Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07116/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07116-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Case No. 18-07116 BLF (PR) 

ORDER DEN. PET. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DEN. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RANDY ALANA, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 18-07116 BLF (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; DIRECTIONS 

TO CLERK 

 Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 challenging his 2016 criminal judgment. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”). Respondent filed 

an answer on the merits. Dkt. No. 15 (“Answer”). Petitioner filed a traverse. Dkt. No. 24 

(“Traverse”). For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 A jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder, second-degree robbery, the 

unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, and two counts of grand theft. See Ans., Ex. A at 

524-29; see also Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 187, 211, 484e(d); Cal. Veh. Code, § 10851(a). In 

addition, the jury found Petitioner had nine serious or violent felony priors and five prior 

prison terms, and imposed enhancements. See Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 667, 667.5, 1170.12. 

On June 18, 2015, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 75 years to life in prison for 

the first-degree murder conviction; a consecutive term of 31 years to life in prison for the 

second-degree robbery conviction; and 25 years in prison for the enhancements. See Ans., 

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Ex. A at 532-41. The trial court stayed sentencing on the remaining counts. See id.; see 

also Cal. Pen. Code § 654. In sum, Petitioner was sentenced to 131 years to life in prison. 

 On August 10, 2017, the California Court of Appeal (“state appellate court”) 

affirmed the judgment. See Ans., Ex. C; see also People v. Alana, No. A145501, 2017 WL 

3431728 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2017) (unpublished). On November 15, 2017, the 

California Supreme Court summarily denied a petition for review. See Ans., Ex. D2. 

When the last state court to adjudicate a federal constitutional claim on the merits 

does not provide an explanation for the denial,” the federal court should ‘look through’ the 

unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant 

rationale.” Wilson v. Sellers, ––– U.S. –––, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). “It should then 

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. Here, the 

California Supreme Court did not provide an explanation for its denial of the petition for 

review. See Ans., Ex. D. Petitioner did not argue that the California Supreme Court relied 

on different grounds than the state appellate court. See generally, Pet. Accordingly, this 

Court will “look through” the California Supreme Court’s decision to the state appellate 

court’s decision. See Skidmore v. Lizarraga, No. 14-CV-04222-BLF, 2019 WL 1245150, 

at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Wilson). 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on November 13, 2018. See Dkt. 

No. 1 (“Petition”). The Petition does not identify Petitioner’s habeas claims, but instead 

attaches Petitioner’s brief to the Supreme Court of California as argument. See generally, 

Pet., Ex. A (“Petition Exhibit A”). 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 The following background facts are from the opinion of the state appellate court on 

direct appeal: 

A. Appellant’s Relationship with the Victim, Sandra Coke 

In 1993, Sandra Coke was a criminal defense investigator for the 

California Appellate Project, working on the case of death row 

inmate David Mason. Coke was assigned the task of locating 

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and interviewing appellant about his friendship with Mason. 

Coke found appellant in Santa Rita Jail and obtained an affidavit 

from him. She subsequently told her boss that appellant was 

charismatic, good looking and smart. According to appellant, 

Coke was receptive to his advances and a romantic relationship 

quickly ensued. 

For most of the time that appellant and Coke knew each other, 

appellant was either in jail or prison. Although Coke told some 

friends and family she was involved with a man named Randy, 

she did not tell them about his criminal history or that he was in 

prison. Appellant was the father of Coke’s daughter, Jane Doe,

who was born in 1998. Coke raised Jane Doe by herself, telling

people that the father was out of the picture or that he lived out 

of state. Coke confided to one friend that Jane Doe’s father was 

not involved in their life because he was a bad guy with a 

criminal history. 

In June 2012, appellant completed a lengthy prison sentence and

was released on parole. He moved to Oakland, lived in a motel 

and secured a job at Caltrans through a prison work program. 

Because of a prior rape conviction, appellant was required to 

wear a GPS ankle device and excluded from living in specified 

areas. In January 2013, appellant became transient, which 

meant he could not spend more than six hours a day at one 

location unless he registered for residential status. 

In January 2013, Coke and her daughter were also living in 

Oakland. When Coke learned that appellant was out of custody, 

she offered her assistance and the two began spending time 

together. Coke continued to keep appellant’s criminal history a 

secret, but told Jane Doe that he was her father and told friends 

that he had recently returned to the area. Jane Doe was not 

comfortable around appellant, but Coke often allowed him to 

spend time at their house and to keep his clothes in a spare room. 

Coke also provided appellant with financial support and let him

borrow her car. 

By spring 2013, Coke was confiding in friends about problems 

she was having with appellant. For example, he took her car 

without permission and kept it overnight. He also stole items 

from her home, including a camera, her daughter’s headphones, 

and two bicycles. Coke began to create a record of appellant’s

misconduct. On April 26, 2013, she filed a police report that her 

car had been stolen, and she suspected appellant had taken it 

without her permission. Later that day, she reported that the car 

was returned. In May, Coke filed disputes with her bank about 

checks that appellant had forged and cashed against her account. 

B. Appellant’s Arrest for Violating Parole 

On May 9, 2013, appellant was arrested after Coke filed a 

complaint with his parole officer. Coke’s written statement, 

which was admitted into evidence at appellant’s trial, described 

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the following incident: On May 8, Coke reluctantly agreed that 

appellant could sleep in her house while she and her daughter 

were out for the day. Initially, Coke told appellant he could only 

use the garage because he was taking drugs again and pawning 

things to support his habit. However, appellant convinced Coke

that he was not that desperate and that if she trusted him in the 

garage she should also trust him in the house. When Coke 

arrived home that evening she realized that she forgot to unlock 

the deadbolt, which meant appellant was locked out of the 

house. Then she discovered that her dog, Ginny, and two 

bicycles were missing. Appellant did not respond to frantic calls 

and texts from Coke until early the next morning, when he sent 

her the following text message: “Question of the day. Is a dog

worth $1,000?” Coke paid appellant $1,000, but he did not 

return Ginny, making a “litany of excuses” as to why he could 

not do so. 

While Coke wrote her May 9 statement, appellant’s parole 

officer used the GPS monitor to locate appellant at an Oakland 

motel where he was arrested after attempting to flee. Appellant 

was sentenced to 150 days for parole violations and ordered to 

serve 75 days in custody. The day after his July 23 release, 

appellant attempted to falsify a drug test and spent another 

several days in jail. 

Meanwhile, Coke’s desperation to find Ginny became an 

obsession. Between May and August 2013, Coke visited 

appellant in jail at least seven times and spoke to him on the 

telephone at least 70 times. During conversations that were 

recorded by the jail, Coke pleaded with appellant to tell her what 

he had done with Ginny, and threatened to cooperate with the 

police unless he did. Appellant expressed anger and hatred 

toward Coke for putting him back in jail, suggesting at one point 

that he should blow the dog’s brains out in front of her, but he 

also played on her sympathies and gave her false leads about 

how Ginny might be found. 

While appellant was in jail, Coke told friends she was going to

end her relationship with appellant, but she needed to stay in 

contact with him until she got her dog back. Dianna Oglethorpe, a work friend from the federal public defender’s office, testified 

that when Coke talked to her about appellant in July 2013, she 

was always visibly upset and frightened. She knew she needed 

to end her relationship with appellant, but was not sure how to

do it. In the summer of 2013, Coke told her good friend Wendy 

Springer that after appellant was released from jail, she wanted 

to pick him up and look for Ginny one last time and then “the 

relationship would be over.” Springer recalled that Coke was so 

angry, frustrated, and sad that she no longer had any love for 

appellant. But, she wanted to maintain contact so that when 

appellant got out of jail she could pick him up and he would take 

her to Ginny. 

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During this time, appellant continued to give Coke false hope 

that Ginny could be found in order to dissuade her from 

cooperating with law enforcement. Appellant discussed this 

strategy with his best friend Keven Qualls during his telephone

calls from jail. As appellant told Qualls, “that dog ain’t to be 

found.” Appellant also discussed the matter with a fellow 

inmate at the jail, Sean Zukowsky. Appellant told Zukowsky 

that he killed Ginny because the dog was Coke’s “pride and joy.” 

Appellant also confided that he was “playing the bitch” for 

money, and if Coke was not part of his “program,” he would 

“place hands on her.” Appellant also told Zukowsky that it 

disgusted him to even look at Coke after she sent him to jail; that 

an ex-wife or girlfriend had done that to him in the past; and that 

he would never be with a woman who called the cops on him. 

Throughout the summer, appellant’s parole officer made 

“countless” requests that Coke report the bike thefts and the theft 

of $1,000 to the Oakland police. Initially, Coke said she would, 

but by the end of the summer she was only interested in getting

her dog back. 

On August 1, 2013, appellant was released from custody. He 

was required to wear an ankle GPS monitor, and ordered not to 

contact Coke. But he went to Coke’s house the following day, 

which was Coke’s birthday. The day after that, Coke paid for 

appellant’s hotel room. 

C. Coke’s Disappearance and Murder 

On the morning of August 4, 2013, Coke went to church. 

Around 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, she had an early dinner with a

man she had started dating. After she returned home, between 

8:00 and 8:30 p.m. that night, Coke had two phone conversations

with appellant. Then Coke told Jane Doe that she was going out

with appellant to look for Ginny and would return in 20 

minutes. At 10:12 p.m., Jane Doe received a call from the cell

phone Coke used for work. A female stranger said she found 

the phone in the middle of a street in Emeryville. After several 

calls to her mother’s personal cell phone went unanswered, Jane

Doe called 911, all the while using her “Find My iPhone app” to

watch the phone travel east then north toward Vacaville. 

On August 5, 2013, police found Coke’s phone on an off-ramp 

of the I–80 freeway. On August 9, they found Coke’s body in a 

dry creek bed in Vacaville. She was wearing the same clothes 

she had been wearing when she left home the night of August 4, 

although her shoes were missing. Her cause of death was 

asphyxia due to strangulation. 

D. Police Investigation of Appellant’s Activities 

Using data from appellant’s GPS monitor, police traced 

appellant’s steps on the evening of August 4, 2013. From 8:28 

until 8:42 p.m., appellant traveled to various locations in 

Oakland at a speed consistent with being in a car. At 8:42 p.m., 

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appellant was at a motel known as a place to buy and use drugs. He left that location around 40 minutes later, again at a speed

consistent with being in a car. At 9:23 p.m., appellant’s monitor 

stopped transmitting data, and he went “off the grid.” 

Investigators used Coke’s bank records, surveillance video from

street cameras, and witness statements to piece together some of 

appellant’s activities on August 5, 2013. Shortly after midnight, 

appellant drove Coke’s car to a convenience store where he used

Coke’s bank card to withdraw $400 from an ATM 

machine. Then he went to a “trap house” in Oakland where he 

picked up Deanna Smith. Appellant and Smith drove Coke’s car 

to a Motel 6. At 3:12 a.m., they checked into a room where they 

smoked “a lot” of crack and had oral sex. At around 7:00 

a.m., they drove Coke’s car to a Chevron station where appellant 

made two failed attempts to use an ATM machine to withdraw 

money from Coke’s bank account. 

At around 9:30 a.m. on the morning of August 5, appellant 

parked Coke’s car in the parking lot of an Oakland Housing 

Authority apartment complex, then walked to a stairwell where 

he sat down. A maintenance worker concerned by appellant’s 

demeanor contacted dispatch, but appellant was gone by the 

time an officer arrived. When police searched Coke’s car, they

found her shoes under the brake and gas petals. Coke’s purse, 

FasTrak transponder and ID were in the car, along with Ginny’s 

green blanket. Coke’s wallet was never found. 

On the afternoon of August 5, 2013, appellant had a telephone 

conversation with his nephew, Angelo Gross. Appellant asked 

for money and a gun, telling Gross he was not going back to 

jail. When Gross asked about Coke, appellant said something 

like “Don’t start acting square on me now. You know how I get 

down. She’s probably where her dog is at.” Gross contacted 

police and assisted them in luring appellant to a meeting location 

where he was arrested. 

E. Appellant’s Trial Testimony 

At trial, appellant denied that he killed Coke. He admitted that 

he stole checks from her and cashed them when he needed 

money. He also admitted taking or stealing the bicycles and 

headphones, and that he did not always return Coke’s car on time 

when she let him borrow it. However, appellant claimed that he

had permission to use Coke’s debit card to get cash. Appellant

also testified that he did not steal Coke’s dog. According to 

appellant, Ginny got out when he opened the gate. Appellant 

claimed that he subsequently tried to find the dog and that he 

also attempted to return Coke’s $1,000, but she refused to take

it back. 

Appellant testified that on the morning of August 4, 2013, he 

and appellant went to church together and then searched for 

Ginny at dog kennels and animal shelters. Appellant was aware 

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that Coke had a date that afternoon, claiming that he was not 

concerned about it because she was just trying to make him 

appreciate her more, and that he made her feel good by 

pretending he was going to show up and “punch her date in the 

face.” 

Appellant testified that he and Coke got together on the evening 

of August 4, 2013, because he needed to get some things from 

Coke’s car and she wanted to help him find a place to stay that

night. While they were together, Coke began to follow the car 

of someone who she believed had information about her dog. 

Eventually, they ended up at a trap house in Richmond where 

appellant got high while Coke was questioning people outside. 

When he rejoined her, Coke asked him to take her car and debit 

card and go get cash at an ATM while she stayed and continued 

to talk with people who appeared to have information about 

Ginny. That was the last time appellant saw Coke; when he 

returned with the money, Coke was gone. Appellant was not 

worried about her though because she was courageous and she 

was on “her mission.” So he went back into the trap house and 

took more drugs, intending to “disappear” for a while, as he had 

done “many times” before. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728 at *1–4. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

 This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). The writ may not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state 

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

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of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set 

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is 

in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state 

court decision. Id. at 412; Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). While 

circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state 

court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the 

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be 

“reasonably” applied. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.), overruled on 

other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 

 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme 

Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ 

clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

B. Claims and Analyses 

 Petitioner raises the following seven claims in this federal habeas petition: 

(1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding a murder that occurred 

thirty years ago; 

(2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he assaulted his wife thirty years 

ago; 

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(3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he kidnapped and assaulted a 

prostitute who was his girlfriend twenty years ago; 

(4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of victim’s hearsay statements 

alleging Petitioner had committed various bad acts; 

(5) the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause in 

admitting the victim’s hearsay statements;1

(6) the trial court erred in failing to give limiting instructions that the victim’s 

extrajudicial statements were admitted not for the truth of the matter but as evidence of the 

victim’s state of mind; and 

(7) cumulative error. 

Because Petitioner’s claims that the trial court erred in admitting Petitioner’s prior 

bad acts (claims 1-3) turn on the same law, the Court will address those claims together, 

and first. The Court then will address Petitioner’s claims that turn on the admission of his 

victim’s statements (claims 4-6). Finally, the Court will address Petitioner’s claim of 

cumulative error (claim 7) last. 

1. Bad Acts Claims 

At the trial for the murder of Sandra Coke, the prosecution introduced evidence of 

three prior violent acts allegedly committed by Petitioner: the 1983 murder of Marilyn 

Piggott, a 1983 assault by Petitioner on Petitioner’s ex-wife, and a 1993 assault by 

Petitioner on Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend. Petitioner claims that this testimony constituted 

impermissible character or propensity evidence, and that its admission at trial violated his 

right to due process and was prejudicial. See Pet., Ex. A at 11-34 (stating claims 1-3). 

1

 The Court notes that the Order to Show Cause only identified claims 1-4, 6, and 7. See

Dkt. No. 8 (referring to Pet. at 12-13). However, a review of the record reveals that 

Petitioner also raised a claim based on the Confrontation Clause. See Pet., Ex. A at 18, 37, 

39, 40. In addition, Petitioner argued in the Traverse that his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause had been violated. See generally, Tr. Although Respondent did not 

address Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim in the Answer, see generally, Ans., the 

Court independently addresses that claim herein, and concludes that Petitioner’s claim 

based on the Confrontation Clause fails. 

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The facts underlying these claims, as summarized by the state appellate court, are as 

follows: 

F. Appellant’s Prior Similar Crimes 

At appellant’s trial, the prosecution presented evidence of three 

incidents from appellant’s past in which he allegedly engaged in 

conduct similar to the charged offenses. 

The first incident was the August 13, 1983 murder of Marilyn 

Piggott. Joel Morgan, a childhood friend of appellant, testified 

that on the morning of August 13, he rented a motel room for 

appellant because appellant did not have identification. 

Appellant had a bag full of money and drugs, and over the next 

few days the two spent time together taking drugs and having 

sex with a prostitute. At one point when they were alone in the 

hotel room, appellant told Morgan that he murdered a woman in 

North Oakland because she fired him. Appellant said he had 

been working as a doorman or bodyguard for the women, who 

was a drug dealer. He also told Morgan that he stole money and

drugs from the victim. Weeks later, appellant asked Morgan to 

give him an alibi for the time of the Piggott murder. When 

Morgan refused, appellant threatened him. 

Piggott’s best friend Rayma Smith also testified at appellant’s

trial in this case. Smith lived down the hall from the apartment 

where Piggott was found face down on her bed with a hammer 

in her head. Smith testified that shortly before Piggott was 

murdered she confided to Smith that she was afraid of appellant, but that she was also angry at him because he had stolen money 

from her. On the day of the murder, Smith was on her way out 

to the store when she saw Piggott and appellant in a heated 

argument. Piggott was accusing appellant of stealing and 

appellant was telling her to be “cool” in a threatening manner. Smith stayed around until she felt her friend was safe, but when 

she returned from the store several hours later another neighbor 

told her that Piggott was dead. 

The jury heard other details about appellant’s involvement in the 

crime including the fact that when he was arrested police found

Piggott’s jewelry in his car. The jury was also told that appellant 

was tried twice for Piggott’s murder and ultimately acquitted in 

1986. 

The second incident involved appellant’s ex-wife, Vickie R. 

Vickie R. testified that, at some time prior to June 25, 1983, she 

ended her relationship with appellant and took his house keys. 

On the evening of June 25, Vickie R. was lying on her sofa when

she heard banging on the door and the next thing she knew 

appellant had broken down her door. He started punching her in

the face with a closed fist, then dragged her up the stairs and

tried to strangle her with his hands. She managed to get away 

and ran into the street where she flagged down a cab driver who

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helped her contact the police. A few months later, Vickie R. 

arrived home early in the morning and found that her porch light 

had been turned off. She called the police for a security check. 

Officers found appellant inside the house and arrested him for 

Piggott’s murder, which had occurred a few weeks earlier. 

Finally, the jury heard about a 1993 incident involving Michelle 

S. Michelle S. testified that she and appellant had a dating 

relationship that included getting high and having sex in his 

motel room. One night in October, appellant asked her to go 

someplace with him, but she refused because she was with a 

friend. Appellant slapped her, chased after her when she tried

to run away, and pushed her into a car driven by his friend. 

Appellant wanted money from Michelle S., but she did not have 

any. She offered to prostitute herself so she could make money

for appellant. When appellant agreed, she was able to flag down 

someone who drove her home. Appellant was arrested for 

battery and kidnapping. But, after appellant spoke with 

Michelle S., she refused to cooperate with police and the charges 

were dropped. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728 at *4–5. 

a. The Piggott Murder 

The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim that admission of evidence 

regarding the Piggott murder violated Petitioner’s due process, finding that the testimony 

was properly admitted under state evidence rules: 

The record also demonstrates that evidence of the Piggott 

murder was properly admitted under to section 1101. As noted, 

the trial court denied the prosecutor’s motion to admit this 

evidence under section 1109 because there was insufficient 

evidence that the Piggott murder involved domestic violence. 

But it did find evidence of a prior dating relationship between

appellant and Piggott, and it concluded that this fact was one of 

several “points of similarity” between the two incidents. In 

addition, the court found that both murders were committed a 

short time after appellant was released from prison, when he 

lacked financial security and relied on the victims for money 

and, to some extent, for a place to stay. Furthermore, appellant 

stole from both victims, both victims accused appellant of 

stealing from him, and in both cases these accusations allegedly 

led to “a violent confrontation that resulted in the death.” In 

light of these multiple similarities, the court properly exercised 

its discretion by concluding that evidence of the Piggott murder 

was “highly material and relevant on the issue of motive and 

intent.” 

In considering possible countervailing factors under section 352, 

the court reiterated that the Piggott murder was not too remote

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because appellant had been incarcerated for most of the relevant 

time period. Furthermore, there was no evidence that appellant

had changed in some way that would diminish the probative 

value of the evidence. The court also concluded that evidence 

of the Piggott murder was not unduly inflammatory or 

prejudicial, noting that the jury would not see any photographic 

evidence. The court acknowledged that striking someone with 

a hammer is a very violent act. But it reasonably concluded that 

the Piggott murder was not more inflammatory than the charged 

crime because Coke’s murder by strangulation was not only 

violent, but extremely personal, intimate and outrageous. 

Appellant argues there are two obvious dissimilarities between 

these murders: Piggott was murdered with a hammer, while 

Coke was strangled; and Piggott died in her apartment, while 

Coke was abandoned in a dry creek bed. The fact that appellant

can draw distinctions like this does not mean that the trial court 

was precluded from considering and relying on the similarities 

outlined above. Nor do these distinctions dilute the probative

value of the Piggott murder. If this evidence had been offered

to prove identity or a common plan, the fact that the murder was 

accomplished in a different physical environment with a 

different weapon might be of concern. But this evidence was 

admitted to prove motive and it was probative of the prosecution 

theory that appellant killed Coke because she was no longer 

useful to him as a source of support. [FN 2] 

 [FN 2: Appellant separately contends that the 

Piggott murder was “not very probative” as to 

the issues of motive or intent. However, 

appellant defeats his own subjective argument 

by expressly conceding that the Piggott murder 

was relevant to prove that appellant killed Coke 

because she was no longer willing to support 

him financially.] 

Appellant argues that the trial court’s section 1101 analysis was 

fatally flawed because the court assumed that appellant had a 

prior dating relationship with Piggott and that he was released

from prison a short time before Piggott was murdered, but these

“supposed similarities” were not established by the trial 

evidence. “In assessing the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, we 

must consider the facts known to the court at the time the ruling 

was made. [Citations.]” (People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal. 

App. 4th 216, 243; see also People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal. 4th 

472, 491.) Thus, appellant cannot establish an abuse of 

discretion based on alleged insufficiency of the trial evidence. 

When the trial court ruled on the motion to admit evidence of 

the Piggott murder, appellant did not dispute the prosecutor’s 

factual contention that appellant had been released from prison

in April 1983, approximately four months before the Piggott 

murder. Thus, this factor was properly considered by the trial

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court. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the trial court 

was provided with evidence of appellant’s prior dating 

relationship with Piggott. At the pretrial hearing, appellant’s 

trial counsel argued that evidence of a domestic relationship 

between appellant and Piggott was thin. That defense attorney,

who also represented appellant in the Piggott case, recalled that 

the prosecution theory in Piggott was that a drug dealer was 

killed by her employee, not by her domestic partner. In response 

to this argument, the court took a recess and reviewed 

appellant’s testimony from his first murder trial in the Piggott 

case. Based on that review, the court concluded that there was

insufficient evidence that the Piggott murder involved domestic

violence, but that there was evidence that Piggott and appellant 

had dated in the past. These circumstances show that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by considering that appellant 

had a prior dating relationship with Piggott when evaluating 

whether to admit evidence of the Piggott murder under section 

1101. 

For all these reasons, appellant has failed to show that the trial 

court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the Vickie

R. assault and the Piggott murder under section 1101. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *9-10. 

Habeas relief is not warranted here because no remediable federal constitutional 

violation occurred. First, a Petitioner’s due process rights concerning the admission of 

propensity evidence is not clearly established for purposes of review under AEDPA, the 

Supreme Court having reserved this issue as an “open question.” Alberni v. McDaniel,

458 F.3d 860, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (reaffirming Alberni). Second, the Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear 

ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process 

violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 

1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Third, any claim that the state court erred in admitting the evidence 

under state law is not remediable on federal habeas review. The state appellate court’s 

ruling that the evidence was properly admitted under state law binds this federal habeas 

court. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Moreover, even if the admission of propensity evidence was the basis for a habeas 

claim, it is clearly established that “[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences the jury 

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may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process.” Jammal v. Van de 

Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, as the state appellate court found, the jury 

could have drawn the permissible inference that Petitioner was motivated to murder his 

victim because she was no longer of financial use to him. See Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, 

at *9 n.2 (noting that Petitioner “conced[ed]” that the Piggott murder was relevant to 

prove” this theory). Because the jury could have drawn this permissible inference 

regarding motive, the admission of evidence related to the Piggott murder did not violate 

Petitioner’s due process. 

Finally, even if the admission of evidence regarding the Piggott murder was an error 

of constitutional dimension – which it is not – the Court must consider whether the error 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). In this case, it did not. As the state 

appellate court found, the “evidence pointing to [Petitioner’s] guilt” was “overwhelming.” 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *15. On August 4, 2013, shortly after 10:12 p.m., the 

victim’s daughter was able to trace the victim’s personal phone as it moved along the I-80 

toward Vacaville. See id. The victim’s body was subsequently found in Vacaville, and her 

personal phone was found on an off-ramp from the I-80. See id. The victim’s shoes were 

missing. See id. After midnight, and for at least nine hours after the victim’s personal 

phone had traveled to Vacaville, Petitioner was in possession of the victim’s car and ATM 

card. See id. When the police searched the car, they found, among other things, the shoes 

that were missing from the victim’s body. See id. The fact that Petitioner remained in 

possession of the victim’s car and missing shoes well after the victim’s body and personal 

phone had gone to Vacaville is strong circumstantial evidence that Petitioner was involved 

in the victim’s death. 

In addition, on August 5, 2013, a few hours after he had abandoned the victim’s car 

which still held the shoes that were missing from the victim’s body, Petitioner called his 

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nephew for assistance. See id. at 4. In this call, Petitioner told his nephew that the victim 

was “probably where her dog is at.” See id. Petitioner had previously admitted to two 

persons that Petitioner killed the victim’s dog. See id. at 3. As the victim’s body was not 

discovered for another four days, see id., Petitioner’s statement that the victim was in the 

same place as her deceased dog, a dog which he had killed, strongly suggests that 

Petitioner killed the victim as well. 

In light of this “overwhelming” evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, any error in admitting 

evidence of the Piggott murder did not have a “substantial and injurious effect” on the 

verdict. See Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of 

reh’g (May 17, 2001) (“Even if we assume, without deciding, that the trial court 

[committed constitutional error], that ruling could not have had a ‘substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ . . . There was an abundance of 

other, uncontradicted evidence that Dillard had suffered the convictions alleged.”) 

(citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, the state appellate court’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s first claim was reasonable and is therefore entitled to AEDPA deference. 

Accordingly, this claim is DENIED. 

b. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence 

The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim that admission of his prior acts 

of domestic violence violated Petitioner’s due process, finding that the testimony was 

properly admitted under state evidence rules: 

The record shows that the trial court properly exercised its 

discretion under section 1109. It considered the relevant factors, 

and reasonably concluded these two prior acts of domestic 

violence were more probative than prejudicial, and that the 

interest of justice would be served by admitting this evidence. Arguing otherwise, appellant contends the trial court failed to

balance correctly the section 352 factors because his prior acts 

are dissimilar to the charged crimes, remote, and unduly 

prejudicial. We disagree with each of these contentions. 

First, the record shows that both prior acts involved some 

similarities to the present case. Vickie R. was violently attacked 

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and strangled by appellant after she ended their domestic 

relationship and locked him out of the house. Similarly, Coke 

was strangled to death after she locked appellant out of her home 

and took other steps against him that were consistent with 

ending their domestic relationship. Michelle S. was assaulted 

and kidnapped by appellant after she refused to comply with his

demands. Similarly, after appellant killed Ginny to punish Coke 

for crossing him, Coke went somewhere in a car with him and 

was never seen alive again. Furthermore, appellant convinced 

both Michelle S. and Coke that they should not cooperate with 

law enforcement. 

Second, the trial court explained why these prior acts of 

domestic violence were not remote under the circumstances of 

this case. Appellant was incarcerated for most of the 30–year 

period prior to Coke’s murder, and when he was not in custody 

his tendency was to abuse his domestic partner. (See People v. 

Daniels (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 304, 317 [rape committed 15 

years before charged offense not remote “because defendant had 

been incarcerated for the vast majority of that period”].) 

Appellant gives no good reason for disputing the trial court’s 

analysis of this issue. 

Third, appellant’s theory of prejudice is not substantiated. He 

suggests that the jury may have been tempted to “condemn” him 

not because they believed him guilty of the charged offenses, but 

rather because he escaped unpunished from the prior offenses. 

(Citing People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 314, 

disapproved on another ground in People v. Scott (2011) 52 

Cal.4th 452, 470–471.) But there was overwhelming evidence 

that appellant was a career criminal who was incarcerated for 

most of the time that he knew Coke, and thus was not a person 

who escaped punishment. Furthermore, the Vickie R. and 

Michelle S. assaults were significantly less inflammatory than 

the charges involving Coke. Thus, it was highly unlikely that 

the jury would base its verdicts on a desire to punish appellant 

for these prior acts. 

As an alternate ground for challenging the section 1109 rulings, appellant appears to contend that domestic violence propensity 

evidence should only be admitted in cases in which (1) the 

charged offenses are part of a larger scheme of escalating 

dominance and control over a domestic violence victim; and (2) 

either that victim or third party witnesses are uncooperative. As 

support for this argument, appellant cites People v. 

Hoover (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1028, and People v. 

Brown (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1333. Both cases rejected 

claims that section 1109 violates constitutional due process. The 

courts’ opinions highlighted policy reasons for admitting 

domestic violence propensity evidence, including that such 

conduct often recurs and that victims often refuse to cooperate. (People v. Hoover, at p. 1028; People v. Brown, at p. 1333.) But 

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neither case restricts the use of section 1109 to cases in which 

these policies are directly implicated. 

Nor is the language of section 1109 limited to cases in which a

defendant has been charged with long-term domestic violence 

against an uncooperative victim. Rather, the statute expressly

applies to any “criminal action in which the defendant is accused 

of an offense involving domestic violence.” (§ 1109, subd. 

(a)(1).) Murder can be “‘the ultimate form of domestic 

violence’” depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. (People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4th 1222, 1225.) Here, 

there is ample evidence that appellant and Coke were in a 

domestic relationship—they had a child together; they had 

resumed their dating relationship; Coke gave appellant financial 

and moral support; appellant regularly spent time at Coke’s 

home and kept his belongings there. There is also evidence that 

Coke was a victim of appellant’s domestic violence. Appellant 

does not dispute the trial court’s finding that the killing of 

Coke’s beloved dog was such an act, and this domestic abuse 

was inextricably tied to the murder of which appellant was 

convicted. Thus, the facts and circumstances of this case 

support the trial court’s conclusion that the charged offenses 

involved domestic violence. 

For all these reasons, we conclude that section 1109 was 

properly applied to admit evidence of the Vickie R. and Michelle 

S. assaults. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *7-8. 

As with the admission of evidence of the Piggott murder, habeas relief is not 

warranted for the admission of Petitioner’s prior acts of domestic violence. No remediable 

federal constitutional violation occurred. Again, the admission of propensity evidence is 

not clearly established for review under AEDPA, see Alberni, 458 F.3d at 866–67; the 

Supreme Court has not clearly ruled that the admission of overly prejudicial evidence is a 

due process violation sufficient to warrant habeas relief, see Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101; and 

a state court’s ruling that the evidence was properly admitted under state law is binding on 

this court, see Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. See also Delira v. Runnels, 213 F. App’x 580, 

581 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The admission of [§ 1109] evidence was not contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court has not 

ruled on the question whether propensity evidence violates the Due Process Clause.”). 

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Moreover, as discussed above and as the state appellate court observed, the 

evidence brought against Petitioner at trial was “overwhelming”; even if the trial court had 

erred in admitting Petitioner’s prior acts of domestic violence, these prior bad acts did not 

have a substantial and injurious effect upon the verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631 

(stating standard for determining whether constitutional error was harmless). 

Based on the foregoing, the state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s second 

and third claims was reasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. Accordingly, these 

claims are DENIED. 

2. Claims Based on Victim’s Statements 

At the trial for the murder of Sandra Coke, the prosecution introduced, for the 

purpose of establishing the victim’s state of mind, statements that the victim had made 

regarding the Petitioner’s recent actions. Petitioner claims that these statements 

constituted inadmissible hearsay, violated Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation 

Clause, and that the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction. See Pet., Ex. 

A at 35-43 (stating claims 4-6). 

The facts underlying these claims, as summarized by the state appellate court, are as 

follows: 

a. Pretrial Rulings 

The trial court spent several court days ruling on pretrial 

motions. At the first hearing on December 9, 2014, the court 

began by addressing a motion by the prosecutor to admit 

evidence probative of Coke’s state of mind. The proffer 

included dozens of statements that Coke made to a variety of 

people, from family to law enforcement to appellant himself. 

The statements fell into three general categories: expressions of 

Coke’s feelings about appellant; statements about actions 

appellant had taken that precipitated those feelings; and 

statements regarding actions that Coke intended to take in the 

future. The prosecution argued some statements were 

admissible for their truth, pursuant to the hearsay exception set 

forth in section 1250, and others were admissible as nonhearsay

circumstantial evidence of Coke’s state of mind. 

At the December 9 hearing, appellant’s trial counsel began by 

arguing that all of this evidence was inadmissible because 

Coke’s state of mind was not relevant. After the court rejected 

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this general objection, defense counsel stated: “So if the Court 

is going to admit any of this, I think there ought—there has to

be some understanding of what’s being offered for the truth of 

the matter stated and what’s being offered as an exception to the 

hearsay rule.” The court agreed. Then defense counsel asked: 

“And assuming we hear any of that testimony, would you be 

giving that Instruction to the jury at the time that it’s being

offered? I would ask that you do that.” The court responded 

that it thought it would have to do that and then asked the 

prosecutor to prepare supplemental briefing to help clarify 

which statements were being offered for a limited purpose. 

The court opined that it would probably face a hearsay issue in

any event before state of mind evidence was offered, but that it 

would also give a limiting instruction “throughout the trial” if it 

admitted state of mind evidence that was not being offered for 

its truth. However, the court noted there was an initial problem 

because it appeared that there was a lot of “overlap” in the sense 

that many statements were offered under more than one theory. 

The prosecutor concurred and then proceeded to argue that an 

instruction limiting the use of evidence of appellant’s 

(uncharged) theft-related conduct during 2013 to a consideration 

of Coke’s state of mind would not be appropriate if the evidence 

was also admissible under section 1101. After further 

discussion, the court elected to continue the matter without 

making any ruling, stating at one point that “I’ve been sitting up 

here for 30 years, and I don’t think I’ve ever been more confused 

than I am now.” 

More than a week later, on December 17, the court returned to 

the motion to admit Coke’s statements as evidence of her state 

of mind. At that point, the court had just granted a motion to

admit evidence of appellant’s uncharged thefts under section 

1101 as relevant to prove his intent to commit theft on August 

4, 2013, and to rebut the defense that Coke gave appellant 

permission to use her car and to take money from her bank 

account on the day of the murder. The court ruled that 

appellant’s taking of the car and headphones, and the forged 

checks were all admissible under section 1101. The court found

that the bike thefts were intertwined with the disappearance of

the dog and the extortion of $1,000, evidence which had already

been ruled admissible under other provisions of the Evidence 

Code. The court observed that some of the uncharged theft 

evidence was also included in the in limine motion to admit state 

of mind evidence, which the court considered next. 

Appellant began by renewing his objection that Coke’s state of 

mind was not relevant at all. In response, the prosecutor outlined 

two theories of relevancy. First, Coke’s mental state was 

relevant to support the prosecution theory that appellant killed 

Coke because she broke up with him on August 4, 2013. In other

words, evidence that Coke intended to terminate her relationship 

with appellant because of the way he behaved in the spring of 

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2013 made it more likely that she acted in conformity with that

intent, which gave appellant a motive to kill her. Second, 

evidence that Coke previously accused appellant of stealing her

car and money was relevant to show that she did not give 

appellant her consent to take her car or debit card that night.

The trial court made a formal ruling that Coke’s state of mind 

was relevant to support the theories outlined by the prosecution, 

and then proceeded to make separate admissibility rulings as to

each statement the prosecutor sought to introduce, admitting 

many, but excluding others under section 352. 

For example, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of a 

conversation between Coke and her friend Michelle Remy 

during which Coke made direct statements about her fearful 

feelings toward appellant, and also described threats appellant

made that made her fear him. The prosecutor argued that Coke’s

statement that she was afraid of appellant was admissible 

hearsay under section 1250, and the rest of the conversation was 

circumstantial evidence of Coke’s state of mind. The court 

responded that it would be too confusing for the jury to follow a 

special instruction telling them to consider only part of the 

conversation for its truth. When the prosecutor suggested that a 

limiting instruction might not be necessary, the court opined that 

it seemed likely the defense was “going to want” an instruction

about what evidence the jury could consider for its truth and 

what statements could not be considered for their truth. Thus,

the court ruled that the prosecutor should limit questions about 

this conversation to Coke’s statement that she was afraid of 

appellant. 

Defense counsel did not actively participate in the discussion 

regarding Coke’s conversation with Remy, which we have just 

described. Nor did he request that any particular statement of

Coke’s that was ruled admissible be accompanied by a limiting 

instruction. Indeed, during the December 17 hearing, 

appellant’s trial counsel never even alluded to the issue of 

whether the court should give a limiting instruction for 

circumstantial state of mind evidence. 

b. Limiting Instructions During Trial 

On March 17 and 18, 2015, the prosecutor made her opening 

statement to the jury. After that presentation, the court talked to 

the jury about the fact that the prosecutor had referenced several 

uncharged acts by appellant that were going to be discussed at 

trial, and it gave instructions regarding the limitations attendant 

to evidence that was going to be admitted under section 1101 

and/or section 1109. Then, defense counsel made his opening 

statement. 

The defense theory was that appellant’s guilt could not be 

established beyond a reasonable doubt because the People’s 

evidence was circumstantial and did not establish that appellant 

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had a motive for the crimes. Defense counsel emphasized that 

appellant had never been violent against Coke, and claimed 

there was no reason why on August 4, appellant would decide to 

become violent against a woman he loved and who was going to 

continue to take care of him. Defense counsel urged the jury to 

take “with a grain of salt,” evidence that Coke allegedly wanted 

to break off the relationship or was afraid of appellant. 

On the afternoon of March 18, the prosecutor elicited testimony

from Coke’s friend, Wendy Springer. Springer testified that 

Coke told her that appellant took her car without permission and 

also stole her bicycles, Jane Doe’s headphones, and a camera. 

Springer gave more detailed testimony about the circumstances 

surrounding Ginny’s disappearance, including the fact that she 

loaned Coke money so that Coke could pay appellant’s demand for $1,000. The defense did not request a limiting instruction

with respect to any of this testimony. 

A short time later, the prosecutor asked Springer to authenticate 

Coke’s handwriting on the May 9, 2013 statement that Coke 

wrote for appellant’s parole officer. Defense counsel referenced 

a prior objection but did not repeat it in front of the jury. Then, 

without waiving that prior objection, the defense stipulated that 

Springer could read Coke’s statement to the jury. After Springer 

read part of the statement, the court interrupted and held sidebar 

conference with counsel. Then the court instructed the jury 

regarding the definition of hearsay, the hearsay rule, and the 

section 1252 exception to the hearsay rule for evidence offered

to prove a declarant’s state of mind or to explain acts or conduct 

of the declarant. The court then stated that Coke’s statement was 

being offered pursuant to the state of mind exception to the 

hearsay rule and also to explain her conduct. 

As our factual summary reflects, several other witnesses 

testified about conversations they had with Coke about 

appellant. In addition, the prosecutor was permitted to introduce 

evidence of a letter Coke wrote to appellant in which she 

discussed things appellant had done that caused her emotional 

or psychological harm. As best we can determine, the jury did 

not receive any limiting instruction regarding its consideration 

of this evidence. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *11–13. 

 Although the challenged statements were not identified in the state appellate court’s 

opinion, the statements are summarized in Petitioner’s brief to the California Supreme 

Court, which was attached as argument to the Petition. See Pet., Ex. A at 6. Petitioner 

specifically challenges the admission of the following statements: 

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[T]he jury heard the following damaging statements by Coke 

about appellant. Coke told Michelle Remy that appellant took 

her car. . . . Coke told Officer Bryan Glick that appellant took 

her car without her permission. . . . Coke told Remy that she 

sometime[s] feared appellant, and that appellant had threatened

to break into her house and “do awful things” if Coke were to 

tum him away. . . . Coke told Wendy Springer, Tanya Kendall, 

and Remy that appellant admitted to stealing her dog Ginny, two

bicycles, a camera, and headphones from Coke’s residence. . . . Coke told Remy that she was scared of what appellant might do, 

and she feared he may have harmed her dog Ginny. . . . Coke 

wrote a statement for appellant’s parole agent, Nghia Tran, 

which accused appellant of stealing her dog and her bicycles and 

extorting $1,000 for her stolen dog’s return. . . . Coke told Diane 

Oglethrope that appellant stole her dog and asked for ransom, 

that she was upset with him, and that she was trying to end the

relationship. . . . Coke told appellant’s nephews Angelo Gross 

and Carlton Duncan that appellant stole her dog and extorted 

$1,000 from her. . . . Coke wrote a letter to appellant, accusing him of stealing her dog and headphones and extorting $1,000 

from her. 

Pet., Ex. A at 36 (record citations omitted). 

a. Due Process Argument 

Petitioner’s first challenge to the admission of the victim’s statements is that those 

statements were hearsay, and their admission in contravention of evidence rules violated 

his due process. The state appellate court rejected this claim, finding that the statements 

were properly admitted under state evidence rules: 

Appellant first contends that statements Coke made about the 

things appellant did in the spring of 2013 were inadmissible 

hearsay because they were not relevant to any disputed issue at

trial. We disagree. First, these statements were circumstantial 

evidence that Coke intended to break up with appellant in 

August 2013; the acts appellant committed in the spring of 2013

helped explain why Coke wanted to break up with him. Second, 

statements that Coke made about appellant’s theft-related 

activity were relevant to prove that Coke did not consent to 

appellant using her car or debit card on the day she was 

murdered. Evidence of these feelings that Coke had about 

appellant, including her fear of him and intent to break up with 

him because of his behavior toward her, were relevant because 

they gave appellant a motive for the charged murder and 

robbery. 

“Although motive is normally not an element of any crime that 

the prosecutor must prove, ‘evidence of motive makes the crime 

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understandable and renders the inferences regarding defendant’s

intent more reasonable.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Riccardi (2012) 

54 Cal. 4th 758, 815 (Riccardi ), disapproved on another ground 

in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal. 4th 1192, 1216.) 

Unquestionably, motive was a disputed issue in this case. 

Indeed, according to his opening statement at trial, appellant’s 

primary defense was that he did not have a motive for the 

charged crimes. Defense counsel told the jury that Coke was the 

best thing that happened to appellant in his adult life, she was 

his “bread and meat,” she provided him with financial and 

emotional support, and there was no reason he would kill her. 

In Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal. 4th 758, the Supreme Court held that 

evidence of a murder victim’s statements that she was afraid of

the defendant and that she acted in conformity with that fear by 

breaking up with him was relevant to the issue of motive when 

other evidence established that the defendant was aware of the 

victim’s state of mind and may have been motivated by it. (Id. at 

p. 821.) The same reasoning applies here. The statements that

Coke made to family, friends and law enforcement tended to 

show that Coke was not going to continue to support appellant 

in the fashion to which he had become accustomed and came to 

expect from her. Other evidence showed that appellant was 

aware of Coke’s change of heart. Indeed, he went to jail because 

Coke filed a report with his parole officer. This material change 

in appellant’s relationship with Coke gave him a motive for the

charged crimes. Appellant himself articulated that motive while 

he was still in jail when he told Sean Zukowsky that he would 

put hands on Coke if she withdrew her financial support. 

Appellant contends that Coke’s statements about his “bad acts” 

may have been probative of her state of mind at the time he 

committed those acts, but they were not probative of her state of 

mind several months later around the time of her murder, which 

was the only time when her state of mind could have been 

relevant. We disagree for two separate reasons. First, appellant 

went to jail a few weeks after he committed these acts and was 

not released until a few days before Coke was murdered. This 

fact effectively precludes appellant from using the mere passage 

of time to create distance between this uncharged conduct and 

the charged crimes. Second, appellant’s assumption that each of 

the “bad acts” that he committed in the spring of 2013 had an 

isolated temporary effect on Coke is flawed. The category of 

statements that appellant challenges on appeal was relevant, 

along with the other state of mind evidence, to prove the 

prosecution theory that Coke decided to terminate her 

relationship with appellant due to his multiple and increasingly 

dangerous transgressions during the relatively short period that 

she allowed him to participate in her domestic life. 

According to appellant, the trial record conclusively shows that 

he and Coke were not estranged at that time of the murder, 

pointing to evidence that after appellant was released from jail, 

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they continued to spend time together and Coke continued to 

provide him with moral and financial support. Thus, appellant 

posits, the “prosecution theory that Coke ended her relationship 

with appellant around the time of her death was speculative.” 

Appellant’s opinion about what the evidence did nor did not 

show was a jury argument. It does not alter our conclusion that 

the trial court properly exercised its discretion by admitting the 

challenged statements as circumstantial evidence of Coke’s 

intention to terminate her relationship with appellant, which 

gave appellant a motive for the charged robbery and murder. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *13-14. 

The state appellate court’s ruling that the evidence was properly admitted under 

state law binds this federal habeas court. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. Moreover, there 

was clearly a permissible inference to be drawn from the victim’s statements. See Jammal, 

926 F.2d at 920 (“Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the 

evidence can its admission violate due process.”). As the state appellate court explained, a 

key argument in Petitioner’s defense was that he had no motive to kill the victim. By 

introducing the victim’s statements, the prosecution was able to show that the victim 

intended to terminate her relationship with Petitioner, and that this termination gave 

Petitioner a motive to kill her. In other words, the prosecution used the victim’s statements 

to rebut Petitioner’s motive argument. 

Even if the admission of the victim’s statements to prove motive were problematic, 

any error was harmless because admissible evidence aside from the victim’s statements 

provided a motive for that murder. The victim’s complaint to Petitioner’s parole officer 

was separately admitted into evidence, and Petitioner was arrested based on that complaint. 

See Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *2. Petitioner subsequently told his best friend that he 

would physically harm the victim for having him sent to jail. See id. at 3. Even without 

the victim’s statements, the jury heard evidence that Petitioner had a motive to murder the 

victim. This Court therefore cannot say, even if the trial court erred in admitting the 

victim’s statements (which it did not), that such an error had a substantial and injurious 

effect on the verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. 619 (setting forth the standard); see 

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also Dillard, 244 F.3d at 770 (holding there was no “substantial and injurious effect” by 

admitting evidence, when it was duplicated by “an abundance of other, uncontradicted 

evidence”). Moreover, as explained above, the evidence against Petitioner was 

“overwhelming.” See Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *15 (“[W]e conclude that given the 

overwhelming nature of the evidence pointing to appellant’s guilt, and other 

unobjectionable evidence of Coke’s state of mind and appellant’s motive presented from 

other witnesses, any failure to give limiting instructions relative to this evidence was 

harmless.”). Because there was cumulative evidence that Petitioner had a motive to kill 

the victim, and the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming, any error in admitting 

the victim’s statements was harmless. 

Accordingly, the state appellate court reasonably rejected Petitioner’s fourth claim, 

and its determination is entitled to AEDPA deference. Petitioner’s fourth claim is 

DENIED. 

b. Confrontation Clause Argument 

Petitioner’s second challenge to the admission of the victim’s statements is that the 

admission of those statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. 

Although the state appellate court appears to have acknowledged that Petitioner raised this 

argument in direct appeal, see Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *10, it did not analyze 

Petitioner’s confrontation argument separately from his due process argument, see id. at 

*10-15. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Sixth 

Amendment right to confrontation was not violated. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases 

the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. The federal confrontation right applies to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The goal of the Confrontation 

Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence, though it is a procedural rather than a 

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substantive guarantee. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). It commands 

not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by 

testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Id.; see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–

16 (1974) (noting a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of 

cross-examination). The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of 

reliable evidence, but about how reliability can best be determined. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 

61; see, e.g., United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 919 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

the Confrontation Clause serves to ensure that witnesses will testify under oath, to force 

witnesses to undergo cross-examination, and to permit the jury to observe the demeanor of 

witnesses). 

The Confrontation Clause applies to all out-of-court testimonial statements offered 

for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., “testimonial hearsay.” See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 

51. Out-of-court statements by absent witnesses that are testimonial hearsay are barred 

under the Confrontation Clause unless (1) the witnesses are unavailable at trial, and (2) the 

defendants had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Id. at 59. If, however, 

a hearsay statement is not testimonial in nature, then that statement “is not subject to the 

Confrontation Clause.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). Here, Respondent 

appears to concede that at least some of the victim’s statements were hearsay. See Ans. at 

16 (arguing that the statements fell into a hearsay exception, not that the statements were 

not hearsay); see also Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *12 (“The prosecutor argued that 

Coke’s statement that she was afraid of appellant was admissible hearsay under section 

1250 . . . .”). Similarly, the state appellate court characterized the victim’s statements as 

hearsay. See Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *11 (“Evidence that is admitted under section 

1250 is hearsay.”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the victim’s 

statements were testimonial in nature in order to determine whether the Confrontation 

Clause applies. 

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The “primary purpose” test establishes whether a statement is testimonial. Ohio v. 

Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179 (2015). Under this test, statements are testimonial: (1) “when 

they result from questioning, ‘the primary purpose of [which was] to establish or prove 

past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,’” and (2) “when written 

statements are ‘functionally identical to live, in-court testimony,’ ‘made for the purpose of 

establishing or proving some fact’ at trial.” Lucero v. Holland, 902 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 

2018) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1180 (2019) (citations omitted). When the primary purpose 

of taking an out-of-court statement is to create an out-of-court substitute for trial 

testimony, the statement is testimonial hearsay and Crawford applies. See Michigan v. 

Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (explaining the primary purpose inquiry). When that 

was not the primary purpose, “the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and 

federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.” Id. 

“The ‘primary purpose’ of a statement is determined objectively.” United States v. 

Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1267 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus “‘the relevant inquiry is not the 

subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather 

the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the 

individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter 

occurred.’” Id. (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360). The testimonial intent of the speaker 

must be evaluated in context, and part of that context is the questioner’s identity. Lucero, 

902 F.3d at 990 n.5. 

If the Confrontation Clause applies to a given statement, Confrontation Clause 

claims are still subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 

581 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005). 

For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of 

the Confrontation Clause is whether the statement had an actual and prejudicial effect upon 

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the jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637). 

The statements that Petitioner challenges, identified above, may be grouped into 

statements to friends, statements to Petitioner, statements to Petitioner’s family, and 

statements to law enforcement. See Pet., Ex. A at 36. First the Court will analyze whether 

the victim’s statements to friends, Petitioner, and Petitioner’s family, (collectively, 

“personal conversations”) were testimonial in nature and, if so, whether their admission 

had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. Next the Court will apply the same 

inquiry to the victim’s statements to law enforcement. 

i. Personal Conversations 

The Court first examines the statements the victim made to friends, Petitioner, and 

Petitioner’s family during personal conversations. 

The victim told her friends Michelle Remy, Wendy Springer, Tanya Kendall, and 

Dianna Oglethorpe that Petitioner took the victim’s car, stole and ransomed her dog, and 

stole several items of the victim’s property. See id. (citing Ans., Ex. B at 491-92, 604, 

891-93, 902). The victim also told her friends that she was trying to end her relationship 

with Petitioner, that Petitioner had threatened “do awful things” to her if she refused to “let 

him be with her and have access to her home,” that she was afraid of Petitioner, and that 

she was afraid Petitioner may have harmed her dog. See id. (citing Ans., Ex. B at 895-96, 

943-44, 2169-72). Similarly, the victim told Petitioner’s nephews that Petitioner had 

stolen the victim’s dog and extorted $1,000 for the return of the dog. See id. (citing Ans., 

Ex. B at 1263, 1266, 1270, 1462-63). The victim made the same statement to Petitioner in 

a letter; the same letter also refers to Petitioner’s theft of the victim’s car. See id. (citing 

Ans., Ex. B at 638-40); see also Ans., Ex. B at 638:26-639:9. 

All of the above statements were non-testimonial, and therefore not subject to the 

Confrontation Clause. First, the statements were non-testimonial as a matter of law 

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because they were not made to law enforcement personnel, or to persons the victim 

believed were working with law enforcement. “No Supreme Court authority has held that 

statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are testimonial.” 

Schubert v. Warner, 605 F. App’x 688 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that statements to a family 

friend were non-testimonial). See also Saechao v. Oregon, 249 F. App’x 678, 679 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (a conversation “between two friends, without any active participation by a 

government official” was non-testimonial); cf. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359 n.3 (“Davis

explicitly reserved the question ‘whether and when statements made to someone other than 

law enforcement personnel are “testimonial.’” Ibid. We have no need to decide that 

question in this case either because Covington’s statements were made to police 

officers.”). The friends to whom the victim made her statements were a kindergarten 

teacher, see Ans., Ex. B at 479:7 (Wendy Springer); a physical education teacher, see id. at 

883:9 (Michelle Remy); a college professor, see id. at 582:24-25 (Tanya Kendall); and a 

paralegal for the federal public defender in another county, see id. at 2166:2-11 (Dianna 

Oglethorpe). Petitioner’s nephews were a CalTrans employee, see id. at 1246:4 (Angelo 

Gross), and an AT&T employee, see id. at 1454:9 (Carlton Duncan). None of these 

friends or family members worked for or with law enforcement. Nor can the victim have 

expected Petitioner to pass her letter to law enforcement. See id. at 638-40 (letter from 

victim to Petitioner). Because the victim did not make any of these statements to law 

enforcement, the victim could not have had testimonial intent in making the challenged 

statements. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (describing “statements made unwittingly to an 

FBI informant” as non-testimonial, because of the declarant’s ignorance of the witness’s 

role). 

Second, the circumstances surrounding each of the challenged statements show that 

the statements were non-testimonial. The United States Supreme Court has explained that 

“[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation” are not testimonial. 

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Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008); see also. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381 (“For an 

out-of-court statement to qualify as testimonial, the declarant must intend the statement to 

be a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark; and he must make 

the statement with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery 

of the State against the accused. . . . That is what distinguishes a narrative told to 

a friend over dinner from a statement to the police.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States 

v. Palamarchuk, 791 F. App’x 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2019) (“a conversation between friends 

over dinner” is non-testimonial); Lara v. Allison, 617 F. App’x 769, 770 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“statements [made] during an unprompted, informal conversation between coworkers at 

their place of employment” are non-testimonial); Williams v. Adams, 447 F. App’x 829, 

831 (9th Cir. 2011) (statements made to family members are non-testimonial). There is no 

suggestion in the record that the victim believed her statements to friends, Petitioner, and 

Petitioner’s family would be “used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State.” Bryant, 

562 U.S. at 381. Instead, “reasonable participants” in the conversations at issue would 

have construed the purpose of those conversations as requesting help or emotional support. 

See id. at 360 (emphasizing that the court must ask what “purpose [] reasonable 

participants would have had”). For example, in the conversation where the victim told 

Wendy Springer that the Petitioner had stolen and was ransoming the victim’s dog, the 

victim had called Ms. Springer to ask for assistance in meeting Petitioner’s monetary 

demand. See Ans., Ex. B at 491:3-13. In the conversation where the victim told Dianna 

Oglethorpe that the victim “was worried about breaking [the relationship with the 

Petitioner] off,” the victim sought emotional support and advice from a friend; Ms. 

Oglethorpe described the victim as “visibly upset” and “crying,” and stated that the victim 

“didn’t know what to do.” Id. at 2172:6-13. The victim called Petitioner’s nephew 

Carlton Duncan to seek help in finding her dog; that nephew explained that the victim was 

“just trying to get some information,” because she thought Petitioner “may have the dog.” 

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Id. at 1461:35-36, 1462:16, 1463:4-5. Petitioner’s other nephew, Angelo Gross, explained 

that when the victim told him that Petitioner had stolen the victim’s dog, extorted money 

from her, and that she was trying to end her relationship with the Petitioner, this was one 

of “quite a few” calls from “an aunt figure.” Id. at 1270:27, 1271:28; see also id. at 1266-

73 (describing conversations with his “aunt figure”). For each statement the victim made 

in personal conversations, the circumstances make clear that the victim was speaking with 

friends and family in an ordinary fashion, not attempting to create a record with law 

enforcement. 

Accordingly, the victim’s statements to friends, the Petitioner, and Petitioner’s 

family were not testimonial in nature. Because these statements were not testimonial, the 

Confrontation Clause does not apply, and the Court need not ask whether their admission 

had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. 

ii. Statements to Law Enforcement 

The Court now examines the statements the victim made to persons in or affiliated 

with law enforcement. Petitioner challenged the following statements made to persons in 

or affiliated with law enforcement: 

Coke told Officer Bryan Glick that appellant took her car 

without her permission. . . . Coke wrote a statement for 

appellant’s parole agent, Nghia Tran, which accused appellant 

of stealing her dog and her bicycles and extorting $1,000 for her 

stolen dog’s return. 

Pet., Ex. A at 36 (citing Ans., Ex. B at 495, 497-501, 838-40, 853-54.) 

a. Officer Glick 

 As to the statements to Officer Glick, a review of the record reveals that those 

statements were not testimonial. The statements were made when Officer Glick met with 

the victim to create a stolen vehicle report, in order to recover the victim’s stolen car. See

Ans., Ex. B at 837:11-16. Statements made to obtain police assistance are not testimonial. 

See Davis, 547 U.S. 813 at 826-27 (finding that a 911 call was not testimonial, because it 

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“is ordinarily not designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, but to 

describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”); Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 

809, 830 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) (statements to police were non-testimonial when the victim 

“initiated their interaction,” was not being interrogated, and “sought [police] help in ending 

a frightening intrusion into her home”); Arias v. Muniz, No. C 15-1136 WHA (PR), 2016 

WL 1427497, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016) (holding that statements made “to address an 

ongoing emergency” are not “converted into testimonial statements under Crawford

because a police officer . . . memorializes them in a report”). 

In response to the victim’s call for assistance, Officer Glick was dispatched to the 

victim’s house at 3:00 a.m., and arrived at the victim’s house at 3:37 a.m. See Ans., Ex. B 

at 837:11-15, 838:6-7. The time of the victim’s conversation with Officer Glick suggests 

that both parties viewed the situation as an ongoing emergency, rather than an 

interrogation. The victim described the car and the circumstances under which she had last 

seen it, see id. at 838:13-839:9, suggesting that she expected Officer Glick to recover the 

car. Officer Glick relayed the report “to [] Dispatch so it could be entered into [the] stolen 

vehicle system, and [] broadcast a description of the vehicle.” Id. at 841:8-10. 

Considering the time at which the report was taken, the information relayed to Officer 

Glick, and the use to which Officer Glick immediately put this information, the Court 

concludes that the victim’s primary purpose in making these statements was to recover her 

stolen car. Because the victim’s “statement[s] [were] not procured with a primary purpose 

of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony . . . the admissibility of [the] 

statement[s] is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation 

Clause.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358–59. 

For the sake of being thorough, the Court notes that, even if the victim’s statements 

to Officer Glick were considered testimonial – which they are not – any error in admitting 

those statements would be harmless. In assessing a Confrontation Clause violation, courts 

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consider, inter alia, “whether the testimony was cumulative.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). As noted above, the jury heard several non-testimonial 

statements from the victim to the victim’s friends, that established Petitioner had stolen the 

victim’s car. The victim’s daughter also informed the jury that Petitioner had stolen the 

victim’s car, see Ans., Ex. B at 669:7-10, and the victim referenced Petitioner’s theft of the 

car in a letter from the victim to Petitioner, see id. at 638:26-639:9. Petitioner also testified 

about this incident, admitting that he did not have permission to take the car, and stating 

that the victim had filed a police report accusing Petitioner of stealing the car. See id. at 

2819:21-2820:6. When this cumulative testimony is considered, the Court cannot 

conclude that the admission of the victim’s statements to Officer Glick had a substantial 

and injurious effect on the verdict. 

b. Agent Tran 

 As to the statements to Agent Tran, a review of the record suggests that those 

statements may have been testimonial in nature. On the one hand, Agent Tran testified that 

the victim contacted him so that he would “ask [Petitioner] to get [the victim’s] dog back.” 

Ans., Ex. B at 2278. Because the victim sought Agent Tran’s help to recover her dog, the 

trial court could have reasonably concluded that the victim’s statements to Agent Tran 

were made “to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.” Davis, 547 

U.S. 813 at 827 (finding that statements made with this primary purpose are not 

testimonial). The inference that the victim was seeking Agent Tran’s help, rather than 

attempting to testify against Petitioner, is bolstered by her refusal to file a police report 

about Petitioner’s crimes against her. See Ans., Ex. B at 2284:22-2285:5 (stating that 

Agent Tran repeatedly asked Petitioner to file a police report, but that Petitioner refused 

because “she was only interested in getting her dog back”); see also id. at 2298:8-2299:12 

(stating, in response to defense counsel’s questioning, that the victim only wanted her dog 

back). 

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On the other hand, the record reveals that the victim’s statements to Agent Tran 

were immediately used to charge Petitioner with a parole violation. See id. at 2280:13-

2281:5. In fact, Agent Tran left his office while the victim was still completing her 

statement, to find and arrest Petitioner for a parole violation. See id. at 2270:20-26. The 

victim thus understood that her statement would be used to revoke Petitioner’s parole. 

There is no suggestion in the record that the victim expected Agent Tran to help recover 

the victim’s stolen dog. In an abundance of caution, the Court will presume for the 

purposes of this petition that the victim’s statements to Agent Tran were testimonial. 

Because the Court presumes that the victim’s statements to Agent Tran were testimonial, 

the Court proceeds to the next step in the Confrontation Clause inquiry: whether any error 

in admitting the victim’s statements was harmless. 

Here, even if the victim’s statements to Agent Tran are deemed testimonial, their 

admission against Petitioner was harmless considering other, cumulative evidence. See 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (stating courts must consider “whether the testimony was 

cumulative” in evaluating a potential Confrontation Clause violation). Petitioner 

challenges the victim’s statement that to Agent Tran Petitioner stole the victim’s dog, 

extorted $1,000 from the victim for the return of the dog, and stole the victim’s bicycles. 

See Pet. at 35 (citing Ans., Ex. B at 495, 497-501. However, the jury heard all of this 

information from other sources: the victim told her friends that Petitioner stole and 

ransomed her dog, and stole several items of the victim’s property including two bicycles, 

see Ans., Ex. B at 491-92, 604, 891-93, 902; the victim told Petitioner’s nephews that 

Petitioner had stolen the victim’s dog and extorted $1,000 for the return of the dog, see id. 

at 1263, 1266, 1270, 1462-63; and the victim referenced these wrongs in a letter written to 

Petitioner, see id. at 638-40. When this cumulative testimony is considered, the Court 

cannot conclude that the admission of the victim’s statements to Agent Tran had a 

substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. 

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sole statement that was testimonial was duplicated by non-testimonial statements, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his Confrontation Clause claim. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s fifth claim is DENIED. 

c. Jury Instruction Argument 

Petitioner’s third challenge to the admission of the victim’s statements is that the 

trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction, informing the jury that the victim’s 

statements were admitted not for the truth of the matter but as evidence of the victim’s 

state of mind. 

The state appellate court rejected this claim, finding that some of the victim’s 

statements did not require a limiting instruction, and that as to the statements that may 

have required such an instruction, Petitioner’s counsel failed to request the instruction: 

Appellant’s second claim of error with respect to Coke’s state of 

mind evidence pertains to the fact that the trial court gave a 

limiting instruction only one time, when it admitted evidence of 

the May 9, 2013 statement Coke gave to appellant’s parole 

agent. Appellant contends that, as a result of the “court’s 

instructional omissions,” the jury improperly considered Coke’s

statements as proof that appellant stole her car, bicycles, 

headphones, and dog, extorted $1,000 from her, and threatened 

and scared her. 

When a direct declaration of a person’s state of mind is admitted 

for its truth under section 1250, it is not subject to any limiting 

instruction. (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal. 4th at p. 822; Ortiz, 

supra, 38 Cal. App. 4th at p. 389.) Thus, appellant’s claim of 

instructional error fails to the extent he is contending that he was 

entitled to a limiting instruction regarding statements Coke 

made about how she felt about appellant, or what she intended 

to do. 

Different considerations apply, however, to statements that 

constitute circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s state of 

mind. “This nonhearsay category of statements presents an 

elevated danger of prejudice if the jury is unable to distinguish 

between the truth of the matter asserted and the inferences 

concerning the declarant’s state of mind. [Citation.]” (Riccardi, 

supra, 54 Cal. 4th at p. 823.) In such situations, a limiting 

instruction can clarify the limited purpose for which the 

evidence is being admitted. However, a limiting instruction is

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not always required and, indeed, there may be times when “the 

risk of such an instruction highlighting the defendant’s conduct 

outweighs any benefit the instruction may provide.” (Id. at p. 

825.) 

Thus, absent a request by the defense, the trial court is not 

required to give a limiting instruction when admitting statements 

as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s state of 

mind. (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal. 4th at p. 823.) Rather, such 

evidence is subject to the general rule set forth in section 355, 

which states: “When evidence is admissible as to one party or 

for one purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for 

another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the 

evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” 

(Italics added.) 

In the present case, appellant fails to establish that his trial 

counsel requested a limiting instruction at the time that any 

statement by Coke was admitted into evidence. As our 

background summary reflects, during the pretrial hearings, 

appellant’s defense counsel contemplated that such a limiting 

instruction would be appropriate with respect to circumstantial

state of mind evidence, and the trial court agreed. However, by 

the time such evidence was elicited at trial, defense counsel 

could have concluded that a limiting instruction would not be 

useful for a variety of reasons. For example, once the jury 

became aware of appellant’s misconduct during the spring of 

2013, defense counsel could reasonably have concluded that 

requesting a limiting instruction would draw further attention to 

the evidence. Such a limiting instruction might also highlight

the fact that other direct evidence of Coke’s state of mind was

admitted for its truth. In any event, absent a specific request at 

the time the evidence was admitted, the trial court did not have 

an obligation to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding the 

proper use of circumstantial evidence of Coke’s state of mind. 

(Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal. 4th at p. 823.) 

Finally, we note that even if the court’s limiting instructions

were deficient, where the omission of a cautionary instruction is 

at issue, reversal of the judgment will not be required unless “it 

is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the 

appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 

error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836; People v. 

Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1040, 1054.) In this case, we 

conclude that given the overwhelming nature of the evidence 

pointing to appellant’s guilt, and other unobjectionable evidence 

of Coke’s state of mind and appellant’s motive presented from 

other witnesses, any failure to give limiting instructions relative 

to this evidence was harmless. 

Alana, 2017 WL 3431728, at *14–15. 

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First, the state appellate court’s ruling regarding the necessity of jury instructions 

under state law binds this federal habeas court. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. 

 Second, as the state appellate court noted, the trial court did give a limiting 

instruction when it admitted the victim’s statements to Agent Tran. See Alana, 2017 WL 

3431728, at *14. In fact, the trial court gave a limiting instruction when admitting those 

statements and repeated the limiting instruction when it gave final jury instructions posttrial. See Ans., Ex. B at 501:23-502:20, 3268:25-3269:3. 

Petitioner appears to challenge the trial court’s decision not to give the same 

instruction multiple times. See Pet. at 42-43 (arguing that the trial court should have given 

the instruction every time hearsay statements were offered). However, the Ninth Circuit 

has expressly held that a trial court need not repeat an instruction over and over. In United 

States v. King, the trial court gave a “requested cautionary jury instruction” only at the end 

of trial, rather than “at the time the evidence was offered.” 552 F.2d 833, 846 (9th Cir. 

1976). In King, the defendant-appellant argued that a limiting instruction should have 

been offered along with the evidence, rather than once trial had concluded. See id. at 846-

49. The Ninth Circuit “h[e]ld that the failure to give the requested instruction prior to the 

presentation of evidence perforce was not error. To repeat such instructions several times 

in the course of trial would compound the fears of confusion . . . .” Id. at 849. If it was not 

erroneous for the King trial court to give a limiting instruction once, at the end of trial, then 

the trial court here did not err in giving a limiting instruction twice, both at the end of trial 

and at the time the evidence was offered. 

Third, as Respondent notes, Petitioner’s counsel did not request an additional 

limiting instruction each time hearsay evidence was offered for a limited purpose. See

Ans. at 21. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that it is counsel’s responsibility to 

request a limiting instruction, and that a trial court does not err by failing to give an 

instruction sua sponte. See United States v. Ramirez, 990 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1993) 

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(“Ramirez requested no limiting instruction at trial and the judge is not required to give 

one sua sponte.”); see also United States v. Palmer, 691 F.2d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(“Appellant further asserts that the trial court erred in not giving the jury a limiting 

instruction regarding the impeachment purposes of the snorting tube. Again, defendant’s 

counsel failed to request such an instruction and the trial court had no affirmative 

obligation to give one sua sponte. . . . Moreover, a failure to give a sua sponte limiting 

instruction is generally not reversible error.”) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 

McLennan, 563 F.2d 943, 947–48 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The court had said nothing about a 

limiting instruction because he had not been asked to give one. Nothing prevented counsel 

from making such a request. In the usual case, the court is not required to give such an 

instruction sua sponte.”) (citing cases). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving 

the limiting instruction only twice. 

Moreover, to the extent Petitioner argues that, because the limiting instruction was 

given only once during trial, the jury was misled into thinking only one statement was 

admitted pursuant to a hearsay exception, this contention is belied by the record. On at 

least one occasion, Petitioner’s counsel withdrew a hearsay objection because the witness 

was “talking about the state of mind of” the victim. Ans., Ex. B at 892:10-11; cf. id. at 

680:5-14 (following a hearsay objection, the prosecutor rephrased a question to ask about 

the victim’s feelings). Similarly, on other occasions the trial court overruled counsel’s 

objections to hearsay because the statement was “not being offered for the truth,” but was 

instead “explaining subsequent conduct.” Id. at 563:25-28; see also id. at 1880:23-1881:3 

(admitting testimony to explain conduct); 1886:20-1887:10 (same, with the trial court 

explaining the difference between hearsay and a non-hearsay purpose). Because the jury 

was told on multiple occasions that some testimony was being admitted for a non-hearsay 

purpose, and the difference between hearsay and a statement admitted for a non-hearsay 

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purpose was explained to the jury several times, a reasonable juror would not have 

assumed that every statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. 

Finally, even if Petitioner’s arguments were not belied by the record, any error in 

refusing to give the same instruction multiple times would have been harmless. In the 

review of a habeas petition, “[t]he only question for us is ‘whether the ailing instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle 

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). “It is well established that the instruction ‘may not be 

judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a 

whole and the trial record.” Id. Here, as discussed above and as found by the state 

appellate court, the evidence against Petitioner was “overwhelming.” Accordingly, even if 

the trial court had erred in not giving a jury instruction every time out-of-court statements 

were admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, this Court could not conclude that the resulting 

conviction violated due process. The state appellate court did not apply federal law in a 

way that was “objectively unreasonable.” 

 For these reasons, Petitioner’s sixth claim is DENIED. 

3. Cumulative Error Claim 

Petitioner argues the cumulative effect of the alleged constitutional errors violated 

his right to a fair trial. Pet. at 54. In some cases, although no single trial error is 

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still 

prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. Alcala v. 

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2003). However, where there is no single 

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional 

violation. Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, there can be no 

cumulative error if there has not been more than one error. United States v. Solorio, 669 

F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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Here, there were no constitutional errors and, therefore, nothing can accumulate to 

the level of a constitutional violation. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes that the 

Petition must be DENIED. 

 Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may 

not appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a 

certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of 

Respondent, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 2, 2020 ________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

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