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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 15-1239 

LAMAR BLAKE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. 

No. 14 CV 50117 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 27, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

____________________ 

Before POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Lamar Blake pled guilty to possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm 

as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Blake 

did not appeal, but he later filed a motion to vacate, set 

aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on one of Blake’s 

claims—that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a requested notice of apCase: 15-1239 Document: 33 Filed: 02/26/2016 Pages: 8
2 No. 15-1239 

peal. After the hearing, the district court denied Blake’s 

§ 2255 motion but certified the ineffective-assistance claim 

for appeal. Because the district court’s finding that Blake did 

not ask his attorney to file an appeal is not clearly erroneous, 

we affirm. 

I. History 

Blake was represented during his criminal proceedings 

by retained counsel and pled guilty to possessing cocaine 

base and a firearm as a felon. The plea agreement did not 

include a waiver of Blake’s right to file an appeal or a § 2255 

motion. 

A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation 

report (PSR), finding that Blake qualified as an armed career 

criminal, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and a career offender, see

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Blake’s counsel did not object to the PSR, 

but the probation officer filed a supplemental report the day 

before Blake’s sentencing hearing clarifying that Blake was 

not in fact an armed career criminal but still qualified as a 

career offender based on prior drug convictions. The district 

court accepted the probation officer’s amended findings and 

calculated a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. Counsel did not object to the guidelines calculation, 

and Blake confirmed that he approved of his attorney’s actions. The district court explained that “[i]t would be easy 

for me to sentence [Blake] to the maximum of 235 or go over 

that,” but settled on concurrent terms of 216 months’ imprisonment on each count. The district court then explained to 

Blake his right to appeal and the repercussions of not doing 

so. 

Case: 15-1239 Document: 33 Filed: 02/26/2016 Pages: 8
No. 15-1239 3

Almost a year later Blake filed a § 2255 motion, arguing 

that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that his 

attorney rendered ineffective assistance in several ways, including by not filing a requested notice of appeal. Blake 

submitted an affidavit averring that he asked his attorney to 

file a notice of appeal. The government responded with an 

affidavit by Blake’s counsel stating that he discussed with 

Blake his right to appeal after the sentencing hearing, but 

that Blake said he was satisfied with his sentence and so did 

not wish to appeal. The district court denied Blake’s § 2255 

motion on all claims except the alleged ineffective assistance 

for failing to file an appeal; the district court ordered an evidentiary hearing on that claim and appointed counsel for 

Blake. 

At the evidentiary hearing, only Blake and his former attorney testified. Blake testified that he asked about his appeal on three occasions. First, he told counsel he wanted to 

appeal right after his sentencing hearing. Next, while Blake 

was incarcerated at the Winnebago County Jail because of a 

detainer from the Illinois Department of Corrections, counsel 

visited him twice before the expiration of the time to appeal. 

Blake said he asked about his appeal on both occasions. According to Blake, he was subsequently moved to several facilities and both he and other family members, including his 

brother, attempted unsuccessfully to contact his attorney. 

Blake first learned that his appeal had not been filed in May 

2014 after his family called the Court of Appeals. Blake, who 

testified that he has an eighth grade education, then conducted research to “find out if [he] can get back to an appeal” and filed his § 2255 motion. 

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Counsel testified that he and Blake had a “very good” 

working relationship. He confirmed that he and Blake had a 

short conversation after the sentencing hearing but said that 

Blake never asked him to file a notice of appeal. He further 

testified that Blake was happy with the sentence he received 

because he had feared an above-guidelines sentence based 

on his lengthy criminal history. Counsel said he was unaware of any attempts by Blake or his family members to 

contact him after sentencing. When asked about his visits 

with Blake at the jail, counsel initially did not remember the 

visits. But after being shown visitors’ logs from the jail, he 

responded that his recollection was refreshed but that they 

did not discuss filing a notice of appeal during those visits. 

Counsel testified that he would have made a notation if 

Blake had requested that he file an appeal, but he would not 

have made a similar notation if Blake had not wanted to appeal. 

The district court made oral findings, which it later 

adopted in a written order, that Blake had not asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal and therefore could not succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court found that Blake’s credibility was undermined because (1) he waited almost a year after sentencing to file anything with the court complaining about his appeal not being 

filed; (2) at sentencing Blake seemed satisfied with his sentence; (3) Blake has an extensive criminal history which undercut his credibility generally; (4) there were inconsistencies between Blake’s version of events supporting other 

claims in his § 2255 motion and what he said during the plea 

colloquy and sentencing hearing; (5) Blake has a reason to 

lie; and (6) he did not corroborate his claim with other evidence, such as an affidavit or testimony from his family 

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No. 15-1239 5

members who he asserted tried to contact his attorney. The 

court, on the other hand, found counsel credible because (1) 

his testimony that Blake was happy with his sentence because he faced the possibility of a much higher one was logical and consistent with the transcript of the sentencing hearing, (2) he has no bias or interest, and (3) he is an experienced attorney who had no reason not to file an appeal if 

asked. 

The district court also separately discredited Blake’s testimony that he and his attorney discussed an appeal while 

Blake was at the jail. The court found that the “focus of the 

conversation” was the detainer placed on Blake by the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court based this finding 

on Blake’s testimony that the detainer was why he asked his 

attorney to meet him in jail and the fact that counsel did not 

remember the meetings was “not unusual if there was nothing remarkable that the defendant had asked him.” 

The court did, however, grant relief on a claim Blake’s 

newly appointed attorney added to the § 2255 motion. Blake 

was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment on both counts. 

But Blake is not an armed career criminal, so the maximum 

sentence for the firearm offense was 120 months’ imprisonment. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), with § 924(a)(2). The district court therefore vacated the 216-month sentence on the 

firearm count and imposed 120 months’ imprisonment, still 

to run concurrently to the 216-month term for the drug 

count.1 The court also granted Blake a certificate of appeala-

 

1 Neither party argues that the adjustment to Blake’s sentence on the 

firearm count impacts this appeal. At most, Blake received a resentencing on that count, which would not entitle him to challenge the underly-

(continued...) 

Case: 15-1239 Document: 33 Filed: 02/26/2016 Pages: 8
6 No. 15-1239 

bility on his claim that his attorney was ineffective for not 

filing an appeal: “Given the nature of these proceedings, and 

the fact that the court had to make a factual finding regarding whether defendant instructed his attorney to file an appeal, the court finds that reasonable jurists could debate” 

whether Blake had received ineffective assistance. 

II. Analysis 

To succeed on the ineffective assistance claim certified for 

appeal, Blake had to show that he in fact asked his attorney 

to file a notice of appeal. See Gant v. United States, 627 F.3d 

677, 681 (7th Cir. 2010). The only issue before us, therefore, is 

if the district court clearly erred in finding that Blake did 

not, a determination based on the relative credibility of the 

two men. A credibility determination will be overturned only if credited testimony is internally inconsistent, implausible, or contradicted by extrinsic evidence. Ortiz v. Martinez, 

789 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Williams, 216 

F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2000). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between 

them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); see also Webster v. 

United States, 667 F.3d 826, 833 (7th Cir. 2011). We have gone 

so far as to say that a “credibility determination is not a basis 

for appellate review.” Gant, 627 F.3d at 681 (internal citation 

 

(...continued) 

ing conviction in a subsequent proceeding. See Suggs v. United States, 705 

F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 2013). And because Blake retained the right to appeal the validity of his guilty plea, the relief sought in this appeal is not 

coextensive with the relief he received. See Garner v. United States, 808 

F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 2015). 

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No. 15-1239 7

and quotation marks omitted). But simply affixing the label 

“credibility determination” will not insulate a decision from 

review, and the court must base a finding on evidence, not 

mere speculation. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575; Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1012–17 (7th Cir. 2012); Castillo v. United 

States, 34 F.3d 443, 445–46 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Despite Blake’s best efforts to argue that some of the district court’s reasoning was not based on the evidence, the 

district court here chose between two competing, plausible 

versions of events. The only evidence, other than the jail visitors’ logs, was testimony by Blake and his attorney. Counsel 

said that Blake never asked him to file an appeal, and the 

district court believed his testimony over Blake’s. This finding is clearly supported. The court credited counsel because, 

for example, his testimony that Blake was happy with his 

sentence aligned with the court’s reading of the sentencing 

transcript and was logical because Blake faced the possibility 

of a far longer sentence. Indeed, the district court said at sentencing that “[i]t would be easy for me to sentence [Blake] to 

the maximum of 235 or go over that.” Furthermore, Blake 

failed to present any evidence corroborating his version of 

events, such as an affidavit or testimony from the family 

members he claimed unsuccessfully tried to contact his attorney, even though his brother was present at the evidentiary hearing. Cf. Furry v. United States, 712 F.3d 988, 994 (7th 

Cir. 2013); Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2011). 

We note briefly, however, that two of the district court’s 

reasons for discrediting Blake are problematic. First, the 

court believed that if Blake was really concerned about an 

appeal, then he would have filed something with the court 

sooner than he filed his § 2255 motion. But it is undisputed 

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8 No. 15-1239 

that Blake met the one-year deadline for filing his § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Using a perceived lack of diligence to undermine Blake’s credibility effectively prevented 

him from taking the full year he was allotted. See Liu v. 

Lynch, 788 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2015). Diligence is instead 

an appropriate inquiry when determining if lateness should 

be excused by equitable tolling. See Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 

806, 811 (7th Cir. 2013); Ryan v. United States, 657 F.3d 604, 

607 (7th Cir. 2011). Next, the district court found that Blake 

was biased—and therefore more likely to lie—because he 

“wants to somehow get this before the Court of Appeals,” 

while counsel had “no such bias.” But it will always be true 

that a movant—if he is unsuccessful in the district court and 

especially if his claim is based on not receiving an appeal—

would want his case to proceed. Additionally, although there 

was no evidence that counsel had a bias against Blake, an 

attorney accused of ineffective assistance certainly has an 

interest in protecting his reputation. 

Despite our disagreement with two of the district court’s 

specific reasons underpinning its credibility ruling, we cannot find that the district court clearly erred in finding that 

Blake did not ask his attorney to file an appeal. See United 

States v. White, 240 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that factual findings will not be disturbed even if reviewing court would have weighed evidence differently as trier 

of fact); Abbott v. United States, 195 F.3d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 

1999) (upholding credibility determination even though “evidence was not entirely consistent”). 

III. Conclusion 

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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