Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00371/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00371-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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Other issues raised in the Joint Letter were resolved, at least temporarily, at the hearing. 

The only issue currently before the undersigned is the deposition of Defendant’s CEO. 

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

JANICE KENNEDY,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant(s).

_____________________________________/

No. C 07-0371 CW (MEJ)

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY DISPUTE

(DKT. ## 199, 214, 215)

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the joint discovery dispute letter (“Joint Letter”) filed by the parties on

March 25, 2010. (Dkt. #199.) On April 8, 2010, the undersigned held a hearing on the matter,

following which the parties submitted further briefing. (Dkt. ## 214, 215.) After consideration of

the parties’ papers and oral arguments, relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court

ORDERS as follows. 

II. DISCUSSION

This dispute centers around Plaintiff having noticed the deposition of Defendant’s CEO,

Clark P. Manning, Jr.1

 (Joint Letter at 2.) Defendant seeks a protective order to prevent Plaintiff

from deposing Manning. Id. at 3-4. Defendant argues that Manning has no personal involvement in

or knowledge of certain of Defendant’s business practices at issue in this lawsuit. Id. Defendant

argues that this “apex deposition” should not be permitted to go forward because Plaintiff has not

articulated good cause to disrupt the busy schedule of Manning, a high-ranking executive, and has

not shown that Manning possesses unique information which cannot be obtained through a less

burdensome discovery method. Id. at 4. 

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STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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A. Legal Standard

Rule 26(c) provides that a court may, upon a showing of good cause by the party seeking

protection, issue an order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue

burden or expense. “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated

reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966

F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations removed). 

B. Application to the Case at Bar

In her portion of the Joint Letter and at the hearing, Plaintiff argued that Manning’s name

was mentioned “no less than twenty times” by Lisa Drake during her Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 30(b)(6) deposition regarding Actuarial Policies. Id. at 6. Plaintiff argues that

because Drake testified that Manning determines interest crediting rates, renewal rates, and product

pricing spreads, receives reports and participates in regular meetings concerning the design, sale and

performance of deferred annuity products, Manning’s deposition is proper as he has direct

involvement and personal knowledge of facts and issues relevant to the litigation. Id. At the

hearing, Plaintiff submitted to the Court and to Defendant a copy of Drake’s deposition with

relevant portions highlighted. 

Defendant argues that Drake’s testimony during her Rule 30(b)(6) deposition regarding

Defendant’s actuarial policies demonstrates nothing other than that Manning provided “the highlevel direction and oversight one would expect of a CEO.” (Def.’s Briefing at 1, Dkt. #214.) 

Defendant argues that Drake’s testimony “makes two unremarkable and irrelevant points[,]” that

Manning determines the overall pricing of Defendant’s products from a “global” perspective and

that he receives a regular report and meets with management to monitor the sales and performance

of Defendant’s products. Id. Defendant argues that this high-level strategic responsibility does not

amount to unique personal knowledge. Id. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff does not

challenge Defendant’s global pricing, nor does she allege insufficient monitoring of sales and

performance of Defendant’s products by upper management. Id. at 1-2. What Plaintiff does

challenge in this case, Defendant argues, is payment of commissions to sales agents, details

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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regarding possible bias in her annuity’s “excess interest adjustment[,]” and the allegedly illusory

nature of Defendant’s first-year bonus interest rate. Id. at 2. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate that Manning had any involvement in these practices even in a general sense. 

Id. Finally, Defendant argues that it is entitled to a protective order because Plaintiff has not

demonstrated that Manning can provide any information regarding these matters that has not already

been provided by the head of Defendant’s actuarial department, who has already been deposed. Id. 

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not met its burden of proving that a one-day

deposition of Manning would cause “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or

expense.” (Pl.’s Briefing at 1, Dkt. #215.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant attempts to mischaracterize the testimony of Drake so it appears that Manning has “global” rather than direct

knowledge of facts at issue. Id. Plaintiff argues, per Drake’s testimony, that Manning has unique

personal knowledge of renewal rates, product pricing and spreads, interest crediting rates within

individual annuity plans, and that he is the main decision-maker regarding these issues. (Id. at 1-2;

RT 81:19-25, 100:1-16; 103:4-10, 139:7-10, 140:21-24.) Plaintiff argues that Drake’s testimony

“imputing direct and sole responsibility of interest crediting rate practices to Mr. Manning”

mandates that this Court deny Defendant’s motion seeking a protective order. (Pl.’s Briefing at 1,

Dkt. #215.) 

“While a party seeking to prevent a deposition carries a heavy burden to show why discovery

should be denied, courts are sometimes willing to protect high-level corporate officers from

depositions when the officer has no first hand knowledge of the facts of the case or where the

officer's testimony would be repetitive.” Mehmet v. PayPal, Inc., C 08-1961 RMW, 2009 WL

921637, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations removed). However, just because another witness

has testified regarding the same facts does not mean such testimony would be repetitive. First Nat’l

Mortgage Co. v. Federal Realty Inv. Trust, C 03-02013 RMW, 2007 WL 4170548, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

November 19, 2007). Courts will usually not permit an apex deposition to go forward where lower

level employees with more intimate knowledge of the case have not yet been deposed. Id. (citing

Salter v. Upjohn, 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979)). But, where the testimony of lower level

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

employees indicates that the apex deponent may have some relevant personal knowledge, the party

seeking protection will not likely meet the high burden necessary to warrant a protective order. See

First Nat’l Mortgage Co., 2007 WL 4170548, at *2; Google v. American Blind & Wallpaper

Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF; 2006 WL 2578277, at *3 (N.D. Cal. September 6, 2006). 

However, the deposition may be limited in scope to the actual involvement of the high-level

executive in the policies or practices at issue, and may also be limited in length. Google, 2007 WL

2578277, at *3 (limiting the scope of the deposition of Google’s founder to his knowledge and

involvement of the policy change at issue, and limiting the length to three hours). 

Here, the Court finds that Defendant’s CEO may have relevant personal knowledge

regarding the facts of this case. Specifically, the Court notes that Lisa Drake mentioned him several

times in her Rule 30(b)(6) deposition as being the main decision-maker regarding interest crediting

rates, product pricing and spreads for purposes of recovering undisclosed product costs, and

expenses and maintaining profit margins. (Pl.’s Briefing at 2, Dkt. #215.) Furthermore, the Court

finds that Defendant has not shown good cause as to why a protective order is warranted regarding

Manning’s deposition. Defendant only argues that the deposition would result in lost productivity

and a disrupted schedule, that Plaintiff has not articulated good cause to disrupt Manning’s busy

schedule, and that Plaintiff seeks only to harass Manning. (Joint Letter at 2, 4; Def.’s Briefing at 1,

Dkt. #215.) The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff has articulated good cause warranting

Manning’s deposition, and that a one-day deposition would not be burdensome. Plaintiff seeks to

depose Manning for one day, and the Court is amenable to Plaintiff’s request. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s motion for a protective

order. Mr. Manning, Jr.’s deposition shall be limited to one day of seven hours in length, and shall

take place at Defendant’s office in Lansing, Michigan, per Plaintiff’s statement at the hearing. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2010 _______________________________

Maria-Elena James 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

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