Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02378/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02378-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTEBAN SANDOVAL,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 14cv2378-BAS (PCL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: 

(1) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND

(2) DISMISSING THE PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WITH PREJUDICE AS UNTIMELY

vs.

WARREN L. MONTGOMERY, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Esteban Sandoval (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a California prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (ECF No. 1.) He challenges a July 12, 2006, prison disciplinary proceeding finding him

guilty of constructive possession of a deadly weapon, which resulted in the loss of 360 days of

earned custody credits. (Pet. Ex. F.) He claims his federal Constitutional right to due process

was violated because the guilty finding was not based on reliable evidence. (Pet. at 4-5.) 

Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss with an incorporated Memorandum of Points

and Authorities, and has lodged portions of the state record. (ECF Nos. 13-14.) Respondent

argues that this action was initiated nearly two and one-half years after the one-year statute of

limitations expired, that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period

because he waited until after it expired before seeking relief in state court, and that he is not

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entitled to equitable tolling because he has not shown any delay was caused by extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control. (Mem. P&A in Supp. Resp.’s MTD at 1-6.) 

Petitioner has filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 21.) He agrees with Respondent that his

Petition is untimely unless he is entitled to equitable tolling, but argues equitable tolling is

available because the inmate assisting him in prosecuting his claim was in possession of

Petitioner’s legal materials while the inmate was medically incapacitated, which delayed the

filing of the first state habeas petition. (Pet.’s Opp. at 3-5.) He argues that with equitable tolling

for that delay, statutory tolling is available for his one complete round of state post-conviction

review, rendering his federal Petition timely. (Id.) 

The Court finds, for the following reasons, that even allowing for equitable tolling for the

period Petitioner was not in possession of his legal materials, the federal Petition was filed well

after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The Court recommends GRANTING the

Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSING the Petition as untimely. 

I. Background

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion denying habeas

relief. (Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal.App.Ct. May 2,

2013).) This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981)

(stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts). 

A search of Sandoval’s cell revealed an inmate manufactured weapon and

two large pieces of metal stock under the cushion on his cellmate’s wheelchair. 

When the correctional officers asked Sandoval to exit his cell to allow the search,

he refused to exit the cell and turned his light off. Although Sandoval asserted he

had no knowledge of the weapon and his cellmate claimed responsibility, the

hearing officer’s investigation determined that the weapon and metal stock were

pieces of a handicap walker and it would have been impossible for Sandoval to

have no knowledge of these weapons given the time involved to break down the

walker into pieces and fashion a weapon. 

(Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op. at 1-2.)

Petitioner was issued a rules violation report on July 2, 2006. (Pet. Ex. D.) A hearing

was held on July 8, 2006, at which Petitioner did not testify but stipulated that his statement

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would be the same as that of his cellmate, who stated: “[Petitioner] didn’t know nothing about

that. I had it on my wheel chair. He wasn’t present when I broke that stuff down. I had it

hidden between the seat and the cushion.” (Pet. Ex. E.) On July 12, 2006, Petitioner was found

guilty of constructive possession of a deadly weapon; he was assessed the loss of 360 days of

earned custody credits, and referred to the classification committee for a possible segregated

housing term and program/housing review. (Pet. Ex. F.) 

Petitioner challenged the guilty finding through the prison administrative appeal process,

which ended with a Director’s Level decision denying his appeal on April 6, 2011. (Lodgment

No. 2.) Petitioner waited over a year and four months before he submitted a habeas petition to

the state superior court, which he signed on August 27, 2012, and which bears a filing stamp of

September 17, 2012.1

 (Lodgment No. 3.) That court denied the petition, stating:

It appears that Petitioner was on “out to court status” for two years beyond

July of 2006, thereby delaying his ability to submit his appeal in connection with

Log No. C-06-07-002. Due primarily to the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation’s acceptance and processing of Petitioner’s untimely CDCR

Form 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal, this court finds Petitioner’s post-hearing delay

in seeking administrative review of his complaints to be in good faith. However,

as to why Petitioner substantially delayed in pursuing habeas corpus relief

following his April 6, 2011 exhaustion of administrative remedies, this court finds

a complete lack of acceptable excuse.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the petition is denied. According to

Petitioner, he was delaying in the filing of his petition because his “jail house

lawyer” became seriously ill. It is the opinion of this tribunal, however, that the

unavailability of a preferred “jail house” assistant does not (without more)

sufficiently justify Petitioner’s substantial delay in seeking habeas corpus relief. 

(In re: Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 805.)

(Lodgment No. 4, In re Sandoval, No. 12W01771, order at 1 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Nov. 26, 2012).)

Petitioner then waited nearly five months before he submitted a habeas petition in the

state appellate court, which he signed on April 17, 2013, and which bears a filing stamp of April

23, 2013. (Lodgment No. 5.) That court denied the Petition on May 2, 2013, stating:

Sandoval contends that he was denied due process when he was found

guilty by an “arbitrary fact finder.” “The Legislature has given the Director of the

1

 Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox” rule which provides that his pro se filings

are considered to have been constructively filed as of the date he hands them to prison authorities for

mailing to a court. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). Absent an indication

otherwise, the Court will use the date the petitions are signed as the constructive filing date.

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Department of Corrections broad authority for the discipline and classification of

persons confined in state prisons.” (In re Lusero (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 572, 575.) 

Requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision

of the prison disciplinary board. (In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493,

1500.) This standard is met if “there was some evidence from which the

conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .” (Superintendent

v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 455-456.) “Constructive possession exists where a

defendant maintains some control or right to control contraband that is in the

actual possession of another.” (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 417.) 

A search of Sandoval’s cell revealed an inmate manufactured weapon and

two large pieces of metal stock under the cushion on his cellmate’s wheelchair. 

When the correctional officers asked Sandoval to exit his cell to allow the search,

he refused to exit the cell and turned his light off. Although Sandoval asserted he

had no knowledge of the weapon and his cellmate claimed responsibility, the

hearing officer’s investigation determined that the weapon and metal stock were

pieces of a handicap walker and it would have been impossible for Sandoval to

have no knowledge of these weapons given the time involved to break down the

walker into pieces and fashion a weapon. Thus, “some evidence” supports the

hearing officer’s finding that Sandoval had constructive possession of the weapon.

We do not review Sandoval’s claims of error with respect to the superior

court’s denial of relief. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7.)

(Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op. at 1-2.)

Petitioner then waited nearly a year before he submitted a habeas petition in the state

supreme court, which he signed on April 16, 2014, and which bears a filing stamp dated April

21, 2014. (Lodgment No. 7.) That court denied relief in an order which stated: “The petition

for writ of habeas corpus is denied.” (Lodgment No. 8, In re Sandoval, No. S2118040, order at

1 (Cal. Jun. 18, 2014).) Petitioner constructively filed his federal Petition on September 29,

2014, the date it is signed. (Pet. at 7; Mem. P&A in Supp. Resp.’s MTD at 3.)

II. Discussion

Respondent contends that the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 6,

2011, the date the administrative appeal ended, and that, absent tolling, the limitations period

expired on April 5, 2012. (Mem. P&A in Supp. Resp.’s MTD at 4.) Respondent argues that

statutory tolling is not available because the first state habeas petition was filed on September

17, 2012, over five months after the limitations period expired. (Id. at 4-5.) Respondent also

contends equitable tolling is not available because Petitioner has not shown that extraordinary

circumstances caused the delay in initiating state habeas proceedings, or caused the lengthy gaps

between the filings of the state petitions. (Id. at 5-6.)

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Petitioner agrees that the one-year statute of limitations began to run when his

administrative grievance process became final, and concedes his federal Petition is untimely

without the benefit of equitable tolling. (Pet.’s Opp. at 2.) He argues that equitable tolling is

appropriate because exceptional circumstances beyond his control prevented him from pursuing

his claim from November 30, 2011, until March 2, 2012. (Id. at 2-5.) Specifically, he alleges

that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has promulgated

regulations permitting one inmate to assist another inmate in the preparation of legal documents,

that he relied on an inmate named Johnny Rodriguez to assist him in pursuing his claim, and that

Rodriguez was in possession of Petitioner’s legal papers when Rodriguez was hospitalized with

a contagious disease on November 27, 2011, thus depriving Petitioner of access to his legal

materials until March 2, 2012, when Rodriguez returned to Petitioner’s facility. (Id. at 4-5.) 

A. Triggering Dates of the Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 begins to run at the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). 

The parties agree that § 2244(d)(1)(D) provides the triggering date, which is April 6,

2011, the date Petitioner’s administrative review ended. (Mem. P&A in Supp. Resp.’s MTD at

4; Pet.’s Opp. at 2.) The Court finds that the one-year statute of limitations began to run,

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D), on April 7, 2011. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246

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(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by . . . any

applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from the designated period of time begins

to run shall not be included.”) Absent tolling, the statute of limitations was set to expire on April

6, 2012. Thus, this action, initiated on September 29, 2014, nearly two and one-half years later,

is untimely absent tolling of the limitations period.

B. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending”

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If Petitioner was “properly pursuing” his state court

remedies, “the one-year statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition

is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” 

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 225 (2002) (holding that the statute of limitations is not statutorily tolled during gaps

between petitions if the delay is unreasonable); see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 201

(2006) (holding that an unjustified six-month gap was unreasonable under California law). 

An untimely state petition is neither “properly filed” nor “pending” during the time it was

under consideration by the state courts. Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir.

2006). If the limitations period had already expired by the time Petitioner began his round of

state collateral review, statutory tolling is not available for any of the state petitions. See Jiminez

v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that state post-conviction petition which was

filed after expiration of the statute of limitations cannot toll the limitations period). 

Petitioner constructively filed his first state habeas petition in the superior court on

August 27, 2012, nearly one year and five months after his administrative review ended, and

nearly five months after the limitations period was set to expire on April 6, 2012. He attached

to that first state petition the declaration of inmate Rodriguez, who stated that he was in the

process of assisting Petitioner with his challenge to the disciplinary proceeding, as he was

permitted to do under CDCR regulations, and was in possession of Petitioner’s legal papers,

again as permitted by CDCR regulations, when Rodriguez was removed from the prison on

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November 27, 2011, and admitted to a hospital due to an infection. (Lodgment No. 3, Ex. A.) 

Rodriguez states that he returned to the prison infirmary on December 2, 2011, but due to the

infectious nature of his condition was not able to return to general population in time to file the

state trial court habeas petition before the federal one-year statute of limitations expired. (Id.) 

The declaration does not explicitly state when inmate Rodriguez was returned to the general

population or when he was able to resume assisting Petitioner, but merely that, “declarant was

not able to prepare and file the enclosed Writ of Habeas Corpus until the healing process was

over, thus violating the one year statute after final disposition at the Director’s Level of Appeal.” 

(Id.) Petitioner included his own declaration, which also failed to explicitly state when

Rodriguez was returned to the general population. (Lodgment No. 3 at 7.) As quoted above, the

superior court denied the petition as untimely, stating that, “the unavailability of a preferred ‘jail

house’ assistant does not (without more) sufficiently justify” the delay. (Lodgment No. 4, In re

Sandoval, No. 12W0177A, order at 1.) 

The superior court’s denial of Petitioner’s first state petition as untimely precludes

statutory tolling for the pendency of that petition unless a later state court decision invalidated

the finding of untimeliness. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413-14 (2005) (“[W]hen

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that (is) the end of the matter’ for purposes

of § 2244(d)(2).”), quoting Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226; see also Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a denial on the merits by state supreme court will not invalidate

earlier finding of untimeliness by lower court absent compelling circumstances). After the

superior court denied the habeas petition on November 26, 2012, Petitioner waited nearly five

months, until April 17, 2013, to file a habeas petition in the state appellate court. He argued that

the 142-day gap between the denial by the superior court and the filing in the appellate court was

due to his spending time investigating his claim, and argued that the superior court had erred in

finding the first petition to be untimely. (Lodgment No. 5 at 1-2.) Petitioner presented two new

declarations from inmate Rodriguez in support of those contentions, and his own new

declaration, none of which explicitly stated when inmate Rodriguez was able to continue

assisting Petitioner or return his legal materials. (See Attachments to Lodgment No. 5.) As

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quoted above, although the appellate court reached the merits of the claim, it was silent on the

timeliness issue, other than to state: “We do not review Sandoval’s claims of error with respect

to the superior court’s denial of relief.” (Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op.

at 2.) 

There is no indication that the appellate court invalidated the finding of untimeliness by

the trial court. That is particularly true in light of Petitioner’s failure to identify the exact date

Rodriguez returned to the general population and resumed assisting Petitioner, and in light of

the fact that the appellate court indicated it would not address Petitioner’s contention that the

superior court erred in determining the first petition was untimely. Thus, statutory tolling is not

available for the first state habeas petition. And because the appellate court habeas petition was

also filed after the limitations period expired (assuming, as discussed below, that equitable

tolling did not extend the limitations period so as to render the appellate court petition to have

been filed before the limitations period expired), the pendency of the appellate court petition also

did not statutorily toll the limitations period. 

Neither does the state supreme court petition provide statutory tolling. Petitioner waited

349 days after the appellate court denied his petition on the merits to file a habeas petition in the

state supreme court. Petitioner alleged in his supreme court petition that the delay in presenting

the claim was excusable under state law because his claim relied on a error of constitutional

magnitude. (Lodgment No. 7 at 6-7.) The supreme court summarily denied the petition. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) There is a presumption that the state supreme court adopted the reasoning

of the appellate court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991) (“Where there has

been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding

that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.”) As set forth below, it

is clear that the state supreme court rejected Petitioner’s contention that his delay was excusable

because it relied on an error of constitutional magnitude. 

The gaps between the state petitions, 142 days between the superior and appellate courts,

and 349 days between the appellate and supreme courts, are presumptively too long to entitle

Petitioner to statutory tolling during those gaps even if he were entitled to statutory tolling while

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those petitions were pending in state court. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 201 (holding that a six-month

unjustified delay was unreasonable under California law); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046,

1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that gaps of 115 days and 101 days without adequate explanation

did not support statutory tolling). Although the orders of the state appellate and supreme courts

did not find those petitions untimely, or comment on the lengthy gaps between filings, their

silence does not preclude this Court from finding those petitions untimely under state law for

purposes of statutory tolling. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 198 (holding that in the absence of a clear

indication that a request for state collateral review was timely or untimely, the federal court

“must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held

in respect to timeliness.”) As set forth below in the equitable tolling section of this Report,

Petitioner has not justified those delays. 

The Court finds that statutory tolling is not available because Petitioner initiated his one

round of state habeas review after the limitations period expired. Even to the extent (discussed

below) that equitable tolling is available up to the filing date of the first state habeas petition,

statutory tolling is not available for that petition because it is untimely. As discussed below, the

limitations period would have expired while that first state petition was pending, and statutory

tolling is not available for the two subsequent state habeas petitions because they were therefore

filed after the limitations period expired, or for the lengthy gaps between the petitions. 

C. Equitable Tolling

In order to be entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, Petitioner must

show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,

645-51 (2010). Petitioner bears the burden of showing that “extraordinary circumstances” were

the proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence. Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). A prisoner’s lack of access to legal materials which

makes it impossible to file within the one-year statute of limitations can support equitable

tolling. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2002).

/ / /

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Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period from

November 27, 2011, until March 2, 2012, due to his lack of access to his legal materials, which

were in the possession of inmate Rodriguez while he was incapacitated with a contagious

disease. (Pet.’s Opp. at 2-5.) Petitioner states in his verified Opposition here, apparently for the

first time in any court, that Rodriguez returned to general population on March 2, 2012, at which

time, “he and petitioner were once again quartered in close proximity, legal research and

preparation into his federal claim got under way up to and until” the August 27, 2012,

constructive filing of the trial court habeas petition. (Id. at 4.) 

As set forth above, the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 7, 2011, and,

absent tolling, was set to expire on April 6, 2012. Assuming equitable tolling began on

November 27, 2011, at which point 236 days had expired from the limitations period, and

stopped on March 2, 2012, the statute of limitations would be set to expire 129 days later, on

July 9, 2012. Petitioner constructively filed his first state habeas petition on August 27, 2012,

49 days after expiration of the limitations period. Because he initiated his round of state postconviction review after expiration of the limitations period, he is not entitled to statutory tolling

from August 27, 2012, when he filed his first state habeas petition, until June 18, 2014, when

the state supreme court denied his final state habeas petition. Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482. As a

result, the instant federal Petition is untimely because it was filed on September 29, 2015, over

three years after the one-year statute of limitations expired on July 9, 2012, even with the benefit

of equitable tolling requested by Petitioner.

Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, this Court must liberally construe his pleadings. 

Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). Under such a construction, it appears that

Petitioner has alleged that, despite Rodriguez’ return to the general population on March 2, 2012,

he and Petitioner were unable to prepare and file the first state habeas petition prior to the

expiration of the statute of limitations. See e.g. Lott, 304 F.3d at 924-25 (stating that the

equitable tolling inquiry is highly fact dependant, that a prisoner who had his legal materials

returned to him near the filing deadline may still have been unable to file on time, and remanding

for development of the record in that regard.) This Court is required to develop the record when

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a petitioner “makes ‘a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” 

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919,

919 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether exceptional

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control prevented him from filing his first state habeas

petition prior to expiration of the limitations period. Even were the Court to extend equitable

tolling for the additional time it took Petitioner to prepare and file his first state habeas petition

on August 27, 2012, he would, at that time, have 129 days remaining on the limitations period. 

He filed his federal Petition 103 days after his round of state habeas review ended on June 18,

2014, when the state supreme court denied relief. Thus, if equitable tolling extended the

limitations period to August 27, 2012, and if statutory tolling is available throughout the one

complete round of state habeas review, the federal Petition would be timely. 

However, as set forth above, the state superior court found the first petition to be

untimely, and unless Petitioner can show that determination was later invalidated, “that (is) the

end of the matter” for statute of limitations purposes. Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-14. In order to avail

himself of statutory tolling for that first state petition, Petitioner would have to demonstrate that

the later decisions of the state appellate or supreme courts reaching the merits of the claim

somehow invalidated the finding by the superior court that the first petition was untimely. 

Trigueros, 658 F.3d at 990. Although Petitioner asked the appellate court to review the superior

court’s finding of untimeliness (see Lodgment No. 5 at 1-2), the state appellate court specifically

stated: “We do not review Sandoval’s claims of error with respect to the superior court’s denial

of relief.” (Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op. at 2.) 

Neither does the silent denial by the state supreme court support a finding that the

superior court’s untimeliness finding was invalidated. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 197-98 (holding

that the presumption that a silent denial is an adjudication on the merits does not excuse the

district court from determining whether a state habeas petition was also untimely for statute of

limitations purposes). The Ninth Circuit in Bonner looked through the silent denial of a habeas

petition by the California Supreme Court to the appellate court order which adopted the superior

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court’s finding of untimeliness, and found no reason to disturb the untimeliness finding. Bonner,

425 F.3d at 1148-49. Unlike Bonner, however, this Court looks through the silent denial by the

state supreme court to the appellate court order denying the claim on the merits. In Trigueros,

the state supreme court silently denied a habeas petition which had been silently denied by the

appellate court and found to be untimely by the superior court. Trigueros, 658 F.3d at 990. The

Ninth Circuit found “compelling factual circumstances” signaling that the California Supreme

Court had considered and rejected the finding of untimeliness by the superior court. Id. The

Ninth Circuit based that finding on the fact that the state supreme court “did not cite to cases

involving a timeliness procedural bar” despite, unlike here or in Bonner, having requested

briefing on the timeliness issue. Id.

The present case is closer to Bonner than Trigueros, as there are no compelling factual

circumstances in this case to indicate the appellate or supreme courts invalidated the superior

court’s finding of untimeliness. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the

pendency of the first state habeas petition. Thus, even if he is given credit for equitable tolling

until he filed the first state petition, the one-year statute of limitations, which would have had

129 days remaining when equitable tolling ended, expired during the 234 days the first state

petition was pending.

Additionally, even if Petitioner could demonstrate that the superior court’s untimeliness

finding was invalidated by the higher courts reaching the merits of his claim, and even if he is

able to demonstrate he is entitled to statutory tolling while all three state petitions were under

consideration by the state courts, statutory tolling is not available for the 142-day gap between

the denial of the superior court petition and the filing of the appellate court petition, or for the

349-day gap between the state appellate court denial and the filing of the state supreme court

petition. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 201 (stating that unjustified six-month delay was unreasonable);

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048 (holding that gaps of 115 days and 101 days without adequate

explanation did not support statutory tolling). Petitioner argued in the state supreme court that

his 349-day delay (and perhaps all of his delays) should be excused because his claim fits within

an exception to the state timeliness rule, as it alleges an error of constitutional magnitude in that

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“no reasonable disciplinary tribunal SHO would have held petitioner culpable.” (See Lodgment

No. 7 at 7, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 797-98.) The passage in Clark which Petitioner

referenced states:

Although we conclude here that it should not be inflexible, the general rule

is still that, absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a

single, timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely

petitions will be summarily denied. The only exception to this rule are petitions

which allege facts which, if proven, would establish that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to conviction

and/or sentence. 

Thus, for purposes of the exception to the procedural bar against successive

and untimely petitions, a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will have occurred

in any proceeding in which it can be demonstrated: (1) that error of constitutional

magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no

reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that the

petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the petitioner was

convicted; . . .

Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 797-98 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

Petitioner has not shown, either here or in state court, that no reasonable factfinder would

have found him guilty of constructive possession of an inmate manufactured weapon. As the

appellate court found: 

A search of Sandoval’s cell revealed an inmate manufactured weapon and

two large pieces of metal stock under the cushion on his cellmate’s wheelchair. 

When the correctional officers asked Sandoval to exit his cell to allow the search,

he refused to exit the cell and turned his light off. Although Sandoval asserted he

had no knowledge of the weapon and his cellmate claimed responsibility, the

hearing officer’s investigation determined that the weapon and metal stock were

pieces of a handicap walker and it would have been impossible for Sandoval to

have no knowledge of these weapons given the time involved to break down the

walker into pieces and fashion a weapon. Thus, “some evidence” supports the

hearing officer’s finding that Sandoval had constructive possession of the weapon.

(Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op. at 1-2.)

The record supports a finding that the state supreme court, in silently adopting the

reasoning of the appellate court, did not accept Petitioner’s contention that his delay was

excusable based on the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the timeliness rule. This

Court must make an independent determination of what the state court would have held with

respect to timeliness. Evans, 546 U.S. at 197-98. The Court finds that Petitioner has not shown

that the 349-day delay between the denial of his appellate court habeas petition and the filing of

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his state supreme court petition was “reasonable” or otherwise excusable under California law. 

Accordingly, he is not entitled to statutory tolling for that gap, and the federal Petition is

untimely even if Petitioner is entitled to the most generous application of equitable tolling, as

well as statutory tolling while any or all of his state petitions were under consideration by the

state courts. 

D. Tolling Summary

The Court finds that the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 7, 2011. 

Assuming Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling while he was not in possession of his legal

materials from November 27, 2011, until March 2, 2012, at which point 129 days remained on

the statute of limitations, it expired on July 9, 2012, 49 days before state habeas review began

on August 27, 2012, thereby precluding any statutory tolling and rendering the federal Petition

untimely. Assuming Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling from November 27, 2011, until he

filed his first state habeas petition on August 27, 2012, at which point 129 days remained on the

one-year statute of limitations, he is not entitled to statutory tolling during the pendency of his

first state habeas petition because the superior court found it to be untimely, and the limitations

period therefore expired during the 234 days that first state petition was pending, precluding

statutory tolling for any subsequent state petitions and rendering the federal Petition untimely. 

Finally, assuming equitable tolling is available from November 27, 2011, until Petitioner filed

his first state habeas petition on August 27, 2012, at which point 129 days remained on the oneyear statute of limitations, and assuming the finding of untimeliness of his first state petition by

the superior court was invalidated by the later state court decisions addressing the merits of the

claim, statutory tolling is not available for the 349-day gap between the denial of the appellate

court petition and the filing of the state supreme court petition, and the one-year statute of

limitations would have expired during that lengthy and unjustified gap between petitions,

thereby rendering the federal Petition untimely. 

E. Actual Innocence

Finally, to the extent Petitioner’s contention that no reasonable factfinder would have

found him guilty must be liberally construed as an allegation that he is actually innocent, he has

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not satisfied the actual innocence exception to untimeliness set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 327 (1995). “In order to pass through Schlup’s gateway, and have an otherwise barred

constitutional claim heard on the merits, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence,

including evidence not introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770,

775-76 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In applying this standard, “A petitioner

need not show that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was convicted of committing;

instead, he must show that ‘“a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” 

Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776, quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1987) (en

banc), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. 

The Court finds that Petitioner has not made such a showing for the same reasons set forth

above regarding why he failed to demonstrate in state court that no reasonable factfinder could

find him guilty. As the state appellate court correctly found, sufficient evidence was presented

for a reasonable factfinder to find that Petitioner was aware of the deadly weapon possessed by

his cellmate, and therefore guilty of constructive possession of it, not only because its existence

must have been obvious to Petitioner, but because Petitioner acted suspiciously when asked to

exit his cell. (Lodgment No. 6, In re Sandoval, No. D063782, slip op. at 1-2.) Petitioner has

failed to show any reasons that “a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the”

disciplinary proceeding. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) directing that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED; and (3) directing that judgment be entered

DISMISSING the Petition with prejudice for failure to file within the applicable statute of

limitations. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 21, 2015 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than September 18, 2015. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 29, 2015

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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