Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-18-03434/USCOURTS-ca7-18-03434-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-3434 

ANTRIM PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BIO-PHARM, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 16-cv-00784 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 14, 2020 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Antrim Pharmaceuticals LLC and 

Bio-Pharm, Inc. arranged to manufacture and sell a generic 

anti-depressant. When their plan fell apart, litigation followed. Antrim sued Bio-Pharm for breach of contract, and 

Bio-Pharm counterclaimed based on promissory estoppel or, 

in the alternative, breach of contract. Following a five-day 

trial, a jury found for Bio-Pharm on Antrim’s breach of 

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contract claim and for Antrim on Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim. 

Neither party was awarded damages. Antrim appealed. 

Antrim challenges the district court’s jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and decision to allow Bio-Pharm to request 

lost profits as a remedy on its counterclaim. Bio-Pharm argues 

Antrim waived these arguments on appeal because Antrim 

agreed to a general verdict form and did not file a post-trial 

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). We conclude that Bio-Pharm’s waiver argument has no merit but affirm because the district court committed no reversible error. 

I. 

As 2011 gave way to the new year, some in the pharmaceutical industry believed easy money was to be made. The 

patent for Lexapro, an anti-depressant with billions of dollars 

in yearly sales, was set to expire in March 2012. See Gary Robbins, Consumers to Save Big as Lexapro Patent Expires, SAN 

DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 2012, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/biotech/sdut-consumes-savebig-lexapro-patent-expires-2012mar05-htmlstory.html. The 

expiration of Lexapro’s patent presented a potentially lucrative business opportunity for pharmaceutical companies 

looking to sell the generic version of Lexapro, known as escitalopram. 

Enter the startup company Antrim and the drug manufacturer Bio-Pharm. These companies appeared to be a perfect 

match to profit from Lexapro’s loss of patent protection. Brian 

Tambi, the head of Antrim, had extensive experience in growing pharmaceutical companies from the ground up. BioPharm was a well-known contract manufacturer for the 

generic drug industry. And Antrim and Bio-Pharm had 

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already established a business relationship—BrianT Laboratories (Antrim’s corporate predecessor), Bio-Pharm, and a 

third company had signed a non-binding term sheet in December 2009 to develop, manufacture, market, and sell unspecified pharmaceutical products. The parties to the term 

sheet planned to share equity in that joint pharmaceutical arrangement. But the business deal never materialized, and the 

term sheet lapsed in early 2010. Although Antrim and BioPharm originally intended to sign an updated version of the 

term sheet for their escitalopram venture, the two companies 

never signed a written contract to replace the term sheet after 

its expiration. 

The two companies forged ahead without a signed agreement. In May 2015, the Food and Drug Administration approved Antrim’s Abbreviated New Drug Application 

(“ANDA”) for escitalopram, which permitted Antrim to sell 

escitalopram and contract out its manufacturing to BioPharm. Later that year, Bio-Pharm manufactured the first 

batch. 

Bio-Pharm, however, never shipped the escitalopram to 

Antrim. Bio-Pharm insists it was not obligated to supply 

Antrim with the escitalopram because the companies never 

signed a new agreement after the term sheet expired. Although the companies lacked a written contract, Bio-Pharm 

claims Antrim had promised they would share equity in the 

new venture according to the now-expired term sheet. But 

when Antrim told Bio-Pharm that equity was off the table, 

Bio-Pharm contends it decided to leave the business venture. 

Antrim tells a different story. According to Antrim, the 

two parties committed to an oral contract in early 2012, under 

which Bio-Pharm received a share of net profits instead of 

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equity, but Bio-Pharm backed out of that agreement when 

Antrim refused to renegotiate the terms of the deal. 

Antrim sued Bio-Pharm for allegedly breaching the oral 

contract. Bio-Pharm counterclaimed on the theory of promissory estoppel, asserting it relied on Antrim’s false promises of 

shared equity in the venture. In the alternative, Bio-Pharm 

counterclaimed against Antrim for breaching the oral contract 

Antrim claimed existed. 

Both parties filed motions in limine relevant to this appeal. 

Antrim argued the district court should preclude expert testimony by one of Bio-Pharm’s expert witnesses, Mark 

Schwartz, on how the FDA regulates ANDA holders. BioPharm argued the district court should preclude expert testimony by Sean Brynjelsen, one of Antrim’s expert witnesses, 

on industry practices and to what degree Bio-Pharm’s alleged 

breach impaired the value of Antrim’s business under a lost 

enterprise value theory. The district court denied Antrim’s 

motion in limine to exclude Schwartz’s testimony on FDA 

practices, but it granted Bio-Pharm’s motions in limine to exclude those portions of Brynjelsen’s testimony on industry 

practices and Antrim’s losses under a lost enterprise value 

theory. 

Several other motions are pertinent to this appeal. In the 

final pretrial order and later at the jury instruction conference, 

Antrim proposed Jury Instruction No. 8. That instruction 

stated that under FDA policy the holder of an ANDA is also 

the owner of the product underlying that ANDA. The district 

court rejected Jury Instruction No. 8 after finding the instruction on “what an ANDA means” was irrelevant to the case. 

DE 169 at 39. Antrim also filed a motion to bar Bio-Pharm 

from requesting lost profits as a remedy for its counterclaim 

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because Bio-Pharm missed the disclosure deadline imposed 

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1). The district court 

ruled that Bio-Pharm violated Rule 26(a)(1) but denied Antrim’s motion on the grounds that the violation was harmless. 

The case went to trial, and the district court used a general 

verdict form after neither party objected.1 Following the jury’s 

verdict in favor of Bio-Pharm on Antrim’s claim and in favor 

of Antrim on Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim, Antrim timely appealed. 

II. 

On appeal, Antrim alleges the district court erred by: (1) 

rejecting Jury Instruction No. 8, (2) denying its motion to preclude Schwartz’s testimony on FDA practices, (3) granting 

Bio-Pharm’s motion to preclude Brynjelsen’s testimony on industry practices, (4) granting Bio-Pharm’s motion to preclude 

Brynjelsen’s testimony on Antrim’s lost enterprise value, and 

(5) allowing Bio-Pharm to request lost profits as a remedy for 

its counterclaim.2

1 Among the types of jury verdicts that federal courts recognize are 

general and special. See Turyna v. Martam Const. Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 178, 180–

81 (7th Cir. 1996). “General verdicts simply ask the jury to answer the 

question ‘who won,’ and if the winning party is entitled to a monetary 

award, to answer the question ‘how much.’” Id. at 181. Special verdict 

forms require the jury to make written findings on issues of fact; the court 

then applies the law to the jury’s findings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a). 

2 This court has cautioned appellate counsel to focus on “one central 

issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” United States v. Boscarino, 

437 F.3d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–

52 (1983)). By arguing so many issues (and sub-issues) on appeal, Antrim 

has “consume[d] space that [could have] be[en] devoted to developing [] 

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Before addressing the substance of Antrim’s arguments, 

we consider whether Antrim has waived any of its arguments 

on appeal. Bio-Pharm asserts “every issue appealed by 

Antrim” is rendered “moot” because the district court used a 

general verdict form and Antrim did not file a motion for a 

renewed judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). We 

disagree. 

Bio-Pharm incorrectly assumes that on appeal Antrim 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. For example, BioPharm contends that “[a] general verdict, without more, 

will ... give rise to the presumption that material fact issues 

have been resolved in favor of the prevailing party.” Freeman 

v. Chicago Park Dist., 189 F.3d 613, 616 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting 

Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660, 667 

(7th Cir. 1980)). Although a true statement of the law, it is irrelevant to this appeal because Antrim challenges pretrial rulings, not the jury’s factual findings. Therefore, Antrim has not 

waived any of the issues it raises on appeal by failing to file 

for a renewed judgment as a matter of law. Bio-Pharm is also 

correct that “[a] party’s failure to comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” Consumer Products Research & Design, Inc. v. Jensen, 572 

F.3d 436, 437–38 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. 

v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 404–07 (2006)). But again, 

Antrim does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on 

appeal. Here too, Antrim has not waived any arguments. 

arguments with some promise.” Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th 

Cir. 2000). 

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Turning to the merits, we group Antrim’s arguments into 

challenges related to the jury instructions, to the motion in 

limine rulings, and to Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim. 

A. Jury Instructions

“We review the legal accuracy of [] jury instruction[s] de 

novo, but we evaluate the particular phrasing for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1056 (7th Cir. 

2014) (citing United States v. Dickerson, 705 F.3d 683, 688 (7th 

Cir. 2013)). If a court’s instructions were legally accurate, 

“[r]eversal is warranted ‘only if it appears both that the jury 

was misled and that the instructions prejudiced the defendant.’” United States v. McKnight, 655 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 

2011) (quoting United States v. Curry, 538 F.3d 718, 731 (7th 

Cir. 2008)); see also Jimenez v. City of City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 

710, 717 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 

F.3d 365 374–75 (7th Cir. 2000)) (“If the instructions were deficient, we ask whether the jury was confused or misled by 

the instructions. Even if we believe that the jury was confused 

or misled, we would need to find that the defendants were 

prejudiced before ordering a new trial.”). 

According to Antrim, the district court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury on the legal significance of Antrim holding 

an escitalopram ANDA. Before trial, Antrim proposed Jury 

Instruction No. 8, which directed the jury to “conclude that 

Antrim owns [e]scitalopram according to FDA regulation and 

policy” if it found “that Antrim is the holder of the ANDA for 

[e]scitalopram.” DE 173-3 at 13. Since the district court 

rejected Jury Instruction No. 8 and never instructed the jury 

on the preclusive effects of ANDA ownership, Antrim claims 

“the trial devolved into a debate about [whether] Bio-Pharm[] 

... owned an interest in the ANDA, or was promised an 

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ownership interest in the ANDA.” Antrim contends this 

failure to instruct the jury on the consequences of ANDA 

ownership “was extremely confusing for the jury.” Because 

Antrim does not dispute the legal accuracy of the district 

court’s jury instructions—but rather contends its instructions 

were insufficient—Antrim must show the instructions 

“confused or misled the jury” and caused it prejudice for this 

court to reverse. Jimenez, 732 F.3d at 717 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Antrim fails to meet this strict standard. 

Neither party disputes that Antrim owned an escitalopram ANDA and was an ANDA holder for escitalopram 

under FDA regulations. But the parties dispute the consequences of that ownership. Antrim argues ANDA holders 

own the products manufactured in accordance with those 

ANDAs as well as the ANDAs themselves. Antrim insists that 

because it owns an ANDA for escitalopram and Bio-Pharm 

was aware of that ownership, Bio-Pharm accepted its role as 

a contractor and not a co-owner. Bio-Pharm’s position is that 

although Antrim held an ANDA for escitalopram, Antrim did 

not own the escitalopram manufactured by Bio-Pharm under 

the ANDA unless Bio-Pharm agreed to sell it. We conclude 

FDA regulations support Bio-Pharm’s position. 

Before manufacturing and marketing a generic drug, a 

company must file an ANDA with the FDA. See FDA, Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), https://www.fda.gov/ 

drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drug-applicationanda (May 22, 2019). To receive FDA approval, ANDA applicants are not required to replicate original costly clinical trials, 

but they must demonstrate their generic drug functions in the 

same manner as the non-generic version of the drug. Id. After 

the FDA accepts an ANDA filed by an ANDA applicant, that 

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applicant “owns [the] approved ANDA” and becomes the 

“ANDA holder.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b). Being an ANDA holder 

does not confer any exclusive rights. For example, when this 

case was tried, at least six companies held ANDAs for escitalopram. Essentially, an ANDA serves as an FDA-granted license to manufacture and market the generic version of a 

drug. But ownership of an ANDA, and the ability to manufacture and market the drug listed in that ANDA, does not 

decide ownership of any product manufactured in accordance with that ANDA.3

 Indeed, the relevant regulations never 

equate ownership of the ANDA with ownership of the underlying product. 

Before the district court, the parties disputed ownership of 

the escitalopram, not ownership of the ANDA. As described 

above, these are unrelated concepts; whether Antrim had an 

ownership interest in the ANDA was irrelevant to the question of ownership. Reversal is not appropriate because 

Antrim has failed to show the district court “confused or misled the jury” by not permitting Jury Instruction No. 8. See 

Jimenez, 732 F.3d at 717. In fact, Jury Instruction No. 8 likely 

posed a risk of confusing or misleading even the most astute 

jurors given its irrelevant language on ANDA ownership. 

3 A hypothetical can demonstrate the difference in this context between a license and ownership. Suppose a landowner sells a license to a 

business that allows the business to harvest timber on Blackacre. Under 

that license, the business can keep the lumber it harvests. And suppose the 

business hires a third party to remove the timber located on Blackacre. If 

the business grants the third party an interest in the harvested timber in 

exchange for the third party’s work, the third party then possesses an 

ownership interest in the timber without having an ownership interest in 

the license itself. 

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Because ANDA ownership was immaterial to this case and 

Antrim has not shown the district court’s instructions confused or misled the jury, the district court did not err by rejecting Jury Instruction No. 8. 

B. Motions in Limine 

Antrim next challenges the district court’s rulings on three 

motions in limine. We review rulings on motions in limine for 

abuse of discretion. See Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees. of the Univ. 

of Ill., 893 F.3d 397, 407 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Empire Bucket, 

Inc. v. Contractors Cargo Co., 739 F.3d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 

2014)); United States v. Johnson, 916 F.3d 579, 586–87 (7th Cir. 

2019) (quoting United States v. Causey, 748 F.3d 310, 316 (7th 

Cir. 2014)) (“We afford the district court’s evidentiary rulings 

special deference and find an abuse of discretion ‘only where 

no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial 

court.’”). 

1. Schwartz’s testimony on FDA practices 

Mark Schwartz was an expert witness for Bio-Pharm and 

a former FDA lawyer. Schwartz had extensive experience 

with federal drug regulations: he spent 13 years at the FDA 

before joining a private firm that advises generic drug manufacturers. In his expert witness report, Schwartz disclosed he 

intended to testify about what the FDA would infer based on 

Antrim’s status as an ANDA holder for escitalopram. Specifically, Schwartz planned to testify that the FDA would treat 

the relationship between Antrim and Bio-Pharm as “a contractual relationship for Bio-Pharm to manufacture the drug 

at issue on behalf of Antrim” because Bio-Pharm was identified as the manufacturer on the ANDA application. DE 154 

Ex. 1 at 2. Schwartz also planned to testify that the “FDA 

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would not infer any ownership relationship one way or the 

other” from the ANDA. Id. Antrim filed a motion in limine to 

preclude Schwartz’s testimony on the basis that: (1) his testimony was inaccurate because “applicable federal statutes and 

FDA regulations all make clear that the ANDA ‘holder’ is the 

‘owner’ of the product” and (2) allowing an FDA officer to 

testify on a legal issue invades the province of the court. DE 

132 at 1. The district court found these arguments unpersuasive, and Schwartz testified on ANDA ownership at trial. On 

appeal, Antrim raises the same arguments it raised before the 

district court. 

Antrim’s first argument is easily rejected. Schwartz’s testimony that ownership of an ANDA does not determine ownership of the underlying product is legally correct. Just as the 

district court did not err by rejecting Jury Instruction No. 8, 

the district court did not err by rejecting Antrim’s motion in 

limine to preclude Schwartz’s testimony. 

Antrim’s second argument—that the district court should 

not have permitted Schwartz to testify on FDA statutes and 

regulations—is more complicated. Experts generally may not 

testify on pure issues of law, such as the meaning of statutes 

or regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 

942 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transportation Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1994)) (“The ... meaning 

of the statute and regulations [is] a subject for the court, not 

for testimonial experts.”). But courts have permitted regulatory experts to testify on complex statutory or regulatory 

frameworks when that testimony assists the jury in understanding a party’s actions within that broader framework. See, 

e.g., In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 169 F. Supp. 3d 396, 

478–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Dr. Parisian's experience as an 

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12 No. 18-3434 

officer at the FDA qualifies her to opine on the background of 

the FDA, its functions, and the FDA's regulatory framework. ... Dr. Parisian’s testimony regarding compliance with 

FDA regulations does not usurp the role of the jury, but rather 

merely helps them understand a complicated statutory framework.”); Jones v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 

1255–56 (N.D. Ala. 2017) (“The court finds that Dr. Parisian is 

qualified, based on her experience at the FDA as a Medical 

Officer, to offer testimony about regulatory requirements for 

the testing, marketing, and development of prescription 

drugs.”); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 

WL 6302287 at *16 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011) (stating the same). 

See also FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (“A witness who is qualified as an 

expert ... may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise 

if: the expert’s ... specialized knowledge will help the trier of 

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”). 

The district court properly admitted Schwartz’s testimony 

on the FDA’s statutory and regulatory authority. His testimony helped the jury better grasp the relationship between 

Antrim and Bio-Pharm in light of the FDA’s regulations on 

generic pharmaceuticals. Schwartz’s testimony on ANDA 

ownership assisted the jury with understanding how Antrim’s ownership of the escitalopram ANDA was irrelevant to 

whether Antrim owned the escitalopram manufactured by 

Bio-Pharm. And that testimony was particularly important in 

this case, where one of Antrim’s witnesses incorrectly stated 

there is “no difference” between ownership of an ANDA and 

ownership of the underlying product. DE 213 at 406. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

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No. 18-3434 13

Antrim’s motion in limine to prevent Schwartz from testifying on FDA practices. 

2. Brynjelsen’s intended testimony on industry practices 

Antrim then challenges the preclusion of testimony from 

its expert, Sean Brynjelsen, on industry practices. With over 

20 years of experience working for pharmaceutical companies, Brynjelsen intended to testify that, according to his experience and “well-known industry practice and norms,” 

contract manufacturers like Bio-Pharm “never [hold] an ownership interest in the drugs falling under the ANDA.” DE 140 

at 12. But after Bio-Pharm filed a motion in limine to preclude 

Brynjelsen’s testimony on industry practices, the district court 

prohibited Brynjelsen from testifying that “Antrim’s ownership of the ANDA for escitalopram somehow makes it less 

likely or impossible that Antrim promised Bio-Pharm an equity share.” DE 168 at 4. 

On appeal, Antrim argues the district court erred by granting Bio-Pharm’s motion in limine because Brynjelsen’s testimony would have established that Antrim’s ownership of the 

escitalopram ANDA meant Antrim was more likely to own 

escitalopram manufactured under that ANDA. But the district court’s decision to preclude Brynjelsen’s testimony on 

this issue does not rise to an abuse of discretion. During his 

deposition, Brynjelsen admitted he did “not have specific 

knowledge” of whether Antrim and Bio-Pharm ever agreed 

to split equity in the escitalopram produced under the 

ANDA. DE 142 at 33. Without specific knowledge of any 

agreement between Antrim and Bio-Pharm, Brynjelsen’s intended testimony on general industry customs and practices 

was not relevant to whether the parties entered into an 

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agreement to share equity in this case. So the district court did 

not err by precluding this line of testimony. 

3. Brynjelsen’s intended testimony on Antrim’s lost 

enterprise value 

Antrim also sought Brynjelsen’s testimony on how BioPharm’s alleged breach reduced Antrim’s profits and reduced 

the value of Antrim’s business. But the district court excluded 

Brynjelsen’s latter calculation after finding that Antrim had 

“failed to show a legal basis or a proper evidentiary foundation for recoverability of damages for lost enterprise value in 

this case (as distinguished from lost profits).” DE 174. 

Antrim argues the district court erred because federal 

courts, applying Illinois law,4 permit breach of contract 

awards based on theories of lost enterprise value. But Antrim 

oversimplifies Illinois law, under which “damages cannot be 

based on potential or future loss, unless it is reasonably certain to occur, nor can damages be based on speculation and 

conjecture.” Platinum Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 927, 

933 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 443 N.E.2d 36, 

42 (1982); Harp v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 370 N.E.2d 826, 829 

(1997)). See also Westlake Fin. Grp. v. CDH-Delnor Health Sys.,

25 N.E.3d 1166, 1179 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (quoting Thornhill v. 

Midwest Physician Ctr. of Orland Park 787 N.E.2d (Ill. App. Ct. 

4 Neither party on appeal raises a conflict of law issue, and this suit, 

arising out of diversity jurisdiction, was filed in the U.S. District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois. We therefore apply Illinois law. See Wood 

v. Mid-Valley Inc., 942 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The operative rule is 

that when neither party raises a conflict of law issue in a diversity case, 

the federal court simply applies the law of the state in which the federal 

court sits.”). 

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2003)) (“Damages are speculative when uncertainty exists as 

to the facts of their existence.”). 

Brynjelsen failed to show the damages to Antrim’s business value were reasonably certain to occur; he instead based 

his estimate on impermissible conjecture and speculation. To 

reach his estimate, he took the annual profits he believed 

Antrim would have received had Bio-Pharm provided the escitalopram and multiplied that figure by between 8.3 and 24 

times to account for “precedent transactions” involving other 

acquired companies. DE 140 at 8. But, as Brynjelsen admitted 

in his deposition, he never compared those acquired companies to Antrim. In addition to this exercise in conjecture, 

another problem arises: these damages would never occur unless Antrim chose to sell itself. And Antrim has provided no 

evidence that its owners ever intended to sell the business or 

had ever engaged in discussions with potential buyers. Thus, 

Brynjelsen’s lost value calculations assumed Bio-Pharm and 

Antrim would successfully introduce escitalopram into the 

market, the venture would prove profitable, Antrim’s market 

value would rise to between 8.3 and 24 times its annual profits, and Antrim would sell itself to an interested buyer. This 

chain of assumptions grows weaker with each additional link. 

Brynjelsen’s potential testimony, replete with assumptions, 

was based on improper speculation and conjecture. Furthermore, because Antrim provided no evidence that it intended 

to sell itself, Brynjelsen failed to show the loss of Antrim’s 

business value was “reasonably certain” to have occurred. 

Platinum Tech., Inc., 282 F.3d at 933 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted). Applying Illinois law, the district court therefore 

did not abuse its discretion by barring Antrim from presenting to the jury Brynjelsen’s calculations on Antrim’s lost enterprise value. 

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C. Bio-Pharm’s Counterclaim

Lastly, Antrim argues the district court erred by allowing 

Bio-Pharm to request lost profits as an alternative remedy for 

its counterclaim. Roughly three months before the trial 

began—and more than two years after its initial Rule 26(a)(1) 

disclosures—Bio-Pharm revealed for the first time it intended 

to request lost profits based on Brynjelsen’s testimony on 

Antrim’s lost profits.5 Specifically, Bio-Pharm argued that if 

the parties had a contract, Bio-Pharm was entitled to 25% of 

any of Antrim’s profits under that contract. Antrim moved to 

prevent Bio-Pharm from relying on Brynjelsen’s lost profits 

testimony due to Bio-Pharm’s last minute disclosures. The 

district court looked to whether Bio-Pharm violated Rule 

26(a)(1)’s disclosure rules and, if such a failure to timely 

disclose did occur, whether Bio-Pharm could still rely on 

Brynjelsen’s testimony by showing the late disclosure was 

“justified or [] harmless” under Rule 37(c)(1). The district 

court decided Bio-Pharm had violated Rule 26(a)(1) but also 

deemed Bio-Pharm’s late disclosure harmless because Antrim 

was aware of Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim “from a very early 

point in this case.” DE 189. The district court also found 

Antrim knew that Bio-Pharm intended to ask the jury for 25% 

of the profits derived from Antrim’s escitalopram sales and 

that Antrim failed to identify anything it would have done 

5 Although Brynjelsen’s calculations of Antrim’s lost enterprise value 

rely on his calculations of Antrim’s lost profits, we do not find it necessary 

to decide whether Brynjelsen’s lost profits calculations are too speculative 

under Illinois law. 

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differently if Bio-Pharm had complied with Rule 26(a)(1). So 

the district court denied Antrim’s motion to exclude. 

Here, Antrim argues the district court erred by allowing 

Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim to advance to trial because BioPharm missed the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure deadline and because Brynjelsen never established that his lost profit calculations could be used to measure Bio-Pharm’s damages. Even if 

these arguments had merit, “[i]t is well established that a 

party cannot appeal an issue it won at trial.” See Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 432 F. App’x 618, 619–20 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 

(1939)). And Antrim prevailed against Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim at trial—barring Antrim’s appeal of the district court’s 

Rule 37(c)(1) determination. Nevertheless, Antrim asserts the 

jury in this case was improperly permitted to “off-set” 

Antrim’s breach of contract claim with Bio-Pharm’s counterclaim. But Antrim provides no authority for this assertion. Essentially, Antrim invites this court to ignore precedent and 

speculate as to why the jury issued a split verdict. We decline 

to do so. 

III. 

The district court correctly ruled on the various evidentiary and procedural questions presented in this case, so we 

AFFIRM its judgment. 

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