Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_13-cv-00044/USCOURTS-akd-3_13-cv-00044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Repo

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

SAM KUNAKNANA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS

OF ENGINEERS, et al.,

Defendants,

and

CONOCOPHILLIPS ALASKA, INC., et 

al.,

Intervenor-Defendants.

Case No. 3:13-cv-00044-SLG

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Before the Court at Docket 149 is a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs Sam Kunaknana et al. Oral argument was not 

requested by the parties and was not necessary to the Court’s resolution of the motion. 

For the reasons discussed herein, the motion will be denied with respect to the current 

construction season, but without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to request injunctive relief 

with respect to future construction seasons if the Court grants all or part of Plaintiffs’ 

pending motion for summary judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of this motion, the Court presents only a brief overview of the key 

facts of this case:

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The Alpine oil field, located on Alaska’s North Slope, was discovered in 1994.1

 In 

1998, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) issued a permit to ARCO Alaska 

to construct the Alpine Central Processing Facility and two drill sites, CD-1 and CD-2.2 

In 2001, ARCO’s successor, ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. (“CPAI”), announced the 

discovery of additional oil to the west of Alpine in the National Petroleum Reserve –

Alaska (“NPRA”).

3

 Thereafter, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) initiated a 

review process pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) to assess 

the environmental impact of CPAI’s proposal to develop five drill sites: CD-3 through 

CD-7.

4

 That review process culminated with the publication of the final Alpine Satellites 

Environmental Impact Statement in 2004.5

In December 2011, following a lengthy administrative process, the Corps issued 

a Record of Decision (“2011 ROD”) granting CPAI a permit under Section 404 of the 

Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to fill 58.5 acres of wetlands in order to develop CD-5.6 CD-5 

is located on lands conveyed to Kuukpik Corporation within the NPRA.

7 A portion of 

the filling would occur on land within the Colville River Delta,8 an area “recognized 

1 Administrative Record [hereinafter A.R.] 306.

2 A.R. 6768.

3 A.R. 306.

4 A.R. 191, 306.

5 A.R. 191.

6 A.R. 6763.

7 A.R. 288; see also N. Alaska Envt’l Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(discussing the NPRA generally).

8 A.R. 7490. 

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internationally for its biological diversity and richness” and “regionally for its importance 

to fish, wildlife, and subsistence resources.”9

On February 27, 2013 Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit,10 which challenges the Corps’ 

issuance of the permit as violating the procedural requirements of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§

4321–4327, and Section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.

11 Plaintiffs are residents of 

Nuiqsut, an Inupiat Eskimo village located on the Nigliq Channel of the Colville River 

Delta, approximately 8.7 miles southwest of the CD-5 project area.12 In the standing 

declarations submitted with their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs state that they 

conduct subsistence activities in the vicinity of the CD-5 project area.

13 They maintain 

that full compliance with the CWA and NEPA may result in a project “that will have less 

of an impact on the rich and productive subsistence areas [they] rely on near the CD-5 

project.”14 

In the months following the filing of the Complaint, the Court permitted CPAI, the 

Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (“ASRC”), the State of Alaska, Kuukpik Corporation, 

9 A.R. 3297 (11/23/05 letter from U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to Corps re CD-5).

10 Docket 1 (Compl.).

11 See Docket 117 at 1–2 ¶¶ 1–2 (Am. Compl.). The Complaint named as defendants the Corps 

as well as Corps’ officers Thomas P. Bostick and Christopher D. Lestochi. This Order refers to 

all three defendants collectively as “the Corps.”

12 A.R. 451; Docket 117 at 2–5 ¶¶ 5–9 (Am. Compl.); Docket 169 at 2 ¶¶ 2–3 (Isaac Nukapigak 

Decl. in Supp. of Kuukpik Opp’n).

13 See Docket 110 (Kunaknana Decl.); Docket 111 (Itta Decl.); Docket 112 (Robert Nukapigak 

Decl.); Docket 113 (Ahnupkana Decl.); Docket 114 (Nicholls Decl.).

14 Docket 110 at 3 ¶ 12 (Kunaknana Decl.); Docket 111 at 3 ¶ 11 (Itta Decl.); Docket 112 at 3 ¶

11 (Robert Nukapigak Decl.); Docket 113 at 3 ¶ 11 (Ahnupkana Decl.); Docket 114 at 3 ¶ 11 

(Nicholls Decl.).

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and the North Slope Borough to join this action as Intervenor-Defendants in support of 

the Corps.15

On August 14, 2013, the Court issued an Order Establishing Joint Case 

Management and a Case Schedule for this case and the related case of Center for 

Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Case No. 3:13-cv-00095-SLG. 

The order set a deadline of August 30, 2013 for the Corps to file any augmentation of 

the administrative record.16 The order also established a schedule for the parties to file 

summary judgment briefs.17

The Corps moved for an extension of time to augment the record.18 Plaintiffs 

opposed, stating they had “hoped to fully litigate the case before [CPAI] begins 

construction in the first quarter of 2014,” but “[n]ow this goal is jeopardized and Plaintiffs 

will likely have to request a preliminary injunction.”19 The Court granted the Corps’ 

motion and modified the summary judgment briefing schedule.20 Pursuant to this 

modified schedule, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.21 These 

15 Docket 14 (Order Granting CPAI Mot. for Intervention); Docket 25 (Order Granting ASRC Mot. 

for Intervention); Docket 38 (Order Granting State of Alaska Mot. for Intervention); Docket 51 

(Order Granting Kuukpik Corp. Mot. for Intervention); Docket 86 at 2 (Order Establishing Joint 

Case Mgmt.) (granting intervention to North Slope Borough). 

16 Docket 86 at 3 (Order Establishing Joint Case Management & Case Schedule).

17 Docket 86 at 3–4 (Order Establishing Joint Case Management & Case Schedule); see also 

D.Ak. LR 16.3(c).

18 Docket 90 (Corps Mot. for Extension of Time).

19 Docket 94 at 3 (Opp’n to Corps Mot. for Extension of Time).

20 Docket 96 (Order Granting Defs. Mot. for Extension of Time & Modifying Case Schedule).

21 Docket 107 (Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 131 (Corps Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 127 

(CPAI Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 140 (ASRC Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 141 

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motions became ripe on January 3, 2014, and the Court has taken them under 

advisement. 

On February 5, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 

and Preliminary Injunction.

22 In an affidavit filed with the motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

avers that on January 28, 2014, he received a telephone call from Plaintiff Martha Itta 

informing him that she had heard from the BLM that CPAI had begun construction on 

CD-5.

23 Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted CPAI’s counsel, who confirmed that CPAI had 

begun construction.24 In their motion, Plaintiffs assert that CPAI’s construction activities 

“pose a threat of irreparable harm to the environment,” and they request “a temporary 

restraining order and preliminary injunction to halt construction activities until the Court 

has issued an order on . . . Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.”25

Pursuant to the parties’ apparent stipulation and this Court’s Order,26 the Corps, 

CPAI, and the other Intervenor-Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ motion on February 

(Kuukpik Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 142 (State of Alaska Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.); 

Docket 143 (North Slope Borough Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 146 (Reply re Mot. for 

Summ. J.); see also D.Ak. LR 16.3(c)(2) (“Defendant’s principal brief in opposition . . . will be 

deemed a cross-motion for summary judgment . . . .”).

22 Docket 149 (Mot.). The plaintiff in the related case of Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Case No. 3:13-cv-00095-SLG, has not joined in this motion or filed a 

separate motion for a preliminary injunction.

23 Docket 151 at 2 ¶ 2 (Litmans Decl. in Supp. of Mot.).

24 Docket 151 at 2 ¶¶ 3–4 (Litmans Decl. in Supp. of Mot.).

25 Docket 150 at 7 (Mot.).

26 See Docket 157 (Order re Mot.).

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21, 2014,27 and Plaintiffs replied on February 28, 2014.28

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331. 

II. Preliminary Injunction Standard.

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded 

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”29 “A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish (1) likely success on the merits; (2) likely 

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips 

in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.”30 “Under the 

‘sliding scale’ approach to preliminary injunctions observed in [the Ninth Circuit], ‘the 

elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of 

one element may offset a weaker showing of another.’”31 For example, “‘serious 

questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the 

plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements . . . are 

27 Docket 160 (CPAI Opp’n); Docket 164 (ASRC Opp’n); Docket 166 (Corps Opp’n); Docket 167 

(Kuukpik Opp’n); Docket 168 (State of Alaska Opp’n); Docket 170 (North Slope Borough Opp’n).

28 Docket 172 (Reply).

29 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).

30 Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. 

at 20).

31 Id. (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011)).

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also met.”32 However, a plaintiff “must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 

possible,” regardless of the strength of plaintiff’s showing on the other three elements.33

When applying the four-part test for a preliminary injunction, a court may 

consider inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, “when to do so serves the purpose of 

preventing irreparable harm before trial.”34 Additionally, the court has broad discretion 

to “fashion a remedy depending upon the necessities of the particular case.”35 

III. Analysis.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

With respect to the first prong of the preliminary injunction test, and solely for 

purposes of this motion, the Court assumes Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are 

likely to succeed on the merits of one or more of their claims under the CWA and/or

NEPA. 

B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm.

With respect to the second prong of the preliminary injunction test, it is 

questionable whether Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in 

the absence of the preliminary relief they seek. Plaintiffs rely largely on their standing 

32 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1132.

33 Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original).

34 Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Flynt Distrib. Co. v. 

Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984)).

35 See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 

v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1987)).

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declarations filed in October 2013 to demonstrate irreparable harm,

36 but these 

declarations do not indicate the extent to which the current construction activities are 

harming or will harm Plaintiffs’ subsistence interests.

37 Additionally, the fact that

Plaintiffs waited to file their motion until two months after CPAI began its construction 

season militates against a finding of irreparable harm.

38 Nonetheless, solely for 

purposes of this motion, the Court will assume Plaintiffs have met their burden of 

showing that their subsistence interests are likely to be irreparably harmed as a result of 

the construction activities taking place this winter and early spring at CD-5. CPAI is 

presently installing bridge and sheet pilings and blasting to open the gravel mine site,

39

activities that could damage the environment in ways that irreparably harm Plaintiffs’ 

subsistence interests.40

36 See Docket 150 at 12 (Mot.) (“[T]he impacts to Nuiqsut Plaintiffs include impacts to their 

subsistence way of life and enjoyment that are being irreparably harmed from Conoco’s 

construction activities, as set forth in the Nuiqsut Plaintiffs’ standing declarations.”).

37 Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any firsthand information regarding how CPAI’s 

current construction activities are impacting them.

38 See Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(“Plaintiff’s long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and 

irreparable harm.”); Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 

1113–14 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (holding plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm in part 

because they waited to file their motion for preliminary injunction until the day construction 

began, despite advance knowledge of when project was scheduled to commence).

39 Docket 161 at 4 ¶¶ 8–9 (Brodie Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n).

40 See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental 

injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often . . . 

irreparable.”).

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C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest.

A court cannot “abandon a balance of harms analysis just because a potential 

environmental injury is at issue.”41 Rather, this Court “must weigh the environmental 

injuries invoked by [Plaintiffs] against the other injuries identified by the [Corps and 

Intervenor-Defendants].”42 Here, even assuming Plaintiffs have shown likely success 

on the merits and likely irreparable harm for purposes of this motion, the balance of the 

equities tips so far in favor of CPAI and the other Intervenor-Defendants at this time that 

a preliminary injunction halting this season’s construction activities is not warranted, nor 

would it be in the public interest.43 

As Plaintiffs appear to recognize in their motion, even prior to the issuance of the 

2011 ROD, CPAI had announced its intent to begin construction at CD-5 during the 

2013–2014 winter.44 Moreover, in May 2012 and August 2013, CPAI held community 

meetings in Nuiqsut and indicated its intent to begin construction during the 2013–2014 

winter.45 According to Lisa Pekich, Director of Village Outreach for CPAI, Plaintiff 

41 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled in part on 

other grounds by Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009).

42 See id. at 1004; see also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“[T]he district court has a ‘duty . . . to balance the interests of all parties and weigh the damage 

to each.’” (quoting L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203 

(9th Cir. 1980))).

43 Cf. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23–24 (2008) (declining to address 

plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits and holding “even if plaintiffs have shown 

irreparable injury,” that injury is outweighed by defendant’s and the public’s interests).

44 See Docket 150 at 8–9 n.14 (Mot.) (citing A.R. 5867, a 10/19/11 letter from CPAI to the 

Corps, as “indicating Conoco will construct the gravel satellite pad, gravel road, bridge piers and 

substructure, and possibly the vertical support members for the pipeline in the first quarter of 

2014”).

45 Docket 163 at 2–3 ¶¶ 4–5 (Pekich Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n).

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Clarence Ahnupkana attended the May 2012 meeting, and Plaintiffs Sam Kunaknana, 

Martha Itta, and John Nicholls attended the August 2013 meeting.46 In their briefing, 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that they attended these meetings. 

In September 2013, in opposition to the Corps’ motion for an extension of time to 

augment the record, Plaintiffs demonstrated their awareness of CPAI’s intent to begin 

construction in the first quarter of 2014.

47 But Plaintiffs did not request a preliminary 

injunction at that time. In the months that followed, CPAI continued publicly to take 

steps to begin construction during the 2013–2014 winter.48 Then, when the

construction season was well underway, Plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary 

injunction. In doing so, it appears CPAI is correct that Plaintiffs waited “until the 

moment it would inflict the maximum possible damage and disruption to [CPAI].”

49 

Because the 2014 ice road season is expected to last for only 13–15 weeks, 

CPAI estimates that stopping work for as little as one week might cause it not to reach 

its construction milestones for the 2014 season, which could necessitate an additional 

winter season of work costing an estimated $105 million.50 The Court agrees with CPAI 

46 Docket 163 at 2–3 ¶¶ 4–5 (Pekich Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n).

47 Docket 94 at 3 (Opp’n to Corps Mot. for Extension of Time) (stating on September 3, 2013 

that Plaintiffs had “hoped to fully litigate the case before [CPAI] begins construction in the first 

quarter of 2014,” but “[n]ow this goal is jeopardized and Plaintiffs will likely have to request a 

preliminary injunction”).

48 Docket 163 at 3 ¶¶ 6–9 (Pekich Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n) (discussing 11/6/13 meeting 

with Kuukpik Subsistence Oversight Panel—at which Plaintiff Sam Kunaknana was present—

11/7/13 CD-5 job fair in Nuiqsut, 12/2/13 Facebook announcement, and 1/14/14 kickoff meeting 

in Nuiqsut).

49 See Docket 160 at 5 (CPAI Opp’n). 

50 Docket 161 at 6–10 ¶¶ 12–13, 20 (Brodie Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n). Plaintiffs assert that 

“[e]ven if an injunction would cause Conoco some financial hardship, economic harm is not 

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that “the cost of unplanned demobilization, staging, and remobilization of material that 

could be installed in 2014 is wasteful.”

51

In addition to the harm to CPAI, it appears the other Intervenor-Defendants would 

likely be adversely affected if CPAI were forced to stop work in the middle of this 

construction season.52 For example, residents from various North Slope Borough 

communities, including Kuukpik shareholders who live in Nuiqsut, could lose their jobs 

and income needed to buy subsistence equipment.53 Additionally, the Corps’ interest in 

“the orderly administration of [its] environmental permitting process” could be harmed.54

The disruption a mid-season work stoppage would cause could even result in 

more environmental damage than if CPAI continued work through the end of this 

construction season.55 Under these circumstances, and given the Plaintiffs’ long delay 

irreparable and, as a matter of law, does not override the threat of likely irreparable 

environmental harm.” Docket 150 at 15 (Mot.). However, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 

“[e]conomic harm may indeed be a factor in considering the balance of equitable interests.” 

Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010) (on appeal of denial of 

preliminary injunction to halt post-wildfire logging in a national forest, holding district court did 

not err in determining “the economic stakes, in combination with the safety concerns and 

reforestation efforts, outweighed any harm to environmental interests”).

51 Docket 161 at 9 ¶ 17 (Brodie Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n).

52 See Docket 165 (Imm Decl. in Supp. of ASRC Opp’n); Docket 168 (State of Alaska Opp’n); 

Docket 169 (Isaac Nukapigak Decl. in Supp. of Kuukpik Opp’n); Docket 170-1 (Brower Decl. in 

Supp. of North Slope Borough Opp’n)

53 Docket 169 at 7 ¶ 14 (Isaac Nukapigak Decl. in Supp. of Kuukpik Opp’n); Docket 170-1 at 3–4 

¶ 13 (Brower Decl. in Supp. of North Slope Borough Opp’n). More broadly, stopping work in the 

middle of the current construction season would threaten the jobs of up to 800 individuals 

currently working on the CD-5 project. See Docket 161 at 5 ¶ 10 (Brodie Decl. in Supp. of CPAI 

Opp’n). 

54 See Docket 166 at 13 (Corps Opp’n).

55 See Docket 161 at 6 ¶ 12 (Brodie Decl. in Supp. of CPAI Opp’n) (noting “incomplete bridge 

and road installations” could result in “incomplete protection against erosion during breakup”); 

Docket 165 at 2 ¶ 4 (Imm Decl. in Supp. of ASRC Opp’n) (explaining how preliminary injunction 

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in filing for a preliminary injunction despite their knowledge that construction on CD-5 

was set to begin during the 2013–2014 winter, the issuance of a preliminary injunction 

at this time would be clearly inequitable and not in the public interest.56

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction, at Docket 149, is DENIED.

57

DATED this 12th day of March, 2014, at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

“would result in serious environmental risks related to the ASRC Gravel Site”); Docket 169 at 6 

¶ 12 (Isaac Nukapigak Decl. in Supp. of Kuukpik Opp’n) (“[H]alting construction now, in the 

middle of the season, would just extend the time it would take to complete the project . . . and 

thereby create more and greater disruptions to the environment and to our subsistence way of 

life, than if the project is allowed to proceed and the work scheduled for this winter completed.”).

56 In their reply, Plaintiffs assert they filed their motion “almost immediately after learning that 

Conoco had begun construction,” and “[i]t would have been improper to bring a motion for 

injunctive relief earlier because any alleged harms would have been speculative and any threats 

would not have been actual or imminent.” Docket 172 at 10 (Reply). However, Plaintiffs were 

not required to wait until construction began to file their motion, particularly where for over two

years CPAI consistently declared its intention to begin construction on CD-5 during the 2013–

2014 winter. See W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 

in balancing the equities, the district court “properly exercised its discretion in weighing 

Appellant’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction until after construction began . . . and some 

$712 million had been expended”); Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 845 F. 

Supp. 2d 1102, 1113 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (where plaintiffs had four months advance notice of date 

construction would begin, holding plaintiffs “were not required to wait until construction . . . 

began to file the Motion for Preliminary Injunction”); cf. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 

523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998) (noting that because NEPA is a procedural statute, “a person with 

standing who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that 

failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper”). 

57 This denial is without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to request injunctive relief with respect to 

future construction seasons if the Court grants all or part of Plaintiffs’ pending motion for 

summary judgment.

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