Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00775/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00775-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GORDON ANDREW DOUGLAS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-97-0775 FCD GGH P

vs.

S. CAMBRA, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On August 18, 2000, this court dismissed as

procedurally defaulted petitioner’s claims that were raised in his state habeas petition but not in

his petition for review. On July 19, 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and

remanded this order. The Ninth Circuit stated that petitioner did not have sufficient notice or

opportunity to prepare arguments regarding the adequacy of procedural rules under the new

standard described in Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003). 

On October 13, 2004, the court ordered the parties to file briefing addressing the

remaining claims. On November 8, 2004, respondent filed a supplemental answer. On March 7,

2005, petitioner filed a supplemental traverse. On May 5, 2005, oral argument was held. Daniel

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Bernstein appeared on behalf of respondent. Allison Claire appeared on behalf of respondent.

After considering the record and argument, the court finds that the remaining

claims are procedurally barred.

II. Discussion

In 1993 petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and arson of an inhabited

dwelling. In May 1994 petitioner filed a petition for review. On June 22, 1994, the California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review without comment or citation. On April 28, 1997,

petitioner filed the original federal petition raising three claims. On May 12, 1998, this action

was stayed pending petitioner’s exhaustion of additional claims. On April 27, 1998, petitioner

filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court. On November 24, 1998, the

California Supreme Court denied the petition citing In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949) and

In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998). 

On December 7, 1998, petitioner filed a second amended petition in this action. 

As discussed above, on August 18, 2000, the court dismissed the claims to which the Swain and

Robbins citations applied as procedurally barred. 

Based on concerns of comity and federalism, federal courts will not review a

habeas petitioner’s claims if the state court decision denying relief rests on a state law ground

that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-62, 109 S. Ct.

1038 (1989). Generally, the only state law grounds meeting these requirements are state

procedural rules. However, the procedural basis of the ruling must be clear. Ambiguous

reference to procedural rules is insufficient for invocation of procedural bar. Calderon v. United

States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, where the procedural

and merits analysis are intermixed, it cannot be said that the procedural bar is independent of

federal law, i.e., there is no plain statement of reliance on procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, supra.

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If there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision, the federal

court may still consider the claim if the petitioner demonstrates: (1) cause for the default and

actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Harris, 489 U.S. at 262, 109 S. Ct. at 1043. The existence of cause for a

procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1476 (1991). Examples of

cause include showings “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to

counsel,” “that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable,” or “of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645. Prejudice is difficult to

demonstrate:

The showing of prejudice required under Wainwright v. Sykes is

significantly greater than that necessary under “the more vague

inquiry suggested by the words ‘plain error.’” Engle, 456 U.S., at

135, 102 S.Ct., at 1575; Frady, supra, 456 U.S., at 166, 102 S.Ct.,

at 1593. See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct.

1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). The habeas petitioner must

show “not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” Frady, supra, at 170, 102 S.Ct., at 1596.

Murray v Carrier, 477 U.S. at 493-494, 106 S. Ct. at 2648 (1986). 

Although different phraseology is used in the default context from that used in the ineffective

assistance of counsel prejudice inquiry, as stated above, the ultimate application of the two

prejudice inquiries is essentially similar—that is, whether the prejudice is sufficient to have

undermined the reviewer’s confidence in the result of the trial.

In the March 14, 2000, findings and recommendations, this court found that the

citations to Swain and Robbins indicate that the California Supreme Court found that petitioner

failed to timely present his claims. The parties do not dispute that finding in their supplemental

briefing.

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In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003) the Ninth Circuit considered

whether California’s timeliness rule constituted an independent and adequate state ground

barring federal relief. It found the timeliness rule to be independent, 322 F.3d at 581, but

remanded the issue of adequacy to the district court. 322 F.3d at 586. This court now considers

whether the timeliness rule is adequate. 

To be deemed adequate, a state law ground for decision must be well-established

and consistently applied. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 582, citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577

(9th Cir. 1999). In his supplemental traverse, petitioner argues that California’s timeliness rule is

not well-established because it is vague and standardless. In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit implicitly

found that California’s timeliness rule was well-established and instead focused on whether the

rule was consistently applied. Nevertheless, the court will briefly address petitioner’s argument

that the timeliness rule is not well-established below.

On remand, the district court in Bennett discussed California’s timeliness bar:

California “has long required that a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding 

justify any substantial delay in seeking relief.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 579 (citations

omitted). However, in In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 763, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 517, 

855 P.2d 729 (1993)(“Clark”), a capital case, the California Supreme Court 

acknowledged that prior law had not established “clear guidelines regarding state 

procedural limitations on habeas corpus petitions. Clark recognized that, in 1989, 

the California Supreme Court adopted new Policies containing express timeliness 

standards for death penalty cases. Id. at 782-82, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 532, 855 P.2d 

729. Clark indicated that the Policies “did not create or modify the timeliness 

requirements applicable to all habeas corpus petitions,” but established for capital 

cases, a presumption of timeliness if the petitioner filed a petition within ninety 

days of the final due date of an appellate reply brief. See Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 782-

83, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 530-31, 855 P.2d 729. Clark explained that “any substantial

delay in the filing of a petition after the factual and legal bases for the claim are 

known or should have been known must be explained and justified.” Id. at 784, 

21 CalRptr.2d at 532, 855 P.2d 729,

Clark also recognized an exception to the timeliness requirements for “petitions 

which allege facts which, if proven, would establish that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to conviction

and/or sentence.” Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 797, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 540, 855 P.2d 729. 

This “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception applies when “it can be 

demonstrated: (1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so 

fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have 

convicted the petitioner; (2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or 

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crimes of which the petitioner was convicted; (3) that the death penalty was 

imposed by a sentencing authority which had such a grossly misleading profile of 

the petitioner before it that absent the trial error or omission no reasonable judge 

or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; (3) that the petitioner was 

convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.” Id. at 787-98, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 

540-41, 855 P.2d 729. Thus after Clark,a California court’s application of the 

timeliness bar signifies the court’s determination that “the petitioner has failed to 

establish the absence of substantial delay or good cause for the delay, and that

none of the four exceptions set out in Clark apply.” In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 

770, 814 n. 34, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 182, 959 P.2d 311 (1998)(citations omitted) 

(“Robbins”); see also LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Bennett 2005 WL 827071 *3-4.

Since In re Clark, it cannot be seriously contended that California’s timeliness rule

for all habeas petitions—capital and non-capital—is other than well established. In several cases,

the state supreme court has gone to great lengths to emphasize the importance of this rule. In re

Clark, supra, In re Robbins, supra, In re Gallegos, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (1988);

In re Sanders, supra. In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit implicitly found these standards to be wellestablished. 

Moreover, as this court stated in its findings and recommendations filed March 3,

2004, in Stanley v. Woodford, CIV S-95-1500 FCD GGH P, there is nothing in these standards

that is not mirrored to a large degree in federal timeliness law. For example, the AEDPA

limitations period does not even commence to run until “the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Similarly, a state prisoner will be found to have

proceeded without substantial delay if the petition was filed within a reasonable time after he (or

the attorney) knew or should have known of the facts and became aware, and/or should have

become aware of the law favoring his claim. The standards are substantively identical. 

Furthermore, the federal law has its own “good cause” escape hatch in the form of equitable

tolling. The circumstances that give rise to equitable tolling, much like those giving rise to good

cause under the California scheme, cannot be completely chronicled ahead of time. Rather, the

standards under both federal and state schemes will become fleshed out with the addition of

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explicated decisions. Thus, one may avoid the federal statute of limitations if the prison law

library was not stocked with AEDPA laws, Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000),

or a clerk’s office snafu impeded timely filing, Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir.

2002), or one’s attorney committed gross negligence in the habeas process (as opposed to mere

negligence), Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003). If federal timeliness law may

possess such discretionary aspects, why cannot state law possess the same? The answer is that

limitations can, and sometimes must, have such discretionary aspects. See Wood v. Hall, 130

F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (fact that procedural bar calls for exercise of discretion does not

invalidate the bar). Thus, the undersigned does not find that the California timeliness standards

are unclear or uncertain because they do not attempt to identify and describe every possible

application of good cause.

For these reasons, the court finds that petitioner’s challenge to California’s

timeliness bar on grounds that it is not well-established is without merit.

The court now turns to the more difficult question of whether California’s

timeliness rules are consistently applied. In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit discussed the burden of

proof as to this issue. 

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate 

state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense

in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting 

specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure,

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule. 

Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s. 

322 F.3d at 586.

In the instant case, the state has met its first burden of pleading the existence of an

independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, i.e. the timeliness

bar. The court now considers whether petitioner has met his burden of asserting specific factual

allegations demonstrating the inconsistent application of that rule.

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To demonstrate that the timeliness rule was not consistently applied, in his

supplemental traverse petitioner presented twelve orders by the California Supreme Court in

1998 denying habeas petitions on the merits without comment or citation. Supplemental

Traverse, Exhibits 1-12. Because the convictions of these petitioners became final in 1983,

1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively, petitioner contends that the

timeliness bar could have been, but was not, applied. Petitioner argues that these cases

demonstrate that the timeliness bar is not consistently applied.

For the following reasons, the court finds that these post-card orders do not

demonstrate inconsistent application of the timeliness bar. These orders do not discuss whether

the California Supreme Court found applicable any of the exceptions to the timeliness bar, which

presumably it did. Petitioner’s solution to this problem would be to task this court with

reviewing the state court records of these cases to determine whether any exception applied. The

logistics of wading through volumes and volumes of other case material to arrive at an

independent assessment of what was reasonable for the state supreme court to decide smacks of

absurdity. Moreover, in Bennett, the Ninth Circuit stated that in determining the adequacy of a

procedural review, federal courts should review the text of the state court opinions rather than

conduct a post hoc examination of pleadings and records. 322 F.3d at 583-584. 

Petitioner also argues that the court may consider the post-card orders because in

Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004) the Ninth Circuit stated that courts could

consider unpublished opinions in determining the adequacy of state procedural rules. In Powell,

the Ninth Circuit found that a procedural rule under Washington law was not adequate to bar

federal claims because it was not consistently applied. The Ninth Circuit considered reasoned

unpublished decisions in making this determination. 357 F.3d at 876-879. The post-card denials

submitted by petitioner are not reasoned decisions. The undersigned believes that reference to

published or other explicated decisions to review consistency of application commences the only

feasible methodology. On this point, neither side has contended that reasoned decisions of the

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California Supreme Court at about the time of the Robbins decision, or since that decision, have

been inconsistent. The court does not find so either. See In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 77 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 132 (1998); In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (1999) (emphasizing

the need for timeliness petitions but finding good cause in the particular circumstances of the

case); People v. Molotla, 2004 W.L. 1068840 (Cal. App. 2004) (unpublished). 

On remand, the district court in Bennett recently determined that the petitioner

had met his burden of demonstrating inconsistent application of the timeliness rule. Bennett v.

Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 2005 WL 827071 (C.D. Cal. April 1, 2005). In Bennett, the

petitioner submitted letters from a deputy clerk of the California Supreme Court to the petitioner

stating that there was no time limit in which to file an original petition. 2005 WL 827071 *13. 

The district court found that in light of the California Supreme Court’s concurrent practice of

denying petitions for substantial and unjustified delay, such advisements would render potential

petitioners legitimately confused about the timeliness of the bar. Id.

At oral argument, petitioner’s counsel stated that she would attempt to obtain the

clerk’s letters submitted in Bennett and provide them to this court. Although counsel has

evidently not obtained the letters, had they been submitted, this court would not find that they

demonstrated inconsistent application of a state procedural rule. A letter from a deputy clerk is

not a legitimate source of legal authority. The deputy clerk may have drafted the letter without

consulting the court itself. A letter from the deputy clerk is not evidence of whether the

California Supreme Court regularly and consistently applied a procedural rule.

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that petitioner has not met his

burden of demonstrating inconsistent application of the timeliness rule. Therefore, the burden

does not shift back to respondent to prove consistent application. For the reasons stated in the

March 14, 2000, findings and recommendations, the court again finds that petitioner has failed to

demonstrate cause and prejudice for his default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

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would result if the court failed to consider his claims. See March 14, 2000, findings and

recommendations, pp. 16-17. 

Because petitioner’s remaining claims are procedurally barred, the court

recommends that this action be dismissed.

The court appreciates the helpful briefing and oral argument presented by both

sides in this action.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition be dismissed on

grounds that the remaining claims are procedurally barred.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 6/22/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

doug775.157

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