Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00392/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00392-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENZO MATEO CORTEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOLANO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFFICE,

Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-0392 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a county jail inmate, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

and Local Rule 302.

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

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payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s inmate trust 

account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court 

each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Initially, the undersigned observes that it is unclear whether plaintiff was a pretrial 

detainee at the relevant time. If that is the case, then plaintiff’s claims concerning the conditions 

of his confinement arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the 

Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (noting that “the Due 

Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment” is relied on in considering claims of pretrial 

detainees because “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied 

with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions”). In an 

abundance of caution, the undersigned presumes that plaintiff was a pretrial detainee for initial 

screening purposes. 

As set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, and plaintiff is granted leave to file 

an amended complaint. 

Screening Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

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2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. However, “[s]pecific facts 

are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . 

. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, id., and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 

U.S. 183 (1984).

Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is on a no soy, no beans, and no dairy medical diet. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff 

alleges that on December 28, 2019, he was denied dinner “due to the negligence of the . . . 

kitchen staff.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Officers informed plaintiff that he would not be provided a 

meal because the kitchen was closed. On January 1, 2020, he was denied breakfast, despite 

plaintiff’s contention that “by this time jail officials should have had everything in order in 

regards to my dietary needs.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) A floor officer again informed plaintiff that the 

kitchen was closed. On January 1, 2020, plaintiff was given a dinner meal; after eating the food, 

plaintiff had an allergic reaction. Following medical treatment, plaintiff asked for his proper diet 

to be provided because he was still hungry but was refused. Plaintiff seeks money damages.

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Discussion

First, plaintiff failed to name a particular individual responsible for the alleged violations. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . 

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Here, plaintiff did not name a specific officer or kitchen staff member in connection with 

the alleged deprivation of meals. Simply naming the Solano County Sheriff’s Office as a 

defendant is insufficient. 

Second, plaintiff’s alleged deprivations fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

“Pretrial detainees are entitled to ‘adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical 

care, and personal safety.’” Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). To state a claim of 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement against an individual defendant, a pretrial detainee 

must allege facts that show:

(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 

conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures 

to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 

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circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved -- making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct 

obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused 

the plaintiff’s injuries.

Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).

Whether the conditions and conduct rise to the level of a constitutional violation is an 

objective assessment that turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id.; Hearns 

v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). However, “a de minimis level of imposition” is 

insufficient. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21. In addition, the “‘mere lack of due care by a state 

official’ does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)). Thus, a plaintiff must “prove more than 

negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.” Id.

Here, plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that a particular individual made an 

intentional decision that put plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm.1 Rather, it 

appears plaintiff was deprived meals on two occasions; first, he was deprived a dinner meal on 

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 Plaintiff’s claims fare no better under the Eighth Amendment. To state an Eighth Amendment 

conditions-of-confinement claim, plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. “First, the alleged 

constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently serious” such that the “official’s act or 

omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Second, the prison official 

must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with “deliberate indifference to 

inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is a higher 

standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. In 

defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective 

test: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “Food is 

one of life’s basic necessities,” and the government is obligated to provide those in its custody 

“with adequate sustenance on a daily basis.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 

2009) (denial of 16 meals in 23 days which caused dizziness and headaches was a sufficiently 

serious deprivation within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment).

 Here, the deprivation of meals on two occasions fails to state an Eighth Amendment 

claim. Compare Roberts v. Persona, 2019 WL 1776965, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2019) (finding 

plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim where “defendants 

denied plaintiff a single meal on one occasion”), with Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 680 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“The sustained deprivation of food can be cruel and unusual punishment when it 

results in pain without any penological purpose.”).

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December 28, 2019, because the kitchen was closed. Second, on January 1, 2020, plaintiff was 

denied breakfast. Plaintiff received a dinner meal on January 1, 2020, but suffered an allergic 

reaction. While plaintiff certainly suffered the discomfort from going hungry on two days, such 

deprivation fails to rise to the level of a civil rights violation. Further, plaintiff alleges no facts 

demonstrating that the provision of the dinner meal resulting in plaintiff’s allergic reaction was 

anything other than, at most, negligence. 

While it is unclear plaintiff can amend to cure the above pleading deficiencies, plaintiff is 

granted leave to amend. 

Leave to Amend

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required 

by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible 

pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and 

succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must 

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that 

support plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file 

an amended complaint in which he raises only those claims arising from the same incident and 

involving the same defendants.

If plaintiff chooses to amend, plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a 

single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim against the same 

defendant based upon separate transactions or occurrences, the claims must be set forth in 

separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). As discussed above, unrelated claims against 

different defendants must be pursued in multiple lawsuits. 

The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party 

asserting a claim . . . may join, [] as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims . . . as the party has against an opposing 

party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim 

A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B 

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against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants 

belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a 

multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 

ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees-for the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or 

appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 

required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

George, 507 F.3d at 607; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (joinder of defendants not permitted 

unless both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied).

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no 

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 

defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 

F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez 

v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint 

supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation 

omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

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2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Sheriff of the Solano County Jail filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within sixty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the 

dismissal of this action.

5. The Clerk of the Court shall send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights complaint by 

a prisoner. 

Dated: March 30, 2020

/cort0392.14n

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENZO MATEO CORTEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOLANO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFFICE,

Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-0392 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order 

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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