Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07044/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 16, 2009 Decided January 29, 2010 

No. 09-7044 

MILAN JANKOVIC, ALSO KNOWN AS PHILIP ZEPTER, 

APPELLANT

v. 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:04-cv-01198-RBW) 

William T. O’Brien argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were Lisa M. Norrett, John W. Lomas Jr., 

and Malcolm I. Lewin. 

 Amy L. Neuhardt argued the cause for appellee 

International Crisis Group. With her on the brief was 

Jonathan L. Greenblatt. Neil H. Koslowe entered an 

appearance. 

Before: GINSBURG and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Milan Jankovic, also 

known as Philip Zepter, sued International Crisis Group and 

additional unnamed defendants Does 1 through 10 (“ICG,” for 

the institution or for all defendants, as appropriate) for 

defamation, false light and intentional interference with 

business expectancy. The district court issued an order 

granting ICG’s motion to dismiss (the “Order”), J.A. 1221-28 

and Jankovic appeals. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and 

remand for additional proceedings. 

* * * 

Jankovic is the founder of Zepter Group, which provides 

“a wide range of products and services, including banking, 

insurance, telecommunications, and retail sales of consumer 

products.” J.A. 20. ICG is a non-profit organization that 

describes itself as "working through field-based analysis and 

high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.” 

International Crisis Group, Serbian Reform Stalls Again, ICG 

Balkans Report No. 145 at 30 (July 17, 2003) (“Report 145”) 

J.A. 82-124. ICG’s “reports and briefing papers are 

distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in 

foreign ministries and international organisations and made 

generally available at the same time via the organisation’s 

Internet site.” Id. The language at issue in this case appears in 

ICG’s Report 145, which addresses the deceleration of 

Serbian reforms—reforms initially spurred by the 

assassination of Premier Zoran Djindjic. We excerpt it below, 

numbering the sentences to assist discussion: 

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[1] The unwillingness to continue the crackdown 

reflects the power of the Milosevic-era financial 

structures that – with the rigid oversight once provided by 

the dictator removed – have transformed themselves into 

a new Serbian oligarchy that finances many of the leading 

political parties and has tremendous influence over 

government decisions. [2] Some of the companies were 

originally formed as fronts by State Security or Army 

Counterintelligence (KOS), while others operated at the 

direct pleasure of the ruling couple. [3] Under 

Milosevic, many of these companies profited from special 

informal monopolies, as well as the use of privileged 

exchange rates. [4] In return, many of them financed the 

regime and its parallel structures. 

[5] Some of the individuals and companies are well 

known to average Serbs: Delta Holding (Milorad 

Miskovic), Karic (Bogoljub Karic), Pink (Zeljko 

Mitrovic), Zepter (Milan Jankovic, aka Filip Zepter), 

Kapital Banka (Djordje Nicovic), Toza Markovic (Dmitar 

Segrt), Progres (Mirko Marjanovic), Simpo (Dragan 

Tomic), Komercijalna Banka (Ljubomir Mihajlovic), 

Novokabel (Djordje Siradovic), Stanko Subotic, Dibek 

(Milan Beko), ABC (Radisav Rodic), Hemofarm 

(Miodrag Babic), AIK Banka Nis (Ljubisa Jovanovic) 

and Dijamant (Savo Knezevic) are but some of the most 

prominent. [6] Because of the support they gave to 

Milosevic and the parallel structures that characterised his 

regime, many of these individuals or companies have at 

one time or another been on EU visa ban lists, while 

others have had their assets frozen in Europe or the US.80

[7] In the popular mind, they and their companies 

were associated with the Milosevic regime and benefited 

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from it directly. [8] The DOS campaign platform in 

September 2000 promised that crony companies and their 

owners would be forced to answer for past misdeeds. [9] 

Few of the Milosevic crony companies have been 

subjected to legal action, however. [10] The 

enforcement of the “extra-profit” law is often viewed as 

selective and there have been only a handful of instances 

in which back taxes, perhaps 65 million Euros worth, 

have been collected.81 [11] Most disturbing is the 

public’s perception that – at a time when the economy is 

worsening – these companies’ positions of power, 

influence and access to public resources seem to have 

changed very little. 

80 http://europa.eu.int/index.eu.htm#; 

 http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/index.html

81 ICG interview with Finance Minister Djelic. 

Report 145 at 17. 

Plaintiff initially alleged that the above passage (as well 

as two others in Report 145) contained defamatory statements, 

placed him in a false light, and intentionally interfered with 

his business expectancies. Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Group, 429 

F. Supp. 2d 165, 168-69 (D.D.C. 2006). The district court 

dismissed these claims, characterizing the passages as “not 

capable of defamatory meaning” and ruling that, as a result, 

they could not support either of the other claims. Id. at 179. 

In Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Group, 494 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 

2007), we reversed the district court’s dismissal in part, 

finding that the passage excerpted above was susceptible of a 

defamatory reading. Id. at 1091. 

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Specifically, following the sequence laid out in Moldea v. 

New York Times Co. 15 F.3d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(Moldea I), we first found that, despite “numerous qualifiers,” 

a reasonable reader could construe the passage as asserting 

“that Philip Zepter, personally, was a ‘crony’ of Milosevic 

who supported the regime in exchange for favorable 

treatment” and “that Philip Zepter was actively in alliance 

with Milosevic and his regime.” Jankovic, 494 F.3d at 1091. 

The understanding that Report 145 accused Jankovic of 

“supporting” the Milosevic regime clearly derives from 

sentences 5 and 6 of the passage. Sentence 5 lists “Zepter 

(Milan Jankovic, aka Filip Zepter)” as belonging to the new 

Serbian oligarchy described in the first sentence. Sentence 6 

imputes support of Milosevic (“and the parallel structures that 

characterised his regime”) to those named in sentence 5. In 

addition, sentences 1 through 4 implied the quid pro quo 

feature that we identified (“in exchange for favorable 

treatment”). 

We note that sentences 2, 3, 4 and 6 use the pronouns 

“some” or “many,” leaving open the possibility that readers of 

Report 145 might not suppose that the companies and 

individuals named in sentence 5 were generally guilty of the 

conduct charged in sentences 2, 3, 4 and 6. But the prior 

panel, though recognizing that the passage contained a 

number of “qualifiers,” Jankovic, 494 F.3d at 1091, could not 

have reached its interpretation unless it supposed that 

ordinary, reasonable readers could read the report as implying 

that those named in sentence 5 were guilty of supporting 

Milosevic and of receiving favorable treatment in exchange. 

Even if we disagreed with that understanding, which we do 

not, we are bound to it under the doctrine of law of the case. 

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en 

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banc) (“[T]he same issue presented a second time in the same 

case in the same court should lead to the same result.”) 

(emphasis in original). 

As to the defamatory quality of the assertions, we 

observed that “[m]erely associating somebody with a foreign 

government would not ordinarily be defamatory”; but, citing a 

case involving the apartheid regime of South Africa, we found 

that in this case the relationship asserted could be “sufficiently 

‘odious, infamous, or ridiculous’” to so qualify. Jankovic, 

494 F.3d at 1091 (citing Southern Air Transport, Inc. v. ABC, 

Inc., 877 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.1989)). We remanded to the 

district court with instructions that it consider “the 

applicability and merits of . . . Opinion and Fair Comment 

Protection, the Fair Report Privilege, or the Neutral-Reportage 

Doctrine.” Id. 

 On remand, ICG filed a motion seeking dismissal on 

grounds of opinion, fair comment, and fair report privilege. 

Jankovic opposed and also sought discovery on facts relating 

to the asserted defenses. The district court denied Jankovic’s 

discovery motion and concluded that the passage was shielded 

by the fair report and fair comment privileges and protected as 

opinion. Holding that the passage was non-actionable, the 

district court dismissed all of Jankovic’s claims. Order at 2. 

The court also held that the claim for intentional interference 

with business expectancy was inadequately pled. Id. at 6-7. 

Jankovic now challenges all these rulings. We review the 

district court’s dismissal de novo. Weyrich v. New Republic, 

Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 2001). While we affirm 

dismissal of the claim for intentional interference with 

business expectancy, we hold that none of the privileges or 

protections raised by ICG applies to the assertions that 

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Jankovic supported the Milosevic regime and that he received 

advantages in exchange. Accordingly, we remand the case for 

further proceedings on the claims for defamation and false 

light. 

* * * 

A. The privileges and defenses 

Fair report. Under applicable District of Columbia law, 

a defendant must “clear[] two major hurdles” to qualify for 

the fair report privilege. Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper 

Co., 424 A.2d 78, 89 (D.C. App. 1980). It must show, first, 

that its publication was a “fair and accurate report” of a 

qualified government source, and, second, that the publication 

properly attributed the statement to the official source. Id. 

See also Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 

736 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Prins v. Int’l Telephone & Telegraph 

Corp., 757 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1991). 

There are serious problems on the score of proper 

“attribution.” The pertinent government source is referenced 

in footnote 80 of Report 145, which contains the Uniform 

Resource Locator (“URL”) for an Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (OFAC) website: http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ 

ofac/sdn/index.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2009). The cited 

URL is currently non-functional: the Treasury’s server returns 

an error message saying that it is not aware of the page. 

ICG asserts that those who now access that URL will be 

“automatically transfer[red] to the now-current OFAC 

webpage regarding the Specially Designated Nationals 

(‘SDN’) List at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ 

ofac/sdn/index.html” (last visited Dec. 22, 2009). ICG Br. at 

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32 n.18. Not only is that not correct, but this second OFAC 

URL is also non-functioning. 

Whatever the efficacy of the URLs as such, ICG claims 

that footnote 80 adequately attributes the defamatory 

statements to the OFAC’s frozen assets list for 1998, and to 

Executive Order 13088: Blocking Property of the 

Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 

and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of 

Montenegro, and Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic 

of Serbia in Response to the Situation in Kosovo (June 9, 

1998), 63 Fed. Reg 32109 (the “Executive Order”). ICG Br. 

at 33; see also id. at 42. We will assume in ICG’s favor that 

Report 145 adequately leads the reader to either or both of 

these sources. 

As we shall see, however, Report 145 does not give a 

“fair and accurate” report of either of them. The apparent 

listing of Zepter Banka appears on page 40 of a 42-page 

single-spaced list that ICG offered to the district court as “a 

true and correct copy of the screen shot of SDN Changes 

1998.” J.A. 454, 576. At page 9 of this “screen shot” is a 

heading indicating that the names below (which include more 

than 100 banks) were added to the frozen assets list on June 

18, 1998: 

06/18/98: The following names have been added to the 

list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 

Persons in connection with an Executive Order issued by 

President Clinton blocking property of the Governments 

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of 

Montenegro, and Prohibiting new investment in the 

Republic of Serbia in response to the situation in Kosovo. 

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J.A. 545. 

 This listing, standing alone, tells only that it occurred 

pursuant to the Executive Order and that the entities either 

were property of the Yugoslav, Serbian or Montenegrin 

governments or somehow had a role in enabling investment in 

the Republic of Serbia. Not a word suggests that Zepter 

Banka, let alone Phillip Zepter, supported the Milosevic 

regime or received advantages in exchange. 

In the Executive Order itself, President Clinton ordered 

(with immaterial exceptions): 

[A]ll property and interests in property of the 

Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the 

Republic of Montenegro that are in the United States, that 

hereafter come within the United States, or that are or 

hereafter come within the possession or control of United 

States persons . . . are hereby blocked. 

63 Fed. Reg. at 32109, § 1(a). The order defines the 

“government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 

and Montenegro)” as 

the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(Serbia and Montenegro), its agencies, instrumentalities, 

and controlled entities, including all financial institutions

and state-owned and socially owned entities organized or 

located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro) as of June 9, 1998. 

Id. § 5(e) (emphasis added). It similarly defines the 

governments of Serbia and Montenegro to include all 

financial institutions organized or located in those countries. 

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Id. §§ 5(f), 5(g). These definitions are replicated in 

regulations of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the 

Treasury Department. 31 C.F.R. §§ 586.306-308. 

 Later Treasury regulations explain: 

These governments are defined in §§ 586.306 and 

586.308 of the Regulations, respectively, and include “all 

financial institutions and state-owned and socially-owned 

entities organized or located” in the territories of the FRY 

(S&M) state and the Republic of Serbia, respectively, as 

well as “any persons acting or purporting to act for or on 

behalf of'” those governments. 

64 Fed. Reg. 60660/3 (Nov. 8, 1999). 

These definitions make it clear that the regulations treat 

all financial institutions as agencies, instrumentalities, or 

controlled entities of the governments of the various territories 

where they are organized or located. As a financial 

institution, Zepter Banka would appear on the frozen assets 

list whatever its relationship was to the Milosevic regime, so 

long as it met either the locational or the organizational 

criterion. Thus Report 145’s assertions that Zepter Banka 

gave “support” to Milosevic, and that its U.S. assets were 

frozen because of that support, are not fair or accurate reports 

of any government document ICG has identified. 

Accordingly, the fair report privilege is of no use to ICG. 

Opinion, non-verifiable propositions. Although the 

parties direct arguments to whether ICG’s assertions are 

“opinion,” the Supreme Court’s decision in Milkovich v. 

Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990), made clear that the 

First Amendment gives no protection to an assertion 

“sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or 

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false,” id. at 21, even if the assertion is expressed by 

implication in “a statement of ‘opinion,’” id. at 20. See also 

Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 313 (D.C. Cir. 

1994). (ICG does not suggest that liability under the law of 

the District of Columbia might (in this respect) be narrower 

than what the First Amendment allows.) 

In finding non-verifiability, the district court focused on 

the word “crony,” Order at 4-5, which we indeed used in our 

summary of Report 145’s relevant statements. But regardless 

of whether that epithet is verifiable standing alone, the 

question here is the verifiability of ICG’s assertions that the 

plaintiff “gave” “support” to Milosevic (sentence 6), and that 

he gave support “in exchange for favorable treatment” (as the 

prior panel summarized the reasonably understood meaning of 

the relevant sentences, see 494 F.3d at 1091). To resolve the 

issue of “verifiability,” we need not probe arcane matters of 

epistemology; both propositions are verifiable in the practical 

sense that our legal system is ready to make decisions on the 

basis of how such issues are resolved—decisions profoundly 

impacting people’s lives. 

As to “support,” for example, the Supreme Court has 

upheld the authority of the executive branch to detain an 

individual, including a citizen, on a showing that he was 

(among other things) “‘part of or supporting forces hostile to 

the United States or coalition partners.’” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 

542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (emphasis added). Similarly, 

whether support is offered in exchange for favorable treatment 

is analogous to the factual inquiry underlying the offense of 

bribery. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“Whoever . . . directly or 

indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of 

value to any public official . . . with intent . . . to influence any 

official act . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned for not more 

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than fifteen years, or both.”). If such points are verifiable 

enough to be the bases for prolonged detention, they are 

surely (at least in the potentially defamatory constructions 

understood by the prior panel) verifiable enough for 

defamation liability. 

As part of its “opinion” argument, ICG says that the 

“factual basis for the connection between Zepter and the 

Milosevic regime that this Court held could be gleaned from 

[Report 145] is fully disclosed to the reader,” and that 

therefore ICG should be immune under the doctrine that “a 

statement of opinion that is based upon true facts that are 

revealed to readers . . . [is] generally . . . not actionable so 

long as the opinion does not otherwise imply unstated 

defamatory facts.” ICG Br. at 29 (quoting Moldea I, 15 F.3d 

at 1144-45). But as we explained above, the proposition that 

we said a reasonable reader could derive from Report 145—

that Zepter supported the Milosevic regime or “the parallel 

structures that characterised his regime”—is based on ICG’s 

assertions in sentences 5 and 6 that Zepter or Zepter Banka 

appeared on the frozen assets list because of support that was 

provided to Milosevic. Though Zepter Banka did appear on 

the frozen assets list, there is no evidence in the record that its 

appearance was based upon support for Milosevic, as opposed 

its simply being a financial institution in the region (and 

therefore automatically listed). Whether or not the 

defamatory reading of the passage constitutes an opinion, this 

aspect of Moldea I protects only opinions based on true facts, 

accurately disclosed. As ICG falsely stated the basis for the 

frozen assets lists, the doctrine is of no use to it. See 

Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19 (“Even if the speaker states the 

facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either 

incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is 

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erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of 

fact.”). 

ICG makes an additional somewhat muddled effort to 

pull the sting of Report 145. ICG Br. at 29-35. This portion 

of its brief appears to rely on the notion that authors of the 

report saved it from any defamatory character by sprinkling 

the pronouns “many” and “some” throughout its allegations. 

As we said earlier, that reading is inconsistent with the 

interpretation reached by the prior panel and is thus of no help 

to ICG. 

Fair comment. ICG argues “fair comment” also as a freestanding doctrine under District of Columbia law (separately 

from its role in ICG’s First Amendment non-verifiability 

defense). ICG Br. at 40-41. But a conclusion based on a 

misstatement of fact is not protected by the privilege. See 

Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F.2d 836, 841 n.4 (D.C. 

Cir. 1936) (“[T]he facts asserted as predicate of the fair 

comment must be true . . . .”). As we explained above, ICG 

here relies on the appearance of Zepter Banka on the frozen 

assets lists. Those lists, however, do not buttress accusations 

that Zepter Banka or Jankovic supported Milosevic or did so 

“in exchange for favorable treatment.” Accordingly, the key 

passages of Report 145 are not protected as fair comment. 

 In short, the excerpted passage is not protected as fair 

comment, fair report or opinion, whether for purposes of 

defamation, false light or intentional interference with 

business expectancy.

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B. Intentional Interference with Business Expectancy 

We have said that a plaintiff must plead, as necessary 

elements for a claim for intentional interference with business 

expectancy under District of Columbia law: “(1) the existence 

of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge 

of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer, 

(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or 

termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4) resultant 

damage.” Bennett Enters. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 

493, 499 (D.C. Cir.1995). 

For the first element Jankovic appears to rely entirely on 

allegations of harm to his business generally. His complaint 

alleges, for example: “Plaintiffs’ businesses have suffered a 

loss of current growth and business opportunities, a loss of 

future growth and business opportunities, and a loss of access 

to markets that otherwise would have been available, 

amounting to general damages in an amount to be proven at 

trial.” Complaint ¶ 104. 

But the first element of the tort, “a valid business 

relationship or expectancy,” appears to require rather specific 

business opportunities (to be sure, however, not ones 

necessarily manifested in any contract). The cases invoked by 

the parties all revolve around relatively specific anticipated 

transactions: a prospective book deal, Browning v. Clinton, 

292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002); “three potential sources of 

prospective employment,” Kimmel v. Gallaudet Univ., 639 F. 

Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2009); development of a specific 

property in the District of Columbia, Carr v. Brown, 395 A.2d 

79, 82-84 (D.C. 1978); opportunity to represent a trustee in a 

specific litigation, Dem. State Comm. of D.C. v. Bebchick, 706 

A.2d 569 (D.C. 1998). See also Laser Labs, Inc. v. ETL 

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Testing Labs., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. Mass. 1998) 

(dismissing a claim for intentional interference with business 

expectancy under Massachusetts law where plaintiff failed to 

allege interference with specific expectancies). The 

opportunities alleged by Jankovic, by contrast, appear to be 

simply the generic opportunities of any successful enterprise, 

a type of injury that can be protected by an award of damages 

in a successful defamation suit. See Robert D. Sack, Sack on 

Defamation, Libel, Slander and Related Problems § 10.5.1 (3d 

ed. 2009) (citing cases). Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of the business expectancy claim. 

Conclusion 

 While we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Jankovic’s claim for intentional interference with a business 

expectancy, we reverse its dismissal of the remaining counts, 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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