Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02582/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals T,-nt} ... r.,~,.,~·r 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 3 - 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DINA LESTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ELI LILLY & COMPANY; E.R. SQUIBB & 

INCORPORATED; RICHARDSON MERRILL 

COMPANY; ABBOTT LABORATORIES; MERCK 

& CO., INC.; THE UPJOHN COMPANY; 

DEXTER CORPORATION, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 88-2582 

(D.C. No. 87-2442-0) 

( D. Kan. ) 

698 F. Supp. 843 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

This case turns on the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 60-513(b), a maximum ten-year statute of limitations, to 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2582 Document: 01019958653 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 1 
plaintiff's claim that exposure to dietheylstilbestrol (DES) while 

in utero caused her damage well over twenty years later. 

The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff's mother ingested DES 

while pregnant with plaintiff in 1959-1960. Plaintiff in 1985 was 

advised by her physician that the exposure to DES placed her at a 

greater risk of developing cancer than a person not exposed to 

DES. This action was commenced in 1987. 

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on 

the ground that the ten-year statute of repose operated to bar 

plaintiff's cause of action even though plaintiff could not have 

discovered the alleged injury until the time for pursuing a cause 

of 

843 

action had expired. Lester v. Eli Lilly & Co., 698 F. Supp. 

(D. Kan. 1988). We affirm. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513 reads as follows: 

Actions limited to two years. 

(a) The following actions shall be brought within two 

years: 

(1) An action for trespass upon real property. 

(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring 

personal property, including actions for the 

specific recovery thereof. 

(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, 

but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have 

accrued until the fraud is discovered. 

(4) An action for injury to the rights of another, 

not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated. 

(5) An action for wrongful death. 

(6) An action to recover for an ionizing radiation 

injury as provided in K.S.A. 60-513a, 60-513b and 

60-513c, and amendments thereto. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2582 Document: 01019958653 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 2 
(7) An action arising out of the rendering of or 

failure to render professional services by a health 

care provider, not arising on contract. 

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the causes of 

action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to 

have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of 

action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact 

of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some 

time after the initial act, then the period of 

limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury 

becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, 

but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 

10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the 

cause of action. 

(c) A cause of action arising out of the rendering of 

or the failure to render professional services by a 

health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at 

the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the 

cause of action, unless the fact of injury is not 

reasonably ascertainable until some time after the 

initial act, then the period of limitation shall not 

commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably 

ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event 

shall such an action be commenced more than four years 

beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of 

action. 

(d) The provisions of this section as it was 

constituted prior to July 1, 1987, shall continue in 

force and effect for a period of two years from that 

date with respect to any act giving rise to a cause of 

action occurring prior to that date. 

Pursuant to a question of law certified by the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas (Judge Kelly), the 

Kansas Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) and determined that the ten-year 

period is an absolute cut-off point even for causes of action 

involving latent diseases that could not have been discovered 

within the limitations period. Tomlinson v. Celotex Corp., 770 

P.2d 825 (Kan. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2582 Document: 01019958653 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 3 
In view of the Tomlinson decision, which is also in accord 

with this court's holding in Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 

(10th Cir. 1984)(upholding similar four-year absolute bar for 

medical malpractice claims under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(c)), the 

judgment of the district court must be affirmed. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 88-2582 Document: 01019958653 Date Filed: 01/03/1990 Page: 4