Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01007/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01007-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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 On April 3, 2007, the Court issued an order vacating the April 6, 2007 hearing due

to plaintiff’s failure to oppose the motion. Plaintiff has not sought an extension of time to file

an opposition. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON E. McMURRAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MERCK & CO., INC, a NEW JERSEY

CORPORATION,

Defendant /

No. C 07-1007 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING

MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE

DAMAGES; DENYING MOTION FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(Docket No. 6)

Before the Court is defendant Merck & Co., Inc.’s motion, filed February 23, 2007, to

dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, four of the eight

causes of action alleged in plaintiff Jason E. McMurray’s complaint; to strike the prayer for

punitive damages, pursuant to Rule 12(f); and for a more definite statement, pursuant to

Rule 12(e). Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.1

 Having considered the papers filed in

support of the motion, the Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral

argument, see Civil L. R. 7-1(b), and rules as follows:

1. To the extent defendant seeks dismissal of the First Cause of Action (“Breach of

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Express Warranty”), the motion is hereby DENIED.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff has not failed to adequately allege an

express warranty by defendant. Plaintiff has alleged that defendant breached an express

warranty, made “both orally and in publications, brochures, package inserts and/or other

written materials intended for medical professionals, patients and/or the general public,”

that “Lovastatin was safe, effective, fit and/or proper for its intended use to manage and/or

control pain.” (See Compl. ¶ 12.) Defendant has cited no authority requiring the precise

language of the express warranty at issue to be pleaded. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)

(requiring pleading of “short and plain statement” of claim); Sierra Diesel Injection Service,

Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 890 F.2d 108, 113 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding claim for breach of

express warranty governed by “federal court’s liberal pleading requirements”); cf. Willson v.

Bank of America, 2004 WL 1811148 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss

claim for breach of contract; observing plaintiff “need not allege specific terms of the

contract under federal notice pleading standards”).

2. To the extent defendant seeks dismissal of the Sixth Cause of Action (“Fraud and

Deceit”), the motion is hereby GRANTED, and such claim is hereby DISMISSED, with

leave to amend. 

The elements of fraud under California law are: “(a) misrepresentation (false

representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c)

intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”

See Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). Rule 9(b) provides that “[i]n all

averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be

stated with particularity.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy Rule 9(b), “the pleader must

state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the

identities of the parties to the misrepresentation,” see Schreiber Distributing Co. v. ServWell Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986), and “explain why they are

false and misleading,” see Philips Medical Capital, LLC v. Medical Insights Diagnostics

Center, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec.

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Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff fails to allege the time, place, and

specific content of the asserted false representations, the identities of the parties to the

misrepresentations, or the reason why such representations are false and misleading. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations in support of his fraud claim fail to satisfy the

requirements of Rule 9(b).

3. To the extent defendant seeks dismissal of the Seventh Cause of Action

(“Negligent Misrepresentation”), the motion is hereby GRANTED, and such claim is hereby

DISMISSED, with leave to amend. 

The elements of negligent misrepresentation under California law are similar to the

elements of fraud, with the exception that there is no requirement of scienter or intent to

defraud. See Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 173-74 (2003). The tort of

negligent misrepresentation encompasses (1) the “assertion, as a fact, of that which is not

true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true,” and (2) the “positive

assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that

which is not true, though he believes it to be true.” See id. at 174 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). For the same reasons set forth above in connection with the fraud claim,

plaintiff’s allegations in support of his negligent misrepresentation claim fail to satisfy the

requirements of Rule 9(b).

4. To the extent defendant seeks dismissal of the Eighth Cause of Action (“Violation

of Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code Section 17500, et seq.”), the motion is hereby DENIED. 

Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff has not failed to identify the code sections

defendant allegedly violated. Rather, plaintiff expressly alleges defendant’s conduct

constitutes “unfair competition, unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising, and an

unlawful business practice within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code

Sections 17200 and 17500.” (See Compl. ¶ 65.)

5. Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is hereby

GRANTED, and such prayer is stricken, with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff has failed to plead the allegedly wrongful conduct was authorized or ratified

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by an officer, director or managing agent of defendant. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b); see

also Scannell v. County of Riverside, 152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 614 (1984). Defendant’s

additional argument is unpersuasive, however. Contrary to such argument, plaintiff is not

required to plead oppression, fraud, or malice with particularity. Rule 9(b) expressly

provides that “[m]alice, intent, . . . and other condition of mind of a person may be averred

generally.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Co., 231 F.R.D. 405, 406 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[A] plaintiff bringing an action in federal court

may include a ‘short and plain’ prayer for punitive damages that relies entirely on

unsupported and conclusory averments of malice or fraudulent intent”) (internal quotation

and citation omitted). 

6. To the extent defendant moves for a more definite statement, the motion is

hereby DENIED.

A more definite statement is appropriate where a pleading “is so vague or

ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Here, contrary to defendant’s argument, the allegations in

support of plaintiff’s claims for negligence and violation of §§ 17200 and 17500 of the

California Business and Professions Code are adequately pleaded, in conformity with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and are sufficiently clear

that defendant can respond to them. Defendant further contends the complaint is

ambiguous and confusing because the complaint (1) repeatedly refers to Lovastatin’s

effectiveness for management of pain, although, according to defendant, Lovastatin is a

cholesterol drug that is not prescribed to control pain; (2) repeatedly alleges that Lovastatin

causes an increased risk of heart attack and stroke, although, according to defendant, such

injuries are not the type of injuries associated with use of Lovastatin; (3) fails to allege what

injury plaintiff actually has suffered from use of Lovastatin; and (4) refers to plaintiff

throughout the complaint as both “him” and “her.” Although such allegations suggest that

plaintiff may have based his complaint on a prior pleading without redacting allegations that

are not relevant to the instant action, the allegations are not so vague and ambiguous that

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defendant cannot respond to them. Defendant, for example, can deny that Lovastatin is

used for pain management. To the extent plaintiff agrees with defendant that the complaint

contains allegations that were not intended, however, plaintiff may amend his complaint

accordingly.

7. Any amended complaint shall be filed no later than June 8, 2007.

This order terminates Docket No. 6.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY 

United States District Judge

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