Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-02594/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-02594-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Samantha Felt,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Alberto Zubia, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-24-02594-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

The Court has an independent obligation to determine whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 

Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

action.” 

Diversity jurisdiction exists when there is complete diversity of citizenship 

between the plaintiff and the defendants and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 

exclusive of interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A controversy meets this requirement 

when “all the persons on one side of it are citizens of different states from all the persons 

on the other side.” Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).

The party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction has the burden of 

proof, Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986), by a preponderance of the 

evidence. McNatt v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 972 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); see 13B Federal 

Practice § 3611 at 521 & n. 34. “Absent unusual circumstances, a party seeking to 

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invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the 

actual citizenship of the relevant parties.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 

857 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 

The complaint alleges that Defendant International Flatbed Services, Inc. 

(“International Flatbed”) “upon information and belief was, at all times herein, a foreign 

corporation authorized to do business in the State of Arizona.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 3.) This is 

inadequate. A corporation, whether incorporated in a state of the United States or in a 

foreign country, is “deemed a citizen of its place of incorporation and the location of its 

principal place of business.” Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, 

S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994). The complaint must affirmatively allege 

International Flatbed’s place of incorporation and the location of its principal place of 

business. Star Ins. Co. v. West, 2010 WL 3715155, *1 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“[T]he Notice of 

Removal fails to properly allege the citizenship of the plaintiffs in that it merely states 

that they ‘are foreign corporations, with its/their principal place of business in Michigan 

and Minnesota.’ Such a jurisdictional allegation is insufficient as a matter of law since a 

corporation is a citizen both of the state by which it is incorporated and the state where it 

has its principal place of business, and a notice of removal must affirmatively allege both 

states.”); Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970) 

(“The facts must be alleged from which it may be determined of which state, or states, the 

corporation is ‘deemed’ to be a citizen—i.e. the state in which it was incorporated and the 

state in which it has its principal place of business.”).

The complaint also alleges that Plaintiff “resided” in Arizona (Doc. 1 ¶ 1) and 

Defendant Alberto Zubia was “a resident” of Texas (id. ¶ 2). These allegations are also 

inadequate. As to individual natural persons, an allegation about an individual’s 

residence does not establish his or her citizenship for purposes of establishing diversity 

jurisdiction. “It has long been settled that residence and citizenship [are] wholly different 

things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining and regulating the 

jurisdiction of the . . . courts of the United States; and that a mere averment of residence 

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in a particular state is not an averment of citizenship in that state for the purpose of 

jurisdiction.” Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141, 143 (1905). “To be a citizen of a 

state, a natural person must first be a citizen of the United States. The natural person’s 

state citizenship is then determined by her state of domicile, not her state of residence. A 

person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain 

or to which she intends to return.” Kanter, 265 F.3d at 858-59 (emphasis added) 

(citations omitted).

Thus, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint1that rectifies the identified 

deficiencies. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that by January 27, 2025, Plaintiff shall file an amended 

complaint establishing the relevant jurisdictional facts, as described in this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended 

complaint, the Clerk of the Court shall dismiss this case, without prejudice, for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction.

Dated this 13th day of January, 2025.

1 This amended complaint pursuant to court order will not affect Plaintiff’s right 

under Rule 15(a)(1) to later amend once as a matter of course, if it chooses to do so. See, 

e.g., Ramirez v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1006-09 (9th Cir. 2015).

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