Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01711/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01711-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marwan Handsome, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Conrad M. Graber, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-13-01711-PHX-JAT (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Marwan Handsome (Petitioner) has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner claims that the loss of his good time credits 

violated due process. Respondents have filed a Response arguing that Petitioner’s claim 

lacks merit. (Doc. 8 at 6.) Petitioner has replied. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons set forth 

below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Background 

 A. Guilty Plea and Sentence

On September 9, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 

Felon in Possession of a Firearm. (Doc. 8, Ex. A; Doc. 8-1 at 8.)1

 He was sentenced to a 

term of eighty-four months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. 

(Id. at 9-10.) Petitioner began serving his sentence at Federal Correctional Institution-

 

1

 Exhibit A to Respondent’s Answer is the Declaration of Catherine Smithers. 

There are several attachments to the Smithers declaration. For ease of reference, the 

Court uses the CM/ECF document (Doc. 8-1) and page numbers to refer to the Smithers 

declaration and the attachments. 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Gilmer (FCI-Gilmer) in Glenville, West Virginia, and is currently incarcerated at Federal 

Correctional Institution-Phoenix (FCI-Phoenix) in Phoenix, Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 1.) 

Petitioner has a projected release date of January 23, 2016. (Doc. 8-1 at 15.) 

B. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

 In the pending habeas petition, Petitioner raises one ground for relief asserting that 

his due process rights were violated during disciplinary hearings because the reporting 

officer falsified the date of the initial report, and he was convicted of the violation despite 

presenting witness testimony that he did not commit the offense.2

 (Doc. 1 at 1.) As a 

result, Petitioner lost twenty-seven days of good time credits. (Doc. 8-1 at 25.) 

Petitioner asks the Court to expunge the incident report and restore his good time credits. 

(Doc. 1 at 9.) 

II. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim 

 A. The Disciplinary Proceedings and Administrative Appeals

 On July 5, 2011, FCI-Gilmer officials initiated disciplinary proceedings against 

Petitioner after he was involved in an incident with a correctional officer. (Doc. 8-1 at 

19.) According to the correctional officer, Petitioner walked up a stairwell, approached 

the officer in a “threatening manner” and asked, “What would you do if I just knocked 

your ass out?” (Id.) The correctional officer reported the threat to the Operation 

Lieutenant and wrote an incident report the same day. (Id. at 19, 23.) The incident report 

charged Petitioner with violating Code 203, Threatening Another with Bodily Harm. (Id. 

at 20.) The correctional officer, however, did not sign the report. (Id. at 4) The incident 

report was “suspended” to await the correctional officer’s signature. (Id.) 

 The correctional officer signed the report on July 11, 2011, and the report was 

released to a lieutenant to investigate the incident. (Id. at 20.) The lieutenant delivered 

the incident report to Petitioner, advised Petitioner of his rights, and conducted an 

interview. (Id.) During the interview Petitioner denied talking to the correctional officer. 

 

2

 There is no dispute that Petitioner exhausted all available administrative 

remedies before filing the petition. (Doc. 1 at 4; see also Doc. 8 at 2.) 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Id. at 19.) Petitioner claimed that he was talking to another inmate who was also in the 

stairwell, Leroy Kelley3

. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner asked that Kelley be called as a witness 

when appropriate. (Id.) 

 The Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) held a disciplinary hearing on July 13, 

2011. (Id. at 19.) At the hearing, Petitioner testified that he was talking to Kelley, not 

the correctional officer, and was “just messing around” with Kelley. (Id.) Based on the 

seriousness of the charge, the UDC referred the matter to a Discipline Hearing Officer 

(DHO) for further review. (Id.) 

 On August 5, 2011, Petitioner appeared at a hearing before a DHO and waived his 

right to a staff representative, but called Kelley as a witness. (Id. at 23.) At the hearing, 

Petitioner stated that he asked inmate Kelley, “What would you do if I knocked you out?” 

(Id.) Petitioner also stated that he and Kelley were standing at the top of the stairwell and 

that he never threatened the correctional officer. (Id.) Kelley stated that he and 

Petitioner were standing at the bottom, not the top, of the stairwell. (Id. at 24.) Kelley 

also stated that he asked Petitioner, “What would you do if I knocked you out?” and that 

Petitioner replied, “What would you do if I knocked the C.O. [correctional officer] out?” 

(Id.) Kelley added that he and the Petitioner were “joking amongst themselves” and that 

neither inmate threatened the correctional officer. (Id.) 

 The DHO found Petitioner’s and Kelley’s statements “questionable” and noted 

that Petitioner provided no evidence (other than his own denial) that he did not threaten 

the correctional officer. (Id. at 25) The DHO upheld the charge and revoked twentyseven days of Petitioner’s “good conduct time.” (Id.) The DHO also sanctioned 

Petitioner to ten days of disciplinary segregation, with another twenty days of 

disciplinary segregation suspended, and revoked his commissary and telephone privileges 

for ninety days. (Id.) Respondents assert that Petitioner received the DHO’s report on 

August 31, 2011. (Id. at 30.) 

 

3

 Kelley’s name is spelled differently in the record. The Court adopts the spelling used in the incident report. (Doc. 8-1 at 20.) 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On November 18, 2011, Petitioner submitted a “Regional Administrative Remedy 

Appeal” to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office alleging delays in the disciplinary 

proceedings. (Id. at 32.) The Regional Director upheld the DHO’s findings several 

months later and rejected Petitioner’s contention that delays in the proceedings violated 

applicable regulations. (See id. (finding that the “Warden approved the extension of time 

necessary to administratively process the incident report, and we find no reason to 

elaborate further”).) Petitioner appealed the Regional Director’s decision to the Office of 

General Counsel on April 23, 2012. (Id. at 33.) The Office of General Counsel also 

upheld the DHO’s findings, explaining that Petitioner was “provided due process as 

required” by law. (Id. at 34). The Office of General Counsel further noted that “[t]here 

is no indication . . . that any delays in the discipline process hampered [Petitioner’s] 

ability to prepare a defense[.]” (Id.) 

 B. Due Process and the Loss of Good Time Credits

 Habeas corpus relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a prisoner’s claim 

that his good time credits have been revoked without the due process of law. Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (stating that suits regarding revocation of good 

time credits fall “squarely within [the] traditional scope of habeas corpus”). Revocation 

of good time credits complies with due process when prison officials provide an inmate: 

(1) written notice of the violation at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary 

hearing; (2) a written statement by the fact finder regarding the evidence relied on and the 

reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) a limited opportunity to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence; (4) assistance at the hearing if the inmate is illiterate or if the 

matter is complex; and (5) a sufficiently impartial fact-finder. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974). 

 Furthermore, “some evidence” in the disciplinary record must support the factfinder’s decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). In determining if 

this standard is met, the “relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record 

that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56. 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. The Disciplinary Process Did Not Violate the Due Process Clause

 The disciplinary process in Petitioner’s case complied with the five factors set 

forth in Wolff. First, Petitioner received written notice of the violation more than twentyfour hours before the disciplinary proceeding. Petitioner received a copy of the incident 

report on July 11, 2011, two days before the UDC hearing. (Doc. 8-1 at 19.) 

 Second, the record reflects that Petitioner received a copy of the DHO report on 

August 31, 2011. (Doc. 8-1 at 30.) Although Petitioner did not sign the 

“acknowledgement of receipt” section of the DHO report (Doc. 8-1 at 26), Petitioner 

stated that he received a copy of the report on August 31, 2011. (Id. at 30.) 

 Third, Petitioner requested that only one witness, inmate Kelley, appear at the 

hearing. (Id. at 23-24.) Kelley appeared and testified at the hearing. (Id.) Fourth, 

Petitioner waived his right to a staff representative. (Id. at 23.) 

 Finally, the DHO who conducted the hearing acted as a sufficiently impartial factfinder. Wolff only requires that the fact finder not present a “hazard of arbitrary 

decisionmaking.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. A fact-finder who follows established 

procedures, whose discretion is circumscribed by regulations, and who adheres to Wolff's

procedural requirements poses no hazard of arbitrariness. Id. Here, the required 

procedures were followed.4

 (See Doc. 8-1 at 32 (stating that the “required disciplinary 

procedures were substantially followed[.]”).) Thus, under the factors set forth in Wolff, 

the disciplinary process did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights. 

 Additionally, although Petitioner argues that the DHO’s decision is contrary to the 

evidence presented at the hearing, there is “some evidence,” as Hill requires, to support 

the DHO’s decision. The correctional officer, Petitioner, and Kelley provided three 

different accounts of the incident in question. The DHO chose to discredit Petitioner’s 

account, noting that he “has a motive for denying his involvement in [the incident] since 

the charge is serious and has significant consequences[.]” (Doc. 8-1 at 25.) Instead, the 

 

4

 The Bureau of Prisons has promulgated regulations that govern the procedures of disciplinary hearings. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.1, et seq.

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

DHO relied on the correctional officer’s account, noting that the officer is under a legal 

obligation to be truthful and, unlike Petitioner, has no motive to be untruthful. (Id.) This 

Court may not second-guess the DHO’s decision to rely on the correctional officer’s 

account. Cf. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (indicating that a disciplinary board’s factual findings 

are not subject to “second-guessing” upon review, nor is the reviewing court required to 

independently assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence). Kelley’s 

account lends further support to the DHO’s decision. Kelley testified at the disciplinary 

hearing that Petitioner said, “What would you do if I knocked the C.O. [correctional 

officer] out?” (Doc. 8-1 at 24.) 

 Petitioner also argues that the correctional officer falsified the incident report with 

the wrong signature date. (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 10 at 2.) The record, however, does not 

support this claim. The DHO’s report states that the correctional officer wrote the 

incident report on July 5, 2011, but did not sign it until July 11, 2011. (Doc. 8-1 at 25.) 

The incident report was suspended until the correctional officer could sign it. (Id.) 

 Petitioner also argues that there was “undue delay” before his UDC hearing.5

(Doc. 10 at 1.) However, the UDC hearing occurred on July 13, 2011, two days after the 

correctional officer signed the incident report. (Doc. 8-1 at 25.) The Warden found that 

the delay in holding the hearing while waiting for the correctional officer’s signature was 

not “undue” and was “within the parameters established by policy[.]” (Id.) This brief 

delay in scheduling the UDC hearing, even if considered a violation of a regulation, did 

not violate due process. Sims v. Ulit, 2012 WL 293298 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) 

(“a prison official’s mere violation of a prison regulation” does not constitute a 

constitutional violation) (citing Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 2000)); 

Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) (failure to adhere to 

administrative regulations does not equate to a constitutional violation) (citing Davis v. 

Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984)).

 

5

 At the time, 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(c) required the UDC to review an incident report within three working days after its issuance. The Unit Manager responsible for the UDC therefore requested and received the Warden’s approval for the delay. (Doc. 8-1 at 21.) 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

III. Conclusion 

As set forth above, Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by any delays 

in the disciplinary proceedings and sufficient evidence supports the disciplinary decision. 

Therefore, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied.

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 25th day of June, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-01711-JAT Document 12 Filed 06/25/14 Page 8 of 8