Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00096/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00096-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT SCHWERIN, II,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0096 MCE GGH P 

vs.

MICHAEL KNOWLES, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction for 25

counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288(a).

Petitioner is serving a sentence of 56 years.

Petitioner was also initially convicted of one count of continuous child abuse in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 299.5. This conviction was reversed during petitioner’s state

habeas proceedings.

This action is proceeding on the amended petition filed June 4, 2004, as to the 

following claims: 1) trial court violated petitioner’s right to due process by permitting the

prosecution to amend the information and add offenses not supported by the evidence presented

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at the preliminary hearing; 2) the prosecution overcharged petitioner; 3) improper 

admission of character evidence under Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1101(b) and 1108, and jury instruction

error; 4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and 5) prosecutorial misconduct.

After carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends that the petition be

denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The AEDPA applies to this petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the

AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy,

117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,”

establishing more deferential standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in

assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. 

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

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of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

The California courts issued reasoned decisions as to all of petitioner’s claims but

for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the court will independently review

the record in adjudication of that claim.

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III. Factual Background

The following background summary is contained in the opinion of the California

Court of Appeal. After independently reviewing the record, the court finds this summary to be

accurate and adopts it below.

An information charged defendant with a violation of section 299.5, continuous 

sexual abuse of a child (count I) and 25 violations of section 288, subdivision (a), 

lewd or lascivious acts upon a child (counts II-XXVI). The information also 

alleged special allegations tolling the statute of limitations (§ 803, subds. (d) and 

(g)). Defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

Following a jury trial, the trial court declared a mistrial after finding the jury 

deadlocked. A second jury trial followed.

At trial, defendant’s son Robert testified. He and his sister Amber lived with their

mother in Redding. Robert is two years older than Amber. At the age of eight, 

Robert began visiting defendant “about every other week.” Robert slept either in 

defendant’s apartment or in defendant’s camper.

Robert witnessed several incidents between defendant and Amber. In one 

incident, Robert opened the door of the camper to find defendant holding his 

exposed penis with Amber sitting in front of him. Robert told no one of the 

incident.

Another time, Robert, Amber and defendant camped by a lake. Robert saw 

defendant perform oral sex on Amber.

Robert and Amber discussed defendant’s behavior. Amber told Robert defendant 

had intercourse with her, but asked him not to tell anyone. Later, in 1997, when 

interviewed by police, Robert denied witnessing sexual contact between defendant

and Amber.

At age 14, Amber confided in her 15-year-old boyfriend Jeremy. She told him she

was forced to have sex with defendant from the age of six until she was 10. 

Jeremy and Amber discussed the subject “a couple of times.”

A friend of Amber’s, Shanna, testified when they were about 10 years old Amber 

told Shanna that defendant had touched her. Shanna asked Amber what she meant

and Amber stated defendant had molested her. Amber asked Shanna not to tell 

anyone. The two girls discussed the molestation at least 20 times. Shanna 

encouraged Amber to tell her mother about the molestations, but Amber refused, 

saying it would upset her mother. Another childhood friend testified Amber told 

her of the molestation in the summer between fourth and fifth grades.

In 1991, a mother of one of Amber’s classmates contacted police about the 

molestation. Amber told her classmates she had been raped at knifepoint by 

defendant several times. The police were unable to substantiate the report and the

investigation was dropped. During a police interview, Amber denied the abuse.

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Amber’s mother Linda testified she was separated from defendant when she was

four months pregnant with Amber. The couple briefly reconciled, then 

permanently separated. While defendant lived in Redding, Robert and Amber 

visited him occasionally. When defendant moved to Dunsmuir, the children 

visited him every other weekend.

During this period, Amber wanted to wear full-length, one piece pajamas, which 

her mother found odd given the warm weather. Amber did not want to bathe and 

seemed very glad to come home from the visits.

Linda never suspected defendant had molested Amber until, in 1997, she 

overheard a telephone conversation between Amber and defendant’s current wife. 

Amber wept as she spoke and Linda asked what was wrong. Amber told her

mother defendant had molested her. Amber was upset and apologetic and Linda 

did not ask for any details. Linda contacted the police. [Footnote 2]

[Footnote 2: Linda also testified concerning a prior molestation. A 14-

year-old neighbor molested three-year-old Amber and attempted to have 

intercourse with her. Amber wrote an essay in second or third grade about

the incident.]

Amber testified she began visiting defendant in Redding at age five or six. During

these visits, defendant would rub her buttocks when they went for a walk, which 

“didn’t feel right.” This happened on 10 to 15 occasions.

In 1990, defendant moved to Dunsmuir. Amber testified she was unsure how 

many visits she made to Dunsmuir; she estimated 15 to 20 visits. The visits 

usually lasted two nights.

Defendant’s molestations followed a pattern. At night, defendant would enter the 

room where Amber slept with Stephanie, defendant’s daughter from another 

union. [Footnote 3.]

[Footnote 3: Stephanie was five years younger than Amber.]

Defendant would stand smoking a cigarette and, without waking Stephanie, would

remove Amber’s pajamas. He would put his finger in her vagina or lick her 

vagina. He penetrated her with his penis, ejaculating on her stomach. Amber 

would pretend to be asleep. Because she was afraid, she never screamed or cried 

out. Sometimes defendant would use a condom. The molestations occurred every

weekend she visited defendant. The parties stipulated defendant moved to 

Dunsmuir on June 1, 1990, and remained until May 31, 1991.

Amber recounted an incident beside a creek, when defendant licked her vagina 

and asked Robert “do you want to?” On other occasions, defendant asked Amber 

to touch his penis, moving her hand up and down.

Amber never told her mother or defendant’s current wife about the abuse. 

Defendant told her no one would believe her and if she told her mother, her 

mother would stop loving her. Defendant called the molestations “our secret.” 

Amber told only a few other children and asked them not to tell anyone. She 

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thought she had done something wrong, and she deserved what was happening to 

her.

Initially when questioned by police, Amber denied any abuse. She was too 

frightened to tell, afraid her mother wouldn’t love her. After her mother 

overheard Amber upset and talking to defendant’s wife, Amber told her mother, 

“My dad raped me.” Amber testified she visited defendant every other weekend 

while he lived in Dunsmuir, and she never spent a weekend in Dunsmuir without 

defendant molesting her.

Defendant did not testify. The defense presented testimony by several police 

officers who interviewed Robert in 1997, after Amber confided in her mother. 

During these interviews, Robert denied witnessing sexual conduct between 

defendant and Amber.

Tammy S., defendant’s wife of 14 years, testified. She stated defendant suffered a

back injury in 1987 and endured several surgeries which left him in a great deal of

pain. Defendant could not engage in sexual activity unless supine and 

experienced pain and impotence. Tammy testified Robert and Amber only visited

defendant and Tammy in Dunsmuir on four occasions.

The physician who examined Amber in 1988 for evidence of abuse testified. The 

primary physical exam was considered “suspicious for sexual abuse.” However, a

team review of photographs taken during the exam concluded Amber’s genitalia 

were normal. The physician testified a normal exam does not preclude full 

vaginal penetration seven years earlier.

Respondent’s Answer to Amended Petition, Exhibit B, pp. 2-6.

IV. Discussion

A. Claim 1: Amendment of Information

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated due process by allowing the

prosecution to amend the information to add offenses not supported by the evidence presented at

the preliminary hearing. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental

right to be clearly informed of the nature and course of the charges in order to permit adequate

preparation of a defense. See Shepard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1990). The notice

provision of the Sixth Amendment is incorporated within the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and is fully applicable to the states. See Gray v. Raines, 662 F.2d 569,

571 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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 A police officer had testified that he “understood” petitioner had moved to Alaska in

November 1990. However, the parties stipulated to the correct dates.

7

The felony complaint filed January 12, 1998, alleged that the offenses occurred

between April 1989 and April 1992. CT at 1. At the preliminary hearing, held June 10, 1998, 

the prosecution presented testimony that petitioner had improper contact with Amber when she

was eight to ten years old. CT at 25. Amber was born on April 17, 1981. CT at 24. Therefore,

the abuse occurred between April 17, 1989, and April 17, 1992. Petitioner lived in Dunsmuir

from June 1, 1990 to May 31, 1991. Court of Appeal Opinion at 7.1 All of the improper contact

occurred while petitioner lived in Dunsmuir. CT at 27. 

Following petitioner’s first trial, a mistrial was declared. CT at 131. Petitioner’s

second trial began on February 16, 1999. CT at 136. On that date, the trial court granted the

prosecution’s motion to amend the complaint to reflect the dates of the allegations as June 1,

1990, through May 31, 1991. CT at 136.

Petitioner argues that allowing the prosecutor to amend the information violated

his constitutional rights because the jury could have convicted petitioner for offenses they found

had occurred after he moved away from Dunsmuir in November 1990—a time period excluded

by the testimony of the police officer at the preliminary hearing.

At the preliminary hearing and the second trial, the prosecution presented

evidence that petitioner molested Amber during the time he lived in Dunsmuir. No evidence was

presented at the preliminary hearing or the second trial that petitioner molested Amber after he

left Dunsmuir. Therefore, petitioner’s ability to prepare a defense was not prejudiced by the

amendment to the complaint because the prosecution’s theory regarding when the molestations

occurred was consistent in the preliminary hearing and the second trial. No Sixth Amendment

violation occurred because petitioner had adequate notice of the charges against him.

Petitioner also cites state law in support of the instant claim. Pursuant to the

AEDPA standards discussed above, this court applies clearly established Supreme Court

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authority in evaluating petitioner’s claim. Because the denial of this claim by the California

Supreme Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

authority, this claim should be denied.

B. Claim 2: Overcharging

Petitioner next argues that he was denied due process by the prosecution’s abuse

of power in arbitrarily overcharging the number of offenses. Petitioner states that he was

originally charged with one count of continuing sexual abuse under Cal. Penal Code § 288.5, a

crime carrying a sentence of 16 years. After the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor added 25

additional counts of child sexual abuse under Cal. Penal Code § 288(a), which resulted in a term

of 56 years. Petitioner argues that the prosecution violated his right to due process by charging

him with so many separate counts pursuant to § 288(a).

In support of this claim, petitioner relies primarily on People v. Jones, 51 Cal.3d

294 (1990). On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim as follows:

In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, the Supreme Court held that a child’s 

inability to provide specific details regarding the time and circumstances of sexual

abuse did not violate a defendant’s due process rights. The court stated, “It must 

be remembered that even generic testimony (e.g., an act of intercourse ‘once a 

month for three years’) outlines a series of specific, albeit undifferentiated, 

incident, each of which amounts to a separate offense, and each of which could 

support a separate criminal sanction. (Of course prosecutors should 

exercise discretion in limiting the number of separate counts charged. No valid 

purpose would be served by charging hundreds or thousands of separate counts 

of molestation, when even one count may result in a substantial punishment.)” (Id.

at p. 314, italics within parentheses added.)

Here, evidence at the preliminary hearing alleged that “at least a hundred, 

probably more” separate incidents of sexual abuse occurred. The prosecution, in 

the information alleged 25 separate violations of section 288, subdivision (a). In 

Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 294, the court implied an abuse of discretion might be 

found if a prosecutor charged hundreds or thousands of separate counts. Twentyfive counts stemming from an alleged two-year period of molestation every other 

weekend does not represent the type of overcharging the Jones court warned 

against. We find no abuse of discretion.

Respondent’s Answer to Amended Petition, Exhibit B, pp. 9-10.

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This court must apply the relevant Supreme Court authority in evaluating the

instant claim. A prosecutor possesses broad authority when selecting a charge so long as there is

probable cause to believe the accused committed an offense defined by statute and the decision is

not based on an arbitrary classification. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct.

663, 668 (1987). There is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor did not have probable

cause to believe that petitioner committed the charged offenses or that the decision was based on

an improper motive. 

Accordingly, because the denial of this claim by the California Supreme Court

was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority, this claim

should be denied.

C. Claim 3: Improper Admission of Evidence and Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner states that evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct was admitted

under Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1101(b) and 1108. Petitioner argues that the trial court failed to

perform the requisite balancing of probative value versus prejudice as required by Cal. Penal

Code § 352. In order to succeed on this claim, which is based on a violation of state law,

petitioner must demonstrate an error involving “fundamental fairness.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 73, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991) (in order for error in the state trial proceedings to reach

the level of a due process violation, the error had to be one involving “fundamental fairness”). 

The trial court admitted the following evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct:

During trial, the prosecution elicited testimony concerning four specific acts. In 

the first, defendant pointed out a picture of a naked woman, spray painted on the 

inside of a tunnel, to his children. Defendant laughed and thought it was funny. 

Defense counsel made no objection to the admission of this evidence. 

In the second incident, Robert testified defendant left pornographic magazines out

for his nine-year-old son to see. Defendant knew Robert looked at the magazines. 

Defense counsel failed to object.

The final incidents occurred on camping trips outside of Siskiyou County. During

a trip to Whiskey Town Lake, Robert testified he saw defendant perform oral sex 

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on Amber. Amber testified defendant rubbed her genitals through a blanket 

during a family camping trip to Shasta County. Again, counsel did not object. 

Respondent’s Answer to Amended Petition, Exhibit B, pp. 13-14.

The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner had waived his claim that the

trial court failed to sua sponte perform a balancing test:

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to balance probative value 

against prejudicial impact under Evidence Code section 352 before admitting the 

evidence of uncharged sexual offenses. However, as the People point out, in 

order to preserve an evidentiary error on appeal, the defendant must make a timely

and specific objection at trial. (Evid. Code § 353, subd. (a).) If a defendant fails 

to object to evidence based on Evidence Code section 352, defendant may not 

raise the issue on appeal. (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1014-

1015.) Defendant’s failure to object waived the issue on appeal.

Defendant, in response, asserts “[a]s a foundational requirement for the admission

of character evidence, the Evidence Code section 352 balancing test must be 

performed sua sponte if not requested by the proponent of the evidence.” 

However, defendant offers no authority for this proposition. The Supreme Court 

in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 upheld the constitutionality of 

Evidence Code section 1108; the court did not impose a sua sponte duty to 

conduct an Evidence Code section 352 analysis whenever evidence of other 

crimes is introduced–even in the absence of an objection to the admission of the 

evidence.

Respondent’s Answer to Amended Petition, Exhibit B, pp. 15-16.

In the answer to the amended petition, respondent argues that petitioner’s claim

challenging the trial court’s failure to conduct a balancing test pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 352

is procedurally defaulted based on trial counsel’s failure to object. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991) (federal courts look through to last reasoned state court

judgment to determine whether claim is procedurally barred); answer amended petition, exhibit

D (unreasoned decision by California Supreme Court denying petition for review). 

Based on concerns of comity and federalism, federal courts will not review a

habeas petitioner’s claims if the state court decision denying relief rests on a state law ground

that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-62, 109 S. Ct.

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1038 (1989). Generally, the only state law grounds meeting these requirements are state

procedural rules. However, the procedural basis of the ruling must be clear. Ambiguous

reference to procedural rules is insufficient for invocation of procedural bar. Calderon v. United

States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, where the procedural

and merits analysis are intermixed, it cannot be said that the procedural bar is independent of

federal law, i.e., there is no plain statement of reliance on procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, supra.

If there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision, the federal

court may still consider the claim if the petitioner demonstrates: (1) cause for the default and

actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Harris, 489 U.S. at 262, 109 S. Ct. at 1043. The existence of cause for a

procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1476 (1991). Examples of

cause include showings “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to

counsel,” “that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable,” or “of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645. Prejudice is difficult to

demonstrate:

The showing of prejudice required under Wainwright v. Sykes is

significantly greater than that necessary under “the more vague

inquiry suggested by the words ‘plain error.’” Engle, 456 U.S., at

135, 102 S.Ct., at 1575; Frady, supra, 456 U.S., at 166, 102 S.Ct.,

at 1593. See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct.

1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). The habeas petitioner must

show “not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” Frady, supra, at 170, 102 S.Ct., at 1596.

Murray v Carrier, 477 U.S. at 493-494, 106 S. Ct. at 2648 (1986). 

Although different phraseology is used in the default context from that used in the

ineffective assistance of counsel prejudice inquiry, as stated above, the ultimate application of the

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two prejudice inquiries is essentially similar—that is, whether the prejudice is sufficient to have

undermined the reviewer’s confidence in the result of the trial.

If the state adequately pleads an independent and adequate state procedural

ground, the burden shifts to petitioner to come forward with “specific factual allegations that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). 

By arguing that petitioner waived this claim by failing to object, the state has met

its burden of pleading an independent and adequate state procedural ground. Petitioner has not

come forward with any evidence demonstrating that the rule applied by the state appellate court

is not firmly established and not regularly followed by the California courts. 

The court now considers whether the trial court’s alleged failure to conduct the

proper balancing test regarding admission of the uncharged acts evidence prejudiced petitioner or

resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) permits admission of evidence that a person committed

a crime, civil wrong or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, etc.) other than his

disposition to commit such an act. In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a

sexual offense, Cal. Evid. Code § 1108 permits admission of the defendant’s commission of

another sexual offense to prove his disposition to commit the offense so long as the evidence is

not inadmissible pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 352. Section 1108 defines “sexual offense” as a

crime under the law of the state.

Evidence of other sexual offenses cannot be used in cases where its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the possibility that it will consume an undue amount of time

or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. 

People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903, 916-920, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 855-858 (1999). In evaluating

the admission of such evidence, California courts consider such factors as its nature, relevance

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and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of

confusing, misleading or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the

charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in

defending against the uncharged offense, and availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its

outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or

excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense. Id. at 916-917, 89

Cal.Rptr.2d at 855-856. The probative value or other crimes offenses is increased by the relative

similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses, the close proximity in time of the

offenses, and the independent sources of evidence (the victims) in each offense. Id. at 917, 89

Cal.Rptr.2d at 856.

Had the trial judge performed the balancing test, he still most likely would have

found the evidence involving petitioner performing oral sex on Amber and rubbing her genitals

admissible. These incidents, involving criminal offenses, occurred in close proximity to the time

of the charged offenses because they occurred during Amber’s visits to Dunsmuir. These

uncharged offenses were also similar in nature to the charged offenses. Robert was an

independent source as to the incident involving oral sex. RT at 110-111. Evidence of these

incidents was also not likely to have confused the jury. Accordingly, petitioner was not

prejudiced nor did any violation of fundamental fairness occur as a result of the trial court’s

failure to conduct the proper balancing test. 

Evidence that petitioner pointed and laughed at a picture of a naked woman in his

children’s presence and left out pornographic magazines for his son were not crimes. Therefore,

these incidents were not admissible under Cal. Evid. Code § 1108 to prove petitioner’s

disposition. That petitioner laughed at a probably cartoonish picture of a naked women in front

of his children does not go far, if at all, in terms of an intent issue, and is simply character

evidence introduced by an overzealous prosecutor. As such it should not have been admitted, but

this rather de minimis misconduct cannot be said to rise to the level of verdict influencing. It did

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not “infect” the trial. In light of the other graphic, admissible evidence, the same can be said for

the magazines.

Petitioner also argues that the trial court failed to give sufficient limiting

instructions to the jury regarding the uncharged offenses. The California Court of Appeal

addressed the merits of this claim. Petitioner’s counsel initially told the court that he intended to

submit an instruction regarding the uncharged acts. Answer to Amended Petition, Exhibit B, pp.

14-15. The court directed counsel to CALJIC Nos. 2.50 and 2.50.1 and stated that it remained

open to “such an instruction at a later time if one is presented.” Id., p. 15. According to the

Court of Appeal, defense counsel requested but then withdrew requests for 2.50 and 2.50.1. 

Opinion at 15 n.5. The court later instructed the jury with a modified version of CALJIC No.

10.43:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing lewd or lascivious acts 

outside of Siskiyou County between the defendant and the alleged victim on one 

or more occasion other than that charged in this case.

If you believe this evidence, you may use it only for the limited purpose of tending

to show that defendant’s lewd disposition or intent toward the child.

You must not consider that evidence for any other purpose.

CT at 204.

Petitioner is apparently claiming that the trial court should have sua sponte

instructed the jury as to CALJIC No. 2.50 and CALJIC 2.50.1. CALJIC 2.50 addresses evidence

of other crimes. CALJIC 2.50.1 addresses introduction of other evidence of other sexual

offenses and would be the more relevant instruction. CALJIC 2.50.1 provides, in relevant part, 

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are 

not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual 

offenses. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not 

required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crimes of which

he is accused.

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Middleton v.

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Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475

(1981); see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). The standard of review for a federal habeas court “is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States

(citations omitted).” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. In order for error in

the state trial proceedings to reach the level of a due process violation, the error had to be one

involving “fundamental fairness.” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 482. The Supreme Court has defined

the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly. Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct.

at 482.

Where what is at issue is the failure to give an instruction, petitioner’s burden is

“especially heavy” because it has been held that “[a]n omission or an incomplete instruction is

less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145,

155, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (1977). Moreover, a trial judge need not instruct on a defense which

would be inconsistent with petitioner’s theory of the case. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240

(9th Cir. 1984). Failure to give a jury instruction under these circumstances will not amount to a

due process violation. Id.

The burden upon petitioner is greater yet in a situation where he claims that the

trial court did not give an instruction sua sponte. To the extent that petitioner rests his claim on a

duty to give an instruction sua sponte under rules of state law, petitioner has stated no federal

claim. Indeed, in the failure to give a lesser included offense instruction context, the Ninth

Circuit has flatly held in non-capital cases that the failure to give the instruction states no federal

claim whatsoever. James v. Reece, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976). Therefore, in order to

violate due process, the impact on the proceeding from failure to give an instruction sua sponte

must be of a very substantial magnitude.

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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently held that there is no unreasonable

application of federal law where a state appellate court decided that a jury instruction’s single

incorrect statement of the “imperfect self-defense” standard did not render the instruction

reasonably likely to have misled the jury. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S. Ct. 1830

(2004).

The instruction given adequately informed the jury that it could consider the

evidence of uncharged crimes as tending to show petitioner’s disposition to commit the charged

crimes. The error generally involved with sex offense instructions concerns the burden of proof. 

If not carefully given, the jury may be misdirected to a preponderance standard for the crime at

issue, and not just the other sexual offenses. See Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, simply informing the jury that it can use the evidence in determining intent, without

instructing on the burden of proof for those offenses does not present a problem, assuming the

admissibility of the evidence in the first place. Gibson, 387 F.3d at 822. Moreover, in situations

where counsel is aware of all the instructions he would like, but decides to withdraw the

instructions, one cannot fault the judge from a due process standpoint from not giving the

withdrawn instructions sua sponte. The trial court’s failure to sua sponte give CALJIC No.

2.50.1 did not violate fundamental fairness. 

Because the denial of this claim by the California Supreme Court was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority, this claim should be

denied.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Legal Standard

The test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, a petitioner must show

that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To this end, the petitioner must

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identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. The federal court must then determine

whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professional competent assistance. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “We strongly presume that

counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised 

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland at 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In extraordinary cases, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated

based on a fundamental fairness standard. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391-93, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1512-13 (2000), (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).

The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the importance of giving deference 

to trial counsel’s decisions, especially in the AEDPA context:

In Strickland we said that “[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential” and that “every effort

[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, even when a court is

presented with an ineffective-assistance claim not subject to §

2254(d)(1) deference, a [petitioner] must overcome the

“presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Ibid. (quoting Michel

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

For [petitioner] to succeed, however, he must do more than show that he would 

have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed in the first 

instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas

court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland

incorrectly. See Williams, supra, at 411, 65 S. Ct. 363. Rather, he must show 

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that the [ ]Court of Appeals applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an 

objectively unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699, 122 S. Ct. 1843,1852 (2002).

Analysis

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to admission

of evidence regarding the uncharged acts. Petitioner observes that this evidence was not

admitted at his first trial, which resulted in a mistrial. CT at 75 (minutes showing mistrial as a

result of hung jury.) Petitioner argues he was prejudiced by the admission of this evidence at his

second trial because he was convicted. As discussed above, the evidence that petitioner

performed oral sex on Amber and touched her inappropriately during camping trips was most

likely admissible under Cal. Evid. Code § 1108. Therefore, petitioner was not prejudiced by

counsel’s failure to object to this evidence.

As discussed above, the evidence that petitioner pointed at the picture of the

naked woman and left out pornographic magazines for his son was not admissible pursuant to

Cal. Evid. Code § 1108. This evidence was also not admissible pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code §

1101 because neither of these incidents tended to show any fact such as petitioner’s intent to

molest Amber. 

While this evidence was not particularly relevant to any issue in the case,

petitioner was not prejudiced by its admission. Although this evidence, at best, demonstrated

inappropriate behavior by petitioner around his children regarding sexual matters, it was

significantly “tamer” then the evidence regarding his molestation of Amber. It is very unlikely

that evidence of these milder incidents influenced the jury in its decision. 

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that petitioner was not prejudiced

by counsel’s failure to object to the “other acts” evidence. After conducting an independent

review of the record, the court finds that the decision by the California Supreme Court denying

this claim was not objectively unreasonable. 

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E. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Legal Standard

Success on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the

conduct infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3109 (1987) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974)). The conduct must be examined

to determine “whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to

have affected the jury’s discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v.

Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990).

The appropriate standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on a

writ of habeas corpus is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of

supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (1986)

(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974)). 

According to the Supreme Court, “the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith

v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S. Ct. 940, 947 (1982). Thus, the federal habeas court must 

distinguish between “ordinary trial error of a prosecutor and that sort of egregious 

misconduct . . . amount[ing] to a denial of constitutional due process.” Id., 102 S. Ct. at 947.

Improper prosecutorial argument violates rights under the federal

constitution if it “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144

(1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94

S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). It “is not enough that the

prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally

condemned.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 997-998 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Analysis

Petitioner cites four instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing

argument. First, the prosecutor referred to the jury as sanitation workers and to petitioner as

garbage. In his closing argument the prosecutor stated, 

You know, in a case like this, I feel like your job is similar to that of–if you will 

pardon me for saying this, of a sanitation worker. You have to come face to face 

with some–some true filth. And you have to confront it and you have to do 

something about it. 

Sanitation workers, garbage collectors, sewage system workers, they have my 

deepest respect. That is honorable work. And imagine what our society would be

like if we didn’t have people doing that work.

And the same thing goes for you. This is a tough, tough case. It is ugly stuff to 

have to listen to and think about it. Think what our society would be like if we 

didn’t have people who had the courage and integrity to think through it and do 

the right thing.

RT at 810-811.

Later in his rebuttal the prosecutor stated, 

Ladies and gentlemen, to use my previous analogy, it is time to take out the 

garbage. Mr. King says his client is a human being. Anybody who could do those

things is human garbage. The only people who can do anything about it are you. 

RT at 876. 

There is no excuse for the prosecutor’s statement here concerning his personal

opinion on the worth of the petitioner (defendant). It is one thing to call the crime “filth,” and

that the jury must feel like sanitation workers; it is quite another to call the defendant “human

garbage.” The Court of Appeal focused on the former comments and ignored the comment on

petitioner’s worth. If trials are not simply to degenerate into a name calling contest, the

prosecutor’s comment should be condemned.

And, if this had been a federal trial in the Ninth Circuit, the comments may well

have caused a retrial. See United States v. Weatherspoon, __F.3d__, 2005 WL 1384341(9th Cir.

2005) (argument that jury should convict to alleviate social problems, i.e., convicting the

defendant will make you (the jury) feel comfortable because the defendant will be off the street)

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2

 The prosecutor in Darden, a death penalty case, made the following improper

statements during closing argument:

“As far as I’m concerned, there should be another defendant in this courtroom, one more, and

that is the division of corrections, the prisons...Can’t we expect him to stay in a prison when they

go there? Can we expect them to stay locked up once they go there? Do we know that they’re

going to be out on the public with guns, drinking?” 477 U.S. at 181 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. at 2471. 

“Yes, there is another defendant, but I regret that I know of no charges to place upon him, except

the public condemnation of them, condemn them.” Id.

“I will ask you to advise the Court to give him death. That’s the only way that I know that he is

not going to get out on the public. It’s the only way I know. It’s the only way I can be sure of it. 

It’s the only way that anybody can be sure of it now, because the people that turned him

loose.—“ Id., n. 10, 94 S.Ct. at 1871.

“As far as I am concerned, and as Mr. Maloney said as he identified this man this person, as an

animal, this animal was on the public for one reason.” Id., n. 11, 94 S.Ct. at 1871.

“He shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end

that leash.” Id., n. 12, 94 S.Ct. at 1871.

“I wish [Mr. Turman] had had a shotgun in his hand when he walked in the back door and blown

his [Darden’s] face off. I wish that I could see him sitting here with no face, blown away by a

shotgun.” Id.

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inappropriate and reversible); United States v. Brown, 327 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2003)

(comment that if defendant cheated in one area he cheated in the one at issue, improper character

statement and inflammatory). However, the standards are set by the Supreme Court and the

undersigned cannot say that the Supreme Court standard has been exceeded.

In Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986) the Supreme

Court found that the petitioner was not deprived of a fair trial despite the prosecutor’s

inflammatory and offensive remarks when the weight of the evidence supported the verdict and

the trial court instructed the jury that closing arguments were not evidence. In Darden, the

prosecutor’s inappropriate comments during closing argument were more numerous and just as

inappropriate, if not more so, then the comments made in the instant case. See 477 U.S. at 181 n.

9, n. 10, n. 11, n. 12, 106 S. Ct. at 2471.2 If a prosecutor’s statement that a defendant is an

animal who should not be let out except on a leash, and that he wished the defendant’s face had

been blown off with a shotgun, the human garbage statement will not go beyond the line set by

the Supreme Court.

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In the instant case, the court instructed the jury that closing argument was not

evidence. RT at 809. In addition, the weight of the evidence supported the verdict. Amber

testified that petitioner repeatedly molested her. Three of Amber’s friends testified that she told

them that her father had molested her. See RT at 170-172 (Jeremy Day); RT at 319-320 (Shanna

Brunridge); RT at 439-440 (Carrie Harris). Amber’s brother, Rob, also testified that he

witnessed some of the incidents. Because the jury was instructed that closing argument was not

evidence and because the evidence supported the verdict, the court finds that the inflammatory

comments by the prosecutor did not violate petitioner’s right to a fair trial. 

Petitioner next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he told the

jury that if they voted for not guilty, they would be calling Amber a liar: “If even one of you were

not to–were to call Amber a liar through your verdict, it just–just wouldn’t do her justice,

wouldn’t do Rob justice. I am just asking you to do justice.” RT at 877.

The prosecutor again crossed the line of appropriate argument. Telling the jury

that an acquittal means that the victim was a “liar” was simply an inappropriate pressure tactic

that should be avoided. Of course, the jury could acquit without finding the victim a liar. 

Victims can be confused, inarticulate, not persuasive to “beyond a reasonable doubt”– they do

not have to be liars for a defendant to be acquitted. But nevertheless, the undersigned cannot find

that such a tactic was beyond the due process bar set by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner next argues that the prosecutor improperly reminded the jury that

Amber had already twice testified:

Now, in addition to having no motivation to tell such a lie, there have been 

strong–strong reasons for Amber and Rob not to tell such a lie. Think about this. 

What have been the impacts on Amber? 

First of all, she has had to sit through two trials in which she has accused her own 

father of horrendous sexual abuse. I don’t know if that sounds like fun to any of 

you, but if you can imagine sitting in court through two trials and accusing your 

father of sexual abuse for no reason and it is a total lie, you are a unique 

individual.

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Secondly, she has had to inconvenience her family and friends, her mother, 

brother, her friends and acquaintances. They have come all the way to Yreka 

from as far away as Sacramento. That was Jeremy Day. As near as Redding, 

most of them came from Redding. They had to testify under oath and be cross 

examined by Mr. King. 

So if she is lying, she is just imposing that on them for no reason. And she herself

had to testify under oath at each trial in front of strangers.

RT at 817-818.

The jury knew that petitioner had been previously tried for the offense based on

the cross-examination of witnesses. For example, Amber’s mother testified that she spoke with

her son, Rob, about the details of petitioner’s conduct a little before the first trial and more before

the second trial. RT at 357. Because the jury knew that Amber had already testified against

petitioner in a previous trial, the prosecutor did not misstate evidence or otherwise commit

misconduct by referring to the previous trial. 

In addition, the prosecutor’s argument regarding Amber’s testimony in the first

trial was that her willingness to get up and testify against her father in two trials demonstrated her

credibility. This was not an improper argument. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the

prosecutor did not ask the jury to convict so that she would not have to testify again.

Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit. 

Finally, petitioner argues that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the

presumption of innocence: 

A of [sic] couple of preliminary comments about our system of law and some of

the rules you have been presented with. Everyone is familiar with the 

presumption of innocence in the American system of justice.

Well, what’s the purpose of that? There are some places in the world, as you 

undoubtedly know, where there is no presumption of innocence. If the ruling 

junta or whatever it is decides to put something on trial, or whatever it is, you 

prove you are not guilty. If you don’t do that, you are convicted.

That’s not the way it is in the United States of America. There is nothing for you 

to conclude from the fact that the defendant has been charged with a crime, has 

been brought to trial, or so forth. That is no evidence of anything.

So you might recall when we were selecting the jury that there was a lady that I 

asked, “What would you do if you had to decide right now which way you were

going to vote, guilty or not guilty?”

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She said, “Can I have another choice?”

I said, “No, guilty or not guilty.”

She said, “I would have to vote not guilty.”

That is absolutely right, because at that point, there was no evidence before you.

The defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. But as Judge 

Kaster just told you a moment ago, you have heard all the evidence. All the 

evidence is before you, and I submit to you, ladies and gentleman, the contrary has

been proved.

So you do not at this point have to go through some artificial mental exercise and 

try to think in your mind, “He is not guilty. I am going to presume he is not

guilty,” until you go back to deliberate. That is not the way it works.

It has been proven to you. The presumption of innocence is at the beginning of the

trial. After the evidence, it is not there anymore. You analyze the evidence. 

There is a correlary to the presumption of evidence. That is, that the defendant is 

not required to prove or disprove anything. That’s true.

RT at 811-812.

In the amended petition, petitioner argues that the prosecutor misstated the law

when he argued, “So you do not at this point have to go through some artificial mental exercise

and try to think in your mind ‘he is not guilty. I’m going to presume he is not guilty,’ until you

go back to deliberate.’” Amended Petition, p. 26. Standing alone, this statement is confusing. 

However, taken in the context of the entire argument quoted above, the statement referred to the

prosecutor’s conversation with the potential juror during voir dire. The prosecutor’s point was

that before the evidence was presented, the jury would have to have found petitioner not guilty. 

After the jury was presented with evidence, the jury would have evidence before it on which to

find petitioner guilty. The prosecutor’s argument did not misstate the legal standard.

The denial of petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim by the California

Supreme Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

authority. Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/1/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

sch96.157

Case 2:02-cv-00096-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/05/05 Page 25 of 25