Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01312/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01312-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 According to the record, Petitioner was indicted on September 4, 2007, for 26 counts

related to the sexual abuse of his 12-year-old daughter, including, two counts of molestation of a

child, two counts of sexual conduct with a minor, one count of sexual abuse, nineteen counts of

sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of furnishing obscene or harmful items to a minor.

(Exh. C.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas D. Yokois,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 18-01312-PHX-DGC (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Douglas D. Yokois, acting through counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc.

10), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14).

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, on March 12, 2009, Petitioner was convicted in

Maricopa County Superior Court, case CR2007-155558, of two counts of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. He was sentenced to

a 22-year term of imprisonment.1

 (Doc. 4.)

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The Court notes that throughout his Petition, Petitioner refers to his “first trial” and

“second trial” – presumably referring to his change-of-plea proceeding and his sentencing

hearing. Petitioner asserts that the trial judge conducted two separate bench trials in

CR2007-155558 – one to determine Petitioner’s guilt and one to determine the existence of

aggravating factors. Petitioner also states that the first trial was conducted pursuant to a

“stipulated outcome of guilt,” as set forth in a plea agreement. (Docs. 1, 4, 10.)

- 2 -

After sentencing, the record reflects that Petitioner failed to seek further review in any

post-conviction relief proceeding at the superior court or in any other state court. Petitioner

filed his habeas petition in this Court on April 27, 2018, raising five grounds for relief. (Doc.

1.)

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights and right to counsel were

violated when his trial counsel failed to inform him of the “constitutional rights, obligations

or requirements associated with aggravating factors and aggravated terms of imprisonment”

during Petitioner’s “first trial.”2

 In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights

and right to counsel were violated when his trial counsel failed to investigate his innocence.

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights and right to counsel were

violated when his trial counsel failed to inform him of the constitutional rights, obligations,

or requirements associated with aggravating factors and aggravated terms of imprisonment

during Petitioner’s second trial. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights

and right to counsel were violated when his trial counsel failed to object to the court’s

improper determination of aggravating factors. In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges that his due

process rights and right to counsel were violated when his trial counsel failed to object to the

imposition of sentence in the absence of properly determined aggravating factors. (Docs. 4,

1.)

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely. On

March 12, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to the terms set forth in the plea

agreement. By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, and had 90 days

to file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which he failed to do.

Thus, Petitioner’s case became final and the statute of limitations began running on

June 10, 2009. Petitioner was required to initiate habeas proceedings on or before June 10,

2010. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on April 27, 2018. Absent equitable tolling, his

habeas petition is untimely by almost 8 years. See United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005,

1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas petition submitted one day late was properly dismissed

as untimely under AEDPA, noting that a “missed” deadline “is not grounds for equitable

tolling”); Hartz v. United States, 419 Fed.Appx. 782, 783 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

(affirming dismissal of federal habeas petition where petitioner “simply missed the statute

of limitations deadline by one day”).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

There is nothing in the record explaining why Petitioner waited almost 8 years to file

his Petition or indicating that an external force prevented him from timely filing the Petition.

And, a petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Petitioner attempts, however, to explain his untimeliness by stating that he “seeks to

file his Petition pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), and its

progeny... .” Petitioner states that under Martinez, “the procedural default caused by

Petitioner’s post conviction relief counsel’s failure to file for post conviction relief allows

this court to consider all aspects of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at

time of first and second trials.” In his Reply to Respondents’ Answer, Petitioner again argues

that Martinez applies to excuse his untimeliness, and also argues that he has demonstrated

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

In support of his fundamental miscarriage of justice claim, Petitioner argues the merits

of the claims set forth in his habeas petition stating, among other things:

Petitioner demonstrated with clarity that he was denied a jury trial in the state

court system, knowingly induced to enter a plea of guilty without investigation

of specific information provided by Petitioner to his defense attorney, duped

into unwitting (and therefore unconstitutional) waiver of fundamental

constitutional rights, subjected to aggravated sentencing without

constitutionally acceptable determination of aggravating factors, and ignored

when he requested appellate review.

Petitioner argues that the claim of structural error, the challenge to aggravated

sentencing, the challenge to the plea stipulation to an aggravated term of

imprisonment, and the claim of an involuntary plea is sufficient to invoke the

miscarriage of justice exception to the standard time frame for filing a federal

habeas petition.

(Doc. 14.) Petitioner states that “[s]tanding alone, a flawed state court procedure that does

not demonstrate actual innocence would not ordinarily suffice to qualify for a miscarriage

of justice exception to untimeliness. However, in this case, the intertwining of the violations

does suffice ... .”

Initially, the Court finds that Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), does not apply

here. Martinez recognized a narrow set of circumstances in which the procedural default of

a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be excused because of the

ineffectiveness of counsel in PCR proceedings. See Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th

Cir. 2012). Martinez does not apply to tolling the limitations of § 2244(d). Other courts have

also reached this conclusion. See Lambrix v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246,

1249 (11th Cir. 2014) (“the equitable rule in Martinez applies only to the issue of cause to

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

excuse the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that occurred

in a state collateral proceeding and has no application to the operation or tolling of the §

2244(d) state of limitations for filing a § 2254 petition”); Madueno v. Ryan, No.

CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez has

no application to the statute of limitations in the AEDPA which governs Petitioner’s filing

in federal court.”). Thus, Petitioner cannot rely on Martinez to overcome the untimeliness of

his claims.

Regarding Petitioner’s fundamental miscarriage of justice claim, such a claim occurs

if a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-496 (1986). Under certain circumstances,

a claim of “actual innocence” serves as a “gateway through which a petitioner may pass

whether the impediment is a procedural bar or expiration of the statute of limitations.”

Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-938 (9th Cir. 2014). “When an otherwise time-barred

habeas petitioner presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free

of non-harmless constitutional error, the Court may consider the petition on the merits.” Id.

“The Supreme Court has recently cautioned, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway

pleas are rare.” Id. (citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013)). “A

petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that,

in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

To establish a claim of “actual innocence” the petitioner must first present “new

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 324, 115 S. Ct. 851, 865 (1995).

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

While Petitioner’s conclusory arguments may challenge the plea process, fairness of

his sentence, and the adequacy of the procedures that led to his sentence, Petitioner fails to

argue or point to any new reliable evidence of actual, factual innocence. Therefore, Petitioner

has not demonstrated that there is evidence of actual innocence such that the fundamental

miscarriage of justice exception entitles him to review of his time-barred claims.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 5th day of August, 2019.

Case 2:18-cv-01312-DGC Document 17 Filed 08/05/19 Page 9 of 9