Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01076/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01076-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 1

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo

Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “Doc. No.” The transcript pages for

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this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

TABITHA A. JACOBS, PLAINTIFF 

v. Case No. 1:06-cv-1076

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Tabitha A. Jacobs, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking

judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability, and supplemental security income

(SSI) benefits under the provisions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). 

1. Procedural Background:

Plaintiff filed her applications for SSI on January 14, 2004, alleging an onset date of May

29, 2002. (Tr. 48-50). Plaintiff’s impairments included back problems, anxiety, and left arm 2

problems. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 24-32, 37-38).

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was held on

September 27, 2005. The Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Mary Thomason, at the

hearing. Also testifying was Mark Welch, a vocational expert (VE), and Dr. Henry Hamilton, a

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medical expert and a friend of the Plaintiff. (Tr. 259-293). After considering all of the evidence of

record, the ALJ rendered a decision on April 24, 2006, finding Plaintiff was not disabled within

meaning of the Act at anytime during the relevant time period. (Tr.12-17). The decision of the ALJ

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request

for review on July 7, 2006. (Tr. 5-7). 

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2007); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See

Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible

to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the

findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,

1068 (8th Cir. 2000). 

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one

year and prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160

F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

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“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her

disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

To determine whether the claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the

familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to

the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can

perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f) (2003). The fact finder only

considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003). 

3. Discussion:

The Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Commissioner finding her not disabled. She claims

the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record because the ALJ

improperly applied the factors of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984); and the ALJ

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failed to correctly use the five-step process to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled. The

Defendant argues the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in accordance with

Polaski; and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled.

Because I find the ALJ did not properly apply Polaski, the Court will not address the other issue. 

 Polaski Analysis

The Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in his determination that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

of pain were not fully credible. The Plaintiff asserts the ALJ performed an improper Polaski

evaluation. The Defendant argues there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s

credibility determination.

In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and apply the five

factors from Polaski v. Heckler. These five Polaski factors must be analyzed in light of the

claimant’s subjective complaints of pain and discomfort. The factors are: (1) the claimant’s daily

activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating

factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See

id. at 1322. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each Polaski factor as long as the ALJ

acknowledges and examines those factors before discounting the subjective complaints of the

claimant. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 371-72 (8th Cir. 2000). When discounting a claimant’s

complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulating the reasons

for discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors.

See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998).

The ALJ’s decision in the present action is not supported by substantial evidence in the

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The preferred practice is to cite to Polaski. The factors mentioned by the ALJ are almost identical to the 3

factors in Polaski and may be used to evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in lieu of the Polaski factors. See

Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007)(“Although the ALJ never expressly cited Polaski (which is our

preferred practice), the ALJ cited and conducted an analysis pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, which

largely mirror the Polaski factors.”)

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record. Specifically, the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence

because the ALJ failed to analyze and to evaluate the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints pursuant to

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1984). See Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 569 (8th Cir.

1991). The ALJ must make an express credibility determination, must detail reasons for discrediting

the testimony, must set forth the inconsistencies, and must discuss the Polaski factors. See Cline,

939 F.2d at 565.

In the present action, although the ALJ did not acknowledge Polaski, he did list factors for

analysis that largely mirror the factors set out in Polaski. (Tr. 14). Without providing any analysis,

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the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her limitations, and her complaints of pain and

discomfort, were not entirely credible. (Tr. 15). The ALJ failed to provide any specific reasons for

his finding that Plaintiff’s complaints were not credible. The ALJ is required to acknowledge and

to consider all of the Polaski factors prior to discounting the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain.

See Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case the ALJ failed to properly

analyze or consider those factors.

Although the ALJ discusses Plaintiff’s daily activities, he fails to state any specific reason

or identify any inconsistency, explaining why these activities are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s

complaints of pain. (Tr. 15). The ALJ references Plaintiff’s use of pain medication and the fact that

Plaintiff claimed the medicine made her drowsy, but fails to discuss the type, dosage and

effectiveness of the pain medication. (Tr. 15). 

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 The Court notes that on January 24, 2004, Plaintiff underwent an MRI. The results of the

MRIshowed a very large disc herniation at the L5-S1 level, bulging disc herniation at the L4-5 level,

and annular tears at the L3-4 and L2-3 levels. (Tr. 157-158). Three months later, on April 5, 2004,

Plaintiff underwent a microlumbar discectomy for the disc herniation at the L5-S1 level. (Tr. 141).

Following surgery Plaintiff continued to have complaints of left leg pain and numbness and

continued back pain. (Tr. 223, 243, 244, 245, 247-248). The ALJ does not discuss the duration,

frequency, and intensity of the pain or precipitating and aggravating factors in so far as they relate

to Plaintiff’s complaints of pain. (Tr. 14-15). 

Because the ALJ did not properly examine any of the five Polaski factors, this case should

be reversed and remanded for a full Polaski analysis. Id. 

4. Conclusion:

The Court has reviewed all of the relevant medical records and briefing in this case. After

a careful review of the entire record, the decision of the ALJ denying benefits to the Plaintiff is not

supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. This matter should be remanded to the

Commissioner for further action consistent with this opinion.

ENTERED this 28 day of June, 2007. th

 /s/ Barry A. Bryant 

 HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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