Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01210/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FILL D 

Unit~ Stat.es Court of Appeal! 'l'rntl, Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LEWIS STEVEN AMOS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

U.S. WEST COMMUNICATIONS, Network ) 

Services, Operation Services, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

FEB 1 7 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No. 92-1210 

(D.C. No. 91-M-1666) 

(District of Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SETH and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff appeals prose from the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado, which rejected 

his Title VII claim against Defendant, his former employer, after 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-1210 Document: 010110171193 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 1 
a two-day bench trial at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. We affirm. 

I 

On January 1, 1990, Plaintiff was involved in an ugly racial 

incident with a co-worker during which she called him a "f---ing 

nigger." Plaintiff admits that during this incident he called her 

a "degenerate ho," i.e. a whore. (R. Supp. vol. I at 102-03.) 

After this inci dent, Plaintiff, an African-American male, was 

fired, while the co-worker, a white woman, was not. Plaintiff 

subsequently brought this action. 

The trial court explicitly found that Plaintiff was a victim 

of racial animus on the part of his co-worker. However, it was 

correct in pointing out that the issue in this case is not a 

racial bias on the part of the co-worker, but rather racial bias 

on the part of the management in imposing disparate punishments on 

Plaintiff and his adversary. 

The trial court found that the managers who fired Plaintiff 

were not motivated by racial bias. Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 52(a), we may only reverse if that finding is "clearly 

erroneous." We conclude that it is not . 

The trial court noted that Plaintiff did not enter this incident with a clean employment record. Rather, he had been involved 

in a series of disputes with co-workers beginning in 1986 . At the 

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Appellate Case: 92-1210 Document: 010110171193 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 2 
time of the altercation on January 1, 1990, he was under a "warning of dismissal," under which one further incident could result 

in his dismissal. Under these circumstances, the trial court 

found that the dismissal was not racially motivated. Because all 

of these contentions find support in the record, we must affirm 

the district court. 

Plaintiff argues that in so ruling, the trial judge ignored 

Defendant's pattern of condoning racial harassment in the workplace. The record does not support this argument . The co-worker 

who used such hateful language towards Plaintiff did not escape 

discipline. Rather, the testimony, undisputed by Plaintiff, shows 

that despite having no record of prior office altercations, Defendant suspended the co-worker without pay during the investigation 

of the incident, placed a reprimand in her permanent record, 

required her to attend an Equal Employment Opportunity class, and 

placed her under a warning of dismissal for one year. This was 

the severest punishment which Defendant could impose short of dismissal. 

Plaintiff also argues that his disciplinary record did not 

form a non-invidious justification for the more severe punishment 

he received, because he claims that his record resulted from a 

pattern of one-sided investigations by management into the various 

incidents. However, the trial court found that Plaintiff was 

employed under a collective bargaining agre ement which contained 

provisions allowing Plaintiff to file grievances regarding any 

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Appellate Case: 92-1210 Document: 010110171193 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 3 
disciplinary actions taken against him. There is no evidence that 

Plaintiff had successfully challenged any of these disciplinary 

actions through the grievance process. Under the circumstances, 

the trial court was justified, stating that Defendant "was 

entitled to rely on [the record of the prior altercations] as being documented incidents whether they were fairly documented or 

not." (R. vol. II at 338.) The trial court's conclusion that 

Plaintiff's disciplinary record was "a valid justification for 

treating these employees differently," (id.), is not clearly 

erroneous. 

II 

Plaintiff also appeals from the district court's dismissal of 

his claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (Supp. 1992) and 42 U.S . C. § 

1983 (1988) . We find no reversible error. 

Plaintiff is correct in asserting that§ 1981, as well as 

Title VII, is a proper statute for bringing claims of post-hire 

racial discrimination. While§ 1981 was briefly interpreted as 

not covering actions such as this, see Patterson v. McLean Credit 

Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1989), the original understanding of 

§ 1981 was restored by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 101, Pub . 

L. No . 102 - 166 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b), (c) 

(Supp . 1992)). See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 

18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 556 . There is a 

substantial question as to whether the Civil Rights Act of 1~91 

applies to this case, because both the events in question and the 

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Appellate Case: 92-1210 Document: 010110171193 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 4 
filing of the present suit occurred prior to its enactment on 

November 21, 1991. However, we need not reach that issue because 

Plaintiff's§ 1981 claim, like his Title VII claim, requires a 

showing that Defendant acted in a racially discriminatory manner. 

The trial court found that Defendant did not. The dismissal of 

Plaintiff's claim under§ 1981 therefore had no effect on the outcome of this case. 

Section 1983 is inapplicable to this case, as it only applies 

to deprivations of rights under color of state law. While Defendant is a regulated utility, it is not considered a state actor in 

situations that are not closely related to subjects that the state 

regulates. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-

51 (1974). Because employee discipline is not a subject that the 

state regulates, Defendant is not a state actor for purposes of 

this suit. 

III 

Finally, plaintiff argues that he was prejudiced by not having the testimony of Merle P. Rowland, another employee of Defendant who apparently was Plaintiff's supervisor. We find no 

reversible error. 

While Plaintiff appears prose in this appeal , he was represented at trial by counsel . As such, he is answerable to normal 

procedural requirements from the trial. Whi le Mr. Rowland is mentioned at several points in the testimony, he is not mentioned by 

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Appellate Case: 92-1210 Document: 010110171193 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 5 
Plaintiff in his proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law 

nor in Plaintiff's opening statement. His name does not appear on 

Plaintiff's pre-trial witness list. We have found no indication 

in the record that Plaintiff ever attempted to call Mr. Rowland. 

Plaintiff therefore may not argue that the absence of his testimony constituted reversible error. 

IV 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

6 

Entered for the court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Chief Judge 

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