Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01159/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01159-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Delanie Belfield Ross, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV 14-1159-PHX-PGR (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Delanie Belfield Ross, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison, Lewis

Complex, Buckeye, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(hereinafter “habeas petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an

Answer on November 25, 2014 (Doc. 19). On December 23, 2014, Petition filed a Traverse

(Doc. 22).

Petitioner lists three grounds for habeas relief, all which he claims resulted in a

violation of his right to due process under the United States Constitution:

Ground 1: the trial court lacked “jurisdiction and authority to hold and try

Petitioner, which led to a void conviction, sentence, [and] unlawful

confinement” when it, on August 2, 2006, “dismissed CR 2005-006706.”

Ground 2: Petitioner was convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt

of every fact necessary to constitute the crimes charged: the jury was allowed

to decide the case on an impermissible theory of guilt - the trial court failed to

properly instruct the jury on consideration of the evidence.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

All exhibits cited in this report and recommendation are attached to Respondents’

Answer (Doc. 19).

- 2 -

Ground 3: Petitioner’s sentence is illegal/unlawful and imposed in an unlawful

manner - Petitioner’s written judgment is different from the orally pronounced

sentence. Petitioner was deprived of constitutionally adequate notice of the

sentencing enhancements sought by the state.

(Doc. 1, at 6-8.)

Respondents contend that grounds 1 and 2 should be dismissed for failure to state a

federal claim, “as these claims concern Arizona law and are not cognizable on federal habeas

corpus review,” and, in any event should be denied on their merits, and that ground 3 should

be denied on the merits. (Doc. 19, at 2.) 

BACKGROUND

I. Trial Court Proceedings.

In February 2005, the State charged Petitioner, his wife (Veronica), and Petitioner’s

brother-in-law (Cooper), with several charges of fraudulent schemes and artifices, theft, and

conspiracy (“First Indictment”). (Doc. 191

, Exh. A.) In July 2005, Cooper pled guilty to

theft, a class 3 felony. (Exh. VV, at 30.) In June 2006, the trial court ruled that count one

of the First Indictment was duplicitous, and ordered that the State have a week to amend the

indictment to charge a single benefit. (Exh. B.) Instead, on June 28, 2006, the State

presented the case to the grand jury and the grand jury returned a second indictment against

Petitioner and Veronica (“Second Indictment”). (Exh. C.) The Second Indictment removed

Cooper as a defendant, and addressed the issue of duplicity by breaking down Count 1 of the

First Indictment into four separate charges of fraudulent schemes and artifices. (Id.) The

Second Indictment bore the same case number, CR2005-006706, as the first. In August

2006, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the First Indictment (denoting it

as the “2005 indictment”) noting “there being no objection by [Petitioner].” (Exh. D.) The

case proceeded under the CR2005-006706 case number.

In October 2006, the trial court remanded the case to the grand jury for a new finding

of probable cause. (Exh. E.) In November 2006, the grand jury returned another indictment

charging Petitioner and Veronica with four counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices (counts

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

1 through 4), theft (count 5), and conspiracy (count 6), all class 2 felonies (“Third

Indictment”). (Exh. F.) Veronica was also charged with an additional count of fraudulent

schemes and artifices (count 7). (Id.) The case was once again remanded to the grand jury

in June 2008, with the trial court finding the Third Indictment was “fundamentally unfair.”

(Exh. G.) The State appealed the remand order by filing a petition for special action in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. H.) In July 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed

the trial court’s remand order. (Exh. I.) 

Prior to trial, the indictment was amended to allege Petitioner’s four prior felony

convictions. (Exhs. J, K.) Also, prior to Petitioner’s trial codefendant Veronica entered into

a plea agreement and was sentenced. (Exh. OO, at 19.) On the first day of trial, November

3, 2008, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss counts 6 and 7 of the indictment.

(Exh. TT.) At the conclusion of his trial, Petitioner was convicted by the jury on three counts

of fraudulent schemes and artifices (counts 1, 3, and 4), and one count of theft (count 5).

(Exh. AAA.) On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying

Petitioner’s convictions as follows:

In 2003, Appellant learned that his brother-in-law, Willard Cooper, Jr.

(Cooper), had a high credit score. Appellant told Cooper that he “could get

[Cooper] a million dollars’ worth of property and like a hundred thousand

dollars in cash” based on the credit score. Cooper subsequently moved from

Mississippi to Arizona to live with Appellant and Appellant’s wife, Veronica.

Appellant formed TempleBloc, Inc. (TempleBloc) under Cooper’s name in

March 2004, listed Cooper as president, completed the Articles of Incorporation

for TempleBloc, and designated a board of directors consisting of Cooper,

Veronica, and Appellant. Veronica applied for a corporate bank account

under the name UPSW Dispatching Services (UPSW) and later amended her

application to say that UPSW did domestic and international consulting and

was owned by TempleBloc. She also added Cooper as a co-signer on to the

account.

In 2004, M. Brooks prepared a 2002 corporate tax return for UPSW and a

2003 corporate tax return for TempleBloc based on information provided to

him by Appellant, who identified himself by his nickname, Lane Quue.

Brooks had no experience preparing corporate tax returns and failed to

obtain annual reports, profit and loss statements, or other financial

records for the companies. The tax returns listed assets in the amounts of

$1,546,660 and $1,031,610 for UPSW and TempleBloc, respectively.

However, TempleBloc conducted no form of legitimate business. Cooper

testified that he signed the tax returns because he signed anything that

Appellant asked him to sign.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

In 2004, Appellant leased four Hummers from Kachina Cadillac (Kachina)

for himself, Veronica, Cooper, and Appellant’s friend. Appellant who

identified himself as Mr. Quue, negotiated the leases with T. Heiner, one of

Kachina’s salesmen. Appellant informed Heiner that he ran a very profitable

business, was going to put the vehicles in TempleBloc’s name, and was acting

at the direction of Cooper. Kachina sent Cooper’s credit application and

TempleBloc’s tax return to its credit agency, GMAC Financial Services

(GMAC).

After GMAC approved the leases, Cooper signed the paperwork. He testified

that Appellant told him not to talk to anyone at Kachina, to sign the

documents, to write a check for $80,000 even though the money was not in

the account at the time, and to leave as quickly as possible. Kachina

subsequently provided the four Hummers to TempleBloc.

In June 2004, M. Lima of Luxury Home Investments, LLC (Luxury Home)

was in negotiations to buy a home valued at approximately $4.2 million in

Paradise Valley, Arizona (Quartz Mountain Property). Lima met Appellant,

who identified himself as Lane Quue, around this same time. Although

Appellant informed Lima that he was “the right-hand man” for Cooper and

that he wanted to purchase properties on Cooper’s behalf, Lima never met

Cooper.

Luxury Home entered into a contract to purchase the Quartz Mountain Property for $2 million and the current owners’ personal property for an

additional $320,000. After securing the contract, Lima and Appellant

negotiated a contract in which Luxury Home would sell the Quartz Mountain Property to TempleBloc for approximately $4.2 million. 

After Appellant informed Lima that he was having trouble securing

conventional financing for the purchase of the Quartz Mountain Property,

 Lima referred Appellant to J. Janssen of A&A Funding Co r p o r ation

(A&A Funding). Because A&A Funding did not have the funds necessary for

the Quartz Mountain Property Loan, Janssen referred the deal to J. Kapland of

Mortgages, Ltd. And asked Mortgages, Ltd. to assist in funding the acquisition

of the Quartz Mountain Property. Lima and Janssen gave Mortgages, Ltd.

some of the paperwork it needed to complete the loan, including TempleBloc’s

tax return.

Mortgages, Ltd. provided TempleBloc with a $2.2 million loan to purchase

the Quartz Mountain Property. Kaplan testified that he believed Appellant

was Cooper, but Cooper was not involved in the acquisition of the Quartz

Mountain Property and when Cooper discovered that Appellant was trying to

purchase the house, he “objected to it from the start.” However, after

Appellant told him that everything was alright, Cooper “went on [Ross’s]

word” and signed the closing documents.

Luxury Home and Appellant negotiated a reduced purchase price of

approximately $3.2 million for the Quartz Mountain Property in August

2004. Because TempleBloc still needed $1 million to purchase the Quartz

Mountain Property, Lima contacted a private investor, Dr. R. Greenberg, to

assist in securing the necessary financing. Dr. Greenberg’s company,

Quantum Consulting, LLC (Quantum), provided the loan for the additional $1

million.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

As a result of some confusion over whether certain items of personal

property were going to remain in the Quartz Mountain Property after the sale,

Luxury Home gave TempleBloc a price concession. Rather than give money

to TempleBloc, Luxury Home used approximately $430,000 of the price

concession funds to repay a portion of Quantum’s loan. While completing the

price concession agreement, Lima witnessed Appellant sign Cooper’s name,

which concerned Lima because this was the first time he had witnessed

Appellant sign anything. Because of the price concession, TempleBloc and

Cooper owed Quantum $600,000, and a promissory note for this amount was

recorded and was secured by the Quartz Mountain Property. [FN2]

FN2. The State charged Appellant with one count of

fraudulent schemes and artifices for the $600,000 loan from Dr.

Greenberg (Count 2); however, the jury acquitted Appellant of

this count at trial.

After TempleBloc secured financing, there was a simultaneous close of escrow

with Luxury Home purchasing the Quartz Mountain Property from the owners

for $2 million and simultaneously selling it to TempleBloc for $3.2 million.

Because the parties used a nominee agreement, the deed indicated the buyer

was TempleBloc and the sellers were the original owners. After the closing,

Appellant and Veronica lived in the Quartz Mountain Property, but Cooper

continued to reside at their previous address.

After purchasing the Quartz Mountain Property, Appellant told Cooper that he

was going to release the liens because he wanted to be able to refinance.

Appellant used the Internet to learn how to release liens on real property and

told Cooper that by doing that, the house becomes “yours outright.”

Appellant contacted A. Flagg-Thomas and asked her if she knew anyone who

could notarize documents. She introduced Appellant to her friend S.

Emudianughe. Emudianughe notarized two lien releases for Appellant: one in

which Appellant signed as Daniel Moore in order to release the $2.2 million

Mortgages, Ltd. lien, and the other in which Appellant signed as Dr.

Greenberg in order to release Quantum’s $600,000 lien. Both lien releases

stated that the debts had been fully paid.

After recording the lien releases, TempleBloc conveyed the Quartz Mountain

Property to Horizon Consulting, Inc. (Horizon). TempleBloc registered for the

trade name Horizon Consulting Grant Resource (HCGR) several weeks later.

Appellant subsequently obtained an $850,000 line of credit from a private

lender, J. Hancock, after Appellant told Hancock that he owned the Quartz

Mountain Property “free and clear.” Hancock believed that Appellant was

Cooper and that Horizon was Appellant’s company, and he agreed to provide

draws against the line of credit to Appellant upon Appellant’s request.

Before receiving any funds from Hancock, Cooper named himself president

of Horizon at Appellant’s request because Appellant told him that if Cooper

was Horizon’s president, it would enable them to deposit checks issued to

Horizon in one of Veronica’s bank accounts. [FN3] Hancock provided an

initial draw of $225,000 to Appellant. Appellant then requested that Hancock

give Quantum $250,000 as payment of the $600,000 loan.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The trial court later vacated its order granting Petitioner 1,626 days of presentence

incarceration credit because it had mistakenly double-credited Petitioner for the time served

and credited to his probation case, and instead awarded Petitioner 267 days of presentence

incarceration credit. (Exh. O.) The Arizona Court of Appeals later reversed the trial court

order, finding that the trial court had failed to correct Petitioner’s sentence within 60 days of

sentencing as required by Ariz.R.Crim.P. 24.3. (Exh. BB, at ¶ 115.)

- 6 -

FN3. Although TempleBloc registered for the trade name

HCGR, Cooper signed a corporate resolution that made him the

president of Horizon. The corporate resolution states that

Horizon is a Mississippi corporation.

Appellant later requested the remaining $375,000 of the $850,000line of credit

from Hancock. However, Appellant wanted the money quickly, and Hancock

denied the request because Hancock was entitled to time to come up with the

money under their agreement.

After learning that the Quartz Mountain Property liens had been fraudulently

released, Mortgages, Ltd. filed an affidavit of erroneous recording with the

recorder’s office and initiated foreclosure proceedings in December 2004.

(Ex. BB at ¶¶ 2–20.)

Petitioner was sentenced on July 17, 2009, to the presumptive 15.75 years in prison

on each of the four counts, and the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The

court found that Petitioner had prior convictions for bank fraud and fraudulent schemes and

artifices, both class 2 non dangerous offenses. (Exh. M.) Petitioner received credit for 1626

days of presentence incarceration.2

 (Id.) The transcripts of the sentencing hearing reflected

that the trial court imposed sentence on counts 1, 2, and twice on count 4, instead of the

counts of conviction, 1, 3, 4 and 5. (Exh. CCC, at 32.) The judgment, however, indicated

that the sentences were imposed on the correct counts. (Exh. M.)

II. Direct Appeal Proceedings.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and on June

8, 2011, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he was unable to identify any arguable issues

of merit. (Exh. Q.) Petitioner then filed supplemental pro per brief, raising the following

issues (Exh. S):

1. Petitioner’s due process rights were “violated when the State

resubmitted [his] case before a new grand jury . . . and obtained a new

charging instrument (8-9);

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

2. The State violated the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and his due

process rights by “add[ing] new statutes to charges that it resubmitted

to a new grand jury” (9);

3. The charging instrument was not “legally valid” and the trial court lost

jurisdiction to hold and try him (9-10);

4. The trial court failed to rule on his motions (10-17);

5. The State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions

(20-16, 31-35);

6. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on various Arizona

statutes pertaining to “criminal liability,” including “criminal liability

on an individual for conduct of an enterprise” (21-22, 27-28);

7. The State “failed to correct testimony that it knew was misleading and

false” (26-27, 29-31);

8. Count 1 of the indictment was duplicitous (28-29);

9. “[T]he charging instrument does not allege a crime against a true

victim” (31, 35);

10. The court sentenced him “pursuant to priors alleged that were not

proven and pursuant to [a] sentencing allegation never formally filed”

(38-40);

11. Petitioner received an “unlawful sentence” (40).

On July 18, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Exh. BB.) Petitioner then filed a petition

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on March 21, 2014.

(Exh. FF.) Petitioner’s first post-conviction proceeding, pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32 is still

pending in state court. (Doc. 8, at 2.) The claims raised in Petitioner habeas petition only

relate to claims previously raised on direct appeal, so they are exhausted for purpose of

habeas review. Petitioner was previously warned that the Court would “likely [] be unable

to consider any claims in his pending Rule 32 proceeding unless Petitioner first obtains

authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a second or successive habeas

corpus case,” and advised of his right to “voluntarily dismiss his current habeas corpus case

without prejudice by following the procedures set forth in Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.” Petitioner has not done so, and in fact, filed a notice with the Court that

he does not seek a stay, and requests a ruling on his habeas petition. (Doc. 28.)

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

DISCUSSION

I. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

A. Claim Cognizability

 The AEDPA provides that the Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that

[a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). “[I]t is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); see Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S.

333, 348-49 (1993) (“a mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas.”); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”). And, a

petitioner may not “transform a state law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a

violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120-

21 (1982) (“While they attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional terms, we believe

that this claim does no more than suggest that the instructions at respondents’ trials may have

violated state law.”). A habeas petition “must allege the petitioner’s detention violates the

constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Merits Analysis

In reviewing a cognizable claim under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant

habeas relief with respect to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings" unless the State court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court

as to the AEDPA standard of review). "When applying these standards, the federal court

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

should review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,"

or (2) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent." Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an

'unreasonable application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). This Court must “presume the correctness of [the] state courts’ factual

findings” and a petitioner has the burden to “rebut this presumption with ‘clear and

convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-474 (2007) (quoting 28

U.S.C. §2254(e)(1)). 

II. Ground 1.

Respondents claim that Petitioner’s ground 1 of his habeas petition should be

dismissed as non-cognizable, as Petitioner challenges the procedures used by the State to

remand his case to the grand jury and secure an indictment against him. Petitioner complains

that he was denied due process when the State elected to obtain a Second Indictment before

the grand jury, when the trial court had given the State a week to cure a defect (duplicity) in

count 1 of the First Indictment, and when the same case number was assigned to the second

indictment. Petitioner claims that the trial court lost jurisdiction to hold him and try him and

that the Second Indictment was legally void. State grand jury procedures are outlined in the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: see, e.g., Ariz.R.Crim.P. 12.9 (governing challenges

to grand jury proceedings); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 13.5 (governing “amendment of the charges” and

“defects in the charging document” in criminal cases). A trial court has the authority to

amend an indictment under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 13.5 to “correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

In fact, the claim in his habeas petition is mostly supported by incorporating his state

court briefing.

- 10 -

or technical defects,” and the State is permitted to amend an indictment to charge “new and

different matters of substance” with “the concurrence of the grand jury.” State v. O’Haire,

720 P.2d 119, 121 (App. 1986). 

Other than a glancing reference to due process, Petitioner cites no authority supporting

his claim that having two indictments pending at once under the same case number

constitutes a constitutional violation. In addition, although he argues that the trial court

dismissed the case, and therefore lost jurisdiction, in reality the record is clear that the First

(2005) Indictment was dismissed, not the entire case. In addition, Petitioner’s claim lacks

merit. Petitioner presented the precise issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals,3

 and its ruling

on the issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The Court thoroughly addressed each of Petitioner’s arguments in turn:

A. Amendment of the First Indictment

First, Appellant contends that the First Indictment limited any future trial to the

specific charge or charges stated in that indictment. He further asserts that

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5.b, the First Indictment could

only be amended to correct mistakes of fact or to remedy formal or technical

defects, unless he consented to the amendment. Appellant argues that the State

violated Rule 13.5.b and his due process rights by altering the nature of the

charges and original allegations made against him.

Based on the record, we find this argument to be without merit. Appellant is

correct that Rule 13.5.b limits the amending of an indictment to corrections of

“mistakes of fact or [remedies for] formal or technical defects.” However, the

state can modify an indictment to charge new and different matters with “the

concurrence of the grand jury.” State v. O’Haire, 149 Ariz. 518, 520, 720 P.2d

119, 121 (App. 1986). The State obtained the concurrence of the grand jury

in this case when it resubmitted the case to a new grand jury, which returned

the Second Indictment against Appellant. Accordingly, we find no violation

of Rule 13.5.b and no violation of Appellant’s due process rights.

B. Modification of the Entire Indictment

Appellant also asserts that the State arbitrarily decided to treat the entire First

Indictment as a remand, rather than just amending the duplicitous count one.

He contends that defects in indictments must be attacked by a Rule 16 motion

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 10 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

and the state did not file one. Additionally, Appellant claims that the State

violated the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and his due process rights

by treating the entire charging instrument as a remand and resubmitting the

case to a new grand jury, adding new statutes, and altering the nature of the

original allegations, without the court remanding or dismissing the First

Indictment.

As previously discussed, the State can make substantive modifications to an

indictment, but it may not do so without the concurrence of the grand jury.

State v. Kelly, 123 Ariz. 24, 26, 597 P.2d 177, 179 (1979). Additionally, we

find no support for Appellant’s argument that the State may only attack defects

in an indictment by a Rule 16 motion. The case Appellant cites states that a

Rule 16 motion to dismiss the prosecution would be a proper remedy in a

situation in which the indictment is challenged as being insufficient. See State

v. Superior Court ex. rel. Pima Cnty., 171 Ariz. 341, 342, 590 P.2d 457, 458

(App. 1977). Nowhere in the case does it say that “[d]efects in [an] indictment

must be attacked by way of Rule 16.6 motion[s],” as Appellant claims.

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the State may return a superseding

indictment “anytime before trial,” in the event it needs to make substantive

changes to the indictment. State v. Superior Court ex rel. Pima Cnty., 137

Ariz. 534, 536, 672 P.2d 199, 201 (App. 1983). Because the State did not

merely amend the First Indictment to charge new and different matters, but

rather returned a Second Indictment, we do not find that the State violated the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure or Appellant’s due process rights.

C. Two Indictments Under the Same Cause Number

Appellant next contends that it was impossible for the First and Second

Indictments to be valid at the same time. He asserts that only the First

Indictment was valid because there cannot be two valid indictments at the

same time under the same cause number; therefore, when the First Indictment

was dismissed, only a void Second Indictment remained. Alternatively,

Appellant asserts that the First and Second Indictments were a single charging

instrument and both would have been dismissed when the First Indictment was

dismissed by the State, which left no valid charging instrument to hold and try

Appellant. Appellant believes that his due process rights were violated

because the State submitted the case before a new grand jury and returned a

Second Indictment under the same cause number without the trial court

granting a remand or dismissal of the First Indictment.

As stated above, “[a] superseding indictment may be returned any time before

trial,” and it replaces the prior indictment. Superior Court ex rel. Pima

County, 137 Ariz. at 536, 672 P.2d at 201. While returning a second

indictment under the same cause number as the first indictment is not a

common practice, we do not find that this caused the superseding Second

Indictment to be void because we fail to see how this resulted in any prejudice

to Appellant. See, e.g., State v. Steward, 9 Or. App. 35, 39, 496 P.2d 40, 42-43

(1972) (stating that “the second indictment retained the same case number as

the first cannot invalidate it” because the defect does not prejudice the

substantial rights of the defendant); see also State v. Young, 149 Ariz. 580,

585, 720 P.2d 965, 970 (App. 1986) (“Absent prejudice, errors in a grand jury

proceeding do not constitute reversible error when a conviction is appealed.”).

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 11 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

The State returned the Second Indictment even though the trial court merely

requested that it amend the duplicitous count one. However, Appellant did not

object to the dismissal of the First Indictment. Further, the trial court found no

bad faith in the State’s decision to return the Second Indictment against

Appellant, and it stated that the request to dismiss the First Indictment was

supported by good cause. See Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.6.a

(“The court, on motion of the prosecutor showing good cause therefor, may

order that a prosecution be dismissed at any time upon finding that the purpose

of the dismissal is not to avoid the provisions of Rule 8.”).

Based on the fact that the State may return a superseding indictment at any

time and the fact that a superseding indictment is not invalidated merely

because it is the same cause number as the first indictment, we find that

Appellant has failed to demonstrate how his due process rights have been

violated or that the State’s decision to obtain the Second Indictment prejudiced

him. Further, Appellant has failed to explain how the First and Second

Indictments affected the Third Indictment, on which Appellant was

subsequently tried. Therefore, we find that the State did not violate

Appellant’s due process rights and the Second Indictment was a valid charging

instrument to hold Appellant until it was superseded by the Third Indictment.

(Exh. BB, at ¶¶ 28-36.)

Petitioner does not discuss the Court of Appeals’ resolution of this issue in his habeas

petition. He does, however, allege in his Traverse that he was prejudiced in the appellate

process because he did not receive a copy of the State’s response to his appeal and therefore

did not have an opportunity to file a reply addressing the State’s arguments. (Doc. 22, at 7-

9.) Petitioner fails, however, to cite facts or law that he could have been presented to the

Court of Appeals that weren’t already considered or that would have made a difference in

the Court’s analysis and decision. Petitioner furthermore “notices this court that the Arizona

prison law libraries provide no legal materials beyond court rules, criminal statutes, common

legal forms, and a law dictionary,” and that “[g]enerally, a pro se litigant’s only access to

case law is what might be in the possession of other inmates.” (Id.) Petitioner’s claim is

belied by the plethora of citations to case and other authority in Petitioner’s federal and state

pleadings. (Docs. 1, at 15-57, 62-74, 76-88, 97-103; 22.)

Petitioner continues to assert that the court and court minutes used the word “remand”

in referring to the Second Indictment, and that this failure of the State to follow “proper

procedures” on remand constitutes a due process violation and rendered that indictment

invalid. (Doc. 22, at 15-Doc. 22-1, at 8.) Petitioner cites no authority in support of his

argument, and in any case, does not demonstrate prejudice by the alleged incorrect

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 12 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

nomenclature. The fact that the word “remand” may have been used inaccurately does not

transform an otherwise proper grand jury procedure into an improper one, and certainly did

not act to “cloak” the proceedings so much as to deprive Petitioner of notice of the charges

against him, or somehow taint the grand jury presentation or concurrence. 

Petitioner fails to establish that the state court decision was contrary to clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, or that the state court unreasonably applied the facts

in reaching its decision in light of the court record. This Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s ground 1 of his habeas petition be denied and dismissed.

III. Ground 2.

To the extent Petitioner’s claim is grounded on his assertion that the jury decided his

guilt based upon an impermissible theory of guilt, because the State invited the jury to decide

his case based upon accomplice liability, and the jury was not given accomplice or accessory

liability instructions, his claim is non-cognizable. “Failure to give a jury instruction which

might be proper as a matter of state law, by itself, does not merit federal habeas relief.”

Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005). A petitioner would have to

show that the failure to give a jury instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violate[d] due process.” Id. (citation omitted); Willard v. People of State of Cal.,

812 F.2d 461, 363 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Insofar as Willard challenges the jury instructions under

California law, his claim is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.”) (citations

omitted). Under Arizona law, “there is no requirement that the indictment charge [a

defendant] as an accomplice in order to permit a jury instruction to that effect. [], an accused

is a principal regardless of whether he directly commits the illegal act or aids or abets in its

commission.” State v. McInelly, 704 P.2d 291, 292-93 (App. 1985).

In any event, Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. He cites no place in the record where the

State “invited jurors to decide the case on the theory that [Petitioner] was an accomplice.”

(Doc. 22-1, at 11.) This Court has reviewed the transcripts of the State’s opening and closing

arguments, and, other than referring to Petitioner AND his co-defendants as accomplices,

there is no such invitation. (Exhs. UU at 22-29; ZZ, at 69-91, 120-132.) In fact, the State

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 13 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

in its closing arguments stressed the direct involvement of Petitioner in all five counts

charged, and even referred to Petitioner as the “puppet master.” (Doc. ZZ at 69-71, 131.) 

Insofar as Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence of guilt, the “clearly

established Federal law” applicable is Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), under

which “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” This analysis “ask[s] whether the decision of the

[state appellate court] reflected an ‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson . . . to the facts of

this case.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005). As to Petitioner’s

insufficiency of the evidence claim the Court of Appeals found as follows:

[]. Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices

Fraudulent schemes and artifices is committed when a person,

“pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by

means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material

omissions.” A.R.S. 13-2310.A (2010). The term “benefit” means “anything

of value or advantage, present or prospective,” A.R.S. 13-105.3 (Supp. 2012),

and it is defined broadly to encompass both pecuniary and non-pecuniary gain.

State v. Henry, 205 Ariz. 229, 233, ¶15, 68 P.3d 455, 459 (App. 2003).

a. Count One

Appellant was convicted of one count of fraudulent schemes and

artifices for making false or fraudulent representations to Lima of Luxury

Home, Janssen of A&A Funding, and Kaplan and Ziegler of Mortgages, Ltd.,

in order to knowingly obtain the benefit of a $2.2 million mortgage from

Mortgages, Ltd.

During the trial, the State introduced sufficient evidence of the false or

fraudulent representations made by Appellant. Cooper testified that Appellant

posed as Cooper when he was negotiating to buy theQuartz Mountain

Property. Although Cooper objected to Appellant buying the Quartz Mountain

Property when he first learned of the negotiations, he testified he signed the

closing documents after Appellant told him that everything was alright.

Brooks prepared a 2003 corporate tax return for TempleBloc. Brooks

had no experience preparing corporate tax returns and failed to obtain annual

reports, profit and loss statements, or other financial records for the company;

instead, he completed the tax return based on information provided to him by

Appellant. The tax return listed assets in the amount of $1,031,610 for

TempleBloc. However, TempleBloc conducted no form of legitimate

business.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 14 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

Lima testified that Appellant told him that he was the right-hand man

for Cooper and that he would be buying the Quartz Mountain Property on

Cooper’s behalf. Lima testified that he witnessed Appellant sign a price

concession document as Cooper.

Appellant also informed Lima that Cooper had an escrow account of approximately $1 million, and Cooper was planning on using that money to

purchase properties in Arizona. However, when asked if he had an escrow

account from Diversified Title and Escrow in the amount of $800,000, Cooper

testified that he had no knowledge of the account.

After Appellant informed Lima that he was having trouble getting

conventional financing, Lima referred Appellant to Janssen of A&A Funding.

Janssen identified Appellant in a photo lineup as Cooper. Janssen testified that

he packaged a loan for the Quartz Mountain Property anad that he considered

TempleBloc’s 2003 corporate tax return when generating the loan application.

Janssen further testified that Appellant signed documents with Cooper’s

signature.

Janssen also stated he brokered the loan to Mortgages, Ltd. because his

company did not have an in-house funding source for a loan the size required

to obtain the Quartz Mountain Property. He testified that he provided the

documentation given to him for the loan application to Mortgages, Ltd.,

including TempleBloc’s fraudulent tax return.

Kaplan and Zeigler of Mortgages, Ltd. testified that Appellant held

himself out to be Cooper during the walk through of the Quartz Mountain

Property and signed loan commitment documents with Cooper’s name. They

both also identified Appellant as the man they believed to be Cooper in a photo

lineup. Kaplan said that TempleBloc’s tax return was material to his decision

to fund the loan.

In his supplemental brief, Appellant questions who actually received the benefit of the $2.2 million loan. He believes that Kaplan testified falsely when

he said that Cooper was the borrower and not TempleBloc. However,

TempleBloc was merely a shell corporation that conducted no legitimate form

of business. Appellant personally negotiated with the parties and made the

false representations necessary to secure the $2.2 million loan, not Cooper. As

a result of these fraudulent representations, Appellant obtained the benefit of

a $2.2 million loan from Mortgages, Ltd. This loan was used to finance the

acquisition of the Quartz Mountain Property, in which Appellant and Veronica

lived.

b. Count Three

Appellant was also convicted of one count of fraudulent schemes and

artifices for making false or fraudulent representations in order to knowingly

obtain the benefit of an $850,000 loan from Hancock. At trial, the State

introduced sufficient evidence of the false or fraudulent representations made

by Appellant to Hancock in order to obtain the loan.

Hancock testified that he entered into negotiations to provide a loan to

Appellant, who he blieved to be Cooper, using the nickname Lane Quue.

Hancock identified Appellant as Cooper or Lane Quue during a photo lineup.

Hancock also testified that he was told that the Quartz Mountain Property was

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 15 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

owned free and clear by Cooper, who he identified as Appellant. He stated

that if he had known there were other liens against the property, he would

never have agreed to lend money to Appellant, especially in light of th size of

the other liens.

Appellant misrepresented to Hancock that the Quartz Mountain

Property was owned free and clear when, in reality, he had fraudulently released liens in the amount of $2.2 million and $600,000 against the Quartz

Mountain Property. As a result of these misrepresentations, Appellant

received a benefit: Hancock extended an $850,000 line of credit to him.

c. Count Four

Appellant was convicted of one final count of fraudulent schemes and

artifices for making false or fradulent representations in order to knowingly

obtain the benefit of leases on four Hummers from Kachina. At trial, the State

introduced sufficient evidence of the false or fraudulent representations made

by Appellant to Kachina to obtain the leases.

Appellant first contends that no evidence was presented that Appellant

or TempleBloc obtained leases in Cooper’s name. However, Cooper testified

that Appellant negotiated the leases for the Hummers. Additionally, Heiner,

a salesman for Kachina, identified Appellant in a photo lineup and testified

that he worked primarily with Appellant in negotiating the leases for the four

Hummers. He further testified that Appellant informed him that he was

negotiating on Cooper’s behalf and that Cooper wanted to lease the vehicles

in TempleBloc’s name.

As described above, Appellant was instrumental in creating a fraudulent tax return for TempleBloc that included $1,031,610 in assets, even though

Templebloc conducted no form of legitimate business. Appellant provided

templeBloc’s fraudulent tax return to Kachina in order to obtain the leases.

When shown TempleBloc’s tax return during trial, Heiner testified that the

return would have been required for a GMAC credit applicaiton in order to

obtain the leases on the four vehicles. He stated that GMAC would have relied

on the tax return in order to establish that the leassee had sufficient income to

repay the loans and to guarantee return of the vehicles at the end of their lease.

Appellant contends that TempleBloc obtained the benefit because

TempleBloc’s name was on the leases. However, as previously stated,

TempleBloc was merely a shell corporation that conduted no legitimate

business. Appellant negotiated with the parties and made the false

representations necessary to secure the four leases. As a result of Appellant’s

false or fraudulent representations, he obtained the benefit of leases on four

Hummers from Kachina.

ii. Theft

Appellant also contends that the State introduced insufficient evidence

to convict him of count five. Under count five, Appellant was charged with

theft because he obtained $475,000 from Hancock using forged lien releases

in order to represent the already mortgaged Quartz Mountain Property as good

collateral for an $850,000 loan. To convict a defendant of theft, the State must

prove that the defendant “[o]btain[ed] services or property of another by means

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 16 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

of any material misrepresentation with intent to deprive the other person of

such property or services.” A.R.S. 13-1802.A.3 (Supp. 2012).

During Appellant’s trial, the State introduced sufficient evidence to

convict Appellant of this crime. Cooper testified that Appellant told him that

he was going to release the loans from the Quartz Mountain Property because

he wanted to refinance. Appellant used the Internet to learn how to release

loans from a property and told Cooper that by doing that, the house becomes

“yours outright.”

Flagg-Thomas testified that Appellant asked her if she knew anyone

who could notarize documents. She introduced Appellant to her friend

Emudianughe. Emudianughe testified that Appellant told her his name was

Daniel Moore when she met him, and she identified him in a photo lineup as

Daniel Moore. She testified further that after signing one lien release as

Daniel Moore, Appellant signed another lien release in the name of Dr.

Greenberg, who he claimed was his brother.

Appellant contends that there was no evidence that material

misrepresentations were made to Hancock related to the fraudulent lien

releases. However, Hancock testified that Appellant told him that he owned

the Quartz Mountain Property free an clear and that statement was material to

his decision to loan money to Appellant. Hancock loaned Appellant a total of

$475,000, consisting of one draw in the amount of $225,000 and a second

draw of $250,000. After securing these funds, Appellant and Veronica moved

to Atlanta. There is no indication that Appellant intended to repay the funds

received from Hancock. Therefore, we find that sufficient evidence was

presented at trial to convict Appellant of theft.

(Exh. BB, at ¶¶ 55-75.)

Petitioner does not address the Court’s analysis or ruling in his habeas petition, other

than to incorporate the facts in his appellate court briefs, and to assert that “[t]he state’s

theory at trial was that the petitioner, as an accomplice (along with 2 other accomplices),

committed the crimes alleged in Counts 1, 3, 4 + 5,” and that “the facts are that the benefits

alleged in each count were obtained by a corporate entity (enterprise).” In his Traverse,

Petitioner asserts that the State, at the beginning of its closing argument referred to Petitioner,

and his co-defendants Veronica and Willard Cooper as “accomplices.” (Doc. 22-1, at 9.)

This one statement taken out of context simply does not transform the State’s closing

arguments into a “theory” of accomplice liability. The State’s “theory” as made clear upon

a review of the opening and closing arguments, was that Petitioner was the principal architect

of the fraudulent schemes and theft. In addition, the State emphasized, and the Court of

Appeals found, that the “corporate entity,” i.e., TempleBloc was a shell corporation that

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 17 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

conducted no legitimate business, and that Petitioner was the direct beneficiary of the

schemes and theft. 

Petitioner does not argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals rejection of his claim was

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2).

Furthermore, he does not address in his Traverse, the Respondents’ numerous citations to the

record of the trial evidence supporting the Court of Appeals factual determinations.

Petitioner does not establish that no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, and thus, his

claim lacks merit, and should be denied and dismissed.

IV. Ground 3.

Petitioner asserts that his sentence is illegal/unlawful and imposed in an unlawful

manner, in that the written judgment of the court varies from the orally pronounced sentence,

and that he was not given constitutionally required notice of the sentencing enhancements

sought by the state. Other than a reference to a violation of his “due process rights under the

U.S. Constitution,” Petitioner cites no additional federal legal authority in his habeas petition

in support of his sentencing claim. A petitioner’s “conclusory citation [to Amendments to

the United States Constitution] does not transform his state-law claims into federal ones.”

Poland, 169 F.3d at 584. Additionally, state law sentencing claims are not subject to federal

habeas corpus review. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994)

(declining to consider claim that petitioner was denied due process when he was sentenced

to consecutive sentences without any explanation because “[t]he decision whether to impose

sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state criminal procedure and is not

within the purview of federal habeas corpus”); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th

Cir. 1993) (holding that “claim regarding merger of convictions for sentencing is exclusively

concerned with state law and therefore not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus

proceeding.”) The provisions of state law applicable to errors in Petitioner’s sentencing are

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4 (governing mistakes in judgments); A.R.S. §§13-703 (sentencing

provisions applicable to “repetitive offenders” who have prior felony convictions); -708

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 18 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

(sentencing provisions applicable to offenders who commit crimes while released from

confinement). 

Petitioner asserted the same sentencing errors in ground 3 of his habeas petition before

the Arizona Court of Appeals, which resolved them entirely on state law grounds:

IV. Sentencing

Defendant’s brief raises a number of sentencing issues, many of which

stem from the same course of events. On June 10, 2008, just prior to the trial

court granting the Motion to Remand, the State filed “State’s Motion to

Amend Indictment to allege Defendant’s Prior Convictions.” The motion

stated “[t]he State intends to use [Appellant]’s prior felony convictions at trial

and at sentencing” and listed three alleged prior convictions: (1) a 1997 federal

felony conviction in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division for one

count of conspiracy to possess unauthorized access devices and one count of

counterfeit access devices (aiding and abetting); (2) a 2000 federal felony

conviction in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division for bank fraud;

and (3) a 2003 Arizona felony conviction for fraudulent schemes and artifices.

The motion also indicated Appellant’s violation of his term of release for the

second prior and violation of probation on the third prior. Appellant takes

issue with several elements of this motion.

A. Failure to Allege Supervised Release Status

First, Appellant contends that the State failed to properly allege that he

was on probation, parole, or supervised release at the time of his arrest. This

argument is without merit. Appellant’s enhanced sentence was based on his

prior convictions, which moved him from the first-time offender sentencing

scheme into the repetitive offender sentencing scheme pursuant to A.R.S. §13-

703.C, J (Supp. 2012). Although the trial court mentioned the fact that

Appellant was on probation at the time of the current offenses at Appellant’s

sentencing, this also was not the reason the trial court cited for giving

Appellant the presumptive sentence within the repetitive offender sentencing

scheme. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a presumptive term based on

its determination that the aggravating and mitigating factors balanced out.

Additionally, the fact that Appellant was on probation at the time of his

arrest was addressed in two settlement conference memoranda, filed by the

State on December 18, 2007 and February 6, 2008. The memoranda cite

A.R.S. §13-604.02B [footnote omitted] and state that Appellant “must be

sentenced to at least the presumptive term, as these offenses were committed

while [Appellant] was on probation.” Thus, we find Appellant had prior notice

of the State’s intent to use the fact that Appellant was on probation at the time

he committed the current offense during Appellant’s sentencing.

///

///

///

///

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 19 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

B. Lack of Adequate Notice of Intent to Use Historical 

Priors for Sentence Enhancement

Appellant further contends that the State failed to give him adequate

notice of its intent to use his prior convictions for sentence enhancement.

Arizona Revised Statutes §13-703.N requires that notice be given of the

State’s intent to prove priors any time before the case is actually tried, and at

least twenty days before the case is actually tried if there is a possibility of

prejudice.

Here, Appellant was put on notice of the possible sentencing

implication of his historical priors as early as December 18, 2007, when the

State filed a Settlement Conference Memorandum detailing Appellant’s three

prior convictions and the effects that those convictions could have on

Appellant’s sentence. Additionally, the State filed a second Settlement

Conference Memorandum on February 6, 2008 that outlined the enhancement

effect that his historical priors would have on his sentence. 

In addition, the State filed its Motion to Amend Indictment to Allege

[Appellant]’s Prior Convictions on June 10, 2008. This motion discussed

Appellant’s prior convictions and stated that “[t]he State intends to use

[Appellant]’s prior felony convictions at trial and at sentencing.”

Appellant also contends that the State’s Motion to Amend “did not

amend [the] charging document to allege any statutes to authorize a sentence

in the two historical prior range.” However, Appellant was put on notice of

the increased presumptive sentence that he would receive as a result of his

prior felony convictions in the two settlement conference memoranda filed by

the State.

We therefore find that not prejudice or surprise resulted from the

omission of the citation in the indictment. Additionally, because the trial did

not commence until November 3, 2008, both provisions of A.R.S. §13-03.N

were satisfied, and Appellant was undoubtedly on notice of the potential

punishments for his crimes.

C. Failure to Prove Historical Priors

Appellant then argues that regardless of the issue of notice, the State

failed to prove the prior convictions at the priors hearing. At the hearing, the

State introduced certified copies of Appellant’s prior convictions, and

Appellant’s probation officer testified regarding the identity of Appellant.

Appellant contends that the only way to prove alleged priors is to submit a

certified record of the conviction containing defendant’s fingerprints and then

call a fingerprint analyst to testify that the fingerprints are in fact those of the

defendant. “Although the preferred method of proving prior convictions for

sentence-enhancement purposes is submission of certified conviction

documents bearing the defendant’s fingerprints, courts may consider other

kinds of evidence as well.” State v. Robles, 213 Ariz. 268, 273, ¶ 16, 141 P.3d

748, 753 (App. 2006) (citation omitted).

In this case, the State submitted both documentary and testimonial

evidence that established that Appellant’s prior convictions existed and that

Appellant was the party named in those prior convictions. The probation

officer testified that even though he had not been present at trial or sentencing

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 20 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

for Appellant’s federal convictions, Appellant presented himself to the

probation officer upon his relocation to Arizona and identified himself as

Delanie Ross. In addition , the trial court took proper judicial notice of its own

records in verifying Appellant’s prior Arizona conviction and probation status.

See Ariz. R. Evid. 201; see also In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4, 10

P.3d 1211, 1212 (App. 2000). This combination of evidence meets the clear

and convincing burden required to prove Appellant’s prior convictions for

sentence enhancement purposes.

D. Use of Foreign Priors

Appellant further contends that his foreign priors are unusable because

the State did not demonstrate that they would be felonies in Arizona. “Before

using a foreign conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes under 13-604,

the superior court must first conclude that the foreign conviction includes

‘every element that would be required to prove an enumerated Arizona

offense.’” State v. Crawford, 214 Ariz. 129, 131, ¶ 7, 149 P.3d 753, 755

(quoting State v. Ault, 157 Ariz. 516, 521, 759 P.2d 1320, 1325 (1988)).

The record reflects that the trial court found that Appellant’s federal

conviction for bank fraud required proof of all the necessary elements of

fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class two felony in Arizona. As such, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion to use the foreign prior for sentence

enhancement.

E. Unlawful Sentence

Finally, Appellant argues that the sentence given by the trial court was

unlawful. Upon review, there are two separate issues concerning the trial

court’s initial sentence. Appellant only argues the first, but we consider both.

i. Errors in Oral Pronouncement

The first issue concerns clerical errors made in the oral pronouncement

of Appellant’s sentence. In the oral pronouncement, the trial court made

several errors, such as issuing Appellant a sentence for count two, for which

he was not convicted. In the written pronouncement of sentence, the sentences

were attributed to the proper counts, but the dates for Appellant’s prior

convictions were entered incorrectly. Appellant is correct in asserting that this

constitutes an error; however, his argument that the oral pronouncement

controls is flawed.

“[W]hen there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of

sentence and the minute entry that cannot be resolved by reference to the

record, a remand for clarification of sentence is appropriate.” State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216, 814 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992). In Bowles, the court

referenced other parts of the record that indicated that the trial court intended

the defendant’s sentence to be consistent with the written pronouncement. Id.

As such, the court determined that because the trial court’s intent was

manifest, remand was unnecessary. Id.

Here, the trial court held an additional hearing on February 12, 2010,

in which it clarified the record and removed any doubt about its intent. During

this hearing, the trial court corrected both the sentences issued for each count

and the dates of the prior convictions used for sentence enhancement. As the

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 21 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and written pronouncement can

be resolved by referencing the record, there is no need for remand on this

issue.

(Exh. BB, at ¶¶99-114.)

In Petitioner’s Traverse, he cites several federal cases he claims stand for the

proposition that an orally pronounced sentence is the sentence that constitutes the court’s

judgment, and since it was deficient as described above, his sentence was unlawful and must

be “stricken.” (Doc. 22-1, at 13-22.) He does not address to Respondents’ argument that

Petitioner’s claim that he received insufficient notice of sentencing enhancements does not

raise a federal claim, and lacks merit.

The cases cited by Petitioner do not establish that an oral pronouncement of sentence

always controls, such that any later amendment or clarification necessarily constitutes

constitutional error: the Ninth Circuit, in Boyd v. Archer, 42 F.3d 43, 44-46 (9th Cir. 1930)

held that the intent of the court is taken into consideration in resolving sentencing

ambiguities: in Biddle v. Shirley, 16 F.2d 566, 567 (8th Cir. 1926), the Eighth Circuit held

that the trial court retained jurisdiction to take a defendant back into custody to impose a

sentence on a count of conviction that had been announced at sentencing, but that did not

appear in the order of commitment: in Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206, 211 (1933), the

Supreme Court held that the trial court retained jurisdiction, when a defendant’s sentence had

been “suspended,” to impose a later sentence of incarceration: and, in Hill v. United States

ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 464 (1936), the Supreme Court, although holding that the

insertion by a courtroom clerk of a substantive sentencing term not ordered by the court

rendered that term void, a variance between an oral and written sentence or commitment may

be corrected by the trial court in a direct proceeding. 

Even if Petitioner’s ground 3 of his habeas petition can be construed to raise a federal

claim, it nonetheless lacks merit. Petitioner does not establish that the Arizona Court of

Appeal’s decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 22 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That Court’s reasoning that the trial court’s expression

of intent as to Petitioner’s sentence resolved the ambiguity between the orally pronounced

sentence and the minute entry, particularly in light of the fact that the trial court held a

subsequent hearing to correct the errors, was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court decisions or other federal law cited by Petitioner. The

discrepancy between the oral and written pronouncement of sentence was “resolved by

referencing the record,” which included a detailed hearing that clarified the trial court’s intent

and also conformed the orally pronounced sentence to the jury verdicts. (Ex. BB, at ¶ 114.)

Petitioner also does not demonstrate that the Arizona Court of Appeals unreasonably

determined the facts in light of the state court record. Petitioner asserts that the court of

appeals “reinstated [his] 7/1/2009 sentence” and argues that this was a “blanket

reinstatement” of his original, flawed sentence. (Doc. 1, at 8.) The Arizona court of appeals

however, in its memorandum decision, made clear in the context of the entire opinion that

it was not reinstating the entirety of the trial court’s 7/17/09 sentencing minute entry, but

rather it was simply reinstating the order awarding Petitioner’s 1,626 days of presentence

incarceration credit. (Ex. BB, at ¶¶ 119-120.) 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury at trial of counts 1, 3, and 4, fraudulent schemes

and artifices, and count 5, theft. That much is abundantly clear from the record and

Petitioner does not dispute this fact. Petitioner, however, asserts that constitutional error

occurred due to the trial court’s mis-numbering the counts of conviction during its

pronouncement of sentence. The trial court took steps after the discovery of the error to

conform the oral pronouncement to the written judgment. As set forth above, ground 3 of

Petitioner’s habeas petition does not raise a federal claim, and in any event lacks merit, and

should be denied and dismissed.

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 23 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Petitioner’s grounds 1, 2 and 3 of his

habeas petition do not raise a federal claim and, in any event, lack merit. Wherefore, this

Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the habeas petition

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural

ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 24 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Ruling, and Motion for

Status (Docs. 28, 29), be denied as moot.

DATED this 4th day of June, 2015.

Case 2:14-cv-01159-PGR Document 30 Filed 06/05/15 Page 25 of 25