Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00041/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00041-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

JULIA BLACKWELL PLAINTIFF 

v. No. 5:18-cv-41-DPM 

WENDY KELLEY, Director of 

the Arkansas Department of Correction DEFENDANT 

ORDER 

1. Blackwell's embedded motions to supplement, NQ 52 & NQ 56, 

are partly granted. It appears the direct appeal and Rule 37 opinions 

were omitted from the exhibits to Kelley's answer. NQ 36; Rule 5(d)(3) 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 

Courts. The Court is therefore attaching them to this Order. The 

embedded motions are otherwise denied. Much of what Blackwell 

wants to submit was already attached in the lengthy exhibits to her 

amended petition. NQ 30. And to the extent Blackwell seeks to expand 

the record, she hasn't met the conditions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Mark 

v. Ault, 498 F.3d 775, 788 (8th Cir. 2007). 

2. On de nova review, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Harris's 

thorough recommendation, NQ 49, and overrules Blackwell's objections, 

NQ 52-53 & NQ 56. Certain claims in Blackwell's petition would present 

harder questions if this Court were reviewing the issues de nova. But 

that is not the Court's task at this stage. Instead, most of Blackwell's 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 57 Filed 07/31/19 Page 1 of 25
claims can't be reviewed at all because they are inexcusably defaulted. 

And her preserved claims all fail on the merits when analyzed through 

the strict, doubly deferential standard created by 28 U.S.C. § 2254( d). 

Her petition will therefore be dismissed with prejudice. No certificate 

of appealability will issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)-(2). 

So Ordered. 

v D .P. Marshall Jr. 

United States District Judge 

31 :f~ ?..Dlj 

-2-

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'

· 

Cite as 2015 Ark. App . 96 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISfON I 

No. CR-14-539 

JULIA ELIZABETH BLACKWELL Opinion Delivered February 18, 2015 

APPELLANT 

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI 

V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

FIRST DIVISION 

STATE OF ARKANSAS 

[NO. 60CR-10-2047] 

APPELLEE HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON, 

JUDGE 

AFFIRMED 

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON,Judge 

A Pulaski County jury convicted Julia Blackwell of fe lony negligent homicide, 

manslaughter, and third-degree battery. The jury sentenced Blackwell to ten years' 

imprisonment fo r felon y negligent homicide and fined her $500 for battery. Blackwell now 

appeals her conviction, arguin g that the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to 

suppress and her motion to dismiss. 1 W e affirm. 

On March 28, 20 10, a ca r driven by Blackwell hit a seventy-nine-year-old man, Ralph 

John Friedmann, who ,vas walking on a sidewalk alongside Breckenridge Drive in Little 

Rock. Friedmann sustained several injuries. Immediately following the accident, Little Rock 

poli ce officers transported Blackwell to Baptist Hospital where Blackwell gave a urine sample. 

Blackwell was th en transported to j ail. At the jail, Blackwell gave a second urine sample. 

1

Blackwell filed a pro se motion to stay proceedings on February 3, 2015 . We deny 

the motion. 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

On June 8, 2010, Ftiedmann di ed from his injuries, and on June 24, 2010, the State 

charged Blackwell with felony negligent homicide and third-degree battery. Blackwell pled 

not guilty to the charges. 

On April 20, 2012, rna ckwell filed a motion to suppress the urine samples taken at 

Baptist Hospital and at the jail. Blackwell argued that the samples violated her Fourth, Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-65-205 . 

Blackwell also argued that officials failed to maintain a proper chain of custody of the samples. 

On August 7, 2013, the circuit court held a suppression hearing. At the hearing, the 

State's witnesses included Sergeam Greg Birkhead, Officer N atasha ("Tasha") Sims, Amanda 

Shere, Canie Frederick, Sarah Dougan, Andrea Swift, and R ebecca Carlisle. 

Sergeant Greg Birkhead of the Little Rock Police Department testified that on March 

28, 2010, he went to Baptist Hospital to retrieve a blood sample from Blackwell. He stated 

chat when he asked l31ackwell for a blood draw, she continually refused and asked to speak 

with her attorney. Sergeant Birkhead told Blackwell that she was not entitled to an attorney 

at that time but cou ld call her attorney once she was booked at the jail. After Blackwell 

refused to give a sample, Sergeant Birkhead contacted personnel in his department to try to 

get a search warrant to draw Blackwell's blood. H owever, he could not obtain a warrant. 

Sergeant Birkhead testified that Officer Sims heard Blackwell refu se to give samples and knew 

that he had tried to get a search warrant. Sergea nt Birkhead also stated that he later witnessed 

Officer Sims and I3lackwell exit a hospital bathroom with a urine sample. H e could not recall 

whether Officer Sims had gloves or whether the cup had tape on it. 

2 

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Cite as 201 5 Ark. App. 96 

Officer T asha Sims, an officer with the Little Rock Police Department, testified that 

she also went to Baptist Hospit:11 on March 28, 2010, to obtain a blood sample from 

Blac kvvell. She explained that she read Blackwell her rights under Act 106~ and then asked 

Blackwell to give a blood sample. She testified that Blackwell initially agreed to give a sample; 

however, wh en the nurse entered the room to take the sample, Blackwell refused. The nurse 

then left th e room but Officer Sims continued to speak with Blackwell about giving the blood 

sampl e. Later, th e nurse reentered to try again to draw Blackwell's blood but Blackwell again 

refused. Offi cer Sims testified that Blackwell then explained that she was scared of needles. 

Officer Sims suggested that Blackwell give a urine sample instead, and Blackwell agreed. She 

took Blackwell to the restroom , and Blackwell provided her with a urine sample. Officer Sims 

stated that she placed a l;itex glove over the cup containing the sample and wrote Blackwell's 

name on it. Officer Sims testified that she normally places tape over the cup but did not have 

tape with her at that time. 

Offi cer Sims then transported Blackwell to jail. She testified that she kept the sample 

with her at all times except when she entered the jail with Blackwell. At that time, she locked 

the sample in her vehicle. fn th e jail, Officer Sims took a second UJine sample from Blackwell. 

Officer Sims testified that she wrote Blackwell's name on the cup along with the date, time, 

and her initials. Officers Sims stated that her initials are "T.S." 

After processing Blackwell at the jail, Officer Sims drove to the department's property 

room in downtown Little Rock with both urine sampl es. Officer Sims testified that, in the 

------~ --

2

Act 106 refers to the right to refuse a chemical test under Arkansas Code Annotated 

section 5-65-205 (a)(1) (Supp. 2007). 

3 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

property room, she put the samples into separate plastic bags and heat-sealed them. She then 

assigned ;i tag m,mber to the samples and placed them in a refrigera tor locker. She finally 

wrote a request to have the samples transferred to the Arkansas State Crime Lab. She testified 

that she had no further conta ct with the samples after she placed them in the refiigerator. 

On cross- examination, Blackwell's counsel questioned Officer Sims about a previous 

deposition in a civil case in which Officer Sims testified that she had initialed both samples and 

sealed both samples with tape. In response to this questioning, Sims explained that at the civil 

deposition, she testified to her nom1al practice of taking urine sampl es and how she 

remembered taking Blackwell's samples but admitted that her recollection at the civil 

deposition and at the current hearing could be flawed. 

Amanda Shere, a property technician for the Little Rock Police Department, also 

testified at the suppression hearing. She stated that the urine samples remained in the 

refrigerator where Officer Sims placed them until March 29, 2010. Shere explained that on 

that day another property te chnician, employee 17495, transferred the samples to the property 

room where she worked. On March 30, 2010, she transported the samples to the Arkansas 

State Crime Lab for testing. 

Sh ere also explained that samples must be properly sealed, initialed, and dated before 

the property room will accept them. She noted that if a sample is not properly sealed, she 

usually sends a notice to the submitting officer. In regard to the samples in this case, she did 

not remember whether she had sent a notice and did not recall details about the samples' 

packaging. 

4 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

Carrie Frederick, the property-room supervisor for the Little Rock Police Department, 

testifi ed that, on March 29, 2010, employee 17495 transferred the samples from the property 

room where Officer Sims had submitted them to the property room down the street where 

she and Shere worked. She noted that employee 17495 was Ed Fisher but explained that 

Fisher had retired and rnoved to Arizona. 

Sarah Dugan , a forensic technician for the Arkansas State Crime Lab, testified that her 

job includes takin g evidence from She re to make sure the evidence is properly sealed and has 

an officer's initi als. She explained that she then enters the evidence into the computer, assigns 

barcodes to it, and pl aces it into secure storage . Duga n testifi ed that, according to her records, 

she followed that procedure with the samples in this case and no problems existed with the 

sampl es. 

Andrea Swift, a fore nsic technician for the Arkansas State Crime Lab, stated that her 

job includes caking evidence out of secure storage and transferring it to analysts. She testified 

chat, on April 1, 2010, she took samples in this case from secure storage to analyst Rebecca 

Carlisle. She testified ch at she did not notice anything unusual or make any notations about 

the packaging of the sampl es. 

R ebecca Carlisle, a forensic toxicologist for the Arkansas State Crime Lab, testified that 

she received the samples in this case from Swift on April 1, 2010, and placed them in secure 

storage in the toxicology department to await testing. A few days later, on April 6, 2010, she 

checked ou t the samples for testing. After checking out the samples, she inspected their 

condition and packaging. She testified that the sampl es were in a single, sealed plastic bag. She 

5 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

explained that, within the plastic bag, each sample was in a latex glove. Carlisle noted that the 

samples were distinguished from one another by numbers written on the gloves-"1" and 

"2." She stated that sample "1" had a plastic jar with the labeling ''Julia Blackwell" along with 

the time "20:03 ." She testifi ed that no initi als appeared on the jar of sample "1" and the 

sample had not been taped shut. She stated that sample "2" had the initials "JM" and the 

sample had been taped shut. After noting the appearance of the samples, Carlisle stated that 

she proceeded with the testing. She explained that she tested sample " 1" because that sample 

had the earlier time on it. She testified that sample "1" tested positive for amphetam.ines. She 

did not test sample "2." 

At the conclusion of this testimony and the hearing, the circuit court denied 

Blackwell's motion to suppress on all grounds. On Septem.ber 4, 2013, the State amended the 

charges against Blackwell to include a charge for manslaughter. Blackwell filed a 111.otion to 

dismiss the manslaughter charge , arguing that the statute of limitations in Arkansas Code 

Annot:ired ~ection 5-1-·109(b)(3) barred the charge. The circuit court held a hearing on the 

motion to dismiss, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion. 

On N ovember 7, 2013, a jury trial was held, and the jury convicted Blackwell of all 

three charges. T he j ury then sentenced Blackwell for the felony negligent homicide 

conviction and the battery convicti on but did not sentence her for the manslaughter 

conviction. 3 However, Blackwell's judgment reflects the following sentences: zero years' 

3

T he record shows that in a bench conference before the sentencing stao-e, the State 

asked the court not to send the manslaughter-sentencing instruction to the JUry.~pecifically, 

the prosecutor stated, " I think the defense would make a motion. We would actually, we'll 

make a motion . I don't believe double jeopardy allows the jury to sentence on negligent 

6 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

imprisonment for manslaughter, ten years' imprisonment for felony negligent homicide, and 

a $500 fin e for battery. Black well fil ed a timely notice of appeal, arguing that the circuit court 

ened whe n it denied her motion to suppress the urine samples and her motion to disrniss the 

manslaughter charge. 

I. Motion to Suppress 

Black well argues that the circuit court should have suppressed the urine sample because 

the caking of the sampl e violated the plain language of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-

65-205(a)(1) and her rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and the corresponding articles under the Arkansas Constitution. Blackwell also 

cbims that the circuit court should have suppressed the urine sampl es because the testimony 

at the suppression he:iri ng established that the samples lacked authenticity. 

In reviewing the deni al of a motion to suppress evidence, this court conducts a de 

nova review based on the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the circuit court's 

rulin g den ying the motion is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence . Hart v. State, 

368 Ark. 237, 244 S.W.3d 670 (2006). We defer to the superiority of the circuit judge to 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing. Montgomery v. State, 

367 Ark. 485 , 241 S.W.3d 753 (2006) . 

Blackwell first argues that the taking of the urine sampl es violated the plain language 

of Arbnsas Code Ann otated section 5-65-205 because Officer Sims and Sergeant Birkhead 

repeatedly :isked I3lackwell to submit to chemical testing despite her refu sals. Specifically, 

Blackwell claims that the language of section 5-65-205 restricts officers to onl y one request 

homi cide :ind manslaughter. " 

7 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

for chemical tests. 

Under Arkansas's implied-consent statute, any person who operates a motor vehicle 

shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of her blood, breath, or urine 

if that person i'i involved in an accident wh ile operati ng a motor vehicl e. Ark. Code Ann . § 

5-65-202(a ) (Rep!. 2005). Hov-1ever, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-65-205(a)(l) 

provides that "[ijf a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer 

to submit to a chemical test designated by the law enforcement agency, as provided in 

[section] 5-65-202, no chemical test shall be given." We strictly construe criminal statutes 

and resolve any doubts in favo r of the defendant. Graham v. State, 314 Ark. 152, 861 S.W.2d 

299 (1993). The first rnle of statutory construction is co construe the statute just as it reads, 

giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. State v. 

H avens, 337 Ark. 161 , 987 S.W.2d 686 (1999). If the language of the statute is plain and 

unambiguous, and conveys a cl ear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules 

of ~tatutory interpretati on. Id. 

[n construing section 5-65-205 in this light, we find no merit in Blackwell 's argument. 

Nothing in the statute limits law-enforcement officers to one request. Further, Officer 

BirkheJd ;:md Officer Sims compli ed with the statute when they did not force Blackwell to 

submit to a blood te'it \Vhen she refused, and Officer Sims obtained a urine sample only after 

Blackwell agreed to a urine test. Accordin gly, the giving of the urine samples did not violate 

tht' pbin language of the statute . 

Blackwell next argues that the caking of the urine sampl es violated her rights under the 

8 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

Fifrh Amendment and her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. -1 Our supreme court has 

eke lined to extend the Fifth Amendment privil ege protection to the colle ction of a chemical 

test and has ~pecifi cally held that 1'v1iranda rigl1ts do not apply to taking tests under the impliedconsent statute. Talley L'. Stare, 2010 Ark. 357, 377 S.W .3d 222 (holding that the Fifth 

Amendment did not prevent the compelled produ ction of DNA); Wright 11 • State, 288 Ark. 

209, 703 S.W.2d 850 (l 986) (holding that the Miranda rights do not apply to caking tests 

under the implied-consent stacute). Further, our supreme court has held that submitting to 

a sc ientific test is not a critica l stage in criminal proceedings subject to the right to counsel 

under the Sixth Amendment. Fontster 11 . State, 20] 0 Ark . 291 (holding that there is no right 

to counsel p1ior to a brea thalyzer). Accordingly, the taking of the urine samples did not 

viobte I3la ckwell\ Fifth Amendment rights or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

Blackwell finall y asserts that the circuit court should have suppressed the samples 

because testimony at the suppression hea ting established chat the samples lacked authenticity. 

Specificall y, Dlackwell claims that the testimony establishes that the samples were tarnpered 

with or confi1sed with another sample. Blackwell points to Officer Sims's testimony to 

establish tampering and confusion. She notes chat Officer Sims's testimony concerning the 

packaging of the sampl es conflicts with her earlier deposition testimon y as well as the forensic 

toxicologist\ description of the samples' packaging. 

[n making this argument, Blackwell asserts that the facts of this case are on point with 

~Blackwell also appears to argue that the sample violated her due- process rights under 

the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Blackwell merely states that the sample violated her 

due-process rights but does not argue how those rights were violated. T his court does not 

consider an assertion when the appell ant fa ils to present a convincing argument in its support. 

Davis 11. State, 2009 Ark. 478, 348 S.W.3d 553. 

9 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 96 

Crisco JJ. State, 328 Ark. 388, 9-+3 S.W.2d 582 (1997). In Crisw, our supreme court held that 

a dru g sample lacked authenticity w h en an officer's testimony concerning the appearance of 

the sample differed from the crirne-bb chemist's testimony. Id. The offlcer described the 

sample as ;111 off-white powder whereas the chemist described it as a tan, rock-like substance. 

Id. Most significmtly, the chemist stated that he would nor have described the substance as 

an o ff-white powder. Id. Our suprem e court held that the marked difference in the 

descriptiom o f the substa nce established a lack of authenticity. Id. 

The facts in Crisco are distinguish able from the instant case. In Crisco, the testimony of 

chc off1cer and thc ch emist differed on the description of th e actual substance. In this case, 

O fficer Sims's description of th e urin e did not differ from the toxicologist's description . The 

individuals disagreed only on the packaging of the sample, and Officer Sims admitted that she 

could }1ave mistakenly described the packaging. Further, our supreme court has held that any 

inconsistencies in the testimony offered to establish chain of custody are for the trier of fact 

to resolve. 011'Clls 11. State, 201 ·1 Ark . App. 763, 387 S.W .3d 250 (citing Dansby u. State, 338 

Ark. 697. l S.W.3d 403 (1999)) . Th e circuit court judge observed the witnesses and heard 

their testimony and concluded that the sam.ples should be admitted. Accordingly, the urine 

sample did not lack authenticity, and the circuit court properly denied Blackwell's motion to 

~uppress. 

II. 1'vlotio11 to Dismiss 

Blackwell argues that th e circuit court erred when it denied h er motion to dismiss the 

m anslaughter ch arge because the charge w as barred by the three-year statute of limitations 

provided in Arkans:is Code Annotated section 5-1-109(6) (3). Specifically, Blackwell claims 

lO 

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Cite as 2015 Ark. App . 96 

that the statute of limitations began running on June 8, 2010, the day that Friedmann died, 

and expired three ye:-irs bter on June 8, 2013. Thus, Blackwell asserts the manslaughter charge 

filed on September 4, 2013, was time- barred. The State argues that the felony negligent 

homicide charge filed on June 24, 20 I 0, tolled the statute of limitations. Tn support of its 

posi tion. the State relies on section S-1-109(g)(2), which provides that the statute oflimitati on 

does not run during "any period when a prosc-cution against the accused for the same conduct 

is pending in this sta te ." 

We agree with the St;.itc-. Both the felony negligent-homicide charge and the 

manslaughter charge arise out of a single action-13lackwell striking Friedmann with her car. 

Thus, the filing of tl1e felony negligent-homicide charge tolled the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Blackwell's motion to dismiss. 

111. lllep,al Sentence 

Finally, this court notes th;.i t Blackwell's sentence for manslaughter is illegal on its face. 

Specifically, the judgment refl ects a sentence of zero years' imprisonment for the manslaughter 

conviction, a Class C felony, which requires a three-year minimum. See Ark. Code Ann. § 

5-10- 104(c) (Repl. 2006); Ark. Code Ann.§ 5-4-401(a)(4) (R epl. 2006). Although this court 

can consider an argument regarding an illegal sentence for the first time on appeal, the 

agg1ieved party must nonetheless appea l or cross-appeal in order to invoke the appellate 

court'sjuri~diction over the claim. See Sullil'an I'. State, 366 Ark. 183,234 S.W.3d 285 (2006); 

Smit/, v. St,1te, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003); Cook IJ. State, 46 Ark. App. 169, 878 

11 

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S.W .2d 765 (1994). Here, the State did not file a notice of :ippeal o r of cross-appeal. 

Accordingl y. we c rnnot :iddre~s the legali ty of Blackwell's rn:inslaughter semence. 5 

Affirmed. 

HARRISON and Guwrn., JJ. , agree. 

Debra J. Reece, for appellant. 

Dustin J\,fcDaniel, Att'y Gen ., by: Brad Newman, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee. 

5

This court also notes that Blackwell 's conviction for both manslaughter and felony 

negligent homicide may viola te double jeopardy. H owever, Blackwell did not raise the issue 

on appeal, and thus it is nor preserved for our review. See State v. Montague, 341 Ark. 144, 14 

S.W .3d 867 (2000); bur see Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark 33, 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000) (holding 

tlut a doubl e-j eopardy claim was a fundamental ri ght that an appellant could raise for the first 

time in Rule 37 proceedings). 

12 

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Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 248 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

JULIA BLACKWELL 

V. 

ST A TE OF ARKANSAS 

DlVISION II 

No. CR-16-833 

APPELLANT 

APPELLEE 

Opinion Delivered: April 26, 2017 

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

FIRST D lVISION 

[NO. 60CR-l0-2047] 

HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON, 

JUDGE 

AFFIRMED 

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON,Judge 

Julia Blackwell appeals the order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court denying her 

petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.l 

(2016). We affirm the circuit court's decision. 

On March 28, 2010, a car driven by Blackwell hit Ralph John Friedmann, who was 

walking on a sidewalk along Breckenridge Drive in Little Rock. Friedmann died from his 

injuries on June 8, 2010. On June 24, 2010, the State charged Blackwell with felony 

negligent homicide and third-degree battery for the death of Friedmann. On September 4, 

2013, the State amended the charges to include a charge for manslaughter. 

Thereafter, a jury convicted Blackwell of felony negligent homicide, n1anslaughter, 

and third-degree battery. The jury sentenced Blackwell to ten years' imprisonment for 

felony negligent homicide and fined her $500 for third-degree battery. The jury did not 

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sentence I31ackwell on the manslaughter charge at the request of the State. On February 18, 

2015 , this court affirmed Blackwell's conviction. Blackwell v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 96, 455 

S.W.3d 848. 

Onjune 5, 2015, BlackwelJ fil ed a petition in the Pulaski County Circuit Court for 

postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. She alleged 

that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (l) move to dismiss either the felony 

negligent-homicide charge or the manslaughter charge; (2) object to the use of nonpattern 

jury instructions; (3) cross-examine former police officer N atasha Sims about her 

termination fron, the Little Rock Police Department; (4) protect her right to trial by an 

impartial jury; (5) object to the prosecutor's improper acquisition of her sealed medical 

records; and (6) object or move for a mistrial after the prosecutor made personal attacks on 

her trial counsel during closing arguments. 

On February 19, 2016, the court held an evidentiary hearing and took the matter 

under advisement. Thereafter, on May 27, 2016, the court entered an order denying 

Blackwell's petition. On June 23, 2016, Blackwell appealed the decision. We assumed 

jurisdiction of this appea l pursuant to footnote 1 in Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, _ S.W.3d 

_ (per curiam). 

We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court's findings 

are clearly erroneous. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. 115 (per curiam). A finding is clearly 

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing 

the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. Id. 

2 

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The benchmark question to be resolved in judging a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Norris 

v. State, 2013 Ark. 205,427 S.W.3d 626 (per curiam). We assess the effectiveness of counsel 

under a two-prong standard as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 

Wasl1ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Lowe v. State, 2012 Ark. 185, 423 S.W.3d 6 (per 

curi am). Under the Strickland test, a claimant must show that counsel's performance was 

deficient, and the claimant must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense to the extent that the appellant was deprived of a fair trial. Id. A claimant must satisfy 

both prongs of the test, and it is unnecessary to examine both components of the inquiry if 

the petitioner fails to satisfy either requirement. See Pennington v. State, 2013 Ark. 39 (per 

curiam) . 

A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance must first show that counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed to the petitioner by 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Walton v. State, 2013 Ark. 254, 

(per curiam). There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance, and an appellant has the burden of overcoming 

this presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions of trial counsel that when viewed 

from counsel's perspective at the time of the trial could not have been the result of 

reasonable professional judgment. Id. 

In order to meet the second prong of the test, a claimant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent 

3 

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counsel's errors. Delamar v. State, 2011 Ark. 87 (per curiam). A reasonable probability is a 

probability suffi cient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the tri al. Id. 

On appeal, Blackwell first argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

obtain a ruling from the circuit court on the use of nonpattern jury instructions at trial. She 

recognizes that her trial attorney made "extensive" arguments at trial concerning the 

instru ctions but asserts that she failed to obtain a ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. She 

claims that the verdict forms in the instructions were flawed because they did not have a 

place for the jury to indicate "not guilty" for felony negligent homicide and manslaughter. 

She asserts th at the instructions amounted to a fundamental structural error in the trial 

mechanism. The verdict forms submitted to the jury stated as follows: 

COUNT1 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Negligent Homicide (intoxication). 

FOREPERSON 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

FOREPERSON 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell not guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

FOR.EPERSON 

COUNT2 

We, the jury, find Juba Blackwell guilty of Manslaughter (recklessness). 

FOR.EPERSON 

We, th e jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

FOR.EPERSON 

4 

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We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell not guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

FOREPERSON 

We hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Blackwell was not 

entitl ed to postconviction relief under this claim. Blackwell incorrectly states that the circuit 

court made no ruling on her trial counsel's objection to the instructions. The trial record 

shows that the circuit court found that Blackwell's trial counsel had made a "good 

argument" concerning the instructions, but the court submitted the nonpattern instructions 

to the jury. Furth er, the court asked Blackwell's trial counsel whether she wanted to proffer 

her instructions, and she did. Thus, the trial court did make a ruling on the issue. 

Further, as to Blackwell 's argument that her counsel should have appealed the issue, 

she has failed to establish a meritorious issue that she could have appealed. A petitioner who 

claims that appellate counsel was ineffecti ve bears the burden of making a clear showing that 

counsel failed to raise some meritorious issue on appeal. Moore v . State, 2011 Ark. 269 (per 

curi am). The petitioner must show that there could have been a specific issue raised on 

appea l that would have resulted in the appellate court's declaring reversible error. Walton v. 

State, 2013 Ark . 254 (per curiam). 

In this case, Blackwell cl aims the instructions amounted to a fundamental structural 

defect in the trial, like the instructions in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). We 

disagree. In S11/livan, th e United States Supreme Court held that an erroneous instruction 

that misstated the State's burden of proof was a structural defect in the trial mechanism. Id. 

The Court reasoned th at, where th e jury convicts a defendant according to an erroneous 

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instruction abo ut the State's burden of proof, there has been no actual finding of guilty as 

required by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Here, Blackwell has not shown that the instructions 

misstated th e law such that there had been no actual finding of guilt. The verdict fom1s 

instru ct the jury to first consider the higher charge, then the lesser charge, and then provide 

the jury with the option to find Blackwell not guilty. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 

court did not clea rly err in findin g that Blackwell was not entitled to relief under this ground. 

Blackwell next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that her trial counsel was 

not in effective for failing to cross-examine former police officer Natasha Sims concerning 

her terminatio n from the Little Rock Police Department based on allegations of dishonesty. 

She points out that cru cial pieces of evidence at trial were her urine samples, which Sims 

took. She recognizes that her counsel attempted to question Sims about the allegations at a 

suppression hearing and that the circuit court instructed her not to question Sims about the 

all ega tions because Sims had appealed her termination. However, Blackwell claims that her 

trial counsel should have raised the issue at trial because, during questioning at trial, the State 

asked Sims why she had been terminated and Sims stated that she had appealed the 

termination. The circuit court found that Blackwell was not entitled to relief under this 

ground because Blackwell's trial counsel made a strategic decision not to cross-examine Sims 

about her termination. 

When a decision by counsel was a matter of trial tactics or strategy, and that decision 

is supported by reasonable professional judgment, then counsel's decision is not a basis for 

reli ef under Rule 37. 1. Adams v. State, 2013 Ark. 174, 427 S.W.3d 63. Counsel is allowed 

grea t leeway in making strategi c and tactical decisions. Leak v. State, 2011 Ark. 353 (per 

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curiam). In this case, counsel testified at the evidenti ary hearing that she "wrestled" with 

th e decision w hether to impeach Sims abo ut her terminati on but decided not to crossexamine her because the trial court had already stated that it would exclude that testimony. 

She further testifi ed that she had researched the status of Sims's appeal and determined that 

it was ongoing. Given this testimony, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in 

finding that counsel made a reasonable and professional decision not to question Sims about 

her termination . 

Blackwell next argu es that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 

dismiss either th e felon y negligent-homicide charge or the manslaughter charge because the 

charges violate her right against double jeopardy. When it is alleged that counsel was 

ineffective fo r the failure to make a motion or argument, the petitioner must show that the 

motion or argument would have bec>n meritorious because the failure to make an argument 

that is meritl ess is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, 433 

S. W. 3d 234. Thus, in this case, Blackwell must show that a double-jeopardy argument 

would have resulted in the dismissal of the charges for felony negligent homicide or 

manslaughter. 

Blackwell has failed to make that showing. She summarily asserts that her counsel 

should have moved to dismiss the charges because the charges violate double j eopardy, but 

she cites no auth ority in support of her argument. 1 "Conclusory statements in a [Rule 37] 

1 In her brief, Blackwell references footnote number fi ve in this court's opinion on 

the direct appeal of her convi ctions and claims that her convictions violate double jeopardy 

because this court found that her convictions violate doubl e j eopardy . She is mistaken. This 

court did not find that her convictions violate double jeopardy. Sec Blackwell v. State, 2015 

Ark. App. 96, 455 S.W .3d 848. 

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petition or in a brief on appeal are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel 

was effective." Ellis v. State, 2014 Ark. 24, at 3 (per curiam). W e do not research or develop 

arguments for appellants. Sims 11. State, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d 107. Moreover, the State 

correctly asserts in its brief that Blackwell's convictions do not violate double jeopardy 

because fe lony negligent homi cide requires the element of intoxication , w hich is not 

included in the definition of ma nslaughter. See Walker v. State, 2012 Ark. App . 61, at 5, 389 

S.W.3d 10, 13 ("Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 

~tatutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or 

o nly one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."). 

Accordingly, we find no merit here. 

Blackwell next argues that her counsel was ineffec ti ve for failing to protect her right 

to t1ial by an impartial jury. She points out that during the sentencing phase of trial, the 

State published a photograph to the jury of the victim donating a check to Arkansas 

C hildren 's Hospital and that a juror was in the picture. She asserts that her trial counsel 

should have moved for a mistrial as a result of the photo. 

The decision to accept or exclude a particular j uror may be a matter of trial strategy 

or technique. Butler v. State, 2011 Ark. 435 , 384 S.W.3d 526 (per curiam) . Further, as we 

have stated, counsel cannot be considered deficient for failing to make a meritless obj ection. 

Co11 /ey, 2014 Ark. 172, 433 S.W.3d 234. A mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy to be 

resorted to onl y w hen there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by 

continuing th e trial. See Ellis v. State, 20 14 Ark. 24 (per curiam); Green v. State, 2013 Ark. 

497,430 S.W.3d 729. 

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In this case, the trial record shows that after the court learned that the juror was in 

the photo, it call ed a recess and questioned the juror. The juror stated that she had been 

employed at Arkansas Children's Hospital for thirteen years, that she had worked with 

thousands of donors and volunteers, that she did not remember the picture, and that she 

could remain fair and impartial. At the evidentiary hearing, Blackwell's trial counsel testified 

that she was satisfi ed with the juror's response but that Blackwell insisted that she object to 

the juror's remaining on the panel and that she did object. However, the trial court 

overruled the objection. Trial counsel further stated that she did not move for a mistrial 

because the juror had no memory of the picture, which was more than ten years old. Given 

this evidence, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Blackwell's 

trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving for a mistrial based on the juror's presence 

in th e photo. 

Blackwell next argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the 

State's acquisition of her sealed medical and psychological records filed in a separate, civil 

case. The circuit court found that Blackwell had no relief under this claim because her 

counsel obj ected to the use of the records and the records were not used at trial. At the 

evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that when she learned that the State had obtained 

the records, she filed a motion in limjne to exclude the use of the records. Further, she 

explained that the records were not introduced at trial and that no witnesses testified about 

the records. 

We hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Blackwell's counsel 

was not ineffective for failing to appeal the State's acquisition of her medical and 

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psychological records. O nce aga in, J petitioner who claims that appellate counsel was 

ineffective bears the burden of making a clear showing that counsel failed to raise some 

meritorious iss ue on appeal. Moore, 20 11 Ark. 269. The petitioner must show that there 

could have been a specific issue raised on appeal that would have resulted in the appellate 

court's declaring reversible error. vValton, 20 13 Ark. 254. Blackwell has cited no authority 

showing that the State's acquisi tion of her records would have resulted in a reversible error. 

Accordingl y, there is no basis on which to grant postconviction reli ef on this claim. 

Blackwell lastly argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 

mistrial after the prosecutor made personal attacks on her counsel during closing remarks. 

She points out that the prosecutor made comments questioning her counsel's credibility 

su ch as that her "whole idea . . . her whole alternate theory is fantasy ." When it is alleged 

that counsel was ineffecti ve for the fa ilure to make a motion or argument, the petitioner 

must show that the motion or argument would have been meritorious because the failure 

to make an argument that is meritl ess is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Conley, 2014 

Ark. 172, 433 S.W.3d 234. ft is well settled that closing remarks that require reversal are 

rare and require an appeal to the jurors' passions. Wooten v. State, 2016 Ark. 376,502 S.W.3d 

503. Further, as we have stated, a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy to be resorted 

to only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by 

continuing the trial. See Ellis, 2014 Ark. 24; Green, 2013 Ark. 497, 430 S.W.3d 729. 

Blackwell has not shown the prosecutor's com ments warranted a mistrial. Accordingly, we 

hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Blackwell was not entitl ed to 

relief under this claim. 

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Affirmed . 

HIXSON and M URYHY , Jj. , agree. 

Montgo111 ery, Ada111s & Wyatt, PLC, by: Dale E. Adams, for appellant. 

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Bra d New111an, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee. 

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