Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00004/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Franklin Adakai, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Salt River Project Agricultural

Improvement and Power District, a quasimunicipal corporation of the State of

Arizona,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV-03-0004-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently, before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Clarification and in the

Alternative Motion for Reconsideration. (Dkt. #121). Having reviewed the pleadings, the

Court issues the following Order.

I. Background

On August 29, 2005, this Court issued its Order denying Plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment. (Dkt. #115). Moreover, the Court denied in part and granted in part

Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Defendant's motion for summary

judgment was denied as to Plaintiff's Title VII claims set forth in Counts I (Retaliation) and

II (Discrimination) and granted with respect to Count III (Harassment). In Section III(A) of

the Order, the Court specifically addressed the Retaliation claim. The Court noted on page

4 that "[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show: 1) he

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engaged in protected activity; 2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and 3) there

was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse decision." Villiarimo v.

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court went on to address

these elements individually. With respect to the first element of "protected activity," the

Court, after distinguishing the facts presented in O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopters

Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) and Kaplan v. City of Arlington, 184 F. Supp.2d 553,

561 (N.D. Tex. 2002), held that "Plaintiff's complaints are neither as voluminous nor as

consistently hostile as those in Kaplan and, therefore, constitute protected activity." (August

29, 2005 Order, page 6). 

Defendant, now, moves this Court, some two and one-half months after the Court's

Order, for clarification or in the alternative for reconsideration of the above quoted statement

appearing on page 6 of the Court's Order. Specifically, Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff's

reliance on the statement as authority from this Court that Plaintiff's actions with respect to

his claim of Retaliation is deemed to be "protected activity" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

as a matter of law. The Court, although it believes its original Order was clear, will clarify

for the parties its position that Plaintiff's actions with respect to his Retaliation claim are

deemed to be "protected activity" as a matter of law and that reconsideration of this holding

is unnecessary.

II. Discussion

A. Timeliness

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff notes that Defendant's pending motion was filed

approximately two and one-half months after the Court's Order addressing this issue. Local

Rule 7.2(g) of the Arizona District Court Local Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "any

motion for reconsideration shall be filed no later than ten (10) days after the filing of the

Order that is the subject of the motion." As such, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's motion

should be denied on this basis alone. Plaintiff''s position is well taken; however in the

interest of clarifying any ambiguity of the Court's previous Order and in light of the pending

trial in this matter, the Court will review Defendant's motion.

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B. This Court Held That Plaintiff's Actions Constitute "Protected Activity"

As A Matter Of Law. 

As Plaintiff notes in his Responsive brief to the Court, there are several instances in

which the Court made clear its determination that Plaintiff's conduct with respect to his

Retaliation claim was deemed to be "protected activity" as a matter of law. 

First, as noted above, on page 6 of the Order, the Court stated, "Plaintiff's complaints

are neither as voluminous nor as consistently hostile as those in Kaplan and, therefore,

constitute protected activity." Second, the Court stated, in addressing the issue of causation

that, "[t]hirdly, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding a causal link between

Plaintiff engaging in protecting activity and the adverse employment actions." Moreover,

in the same analysis, the Court concluded, "[t]hus, there is an inference of retaliation between

the adverse employment decisions followed 'on the heels' of Plaintiff's protected activity."

These statements, by clear inference, demonstrate that the Court finds Plaintiff's conduct at

issue of filing complaints to supervisors, human resources and labor organizations addressing

perceived discrimination by Defendant to be "protected activity" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a). 

C. Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration

Defendant argues that even if the Court ruled that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's

activity constituted "protected activity" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), that the Court should

reconsider its position. Defendant argues that because the determination regarding the

employee's opposition to unlawful discrimination involves a determination of

"reasonableness" "it necessarily involves a fact determination which is generally the province

of the jury to make." (Defendant's Motion, page 2). Specifically, Defendant cites Wrighten

v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir .1984) for the proposition that

the determination of whether the employee engaged in "protected activity" is "essentially a

factual one..." However, Defendant's reliance on Wrighten is not persuasive and does not

suggest that the Court should reconsider its position. Although the determination of

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1

The Court expressly distinguished the holdings in O'Day and Kaplan in making its

determination that Plaintiff's complaints constitute protected activity. 

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"protected activity" involves a fact determination there is ample authority demonstrating

instances in which courts have made this determination, as a matter of law. For instance, as

Defendant fails to note, in Wrighten, the Ninth Circuit after stating that the determination of

reasonableness is factual went on to reverse the trial court's determination and held that the

plaintiff's actions did not exceed the protection of § 2000(e)(3). Id. at 1355. Conversely, in

situations in which the evidence clearly demonstrates actions of unprotected activity, a court

may conclude as a matter of law that the disputed activity is not protected under §

2000(e)(3)'s opposition clause. For instance, as the Court notes in its order, in Kaplan v. City

of Arlington, 184 F. Supp.2d 553, 565 (N.D. Tex. 2002) the district court held that the

plaintiff's conduct of filing numerous and hostile grievances and refusal to participate in the

investigation was not protected activity. Moreover, in O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas

Heliopters Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) the Ninth Circuit in balancing the purpose

of the Title VII "to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing discrimination

against Congress' equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of the employer" held that the

plaintiff's conduct of stealing documents from his employer constituted a serious breach of

trust and was not "protected activity."1

 The above authority exemplifies that courts are

permitted to make the determination of "protected activity." As such, the Court was

permitted to conclude, as a matter of law, that the employee's conduct constitutes "protected

activity." 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Defendant's Motion for Clarification and in the

Alternative Motion for Reconsideration. (Dkt. #121). 

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DATED this 16th day of December, 2005.

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