Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-05899/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-05899-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KLAUSTECH, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 10-05899 JSW

CLAIMS CONSTRUCTION

ORDER

The Court has been presented with a technology tutorial and briefing leading up to a 

hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). This Order

construes the disputed claim terms selected by the parties, which appear in the patent at issue in

this case: United States Patent No. 6,128,651 (“’651 Patent”) entitled “Internet Advertising

with Controlled and Timed Display of Ad Content from Centralized System Controller.”

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff KlausTech, Inc. (“KlausTech”) contends that Defendant Google, formerly

AdMob, Inc. (“Defendant”) infringes its patent. KlausTech’s patent relates to the technology

governing an internet advertising system that allows a non-scrolling display for advertising at

guaranteed minimum intervals. The frame on the user’s website “displays controlled and timed

ad content under the control of a centralized system controller.” (’651 Patent at 1:7-9.)

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the remainder of this Order.

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ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to

which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water 

Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The interpretation of the scope and

meaning of disputed terms in patent claims is a question of law and exclusively within the

province of a court to decide. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372. The inquiry into the meaning of the

claim terms is “an objective one.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116. As a result, when a

court construes disputed terms, it “looks to those sources available to the public that show what

a person of skill in the art would have understood the disputed claim language to mean.” Id. In

most cases, a court’s analysis will focus on three sources: the claims, the specification, and the

prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). However, on occasion, it is appropriate to rely on

extrinsic evidence regarding the relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms,

and the state of the art at the time at the time the patent issued. Id. at 979-81.

The starting point of the claim construction analysis is an examination of the specific

claim language. A court’s “claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the

claim language itself, for that is the language that the patentee has chosen to particularly point

out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.” 

Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, in the

absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a term, an inventor’s chosen language

is given its ordinary meaning. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99

F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, “[c]laim language generally carries the ordinary

meaning of the words in their normal usage in the field of the invention.” Invitrogen Corp. v.

Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Renishaw v. Marposs

Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “the claims define

the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in

all cases with the actual words of the claim”). A court’s final construction, therefore, must

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accord with the words chosen by the patentee to mete out the boundaries of the claimed

invention.

The court should also look to intrinsic evidence, including the written description, the

drawings, and the prosecution history, if included in the record, to provide context and

clarification regarding the intended meaning of the claim terms. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.

Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The claims do not stand alone. Rather, “they

are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). The specification “may act as a

sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims.” 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification also can indicate whether the patentee intended to

limit the scope of a claim, despite the use of seemingly broad claim language. SciMed Life Sys.,

Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing

that when the specification “makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature,

that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the

language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad

enough to encompass the feature in question”). 

Intent to limit the claims can be demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, if the

patentee “acted as his own lexicographer,” and clearly and precisely “set forth a definition of

the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history,” a court will defer to

that definition. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In

order to so limit the claims, “the patent applicant [must] set out the different meaning in the

specification in a manner sufficient to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change

from ordinary meaning.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1117. In addition, a court will adopt

an alternative meaning of a term “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished

that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject

matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” CCS Fitness, 288

F.3d at 1367. For example, the presumption of ordinary meaning will give way where the

“inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words or expressions of

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manifest exclusion or restriction, representing clear disavowal of claim scope.” Gemstar-TV

Guide Int’l Inc. v. ITC, 383 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The disclaimer in the prosecution

history must be “clear and unmistakable.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314,

1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Likewise, the specification may be used to resolve ambiguity “where

the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to

permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at

1325.

Limitations from the specification (such as from the preferred embodiment) may not be

read into the claims, absent the inventor’s express intention to the contrary. Id. at 1326; see

also CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“[A] patentee need not ‘describe in the specification every

conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.’”) (quoting Rexnord Corp. v.

Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). To protect against this result, a court’s

focus should remain on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would

understand the claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Additionally, “[w]hen consulting the

specification to clarify the meaning of claim terms, court must take care not to import

limitations into the claims from the specification.” Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.

3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Although it is improper to read a limitation into the claims, “[c]laims must be read in

view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems,

Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). “Claims are not

interpreted in a vacuum, but are part of and are read in light of the specification.” Slimfold Mfg.

Co. v. Kinkead Indus. Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987). When the specification

“makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to

be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read

without reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the

feature in question.” SciMed Life, 242 F.3d at 1341.

However, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly cautioned courts against reading limitations

into the claims based on a preferred embodiment: “although the specification often describes

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very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the

claims to these embodiments.” Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1323. Courts have also “expressly

rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the

patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.

Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

If the analysis of the intrinsic evidence fails to resolve any ambiguity in the claim

language, a court then may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as expert declarations and testimony

from the inventors. Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(“When an analysis of intrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity in a disputed claim term, it is

improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning so ascertained.”) (emphasis in

original). When considering extrinsic evidence, a court should take care not to use it to vary or

contradict the claim terms. Rather, extrinsic evidence is relied upon more appropriately to

assist in determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims. Vitronics Corp. v.

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Dictionaries also may play a role in the determination of the ordinary and customary

meaning of a claim term. In Phillips, the Federal Circuit reiterated that “[d]ictionaries or

comparable sources are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood

meanings of words . . . .” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322. The Phillips court, however, also

admonished that district courts should be careful not to allow dictionary definitions to supplant

the inventor’s understanding of the claimed subject matter. “The main problem with elevating

the dictionary to . . . prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of the

words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within in the context of the patent.” Id. at

1321. Accordingly, dictionaries necessarily must play a role subordinate to the intrinsic

evidence.

In addition, a court has the discretion to rely upon prior art, whether or not cited in the

specification or the file history, but only when the meaning of the disputed terms cannot be

ascertained from a careful reading of the public record. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Referring to

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prior art may make it unnecessary to rely upon expert testimony, because prior art may be

indicative of what those skilled in the art generally understood certain terms to mean. Id. 

B. Claim Construction.

1. “Website”

The term “website” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of the ’651

Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “website” should be given its plain and ordinary

meaning and must be construed to mean “a place on the World Wide Web that contains

information through which a user can navigate.” (KlausTech’s Opening Brief at 7.) Defendant,

on the other hand, argues that the term must be construed to mean “a client website (i.e. HTML

document), from the client webserver, that is indexed by general search sites and contains code

for the retrieval of a non-scrolling ad frame from the central controller.” (Id.)

The key dispute between the parties is whether it is permissible for Defendant to import

the specifications of the website being from a client server, that it can only be an indexed

HTML document, and that the claimed website must contain code for retrieval of a nonscrolling ad frame. 

During the claims construction hearing, KlausTech clarified that it did not intend to

argue that “an ad is the claimed website.” Still, Defendant contends that importing the

limitation of the fact that “the non-scrolling ad frame never appears at the website” from the

summary of invention section of the patent give purpose to the invention and distinguishes it

over the prior art. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1346-51

(Fed. Cir. 2004). However, KlausTech resisted the importation of the limitations on the term in

order to give meaning to the patent’s alleged purpose. See E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,

343 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the “court’s task is not to limit claim

language to exclude particular devices because they do no serve a perceived ‘purpose’ of the

invention. Rather, the district court’s function is to interpret claims according to their plain

language unless the patentee has chosen to be his own lexicographer in the specification or has

clearly disclaimed coverage during prosecution. An invention may possess a number of

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advantages or purposes, and there is no requirement that every claim directed to that invention

be limited to encompass all of them.”) Defendant argued that the suggested broad definition of

the term ‘website’ would result in the recapture of prior art when the purpose of the invention

itself was to improve upon the prior existing art. KlausTech, however, resists Defendant’s

attempt to import the limitations from the specifications and argues that importation of the

specific limitations would render the term meaningless. 

The parties also argued over whether the definition of the term website requires the

explanation that websites are drafted in HTML. Defendant argued that resolution of this hotly

contested issue would likely resolve the parties’ conflict altogether. The Court cannot resolve

as a matter of law whether all websites must be drafted in HTML; this is an area of proper

discovery, expert testimony, and further briefing at the summary judgment stage. 

The generic term “website” has been construed to mean “a location on the World 

Wide Web” or “one or more related web pages at a location on the World Wide Web.” See

ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); VirnetX, Inc. v.

Microsoft Corp., 2009 WL 2370727, at *9 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2009). In addition, although the

specifications mention all three of Defendant’s suggested limitations, there is no support for

their importation into the construction of the term website. 

Accordingly, the Court adopts the following construction: “one or more related web

pages at a location on the World Wide Web.”

2. “Non-Scrolling Ad Frame”

The term “non-scrolling ad frame” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29

of the ’651 Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “non-scrolling ad frame” should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning and must be construed to mean “a frame which displays an ad and does not

scroll (when the user scrolls).” (KlausTech’s Opening Brief at 9; Reply at 5.) Defendant, on

the other hand, argues that the term must be construed to mean “an HTML frame element that is

used to display ad content and is constantly located with regard to the viewed screen of the

browser.” (Id.)

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The key dispute between the parties is the addition of two elements: (1) the nonscrolling ad frame is used to display ad content and constantly located with regard to the viewed

screen of the browser, and (2) the non-scrolling ad frame is an HTML frame element. 

Again, the Court finds that, on this current record, it cannot import the HTML limitation

into the claim term without further discovery and briefing. KlausTech agreed that the nonscrolling could be defined to mean constantly located with regard to the viewed screen of the

browser.

The Court adopts the following construction: “a frame element which displays an ad

and is constantly located with regard to the viewed screen of the browser.”

3. “Transmitting At Least One Page With a Non-Scrolling Ad Frame to a

Browser”

The term “transmitting at least one page with a non-scrolling ad frame to a browser”

appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of the ’651 Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “transmitting at least one page with a non-scrolling ad

frame to a browser” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and must be construed to

mean “transmitting at least one page with a non-scrolling ad frame to a browser.” (KlausTech’s

Opening Brief at 10.) Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the term must be construed to

mean “transmitting to a browser at least one page displayed outside the non-scrolling ad frame

and that retrieves a non-scrolling ad frame from the central controller.” (Id.) 

The key dispute between the parties is the proposed addition by Defendant of the

identity and function of the page being transmitted as “displayed outside the non-scrolling ad

frame” (i.e., that it is not the ad frame content) and the page retrieves a non-scrolling ad frame

from the central controller. 

The Court adopts the following construction: “separately transmitting to a browser at

least one page with an independent non-scrolling ad frame.”

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4. “Individual Timer”

The term “individual timer” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of the

’651 Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “individual timer” should be given its plain and ordinary

meaning and must be construed to mean “the timer that corresponds to each ad.” (KlausTech’s

Opening Brief at 12.) Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the term must be construed to

mean “a timer specific to the ad content, set by the advertiser, and that sets a guaranteed

minimum interval of display in the screen of the browser.” (Id.)

The key dispute between the parties is the importation of the advertiser as the one

setting the timer, and the idea that the timer sets a guaranteed minimum interval of display. The

parties agreed that the timer must correspond to set the display time specifically to each ad.

The patent explicitly sets out that “it is possible to give the advertiser direct control of

ad content and ad duration used with this system.” (’651 Patent at 5:65-67 (emphasis added).) 

But an allusion to one possible implementation does not allow the Court to import the limitation

as a required element into the definition of the term. In addition, the preamble of Claim 20

alludes to aim to achieve “ad display with guaranteed minimum timed intervals” but not clear

that preamble can limit the definition of a term. See Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v.

Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d

473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally

complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose of intended

use for the invention.”)). At the claims construction hearing, the parties agreed to the limitation

“for a specific amount of time” which the Court adds to its construction.

The Court adopts the following construction: “an individual timer specific to set the ad

display for a specific amount of time.”

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5. “Central Controller”

The term “central controller” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of the

’651 Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “central controller” should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning and must be construed to mean “typically a computer or collection of

computers.” (KlausTech’s Opening Brief at 14.) Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the

term must be construed as a means plus function term governed by 35 U.S.C. section 112

paragraph 6, indicating that the function should be found to be: “interrogating for browser

identity and maintaining records associated with the browser identity indicating ad identity

displayed, and timer timeout.” And the corresponding structure Defendant advances is: “system

controller S as described by the ’651 Patent Fig. 1, 4:23-5:6.” (Id.) 

In the alternative, Defendant proffers an alternate construction of the term “central

controller” to mean “a device or collection of devices having a database to provide site

accounting used to compensate advertisers for the total time of ad display to a particular

browser and that directs non-scrolling ad frame set up in the browser; generates, dispenses and

interrogates for unique browser identifiers; maintains records associated with the unique

browser identifiers indicating ads displayed and ads available for display; and dispatches to

inquiring browsers ad content.” (Id.)

The first key dispute between the parties is whether Section 112, paragraph 6 governs

where the term “fails to (1) recite sufficiently definite structure or else (2) recites function

without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online,

792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). KlausTech’s contention that the

“central controller” is typically a computer or collection of computers may indicate that the term

does not connote any specific structure. Defendant also proffers an alternative construction, but

Defendant’s proposal selects statements from the specification and reads them into the claims. 

In addition to advocating that the generic meaning of this term is sufficient, KlausTech

contends that the term “central controller” should not be considered a means-plus-function term

lacking the word “means.” However, merely because a terms does not include the word

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“means” does not automatically prevent the term from being construed as means-plus-function

element. See, e.g., Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 431 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “In

making the assessment of whether the limitation in question is means-plus-function term subject

to the strictures of § 112, para. 6, our cases have emphasized that the essential inquiry is not

merely the presence or absence of the word ‘means’ but whether the words of the claim are

understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the

name for structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. If a term lacks the word “means,” the

presumption can be overcome and section 112, paragraph 6 will apply if the challenger

demonstrates that the claim term fails “to recite [] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites

“function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. (citing Watts v.

XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Here, the construction proffered by

KlausTech does not advance the jury’s understanding of this very vague term. Without

indicating the function of the structure, the Court finds the generic term is essentially without

meaning.

Construction of a means-plus-function claim involves a two-step process. Medical

Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In

the first step, the Court must identify the particular claimed function. Id. In the second step, the

Court looks to the specification and identifies the structure that corresponds to that function. Id. 

A structure is a “corresponding structure” only if that element is necessary to perform the

function recited in the claim and is clearly linked to that function by the disclosure in the

specification. Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The

patentee’s “duty to clearly link or associate structure to the claimed function” represents the fair

exchange for the convenience of employing means-plus-function claim limitations. Budde v.

Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The Court adopts the following construction: “A computer or collection of computers

for interrogating for browser identity and maintaining records associated with the browser

identity indicating ad identity displayed, and timer timeout.”

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6. “Interrogating”

The term “interrogating” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of the ’651

Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “interrogating” should be given its plain and ordinary

meaning and must be construed to mean “simply checking for a condition/status or for the

existence of specific information.” (KlausTech’s Opening Brief at 17.) Defendant, on the other

hand, argues that the term must be construed to mean “requesting information to obtain an

answer.” (Id.)

The parties agree that the term means “requesting,” but had disputed whether the

construction should include the provision that the component is requesting information “to

obtain an answer.” At the claims construction hearing, they agreed to omit that portion of the

proposed construction.

The Court adopts the following construction: “requesting information.”

7. “Timer Timeout Report”

The term “timer timeout report” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of

the ’651 Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “timer timeout report” should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning to be “the report containing timer timeout information” or alternatively, to

mean “reporting from the browser to the central controller of the timer timeout of the ad

content.” (KlausTech’s Opening Brief at 19.) Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the

term must be construed to mean “a report or record of time of display that is recorded at the

central controller and records the timeout of the ad content that was displayed in the screen of

the browser for a guaranteed minimum time interval.” (Id.)

The key disputes between the parties are (1) whether the term is properly construed to

indicate it is “recorded at the central controller” and (2) whether the term includes the time of

display. Defendant also seeks to add the limitation that the “ad content that was displayed in

the screen of the browser for a guaranteed minimum interval.”

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The Court adopts the following construction: “a report or record of the guaranteed

minimum time interval an ad was displayed that is recorded at the central controller.”

8. Browser Identity.

Although KlausTech did not raise any arguments in their opening claim construction

brief on the meaning of this term, KlausTech preserved their dispute by briefing contesting the

construction in the parties’ joint claim construction and prehearing statement. (See Statement at

6-7.) 

The term “browser identity” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29 of the

’651 Patent.

KlausTech argues that the term “browser identity” should be given its plain and ordinary

meaning. (Id.) Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the term must be construed to mean “a

unique identifier for the browser.” (Id. at 6.)

The key dispute between the parties is whether the browser identity must be unique. 

The Court finds without this specification, the term is rendered without significant meaning. 

The identifier is described in the patent as following a unique browser. (See ’651 Patent at 3:3-

6, 3:12-15.) “Different terms or phrases in separate claims may be construed to cover the same

subject matter where the written description and prosecution history indicate that such a reading

of the terms or phrases is proper.” Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted). 

The Court adopts the following construction: “a unique identifier for the browser.” 

9. Non-Scrolling Ad Display.

Again, although KlausTech did not raise any arguments in their opening claim

construction brief on the meaning of this term, KlausTech preserved their dispute by briefing

contesting the construction in the parties’ joint claim construction and prehearing statement. 

(See Statement at 7-8.) 

The term “non-scrolling ad display” appears in Claims 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29

of the ’651 Patent.

Case 4:10-cv-05899-JSW Document 176 Filed 05/23/16 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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KlausTech argues that the term “non-scrolling ad display” should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning. (Id. at 8) Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the term must be

construed to mean “a graphical display in the screen of the browser of ad content within a nonscrolling ad frame.” (Id.)

In its reply, KlausTech states that it does not dispute Defendant’s proffered construction. 

Accordingly, the Court adopts the following construction: “a graphical display in the

screen of the browser of ad content within a non-scrolling ad frame.” 

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis set forth above, the Court adopts the foregoing constructions of

the disputed terms. The parties are ORDERED to submit a further joint case management

report pursuant to Patent Standing Order ¶ 13 by no later than June 24, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2016 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:10-cv-05899-JSW Document 176 Filed 05/23/16 Page 14 of 14