Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORIS RAY KNOX; JERRY WAYNE 

KNOX; JEREMY EDWARD MOORE, 

individually and as successor-in-interest to 

VERONICA LYNN CANTER, deceased,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipal 

corporation;

EDWARD CHRISTOPHER LOUCHREN,

individually and in his capacity as a police 

officer for the CITY OF FRESNO; 

DOUGLAS EDWARD COX, individually 

and in his capacity as a police officer for the 

CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00799-EPG

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR NEW TRIAL

(ECF No. 178)

Plaintiffs have moved this Court for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

59 on the basis that the Court did not grant Plaintiffs’ request to amend Ninth Circuit Model 

Instruction 9.23. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties first proposed jury instructions on June 3, 2016. (ECF Nos. 98, 99, 102, 

103, 109, 110.) In one of Plaintiffs’ first submissions of proposed jury instructions, they

proposed using Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions 9.23 (2016) on the question of 

Case 1:14-cv-00799-EPG Document 182 Filed 09/09/16 Page 1 of 10
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“Particular Rights—Fourth Amendment—Unreasonable Seizure of Person—Excessive (Deadly 

and Nondeadly) Force.” (ECF No. 109, at 8.) As proposed by Plaintiffs, that instruction 

provided in part:

Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may only use such force as is 

“objectively reasonable” under all of the circumstances. You must judge the 

reasonableness of a particular use of force from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene and not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. An officer’s 

intent or motive is not relevant to your inquiry. In determining whether 

Defendants Cox and Louchren used excessive force in this case, consider all of 

the circumstances known to them on the scene, including:

(ECF No. 109, at 8.) Plaintiffs’ proposed instruction went on to list 10 relevant factors 

including “whether it should have been apparent to the officers that the person they used force 

against was emotionally disturbed.” (ECF No. 109, at 9.) 

Between June 3 and June 13, Plaintiffs filed many documents regarding jury 

instructions, including objections to certain of Defendants’ jury instructions and additional 

proposed jury instructions. (ECF No. 125, 128, 129, 130.) Nowhere in these submissions did 

Plaintiffs suggest any change to their Proposed Instruction regarding the Fourth Amendment.

The Court reviewed the parties’ proposed instructions and submitted its consolidated 

proposed set of jury instructions to the parties by e-mail on June 10. The Court then held 

argument regarding proposed jury instructions on June 13, 2016, the day before trial. (ECF No. 

133.) Plaintiff again did not provide any objection or amendment to the previously proposed 

instruction on the Fourth Amendment claim. The Court ruled on all outstanding objections

addressed at the June 13 hearing and later provided the parties with copies of the draft jury 

instructions once the trial had started. 

The jury trial began on June 14, 2016 and evidence was presented through June 16, 

2016. The parties concluded their presentation of evidence in the afternoon of June 16, 2016, 

and the Court recessed until 9:00 am of June 17 for closing arguments and deliberation. The 

Court emailed a final version of the jury instructions to counsel at 3:11 p.m. following 

conclusion of the evidence.

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Later on June 16, at 5:20 p.m., Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs’ Request for Amendment to 

Jury Instruction No. 18. (ECF No. 151.) For the first time, Plaintiffs proposed an amendment 

to their own proposed jury instruction on the Fourth Amendment claim, proposing to change 

the phrase from “In determining whether Defendants Cox and Louchren used excessive force in 

this case, consider all of the circumstances known to them on the scene, including:” to “In 

determining whether Defendants Cox and Louchren used excessive force in this case, consider 

all of the circumstances that they knew or should have known on the scene, including . . . .” 

The remainder of the instruction remained the same. Plaintiffs did not alert the Court (or 

defense counsel) to this submission besides filing electronically via CM/ECF.

The Court convened for closing arguments shortly before 9 a.m. on June 17, 2016. As 

the Court prepared to call in the jury, Plaintiffs noted their proposed amendment, which the 

Court (and defense counsel) had not yet seen. The Court heard from both sides and overruled 

the objection. The Court noted that the instruction as finalized for the jury was the model Ninth 

Circuit instruction. 

On July 15, 2016, Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the basis of the Court failing to 

grant its amendment to the proposed model instruction. (ECF No. 178.)

II. TIMELINESS OF OBJECTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 governs objections to jury instructions to preserve a 

claim of error. That rule provides:

(a) Requests.

(1) Before or at the Close of the Evidence. At the close of the evidence 

or at any earlier reasonable time that the court orders, a party may file 

and furnish to every other party written requests for the jury instructions 

it wants the court to give.

(2) After the Close of the Evidence. After the close of the evidence, a 

party may:

(A) file requests for instructions on issues that could not 

reasonably have been anticipated by an earlier time that the court 

set for requests; and

(B) with the court's permission, file untimely requests for 

instructions on any issue.

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(b) Instructions. The court:

(1) must inform the parties of its proposed instructions and proposed 

action on the requests before instructing the jury and before final jury 

arguments;

(2) must give the parties an opportunity to object on the record and out of 

the jury's hearing before the instructions and arguments are delivered; 

and

(3) may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged.

(c) Objections.

(1) How to Make. A party who objects to an instruction or the failure to 

give an instruction must do so on the record, stating distinctly the matter 

objected to and the grounds for the objection.

(2) When to Make. An objection is timely if:

(A) a party objects at the opportunity provided under Rule

51(b)(2); or

(B) a party was not informed of an instruction or action on a 

request before that opportunity to object, and the party objects 

promptly after learning that the instruction or request will be, or 

has been, given or refused.

(d) Assigning Error; Plain Error.

(1) Assigning Error. A party may assign as error:

(A) an error in an instruction actually given, if that party properly 

objected; or

(B) a failure to give an instruction, if that party properly 

requested it and--unless the court rejected the request in a 

definitive ruling on the record--also properly objected.

(2) Plain Error. A court may consider a plain error in the instructions 

that has not been preserved as required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error 

affects substantial rights.

Here the objection was made after evidence had closed.1 Plaintiffs did not meet the 

criteria for objecting after the close of evidence because they did not “file requests for 

instructions on issues that could not reasonably have been anticipated by an earlier time that the 

court set for requests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(a)(1). On the contrary, this issue had been addressed 

 

1 At oral argument, Plaintiffs argued that closing argument should be considered evidence under this rule, but this 

is clearly incorrect. Closing argument is not evidence. Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 782 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The parties had closed their submission of evidence before the proposed amendment was filed. 

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since the first proposal of jury instructions and concerned an instruction that directly concerned 

one of Plaintiffs’ claims in the case. Nor had the Court given permission to file an untimely 

request for instruction under Rule 51(a)(2)(b). 

Notably, the Court had complied with Rule 51(b). On June 10, the Court had sent 

proposed instructions and proposed action on the requests to the parties. It also gave the parties 

an opportunity to object at a hearing for that purpose on June 13, the day before trial. 

Plaintiffs also do not satisfy the criteria for a timely objection as provided in Rule 

51(c)(2) because Plaintiffs did not object at the opportunity proived under rule 51(b)(2), i.e. the 

hearing on June 13. This is also not a case where Plaintiffs were not informed of the 

instruction, as they themselves provided the proposed instruction originally.

Rule 51 concludes by stating that “A court may consider a plain error in the instructions 

that has not been preserved as required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error affects substantial rights,” 

but notably leaves that to the discretion of the court.

Thus, under the plain terms of Rule 51, Plaintiffs’ request to amend their own proposed 

instructions was untimely. 

This is not just a technicality. The Court provided ample time to receive proposed 

instructions and hear argument so that it could carefully adhere to the law in its instructions. It 

received and reviewed multiple submissions by both parties, submitted the proposed 

instructions to the parties well in advance of the trial, set aside time to hear argument, and 

carefully considered each instruction. It then provided those instructions in final form to the 

parties in advance of their closing argument so the parties could correctly refer to the law in 

argument.

Plaintiffs’ timing eliminated any opportunity for the Court to engage in a deliberate 

consideration. The Court first learned of the proposed amendment just as it was calling the jury 

in for closing argument. The jury was waiting. The packed courtroom was waiting. Plaintiffs 

were not pointing to a clerical error—they were requesting a change to a model instruction, 

over Defendants’ opposition. To rule on such a change would require examination of Ninth 

Circuit and Supreme Court case law to determine if the model instruction was in fact incorrect. 

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After all, Plaintiffs were not relying on a case blessing their jury instruction as the correct 

standard notwithstanding the Model Jury Instruction. As described further below, Plaintiffs’ 

argument relies on Ninth Circuit common law in the Fourth Amendment contenxt. Plaintiffs’ 

objection required consideration that the Court could not provide when the objection was made. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial is thus denied because Plaintiffs failed to make a timely 

objection to their own proposed instruction under Rule 51.

III. WHETHER THE JURY INSTRUCTION CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment correctly states the law. 

Again, the jury instruction as given to the jury was the Model Ninth Circuit instruction. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that the phrase “consider all of the circumstances known to them 

on the scene” is an erroneous statement of the law. 

Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the jury instruction as presented comports 

with the Supreme Court’s explanation of the Fourth Amendment in Graham v. Connor, 490 

Ul.S. 386 (1989). In that case, the Court set forth the standards as follows: “As in other Fourth 

Amendment contexts, however, the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an 

objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light 

of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.” Id. at 397. While “circumstances confronting them” is not exactly the same 

words in the model instruction, i.e., “all of the circumstances known to them,” it is substantially 

the same. Notably, Graham does not use the language proposed by Plaintiff. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs do not cite any case claiming that Fourth Amendment jury 

instructions must include the language Plaintiffs proposed, nor do they cite any case that 

includes such language in describing the relevant test for a Fourth Amendment claim. Rather, 

plaintiffs cite Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) in support of their 

argument that the Ninth Circuit has considered what officers should have known in the context 

of excessive force cases. In Torres, the 9th Circuit provided the following guidance on a 

Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force:

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An objectively unreasonable use of force is constitutionally excessive and 

violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. 

Determining the reasonableness of an officer's actions is a highly fact-intensive 

task for which there are no per se rules. We recognize that police officers are 

often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation, and that these judgments are sometimes informed by errors 

in perception of the actual surrounding facts.

Not all errors in perception or judgment, however, are reasonable. While we do 

not judge the reasonableness of an officer's actions with the 20/20 vision of 

hindsight, nor does the Constitution forgive an officer's every mistake. Rather, 

we adopt the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . in light of the 

facts and circumstances confronting her. Where an officer's particular use of 

force is based on a mistake of fact, we ask whether a reasonable officer would 

have or should have accurately perceived that fact. 

Standing in the shoes of the “reasonable officer,” we then ask whether the 

severity of force applied was balanced by the need for such force considering 

the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the severity of the crime at issue, 

(2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 

others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to 

evade arrest by flight. 

Id. at 1124 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The jury instruction as given closely 

followed the Ninth Circuit’s direction even in the Torres case that “we adopt the perspective of 

a reasonable officer on the scene ... in light of the facts and circumstances confronting her.” 

Plaintiffs use Torres to argue that the facts of this case warranted an amendment to that

instruction to explicitly ask the jury to consider what an officer “should have known,” because, 

Plaintiffs argue, this case concerned an alleged mistake of fact. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend 

that the defendant officers in this case mistakenly assumed that the decedent, who was 

ultimately shot by the officers, was not mentally ill. Plaintiffs contend the officers should have 

known facts pointing to her being mentally ill at the time. 

Based on Torres, and given ample time to consider, this Court finds it would not have 

been error to add the phrase “should have known” to the jury instruction. That said, the 

instruction as delivered without that phrase was not legal error. For this purpose it is worth 

looking at the entire instruction a given to the jury, which taken as a whole comports with the 

Fourth Amendment and Ninth Circuit’s explanation of the Fourth Amendment:

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In general, a seizure of a person is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if 

a police officer uses excessive force in making a lawful arrest or in defending 

himself. Thus, in order to prove an unreasonable seizure in this case, Plaintiffs 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants Cox and 

Louchren used excessive force.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may only use such force as is 

‘objectively reasonable’ under all of the circumstances. You must judge the 

reasonableness of a particular use of force from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene and not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. An officer’s 

intent or motive is not relevant to your inquiry.

In determining whether Defendants Cox and Louchren used excessive force in 

this case, consider all of the circumstances known to them on the scene, 

including:

1. The severity of the crime of other circumstances to which the officers were 

responding;

2. Whether Veronica Canter posed an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or to the others;

3. Whether Veronica Canter was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight;

4. The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the 

officers had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be 

necessary;

5. The type and amount of force used;

6. The availability of alternative methods to subdue the plaintiff;

7. The number of lives at risk (motorists, pedestrians, police officers) and the 

parties’ relative culpability, i.e., which party created the dangerous situation, 

and which party is more innocent;

8. Whether it was practical for the officer[s] to give warning of the imminent 

use of force, and whether such warning was given;

9. Whether the officers were responding to a domestic violence disturbance; 

and 

10. Whether it should have been apparent to the officers that the person they 

used force against was emotionally disturbed.

(ECF No. 160, at 21-22.) The jury instruction thus properly set forth the test: whether an 

officer uses excessive force. It correctly explained how “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a 

police officer may only use such force as is ‘objectively reasonable’ under all of the 

circumstances.” It correcly asked the jury to consider “the reasonableness of a particular use of 

force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and not with the 20/20 vision of 

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hindsight.” And it listed a number of factors including “[w]hether it should have been apparent 

to the officers that the person they used force against was emotionally disturbed.” This 

explanation of the Fourth Amendment comports with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law 

without the additional phrase proposed by Plaintiffs.

Indeed, the instruction as given also comports with another Ninth Circuit case cited by 

Plaintiffs: Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, the 

Ninth Circuit noted that there were factual questions regarding the reasonableness of force,

including whether “he should have been able to recognize that the figure he was shooting was a 

fellow officer.” Id. at 1086. Plaintiffs use this case to claim that the jurors should have been 

told to consider what an officer should have known. Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit even 

in the Jensen case describes the law in almost the same way as the jury instruction given to the 

jury here, as “an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively 

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 

underlying intent or motivation.” Id (emphasis added). Again, even in the Jensen case, the 

Ninth Circuit does not describe the Fourth Amendment question is one involving “all of the 

circumstances that they knew or should have known on the scene” as Plaintiffs argue. 

Perhaps one can square the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of certain facts in these cases

with the legal standard as set forth in Graham by considering that what the officer “should have 

known” in the end still comes down to the circumstances “confronting them at the time.” After 

all, not even Plaintiffs contend that the jury should consider something that could never be 

apparent to Defendants. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that there was something in the 

circumstances that confronted the officers at the time that could have led them to consider 

something else. The inquiry is still properly always on the facts and circumstances confronting 

the officers at the time, and their reasonableness includes whether they made reasonable 

inquiries and took reasonable actions based on what they knew. In this way, both the model

jury instruction and Plaintiffs’ proposed instruction are legally correct, but have different 

emphases. 

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In the end, given that “no per se rules” govern the Fourth Amendment excessive force 

question, the jury instruction as given, which was the model instruction, correctly set forth the 

Fourth Amendment standard and was not an erroneous explanation of the law. With all the 

time and consideration provided during the appropriate phase for objections, this Court may 

have sided with Plaintiffs and added the “should have known” language as well. But it was not 

error to keep the model instruction as written in this case. 

Plaintiffs’ request for a new trial is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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