Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04725/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04725-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 63.

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Docket No. 72.

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Also before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 66.) Defendant opposes

the motion. (Docket No. 71.) As no discovery has been done in this matter, Pro Se Plaintiff’s motion is premature. The

Court DENIES Pro Se Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice to filing at the appropriate time pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E.K. WADE,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

ELAINE CHAO,

Defendant. /

No. C06-04725 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Elaine Chao, Secretary of Labor’s (“Defendant” or

“Government”) Motion to Dismiss Pro Se Plaintiff E.K. Wade’s (“Plaintiff” or “Wade”) Third

Amended Complaint (“TAC”).1

 Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion.2 For the following reasons,

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case presents an employment dispute arising from Plaintiff’s employment with the

Department of Labor (“DOL”). The material allegations taken from the operative complaint are as

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follows.

Plaintiff E.K. Wade worked as an equal employment opportunity specialist with the

Department of Labor from September 26, 2000 until October 11, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that he was

denied promotions, sent on demeaning assignments, refused transfer, denied advance sick leave, and

suffered emotional distress as a result of his complaints about a co-worker’s distribution of sexual

and racist e-mails. During his tenure with the DOL, Plaintiff filed a number of complaints, as well

as a formal grievance through his union representation. Facing a possible suspension for comments

made to co-workers, Plaintiff tendered his resignation, and subsequently filed complaints with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Merit Systems Protection Board

(“MSPB). Plaintiff filed the instant suit in this Court on December 9, 2005. Plaintiff brings the

claims at issue in the current motion under the auspices of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991,

the Rehabilitation Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a claim for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; thus, the Court

presumes lack of jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the

burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party challenging the court's jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do

so by raising either a facial attack or a factual attack. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th

Cir. 2000).

A facial attack is one where “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack to jurisdiction, the Court

must accept the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d

1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). For a factual attack, in contrast, the Court may consider extrinsic

evidence. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.1987). Further, the court does

not have to assume the truthfulness of the allegations, and may resolve any factual disputes. See

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White, 227 F.3d at 1242. Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a

factual motion by presenting affidavits or evidence properly before the court, the party opposing the

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.

2003). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, “[j]urisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question

jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specific in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678

[] (1946).” Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1983); see Safe Air for

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The Bell standard provides that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted

“where the alleged claim under the [C]onstitution or federal statute clearly appears to be immaterial

and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly

insubstantial and frivolous.” 327 U.S. at 682-83. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has admonished

that a “[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when ‘the jurisdictional

issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the merits’ of an action.” Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139. The

jurisdictional issue and the substantive issues are intertwined where “a statute provides the basis for

both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for

relief.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v.

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Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th

Cir. 1984). In pleading sufficient facts, however, a plaintiff must suggest his or her right to relief is

more than merely conceivable, but plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that the pleader give

the defendant “fair notice what the plaintiff’s claim is” and “the grounds upon which it rests.” Id.

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 127

S.Ct. (1955)). This is especially true for complaints drafted by pro se plaintiffs, which are held to

even more relaxed standards than those prepared by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). 

The Court will dismiss the complaint or any claim in it without leave to amend only if “it is

clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Schneider v.

Cal. Dept of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998). Before a district court can dismiss a pro se

litigant's complaint, however, the court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies and

an opportunity to amend the complaint effectively. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th

Cir. 1992); Moore v. United States et al., 193 F.R.D. 647, 651 (No. C99-3211 MEJ). 

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Title VII and Rehabilitation Claims Are Timely

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII and Rehabilitation claims are untimely and barred

by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Plaintiff argues that his claims were properly filed after a statutorily

defined lapse in activity by the EEOC.

The Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Third Amended Complaint. On August 2,

2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint before the DOL alleging discrimination. After a final decision from

Defendant on January 24, 2005, Plaintiff filed an appeal before the EEOC on February 21, 2005. On

August 20, 2005, 180 days had elapsed without the EEOC issuing a final decision. On December 9,

2005, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court. On July 25, 2006, the EEOC issued its final

decision. 

Section 2000e-16 governs the timing and requirements for an aggrieved federal employee to

file suit in district court for review of an administrative decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. One clause

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provides that “. . . after 180 days from the filing of the initial charge with the . . . [EEOC] on appeal

from a decision or order . . . until such time as final action may be taken . . . an employee . . . if

aggrieved by . . . the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided

in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department . . . shall be the

defendant.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Here, Plaintiff filed his action in this Court after the required

180 days had elapsed, and before the final action of the EEOC, naming the head of the department as

Defendant. Because Plaintiff has complied with the applicable requirements, his Title VII and

Rehabilitation claims are timely.

B. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Exhaustion of His Administrative Remedy

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred because Plaintiff chose a grievance

remedy and then failed to pursue that remedy to exhaustion. Plaintiff alleges that he filed a Step 1

Grievance on or about November 27, 2001, and subsequently re-filed the grievance on July 3, 2002.

(TAC ¶¶ 93, 95). After the initiation of an administrative remedy, the remedy must be exhausted

before the pursuit of other remedies may commence. Vinieratos v. United States Department of the

Air Force, 939 F. 2d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 1991). In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that he pursued his

grievance to exhaustion, a point reached when his union representation “simply abandoned Plaintiff”

after sending a demand for arbitration to the Department of Labor. (Pl.’s Opp. 7:13.) Plaintiff relies

on Sidhu v. The Flecto Co., 279 F. 3d 896 (9th Cir. 2002), a case in which the court excused a

Plaintiff from the required exhaustion of a union grievance where an employer repudiated the

arbitration phase of the grievance. Because the Defendant’s motion to dismiss is a facial one, the

Court will take as true all allegations in the complaint. Miranda, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir.

2001). But here, the complaint is inadequate. Although Plaintiff attaches documentation of the

grievance process to his Opposition, he has failed to allege exhaustion of his grievance in the

operative complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations as taken from the face of the complaint do not support

his theory of excuse from exhaustion. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s

motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Title VII and Rehabilitation claims. Plaintiff has leave to amend

his Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims within 30 days of the filing date of this order.

 C. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Facts Sufficient to Support a Claim of Intentional

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6

Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff brings a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) by way of the

FTCA. For the following reasons, Plaintiff has failed allege facts sufficient to support this claim. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s interactions with his co-workers were not sufficiently outrageous as

to support an IIED claim. Plaintiff argues that his co-workers and superiors conspired to take

advantage of his disabled status in order to bait him into conduct that would result in his termination.

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress consists of four elements: (1)

outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) an intention by the defendant to cause, or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) an

actual and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress. Nally v.

Grace, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 300 (1988). While generally a factual issue, a court may dismiss a claim if,

as alleged, it fails to rise to the level of outrageousness. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital,

214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 617-618 (2nd Dist. 1989) (Sustaining a demurrer and stating that the tort

requires more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities.”) In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to demean, intimidate

and harass Plaintiff into snapping, and describes two incidents that he believes support this claim.

(TAC ¶¶ 102, 158.) Both incidents involve interactions with co-workers that, while contentious, do

not rise to the level of “outrageous” as required to sustain an IIED claim. See Davidson v. City of

Westminster 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982) (Stating that for “[c]onduct to be outrageous [it] must be so

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”) As Plaintiff has

failed to allege conduct sufficient to satisfy the element of the IIED tort requiring outrageous

conduct on the part of the defendant, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to

Plaintiff’s IIED. Plaintiff has leave to amend his IIED claims within 30 days of the filing date of

this order.

//

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//

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint, if any, shall be filed not later than 30 days from the filing date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August ___, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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