Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02330/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

---

, 

t'lLfiD 

United Sta~ C9urt of Ap~ls 

Tenth Cir~it 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 10 1Q@O 

!lOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

GARLAND L. RUCKER, JR.; JACK T. 

MILLER; RAYMOND L. COMBS; DALE HULL; 

GALE McINTYRE; JAMES WENDT; and 

CHARLES E. MILLER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

THE ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY 

COMPANY, a corporation; THE SOUTHERN 

PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a 

corporation; and THE INTERNATIONAL 

BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 88-2330 

(D.C. No. 83-4262) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before TACHA and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.** 

The plaintiffs are seven locomotive engineers ·who are former 

employees of the bankrupt Chicago, Rhode Island, and Pacific 

Railway, current employees of one defendant, the St. Louis 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 1 
Southwestern Railway Co. ("SLSW11 ) 1 and union members of the 

defendant International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 

("BLE"). The plaintiffs appeal the district court's grant of 

summary judgment dismissing their claims against the SLSW, the 

SPT, and the BLE. We affirm. 

In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the district court 

ruled that (1) plaintiffs' claim that the SLSW violated federal 

law by contravening an Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") 

order which required the SLSW to follow a prior agreement 

governing the labor rights of Rock Island employees as a condition 

for purchasing a Rock Island rail line should be dismissed on 

primary jurisdiction grounds; (2) the six-month statute of 

limitations barred the plaintiffs' seniority rights claims; and 

(3) summary judgment on the plaintiffs' breach of the duty of fair 

representation claim should be granted in favor of the BLE. 

After reviewing de novo these rulings of the district court, 

we affirm for the reasons expressed in the district court's 

memorandum and order attached hereto. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

1 The SLSW is a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant 

Southern Pacific Transportation Company ("SPT"). The district 

court in its opinion assumed the arguments applying to the SLSW 

also applied to the SPT, and we do likewise. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 2 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

FILED 

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

GARLAND L. RUCKER, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY 

COMPANY, a corporation, et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) ___________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Case No. 83-4262 

Plaintiffs in this case are seven locomotive engineers and 

former employees of the Chicago, Rock Is land and Pacific Railway 

(hereinafter, Rock Island). The Rock Island went bankrupt and 

plaintiffs are now employees of the defendant, St. Louis 

Southwestern Railway Company (hereinafter, SSW), a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of the defendant Southern Pacific Transportation Company 

(hereinafter, Southern Pacific). Obviously, defendants SSW and 

Southern Pacific are railroad companies. The other defendant in 

this case is the International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 

(hereinafter, BLE), the union of which plaintiffs are members. 

This case centers upon the protection of labor rights 

following the bankruptcy of the Rock Island and the acquisition of 

trackage or track rights from Santa Rosa, New Mexico to Kansas City, 

Missouri and from Kansas City, Missouri to St. Louis, Missouri. 

Prior to the Rock Island bankruptcy, SSW and Southern Pacific moved 

freight from the West Coast to St. Louis over a line that stretched 

from El Paso, Texas to Corsicana, Texas, northeast through Pine 

Bluff, Arkansas and then east and north to St. Louis. This is 

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 3 
cailed the Corsicana line. After the bankruptcy, SSW received 

approval to purchase the Rock Island trackage from Santa Rosa, New 

Mexico, north and east through Kansas to St. Louis, Missouri. This 

is called the Tucumcari line. The track between Kansas City and St. 

Louis, however, was in such poor shape that it was not used by SSW. 

So, freight bound from the West Coast to St. Louis continued to 

travel over the Corsicana line, which was 400 miles longer than the 

Tucumcari line. 

After the Union Pacific Railroad applied for merger with the 

Missouri Pacific Railroad, the SSW requested the Interstate Commerce 

Commission (hereinafter, ICC) to grant SSW track rights over a 

portion of the Missouri Pacific line stretching from Kansas City to 

St. Louis. This would al low the defendant railroads to emp lay a 

shorter route for freight moving between St. Louis and the West 

Coast without spending huge sums of money to rehabilitate the 

Tucumcari line between Kansas City and St. Louis. The ICC approved 

this request. After January 5, 1983, freight from the West Coast to 

St. Louis was moved by defendant railroads over the Tucumcari line 

to Kansas City and then over the Missouri Pacific tracks to St. 

Louis. Of course, the route was reversed for traffic moving west 

from St. Louis to the West Coast. 

Under the law, conditions for the protection of labor rights 

are placed upon track acquisitions. 49 U.S.C. §11347. As regards 

the acquisition of the Tucumcari line, the ICC found that an 

agreement dated March 4, 1980 between various railroads and various 

unions, including the parties to this case, afforded the labor 

protection required by law. Under the March 4th agreement, 

defendant railroads were required to give preference to former Rock 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 4 
Is Land employees 11 0n appropriate seniority rosters II for additional 

manpower requirements resulting from the purchase of Rock Island 

trackage. 

The March 4th agreement was not self-implementing. A later 

agreement, dated December 12, 1980, was reached between the SSW and 

the BLE, which gave al 1 former Rock Island employees system 

seniority dating to March 24, 1980 for matters related to the 

Tucumcari line. It also gave former Rock Island workers 11 prior 

rights 11 to jobs in their ''home district 11 on the Tucumcari line. 

11Home districts 11 were portions of the Tucumcari line designated by 

the Rock Is land and carried forward by the SSW. The use of prior 

rights al lowed former Rock Is land engineers to have preference for 

jobs in their home district over other employees with longer system 

seniority. 

As regards the acquisition of track rights over the Missouri 

Pacific line from Kansas City to St. Louis, the ICC imposed the 

so-called "Burlington Northern conditions" to protect the labor 

rights of affected employees. These conditions called for the 

railroad and the union to reach an agreement for the selection of 

the work force to handle rail traffic altered by the transaction. 

But, if no agreement was reached, either party could submit the 

dispute to arbitration. 

Prior to the use of the Missouri Pacific track rights, only 

former Rock Is land engineers worked traffic on the Tucumcari line. 

In November 1982, the SSW announced its intention to divert traffic 

from the Corsicana line to the Tucumcari line and over the Missouri 

Pacific tracks. This started on January 6, 1983. Together with the 

diversion of rail traffic, the SSW moved eleven engineers from SSW's 

Corsicana route to the Tucumcari route. Plaintiffs objected to this 

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 5 
arguing that any work on the Tucumcari route should be reserved 

solely for former Rock Island employees. No agreement could be 

reached between the SSW and the BLE members on this issue. So, the 

SSW chose to submit the matter to arbitration. 

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit and tried to enjoin the 

arbitration. This court refused to issue an injunction against the 

arbitration. Eventually, the arbitrator approved a version of an 

implementing agreement negotiated between the SSW and a 

representative of the BLE. Under this agreement, some SSW engineers 

were transferred to the Tucumcari line. 

Plaintiffs allege that the defendant railroads have violated 

the March 4th agreement and, therefore, federal law, by conspiring 

with the BLE to prefer SSW employees to the detriment of former Rock 

Island employees. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendant BLE 

has violated its duty of fair representation by participating in the 

conspiracy. This conspiracy was capped off, according to 

plaintiffs, when the railroads and the BLE submitted substantially 

similar proposals to the arbitrator--proposals which had been 

rejected previously by former Rock Island employees. In support of 

their conspiracy claims, plaintiffs contend that it was financially 

favorable to the railroads to continue to employ SSW employees for 

the diverted traffic instead of paying unemployment benefits to SSW 

employees, as well as new salaries to former Rock Island employees. 

Plaintiffs further contend that Mr. B. R. Parker, the BLE General 

Chairman in charge of negotiations with the railroads, was a SSW 

employee who favored his associates with the SSW over former Rock 

Island workers. 

This case is now before the court upon two long-pending 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 6 
mot~ons for summary judgment--one on behalf of SSW and one on behalf 

of BLE. 1 The court assumes the arguments in favor of the SSW 

apply as well co Southern Pacific. The standards governing summary 

judgment are well-established and shall not be repeated here. 

Both motions advance the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as 

grounds for summary j udgmenc. 

decline jurisdiction over a 

Under chis doctrine, the court may 

case involving issues chat an 

administrative agency has the expertise and opportunity to 

e v aluate. See Englehardt v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 594 F.Supp. 

1157 (N.D. N.Y. 1984) aff'd per curiam, 756 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 

1985). The court believes chis argument provides good grounds for 

dismissing the claims against both railroad companies. Plaintiffs 

contend that this case simply requires a straightforward 

construction and enforcement of the ICC order making the March 4th 

agreement a condition of SSW's purchase of the Tucumcari line. The 

court does not believe the matter is so clear. We doubt that the 

March 4th agreement contemplated the necessary labor protective 

conditions when a diversion of traffic results from two 

transactions--the purchase of the Tucumcari line and the acquisition 

of the Missouri Pacific track rights. Of course, the latter 

transaction was approved in a separate ICC order. The reconciliation 

1 There are other motions pending or under advisement in 

this case. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a denial of 

defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts (Doc. No. 139) is 

granted. The court has under advisement a motion for class 

certification which is rendered moot by the outcome of the summary 

judgment motions. Also pending is a motion to review an order by 

the U.S. Magistrate granting the defendant railroads leave to amend 

their answer to assert a statute of limitations defense (Doc. No. 

143). The court finds that the Magistrate's order is neither 

clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. The order is 

affirmed. A motion to consolidate this case with Case No. 83-6025, 

Volkman v. United Transportation Union, shall be denied. Finally, a 

motion to review an order of the U.S. Magistrate directing sanctions 

against plaintiffs shall be considered in a separate order. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 7 
an& application of the two ICC orders to the situation at hand is a 

task better suited to the expertise of the ICC. In similar cases, 

the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been applied to dismiss 

actions arising from the merger of rail operations. Zapp v. United 

Transportation Union, 727 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1984); Englehardt v. 

Consolidated Rail Corp., supra. Therefore, we believe summary 

judgment may be enforced against plaintiffs' action against the 

railroads under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 2 

While a similar argument might be persuasive as regards 

plaintiffs' unfair representation claim (see Zapp v. United 

Transportation Union, supra, 727 F.2d at 628 n. 18), given the wide 

latitude afforded the union as explained later in this opinion, the 

court does not believe it is necessary to resolve the construction 

and application of the March 4th agreement and the ICC orders to 

decide the claim against the BLE. 

Both motions for summary judgment also raise a statute of 

limitations argument that has some merit in the court's estimation. 

Defendants assert that a six-month limitations period governs this 

case under the holding of DelCostello v. International Brotherhood 

of Te ams t er s , 4 6 2 U . S . 151 (19 8 3) . There, the Supreme Court held 

that a six-month limitations period applied to a suit alleging that 

an employer violated a collective bargaining agreement and that a 

union violated its duty of fair representation in handling the 

plaintiff's claims against the employer. The Tenth Circuit applied 

2 To the extent plaintiffs' action is considered a challenge 

of the arbitrator's decision, subject matter jurisdiction is also 

inappropriate under the holding of United Transtortation Union v. 

Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 822 F.2d 1114 (D .. Cir. 1987). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 8 
the DelCostello holding in Barnett v. United Airlines, Inc., 738 

F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1087 (1984), where it 

enforced the six-month limitations period in an action alleging that 

an employer misadjusted the plaintiff's seniority level in violation 

of a collective bargaining agreement and that plaintiff's union 

acted in bad faith in processing plaintiff's grievance. DelCostello 

has also been applied in railroad cases where employees have made 

claims 

rights 

against 

under 

their employer and their union involving 

and ICC 

seniority 

orders. 

Englehardt v. 

Rail Corp., 

assert chat 

collective bargaining 

Consolidated Rail Corp., 

732 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 

a two-year statute 

agreements 

supra; Sisco v. 

(3d 

of 

Cir. 1984). 

limitations 

Consolidated 

Plaintiffs 

(49 u.s.c. 

11706(c)(l)) for complaints filed before the ICC applies or a 

five-year limitations period (K.S.A. 60-511) for Kansas contract 

actions is applicable. 

We believe the six-month limitations period should be applied 

in this case. In DelCostello, the Court specifically declined to 

borrow a state statute of limitations for a "hybrid" breach of 

contract/fair representation lawsuit. Therefore, the analogy to 

state law suggested by plaintiffs should be rejected. The case 

authority for a two-year statute of limitations (Modin v. New York 

Central Co., 650 F.2d 829 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967 

(1981)) is distinguishable from this case because there, no duty of 

fair representation claim was made against a union. In any case, 

because of this court's holding upon the primary jurisdiction 

argument, the claim against the BLE deserves this court's primary 

attention at this stage. As to this claim, it appears certain that 

a six-month limitations period must be applied. 

- 7-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 9 
Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the seniority rights 

negotiated in the December 12, 1980 agreement more than six months 

before this lawsuit was filed. There appears to be no genuine 

dispute as to this point. Plaintiffs could have brought suit when 

they became aware of the agreement. There is no colorable claim 

that they were misled into sitting on their rights. Therefore, this 

aspect of plaintiffs' suit, the system seniority afforded to former 

Rock Island employees hired by SSW, is not a timely issue for 

consideration. Nor would it appear to be timely if a two-year 

limitations period was controlling. 

As regards the transfer of SSW engineers to the Tucumcari 

line, however, the BLE' s negotiations with the railroads continued 

at least through April 1983. The court believes there is evidence 

to support plaintiffs' claim that they were not aware that the BLE 

had "abandoned" plaintiffs' interests until these negotiations were 

completed and the matter was being prepared for arbitration. This 

revelation may have fallen within the six-month limitations period. 

Therefore, summary judgment against the unfair representation claim 

cannot be predicated upon the statute of limitations argument. 

Nevertheless, the court shall grant summary judgment in favor 

of the BLE because we do not believe a triable issue exists as to 

plaintiffs' claims against the BLE. A breach of the statutory duty 

of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a 

member of the collective bargaining unit is "arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith." ~' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 

171, 190 (1967). A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a 

statutory bargaining representative in situations where the union is 

faced with conflicting interests within its organization. Humphrey 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 10 
v. ~ Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Evaluated by this standard, 

plaintiffs' evidence can in no way be viewed as supporting an 

actionable claim for relief against the BLE. 

The court finds nothing arbitrary, discriminatory, or 

about a decision advocating the transfer of SSW engineers 

hostile 

to the 

Tucumcari line after the acquisition of the Missouri-Pacific track 

rights made the diversion of rail traffic from the SSW' s Corsicana 

line economical. It was not unreasonable to consider the 

rearrangement of the labor force under the Burlington Northern 

conditions. These conditions were prescribed by the ICC as a 

requirement for the ICC's approval of the acquisition of the 

Missouri Pacific track rights. The acquisition of the track rights 

resulted in the displacement of SSW engineers who had manned traffic 

diverted from the Corsicana line. Although plaintiffs contend the 

preference granted former Rock Is land employees by the March 4th 

agreement is controlling, it was not unreasonable or discriminatory 

to conclude that the subsequent ICC order imposing the Burlington 

Northern conditions took precedence over the earlier order regarding 

the purchase of the Tucumcari line and, therefore, that the 

interests of the SSW engineers had to be considered as part of the 

transaction. Nor was it unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory 

to permit SSW engineers who had lost work due to the diversion of 

rail traffic to follow their work to another district. This 

practice is consistent with general principles of the BLE as 

contained in its Constitution and Standing Rules. 

C. Miller at 116 and J. Systma at 101-02.) 

(Depositions of 

Plaintiffs cannot establish a genuine issue of fact regarding 

their unfair representation claim on the basis of their opposition 

-9-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 11 
to ·the BLE' s position (assuming the BLE took a position contrary to 

plaintiffs' interests), the ties of Mr. Parker to SSW employees, or 

the provisions of the March 4th agreement. The BLE' s position on 

the transfer of SSW engineers was necessarily adverse to some of its 

members. It could not please everybody. This does not mean its 

representation was unfair or in bad faith. See Humphrey v. Moore, 

supra. Summary judgment against fair representation claims has been 

granted in analogous cases (including one from this district) 

involving merging work forces where it was claimed that a union 

sided against a group of its members in grievance proceedings. 

Bernard v. McLean Trucking Co., 429 F.Supp. 284 (D.Kan. 1977); 

Ferrara v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 301 F.Supp. 1240 

(N.D.Ill. 1969). The ties of the BLE General Chairman, Mr. Parker, 

to SSW workers is also not sufficient to create a genuine issue of 

fact in light of the other circumstances indicating the 

reasonableness of the BLE's position--namely, the Burlington 

Northern conditions and the BLE' s constitution and bylaws. 

Furthermore, it is undenied that two different union 

representatives, not Mr. Parker, represented the BLE at the hearing 

before the arbitrator. These representatives may not have argued 

against transferring some Corsicana route engineers. But, this can 

be considered evidence of the reasonableness of Mr. Parker's 

conduct. Finally, the application of the March 4th agreement to the 

situation at hand is sufficiently uncertain that it is reasonable as 

a matter of law to conclude that there was no mandate granting all 

work on the Tucumcari line to former Rock Island employees when 

traffic was diverted to the Tucumcari line by reason of the 

acquisition of Missouri Pacific track rights. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 12 
On the basis of the above-stated reasoning and authority, the 

court shall grant summary judgment to defendant BLE. 

In cone lus ion, summary judgment for all defendants is 

granted. Plaintiffs' motions at Doc. Nos. 143 and 36 are denied. 

Plaintiffs' motion at Doc. No. 139 is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this /1?J:_day of May, 1988 at Topeka, Kansas. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 88-2330 Document: 01019971236 Date Filed: 04/10/1990 Page: 13