Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00025/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00025-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARLA LONGMIRE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 16-0025-WS-M

 )

CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer (doc. 27) 

filed by defendants Donald Dees and the Mobile County Personnel Board, as well as the Motion 

to Strike (doc. 33) filed by plaintiff. The Motions have been briefed and are now ripe for 

disposition.

I. Background.

Plaintiff Carla Longmire, a City of Mobile Police Department officer, brought this action 

against a host of defendants, including Donald Dees and the Mobile County Personnel Board, 

alleging federal and state due process violations in connection with certain disciplinary 

proceedings wherein she was demoted from the rank of Captain to that of Lieutenant. Dees and 

the Personnel Board, who are represented by the same counsel, filed Answers (docs. 3 & 4) 

asserting various affirmative defenses on January 21, 2016.

On March 8, 2016, Magistrate Judge Milling entered a Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order 

providing, in relevant part, that “Motions for leave to amend the pleadings or to join other parties 

must be filed not later than May 27, 2016.” (Doc. 8, ¶ 5.)1 The Scheduling Order also fixed a 

discovery completion deadline of December 16, 2016. (Id., ¶ 3.) At no time prior to the May 27, 

 1 In setting that deadline, the Magistrate Judge hewed closely to the parties’ 

proposed timeline. The Report of Parties’ Planning Meeting reflected that plaintiff requested 

until May 6, 2016 to join additional parties and amend pleadings, and that defendants requested 

until June 3, 2016 to join additional parties and amend pleadings. (See doc. 7, ¶ 6.)

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2016 deadline did Dees, the Personnel Board or anyone else seek leave to amend the pleadings 

or to add additional parties.

On December 15, 2016, more than six months after expiration of the deadline for motions 

to amend pleadings, Dees and the Personnel Board collectively filed a Motion for Leave to 

Amend Answer. Movants indicate that the Motion is animated by their desire to amend their 

pleadings to interpose the affirmative defense of res judicata. In support of this request, movants 

explain that in certain related proceedings, Longmire appealed the Personnel Board’s decision 

affirming her demotion to the Mobile County Circuit Court. The Circuit Court affirmed the 

demotion via summary judgment order dated August 7, 2015, and the Alabama Court of Civil 

Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision without opinion on April 22, 2016. Movants now 

seek to raise the affirmative defense of res judicata based on these events in the related statecourt proceedings. Plaintiff opposes the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer, and also filed a 

Motion to Strike (doc. 33) directed at Exhibit 3 to the Motion for Leave to Amend, which exhibit

is a copy of the Circuit Court’s ruling of August 7, 2015.

II. Analysis.

Movants frame their Motion for Leave to Amend in terms of Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, which generally prescribes a liberal standard under which leave to 

amend a pleading should be freely given when justice so requires. See generally City of Miami 

v. Bank of America Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1286 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[U]nless a substantial reason 

exists to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit 

denial”) (citation omitted). But the Motion is not governed (at least, in the first instance) by the 

lenient provisions of Rule 15(a)(2), for the simple reason that defendants filed it many months 

after the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order deadline for motions to amend pleadings. Where, as here, 

a party endeavors to amend its pleading after expiration of the applicable scheduling order 

deadline, the movant must first satisfy the more stringent requirements of Rule 16(b)(4). See, 

e.g., Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A 

plaintiff seeking leave to amend its complaint after the deadline designated in a scheduling order 

must demonstrate ‘good cause’ under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b).”); Sosa v. Airprint Systems, Inc., 133 

F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause Sosa’s motion to amend was filed after the 

scheduling order’s deadline, she must first demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b) before we 

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will consider whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).”).2 Pursuant to that rule, “[a] 

schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Rule 16(b)(4), 

Fed.R.Civ.P. The “good cause” standard “precludes modification unless the schedule cannot be 

met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).3 The burden of establishing the requisite good cause / 

diligence rests on Dees and the Personnel Board, the parties seeking relief from the lapsed 

deadline in the original Scheduling Order. See, e.g., Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing 

Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“Rule 16(b)(4) focuses on the moving party’s burden 

to show due diligence.”); Northstar Marine, Inc. v. Huffman, 2014 WL 3720537, *3 (S.D. Ala. 

July 28, 2014) (“The burden of establishing good cause / diligence rests squarely on the party 

seeking relief from the scheduling order.”).

Dees and the Personnel Board have not shown that, even with diligence, they were unable 

to comply with the Scheduling Order deadline for filing motions to amend pleadings. Indeed, 

the record before the Court unambiguously establishes that movants had knowledge of the facts 

and circumstances undergirding their proposed new res judicata defense well before the May 27, 

2016 deadline for motions to amend pleadings. By movants’ own reckoning, the Mobile County 

Circuit Court entered the order to which they wish to assign preclusive effect on August 7, 2015, 

more than four months before Longmire even filed her Complaint to commence this action. 

Although Longmire appealed the Circuit Court ruling in the demotion case, the Alabama Court 

 2 The rationale for requiring a heightened showing to amend the pleadings after the 

scheduling order deadline lapses is that “a scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly 

entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded.... Disregard of the order would undermine the 

court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward 

the indolent and the cavalier.” Rogers v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 2395194, *1 

n.3 (S.D. Ala. June 22, 2012) (citation omitted); see also Baker v. U.S. Marshal Service, 2014 

WL 2534927, *2 (D.N.J. June 5, 2014) (“Extensions of time without good cause would deprive 

courts of the ability to effectively manage cases on their overcrowded dockets and would 

severely impair the utility of Scheduling Orders.”).

3 See also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (“To 

establish good cause, the party seeking the extension must have been diligent.”); King v. Chubb 

& Son, 563 Fed.Appx. 729, 732 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014) (“There can be no good cause where 

the record shows that the late-filing party lacked diligence in pursuing its claim.”) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

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of Civil Appeals summarily affirmed it on April 22, 2016, more than a month before the 

operative deadline for amending pleadings in this action. Surely, by that time, Dees and the 

Personnel Board possessed the necessary information to plead an affirmative defense of res 

judicata in this action without jeopardizing fulfillment of their Rule 11(b) obligations.4 Because 

record facts confirm that, with diligence, movants could have complied with the Scheduling 

Order deadline for motions to amend pleadings, the Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause” standard is not 

satisfied here and the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer is properly denied as untimely.

Alternatively, even if movants could show the requisite diligence and good cause for their 

noncompliance with the Scheduling Order in a manner that meets their burden under Rule 

16(b)(4), denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer would remain warranted under Rule 

15(a)(2)’s liberal standard. “Although leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so 

requires, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as undue delay, undue 

prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.” Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 

1316 (11th Cir. 2013). “Although generally, the mere passage of time, without more, is an 

insufficient reason to deny leave to amend a complaint, undue delay may clearly support such a 

denial.” In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1109 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “A district 

court may find undue delay when the movant knew of facts supporting the new claim long before 

the movant requested leave to amend” and where the amendment would cause prejudice. Tampa 

Bay Water v. HDR Engineering, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171, 1186 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Even if the Court were to accept at face value the dubious (and legally unsupported) 

proposition that the res judicata defense was unavailable for movants to plead in good faith until

 4 In so concluding, the Court recognizes that there were further appellate 

proceedings in the state-court case following the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals’ ruling of 

April 22, 2016. Specifically, the record shows that Longmire filed an application for rehearing 

(denied by the Court of Civil Appeals on July 15, 2016) and a petition for certiorari (denied by 

the Alabama Supreme Court on July 29, 2016). (Doc. 34, Exh. A.) Even though the Alabama 

courts had not issued a final judgment in the state-court matter by the May 27 deadline, Dees and 

the Personnel Board certainly could have amended their pleadings prior to that date to assert a 

res judicata defense based on the rulings already issued by the state courts and the strong 

likelihood of a final judgment being entered that affirmed the Mobile County Circuit Court’s 

decision. On that basis, the Court finds that, with diligence, movants could have interjected the 

res judicata affirmative defense into their answers before the May 27 deadline for motions to 

amend pleadings.

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after the state appellate courts entered a final judgment, movants concede that such final 

judgment was entered on September 16, 2016. (Doc. 34, at 3 n.5 & Exh. B.) Yet Dees and the 

Personnel Board tarried three additional months until December 15, 2016 before filing their 

Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. That constitutes undue delay for Rule 15(a)(2) purposes, 

particularly given that movants filed their Motion precisely one day before the discovery cutoff 

of December 16, 2016, thereby guaranteeing that Longmire would be unable to explore that issue 

via discovery (as she has strenuously argued she wishes to do). (See doc. 33, at 4.) Moreover, 

by filing their Motion for Leave to Amend on the eve of the dispositive motions deadline, Dees 

and the Personnel Board effectively ensured that the res judicata could not be properly litigated 

on summary judgment. The point is that by waiting until the eleventh hour to seek to interpose 

the res judicata defense, movants impaired the parties’ ability to investigate and litigate it 

properly and the Court’s ability to adjudicate it in a fair and efficient manner. Movants could 

have avoided this scenario by seeking leave to amend much earlier, and in any event no later 

than the immediate aftermath of the final judgment entered by the Alabama Court of Civil 

Appeals on September 16, 2016. Even under the liberal Rule 15(a)(2) standard, then, the 

proposed amendment does not pass master.

Finally, the Court pauses to consider Longmire’s Motion to Strike, wherein she requests 

that the Mobile County Circuit Court order dated August 7, 2015, and attached to the Motion for 

Leave to Amend Answer as Attachment 3, be stricken as “prejudicial and improper under these 

circumstances.” (Doc. 33, at 4.) To be clear, the issue presented in the Motion to Strike is not 

whether the August 7 order would be admissible at trial in this proceeding, but whether the 

exhibit should be stricken from the court file in its entirety. Although Longmire identifies no 

authority in support of her request, motions to strike are ordinarily governed by Rule 12(f), 

Fed.R.Civ.P., which authorizes district courts to “order stricken from any pleading ... any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” Id. However, “[s]triking matter on 

Rule 12(f) grounds is a drastic, disfavored remedy.” Evonik Degussa Corp. v. Quality Carriers, 

Inc., 2007 WL 4358260, *1 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2007).5 Longmire makes no showing that any of 

 5 See also Kirksey v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2016 WL 3189242, *3 n.6 (S.D. 

Ala. June 7, 2016) (“[E]xhibits are not stricken (and motions to strike should not be filed in 

federal court) as a kneejerk reaction whenever a litigant is unhappy with either the contents of an 

exhibit or the other side’s arguments drawn from that exhibit.”) (citations omitted); Stephens v. 

(Continued)

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the Rule 12(f) considerations are satisfied, much less that she will be prejudiced in any way by 

the mere presence of the August 7 order (which is, of course, a matter of public record issued in 

public judicial proceedings in Mobile County Circuit Court) in the court file. Simply put, she 

provides no explanation for why the draconian step of striking this exhibit is an appropriate 

remedy here. Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is denied.

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:

1. Defendants Donald Dees’ and Mobile County Personnel Board’s Motion for 

Leave to Amend Answer (doc. 27) is denied; and

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (doc. 33) is denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of January, 2017.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Trust for Public Land, 479 F. Supp.2d 1341, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (noting that a motion to strike 

is a “drastic remedy” and that such motions “are rarely granted absent a showing of prejudice”); 

BB In Technology Co. v. JAF, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 632, 641 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (opining that Rule 

12(f) motions “will usually be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the 

controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties”); Carlson Corporation/Southeast v. 

School Bd. of Seminole County, Fla., 778 F. Supp. 518, 519 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (characterizing 

motions to strike as “time wasters” and observing that such motions “will usually be denied”).

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