Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02495/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02495-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1400 IDEA: Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (short title)

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19-CV-2495-CAB-LL

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.F., a minor, individually and on behalf of 

a proposed class,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-CV-2495-CAB-LL

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

[Doc. No. 15]

This matter is before the Court on Defendant San Diego Unified School District’s 

(“SDUSD”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. The motion has been 

fully briefed and the Court deems it suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 

without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, 

the motion to dismiss is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff J.F. is a minor who qualifies as an individual with a disability under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. [Doc. No. 13 

at ¶ 5.] Plaintiff is enrolled as a public-school student at Defendant SDUSD’s Gage 

Elementary School and alleges that as far back as 2017, SDUSD has known that its staffing 

and funding for special education services was inadequate when it was reported that the 

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school board cut the department’s budget significantly. [Id. at ¶¶ 15—18.] 

Plaintiff suffers from autism spectrum disorder and has speech issues. [Id. at ¶ 27.] 

SDUSD and Plaintiff’s parents developed an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for 

Plaintiff which entitles him to, among other things, a 1:1 aide. [Id. at ¶¶ 27—30.] In 

October 2018, Plaintiff’s mother learned that the 1:1 aide was being removed from 

Plaintiff’s classroom, so she wrote to the school principal that removal of the aide would 

be detrimental to Plaintiff’s education. [Id. at ¶ 31.] After repeated attempts contacting 

school officials and board members to follow up on the issue and the failure to provide an 

updated IEP through April 2019, Plaintiff finally received a 1:1 aide in May 2019, but only 

for the remaining three weeks of the school year. [Id. at ¶¶ 32—40.] Throughout the 2019-

2020 school year, SDUSD has again failed to consistently provide Plaintiff with the 1:1 

aide, which has resulted in an escalation of problematic behaviors and unnecessary 

difficulties, ultimately denying Plaintiff of a proper education. [Id. at ¶¶ 41—46.]

On February 10, 2020, Plaintiff J.F., by and through his guardians ad litem, 

individually and on behalf of a proposed class, filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

alleging: (1) violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 

U.S.C. § 1400; (2) civil rights violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violations of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; and (4) violations of Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 701. [Doc. No. 13.] On February 24, 2020, 

Defendant SDUSD moved to dismiss the FAC without leave to amend. [Doc. No. 15.]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 

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(9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Conclusory allegations of law are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss”). Nor is the Court “required to accept as true 

allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or . . . allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” DanielsHall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

Generally, when dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court should

deny opportunity to amend only if amendment would be futile. See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 

F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate if 

amendment “could not possibly cure the deficiency”), amended, 856 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 

1988).

B. Exhaustion Under the IDEA

“Judicial review under the IDEA is ordinarily available only after the plaintiff 

exhausts administrative remedies.” Doe By & Through Brockhuis v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)). So too, “a 

plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws must in 

certain circumstances—that is, when ‘seeking relief that is also available under’ the 

IDEA—first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 

137 S. Ct. 743, 750 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). However, “this exhaustion 

requirement is not a rigid one, and is subject to certain exceptions.” Hoeft v. Tucson 

Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1992).

The exhaustion of such administrative remedies is not required when “resort to the 

administrative process would be futile or inadequate,” or when “an agency has adopted a 

policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law.” Id. at 

1303-04 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985)). “Administrative 

remedies are generally inadequate where structural, systemic reforms are sought.” Id. at 

1309. “[A] claim is ‘systemic’ if it implicates the integrity or reliability of the IDEA 

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dispute resolution procedures themselves, or requires restructuring the education system 

itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act; but that it is not ‘systemic’ if it 

involves only a substantive claim having to do with limited components of a program, and 

if the administrative process is capable of correcting the problem.” Doe, 111 F.3d at 682. 

“In determining whether these exceptions apply, [a court’s] inquiry is whether pursuit of 

administrative remedies under the facts of a given case will further the general purposes of 

exhaustion and the congressional intent behind the administrative scheme.” Hoeft, 967 

F.2d at 1303.

The Ninth Circuit has read the exhaustion requirement of IDEA to “appl[y] 

differently to class actions than to suits brought by individuals, inasmuch as each class 

member need not exhaust before a suit is brought.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309. However, 

“the mere fact the complaint is structured as a class action seeking injunctive relief, without 

more, does not excuse exhaustion.” Id. at 1309.

C. Exceptions to the Exhaustion Requirement

Exhaustion may be excused when: “(1) use of the administrative process would be 

‘futile,’ (2) the claim arises from a policy or practice ‘of general applicability that is 

contrary to law,’ or (3) it is ‘improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing 

administrative remedies (e.g. the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief 

sought).’” Paul G. by and through Steve G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 933 

F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303-04). However, futility 

or inadequacy is not established simply because the body hearing the administrative appeal 

lacks jurisdiction to provide all or some of the relief requested. See Paul G., 933 F.3d at 

1002 (futility or inadequacy did not exist even though OAH did not have jurisdiction to 

order “structural and systemic statewide relief” because the “principal purpose of requiring 

administrative exhaustion, however, is to ensure the agency has had an opportunity to rule 

on a claim before a plaintiff goes to court,” on a claim seeking both damages and injunctive 

relief).

Under the second exemption, a claim is systemic, and “therefore entitled to the 

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general applicability exception, if it concerns ‘the integrity or reliability of the IDEA 

dispute resolution procedures themselves, or requires restructuring the education system 

itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act.’” Paul G., 933 F.3d at 1101-02 

(quoting Doe, 111 F.3d at 682).

III. DISCUSSION

SDUSD moves to dismiss the FAC primarily contending that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies. The parties do not dispute that the IDEA’s 

exhaustion requirements apply equally to each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. However, 

Plaintiff avers that he and the class satisfy all three of the exceptions to be excused from

exhaustion.

A. Futile and Inadequate

Plaintiff argues that exhaustion in this case is both futile and inadequate because 

SDUSD had already agreed to provide a 1:1 aide to Plaintiff and the class but fails to 

provide the aides. Therefore, Plaintiff contends that the best outcome he and the class 

would receive from an administrative proceeding is mere confirmation that SDUSD failed 

to provide the 1:1 aides.

Plaintiff has not shown that the administrative process in this case would be futile or 

inadequate. “[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the administrative process is adequately 

equipped to address and resolve the issues presented.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309. The relief 

the plaintiffs sought in Hoeft included an injunction requiring the school district “to 

develop ‘appropriate criteria . . . for evaluating each child’s need for [services]’ [and] to 

afford parents all the procedural rights to which they [were] entitled under the IDEA,” yet 

the Ninth Circuit stated “[t]he issues in [Hoeft] consist[ed] primarily of questions of 

substantive educational policy, issues which the administrative process was specifically 

designed to address. Moreover, even though injunctive relief is unavailable, the 

administrative process has the potential for producing the very result plaintiffs seek, 

namely, statutory compliance.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1302, 1309. Similarly, the Court finds 

that the administrative process has the potential for producing the results Plaintiff and the 

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class seek in this case. Ultimately, Plaintiff and the class seek consistent 1:1 aides as 

entitled by each of their IEP’s. Whether that involves additional funding or resources 

remains in question and the administrative process should be able to resolve such issues. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the administrative process in this case would be 

futile or inadequate. 

B. Facially Illegal Policy

Plaintiff also argues that his complaint presents a facially illegal policy and purely 

legal question. The purported policy is SDUSD’s failure to comply with Plaintiff’s and 

the class members’ IEP’s—specifically, the failure to allocate adequate funding and 

resources to provide 1:1 aides.

Even where local school policies appear on their face to violate the IDEA, 

administrative exhaustion may be necessary to give the state a reasonable opportunity to 

investigate and correct such policies. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1492 (9th 

Cir.1986) (parents must give state officials “adequate notice of the local agency’s 

noncompliance, and the state must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to compel local 

compliance”), modified on other grounds sub nom. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 

Challenging an individualized education program by recourse to the IDEA’s procedural 

scheme affords the state such an opportunity. Although hearing officers lack power to 

adjudicate questions of statutory compliance, they are empowered to order the provision 

of an appropriate education program for an individual child, as guaranteed by the IDEA. 

Cf. Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1271, 1274–75 (4th Cir.1987) (school 

district’s failure to implement hearing officer decision ordering private placement where 

services not available in district is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as deprivation of 

right secured by federal law).

Plaintiff’s characterization of a systemic policy by SDUSD failing to allocate 

enough resources to provide 1:1 aides appears overstated to overcome the exhaustion

requirements. As discussed above, Plaintiff contends that SDUSD fails to provide aides as 

prescribed by each students’ IEP. However, it is not ascertainable to what extent each 

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students’ IEP prescribes a 1:1 aide with respect to purpose, duration, educational needs, 

etc. This requires specific factual inquiry which the administrative courts are well 

equipped to analyze to develop the necessary factual record. The purported policies

challenged by Plaintiff in this case are “the kind of technical questions of educational 

policy best resolved with the benefit of agency expertise and a fully developed 

administrative record.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305 (citations omitted). Further, even if the 

failure to allocate adequate resources appears on its face to violate the IDEA, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that administrative exhaustion may still be necessary to give the state a 

reasonable opportunity to investigate and correct such policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

not shown that this case presents a facially illegal policy such that administrative 

exhaustion should be excused.

C. Furthering the Purpose of the Exhaustion Doctrine

The Court is also not persuaded by Plaintiff’s contention that requiring exhaustion 

in this case would serve none of the purposes of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements. “The 

exhaustion doctrine embodies the notion that ‘agencies, not the courts, ought to have 

primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.’” 

Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). 

“Exhaustion of the administrative process allows for the exercise of discretion and 

educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical 

educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes 

judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in 

their educational programs for disabled children.” Id. (emphasis added). As the Supreme 

Court has observed, “courts lack the ‘specialized knowledge and experience’ necessary to 

resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,’” and Congress shared that 

view when it adopted the IDEA. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) 

(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the administrative process can address Plaintiff’s 

and the class members’ disputes and, if Plaintiff and the class remain aggrieved after 

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exhaustion of the administrative process, they can bring a civil action at that time. As 

stated by the Ninth Circuit, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “recognizes the 

traditionally strong state and local interest in education, as reflected in the statute’s 

emphasis on state and local responsibility.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303. Thus, it would be 

inappropriate for the Court to consider this matter before Plaintiff and the class give state 

and local interests the opportunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant SDUSD’s motion to dismiss the FAC is 

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s FAC is DISMISSED without leave to amend. The Clerk of 

Court shall CLOSE this case.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2020

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