Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00518/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00518-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Diego Lerma, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Nogales; et. al, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 12-518-TUC-FRZ (CRP)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff has filed the instant action arising out of his arrest by Nogales Police and

interaction with Nogales EMTs prior to arrest. Plaintiff alleges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and 42 U.S.C. §12131-12134 (“ADA”), and he also alleges state law claims of: assault,

battery, negligence, inadequate training, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, vicarious liability, and exemplary damages. (First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) (Doc. 77)). Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims.

(Doc. 96). For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court, after its independent review, grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 1 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiff filed a “Response to Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts” (Doc. 103,

¶¶ 1-73, at pp. 1-6), which also includes a separate section captioned “Plaintiff’s Additional

Facts” (Doc. 103, ¶¶1-29, at pp. 6-8). Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Separate

Statement of Facts is referred to as “PRDSOF” and Plaintiff’s Additional Facts are referred

to as “PSOF”.

- 2 -

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has epilepsy and has suffered from seizures since he was about 14 years old.

(Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts1

 (“PSOF”) (Doc. 103), Exh. 8, p. 7; Plaintiff’s Supplement to

Statement of Facts (“PSSOF”) (Doc. 104), Exh. 20, pp. 10-11 (Dr. Labiner has been treating

Plaintiff for over 20 years for “refractory epilepsy, epilepsy that’s not responding favorably

to medication.”)). At the time of the incident at issue, Plaintiff was 39 years old, 6'2", and

weighed over 220 pounds. (Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) (Doc. 97), ¶27;

PRDSOF, ¶27). 

On July 12, 2011 at 5:51 p.m., a Nogales Fire Department ambulance was dispatched

to the area of a Subway restaurant in response to 911 call from Subway employee, David

Velarde reporting that a male customer, later identified as Plaintiff, was on the floor “having

like a seizure[]” and a few minutes later got up and left Subway and went around to the back

of a shopping center. (DSOF, ¶1-3, 14; PRDSOF, ¶¶1-3, 14; PSOF, Exh. 1, pp. 21-22, 26,

72). Velarde followed Plaintiff outside the Subway, and when the ambulance came on scene,

pointed him out to the EMTs in the ambulance. (PSOF, Exh. 1, pp.17, 20-22). Velarde

testified that Plaintiff ran around some parked cars, “and the ambulance drove around the

cars trying to talk to him.” (Id. at p. 22). EMT George Boyd, who was driving the

ambulance, drove toward Plaintiff and inquired in English and Spanish whether “he needed

medical attention or if...he had had a seizure...and he didn’t respond.....So we were like well

maybe this isn’t the guy.” (DSOF, Exh. 2, pp. 39-40, 42; see also id. at pp. 43-44 (Plaintiff

never spoke to Boyd, and Boyd and his partner did not get out of the ambulance)).

Concluding that he was unable to locate the person who was the subject of the 911 call,

EMT Boyd and his partner left the area without making any further inquiry. (Id. at p. 44, 93).

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 2 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

After Plaintiff’s encounter with EMT Boyd, Plaintiff entered La Cinderella

Department Store at La Mariposa Shopping Center and walked through the store to the back

warehouse that is off-limits to customers. (DSOF, ¶¶17, 20; PRDSOF, ¶¶17, 20; see also

DSOF, ¶¶22 (La Cinderella is less than 1/4 mile from Subway); PRDSOF, ¶22). La

Cinderella employees contacted 911, and the 911 dispatcher stated in her dispatch about the

incident that the suspect appeared “disoriented.” (DSOF, ¶¶19, 21; PSOF, ¶¶19, 21).

Afterwards, the dispatcher came back on the radio to state:

Just for information, a couple of minutes ago we had a medical call at the

Subway, a disoriented male subject. Might be the same one. Possibly wearing

blue shirt and Levis.

(PSOF, Exh. 14, pp. 81-82 (dispatch made at 18:04:43 p.m.)).

At approximately 6:04 p.m., Nogales police offices responded. (DSOF, ¶20;

PRDSOF, ¶20). It appears that Officer Roberto Fierros and Detective Jose Pimienta may

have arrived first and were later joined by Officers Raymundo De La Ossa and Gaston

Ortega.

 Upon entering the store, which had been locked by La Cinderella employees who had

vacated the premises, Officer Fierros announced “Nogales Police” loudly many times, and

he ordered anyone in the premises to come out. (DSOF, ¶25; PRDSOF, ¶25). With firearms

drawn, the officers began searching the store and discovered Plaintiff partially concealed

behind some shelves in the warehouse area. (DSOF, ¶26; PRDSOF, ¶26). Plaintiff was

wearing an untucked tank-top shirt that hung over the waistline of his jeans, and officers did

not know whether he was armed. (DSOF, ¶¶28-29; PRDSOF, ¶¶28-29). At no time did

officers see that Plaintiff possessed a weapon. (PRDSOF, Exh. 7, p. 166).

Officer Fierros identified himself to Plaintiff as a police officer and ordered Plaintiff

repeatedly to show himself and put his hands up. (DSOF, ¶30; PRDSOF, 30). Officer

Fierros testified that Plaintiff “didn’t show a response. He did not talk back to me. He did

not do as I told, to show me his hands and to come on out from where he was hiding....he did

not show me a sign. He did not make any attempt at communicating back with me.” (DSOF,

Exh. 5, p. 30; see also id. at pp. 28-29, 33). Instead, Plaintiff “continued looking up. He

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 3 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff challenges the officers’ testimony that he was running at Officer Fierros. 

According to Plaintiff’s treating physician, David Labiner, M.D., the literature substantiates

the conclusion that most epileptics are non-confrontational and will not “seek out to do

somebody harm in the aftermath of a seizure.” (PSSOF, Exh. 20, p. 52; see also id. at p. 36

(“trying to restrain somebody who is in a postictal state can actually cause nondirected

violent behavior. So the advice is to gently coax...[d]on’t try to restrain....”); id. at p. 68 (an

epileptic in a postictal state is not likely to seek out confrontation or commit acts of violence

directed against anyone)). 

- 4 -

would make eye contact with [Officer Fierros], just looking straight ahead...and he’d put his

head down and he wouldn’t show any movement. His hands stayed clenched.” (Id. at p. 30).

Officer Fierros also testified that Plaintiff’s behavior and physical characteristics seemed “out

of character...”, in that he usually does not see such behavior when effectuating an arrest.

(Id. at p.29). According to Officer Fierros, Plaintiff stood partially behind a shelf, he was

sweating profusely, his breathing was labored, his pupils were dilated, his fists were clenched

so tightly that sweat was dripping from his hands, and he had a smile-like expression.

(DSOF, ¶32; PRDSOF, ¶32). It never crossed Officer Fierros’ mind that Plaintiff might be

suffering from a disability.2

 (PSOF, Exh. 5, pp. 43-44).

Officer Fierros called out for a taser, and Detective Jose Pimienta took Officer

Fierros’ taser, model # X26, from Officer Fierros’ gear belt. (DSOF, ¶¶33-34; PRDSOF,

¶¶33-34 & Exh. 9). Plaintiff suddenly ran away from Officer Fierros toward the south wall

of the store. (DSOF, 35; PRDSOF, 35). Detective Pimienta ran parallel to Plaintiff the next

aisle over and when they met up at end of their respective aisles, Plaintiff turned and ran back

toward Officer Fierros. (DSOF, Exh. 5, pp. 36-39; DSOF, Exh. 6, pp. 123-24). Officer

Fierros testified that Plaintiff, who is significantly larger than he is, was running directly at

him in an aggressive manner, “with a lot of energy...” and with fists still clenched. (DSOF,

Exh. 5, p. 38 (Officer Fierros braced himself for “a tackle and a strike, a hit” from Plaintiff

because he is “significantly bigger than me, weighs much more than me....”); see also DSOF,

Exh. 6, p.121). At this time, Detective Pimienta was running behind Plaintiff yelling “police,

police stop”, and “taser, taser, taser....” (DSOF, Exh. 6, p.121 & Exh. 5, 37). Because

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 4 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Plaintiff was running “at full speed going directly towards...” Officer Fierros, Detective

Pimienta thought if he did not stop Plaintiff, Plaintiff was “going to run [Officer Fierros]

over. He’s going to injure [Officer Fierros]. So I deploy the taser [in dart-mode] after I say

taser, taser, taser.” (DSOF, Exh. 6, pp. 120-21). The taser’s probes struck Plaintiff in his

back. (DSOF, ¶42; PRDSOF, ¶42). Before making any contact with Officer Fierros,

Plaintiff fell on his stomach and said,“okay, okay, okay, okay” which Detective Pimienta

took as Plaintiff’s willingness to comply with their commands. (DSOF, Exh. 6, pp. 127-28).

Detective Pimienta removed the cartridge from the taser, but did not remove the darts from

Plaintiff. (Id.). Officer Fierros issued several commands to Plaintiff, including to put his

arms behind his back and when Plaintiff failed to do as instructed, Detective Pimienta placed

the cartridge in the taser and deployed it a second time. (Id.). 

Thereafter, Plaintiff moved into a fetal position and continued not to respond to

Officer Fierros’ commands, and Detective Pimienta deployed the taser a third time. (Id. at

129). Plaintiff straightened out his body and Officer Fierros grabbed his left arm in an effort

to get it behind Plaintiff’s back. (Id. at pp. 134-35 (Officer Fierros had control of Plaintiff’s

left arm as the third taser cycle ended)). Officer Fierros directed Plaintiff to put his right arm

behind his back, and when Plaintiff did not do this, Detective Pimienta deployed the taser a

fourth time. (Id. at p. 135). By this time, Officer De La Ossa had arrived, and he grabbed

Plaintiff’s right arm and put it behind Plaintiff’s back. (Id.; see also DSOF, Exh. 7, p. 44

(Officer De La Ossa testified that once Officer Fierros took Plaintiff’s “left hand down and

cuffs him, I go down and try to take his right hand down.”)). Detective Pimienta testified

that: “By then, the [taser’s five-second cycle] is ending...[Plaintiff] straightens out his arms

and he closes the gap, making it hard to put the handcuffs on, especially in a confined area

where we’re at. I’m seeing two officers trying to struggle to get the handcuffs. He’s not

complying, he’s not helping. That’s when I tased the final time.” (DSOF, Exh. 6, p. 135; see

also id. at p. 129 (five-second cycle); DSOF, Exh. 14, p. 59). Detective Pimienta testified

that Plaintiff’s hands were behind his back (one held by Officer Fierros and one by Officer

De La Ossa) before he deployed the taser a fifth time. (DSOF, Exh. 6, p. 138). Detective

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 5 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Pimienta stated that when Plaintiff rolled over onto his back, after the fifth taser, he was

handcuffed. (Id. at p. 140). The taser record shows it was deployed five times as follows:

18:11:08; 18:11:15; 18:11:24; 18:11:32; and 18:12:04.(DSOF, ¶64; PRDSOF, ¶64). 

 Plaintiff was placed under arrest for criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, and

criminal damage for fluorescent light bulbs he broke in the warehouse. (DSOF, 66;

PRDSOF, ¶66). After Plaintiff was Mirandized, he told Officer Fierros that he was in the

store because he wanted time by himself and he did not come out as directed because he did

not know what to do. (Id.). When asked, Plaintiff denied being under the influence of drugs

or alcohol and he denied being mentally ill. (DSOF, ¶67; PSOF, ¶67). When the officers

asked whether Plaintiff had a medical disability card, he did not show them one. (DSOF, ¶68;

PRDSOF, ¶68 (citing PSOF, Exh. 4, Plaintiff contends he left his wallet at Subway)).

Plaintiff was not wearing a medical alert bracelet or necklace at the time of the incident.

(DSOF, ¶69; PRDSOF, ¶69). Nor did Plaintiff tell the officers that he was an epileptic.

(DSOF, ¶70; PRDSOF, ¶70; but see PSOF, Exh. 8, p. 12 (Plaintiff testified that he had told

officers he had a seizure disorder just before the fifth taser shot)). However, Detective

Pimienta testified that even if he had known Plaintiff was an epileptic prior to their

encounter, “[i]f he wasn’t complying,...the same thing would have happened...”, and he

would have treated Plaintiff the same way. (PSOF, Exh. 7, p. 185). 

After the incident, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital where he was diagnosed

and treated for a non-displaced fracture of his left elbow. (DSOF, ¶¶71-72; PRDSOF, ¶¶71-

72).

Plaintiff does not recall anything from the time he entered Subway until he was on the

floor of the warehouse after he had been tasered four times, nor does he remember the pain

from the taser. (DSOF, Exh. 8, pp. 13, 15, 19). Plaintiff testified that before the final taser

shot, he was on his back, some officers were holding him down, another officer was

straddling him, and he told them “there’s no need to do that, where am I,...what year is

this,...you know, have I hurt anyone,... I have a disability, a seizure disorder, there’s no need

to do that anymore. And all he did was smile and do it to me again.” (PSOF, Exh. 8, pp. 11-

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 6 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

12; see also id. at pp. 12-13 (“I told him there’s no need to do that anymore, there’s no need

to tase me...–because I saw the thing in his hand and I was telling him these things, and all

he did was smile and do it to me again.”); id. at pp. 14, 21). 

According to Plaintiff, when the taser was deployed the final time, Detective Pimienta

used the “drive stun” mode against the skin of Plaintiff’s right shoulder. (DSOF, Exh. 8, pp.

14-15). “Drive stun occurs when the cartridge that propels the probes is removed from the

gun and the electrodes on the gun are pressed against the body and the trigger is pulled.”

(DSOF, ¶61; PRDSOF, ¶61). Drive stun mode is used to cause pain rather than to

incapacitate. (PSOF, Exh. 10). For purposes of the instant motion, Defendants “recognize

that...[Plaintiff’s] claim that he was drive stunned one time must be taken as true.” (DSOF,

63; see also DSOF, Exh. 6, pp. 45, 64-65; DSOF, Exh. 7, pp. 60-61 (Detective Pimienta and

Officer De La Ossa deny using the taser in drive stun mode)). 

Plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Labiner, testified that with the “complex partial type of

seizures...”that Plaintiff suffers, “there is a postictal period where there’s anything from

some confusion that can be seconds to minutes long to severe confusion that can go on for

minutes to hours, fatigue, sleepiness, unusual behaviors in the immediate aftermath. People

can look like they’re intoxicated from the time they’re having a seizure and don’t look like

they’re getting back to normal in this period.” (PSSOF, Exh. 20 at p. 34).

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). The

party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]...which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, “a ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is

not to ‘weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan v. Cotton, __ U.S. __, 2014 WL 1757856, *4 (May

5, 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Instead, the

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 7 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

nonmoving party’s evidence is presumed true and all inferences are to be drawn in the light

most favorable to that party. Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289

(9th Cir. 1987); see also Tolan, __ U.S. __, 2014 WL 1757856 at *4 (in deciding a motion

for summary judgment, “a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

opposing party.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the

entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the burden

of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the movant may carry its initial

burden of production under Rule 56(c) by producing, “evidence negating an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s case,” or by showing, after suitable discovery, that the “nonmoving

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry

its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210

F.3d 1099, 1105-1106 (9th Cir. 2000). 

VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (CLAIM 1).

EXCESSIVE FORCE. Defendants argue that they did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights because they did not use excessive force and, even if they did, they are entitled to

qualified immunity. 

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sheehan v. City and County of San

Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In considering qualified

immunity in the context of a motion for summary judgment, “courts engage in a two-pronged

inquiry.” Tolan, __ U.S. __, 2014 WL 1757856 at *4; see also Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d

433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011). The first prong requires determination whether “the facts, ‘[t]aken

in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the officer's conduct

violated a [federal] right [.]’” Tolan, __ U.S. __, 2014 WL 1757856, at *4 (quoting Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201(2001)). “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 8 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Id.

(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).

Defendants argue that there is no §1983 violation because there was no use of

excessive force. “When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest,

the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The inquiry

into whether this right was violated requires a balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the

intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the

governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’ Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8,

105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)....” Id. See also Marquez v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d

1167 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1468 (2013). The Ninth Circuit

“undertake[s] this inquiry with great caution making ‘allowance[s] for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation.’” Marquez, 693 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). Although

“the existence of less forceful options to achieve the governmental purpose is relevant,

‘[p]olice officers ... are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible.’” Id.

(quoting Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807–08 (9th Cir.1994)). 

In excessive force cases, if the evidence when reviewed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff could support a finding of excessive force, then the defendants are not entitled

to summary judgment. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005). “‘Because

[the excessive force inquiry] nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual

contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,...[the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] held on many

occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases

should be granted sparingly.’” Id. (quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir.2002)

& citing Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n. 10 (9th Cir.1997) (as amended))

(“We have held repeatedly that the reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question of

fact for the jury.”)). “This is because such cases almost always turn on a jury's credibility

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 9 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The Ninth Circuit has explained that in dart-mode the taser:

uses compressed nitrogen to propel a pair of “probes”—aluminum darts tipped

with stainless steel barbs connected to the [taser] by insulated wires—toward

the target at a rate of over 160 feet per second. Upon striking a person, the

[taser] delivers a 1200 volt, low ampere electrical charge ... The electrical

impulse instantly overrides the victim's central nervous system, paralyzing the

muscles throughout the body, rendering the target limp and helpless.

Mattos, 661 F.3d at 443 (quoting Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 824 (9th Cir. 2010)).

4

“When a taser is used in drivestun mode, the operator removes the dart cartridge and

pushes two electrode contacts located on the front of the taser directly against the victim. In

this mode, the taser delivers an electric shock to the victim, but it does not cause an override

of the victim's central nervous system as it does in dart-mode.” Mattos, 661 F.3d. at 443

(recognizing “in drive-stun mode, the shock was ‘extremely painful.’”). See also PSOF, Exh.

10 (Drive-stun mode is used to cause pain or discomfort to promote “pain compliance”);

Harris v. Simental, 2013 WL 3733429, *7 n.5 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) (drive-stun mode

“is apparently a lower setting or lesser application of the taser than the ‘dart mode’”).

- 10 -

determinations.” Id.

NATURE OF THE INTRUSION. It is undisputed that Detective Pimienta deployed the taser five

times. Detective Pimienta states that the first time was in dart-mode3

. Although he does not

specify, it appears that the second through fourth taser shots were in dart- mode as well. For

purposes of the instant motion, Defendants “recognize that... [Plaintiff’s] claim that he was

drive-stunned[4] one time [the fifth time] must be taken as true.” (DSOF, ¶63). The Ninth

Circuit has “recognize[d] the important role controlled electric devices like the Taser X26

can play in law enforcement. The ability to defuse a dangerous situation from a distance can

obviate the need for more severe, or even deadly, force and thus can help protect police

officers, bystanders, and suspects alike.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826. In Bryan, the Ninth

Circuit held the taser “X26 and similar devices when used in dart-mode constitute an

intermediate, significant level of force that must be justified by the governmental interest

involved.” Id. Thus, in Plaintiff’s case the first four taser deployments, which were in dartmode, constituted an intermediate, significant level of force that must be justified by the

governmental interest involved. See id.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically identified the level of force used when

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 10 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

a taser is deployed in drive-stun mode, the court has found that deployment of a taser nine

times, twice in dart-mode and seven times in drive-stun, while the officer wrestled the subject

to into submission “constituted a not-insignificant potential intrusion upon [the subject’s]

Fourth Amendment rights.” Marquez, 693 F.3d at 1174; see also Mattos, 661 F.3d at 443

(stating that the court need not decide what level of force is used when a taser is deployed

in drive-stun mode in order to assess the reasonableness of the tasering and holding that the

use of a taser in drive-stun mode three times in rapid succession on a pregnant woman during

a traffic stop was excessive) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007)). Since

Mattos, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have “assume[d] that the taser use in drive stun

mode constituted a somewhat less than intermediate level of force.” Harris, 2013 WL

3733429, *7 n.5; see also Williams v. City of Merced, 2013 WL 498854, *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb..

7, 2013) (same).

A taser cycle lasts five seconds. (DSOF, ¶65; PRDSOF, ¶65). Here, Defendants

deployed the taser in dart-mode four times, within 2-4 seconds of each other, after the fivesecond cycle had run; and approximately 27 seconds after the last dart-mode cycle, Plaintiff

was tasered in drive-stun mode. (See DSOF, ¶64 (the taser was deployed at 18:11:08;

18:11:15; 18:11:24; 18:11:32; and 18:12:04; PRDSOF, ¶64)). Defendants contend that just

before Detective Pimienta deployed the taser on drive-stun mode, Plaintiff was face down

on the floor surrounded by four officers, his arms were behind his back with Officer Fierros

holding his left arm with his left wrist cuffed, Officer De La Ossa holding his right arm, and

Plaintiff straightened his arms out behind him. (DSOF, Exh. 6, pp. 132, 134-35, 137-39; see

also DSOF, Exh. 7, pp. 44-45 (Officer De La Ossa’s testimony that prior to the last taser

deployment, Officer Fierros had handcuffed Plaintiff’s left hand, and Officer De La Ossa had

Plaintiff’s right hand, “[a]nd once we have his right and left hand in the back, he’s still

resisting. So we couldn’t cuff him.”)). Detective Pimienta cannot remember whether Officer

Fierros or Officer De La Ossa had contact with Plaintiff’s arms when he deployed the taser

in drive-stun mode. (DSOF, Exh. 6, p. 139). During this fifth cycle, Plaintiff ended up on

his back in handcuffs, though Detective Pimienta does not know how Plaintiff came to be on

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 11 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

his back. (Id. at p. 140). Plaintiff claims that before the fifth taser shot, he was on his back

and had told the officers that he had a seizure disorder and there was no need to taser him.

(PSOF, Exh. 8, pp. 11-14, 21). The evidence supports the conclusion that the four taser

deployments in dart-mode made in quick succession, together with the drive-stun mode

deployment and the officers’ physical contact with Plaintiff who, after the first taser

deployment remained on the floor, “constituted a not-insignificant potential intrusion upon

[Plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” Marquez, 693 F.3d at 1174. 

GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS AT STAKE. Next, the Court must balance the Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the governmental interests, “by looking at (1) how severe the

crime at issue is, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight.” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 441 (quoting Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d

1272, 1279–80 (9th Cir.2001)); see also Marquez, 693 F.3d at 1174. “‘[T]hese factors,

however, are not exclusive. Rather,...[the court must also] examine the totality of the

circumstances and consider ‘whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular

case, whether or not listed in Graham.’” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryan 630 F.3d

at 826). 

Defendants do not specifically discuss the severity of the crime. Plaintiff persuasively

points out that, at most, when the officers “approached and subdued [Plaintiff], the crime was

trespassing.” (Response (Doc. 102), p. 3). In addition to trespass, Plaintiff was charged with

disorderly conduct and criminal damage because some light bulbs were broken during the

arrest, all lower level misdemeanors. (Id. at pp. 3-4). The charges were dropped two weeks

later. (Id.). 

The employees at La Cinderella reported that Plaintiff appeared disoriented, he did

not threaten them, and they did not feel scared. (PSOF, Exh. 17, pp.12-13, 16; PSOF, Exh,

18, p.12; PSOF, Exh. 19, p10; see also Defendants’ Reply, Exh. 1 (Doc. 107-1), pp. 20 (one

employee stated that Plaintiff’s eyes were glazed and he looked “[a]s if he had been

drinking...[or] was sick or [on] drugs.”)). Here, trespassing, as that offense was committed

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 12 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

by Plaintiff, cannot be viewed as a severe offenses. See Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d

1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (trespassing and obstructing a police officer were not severe

crimes). 

“Ultimately, the ‘most important’ Graham factor is whether the suspect posed an

‘immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.’” Mattos, 660 F.3d at 441 (quoting

Smith, 394 F.3d at 702 (internal quotations omitted)). In considering whether there was an

immediate threat, a “simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety

of others is not enough; there must be objective factors to justify such a concern.’” Id. at 441-

42 (quoting Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281).

 Plaintiff points out that the La Cinderella employee who called 911 said nothing to

indicate Plaintiff might be a threat. He also points out that after the 911 dispatcher

announced the call from La Cinderella, she came back on the radio to state: “Just for

information, a couple of minutes ago we had a medical call at the Subway, a disoriented male

subject. Might be the same one. Possibly wearing blue shirt and Levis.” (PSOF, Exh. 14,

pp. 81-82). Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the officers were on notice that the person at La

Cinderella might be the same person who had a recent “seizure.” (Response p. 4).

Defendants correctly counter that the dispatcher reported only that the person was

“disoriented” and never used the word “seizure.” (Reply, p.3). Further, the parties have not

cited testimony to indicate whether or not the officers actually heard this dispatch. (See

PSOF, Exh. 5, p. 20 (Officer Fierros testified he did not recall whether he heard the

dispatch.)).

When the officers entered the warehouse, they had no confirmation that Plaintiff was

the same man who suffered the seizure earlier or what caused that seizure. Plaintiff blames

the EMTs’ failure for this; nonetheless, upon arriving at La Cinderella, the officers, at best,

knew they were responding to a call involving a reportedly disoriented male. In the

warehouse, they encountered Plaintiff, who is a large man. His shirt hung over the waist

band of his jeans possibly concealing a weapon. He stood partially concealed behind

shelving and he did not respond to officers’ orders to show himself or to show his hands.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 13 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

Plaintiff was sweating profusely, his breathing was labored, his pupils were dilated, his fists

were tightly clenched, and he had a smile-like expression on his face. He ran at first away

from the officers, and when he reached a wall, he turned and ran directly at Officer Fierros,

who was smaller than Plaintiff. The officers contend that Plaintiff did not “comply” with

their orders, and Plaintiff argues that he was not wilfully non-compliant, but was instead in

a postictal state that prevented him from complying. (See PSSOF, Exh. 20, p. 69 (Dr. Labiner

testifying that any resistance from an epileptic in a postictal state is not volitional resistance

and it “would be a misrepresentation” to suggest that Plaintiff was being intentionally violent

while in a postictal state)). 

In any event, the officers’ actions must be evaluated “from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490

U.S. at 396. Plaintiff’s expert and treating doctor, Dr. Labiner, testified at his deposition that

people in a postictal state after an epileptical seizure can appear intoxicated or on drugs,

“[t]hey just don’t look normal.” (PSSOF, Exh. 20, p. 68). He went on to state: “that’s really

where the dilemma comes in, because obviously you treat somebody who is intoxicated and

potentially a danger to you differently than you would treat somebody else. And that’s why

I mentioned earlier that I don’t envy law enforcement for having to do that on the fly.” (Id.).

 Plaintiff argues that in a postictal state, he would not have run toward anyone, but away from

them. Dr. Labiner also testified that a person in a postictal state would not act in a

confrontational manner and if such person is restrained, he may “thrash out in a nondirected

fashion. Somebody may interpret that as directed if they get their clock cleaned from that....”

(Id. at p. 52).

Given the 911 dispatcher’s radio communication that the man reported at La

Cinderella may be the same one who had been reported earlier in the same area as appearing

disoriented, there is a factual question whether the Defendant officers were aware that they

might be dealing with someone with epilepsy. As events quickly unfolded, and Plaintiff

failed to respond to the officers’ orders and ultimately ran at Officer Fierros, who was

smaller than Plaintiff, the first taser shot was deployed. Under these circumstances a

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 14 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to Officer Fierros.

Whether Plaintiff continued to pose an immediate threat by the time the taser was

deployed three additional times in dart-mode and a final time drive-stun mode is a more

difficult question. A reasonable fact finder could find that the threat to Officer Fierros

created by Plaintiff running directly at him was abated after the first taser shot given that

Plaintiff fell to the floor and that before the second shot, he was on the floor on his stomach.

(See PSOF, Exh. 6, p. 65 (Officer De La Ossa testified that when Plaintiff was on the ground,

he did not kick, threaten or yell); PSOF Exh. 5, p. 43 (After Plaintiff was on the ground, he

never hit or took any deliberate action to hurt Officer Fierros)). Officer De La Ossa testified

that by referring to Plaintiff resisting, he meant Plaintiff would not bring his arms together

so they could handcuff him. (PSOF, Exh. 6, p. 65). 

By the fifth taser shot, Plaintiff alleges he was handcuffed; however, Defendants claim

he was not. Instead according to Defendants, Officer Fierros had fastened a handcuff to

Plaintiff’s left wrist and Officer De La Ossa was trying to subdue Plaintiff’s right arm, but

the officers were unsuccessful in handcuffing Plaintiff because Plaintiff had straightened out

his arms. With his left hand in handcuffs, Plaintiff was on the floor (Defendants state

Plaintiff was on his stomach and Plaintiff states he was on his back), Detective Pimienta was

sitting on top of him, straddling him, and he was surrounded by three other officers, two of

whom had hold of each of his arms. According to the officers, it was difficult to handcuff

Plaintiff in such a confined place due to his resistance. The record is clear that several

officers were dealing with Plaintiff. See Beaver v. City of Federal Way, 507 F.Supp.2d 1137,

1145 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (observing that to the extent the plaintiff posed an “immediate

threat” to the officer during the first three taser shots, that threat was significantly diminished

when another officer arrived to provide backup, but acknowledging that if plaintiff resisted

handcuffing the officer could have fired the taser again or moved to manual methods). 

Plaintiff testified that, before the last taser shot, he told the officers that he had a

seizure disorder and there was no need to taser him. (PSOF, Exh. 8, pp. 11-14, 21). 

Other than Plaintiff straightening out his arms, there is no evidence that he was

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 15 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

After the incident, Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where diagnosis included a nondisplaced fracture of his left elbow. Depending on when the fracture occurred, that injury

might have contributed to hampering efforts to handcuff Plaintiff.

- 16 -

resisting.5

 For example, there is no evidence Plaintiff was struggling to get up. Further, the

officers agree that Plaintiff was not kicking, yelling, or making verbal threats. (See PSOF,

Exh. 6, p. 65; PSOF, Exh. 5, p. 43). It is difficult to say Plaintiff posed an “immediate threat”

after the first taser shot, especially given his testimony that before the final taser shot, he told

officers there was no need to taser him.

WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ACTIVELY RESISTING ARREST OR ATTEMPTING TO EVADE

OFFICERS BY FLIGHT. This analysis involves the same facts stated above together with the

fact that the warehouse and La Cinderella store were locked, so there was no way for

Plaintiff to escape. While it is arguable that this factor favors Defendants regarding the first

taser deployment, it is more debatable as events proceeded to the last taser deployment in that

there is no evidence that Plaintiff, other than not giving officers his hands, attempted to rise,

flee or fight. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 702-03 (“To the extent that he physically resisted arrest,

defendants acknowledge that it lasted for only a brief time. Although [plaintiff] refused to

place both his arms behind his back, he did not attack the officers or their dog. In all, it does

not appear that [plaintiff] resistance was particularly bellicose or that he showed any signs

of fleeing the area.”). Moreover, Plaintiff states that he was handcuffed before the fifth taser

shot and he told officers there was no need to taser him. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must on summary judgment, this factor supports a

finding that Plaintiff was not resisting before the last taser deployment.

TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Finally, the Court must examine the totality of the

circumstances and consider “‘whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular

case, whether or not listed in Graham.’” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 445 (considering, inter alia,

officers’ knowledge that the plaintiff was pregnant when they tasered her) (quoting Bryan,

630 F.3d at 826). The Court “must ask if the officers' conduct is ‘[]objectively reasonable[]

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them’ without regard for an officer's

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 16 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

subjective intentions.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 832 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Although

the Ninth Circuit has “held that police are required to consider [w]hat other tactics if any

were available to effect the arrest[]”, Id. at 831 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted), Defendants do not offer any evidence as to whether the officers considered

alternative tactics at any point during their encounter with Plaintiff. 

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury

could conclude that the force used against Plaintiff was excessive in light of the

governmental interests at stake. The officers responded to a report of trespass, a relatively

minor offense. By the time they arrived at La Cinderella, the store had been evacuated and

the doors were locked. (See PSOF, Exh. 4).

In the span of approximately one minute, Detective Pimienta tasered Plaintiff five

times. Four of the shots were deployed while Plaintiff was on the floor. At one point,

Plaintiff was tasered while in a fetal position. By the time the fifth shot was deployed, at

least two of the four officers had hands on Plaintiff and a third was sitting atop him,

straddling him. Though the officers testified that they had difficulty handcuffing Plaintiff

because he straightened out his arms, there is no evidence suggesting that after falling to the

floor, Plaintiff fought, kicked, or attempted rise or flee. Further, because the store was

locked, Plaintiff could not have escaped the officers. Nor were any members of the public

present who potentially could be harmed. Additionally, Plaintiff states that he was already

handcuffed before the fifth taser shot. 

Clearly, whether Plaintiff was handcuffed when the fifth shot was deployed is a

question of fact for the jury. Further, at oral argument, Defendants agreed with the Court’s

statement that “if some jurors think the first [t]aser was bad, and some think only the fifth

[t]aser was bad...” they could still reach a verdict. (Tr. (Doc. 111), p. 33). “The witnesses on

both sides come to this case with their own perceptions, recollections, and even potential

biases. It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our

adversarial system.” See Tolan, __ U.S. __, 2014 WL 1757856 at *6.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 17 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

DID THE OFFICERS VIOLATE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW?

Here the Court must ask: “was the constitutional violation...‘sufficiently clear’ that

every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that

right[?]’” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 446 (quoting Aschcroft v. al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2074,

2083 (2011)). “The Supreme Court has made ‘clear that officials can still be on notice that

their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.’” Id. at 442

(quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741); see also Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1093

(9th Cir. 2013) (“[i]t does not matter that no case of this court directly addresses the use of

[a particular weapon]; we have held that ‘[a]n officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on

the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict

injury.’”) (citations omitted). Moreover, “in an obvious case” Graham’s excessive force

“‘standards can []clearly establish[] the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.’”

Mattos, 661 F.3d. at 442 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).

“Although this ‘obvious case’ exception remains good law, the Supreme Court recently

clarified that the bar for finding such obviousness is quite high. In al-Kidd, the Court

emphasized that it has ‘repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high

level of generality. The general proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or

seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative

nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131

S.Ct. at 2084)). Further, the Supreme Court “has instructed that courts should define the

‘clearly established’ right at issue on the basis of the ‘specific context of the case.’” Tolan,

__ U.S. __, 2014 WL 1757856 at *4 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). The inquiry begins

“by looking at the most analogous case law that existed when the officers tased...” Plaintiff

in July 2011. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 446.

In 2010, the Ninth Circuit found the use of a taser in dart-mode unreasonable where

the plaintiff was stopped:

for the most minor of offenses [not wearing a seat belt]. There was no

reasonable basis to conclude that [he] was armed. He was twenty feet away

and did not physically confront the officer. The facts suggest that [the plaintiff]

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 18 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

was not even facing [the] [o]fficer... when he was shot. A reasonable officer

in these circumstances would have known that it was unreasonable to deploy

intermediate force.

Bryan, 630 F.3d at 832. Although the court indicated it did not need to find closely

analogous case law to show that the right was clearly established, the court applied qualified

immunity because only recent decisions had held that a taser in dart-mode constituted an

intermediate use of force, and there was a dearth of prior authority. Id.

In October 2011, the Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that officers

used excessive force when, in less than one minute, they used stun-mode to taser the plaintiff

who was seven-months pregnant, where: the plaintiff’s traffic offense was minor; she did not

pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; she actively resisted arrest

insofar a she refused to get out of her car when instructed to do so and stiffened her body and

clutched the steering wheel to frustrate the officers’ efforts to remover her from her car; and

she did not evade arrest by flight. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 445-46. However, the court applied

qualified immunity because, at the time of the offense, there was no Supreme Court decision

or decision of the Ninth Circuit addressing the use of taser in dart-mode. Id. at 448. 

Plaintiff argues that “it was patently unreasonable to administer electric shock to [him]

several times when he was already compliant. No reasonable officer would think it was

reasonable to administer electric shock to another person who posed no threat to anyone, was

not resisting or trying to flee. The officers know the standard of Graham....” (Response, p.

8). Plaintiff stresses that this is especially true regarding the fifth taser shot which he will

testify was on drive-stun mode designed to inflict pain. Plaintiff “will testify he was already

cuffed when [Detective] Pimienta shocked him that last time.” (Id.). 

Defendants counter that in July 2011, there were no decisions in the Ninth Circuit or

elsewhere that came close to suggesting that the officers’ conduct in this case, based on the

circumstances they faced, was unconstitutional or violated clearly established parameters for

the use of tasers. (Reply, p. 4). Defendants also argue that the undisputed facts do not

support Plaintiff’s version that he was already complaint and posed no threat. According to

Defendants, whether Plaintiff’s non-compliance was voluntary is not relevant when the

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 19 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

officers are dealing with him in the moment–especially considering Plaintiff’s size and

behavior, and that they did not know whether he was armed. Defendants stress there is no

evidence showing Plaintiff was handcuffed prior to the last taser shot. 

The Sixth Circuit has declined to apply qualified immunity where officers beat the

resistant subject with a baton, tasered him unsuccessfully in dart mode and also tasered him

three times in quick succession in stun mode on bare skin. Landis v. Baker, 297 Fed.Appx.

453, 464, 2008 WL 4613547, *10 (6th Cir. 2008). During the tasering, the subject was in a

semi-prone push up-position in at least 10 inches of muddy water, with one officer kneeling

on his back and one arm in a handcuff. Id. The court held:

The defendant officers should have known that the use of a taser in stun mode,

in rapid succession on a suspect who is surrounded by officers, in a prone

position in a muddy swamp, who has only one arm beneath him, and who has

just been struck several times with a baton would be a violation of a

constitutional right.

Id. The court further stated: “Even without precise knowledge that the use of the taser

would be a violation of a constitutional right, the officers should have known based on

analogous cases that their actions were unreasonable.” Id., 297 Fed.Appx. at 463, 2008 WL

4613547, *10 (citing Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that it may

be excessive force to use pepper spray on suspect who was resisting arrest but “not

threatening anyone's safety or attempting to evade arrest by flight”), abrogated on other

grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18

Fed.Appx. 252, 266, (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the use of a chemical spray may be

unconstitutional when there is no immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others);

Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that the use of mace on a

compliant suspect is constitutionally unreasonable)). Further, in the Sixth Circuit, at least

as of October 2006, a non-resistant suspect had a clearly established right not to be tasered.

Thomas v. Plummer, 489 Fed.Appx. 116, 2012 WL 2897007 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Kijowski

v. City of Niles, 372 Fed.Appx. 595, 601 (6th Cir. 2010)). 

Like the court in Thomas, supra, the District Court for the Western District of

Washington pointed out in 2007 that prior Ninth Circuit decisions supported the proposition

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 20 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

In Smith, decided in 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that a jury could reasonably find

excessive force where the plaintiff did not attack or threaten the officers but did not comply

with command to place his hands on his head and the officers used four blasts of pepper

spray, slammed the plaintiff down onto a porch, dragged him off the porch face down, and

released a police dog against him while he was already pinned to the ground. 

7

In Harveston, decided in 2007, the Ninth Circuit found that an officer used excessive

force when he used pepper spray against a suspect who was already handcuffed and on the

ground, but trying to roll over. 

- 21 -

that officers may not use force when a suspect is not a threat, even if the suspect is not fully

complying with officers’ commands. See Beaver, 507 F.Supp.2d at 1149 (taser case citing

Smith, 394 F.3d at 703-046

 and Harveston v. Cunningham, 216 Fed.Appx. 682 (9th Cir.

2007)7

). Although the Beaver court held that on the 2004 date of the incident at issue, the

case law on the use of tasers was not well developed, the court went on to state:

[h]owever, as far as the undersigned is concerned, the following issues are now

clearly established. First, the use of a Taser involves the application of force.

Second, each application of a Taser involves an additional use of force. Third,

multiple applications of a Taser cannot be justified solely on the grounds that

a suspect fails to comply with a command, absent other indications that the

suspect is about to flee or poses an immediate threat to an officer. This is

particularly true when more than one officer is present to assist in controlling

a situation. Fourth, any decision to apply multiple applications of a Taser must

take into consideration whether a suspect is capable of complying with an

officer's commands.

Id. at 1149. Additionally, in 2012, the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington

denied summary judgment on qualified immunity where the plaintiff, who claimed he was

not actively resisting and verbally surrendered, was tasered and slammed to the ground in

December 2011. Bailey v. Chelan County, 2012 WL 4756068 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2012).

The determination turns on whether “the state of the law [at the time of the incident]

... gave respondents fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was

unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Given the state of the law in July 2011, the

officers should have known that use of a taser could constitute unreasonable force, see Bryan,

630 F.3d at 832, which was decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2010. Further, prior to the

Defendant officers’ encounter with Plaintiff, the officers should have been aware that they

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 21 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

may not use force against a suspect who is not a threat, even where the suspect is not fully

complaint. See e.g., Id.; Smith, 394 F.3d at 703-04; Harveston, 216 Fed.Appx. 682.

The Court can decline to enter summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim

where there are disputed issues of fact as to what the officer knew and did or failed to do.

See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[i]f a genuine issue of

fact exists preventing a determination of qualified immunity at summary judgment, the case

must proceed to trial.”). Here, Plaintiff was on the floor after the first taser shot and, before

the final shot, he states that he was handcuffed and that he told Detective Pimienta that he

suffered from a seizure disorder and there was no need to taser him. Crediting Plaintiff’s

evidence, whether he posed a threat initially or continually, whether he resisted, whether

before the fifth taser shot he was already handcuffed and had told officers about his seizure

disorder and that there was no need to taser him are all questions of fact for the jury’s

determination. If Plaintiff did not pose a threat and/or was not actively resisting and/or was

handcuffed and/or had indicated that he would comply, then repeatedly tasering him was a

violation of clearly established law. See e.g., Bryan, 630 F.3d at 832; Beaver, 507 F.Supp.2d

at 1149. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied on the issue of

qualified immunity.

WHETHER THE CITY OF NOGALES HAD A CUSTOM OR PRACTICE OF TASERING PEOPLE

INDISCRIMINATELY

Plaintiff contends that the City of Nogales (“City”) is liable because it had a custom

or practice of tasering indiscriminately. (Response, p. 8). As of July 2011 when the incident

at issue occurred, the City had a “Use of Force” policy which, in pertinent part, specifically

discussed tasers as follows:

The Taser will not be used in the following circumstances:...(2) On subjects

who are handcuffed, unless they are physically violent and uncontrollable

by lesser applications of force; (3) On subjects who are under control of an

officer and are not physically resisting; (4) On subjects who are under the

control of an officer and pose no immediate threat of violence to self or

others.

(PSOF, Exh. 15, p. 1681). Plaintiff argues that “the Defendant officers testified that it was

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 22 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

their custom and habit to ‘Taser a subject until compliant.’” (Response, p. 9 (citing PSOF,

Exh. 7, p. 72)). Plaintiff’s citation is to Detective Pimienta’s deposition testimony that he

could taser a suspect an unlimited number of times until he achieved compliance. (PSOF,

Exh. 7, pp. 72-73 (Detective Pimienta also testified that he did not receive training as to

whether there is a limit to the number of cycles of repetitive taser shots to which a suspect

should be exposed)). According to Plaintiff, the officers did not stop after each taser shot to

evaluate the situation to determine whether Plaintiff was still a threat, was actively trying to

avoid arrest or escape or was otherwise complaint. Plaintiff cites the Mattos’ court’s

observation that the rapid succession of three taser shots in a drive-stun mode “provided no

time for [plaintiff] to recover from the extreme pain she experienced, gather herself, and

reconsider her refusal to comply.” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 445. 

A municipality is liable for unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when

those acts implement or execute an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom. Monell v.

Dep’t. of Soc.Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The policy must result from a

deliberate choice made by a policy-making official, and may be inferred from widespread

practices or “evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal

officials were not discharged or reprimanded.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th

Cir.1992); see also Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477-78 (9th Cir. 1992). Consequently,

“[a] plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely on the

occurrence of a single incident of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.”

Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir.1989). Nor can municipalities “be

held liable simply because they employ a tortfeasor.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).

Other than Detective Pimienta’s opinion that he can taser a subject until the subject

is compliant, Plaintiff has cited no evidence suggesting that the City had a custom or practice

of tasering people indiscriminately or that previous incidents violating the City’s taser policy

had occurred for which the offending officers were not discharged or reprimanded. See

Davis, 869 F.2d at 1235 (“[Plaintiff] failed to present any evidence of other acts by ... police

officers to prove that the use of excessive force is a widespread practice or custom in the city.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 23 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

Thus,...” the court could not infer “that the use of excessive force is sufficiently pervasive

to rise to the level of a custom of the City.”)). Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue

of material fact on this issue.

ADA CLAIMS (Claim 2).

Plaintiff makes two ADA claims: (1) that his wrongful arrest was an act of

discrimination based on his disability; and (2) the City of Nogales never trained its

employees or instituted policies to accommodate disabled individuals such as Plaintiff by

giving firefighters and police officers the tools and resources to handle interactions between

those responders and disabled individuals peacefully. (Response, p. 10). To recover

monetary damages under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on

behalf of the defendants. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).

Such a showing requires proof that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference, which

“requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and

a failure to act upon that the likelihood.” Id. (citation omitted).

WRONGFUL ARREST. “Courts have recognized at least two types of [ADA]... claims

applicable to arrests: (1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a

disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and (2)

reasonable accommodation, where, although police properly investigate and arrest a person

with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they fail to reasonably accommodate

the person's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer

greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232

(citation omitted); see also Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing

Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F.Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Jackson v. Inhabitants of Town of Sanford,

1994 WL 589617, *12 (D.Me. Sept. 1994)); Otioti v. Arizona, 2008 WL 7069009 (D. Ariz.

Aug. 19, 2008) (“Because the Ninth Circuit has made clear that the ADA applies to anything

a public entity does and has indicated its unwillingness to carve out categorical exceptions

to the ADA in the areas of arrests, detention, and parole, the Court concludes that [an officer

tasering and shooting a deaf man on the roadside who did not respond to the officer’s

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 24 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

inquiries]...does not fall outside the scope of the ADA.”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). In holding that the ADA applies to arrests, the Ninth Circuit has

emphasized “that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA,

just as they inform the distinct reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment.”

Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (citation omitted). Courts have held that a plaintiff may recover

based on a theory of wrongful arrest where the police misperceived the effects of a disability

as criminal activity, where the plaintiff “can show that: (1) he was disabled, (2) the

defendants knew or should have known he was disabled, and (3) the defendants arrested him

because of legal conduct related to his disability.” Lewis, 960 F.Supp. at 178 (citations

omitted).

Plaintiff argues that the City had a legal obligation to train its officers to recognize the

signs and symptoms of disability in the field and because the City failed this duty, the

officers created exigent circumstances through their own conduct. (Response, p. 12). “Here

there was no exigency until the police arrived, ill-informed and unwilling to do any pre-entry

inquiry via the witness standing outside[]”, which includes La Cinderella store employees.

(Id.).

Defendants point out that force was not used because Detective Pimienta

misconceived the lawful effects of Plaintiff’s disability as criminal conduct. Instead, Plaintiff

trespassed into the warehouse area of La Cinderella Store “and his subsequent assaultive

behavior towards Officer Fierros were not lawful.” (MSJ, p. 9-10). 

Police responded to a dispatch about a “disoriented” male having trespassed into the

warehouse area at La Cinderella store. Had officers spoken to the store employees, they

would have possibly learned that Plaintiff had a “lost–glazed...” look and appeared

disoriented as if he had been drinking or was on drugs. (DSOF, Exh. 16, pp. 19-20). Even

assuming the officers had heard the dispatch about reports of a disoriented male in the area

earlier, they would not know the reason why the subject was disoriented. As to the trespass,

“the officer[s] did not misperceive lawful conduct caused by [Plaintiff’s]...disability as

criminal activity and then arrest him for that conduct. [Plaintiff’s] conduct was not lawful....”

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 25 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Plaintiff also alleges that the City failed to train the officers, which the Court

discusses infra. For purposes of Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim, however, there is no

evidence in the record suggesting that even had the officers received ADA training

specifically regarding epilepsy, they should have known that Plaintiff was in fact epileptic

and in a postictal state when they encountered him.

- 26 -

Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1222. Moreover, Detective Pimienta did not initially use force to effect

an arrest, instead he defended against a perceived threat to Officer Fierros. Id. While

Plaintiff argues that the manner in which the officers approached him caused him to run

toward Officer Fierros due to being in a postictal state, on the instant record there are no facts

suggesting that the Defendant officers should have known that Plaintiff was in fact epileptic

and in a postictal state when they encountered him. Plaintiff fails to present evidence creating

a question of material fact on this issue.8

 This is especially so given Dr. Labiner’s testimony

that an epileptic in a postictal state “can appear intoxicated, on drugs, things like that. They

just don’t look normal. And that’s really where the dilemma comes in, because obviously

you treat somebody who is intoxicated and potentially a danger to you differently than you

would treat somebody else. And that’s why I mentioned earlier that I don’t envy law

enforcement for having to do that on the fly.” (PSSOF, Exh. 20, pp. 68-69). 

FAILURE TO TRAIN. Plaintiff argues that the City made no effort “to appropriately comply

with the constitutional protections afforded each disabled citizen under the ADA. To do

nothing would lead to continued discrimination based on disability.” (Response, p. 13).

According to Plaintiff, the City waited nearly 20 years after the 1990 enactment of the ADA

to develop a written policy. “All of [the] EMTs and police officers testified that they

received no ADA training.” (Id. (citing PSOF, ¶15) (emphasis in original)). For support,

Plaintiff cites the following exchange with Detective Pimienta at his deposition:

Q. I just want to make sure we’re agreeing....The very same thing that

happened to Diego on July 12, 2011, would have happened to him if you had

known he was an epileptic and he had resisted as he, in fact resisted?

A.[Detective Pimienta]: That is correct.

(PSOF, Exh. 7, p. 185).

The cited testimony does little to aid Plaintiff given that the question did not ask how

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 26 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

the officers would have treated Plaintiff had they known he was in a postictal state. 

In considering the ADA, the House Judiciary Committee stated:

In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often necessary

to [train] public employees about disability. For example, persons who have

epilepsy, and a variety of other disabilities, are frequently inappropriately

arrested and jailed because police officers have not received proper training in

[how to recognize and aid people having] seizures.... Such discriminatory

treatment based on disability can be avoided by proper training.

Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221-22 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 101–485, pt. III (1990), reprinted in

1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445)) (emphasis added).

Because the Ninth Circuit has not set forth a standard for failure-to-train claims under

the ADA, courts analogize to such claims brought under §1983. Green v. Tri-Country

Metropolitan Transp. Dist. Of Oregon, 909 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1220-21 (D.Or. 2012). “‘A

claim of failure to train requires the plaintiff to show that the failure to provide adequate

training or supervision amounts to a policy or custom evidencing a deliberate indifference

to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. See City of Canton, Ohio

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); see also Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765,

770 (9th Cir.1989).’” Id. at 1220-21 (quoting Carr v. City of Hillsboro, 497 F.Supp.2d 1197,

1210 (D.Or. 1997)); see also Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1230. Under this test, the plaintiff must

establish “a program-wide inadequacy in training.” Alexander v. City and County of San

Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir.1994). The plaintiff “cannot simply allege a specific

type of training that he believes the officers should have had.” Green, 909 F.Supp.2d at

1221.

As to training the officers received regarding dealing with disabled subjects, Detective

Pimienta testified that when the Police Department implemented its ADA policy, the policy

was attached to a memo and officers “signed off on the policy, you dated it, you gave that

memo back, and then you put those papers that you were supposed to read into your policy

manual[;]” there was no meeting to explain or discuss the policy. (PSOF, Exh. 7, p. 81).

Officer Ortega’s testimony was similar to Detective Pimienta’s. (PSOF, Exh. 11, p. 28).

Officer De La Ossa testified that he had not seen an ADA policy, he did not receive any

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 27 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

training about what to do to determine whether a suspect is suffering from a disability, nor

has he received training about how to recognize the signs and symptoms of epilepsy. (PSOF,

Exh. 6, pp. 10-11, 13, 23-24). Officer Fierros did not recall whether he had received training

from the police department regarding how to determine whether a suspect is actually

engaging in criminal conduct as opposed to suffering from a disability. (PSOF, Exh. 5, p.9).

Officer Fierros was not aware whether the ADA applies to police officers. (Id. at pp. 9-10).

He had not received training regarding what happens to a person with epilepsy after he has

had a seizure. (Id. at pp. 46-47).

Plaintiff acknowledges that the City had a written ADA policy and he does not raise

any specific objection to it. (See Response, p. 13). Plaintiff offers no expert opinion that the

City’s policy or method of implementing same was inadequate. See Green, 909 F.Supp.2d

at 1221 (simply citing fact of own arrest to support failure-to-train claim “will not carry the

day....”). Although Officers Fierros’ and De La Ossa’s testimony is especially troubling,

Plaintiff “must also show that the inadequate training program ‘actually caused’ the

constitutional violation.” Green, 909 F.Supp.2d at 1221 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S.

at 391). In other words, the Court must ask: “‘Would the injury have been avoided had the

employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in that respect?” City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 391; see also Green, 909 F.Supp. 2d at 1221. With regard to the

Defendant officers, the answer is “no”. As Defendants persuasively point out, Dr. Labiner

testified that people in a postictal state can appear intoxicated or on drugs and “[t]hey just

don’t look normal.” (Reply, p. 9; PSSOF, Exh. 20, p. 68)). He went on to state: “[T]hat’s

really where the dilemma comes in, because obviously you treat somebody who is

intoxicated and potentially a danger to you differently than you would treat somebody else.

And that’s why I mentioned earlier that I don’t envy law enforcement for having to do that

on the fly.” (PSSOF, Exh. 20, p. 68). The evidence of record does not create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether different training would have led the officers to conclude that

the disoriented male, who was sweating profusely with labored breathing, dilated pupils,

clenched fists, and a smile-like expression on his face, whom they encountered trespassing

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 28 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 -

at La Cinderella’s warehouse was in a postictal state versus being intoxicated or high on

drugs.

Review of EMT Boyd’s deposition reflects that he did not believe the City had any

ADA policies, “[b]ut I think just out of our training as EMTs and paramedics, there is [sic]

I guess, policies on how to–I guess, on how to treat people with disabilities a little more

patient or whatnot....” (PSOF, Exh. 2, p.9). Although Plaintiff contends the EMTs did not

directly contact Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not support this assertion. Instead, Subway manager

Velarde testified that the EMTs “were trying to get [Plaintiff] to talk to them.” (PSOF, Exh.

1, p.26). This is consistent with EMT Boyd’s version. 

EMT Boyd, who is familiar with persons in a post-seizure, postictal state, testified that

such a person is usually physically unsteady, with a blank facial expression, disoriented,

“[a]nd when you do ask them questions, most of the time they’ll just kind of sit there.”

(DSOF, Exh. 2, p. 91). According to EMT Boyd, when he encountered Plaintiff, Plaintiff

was not unsteady on his feet and did not appear disoriented. (Id. at pp. 89, 92). Concluding

that he was unable to locate the person who was the subject of the 911 call, EMT Boyd and

his partner drove away without making any further inquiry. (Id. at p. 44, 93; see also id at

p. 87 (An EMT or paramedic cannot force a person to receive care)). 

Plaintiff relies on testimony from Dr. Labiner that Plaintiff’s normal gait, as observed

by EMT Boyd, is insignificant because “[m]any if not most people who have brief seizures

would be able to ambulate in the aftermath.” (PSSOF, Exh. 20, p. 36). Dr. Labiner also

testified that “it sounds pretty clear that [during the encounter with EMT Boyd and thereafter,

Plaintiff] was in a postictal state. It’s not normal to just go running into someplace and not

pay attention to people who are hollering at you and things.” (Id. at p. 35). Plaintiff

challenges EMT Boyd’s testimony that Plaintiff did not appear disoriented. Plaintiff relies

on: (1) Velarde’s testimony that after the seizure, Plaintiff “stood up, he looked like he was

lost, I guess, and opened the door [of Subway] and walked out[]” (PSOF, Exh. 1, pp. 16-17);

and (2) the 911 transcript indicating that Plaintiff was disoriented when he left Subway.

(DSOF, Exh. 1).

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 29 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

“A party is grossly or wantonly negligent if he acts or fails to act when he knows or

has reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize that his conduct not

only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others but also involves a high

probability that substantial harm will result....Gross negligence differs from ordinary

negligence in quality and not degree.” Walls v. Arizona Dept. Of Public Safety, 170 Ariz.

591, 595, 826 P.2d 1217, 1222 (App. 1991). The Arizona Supreme Court has described gross

or wanton negligence as follows: “‘Wanton negligence is highly potent, and when it is

present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms. It is []in the air,[] so to speak. It is

flagrant and evinces a lawless and destructive spirit.’” Id. (quoting Scott v. Scott, 75 Ariz

116, 122, 25 P.2d 571, 575 (1953)).

- 30 -

EMT Boyd’s lack of knowledge regarding the ADA is very troubling. However, the

record is scant with regard to the City’s alleged lack of training for EMTs and whether EMT

Boyd’s experience is a widespread practice. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91 (That

a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on

the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty

training program). Summary judgment should be granted on this issue. 

STATE LAW CLAIMS

Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s state law claims. (MSJ, pp.

13-15).

ASSAULT & BATTERY ALLEGED AGAINST DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICERS (CLAIMS 3 & 4).

 Defendants point out that officers are entitled to use reasonable force. ARS §13-409. They

argue there is no evidence that the force used was unreasonable. They also argue that there

was no unauthorized touching because the officers were authorized to physically detain

Plaintiff. In light of the factual issues surrounding the encounter in the warehouse, see supra,

summary judgment should be denied on these claims.

NEGLIGENCE (CLAIM 5). Defendants contend the officers’ conduct was reasonable under

Graham, and therefore, any negligence claim fails. Because factual questions remain for the

jury’s determination whether the Defendant officers’ conduct was reasonable, summary

judgment should be denied on this issue.

Plaintiff agrees that any claim against the EMTs must allege gross negligence9

. (Tr.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 30 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 -

at p. 28). “[O]rdinarily, the issue of gross negligence is a question of fact to be decided by

the jury.” Luchanski v. Congrove, 193 Ariz. 176, 180, 971 P.2d 636, 640 (App. 1998)

(quoting Walls, 170 Ariz. at 595, 826 P.2d at 1221). “To present the issue to the jury, gross

negligence need not be established conclusively, although the evidence must be more than

slight and may not border on conjecture.” Id. Viewing the facts favorably to Plaintiff, the

evidence is that Velarde pointed Plaintiff out to the EMTs as the seizure victim. Yet, the

EMTs did nothing after Plaintiff, who was non-responsive to their inquiries, walked away

from them. They did not even bother to get out of the ambulance to question or assess the

subject who had been specifically pointed out to them as the person who had suffered a

seizure moments earlier. Nor, in order to gain a better assessment of the situation, did the

EMTs bother to seek details from Velarde. Reasonable jurors could find that the EMTs’

failure to leave the ambulance to question or assess Plaintiff rises to the level of gross

negligence.

Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff failed to allege gross negligence against

the EMTs. Given that Defendants have had fair notice of Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff should

be granted leave to amend the FAC on this issue.

INADEQUATE TRAINING (CLAIM 6). Defendants argue that Claim 6 should be dismissed

because the Nogales Police Department is the sole named Defendant, and municipal police

departments are non-jural entities. (MSJ, p. 14). Under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the capacity of an entity other than an individual or corporation to sue or be sued

is governed by the law of the state in which the district court is located. In Arizona, a

government entity may be sued only if the legislature has given that entity power to be sued.

Payne v. Arpaio, 2009 WL 3756679, *4 (D.Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009)(involving section 1983 and

ADA claims)(citations omitted). The District Court for the District of Arizona has noted that

there is a consensus that city police departments are non-jural entities that may not be sued

in their own names. Id. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (CLAIM 7). To be liable for negligent hiring, retention, or

supervision of an employee, the court must find that the employee committed a tort. Mulhern

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 31 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 32 -

v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 398, 799 P.2d 15, 18 (App.1990). “If the theory of the

employee's underlying tort fails, an employer cannot be negligent as a matter of law for

hiring or retaining the employee.” Kuehn v. Stanley, 208 Ariz. 124, 130, 91 P.3d 346, 352

(App.2004) (citation omitted). Defendants argue that there is no evidence to support this

claim and that the standard regarding the EMTs is gross negligence. Plaintiff indicates he has

nothing to add other than to point out Defendants’ concession that there is respondeat

superior liability on state claims. (Response, p. 15; see also MSJ, p. 15). As with Plaintiff’s

claims of assault, battery, and negligence, factual questions as to whether the Defendant

officers and EMTs committed a tort make this claim inappropriate for summary judgment.

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (CLAIM 8). To establish intentional infliction of

emotional distress, Plaintiff must show: (1) the conduct by the defendant was extreme and

outrageous; (2) the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or recklessly

disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct; and (3) severe

emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant’s conduct. Ford v. Revlon, 153

Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987). Plaintiff argues that he suffered severe emotional

distress and PTSD as a result of the taser in drive-stun mode. Plaintiff cites generally to the

deposition from Brian Walker, Ph.D., his treating psychologist, reflecting he has diagnosed

Plaintiff with PTSD. (PSOF, Exh. 3, p. 73). Plaintiff argues that whether the tasering did in

fact cause emotional distress of such severity so as to entitle him to damages is a question

for the jury. (Response, p. 15). On the instant record, there is clearly enough evidence on

the first and second elements to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the jury’s

consideration. Further, absent more analysis from Defendants as to why the third element

is lacking, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently satisfied his burden to point to

evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. However, to

obtain a jury instruction on this issue, more specific information as to the severity of the

distress and causation will be necessary at trial. Nonetheless, at this point, summary

judgment on this issue should be denied.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 32 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10If Plaintiff wishes to pursue the theory that Defendant Pimienta was acting outside

the course and scope of his employment, then the statutory bar on exemplary damages would

not apply. Such a theory complicates the case and the various parties’ interests given that

such an approach could possibly take Defendant Pimienta outside the scope of coverage

available by the State’s risk management statutes. See e.g. State v. Schallock, 189 Ariz. 250,

941 P.2d 1275 (1997); State v. Heinze, 196 Ariz. 126, 993 P.3d 1090 (App. 1999). Of

course, this is a decision that must be determined by Plaintiff’s counsel.

- 33 -

VICARIOUS LIABILITY (CLAIM 9). The parties agree that there is no respondeat superior

liability on the §1983 claim. Although there is such liability on the ADA claims, Defendants

correctly contend that the issue is moot given that they are entitled to summary judgment on

those claims. The parties agree that “[t]here is respondeat superior liability on the state law

claims.” (MSJ, p. 15). Therefore, entry of summary judgment on Claim 9 relates only to the

federal claims.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES (CLAIM 10). Defendants contend punitive damages are barred by

statute on state law claims. A.R.S. §12-820.04. Plaintiff argues that if the jury believes he

was handcuffed and in custody before the fifth taser shot, the jury can conclude that the only

reason for that last taser was to inflict pain which constitutes torture. According to Plaintiff,

it is up to the jury to determine whether the fifth taser shot occurred and whether it occurred

within the course and scope of Detective Pimienta’s employment with the City. There are

questions of fact as to whether Plaintiff was handcuffed, and whether he told officers he

would comply and they did not need to taser him that last time. Summary judgment should

be denied on this claim.10

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, grant in part and deny Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 96). Defendants’ Motion should be granted to the extent they seek summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s claims:

 (1) that the City of Nogales had a custom or practice of tasering people

indiscriminately in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (portion of Claim 1);

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 33 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 34 -

(2) under the ADA (Claim 2);

(3) of negligence (Claim 5) alleged against the EMTs only;

(4) of inadequate training (Claim 6);

(5) of vicarious liability (Claim 9) as to the federal claims only (the parties do not

dispute that Claim 9 remains as to the state law claims); and

(6) for exemplary damages (Claim 10) except as to Defendant Pimienta.

Defendants’ Motion should be denied to the extent that they seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claims of:

(1) excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (portion of Claim 1);

(2) assault (Claim 3);

(3) battery (Claim 4);

(4) negligence (Claim 5) as to the police officers;

(5) negligent supervision (Claim 7);

(6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Claim 8); and

(7) entitlement to exemplary damages as to Defendant Pimienta (Claim 10).

Additionally, the Magistrate Judge further recommends that Plaintiff should be

granted leave to amend the complaint to allege gross negligence as to the EMTs.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 

////

////

////

////

////

////

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 34 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 35 -

72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from the district court

to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-

518-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2014.

Case 4:12-cv-00518-FRZ Document 115 Filed 05/20/14 Page 35 of 35