Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01390/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01390-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:0552pa Right to Privacy Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY ATKINS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv1390-GPC-WVG

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT

[DKT. NO. 4]

vs.

RAYMOND E. MABUS, SECRETARY OF

THE NAVY

Defendant.

On August 27, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to

state a claim. (Dkt. No. 4.) For the reasons set out below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s

motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present action under the Federal Privacy Act against

Raymond Mabus, Secretary of the Department of the Navy, alleging improper dissemination of his

medical records. 5 U.S.C. §552(a). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff is the head of the Professional Development

at the Naval Medical Center San Diego (“NMCSD”). Plaintiff was also a patient of NMCSD, as he

also utilized the hospital for his medical needs. According to Plaintiff, around June 24, 2010, Plaintiff

asked Lieutenant Commander Simons (“LCDR Simons”), the Division Officer for the Life

Support/Trauma at NMCSD, a question regarding how a co-worker could access acupuncture

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treatment at NMCSD. Simons responded, “out of the blue, that acupuncture was also ‘good for

counts.’” Plaintiff alleges that “there would be no reason for Simonsto make this comment other than

if he were accessing Plaintiff’s medical records and therefore aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition.”

(Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that this knowledge could have come through a different source,

specifically from Spencer Dice, who could have disclosed the information to Simonsfrom a Facebook

account. (Id. at 3.) 

Based on these limited facts, Plaintiff alleges improper accessing and dissemination of his

medical records under the Privacy Claim Act. Plaintiff alleges failure to keep an accounting of

disclosures, failure to provide lists of disclosures, and failure to establish safeguards to ensure security

of records. He further alleges that he received downgraded employment reviews as a result of the

improper disclosure of his medical records. Plaintiff seeks relief damages and injunction relief under

the Privacy Act.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of

a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under

Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326

(1989) (“Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of

law.”). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet

fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need

not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545

(2007). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). In other words, “the non-conclusory

‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”

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Privacy Act 

Section 552a(b) of the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of personnel files unless certain

exceptions apply. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). An agency's improper disclosure gives rise to a cause of

action if the Privacy Act violation caused an adverse effect and the violation was willful or

intentional. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D); Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 131 (3d Cir.1992). Section

552(a)(g)(4), the “catch-all” provision provides:

In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of

this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner

which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the

individual in an amount equal to the sum of (A) actual damages sustained by

the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a

person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and(B) the

costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by

the court.

The Supreme Court recently clarified that actual damages under the Privacy Act means “proven

pecuniary or economic harm.” Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, _ U.S. _, 132 S.Ct.

1441, 1453 (March 28, 2012). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under the Privacy Act. Plaintiff 

has brought a claim under the “catch-all” provision of the Privacy Act, and therefore he must

provide evidence to support the necessary elements: (1) the information is covered by the Act as a

“record” in a “system of records”; (2) the agency “disclose[d] the information; (3) the disclosure

had an “adverse effect” on the plaintiff (an element which separates itself into two components: (a)

an adverse effect standing requirement and (b) a causal nexus between the disclosure and the

adverse effect); and (4) the disclosure was “willful or intentional.” Quinn, 978 F. 131. In addition,

the Plaintiff must show “actual damages.” Stafford v. Social Security Administration, 437 F.

Supp. 2d 1113, 117-18 (N.D. Cal. 2006); See also Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004). 

Defendants first contend that Plaintiff has failed to properly allege that the agency engaged in

improper disclosure of information, but rather that Plaintiff has alleged improper access to his

information - a claim appropriately brought under the Health Insurance Portability and

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Accountability Act (“HIPPAA”), not the Privacy Act. Defendants rely on Cacho v. Certoff, which

held that “a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim under the Privacy Act simply by showing

that the agency official who disclosed a protected record should never have accessed the record in

the first place.” Cacho, 2006 WL 3422548 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 2006). The Court in Cacho

distinguished the allegations regarding improper access of information with those involving

improper disclosure, and found that Plaintiff’s claim would be relevant under HIPPAA. 42 U.S.C.

S 1320d-6 (2006) (making it an offense for a person knowingly to “obtain individually identifiable

health information relating to an individual” in violation of the statute). Under HIPPAA, courts

have held that there is no implied right of action for private individuals. Johnson v. Quander, 370

F.Supp.2d 79, 100 (D.D.C.2005). 

On one hand, Defendants are correct in noting that Plaintiff has alleged improper access of

information. Plaintiff states that LCDR Simons had been “accessing Plaintiff’s medical records”

and was “therefore aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2). However, Plaintiff

also alleges that a separate NMCSD employee, Spencer Dice, may have “authorized access to

Plaintiff’s medical information, which he could have easily have illegally disseminated to Simons.”

(Id. at 3). Plaintiff also asserts that his employment reviews were downgraded as a result of the

dissemination of his medical records. (Id. at 4.) The complaint, while sparse on the facts, alleges

both improper access to information and the illegal dissemination of information, allowing the

Court to review the claim under the Privacy Act. 

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory. Under the Iqbal framework, “to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).

As stated above, Plaintiff alleges one mere primary fact: LCDR Simons told Plaintiff that

acupuncture treatment was “good for counts.” (Dkt. No. 1.) Based off this statement only,

Plaintiff alleges improper access and dissemination of his medical records. Plaintiff fails to

provide any additional facts to lead the Court to believe that the LCDR Simons statement was the

result of improper disclosure. Plaintiff alternatively alleges that LCDR Simons could have

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received the information from FaceBook; however, Plaintiff fails to offer any facts that would

support that conclusion. As Plaintiff’s complaint is void of sufficient facts, he is unable to

establish that the agency improperly disclosed his information, the second prong necessary to

establish a claim under the Privacy Act. Given this primary failure, the Court finds it unnecessary

to further assess the additional requirements to state a claim under the Privacy Act. Accordingly,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state his claim with sufficient particularity. 

The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint

within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. Accordingly, the Court hereby VACATES the

hearing on the motion to dismiss scheduled for Friday, February 15, 2013.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 11, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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