Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02673/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02673-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KRISTA RICCI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, 

SACRAMENTO DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 

GIA SAVOY, DAVID CHERNOW, and 

Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:17-cv-2673-MCE-EFB PS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Several motions are pending in this action, which are addressed herein: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 52); 

2. Plaintiff’s motions to amend the complaint (ECF Nos. 51, 59, 66)1

; 

3. Defendants’ motions to strike plaintiff’s third and fourth amended complaints for 

failure to comply with Rule 15 (ECF Nos. 53 & 65); and 

1

 Subsequent to filing her second amended complaint, plaintiff filed—without 

defendants’ consent or leave of court—third and fourth amended complaints. ECF No. 51 & 59. 

After defendants moved to strike the third and fourth amended complaints, plaintiff moved for 

leave to amend her complaint. ECF No. 66. Submitted with the motion was a copy of plaintiff’s 

fourth amended complaint, which she mistakenly labels as a second amended complaint. See id. 

at 38-68. 

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4. Plaintiff’s motions to vacate judgment (ECF Nos. 60 & 73). 

 For the following reasons, it is recommended that defendants’ motion to dismiss be 

granted and all remaining motions be denied.2 

I. Procedural History 

This action arises out of the County of Sacramento’s investigation into a report of 

domestic violence, which led to child dependency proceedings and custody of plaintiff’s minor 

child, J.A., being awarded to the child’s father. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. Defendants previously moved 

to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint, arguing, among other things, that the court should 

abstain from hearing this case because the underlying custody proceeding remained pending 

before California’s Third District Court of Appeal. ECF No. 19. While that motion was pending, 

the state appellate proceedings concluded. Accordingly, the assigned district judge ordered the 

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing how termination of the state court proceedings 

impacted the instant action. ECF No. 26. After those briefs were submitted, the court granted 

defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint with leave to amend, finding that 

plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. ECF No. 29. In reaching that 

conclusion the court noted that “[a]ny decision of this Court in Plaintiff’s favor would run 

contrary to the facts already adjudicated in the state proceeding.” Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff’s attorney subsequently moved to withdraw as counsel. ECF No. 31. After that 

motion was granted3

, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. ECF No. 50. Less than a week 

later, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. ECF 51. Defendant then moved to dismiss the 

second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 52) and to strike the third 

amended complaint (ECF No. 53). In response, plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint (ECF 

2

 The court determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance to the 

court, and defendants’ motions were submitted without oral argument. Eastern District of 

California Local Rule 230(g). 

3

 After plaintiff’s counsel withdrew, the matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant 

to Eastern District of California Local Rule 302(c)(21). Plaintiff failed to notice her motions for 

hearing in violation of Local Rules 230(c). Nevertheless, the court finds it appropriate to resolve 

each motion on the briefs and without oral argument. 

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No. 59) and a document styled as a “Motion to Vacate Judgement for Fraud on the Court” (ECF 

No. 60). Defendant subsequently moved to strike the fourth amended complaint. ECF No. 73. 

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 66) and an amended motion 

to “Vacate Judgment for Fraud on the Court” (ECF No. 73). 

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards 

A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

“probability requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 

theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 

at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 

claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the Court need not accept as 

true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual 

allegations. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 

subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 

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most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 

F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. Discussion 

Defendants argue that the facts alleged in plaintiff’s second amended complaint do not 

“materially differ” from the facts alleged in her first amended complaint. ECF. No. 52-2 at 3. 

Therefore, defendants argue that the second amended complaint should also be dismissed as 

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 5. 

Federal courts “are required to give state court judgments the preclusive effect they would 

be given by another court of that state.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84 (1984)). In dealing with the 

judgment of a state court, federal courts must look to the preclusion rules of the relevant state to 

determine whether a decision is preclusive. Miofsky v. Superior Court of California, 703 F.2d 

332, 336 (9th Cir. 1983). In California, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a second lawsuit 

between the same parties on the same cause of action. People v. Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th 236, 252 

(2004). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues that were actually 

litigated and determined in the first action. Id. at 252-53. The elements for applying either claim 

preclusion or issue preclusion to a second action are the same: “(1) A claim or issue raised in the 

present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior 

proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine 

is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” Id. at 253 

(internal quotations omitted). 

In the state court custody proceedings, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 

decision to award full custody of J.A. to his father.4

 ECF No. 52 at 15. In its decision, the state 

court observed that the evidence showed: (1) that the dependency proceedings were initiated 

because there was domestic violence between the parents; (2) that both parents signed an informal 

4

 Defendants’ request for judicial notice of state court records is granted. See ECF No. 52 

at 1-2; see also, e.g. Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys. Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-61 (N.D. Cal. 

2007) (“Judicial notice may be taken of ‘adjudicative facts’ such as court records [and] pleadings 

. . . .”). 

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supervision agreement to participate in services that addressed domestic violence; (3) that the 

father participated in the services and benefitted from them; and (4) that the mother (plaintiff) was 

reluctant to participate in the services, was uncooperative with social workers and the courts, and 

refused to participate in a mental health assessment. Id. at 14-15. The appellate court concluded 

that this evidence showed that awarding custody to plaintiff would not be in the best interest of 

J.A. Id. at 15. 

In the instant action, plaintiff alleges claims for violation of her substantive and 

procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ECF No. 50 at 9-15. But like 

her earlier complaint, the second amended complaint’s claims are predicated on factual 

allegations that contradict the state court’s findings.5 Specifically, the second amended complaint 

alleges that the removal of plaintiff’s children from her custody was improper because: (1) no 

domestic violence occurred between plaintiff and J.A.’s father, and (2) plaintiff cooperated with 

social workers and the state family court by participating in domestic violence services and 

submitting a mental health assessment. Id. at 4-5. As plaintiff was previously notified, granting 

her relief based on these allegations would necessarily “run contrary to the facts already 

adjudicated in the state proceeding.” ECF No. 29; see United States v. Cnty. Of Maricopa, 

Arizona, 889 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s second amended complaint must also be dismissed. The dismissal 

should be without leave to amend. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(while the court ordinarily would permit a pro se plaintiff to amend, leave to amend should not be 

granted where it appears amendment would be futile); California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. 

Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to 

amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.”). As discussed below, plaintiff has 

filed several amended complaints that also fail to demonstrate plaintiff’s right to relief. 

///// 

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5

 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is nearly identical to his first amended complaint, 

with only minor changes that have no bearing on her claims. 

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III. Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend 

Shortly after filing the second amended complaint, plaintiff filed a third amended 

complaint. ECF No. 51. She subsequently filed a fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 59), 

which was eventually followed by a motion for leave to amend the complaint (ECF No. 66). 

Because plaintiff already amended her complaint as a matter of course, she may only 

amend her complaint “with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so 

requires,” and the Ninth Circuit has directed courts to apply this policy with “extreme liberality.” 

DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). When determining whether 

to grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), a court should consider the following factors: (1) 

undue delay, (2) bad faith, (3) futility of amendment, and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). According to the Ninth Circuit, “the crucial factor is 

the resulting prejudice to the opposing party,” and the burden of showing that prejudice is on the 

party opposing amendment. Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973); 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003); DCD Programs, 

833 F.2d at 187. Granting or denying leave to amend rests in the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 

339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The third amended complaint is virtually identical to her second amended complaint, 

containing minor stylistic changes and adding only limited background information that is not 

pertinent to plaintiff’s claims. Compare ECF No. 50 with ECF No. 51. Consequently, plaintiff’s 

proposed third amended complaint fails to state a claim for the same reason her prior complaints 

failed to state a claim. Thus, the third amended complaint would be futile. 

Plaintiff’s proposed fourth amended complaint also continues to allege substantive and 

procedural due process claims based on the same allegations contained in her prior complaints. 

ECF No. 59 at 2-4, 7-10. However, unlike the earlier complaints, the fourth amended complaint 

also alleges claims for intentional infliction of emotion distress and for violation of the of the 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). ECF No. 59 

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at 10-12. Plaintiff also adds new allegations concerning the infiltration of her place of 

employment by a criminal organization. 

As for the RICO claim, plaintiff alleges that she was previously employed as a mental 

health worker at Telecare. Id. ¶ 48. She claims that Telecare was “infiltrated by a criminal 

syndicate from” Folsom prison after Cathi Stoffan, a registered nurse, transferred to Telecare’s 

Placer County facility, the location where plaintiff worked. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. Stoffan allegedly began 

hiring individuals related to inmates or with connections to criminal entities. Id. ¶ 50. The 

newly-hired staff ensured that narcotic and psychotropic medications were ordered for patients 

scheduled to be transferred or discharged. Id. ¶ 56. These medications were then distributed to 

gang members to be sold. Id. ¶¶ 58, 110. Plaintiff further alleges that Stoffan bragged about her 

relationship with the director of Child Protective Services and informed plaintiff that she would 

never get her kids back. Id. ¶ 69. Plaintiff also claims that because she refused to participate in 

Stoffan’s drug trafficking scheme, “her children are being kept from her and . . . she can no 

longer work in her area of expertise.” Id. ¶ 110. 

These allegations are insufficient to state a RICO claim. “To prevail on a civil RICO 

claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) 

through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity and, additionally, must establish that (5) the 

defendant caused injury to plaintiff’s business or property.” Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Intern., LP, 

300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, to state such a claim plaintiff’s complaint must allege 

facts that, if true, establish each of those elements. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that she 

sustained an injury to her business or property as a result of the drug trafficking enterprise. 

Although she does claim that she was injured “financially” and “can no longer work in her area of 

expertise.” (ECF No. 59 ¶ 110), these vague and conclusory allegations fail to demonstrate 

plaintiff suffered a “concrete financial loss.” See Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 898 (9th Cir. 

2005) (en banc) (per curiam) (“RICO does not provide a cause of action for all types of injury to 

property interests, but only for injuries resulting in ‘concrete financial loss.’”). These conclusory 

allegations also fail to establish that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by defendants’ conduct. 

Painters and Allied Traders Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co. 

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Ltd., 943 F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 2019) (to establish causation for purposes of RICO, a plaintiff 

must allege “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”). 

Furthermore, plaintiff’s claim that the alleged racketeering activity somehow precluded 

her from being reunited with her children also fails to establish an economic injury. See Bowen v. 

Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Civil rights violations . . . do not fall within the 

statutory definition of ‘racketeering activity’” and thus cannot support a RICO violation). 

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim under RICO.

Plaintiff’s remaining claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. But plaintiff 

has not sufficiently alleged a federal claim that could support supplemental jurisdiction over this 

state law claim. Nor does the fourth amended complaint demonstrate that the parties’ citizenship 

is diverse, thereby failing to establish an independent basis for jurisdiction over the claim. See 

Bautista v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff must 

specifically allege the diverse citizenship of all parties to invoke diversity jurisdiction).6

Accordingly, granting plaintiff leave to amend would be futile, and her motion to amend 

must be denied. See Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motions to Vacate Judgment 

 Plaintiff has filed two motions to vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3). ECF Nos. 

60 & 73. Plaintiff requests that the court vacate an unspecified judgment7 entered against her “on 

the grounds that said judgment was procured through fraud on the Court . . . .” ECF No. 60 at 1-

2; ECF No. 73 at 3. 

 As far as the court can discern, plaintiff seeks to have this court vacate a judgment entered 

by the state court in the underlying custody proceedings. This court lacks jurisdiction to provide 

6

 Although plaintiff does not specify her citizenship, she does allege that she is a resident 

of California, suggesting she is a California citizen. ECF No. 59 ¶ 1. Defendant County of 

Sacramento is also a California citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Moor v. 

Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 718 (1973) (“[F]or purposes of diversity of citizenship, political 

subdivisions are citizens of their respective States.”). 

7

 Plaintiff first seeks “an order vacating the judgment entered against them on 02/19/2019 

. . . .” ECF No. 73 at 2. However, in the same motion, plaintiff states that “[j]udgment was 

entered against Plaintiffs on July 24, 2018.” Id. at 3. 

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such relief under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction 

in federal court if the exact claims raised in a state court case are raised in the subsequent federal 

case, or if the claims presented to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state 

court’s denial of relief. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16). Rooker-Feldman thus bars federal adjudication of any suit 

where a plaintiff alleges an injury based on a state court judgment or directly appeals a state court 

decision. Id. at 900 n. 4; see also Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (finding no subject matter jurisdiction 

over a section 1982 claim seeking the state appellate court’s decision vacated). 

 Accordingly, plaintiff’s motions to vacate judgment must be denied. 

V. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 52) be granted and plaintiff’s second 

amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend; 

2. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend the complaint (ECF Nos. 51, 59, 66) be denied; 

3. Defendants’ motions to strike plaintiff’s third and fourth amended complaints (ECF 

Nos. 53 & 65) be denied as moot; 

4. Plaintiff’s motions to vacate judgment (ECF Nos. 60 & 73) be denied; and 

5. The Clerk be directed to close the case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 4, 2020. 

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