Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00318/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00318-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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 This matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral 1

argument. Local Rule 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SULINDER SINGH RAIHSI,

NO. CIV. S 05-0318 MCE KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SACRAMENTO INDEPENDENT 

TAXI OWNERS (SITOA); 

HADI KAKAR; SACRAMENTO 

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY; and 

DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendants Sacramento Independent Taxi Owners Association

(“SITOA”) and Hadi Kakar (collectively “Defendants”) have asked

the Court to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiff Sulinder

Singh Raihsi (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below,

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is 1

dismissed in its entirety.

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BACKGROUND

SITOA is a private organization licenced to conduct business

in California. Defendant Hadi Kakar is the current president of

SITOA. (Compl. at 4:9-12.) 

Pursuant to Sacramento County Resolution No. 2202-1381, all

taxi operators are required to have a special airport taxicab

permit (hereinafter “permit”) to operate on the grounds of the

Sacramento International Airport. Plaintiff alleges that SITOA

contracted with the County of Sacramento (hereinafter “County”)

for the exclusive right to issue the required permits. According

to Plaintiff, a cab driver must become a member of SITOA in order

to obtain a permit. (Compl. at 2:2-8.) 

Plaintiff claims he was a qualified membership candidate who

was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of race,

religion, ancestry, and national origin during the SITOA

application process. As a result of not being admitted to SITOA,

Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to a permit. A SITOA

permit is apparently quite valuable: a permit holder can earn up

to five times the income of a non-Permit holder. (Compl. at

2:12-14; 3:12-14; 4:17-18.)

Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 16, 2005, alleging

six causes of action: 1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 2)

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,

4) violation of California Government Code § 12900 (“FEHA”), 5)

violation of the California Constitution, Article I, Section 31,

and 6) violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. (Compl. at 4:19-5:21.) 

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 Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a 2

“Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

3

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of 2

material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint will

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his [or her] claim that would entitle him [or her] to

relief. Yamaguchi v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87

F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996).

In addressing the federal pleading requirements, the Supreme

Court has found that the statement required under Rule 8(a) must

“simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. This simplified

notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and

summary judgement motions to define disputed facts and issues and

to dispose of unmeritorious claims . . . Rule 8(a)’s simplified

pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512

(2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

Under Rule 15(a), when there is no “[u]ndue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

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[or] futility of the amendment,” leave to amend a complaint is to

be “freely given when justice so requires.” Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962); F.R.C.P. 15(a). Generally, leave to amend

is denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint could not be cured by amendment. Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

ANALYSIS

In light of future litigation and trial, the Court finds

that Plaintiff’s complaint is defective as drafted. Even in

light of the most liberal pleading standards, as discussed below,

neither the Court nor the parties should be expected to make

assumptions about facts, relationships, or other vital

information. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

provide Defendants with sufficient information to prepare a

reasonable defense. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,

512 (2002) 

1. The 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim

42 U.S.C. § 1981 states in relevant part: “All persons . . .

shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to

sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit

of all laws and proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens

. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2003).

 To state a claim under § 1981 Plaintiff must allege

intentional discrimination on the basis of race. Evans v. McKay,

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869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989). However, as acknowledged by

the Supreme Court, the definition and classification of a

particular race in the context of § 1981 is not necessarily a

simple task, especially when dealing with a classification such

as “East Indian” (Compl. at 3:7). Saint Francis College v. Al

Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). 

While Plaintiff has provided notice of his § 1981 claim, he

has failed to supply Defendants with a clear basis for the claim.

Only by cobbling together various pieces of the complaint can the

Court make the assumption that Plaintiff is an East Indian

(Compl. at 3:7) who SITOA subjected to discrimination in its

admissions process (Compl. at 3:12-14) solely on the basis of his

ancestry or race (Compl. at 4:15-18). Notably, Plaintiff never

actually states that he applied to join SITOA.

Under the notice pleading standard, Plaintiff must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,

512 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted). 

Without some context or explanation, the Court finds that

Defendant will be unable to ascertain the exact basis for

Plaintiff’s alleged discrimination, which, when pleading under §

1981, is of paramount importance. 

Accepting all allegations of fact as true and construing

them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the federal pleading

requirements. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-

38 (9th Cir. 1996). Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is granted. Plaintiff is granted twenty

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(20) days leave to amend. 

2. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in relevant part: “Every person who,

under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(West 2003).

To state a claim under § 1983 Plaintiff must allege the

following: 1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under the color of state law, and 2) the conduct

complained of deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United

States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (overruled

on separate grounds). 

While Plaintiff has provided notice of his § 1983 claim, he

has failed to provide Defendants with a sufficient basis for such

a claim. Other than stating (in two sentences) that SITOA and

the County have contracted together for certain licencing rights,

Plaintiff fails to provide any significant context or explanation

as to why or how SITOA is a state actor. (Compl. at 2:2-8.) 

Furthermore, the complaint leaves the Court and Defendants

guessing as to which rights (due process, equal protection, or

others) Plaintiff is complaining about. (Compl. at 4:17-18; 5:1-

2; 5:20-21.) 

Even in light of the liberal pleading requirements of Rule

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8(a), the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to give

Defendants fair notice of the grounds upon which his § 1983 claim

rests. Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s §

1983 claim is granted. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days

leave to amend.

3. The 42 U.S.C. § 2000e Claim

The Court does not recognize a cause of action under 42

U.S.C. § 2000e (the definition section of Subchapter VI (Equal

Employment Opportunities)). (Compl. at 1:21; 5:7.) Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s § 2000e claim is dismissed for lack of

specificity. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days leave to

amend.

4. The California Government Code § 12900 Claim

The Court does not recognize a cause of action under

California Government Code § 12900 (the Short Title of the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act). (Compl. at 5:11-

12.) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Consequently, Plaintiff’s § 12900 claim is dismissed

for lack of specificity. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days

leave to amend. 

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5. The State Constitutional Claim

Article I, Section 31, of the California Constitution

(hereinafter “§ 31”) states in relevant part: “The state shall

not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any

individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity,

or national origin in the operation of public employment, pubic

education, or public contracting.” Notably, § 31 is a selfexecuting law, which includes counties in its definition of the

term “state”. Article I, Section 31 (f) and (h) of the

California Constitution. 

As discussed in Section 2 above, whether Defendants qualify

as state actors is a question for summary judgement and not a

motion to dismiss. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

failed to plead discrimination in the operation of public

employment, public education, or public contracting. In this

case, Plaintiff alleges discrimination in the application process

for an independent taxi owners association. The Court fails to

see how discrimination in the context of an application process

equates to discrimination in the operation of public employment,

public education, or public contracting. Accordingly, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 31.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is

granted. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days leave to amend.

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6. The Federal Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff claims that “Defendants’s conduct violated the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution.” (Compl. at 5:20-21.) 

With regard to the Fifth Amendment, the Court finds that

Plaintiff is unable to state a claim. Barron v. City of

Baltiomre, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (“the [F]ifth [A]mendment

to the [C]onstitution . . . is intended solely as a limitation on

the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and

is not applicable to the legislation of the states.”); Geneva

Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d

483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974); Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d

710, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment does not directly apply to the actions of state

officials . . . the limitations of the Fifth Amendment restrict

only federal government action.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges

violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights by state

actors, not federal actors. (Compl. at 4:17, 5:20-21.) Because

the Fifth Amendment does not apply to state actors, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim. Plaintiff is not

granted leave to amend. 

However, Plaintiff’s due process rights are protected from

infringement by state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Apao v. Bank of New York, 324 F.3d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Fourteenth Amendment can only be violated by conduct that

qualifies as a state action, i.e., conduct that may be fairly

attributable to the state. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457

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U.S. 922, 934 (1982) (acknowledging that § 1983 was passed for

the express purpose of enforc[ing] the provisions of the

Fourteenth Amendment) (citations and quotations omitted). 

The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim is unnecessarily duplicative. See id. That is,

it states exactly the same cause of action as Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim. Both claims are based on an alleged violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl. at 3:12-14, 4:15-18, 5:1-3; 5:20-

21.) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s federal rights may be

fully and effectively vindicated under § 1983. Consequently, the

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s redundant Fourteenth Amendment claim

under Count VI of the complaint. Plaintiff is not granted leave

to amend.

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CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ motion is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety. 

Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days leave to amend as discussed

above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2005

__________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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