Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02446/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02446-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 00:0000 Cause Code Unknown

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIRECTV, INC., a California No. CIV.S-03-2446 DFL DAD

corporation,

 

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ROBERT WAIDTLOW, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

This matter came before the court on September 16, 2005,

for hearing on plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against

defendant Judy Kim and defendant Kim’s cross-motion to set aside the

entry of default against her. Kelli N. Osaki appeared on behalf of

plaintiff. Defendant Kim, proceeding pro se, appeared on her own

behalf. Having considered all written materials submitted with

respect to the motions, and after hearing oral argument, for the

reasons set forth below the undersigned recommends that defendant’s

motion to set aside entry of default be granted and plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment be denied as moot. 

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1 Plaintiff is a company in the business of distributing

television broadcasts throughout the United States. According to the

complaint, plaintiff has developed a satellite system capable of

transmitting digitized video and audio signals to homes and

businesses nationwide to be used for entertainment purposes. In

addition to other hardware, such as a satellite dish and receiver,

each DirecTV customer is required to have a removable access card

that manages the receipt of satellite signals and the opening and

closing of television channels offered by DirecTV. DirecTV scrambles

its signals using encryption technology to prevent their unauthorized

reception. According to the complaint, each named defendant

purchased and used an illegally programmed access card and/or a

device designed to permit viewing of DirecTV’s programming without

authorization by or payment to DirecTV.

2

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 25, 2003, plaintiff DirecTV, Inc. initiated

this action by filing a complaint for damages and injunctive relief

pursuant to various federal statutes prohibiting the interception of

satellite communications. The complaint names four individual

defendants and alleges federal causes of action under 47 U.S.C. §§

605(a) and 605(e)(4) (unauthorized publication or use of

communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (unauthorized interception

and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications); and 18

U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (unauthorized manufacture, distribution,

possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic

communication intercepting devices). The complaint also alleges a

state law claim for conversion. According to the complaint,

defendant Kim’s liability to plaintiff stems from her alleged

purchase and use of “a Pirate Access Device, consisting of a printed

circuit board device called an ‘Atomic Multi-Purpose,’ from [an

entity known as] DSS Pro.”1 (Compl. ¶ 11(a).) 

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3

Despite being served with process, defendant Kim failed to

appear in this action. On July 27, 2004, the Clerk of the Court

entered default against defendant Kim pursuant to plaintiff’s

request. On July 8, 2005, plaintiff filed its motion for default

judgment. Defendant Kim did not respond to plaintiff’s motion in

writing but appeared at the August 19, 2005, hearing on the motion. 

Defendant Kim requested additional time to oppose the motion as well

as to move to set aside the entry of default against her. The court

granted defendant Kim’s requests and set both motions for further

hearing on September 16, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) governs the setting

aside of an entry of default and states, in relevant part: “For good

cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default ....” The

Ninth Circuit has indicated that a district court’s discretion is

“especially broad where ... it is entry of default that is being set

aside, rather than a default judgment.” Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard

Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1986)(citation omitted). See also

Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2000). “A

decision on a motion to set aside a default is not an abuse of

discretion unless the court is ‘clearly wrong’ in its determination

of good cause.” Mendoza, 783 F.2d at 945 (citation omitted). "Where

timely relief is sought from a default ... and the movant has a

meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of

the motion to set aside the default so that cases may be decided on

their merits." Id. at 945-46 (internal quotations, citations and

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2 The court recognizes that the parties dispute the content of

those communications.

4

brackets omitted). See also O’Connor v. State of Nevada, 27 F.3d

357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994). 

ANALYSIS

As discussed on the record at the hearing on the parties’

motions, while defendant Kim’s motion to set aside the default

against her may not be prompt, the undersigned finds that it is

timely. In this regard, the court notes that defendant Kim is

proceeding pro se in this matter. Additional confusion, from

defendant’s perspective, has resulted from defendant Kim

communicating and negotiating with counsel for plaintiff regarding

the possible settlement of this matter.2 It also is noteworthy that

plaintiff has not demonstrated an intention to litigate this case in

a particularly speedy fashion, having waited nearly one year after

the Clerk’s entry of default to move for entry of default judgment. 

For these reasons, the undersigned finds that defendant has sought

timely relief from the default entered against her.

Defendant Kim has also asserted a potentially meritorious

defense to plaintiff’s action. Specifically, defendant Kim asserts

that she neither purchased nor used any pirate access device. She

has submitted a sworn affidavit in this regard as has her son.

Plaintiff has yet to offer any evidence to the contrary. Moreover,

as observed by the court at the hearing, the case law developing in

this area has at least called into question the validity of two of

the four federal claims alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. 

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5

Specifically, there is considerable authority supporting the

proposition that no private right of action exists pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). See DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124,

1129 (11th Cir. 2004)(“Congress did not create a private right of

action against persons in possession of access devices in violation

of section 2512(1)(b).”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 318 F. Supp. 2d

1122, 1129 (M.D. Ala. 2004); DirecTV, Inc. v. Amato, 269 F. Supp. 2d

688 (E.D. Va. 2003). One district court has found that there is no

private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) as well. See

DirecTV v. Decroce, 332 F. Supp. 2d 715, 720 (D. N.J. 2004)(“Congress

did not intend to create a private right of action for a violation of

Section 2511(1)(a) based on the unauthorized interception of

satellite televison programming.”) For these reasons, the court

finds that defendant Kim has asserted a meritorious defense at this

stage of the proceedings.

Finally, defendant having requested permission to file an

answer and proceed with her defense of this action, the court does

not recommend conditioning the setting aside of the default in any

other respects. More specifically, the court recommends that the

district court deny plaintiff’s request that the setting aside of

default be conditioned upon defendant Kim paying $1,937.50 for

plaintiff’s expenses incurred in pursuing the motion for default

judgment. Plaintiff has not shown that reopening this litigation

would result in the requisite prejudice justifying an order requiring

this pro se defendant to pay plaintiff’s expenses under the

circumstances presented here. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn,

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6

Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1546

(9th Cir. 1988)(recognizing that in appropriate circumstances any

prejudice suffered by the non-defaulting party as a result of the

default and the subsequent reopening of the litigation can be

addressed by conditioning the setting aside of the default).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendant Kim’s motion to set aside the entry of

default against her be granted;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment be

denied as moot; and

3. Defendant Kim be directed to file her answer within

twenty (20) days of the date of any order adopting these findings and

recommendation.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Findings

and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 

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7

the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 4, 2005.

DAD:th

Ddad1\orders.civil\directv2446.default.entry.f&r

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