Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05340/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05340-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 2/8/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GOOGLE, INC., 

Plaintiff,

 v.

AMERICAN BLIND & WALLPAPER

FACTORY, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants. /

NO. 03-cv-5340 JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS 

TO ENFORCE PROTECTIVE

ORDER AND TO COMPEL 

DESIGNATION AND

CLASSIFICATION OF

DOCUMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant American Blind and Wallpaper Factory, Inc. ("American") moves to compel

plaintiff Google, Inc. ("Google") to de-classify various documents which American argues have

been improperly afforded the highest level of confidentiality under the stipulated protective order

entered in this case. American also moves to compel Google to comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b)

by either labeling the documents produced to correspond with specific discovery requests or by

providing an index which designates the source and origin of each of the 24 boxes and 10 compact

discs thus far provided by Google.

The motions were fully briefed and heard by the Court on February 3, 2006. Based on all

papers filed to date, as well as on the oral argument of counsel, the Court grants the motion

regarding document classification and further grants the motion to compel regarding compliance

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with Rule 34(b).

II. BACKGROUND

Google filed this declaratory relief action against American to determine Google's rights to

sell keyword-triggered advertising that includes descriptive terms such as "blind," "wallpaper," and

"factory"; words which are also component parts of American's trademarks. Although Google has

agreed to prevent entities from using American's registered marks, it argues that descriptive terms

such as "blind" are not entitled to protection under the Lanham Act. 

As part of its discovery requests, specifically Document Request No. 44, American requested

and Google produced all of the documents Google previously produced in a prior action, Geico v.

Google ("Geico"). Google contends that, although American's request for such documents was

overbroad, since it posed no burden to Google to provide copies of the Geico documents to

American, it did so without objection. Those documents were produced to American, however,

without any additional review or re-classification by Google. American now contends that, under

the terms of the stipulated protective order entered in this action, Google is obliged to review the

Geico documents and, if necessary, de-designate various documents which were classified in that

case as "Confidential - Attorneys' Eyes Only," and which are not entitled to that designation under

the stipulated protective order. Google responds that such a review is overly burdensome and notes

that it is simply easier for the parties to proceed as American has thus far; namely for American to

present to Google those documents which it contends need to be de-designated. 

In addition to re-classifying various documents contained in the Geico production, American

requests that Google be compelled to identify with specificity the discovery requests to which those

documents respond. While Google has stated that the documents respond to Request No. 44,

American argues that the documents may also be responsive to additional requests and, if so, asks

Google to identify those requests, or submit a verified response that the documents are responsive

solely to Request No. 44. 

\\\

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III. STANDARDS

A. Stipulated Protective Order

In granting a stipulated protective order, the court delegates to the litigants significant

discretion to decide what shall be treated as confidential. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in

Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101 F.R.D. 34, 41 (C.D. Cal. 1984). It is the designating

party's burden to show that the documents it seeks to keep confidential are entitled to protection

from disclosure. Verizon California, Inc. v. Ronald Katz Technology Licensing, L.P., 214 F.R.D.

583, 586 (C.D. Cal. 2003). "A problem arises if it later appears that the parties have abused their

authority to designate documents 'Confidential' or that, for some reason, some of the sealed

information should not legitimately remain closed to the public." In re Petroleum Products, 101

F.R.D. at 41. Under such circumstances, the court must balance the interests of confidentiality with

the interests of access to the information. Id. The weight to be accorded to each may vary according

to the purposes the documents serve in the litigation. Id.

B. Motion to Compel

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34 permits a party to serve on any other party a request to produce and copy

designated documents. In answering a request for production, the responding party shall state, with

respect to each item or category requested, whether production shall occur or whether an objection

exists and, if so, shall state such objection. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b). If documents are produced, they

must be provided as they are kept in the usual course of business or organized and labeled to

correspond with the categories in the request. Id. The party submitting the request may move for an

order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any request or objection thereto. Id.

Motions to compel are authorized by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

[If] a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a

party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails

to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit

inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order

compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection

in accordance with the request. The motion must include a certification that

the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the

person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the

information or material without court action. 

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1

 The "limited circumstances" delineated by the parties in the protective order are defined as materials reflecting:

1) current revenues, costs, profits, or other highly-sensitive, non-public financial matters; 2) bids, proposals, offers, or other

documents relating to attempts to acquire a competing business; 3) future strategic business, sales or marketing plans or

activities; or, 4) patents or other highly-sensitive trade secrets, the disclosure of which would irreparably harm the

Designating Party. Id.

2

 While the two protective orders are similar, they are not identical. Compare, Andelman Decl., Exh. B with Hamm

Decl., Exh. B. Google concedes this point. See Opposition at p. 7, lines 12-24.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Stipulated Protective Order

American moves to compel Google's compliance with the stipulated protective order, which

provides that the "Confidential -Attorneys' Eyes Only" designation will be used only in "limited

circumstances."1 See Declaration of Caroline Plater, Exh. A at ¶ 1. Despite its agreement to limit

such designation of documents, Google concedes that it simply provided the Geico documents to

American without any review or re-classification based on the fact that the designations which had

been made in the prior case were "very similar" to those agreed to by the parties in this action.2 

While Google's notion of streamlining the discovery process by producing readily available

responsive materials is certainly understandable, that does not relieve it of the obligation to comply

with the terms of the protective order in this particular case. Google, therefore, must review and

classify all documents it produces here, independent of what may have been done in any prior

separate action. Once designation and production has occurred, the protective order provides a

mechanism whereby the receiving party, in this instance American, may challenge the designations. 

Google concedes that it did not comply with this procedure and admits that it produced documents

which may carry improper classifications under the terms of the present protective order. See

Opposition at pp. 1, lines 19-22; 4, lines 3-7. As a result, Google must review and re-classify the

Geico documents it produced to American in this action based on the understandings reflected in the

parties' stipulated protective order. 

B. Motion to Compel

American also seeks to compel Google to comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b) with respect

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to Google's production of the Geico files. Although Google argues that those files were produced in

response to Document Request No. 44 as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, two

problems arise concerning that argument. First, Google's statement does not satisfy the "certified

response" requirement set forth in Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(g)(2). Accordingly, if it is Google's position

that the Geico files are responsive solely to Request No. 44, Google must serve a certified response

to American which so states. If, on the other hand, the Geico files are responsive to additional

discovery requests, then Google must identify with specificity which documents correspond to

which requests, in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b).

Second, Google's unsupported statement that the Geico files were produced "as they were

kept in the usual course of business" similarly fails to fulfill the requirements set forth in Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 34(b). See e.g., Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611 (D. Kan. 2005)

(holding that a mere assertion that documents were produced as kept in ordinary course of business

is insufficient to fulfill the requirements of Rule 34(b)). Moreover, a party's option to produce

documents "as they are kept in the usual course of business" is not absolute. As the Cardenas court

noted, "merely categorizing the documents produced does not, without some further explanation,

satisfy the requirement that they be produced as kept in the usual course of business." Id. at 618. 

Accord, Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v. Baxter Travenol Labs, Inc., 1988 WL 70013 (D.

Del. 1988) (motion to compel defendant to label and index 45,000 documents produced in 15 boxes

with no designations as to the origins of the files granted since court had reason to doubt documents

were produced as kept in ordinary course of business); T.N. Taube Corp. v. Marine Midland

Mortgage Corp., 136 F.R.D. 449, 456 (W.D. N. C. 1991) (court stated it "doubt[ed] very much

whether the Defendant complied with the command of Rule 34(b)...It is certainly improbable that

[defendant] haphazardly store[d] documents in a cardboard box").

In support of its contention that the records were produced as maintained in the ordinary

course of business, Google points out that the Geico files contain both colored and alphabetized

pages to assist American in navigating the documents. See Klaus Hamm Declaration, Exh. J. There

is no showing made by Google, however, that the colored and alphabetized pages, while perhaps

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3

 Google also advances the novel notion that as kept "in the usual course of business" may mean as documents have

been compiled and maintained in response to discovery in a prior case, as litigation has become an integral part of its

"business." The more reasonable reading of Rule 34, however, is that the "course of business" to which it refers concerns a

party's substantive business operations. 

6

somewhat helpful, correspond to the manner in which those files were maintained.3 "For this reason,

Rule 34(b) places the obligation on the responding party to 'organize and label' the documents which

are produced for inspection." Stiller v. Arnold, 167 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. Ind. 1996). As a result, the

motion to compel Google to comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b) by organizing and labeling the

documents produced to American is granted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, American's motion to compel Google to comply with the terms

of the stipulated protective order is granted. Google is ordered to review and classify all documents

produced to American to correspond with the requirements of the stipulated protective order within

thirty (30) days of the date of this order.

In addition, American's motion to compel Google to comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34(b) is

granted. Google shall provide a written response to American within thirty (30) days of the date of

this order linking the documents produced by Google to the requests made by American, including,

as appropriate, an indication that no documents are being produced in response to a particular

request. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 8, 2006 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Nathan B. Andelman andelmane@howrey.com, cranmerp@howrey.com

Ravind Singh Grewal rsg@kvn.com

Klaus Hemingway Hamm khamm@kvn.com, dmiller@kvn.com; dfox@kvn.com

Michael H. Page mhp@kvn.com, sjr@kvn.com; nsn@kvn.com

Robert Nathan Phillips phillipsr@howrey.com, cranmerp@howrey.com

Stephen E. Taylor staylor@tcolaw.com, jklohonatz@tcolaw.com; swexler@tcolaw.com;

tnewby@tcolaw.com; cdunbar@tcolaw.com; nfreese@tcolaw.com; sscoggins@tcolaw.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 2/8/06 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

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