Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08125/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lewis Edward Victery,

Petitioner

-vsState of Arizona, et al.,

Respondents

CV-09-8125-PCT-FJM (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 on October 30, 2009 (Doc. 9). On March 1, 2010 Respondents filed their Answer

(Doc. 17). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 22) and Exhibits (Doc. 23) on June 21, 2010. 

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Coconino County Superior Court on four counts

each of sexual conduct with a minor, sexual assault, child molestation and kidnapping of a

minor, all class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children. The charges stemmed from

four separate assaults on his 11-12 year old step-daughter over the course of some 13 months.

He was sentenced on each of the sexual conduct and sexual assault counts to a mandatory

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term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 35 years, and on each of the

molestation and kidnapping counts to a presumptive term of 17 years imprisonment. The

counts arising from each instance were concurrent to each other, but the combined sentence

from each instance was consecutive to the others, with the net effect of four consecutive life

sentences. (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 3/23/06 at 1-4.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 17, a

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal asserting two grounds for appeal:

(1) “whether the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing a witness to

read from two studies analyzing the results of physical examinations of child

sexual-abuse victims and”

(2) “whether the court abused its discretion in precluding evidence of an allegation

that the victim had previously been molested by her biological father.”

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 3/23/06 at 1-2.) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal on

March 23, 2006. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner did not seek further direct review. (2nd Amend. Pet.

Doc. 9 at 3.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On August 5, 2005, during the pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal, Petitioner filed

a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit C). Eventually, counsel was appointed and filed

a supplemental petition dated December 1, 2006 (Exhibit D). The petition asserted claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. On May 4, 2007, the PCR Court

summarily denied the Petition. (Exhibit E, Order 5/4/7.) 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, asserting the same two

general claims. (Exhibit F, PFR.) Review was denied. (Exhibit G, Order 3/18/08.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit H, PFR), which was

denied on July 28, 2008 (Exhibit K, Order). 

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D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 22, 2009 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s

original petition utilized portions of the Court approved form, named solely the Arizona

Attorney General as respondent, and asserted no grounds for relief, those pages of the form

being omitted. Attached within the Petition were various records from the state court PCR

Proceeding, including Petitioner’s PCR Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals

(Doc. 1 at 10) and to the Arizona Supreme Court (id. at 43) and his Reply in the Arizona

Court of Appeals. 

On August 18, 2009, the Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend because

of Petitioner’s failure to name a proper respondent. (Order 8/18/09, Doc. 6.) A court

approved form of petition was appended to the Order. (Id.) 

On August 24, 2009, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition (Doc. 7). This

amended petition was essentially a duplicate of the first, save for the addition of the Director

of the Arizona Department of Corrections as a Respondent, and the addition of a separate

certificate of service.

On October 9, 2009, the Court dismissed the First Amended Petition with leave to

amend because Petitioner had failed to set out any grounds for relief. (Order 10/9/9, Doc.

8.) That order reasoned:

Petitioner used the court-approved form to seek habeas relief, but he

has failed to set forth the grounds upon which he seeks relief. Instead,

Petitioner merely inserts copies of orders, petitions, and briefs from his

state proceedings. That is not sufficient. Petitioner must set forth each

ground for relief separately in the space provided on the court-approved

form, and append additional pages, if necessary. Accordingly, the Court

will dismiss the First Amended Petition with leave to file a second

amended petition. In a second amended petition, Petitioner should

separately state each ground for relief, the federal constitutional right

allegedly violated, and supporting facts.

(Id. at 1-2.)

On October 30, 2009, Petitioner filed his Second Amended Petition (Doc. 9),

identifying four grounds for relief generally describable as: (1) ineffective assistance of

counsel; (2) denial of due process as a result of conviction on uncorroborated testimony of

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the victim; (3) denial of the right to confront witnesses by admission of readings by an expert

from a treatise; and (4) denial of the right to confront and to present a defense, etc. as a result

of preclusion of evidence of the victim making a prior false allegation.

Service and an answer was ordered (Order 12/3/9, Doc. 10).

Answer - On March 1, 2010, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc. 17).

Respondents argue that the petition is untimely, Grounds 2 and 3 are procedurally defaulted

and Grounds 1 and 2 are without merit. Respondents mislabel their procedural default

argument on Ground 3 (hearsay from treatise) as “Ground 4", and do not appear to address

Ground 4 apart from their statute of limitations defense.

Reply - On June 21, 2010, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 22) and Exhibits (Doc. 23).

Petitioner argues that his Petition is not untimely because he complied with the Court’s

orders in filing amended petitions, his claims are properly exhausted and meritorious.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a

1-year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner asserts that this Court has already found his Petition timely. (Reply, Doc.

22 at 5.) Petitioner provides no basis for this assertion. The undersigned finds no ruling

herein on the timeliness of Petitioner’s petition. Indeed, the Court’s service order set forth

procedures for the assertion of a “statute of limitations” defense. (Order 12/3/09, Doc. 10

at 3.) 

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1

 While the finality of the conviction is the normal commencement date for the

habeas limitations period, the statute does provide various exceptions, including newly

recognized claims and newly discovered factual predicates, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1),

Petitioner does not assert any of these apply. It does not appear to the undersigned that these

have any application. 

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2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the

date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1

 Petitioner’s direct appeal

was denied March 23, 2006. Thereafter Petitioner had 30 days to seek further review by the

Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not do so.

Thus, barring any tolling, Petitioner’s one year began to run after Monday, April 24,

2006, and would have expired on April 24, 2007. 

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statutory tolling applies during

the entire time during which the application is pending, including interludes between various

stages of appeal on the application. The “AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of

the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application.’ ” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)). See also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

217 (2002). 

Here, Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was commenced on August 5, 2005, during the

pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal, when Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief (Exhibit C). It remained pending until the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

July 28, 2008 (Exhibit K, Order). Thus, Petitioner’s limitations period was tolled from its

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2

 Petitioner represents that his original Petition was mailed July 21, 2009, his First

Amended Petition was mailed August 21, 2009, and his Second Amended Petition was

mailed October 29, 2009. (Reply, Doc. 22 at 6-7.) 

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inception until July 28, 2008.

The one year began running thereafter and expired on July 28, 2009.

4. Timeliness of Federal Habeas Petition

Petitioner’s current Second Amended Petition (Doc. 9) was filed October 30, 2009,

well after the expiration of the limitations period. His First Amended Petition (Doc. 7) was

filed August 24, 2009, also well after the expiration.2

 However, his original Petition (Doc.

1) was filed July 22, 2009, prior to the expiration. 

Petitioner notes that he was granted leave to amend. (Reply, Doc. 22 at 6.) Such a

grant of leave does not, however, guarantee that the subsequent amendment will be viable

or timely under a statute of limitations. Indeed, the Court undertook no effort, and did not

at the time have the record, to ascertain whether the amendment would be timely. 

Applications for habeas corpus "may be amended or supplemented as provided in the

rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." 28 U.S.C. § 2242. However, Rule 15(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an "amendment of a pleading relates back to

the date of the original pleading when . . . (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - - or attempted to be set

out - - in the original pleading." 

In Mayle v. Felix, the Supreme Court clarified that the relevant “occurrence” for

purposes of Rule 15(c) is not the trial or conviction, but the specific claims being asserted.

“So long as the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core

of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005).

Here, District Judge Martone has already determined that Petitioner’s First Amended

Petition (Doc. 7), “failed to set forth the grounds upon which he seeks relief.” (Order 10/9/9,

Doc. 8 at 1.) Petitioner’s First Amended Petition was essentially the same as his original

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Petition (Doc. 1). Petitioner has not sought reconsideration of that Order. Moreover, the

undersigned magistrate judge hears this matter on referral, and does not presume to be free

to reconsider the referring district judge’s orders.

Even if the undersigned had authority to conclude in the first instance that the original

Petition, as opposed to the First Amended Petition, set forth grounds for relief, the

undersigned finds no principled way to distinguish between the two petitions. They are all

but duplicates of each other, save the named respondents and the certificate of service. 

Moreover, even if not bound by Judge Martone’s decision, the undersigned could not

conclude that the original Petition set forth any claims whose “operative facts” a subsequent

amendment could have in common. It is true that the pro se habeas petition is to be liberally

construed. Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 8889-890 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner cites Balister

v. Pacific Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that a pro

se litigant cannot lose their right to a hearing on the merits on a technical procedural

requirement. Setting forth a claim is not a technical procedural requirement. 

As noted in Mayle, a habeas petitioner is required at a minimum to explicitly set out

the basis for his claims in his petition.

 Under Rule 8(a), applicable to ordinary civil proceedings, a complaint

need only provide “fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) is more

demanding. It provides that the petition must “specify all the grounds

for relief available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each

ground.” Accordingly, the model form available to aid prisoners in

filing their habeas petitions instructs in boldface:

“CAUTION: You must include in this petition all the

grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you

challenge. And you must state the facts that support each

ground. If you fail to set forth all the grounds in this

petition, you may be barred from presenting additional

grounds at a later date.”

A prime purpose of Rule 2(c)'s demand that habeas petitioners plead

with particularity is to assist the district court in determining whether

the State should be ordered to “show cause why the writ should not be

granted.” Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4, if “it plainly appears from the

petition ... that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district

court,” the court must summarily dismiss the petition without ordering

a responsive pleading. If the court orders the State to file an answer,

that pleading must “address the allegations in the petition.”

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3

 “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Entertainment

Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.1997).

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545 U.S. at 655-656 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). 

Here, Petitioner did not merely engage in some inartful layman’s assertion of his

claims in his original petition which could be cured by a liberal construction. Instead, he

simply inserted state filings, leaving it to the Court (and respondents) to ascertain what (if

anything) from them should be viewed as a claim and responded to (as opposed to simply

being portions of the state court record).3

 A court (and respondent) left to make such

determinations would face such imponderables as deciding whether all claims raised in the

state proceeding were urged, whether facts alleged under state law claims were now intended

to be asserted as federal claims, etc. Worse, it would invite such “kitchen sink” litigation.

There would be little impetus for petitioners to not incorporate, either physically or by

reference, their entire state court file, lest they overlook some tangential claim or fact that

may later prove productive when added by an otherwise delinquent amendment.

It is true that Habeas Rule 4 directs the court to evaluate a petition based upon the

“petition and any attached exhibits.” Had Petitioner made any effort to set out his grounds

for relief, and referenced portions of the attached exhibits to provide the meat on an

otherwise bare skeleton, then the court would be obligated to consider those exhibits.

Petitioner did not. His original Petition made no reference to the exhibits. There was no

skeleton of claims on which their meat could hang. Cf. Walton v. Hill, 652 F.Supp.2d 1148,

1170-1171 (D. Or. 2009) (while not preferable, petition could explicitly incorporate by

reference arguments set out in exhibits); and Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005) (habeas

petition adequate where it “ made clear and repeated references to an appended supporting

brief, which presented Dye's federal claim with more than sufficient particularity”).

It is also true that the 2004 amendments to Habeas Rules 2 and 3 were intended to

ameliorate the potential statute of limitations problems where a clerk of the court might be

inclined to return unfiled a procedurally deficient petition. Instead, the clerk is directed to

file “the defective petition and require the petitioner to submit a corrected petition.” Rules

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Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 3 (Advisory Committed Notes to 2004 Amendments).

However, there is no indication that this approach was appropriate where the defects went

beyond such formal requirements as defects “in form,” or the filing “lacked the requisite

filing fee or an in forma pauperis form.” (Id.) If such procedure were extended to matters

of substance, a petitioner could simply submit a filing labeled “habeas petition,” and await

a request for correction before deigning to provide the grounds for relief or even identifying

the custody being challenged, effectively extending the limitations period indefinitely. Nor

are these comments expressed as a limitation on the court’s authority to dismiss substantively

inadequate petitions, something mandated by Habeas Rule 4.

Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that Petitioner’s original Petition set out

no claims to which this Court could look to find a “operative facts” common to the claims

raised in the Second Amended Petition.

Therefore, none of the claims set out in the Second Amended Petition relate back in

time to the original Petition, and they are, therefore delinquent.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available

in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make

it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The petitioner must

additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness, and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it

impossible to file a petition on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

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Petitioner asserts no circumstances prior to his filings in this Court to establish

equitable tolling.

Petitioner does complain that the dismissal of the original Petition was based solely

on the named respondent, and made no reference to deficiencies in the assertion of his

grounds for relief. (Reply, Doc. 22 at 6.) Assuming the Court had some obligation to apprise

Petitioner of those deficiencies in its dismissal of the original Petitioner, Petitioner cannot

show that such failure was the cause of his delinquency. First, Petitioner’s First Amended

Petition was delinquent. So, even had the Court included such notice and Petitioner made

those corrections, the First Amended Petition would have still been untimely, and the claims

therein barred under the statute of limitations. 

Moreover, the Court ordered and the Clerk forwarded to Petitioner a copy of the

approved form. (Order 8/18/9 at 4, and attachments.) The forms instructions clearly

specified: 

All questions must be answered clearly and concisely in the

appropriate space on the form. If needed, you may attach additional

pages. The form, however, must be completely filled in to the extent

applicable. 

 District of Arizona, Court Approved Form for Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Instructions,

at 1. 

Pages 6 through 9 of the form provided spaces to describe the grounds for relief,

supporting facts, and steps for exhaustion. The instructions at the preceding page directed:

12. For this petition, state every ground on which you claim that you

are being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States. Attach additional pages if you have more than four

grounds. State the facts supporting each ground.

CAUTION: ...Also, if you fail to set forth all the grounds in this

petition, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds

at a later date.

Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). Instead of responding to these questions and completing the

form, Petitioner deleted the pages and inserted his exhibits.

While exhibits are permitted, the instructions make clear that they are for a limited

purpose.

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10. Exhibits. If available, you should attach a copy of all state and

federal court written decisions regarding the conviction you are

challenging. Do not submit any other exhibits with the petition. Instead,

you should paraphrase the relevant information in the petition.

Id. at Instructions at 2. 

Thus, Petitioner had ample notice that he was required to provide a statement of his

grounds for relief and supporting facts. Instead of heeding that notice, he regurgitated the

substance of his original petition, again excluding any grounds for relief.

In short, Petitioner fails to offer any extraordinary circumstance that made it

impossible for him to file a timely petition setting forth the substance of his grounds for

relief. Therefore, the undersigned finds no grounds for equitable tolling, and therefore

Petitioner’s Petition must be dismissed as delinquent.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth herein,

the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts

this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be

denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October 30, 2009 (Doc. 9) be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: May 2, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-8125-009r RR 11 04 27 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:09-cv-08125-FJM Document 25 Filed 05/02/11 Page 13 of 13