis

v. Plainer, No. CIV S-09-0253-CMK, 2010 WL 4880637 at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“[I]t is possible

for defendants to have used excessive [force] and for plaintiff to have attempted to assault a

correctional officer. Thus, success on plaintiff’s civil rights claims would not necessarily imply

that the guilty finding and resulting loss of good-time credits is invalid.” (emphasis added));

Candler v. Woodford, No. C 04-5453 MMC, 2007 WL 3232435 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007)

(“[B]ecause defendants have not shown that a finding of their use of excessive force would

necessarily negate an element of the battery offense, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff’s

claims are barred under Heck.”); Grant v. Knipp, 2012 WL 2839832 at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 9,

2012).

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

excessive force claims on grounds that they are barred by Heck.

C. Deliberate Indifference Claims Against Defendants McGee and Larocco

Defendants McGee and Larocco also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against them in

“Count 1.” First, Defendant McGee argues he is not alleged to have been “present for the

alleged excessive force incident,” and contends Plaintiff has failed to allege he acted with any

deliberate indifference with regard to his medical needs. (Defs.’ P&As at 4-5.) Plaintiff’s only

allegation as to Defendant McGee in Count 1 is that he “arrived along with Larocco” after

Plaintiff was “dragged” out ofthe programoffice, that he “escorted [Plaintiff] out of the building

to the holding cages,” and that Plaintiff “asked [] McGee is he would please take [him] to the

shower so [he] could wash off the O.C. pepper spray.” (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff admits he was

permitted to rinse his eyes in a “small fountain,” but claims it “didn’t help.” (Id.) 

As to Defendant Larocco, Plaintiff alleges that “several hours” after the incident,

Defendant Larocco escorted him to Ad-Seg. (Compl. at 6.) At that time, Plaintiff “again asked

to be allowed to shower,” but Larocco “wouldn’t let [him].” (Id.)

/ / /

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -10- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To the extent these allegations suggest Plaintiff seeks to hold either McGee or Larocco

liable for violating his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical treatment, the Court agrees

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either of them acted with deliberate

indifference to any excessive risk to his health or safety. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898,

903-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘Deliberate indifference’ is evidenced only ‘when the official knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety ....’”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 837, (1994)). While a claim of deliberate indifference may lie where prison

officials are alleged to have been “aware of the harmful effects of the pepper spray,” but to have

“purposefully refused” to “provide showers, [or] medical care” to address any “obvious risks,”

id., Plaintiff himself admits he was permitted to rinse his eyes in a “small fountain,” immediately

after he was removed from the office and before he was placed in a holding cage. (Compl. at 

5.) Moreover, the CDCR 7219 Medical Report, completed by D. Dela Guerra, LVN, which

Plaintiff attaches as an exhibit to his Complaint, indicates that while he was exposed to O.C.

spray, he was decontaminated, and provided with “self-decontamination instructions” at 1:36

p.m., no more than 16 minutes after he was exposed. (Compl. at 5, 26, 28, 29, 34 35.) Thus,

while Plaintiff claims the initial decontamination provided “didn’t help,” (id. at 5), he has failed

to allege any facts to show that either Defendants McGee or Larocco “purposefully refused” to

address his immediate needs, or had any reason to know that he continued to suffer symptoms

hours later, and yet did nothing in response. See Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference by

“intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.”). 

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either 

McGee or Larocco acted with “deliberate indifference” to any obvious risk ofserious harm. Id.;

see also Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (“mere negligence” is insufficient

for Eighth Amendment liability); Shapley v. Nevada Board. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that “mere delay,” without a showing of harm caused by the

delay, “is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference.”).

/ / /

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -11- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. Due Process Claims

Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and Larocco further seek to dismiss Count

2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint on grounds that his false disciplinary reports claims, like his excessive

force claims, are barred by Heck, and that even if they are not, they nevertheless fail to rise to

the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. (Defs.’ P&As at 6-7.)

First, unlike his excessive force claims, it does appear, based only on the pleadings, that

Plaintiff’s “false” disciplinary reports claims may be barred byHeck insofar as he admits to have

been deprived of good-time credits as a result of being found guilty of battery on a peace officer

(Compl. at 7, 48), but does not further allege to have had the disciplinary conviction which was

based on these reports invalidated prior to filing a civil rights suit. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In

Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648, the Supreme Court made clear that claims for “declaratory relief and

money damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias” related to a prison disciplinary

conviction which resulted in the loss of good-time or custody credit “necessarily imply the

invalidity of the punishment imposed,” and thus, are “not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. “In

other words, if the plaintiff in Edwards proved the truth of the allegations of his complaint, there

[wa]s no way that the revocation of the good-time credits could stand.” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d

817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The same is true as to Plaintiff’s false and deceptive incident report claims against

Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and Larocco. In other words, if Plaintiff could

show that these Defendants all fabricated their incident reports in order to deceive and mislead

the hearing officers who presided over his disciplinary hearing in order to support his conviction

for assault upon a peace officer in violation of CAL.CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3005(d)(1), this would

“necessarily imply the invalidity” of that conviction and the the loss of custody credit could not

stand. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648; Ove, 264 F.3d at 823. Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not allege, nor do any of his attached exhibits show, that the disciplinary

conviction which resulted from the April 1, 2011 CDC 115 Rules Violation Report, Log No. F2-

11-093, was invalidated or set aside in his favor prior to filing this action, the Court finds that 

/ / /

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -12- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s due process claims as alleged in Count 2 are “not cognizable under § 1983.” Balisok,

641 U.S. at 648.

Second, even if Plaintiff’s fabricated report claims were not Heck barred, the Court also

agrees that he has failed to state a due process claim upon which relief can be granted. While

Plaintiff claims Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and Larocco violated “due

process” simply by issuing “fabricated stories” and “false allegations,” to state a Fourteenth

Amendment claim, he must allege more. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir.

1986) (prisoners have “no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly

accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest,” so long

as they are “not ... deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.”). 

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant

prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427

U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances

in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995),

a prisoner can show a liberty interest at stake under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant

hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted);

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges to have been “subjected to a SHU term based on false allegations

and fabricated reports,” and to have forfeited 61 days of behavioral credit which “increas[ed]

[his] sentence.” (Compl. at 7, 48.) Plaintiff’s exhibits further show that he was ordered to serve

a “9-month aggravated consecutive SHU term” as a result of the April 1, 2011 incident. (Id. at

61, CDC 128-G dated 5/27/2011.) The Court assumes the loss of credit, when coupled with a

9-month SHU term, is sufficient to show Plaintiff suffered an “atypical and significant”

deprivation under Sandin. However, he has nevertheless failed to further allege that this

deprivation occurred in the absence of the procedural safeguards which are due. See Wolff v.

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -13- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)

(“When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is

paramount.”).

Specifically, when a liberty interest has been implicated as the result of a disciplinary

charge, the Fourteenth Amendment requires prison officials to provide the prisoner with: (1)

written notice of the charges at least 24-hours before the hearing; (2) the opportunity to appear

in person at the hearing, to call witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence; and (3) a written

statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on for their decision and the reasons for the

action taken by the committee. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; Neal, 131 F.3d at 830; Freeman, 808

F.2d at 952 (“Although prisoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary action and conduct of

prison officials, the protections against arbitrary action ‘are the procedural due process

requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.’”). Once these protections have been provided,

due process is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the officials. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1104-05 (1986); see also

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (even where the punishment is the loss of good

time credits, the requirements of due process are satisfied if there is even “some evidence” to

support the prison’s disciplinary decision). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges generally that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated because his disciplinary conviction was based on “fabricated stories” and “false

allegations.” (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff does not further claim to have been deprived of adequate

notice of the charges against him, however, nor does he claim to have been denied an

opportunity to present a defense during his May 3, 2011 CDC 115 hearing. In fact, Plaintiff

admits he was permitted to present the testimony of inmate Swan, who stated that he “got down

into a prone position before staff entered the office and did not swing or kick at staff,” and which

directly contradicted Defendant Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee and Larocco’s version of the

events. (Id. at 7, 47.) In addition, Plaintiff’s exhibits include a copy of Plaintiff’s CDC 115

Rules Violation Report, Log No. F2-11-093, which shows that Plaintiff received a copy of his

CDC115 on April 7, 2011, and a copy of both the Crime Incident Report, Log No. RJD-210-11-

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -14- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04-0166 (CDC Form 837), and Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence (CDCR Form

7219) on April 19, 2011. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff’s CDC 115 hearing report further shows that

Correctional Lieutenant Savala considered the testimony of several correctional official

witnesses (including Defendants Crespo and Kemp), as well as inmate Swan, but concluded it

“was insufficient to mitigate the reports byC/O Crespon, C/O Andersen, [and] C/O Kemp.” (Id.

at 48.) Thus, both Plaintiff’s own allegations and exhibits demonstrate that he was provided

with the procedural protections guaranteed by Wolff, and that there was “some evidence in the

record” to show him guilty of the disciplinary offense. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the due process

claims alleged in Count 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

E. Conspiracy Claims 

In Count 3, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and

Larocco violated his right to equal protection/access to the courts by “conspir[ing] and

fabricat[ing] reports,” and that this conspiracy “obstruct[s] the due course of justice” under “42

U.S.C. § 1985 et seq.” (Compl. at 8.) Plaintiff claims that “it is a common practice of CDCR

prison guards to escalate incidents, beat inmates, [and] then turn around and falsely accuse the

inmate of crimes like battery and assault to cover up the beatings they inflict.” (Id.) Plaintiff

further alleges Defendants Savala, Luna, and Garcia “had knowledge ofthe conspiracies and did

not do anything about it,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Id.)

Neither § 1983 nor § 1985(3) create independent substantive rights; they are procedural

statutes which provide a remedy for deprivation of existing rights. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan

v. Novetny, 442 U.S. 366, 372, 376 (1979); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.

600, 617–618 (1979). A § 1985 claim is grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment, while a § 1983

claim is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

42 U.S.C. § 1985, otherwise known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, “is not to be construed as

a general federal tort law.” Gerritssen v. Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1518-19 (9th Cir.

1987). “To state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy,

(2) to deprive any person or a class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -15- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of

the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir.

1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal

protection ... means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; Sever, 978

F.2d at 1536. 

Here, in support of his § 1985 conspiracy claims against Defendants Andersen, Crespo,

Kemp, McGee, and Larocco, Plaintiff makes onlysummaryallegations ofthe CDCR’s “common

practice” of “beat[ing] inmates” and “falsely accus[ing]” them of “crimes like battery and

assault” in order to “cover up” incidents of excessive force (Compl. at 8); however, these

assertions are too vague and generalized to show that any of the specific defendants Plaintiff

accuses in this case agreed together to fabricate their CDCR 837 Reports of the April 1, 2011

incident in order to violate his rights. A § 1985 claim “must allege facts to support the allegation

that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity

is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir.1988);

see also Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1990); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679 (“[W]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations.”). Moreover, there are no allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint

to show or even suggest that Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, or Larocco

discriminated against him because of “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based” animus,

or because he is a member of a protected class. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Sever, 978

F.2d at 1536. 

Finally, “[s]ection 1986 authorizes a remedy against state actors who have negligently

failed to prevent a conspiracy that would be actionable under § 1985.” Cerrato v. San Francisco

Comm. College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). “A claim can be stated under [§]

1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under [§] 1985.” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -16- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

626; Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) ( a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986

is necessarily contingent upon a valid § 1985 claim) ; McCalden v. California Library Ass’n, 955

F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990) (to state a claim under § 1986 for neglect or refusal to prevent

a § 1985 conspiracy, there must be a valid claim under § 1985). Thus, because Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim against Defendants Andersen, Crespo, Kemp, McGee, and Larocco under

§ 1985, his claims against Defendants Savala, Luna, and Garcia under § 1986 also fail to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the conspiracy

claims alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986 in Count 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons stated in this Order, the Court hereby:

(1) DENIES Defendants’Motion toDismissPlaintiff’s excessive force claims against

Defendants Kemp, Andersen and Crespo as alleged in Count 1 pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6);

(2) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

inadequate medical treatment claims against Defendants McGee and Larocco as alleged inCount

1 for failing to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); 

(3) GRANTSDefendants’Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims as alleged

in Count 2 pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); and

(4) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986 as alleged in Count 3 pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

(5) Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order

is filed to either: a) file with the Court and serve upon Defendants an Amended Complaint

which addresses all the deficiencies of pleading noted in this Order; or b) file and serve a

“Notice of Intention to Proceed with his Original Complaint” as to the Eighth Amendment

claims currently alleged in Count 1 against Defendants Kemp, Andersen, and Crespo only. 

/ / / 

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -17- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff is cautioned that should he elect to amend, his Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself, that it will supersede his original Complaint, and that any claim not re-alleged

against anyDefendant previously named will be considered waived. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1;

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If Plaintiff elects not to amend, and instead files a “Notice of Intention to Proceed with

his Original Complaint,” the Court shall direct Defendants Kemp, Andersen, and Crespo to file

an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF Doc. No. 1] within the time provided by FED.R.CIV.P.

12(a)(4)(A).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 12, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\BTM\11cv2688-MTD.wpd -18- 11cv2688 BTM (JMA)

Case 3:11-cv-02688-BTM-JMA Document 21 Filed 03/12/13 Page 18 of 18