Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00100/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00100-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 See Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 5, 260:21.

1 06cv0100

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS OUIA HAITHCOCK, Civil No. 06-cv-0100-MMA(JMA)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

M. VEAL, Warden, 

Respondent.

State prisoner Thomas Ovia1 Haithcock ("Haithcock"), proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"), seeks

relief from his May 2004 conviction and sentence for possessing and selling cocaine base, as charged

in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SDC179790. There is no dispute his January 17, 2006

Petition was timely filed, and the two grounds for habeas relief presented are exhausted. Respondent

filed an Answer, and Haithcock filed a Traverse. (Dkt Nos. 29, 31.) Intervening proceedings

memorialized in the docket, including an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, account for the delay in reaching

the Petition merits. In consideration of the lodged record and controlling legal authority, and for the

reasons discussed below, it is now recommended the Petition be DENIED.

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 Respondent's Notice of Lodgment lists the lodged documents. (Dkt No. 30.) However, the

documents themselves were not labeled correspondingly. The Reporter's Transcript ("RT"), identified as

Lodgment 1, is comprised of six volumes. The Clerk's Transcript ("CT") is identified as a one-volume

Lodgment 2, whereas the lodged record has three CT volumes. The main volume contains Bates-numbered

pages 0001 through 0115. One of the other CT volumes, designated on its cover "Augment Clerk's Transcript,"

contains four items of correspondence from Haithcock addressed to particular judges in April and May 2004.

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I. BACKGROUND

Federal habeas courts presume the correctness of "a determination of a factual issue made by

a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The only state court opinion of record addressing the merits

of Haithcock's claims is the August 10, 2005 Court of Appeal decision affirming his conviction and

sentence. (Lodg. 6.)2

 As pertinent here, the Court of Appeal recited the following facts: 

On January 11, 2004, at around 6:00 p.m., the San Diego Police

Narcotics Unit conducted a "buy/bust" operation in the area of 1500

Island Avenue in San Diego. This type of operation normally consists

of an undercover operative purchasing illegal narcotics from a streetlevel dealer, followed by several other uniformed officers moving in to

arrest the people involved in the sale. On this occasion, Officer

William Martinez was the undercover agent, dressed in street clothes

and equipped with two $20 bills and one $10 bill, the serial numbers of

which had been prerecorded for comparison purposes after the arrest of

the alleged drug dealers. Several other police officers were nearby in

unmarked cars, ready to assist in providing surveillance and arrest,

should a successful purchase of narcotics occur.

Officer Martinez approached a group of approximately 10

people on the 500 block of 15th Street and engaged Grace Cartwright

in a conversation in which he asked to buy $40 of rock cocaine.

Cartwright instructed Officer Martinez to follow her, and he did so.

They walked several blocks and stopped near the 1400 block of

J Street. Officer Martinez gave Cartwright the two prerecorded $20

bills, and Cartwright gave Officer Martinez a watch to hold for

collateral while she went to retrieve the drugs. Cartwright walked

down the block, while Officer Martinez watched and waited for her to

return.

Cartwright stopped in front of a chain link fence surrounding

1453 J Street. Appellant [Haithcock] approached Cartwright from the

other side of the fence, and, after engaging her in a brief conversation,

the two exchanged something between their hands. Appellant walked

back to the doorway of the house and engaged in another hand-to-hand

transaction with Kim Harris. Appellant returned to Cartwright and

again exchanged something between their hands and then returned to

the house. While Officer Martinez could not see the hand-to-hand

exchange between appellant and Harris from his vantage point, several

other officers in nearby unmarked cars observed the transaction.

Cartwright returned to Officer Martinez and placed

approximately 0.55 grams of rock cocaine on a green electrical box

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near them. Martinez picked up the rock cocaine and began to walk

away. Cartwright called to Martinez and asked for a piece of the rock

cocaine. Martinez said he could not do that, gave her the prerecorded

$10 bill instead and walked away. [FN 2: Cartwright expected either

money or a piece of the narcotics in return for her assistance.]

After Officer Martinez gave the signal, officers moved in to

arrest appellant, Cartwright, and Harris. Officer Vernon Peterson

detained Cartwright. Detective Davies and Officer Hall arrested

appellant. Officer Michael Moran arrested Harris. Officers saw

Cartwright drop a $10 bill. They retrieved it and confirmed it was the

prerecorded $10 bill. While searching Harris, officers found the two

prerecorded $20 bills in her possession. Harris later told police officers

she lived at 1453 J Street and appellant was involved in the narcotics

transaction. Appellant also told officers he lived at 1453 J Street.

(Lodg. 6, pp. 2-4.)

A February 9, 2004 Information charged Haithcock with two criminal counts: (1) selling a

controlled substance (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(a)), with the special allegation under

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.073(b)(7) the controlled substance was cocaine base, and (2) possession of

cocaine base for sale (CAL.HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 11351.5). (Lodg. 2, Clerk's Transcript ("CT")

at 1-2.) The Information also alleged Haithcock had been previously convicted of a serious or violent

felony under CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) in August 1999 (SDC147045) for which he served a

prison term, a strike prior pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5(b) through (i), 1170.12, and 668.

(CT at 3.) On May 3, 2004, a motion to bifurcate the trial of Haithcock's alleged prison and strike

priors became moot when he admitted both the allegations. (CT at 103; Lodg. 1, Reporter's Transcript

("RT") Vol. 4, pp. 47-54.)

Trial lasted three days. Haithcock testified on his own behalf. (CT at 109-110; RT Vol. 5,

pp. 260-290.) On May 6, 2004, during their deliberations, the jury requested and received a readback

of all his testimony. Within one-half hour thereafter, the jury convicted him of the two charged

counts. (CT at 111-114; RT Vol. 6, pp. 240-344.) On June 4, 2004, the court sentenced him to the

upper term of five years on Count 1, doubled for the prior strike conviction, for a total term of ten

years in state prison. The court dismissed Count 2 as a lesser included offense and struck the prior

prison term allegation. (CT at 115; RT Vol. 6, pp. 352-355.)

On January 19, 2005, Haithcock filed an appeal alleging the same two grounds for relief he

presents in his federal Petition: (1) the trial court abused its discretion to deny each of his two pretrial

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3

 Haithcock noticed his appeal of the stay and abeyance denial on December 13, 2006. (Dkt No. 39.)

Nearly a year later, on December 3, 2007, the Ninth Circuit ordered appointment of counsel for the appeal,

finding it "unclear" whether the denial of such a motion is a final, appealable Order, instructing the parties to

brief that issue, and granting a COA on the issue whether the district court abused its discretion in denying that

motion. (Dkt No. 46.) The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on January 23, 2009. (Dkt No. 49.)

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motions to substitute appointed defense counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment representation

rights, and (2) the trial court denied him due process when it sentenced him to the upper term based

on aggravating factors he did not admit and the jury did not find. (Lodg. 3.) The Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment on August 10, 2005, in an unpublished, reasoned decision. (Lodg. 6.)

Haithcock sought review in the California Supreme Court, raising the same two claims. (Lodg. 7).

On October 21 2005, that court summarily denied review, the last state court proceeding before he

filed his federal Petition. (Lodg. 8.)

On February 28, 2006, just over a month after he filed his federal Petition, Haithcock filed a

state habeas petition in Superior Court, asserting the same two claims rejected on direct appeal and

adding two new claims: ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and a Confrontation

Clause violation based on the arresting officer's allegedly inadmissible hearsay testimony. He pursued

collateral relief in the state courts through the California Supreme Court's summary denial on

March 21, 2007, as substantiated in an attachment to his February 10, 2009 Motion To Amend/Correct

his federal Petition. (Dkt No. 51.) 

On March 27, 2006, Haithcock had filed a Motion To Stay his federal habeas proceedings and

to hold the Petition in abeyance while he pursued exhaustion of his two new claims and collateral

review of his original claims in state court. (Dkt No. 10.) Respondent opposed the motion (Dkt

No. 12), and Haithcock filed a Reply (Dkt No. 28). By Order entered November 7, 2006, the District

Judge then assigned to this case adopted the Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge that the stay and abeyance motion be denied. (Dkt No. 38). Haithcock filed a Notice

Of Appeal of that result on December 13, 2006. (Dkt No. 39.) His appeal was dismissed on

January 23, 2009 for lack of jurisdiction because the denial of a stay and abeyance motion is not a

final and appealable order.3

 (Dkt No. 49.) In the interim, the parties had filed their Answer and

Traverse to the federal Petition, in June 2006 and July 2006 respectively. (Dkt Nos. 29, 31.)

//

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5 06cv0100

On February 10, 2009, just over two weeks after the Ninth Circuit dismissed his appeal of the

stay and abeyance denial, Haithcock filed a Motion To Amend his Petition to add the two new claims

he had raised in his state court collateral proceedings. (Dkt No. 51.) Respondent opposed the motion

(Dkt No. 54), and after extensions of time, Haithcock filed a Reply (Dkt No. 62). Before the motion

was decided, Haithcock attempted to file a First Amended Petition, which was rejected. (Dkt No. 60).

On September 24, 2009, the motion was denied on grounds amendment would be futile because the

amended petition would not relate back to the filing date of his original petition, inasmuch as the new

claims did not arise out of the same "conduct, transaction or occurrence" (FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2)),

and thus were time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Dkt

No. 64, 5:16-18); see Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656-57 (2005). Therefore, the claims at issue

remain the two grounds for relief Haithcock presented in his original federal Petition: challenges to

the trial court's denial of his two Marsden motions for substitute counsel and to his upper-term

sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards For Federal Habeas Relief

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). Federal habeas

courts are bound by a state's interpretation of its own law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)

(federal courts may not reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions); Oxborrow v.

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) ("errors of state law do not concern us unless they

rise to the level of a constitutional violation"); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990)

(federal courts "have no authority to review a state's application of its own laws"). Habeas relief is

warranted only if constitutional error occurred and the error was structural or the trial error had a

" 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001), quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

Federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996 are governed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

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Haithcock mistakenly asserts AEDPA "does not apply to Petitioner['s] claim[s]." (Dkt No. 31, p. 2.)

AEDPA establishes a " 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' " requiring "that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002), quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7. The petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Federal

habeas relief is warranted only if the result of a claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court "was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A decision is "contrary to" federal law if (1) it applies a rule that

contradicts governing Supreme Court authority, or (2) it "confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but reaches a different result. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (citations omitted). To be found "unreasonable," the application of the precedent

"must have been more than incorrect or erroneous;" it "must have been 'objectively unreasonable.' "

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted); see Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S.

433, 436 (2004). A federal court applies AEDPA standards to the "last reasoned decision" by a state

court. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005); see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803 (1991) ("Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground").

B. Ground One: Sixth Amendment Violation

 Haithcock alleges his "conviction must be reversed because my 6th Amendment right to

counsel was violated with the [sic] trial court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner['s] Marsden

motion[s]." (Pet. p. 7.) The denial of a motion to substitute counsel can be considered in a habeas

proceeding. See Robinson v. Kramer, 588 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2009). "It is well established and clear

that the Sixth Amendment requires on the record an appropriate inquiry into the grounds for such a

motion, and that the matter be resolved on the merits before the case goes forward." Schell v. Witek,

218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). This claim encompasses only the allegedly prejudicial

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error Haithcock ascribes to the trial courts' refusal to substitute counsel. The merits of his ineffective

assistance of counsel contentions are not before the Court as a separate ground. (See Dkt Nos. 60, 64.)

The Sixth Amendment accords a defendant the right to receive the assistance of counsel at

every critical stage of criminal proceedings. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right

to counsel encompasses the right to reasonably effective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The "purpose of providing assistance of counsel 'is simply to ensure that

criminal defendants receive a fair trial.' " Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988), quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-57 (1984) ("the right to

the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has

on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial"). A defendant has a qualified right to retained

counsel of choice, but an indigent defendant, while entitled to appointed counsel, is not entitled to

appointed counsel of choice. Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 671 (9th Cir.1993); see Morris v.

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (holding the Sixth Amendment requires only competent representation

and does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between a defendant and counsel). 

Thus, the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on

the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such. If counsel is a

reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitutional standards

irrespective of his client's evaluation of his performance.

Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657, n. 21.

"[A] state trial court has no discretion to ignore an indigent defendant's timely motion to

relieve an appointed attorney." Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025, 1026-27 (remanding for evidentiary hearing

where state court had failed to make any inquiry into the substance of defendant's claims alleging

breakdown of attorney-petitioner relationship, so there was no record of how far that relationship had

deteriorated). Even a brief inquiry into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction can be sufficient.

See Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).

[T]he ultimate constitutional question the federal courts must

answer here is not whether the state trial court "abused its discretion"

in not deciding [the petitioner's] motion, but whether this error actually

violated [the petitioner's] constitutional rights in that the conflict

between [the petitioner] and his attorney had become so great that it

resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that

fell short of that required by the Sixth Amendment.

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4

 Haithcock's first motion was heard by Hon. Bernard E. Revak on April 5, 2004. The second was

heard by Hon. Peter C. Deddeh on April 27, 2004. Trial began May 3, 2004, presided over by Hon. Laura

Palmer Hammes.

8 06cv0100

Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026, 1024-25 (overruling the "abuse of discretion" test described in Bland v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) as the correct standard of review

"to examine the constitutionality of a state court's handling of a motion to substitute appointed counsel

based on allegations of an irreconcilable conflict"). 

The Schell court clarified that the three-part Bland protocol is "of course . . . the correct

methodology for reviewing federal cases on direct appeal," but "our focus is different on direct review

than in the context of a § 2254 proceeding." Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 730 (1991) ("The [habeas] court does not review a judgment, but the lawfulness of the

petitioner's custody simpliciter"). Accordingly, a "federal court reviewing a state court determination

in a habeas corpus proceeding ordinarily applies a harmless error standard, examining whether the

error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence' on the trial." Schell, 218 F.3d at 1022, quoting

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). "Not every conflict or disagreement between the

defendant and counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights." Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026-28. "Under this

standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual

prejudice.' " Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Haithcock became dissatisfied with his appointed public defender and moved twice to have

him replaced. Unlike in Schell, two trial courts looked into the merits of Haithcock's serious

allegations and created a detailed record of his complaints, his attorney's responses at hearings on the

record, and the degree of responsibility Haithcock himself bore for the breakdown in the relationship.4

He nevertheless contends the determinations to deny him substitute counsel were "unreasonable" and

a violation of his "Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which then violated my Fourteenth Amendment

[right] to a fair trial." (Dkt No. 31, pp. 2-3.) He summarily asserts "Petitioner would of [sic] been

found 'not' guilty if Petitioner had an attorney that would have done his job as a[n] attorney. . . ." (Id.)

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A defendant has no automatic right to the substitution of counsel because of dissatisfaction

with counsel's performance. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990). Only irreconcilable

conflicts which constructively deny the defendant any counsel whatsoever implicate the Sixth

Amendment. Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005); see Stenson v. Lambert, 504

F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007) (an "irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs

only where there is a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and client, and the

breakdown prevents effective assistance of counsel") (emphasis added). Where a defendant has

"completely lost trust in his attorney" and has "legitimate reason" for doing so, a court may find

constructive denial of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1198-99.

However, if the defendant's refusal to cooperate with counsel "demonstrates 'unreasonable

contumacy,' " a court's refusal to remove the attorney does not support a finding the defendant was

denied counsel. Id. (citations omitted).

The California standard in People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) substantially parallels

federal law. See Hudson, 686 F.2d at 829. "[A] claim a trial court unconstitutionally denied a

defendant's Marsden motion is in essence a claim that the trial court failed to recognize that the

defendant's complaints as to his counsel were such that, if true, counsel's performance fell below the

Sixth Amendment standard for effective assistance of counsel." Robinson, 588 F.3d at 1215 n.1, 1216,

citing Schell, 218 F.3d at 1021. A defendant requesting substitute counsel must have the opportunity

to present his reasons for dissatisfaction with the representation. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d at 123-24.

"[S]ubstitution is a matter of judicial discretion" after consideration of "any specific examples of

counsel's inadequate representation that the defendant wishes to enumerate." People v. Horton, 11

Cal.4th 1068, 1102 (1995), quoting Marsden, 2 Cal.3d at 124; see People v. Earp, 20 Cal. 4th 826, 876

(1999).) A Marsden motion need be granted only if the record "clearly" shows " ' that the first

appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have

become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.

' " (See Lodg. 6, p. 7, quoting People v. Hart, 20 Cal.4th 546, 603 (1999).)

The conflicts between Haithcock and his attorney were fully explored on the record at both his

Marsden motion hearings. (Lodg. 1, RT Vols. 2, 3.) As summarized by the Court of Appeal:

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 Prior to trial, appellant made two separate motions, asking the

court to replace his appointed counsel. On each occasion, in accord

with People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, the trial court afforded

appellant a hearing to plead his motion, as well as giving his counsel

an opportunity to respond. Because the judge in each motion found no

legally compelling reason to grant the request, each judge denied his

motion. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to grant either of his Marsden motions. We disagree.

(Log. 6, p. 5.)

The first Marsden motion hearing was held on April 5, 2004:

During this first Marsden hearing, appellant voiced several

concerns regarding George Peterson, his appointed counsel. He

complained of the infrequency of his communication with Peterson,

noting they had only discussed his case on one prior occasion.

Appellant expressed an unfavorable opinion of his attorney's

performance, stating: "You know, he's not trying – he's not doing a

very good job." Appellant also expressed dissatisfaction with

Peterson's suggestion it would be difficult to prove [Haithcock's version

of the] story regarding the alleged crime to the jury. The court gave

Peterson an opportunity to respond to the accusations. He mentioned

[among other things] an occasion in which appellant hung up the

telephone during an attempt to discuss the case. Peterson also

explained an extended period of illness had made it difficult to meet

with the appellant as planned.

The judge denied appellant's Marsden motion because he did

not "see any reason to replace Mr. Peterson." The judge explained to

appellant that Peterson had simply been explaining "some of the

realities" of the case, and that "just because you don't like the message,

you know, you don't shoot the messenger."

(Lodg. 6, pp. 5-6.)

The second Marsden motion hearing was held on April 27, 2004:

During this second Marsden hearing, appellant made similar

claims regarding the length of time Peterson spent with him discussing

the case. He claimed he called Peterson's office multiple times and that

individuals hung up the telephone. Because appellant believed firmly

in his innocence, he expressed displeasure with Peterson discussing any

outcome other than acquittal. In response, Peterson explained several

individuals in his office refused to take appellant's calls because of the

nature of his previous contacts. Peterson further stated his belief

appellant had "done everything he possibly" could to destroy the

attorney-client relationship. Because of the difficulty in the

relationship, Peterson advised the court "that there is an irreconcilable

difference between us, because he has made every effort to tarnish and

to destroy any relationship that existed prior to the series of

communications and Marsden hearing." Peterson proceeded to ask the

court to grant appellant's Marsden motion.

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5

 For example, the prosecutor called each of the four police officers who participated in the "buy/bust"

operation, each of whom was an eyewitness to the illicit transaction. (Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 4, pp. 61-209.)

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The judge denied appellant's motion because none of the

reasons stated "legally compel" the appointment of a new attorney.

The judge explained a sufficient basis for granting a Marsden motion

is not found just "because two people can't get along."

(Lodg. 6, pp. 6-7.) 

 Merely reciting "the number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates

with his attorney" does not compel substitution of counsel. (Lodg. 6, p. 8 (citations omitted). "[A]

defendant may not effectively veto the appointment of counsel by claiming a lack of trust in, or the

inability to get along with appointed counsel," and "[a] disagreement concerning tactics is . . .

insufficient to compel the discharge of appointed counsel, unless it signals a complete breakdown in

the attorney-client relationship." (Id. (citations omitted).) Applying those standards, the Court of

Appeal found no abuse of discretion in Haithcock's case. 

In each motion, appellant expressed concerns about his counsel, but

none of them constituted reasons such that any reasonable judge would

have granted his motions. His attorney provided representation at the

preliminary hearing and readiness conference. He conducted

discovery, reviewed the preliminary hearing transcripts and remained

in touch with appellant by telephone and letters. When his counsel was

ill, other attorneys filled in for him from the Alternative Public

Defenders Office. At neither Marsden hearing did appellant present a

basis for concluding he was inadequately represented.

(Lodg. 6, p. 8.)

The Court of Appeal further observed: "Even if a judge abused his or her discretion in denying

a Marsden motion, we will not reverse unless 'the error in the trial court was prejudicial to defendant' "

applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). (Lodg. 6, p. 8.) Under Chapman, a court

on direct review will not disturb the result unless there was constitutional error in denial of the

Marsden motions and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal

concluded Haithcock showed no prejudice, so that any error was harmless: 

The evidence against appellant was substantial.[5] Appellant's counsel

presented reasonable defenses. Appellant's counsel made concerted

efforts to defend his client and appeared to thoroughly understand the

case.

(Lodg. 6, p. 9.)

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6

 After the jury was excused on the first day of trial, Cartwright appeared with her attorney. She had

already been sentenced to a six-year term under the same plea deal prosecutors had offered Haithcock.

However, her appeal time had not elapsed, and she apparently faced other charges in pending matters, so she

chose not to testify at Haithcock's trial. (CT at 105; Lodg. 1, Vol. 4, pp. 108-109.) 

7

 In resetting the hearing for April 27, 2004, the court informed Haithcock: "It looks like the court

screwed up." (Petition Exh. B, p. 32.)

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A federal habeas court applies the harmless error standard of Brecht to constitutional error by

the state courts, rather than the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman. See

Baines v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Brecht harmless error standard

applies in all 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus independent reviews regardless of the standard,

if any, applied by the state courts). Haithcock has failed to establish denial of his motions to substitute

counsel entailed constitutional error or, even if it did, that the error "had substantial and injurious

effect or influence" on the trial. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

Haithcock's primary complaints relate to trial tactics. It is well-settled that strategic and

tactical matters fall within trial counsel's discretion, and a defendant's disagreement does not

necessitate substitution of counsel. United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir.1987)

("appointed counsel, and not his client, is in charge of the choice of trial tactics and the theory of

defense"), citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965). Haithcock complained that no

defense witnesses were called, even though he told his attorney and the court that he wanted witness

testimony at trial. That "never happen[ed], just like everything else." (Petition, pp. 7-8.) In particular,

he had asked his attorney to subpoena Grace Cartwright, one of his co-defendants, who would testify

that he did not participate in the drug transaction. Haithcock's attempt to blame his attorney for her

absence as a defense witness contradicts the factual record. Counsel actually attempted to procure her

trial testimony, but she invoked her Fifth Amendment rights.6 (CT at 105; RT Vol. 4, pp. 108-109).

Thus, her absence as a defense witness was not an omission attributable to counsel's shortcoming, nor

could it have been remedied by substitute counsel. Haithcock also accuses his attorney of missing a

couple of court appearances, in particular, the second Marsden hearing initially convened on April 23,

2004. However, the record reflects the court's own notice mistake excused counsel's absence, and the

motion hearing went forward four days later.7

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Haithcock also complains about the lack of communication and the infrequency of his

meetings with counsel: "I knew what Mr. Peterson was going to do at the trial the same time that the

jury heard Mr. Peterson that's when I found out my defense. Nothing." (Petition pp. 7-8.) He

summarily observes his attorney "just wanted to make a deal" and "did not want to go to trial;" "he

just wanted to get paid and not do anything;" he "believ[ed] what the police said." (Id.) He argues:

"If I had paid Mr. Peterson would have listened to what I had to say," and the court should have

granted his motion based on the conflict they had. (Petition pp. 7-8.) However, Haithcock's

impressions do not equate with any actual failure to prepare the case for trial. This Court has reviewed

the record and concludes the Court of Appeal reasonably found the conflict between Haithcock and

his counsel did not pose a risk of (or result in) a constitutionally inadequate defense. 

The record substantiates counsel's thorough understanding of the evidence and readiness for

trial. Defense counsel extensively addressed all the issues Haithcock raised, including the steps he

had taken to investigate and prepare his defense and examples of areas where he hoped to create

reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds. He emphasized the "enormous burden on whoever represents"

Haithcock because of "the hand-to hand sale" witnessed by several police officers who would no doubt

testify at trial, and "the fact of the recovery of the narcotics, the money, the number of officers

involved, versus the testimony of Mr. Haithcock." (Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 3, p. 34.) He also described "the

enormous amount of information which may, or may not, be in the possession of the prosecution"

adverse to Haithcock discovered by his investigator. (Id. pp. 34-35.) Moreover, Haithcock testified

on his own behalf and was able to present his version of events to the jury. (RT Vol. 5, pp. 260-290).

In summary, the trial courts made full, appropriate, and interactive inquiries into Haithcock's

complaints and the extent of the attorney-client conflict in deciding his Marsden motions. See Schell,

218 F.3d 1017. Haithcock had the opportunity to explain all his reasons for wanting new counsel.

The trial courts developed an ample record to make an informed decision that Haithcock's conflict

with his attorney would not deprive him of a fair trial, as found by the Court of Appeal, whose factual

findings are entitled to deference. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). For all the foregoing reasons, this Court

recommends a finding the state court's decision on the merits of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor did it involve an

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8

 "MR. PETERSON: Mr. Haithcock understands that he has a strike. . . . He understands that, as a

result of the strike, the sentence that the Court may impose on either Count 1 or Count 2 must be doubled. . . . "

(Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 6, 347:20-25; see also Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 4, 53:27-54:8.) 

9

 "[W]hat makes this an upper term case appropriate is his lengthy criminal history. And it should be

noted included in his history are possible additional strike offenses . . ., but the People did not allege them. And

that inures to the benefit of the defendant. And I'm speaking of the two robbery convictions, the abduction

conviction, and also the aggravated assault conviction. [¶] We attempted to allege those. We were unable to

in a timely fashion . . . . I only cite those cases to show the upper term is warranted when we have someone who

has a serious criminal history and who fails to remain law-abiding." (Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 6 at 351-352.)

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objectively unreasonable determination of the facts from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

It is accordingly recommended habeas relief on Ground One be DENIED. 

C. Ground Two: Imposition Of Upper Term Sentence

Haithcock alleges in Ground Two the trial court's imposition of the five-year upper term under

California's three-tier determinate sentencing scheme ("DSL") must be reversed because the factors

used to depart from the middle term were neither admitted by him nor found true by a jury, in violation

of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Petition, pp. 9-10.) The Court of Appeal

summarized the sentencing record in its August 10, 2005 decision:

On June 10, 2004, the court imposed the upper term of five

years on count 1, doubling it to 10 years for the strike prior. Factors in

mitigation included the relatively small amount of cocaine involved in

the crime. Factors in aggravation included prior convictions, the

seriousness of prior convictions, the fact appellant was on parole at

the time of this offense, lack of remorse, lack of understanding of the

severity of the crime, and the prospect of appellant being a danger to

the community. The court dismissed count 2 as a lesser included

offense and struck the prison prior enhancement because the court

considered it as an aggravating factor in the imposition of the

upper term for count 1.

(Lodg. 6, pp. 4-5 (emphasis added).)

Following the jury's guilty verdicts on both charged counts, the court observed: "The serious

question is the term that the Court will impose and which will be doubled by the existing strike."8

(Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 6, 348:8-10.) Haithcock addressed the court regarding his personal circumstances,

acknowledging the truth of his 1999 prior conviction. (Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 6, 350:13-351:6.) The

prosecutor argued for an upper term sentence, as recommended by the Probation Department,

emphasizing, among other things, Haithcock's "lengthy criminal history."9

 (Id. at 351:10-352:6.)

Although the trial court identified several other factors in support of an upper term sentence,

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Haithcock's admitted prior conviction and his documented criminal record appear to have been

decisive considerations in the selection of the upper-term sentence. 

[T]he Court looks at this case, first of all, as one in which, but

for the record would have been probation. Small amount, facilitator,

not the actual holder of the drugs by the evidence. And it would have

been probation, but in looking at this record, I am appalled. This is an

extremely serious criminal record. And the defendant was on parole

at the time of this crime. . . .

First of all, looking at the overview, there are 19 adult

convictions in the past, and they include -- and this is just a summary

fashion. And I'm reading from Page 11 of the probation report, just

taking the highlights of it. Since 1973, two[] counts of robbery, assault

and battery twice, contempt three times, resisting arrest, criminal

mischief, abduction, felony assault, disorderly conduct, aggravated

assault, drug abuse twice, fighting in public, driving under the

influence, and assault with a deadly weapon with force likely to

produce great bodily injury.

The crime for which you are on parole, Mr. Haithcock, is one

of the most serious I've ever seen.. . . . [¶] And this came after a

previous assault on another girlfriend . . . . 

So I don't find that you are A, remorseful, B, understand

the severity of what you are doing or, C, pose any prospect of being

anything but a danger to the community, and therefore it is

necessary to impose the upper term. . . .

And in aggravation I look at the prior convictions, which

are numerous and extremely serious, the fact that you were on

parole at the time of this offense, and the fact that your prior

performance on parole and probation has been bad and you've

continued to reoffend throughout your entire lifetime, so therefor I

find that the aggravants outweigh the mitigants.

(Lodg. 1, RT Vol. 6 at 353-355 (emphasis added); CT at 353-354.)

At the time Haithcock was sentenced, California's DSL required the court to impose the middle

term "unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." People v. Black

("Black I"), 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1247 (2005), judgment vacated by Black v. California, 549 U.S. 1190

(2007). The California Rules Of Court provide a nonexhaustive list of aggravating circumstances,

including facts "relating to the crime," facts "relating to the defendant," and "[a]ny other facts

statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation." CAL.R.CT. 4.421(b)-(c). The sentencing

court was empowered at the time to impose the upper term if it expressly considered all the relevant

facts and found the circumstances in aggravation outweighed the circumstances in mitigation. CAL

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10 Respondent's June 30, 2006 Answer to Haithcock's federal Petition signaled that the United States

Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Cunningham on February 21, 2006 so that the issue of the

constitutionality of California's DSL was still pending. (Dkt No. 29, Answer at 12 n.1.) Respondent's reliance

on the Black I court's rationale must be rejected in consideration of the Cunningham decision. 

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R CT. 4.420. None of the aggravating facts needed to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rather, the trial court could find the particular aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence.

In his August 2005 Petition For Review to the California Supreme Court, Haithcock had

argued his sentencing judge erred in making factual findings to support his aggravated sentence.

(Lodg. 7, p. 18.: "The decision in Blakely renders unconstitutional portions of the California

determinate sentencing scheme . . ., including the portion of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b),

authorizing judges to make factual findings in connection with aggravating factors used to impose the

aggravated term.") His argument also relied on Apprendi and Booker for the proposition: "all of the

aggravating allegations used to increase his sentence were subject to proof beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

standard, and should have been tried to a jury if they were going to be used to aggravate the

defendant's sentence." (Lodg. 7 p. 20.) He contended there, as here: "Because all of the factors

relied upon by the trial court were inappropriately found and considered by the trial court, the

aggravated sentence imposed by the court was unauthorized, and violated petitioner's Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial under the United States Constitution." (Id.) In denying this

claim in August 2005, the Court of Appeal had simply stated: "The California Supreme Court recently

examined California's determinate sentencing structure and found it does not violate the criteria for

sentencing stated in Blakely" (Lodg. 6, p. 9, citing Black I, 35 Cal.4th 1238.) 

The Black I court had concluded the upper term, rather than the middle term, qualified as the

relevant statutory maximum for sentencing purposes and held there is no right to jury fact-finding

when a court imposes a sentence within the maximum authorized by a jury's verdict of guilt.

However, in February 2007, the United States Supreme Court vacated Black I and "remanded to the

California Supreme Court for further consideration in light of" Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.

270 (2007).10 Black v. California, 549 U.S. 1190 (2007). 

The Cunningham Court had invalidated California's DSL insofar as it authorized a judge rather

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11 "In sum, California's DSL, and the rules governing its application, direct the sentencing court to start

with the middle term, and to move from that term only when the court itself finds and places on the record facts

– whether related to the offense or the offender – beyond the elements of the charged offense." Cunningham,

549 U.S. at 279. "Because the DSL authorizes the judge, not the jury, to find the facts permitting an upper term

sentence, the system cannot withstand measurement against our Sixth Amendment precedent." Id. 549 U.S.

at 293.

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than a jury to find facts exposing a defendant to the upper term sentence, as a violation of the

defendant's right to a trial by jury, applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69. 471

(2000), Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005) (converting

the federal sentencing guidelines from mandatory to advisory to comport with the Sixth Amendment).

Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 274-75, 292-93. "Contrary to the Black [I] court's holding, our decisions

from Apprendi to Booker point to the middle term specified in California's statutes, not the upper term,

as the relevant statutory maximum." Id. at 293, 288 (the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes

"is the maximum sentence a judge may impose "solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury

verdict or admitted by the defendant"), quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis in original).

"[U]nder the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must

be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a

preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 281, citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) and

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69. 471 (same, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction"); see also

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 241-46 (1998) (recognizing the prior conviction

exception). "If the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if instead, the judge must find

an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied."11

Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 289-92, citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. 

Because the Cunningham opinion applied the reasoning of Apprendi and Blakely to

California's DSL, the Ninth Circuit has concluded it therefore announced no new constitutional rule

and may be applied retroactively. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom

Curry v. Butler, -- U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 767 (2008). "[W]here a federal habeas petitioner's conviction

became final between Blakely and Cunningham, the rule in Cunningham should be retroactively

applied under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)." Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1184 n.1

(9th Cir. 2009), citing Butler, 528 F.3d at 639. Haithcock was sentenced on June 4, 2004, twenty days

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before the Blakely decision. His conviction became final 90 days after the California Supreme Court

summarily denied his petition for review on October 21, 2005, as he did not file a petition for writ of

certiorari. SUP.CT.R. 13.4; see Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) ("A state conviction and

sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to

the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed

or a timely filed petition has been finally decided"). The Cunningham opinion issued January 22,

2007.

On remand, the Black II court applied Cunningham, but again concluded imposition of the

upper term did not violate the defendant's jury trial right because one legally-sufficient aggravating

factor justified the upper term. People v. Black ("Black II"), 41 Cal.4th 799 (2007), cert. denied sub

nom Black v. California, 552 U.S. 1144 (2008). "The United States Supreme Court consistently has

stated that the right to a jury trial does not apply to the fact of a prior conviction." Black II. 41 Cal.4th

at 818, citing Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288, Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.

at 243. While a sentencing court must start with the middle term, a single legally-sufficient

aggravating factor is enough to justify the court's imposition of an upper term sentence, even if the

trial court also relies on other aggravating circumstances not found true by a jury or admitted by the

defendant. Butler, 528 F.3d at 643 ("under California law, only one aggravating factor is necessary

to set the upper term as the maximum sentence"). "[I]f one aggravating circumstance has been

established in accordance with the constitutional requirements set forth in Blakely, the defendant is

not 'legally entitled' to the middle term sentence, and the upper term sentence is the 'statutory

maximum'. " Black II, 41 Cal.4th at 813, 816 ("imposition of the upper term does not infringe upon

the defendant's constitutional right to jury trial so long as one legally sufficient aggravating

circumstance has been found to exist by the jury, has been admitted by the defendant, or is justified

based upon the defendant's record of prior convictions," even if the sentencing court also engaged in

additional judicial fact-finding). 

Not only does the record reflect Haithcock admitted at least one prison and one strike prior

conviction, waiving trial on those charged allegations as established below, but also the line of cases

culminating in Cunningham acknowledges an exception to the "bright line rule" of Apprendi requiring

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jury fact-finding of aggravating factors: "Except for a prior conviction, 'any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288-89 (emphasis added), quoting Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 490, 476. In the Ninth Circuit, the prior conviction exception is a "narrow" one that

applies only to "those facts that can be established by the 'prior judicial record' of conviction," not to

secondary facts that may relate to the conviction itself but are not reflected in its immediate record.

Butler, 528 F.3d at 644-45. Nevertheless, Haithcock's circumstances appear to satisfy both the

defendant's factual admissions exception and the documented prior conviction exception to the Sixth

Amendment right to jury fact-finding. Although Haithcock's sentencing court also made

impermissible judicial "qualitative evaluations" in deciding to impose the upper term, "if at least one

of the aggravating factors on which the judge relied in sentencing [Petitioner] was established in a

manner consistent with the Sixth Amendment, [Petitioner's] sentence does not violate the

Constitution." Butler, 528 F.3d at 648. On that basis, while the additional judicial factfinding may

have been Apprendi error, this Court recommends a finding any such error was harmless. 

"To determine whether an Apprendi error was harmless, we must examine the whole record,

including the evidence presented by the government at sentencing." Butler, 528 F.3d at 651. In

connection with a motion to bifurcate trial of the priors allegations, counsel informed the court

Haithcock was prepared to waive trial and to admit the priors. The court confirmed on the record:

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Haithcock, you've had a chance to discuss your

right to a separate trial on the first prison prior allegation and the strike

prior allegation?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you feel that you understand that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: That if the jury does convict you of one of the felony

underlying offenses that is charged on the current offenses, then and

only then would they go into a second trial, and that would be the trial

on whether these allegations of the priors are true or not. And then that

trial takes place, and all 12 jurors would have to be satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that these priors had taken place before – as alleged

before they could make a true finding.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

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THE COURT: It's an odd thing. The jury in that bifurcated trial does

not decide whether, in fact, it was your prior, that's for the Court to

decide, but they do decide whether or not the documentation and other

evidence is sufficient to show that someone with your name had those

priors.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.

THE COURT: Okay. And you also have a right to give up the right to

a jury trial, if you wish, and to admit that you had these priors. That's

up to you. Do you wish to admit it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(RT Vol. 4n 49:2-50:2.)

THE COURT: Do you specifically admit – and I'll just read it if you

want to follow along in the Information. Do you admit the first prison

prior allegation that you served a separate prison term for a felony that

is alleged there, specifically Penal Code Section 245(a)(1); date of

conviction, August 20th, 1999; Court No. SCD 147045 in San Diego

Superior Court; that you were convicted as it states and as I just read

to you; and you went to prison for that offense, and when you were

released from prison, within the next five years you suffered another

felony conviction. Do you admit that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you admit the strike prior allegation pursuant

to Penal Code Section 667(b) through (i), and 668, that you had

suffered the same prior felony conviction that we just mentioned, . . . .

and that was a serious or violent felony under California law. Do you

admit that strike prior?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

. . .

THE COURT: Do you wish to admit that it was with personal

infliction of great bodily injury that makes it fall within the strike

category?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(RT Vol. 4, 50:17-52:24; see also RT Vol. 4, 53:10-21.)

 Even had Haithcock not admitted his two prior convictions, his Probation Report documents

the facts of several other prior felony convictions, a criminal history the trial court expressly relied

on to support selection of the upper term sentence. (CT 79-90.) "[T]he prior conviction exception [to

jury fact-finding] is justified by the reliability of court documents created as part of a process with

Sixth Amendment safeguards" to prove the existence of a particular prior conviction. Butler, 528 F.3d

at 645. Thus, not only did Haithcock admit a prior felony conviction, but also the Probation Report

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12 "[T]he exception does not extend to a court's qualitative evaluations of the nature or seriousness of

past crimes" or the "likelihood of recidivism" because "such determinations cannot be made solely by looking

to documents of conviction." Butler, 528 F.3d at 644.

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substantiates Haithcock's multiple other convictions. Therefore, while the considerations the

sentencing court recited as "A", "B", and "C" reasons for selecting the upper term sentence (Lodg. 1,

RT Vol. 6 at 354, reproduced and highlighted above) may not survive Cunningham scrutiny,12 the trial

court's permissible consideration of Haithcock's own admissions and the documentation of his other

criminal convictions supports the upper term sentence.

Even if Apprendi/ Cunningham/ Blakely judicial fact-finding error occurred, the error had no

substantial or injurious effect on his sentence. See Washington v. Recueno, 548 U.S. 212 (2006)

(holding that sentencing errors are subject to harmless error analysis); see Butler, 528 F.3d at 648-49.

"When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal

law had 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, that error is not

harmless." O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995), quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627. From

Haithcock's extensive prior criminal history documented in the record, it is virtually certain that a jury

would have found facts beyond a reasonable doubt to support at least one additional recidivist factor

authorizing the aggravated term. Consequently, on this record, any such error was harmless.

For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended the Court find Haithcock is not entitled to

federal habeas relief from his upper term sentence as the state court result is not contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority, and the state court's factual

findings are objectively reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, it is recommended relief on

Ground Two be DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Michael

M. Anello under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED this habeas petition be DENIED in its entirety on grounds the Petitioner is not

in custody in violation of any federal right. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue

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an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than May 14, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than May 28, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order.

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 23, 2010

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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