Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_05-cv-03011/USCOURTS-arwd-3_05-cv-03011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

MARK McKENZIE PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-3011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENDANT

O R D E R

Now on this 24th day of April, 2006, comes on for

consideration a certain letter, written by plaintiff’s counsel to

the United States Magistrate Judge, in which he requests a hearing

in the captioned matter “regarding the current state of this case

and the Court’s granting of the Defendant’s Motion to Stay the

Proceedings.” A copy of that letter has been filed as Plaintiff’s

Motion For Reconsideration, and the defendant’s letter response

has been filed as Defendant’s Response To Motion For

Reconsideration.

1. This matter began as an action under the Federal Tort

Claims Act on March 8, 2005. On January 31, 2006, in response to

defendant’s Motion To Stay The Proceedings, the Court

administratively terminated the case, “subject to being reopened

on motion of either party upon the disposition of a FECA claim

based on the facts of this case.”

2. Plaintiff’s letter states that the case is now “in a

state of limbo that will not end because no workers’ compensation

case was ever filed by the Plaintiff.” Defendant disagrees.

3. The Court is puzzled as to why plaintiff’s counsel

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contacted the Magistrate Judge in connection with the Court’s

January 31 Order, since a proper request for reconsideration must

be addressed to this Court and a proper notice of appeal must be

addressed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Nevertheless,

the Magistrate Judge was kind enough to forward the letter to the

Court and it will now be addressed.

The Court notes that, although the letter is not a proper

vehicle by which to request reconsideration (or to appeal, for

that matter), it is being treated as a request for reconsideration

in order to get the dispute resolved and, hopefully, move this

matter on toward conclusion. In that regard, the Court has

reviewed the file to determine whether there is any merit to

plaintiff’s contention that he is in “a state of limbo that will

not end.” It concludes that the contention is without merit.

4. The administrative termination was granted on the basis

of defendant’s contention that there is a “significant

possibility” that plaintiff’s claim is covered under the Federal

Employee’s Compensation Act (“FECA”). This contention was

supported by the Declaration of Edward G. Duncan, Deputy Director

for Federal Employees’ Compensation, Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor. Mr.

Duncan opined that there was a significant possibility that

plaintiff’s claim was covered under FECA for three reasons:

* He had reviewed a Rural Carrier Trip Report kept by the

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Postal Service showing that plaintiff had signed in to

work before he was injured, and a decision of the

Employee Compensation Appeals Board (“ECAB”) held that

an employee within the time and space limits of

employment who takes care of a personal errand does not

ordinarily leave the course of employment to do so.

* Even if plaintiff had not signed in to work at the time

of his injury, ECAB case law holds that an employee is

covered for a reasonable interval before official

working hours while engaged in preparatory or incidental

acts.

* Rural mail carriers are considered to be performing duty

while traveling to and from work.

The FTCA claim filed by plaintiff indicates that he was going

to work the morning of his fall, and that all the other employees

were already at work. His deposition indicates that he had parked

in the employee parking lot before walking to the front door area,

where he fell. Given the ECAB case law and the facts admitted by

plaintiff, the Court agreed with defendant that there is a

substantial possibility that plaintiff’s claim is covered by FECA.

5. Where there is a substantial question regarding whether

FECA coverage exists, several circuits have held that the

plaintiff cannot turn first to the District Court for a tort

remedy, but must start by making a claim under FECA, so that the

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coverage issue can be resolved by the agency. See, e.g., Tippetts

v. U.S., 308 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2002); Noble v. U.S., 216 F.3d

1229 (11th Cir. 2000); Bennett v. Barnett, 210 F.3d 272 (5th Cir.

2000); DePippa v. U.S., 687 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982); Reep v. U.S.,

557 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1977).

These cases point out that a substantial question exists

unless it is certain that the Secretary of Labor would not find

coverage. Whether one parses the coverage issue as a “substantial

question,” or a “significant possibility,” or (as the Court put

it) a “genuine issue,” the Court believes these cases point to the

conclusion that the plaintiff must begin his quest for

compensation by filing an FECA claim. If that claim is accepted

and paid, he has no further recourse. If the Secretary of Labor

concludes that there is no coverage for his injury, he may then

return to this Court and seek to reopen his FTCA case. Either

way, plaintiff’s case is not “in a state of limbo that will not

end.”

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s letter motion for

reconsideration is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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