Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00987/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00987-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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16cv987-BTM-BGS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Julio Julieta,

Petitioner,

v.

S. Frauenheim, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv987-BTM-BGS

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL

Petitioner filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel along with his original federal 

petition. (ECF No. 2.) In this motion, Petitioner asserts that he requires representation 

because he only speaks Spanish, and the inmate he used to help him write the motion to 

appoint counsel “does not know what to do behalf of the petitioner in this case.” (Id. at 

1.)

Every defendant has an absolute right to counsel on direct appeal from a 

conviction, but there is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in state or 

federal collateral proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-57 (1991). 

Nevertheless, when a federal court “determines that the interests of justice so require, 

representation may be provided for any financially eligible person who” is seeking relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); see Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 

1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) (the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent petitioner 

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collaterally attacking a conviction is discretionary with the court, unless an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary, in which case appointment of counsel is mandatory); see also Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 8(c). 

Courts consider various factors in exercising their discretion to decide whether 

counsel should be appointed. Those factors include the factual or legal complexity of the 

petition, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the petitioner’s understanding of 

issues and capability to investigate and to present the claims himself. See LaMere v. 

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (no abuse of discretion to deny appointment of 

counsel when district court pleadings demonstrated petitioner’s “good understanding of 

the issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his contentions”). The

appointment of counsel is discretionary when no evidentiary hearing is necessary. 

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1990); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 

791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, Petitioner has sufficiently represented himself to date, including the filing of 

his Habeas Petition and an opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 1, 

11.) Petitioner has extensively articulated his arguments and authority, despite his claims 

that he struggles with the English language.

1 Moreover, Petitioner’s claims present no 

unusual factual or legal complexity. The Court finds that the interests of justice do not 

require the appointment of counsel in this case. Petitioner’s motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 23, 2017

 

1 The Court has found no legal authority supporting the notion that lack of proficiency in the English 

language is sufficient to warrant appointment of counsel in a habeas proceeding. See e.g., Ortiz v. 

Skolnik, 2011 WL 2268508, at *2 (D. Nev. June 7, 2011)(denying motion to appoint counsel based on 

Petitioner’s assertion that he “speaks primarily Spanish and needs an interpreter for legal proceedings.”)

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