Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00735/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00735-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Armin Calbo Velasco, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0735-PHX-DGC (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Armin Calbo Velasco has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 15, 2005, which was 35 days 

after the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his jury trial conviction and sentence. 

Petitioner’s habeas deadline was statutorily tolled until post-conviction review ended on 

April 26, 2006. The instant petition was due April 27, 2007, absent equitable tolling, but 

it was not filed until April 23, 2015. Because there are no grounds for equitable tolling, 

the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are untimely. Therefore, the Court will 

recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 1 of 9
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts of the Crimes 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts as true:1

 Late in the evening of August 2, 2003, Appellant went to the victim’s home and knocked loudly on the door. The knocking woke the victim’s ten-year-old brother who had been sleeping on the couch. The victim’s brother opened the door slightly. Appellant then pushed open the door and grabbed the victim’s brother by the shirt and threw him behind the couch. Because he had a sore throat, the victim’s brother did not yell out. 

 Appellant then went into the bedroom where the eight-year-old victim and her sister slept. After unzipping his pants, Appellant went to the victim’s bed, moved the victim so that she laid across the width of the bed, 

and removed the victim’s pants and underwear. Appellant then sexually 

touched and molested the victim. Appellant further proceeded to engage in sexual conduct with the victim. During this incident, the victim tried to get up, but Appellant was holding her legs down with his legs. Appellant signaled to the victim that she should be quiet and not tell anyone. The victim’s sister, who was sleeping in the bed next to the victim, witnessed 

Appellant’s conduct with the victim. Both the victim and her sister saw and 

recognized Appellant at the time because he was their aunt’s boyfriend. As Appellant was leaving the house, the victim’s brother also recognized him. 

(Doc. 7-1, Ex. O, at 83-84.) 

b. Charges, Convictions, and Sentencing of Petitioner 

 On March 10, 2004, after a five-day jury trial, Petitioner was convicted by a jury 

of “molestation of a child in the first degree, a class two felony and dangerous crime 

against children; sexual conduct with a minor under the age of twelve in the first degree, 

a class two felony and dangerous crime against children; kidnapping, a class two felony 

and dangerous crime against children; and burglary in the second degree, a class three 

felony.” (Doc. 7-1, Ex. D, at 19; Doc. 7-1, Ex. O, at 82-83.) 

 On May 7, 2004, the court sentenced Petitioner to terms of 17 years’ 

imprisonment for Count 1, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 35 

years for Count 2 (consecutive to Count 1), 17 years’ imprisonment for Count 3 

(consecutive to Count 2), and 3.5 years’ imprisonment for Count 4 (concurrent with 

 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts is presumed correct. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2012) (rejecting argument that statement of facts in state appellate court’s opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 2 of 9
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Counts 1, 2, and 3). (Doc. 7-1, Ex. E, at 22-23.) 

c. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal

 On December 3, 2004, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed an opening brief in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, stating that she had searched the record pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 451 P.2d 878 (Ariz. 1969), but was 

unable to find a non-frivolous argument to present. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. J, at 41.) At 

Petitioner’s request, counsel raised the issue of insufficient evidence based upon a lack of 

identification at trial. (Id. at 64.) The court of appeals granted Petitioner additional time 

to file a pro se brief (Doc. 7-1, Ex. M, at 73), but he declined to do so (Doc. 7-1, Ex. O, at 

83). On August 11, 2005, after reviewing the entire record (including Petitioner’s 

identification argument), the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. O, at 87-88.) 

d. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On May 20, 2004, before his direct appeal commenced, Petitioner filed a PCR 

notice. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. R, at 99.) After PCR counsel was appointed, Petitioner moved to 

dismiss his PCR matter with leave to refile after the conclusion of the direct appeal. 

(Doc. 7-1, Ex. T, at 107.) On August 17, 2004, the trial court dismissed this PCR 

proceeding. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. U, at 2.) 

e. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On October 28, 2005, Velasco filed a second PCR notice. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. V, at 4.) 

On February 2, 2006, counsel filed a notice of completion stating counsel was unable to 

find any claims for Rule 32 relief. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. X, at 12.) On April 26, 2006, the trial 

court dismissed the second PCR proceedings because no PCR petition had been filed by 

the deadline of March 24, 2006. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. Y, at 15.) On March 24, 2008, Petitioner 

requested preparation of the PCR record. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. Z, at 17.) On March 26, 2008, 

the trial court found that no PCR proceeding was pending and denied the request. (Doc. 

7-2, Ex. AA, at 20.) 

f. Petitioner’s Third Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On July 16, 2012, Petitioner filed a third PCR Notice. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. BB, at 22.) 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 3 of 9
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

On the same date, Petitioner filed a petition and brief alleging (1) insufficient evidence 

and withholding of DNA evidence, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) that his 

sentence was excessive and disproportionate. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. CC, at 32-41.) On August 8, 

2012, the trial court dismissed the petition finding Petitioner could not “raise claims of 

this nature in an untimely or successive notice of post-conviction relief.” (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 

FF, at 58.) The court found that Petitioner’s “prior Rule 32 proceedings were dismissed 

by the Court on August 17, 2004 and April 26, 2006.” (Id.) On September 4, 2012, the 

trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. HH, at 65.) 

 On October 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. II, at 67.) The Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

review, but denied relief. The court found the third PCR was “a successive proceeding” 

and properly dismissed. State v. Velasco, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0448-PR, 2014 WL 

340380, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2014) (finding none of Petitioner’s arguments “fell 

within the subsections of Rule 32.1 that may be raised in a successive post-conviction 

proceeding”). 

 On February 18, 2014, Petitioner submitted a pro se Petition for Review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. NN, at 85.) On July 25, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied the Petition for Review. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. OO, at 93.) Petitioner filed a 

“request for reconsideration” with the Arizona Supreme Court, which the Court also 

denied. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. QQ, at 102.) 

g. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On April 23, 2015, Petitioner filed this habeas Petition. (Doc. 1.) On July 14, 

2015, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner raises the 

following grounds for relief: 

1. Trial counsel was ineffective in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth 

Amendment rights based upon a failure to obtain DNA evidence, 

present alibi testimony, present expert testimony, and to allow Petitioner to testify at trial; 

2. Petitioner’s sentence was excessive due to a failure to present 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 4 of 9
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

mitigation evidence and bias by the trial judge in violation of Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights; 

3. The State withheld exculpatory evidence (DNA and alibi witnesses) 

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 

4. The State committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to present exculpatory evidence in violation of Petitioner’s Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. 

(Doc. 1.) 

III. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

a. Time Calculation 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences on August 11, 2005. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. O, at 83.) Petitioner then had 35 days to 

file a petition for discretionary review with the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues its decision, any 

party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme Court . . . .”); Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 1.3 (expanding time limits by five days after service by mail); State v. Rabun, 

162 Ariz. 261, 782 P.2d 737 (1989). Petitioner did not file for review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Petitioner’s conviction thus became final 35 days later on September 15, 

2005, when his time to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court expired. 

b. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 5 of 9
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 On October 28, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely PCR notice.2

 (Doc. 7-2, Ex. V, at 

4.) The one-year deadline to file a federal habeas will be tolled while “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction . . . review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

On April 26, 2006, the trial court dismissed the second PCR proceeding.3

 (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 

Y, at 15.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the court of appeals. Because 

nothing was pending after the trial court’s decision, the statute of limitations began 

running the next day—on April 27, 2006. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 

(9th Cir. 2007) (statute of limitations was tolled until date on which notice of postconviction relief was dismissed where no petition for review was filed). The limitations 

period continued running uninterrupted for one year—until April 27, 2007—when it 

expired. 

 The statute of limitations was not tolled by Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals found the third PCR was “a successive proceeding” and 

properly dismissed. Velasco, 2014 WL 340380, at *1. This filing was not a “properly 

filed” state action for post-conviction relief because it was untimely. See Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“[W]e hold that time limits, no matter their 

form, are ‘filing’ conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCR petition as 

untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 

2244(d)(2).”). Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state 

 

2

 The order and mandate from Petitioner’s direct appeal issued on September 29, 2005. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. P.) Respondents agree that Petitioner was required to file his PCR notice by October 29, 2005. (Doc. 7 at 13.) See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). 

3

 Although the order of dismissal is dated April 26, 2006, the order also states that it was filed on May 3, 2006. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. Y, at 15.) The filing date is not relevant here because Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 6 of 9
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) “does not permit 

the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was 

filed”). 

 Here, the instant petition was due April 27, 2007, absent equitable tolling. 

c. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 

S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 

2015). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling 

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 

1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–

Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 In his Petition, Petitioner asserts “this is a timely petition for writ of habeas.” 

(Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner offers no grounds for equitable tolling and none appear in the 

record. A claim of actual innocence could merit equitable tolling. See Lee v. Lampert, 

653 F.3d 929, 932–933 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“a credible claim of actual innocence 

constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations period, and a petitioner who 

makes such a showing may pass through the Schlup4

 gateway and have his otherwise 

 

4 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314–15 (1995). 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 7 of 9
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

time-barred claims heard on the merits.”). The Court is mindful that the grounds for 

equitable tolling under § 2244(d) are highly fact-dependent and considered on a case-bycase basis. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010). Here, Petitioner presents 

nothing other than an unsubstantiated claim that DNA evidence and alibi testimony 

would exonerate him. Petitioner’s mere assertion fails because his claim must be 

founded upon “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at 

trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner has not established that equitable tolling is 

warranted in this proceeding. 

 This Petition was due April 27, 2007. It was filed on April 23, 2015. The Petition 

is untimely. 

IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims, including 

equitable tolling, because the record is sufficiently developed to resolve this question. A 

habeas petitioner asserting equitable tolling “should receive an evidentiary hearing when 

he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” 

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not asserted grounds for equitable tolling, and an 

evidentiary hearing is not mandatory. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 8 of 9
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 9th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00735-DGC Document 8 Filed 02/10/16 Page 9 of 9