Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05163/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United S!ares Court of Appeals 

fenth Circuit 

MAY 23 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

VERNELL MCKNIGHT, Jr., 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

TOM WHITE, Warden; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, State of 

Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

No. 89-5163 

(D. C. No. 86-C-558-E) 

( N. D. Ok la. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 1 
Vernell McKnight, Jr. (McKnight), a state prisoner, appeals 

pro se the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

We affirm. 

Following the incendiary death of his wife, 1 McKnight was 

charged with first degree murder. He was represented by retained 

counsel. After preliminary hearing, McKnight entered a plea to 

first degree manslaughter in violation of Oklahoma law, and was 

sentenced to life imprisonment. Although McKnight did not file a 

direct appeal, he pursued post conviction relief in the state 

courts, which resulted in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirming the conviction. 

McKnight then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, alleging: (1) the state trial court violated his 

constitutional rights by failing to advise him of the rights he 

would waive in submitting a guilty plea; (2) the state court 

failed to inquire as to the voluntariness of his plea; (3) the 

trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into his past and 

present mental status; (4) the trial court erred in failing to 

1 The evidence in the case established that McKnight's nine-yearold child observed his father douse his mother with gasoline and 

set her on fire inside the family home. McKnight's neighbors 

observed Mrs. McKnight run from their home and that she was "a 

human torch,'' on fire from head to foot. She screamed: "My God, 

My God, I'm dying. Keep him away from me.'' Neighbors 

extinguished her while the other McKnight child was in the yard. 

McKnight exited the home, walked by his wife, who was lying on the 

ground, got into his vehicle, and drove from the scene. At 

preliminary hearing McKnight's counsel stipulated to the cause of 

death. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 2 
send him a copy of his petition; and (5) trial counsel was 

ineffective in advising him not to appeal. 

The United States Magistrate found that because the 

transcript of the plea hearing did not affirmatively demonstrate 

that McKnight was aware of the nature of the offense charged, he 

did not knowingly and voluntarily enter the guilty plea. 2 Based 

on this finding, the magistrate recommended that the application 

for a writ of habeas corpus be granted and that the case be 

remanded to state court for a new plea hearing. The magistrate 

further found McKnight's other contentions non-meritorious. 

The State of Oklahoma then filed a request for an evidentiary 

hearing and brief in support accompanied by an affidavit of 

McKnight's trial counsel. On October 2, 1987, the district court 

issued an order directing the magistrate to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing on the issue of whether McKnight's plea of guilty was 

knowing and voluntary. 

The hearing was held on November 5, 1987. The State of 

Oklahoma called as witnesses both the attorney who prosecuted the 

case and the attorney who defended McKnight. Counsel for McKnight 

called as witnesses both McKnight and his mother. The evidence at 

2 At the plea hearing, the state court judge asked McKnight: "Do 

you wish to waive your right to a trial by the court and enter a 

plea of guilty to the first degree manslaughter in a cruel and 

unusual way?" McKnight responded: "I do." The judge also asked 

McKnight: "Are you guilty of manslaughter, first degree in a 

cruel and unusual way?" and McKnight responded: "Yes, to a 

certain degree." 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 3 
the hearing established that the attorney who represented McKnight 

on the first-degree murder case had practiced criminal law since 

1958, had represented clients in fifty to eighty capital cases, 

and had defended at trial thirty of those cases. He testified 

that during the representation of McKnight, he discussed the case 

with his client between six and twelve times, both before and 

after the preliminary hearing. He further testified that after he 

heard the damaging testimony at preliminary hearing, he engaged in 

ongoing plea negotiations with the prosecutor in an effort to 

avoid having the case evolve into a capital case. The attorney 

testified that he discussed with McKnight the possibility of a 

death sentence in this case, 3 the inapplicability of available 

defenses, and the significance of McKnight's criminal record, 

which included convictions for arson. The attorney also recalled 

discussing McKnight's contention that he did not intend to kill 

his wife, but only frighten her and the flames "just went up." 

The attorney discussed intent with his client and advised McKnight 

that his proposed theory of defense was not viable in light of the 

other damaging evidence. He recommended to his client that he 

plead to first degree manslaughter with the provision for a life 

sentence. He told McKnight that the charge was a homicide 

committed in a cruel and unusual manner. In his opinion the plea 

agreement was in his client's best interests and his client 

understood the plea and the agreement. Further, he testified that 

3 The prosecutor testified that he contemplated pursuing the 

death penalty in this case, and that before preliminary hearing he 

communicated that fact to the defense counsel handling McKnight's 

case. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 4 
in his opinion a factual basis existed for the plea and also for 

first degree murder, although he recalled that McKnight stated 

that he was not guilty of any crime above second degree 

manslaughter, and a four-year sentence should apply. The attorney 

recalled telling McKnight the prosecutor would consider such a 

proposal "ludicrous." 

The magistrate concluded, in part, as follows: 

From the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing 

held in this matter, it was clearly demonstrated that 

petitioner was aware of the nature and consequences of 

his plea and that a factual basis for such plea existed. 

The magistrate recommended the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be denied. The district court adopted the findings and 

recommendations of the magistrate, and dismissed the petition. 

In this appeal, McKnight asserts: (1) the judgment finding 

that he entered his guilty plea with full knowledge of the nature 

and consequences thereof was clearly erroneous; (2) the judgment 

of the trial court finding adequate the factual basis for 

McKnight's guilty plea was clearly erroneous; (3) McKnight was 

prejudiced by the magistrate and the district court judge; (4) the 

order granting the second evidentiary hearing over McKnight's 

objections violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 

Clause; (5) the order adopting the findings and recommendations of 

the second report of the magistrate is in violation of Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 as well as the Equal Protection Clause; and (6) the 

trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. The only issues 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 5 
meriting discussion are those regarding McKnight's entry of a 

guilty plea in state court to the charge of manslaughter in the 

first degree. We have considered the remaining issues raised by 

McKnight, and find them to be without merit. 

First we address McKnight's contention that the magistrate's 

judgment finding that he entered his guilty plea with full 

knowledge of the nature and consequences thereof was "clearly 

erroneous." We disagree. 

We readily acknowledge that the transcript of the plea 

hearing reveals that the state court judge did not advise McKnight 

of the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty. This 

fact, however, does not defeat the plea. In order for a guilty 

plea to be entered knowingly and intelligently, the defendant must 

be reasonably informed of the nature of the charges against him, 

the factual basis underlying those charges, and the legal options 

and alternatives that are available. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 

U.S. 238 (1969). Ordinarily, the judge taking the plea reiterates 

advisements immediately before taking the plea in order to insure 

the propriety thereof. The judge in the instant case failed to do 

so. 

However, even where a record fails to demonstrate that the 

plea was intelligent and voluntary, reversal is not required if 

the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea is proved at a 

post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Sena v. Romero, 617 F.2d 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 6 
579, 580 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Pricepaul, 540 

F.2d 417, 422-24 (9th Cir. 1976)), and see Townsend v. Sain, 372 

U.S. 293 (1963). Further, the plea may be determined voluntary 

and intelligent where the proof reveals the attorney and not the 

court informed the defendant of the elements of the crime in 

question. In Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 944 (11th Cir. 

1986), the Eleventh Circuit wrote: 

Due process does not require that the defendant, in 

pleading guilty, be informed of each element of the crime 

in question at the plea hearing. The defendant may 

receive detailed information about the elements of the 

offense beforehand. Most commonly, his attorney provides 

such information. Thus, for a plea to be knowing and 

voluntary, the defendant must be informed of the elements 

of the offense either at the plea hearing or on some 

prior occasion, and he must understand them. 

(Emphasis and citations omitted.) Citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 

U.S. 637, 647 (1976), the Second Circuit in Oppel v. Meachum, 851 

F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 266 (1988), held 

that it was appropriate to presume that petitioner's attorney 

informed him of the elements of the crime prior to the time he 

tendered his plea. In the instant case, the voluntariness and 

intelligence of the plea was proved at the evidentiary hearing 

through the testimony of McKnight's attorney, who testified that 

he specifically advised his client prior to the entry of the plea 

that second-degree manslaughter was a homicide committed in a 

cruel and unusual manner, and that he also explained intent to his 

client. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding that 

McKnight entered his guilty plea with full knowledge of the nature 

and consequences thereof. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 7 
McKnight next argues that the trial court clearly erred in 

finding an adequate factual basis for McKnight's guilty plea. He 

claims that the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel lied at 

the hearing before the magistrate; the state court testimony 

contradicts these witnesses; and the record contains no credible 

evidence except the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. We 

have reviewed the record in this case, and are unpersuaded by 

McKnight's assertions. 

At the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate, the 

attorney representing McKnight testified that in his opinion, a 

factual basis for the plea existed at the time his client entered 

the plea. The attorney who prosecuted the case testified at 

length about the testimony adduced at preliminary hearing. Based 

upon the testimony and the record before him, the magistrate 

concluded that a factual basis for the plea existed, and we 

concur. 

We further note that this is not a case where a petitioner 

proclaims his innocence. 4 He merely claims the ignition was 

accidental. In our view, this issue merges with our treatment of 

the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea. If McKnight 

voluntarily and knowingly plead guilty, with an understanding of 

intent as explained by counsel, he cannot now claim that the plea 

entered was without factual basis therefor. 

4 This case presents no issue of a plea entered under North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). Rather, McKnight 

entered his plea simply to a lesser included offense. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5163 Document: 01019970288 Date Filed: 05/23/1990 Page: 8 
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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