Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02098/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02098-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD WALKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-02098-SMS PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR A 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(Doc. 6)

Plaintiff Harold Walker is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge

on December 14, 2009.

On February 8, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction, asserting

that Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and numerous other

Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances; denied him access to the courts; denied

him medical treatment; charged him with violating probation for refusing to stay at a facility that

was not accessible to Plaintiff, who is mobility impaired; and required him to submit to drug

testing without valid penological reason. 

A preliminary injunction preserves the status quo if the balance of equities favors the

moving party so strongly that justice requires court intervention to secure the parties’ positions

until the lawsuit is ultimately resolved on its merits. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.

390, 395 (1981). To secure a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate “either (1) a

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combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in its favor.” Arcamuzi v. Continental Air

Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9 Cir. 1987). Under either approach, the plaintiff “must th

demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Id. No injunction should issue if the

plaintiff fails to demonstrate “a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough

to require litigation.” Id. “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,

one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of

persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations

omitted). A mandatory preliminary injunction such as the one plaintiff seeks here “is subject to

heightened scrutiny and should not be issued unless the facts and the law clearly favor the

moving party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9 Cir. 1993). th

Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the stringent requirements for the grant of a preliminary

injunction. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s February 8, 2010, motion for a

preliminary injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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