Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00483/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00483-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FONTANO WATTERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:14-cv-00483-TMP

)

HARSCO METALS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed 

April 20, 2015, by the defendant, Harsco Metals (“Harsco”). (Doc. 36). The 

motion was supported by a brief and evidentiary submission. (Docs. 36, 37). 

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, supported by evidence, on May 27, 

2015. (Doc. 45). The defendant filed a reply brief on June 8, 2015. (Doc. 51). 

Plaintiff Fontano Watters, an African American male, alleges that his employer, 

defendant Harsco Metals, discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The 

parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 22). 

FILED

 2016 Mar-30 PM 12:16

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 

party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this 

burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by 

showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of 

some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, “that the moving party 

support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the 

opponent’s claim.” Id. at 323.

Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56 “requires the nonmoving 

party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,’ designate ‘specific facts 

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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form 

necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry 

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against 

a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Id. at 322.

After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary 

judgment, the court must grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are 

irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute 

is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh 

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is 

a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to 

direct a verdict: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must 

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prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52; see also Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. 

v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983). However, the nonmoving party “must 

do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 

judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord 

Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court 

must “view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary 

burden,” so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Cottle v. Storer Communication, 

Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, 

the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the 

function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed 

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of 

every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 

(11th Cir. 1988).

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II. FACTS

Applying these standards to the evidence before the court, the following 

facts are either undisputed or taken in a light most favorably to the non-moving 

plaintiff. 

At all relevant times the plaintiff, Fontano Watters (“Watters”), was 

employed by the defendant, Harsco Metals (“Harsco”). Harsco operated a mill 

service business located in Birmingham, Alabama. The mill was owned by 

another entity, CMC Steel (“CMC”).1

 The plant was referred to as Plant 61 and/or 

CMC Birmingham (“Plant 61”). Watters began working as a welder at Plant 61 in 

November of 2011. He was later promoted to the position of lube technician and 

then to a position on the rail crew. All of Watters’ positions were in the 

maintenance department, which consisted of about ten workers. The plaintiff’s 

direct supervisor at the relevant time was Roger Boswell (“Boswell”). At the time 

of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Watters was working as a lube technician. 

On January 29, 2013, Watters was transporting tanks and cylinders with a 

company forklift when he bumped into a storage building, causing damage to the 

building.2

 He reported the incident to Boswell, his immediate supervisor, and met 

 1 No allegations have been made that the plaintiff was an employee of CMC.

2

 It is disputed how serious the damage was, even though it is undisputed that damage occurred.

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with the production supervisor, Eddie Ishman (“Ishman”), and the site manager, 

Doug Mullins (“Mullins”), on the following day, January 30, 2013. Ishman and 

Mullins were the decision-makers with regard to discipline of all Plant 61 

employees at that time. Because of the accident, Watters was given a three-day,

unpaid suspension and was required to submit to a drug test. Harsco’s policy for 

post-accident drug testing is set out in the Employee Handbook along with the 

general guidelines regarding workplace accidents. Workplace accidents involving 

the use of company equipment and resulting in damage to company property are 

considered to be violations of Harsco’s Health, Safety and Security Policy, as it is 

set out in Harsco’s Code of Conduct.

Watters already had received a three-day suspension for an earlier 

disciplinary infraction. Soon after plaintiff started work in 2011, he received a 

three-day suspension for “disabl[ing] a maintenance truck out of anger.” (Watters 

Depo., Doc. 36-8, p. 53). After making several requests for the key to a 

maintenance truck, plaintiff got “a crescent wrench and I open the hood on the 

truck and take the battery out because I feel like if I can't use the truck, ain't 

nobody going to use it. So Roger came and told me to put [the] battery back in. I

went and put it back in.” Id. at p. 56.

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Watters is African American. Mullins and Boswell are Caucasian males, but

Ishman is an African American male. Watters contends that Caucasian employees 

similarly situated to him, Donald Mauldin (“Mauldin”), C. Matthew Wood (“C. 

Wood”), and Mason Wood (“M. Wood”), were treated more favorably than 

Watters when involved in workplace accidents. In early 2011, before Watters was 

employed by Harsco (he started in November 2011), C. Wood was repairing a 

piece of machinery that malfunctioned during the repair, causing damage to the 

building in which it was housed. Ishman and Mullins were the decision-makers 

with regard to this incident, and they did not discipline C. Wood or require him to

submit to a drug test, which Watters contends is contrary to Harsco’s policy. 

According to Watters, the incident involving Mauldin occurred in January 

2013, although Watters admits he has no personal knowledge of the incident as he 

was not at work at the time. Watters claims that Mauldin damaged the door of the 

“yard truck” while operating a crane. No disciplinary action was taken against 

Mauldin, and he was not required to take a drug test. Ishman and Mullins deny 

that they were ever aware of the incident, and there is no evidence otherwise.

In early February 2013, shortly after Watters’ accident, M. Wood was 

involved in a workplace accident causing damage to company property. It was 

determined that he failed to chock the wheels of a truck, even though he engaged 

Case 2:14-cv-00483-TMP Document 69 Filed 03/30/16 Page 7 of 33
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the parking break, which allowed the truck to roll backward into a building doing 

damage to the building. He was not disciplined or required to submit to a drug 

test, even though company policy requires drug testing and discipline in the case of 

any accident resulting in damage to company policy. 

Early in 2013, after the plaintiff’s workplace accident, the oversight of 

Plant 61 transferred from Mullins and Ishman to a department of Harsco known as 

“Harsco Future Fleet.” One consequence of this shift in oversight was that Ishman 

and Mullins no longer were the decision-makers with regard to discipline for 

Plant 61. Harsco Future Fleet, and particularly Deric Zies, took over the 

administration of discipline. Although Mullins and Ishman recommended that M. 

Wood be given a three-day suspension, Zies overruled them. He concluded that 

because M. Wood had no similar infractions in his history and because he had 

attempted to secure the truck by engaging the parking brake (even though he forgot 

to chock the wheels), the more appropriate discipline would be a written warning, 

not a suspension. (See Declaration of Deric Zies, Doc. 36-4.)

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to an employee’s 

“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such 

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individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 

Specifically, the statute provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer:

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 

terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may prove a prima facie case of 

discrimination under Title VII with circumstantial evidence by establishing that: 

(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment 

action; (3) he is qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly 

situated employees who are not members of the protected class more favorably. 

See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). A disparate 

treatment claim requires proof of discriminatory intent, through the use of either 

direct or circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000). In 

order to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff may present 

to the court: (1) direct evidence that “discriminatory animus played a significant or 

substantial role in the employment decision,” Eskra v. Provident Life and 

Accident Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997), or (2) circumstantial 

evidence of discrimination, in accordance with the four-part test set forth in 

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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 

668 (1973), or (3) statistical evidence of a pattern of discrimination. Zaben, 129 

F.3d at 1457.

Direct evidence is evidence that establishes the existence of discriminatory 

intent behind the employment decision without requiring the factfinder to make 

any inferences or presumptions. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 580-81 

(11th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff states in his response to the Motion for Summary 

Judgment that he has shown “both direct and circumstantial evidence” of 

discrimination. (Doc. 45, p. 17). However, the plaintiff hinges his argument on 

the alleged disparate treatment of himself and similarly situated employees outside 

the protected class, not on any direct statement or action. The Eleventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals has steadfastly held that direct evidence of discrimination is 

“evidence, that, if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact without inference or 

presumption.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 

2004) (citing Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 

1393 (11th Cir.1997)); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th 

Cir.1997). Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other 

than to discriminate on the basis of a protected classification, constitute direct 

evidence. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086. The case generally cited for the proposition 

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that the direct evidence standard is more relaxed, Judge Tjoflat’s opinion in Wright 

v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999), was not joined by either 

of the other two members of the panel. 187 F.3d at 1306 (Cox, J., concurring in 

result only); (Hull, J., concurring in result only). Moreover, the broad view of the 

standard is in conflict with earlier precedent and with the cases that have been 

decided since. The plaintiff has put forth no direct evidence to support a finding of 

racial animus on the part of any of his supervisors. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim 

must be evaluated under the standard for circumstantial evidence. 

Where there is no direct evidence, the plaintiff must prove intent through 

circumstantial evidence in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). When the plaintiff relies 

upon circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence, he creates a presumption 

of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. The presumption may be 

rebutted, however, if the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for the employment action. Once the nondiscriminatory reason is articulated, the 

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the reason is either not worthy of belief, 

or that, in light of all the evidence, a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 

the decision than the proffered reason. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs. Inc., 161 F.3d 

1318, 1331-33 (11th Cir. 1998) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 172 F.2d 884 

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(11th Cir. 1999), citing Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th 

Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685, 139 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1998). 

It is not disputed that, as an African American, Watters is a member of a 

protected class. Furthermore, the parties do not dispute that the plaintiff was 

qualified to perform his job. The issues in this case arise over whether the plaintiff 

suffered an adverse employment action and whether Harsco treated similarly 

situated employees from outside the protected class more favorably than the 

plaintiff.

A. Adverse Employment Action

The plaintiff argues that he was subjected to an adverse employment action 

because, after the accident, he was required to submit to a drug test and was 

suspended from work for three days without pay. The Eleventh Circuit has 

determined that, to prove an adverse employment action in a Title VII 

discrimination claim, if the plaintiff has not suffered an “ultimate employment 

decision[] . . . ‘such as termination, failure to hire, or demotion,’” the plaintiff must 

show that he “suffered ‘a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment.’” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970-71 (11th Cir. 

2008)(internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original).

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The Eleventh Circuit previously has determined that a one-day suspension 

without pay is not sufficient to be considered an adverse employment action. In 

Embry v. Callahan Eye Foundation Hospital, the Eleventh Circuit states as follows:

To the extent Embry also identified her one-day suspension as an 

“adverse employment action,” we recently have explained that, 

following the language of Title VII, “actions that affect compensation 

are considered adverse employment actions.” See Gillis v. Georgia 

Dep’t of Corrections, 400 F.3d 883, 887-88 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(concluding that an evaluation that directly disentitled an employee to 

a raise of any significance was an adverse employment action under 

Title VII). In Gillis, however, we clarified that the case did not 

involve disentitlement to a de minimus raise, but, instead, revolved 

around an employment decision that significantly affected the 

plaintiff’s compensation. See id. at 888. Assuming, as the district 

court did, that Embry’s suspension began as early as 9:00 a.m., with 

an hourly salary of $11.83, the most compensation lost was $88.73. 

Thus, this suspension also did not constitute “a serious and material

change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See

Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239.

147 Fed. Appx. 819, 828-29 (11th Cir. 2005). The court of appeals has not drawn 

a brightline to delineate when a de minimus suspension and loss of pay crosses 

over to being a “serious and material” change in the employees terms of 

employment. 

In the instant case, Watters was suspended for three days without pay. It is 

unclear exactly how much pay the plaintiff lost due to the suspension. However, 

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presuming that the plaintiff is paid an hourly wage and works a full-time, fortyhour week, he was deprived of pay for a total of 24 hours due to the suspension. Is 

this enough to be a “serious and material” change in the employee’s terms of 

employment? How great must the loss of pay be before it qualifies as “serious and 

material”? The plaintiff has not alleged that there were any far-reaching economic 

ramifications stemming from the suspension, and the court notes not only does he 

continue to work for Harsco today, he was promoted to the rail crew after the 

suspension. It seems to have had little or no impact on his career with Harsco. 

Indeed, the three-day suspension rule seems to have been accepted as an ordinary 

part of employment, at least prior to the arrival of the Harsco Future Fleet.

Accordingly, the court cannot assume, in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s 

holding in Embry, that a three-day, unpaid suspension is a sufficiently serious and 

material” change in the plaintiff’s terms of employment so as to qualify as an

adverse employment action. Because the three-day suspension was merely de 

minimus and not a sufficient “adverse employment action” for establishing a prima 

facie case of employment discrimination, defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiff was required to submit to a drug test 

clearly does not constitute an adverse employment action. The petitioner has not 

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argued, and the facts do not indicate, that taking a drug test in any way changed the 

terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s employment, and certainly did not 

do so to a serious or material extent. Even if the plaintiff was treated differently 

than other similarly situated employees who are not part of a protected class when 

he was required to submit to a drug test after his workplace accident, he cannot 

meet the McDonnell Douglas factors for supporting a Title VII claim because the 

drug test itself was not an adverse employment action. To the extent the plaintiff’s 

Title VII claims are based upon the fact that he was required to take a drug test, the 

claims are due to be dismissed. 

Comparators

Even giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and treating the three-day 

suspension as an adverse employment action for purposes of a prima facie case, 

the plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim because he fails to allege adequate 

comparators to establish the fourth element of the prima facie showing, that other 

similarly situated employees who were not members of a protected class were 

treated more favorably than he was treated. Plaintiff’s prima facie showing 

requires that he demonstrate that similarly-situated Harsco employees who were 

not African American were treated more favorably in the event of similar 

workplace accidents. In the instant case, the plaintiff names three Harsco 

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employees who, he claims, were involved in similar workplace accidents but who 

did not receive a temporary suspension: C. Wood, Donald Mauldin, and M. Wood, 

all Caucasian males.

It is well established that for the plaintiff to prove his allegations of 

discrimination, he must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee, not a 

member of his protected class, had a similar workplace accident resulting in 

damage to company property and that he or she was not suspended. “The plaintiff 

and the employees [he] identifies as comparators must be similarly situated in ‘all 

relevant respects.’” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 

2004), quoting Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). A 

comparator must be “nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from secondguessing a reasonable decision by the employer.” Wilson, 276 F.2d at 1091, citing 

Silvera v. Orange County School Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). 

This rule follows the more general mandate that it is not the duty of this 

court to evaluate whether the decision to suspend Watters was fair or wise; 

employers are free to make unfair or unwise employment decisions so long as they 

do not violate anti-discrimination statutes. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 

939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991). Moreover, courts, have recognized that the 

discrimination laws should not be used to override employment decisions “based 

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on individual assessments of a person’s abilities, capabilities, or potential.” 

Magruder v. Selling Area Mktg. Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1977).

A plaintiff complaining of discriminatory discipline or termination generally 

must be able to identify a similarly situated employee, not within the protected 

class, who engaged in nearly identical conduct and was not disciplined or 

terminated. Turner v. Florida Prepaid College Bd., 522 Fed. Appx. 829, 832 (11th

Cir. 2013). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, however, that 

failure to point to a comparator “does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case,” 

and that a claim may survive where the plaintiff presents “circumstantial evidence 

that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith 

v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Even so, the 

circumstantial evidence must provide more than a “suspicion or guess” and must 

be sufficient to create a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would 

allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” 644 F.3d at 

1328, quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999); 

Silverman v. Board of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011).

1. C. Wood

The plaintiff alleges that C. Wood was involved in an incident “in early 

2011, in which he was repairing machinery that malfunctioned and caused damage 

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to the building in which it was housed.”3 (Doc. 45, ¶ 16). The event is not 

documented in C. Wood’s personnel file, to the extent the entire file was presented 

as evidence. (Doc. 36-7, pp. 55-75). By the plaintiff’s own admission, however,

C. Wood’s accident was due to a machinery malfunction, and not due to any 

negligence or carelessness on his part. In order to be a properly named comparator 

for purposes of Title VII, the comparator must be “nearly identical to the plaintiff.” 

Wilson, 276 F. 2d at 1901. In this instance, the damage involved was not the 

product of carelessness by C. Wood and, hence, is not comparable to the damage 

done by plaintiff, who admits he was at fault for the damage. A piece of 

machinery malfunctioning, where there is no allegation of negligence or 

carelessness leading up to that malfunction, is not “nearly identical” to an accident 

caused by carelessness or negligence. 

The plaintiff describes the accident leading to his suspension as follows:

 3

 In his deposition, Watters refers to an incident during or around January 2011 during which he 

alleges that C. Wood, while working on a crane, put the boom of the crane through the field 

office. (Doc. 36-8, Watters depo. p. 58). Watters asserts that C. Wood was never suspended or 

otherwise punished for this event. However, Watters does not in any way refer to this event in 

his brief regarding the Motion for Summary judgment, nor does the event appear in the personnel 

file for C. Wood. (Doc. 36-7, pp. 55-75). C. Wood was suspended for three days on November 

15, 2013, however, for moving a piece of equipment that had been locked out. (Doc. 36-7, 

p. 58). Plainly, Watters was not yet employed at Harsco when C. Wood had his first accident, 

and there is no way plaintiff could have personal knowledge of it. There simply is no admissible 

evidence in the record upon which to make a finding that C. Wood’s accident was “nearly 

identical” to plaintiff’s.

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A. It was like the end of the shift. I was unloading something with a 

big forklift. It was dark, I had on my dark shades. Someone parked 

the yard truck kind of close to the shed. So I was missing the truck. 

As I’m missing the truck, I’m saying to myself now, I’m going to 

miss the truck, I’m ain’t [sic] going to hit this truck. So when I got to 

the truck, I didn’t think about the forklift up top. It hit the top of - - it 

just peeled back to the top of the deck just a little bit. It wasn’t much 

damage to it at all.

(Doc. 36-8, Watters depo. p. 19). In his description of the accident, Watters does 

not contend that the machinery he was using malfunctioned in any way, or that the 

accident was somehow beyond his control. Accordingly, the accident C. Wood 

was involved in, which the plaintiff himself states occurred because of a machinery 

malfunction, is not similar enough to establish C. Wood as a comparator for 

purposes of Title VII. There was no basis for disciplining C. Woods comparable to 

plaintiff’s discipline. Therefore, the plaintiff may not support his disparate 

treatment claim by comparing his accident to that of C. Wood. 

2. Donald Mauldin

The plaintiff alleges that “an incident involving Mr. Mauldin occurred in 

January 2013.” (Doc. 45, ¶ 18). The plaintiff testified regarding the Mauldin 

incident:

A. I’m not sure what happened because I wasn’t at work, but the next 

day I came to work, the same yard truck that we used to get around on 

the yard with, the door wouldn’t open. So, you know, just talk 

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amongst coworkers, what happened to the door, man? Oh, Don 

messed up that door yesterday with the crane. He was too close and 

when he let up the outrigger, he caught the door and it messed up the 

door. It wouldn’t even open. And like the front fender by the tire, it 

was bent in real bad. It was bent. 

. . . 

Q. Do you know if anybody had reported the Don Maulding [sic] 

incident to management?

A. I know he reported it to Ryan - - Ryan or to David, the lead man at 

the time. So I don’t know if they took it to a higher level or - - I don’t 

know what they did. 

. . .

Q. Did Ryan Stone tell you that he reported it up the chain of 

command to Roger or anybody like that?

A. No, we didn’t get that deep into it.

Q. Okay. So you don’t know as we sit here today?

A. No, I don’t. 

(Watters, Depo., Doc. 36-8, pp. 63-65).

In order to establish a sufficient comparator for Title VII purposes, the 

plaintiff “must show that the person imposing the discipline knew of the 

comparator’s alleged misconduct ‘and that the known violations were consciously 

overlooked.’” Marshall v. Mayor of Savannah, 366 Fed. Appx. 91, 98 (11th Cir. 

2010), citing Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir. 1989). The 

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plaintiff has failed to rebut the declarations by Mullins and Ishman that they had no 

knowledge of any incident resulting in damage to company property that involved 

Mauldin4 (docs. 36-2, ¶ 30; 36-3, ¶ 30), and has failed to present any evidence that 

Mullins or Ishman were aware of the Mauldin incident. “Absent proof of such 

knowledge, [the plaintiff] cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.

at 99. Accordingly, Mauldin, too, is an improper comparator for purposes of 

establishing a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. 

3. M. Wood

Finally, the plaintiff points to M. Wood as a comparator. He alleges that M. 

Wood was involved in a workplace accident resulting in damage to company 

property “[j]ust a few days after” his own incident. (Doc. 45, ¶ 19). The plaintiff 

claims that M. Wood was not disciplined or drug tested. He testified that 

M. Wood, a driver for the company, parked his truck improperly during his 

overnight shift, allowing the truck to roll back and damage the porch on the front 

office. (Watters Depo.; Doc. 36-8, p. 34). The plaintiff testified that M. Wood 

told him he forgot to properly engage the break on the truck. (Id. at 36). The 

 4 The only incident from January 2013 in Donald Mauldin’s personnel file (doc. 36-7, pp. 24-

53), to the extent the file was produced to the court, was a warning notice from January 29, 2013, 

for “poor work performance failure to do what you are told to on time.” (Doc. 36-7, p. 50). 

Mauldin was suspended for three days in November of 2013 for actions in violation of a memo 

previously issued. (Doc. 36-7, p. 48).

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defendant argues that M. Wood’s incident is distinguishable from the plaintiff’s for 

two reasons. First, M. Wood was not operating moving equipment at the time of 

the incident. The defendant notes that “Harsco places greater emphasis on 

employee safety while the employee is moving equipment due to the nature of the 

job and the inherent safety concerns in doing so.” (Doc. 36, p. 22). Secondly, the 

defendant argues that different supervisors made the disciplinary decisions for the 

plaintiff and M. Wood.

The court has a hard time understanding the gossamer distinction between 

moving equipment and non-moving equipment advanced by the defendant. In 

plaintiff’s situation, he ran into a shed while operating a forklift. In M. Wood’s 

infraction, he failed to properly park a truck that then rolled into a building. Both 

were highly dangerous events. Indeed, what made M. Wood’s infraction serious 

was that the parked truck began moving due to his carelessness and, thus, involved 

moving equipment. The court does not believe the distinction asserted here makes 

these two events so dissimilar that they cannot be used a proper comparators. 

There also appears to be a factual dispute as to which supervisors handled 

the M. Wood disciplinary incident. The defendants state that a new supervision 

team had taken over, the plaintiff argues in his brief that the M. Wood incident 

“occurred in early February 2013, before there was a change in company policy 

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and before there was a change in supervision,” (Doc. 45, ¶ 19), but the reference of 

Field’s deposition testimony fails to establish this as a fact. The plaintiff cites the 

deposition of Robert Field, the regional human resources business partner for 

Harsco Metals & Minerals North America, who testified as follows:

Q. Was all the month of February 2013 covered under the previous 

management regime [i.e., Mullins and Ishman]?

A. It was in that transition time. It’s hard - - again, it’s very difficult 

to be talking about an organizational culture and design to move from 

one to another. But that was certainly the beginning of it I will say. I 

think as we went into later months in 2013 we got - - we got around to 

having more of that new organizational style be introduced into the 

various locations. So I just honestly can’t come up with a single 

definitive date. It was two large organizes [sic] transitioning. 

(Field Depo., doc. 36-12, pp. 75-76). In short, Field simply testified that he does 

not know precisely when Harsco Future Fleet took over the disciplinary 

management of Plant 61 in relation to plaintiff’s and M. Wood’s infractions. 

By contrast, Ishman and Mullins state plainly in their declarations that Deric 

Zies of Harsco Future Fleet handled the discipline with regard to the M. Wood 

incident. (Docs. 36-2, pp. 4-5; 36-3, pp. 4-5). Zies also confirms in his declaration 

that he handled the discipline in the M. Wood incident and that, prior to that 

incident, he was not involved in discipline at Plant 61. (Doc. 36-4, pp. 2-3). Based 

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on the testimony, it is unclear who signed M. Wood’s warning notice regarding his 

failure to chock the wheels of his service truck. But to the court’s eye, it appears 

the notice was signed by Ishman, and it certainly was not signed by Zies.5

 (Doc. 

36-6, p. 5). 

 5

 The court certainly is not an expert in handwriting analysis, but the signature on M. Wood’s 

notice of warning appears most like Ishman’s. The signature of the supervisor issuing the 

warning to M. Wood appears as follows:

The signature appearing at the end of Eddie Ishman’s declaration filed in this case appears as 

follows:

By contrast, the signature on Deric Zies’s declaration is the following:

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25

The state of the evidence on this point, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, 

indicates that the disciplinary management at Plant 61 was in transition during the 

month of February 2013, when the M. Wood incident occurred. It is not at all clear 

when the change-over from the old regime to the Harsco Future Fleet actually 

occurred at Plaint 61. Although Mullins, Ishman, and Zies all agree that is was 

Zies who made the decision to discipline M. Wood with a warning rather than a 

suspension, the notice of warning given to M. Wood appears to have been signed 

by Ishman, and certainly not by Zies. Accordingly, it remains a question of

material fact whether the same supervisor(s) oversaw the discipline for both the 

plaintiff’s incident and M. Wood’s incident. A reasonable jury could find, based 

on the signature on the notice of warning to M. Wood and the uncertainty of the 

timing of the transition, that Ishman and Mullins were the decision-makers for M. 

Wood’s discipline, as they were for plaintiff’s.

Even so, the court still does not believe that M. Wood is an adequate 

comparator for the plaintiff because their disciplinary histories are not comparable. 

Plaintiff testified that he had previously received a three-day suspension for 

disabling a vehicle out of anger. (Watters Depo., Doc. 36-8, p. 53).6

 Thus, at the

 6

 See also Field Decl., Doc. 36-5, p. 82, which is a copy of a Suspension Notice to the plaintiff, 

dated September 1, 2011, suspending plaintiff for three days “pending termination,” because he 

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time of the suspension he now complains about, it was his second disciplinary 

infraction. There is no evidence in the record that M. Wood had previous 

suspensions to be considered in the disciplinary calculus in February 2013.7

 Many 

courts have expressed the rule this way:

A plaintiff's employment record is relevant to determining whether his 

proffered comparator employees are in fact similarly situated. Even 

where the Plaintiff identifies a comparator who committed a similar 

disciplinary infraction, that co-worker is not similarly situated if 

Plaintiff has a history of deficient performance and the comparator is 

not alleged to have such a record. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway 

Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1312–13 (11th Cir.1998) (employees who 

both came to work unprepared were not similarly situated for 

purposes of Title VII discriminatory discipline claim, where Plaintiff 

had a record of other deficiencies, and no evidence showed the 

comparator had a similar history). An employer is within his rights to 

fire a troublesome employee over a minor offense that he might 

overlook in a model employee; the latest offense may be the 

proverbial “straw that broke the camel's back.” Dhyne v. Meiners 

Thriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 1999).

Hudson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2001); see 

also Knight v. Fourteen D Enterprises, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1328 (S.D. Ala. 

 

“disabled maintenance truck out of anger so that the mechanics couldn’t drive the truck if he 

wasn’t able to use the truck.”

7

 Mason Wood’s complete personnel file is annexed as an exhibit to the Declaration of Robert 

Field at Doc. 36-6. Although it contains an earlier written warning for “poor work performance 

failure to do daily,” just days before the February 11, 2013, incident, there is no record of any 

suspension. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Wood had a previous suspension.

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2014), appeal dismissed (Aug. 13, 2014); Stephens v. Board of Trustees of Auburn 

Univ., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 2011). For this reason, M. Wood is 

not an adequate comparator to plaintiff for disciplinary purposes. Plaintiff had 

been previously suspended for intentionally disabling a piece of equipment, while 

M. Wood had no previous suspensions of any sort and his most serious prior 

infraction was a written warning for poor work performance. Because employers 

are entitled to take into account the disciplinary histories of employees, it is not 

surprising that an employee with a more serious disciplinary history receives a 

harsher discipline, even for similar misconduct.

Accordingly, it appears that the plaintiff has not presented at least one 

adequate comparator for his disparate treatment claim. Thus, he has failed to make 

a prima facie showing that his three-day suspension was racially motivated. 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court 

concludes that Watters has not established a prima facie case for disparate 

treatment under Title VII. 

B. Pretext

Even assuming that plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of prohibited 

discrimination, however, the presumption of discrimination that is raised may be 

rebutted if the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 

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employment action. To satisfy this burden, “the employer need only produce 

admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact to rationally conclude that 

the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.” 

Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997), quoting Texas 

Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L. Ed. 

2d 207 (1981) (emphasis added). Once the nondiscriminatory reason is articulated, 

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the reason is either not worthy of 

belief, or that, in light of all the evidence, a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the decision than the proffered reason. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs. Inc., 

161 F.3d 1318, 1331-33 (11th Cir. 1998) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 172 F.2d 

884 (11th Cir. 1999), citing Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 

(11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685, 139 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1998). He must 

show not only that the articulated reason is false or unworthy of belief, but also 

that the true reason for the adverse employment action was discriminatory. See

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993).

Proof of pretext was discussed by the Supreme Court in Reeves v. 

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.:

Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under 

this framework, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact 

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 

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remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S., at 253, 101 

S. Ct. 1089. And in attempting to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff—

once the employer produces sufficient evidence to support a 

nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision—must be afforded the 

“opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, 

but were a pretext for discrimination.” Ibid.; see also St. Mary’s 

Honor Center, supra, at 507-508, 113 S. Ct. 2742. That is, the 

plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional 

discrimination “by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation 

is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, supra, at 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089. 

Moreover, although the presumption of discrimination “drops out of 

the picture” once the defendant meets its burden of production, St. 

Mary’s Honor Center, supra, at 511, 113 S. Ct. 2742, the trier of fact 

may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie 

case “and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of 

whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual,” Burdine, supra, at 

255 n. 10, 101 S. Ct. 1089. 

530 U.S. 133, 144, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).

In this case, Harsco asserts that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason to suspend the plaintiff because he admittedly committed a safety violation. 

Field states in his deposition that if an employee was driving “mobile equipment” 

and caused “several hundred dollars or thousands of dollars of damage, that would 

clearly fall within anybody’s definition of a rule violation.” (Doc. 36-12, p. 80). 

Harsco argues that Ishman and Mullins routinely suspended all employees who

committed safety violations resulting in significant property damage, but, when 

Future Fleet took over discipline, Zeis wanted to make a more subjective 

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determination as to what punishment may be merited. There remains a fact dispute 

as to whether M. Wood was disciplined by the same set of supervisors as plaintiff, 

or by a completely different supervisor. That dispute of fact leaves the pretext 

prong of the burden of proof open to a trial.

The defendant also states that, even if Ishman and Mullins are found to be 

the decision-makers with regard to the M. Wood incident, Wood’s accident would 

have been handled differently anyway because he was not operating machinery at 

the time of his accident. Robert Field explained the difference between the two 

incidents in his deposition:

Q. What is the difference between Mason Wood - - well, let me ask 

you this. Is this not the same thing as an accident with injury to 

property that we discussed earlier? 

A. In the broad view, certainly. In this particular case he [M. Wood]

was not operating a piece of mobile equipment. He had properly 

stopped his vehicle. He had applied the emergency brake, as I 

understand, however, he did not do the final wheel chock, so not 

having the wheel chocked, the machine drifted back on its own weight 

as opposed to him being in control of it. 

. . .

A. I - - my personal belief is that the violations are not that similar. 

One [plaintiff’s] was operating a moving - - a live vehicle. The other 

one had safely stopped their vehicle, parked it, put an emergency 

brake on, however, failed to - -

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(Doc. 87-128, pp. 83-84, 87).

As set out above, Harsco’s burden is one of production, not persuasion. 

Once Harsco sets out a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for suspending 

Watters but not M. Mason, the burden shifts back to Watters to show that the 

articulated reason is false and that the true reason was discriminatory. In this case, 

the plaintiff has not met that burden. The plaintiff fails to put forth any evidence 

that any of the defendant’s supervisory personnel was motivated by a

discriminatory animus when Ishman and Mullins suspended him. The only 

argument advanced by the plaintiff is that M. Wood--the employee the court has 

determined is not a true comparator to plaintiff--was not suspended after his 

accident. Harsco has pointed to the Field deposition to show that Harsco treated 

the two types of accidents differently, depending on whether the accident occurred 

while the employee was operating a moving vehicle.8

 The plaintiff has not put 

forth any evidence rebutting Harsco’s assertion.

 8

 The court has determined previously that this distinction is not enough to regard the accidents 

dissimilar for purposes of identifying comparators. This conclusion, however, does not prevent 

Harsco from asserting that it did believe the distinction was significant for plant safety reasons. 

The fact that the court does not believe them to be substantially different does not mean that 

Harsco did not truthfully and in good faith believed the distinction justify different disciplinary 

treatment. In the analysis of pretext, the question is whether the plaintiff has presented evidence 

that would allow a jury to infer that the employer’s articulated distinction is simply false and not 

worthy of credence. There is no evidence that Harsco did not truly believe the distinction 

between moving and non-moving accidents warranted different treatment. There is no evidence 

that Harsco had never used that distinction before or that it was a pure contrivance for purposes 

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There remains a dispute as to whether the same supervisors addressed both 

incidents. However, even if they did, the plaintiff has not responded at all to 

Harsco’s allegations that it treats the two types of accidents differently, not out of 

racial animus, but because of the inherent dangers of operating moving machinery. 

The plaintiff has not alleged any true comparator who had an accident while 

operating machinery that resulted in damage to company property and was not 

given a three-day suspension. However, even giving the plaintiff the benefit of the 

doubt and assuming M. Wood to be a proper comparator, the plaintiff has not 

shown that Harsco’s asserted reasons for suspending him were pretextual. Plaintiff 

admits he damaged company property while operating a forklift at night with 

“shades” on. The plaintiff certainly has not shown that “in light of all the 

evidence, a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the decision than the 

proffered reason,” Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331-33, that Harsco viewed M. Wood’s 

accident differently because he was not actively operating the truck when it 

crashed into a building. In short, Harsco has provided a reasonable basis for 

suspending Watters, and the plaintiff has shown no evidence to suggest that the 

true reason for the suspension was discrimination on account of Watters’ race.

 

of this case. Therefore, it, not discrimination, was the true reason for the action taken against

plaintiff.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 

that the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action is not worthy of belief. Accordingly, the motion for summary 

judgment regarding plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claims is due to be 

GRANTED, and this action is due to be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A final 

Order of Judgment will be entered concurrently herewith. 

DONE this 30th day of March, 2016.

_______________________________

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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