Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01970/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01970-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jerome Mason,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents

CV-08-1970-PHX-PGR (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Winslow,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October

27, 2008 (#1). On December 22, 2008, Respondents filed their Response (#7). Petitioner

filed a Traverse on January 9, 2009 (#8), and a Supplement on January 16, 2009 (#11).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 27, 1998, Petitioner engaged in a verbal argument with the victim at a

motel in Phoenix, Arizona. The victim retired to his motel room with a woman. Petitioner

followed the victim, kicked down the door to the motel room and fired a number of shots at

the victim, killing him. Petitioner was ultimately arrested in 2001 in Milford, Connecticut.

(Exhibit R, Mem. Dec. at 1-7.) (Exhibits to the Answer (#7) are referenced herein as “Exhibit

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 1 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial in April, 2002, and was convicted of first degree

murder, burglary in the first degree and endangerment. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner was sentenced

to concurrent sentences of: (a) life without possibility of parole for 25 years, (b) 10.5 years,

and (c) 2.25 years. (Id. at 8.)

Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment (Exhibit L) arguing that, after the jury

verdict, he had met in the jail the man who was Petitioner’s passenger the night of the murder

(referred to at trial as “Diz”, and eventually identified by Petitioner as “Dale Chambers”),

and asserting that this man would testify that Petitioner had not had a weapon, had not shot

the victim, and the prosecution’s star witness had lied about being outside the motel room.

No affidavit of the witness was presented, but trial counsel related that he had interviewed

the witness. (Exhibit L at 3-4.) The trial court rejected the motion, finding the testimony

was cumulative and would not have change the result at trial, and Petitioner had failed to

show diligence in seeking the evidence. The court also noted that Petitioner filed to identify

the witness by anything more than his nickname. (Exhibit N, M.E. 7/24/02.) Petitioner filed

a Motion for Reconsideration identifying his as Dale Chambers, and objecting to the trial

court’s ruling on the motion to vacate before a reply could be filed. (Exhibit O.) That

motion was summarily denied. (Exhibit P, M.E. 8/21/02.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing: (1) the trial court improperly sanitized an eyewitness’ prior felony conviction; and (2) the trial court improperly denied a motion asserting

newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony of Petitioner’s companion on the night

of the murder. (Id. at 9, 12.) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal, and affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 16.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit S), which was denied (Exhibit T) on

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 2 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

April 20, 2004.

D. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 12, 2004, during the pendency of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit U). He eventually filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief (Exhibit V) asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, unconstitutional

use of perjured testimony, newly discovered evidence, and denial of opportunity to confront

witnesses. The petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court. (Exhibit X, M.E.

2/16/05.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit Y) by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial of his right to confront and cross

examine witnesses. The petition for review was summarily denied (Exhibit Z). 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily

denied on October 26, 2007 (Exhibit AA).

E. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On February 26, 2007, during the pendency of his first PCR petition, Petitioner

instituted his second PCR proceeding by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit

BB). The Notice asserted the use of perjured testimony. On March 15, 2007, the trial court

summarily dismissed the Notice, noting it was untimely but asserted newly discovered

evidence, and finding that it was precluded under Rule 32.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. (Exhibit CC, M.E. 3/15/07.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, which was

summarily denied on March 14, 2008. (Exhibit DD, Order 3/14/08.)

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced the instant federal habeas proceeding by filing his Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (#1) on October 27, 2008. The Petition asserts ten grounds for relief:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) selective prosecution; (3) actual innocence; (4)

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 3 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

prosecutorial misconduct; (5) suggestive identification; (6) false evidence; (7) violation of

Miranda; (8) improper vouching by the prosecution; (9) “Chapman” (i.e not harmless) error;

and (10) failure to exclude witnesses from the court room.

On December 22, 2008, Respondents filed their Answer (#7), arguing that Grounds

2 through 10, and portions of Ground 1 are procedurally defaulted. (#7 at 20-21.)

Respondents argue that Petitioner at least arguably exhausted his claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to support the motion to vacate judgment by presenting an affidavit

with the testimony of Petitioner’s companion on the night of the murder. However,

Respondents argue the claim is without merit because the delay in locating the witness, not

the failure to present an affidavit, was the basis for denial of the motion, and because the

court properly found a lack of prejudice. (Id. at 21-22, 29-30.)

On January 9, 2009, Petitioner filed his Traverse (#8). In response to the procedural

default issue, Petitioner argues that he presented his actual innocence claim in his first PCR

petition (id. at 4), lacked counsel in his PCR proceedings (id. at 5), raised his claims in a state

habeas petition (id. at 6), the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling on August 20, 2008 on his state

habeas petition recognized that his claims were previously raised (id.), and the Response

(#7) was not timely filed (id. at 7).

On January 16, 2009, Petitioner filed a supplemental Points and Authorities (#11) in

support of his Traverse. Petitioner again argues his state habeas petition exhausted his claims

(#11 at 6-10), and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate,

determine the name of the newly discovered witness, and to provide it to the trial court (id.

at 11-14). 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Grounds 2 through 10, and all but a portion of

Ground 1, are unexhausted, now procedurally defaulted, and thus barred from habeas review.

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 4 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of the Arizona avenues of relief (direct appeal of petition for postconviction relief) must be exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This

is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available

in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827

F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

“In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state

prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals

has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

 b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 5 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

c. Avenues of Presentment - Petitioner visited the state appellate courts on four

separate occasions: (1) direct appeal; (2) review of first PCR proceeding; (3) review of

second PCR proceeding; and (4) state habeas proceeding. For the following reasons, only

the first two resulted in any exhaustion.

Effect of Second PCR Proceeding - In his second PCR Notice (Exhibit BB), Petitioner

asserted that the prosecution utilized perjured testimony. Respondents have not provided

Petitioner’s Petition for Review in his second PCR proceeding. Arguably, any of Petitioner’s

claims could have been presented in that petition for review. However, the Arizona Court

of Appeals issued a summary denial of Petitioner’s claims. (Exhibit DD.) A summary denial

following a reasoned decision is presumed to be based on the same grounds as the reasoned

decision, and the habeas court should "look through" the summary denial to the rationale

given in the reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). The trial

court issued a “reasoned decision”, summarily dismissing the proceeding on the basis that

the claims were precluded by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) for failure to raise them on direct

appeal or the prior PCR proceeding. As discussed hereinafter, that decision would be an

independent and adequate state bar of any claims presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

and thus would not constitute fair presentation.

Effect of State Habeas Proceeding - Petitioner argues that various claims were

exhausted when he presented them to the Arizona Supreme Court in his state habeas petition.

(See Traverse, #8, Exhibit A, Order 8/20/8.) Such presentation would not suffice.

"Submitting a new claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in which its

merits will not be considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair

presentation." Roentgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). Thus, where a claim is cognizable in the Arizona courts

on direct appeal or in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, presenting it in a state

habeas petition is not adequate to exhaust state remedies. Id.

Effect of Finding of Prior Presentation in State Habeas Proceeding - Petitioner has

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 6 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

asserted that in denying Petitioner’s state habeas petition, the Arizona Supreme Court found

that the issues raised therein “were previously presented to this Court in prior petitions for

review.” (Petition, #1, Exhibits, Order 8/20/08 (emphasis added).) Petitioner argues that this

acknowledges the exhaustion of his state remedies. The undersigned presumes for purposes

of this Report & Recommendation that this Court is bound by such a determination, and thus

must find that Petitioner had presented all such claims. Assuming arguendo that those claims

included some or all of those claims determined herein to not have been fairly presented, no

exhaustion would result because presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court is not sufficient

for fair presentment, and Petitioner has not shown that his claims were presented to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. 

“Whether a claim is exhausted through a direct appellate procedure, a post-conviction

procedure, or both, the claim should be raised at all appellate stages afforded under state law

as of right by that procedure.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th ed. 1998)).

Thus, “where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context

in which its merits will not be considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons

therefor’...[r]aising the claim in such a fashion does not, for the relevant purpose, constitute

‘fair presentation.’” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Therefore, where a

petitioner “raised his federal constitutional claims for the first and only time to the state's

highest court on discretionary review, he did not fairly present them.” Casey, 386 F.3d at

918.

Summary regard Proceedings -Based upon the foregoing, only those claims presented

in Petitioner’s direct appeal and his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals in

his first PCR proceeding can provide a basis for finding exhaustion of his state remedies.

d. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Ground One - Ineffective Assistance - In his Ground One, Petitioner argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for: (a) failing to interview witnesses; (b) failure to file for

voluntariness hearing; (c) failing to challenge the arrest warrant; (d) failing to submit the

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 7 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Petitioner’s failure to assert a federal basis for his claim to the trial court is not

controlling. Failure to present to the trial court does not prevent exhaustion; all that is

required is presentation "at all appellate stages." Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added).

“If the petitioner fails to raise a federal claim at trial (or if the claim was not cognizable at

all or did not arise until after trial), the petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by

raising the claim on appeal, on a motion for rehearing of the appeal, or even in a delayed

appeal.” Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (5th

ed. 2001). The failure to present to the trial court might prevent habeas review if it results in

the appellate court applying a procedural bar which qualifies as an "independent and

adequate state ground." But Respondents fail to meet their burden of pleading such a ground,

and none appears from the summary denial of Petitioner's claims. (See Exhibitz Z (Order

7/12/09) and AA (Order 10/26/7). 

- 8 -

affidavit of Petitioner’s passenger; (e) failing to investigate and photograph the scene.

(Petition, #1, Attach. at 1.) 

Petitioner did not assert any claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. (See

Exhibit Q, Opening Brief.) 

Petitioner did mark his form PCR petition in his first PCR proceeding as asserting

“[t]he denial of the constitutional right to representation by a competent lawyer at every

critical stage of the proceeding.” (Exhibit V, PCR Pet. at 2.) In his attachment, Petitioner

argued only that counsel “was ineffective for not submitting the newly discovered testimony

of Mr. Chambers in affidavit form and not presenting the potential testimony of Mr.

Chambers fully.” (Id. at Exh. A at 2, ¶ 3.) Petitioner did not reference any federal law in his

Petition or Exhibit in support of his claim of ineffective assistance.1

 In his Petition for

Review (Exhibit Y), Petitioner repeated his claim, this time specifically referencing the “U.S.

Const., 6th & 14th Amendments . . . Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).” (Exhibit

Y at 5.) Again, however, his arguments were limited to counsel’s failure with respect to the

newly discovered testimony from Petitioner’s passenger. 

Thus, Petitioner’s Ground One is unexhausted, with the exception of his claim that

trial counsel was ineffective with regard to the presentation of testimony of Petitioner’s

passenger. 

Ground Two - Selective Prosecution - Petitioner argues in his Ground Two that he

was the victim of “selective prosecution” because witnesses had identified the suspect as

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 8 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Respondents argue Ground Six is not procedurally defaulted, but was procedurally

barred by presentation in his second PCR proceeding. However, the absence of Petitioner’s

petition for review in that proceeding precludes a finding that it was raised to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, and thus a conclusion that it was determined by that Court to have been

precluded. Whether procedurally defaulted or procedurally barred, the result is the same.

- 9 -

having light colored eyes and driving a white Oldsmobile (apparently in contrast to

Petitioner’s eye color and vehicle), and yet the state proceeded to prosecute Petitioner.

Petitioner did not assert this claim in his direct appeal (Exhibit Q, Opening Brief), his first

PCR Petition (Exhibit V), or his Petition for Review on his first PCR Petition (Exhibit Y).

Accordingly, this claim was not properly exhausted.

Ground Three - Actual Innocence - In his Ground Three, Petitioner argues that he

is actually innocent of the charges. (Petition, Attachment at 2-3.) He made no such claim

on direct appeal. (See Exhibit Q, Opening Brief.) Petitioner asserts he raised the claim in

his first PCR petition. (Traverse, #8 at 4-5.) He argued in his first PCR petition that he was

“innocent of the charges in this case,” but offered no federal basis for such claim. (Exhibit

V, PCR Pet. at 2, ¶ 5.) More importantly, he made no claim of actual innocence in his

Petition for Review, but simply argued that there was a basis for a reasonable doubt. (Exhibit

Y at 4.) Accordingly, this claim was not properly exhausted.

Grounds Four, Six, Eight and Nine - Prosecutorial Misconduct - In his Ground

Four, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in using false testimony,

attempted to improperly influence the jury, and fraternizing with and interviewing a

prosecution witness. (Petition, #1, Attachment at 3-4.) 

In his Grounds Six and Nine, Petitioner repeats the specific argument that the

witnesses’ testimony was false. (Id. at 5, 7-8.)2

 In Ground Nine he also asserts the error was

not harmless, apparently referencing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (adopting

“harmless-constitutional-error rule”). (Id. at 7.) The presence of “false evidence” is not a

basis for constitutional relief. See e.g. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (“federal

habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the

Constitution-not to correct errors of fact”). Such evidence is relevant to claims of

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 9 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

prosecutorial misconduct or actual innocence. Petitioner’s Grounds Six and Nine do not

assert his actual innocence. Accordingly, these grounds are liberally construed to assert

claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 

In his Ground Eight, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by

improperly vouching for un-credible witnesses by presenting their testimony. (Id. at 6-7.)

Petitioner made no claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. (See Exhibit

Q, Opening Brief.) He argued in his first PCR petition that the witnesses made “several

inconsistent statements,” but did not assert prosecutorial misconduct of any kind. (Exhibit

V, Exhibit A at 2, ¶ 8.) Nor did he assert such a claim in his Petition for Review (Exhibit Y).

Accordingly, the claims in Grounds 4, 6, 8 and 9 were not properly exhausted.

Ground Five - Suggestive Identification - In his Ground Five, Petitioner argues that

the courtroom identification of him was unduly suggestive because Petitioner was the only

defendant at the defense table. (Petition #1, Attachment at 4-5.) Petitioner did not address

the identification in his direct appeal (Exhibit Q), his first PCR Petition (Exhibit V), or his

Petition for Review (Exhibit Y). Accordingly, this claim was not properly exhausted.

Ground Seven - Miranda Violation - In his Ground Seven, Petitioner argues that

when he was questioned by officers in Milford, Connecticut and Atlantic City, New Jersey,

he was not advised of his Miranda rights. He made no such claim on direct appeal (see

Exhibit Q, Opening Brief), his first PCR petition (Exhibit V), or his Petition for Review

(Exhibit Y). Accordingly, this claim was not properly exhausted.

Ground Ten - Exclusion of Witnesses - In Ground Ten, Petitioner complains that

the trial court improperly failed to exclude all but one of the state’s investigators from the

courtroom during trial testimony. . He made no such claim on direct appeal (see Exhibit Q,

Opening Brief), his first PCR petition (Exhibit V), or his Petition for Review (Exhibit Y).

Accordingly, this claim was not properly exhausted.

Summary re Exhaustion - Base on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that

Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies on all of his claims, except that portion of

Ground One that asserts trial counsel was ineffective with regard to the presentation of

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 10 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

testimony of Petitioner’s passenger. 

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim.

Proc. 32.2(a), and its timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, #18 at 13-14.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a

subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a claim

may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that "has been waived

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows "that the

defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding."

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 11 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Some types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the tyep of

waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz. at

450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission),

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived by

omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal sentence

(waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge conflict of

interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 2008); 

- 12 -

that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights

“that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399,

166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v.

Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver

of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the

Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at

450, 46 P.3d at 1071.3

Here, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims do not fit within the list of claims identified as

requiring a personal waiver. Nor are they of the same character. Therefore, it appears that

Petitioner’s claims would be precluded by his failure to raise them in an earlier proceeding.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions

for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128,

912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition

of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long

since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 12 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his claims. 

Nor, with one exception, does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines

the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.

Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the law.

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to

Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 945, 959

(App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “ not established that trial error

...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Actual Innocence Claim - However, Petitioner’s Ground Three argues that he is

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 13 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Respondents only explicitly rely on procedural bar as to Ground Six, which was

asserted in the second PCR notice. (See Answer, #7 at 20.) However, as discussed herein,

the procedural bar must be deemed to equally apply to whatever claims were asserted in the

ensuing petition for review.

- 14 -

actually innocent of the charges. (Petition, Attachment at 2-3.) It is true that Petitioner

argued in his first PCR petition that he was “innocent of the charges in this case.” (Exhibit

Y at 4.) However, Rule 32.1(h) would except that claim not only from the timeliness bar,

but also from the preclusion bar. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s claim

of actual innocence is not procedurally defaulted. 

Summary - Accordingly, with the exception of his actual innocence claim in Ground

Three, the undersigned must conclude that review through Arizona’s direct appeal and postconviction relief process is no longer possible for Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Summary re Procedural Default - Except for the portion of Ground One asserting

ineffective assistance with regard to the newly discovered evidence, Petitioner has failed to

exhaust his state remedies on the claims in the Petition, and (with the exception of Ground

Three) is now procedurally barred from doing so. Accordingly, these unexhausted claims

are procedurally defaulted, and absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence,

must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS

Petitioner arguably raised the claims in his Ground Six in his second PCR Notice

(Exhibit CC).4

 The trial court summarily dismissed that proceeding on the basis that the

claims were precluded by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) for failure to raise them on direct appeal

or the prior PCR proceeding. (Exhibit CC, M.E. 3/15/07.) The Arizona Court of Appeals

summarily dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review from that decision. (Exhibit DD, Order

3/14/08.) As discussed above, a summary denial following a reasoned decision is presumed

to be based on the same grounds as the reasoned decision, and the habeas court should "look

through" the summary denial to the rationale given in the reasoned decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). Thus, any claims presented in Petitioner’s petition

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 14 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Petitioner argues his unexhausted claims were asserted in his state habeas petition.

In disposing of those claims, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that those issues were

previously presented. (Traverse, #8 at Exhibits, Order 8/20/08.) The Court did not, however,

explicitly rely upon any preclusion bar or other procedural bar to dispose of the claim.

Respondents do not assert any procedural bar from this proceeding. Accordingly, the

undersigned presumes that order does not establish a procedural bar.

- 15 -

for review in his second PCR proceeding must be deemed to have been rejected on the basis

of that preclusion rule.5

 Federal habeas review of a defaulted federal claim is precluded when the state court

has disposed of the claim on a procedural ground "that is both 'independent' of the merits of

the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 260 (1989); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)).

In Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002), the Supreme Court determined that

Arizona's rule of preclusion (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2) is "independent" of federal law. The

Court did not decide, however, whether the rule is "adequate." 

In Woods v. Hall, the Ninth Circuit noted that cases addressing the "adequacy" of a

state procedural bar "generally fall into two categories: (1) rules that have been selectively

applied to bar the claims of certain litigants, and (2) rules that are so unsettled due to

ambiguous or changing state authority that applying them to bar a litigant's claims is unfair."

130 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). There has been no assertion, nor is the undersigned aware

of any basis for one, that Arizona's preclusion bar is applied selectively. Further, the text of

Arizona's preclusion bar as embodied in Rule 32.2 has been "firmly established." 

It is true that the interpretation of Rule 32.2 had been in significant turmoil and

dispute in recent years concerning its application to specific claims. See e.g. Stewart v. Smith,

202 Ariz. 446, 450, 46 P.3d 1067, 1071 (2002) (disapproving of court of appeals' decisions

making determination of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" depend on consideration of

merits). Thus, if there was some dispute within the Arizona Courts as to whether Petitioner’s

claims asserted in his second PCR were “of sufficient constitutional magnitude”, then

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 15 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

perhaps this Court would be required to find that as to those claims the rule was not “firmly

established.” and thus did not bar habeas review. 

Here, however, Petitioner makes no assertion that any claim would be of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” so as to qualify for such an exception, nor does he assert any

dispute about such an issue. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003) (discussing

burden of proof on independence and adequacy), 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds Rule 32.2(a) to be an independent and adequate

state ground sufficient to bar whatever grounds were asserted in Petitioner’s petition for

review in his second PCR proceeding.

However, Respondents have failed to provide a copy of Petitioner’s Petition for

Review in this proceeding. Accordingly, the undersigned cannot determine what claims were

asserted, and are thereby procedurally barred. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the

undersigned finds all unexhausted claims to be procedurally defaulted, excepting only

Ground Three’s claim of actual innocence. Therefore, with that exception, the inability to

identify the claims precluded has no affect to the outcome in this proceeding.

With regard to Petitioner’s actual innocence claim, it would have been subject to the

exception in Rule 32.1(h), discussed above, avoiding any preclusion bar. Thus, the

undersigned must presume it was not presented his the second PCR proceeding.

Therefore, consideration of any procedural bar in Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding

would not alter the outcome in this proceeding. Therefore, the undersigned presumes, for

purposes of this Report & Recommendation, that none of Petitioner’s claims asserted herein

were subject to the procedural bar applied in Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding.

C. MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

1. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 16 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Although both "cause" and "prejudice"

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, a court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43

(1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991).

 "Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. "Because

of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court

'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some objective

factor external to petitioner, for instance:

 ... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by officials",

made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this

standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues in his Traverse that: (1) he was denied counsel in his first PCR

petition; and (2) he should have been afforded a hearing on his PCR petitions. (Traverse, #8

at 5.) The undersigned construes these allegations as an assertion of cause to excuse his

procedural defaults. 

Lack of Counsel - The lack of effective assistance of counsel may constitute cause

for failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, to meet the "cause" requirement, the

ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent constitutional violation. Id.

Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, ineffective assistance will

not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. If there is no federal

constitutional right to counsel, a petitioner "cannot establish cause because of the state trial

court's failure to appoint him counsel, even if such failure was erroneous as a matter of state

law." Smith v. State of Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004). In Patrick Poland v.

Stewart, 169 F. 3d 573 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause there is no right

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 17 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, there cannot be constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings." Id. at 588 (quoting Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)). Therefore, because Petitioner had no federal

constitutional right to counsel in his PCR proceeding, he cannot rely upon such absence as

cause to excuse his procedural default.

Moreover, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel showing "cause" is itself

subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986);

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). Accordingly, "[t]o the extent that petitioner is

alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for the default, the exhaustion

doctrine requires him to first raise this ineffectiveness claim as a separate claim in state

court." Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Petitioner has not

exhausted any state remedies on a claim asserting a lack of constitutionally required counsel

in his PCR proceedings.

Lack of Evidentiary Hearing - Petitioner fails to show how the lack of an

evidentiary hearing in the state courts precluded him from asserting his federal claims in the

first instance. Any evidentiary hearing granted would, presumably, have been limited to the

claims asserted in the Petition, and thus would not have resulted in presentation of

Petitioner’s unexhausted federal claims.

Summary - Petitioner has failed to show “cause” to excuse his failure to properly

exhaust his state remedies, and thus is not entitled to be relieved from his procedural defaults

under the “cause and prejudice” standard.

2. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800

F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in

an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 18 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 For example, much trial testimony was devoted to the gun of Greg Clay, the

boyfriend of eyewitness Wallace, and fellow resident of the motel. This was part of a

defense strategy to suggest that Clay was the perpetrator. That testimony is not deemed

significant, inasmuch as testimony showed the gun was recovered from Clay’s effects after

his death, and was determined by ballistic examination to not match the shells recovered

from the scene. (Exhibit F, R.T. 4/24/02, Testimony of Randy Leister at 82.) Evidence of

such low credibility and relevance is not summarized herein.

- 19 -

added). However, it is not sufficient that the petitioner point to some legal insufficiency.

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623(1998) (“‘actual innocence’ means factual

innocence , not mere legal insufficiency”). Rather, a petitioner asserting his actual innocence

of the underlying crime must show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

[T]he prisoner must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the

evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but

with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed

to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after

the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt

of his guilt." 

Id., 477 U.S., at 455, n. 17, quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on

Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970).

Here, Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent. The actual innocence gateway

“requires ‘new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial’.” House

v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Here, the only proof

of such innocence proffered is Petitioner’s passenger’s testimony that established an alibi for

Petitioner and contradicted the testimony of trial witnesses who asserted Petitioner/s guilt.

(Exhibit V, PCR Pet., Exh. A., Attach., Affid. Chambers.) 

Having reviewed the trial transcript, the undersigned finds the following the most

relevant evidence6

:

Eyewitness - The woman, Tamara Wallace, who had one arm amputated, testified that

on the night of the murder she was sitting in Petitioner’s car, a green Mercury Mountaineer,

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 19 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

and observed Petitioner engage in an argument with the victim. (Exhibit C, R.T. 4/18/02 at

88.) She exited the vehicle and went to the victim’s motel room. (Id. at 91.) The victim

returned to the room, and was locking the door when Petitioner kicked down the door and

shot the victim. (Id. at 94-96.) She heard the victim say, when the door was kicked in,

“Jerry, no, why are you doing this?” (Id. at 98.) The credibility of Ms. Wallace was

impeached on a number of grounds, including her statements that the perpetrator had light

eyes and drove a white Oldsmobile, her violation of her probation by drinking, her prior

felony convictions, and various contradictions in her statements to the police. (Id. at 134 et

seq.; Exhibit D, R.T. 4/22/02.) 

Interviewing Officer - Officer McFadden of the Atlantic City, New Jersey, Police

Department, testified that upon questioning Petitioner admitted owning a green Mercury

Mountaineer, to being at the motel and arguing with the two men, one named “McDub”, and

then leaving the motel, and then returning and kicking down the door to the motel room to

fight with the one of the men. (Exhibit E, R.T. 4/23/02 at 14-16.)

Victim’s Nephew - Robert Haley, the victim’s nephew, testified that “McDub” was

a close friend of the victim, that on the night of the murder he saw Petitioner in a green

Mercury Mountaineer at the motel, that McDub and Petitioner got in an argument and a fight,

that the victim broke up the fight, and then returned to his motel room with a one armed

white woman. (Exhibit E. R.T. 4/23/02 at 46.) Haley was impeached on the basis of his

prior felony conviction. (Id. at 52.)

Investigating Officer - Detective Ragsdale of the Phoenix Police Department testified

that Tamara Wallace identified Petitioner from a photographic lineup as the murderer.

(Exhibit E. R.T. 4/23/02 at 113-114.) 

Apartment Dweller - Raphael Gonzales-Lopez testified that on the night of the

murder, a green Explorer- like vehicle pulled into the parking space of the apartment where

he was staying, and the two occupants took off running, leaving the vehicle there. (Exhibit

E, R.T. 4/23/02 at 160-167.) 

Motel Resident - Craig Blomquist testified that he was living at the motel on the night

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 20 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

of the murder and heard an argument and saw a scuffle in the parking lot around a small

“Blazer-type” vehicle, that the vehicle left and then returned, arguments with the driver again

occurred, the vehicle left and returned again, and the driver then kicked the motel room door

down and fired shots. (Exhibit F, R.T. 4/24/02 at 91-100.) Blomquist was impeached on the

basis inter alia that he had originally identified the vehicle as maroon, and as being occupied

by up to four people. (Id. at 100-154.) 

Landlord - Ernesto Navarette testified that he was the landlord where Mr. GonzalesLopez was staying on the night of the murder and the next morning saw the green SUV in

his parking lot with four flat tires, and that he called the police. (Exhibit G, R.T. 4/25/02 at

47-56.) 

Man Fighting With Petitioner - Robert Williams testified that he was nicknamed

“McDub”, identified Petitioner as “Jerry”, who he had known for a year before the murder.

He testified that Petitioner had been driving a green SUV, and on the night of the murder he

and Petitioner had a disagreement and scuffle at the motel, that the victim and others broke

up. After the scuffle, he went to the room with the victim and a one-armed woman, spoke

with Petitioner at the room, Petitioner left the motel, and then Williams left the motel.

(Exhibit G, R.T. 4/25/02 at 92-111.) Williams was impeached on the basis inter alia of his

four felony convictions, drug and alcohol use on the day of the murder, and prior

inconsistent statements to investigators. (Id. at 111-136.) 

Petitioner - Petitioner testified that he knew “McDub” and the victim, but denied ever

meeting Tamara Wallace. He admitted that twice on the evening of the murder being

involved in a dispute at the motel with McDub over a McDub’s girlfriend. He admitted that

the second incident involved a physical altercation, and that the victim was present. He

admitted that he later went to the room where the murder occurred to continue the fight, but

McDub declined. He then got in his green 1998 Mercury Mountaineer and left, dropping his

passenger “Diz” off at a Circle K. He testified that he had a flat tire before getting on the 202

freeway, and pulled into the parking lot of an apartment complex. He left the car there, got

a ride, left the keys with his daughter, and went to Las Vegas with a friend on a preplanned

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 21 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

trip. He then went to New York and New Jersey, and did not return to Phoenix until his

arrest. He denied having a gun at the time of the murder and denied shooting the victim.

(Exhibit H, R.T. 4/29/02 at 6-30.) He was impeached on the year of the vehicle, his prior

inconsistent statements to the officers in New Jersey, that the airbags in his car were already

deployed when he was at the motel, his claim that he was not drinking. He denied knowing

the true name of “Diz” and asserted hearing that “Diz” was deceased. He claimed that he

did not run from his car after leaving it at the apartment complex, and denied having anyone

with him. (Id. at 30-65.) 

New Evidence from Passenger - As noted above, Petitioner’s only new evidence is

from his passenger, Dale Chambers. Chambers asserts in his Affidavit that he and Petitioner

were present at the motel, that he knew the woman (Tamara Wallace) who was with the

victim and that she had been smoking crack cocaine on that occasion, that Petitioner got into

a fight with someone other than the victim and thus Chambers and Petitioner left the motel,

and that the victim was alive when they left. He asserts that Petitioner dropped him off away

from the motel, and drove away from the motel, entering the 202 freeway, without turning

around back towards the motel. He asserts that he had never known Petitioner to possess a

gun, and asserts that the victim’s relatives and other witnesses offered him money and drugs

to implicate Petitioner. (Exhibit V, PCR Pet., Exh. A., Attach., Affid. Chambers.) 

Effect of New Evidence - This testimony would not have made it “ more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted” Petitioner. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In

most respects, it actually bolsters the other testimony at trial: e.g. the presence at the motel

of Chambers, Petitioner and Tamara Wallace; the fight between Petitioner and “McDub”; and

Wallace’s presence in the room with the victim. In one significant respect, it directly

contradicts Petitioner’s own testimony. Chambers claims Petitioner entered the freeway after

leaving the scene, thus implying he could not have again returned to the motel. However

Petitioner denied entering the freeway, and admits leaving his car at an apartment complex

in the neighborhood. Thus, even the limited implication (from Chambers’ statements) that

Petitioner had left the area for good would have been dissipated by Petitioner’s own

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 22 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

statements and the evidence about the resting location of the vehicle.

Further, Chambers’ testimony would be subject to impeachment as a self-serving

attempt to avoid any potential criminal liability as an accomplice, and because it was first

recorded in 2004, some six years after the events. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414

(1988) (“It is equally reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a defense

witness who is not identified until after the 11th hour has passed.”)

Other Evidence - Moreover, this Court must consider all the evidence in making its

actual innocence determination, and “is not bound by the rules of admissibility.” Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327. In responding to Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, the prosecution proffered

evidence of a recorded statement by Williams (“McDub”) that Petitioner’s passenger “Diz”

had told him that “Jerry put him out of the car prior to the shooting. Jerry told this subject

he had to go back and ‘handle his business.’ ” (Exhibit M, Resp. Mot. Vacate at 5.) 

Conclusion - Considering all the evidence, a reasonable juror could just as likely have

rejected Chambers’ protestations of Petitioner’s innocence of the shooting, just as the jury

rejected Petitioner’s own protestations, and relied instead upon the eyewitness testimony of

Tamara Williams that Petitioner was the shooter, and the testimony of Craig Blomquist that

the driver of the dark blazer-type vehicle who had been involved in the arguments in the

parking lot was the shooter.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to

provide new reliable evidence to show his actual innocence sufficiently to pass the Schlup

gateway.

3. Summary re Procedural Default

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claims in all grounds except portions of

Ground One (ineffective assistance) and Ground Three (actual innocence). Petitioner has

failed to establish cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his procedural default.

Accordingly, these procedurally defaulted grounds must be dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 23 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

D. BYPASS OF NON-EXHAUSTION; MERITS OF GROUND THREE

The undersigned has concluded that Petitioner’s Ground Three (actual innocence) is

unexhausted but not procedurally defaulted. Ordinarily, therefore, this ground should be

dismissed without prejudice.

However, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) provides: "An application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State." Accordingly, the court is free to side step

the exhaustion issue when it is more efficient or easier to dispose of a claim on its merits.

Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 1999). However, that only applies in

limited circumstances where the petitioner has no hope of prevailing on the merits of his

claim. "[A] federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is

perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim." Cassett v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).

In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the Supreme Court rejected a habeas claim

based solely upon an assertion of actual innocence. “Claims of actual innocence based on

newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief

absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal

proceeding.” Id. at 400.

In Herrera, the Court was willing to “assume, for the sake of argument in deciding

this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made

after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal

habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” 506 U.S. at 417.

Indeed, Herrera was itself a death sentence case. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the

conflicting affidavits, submitted long after trial, were insufficient to meet the “extraordinarily

high” standard required for making the showing necessary for such a presumed claim. Id.

Here, Petitioner’s case did not involve the death penalty. Nor was Petitioner without

a “state avenue . . . to process such a claim.” Id. Indeed, Herrera was satisfied with the

availability of an executive clemency proceeding. Here, as discussed above, Petitioner has

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 24 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

had available to him a state petition for post-conviction relief founded upon his claim of

actual innocence.

It is true that rather than merely requiring a likelihood of a different result (as required

in a Schlup analysis), Arizona requires “clear and convincing evidence” that “no reasonable

fact-finder would have found defendant guilty.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h). However,

nothing in Herrera suggests that the standard for state relief would have to match the Schlup

standard, even in a capital case.

Accordingly, on this basis alone, Petitioner’s ground three is without merit.

Moreover, as discussed above, Petitioner has failed to show his actual innocence

under the standard applicable to the Schlup gateway. Presumably the standard for a freestanding (e.g. not part of a procedural default analysis) claim of actual innocence would be

as high, if not higher than the Schlup gateway analysis. The only standard contemplated in

Herrera was one that was “extraordinarily high.” The Ninth Circuit has found “that the

required showing would have to be at least as high as [requiring that the petitioner] . . . go

beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably

innocent.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). With the limited effect

of Chambers’ evidence (that he didn’t see Petitioner kill the victim, that they left with

Petitioner while the victim was alive, and then Petitioner left Chambers), Petitioner has failed

to proffer anything to affirmatively prove his innocence. Petitioner “has presented no

evidence, for example, demonstrating he was elsewhere at the time of the murder, nor is there

any new and reliable physical evidence, such as DNA, that would preclude any possibility

of [Petitioner’s] guilt. Id. at 477.

Thus, Petitioner’s actual innocence claim not only fails to state a cognizable basis for

federal habeas relief, but Petitioner fails to proffer sufficient proof to support his claim.

Accordingly, it is “perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable

federal claim” in his Ground Three. " Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624. Therefore, notwithstanding

its unexhausted state, this claim should be denied on its merits.

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 25 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

E. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: MERITS OF GROUND ONE

In his Ground One, Petitioner argues, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to submit Chambers’ affidavit in support of Petitioner’s motion to vacate.

Respondents counter that the absence of an affidavit was not the basis for rejecting the claim,

and thus Petitioner has failed to meet the standard for ineffective assistance. 

1. Standard for Ineffective Assistance

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim,

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may

reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the

claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

A deficient performance is one in which counsel’s errors were so great he or she was

not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d

861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986). An objective standard applies to proving such ineffectiveness, and

requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of

professionally competent.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.

1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is

judged from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). 

2. Application to Petitioner’s Claim

Here, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim by simply concluding “[there is no

evidence that trial or appellate counsel’s performance was ineffective.” (Exhibit X M.E.

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 26 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 The state appellate courts authored postcard denials on review of this claim.

Accordingly, this Court looks through to the trial court’s determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). 

- 27 -

2/16/05.)7 No specific findings were made as to any factual assertions, or to the absence or

presence of either prong of the Strickland standard. 

Respondents argue, in part, that the absence of an affidavit was not determinative on

Petitioner’s claim. However, in rejecting Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of

Appeals went to some lengths to address the absence of an affidavit. 

¶ 49 "Rule 32 does not require the trial court to conduct evidentiary

hearings based on mere generalizations and unsubstantiated claims that

people exist who would give favorable testimony." State v. Borbon, 146

Ariz. 392, 399, 706 P.2d 718, 725 (1985); see also State v. Krum, 183

Ariz. 288, 292-93, 903 P.2d 596, 600-01 (1995) (third-party affidavit

alleging that victim recanted may, but rarely will, provide sufficient

evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz.

509, 512, 658 P.2d 162, 165 (1982) (counsel's affidavits are

unacceptable as an attempt to create new evidence) .

¶50 We also note Defendant failed to provide either an affidavit from

Diz or a third-party affidavit from counsel in support of his motion to

vacate judgment. A court is justified in denying a motion for new trial

based on newly discovered evidence where statements are not made

under oath or in affidavits. State v. Salinas, 129 Ariz. 364, 368, 631

P.2d 519, 523 (1981). Regardless of whether an affidavit is required

under Rule 24, there must be sufficient indication the newly discovered

evidence would have changed the verdict. State v. Lindsay, 149 Ariz.

493, 498, 720 P.2d 94, 99 (App. 1985), vacated in part on other

grounds, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986). Without affidavits, there

is no basis to conclude that the alleged testimony of Diz was substantial

and accurate or would have any effect whatsoever.

(Exhibit R, Mem. Dec. at 15.) Given the Arizona standards cited in this decision, it was

unreasonable for counsel to fail to provide an affidavit of Petitioner’s new found witness to

support his motions. 

It might be argued that the original motion was required to be filed so hastily as to not

permit preparation of an affidavit. However, a motion to vacate is not required to be filed

until 60 days after sentencing. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.2(a). Petitioner was sentenced on

June 28, 2002. (Exhibit K, Sentence.) His Motion to Vacate Judgement was filed just five

days later, on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit L). Respondents proffer no reason why additional time

could not have been taken to obtain an affidavit to present with the motion. Nor do

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 27 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

Respondents offer any reason why counsel could not have obtained such an affidavit prior

to filing his Motion for Reconsideration some 42 days later, on August 14, 2002 (Exhibit O).

Nor do Respondents proffer any tactical reason for failing to present an affidavit. The

undersigned sees none.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that counsel performed deficiently by failing

to submit an affidavit with the motion to vacate.

That does not, however, resolve the issue. Rather, Petitioner must also show

prejudice. To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Here, the Arizona Court of

Appeals decision is again instructive. That decision makes clear that Petitioner’s appeal on

this issue was not rejected solely because of the lack of an affidavit, but also based upon the

failure to “present sufficient evidence of due diligence to obtain a hearing” and because “the

evidence was merely impeaching” and “would not have changed the verdict.” (Exhibit R,

Mem. Dec. at 14-15.) 

Perhaps if Petitioner could show that presentation of the affidavit would have altered

those conclusions, then he might be able to show prejudice. However, nothing in Chambers’

affidavit addresses Petitioner’s lack of diligence in locating him. For example, Chambers’

affidavit does not suggest that Chambers was evading Petitioner or counsel or was otherwise

unlocatable prior to or during trial. 

Nor does anything in the affidavit suggest that the characterization as “merely

impeaching” was incorrect. Indeed, Chambers affidavit does not affirmatively show that

Petitioner was not or could not be the murderer. Rather it simply offers contradictions to the

testimony of others, and asserts that Chambers was not with Petitioner at the motel at the

time of the murder. The Affidavit was, in fact, largely a reflection of the proffer of testimony

that counsel included in the motion. The only significant addition was the claim that

Chambers had been propositioned by various people to incriminate Petitioner. (Compare

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 28 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 -

Exhibit L, Mot. to Vacate at 3-4, and Exhibit V, PCR Pet., Exh. B, Affid.)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the outcome of the proceeding would not have

been different had the Chambers Affidavit been provided by trial counsel. Therefore, the

undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.

Thus, this portion of Ground One should be denied on the merits.

F. SUMMARY

That portion of Ground One based on trial counsel’s failure to submit an affidavit by

Petitioner’s passenger and all of Ground Three (actual innocence) are without merit and

should be denied. The balance of Petitioner’s grounds for relief are unexhausted,

procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice or actual

innocence to excuse that default. Accordingly, those claims must be denied with prejudice.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the portion of Ground One based on

trial counsel’s failure to submit an affidavit by Petitioner’s passenger and all of Ground

Three (actual innocence) of the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October

27, 2008 (#1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October 27, 2008 (#1)be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 29 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 -

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: October 27, 2009 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\08-1970-001r RR 09 09 23 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:08-cv-01970-PGR Document 13 Filed 10/28/09 Page 30 of 30