Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-01150/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-01150-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DANIEL BRYAN KELLY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) 2:05-CV-1150-MHT-DRB

) [wo]

RICKY OWENS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

After considering all submissions on Defendant Randall W. Weaver, M.D.’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 57), the Magistrate Judge concludes that the Motion should be

GRANTED. 

I. Procedural Background

Daniel Bryan Kelly (“Kelly”) filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on December 6, 2005, alleging

inadequate medical care and physical abuse suffered as a pretrial detainee in the Coosa County Jail

from November 13, 2003 until January 16, 2004. Doctor Randall Weaver (“Dr. Weaver”) is sued

“individually and in his official capacity as medical doctor for Coosa County Jail.” Additional

defendants are Coosa County Sheriff Ricky Owens (“Sheriff Owens”), sheriff’s deputies Al Bradley

(“Dep. Bradley”), TerryWilson (“Dep.Wilson”), and Wendy Roberson (“Dep. Roberson”), and the

Coosa County Commission (“the Commission”). 

 For good cause, the court allowed Kelly to file the First Amended Complaint docketed on

May 22, 2006 (Doc. 42, “Complaint”). Dr. Weaver’ssummary judgmentmotion, filed June 30, 2006,

is supported by evidentiary exhibits and a memorandum brief (Doc. 58), as corrected (Doc. 62). He

asserts two grounds for summary judgment: statutory absolute immunity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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233(g), and the two-year statute of limitations for medical liability and 42U.S.C. § 1983 claims, §§

6-2-38(1) and 6-5-482 Ala.Code (1975). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition (Doc.63, Aug.7, 2006),

and Dr. Weaver responded with a Reply Memorandum (Doc. 64, Aug. 18, 2006).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.

P. 56 (c). The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, identifying those portions of” of the pleadings and

evidentiary record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A properly supported motion for summary

judgment “requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by... . affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file’, “designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial’.” Id.; See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2

F.3d 1112, 1116 (11 Cir. 1993)(explaining the evidentiary rebuttal required for issues on which the th

non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial).

The court’s role is neither to weigh the evidence nor to find the facts; instead, it is “the

threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, there

are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986). In doing so, the court must accept the evidence of the non-moving party as true, resolve

all doubts against the moving party, construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonCase 2:05-cv-01150-MHT-TFM Document 69 Filed 11/14/06 Page 2 of 15
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moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See Hunt v.

Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-55 (1999). 

III. Evidentiary Background 

A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint 

Kelly invokes federal question jurisdiction under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

of the United States Constitution (Counts I -V), and state court claims asserted in Counts VI-IX rest

on ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory

relief, injunctive relief, a reasonable attorneys’ fee, and costs. At this pre-discovery juncture an

overview of Kelly’s “allegations of fact” is a necessary framework for the claims on this motion for

summary judgment. 

When “placed as a pretrial detainee in the Coosa County Jail on November 13, 2003" (¶ 4),

Kelly and his parents told “the defendants” (not otherwise named) about his “extensive medical

history”:

that he suffered from a Bipolar disorder and had recently been in treatment for that;

that he was under medicationand under a doctor’s care for his bipolar condition; that

[he] had a history of lower back pain and a degenerative disc problem in his lower

back for which he had surgery; that [he] had a history of migraine headaches; that

[he] was on medication, without which he would suffer seizures. 

Kelly declares that the Sheriff and the named deputies “informed defendant Weaver of plaintiff’s

serious medical condition” and had him taken to Dr. Weaver, “on or about November 25, 2003, for

treatment of injury to his back and leg.”(¶ 5).

 Kelly suffered a fall on December 5, and after hospital treatment, he returned to jail, where

the Sheriff had him placed in a solitary cell known as “the hole.” Kelly’s constitutional claims target

deplorably unsanitary and dangerous conditions he endured inside the solitary cell from December

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6, 2003 until January 16, 2004 (see ¶¶ 10-15). He allegesthat Dr. Weaver, as well as all other named

defendants, “knew that [he] was suffering seizures and was confused and distressed . . . knew that

[he] was continually crying and begging for the attention of a doctor, but they did not provide him

the medical assistance he needed.” (¶ 16). Finally, on January 7, 2004, he was taken to see an

unnamed doctor, and transported on January 16, 2004, from the jail to Russell Hospital. Paragraphs

34 and 35 of the Complaint attribute to the Coosa County Commission the hiring of Dr. Weaver

“to provide medical treatment for inmates at the Coosa County jail” and claims, in pertinent part:

Defendant Weaver was aware of plaintiff’s serious medical condition. He had been

provided a summary of plaintiff’s medical condition. He also observed and treated

plaintiff when plaintiff was brought to his office.

Defendant Weaver was grossly incompetent in providing medical care to the plaintiff

and also chose an easier but less effective course for treating the plaintiff by sending

him back for confinement in the jail with no medical facilities and under the

observation of untrained personnel and having instructed untrained and

unsupervised personnel to give depression medication to plaintiff. Defendant Weaver

was responsible for prescribing medication which resulted in poisoning the plaintiff.

Kelly includes Dr. Weaver along with the Sheriff, sheriff’s deputies, and the Commission in federal

claims charging deliberate indifference to his medical needs (Counts I, II). In Count IX, Kelly

charges, in material part:

that defendant Coosa County Commission and defendant Randall Weaver owed

plaintiff a duty to provide medical treatment to the plaintiff. 

Defendants breached their duty when Weaver breached the standard of care required

of physicians by failing to adequately treat the plaintiff, but instead provided such

grossly incompetent treatment that plaintiff suffered seizures, pain, mental anguish,

drug poisoning, drug induced hepatitis, onset of his bipolar disorder, exacerbation of

his back injury, and post traumatic stress disorder.

(¶¶ 75-76).

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Kelly does not object that these exhibits lack the formal authentication generally 1

contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P.56(e). Indeed, he relies on the contents of Def.’s Ex. B in arguing for

discovery to evaluate whether the claimed statutory immunity coversmedical treatment of county jail

inmates. 

The notesinclude handwritten notes on a one-page form with the printed caption, “HSI Adult 2

Medicine Progress Note”, and four pages of handwritten notes on a form with the printed caption,

“Health Services, Inc. - Initial Pain Assessment Tool (Adult)”.

5

B. Movant’s Evidentiary Submissions 

Dr. Weaver submits three exhibits: his affidavit (Def.’s Ex A), an unauthenticated letter on

October 4, 1993, from an Assistant Surgeon General with the Health Resources and Services

Administration to the Chief Executive Officer of Health Services, Inc. (Def.’s Ex. B) and another

unauthenticated letter, dated March 6, 2003, from the Deputy Associate General Counsel for the

Department of Health & Human Services to a lawyer in the Justice Department. (Def.’s Ex. C).1

A physician with a family practice since August 1995, Dr. Weaver declares his employment

by Health Services, Inc., (“HSI”) “[f]rom on or about July 2001 through June 2004. . . to provide

medical services in Rockford and the surrounding area.” (Def.’s Ex. A at ¶5). He maintains that he

examined the plaintiff, as an HSI patient, on a single occasion – November 26, 2003 – in his office,

and he attaches five pages of medical records which “accurately reflect [his] examination.” Kelly 2

told him then “that he had a seizure in jail and suffered a fall”, and he “complained of pain in his

right leg, foot, and knee.” Dr. Weaver “never saw Mr. Kelly again.” (Def.’s Ex. A. at ¶6).

Additionally, the doctor declares under penalty of perjury:

I have never been employed by Coosa County or the Coosa County Commission to

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) provides: 3

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s

opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a

continuance to permit affidavitsto be obtained or depositionsto be taken or discovery

to be had or may make such other order as is just. 

6

provide medical services for inmates at the Coosa County jail.

I have never had any responsibility for conditions of confinement or medical services

at the Coosa County Jail.

(Def.’s Ex. A at ¶¶ 7, 8).

Def.’s Ex. B purports to document the status of Dr. Weaver’s employer, HSI, as “an employee

of the Federal Government for the purposes of Section 224(h) of the Public Health Service(PHS)

Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(h) as added by the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992

(P.L. 102-501.” Similarly, it confirms the status of HSI’s physician employees as federal employees

against whom claims “for medical and related functions” are governed exclusively by the Federal Tort

Claims Act. Def.’s Ex. C similarly purports to document Dr. Weaver’s determined status as “an

employee of the Public Health Service” entitled to representation by the Department of Justice on

Kelly’s claims in this specific lawsuit. 

C. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Submission in Opposition

In opposition to Dr. Weaver’s requested summary judgment, Kelly seeks to continue the

motion, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(f), in order to conduct discovery concerning Dr. Weaver’s 3

declarations of non-employment and non-responsibility for medical care to Coosa County’s jail

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Concerning Dr. Weaver’s responsibility, Mrs. Kelly declares: “When my son, Bryan, was 4

being held in the Coosa County Jail, I went and spoke with Wendy Roberson, an officer in the Coosa

County Jail, because I was concerned about my son’s health. She told me that the Coosa County Jail

had its own doctor and that was Dr. Weaver.” (Pl.’s Ex. A).

 Mr. Kelly summarizes his pertinent knowledge as follows:

When my son, Bryan was being held in the Coosa County Jail, in November 2003,

December 2003, and January 2004 I was concerned that he was not getting adequate

medical treatment so I went to the jail and talked to the jail personnel about it.

Wendy Roberson, an officer in the Coosa County Jail, told me that the Coosa County

Jail had its own doctor and that was Dr. Weaver. She also told me that Dr. Weaver

was the doctor who was prescribing medications. 

(Pl.’s Ex. B).

7

inmates at the time of his pretrial detention. Kelly submits affidavits from his parents, Wanda Kelly

and Roy Kelly (Pl.’s Exs. A and B) “that they were told by Wendy Roberson, an officer in the Coosa

County Jail, that the Coosa County Jail had its own doctor, Dr. Weaver, and that Dr. Weaver was

the doctor that was prescribing medications.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition, Doc. 63, at 102, hereinafter Pl.’s

Br.) By his own affidavit, Kelly’s counsel highlights the absence of any discovery at all in this 4

litigation once defendants responded to the complaint with dismissal motions, and he specifies the

necessary discovery, in pertinent part, as follows:

In order to be able to adequately address Defendant Dr. Weaver’s claim that he is

entitled to immunity 42 U.S.C.§ 233 Plaintiff will need discovery from Defendant Dr.

Weaver, Defendant Coosa County, Defendant Roberson, Defendant Owens and

Defendant Dr. Weaver with respect to whether or not Defendant Dr. Weaver was the

jail doctor. 

[W]here the doctor has worked outside the scope of his employment with the public

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health service [that] he is not entitled to immunity under 42 U.S.C.§ 233. Plaintiff

needs to explore in discovery the range of the immunity offered under the Health

Services, Inc., contract with Defendant Dr. Weaver. . . Plaintiff needs to take

discovery as to whether or not the treatment of county jail employees is covered

within this contract. 

Plaintiff will also need discovery with respect to Dr. Weaver’s assertion of his statute

of limitations defense . . .[including] discovery as to the ongoing nature of Dr.

Weaver’s treatment and/or failure to treat Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. . .,

discovery on the role of Defendant Dr. Weaver in the prescription of medication for

Plaintiff that resulted in his poisoning, as well as what follow-up he had regarding

administration of medication to the Plaintiff, as well as what other roles Dr. Weaver

had undertaken with regard to the Coosa County Jail.

 

(Pl.’s Ex. C at 2-5).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Contentions

In reliance on his evidentiary exhibits, Kelly submits that requested discovery “will allow him

to show that there is a dispute with regard to the relevant facts” underlying Dr. Weaver’s asserted

immunity and statute of limitations defenses. Because immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 233 requires a

covered physician to act within the line and scope of his employment, Kelly argues that discovery

“may well show that [Dr. Weaver’s] treatment of the Plaintiff did not fall within the scope of [his]

employment under his contract with Health Services, Inc.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5). Specifically, he suggests

the absence of statutory immunity for Dr.Weaver’streatment of county jail inmates, pursuantto the

following-described limits described in pertinent part by Def.’s Ex. B: 

All officers, employees, and fulltime contractors [] ofthis grantee who are physicians

. . . and who are providing services under the scope of activities covered by the project

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funded through its Section 329 (migrant health centers), Section 330 (community

health centers), Section 340 (health services for the homeless), or Section 340A

(health services for residents of public housing) grant(s) are also deemed to be

employees of the Federal Government for the purposes of section 224, . . .

Subrecipients listed as eligible for FTCA coverage by the grantee will be deemed

eligible only for carrying out those grant-related activities designated as being within

the scope of their contract. 

Moreover, citing Dedrick v. Youngblood, 200 F.3d 744, 746 (11 Cir. 2000), Kelly challenges th

Dr. Weaver’s claimed entitlement to 42 U. S. C §233 immunity for the constitutional torts asserted

in Counts I and II, and suggests his need fo discovery “to show that [his] actions fall outside the area

of negligence and outside [his] scope of employment in his contract with Health Services, Inc.” (Pl.’s

Br. at 9). In response to Dr. Weaver’s “statute of limitations” defense, Kelly “submits that through

discovery Plaintiff expects to establish facts that show that Plaintiff’s medical condition was severe

and continuing, and that denial of treatment, or inadequate treatment came under Dr. Weaver’s

responsibility as jail doctor for inmates in the Coosa County Jail. (Pl.’s Br. at 10).

Dr. Weaver’s Reply Memorandum (“Reply Br.”) objects to any Rule 56(f) continuance for

discovery

because the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) determination that

Dr. Weaver was a deemed employee of the Publish Health Service (PHS) when he

treated plaintiff is final and binding on all parties to this litigation 42 U.S.C. 233

(g)(1)(F). Accordingly, all of the discovery plaintiff seeks in an attempt to establish

that Dr. Weaver was in fact employed as the doctor the Coosa County jail is entirely

irrelevant because HHS’s deeming determination is not subject to judicialreview. Id.

As a deemed PHS physician, Dr. Weaver is entitled to absolute immunity from all

claims arising from his performance of medical or related functions. 42 U.S.C. §233

(g) (a). Plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy for Dr. Weaver’s alleged acts or

omissions is an action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims

Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C.§§1346(b), 2671-2680. 42 U.S.C § 233 (g) (1)(A). His

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Whether to grant or deny a Rule 56(f) postponement is committed to the district court’s 5

discretion, and the court must balance the movant’s need for the requested discovery against the

burden the discoveryand delay will place on the opposing party. See Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157

F.3d 1271, 1280 (11 Cir. 1998). Sufficient reasons to reject a Rule 56(f) motion include mere th

speculation as to what may be discovered, the irrelevance of the information sought to be discovered,

and a summary judgment record which indicates that further discovery is not likely to produce facts

needed to defeat the motion. 11 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.10[8][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.).

10

claims against Dr. Weaver fail as a matter of law. 

(Def.’s Reply Br. at 1-2, emphasis in original).

B. Analysis

Dr. Weaver’s statutory immunity is due to be honored on this summary judgment record

because no genuine factual issue exists and controlling law establishes his entitlement to the claimed

immunity. No Rule 56(f) continuance is warranted because it is clear that the requested discovery

will not preclude the entry of summary judgment. 

5

The controlling issue of fact is Dr. Weaver’s status at the time he rendered any medical

services to Kelly – whether a Public Health Service (“PHS”) physician or a doctor employed by Coosa

County for its inmates’ medical care. Dr. Weaver documents his claimed status with sworn

testimony of his employment by Health Services, Inc., indisputably a PHS contractor, when he

examined Kelly on November 26, 2003 , along with his authenticated, contemporaneously prepared

medical records, prepared on HSI forms. 

 In addition to his testimony, Dr. Weaver submits without opposition “official”

documentation that (a) the Federal Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for claims against HSI

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physicians for their medical and related functions (Def.’s Ex. B), and (b) “the Department of Health

and Human Services has deemed Dr. Weaver to be an employee of the Public Health Service

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 233(g) as to all three counts against him” in this lawsuit. (Def.’s Ex. C). In

granting Dr. Weaver’s request for legal representation by the United States, the Department’s

presumptively authorized counsel advised the U.S. Department of Justice, in pertinent part:

Although the complaint ... contains two counts alleging that the physician violated

the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, these allegations arise out of “the performance of

medical ... or related functions ...by...employee[s] of the Public Health Service while

acting within the scope of [their] office or employment.” 42 U.S.C § 233(a).

***

Although the complaint allegesthat Dr. Weaver was employed by the Coosa County

Commission and was acting in his official capacity as the medical doctor for the

Coosa County Jail, Dr. Weaver was not a county employee when he treated the

plaintiff on November 26, 2003. Rather, as the attached documentation shows, Dr.

Weaver was employed by Health Services, Inc. (“health center”) when he treated

plaintiff on that date. . . Plaintiff was transported by jail personnel to the health

center’s clinic in Autaugaville, Alabama, where he was seen by Dr. Weaver. . . [T]he

health center’s Autaugaville clinic is within the scope of the funding grant issued

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 254b. ....

Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Weaver is one of medical malpractice, but only Count IX

is plead as a standard negligence claim, while Courts I and II allege that Dr. Weaver

violated plaintiff’s rights under the U.S. Constitution to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment. [ ] Nonetheless, all three counts arise from the performance of

medical or related functions, i.e., Dr. Weaver’s treatment of plaintiff’s leg. For this

reason, the Department of Health and Human Services has deemed Dr. Weaver to

be an employee of the Public Health Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 233(g) as to all

three counts against him. 

Based on our review of the medical records and Dr. Weaver’s statements . . ., we are

satisfied that Dr. Weaver was acting within the scope of his deemed federal

employment in connection with this matter.

(Def.’s Ex. C)(emphasis added).

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In response to this documented fact of Dr. Weaver’s deemed status as a federally employed

physician, Kelly offers only speculation– fueled by his parents’ testimony of their understanding from

a deputy sheriff also sued – that Dr. Weaver’s undisputed evidentiary submissions should not be

accepted but instead tested by further discovery. No affidavit from the deputy sheriff supports the

representations attributed to her. No direct or otherwise credible evidence indicates that Dr. Weaver

examined, treated, or prescribed medicines for, Kelly on any specific occasion after November 26,

2003. Nor does Kelly provide an evidentiary submission from an authorized spokesman for the Coosa

County Jail or the Coosa County Commission, or from the Sheriff or a Commissioner, which would

be probative of Deputy Sheriff Roberson’s purported identification of Dr. Weaver as the Coosa

County Jail’s physician and/or the doctor who prescribed medicines or otherwise treated him after

November 26, 2003.

 Kelly seeks a chance to challenge the federal government’s unconditional determination of

Dr. Weaver’s status entitling him to statutory immunity in this action. In sum, Kelly urges the court

to ignore evidence because he is unable to discredit it and, instead, to permit him to engage in

discovery. The requested discovery, however, is fueled only by the speculative opinions of persons

having no supervisory or official roles in deciding either the physicians Coosa County hired to

provide inmate medical care or the physicians the federal government can deem to be federal

physicians entitled to statutory immunity. The court’s decision favoring the undisputed evidence

warrants little discussion.

Because the record is clear regarding Dr. Weaver’s status when he did provide medical

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services to Kelly, the courtis bound to apply the controlling law giving final and binding effect to this

factual determination: 

Once the Secretary makes a determination that an entity or an officer, governing

board member, employee, or contractor of an entity is deemed to be an employee of

the Public Health Service for purposes of this section, the determination shall be

final and binding upon the Secretary and the Attorney General and other parties

to any civil action or proceeding. Except as provided in subsection (i), the Secretary

and the Attorney General may not determine that the provision of services which are

the subject of such a determination are not covered under this section.

42 U.S.C. § 233 (g)(1)(F)(emphasis added); see Brown v. Health Services, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 518, 521

(M.D. Ala. 1997) (“The statute does not provide for judicial review of the individual administrative

decisions which culminate in FTCA protection. Instead,the statute provides, in clear language that

the FTCA ‘shall be exclusive of any other civil remedy’”.); see also Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F. 3d

1290, 1294 (11 Cir. 2003)(“In order to be covered under the FTCA, an entity, an employee of the th

entity, or a contractor of the entity seeking coverage must be deemed an employee of PHS.”)

This court thus concludes that Dr. Weaver has established his entitlement to summary

judgment by demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute on the determinative fact – his status

as a “deemed” Public Health Service physician when he provided medical services to Kelly – along

with the clearly controlling law which insulates him from liability in this action. Because Dr.

Weaver’s submissions also document November 26, 2003, as the only occasion for his medical

examination of Kelly, he has also established that any valid claim asserted in this action filed on

December 6, 2005, would be barred by the statute of limitations if re-filed under the Federal Tort

Claims Act. Kelly’s suggestion of a “continuing duty” by Dr. Weaver to serve his medical needs is

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simply unsupported by any basis in fact or law. 

V. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, it is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 

1. that Plaintiff Kelly’s request at ¶ 3 of his Opposition (Doc. 63), construed as a Motion, for

a Rule 56(f) stay of Dr. Weaver’s summary judgment motion in order to conduct limited discovery

be DENIED; and 

2. that Defendant Randall W. Weaver, M.D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) be

GRANTED with respect to the purported federal claims asserted against him in Counts I and II, and

the purported state claims asserted in Count IX. 

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said

Recommendation not later than November 28, 2006. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties

are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the Magistrate

Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

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issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE THIS 14 day of November, 2006. th

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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