Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01273/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01273-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Irvin Ban Buren (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on August 14, 2013. The action is proceeding on an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Emerson.

On September 4, 2014, after Defendant filed an answer, the Court issued a Discovery and 

Scheduling Order. Part I of the Order requires the parties to provide initial disclosures, including 

names of witnesses and production of documents. 

IRVIN VAN BUREN,

 Plaintiff,

v.

EMERSON,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-01273-LJO-DLB (PC)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Document 29)

Case 1:13-cv-01273-LJO-DLB Document 33 Filed 12/02/14 Page 1 of 4
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On October 16, 2014, Defendant filed a Request for Reconsideration of Part I of the Discovery 

and Scheduling Order. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The matter is deemed submitted pursuant 

to Local Rule 230(l).

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant moves for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 303(c), which permits District 

Judge review of a Magistrate Judge’s order. Local Rule 303(a) incorporates the “clearly erroneous” or 

“contrary to law” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Thus, the District Judge 

must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(a).

DISCUSSION

Defendant correctly argues that Part I of the Discovery and Scheduling Order requires the 

parties to engage in disclosures similar to those required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26(a)(1). Defendant is also correct in that Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner, and that such actions are 

generally exempt from initial disclosure requirements.

Defendant is incorrect, however, insofar as he argues that the Discovery and Scheduling Order 

is an improper “standing order” meant to modify the initial disclosure requirements. As the Court has 

previously explained in numerous prisoner actions where the Discovery and Scheduling Order has 

been issued, the order is a case-specific order that issued in this action “[t]o expedite the fair 

disposition of this action and to discourage wasteful pretrial activities.” Therefore, the order is proper 

since “even in a case excluded . . ., the court can order exchange of similar information in managing 

the action under rule 16.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee Note of 2000. The fact that a 

similar order has issued in other prisoner cases does not transform the order into a formal, or informal, 

standing order. Indeed, if there is an instance where initial disclosures are not warranted, the Court 

will not issue an order requiring their exchange.

Moreover, Defendant’s tactic of listing each and every prisoner action where the Discovery 

and Scheduling Order issued does not sway the Court. The Discovery and Scheduling Orders may 

read the same, but this does not mean that each action is not analyzed prior to the issuance of the 

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order. As Defendant is undoubtedly aware, this Court’s prisoner case load is staggering, and while the 

Court may not tailor each and every discovery order, it reviews the actions prior to imposing initial 

disclosures. The fact is that most, if not all, prisoner actions begin without issues that would preclude 

initial disclosures. If other arrangements should be made subsequent to the order, the Court will act 

accordingly. 

The Court further notes that the discovery order at issue, which has been used and upheld in 

other actions in this Court, was implemented in light of the numerous discovery issues that were 

arising with increasing frequency in other pro se prisoner actions. Defendants’ discovery practices 

were bordering on unnecessarily obstructive, and these tactics caused numerous discovery disputes 

that required extensive Court resources to resolve. The intent of the order, as explained above, is to 

discourage similar wasteful activities. 

Defendant further believes that such requirements are an undue burden on the State in prisoner 

cases. However, again, the intent behind the order is to streamline the discovery process and 

ultimately reduce the overall burden on the State, the Court and the parties. In fact, since the 

requirement to exchange initial disclosures has been in place, there has been a significant decrease in 

discovery disputes in actions where the ordered has issued. This decrease has benefited both the 

parties and the Court. 

Defendant also attempts to raise an issue based on his belief that the Discovery and Scheduling 

Order improperly expands the initial disclosure requirement of Rule 26(a)(1)(A) by requiring a party 

to identify witnesses and evidence it may use to support its claims or defenses. However, the order 

requires no more than would be required under Rule 26(a), or in the ordinary course of investigating a 

complaint. The purpose of initial disclosures under FRCP 26(a) is “to accelerate the exchange of basic 

information . . . and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee Note of 1993 (emphasis added). Orders such as this fall well 

within the vested control of a trial court to control its docket and to ensure efficient use of limited 

judicial resources.

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Moreover, while the order may not specifically state that disclosures are limited to 

“discoverable information,” the context of the order, as well as common sense, dictate that only 

discoverable information need be exchanged. 

Finally, insofar as Defendant objects to the requirement that he produce materials in the 

possession, custody or control of Defendant and CDCR, his objection fails. Defendant specifically 

objects to the definition used in Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945 (E. D. Cal. 2007), cited in the 

order, and contends that he is “neither the Secretary of the Department nor a member of its executive 

staff.” Mot., 6. Defendant therefore believes that it is improper to place upon him an obligation to 

produce documents in the care, custody or control of CDCR.

This standard, however, requires no more than production of information for which Defendant 

has “the legal right to obtain” on demand. If a document does not fall within the definition of Allen, it 

need not be produced. Certainly, Defendant will not have “possession, custody or control” of all of 

CDCR’s documents. The order does not require Defendant to produce documents that he cannot 

otherwise obtain in the course of his employment. 

The above arguments are not persuasive and do not establish that the Discovery and 

Scheduling Order, in general, is contrary to law or clearly erroneous.

Defendant’s motion is DENIED. The parties SHALL exchange initial disclosures within thirty 

(30) days of the date of service of this order. 

SO ORDERED

Dated: December 2, 2014

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge

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