Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01200/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01200-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YESENIA JIMENEZ, CASE NO. CV F 13-1200 LJO SMS

Plaintiff, ORDER ON CORRECT CARE SOLUTION'S 

F.R.Civ.P. 12 MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 18.)

vs.

CITY OF CERES, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________/

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseload in the nation, 

and this Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and 

matters. This Court cannot address all arguments, evidence and matters raised by parties and 

addresses only the arguments, evidence and matters necessary to reach the decision in this 

order given the shortage of district judges and staff. The parties and counsel are encouraged to 

contact United States Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer to address this Court’s 

inability to accommodate the parties and this action. The parties are required to consider, and 

if necessary, to reconsider consent to one of the Court's U.S. Magistrate Judges to conduct all 

further proceedings in that the Magistrate Judges’ availability is far more realistic and 

accommodating to parties than that of U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill who must 

prioritize criminal and older civil cases. A Magistrate Judge consent form is available on this 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court’s website. 

Civil trials set before Judge O'Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject to 

suspension mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later 

date if Judge O'Neill is unavailable on the original date set for trial. If a trial trails, it may 

proceed with little advance notice, and the parties and counsel may be expected to proceed to 

trial with less than 24 hours notice. Moreover, this Court’s Fresno Division randomly and 

without advance notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges throughout the nation to 

serve as visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this action is subject to 

reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from outside the Eastern District of California. Case 

management difficulties, including trial setting and interruption, are avoided if the parties 

consent to conduct of further proceedings by a U.S. Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC ("CCS") seeks to dismiss plaintiff Yesenia 

Jimenez' ("Ms. Jimenez'") inadequate medical care claims as insufficiently pled. Ms. Jimenez 

responds that her operative First Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory & Injunctive 

Relief ("FAC") no less than raises inferences that a CCS nurse failed to summon and/or 

administer proper medical care for Ms. Jimenez. This Court considered CCS' F.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record without a hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For 

the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES the FAC's inadequate medical care claims 

against CCS.

BACKGROUND1

Ms. Jimenez' Arrest And Injury

Near midnight on August 10, 2012, police officers of defendant City of Ceres ("City") 

responded to a call regarding a party. Ms. Jimenez was outside and uttered disapproval of the 

police officers. Defendant City police officer Frederico Ortiz, Jr. ("Officer Ortiz") overheard 

Ms. Jimenez and in retaliation grabbed, pulled and bent Ms. Jimenez' wrist, slammed her onto 

his police car, and placed her in handcuffs. Ms. Jimenez objected to Officer Ortiz' exertion of 

 

1 The factual recitation summarizes the FAC. 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

force on her. Ms. Jimenez suffered a grossly angulated and displaced fracture of the distal 

humeral shaft in her right arm. 

Officer Ortiz placed Ms. Jimenez with her injured arm into the rear seat of his police 

vehicle. Ms. Jimenez informed Officer Ortiz and other officers present that Officer Ortiz had 

severely injured or broken her arm.

Absence Of Care During Detention

Officer Ortiz booked Ms. Jimenez into the Stanislaus County Jail/Public Safety Center 

("center"), where Ms. Jimenez continued to complain about her right arm pain and discomfort. 

The nurse on duty at the center failed to summon and/or administer proper medical care or to 

take action to obtain immediate medical care. Ms. Jimenez made several requests for medical 

assistance, but personnel of CCS and defendant Stanislaus County ("County") failed to take 

reasonable action to summon such medical care although CCS and/or County personnel knew 

or had reason to know that Ms. Jimenez required immediate medical care.

Upon her release from the center, Ms. Jimenez sought prompt medical care, and x-rays 

revealed a comminuted fracture of the distal humeral shaft. Ms. Jimenez underwent "an 

invasive, complicated, and risky surgical procedure" on August 14, 2012.

The County district attorney declined to file criminal charges against Ms. Jimenez.

Ms. Jimenez' Claims

The FAC alleges:

1. A (twelfth) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") claim that County 

guards/deputies and/or CCS nurse and/or employees "acted with deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"; and

2. A (thirteenth) a California Government Code section 845.6 ("section 845.6") 

claim that CCS and its employees breached their duty "to take reasonable action to summon 

and/or furnish medical care" although "they knew of had reason to know that Plaintiff was in 

need of immediate medical care."

/ / /

/ / /

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

CCS seeks to dismiss the section 1983 and section 845.6 claims in the absence of 

sufficient supporting facts.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable 

legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of 

Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In addressing dismissal, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) 

determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit 

relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a 

court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court “need not assume the truth of legal 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 

638, 643, n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and must not “assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it 

has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not been 

alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to 

amend if “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Livid Holdings 

Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).

A plaintiff is obliged “to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ [which] 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2007) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when 

construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required 

elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 

(S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint “must contain either direct or inferential allegations 

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal 

theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford 

Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme 

Court explained:

. . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.)

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit summarized: “In sum, for a complaint to 

survive [dismissal], the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that 

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 

1949).

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address dismissal:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in 

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second, 

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . . . 

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it 

has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can 

choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. 

When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity 

and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to CCS' challenges to the FAC's claims 

against it.

Section 1983 Requirements

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a 

person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct 

deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or 

laws of the United States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9th Cir. 1988).

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 

271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 

2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). Section 1983 and other federal civil rights statutes address liability 

“in favor of persons who are deprived of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by 

the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 996 (1976)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, 

therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and 

laws.’” Baker, 443 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979). Stated differently, the first step in a 

section 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright 

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 (1994). “Section 1983 imposes liability for 

violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out 

of tort law.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

“Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must do more than name laws that may have been 

violated by the defendant; it must also allege facts regarding what conduct violated those 

laws.” Anderson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 554 F.3d 525, 528 (5th Cir. 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2008).

Direct Participation

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon 

fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a 

constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 

U.S. 1230, 117 S.Ct. 1822 (1997); see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the 

defendant.”) “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused the constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Section 1983 requires that there 

be an actual connection or link between the defendant’s actions and the deprivation allegedly 

suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976). 

A plaintiff cannot hold an officer liable “because of his membership in a group without 

a showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996)). A 

plaintiff must “establish the ‘integral participation’ of the officers in the alleged constitutional 

violation.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 935. “‘[I]ntegral participation’ does not require that each

officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Boyd v. Benton 

County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004). Integral participation requires “some fundamental 

involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of 

Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481, n. 12 (9th Cir. 2007). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was 

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). A section 1983 plaintiff “must state the allegations generally so as 

to provide notice to the defendants and alert the court as to what conduct violated clearly 

established law.” Preschooler II v. Clark County School Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 

(9th Cir. 2007).

Deliberate Indifference To Ms. Jimenez' Medical Needs

CCS challenges the absence of FAC facts for a section 1983 claim for deliberate 

indifference to Ms. Jimenez' medical needs.

A pretrial detainee’s claim of failure to provide care for serious medical needs is 

analyzed under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Simmons v. 

Navajo County, Az., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010); Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 

410, 418-419 (9th Cir. 2003); see Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106, 123 S.Ct. 872 (2003). “With regard to medical needs, the 

due process clause imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth Amendment imposes: 

‘persons in custody ha[ve] the established right to not have officials remain deliberately 

indifferent to their serious medical needs.’” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Carnell v. 

Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Under the Eighth Amendment’s standard of 

deliberate indifference, a person is liable for denying a prisoner needed medical care only if the 

person ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Gibson, 290 

F.3d at 1187 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994)).

The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a 

serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result 

in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), 

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were confined 

under conditions posing a risk of “objectively, sufficiently serious” harm and that the officials 

had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying the proper medical care. Wallis v. 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted).

Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

[detainee’s] pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference may be manifested 

when officials “deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 

1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (internal quotations omitted)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). Indifference to “medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ 

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. 

Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Under the deliberate indifference 

standard, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. “But if a person is aware of a substantial risk of serious harm, 

a person may be liable for neglecting a [detainee's] serious medical needs on the basis of either 

his action or his inaction.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (alteration in original). “A defendant 

must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need in 

order for deliberate indifference to be established.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

The "question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of 

treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical 

decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual 

punishment. At most it is medical malpractice . . ." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107, 97 

S.Ct. 285 (1976). "A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical 

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim." Franklin v. State of Or., 

State Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 

242 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate indifference to 

Sanchez' serious medical needs"); see Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 

F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (“mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a 

claim of deliberate medical indifference”).

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This Court will address below the FAC's pleading of section 1983 deliberate 

indifference claims in conjunction with its pleading of section 845.6 claims.

Section 845.6 – Failure To Summon Medical Care

Section 845.6 provides that although a public employee is not liable for injury caused 

by failure to furnish or obtain medical care for an inmate, a public employee, and his/her 

employer, are liable if he/she “knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of 

immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” 

To state a section 845.6 claim, an inmate must establish: (1) the public employee knew or had 

reason to know of the need, (2) for immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably 

summon such care. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006). “Liability under 

section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” 

Watson v. State, 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 265 (1993). Section 845.6 “does not 

impose a duty to monitor the quality of care provided.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1099. The section 

845.6 duty to provide medical care to inmates is limited to when there is actual or constructive 

knowledge that the inmate needs immediate medical care. Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 47 

Cal.App.4th 277, 288, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 (1996). “The public employee must know or have 

reason to know of the need of immediate medical care and fail to summon such care.” Lucas, 

47 Cal.App.4th 277, 288, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 655.

CCS faults the absence of facts to support a section 1983 deliberate indifference and

section 845.6 failure to summon claims. CCS points to the FAC's "conclusory and 

speculative" allegations which demonstrate no contact with a CCS employee, or that CCS 

knew, had reason to know, or had been informed of an immediate medical need or Ms. 

Jimenez' pain and discomfort. CCS faults the absence of facts that CCS acted purposefully to 

disregard Ms. Jimenez' injury and aggravation of it due to delay.

Ms. Jimenez responds that "contact with a CCS employee is reasonably inferable" in 

that Ms. Jimenez was booked into the center where Ms. Jimenez complained of pain and 

discomfort and where CCS employees were working when Ms. Jimenez was booked. Ms. 

Jimenez relies on FAC allegations to suggest that a CCS nurse "acted with deliberate 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs" and that the "nurse on duty . . . failed to 

summon and/or administer proper medical care to Plaintiff or to take other action to cause or 

enable Plaintiff to obtain immediate medical care." Ms. Jimenez points to further FAC 

allegations that despite her requests for medical assistance, "CCS personnel failed to take 

reasonable action to summon such medical care," although County and/or CCS "personnel 

knew or had reason to know Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care."

Perhaps realizing the absence of sufficient factual matter, Ms. Jimenez makes "an offer 

of proof" for further amendment that:

1. CCA contracted with the County to provide medical treatment at the center 

during Ms. Jimenez' detention;

2. Ms. Jimenez was seen by a CCS nurse; and

3. Ms. Jimenez communicated her severe pain and injuries to a CCS employee(s)

and made several requests for medical care to CCS personnel but was refused.

CCS raises valid points given the FAC's limited allegations as to CCS. The FAC 

merely alleges that:

1. Ms. Jimenez was booked into the center where she "continued to complain 

about pain and discomfort";

2. An unidentified nurse on duty failed to summon or obtain proper medical care; 

and

3. Despite Ms. Jimenez' requests for medical assistance, unidentified County and 

CCS personnel failed to take reasonable action. 

The FAC lumps County and CCS personnel without identifying even generally the 

personnel and without distinguishing alleged misconduct or omissions of particular personnel. 

There are no facts to particularize what CCS through its unidentified employees knew about 

Ms. Jimenez' condition. The FAC fails to identify specifically or generally Ms. Jimenez' 

complaints. There are no allegations as to the contents or duration of her complaints and to 

whom they were directed. The FAC alleges no more than that Ms. Jimenez arrived at the 

center with a fracture, was not treated despite complaints, and was released with a fracture for 

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which she had surgery several days later. The FAC lacks sufficient factual matter to support 

the section 1983 deliberate indifference and section 845.6 failure to summon claims against 

CCS.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. ORDERS Ms. Jimenez, no later than January 23, 2014, to file and serve either: 

(a) papers to dismiss this action against CCS; or (b) a second amended complaint which 

amends only the (twelfth) section 1983 deliberate indifference and (thirteenth) section 845.6 

failure to summon claims against CCS only. Ms. Jimenez is prohibited to amend claims

against defendants other than CCS. If Ms. Jimenez elects to amend the (twelfth) section 1983 

deliberate indifference and (thirteenth) section 845.6 failure to summon claims against CCS, 

she is admonished to pursue only such claims based on sufficient supporting facts and law and 

that this Court will grant Ms. Jimenez no further attempt to plead claims; and

2. ORDERS CCS and other defendants, no later than February 13, 2014, to file 

and serve a response to the second amended complaint, as necessary.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2014 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01200-LJO-SMS Document 24 Filed 01/03/14 Page 12 of 12