Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04803/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04803-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff has not submitted an opposition to Defendant’s

cross-motion or a reply to Defendant’s opposition. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA DEL PILAR REYES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-04803 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OR REMAND AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Plaintiff Maria del Pilar Reyes has filed a motion for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, remand to the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration (SSA) for further proceedings. 

Defendant Michael J. Astrue, in his capacity as Commissioner of the

SSA, opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment.1

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On September 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed an application for

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Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security

Act. Administrative Record (AR) 110. Plaintiff alleged that she

became disabled on December 15, 2005 due to carpal tunnel syndrome

and pain in her neck and back. AR 63. On December 29, 2006, her

claim was denied. AR 63-67. On February 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed

a request for reconsideration, which was denied on April 25, 2007. 

AR 69-73. On January 31, 2008, a hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), at which Plaintiff testified and

was represented by counsel. AR 22-60. On April 14, 2008, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act because she could perform a significant number

of jobs in the national economy. AR 7-21.

On June 19, 2008, Plaintiff filed a request for review with

the Social Security Appeals Council, challenging the ALJ's

decision. AR 5-6. On August 25, 2008, the Appeals Council

affirmed the ALJ's decision. AR 1-4. On October 21, 2008,

Plaintiff initiated the present action for judicial review under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking summary judgment or, in the alternative,

remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Defendant

opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. 

II. Factual History 

A. Plaintiff’s Personal History

Plaintiff was born on October 21, 1969. She received a

Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1996 and holds several financial

services licenses to sell mutual funds and securities. AR 236. 

Plaintiff has past work experience as a corporate teller, financial

representative, marketing lead, offshore sales specialist and

marketing representative. AR 236-237. From 2001 through 2005,

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2 DeQuervain's tendonitis is a condition brought on by

inflammation of the tendons of the first dorsal compartment of the

wrist. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 336 (Mark H.

Beers et al. eds., Merck Research Laboratories 18th ed. 2006)

(hereinafter The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy). Surgical

release opens the first extensor compartment to make more room for

the inflamed tendons. Id.

3 Radiculopathy is the dysfunction of a nerve root often

caused by compression of the root. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis

and Therapy at 1901. 

4Synovitis is the inflammation of a membrane lining a joint. 

Black’s Medical Dictionary, 689 (Harvey Marcovitch ed., The

Scarecrow Press 41st ed. 2006).

3

Plaintiff worked as a sales assistant for Bank of America. AR 236. 

Plaintiff's sales assistant position is classified as a skilled

occupation performed at the light exertional level. AR 255. 

On December 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed for workers' compensation

benefits. The claim resulted in a finding that she was precluded

or likely to be precluded from engaging in her former employment,

that she was entitled to a cash settlement, and that she was

entitled to continued medical treatment and vocational

rehabilitation services. AR 263-270. 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

In 2003, Plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome

and underwent a carpal tunnel release procedure and DeQuervain's

tendonitis release2. AR 292. Her symptoms improved temporarily

and she was able to return to work. Id. In 2004, Plaintiff was

also diagnosed with cervical spine strain without radiculopathy3

and bilateral forearm tendonitis. AR 292-293. 

On March 3, 2004, Dr. David Curtis, a rheumatologist,

diagnosed Plaintiff with mild synovitis,4 or inflammation of

certain membranes, with a negative rheumatoid factor. AR 321. He

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5 Phalen’s test is a maneuver used in the physical diagnosis

of carpal tunnel symptoms. The test is positive when wrist flexion

produces tingling in the distribution of the median nerve. The

Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy at 334, 339.

6 Myofascial pain syndrome is a condition that affects the

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noted that, with her mother’s history of rheumatoid arthritis,

Plaintiff’s diagnosis appeared to be rheumatoid arthritis. AR 321.

In July, 2005, Dr. Leonard Gordon, a hand specialist, examined

Plaintiff and found that she could perform “lighter” work; that is,

on a prophylactic basis, she could do computer work up to four

hours per day with a half hour on and half hour off, and she could

lift up to ten pounds on a moderately repetitive basis or fifteen

pounds intermittently. AR 244. 

In January, 2006, Dr. Gary Salomon, Plaintiff's treating

physician, assessed that she had no restrictions on sitting,

standing or walking, that she could occasionally lift up to twenty

pounds, and that she should not perform fine finger movements or

push/pull bilaterally. AR 433-435. In March, 2006, Dr. Salomon

opined that Plaintiff could return to work with limited

keyboarding. AR 387. 

In May, 2006, Dr. Jules Steimnitz, a specialist in physical

medicine, rehabilitation, and pain medicine, evaluated Plaintiff

and found tenderness and reduced range of motion in the cervical

spine, reduced grip strength in the right (dominant) hand, and

positive Phalen’s test5, right greater than left. AR 294-295. Dr.

Steimnitz diagnosed Plaintiff with repetitive strain injury of the 

neck and bilateral upper extremities with myofascial pain

syndrome.6

 AR 295. Plaintiff reported improvement after attending

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6(...continued)

"fascia surrounding and separating muscle tissue." Stedman's

Medical Dictionary at 1272. The fascia is "a sheet of fibrous

tissue that envelops the body beneath the skin" and "encloses

muscles and groups of muscles, and separates their several layers

or groups." Id. at 700.

7 Tinel's sign is a tingling sensation that a patient may feel

at the site of a compressed or injured nerve. The Merck Manual of

Diagnosis and Therapy at 334, 339. 

8 Paresthesia is defined as a "spontaneous abnormal usually

nonpainful sensation (e.g., burning, pricking)." Thomas Lathrop

Stedman, Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1425 (28th ed. 2006)

(hereinafter Stedman's Medical Dictionary). 

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biofeedback muscle re-education. AR 362.

In June, 2006, Dr. Marvin Zwerin performed an Agreed Medical

Examination on Plaintiff and reported that, due to problems in her

upper back and neck, she was precluded from very heavy lifting and

unremitting cervical mobility. AR 349. He also advised that

Plaintiff should not be in a fixed position without being able to

move, suggesting one to two minutes of movement every thirty to

forty-five minutes. Id.

In December, 2006, Dr. Stacie Daniels performed an orthopedic

consultative examination on Plaintiff. Dr. Daniels noted that

Plaintiff had a limited range of motion in the cervical spine and a

positive Phalen's test, but a negative Tinel's sign.7 AR 355-357. 

Dr. Daniels' diagnostic impression was limited to bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome, and she assessed no physical limitations. Id.

In August, 2007, Dr. Salomon addressed Plaintiff’s complaints

of parasthesias8 in the right hand occurring occasionally once or

twice a day. AR 431-432. Dr. Salomon indicated that his objective

findings were minimal and that Plaintiff had full range of motion

in her shoulders, elbows, wrists, digits and thumbs. Id. Dr.

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9

 Thoracic outlet syndrome is the general term for a group of

conditions caused by compression of nerves, blood vessels, or both,

at the base of the neck. Stedman's Medical Dictionary at 1916.

10 Limb dystonia is a syndrome of abnormal muscle contraction

that produces repetitive twisting movements or abnormal positions

or postures of the affected limb. Stedman's Medical Dictionary at

602. 

6

Salomon referred Plaintiff for a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)

scan. Id. Based on the MRI scan, he recommended that Plaintiff

receive treatment for thoracic outlet syndrome.9 Plaintiff

participated in physical therapy throughout 2007. AR 436-444. 

In October, 2007, Dr. Richard Braun, a hand surgeon, examined

Plaintiff for an upper extremity evaluation. Dr. Braun found no

strong clinical evidence of thoracic outlet syndrome, good motion

in her thumb and a normal range of motion bilaterally in her upper

extremities. AR 449-461. However, he noted that Plaintiff may

require further evaluation for her cervical degenerative disc

condition. AR 460. Dr. Braun concluded that Plaintiff should use

a computer for no more than one-half hour, should lift no more than

ten pounds, and should not keep her neck in a constant flexion

position or twist it from side to side. AR 460-461.

In November, 2007, Dr. Tracy Newkirk performed a neurological

evaluation of Plaintiff. Based on his examination of Plaintiff and 

a review of her MRI scan and medical records, Dr. Newkirk diagnosed

costo-clavicular form of post-traumatic thoracic outlet syndrome;

neuropathic pain; focal, acquired limb dystonia10 (greater on

right); repetitive strain or over-use syndrome; and cervical

strain. AR 466, 472. Dr. Newkirk advised that Plaintiff should

not type more than thirty minutes, should not carry over five

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pounds singly or repetitively and should not perform repetitive

reaching, fingering, manipulating or reaching with or without load

at or above shoulder level. AR 472.

III. Plaintiff’s Vocational Rehabilitation Evidence

On February 20, 2006, Plaintiff underwent a functional

capacity evaluation with vocational consultant, Timothy Farrell. 

Mr. Farrell indicated that Plaintiff’s upper extremity and cervical

spine conditions caused her to have residual limitations with

regard to cervical range of motion, bilateral grip and pinch

strength, manual and fine finger dexterity, repetitive forward and

overhead reaching, and lifting/carrying. AR 257. He noted that

Plaintiff would be limited to sedentary strength occupations due to

her ten pound lifting and carrying limitation. Id. Mr. Farrell

concluded that Plaintiff could not return to her usual and

customary work due to pain limitations related to handling, fine

manipulation and reaching, and could not work in any occupation

that involved frequent and continuous use of her upper extremities. 

AR 258. He did not identify any limitations in Plaintiff's ability

to sit, stand or walk. 

IV. RFC and Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Mr. Alan Nelson, vocational expert (VE), appeared at the

hearing at the request of the ALJ. The ALJ provided the following

hypothetical to the VE: a person such as Plaintiff, who had no

limitations sitting, standing or walking; could lift and carry ten

pounds on an occasional basis; was limited to occasional overhead

reaching; could not perform power gripping or grasping bilaterally;

could not perform repetitive rotation of the neck right to left;

could not remain in a fixed position with constant flexion of the

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11 "Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a

time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10

pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is

in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or

standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some

pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered

capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must

have the ability to do substantially all of these activities." 20

C.F.R. § 404.1567. 

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neck; and could only spend thirty minutes per work day on a

computer. The ALJ asked the VE whether such a person could perform

Plaintiff’s last relevant work. AR 54. 

The VE testified that a hypothetical person with this RFC

could not perform Plaintiff’s last relevant work because the

position required significant use of the computer. AR 55. The VE

testified that there were “unskilled jobs” that such an individual

could perform, including an unarmed security guard of which there

were 543,546 jobs existing nationally and 8,057 jobs regionally;

ticket taker/usher of which there were 36,399 jobs existing

nationally and 588 regionally; and information clerk with 102,104

jobs existing nationally and 1,467 jobs regionally. AR 56-58. The

ALJ asked the VE whether Plaintiff's ten pound lifting limitation

would affect the number of security guard and ticket taker

positions available, because as "light" work11 jobs, they may

require occasional lifting up to twenty pounds. The VE responded

that the ten pound lifting limitation would erode approximately

twenty-five percent of all available security guard and ticket

taker jobs. AR 56-57. The VE noted that the positions were

categorized as "light" due to the standing demands, not the lifting

requirements. Id.

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12 A claimant’s RFC is the most he or she “can still do despite

his [or her] limitations,” or the claimant’s maximum ability to

perform sustained work in an ordinary work setting on a regular and

continuing basis, eight hours a day for five days a week. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ must weigh all of the relevant

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V. The ALJ’s Disability Determination

In his April 14, 2008 decision, the ALJ employed the five-step

sequential process to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim of disability: 

(1) is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful work activity;

(2) if not, does the claimant have a severe impairment, or

combination of impairments; (3) if so, are the impairments listed

in, or as severe as those listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, do the

impairments preclude the claimant from performing past relevant

work; and (5) if so, is other work precluded? 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(b)-(g). He found that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 10-21. At step one of

the five-part analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful employment since December 15, 2005,

the alleged disability onset date. AR 12. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s cervical

degenerative disc disease, thoracic outlet syndrome, history of

carpal tunnel syndrome and repetitive stress injuries were severe

within the meaning of the Regulations. Id. 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments were

not severe enough to meet or medically equal any of the impairments

listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. Id.

Prior to addressing steps four and five of the analysis, the

ALJ weighed the medical and other evidence in the record to assess

Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC).12 AR 13-18. The

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12(...continued)

medical and other evidence to make the RFC determination. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). 

10

ALJ considered several sources to make his RFC determination,

including: the medical information from Dr. Salomon, Plaintiff’s

treating physician; the reports of Drs. Gordon, Steimnitz, Zwerin,

Daniels, Braun and Newkirk; and the report of vocational consultant

Timothy Farrell. Id. The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's

testimony, explaining that he gave little weight to her statements,

because he found her testimony "not entirely credible" in light of

the treatment record and her daily activities. AR 16. The ALJ

determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC for light work, except

she could not lift or carry more than ten pounds at any one time;

could not perform repetitive rotation of her neck or keep her neck

in a constant flexed or fixed position; could not perform

keyboarding for more than thirty minutes in an eight hour workday;

could not reach overhead or lift or carry overhead more than

occasionally with her bilateral upper extremities; and could not

perform power gripping or grasping bilaterally. AR 18. 

At step four of the disability analysis, the ALJ relied on the

VE’s testimony to conclude that Plaintiff was precluded from

working in her past relevant occupation of sales associate. AR 18.

At step five, the ALJ noted that the VE testified that

Plaintiff’s ten pound lifting limitation would eliminate only

twenty-five percent of security guard and ticket taker jobs. The

ALJ utilized the Medical-Vocational guidelines, as well as the VE's

testimony, to determine that there were a significant number of

jobs that Plaintiff could perform. AR 19. Consequently, the ALJ

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found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. AR 19-20.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ’s

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, a court reviews the record as a whole, not

just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the Commissioner’s decision simply by isolating a specific

quantum of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498,

501 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, a court must weigh the evidence which

supports the Commissioner’s conclusions and that which does not. 

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be affirmed even

when there is evidence on the other side. Hall v. Sec’y of Health,

Educ., & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979). The ALJ’s

decision should also be affirmed when the evidence is susceptible

to more than one rational interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler, 753

F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by substantial

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evidence, the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact shall be

conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as an

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will be determined to be

disabled only if his or her physical or mental impairment is so

severe that he or she “is not only unable to do his [or her]

previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ’s assessment of her severe

impairments did not reflect a complete evaluation of the medical

evidence; (2) the ALJ failed to consider the combined effect of her

impairments in determining she did not meet or equal a listed

impairment; (3) the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by

substantial evidence; (4) the vocational expert's testimony was

unresponsive to the ALJ's hypothetical question; and (5) the ALJ

improperly found Plaintiff not credible. 

I. Step Two Determination

Plaintiff argues that at the second step of the five-step

sequential inquiry, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s

failure to include Plaintiff’s diagnoses for myofascial pain

syndrome; neuropathic pain; rheumatoid arthritis; facet joint

dysfunction; DeQuervain’s tendonitis; and cervical spine strain in

the list of her conditions that he found severe. 

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At step two of the disability determination, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment

or combination of impairments that “significantly limits [his or

her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities include: “[p]hysical

functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,

pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1521(b).

Here, the ALJ ruled in Plaintiff’s favor at step two, finding

four severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical

spine, thoracic outlet syndrome, carpal tunnel syndrome and

bilateral repetitive stress injury. AR 12. 

The ALJ examined the evidence of Plaintiff’s claims of

neuropathic pain, rheumatoid arthritis, facet joint dysfunction,

DeQuervain’s tendonitis and cervical spine strain, but did not

include them in his list of severe impairments. The ALJ noted that

Dr. Steimnitz, a specialist in physical medicine and

rehabilitation, diagnosed Plaintiff with myofascial pain syndrome

in May, 2006. AR 292-298. The ALJ noted, however, that, in an

examination one month later by Dr. Zwerin, an agreed medical

examiner, Plaintiff reported no intolerance for sitting or walking

and that, although she had some pain in her back, it was not

regular or frequent. AR 344-345.

 Plaintiff points to pages 315-341 of the record as evidence

that her rheumatoid arthritis diagnosis was severe. However,

nowhere in the record is there evidence of a severe rheumatoid

arthritis condition; rather, Dr. Curtis, a rheumatologist, merely

speculates that “with her mother’s history . . . the diagnosis

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appears to be rheumatoid arthritis.” AR 321. Lastly, Plaintiff

points to medical records from 2004 and 2005 as evidence of her

DeQuervain's tendonitis diagnoses. However, in 2006, Dr. Daniels

performed an orthopedic consultative examination on Plaintiff and

found that she had no physical limitations and limited her

diagnostic impression to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. AR 354-

357. 

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ ignored the

evidence of some of her diagnosed conditions, a review of the ALJ’s

findings makes clear that the ALJ properly considered the evidence

and determined that not all ten of the medical diagnoses were

severe impairments. The fact that a medically determinable

condition exists does not necessarily mean the symptoms are severe

or disabling, as defined by the Social Security Regulations. The

ALJ did not err in the step two determination.

II. Step Three Determination 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his step three

determination by concluding that her impairments were not medically

equivalent to those listed in Appendix 1. 

At step three of the evaluation process, the ALJ must

determine whether a claimant has an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or equals a condition outlined in the

Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). "An ALJ must

evaluate the relevant evidence before concluding that a claimant's

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment. A

boilerplate finding is insufficient to support a conclusion that a

claimant's impairment does not do so." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d

503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). In order for a claimant's impairment or

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combination of impairments to meet the requirement of a listing,

all of the criteria of that listing and the duration requirement

must be satisfied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(1)-(3). A claimant

bears the burden of proving that he or she has an impairment that

meets or equals the criteria of a listed impairment. Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005) ("An ALJ is not

required to discuss the combined effects of a claimant's

impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency

determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort

to establish equivalence.") 

Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of proving that her

combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment. 

Plaintiff does not specify which listing she believes she meets or

equals and fails to set forth any evidence which would support the

diagnosis and finding of a listed impairment. The ALJ properly

considered the combined effect of all Plaintiff's impairments and

determined that it failed to meet or equal in severity the criteria

of either section 1.02 or 1.04, listed impairments related to the

musculoskeletal system. 

Further, the ALJ was not required, as urged by Plaintiff, to

obtain an updated expert medical opinion pursuant to Social

Security Ruling 96-6p. That Ruling provides that the ALJ must

obtain an updated medical report “when additional medical evidence

is received that in the opinion of the administrative law judge or

the Appeals Council may change the state agency medical or

psychological consultant’s finding that the impairment(s) is not

equivalent in severity to any impairment in the Listing of

Impairments.” SSR 96-6p. Here, the ALJ’s determination that the

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record did not contain evidence that would change the state

agency's opinion regarding Plaintiff's medical equivalence was not

unreasonable. The issue of medical equivalence is one reserved to

the Commissioner and the ALJ properly considered all of Plaintiff's

medical evidence.

Thus, the ALJ did not violate Social Security Ruling 96-6p,

nor did he err in finding at step three that Plaintiff's

impairments were not medically equivalent to any section of the

Listing of Impairments. 

III. Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the effects

of all her impairments when assessing her RFC as required by Social

Security Ruling 96-8p. 

Social Security Ruling 96-8p provides: 

In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider only

limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an

individual’s impairments, even those that are not

“severe.” While a “not severe” impairment(s) standing

alone may not significantly limit an individual’s ability

to do basic work activities, it may -- when considered

with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments

–- be critical to the outcome of a claim.

As noted above, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the

RFC for light work, except she could not lift or carry more than

ten pounds at any one time; could not perform repetitive rotation

of her neck or keep her neck in a constant flexed or fixed

position; could not perform keyboarding for more than thirty

minutes in an eight hour workday; could not reach overhead or lift

or carry overhead more than occasionally with her bilateral upper

extremities; and could not perform power gripping or grasping

bilaterally. AR 18. 

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The ALJ based his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC on substantial

evidence in the record. In January, 2006, Dr. Salomon, Plaintiff’s

treating physician, found that, although she should not perform

fine finger movements or push/pull bilaterally, she could return to

work with limited keyboarding. AR 399. In June, 2006, Dr. Zwerin,

an agreed medical examiner, noted that Plaintiff was precluded only

from very heavy lifting, unremitting cervical immobility and/or

maintaining her neck/upper back in a fixed position. AR 349. In

August, 2007, Dr. Salomon indicated that, although Plaintiff

complained of pain in her right hand, she actually had a full range

of motion in her shoulders, elbows, wrists, digits and thumbs. AR

431. In October and November of 2007, respectively, Drs. Braun and

Newkirk opined that Plaintiff should limit her computer work to no

more than thirty minutes per workday, should lift no more than five

to ten pounds and should restrict using her upper extremities for

activities at or above shoulder level. AR 460-61, 472. 

The ALJ considered all of the doctors’ prescribed limitations

for Plaintiff in his RFC determination. Furthermore, although the

doctors recommended limitations on Plaintiff’s activities, no

doctor indicated that Plaintiff was unable to work. Plaintiff has

not set forth, and there is no evidence in the record of, any

functional limitations that the ALJ failed to consider. 

IV. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s step five determination was

flawed because the VE’s answers were unresponsive to the ALJ’s

hypothetical questions, and the VE’s resulting testimony did not

accurately describe the occupations listed in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (DOT), in contravention of Social Security

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Ruling 00-4p.

 Plaintiff contends that the VE’s answer to the ALJ’s

hypothetical question was unresponsive because the VE identified

jobs that required manipulative and reaching requirements identical

to those of her past relevant work. Citing this alleged

inconsistency, Plaintiff concludes that the VE’s testimony that

Plaintiff could perform work as a security guard, ticket taker or

information clerk was unreliable. However, the VE did not testify

that Plaintiff was precluded from her past work on the basis of

manipulative and reaching limitations, but because those jobs

required significant use of the computer. AR 55. The ALJ did not

include any limitation regarding manipulative functions in the

hypothetical question. 

Plaintiff also argues that the VE contradicted the DOT by

disregarding the ten pound lifting limitation because the security

guard and ticket taker positions are categorized as light category

jobs, which require occasional lifting of up to twenty pounds and

frequent lifting of up to ten pounds. DOT (372.667-034 Security

Guard, 344.667-010 Ticket Taker). However, as Defendant points

out, the DOT identifies the security guard and ticket taker

positions as light due to the standing demands, and Plaintiff had

no standing restrictions. 

Pursuant to Social Security Ruling 00-04p, an ALJ is required

to ask a VE about any conflicts between his expert testimony and

the information provided in the DOT. The ALJ complied with this

rule both at the outset of the hearing and during the VE's

testimony. See AR 50 ("If at any time your opinions differ in any

regard from the DOT, please tell me"); AR 56. In view of the fact

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that the jobs the VE identified were classified as “light” and that

Plaintiff could only lift up to ten pounds, the ALJ asked the VE

whether the ten pound lifting limitation would affect the number of

those positions available. The VE testified that Plaintiff’s ten

pound lifting limitation would erode the occupational base by

twenty-five percent, which would mean that there were 6,042

security guard jobs and 441 ticket taker jobs available in the

regional area. Thus, the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s

testimony because the ALJ properly elicited the VE’s explanation of

any conflict between his testimony and the DOT, as required by

Social Security Ruling 00-04p. 

V. Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by concluding that she

was not credible. 

Under the Cotton test, where the claimant has produced

objective medical evidence of an impairment which could reasonably

be expected to produce some degree of pain or other symptoms, and

the record is devoid of any affirmative evidence of malingering,

the ALJ may reject the claimant's testimony regarding the severity

of the claimant's pain or other symptoms only if the ALJ makes

specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing

so. Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); see also

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding the

severity of his or her symptoms is credible, the ALJ may properly

consider: (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such

as the plaintiff's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent

statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the

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plaintiff that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the plaintiff's daily

activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1273.

Assuming that Plaintiff meets the Cotton threshold test, the

ALJ has provided clear and convincing reasons for questioning

Plaintiff's credibility. First, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s

testimony that she engaged in a wide range of daily activities that

included caring for herself and her infant daughter, grocery

shopping, cleaning the house with help from her husband, walking

and driving for up to two hours. AR 16. Plaintiff was also able

to carry her baby “all day.” AR 189. Moreover, not only did

Plaintiff provide her mother with in-home care during the time she

was allegedly disabled, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that

she stopped this work because her baby required more care and

attention, not because of any pain or limitation. AR 16, 53-54. 

Plaintiff cites Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2001), for the proposition that a person need not be “utterly

incapacitated” to be found disabled. But, where a plaintiff

claiming disability is able to spend a substantial part of his or

her day performing physical functions that are transferable to a

work setting, an ALJ may properly discredit his or her allegations

of complete inability to work. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the ALJ’s

determination that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were

consistent with an ability to perform light work was both

reasonable and consistent with the record. 

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ's credibility finding by

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citing Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Plaintiff argues that her

history of efforts to obtain medical treatment, seeking diagnoses

and treatment from more than a dozen doctors and treating sources,

serves to enhance her credibility. 

Despite Plaintiff’s history of seeking medical treatment,

“evidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a

claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra

v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ noted that,

although Plaintiff claimed to suffer from complete impairment, she

received little or no medical care to treat her alleged symptoms,

other than some periodic physical therapy. AR 16. Further, she

took no prescription medication other than over-the-counter

medications such as Tylenol and Ibuprofen for her allegedly

disabling pain. Id.; see Parra, 481 F.3d at 751 (rejecting a

claimant’s subjective complaints of pain because his “physical

ailments were treated with an over-the-counter pain medication”). 

Thus, the ALJ correctly considered the factors set out in Social

Security Ruling 96-7p. 

Plaintiff also cites Social Security Ruling 06-03p to argue

that the ALJ failed to consider that the Workers Compensation Board

found that she was unable to return to her former employment. 

Under Social Security Ruling 06-03p, “evidence of a disability

decision by another governmental or non-governmental agency cannot

be ignored and must be considered.” Although the ALJ made no

specific mention of the Workers Compensation Board’s decision, the

Court finds no error in this omission because he ultimately reached

the same conclusion as the Workers Compensation Board. Both found

that Plaintiff was unable to return to her former employment. 

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Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's subjective complaint

of a “complete inability to work.” 

CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ properly applied the five-step analysis to

conclude that Plaintiff was not disabled, and for the more specific

reasons outlined above, Defendant did not commit reversible error. 

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act was

supported by substantial evidence in the record and was based upon

proper legal standards. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment or remand is DENIED and Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly and close the file. Each party shall bear his or her

own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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