Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02389/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

J & C Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a As Is Arizona 

an Arizona Corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Raymond Srour, d/b/a El Mundo and d/b/a 

Canal Wholesale Distribution, and Jane 

Doe Srour, husband and wife, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV11-02389-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, for 

change of venue. Doc. 9. Plaintiff opposes. Doc. 10. The motions have been fully 

briefed. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny both motions.1

I. Background.

 Sometime around July 2009, Plaintiff contacted Raymond Srour to discuss a 

potential financing relationship. Doc. 10 at 4. During this conversation the parties 

discussed general terms in which Plaintiff would be willing to provide financing to 

Defendants. Id. Between July 2009 and January 2010, Plaintiff made six separate loans 

to Defendants. Id. at 5. Throughout this time Defendants made fifteen payments to 

Plaintiff’s bank in Arizona by wire transfer. Id. Plaintiff claims that additional money is 

 

1

 The parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because the issues have been 

fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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owed by Defendants. 

II. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue. 

A diversity action may be brought in any venue that meets the criteria of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(a): 

(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity of 

citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in 

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in 

the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events 

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the 

property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district 

in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the 

action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may 

otherwise be brought. 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). There is a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of 

forum. Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A. Venue is Proper Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Venue is proper in this district under § 1391(a)(2) if a “substantial part” of the 

events giving rise to the suit occurred in Arizona. The parties’ dealings in this case were 

largely oral. Plaintiff made loans to Defendants while Plaintiff was located in Arizona. 

Defendants, located primarily in New York, used the loans for transactions around the 

country. In addition to the fact that Plaintiff made loans from Arizona, other events 

touched this State. Defendant Raymond Srour initiated contact with Plaintiff through a 

Macy’s representative. Doc. 10 at 6. Defendants directed communications about the 

business relationship to Arizona, including solicitations for new financing. Id. 

Defendants caused invoices to be sent to Plaintiff in Arizona. Doc. 10 at 7. Defendants 

made payments to Plaintiff in Arizona. Id. Given these facts, the Court concludes that a 

substantial part of the events giving rise to the suit occurred in Arizona. See Multi-Media 

Intern., LLC v. Promag Retail Servs., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1024. 1033-34 (D. Kan. 2004) 

(“The contacts in this case consist entirely of oral, written, and electronic 

communications between both parties. Even if it is true that a substantial part of the 

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events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim occurred in California, it is equally true that a 

substantial part of the events surrounding Plaintiff's claim occurred in Kansas.) (citing 

Etienne v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1181 (D. Kan. 1998) (concluding 

that a substantial part of the relevant conduct took place in Kansas because “the primary 

events giving rise to this [breach of contract] action ... occurred by means of 

communications between ... two states,” and “to the extent that [the] events occurred 

anywhere, they occurred almost as much in Kansas as in Alabama”)). Because 

§ 1391(a)(2) is satisfied, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. 

III. Motion to Transfer the Action for the Convenience of the Parties.

Defendants move in the alternative to transfer this action to New York.2

 Even 

where venue is proper, a court may transfer a civil action to another district “for the 

convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a). The Court has discretion “to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 

‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Jones v. GNC 

Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). In Jones, the Ninth Circuit 

provided the following list of non-exclusive factors to consider: 

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and 

executed; (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law; (3) the 

plaintiffs choice of forum; (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the 

forum; (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the 

chosen forum (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums; 

(7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of 

unwilling non-party witnesses; and (8) the ease of access to sources of 

proof. 

Id. at 498-99. Defendants have the burden of demonstrating that transfer is appropriate, 

see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-256 (1981), and “must make a strong 

 

2

 Although the Plaintiff failed to address the motion to transfer in its response brief, the response brief and supporting affidavits are sufficient to allow the Court to 

determine the appropriateness of this motion. 

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showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” Decker 

Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir.1986). 

 After considering these factors, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to 

transfer. The party’s negotiations occurred over the telephone and Internet; there is no 

mention of documents signed or recorded in either Arizona or New York. As a resident 

of Arizona, Plaintiff has strong contacts here and Arizona is most familiar with Plaintiff’s 

state law claims. The financing relationship between the parties allegedly created a 

continuing obligation for Defendants to make payments to Plaintiff in Arizona, and the 

Court has identified above a number of contacts Defendants initiated with Arizona. (It is 

also noteworthy that Defendants do not challenge the fact that they are subject to personal 

jurisdiction here.) While the costs associated with maintaining a suit in Arizona may be 

higher for Defendants (Doc. 9 at 6; Doc. 13 at 4), Plaintiff would face the same burden if 

this suit were transferred to New York. (Doc. 10 at 10). Finally, although some witnesses 

are located in New York, they appear to be employees of Defendants who likely would 

be amendable to travelling here for trial. If not, the parties could preserve their testimony 

through depositions.3

 

“A court should not lightly disturb a plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Holder Corp. v. 

The Main Street Distrib., Inc., No. CV-86-1285 PHX RCB, 1987 WL 14339, at *8 

(D.Ariz. Jan.16, 1987) (citing N. Acceptance Trust v. Gray, 423 F.2d 635, 654 (9th 

Cir.1970)). Defendants “must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant 

 3

 Defendants attach to their reply memorandum a declaration of Defendant Srour 

setting forth facts relevant to the § 1404(a) claim. Materials submitted for the first time 

with a reply memorandum will not be considered by the Court because the opposing 

party has not had a fair opportunity to respond. See Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., 

Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 n. 6 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citing Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for 

the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 843 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

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upsetting [Plaintiff's] choice of forum.” Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. The Court 

concludes that Defendants have not met this burden. 

IV. Improper Removal. 

Plaintiff’s response addresses potential problems with Defendants’ removal of this 

case from Arizona state court – some defendants did not join the removal or file a written 

consent to removal. Doc. 10 at 3. Failure of all Defendants to join a notice of removal is 

procedural, not jurisdictional. Johnson, 892 F.2d 423; Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 

685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Aero Services Intern, Inc., 657 F. Supp 519 (E.D. 

Va. 1987). The Court cannot remand a case sua sponte for a procedural defect more than 

thirty days after the notice of removal was filed. Maniar v. Federal Deposit Insurance 

Company, 979 F.2d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, Plaintiff must file any 

motion to remand for a procedural defect within thirty days of the notice of removal. Id.

at 784. Plaintiff did not do so. The Court will not remand this case. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to or transfer (Doc. 9) is denied. 

Dated this 9th day of March, 2012. 

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