Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_15-cv-00386/USCOURTS-ared-3_15-cv-00386-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

EDDIE BOLAR, JR. PLAINTIFF

 

V. NO. 3:15CV00386-JTR

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, DEFENDANT

Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration

 

ORDER

I. Introduction:

Plaintiff, Eddie Lee Bolar Jr. (“Bolar”), applied for disability income benefits on April

23, 2013, alleging a disability onset date of March 1, 2013. (Tr. at 38). After conducting a

hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied his application. (Tr. at 48). The

Appeals Council denied his request for review. (Tr. at 1). The ALJ’s decision now stands as

the final decision of the Commissioner, and Bolar has requested judicial review.1

For the reasons stated below, the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.

II. The Commissioner’s Decision:

The ALJ found that Bolar had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

alleged onset date of March 1, 2013. (Tr. at 40). At Step Two, the ALJ found that Bolar has

the following severe impairments: depressive disorder; adjustment disorder with anxious

mood; lumbar spondylosis; pain disorder associated with both medical and psychological

factors; diabetes mellitus; obstructive sleep apnea; hypertension; obesity; and alcohol abuse.

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The parties have consented in writing to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge.

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Id. After finding that Bolar’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. at

41), the ALJ determined that Bolar had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform

sedentary work with the following limitations: 1) stand or walk for about two hours in an

eight-hour workday; 2) requires an option to stand after sitting more than thirty minutes

(standing option lasting no more than ten minutes, to be performed within the immediate

workplace area, and does not interfere with the work process); 3) occasional stooping,

crouching, bending, kneeling, crawling, or balancing; 4) no exposure to unprotected heights,

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and 5) only simple routine, repetitive tasks with supervision that

is simple, direct, and concrete. (Tr. at 43). 

While the ALJ found that Bolar was not capable of performing his past relevant work

(Tr. at 47), the ALJ relied on the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) to find that, based

on Bolar’s age, education, work experience and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in

the national economy that he could perform at the sedentary level with added limitations,

specifically, document preparer and charge account clerk. (Tr. at 48). Based on this Step Five

determination, the ALJ held that Bolar was not disabled. Id.

III. Discussion:

A. Standard of Review

The Court’s function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether it is based on legal

error. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

While “substantial evidence” is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion, “substantial evidence on the record as a whole” requires a court to

engage in a more scrutinizing analysis:

“[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record for the existence of

substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner’s decision; we also take

into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from that decision.”

Reversal is not warranted, however, “merely because substantial evidence

would have supported an opposite decision.” 

Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent

decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the

record which contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. Miller, 784 F.3d at 477. The Court

has reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the ALJ's decision, and the transcript of

the hearing.

B. Bolar’s Argument on Appeal

Bolar’s sole argument is that the jobs identified by the VE involve “level three

reasoning,” as defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”),2

 thereby exceeding

the ALJ’s RFC finding that Bolar could only perform “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with

supervision that is simple, direct, and concrete.” (Tr. at 43). Thus, Bolar argues there was a

conflict between the VE testimony and the DOT, which the ALJ erred in failing to resolve.

2

Level three reasoning requires an ability to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry

out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form” and to “[d]eal with problems

involving several concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” DOT, app. C, pt. III (1991

WL 688702 (4th ed. rev. 1991). 

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The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that DOT definitions are “simply

generic job descriptions that offer the approximate maximum requirements for each position,

rather than their range.” Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless,

before relying on VE evidence to support a determination that a claimant is not disabled, the

ALJ has an affirmative responsibility to ask about “any possible conflict” between VE

testimony and the DOT, and to obtain an explanation for any such conflict. Renfrow v.

Colvin, 496 F.3d 918, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2007); see Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL

1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000).

In this case, at the beginning of the VE’s testimony, the ALJ asked: 

Q: If your testimony differs from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,

will you advise [Bolar’s attorney] and myself? Will you do that? 

A. Yes, Your Honor. 

(Tr. at 85-86.) The ALJ then asked the VE if there were any jobs consistent with a

hypothetical individual who was limited to sedentary work that was “simple, routine and

repetitive with supervision which is simple, direct and concrete.” (Tr. at 86-87). The VE

testified that such an individual could perform the jobs of document preparer (DOT 249.587-

018) and charge account clerk (DOT 205.367-014). (Tr. at 87-88). The VE did not identify

any conflict between her testimony and the DOT. In the ALJ’s decision, he stated that,

“[p]ursuant to SSR 00-4p,” he had determined that the VE’s testimony was “consistent with

the information contained in the [DOT].” (Tr. at 48).

The ALJ’s questioning, and the VE’s responsive testimony, accurately reflected the

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ALJ’s RFC determination, which Bolar does not dispute. That RFC determination constituted

a limitation to unskilled work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a), 416.968(b) (unskilled work

“needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short

period of time”). The VE testified that both jobs she identified had an SVP of 2.3

 (Tr. at 88).

Although those jobs require a reasoning level of three, the SVP is commensurate with

unskilled work. See SSR 00-4p, supra at *3 (unskilled work corresponds to an SVP level of

1-2). 

In Renfrow, 496 F.3d at 920, the claimant could not perform complex, technical work

and was limited to “unskilled work.” The VE identified jobs requiring a reasoning level of

three. The Eighth Circuit stated that “[t]he jobs in question are both classified as unskilled

and so do not appear to be ‘complex.’” Id. The Court thus held that no conflict existed

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Id. Because no conflict existed, the ALJ’s failure

to expressly question the VE about conflicts between his testimony and the DOT constituted

harmless error. Id. at 921. 

Similarly, in Welsh v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 926, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2014), the Eighth Circuit

held that ALJ properly relied on the VE’s opinion that there was “no inconsistency” between

jobs requiring level 3 reasoning capability under the DOT, and an RFC that was limited to

“simple, routine, repetitive work.” The Court thus held that no remand was required due to

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The DOT assigns each occupation a number that reflects the job’s specific vocational

preparation (SVP) time, i.e., how long it generally takes to learn the job. Fines v. Apfel, 149 F.3d

893, 895 (8th Cir. 1998); see DOT, app. C, pt. II.

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the ALJ’s “failure to address any potential inconsistency.” Id. at 930. 

Finally, Bolar’s past job as a truck driver is classified as “semi-skilled,” with an SVP

of 4 (Tr. at 86), indicating some ability to perform work requiring more than the “simple”

duties involved in unskilled work.4 See Hillier v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 359, 366-67 (8th

Cir. 2007) (even though, “[i]n the abstract,” tension exists between the DOT’s description

of a cashier job requiring level 3 reasoning and an RFC limitation to following “simple,

concrete” instructions, the claimant’s previous work as a cashier supported the ALJ’s

conclusion that the claimant could perform that work).5

Bolar’s argument, that the level three reasoning of the jobs identified by the VE

required more than the RFC presented, is not supported by the law of the Eighth Circuit. The

VE testimony was not in conflict with the DOT, and the ALJ was not required to go further

in identifying or addressing any potential inconsistency. Accordingly, the ALJ properly

relied on the VE’s testimony in determining that Bolar was not disabled.

IV. Conclusion:

Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision that Bolar had the RFC

to perform the jobs identified by the VE. The finding that Bolar was not disabled within the

4

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(b), 416.968(b) (defining semi-skilled work). 

5

See also McCalla v. Colvin, 2015 WL 4977190, *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 21, 2015) (concluding

that, based on Renfrow and Hillier, “[n]o conflict exists between the ‘simple instructions’ limitation

and the level three reasoning ability position – order clerk – identified by the VE”); Filbert v.

Colvin, 2015 WL 1474873, *11 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2015) (citing Renfrow and Welsh and holding:

“The law in this Circuit is clear – any potential inconsistency between a reasoning level of three and

the ability to follow only simple instructions on non-detailed tasks is not a conflict.”).

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meaning of the Social Security Act, therefore, must be, and hereby is affirmed. The case is

dismissed, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of November, 2016.

___________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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