Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01088/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN ALAN KELLEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ROSEMARY NDOH, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-1088 GGH HC 

ORDER 

INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254, together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by § 1915(a) showing that plaintiff 

is unable to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed 

in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

By virtue of reading the petition itself, the undersigned finds, however, that petition has 

failed to exhaust his state court remedies in regard to all claims. The claims to be reviewed in 

federal habeas must be presented to the California Supreme Court either by way of petitioning for 

direct review after an appeal has been denied in the California Court of Appeal, or by way of a 

habeas corpus petition presented to the state supreme court. Petitioner avers that he has not made 

such a presentation, terminating all efforts with the California Court of Appeal. 

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 The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must be waived 

explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). Thus, a waiver of exhaustion may 

not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the 

highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to 

the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 

1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

 A petition which includes only unexhausted claims may be dismissed on that basis. 

However, on February 17, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion 

which may affect this case. Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Rhines stay 

and abeyance procedure applies to completely unexhausted petitions as well as mixed petitions). 

Therefore the petitioner will be provided the opportunity to move for a stay under Mena and 

Rhines. 

DISCUSSION 

 The February 16, 2016 Ninth Circuit opinion in Mena significantly changes the manner in 

which wholly unexhausted federal habeas petitions are handled. The court held “that a district 

court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully unexhausted petitions under the 

circumstances set forth in Rhines. Mena, supra, 813 F.3d at 908. A district court may also 

properly stay a habeas petition and hold it in abeyance pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 

(2005. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 9th Cir. 2009). 

 Under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present an 

unexhausted claim to the state courts. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Such a stay “eliminates entirely 

any limitations issue with regard to the originally unexhausted claims, as the claims remain 

pending in federal court[.]” King, 564 F.3d at 1140. However, to qualify for a stay under Rhines, 

a petitioner must: (1) show good cause for his failure to exhaust all his claims before filing this 

action; (2) explain and demonstrate how his unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious; (3) 

describe the status of any pending state court proceedings on his unexhausted claim; and (4) 

explain how she has diligently pursued his unexhausted claim. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78. 

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 What constitutes good cause has not been precisely defined except to indicate at the outer 

end that petitioner must not have engaged in purposeful dilatory tactics, Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-

78, and that “extraordinary circumstances” need not be found. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 

661–62 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Rhines, 544 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the “good 

cause” requirement should not be read “to impose the sort of strict and inflexible requirement that 

would trap the unwary pro se prisoner”) (internal citation omitted); id. (Souter, J., concurring) 

(pro se habeas petitioners do not come well trained to address tricky exhaustion determinations). 

“But as the Jackson court recognized, we must interpret whether a petitioner has “good cause” for 

a failure to exhaust in light of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Rhines that the district court 

should only stay mixed petitions in ‘limited circumstances.’ We also must be mindful that 

AEDPA aims to encourage the finality of sentences and to encourage petitioners to exhaust their 

claims in state court before filing in federal court.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661) (internal citations omitted). 

 Recently, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a reasonable excuse, supported by evidence to 

justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust,” will demonstrate good cause under Rhines. Blake v. 

Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). In Blake, the Ninth Circuit held that ineffective 

assistance of counsel by post-conviction counsel can be good cause for a Rhines stay, however, 

bare allegations of state post-conviction IAC do not suffice. Id. at 983. The Blake court 

concluded that petitioner satisfied the good cause standard where he argued that his postconviction counsel “failed to conduct any independent investigation or retain experts in order to 

discover the facts underlying his trial-counsel IAC claim; namely, evidence that Blake was” 

subject to severe abuse as a child and suffered from brain damage and psychological disorders. 

745 F.3d at 982 (internal quotes omitted). The petitioner supported this argument with extensive 

evidence, including psychological evaluation reports, a declaration by the private investigator 

who worked briefly for his post-conviction attorney, and thirteen declarations from petitioner’s 

family and friends describing his “abhorrent” childhood conditions. Id. at 982-83. The Blake 

court concluded that the petitioner had met the Coleman/Martinez standard to show good cause 

under Rhines.” Id. at 983-84 & n.7. 

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 Based on the decision in Rhines, petitioner will be required to file a motion for stay and 

abeyance in which he sets forth good cause for his failure to exhaust prior to filing the petition in 

this case, that his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and that he has not been dilatory 

in proceeding on his claims. 

 Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Petitioner is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis; 

 2. Within twenty-eight (28) days of this order petitioner shall: (a) file and serve a 

motion for stay and abeyance; and (b) include a statement indicating whether he wishes to 

proceed with the original petition or the amended petition; failure to comply with this order will 

result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed as unexhausted; 

 3. Respondent shall file a response to petitioner’s motion within fourteen (14) days 

thereafter; 

 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order and the form 

Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge on Michael Patrick Farrell, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Dated: June 16, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Ndoh.1088.amm 

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