Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00934/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00934-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Valentin Fuentes (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on June

19, 2013, is currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

VALENTIN FUENTES,

 Plaintiff,

v.

JERRY BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:13-cv-00934-BAM (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND 

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 1 of 9
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. 

United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, where the 

events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) 

Jerry Brown, Governor of the State of California; (2) Kathleen L. Dickinson, Director of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); (3) Terri McDonald, Under Secretary 

CDCR; (4) Kathleen Allison, Deputy Director; (5) M. Stainer, Deputy Director of Facility Operations; 

(6) T. L. Gonzalez, Associate Director; (7) Albert Chamberlin, Captain; (8) Ralph M. Diaz, Warden; 

(9) C. Etchebeh, Associate Warden; (10) R. Tolsen, Associate Warden; (11) L. Cartagena, Captain; 

(12) S. Smith, Captain; (13) T. Atkin, Lieutenant; (14) R. K. Williams, Lieutenant; (15) M. Jones, 

Sergeant; (16) J. Tangen, Sergeant; (17) R. Hall, Appeals Coordinator; (18) J. Cota, Appeals 

Coordinator; (19) C. M. Heck, Appeals Coordinator; (20) K. Ramirez, Correctional Counselor II; (21) 

A. Lyons, Correctional Officer; (22) C. Lane, Correctional Officer; (23) R. Diaz, Correctional Officer; 

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 2 of 9
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and (24) V. Magana, Correctional Officer. Defendants are sued in their individual and official 

capacities. 

Plaintiff alleges: On April 17, 2013, Defendant V. Magana received a confidential kite from 

an inmate indicating that there was a sharpened piece of metal in Plaintiff’s cell and an inmate was 

going to be stabbed on the yard. The information was provided to Defendant Magana at 10:00 a.m. 

After she read the kite, she failed to notify proper personnel and turned a blind eye to the security 

threat at the institution. 

At 11:00 a.m., Plaintiff was released from education, returned to his cell to change his clothes 

and released back into the yard. At 11:15 a.m., the yard was put down by Sgt. J. Tangen and Sgt. M. 

Jones. Plaintiff was arrested and taken to the facility program officer. Plaintiff was told by the 

arresting officer that he would be going to Administrative Segregation and would be removed from the 

facility yard. When Plaintiff asked Defendants why he was going to Ad-Seg, Defendants stated that 

they had received confidential information regarding Plaintiff. 

Defendant Magana searched Plaintiff’s cell after 11:00 a.m., when Plaintiff was out of the 

building and over an hour after the confidential information was received. Defendant Magana failed 

to contact I.G.I. to conduct the search. During the search, Defendant Magana took what was said to be 

in Plaintiff’s locker to the office and took photos for evidence. Defendant Magana failed to follow 

proper procedures by failing to contact I.G.I. and failing to take photos of the evidence where it was 

found in the cell. Defendant Magana then stated on the 115 Rule Violation Report that a rock, 2 nails, 

confidential kite and camera were placed in evidence locker #3 and the confidential information was 

placed in Plaintiff’s C-File, Confidential Section. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights by not doing 

an investigation to see if the confidential informant was reliable. Plaintiff argues that Defendants 

conspired to file a false report in to have Plaintiff collect a lengthier sentence than the eight months he 

had left. 

On April 18, 2013, Defendant K. Ramirez came to Plaintiff’s cell door in Ad-Seg and asked if 

Plaintiff had anything to say about his lock-up order. When Plaintiff said no, Defendant Ramirez 

began to get hostile and threatened Plaintiff that a new lock up order would be written up stating 

intimidation. 

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 3 of 9
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On April 22, 2013, Defendant Cartagena came to see Plaintiff in Ad-Seg. Defendant 

Cartagena told Plaintiff that he was sorry it took him so long to see and interview Plaintiff. He further 

stated that Plaintiff should have never been removed from the yard and taken to Ad-Seg in the first 

place. Plaintiff claims that he was falsely imprisoned for over 5 days without reason.

On April 23, 2013, when Defendant Magana unlocked the tray slot to give Plaintiff breakfast, 

she told Plaintiff that she was going to move him to 5 block. Plaintiff then stated that he wanted to 

move in with another (A.M.I.) brother. Defendant Magana then stated, “I am no longer going to deal 

with you in my block. So have your shit packed and be ready to move to 5 block.” (ECF No. 1, p. 

11.)

On May 6, 2013, Defendant R. K. Williams called Plaintiff for the 115 hearing. Defendant 

Williams asked Plaintiff if he knew anything about the weapons or nails. Plaintiff responded that he 

knew nothing about them. Defendant R. K. Williams said that the 115 was going to be dismissed 

because the confidential information was not in Plaintiff’s c-file. Plaintiff stated that he had questions. 

Defendant Williams stated that the write-up was being dismissed and asked Plaintiff if he was 

pleading not guilty. Plaintiff stated that he was pleading not guilty. Defendant Williams then stated 

that there was no need for Plaintiff’s questions. Plaintiff then asked when he would receive the final 

copy of the disposition. Defendant Williams stated that Plaintiff would receive a copy within five 

days. Plaintiff did not receive a copy until 18 days later. 

In Counts 1-3, 5-8, and 10, Plaintiff asserts violations of the California Penal Code. The 

remainder of his allegations relate to violations of the California Government Code (Count 4), the 

Administrative Procedures Act (Count 9), false imprisonment (Count 11) and a request for declaratory 

and injunctive relief (Count 12.) 

Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages. 

III. Discussion

A. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 4 of 9
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 

S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do 

that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978).

Here, Plaintiff fails to link the following defendants to any violation of his constitutional 

rights: Jerry Brown, Kathleen L. Dickinson, Terri McDonald, Kathleen Allison, M. Stainer, T. L. 

Gonzalez, Albert Chamberlin, Ralph M. Diaz, C. Etchebeh, R. Tolsen, S. Smith, T. Atkin, R. Hall, J. 

Cota, C. M. Heck, A. Lyons, C. Lane and R. Diaz. If Plaintiff amends his complaint, he must allege 

what each individual did or failed to do that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

B. Official Capacity and Eleventh Amendment

Plaintiff brings suit against all defendants in their individual and official capacities. To the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring damages claims against defendants in their official capacities for 

money damages, he may not do so. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for monetary damages 

against a State, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. Aholelei v. Dep’t of 

Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

C. Supervisory Liability

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring suit against any individual defendant based on his or her 

role as supervisor, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983

for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Crowley 

v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915–16 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in 

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 5 of 9
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915–16. “Under the latter 

theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if 

supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 

(citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

D. Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985

In Claim 3, Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Title 42 of the United States Code, section

1985(2). Section 1985(2) proscribes conspiracies for the purpose of impeding the due course of 

justice in any state, with the intent to deny equal protection of the laws. Coverdell v. Dep’t. of Soc. 

and Health Servs., State of Washington, 834 F.2d 758, 767 (9th Cir. 1987). A claim under § 1985 

must allege specific facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. Karim-Panahi 

v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere allegation of conspiracy 

without factual specificity is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.; Sanchez v. City 

of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts to support a conspiracy allegation. 

E. California Penal Code Violations

In Claims 1-3, 5-8 and 10, Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against defendants based on 

alleged violations of California Penal Code sections 2652, 2650, 182, 142, 141, 134, 125, and 147. A 

private right of action under a criminal statute has rarely been implied. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 

U.S. 281, 316, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1725, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). Where a private right of action has been 

implied, “there was at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in 

favor of someone.” Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 316, 99 S. Ct at 1725 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 

66, 79, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); see Taylor v. Hubbard, 2012 WL 1718055, *4 (E.D. Cal. 

May 15, 2012); Sohal v. City of Merced Police Dep’t, 2009 WL 961465, *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009) 

(“[t]his court and courts of this circuit routinely dismiss claims based on violation of state criminal 

statutes where the language of the statute does not confer a private right of action”). The Court has 

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 6 of 9
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reviewed the penal code sections cited by Plaintiff in their entirety and can find no indication of a 

private right of action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the California Penal Code are

not cognizable.

F. Government Code Violations

In Claims 4 and 6, Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated California Government Code 

sections 19572 and 19512. The Government Code sections cited by Plaintiff relate to discipline of 

state civil service personnel. There is no indication that Plaintiff is authorized to bring a private cause

of action based on these Government Code provisions. 

G. Administrative Procedures Act

In Claim 9, Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 

U.S.C. § 500 et seq. The APA cited by Plaintiff governs the manner in which administrative agencies 

of the federal government propose and establish regulations. Plaintiff is bringing suit against state

officials, not federal government employees. Accordingly, the APA has no application to this action. 

H. False Imprisonment

In Claim 11, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants falsely imprisoned him. This allegation appears 

to relate to Plaintiff’s short-term placement in Administrative Segregation during pendency of his 115 

Rules Violation Report. To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must allege he was 

restrained by another without proper authority, and the restraint was completely unlawful and without 

authority. See Collins v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 459-60, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 

(Cal.App.1966), Singleton v. Perry, 289 P.2d 794, 45 Cal.2d 489 (Cal.1955). Plaintiff is not 

challenging the legality of his incarceration in state prison. As such, he cannot state a false 

imprisonment claim even if he was wrongfully housed in administrative segregation for a period of 

time.

I. Disciplinary Proceedings

Insofar as Plaintiff is challenging the disciplinary proceedings, this challenge appears to be 

moot. Plaintiff admits that his 115 Rule Violation was dismissed. 

///

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 7 of 9
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

J. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were violated. “A declaratory judgment, like other 

forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the 

public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 92 

L.Ed. 784 (1948). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in 

clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from 

the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 

1357 (9th Cir. 1985). In the event that this action reaches trial and the jury returns a verdict in favor of 

Plaintiff, the verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, a 

declaration that a defendant violated Plaintiff's rights is unnecessary.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to cure the identified deficiencies. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(citations omitted). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form; 

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; 

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 8 of 9
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first 

amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order and failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00934-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/22/14 Page 9 of 9