Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00368/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00368-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TRACY DALE DATE,

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-368-PHX-MHM (LOA)

ORDER

Petitioner Tracy Dale Date (“Petitioner”), pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 20, 2007; the Petition raises 24

claims for relief. (Dkt. #1). The Court referred the matter to United States Magistrate

Judge Lawrence O. Anderson, who issued a 68-page Report and Recommendation on

July 22, 2008, recommending that the Court deny all 24 claims of Petitioner’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. #19). Petitioner filed a written objection to the Report and

Recommendation on September 19, 2008. (Dkt. #22).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review de novo the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court

must review de novo the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation for those

facts to which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court

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shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). “Failure to object to a

magistrate judge’s recommendation waives all objections to the judge’s findings of fact.” 

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility

of parole after serving 25 calendar years for conspiracy to commit first degree murder,

A.R.S. §§ 13-1003, 1105. (Dkt. #19, pp. 9-12). After direct appeal and post-conviction

review, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising 24 claims

for relief. (id., p.15). After reviewing the Petition, Respondents’ Answer, and

Petitioner’s Traverse, Magistrate Judge Anderson issued a detailed Report and

Recommendation, recommending that the Court deny the Petition. (id., p.68). Petitioner

subsequently objected to the Report and Recommendation on all 24 claims for relief in

his Petition. (Dkt. #22). 

In his objection, Petitioner simply restates most of his claims for relief and then

states that he objects to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his claims and relies on his

Traverse to the State’s Answer to his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (id.). 

However, Petitioner provides substantive objections with respect to two of his claims for

relief: (1) that his conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment because there was

insufficient evidence to prove that he and his co-conspirators intended to cause the death

of another person (Dkt. #22, pp. 2-7), and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective in

violation of the Sixth Amendment because he advised Petitioner that Petitioner could not

be found guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder based on conditional intent

(id., pp. 12-17). 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner makes a number of objections to Magistrate Judge Anderson’s Report

and Recommendation without giving any explanation as to why he believes that the

Magistrate Judge’s legal or factual analysis is incorrect. Specifically, Petitioner gives no

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explanation for his objections to Grounds II through X and Grounds XI(B) through

XXIV. After a thorough and independent review of those issues as presented, the Court

finds itself in agreement with Magistrate Judge Anderson’s Report and Recommendation. 

As such, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation on those claims without

further discussion and deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with respect

to Grounds II through X and XI(B) through XXIV. 

However, Petitioner substantively objects to the Magistrate Judge Anderson’s

Report and Recommendation on Grounds I and XI(A) in his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. As such, the Court will now turn to those claims for relief.

A. Ground I - Fourteenth Amendment

In Ground I of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner alleges that his

conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment because there was insufficient evidence to

prove that he and his co-conspirators intended to cause the death of another person. (Dkt.

#1, p.15). In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Anderson found that

Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is unexhausted and procedurally barred from

federal habeas review, and in the alternative fails on the merits because Petitioner has not

established that the state court’s resolution of his claim was contrary to or resulted in an

unreasonable application of federal law. (Dkt. #19, pp. 27, 31). 

Petitioner appears to concede that his claim is unexhausted and procedurally

barred from federal habeas review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Dkt. #22, p.2 (contending that he “meets both

prongs of ‘cause and prejudice’ as well as ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’”). As

discussed in the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner’s mere citation to the Fourteenth

Amendment on direct appeal was insufficient to exhaust the instant federal claim. See,

e.g., Sumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to

have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee”). In addition, the Court agrees

with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred from

federal habeas review; the Court disagrees with Petitioner’s assertion that “[i]t is a

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fundamental miscarriage of justice to affirm a conviction for conspiracy to commit first

degree murder based on something less than the required mens rea element of specific

intent in this case.” (Dkt. #22, p.2). However the Court will first turn to the merits of

Petitioner’s claim, and specifically Petitioner’s assertion that the Arizona Court of

Appeals’s use of Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), was “misplaced” and the

Court’s holding that conditional intent is sufficient to establish the mens rea for

conspiracy to commit first degree murder violates the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id., p.7). 

At the time of Petitioner’s trial, first degree murder under A.R.S. § 13-1105 was

considered a “specific intent” crime, requiring the specific intent to kill another person. 

See Dkt. #19, p.28; State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 32 (1995). However, Arizona courts

had not yet addressed the question of whether “conditional intent” was sufficient to

satisfy the mens rea requirement of a “specific intent” crime. See id. at p.29. The

Arizona Court of Appeals considered that question on appeal and relied on Holloway and

People v. Vandeliner, 481 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. 1992), to hold that Petitioner’s claim failed

because conditional intent was in fact sufficient under Arizona law to establish the mens

rea for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. See Dkt. #19, p.29. Petitioner argues

that Court of Appeals’s conclusion is based on an improper extension of the principle

espoused in Holloway and is contrary to the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Evanchyk

v. v. Stewart, 47 P.3d 1114 (Ariz. 2002). 

As the Magistrate Judge clearly stated, the appropriate standard of review

applicable to Petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief is whether the state court’s

adjudication of Petitioner’s federal claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

As such, to the extent that Petitioner challenges the Arizona Court of Appeals’s

application of state law, e.g., Evanchyk, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas

review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”).

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However, in rejecting Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Arizona

Court of Appeals also cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Holloway for the

proposition that “a defendant may not negate a proscribed intent by requiring a victim to

comply with a condition he has no right to impose; an intent to kill, in the alternative, is

nevertheless, an intent to kill.” 526 U.S. at 9. In Holloway, the Supreme Court found

that conditional intent satisfied the intent requirement in the federal car-jacking statute, 18

U.S.C. § 2119, which required the defendant to have the requisite intent to commit the

crime. Thus, because Arizona’s statute governing conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder also required the defendant to have the requisite intent to commit the crime, the

Arizona Court of Appeals drew an analogy between the two statutes to find that

conditional intent satisfied the intent requirement under A.R.S. § 13-1005. 

Despite Petitioner’s etymological foray into the uses and misuses of the word

“intent,” Petitioner offers no sufficient explanation for why the Arizona Court of

Appeals’s application of the principle espoused in Holloway to Arizona’s statute

governing conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was contrary to or resulted in an

unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner merely states that “Holloway is a

completed offense under a federal car-jacking statute (18 U.S.C. § 2119) whereas the

instant case is an Arizona conspiracy (a preparatory offense governed by A.R.S. § 13-

1003) (A.R.S. § 13-1105).” Dkt. #22, p.3. However, Petitioner appears to confuse mens

rea, the intent element, with actus reus, the objective element of a crime; the issue before

the Arizona Court of Appeals was whether “conditional intent” was sufficient to satisfy

the mens rea requirement of a “specific intent” crime. Petitioner cites the Court to no

authority to support his contention that the Arizona Court of Appeals’s citation to the

Supreme Court’s statement in Holloway resulted in an unreasonable application of federal

law. As such, the Court finds that even if Petitioner’s claim was not procedurally barred,

it would fail on the merits; the Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation.

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i. Procedural Bar

If a federal constitutional claim can no longer be in state court due to a failure to

follow the prescribed procedure for presenting such an issue, the claim is procedurally

barred and the petition must be denied. See Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th

Cir. 1991). As discussed above, and in the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner did

not present Ground I and most of his other federal claims to the state courts in a sufficient

manner, and any attempt to now return to state court to present those claims would be

futile because they would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. See Dkt. #19,

pp. 22-23, 63-68. Because Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim for relief in

Ground I, among others, he may not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See, e.g.,

Cook v. Schriro, 516 F.3d 802, 827-29 (9th Cir. 2008). 

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external

to the defense, such as interference by state officials, a showing that the factual or legal

basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel, impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. And to

establish “prejudice,” Petitioner must show actual harm resulting from a constitutional

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). However,

whether a petitioner fails to establish cause, the Court need not consider whether the

petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. 

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner argues that “cause” is shown here because of ineffective assistance of

counsel due to his appellate counsel’s failure to raise his Fourteenth Amendment claim on

direct appeal. However, before an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be

considered “cause” to excuse the procedural default of another constitutional claim, the

petitioner must have fairly presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state

court as an independent claim. But the record reflects that Petitioner did not properly

exhaust in state court a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

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raise his claim on direct appeal, and thus any deficiency in counsel’s representation

cannot excuse Petitioner’s procedural defaults on this claim. The Court agrees with the

Report and Recommendation.

Petitioner also argues that he is asserting a claim of actual innocence and has

satisfied the requirement to show a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dkt. #22, p.2. 

To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Petitioner must establish that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt in light of new evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

However, despite his assertions that failure to consider his claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner points to no newly discovered evidence

such that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Petitioner merely discusses the Arizona Court of Appeals’s alleged constitutional

violation, discussed above, of finding that “conditional intent” is sufficient to convict a

person of the crime of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Further, there is no

evidence that the jury convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit first degree murder

based solely on conditional intent. See Dkt. #19, p.63. As such, Petitioner has not

established a fundamental miscarriage of justice and shown that a constitutional violation

has occurred and resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. The Court

agrees with the Report and Recommendation.

B. Ground XI(A) - Sixth Amendment

This claim is properly before the Court on federal habeas corpus relief. See Dkt.

#19, p.57. In Ground XI(A) of his Petition, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was

ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment because counsel advised Petitioner that

he could not be found guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder based on

conditional intent. (Dkt. #19, p.57). Petitioner alleges that based on counsel’s erroneous

advice, he rejected the State’s plea offer, and had counsel correctly interpreted the law,

Petitioner “could have made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision whether or not

to proceed to trial and avoid a life sentence.” (Dkt. #1, p.15). 

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As Magistrate Judge Anderson detailed in his Report and Recommendation, to

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must establish that: (1) counsel’s

performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness and fell “outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance,” and (2) that counsel’s performance

prejudiced Petitioner by creating “a reasonable probability that absent the errors the fact

finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.”). 

To establish prejudice in the context of a plea offer, Petitioner must demonstrate

that “but for counsel’s error, he would have pleaded guilty and would not have insisted on

going to trial.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 879 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

Although Petitioner asserted in his Petition only that “[h]ad counsel correctly interpreted

the law, [he] could have made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision whether or

not to establish prejudice,” Dkt. #1, p.15, Petitioner now alleges in his objection to the

Report and Recommendation that he “most definitely would have signed a plea

agreement for a six year sentence to avoid being sentenced to life in prison had he been

properly informed by trial counsel that there was even the slightest possibility of a

conviction as to Count I.” Dkt. #22, p.17. But Strickland requires that a petitioner

establish a “reasonable probability” of prejudice, showing evidence “sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694. Here, Petitioner offers no

evidence other than his own self-serving statements that but for counsel’s failure to tell

him that there was some possibility that he could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit

first degree murder based on conditional intent, he would have pled guilty and not

insisted on going to trial. 

Still, Petitioner is correct that “in cases such as this where the question turns on the

motivation of the defendant – that is, what would the defendant have done if supplied

with accurate information – the amount of objective evidence will quite understandably

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be sparse.” Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1991). However, in

Lewandowski, the defendant had already initially entered a plea agreement, and then

withdrew his plea based on his counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. Id. at 888-89. 

The Sixth Circuit found that the fact that the defendant had already accepted a plea was

sufficient objective evidence to support his contention that but for his counsel’s error, he

would have pled guilty rather than insisted on going to trial. That is not the case here;

there is no evidence other than Petitioner’s own self-serving statement that he would have

accepted the plea had his counsel informed him of the possibility of conviction. In fact,

as the Magistrate Judge pointed out, Petitioner, in his Petition, merely stated that had

counsel informed him correctly, he could have made a knowing decision on whether or

not to proceed to trial. That statement belies Petitioner’s current insistence that he “most

definitely would have signed a plea agreement” but for counsel’s alleged error. As such,

the Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation and finds that Petitioner has not

established prejudice under Strickland v. Washington.

 Moreover, it is “universally recognized” that “an attorney is not liable for an error

of judgment on an unsettled proposition of law”; “giving . . . legal advice that later is

proven to be incorrect [ ] does not necessarily fall below the objective standard of

reasonableness.” Smith v. Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 154 (11h Cir. 1999). At the time of

Petitioner’s trial in 2001, Arizona courts had not addressed whether “conditional intent”

satisfied the mens rea of a “specific intent” crime, and the States that had addressed that

issue were split; Arizona law was unsettled on this issue. See Dkt. #19, pp. 60-61. As

such, counsel’s advice to Petitioner that he could not be found guilty of conspiracy to

commit first degree murder based on conditional intent in Arizona at that time did not fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id., pp. 61-62. The Court agrees with

the Report and Recommendation, see Dkt. #22, pp.60-62, and finds the counsel’s advice

to Petitioner did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections to Magistrate Judge

Anderson’s Report and Recommendation are overruled. (Dkt. #22).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation is adopted in its entirety. (Dkt. #19).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is DENIED. (Dkt. #1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 25th day of November, 2008.

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