Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02271/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02271-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barbara A. (Dunne) Kohnert, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

JoAnne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-2271-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Alter, Amend, or Reform

Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof (Doc. 29).

Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 33). The Court considers the papers submitted and issues

the following Order.

I. ALTER OR AMENDMENT 

A motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) may be

granted for the following reasons: (1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the

judgment is based; (2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable

evidence; (3) as necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) there is an intervening change

in controlling law. Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058,

1063 (9th Cir. 2003). "A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present

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evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the

litigation." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003).

In its Motion to Alter, Amend, or Reform the Judgment, Defendant argues that the

Court erred by "weighing the evidence in violation of the substantial evidence rule, which

mandates that the Court defer to the factual finding of the administrative agency." Def.'s

Mot. to Alter, at p. 2 lines 2-4. Defendant objects to the Court's finding that the

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly assessed Plaintiff's credibility regarding the

degree and extent to which she was functionally limited by her panic disorder and mild

agoraphobia. Def.'s Mot. to Alter, at p. 3 lines 17-20. Defendant argues that instead of

reviewing whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings, the Court reviewed

whether substantial evidence supported the Plaintiff's claims. Def.'s Mot. to Alter, at p. 3

lines 11-14. 

Defendant suggests the Court improperly concluded that the ALJ unlawfully found

Plaintiff's description of her panic disorder and agoraphobia not credible, since Carl

Mansfield, Ph.D., had indicated Plaintiff's conditions "were only mild and did not prevent

Plaintiff from working." Motion for Reconsideration, at p. 3 lines 23-25 & p. 4 lines 1-4.

Defendant's argument appears to repeat the discussion it presented in its Brief in Support of

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment. This time in the context that the Court had committed legal error.

Motion for Reconsideration, at p. 4 lines 1-4. However, Defendant overlooks that Dr.

Mansfield also described Plaintiff's functional limitations as fair (seriously limited but not

precluded) in the following categories: relating to co-workers; dealing with the public;

interacting with supervisors; dealing with work stresses; functioning independently;

maintaining attention/concentration; behaving in an emotionally stable matter; relating

predictably and social situations. Plaintiff's SOF ¶ 110 (Transcript. 186 & 187). 

Furthermore, the Court has the authority to recognize the validity of other expert

opinions evidence in the evidentiary file. In this instance, such expert opinions included not

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only Dr. Mansfield's opinion but also the statements of Jane George, Ph.D., and two

Vocational Experts ("VEs"), Maude Prall and David Janus. In combination, the reports of

Dr. Mansfield, and Dr. George, and the opinions of VEs Prall and Janus reflect Plaintiff's

psychological condition after September 18, 2002 as disabled. See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367

F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons to reject testimony evidence and, finding remand inappropriate, awarding benefits

without remand), citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729 & n. 13 (9th Cir. 1998)

(remanding for an award of benefits where testimony by claimant and VE, properly credited,

established disability); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989) (same);

Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 

Defendant cites Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) to contend that

the Court is precluded from overriding the ALJ as long as a reasonable person could have

reached the conclusion the ALJ reached. ("If the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by

substantial evidence in the record, we may not engage in second-guessing.") However the

weight of the evidence favors a finding Plaintiff disabled. After its thorough review of the

record, the Court found that a reasonable person could not have reached the conclusion the

ALJ reached. According to the available case law, the Court's Order, reflects no more nor

less than is authorized, within the Court's exercise of its discretion, by relevant legal

authority. 

II. REMAND

"The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or simply to award benefits

is within the discretion of this court." McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.

1989); see Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, it is appropriate

to award benefits when no useful purpose would be served by further administrative

proceedings, Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1985), or when the record has

been fully developed and there is not sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion.

Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). Remand is appropriate “where

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additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects”; but where remand would only

delay the receipt of benefits, judgment for the claimant is appropriate. Bilby v. Schweiker,

762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985).

In Moisa, 367 F.3d at 887, the court found that the case required no further agency

expertise or evaluation, and that the Commissioner should not be afforded another

opportunity to find that plaintiff is not credible. Similarly, here, there is no need for

additional administrative proceedings. Moreover, the record has been fully developed and

the Court found in its March 28, 2007 Order that there is not sufficient evidence to support

the ALJ's conclusion. Finally, additional administrative proceedings could not remedy

defects. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Alter, Amend, or Reform Judgment

(Doc. 29) is denied.

DATED this 29th day of May, 2007.

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