Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02116/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02116-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIMCO MORRIS, No. 2:12-CV-2116-GEB-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

GARY SWARTHOUT,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 17). Petitioner is challenging a 2008 prison disciplinary proceeding.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in

lieu of an answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being

in violation of the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th

Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state

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remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural

grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp.

1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss

after the court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion.

See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12. The petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has

exhausted state remedies. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Respondent brings this motion to dismiss petitioner’s federal habeas corpus

petition on the grounds that the petition fails to challenge the fact or duration of petitioner’s 

imprisonment and due process is not implicated absent a deprivation of credits. Respondent

argues that because petitioner is an indeterminately sentenced inmate who has already surpassed

his minimum eligible parole date and is receiving parole consideration hearings, the loss of credit

has no direct impact on the time he must serve in prison. In addition, respondent argues that as

an indeterminately sentenced inmate, due process is not implicated by the loss of credits, which

requires only minimal due process when the statutory credits may reduce an inmate’s sentence. 

Such is not the case here, when petitioner does not earn statutory credits due to his indeterminate

sentence. 

Petitioner opposes the motion, arguing that the disciplinary action will impact the

duration of his sentence as the controlling factor in a parole eligibility hearing is whether an

inmate poses a current unreasonable danger or risk to public safety, and a disciplinary infraction

for fighting is a violent act. In addition, he contends that when and if he is found suitable for

parole, he would be denied good time credits in the amount of 120 days for each serious

disciplinary infraction. 

Petitioner is challenging a rules violation report (RVR) wherein he was charged

with mutual combat. Petitioner was found guilty of the charges, assessed 61 days credit

forfeiture, 30 days loss of yard privileges, and 90 days loss of Friday night visits. Petitioner filed

an administrative appeal challenging the finding of guilt as arbitrary and capricious, and lack

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evidentiary support. His appeal was denied. He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Solano County Superior Court, which was denied. The California Court of Appeals and the

California Supreme Court also denied his petitions. 

A writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy when “a state prisoner is

challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a

determination that he is entitled to an immediate or speedier release from that imprisonment.”

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Challenges to prison disciplinary convictions in

which the inmate has lost time credits must be raised in a federal habeas corpus action unless the

credits have been restored or the disciplinary conviction set aside. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641 (1997). Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction also exists when a prisoner seeks

“expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record if expungement is likely to accelerate the

prisoner’s eligibility for parole.” Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing

McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1047 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d

1024, 1028- 29, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (challenging state parole board’s refusal to provide

petitioner with annual review of his suitability for parole). 

Expungement of a disciplinary finding is “likely” to accelerate a prisoner’s

eligibility for parole when his claim has “a sufficient nexus to the length of imprisonment so as

to implicate, but not fall squarely within the ‘core’ challenges identified [in Preiser].” Docken,

393 F.3d at 1031. An inmate’s claim strikes at the core of habeas corpus when it “attack[s] the

very duration of [his] physical confinement itself” and seeks “immediate release or speedier

release from that confinement.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487-88, 498. The Ninth Circuit has

concluded that a “sufficient nexus” exists, and therefore habeas jurisdiction, where a prison

inmate “seek[s] only equitable relief in challenging aspects of [his] parole review that . . . could

potentially affect the duration of [his] confinement.” Docken, 393 F.3d at 1031 (emphasis in

original). However, “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a

successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence.” 

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Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he likelihood of the effect on the

overall length of the prisoner’s sentence . . . determines the availability of habeas corpus.” 

Docken, 393 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858) (emphasis in original).

A disciplinary violation may affect the duration of an inmate’s confinement in that

it is one of several factors reviewed in determining parole eligibility. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2402(a). However, a disciplinary conviction is only one of several factors considered when

reviewing an inmate’s “risk of danger to society if released from prison.” Id. The Board of

Parole Hearings is required to consider “all relevant, reliable information available,” including

the prisoner’s social history, mental state, criminal history and misconduct, the commitment

offense, behavior before, during, and after the crime, “and any other information which bears on

the prisoner’s suitability for release.” Id., § 2402(b). The unsuitability and suitability factors are

“set forth as general guidelines” to be considered by the parole board. Id., § 2402(c), (d). The

presence of a prison disciplinary conviction can therefore diminish the chance that an inmate will

be granted a parole date, and prisoners are often advised to become or remain disciplinary free

pending their next parole hearing. 

In this case, petitioner has passed his minimum eligible parole date (MEPD), so

any loss of credit would not directly impact the duration of his imprisonment. However, the

impact of an RVR, as discussed above, may have an impact in the duration of petitioner’s

imprisonment to the extent it may diminish his chance of being found suitable for parole. 

However, he has failed to provide the court with sufficient information to determine whether

expungement of his RVR is likely to accelerate his eligibility for parole. There is nothing in his

petition or opposition to the motion indicating whether this RVR is the only one in his record,

when he has received a parole suitability hearing, or whether he has previously been denied a

parole date, and if so the reasons for the denial. Instead, he has attached to his opposition a

number of other parole hearing decisions issued to other inmates. While these parole suitability

determinations indicate other prisoners have been denied parole at least in part on prison

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disciplinary findings, there is nothing to show that petitioner has been denied parole based on

those same factors. Nor is there any indication that this is the only disciplinary finding on

petitioner’s record, or whether he has previously been denied parole on the basis of other

findings. Thus, he fails to show that his claims rise above pure speculation as to whether or not

the presence of this disciplinary conviction would affect his parole eligibility. See Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (“The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the

balance [or a parole suitability decision] is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural

guarantees of the Due Process Clause”); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859 (successful challenge to a

prison disciplinary proceeding will not necessarily shorten the length of confinement because the

Parole Board could deny parole for other reasons). The undersigned therefore finds that

petitioner’s claim as to the possible affect the disciplinary conviction may have on his parole

eligibility is too speculative for federal habeas jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 17) be granted, the petition be dismissed, and this case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 18, 2015

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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