Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00074/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO KM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Norberto Leyva-Cortez, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 12-074-PHX-GMS (MEA)

No. CR 11-1498-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Movant Norberto Leyva-Cortez, who is confined in the Corrections Corporation of

Arizona-Florence Correctional Center in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

The Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Re-Entry of Removed Alien, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) with a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1). On December 13, 2011, the Court sentenced Movant to an 18-month term of

imprisonment followed by 3 years on supervised release.

Movant seeks a reduction of his sentence because he believes he received “a lot of

time just for Re-entry” and because his prior conviction should not be used to enhance his

sentence.

. . .

Case 2:12-cv-00074-GMS--MEA Document 3 Filed 02/17/12 Page 1 of 4
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II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

Case 2:12-cv-00074-GMS--MEA Document 3 Filed 02/17/12 Page 2 of 4
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erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Providing the defendant’s sentence and disposition are

consistent with this agreement, the defendant waives: (1) any

and all motions, defenses, probable cause determinations, and

objections which the defendant could assert to the information

or indictment, or to the petition to revoke; and (2) any right to

file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion

that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution or

forfeiture, the Court’s entry of judgment against defendant, or

any aspect of the defendant’s sentence or disposition, including

the manner in which the sentence or disposition is determined,

including but not limited to any appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742

and motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255. The

defendant acknowledges that if the court has sentenced the

defendant and imposed disposition according to the terms of

the agreement, this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

appeal, collateral attack or other motion the defendant

might file challenging the conviction . . . .

(Doc. 22) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had discussed

the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into the plea

voluntarily. (Doc. 22).

Case 2:12-cv-00074-GMS--MEA Document 3 Filed 02/17/12 Page 3 of 4
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Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion all pertain to sentencing and do not pertain

to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition

of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his

plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing

issues raised in his § 2255 motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 (Doc. 24 in CR 11-1498-PHX-GMS) is denied and the civil action opened in

connection with this Motion (CV 12-074-PHX-GMS (MEA)) is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(2) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 16th day of February, 2012.

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