Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01654/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01654-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:688 Jones Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL BERNARDO BAILON,

Plaintiff,

v.

AACH HOLDING CO., NO. 2, LLC et

al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 3:10-cv-1654-GPC-NLS

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

COMPEL MAINTENANCE AND

CURE

(ECF NO. 97)

This is a Jones Act case in which plaintiff Rafael Bernardo Bailon (“Plaintiff”)

alleges he was injured while employed aboard the defendant vessel F/V Isabella

(“Vessel”). Plaintiff alleges that his right knee was injured when he fell and that he

subsequently incurred left knee and right ankle injuries due to Defendants’ delay in

providing maintenance and cure. Plaintiff asserts claims for negligence,

unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and statutory wages against the Vessel; its

owners, AACH Holding Co., No. 2, LLC and AACH Holding Co., LLC; and the

owners’ agent, Sardinha and Cileu Management, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). At

the motion in limine hearing on January 11, 2013, this Court vacated the jury trial,

which was set for February 12, 2013, and granted Plaintiff leave to file the instant

motion for maintenance and cure.

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“Maintenance and cure is designed to provide a seaman with food and lodging

when he becomes sick or injured in the ship’s service; and it extends during the period

when he is incapacitated to do a seaman’s work and continues until he reaches

maximum medical recovery.” Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962). 

“Admiralty courts have been liberal in interpreting this duty for the benefit and

protection of seamen who are its wards.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). A

shipowner’s liability for maintenance and cure is “the most pervasive of all” and is “not

to be defeated by restrictive distinctions nor narrowly confined.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). Indeed, “[w]hen there are ambiguities or doubts, they are to be

resolved in favor of the seaman.” Id.

Seamen are entitled to maintenance and cure for injuriesincurred “in the service

of the ship.” Aguilera v. Alaska Juris F/V, O.N. 569276, 535 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.

2008); see also Baker v. Ocean Systems, Inc., 454 F.2d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The

determination of whether a seaman is ‘in the service of the vessel’ . . . at the time of the

accident depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”).

“Where [a] demand for maintenance and cure has been joined with causes of

action for negligence and/or unseaworthiness . . . then maintenance and cure may be

disposed of by a properly framedmotion for summary judgment” only when“the parties

have agreed that maintenance and cure is payable at a specified rate and no genuine

issue as to any material fact remains.” 2 Robert Force & Martin J. Norris, Law of the

Seamen § 26:55 (5th ed. 2012).

Several district courts have treated motions to compel maintenance and cure as

motionsfor summary judgment. See McNeil v. Jantran, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930

(W.D. Ark. 2003) (concluding that “motion for retroactive and future maintenance and

cure should be treated as something similar to a motion for summary judgment”);

Bloom v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

(concluding a claimfor maintenance and cure can be disposed of by summary judgment

if there is no dispute of material fact); Billiot v. Toups Marine Transport, Inc., 465 F.

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Supp. 1265, 1267 (E.D. La. 1979) (concluding that “a motion for summary judgment

isthe only permissible pre-trial procedure to determine the daily rate of maintenance”);

Guerra v. Arctic Storm, Inc., 2004 WL 3007097, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2004)

(treating motion for maintenance and cure as motion for summary judgment); Blake v.

Cairns, 2004 WL 1857255, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2004) (concluding that a motion

for maintenance and cure may be disposed of by summary judgment if there is no

dispute of material fact); Sanfilippo v. Rosa S. Inc., 1985 WL 4565, at *2 (D. Mass.

Dec. 9, 1985) (“[U]nlessthe seaman can show that there are no material facts in dispute

and that he is entitled to summary judgment on the claim, he cannot obtain a pre-trial

order for payment [of maintenance and cure].”)

Still, at least two other district courts have declined to treat motions to compel

maintenance and cure as motions for summary judgment. Boyden v. American

Seafoods Co., 2000 A.M.C. 1512 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (“Applying a summary judgment

standard to the payment of maintenance and cure would invite litigation and cause

delays by involving the court in the medical determinations of maximum medical

improvement, thus undermining the policy of simplicity in these matters.”); Sefcik v.

Ocean Pride Alaska, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1993) (declining to treat a

motion to reinstate maintenance and cure as a motion for summary judgment). These

cases, however, are distinguishable from the instant case. In Boyden, there was “no

dispute that [the] plaintiff was injured while working on the vessel and that defendant

paid maintenance and cure after discontinuing payments.” 2000 A.M.C. at 1514. In

Sefcik, there was no dispute as to whether the plaintiff’s injuries were tied to his work

on the vessel; rather, the dispute centered on whether the plaintiff had achieved

maximum cure. 

Here, as a preliminary matter, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel Maintenance and Cure as a motion for summary judgment. As such, Plaintiff’s

Motion must be denied because it is untimely and because, even if it were timely, there

exists a dispute of material fact.

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As Defendants note, the motion filing deadline in this case passed on November

5, 2012. (See ECF No. 76 at 1.) And, as Defendants further note, Plaintiff has failed

to articulate good cause why the prior scheduling order should be modified to permit

consideration of the instant motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be

modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”) Accordingly, the Court

concludes the untimeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion alone is sufficient grounds to deny it. 

Even if it were timely, however, it must still be denied.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact

is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of

the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine

if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Here, there is a dispute of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s left knee

and right ankle injuries were incurred while in the service of the Vessel, which Plaintiff

must show to receive maintenance and cure. Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Maywood, opines

that Plaintiff’s left knee and right ankle injuries are compensatory injuries resulting

from the alleged fall on the Vessel. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Wilson, opines that

Plaintiff’s left knee and right ankle injuries are not compensatory injuries resulting

from the alleged fall on the Vessel, as there exists no medical basis to support such a

compensatory injury theory. Dr. Wilson further opines that Plaintiff’s right ankle

condition is congenital in nature and could not therefore be a result of the alleged fall. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Maintenance and Cure is DENIED. The 1

Plaintiff requests attorney fees in connection with having to file a motion to compel 1

maintenance and cure. AACH2 states that it has authorized treatment for Plaintiff’s right knee

condition and states it will pay “reasonably incurred medical bills related to [Plaintiff’s] right knee

anterior cruciate ligament tear.” The Court further notes, however, that AACH2 has provided no

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hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion, currently set for March 1, 2013, is VACATED. The

Court sets a STATUS CONFERENCE for April 12, 2013, at 1:30 p.m.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 26, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

evidence that it has paid any such bills since they began accruing in October 2010. To the contrary,

Plaintiff provides evidence in the form of unpaid bills indicating no such bills have been paid. Thus,

while attorney fees may be warranted due to the delay in making payments related to the treatment of

Plaintiff’s right knee, the Court reserves Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees for a decision after a trial

on the merits when the question of attorney fees can be considered all at once. See Vaughan, 369 U.S.

at 530 (attorney fees are appropriate when the seaman’s employer willfully and arbitrarily refuses to

pay maintenance and cure”); see also Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 1995 AMC 2022, 2028-29

(9th Cir. 1995).

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