Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01443/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01443-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

RICHARD C. COPP, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FI LED 

U~ttt<'d States C';)tt:rt of Appc~ls 

'fenth Gr::uir 

AUG 2 l 1989 

ROBERT L. I-IOECK...ER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 87-1443 

87-1838 

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #501; 

TOPEKA BOARD OF EDUCATION; 

JOE DOUGLAS, JR.; PEGGY M. 

BOGGS; JOYCE C. ROMERO; MARY 

JO BERGKAMP; HOWARD WARD; 

RON TAYLOR; RON HALL; OWEN M. 

HENSON; DON R. O'NEIL; TONY 

VARGAS; and DENNIS DUNKLEE, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

-------------------------------) 

KANSAS ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL 

BOARDS, 

Amicus Curiae. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

D.C. Nos. 84-4241 & 84-4241-S 

Fred w. Phelps, Jr. (Brent D. Roper with him on the brief) of 

Phelps - Chartered, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William G. Haynes (Wendy E. Johnston with him on the briefs) of 

Edison, Lewis, Porter & Haynes, Topeka, Kansas, for DefendantsAppellants. 

Cynthia K. Lutz of the Kansas Association of School Boards, 

Topeka, Kansas, for Amicus Curiae. 

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 1 
.. 

Before MOORE and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, District. 

Judge.* 

PER CURIAM • 

* Honorable Layn R. Phillips, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 2 
Defendants appeal from the district court's denial of their 

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The jury awarded 

plaintiff damages on his claim that defendants had transferred him 

to a different job in violation of his First Amendment rights of 

free association and speech. We conclude that plaintiff failed to 

prove a violation of his association rights. Consequently, 

defendants' motion should have been granted on that issue. We 

also conclude, however, that the plaintiff's speech was protected. 

Because we cannot be sure whether the jury awarded damages based 

upon the association claim, the speech claim, or both, we remand 

for a new trial on the speech claim. 

I. FACTS 

Plaintiff Richard Copp was employed as the head custodian of 

Topeka High School in Topeka, Kansas. There, he became close 

friends with the school's principal, Frank Blackburn, and he 

formed the relationship with Blackburn upon which this case 

centers. 

Testimony revealed that Blackburn delegated an unusual amount 

of authority to plaintiff. For example, Blackburn authorized 

plaintiff to sit in on staff meetings and perform functions 

considered administrative rather than custodial. 

In May 1983, a former female employee of Topeka High, Sharon 

Mccubbin, sued Blackburn, the school district, and certain 

administrators for sexual harassment. That lawsuit ultimately led 

to Blackburn's proposed transfer from Topeka High and spawned a 

subsequent suit by Blackburn in which he claimed that the school 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 3 
district had failed to provide him with legal counsel to defend 

against the Mccubbin claim. 

In June 1984, prior to Blackburn's transi'er, plaintiff 

appeared at a public meeting of the Board of Education to express 

his opposition to Blackburn's transfer. The Board, nonetheless, 

transferred Blackburn to an elementary school in the district. 

Three weeks later the Board also transferred plaintiff to the 

Topeka Adventure Center. At his new post, plaintiff was required 

to do more physical labor and had relatively few supervisory 

duties. Further, plaintiff became an hourly employee at the 

district's smallest school in contrast to his former salaried and 

supervisory position at the district's largest school. 

Dennis Dunklee, the acting principal of Topeka High, 

testified that he recommended plaintiff's transfer because he 

thought it would be the least disruptive way to diminish the 

excessive authority that plaintiff had acquired through his close 

relationship with Blackburn. The Board agreed with Dunklee's 

assessment. 

Plaintiff brought this action against the Board, alleging 

that it had transferred him in retaliation for his speech before 

the Board and because of his association with Blackburn. 

Plaintiff also claimed that the Board deprived him of due process 

of law. The jury found for plaintiff and awarded him $30,000 for 

future lost wages and benefits, $20,000 for mental pain and 

suffering, and $33,000 for punitive damages. Defendants then 

moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court 

granted the motion as to plaintiff's due process claim but left 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 4 
the verdict standing on the speech and association claims. In 

this appeal, defendants contend that neither plaintiff's speech 

nor his association with Blackburn was protected by the First 

Amendment. 

-

II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 

To support his freedom of association claim, plaintiff relies 

on NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Button involved a 

Virginia statute that prohibited organizations from soliciting 

legal business. The NAACP claimed that its solicitation of civil 

rights plaintiffs for school desegregation cases constituted a 

mode of expression and association protected by the First 

Amendment and, thus, could not be prohibited. The Supreme Court 

agreed, reasoning.that "[i]n the contex_t of NAACP objectives, 

litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it 

is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of 

treatment by all government ••• for the members of the Negro 

conununity in this country." Id. at 429. 

In Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), we 

construed Button as protecting activities involving the assistance 

of litigation vindicating civil rights. Accordingly, we held that 

"attending meetings on necessary legal steps" and "associating for 

the purpose of assisting persons seeking legal redress" are modes 

of expression and association protected by the First Amendment. 

Id. Thus, we allowed a police officer to pursue a First Amendment 

claim when he alleged that the sheriff's department fired him 

-5-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 5 
because he assisted his wife in.filing a sex discrimination claim 

against the department. 

In the present case, plaintiff claims that he was assisting 

Blackburn in litigation vindicating his civil rights. Even if we 

asiume, for argument's sake, that Blackburn's lawsuit against the . 

school district constituted litigation to vindicate a civil right, 

we cannot say that plaintiff assisted in that litigation in a way 

covered by Button. At trial, plaintiff expressly stated that at 

the time of his transfer he had done nothing to assist Blackburn 

in that litigation. 1 Furthermore, plaintiff conceded that the 

assistance that he provided in that litigation had nothing to do 

with plaintiff's lawsuit. 2 Thus, there is no factual support for 

plaintiff's contention. 

To be. sure, plaintiff was to be a witness in the sexual 

harassment suit against Blackburn and the school district. 

Plaintiff believed the relationship between Blackburn and the 

plaintiff in that suit was voluntary and agreed to so testify. 

1 On cross-examination the following exchange took place: 

Q. And when you appeared at the board meeting on 

June 6, what had you done to assist Mr. Blackburn with 

his, with regard to his dispute, if anything, about the 

district paying attorney fees to the Phelps firm? 

A. I'm not aware of that. 

Q. And at the time you were transferred on June 29, 

what had you done, if anything, with regard to assisting 

Mr. Blackburn with regard to the defense of the Mccubbin 

[sexual harassment] case. 

A. I'm not aware of anything. 

Vol. VII at 1259-60. 

2 Vol. VII at 1261. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 6 
Ultimately, several months after the Board transferred plaintiff, 

he was deposed in Blackburn's case. Plaintiff does not, however, 

claim that the Board retaliated against him for his testimony at 

that deposition. See Tate v. Yenoir, 537 F. Supp. 306, 310 (E.D. 

Mich. 1982) ("speech in the form of testimony is constitutionally 

protected as a matter of law"). 

Plaintiff claims he was threatened by the school district's 

attorney to cooperate in the sexual harassment case. Plaintiff's 

own description of this conversation, however, is not supportive 

of his claim and suggests only that the attorney wished to hear 

plaintiff's version of the events surrounding the sexual 

harassment claim. 3 Plaintiff's description of the conversation 

3 Plaintiff testified that the following conversation took place 

between the school district's attorney and himself in January 

1984: 

[The school attdrney] says, "I understand you know 

something about the Blackburn case," and I said, "Yes, I 

do," and he said, "Will you tell me?" and I says, "No, I 

won't," and he says, "Why?" and I says, "Because you're 

not the counselor for Mr. Blackburn," and then he said, 

he says, "You know I'm the counselor for the Board of 

Education," and I says, "Yes, I do," and he says, "You 

know you work for the district," and I said, "Yes, I do" 

••• , now, he says, "Do you want to tell me what you 

know" and I said "no" and he says, "Well , you know, I 

can talk to the superintendent," and I said, "Well, you 

go ahead and talk to the su'per intendent if you want to," 

and then he talked about the superintendent a little bit 

and at that point in time I was getting nervous because 

when he mentioned the superintendent I thought, I didn't 

think there was a threat there, that I'm supposed to 

talk to him and I says, "No I'm not going to talk to 

you," and he says, then he said, "Why don't you want to 

talk?" and I said, "Well, I think I need to get counsel 

before I talk to you," and then he went back to the 

superintendent again and I says, "You do what you have 

to do," and I got up and I walked out with the box. 

Vol. VII at 1096-98 (emphasis added). 

-7-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 7 
does not suggest that the attorney was demanding improper 

disclosures from plaintiff, nor does it suggest that the attorney 

was threatening plaintiff's employment for his alignment with 

Blackburn in the pending litigation. 

In light of those circumstances, we do not believe that 

plaintiff's posture as a potential witness at the time of his 

transfer rises to the level of assisting in litigation as that 

term is construed in Owens. Therefore, we cannot conclude that 

plaintiff's relationship to the Blackburn litigation triggers a 

freedom of association claim. 

In addition, plaintiff claims that he was transferred because 

of his general association with Blackburn. Indeed, there is 

evidence that tends to support that assertion. The testimony 

reveals that school officials and parents were genuinely concerned 

with the excessive authority plaintiff wielded because of his 

close relationship with the former ptincipal. The evidence also 

shows that school officials believed it to be in the school's best 

interest to transfer plaintiff because of that relationship. 

Thus, it cannot be denied that plaintiff was transferred at least 

partly because of his relationship with Blackburn. We do not 

believe, however, that piaintiff's relationship with Blackburn is 

the type of association that the First Amendment shelters from 

governmental action, and plaintiff cites no case which conflicts 

with our conclusion. 

The right to associate protects an individual's decision to 

"enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships." 

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). In 

-8-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 8 
general, those protected relationships have involved familial 

settings not present in the case before us. Id. at 619-20. See 

also Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1232 n.16 (7th Cir. 1985) 

(right to associate does not include emotional bonds between 

public employees). Thus, we hold that plaintiff possessed no 

First Amendment right to associate generally with Blackburn. 

III. RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH 

Having determined that plaintiff does not possess a valid 

freedom of association claim, we are left to consider his claim 

that he was transferred because of his speech at the School Board 

meeting. In order to prevail on his speech claim, plaintiff must 

satisfy a three-prong test established by the Supreme Court in 

Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 

(1977). Under Mount Healthy, an employee challenging an adverse 

employment decision initially must show that, as a matter of law, 

his speech deserves constitutional protection. Id. at 284. Once 

the court determines that the speech is worthy of protection, the 

employee must prove as a factual matter that the protected speech 

was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

decision. Id. at 287. The burden then shifts to the employer to 

show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 

reached the same decision . even in the absence of the 

protected conduct." Id.; see also Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School 

Dist. RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 865-66 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The first prong of Mount Healthy, whether speech is 

constitutionally protected, necessarily involves the two-part test 

-9-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 9 
articulated in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 

(1968): (1) whether the speech comments on a matter of public 

concern; and (2) whether the employee's interest in making such 

statements outweighs "the interest of the State, as an employer, 

in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees." 

The Supreme Court has characterized a matter of public 

concern as a matter "fairly considered as relating to any matter 

of political, social, or other concern of the community." Connick 

v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). "Whether an employee's 

speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by 

the content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by 

the whole record." Id. at 147-48, quoted in Rankin v. McPherson, 

483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987). In light of those standards, we 

conclude that plaintiff's speech before the School Board 

constituted a matter of public concern. 

Plaintiff's speech was before a governmental body, the Topeka 

School Board, concerning a matter that was properly within the 

Board's official responsibility -- the discipline or transfer of a 

high school principal. 4 The speech was presented under a Board 

agenda item soliciting public comments. 5 Plaintiff's speech 

sought and received public response from the audience at the 

meeting, and the news media covered the speech as an event of 

public interest. 6 There is no evidence in the record that 

4 Plaintiff's Ex. 35; Vol.Vat 772, 777. 

5 Plaintiff's Ex. 35. 

6 The June 7, 1984, Topeka Capital Journal article read: 

-10-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 10 
plaintiff's speech was in any way inflammatory or threatening, or 

that the "manner, form and context" in which he presented his 

ideas was inappropriate. Moreover, plaintiff spoke at the Board 

meeting on his own time and as a citizen, not privately as an 

employee. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Those facts are 

sufficient to establish the public nature of the speech. See 

Lewis v. Harrison School Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310, 316 (8th Cir. 

1986) (principal's speech to school board criticizing 

superintendent's decision to transfer principal's wife from high 

school to junior high was matter of public concern), cert. denied, 

482 U.S. 905 (1987); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th 

Cir. 1986) (teacher's written complaints about principal were 

matters of public concern), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). 

Because plaintiff's speech commented on a matter of public 

concern, we must next address whether plaintiff's interest in 

making the speech outweighed the School Board's interest "in 

promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees." See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. In that 

inquiry, "pertinent considerations [are] whether the statement 

impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a 

detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 

personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 

The transfer of Blackburn was challenged by one person 

at the meeting. Blackburn was being 'put out to grass' 

with his reassignment. He urged the Board to rescind 

its action and return Blackburn to the principal's 

office at Topeka High. 

Plaintiff's Ex. 3; Vol. III at 463-65. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 11 
performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular 

operation of the enterprise." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. Here, our 

task is simplified by defendants' failure to present any evidence 

that plaintiff's speech had any deleterious effects qn discipline, 

working relationships, plaintiff's performance, or the regular 

operations of the school. Indeed, defendants do not even argue 

that the decision to transfer plaintiff was based on their 

conclusion that plaintiff's speech was disruptive or that it was 

harmful to the School District's ability to fulfill its public 

responsibilities. Rather, they argue that plaintiff's speech 

played no part in their decision7 and that the transfer was 

routine and represented the least disruptive way to diminish the 

excessive authority and ameliorate the effects of the abrasive 

personality that plaintiff had developed through his close 

relationship with Blackburn. 8 Therefore, because the record is 

silent as to any ''government interest" to balance against 

plaintiff's interest, we must conclude that plaintiff's speech was 

protected. See Ware v. Unified School Dist. No. 492, F.2d 

(10th Cir. 1989) (defendants' contention that they were justified 

in terminating plaintiff was "fatally undermined by defendants' 

failure to assert it at trial or present any evidence to support 

it"); Rankin v. Independent School Dist. No. I-3, 876 F.2d 838, 

844 n.8 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[The Pickering] balancing test is not 

at issue here. Defendants do not argue that the decision not to 

7 Vol. II at 136-37; Vol. VIII at 1633, 1661; Doc. 84 at 9. 

8 Vol. II at 131; Vol. III at 308-316; Vol. IV at 660; Vol.Vat 

781. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 12 
renew Rankin's contract was based on a conclusion that his speech 

was too disruptive; rather, defendants argue that Rankin's speech 

played no part in their decision."); Saye v. St~ Vrain Valley 

School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 865-66 (10th Cir. 1986) 

("Defendants here do not argue that they acted to protect such an 

interest; indeed they argue instead that Saye's union 

participation played no part in the adverse decision. We thus 

conclude that Saye's union activities were constitutionally 

protected."). 

Because we are satisfied that plaintiff's speech was 

protected, we turn to ~he second prong of Mount Healthy, the 

factual question of causation. To satisfy his burden of proving 

causation, plaintiff need not prove that his speech was the sole 

reason for defendants' action. It is enough if the speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in causing defendants to transfer 

him. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. Our review of the 

record persuades us that there was sufficient evidence on 

causation to send the speech issue to the jury. 

The dissent suggests that the district court should have 

granted defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict on the ground that plaintiff made no showing that his 

speech was a motivating or substantial factor in his transfer and 

that, in fact, plaintiff conceded at trial that his speech was not 

the reason for his transfer. We disagree for two reasons. First, 

defendants did not challenge the adequacy of the proof of 

causation arising from plaintiff's speech in their motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, nor do they challenge 

-13-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 13 
the adequacy of the proof of causation on appeal. Accordingly, 

defendants have effectively waived that issue. See FDIC v. 

Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust, 806 F.2d 961, 963. n.l (10th Cir. 1986) 

(court need not consider issues not raised on _appeal); Bledsoe v. 

Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984) (issue not raised on 

appeal deemed waived). 

Second, even if we were to consider the merits of that issue, 

plaintiff's testimony merely indicates that he may have 

subjectively believed that he was not transferred because of his 

speech. 9 That is only one piece of evidence on the issue of 

causation. Also relevant to our inquiry is the evidence that (1) 

there were threats of retaliation to those who signed the 

plaintiff's petition that was presented at the Board meeting; 10 

(2) the acting principal had stated that plaintiff's speech had 

not done plaintiff any good, 11 and (3) the reason given for his 

transfer (a "human relations" problem of plaintiff's inability to 

get along with people) may have been pretextual, as evidenced from 

9 Although plaintiff appears to have stated that, in his op1n1on, 

his transfer was due to his association with Blackburn rather than 

his appearance before the Board, plaintiff was somewhat confused 

during his testimony. For exampl~, he initially said that he felt 

that his transfer was at least in part in retaliation for his 

speech before the Board. Vol. VII at 1253-54. The subsequent 

colloquy concerning plaintiff's deposition testimony was valid for 

impeachment purposes, but did not rise to the level of waiver of 

the speech claim. Likewise, plaintiff's subsequent testimony 

concerned his motive for filing the lawsuit, not defendant's 

motive for transferring him. See Vol. VII at 1262-63. 

10 Vol. VI at 1036-57. 

11 Vol. VII at 1111. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 14 
the total absence of documentation corroborating the alleged 

problem. 12 

Moreover, the chronology of events give rise to the inference 

that plaintiff was transferred because of his speech. Cf. Luethje 

v. Peavine School Dist., 872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1989) 

("sequence of events detailed above strongly indicates that 

plaintiff's suit was, at the very least, a significant catalyst or 

substantial factor in causing defendants to change their policy"), 

see also Oriz De Arroyo v. Barcelo, 765 F.2d 275, 282-83 (1st Ciro 

1985) (chronology of events is "an important factor" in 

determining causation). Plaintiff's speech before the School 

Board was on June 6. On June 11, the acting principal of Topeka 

High told plaintiff that his speech before the Board had not done 

him·any good. On June 12, the acting principal recommended 

plaintiff's transfer, and on June 29, plaintiff was informed of 

the transfer. Thus, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence 

in the record to allow a jury to find causation. 

As for the third prong of Mount Healthy, whether defendants 

would have transferred plaintiff even if he had not spoken at the 

Board meeting, defendants introduced evidence to the effect that 

they transferred plaintiff because of his association with 

Blackburn and the disruptive effect of that association on the 

school's morale, 13 and because of plaintiff's human relations 

problem. 14 Because we have determined that plaintiff has no 

12 ~'Vol.Vat 781-794. 

13 See note 8. 

14 Vol.Vat 781-94. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 15 
constitutional right to associate with Blackburn, defendants would 

be relieved from liability if they can establish that they would 

have reached the same decision even in the absence of plaintiff's 

speech, which is the only protected conduct here. 

Unfortunately, the special interrogatory on liability, which 

the jury answered in the affirmative, lumped together both the 

speech and association claims. 15 Thus, it is impossible to 

ascertain whether the jury concluded that plaintiff was 

transferred because of his speech at the Board meeting or because 

of his association with Blackburn. Nor is it possible to 

determine whether the jury found that defendants would have 

transferred plaintiff even if he had not made the speech. 

Accordingly, we must remand this case for a new trial on the issue 

of whether plaint~ff's speech before the School Board was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the decision to transfer him 

and whether defendants would have transferred him even if in the 

absence of the protected activity. 

IV. OTHER ISSUES ON APPEAL 

Defendants also appeal from the award of (1) damages for 

mental pain and suffering, which the district court did not reduce 

even though the court granted defendant's motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff's due process claim; (2) 

future lost earnings; (3) punitive damages; and (4) attorney's 

fees. Because those issues are inextricably intertwined with the 

15 The special interrogatory read: "Was plaintiff discriminated 

against by any of the defendants because of his speech or 

association under Section 1983?" Doc. 80 at 2. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 16 
jury's finding of liability, which itself is irretrievably tainted 

by the First Amendment association issue, the district court 

should reconsider those issues on remand. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE the district court's 

denial of defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict on plaintiff's association claim. We REMAND for a new 

trial on the issues of whether plaintiff's speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in plaintiff's transfer and 

whether defendants would have transferred him even in the absence 

of his protected speech, and on the issue of what damages, if any, 

stemmed from the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's right of free 

speech. We further REMAND for a determination of what attorney's 

fees should be awarded to plaintiff in light of the outcome of the 

new trial. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 17 
Nos. 87-1443, 87-1838 - Richard C. Copp v. 

Unified School District #501; etc. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

It is difficult to take issue with colleagues who strive for 

a just result, but I must do so respectfully in this case for I 

believe the court has been too generous in its treatment of the 

evidence. While I am in general accord with the results achieved 

here, I think the court has gone too far in looking for inferences 

in the evidence that justify concluding Mr. Copp's speech was 

protected and that he met his burden of proof. 

with instructions to dismiss the case. 

I would remand 

Without belaboring the point, I simply do not believe, viewed 

in context, Mr. Copp's speech meets the tests. established in 

Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct 2891, 2896-97 (1987}; Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); and Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 

847 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir.} (en bane}, cert. denied, 109 

s. Ct. 262 (1988). As we noted also in Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 

789, 796 (10th Cir. 1984), whether speech is constitutionally 

protected depends in part on "whether the speech was calculated to 

disclose misconduct or dealt with only personal disputes and 

grievances with no relevance to the public interests." 

853 F.2d at 796. 

Conaway, 

In its review of the circumstances leading the court to 

conclude Mr. Copp's speech was a matter of public concern, the 

court fails to consider whether the address was calculated to 

disclose facts relating to the administration's conduct of its 

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 18 
governmental responsibilities or merely to support the personal 

interest of Mr. Copp's friend. I think the record is more 

supportive of the latter than the former. 

I am also in disagreement over the court's unwillingness to 

address the key issue relevant to the speech question. A public 

employee alleging he has been adversely affected by an abuse of 

his right to free speech has the burden of proving his speech was 

a substantial or motivating factor behind the alleged adverse 

action. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 

U.S. 274, 287 (1977). That much has been recognized by the court 

in this case. However, after recognizing this burden, the court 

turns the plaintiff's failure to meet the test into the 

defendant's failure to preserve the issue for appeal. I believe 

in doing so the court has both ignored the fundamental facts of 

this case and advanced form over substance. 

Our whole quest, with respect to the Mt. Healthy test is to 

determine whether Mr. Copp has shown that his appearance before 

the school board was in part responsible for his transfer. I 

believe that because Mr. Copp's proof fell short of any evidence 

his transfer was related in any way to his appearance before the 

board, he has not met the Mt. Healthy test the court has stated is 

fundamental to his case. 

While the court has cited facts which it says are inferential 

of the board's motivation, and hence evidence of causation, I 

think these facts are too conjectural to be regarded as evidence. 

I believe the so-called "threats" and the statement of the acting 

principal that Mr. Copp's appearance had not done him "any good" 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 19 
are too remote to give rise to a proper inference of motivation. 

Nor do I find the "chronology of events" particularly revealing. 

Indeed, that chronology simply follows the board's objective in 

relocating both Mr. Blackburn and Mr. Copp. The fact that Mr. 

Copp appeared at a school board meeting at a point during the 

unfolding of this objective is as fortuitous as it is probative. 

Moreover, I think Mr. Copp's own explanation of the reason behind 

his transfer is worth more consideration than that given by the 

court. Although the court refers to Mr. Copp's admission that his 

transfer was a consequence of his association with Mr. Blackburn, 

it sweeps the statement aside with the suggestion that Mr. Copp 

was ''somewhat confused." Slip op. at 14, n.9. In reaching that 

conclusion, I think the court has weighed the evidence and made 

its own findings. I disagree with that approach. 

In short, I think Mr. Copp took his best sho.t and missed the 

target. I see no justice in putting the defendants or the 

taxpayers of the district to the time and expense of a second 

trial of a case that does not exist. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-1443 Document: 01019844378 Date Filed: 08/21/1989 Page: 20