Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02655/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Larry Bernard Long, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 14-02655-PHX-DJH (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Larry Bernard Long, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex-Lewis in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) on December 9, 2014. In a 

January 14, 2015 Order (Doc. 6), the Court granted Petitioner’s Application to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis and dismissed the Petition without prejudice, giving Petitioner 30 days 

to file an amended petition. On February 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend 

Time for Filing an Amended Petition and for Clarity regarding Court Order indicating 

that he only received one of the nineteen pages of the January 14 Order (Doc. 7). On 

February 24, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Time for Filing an Amended 

Petition (Doc. 8) and lodged an Amended Petition (Doc. 9). In a March 2, 2015 Order 

(Doc. 10), the Court granted the Motions for Extension of Time and deemed the 

Amended Petition (Doc. 11) timely filed in relation to the January 14, 2015 Order at Doc. 

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6. Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 15) asserting that the Amended Petition 

should be dismissed as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA), and in any event, Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted. Petitioner filed a Reply (Docs. 18, 19), and the matter is fully briefed. For the 

reasons below, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied as untimely. 

BACKGROUND

 On June 16, 2009, at the conclusion of a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted in 

Maricopa County Superior Court, Case #Cr 2008-102941-001DT, of sale or 

transportation of narcotic drugs, possession of dangerous drugs, possession or use of 

marijuana, resisting arrest, and two counts of misconduct involving weapons. (Doc. 15 at 

Ex. B.) On August 7, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to a 28-year term of imprisonment. 

(Id. at Ex. D, p. 3; Ex. SS, p. 26–35.) The trial court advised Petitioner in open court 

about his post-conviction appellate rights, and he also received and signed a notice of 

rights of review. (Id. at Ex. E; Ex. SS, p. 35–36.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. (Id. at Ex. F.) On January 18, 2011, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. (Id. at Ex. L; see State v. 

Long, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0625, 2011 WL 285126 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011)). 

Petitioner did not appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court or file a petition for certiorari in 

the United States Supreme Court. On March 4, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

issued its mandate. (Doc. 15 at Ex. M.) 

On February 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) 

with the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id. at Ex. N.) On February 24, 2011, the trial 

court appointed post-conviction counsel and set a briefing schedule. (Id. at Ex. O.) After 

requesting and receiving two extensions of time, on August 1, 2011, Petitioner’s counsel 

filed a notice of completion of review informing the trial court that he was “unable to 

discern any colorable claim upon which to base a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” 

(Id. at Exs. P, Q, R. S, T.) The trial court granted Petitioner time to file a pro per PCR 

petition. (Id. at Ex. U.) Petitioner requested and received an extension of time, and on 

September 12, 2011, filed a PCR petition. (Id. at Exs. V, W, X, Y.) On March 1, 2012, 

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the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR. (Id. at Ex. HH.) Petitioner did not file a 

petition for review in the court of appeals. 

On August 27, 2013, Petitioner filed a second, untimely PCR notice, alleging the 

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was a significant change in the law. (Id. at Ex. II, p. 3.) On 

September 3, 2013, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second PCR notice, finding it 

“both untimely and successive.” (Id. at Ex. JJ, p. 1.) On September 23, 2013, Petitioner 

filed a petition for review. (Id. at Ex. KK.) The Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review on March 12, 2015. (Id. at Ex. LL, p. 2–3.) 

Petitioner filed his original habeas petition on December 9, 2014. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner’s Amended Petition was filed on February 24, 2015. (See Doc. 9.) Petitioner 

raises three grounds for relief in his Amended Petition, and names Charles L. Ryan as 

Respondent and the Arizona Attorney General as an Additional Respondent. In Ground 

One, Petitioner alleges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective 

assistance of counsel were violated. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because of prosecutorial 

misconduct. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated because of a wrongful sentence. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

 1. Timeliness under the AEDPA 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The period 

generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). To assess the timeliness of the Petition, the Court must first determine the 

date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of direct review.” 

 Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending through January 18, 2011, when the 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied his direct appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner would 

ordinarily have had 35 days to seek further review, or until Tuesday, February 22, 2011. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (30 days for petition for review); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3 

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(additional five days after mailing); State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 

957 (1990) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to mailed appellate decision). Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

time to seek further review expired and his conviction became final on February 22, 

2011. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 

direct appeal is final upon expiration of time for seeking further appellate review). Thus, 

absent any statutory or equitable tolling, the AEDPA limitations period would have 

required Petitioner to file the instant federal habeas petition on or before February 22, 

2012. 

 2. Statutory Tolling 

 Under the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also 

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state petition that is not filed within 

the state’s required time limit, however, is not “properly filed,” and is thus not entitled to 

statutory tolling. Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6–7 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely 

state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” under AEDPA tolling provision); 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is 

untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). 

Thus, the AEDPA grants a petitioner one year from the conclusion of his direct appeal, 

minus time spent litigating a “properly filed” post-conviction claim, to file a federal 

habeas corpus petition. 

 Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was filed before his conviction became final on 

February 22, 2011. The AEDPA time limit was therefore tolled from its inception until 

the time expired to file a petition for review from the trial court’s dismissal of his first 

PCR on March 1, 2012. Petitioner had 35 days from March 1, 2012 (or April 5, 2012) to 

petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the trial court’s order. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.9(c), 1.3(a). Petitioner did not file a petition for review. Therefore the one-year 

statute of limitations began running on April 6, 2012, and Petitioner was required to file 

his federal petition one year later, by April 5, 2013. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

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1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the “anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations). 

 Petitioner’s second, untimely PCR petition filed on August 27, 2013, did not 

statutorily toll the running of the limitations period. An untimely petition is not a 

“properly-filed” application, and does not toll the running of the statute. See Pace, 544 

U.S. at 414; Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, 

because the limitations period had already expired on April 5, 2013, Petitioner could not 

restart the clock by filing a subsequent PCR application. “A state-court petition . . . that 

is filed following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because 

there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th 

Cir. 2000); see also Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Therefore, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition by April 5, 2013, 

absent any equitable tolling. 

 3. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 

(2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Id. at 649 (quoting 

Pace v. DiGuglielma, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “The diligence required for equitable 

tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply the doctrine of 

equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of 

showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that equitable tolling is “unavailable in most 

cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very 

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations and internal emphasis omitted). 

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Petitioner must also establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary 

circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney 

General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the 

law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication 

is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see also

Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV-06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation 

during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances). Further, a prisoner’s “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

 Petitioner makes a sweeping assertion that he should be given relief from the one 

year AEDPA statute of limitations because the issues in his Petition are of constitutional 

importance, he has been in disciplinary segregation since 2010, and he is acting pro se 

with limited access to the law library and limited knowledge of the law. (Doc. 11, at 11.) 

In his reply, Petitioner asserts that: 

Extraordinary circumstances beyond prisoner’s control 

prevented him from filing on time. On August 1, 2011, 

Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice of completion of review 

informing the trial court that he was “unable to discern any 

colorable claim upon which to base petition for postconviction relief.” Counsel was supposed to stay on in an 

advisory capacity, and never advised petitioner on anything. 

Petitioner was abandoned by attorney. Petitioner was also in 

Arizona’s Super Max Unit from 2010 to 2014 with limited 

access to law library. 

(Doc. 18, at 14–15) (internal citations omitted.) 

This broad assertion does not meet Petitioner’s burden for equitable tolling relief. 

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Petitioner makes no reference in his Petition as to any specific efforts, let alone diligent 

efforts, he made to try to overcome whatever obstacles he believes his limited access to 

the library created in filing the Petition in this case. Petitioner fails to set forth the actual 

number of attempts, the dates of such attempts, or the reasons given for his claimed lack 

of access. The Petition in this case is written in clear English and cites multiple legal 

authorities. Petitioner has the ability to articulate specifics, but chose not to give specific 

reasons for his untimely filing of the Petition. Petitioner did file a timely PCR and 

otherwise demonstrated his capability of filing legal documents. 

In Ramirez v. Yates, the petitioner argued that he had limited access to the law 

library and copy machine during the period in which he remained in administrative 

segregation. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). In denying equitable 

tolling for that period of time, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[o]rdinary prison 

limitations on [petitioner’s] access to the law library and copier (quite unlike the denial 

altogether of access to his personal legal papers) were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it 

‘impossible’ for him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most 

common day-to-day security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit 

the exception to swallow the rule—according to [petitioner’s] theory, AEDPA’s 

limitations period would be tolled for the duration of any and every prisoner’s stay in 

administrative segregation, and likely under a far broader range of circumstances as 

well.” Id.; see also Gutierrez-Valencia v. Ryan, No. CV-12-01318-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 

1762978, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2014) (where petitioner did not allege a complete lack of 

access to his legal file, only his being housed in lock down status in a maximum security 

facility, court held that “Petitioner has not provided this Court with any specific details 

regarding what legal materials he was seeking and how they would be of assistance in his 

habeas filing . . . [and] Petitioner does not dispute that his lock down status is an ordinary 

prison limitation.”). Cf. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that 

lack of access to Spanish language legal materials or assistance could entitle habeas 

petitioner to equitable tolling). 

Petitioner claims that his PCR counsel was ordered to remain in an advisory 

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capacity when Petitioner filed his pro per petition, that counsel failed to advise Petitioner 

on anything, and that counsel abandoned Petitioner. Tolling may be justified where 

counsel’s behavior is sufficiently egregious. See Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Holland as establishing that even if a litigant is not constitutionally 

entitled to counsel, principles of equity can justify tolling where counsel’s behavior is 

sufficiently egregious). Lack of legal assistance in seeking post-conviction relief cannot 

form the basis for equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 

(2007). In Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, the court held that “[d]efense counsel shall 

remain in an advisory capacity for the Defendant until a final determination is made by 

the trial court regarding any post-conviction relief proceeding, pursuant to Rule 

32.4(c)(2), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (Doc. 15, at Ex. U) (emphasis added.) 

There is no indication that Petitioner was represented by counsel during the period of 

time when equitable tolling would apply. The statute of limitations is already being 

statutorily tolled during the period of time in which his first PCR petition was pending. 

According to the court’s order, counsel’s advisory capacity ended upon the conclusion of 

his PCR proceeding. 

 Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing 

extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence that would justify equitable tolling. 

Additionally, the record does not reveal any extraordinary circumstances that prevented 

Petitioner from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. 

Absent equitable tolling, the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s federal habeas 

petition expired on April 5, 2013. Petitioner filed his original habeas petition on 

December 9, 2014 (Doc. 1.), and his Amended Petition (Doc. 11) on February 24, 2015. 

(See Doc. 9.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) provides that an “amendment to a 

pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading” when, in pertinent part, “the 

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amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading.” This Rule has 

been held applicable to habeas proceedings, which are essentially civil in nature. Mayle 

v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). “Relation back depends on the existence of a 

common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” Id. at 

659. “An amended habeas petition, we hold, does not relate back (and thereby escape 

AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts 

that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Id. at 650. 

Although it appears as though only two of Petitioner’s three grounds were also alleged in 

his original petition, the Court will use the date of filing his original petition since the 

difference in the two dates will not affect the Court’s decision. Even considering the 

December 9, 2014 filing date for all of Plaintiff’s claims, his Petition was untimely by 

one year and eight months. 

Because Petitioner has not presented any circumstance that would justify equitably 

tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations, his Petition should be denied as untimely and 

the Court will not consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus 

relief. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2002) (whether a petition is 

barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold issue that must be resolved before 

considering other procedural issues or the merits of individual claims). 

CONCLUSION

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition after the expiration of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations and statutory and equitable tolling do not render the petition timely. 

Accordingly, the Petition should be denied as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Because the Petition is untimely, the Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative 

grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. The Court will therefore recommend that the 

petition be denied and dismissed. Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in 

the District Judge’s judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural 

grounds. Under the reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it 

debatable whether the District Court was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to 

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the extent the Court adopts this Report and Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 11) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 22nd day of April, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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