Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-00563/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-00563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCINE HUERTA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-00563-SVK 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 24, 25, 26, 28

Plaintiff Francine Huerta (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of a final decision of Defendant Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff presents four issues for 

review: (1) whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly evaluated the opinion of the 

treating physician and examining physicians; (2) whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s 

testimony; (3) whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s husband’s testimony and (4) 

whether the ALJ’s decision under Step 4 and Step 5 is supported by substantial evidence. ECF 24

(“Pl. MSJ”). Plaintiff further contends that each error undermines the ALJ’s ultimate findings that 

Plaintiff has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from July 3, 

2012, through the date of last insured. Id. As a result, Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the 

ALJ’s decision and award benefits. Id. at 13. Before the Court are the Parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment. Id.; ECF 25 (“Def. MSJ”); ECF 26 (“Pl. Reply”).

Having considered the cross-motions for summary judgment, the relevant law and the 

record in this case,1the Court finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and that his 

 

1 This matter was submitted without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5.

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determinations are supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2 

As set forth more thoroughly below, the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and 

more particularly, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for discrediting certain physician testimony, 

Plaintiff’s testimony and Plaintiff’s husband’s testimony. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On April 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability benefits with an

alleged onset date of July 3, 2012. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 17. Plaintiff is now 53 years 

old. AR 43. She has at least a high school education and can communicate in English. AR 34. 

Prior to her accident, she worked as an evidence specialist and most recently as a patient services 

representative. AR 65–66. Her disability arises from a knee injury she suffered from slipping and 

falling while working as a patient services representative. AR 46–47. Following her knee 

surgery, Plaintiff began suffering from hemiplegic migraines. She applied for disability benefits 

based on a combination of impairments including symptoms from her knee injury and hemiplegic 

migraines. AR 212–13. 

After Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a 

hearing before an ALJ. AR 116–17. ALJ E. Alis held a hearing on May 10, 2016, at which 

Plaintiff, who was represented by an attorney, testified. AR 40–79. A vocational expert also 

testified. Id. On September 26, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff has not been 

under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date of July 3, 2013, 

through March 31, 2016, the last date insured. AR 17–35. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review on November 24, 2017. AR 1–6.

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed a timely civil action in this Court. ECF 1. All parties 

have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. ECF 13; ECF 15.

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2 The Court has received Defendant’s resubmission of a certified, paper copy of the transcript of 

the administrative record. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Parties’ stipulation for an 

extension to resubmit a copy of the record (ECF 28) is moot. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review 

This Court has the authority to review the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability 

benefits, but “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite limited.” BrownHunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Federal courts 

“leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve

ambiguities in the record.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or if it is based on the application of improper legal standards. Id. “Substantial 

evidence” means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rounds v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Court “must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence 

that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Court 

must uphold the ALJ’s findings if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Id.

Even if the ALJ commits a legal error, the ALJ’s decision will be upheld if the error is 

harmless. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. But “[a] reviewing court may not make independent 

findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless.” Id. 

The Court is instead “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Id. (citation omitted).

B. Standard for Eligibility for Disability Benefits 

Disability benefits are available under Title II of the Social Security Act when an eligible 

claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must employ a five-step 

sequential analysis, determining (1) whether the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity; (2) 

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whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment or 

combination of impairments that has lasted for more than 12 months; (3) whether the impairment 

meets or equals one of the listings in the regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (i.e., what a claimant can still do despite her limitations), the claimant can still 

do her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work. 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 and n.5 (9th Cir. 2014). The burden of proof is on the 

claimant at Steps 1 through 4 but shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION 

The ALJ employed the established five-step framework for evaluating disability claims as 

set forth below. It is the ALJ’s findings in Step 4 and the resultant conclusions in Step 4 and Step 

5 which are relevant to the pending motions. 

• Step 1: The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during 

the period from her alleged onset date of July 3, 2012, through her date of last insured of 

March 31, 2016. AR 19.

• Step 2: The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: left knee 

chondromalacia (status post left knee arthroscopy, partial medial meniscectomy, medial 

femoral chondroplasty and plica resection); and obesity (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). AR 19. 

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments (AR 20), hemiplegic migraines

(AR 23), fibromyalgia (id.), gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) (AR 22) and mild 

chronic gastritis (id.) are non-severe through the date last insured. 

• Step 3: The ALJ held that through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of 

one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). AR 24.

• Step 4: The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform 

sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) except that: Plaintiff can stand 

and/or walk for a total of four hours an eight-hour workday; Plaintiff has no sitting 

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limitations but requires the option to sit or stand at will without leaving the workstation or 

being off task; Plaintiff can occasionally push and pull with her left lower extremity; 

Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; the claimant can occasionally stoop, 

kneel, crouch, crawl, balance and climb ramps and stairs; and Plaintiff must avoid all 

exposure to dangerous moving mechanical parts and unprotected heights. AR 24. Based 

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of 

performing her past relevant work as a hospital admitting clerk through the date last 

insured. AR 33

• Step 5: Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform her past work, the ALJ 

made alternative findings under Step 5, concluding that considering Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. AR 34. In 

particular, the ALJ adopted the testimony of the vocational expert and found that Plaintiff 

could perform the requirements of a receptionist. AR 35.

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made four errors that warrant reversal: (1) the ALJ failed to 

articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the testimonies of her treating physician, 

Dr. Elaina Guerin, treating physician, Dr. H. Michael Jaffin,3and examining physician, Dr. Oscar 

Abeliuk, (2) the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms, (3) the ALJ improperly rejected Plaintiff’s 

husband’s lay testimony and (4) the ALJ failed to support his opinion in Step 4 and Step 5 with 

substantial evidence. ECF 24 at 8–18.

A. Physician Testimony 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the findings of Dr. Guerin, Dr. Jaffin

and Dr. Abeliuk. ECF 24 at 8–12. Plaintiff contends that these opinions establish that she could 

not sustain even sedentary work on a regular and continuing basis, and that the ALJ’s opinion fails 

 

3 Plaintiff categorizes Dr. Jaffin as an examining doctor, but Dr. Jaffin is an orthopedic surgeon, 

who performed Plaintiff’s knee surgery and treated her during her post-operation recovery. 

AR 502–3. Accordingly, the Court finds that Dr. Jaffin is more appropriately labeled as a treating 

physician. 

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to support the ALJ’s rejection of these opinions with clear and convincing reasons. Id. at 12. 

1. The ALJ’s Analysis of the Physicians’ Opinions 

The medical records in this case are complex because of the number of physicians who 

have treated Plaintiff, the duration of Plaintiff’s treatment and the number of medical 

complications from which Plaintiff suffers. The ALJ’s opinion provides a detailed account of 

these medical records (AR 20–23; AR 25–30), and the ALJ’s ultimate conclusions can be grouped 

into three general categories: (1) Plaintiff’s residual capacity given her the complications with her 

left knee, (2) Plaintiff’s mental impairments and (3) Plaintiff’s non-severe physical impairments, 

which includes Plaintiff’s recurring migraines. The Court reproduces the ALJ’s conclusions 

below: 

(1) The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual capacity given her left knee impairments as 

follows:

In summary, the claimant’s medical records reflect a history of a left 

knee surgery in October of 2012, with repeated observations by her 

orthopedic surgeon [Dr. Jaffin] of an ability to walk “well” or 

“reasonably well” and to perform activity such as “jumping up and 

down” and squatting after that surgery and through the end of 2013. 

Thereafter, the claimant’s medical records depict her worsening left 

knee symptom complaints, with supporting exam findings of reduced 

range of motion and crepitus and imaging studies depicting moderate 

left knee chondromalacia. Additionally, Dr. Abeliuk reported limited 

lumbar range of motion, positive straight leg raise testing on the left, 

and some postural and gait-related limitations in early 2016. The 

totality of the evidence reasonably supports a limitation to less than 

the full range of sedentary work, with a sit-stand option. However, it 

does not support the claimant’s allegations of entirely disabling 

symptoms and limitations from her physical impairments.

AR 28. 

(2) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments are non-severe:

Under the totality of the evidence, I find that the claimant has the 

following degree of limitation in the broad areas of functioning set 

out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders and in 

the mental disorders listings in 20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1: mild restriction in activities of daily living, mild 

difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes of 

decompensation, each of extended duration. I further find that the 

claimant’s mental impairments (including but not limited to 

depression, panic disorder and anxiety disorder) have no more than 

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minimally impaired her ability to perform work activities over any 

period of at least 12 consecutive months since the date of alleged 

onset of disability. Therefore, these impairments were non-severe 

through the claimant’s date last insured for Title II disability benefits.

AR 21. 

(3) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments, hemiplegic migraine 

headaches, fibromyalgia, GERD and mild chronic gastritis are non-severe:

Under the totality of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s migraine 

headaches, fibromyalgia, GERD, and mild chronic gastritis have not 

more than minimally impaired her ability to perform work activities 

over any period of at least 12 consecutive months since the date of 

alleged onset of disability.

AR 23.

Based on these conclusions, the ALJ’s opinion then discusses the credit that the ALJ gave 

each physician’s opinion. Plaintiff’s appeal focuses on the ALJ’s findings regarding a subset of 

her medical complications. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of 

Plaintiff’s treating doctor, Dr. Guerin, regarding the medical impairments caused by Plaintiff’s 

migraines. ECF 24 at 9-10. Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rejection of the opinions of Dr.

Jaffin and Dr. Abeliuk, Plaintiff’s treating and examining physician respectively. Id. at 10–12. 

These findings relate to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity considering Plaintiff’s medical 

complications with her left knee. The Court summarizes the medical evidence regarding these two 

issues according to the physician making the findings. 

i. Dr. Elaina Guerin

Dr. Guerin, Plaintiff’s treating doctor, diagnosed Plaintiff with complex migraines, 

fibromyalgia, chest pain, GERD, dizziness, fatigue, papulations and neck pain. AR 831. She also 

opined that Plaintiff would have to take three to four unscheduled, one-hour breaks during an 

eight-hour workday. AR 833. Dr. Guerin further stated that Plaintiff’s impairment symptoms 

would result in Plaintiff missing work more than four times a month. Id. The ALJ gave her 

opinion “little weight,” finding that “her severely restrictive medical assessment (which would 

effectively preclude all work activity) is not reasonably supported by the balance of the evidence, 

and thereby more closely fits the profile of a treatment provider who is advocating for her patient.” 

AR 30-31. 

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ii. Dr. H. Michael Jaffin

Dr. Jaffin performed orthopedic surgery on Plaintiff’s left knee and conducted numerous 

post-operation evaluations. AR 502–03. Prior to her surgery, Dr. Jaffin indicated that Plaintiff 

should avoid “prolonged standing, squatting, or bending.” AR 529. But in Plaintiff’s post-surgery 

evaluations, Dr. Jaffin regularly observed that Plaintiff “walks well,” “can toe and heel walk,” 

“can jump up and down” as well as at least “partially squat and recover.” AR 488; AR 489; AR

490; AR 491; AR 492; AR 495; AR 504. 

Dr. Jaffin consistently opined that Plaintiff should remain off work from July 11, 2012, to 

December 4, 2013. AR 483–84; AR 486; AR 488–92; AR 495; AR 498–99; AR 501; AR 504; 

AR 506–7; AR 515; AR 529.4 On December 4, 2013, Dr. Jaffin observed that Plaintiff “walks 

reasonably well,” “has no joint tenderness” but “has some patellofemoral compression 

tenderness.” AR 483. Dr. Jaffin recommended another left knee arthroscopy and opined that 

Plaintiff remains unable to work. Id.

The ALJ relied heavily on Dr. Jaffin’s treatment observations but gave Dr. Jaffin’s various 

opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work “relatively little weight.” AR 31. The ALJ noted 

that “the issue of disability is expressly reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527). The ALJ further noted that Dr. Jaffin supported his opinion with a “specific 

quantitative function-by-function assessments” on only one occasion. Id. In that report, Dr. Jaffin

failed to “define what he meant by ‘prolonged’” standing, squatting and bending. Id. 

iii. Dr. Craig Wiseman and Dr. Wesley Chan 

Dr. Craig Wiseman examined and treated Plaintiff regarding her left knee pain on June 26, 

2014, and November 16, 2015. AR 838–46. In June 2014, Dr. Wiseman opined that the Plaintiff 

“is only able to tolerate modified work restrictions.” AR 843. Dr. Wiseman further opined the 

Plaintiff cannot stand for over four hours in an eight-hour workday and cannot engage in 

prolonged bending, lifting, stooping or squatting. AR 846. Dr. Wiseman found no change in 

Plaintiff’s condition in November 2015. AR 845. 

 

4 A few of Dr. Jaffin’s examination notes do not make an indication regarding her ability to return 

to work. See e.g. AR 491. 

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Dr. Wesley Chan examined Plaintiff on July 30, 2014, and declared Plaintiff permanent 

and stationary. AR 821. The ALJ noted that Dr. Chan cited and reproduced Dr. Wiseman’s work 

restrictions (AR 822), which the ALJ considered as evidence that Dr. Chan “adopted and agreed 

with Dr. Wiseman’s opinion.” AR 31.

The ALJ gave “great weight to Dr. Wiseman’s medical assessment (as supported by Dr. 

Chan) as affirmatively detailed, while also noting that the medical evidence supports additional 

appropriate postural and environmental restrictions as well as a sit/stand option.” AR 31.

iv. Dr. Oscar Abeliuk

Dr. Abeliuk provided two reports based on personal observations of Plaintiff and a review 

of her medical records (AR 858): one in June 2013 and a second in March 2016. In both reports, 

Dr. Abeliuk opined that the Plaintiff was restricted to no “heavy” lifting, no climbing of “stairs or 

ladders,” no kneeling, squatting or walking on uneven terrain and no “prolonged” standing or 

walking. AR 873; AR 945–46. In June 2013, Dr. Abeliuk opined that Plaintiff would need a ten 

to fifteen-minute break if she has to stand or walk longer than one hour. AR 873. In March 2016, 

he found that Plaintiff requires a ten-minute break if she must stand or walk longer than fifty 

minutes. AR 945. Finally, Dr. Abeliuk noted that Plaintiff “might be able to return to work in a 

sedentary position” but was unsure if her employer offered that option. AR 873.

The ALJ gave “partial weight to Dr. Abeliuk’s medical assessments” noting that Dr. 

Abeliuk’s “limitation to sedentary exertional work, with rest periods in the event of prolonged 

standing or walking, finds some support in the medical evidence.” AR 32. The ALJ found that 

“Dr. Abeliuk essentially proposed a sit/stand option,” and that “the totality of the evidence more 

reasonably supports a sit/stand option such that the claimant requires the option to simply sit or 

stand at will without leaving the workstation or being off task, with total standing and/or walking 

limited to up to 4 hours in an 8-hour workday.” Id. However, the ALJ rejected “Dr. Abeliuk’s 

restrictions to “no” climbing of stairs, stooping (bending), kneeling, crouching (squatting), and 

walking on uneven terrain [as] overly restrictive.” Id.5

 

5 The ALJ noted that Dr. Abeliuk inaccurately represented the functional limitations that Dr. Chan 

described from Dr. Wiseman’s June 2014 assessment. AR 31–32. Dr. Chan did not restrict 

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v. State Agency Physicians 

Regarding Plaintiff’s physical impairments, State agency physician Dr. J. Zheutlin 

concluded that Plaintiff could perform light work with some additional restrictions and that 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms are “not fully supported by the 

objective evidence in the file.” AR 88–91. State agency physician Dr. N.J. Rubaum concurred 

with these findings. AR 100–03. The ALJ partially credited these findings. AR 30. The ALJ 

gave “great weight to their opinions regarding the claimant’s postural and environmental 

functionality,” but the ALJ gave “somewhat less weight to the state agency physicians’ exertional 

assessments” because “the balance of the evidence adequately supports a somewhat more 

restrictive residual functional capacity limitation to less than the full range of sedentary work.” 

AR 30. 

As for Plaintiff’s mental impairments, State agency physician Dr. Jaine Foster-Valdez 

observed that “generally [Plaintiff’s] mental status reports are unremarkable” and concluded that 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe. AR 86. Dr. Foster-Valdez opined that Plaintiff 

had mild restrictions in activities of daily living, maintaining social functioning and maintaining 

concentration, persistence or pace. AR 87. State agency physician Dr. F.L. Williams set forth the 

same findings and concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe. AR 98–99. 

The ALJ gave these two opinions “great weight.” AR 30. The ALJ concluded that “the balance of 

the evidence reasonably supports their medical opinions, as the claimant’s mental status 

examinations have been generally unremarkable over her treatment history,” and “her insight, 

judgment, memory, attention, and concentration have repeatedly been assessed as normal.” AR 30 

(citing AR 619–20; AR 670–72; AR 701–02; AR 708–10; AR 910; AR 933). 

2. Legal Background

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of physicians based on three 

categories: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do 

 

Plaintiff to “[n]o squatting, climbing or kneeling;” instead, Dr. Chan stated, as Dr. Wiseman 

assessed, that Plaintiff could not perform “prolonged bending, lifting, stooping, or squatting.” 

AR 31–32; AR 822; AR 846; AR 925.

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not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the 

claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The 

Court gives more weight to the opinions of physicians who treat the claimant than to the opinions 

of those who do not. Id. The opinion of an examining physician likewise warrants greater weight 

than the opinion of a nonexamining physician. Id. 

An ALJ may only “disregard the opinion of a treating physician” after providing “clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so if the treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another 

doctor.” Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). When another physician’s findings conflict with the treating physician’s opinion 

the ALJ must state “‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the 

record for” rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Murray v. 

Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983)). The same standards apply to the ALJ’s consideration 

and rejection of an examining physician’s opinion. Id. at 830–31 (citations omitted).

An ALJ must also consider the opinions of state agency medical or psychological 

consultants because they “are highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability 

evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1). Their findings and the findings of other “nontreating, 

nonexamining physician can amount to substantial evidence, so long as other evidence in the 

record supports those findings.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation 

omitted). But their opinions “should be discounted and [are] not substantial evidence when 

contradicted by all other evidence in the record.” Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (quoting Millner v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 243, 245 (4th Cir.1984)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute 

substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

3. The Standard that the ALJ Must Meet When Rejecting the 

Physicians’ Opinions 

Plaintiff contends that the clear and convincing standard applies because nontreating, 

nonexamining physician opinions are not sufficient to contradict the opinion of a treating 

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physician. ECF 26 at 2 (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d at 1454).6 There appears to be some 

ambiguity under Ninth Circuit precedent regarding whether the unsupported opinion of a 

nontreating, nonexamining physician constitutes sufficient evidence to find that a treating 

physician’s opinion is contradicted and thus trigger the specific, legitimate reasons standard. See 

Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the clear and convincing 

standard where the only conflicting evidence is the unsupported opinions of the non-examining 

state agency physicians); But see Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(applying the specific, legitimate reasons standard “[w]here . . . a nontreating source’s opinion 

contradicts that of the treating physician but is not based on independent clinical findings, or rests 

on clinical findings also considered by the treating physician”) (citations omitted). 

Here, the Court does not need to resolve this ambiguity. As further discussed below, 

evidence in the record supports the nontreating, nonexamining physicians’ opinions regarding the 

impairments from both Plaintiff’s left knee complications and migraines. Thus, the specific, 

legitimate reasons standard applies. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1042 (holding the Court was “not 

obliged to inquire whether the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting” the 

examining physicians opinions where “there is legitimate conflicting testimony by” a nontreating, 

nonexaming physician and the claimant). The Ninth Circuit has “consistently upheld the 

Commissioner’s rejection of the opinion of a treating or examining physician, based in part on the 

testimony of a nontreating, nonexamining medical advisor.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 

4. The ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Guerin’s Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Guerin’s opinion regarding the impairments caused by her complex migraines. ECF 24 at 10. 

In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly focused on what Plaintiff can do when 

having a good day rather than her inability to sustain adequate mental and physical functioning

 

6 Plaintiff also cites Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1987). However, in Winans, the 

Ninth Circuit applied the “specific, legitimate reasons” standard because the examining 

physician’s testimony contradicted the treating physician’s opinion. Id. at 647. 

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due to the frequency of her bad days. Id. Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ provided no 

evidence for the ALJ’s assertion that Dr. Guerin has taken on an improper role as an advocate for 

Plaintiff. Id. 

The ALJ gave specific legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Guerin’s opinions regarding the 

impairments caused by Plaintiff’s complex migraines. First, the ALJ noted that medical testing 

such as a brain MRI in January 2014 (AR 615), a bilateral carotid ultrasound study (AR 750–51)

and an EEG (AR 618) did not reveal any medical issues. AR 22-23. Second, treatment records 

also demonstrate that Plaintiff’s complaints regarding her migraines were inconsistent. AR 23 

(noting that after January 2013, Plaintiff did not raise additional migraine symptoms with Dr. 

Jaffin). Third, Dr. Alben C. Lui, who examined Plaintiff regarding her complex migraines, 

remarked that Nortriptyline made her headache symptoms “less intense” and that Plaintiff was 

able to care for her seven-year-old daughter. AR 23 (citing AR 615–16). Third, three other 

examining or treating physicians, Dr. Wiseman, Dr. Chan and Dr. Abeluik opined that Plaintiff 

was capable of higher levels of work activity. Specifically, Dr. Abeluik reviewed Plaintiff’s 

medical records, including her treatment records regarding her migraines. Although Dr. Abeluik 

noted that Plaintiff exhibited “several” hemiplegic migraine attacks since her surgery, Dr. Abeluik 

did not opine that Plaintiff’s migraines warranted any additional work restrictions—only further 

study. AR 941–42 (observing that Plaintiff “has had some conflicting counseling and 

recommendations regarding this issue by three different neurologists at Kaiser”) (emphasis 

omitted). Fourth, the ALJ also cited Plaintiff’s “largely unremarkable” mental status exam 

findings over her treatment history and her ability to drive as further evidence that Dr. Guerin’s 

assessment was too restrictive. AR 31 (citing AR 619–20; AR 670–72; AR 701–2; AR 708–10; 

AR 933). All of the foregoing evidence contradicts Dr. Guerin’s “severely restrictive medical 

assessment (which would effectively preclude all work activity)” and supports the ALJ’s assertion 

that she appears to be advocating for her patient. AR 30-31.

A reasonable factfinder could reach a different conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity given her complex migraines and adopt Plaintiff’s logic that the evidence in 

the record showing a lower level of impairment is simply evidence from Plaintiff’s “good days.” 

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However, a reasonable factfinder could also conclude the opposite—that the inconsistent evidence 

regarding Plaintiff’s migraine symptoms indicates that she can sustain a greater level of work 

functioning. The ALJ has reached the latter conclusion. Because the ALJ has supported that 

conclusion with specific, legitimate reasons, as outline above, the Court must respect that decision. 

See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039–40 (noting that a court “must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation”).

5. The ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Jaffin’s Findings Regarding Plaintiff’s 

Ability to Work 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly address Dr. Jaffin’s opinion that Plaintiff 

could not work for eighteen months between July 2012 and December 2013. ECF 24 at 10. 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Jaffin’s opinion that Plaintiff cannot 

engage in prolonged standing, which would mean that Plaintiff cannot stand long enough to make 

it through an eight-hour work day. Id. at 11. 

Here, the ALJ properly supported the rejection of Dr. Jaffin’s work restrictions by citing

their lack of specificity. AR 31. Federal regulations provide that “medical source opinions on 

issues reserved to the Commissioner,” such as whether a Plaintiff is “unable to work,” “are not 

medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ noted 

that Dr Jaffin “made no specific quantitative function -by-function assessments” of Plaintiff’s 

“work-related functionality.” AR 31. Dr. Jaffin’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work 

in connection with her worker’s compensation claim are largely unspecific, often simply involving 

checking a box to indicate that Plaintiff should remain off work. See e.g. AR 484. As a result, the 

ALJ could not determine the standard that Dr. Jaffin applied or compare his findings to federal 

disability standards. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Jaffin only opined once that the Plaintiff should 

avoid “prolonged” standing, squatting and stooping. That opinion came in July 2012, prior to 

Plaintiff’s surgery, and Dr. Jaffin did not define what he meant by “prolonged” activity. As the 

ALJ indicated, that opinion provides little insight into Plaintiff’s post-operation capacities. See 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of 

any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

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supported by clinical findings.”) (citations omitted).

Further, as the ALJ detailed throughout the opinion, Dr. Jaffin’s non-specific work 

prohibitions are countered by Dr. Jaffin’s more detailed observations regarding Plaintiff’s 

symptoms and ability to “walk[] well,” “toe and heel walk,” “jump up and down” as well as at 

least “partially squat and recover.” AR 488; AR 489; AR 490; AR 491; AR 492; AR 495; AR 

504. Such findings are inconsistent with a complete prohibition on work. See Morgan, 169 F.3d 

at 603 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that “internal inconsistencies within” a doctor’s report “also 

constitute relevant evidence”). And as the ALJ noted, these observations are consistent with 

Dr. Wiseman’s, Dr. Chan’s and Dr. Abeluik’s opinions. AR 26–27. Accordingly, the ALJ 

provided specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Jaffin’s opinion that Plaintiff should not 

return to work and his July 2012 opinion that she should avoid prolonged standing, squatting and 

stooping. 

6. The ALJ’s Interpretation of Dr. Abeliuk’s Opinion

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Abeluik’s opinion that Plaintiff would need a ten-minute break 

after fifty minutes of standing is not necessarily consistent with a sit/stand option. ECF 24 at 11. 

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Abeluik’s opinion does not clarify whether Plaintiff would have to take 

her ten-minute break away from her work station. Id. According to Plaintiff, such a distinction is 

important, because the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff would be disabled if she had to take 

her break away from the work station. Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have fully and 

fairly developed the record by seeking clarification from Dr. Abeluik on this point. Id. at 11–12. 

The ALJ did not error in concluding that Dr. Abeluik’s opinion that Plaintiff would need a 

ten-minute break after fifty minutes of standing or walking is “essentially” a “sit/stand option.” 

AR 32. Dr. Abeluik’s suggested work limitations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to stand and walk 

relate to her physical impairments. AR 945–46. Accordingly, it is unclear why Plaintiff would 

have to take a break away from her work station, instead of simply a break from those activities. 

The ALJ clarified that a sit/stand option would give Plaintiff “the option to simply sit or stand at 

will without leaving the workstation or being off task.” AR 32. Such an option would allow 

Plaintiff to take breaks from standing or walking, consistent with Dr. Abeluik’s proposed tenCase 5:18-cv-00563-SVK Document 29 Filed 01/04/19 Page 15 of 20
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minute break limitation. Ultimately, Plaintiff asks the Court to find an ambiguity where the ALJ 

reasonably concluded that none existed. Because “inferences reasonably drawn from the record” 

support the ALJ’s findings regarding the consistency of Dr. Abeluik’s opinion with a sit/stand 

option, the Court upholds those findings. Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

In sum, the ALJ satisfied his responsibility to determine the credibility of the medical 

evidence and provided specific, legitimate reasons for discrediting the physician opinions outlined 

above.

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 

evidence in the record.” AR 26. Plaintiff testified that she can walk “a couple of blocks,” but then 

she needs 15-30 minutes of rest. AR 208. She also testified that she “cannot stand, walk or sit at a 

computer for more than 15-20 minutes.” AR 203. Plaintiff further testified that her migraines can 

disable her for “days at a time” and that “[s]ometimes it can take 5 to 7 days to recover but just to 

have another attack again right after.” AR 212. According to Plaintiff, she constantly has strokelike symptoms (AR 51), and her migraine attacks occur up to ten times a month. AR 52. 

Plaintiff generally contends that the ALJ errored by failing to credit her testimony, which 

according the Plaintiff establishes that her impairments preclude her from sustaining work activity 

for a complete work day or work week and prevent her from maintaining competitive 

employment. ECF 24 at 12–15. 

1. Legal Background 

The ALJ is responsible for determining a plaintiff’s credibility. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. 

An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 

subjective pain or symptoms is credible. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be 

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no 

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evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the 

symptoms if [the ALJ] gives specific, clear and convincing reasons for the rejection.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). General findings are insufficient; rather, “the ALJ must 

make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude 

that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. In other 

words, the ALJ must identify the non-credible testimony and the evidence that undermines it. 

Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Factors the ALJ may 

consider in making an adverse credibility determination include (1) the claimant’s reputation for 

truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her 

conduct; (3) the claimant’s daily living activities; (4) the claimant’s work record and (5) testimony 

from physicians or third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the claimant’s 

condition. Id. at 958–59.

2. Analysis 

The ALJ offered specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

testimony concerning her symptoms. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance on her mental health 

examinations, her testimony regarding the reason she did not return to her job, her daily activities 

and her refusal to follow up with mental treatment are not sufficient to justify the ALJ’s rejection 

of her testimony. ECF 24 at 13–15. While the Court finds that these are proper reasons to 

discredit Plaintiff’s testimony, the more the more significant factor in upholding the ALJ’s 

decision is that the foregoing reasons cited by Plaintiff are just a few of the several that the ALJ 

offered. 

As discussed above, the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence regarding the impairments 

caused by Plaintiff’s mental and physical health conditions. See section III(A)(4), supra. The

ALJ relied on this same analysis to reject Plaintiff’s “allegations of entirely disabling symptoms 

and limitation from her physical impairments.” AR 28. The ALJ specifically cited the results 

from diagnostic tests on Plaintiff’s left knee as well as the results of physical examinations from 

Dr. Jaffin, Dr. Wiseman, Dr. Chan and Dr. Abeliuk. AR 26–28. This evidence sufficiently

supports the ALJ conclusion that “[t]he totality of the evidence reasonably supports a limitation to 

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less than the full range of sedentary work, with a sit-stand option.” AR 28. 

The ALJ also discredited Plaintiff’s statements regarding the symptoms from her 

hemiplegic migraines. AR 28. The ALJ supported this conclusion by citing her November 1, 

2012 emergency visit where she did not have symptoms of weakness or speech and/or vision 

disturbance, and she exhibited normal speech, sensation, gait and no focal neurological deficits. 

AR 708; AR 710. Plaintiff’s December 19, 2013 neurology consultation also shows that Plaintiff 

reported that she has headaches “1-2 times per month,” which “usually last[] for hours” and do

“not go away without medication.” AR 618. As the ALJ noted these statements contradict her 

testimony that it can take five to seven days for her to recover from a headache attack. AR 28. 

Lastly, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s repeated acknowledgement of her ability to drive (AR 47–48; 

AR 206) and observed that driving “involves a substantial and sustained degree of attention and 

concentration, and is inconsistent with the claimant’s testimony regarding entirely disabling 

symptoms of migraine headaches with ‘stroke-like symptoms 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.’” 

AR 28. This evidence sufficiently supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding her hemiplegic migraine symptoms. 

The ALJ also cited a several inconsistences between Plaintiff’s statements and the 

evidence in the record. AR 28–29. First, Dr. Jaffin’s treatment records show that that Plaintiff 

had generally normal walking ability as well as the ability to jump up and down, heel-toe walk and 

squat and rise over several evaluations from late 2012 through December 2013, which contradicts 

Plaintiff’s statement that she never healed or recovered from her left knee surgery. AR 28 (citing 

AR 483; AR 484; AR 486; AR 488–92). Second, Dr. Lui’s notes show that he informed Plaintiff 

that “surgery would not be contraindicated for her headaches and other symptoms,” which casts 

doubt on Plaintiff’s testimony that she declined a second knee surgery based on advice from her 

doctor that surgery may make her headache symptoms worse. AR 29 (citing AR 616). Third, 

Plaintiff’s daily activities, including walking for 30 minutes, three times a week, walking her dog 

and driving “suggest that she was more functional than she has alleged.” AR 29 (citing AR 416; 

AR 931; AR 47–48; AR 206); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]f a 

claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to the 

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workplace, the ALJ may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings 

relating to those activities.”). Fourth, the ALJ found that the conservative treatment of Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments such as not taking any psychotic medications “undermines the persuasiveness 

of her impairment allegations.” AR 29–30; see Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“[E]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding 

severity of an impairment.”) (citation omitted). These inconsistencies further support the ALJ’s 

decision to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. 

The Court finds that the ALJ set forth valid reasons, supported by substantial evidence in 

the record, for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. As a 

result, the Court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints and provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony 

concerning her pain symptoms.

C. Plaintiff’s Husband’s Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly disregarded the testimony of Plaintiff’s 

husband, Richard V. Huerta. ECF 24 at 15-17. The ALJ may consider testimony from lay 

witnesses such as Mr. Huerta because “friends and family members in a position to observe a 

claimant’s symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify as to her condition.” Dodrill v. 

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The ALJ may discount the 

testimony of lay witnesses provided that the ALJ “give[s] reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Id. at 919. 

Here, the ALJ properly supported his decision to give little weight to Mr. Huerta’s

statements describing Plaintiff’s functionality (AR 187-94). The ALJ described Mr. Huerta’s 

statements and concluded that his observations were “partially consistent with the evidence or 

otherwise partially persuasive.” AR 33. However, the ALJ gave “little weight” to Mr. Huerta’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s “quantitative functional limitations . . . because of their inherent bias and 

subjectivity, lack of medically acceptable standards, and their general inconsistency with the 

objective medical evidence, including opinion evidence from acceptable medical sources 

indicating that the claimant is more functional than these lay statements suggest.” Id. All three 

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reasons are germane to Mr. Huerta. Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(upholding a decision to discredit lay witness testimony based on inconsistencies with the 

claimant’s treatment records and the possible desire of the witness to help the claimant because of 

their close relationship). The ALJ’s reliance on Mr. Huerta’s failure to use accepted medical 

standards is suspect given that as a lay witness Mr. Huerta may base his testimony on his 

observations, rather than medical expertise. See Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 

2009). Nevertheless, the ALJ’s conclusion that the Mr. Huerta’s testimony is inconsistent with the 

medical evidence provides sufficient justification for disregarding his testimony in light of the 

ALJ’s detailed analysis of the medical evidence discussed previously. This reason as well as Mr. 

Huerta’s potential bias are germane to Mr. Huerta, and thus, the ALJ properly supported his 

decision to discount Mr. Huerta’s testimony. 

D. The ALJ’s Step 4 and Step 5 Analysis

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to support his analysis under Step 4 and Step 5

relies on her earlier arguments that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Guerin, Dr. 

Jaffin and Dr. Abeliuk. ECF 24 at 17. As discussed above in section III(A), supra, the Court 

finds that the ALJ properly evaluated those opinions and supported his conclusion regarding 

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity with substantial evidence. The Court likewise finds that the 

ALJ’s conclusion under Step 4 that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past work as a hospital 

admitting clerk is supported by substantial evidence. Based on this conclusion, the Court does not 

reach the ALJ’s analysis under Step 5. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, 

and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2019

SUSAN VAN KEULEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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