Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02431/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02431-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES ANDERSON MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 

(CDCR), et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02431-EMC 

ORDER OF SERVICE

Docket Nos. 3, 11, 15, 20

I. INTRODUCTION

Charles Anderson Miller, an inmate at the Correctional Treatment Facility in Soledad, 

commenced this action by filing a complaint in Monterey County Superior Court. Defendant 

Posson then removed the action to federal court because the complaint‟s claims for violations of 

Mr. Miller‟s rights under the U.S. Constitution presented a federal question. The complaint is now 

before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Mr. Miller‟s application for service of a

summons and complaint on certain defendants, application for appointment of an orthopedic 

expert, and motion for a temporary restraining order also are now before the court.

II. BACKGROUND

The complaint in this action is a very longwinded document -- 58 pages of single-spaced 

typing -- that provides an excessively detailed narrative of medical care providers‟ responses to 

Mr. Miller‟s knee problems for the last seven years. The narrative begins in 2009, and provides 

about 15+ pages (single-spaced) of background material that could be summarized in a short 

paragraph, such as is provided in the next paragraph below. Notwithstanding the wordiness of it, 

the complaint does state some claims for relief. The complaint alleges the following: 

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Mr. Miller hurt his right knee during a fall on March 29, 2009 when he was at an outside 

hospital for care for an unrelated problem. Docket No. 1-2 at 11. He thereafter had knee pain and 

eventually had arthroscopic knee surgery on August 9, 2012. Id.at 15. After the surgery, he 

continued to have knee pain. Doctors at the California State Prison at Corcoran, where Mr. Miller 

was then housed, eventually recommended a total knee replacement (TKR) surgery for Mr. 

Miller.

1

 Id.at 16-17. Dr. Moon informed Mr. Miller that Mr. Miller would receive TKR surgery

as soon as it could be scheduled, and submitted a request for services (RFS) to begin the process 

for final approval of the TKR surgery. Id.at 18. On June 10, 2014, Dr. Beregovskaya, on behalf 

of Dr. Moon, allegedly completed a RFS for a TKR surgery by Dr. Alade that was approved at 

Corcoran on or about June 12 or 17, 2014. That form allegedly was emailed to the Utilization 

Management Registered Nurse (UMRN) at the Correctional Training Facility-Soledad. Id.

As the RFS was being processed at Corcoran, Mr. Miller was being transferred to the 

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad (CTF-Soledad). Mr. Miller left Corcoran on June 10, 

2014, and arrived at CTF-Soledad on June 12, 2014. Id. at 18. Although Mr. Miller‟s TKR 

surgery had been approved at Corcoran, the UMRN at CTF-Soledad took the form to Dr. Darrin 

Bright, who determined not to provide the surgery. Id. at 19.2 Dr. Bright, the UMRN, Dr. 

Beregovskaya and Dr. Zahed Ahmed then allegedly falsified and fabricated medical records to 

show that the RFS had been denied. Id.

 

1

In various documents and in different places in Mr. Miller‟s complaint, the surgery is referred to 

by different names, e.g., total knee replacement, total joint replacement, and total knee 

arthroscopy. For sake of clarity, the surgery will be referred to as TKR surgery throughout this

order. 

2 By citing to a particular page in the complaint on which information may be found, the Court 

does not suggest that the cited page is the only place in the complaint on which allegations relating 

to the claim may be found. For example, there are allegations about the inadequacies of the care 

provided by Dr. Ahmed throughout the complaint. 

Mr. Miller has represented that this action only “concerns events having taken place since 

June 4, 2014.” Docket No. 15 at 2; see also Docket No. 1-2 at 43-59 (identifying the dates of the 

events and omissions giving rise to the causes of actions as occurring in June 2014 and later). The 

allegations about the events and omission on and after June 4, 2014 start at about paragraph 37 of 

the complaint. Defendants must address all the allegations against each of the defendants, starting 

with the allegations in paragraph 37 of the complaint. 

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Dr. Ahmed failed and refused to cause the TKR surgery to be done for Mr. Miller. Dr. 

Bright and Dr. Posson also failed and refused to approve the TKR surgery for Mr. Miller. 

Dr. Ahmed improperly tapered Mr. Miller off MS Contin, an opioid pain medication, and 

failed to prescribe adequate medications to address Mr. Miller‟s withdrawal symptoms. Dr. 

Ahmed also later failed to provide an adequate replacement pain medication. See id.at 26-30. Dr. 

Bright and Dr. Posson also made decisions that caused Mr. Miller to be taken off the MS Contin. 

Id. at 28.

Nurse Robert Deluna and nurse N. Knight did not obtain help for Mr. Miller‟s complaints 

of increased pain and drug withdrawal symptoms in April 2015. Id. at 29-30. Later, in August 

2015, nurse Deluna told Mr. Miller that he “didn‟t want to have anything to do with [Mr. Miller] 

and all of [his] 602‟s” and that nurse Deluna didn‟t want to see Mr. Miller again unless he was 

having a cardiac arrest. Id. at 41. 

Dr. Ahmed prescribed carbamazepine (also known as Tegretol) for pain, after Mr. Miller 

had informed his healthcare providers that he would not give informed consent for them to 

“prescribe antidepressants, antiseizure/anticonvulsant, and/or anti-psychotic/psychoactive drugs 

for „off label‟ use to treat plaintiff‟s right knee pain.” Id. at 33. Dr. Ahmed told Mr. Miller that 

carbamazepine was not such a drug and would have no appreciable side effects. Id. The drug is 

approved as an anticonvulsant, and Dr. Ahmed fraudulently induced Mr. Miller to take it by 

failing to disclose that the drug was an anticonvulsant. Id. Mr. Miller had chest pains and 

irregular heartbeat shortly after taking carbamazepine for the first time, and decided to never take 

it again. Id. at 33-34. When Mr. Miller wrote a letter of complaint to the doctors at the prison 

about the prescription of carbamazepine, his prescription was cancelled. Id. at 34. Nurse Knight 

made comments to the effect that Mr. Miller was creating problems by complaining so much and 

things would get worse if he continued to file inmate appeals and requests for service. Id at 34.

Dr. Schultz prepared a radiology report dated January 22, 2015, which was not “wholly 

incorrect,” but “almost certainly fashioned/created to omit the facts contained in the actual 

12/10/2013 radiology report by Dr. Laufik.” Id. at 23-24. 

Dr. Troup allegedly fabricated a report for x-rays that were ordered but not actually done 

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on April 30, 2015. Id. at 32. 

Mr. Miller was sent to Dr. Williams for a consultation as to the appropriate care for his 

knee. Id. at 39. Dr. Williams saw Mr. Miller via a telemedicine link on July 30, 2015, and wrote 

a report the next day that had several inaccuracies. Dr. Williams opined that a TKR surgery was 

unnecessary because Mr. Miller had not exhausted all conservative treatment options, 

recommended physical therapy and a steroid injection, and directed that Mr. Miller be returned to 

him in 3-4 months. Id. at 40. The return visit did not occur.

Dr. Ahmed then prepared an RFS for steroid injections for Mr. Miller‟s right knee but did 

not order physical therapy. Dr. Ahmed stated that he did not order physical therapy because all 

the physical therapists had done nothing but talk to Mr. Miller instead of providing hands-on 

therapy. Id. at 41. Mr. Miller received the steroid injection on September 2, 2015. Id. at 42.

To date, Mr. Miller apparently has not received the TKR surgery he wants.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Review of Complaint

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

1. Claims Under Federal Law (Third and Seventh Causes of Action)

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). (Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code, also cited by Mr. Miller, 

does not provide a substantive cause of action; it allows for attorney‟s fees.)

Eighth Amendment: The Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

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punishment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures for the safety and health of 

inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prison official violates the Eighth 

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, 

sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate‟s 

safety or health. See id. at 834. Liberally construed, the seventh cause of action of the pro se

complaint states cognizable claims against the following defendants for deliberate indifference to 

Mr. Miller‟s allegedly serious medical needs for a TKR surgery and adequate pain medication: 

Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Bright, Dr. Posson, Dr. Williams, and Doe # 1 (a/k/a the UMRN). Giving the 

complaint the liberal construction to which it is entitled, the complaint states a cognizable claim 

against Dr. Troup and Dr. Schultz, who allegedly created false or misleading x-ray reports used to 

support the denial of a TKR surgery.

Retaliation: An inmate has a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison 

officials without being subjected to retaliation in response thereto. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 

2005) (footnote omitted). Liberally construed, the third cause of action of the pro se complaint 

states a cognizable claim against Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Bright, Dr. Posson, nurse Deluna, and nurse 

Knight for retaliation, as they allegedly denied him proper medical care because of Mr. Miller‟s 

extensive complaining and grievance-filing activity. 

A claim is not stated against Dr. Williams for retaliation, as his activity was limited to 

allegedly providing a telemedicine consultation in response to Mr. Miller‟s many inmate appeals 

and extensive disagreement with the medical care he was being provided. While Dr. Williams‟

acts followed Mr. Miller‟s First Amendment activity, in that Dr. Williams was tasked with

evaluating Mr. Miller due to the latter‟s inmate appeals, merely making a decision adverse to a 

prisoner is not inherently retaliatory. Retaliation has a collateral nature that Mr. Miller‟s approach 

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ignores as he attempts to label as retaliatory everything other than prompt, cheerful and agreeable

responses to his apparently numerous requests.

Fourteenth Amendment: Many of the allegations in the complaint pertain to the handling 

of Mr. Miller‟s inmate appeals. Any mishandling or failure to grant Mr. Miller‟s inmate appeals 

in the prison administrative appeal system does not amount to a due process violation. There is no 

federal constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system for California 

inmates. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (prison 

grievance procedure is procedural right that does not give rise to protected liberty interest 

requiring procedural protections of Due Process Clause); Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Prison officials are not liable for a due process violation for simply failing to process 

an appeal properly or failing to find in Mr. Miller‟s favor. The claim alleged under the Fourteenth 

Amendment is dismissed without leave to amend.

2. Claims Under State Law

Statutory negligence: Under California Government Code § 845.6, “a public employee, 

and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if 

the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care 

and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Liberally construed, the first 

cause of action of the pro se complaint states a claim for relief against the CDCR, Dr. Ahmed, Dr. 

Bright, Dr. Posson, and Doe # 1 (aka UMRN) under California Government Code § 845.6 based 

on their failure to obtain a TKR surgery for Mr. Miller. Liberally construed the second cause of 

action of the pro se complaint states a claim for relief against the CDCR, nurse Knight and nurse 

Deluna under California Government Code § 845.6 based on their failure to obtain care for Mr. 

Miller‟s opioid withdrawal pain and symptoms.

Negligence: Under California law, “[t]he elements of a cause of action for negligence are 

well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] 

(c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Ladd v. County of San 

Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917 (Cal. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Liberally construed, the fifth cause of action of the pro se complaint states a claim for relief 

against Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Bright, Dr. Posson, Mr. Beregovskaya and Doe # 1 (a/k/a UMRN) for 

professional negligence in their response to Mr. Miller‟s need for TKR surgery and pain 

medication. 

California Civil Code § 52.1: The Bane Act, codified at California Civil Code § 52.1, 

makes it unlawful for any person to “interfere[] by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempt[] 

to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual 

or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights 

secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” Liberally construed, the third cause of action of 

the pro se complaint states a cognizable claim for relief for a violation of California Civil Code §

52.1 against the following defendants for interfering with Mr. Miller‟s constitutional right to 

petition the government for redress of grievances: Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Bright. Dr. Posson, nurse 

Deluna, and nurse Knight. A claim is not stated against Dr. Williams, as his activity was limited 

to providing a telemedicine consultation in response to Mr. Miller‟s many inmate appeals and 

extensive disagreement with the medical care he was being provided. 

Intentional Infliction Of Mental Distress: The tort of intentional infliction of mental 

distress has these elements: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the 

plaintiff‟s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation 

of the emotional distress by the defendant‟s outrageous conduct.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 

54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (Cal. 1991). To be “outrageous,” conduct must “be so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. Giving the pro se complaint the 

liberal construction to which it is entitled, the Court is constrained to find that the complaint 

appears to state a cognizable claim against Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Bright, Dr. Posson, nurse Knight, and 

nurse Deluna for intentional infliction of mental distress in their handling of his requests for TKR 

surgery and adequate pain medications.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty: In California, the “doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary one 

and as a consequences of the physician‟s „fiducial‟ obligations, the physician is prohibited from 

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misrepresenting the nature of the patient‟s medical condition.” Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal.App.4th 

740, 748 (Cal. Ct. Ap. 2007). Liberally construed, the sixth cause of action in the pro se

complaint states a cognizable claim for a breach of fiduciary duty by Dr. Ahmed, who allegedly 

prescribed a pain medication, carbamazepine, that was in a class of medications Mr. Miller 

specifically refused to consent to take.

B. Miscellaneous Motions

Screening the complaint: Defendants‟ request for the Court to screen the complaint is 

GRANTED. (Docket No. 3.) This order does the screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of the 

prisoner-plaintiff‟s complaint.

Medical expert: Mr. Miller requests the Court to appoint an independent orthopedic 

surgeon as a medical expert. (Docket No. 15.) Mr. Miller states that he is not asking for the Court 

to appoint an expert for him, but only for an expert to help the Court evaluate his case and factual 

allegations. He also urges that Defendants should pay the entire cost. Docket No. 15 at 7-8. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows the court to appoint an expert, but the Court does not believe 

appointment of an expert is necessary or appropriate in this case. The Court does not need an 

independent expert to aid the court‟s understanding of the legal claims alleged in this medical care 

case. It is up to the parties to present appropriate evidence, including their own experts if 

necessary, to prove their claims. Further, in a civil rights action such as this, Rule 706(b) 

contemplates that the expert would be paid by the parties, but here Defendants would have to bear 

the entire cost because Mr. Miller apparently is indigent. There is no showing that it is appropriate 

or fair to require Defendants to bear the sole burden of paying an expert witness to present what

Mr. Miller hopes will be a view consistent with Mr. Miller‟s own point of view. The request for 

appointment of an independent orthopedic surgeon as a medical expert is DENIED. (Docket No. 

15.) This ruling in no way precludes Mr. Miller from hiring and paying his own expert witness. 

Service on unserved defendants: Mr. Miller‟s request for service of process on Dr. 

Schultz, Dr. Troup and nurse Knight is GRANTED. (Docket No. 11.) Having found that claims 

for relief were stated against these defendants, service of process will be ordered on them.

TRO request: A temporary restraining order preserves the status quo and prevents 

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irreparable harm until a hearing can be held on a preliminary injunction application. See Granny 

Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award only when 

a plaintiff makes a clear showing that he is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. 

Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The standards for a temporary restraining order 

mirror that for a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & 

Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm that would result if an injunction were 

not issued, (3) the balance of equities tips in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the 

public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.3The irreparable injury must be both likely and 

immediate. See id. at 22; Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish 

standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary 

injunctive relief.”)

Mr. Miller has filed a request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel 

defendants (a) not to transfer him and (b) to arrange the TKR surgery Mr. Miller wants. He is not 

entitled to a TRO on either point. 

Mr. Miller‟s contention that he should remain at CTF-Soledad so that he does not suffer 

further delay in surgery due to a transfer rings hollow in light of the theme of his complaint that

doctors at CTF-Soledad -- the chief medical executive, the chief physician and surgeon, and his 

primary care provider -- have steadfastly refused to provide him with the surgery he wants. Mr. 

Miller also has not shown that his transfer to another prison is imminent. The memorandum from 

his most recent classification committee hearing on May 18, 2016, does not show that he is soon 

 

3 Winter did not, however, completely reject the validity of the sliding scale approach to 

preliminary injunctions. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2011). Under the “sliding scale” approach used in the Ninth Circuit – also dubbed the “serious 

question” test in Alliance for Wild Rockies -- “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are 

balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id.

at 1131. Thus, even after Winter, “„serious questions going to the merits‟ and a hardship balance 

that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two 

elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).

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to be transferred. See Docket No. 23 at 70. Moreover, even if Mr. Miller is transferred, effective 

injunctive relief could be ordered if he prevails because at least one of the defendants (CDCR) 

apparently would have statewide authority to provide the requested surgery. Mr. Miller‟s request 

for a TRO to keep him at CTF-Soledad fails because he does not “demonstrate irreparable injury is 

likely in the absence of” interim relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. He provides no evidence that any 

defendant has threatened or taken steps to transfer him and instead speaks in generalities and relies 

on unpersuasive prison scuttlebutt about medical care to try to make his point that he might be 

transferred. And, he provides no evidence that a transfer would cause him irreparable injury.

As to the request for a TRO compelling defendants to arrange a TKR surgery, Mr. Miller 

has not met the high standard necessary to obtain the extraordinary relief he now seeks. When, as 

here, the party seeks interim relief that requires a defendant to take affirmative action (as opposed 

to refrain from taking action), the movant‟s burden “is doubly demanding,” and he “must establish 

that the law and facts clearly favor [his] position, not simply that [he] is likely to succeed” on the 

merits. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2015). In essence, Mr. Miller wants 

his surgery now, and to litigate his entitlement to it later. But that will not happen because, on the 

record now before the court, it cannot be said that he has demonstrated a likelihood of success on 

the merits, let alone that the law and facts clearly favor his position. The allegations of the 

complaint and the attachments thereto show a sharp difference of opinion between Mr. Miller and 

the defendant-doctors at CTF-Soledad as to whether TKR surgery is necessary at this time. The 

defendant-doctors apparently are of the view that his knee problem is not severe enough to warrant 

TKR surgery, and that other more conservative methods should be pursued. To prevail on an 

Eighth Amendment “claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, [an inmate] 

must show that the chosen course of treatment „was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances,‟ and was chosen „in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the inmate‟s] 

health.‟” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). The evidence now in the record 

does not show a likelihood of success for Mr. Miller in showing that the decisions made by the 

defendants to deny him TKR surgery were done with deliberate indifference to Mr. Miller‟s 

serious medical needs. Further, under state law, a plaintiff alleging professional negligence by a 

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doctor must support his claim with expert medical evidence, which Mr. Miller has not yet done. 

See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 410 (Cal. 1976) (citation omitted) (“„The standard of care 

against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the 

knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by 

their testimony [citations], unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within 

the common knowledge of the layman.‟”); Bromme v. Pavitt, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1498 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1992) (“in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical 

probability based upon competent expert testimony”). For these reasons, Mr. Miller‟s request for 

a temporary restraining order is DENIED. (Docket No. 20.)

C. Filings and Procedural Rules

Finally, the Court notes that numerous filings from Mr. Miller have been unnecessarily 

long-winded (e.g., the 58-page single spaced complaint, the 7-page single spaced declaration in 

support of the application for appointment of an expert, and the 8-paged application for 

appointment of an expert (which was in addition to the 11-page memorandum of points and 

authorities in support of that application)). In the future, Mr. Miller should attempt to be more 

concise in his filings. A memorandum of points and authorities should contain all his legal 

arguments, but should not be bulked up with unnecessary and irrelevant argument. Any 

declaration he submits should not include legal argument and should only contain statements of 

facts of which he has personal knowledge. 

Plaintiff must comply with the following rules about formatting and scheduling. First, any 

motion, legal brief or declaration he files may have text on only one side of a page, must be 

double-spaced with no more than 28 lines per page (except that quotations may be single-spaced), 

and any typewritten text must be at least 12-point type. See N.D. Cal. Local Rule 3-4(c). Second, 

for any motion, the motion-- including the notice of motion as well as the legal argument (also 

known as the points and authorities) in support of the motion -- may not exceed 25 pages in 

length. N.D. Cal. Local Rule 7-2. Any opposition brief or memorandum of points and authorities 

may not exceed 25 pages of text, and any reply may not exceed 15 pages to text. N. D. Cal. Local 

Rule 7-3. After the reply is filed, no further argument, briefing or evidence may be submitted. All 

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motions will be decided on the papers without oral argument unless the Court specifically orders 

otherwise.

IV. CONCLUSION

1. The complaints states cognizable claims against the defendants under federal and 

state law as stated in Section A of the Discussion section, above. All of the defendants except Dr. 

Schultz, Dr. Troup and nurse Knight have been served and appeared in this action. 

2. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the first amended complaint and a copy of all the 

documents in the case file upon the following three defendants:

(1) Christopher Schultz, M.D. 

Radiology group

Queen of the Valley Hospital 

1000 Trancas Street

Napa, CA 94558

(2) B. Troup, M.D. 

Radiology group

Queen of the Valley Hospital 

1000 Trancas Street

Napa, CA 94558

(3) N. Knight, R.N.

c/o Management Solution, LLC

200 Pine Avenue, Suite 300

Long Beach, CA 90815

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for 

dispositive motions is set:

a. No later than August 26, 2016, Defendants must file and serve a motion for 

summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case 

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date 

the motion is due. If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, Defendants must provide to 

Plaintiff a new Rand notice regarding summary judgment procedures at the time they file such a 

motion. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012). If Defendants file a motion to 

dismiss for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, Defendants must provide to Plaintiff a 

notice regarding motions to dismiss for non-exhaustion procedures at the time they file such a 

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motion. See Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

b. Plaintiff‟s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than September 23, 2016. 

Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided later in 

this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff also must 

bear in mind the notice and warning regarding motions to dismiss for non-exhaustion provided 

later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion to dismiss. Plaintiff also is 

cautioned that he must comply with the Court‟s page limitations, i.e., his opposition brief may not 

exceed 25 pages in length. 

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and 

served no later than October 7, 2016.

4. Plaintiff is provided the following notices and warnings about the procedures for 

motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for non-exhaustion of administrative 

remedies:

The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by 

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for 

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. . . . Rule 56 tells you what 

you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no 

genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute 

about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 

who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by 

declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on 

what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in 

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict 

the facts shown in the defendants‟ declarations and documents and 

show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do 

not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is 

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand 

v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The defendants may file a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

instead of, or in addition to, a motion for summary judgment. A motion to dismiss for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies is similar to a motion for summary judgment in that the court will 

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consider materials beyond the pleadings. You have the right to present any evidence you may have 

which tends to show that you did exhaust your administrative remedies or were excused from 

doing so. The evidence may be in the form of declarations (that is, statements of fact signed under 

penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents (that is, documents accompanied by a declaration 

showing where they came from and why they are authentic), or discovery documents such as 

answers to interrogatories or depositions. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to 

exhaust, the court can decide disputed issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. If 

defendants file a motion to dismiss and it is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be 

no trial. See generally Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d at 1008. 

5. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on a Defendant‟s 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to the Defendant‟s counsel. The Court may 

disregard any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a 

Defendant‟s counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly 

to the Defendant, but once a Defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to that Defendant. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court‟s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

9. Defendants‟ motion to screen the complaint is GRANTED. Docket No. 3. 

Plaintiff‟s request for service of process on three unserved defendants is GRANTED. (Docket No. 

11.) Plaintiff‟s request for appointment of an independent expert and for a temporary restraining 

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order are DENIED. (Docket Nos. 15, 20.)

10. Plaintiff must provide a name for the defendant he refers to as “UMRN” and 

alternatively as Doe # 1 no later than August 26, 2016, so that s/he may be served with process. 

Failure to provide the true name and address of that person by that date will result in the dismissal 

of that defendant. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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