Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00546/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00546-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 05:7703 Discrimination - Review of Agency Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 05-546-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion in Limine [Doc. # 151], Plaintiff’s

Motion in Limine Re: Employment Evidence Not Related to the Border Patrol [Doc. # 154],

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: Marital Status [Doc. # 155], and Plaintiff’s Motion in

Limine Re Unrelated Act [Doc. # 156]. Oral argument was presented to the Court on

September 10, 2008.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: Unrelated Acts, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: Evidence

of Information Relating to Employment Not Related to Border Patrol, and Government’s

Motion in Limine Re: Omissions, Inconsistencies, and Untruthful Statements 

Plaintiff seeks to preclude any reference to Plaintiff’s separation due to personal

reasons from the military, his termination from other post-Border Patrol employment, and

his applications for employment. The government agrees that such reference is not relevant.

However, the government asserts that, to the extent that Plaintiff was untruthful about these

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

issues, they are relevant. Indeed, such evidence is relevant to Plaintiff’s credibility and thus

is “always open to cross-examination.” United States v. Zandi, 769 F.2d 229, 236 (4th Cir.

1985). “After all, a witness’s willingness to lie . . . in an application . . . is highly probative

of his character for truthfulness.” United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir.

2008). Plaintiff’s credibility, his attention to detail, and providing accurate information in

completing forms are central issues in this case. The Court finds such evidence is relevant.

However, the government also argues that Plaintiff cannot only be questioned

regarding this “untruthful” conduct on cross-examination, but that the inaccuracies and

untruthful statements (e.g., contained within employment documents) are also admissible

substantively. The admissibility of evidence of specific instances of conduct is limited:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or

supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as

provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,

in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired

into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for

truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.

Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). The government asserts the substantive admission is appropriate

because Plaintiff admits the acts at issue (i.e., filling out the forms). There is limited case law

to support this admission. See e.g., United States v. Zandi, 769 F.2d 229 , 236 (4th Cir.

1985); Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 970-71 (3rd Cir. 1980). Other cases, however, find

such admission to not be appropriate. See e.g., Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 18 (document can

be used to refresh recollection, but may not be admitted). The admission of such evidence,

however, is contrary to the rule. See 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 306, 1989

supp. (“several decisions have refused to disapprove introduction of such documents where

the witness concedes his relevant connection to them, seemingly diluting the clear command

of the Rule itself”), emphasis added. The Court finds that, while the evidence may be used

for impeachment and to show untruthfulness, the use of extrinsic evidence for substantive

purposes under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) is not permissible.

The parties dispute whether such evidence may be substantively considered as “afterCase 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The government asserts that it is “likely” witnesses will testify that such evidence

provided another valid reason for Plaintiff’s termination. Defendant’s Motions in Limine,

p. 9. The government does not assert that such evidence would have resulted in Plaintiff’s

termination.

- 3 -

acquired” evidence. Courts have held that after-acquired evidence may be an independent

reason for termination, even if only discovered during the litigation. McKennon v. Nashville

Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-60, 115 S.Ct. 879,130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).

Before an employer may invoke the after-acquired evidence doctrine, it must be shown that

(1) the employee actually committed the misconduct and (2) the employer in fact would have

terminated the employee on those grounds alone if it had discovered the wrongdoing.

Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff asserts, however,

because any alleged misconduct by Plaintiff is alleged to have occurred before or after the

employment, the McKennon principle does not apply.

The government asserts that courts have not interpreted McKennon as narrowly as

Plaintiff. See e.g.,Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1063-65 (8th Cir. 2004); Medlock V.

Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1999); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins.

Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1074 n. 4 (3rd Cir. 1995). The admission of such evidence is limited,

discretionary, and fact-based. However, the government has not asserted that the conduct

is such that the government would have terminated Plaintiff because of the conduct.1

 This,

in and of itself, disqualifies the evidence for admission under McKennon. Moreover, the

government has failed to provide any Ninth Circuit authority supporting such admission.

The Court finds that the admission of such evidence as after-acquired evidence is not

appropriate.

The government also asserts that, if it offers a mixed motive defense, such evidence

may be admissible. However, besides mentioning this argument, the government does not

provide any authority for this assertion. The Court does not find the evidence is admissible

simply because the government may offer a mixed motive defense.

However, relevant evidence should be excluded "if its probative value is substantially

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Fed.R.Evid. 403. "The unfair prejudice is

measured by the extent to which the testimony 'makes [a finding regarding liability] more

likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect

adversely the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to [its

conduct]." United States v. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting

United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit has

stated:

Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice,

substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter

under Rule 403. Unless trials are to be conducted as scenarios, or unreal facts tailored

and sanitized for the occasion, the application of Rule 403 must be cautious and

sparing. Its major function is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative

probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.

United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000). The probative value of

impeachment evidence as to veracity and other claims of discrimination is not substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Plaintiff also asserts that evidence of other complaints of discrimination should be

precluded. In support of his assertion, Plaintiff relies on EEOC v. Lexus Serramonte, 237

F.R.D. 220, 223 (N.D.Cal. 2006). In that case, disclosure of information of other harassment

claims made after the relevant employment was sought. The court did not address that

request, but found that work performance evidence was inadmissible and denied the request.

The government, however, argues that employers are entitled to be shielded from having to

accommodate “the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee.” Ellison v.

Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The government argues that evidence of

Plaintiff’s other complaints shows his hypersensitivity and his willingness to point to his

national origin when accused of wrongdoing. Because Fed.R.Evid. 404 is a rule of inclusion,

United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3 935 (9th Cir. 2007), the government argues such evidence

is admissible.

Although evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove the character of an

individual to show he or she acted in conformity therewith, evidence of other acts may be

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

"admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]" Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). To be

admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404, the evidence must tend to prove a material element, be

similar to conduct at issue, be supported by sufficient evidence, and not be too remote in

time. United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). The government

does not discuss how Rodriguez’ conduct qualifies him as a “rare hyper-sensitive employee.”

For example, how many complaints must an employee make before being considered hypersensitive? Further, what consideration must be made of the quality of the complained

conduct (e.g., complaining to co-employees compare to filing a lawsuit) versus the quantity

of complaints? Indeed, that Rodriguez may have complained of other conduct at a different

employment does not address whether a reasonable person would find the government’s

environment hostile or abusive. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787

(1998), citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); see also Clark

County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001), citation omitted. Additionally,

the government’s reliance on Ellison fails to consider that the court’s discussion of shielding

employers from accommodating hyper-sensitive employees was made in determining the

appropriateness of a reasonable person standard . . . not the admissibility of other complaints.

Moreover, in Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1998), the

court found evidence was not admissible to simply establish a party’s propensity to sue his

employers. Among other reasons, the evidence was admissible to show a party’s modus

operandi of creating fraudulent documents in anticipation of litigation. There is no such

allegation in this case. Rather, the government is seeking to admit propensity evidence of

claiming foul and that Rodriquez simply acted in conformity with that evidence. The Court

finds the evidence is not admissible.

Motion in Limine Re: Marital Status of Plaintiff

Plaintiff requests evidence of his marital status and his child with his common-law

wife be precluded. See e.g. Gage v. Metro Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 365

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

F.Supp.2d 919, 927-928 (N.D.Ill. 2005) (evidence that plaintiff bore children out of wedlock

precluded as not probative). The government agrees that evidence regarding the child is not

relevant, but asserts that evidence of Plaintiff’s misstatements regarding his marital status is

relevant to show Plaintiff’s inability or unwillingness to pay attention to details. For

example, the government points to the fact that the complaint in this matter alleged that he

is a married man even though his testimony at deposition indicates that is aware that he is not

legally married. The government asserts that Plaintiff’s willingness to be so inexact in such

a document shows that his is either unable or unwilling to properly fulfill his duties

connected to official paperwork. Plaintiff asserts, however, that admission of the evidence

presents a high degree of unfair prejudice and would require a lengthy explanation.

While Plaintiff’s marital status may be slightly prejudicial and its admission may

lengthen the proceedings, Plaintiff’s credibility and his ability/willingness to be exact is

highly relevant. The Court finds the potential for unfair prejudice does not outweigh the

probative value of the evidence. The evidence of marital status is admissible at trial.

Defendant’s Motions in Limine

The government asserts that witness Michael Lynch and related testimony should be

precluded. In effect, the proposed testimony is that Plaintiff has the skills to be a policeman

with the Department of the Navy and, therefore, he had the skills to be a Border Patrol Agent.

The government asserts that such evidence is not relevant. See e.g., Zubulake v. UBS

Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (evidence of plaintiff’s prior

employment to show propensity for deficiency was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 403).

The government also asserts that Plaintiff is attempting to show character traits with evidence

that is not admissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404. See e.g., EEOC v. Serramonte, 237

F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (“[w]ork performance with other employers, either before

and after the defendant employer, is not admissible under Rule 404(a) . . .”); Raugh v. Coyne,

744 F.Supp. 1181, 1184 (D.D.C. 1990) (evidence of plaintiff’s positive performance at jobs

both before and after employment with the defendant was inadmissible under Rules 403 and

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Indeed, this compromise was proposed in a document submitted after the deadline

for the filing of motions in limine and after argument on the motions in limine. 

- 7 -

404(a)); Zenian v. District of Columbia, 283 F.Supp.2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2003) (evidence of

negative performance prior to time period during which discrimination occurred was both

irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 404(a)). Plaintiff argues, however, that his

competence and evaluations in a different federal law enforcement position is directly

relevant to whether he was receiving fair evaluations.

The Court agrees with the government that such evidence is not relevant. What one

law enforcement agency may require of their officers does not necessarily apply to all law

enforcement agencies. Further, such evidence would constitute trait or character evidence

that is not admissible to prove action in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(a). The

Court finds such evidence shall be precluded.

In its Supplement Regarding Defendant’s Motion in Limine, the government states

that it did not object to Rodriguez testifying as to his current Naval police officer position

and his current salary to show his attempts to mitigate his damages. Such background

testimony is generally admissible to permit a witness to become comfortable and to introduce

the witness to the jury. See generally 3 Litigating Tort Cases § 39:76 (July 2008). The

government asserts, however, that it will have to present evidence regarding the differences

between Rodriquez’ current position and the Border Patrol position. The government

proposes a compromise whereby Rodriquez testifies to currently being employed by the

federal government and stating his current salary. The government having failed to object

to, or moved to preclude, such testimony, the Court declines to address whether such

testimony should be precluded.2

The government also seeks to preclude “stray comments.” The government asserts

that comments not related to Plaintiff should not be admitted because there is not a sufficient

nexus between the alleged remarks and the adverse employment decision. See e.g., Vasquez

v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2004). The government also

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

asserts ambiguous remarks are insufficient to show pretext. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator

Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1997). The government asserts that any probative

value is outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and their misleading nature.

Plaintiff asserts, however, the “stray comments” were made by Edmisten and

LaLonde, two of Plaintiff’s supervisors, and that derogatory comments can create an

inference of discriminatory motive. Warren v. Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1995);

Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991) (general comments about

Hispanics create inference of discriminatory motive against particular complainant). 

The Court finds that this evidence is relevant to an alleged “discriminatory motive.”

Moreover, the probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or

confusion of issues. The Court finds the evidence is admissible.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion in Limine [Doc. # 151] is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: Employment Evidence Not Related to the

Border Patrol [Doc. # 154] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

3. Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s new law enforcement employment (i.e., witness

Lynch and related testimony) is precluded.

4. Evidence regarding omissions, inconsistencies, and untruthful statement s made

on Plaintiff’s employment applications and paperwork and evidence regarding Plaintiff’s

separation from the military and his termination from another position in 2006 may be used

to attack Plaintiff’s credibility, but such evidence is substantively precluded and any such

extrinsic evidence is precluded. 

5. Evidence regarding stray comments by Edmisten and LaLonde is admissible.

6. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: Marital Status [Doc. # 155] is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

7. Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s marital status may be used to attack Plaintiff’s

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

credibility.

8. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re Unrelated Acts [Doc. # 156] is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

9. Evidence of other complaints of discrimination by Rodriguez is precluded.

DATED this 22nd day of October, 2008.

Case 4:05-cv-00546-CKJ Document 173 Filed 10/22/08 Page 9 of 9