Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06551/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06551-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER SIMAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, et al. )

)

)

Respondents. )

____________________________________)

1:04-cv-06551-AWI-TAG-HC

ORDER LIFTING STAY GRANTED ON

OCTOBER 3, 2005 (Doc. 10)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

(Doc. 16)

ORDER VACATING ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE DATED JANUARY 9, 2006

(Doc. 12)

ORDER VACATING ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE DATED AUGUST 29, 2007 

(Doc. 17)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On November 5, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (Doc. 1). The petition

contained the following two grounds for relief: (1) The trial court misinstructed the jury about

how it should consider the evidence of a prior sexual offense against the victim, which was

introduced at trial as a prior “bad act”; and (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error and

denied Petitioner due process of law when it admitted the evidence of the prior “bad act”. 

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(Doc. 1, p. 5.) Because it was unclear from the petition whether the two issues were

completely exhausted, on February 24, 2005 the Court issued an order to Petitioner to file an

amended petition describing the efforts made by Petitioner to exhaust his state court remedies. 

(Doc. 6). On March 24, 2005, Petitioner filed an amended petition. (Doc. 7). 

In that amended petition, however, Petitioner raised three new issues that apparently

were unexhausted: (1) illegal imposition of the aggravated term in violation of Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to

the prosecution’s request that a witness be permitted to hold a stuffed animal while testifying;

and (3) misconduct of the trial court in questioning a witness and acting as an advocate for the

prosecution. (Id.). 

Also on March 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the instant habeas

proceedings. (Doc. 8). In that motion, Petitioner indicated that he wished to file a habeas

petition in the California Supreme Court in an effort to exhaust “all issued raised herein that

were not brought up on direct appeal.” (Id. at p. 2). Petitioner also noted the hardship that

might result from an outright dismissal of his “mixed” petition in light of the one-year statute

of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Id.). On October 3, 2005, the Court

granted Petitioner’s motion for a stay and held the proceedings in abeyance pending a decision

on Petitioner’s state habeas petition by the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 10). In that order,

the Court made clear that Petitioner was to keep the Court apprised of the status of the pending

petition through status reports to be filed every sixty days until the petition was ruled upon. 

Thereafter, Petitioner submitted just a single status report on October 14, 2005, thus

requiring the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause why the stay should not be lifted on

January 9, 2006. (Doc. 12). On January 19, 2006, January 25, 2006, and February 8, 2006,

Petitioner sent status reports to the Court, despite the Court’s directive that reports be sent

every sixty days. (Docs. 13, 14, & 15). 

 On April 6, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for another stay, this time indicating that

he had several more issues he wished to file in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 16). On

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August 29, 2007, in light of the fact that Petitioner had failed to submit any further status

reports, the Court issued another Order to Show Cause why the stay should not be lifted. (Doc.

17). On October 15, 2007, Petitioner filed a tardy status report indicating that he had filed a

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on June 28, 2007, raising the issues proposed

in his second motion for stay, despite the fact that the Court had never granted a stay nor had

Petitioner ever responded to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. (Doc. 18). 

In reviewing this matter, the Court has accessed the State of California’s electronic

court database, which indicates that Petitioner’s original state habeas petition was denied by the

California Supreme Court on February 22, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may

validly consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981,

987-988 (9th Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts carte blanche

to stay even fully exhausted habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. Granting a stay

is appropriate where there is no intention on the part of the petitioner to delay or harass and in

order to avoid piecemeal litigation. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is

proper for a district court, in its discretion, to hold a petition containing only exhausted claims

in abeyance in order to permit the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his state

remedies. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003); Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d

875, 882-883 (9th Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2001);

Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require

that the Court dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). However, on March 30, 2005, the United States Supreme

Court decided Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Recognizing that “[a]s a result of the

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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d). 1

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interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations and Lundy’s dismissal requirement, 1

petitioners who come to federal court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their

opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims,” the Supreme Court held that

federal courts may now issue “stay and abey” orders under appropriate circumstances to permit

petitioners to exhaust unexhausted claims before proceeding with their federal petitions. 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273-278. 

In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that, while the procedure should be “available

only in limited circumstances,” it “likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to

deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to

exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 125 S.Ct. at

278. When a petitioner has met these requirements, his interest in obtaining federal review of

his claims outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal

petitions. Id. 

Here, Petitioner timely filed a federal habeas petition containing two exhausted claims

and three unexhausted claims. He promptly initiated state court habeas proceedings to exhaust

the three unexhausted claims. Based on what appeared to be Petitioner’s diligence and good

faith, the Court granted the first motion for stay and permitted Petitioner to exhaust his state

court remedies so that all five issues in the amended petition could be addressed in these

proceedings. 

However, thereafter, Petitioner engaged in a pattern of intermittent and infrequent

status reports, including his complete failure to advise the Court that the California Supreme

Court had denied the very petition for which the original stay had been granted. In the October

3, 2005 order granting the original stay, the Court ordered Petitioner to notify the Court within

thirty days of the date of decision by the California Supreme Court and to provide

documentation of the decision in his notification. (Doc. 10, p. 5). To date, Petitioner has never

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advised the Court of the California Supreme Court’s decision, even though that decision was

issued almost two years ago. Nor has Petitioner ever responded to either of the Orders to Show

Cause issued by the Court in response to Petitioner’s own failure to timely file his status

reports.

Subsequently, and without authorization from the Court, Petitioner filed a second

petition in the California Supreme Court, seeking to exhaust new issues never before raised in

this Court. Now, Petitioner asks the Court to continue to stay proceedings while the petition

raising those new issues remains pending. 

At this juncture, it is difficult to conclude that Petitioner is acting in good faith or with

any diligence in this matter. Petitioner has failed to respond to lawful orders of the Court and

he has failed to keep the Court informed as to the status of his petitions. Indeed, it appears that

he has used the Court’s own ignorance of the status of his first petition in order to seek and

obtain a second stay. Re-weighing, in light of current circumstances, the various factors the

Court is required to consider in deciding whether to stay proceedings pending exhaustion in

state court, the Court has determined that Petitioner’s interest in obtaining federal review of

these new, unexhausted claims no longer outweighs the competing interests in finality and

speedy resolution of federal petitions. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277-279. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court will lift the original stay and deny Petitioner’s

motion for a second stay. The amended petition is already on file and it appears Petitioner has

exhausted his remedies as to the three new claims in the amended petition. Therefore, by

separate order, the Court will order Respondent to file an answer to the amended petition. 

ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The stay of proceedings imposed by Order of October 3, 2005 (Doc. 10), is

LIFTED;

2. The Order to Show Cause issued on January 9, 2006 (Doc. 12), is VACATED;

///

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3. The Order to Show Cause issued on August 29, 2007 (Doc. 17), is

VACATED; and

4. Petitioner’s motion for stay dated April 6, 2007 (Doc. 16), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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