Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01340/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01340-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NABIL IBN MANLEY, No. 2:14-cv-1340-TLN-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

DAVE DAVEY,1

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion (Doc. 15), and respondent filed a

reply (Doc. 22). 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Respondent requests the Court substitute the warden at petitioner’ current location 1

of incarceration, California State Prison - Corcoran, as the proper respondent to this action

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). This request is granted, and the Clerk of the

Court is directed to update the docket to reflect the above caption.

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Section 2254 Cases. The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in

lieu of an answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being

in violation of the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th

Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state

remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural

grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp.

1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss

after the court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion.

See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12. The petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has

exhausted state remedies. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Respondent brings this motion to dismiss petitioner’s federal habeas corpus

petition on the grounds that the petition is a second or successive petition filed without leave of 2

the Court of Appeals. Petitioner opposes the motion, arguing inter alia that his petition is not

successive, that he is only challenging his unconstitutional sentence which is predicated on a new

rule of constitutional law made retroactive. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[a] claim presented in a second or successive

habeas corpus application . . . that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 

Under § 2244(b)(2), “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . .

that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. . . .” unless one of two

circumstances exist. Either the newly raised claim must rely on a new rule of constitutional law,

or the factual predicate of the new claim could not have been discovered earlier through the

exercise of due diligence and the new claim, if proven, establishes actual innocence. See id. 

Before a second or successive petition can be filed in the district court, however, the petitioner

Respondent also contends the petition is untimely, filed well beyond the statute of 2

limitations. The undersigned agrees, but finds it unnecessary to reach this issue given that it is

also a second or successive petition as discussed herein. 

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must first obtain leave of the Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). In the absence of

proper authorization from the Court of Appeals, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a

second or successive petition and must dismiss it. See Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270 (9th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 

A second petition can only be successive of a prior petition which has been

decided on the merits. Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). A decision on the

merits occurs if the district court either considers and rejects the claims or determines that the

claims will not be considered by a federal court. See Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23

(9th Cir. 1990). Where a prior petition has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to

exhaust state court remedies, the dismissal does not result in an adjudication on the merits

because the possibility of returning to court following exhaustion exists and a habeas petition

filed in the district court after the initial petition was dismissed is not second or successive. See

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-86 (2000). The dismissal of a petition as untimely,

however, does constitute a decision on the merits because such a dismissal is a determination that

the claims will not be considered. See McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir.

2009). Likewise, the denial of a petition on procedural default grounds is also a determination

on the merits. See Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Howard,

905 F.2d at 1322-23, and stating that the denial of a petition on procedural default grounds is a

determination that the claims will not be considered by the federal court). 

Here, petitioner does not dispute that he has filed prior petitions for writ of habeas

corpus in this court. His first prior petition, Manley v. Knowles, 2:01-cv-1608-FCD-PAN, was 3

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to his voluntary dismissal request. His second petition,

Manley v. Campbell, 2:03-cv-0030-JKS, which challenged this same sentence and conviction,

was dismissed as filed beyond the statue of limitations, or in the alternative denied on the merits. 

This court takes judicial notice of petitioner’s prior cases. See Chandler v. U.S., 3

378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967). 

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Rather, petitioner argues that he meets the exception to the rule set forth in § 2244(b)(2), that his

current petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law. Specifically, he contends that his

current petition is based on two United States Supreme Court cases, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.

___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 4 (2010). 

Petitioner’s argument that he meets the exception set forth in § 2244(b)(2) is

simply made to the wrong court. As respondent contends, such an argument must be made to the

Court of Appeals in an application for leave to file a second or successive petition. Until such

permission is requested and granted by the Court of Appeals, this court lacks jurisdiction to reach

the merits of his arguments. See Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d at 1274-75.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be granted on the ground that

the petition is successive; and

2. Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without

prejudice to its refiling with a copy of an order from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

authorizing petitioner to file a second or successive petition. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 16, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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