Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05353/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05353-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided July 28, 1998

No. 97-5353

Larry N. White,

Appellant

v.

United States Probation Office, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv0183)

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On Motion for Summary Affirmance

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Larry N. White, pro se.

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, and Stephen R.

Martin II, Special Assistant United States Attorney, were on

the motion for summary affirmance for the appellees.

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Before: Williams, Ginsburg, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: The main question presented by this appeal is

whether a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a), can be brought by a federal prisoner in order

collaterally to attack his sentence. We hold that such a claim

is not cognizable under the Privacy Act unless the sentence

has been invalidated in a prior proceeding.

After Larry N. White was convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846, he

brought this action under the Privacy Act claiming that the

Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the U.S. Parole Commission, and certain individuals refused to correct inaccurate

statements in his presentence report regarding the applicable

law under which he was sentenced. White claims that as a

result of this inaccuracy, he is ineligible for parole and is

required to serve more time in prison than he would have if

he had been sentenced under the appropriate law. He seeks

damages and an order directing the BOP to amend its

records. In dismissing the action, the district court noted

that White previously challenged his sentence on direct appeal, see U.S. v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1990), and in

motions to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255,

and stated that it was "unaware of any authority that would

sanction plaintiff's use of the Privacy Act to attack collaterally

the actions of the sentencing court."

The Privacy Act permits a suit for damages if an agency's

violation of s 552a(e)(5) results in a determination adverse to

the individual. See 5 U.S.C. ss 552a(g)(1)(C), (g)(4). The

Act also gives an individual the right to request amendment

of his records. 5 U.S.C. s 552a(d). Under regulations, however, presentence reports and BOP inmate records systems

are exempt from the amendment provisions of the Act. See

28 C.F.R. ss 16.51(c), 16.97(a); Deters v. United States Parole Comm'n, 85 F.3d 655, 658 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996). AccordUSCA Case #97-5353 Document #370255 Filed: 07/28/1998 Page 2 of 4
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ingly, White is barred from seeking amendment of his presentence report.

Nor is White entitled to money damages for the alleged

"inaccuracies" in calculating his sentence. He does not allege

that there are inaccurate factual statements in the presentence report, see Deters, 85 F.3d at 660; Sellers v. Bureau of

Prisons, 959 F.2d 307, 309-10 (D.C. Cir. 1992); rather he

essentially contests that portion of the report consisting of

legal conclusions that aided the sentencing court in computing

the length of his sentence. As a result, his complaint must be

viewed as a challenge to the duration of his sentence. See

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the

Supreme Court held that a claim for damages under 42

U.S.C. s 1983 that challenges the fact or duration of a

prisoner's conviction or confinement is not cognizable unless

that conviction or confinement has been invalidated in a

separate proceeding. A plaintiff who seeks to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional confinement (or any other

harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would

render his sentence invalid) must prove that the sentence has

been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such determination, or called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. The

rationale of Heck has been applied to damage claims against

federal officials in actions under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), see Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (D.C. Cir.

1996), and to a claim for damages brought by a state prisoner

challenging the validity of disciplinary proceedings used to

deprive him of good-time credits, thereby delaying his release, see Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1588-89 (1997).

We conclude that White's suit, which seeks damages in

conjunction with a challenge to the length of his confinement,

is governed by Preiser and Heck. Because a judgment in

favor of White on his challenge to the legal conclusions in his

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presentence report would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his sentence, which has not been invalidated in a prior

proceeding, his complaint for damages under the Privacy Act

must be dismissed. Accordingly, the motion for summary

affirmance is

Granted.

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