Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-01820/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-01820-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

WESLEY IRVIN NUNN,

Petitioner,

v.

MELISSA A. LEBLANC,

also known as Melissa LeBlanc-Fenwick,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-01820-NJV

ORDER DISMISSSING CASE FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

This is a Petition for Judicial Enforcement of Rescission, Quiet Title, and Damages. The 

lengthy litigation history associated with this case was previously set forth by District Judge 

Phyllis J. Hamilton as follows:

Plaintiff Wesley I. Nunn was at one time involved in a romantic relationship 

with Jennifer Fenswick, the mother-in-law of Melissa LeBlanc (now Melissa 

Fenswick), defendant herein. At the conclusion of the relationship in 2004, Mr. 

Nunn agreed to deed certain real property to Ms. LeBlanc ("the Meridian Street 

property") in exchange for a release of claims that Jennifer Fenswick had against 

him. Mr. Nunn signed the grant deed on May 24, 2004, and Ms. Fenswick signed 

the release on June 15, 2004.

Mr. Nunn and Jennifer Fenswick had a falling-out, and litigation ensued 

regarding money and property. First, Ms. Fenswick sued Mr. Nunn in a 2005 

action filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Del Norte (Fenswick v.

Nunn, No. CVUJ05-1431), alleging she was entitled to compensation under an oral 

agreement to share equally in the benefits of property acquired during the 

relationship. Mr. Nunn filed a counterclaim alleging that Ms. Fenswick had 

fraudulently induced him to transfer the Meridian Street property to Ms. LeBlanc 

by signing a release she did not intend to be bound by. Shortly thereafter, Mr. 

Nunn sued Melissa LeBlanc, also in Del Norte County Superior Court (Nunn v.

LeBlanc, No. CVUJ05-1527), seeking damages for fraud, and rescission of the 

agreement to transfer the Meridian Street property to her. The Superior Court []

denied Mr. Nunn's motion to consolidate the two cases.

Case 1:15-cv-01820-NJV Document 21 Filed 12/04/15 Page 1 of 6
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On April 6, 2009, following a court trial, the Superior Court entered 

judgment in Fenswick v. Nunn (No. CVUJ05-1431). The court found that the 

release signed by Ms. Fenswick was a valid release, that neither party had 

fraudulently induced the other for any purpose, and that neither had been unjustly 

enriched at the expense of the other. The court awarded Mr. Nunn approximately 

$7,900 in damages for unauthorized credit card charges made by Ms. Fenswick.

In August 2009, the Superior Court dismissed Nunn v. LeBlanc (No. 

CVUJ05-1527) on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds, finding that the 

issues had been resolved by the findings made by the trial judge in Fenswick v.

Nunn (No. CVUJ05-1431). Mr. Nunn apparently did not appeal.

Instead, on September 14, 2009, Mr. Nunn filed another suit against Melissa 

LeBlanc in the Del Norte County Superior Court, in Nunn v. LeBlanc (No. 

CVUJ09-1323). In sustaining the demurrer, the Superior Court found that the 

gravamen of the complaint was that Mr. Nunn had entered into a written contract 

that provided that he would not be sued, in exchange for consideration in the form

of a parcel of real estate; and that he was sued and thus was seeking return of the 

consideration. The court found that the statute of limitations for a claim of breach 

of written contract had run, and that Mr. Nunn's claims were time-barred. Mr. 

Nunn appealed, and the Court of Appeal issued a decision on February 6, 2012, 

affirming the judgment. See Nunn v. LeBlanc, 2012 WL 363104 (A132141, Cal. 

Ct. App., Feb. 6, 2012).

On March 30, 2011, Mr. Nunn filed suit in this court against Jennifer 

Fenswick and Melissa LeBlanc (Nunn v. Fenswick, No. C-11-1545 NJV). On July 

18, 2011, having found that the claims in plaintiff's state court case (No. CVUJ09-

1323) were identical to those in the federal case (C-11-1545 NJV), the court stayed 

the federal case because the state court case had been dismissed and that dismissal 

was on appeal. On March 28, 2012, after the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment of dismissal in CVUJ09-1323, the stay of the federal case was lifted, 

and on April 19, 2012, the federal case was dismissed.

Meanwhile, on March 21, 2012, Mr. Nunn filed yet another suit (his third) 

against Melissa Fenswick (formerly LeBlanc) in the Del Norte County Superior 

Court, Nunn v. Fenswick (No. CVUJ12-1104), asserting claims for declaratory 

relief, quiet title, and damages for mesne profits (lost rents), and seeking return of 

the Meridian property. He alleged that Jennifer Fenswick had rescinded the 

settlement agreement and release of claims, and that he was entitled to a return of

the Meridian Street property before she filed her 2005 lawsuit seeking damages.

Melissa Fenswick (formerly LeBlanc) demurred to the first amended 

complaint, and the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding 

that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata, as they 

were based on facts already litigated and decided on the merits in the previous 

lawsuits. Mr. Nunn appealed the dismissal, and on September 27, 2013, the Court 

of Appeal issued a decision affirming the judgment of dismissal. See Nunn v.

Fenswick, 2013 WL 5405321 (A137415, Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 27, 2013). In 

particular, the court found that the suit was seeking the same relief as Mr. Nunn's 

previous suit (CVUJ09-1323), on essentially the same theory.

On February 28, 2014, Mr. Nunn filed the present action (his second federal 

suit), against Melissa LeBlanc aka Melissa Fenswick. Mr. Nunn alleges that 

because the Fenswick v. Nunn action (CVUJ05-1431) proceeded to trial for a 

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judicial determination as to the validity of the release and settlement (but without 

Melissa LeBlanc as a party, and without a cause of action for rescission), and 

because after finding the release valid, the Superior Court proceeded to rule that 

Mr. Nunn's "rescission for fraud" claim in Nunn v. LeBlanc (CVUJ05-1527) was 

precluded by res judicata based on the judgment in Fenswick v. Nunn, he was still 

entitled to pursue a separate claim for "rescission for failure of consideration," 

which he did in filing Nunn v. LeBlanc (CVUJ09-1323).

Nunn v. LeBlanc, 4:14-cv-0905 PJH, Order of Dismissal; Order Denying Request to 

Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Doc. 8, 2:22-5:6. 

In Nunn v. LeBlanc, 4:14-cv-0905 PJH, District Judge Hamilton found that, "Nunn 

is again seeking to obtain an order rescinding the grant of the Meridian Street property, or, 

in the alternative, an order awarding damages for the value of the property plus the value 

of rental proceeds." Id. at 5:15-16. In dismissing the case, District Judge Hamilton found 

that Nunn's Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims failed to state a claim on which relief 

could be granted because the complaint failed to plead facts showing that Ms. LeBlanc was 

a state actor. Id., 6:19-8:2. District Judge Hamilton further found that the court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction, explaining as follows:

Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, do not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to review errors allegedly committed by state courts. Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“The jurisdiction possessed by the 

District Courts is strictly original.”); D.C. Ct.App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 

(1983) (“[A] United States District Court has no authority to review final 

judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.”).

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction 

to review the propriety of state court rulings. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 

“cases brought by state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 

district court review of those judgments”). The proper court to obtain review of a 

final state court decision is the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1257; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when the state court judgment is 

not made by the highest state court, Dubinka v. Judges of the Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 

218, 221 (9th Cir.1994); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 

n.3 (9th Cir. 1986); and when a plaintiff's challenge to the state court's actions 

involves federal constitutional issues, Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84.

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Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court's jurisdiction to 

hear a particular constitutional challenge depends on whether the constitutional 

claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court's ruling in a state court 

action. Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 221 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16). If 

the constitutional claim presented to a district court is inextricably intertwined with 

the state court's decision, then the district court essentially is being called upon to 

review the state court decision. Id.

The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if the relief requested 

requires “‘a mere revision of the errors and irregularities, or of the legality and 

correctness' of the state court judgment, not the ‘investigation of a new case arising 

upon new facts.’” MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1987). Because 

district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, they 

"must decline jurisdiction whenever they are in essence being called upon to review 

the state court decision.” Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 

1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, the complaint plainly asserts a challenge to the decisions of the 

California Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal in the various 

lawsuits described above. See, e.g., Cplt ¶ 23 ("state court . . . disposed of plaintiff's 

[p]laintiff's action on demurrer, ruling the statute of limitations as res judicata, 

displaying deliberate indifference against [p]laintiff without rationale or legal 

reasoning, and at all times disregarding [p]laintiff's due process right to litigate" the 

"rescission for failure of consideration" claim); ¶ 25 (plaintiff's "arguments fell on 

deaf ears, the Court of Appeal declining to acknowledge, address, or respond to any 

of [those] arguments"); ¶ 26 (Court of Appeal "deprived [p]laintiff of his only postdeprivation remedy, rendering the state procedural safeguards constitutionally 

inadequate"); ¶ 28 (no state court "ever cited law authorizing [d]efendant to assert a 

time bar against a claim severed and constitutionally bifurcated under California's 

bifurcation statute, and the trial court has refused every one of [p]laintiff's requests 

to introduce [other] testimony evidence"); ¶ 30 ("this action is based on the damage 

suffered by [p]laintiff resulting from joint participation or conspiracy, under color 

of law, of [d]efendant with the state court to unlawfully deprive" plaintiff of 

constitutional rights); ¶ 35 (the "decisions by the state court are contrary to judicial 

policy of the state of California"); ¶ 40 ("California Court of Appeal . . . unlawfully 

deprived [p]laintiff of his only post-deprivation remedy").

Because plaintiff is in essence asking this court to serve as an appellate 

tribunal to review errors allegedly committed by the California Superior Court and 

the California Court of Appeal in adjudicating cases to which he was a party, the 

court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal constitutional claims.

Nunn v. LeBlanc, 4:14-cv-0905 PJH, Order of Dismissal; Order Denying Request to 

Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Doc. 8, 8:5-9:28.

In this, the sixth civil action brought by Petitioner seeking to regain title to the 

Meridian Street property, Nunn "petitions the court for the judicial enforcement of a party 

effected recission that is otherwise complete in every respect, statutory consequential 

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damages, quiet title to the subject property, and special damages." Petition, 3:20-21. 

Petitioner asserts that "the claims in this action do not compete with or seek to invalidate 

any state court judgment, nor do these claims allege any error by the state court, and are 

therefore not subject to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine." Petition, 2:7-10.

Petitioner is mistaken. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine may also apply where the 

parties do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine “prohibits 

a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de 

facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 

(9th Cir.2004) (citing Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.2003)). A federal 

action constitutes such a de facto appeal where “claims raised in the federal court action 

are' inextricably intertwined' with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of the 

federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the 

application of state laws or procedural rules.” Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. In such 

circumstances, “the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state court 

decision.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303. As set forth above, the issue 

of the recission of the agreement to transfer the Meridian Street property to Respondent has

been repeatedly litigated in the state courts. See Nunn v. LeBlanc, No. CVUJ05-1527; 

Nunn v. LeBlanc, No. CVUJ09-1323; Nunn v. Fenswick, No. CVUJ12-1104; Nunn v. 

Fenswick, 4:14-cv-0905 PJH. Thus, regardless of how Petitioner attempts to reframe his 

claims, he is attempting to relitigate matters already decided by the state courts. Petitioner 

is, in essence, asking this court to review the state courts' decisions. This court declines to 

do so. See Doe v. Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d at 1030 (district courts 

"must decline jurisdiction whenever they are in essence being called upon to review the 

state court decision.”) 

Based on the foregoing, the court HEREBY DISMISSES this case for lack of 

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subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2015

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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