Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01306/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01306-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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1 Unless otherwise stated, all references to “Rule” are to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELAINE CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR, )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

LABOR, )

) 2:05-cv-01306-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER

v. )

)

JASMINE HALL CARE HOMES, INC., a )

corporation, HALL CARE HOMES, INC.,)

corporation, GEORGE K. HALL, an )

individual, and ESTELLA HALL, an )

individual, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On September 22, 2005, an Order to Show Cause (OSC) issued

requiring Plaintiff to explain why sanctions should not be imposed

against Plaintiff and/or her counsel because of Plaintiff’s failure to

timely file a status report in compliance with the Court’s June 29,

2005, Order Setting Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference (hereafter

referenced as “Rule 16 Order”).1 On November 28, 2005, Plaintiff

filed a timely Response to OSC and Declaration in Support of

Plaintiff’s Response to OSC. In the Response, Plaintiff declined the

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opportunity for a hearing on the OSC. (Pl.’s Response to OSC

(“Response”) at 1.) 

Plaintiff’s Response reveals that the failure to timely file

a status report is due to the fault of Plaintiff’s counsel, not

Plaintiff. The Response states that Plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently

failed to recognize when the status report was due, and that this

“inadvertence was compounded by an aberration in the calendaring

system in counsel’s office.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s counsel argues

that sanctions should not be imposed because a “three-day inadvertent

delay” is “not a long delay,” and because “the imposition of sanctions

for this isolated mistake, entirely lacking in bad faith or

contumaciousness, would not be just.” (Id. at 4-5.) In support of

her argument, Plaintiff’s counsel cites to out-of circuit cases and a

Ninth Circuit case that assessed “a District Court’s imposition of

sanctions under Rule 37. . . .” (Id. at 4.) 

However, the authority on which Plaintiff relies does not

address the Ninth Circuit’s application of Rule 16(f) to a situation

where counsel’s inattentiveness resulted in counsel’s failure to

comply with a Rule 16 scheduling event. In Ayers v. City of Richmond,

the Ninth Circuit upheld imposition of a sanction where counsel failed

to appear for a settlement conference because the date “slipped by

him.” 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990); see Martin Family Trust v.

Neco-Nostalgia Entr. Co., 186 F.R.D. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (sanctioning

plaintiff for failure to submit a status report notwithstanding

plaintiff’s excuse that it failed to file the status report because it

was engaged in settlement negotiations). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

counsel’s failure to timely file a status report due to inadvertence

of counsel is sanctionable conduct, even if that failure was an

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isolated mistake lacking in contumaciousness. Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d

1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating “neither contumacious attitude

nor chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of

sanctions” under Rule 16). 

Plaintiff’s counsel argues that despite her inadvertence,

sanctions should not be imposed because the “lack of prejudice to the

other parties . . . is a substantial factor weighing against their

issuance, given that one of the major purposes of sanctions under

Rule 16 is ‘to compensate opposing parties for inconvenience and

expense . . . .’” (Response at 5, quoting In re Matter of the

Sanction of Jay C. Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440-41 (10th Cir. 1984).)

However, “[t]he primary purpose of sanctions [under Rule 16(f) . . .

is to insure reasonable management requirements for case preparation.” 

In re Matter of the Sanction of Jay C. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441

(stating that “the text [of Rule 16] and the Notes of the Advisory

Committee make clear that concerns about burdens on the court are to

receive no less attention than concerns about burdens on opposing

parties”). Thus, a court has discretion to impose sanctions under

Rule 16(f), despite the lack of prejudice to opposing parties, “where

necessary to insure . . . that lawyers . . . fulfill their high duty

to ensure the expeditious and sound management of the preparation of

cases for trial.” Id. at 1440. 

Judges should be expected to take action when Rule 16 filing

deadlines are missed -- otherwise, deadlines cease to be meaningful. 

[The] trial judge has an independent

responsibility to enforce the directives he has

laid down for the case. . . . “Rules are rules –

and the parties must play by them. In the final

analysis, the judicial process depends heavily on

the judge’s credibility. To ensure such

credibility, a district judge must often be firm

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in managing crowded dockets and demanding

adherence to announced deadlines. If he or she

sets a reasonable due date, parties should not be

allowed casually to flout it or painlessly to

escape the foreseeable consequences of

noncompliance.”

Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting

Mendez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.

1990)). “A scheduling order ‘is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly

entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without

peril.’ . . . Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s

ability to control its docket . . . and reward the indolent and the

cavalier.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610

(9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, it is imperative for counsel “to focus

some attention on the importance of [filing documents on time] and of

devising a system which will avoid tardiness and complicating delays

in the administration of the business of the Court.” In re Allis, 531

F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Plaintiff’s counsel states that the failure to timely file

the status report was due to “a substantial press of case deadlines in

other active litigation matters . . . which [she] was handling

[herself].” (Coplick Decl. ¶ 15.) However, the “excuse . . . that

attorneys labor under the pressure of deadlines [usually connotes that

the attorneys failed to adequately manage cases]. Time is a precious

luxury which, if not carefully budgeted, can be a powerful foe.” Dela

Rosa v. Scottsdale Memorial Health Sys., 136 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir.

1998). In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates her “inadvertent

oversight was compounded by the fact that [her] office’s usual back-up

calendaring systems . . . had failed to catch the deadline . . . .” 

(Coplick Decl. ¶ 19.) However, when a non-attorney is given the task

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of scheduling a Rule 16 deadline, “it should never be forgotten that

the attorney of record is ultimately responsible for . . . [compliance

with the deadline].” Dela Rosa, 136 F.3d at 1244. 

The only statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel clearly

indicating some acknowledgment of the need to timely file documents

are located in the Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Response to

the OSC. In the declaration, counsel states she “sincerely regrets

any inconvenience which may have been caused to the Court,” and

explains that “immediately” upon learning of the calendaring error, an

“emergency office meeting” was held to correct “the calendering system

omission.” (Coplick Decl. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Unlike the declaration,

however, the Response to the OSC appears to indicate that the judge

should not expect counsel to file documents when they are due, and

should not be bothered when a document is three days late. This

response bristles with a contemptuous tone. Plaintiff’s counsel’s

apparent attitude evincing indifference as to whether Plaintiff timely

complies with a Rule 16 scheduling order is disturbing and indicates

that sanctions should issue to ensure that Plaintiff’s counsel and

other attorneys are deterred from being inattentive to Rule 16

scheduling dates. 

Therefore, it is clear that a sanction could be, and perhaps

ought to be, imposed because Plaintiff’s counsel did not provide a

sufficient justification to avoid a sanction. However, a sanction

will not be imposed at this time because unlike the Response to the

OSC, Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration shows acknowledgment of the

need to timely comply with a Rule 16 scheduling date. Plaintiff’s

counsel is warned that in the future, scheduling dates are to be

complied with in a timely fashion, and that sanctions jurisprudence

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will be re-visited if counsel fails to heed this warning. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 6, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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