Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01293/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01293-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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07cv1293

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ATM EXPRESS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATM EXPRESS, INC.,

Defendant; __________________________________

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM.

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Civil No. 07cv1293-L(RBB)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

EX PARTE APPLICATION TO FILE

DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL

On November 19, 2008 Defendant filed an ex parte application to file documents under

seal (“Motion to Seal”). Defendant requests to seal more than 120 pages of documents,

consisting of four exhibits in support of its motion for summary judgment – excerpts from the

deposition of Christopher Bryan Stewart, Defendant’s profit and loss statements for the years

2000 through 2007, and the report of Plaintiff’s damages expert William Buckley. For the

reasons which follow, the Motion to Seal is DENIED.

Historically, courts have recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public records

and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.,

435 U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7 (1978). Three different standards govern motions to seal documents in

judicial proceedings. First, “the narrow range of documents such as grand jury transcripts and

certain warrant materials . . . traditionally have been kept secret for important policy reasons.” 

Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 504 F.3d 792, 801 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks,

Case 3:07-cv-01293-L-RBB Document 67 Filed 11/20/08 Page 1 of 4
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brackets, and citation omitted); Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178

(9th Cir. 2006). Second, sealing a judicial record requires the requesting party to show

compelling reasons which outweigh the general history of access and the public policies

favoring disclosure. Pintos, 503 F.3d at 801; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Last, to shield

“private materials unearthed during discovery” from public view, the requesting party must meet

the good cause standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Pintos, 503 F.3d at 801; Foltz

v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); Phillips v. General

Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002). 

To seal documents appended to a dispositive motion such as a motion for summary

judgment, the requesting party must meet the compelling reasons standard. Pintos, 503 F.3d at

802; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“the strong presumption of access to judicial records applies

fully to dispositive pleadings, including motions for summary judgment and related

attachments). The compelling reasons standard “derives from the common law right to inspect

and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Pintos, 503

F.3d at 801; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. The “good cause” standard “presents and lower

burden [because] [t]he ‘compelling reasons’ standard does not exist for documents produced

between private litigants.” Pintos, 503 F.3d at 801. Although the documents Defendant requests

to seal were initially produced in discovery between private litigants, they became part of the

judicial record when Defendant filed its summary judgment motion and sought to rely on them. 

Pintos, 503 F.3d at 802; Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134 (when discovery material is filed with the court,

its status changes).

To meet the compelling reasons standard, the moving party “must overcome a strong

presumption of access by showing that compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings

outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.” Pintos, 504

F.3d at 802 (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and citation omitted); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at

1179-80. “Under the ‘compelling reasons’ standard, a district court must weigh relevant factors,

base its decision on a compelling reason, and articulate a factual basis for its ruling without

relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Pintos, 504 F.3d at 802 (internal quotation marks, ellipsis,

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1 Defendant points out that all documents it requested to seal were subject to a

stipulated protective order. (See docket no. 18 & 19.) To the extent Defendant intends to

suggest that the protective order itself assures that Rule 26(c) good cause standard is met in this

case, the argument is rejected. This is a blanket protective order to which the parties stipulated

prior to the production of what they considered confidential documents. Accordingly, the

protective order is prospective in nature. Such protective orders are necessarily overinclusive. 

See Beckman Indus., 966 F.2d at 476. Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not have the

occasion to engage in the Rule 26(c) good cause analysis prior to signing the order. This is not

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footnote, and citation omitted). “Relevant factors include the public interest in understanding

the judicial process and whether disclosure of the material could result in improper use of the

material for scandalous or libelous purposes or infringement upon trade secrets.” Id. at 802 n.9

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant argues that the documents meet the good cause standard. This argument

misses the mark. “[A] ‘good cause’ showing . . . will not suffice to fulfill the ‘compelling

reasons’ standard that a party must meet to rebut the presumption of access to dispositive

pleadings and attachments.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. Moreover, Defendant’s motion does

not meet the lower good cause standard. See Pintos, 504 F.3d at 803. 

Under Rule 26(c), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party . . .

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(c). “A party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to

protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” 

Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[B]road allegations of

harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule

26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).

Defendant argues that more than 80 pages of Mr. Stewart’s deposition excerpts should be

sealed because he was asked questions about Plaintiff’s finances, business, advertising and

promotional strategies, and its customer base. Defendant concludes that all of this constitutes

confidential and proprietary business information of Plaintiff. This argument, unsupported by

evidence, fails to meet the good cause standard because it does not attempt to make a showing of

specific prejudice or harm, is unsubstantiated by specific examples, and is not supported by

articulated reasoning.1

 A fortiori, Defendant’s argument falls short of compelling reasons.

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uncommon. “[A] party seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order

typically does not make a ‘good cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any

particular document.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133. 

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Moreover, no attempt has been made to identify any particular statement in Mr. Stewart’s

testimony which may warrant sealing, but the entire transcript was designated “confidential”

because the allegedly sensitive testimony was interspersed throughout. Even if any portion of

Mr. Stewart’s testimony were shown to rise to the compelling reasons standard, sealing of the

entire transcript would not be warranted. Should either party in the future request the sealing of

any documents, they must designate specific portions based on the appropriate showing.

As to the remaining three exhibits, i.e., financial statements and the report of Plaintiff’s

damages expert, Defendant maintains they contain confidential, sensitive and proprietary

financial information. Again, this argument is unsupported by evidence, lacks a showing of

specific prejudice or harm, is unsubstantiated by specific examples, and unsupported by

articulated reasoning. This falls short not only of the good cause standard but of the compelling

reasons standard as well.

Furthermore, according to Defendant, the financial information is relevant to damages. In

almost any case where a plaintiff seeks economic damages, it must present financial information

in support of the requested amount. Should either party in the future seek to seal any financial

information on which it intends to rely for proof of damages, it must show how the financial

information in this case is more confidential, sensitive or proprietary than in a typical case where

damages are sought.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Seal is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 20, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

HON. RUBEN B. BROOKS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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