Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00790/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00790-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURA C.,

Plaintiff, 

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

Case No.: 18-cv-00790-AJB-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION 

AND CROSS MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 21, 22]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States Judge 

Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. 

Plaintiff Laura C. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) for judicial review of the final administrative decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). (ECF 

No. 21 at 2).1 The final administrative decision of the Commissioner denied 

 

1 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF page 

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Plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the 

Social Security Act (“Title II”) and for Supplemental Security Income under 

Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Title XVI”). (AR 115).2

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and Defendant’s 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Specifically, this Court 

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request that the case be REMANDED for 

further proceedings is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1957. (AR 246). At the time the instant 

application was filed on February 26, 2014, Plaintiff was 56 years-old which 

categorized her as a person of advanced age. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563, 416.963. 

A. Procedural History

On February 26, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a 

period of Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II. (AR 105). On January 

3, 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of Supplementary Security 

Income under Title XVI. (Id.). Both applications alleged a disability 

beginning February 12, 2014. (Id.). After her application was denied 

initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested an administrative 

hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). An administrative 

hearing was held on January 18, 2017. (Id.). Plaintiff appeared and was 

represented by attorney Holly McMahon. (Id.). Testimony was taken from 

Plaintiff, impartial medical expert John R. Morse, M.D., and impartial 

 

number, not the page number in the original document.

2 “AR” refers to the Certified Administrative Record filed on September 7, 

2018. (ECF No. 20).

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vocational expert Gloria J. Lasoff. (Id.). On March 21, 2017, the ALJ issued 

a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled from February 12, 2014 through 

the date of the decision and therefore denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. 

(AR 115). 

On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. (AR 

354). On March 20, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review and declared the ALJ’s decision to be the Commissioner’s final 

decision in Plaintiff’s case. (AR 1). This timely civil action followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow 

unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision of 

the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial 

review is limited in that a denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is 

supported by substantial evidence and contains no legal error. Id.; see also 

Batson v. Comm’r of the SSA, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing 

both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s 

conclusions. Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 

(9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence supports more than one rational 

interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 

1193. When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and 

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.” 

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Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Waters v. 

Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 858 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusion, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to 

apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or 

her decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Section 405(g) permits a court to 

enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s 

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the 

matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

B. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five step 

sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment 

since February 12, 2014. (AR 107).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and deep vein 

thrombosis. (Id.). 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the 

impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 109)

(citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 

404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926)).

Next, after considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff had the “residual functional capacity to perform light work as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),” and announced the 

following residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

Perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 

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416.967(b) except the [Plaintiff] is limited to frequent climbing 

stairs and ramps, occasional climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolding, 

and frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; avoid 

concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving machinery and 

working at unprotected heights; and avoid concentrated exposure 

to extreme temperature and vibration. (AR 110). 

The ALJ said that this RFC assessment was “consistent with the 

objective medical evidence and other evidence. . . .” (Id.). The ALJ stated he 

considered the opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 

C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927. (Id.). 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation

process. He found Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work. (AR

115). For the purposes of his step five evaluation, the ALJ accepted the 

testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”). (Id.). The VE testified that 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work included the following jobs: medical clerk, 

administrative assistant, and office supervisor. (Id.). 

C. Issues in Dispute

The issues in dispute in this case are: 1) whether the ALJ erred by 

giving great weight to the opinion of Dr. Morse, M.D. (the testifying Medical 

Expert) in establishing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity over 

substantial weight given to the opinion of Dr. Crider, M.D. (examining 

consultative physician); and 2) whether the ALJ failed to provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s pain and limitation testimony. 

(ECF No. 21-1 at 6, 11).

1. The ALJ’s decision to accept the opinion of the nonexamining vs. the examining physician in establishing 

Plaintiff’s RFC

“In making a determination of disability, the ALJ must develop the 

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record and interpret the medical evidence.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 

341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Title 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) of the Code 

of Federal Regulations states in pertinent part, “at the administrative law 

judge hearing level ..., the administrative law judge ... is responsible for 

assessing your residual functional capacity.” 

An individual’s residual functional capacity (RFC) is “based on all the 

relevant medical and other evidence in the individual’s case record.” Soc. Sec 

Ruling 16-3p (2016). RFC “is the most an individual can still do despite his 

or her impairment related limitations.” (Id). When establishing an 

individual’s RFC, the ALJ reviews the medical record submitted and the 

opinions of medical providers (e.g. physicians).

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of 

physicians: (1) those who treat the Plaintiff (“treating physicians”); (2) those 

who examine but do not treat the Plaintiff (“examining physicians”); and (3) 

those who neither examine nor treat the Plaintiff (“non-examining 

physicians”). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). As a general 

rule, more weight is given to the opinions of a treating source than to that of 

a non-treating physician. Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th 

Cir. 1987)). Likewise, the opinion of an examining physician is typically 

entitled to greater weight than that of a non-examining physician. Pitzer v. 

Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990).

In Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit held:

If a treating physician's opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ 

because it is not ‘well-supported’ or because it is inconsistent with 

other substantial evidence in the record, the Administration 

considers specified factors in determining the weight it will be 

given. Those factors include the ‘length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination’ by the treating 

physician; and the ‘nature and extent of the treatment 

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relationship’ between the patient and the treating physician. 

Generally, the opinions of examining physicians are afforded more 

weight than those of non-examining physicians, and the opinions 

of examining non-treating physicians are afforded less weight 

than those of treating physicians.

Id. at 631 (internal citations omitted).

Where a non-treating, non-examining physician’s opinion contradicts 

the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ may only reject the treating 

physician’s opinion “if the ALJ gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so 

that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” Jamerson v. Chater, 

112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The ALJ may meet this burden by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting evidence, stating 

his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 

595, 600-601 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir.1989)).

Dr. Crider is an examining physician. After examining Plaintiff, 

Dr. Crider assessed an RFC to include the following: 

Plaintiff can lift, carry, push, or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 

10 pounds frequently. Standing and/or walking can be done up to 

6 hours in a normal 8-hour workday but requires Plaintiff 

periodically alternate between sitting and standing. Plaintiff 

medically requires a hand-held assistive device for balance and 

support. Plaintiff can climb ramps and stairs without restriction. 

Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Plaintiff can 

never stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. (AR 633-34) (emphasis 

added). 

Dr. Morse is categorized as a non-examining physician. He was the 

testifying medical expert at Plaintiff’s hearing, he neither examined nor 

treated Plaintiff. As the testifying medical expert, Dr. Morse opined that 

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based upon his review of the medical record, Plaintiff had the following RFC:

Limited to lifting no more than 10 pounds on a frequent basis and 

20 pounds occasionally; sit, stand, and walk no more than six 

hours per day; limited to frequently climbing ramps and stairs, 

and limited to occasionally climbing of ladders/ropes/scaffolding; 

frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; avoid concentrated 

exposure to machinery or unprotected heights. (AR 240-41) 

(emphasis added). 

Two other non-examining physicians also opined on Plaintiff’s disability 

status, the State Agency consultants, Dr. S. Lee, M.D. and Dr. A. Wong, M.D. 

(AR 114). Dr. Lee determined that Plaintiff could lift up to 20 pounds 

occasionally and more than 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk for 6 hours in 

an 8-hour work day and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour work day, occasionally 

climb ramps and stairs, never climb ladders, ropes, scaffolding, and 

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, avoid concentrated exposure 

to hazards such as moving machinery and working at unprotected heights; 

and avoid concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures and vibration. 

(Id.). Dr. Wong’s report was similar to Dr. Lee’s. They both gave substantial 

weight to Dr. Crider’s findings, and found Plaintiff’s postural limitations in 

line with his report. However, both physicians disagreed with Dr. Crider’s 

opinion about Plaintiff’s need for a cane to balance and ambulate. (AR 284, 

302). 

Ultimately, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Morse; 

substantial weight to Dr. Crider’s opinion; and substantial weight to the 

State Agency consultants, Drs. Lee and Wong. (AR 112, 114). The ALJ stated 

he gave less weight to Dr. Crider’s opinion than to that of Dr. Morse’s 

opinion, because Dr. Morse “had access to the entire medical record,” was “an 

accepted medical source with a board certified specialty in internal medicine,” 

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and his “conclusions are consistent with the bulk of the evidence in the 

record.” (AR 112-113). The ALJ gave the opinions of Drs. Lee and Wong 

substantial weight “because they are generally consistent with the record” 

although, the ALJ reiterated his decision to accord Dr. Morse’s opinion with

greater weight citing “he had access to the entire record and his opinion is 

better supported by that record.” (Id.). The ALJ also accepted the opinion of 

Dr. Morse in concluding that “none of Plaintiff’s impairments met or 

medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

As noted herein, “[i]f a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by 

providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence. Ryan v. Commissioner Soc. Sec., 528 F3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 

2008). “This is so because, even when contradicted, a treating or examining 

physician’s opinion is still owed deference and will often be entitled to the 

greatest weight ... even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.” 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations 

omitted). Further, “[t]he opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by 

itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, in the RFC determination, the ALJ made findings that conflict or 

appear to conflict with Dr. Crider’s opinion. Adopting Dr. Morse’s opinion, 

the ALJ found “[t]he physical symptoms and limitations reported by the 

[Plaintiff] are inconsistent with the medical evidence and the record as a 

whole, including objective clinical signs and laboratory findings, to the extent 

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they indicate a more restrictive residual functional capacity assessment” as 

determine by the ALJ. (AR 111-112). The ALJ cited to the testimony and 

findings of Dr. Morse to support his determination of Plaintiff’s RFC. For 

example, the ALJ noted “at the hearing...Dr. Morse...testified he reviewed 

the medical evidence in the record and reported that “while the Plaintiff 

complained of chronic neck pain and chronic back pain, the orthopedic CE 

reported that a straight leg test was negative and found no neurological 

deficits.” (AR 112). The ALJ then set out Dr. Morse’s assessment of 

Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id.). As noted herein, the ALJ essentially adopted Dr. 

Morse’s assessment in full:

Perform light work . . . except the [Plaintiff] is limited to frequent 

climbing stairs and ramps, occasional climbing ladders/ropes/

scaffolding, and frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 

crawling; avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving 

machinery and working at unprotected heights; and avoid 

concentrated exposure to extreme temperature and vibration. (AR 

110) (emphasis added).

The ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Morse’s findings is misplaced. A review of Dr. 

Morse’s testimony reveals inaccuracies that render the ALJ’s decision not 

based upon the substantial evidence in the record. For example, one stated 

reason the ALJ gave Dr. Morse great weight was based on his “board certified 

specialty in internal medicine.” (AR 112). A review of Dr. Morse’s Vitae 

shows that he was board certified in internal medicine in 1970, however, his 

education and training was focused on cardiology. Specifically, he became 

board certified in cardiology in 1973, has been a fellow of the American Heart 

Association and American College of Cardiology from 1972 to the present. He 

was a research fellow, senior clinical fellow, department chief and chairman 

all in cardiology. (AR 783-84). Also, Dr. Morse has been published at least 

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six times all addressing cardiology issues. As such, this reason cited by the 

ALJ to give greater weight to Dr. Morse over Dr. Crider, a practicing Board 

Certified Orthopedic Surgeon, is not based on substantial evidence in the 

record. 

Second, as another reason to give greater weight to Dr. Morse, the ALJ 

cited to his review of the entire longitudinal record and that his “conclusions 

were consistent with the bulk of the evidence in the record.” (AR 112). At the 

hearing, Dr. Morse noted Dr. Crider assessed Plaintiff with primarily 

“discogenic disease of the neck and back.” (AR 239). Dr. Morse also noted Dr. 

Crider’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s need for a cane. (AR 240). Dr. Morse 

testified there were inconsistencies in regard to the need for a cane in Dr. 

Crider’s evaluation: “The RFC that he offered was basically a light RFC with 

some inconsistencies...to whether or not she needs a cane....” (Id.). 

A review of Dr. Crider’s report notes that Plaintiff did not use an 

assistive device for ambulation at the examination. However, Dr. Crider 

stated that “in his opinion” Plaintiff should use a cane for balance and 

support. (AR 631, 633). This is the opinion of the CE and nothing in Dr. 

Morse’s testimony noted any contrary record evidence. Additionally, Plaintiff 

testified later in the hearing that there were days she used a cane to lean on. 

She uses it to lean on if she isn’t sitting. (AR 264). Her use of a cane was also 

documented at a follow up appointment after her back surgery. One of her 

treating physicians, Dr. Phan, M.D. reported Plaintiff was “utilizing [a] cane 

to assist with ambulation.” (AR 853). 

Third, Dr. Morse testified that Dr. Crider did not assess Plaintiff with 

any postural limitations.3 “The orthopedist did not limit her at all.” (AR 241). 

 

3 Exertional/Postural limitations are the strength demands of a job (sitting, standing, 

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Dr. Morse testified that he would limit her to frequent ramps and stairs, 

frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, and occasional climbing 

ladders, ropes and scaffolds. (Id.). A review of Dr. Crider’s report shows that 

he did assess Plaintiff with the following postural limitations: “ramps and 

stairs without restriction;” “never climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds due to her 

present complaints;” and “stooping kneeling, crouching and crawling can 

never be done due to her present complaints.” (AR 633-34). 

Fourth, the ALJ gave more weight to Dr. Morse’s opinion than to Dr. 

Crider’s opinion because Dr. Morse had the benefit of reviewing the entire 

record, so was better able to determine Plaintiff’s most recent abilities and 

disabilities. 

The majority of the ALJ’s reasons for giving primary weight to Dr. 

Morse are not substantiated by other evidence in the record. Dr. Morse’s 

testimony appears to have been overly focused on Dr. Crider’s consultative 

report rather than all the record evidence at that point in time. For example, 

Dr. Morse testified that Dr. Crider’s report “was contradictory with respect to 

the postural limitations he assessed.” (AR 239-40). However, despite citing

numerous pages of Plaintiff’s medical record that existed during the 

timeframe that Dr. Crider performed his examination, the ALJ still adopted 

Dr. Morse’s RFC determination. A sampling of Plaintiff’s individual progress 

notes provide relevant evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s allegation 

of error:

2014: In May 2014, Plaintiff had an x-ray of her lumbar spine showing 

multilevel degenerative disc disease but no acute disease, and an x-ray of her 

cervical spine showed severe degenerative disc disease. (AR 543, 545-46). In 

 

walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling). See C.F.R. § 416.969a.

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July 2014, treating physician Dr. Gin noted 5/5 strength and “muscle tone 

and strength normal and symmetric” in Plaintiff’s upper and lower 

extremities. (AR 662-70). These records do not, however, support the 

conclusion that Plaintiff is able to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding, or 

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. In September 2014, during an examination 

regarding seasonal allergies and hypertension, Dr. Judson Merritt, M.D. 

found Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal range of motion normal. (AR 680-82). In 

November 2014, Plaintiff had an MRI of her lumbar spine, which showed 

multilevel degenerative changes of the lumbar spine, including a disc 

extrusion at L3-4 resulting in severe left neuroforaminal stenosis and 

impingement on the left L4 traversing nerve root. (AR 652-53). These 

records similarly do not support the conclusion that Plaintiff is able to climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolding, or stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. 

2015: Between January and May 2015, Plaintiff underwent epidural 

steroid injections in her spine. (AR 657-58, 882, 897). These records report 

that Plaintiff’s history and physical findings are consistent with lumbar 

radiculopathy. (AR 882). The records do not indicate that Plaintiff would 

have been able to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding, or stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl. In June 2015, Plaintiff began physical therapy, which she attended 

one to two times weekly. (AR 751-59, 902-06). Plaintiff’s June 12, 2015 

physical therapy records indicated Plaintiff’s functional limitation include no 

vacuuming or sweeping. (AR 752). These records also indicate Plaintiff 

recently fell and “started using a cane because her left leg was giving her 

difficulty.” (AR 751). Plaintiff reported her post-stretching pain as a 4/10 on 

June 19, 2015; a 5/10 on June 24, 2015; and an 8/10 on June 29, 2015. (AR

902-06). In July 2015, Plaintiff had an MRI of her lumbar spine, which 

showed multifactorial severe left neural foraminal narrowing at L3-4 and 

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overall mild spinal canal stenosis. (AR 750-51). In August 2015, treating 

nurse practitioner Elizabeth Stimson examined Plaintiff and found Spurling’s 

test negative, Trendelenburn sign negative, and normal alignment of thoracic 

spine. (AR 774-75). Plaintiff was tender to percussion in her cervical, 

thoracic, and lumbar spine. (Id.). In November 2015, Plaintiff underwent a 

partial laminectomy of the left L3-L4 with laminoforaminotomy and 

facetectomy. (AR 975-80). Taken together, these records do not support the 

conclusion that Plaintiff is able to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding, or 

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. 

2016: In January 2016, treating physician Vinko Zlomislic reported 

Plaintiff’s motor strength was “5/5 in both upper and lower extremities.” (AR 

995). These records also indicate that Plaintiff was intermittently wearing a 

brace and that she was referred to physical therapy. (Id.). In April 2016, 

Plaintiff presented to Dr. Jan Weichsel, M.D., complaining of chronic pain. 

(AR 1036). Plaintiff reported experiencing daily pain causing her to stay in 

bed all day. (Id.). In April 2016, Plaintiff reported being in “max pain,” and 

increased back pain since her previous appointment. (AR 1043). In April and 

May 2016, Plaintiff attended physical therapy. (AR 1043, 1048) 

The ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in rejecting the contradicted opinions of examining 

physicians. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. As stated previously, an examining 

physician’s opinion can alone constitute substantial evidence, where it rests 

on that physician’s own independent examination of the plaintiff. See

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. The opinion of a non-examining physician, 

standing alone, cannot constitute substantial evidence. Widmark v. 

Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 

F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Erickson v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 813, 818 n. 

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7 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the ALJ’s reliance on the opinion of a physician who 

neither treated nor examined Plaintiff over an examining physician and the 

reports of several treating physicians was not based on substantial evidence. 

The record evidence provides no support for Dr. Morse’s opinion—or the 

ALJ’s RFC conclusion—that Plaintiff is able to climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds, or stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. As a result, the ALJ erred by 

according greater weight to the testifying medical expert, Dr. Morse, than to 

the consultative examining physician, Dr. Crider.

In a related argument, Plaintiff contends that she was eligible for a 

closed period of disability because her “lumbar condition met the durational 

requirement of the act independent of any other impairment....” (ECF 21-1, 

p. 7). Plaintiff asserts that “the ALJ failed to articulate specific and 

legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Crider’s opinions for the period February 

24, [2014] through November 2015 and the immediate post-surgical period.” 

(Id.). According to Plaintiff “the ALJ should have adjudicated that separate 

capacity different from the post-surgical status.” (Id.). Defendant argues

“Plaintiff points to no pre-surgical evidence establishing functional 

limitations beyond her restrictive RFC as a matter of law.” (ECF 22-1, p.6). 

The Program Operations Manual System4 (POMS) DI 25510.001(B)(1) 

states: 

A claimant may be entitled to a closed period of disability if the 

evidence shows he or she was disabled or blind for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months but based on the evidence is no 

longer disabled...at the time of adjudication. 

To establish a closed period of disability the evidence must 

show the onset date, satisfaction of the duration requirement, and 

 

4 The POMS is a primary source of information used by Social Security employees to 

process claims for Social Security benefits. https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/home!readform.

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the date disability ceased. 

Here the evidence presented is insufficient to find that Plaintiff was 

continuously unable to engage in substantial gainful activity because of a 

medically determinable impairment(s). Plaintiff alleged a disability 

commencing February 2014. (ECF 21-1, p. 7). Slightly less than a year later, 

Dr. Crider’s examination concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled but had 

specific postural limitations that he set out in his written report. Plaintiff 

does not assert that Dr. Crider’s overall opinion was error, in fact Plaintiff 

asserts “the ALJ failed to articulate specific and legitimate reasons for 

rejecting Dr. Crider’s opinions for the period February 24 through November 

2015 and the immediate post-surgical period.” (Id.). Because Dr. Crider’s 

opinion of non-disability is uncontested, the twelve month period required to 

support a closed period of disability is not satisfied. The ALJ did not fail to 

determine whether Plaintiff’s pre-surgical impairment and post-surgical 

recuperative period satisfied the requirements for a closed period of 

disability.

2. Adverse Credibility Determination

As a result of the Court’s inability to affirm the ALJ’s reasons for 

rejecting the examining physician’s opinions, it is unnecessary to reach the 

other disputed issue raised by Plaintiff. Because the Court is unable to 

affirm the ALJ’s rejection of the examining physician’s opinions, the Court is 

also unable to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination. Since the Court cannot 

affirm the RFC, it follows that it is futile for the Court to consider the other 

claim of error raised by Plaintiff. 

3. Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings

 A court has discretion to remand for further proceedings when an ALJ has 

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committed legal error in denying benefits. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 

1176-77 (9th Cir. 2000). The record does not support the ALJ’s decision to 

accord less weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s examining physician absent 

providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. 

See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F. 3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

When error exists in an administrative determination, “the proper 

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 

additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 

(2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 

882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). On remand, the ALJ must evaluate the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s examining physician in accordance with the applicable law. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends the case be remanded for further 

administrative action consistent with the findings presented herein.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED to the extent that the case be 

REMANDED for further proceedings. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be 

DENIED. This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate 

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, 

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this report 

must be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than January

17, 2020. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendations.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 24, 

2020. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2020

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