Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05069/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05069-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOE McGRATH, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________

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No. C 04-5069 MMC (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket No. 26)

On November 30, 2004, plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se and

currently incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), filed the above-titled civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 11, 2005, after reviewing the complaint, the Court

found plaintiff had stated cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against several PBSP

officials. In the same order, the Court directed defendants to file a dispositive motion or, in

the alternative, a notice indicating defendants are of the opinion such a motion is not

warranted. 

On October 11, 2005, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground plaintiff had failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003) (providing nonexhaustion claim should be raised in

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than in motion for summary judgment). Plaintiff

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All dates in this order are in 2004, unless otherwise specified.

2

 Plaintiff identifies this defendant as “Goodwin” in the body of the complaint and as

“Goodman” in the caption.

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filed an opposition, and defendants filed a reply. Thereafter, on August 23, 2006, the Court

granted plaintiff leave to file a supplemental opposition to the motion to dismiss, in accord

with Wyatt. See id. at 1120 n.14 (holding court must assure pro se prisoner plaintiff has “fair

notice of his opportunity to develop a record” in opposition to an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion). Plaintiff filed two supplemental briefs in support of his opposition to the motion to

dismiss, defendants filed a supplemental reply in response thereto, and plaintiff filed a reply

in response to defendants’ supplemental reply. Accordingly, the motion has been fully

briefed and is ready for decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In its order of service, the Court summarized the facts alleged by plaintiff as follows: 

On February 24, 2004,1

 prison guards extracted two inmates from a cell

near the cell in which plaintiff was housed. In the course of that extraction, the

officers discharged Oleorisin Capasicum (“OC”) spray. Because of the lack of

windows or cross-ventilation, plaintiff’s eyes and lungs began to burn, his nose

discharged mucus, and his skin developed red patches. Defendants Sergeant

Navarro (“Navarro”) and Medical Technical Assistant Munos (“Munos”)

walked by plaintiff’s cell, at which time plaintiff asked them to remove him

from the building because of his asthma and reaction to the OC spray. They

declined to do so. Thereafter, Navarro and defendant Lieutenant Swift

(“Swift”) directed the extraction of another inmate, “Baca,” from a nearby cell,

during which OC spray was used periodically over the course of 20 to 30

minutes. There was a sufficient amount of airborne spray that at least ten

guards wore gas masks, other guards put on gas masks when they entered the

building, and inmate Baca was rendered unconscious. Plaintiff saw defendant

Correctional Officer Harkins (“Harkins”) supply gas masks to PBSP personnel. 

For the next 45 minutes, the inmates in that section of the facility were choking

and coughing. At the time of the extractions, defendant Correctional Officer

Goodwin2

 was the control officer and responsible for the inmates. All of said

defendants were aware of plaintiff’s medical condition.

Plaintiff’s asthma inhaler had not been replaced. He was having

difficulty breathing and, along with other inmates, he began to yell for help. 

He also complained to at least 15 staff members who passed by his cell to

participate in Baca’s extraction. Plaintiff experienced nausea, vomiting,

lightheadedness, and ultimately fainted. Defendant Correctional Officer Pope

(“Pope”) saw plaintiff at his cell door gagging, and then saw him fall down. 

Plaintiff struck his head, and was taken to the medical clinic, where defendant

Nurse Aanerud (“Aanerud”) stated that she thought he was malingering. 

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If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an unenumerated motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court must give the prisoner fair notice of his opportunity

to develop a record. Id. at 1120 n.14. As noted above, plaintiff was given such notice by the

Court on August 23, 2006. 

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Defendant Nurse Practitioner Win-Risenhoove (“Win-Risenhoove”) examined

him, cleaned the wound on his head, and ordered Aanerud to dress the wound. 

Plaintiff had a bruise on his head, as well as a “golf-ball” size bump, and a cut,

which caused some bleeding. Aanerud did not consider the injury to be

serious, sent plaintiff back to his cell, and denied plaintiff’s request for pain

medication. Because plaintiff could not stand up properly, he was taken back

to his cell in a wheelchair. At approximately 6:00 p.m., plaintiff agreed to be

removed from his cell while the cell and surrounding area were

decontaminated. 

On February 26, plaintiff complained of headaches and chest pain to

Aanerud. In the ensuing weeks, plaintiff submitted forms requesting medical

care for these symptoms, as well as for nausea, dizziness, and asthma. 

On March 2, he submitted an inmate grievance regarding his exposure to

the OC spray and resulting medical problems. A hearing on the grievance was

held by Lieutenant Foss, who denied the grievance. Plaintiff’s subsequent

appeals at the higher levels likewise were denied.

On April 8, plaintiff was examined by Win-Risenhoove, who renewed

various medications plaintiff had been receiving. Over the next ten days,

plaintiff submitted more forms requesting medical care for ongoing asthma

problems. On April 22, Win-Risenhoove examined plaintiff again, renewed his

asthma medications, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for June 4. 

During the month of May, plaintiff continued to submit forms requesting

medical care for his asthma, and was told by defendant Registered Nurse

Garrett (“Garrett”) that he would be seen. On June 1, Win-Risenhoove saw

plaintiff again, and she again renewed his medication. On August 19, plaintiff

requested that his medications be renewed, and, at his visit with WinRisenhoove on August 24, his medications were renewed.

(See Order of Service, filed May 11, 2005, at 1:20-3:14.)

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Standard of Review

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense; defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion. Id. In deciding such a motion, the district court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.3

 If the court concludes the

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prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the

complaint without prejudice. Id. at 1120.

2. The Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996) (“PLRA”) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of

the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). Exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such actions involve

general conditions or particular episodes, whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance proceedings, such as money

damages. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The exhaustion requirement requires

“proper exhaustion” of all available administrative remedies. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

 The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review, (2) first formal written appeal

on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second formal level appeal to the institution head or

designee, and (4) third formal level appeal to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“Director”). See Barry v Ratelle, 985 F. Supp 1235, 1237

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the

Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at

1237-38. 

3. Analysis

In his complaint, plaintiff makes the following allegations regarding his exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s allegations are supported by documentation attached to

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his complaint.

On March 2, 2004, plaintiff submitted an appeal at the informal level of review,

complaining about his exposure to OC spray during the February 24, 2004 cell extraction,

and his resulting medical problems. The action requested by plaintiff in the appeal was for

prison officials to determine, before they used OC spray to accomplish a cell extraction,

whether the prisoner being extracted, or prisoners housed in the same cell unit as the prisoner

being extracted, suffered from asthma, and, if so, that those prisoners be offered the

opportunity to leave the area before the extraction took place. (Compl. ¶ 55 & Ex. E at 1.) 

Review of plaintiff’s appeal at the informal level was bypassed pursuant to prison

procedures, and the appeal was forwarded directly to the first formal level of review

(hereinafter referred to as plaintiff’s “first-level” appeal). (Compl. ¶ 57 & Ex. E at 4-5.) On

approximately April 20, 2004, plaintiff received the response to his first-level appeal,

(Compl. ¶ 64), which was a denial. (Compl. Ex. E at 6-7.) 

On April 22, 2004, plaintiff submitted a second-level appeal. (Compl. ¶ 64.) On

May 25, 2004, that appeal was denied. (Compl. ¶ 67 & Ex. E at 10.) 

On May 26, 2004, plaintiff submitted a third-level appeal to the Director’s Level of

Review. (Compl. ¶ 67.) On July 10, 2004, N. Grannis (“Grannis”), Chief of the Inmate

Appeals Branch, returned plaintiff’s appeal to him because it was missing the “CDC 7219,

Report of Injury,” and because plaintiff had not included copies of the incident reports

discussed in the response to plaintiff’s first-level appeal. (Compl. ¶ 69 & Ex. E at 12.) On

July 14, 2004, plaintiff submitted a request to “Dr. Risenhoove or R.N.” for a copy of the

“Report of Injury” so that he could complete the appeals process. (Compl. ¶ 69 & Ex. E at

13.) Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff resubmitted his third-level appeal, along with

the “Report of Injury.” (Compl. ¶ 69.)

On September 7, 2004, Grannis returned plaintiff’s appeal to him again, because it

was missing “the complete CDC 837, Incident Report (007-04-02-0152, 007-04-02-0153).” 

(Compl. ¶ 73 & Ex. E at 16.) Grannis informed plaintiff that plaintiff’s assigned counselor,

or the Appeals Coordinator, or plaintiff’s parole agent could answer any questions plaintiff

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might have about the appeals process. (Id.) 

On September 12, 2004, plaintiff submitted requests to both his assigned counselor, T.

Cook (“Cook”), and the Appeals Coordinator, M. Nimrod (“Nimrod”), asking for copies of

the relevant incident reports so he could complete the appeals process. (Compl. ¶ 73 & Ex. E

at 17-18.) On September 13, 2004, Nimrod told plaintiff that plaintiff needed to ask his

counselor to look in plaintiff’s file for the reports. (Compl. ¶ 73 n.10 & Ex. E at 18.) On

September 23, 2004, Cook responded to plaintiff’s request as follows:

These 837's are not in your c-file as they were for another incident. Appeals

will get access to these. You cannot get copies.

(Compl. Ex. E at 17.) 

Plaintiff did not resubmit his third-level appeal or initiate any other appeals regarding

the claims at issue in the instant action.

Defendants contend plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he

never received a third-level decision on his appeal. Plaintiff argues he did exhaust his 

administrative remedies, for the following reasons: a third-level decision should have been

issued but was not, in violation of regulatory time limits; plaintiff was precluded from

proceeding further in the appeals process due to his inability to obtain access to the incident

reports requested by the third-level reviewer; and, defendants had adequate notice of the

claims against them before plaintiff filed suit. The Court addresses the parties’ respective

arguments below.

a. Regulatory Time Limits

California’s regulations pertaining to the inmate appeals process contain time limits

for submitting or reviewing appeals. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6. With certain

exceptions, third-level appeals must be responded to and returned to the appellant within

sixty working days from the date the appeal is received. See id. § 3084.6(a), (b)(4)-(5). 

Here, plaintiff contends the sixty-day period for responding to his third-level appeal

was exceeded when, on September 7, 2004, Grannis returned plaintiff’s third-level appeal to

him for the second time, telling plaintiff he still needed to submit additional documentation. 

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Plaintiff does not provide the exact date he resubmitted his appeal, but states in his

complaint that it was approximately two weeks after July 14, 2004, the date he requested a

“Report of Injury.” (Compl. ¶ 69.)

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Plaintiff argues the sixty-day time limit was exceeded with respect to both his initial thirdlevel appeal and his resubmitted third-level appeal. 

There is some authority for the proposition that the exhaustion requirement may be

satisfied if a prisoner files an inmate appeal and receives no response within the time allotted

for a response under appeal procedures. See, e.g., Gregory v. PHS, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-467-

SLR, 2001 WL 1182779, *3 (D. Del. Sept. 21, 2001) (holding prisoner satisfied exhaustion

requirement where defendants conceded he had filed grievance and there had been no

response thereto). In the instant case, however, plaintiff’s third-level appeals were responded

to within the regulatory time limits. Plaintiff submitted his first third-level appeal on May

26, 2004. Within sixty days, on July 10, 2004, Grannis responded to the appeal by returning

it to plaintiff as incomplete. Plaintiff resubmitted his third-level appeal approximately two

weeks after July 14, 2004.4

 Within sixty days, on September 7, 2004, Grannis responded to

the appeal by again returning it to plaintiff as incomplete. 

Accordingly, the Court finds no support for plaintiff’s argument he exhausted his

administrative remedies due to defendants’ failure to respond to his third-level appeals within

regulatory time limits.

b. Proper Exhaustion

Plaintiff argues he exhausted his administrative remedies on the date he resubmitted

his third-level appeal because no further administrative remedies thereafter remained

available to him. Specifically, he maintains that after he was told by his counselor he could

not have access to the incident reports Grannis was requiring him to submit, there was

nothing further he could do to complete his appeal; accordingly, plaintiff maintains, Grannis

should have independently obtained the reports and reviewed the third-level appeal. 

Defendants argue plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies. In

particular, defendants argue, plaintiff did not comply with the procedural rule requiring him

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to submit the incident reports with his third-level appeal, because two avenues of compliance

remained available after plaintiff’s counselor and the Appeals Coordinator failed to provide

him with those reports. First, defendants argue, plaintiff could have resubmitted his appeal to

the third level after he learned he could not have access to the required incident reports, and

explained therein to Grannis that he had followed Grannis”s advice to ask his counselor and

the Appeals Coordinator for assistance, but that he still could not get copies of the incident

reports. Second, defendants argue, plaintiff could have initiated a new appeal requesting the

incident reports. 

In response to defendants’ first contention, plaintiff argues it would have been

fruitless for him to resubmit his appeal without the incident reports, because Grannis had

previously refused to consider the appeal if it did not include the incident reports. Plaintiff

also argues that if Grannis would have agreed to consider the resubmitted appeal without the

incident reports, such agreement would have shown the documents were not necessary for

determination of the appeal, and, if that were the case, plaintiff’s submission of the thirdlevel appeal without the incident reports should have satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 

In response to defendants’ second contention, plaintiff argues he could not have

initiated a new appeal requesting the incident reports, because such an appeal would have

been deemed a duplicative appeal on the same matter, the submission of which is prohibited

by appeal regulations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.3(c)(2). Plaintiff further argues his

requesting the incident reports from the Appeals Coordinator would have been pointless,

because the Appeals Coordinator had denied plaintiff’s earlier request for the incident

reports. 

The Supreme Court has held the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied

“by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or

appeal.” Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. Rather, the exhaustion requirement requires “proper

exhaustion” of available administrative remedies. Id. at 2387. “Proper exhaustion demands

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the

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course of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386 (footnote omitted). 

In the instant case, the third-level appeal plaintiff resubmitted was procedurally

defective because it did not include required documentation. The Court finds unpersuasive

plaintiff’s contentions that he could not cure the deficiency and submit a perfected third-level

appeal. Defendants’ suggested options for plaintiff’s satisfaction of the procedural

requirement are both logical and reasonable, and are not prohibited by appeals regulations.

Indeed, plaintiff’s assigned counsel expressly suggested to plaintiff that “Appeals could get

access to” the requisite reports if needed. (See Compl. E at 17.) By contrast, plaintiff’s

objections are based on speculation without evidentiary support. Accordingly, the Court

concludes plaintiff did not properly exhaust his available administrative remedies. 

c. Notice

Lastly, plaintiff argues his administrative remedies are exhausted because defendants

had adequate notice of the claims against them before plaintiff filed suit. The Supreme Court

has made clear, however, that the primary purposes of the exhaustion requirement extend

well beyond that of providing notice of possible legal action to potential defendants. See

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (2007) (discussing benefits of exhaustion requirement;

finding promotion of early notice to those who might later be sued is not “one of the leading

purposes of the exhaustion requirement”). As the Supreme Court observed in Jones:

We have identified the benefits of exhaustion to include allowing a prison to

address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to

suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and

improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful

record.

Id. (citing Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2378; Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524-25.) 

In the instant matter, plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies through

the third level of review deprived Grannis – the appeals reviewer with the highest level of

authority – of the opportunity to respond to plaintiff’s claims and remedy the situation, and

foreclosed the development of an administrative record clarifying the contours of the dispute. 

See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. Consequently, even if defendants were put on notice of

plaintiff’s claims against them, the exhaustion requirement was not satisfied as a result

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thereof. 

d. Summary

 As discussed above, the Court finds defendants did not fail to respond to plaintiff’s

third-level appeal within regulatory time limits, plaintiff did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies, and any notice defendants had of plaintiff’s claims against them did

not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, the Court will grant defendants’ motion

to dismiss the complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby

GRANTED, and the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to

plaintiff’s refiling his claims after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.

This order terminates Docket No. 26.

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 12, 2007

_____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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