Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00202/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORI WILEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF No. 13]; and

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF No. 14]

Lori Wiley (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under the Social Security Act. See 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s 

(“Defendant”) final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits. This 

case was referred for a report and recommendation on the parties’ cross motions for 

summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After considering the papers 

submitted, the administrative record, and the applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and that Defendant’s cross

motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

///

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 22
2

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Social Security Disability Insurance on 

October 15, 2013, and a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

Benefits on October 21, 2013. Administrative Record (“AR”) 157-58, 161-66. She 

alleges a disability onset date of July 1, 2010. AR 157, 161. The Commissioner denied 

Plaintiff’s claim initially on January 6, 2014 and on reconsideration on May 16, 2014. 

AR 100-11. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”), which was held on June 22, 2015. AR 32. Plaintiff was represented by counsel

at the hearing. Id. Plaintiff and vocational expert Katie T. Macy-Powers testified at the 

hearing. AR 14.

On August 3, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s request for 

benefits, finding that Plaintiff had not been under a disability within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act from July 1, 2010, through the date of the decision. AR 14. Plaintiff 

filed a Request for Reconsideration on January 16, 2014. AR 106. On December 12, 

2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner for judicial review purposes. AR 1-6. 

Plaintiff timely commenced this action in federal court. 

B. Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony

Plaintiff was born on October 23, 1954. AR 33. Plaintiff claims that she suffers 

from, among others, fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus, obesity, depression, hypertension, 

asthma, anemia, degenerative joint disease, and right lower extremity pain. AR 216, 234-

35.

Regarding education, Plaintiff has a General Education Diploma. AR 33. Plaintiff 

has held a variety of jobs. Beginning in 1992 to 2001, Plaintiff worked full-time as an 

exhibit associate. AR 34, 178-79. In 2002, she worked as a marketing associate. AR 34, 

179. Between 2003 and 2005, Plaintiff worked in retail. AR 33-35, 179. From 2005 to 

2006, Plaintiff worked for a hotel in Arizona where she would make arrangements and 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 22
3

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

help with events. AR 35, 179-80. This full-time position allowed Plaintiff to mostly sit

during the event setup stages but stand during the actual events. AR 35. From 2006 

through 2010, Plaintiff worked as a telemarketer. AR 35, 179-80. She was working in 

telemarking at her disability onset date. Subsequently, from November 2012 until

February 2013, Plaintiff worked as a seasonal retail employee, working three or four hour 

shifts. AR 36, 185. In October 2012, she worked for one week creating edible 

arrangements. AR 36-37, 186. And in 2013, Plaintiff worked as a grocery story courtesy 

clerk for one month. AR 37, 185.

Plaintiff lives in a home similar to a boarding house. AR 162. She is given a small 

chore that she does daily, which she states usually takes her about ten to fifteen minutes 

to complete. AR 39. This can include wiping down appliances in the kitchen or cleaning 

the bathroom. Id. Certain days her chore will be to sweep the sidewalk outside her 

home, but she claims she can only do a section of the sidewalk each day. Id. During the 

rest of her day, Plaintiff attends appointments and classes by taking the bus or trolley. Id.

And, up to twice a month, she goes to the grocery store. AR 40.

Since her disability onset date in 2010, Plaintiff states she has problems with lifting

objects and being on her feet. AR 36-37. She claims to experience pain in her neck, 

back, fingers, hips, and knees, and the worst pain that she experiences is in her right leg 

from the knee down. AR 42-43. She also states that it is difficult for her to be around 

people because she suffers from depression and anxiety. AR 41-42.

At her hearing, when the ALJ asked her how much time she could spend on her 

feet without it being too much, Plaintiff explained that she could stand for ten or fifteen 

minutes and then needs to sit down. AR 38. When questioned on how she accomplishes 

her daily tasks and chores while only being able to stand or walk for ten or fifteen 

minutes, Plaintiff clarified that she plans her trips so that she does not have to go very far 

and chooses classes and locations “that [have] the least amount of walking.” AR 40. 

///

///

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 22
4

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Documentary Medical Evidence

1. Physical Health 

A. Dr. Park

Plaintiff began receiving medical treatment at the Family Health Centers of San 

Diego (“FHC”) in November 2010. See generally AR 242-310; 318-338; 348-366, 395-

443. Medical records show that she returned for visits every few months for general 

medical reasons, including with complaints about pain and to refill her prescriptions. 

During these visits, she was seen by various physicians. 

On January 22, 2014, Dr. Park from FHC prepared a check box medical report 

concerning the verification of Plaintiff’s physical incapacity. AR 311. He indicated that 

Plaintiff’s disability was permanent and that she was unable to perform any work, 

including sedentary/clerical work but could care for herself. Id. However, Dr. Park 

indicated that he was unable to evaluate Plaintiff’s capacity to lift, push, pull, sit, stand, 

squat, kneel, conduct overhead work, or restrictions on hand use. Id.

B. Dr. Lee

Plaintiff’s medical records also indicated that she began being seen at St. Paul’s 

PACE (“PACE”) in April 2015. See generally AR 453-504. Dr. Lee prepared a check 

box medical source statement on May 26, 2015. AR 522-23. He reported that Plaintiff 

had diagnoses of diabetes mellitus and neuropathy, fibromyalgia, anemia, hypertension, 

and chronic kidney disease and that her general prognosis was “fair.” AR 522. In 

reporting on Plaintiff’s residual functioning capacity, Dr. Lee estimated that Plaintiff 

could sit for eight hours out of an eight-hour work day and could stand for one hour out 

of an eight-hour work day. AR 523. Dr. Lee assessed that Plaintiff could occasionally 

lift and carry less than ten pounds, rarely lift and carry twenty pounds, and could never 

lift and carry twenty or fifty pounds. Id. He also indicated that she needed a walker to 

aid in standing and walking. Id. Overall, Dr. Lee opined that Plaintiff would be unable 

to work due to her multiple medical conditions and was not a malingerer. Id.

///

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 22
5

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Dr. Dao

Dr. Dao performed a consultative complete internal medicine evaluation of 

Plaintiff on April 8, 2015. AR 372-80. She reported complaints of diabetes, 

hypertension, asthma, and fibromyalgia. Id.

In regards to the complaint of diabetes, Dr. Dao’s impression was that Plaintiff’s 

blood sugars were not well controlled, but he detected no signs of diabetic peripheral 

neuropathy or diabetic ulcers. AR 376-77. Plaintiff’s hypertension and asthma were

assessed as asymptomatic. AR 377. Dr. Dao stated that on the day of the examination 

Plaintiff did not have enough tender points to associate her with fibromyalgia. Id.

However, Dr. Dao also reported Plaintiff had a “1+ pitting edema of the lower 

extremities,” bilateral crepitus of the knees, tenderness of the medial aspect of the left and 

right knees through palpation, and a normal gait. AR 375-76. Plaintiff was noted as 

obese, in no acute distress, with no ataxia or dyspnea noted. AR 374.

Based on his examination, Dr. Dao concluded Plaintiff could: lift, carry, push, or 

pull fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently; stand, sit, or walk for 

six hours out of an eight-hour day; sit for six hours out of an eight-hour day; climb, stoop, 

kneel, and crouch frequently; and had no manipulative, visual, or communicative 

limitations. AR 377. 

D. Dr. Spellman and Dr. Nordlicht

Dr. Spellman prepared a Disability Determination Explanation opinion at the initial 

stage of Plaintiff’s disability process, while Dr. Nordlicht provided a Disability 

Determination Explanation opinion at the reconsideration stage. AR 56-70, 72-93. They 

found Plaintiff’s statements regarding her symptoms to be partially credible and found 

her postural activities limited to occasional. AR 59-60, 67-68, 78-79, 89-90. Both 

doctors determined Plaintiff was not disabled and that, while she had some limitations in 

her ability to perform work related activities, her symptoms were not severe enough to 

prevent Plaintiff from performing her previous work as a telemarketer. AR 62-63, 70-71, 

81-82, 92-93.

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 22
6

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Mental Health 

A. Dr. Hodges

Plaintiff received mental health services at PACE from Dr. Hodges beginning in 

April 2015. AR 505-519. Dr. Hodges prepared a DSM-IV Multiaxial Evaluation of 

Plaintiff on June 19, 2015. AR 520. Dr. Hodges identified Plaintiff’s symptoms as 

including generalized persistent anxiety and mood disturbance. Id. He further indicated

that Plaintiff’s symptoms have lasted or could be expected to last at least twelve months.

Id. Dr. Hodges opined that Plaintiff had mild restrictions on her activities of daily living 

and moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, concentration, and 

persistence or pace. Id.

B. Dr. Weiss

Dr. Weiss reviewed Plaintiff’s Medical Evidence of Record and accompanying 

documents at the reconsideration stage. She noted that Plaintiff’s depression as mostly in 

remission, she was sleeping better, had improved coping, was social, goes to the beach, 

and her mental status was reported as normal. AR 77, 88. Overall, Dr. Weiss determined 

that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments were nonsevere. AR 77, 88.

D. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Katie Macy-Powers testified at the hearing. AR 47.

She characterized Plaintiff’s vocational background as a customer service clerk at the 

light exertion level, with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) of 4. AR 48.

Plaintiff’s work as a telemarketer was assessed at a sedentary exertion level, SVP of 3. 

Id. Both Plaintiff’s work as a display representative and as a sales clerk were listed at the 

light exertion level, SVP of 3. Id.

The ALJ posed this first hypothetical to the VE, asking whether an individual with 

the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff who had these limitations could 

perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a telemarketer or customer service clerk: limited 

to light work; could stand or walk for no more than four hours for the day; stand no more 

than thirty minutes at one time, walk no more than thirty minutes at one time; and 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 22
7

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

required a cane for ambulation over 100 feet. AR 49. The VE replied that a person with 

these limitations would be able to work as a telemarketer and customer service clerk, but 

not as an exhibit display representative or sales clerk. Id. Extending the hypothetical, the 

ALJ questioned whether having a non-public restriction would eliminate the possibility

of working as a customer service clerk or telemarketer. AR 50. The VE affirmed that a 

non-public restriction would eliminate the remaining possibilities. Id.

Plaintiff’s attorney created a second hypothetical, using the same limitations as 

described in the first hypothetical but added that the person experienced difficulty with 

complex and detailed work and was limited to only simple routine tasks. Id. The VE 

replied that the individual would not be able to work as a telemarketer or customer 

service clerk and would have no transferrable skills. Id.

II. THE ALJ DECISION

A. The Sequential Process

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must 

show that he or she cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected 

to last at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3). The Social Security 

regulations establish a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether an applicant 

is disabled under this standard. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Batson v. Comm’r 

of the Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the applicant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(b). If not, then at step two the 

ALJ must determine whether the applicant suffers from a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c). If the impairment is 

severe, at step three the ALJ must determine whether the applicant’s impairment or 

combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment contained under 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d). If the 

applicant’s impairment meets or equals a listing, he or she must be found disabled. Id.

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 22
8

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If the impairment does not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ must determine the 

applicant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(e). 

Then, the ALJ must determine at step four whether the applicant retains the residual 

functional capacity to perform past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f).

If the applicant cannot perform past relevant work, at step five the ALJ must consider 

whether the applicant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). 

The applicant carries the burden to prove eligibility from steps one through four 

but the burden at step five is on the agency. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Applicants not disqualified at step five are eligible for disability benefits. Id.

B. Substance of the ALJ’s Decision

At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since July 1, 2010, the alleged onset date. AR 16. 

At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus, 

obesity, hypertension, asthma, degenerative joint disease, and right lower extremity pain

constituted severe impairments. Id. In addition, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable impairment of depression did not constitute a severe impairment 

and only caused Plaintiff minimal limitations. AR 17-18. 

At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that would meet or medically equal the severity of any listed 

impairments. AR 18-20.

The ALJ next established that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except she 

could perform only occasional postural activities and could not climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. AR 20. The ALJ also found Plaintiff could stand for thirty minutes at a time, 

walk for thirty minutes at a time, and stand and/or walk for four hours cumulatively 

during an eight-hour workday. Id. She required a cane for ambulation over 100 feet, 

could perform frequent left foot controls and occasional right foot controls, and could

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 22
9

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have frequent exposure to all environmental conditions, but only occasional exposure to 

pulmonary irritants and no exposure to hazards. Id.

With these limitations, at step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform her 

past relevant works as both a telemarketer and a customer service clerk. AR 23. Thus, 

the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security 

Act from July 1, 2010, the alleged disability onset date, through August 2, 2015, the date 

of the decision. AR 24. 

III. DISCUSSION

In challenging the ALJ’s denial of benefits, Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed

reversible error and did not base his decision on substantial evidence because he (1) did 

not properly credit Plaintiff’s testimony, and (2) failed to properly consider the opinions 

of Plaintiff’s treating doctors. ECF No. 13 at 12-19. 

A. Legal Standard of Review

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision 

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must 

affirm the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and applies the correct legal standards. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. “Substantial evidence 

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation and 

citation omitted). It is a “highly deferential” standard of review. Valentine v. Astrue, 574 

F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, 

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Vasquez v. 

Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). If the evidence is susceptible to more than 

one reasonable interpretation, the agency’s decision must be upheld. Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1111. It is not the court’s job to reinterpret or re-evaluate the evidence, even if a reevaluation may reasonably result in a favorable outcome for the plaintiff. Batson, 359 

F.3d at 1193.

///

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 22
10

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Testimony

In making a final determination, an ALJ must determine the extent to which a 

claimant’s symptoms “can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs 

and laboratory findings and other evidence to decide how [those] symptoms affect [the 

claimant’s] ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). A claimant’s subjective 

symptoms must be considered in a disability evaluation. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). But those statements alone cannot be decisive on a disability 

claim. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“[a]n individual’s statement as to pain or other 

symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) 

(“statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are 

disabled”). It is the province of the ALJ to make findings of fact as to a claimant’s 

credibility. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Social Security 

Ruling (SSR) 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996).

In deciding whether to credit a claimant’s testimony about subjective symptoms or 

limitations, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196; 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. Under the first step, the claimant must produce objective 

medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to 

produce pain or other symptoms. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281.

“[T]he claimant need not show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to 

cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. If this 

test is satisfied, and there is no affirmative evidence that the claimant is malingering, then 

the ALJ must determine the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints. At step 

two, the ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] symptoms” to 

determine whether and how these symptoms limit a claimant’s ability to work. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). The ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity 

of symptoms as long as he gives clear, specific, and convincing reasons for doing so. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson, 395 F.3d at 1195.

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 22
11

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider the following factors: 

1) reputations for being honest; 2) inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony; 3) 

inconsistencies in the claimant’s conduct; 4) daily living activities; 5) work record; and 6) 

physician’s testimony concerning the symptoms alleged. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). Daily activities may be grounds for an adverse credibility 

finding if the claimant is able to perform substantial physical functions that could be 

transferred to the workplace. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). In 

rejecting a plaintiff’s testimony, “the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible 

and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). “The fact that a claimant’s testimony is not fully corroborated 

by the objective medical findings, in and of itself, is not a clear and convincing reason for 

rejecting it.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “[i]f the 

ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, we may not 

engage in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

Here, at step one, the ALJ accepted the following as objective medical evidence: a 

recent x-ray of Plaintiff’s right knee; a report from a consultative examination; and 

Plaintiff’s medical history records. AR 21-22, 328, 356, 373-77, 399, 413, 504. The ALJ 

concluded that that the medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms. AR 21. However, at step two of the 

credibility analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements of disability less than fully 

credible because they were inconsistent with the medical records and her daily living 

activities. AR 20-23. Thus, this Court must determine whether he gave specific and 

convincing reasons to reject her testimony. 

1. Medical Records

While the medical records generally show that Plaintiff has some functional 

limitations, the ALJ found that her statements regarding the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of her symptoms were not fully supported by the medical evidence. AR 

21-22. 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 22
12

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

First, in analyzing the record, the ALJ clearly acknowledged that Plaintiff has

some functional limitations in her lower extremities because of the combined effects of 

degenerative joint disease, obesity, and fibromyalgia. AR 21. For example, he points to 

an x-ray of her right knee, showing slow degenerative changes consistent with 

osteoarthritis. AR 21, 504. He also noted that Plaintiff has shown some signs of 

limitations during consultations, particularly calling out a visit on April 8, 2015 with Dr. 

Dao where she demonstrated evidence of crepitus in her knees and exhibited tenderness 

in her knees. AR 21, 375-77. Thus, the ALJ limited Plaintiff’s work to the light 

exertional level and limited her standing and walking to 30 minutes at a time, and to 4 

hours cumulatively for the 8-hour workday. AR 21. 

However, declining to impose further restrictions, the ALJ noted other evidence in 

the medical record that appeared to refute Plaintiff’s statements as to the severity of her 

limitations. He noted that Plaintiff has a grossly intact range of motion and a normal gait

during her April 8, 2015 consultation. Id. The ALJ also cited to a report from a June 

2015 physical therapy session which stated that Plaintiff’s “pain symptoms have 

generally been reported as in the mild to moderate range,” with Plaintiff’s pain generally 

running as a 3-4 out of 10. AR 21, 453, 503. The ALJ also took into consideration 

Plaintiff’s other medical conditions, including diabetes, high blood pressure, and asthma, 

but—with citations to the record—found that these impairments did not cause Plaintiff 

any further limitations. AR 21-22. 

The Court finds that these citations are specific enough to constitute substantial 

evidence to support the ALJ’s credibility finding. See Social Security Ruling 96-7p 

(credibility findings “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to 

any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s 

statements”). Further, it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider this evidence when 

assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (finding ALJ can consider 

objective medical evidence when assessing credibility). 

///

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 22
13

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Activities of Daily Living

The ALJ also discredited Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling symptoms and 

limitations because he found it inconsistent with her self-reported activities of daily 

living, including performing light household chores, utilizing public transportation, and 

shopping for groceries. AR 22. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ mischaracterized her 

testimony regarding her ability to perform daily activities and incorrectly concluded that 

her testimony was inconsistent with her pain-related impairments. ECF No. 13 at 13-14. 

In assessing the credibility of subjective complaints, the ALJ may consider the 

claimant’s daily activities. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 144, 148 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Differences between a 

claimant’s allegations and her conduct qualify as substantial evidence that may be used in 

a credibility determination. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The court is aware, though, “that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that 

daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that 

would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment 

will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day.” Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2014). But, where a level of activity is inconsistent with a 

claimant’s claimed limitations, then the activities bear on a claimant’s credibility. Id.

Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s daily activities include performing light 

household chores, using public transportation, and grocery shopping. AR 22. The ALJ 

acknowledged that “the claimant clearly experiences some degree of difficulty as a 

byproduct of her impairments” and imposed restrictions on the exertional level and 

limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to stand/walk. AR 22-23.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis erred in two ways. First, Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ misconstrued her testimony by failing to specifically note that Plaintiff 

testified that she sometimes needed to break up certain chores she was assigned (such as 

sweeping the sidewalk) into sections and that she would plan her trips to activities, 

classes, and doctor’s appointments to require the least amount of walking. ECF No. 13 at 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 22
14

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9; ECF No. 15 at 3. The Court declines to find any error in the ALJ’s failure to 

specifically mention this testimony. As to her chores, the aforementioned limitations do 

not appear inconsistent with the ALJ’s statement that the Plaintiff is able to perform light

household chores. And while Plaintiff did testify that she could only walk or stand for 10 

to 15 minutes for the whole day (AR 38, 40), when questioned by the ALJ about how she 

goes to her appointments and classes, she only stated that she would plan the trip to 

minimize walking but never testified that she would be prohibited from taking a trip if it 

required more than 15 minutes of walking or standing at a time. In contrast to the case 

cited by Plaintiff, in ALJ in Garrison v. Colvin, failed to mention that the plaintiff there 

was heavily assisted by her mother in carrying out the daily tasks she was credited with 

and that she was regularly prohibited from engaging in many other normal household 

activities. 759 F.3d at 1015-16. While the ALJ did not repeat every detail of Plaintiff’s 

testimony verbatim, he did not materially misconstrue her statements.1 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain how her daily activities were 

transferrable to a work setting. ECF No. 13 at 10. The ALJ found that the physical, 

mental, and social abilities and interactions that are required to perform her reported daily 

activities reflect the abilities and interactions that are necessary to obtain and maintain 

employment. AR 22. The ALJ directly cited to activities that Plaintiff testified about, 

including her abilities to perform light household chores, taking public transportation, 

and shopping for groceries. Plaintiff’s past work included employment as a telemarketer 

and a customer service clerk. The ALJ did not make a logical leap in concluding that 

Plaintiff’s ability to participate in these activities required her to engage in work-typical 

tasks, such as walking/standing, lifting, utilizing transportation and engaging in at least 

 

1 However, even assuming the ALJ should have explicitly mentioned this testimony, any 

such error would be harmless, in light of Plaintiff’s other self-reported daily activities and 

evidence from the medical record. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

1990) (harmless error rule applies to review of administrative decisions regarding 

disability).

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 22
15

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

some social interactions, diminished Plaintiff’s credibility in claiming functional 

limitations severe enough to prohibit Plaintiff from all work. The tasks that Plaintiff 

testified that she performs here differ in nature from the tasks that the court found to be 

not transferrable to the work place in the case Plaintiff cites, Vertigan v. Halter. The 

Vertigan plaintiff was only able to go grocery shopping with assistance and the other 

activities she cited were for leisure, including walking in malls, getting together with 

friends, playing cards, swimming, watching television and reading. 260 F.3d at 1049.

Moreover, unlike in Vertigan, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony not only 

based on conflicts with her reported activities of daily living, but because of her medical 

record as well. The Court finds that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s daily activities 

were inconsistent with the claimed limitations is reasonable and supported by substantial 

evidence cited in the record. Thus, the Court, may not “second-guess it.” Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding adverse credibility 

determination even though there were other ways to reasonably interpret the claimant’s 

testimony regarding daily activities). 

C. The ALJ Properly Considered the Opinions of Plaintiff’s 

Treating Doctors

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of her 

treating physicians, Dr. Lee and Dr. Park, as well as her treating psychologist, Dr.

Hodges. ECF No. 13 at 15-19. 

As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating doctor

than to the opinion of a source who does not treat the claimant. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-

31; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The rationale behind giving a

treating source’s opinion greater weight is that “he is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Winans, 853 F.2d at 647. 

However, an ALJ may disregard a treating source’s opinion whether or not that opinion is 

contradicted. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Where a treating 

doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, a commissioner can only reject the 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 22
16

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treating doctor’s opinion for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If 

the treating source’s opinion is contradicted by another source, the general rule is that 

conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the Secretary and that his determination 

must be upheld when the evidence is susceptible to one or more rational interpretations. 

Winans, 853 F.2d at 647. When there is a conflict between the opinions of a treating 

source and an examining source, the Ninth Circuit requires that, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to 

disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he . . . must make findings setting forth 

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the 

record.” Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830-31.

When evaluating conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not accept the opinion 

of a doctor if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical 

findings. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149; see also Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1140 

(9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are 

conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical 

findings.”); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111-12 (noting an “ALJ may ‘permissibly reject[] . . . 

check-off reports that [do] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions’” 

(quoting Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996))). The more consistent a 

medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight it is given. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d)(4). A treating source’s opinion on the nature and severity of an 

impairment is given controlling weight only if it is well-supported by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and not inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(62). The opinion of a 

consultative examiner that rests on the examiner’s own independent examination and 

clinical findings can alone constitute substantial evidence for rejecting a conflicting 

opinion from a treating source. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. It is then solely the 

province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 

(9th Cir. 2008). 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 22
17

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, the Court finds that the opinions of the treating doctors are contradicted by

those of the other doctors, and thus applies the “specific and legitimate” reasons standard. 

1. Treating Physicians

Plaintiff argues that while the opinions of Dr. Park and Dr. Lee are contradicted by 

other doctors in the record, the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons based on 

substantial evidence in rejecting their opinions. ECF No. 13 at 12-13. 

In considering the opinions of Dr. Park and Dr. Lee, the ALJ noted that they 

opined Plaintiff was “limited to a less than full range of sedentary work” and “incapable 

of working.” AR 22. Dr. Lee opined that Plaintiff could sit for 8 hours a day, stand/walk 

for 1 hour a day, occasionally lift up to 10lbs, rarely lift 10lbs, and never lift 20 or 50lbs 

in an 8-hour workday. AR 523. The ALJ did not fully reject these opinions but gave 

them little weight because “as discussed in the remainder of [the ALJ decision], the 

claimant continues to be capable of returning to prior work despite the limitation outlined 

in the above residual functional capacity.” Id.

First, earlier in the opinion, the ALJ noted some discrepancies in the medical 

record that caused him to modify the limitations in determining her residual functioning 

capacity to be different from that opined by Dr. Park and Dr. Lee. The ALJ pointed to 

specific medical evidence in the record that indicated the Plaintiff had a grossly intact 

range of motion, normal gait, and mild to moderate pain levels. AR 21. To the extent 

conflicting evidence exists in the medical record, the “ALJ is the final arbiter with respect 

to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.” Tommasetti, 533 at 1041. 

Second, Dr. Park and Dr. Lee’s opinions were discounted because they were 

contradicted by the opinions of Drs. Dao, Spellman, and Nordlicht. AR 22-23. Dr. Dao

conducted a physical consultative exam and reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. AR 22.

He opined that Plaintiff could work at the medium exertional level and was capable of 

climbing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching on a frequent basis. Id. In justifying his 

reliance on Dr. Dao’s opinion, the ALJ explained that he gave greater weight to Dr. 

Dao’s opinion because it was “supported by a detailed narrative summary of specific 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 22
18

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

clinical signs” and is “generally consistent with the medical evidence of record.” AR 22, 

375-77. For example, Dr. Dao observed that Plaintiff exhibited crepitus of the knees 

bilaterally and that there was tenderness on palpation of the medial aspect of the left and 

right knee. AR 376. He found that the range of motion in the knees was normal 

bilaterally. Id. He also found that her gait was normal and that she could stand on her 

heels and toes. AR 377. Nevertheless, the ALJ imposed stricter limitations than Dr. Dao 

did, for example limiting Plaintiff to the light exertional level and limiting her cumulative 

standing/walking time to 4 hours in a workday. AR 22. 

Next, the ALJ considered the opinions of Dr. Spellman and Dr. Nordlicht who 

conducted consultative exams at the initial and reconsideration stages. AR 23, 56-63, 72-

82, 83-93. Both physicians found Plaintiff to be limited to the light exertional level. AR 

23. The ALJ explained that he gave considerable weight to their opinions because they

were acting as acceptable medical sources under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513, 416.913(a), the 

opinions were found to be consistent with the majority of the medical evidence, and 

because, as “medical consultants, they are familiar with the disability process and have 

significant programmatic knowledge.” AR 23. Again, the ALJ imposed stricter 

limitations than these two doctors did. AR 23. 

By citing medical evidence and providing reasons to credit the other doctors’ 

opinions, the Court, therefore, finds that the ALJ gave “specific and legitimate” reasons 

based on “substantial evidence” to support his partial rejection of Dr. Park and Dr. Lee’s 

opinions.

2

 Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-831; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (“When confronted 

 

2 Recently, the Ninth Circuit reversed an order affirming the denial of an SSI and DIB 

because, in part, the ALJ failed to properly analyze the claimant’s fibromyalgia-related 

symptoms and erred by giving no weight to the treating physician’s opinion as to the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her fibromyalgia. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 

F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2017). Though neither party affirmatively raised this case to the Court, 

the Court acknowledges the relevance of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling but finds the present 

case distinguishable. There, the ALJ gave “no weight” to the claimant’s treating 

rheumatologist, a physician with specialized knowledge of fibromyalgia, and did not 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 22
19

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion 

that is conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings.”). 

2. Treating Psychologist

The ALJ primarily relied on the opinion of Dr. Weiss in concluding that Plaintiff 

suffered from no severe mental impairments. AR 18. The ALJ afforded Dr. Weiss’s 

opinion great weight because of its consistency with the record’s evidence in finding that 

Plaintiff had no limitations in activities of daily living caused by her mental impairment, 

no limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, mild limitation in social functioning, 

and no extended episodes of decompensation. AR 17-18. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her treating psychologist Dr. 

Hodges’s opinion. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not provide a specific 

rationale in rejecting his opinion and failed to identify which medical evidence is 

inconsistent and contradicted. ECF No. 13 at 17.

The ALJ gave two reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Hodges’s opinion,

because his opinion was “notably inconsistent with the signs and symptoms identified by 

Dr. Hodges in his treatment records (see generally, Exhibit 11F) with respect to any 

continuous period of at least 12 months” and because it was “inconsistent with the 

medical evidence of record.” AR 18. 

As to internal inconsistencies, Dr. Hodges, in his DSM-IV Multiaxial Evaluation

conducted on June 19, 2015, concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairment resulted in 

mild restrictions in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social 

functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. 

AR 520. However, as the ALJ noted, he found inconsistencies generally throughout Dr. 

 

provide “specific and legitimate reasons” in rejecting the opinion. Id. at 663-65. Here, the 

opinion of a specialist was not involved as neither Dr. Lee nor Dr. Park were 

rheumatologists and the ALJ gave specific reasons for partially discrediting the treating 

doctors’ opinions. 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 22
20

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Hodges’s own treatment records. For example, despite concluding she would have 

moderate difficulties in several areas, Dr. Hodges assessed Plaintiff’s mental status, in 

relevant part, as: 

Attention/Concentration: Good 

Thought content: Normal 

Insight: Fair 

Perception: Normal 

Judgment: Fair [and]

Flow of Thought: Normal

AR 518. The ALJ cited to this exact page in the treatment record in finding that Plaintiff 

suffered no limitations in cognitive functioning. AR 17. Further, while Dr. Hodges 

opined Plaintiff has “moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or

pace,” he notably left blank the check-box for “Difficulty thinking or concentrating” on 

that very form. AR 520. Dr. Hodges also consistently assessed the Plaintiff’s cognitive 

functioning as “oriented/alert.” AR 505, 507, 509, 511, 513, 516. Dr. Hodges’s notes 

from individual sessions indicate Plaintiff was making positive progress. See AR 506 

(noting Plaintiff was “engaged in the problem solving exercise”), 509 (noting Plaintiff 

was “oriented to cognitive distortions and how they function to maintain negative 

emotional states . . . [she] recognized the use of several distortions . . . and agreed to use 

thought stopping and auto correct to interrupt the distortions”), 511 (noting Plaintiff 

“agreed to take responsibility to make improvements”). These notes from Dr. Hodges’s 

treatment records are inconsistent with his conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments 

result in “moderate” difficulties. The ALJ cited to this treatment record in his decision

and may properly rely on such internal inconsistencies to discredit a treating physician’s 

testimony. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that an ALJ 

may cite internal inconsistencies in evaluating a physician’s opinion). The court, 

therefore, concludes that the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Hodges’ conclusions were

inconsistent with his own treatment record is supported by “specific and legitimate” 

reasons based on “substantial evidence.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 22
21

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The ALJ also noted that the limitations identified by Dr. Hodges were inconsistent 

with the medical evidence. The Court notes this reference, while not supported with a 

specific citation, is accurate and supports his conclusion. In particular, Exhibits 3F, 4F, 

and 8F—each of which the ALJ cites and relies on when addressing residual functional 

capacity—contain references to Plaintiff’s positive social and mental state. See AR 325 

(“enjoys being social, using her tablet and surfing internet, read, go to the beach, feels 

guilty about not having a job”), AR 353 (repeats prior history, “enjoys being social,” etc. 

and notes “mood: improving”); AR 405 (“mood much improved, future oriented”), AR 

418 (“Mood: improving”). While the Court acknowledges that the ALJ should have been 

more specific in providing citations to the medical record here, any such error is harmless 

in light of the other reasons the ALJ gave for discrediting Dr. Hodges’s opinion. 

See Curry, 925 F.2d at 1131. 

In sum, the ALJ cited specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence 

to reject the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating doctors. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s benefits is supported by 

substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment be DENIED and that Defendant’s cross motion for summary 

judgment be GRANTED. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 22
22

3:17-cv-202-JLS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties on or before January 26, 2018.

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any 

response to the objections shall be filed and served on or before February 2, 2018. The 

parties are advised that any failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the court’s order. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2018

Case 3:17-cv-00202-JLS-NLS Document 16 Filed 01/12/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 22