Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01375/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01375-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338pt Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,

 Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

 Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv1375-DMS-MDD

ORDER ON JOINT MOTION FOR 

DETERMINATION OF 

DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

REGARDING DOCUMENTS 

PRODUCED AFTER THE CLOSE 

OF FACT DISCOVERY AND 

PORTIONS OF THE REBUTTAL 

EXPERT REPORT OF STEPHEN 

PROWSE

[ECF No. 454]

BACKGROUND

Before the Court is the Joint Motion of the parties for determination of 

a discovery dispute filed on November 13, 2018. (ECF No. 454). The Joint 

Motion presents Qualcomm’s motion to strike certain documents and the 

portions of the rebuttal expert report of Stephen Prowse relying on those 

documents. The documents consist of three letters regarding potential 

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settlement terms. Apple did not disclose these documents during fact 

discovery, despite at least one Request for Production requiring such 

disclosure, and the documents were used by Mr. Prowse in forming an 

opinion regarding damages. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to obtain 

discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 

defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). “Information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in 

evidence to be discoverable.” Id. District courts have broad discretion to 

limit discovery where the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or 

duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more 

convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 

Without awaiting a discovery request, a party must disclose, among 

other things, “a copy . . . of all documents . . . that the disclosing party has in 

its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or 

defenses . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). A party also must disclose, 

without a discovery request:

a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing 

party – who must also make available for inspection and copying as under 

Rule 34 the documents . . . on which each computation is based, including 

materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). A party also must supplement or correct its 

disclosures in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material 

respect the disclosure is incomplete or incorrect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).

A party may request the production of any document within the scope of 

Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response 

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must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as 

requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Rule

34(b)(2)(B). If the responding party chooses to produce responsive 

information, rather than allow for inspection, the production must be 

completed no later than the time specified in the request or another 

reasonable time specified in the response. Id. An objection must state 

whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that 

objection. Rule 34(b)(2)(C). An objection to part of a request must specify the 

part and permit inspection or production of the rest. Id. The responding 

party is responsible for all items in “the responding party’s possession, 

custody, or control.” Rule 34(a)(1). Actual possession, custody or control is 

not required. Rather, “[a] party may be ordered to produce a document in the 

possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain the 

document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the 

document.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 620 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

DISCUSSION

Failure to Disclose (Rule 26(a))

There seems little doubt that the letters should have been disclosed 

either under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) or (iii). They were used to support a claim for 

damages by Apple. Apple’s assertion that because Qualcomm also had the 

letters in its possession obviated its disclosure obligations is unavailing. The 

issue is whether Apple intended to rely on the letters to support its claims or 

defenses or in support of its damage computations. A party does not get a 

free pass on its disclosure obligations because the opposing party also has the 

documents. The question is a party’s intent to rely on the documents. The 

Court finds that Apple was required to disclose these letters under Rule 26(a) 

once it decided to rely on them. 

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It may be that Apple did not intend initially to rely on these letters so 

its failure to disclose the letters in its original disclosures is justified. But, 

once Apple provided the letters to Mr. Prowse for him to consider in creating 

his opinions regarding damages, the duty to supplement under Rule 26(e) 

kicked in. The letters were not produced until Apple served Mr. Prowse’s 

rebuttal expert report. 

Failure to Produce (Rule 34))

Apple refused to produce these letters in response to Qualcomm’s 

Request for Production No. 51 which called for all communications and 

documents concerning negotiations for licenses or settlements regarding the 

accused functionalities. (ECF No. 454 at 4). Apple objected at the time, and 

persists in its objection today that it was under no obligation to produce 

documents already in Qualcomm’s possession. That objection is frivolous 

unless supported by a claim of undue burden. There often is evidentiary 

value in having an opposing party produce a document that the requesting 

party already has. The value is not in what the document necessary says, 

but in the fact that the opposing party has it. That objection is 

OVERRULED. 

There is also a dispute regarding a purported agreement between the 

parties regarding the relevance of documents reflecting negotiations for 

portfolio licenses. That there is a dispute over the agreement suggests that 

there was no meeting of the minds. The Court is no position to determine the 

scope of that purported agreement and its effect on this dispute.

Regardless, Apple refused to produce any documents potentially covered 

by Fed. R. Ev. 408 which renders inadmissible communications regarding 

compromise to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or 

to impeach. This objection also is frivolous – Rule 408 governs admissibility, 

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not discovery. 

The duty to supplement provided at Rule 26(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., also 

applies to responses to requests for production.

Sanctions

Having failed to supplement its initial disclosures and its response to 

Request for Production No. 51, the Court must consider sanctions against 

Apple. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) requires the Court to consider sanctions unless 

the failure to supplement was “substantially justified or is harmless.” Apple 

offers nothing in support of substantial justification other than it did not 

know that its rebuttal expert would rely on the letters. Having provided the 

letters to the expert, Apple’s argument is disingenuous and unavailing. 

The question of harmlessness is more challenging. Qualcomm asserts it 

is prejudiced because it now has no opportunity to propound follow-on 

discovery requests, take fact deposition testimony on the documents or have 

them considered by its own experts. (ECF No. 454 at 11). Apple responds 

that there is no prejudice because Qualcomm has and has had the documents 

all along, putting this case in a different light than in cases where the 

documents previously were unknown. (Id. at 15-16). 

The Court finds that the failure to disclose is not harmless. To the 

extent that Mr. Prowse refers to or relies on these letters in his rebuttal 

expert report, those references and opinions are stricken. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2019

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