Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00689/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00689-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1400 IDEA: Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (short title)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

E.M., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 19cv689 MJ MSB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART CROSS 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

Plaintiff E.M. (“E.M.”), by and through his parents (“E.M.’s Parents”), and 

Defendant Poway Unified School District (“the District”), filed cross motions for 

summary judgment under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-09, appealing a decision by Administrative Law Judge Clifford H. 

Woosley (“the ALJ”). (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.) The motions have been briefed and the court 

finds them suitable for submission on the papers and without oral argument in accordance 

with Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the below reasons, the court: (1) affirms the ALJ’s 

decision that the District failed to make a sufficiently specific placement offer; (2) declines 

to reach the issue of whether private school is E.M.’s least restrictive environment; 

(3) affirms the ALJ’s decision that E.M.s’ individualized education program (IEP) was 

reasonably calculated to enable E.M. to make appropriate progress; and (4) affirms the 

ALJ’s decision that the District did not unreasonably delay initiating a due process 

hearing. The parties’ motions are, therefore, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

E.M. is a ten-year-old boy diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, attention 

deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and anxiety/mood disorder who qualifies for 

special education services. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 271.)1

 E.M. began second 

grade for the 2016-2017 year in a general education class at Chaparral Elementary. (Id.

at 193.) On September 8, 2016, a required annual meeting was held to review E.M.’s IEP 

with E.M.’s Parents. (Id. at 321.) The District offered to keep E.M. in a general education 

classroom, with some specialized academic instruction, occupational therapy, and speech 

and language services. (Id. at 341-42.) 

On October 6, 2016, E.M.’s Parents were called because he reportedly struck 

classmates and hit a staff member with a water bottle. (Id. at 729.) On October 13, 2016, 

E.M.’s Parents were called because he reportedly hit a school psychologist on the arm 

multiple times and pounded on his classroom door trying to get in. (Id.) 

On October 17, 2016, a meeting was held at E.M.’s Parents’ request. (Id. at 348.) 

E.M.’s Parents shared their concerns including, inter alia, that E.M.’s behavior was 

interfering with his education, that he was exhibiting behaviors similar to those in 

kindergarten and first grade, and that being sent to the principal’s office was reinforcing 

his behavior. (Id.) They also requested that the District develop a behavior intervention 

plan (BIP) and provide a one-on-one aide to implement the plan and promote E.M.’s 

safety. (Id.) The District did not agree to the aide, but agreed to conduct (1) a functional 

behavior assessment to determine the functions E.M.’s negative behaviors served and how 

those functions could be more appropriately met, and (2) a special circumstances 

independence assessment to evaluate the benefit of a one-on-one aide. (Id. at 177, 366.) 

On October 20, 2016, E.M. was sent home for reportedly throwing balls at students and 

hitting a student with a book. (Id. at 728.) 

1

 References to pages in the administrative record are to the page numbers in the stipulated 

record, (Doc. No. 25), not those assigned by the court’s CM/ECF system. 

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On October 27, 2016, a meeting was held during which E.M.’s Parents were 

presented with a draft BIP, but declined to review it “due to parent’s desire to have the 

BIP written by a member of the behavior support team after the completion of [the 

functional behavior assessment].” (Id. at 358.) Due to a “concern for [E.M.’s] safety, and 

other children’s safety,” E.M.’s Parents again requested an aide, at least on a temporary 

basis, until the functional behavior assessment could be completed. (Id. at 359.) The 

District again declined to offer an aide, but agreed to consider it after the completion of 

the special circumstances independence assessment. (Id.) Again, the District offered to 

keep E.M. in a general education classroom, with some specialized academic instruction, 

occupational therapy, and speech and language services. (Id. at 341-42.) The District also 

offered an extended school year “based on [E.M.’s] regression and recoupment.” (Id. at 

361.) E.M.’s Parents agreed.2

 (Id. at 365.) 

On November 9, 2016, E.M. was disciplined with a loss of privileges for causing, 

attempting, or threating injury. (Id. at 728.) The disciplinary report states: 

[E.M.] entered the classroom and started bullying another student by trying to 

grab his papers and pencils. The other student tried to cover up his items with 

his arms and [E.M.] proceeded to pry the student’s arms open. The student 

was holding a pencil and it scratched [E.M.] on the arm because [E.M.] was 

grabbing the student’s arms. In return, [E.M.] grabbed the pencil and 

intentionally scratched the student with it. 

(Id.) 

2

 The meeting notes also state: 

A quiet place in the classroom has been made for [E.M.] to access in the gen. 

ed. [class] and he has chosen to work in the area at times, and at times he 

works, and is encouraged to work in other areas in the classroom. Father 

reported that he felt that this was isolation. Site team shared that it appears 

that is an area that is less distracting for [E.M.]. Parents request an observation 

of the gen. ed. classroom. [The principal] will coordinate this with the parents 

for a 30-minute observation. 

(AR at 358.) 

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On December 15, 2016, the District completed the functional behavior assessment, 

(id. at 373-86), and special circumstances independence assessment, (id. at 366-72). A 

meeting was held to discuss the assessments during which it was agreed to develop a BIP. 

(Id. at 387.) Based on the assessment, the District recommended that a one-on-one aide 

in a general education class would not be sufficient support for E.M. (Id.) The parties 

agreed to discuss the recommendation after a proposed BIP was reviewed. (Id.) The 

parties discussed placing E.M. in a special day class for children with autism spectrum 

disorder at Westwood Elementary.3

 (Id.) E.M.’s Parents wanted to try to implement the 

BIP in E.M.’s general education class with an aide. (Id.) The District agreed to provide 

“additional classroom support” in E.M.’s current class for a 30-day trial period. (Id.) 

E.M.’s Parents agreed. (Id. at 388.) The following day, E.M. was disciplined with a loss 

of privileges because he reportedly pinned another student to the wall and threatened to 

hurt him. (Id. at 727.) 

In January of 2017, E.M. was disciplined multiple times. On January 10, 2017, 

E.M. was suspended after he came into an office, kicked one of the adults, tried to lock 

the office door, and began screaming. (Id. at 727.) On January 12, 2017, E.M. was 

counseled for running into the resource room and pushing and grabbing at another 

student’s clothes while yelling. (Id. at 726.) He was also suspended for breaking a 

popsicle stick in half and saying “it’s a knife, I’m going to kill you” and waiving the stick 

in students’ faces. (Id.) On January 26, 2017, E.M. was sent home for running around 

3

 The District recommended that: 

E.M. would benefit from a structured classroom environment with clear 

expectations, a smaller adult to student ratio, consistent routine, a positive 

behavior system, that would provide immediate and frequent feedback 

throughout the day, sensory strategies, visual supports, and instruction to meet 

his academic, social skills and behavior/social needs. 

(AR at 388.) 

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campus, running into classrooms, banging on doors, grabbing three students, and 

disregarding directions of multiple adults. (Id.) On January 30, 2017, E.M. received an 

in-school suspension for pushing his aide, screaming in the office, and physically “going 

after” another student. (Id. at 725.) 

 On February 1, 2017, E.M. was suspended for pushing and hitting his aide. (Id.) 

That same day, E.M.’s Parents agreed to place E.M. in the special day class at Westwood 

Elementary.4

 (Id. at 591.) The District agreed and E.M. was placed in the special day 

class beginning on February 6, 2017. (Id. at 592.) The District also agreed to provide 

“adult additional classroom support” for E.M. for 60 days to assist with the transition, as 

well as special education transportation services. (Id.) Notwithstanding his recent 

disciplinary incidents, on March 21, 2017, the parties met and agreed that E.M. was 

responding positively to his new class and school. (Id. at 395.) 

 In May of 2017, E.M. was disciplined multiple times. On May 8, 2017, he was 

suspended for assaulting five people at the start of the day and repeatedly attempting to 

assault a first-grade student in another class. (Id. at 724.) On May 16, 2017, E.M.’s 

Parents were called because he got off the bus and ran away from his teachers, and 

slammed his body into teachers and aides throughout the day. (Id.) On May 17, 2017, 

E.M. was suspended for repeatedly assaulting staff. (Id. at 723-24.) On May 24, 2017, 

E.M. was disciplined with loss of privileges for repeatedly grabbing and shaking a student. 

(Id. at 723.) 

 On September 5, 2017, at the beginning of his third-grade year in Westwood’s 

special day class, E.M. was suspended for reportedly running through eight classes during 

instruction, assaulting one student, threatening further assault, and running off campus. 

(Id.) On September 6, 2017, the parties met to develop E.M.’s IEP. (Id. at 598.) Again, 

notwithstanding his recent disciplinary incidents, the parties agreed that “at this point 

4

 E.M.’s complaint suggests that his Parents were informed of the suspension after agreeing 

to the new placement. (AR at 181.) 

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[E.M.] is not displaying a lot of autism characteristics at school and is doing well socially 

and pragmatically at school, at this time.” (Id. at 638.) E.M.’s Parents expressed concern 

regarding closing a gap in his reading and writing. (Id.) Due to time constraints and a 

need to complete assessments, the parties agreed to reconvene later to complete the IEP. 

(Id.) 

 On October 16, 2017, a District occupational therapist completed a school basedoccupational therapy evaluation. (Id. at 643.) On October 24, 2017, Ms. Cummings, a 

school psychologist, completed an educationally related mental health services assessment 

(“ERMHS assessment”). (Id. at 398.) On October 25, 2017, Ms. Klock, another school 

psychologist, completed a pyscho-educational assessment report. (Id. at 652.) Ms. 

Cummings’ and Ms. Klock’s assessments listed 14 recommendations for controlling 

E.M.’s negative behaviors. (Id. at 408-09, 675.) On October 25, 2017, the parties met to 

continue discussing E.M.’s IEP. (Id. at 641-42.) The parties developed goals related to 

reading, writing, communication, behavior, social-emotional goals, and fine motor skills, 

(id. at 94-96), but due to time constraints, the IEP was not completed and the parties agreed 

to reconvene later, (id. at 642). 

On December 14, 2017, the parties met to continue discussing E.M.’s IEP during 

which E.M.’s special education teacher, Ms. Romero, gave a report. (Id. at 676.) The 

meeting notes state: 

[Ms. Romero] shared behavior data regarding his behavior (non-compliance, 

elopement, aggression) [and that] there has been an increase in aggression 

duration, and frequency. It is noted that there are increases and decreases, 

however, despite the many interventions, supports, and strategies, the patterns 

of behavior are not decreasing, they are at a maintenance level with very [few] 

demands. It was noted by [Ms. Romero] that with increases in demands then 

his behavior increases. His aggressive behavior is not really with intent to 

hurt someone, however the actions could hurt others or himself, it will 

necessitate adult attention, and there are safety concerns. [Ms. Romero] 

shared that his behavior impacts the learning of the other students as well. 

[Ms. Romero] reported a recent incident at an emergency drill, despite 

frontloading, and this drill occurring previously. He was very dangerous to 

the point that the class could not hear the call for the class to evacuate the 

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room. She also noted that there are times that he can be completing a preferred 

activity and then begin attention seeking behavior which can then move to 

aggressive behavior. It was also noted that with his behaviors, 100% of them 

are non-compliance. 

(Id.) In order to meet his goals, the District offered the following special education 

services: (1) specialized academic instruction for five hours per day; (2) individual 

counseling for 10 hours per year; (3) individual speech-language therapy for 15 hours per 

year; (4) individual occupational therapy for 15 hours per year; (5) an extended school 

year (to include specialized academic instruction for four hours per day, counseling for 15 

minutes per week, speech language therapy for 20 minutes per week, occupational therapy 

for 20 minutes per week, and additional classroom support for four hours per day). (Id. at 

96-97.) The parties agreed to develop a BIP to deal with E.M.’s non-compliance, 

aggression, and elopement. (Id. at 97.) 

At this December 14, 2017 meeting, the District also “recommended,” for the first 

time, placing E.M. in a private school5

 and specifically recommended two private schools. 

(Id. at 676-77.) The record of the meeting states: 

[E.M.’s program specialist] presented program options and that the school 

team has implemented many various resources, supports, and interventions, 

and that his access to typical peers is very limited currently due to behavior 

and safety concerns. Team discussed current level of behaviors and a need to 

move to a more supportive environment to address his behavior needs. School 

team is recommending placement in a Non-Public School for this purpose. 

The team discussed the process for this, and [the program specialist] and [Ms. 

Klock] provided information about Non-Public Schools in general, with 

specific recommendations for Springall Academy and San Diego Center for 

Children. Transportation would be provided. Parent was provided with 

Release of Information forms, which is necessary for the process of referrals 

to the schools. Parent will take them home to review with her husband, and 

will contact [E.M.’s program specialist] regarding their decision. . . . 

5

 The administrative record often uses the term “nonpublic school” or “NPS.” Because the 

IDEA statute uses the term “private school,” see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2)(H), the court 

will use the term “private school” where possible. 

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[O]ffer of [free appropriate public education] is placement in the [special day] 

class at [Westwood] until the next IEP meeting which will be scheduled after 

we receive word from the parents regarding the NPS process[.] 

(Id.) At the meeting, E.M.’s Parents agreed that the special educational services and goals 

could be implemented immediately, but did not consent to placing E.M. in a private 

school. (Id. at 97, 677.) 

On January 29, 2018, the parties met to continue discussing E.M.’s IEP. (Id. at 

678.) Ms. Klock reported that she tried recommendations from the ERMHS assessment, 

but E.M.’s behaviors only increased. (Id.) The parties agreed to conduct another ERMHS 

assessment. (Id.) The record of the meeting states “a change of placement is still being 

offered due to [E.M.’s] behavior needs, and that he needs an environment that would 

provide more behavioral supports than are available in his current placement. . . . The 

[District’s] offer of [free appropriate public education] is placement in a Non-Public 

School, start date would be determined[.]” (Id. at 679.) E.M.’s parents “stated [they] 

would like to move forward with the [annual review of E.M.’s IEP] but not . . . . a change 

in placement to a Non Public School.” (Id. at 678.) 

 In February of 2018, E.M. was disciplined multiple times. On February 5, 2018, 

E.M. was suspended. (Id. at 722.) The disciplinary report states: 

[E.M.], on 2/05/18, holding plastic knives in both hands, attempted to stab 

another student. He then proceeded to kick other students, the classroom 

teacher and threatened to hit both the teacher and the principal. In addition, 

[E.M.] tore up the work of other students, damaged classroom furniture, 

destroyed printed curriculum and destroyed classroom decorations 

(Id.) On February 13, 2018, E.M.’s Parents were called because he eloped from class and 

attempted to trip students. (Id. at 722.) On February 14, 2018, E.M.’s Parents were called 

because he destroyed another student’s belongings and attempted to leave campus. (Id. at 

721-22.) On February 16, 2018, E.M.’s Parents were called because he grabbed and 

tackled classmates then ran around the school. (Id. at 721.) 

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In March of 2018, E.M. was disciplined multiple times. On March 1, 2018, E.M.’s 

Parents were called because he hit himself, yelled and screamed at classmates, and 

attempted to trip another student. (Id.) On March 2, 2018, E.M. was suspended for 

causing, attempting or threatening injury and terroristic threats. (Id. at 720.) The 

disciplinary report states: 

[E.M.], on 2/28 said, “Can I blow up the whole school?” Beginning at 

8:45AM and repeated four times. 

On 3/1 he was self injuring – hitting bare leg with ruler repeatedly, saying 

there was a bug on him, was assured there was no bug and continued – red 

mark that eventually faded. At 11:30 the same day he said, “I want to blow 

up the whole school.” 

On 3/2 the student said, “I have a bomb. I’m going to blow up the classroom. 

This is half TNT and half C4; I set the bomb to go off at 12 o’clock. I hid a 

bomb. Haha. I hid a bomb in the classroom.” 

. . . . 

Assistant Principal called the parent and described the incident to him and 

explained that [E.M.] was suspended for 3 days. Parent was also notified that 

the police were called and would be performing a threat assessment [as 

required by law]. 

(Id.) On March 16, 2018, E.M.’s Parents were called because he ran around class 

attempting to bother another student and called the teachers names. (Id. at 719.) On 

March 20, 2018, E.M. was “detained in office” for putting his hands on another student 

and knocking down the toys the student was playing with. (Id.) On March 21, 2018, 

E.M.’s Parents were called because he threw his backpack at another student. (Id.) On 

March 26, 2018, E.M. was “detained in office” for running from the bus to class, running 

from the class when presented with morning work, attempting to leave campus, and 

running through classrooms yelling and causing a lockdown. (Id. at 718.) On March 28, 

2018, E.M. was disciplined with a loss of privileges for running from class, entering other 

classrooms yelling, and causing a lockdown of the school. (Id.) On March 29, 2018, E.M. 

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was “detained in office” for attacking a classmate and running around the school for 45 

minutes. (Id. at 717.) 

On March 16, 2018, a third school psychologist, Ms. Valencia, completed a second 

ERMHS assessment. (Id. at 680.) 

In April of 2018, E.M. was disciplined multiple times. On April 2, 2018, E.M. was 

“detained in office” for running from class and around campus causing rooms to be locked. 

(Id. at 717.) On April 3, 2018, E.M. was “detained in office” for running around campus 

and targeting certain classrooms which were locked for safety. (Id. at 716.) On April 17, 

2018, E.M. was counseled for running through classrooms and disrupting instruction. (Id.) 

On April 18, 2018, E.M. was “detained in office” and counseled for running around 

campus and disrupting other classrooms. (Id.) On April 26, 2018, E.M. was suspended 

for threatening to hit another student while riding the bus and threatening to evacuate the 

bus through the emergency exit.6

 (Id. at 715.) 

On May 2, 2018, the District completed an assessment to determine whether E.M.’s 

behaviors resulting in suspensions on September 5th, February 2nd, March 2nd, and April 

26th were manifestations of his disability. (Id. at 703-05.) The report includes a section 

titled “teacher observations” which states: 

Teacher reports that [E.M.] climbs trees/fences/furniture, yells out of anger at 

peers/adults, and screams high-pitched directly in peers’ ears. [E.M.] argues 

with staff and name-calls staff/peers, grabs staff legs/tries to trip them, and 

head-butts teachers in their mid-section. [E.M.] elopes through campus while 

yelling (through classrooms), and has made attempts to leave campus. [E.M.] 

takes materials from students, shakes their bodies, laughs in their face, and 

tackles them, all of which occur unprovoked. [E.M.] teases peers, falsely 

accuses peers/adults of things, and threatens students verbally/physically. 

6

 E.M.’s complaint states that “[E.M.’s] father asked that District to further investigate this 

claim. Following its investigation, District informed [E.M.’s] father that [E.M.] did not 

threaten to open the bus door. Instead, [E.M.] simply moved close to the emergency door 

and the driver feared he could open it.” (AR at 185-86.) 

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[E.M.] erases student work, intentionally distracts peers from working, and 

throws away their work/personal items. [E.M.] refuses to get on/off the bus, 

gets out of his seat while the bus is in motion, physically/verbally targets peers 

on the bus, and threatens to open the emergency exits. [E.M.] engages in 

property destruction, uses technology without permission, throws objects at 

peers/adults, charges student with “sharp” Play-Doh tool, attempts/threatens 

to bite others, disrupts safety drills, hits his head with materials, hits his bare 

legs with the side of a ruler and says there are bugs on him, trips peers while 

they are running on the track and in class. [E.M.] has dug under the school 

fence to elope from school, runs/hides in the bushes/behind portables/sheds, 

verbally threatens others saying things like, “I am going to get you,” “Can I 

blow up the school” and “I have a bomb.” 

(Id. at 704.) The report also includes a section for “parent input” which states: 

The function of [E.M.’s] negative behaviors (including those resulting in the 

suspensions) were primarily to avoid and escape work or the classroom 

environment. Avoidance of school work is a manifestation of his disability 

(ADHD). Also at least one of the suspensions was a direct result of the 

district’s failure to implement [E.M.’s] IEP. 

(Id.) The report concludes that E.M.’s behavior was caused by or had a direct and 

substantial relationship to E.M.’s disability and was not the result of the District’s failure 

to implement the IEP. (Id. at 704-05.) E.M.’s Parents agreed that E.M.’s conduct was a 

manifestation of his disability, but disagreed that it was not the direct result of the 

District’s failure to implement E.M.’s IEP. (Id. at 186.) 

 On May 3, 2018, the parties met and the District again offered placement at a private 

school, as well as individual counseling services. (Id. at 707-08.) Ms. Valencia shared 

the results of the ERMHS assessment and recommended a trial of the counseling services 

for 30 minutes per week in place of the counseling E.M. was receiving at the time. (Id. at 

707.) The District also offered to provide E.M. with an aide while riding the bus and 

E.M.’s Parents agreed. (Id.) The record of the meeting states “[the program specialist] 

reviews offer of [free appropriate public education] to be placement and it continues at 

Non-Public School[.]” (Id. at 708.) 

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 In May of 2018, E.M. was disciplined several more times. On May 15, 2018, E.M. 

was suspended for assaulting school staff and damaging school property. (Id. at 715.) On 

May 21, 2018, E.M. was disciplined with a behavior contract and loss of privileges for 

running around the school, being aggressive toward his classmates, and causing other 

students to be evacuated from the room. (Id. at 714.) On May 23, 2018, E.M. was 

suspended for repeatedly trying to leave campus and being physical with his aide and the 

principal. (Id. at 713.) 

 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On June 18, 2018, E.M.’s Parents filed their initial complaint requesting a due 

process hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings. (Id. at 1.) On August 1, 

2018, the District filed its own complaint requesting a due process hearing. (Id. at 93.) 

E.M.’s Parents ultimately presented three issues for the ALJ to decide. (Id. at 742.) First, 

did the District deny E.M. a free appropriate public education (FAPE) because the 

December 2017 offer of private school placement was not E.M.’s least restrictive 

environment? (Id.) Second, did the District deny E.M. a FAPE from June 2016 to the 

date the complaint was filed in June 2018 when the District failed to develop E.M.’s IEP 

to include appropriate accommodations, modifications, supports, and services? (Id.) 

Third, did the District deny E.M. a FAPE by failing to initiate a due process hearing within 

a reasonable time after the IEP team reached an impasse regarding his placement in 2017? 

(Id.) The sole issue in the District’s complaint was whether “the District’s September 6, 

2017 offer of program, services, and placement, as amended on October 26, 2017, 

December 14, 2017, January 29, 2018, and May 3, 2018 constitutes [E.M.’s FAPE] in his 

least restrictive environment[.]” (Id. at 187, 742.) 

 The ALJ found for the District on all three of E.M.’s issues. (Id. at 742-43.) On 

E.M.’s first issue, the ALJ found that private school was E.M.’s least restrictive 

environment because: (1) private school was appropriate because it provided a smaller 

effective environment to address E.M.’s behavior; (2) E.M.’s dysregulation, aggressions, 

defiance, sensory needs, and elopement could not be addressed in his current placement 

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on a comprehensive public-school campus; (3) E.M.’s behaviors created safety risks for 

him, his fellow students, and the staff; and (4) E.M. was not meaningfully interacting with 

typical peers in mainstreaming activities and was not accessing and benefiting from his 

educational placement. (Id. at 742.) 

 On E.M.’s second issue, the ALJ found that E.M.’s IEP was reasonably calculated 

to enable him to make appropriate progress in light of his circumstances because (1) from 

June 2016 through May 2017, the District convened eleven IEP team meetings and 

conducted seven assessments, and (2) the District used multiple sources to determine his 

present levels of performance, drafted and revised goals, gathered behavior data, and finetuned the BIP, while keeping E.M.’s Parents informed and involved. (Id. at 743.) 

 On E.M.’s third issue, the ALJ found that the District did not fail to initiate a due 

process hearing within a reasonable time after an impasse was reached regarding his 

placement because (1) the District’s August 1, 2018 complaint was filed within three 

months of the May 2018 IEP meeting, and (2) the parties desired to mediate a second time 

and jointly requested to set the hearing for December 12, 2018, and the hearing was 

continued to January 24, 2019 because the E.M.’s Parents filed an amended complaint. 

(Id. at 743, 782.) 

 On the District’s issue, although the ALJ found that private school was E.M.’s least 

restrictive environment, the ALJ also found that the District did not demonstrate that its 

December 2017 offer of private school placement, as amended at the May 2018 meeting, 

offered E.M. a FAPE in his least restrictive environment. (Id. at 784-86.) This was based 

upon the ALJ’s finding that the District committed a procedural violation that significantly 

impeded E.M.’s Parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, and 

therefore, amounted to a denial of a FAPE. (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ found the District 

failed to provide E.M.’s Parents with adequate information about the private school 

placement it was recommending, and thereby violated federal and state law requiring the 

District to make an offer that was sufficiently specific for Parents to evaluate. (Id.) Based 

on the information provided by the District, the ALJ found that E.M.’s Parents could not 

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make an informed decision as to whether they believed E.M.’s unique needs could be met 

in private school. (Id.) On August 23, 2019, the parties filed cross motions for summary 

judgment. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.) 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The IDEA statute’s “core” is the “cooperative process that it establishes between 

parents and schools,” the “central vehicle” of which is the development of an IEP. 

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). A party objecting to an IEP may invoke 

IDEA’s “procedural safeguards.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415; see also Winkelman v. Parma City 

Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007). These safeguards include the opportunity for 

“any party to present a complaint” concerning “any matter relating to the identification, 

evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 

public education to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). A complaint initiates a process 

of review that can include, in relevant part, a preliminary meeting and an impartial due 

process hearing conducted by the state or local educational agency. Id. at § 1415(f)(1). 

Once the state educational agency has reached a decision, an aggrieved party may sue in 

federal court. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 526 (citing § 1415(i)(2)(A)). 

In appeals of administrative decisions in federal court, IDEA provides “the court 

shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence 

at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, 

shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not plainly speak to how such appeals should 

be handled.” L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 891 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Such appeals, however, generally involve disputed issues of material fact. Id. Thus, 

using a summary judgment framework to appeal administrative decisions under IDEA 

presents a “puzzling procedural problem.” Id. at 892. To resolve this problem, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that “[t]hough the parties may call the procedure a ‘motion for summary 

judgment’ in order to obtain a calendar date from the district court’s case management 

clerk, the procedure is, in substance, an appeal from an administrative determination, not 

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a summary judgment.” Id.; see also Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“Although this procedure is permissible under the IDEA, it is not a true 

summary judgment procedure. Instead, the district court essentially conduct[s] a bench 

trial based on a stipulated record.”); J.L.N. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., Case No. 

17cv2097 L (MDD), 2019 WL 4849172, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (treating cross 

motions for summary judgment as an appeal of an administrative decision). 

The Supreme Court has held that IDEA’s procedural safeguard provision “is by no 

means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational 

policy for those of the school authorities which they review. . . . The fact that § 1415(e) 

requires that the reviewing court ‘receive the records of the [state] administrative 

proceedings’ carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to 

these proceedings.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. 

v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). 

Although a substantial body of caselaw exists defining the nature and limits of 

judicial discretion in IDEA matters, independent review informed by careful 

consideration of an ALJ’s thoughtful analysis would seem to encapsulate this court’s task. 

A sampling of the finely spun attenuations of this standard follows: Cty. of San Diego v. 

California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1996) (“At bottom, 

the court itself is free to determine independently how much weight to give the 

administrative findings in light of the enumerated factors.”); Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 

15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The extent of deference to be given is within our 

discretion.”); Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(the deference afforded the ALJ’s decision “is a matter for the discretion of the courts”). 

This does not mean the ALJ’s findings can be ignored. Longview, 811 F.2d at 

1311; see also M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1195 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2017) (“[B]lind deference is not appropriate. Rather, the district judge must 

actually examine the record to determine whether it supports the ALJ’s opinion.”), cert. 

denied, 138 S. Ct. 556 (2017); Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 892 (“The district court’s 

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independent judgment is not controlled by the hearing officer’s recommendations, but 

neither may it be made without due deference.”); Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1474 (“Despite their 

discretion to reject the administrative findings after carefully considering them . . . . courts 

are not permitted simply to ‘ignore the administrative findings.’”) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held that in reviewing administrative findings, “‘[t]he 

court, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency, must consider the 

findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer’s resolution of each 

material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to accept or reject the findings 

in part or in whole.’” Longview, 811 F.2d at 1311 (quoting Town of Burlington v. Dept. 

of Ed., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 471 U.S. 359 (1985)). 

The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[w]e give deference to the administrative 

findings of the Hearing Officer particularly when . . . . they are thorough and careful.” 

Union, 15 F.3d at 1524; see also R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 

937 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The court gives particular deference where the hearing officer’s 

administrative findings are ‘thorough and careful.’”); Cty. of San Diego, 93 F.3d at 1466-

67 (“This circuit gives the state hearing officer’s decision ‘substantial weight’ when it 

‘evinces his careful, impartial consideration of all the evidence and demonstrates his 

sensitivity to the complexity of the issues presented.’”) (quoting Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1476); 

Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 891 (“The amount of deference accorded the hearing officer’s 

findings increases where they are ‘thorough and careful.’”); but see Antelope Valley, 858 

F.3d at 1194 (“We can accord some deference to the ALJ’s factual findings, but only 

where they are ‘thorough and careful[.]’”). A court “treat[s] a hearing officer’s findings 

as ‘thorough and careful’ when the officer participates in the questioning of witnesses 

and writes a decision contain[ing] a complete factual background as well as a discrete 

analysis supporting the ultimate conclusions.” Napa Valley, 496 F.3d at 942-43. “But 

neither the duration of the hearing, nor the ALJ’s active involvement, nor the length of 

the ALJ’s opinion can ensure that the ALJ was ‘thorough and careful.’” Antelope Valley, 

858 F.3d at 1194. 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

The IDEA statute assures that all children with disabilities receive a FAPE through 

an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Capistrano, 556 F.3d at 909. Under IDEA, Congress 

conditions federal funding upon state compliance with the statute’s “extensive substantive 

and procedural requirements.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 

(9th Cir. 1992). In Rowley, the Supreme Court held that a school district complies with 

IDEA if the school district (1) complies with the statute’s procedures, and (2) develops an 

IEP reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. 458 U.S. at 

206-07. “If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations 

imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.” Id. at 207. 

A. The District’s Procedural Compliance Regarding Its Private 

School Offer 

 The ALJ addressed the District’s compliance with IDEA’s procedural requirements 

that (1) placement offers be sufficiently specific, and (2) if an impasse is reached, school 

districts must, with reasonable promptness, file for a due process hearing. 

 1. Specificity of the District’s Placement Offer 

The ALJ decided that the District violated IDEA’s procedural requirements by 

failing to provide E.M.’s Parents with sufficiently specific information about its offer to 

place E.M. in private school. (AR at 784-86.) The ALJ also decided this procedural 

violation amounted to a denial of a FAPE because it significantly impeded E.M.’s Parents’ 

opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. (Id.) In support of his decision, 

the ALJ found that under Union, 15 F.3d at 1526, a school district’s offer to place a child 

in a private school must be sufficiently specific. (AR at 782, 785.) 

a. Placement Offer Standard 

The ALJ correctly recognized that a school district’s failure to make a sufficiently 

specific placement offer is a procedural violation of IDEA and a denial of a FAPE if the 

failure significantly impedes the child’s parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process. Under IDEA, school districts must provide parents with written prior 

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notice whenever the district proposes to change the child’s educational placement. 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). The notice must include: (1) a description of the proposed 

placement; (2) an explanation why the district proposes to make the placement and a 

description of each evaluation procedure, assessment, record, or report the district used as 

a basis for the proposed placement; (3) a description of other options considered by the 

IEP team and the reason why those options were rejected; and (4) a description of the 

factors that are relevant to the district’s proposal or refusal. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1). 

The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of complying with IDEA’s 

procedural requirements. In Rowley, the Court stated “Congress placed every bit as much 

emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure 

of participation at every stage of the administrative process as it did upon the measurement 

of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.” 458 U.S. at 205-06 (citing 20 U.S.C. 

§§ 1415(a)-(d)); see also Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 

(2017) (“[T]he procedures are there for a reason, and their focus provides insight into what 

it means, for purposes of the FAPE definition, to ‘meet the unique needs’ of a child with 

a disability.”). The Ninth Circuit has explained that while “technical violations” of 

IDEA’s procedural requirements may not necessarily deny a FAPE, “procedural 

inadequacies that . . . . seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP 

formulation process . . . . clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” Amanda J. v. Clark Cty. 

Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, federal and state law provide that an ALJ may find that a child did 

not receive a FAPE if the procedural inadequacies “significantly impeded the parents’ 

opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 

Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(f)(2)(B); see also N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 

541 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2008) (under IDEA, school districts must also comply with 

state regulations, which are enforceable in federal court) (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, placement offers under IDEA must be formal, written, and specific. 

Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. In Union, the school district desired to place a child with autism 

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spectrum disorder into a special school, but the district conceded that it never made a 

formal offer to place the child in the school because it believed the parents would not 

agree. Id. at 1524. The court held “a school district cannot escape its obligation under the 

IDEA to offer formally an appropriate educational placement by arguing that a disabled 

child’s parents expressed unwillingness to accept that placement.” Id. at 1526. The court 

stated: 

We find that this formal requirement has an important purpose that is not 

merely technical, and we therefore believe it should be enforced rigorously. 

The requirement of a formal, written offer creates a clear record that will do 

much to eliminate troublesome factual disputes many years later about when 

placements were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional 

educational assistance was offered to supplement a placement, if any. 

Furthermore, a formal, specific offer from a school district will greatly assist 

parents in “present[ing] complaints with respect to any matter relating to the 

. . . . educational placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E). 

Id.; see also J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 459 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“Pursuant to the IDEA, [the] District must make a formal, specific written offer of 

placement.”) (citing Union, 15 F.3d at 1526). Based on the above, the ALJ identified the 

correct legal standard regarding the District’s offer to place E.M. in a private school. 

b. The District’s Arguments

The District bears the burden of demonstrating that the ALJ’s decision regarding 

the District’s placement offer should be reversed. Fresno Unified, 626 F.3d at 438. The 

court reviews the ALJ’s decision under a preponderance of evidence standard. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(e)(2). For the below reasons, the District does not meet its burden. 

i. Offer Specificity 

The District first argues that its offer to place E.M. in private school was specific 

because “[t]he December 2017 IEP, as amended in May 2018, offered [E.M.] placement 

in a [private school], on a small therapeutic campus, that could implement his BIP and 

IEP goals, and provide the necessary counseling/ERMHS services that were set forth in 

the IEP.” (Doc. No. 27 at 29-30.) Even if such an offer would have been sufficiently 

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specific, the record does not support that this was the offer made by the District. The 

portions of the record the District cites to support this description of the offer, i.e. the 

records memorializing the December 2017 and May 2018 IEP meetings, do not show that 

any such offer was made. (See AR at 676-77; 707-08.) Rather, the record of the December 

2017 meeting merely shows that placement in a private school was “recommended” for 

the purpose of moving E.M. to a “more supportive environment to address his behavior 

needs.” (Id. at 676.) The record also shows that the District provided information about 

“Non-Public schools in general, with specific recommendations for Springall Academy 

and San Diego Center for Children.”7

 (Id. (emphasis added).) The records of the meetings 

in January and May of 2018 are similarly unspecific. The January 2018 record states “a 

change of placement is still being offered due to [E.M.’s] behavior needs, and that he 

needs an environment that would provide more behavioral supports than are available in 

his current placement. . . . The [District’s] offer of FAPE is placement in a Non-Public 

School, start date would be determined[.]” (Id. at 679.) The record of the May 2018 

meeting states “offer of FAPE to be placement and it continues at Non-Public School[.]” 

(Id. at 708.) Although the ALJ found that the District’s “offer of nonpublic school 

placement was appropriate because it provided a smaller and more therapeutic 

environment,” (id. at 784), the record does not suggest the District provided any 

information in its offer that either of the two private schools it recommended had a “small 

therapeutic campus,” “could implement [E.M.’s] BIP and IEP goals,” or could “provide 

the necessary counseling/ERMHS services that were set forth in the IEP,” (Doc. No. 27 at 

7

 The record shows that the District intended not to make a formal, written and specific 

offer at the December 2017 meeting. The record of the meeting states “offer of FAPE is 

[continued] placement in the [special day class] until the next IEP meeting which will be 

scheduled after we receive word from the parents regarding the [private school] process[.]” 

(AR at 677.) It was not until the next meeting, on January 29, 2018, that the District 

expressly offered private school placement. (See id. at 679.) 

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29-30). At the subsequent hearing, District personnel explained that private schools are 

“generally speaking . . . . considered to be more therapeutic.” (Id. at 1106.) To the extent 

that the District attempted to provide specific information about the private school 

placement offer at the subsequent hearing before the ALJ, (see Doc. No. 27 at 8), under 

the snapshot rule, the court must judge the appropriateness of the offer on the basis of the 

information reasonably available to the parties at the time the offer was made. L.J. v. 

Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2017). As pointed out by E.M., 

in addition to failing to arrange for a representative from either school to attend a meeting 

with E.M.’s Parents as required by 34 C.F.R. § 300.325(a)(2), the District did not have a 

representative from either private school testify at the hearing before the ALJ. There is 

nothing in the record to suggest, and the District does not expressly contend, that its 

personnel involved in the private school placement offer were knowledgeable about the 

services or programs available at Springall or San Diego Center for Children or shared 

that knowledge with E.M.’s Parents. Based on the above, the District has not shown that 

its offer of private school placement was specific. To the contrary, the preponderance of 

evidence shows the offer was not specific, especially when juxtaposed with the notice 

requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1).8

 

ii. Parental Participation 

The District argues that even if its offer of private school placement was not 

specific, E.M.’s Parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process was 

not significantly impeded and therefore did not amount to a denial of a FAPE. (Doc. No. 

8

 Given that the only contemporaneous record of the offer is contained in notes of the 

December 2017, January 2018 and May 2018 meetings, it is also questionable whether the 

District ever made a “formal” and “written” offer. While the meeting notes memorializing 

the offer are written and were given to E.M.’s parents to review, there is nothing in the 

record suggesting that the District provided E.M.’s Parents with a letter, contract, form, or 

some other type of a formal written offer. It is also questionable whether the District 

complied with the detailed notice requirements in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1), but neither E.M. 

nor the ALJ raised this issue.

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27 at 30.) The District first points out that E.M.’s parents were active participants in the 

IEP meetings in which the District raised the issue of private school. (Id.) Although some 

courts have noted parents’ participation in meetings as one of multiple factors supporting 

a finding that those parents reasonably understood a placement offer, see, e.g., Fresno 

Unified, 626 F.3d at 460, Fermin v. San Mateo-Foster City Sch. Dist., Case No. 99cv3376 

SI, 2000 WL 1130070, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2000), others have found the failure to 

make a formal and specific placement offer is a per se denial of a FAPE, see, e.g., 

Redding Elementary School District v. Goyne, Case No. 00cv1174 WBS (GGH), 2001 

WL 34098658, *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2001). Here, E.M.’s Parents could not have 

sufficiently understood the placement offer because, other than specifying that it included 

private school, the offer was totally lacking in detail, including crucial details like the 

services and programs available to E.M. The District’s offer did not even confirm that 

either of the private schools it recommended accepted children with E.M.’s special 

educational needs or had space for him. (AR at 1010.) The Ninth Circuit has stressed that 

“[w]hen a parent is unaware of the services offered to the student . . . . a FAPE has been 

denied, whether or not the parent had ample opportunity to participate in the formulation 

of the IEP.” Antelope Valley, 858 F.3d at 1198. E.M.’s Parents’ active involvement in 

his education in no way diminishes E.M.’s rights, or the District’s IDEA obligations. 

Second, the District claims that its offer was specific because the offer was 

“discussed, including a discussion regarding the programs available at Springall and San 

Diego Center” and the District “provided the Parents with information regarding each of 

the proposed [private schools] and shared that [E.M.’s] IEP could be implemented at each 

school.” (Doc. No. 27 at 30.) Certainly, the record supports that some “discussion” of the 

District’s private school offer occurred and that some “information” was provided. (See

AR at 783, 785.) Any reference to unspecified information and discussion, however, does 

not show that the District’s offer was sufficiently specific. Moreover, the District does 

not cite anything in the record supporting its contentions that a discussion occurred 

regarding the “programs available” at either school or that the District “shared” that E.M.’s 

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IEP could be implemented at either school. As noted above, the record shows that the 

District merely provided information about private schools “in general” along with 

specific “recommendations” for two private schools. (Id. at 676 (emphasis added).) 

Although at the December 2017 IEP meeting the District provided E.M.’s Parents with 

some information pulled from the internet about the schools, (id. at 852, 1002, 1011), the 

District offers no evidence suggesting the materials contained any specific information 

that satisfied its obligations under IDEA. Instead, the District states broadly that the 

materials “contained information regarding the proposed programs.” (Doc. No. 27 at 31.) 

Based on this evidentiary record, however, the only specific information about the offer 

of private school placement were the names of two private schools. (AR at 785.) 

Third, the District points out that E.M’s Parents did not sign the release of 

information, did not request to visit either private school, and did not ask questions about 

the schools. (Doc. No. 30 at 33.) With respect to the release of information, the District 

claims the signed release would have “allow[ed] the District to speak with the [private 

school] placements specifically about [E.M.] and determine which school would be best.” 

(Id. at 23.) Certainty, the record supports the refusal of E.M.’s Parents to sign the release 

form. (AR at 676, 1011, 1017, 1019, 1029, 1036.) The District was also clearly under the 

impression that it needed releases to be signed. (See id. at 677 (stating that the release 

form was “necessary for the process of referrals to the schools”); 1261-62 (stating that 

asking parents for a release of information was “in general” part of the referral process).) 

The District does not explain, however, how exactly its obligations to protect E.M.’s 

privacy or E.M.’s Parents’ refusal to sign a release prevented the District from making a 

specific placement offer.9

 As noted by E.M.’s Parents, their refusal to sign the release 

form did not, per se, prohibit the District from speaking in hypotheticals to private schools 

about E.M. (Id. at 1029.) Overall, as recognized by the ALJ, E.M.’s Parents’ refusal to 

9

 For example, the District does not cite the authority protecting students’ information or 

identify what information is protected. 

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sign a release did not relieve the District of its duty to make a clear placement offer. See 

A.V. v. Lemon Grove Sch. Dist., Case No. 16cv0803 CAB (BLM), 2017 WL 733424, at 

*12 n.16 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017) (finding that the school district committed a procedural 

violation despite parents’ refusal to sign a release form that the district alleged would have 

allowed it to share information with a private school at which it was considering placing 

the child). Similarly, the reluctance of E.M.’s Parents’ to ask questions or request a tour 

did not relieve the District of its obligations under IDEA. The Ninth Circuit has made 

abundantly clear that parents’ disinterest in a placement offer is no excuse. See Anchorage 

School Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2012); Union, 15 F.3d at 1526; see 

also Bookout v. Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist., Case No. 13cv2710 SH, 2014 WL 1152948, 

at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014) (“[I]t is clear under Ninth Circuit law, that Parents’ 

unwillingness to consider [a placement] did not relieve the District of its obligation to 

make a specific offer of educational placement.”) (citation omitted). 

Fourth, the District argues its offer was specific because it “did not offer multiple 

[private school] placements and force the parent to decide.” (Doc. No. 27 at 30.) The 

District states that it “only proposed Springall and San Diego Center as possible [private 

school] options that could be appropriate to meet [E.M.’s] unique needs and implement 

the IEP.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Contrary to the District’s assertion, the District did

offer multiple private school placements: Springall Academy and San Diego Center for 

Children. (AR at 676.) The District’s contention that the schools were merely “possible 

options” suggests the number of potential placements was even greater. While the District 

was not “forcing” E.M.’s Parents to decide E.M.’s placement, by “proposing” two schools 

that “could be appropriate,” but never identifying a specific school that was appropriate, 

the District reasonably implied that it was up to E.M.’s Parents to decide. Like the ALJ 

found here, most courts have found that offers containing multiple placement options are 

insufficiently specific. See J.P. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., Case No. 09cv01083 

MMM (MANx), 2011 WL 12697384 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) (three schools); Glendale 

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (four 

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placements); see also A.K. v. Alexandria City School Board, 484 F.3d 672 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(five placements); but see Fresno Unified, 626 F.3d at 460-61 (making an initial offer of 

placement at four schools did not deny a FAPE because the options were extensively 

discussed and the district eventually offered a single placement); Fermin, 2000 WL 

1130070, at *10 (offer stating that the school district “continues to offer a range of 

placements in [county] special day class programs” was sufficiently specific because the 

child was previously in the program and the parents understood the substantive 

components of the program, even if they did not know the exact location). 

Finally, the District asserts that its “goal the entire time [was] to collaborate with 

[E.M.’s] parents subsequent to receiving consent to share [E.M.’s] records with the two 

[private schools] and visitations by [E.M.’s] parents at the two [private schools].” (Doc. 

No. 27 at 30 (emphasis added).) While it is apparent from the record the District sought 

E.M.’s Parents’ consent to place E.M. in a private school generally, a general placement 

offer is, of course, in direct conflict with Union’s requirement that placement offers be 

specific. The District’s intent to make a specific placement offer at some point in the 

future only serves to bolster the ALJ’s finding that the District had not made a specific 

offer by the time E.M.’s parents filed their complaint. As recognized in Union, the 

purpose of requiring school districts to make specific placement offers is to create a “clear 

record” and “eliminate troublesome factual disputes” so that parents can more efficiently 

challenge placement decisions. 15 F.3d at 1526 (“[A] formal, specific offer from a school 

district will greatly assist parents in ‘present[ing] complaints with respect to any 

matter relating to the . . . . educational placement of the child)’” (quoting 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(b)(1)(E)). Without a specific placement offer, E.M.’s Parents, as well as the ALJ 

and court, are left to decide the appropriateness of a placement offer that is incomplete. 

As stated by the district court in Glendale: 

Discussion of a range of possible placements during the IEP meeting is, of 

course, appropriate. However, a school district cannot abdicate its 

responsibility to make a specific offer allowing a parent to choose from among 

several programs presented as formal offers. After discussing the advantages 

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and disadvantages of various programs that might serve the needs of a particular 

child, the school district must take the final step and clearly identify an 

appropriate placement from the range of possibilities. It was the District’s 

responsibility to use its expertise to decide which program was best suited for 

[the child’s] unique needs. Thus, under Union, the District [must] articulate a 

clear, coherent offer which [the parent] reasonably could evaluate and decide 

whether to accept or appeal. 

122 F. Supp. 2d at 1108; see also Alexandria, 484 F.3d 672 (adopting Glendale as 

consistent with Union).10 Based on the above, the District has not demonstrated that it did 

not significantly impede E.M.’s parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making 

process. The preponderance of evidence shows that E.M.’s Parents could not have 

reasonably evaluated the District’s general offer of private school placement. 

 

c. The ALJ’s Factual Findings 

In support of his decision, the ALJ made the following factual findings: (1) the offer 

did not specify the classroom, type of curriculum, or contents of the program at either 

private school; (2) no representative from either private school was present at the IEP 

meeting; (3) the District spoke in generalities as to what the private schools provided; 

(4) the District provided the school names, printouts from the schools’ websites, and 

releases for E.M.’s Parents to sign; (5) the District did not offer to arrange tours of the 

schools; (6) the District did not have its own educational professionals,11 like Ms. 

10 The District also claims that its offer was specific because it was “seeking consent to the 

specific type of placement, that being a [private school] setting.” (Doc. No. 27 at 31 

(emphasis added).) This is contrary to Union and is akin to arguing that general offers to 

place children in private or public school are specific. The District also fails to cite any 

authority suggesting that a general offer to attend private school satisfies IDEA’s 

requirement to make a specific placement offer, or that this is a regular or accepted practice. 

11 The ALJ gave the additional reason that “[District] staff who had additional knowledge 

of the recommended nonpublic schools’ programs were not present at the IEP meeting.” 

(AR at 785.) The ALJ does not specify the staff that were absent, but given his subsequent 

reference to Ms. Cummings, he was likely referring to Ms. Cummings. 

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Cummings, whose duties included serving students in private schools, including Springall, 

at the IEP meeting; and (7) the District did not provide more meaningful or comprehensive 

information in the two meetings following the December 2017 meeting. (AR at 785.) 

The District challenges few, if any, of the ALJ’s factual findings. While the District 

states “the ALJ incorrectly found that the District failed to provide [E.M.’s] parents with 

specific information regarding the classroom [E.M.] would be placed in or the curriculum 

that would be used,” (Doc. No. 27 at 29), nothing in the record suggests that the District 

provided any information about the classroom or curriculum at either school at any point. 

(See AR at 676, 678, 707.) District courts have found the failure to specify the classroom, 

curriculum and program contents of a placement offer is a procedural violation that denies 

a FAPE. See, e.g., Bellflower, 2014 WL 1152948, at *10 (school district’s offer of 

placement in a special day class with five potential classrooms was insufficiently specific); 

Glendale, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (“[T]he District’s offer of various types of classrooms, 

located at a number of different school sites, with varying school-day durations, does not 

comport with the Union requirement that the District make a formal, specific placement 

offer.”). 

The record also supports, and the District does not dispute, the ALJ’s finding that 

no representative from either school was present at the IEP meeting. (AR at 785.) As 

pointed out by E.M., “[b]efore a public agency places a child with a disability in, or refers 

a child to, a private school or facility, the agency must initiate and conduct a meeting to 

develop an IEP for the child . . . . [and] ensure that a representative of the private school 

or facility attends the meeting.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.325(a). “If the representative cannot 

attend, the [district] must use other methods to ensure participation by the private school 

or facility, including individual or conference telephone calls.” Id. at § 300.325(a)(2). 

The parties do not dispute that the District failed to ensure that a representative from either 

private school it recommended attended or otherwise participated in any meeting with 

E.M.’s Parents. While the ALJ listed the absence of a private school representative at the 

IEP meetings as one of the reasons for finding that the private school placement offer was 

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insufficiently specific, (AR at 785), the ALJ did not base his decision on that particular 

procedural violation, and E.M. only briefly references the violation in his motion, (Doc. 

No. 33 at 2 (“The District . . . . flouted federal law and failed to bring [private school] 

representatives to the IEP meetings[.]”).) Indeed, District courts have found that this 

particular procedural violation does necessarily amount to a denial of a FAPE. See, e.g., 

Lemon Grove, 2017 WL 733424, at *13 (parents met with the private school outside of 

IEP meetings, discussed the school with the IEP team, and stipulated that the school was 

appropriate); Student R.A. v. West Contra Costa Unified Sch. Dist., Case No. 14cv931 

PJH, 2015 WL 4914795, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015) (the school district arranged 

for the parents to tour the private school and meet with its staff, which the parents did); 

but see Werner v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 

(failure to have a representative from a proposed private school denied a FAPE even 

though there was no dispute as to the propriety of the placement). Overall, the absence of 

a representative from either private school at any of the IEP meetings, in conflict with 

IDEA regulations, supports the ALJ’s conclusion that E.M.’s Parents were significantly 

deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process on whether the 

schools offered a placement that was appropriate for E.M.’s unique needs. 

The record also supports the remainder of the ALJ’s factual findings. The District 

spoke in generalities as to what the nonpublic schools provided. (See AR at 676 (noting 

that E.M.’s parents were provided with information about private schools “in general”).) 

The District merely provided the school names, (id. at 785), printouts from the schools’ 

websites, (id. at 852, 1002, 1011), and releases for E.M.’s Parents to sign, (id. at 676). 

The District did not offer to arrange for E.M.’s Parents to tour any private school. (Id. at 

1007-08, 1010-11, 1016.) Ms. Cummings’ other duties included serving students in 

private schools, including at Springall, and she was not at the IEP meetings in December 

2017, January 2018 or May 2018. (Id. at 676, 678, 707, 1096-97.) Finally, the District 

did not provide more information, and certainly not meaningful or comprehensive 

information, at the two meetings following the December 2017 meeting. (See id. at 678, 

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707.) Based on the above, the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by the record and the 

preponderance of evidence shows the District’s offer was insufficiently specific. 

2. The District’s Filing Delay 

 The ALJ also decided that the District did not unreasonably delay filing for a due 

process hearing. (AR at 781.) As the party seeking reversal of this decision, E.M. bears 

the burden of proof. E.M. argues that (1) the parties reached an impasse on January 29, 

2018 when E.M.’s Parents informed the District that they did not accept the offer of private 

school, and (2) the District failed to fulfill its obligation to initiate, with reasonable 

promptness, a due process hearing by filing its complaint on August 1, 2018, 184 days 

later. (Doc. No. 26 at 31.) For the below reasons, E.M. does not meet his burden. 

 California Education Code § 56346(f) provides that “if the public agency 

determines that the proposed special education program component to which the parent 

does not consent is necessary to provide a free appropriate public education to the child, 

a due process hearing shall be initiated[.]” The Ninth Circuit has held that “[i]n effect, 

§ 56346(f) compels a school district to initiate a due process hearing when the school 

district and the parents reach an impasse.” I.R. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 

1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2015). “In evaluating how long is too long for a school district to 

take in determining a component’s necessity and initiating a due process hearing, [the 

court must] recognize that the school district must have some flexibility to allow for due 

consideration of the parents’ reasons for withholding consent to an IEP component.” Id. 

“If in the school district’s judgment,” however, “the child is not receiving a FAPE, the 

district must act with reasonable promptness to correct that problem by adjudicating the 

differences with the parents.” Id. at 1170. 

The record shows that on January 29, 2018 the parties met, the District offered 

private school placement, and E.M.’s Parents did not accept the offer. (Id. at 678-79.) As 

pointed out by the ALJ, it is at least questionable that an impasse occurred at this point 

because E.M.’s Parents agreed to continue with the annual review of E.M.’s IEP, as well 

as to another ERMHS assessment, (id.), and at the subsequent meeting on May 3, 2018, 

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the District amended its offer of a private school placement to include different mental 

health services, (id. at 708). On June 18, 2018, E.M.’s Parents filed their initial complaint 

with the assistance of counsel. (Id. at 1.) On August 1, 2018, the District filed its own 

complaint requesting a due process hearing. (Id. at 93.) 

While a delay of six months, or even three months, might not be reasonably prompt, 

E.M. does not point to any binding authority that such a delay constitutes a procedural 

violation, or the loss of educational opportunity or benefit, or seriously infringes upon 

parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process. See Amanda J., 267 

F.3d at 892. During the delay, E.M. remained at Westwood, which was consistent with 

his Parents’ wishes. The only prejudice E.M.’s Parents suggest they suffered due to the 

delay was incurring attorney’s fees in filing their own complaint. (Doc. No. 26 at 31.) 

They do not allege, however, that they might not have retained an attorney and filed their 

complaint but for the District’s delay in filing its complaint. See Antelope Valley, 858 

F.3d at 1197 (finding that had the school district disclosed a mistake in the IEP at an earlier 

date, “[p]laintiffs might have avoided hiring a lawyer and taking the case to a due process 

hearing”). Based on the above, E.M. does not meet his burden of showing that he was 

denied a FAPE by the District’s delay in filing for a due process hearing. 

B. Substantive Issues 

 The ALJ also addressed the District’s compliance with IDEA’s substantive 

requirements that school districts provide (1) an IEP reasonably calculated to enable the 

child to receive educational benefits, and (2) a FAPE in the child’s least restrictive 

environment. 

1. Appropriate IEP and BIP 

 As noted above, the IEP is the “centerpiece” of IDEA’s “education delivery system” 

for children with disabilities. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). An IEP is a written 

statement for each child that is developed, reviewed, and revised annually. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i). The IEP must include: (1) a statement of the child’s present levels of 

academic achievement and functional performance; (2) a statement of measurable annual 

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goals, including academic and functional goals; (3) a description of how the child’s 

progress toward meeting the annual goals will be measured; (4) a statement of the special 

education and related services to be provided to the child; (5) an explanation of the extent, 

if any, to which the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class; 

(6) the projected date for the beginning of services and modifications; and (7) the 

anticipated frequency, location, and duration of the services and modifications. Id. “[A] 

school district can be liable for a substantive violation [of IDEA] by drafting an IEP that is 

not reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Fresno 

Unified, 626 F.3d at 432-33. 

The IDEA statute further provides that “[s]chool personnel may consider any unique 

circumstances on a case-by-case basis when determining whether to order a change in 

placement for a child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct.” 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(k)(1)(A). The statute also provides: 

If the local educational agency, the parent, and relevant members of the IEP 

Team make the determination that the conduct was a manifestation of the 

child’s disability, the IEP Team shall (i) conduct a functional behavioral 

assessment, and implement a behavioral intervention plan for such child 

[and] (ii) in the situation where a behavioral intervention plan has been 

developed, review the behavioral intervention plan if the child already has 

such a behavioral intervention plan, and modify it, as necessary, to address 

the behavior[.] 

Id. at § 1415(k)(1)(F). 

The ALJ found that E.M. did not prove by a preponderance of evidence that the 

District failed to develop IEPs that included appropriate accommodations, modifications, 

supports, and services. (AR at 779.) Instead, the ALJ found that “the record reflected 

consistent and frequent evaluation of [E.M.’s] academic and behavioral needs, with earnest 

and thoughtful adjustment to [his] IEP and [BIP].” (Id. at 779-80; see also id. at 781 

(“[E.M.’s] IEPs were based upon comprehensive appropriate assessments, were reasonably 

calculated to provide educational benefit to [E.M.] and offered [E.M.] appropriate 

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accommodations, modifications, supports, and services to enable [E.M.] to make progress 

appropriate in light of his circumstances.”).) 

In support of his decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact that E.M. 

does not directly challenge: (1) from September 2016 to May 2017, the District conducted 

seven assessments, including a full triennial psycho-educational assessment, a second 

functional behavior analysis, and two ERMHS assessments; (2) the District convened 11 

IEP team meetings; (3) E.M.’s Parents participated in each meeting, making suggestions, 

asking for additional or revised goals, reporting their view of [E.M.’s] then-current 

behaviors, and expressing concerns regarding his academic growth; (4) E.M. was assessed 

in all areas of suspected disability and his parents did not challenge the assessments; 

(5) the testimony and IEP team meeting notes indicate that the District regularly evaluated 

and assessed [E.M.’s] performance, behavior, and educational and emotional needs; (6) the 

District used multiple sources to determine his present levels of performance, drafted and 

revised goals, reviewed and updated accommodations and modifications, gathered 

behavior data, and fine-tuned the BIP; and (7) the District informed and involved E.M.’s 

Parents and waited for their approval to implement a goal or service. (Id. at 779-80.) E.M. 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the ALJ’s decision regarding the IEP and BIP 

should be reversed. For the below reasons, E.M. does not meet his burden. 

a. The Psychologists’ Recommendations 

 E.M. first argues the District denied him a FAPE because it “ignored” and “without 

explanation” adopted “none” of the recommendations from its own psychologists to 

modify his BIP. (Doc. No. 26 at 17, 20 n.13, 23.) E.M. also argues the District failed to 

adopt the “most important” recommendation, which was to develop a hierarchy of 

reinforcers and limit his access to a video game called Minecraft that E.M. was allowed to 

play on an iPad while in school. (Id. at 23.) The District contends it implemented “many” 

of the recommendations, though some were worded differently. (Doc. No. 29 at 9.) Based 

on the record, E.M. is incorrect that the District, without explanation, ignored the 

recommendations from its psychologists and failed to adopt any of them into E.M.’s BIP. 

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On October 24, 2017, Ms. Cummings issued an ERMHS assessment listing nine 

recommendations.12 (AR at 408-09.) On October 25, 2017, Ms. Klock issued a report 

listing four recommendations.13 (Id. at 675.) Ms. Cummings’ assessment also included a 

recommendation relating to E.M.’s access to Minecraft. (Id. at 407.) On March 16, 2018, 

a third school psychologist, Ms. Valencia, issued an assessment also making a 

recommendation relating to E.M.’s use of video games. (Id. at 700, 702.) 

12 Ms. Cummings’ recommendations were as follows: 

(1) [E.M.] is minimally responsive to verbal praise; verbal praise should be 

specific in nature. (2) Use of structured choice when requesting alternative 

assignment to gain compliance. (3) Revising his Behavior Intervention Plan to 

include access to lower level reinforcement when he does not demonstrate 

expected behaviors/termination of tasks. (4) Continuing DIS Counseling to 

promote adaptive coping, prosocial behavior. (5) Continued [occupational 

therapy] support for behavioral regulation and teaching [E.M.] to employ coping 

strategies when he experiences thoughts of frustration. Consider trialing number 

scale rather than zones to honor [E.M.’s] preference and increase buy-in. 

(6) Adopt pragmatic goals to provide explicit, guided instruction and practice of 

deficit areas. (7) Enroll [E.M.] in a social skills/Circle of Friends group where he 

can practice learned strategies to assist with generalizing outside of DIS sessions. 

(8) Provide opportunities for [E.M.] to socialize with peers who have similar 

interests in order to increase opportunities for social/emotional learning. 

(9) Increase home to school communication to ensure consistent expectations for 

behavior and academic effort across environments. 

(AR at 408-09.) 

13 Ms. Klock’s recommendations were as follows: 

(1) Outline behavioral expectations for upcoming situations. (2) Talk to [E.M.] 

when in a relaxed mood to help the student get to know his impulsive times, how 

it affects himself and others, and what alternative behaviors he could consider. (3) 

Encourage [E.M.] to observe his environment to notice if he sees/hears impulsive 

behaviors. Talk about what the individual could have done differently. Discuss 

the situation and alternatives. (4) Use of a daily schedule which provides [E.M.] 

with choices he can make throughout his day, and avoid power struggles[.] 

(AR at 675.) 

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E.M.’s December 2017 BIP lists over a dozen “changes, structures, and supports” 

designed to “remove [E.M.’s] need to utilize problem behavior.” (Id. at 628.) Those items 

incorporate several of the Districts’ psychologists’ recommendations. First, the BIP’s 

instruction to provide a “[d]aily schedule that incorporates choices into [E.M.’s] day” and 

for “staff to avoid power struggles” adopts the recommendation for the “[u]se of a daily 

schedule which provides [E.M.] with choices he can make throughout his day, and avoid 

power struggles with [E.M.].” (Id. at 675.) Second, the BIP’s instruction that “[a]cademic 

work [be] available that is geared to [E.M.’s] academic level” is consistent with the 

recommendation to “[a]dopt pragmatic goals to provide explicit, guided instruction and 

practice of deficit areas.” (Id. at 408.) Third, the BIP’s instruction to provide “alternate 

work activities” is consistent with the recommendation for the “[u]se of structured choice 

when requesting alternative assignment to gain compliance,” (id. at 408), and “provid[ing] 

[E.M.] with choices he can make throughout his day,” (id. at 675). Fourth, the BIP’s 

instruction that “[s]taff should minimize reactions to problem behavior” appears to be 

consistent with the recommendation for “access to lower level reinforcement when he 

does not demonstrate expected behaviors/termination of tasks,” (id. at 408), and 

“[t]alk[ing] to [E.M.] when in a relaxed mood to help the student get to know his impulsive 

times, how it affects himself and others, and what alternative behaviors he could consider,” 

(id. at 675). 

While the BIP does not expressly adopt many, if not most, of the psychologists’ 

recommendations (or at least, did not adopt them verbatim),14 the BIP includes multiple 

14 The items included in the BIP that were not expressly recommended by the psychologists 

include: (1) providing an available alternate work environment that is quiet and has less 

distractions; (2) positive relationship/rapport building with staff; (3) administering 

correctives in a manner that demonstrates that you are on E.M.’s side; (4) scheduled 

movement breaks; (5) making sensory tools available in classroom environment; (6) using 

positive reinforcement for general positive and on task behaviors; and (7) E.M. should 

receive far more attention for his appropriate/safe behavior and any on-task or academic 

related behavior and activity than he does for any problem behavior. (AR at 628.) 

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additional items that were not expressly recommended by the psychologists.15 The BIP 

also outlines detailed “replacement behaviors,” “reinforcement procedures,” and 

“response[s] to problem behavior[s].” (Id. 629-31.) Moreover, the record does not show 

that any of the items in the BIP were inconsistent with the psychologists’ 

recommendations. For example, the BIP’s inclusion of administering “correctives” in a 

manner that demonstrates “siding with E.M.,” (id. at 628), is consistent with the 

recommendation to “avoid power struggles” with E.M., (id. at 675). 

 Overall, recommendations are, by definition, not compulsory. The District’s 

employment of professionals willing to critically evaluate the special educational needs 

of children and suggest specific solutions is a practice that should not be discouraged. The 

District, acting through the IEP team, was ultimately responsible for deciding whether to 

adopt the recommendations of its own employees. Indeed, the District does not cite any 

authority, and the court is aware of none, that requires the District to do so. Based on the 

above, the preponderance of evidence shows that the District did not deny E.M. a FAPE 

by failing to adopt, verbatim, most of the recommendations from its psychologists into 

E.M.’s BIP. 

/// 

/// 

15 The recommendations that were not expressly adopted include: (1) continuing DIS 

counseling to promote adaptive coping, prosocial behavior; (2) continuing [occupational 

therapy] support for behavioral regulation and teaching [E.M.] to employ coping strategies 

when he experiences thoughts of frustration; (3) enrolling [E.M.] in a social skills/Circle 

of Friends group where he can practice learned strategies to assist with generalizing outside 

of DIS sessions; (4) providing opportunities for [E.M.] to socialize with peers who have 

similar interests in order to increase opportunities for social/emotional learning; 

(5) increasing home to school communication to ensure consistent expectations for 

behavior and academic effort across environments; (6) outlining behavioral expectations 

for upcoming situations; (7) encouraging [E.M.] to observe his environment to notice if he 

sees/hears impulsive behaviors; and (8) limiting access to Minecraft. (AR at 407-09, 675.) 

 

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b. Minecraft and Hierarchy of Reinforcers 

 E.M. argues that he was denied a FAPE because his December 2017 BIP was not 

modified to include limiting his access to Minecraft and developing a hierarchy of 

reinforcers. (Doc. No. 26 at 23.) In support of his argument, E.M. claims that: (1) Ms. 

Cummings and Ms. Valencia recommended that the team develop a hierarchy of 

reinforcers in lieu of Minecraft; (2) Ms. Romero continued to give E.M. access to 

Minecraft; (3) the IEP team failed to develop a hierarchy of reinforcers; (4) the District’s 

list of reinforcers in the December 2017 BIP are nearly identical to those listed in the 

September 2016 BIP; (5) the only reinforcer used in December 2017 and afterwards was 

Minecraft; and (6) the list of reinforcers in the December 2017 BIP is not a hierarchy 

because the list does not explain which reinforcers are more preferable for E.M. and/or 

which should be offered to him before others. (Id.) 

 Contrary to E.M.’s suggestion, neither Ms. Cummings’ nor Ms. Valencia’s written 

assessment recommended a “hierarchy of reinforcers in lieu of Minecraft.” In her October 

2017 assessment, Ms. Cummings recommended that “task and reward contingencies need 

to involve less preferred items/activities (i.e. not Minecraft). Given a new task demand, 

should [E.M.] demonstrate the expected behavior criteria[,] he can be given contingent 

access to the iPad.” (AR at 407.) On December 14, 2017, the parties met to “review 

assessment results . . . . and discuss recommendations.” (Id. at 408, 628-31.) A BIP was 

developed that specifically included “iPad” and “Minecraft” among a list of “current 

reinforcements.”16 (Id. at 630.) The reference to a “hierarchy” of preferred activities 

16 The ALJ’s written decision focuses heavily on Ms. Cummings’ recommendation 

regarding E.M.’s access to Minecraft because the ALJ found, with respect to the 

appropriateness of E.M.’s IEP and BIP, the failure to limit Minecraft was E.M.’s “primary” 

argument and was continually referenced by E.M. at the hearing. (AR at 780.) In his brief, 

E.M. does not address any of the specific recommendations from the psychologists other 

than Ms. Cummings’ recommendation regarding Minecraft. (Doc. No. 26 at 23.) 

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appears to be taken from the notes of an October 25, 2017 IEP meeting stating “[a] 

hierarchy of preferred activities for reinforcement was recommended to be put into place.” 

(Id. at 642.) The meeting notes do not indicate who made the recommendation, but Ms. 

Cummings subsequently testified that she recommended, at some point, that the IEP team 

“consider adapting somewhat of a hierarchy of support.” (Id. at 1093.) 

Furthermore, Ms. Romero’s decision to allow E.M. continued access to Minecraft 

does not necessarily conflict with his IEP or BIP because it was never decided, or even 

recommended, that access be completely eliminated. The ALJ rejected E.M.’s claim that 

Ms. Cummings found that E.M.’s access to Minecraft should be “eliminated.” (Id. at 780.) 

In his motion, E.M. does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Cummings did not 

recommend eliminating Minecraft. (Doc. No. 26 at 23.) Instead, E.M. acknowledges that 

the recommendation was to “limit” access to the game. (Id.) 

The record also does not support E.M.’s contention that Minecraft was the “only” 

reinforcement the IEP team was using in December 2017 and afterwards. As the ALJ 

correctly found: 

The December 2017 [BIP] included multiple reinforcement strategies that did 

not include the iPad, such as choice in work environment, asking for breaks, 

token economy, hot chocolate, extra recess time, and being a helper to a 

preferred adult. The success of each strategy varied. Student’s assertion that 

Poway ignored its own psychologist’s recommendations was unsupported by 

the evidence. 

(AR at 780.) Additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest, and E.M. does not 

allege, that E.M.’s Parents were unaware of the inclusion of these provisions or were 

prevented from objecting to their inclusion. The December 2017 meeting notes state the 

BIP and IEP meeting notes were reviewed by E.M.’s Parents. (Id. at 676-77.) Similarly, 

the record does not show that E.M.’s Parents sought to have all the recommendations 

adopted. In April of 2018, Ms. Valencia issued her report recommending that “[t]he video 

games should be limited for [E.M.].” (Id. at 702.) On May 3, 2018, the parties met and 

discussed, inter alia, “possible solutions for game time.” (Id. at 707.) The record of the

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meeting states “suggestions were less time at home or school as well as different activities 

on the iPad or implementing screen time on computers and Chrome book.” (Id.) The 

record does not state that the parties agreed on any particular suggestion regarding 

Minecraft. Moreover, Ms. Romero subsequently testified that prior to Ms. Valencia’s 

April 2018 report: 

[W]e had tried removing iPad as a reinforcer. And the levels of behavior went 

very high, and the work demand went very low. We have definitely tried 

introducing and trialing noncomputer-based reinforcers. And it just was not 

successful. And it led to more behavior and less work production. . . . [W]e 

did try [a computer-based reinforcer other than Minecraft]. . . . The computer 

games that – or the computer access that’s on a school campus was not 

interesting for E.M. He tried it a couple of times. And eventually it turned 

into the same thing of I don’t want to work with a computer – don’t – I’m not 

interested in that. . . . I do recall [Ms. Valencia’s rationale for limiting the 

video games for E.M.]. And we had a discussion that when he did not have 

any computer or iPad access in previous instances for periods of weeks at a 

time, we did not see any new behavior. We did not see – and, if anything, it 

was the opposite. If he didn’t have access to it, we saw worse behavior 

because he had no reinforcement that he was interested in. So in my 

experience with E.M., the data did not show that he had any more aggression 

or anything when we – he had access to it then when he didn’t. He – there 

were times where he did not have access to a computer or an iPad, and the 

behavior was higher. 

(Id. at 1406-07.) Based on the above, there was no concrete recommendation that access 

to Minecraft be eliminated or that a hierarchy of reinforcers be developed. The 

preponderance of evidence does not show that the District denied E.M. a FAPE by failing 

to adjust E.M.’s BIP or EIP with respect to reinforcers. Similarly, the record does not 

suggest, and E.M. does not allege, that the District failed to comply with the BIP by 

allowing him continued access to Minecraft as a reinforcer or that E.M.’s Parents were 

prevented from participating in any decision regarding his access to Minecraft or any other 

reinforcer. 

/// 

/// 

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2. Least Restrictive Environment

The IDEA statute requires that children with disabilities be educated “to the 

maximum extent appropriate” with children who are not disabled. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 

(a)(5)(A). School districts must ensure that “special classes, separate schooling, or other 

removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only 

when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular 

classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” 

Id. This is referred to as IDEA’s “mainstreaming” or “least restrictive environment” 

requirement. Smith v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 2016); 

Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 Because the court affirms the ALJ’s finding that the District committed a procedural 

violation that amounted to a denial of a FAPE, see supra, IV(A)(1), the court declines to 

reach the substantive issue of whether private school placement constitutes a FAPE in 

E.M.’s least restrictive environment. “[T]he court need not reach the question of 

substantive compliance if the court finds procedural inadequacies that . . . . seriously 

infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process[.]” Hellgate, 

541 F.3d at 1207 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also M.M. v. Lafayette 

Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 856 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Oct. 1, 2014) (declining to reach 

the issue of substantive compliance after finding a procedural violation that denied a 

FAPE); Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 895 (declining to reach the issue of substantive compliance 

after finding that the district denied a FAPE by failing to provide a specific offer of 

placement); Grossmont, 2019 WL 4849172, at *5 (“In other words, if procedural 

inadequacies are such as to amount to the denial of FAPE, the court need not reach the 

issue of substantive compliance[.]”); Popowitz, 2011 WL 12697384, at *26 (declining to 

reach substantive issue after finding the school district failed to make a specific placement 

offer). 

The court recognizes, however, that all parties and participants involved in this case 

devoted a great deal of time and effort to determine the most appropriate and least 

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restrictive educational environment for E.M. As recognized by the ALJ, the District has 

conducted repeated and lengthy assessments of E.M.’s needs and the parties have met at 

least a dozen times to discuss and adjust E.M.’s IEP. (AR at 780.) Additionally, the parties 

and their counsel presented evidence to the ALJ over the course of a multi-day hearing. 

(Id. at 741.) Furthermore, in his lengthy and carefully considered written decision, the ALJ 

devotes a considerable portion of his analysis to evaluating whether E.M.’s current 

placement constituted a FAPE in the least restrictive environment. (See id. at 741-86.) The 

parties’ too, in their papers, devote considerable analysis to the issue. (See Doc. Nos. 26, 

27, 29, 30.) Ultimately, however, the ALJ found that private school was E.M.’s least 

restrictive environment without knowing, or at least explaining on the record, what that 

environment included. Without having any specific details about the services and 

programs that were included in the District’s offer to place E.M. in private school, the ALJ 

nonetheless found that private school was more appropriate and less restrictive than E.M.’s 

current placement. While the ALJ likely has far greater expertise than the court as to the 

programs and services generally available in private schools, which might be far more 

conducive to meet the challenges posed by E.M. and chronicled in the factual background 

of the order, without knowing the specific services and programs that were being offered 

to E.M., the court cannot determine that placement in a private school would be more 

appropriate than E.M.’s current one. As stated in E.M.’s motion, “a placement offer cannot 

be both a denial of FAPE and appropriate.” (Doc. No. 33 at 2.) While both parties may 

have desired that the court decide the appropriate placement for E.M., without a specific 

placement offer to evaluate, the court cannot reasonably do so.17

17 Although the court has referred to the ALJ’s decision as “carefully considered,” for the 

reasons stated, the court does not afford the ALJ’s findings “particular” deference. See 

Napa Valley, 496 F.3d at 937. Based on a thorough review of the record and the ALJ’s 

decision, no part of the court’s order depends on affording “particular” deference above 

and beyond what the court has, in its discretion, already afforded. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

For the above reasons, the court: (1) affirms the ALJ’s decision that the District 

failed to make a sufficiently specific placement offer; (2) declines to reach the issue of 

whether private school is E.M.’s least restrictive environment; (3) affirms the ALJ’s 

decision that E.M.s’ individualized education program (IEP) was reasonably calculated to 

enable E.M. to make appropriate progress; and (4) affirms the ALJ’s decision that the 

District did not unreasonably delay initiating a due process hearing. Both parties’ motions 

are, therefore, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Although E.M. requests 

an order declaring him the prevailing party, (Doc. No. 26 at 31), the court declines to 

determine whether E.M. is the prevailing party unless and until a motion for attorney’s 

fees is filed. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate the case. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 14, 2020 

JEFFREY T. MILLER 

United States District Judge 

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