Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01252/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01252-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MOOTRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. G. FLORES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01252-LJO-BAM PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 64)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN

DAYS

I. Background

Plaintiff Michael Mootry (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 20, 2009. This action is

proceeding on the second amended complaint, filed on May 1, 2012, against Defendants Hedgpeth,

Flores, Wegman, Lewis and Cabrera for denial of Jumu’ah services in violation of the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment. 

On July 5, 2012, Defendants Hedgpeth, Flores, Lewis and Wegman filed a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim and for qualified immunity. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The

motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 

II. Second Amended Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff is a Muslim prisoner who was incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”)

from June 2006 through July 20, 2010. In December 2007, Defendant Hedgpeth enforced a KVSP

Department of Operations Manual (“DOM”) Supplement, which almost completely abolished the

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Muslim inmates’ rights and ability to practice their religion. Defendant Hedgpeth implemented a

policy banning inmate ministers from leading religious services without the direct supervision of a

hired chaplain or volunteer. From October 2007 until April 2009, KVSP Muslim inmates were not

accommodated with a hired chaplain to supervise Jumu’ah prayer services. 

In March 2008, Defendant E.G. Flores, active warden and head of religious programming on

“A” yard at KVSP, officially abolished Jumu’ah prayer services for Muslims, including Plaintiff. 

Defendant Flores enforced the ban on inmate ministers. Prior to that time, inmate minister Earnest

Granberry was permitted to lead the Muslims in services with only correctional guard supervision. 

On March 28, 2008, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal regarding denial of his rights to

Jumu’ah prayer services and to a Muslim chaplain or inmate minister. The KVSP appeals

coordinator improperly screened out his appeal. 

On August 4, 2008, Plaintiff was ordered to resubmit his appeal on a new form. Plaintiff

resubmitted his appeal on August 6, 2008. On September 28, 2008, Defendant Wegman interviewed

Plaintiff. Defendant M. Cabrera was present during the interview. 

Defendant Wegman partiallygranted Plaintiff’s appeal at the first level, stating that Jumu’ah

services were scheduled for Friday at noon. Plaintiff objected to the response on that grounds that

Jumu’ah services were not being conducted and that Defendant Wegman evaded the issue of an

inmate minister being allowed to conduct Jumu’ah services in the absence of a chaplain or volunteer. 

On December 5, 2008, Defendant Lewis partially granted Plaintiff’s appeal at the second

level. Defendant Lewis admitted that KVSP only had a Jewish Rabbi to conduct services for

Jumu’ah on Friday, but the Rabbi did not work on Fridays due to religious beliefs. Defendant Lewis

stated that when it was determined that a chaplain could not be obtained, then KVSP would

accommodate Plaintiff’s spiritual needs. 

On December 28, 2008, Plaintiff requested a Director’s level review of his appeal. Plaintiff

objected to Defendant Lewis’ response because it evaded the fact that Jumu’ah services were still

being denied him and the law regarding inmate ministers was not being adhered to. On March 9,

2009, N. Grannis provided a Director’s level response, claiming she spoke to Defendant Wegman

who told her that only one hired chaplain is employed at KVSP (the Jewish Rabbi) and that there

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should be a Muslim chaplain hired in the near future. Defendant Wegman also told her that

volunteers had discontinued volunteering for personal reasons. N. Grannis denied Plaintiff’s appeal. 

III. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally considers

only the pleadings and must accept as true the allegations in the complaint. Marder v. Lopez, 450

F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006); Shaver v. Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund, 332

F.3d 1198, 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002). A court may consider evidence that the complaint relies on,

where the complaint refers to a document that is central to the complaint and no party questions the

authenticity of the document. Marder, 450 F.3d at 448; see United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,

908 (9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, the court is to “construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those

drafted by attorneys. Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342. 

A motion to dismissfor failure to state a claim is properly granted where the complaint lacks

“a cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotingBalistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). While accepting factual allegations in the

complaint as true, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true, and the factual

allegations must state a plausible claim for relief. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067-68

(9th Cir. 2011). 

IV. Argument

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants contend that dismissal is appropriate because they had no direct or causal

connection to Plaintiff’s claims aside from their involvement in the grievance process and they are

entitled to qualified immunity. 

B. Discussion

1. Free Exercise

“Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that

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no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348,

107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free

Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s

religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with

his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732,

736 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

a. Defendants Hedgpeth and Flores

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim against Warden Hedgpeth and Active

Warden Flores based on supervisory liability. “It has long been clearly established that

‘[s]upervisoryliabilityis imposed against a supervisoryofficial in his individual capacityfor his own

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, for his

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” Preschooler II v. Davis, 479 F.3d

1175, 1183 (9th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). A supervisor, such as the warden, may be liable under

section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citation

omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970,

128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Indeed, “[s]upervisory liability exists even without overt personal

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the

policy “itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights” and is “the moving force of the constitutional

violation.” Redman. 942 F.2d at 1146 (citations omitted). 

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Warden Hedgpeth or

Assistant Warden Flores were personally involved in any deprivation or that they implemented

wrongful policies. As found in the court's prior order of service, a liberal reading of Plaintiff's

complaint demonstrates that he properly states a cognizable claim against Defendants Hedgpeth and

Flores for implementing and enforcing policies that essentially abolished Jumu’ah prayer services.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendants knew or

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reasonably should have known that the policy would cause a denial of Jumu’ah services. In so

arguing, Defendants contend that the policy itself provides for a number of qualified individuals to

supervise inmate religious activities and the prohibition on inmates leading religious services

themselves exists only to the extent that inmates want to lead such services in the facility chapel

without direct supervision of a facility Chaplain or Volunteer. Ex. A to Sec. Amend. Compl., DOM

Supplement 101060.6.4., p. 4 (“No inmate will be authorized or allowed to conduct or lead any

religious services, classes, or groups of any kind in the facility chapels, without being under the

direct supervision of a facility chaplain or authorized volunteer.” ) Defendants’ argument apparently

overlooks Plaintiff’s allegations that neither a Chaplain nor a volunteer were available to either lead

or to supervise Jumu’ah services and that the policy was implemented generally to preclude inmates

from leading Jumu’ah services. Sec. Amend. Compl. pp. 3-4. 

Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that Defendant Flores was

aware of any deprivation occurring or personallytook anyaction to denyPlaintiff’s rights. However,

Plaintiff clearly alleges that Defendant Flores officially abolished Jumu’ah prayer services for

Muslims, including Plaintiff. Sec. Amend. Compl. p. 4 Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

support a claim that Defendant Flores burdened his practice of Jumu’ah by preventing him from

attending prayer services. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

Hedgpeth and Flores should be denied.

b. Defendant Wegman

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s own evidence demonstrates that he cannot state a claim

against Defendant Wegman because Defendant Wegman partially granted his appeal and was

“responsive” to Plaintiff’s concerns by telling Plaintiff that KVSP was in the process of hiring a new

Muslim chaplain and the Jewish chaplain could provide Plaintiff services in the meantime. (ECF

No. 64, p. 9; Ex. D to Sec. Amend. Compl.) 

Discovery and summary judgment motions - not motions to dismiss- “define disputed facts”

and “dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). “‘The

issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

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evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is

very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the

claim . . . .’”) (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001)). As previously stated,

on a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true, Marder,

450 F.3d at 448, and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor, Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 340.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant C. Wegman, the Community Partnership

Manager (“CPM”), interviewed Plaintiff in connection with his inmate appeal. Plaintiff explained

to Defendant Wegman that his rights to Jumu’ah were being denied due to the lack of a Muslim

Chaplain to conduct services and the refusal to appoint an inmate minister while KVSP did not have

a hired chaplain or volunteer to supervise Jumu’ah. Defendant Wegman partiallygranted his appeal,

admitting that KVSP did not have a Muslim Chaplain, but that Jumu’ah services were scheduled for

Fridays at noon. Plaintiff objected to Defendant Wegman’s response because Jumu’ah services were

still not being conducted and Defendant Wegman evaded the issue of an inmate minister being

allowed to conduct Jumu’ah in the absence of a chaplain or volunteer. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Wegman had the authority, as CPM and head of religious programming, to ensure that

Plaintiff’s religious practice was not needlessly and intentionally burdened. (Sec. Amend. Compl.

pp. 6-7, 16-20; Exhibit D to Sec. Amend. Compl.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Wegman

told N. Grannis that there was no Muslim chaplain and volunteers had stopped volunteering. (Sec.

Amend. Compl. p. 8.) 

Construing the allegations in a light favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that he has alleged

Defendant Wegman knew that he was not allowed to participate in or to attend Jumu’ah services on

Fridays in the absence of a Muslim chaplain or volunteer, that this lack of participation was ongoing

and that Defendant Wegman had the authority to correct it. As the Court previously determined, 

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

against Defendant Wegman. Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Wegman should be denied. 

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c. Defendant Lewis

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot state a claim against Defendant Lewis because

Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that Defendant Lewis had any involvement in the Yard A

religious services other than his review of Plaintiff’s grievance. Defendants also contend that

Defendant Lewis was responsive to Plaintiff’s grievance and there are no allegations that

Defendant Lewis was aware that Plaintiff could not attend Jumu’ah services. 

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lewis responded to his

grievance by stating that volunteers sometimes volunteered to conduct services, that the hired

Rabbi did not conduct services on Friday, and that when it was clear that spiritual leaders could

not be obtained, then accommodations would be made. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant

Lewis had the authority to accommodate Plaintiff, but failed to address Plaintiff’s issue that

KVSP was denying him religious services by not obtaining an authority figure who could

supervise Jumu’ah services and by denying Plaintiff an inmate minister to lead him in Jumu’ah

services in the absence of a hired chaplain. (Sec. Amend. Compl. pp. 19-21.) 

As this Court previously determined, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Lewis partially

granted Plaintiff’s appeal, was aware that Muslim inmates were being denied access to Jumu’ah

services, and failed to act to correct the violation while having the authority to do so states a

cognizable claim for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Shakur,

514 F.3d at 884-85. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Defendant Lewis should

be denied. 

2. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were

reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials from civil liability where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102

S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (citations

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omitted). To determine if an official is entitled to qualified immunity the court uses a two part

inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001) overruled in part by

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. at 818. The court determines if the facts as

alleged state a violation of a constitutional right and if the right is clearly established so that a

reasonable official would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Ashcroft, 131 S.Ct. at

2080. This does not require that the same factual situation must have been decided, but that

existing precedent would establish the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Id. at

2083; Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011). The inquiry as to whether the right

was clearly established is “solely a question of law for the judge.” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d

1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t., 556 F.3d 1075,

1085 (9th Cir. 2009)). District courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding

which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of

the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. at 818.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because none of their

actions amounted to a constitutional violation. (ECF No. 64, p. 13.) At this stage of the action,

Defendants’ argument is unsupported given the Court’s determination that Plaintiff has stated

claims against them for violations under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims because

reasonable prison staff could have believed that Defendants’ conduct was not unlawful. 

However, Plaintiff has alleged a complete denial of his access to Jumu’ah services. At a basic

level, a denial of access to such services would violate the clearly established protections of the

Free Exercise Clause. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. Accordingly, there is no basis to determine,

at this stage, that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, filed July 5, 2012, be

DENIED; and

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon qualified immunity be DENIED

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without prejudice.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

fourteen (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may

file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 25, 2013 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe 

10c20k UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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