Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08056/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08056-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robin Lynn Robbins,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-8056-PCT-GMS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona Department of Corrections, filed 

through retained counsel a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on March 26, 2012 (Docs. 1, 2, 3). On June 21, 2012, Respondents filed their 

Answer (Docs. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). Petitioner has not replied.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 31, 2004, Petitioner was driving on a highway near Cottonwood, 

Arizona, repeatedly crossed the centerline and eventually struck an oncoming vehicle 

head on. Ultimately, four vehicles were involved in the collision, four people died, three 

others and Petitioner were injured. Petitioner was found to have a used 

methamphetamine pipe in his pocket, methamphetamine in his vehicle, and 

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methamphetamine in his system. (Exhibit Y, Presentence Report at 5-6; Exhibit X, 

Defendant’s Present. Memo. at 2-4.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Docs. 11 et seq. are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to the Petition, Docs. 1 et seq. are 

referenced herein as “Pet. Exhibit ___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On January 5, 2005, Petitioner was indicted in Yavapai County Superior Court on 

four counts of second degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of 

misdemeanor DUI, and one count each of endangerment, criminal damage, possession of

dangerous drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Exhibit A, Indictment.)

During the course of pretrial proceedings, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special 

Action (Exhibit P), challenging the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate the trial and to 

prohibit introduction of evidence of Petitioner’s prior D.W.I. conviction. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals granted a stay of proceedings before the jury panel, and directed a 

response to the petition. (Exhibhit R, Order 9/22/06.) 

On September 29, 2006, Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit 

S), wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the charges, in exchange for dismissal of any 

allegation of multiple offenses committed on different occasions. Petitioner entered his 

plea pursuant to the agreement on September 29, 2006. (Exhibit U.)

On November 17, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a combination of 

presumptive, concurrent, and consecutive sentences for an aggregate of 71.5 years' 

imprisonment. (Exhibit AA, Sentence; Exhibit PP, Dec. Order 12/4/08 at 1.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 16 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

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(Exhibit BB). Counsel was appointed and withdrew, and substitute counsel was 

appointed. (Exhibit CC, M.E. 1/17/07; Exhibit DD, Order 2/13/07.) On July 3, 2007, 

counsel filed a PCR Petition (Exhibit EE) arguing: (1) insufficient evidence; (2) plea was 

not knowingly entered and counsel was ineffective; and (3) sentencing errors. 

The PCR court summarily denied the Petition on October 30, 2007, finding that 

the claims were without merit. (Exhibit LL, M.E. 10/30/07.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit MM) raising claims of: (1) actual 

innocence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea proceedings; and (3) 

sentencing errors. On December 4, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the 

PCR Court had erred in failing to require an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s actual 

innocence claims and ineffective assistance claims, and granted relief on those issues. 

(Exhibit PP, Order 12/4/08.)

An evidentiary hearing was held on April 14, 15, 28, 29, 2009, and June 2, 2009. 

(Exhibit WW, M.E.s.) On August 13, 2009, the PCR Court rejected the claims of actual 

innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, and denied the petition. (Exhibit XX, 

M.E. 8/13/09.) 

Petitioner again filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit YY), arguing the PCR court 

had applied an incorrect standard to his actual innocence claim, and incorrectly decided 

the ineffective assistance and voluntariness of the plea claims. The Arizona Court of 

Appeal summarily denied review on May 5, 2011. (Exhibit BBB.) Petitioner did not 

seek further review. (Exhibit DDD, Az. Ct. of App. Docket 1CA-CR-09-0932 PRPC.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing, through counsel, his 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 26, 2012 

(Docs. 1, 2, 3). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following two grounds for relief: (1) his 

plea was involuntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) 

insufficient evidence to convict. 

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Response - On June 21, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). Respondents argue that Grounds One and Two 

are without merit and that Ground Two was not fairly presented to the state courts as a 

federal law claim, the state remedies were not properly exhausted, and are now

procedurally defaulted.

Reply – The Service Order provided: “Petitioner may file a reply within 30 days 

from the date of service of the answer.” (Doc. 5 at 3.) Petitioner has not filed a reply, 

and the time to do so has passed. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND ONE: VOLUNTARINESS

In his Ground One, Petitioner summarizes his claim as arguing that his plea was 

involuntary due to counsel’s ineffective assistance in advising him “regarding the 

probable sentence.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 24.) The bulk of Petitioner’s argument, 

however, is not that counsel misinformed Petitioner about the probable sentence, but that 

counsel “did not investigate the case and inform himself of defenses prior to pressuring 

Mr. Robbins to plead guilty to the indictment.” (Id. at 26.) In that regard, Petitioner 

argues that counsel: (a) gave incorrect advice about the value of pleading guilty in 

obtaining concurrent sentences; (b) failed to advise Petitioner about the lack of evidence 

of impairment; (c) improperly advised Petitioner that no mechanical expert was available 

to support Petitioner’s assertion of steering failure; and (d) improperly advised Petitioner 

that the case was “not defensible.” 

Respondents argue that: the PCR court: (1) properly rejected as “not credible” 

Petitioner’s claim of not having been adequately advised about the risks of consecutive 

sentencing, and properly found no presumption of consecutive sentences applied; (2) 

properly found that counsel correctly advised Petitioner on the value of pleading guilty 

as an acceptance of responsibility; (3) properly found evidence sufficient to show 

“impairment” and not merely “under the influence;” (4) properly found counsel was not 

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ineffective with regard to an expert, given concerns about the expert proffered by 

Petitioner, efforts to locate an expert, and the absence of an expert did not preclude 

asserting mechanical failure at trial; and (5) properly concluded that Petitioner knew 

there were defenses ready to be presented at trial, and that counsel had not advised 

Petitioner to plead guilty.

1. Standard Applicable on Habeas

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, not every error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

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Credibility Determinations – At least some of the factual findings made by the 

state courts and disputed by Petitioner involve credibility determinations. Those 

determinations are subject to the presumption of correctness and “unreasonable 

determination” limitations on habeas relief.

We can think of no sort of factual finding that is more appropriate 

for deferential treatment than is a state court's credibility 

determination. “Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas 

courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose 

demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by 

them.” 

Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 727 (9

th Cir. 1986) (quoting Marshall v. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). 

Mixed Questions – Petitioner contends that the presumption of correctness does 

not apply to the trial court’s finding of voluntariness because it is a finding of law, nor 

does it apply to the fining of effective assistance of counsel because it is a mixed 

question of law and fact. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 24.) 

"[T]he reach of the presumption of correctness in new § 2254(e)(1) is restricted to 

pure questions of historical fact. State decisions applying law to facts are governed by § 

2254(d)(1); however, factual findings underlying the state court’s conclusion on the 

mixed issue are accorded a presumption of correctness." Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 

943, 976 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Consequently, a federal court reviewing a state court conclusion on 

a mixed issue involving questions both of fact and law must first 

separate the legal conclusions from the factual determinations that 

underlie it. Fact-finding underlying the state court’s decision is 

accorded the full deference of §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), while the 

state court’s conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue — or the 

application of federal law to the factual findings — is reviewed per 

§ 2254(d)(1) in order to ascertain whether the decision is 'contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established' 

Supreme Court precedent.

Id. at 977-978. 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Petitioner’s claims in Ground One 

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were arguably raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his second petition for review in 

his PCR proceeding (Exhibit YY). The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily rejected 

that petition. (Exhibit BBB Order 5/5/11.) Accordingly, this Court looks through that 

appellate Order to the PCR court’s order (Exhibit XX), as the last reasoned decision.

In granting, in part, Petitioner’s first petition for review, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals left undisturbed those portions of the PCR court’s order not specifically 

rejected. “We deny review of all other issues presented in the petition for review.” 

(Exhibit PP, Order 12/4/08.) Accordingly, this Court looks through that Order to the 

undisturbed portions of the PCR Court’s first dismissal (Exhibit LL). 

2. Standard for Voluntariness

Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered into. The Supreme 

Court has stated that where “a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 

process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea 

depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases. . . . [A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of 

counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by 

showing that the advice he received from counsel was [ineffective].” Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Petitioner was represented by counsel during the plea process and entered 

his plea upon the advice of counsel. (See Exhibit T, R.T. 9/29/06 at 14.) Accordingly, 

the voluntariness of his plea turns upon the effectiveness of counsel in advising 

Petitioner as to the plea.

3. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

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objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687 88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

In determining whether counsel performed deficiently, the court must focus on 

whether the attorney's advice was appropriate under the circumstances existing at the 

time of the guilty plea. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Moreover, there is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. United States v. QuinterroBarraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). The court should “presume that the 

attorneys made reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” 

United States v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

The pleading defendant must prove he was prejudiced from counsel's 

ineffectiveness by demonstrating a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 

474 U.S. at 58 59; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The defendant must show "that but for 

counsel’s errors, he would either have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain." 

U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court must assess the 

circumstances surrounding the case to determine if the petitioner's allegation that he 

would have proceeded to trial is plausible. See United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 

1394 95 (9th Cir. 1990)(petitioner failed to show prejudice because he entered plea as 

alternative to long trial, possible conviction on more serious charges and a longer 

sentence; additional information about parole eligibility was unlikely to affect his 

decision). This is an objective analysis that requires the court to examine what a 

reasonable person would do “without regard for the idiosyncrasies of the particular 

decisionmaker.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

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4. Advice on Possible Sentencing

Petitioner argues that counsel improperly advised Petitioner that his “ ‘probable 

sentence’ would be between 10 and 16 years with a maximum of 22 years,” when in 

reality he faced up to 147.25 years under the plea agreement. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 15.) 

Respondents argue that the state courts found the claim “ ‘not credible’ ” and that the 

record supports the finding.

The PCR court made the following findings:

The Court finds the testimony of defense counsel Griffen to be 

credible. Mr. Griffen testified to the effect that although he, Mr. 

Robbins and the Robbins family were hopeful that the sentences 

would run concurrently, no guarantees or promises were made in 

that regard. Mr. Griffen had discussed with Mr. Robbins the risk of 

consecutive sentencing and the risk of the imposition of very 

lengthy sentences in general as reflected in Exhibit 10. Mr. 

Robbins's claim that he did not understand the meaning and risks of 

consecutive sentencing is not credible. Furthermore, at the change 

of plea hearing Mr. Griffen appropriately avowed to the Court that 

he discussed with Mr. Robbins the fact that the sentences could run 

consecutively in the discretion of the Court. This avowal was not

self-serving; rather, it was a proper avowal made in keeping with an 

attorney's responsibilities as an officer of the court.

(Exhibit XX, M.E. 8/14/09 at 4-5.) 

Petitioner makes no argument to show that these credibility determinations and 

findings of fact are not entitled to a presumption of correctness or that they were 

“unreasonable determination[s] of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

There is certainly evidence in the record, apart from the testimony at the PCR 

hearing, which would suggest Petitioner was not informed of the potential for 

consecutive sentences.

For example:

(1) The referenced Exhibit 10 was a letter written by counsel to Petitioner at the 

outset of the case, dated September 1, 2005, reviewing the indictment and not 

the guilty plea. (Exhibit UU, R.T. 6/2/09 at 81.) Petitioner did not enter into 

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the guilty plea until over a year later. (Exhibit S, Plea Agreement.)1

(2) Although the Plea Agreement reflected that “each” of the various offenses 

carried their own applicable sentencing ranges (Exhibit S, Plea Agreement at 

3), it included no indication whether the sentences would or could be made 

consecutive or concurrent.

(3) At the change of plea hearing, the trial court carefully went through the 

sentencing ranges on each count. (Exhibit T, R.T. 9/29/06 at 7-10.) However, 

at no time did the trial court indicate that the sentences could be made 

consecutive. Indeed, the only discussions of consecutive prison sentences in 

that hearing was trial counsel’s succinct advice that he had made Petitioner 

“aware of the ranges of the punishments that are available, including whether 

The [sic] Court would exercise it’s [sic] discretion and require consecutive or 

concurrent terms.” (Id. at 29.) 

(4) The sentencing memorandum filed by counsel asked for the imposition of 

concurrent sentences, and argued that the nature of the offenses as a single act 

called for the court to impose concurrent sentences. (Exhibit X, Memo at 10 

and n. 6.) 

(5) At sentencing, trial counsel continued to argue at length that the sentences on 

the murder and aggravated assault charges “would have to run concurrently as 

a matter of law” under the “single act rule.” (Exhibit AA, R.T. 11/17/06 at 99-

100.)2 

 

1

Indeed, Petitioner dismissed the letter as referencing “that scenario was if I went to 

trial, not the plea.” (Exhibit UU, R.T. 6/2/09 at 45.) 

2 Counsel relied upon State v. Noble, 152 Ariz. 284, 731 P.2d 1228 (1987) in support of 

his argument. Rather than mandating a “single act rule” based upon a single act harming 

multiple victims, the Noble court espoused a single act rule founded upon the Arizona 

double jeopardy statute’s requirement that “if, after eliminating evidence supporting 

elements of one charge, remaining evidence will not support elements of additional 

charges” then consecutive sentences could not be applied. Id. at 286, 731 P.3d at 1230. 

Here, as long determined by state precedent, the additional facts of the separate victims 

took this case outside that rule. See State v. White, 160 Ariz. 377, 380, 773 P.2d 482, 485 

(App.1989) (“We conclude that our legislature did not intend § 13–116 [the predecessor 

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However, none of this indicates that the trial court’s election to rely upon trial 

counsel’s “credible” testimony that he had advised Petitioner about the potential for 

consecutive sentencing, was an unreasonable determination of the facts as required for 

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

“Challenges under § 2254(d)(2) fall into two main categories. First, a petitioner 

may challenge the substance of the state court's findings and attempt to show that those 

findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the state court record. Second, a 

petitioner may challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was deficient 

in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9

th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial Evidence - Here, the state court’s finding was supported by substantial 

evidence, i.e. trial counsel’s assurances, both at the change of plea and in the PCR 

evidentiary hearing, supported by correspondence with Petitioner, that he had advised 

Petitioner of the potential for consecutive sentencing. 

At the change of plea, counsel reviewed the cap on restitution, credit for time 

served, and then stated:

I've made it clear to Mr. Robbins that the best he can do 

under the circumstances of this plea would be a calendar term of 10 

years. That's the best that he could do. I've also made him aware of 

the ranges of the punishments that are available, including whether 

The [sic] Court would exercise it's [sic] discretion and require 

consecutive or concurrent terms.

(Exhibit T, R.T. 9/29/06 at 29.) Petitioner subsequently denied having any questions or 

wanting time to discuss the matter with counsel. (Id. at 33.) 

At the PCR hearing, counsel asserted having repeatedly alerted Petitioner to the 

potential for consecutive sentencing:

Q. Right. While you were representing Mr. Robbins, did you 

ever have a meeting with him or at any point in time in some other 

fashion and explain to him the possible range of sentences that he 

was facing for the charges that were against him in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you tell us how that happened.

A. In more than one way. By written correspondence, by 

 

statute] to preclude consecutive sentencing where a convicted defendant has injured 

more than one individual as a result of his single act.”)

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personal communication, personally through visitation at the jail in 

consultation with Mr. Robbins.

* * * 

Q. Did you point out to Mr. Robbins in that letter that there 

was the danger of consecutive sentences for each of those second 

degree murder charges?

A. Yes. It's directly referred to in paragraph 3 of the letter. 

Well, actually paragraph 2.

Q. What does it say?

A. I'm quoting again. " . .the potential of not only be 

consecutive to each other but consecutive to any homicide 

conviction." I was discussing the four possible homicide charges not 

only being consecutive to the aggravated assaults and other related 

charges but consecutive to each other.

* * * 

Q. Did you have subsequent conversations with Mr. Robbins 

about the fact that he was facing the possibility of consecutive 

sentences?

A. Yes. It was always -- as I’ve testified previously, the issue 

of consecutive exposure was obviously the most significant issue 

associated with the case.

Q. Was that his and, in fact, your major concern in this case, 

the fact that he was going to risk the possibility of spending the rest 

of his life in prison?

A. It was always his greatest concern given his family 

relationships and what he was hopeful to achieve.

(Exhibit UU, R.T. 6/2/09 at 80-85.) 

Further, Petitioner wrote the judge in anticipation of sentencing, expressing his 

hope of a sentence less than effectual life.

Q. And that's why you wrote in your letter here it is. That's 

why you wrote in your letter to The [sic] Judge that you hope you 

can give me a sentence where I will have some life left not to die in

prison; right?

A. Yeah.

* * *

Q. And that's because you and your mother were concerned 

that you could receive a sentence as a result of pleading guilty in 

this case that would cause you to spend the rest of your life in 

prison; right?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 53-54.) 

Fact-Finding Process – Petitioner argues that the fact-finding process employed 

by the PCR court was inadequate. However, Petitioner points to no inadequacy in the 

process concerning this claim.

Petitioner does assert that because ineffective assistance is a mixed question of 

law and fact, and the voluntariness of a plea is a legal question, the presumptions of 

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correctness simply don’t apply. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 24.) That claim is disposed of 

hereinabove. 

Sentencing Predictions – Moreover, there is nothing wrong with defense counsel 

advising a client of the possible consequences of a case. See United States v. Ulano, 468 

F. Supp. 1054, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, 

in U.S. vs. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1990) the Ninth Circuit held that an 

erroneous prediction of a sentence by a defense attorney did not rise to the level of 

constitutional deficient representation, and thus did not render a plea based upon such 

erroneous prediction involuntary.

Cases both prior to and since Garcia have differentiated between simple errors in 

predictions and a gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome. For example, in U.S. 

vs. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1994) the Ninth Circuit recognized that the court has 

“held that ‘an erroneous prediction by defense attorney concerning sentencing does not 

entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea,’ although an exception might be made in 

a case of ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome.’” Id. at 899 (citations 

omitted). 

In Iaea vs. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861(9th Cir. 1986) defense counsel represented to the 

defendant that a guilty plea would give him a chance to receive probation. That advice 

was defective because of mandatory minimum sentences which resulted in his receiving 

life sentences. The court found that such a gross mischaracterization (probation v. life 

sentences), coupled with inaccurate advice on the effects of going to trial, established 

defective performance by counsel and remanded the case for a determination on the 

prejudice component of the ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 865-66. See also 

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 

940 (1991)(no ineffectiveness where actual sentence was three years longer than attorney 

predicted). 

In contrast, in Womack v. Del Papa, 487 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2007), counsel had 

predicted a sentence upon pleading guilty of 30 to 40 years, and instead the defendant 

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received eight life terms without parole. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Iaea, and found 

the plea nonetheless voluntary.

Here, Petitioner makes no contention that he was unaware at the time of his guilty 

plea that he faced a substantial sentence. 

Q. Okay. And you were hoping to get a sentence in the 

range of 10 years to 22 at a maximum, right?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit UU, R.T. 6/2/09 at 51.) 

Q. Did Mr. Griffen ever tell you about a sentence range of 

10 years, at a minimum 16 years 18 presumptive, 22 years a 

maximum?

A. At the plea?

Q. At the plea.

A. That's what he said the plea was.

Q. So he told you that at the time of the change of plea; is 

that correct?

A. 10 to 16 to 22. Yeah

(Exhibit UU, R.T. 6/22/09 at 45.) Instead of a purported 22 years as a maximum, 

Petitioner received an effective sentence of 71.5 years.

Thus, this case (22 years v. 71.5 years) is farm more akin to Womack (40 years 

v.8 life sentences) than Iaea (probation v. life plus) in terms of the disparity between the 

advice and the result. Moreover, unlike in Iaea, Petitioner has not shown patently 

erroneous advice. To be sure, Petitioner argues counsel’s error of the effect of the guilty 

plea, but as discussed hereinafter, that argument is unsupported by state law and is 

without merit.

Conclusion re Sentencing Predictions – Petitioner has failed to show that the PCR 

court’s finding that counsel properly advised Petitioner as to his exposure to consecutive 

sentencing was an unreasonable determination of the facts. On the basis of those facts, 

the PCR court’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to show his plea was involuntary as the 

result of ineffective assistance of counsel must be found to be a correct application of 

federal law. Moreover, even if this Court could reject that factual finding, the disparity 

between counsel’s purported advice and the result at sentencing were not so great as to 

invalidate Petitioner’s plea. Accordingly, this claim must be denied.

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5. Advice on Value at Sentencing of Pleading Guilty

Petitioner next contends that counsel misrepresented to Petitioner that his 

acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty was a “key factor” at sentencing and 

would allow counsel to argue for the imposition of concurrent sentences. Petitioner 

argues that counsel could have argued acceptance of responsibility with or without a 

guilty plea, and the existence of multiple victims created a presumption under state law 

for the imposition of consecutive sentences. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 25.) 

The PCR Court made the following findings:

The Court finds the testimony of defense counsel Griffen to be 

credible. Mr. Griffen testified to the effect that although he, Mr. 

Robbins and the Robbins family were hopeful that the sentences 

would run concurrently, no guarantees or promises were made in 

that regard. Mr. Griffen had discussed with Mr. Robbins the risk of 

consecutive sentencing and the risk of the imposition of very 

lengthy sentences in general as reflected in Exhibit 10. Mr. 

Robbins's claim that he did not understand the meaning and risks of 

consecutive sentencing is not credible. Furthermore, at the change 

of plea hearing Mr. Griffen appropriately avowed to the Court that 

he discussed with Mr. Robbins the fact that the sentences could run 

consecutively in the discretion of the Court. This avowal was not

self-serving; rather, it was a proper avowal made in keeping with an 

attorney's responsibilities as an officer of the court.

(Exhibit XX, M.E. 8/13/09 at 4.) 

Petitioner offers nothing to explain why the PCR court’s conclusion that 

Petitioner had been properly advised was incorrect.

Petitioner does revert to an earlier attack, arguing that counsel’s error arose 

specifically in advising that consecutive sentencing could be avoided only by pleading 

guilty. In disposing of this claim in its earlier dismissal of the Petition, the PCR Court 

held:

In the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief the Defendant claims that 

his trial counsel was ineffective by ''failing to advise Robin that 

under Arizona law multiple crimes presumptively run consecutive 

to each other, that case law supports running multiple victims 

crimes consecutive to each other and that there was a possibility the 

court would sentence him to what amounts to the rest of his life in 

prison." Petition for PCR, p. 14. The Defendant also acknowledges, 

however, that AR.S. § 13-708 does not create a presumption in 

favor of consecutive sentencing. Petition for PCR, p. 19. See State v. 

Garza, 192 Ariz. 171,962 P.2d 898 (1998). This Court is, and was at 

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the time relevant to this proceeding, aware that AR.S. § 13-708 does 

not create a presumption favoring consecutive sentences. This Court 

in no manner regarded itself constrained by the language contained 

in AR.S. § 13-708 to impose consecutive sentences. Defense 

counsel's statement at the change of plea hearing concerning the 

discretion of the court at sentencing was correct. 

(Exhibit LL, M.E. 10/30/07 at 2.) 

No Presumption of Consecutive Sentence - Indeed, state authorities had long 

plainly held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-708 did not create a presumption in favor of 

consecutive sentences:

Section 13-708 neither creates a presumption for consecutive or 

concurrent sentences, nor imposes any restrictions on a trial court's 

discretion in choosing between consecutive or concurrent sentences. 

Because section 13-708 creates no presumption in favor of one type 

of sentencing structure over the other and acts as a default statute 

solely applicable in the event that a judge fails to designate a 

particular structure at the time of sentencing, it is immaterial that the 

legislature did not include any reference to this section within 

section 13-502(D).

State v. Ward, 200 Ariz. 387, 388-89, 26 P.3d 1158, 1159-60 (Ariz.App. 2001) (citing

Garza). Notwithstanding the decision of the trial court in this matter, and the plain 

holdings of Garza and Ward, Petitioner continues to argue without supporting authorities

that “the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-708 was for the court to impose consecutive 

sentences.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 25.) Petitioner is mistaken.

Petitioner cites State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 315, 778 P.2d 1204 (1989) for the 

proposition that when “a single act harms multiple victims may be punished by 

consecutive sentences.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 10 (emphasis added).) Petitioner conflates 

permission into mandate. In Gordon, the Arizona Court was applying the prescription in 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-116 that only concurrent sentences be applied when a “single act” is 

“made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws.” Similarly, the 

specific quotation, note 5 of the Gordon opinion, was a reference to State v. Gunter, 132 

Ariz. 64, 643 P.2d 1034 (App. 1982), which was applying double jeopardy principles 

and an earlier version of § 13-116. In each of these opinions, the question was not 

whether the court was required to apply consecutive sentences, but rather the reverse, 

whether it was required to apply concurrent sentencing. Having found in both cases that 

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concurrent sentences were not mandated, neither court went on to hold that consecutive 

sentences were mandated, merely that they were permissible.

Ability to Argue Acceptance of Responsibility - Petitioner also argues (again, 

without supporting authorities) that counsel could have argued Petitioner’s acceptance of 

responsibility “with or without the plea.” (Petition, Doc, 1 at 25.) Respondents point to 

no authority holding to the contrary.

Arizona generally precludes the consideration of a defendant’s failure to accept 

responsibility as grounds for heightening a defendant’s sentence, finding it a violation of 

the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. See e.g. State v. Trujillo, 227 

Ariz. 314, 257 P.3d 1194 (App. 2011). Nonetheless, defendants are permitted to argue 

acceptance of responsibility as grounds for leniency. See e.g. State v. Sansing, 206 Ariz. 

232, 241, 77 P.3d 30, 39 (2003). “A defendant is guilty when convicted and if he 

chooses not to publicly admit his guilt, that is irrelevant to a sentencing determination. If 

a defendant admits his guilt, this can be used as additional mitigating evidence, provided 

the defendant is truly remorseful for his crime.” State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 162, 

692 P.2d 991, 1011 (1984). 

Here, however, counsel pointed out that acceptance of responsibility after trial 

came with risks:

Q. He could still accept responsibility for what happened?

A. He could. If you go through the efforts of trial, it's 

unknown when you go in whether or not you may achieve a better 

feeling at the outcome of the case or a more hostile feeling. That's a 

factor that can have some sway.

Q. You are familiar with the Michelle case which says that 

the Court cannot use the fact that the defendant chooses to go to trial 

and maintain his innocence as an aggravating factor against him?

A. Certainly. It cannot be considered to be an aggravating 

factor. What I'm suggesting is as a practical reality during the ebb 

and flow of the trial, there can be factors in emotions generated that 

.can sway sentencing considerations, not the fact of whether you 

pursued trial. That, of course, is not a consideration.

(Exhibit SS, R.T. 4/28/09 at 40.) Thus, counsel’s advice could have been based upon 

the reasonable strategic determination that the evidence presented at trial would create a 

predisposition in the judge to a harsher sentence, and that pleading guilty prior to trial 

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would avoid that affect. 

Moreover, acceptance of responsibility only after putting the state, the victims, 

and the witnesses to the burden of a trial, generally engenders less good will than doing 

so before trial. Indeed, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, special 

preference for an acceptance of responsibility is only available to pre-trial acceptance. 

See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Applic. Note 2 (“This adjustment is not intended to apply to a 

defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the 

essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses 

remorse.”). As a practical matter, the kind of honest, remorseful acceptance of 

responsibility that engenders leniency at sentencing is seldom demonstrated by waiting 

until after the defendant has rolled the dice at trial and lost, and only then offered to 

admit his guilt.

Conclusion - Thus, advice by counsel that Petitioner stood a better chance of 

obtaining concurrent sentencing with a guilty plea, than he did without, was at least a 

reasonable strategy, if not downright good advice. Accordingly, this portion of the claim 

is without merit.

6. Advice on Lack of Evidence of Impairment

Petitioner argues that counsel failed to advise Petitioner about the lack of 

evidence of impairment. Petitioner largely stakes this claim on the conclusion that the 

expert witnesses could only testify that Petitioner was “under the influence” and could 

not testify that he was “impaired.” 

Petitioner further argues that the PCR court “accepted that the experts would 

testify that Mr. Robbins was impaired,” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 25), when all the testimony 

from the experts showed they could not make such a determination. However, the PCR 

court’s order indicates to the contrary.

The PCR court rejected this claim finding that, although the experts could not 

provide evidence “of sufficient clarity or certainty to support a finding of impairment,” 

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there was other “substantial, strong evidence that Mr. Robbins was impaired.” (Exhibit 

XX, M.E. 8/14/09 at 2.) In particular, the court pointed to Petitioner’s “pattern of erratic 

driving,” “driving into oncoming traffic while maintaining highway speeds,” and “failure 

to make all efforts to slow and stop the vehicle” if it were malfunctioning. (Id.)

Petitioner complains that the PCR Court somehow failed to understand the claim 

as being based on counsel’s erroneous advice, and failed to address the fact that counsel 

“believed the case was not defensible because...there was no expert to contest the State’s 

conclusion that Mr. Robbins’ was impaired.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 27.) However, the 

PCR court properly recognized that expert opinion was not necessary to the state’s case 

on impairment. See state ex re. McDougall v. Albrecht 168 Ariz. 128, 132, 811 P.2d 

791, 795 (App. 1991) (“failure to stop at a red light and speeding coupled with his poor 

performance of the field sobriety tests and physical signs of impairment constituted 

substantial evidence of impairment. This evidence alone amply supports the jury 

verdict”); and State v. Sup. Court, Cochise County , 149 Ariz. 269, 279-280, 718 P.2d 

171, 181-182 (1986) (discussing portions of the DUI statutes which may be proven by 

evidence other than chemical analysis). 

To be sure, Petitioner proffers alternative, innocent explanations for his driving, 

including mechanical failure and drowsiness brought on by sleep apnea, insomnia and 

sedating medications (either over-the-counter Excedrin, or an inadverantly administered 

anti-depressant). But the PCR court found none of those viable, given “the erratic 

driving or movements of the Defendant’s truck...very consistent with the vehicle being 

operated by an impaired driver [and]...not consistent with control by a dozing driver.” 

(Exhibit XX, M.E. 8/14/09 at 3.) 

Given the circumstances of the collision, counsel could have reasonably 

concluded that the issue of impairment was indefensible, notwithstanding the limits of 

the expected expert testimony.

3

 For this reason alone, the claim is without merit.

 

3 Moreover, the toxicologist retained by counsel had opined that he could make finding 

of impairment based upon retrograded levels of methamphetamine in Petitioner at the 

time of the collision. (Exhibit JJ, Griffen Affid., Exhibit C.)

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Further, proof of “impairment,” a term heavily laden with meaning under Arizona 

DUI statutes, was necessary only to convict Petitioner of the misdemeanor DUI charges 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1381(A)(1). The serious charges, e.g. second degree murder, 

aggravated assault, etc., did not mandate any proof of “impairment.”

4

 The former 

requires proof that “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, 

the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby 

causes the death of another person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1104(A)(3). The latter 

required only proof of a reckless assault using “a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(2), in this case Petitioner’s truck. Even had 

counsel been able to conjure a defense to the misdemeanor DUI charges (for which he 

received only 6 months jail time), his advice to Petitioner to plead guilty to the charges 

in hopes of securing leniency at sentencing on the drastically more serious charges 

would have been reasonable.

Thus, to advise Petitioner to accept the plea based (in part) on the lack of a 

defense to the allegations of impairment would not have been deficient performance, and 

this portion of the claim is without merit.

7. Advice on Availability of Mechanical Expert

Next, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because he improperly 

advised Petitioner that no mechanical expert was available to support Petitioner’s 

assertion of steering failure. 

The PCR Court ruled:

Mr. Griffen testified that he viewed Mr. Verheggen as a fact 

witness who would be used as the source of information about the 

condition of the steering column. Because of the friendship between 

Mr. Robbins and Mr. Verheggen, Mr. Griffen did not formally 

categorize Verheggen as an expert, but it is clear that Mr. Griffen 

intended to call Mr. Verheggen as a fact witness who potentially 

 

4

Thus, the PCR court opined that the failure to pull over in the face of purported 

mechanical difficulties sufficiently demonstrated the requisite recklessness. (Exhibit 

XX, M.E. 8/14/09 at 2.) Indeed, simply repeatedly crossing the line without justification 

would seem to suffice to establish the requisite extreme indifference.

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would qualify as an expert as well. Thus, the Defendant's claim on 

this point appears to involve a semantic, rather than a substantive, 

distinction. Griffen told the Defendant that there was no 

"independent" expert on the issue of mechanical failure. That 

statement was true but did not negate the fact that the issue of 

mechanical failure would be raised as a defense.

It is also clear, however, that Griffen had justifiable 

reservations about the credibility of Verheggen either as an expert 

or fact witness. Griffen knew that Verheggen was taking a number 

of medications and had problems with his memory. This Court finds 

that even if Mr. Verheggen should qualify as an expert witness 

competent to express an opinion regarding the steering column, he 

would not likely be viewed by the jury as a credible witness.

The Court finds that Mr. Griffen made reasonable, good faith 

attempts to retain a properly qualified expert witness and was 

unable to do so. The Court notes that the defense did not present a 

qualified expert witness who could meaningfully counter the

testimony of Jeffrey Browne, testimony that included the opinion 

that the steering linkage was operational prior to the collision.

(Exhibit XX, ME. 8/14/09 at 4.) 

In the face of the PCR court’s findings, Petitioner essentially contends that the 

state court simply got it wrong. Petitioner points to no deficiency in the fact-finding 

process itself. Thus, Petitioner must show that the facts found were not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1146.

Petitioner points to no specific evidentiary deficiencies, but simply restates his 

claims. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 26.) Those claims fall into three categories, and they will be 

addressed serially.

First, Petitioner asserts that Verheggen was an expert mechanic available to 

testify. The PCR court found that counsel recognized the potential for using Verheggen 

as an expert, but discounted his value. Counsel testified that he viewed Verheggen as a 

fact witness, and was hesitant to rely on him as an expert, because Verheggen had a close 

relationship with Petitioner and suffered from memory and credibility issues, the latter 

being suggestions that Verheggen was a drug dealer. (Exhibit RR, R.T. 4/15/09 at 239-

261.) Petitioner offers nothing to counter that testimony. The PCR court’s findings in 

this regard were supported by substantial evidence. 

Moreover, to the extent that counsel may have represented to Petitioner that 

literally no expert was available, thereby excluding Verheggen, the undersigned could 

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not find, in light of the problems with Verheggen’s testimony, that had counsel discussed 

using Verheggen with Petitioner, that Petitioner would have instead elected to go to trial. 

The likelihood that Petitioner would have still entered into the plea is further indicated 

by Petitioner’s conduct in the face of his asserted mechanical failure. As noted by the 

PCR court, even assuming there was a mechanical failure, Petitioner exhibited the 

requisite reckless behavior by continuing to drive the vehicle down the highway at a high 

rate of speed, rather than slowing and/or stopping and/or pulling over to the side of the 

road.5

Further, the testimony of counsel was that Petitioner was well aware of 

Verheggen’s potential use.

Q. And one of those aspects -- and I think this was addressed 

in your affidavit as well -- is whether you told Mr. Robbins prior to 

him pleading guilty that you had no expert to go forward at trial 

with on the mechanical defect.

A. No independent expert, meaning Robin and I certainly 

understood we had Verheggen. What I conveyed to Robin was we 

don't have an independent guy that we’ve been trying to secure 

that's going to come in and support our position. We all knew that

we had Verheggen. That was known from day one.

* * *

Q. I'll hand you this so I can ask you a question while you 

look at it. Did you not write in your affidavit on paragraph 6 -- that's 

Exhibit 7 regarding this discussion we're having right now about 

mechanical malfunction, quote, "While there were lay witnesses to 

support his claim, Robin was specifically told he had no expert 

witness to support his claim"?

A. That's correct. That's consistent with what I'm saying now. 

We had the Verheggens, which arguably might elevate to the level 

of something maybe more than a fact witness. Certainly well 

understood by Robin.

But we had no independent, unrelated, "nonbuddy," I-spentthe-weekend-at-his-house witness that I was looking for to bolster 

his position.

(Exhibit RR, R.T. 4/15/09 at 259-260.) 

Second, Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to investigate the mechanical defect.

Apart from criticism about locating an expert, Petitioner fails to suggest what else 

 

5

Petitioner also argued that he found himself with no choice, due to a large truck behind 

him and the railings of a bridge he was crossing. Again, however, the trial court could 

reasonably reject that explanation, given the potential to simply slow, the elapsed time 

and distance, as well as the descriptions of the events given by the eyewitnesses.

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counsel should have done to investigate. A habeas petitioner may not leave a court to 

speculate what evidence the deficient investigation would have discovered. In order to 

prevail on an allegation that defense counsel conducted an insufficient investigation 

resulting in ineffective assistance, the petitioner must show specifically what that 

investigation would have produced. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 

1997). Apart from Verheggen’s testimony, Petitioner proffers nothing further that 

counsel could have offered.

Third, Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to have an expert examine the steering. 

Petitioner complains that counsel showed one expert pictures, the expert declined to be 

involved, and that was the end of the investigation. To the contrary, counsel testified 

that not only had he contacted the reference expert shown photographs, but had pursued 

other experts. 

Q. If you were not prepared to use [Verheggen] or, as you 

said, fly solo, who were you going to use on this mechanical issue?

A. We tried to get backup in the form of somebody to 

confirm whether there was a defect in the steering column. We were 

unsuccessful in achieving that.

Q. That was only based on your associates showing 

photographs, to your memory, to one person in Flagstaff that 

declined to make that opinion?

A. Well, I remember that specific situation. I remember also 

calling and trying to secure other people who would serve as an 

expert on the issue and having significant difficulty with that.

(Exhibit RR, R.T. 4/15/09 at 244.) 

Q. Now, going back to the mechanical issue here, you did 

not do that with the mechanical issue, did you?

A. We tried to do that, as you know. But we also had backup 

testimony from the Verheggens that was helpful on the issue. As I 

said, I would have enjoyed having an expert that was more specific, 

but we weren't able to secure that.

(Id. at 258.) Again, apart from Verheggen, Petitioner fails to proffer any expert who 

would have testified that the collision resulted from mechanical failure. Petitioner 

proffers no evidence to counter trial counsel’s assertion that none was available.

/ /

/ /

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8. Case Not Defensible

Finally, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because counsel improperly 

advised him that the case was “not defensible.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 27.) 

The PCR Court rejected this claim, finding:

The Court finds that the testimony of defense counsel is 

credible and that Mr. Robbins knew that his attorney intended to 

present defenses at trial. The predominant defenses were: (1) the 

collision was an accident caused by a mechanical defect in the 

steering system of the Defendant's truck; and (2) Mr. Robbins was 

not immediately impaired by methamphetamine.

(Exhibit XX, M.E. 8/14/09 at 5.) Petitioner proffers nothing to show that this finding 

was unreasonable.

Indeed, Petitioner testified that he had discussed the potential for defenses with 

counsel:

Q. What was it that Mr. Griffen told you he was going to 

pursue on your behalf in terms of a defense in this case?

A. He was going to get some experts to do steering column 

and toxicology report I think, and accident reconstruction.

(Exhibit TT, R.T. 4/29/09 at 38.)

Q. Did he only discuss the strengths of the state's case against 

you?

A. He told me I had a weak case.

Q. Did he say anything positive about any of your potential 

evidence?

A. Basically, if we could get the jury to look away from the 

methamphetamine, if I wasn't impaired, things like that.

(Id. at 54.) 

Apart from the unsupported or ineffective defenses discussed hereinabove, 

Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he in fact had a viable defense to use at trial. 

Rather than misadvising Petitioner, the record fairly shows that counsel gave Petitioner a 

clear indication of the hazards he faced at trial. 

9. Summary

Petitioner’s theme in Ground One is that his guilty plea was involuntary because 

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counsel failed to properly advise him concerning the advisability and effect of the 

proffered plea agreement and his opportunities at trial. However, Petitioner fails to show 

that in rejecting these claims the PCR court erred legally, or that its factual findings were 

unreasonable. Accordingly, Ground One is without merit and must be denied.

B. GROUND TWO: PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

For his Ground Two for relief, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process 

because there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Petitioner bases this claim on the 

availability of defenses to and lack of evidence of, his impairment. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

28-29.) 

Respondents argue that the claim was not fairly presented as a federal claim, that 

presentation of the facts in a related state claim is not fair presentation, and that 

Arizona’s actual innocence claim is permitted based on the absence of a federal habeas 

claim for actual innocence and thus is not the same as a federal claim of insufficient 

evidence. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 17-18.)Respondents further argue that the claim is without 

merit inasmuch as there is no Supreme Court law supporting an actual innocence claim 

by a defendant who has pled guilty. (Id. at 40 et seq.)

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

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Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Petitioner argues that the substance of this claim was raised in his actual 

innocence claim to the state courts, and despite the absence of citations to federal law, 

the federal nature of the claim was presented because it was “clear that this was raised as 

a constitutional error,” and because “Arizona state law is the same as federal law on this 

issue.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 28-29.) Petitioner further argues that this claim was fairly 

presented because it was part and parcel of his underlying federal ineffective assistance 

claim. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 30.) 

Presentation of Underlying Facts - Although Petitioner asserted the underlying 

facts (e.g. the defenses to, and lack of evidence of, impairment), a claim has been fairly 

presented to the state court only if the petitioner has described both the operative facts 

and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Petitioner did not present his current federal legal theory (insufficient evidence) to 

the state courts. It is not sufficient that the constitutional nature of the claim was 

“apparent” from the facts being argued. “In this circuit, the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular provisions of the federal 

Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 

F.3d 657, 668 (9

th Cir. 2005). See also Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“Full and fair presentation additionally requires a petitioner to present the substance of 

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his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee “).

Presentation of Related Actual Innocence Claim - Petitioner argues that 

because Arizona state law is the same as federal law on the issue, his claim was fairly 

presented. The claim argued by Petitioner to the Arizona Court of Appeals was founded 

upon Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(h). (Exhibit YY, Pet. Rev. at 15.) That 

rule requires a petitioner to show that he was actually innocent – i.e. that “the facts 

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would 

have found defendant guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” The 

comments to the rule indicate that this provision was added in 2000 because of “the U.S. 

Supreme Court's pronouncement that claims of actual innocence are not cognizable 

under the federal habeas corpus remedy. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853 

(1993).” The Arizona courts denominate the rule as a claim of “actual innocence.” See 

e.g. State v. Espinoza, 2011 WL 2714079 (Ariz.App. 2011); and State v. Swoopes, 216 

Ariz. 390, 394, 166 P.3d 945, 949 (App. 2007).

The focus of rule 32.1(h) is the petitioner’s presentation of information or 

evidence that would preclude a reasonable jury from convicting. The evidence

considered is not limited to what was presented at trial. See State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 

573, 580, 278 P.3d 1276, 1283 (2012) (considering post-trial DNA evidence, etc.) In 

contrast, in a federal insufficiency of the evidence claim, the actual innocence of the 

defendant is irrelevant. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-324 (1979) (“even a thief 

is entitled to complain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as a 

burglar”). Rather, such a claim is founded upon an assertion that the evidence presented 

at trial made it unreasonable for that jury to have convicted, thus resulting in a denial of 

due process. Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (“ the applicant is entitled to habeas 

corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational 

trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). See Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995) (distinguishing between insufficiency of the evidence 

and federal actual innocence claims). 

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Thus, insufficiency of the evidence is a very different thing from the type of 

actual innocence claim contemplated under Rule 32.1(h). And, indeed, Arizona’s postconviction proceeding does not encompass an insufficiency of the evidence claim. “Rule 

32.1 defines the scope of the remedy available and specifies the only permissible 

grounds for relief...[i]nsufficiency of the evidence...[is] not among them.” State v. 

Salazar, 122 Ariz. 404, 406, 595 P.2d 196, 198 (App. 1979). See State v. Gutierrez, 229 

Ariz. 573, 580, n. 3, 278 P.3d 1276, 1283, n.3 (2012) (quoting Salazar and 

distinguishing between insufficiency of the evidence claims and claims under Rule 

32.1(h).)

Even had Petitioner asserted an insufficiency of the evidence claim in the state 

court, that would not amount to presentation of the federal insufficiency of the evidence 

claim he now raises. “[R]aising a state claim that is merely similar to a federal claim 

does not exhaust state remedies.” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 

2005). “[W]e cannot assume federal claims were impliedly brought by virtue of the fact 

that they may be ‘essentially the same’ as state law claims. If a petitioner fails to alert the 

state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is 

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 914 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, Petitioner bears 

the burden of showing an identity between the state and federal claims. Id. And, the 

burden of proof of such identity is high. “In the absence of an affirmative statement by 

the [state supreme court] that it considers a particular state and federal constitutional 

claim to be identical, rather than analogous ... Petitioner was required to raise his federal 

claims affirmatively; we will not infer that federal claims have been exhausted.” Fields 

v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner proffers nothing to 

show an identity between the state and federal insufficiency of the evidence claims.

Presentation of Related Ineffective Assistance Claim - Finally, Petitioner 

asserts that an insufficiency of the evidence claim underlay his ineffective assistance 

claim. That argument fails on two counts.

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First, assertion of an ineffective assistance claim is not sufficient to raise an 

underlying claim. See Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(holding that a petitioner does not fairly present a Fifth Amendment claim to the state 

courts when it is merely discussed as one of several issues handled ineffectively by 

counsel). “While [the ineffective assistance and underlying constitutional claim are] 

admittedly related, they are distinct claims with separate elements of proof, and each 

claim should have been separately and specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose, 

395 F.3d at 1112.

Second, Petitioner’s claim underlying his ineffective assistance argument was not 

that there was insufficient evidence to convict, but that counsel had not adequately 

pursued or advised Petitioner on the possibility of defenses at trial. To be sure, some of 

the evidentiary issues would have been similar (e.g. evidence on impairment, mechanical 

failure, etc.). However, to maintain his ineffective assistance claim, Petitioner was not 

required to show the net effect on a jury, but upon Petitioner, i.e. whether Petitioner 

would have proceeded to trial rather than pleading guilty had counsel properly pursued 

and advised Petitioner on the defenses. 

Moreover, as discussed more fully below, an insufficiency of the evidence claim 

relates to a result a trial. Here, there was no trial, but a guilty plea. 

Summary re Exhaustion – Petitioner failed to fairly present to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals a federal claim of insufficient evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner’s state 

remedies on the claim were not properly exhausted.

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

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of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper 

absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 

1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 13, n. 3.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal – As a pleading defendant, Petitioner has no right to 

file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 

256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a 

subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). 

Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court 

identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) 

waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among 

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those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.6 

Respondents do not offer anything to show that insufficiency of the evidence is 

the type of claim which does not require a personal waiver. The undersigned has found 

no Arizona case law on point. Because it is not clear, this Court cannot find that the 

claim is procedurally defaulted under Rule 32.2. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 

622 (9

th Cir. 2005) (“The Arizona state courts are better suited to make these 

determinations, which may require both a fact-intensive inquiry, and an application of 

Arizona's complex case law on waiver.”).

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bar. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions – Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the 

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these 

exceptions are applicable to his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would 

apply. The rule defines the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

 

6

Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type of 

waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz. 

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission), 

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived 

by omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy 

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal 

sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge 

conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 

2008).

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facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his insufficiency 

of the evidence claim. Petitioner has presented no facts to suggest that Paragraph (f) 

would apply. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to Petitioner’s procedural claims of 

insufficiency of the evidence at trial. 

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time bar would prevent 

Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims are all now 

procedurally defaulted.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

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procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner does not proffer any good cause to excuse his failures to exhaust 

and procedural defaults on Ground Two. The undersigned finds none.

Prejudice - Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural 

default, although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner 

fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, the undersigned finds the claim 

to be without merit. Accordingly, Petitioner has also failed to show prejudice. 

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion 

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

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Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc., §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

Although Petitioner argued his actual innocence to the state courts, Petitioner 

makes no claim of his actual innocence in this proceeding. 

3. Conclusion re Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Petitioner’s claim denial of federal due process as a result of insufficiency of the 

evidence was not fairly presented to the state courts, thus his state remedies were not 

properly exhausted. He is now barred under Arizona’s time bar from seeking state court 

review of this claim, and thus the claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has failed to 

show cause and prejudice, and has not asserted actual innocence to avoid his procedural 

default. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground Two must be dismissed with prejudice.

C. GROUND TWO: MERITS

Even if Petitioner’s Ground Two were not procedurally defaulted, it is without 

merit. Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict, resulting in a 

denial of due process, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).7 Petitioner 

concedes that because there was no trial and he pled guilty this is not the “usual lack of 

evidence claim” being raised. (Petition, Doc, 1 at 29.) Indeed, Petitioner proffers no 

authority, state8or federal, to support the existence of an insufficiency of the evidence 

 

7 Respondents convincingly observe (Answer, Doc. 11 at 41) that Petitioner’s shift from 

his assertion of actual innocence in the state courts to insufficiency of the evidence in the 

federal court appears to stem from the lack of any federally recognized constitutional 

claim of actual innocence. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).

8

See State v. Wood, 2012 WL 4859122 (Ariz.App. 2012) (finding that guilty plea 

precludes a claim of innocence, but recognizing the ability to attack the sufficiency of 

factual basis and assuming without deciding that a claim of actual innocence under Rule 

32.1(h) could be brought).

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claim in the context of a guilty plea.9

Generally, a defendant entering a guilty plea is deemed to have admitted all of the 

elements of the crime to which he pleads. The plea itself, not some modicum of 

evidence, supports the conviction.

A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission 

or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict 

of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing 

to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for 

persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty 

shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice 

and with full understanding of the consequences. When one so

pleads he may be held bound.

Kercheval v. U.S., 274 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1927).

The Constitution does not mandate that a factual basis (or “sufficient evidence”) 

support a guilty plea, as long as it is entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Loftis v. 

Almager, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 6183531, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13, 473 (9th Cir. 

12/11/12). The Loftis court observed (albeit in the more problematic context of a nocontest plea) that a defendant “cannot obtain habeas relief because the state trial court's 

failure to find a factual basis for his no contest plea—unaccompanied by protestations of 

innocence—does not present a constitutional issue cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 

Id. “[T]he due process clause does not impose on a state court the duty to establish a 

factual basis for a guilty plea absent special circumstances.” Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 777 

F.2d 527, 528 (9

th Cir. 1985) (noting a protestation of innocence at the time of plea as a 

potential special circumstance).

Here, Petitioner entered an unadorned plea of guilty. No evidence is required, 

under the Constitution, to support his conviction.

Petitioner attempts to avoid the effect of his guilty plea by again asserting it was 

not knowingly and voluntarily entered. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 29-30.) Those claims are 

 

9 Respondents argue inter alia that the claim is without merit because habeas relief must 

be founded upon Supreme Court law, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Answer, Doc. 11 at 

40, 42.) However, that section only applies to a “claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings.” As discussed hereinabove, Petitioner never presented 

a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to the state courts.

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rejected in connection with Ground One. 

Accordingly, Ground Two is without merit, and if not subject to dismissal with 

prejudice as procedurally defaulted, it must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

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district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under 

the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not 

“find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground Two (Insufficiency of the 

Evidence) of the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed March 26, 2012 

(Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of the Petitioner's 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed March 26, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

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findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 11, 2013

12-8056r RR 13 01 18 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:12-cv-08056-GMS Document 22 Filed 02/11/13 Page 38 of 38