Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-02151/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-02151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRYANT BERNARD EVANS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 2:13-cv-02151-JHH-TMP

)

CHERYL PRICE, Warden, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The magistrate judge filed his Report and Recommendation (doc. 11) in the abovestyled cause on June 3, 2014, recommending that the § 2254 petition for writ of habeas

corpus challenging the constitutional validity of petitioner’s conviction be dismissed with

prejudice as time-barred. Bryant Bernard Evans (“Petitioner”) filed his objections (doc. 12)

to the Report and Recommendation on June 10, 2014. Having now carefully reviewed and 1

considered de novo the objections to the Report and Recommendation, the report itself, and

other materials in the court file relevant to the case, the court finds that the report is due to

be ADOPTED and the recommendation ACCEPTED. 

 Under the “prison mailbox rule,” the objections are deemed filed on the day it was 1

signed and delivered to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S. Ct.

2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988). Therefore, although Petitioner’s objections to the Report and

Recommendation and the Motion for Reconsideration were received by the court on June 11,

2014, the date of Petitioner’s signature is the deemed filing date. 

FILED

 2014 Jun-17 AM 10:04

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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In his objections, Petitioner argues that the magistrate judge failed to properly

calculate the tolling period brought on by Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition. Specifically, he

argues that he was due to be granted ninety (90) days subsequent to the Alabama Supreme

Court’s denial of certiorari – the time allowed for him to petition the United States Supreme

Court for certiorari review. Petitioner cites Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11th Cir.

2000), to support his position. However, Petitioner has fundamentallymisread Coates which,

in fact, supports the magistrate judge’s determination.

In Coates, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a petitioner’s

application on statute of limitations grounds and specifically addressed the issue of “whether

the time limit for filing [the petitioner’s] federal habeas application was tolled during the

ninety-day period following the Georgia Supreme Court’s refusal to review the state trial

court’s denial of his petition for collateral relief.” 211 F.3d at 1226. The Eleventh Circuit

agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s determination of the matter, which employed a comparison

of the language in 28 U.S.C. Sections 2244(d)(1) and 2244(d)(2). The Eleventh Circuit

reasoned:

The statute specifies that during direct appeal the tolling lasts until (or

more accurately, the limitations period begins to run from) “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). By contrast, the tolling during state collateral review

occurs only while the application for “State post-conviction or other

collateral review . . . is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

2

Case 2:13-cv-02151-JHH-TMP Document 13 Filed 06/17/14 Page 2 of 4
As the Tenth Circuit explained in Rhine, the difference in the wording

of the two provisions is significant. A judgment does not become

“final by the conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time

for seeking such review,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the

Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the case or the time

for seeking review has expired. See Rhine, 182 F.3d at 11156; cf.

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 708, 712 n. 6, 93

L.Ed. 2d 649 (1987)(defining a state conviction as “final” for

retroactivity doctrine purposes when the availability of direct appeal

has been exhausted, including the denial of a certiorari petition by the

United States Supreme Court or the expiration of time for seeking such

review). On the other hand, an application “for State post-conviction

or other collateral review . . . is pending,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), only

so long as the case is in the state courts. See Rhine, 182 F.3d at 1156. 

“A petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is

simply not an application for state [court] review of any kind; it is

neither an application for state post-conviction review nor an

application for other state collateral review.” Id.

. . . 

We agree with the Tenth and Fifth Circuits that the time during which

a petition for writ of certiorari is pending, or could have been filed,

following the denial of collateral relief in the state courts, is not to be

subtracted from the running of time for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) statute

of limitations purposes.

Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2000)(emphasis added). In other words,

the ninety-dayperiod in which Petitioner could have filed in the United States Supreme Court

a petition for writ of certiorari regarding the denial of his Rule 32 petition is not part of the

tolling period because, upon the Alabama Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, the Rule 32

petition no longer was “pending” as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Steed v. Head,

3

Case 2:13-cv-02151-JHH-TMP Document 13 Filed 06/17/14 Page 3 of 4
219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)(affirming the district court’s determination that a

petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court following the denial of

post-conviction relief “does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 2244(d)(2).”). 

Therefore, because the magistrate judge carefully and correctly addressed the issue

raised by Petitioner, his objections to the Report and Recommendation are meritless and are

hereby OVERRULED. Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials

in the court file, including the Report and Recommendation, the Court is of the opinion that

the magistrate judge's report is due to be and is hereby ADOPTED and the recommendation

is ACCEPTED. Accordingly, the complaint is due to be dismissed with prejudice. A Final

Judgment will be entered. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of the foregoing to Petitioner.

DONE this the 17thday of June, 2014. 

 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

4

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