Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07039/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 19, 2016 Decided June 24, 2016

No. 15-7039

CARLOS ALEXANDER,

APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-01959)

Donna R. Williams Rucker argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellant.

Gerard J. Stief argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee.

Before: MILLETT, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Carlos Alexander brought this disability 

discrimination action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., against his former 

employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (“Authority”). The district court granted summary 

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judgment to the Authority on the ground that Alexander failed 

to come forward with sufficient evidence that he had a 

“disability” as defined in the Act. In so holding, however, the 

district court failed to properly consider the record evidence 

as applied to all three of the Act’s alternative definitions of 

“disability.” We accordingly reverse and remand.

I

Alexander has suffered from alcoholism since 

approximately 1980. The Authority hired him in 1999 as an 

Automatic Train Control Mechanic Helper. In 2007, he 

transferred to a Communications Mechanic Helper position.

One day in April 2007, Alexander’s supervisor smelled 

alcohol on his breath. A breathalyzer test came up positive 

for alcohol. Shortly thereafter, Alexander was suspended and 

referred to the Authority’s Employee Assistance Program.

Alexander returned to work in December 2007, subject to 

periodic alcohol tests. In January 2009, Alexander proved 

unable to comply with the Authority’s internal Employee 

Assistance Program as he again tested positive for alcohol 

while at work. As a result, he was terminated. During the

exit interview, Alexander was told that he could apply to be 

rehired in one year if he completed an intensive alcohol

dependency treatment program. Accordingly, Alexander

enrolled in the Chemical Dependency Intensive Outpatient 

Program at Washington Hospital Center, completing it in 

January 2010. He then sought to be rehired by the Authority

on several occasions, three of which are the subject of his 

complaint. In April 2010, Alexander applied for a 

Communications Mechanic Helper position and received a 

contingent offer of employment, but was later notified that 

“screening/Physical ha[d] disqualified [him].” J.A. 272. 

Alexander submitted a second application for a 

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Communications Mechanic Helper position in August 2011, 

but was informed a few days later that he had again been 

disqualified. Two months later, Alexander applied for an 

Automatic Fare Collections Mechanic Helper position, but 

was not hired. 

On September 13, 2010, after the Authority’s first refusal 

to rehire him, but before the second and third decisions, 

Alexander filed a charge with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that the 

Authority had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) by not rehiring him because of his history of 

alcoholism. The Authority denied the allegation and claimed 

Alexander was not hired because he had falsified information 

on his medical form and failed to produce documentation of 

his completed alcohol dependency treatment program. On 

March 28, 2012, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination 

finding reasonable cause to believe that the Authority’s 

decision not to hire Alexander violated the ADA because 

evidence indicated that Alexander “is a qualified individual 

with a disability” who had not falsified his medical form and 

who had adequately documented his completion of a 

treatment program. J.A. 261–262. When conciliation failed, 

the EEOC issued Alexander a “right to sue” letter on 

September 7, 2012. 

Alexander filed his complaint in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations 

of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, although Alexander 

later dismissed his ADA claim. The district court 

subsequently granted summary judgment for the Authority. 

The court held that Alexander’s claim was timely filed, but 

that Alexander had not established that he is “an individual 

with a disability within the meaning of the [Rehabilitation]

Act” because he failed to point to any evidence in the record 

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“demonstrat[ing] that his alcohol dependency substantially 

limits at least one of his major life activities.” J.A. 305.

II

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, and will affirm only if the record demonstrates both 

that “‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ and 

that ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.’” Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 

(D.C. Cir. 2010)).

A. Disability Discrimination

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o 

otherwise qualified individual with a disability * * * shall, 

solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 

discrimination under any program or activity receiving 

Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act 

expressly incorporates the liability standards set out in the 

ADA. See id. § 794(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b). 

Accordingly, to prevail on a claim of discrimination under the 

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must first establish that he has a 

“disability” as defined in the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9),

705(20)(B). The ADA provides a three-pronged definition of 

the term: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 

individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 

regarded as having such an impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(1). In September 2008, Congress enacted the ADA 

Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 

3553, to ensure “a broad scope of protection” for individuals 

under the ADA (and consequently, the Rehabilitation Act), 42 

U.S.C. § 12101 note. Of particular relevance here, Congress 

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directed that “[t]he definition of disability * * * shall be 

construed in favor of broad coverage * * *, to the maximum 

extent permitted by the terms [of the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(4)(A). 

The district court ruled that Alexander had failed to 

establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the 

Rehabilitation Act because he failed to come forward with 

sufficient evidence showing that his alcoholism “substantially 

limits one or more major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(1)(A). The district court’s analysis, however, 

focused on only the first definition of “disability”—an actual 

and substantially limiting “physical or mental impairment”—

and failed to consider whether Alexander met either the 

record-of-impairment or regarded-as-impaired definitions of 

disability. Compounding the error, the district court also 

applied an outmoded statutory standard, overlooking material 

changes to the governing law worked by the 2008 

Amendments. 

The district court’s central error was in failing to consider 

at all whether the Authority “regarded” Alexander as “having 

* * * an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C), or 

discriminated against him for having a “record of * * * 

impairment,” id. §12102(1)(B), even though Alexander’s 

claim implicated both definitions. The district court 

explained that, in its view, “Alexander does not allege either 

as the basis for his claim.” J.A. 304. But both Alexander’s 

complaint and his opposition to summary judgment make 

clear that he was also alleging discrimination on both recordof and regarded-as grounds. See, e.g., J.A. 11 (Complaint 

¶ 24) (alleging Alexander was informed that “he was not 

eligible to be rehired because of his previous unsuccessful 

completion of the Employee Assistance Program,” i.e., his 

second violation of the Authority’s alcohol policy and 

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resulting termination); id. at 12 (Complaint ¶ 35) (claiming 

that “WMATA does not have a written policy pertaining to 

non-compliance with the Employee Assistance Program,” but 

nevertheless the Authority’s “representatives were not willing 

to rehire him because they feared that rehiring him would 

open the gates for others”); id. at 15–16 (Complaint ¶¶ 65, 67) 

(alleging that the Authority “was aware that [Alexander] 

suffered from alcoholism” prior to his non-selection and 

“intentionally discriminated against [him] because of his 

disability”); id. at 56 (Opp. to Mot. for S.J. 16 (“Alexander 

Opp.”)) (stating that Alexander “was not hire[d] because of 

his history of a disability”); id. at 57 (Alexander Opp. 17) 

(same).

Considering those alternative definitions was critical. In 

particular, after the 2008 Amendments, the regarded-as prong 

has become the primary avenue for bringing the type of 

discrimination claim that Alexander asserts. See 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(g)(3) (“Where an individual is not challenging a 

covered entity’s failure to make reasonable 

accommodations[,] * * * it is generally unnecessary to 

proceed under the ‘actual disability’ or ‘record of’ prongs

* * *. In these cases, the evaluation of coverage can be made 

solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of 

disability[.]”). Critically, while the district court’s decision 

relied heavily on what it deemed to be insufficient evidence 

that Alexander’s alcoholism substantially limited any major 

life activity, the 2008 Amendments eliminate any such 

requirement for a regarded-as claim. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(3) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being 

regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual 

establishes that he or she has been subject to an action 

prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or 

perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 

impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 

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activity.”) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. 

at 380 (2009) (“‘Any individual who has been discriminated 

against because of an impairment * * * should be bringing a 

claim under the third prong of the definition which will 

require no showing with regard to the severity of his or her 

impairment.’”) (quoting Joint Hoyer-Sensenbrenner 

Statement on the Origins of the ADA Restoration Act of 

2008, H.R. 3195 at 4); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (regarded-as 

claim “does not require a showing of an impairment that 

substantially limits a major life activity[.]”). 

Instead, Alexander needed only to show that the 

Authority took “a prohibited action against [him] because of 

an actual or perceived impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2). 

There is no dispute in this case that Alexander’s alcoholism is 

an “impairment” under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 

See J.A. 306 (District Court Op. 310) (finding that Alexander 

adequately “provid[ed] evidence that he has an impairment 

(alcohol dependency) that affects major life activities”); see 

also H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. pt. 2, at 51 

(1990) (“physical or mental impairment” under the ADA 

includes “drug addiction and alcoholism”); Bailey v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1167 (1st Cir. 2002) (“There is 

no question that alcoholism is an impairment for purposes of 

* * * analysis under the ADA.”) (listing cases). 

In addition, Alexander came forward with sufficient 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 

the Authority refused to hire him because of his alcoholism. 

Alexander’s deposition testimony and sworn affidavit attest 

that he was told by Authority representatives at the time of his 

termination that he would be eligible for rehire in one year’s 

time if he successfully completed a substance abuse program, 

a contention supported by the Authority’s written drug and 

alcohol policy itself, as well as a letter from a union official 

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about the conversation. There also is no dispute that 

Alexander successfully completed the Washington Hospital 

Center’s alcohol dependency treatment program and waited a 

year before applying to be rehired. Yet when he did apply, 

the Authority told him that he “couldn’t come back * * * 

because [he] failed the [Employee Assistance] program that 

got [him] fired in the first place, and Metro don’t have 

revolving doors.” J.A. 90; see also id. at 107 (“They said I 

couldn’t come back because I failed the [Employee 

Assistance] program and got terminated.”). 

Alexander further testified that, after applying for the 

Automatic Fare Collections Mechanic Helper position, he was 

pulled out of the line to take the practical entrance exam by 

Rita Watkins, an Authority human resources representative, 

who “remember[ed]” him as “the one that can’t have safetysensitive positions.” J.A. 99, 289; see also id. at 106–107 

(“[S]he told me she remembered me as the one that was 

disqualified and couldn’t come back because of safetysensitive something.”). But Alexander also produced 

evidence suggesting that Automatic Fare Collections 

Mechanic Helper was not a safety-sensitive position. See id. 

at 106 (testifying that Watkins told him that some positions in 

the Automatic Fare Collections department “are non-safety”). 

Compare id. at 266 (listing job code 5226 for the Automatic 

Fare Collections Mechanic Helper position), with Alexander 

Opp. at Exhibit 14, Alexander v. WMATA, 82 F. Supp. 3d 388 

(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:12-cv-01959-TSC), ECF No. 22 (not 

including job code 5226 on “List of Safety Sensitive 

Functions”).

In addition, Alexander testified that, during a meeting 

with Dr. Lisa Cooper-Lucas, the Authority’s medical office 

manager and the person who made the decision to disqualify 

him, she offered shifting reasons for the Authority’s refusal to 

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rehire Alexander. She initially said that Alexander had been 

disqualified for lying on his medical questionnaire form by 

marking a box indicating he had never been in a drug 

treatment program. When Alexander challenged that 

accusation, Cooper-Lucas asserted that the real reason for 

disqualification was that Alexander needed to wait two years, 

not one, before he could be rehired. When Alexander 

countered that version with the information he received from 

the union and other Authority personnel, Cooper-Lucas “got 

mad or upset” and upped the requirement to three years. J.A. 

93. Alexander questioned “how can it take three if it don’t 

take two[?],” which led Cooper-Lucas to declare that he 

“can’t come back at all.” Id. Alexander further testified that

Cooper-Lucas’s boss later informed him that, despite “no 

policy preventing [him] from coming back,” he would not be 

rehired “because it will open the floodgates for people like 

[him].” Id. at 96. 

Deposition testimony from Authority witnesses likewise 

supports Alexander’s claim. Cooper-Lucas confirmed that 

she presided over the Authority’s Employee Assistance 

Program at the time of Alexander’s participation, and thus

was aware of Alexander’s alcoholism before he was 

terminated. J.A. 200–202. She admitted she had no reason to 

believe that Alexander was drinking at the time of his rehire 

applications “to the point where there is a concern about his 

ability to function in a safety-sensitive program,” id. at 222,

and that his physical exam revealed no evidence of drug or 

alcohol use. Yet she insisted that Alexander was nonetheless 

“too much of a risk for a safety sensitive position,” id. at 218–

219. Both Cooper-Lucas and Romina Parahoo, a human 

resources official, also conceded that they could not recall any 

employee who had been terminated for violating the 

substance abuse policy and was later rehired. 

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Further, the record calls into question the nondiscriminatory reasons that the Authority asserted for refusing 

to rehire Alexander. Cooper-Lucas testified that she 

disqualified Alexander because he had falsified information 

on his pre-employment medical form and lacked required 

documentation showing he had been assessed by a substance 

abuse professional trained on U.S. Department of 

Transportation regulations. But she had no recollection of 

ever providing either of those reasons to Alexander. 

Moreover, the record indicates how a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Alexander’s allegedly false answer on the 

medical form could have been accurate: he checked “no” for 

whether he had ever had “drug rehab/counseling.” Alexander 

Opp. at Exhibit 17, Alexander, 82 F. Supp. 3d 388 (No. 1:12-

cv-01959-TSC), ECF No. 22 (emphasis added). See also J.A. 

at 92 (“And I said [to Cooper-Lucas], if I marked that, then 

that had to be a mistake, an oversight, because I said I was in 

your [Employee Assistance] program.”); id. at 232 (counsel 

pointing out to Cooper-Lucas that the form “says specifically 

drug”). Alexander also showed that nothing in the 

Authority’s drug and alcohol policy requires that substance 

abuse programs be approved by the federal Department of 

Transportation. See id. at 281 (“The applicant must also 

provide evidence of having successfully completed an alcohol 

or drug treatment program.”).

Beyond those errors with respect to the regarded-as 

definition of disability, the district court further erred by 

enforcing too strict a definition of the “substantially limits” 

showing needed for Alexander’s actual-disability and recordof-impairment claims. Under the 2008 Amendments, the 

substantially-limits requirement “is not meant to be a 

demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), or to 

require “extensive analysis,” id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). See also 

42 U.S.C. § 12101 note (one purpose of the 2008 

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Amendments is “to convey congressional intent that the 

standard created by the Supreme Court * * * for ‘substantially 

limits’ * * * ha[d] created an inappropriately high level of 

limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA”). 

Given the legal standard prescribed by the 2008 

Amendments, we hold that Alexander came forward with 

sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that his 

alcoholism “substantially limit[ed]” major life activities 

“compared to most people in the general population.” 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). For example, Alexander stated in 

response to interrogatories that “sleeping, daily care 

activities[,] and depression” are the “major life activity or 

activities * * * affected by [his] disability.” J.A. 255. An 

expert medical report from Dr. Roberta Malone provides 

additional detail, explaining that Alexander has a “debilitating 

diagnosis of alcoholism,” id. at 246, and his condition 

“dramatically [a]ffects major life activities, including the 

ability to care for himself, walking, concentrating, and 

communicating,” id. at 248. The report catalogs Alexander’s 

long and difficult history of alcohol dependency, including 

that Alexander had a “stated daily history of consuming a sixpack of beer or half a pint of rum”; that “[h]e also noted 

periods of time during which he could not recollect events 

following his consumption of alcohol (consistent with 

blackouts), as well as a more general deterioration in his 

ability to sleep regularly”; that he previously continued to use 

alcohol “despite a clearly declared motivation to re-commit 

himself to his work, and even in the face of the considerable 

occupational difficulties it presented”; and that he met the 

DSM-IV-TR criteria of “[i]mportant social, occupational, or 

recreational activities given up or reduced because of 

drinking.” Id. at 247–248. The report further indicates that 

Alexander had been assessed a DSM-IV-TR Axis V “Level of 

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function” score of “55-60 (occupational difficulty).” Id. at 

246.

*

 

In sum, the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment because a reasonable jury considering the proffered 

evidence could conclude both that Alexander has a qualifying 

“disability” under all three definitions of the term in the 

Rehabilitation Act, and that the Authority refused to rehire 

him because of his disability. 

B. Statute of Limitations

As an alternative ground for affirmance, the Authority 

maintains that Alexander’s Rehabilitation Act claim is barred 

by the statute of limitations. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 

U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970) (“The prevailing party may * * * 

assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of [its] 

judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even 

considered by the trial court.”); MBIA Ins. Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 

708 F.3d 234, 247 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (an appellee may 

“urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the 

record, although [its] argument may involve an attack upon 

the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon a matter 

overlooked or ignored by it”) (quoting Freeman v. B & B 

Assoc., 790 F.2d 145, 150–151 (D.C. Cir. 1986)) (alteration in 

original). We review de novo the district court’s finding that 

Alexander’s claim was timely, and conclude that the district 

court rightly rejected the Authority’s argument. See, e.g., 

Jung v. Mundy, Holt & Mance, P.C., 372 F.3d 429, 432 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). 

Because the Rehabilitation Act does not specify its own 

limitations period, courts generally “‘borrow’ one from an 

 * At the time of the report, Alexander had been in remission for 

about four years.

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analogous state cause of action, provided that the state 

limitations period is not inconsistent with underlying federal 

policies.” Spiegler v. District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 

463–464 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Alexander argues that the District 

of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations for personal 

injury claims should apply. The Authority argues for the oneyear statute of limitations of the District of Columbia Human 

Rights Act. See Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 

356, 368 (D.C. 2012) (applying the Human Rights Act 

limitation period to discrimination claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act). 

We need not decide which limitations period applies 

because Alexander’s claim was timely either way. If the 

three-year personal-injury limitations period applies, the 

complaint was filed on December 5, 2012, which was well 

within three years of the Authority’s rehiring denials in June 

2010, August 2011, and October 2011. 

If the Human Rights Act limitation applies, there is no 

dispute that the complaint came more than one year after 

those adverse rehiring decisions. But generally when a 

federal court borrows a limitations period from state law, that 

law’s tolling provisions come along as part of the package. 

That is because, “[i]n virtually all statutes of limitations the 

chronological length of the limitation period is interrelated 

with provisions regarding tolling.” Johnson v. Railway 

Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975); see also 

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (“Courts thus 

should not unravel state limitations rules unless their full 

application would defeat the goals of the federal statute at 

issue.”). The Human Rights Act provides that “[t]he timely 

filing of a complaint with the [District of Columbia Office of 

Human Rights], or under the administrative procedures 

established by the Mayor * * * shall toll the running of the 

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statute of limitations while the complaint is pending.” D.C.

CODE § 2-1403.16(a). Importantly, that tolling provision is

also “triggered by the timely filing of a complaint with the 

EEOC” pursuant to a worksharing agreement between the 

EEOC and Office of Human Rights. Jaiyeola, 40 A.3d at

369. 

The Authority argues that the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Johnson forecloses Alexander’s reliance on the tolling 

provision. In that case, the Court held that a plaintiff’s pursuit 

of an EEOC charge for a Title VII claim did not toll the 

limitations period for his 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, noting that 

the remedies available under Title VII and under Section 

1981, “although related, and although directed to most of the 

same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent.” Johnson, 

421 U.S. at 461. 

This case is very different from Johnson for two reasons. 

First, the ADA claim that Alexander exhausted is not 

“separate, distinct, and independent,” but instead is closely 

akin to Alexander’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The 

Rehabilitation Act, in fact, incorporates many of the standards 

and regulations set by the ADA, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.203(b), including provisions that govern 

Alexander’s claim in this case, such as the definition of 

“disability,” see 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9)(B), 705(20)(B). 

Second, the relevant state statute of limitations in Johnson did 

not have any tolling provision, and so the Court deferred to 

the State’s judgment “in setting a limit, and exceptions 

thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim.” 421 

U.S. at 464. This case is exactly the opposite because District 

law mandates tolling. 

The Authority also argues that tolling should not apply 

because Alexander was not required to exhaust administrative 

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remedies before bringing suit under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act. But nothing in the Human Rights Act 

limits tolling to mandatory exhaustion. Indeed, the Human 

Rights Act itself does not inflexibly command exhaustion, 

and its tolling provision applies generally to any time period 

“while [an administrative] complaint is pending.” See D.C.

CODE § 2-1403.16; cf. Simpson v. District of Columbia Office 

of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 396 (D.C. 1991) (under the 

Human Rights Act, “[a]n aggrieved individual may elect to 

file a complaint with [the Office of Human Rights] or in any 

court of competent jurisdiction”) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, Alexander’s complaint was timely filed 

under both the three-year and one-year limitations periods 

provided by District law. 

III

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case 

is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

So ordered.

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