Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00490/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE SHARON L. GLEASON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Glen Alan Huggins, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Whetstone Unit, in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1).

BACKGROUND 

I. Case No. CR 2005-0551 

 On September 28, 2005, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Gila County 

Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 2005-0551, charging him with 

Possession of a Dangerous Drug (Count One), Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 

Two), and Unlawful Use of a Means of Transportation (Count Three). (See Doc. 9-1 at 

31, Exh. H.) The underlying facts of the charges were summarized as follows: 

Officer Schmidlin of the Miami Police Department had stopped the car in which Huggins was riding as a passenger 

after a license plate check led him to believe the car had been 

stolen. When Schmidlin approached and spoke to the driver, 

he noticed that Huggins was eating popcorn from a bag. Other 

Glen Alan Huggins, 

 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-00490-PHX-SLG (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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officers who assisted Schmidlin searched the car and found 

methamphetamine, a syringe, and a pipe in a door panel on 

the driver's side of the car. On the passenger side, in the bag 

of popcorn from which Huggins had been eating, officers 

found a plastic bag of methamphetamine and a syringe. 

(Doc. 9-1 at 46, Exh. I.)1

 Count Three was dismissed upon motion of the state, and trial 

commenced on the remaining charges on August 30, 2006. (Doc. 9-1 at 32, Exh. H.) The 

following day, on August 31, 2006, a jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts One and 

Two. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. A.) On September 11, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a 10-year 

term of imprisonment for the first count, and a concurrent 3.75-year term of 

imprisonment for the second count. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. B.) 

 On September 11, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. C.) 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion for 

judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 

9-1, Exh. G.) In a memorandum decision filed on October 16, 2007, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed his convictions. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. I; State v. Huggins, No. 2 CA-CR 

2006-0389-PR, 2007 WL 5582238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).) Petitioner sought review by 

the Arizona Supreme Court on November 19, 2007. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. J.) The Petition for 

Review was summarily denied on March 24, 2008. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. K.) 

 On December 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Superior Court (Doc. 9-2, Exh. N),2 and counsel was appointed to represent him (Doc. 9-

2, Exh. O). The proceedings were stayed (Doc. 10, Exh. P), and on March 17, 2009, 

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Doc. 9-2, Exh. Q). 

Petitioner raised two grounds for relief in the petition: (1) ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel; and (2) newly discovered evidence of juror bias entitled him to a new trial. (Id.) 

An evidentiary hearing was held, and on August 28, 2009, the Superior Court denied 

 

1

 The Court presumes the state court’s factual recitation is correct because Petitioner 

has not contested or “rebut[ed] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

2

 The Notice was filed jointly for Case No. CR 2005-0551 and Case No. CR 2005-

0498. 

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relief. (Doc. 9-3, Exh. R.) Petitioner timely petitioned for review. (Doc. 10, Exh. S.) In a 

memorandum decision filed on March 30, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

review but denied relief. (Doc. 10, Exh. T; State v. Huggins, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0376-

PR, 2010 WL 1223982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).) Although a request for extension of time 

was granted, Petitioner did not petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 

10-1, Exh. U-X.) 

 On May 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Superior Court in Case No. CR 2005-0551 (Doc. 10-1, Exh. Z), and counsel was 

appointed to represent him (Doc. 10-1, Exh. AA). Upon review of the record, counsel 

filed a notice to the Superior Court that she found no issues upon which to base a claim 

for relief and requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 10-1, Exh. BB), and Petitioner filed a supplemental petition 

on November 24, 2010 (Doc. 10-2, Exh. DD). On February 9, 2011, the Superior Court 

issued an order dismissing the second post-conviction relief petition (Doc. 10-3, Exh. 

EE). Following the denial of a motion to reconsider, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review 

on March 24, 2011 (Doc. 11-1, Exh. HH). In a memorandum decision filed on August 26, 

2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief. (Doc. 11-3, Exh. 

II); State v. Huggins, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0079-PR, 2011 WL 3805961 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2011). Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 On September 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

in the Superior Court in Case No. CR 2005-0551.3

 (Doc. 11-3, Exh. OO.) On December 

28, 2011, the Superior Court found “there [was] no basis upon which [Petitioner] could 

seek relief and any request by [Petitioner] in CR2005-0551 for relief [was] denied.” 

(Doc. 11-3, Exh. PP.) Petitioner did not seek review of the Superior Court’s decision. 

 On December 13, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 12-3, Exh. YY),4

 over which the court summarily 

 3

 The Notice was filed jointly for Case No. 2005-0551 and Case No. CR 2005-0498. 

4

 The Petition for Special Action was filed jointly for Case No. CR 2005-0551 and 

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declined to exercise jurisdiction (Doc. 12-3, Exh. ZZ, No. 2-CA-SA 2011-0104). The 

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on May 10, 2012. (Doc. 12-3, Exh. 

AAA.) 

II. Case No. CR 2005-0498 

 On September 7, 2005, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Superior 

Court, Case No. CR 2005-0498, charging him with Hindering Prosecution in the First 

Degree (Count One), Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution (Count Two), and Destruction of 

Evidence (Count Three). (Doc. 9-1, Exh. D.)5

 In sum, the charges alleged that Petitioner 

had acted to obstruct the prosecution of Clayton Huggins for murder of Marcus Pizano. 

(Id.) On August 31, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to all three counts. (Doc. 9-1, 

Exh. E.) On September 11, 2006, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent 

terms of imprisonment of 3.5 years for Count One, 3.5 years for Count Two, and 1 year 

for Count Three, all to be served consecutive to his sentence of imprisonment in Case No. 

CR 2005-0551. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. F.) 

 On September 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. G.) 

Finding that an appeal from the entry of a plea of guilty was not permitted under Rule 

17.1(e) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, on March 8, 2007, the appeal was 

dismissed. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. M.) 

 On December 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Superior Court (Doc. 9-2, Exh. N) and counsel was appointed to represent him (Doc. 11-

3, Exh. KK).6

 On January 28, 2008, the Superior Court found: 

Upon review of Defendant’s notice, the Court believes that its 

contents demonstrate that his claims are precluded under Rule 32.2(a) and (3), Ariz. R. Crim. P. Furthermore, the claims 

 Case No. CR 2005-0498. 

5

 Petitioner’s mother, Mary Martha Huggins, was also indicted the same day on related charges in a separate case, Case No. CR 2005-0497. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. E; Doc. 11-4, 

Exh. RR.) 

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 The Notice was filed jointly for Case No. CR 2005-0498 and Case No. CR 2005-

0551. 

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appear to be untimely and there are not specific exceptions 

and meritorious reasons for the untimely and there are no specific exceptions and meritorious reasons for the untimely filing; nor are there facts which substantiate Defendant’s 

claims. Consequently, the Court believes the notice is subject to summary dismissal under Rule 32.2(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

The Court grants Defendant’s counsel through February 29, 2008 to submit supplemental pleadings explaining why the 

matter should not be summarily dismissed. The Court will 

consider such pleadings on its Non-Appearance Calendar on March 3, 2008. 

(Doc. 11-3, Exh. LL.)7

 On February 27, 2008, Petitioner, through counsel, moved to 

dismiss the proceedings (Doc. 11-3, Exh. MM), which the Superior Court granted in an 

order dated February 28, 2008. (Doc. 11-3, Exh. NN). 

 On September 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

in the Superior Court in Case No. CR 2005-0498. (Doc. 11-3, Exh. OO.)8

 On December 

28, 2011, the Superior Court found that “[a]lthough it is not clear if Defendant seeks post 

conviction relief for the ineffectiveness of his previous post conviction relief counsel, the 

Court determines that Defendant should receive the benefit of counsel to evaluate 

whether there is a viable claim for relief,” and appointed Petitioner counsel. (Doc. 11-3, 

Exh. PP.) On April 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, raising 

two grounds for relief in connection with his guilty plea: (1) ineffective assistance of 

counsel; and (2) prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 11-4, Exh. RR.) On August 2, 2012, the 

Superior Court denied the petition. (Doc. 11-4. Exh. TT.) On August 27, 2012, Petitioner 

filed a Petition for Review. (Doc. 12-1, Exh. UU.) In a memorandum decision filed on 

November 14, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief.

(Doc. 12-2, Exh. VV); State v. Huggins, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0360-PR, 2012 WL 

5506988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). Petitioner sought review of the decision, which the 

Arizona Supreme Court summary denied on February 12, 2013. (Doc. 12-2, Exh. XX.) 

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 The Court noted that, with regard to Case No. CR 2005-0551, post-conviction relief proceedings had been stayed. 

8

 The Notice was filed jointly for Case No. CR 2005-0498 and Case No. CR 2005-

0551. 

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DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) on March 8, 2013. Petitioner raises four grounds for relief: 

GROUND ONE: Failure of the trial court to follow Arizona 

Law and Rules of Court in regards to plea negotiations or hold County Attorney, Daisy Flores, to the date that was 

ordered by the court for the hearing of plea offers. No hearing held as required after the filing of a plea offer in writing pursuant to (State v. Donald) 2000. No record to refer to in 

my behalf to refute my attorney’s claim of having discussed the plea or the prior aggravator. I am of the op[]inion that the court should have to produce a record of all plea proceedings to be in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. Not me! 

GROUND TWO: Violation of my Sixth Amendment constitutional right[]s in regard to pre-trial proceedings, 

including plea-offers as defined in the recent U.S. Supreme 

Court syllabus of (Lafler v. Cooper) and (Missouri v. Frye) 2012. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the very short duration of the plea window in this case denied 

Petitioner his 6th Amendment g[ua]rant[ee] and also fell far 

short of the standards required by the American Bar Ass. in regards to attorney/client relationships. 

GROUND THREE: Prosecutorial misconduct during the plea bargaining stages of trial and during the appeals process along with ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the court as 

regards to plea proceedings. 

GROUND FOUR: Petitioner is serving an illegal sentence 

because the prior aggravator used to [e]nhance his sentence, 

and deny him mand[a]tory Prop. 200 probation was not disclosed to Petitioner by his attorney or the court as required by law, until after trial. The Court never advised the 

Petitioner of the prior or the sentence he would be facing should he refuse to accept the profer[r]ed plea and lose at trial. Nor did the court record the wishes as to acceptance or denial of the filed plea offer. 

(Doc. 1 at 47-51.) 

 Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Docs. 9-12), to which Petitioner filed a 

Reply (Doc. 13). In their answer, Respondents contend that the petition is time-barred 

and alternatively, Petitioner did not exhaust his claims in state court and all four grounds 

are procedurally barred. 

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I. Legal Standards 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).9

 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

 A. Commencement of Limitations Period

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the AEDPA provides that a 1-year statute of 

limitations shall “apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

 Where a petitioner seeks direct review from the highest state court, “the period of 

‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner 

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether 

or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 

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 The AEDPA applies to federal habeas petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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(9th Cir. 1999); see also Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). “[W]ith 

respect to a state prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the 

judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review 

expires.” See Gonzalez v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012). 

 Within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), an “of-right” petition for postconviction review under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, available to 

criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct review.” Summers v. Schriro, 

481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. Therefore, the 

judgment of conviction becomes final upon the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding and review of that proceeding or upon the expiration of the time for seeking 

such proceeding or review. Summers, 481 F.3d at 711. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a), 

32.9(c). 

B. Statutory Tolling of Limitations Period 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the AEDPA provides that the one-year filing 

deadline is statutorily tolled during the time in “which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 

claim is pending.” See also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). In 

Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed, 

even though the petition is not filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of 

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). An application is “pending” under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2) during the “time between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a 

notice of appeal to a higher state court.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002); Biggs v. 

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the time between a first and 

second application for post-conviction relief is generally not tolled because no 

application is “pending” during that period. See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. 

Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding petitioner was “not entitled to tolling during 

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the interval between the completion of one round of state collateral review and the 

commencement of a second round of review”). Further, unlike finality under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1), statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) does not apply to the period to 

seek certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 

920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

C. Equitable Tolling of Limitations Period

 In certain limited circumstances, the one-year filing deadline may be equitably 

tolled. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). See also Calderon 

v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 

AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, 

not a jurisdictional bar), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States 

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner is entitled to equitable 

tolling if he can demonstrate that “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to prevent him from timely 

filing a federal habeas petition. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2010) (the 

petitioner must demonstrate “both that there were ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ and that 

the ‘extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness’”) (quoting Bryant v. 

Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007)); Roy v. Lampert, 465 

F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Equitable tolling is applicable only if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

D. Exception to Limitations Period

 Lastly, “an actual-innocence gateway claim” may serve as an exception to 

AEDPA’s limitations period. McQuiggin v. Perkins, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1926-

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1927 (2013); see also Stewart v. Cate, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 1707033, *6 (9th Cir. May 

1, 2014) (“[a]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner 

may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar ... [or] expiration of the statute of 

limitations”) (brackets in original). “To present otherwise time-barred claims in federal 

court, a petitioner must produce proof of his innocence that is sufficient to convince a 

federal court that a failure to entertain his claim would constitute a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice.” Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Lee v. 

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). A petitioner must “support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 

was not presented at trial.” Larson, 742 F.3d at 1095 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 324 (1995)). See also McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of 

an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). Thereby, in order to qualify for 

this exception and “pass through the Schlup gateway, a ‘petitioner must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). However, “[t]his 

is a high threshold that is rarely met.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 945; see also McQuiggin, 133 S. 

Ct. at 1928 (“tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare”). 

II. Application 

 A. Limitations Period - Judgment in Case No. CR 2005-0551 

Petitioner was originally sentenced following a jury verdict on September 11, 

2006. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and 

sentences on March 24, 2008. Petitioner did not seek review of that decision before the 

United States Supreme Court and therefore, Petitioner’s judgment became final on June 

22, 2008 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), when time to seek a writ of 

certiorari expired. See Zepeda, 581 F.3d at 1016; Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). Absent any tolling, 

the one-year limitations period would have commenced at that time. 

 The limitations period was statutorily tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), 

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when Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on December 17, 2007. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). That properly filed application remained “pending” until 

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its subsequent denial on March 30, 2010. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Because no petition for review was filed in the Arizona Supreme 

Court, the period of statutory tolling concluded with the Arizona Court of Appeals denial. 

See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006); Stewart, 2014 WL 1707033 at *4 (citing 

Carey, 536 U.S at 225) (a collateral review petition is not “pending” and does not toll the 

limitations period during the time between the denial of the petition in a lower state court 

and the filing of an appeal in the next higher state court where the appeal is not properly 

filed). 

 As a result, the limitations period commenced on March 31, 2010, and continued 

to run until May 27, 2010 (i.e., for 57 days), when Petitioner filed his second Notice of 

Post-Conviction Relief. See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048 (the time in between post-conviction 

relief proceedings is not tolled because no application is pending during that period). 

Petitioner’s second post-conviction relief proceedings remained pending until the 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on August 26, 2011. Consequently, the 

limitations period commenced again on August 27, 2011, and continued to run until it 

expired 308 days later on June 30, 2012. 

 Petitioner’s third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief filed on September 23, 2011 

did not toll the limitations period because it was not “properly filed.” See Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 413; Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010). The Notice was filed 

after the state’s time limit, see 32.4(a) (“the notice must be filed within ninety days after 

the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order 

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later”), and the Superior Court found 

no claim warranted further proceedings. By doing so, the Superior Court implicitly found 

that the notice was untimely and did not satisfy any exception to the time limit for filing. 

See Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Examining the court’s words 

against the backdrop of California law regarding untimeliness, it is clear that the court 

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was denying Bonner’s petition as untimely”); cf. Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 991 

(9th Cir. 2011) (tolling limitations period where state court “did not find a timeliness 

procedural bar, and decided Trigueros’s petition on the merits.”). The Superior Court’s 

untimeliness finding is evident by the summary dismissal; the Superior Court did not 

allow Petitioner to file a post-conviction relief petition. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(b) (“If 

the specific exception and meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the claim and 

indicating why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner, the 

notice shall be summarily dismissed.”); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(c) (discussing appointment 

of counsel and the filing of a Rule 32 petition following filing of a notice).10 Petitioner’s 

2011 Special Action was not an application for state post-conviction or other collateral 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and also did not toll the limitations 

period. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001). 

 Accordingly, “with respect to the pertinent judgment” in Case No. CR 2005-0551, 

the limitations period was tolled through August 26, 2011, and thereafter ran until it 

expired on June 30, 2012. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner filed the instant habeas 

petition approximately eight months after the expiration of the one-year limitations 

period. Therefore, any claims raised in the petition arising from the judgment in Case No. 

CR 2005-0551 are untimely. 

B. Limitations Period – Judgment in Case No. CR 2005-0498 

 Having entered a plea of guilty, Petitioner was sentenced on September 11, 2006. 

Petitioner had 90 days from that date to timely file an “of-right” petition for postconviction relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, the 

notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within 

thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate court in the 

petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.”). Petitioner did not do so; 

 10 Even if the September 2011 Notice tolled the limitations period, it only did so until the Superior Court denied post-conviction relief on December 28, 2011. Petitioner 

did not seek review of the Superior Court’s denial of Case No. CR 2005-0551, and 

consequently, the statute of limitations period would have commenced on December 29, 

2011, and ran uninterrupted until it expired in October 2012. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 191. 

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therefore, his convictions became final on December 10, 2006 for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A).11 See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711. The limitations period continued to run 

interrupted until it expired one year later on December 10, 2007. 

 None of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings statutorily tolled the 

limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). First, because Petitioner’s 

December 17, 2007 post-conviction relief notice in Case No. CR 2005-0498 was found to 

be untimely, it was not “properly” filed and did not toll the limitations period. See Pace, 

544 U.S. at 414. Further, Petitioner’s 2011 notice for post-conviction relief did not toll 

the limitations period, because the limitations period had already expired in 2007. See 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (once the AEDPA limitations period 

expires, a subsequently filed petition for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute 

of limitations); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (state petition 

filed after the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year period does not revive a limitations 

period that ended before state petition was filed). Lastly, as previously noted, Petitioner’s 

2011 special action did not toll the limitations period because it was not an application 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

 Accordingly, “with respect to the pertinent judgment” in Case No. CR 2005-0498, 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period. Petitioner filed the 

instant habeas petition more than five years after the one-year limitations period expired 

on December 10, 2007. Therefore, any claims raised in the petition arising from the 

judgment in Case No. CR 2005-0498 are also untimely. 

 C. Equitable Tolling of Limitations Periods 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 

limitation period for either judgment. First, Petitioner points to the disparity in timing of 

state review of his two cases (see Doc. 1 at 53), which he appears to suggest obscured the 

deadline for filing his federal habeas petition. However, Petitioner’s confusion about his 

 11 Petitioner’s subsequent appeal did not impact the finality of his convictions because no direct appeal following entry of his guilty plea was permitted. See supra. 

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state filings does not justify his delay in filing a federal habeas petition. See Pace, 544 

U.S. at 416. If diligent, upon becoming aware of the denial of his post-conviction relief, 

or following the denial of an appeal, “he could have prepared a basic form habeas petition 

and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Pace, 544 U.S. at 416 (citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 

U.S. 269, 278 (2005)) (“A prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid this 

predicament... by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the federal 

court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are 

exhausted”). Waiting “in the hopes that any ambiguities would ultimately be resolved in 

his favor, is the kind of ‘oversight, miscalculation or negligence’ for which equitable 

tolling is not appropriate.” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. Nor is any alleged 

ignorance of the statute of limitations or “lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Robinson v. Kramer, 588 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Fisher v. 

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]gnorance of the law, even for an 

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.”). Petitioner has 

simply not shown that the state courts prevented him “from preparing and filing a habeas 

petition at any time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Petitioner also argues that his lack of legal materials and limited access to the 

prison law library merits equitable tolling of the deadline. (See Doc. 13.) True, in certain 

circumstances, a lack of access to legal resources may be an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that unavailability of a copy of the AEDPA in a prison law 

library could be grounds for equitable tolling). However here, Petitioner has not pointed 

to any specific materials to which he did not have access. Cf. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 

964, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to AEDPA materials and Oregon law 

books may be an extraordinary circumstance); Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th 

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Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to Spanish language legal materials or assistance 

could entitle habeas petitioner to equitable tolling). Rather, his complaints are 

generalized, and he does not show how his lack of legal resources prevented him from 

filing a federal habeas petition while the statute of limitations was running. Instead, the 

fact that Petitioner filed lengthy state court petitions during the limitations periods 

indicate that he had access to legal materials. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that 

despite his own diligence, “the hardship caused by lack of access to his materials was an 

extraordinary circumstance” that resulted in the untimeliness of his petition. WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. 

 D. Exception to Limitations Periods 

 Lastly, Petitioner does not cast “doubt on the conviction[s] by undercutting the 

reliability of the proof of guilt” nor does he make any claim of actual innocence. Lee, 653 

F.3d at 937. “[A] petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring 

him within the narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1927 (“A 

petitioner invoking the miscarriage of justice exception” must present “evidence of 

innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial...”). 

Here, Petitioner seeks to challenge the constitutional adequacy of the procedures that led 

to his convictions and the fairness of the sentences he received; he does not proffer any 

evidence or argument of actual innocence. Therefore, he has not presented new evidence 

that justifies review of his time-barred claims under this exception. 

CONCLUSION 

 In sum, Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until March 8, 2013, 

approximately eight months after the limitations period expired following judgment in 

Case No. CR 2005-0551, and more than five years after the limitations period expired 

following judgment in Case No. CR 2005-0498. Petitioner has not made “‘a good-faith 

allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling’” or would justify an 

exception to the time-bar, and thus has not demonstrated that an evidentiary hearing is 

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warranted. Stewart, 2014 WL 1707033 at *9 (quoting Roy, 465 F.3d at 969). The Court 

therefore concludes that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as it pertains to either 

state court judgment, is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 7th day of May, 2014. 

 

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