Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01867/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01867-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The th

Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on th

other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal th

petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. For the instant petition, Petitioner signed it on October 20, 2009. (Doc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STACY WORTHY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES HARTLEY, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:9-cv-01867-JLT HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

October 20, 2009. A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the petition may be 1

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1, p. 9). 

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untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or

after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9 Cir.2001). th

The Ninth Circuit in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this

Order to Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in

Herbst.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on October 20, 2009, and thus, it is subject to the provisions

of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

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review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas

corpus petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d

782, 784 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations th

period would begin to run on April 25, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 2001 WL 575465 (9 Cir. Ariz.). th

Here, Petitioner has failed to provide any information whatsoever regarding the direct appeal,

if any, from his original conviction. Petitioner does allege that he was convicted on November 21,

1985. Thus, the Court concludes that if Petitioner filed a direct appeal, that appeal would have

concluded at some point prior to April 24, 1996. Accordingly, the statute of limitations would have

commenced on April 25, 1996 and ended on April 24, 1997. As mentioned, the instant petition was

not filed until October 20, 2009, over twelve years after the one-year period ended. Accordingly,

unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling under the AEDPA, his petition is

untimely and should be dismissed.

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C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that “a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that he filed the following state petitions: (1) filed in the Kern County

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The Court has supplemented the filing and denial dates of Petitioner’s state court petitions by accessing the 2

California courts’ electronic database. The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination

by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso,

989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9

(9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see

also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d

736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for

filings in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.

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Superior Court on September 12, 2008, and denied on November 24, 2008; (2) filed in the California

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, on January 7, 2009, and denied on March 13, 2009; and (3)

filed in the California Supreme Court on April 1, 2009, and denied on August 19, 2009. (Doc. 1, pp.

2-3 ; Exs. G, H, & I). 

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However, none of these state petitions affords Petitioner statutory tolling under the AEDPA.

A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a

state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d th

478 (9 Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. th th

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9 Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the th

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d

919, 920 (8 Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after th

expiration of the one-year limitations period). Here, as mentioned, the limitations period expired on

April 24, 1997, over eleven years before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition. Accordingly,

he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

The Court anticipates that Petitioner might argue he is entitled to start the AEDPA one-year

period based on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), i.e., the date on which the factual predicate for his claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Petitioner, however, would

be mistaken. Here, Petitioner argues that the 1985 plea agreement provided that he would only serve

eight years before being paroled, assuming he was discipline-free. Petitioner also asserts that he has

served 22 years of his sentence. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner is correct that § 2244(d)(1)(D)

is applicable, he would have learned of the purported breach of his plea agreement when he

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commenced his ninth year of imprisonment without being paroled. That would have occurred in

1994. 

Thus, under either starting point, the statute of limitations expired long ago and Petitioner has

provided no legal or factual justification for a starting point that would make the instant petition

timely. Accordingly, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition must be dismissed. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland,

410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When 

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

In this case, Petitioner has made no claim of entitlement to equitable tolling, and, after

reviewing the record, the Court finds no basis for such entitlement. Accordingly, the petition appears

to be untimely. However, the Court, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s directive, will permit Petitioner

to respond to the Court’s timeliness concerns by filing a response to this Order to Show Cause. If

the Court is not satisfied with Petitioner’s response, the Court will order the petition to be dismissed.

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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