Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06313/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06313-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE RANDLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAMEIDA, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03-6313 OWW SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 60 ) 

A. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Willie D. Randle is (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

September 24, 2003. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on October 6, 2003. On October 6,

2004, the Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff, however, notified the

Court on October 27, 2004, of his intent to proceed solely on the excessive force claim against

Defendants Cardenas and Miranda and dismiss all remaining claims and defendants from the

action. The Court issued Findings and Recommendations to that effect on April 4, 2005. The

District Court adopted the Findings on June 1, 2005. 

On January 26, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed

an Opposition on March 1, 2007. On March 8, 2007, Defendants filed a Reply to the Opposition.

Plaintiff filed a Surreply (titled “Plaintiff respond to Defendants Reply of Plaintiff Opposition for

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Summary Judgment”). The Court issued an Order striking the Surreply from the record on April

11, 2007. 

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a Summary Judgment Motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

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28 The following facts are undisputed for the purpose of this Motion. 

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suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at

trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine

issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

1. Plaintiff is a California prisoner serving a term of imprisonment for rape, first degree

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burglary, first degree robbery and sexual battery in violation of California Penal Code

§ 261(a)(2); 459/460, 211/212.5(a) and 243.4(a). Plaintiff was sentenced to seventyfive years to life.

2. Plaintiff was transferred to the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) on January

10, 2002, and remained there until April 30, 2003. 

3. Correctional Officer L. Cardenas is employed by the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and is assigned to CCI. She is a Defendant

in this action. 

4. Correctional Officer G. Miranda is employed by CDCR and is assigned to CCI. He is

named as a Defendant in this action. 

5. Correctional Officer Reed is employed by CDCR and is also assigned to CCI. 

Although he is mentioned throughout Plaintiff’s pleadings, he is not a defendant in

this action. 

6. On Saturday, November 16, 2002, at approximately 1955 hrs., while working as a

Floor Officer, Reed and Defendant Cardenas were operating a modified shower

program Housing Unit Three at CCI. The shower program is run by officers escorting

the incarcerated inmates to and from the unit shower. 

7. Officer Reed asked the inmates in cell 323 if they wanted to shower. Plaintiff was

assigned to the lower bunk in cell 323. It was explained that showering would have

to be in the double-shower head unit because that was all that was available at that

time. This meant that both inmates in the cell would have to shower at the same time.

Having only one inmate using a double shower would delay other inmates receiving

their showers. There were many inmates in the unit. Plaintiff became agitated when

told this and very loudly declared “that’s messed, why you doing that?” Defendant

Cardenas suggested to Officer Reed that she should continue on to the next cell

because Plaintiff’s behavior was escalating. Officer Reed and Defendant Cardenas

continued to process inmates for showers. Plaintiff continued yelling. 

8. Plaintiff’s cell door (Cell number 323), opened, Plaintiff grabbed his shower items

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and exited the cell and began to walk towards the showers. 

9. Defendant Cardenas was escorting another inmate back to his cell from the showers

when Plaintiff suddenly appeared in her path. This surprised her because Plaintiff had

been in his cell when she last saw him and she was not informed he had been

released. She later learned that staff had inadvertently opened the wrong cell,

releasing Plaintiff rather than another inmate. 

10. Officer Reed observed Plaintiff out of his cell and standing in front of Defendant

Cardenas with fists clenched and yelling. He was unable to hear what Plaintiff was

yelling, but appeared to be very angry, so he responded to assist Defendant Cardenas. 

11. Defendant Cardenas told Plaintiff that she did not have a shower available for him

and to return to this cell or “lock up.” Plaintiff did not comply and began to protest

the order verbally by saying “I’m not going to my cell because then you won’t talk to

me.” Defendant Cardenas ordered Plaintiff again to go back into his cell. 

12. Plaintiff continued to demand to speak to the sergeant and did not return to his cell. 

13. Defendant Cardenas again ordered Plaintiff to his cell and informed him that she

would use the spray if he did not comply. Plaintiff did not comply. At this point,

Defendant Cardenas withdrew her MK-9 O.C. Pepper Spray cannister from her

holster and gave Plaintiff a fourth direct order to enter his cell. Plaintiff loudly

responded “You’re gonna spray me because I want a shower?” Defendant responded

that she would spray him because he was not following a direct order.

14. Plaintiff stands approximately 6' 4" tall and weighs approximately 220 to 230 pounds. 

15. Defendant Cardenas is much smaller than Plaintiff, weighing approximately 98

pounds. 

16. Defendant Cardenas ordered Plaintiff back into his cell for the fifth time. At this

point, Plaintiff threw his shower gear onto the floor striking Defendant Cardenas in

the leg and verbally protesting the order when Defendant Cardenas discharged pepper

spray at Plaintiff three times, striking him in the face and chest. 

17. As Defendant Cardenas dispensed the spray, Plaintiff began to swing his arms about

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wildly, she also ordered Plaintiff to the ground. However, Plaintiff again did not

comply and was swinging his arms about wildly. 

18. Defendant Miranda responded to assist Defendant Cardenas with Plaintiff and also

ordered Plaintiff to get down. When Plaintiff did not comply, Defendant Miranda

threw a small T-16 O.C. Pepper grenade toward Plaintiff ordering him again to get

down. Plaintiff finally got down onto his hands and knees and then suddenly jumped

back to his feet. Plaintiff was again ordered to get down but Plaintiff instead began to

walk around with his arms outstretched and yelling. At this time, Defendant Miranda

sprayed Plaintiff with a short burst of pepper spray. Plaintiff complied with the order

to get down and was handcuffed. 

19. Correctional Officer Soto, who had also responded to the incident, arrived and

escorted Plaintiff to the sink to begin decontamination. Shortly thereafter, Officer

Soto and another officer who also had responded, escorted Plaintiff out of the housing

unit and to the shower for decontamination. 

20. Officer Reed observed Defendant Cardenas spray Plaintiff with pepper spray and

order him to the ground. He also observed Plaintiff refuse the order, the tossing of the

grenade by Defendant Miranda and the yelling to Plaintiff to get down on the ground. 

Plaintiff began to get down but stopped at his knees and did not move any farther. 

Reed observed Plaintiff begin throwing and swinging his arms wildly toward

Cardenas and Miranda. Plaintiff finally got down as ordered and was handcuffed by

Defendant Miranda with other officers escorting him from the building. 

21. Officer Cardenas prepared a CDCR 115 disciplinary report charging Plaintiff with

attempted battery on an officer. Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation

pending further investigation. An incident packet was prepared setting forth the

incident, the investigation and findings. 

22. On January 21, 2003, Plaintiff was found guilty of the lessor and included offenses of

wilful disobedience and delaying an officer. The hearing officer wrote that Plaintiff

“states he was upset about not getting a shower since he had not showered in five

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days.” Plaintiff admits he disobeyed orders and was disobedient which caused a delay

in the Units showering program.” Plaintiff “admitted he was agitated and had his

hands clenched into fists” but claims “he was not going to assault anyone.” 

23. Correctional Officer A. Hawkinson is employed by CDCR and is assigned to CCI. 

On Saturday, November 16, 2002, Hawkinson was working as a Control Officer

observing the day room in Housing Unit Three at CCI. The Floor Officers, including

Cardenas were providing showers to the unit inmates. Defendant Cardenas motioned

for Hawkinson to open cell 322, however, he inadvertently opened cell 323 and

witnessed Plaintiff step out of his cell into the unit. Hawkinson also observed

Defendant Cardenas order Plaintiff back to his cell but he began to argue with

Cardenas and appeared angry and irate as he stood in front of Cardenas with clenched

fists and yelling loudly. Hawkinson activated his personal alarm and Defendant

Miranda responded and ordered Plaintiff to get down but Plaintiff did not. 

Hawkinson then observed Miranda toss a T-16 OC Pepper grenade on the ground in

front of Plaintiff. Plaintiff finally complied with the order to get down but then

suddenly got up swinging his arms toward Miranda. Defendant Miranda then sprayed

pepper spray into Plaintiff’s facial area and Plaintiff then complied with the order to

get down. Other officers alerted by the alarm also arrived. Defendant Miranda

applied mechanical restraints to Plaintiff and Officer Soto, who had arrived, escorted

him from the unit. 

24. On Saturday, November 16, 2002, Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) DePerio was

directed to respond to Housing Unit Five at CCI, where an inmate was being held in a

holding cell. DePerio was informed that an inmate had received an application of

pepper spray during a disturbance. Upon arrival, DePerio conducted a medical

examination of Plaintiff. DePerio found that Plaintiff was not in distress and was

alert and oriented. DePerio used a stethoscope and found that both of Plaintiff’s lungs

were clear. DePerio noted that Plaintiff had received decontamination following

exposure to O.C. Pepper spray and T-16 Pepper grenade. No injuries were found and

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Although the Court docket reflects that Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on October 6, 2003, it is

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really an Amendment to the Complaint and contains only supplemental facts to the original complaint filed on

September 24, 2003. Thus, the Court examines both the original complaint filed on September 24, 2003, and the

Amendment to the Complaint filed on October 6, 2003, together in addressing the instant Motion for Summary

Judgment. 

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Plaintiff was not short of breath. DePerio cleared Plaintiff to be housed in

Administrative Segregation and prepared a Medical Report of Injury or Unusual

Incident (CDCR 7219) according to procedure. 

25. On December 14, 2002, Correctional Officer Ashmore contacted Plaintiff in regards

to the Rules Violation Report he received on November 16, 202, Log #IV/02-11-

0883, charging him with violating CCR § 3005(c) (attempted battery on a peace

officer). Ashmore asked Plaintiff if he had any objections to him being assigned as his

Investigative Employee and Plaintiff voiced no objection. Ashmore noted that

Plaintiff had received all pertinent reports and requested witnesses. He advised

Plaintiff of his position as an Investigative Employee and his responsibilities and

Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood Ashmore. Ashmore told Plaintiff of his

rights in the disciplinary process and Plaintiff stated that he understood his rights and

supplied the officer with a statement. Ashmore cannot attest to the accuracy or

truthfulness of the statement that Plaintiff provided, but can attest to the fact that the

statement is that which Plaintiff provided him. 

D. ANALYSIS

1. Summary of Complaint2

The events at issue took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the California

Correctional Institute (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California. Plaintiff alleges that on November 16,

2002, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Defendants Cardenas, Miranda and Reed (no longer a

Defendant), were running a modified shower program. Plaintiff was informed that he could only

shower if his cellmate also wanted to. When Plaintiff’s cellmate declined to shower, C/O Reed

walked to the next cell. Approximately fifteen (15) minutes later, Plaintiff’s cell door opened. 

Plaintiff believed that this was for the purpose of his having a shower. Thus, Plaintiff secured his

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shower items and walked out of his cell. At this time, Defendant Cardenas stepped in front of

Plaintiff and told him to “lock it up.” Plaintiff replied that he had not had a shower in five days

and requested a shower. Cardenas informed Plaintiff that if he did not “lock up” she would

“spray” him. Plaintiff responded by asking if she was going to spray him because he wanted a

shower and also asked to speak to a Sergeant. Plaintiff states that Defendant Cardenas told him

she would spray him because he would not “lock up” and then proceeded to spray Plaintiff three

times. Plaintiff states that as he was getting on the ground, Defendant Miranda threw a spray

grenade under his face. Plaintiff states that at this point, he jumped up from the ground to get

fresh air and tried to reach for water when he was hit again with another burst of spray by

Defendant Miranda. Plaintiff states he then vomited and crawled to the sink area. During this

time, Plaintiff recalls hearing someone yell “get down” and he responded that he could not

breathe. The person yelling directed Plaintiff to “cuff up” and that they would take him to water. 

Plaintiff complied, was cuffed, taken to water and then placed in a shower to decontaminate. 

Plaintiff states that he continued to feel burning for thirty (30) minutes and that he was not

medically examined for an hour after the incident. Plaintiff states that he was placed in

Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) and written up for threatening staff. 

2. Eighth Amendment Claim for Relief

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

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that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal

quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

Here, Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff, who had exited his cell without

permission to shower, refused to reenter his cell or “lock up” when Defendant Cardenas ordered

him to. Plaintiff was observed standing in front of Defendant Cardenas with his fists clenched

and appearing angry, however, he did not comply. Instead, Plaintiff began to protest by refusing

to go back to his cell because Cardenas would not talk to him if he complied. Defendant

Cardenas ordered Plaintiff back to his cell a second time and informed him that she would use

spray if he failed to comply. Plaintiff, however, did not comply. At this time, Defendant

Cardenas withdrew the OC Pepper spray cannister from her holster and gave Plaintiff a third

Order to enter his cell. Instead, Plaintiff responded “You’re gonna spray me because I want a

shower?” Defendant Cardenas replied that she would spray Plaintiff because he was not

complying with her order to return to her cell. Defendant Cardenas ordered Plaintiff to his cell a

fourth time. At this time, Plaintiff threw his shower gear down to the floor striking Defendant

Cardenas in the leg. Defendant Cardenas then discharged three sprays toward Plaintiff striking

him in the face and chest and ordered Plaintiff to the ground, however, Plaintiff again did not

comply and was swinging his arms about wildly. At this point, Defendant Miranda appeared on

the scene to assist Defendant Cardenas and also ordered Plaintiff to get down on the ground. 

When Plaintiff did not comply, Defendant Miranda threw a small T-16 OC Pepper grenade

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toward Plaintiff and again ordered him to get on the ground. Plaintiff began to get down on all

fours but then suddenly jumped back to his feet. Defendant Miranda again ordered him to get

down but Plaintiff instead began to walk around with arms outstretched and yelling. Defendant

Miranda then sprayed Plaintiff with a short burst of pepper spray. Plaintiff finally complied, got

down to the ground, was handcuffed and taken to the sink to obtain water. Defendants present

evidence that shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was escorted out of the housing unit to a shower for

decontamination. 

The Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of informing the Court of the

basis for their Motion, and identifying those portions of the record which they believe

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to

Plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, Plaintiff

may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but is required to tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11;

First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747,

749 (9th Cir. 1973).

In opposition, Plaintiff complains that Defendants denied him access to speak to a

supervisor in order to minimize the situation. Further, that despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests,

Defendant Cardenas did not allow Plaintiff to speak to that supervisor. Plaintiff states that he

“was just trying to get a shower or speak to the sergeant to clear things up.” (Plaintiff’s Decl. in

Opposition at 2.) Plaintiff states further that when Defendant Cardenas put a can of spray to his

face he “knew then that Defendant Cardenas was gonna spray, and so I toss my shower roll to the

side ...” Plaintiff states that after the spray was dispensed, he could not help but jump up

because the excessive spray caused breathing difficulty. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that creates a disputed issue of

fact warranting trial. As noted above, the test for an excessive force claim is whether the force

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applied was in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” ” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Here, Plaintiff relies solely on his

contention that the force applied was excessive and unnecessary in order to gain control of

Plaintiff. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was aware that a modified shower program was

in place requiring escort of inmates to the showers. (UF #6.) Despite this, when Plaintiff exited

his cell and no one was there to escort him, he attempted to go to the showers on his own and

then encountered Defendant Cardenas. (Plaintiff’s Deposition [“Depo.”] at 59:15-20.) 

Defendant Cardenas informed Plaintiff to return to his cell but instead of complying, Plaintiff

protested. (UF #11.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff willfully disobeyed Defendant Cardenas’

order to return to his cell on at least four more separate occasions. (UF # 11, 13, 16.) During

these refusals, Plaintiff was seen clenching his fist, yelling at Defendant Cardenas as he

demanded to speak to a sergeant. (UF #10, 23.) Plaintiff conceded in his deposition that

Defendant Cardenas was a very small framed woman and that he stands at approximately 6' 4"

tall and weighs approximately 220 to 230 pounds. (Depo. at 38:23-24, 39:5-7). It is undisputed

that when Defendant Miranda arrived on the scene, Plaintiff had already refused to return to this

cell numerous times, had been sprayed and still did not comply with Miranda’s order to get down

on the ground. (UF #18.) After Miranda dispensed the pepper grenade and again ordered

Plaintiff to the ground, Plaintiff finally got down on all fours but then suddenly jumped back to

his feet, arms outstretched and yelling. Id. Plaintiff concedes in his Declaration in Opposition

that he “knew that if [he] lock[ed] it up as the Defendant wanted, [he] wouldn’t get a shower or a

chance to speak to the sergeant.” (Decl. at 7; Depo.at 64:13-16.) Plaintiff concedes in his

deposition that when Defendant Cardenas indicated to him that she would spray him if he didn’t

comply, he “threw [his] shower that [he] had in his hands ... and said ‘well, cuff me up. Let me

go see the sergeant’” but she sprayed him. (Depo. at 68:5-9.) It is further undisputed that after

being sprayed by Cardenas, Plaintiff did not go to the ground as directed. (UF #17.) When

Defendant Miranda appeared on the scene and also ordered Plaintiff to get down, he again did

not comply. (UF #18.) This caused Defendant Miranda to dispense a pepper grenade. Id.

Plaintiff appeared to begin to comply when he got down on all fours but then jumped back to his

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feet. Id. Miranda then sprayed Plaintiff with a burst of pepper spray and again ordered Plaintiff

to the ground. Id. Plaintiff finally complied with the order, got to the ground, was handcuffed

and decontaminated. Id. The Court finds the undisputed facts demonstrate that the force used

was done in an effort to maintain or restore discipline and not for the purpose of maliciously and

sadistically causing Plaintiff harm. As such, summary judgment on behalf of Defendants is

warranted. 

E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED in favor of Defendants and the case DISMISSED. 

The Court further ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District

Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with a copy

of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed

within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time may waive the

right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06313-LJO -SMS Document 77 Filed 04/26/07 Page 13 of 13