Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00941/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00941-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gail L. Rush-Shaw, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

USF Reddaway Incorporated, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-00941-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant USF Reddaway, Inc.’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 63) on Plaintiff Gail L. Rush-Shaw’s single Title VII sex 

discrimination claim. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 67) and Defendant filed a Reply 

(Doc. 71). The Court heard oral argument on April 22, 2014. The Court now rules on the 

Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 For purposes of the Court’s resolution of the pending summary judgment motion, 

the Court considers the relevant facts and background, viewed in Plaintiff’s favor,1

 to be 

as follows. 

 Defendant USF Reddaway Incorporated is a service company with operations in 

Arizona and the West Coast: it carries and delivers its customers’ freight. (Defendant’s 

Statement of Fact (“DSOF”), Doc. 64 at ¶¶ 1, 3; Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Facts 

 

1

 In the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2004). 

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(“PSOF”), Doc. 68 at ¶¶ 1, 3). Defendant maintains numerous terminals where the freight 

it ships for its customers is handled and loaded on trailers for delivery. (DSOF ¶ 4; PSOF 

¶ 4). In 2007, Defendant merged with another freight carrier, Bestway. (DOSF ¶ 11; 

PSOF ¶ 11). Prior to the merger, Plaintiff Gail L. Rush-Shaw had been employed by 

Bestway since 1978 and, in July 2006, had assumed the position of Phoenix (“PHX”) 

terminal manager. (DSOF ¶ 12; PSOF ¶ 12). Post-merger, Defendant employed Plaintiff, 

“at-will,”2

 as the PHX terminal manager from January 2007 until her termination on 

March 25, 2011. (DSOF ¶ 13; PSOF ¶ 13). 

 As terminal manager, Plaintiff bore the ultimate responsibility for all operations of 

the PHX terminal, including day-to-day operational and supervisory responsibilities over 

customer service, meeting customer specifications regarding deliveries and pickups, 

administration, employee hiring and discipline, sales, claims, safety, and facility 

maintenance. (DSOF ¶ 14; PSOF ¶ 14). Plaintiff reported to Doug Schuster (“Schuster”), 

Defendant’s Divisional Vice President, Southern Division. (DSOF ¶ 17; PSOF ¶ 17). 

Both Plaintiff and Schuster considered PHX to be an “impact” terminal, meaning that the 

terminal had relatively high operations and revenue, such that events at the PHX terminal 

could affect the company and be visible. (DSOF ¶¶ 9–10; PSOF ¶¶ 9–10). 

 Post-merger and through the economic recession that followed, Defendant 

significantly downsized its staffing levels company-wide. (DSOF ¶¶ 146–153, 156, 162, 

173; PSOF ¶¶ 146–153, 156, 162, 173). In fact, between 2007 and March 25, 2011, the 

number of employees at the PHX terminal was reduced from 170 to approximately 70. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 148–150; PSOF ¶¶ 148–150). Additionally, unlike most of Defendant’s 

terminals, the PHX terminal employed union labor, which affected Plaintiff’s ability to 

hire and fire some classes of employees. (DOSF ¶¶ 15, 155; PSOF ¶¶ 15, 155). 

 Following the 2007 merger, Defendant learned of significant customer service 

failures and various internal complaints at the PHX terminal under Plaintiff’s 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s employment was at will: it could be terminated at any time without cause. (DSOF ¶ 16; PSOF ¶ 16). 

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management. (DSOF ¶¶ 19–22, 66; PSOF ¶¶ 19–22, 66). In January 2008, following an 

audit of the PHX terminal, Plaintiff was issued a “Notice of Corrective Action” 

(“NOCA”) regarding serious performance concerns, including significant customer 

dissatisfaction with the Phoenix terminal. (DSOF ¶ 23; PSOF ¶ 23). The NOCA warned 

Plaintiff that “should similar or other performance problems or misconduct occur at any 

time in the future, [Plaintiff] will be subject to discharge.” (DSOF ¶ 24, Ex. 14; PSOF 

¶ 24). Plaintiff’s performance improved and her 2008 and 2009 annual performance 

evaluations rated her as “meets expectations.” (PSOF at Exs. 37–38). 

 In 2010, however, the PHX terminal’s customer service drastically worsened.3

(DSOF ¶¶ 29–33, 38–40, 91; PSOF ¶¶ 29–33, 38–40, 91). During the first three months 

of 2011 (January through Plaintiff’s termination on March 25, 2011), Defendant received 

at least fourteen serious customer complaints about the PHX terminal and Plaintiff, 

including several threats that customers would cease hiring Defendant. (DSOF ¶¶ 41–65; 

PSOF ¶¶ 41–65). Defendant repeatedly stressed to Plaintiff that such complaints were 

unacceptable and could not continue. (DSOF ¶¶ 41, 44, 45, 47, 49–51, 53, 54, 57; PSOF 

¶¶ 41, 44, 45, 47, 49–51, 53, 54, 57). After Schuster’s supervisors expressed a “total lack 

of confidence” in Plaintiff’s management due to the numerous serious customer 

complaints, on March 25, 2011, Schuster terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (DSOF 

¶¶ 65, 95–96, 102; PSOF ¶¶ 65, 95, 102). 

 On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant suit alleging a single Title VII claim of 

sex discrimination in the termination of her employment. (Doc. 1).

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

 

3

 Plaintiff did not receive a 2010 annual performance review prior to her March 25, 2011 termination. However, Schuster’s draft 2010 evaluation notes that Plaintiff’s 

“team building effectiveness has once again come into question as internal controls 

continue to fail, and her effectiveness with regards to internal and external cust[omer] 

suc[cess] & satisfaction has significantly diminished.” (DSOF ¶ 95, Ex. 71; PSOF ¶ 95). 

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disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, or 

declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by 

“showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” 

Id. at 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586B87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247B48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at the 

summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of 

credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.”) (internal citations 

omitted). 

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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “has set a high standard for the 

granting of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. 

Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996). As the Ninth Circuit has 

explained, “[w]e require very little evidence to survive summary judgment in a 

discrimination case, because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved 

through a ‘searching inquiry’—one that is most appropriately conducted by the 

factfinder, upon a full record.” Lam v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9th Cir. 

1994) (internal quotations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) consists of a single Title VII claim of sex 

discrimination. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that because of her female sex, Defendant 

discriminated against her in the terms and conditions of her employment, including 

holding male managers to lower standards, pretextually terminating her employment, and 

replacing her with a less qualified male. (Id. ¶ 17). Defendant moves for summary 

judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of sex 

discrimination because there is not a genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff was 

terminated for poor performance. (Doc. 63 at 12–17). 

A. Legal Framework for Disparate Treatment Sex Discrimination Claim 

 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on 

the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This 

provision of Title VII makes “disparate treatment” based on sex or race a violation of 

federal law. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation omitted); see Johnson v. Teltara, LLC, No. CV 08-1894-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 

2873492, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2010). 

 To prevail on a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must prove that an adverse 

employment action was taken “because of” unlawful discrimination. Costa v. Desert 

Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 857 (9th Cir. 2002). Title VII disparate-treatment claims like 

Plaintiff’s, “require the plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with conscious intent to 

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discriminate.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805–06 (1973). 

Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she 

performed according to her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she was subjected to 

an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her 

protected class were treated more favorably. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 

1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit “has explained 

that under the McDonnell Douglas framework, ‘the requisite degree of proof necessary to 

establish a prima facie case for Title VII . . . on summary judgment is minimal and does 

not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 Furthermore, Courts employ a burden-shifting analysis for Title VII claims: 

[T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct. If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination. 

Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McDonnell Douglas 

Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–05). At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff does not have 

to prove that the employer’s reason for firing her was pretext for discrimination, but the 

plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the employer’s reason was pretextual. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 

1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000). 

B. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 

 Here, Defendant only disputes4

 the second element of Plaintiff’s prima facie case: 

 

4

 Defendant does not dispute the first and third elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie case because Plaintiff is a female whose employment was terminated by Defendant. (Doc. 63 at 11, n.7). Additionally, because Plaintiff was replaced by a male, the fourth element is beyond dispute. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (noting that the fourth McDonnell Douglas element, that similarly situated men were treated more favorably than Plaintiff, can be satisfied by a showing that Plaintiff was replaced by a male). 

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that Plaintiff performed according to her employer’s legitimate expectations.5

Specifically, Defendant argues that the fifteen serious customer complaints about the 

PHX terminal during the three months preceding Plaintiff’s termination undisputedly 

demonstrate that Plaintiff’s performance failed to meet her employer’s legitimate 

expectations. (Doc. 63 at 12). In Response, Plaintiff attempts to downplay the seriousness 

of the customer complaints, provides a positive “self-assessment” of her pre-termination 

performance, and argues that this self-assessment, when combined with various favorable 

comparisons to the Los Angeles (“LAX”) terminal,6

 demonstrates that Plaintiff met 

Defendant’s legitimate performance expectations. (Doc. 67 at 6–8, 11, 16–17). 

 To make her prima facie case, Plaintiff must produce evidence that she was 

performing according to Defendant’s legitimate performance expectations. “The Ninth 

Circuit characterizes the crux of this element as whether the plaintiff ‘adequately’ 

performed her job, which ‘suggests a standard less than perfect performance.’ ” Whitley 

v. City of Portland, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1208 (D. Or. 2009) (quoting Moorehead v. 

Chertoff, No. C-07-1205-MJP, 2008 WL4810308, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2008) 

(citing Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006))). 

Although an employer cannot legitimately expect perfect performance, “employers can 

legitimately expect an employee’s performance not to engender customer complaints.” 

Parada v. Great Plains Int’l of Sioux City, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 777, 807 (N.D. Iowa 

2007) (“[T]he record shows beyond dispute that [plaintiff] was not meeting that 

legitimate expectation, where there is evidence of serious customer complaints against 

her and no evidence, whatsoever, that the complaints did not occur.”); see, U.S. E.E.O.C. 

v. Republic Servs., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1301 (D. Nev. 2009) (finding customer 

 

5

 Under McDonnell Douglas, “the elements and contours of a prima facie case will differ according to the facts at hand.” Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the Parties agree that as to the second element, Plaintiff must 

prove she was meeting Defendant’s “legitimate performance expectations.” (Doc. 63 at 12; Doc. 67 at 6–8). Consonant with the facts of this case, the Court agrees. 

6

 Plaintiff argues that “LAX and PHX were comparable Reddaway ‘impact’ terminals because they were the only union terminals in the Southern Division.” (Doc. 67 

at 7). 

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complaints about an employee’s performance relevant when determining that the 

employee did not demonstrate a prima facie case of satisfactorily performing his duties). 

 Here, the record demonstrates that Defendant received numerous customer 

complaints about the PHX terminal during the months leading up to Plaintiff’s 

termination. (DSOF ¶¶ 38–65). Indeed, it is undisputed that in the three-months 

preceding Plaintiff’s termination, Defendant received at least fourteen serious complaints, 

some of which included threats to cease doing business with Defendant.7

 (DSOF ¶¶ 41–

65; see PSOF ¶¶ 41–65 (admitting that the customer complaints occurred). Moreover, it 

is undisputed that during this three-month period, Defendant repeatedly stressed to 

Plaintiff that engendering such serious customer complaints fails to meet Defendant’s 

performance expectations. (DSOF ¶ 49, Ex. 34 (where Schuster emailed Plaintiff that 

undelivered shipments “placed the company in a tenuous situation. The root cause was a 

loss of internal control, resulting in shipments sitting for weeks without visibility or 

proper disposition. This is unacceptable Gail, and you can expect that there will be follow 

up accountability regarding the loss of internal control.”); PSOF ¶ 49 (disputing the cause 

of the complaints, but not Defendant’s warning); see also, DSOF ¶¶ 41, 44, 45, 47, 50, 

51, 53, 54, 57; PSOF ¶¶ 41, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57 (disputing Plaintiff’s 

responsibility for the various serious complaints, but not that Defendant’s warnings 

occurred). Additionally, Plaintiff’s 2008 NOCA clearly stated that serious customer 

complaints are grounds for discharge. (DSOF ¶ 24, Ex. 14; PSOF ¶ 24). 

 Despite not disputing that Defendant repeatedly warned Plaintiff that such serious 

and numerous customer complaints were unacceptable, Plaintiff appears to contend that 

she was nonetheless meeting Defendant’s legitimate performance expectations by 

disputing both the seriousness of the complaints and her responsibility for them. (PSOF 

¶¶ 41–65). For example, Plaintiff argues that, “in context,” only 0.033% of bills 

 

7

 For example, on January 28, 2011, a PHX Terminal service failure was so 

serious that the customer “officially” requested that its supplier “use ANYBODY other 

than [Defendant] to ship out future tire orders to Phoenix.” (DSOF ¶ 42, Ex. 29; PSOF ¶ 42 (not disputing that a customer made this complaint)). 

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(individual pick-up or deliver jobs) during her final three months engendered a customer 

complaint.8

 (Doc. 67 at 11). When presented in this manner, 15 serious customer 

complaints, indeed, appears small. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff commits the 

same error she places at Defendant’s feet: a lack of context. Plaintiff provides no 

evidence of, and the record contains nothing from which the Court could reasonably 

infer, the percentage of serious customer complaints that Defendant accepts as within its 

legitimate performance expectations of its terminal managers. For example, although 

Plaintiff submits evidence suggesting that the overall service failure rate of the PHX 

terminal was comparable to that of the LAX terminal (see Doc. 267 at 7), Plaintiff points 

to no evidence,9

 and the Court finds none in the record, that the LAX terminal’s service 

failures engendered any similarly serious customer complaints, let alone a comparable 

rate of serious complaints. Further, Plaintiff presents no historical evidence of either other 

terminal manager or her own serious customer complaint rates in prior years where the 

other terminal manager or Plaintiff received “meets expectations” performance reviews. 

(2008 and 2009 Annual Performance Reviews of Plaintiff, PSOF at Exs. 37–38; 2010 

Annual Performance Review of Joe Torres, LAX Terminal Manager, PSOF at Ex. 27). 

 Similarly, Plaintiff’s continued insistence that she did not personally cause the 

various service failures that engendered the serious customer complaints (see PSOF 

¶¶ 41–65) fails to demonstrate the prima facie element that she was meeting Defendant’s 

legitimate performance expectations. Even fully accepting Plaintiff’s contention that the 

PHX terminal’s understaffing or the (in)actions of either Plaintiff’s subordinates or other 

terminals were the true causes of the serious customer dissatisfaction, Plaintiff has 

repeatedly acknowledged that she held ultimate responsibility for the operations of the 

 

8

 Plaintiff calculates this percentage by dividing the approximately 46,000 bills handled during January through March, 2011 by 15 complaints (15/46,000 = 0.000326, 

which equals approximately 0.033%). 

9 See Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted) (“Judges need not paw over the files without assistance from the parties.”); Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”) (citation omitted). 

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PHX terminal. (DSOF ¶ 14; PSOF ¶ 14 (admitting that Plaintiff held ultimate 

responsibility for all operations of the PHX terminal, including day-to-day operational 

and supervisory responsibilities over customer service); see DSOF ¶¶ 45, 47, 54, 57; see

PSOF ¶¶ 45, 47, 54, 57 (not disputing that Plaintiff expressed an acceptance of ultimate 

responsibility, but arguing that the “service failures were anticipated and resulted from” 

understaffing)). Moreover, given the fact that Defendant’s annual performance 

evaluations, including those of Plaintiff, explicitly evaluate terminal manager 

performance, in part, on rates of service failures and customer satisfaction (2008 and 

2009 Annual Performance Reviews of Plaintiff, PSOF at Exs. 37–38; Draft 2010 Annual 

Performance Review of Plaintiff, DSOF at Ex. 71), the Court finds it unreasonable to 

infer or conclude that Plaintiff’s position as terminal manager did not include ultimate 

responsibility for PHX terminal service failures and the satisfaction of PHX terminal 

customers. 

 Lastly, Plaintiff asks the Court to infer that Plaintiff was meeting Defendant’s 

legitimate performance expectations because Plaintiff received more customer 

compliments (23) than complaints (15) during the relevant time period. (Doc. 67 at 11). 

However, such an inference is not reasonable. Generally, an employer legitimately 

expects its employees to both not engender serious customer dissatisfaction (which may 

be manifested as complaints) and to satisfactorily service customers (which may be 

expressed in compliments). The record presented to the Court provides no evidence or 

basis for a reasonable inference that Defendant peculiarly excused terminal managers of 

serious customer dissatisfaction as long as other customers expressed some degree of 

satisfaction. In fact, the undisputed record demonstrates the opposite: Defendant 

repeatedly warned Plaintiff that the serious customer complaints were unacceptable. 

(2008 NOCA, DSOF at Ex. 14; DSOF ¶¶ 24, 41, 44, 45, 47, 49–51, 53, 54, 57; see PSOF 

¶¶ 24, 41, 44, 45, 47, 49–51, 53, 54, 57). Thus, the numerous serious customer 

complaints during the months preceding Plaintiff’s termination undisputedly demonstrate 

that Plaintiff’s performance failed to meet her employer’s legitimate expectations. 

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 Nonetheless, Plaintiff insists that her positive self-assessment of her performance 

during the three months prior to her termination, in which she rates herself as “meets 

expectations” based upon various favorable comparisons to the LAX terminal, 

sufficiently demonstrates her prima facie case. (Doc. 67 at 6–8). “In fact, while a 

plaintiff’s self-assessment is a relevant consideration, by itself it is not evidence sufficient 

to satisfy this element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Whitley, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; 

see, e.g., Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659–60 (9th Cir. 

2002) (holding that plaintiff employee’s self-assessment of his performance was relevant, 

and when bolstered by other evidence that he had received no formal write-ups and that 

his work-product equaled that of his co-workers, was sufficient to prove a prima facie 

case); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff’s selfassessment is “relevant in combination with other circumstantial evidence of 

qualifications” when demonstrating a prima facie failure to promote claim). 

 Here, Plaintiff’s positive self-assessment is based on favorable comparisons to the 

LAX terminal using such metrics as the number of Teamsters Union grievances, various 

measures of the work required per bill, safety incidents, and the rate of service failures.10

(Doc. 67 at 6–8). Plaintiff, however, makes no attempt to “bolster” her self-assessment 

with other relevant evidence.11 See Aragon, 292 F.3d at 659–60. Instead, Plaintiff’s 

admittance that numerous serious customer complaints occurred tarnishes her positive 

 

10 The rate of service failures has some relation to customer complaints in so far as a customer is unlikely to complain absent a service failure. However, as noted above, 

Plaintiff provides no indication that the LAX terminal received any serious customer complaints during the relevant time. 

11 To the extent that Plaintiff points to 33 years of previous good performance reviews to bolster her self-assessment, the Court notes that, in fact, Plaintiff submits only two years of PHX terminal manager “meets expectations” annual performance reviews from Defendant. (PSOF at Exs. 37–38). Between 1978 and 2007, Plaintiff was employed by “Bestway,” not Defendant, and thus any such reviews (which have not been submitted) are irrelevant. Plaintiff has not submitted her 2007 annual performance review. Additionally, Schuster’s draft 2010 annual performance review notes that Plaintiff’s “team building effectiveness has once again come into question as internal controls continue to fail, and her effectiveness with regards to internal and external 

cut[omer] suc[cess] & satisfaction has significantly diminished.” (DSOF ¶ 95, Ex. 71; PSOF ¶ 95). 

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self-assessment. Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that meeting Defendant’s 

performance expectations in some areas absolves seriously deficient performance in 

customer satisfaction. Thus, given Plaintiff’s acknowledgment of the numerous serious 

customer complaints, Plaintiff’s positive self-assessment is insufficient evidence to 

support a reasonable inference that her performance met Defendant’s legitimate 

expectations. See Nguyen v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 09CV1925–MMA, 2011 WL 1119564, 

*8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011) (holding that absent additional evidence, a plaintiff’s selfassessment alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case). 

 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an essential 

element of a prima facie case: that her performance met Defendant’s legitimate 

expectations. Accordingly, under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. However, because the degree of proof is so 

low at the prima facie stage, the Court makes the following additional alternative findings 

regarding Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination 

and Plaintiff’s showing of pretext. 

C. Defendant’s Articulated Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons for 

Terminating Plaintiff’s Employment and Plaintiff’s Evidence of Pretext 

 Defendant has clearly articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 

Plaintiff’s termination. The question then is whether there is any evidence of pretext. 

Because Plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination, Plaintiff

must proffer “specific” and “substantial” evidence of pretext to overcome [defendant’s] summary judgment motion. See Manatt [v. Bank of Am.], 339 

F.3d [792,] 801 [(9th Cir. 2003)] (“Because Manatt failed to introduce any direct or specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of pretext, summary judgment for the [employer] must be affirmed.”); Brown v. City 

of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To avoid summary judgment, Bradley must do more than establish a prima facie case and deny the 

credibility of the [defendant’s] witnesses. She must produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “the focus of 

the pretext inquiry is not to determine whether [Defendant] was correct in determining 

that [Plaintiff’s] job performance was unsatisfactory, but simply whether [Plaintiff’s] 

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performance was the real reason for the termination. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 

521 F.3d 1201, 1214 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 

n. 5 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 

1998) (“[W]hen an employer articulates a reason for discharging the plaintiff not 

forbidden by law, it is not our province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or 

even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiff’s 

termination.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Here, Plaintiff provides three categories of pretext allegations: (1) “Plaintiff met 

the reasonable expectations of Defendant before she was fired” (Doc. 67 at 9); (2) 

“Defendant had a “corporate culture” of prejudice (id. at 9–13); and, (3) Defendant’s 

reasons for firing Plaintiff (customer complaints) are a false, post hoc rationalization (id.

at 13–17). 

 Initially, the Court notes that the first and third categories are essentially the same 

argument and based on the same evidence in the record. As explained above, the 

evidence in the record does not create a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff was 

meeting the legitimate performance expectations of Defendant prior to her termination. 

Rather, the undisputed evidence of serious customer complaints establishes that Plaintiff 

was not meeting Defendant’s legitimate performance expectations. 

 Nonetheless, Plaintiff stresses her positive self-assessment and positive 

comparisons to other terminal managers. However, “an employee’s own statement that he 

was performing at a level equal to that of other employees is not enough to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact.” Aragon, 292 F.3d at 660 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bradley v. 

Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n employee’s subjective 

personal judgments of [his] competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material 

fact.”). Plaintiff also claims that the evidence demonstrates that the PHX terminal 

“outperformed other terminals managed by male managers in service in the last months 

of her employment.” (Doc. 67 at 14). Even accepting this as true, it is based solely on the 

service failure rate and not the seriousness of those service failures. Plaintiff’s 

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comparison wholly fails to address the numerous serious customer complaints that 

Plaintiff admits occurred. “Unless [Plaintiff] attacks the specific reasons given for a 

termination, a plaintiff who stresses evidence of satisfactory performance is simply 

challenging the wisdom of the employer’s decision, which we have consistently refused 

to review. Anderson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 965 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing 

Castleman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Neither the jury nor 

this Court is empowered to act as a ‘super-personnel department’ and decide if [a] firing 

was unwise or unjustified.”)). 

 Plaintiff further argues that the numerous serious customer complaints were not 

her fault and were reasonably expected by Defendant because of severe understaffing of 

the PHX terminal.12 (Doc. 67 at 13–14; PSOF ¶¶ 41–65). Plaintiff argues that the 

understaffing forced her to work 7–8 hours dispatching each morning instead of 

performing her managerial duties, but that no male manager had the same burden. (Id. at 

12–15). Plaintiff argues that these facts demonstrate that Defendant set Plaintiff up to fail 

in order to manufacture pretext for her termination. (Id. at 13–14). Plaintiff’s “conspiracy 

theory,” however, is not supported by the evidence in the record or reasonable inferences 

drawn from that evidence. See Gold v. Parker Toyota, Inc., 2:09-CV-00618-EJL, 2011 

WL 675239 (D. Idaho Feb. 17, 2011). Rather, Plaintiff admits that during the relevant 

time, in response to a dire economic situation, Defendant instituted massive layoffs and a 

company-wide hiring freeze preventing Plaintiff from hiring an additional dispatcher. 

(Doc. 67 at 4; PSOF ¶ 250–53; DSOF ¶¶ 146–53, 156, 160, 162, 163, 173). Furthermore, 

Plaintiff readily admits that because the PHX terminal was unionized, she was 

constrained in hiring any short-term drivers or loaders to alleviate stress on the PHX 

terminal. (Doc. 67 at 6–7). 

 Plaintiff also attempts to connect understaffing with gender animus by arguing that 

 

12 Even accepting that the various service failures that engendered the serious customer complaints were not Plaintiff’s “fault,” there is no dispute of material fact that, whether “fair” or not, Defendant legitimately expected the buck to stop at Plaintiff, the terminal manager. 

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additional staff was hired after her termination for the benefit of her male replacement. 

(Doc. 67 at 8, 13). However, the Court notes that Schuster hired additional part-time, 

casual dock-workers to clear the back-log that had amassed during Plaintiff’s tenure 

immediately after Plaintiff’s termination and before Plaintiff’s replacement was hired. 

(DSOF ¶ 176; PSOF ¶ 176). Furthermore, because an employee began a 5-month medical 

leave a few days before Plaintiff was terminated, her replacement was able to allocate the 

now available man hours to a new hire who took over some dispatching duties until the 

absent employee returned from leave. (DSOF ¶¶ 179–81; PSOF ¶¶ 179–81). 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s dispatcher duties and the PHX terminal’s understaffing are not 

specific or substantial evidence of pretext and do not establish a genuine dispute of 

material fact. Simply put, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact 

that she was performing her job “well enough to rule out the possibility that [s]he was 

fired for inadequate job performance.”13 Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

1054, 1063 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 

672 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

 Plaintiff’s argument that “Defendant had a “corporate culture” of prejudice (Doc. 

67 at 9–13) is similarly unsupported by specific, substantial evidence of pretext. Plaintiff 

bases her argument primarily on the dearth of female employees throughout Defendant’s 

operation. (Doc. 67 at 9–10). Plaintiff claims that all of her managers and all other 

terminal managers were male. (Doc. 67 at 9). Plaintiff further contends that all of the 

drivers and dockworkers at the PHX terminal were male and “did not like being managed 

by a woman.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s broad demographic statements are not specific or 

substantial evidence of pretext because Plaintiff has made no attempt to eliminate any 

non-sex discriminatory reasons for the lack of gender diversity. Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. 

of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the Court notes that both 

 

13 Plaintiff has undisputedly established that she worked incredibly hard in an attempt to meet the legitimate expectations of her terminal manager position. Nonetheless, it is a disappointing fact of life that an earnest desire to succeed, even when 

coupled with diligent work, does not always produce success. 

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because Plaintiff had hiring power over the drivers and dockworkers in the PHX terminal, 

and because of their subordinate relationship, their gender composition (all male) is 

wholly irrelevant. 

 With regard to Plaintiff’s male superiors, Plaintiff admits that none ever made any 

negative statements related to gender. (DSOF ¶¶ 113–14; PSOF ¶¶ 113–14 (admitting 

same)). Plaintiff does relate an incident where Schuster yelled at her (Doc. 67 at 15–16) 

and other circumstantial evidence that Schuster may not have liked her (see id. at 14–16). 

However, the record lacks any indication that these incidents were motivated by gender 

animus as opposed to ordinary dislike. See Joki v. Rogue Cmty. Coll., 544 F. App’x 679, 

682 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) 

(“[S]tandards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII 

does not become a ‘general civility code.’ ”). Because, “personal conflict does not equate 

with discriminatory animus,” Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 342–43 

(6th Cir. 1998), Plaintiff’s evidence is not specific or substantial evidence of pretext and 

does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact. See also Burniche v. Gen. Elec. 

Automation Servs., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 233, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (“statements and 

conduct” that “largely reflect that plaintiff and [defendant] simply [do] not get along 

well,” “without more, are insufficient grounds from which to infer discriminatory animus 

in [plaintiff’s] termination.”). 

 In sum, Plaintiff offers no specific and substantial evidence that her termination 

was motivated by anything other than Defendant’s loss of confidence in her management 

abilities, provoked by numerous serious customer complaints during the final three 

months of her employment.14 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established that genuine 

issues of fact exist regarding any evidence of pretext, and the motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim is granted. 

 

14 “Plaintiff has no evidence showing that any of the customer complaints made about her and the Phoenix terminal and the resulting loss in confidence were because she was a woman or was, in any way, correlated to her gender.” (DSOF ¶ 102; see PSOF 

¶ 102 (not disputing same)). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 63) is 

GRANTED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment 

for Defendant. 

 Dated this 30th day of April, 2014. 

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