Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00237/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frederic B. CLEERE

Plaintiff,

v. 

State of ARIZONA

Defendant.

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CV 07-237-DCB-CRP

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Petitioner Frederic Cleere (“Cleere”), presently an inmate of the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person In

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1). Petitioner asserts the trial

judge improperly sentenced him with four aggravating factors not admitted or found by a

jury in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights as outlined in Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004). The Government contests the Petition, arguing Petitioner procedurally

defaulted his claim on the first aggravating factor of serious physical injury and that his

claims on all four factors fail on the merits. (Doc. 9). Because this Court concludes that

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal claim on the first aggravating factor, serious

physical injury, and notwithstanding that default, his claim on all four aggravating factors

fails on the merits, it is the report and recommendation of this Court that the Petition be

denied.

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1

The Court draws these facts from Cleere’s Presentence Report (Doc. 9-2, Ex. J), the

Reporter’s Transcript of Resentencing Hearing (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A), Cleere’s Plea Agreement

(Doc. 9-1, Ex. C), and the Arizona Court of Appeals’ first decision (Doc. 9-1, Ex. B).

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 In August of 2000, Cleere began living with Alida Cook in Sierra Vista at the Los

Arcos Mobile Home Park. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. J, p. 20.1

) Over the course of the next two weeks

Cook began to suspect that Cleere was stealing money from her. (Id.) During the evening

of August 27, 2000 Cook confronted Cleere about some gold coins she believed he had

stolen from her. (Id.) After the confrontation, Cook went to her bedroom and began opening

the closet door. (Id.) At this time, Cleere came up behind her, grabbed her, and slit her

throat with a box cutter from ear to ear, exposing her trachea. (Id.) She collapsed onto her

bed, bleeding profusely. (Id.)

 According to Cook’s statement at the resentencing hearing, Cleere then sat on her back

and listened for noise. (Doc. 9-1 Ex. A p. 20.) Cleere then took $1,500 from Cook’s purse

and left the room. (Id.) Cook was able to reach a phone and dial 911. (Id.) She told the

police that “Freddie Cleere had cut [her] throat.” (Id.) Cook stated that Cleere then came

back into the room, removed the phone from Cook, and cleaned it. (Id. at p. 21). She further

testified that he then said, “Alita, what does it take to kill you” and again sat on her back until

he could no longer hear Cook breathing. (Id.) Cleere then left the room and the premises.

(Id.) Two hours later, police officers arrested Cleere at his mother’s home in Bisbee,

Arizona. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. J, p. 21). 

 In March of 2001, Cleere entered a plea agreement with the state, pleading guilty to

attempted murder. (Doc 9-1, Exhibit B, p. 31). The agreement stipulated that he would not

be sentenced to more than a partially aggravated term of 15 years. (Doc. 9-1, Exhibit C, p.

46). 

 In preparation for his sentencing, Cleere submitted a letter stating “This letter is not

intended to minimize or justify the violent crime I committed.” (Doc. 9-2, Exhibit J, p. 22).

On April 17, 2001, the Arizona Superior Court sentenced Cleere to an aggravated sentence

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of 15 years, the maximum allowed by his plea agreement. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The judge used the

fact that Cleere had used a dangerous weapon and inflicted serious physical injury to both

enhance and aggravate the sentence, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-604(I) and 13-702(C)(1) (West

2001). (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A, pp. 22-23). Cleere successfully sought post-conviction relief on

the ground that the same factors cannot be used to both enhance and aggravate a sentence.

(Doc. 9-1, Ex. B, pp. 31-32).

 At the resentencing hearing, the judge acknowledged his error and then separated the

factors using one factor to enhance Cleere’s sentence and the other factor to aggravate it.

(Doc. 9-1, Ex. A, pp. 21-26). The trial judge enhanced Cleere’s sentenced based solely on

Cleere’s use of a dangerous instrument. (Id. at 23). He then aggravated Cleere’s sentence

by finding Cleere inflicted serious physical injury to the victim. (Id. at 26). Cleere admitted

he caused serious physical injury to the victim in his change of plea hearing. (Doc. 15-2, p.

38). The exchange between the court, counsel, and Cleere went as follows:

THE COURT: Ms. Bechman [Cleere’s Attorney], would you state the

factual basis that would support the plea?

MS. BECHMAN: Yes, your Honor. On August 27th, the year 2000,

Fred Cleere did use a sharp instrument to cut the throat of Alida

Cook, intending that injury to be a mortal wound. Fortunately, she

was able to summon medical attention, and she survived. These

events occurred in Cochise County.

THE COURT: Mr. Fest [the Prosecutor], anything to add to the

factual basis?

MR. FESTA: I think that covers it, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Cleere, you’ve heard what your attorney has

said about what happened on August 27, 2000. Do you agree with

her?

[CLEERE]: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: You did do those things.

[CLEERE]: Yes, I did.

(Id. at 38-39).

 At the resentencing hearing, Cleere’s attorney again stated that “[o]n August 27th, the

year 2000, Fred Cleere did use a sharp instrument to cut the throat of Alita Cook, intending

that injury to be a mortal wound.” (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A, p. 9). Cleere did not object to this

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statement by his attorney. (Id.) 

 In addition to the aggravating factor of serious physical injury admitted by Cleere, the

judge also considered a number of other factors in sentencing Cleere. He considered as

mitigating factors: Cleere’s lack of criminal history, his peaceable behavior over 36 years,

and his expression of remorse. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A, p. 22). The judge then considered as

additional aggravating factors: the especially cruel nature of the crime, the mental and

emotional harm to the victim, and Cleere’s committing the offense in expectation of

pecuniary gain (the $1500 he took from Cook’s purse). (Id. at 23-24, 26).

 The judge sentenced Cleere to the maximum allowed under the plea agreement, a

partially aggravated term of fifteen years. (Id. at 26).

 Cleere once again appealed his sentence, this time arguing that serious physical injury

was an essential element of attempted murder, and therefore could not be considered as an

aggravating factor under A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(1). (Doc. 9-1, Ex. B, p. 32). He also contested

the court’s finding of the four aggravating factors as against the weight of the law and the

fine and surcharge the court imposed on him. (Id.)

 The trial court rejected his arguments about the aggravating factors, but did grant him

relief on the surcharge. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. B, p. 32).

 Cleere appealed the trial court’s decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9-1,

Ex. B, p. 32). While his petition for review to the Court of Appeals was pending, the United

States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The Court of

Appeals granted Cleere leave to file a supplemental brief based on the effects of the case.

(Id. at 33). In his supplemental brief, Cleere argued three of the four aggravated factors used

against him were not Blakely-compliant, including the especially cruel nature of the crime,

the mental and emotional harm to the victim, and Cleere’s committing the offense in

expectation of pecuniary gain. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. B., p. 34). Regarding the first aggravating

factor of Cleere inflicting serious physical injury, Cleere stated “Blakely has no impact.”

(Doc. 1, Ex. 1, p. 10). Cleere maintained his state law argument that under A.R.S. § 13-

702(C)(1) “serious physical injury” is an essential element of attempted murder and cannot,

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then, be an aggravating factor. (Doc 9-1, Ex. B, p. 33).

 The Court of Appeals agreed with Cleere that the three aggravating factors (the

especially cruel nature of the crime, the mental and emotional harm to the victim, and

Cleere’s committing the offense in expectation of pecuniary gain) were not Blakelycompliant as they were not found by a jury or admitted by Cleere. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. B, p. 36).

Therefore, the appellate court found the trial judge improperly considered those factors at

sentencing and remanded the case for resentencing. (Id. at 41). Addressing the first

aggravating factor, infliction of serious physical harm to the victim, the Court of Appeals

found Cleere did not challenge that factor on Blakely grounds. (Id. at 35). The court then

held “absent any argument by Cleere to the contrary, we assume without deciding that the

trial court’s finding of serious physical harm to the victim as an aggravating factor did not

violate Blakely. (Id.). The court also noted in footnote 4 that the partial dissent persuasively

argued Cleere admitted this aggravating factor and that such an admission was Blakelycompliant. (Id. at 35, n. 4). The Court of Appeals rejected Cleere’s state law claim regarding

the first aggravating factor of serious physical injury. (Id. at 34). 

 Both the State and Cleere appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Arizona

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied Cleere’s petition but granted the State petition.

(Doc. 9-2, Exs. F and G). Rather than conduct a hearing, the Supreme Court vacated the

Court of Appeals’ opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of State v.

Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578 (2005), and State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2005). (Doc. 9-2,

Ex. G). 

 These cases held that once one aggravating factor is proven beyond a reasonable doubt

to a jury or admitted by the defendant, the judge may, in his discretion, sentence the

defendant up to the maximum amount allowed by the one aggravating factor. Martinez, 210

Ariz. at 583 (holding “[o]nce a jury finds the facts legally essential to expose a defendant to

a statutory sentencing range, the sentencing judge may consider additional factors in

determining what sentence to impose, so long as the sentence falls within the established

range”); Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 n. 4 (noting Justice Stevens’ dissent in U.S. v. Booker,

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543 U.S. 220, 278 (2005), that “[j]udicial factfinding to support an offense level or an

enhancement is only unconstitutional when that finding raises the sentence beyond the

sentence that could have lawfully been imposed by reference to facts found by the jury or

admitted by the defendant”). 

 On remand, the Arizona Court of Appeals began its Blakely analysis by addressing the

first aggravating factor, Cleere’s infliction of serious physical injury to the victim. (Doc. 9-2,

Ex. H, p. 12). Like its initial analysis of this factor in the original decision on Cleere’s

second post-conviction appeal, the court found Cleere did not challenge this factor on Blakely

grounds and “forfeited his right to challenge that aggravating factor under Blakely.” (Id. at

12-13).

 The court then went a step further than its original decision and found that even if

Cleere had not waived his Blakely challenge on this first factor, he could not establish that

he was prejudiced by the judge’s finding. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. H, pp. 13-14). The court noted that

Cleere never challenged the fact that the victim sustained serious physical injury. (Id. at 14).

The court cited defense counsel’s statement at resentencing that “Cleere took a box cutter and

he cut [the victim’s] throat” and the presentence report that stated the victim’s “cut went from

ear to ear and the trachea was exposed.” (Id.). 

 The court then reasoned that because the trial judge found the first aggravating factor

of serious physical injury, which was uncontested by Cleere and regardless not prejudicial

to him, the trial court could properly consider other aggravating factors. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. H,

pp. 14-15). Therefore, the Court of Appeals found the trial court did not err in considering

the four aggravating factors and it denied relief. (Id. at 15).

 Cleere appealed this decision to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 15-2, p. 2). The

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on June 28, 2006. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. I, p. 17). 

 Cleere filed his federal habeas petition in this Court on May 22, 2007. (Doc. 1). In his

petition to this Court, Cleere now argues that his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment and

the holding of Blakely that the maximum sentence a judge may impose is the one allowed

“solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”

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542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis in original). For the first time, Cleere alleges the finding of

serious physical injury as an aggravating factor violates the holding of Blakely and the Sixth

Amendment. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6).

II. ANALYSIS

A. REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW.

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners filing federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review; (2) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). 

 Next the prisoner must show either he has exhausted the remedies available in the

courts of the State, or there is an absence of available State corrective process, or

circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). To properly exhaust state remedies a petitioner must “fairly present

his claims to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). Specific to Arizona, exhaustion requires that a petitioner either

fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999), or show that no state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719

F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir.

1982)). This requirement of exhaustion is designed to give the State an initial opportunity

to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights. Picard v. Connor,

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404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).

 Under procedural default, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal

review in either of two ways: by showing either that a state court found a claim defaulted on

state procedural grounds, or, if the claim was never presented in any forum, that no state

remedies remain available to the petitioner. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-730,

735 (1991). 

 The first type of procedural default occurs when a state court “makes an adequate and

independent finding of procedural default” that finding “will bar federal habeas review of the

federal claim, unless the habeas petitioner can show ‘cause’ for the default and ‘prejudice

attributable thereto,’ or demonstrate that failure to consider the federal claim will result in

a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989) (internal

quotation marks omitted). However, the adequate and independent finding cannot be

equivocal: “[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state court rending a judgment in the case ‘clearly and

expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Id. at 263 (internal

quotation marks omitted). If it is not clear that the state court decided the claim based on an

independent and adequate state law ground, but rather its decision was interwoven with

federal law, there is a conclusive presumption of jurisdiction. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 733.

 The second type of procedural default occurs when a petitioner has technically

exhausted his federal claim in state court because no available state remedy remains, but the

petitioner failed to present that claim in state court. To determine whether any state remedy

remains with a claim that has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court

looks to the state procedural rules. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9 (1989). In

Arizona, determining whether a petitioner’s unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted

involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule

32 governs post-conviction relief proceedings and outlines the circumstances under which

a state prisoner may seek relief. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on

any claim which could have been raised in a direct appeal under Rule 31or a prior Rule 32

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petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain claims not applicable here.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. (For exceptions see Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d)-(h): State prisoners may seek

relief in successive PCR Appeals for: claims of incarceration beyond sentence expiration,

newly-discovered material facts, failure to timely file for relief not prisoner’s fault,

significant change in the law retroactively applicable, or actual innocence). When a

petitioner fails to exhaust his claims in state court but cannot now return to state court

because the state procedural rules bar Petitioner’s claims, the claims are procedurally

defaulted for purposes of his federal habeas petition. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223,

1231 (9th Cir.2002). 

 If a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not

review the claim unless the petitioner shows “cause and prejudice” for the failure to present

the constitutional issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence.

See Gray, 518 U.S. at 162, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (9th Cir.1989). When a

petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and the petitioner has not shown cause or

prejudice for the default, “the district court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has

no further recourse in state court.” Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231 (internal citations omitted).

 Only after a petitioner has passed the timeliness, exhaustion, and procedural default

requirements may this Court review the merits of his claim. Under the AEDPA, a federal

court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings” unless the State court decision was (1) contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion

of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review). A state court’s decision is “contrary to”

clearly established precedent if (1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

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nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406.

The state court’s application of Supreme Court law must be more than incorrect or erroneous;

it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “When

applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a

state court ....” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations

omitted).

B. EVALUATION OF PETITIONER’S PROCEDURAL POSTURE.

1. Timeliness.

 Respondents do not contend that Petitioner filed his claim in federal court in an

untimely manner, and the record reveals the Petition was timely.

2. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

 Respondents contend Cleere’s Sixth Amendment Blakely challenge to the finding of

the first aggravating factor, serious physical injury, is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 9,

pp. 5-6). After Blakely was decided in 2004, Petitioner sought and the Arizona Court of

Appeals granted him leave to supplement his second post-conviction appeal raising any

relevant Blakely issues. In his supplement, Cleere chose to argue only that three of the

four aggravating factors found by the trial judge violated Blakely. He did not argue that

the first factor, serious physical injury, violated Blakely. In fact, he focused on a state law

claim and said “Blakely has no impact” on the first aggravating factor.

 In its first decision on Cleere’s second post-conviction appeal, the Court of Appeals

found “absent any argument by Cleere to the contrary, we assume without deciding that

the trial court’s finding of serious physical harm to the victim as an aggravating factor did

not violate Blakely.” (Doc. 9-1, Ex. B, p. 35). On remand from the Arizona Supreme

Court for the other aggravating factors, the Arizona Court of Appeals in its second

decision on Cleere’s second post-conviction appeal, again found Cleere failed to raise a

Blakely claim on the first aggravating factor. The court found Cleere “forfeited his right

to challenge that aggravating factor under Blakely.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. H, pp. 12-13). 

 The Court of Appeals arguably applied an express procedural bar on Cleere’s

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Blakely claim for the first aggravating factor. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230

(9th Cir. 2002). Regardless, Cleere failed to raise a Blakely claim on the first aggravating

factor at the state court level and he would now be precluded from raising such a claim. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2. Cleere fails to prove cause and prejudice for failing to bring this

claim to the state courts. In fact, the state courts gave Cleere the opportunity to bring any

Blakely claims in a supplemental memorandum and he specifically stated Blakely had no

impact on the first factor. Cleere also fails to show any fundamental miscarriage of

justice if the Court does not rule on the merits of this claim.

 While the Court recommends the District Judge find this claim procedurally

defaulted, it will, in the alternative, consider the merits of this claim along with the three

aggravating factors that were properly exhausted.

C. THE MERITS OF CLEERE’S CLAIMS.

 Cleere alleges the trial judge improperly found four aggravating factors when

sentencing him in violation of the Sixth Amendment and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court held any fact, other than a prior

conviction, which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the presumptive sentence,

must be found by the jury under a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard or admitted

by the defendant. 542 U.S. at 303-304.

 In Cleere’s case, the trial judge used Cleere’s infliction of serious physical injury on

the victim as the first aggravating factor. Reviewing the state court record, in its second

decision on Cleere’s second post-conviction appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals opined

that even if Cleere had raised this issue and even if the trial judge had committed error,

that error was harmless and Cleere suffered no prejudice. This Court finds the Court of

Appeals decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law nor is it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

 The evidence supports a finding that no reasonable jury could determine that

Petitioner’s use of a box cutter to cut the victim’s throat from ear to ear exposing her

trachea was not infliction of serious physical injury to the victim. Furthermore, Cleere

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admitted this fact. At his original change of plea hearing, Cleere’s attorney provided the

factual basis for Cleere’s plea, stating that “Cleere did use a sharp instrument to cut the

throat of [the victim] intending that injury to be a mortal wound.” (Doc. 15-2, p. 38). The

trial court then directly questioned Cleere, who affirmed that he had heard the factual

basis, agreed with it, and acknowledged he had done “those things.” (Id. at 39). Cleere’s

Blakely claim on the first aggravating factor fails. 

 Because Cleere admitted the first aggravating factor, his claims that the trial judge

improperly used the other three factors to aggravate his sentence also fail. As the Arizona

Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, once one aggravating factor has been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant, the trial judge is free to consider

any sentence within the range allowed by those facts. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233

(2005). The Court in Booker stated, “[w]e have never doubted the authority of a judge to

exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” Id. The Court

then elaborated, “when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence

within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that

the judge deems relevant.” Id. 

 Here, Plaintiff’s sentence was enhanced by his use of a dangerous instrument (a box

cutter) during the commission of the crime, which gave him a presumptive sentence 10.5

years with a maximum aggravated sentence of 21 years. His plea agreement limited that

aggravated sentence to a maximum of 15 years. Once Plaintiff admitted at his change of

plea hearing that he had caused serious physical injury, the trial judge could properly

consider a sentence up to the maximum of 15 years. The trial judge’s finding of three

additional aggravating factors did not change the maximum aggravated sentence of 15

years that Cleere faced. The state courts properly found no Blakely violation. Cleere’s

claims on all four aggravating factors fail on the merits.

III. RECOMMENDATION

 THEREFORE, IT IS THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of this Court that

District Judge Bury, after his independent review and consideration, DENY and dismiss

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with prejudice Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: CV-07-237-TUC-DCB.

DATED this 16th day of July, 2010.

Case 4:07-cv-00237-DCB Document 16 Filed 07/16/10 Page 13 of 13