Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00006/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Hermon Shead,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O Vong, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-CV-00006-OWW-SMS PC 

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO BE

COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Hermon Shead (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law. Plaintiff

filed this action January 5, 2009. A previous lawsuit arising from the same incident was

dismissed June 26, 2007, for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust prison appeals.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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28 Bradford’s name is included within the body of Plaintiff’s Complaint but is omitted from the caption. 1

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, supra, 534 U.S. at 512. A court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts

that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a

plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the

claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001)). However, “the

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union

Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Claim

A. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff was injured when he experienced a diabetic seizure at the Pleasant Valley State

Prison (PVSP), Coalinga, California, where Plaintiff is currently housed. Plaintiff seeks a

declaratory judgment and money damages for violations of his rights under the First and Eighth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff names as defendants Correctional

Officer Vong, Sgt. Fogle, and Sgt. M. Bradford, all of whom are employed at PVSP, and P.D. 1

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Vera, an appeals examiner for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR).

On July 3, 2007, Plaintiff, a diabetic, experienced a severe hypoglycemic seizure as a

result of low blood sugar. In the course of the seizure, Plaintiff became unconscious, incurred lip

and mouth injuries requiring stitches, and lost his front teeth. Plaintiff continues to suffer head

pain, which he attributes to his injuries. Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused when C/O

Vong struck him in the face with a billy club and that Sgt. Fogle, Sgt. Bradford, and appeals

examiner Vera conspired to cover up Vong’s misconduct in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing a

complaint against Vong. 

B. Eighth Amendment Claim: Excessive Use of Force.

Plaintiff contends that Vong’s striking him in the face with a billy club while Plaintiff

was suffering a diabetic seizure was an excessive use of force, particularly in light of the

presence of medical personnel, Plaintiff’s apparent medical condition, and Vong’s knowledge of

Plaintiff’s diabetes. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002).

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

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marks and citations omitted). This test is appropriately applied when the allegations of excessive

force arise from the defendant’s attempts to subdue an inmate to enable administration of

necessary medical treatment. Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 104 (2d. Cir. 1993). 

Under federal notice pleading standards, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a

claim against defendant Vong. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Swierkiewicz, supra, 534 U.S. at 512-15;

Austin, supra, 367 F.3d at 1171; Jackson, supra, 353 F.3d at 754; Galbraith v. County of Santa

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). 

C. First Amendment Claim: Retaliation

Plaintiff contends that, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of his First and Eighth

Amendment rights to file a prison grievance, Defendants Fogle, Bradford and Vera conspired to

maintain silence and cover up Vong’s excessive use of force on Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s

diabetic seizure through false accounts of the circumstances in which Plaintiff was injured and

the suppression of the statements of prisoners who witnessed the incident. According to

Plaintiff, these defendants’ actions had a chilling effect on the use of the grievance system. 

Plaintiff alleges no facts supporting his allegations that Defendants Fogle, Bradford and

Vera conspired to falsify or withhold evidence or that they did falsify or withhold evidence. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations rest solely on the failure of the grievance procedure to reach a

conclusion favorable to Plaintiff. Nothing in Plaintiff’s allegations supports his assertions that

the conspiracy or falsification or withholding of evidence was motivated by the defendants’

desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for his filing of a grievance in this matter.

Characterizing Plaintiff’s disappointment in the outcome of the grievance process as

retaliation is like forcing a square peg into a round hole. The conduct of the grievance hearings

simply does not fit within the confines of a retaliation claim. Plaintiff’s claim more appropriately

fits the category of due process, but Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to state a due process

claim either. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To state a cause of action for

deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for

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which the protection is sought. “[S]tates may under certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84

(1995). Liberty interests created by state laws are generally limited to freedom from restraint

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484.

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8 Cir. 1993), th

quoting Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See also Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9 Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom, McEnroe v. Ramirez, 541 U.S. 1063 th

(2004) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7 Cir. 2001)(existence of grievance th

procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9 Cir. th

1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (no claim of entitlement to grievance procedure). 

Accordingly, grievance procedures do not create any liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause. Spencer v. Moore, 638 F.Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986);

Azeez, supra, 568 F. Supp. at 10. In a grievance proceeding, a prisoner is not entitled to an

opportunity to present witnesses. Jordan v. Veal, __ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 607414 (E.D. Cal.

March 9, 2009), quoting Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9 Cir. 1986), cert. th

denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, supra, 515 U.S.

472.

Nor can liability in a §1983 action be based on the actions of prison personnel in

reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal. Buckley, supra, 997 F.2d at 495. Assuming that

Plaintiff’s underlying complaint, the alleged beating by Vong, gives rise to a Constitutional

violation, a hearing officer or other person does not also violate the Constitution by failing to

acknowledge and cure it. “A guard who stands and watches while another guard beats a prisoner

violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act

of misconduct does not.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7 Cir. 2007). See also

th

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7 Cir. 2005) (complaint examiners who process and th

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investigate plaintiffs’ grievances not liable); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7 Cir. th

1999) (supervisors who negligently fail to detect and prevent misconduct not constitutionally

liable); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997) th

(individual only liable if he caused or participated in constitutional violation).

Plaintiff’s contention that the outcome of the grievance process resulted from a

conspiracy between Defendants Fogle, Bradford, and Vera does not save his claim. A conspiracy

claim brought under §1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate

constitutional rights,” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9 Cir. 2001), quoting United Steel th

Workers of Amer. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 th

U.S. 809 (1989) (citation omitted), as well as an “actual deprivation of constitutional rights

resulting from the alleged conspiracy.” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9 Cir. 2006), th

quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9 Cir. 1989). “To be th

liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each

participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, supra, 312

F.3d at 441, quoting United Steel Workers, supra, 865 F.2d at 1541. Plaintiff alleges nothing

that tends to support the existence of the alleged conspiracy other than the unfavorable outcome

of the grievance procedure. 

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a heightened

pleading standard to Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of

San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9 Cir. 2005); Galbraith, supra, 307 F.3d at 1126. th

Although accepted as true, “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action.” Id. at 555-56 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A bare allegation that

defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights is not sufficient to establish a

conspiracy claim under §1983. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not established a claim for

violation of due process or conspiracy arising from the prison grievance procedure, his second

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claim does not state a cause of action.

D. Supplemental State Claims

In his Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiff re-alleges the factual bases for his first two claims,

contending that they also constitute violations of the California Constitution, statutes and

regulations. 

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Hydrick

v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9 Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. th

January 17, 2008) (No. 07-958); Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9 Cir. th

2007); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9 Cir. 2001); Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 th

F.3d 1385, 1391 (9 Cir. 1997); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9 Cir. th th

1996); Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981). See th

also Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 921 (9 Cir. 1986); Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, th

1207 (9 Cir. 2007). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), however, in any civil action in which the th

district court has original jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over

all other claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case

or controversy under Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial

power exists under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under

1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9 Cir. 1997). “The th

district court my decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)

if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed

before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers, supra, 383

U.S. at 726.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for excessive force, this court

may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims relating to Vong’s alleged

use of excessive force. Plaintiff alleges that, in beating Plaintiff, Vong ‘breached his affirmative

duty by using unnecessary force when Plaintiff was no threat to him, and also failed to exercise

due care in violation of CCR Title 15, Sec. 3286(b) and CC sec. 43 & Article I sec. 17 of the Cal.

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Const. See also Govn’t Code 815.6 and 820.4.” 

Nonetheless, most of Plaintiff’s state claims do not offer relief. No private cause of

action exists for damages under California Constitution, Art. I §17 (the cruel and unusual

punishment clause). Giraldo v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 389-

90(Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Because Cal. Gov’t Code §815.6 applies solely to governmental entities,

none of which is named as a defendant in this case, §815.6 does not provide relief in this case. 

See Davis v. Kissinger, 2009 WL 256574, n. 4 (E.D.Cal. February 3, 2009), report &

recommendation adopted, 2009WL647350 (E.D.Cal. March 10, 2009). Similarly, no

independent cause of action exists for actions pursuant to the California Code of Regulations,

such as Plaintiff’s claims under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §23268(b). Ibid.

Cal. Civil Code §43 sets forth a statement of general personal rights and creates a

statutory rubric from which personal tort actions spring. To establish a claim of assault and

battery on a public official, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant touched the plaintiff,

intending to harm him, (2) that the plaintiff did not consent to be touched, (3) that the plaintiff

was injured by the defendant’s touch, and (4) that the officer used excessive force. Boyd v. City

of Oakland, 458 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1051-52 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Edson v. City of Anaheim, 74

Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). As with the policeman in Edson, whether a

corrections officer used excessive force must be viewed in the context of his job responsibilities,

including the requirement that he use force as part of his duty and the necessity that the officer

must retain control and make “split-second judgments.” Ibid.

Since a corrections officer is a state employee, any tort action against him must proceed

pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act (Cal. Gov’t Code §810 et seq.). Provided that he has

satisfied all requirements precedent to an action under the Act,` Plaintiff’s claims under Cal.

Gov’t Code §820.4 are cognizable by this court under its supplementary jurisdiction. Section

820.4 generally provides discretionary immunity to public employees exercising due care in the

execution or enforcement of any law, but it does not “exonerate a public employee from liability

for false arrest or false imprisonment.” Nor is immunity available if a police officer used

unreasonable force. Scruggs v. Haynes, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). Whether

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the public employee acted with due care is a question of material fact. Ogborn v. City of

Lancaster, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Accordingly, Plaintiff may pursue

claims under the California Tort Claims Act if he amends this count to include allegations

indicating that he has satisfied all requirements, including notice requirements, necessary to bring

an action under it.

None of Plaintiff’s state claims against Defendants Fogel, Bradford and Vera can be

brought within the federal court’s supplementary jurisdiction. “Retaliation” and “malfeasance”

are not legally cognizable torts. No possible interpretation of the conspiracy and retaliation facts

that Plaintiff alleges constitute a tort that falls within the exceptions to Cal. Gov’t Code §820.4: 

false arrest, false imprisonment, or the use of excessive force. Only against Vong has Plaintiff

alleged a cause of action under California law over which this court may exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction.

E. Claim for Declaratory Relief

In addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment. “A case or

controversy exists justifying declaratory relief only when the challenged government activity is

not contingent, has not evaporated or disappeared, and by its continuing and brooding presence,

casts what may well be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.”

Feldman v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 642 (9 Cir. 2008) (quoting Headwaters, Inc., v. Bureau of th

Land Mgmt., Medford Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9 Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citation th

omitted)). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in

clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief

from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. State of Wash., 759

F.2d 1353, 1357 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985) (citations omitted). th

In this instance, Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. Should Plaintiff file an amended

complaint and thereafter prevail on his claims, he is entitled to money damages. A declaratory

judgment would serve no useful purpose and would not terminate the proceedings. Therefore, this

action should proceed as one for damages only.

F. Appointment of Counsel

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Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that

district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. 

Mallard v. U. S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain

exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn in

part, on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999). Without a

reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, this court will seek volunteer counsel

only in the most serious and exceptional cases. 

In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. See

Rand, supra,113 F.3d at 1525. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law

and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is

not exceptional. This court is faced with similar cases almost daily. Therefore, Plaintiff's request

for the appointment of counsel shall be, and is hereby ordered to be, denied.

H. Official Capacity Damages Under Section 1983

Plaintiff alleges that he is seeking to impose liability on Defendants in their individual and

official capacities. While Plaintiff may seek damages against Defendants in their personal

capacities, his official claims are precluded by the Eleventh Amendment, which “bars suits for

money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official

capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 11457 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, ___

th

U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 441 (2007) (citations omitted); see also Hydrick, supra, 500 F.3d at 986-87. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity damages claim fails as a matter of law.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states claims under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Vong

for use of excessive force in the course of subduing Plaintiff during his diabetic seizure. Provided

that Plaintiff amends his complaint to allege facts establishing his compliance with the procedural

prerequisites for maintaining an action under the California Tort Claims law, this court may

exercise supplemental jurisdiction on that claim as well. As alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s federal

and state claims against the remaining three defendants, Fogel, Bradford and Vera, are not

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cognizable before this court.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing

the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th

Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his

amended complaint. George, supra, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only

on his federal claim against Vong, Plaintiff may so notify the court in writing, and the court will

issue a recommendation for dismissal from this action of Plaintiff’s second and third claims. The

court will then forward to Plaintiff one summons and one USM-285 form for completion and

return. Upon receipt of the forms, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate

service of process.

In the event that Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff is advised that an

amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467,

1474 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,”

Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint

which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, supra, 814 F.2d at 567;

accord Forsyth, supra, 114 F.3d at 1474. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against Defendant Vong on his

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

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to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2009 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00006-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 04/06/09 Page 12 of 12