Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01894/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01894-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jenny Hassiba-Fikke, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Stephen L. Fickett, District Director,

Phoenix, Arizona, Bureau of Citizenship

and Immigration Services, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security;

Robert P. Wiemann, Director,

Administrative Appeals Office, Bureau

of Citizenship and Immigration Services,

U. S. Department of Homeland Security,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-1894 PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment . Doc. #27.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material

fact regarding her entitlement to United States citizenship. For the reasons discussed

below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.

Background

Plaintiff was born on December 4, 1973, in Sweden, to her mother, Frida Fikke, a

native of Norway, and her father, Jacob Corcos (“Corcos”), a naturalized citizen of the

United States. Corcos had moved to the United States in 1961 after marrying Ora CorcosKaree, a United States citizen. They lived together in the United States between 1961 and

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1966 and divorced in 1967. Corcos traveled to Sweden in February of 1973, during which

time Plaintiff was conceived. Corcos returned to the United States alone in March of 1973.

In anticipation of Plaintiff’s birth, Corcos wrote several letters t o Sweden promising

support for Plaintiff and her mother, including a check for $200, and acknowledging plans

for them to live t ogether as a family in the United States. In 1978 and 1987, Corcos sent

Plaintiff plane tickets so she could visit him during her summer breaks from school.

In 1975, Plaintiff’s mother initiated a paternity action in a Swedish court, in which

Corcos was found to be Plaintiff’s biological father. Corcos died in 1992 while residing in

Florida. Plaintiff ap p lied for United States citizenship in 2000, but her application was

denied on the ground that she failed to show she is ent itled to citizenship under 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1401 and 1409(a)(3). 

Discussion

I. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is approp riat e if the admissible evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any

mat erial fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed.

Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). T he moving party bears the initial burden

of establishing t hat there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. Substantive law

determines which fact s are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit . . . will properly p reclude t he entry of summary judgment.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. Similarly, to

preclude summary judgment the dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,

U.S. at 248.

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II. Relevant Law.

The applicable law for conveying citizenship to a child born abroad when one parent

is a citizen is the law in effect at the t ime of the child’s birth. See Scales v. Immigration and

Naturalization Services, 232 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2000). At the t ime of Plaintiff’s birth

in 1973, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (later redesignated as §1401(g)), afforded citizenship to:

a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its

out ly ing possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a

citizen of the United States, who, prior to the birth of such person, was

physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a

p eriod or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were

after attaining the age of fourteen years.

In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) provides that a person born out of wedlock abroad

to a citizen father and a non-citizen mother shall be entitled to citizenship if four statutory

requirements are met:

(1) a blood relationship between the p erson and the father is established by

clear and convincing evidence,

(2) t he fat her had the nationality of the United States at the time of t he

person’s birth,

(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial

support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years,

and

(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years –

(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s

residence or domicile,

(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in

writing under oath or,

(C) the paternity of the person is est ablished by

adjudication of a competent court.

8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1)-(4). 

III. Analysis.

Plaintiff must establish her right to citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.

See Lim v. Mitchell, 431 F.2d 197, 199 (9t h Cir. 1970). It is undisputed that a blood

relationship exist s bet ween Plaintiff and Corcos, a United States citizen at the time of her

birth, and that this relationship was legitimated by a competent court in satisfaction of

§§ 1409(a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(4). Doc. # 27, Ex. B. At issue is whether Plaintiff has met her

burden of showing that her father, at the time of her birth, had been physically present in

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the United St at es for 10 years and provided her with a written promise of support to age

18, as required by §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a)(3). 

A. Residency Requirement.

To sat isfy the ten-year residency requirement, Plaintiff submitted a signed affidavit

from Corcos’ ex-wife verifying his physical presence in the United States for part of 1961,

1962 through 1967, 1968 through 1971, part of 1972 and p art of 1973. Doc. #27, Ex. F.

Plaintiff also submitted Social Security Administration records showing Corcos earned

income in the United States during the years of 1961, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1973, and

claimed self employment income for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971. Doc. #27, Ex. G. 

Defendants offer no evidence to controvert the sworn affidavit of Corcos’ ex-wife

that he resided in the United States for the requisite 10 years. Defendants argue instead

that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient because the documents provide “no evidence of

where [Corcos] lived in 1970 to 1972, and part of 1973, not even a state.” Doc. #32 at 4. But

the affidavit does state that Corcos was in t he Unit ed States for ten years and the statute

requires no more. The statute does not require Plaint iff t o p rove the specific State in which

he resided.

When a motion for summary judgment is made, “an adverse party may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s

response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Defendants p resent

no specific facts concerning Corcos’ residency. They merely deny the sufficiency of

Plaintiff’s evidence, calling the affidavit “ cryptic” and lacking in detail. As noted above,

however, Plaintiff need prove her right t o citizenship only by a preponderance of the

evidence. Her affidavit and Social Security evidence certainly satisfy this minimal standard

when opposed by no controverting evidence. Defendants have not shown that there is

a genuine issue for trial as t o Plaintiff’s satisfaction of the § 1401(a)(7) ten-year residency

requirement. 

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B. Written Promise of Support.

The outcome with respect to the next requirement is different. Section 1409(a)(3)

requires Plaintiff to prove a very specific fact – that her father stated in writing that he

would support her until the age of 18. Like the other requirements of section 1409(a), this

requirement is strict ly applied. See Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services,

533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001). As ot her court s have explained, “[a]n individual seeking citizenship

under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) must meet all of its preconditions.” O’Donovan-Conlin v.

Department of State, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (emphasis in original). 

 Plaintiff has not shown that her father stated in writ ing t hat he would support her

until age 18. Plaintiff has submitted documents showing occasional monetary

contributions from her father, including a $200 check in 1973 for baby furnishings, some

money in 1974, and plane tickets in 1978 and 1987. Plaintiff argues that her fat her’s letters

and this intermittent monetary support substantially comply with the § 1409(a)(3)

requirement. But courts have held that “there is no subst antial compliance exception” to

the highly specific requirement of § 1409(a)(3). Id. at 1084-85. Because Plaintiff has

produced no evidence that her father made a specific writ t en promise to support her

financially until age 18, Plaintiff has failed to satisfied the statutory requirement. T he Court

accordingly will deny her motion for summary judgment. 

IV. Resolution of this Case.

For reasons that are not clear, Defendant s filed no cross-motion for summary

judgment. This presents a dilemma, because it would appear from the summary judgment

briefing that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirement of § 1409(a)(3) and that there is no

issue for trial. 

The Supreme Court has held that summary judgment may be entered in favor of a

nonmoving party even t hough that party has made no formal motion under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 326 (“district courts are widely

acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as

the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.”)

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This principle is in keeping with the spirit and purpose of Rule 56 – that a court may

dispose of an action in which t here is no triable issue of material fact. See Hooker v. New

York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313, 317 (1947). Before entering summary judgment sua

sponte, the Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to produce any additional evidence

in her possession showing that her father made the written promise required by §

1409(a)(3). Unless Plaintiff can produce evidence of such a writing, Defendants will be

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 326. 

Plaintiff must submit such evidence, if it exists, within 20 days of this order. Upon

receiving such evidence t he Court will decide whether any additional response it required

from Defendants.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 27) is denied.

2. Plaintiff shall submit further evidence in satisfaction of 8 U.S.C 1409(a)(3)

 within 20 days of this order.

DATED this 23rd day of November, 2005.

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