Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02104/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02104-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

17cv2104-CAB-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEANDRO LEONEL GONZALEZ 

CASTILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. RENTERIA, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv2104-CAB-WVG

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [Doc. No. 38]

AND GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 

30]

Plaintiff Leandro Leonel Gonzalez Castillo (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his complaint on October 12, 2017, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming violation of his constitutional rights under the First 

and Eighth Amendments. [Doc. No. 1.] On March 27, 2019, Defendants A. Renteria, R. 

Segovia, and L. Romero (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. No. 

30.] On April 24 and 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion for summary 

judgment. [Doc. Nos. 32, 33.] On May 20, 2019, Defendants filed a reply to the 

opposition. [Doc. No. 35.]

On August 5, 2019, Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“Report”) to grant the motion for summary judgment. [Doc. No. 38 at 

13.] On August 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. [Doc. No. 39.] Having 

Case 3:17-cv-02104-CAB-WVG Document 40 Filed 09/10/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
2

17cv2104-CAB-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reviewed the matter de novo and for the reasons set forth below, the Report is 

ADOPTED and the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of 

Defendants.

REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The duties of the district court in connection with a report and recommendation of 

a magistrate judge are set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b). The district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b). The district court need not review de novo those portions of a report and 

recommendation to which neither party objects. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 

1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(en banc).

DISCUSSION

A. Background.

The Report contains a complete summary of the undisputed facts as obtained from 

the complaint and Plaintiff’s own deposition [Doc. No. 38 at 2-3] and, therefore, the 

summary is adopted in full. 

B. Eighth Amendment claim against Renteria.

Plaintiff alleges Renteria violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment because Renteria sexually assaulted him during two 

clothed body searches on February 6, 2016 and June 25, 2016. [Doc. No. 1 at 9-10.] 

1. February 6, 2016.

Based on Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, the February 6, 2016 incident 

amounted to Renteria momentarily squeezing Plaintiff’s buttocks during a fully clothed 

pat-down in Donovan’s prison recreation yard. According to Plaintiff’s deposition, the 

squeezing was only “seconds long,” it was not done in a “harsh way,” Renteria’s actions 

Case 3:17-cv-02104-CAB-WVG Document 40 Filed 09/10/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
3

17cv2104-CAB-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

were done “clowning around like that,” Renteria did not pat down Plaintiff’s groin areas, 

and Renteria did not make any sexually suggestive comments during the incident. 

As noted by the Magistrate Judge, such conduct is not objectively egregious.

Generally, inmate sexual harassment claims that allege brief inappropriate touching by a 

correctional officer are not cognizable, particularly where the alleged touching occurred 

pursuant to an authorized search. See e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 

(9th Cir. 2012) (inmate’s allegations an officer entered his cell and approached him while 

he was on the toilet, then rubbed his thigh against the inmate’s thigh, “began smiling in a 

sexual [manner], and left the cell laughing,” did not support a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment); Berryhill v. Schiro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding two brief 

(“mere seconds”) touches to the inmate’s buttocks during horseplay did not violate the 

Eighth Amendment); Jackson v. Madery, 158 Fed.Appx. 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005), 

abrogated in part on other grounds by Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2018) 

(officer’s conduct in allegedly rubbing and grabbing prisoner’s buttocks in a degrading 

manner was “isolated, brief, and not severe” and therefore, failed to meet Eighth 

Amendment standards); Osterloth v. Hopwood, No. CV 06 152 M JCL, 2006 WL 

3337505, *6, *7 (D. Mont. 2006) (dismissing Eighth Amendment claim challenging as 

sexually abusive an officer’s search of plaintiff that allegedly included the officer 

reaching between plaintiff’s legs, grabbing his scrotum and penis, and sliding his hand 

between plaintiff’s buttocks, wherein plaintiff stated to the officer, “that was pretty much 

sexual assault,” and officer responded, “yah pretty much.”).

In his objections, Plaintiff cites to Mathie v. Fries, 935 F.Supp. 1284, 1301 

(E.D.N.Y. 1996) for the proposition that “unwanted and prohibited sexual abuses on the 

powerless plaintiff is objectively unreasonable.” [Doc. No. 39 at 4.] However, Mathie

involved allegations that the officer “intentionally, deliberately and sadistically sexually 

abused an inmate and committed sodomy on him while he was handcuffed.” 935 F.Supp. 

at 1301. Nothing close to such conduct occurred here, as Plaintiff testified Renteria 

Case 3:17-cv-02104-CAB-WVG Document 40 Filed 09/10/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
4

17cv2104-CAB-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

briefly touched plaintiff’s buttock incident to a search and without sexual comment. 

Thus, Renteria’s conduct does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

In addition, Renteria’s conduct fails to satisfy the subjective requirement that he 

had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,”1as Plaintiff testified that Renteria was 

“clowning around like that,” and made no sexual comments. See Berryhill, 137 F.3d at 

1076. In his objections, Plaintiff argues that Renteria possessed the requisite state of 

mind because “his actions were with the only intent to abuse, arouse or gratify sexual 

desire.” [Doc. No. 39 at 5.] However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of such state of 

mind,2and Plaintiff’s own testimony is that Renteria was “clowning around.” Therefore, 

no Eighth Amendment violation is shown.

2. June 25, 2016.

More than four months later, Renteria again conducted a fully-clothed pat-down of

Plaintiff in the prison yard on June 25, 2016. This time, Renteria touched Plaintiff’s 

nipples during the course of the pat-down. While standing behind Plaintiff, Renteria 

searched the sides of Plaintiff’s torso, then Plaintiff’s stomach, and then his hands went 

up to Plaintiff’s chest. Renteria’s hands were open, and his fingers were apart as he 

rubbed and “caressed” the front of Plaintiff’s torso. When Renteria reached Plaintiff’s 

nipples, Plaintiff alleges Renteria started “rubbing” Plaintiff’s nipples with an open hand 

with his hand flat on Plaintiff’s chest as he swept Plaintiff’s torso. The touching of 

Plaintiff’s nipples lasted no more than fifteen to twenty seconds. Thereafter, Renteria 

completed the search by patting the bottom part of Plaintiff’s legs.

 

1 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

2 Plaintiff “cannot defeat summary judgment with allegations in the complaint . . . .” Hernandez v. 

Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, in order to demonstrate that a 

genuine dispute of facts exist, plaintiff must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, 

or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Case 3:17-cv-02104-CAB-WVG Document 40 Filed 09/10/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
5

17cv2104-CAB-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As noted by the Magistrate Judge, this conduct fails to satisfy the requirement that 

the touching be objectively serious because this was a one-time isolated touching of nongenitalia and no sexual comments were made. [See Report at 7 and cases cited therein.] 

In addition, there is no evidence that Renteria’s subjective mental state was to sexually 

assault Plaintiff. Therefore, no Eighth Amendment violation is shown.

C. Eighth Amendment Claim Against Romero.

Plaintiff alleges that Romero violated his Eighth Amendment rights because he 

was present during the two Renteria searches at issue, observed the alleged assaults, but 

did not intervene. [Doc. No. 1 at 14-15.] Given that there are no Eighth Amendment 

violations by Renteria, Romero cannot be vicariously liable for his actions.

D. Qualified Immunity.

As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, Renteria and Romero are entitled to 

qualified immunity because there were no Eighth Amendment violations. Moreover, 

even if one were to assume an Eighth Amendment violation, Renteria (and therefore 

Romero) are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because no court has held that the 

minimal touching Plaintiff experienced here was sufficiently objectively serious to rise to 

the level of an Eighth Amendment claim. 

E. First Amendment claim against Segovia.

Plaintiff alleges that Segovia retaliated against him by threatening to choke and kill 

him because of the prison grievances he had filed against Renteria and Romero. In order 

to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context, Plaintiff must 

prove (1) “that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 

his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

As noted by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff’s complaint and testimony show that he 

cannot meet the fourth element, because Segovia immediately retreated from his physical 

threat once Plaintiff saw his nametag, and Plaintiff knew that no more intimidation would 

Case 3:17-cv-02104-CAB-WVG Document 40 Filed 09/10/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
6

17cv2104-CAB-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

follow. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the “chilling effect” element of his First 

Amendment claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED IN FULL;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;

3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for Defendants and CLOSE the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2019

Case 3:17-cv-02104-CAB-WVG Document 40 Filed 09/10/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6