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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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F L~ 

United Sts.tes w1u·f of Appeals 

Tenth Cirrnit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT .ROBERT L. HOECKER 

MELODEE SUE TONETTI, 

Plainti ff-Appellee, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 87-2662 

Clerk 

) (D.C. No. 85-Z-2533) 

CITICORP DINERS CLUB; CITICORP 

PERSON-TO-PERSON, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1 

McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant appeals the trial court's finding that defendant 

discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex by failing to 

promote her and by granting her a less favorable salary increase 

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e (1985). 

I. Facts 

Plaintiff was a unit manager in defendant's credit operations 

administrative department. In July 1984 plaintiff was given a 

1 This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 1 
performance evaluation by her supervisor, Mr. Galloway, the 

department's operation manager, just before he left the company. 

Mr. Galloway rated her performance as "E", excellent. 2 

Mr. Galloway was not replaced, and plaintiff continued under the 

supervision of the department's vice-president, Mr. Schoemaker. 

On October 8, 1984, plaintiff was given a second performance 

evaluation for purposes of determining the amount of her annual 

salary increase. Her supervisor, Mr. Schoemaker, rated her an 11 0 11 

and awarded her a nine percent salary increase. 0-level employees 

are entitled to an eight to ten percent increase, while E-level 

employees are permitted a ten to fifteen percent raise. 

Plaintiff's colleague, Mr. Sobota, had also been rated an "E" 

by Mr. Galloway before he left the company. Mr. Sobota was also 

reduced to an 11 0 11 for purposes of the October merit or salary 

increase, and received a nine percent increase. The reason given 

by Mr. Schoemaker for reducing plaintiff's and Mr. Sobota's ratings to an 11 0 11 on October 8, 1984, was because he subjectively did 

not believe anyone could rate an excellent in all areas of performance in order to warrant an "E" rating. 

Other unit managers in the credit operations division also 

received performance reviews and were recommended for salary 

2 Citicorp had a series of evaluations which ranged from a top 

of "E" (excellent) in descending order to 11 0 11 (outstanding), "F" 

( fully standard), 11 S 11 (satisfactory), and "U" (unsatisfactory) . 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 2 
increases in October 1984. In particular, Mark Ebling, a unit 

manager in special products, was reviewed by his supervisor, vicepresident William Meade, who rated Mr. Ebling's performance as 

"O", or outstanding. Mr. Meade recommended that Mr. Ebling 

receive a ten-percent increase. 3 

Sometime around October 24, 1984, the department vicepresidents met to conduct a "forced rating" in which they evaluated all the employees from all departments and ranked them on a 

single list with only two "E" positions, three "O" positions, 

three "F" positions, four "S" positions, and three "U" positions. 

Through this process, Mr. Schoemaker vehemently defended plaintiff's excellence and won her the second-place rank as an "E". 

Mr. Sobota was ranked an "O" in the forced ranking. Mr. Ebling 

was ranked an "F" at the top of the full standard group. Plaint i ff now complains that her October 8, 1984 rating of "O" was 

inconsistent with her July 1984 rating of "E" and her October 24, 

1984 rating of "E". Plaintiff claims that this inconsistency was 

based on sex discrimination and caused her to receive a lower salary. 

In April 1984 Mr. Busselmaier began working as defendant's 

new credit operations senior vice-president. During October 1984 

Mr. Busselmaier, along with the company's credit agency department 

3 Mr. Ebling's salary was lower than plaintiff's at the time he 

received his ten percent increase. Even after the increases, his 

salary remained below plaintiff's. 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 3 
vice-president, Mr. Rousseau, arranged to terminate the current 

operations manager who they found to have an unacceptable record. 

An operations manager opening was traditionally filled by the 

department vice-president, in this case Mr. Rousseau. However, in 

this particular instance, Mr. Busselmaier testified that he did 

not trust Mr. Rousseau's judgment in light of his tolerating the 

prior manager for so long. Therefore, Mr. Busselmaier assumed 

complete control of the selection process. 

According to Mr. Busselmaier, he decided that the qualifications necessary for the operations manager position would require 

financial planning, line balancing, variable and fixed expenses, 

loss forecasting, and personal computer skills. Mr. Busselmaier 

testified that he thereafter determined through his personal 

familiarity with the department personnel that Mr. Ebling was the 

best qualified pe r son for the job. 

Mr. Busselmaier testified that he was familiar with plaintiff's skills, based on his experience in conducting a department 

review in July 1984 with Mr. Schoemaker after Mr. Galloway left. 

Mr. Busselmaier claimed he gave serious consideration to plaintiff 

for the job; but because he knew she did not possess the financial 

or personal computer skills, he did not permit Mr. Rousseau to 

interview her. He claimed that he did not want plaintiff interviewed because it would have been a waste of time, and because he 

did not want to get her hopes up since he had already decided on 

Mr. Ebling. Mr. Busselmaier did not interview any candidate for 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 4 
the position, nor did he review their personnel files. His decision was made completely on his own evaluation of the individuals 

informally conducted over the six months he had worked at 

Citicorp. On the basis of these facts, plaintiff sued Citicorp 

for sex discrimination resulting in a lower salary increase and in 

not receiving a promotion for which she believed she was qualified. 

II. Standard of Review 

The determination of whether a plaintiff has suffered discrimination under Title VII is an ultimate question of fact for 

the trial court. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 

711, 715 (1983). Therefore, we may reverse the trial court's 

finding of discrimination only if it is clearly erroneous. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 52(a). The finding is clearly erroneous 

"when although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 

333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) .... If the district court's 

account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 

record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may 

not reverse it even though convinced that had it been 

sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 

evidence differently. When there are two permissible 

views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between 

them cannot be clearly erroneous. 

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 

III. Salary Increase 

The trial court characterized the determination of discrimination based on t he failure to make equivalent salary increases 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 5 
as an issue of fact. We agree with the trial court's characterization of this issue and thus in order to reverse must find that 

the trial court's determination was ''clearly erroneous." After a 

thorough review of the record in this case, we hold that the trial 

court's finding on the issue of discrimination with regard to the 

salary increase was not clearly erroneous. 

The trial court based its determination of discrimination 

largely on the fact that it found a connection between the discrimination involved in the promotion activity and the discrimination involved in the lower ranking for the salary increase. 

Although defendant points out testimony throughout the record that 

Mr. Busselmaier was not involved in the lowering of the rating for 

the salary increase, we believe that the trial court could weigh 

the competing evidence in the record and permissibly conclude that 

there was a connection between the promotion activity and the 

salary increase. 

Plaintiff testified that she was informed by Mr. Rousseau 

that Mr. Busselmaier told Mr. Schoemaker to lower her rating for 

the salary increase. Record, vol. 3, at 162. We also have the 

testimony of Mr. Rousseau concerning a meeting involving himself, 

Mr. Busselmaier and Mr. Schoemaker that Mr. Schoemaker "was pushing for an explanation as to why his evaluation of [the plaintiff] 

wasn't going to be valid; why [Mr. Busselmaier] was questioning 

his evaluation of his subordinate." Record, vol. 3, at 268. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 6 
Although there is evidence in the record contrary to the plaintiff's and Mr. Rousseau's testimony, the trial court could, and 

did, weigh the relative testimony and make a finding of fact that 

the promotion and the salary increase were connected. 4 The trial 

court held "the influence of Mr. Busselmaier may be inferred 

strongly from what happened and from the exhibits which I have 

mentioned; and the indication is that the merit increase was very 

tightly tied up with promotional activity and can't be severed 

from it on that issue." Record, vol. 7, at 8. 

When we review a trial court's findings under the clearly 

erroneous standard, we must affirm the findings even if we are 

convinced that had we been sitting as a trier of fact we would 

have weighed the evidence differently. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-

74. We believe that i t is certainly a possible interpretation of 

the evidence, when weighi ng the testimony, that the promotion 

activity and salary increase act i vity were connected. Although we 

reverse the trial court's ultimate finding of discrimination on 

the promotion claim, we do so only because the trial court failed 

to make an explicit finding that Mr. Ebling and the plaintiff were 

equally qualified. This is merely a procedural requirement that 

4 The trial court found that Mr. Busselmaier came across as 

arrogant and was unpersuasive. Record, vol. 7, at 8-9. In 

contrast, the trial court was impressed with Mr. Rousseau and 

found him to be very competent, knowledgeable, and fair . Id. at 

10. We are unable to hold a finding clearly erroneous whenit is 

based solely on the factfinder's evaluation of the witness' 

credibility. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 7 
applied only to the promotion issue. This holding does not protect the promotion activity when considered in light of the salary 

increase. The requirement of showing equal qualifications has 

only been applied to promotion decisions in this circuit. 

Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983); Beaver 

v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1047048 (10th Cir. 1981). Although we 

recognize that a plaintiff in a salary increase discrimination 

case must prove by some means that she was denied a deserved 

raise, we note that the evidence used could include evidence other 

than equal or better qualifications. The Supreme Court has held 

that sex-based wage discrimination can be found even if no member 

of the opposite sex is paid a higher wage. County of Washington 

v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981). Thus, the strict requirement that a trial court must make a finding on comparative qualifications in a promotion case does not apply to a salary increase 

case. In this case the trial court explicitly found that the 

influence of Mr. Busselmaier on the salary increase could be 

strongly inferred, and that this influence was an effort to control the promotion process. Record, vol. 7, at 8. If gender 

based, this is an impermissible discriminatory treatment of the 

plaintiff. 

We believe that there is also sufficient evidence to support 

the trial court's conclusion that the salary increase decision was 

a product of sex discrimination. Plaintiff was obviously treated 

less favorably than Mr. Ebling both in the salary increase and in 

the promotion decision. This was true in spite of the fact that 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 8 
plaintiff's performance evaluations were consistently higher than 

Mr. Ebling's ratings. Although plaintiff received the same salary 

increase as Mr. Sobota, there is at least some evidence that 

plaintiff's performance evaluations were higher than Mr. Sobota's 

on a fairly consistent basis. In addition, Mr. Busselmaier 

refused to interview plaintiff for the promotion, and the record 

contains evidence that he refused to accept Mr. Schoemaker's evaluation of plaintiff. The trial court inferred from 

Mr. Busselmaier's conduct that he influenced the rating decision 

in order to hurt plaintiff's chances of receiving the promotion. 

We concluded above that this was a permissible inference in light 

of the evidence in the record. Mr. Busselmaier's conduct and the 

poor treatment of plaintiff in comparison to the two males 

presents strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination, probably based on sex. When these facts are combined with 

Mr. Busselmaier's language describing plaintiff at the meeting 

with Mr. Schoemaker, a prima facie case of sex discrimination is 

presented. When Mr. Schoemaker demanded Mr. Busselmaier go talk 

to plaintiff about the promotion decision, Mr. Busselmaier refused 

and responded that you go tell "that woman'' she's not qualified. 

Record, vol. 3, at 270, 274. We believe that the trial court 

could permissibly conclude from this evidence that sex discrimination played a factor in these decisions. Thus, we cannot find 

clearly erroneous the trial court's determination that discrimination actually occurred in the salary increase, and we affirm the 

trial court's finding on this issue. 

9 

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IV. Promotion 

On the issue of the failure to interview the plaintiff for 

the promotion, the trial court failed to make the necessary finding, required by Rule 52(a), to support its conclusion of discrimination.5 The case law in this circuit indicates that the 

district court in this case must make a finding on comparative 

qualifications. In Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th 

Cir. 1981), this court upheld a finding for the employer because 

the plaintiff did not show that her "qualifications were so 

plainly superior as to require a finding of pretext." We noted 

that the ultimate decision in making the promotion "turned on comparative evaluation of capabilities considered important to performance as a post office supervisor." Id. at 1047. In reaching 

that conclusion, we reiterated the Supreme Court's statement that 

an "employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful 

criteria." Id. at 1047 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs 

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)). 

In Burdine, the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit holding which required an employer to prove by objective evidence that 

the person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. In rejecting the view of the court of appeals, the Supreme 

5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a): Findings by the Court 

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 

a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find 

the facts specially and state separately its conclusions 

of law thereon. 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-2662 Document: 01019966652 Date Filed: 03/21/1990 Page: 10 
Court stated "it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not treated equally." Burdine, 450 

U.S. at 258. The Court also stated 

the employer has discretion to choose among equally 

qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based 

upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think 

that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the 

applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII 

liability, although this may be probative of whether the 

employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination. 

Id. at 259. Based on the above language, this circuit has stated 

that "when an employer rejects a minority candidate in choosing 

between competing individuals, the critical determination is 

whether they are equally qualified." Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 

F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). 

It is clear from these cases that a plaintiff must show that 

she is similarly situated or equally qualified. The district 

court in the present case found that the plaintiff was well-qualified for the promotion in finding that she established a prima 

facie case, record, vol. 7, at 3-4, but never made a finding 

regarding the comparative qualifications of the plaintiff and the 

person actually promoted to the position plaintiff sought. 

Based on the trial court's ruling, this court could 

reasonably infer that the district court made a determination that 

the plaintiff and the employee who received the promotion were 

equally, although not identically, qualified for the job, in spite 

of the fact that the court never stated that the plaintiff was as 

qualified. However, not only did the district court fail to 

11 

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specifically make a finding for the record that the plaintiff was 

equally or better qualified, but at one point the court apparently 

labored under the misconception that because the plaintiff was 

never interviewed for the position she sought, the court was 

unable, as a matter of law, to find that she was better 

qualified. 6 It is impossible to tell whether the court felt it 

could not make the necessary finding based on the facts before it 

or whether it believed it could not find the plaintiff qualified 

as a matter of law. The trial court's statement that it could not 

make a finding on the comparative qualifications of the plaintiff 

is inconsistent with the rest of the court's ruling on the 

promotion issue and completely undermines its holding. A 

comparison of qualifications is necessary for plaintiff to rebut 

defendant's asserted reasons for not promoting plaintiff. Because 

of the trial court's statement that it could not determine whether 

plaintiff was equally qualified, the trial court could not hold 

that the defendant's reasons were merely pretextual. As a result 

of that failure, the trial court's judgment cannot stand. 

Because of the particular circumstances of the present case, 

it appears that the district court's conclusion is not supported 

by its findings without a finding as to the comparative 

6 "[I]t may well have been that had this interviewing process 

gone through, Mr. Ebling [the person promoted] may have been the 

most qualified person for the job. But this is something that 

this court will never know, because the regular procedures did not 

go through and because Ms. Tonetti [the plaintiff] was never given 

a chance to be interviewed or show what her qualifications were." 

Record, vol. 7, at 9. 

12 

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qualifications of the candidates. The findings of the district 

court do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 52 because the trial 

court did not decide the issue of whether the candidates were 

equally qualified. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community 

Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1031 (5th Cir. 1980) (the court 

concluded that a full understanding of the issues to be resolved 

on appeal could not be reached because the district court did not 

make findings as to the plaintiff's qualifications); Aikens v. 

United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 665 F.2d 1057 (D.C. 

Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (the 

district court did not make findings on appellant's qualifications 

clear enough to permit the circuit court to determine if a prima 

facie case was established). The only findings which the district 

court made on the promotion issue actually undermine its holding. 

Therefore, we feel constrained to reverse on this issue because 

the court failed to make the required findings of fact on plaintiff's qualifications. 

v. Conclusion 

We affirm the trial court's finding on the salary issue and 

reverse its finding on the promotion issue. Because of our 

reversal of one of the issues, we must remand to the district 

court for an updated calculation of attorney's fees, taking into 

account our reversal and the costs on appeal. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 

13 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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