Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01210/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission,

Plaintiff,

Kelley J. Miles,

Plaintiff-Intervenor

vs.

The Boeing Company, et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________ 

 

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No. CV 03-1210-PHX-PGR 

 ORDER

 

 Pending before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.106).

The Court now rules on the motion.

I. INTRODUCTION

Kelley J. Miles ("Miles") was hired as a contractor for The Boeing Company

("Boeing") at its Mesa, Arizona facility in 1996. In July of 1997, Boeing hired Miles as a

full-time sheet metal mechanic. Miles worked in the Mesa premod department from the

commencement of her employment until on or about July 29, 2004, when, at her request, she

transferred to the Structures Department in the Apache Final Assembly area where she

remains employed today. 

Boeing's premod group is responsible for tearing down Boeing's older Apache

helicopters in preparation for upgrading the helicopter to become an Apache Longbow.

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Boeing employs workers on two shifts in the premod department. The first shift currently

works from 5:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., and the second shift works from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

Starting in October 1999, Miles worked on the second shift. Kevin Nunimaker is the first

level supervisor for the premod department on first shift, and he was Miles's supervisor from

1998 until March 2001. In March 2001, Jeff Luidhardt became Miles's direct supervisor.

Luidhardt remained Miles's supervisor until she transferred out of the premod department in

July, 2004.

During the time relevant to this case, the premod department divided work into teams

known as cells. Miles was a part of cell 4 which was principally responsible for performing

the holefill function. During the period at issue, Miles was teamed with co-worker, Dihn

Luu, as well as other co-workers. 

Miles alleges that punctuated throughout her employment in the premod department,

she was subjected to workplace sexual and gender-based harassment, and that she was

retaliated against for complaining about that alleged harassment. Miles filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on June 5,

2001, alleging retaliation and sex discrimination. This first charge of discrimination alleged

that Manny Cervantes, a co-worker, subjected her to physical and verbal harassment and that

both Todd Blough and Cervantes had spread false sexual rumors about her. The first charge

also alleged that her co-workers took her tools, hid them and broke them, and that her work

cart was trashed on May 17, 2001.

On August 5, 2001, Miles filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC

alleging retaliation. The second charge stated that Kevin Nunimaker told others that Miles

had a list of people she was going to take to human resources, that co-worker John Byrd had

called her derogatory names, and that Richard Clark had told her he could not assist her with

her complaints because she had already brought a charge to the EEOC. The EEOC issued

a cause determination on both charges on March 12, 2002.

On June 25, 2003, the EEOC filed the present lawsuit, and Miles filed her ComplaintIn-Intervention on September 19, 2003. Plaintiffs' Complaint contains a list of alleged

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incidents which purportedly establish the following: (1) two co-workers subjected Miles to

sexual harassment before June 2, 2001; (2) Miles experienced a hostile working environment

based on her gender during her employment with Boeing; and (3) Boeing perpetrated

unlawful retaliation against Miles because she complained about the alleged unlawful

harassment. Many of the incidents and conduct alleged are claimed to have contributed to

both the harassment and the retaliation Miles experienced.

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) no

genuine issues of material fact remain; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to

the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of

N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The Defendants maintain that the

Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, set forth specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact for trial.

A. Gender-Based and Sexual Harassment

According to the Plaintiffs, since at least January 2001, the Defendants have engaged

in unlawful employment practices in Arizona, in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), by subjecting Miles to harassment, based on her female gender, that

altered her conditions of employment and created a hostile work environment. Under Title

VII, it is unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of . . . sex." 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sexual harassment in the form of a hostile work environment

constitutes sex discrimination. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).

To prevail on a hostile environment claim, the Plaintiffs must establish a "pattern of ongoing

and persistent harassment severe enough to alter the conditions of her employment." Draper

v. Coer Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998). To satisfy this requirement, the

Plaintiffs need only prove that Miles's workplace was "both objectively and subjectively

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offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim

in fact did perceive to be so." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).

In addition, the Plaintiffs are required to prove that any harassment took place because of

Miles's gender. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). In sum,

to prevail on her hostile work environment claim premised on sexual harassment, Miles must

show the following: (1) that she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual

nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work

environment. Gregory v. Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998).

To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive to violate Title

VII, a court must look at "all the circumstances," including the "frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work

performance." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The required level of

severity or seriousness "varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct."

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). The objective severity of the harassment

should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in Miles's position, considering

all the circumstances. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82. 

Assuming that a reasonable person would find a workplace hostile, if the victim "does

not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered

the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation." Harris, 510

U.S. at 21-22. A court must determine whether the victim, through his or her conduct,

indicated that the alleged conduct was unwelcome. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. 

Miles's sexual harassment claim is primarily based on the alleged conduct of two coworkers. Furthermore, neither of the two co-workers held positions as supervisors or

managers. Accordingly, in order to establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim

based on these events, the Plaintiffs must prove that Boeing was negligent. Such negligence

can be established by showing that Boeing knew or should have known of the harassment

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but did not take appropriate steps to address it. See Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794,

803 (9th Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Plaintiffs maintain that Miles endured sexual harassment by co-worker Manny

Cervantes beginning in 1998. The alleged harassing conduct included Cervantes grabbing

Miles, touching her in an effort to try and rub her shoulders more than fifty times, trying to

hug her, and on one occasion, picking her up and carrying her around. In addition, the

Plaintiffs maintain that Cervantes would also stick his tongue out at Miles then make

comments such as, "you know you want me" or, "you know you love me." Furthermore,

Cervantes's verbal harassment of Miles included remarks such as "I love you" and "you want

me" and occurred almost daily. According to the Plaintiffs, Miles regularly responded to

Cervantes's conduct by telling him to stop and to get away from her.

Although the harassing conduct Miles endured at the hands of Cervantes allegedly

occurred over a period of years, Miles did not officially complain to Boeing management,

including Human Resources, until June 6, 2001. On this date, Miles gave Dick Mead a

written statement complaining about Cervantes conduct. This prompted an investigation

into Cervantes's alleged misconduct where both Miles and her female co-worker, Luwanna

Woodruff, were interviewed. As a result of the investigation into Miles's complaint,

Cervantes was discharged for misconduct on July 3, 2001.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Boeing cannot prove that it took immediate and

appropriate action to end the harassment by Cervantes; however, the Court disagrees.

Although the Plaintiffs state that Cervantes continuously harassed Miles between 1998 and

June, 2001, Miles did not report this conduct to Boeing until June, 2001 at which time

Boeing took prompt corrective measures. The Plaintiffs contend that Boeing's Human

Resources Department had received a previous complaint about inappropriate sexual remarks

Cervantes made about a male co-worker's female family members, but failed to reasonably

respond to Cervantes's continued misconduct. However, the undisputed facts show that

Boeing did, in fact, reasonably respond to the complaint it received about Cervantes. Boeing

investigated the complaint and issued Cervantes a corrective action notice. The corrective

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1In his deposition, Blough testified that in addition to the verbal warning he received from

Luidhardt, he was later given a reprimand and six-months probation from the Human Resources

generalist, Dick Mead. Mead took these steps after Miles complained about Blough's conduct on

June 6, 2001.

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action notice stated that any further reports of inappropriate behavior could result in

termination and that, due to the seriousness of the conduct, the corrective action notice would

not be removed after the customary year. According to the record before the Court, up until

the time that Miles made a formal complaint concerning her interactions with Cervantes,

there is no evidence that Boeing received any further complaints concerning his conduct.

The Plaintiffs claim that Kevin Nunimaker witnessed Cervantes's harassment of Miles, but

they offer no admissible evidence to support such an allegation. Furthermore, once Boeing

learned about Cervantes's misconduct the evidence shows that it acted promptly to stop it.

Within a month from the day Miles complained, Cervantes was terminated.

In addition to the sexual harassment Miles endured at the hands of Cervantes, the

Plaintiffs also point out that on May 30, 2001, Miles complained to her immediate

supervisor, Jeff Luidhardt, that she had heard from someone that co-worker Todd Blough had

made statements about Miles's sex life to some co-workers. Luidhardt confronted Blough

the same day and Blough effectively admitted his conduct by stating that he had "stepped on

it." Blough was given a verbal warning and told that he would get a written corrective action

if there were any further incidents.1

 Miles did not express any dissatisfaction about how the

situation was handled, and since May 30, 2001, Miles has not reported any other

inappropriate sexual comments directed at her from Blough. 

The Plaintiffs state that Luidhardt's corrective action in regards to Blough was

insufficient; however, it is also undisputed that Miles thanked Luidhardt for handling the

situation and that neither Miles or anyone else has reported Blough for making inappropriate

sexual remarks since. Boeing's response to this incident appears both prompt and effective

since Luidhardt confronted and reprimanded Blough the same day Miles reported his

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2The alleged incidents regarding the tools and tool cart occurred prior to Miles's complaints

of harassment so they could not have been in retaliation for any protected conduct. Furthermore,

the Plaintiffs offer no evidence to suggest that such conduct could be attributed to Miles's female

gender as male co-workers also used the tools and tool cart and it was at all times Boeing property.

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misconduct. Accordingly, Boeing cannot be held liable for Blough's misconduct. Swinton,

270 F.3d at 803; Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition to the above sexual harassment Miles complained of, the Plaintiffs also

allege that she was subjected to harassment based on her female gender. On May 17, 2001,

the Plaintiffs maintain that Miles's co-workers took the hole fill cart Miles had created to

store the materials she needed to perform her job, tore off the labels she had put on it,

dumped some of the material into a box, took some of the parts and equipment stored there,

filled the cart with trash, and wrapped tape around it. Miles immediately reported the trashed

cart to supervisor Lloyd Hatter. Miles was given a camera to take digital pictures of the

trashed cart, but the Plaintiffs maintain that nothing else was done about the incident.

The evidence does not indicate that anyone, including Miles, ever saw anyone hide,

intentionally break, or inappropriately reset any tool from the holefill cart. Furthermore, all

the tools Plaintiffs take issue with are the undisputed property of Boeing, and Miles was

never once accused of breaking or losing a tool. Furthermore, Miles was not the only Boeing

employee who had access to and used the holefill cart as other employees, including Miles's

team, would have been impacted by these events in exactly the same way as Miles. In

addition, the record reflects that Boeing conducted an investigation of the trashed tool cart,

but no one ever admitted to the conduct, no witnesses ever came forward, and the

investigation did not uncover the perpetrator. Accordingly, Boeing could not issue any

disciplinary action.2

Around the same time the hole fill cart was trashed, the Plaintiffs contend that Blough

further harassed Miles by shaking an aircraft she was standing on to perform her work. Miles

was standing on the deck of an aircraft, a flat area on the top middle, about six and one-half

inches to seven feet above the ground, without rails or walls on either side of her. Miles's

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3The Plaintiffs also maintain that Nunimaker telling Miles that "[her] next piece of meat's

here" in reference to the arrival of a new airplane in her work area constitutes sexual harassment

partly due to Miles interpreting the statement to have a sexual meaning; however, this comment does

not have any sexual connotation within the context in which it was made, therefore, it was not

objectively offensive.

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male co-worker, Dihn Luu, was also working on the deck beside her. Blough allegedly

came over to the end of the tailboom, bent down, grabbed the end of it, and shook it really

hard. Miles wobbled and quickly sat down. According to the Defendants, Blough shook the

tailboom to get Miles's and Luu's attention so he could tell them it was break time. The

Defendants maintain that this action is common in the pre-mod department and that there is

no evidence that it was dangerous or done to harm, harass, or intimidate Miles. The Court

agrees. The Plaintiffs offer no evidence to link Blough's actions to an improper motive.

Furthermore, Miles was not the only person on the tailboom. The undisputed evidence

shows that Miles's male co-worker, Luu, was seated next to her when Blough shook the

tailboom, and the action was directed at Luu as much as it was Blough. In addition, Luu

testified that his co-workers regularly shook the tailboom to get his attention while he worked

on the airframe otherwise he would not be able to hear them.

To support the hostile environment claim, the Plaintiffs also point to an incident where

a Boeing supervisor, Kevin Nunimaker, called Miles a "fucking crybaby" because she had

complained that some of her fasteners were messed up, and that he occasionally called Miles

a whiner or a troublemaker for complaining about her co-workers allegedly messing with

her tools. However, there is no evidence that Nunimaker made this comment, or any others,

because of Miles's gender or because she was engaged in protected conduct. Furthermore,

Miles was unable to remember any specific incident in which Nunimaker had actually called

her either a whiner or a troublemaker, or the circumstances under which he allegedly spoke

those words.3

As noted above, in order to state an actionable claim for hostile work environment,

a plaintiff is required to show that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. See Ray v.

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Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000); Gregory, 153 F.3d 1071. The legal standard

for establishing a workplace harassment is high so that Title VII does not become a "general

civility code" for the workplace. Faragher, 542 U.S. at 788. Conduct that is offensive and

inappropriate cannot support a claim for hostile work environment unless it so pollutes the

workplace that it alters the conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Manatt v. Bank of

America, N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). It is the Court's conclusion that the

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that any of the conduct alleged herein supported by

admissible evidence was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Miles's conditions of

employment. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to associate the alleged misconduct

with Miles's female gender. Harassment based on personal animosity, rumors or other

information is not discrimination based on gender and cannot support a claim under Title VII.

See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80. Although it is abundantly clear to the Court that Miles and

some of her co-workers had a less than ideal working relationship, the Court cannot

determine based on the admissible evidence before it that there is an issue of genuine

material fact as to whether that relationship was pervaded by gender discrimination.

B. Retaliation

The Plaintiffs second claim is that, since at least January, 2001, the Defendants have

engaged in unlawful retaliatory practices in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 28

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) by retaliating against Miles because she opposed the unlawful genderbased harassment by filing a complaint with Defendants' Human Resources Department and

a charge with the EEOC. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must

show that (1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer subjected her to an

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240. If a plaintiff asserts a prima facie

retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the

plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for

a discriminatory motive. Id. 

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4 Greg McDonald testified that Luidhardt saw him on one occasion not wearing his safety

glasses and he was not given a warning; however, McDonald stated that he did, in fact, have the

safety glasses on his head when Luidhardt saw him. Furthermore, Miles admitted that she was

repeatedly observed not wearing her safety glasses while was she riveting

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In this case, the parties do not contest that Miles engaged in protected activities when

she complained of the alleged gender-based and sexual harassment to Boeing's Human

Resource Department and filed a complaint with the EEOC. The heart of this dispute is

whether Miles suffered cognizable adverse employment actions. An adverse employment

action is defined as "any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is

reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."

Vasquez v. City of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242-43.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Miles was retaliated against when her supervisor, Jeff

Luidhardt, issued her two corrective action notices (and one written reminder) for failing to

wear safety glasses while operating a pneumatic riveting gun. However, the Court concludes

that the Plaintiffs cannot establish that the corrective action notices were unlawful retaliation,

as the issuance of the corrective action notices did not amount to adverse employment

actions. See Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1112-1113 (9th Cir.

2000). As the Defendant explains, the corrective action notices were merely documentation

of verbal counseling provided to Miles to discuss Miles's failure to wear eye protection, and

the warnings did not constitute a reprimand, suspension, demotion, or a performance review.

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs cannot assert that the corrective action notices were not deserved.

Indeed, Miles admits she was not wearing her safety glasses when she was issued the

corrective action notices. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Boeing has a policy requiring

an employee to wear such eye protection when riveting.4

In addition, the Plaintiffs fail to show any causal connection between any protected

conduct and the issuance of the notices. Luidhardt did not issue the first corrective action

notice until May, 2003, nearly two years after Miles's complaint to him concerning Todd

Blough's behavior. The temporal proximity between Miles's complaint and the corrective

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5Although some employees testified as to their opinion that there was no policy requiring

the use of safety glasses while riveting, the undisputed evidence is that Boeing had a written policy

in place requiring the wearing of eye protection while riveting. Whether or not the employees

testifying knew of the policy is irrelevant. Furthermore, although there is some testimony from

Miles's co-workers that they did not receive a reprimand for failing to wear safety glasses, none of

these employees ever testified that Luidhardt saw them not wearing their safety glasses.

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action notices does not establish the requisite causal connection. Two years is too great a

span of time to create an inference of retaliatory motive based on temporal nexus. See Clark

County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (action taken 20 months after protected

conduct insufficient to infer causation); see also, Manatt, 339 F.3d at 802 (nine months

between the protected activity and the adverse action was too much time to infer retaliatory

causation); Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1992) (termination

six-months after a protected complaint insufficient to establish inference of retaliation). 

Lastly, Boeing has provided a legitimate reason for Luidhardt's actions: Luidhardt was

following a Boeing policy that is in no way discriminatory or retaliatory. Issuing the notices

was a legitimate exercise of Luidhardt's supervisory duties and authority. Furthermore, it is

undisputed that two months after Luidhardt issued the corrective action notice to Miles, he

issued one to a male employee for not wearing safety glasses which directly contradicts

Plaintiffs' discriminatory application argument.5

The Defendants also contend that Miles failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

regarding the corrective action notices she received. It is fundamental that, to establish

federal court jurisdiction in Title VII claims, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative

remedies before she files a lawsuit on those claims. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456

(9th Cir. 1990). "Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may not be

considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the

allegations contained in the EEOC charge." Id. Miles filed two charges with the EEOC, the

first claiming harassment and the second claiming retaliation. However, neither of these

charges mention the subject of not wearing eye protection or the issuance of corrective action

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notices. Likewise, the EEOC investigations and determinations did not encompass these

incidents. 

Next, the Plaintiffs state that Miles suffered retaliation because Boeing refused to

further investigate Miles's internal complaints after she filed a charge with the EEOC. The

Plaintiffs maintain that Boeing officer, Richard Clark, told Miles that there would be no

further investigation of her initial complaints because she had chosen to make the EEOC her

advocate. However, the undisputed evidence provides that Clark explained to Miles that he

could not discuss with her the complaint she had pending before the EEOC, not that he would

not investigate her complaints. Furthermore, Luidhardt explained to Miles that she was free

to use Boeing Human Resources Department and the EEO for any future complaints, which

Miles admittedly did on multiple occasions, even after the comment allegedly made by Clark.

It is the Court's conclusion that Clark's comment to Miles reflected his understanding of a

Boeing practice that if an employee files a charge with the federal EEOC, his obligation as

the Boeing EEO officer was to respond directly to the EEOC on matters relating to the

charge, and not to have contact with the complaining employee regarding the subject matter

of the charge because the EEOC had become the employee's advocate. Clark's conduct does

not constitute an adverse employment action against Miles for exercising her Title VII right

to file a charge with the EEOC. Boeing's policy was an exercise of the employer's right to

engage in reasonable defensive measures against the employee's charge. See U.S. v. New

York City Transit Authority, 97 F.3d 672, 677 (2d cir. 1996); accord, Olsen v. Marriott

Intern., Inc., et al., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1075 (D. Ariz. 1999).

The Plaintiffs also claim that the unlawful retaliation Miles endured included

Nunimaker reporting to co-workers that Miles made an internal complaint, and warning them

to be careful around her because she had them on a list. However, the Plaintiffs offer no

admissible evidence to support this contention. The only evidence Plaintiffs offer in support

of this allegation is that Ted Manchengo told Miles that he had heard from another coworker, Frank Francisco, that Nunimaker made the comment. Francisco, however, denies

having heard Nunimaker say anything similar, and Nunimaker's uncontroverted testimony

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is that he never did. Accordingly, such a contention must be disregarded and will not be used

to support Plaintiffs' hostile work environment or retaliation claims.

Next, the Plaintiffs maintain that several male co-workers expressed hostility toward

Miles by calling her "bitch" and other gender-based derogatory names. However, the

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that Miles's co-workers use of the word

"bitch" was based on Miles's gender or protected conduct. Without proof of unlawful

motivation, the use of the word "bitch" does not establish proof of gender discrimination as

a matter of law. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2002)

("Whether this term [bitch] is part of the everyday give and take of a warehouse environment

or is inherently offensive is not for us to say.").

The Plaintiffs also claim that in retaliation for her complaints of harassment,

unfounded accusations and conclusions about her work were made. According to the

Plaintiffs, early in 2003, co-worker John Byrd made repeated, unfounded accusations that

Miles's work contained multiple errors. Byrd's accusations were reviewed and agreed to by

engineers Dennis Wilson and Darren Jennings. The Plaintiffs state that the problem did not

resolve until Miles brought in a higher-level engineer, Bryan Davis, who confirmed that her

work was correct. Specifically, Byrd and Miles were working off two different meplans that

had two different specifications for the same task. When the issue was brought to attention

of the engineers responsible for the meplans, it was determined that there were indeed two

different plans for the same work, and that Miles, and not Byrd, was working from the

correct plan. The evidence shows that Byrd reasonably and appropriately questioned Miles

about doing work that did not conform to the plan from which he was working. As the

Defendants correctly assert, this is nothing more than a manifestation of a good faith error.

The Plaintiffs contend that Miles was shunned due to her complaints and that her coworkers mocked and swore at her all in retaliation for her protected conduct. The Plaintiffs

maintain that since Miles's initial complaint to Boeing's Human Resources Department, she

has been shunned by several co-workers. However, the Ninth Circuit has determined that

such conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See, e.g., Ray, 217 F.3d at 1241 ("mere

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ostracism by co-workers does not constitute an adverse employment action"); Manatt, 339

F.3d at 803 ("Mere ostracism in the workplace is not grounds for a retaliation claim");

Strother v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996)

("For example, mere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to show an adverse

employment decision."). Furthermore, even if shunning was actionable under current Ninth

Circuit standards, the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that she was shunned because of her

protected activity, as opposed to some lawful factor, such as her co-workers simply disliking

her.

In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that Miles suffered retaliation when she was falsely

accused of damaging an aircraft. According to the Plaintiffs, in March 2002, supervisor

Nunimaker and co-worker Fred Jones falsely accused Miles and her male co-worker, Dihn

Luu, of damaging an aircraft in an effort to subject Miles to discipline. However, Plaintiffs

contention is not supported by the evidence in the record. In fact, this contention is directly

contradicted by Miles's own testimony. For example, when questioned regarding who was

actually accused of damaging an aircraft, Miles admitted that it was her male co-worker, Luu,

and not her. As such, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on this allegation as evidence of retaliation

or a hostile work environment.

As further evidence for the retaliation claim, Plaintiffs maintain that on or about May

2-3, 2003, Luidhardt singled out Miles to yell at her at a high performance meeting and

during a work-related argument they were having. During the high performance meeting,

Miles was asked by Luidhardt for a list of tools he had requested. Miles stated that she had

already given him the list, but Luidhardt responded by leaning toward Miles and pointing and

yelling at her. According to the Plaintiffs, none of Miles's male co-workers received this

type of treatment. However, neither incident can support a claim for retaliation because (1)

the alleged conduct was isolated– two incidents occurring within a twenty-four hour period,

and (2) the undisputed evidence establishes that Miles was not singled out in any way. The

undisputed evidence reflects that during a six-month period of time, Luidhardt was reportedly

ill-tempered with all of his team members, regardless of gender, including frequently yelling,

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swearing and belittling them with little provocation. Furthermore, there is no evidence to

link Luidhardt's conduct to any discriminatory motive due to Miles's gender or in retaliation

for any protected conduct.

In addition to the above allegedly retaliatory actions, the Plaintiffs maintain that in

December 2002, co-worker Jason Carter attempted to cause Miles to have a car accident

when both of them were driving home after work. The Plaintiffs assert that Carter's actions

were retaliatory in nature. However, as the Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiffs' 90-

page statement of facts contains no mention of this alleged incident. The Plaintiffs'

supplemental statement of facts contains one citation to a passage from Luidhardt's

deposition where he stated that he did not know whether Miles had mentioned the incident

to him, but that he had heard about the situation somewhere. At the most, this testimony

would establish that Luidhardt heard from some unknown source that Plaintiff and a coworker were almost involved in a collision away from work. It is still inadmissible hearsay

under the Federal Rules of Evidence and cannot be used as evidence of retaliation.

Based on the foregoing, it is the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs' retaliation claim

must fail as well because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Miles

actually suffered any adverse employment action, nor has the Plaintiff met its burden of

establishing that any of alleged actions were motivated by Miles's participation in protected

conduct. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 106) is

GRANTED.

 DATED this 28th day of September, 2005.

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