Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02478/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02478-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE A/K/A BRIAN SAPIENT,

Plaintiff,

v

URI GELLER and EXPLOROLOGIST,

LTD,

Defendants. /

No C 07-2478 VRW

ORDER

This dispute concerns the copyright infringement takedown

provisions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). 

See 17 USC § 512(f) (2000). Plaintiff claims that defendants

Explorologist, Ltd (“Explorologist”) and Uri Geller (“Geller”)

knowingly misrepresented to the YouTube file-sharing company that

one of plaintiff’s video postings infringed defendants’ copyrights. 

17 USC § 512(f). Plaintiff seeks damages from the alleged

misrepresentation, as well as a declaratory judgment of

noninfringement. Doc #1. Defendants respond with a motion to

dismiss. Doc ##24, 25. Defendants argue that the court lacks

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subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction because the

takedown notice that was sent to YouTube in San Bruno, California,

was transmitted from outside the United States. Defendants also

move to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint’s allegations

surrounding the content of the takedown notice are insufficient

under FRCP 9(b) and FRCP 8(a). Lastly, defendants move to transfer

venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a related

action is proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.

I

The YouTube internet video website is an entirely userdriven medium. Anyone with access to the internet can sign up for

a YouTube account and upload any video file to YouTube’s servers so

that the file may be accessed and viewed anywhere in the world, all

for free. For instance, a family might post a video of a child’s

soccer game in California so that grandparents may view it in

Illinois. Or a pair of young writers might write, film and produce

their own television show and broadcast the episodes in serial form

online, as in the case of the show “lonelygirl15,” which drew

millions of viewers on YouTube. See Virginia Heffernan and Tom

Zeller, Well, It Turns Out That Lonelygirl Really Wasn’t, NY Times

C1 (Sept 13, 2006). Politicians, social activist organizations and

nonprofit groups use YouTube to spread their messages. See Jose

Antonio Vargas, YouTube Creates Issues Debate, Wash Post (Aug 8,

2007), at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/ the-trail/2007/08/08/

youtube_creates_issues_debate.html (last visited Dec 4, 2007);

Moises Naim, The YouTube Effect, Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb 2007), at

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http://www.foreignpolicy. com/story/cms.php?story_id=3676 (last

visited Dec 4, 2007); Yinka Adegoke, Nonprofits turn to YouTube to

raise awareness, funds, Reuters UK (Oct 19, 2007), at

http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUK119280972697._CH_.

242020071019 (last visited Dec 4, 2007). By nearly eliminating the

cost of mass media distribution, YouTube offers its users

unparalleled opportunities for free expression. See Richard Waters

and Kevin Allison, How to set a course for a shooting star,

Financial Times (Oct 8, 2006), at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/

7261e5de-56fc-11db-9110-0000779e2340.html (last visited Dec 4,

2007). 

But because digital content is so easy to generate, the

potential for copyright and trademark violations is enormous. See

Waters and Allison, supra. Claiming fair use, a YouTube user might

post a homemade video that takes scenes from his favorite movie and

sets them to his favorite song, using both without permission. 

See, for example, My Body is a Cage, at http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=Pyp34v6Lmcc (mixing the climactic scene from Sergio Leone’s

Once Upon a Time in the West with the Arcade Fire’s My Body is a

Cage) (garnering over 550,000 hits as of Jan 29, 2008). More

troublingly, a YouTube user might film his favorite musician’s live

performance and post the footage on YouTube, potentially

discouraging other fans from purchasing the musician’s live

performance DVD. YouTube does not actively monitor the content of

the postings on its website.

To address these and other concerns, Congress passed the

DMCA in 1998. 17 USC § 512 (2000). Section 512(c) lays out a

detailed process allowing a copyright owner who observes infringing

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content on a website like YouTube to have the content taken down. 

The copyright owner must send a notification to YouTube (“takedown

notice”) identifying the offending video and asserting under

penalty of perjury that the sender is the copyright owner and has a

good faith belief that the video infringes the sender’s copyrights. 

17 USC § 512(c)(3). YouTube then must remove the material from its

servers or face infringement liability itself. 17 USC

§ 512(c)(1)(C). The infringing user might also suffer penalties

under YouTube’s terms of use, such as suspension of his account. 

See YouTube Terms of Use ¶7, at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms

(last visited Dec 4, 2007). Conversely, copyright owners who abuse

the takedown procedure are subject to liability. At issue in this

case is the misrepresentation provision of the DMCA, which

provides, in relevant part:

Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents [in a

takedown notice to an internet service provider] * * *

that material or activity is infringing * * * shall be

liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’

fees, incurred by the alleged infringer * * * who is

injured by such misrepresentation[] as the result of the

service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in

removing or disabling access to the material or activity

claimed to be infringing * * *. 

17 USC § 512(f).

II

Defendant Explorologist is a private company registered

in London, England. Doc #1 at ¶5. Defendant Geller is a resident

of England and a director and controlling shareholder of

Explorologist. Doc #1 at ¶¶4, 6. Geller is also a performer who

claims to have psychic powers such as the ability to bend spoons

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with his mind. Doc #1 at ¶14. Plaintiff is John Doe AKA Brian

Sapient (“Sapient”) who, as part of his “controversial religious

beliefs,” is a member of the “Rational Response Squad,” which is

committed to “debunking what it maintains are irrational beliefs

and theories.” Doc #1 at ¶¶3, 12. As part of that mission,

plaintiff “rel[ies] on YouTube to reach thousands of audience

members and promote [his] activist messages and campaigns online.” 

Doc #1 at ¶12. Plaintiff uses the alias “Brian Sapient” because

“he receives a substantial amount of abusive correspondence,

including threats of physical harm” due to his beliefs. Doc #1 at

¶3. Given his attention to “the ongoing debate between evolution

and creationism” (see Doc #30 at 2), plaintiff’s choice of

“Sapient” as a pseudonym is presumably a reference to evolutionary

taxonomy, or relatedly, is a derivative of sapientia, Latin for

wisdom.

Plaintiff eventually set his sight on Geller. On

November 15, 2006, plaintiff uploaded a video clip (the “NOVA

video”) to YouTube. The video originally aired on the NOVA

television program and features an illusionist named James Randi

challenging Geller’s powers. Doc #1 at ¶¶13-14. The NOVA video

includes “three seconds” of another video clip in which a man named

Dr C J Hughes describes Geller’s asserted psychic powers (“Hughes

clip”). Doc #1 at ¶14.

It is that second clip – the Hughes clip within the NOVA

video – that prompted the instant dispute. Explorologist owns the

copyright to the Hughes clip. Doc #1 at ¶14. Plaintiff alleges

that on March 23, 2007, an agent of defendants sent YouTube a

takedown notice identifying plaintiff’s post as infringing and

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demanding that the video be removed. Doc #1 at ¶15. Later that

day, YouTube informed plaintiff that the NOVA video had been

flagged and removed in response to a copyright infringement

takedown notice from Explorologist. Doc #1 at ¶16. YouTube

suspended plaintiff’s account for more than two weeks, during which

time all his posted videos were unavailable. Doc #1 at ¶17.

On May 7, 2007, Explorologist filed a complaint in the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where plaintiff resides. See Doc

#29 (Notice of Pendency of other Action or Proceeding). That

complaint alleges that by posting the NOVA video, Sapient committed

copyright infringement under British law, commercial disparagement

and appropriation of name or likeness. See Doc #26 Exh 5.

On May 8, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant complaint. 

Count I of the complaint alleges that defendants “knowingly

materially misrepresent[ed]” to YouTube in the takedown notice that

plaintiff’s posting infringed defendants’ copyrights. Doc #1 at

¶¶18-23; 17 USC § 512(f). Plaintiff alleges that his posting of

the NOVA video does not infringe defendants’ copyrights and

therefore the takedown notice was a misrepresentation. Doc #1 at

19. Plaintiff then alleges that defendants “knew or should have

known” that the video was noninfringing and that defendants “did

not act with reasonable care or diligence before sending” the

takedown notice.” Doc #1 at ¶20. Count II seeks a declaratory

judgment that plaintiff’s video is noninfringing under the First

Amendment and under United States copyright law. Doc #1 at ¶¶24-

27. Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief,

attorneys’ fees and costs.

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III

In addition to defendants’ challenges on the merits,

defendants argue that the court lacks both subject matter and

personal jurisdiction. Because the court agrees that this case

should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, defendants’

other arguments need not be addressed. The Supreme Court has held

that if “a district court has before it a straightforward personal

jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and

the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a

difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its

discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.” Ruhrgas

AG v Marathon Oil Co, 526 US 574, 588 (1999) (footnote omitted);

consider Sinochem Intl Co v Malaysia Intl Shipping Corp, 127 SCt

1184 (2007) (holding that a district court may address a forum non

conveniens plea before considering personal jurisdiction or subject

matter jurisdiction). 

No federal court has ever addressed subject matter

jurisdiction under § 512(f), and the subject matter jurisdiction

issue in this case is complex. Defendants argue the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction because defendants’ act of sending the

YouTube takedown notice occurred in England, where the fax and

email were sent. That fact is significant because United States

copyright laws do not apply extraterritorially. See Subafilms, Ltd

v MGM-Pathe Comm’ns Co, 24 F3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir 1994). But

copyright law is especially unsettled when it comes to cross-border

communications. Compare Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd v Gen Inst

Corp, 69 F3d 381, 387 (9th Cir 1995) (finding no jurisdiction over

a television broadcast from the United States to Canada), with Los

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Angeles News Service v Reuters Television Intl, Ltd, 149 F3d 987

(9th Cir 1998) (finding jurisdiction over a television broadcast

from the United States to Africa); see William Patry, Choice of Law

and International Copyright, 48 Am J Comp L 384, 462 n362 (2000)

(noting the discrepancy between Allarcom and Reuters); Andreas P

Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global

Networks, 19 Mich J Int’l L 799, 823 n84 (1998) (criticizing

Allarcom but noting that the European Community has adopted that

approach); see also National Football League v PrimeTime 24 Joint

Venture, 211 F3d 10, 13 (2d Cir 2000) (rejecting Allarcom and

holding that “each step” in the transmission procedure can give

rise to jurisdiction). It is unclear how that line of precedent

would apply to cross-border communications such as defendants’ fax

and email. Plaintiff suggests that copyright “authorization” law,

which permits jurisdiction over foreign acts that authorize

violations in the United States, is instructive, but that body of

case law is inapposite. Authorization law and other species of

vicarious infringement depend on the particular derivative

relationship between direct and indirect copyright infringement. 

See Subafilms, 24 F3d at 1090-93. Here, however, plaintiff alleges

neither direct nor indirect infringement. Overall, copyright law

does not provide a satisfactory answer whether United States courts

have jurisdiction over cross-border communications in § 512(f)

suits. 

In fact, as an alleged violation of § 512(f) is not a

copyright claim, copyright law may be of little help. Plaintiff

raises a misrepresentation claim. Accordingly, it may be improper

to import jurisdiction principles from one specific context – the

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creation and regulation of property rights – to a very different

context for which those principles were not designed. See Reindl,

supra, at 824. Instead, perhaps misrepresentation law rather than

copyright law should control the subject matter jurisdiction

analysis. 

Even so, treating this case as an ordinary tortious

misrepresentation case does not much clarify matters. Following

common law tort principles, the court might be inclined to rule

that the situs of the act is the place where a fax or email was

received, not sent. But the best support for that statement is

found not in any recent, binding precedent but rather in the First

Restatement of Conflict of Laws, published in 1934. See

Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) (defining the “place

of wrong” as “the state where the last event necessary to make an

actor liable for an alleged tort takes place”); see also cmt a,

illus 5, 7. The court might analogize to other federal

misrepresentation statutes (see Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519

F2d 974, 988-89, 991 (2d Cir 1975) (securities fraud); 13 USC

§ 1343 (wire fraud)), but these too appear to provide scant

guidance.

Suffice it to say, subject matter jurisdiction is neither

clear nor definitive. Accordingly, the court is “convinced that

the challenge to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is not

easily resolved and that the alternative ground [of personal

jurisdiction] is considerably less difficult to decide.” Cantor

Fitzgerald, LP v Peaslee, 88 F3d 152, 155 (2d Cir 1996), cited in

Ruhrgas, 526 US at 588.

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IV

Defendants argue that the court lacks personal

jurisdiction over both Explorologist and Geller because each has

insufficient minimum contacts with California. Plaintiff responds

that the court has specific jurisdiction over defendants arising

out of the takedown notice sent to YouTube in California. 

A

In a motion challenging personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the

federal court, has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction

exists. See Data Disc, Inc v Systems Tech Assocs, Inc, 557 F2d

1280, 1285 (9th Cir 1977). When the motion to dismiss constitutes

a defendant’s initial response to the complaint, the plaintiff need

only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. 

See Data Disc, 557 F2d at 1285. 

 Sapient does not raise a general jurisdiction argument

and asserts only that the court may exercise specific jurisdiction

over defendants. Under California law, “[a] court of this state

may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the

Constitution of this state or of the United States.” Cal Civ Code

§ 410.10. Given the broad reach of California’s long-arm statute,

the court need only satisfy itself that its exercise of

jurisdiction does not exceed constitutional due process

limitations. See Haisten v Grass Valley Med Reimbursement Fund,

Ltd, 784 F2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir 1986). 

 The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test for

determining when specific jurisdiction may be exercised: 

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1. The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate

some transaction with the forum or perform some act by

which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the

benefits and protections of its laws. 

 2. The claim must be one which arises out of or results from

the defendant's forum-related activities. 

 3. Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Data Disc, 557 F2d at 1287. 

The Ninth Circuit has since expanded the first prong,

also known as the purposeful availment or purposeful direction

requirement, “apply[ing] different purposeful availment tests to

contract and tort cases.” Ziegler v Indian River County, 64 F3d

470, 473 (9th Cir 1995); see Schwarzenegger v Fred Martin Motor Co,

374 F3d 797, 802-03 (9th Cir 2004). Purposeful availment in tort

cases is analyzed under the effects test from Calder v Jones, 465

US 783 (1984):

As we have previously recognized, Calder stands for the

proposition that purposeful availment is satisfied even

by a defendant “whose only ‘contact’ with the forum state

is the ‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having

effect in the forum state.” Based on these

interpretations of Calder, the “effects” test requires

that the defendant allegedly have (1) committed an

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state,

(3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be

suffered in the forum state.

Dole Food Co, Inc v Watts, 303 F3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir 2002)

(internal citations omitted). Personal jurisdiction may flow from

a single contact with the forum state if the claim “arise[s] out of

that particular purposeful contact of the defendant with the forum

state.” Lake v Lake, 817 F2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir 1987).

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Plaintiff argues that defendants’ single act of sending

the takedown notice to YouTube in California is sufficient to

establish personal jurisdiction in California courts.

B

The court has its doubts whether plaintiff can

demonstrate “purposeful direction” into California under the first

prong of the jurisdiction test. Although defendants allegedly sent

the takedown notice to YouTube in California, Sapient resides in

Pennsylvania. Sapient is correct that there is no presumption that

a plaintiff is harmed in his domiciliary only (see Keeton v Hustler

Magazine, Inc, 465 US 770 (1984) (holding that a New Hampshire

court could exercise personal jurisdiction in a libel case though

plaintiff resided in New York and defendant resided in Ohio)), but

the only activity that occurred in California was YouTube’s act of

disabling access to plaintiff’s video. Other than by reciting the

language of § 512(f), plaintiff has not explained how the removal

of the video is an injury “sufficient” to establish personal

jurisdiction over defendants in California. See Yahoo! v La Ligue

Contre Le Racisme, 433 F3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir 2006) (rejecting the

“brunt of the harm” test in favor of the less-restrictive

“jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm” test). Instead,

plaintiff’s claimed injuries are more likely to be suffered in

Pennsylvania. See Bancroft & Masters v Augusta Natl Inc, 223 F3d

1082 (9th Cir 2000) (finding personal jurisdiction in California

because the Georgia defendant mailed a letter to a domain name

registry in Virginia thereby interfering with the domain name

rights of plaintiff, who lived in California). 

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The court does not rest its decision on purposeful

direction grounds, however, because that body of precedent does not

apply easily to the facts here. Plaintiffs rarely claim an injury

in a state other than their home state, and plaintiffs rarely

allege the kind of metaphysical internet free speech injuries or

electron-based injuries that Sapient alleges here. See Doc #1 at

¶¶17, 23, 26. The cases cited by both parties are all

distinguishable easily on one or both of those grounds. See

Keeton, 465 US 770; Calder, 465 US 783; Menken v Emm, 503 F3d 1050

(9th Cir 2007); Yahoo!, 433 F3d 1199; Harris Rutsky & Co Ins

Services, Inc v Bell & Clements Ltd, 328 F3d 1122 (9th Cir 2003);

Dole Foods, 303 F3d 1104; Bancroft & Masters, 223 F3d 1082; Wien

Air Alaska, Inc v Brandt, 195 F3d 208 (5th Cir 1999); Resnick v

Rowe, 283 F Supp 2d 1128 (D Hawaii 2003); Cody v Ward, 954 F Supp

43 (D Conn 1997). The court has no affirmative, binding precedent

and no clear guidance. Accordingly, the court declines to rule on

the “purposeful direction” prong of the jurisdiction test, either

under the Calder effects test (as plaintiffs urge) or under the

theory that defendants’ tortious conduct occurred in California

(consider Knipple v Viking Communications, Ltd, 236 Conn 602, 610

(1996) (holding that “[f]alse representations entering Connecticut

by wire or mail constitute tortious conduct in Connecticut”)).

C

Instead, Sapient’s case for personal jurisdiction

flounders immediately once the court considers the third prong of

the jurisdiction test, which is that jurisdiction must be

reasonable. See FDIC v British-American Ins Co, 828 F2d 1439, 1442

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(9th Cir 1987) (declining to rule on purposeful availment in light

of the conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction would be

unreasonable).

Defendants have the burden of making a “compelling case”

that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable; in other

words, that it would not comport with fair play and substantial

justice. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F3d at 802. Defendants must show

that any asserted unfairness could not be alleviated by less

restrictive means such as conflict of law rules or an accommodating

venue transfer. See Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476-

78 (1985). Jurisdiction is reasonable if “under the totality of

the circumstances the defendant could reasonably anticipate being

called upon to present a defense in a distant forum.” FDIC, 828

F2d at 1442.

The Ninth Circuit has set out seven factors to be weighed

in evaluating the reasonableness of exercising personal

jurisdiction in a particular case:

(1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection

into the forum state’s affairs; 

(2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the

forum; 

(3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the

defendants’ state; 

(4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the

dispute; 

(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the

controversy; 

(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s

interest in convenient and effective relief; and 

(7) the existence of an alternative forum. 

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Harris Rutsky, 328 F3d at 1132; see Insurance Co of North Am v

Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir 1981) (“There is no

mechanical or quantitative test for jurisdiction under the

International Shoe reasonableness standard, and we shall not

attempt to list all the factors that might, in a different case, be

part of an assessment of the reasonableness of subjecting a

defendant to jurisdiction. For purposes of the present case we

conclude that the following seven factors are relevant * * *.”). 

The seven factors must be balanced against one another to determine

reasonableness. See Roth v Garcia Marquez, 942 F2d 617, 623, 625

(9th Cir 1991). In this case, each factor suggests that

jurisdiction is unreasonable.

1

The extent of defendants’ “purposeful interjection” into

California was not substantial, comprising only the single takedown

notice sent to YouTube. “Even if there is sufficient

‘interjection’ into the state to satisfy the [purposeful availment

prong], the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in

assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the

[reasonableness prong].* * * The smaller the element of purposeful

interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the

less reasonable is its exercise.” Insurance Co of North Am, 649

F2d at 1271, quoted in Core-Vent Corp v Nobel Industries AB, 11 F3d

1482, 1488 (9th Cir 1993). In Core-Vent, the Ninth Circuit found

defendant’s libelous article circulated in California to be an

“attenuated” contact with California - even though defendants

“allegedly intended their actions to cause harm in California” -

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and the court ruled that the purposeful interjection factor weighed

in defendants’ favor. Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1487, 1488. Here,

defendants’ takedown notice is similar to the article in Core-Vent

because it was a single communication sent from Europe. In fact,

defendants’ contacts with California are even more attenuated

because, although the takedown notice was sent to California, it

was not aimed at any California resident. Thus, whether defendants

intended to create an effect in California or even if defendants

committed a tort in California, defendants’ purposeful interjection

into California is not extensive. Accordingly, this factor weighs

against personal jurisdiction.

2

The second factor – the burden on the defendants – weighs

against jurisdiction slightly. “The unique burdens placed upon one

who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have

significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching

the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.” 

Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, 480 US 102, 114 (1987). 

The use of an agent in the United States might alleviate a foreign

defendant’s burden (see Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1488), but defendants

do not have such an agent. And there is no indication that

defendants or their representatives “frequently travel to

California on business.” Harris Rutsky, 328 F3d at 1132-33; see

Doc #33-2 (discussing defendants’ travel in the United States and

Europe). On the other hand, modern technology has reduced the

burden of litigating in another country (see Sinatra v National

Enquirer, 854 F2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir 1988)), and defendants’

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personal involvement with the litigation is not likely to be

extensive. Explorologist’s claim of undue burden is far less

compelling than Geller’s, of course, because Explorologist has

already sued Sapient in Pennsylvania. Litigation in California

would force Explorologist to fight a two-front war in the United

States, but much of the burden of litigating in the United States

(such as selecting and monitoring American counsel) has already

been done. Because of the Pennsylvania lawsuit, defendants’ burden

of litigating in California is not overwhelming, but it is a burden

nevertheless, and this factor weighs against jurisdiction slightly.

3

“[L]itigation against an alien defendant creates a higher

jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a

sister state because important sovereignty concerns exist.” 

Sinatra, 854 F2d at 1199. The court should not dwell upon this

consideration. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F3d at 1133, citing Gates

Learjet Corp v Jensen, 743 F2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir 1984) (“If [this

factor were] given controlling weight, it would always prevent suit

against a foreign national in a United States court.”).

The court may presume that England has a sovereign

interest in adjudicating a claim against a British corporation and

a British resident. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F3d at 1133. Moreover,

the video clip at the heart of the dispute was filmed in England

(see Doc #26 Exh 5 at ¶7) and features Dr Hughes, whom defendants

claim is British (see Doc #26 Exh 2). Defendants’ lack of an agent

in the United States is also relevant to sovereignty

considerations. See Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1489; Roth, 942 F2d at

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623-24. Accordingly, this factor weighs against jurisdiction

slightly.

4

The fourth factor - the forum state’s interest in

adjudicating the dispute - weighs against personal jurisdiction. 

Sapient resides in Pennsylvania, not California. “Because the

plaintiff is not a California resident, California’s legitimate

interests in the dispute have considerably diminished.” Asahi, 480

US at 114. Sapient alleges no violations of California law. See

FDIC, 828 F2d at 1444. YouTube is a California company but is not

a party to this litigation. California has little interest in the

outcome of this case. See Corporate Inv Bus Brokers v Melcher, 824

F2d 786, 791 (9th Cir 1987). 

Sapient’s only argument to the contrary is that

“California has an abiding interest in protecting YouTube videos

from improper takedown notices” (see Doc #30 at 12 n7), citing the

free speech clause in the California constitution and a California

statute banning the use of lawsuits to chill free speech. See Cal

Const art I, § 2(a); Cal Code Civ Proc § 425.16(a). Those

provisions apply to California residents, not Pennsylvania internet

users, inanimate computer files or lawsuits filed by British

residents against a Pennsylvania resident in Pennsylvania federal

court asserting claims under British law. California is not the

worldwide regulator of free speech in the digital age.

The Supreme Court held in Asahi that courts violate due

process when they adjudicate lawsuits with no connection to the

forum state. See 480 US at 113-16. In Asahi, a Taiwanese auto

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parts manufacturer sued a Japanese auto parts manufacturer in

California state court, seeking indemnification arising out of a

motorcycle accident in Solano County. 480 US at 105-06. The Court

held, in a near-unanimous section of a notoriously splintered

opinion, that jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant was

unreasonable even though the key factual event – the motorcycle

accident – occurred in California. The Court reasoned that

California’s interest in enforcing its automobile safety standards

was too attenuated and “overly broad” when applied to nonCalifornia residents in a claim that did not affect safety

directly. 480 US at 114-15. Here, neither party is a California

resident, and plaintiffs have not shown that the outcome of this

lawsuit will impair the free speech of Californians.

Plaintiff’s case for jurisdiction leads to unreasonable

(even if unintended) consequences. If plaintiff’s theory of

jurisdiction were upheld, then the Northern District of California

could assert jurisdiction over every single takedown notice ever

sent to YouTube or any other company in Silicon Valley. Citizens

around the world – from Indonesia to Italy, Suriname to Siberia –

could all be haled into court in the San Francisco Bay area,

California, USA, for sending off a fax claiming that a video clip

is infringing. Federal courts sitting in California could assert

personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in wholly foreign

disputes. Consider, for example, Erik Jensen, Boy dupes YouTube to

delete videos, Sydney Morning Herald (Apr 14, 2007), at

http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/boy-dupes-youtube-to-delete-v

ideos/2007/04/13/1175971361981.html (last visited Jan 3, 2008)

(reporting that a 15-year-old boy in Australia pretended to

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represent the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and “succeeded in

having more than 200 clips removed” from YouTube using bogus

takedown notices). Such broad jurisdiction, premised solely on the

happenstance that many internet companies that are not even parties

to § 512(f) litigation have offices in Silicon Valley, is

unreasonable. The Northern District of California is not an

international court of internet law. 

California’s interest in Sapient’s case is “slight” (see

Asahi, 480 US at 114), and this factor weighs against jurisdiction.

5

The fifth factor - the most efficient judicial resolution

of the controversy - weighs against jurisdiction. In this case,

the most efficient resolution of the controversy is in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania. Count II of plaintiff’s complaint, which

seeks a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, is the mirror

image of Explorologist’s copyright infringement claim pending in

Pennsylvania. Explorologist Ltd v Sapient, No 07-1848 LP (E D Pa). 

Judge Pollak has already denied a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and has granted in part and denied in

part a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Doc #31 Exh V. Discovery is

underway. See No 07-1848 Doc #42, 44. Judge Pollak requested

additional briefing on various intricacies of British copyright

law, and Sapient responded with a motion for partial summary

judgment on the British copyright law claim. See No 07-1848 Doc

#45. Many third parties including the American Association of Law

Libraries, the American Library Association and Google have moved

for leave to file an amicus brief in support of Sapient. See No

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07-1848 Doc #46. Duplication here of those complicated proceedings

would be a waste of the parties’, the attorneys’ and the court’s

resources. And count I of plaintiff’s complaint here becomes moot

if Explorologist prevails on its infringement claim in

Pennsylvania. Accordingly, Sapient’s claims can be resolved most

efficiently by the court that is already familiar with the

underlying facts.

This factor also requires the court to evaluate where the

witnesses and evidence are likely to be located. See Core-Vent, 11

F3d at 1489. Plaintiff claims vaguely that he will need to call

YouTube employees as witnesses, but he neither identifies any

specific witnesses nor describes the subject matter of their

testimony – and its relevance or importance to this lawsuit - with

any reasonable specificity. See Doc #30 at 17; compare Carolina

Casualty Co v Data Broadcasting Corp, 158 F Supp 2d 1044, 1049 (N D

Cal 2001) (Walker, J). And in any event, the convenience of

witnesses is “no longer weighed heavily given the modern advances

in communication and transportation.” Panavision Intl, LP v

Toeppen, 141 F3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir 1998). 

6

California does not appear to be important to the

plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief. In fact,

quite the opposite: “[N]o doctorate in astrophysics is required to

deduce that trying a case where one lives is almost always a

plaintiff’s preference.” Roth, 942 F2d at 624. Sapient is already

litigating in his home state against Explorologist regarding the

NOVA video. Sapient “has not shown that the [claim] cannot be

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effectively remedied in [Pennsylvania] or [England].” Sinatra, 854

F2d at 1200. Sapient fails to articulate any concerns that paint

California as “important” to his claim. 

The court acknowledges that internet users in Sapient’s

position will not always be able to establish jurisdiction in their

home states (or in the United States) over defendants in § 512(f)

cases. The sender of a takedown notice may not know where the

target of the takedown notice lives, and therefore the sender does

not purposefully direct his actions at any specific individual

state. Hence, in some cases, California (the state to which the

takedown notice is sent) might be the only plausible state in which

to bring a § 512(f) claim over a foreign defendant. The court need

not decide the implications of that fact here because Sapient is

already a party to related litigation in his home state. 

7

The last factor – the existence of an alternative forum –

also weighs against jurisdiction. “The plaintiff bears the burden

of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum.” Core-Vent,

11 F3d at 1490. Sapient has made no such showing that he would be

precluded from suing in Pennsylvania or England. See Harris

Rutsky, 328 F3d at 1133-34. “Doubtless [Sapient] would prefer not

to [litigate in England], but that is not the test.” Roth, 942 F2d

at 625; see Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1490; Sinatra, 854 F2d at 1201.

8

The court’s “balance” of the above factors weighs against

jurisdiction. It is “unreasonable and unfair” for this court to

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assert jurisdiction over British residents in a suit brought by a

Pennsylvania resident over an allegedly tortious fax sent to a

third party in California. See Asahi, 480 US at 116 (“Considering

the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant,

and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the

exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi

in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair.”).

It is true that jurisdictional difficulties should “be

accommodated through means short of finding jurisdiction

unconstitutional,” such as venue transfer. Burger King, 471 US at

477 & n20. That admonition is relevant if the issue is the

defendant’s burden of litigating in the forum state. See Burger

King, 471 US at 477 (“[A] defendant claiming substantial

inconvenience may seek a change of venue.”). Here, by contrast,

the glaring flaws in plaintiff’s case for jurisdiction are

California’s lack of an interest in this dispute and the lack of

any stopping point to this district’s jurisdiction over foreign

defendants in § 512(f) cases. Accordingly the court declines to

find jurisdiction and transfer venue to Pennsylvania.

Accordingly, defendants have made a “compelling case”

that personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California

is unreasonable. 

V

Plaintiff’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction

through physical service of process must fail. Doc #30 at 13-15. 

Defendants waived service of process, thereby mooting the effect of

any subsequent physical service in the state of California. See

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Fed R Civ P 4(d)(4) (2007) (“When the plaintiff files a waiver,

* * * these rules apply as if a summons and complaint have been

served at the time of filing the waiver.”) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff advances no support for his theory of double service.

VI

The court concludes with three final notes. First,

Sapient will suffer no actual prejudice as a result of the court’s

ruling. Sapient will be able to raise his § 512(f) claim against

Explorologist as a counterclaim in the Pennsylvania action. See

Fed R Civ P 13(a), 13(f), 13(b); AJ Indus, Inc v US Dist Court for

Central Dist of Cal, 503 F2d 384, 387-89 (1974). And although

Geller is not a party to that action, Sapient will be able to bring

his claims against Geller using either a regular jurisdiction

analysis or the federal long-arm statute. See Fed R Civ P 4(k)(2). 

Second, the court’s ruling does not require a per se bar

against personal jurisdiction in California over foreign defendants

in § 512(f) cases. In some instances, jurisdiction might be

appropriate and reasonable based on all the circumstances. If a

defendant relies regularly and consistently on YouTube’s takedown

procedures, then the purposeful direction or purposeful

interjection inquiries might be different. Here, had defendants

never sued Sapient in the United States, or had they sued him in a

state other than his residence, then the analysis might be

different as well. Vindication of plaintiffs’ rights must be

weighed against defendants’ interests in a fair trial and the

legitimacy of the judicial system (see Asahi, 480 US at 113), and

on the facts of this case, the balance tips in favor of defendants.

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Third, the DMCA provides explicitly that internet users

such as Sapient who wish to rebut a takedown notice must consent to

the jurisdiction of a federal district court (see 17 USC

512(g)(3)(D)), but the statute does not require copyright owners

who send takedown notices (such as defendants here) to consent to

personal jurisdiction (see 17 USC 512(c)(3)). That difference must

be viewed as intentional. See The Adeline, 13 US 244, 253 (1815). 

If that result seems asymmetrical and unfair, then the problem

should be resolved by Congress, not this court.

VI

Even assuming plaintiffs can demonstrate subject matter

jurisdiction and purposeful direction, personal jurisdiction over

the defendants would violate due process because jurisdiction would

not be “reasonable and just according to our traditional conception

of fair play and substantial justice * * *.” See International

Shoe Co v State of Washington, 326 US 310, 320 (1945). Defendants’

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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