Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00735/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00735-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Armin Calbo Velasco, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00735-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 On April 15, 2015, Petitioner Armin Calbo Velasco filed a pro se petition for writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. The Court referred the petition 

to Magistrate Judge John Z. Boyle. Doc. 2. On February 9, 2016, Judge Boyle issued a 

report and recommendation (“R&R”) that the Court dismiss the petition as untimely. 

Doc. 8. Petitioner filed a pro se objection to the R&R. Doc. 9. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court will overrule his objection and adopt Judge Boyle’s recommendation 

that the petition be dismissed. 

I. Background. 

 A. Velasco’s Conviction. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals provided the following summary of the crime 

underlying Velasco’s conviction: 

Late in the evening of August 2, 2003, [the perpetrator] went to the victim’s 

home and knocked loudly on the door. The knocking woke the victim’s 

ten-year-old brother who had been sleeping on the couch. The victim’s 

brother opened the door slightly. [The perpetrator] then pushed open the 

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door and grabbed the victim’s brother by the shirt and threw him behind the 

couch. Because he had a sore throat, the victim’s brother did not yell out. 

[The perpetrator] then went into the bedroom where the eight-year-old 

victim and her sister slept. After unzipping his pants, [the perpetrator] went 

to the victim’s bed, moved the victim so that she laid across the width of 

the bed, and removed the victim’s pants and underwear. [The perpetrator] 

then sexually touched and molested the victim. [The perpetrator] further 

proceeded to engage in sexual conduct with the victim. During this 

incident, the victim tried to get up, but [the perpetrator] was holding her 

legs down with his legs. [The perpetrator] signaled to the victim that she 

should be quiet and not tell anyone. The victim’s sister, who was sleeping 

in the bed next to the victim, witnessed [the perpetrator’s] conduct with the 

victim. Both the victim and her sister saw and recognized [the perpetrator] 

at the time because he was their aunt’s boyfriend. As [the perpetrator] was 

leaving the house, the victim’s brother also recognized him. 

Doc. 7-1 at 83-84. 

At trial, the victim’s sister identified Velasco as the perpetrator. Id. at 85. A 

police officer also testified. According to the officer, Velasco admitted to consuming 

eight beers, getting into a fight with his girlfriend, and going to the victim’s house on the 

day in question. Id. He denied engaging in any inappropriate touching of the victim, but 

stated that he “didn’t remember” what happened while he was at the victim’s house. Id. 

Based on this evidence, Velasco was convicted of child molestation, sexual conduct with 

a minor under the age of twelve, kidnapping, and burglary. Id. Velasco was sentenced to 

life without possibility of parole for 69 years. Id. 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. Doc. 7-1 at 83. Petitioner’s appellate counsel then informed him that there was 

no reasonable probability that the Arizona Supreme Court would review his case, and he 

declined to seek further review. Doc. 1 at 21. 

 B. Statute of Limitations. 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

establishes a one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As relevant here, the limitations period runs from “the date on 

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which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is subject to 

both statutory tolling and equitable tolling. Statutory tolling is available for “[t]he time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). 

Equitable tolling is available where “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s 

control ma[d]e it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 

968 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, a petitioner is entitled to an equitable exception to the 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations if he makes “a credible showing of actual innocence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013). 

C. The R&R. 

Judge Boyle determined that (1) the AEDPA limitations period began to run on 

September 15, 2005, the last day on which Velasco could have petitioned the Arizona 

Supreme Court for direct review of his conviction; (2) the limitations period was subject 

to statutory tolling from October 28, 2005 through April 26, 2006, during which 

Velasco’s petition for post-conviction review (“PCR”) was pending; and (3) the 

limitations period was not subject to any additional statutory tolling because Velasco did 

not have a “properly filed” PCR petition pending in state court at any time after April 26, 

2006. Doc. 8 at 4. Next, Judge Boyle determined that Velasco was not entitled to 

equitable tolling because he had not shown that extraordinary circumstances made it 

impossible for him to file a timely habeas petition. Id. at 7. Finally, Judge Boyle 

determined that Velasco was not entitled to an equitable exception to the limitations 

period because he had not made a credible showing of actual innocence. Id. at 8. Based 

on these findings, Judge Boyle concluded that the limitations period expired on April 27, 

2007, making Velasco’s petition almost eight years late. Id. 

D. Velasco’s Objections.

In his written objections, Velasco argues that (1) he is entitled to equitable tolling 

for the period between May 2006 and February 2008; (2) he is entitled to statutory tolling 

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for some period in March and April 2008; (3) he is actually innocent, and can show as 

much if an evidentiary hearing is held. Doc. 9 at 3-6. The Court reviews Velasco’s 

objections de novo; the portions of the R&R to which he does not object will be adopted 

without further discussion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. Analysis. 

A. Tolling.

Velasco contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the period between 

May 2006 and February 2008, when he diligently pursued his rights but was impeded by 

the fact that his legal materials were in the possession of an inmate legal assistant who 

had been transferred to another prison unit. Doc. 9 at 2-5. He also argues that he is 

entitled to statutory tolling for some period of time in March and April 2008, when he 

had a successive PRC petition pending. Id. at 3-4. Together, these periods constitute 

about two years. But Velasco’s petition is nearly eight years late, which means his claim 

would be untimely even if he were entitled to all of the tolling he claims. It is therefore 

unnecessary for the Court to determine whether Velasco would otherwise be entitled to 

tolling. See Watson v. Woodford, 247 F. App’x 938, 940 (9th Cir. 2007). 

B. Actual Innocence. 

The ADEPA’s statute of limitations does not apply to habeas petitions that make 

“a credible showing of actual innocence.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931. To make such 

a showing, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). The petitioner 

must show that, if the new evidence had been presented at trial, “it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 

1933 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325) (internal formatting omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “a habeas petitioner should receive an 

evidentiary hearing when he makes a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him 

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to equitable tolling.” Roy, 465 F.3d at 969. The Ninth Circuit has not specifically 

“articulat[ed] a legal standard regarding when an evidentiary hearing on a gateway 

Schlup claim is required.” Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 941 (9th Cir. 2014). It is clear, 

however, that conclusory allegations about the existence of new evidence do not suffice. 

As Schlup explained, habeas courts are entitled to consider the “credibility of the 

affiants” and “probable reliability of [new] evidence” in deciding whether to hold an 

evidentiary hearing. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325. Implicit in this formulation is an 

understanding that the petitioner’s allegations regarding the existence of new evidence 

must be plausible and substantiated by some sort of evidentiary submission. 

Velasco contends that DNA found on the victim did not match his DNA, alibi 

witnesses who were not called at trial could testify to his whereabouts on the night of the 

crime, and other witnesses could identify the person who actually committed the crime. 

Docs. 1 at 6; 9 at 5. Although an evidentiary hearing would be justified if there were 

reason to believe that Velasco could produce this evidence, see House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 

518, 540 (2006) (petitioner who presented new DNA evidence was entitled to pass 

through Schlup gateway); Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 

2004) (petitioner who presented credible alibi evidence was entitled to pass through 

Schlup gateway), Velasco provides nothing to support his assertions. He does not point 

to anything in the record indicating that a DNA sample was ever taken from the victim. 

He asserts that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory DNA evidence, but provides nothing 

to support this assertion. Nor does Velasco identify the witnesses he intends to call or 

explain what their testimony would be. He attaches some 39 pages of documents to his 

petition (Doc. 1), but they contain nothing but court records from the trial and appellate 

courts in this case. Those records do not discuss or contain any of the evidence Velasco 

asserts in support of his actual innocence, and he presents nothing else to support or 

corroborate his bare allegations regarding DNA evidence and exculpatory witnesses. 

In short, Velasco does not present any “new reliable evidence – whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

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evidence – that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Nor does he explain 

where or how this evidence could be found. Velasco therefore is not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing on his claim of actual innocence. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge John Z. Boyle’s R&R (Doc. 8) is accepted. 

2. Velasco’s petition (Doc. 1) is denied with prejudice. 

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. 

Dated this 11th day of March, 2016. 

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