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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2010 Decided June 22, 2010 

No. 09-5187 

MALCOLM G. SCHAEFER, 

APPELLANT

v. 

JOHN MCHUGH, 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-01550-RJL) 

Ryan C. Morris argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Paul J. Zidlicky. 

Kathryn A. Donnelly, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief 

were Channing D. Phillips, Acting United States Attorney, R. 

Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, and Major 

Joshua M. Toman, U.S. Army Litigation Division. 

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Malcolm Schaefer pointed 

to his bad knees as a reason to get out of his Army service. 

But Schaefer was an Army lawyer. Bad knees typically do 

not preclude service as a lawyer. The Army therefore rejected 

Schaefer’s request for discharge. But because of an 

administrative foul-up, Schaefer was able to obtain papers 

showing his legal discharge. Shortly afterwards, the Army 

informed Schaefer that he had to return to service. Schaefer 

did so, and the Army then took disciplinary action against him 

for his apparent shenanigans. In this litigation, Schaefer 

argues, in essence, that he beat the system by obtaining papers 

showing his discharge and that subsequent Army disciplinary 

actions against him were invalid. The District Court rejected 

Schaefer’s challenge, granting summary judgment to the 

Secretary of the Army. We affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. 

I 

The U.S. Army paid for Malcolm Schaefer’s law school 

education in return for a six-year commitment to the Army. 

As of 2000, Schaefer was in the fourth year of his six-year 

active-duty service obligation. He was serving as an officer 

in the United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps at 

Fort Benning, Georgia. 

 Beginning in late 2000, Schaefer sought a medical 

discharge from the Army because of injuries to his knees. He 

did so without informing anyone in his JAG Corps chain of 

command. Based on discharge orders issued in early July 

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2001, Schaefer was to be separated from the Army on 

September 14, 2001. 

In late July 2001, the JAG Corps found out about 

Schaefer’s pending separation – not because Schaefer 

informed his superiors, but because a JAG Corps employee 

happened to come across his discharge orders when updating 

records. Surprised to find that Schaefer was scheduled for 

medical separation – after all, Schaefer was a lawyer, and not 

in combat or in a non-combat position requiring significant 

physical activity – the JAG Corps took immediate action. 

The chief of the JAG Personnel Office informed the U.S. 

Army Physical Disability Agency (the entity within the Army 

that coordinates medical discharges) that Schaefer’s medical 

problems would not impair his ability to serve as a military 

lawyer. On August 14, 2001, the Army therefore revoked the 

authorization for Schaefer’s discharge orders. The Army then 

issued a new medical determination deeming Schaefer fit for 

duty. The Army informed Schaefer of that determination on 

September 5, 2001. Schaefer’s superiors also told him that 

his September discharge had been placed on hold. 

Schaefer nonetheless showed up to obtain a discharge on 

Friday, September 14, 2001. Because of a paperwork foul-up, 

Schaefer was mistakenly issued a discharge certificate that 

day. Schaefer’s chain of command learned of this the 

following Monday – September 17, 2001 – when they came 

to work to find Schaefer’s office empty. 

 The Army soon sent Schaefer a letter informing him that 

if he did not report back to Fort Benning, the Army would 

take steps to return him to military control. After failing to 

obtain a court injunction preventing the Army from taking 

action against him, Schaefer resumed work as a member of 

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the JAG Corps. See Schaefer v. White, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 

1384 (M.D. Ga. 2001). 

In the months following his return, the Army issued 

Schaefer both a highly critical Officer Evaluation and a 

Memorandum of Reprimand for wrongfully obtaining his 

discharge certificate. The Army also brought charges against 

Schaefer for obtaining a fraudulent discharge in violation of 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Rather than undergo 

trial by court-martial, Schaefer submitted a voluntary 

Resignation for the Good of the Service. As a result of his 

resignation, Schaefer left the Army on October 1, 2002. 

 Almost two years after his resignation, Schaefer filed a 

request with the Army Board for Correction of Military 

Records – the body authorized by the Secretary of the Army 

to correct Army personnel files – to have certain entries in his 

official military personnel file removed. See 10 U.S.C. § 

1552(a)(1). As relevant here, Schaefer asked the Correction 

Board to (1) validate his September 2001 discharge, (2) 

nullify his October 2002 discharge, (3) expunge the adverse 

Officer Evaluation, Memorandum of Reprimand, and 

resignation from his record, and (4) stop the Army from 

recouping the severance pay he received in association with 

his 2001 medical discharge. 

The Correction Board denied Schaefer’s request. The 

Board concluded that Schaefer’s September 14, 2001, 

discharge orders lacked legal effect because the authority to 

issue those orders had been revoked. The Board also 

concluded that Schaefer failed to show that his negative 

Officer Evaluation, Memorandum of Reprimand, or 

resignation should be removed from his military service 

record “to correct an error or remove an injustice.” Id.

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Schaefer then filed suit in U.S. District Court, arguing 

primarily that the Correction Board’s decision was arbitrary, 

capricious, and contrary to law. The District Court granted 

summary judgment to the Secretary of the Army. 

This Court reviews the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. The courts review the Correction Board’s 

decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary 

and capricious standard. Kidwell v. Department of the Army, 

56 F.3d 279, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As a general matter, 

judicial review under that standard is deferential. When 

assessing a Correction Board decision, courts employ an 

“unusually deferential application of the arbitrary or 

capricious standard.” Musengo v. White, 286 F.3d 535, 538 

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cone 

v. Caldera, 223 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

II 

Schaefer asserts that he was validly discharged from the 

U.S. Army on September 14, 2001, and that the Correction 

Board should erase all traces of adverse action the Army took 

against him after that date. Relatedly, Schaefer argues that 

even if the Army did in fact revoke his September 14, 2001, 

discharge, the Army did not follow its own procedures in 

doing so. We will consider each argument in turn. 

A 

 The Army Board for Correction of Military Records 

rejected Schaefer’s claim that he was validly discharged from 

the Army on September 14, 2001. The Board’s decision was 

reasonable and reasonably explained. 

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After thoroughly considering the facts of Schaefer’s case, 

the Correction Board concluded that his September 14, 2001, 

discharge was “without legal effect because the authority to 

issue it had been revoked well before that date.” J.A. 126. 

That finding comports with military court precedent 

establishing that “the mistaken delivery of a discharge 

certificate” which has “no legal effect” and which has 

“previously been revoked” does not “terminate” military 

service. United States v. Garvin, 26 M.J. 194, 194-96 

(C.M.A. 1988). The issuing authority “must have intended 

the discharge to take effect” for that discharge to terminate 

service. United States v. Harmon, 63 M.J. 98, 101 (C.A.A.F. 

2006). 

 Schaefer offers no persuasive grounds on which to 

second-guess the Correction Board’s conclusion. The Board 

reasonably concluded that Schaefer was not lawfully 

discharged from the Army on September 14, 2001. 

B 

The Correction Board also rejected Schaefer’s claim that 

Army procedures were not followed in revoking the 

authorization for his discharge. 

Schaefer contends that the wrong Army entity revoked 

the authorization for his discharge – that one entity (the U.S. 

Army Physical Disability Agency) issued the order when 

another entity (the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command) had 

the sole authority to do so. The Correction Board reviewed 

the application of the relevant regulations in detail and 

concluded that the Army did not commit procedural error 

when it revoked the authorization for Schaefer’s discharge. 

Moreover, the Board recognized that any de minimis violation 

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of regulations when the Army revoked Schaefer’s discharge 

did not harm Schaefer. 

We agree with the Board’s latter rationale and need not 

consider the former. A party claiming harm from an agency’s 

failure to follow its own rules must demonstrate some form of 

prejudice. See Battle v. FAA, 393 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 

2005); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). Schaefer was well aware that the Army had revoked 

the authorization for his discharge. He was also directly 

informed by his chain of command that his discharge was on 

hold. Schaefer failed to show that he suffered any prejudice 

from the Army’s alleged error regarding which entity could 

technically revoke the authorization for his discharge. 

C 

In his brief, Schaefer also suggests that Article 3(b) of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice is unconstitutional as 

applied to him. That provision states: “Each person 

discharged from the armed forces who is later charged with 

having fraudulently obtained his discharge is . . . subject to 

trial by court-martial on that charge and is after apprehension 

subject to this chapter while in the custody of the armed 

forces for that trial.” 10 U.S.C. § 803(b). That provision is 

not relevant here. Article 3(b) applies only to individuals who 

are actually “discharged from the armed forces” and then 

returned to the military to face court-martial. Id. As we have 

explained, Schaefer remained in the military until his 

voluntary resignation in 2002. Thus we need not consider the 

constitutionality of Article 3(b). 

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* * * 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

 

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