Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01425/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01425-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID MEDNANSKY AND MARTINE

MEDNANSKY,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07CV1425-LAB (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO

FILE SUR-REPLY; AND

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Docket nos. 13, 37]

vs.

U.S.D.A. Forest Service employees

THOMAS F. GILLETT, SUSAN

DeSONIA, SALLY D. GOODRICH, RICH

TOBIN, TINA TERREL, AND 10

Unknown U.S.D.A. Forest Service

Employees, and the United States

Government of America, 

Defendants.

Plaintiffs David and Martine Mednansky, residents in the Cleveland National Forest,

filed this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986, and tort theories. The Complaint seeks money

damages only. Thereafter, Plaintiffs failed to timely serve all but two of the individual

Defendants, Defendants Gillett and DeSonia. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for

additional time to serve the other Defendants, finding Plaintiffs had not been diligent and had

not shown good cause. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint. Following

briefing on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs applied ex parte for leave to file a sur-reply.

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 Plaintiffs have alleged the Special Use Permit provides that the only contact between 1

them and the Forest Service consists of payment of their fees and a single annual

inspection. (Compl. at 5:3–5.) Neither party submitted a copy of the Special Use Permit,

so the court accepts these allegations as pleaded.

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I. Background

Plaintiffs reside on federal land in the Cleveland National Forest in this District. Their

residence is located on property they leased for twenty years beginning in 1999 or 2000 by

a ForestService Special Use Permit (the “Special Use Permit”), for which they pay an annual

fee and are subject to certain requirements, including annual inspections. Beginning in 1

2001, Plaintiffs allege a Forest Service employee came on their land and took away some

garbage bags that had been set out for pickup by a private disposal company. They allege

someone then mailed them clippings of names and addresses taken from their garbage,

unaccompanied by a letter of explanation. (Compl. at 10:11–18, 11:1–18.) Although they

did not understand what the implied message might have been, they believed it was

intended to intimidate them in some way. (Id. at 10:14–18.) They allege after this, a

Defendant Tobin, a district ranger, orally agreed no employee would ever come onto their

lot in the future without an appointment. 

They allege this agreement was honored until May and June of 2004, when

unidentified Forest Service agents repeatedly harassed and threatened them and, causing

them terror and severe emotional upset. (Compl. at 5:8–10:18.) Plaintiffs allege that as a

result of the Forest Service agents’ behavior, they lived in fear for their lives and they

(particularly Ms. Mednansky) suffered emotional turmoil with attendant physical symptoms

such as insomnia. (Id. at 13:10–17:12.) As a result, they allege that on July 6, 2004 they

wrote to Forest Supervisor Dr. Ann Fege. 

The first of the two allegedly harassing incidents occurred on May 28, 2004. (See

Compl. at 8:27–10:2 (describing the incident).) Plaintiffs allege an unidentified Forest

Service employee appeared unannounced near their residence, and when questioned, said

she was there to conduct a fire hazard inspection. Mr. Mednansky and the Forest Service

employee disagreed about whether the inspection could take place without an appointment,

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 According to the Complaint, this statement was not strictly true, because Mr.

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Mednansky had told the Forest Service employee to leave, threatened her with citizen’s

arrest and arrest by the sheriff, and threatened to sue her for harassment, at which point she

left without conducting the inspection. (Compl. at 9:6–8, 9:25–10:2.) What Plaintiffs are

apparently asserting is that he was justified in sending her away because she had not first

gotten an appointment.

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each threatened the other with arrest, and the employee left, “muttering words of retaliation.”

(Id. at 10:1–2.) Plaintiffs allege nothing on this date other than trespass, a disagreement

about whether an appointment was necessary, and rudeness and belligerence on the Forest

Service employee’s part.

The principal allegations concern the events of June 9, 2004. Plaintiffs allege that

around 2:00 p.m., at least six Forest Service vehicles, accompanied by a sheriff’s vehicle,

surrounded their residence and blocked Plaintiffs’ vehicle in the driveway; Forest Service

employees destroyed a padlock securing a chained driveway gate, stole the padlock, and

then approached the residence. (Compl. at 5:8–17.) Plaintiffs allege at least eight Forest

Service employees brandished handguns and positioned themselves around the residence,

exhibiting “readiness for action.” (Id. at 5:18–27.) Plaintiffs allege Ms. Mednansky saw this

out of the windows, went out and asked what was going on, and was told they were there

to do a fire inspection. (Id. at 6:1–9.) The Forest Service employee allegedly said Plaintiffs

had hindered an earlier inspection attempt and had been rude and intimidating to the

inspector, so they were present to protect the inspector. (Id. at 6:11–16.) A series of

questions and responses allegedly followed in which Ms. Mednansky said they had not

hindered the previous inspection, and challenged the Forest Service’s right to be present,

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to remove their padlock, to take their garbage away, and to behave in the manner they were

behaving. (Id. at 6:16–7:20.) At some point during the exchange of questions and

responses, Plaintiffs allege Ms. Mednansky began to be afraid for her safety. (Id. at

6:25–26.) After the questions and responses, they allege, she “fell into a stupor” but then

apparently recovered and said she would send them a letter. (Id. at 7:15–20.)

Mr. Mednansky was not present for these events, but arrived minutes after Forest

Service agents left, and consoled his wife. (Compl. at 7:22–27.) After some time, he says,

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he was able to get the full story out of her, which outraged him and led him to believe the

Forest Service was attempting to drive them from their home. (Id. at 7:27–8:20.) Plaintiffs

believe the armed fire inspection was done in retaliation for their involvement with the events

of May 28, 2004. (Id. at 8:26–10:2.)

On July 9, Plaintiffs allege they received a reply from Defendant Gillett, who

apologized for any inconvenience, informed them they should not have a lock on their gate,

and agreed that Forest Service agents would honor the previous agreement not to come on

Plaintiffs’ property in the future without an appointment. (Compl. at 17:18–24.) Plaintiffs say

they were dumbfounded at what they perceived as Defendant Gillett’s trivializing of the

incident. (Id. at 17:26–18:4.) They say they wrote to Dr. Fege again, and Defendant again

replied, albeit contemptuously, asserting that his employees had felt threatened. (Id. at

18:9–18.) The second reply letter, they say, contained an admission that Gillett had ordered

an armed response on June 9, and a threat that Gillett “would not hesitate to take whatever

actions necessary to protect his employees.” (Id. at 18:14–22.) He allegedly also said he

ordered law enforcement to be present during any future inspections. (Id. at 18:17–20.)

Thereafter, Plaintiffs say they wrote to Dr. Fege again, asking that she identify what

behavior of theirs had caused Forest Service employees to feel threatened. (Compl. at

19:7–10.) This time, they say, Defendant Gillett telephoned them on December 9, 2004 and

asked them to meet him at a coffee shop. (Id. at 19:12–15.) They say they declined,

thinking this request suspicious, and asked him never to call them again. (Id. at 19:15–22.)

Thereafter, Plaintiffs say Defendant Gillett provided them with conflicting explanations

regarding what their threatening behavior had been, which they found implausible, and they

began to consider him hostile. (Compl. at 19:26–20:25.) They say he did this in a letter

dated January 4, 2005, in which he partly relies on an incident on August 31, 2004 to justify

the events of June 9, 2004. (Id. at 19:26–28, 20:11–13.) 

Plaintiffs then describe in great detail the events of August 31, 2004, which involve

Defendant DeSonia. (Compl. at 20:27–22:22.) They contend DeSonia came to their

residence without an appointment, in violation of the agreement. Ms. Mednansky, who says

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28 This letter is not included in the briefing materials, but may refer to the second letter 3

Gillett wrote, dated September 29, 2004.

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she was immediately afraid, asked why DeSonia was there. DeSonia replied she was there

to conduct the annual inspection. Ms. Mednansky told DeSonia her presence there was

causing her emotional distress. The fact that DeSonia had not been present on June 9 did

not calm Ms. Mednansky’s fears, because she says the mere sight of a Forest Service

employee or vehicle caused her nervousness and distress. Without addressing that

concern, DeSonia said she “could just about do the inspection from where she was

standing,” (id. at 21:15–16), but then asked to move closer to the residence. 

Mr. Mednansky exited his residence in time to see Ms. Mednansky and Defendant

DeSonia begin walking towards the residence. He asked DeSonia why she was there in

violation of the agreement, to which she replied she had called for an appointment. He says

he told her he received no call, and suspected she was lying. He also says he was

suspicious because she was alone, and not accompanied by armed Forest Service

employees (Compl. at 22:4–7), although he provides no explanation why the absence of an

armed escort would have made him nervous. Mr. Mednansky then threatened to place

DeSonia under a citizen’s arrest and sue her for harassment, at which point she left.

Plaintiffs allege Defendant DeSonia’s appearance at their residence after they had been

absent for six weeks caused them to be extremely suspicious and suffer emotional distress.

(Id. at 22:15–22.) 

Plaintiffs then return to setting forth their complaint against Defendant Gillett. (Compl.

at 22:24–24:2.) They construe his letter as a threat to punish them because he did not like

Mr. Mednansky’s “attitude, mannerisms, and statements.” (Id. at 24:2.) They allege that his

letter represents retaliation for past correspondence and interactions with the Forest Service.

(Id. at 24:4–26:4.)

The Complaint follows with further allegations concerning events following the events

of June 9. (Compl. at 26:6–27:9.) This includes a letter dated November 15, 2004 in which 3

they allege Defendant Gillett made frivolous accusations of non-compliance with Forest

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 Neither party included the text of the manual in their briefing, but a copy of what 4

appear to be the relevant documents are available online at the Forest Service’s website at

w w w .fs.fe d . u s / i m / d i r e c t i v e s / f s m / 2700/27 20.doc and a t

www.fs.fed.us/specialuses/documents/fsm_2710_feb02.doc.

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Service requirements in order to retaliate against them and threatened to revoke their permit.

In addition, after Plaintiffs again complained — this time, to Dr. Fege’s successor Tina Terrel

— they allege Defendant Gillett called them a second time on March 31, 2005, which they

say violated the “‘no call’ demand” and which led them to threaten to sue him for

harassment. They contend Gillett wrote them another letter, this one dated September 7,

2005, identifying non-compliance issues including several new ones. Plaintiffs believe the

letters identifying compliance issues are intended to punish them. 

Plaintiffs also allege that around January, 2006, Defendant DeSonia embarked on a

three-month series of daily drive-bys. (Compl. at 27:8–9.) After recounting attempts to

obtain administrative relief, Plaintiffs continue by describing these drive-bys. (Id. at

29:16–24.) They allege De Sonia drove past their residence daily for no reason, slowed

down, stared at their residence, then drove on. They also allege she drove past once again,

while not in uniform, in October of 2006. (Id. at 29:24–27.) Plaintiffs allege a neighbor not

employed by the Forest Service also conducted a series of drive-bys, which they speculate

is somehow related to Defendant DeSonia’s actions. (Id. at 30:4–26.) Plaintiffs say they

interpreted the drive-bys as an expression of control and intimidation, and as a result they

felt tension and anxiety. (Id. at 31:1–20.) They allege Ms. Mednansky suffered severe

health problems as a result.

Plaintiffs allege the June 9 inspection ordered by Gillett violated Forest Service policy

requiring Forest Service employees to make contact with permit holders to attempt to resolve

problems before taking other action. (Compl. at 33:14–17.) The content of this policy is 4

found in the Forest Service Manual. The policy does not appear to be the kind of regulation

which could give rise to a private right of action for damages, because it is hortatory and

gives advice to employees.

/ / /

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Plaintiffs have also made numerous allegations against other named and unnamed

persons who are not Defendants in this case. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss,

they attempt to raise other claims, such as violation of neighbors’ civil rights, obstruction of

justice, property theft, and damage to the residence. Such claims are not set forth in the

Complaint, however, and are therefore not before the Court.

II. Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply

After briefing was complete in this action, the Court took the hearing off calendar and

took Defendants’ motion to dismiss under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

Mr. Mednansky nevertheless appeared for the hearing, at which he presented two more

pleadings, identified as declarations of facts by himself and Ms. Mednansky. By a separate

order issued January 29, 2008, the Court accepted these for filing. Plaintiffs thereafter filed

a sur-reply, which the Court construed as a motion for leave to file a sur-reply.

The proposed sur-reply focuses chiefly on picking holes in the motion to dismiss and

is thus only marginally useful. Arguments not raised in the opening brief are ordinarily

waived, United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006), so in most cases a surreply serves little purpose. Nevertheless, in view of Plaintiffs’ status as pro se litigants, the

Court will accept the sur-reply for filing. Plaintiffs are, however, admonished they cannot rely

on their pro se status to excuse failure to comply with the rules, King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987) as they have repeatedly attempted to do. 

The sur-reply includes a request that the Court reconsider its previous order denying

them an extension of time in which to serve certain of the individual Defendants. (Sur-Reply

at 8:22–9:7.) Not only is this request a violation of ¶ 4(j) of the Court’s standing order and

thus improper, it also lacks merit. Plaintiffs urge the very same reasons the Court rejected

previously. Even worse, their argument is even weaker because their request shows they

were still unprepared to serve these Defendants even after the passage of more time. This

request is DENIED and Plaintiffs are admonished to review the Court’s standing order.

/ / /

/ / /

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III. Legal Standards

Defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (5), and (6).

Defendants Gillett and DeSonia have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5)

Defendants contend the individual Defendants have not been properly served and,

therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over them. The Court lacks jurisdiction over

Defendants who have not been properly served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. S.E.C.

v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9 Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

th

Under Rule 4(m), on motion or sua sponte after notice, the Court must dismiss the

action without prejudice against any defendant who has not been properly served within 120

days of filing the complaint, unless the time is extended for good cause. 

Under Rule 4(i), employees of the United States sued in their individual capacity must

be served personally as provided under Rule 4(e), (f), or (g), and the United States must also

be served. Because a Bivens-type action can be maintained against Defendants only in their

individual capacity, personal service is required, and Plaintiffs may not serve individual

Defendants merely by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to Defendants’ place

of employment. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9 Cir. 1987). 

th

B. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim

A Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal is warranted where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory.

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on

the basis of a dispositive issue of law.") Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where

it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory.

Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534; see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1988). When a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, leave to amend is ordinarily denied only

/ / /

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when it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment.

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court must assume the truth of all factual

allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

including all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts alleged. Cahill v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions need not be

accepted as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Warren v.

Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).

Generally when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court

examines only the contents of pleadings. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9 Cir.

th

1994), overruled on other grounds in Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir. 2002). When the complaint alleges the content of a document, however, and no party

questions its authenticity, the Court may consider the contents of the document even if it is

not attached to the pleading. Branch at 454.

Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and are bringing civil rights claims, the Court

construes their pleadings liberally. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court may not, however, supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled. See Ivey v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity, which bars claims for

money damages against public officers to the extent their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

IV. Discussion

A. Failure to Serve Individual Defendants

Plaintiffs attempted to serve the individual Defendants by mailing summonses and

copies of the complaint to the United States Department of Agriculture’s Office of General

Counsel in San Francisco, which is insufficient under Rule 4. After Defendants moved for

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dismissal, Plaintiffs, apparently realizing their error, on December 5, 2007 filed an ex parte

application for additional time to serve the individual Defendants. The Court denied the

application as to all individual Defendants except Gillett and DeSonia, who by that time had

been served personally.

Because Plaintiffs failed to serve the remaining Defendants within the time permitted,

claims against all individual Defendants except for Defendants Gillett and DeSonia are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Defendant DeSonia

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Defendant DeSonia are minimal. According to the

Complaint, DeSonia came Plaintiffs’ house to conduct one of the required inspections and

began talking with Ms. Mednansky. This was Plaintiffs’ first encounter with DeSonia.

DeSonia and Ms. Mednansky began walking together towards the house when Mr.

Mednansky came out and told her to leave, which she did. Plaintiffs allege Ms. Mednansky

fears Forest Service employees, though they allege nothing threatening Ms. DeSonia said

or did. While Plaintiffs argue they have an agreement contract with the Forest Service or

Defendants Tobin or Gillett requiring all Forest Service employees to get an appointment

before coming to their house, they have not alleged Defendant DeSonia was a party to this

agreement.

Plaintiffs allege Defendant DeSonia then over a period of three months drove past

their house once a day, slowed down, and stared towards their house. They allege she

drove past their house once more months later. Plaintiffs’ remaining allegations pertain to

their own suspicions about the meaning of DeSonia’s actions, and about why a neighbor was

also driving past their house. 

Construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiffs have alleged Defendant DeSonia failed

to get their permission before showing up at their residence to conduct the inspection, but

left when told to go. She did not return, but allegedly drove past their house regularly and

looked at it from the road while continuing to drive. In essence, what Plaintiffs have alleged

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 California recognizes a claim for the tort of invasion of the right to privacy where 5

there has been a public disclosure of private facts which are “offensive and objectionable to

a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.” Wasser v. San Diego Union, 191 Cal.App.3d

1455, 1460, 236 Cal.Rptr. 772 (1987). Simply alleging that “private facts” were disclosed is

nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of this cause of action and does not

suffice to give Defendant DeSonia or other Defendants fair notice of the basis for claims

against them. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___,127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (2007).

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is that Defendant DeSonia was trying to inspect their residence pursuant to their Special Use

Permit, but in a manner they subjectively interpreted as some kind of threat or intimidation.

They allege no objective facts that would have put Plaintiffs in reasonable fear for their

safety. As discussed more fully below, Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts showing

the existence of an agreement purporting to modify the Special Use Permit. No facts have

been pleaded to show Defendant DeSonia was bound by this agreement, nor that Defendant

DeSonia knowingly violated the agreement, even assuming it was enforceable against her.

Plaintiffs make a few more vague allegations about Defendant DeSonia, such as

stating “her position with FS would naturally have involved her with permit holder issues.”

(Compl. at 37:9–10.) They allege her involvement in a conspiracy which, they allege, she

somehow aided and abetted by her drive-bys. (Id. at 37:7–12.) They allege she disclosed

private facts by informing their neighbor about the drive-bys. (Id. at 40:1–4, 43:4–7.) The

nature of these private facts is never alleged.5

Without more, these allegations do not state a claim under any theory upon which any

relief may be granted. The Court therefore need not reach the qualified immunity issue,

although it were to do so, dismissal would be granted with leave to amend because the

allegations do not show Defendant DeSonia’s actions violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established

Constitutional or statutory rights. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant DeSonia are therefore

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Defendant Gillett

Plaintiffs have attached Gillett’s three letters to their opposition to the motion to

dismiss. These, together with a phone call and the November 15, 2004 letter, constitute the

alleged communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant Gillett. The Court therefore may,

and does, consider these letters. Branch, 14 F.3d at 454.

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Gillett’s letter of July 9, 2004 (the “First Letter”) (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C1)

does not, as Plaintiffs claim, acknowledge the existence of an agreement regarding obtaining

appointments before conducting inspections. Rather, it offers to notify Plaintiffs, “as

requested by you at an earlier date,” when Forest Service employees would be in the area

conducting inspections. There is nothing in the letter suggesting any contract to this effect,

however. Nor does it agree the Forest Service must await Plaintiffs’ approval of the

proposed inspection date. The letter is straightforward and offers to purchase a new padlock

for Plaintiffs, but warns them they are not permitted to put it on a chain across their driveway

and thus impede access to the land.

The letter dated September 29, 2004 (the “Second Letter”) (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss,

Ex. C2), explains the events of June 9, 2004. Contrary to the Complaint’s allegations it does

not say Defendant Gillett directed Forest Service employees to conduct an “armed invasion.”

Rather, it says Gillett’s employees do not feel safe conducting the required inspections, and

therefore he has instructed them “to conduct these inspections with law enforcement

accompaniment.” The letter also explained that Forest Service trainees were present on that

date, and that the sheriff’s unit happened to be in the area and offered to assist. The letter

acknowledges that “[i]n hindsight, this number of law enforcement personnel was excessive

for the situation.” Nothing in the letter suggests Gillett directed the events of June 9 beyond

this. The Second Letter contains no remarks that, in context, could reasonably be construed

as intimidating or threatening. The remark Plaintiffs seize on, “I will not hesitate to take

whatever actions are necessary to protect my employees who administer the terms and

conditions of the Special Use Permit,” in context and in view of Plaintiffs’ own allegations is

referring to Gillett’s intention to protect his employees from any harm Plaintiffs might attempt

and is not reasonably construed as a threat to affirmatively harm Plaintiffs.

The letter dated January 4, 2005 (the “Third Letter”) is incomplete. The attached

portion, however, acknowledges a telephone conversation on December 9 in which

Defendant Gillett offered to meet personally with Mr. Mednansky. It notes Mr. Mednansky’s

refusal to meet with Gillett or discuss any issues with him until the events of June 9 had been

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explained to Mr. Mednansky’s satisfaction. The letter then goes on to discuss incidents

described above, explaining how Forest Service employees felt they were being intimidated

and hindered in the course of carrying out their duties.

Plaintiffs have also alleged what was said in the phone call and the November 14,

2004 letter. In the letter, Plaintiffs allege, Gillett accused Plaintiffs of not complying with

applicable regulations, and threatened to revoke their permit. (Compl. at 26:12–16.) In the

phone call, he asked to meet them in person. (Id. at 19:12–16, 26:17–18.) 

On reading the three attached letters, together with Plaintiffs’ summary of the

November 14 letter and the phone call, it is apparent Plaintiffs have grossly misconstrued

the nature of these communications. There is nothing on the face of the letters that would

tend to show Gillett was fabricating anything as Plaintiffs have argued. These

communications do not constitute illegal threats nor do they give rise to any other cause of

action. 

The events of June 9, 2004 require closer examination. It is apparent Defendant

Gillett instructed Forest Service employees to have law enforcement officials with them, but

Plaintiffs have not alleged he authorized any show of force or an “armed invasion” as

Plaintiffs have described it. The Complaint makes plain Mr. Mednansky was not present,

and alleges Ms. Mednansky was initially not afraid. Whether or not Ms. Mednansky should

have been afraid (Mot. for Leave to File Sur-Reply at 8:11–14), according to the Complaint,

she in fact was not. Rather, she says she initially thought the Forest Service employees were

at the wrong house, and went outside to question them. Even though she says they initially

positioned themselves around her house and brandished their guns, it was only after

beginning to question them that she began to feel frightened, not because of any threats

they made or anything they did after that point, but because she began to doubt their

intentions. (Complaint at 6:25–26, 7:27–8:2 (alleging Ms. Mednansky became frightened

/ / /

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 While the Court construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the 6

Complaint’s lone allegation that Ms. Mednansky was immediately afraid contradicts all other

allegations. The inconsistent allegation is found in the Complaint at 6:4–6, which says

“When [she] noticed the weapons and the style of the formation around her residence she

became frightened.” As noted, Plaintiffs twice alleged she became frightened only after

talking with them. Furthermore, Plaintiffs earlier alleged in painstaking detail how the Forest

Service employees arrived, brandished their weapons, and got into formation. (Compl. at

5:8–27.) Mr. Mednansky was not present at this time, so Ms. Mednansky is the only possible

witness to the Forest Service employees’ alleged activities before she came out to meet

them. The allegation that she first noticed their weapons and position after she exited her

house is irreconcilable with these other specific allegations. Directly contradictory factual

allegations such as this do not fairly put Defendants on notice of the claims against them.

See Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (explaining that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires a

complaint to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests).

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only after talking with Forest Service employees). But see id. at 6:4–6 (alleging she became

frightened as soon as she saw the employees’ guns and formation).) 

6

According to the Complaint, the Forest Service employees told Ms. Mednansky she

and her husband had no right to keep garbage or to maintain a locked gate, and only had

rights to their residence, not the surrounding area. Their tone, she implies, was rude and

confrontational.

Essentially what Plaintiffs are complaining about is the presence of armed Forest

Service employees doing a fire inspection on their property who were rude to Ms.

Mednansky. She alleges she was subjectively terrified, although the reasons for her terror

during these events are unclear. Plaintiffs say they believe Forest Service employees are

conspiring against them. Ms. Mednansky’s later Declaration of Facts (Docket no. 34) shows

she later thought of the events of Ruby Ridge and after the fact speculated she might have

been the victim of an unprovoked attack (Decl. at 2:18–20), and she was particularly afraid

because the Forest Service employees evoked in her mind thoughts of the Nazi rise to

power (Compl. at 45:2–5) although she has alleged no objective facts that would have

sufficed to create this impression.

Even assuming these events gave rise to a cause of action, Plaintiffs have only

alleged Defendant Gillett sent the Forest Service employees to do a fire inspection and

directed that they be accompanied by law enforcement personnel. By themselves, such

allegations do not state a claim. There is no allegation showing Defendant Gillett instructed

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anybody to threaten or intimidate Plaintiffs, terrorize them, or use any kind of force on them,

or that he approved such actions. Absent such allegations, Defendant Gillett cannot be held

liable under a Bivens theory. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding

that supervisory personnel cannot be held liable in a Bivens action for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior). At most, Plaintiffs have alleged that the

officers present at the scene conspired together. (Compl. at 37:1–4.)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts connecting Defendant Gillett with the

specific way in which the events of June 9, 2008 unfolded or the actions of individual Forest

Service employees on the scene, the allegations, if proved, would not show he caused any

Constitutional or other violations that may have occurred there. 

Furthermore, there is no showing Defendant Gillett would have known his actions or

the actions of the officers violated Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights. In Robinson v. Solano

County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9 Cir. 2002), for example, the Ninth Circuit first held that

th

pointing a gun to the head of an apparently unarmed suspect during an investigation can be

a Fourth Amendment violation. See also Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 845

(examining excessive force cases). A search of case law uncovered no case establishing

that as of June 9, 2004, law enforcement officers’ being armed and appearing “ready for

action,” without more, constituted excessive force or any other Constitutional violation.

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Forest Service employees did anything more

than get into formation and display their weapons, Defendant Gillett would thus be entitled

to qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs have cited 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 as giving rise to claims against

Defendants. The only Defendant this even arguably applies to is Defendant Gillett. Plaintiffs

have failed, however, to allege he participated in a conspiracy against them, which is a

statutory element of a §1985(3). A § 1985 claim is, by the terms of § 1986, a prerequisite

for a § 1986 claim. Even if they had alleged his involvement in a conspiracy, Plaintiffs have

failed to do so with the degree of specificity required to put him or other Defendants on

notice of the nature of that conspiracy, and the Complaint does not adequately identify

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Constitutional violations or a conspiracy to violate Constitutional rights. Olsen v. Idaho State

Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir.2004) (“To state a claim for conspiracy to violate

constitutional rights, ‘the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the

claimed conspiracy.’”) (quoting Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9 Cir. 1989)); th

Harris v. Broderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (Bivens action). 

The Court therefore need not reach the remainder of Defendants’ arguments

regarding his liability, although Plaintiffs should be aware the qualified immunity and

Constitutional analyses appear to be well-taken. If Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Gillett

were not already subject to dismissal for the reasons already given, it would be subject to

dismissal for the reasons set forth in Defendants’ motion to dismiss. If Plaintiffs choose to

amend their Complaint, they should take care to avoid errors identified in the motion to

dismiss, particularly at 9:12–17:19.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Gillett are thus DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

3. Defendant United States

The United States is named as a Defendant and Defendants concede it has been

served. The United States is protected by its sovereign immunity, except to the extent

immunity has been waived. Balser v. Dep't of Justice, Office of U.S. Tr., 327 F.3d 903, 907

(9th Cir. 2003). The only theory of recovery under which Plaintiffs might recover is therefore

the Federal Tort Claims Act, or FTCA, for a tort under California law.

Plaintiffs set forth arguments for claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs allege facts that,

if proven, would show Forest Service employees subjected them to a large number of

indignities and rude and high-handed behavior. While they construe much of this behavior,

such as Gillett’s letters, as threatening harm, the alleged facts do not support such claims.

/ / /

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1. Invasion of Privacy

Under California law, a plaintiff may recover damages from a defendant

who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or

seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, . . . for invasion of his

privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1482, 233 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1986)

(quoting Restatement Second of Torts, § 652B). Nothing in the Complaint suggests such

an intrusion.

The Complaint alleges various Forest Service employees appeared outside Plaintiffs’

residence in connection with the performance of their duties — conducting inspections,

notifying Plaintiffs of non-compliance issues, and the like. Holders of special use permits

consent to these visits as part of the agreements that permit them to reside on public land,

so it is clear such intrusions are not “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Even if

Plaintiffs believed they had a special arrangement with the Forest Service, an unannounced

visit from a uniformed Forest Service employee would not be “highly offensive to a

reasonable person.” Nor is it apparent why their presence on public land around Plaintiffs’

residence could reasonably be construed as intruding on Plaintiffs’ private affairs.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs allege in painstaking detail the emotional trauma and distress they have

experienced, along with some physical symptoms. While this would suffice to show they

suffered emotional distress, the Court must determine whether their allegations would

support a claim of either intentional or negligent infliction of such distress.

Under California law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress includes

three elements: 

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional

distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and

(3) the plaintiff's injuries actually and proximately caused by the defendant's

outrageous conduct.

Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 (1998) (citation omitted).

To establish the first element, the conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of

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that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. “The tort does not extend to mere insults,

indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions and other trivialities.” Id. at 496 (internal

quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted.)

The allegations, if proved, would support the second and perhaps the third element

of this tort, but Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts to establish the first element. While

Plaintiffs allege they suffered emotional torment and distress, they have failed to show they

suffered anything more than mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty

oppressions to cause it. Even considering the pattern of behavior by all Forest Service

employees, Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts to show why the actions of the Forest Service

or its officers or employees exceeded all bounds tolerated in a civilized community. The

pleadings make it apparent Plaintiffs have been actively attempting to keep Forest Service

employees away and resisting their efforts to conduct required inspections. Some amount

of resistance to Plaintiffs’ efforts is to be expected. The events described in the Complaint

do not rise to the required level.

3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, whether under a “direct victim” or

“bystander” theory, requires the existence of a duty owed to Plaintiffs and breach of that

duty. Cohen v. NuVasive, Inc., 164 Cal.App.4th 868, 876, 79 Cal.Rptr. 759, 764 (2008)

(citations omitted). No other tort has been alleged or is apparent, and infliction of emotional

distress is not itself an independent tort. 6 Witkin: Summary of Cal. Law Torts, § 1004(2)(c)

(10 ed. 2005). The only other source of a duty which might have been violated is the oral th

agreement regarding appointments. With few exceptions, California law does not permit

recovery under this theory for breaches of agreements. Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal.4th 543,

551–52, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 886 (1999). The exceptional cases include situations where a tort

is also a contractual breach. Id. at 551. Failure to obtain an appointment before conducting

an outdoor inspection of public land, even assuming the agreement is enforceable as a

contract, is not a tort.

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Because the United States is immune to all other claims, all tort claims against the

United States are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE but all other claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Other Briefing Issues

In the interests of avoiding unnecessary rounds of briefing, Plaintiffs are advised to

consider the following points if they decide to amend. Plaintiffs need not respond to these

points directly.

Plaintiffs agree the Special Use Permit provides for inspections, but they maintain the

terms of the permit were modified by an oral agreement with Defendant Tobin so that Forest

Service employees need an appointment before conducting the required inspections at or

near Plaintiffs’ residence. While Plaintiffs have not directly sought to enforce the terms of

the oral amendment, and thus Defendants had no reason to brief the issue, such an

agreement may well be unenforceable under either federal or state law both because of the

statute of frauds and because it appears to be a gratuitous promise. In other words, the

promise appears to have been made out of courtesy for Plaintiffs, but Forest Service

employees might not be bound by it or made to pay damages for breaching it. Neither party

submitted a copy of the Special Use Permit or any other written agreement, so the parties’

summary allegations are the only information before the Court showing what the terms of

such agreements might be.

V. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant DeSonia are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Gillett are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’ tort claims against the United States are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

For reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ claims against all other Defendants are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to timely serve them with process. Plaintiffs’

claims against the United States, other than tort claims under the FTCA, are DISMISSED

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WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. This disposes of all claims in the Complaint, which is

therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Because it is not absolutely clear Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants DeSonia and

Gillett, and Plaintiffs’ tort claims under the FTCA against the United States cannot be saved

by amendment, Plaintiffs will be permitted to amend their Complaint to remedy the defects

identified in this order. They may do so by filing an amended complaint no later than thirty

calendar days from the date this order is entered. If Plaintiffs wish to add new claims or

parties, they must first obtain leave to do so. The amended complaint must not include

claims dismissed without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 30, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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