Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_14-cv-00180/USCOURTS-ared-3_14-cv-00180-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

COREY F. LEIJA

ADC #656449 PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 3:14-CV-180 DPM/BD

LARRY MILLS, et al. DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

I. Procedure for Filing Objections:

This Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United

States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. Any party may file written objections to this

Recommendation within fourteen (14) days.

Objections must be specific and must include the factual or legal basis for the

objection. An objection to a factual finding must identify the finding of fact believed to

be wrong and describe the evidence that supports that belief. 

If no objections are filed, Judge Marshall can adopt this Recommendation without

independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may also

waive any right to appeal questions of fact.

II. Background:

Corey Leija, an Arkansas Department of Correction inmate formerly housed at the

Poinsett County Detention Center, filed this case pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

that Defendants Larry Mills and Becky Hitt violated his rights by failing to provide him

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with medical care. (Docket entry #4) Defendants Mills and Hitt have now moved for

summary judgment on Mr. Leija’s claims. (#16)

Mr. Leija responded to the motion (#20), but later asked for additional time to

supplement his response. (#22) Specifically, he asked the Court to allow him to respond

more fully after his release from incarceration. The Court granted Mr. Leija an additional

thirty days to respond, but declined to grant him two or three months to respond. (#24) 

Mr. Leija later asked that he be allowed to respond to the Defendants’ motion until

his release from jail on May 8, 2015. (#27) The Court granted Mr. Leija additional time,

but only until April 6, 2015. (#28) 

Mr. Leija again asked to delay filing a response until after his release so that he

could hire a lawyer. (#29) The Defendants’ motion has now been pending for nearly

four months. Mr. Leija has had ample time to respond. From the response he has filed, it

is clear that the material facts are not in dispute. As explained below, Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment (#16) should be GRANTED.

III. Discussion:

A. Standard

Summary judgment is granted to a party when the evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine dispute as to any material

fact. FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548

(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). A

moving party must first present evidence that there is no genuine dispute as to any

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material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). 

If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with

evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute that must be decided at a trial.

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). If the

nonmoving party does not submit enough proof to establish a necessary element of a

claim, the moving party is entitled to judgment on that claim. Celotex Corp., 447 U.S. at

322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

B. Official-Capacity Claims

Both Defendants are employees of Poinsett County, Arkansas, so Mr. Leija’s

claims against the Defendants in their official capacities are, in effect, claims against

Poinsett County. Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010). Local governments

are not liable under § 1983 for injuries inflicted solely by their employees or agents. 

Monell v. New York Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). 

Rather, a county is liable for the acts of its employee only when the employee is carrying

out a county policy or custom. Id.; Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628,

632 (8th Cir. 2009).

For purposes of § 1983, a policy is a “deliberate choice of a guiding principle or

procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters.”

Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 902 (8th Cir. 2010). To establish a custom, a

plaintiff must prove that the county engaged in a continuing pattern of unconstitutional

misconduct, not just a single unconstitutional act. Id. at 902–903.

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Here, Mr. Leija has not alleged or provided any evidence that he was injured as a

result of any Poinsett County custom or policy. Therefore, his claims against the

Defendants in their official capacities fail as a matter of law.

C. Deliberate-Indifference Claim

Mr. Leija’s claims arise out of a gunshot wound that he suffered several months

prior to his incarceration at the Poinsett County Detention Center (“Detention Center”). 

In his complaint, he alleges that he suffered from serious headaches while at the

Detention Center that he believes were caused by bullet or glass fragments that remained

in his head after the bullet was removed. He explains that, prior to his incarceration, he

was scheduled to have an x-ray performed, but did not have transportation to attend the

appointment. (#17-2) He alleges that he submitted multiple sick-call requests to

Detention Center officials about his headaches, but was never examined by a physician. 

Determining whether an official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s

medical needs involves both objective and subjective analyses. Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d

335, 339–40 (8th Cir. 2014). To prevail, Mr. Leija first must establish that he suffered

from an objectively serious medical need. Id. at 340. Because Defendants do not argue

that Mr. Leija suffered from a serious medical need, the Court will turn to the subjective

component of the deliberate-indifference standard.1

1

 Mr. Leija was a pre-trial detainee at the time this lawsuit was filed, so his

deliberate-indifference claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than

the Eighth Amendment.

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For Defendants to be liable, Mr. Leija must show that the Defendants “actually

knew of but deliberately disregarded [his] serious medical need.” Id. This showing

requires a mental state “akin to criminal recklessness.” Id. (quoting Gordon v. Frank, 454

F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2006)). Mr. Leija must show “more than negligence, more even

than gross negligence.” Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir.

2014)(quoting Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000)). He must show

that the Defendants’ actions were “so inappropriate as to evidence intentional

maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234,

1240-41 (8th Cir. 1997). Based on the undisputed evidence, no reasonable jury could

find that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Leija’s medical needs. 

According to the undisputed evidence, on June 9, 2014, Mr. Leija was booked into

the Detention Center. (#17-1 at p.1) On June 26, 2014, he submitted his first medical

request form, as well as a grievance, requesting to be seen by a doctor due to headaches. 

(#17-2; #17-3) Notations on Mr. Leija’s medical request form indicate that an

appointment was scheduled with Dr. Houchin for August 12, 2014. (Id.)

 Mr. Leija then filed another medical request form on July 7, 2014, again

complaining of headaches. (#17-5) Again, Mr. Leija’s medical request form indicates

that he was scheduled to be examined on August 12, 2014. (Id.) Although Mr. Leija

continued to file similar medical request forms, he received similar responses noting his

upcoming doctor’s appointment. (#17-6) He filed the pending complaint on July 23,

2014.

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On August 12, 2014, Dr. Houchin examined Mr. Leila and diagnosed headaches

and a ruptured eardrum. (#17-7) Dr. Houchin prescribed Anaprox, Amitriptyline, and

Ibuprofen. (#17-7 at p.1) Dr. Houchin’s report does not indicate that any foreign object

was found in Mr. Leija’s head, and no medical procedures were performed.

Defendants also attach the affidavit of Defendant Hitt to their motion. (#17-8)

Defendant Hitt explains that Mr. Leija was seen several times by the jail nurse during his

incarceration at the Detention Center, and that Defendant Hitt had no reason to believe

that Mr. Leija was not receiving adequate medical attention. (#17-8 at p.1) She also

explains that the nurses schedule inmates’ appointments, which are based on the

physicians’ availability. (Id.)

Finally, Defendants produce excerpts from Mr. Leija’s responses to their discovery

requests. According to those responses, Mr. Leija never had any conversation with either

Defendant concerning his need for medical treatment. (#17-9 at p.2)

Based on this undisputed evidence, the Court cannot conclude that either

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Leija’s medical needs. Even

assuming that both Defendants read the medical request forms and grievances that Mr.

Leija submitted, those forms indicate that a medical appointment was scheduled for Mr.

Leija the first time that he complained of headaches. Mr. Leija might have not been

examined as quickly as he would have preferred, but the six-week delay in his

appointment with Dr. Houchin does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 

Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006) (one-month delay in providing x-ray

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of fractured finger did not amount to deliberate indifference). Mr. Leija has not presented

any evidence indicating that the delay in seeing a doctor was the result of any intentional

conduct by either Defendant.

Because Mr. Leija has failed to show any dispute of material fact on this issue,

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion:

The Court recommends that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (#16)

be GRANTED. Mr. Leija’s claims should be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2015.

____________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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