Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04448/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04448-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

INC., COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP,

and CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, SPENCER

ABRAHAM, Secretary, Department of

Energy, and CAMILE YUAN-SOO HOO,

Manager, National Nuclear Security

Administration, Oakland Operations

Office,

Defendants. 

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No. C-04-04448 SC

ORDER GRANTING

FEDERAL DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO ALTER OR

AMEND JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is the motion by the Department of

Energy, et al. ("Federal Defendants") to alter or amend the

Court's May 2, 2007 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment, ("Summary Judgment Order", Docket No. 66) and the

Court's May 3, 2007 Judgment ("Judgment", Docket No. 67). See

Mot., Docket No. 70. The Federal Defendants argue that the

Court's award of attorneys' fees and costs was inappropriate

because the Judgment was not final and unappealable, and because

the Plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they meet the eligibility

requirements imposed by the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA",

28 U.S.C. § 2412). Id. Plaintiffs Natural Resources Defense

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1

In addition to the Organizational Plaintiffs, the City of Los

Angeles ("City") is a plaintiff in this action. Neither the

Summary Judgment Order nor the Judgment distinguished between the

Organizational Plaintiffs and the City in holding that Plaintiffs

were entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs. The City did

not participate in the briefing of the present motion.

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Council and Committee to Bridge the Gap (together referred to as

the "Organizational Plaintiffs")1 opposed the motion, and the

Federal Defendants replied. See Docket Nos. 72, 73.

Having reviewed the parties' arguments, the Court concludes

that the award of attorneys' fees and costs was inappropriate, and

therefore GRANTS the Federal Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend

Judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

"the district court has the discretion to reopen a judgment if one

has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of

fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions." 

Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 928-29 (9th Cir.

2000). While the court has considerable discretion in considering

motions brought under Rule 59(e), there are at least four reasons

the court may grant such a motion: 1) to correct a manifest error

of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) to present

newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) to prevent

manifest injustice; and 4) to account for an intervening change in

the controlling law. See Haskell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1244 (D. Haw. 2002).

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III. DISCUSSION

The Federal Defendants contend that the Court prematurely

awarded attorneys' fees and costs, and in so doing, committed

legal error. See Mot. at 4. The Federal Defendants further argue

that the award of damages was in error because the Plaintiffs have

the burden of establishing their eligibility to recover, which

they have not yet done. Id.

For the United States to be sued, Congress must include in

the text of a statute a clear, unequivocal, specific statement of

consent. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,

37 (1992) ("[T]he 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of

sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in

statutory text."). Where Congress has included a waiver of

sovereign immunity in a statute, such waiver must be strictly

construed. See id. at 34. 

The Organizational Plaintiffs rely on the EAJA as a basis for

recovery of costs and attorneys' fees. See Stipulation to Enlarge

Time to File A Motion Concerning Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Docket

No. 69. The EAJA provides:

[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than

the United States fees and other expenses, in addition

to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a),

incurred by that party in any civil action (other than

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for

judicial review of agency action, brought by or against

the United States in any court having jurisdiction of

that action, unless the court finds that the position of

the United States was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). A party seeking an award of fees and

other expenses shall submit an application to the court within

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thirty days following a final judgment. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 

Under the EAJA, a "party" is "any partnership, corporation,

association of local government, or organization, the net worth of

which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was

filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the

civil action was filed." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii). The net worth

limit does not apply to organizations exempt from taxation under

26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3). Id. 

Thus, in addition to prevailing on their original lawsuit and

receiving a final, unappealable verdict, the Organizational

Plaintiffs must also file a timely claim for costs and attorneys'

fees, prove their eligibility to recover under the EAJA, prove

that the Federal Defendants' position was not substantially

justified, and prove the absence of "special circumstances." See

Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989). 

A. Final Judgment

A party seeking to recover costs or fees under the EAJA must

submit an application within thirty days of final judgment. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). "Final judgment" is defined as "a

judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order

of settlement." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The thirty-day period for

filing an application to recover costs or attorneys' fees under

the EAJA does not begin to run until the time for the Government

to file a notice of appeal has expired. See Melkonyan v.

Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991) ("Accordingly, we hold that a

'final judgment' for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) means

a judgment rendered by a court that terminates the civil action

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for which EAJA fees may be received. The 30-day EAJA clock begins

to run after the time to appeal that 'final judgment' has

expired.").

The thirty-day period established in the EAJA is an outer

limit, however. The statute does not require a prevailing

plaintiff to wait for that period to expire before applying for

fees. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (holding

that application for fees under the EAJA was timely even though

the district court's judgment was still appealable); Koch v.

United States, 47 F.3d 1015, 1021 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Schaefer

therefore makes clear that a plaintiff may ask for attorney's fees

even when the time for appeal has not elapsed."). 

The Federal Defendants' authority to the contrary is

inapposite. Of the three cases cited, two provide no support for

the conclusion that a request for fees prior to final judgment is

premature. See United States v. Section 18, 976 F.2d 515, 521

(9th Cir. 1992); Sohappy v. Hodel, 911 F. 1312, 1321 (9th Cir.

1990). Section 18 merely cites to Sohappy, which in turn cites

the Federal Defendants' third case, Papazian v. Bowen, 865 F.2d

1455, 1456 (9th Cir. 1988). In Papazian, the Ninth Circuit found

timely an application for fees which was filed before the

administrative proceedings on remand were complete. 865 F.2d at

1456. In reaching this conclusion, the court described a series

of rulings which illustrate its liberal reading of the EAJA,

including Auke Bay Concerned Citizen's Advisory Council v. Marsh,

779 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the court held that

an application for attorneys' fees filed prior to the end of the

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2

The City did not participate in the briefing on this motion,

and does not argue that it meets any of the EAJA requirements. At

a minimum, then, the Court's award of fees and costs to

"Plaintiffs" was in error.

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period for appeal is timely, as long as the applicant meets the

eligibility requirements of 24 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(b). See id.

The Federal Defendants' final case is inapplicable because the

plaintiff there requested fees in its initial prayer for relief,

which the court held did not satisfy the EAJA requirements. See

M.A. DeAtley Constr., Inc. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 370, 372

n.1 (Fed. Cl. 2006). 

Thus, if the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfy the conditions

for eligibility set forth in the EAJA, they need not wait until

the Federal Defendants exhaust their appeal to apply for

attorneys' fees and costs. However, the Organizational Plaintiffs

have not actually filed an application under the EAJA. In fact,

they have stipulated not to do so until the time for an appeal has

run because it would be inefficient to litigate the costs and fees

prior to that time. See Docket No. 71. Because the ruling that

Plaintiffs were entitled to recover costs and fees issued when an

application for such recovery had not been filed, the Court now

concludes that such ruling was made in error. 

B. Eligibility to Recover Costs and Fees

The foregoing conclusion regarding timeliness does not

relieve the Organizational Plaintiffs of the burden of proving

their eligibility to recover, which they have not satisfied.

The Organizational Plaintiffs provided the Court with

declarations attesting that they are non-profit organizations.2

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See Declaration of Daniel Hirsch; Declaration of Thomas Cochran. 

Even as non-profit entities, however, the Organizational

Plaintiffs must satisfy the size limitations imposed by the EAJA. 

See 24 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii). Neither of the Organizational

Plaintiffs has provided any evidence to prove they meet this

requirement. That they may have been eligible to apply for fees

in litigation which concluded more than a decade ago does not

prove that they were eligible at the time they filed this suit.

Even if the Organizational Plaintiffs were to establish that

they meet the size limitations of the EAJA, the Federal Defendants

must be given the opportunity to establish that their position was

"substantially justified" or that "special circumstances make an

award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Organizational

Plaintiffs argue that in light of this Court's prior ruling, the

Federal Defendants cannot possibly prove that their position was

substantially justified. See Opp'n, 8-9. If there were no way

for the Government to lose in litigation but prevail on the issue

of fees and costs, section 2412(d)(1)(A) would be meaningless. 

The fact that the Organizational Plaintiffs prevailed at summary

judgment is not dispositive of whether the Federal Defendants'

position was substantially justified. While the Court is mindful

of its previous criticisms of the Federal Defendants' position, it

will not deny them the opportunity to prove that position was

justified under the totality of the circumstances. See Bullfrog

Films, Inc. v. Wick, 959 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The

district court is to take into account the totality of the

circumstances in deciding whether the government's position is

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In their Opposition Brief, the Organizational Plaintiffs ask

the Court to amend the Summary Judgment Order and the Judgment to

include an express finding that the Federal Defendants' position

was not substantially justified. See Opp'n at 8-9. The Court

denies this request. The Organizational Plaintiffs could have

filed a properly noticed motion under Rule 59. Their failure to do

so violates the local rules governing motion practice. See Civ.

L.R. 7-1(a), 7-2(a), 7-2(b). Further, in light of the discussion

herein, such a request is improper as it would deny the Federal

Defendants the opportunity to argue that their position was

substantially justified.

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substantially justified."). The Organizational Plaintiffs'

authorities confirm the standard that the Federal Defendants must

satisfy to show that their position was substantially justified;

however, none of those cases suggests that the Court may conclude

the position was not justified without hearing the Federal

Defendants' argument on the matter. See Gonzales v. Free Speech

Coalition, 408 F.3d 613 (9th cir. 2005); Thangaraja v. Gonzales,

428 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S.

Currency, 354 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2004).3

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that its

prior holding that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their

attorneys' fees and costs was made in error. The Court therefore

GRANTS the Federal Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,

and ORDERS as follows:

1. The Court's May 2, 2007 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion

for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 66), is hereby AMENDED to delete

in its entirety the following sentence from page 47: "The Court

further AWARDS Plaintiffs costs, disbursements, and attorneys'

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fees reasonably expended in their work up to this date which has

caused in the instant result."

2. The Court's May 3, 2007 Judgment is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2007

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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