Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-07012/USCOURTS-caDC-10-07012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2011 Decided April 15, 2011

No. 10-7012

ANDREA PETERSON,

APPELLANT

v.

ARCHSTONE COMMUNITIES LLC, FORMERLY KNOWN AS

ARCHSTONE-SMITH TRUST,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01326)

Andrea Peterson, appearing pro se, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant. 

Nancy N. Delogu argued the cause for appellee. With her

on the brief was S. Libby Henninger.

Before: GARLAND, GRIFFITH, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 1 of 7
-2-

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The district court dismissed

Andrea Peterson’s pro se complaint against Archstone

Properties because she was absent from a single motions

hearing. The court had not previously found Peterson

disobedient or dilatory, did not attempt lesser sanctions, and

failed to explain why the case-ending sanction of dismissal was

necessary. Because such a disposition is inconsistent with our

precedent, we vacate the dismissal order and remand for further

proceedings.

I

Peterson applied for positions with Archstone in November

2006 and October 2007. After Archstone declined to hire her,

Peterson, acting pro se, sued Archstone for alleged violations of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.

§ 621 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act,

D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. In October 2009, the case was

referred to a magistrate judge to resolve a number of discovery

disputes. The magistrate scheduled a hearing for “arguments on

Archstone’s emergency motion to quash deposition notices and

for a protective order, its motion to compel plaintiff’s deposition

and for sanctions, and on plaintiff’s motion for a protective

order.” Peterson v. Archstone, 677 F. Supp. 2d 167, 167

(D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitted). At Peterson’s request, the

magistrate judge rescheduled the hearing and, on November 2,

2009, entered a minute order confirming that it would proceed

the next day as rescheduled. Peterson notified the courtroom

deputy by telephone that she would not attend. Archstone’s

counsel appeared at the hearing; Peterson did not. 

Thereafter, the magistrate judge advised the district court of

Peterson’s failure to appear, and the court issued an Order to

Show Cause why the suit should not be dismissed for lack of

prosecution. Peterson responded -- as she had in her message to

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 2 of 7
-3-

the courtroom deputy -- that she believed that motions she had

previously filed for a change of venue and for the magistrate

judge’s recusal remained pending and operated to suspend all

proceedings and cancel the discovery hearing. The district court

found this contention unpersuasive. Peterson, 677 F. Supp. 2d

at 168. The court pointed out that it had denied both motions,

and that although Peterson had filed a notice of intent to seek

reconsideration, she had not actually filed for reconsideration by

the time of the hearing. Moreover, the court noted, she “cite[d]

to no rule, statute, case or order that filing a motion to change

venue or for recusal or filing a notice of intent to seek

reconsideration operates to suspend or cancel a hearing ordered

by the court.” Id. Declaring that Peterson’s “failure to appear

inconvenienced the Court and caused the opposing party to incur

costs associated with its appearance,” the district court

dismissed the suit for lack of prosecution. Id.

II

District courts have inherent power to dismiss a case sua

sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or otherwise comply

with a court order. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,

629 (1962); see also FED.R.CIV. P. 41(b); D.D.C.LOCAL RULE 

83.23. This court reviews such dismissals for abuse of

discretion. Gardner v. United States, 211 F.3d 1305, 1308 (D.C.

Cir. 2000). Although we are “hesitant to type the exercise of a

district court’s dismissal authority as an abuse of discretion,”

Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir.

1990), the court must “explain why the harsh sanction of

dismissal was necessary under the circumstances of th[e] case,”

English-Speaking Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C.

Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[b]ecause disposition of claims on the

merits is favored[,] . . . the harsh sanction of dismissal for failure

to prosecute is ordinarily limited to cases involving egregious

conduct by particularly dilatory plaintiffs, after ‘less dire

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 3 of 7
-4-

alternatives’ have been tried without success.” Noble v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 71 Fed. App’x 69, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting

Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc., 759 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir.

1985)); see Gardner, 211 F.3d at 1308-09; Shea v. Donohoe

Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Camps v. C

& P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Peterson’s failure to appear at a single motions hearing

cannot fairly be described as “egregious conduct.” See Noble,

71 Fed. App’x at 69. Here, as in other cases in which we have

vacated dismissals, “there is no evidence in the record of ‘bad

faith, deliberate misconduct, or tactical delay.’” Gardner, 211

F.3d at 1309 (quoting Trakas, 759 F.2d at 188). The fact that

“the district court did not identify any prior instance of

misconduct on [the plaintiff’s] part . . . argues in favor of

reversal.” Id.

Archstone contends that Peterson’s failure to appear

“resulted in significant prejudice to Archstone as it was unable

to move forward with the litigation” and because it had

“expended resources preparing for and attending the discovery

hearing.” Appellee Br. 14-15. But to warrant dismissal, the

prejudice to the opposing party “must be ‘so severe[] as to make

it unfair to require the other party to proceed with the case.’” 

Gardner, 211 F.3d at 1309 (quoting Shea, 795 F.2d at 1074). 

The district court did not find -- and Archstone does not even

contend -- that Archstone’s costs in connection with that single

discovery hearing, or any delay arising from Peterson’s failure

to appear, met that standard.

Archstone does maintain that Peterson was a dilatory

plaintiff who “refused to follow the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure in the conduct of her discovery,” Appellee Br. 16, and

who submitted baseless motions “largely in disregard for the

Court’s rules or procedures,” id. at 1. But if that was true, the

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 4 of 7
-5-

district court did not say so -- either in its dismissal order or at

any other place in the record that has been cited to us. Indeed,

as Peterson herself aptly pointed out during the appellate

argument, there is record evidence to the contrary. In a pleading

opposing Peterson’s motion for appointment of counsel to

represent her in the district court, Archstone advised the court as

follows: “[C]ounsel for Archstone has observed that Ms.

Peterson has, to date, ably drafted and responded to motions,

participated in discovery conferences, and otherwise capably

represented herself in this matter.” Mem. in Opp. to Plaintiff’s

Mot. for Counsel at 2 (June 25, 2009). And the district court, in

denying Peterson’s motion for appointment of counsel, found

that her “motions display not only a workable familiarity with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this

Court, but also her ability to represent herself adequately.” 

Mem. Op. at 2 (Sept. 8, 2009).

Nor did the court try “less dire alternatives” before resorting

to dismissal. Noble, 71 Fed. App’x at 69; see Gardner, 211 F.3d

at 1309 (“[T]he sua sponte dismissal of a lawsuit on the merits

is a drastic step, normally to be taken only after unfruitful resort

to lesser sanctions.” (citations omitted)); see also Bristol

Petroleum, 901 F.2d at 167 (“As a rule[,] . . . dismissal is in

order only when lesser sanctions would not serve the interest of

justice.”). Archstone contends that “[t]he District Court was

limited in the types of sanctions it could impose, as Ms. Peterson

is proceeding in forma pauperis and, thus, cannot be held

financially responsible for her abuse of the discovery process.” 

Appellee Br. 11-12. But even if financial sanctions were

unavailable, the court had other intermediate alternatives at its

disposal. It could, for example, have treated Peterson’s failure

to appear as conceding the discovery disputes that were the

subject of the hearing she missed. Such a sanction would have

eliminated any prejudice that Archstone suffered: its prejudice

did not arise from expending money to prepare for the hearing,

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 5 of 7
-6-

but from losing the opportunity to benefit from that preparation. 

Such a sanction would also have eliminated any inconvenience

Archstone (or the court) suffered from the delay attendant to

Peterson’s failure to appear: defaulting Peterson with respect to

the discovery motions would have permitted accelerated

progress toward final disposition of the case. Of course, the

court could also have considered the still lesser alternative of

simply warning Peterson that any future failure to appear would

result in dismissal.

Finally, Archstone insists that dismissal was appropriate

because this court found that “[s]imilar conduct . . . justif[ied] an

involuntary dismissal” in Wooten v. Premier Yachts, Inc.,

No.00-7127, 2000 WL 1683500 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 18, 2000). 

Appellee Br. 17. But the conduct in Wooten was not similar. 

There, we upheld a dismissal order based not only on

“appellant’s failure to appear at [a] status conference,” but also

on “her refusal to participate in discovery, and the filing of

baseless motions even after the district court warned of the

consequences.” 2000 WL 1683500, at *1 (emphasis added).

Here, the district court did not find that Peterson had refused to

participate in discovery or had filed baseless motions. 

Moreover, it is undisputed that the district court did not warn the

pro se plaintiff of the consequence of failing to appear. See

Camps, 692 F.2d at 123 (“[A] pro se litigant, who may not fully

understand the importance of precise compliance with court

directives[,] . . . should not be treated more harshly than litigants

who have the funds to retain lawyers to advise and represent

them.”). “[D]eterrence . . . justifies dismissals when there is

some indication that the client or attorney consciously fails to

comply with a court order cognizant of the drastic

ramifications.” Gardner, 211 F.3d at 1309. But “[a]bsent such

advance warning,” dismissal is unwarranted. Id. at 1309

(quoting Camps, 692 F.2d at 125).

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 6 of 7
-7-

III

For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s

January 4, 2010 order dismissing Peterson’s civil action and

remand the case for further proceedings. Peterson’s pleadings

suggest that, if remanded, this case should go to different district

and magistrate judges, on the ground that both are prejudiced

against her. But while we have found error, we have found

absolutely no evidence of prejudice, or even the appearance of

prejudice, on the part of either the district or magistrate judge. 

No “reasonable and informed observer would question [either]

judge’s impartiality,” District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888,

899 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting SEC v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc.,

392 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2004)), and we therefore deny the

appellant’s suggestion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #10-7012 Document #1303433 Filed: 04/15/2011 Page 7 of 7