Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01825/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01825-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DeJESUS RODRIQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAT MEREZ, SUPERVISOR, SAN JOAQUIN

COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, and

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES

AGENCY, and DOES 3 through...,

Defendants.

CIV S-05-1825 DFL PAN (GGH) PS

ORDER and

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On September 30, 2005, this court granted plaintiff’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis and directed the filing and service of process of plaintiff’s complaint. The

complaint asserts civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, due to defendants’ alleged failure to provide plaintiff “access to

medical attention and facilities” to treat his back problems. Plaintiff, who is 34 years old, states

he is indigent, unemployed and homeless, and has no other means to obtain medical care. 

On October 17, 2005, defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment. 

The court requested supplemental briefing and set the matter for hearing on January 25, 2006. 

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Also pending were plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel filed October 25, 2005, and

motion for preliminary injunction filed December 9, 2005.

All matters were submitted and stayed following the hearing January 25, 2006,

pursuant to order filed February 10, 2006, to permit time for the completion of plaintiff’s medical

examination and issuance of a final administrative decision.

On April 19, 2006, defendants notified the court that the San Joaquin County

Human Services Agency (HSA) had reached a final administrative decision denying plaintiff’s

Medi-Cal disability application.

Plaintiff again moved for appointment of counsel, filed April 25, 2006, and 

and moved to compel discovery, filed May 31, 2006.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Medi-Cal Benefits Application on December 6, 2004. On

December 15, 2004, plaintiff’s application was denied on the ground “you have no linkage to the

Medi-Cal Program,” which defendants have since explained meant that plaintiff did not meet the

criteria for obtaining indigent-based Medi-Cal benefits. Plaintiff completed a “Hearing Request”

form, alleging “[t]he denial of access to a healthplan . . . effectively denies healthcare in an

arbitrary and capricious manner. . .” Plaintiff asserted in his complaint, “It has been nearly one

year and not even a single granting or referral to a doctor.” 

Pamala Gonzales, an Eligibility Worker III in HSA’s Fair Hearings Unit, filed

a declaration after reviewing plaintiff’s case and hearing files. Ms. Gonzalez states that plaintiff 

entered into an “oral agreement” with Luther Harrell, Fair Hearings Unit State Hearings

Representative, to withdraw his State Hearing/Appeal on the denial of his Medi-Cal application

in exchange for the Fair Hearings Unit filing a Determination of Evaluation of Disability

(“DED”) with the Disability Evaluation Bureau in Oakland for a Medi-Cal disability

determination. The “DED packet” was mailed to the Oakland Programs Branch on January 10,

2005, thus commencing the evaluation of plaintiff’s disability claim. An “Amended DED

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packet” was submitted September 13, 2005, providing additional information. 

At the time of this court’s January 25, 2006 hearing, plaintiff’s DED

application was still pending. However, defendants represented they would expedite the

decision-making process and plaintiff agreed to undergo a consultative medical examination and

await a final administrative decision. Plaintiff thereafter informed the court he had attended his

January 31, 2006 medical examination, and defendants informed the court a decision could be

expected in April 2006. Accordingly, this action was stayed pending the decision of the

administrative law judge.

On April 10, 2006, Administrative Law Judge Edwin A. Henrdix denied

plaintiff’s Medi-Cal disability application on the ground that plaintiff’s back problems do not

meet the criteria for disability and that plaintiff has demonstrated no other basis to qualify for

Medi-Cal benefits. See Decision, attachment to defendants’ “Notice of Final Decision.” The

decision informed plaintiff of his right to seek a rehearing within thirty days, or to seek judicial

review in the Superior Court within one year pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5. 

Defendants now renew their motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or for summary judgment. 

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS. 

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle

him to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 (1994); Cervantes

v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal may be based either on

the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable

legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of

Scientology of California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1984). The court construes the

pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks

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School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). General allegations

are presumed to include specific facts necessary to support the claim. NOW, 510 U.S. at 256,

114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130,

2137 (1992). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached

exhibits. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to

accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States

Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may, however, consider matters

of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v.

South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by

Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). 

“The court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or

unwarranted deductions of fact. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972). Unless it is

clear that no amendment can cure its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an

opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-

28 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed. The Eighth

Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual punishments,” as applied to medical care,

precludes only the government’s deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of

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prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976); West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 54, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (1988). Plaintiff does not assert he is now or has ever been

incarcerated and nothing in the record supports such a finding.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

must also be dismissed. “To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts which show

a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law by a

person acting under color of state law.” Lopez v. Department of Health Services, 939 F.2d 881,

883 (9th Cir. 1991). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” This due process guarantee promotes fairness in government

decision-making and protects against arbitrary government action. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986).

Significantly, “[t]he procedural component of the Due Process Clause does

not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit:’ To have a property interest in a

benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire and ‘more than a

unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Such

entitlements are . . . not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law. . . . [A] benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant

or deny it in their discretion.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803

(2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 576, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of

property is a safeguard of the security interests that a person has already acquired in specific

benefits”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970) (constitutionally protected

property interest in welfare benefits for eligible individuals receiving such benefits). Thus, “[t]he

Constitution imposes no obligation on the states to pay any of the medical expenses of indigent

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 The April 10, 2006 administrative decision (at pp. 1-2) provides: “The claimant 1

testified that he was employed at the time of his 12/06/04 Medi-Cal application as a Carpenter’s

Assistant. Since 7/02, he had worked 40 hours a week and had been paid $12.00 per hour. He

stopped working full time as a Carpenter’s Assistant in August 2005. Since that time he has

worked intermittently as a laborer part time. The claimant was also employed assembling and

processing cardboard boxes and cardboard materials in 2004. He worked 20 hours a week and

was paid $7.00 an hour. . . .The claimant testified that he has not been able to work full time

since 08/05 because of lower back pain that runs down both legs. . . . The claimant explained that

he had back problems for some years but he could work full time until he injured his back again

on the job in 08/05.”

 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.603, 611, 80 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (1960) 2

(“‘Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social

welfare program such as (Social Security), we must recognize that the [Fifth Amendment] Due

Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary

classification, utterly lacking in rational justification”); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,

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persons . . . [but only] ‘when a State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by

providing medical care, the manner in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional

limitations,’” Lopez v. Department of Health Services, 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991),

quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2380 (1977) (other citations

omitted). 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a constitutionally protected property interest

in the medical benefits he seeks because he does not assert he meets the statutory criteria for

eligibility. Nor does plaintiff continue to claim lack of adherence to established administrative

procedures. Were he to pursue either contention, plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is a petition to the

superior court.

Plaintiff’s broader claim is lack of access to medical care and facilities due to

indigence and unemployment. However, plaintiff does not meet the Medi-Cal criteria for

indigence, nor does he offer another standard, and his assertions of unemployment at the time he

filed his initial application (December 2004) is contrary to the finding of the administrative law

judge that plaintiff worked full-time as recently as August 2005. To the extent plaintiff 1

challenges the eligibility criteria for indigence and disability, the Supreme Court has upheld

rational classifications necessary to the maintenance of a social welfare system, and plaintiff’s

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485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1161 (1970) (“‘In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not

violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are

imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution

simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it

results in some inequality”). 

 This motion was effectively denied by plaintiff’s agreement fully to participate in the 3

administrative proceedings and the court’s stay of this action pending a final administrative

decision. Moreover, plaintiff at no time demonstrated entitlement to injunctive relief based on

the factors set forth in Harris v. Board of Supervisors, Los Angeles County, 366 F.3d 754, 759-

760 (9th Cir. 2004) ((1) strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) possibility of irreparable

injury to plaintiff, (3) balance of hardships weighing in plaintiff’s favor, and (4) advancement of

the public interest). 

 Plaintiff is not entitled to counsel under either statute he cites. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) 4

applies only to criminal defendants or others facing loss of liberty and is therefore inapposite. 

See, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2159

(1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) does not authorize compulsory appointments but permits a court

to ask an attorney to provide pro bono representation to an indigent civil litigant in “exceptional

circumstances.” See Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,

490 U.S. 296, 301-307 (1989); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). “A

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both ‘the likelihood of success on

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challenges are too general to countenance further analysis.

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a substantive due process right to

medical care, no constitutional provision exists which compels the government to supply plaintiff

with the necessities of life.

Since plaintiff has presented no cognizable legal theory in support of his

Fourteenth Amendment claim, dismissal of the complaint is warranted for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing rationale, the court hereby ORDERS the following:

1. The stay imposed in this action February 10, 2006, is RESCINDED; 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction filed December 9, 2005 is

DENIED;3

3. Plaintiff’s requests for appointment of counsel, filed October 25, 2005 and

April 25, 2006, are DENIED;4

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the merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.’” Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (citations and internal quotations

omitted); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). While plaintiff’s facility with

court procedures, legal knowledge and writing ability are sufficient to present and articulate his

claims, he at no time demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, thus meeting neither

criteria for a finding of “exceptional circumstances” warranting appointment of counsel.

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4. Plaintiff’s motion for discovery filed May 31, 2006 is DENIED.

Additionally, the court hereby RECOMMENDS that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be granted and plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the Honorable David F.

Levi, the United States District Judge assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Written

objections may be filed within ten days after being served with these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: 6/21/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOW6:RODRIQUEZ.F&R Dism

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