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Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH Uoittd Stl\tt8 t@Uff of Appeals 'f cnth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS St p 2 l 1QQ9 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

LITVAK PACKING COMPANY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 87-2150 

) 

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, ) 

LOCAL UNION NO. 7, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. Civil No. 87-K-521) 

Walter V. Siebert of Sherman & Howard (Susan K. Grebeldinger with 

him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

James C. Fattor of Hornbein, MacDonald and Fattor (Susan J. 

Tyburski and Donald P. MacDonald on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2150 Document: 01019910525 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 1 
The United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7 

(U.F.C.W.) filed a grievance protesting Litvak Packing Company's 

(Litvak) discharge of Loyal P. Barstow. The matter was referred 

to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 

which resulted in an award rescinding the discharge. Litvak sued 

in federal district court to vacate the award. On cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the district court granted U.F.C.W.'s motion 

and enforced the award. This appeal followed. 

Barstow was a production employee at Litvak's slaughterhouse, 

meat packing, and processing plant in Denver, Colorado. He was 

discharged on November 14, 1986, for failing on the previous day 

to draw and store blood from cattle fetuses, a part of his job in 

the condemn room of the plant. 

The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of 

the discharge provides in relevant part: 

"6.01 No employee covered by this Agreement shall 

be suspended, demoted, or dismissed without just and 

sufficient cause. Sufficient cause for discharge shall 

include, among other reasons, persistent tardiness or 

absence, dishonesty, negligence, incompetence, 

insubordination, intoxication while on duty, refusal to 

perform any reasonable work, service or labor when 

required to do so by the Employer •••• " 

The parties stipulated the following issue to be decided by 

the arbitrator: "Did the Company have just and sufficient cause 

to discharge the Grievant, Loyal P. Barstow, on November 14, 

1986?" I R. Tab 1 at 3 (Arbitrator's Award). Litvak argues, 

however, that the arbitrator "essentially required Litvak to prove 

that Barstow was insubordinate or refused to perform a reasonable 

work order." Brief of Appellant at 13. The arbitrator did focus 

on these factors, finding that Barstow was fired "for 

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insubordination and refusal to save the blood of the [cattle 

fetuses] as he had been told to do by his supervisors," IR. Tab 1 

at 7, and deeming "[t]he real question in this case [to be] 

whether the Grievant's failure in job performance can be properly 

labeled as 'insubordination' and/or 'the refusal to perform any 

reasonable work required by the Employer' so as to constitute just 

and sufficient cause for discharge under the terms of § 6.01 of 

the contract," id. at 11. 

The arbitrator concluded that even though there was no reason 

for Barstow's "failure to save blood on November 13th other than 

carelessness, laziness, and/or neglect," and that Barstow "was 

derelict in carrying out his duties, ••• he was not 

insubordinate and he did not refuse to perform work when required 

to do so by his Employer." Id. at 12. The arbitrator then stated 

that "[d]ereliction of duty involving extreme carelessness and 

neglect and which results in serious economic damage to the 

employer may itself be grounds for discharge. But that was not 

the grounds stated by the Company in this case and, furthermore, 

all of the circumstances of this case do not add up to just and 

sufficient cause for discharging the Grievant." Id. 

Our review of arbitral awards is among the narrowest known to 

the law. We must enforce an award which "draws its essence from 

the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. 

Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). This 

standard is not an invitation to a court to substitute its 

judgment for that of an arbitrator. The parties have contracted 

for an arbitrator to resolve their disputes, not a court. United 

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Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 369, 370 

(1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764 

(1983). They have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's 

factfinding and contract interpretation whether his findings and 

conclusions are correct or not. Misco, 108 s. ct. at 370-71; W.R. 

Grace, 461 U.S. at 765. Thus, "as long as the arbitrator is even 

arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the 

scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed 

serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Misco, 

108 S. Ct. at 371 (emphasis added). If the parties disagree with 

the arbitrator's interpretation, their remedy is to modify their 

contract or select a new arbitrator. 

Litvak argues that because the arbitrator "specifically found 

that Barstow was negligent," he had no alternative to upholding 

the discharge. Brief of Appellant at 15. We agree that the 

arbitrator cannot ignore the express terms of S 6.01. The 

arbitrator, however, neither f6und this to be a negligence case 

nor that Barstow was negligent within the meaning of S 6.01. On 

the contrary, the arbitrator interpreted the contract and 

concluded that Barstow's carelessness, laziness, and neglect, none 

of which are mentioned specifically in§ 6.01, did not constitute 

just and sufficient cause to fire this 23-year employee. Although 

we might well have reached a contrary conclusion on the merits, 

the arbitrator's· award was certainly "rooted in the agreement," 

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Professional 

Hole Drilling, Inc., 574 F.2d 497, 503 (10th Cir. 1978), and we 

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cannot substitute our interpretation of the contract for his. 

Misco, 108 s. Ct. at 371. 

Accordingly, the order of the district court enforcing the 

arbitration award is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2150 Document: 01019910525 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 5 
87-2150 - LITVAK PACKING COMPANY v. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL 

UNION NO. 7 

SETH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I must respectfully dissent because, in my view, the 

consideration of the unusual details of the case require a much 

different analysis. 

This appeal could be very easily decided on an abundance of 

authority if the award of the arbitrator or the appeal in any way 

involved an interpretation of terms of a labor agreement, or if 

the appeal was on the merits of an arbitrator's award, or if the 

contract had not excepted from arbitration certain issues. But 

unfortunately this is not such a case, and is more complex than 

the majority would insist. 

Instead, this is one of those very rare cases wherein the 

court must examine the reason forcefully expressed by the 

arbitrator for reaching his decision which demonstrated the sole 

basis for the award whic~ ~as the severity of the remedy as 

applied to this employee. However, this was a subject reserved to 

the employer, and in fact this was acknowledged by the arbitrator. 

In my view, the reason for the result reached is a frank and 

honest expression by the arbitrator that the remedy applied for 

the employee's violation of the contract was too severe in his 

view. This was a sincere expression of his feelings, but 

unfortunately it should not have dominated the result as it did. 

The severity of the remedy, which was discharge, was in the 

Appellate Case: 87-2150 Document: 01019910525 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 6 
arbitrator's view not a good solution when applied to an 

experienced employee. This view caused the award to be an 

expression of the arbitrator's "own brand of industrial justice." 

United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 

363 U.S. 593, 597. The issue in the case was not 

"insubordination." Instead there were several issues related to 

the several other causes in the agreement or contract listed in 

Section 6.01 wherein it is stated that "[s]ufficient cause for 

discharge shall include" any of the there listed eight reasons. 

The arbitrator made the following findings of fact, which are 

not disputed on appeal: Mr. Barstow had worked for many years in 

the plant's condemn room, where one of his duties was to bleed the 

slunks. Mr. Barstow had received a warning letter in June 1974 

for his failure to bleed the slunks. He transferred out of the 

condemn room in 1984, but chose to return there on November 10, 

1986. At that time, he was told he must perform all the duties 

associated with the job, including the bleeding of slunks. This 

was reiterated to Mr. Barstow on November 13, 1986. That same 

day, Mr. Barstow failed to bleed any of the slunks on his shift. 

As to the violation of the contract by the employee, the 

arbitrator found as to Mr. Barstow's failure to save blood that he 

(the arbitrator) could find no reason for Mr. Barstow's failure to 

save any blood that day "other than carelessness, laziness, and/or 

neglect." Award of the Arbitrator, at 12. He specifically found 

that Mr. Barstow was "derelict in carrying out his duties," that 

Mr. Barstow's performance that day was "unacceptable," and that 

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Mr. Barstow's failure in his job performance was "very serious." 

Award of the Arbitrator, at 11-13. The arbitrator found that 

Mr. Barstow's proffered excuse for his failure to bleed any slunks 

on November 13, that none of the them were big enough to warrant 

bleeding, was "unsupported by the evidence and just too incredible 

to believe." Award of the Arbitrator, at 11 •. 

Next, the arbitrator in his report stated that "[s]ome 

discipline was clearly justified but [Mr. Barstow's] failure in 

job performance was not enough, by itself, to justify the 

discharge of a 23 year employee." Award of the Arbitrator, at 12. 

The arbitrator went on to offer three reasons why the 

appellant's discharge of Mr. Barstow would not be upheld despite 

the arbitrator's finding that Mr. Barstow's performance on the job 

had been completely unacceptable: 

"(l} [appellant's] failure, over the course of 

many years, to make sure that the bleeding of 

slunks was being done in the manner that it 

wanted it to be done; 

"(2) [appellant's] failure, even after the 

problem was discovered, to take corrective 

action in the form of specific instructions, 

warnings, and, where appropriate, progressive 

discipline; and 

"(3) [appellant's] failure to check the 

Grievant's personnel file and to give proper 

consideration to his 23 years of service with 

nothing more than a letter of warning on his 

record that was more than 12 years old." 

Award of the Arbitrator, at 13-14. This statement of reasons is 

perhaps the most revealing part of the award and brings the award 

into perspective. It demonstrates the basis of the arbitrator's 

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decision was the remedy alone, and demonstrates that the 

arbitrator was thus well outside the scope of his authority. 

The decision to discharge or apply another penalty is 

committed to the discretion of appellant-employer under the 

agreement. The arbitrator's opinion makes clear that he was 

troubled with his obvious lack of authority as to a remedy. 

"Had [appellant] suspended the Grievant for a 

few days, rather than discharged him, and 

warned him that continued dereliction of duty 

would result in further discipline up to and 

including possible discharge, the Arbitrator 

would have upheld that action •.•• But 

••• the Arbitrator is not free to substitute 

such a suspension in place of the discharge in 

this case. The parties have given the 

Arbitrator no jurisdiction at all to decide 

upon an appropriate remedy.-"- -- -

Award of the Arbitrator, at 14 (emphasis added). Because the 

arbitrator disagreed with the penalty that appellant imposed upon 

Mr. Barstow for his failure of performance on the job, he simply 

refused to allow the appellant to impose that penalty, despite the 

fact that the decision whether to impose that penalty is vested in • ,. # 

the appellant. Once the arbitrator had determined that a failure 

of performance on the job had occurred, his authority over this 

matter ended. There was really no separate issue of 

insubordination as all issues were treated by the arbitrator. 

The Court in United Paperworkers International Union v. 

Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, refers to the broad authority of the 

arbitrator in the "formulation of remedies" and emphasizes it, but 

then adds, "The parties, of course, may limit the discretion of 

the arbitrator in this respect." 484 U.S. at The "of 

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course" is significanto In Misco the Court noted that the Company 

argued that it had unreviewable discretion to discharge an 

employee once a violation of Rule IIol was found, and said: 

"But the parties stipulated that the issue 

before the arbitrator was whether there was 

'just 1 cause for the discharge, and the 

arbitrator, in the course of his opinion, 

cryptically observed that Rule II.l merely 

listed causes for discharge and did not 

expressly provide for immediate discharge. Before disposing of the case on the ground 

that Rule II.l had been violated and discharge 

was therefore proper, the proper course would 

have been remand to the arbitrator for a 

definitive construction of the contract in 

this respect." 

484 U.S. at The case before us is very different for at 

least three significant reasons. 

First, in the case before us, in contrast to Misco, the 

causes for discharge were not "merely listed," but instead the 

contract expressly provides for discharge: "Sufficient cause for 

discharge shall include ••• negligence, incompetence. 

refusal to perform any reasonable work," etc. (Emphasis added.) 

Thus the reasons listed are expres~ly stated as reasons for 

discharge. 

Second, the arbitrator acknowledged he had no authority as to 

remedies. 

Third, the Court in Misco notes that broad authority in the 

arbitrator exists as to remedies "where it is contemplated that 

the arbitrator will determine the remedies for contract violations 

that he finds •••• 11 484 U.S. at 

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The pertinent section of the contract-agreement, S 6.01, is 

as follows: 

"No employee covered by this Agreement shall 

be suspended, demoted, or dismissed without 

just and sufficient cause. Sufficient cause 

for discharge shall include, among other 

reasons, persistent tardiness or absence, 

dishonesty, negligence, incompetence, 

insubordination, intoxication while on duty, 

refusal to perform any reasonable work, 

service or labor when required to do so by the 

Employer •••• " (Emphasis added.) 

The contract thus provided that "sufficient cause for discharge 

shall include" the seven specific reasons including "negligence." 

(Emphasis added.) The arbitrator, of course, found the reasons 

for Mr. Barstow's failure to save blood as "carelessness, 

laziness, and/or neglect." Also he was "derelict in carrying out 

his duties," and that his performance was "unacceptable" and "very 

serious". In contrast the Supreme Court in Misco only had a list 

of causes with no mandatory language. Thus no remand is here 

suggested. 

The majority's position apparently is that the words 

"carelessness" and "neglect" were not the equivalent of the 

particular word in S 6.01--"negligence." However, the arbitrator 

made no such distinction. He used all the above quoted strong 

words and concluded, at 12: 

"Some discipline was clearly justified but 

[Mr. Barstow's] failure in job performance was 

not enough, by itself, to justify the 

discharge of a 23 year employee." 

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This combination of descriptive terms and the conclusion that 

"some discipline was clearly justified" is ~ery revealing. It is 

obvious that the case was decided on the remedy. 

The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that a contract 

may vest unreviewable discretion in management to discharge an 

employee once a violation of the contract by the employee has 

occurred. "The parties ••• may limit the discretion of the 

arbitrator" with respect to the formulation of remedies. Misco, 

484 U.S. at • 

In this case, the arbitrator considered all of the grounds 

for discharge enumerated in the contract and determined that some 

of those grounds were present in this case. Nevertheless he 

refused to uphold appellant's discharge of Mr. Barstow. In so 

doing he varied the terms of the agreement by vesting in himself 

the discretion to decide when the employer may exercise its right 

to discharge an employee although at the same time he had no 

authority as to a remedy. 

It is perfectly obvious that the scope of judicial review of 

arbitration awards is narrow, narrow, narrow, but the Supreme 

Court has delineated the scope of that review as follows: 

"[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation 

and application of the collective bargaining 

agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own 

brand of industrial justice. He may of course 

look for guidance from many sources, yet his 

award is legitimate only so long as it draws 

its essence from the collective bargaining 

agreement. When the arbitrator's words 

manifest an infidelity to this obligation, 

courts have no choice but to refuse 

enforcement of the award." 

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United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597. This is a "no choice" case. 

An arbitrator's award must be upheld unless it is contrary to the 

express language of the employment contract, or unless it is so 

unfounded in reason and fact, so unconnected with the wording and 

purpose of the contract as to manifest an infidelity to the 

obligation of the arbitrator. Mistletoe Express Service v. Motor 

Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692, 694 (10th Cir.). An award will 

not be upheld when the arbitrator has rewritten the contract or 

departed from its provisions. Mistletoe, 566 F.2d at 695; 

International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, Local No. 670 

v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 618 F.2d 657, 659 (10th Cir.). 

The arbitrator's award at issue completely fails to withstand 

review under these standards. Appellant does not challenge any of 

the factual findings made by the arbitrator in his opinion. This 

case does not involve the interpretation of an ambiguous 

employment contract. Cf. Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. U.F.c.w., 

Local No. 7, 767 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.). Nor does it involve an 

employment agreement that vests any amount of discretion in the 

arbitrator over the formulation of remedies, a fact expressly 

acknowledged by the arbitrator himself in the text of his opinion. 

Award of the Arbitrator, at 14. Cf. United Paperworkers 

International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (opinion of 

arbitrator unclear as to whether the arbitrator construed the 

contract as vesting in him some discretion in formulating 

remedies): Communication Workers of America v. Southeastern 

Electric Cooperative of Durant, Oklahoma, F.2d (10th 

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Cir.), No. 88-2902, slip op. at 2 (August 11, 1989) (issue to be 

resolved at arbitration was whether grievant was discharged for 

just cause, and, if not, what the remedy should be). 

It cannot be said in this case that "the arbitrator is even 

arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the 

scope of his authority," Misco, 484 U.S. at , nor can it be 

said that the arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the 

collective bargaining agreement. 

This case is directly controlled by our opinion in Mistletoe 

which has in no way been impacted by subsequent Supreme Court 

opinions. The arbitrator went beyond the unambiguous wording of 

the agreement in holding in substance that the remedy of discharge 

was too severe for a 23 year employee. In doing so, he improperly 

"substituted his views of proper industrial relationships for the 

provisions of the contract." Mistletoe, 566 F.2d at 695. 

The employment contract in Mistletoe read as follows: 

"Employees may be discharged for just cause, 

among which just causes are the following: 

. . . . 

"(G) Failure to settle bills and funds 

collected for the company within twenty-four 

(24) hours." 

566 F.2d at 694. The arbitrator found that the grievant had 

violated Section G and that the Employer "did show 'just cause' to 

impose some discipline," Id. (quoting opinion of arbitrator), as 

in the case before us. Nevertheless, it was "the opinion of the 

arbitrator that just cause was not shown by the [employer] for 

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discharge and that the supreme penalty of termination should be 

reduced to a suspension." Id~ (quoting opinion of arbitrator). 

The district court in Mistletoe held that "the arbitrator 

exceeded his authority by reading the theory of progressive 

discipline into the ••• contract and by changing the penalty 

from discharge to suspension." Id. This court affirmed, noting, 

at 695, that: 

"In reducing the penalty from discharge to 

suspension, the arbitrator substituted his 

views of proper industrial relationships for 

the provisions of the contract. He expressly 

found that there was just cause for 

discipline. The contract says that the acts, 

which the arbitrator found are just cause for 

discipline, are just cause f6r discharge. The 

arbitrator may not rewrite the labor 

contract." 

I am not prepared to overrule Mistletoe. It is difficult to 

see how the majority's opinion in this case can be consistent with 

our opinion in Mistletoe, as it involves an identical attempt on 

the part of an arbitrator to graft principles of "progressive 

discipline" onto a perfectly unambiguous agreement ve~~ing total 

discretion over remedies in the employer. The majority overrules 

Mistletoe. The arbitrator simply did not have the authority he 

attempts to exercise in this case and even acknowledges he has no 

such authority. 

The majority's ruling disregards almost thirty years of 

Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent on judicial review of 

arbitral awards. The Arbitrator's Award violates the essence of 

the collective bargaining agreement. 

The award should be set aside. 

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