Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-01180/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-01180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

KATHY RUSSELL; TIFFANY 

ASHLEY; and KRYSTAL STASKO, 

individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TYSON FARMS, INC. d/b/a RIVER 

VALLEY INGREDIENTS; JASON 

SPANN; HYDRASERVICE, INC., 

and JASPER WATER WORKS AND 

SEWER BOARD, INC.

Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:19-cv-1179-LCB

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Background

The complaint in this case was filed on July 24, 2019. By agreement of all 

parties, the present case was consolidated with Ashley, et al, v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 

5:19-cv-1180-LCB, which was filed in this Court on the same day.1

 (Doc. 56). In 

the same order, this Court also stayed general discovery pending a ruling on the 

various motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. Before the Court is Defendant 

 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the record in this memorandum opinion refer to the 

record in case number 5:19-cv-1179-LCB, Russell, et al. v. Tyson, et al.

FILED

 2020 Mar-30 AM 11:18

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:19-cv-01180-LCB Document 55 Filed 03/30/20 Page 1 of 14
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Jasper Water Works and Sewer Board’s (“JWW”) motion to dismiss. (Doc 9)2. The 

motion is fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, the Court 

finds that JWW’s motion to dismiss is due to be DENIED.

A brief summary of the alleged facts is all that is necessary for the resolution 

of the present motion. The basis of the complaint is a wastewater spill that occurred 

on or about June 6, 2019, and the resulting contamination of portions of the Black 

Warrior River. The Plaintiffs, a proposed class, assert that they are individuals and 

businesses who were harmed by the spill. The Defendants are Tyson Farms, Inc., 

the owner of the food-processing facility at which the spill allegedly originated; 

Jason Spann, the manager of the plant in question; HydraService, Inc., the 

manufacturer of the equipment that allegedly failed and caused the spill; and JWW, 

a non-profit corporation that provided water to citizens of Walker County, Alabama.

The Plaintiffs have asserted various state law claims against the Defendants. 

According to the Plaintiffs, Tyson maintained multiple retention ponds on its 

property for the purpose of treating the wastewater generated by its food-processing 

operations. The Plaintiffs claim that a pipe, which was meant to transfer partially 

treated wastewater from one pond to another, failed or malfunctioned thereby 

causing untreated wastewater to spill into the river. Defendant HydraService is 

 2 JWW filed a nearly identical motion to dismiss in the companion case, Ashley, et al. v. Tyson 

Farms, et al. See (Doc. 9) in 5:19-cv-1180-LCB. This memorandum opinion and order applies 

equally to both motions.

Case 5:19-cv-01180-LCB Document 55 Filed 03/30/20 Page 2 of 14
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alleged to have manufactured and installed a defective pump which caused the pipe 

to fail. The Plaintiffs claim that JWW failed to properly notify them of the spill and 

failed to take proper measures to ensure their safety both before and after the spill. 

II. JWW’s Motion to Dismiss

In its motion to dismiss, JWW argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims, all state law 

causes of action, are preempted by federal law. Specifically, JWW claims that the 

Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq, occupies the field of 

drinking-water regulation and leaves no room for regulation through state common 

law tort claims. JWW also contends that the Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted 

because, it says, they conflict with the SDWA. 

A. Legal Standards

JWW moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Generally, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short 

and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 

41, 47 (1957)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss, a district court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and 

construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brophy v. 

Jiangbo Pharms. Inc., 781 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015). Generally, a complaint 

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should include “enough information regarding the material elements of a cause of 

action to support recovery under some ‘viable legal theory.’” Am. Fed'n of Labor & 

Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, Fla., 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011),

quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683–84 (11th Cir.

2001).

In Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485–87 (11th Cir. 2015), the 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a case, pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on preemption grounds and discussed preemption as follows: 

“In pre-emption cases, the question is whether state law is preempted by a federal statute, or in some instances, a federal agency 

action.” POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca–Cola Co., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 

S.Ct. 2228, 2236, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 

U.S. 555, 563, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1193, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009)). The 

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides “the 

Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 

U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. “[W]e have long recognized that state laws 

that conflict with federal law are without effect.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. 

Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Barnett Bank of 

Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 

134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause requires courts to 

follow federal, not state, law.”).

The Supreme Court has identified three circumstantial 

categories, where federal law preempts state law. First is express 

preemption, where Congress defines “explicitly the extent to which its 

enactments pre-empt state law.” English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 

72, 78, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). “[W]hen 

Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory 

language, the courts' task is an easy one.” Id. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275; 

see Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 

131 S.Ct. 1968, 1977, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011)(noting the plain 

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wording of a federal statute “necessarily contains the best evidence of 

Congress' preemptive intent”); Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. 

Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir.2008) (“Express preemption 

occurs when Congress manifests its intent to displace a state law using 

the text of a federal statute.”).

Second is field preemption. English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 

2275. “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is 

preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended 

the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.” Id., 110 S.Ct. at 2275.

Such an intent may be inferred from a “scheme of federal 

regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the 

inference that Congress left no room for the States to 

supplement it,” or where an Act of Congress “touches a 

field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the 

federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 

of state laws on the same subject.”

Id., 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 

U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)) (alteration 

omitted). “Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to 

foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal 

standards.” Arizona v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 

2492, 2502 (2012).

Third is conflict preemption, which occurs when “state law is 

pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.” 

English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275. Conflict preemption exists 

“where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and 

federal requirements or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 

Congress.’” Id., 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 

U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)) (citations omitted). 

“[S]ince our decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 

316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law that 

conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’” Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 

Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) 

(quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 

2128, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981)); see Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 

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N.A., 640 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011)(recognizing “the proper 

preemption test asks whether there is a significant conflict between the 

state and federal statutes—that is, the test for conflict preemption”).

In the present case, JWW argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to field 

preemption and conflict preemption. The Court now turns to JWW’s arguments.

B. JWW’s Arguments

a. The SDWA occupies the field and leaves no room for state 

common law claims.

JWW first argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted because, it says, 

Congress intended to occupy the field of drinking-water regulation when it passed 

the SDWA. JWW contends that allowing a suit for common law tort claims would 

frustrate this purpose and, therefore, is preempted.

The primary case JWW relies on in support of that argument is Mattoon v. 

City of Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), in which the First Circuit characterized 

the SDWA as a “comprehensive federal statutory scheme[],” and held that it 

preempted a federal common law nuisance claim as well as a § 1983 claim. In 

Mattoon, the First Circuit aptly analyzed the SDWA, noting its purpose and broad 

scope and explaining how it provides for the federal government to work with the 

states to regulate the types and amounts of contaminants in their water supplies. The 

First Circuit held that “the regulatory scheme established under the SDWA evinces 

a clear congressional intention to entrust the regulation of public drinking water 

systems to an expert regulatory agency rather than the courts.” Id. at 4–5. Therefore, 

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the Court reasoned, the appellant’s federal common law nuisance claim and its § 

1983 claim were preempted.

JWW quotes the above language in support of its proposition that the holding 

in Mattoon should apply with equal force to its claim in the present case. However, 

the analysis in Mattoon was focused on whether “federal statutory or federal

common law standards should control the field.” Id. at 4. The primary case relied 

on in that analysis was Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), in 

which the United States Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 

1251 et seq., (“CWA”), a similar environmental protection act3

, preempted federal 

common law nuisance claims seeking to abate water pollution. In addressing an 

argument similar to the one raised by JWW, the Supreme Court explained that the 

analysis of whether a federal statute preempts state law is different from the analysis 

regarding preemption of federal common law:

Contrary to the suggestions of respondents, the appropriate analysis in 

determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously the 

subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed in 

deciding if federal law pre-empts state law. In considering the latter 

question “‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers 

of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 

was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Jones v. Rath 

Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 

(1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 

S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). While we have not hesitated 

 3 The Eleventh Circuit has compared the CWA with the SDWA in interpreting the meanings of words contained in 

the statutes. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309-CIV, 2005 WL 

8156096, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2005)(comparing “the express inclusion of Indian tribes as ‘persons’ in several 

federal pollution control laws” including the CWA and the SDWA).

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to find pre-emption of state law, whether express or implied, when 

Congress has so indicated, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 

151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978), or when 

enforcement of state regulations would impair “federal superintendence 

of the field,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 

132, 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), our analysis has 

included “due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal 

system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of 

doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy.” San Diego 

Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243, 79 S.Ct. 773, 

778, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Such concerns are not implicated in the 

same fashion when the question is whether federal statutory or federal 

common law governs, and accordingly the same sort of evidence of a 

clear and manifest purpose is not required.

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1981). Thus, the 

Plaintiffs’ contention that Mattoon does not support JWW’s argument is well taken. 

Mattoon says nothing about the relationship between the SDWA and state common 

law tort claims, and its holding that the SDWA preempts federal common law 

nuisance claims does not imply that it also preempts state common law tort claims. 

JWW cited other cases in support of its proposition. However, like Mattoon, those 

cases did not discuss the relationship of the SDWA, or any other federal statute, with 

state law causes of action.

In its response to JWW’s motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs cite International 

Paper v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), in which the Supreme Court discussed the 

relationship between state law and the Clean Water Act, a similarly constructed 

federal environmental statute. In Oullette, the plaintiff, a Vermont landowner, sued 

a New York pulp mill in a Vermont state court for allegedly discharging pollutants 

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into a Lake Champlain that damaged his property in Vermont. The question 

presented was “whether the [Clean Water] Act pre-empt[ed] a common-law 

nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont law, when the source of the 

alleged injury is located in New York.” Id. at 483. The Court thoroughly analyzed

the CWA and specifically noted that the Act allowed states to enact their own waterpollution regulations so long as those regulations were no less stringent than the 

regulations provided in the Act4

. In contrast, affected states that are subject to 

pollution originating in source states have only the right to notice and to comment 

before the issuance of a federal or source state permit. The Court held that applying 

an “affected State's law to an out-of-state source [] would undermine the important 

goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system.” Id. at 496. Accordingly, 

the Court held that a plaintiff in an affected state could not sue an out-of-state 

defendant in the plaintiff’s home state under that state’s common law.

However, the Court went on to hold as follows:

Our conclusion that Vermont nuisance law is inapplicable to a New 

York point source does not leave respondents without a remedy. The 

CWA precludes only those suits that may require standards of effluent 

control that are incompatible with those established by the procedures 

set forth in the Act. The saving clause specifically preserves other state 

actions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals 

from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State. 

By its terms the CWA allows States such as New York to impose higher 

standards on their own point sources, and in Milwaukee [v Wisconsin 

& Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)] we recognized that this authority 

 4 The SDWA contains similar provisions regarding state regulations.

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may include the right to impose higher common-law as well as higher 

statutory restrictions. 451 U.S., at 328, 101 S.Ct., at 1798 (suggesting 

that “States may adopt more stringent limitations ... through state 

nuisance law, and apply them to in-state dischargers”); see also 

Committee for Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 

1009, and n. 9 (CA4 1976) (CWA preserves common-law suits filed in 

source State).

Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497–98, 107 S. Ct. 805, 814, 93 L. Ed. 2d 

883 (1987). Thus, the Supreme Court held that a saving clause in the CWA 

preserved common law suits as long as the suits were filed in the proper jurisdiction, 

i.e., the state containing the point source of the pollution. The Court then held that, 

“[a]lthough Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, the 

saving clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for state causes of 

action.” Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492. “Because the Act specifically allows source 

States to impose stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not 

disrupt the regulatory partnership established by the permit system.” Id. at 498. 

“Nothing in the Act prevents a court sitting in an affected State from hearing a 

common-law nuisance suit, provided that jurisdiction otherwise is proper.” Id. at 

500.

The saving clause from the CWA5 that the Supreme Court relied on in Oullette

consisted of two sections of the Act which provide, in pertinent part:

 5 In its reply brief, JWW notes that the saving clause in the SDWA is “almost identical” to the 

saving clause in the CWA. (Doc. 35, p. 4).

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Except as expressly provided ..., nothing in this chapter shall ... be 

construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or 

jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary 

waters) of such States.

33 U.S.C. § 1370; and,

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 

of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek 

enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other 

relief....

33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). Those sections are similar to saving clause contained in the 

SDWA. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(e), provides:

Nothing in this subchapter shall diminish any authority of a State or 

political subdivision to adopt or enforce any law or regulation 

respecting drinking water regulations or public water systems, but no 

such law or regulation shall relieve any person of any requirement 

otherwise applicable under this subchapter.

Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(e), provides:

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 

of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek 

enforcement of any requirement prescribed by or under this subchapter 

or to seek any other relief.

This Court finds that the saving clause in the SDWA serves the same purpose as the 

clauses in the CWA. Thus, for the same reasons put forth by the Supreme Court in 

Oullette, this Court holds that state law causes of action like those alleged in this 

case are not preempted by the SDWA. Accordingly, nothing in the SDWA would 

prevent an Alabama trial court, or this Court sitting in diversity, from hearing a 

common law tort action arising out of an incident that occurred within Alabama.

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As noted, JWW concedes that the savings clause in the CWA is “almost 

identical” to the savings clause in the SDWA. (Doc. 35, p. 4). However, it attempts 

to distinguish Oullette by referring to a portion of the opinion that appears to support 

its argument. See (Doc. 35, p. 4)(“Section 300j-8(e) is expressly limited to the 

section of the SDWA that provides a private right of action, i.e., the SDWA’s citizen 

suit provision.... The Supreme Court [in Oullette] has already noted the limited 

scope of almost identical savings clauses.”). However, the language quoted by JWW 

is from a section of Oullette in which the Court was discussing the question of 

whether the CWA allows plaintiffs from an affected state to bring suit against outof-state polluters. See Oullette, 479 U.S. at 492-94. JWW ignores the implication 

of the ultimate holding in Oullette, i.e., that common law causes of action brought 

against a source state under the source state’s law are not preempted.

JWW cites other cases which discuss the preemptive effect of saving clauses

from other statutes such as Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 

(2000)(holding that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act’s savings 

clause did not foreclose or limit operation of ordinary preemption principles), and 

Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 524 U.S. 214 (1998)(holding that a section of the 

Communications Act preempted state law claims). However, none of the cases cited 

in JWW’s reply involve the SDWA, the CWA, or any other similar environmental 

statute. JWW cites portions of those cases in which the Supreme Court discusses 

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how the saving clauses in other statutes do not preclude preemption. However, none 

of the cases cited by JWW alter the holding in Oullette. 

b. The Plaintiffs’ claims conflict with the SDWA.

JWW next argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted because, it says, 

the claims conflict with the SDWA. JWW discusses various requirements of the 

SDWA and cites to portions of the Act mandating that the Administrator of the EPA 

exercise his or her judgment in carrying out certain tasks. However, as discussed in 

the previous section, the Supreme Court took similar requirements from the CWA 

into consideration when it held in Oullette that state common law claims were not 

preempted. That Court thoroughly addressed the dual roles of states and the EPA in 

enacting and enforcing regulations concerning water pollution. JWW’s argument 

that such lawsuits “would interfere with Congress’s intent and the processes it 

mandated for development of national public drinking water regulations” was 

considered and foreclosed in Oullette. JWW has cited no contrary authority.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the SDWA does not preempt 

the state law claims brought by the Plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, JWW’s 

motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is DENIED.

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DONE and ORDERED March 30, 2020.

 _________________________________

 LILES C. BURKE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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