Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01075/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981cv Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVESTER T. OLIVER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 17-cv-1075

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

Sylvester Oliver filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis to commence an action 

against Iron Workers Local 433 and Granite Construction for retaliation under Title VII and 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Oliver works construction as a member of Iron Workers Local 229. His 

complaint is hard to follow, but his main argument is that Local 433 and Granite failed to hire 

him for a job in Rosamond, California on February 4, 2016. Oliver alleges he wasn’t hired 

because he previously filed complaints with the EEOC and NLRB.

Courts may authorize litigants to proceed without paying when they make a showing 

that they can’t afford the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Oliver satisfied that requirement. But 

the Court “shall dismiss the case at any time if it determines that” the action “fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted.” Id. To state a claim for retaliation, Oliver needed to 

offer plausible allegations that defendants took an adverse employment action against him 

because of his engagement in a protected activity. Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 

F.3d 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2017). He’s failed to do so.

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“To show the requisite causal link,” Oliver must allege facts that suggest his 

“protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” Cohen v. Fred Meyer, 686

F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). Oliver says he wasn’t hired on February 4, 2016 because he 

previously filed “complaints of unfair labor practices and discrimination to the NLRB and 

EEOC.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 27.] But Oliver filed his EEOC charge in December 2016. [Dkt. 1-2.] This 

complaint couldn’t have caused the adverse action that occurred ten months earlier. Oliver’s 

EEOC charge mentions previous charges, but he doesn’t specify them in his complaint.

While Oliver filed an NLRB charge in November 2015—three months before the 

Rosamond job—that charge was against his own union, Local 229, for failing to provide him 

minutes from a grievance hearing against Granite. [Dkt. 1-2 at 49.] Oliver suggests that he 

wanted the minutes to show one of the voting members at the hearing was a Local 443 

worker who favored Granite. The gist of his argument is that Local 443 and Granite got wind 

of Oliver’s intentions, and that’s why he wasn’t hired for Rosamond three months later. But 

he hasn’t provided specific, plausible facts to back that up. As it stands, the Court has no 

basis to conclude that an NLRB charge against his own union was the likely reason that 

Local 443 or Granite failed to hire him for the Rosamond job.

There’s another major problem with Oliver’s complaint. He named two defendants—

California Field Iron Workers Administrative Trust and District Council of Iron Workers of the 

State of California and Vicinity—but doesn’t offer any factual allegations against them in his 

complaint. The complaint needs to lay out a concise, plain statement of who did what, why 

those actions are illegal, and what laws entitle plaintiff to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. And it’s 

not sufficient to lump all of the defendants together. Oliver needs to explain, specifically,

what each defendant did that amounts to retaliation.

In addition, Oliver’s complaint only articulates a cause of action for retaliation under 

Title VII and § 1981. Yet, Oliver says he’s an African American and was “treated differently 

due to his protected status.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 26.] There aren’t any other allegations in the complaint 

that support a discrimination claim on the basis of race. If Oliver has a legitimate claim for 

racial discrimination, he needs to allege a second claim for relief, and lay out the specific 

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facts that show his claim is plausible. Oliver also says he wants the Court to “declare null 

and void language in the union CBA.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 1.] He provides no context for this request,

nor cites any law that allows him to bring an action for this claim or empowers this Court to 

rule on a collective bargaining agreement. Again, if he has a legitimate cause of action, he 

needs to lay out a separate claim and explain the relevant facts. If not, he should delete 

these allegations from his amended complaint.

Finally, the complaint should include all of the facts that the Court needs to 

understand the legal claim—but only those. It’s unacceptable to attach 230 pages of exhibits

and ask the Court to piece together the story. Everything the Court needs to know should 

be concisely, and chronologically, laid out in the complaint. For example, Oliver needs to 

explain how the hiring process worked for the Rosamond job: what role did Local 433 play? 

Local 229? What about Granite? The Court doesn’t have any basis to evaluate who was 

responsible for deciding not to hire Oliver and whether that decision was improper. On the 

other hand, Oliver needs to delete any allegations that don’t relate to the Rosamond job. 

For example, the Court doesn’t understand how Oliver’s efforts to track down documents 

from Michael Silvey relate to defendants’ decision not to hire him for Rosamond.

While the Court has an obligation to construe pro se complaints liberally, especially

in civil rights cases, the Court can’t “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011). If Oliver 

believes he can fix the problems the Court has identified by amending his complaint, he may 

do so by October 27, 2017. If he fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will dismiss 

this action. Oliver’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Oliver’s complaint is 

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2017

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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