Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-03922/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-03922-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

COREY HENLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 5:11-cv-03922-JHH-SGC

 )

BYERS, et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Corey Henley (“Plaintiff”), filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging he was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities afforded him under the Constitution or

laws of the United States of America during his incarceration at the St. Clair Correctional Facility

in Springville, Alabama. Plaintiff names as defendants the Alabama Department of Corrections,

Correctional Officer Byers, Correctional Officer Bailey, Correctional Officer MacMillan, and

Correctional Officer Jerome Gray. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as

declaratory relief. In accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2),

the Complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a preliminary report and

recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991). 

CASE HISTORY

On September 9, 2012, the magistrate judge to whom this action was previously assigned

entered an order for special report directing copies of the Complaint be forwarded to Defendants

Byers, Bailey, MacMillan, and Gray and requesting such defendants file a special report addressing

Plaintiff’s factual allegations. The parties were advised, if appropriate, a special report might be

considered a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

FILED

 2014 Jul-11 AM 09:06

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:11-cv-03922-KOB-SGC Document 36 Filed 07/11/14 Page 1 of 19
Procedure. On December 6, 2012, Defendants Byers, Gray, and MacMillan filed a special report

accompanied by affidavits and copies of certain institutional records pertaining to Plaintiff and the

events made the basis of his claims. (Doc. 20). Defendant Bailey, then retired from the Department

of Corrections, had not been served, so he had not waived service or filed a special report. Plaintiff

submitted a response to the special report on May 7, 2013. (Doc. 25). 

Defendant Bailey was ultimately located and waived service of process. On October 25,

2013, a second order for special report was entered, directing Defendant Bailey to file a special

report addressing Plaintiff’s factual allegations. Defendant Baileyfiled a special report on December

23, 2013. (Doc. 33). 

On January 1, 2014, the parties were notified the special reports would be construed as

motions for summary judgment, and Plaintiff was notified he would have twenty days to further

respond to such motions by filing affidavits or other material if he chose. (Doc. 34). Plaintiff was

advised of the consequences of any default or failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Griffith

v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985). 

This matter is now before the undersigned on the special reports (Docs. 20 and 33) construed

as motions for summary judgment, and Plaintiff’s response thereto. (Doc. 25). 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Because the special reports filed by Defendants Byers, Gray, MacMillan, and Bailey are

being considered motions for summary judgment, the undersigned must determine whether the

moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment may be granted only

if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In making that assessment, a court must view the evidence

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in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences against

the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The burden of proof is on the

moving party to establish his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing the absence

of genuine issues and that he is due to prevail as a matter of law. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,

929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991). Once that initial burden has been carried, however, the non-moving

party may not merely rest upon his pleading, but must come forward with evidence supporting each

essential element of his claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242 (1986); Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1989). Unless the plaintiff, who

carries the ultimate burden of proving his action, is able to show some evidence with respect to each

element of his claim, all other issues of fact become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317; Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530

(11th Cir. 1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a

prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any

material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of

the non-moving party’s case necessarilyrenders all other facts immaterial.” [citations

omitted]. Thus, under such circumstances, the public official is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of proof. This

rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532. 

PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections and is

presently housed at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Harvest, Alabama. (Doc. 1, p. 5). His

Complaint concerns events which occurred while he was housed at the St. Clair CountyCorrectional

Facility, where he began serving a twenty-year robbery sentence in April of 2009. (Id. at p. 6).

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On September 3, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to the Jefferson County Jail to facilitate his

testimony in the capital murder trial of Shaunisty Lowe . (Id.). While housed in the jail, prior to 1

testifying, Plaintiff was violently assaulted by another inmate. (Id.). Plaintiff later learned the

inmate who attacked him was a friend of Lowe, against whom Plaintiff was scheduled to testify. (Id.

at p. 7). Plaintiff also learned the attack had been arranged by Lowe, who knew Plaintiff was at the

jail to testify against him. (Id.). Plaintiff was treated for his injuries and escorted to a different cell

block in general population but was subsequently given protective custody status and placed in a

single man cell. (Id.). 

Prior to the trial, Plaintiff spoke with the prosecutor and expressed fears for his safety

because there was a great deal of media coverage of the trial. (Id.). The prosecutor told Plaintiff not

to worry because the judge had ordered the media not to identify any of the witnesses. (Id.). On

September 13, 2010, Plaintiff testified against Lowe. During the trial, Plaintiff also testified about

his injuries and explained how they had been orchestrated by Lowe to prevent Plaintiff from

testifying. (Id.). Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the court, on the prosecution’s motion, ordered the

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office to place Plaintiff in protective custody status and take special

precautions to ensure his safety. (Id.). Plaintiff suffered no further injuries while at the Jefferson

County Jail. (Id. at p. 8). 

On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred back to the St. Clair Correctional Facility. 

(Id.). Although Plaintiff was still in protective custody status, the transporting officers failed to so

inform the staff at the St. Clair Correctional Facility. (Id.). As a result, Plaintiff was released back

into general population status. (Id.). Plaintiff first reported to the infirmary for a body chart then

 Plaintiff states Lowe was facing nine counts of capital murder. 

1

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was heading to the segregation property room to retrieve his stored property. (Id.). Plaintiff was

stopped by a fellow inmate, who warned Plaintiff his name and photograph had been published and

broadcast in the local news media. (Id.). According to this inmate, not only did inmates at St. Clair

know about Plaintiff’s testimony, but Lowe had many friends and relatives in that prison. (Id.). The

inmate warned Plaintiff he was in imminent danger. (Id.). 

Plaintiff immediately went to the segregation unit and reported this threat to Defendants

Byers and MacMillan. (Id.). Plaintiff explained he had just testified in a high-profile murder case,

his name and photograph had been reported on television and in newspapers, the other inmates were

now labeling him "a snitch," threats were already made, warnings were issued, and his life was in

immediate danger. (Id.). Defendant Byers responded she had seen the news broadcasts and

Plaintiff’s concerns were valid, but she could not provide him with any protection. (Id.). She

advised Plaintiff to speak with the on-duty shift commander. (Id. at p. 9). Defendant MacMillan

did not respond at all, and neither Defendant MacMillan nor Defendant Byers took any action to help

Plaintiff. (Id.). 

Plaintiff immediately went to the shift commander’s office and spoke with the acting

commander, Defendant Bailey, who was getting ready to leave work for the day. (Id.). Plaintiff

explained the situation to Defendant Bailey and stated he feared going back to his assigned dorm

because his life was in danger. (Id.). Defendant Bailey stated he could not move Plaintiff to another

dorm due to a new policy on bed changes. (Id.). Plaintiff countered he was not seeking a bed change

but was requesting protective custodystatus. (Id.). Defendant Baileyresponded he could not change

Plaintiff’s custody status. (Id.). Defendant Bailey, appearing to be impatient and unconcerned, told

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Plaintiff he would have to stay in his assigned dorm for the night and ordered him to return to his

dorm, L-1. (Id.). 

Plaintiff feared for his life and was growing increasingly apprehensive about being in the

general population. (Id.). He returned to his assigned dorm for the night, and as he was unpacking,

the other inmates called him a snitch, glaring at him, and made other derogatory and hostile remarks.

(Id. at p. 10). Plaintiff, growing increasingly fearful of another assault, went to another dorm, M-2,

in an attempt to leave a dangerous situation but was pursued by a group of inmates. (Id.). 

As Plaintiff walked into dorm M-2, he was attacked from behind by inmate Larry Lowe, a

cousin of Shaunisty Lowe, against whom Plaintiff had testified. (Id.). Six other inmates joined

inmate Larry Lowe, dragged Plaintiff into a nearby cell, and brutally beat Plaintiff to the point of

unconsciousness. (Id.). Other inmates reported the attack to corrections officers. (Id.). When the

officers arrived, they found Plaintiff locked inside the cell where the attack occurred, unresponsive. 

(Id.). The officers transported Plaintiff to the infirmary. (Id. at p. 11). Plaintiff suffered a

concussion, knots all over his head, a bloody nose, two black eyes, a broken tooth, and injuries to

his back. (Id. at p. 10). A body chart was prepared, but the medical personnel failed to document the

full extent of his injuries and rendered very little treatment. (Id. at p. 11). In spite of Plaintiff’s

complaints of dizziness and the large knots on his head, the medical staff did not perform any brain

scans, administer any pain medications, or address his broken tooth. (Id.). 

After the assault, Plaintiff spoke with other corrections officers and explained the situation. 

(Id.). He was then placed into a single man isolation cell and segregated from other inmates at all

times for his protection. (Id.). His injuries took months to heal, and he is still plagued by back pain

and psychological distress. 

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DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL REPORTS

Defendants Byers, MacMillan, Gray, and BaileydenyPlaintiff everraised his fears and safety

concerns with them.

Defendant Byers submitted an affidavit in which she denies seeing or speaking with Plaintiff

on the date of the incident. (Doc. 20, Ex. E). Defendant Byers states the only way Plaintiff could

have spoken to her would have been if she had cleared him back into segregation, which she did not

do. Defendant Byers furtherstates she would not have been able to place Plaintiff in the segregation

unit without orders from a supervisor. (Id.). 

Defendant MacMillan testifies Plaintiff never attempted to get a supervisor on the date in

question and further states Plaintiff never told him he was in fear for his life. (Doc. 20, Ex. F). 

Defendant Gray states in his affidavit he was not at work on September 23, 2010 because it

was his day off. (Doc. 20, Ex. G). 

Defendant Bailey, who retired from the Alabama Department of Corrections on October 31,

2010, testifies he has no recollection of Plaintiff and, therefore, has no recollection as to whether

Plaintiff informed him of a threat to Plaintiff’s safety. (Doc. 33, Ex. J). Defendant Bailey further

testifies if Plaintiff had informed him of a threat to his safety, he would have followed his normal

procedure for handing potential threats by initiating an investigation, validating the threat, and

placing Plaintiff in a single cell for his protection. (Id.). Defendant Bailey denies dismissing

Plaintiff’s threat because his shift was ending, and states although he does not recall this incident,

had he been informed of a threat soon before he was scheduled to leave, he would have made certain

the incoming shift commander was aware of the threat. (Id.). 

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The special report filed by Defendants Byers, Gray, and MacMillan sets forth the following

statement of facts:

On September 23, 2010, Officers at St. Clair found Plaintiff locked inside cell

M2-36 with bumps and bruises to the head. (See Ex. A, Ex. B). An

investigation was conducted, and officers believed that the assault was the

result of Plaintiff testifying at the trial of the cousin of an inmate incarcerated

at St. Clair, Larry Lowe. (See Ex. A, B, C). Officers escorted Plaintiff to the

infirmary where his injuries were considered minor and treated. (See Ex. B,

D). Hearings were conducted following the incident and five St. Clair

inmates received disciplinaries. (Ex. H). Inmate Larry Lowe was found not

guilty of any prison violations based on testimony provided by Plaintiff. (Ex.

H, pp. 26-28).

(Doc. 20, p. 4). 

Included among the exhibits is a copy of an incident report concerning the attack, which

reads, in pertinent part:

After further investigation it was revealed Inmate Correy (sic) Henley was

coaxed into M-2 by Terrell Penick (fat Mac) B/M 212410 using a newspaper

article that stated, Inmate Henley had testified in a murder case. Once inside

M-2, Inmate Henley was attacked at the top of the steps, pushed down and

into the cell at the bottom. Inmate Henley was chocked and beaten

(unconscious). Inmate Henley was locked in the cell by the attackers for

approx. 30 Mins. Inmate Henley stated that he remembers Inmate Cortez

Seay (Chico) B/M 244019 getting in his face and stating, “we’re gonna kill

you” to Inmate Henley. Inmate Henleystated that he remembers Inmate Larry

Lowe standing directly behind him before he was pushed down the steps....

 (Doc. 20, Ex. C). 

Also included is a copy of Plaintiff’s medical records. (Doc. 20, Ex. D). The body chart

indicates Plaintiff reported “somebody pushed me from the back... I guess he hit me a couple times

in the face and I guess I went out for a few minutes.” (Id. at p. 2). The chart notes the injuries were

minor and no longer bleeding and documents the following: a small abrasion on the right shoulder,

a small contusion on the left cheek with minor swelling, discoloration and a small abrasion on the

8

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left eye, and a small abrasion on the left ear. (Id.). The treatment plan included pain medication and

ice packs as needed, as well as wound checks and dressing changes. (Id.). The medical records also

include two health service request forms submitted by Plaintiff. In the first, submitted on October

3, 2010, Plaintiff complained he was seeing white flashes in his left eye and was concerned, but the

record reflects he did not show up for the appointment. (Id. at p. 5). In the second, dated October

23, 2010, Plaintiff requested medical care for his tooth, which was broken during the assault, and

was scheduled for and received treatment. (Id. at pp. 9-10). 

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE

Plaintiff submitted an affidavit with his response to the special reports, reiterating he did

speak with Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey on September 23, 2010 upon his return to the

St. Clair Correctional Facility. (Doc. 25). Plaintiff testifies he specifically informed Defendants

Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey his life was in danger and relayed to them he had been told he would

be attacked if he went back into general population. (Doc. 25, Ex. A, p. 1). 

Plaintiff does not dispute he was placed into general population and not assigned to

segregation but explains he saw Defendants Byers and MacMillan when he went into the property

room, which is in the segregation unit, to retrieve his belongings upon his return. It was then he

explained the situation to them and asked to be placed into protective custody, but they simply told

him to see the shift supervisor. Plaintiff also reiterates he spoke with Defendant Bailey, conveyed

his fears and the threats and warnings he had received, and asked to be placed in protective custody,

but complains Defendant Bailey took no actions to protect him. Plaintiff concedes Defendant Gray

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was not at work on the date of the incident and, within the body of his response, moves to dismiss

Defendant Gray from this action. (Doc. 25, p. 5). 2

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Gray

As Plaintiff has conceded Defendant Gray was not present on the date of the incident and 

moved to dismiss Defendant Gray from this action, the undersigned finds the motion for summary

Judgment as to Defendant Gray is due to be granted, and the claims against Defendant Gray are due

to be dismissed with prejudice. 

II. Sovereign Immunity

It is well established the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the state or an agency of the state. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). As the Supreme Court has stated:

[T]here can be no doubt . . . that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections

is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of

such a suit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department

of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292

(1937). Respondents do not contend that Alabama has consented to this suit, and it

appears that no consent could be given under Art. I, sec. 14, of the Alabama

Constitution, which provides that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a

defendant in any court of law or equity.”

Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action against

the Alabama Department of Corrections, and it is due to be dismissed from this action. 

Likewise, lawsuits against a state official in his or her official capacity are suits against the

state when “the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465

 Plaintiff wishes to have Defendant Gray designated as a material witness. The undersigned 2

makes no such designation at this time. 

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U.S. at 101. Although Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state officials from suits for money

damages, actions against a state official for prospective injunctive relief are outside the protection

offered by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 102-03; see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,

1524 n.2 ( 11th Cir. 1990). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and

Bailey in their official capacities for monetary relief are due to be dismissed with prejudice. The

remainder of this report and recommendation will address Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey in their individual capacities. 

III. Failure to Protect

For purposes of summary judgment the undersigned accepts as true Plaintiff’s testimony he

had been warned he was in danger upon his return to the St. Clair Correctional Facility; he spoke

with Defendants Byers, Bailey, and MacMillan and conveyed to them his fear for his safety; and

Defendants Byers, Bailey, and MacMillan failed to take any precautionary measures to protect him

from an attack by other inmates. Plaintiff argues it was obvious he was in danger, he made the

defendants aware of this danger, and they were deliberately indifferent to his concerns by taking no

steps to investigate or otherwise attempt to ensure his safety.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes upon

institutional officials the duty to “‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates’”

in their custody. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 526-27 (1984)). However, not everyinjurysuffered byan inmate “translates into constitutional

liability for prison officials responsible for [the inmate’s] safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also

Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 394, 400 (11th Cir. 1986).

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“In order to state a § 1983 cause of action against prison officials based on a constitutional

deprivation resulting from cruel and unusual punishment, there must be at least some allegation of

a conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner’s rights, thus raising the tort to constitutional

stature.” Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Wright v. El Paso

County Jail, 642 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1981). Indeed, deliberate indifference requires “a state of

mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. It is only when institutional

officials’ deliberate indifference to a known danger or risk exposes an inmate to objectively,

“sufficiently serious” harm that a constitutional violation occurs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); see Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir.

1990) (“When officials become aware of a threat to an inmate’s health and safety, the [E]ighth

[A]mendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty to provide

reasonable protection.”).

A danger or risk is “known” only if the institutional official is both “aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he . . . draw[s] th[at]

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a

substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence.” Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842) (quotation marks omitted). “[A]n official’s failure to

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived, but did not,” is not sufficient to establish

liability on the part of the official. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Furthermore, “the known risk of injury

must be a ‘strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility.’” Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,

12

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1276 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.

1983)).

Once it is established an institutional official knew of a substantial danger or risk to an

inmate, it must then be shown the official “disregard[ed] that known risk by failing to respond to

it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

829, 837, 844) “[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or

failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted

or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842. 

Thus, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “produce sufficient evidence of (1) a

substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3)

causation.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Carter v.

Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003)). 

Turning to the instant case, the undersigned must construe the facts in a light most favorable

to Plaintiff: Plaintiff, an inmate at the St. Clair Correctional Facility, testified in a high profile

murder case. He was attacked by people associated with the criminal defendant prior to giving his

testimony. Immediately upon Plaintiff’s return to the St. Clair Correctional Facility, he learned

inmates there were aware he had testified in the trial, friends and relatives of the criminal defendant

against whom he testified were among the jail population, and he was in imminent danger because

threats had been made against him. Plaintiff conveyed this information first to Defendants Byers and

MacMillan. Defendant Byers agreed Plaintiff’s concerns were valid but took no actions to help him

other than advising him to speak with the on-duty shift commander. Defendant MacMillan did

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nothing. Plaintiff then told Defendant Bailey about his concerns, stated he was afraid to go back to

his bed in the general population, and requested to invoke protective custody. Defendant Bailey did

not address Plaintiff’s concerns, took no steps to provide him with protection, and ordered him to

return to his assigned dorm in the general population. Shortly thereafter Plaintiff was attacked and

beaten unconscious by a group of inmates that included the cousin of the criminal defendant against

whom Plaintiff had testified. A subsequent investigation of the assault revealed it was in retaliation

for Plaintiff’s trial testimony. 

Accepting these facts as true, the undersigned first finds a jury could reasonably infer

Plaintiff had a well-founded basis for his fear and did, in fact, face a substantial risk of serious harm. 

Plaintiff had already been attacked once as a result of his involvement in the criminal case and

received a specific warning the criminal defendant had friends and relatives in the St. Clair

Correctional Facility who were out to get him. See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617 n. 12 (risk of harm

sufficiently substantial where plaintiff learned his former gang members wanted to kill him,

members had strong presence at jail, and plaintiff received death threats). 

Second, a reasonable jury could also find Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey actually

knewPlaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Although Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and

Bailey dispute Plaintiff’s version of the events, it is well established that assessing the credibility of

the allegations made by a plaintiff or defendant is beyond the scope of a trial court’s ruling on a

motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);

see also, Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1986). Further, a reasonable

jury could find that, after acquiring the knowledge of the risk, the failure of Defendants Byers,

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MacMillan, and Baileys to make any attempt or take any action to minimize that risk was objectively

unreasonable. 

Finally, as to causation, the question is whether Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey

were “in a position to take steps that could have averted the stabbing incident ... but, through

[deliberate] indifference, failed to do so.” Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 22 (citing Williams, 689 F.2d at

1384). A reasonable jury could infer Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey could have placed

Plaintiff into protective custody while the threat was investigated or reported the threats to a

supervisor and ensured such steps were taken, and their failure to do so resulted in the attack on

Plaintiff. 

In sum, the facts presented by Plaintiff and Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey show

a genuine dispute exists between their respective versions of the material facts in connection with

the September 23, 2010 incident, and there exist questions for the jury. See, Rodriguez, 508 F.3d

at 621-22 (concluding a jury question existed as to defendant's subjective knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm to plaintiff). Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey are

due to be denied. 

IV. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiff’s

allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). 

If a constitutional right would have been violated under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, “the next,

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sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001).

First, Plaintiff’s version of the facts establishes a constitutional violation. The Eighth

Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; see also, Rodriguez, supra; Zatler v. Wainwright, 802

F.2d at 400 (inmates have a constitutional right to be protected ... from physical assault by other

inmates.”). Second, as can be seen from the long line of cases on this issue, the duty of an officer

to protect inmates in their care from assault by other inmates had been clearly established for years

prior to the incident the subject of this proceeding. As such, the motions for summary judgment on

the basis of qualified immunity are also due to be denied.

V. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Although the Complaint appeared to attempt to raise a claim of deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs based on Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the medical treatment he received

after the assault, Plaintiff does not allege any of the named defendants were involved in his medical

care, nor does he name any specific defendants who allegedly violated his constitutional rights with 3

regard to his medical care. 

 It should be noted it is only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs which is actionable

3

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Mere negligence is insufficient to

support a constitutional claim, see Fielder v. Brossard, 590 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979), as is an accidental

or inadvertent failure to provide medical care or negligent diagnosis or treatment of a medical condition. 

See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980). “Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (1976), and a

mere difference of opinion between an inmate and the institution’s medical staff as to treatment and

diagnosis alone will not give rise to a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment. Id.. at 106-08.

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While Plaintiff initially named nurse Jane Doe as a defendant, his subsequent motion to

dismiss her as a defendant was granted (Doc. 12), and Plaintiff has not moved to amend the

Complaint to name a proper party. Plaintiff’s allegations unnamed “medical personnel” failed to

document the full extent of his injuries on the body chart and then subsequently failed to perform

a brain scan, administer sufficient pain medications, or address his broken tooth are insufficient to

state a claim. (Doc. 1, p. 11). It is well settled there is no provision in the federal statutes or the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the use of fictitious parties, see Lubin v. Sybedon Corporation,

688 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Ala. 1986), and

failure to assert specific factual allegations directed toward specific defendants is grounds for

dismissal of a § 1983 claim. See Doe v. Cassell, 403 F.3d 986, 989-90 (8 Cir. 2005). Moreover, th

even if Plaintiff had identified the specific medical providers as defendants, he has failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). This claim is due to be

dismissed. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the magistrate judge RECOMMENDS the

following:

1. The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) as to Defendant Gray is due to

be GRANTED, and the claims against Defendant Gray are due to be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

2. The Alabama Department of Corrections is due to be DISMISSED as a defendant; 

3. The motions for summary judgment (Docs. 20 and 33) as to Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Byers, MacMillan, and Bailey in their official capacities

for monetary relief are due to be GRANTED, and such claims are due to be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

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4. The motions for summary judgment (Docs. 20 and 33) as to Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Defendants Byers, MacMillan,

and Bailey in their individual capacities are due to be DENIED, as is their

attempt to invoke qualified immunity;

5. To the extent Plaintiff was attempting to raise a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs, such claim is DISMISSED.

NOTICE OF THE RIGHT TO OBJECT

Any party who objects to this report and recommendation must, within fourteen (14) days

of the date on which it is entered, file specific written objections with the clerk of this court. Any

objections to the failure of the magistrate judge to address any facts or legal arguments also must be

included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the magistrate judge’s factual

findings or legal conclusions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140(1985),

reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 

To challenge the magistrate judge’s factual findings or legal conclusions, a party must file

with the clerk of the court written objections specifically identifying the factual findings or legal

conclusions to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. The filing of objections

is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence. 

Furthermore, it is not necessary for a party to repeat legal arguments in the objections. A copy of

the objections must be served on all other parties to the action.

On receipt of objections meeting the foregoing specificity requirement, a district judge shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which objection

is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s factual findings

or legal conclusions. The district judge, however, need conduct a hearing only in his or her

discretion or if required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge,

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making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The district judge may also receive

further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Objections not meeting the foregoing specificity requirement will not be considered by a district

judge.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation directly to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final

judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge.

DONE this 11 day of July, 2014. th

 

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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