Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02350/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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•' 

In Re: HAROLD 

BETTY LOU FOSS, 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WAYNE FOSS, ) 

) 

Debtor. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

} 

Appellee, ) 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tf>nth C.irn1•t: 

SEP 11 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2350 

) ( D. C. No. 88-1005-K) 

v. ) ( D • Kan.) 

) 

HAROLD WAYNE FOSS, ) 

) 

Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mater_ially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the cause is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This case involves the question of whether certain periodic 

payments are alimony and therefore not dischargeable in 

bankruptcy. Harold Wayne Foss appeals from the district court's 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2350 Document: 01019973484 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 1 
June 29, 1988 Memorandum and Order affirming the bankruptcy 

court's conclusion that the monthly payments he is obligated to 

make under the parties' divorce decree are alimony. Appellant 

raises the following issues: (1) whether the bankruptcy court 

should have considered any evidence other than the divorce decree 

in determining whether the payments are alimony; (2) whether the 

periodic payments from appellant were necessary for appellee's 

maintenance and support at the time the parties were divorced; 

(3) whether the periodic payments from appellant are now necessary 

for appellee's maintenance and support, following the filing of 

appellant's bankruptcy petition; and (4) whether the bankruptcy 

court should have heard evidence concerning appellee's change in 

financial circumstances since the divorce. 

Although both the bankruptcy court and the district court 

concluded that the payments are alimony, the bases for their 

decisions differed. The district court stressed that a bankruptcy 

court must look beyond the language of the decree to extrinsic 

evidence of the parties' intent and to the substance of the 

obligation at issue. See In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391, 1392 (10th 

Cir. 1987) (bankruptcy courts are not "bound to accept a divorce 

decree's characterization of an award as maintenance or a property 

settlement"); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th 

Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("While it is true that the divorce decree 

refers to the settlement as a 'property settlement,' that label 

does not resolve the issue.") The bankruptcy court, on the other 

hand, placed greater importance on the language of the divorce 

decree. See In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986) 

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Appellate Case: 88-2350 Document: 01019973484 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 2 
("[I]f the agreement between the parties [to a divorce] clearly 

shows that the parties intended the debt to reflect either support 

or a property settlement, then that characterization will normally 

control."). Because both approaches lead to the same result in 

this case, we affirm the district court's judgment without 

resolving any differences in the analysis taken by the district 

court and the bankruptcy court. 

Appellant also raises the issue of whether the monthly 

payments were necessary for appellee's maintenance and support at 

the time of the divorce. Under the bankruptcy court's approach, 

the language of the divorce decree is unambiguous and therefore 

controlling, making appellee's financial condition irrelevant. 

Under the district court's approach, appellee's financial 

condition at the time of the divorce also is irrelevant because 

the parties' divorce decree explicitly provides for spousal 

support (and does not purport to be only a property settlement). 

See In re Goin, 808 F.2d at 1392 (financial need of spouse at time 

of divorce relevant only "if the agreement fails to provide 

explicitly for spousal support"). 

Finally, appellant argues that, in light of appellee's 

current financial position, the monthly payments are no longer 

necessary for her to meet her basic needs. As a result, appellant 

maintains that discharge of the monthly payments obligation is 

appropriate. This argument is without merit in light of the Tenth 

Circuit's recent decision that changed circumstances or present 

need for support should not be considered in determining 

dischargeability. Sylvester, 865 F.2d at 1166. It is therefore 

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Appellate Case: 88-2350 Document: 01019973484 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 3 
irrelevant whether the periodic payments are now necessary for 

appellee's maintenance and support, and the bankruptcy court acted 

properly in refusing to hear evidence concerning her changed 

financial position. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2350 Document: 01019973484 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 4