Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35392/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHELL OFFSHORE INC., a Delaware

corporation; SHELL GULF OF MEXICO

INC., a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

GREENPEACE, INC., a California

corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-35392

DC No.

3:15 cv-0054

SLG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 18, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 4, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

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2 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

SUMMARY*

Mootness

The panel dismissed as moot an appeal from the district

court’s preliminary injunction against Greenpeace, Inc.,

concerning protests against oil exploration activities in the

Chukchi Sea.

The panel held that the appeal was moot because the

injunction had expired, and defendants Shell Offshore, Inc.,

and Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc., did not seek to renew it. The

panel held that the district court’s coercive civil contempt

order issued against Greenpeace did not rescue the appeal

from mootness.

The panel dismissed the appeal, vacated the district

court’s contempt order, and remanded the case to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

COUNSEL

Matthew F. Pawa (argued), Benjamin Krass, Pawa Law

Group, P.C., Newton, Massachusetts; Laura W. Brill, Kendall

Brill & Klieger LLP, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 3

Jeffrey W. Leppo (argued), Jason T. Morgan, and Ryan P.

Steen,StoelRivesLLP,Seattle,Washington,forPlaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Shell Offshore Inc. and Shell Gulf of Mexico

Inc. (together, “Shell”), subsidiaries of Royal Dutch Shell plc,

and Defendant Greenpeace, Inc. (“Greenpeace”), a non-profit

environmental organization, are long-term foes in this Court. 

Shell has invested significant amounts of time and money in

its search for oil in the Chukchi Sea, a stretch of ocean off the

northwest coast of Alaska. Greenpeace regards Shell’s

efforts as dangerous and environmentally irresponsible. As

a result, it has engaged in several direct-action protests in an

effort to impede Shell’s exploration activities.

In this appeal, the parties once again clash over the

propriety of a preliminary injunction entered by the district

court to protect Shell from certain more vigorous and more

intrusive aspects of Greenpeace’s activism.

On appeal, Greenpeace challenges the injunction on

several jurisdictional bases, as well as on the merits. We do

not reach any of these issues, however, because we conclude

that the appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal

and remand for further proceedings.

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4 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

I. BACKGROUND

A. The 2012 Litigation

In 2012, Greenpeace launched a campaign to “Stop Shell”

from drilling for oil in the Chukchi Sea, as part of its greater

efforts to “Save the Arctic.” Opposed to a project they

considered to be a critical threat to the environment,

Greenpeace activists unlawfully boarded several ships

employed by Shell in its offshore drilling operations. In

response, Shell filed suit in the District of Alaska. It sought

a preliminary injunction to prevent Greenpeace from

interfering with its vessels during the Arctic drilling season. 

See Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc. (“Greenpeace I”),

864 F. Supp. 2d 839, 841–42 (D. Alaska 2012). The district

court granted Shell’s request. The resulting injunction

established safety zones around each of the vessels in Shell’s

Arctic drilling fleet, which Greenpeace was prohibited from

entering. Id. at 854–56. The injunction also barred

Greenpeace from committing various torts and acts of

trespass against Shell’s vessels. Id. at 855.

Greenpeace appealed the preliminary injunction, and we

affirmed. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.

(“Greenpeace II”), 709 F.3d 1281, 1292 (9th Cir. 2013). 

While the appeal was pending, the Arctic drilling season

ended and the preliminary injunction expired. Id. at 1287. 

We concluded that the case was nevertheless not moot

because the mootness exception for cases “capable of

repetition, yet evading review” applied. Id. We reasoned that

Shell held multi-year drilling rights in the Chukchi Sea and

“[a] preliminary injunction limited to a single Arctic Ocean

open water season . . . will never last long enough to allow

full litigation” of the merits. Id. Following our decision in

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 5

Greenpeace II, Shell voluntarily dismissed the action without

prejudice.

B. The 2015 Litigation

In January 2015, Shell announced renewed plans to drill

in the Chukchi Sea during the summer drilling season. In

response, Greenpeace resurrected its “Stop Shell” campaign. 

On April 6, 2015, six activists boarded and secured

themselves to the Polar Pioneer, a drilling vessel under

contract with Shell. The activists – one of whom was a

Greenpeace employee – remained on board the Polar Pioneer

for six days. One day after the activists commenced their

protest, Shell filed a new suit – the instant action – against

Greenpeace in the District of Alaska, asserting claims for

both injunctive relief and monetary damages.

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted

Shell a preliminary injunction against Greenpeace. Shell

Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 2015 WL 2185111 (D.

Alaska 2015). As in 2012, the preliminary injunction

established safety zones around each of Shell’s contracted

vessels. The injunction also established aerial safety zones

around all helideck-equipped ships; banned Greenpeace from

engaging in specified actions affecting Shell’s systems and

facilities; and prohibited Greenpeace from operating “any

drones anywhere within the Burger Prospect in the Chukchi

Sea” during the drilling season. Id. at *6–8. Greenpeace

timely appealed the preliminary injunction, challenging the

district court’s jurisdiction to issue the injunction, in addition

to contesting the injunction on the merits. We have

jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1).

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6 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

1. The St. John’s Bridge Protest

In July 2015, while this appeal was pending and the

preliminary injunction remained in effect, Greenpeace

activists suspended themselves from St. John’s Bridge over

the Willamette River in Portland, Oregon. As stated in an

email to supporters, the activists’ purpose was to block one of

Shell’s contracted vessels, the Fennica, from leaving the

Portland harbor. The Fennica fell within the preliminary

injunction’s safety zones, so Shell moved the district court to

enforce the injunction.

After an emergency hearing, the district court entered a

preliminary order of civil contempt (the “Contempt Order”). 

The Contempt Order imposed sanctions “so long as

[Greenpeace] activists continue to hang from the St. John’s

Bridge in Portland.” The sanctions were structured as a

progressively increasing schedule of fines against

Greenpeace: $2,500 for each hour in contempt during the

first day; $5,000 per hour during the second day; $7,500 per

hour during the third day; and $10,000 per hour thereafter. 

Shell contends that Greenpeace activists remained suspended

from the bridge for seven hours in violation of the Contempt

Order.1 The district court has yet to enter a final order

sanctioning Greenpeace.2

1 The Contempt Order was expressly denominated as “preliminary”

because it was “entered without a full evidentiary hearing in light of the

emergency, expedited nature ofthe situation in Portland.” It contemplated

an evidentiary hearing at a later date.

 

2

 District court proceedings have been stayed pending this appeal.

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 7

2. Shell Abandons Its Drilling Efforts

In September 2015, Shell announced that it would cease

exploration in offshore Alaska for the foreseeable future. We

issued an order to show cause why this appeal, and the

underlying action, should not be dismissed as moot. In

response, Shell argued that although the underlying litigation

continued to present a case or controversy to the district

court, this appeal would become moot upon the expiration of

the preliminary injunction. Greenpeace disagreed and argued

the inverse: that the pending preliminary Contempt Order

rescued the appeal from mootness, but that Shell’s actions

had rendered the underlying litigation moot. The preliminary

injunction expired on its own terms on November 1, 2015,

and Shell did not seek to renew it.

II. DISCUSSION

“We have an independent obligation to considermootness

sua sponte.” Greenpeace II, 709 F.3d at 1286 (quotingNASD

Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 488 F.3d 1065,

1068 (9th Cir. 2007)). “A case is moot when the issues

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s

A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (quotingCty. of L.A. v. Davis,

440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). When events change such that the

appellate court can no longer grant “any effectual relief

whatever to the prevailing party,” any resulting opinion

would be merely advisory. Id. (quoting Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). 

In such a case, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction and must

dismiss the appeal. SEIU v. Nat’l Union of Healthcare

Workers, 598 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010). We first

address, as we must, the question of mootness before we can

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8 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

consider the substance of the parties’ contentions. 

Greenpeace II, 709 F.3d at 1286.

A. The Preliminary Injunction

All of the issues on appeal derive from the district court’s

May 8 order granting Shell a preliminary injunction. Thus,

our jurisdiction to hear this appeal hinges on whether the

parties have a continued, legally cognizable interest in the

validity of the injunction. The injunction expired on

November 1, 2015, and Shell has not sought to renew it. As

a result, the injunction no longer constrains Greenpeace, and

it can no longer be enforced by Shell’s motion. Because the

only order on appeal has now expired, we are unable to grant

any effectual relief to either party. This appeal is moot.3

Even though the preliminary injunction has expired and

Shell has pulled out of the Arctic, Greenpeace argues that the

still-pending contempt proceeding rescues its appeal from

mootness. This argument is unavailing. Only compensatory

contempt proceedings survive the termination of an

underlying injunction. Here, as we explain below, the district

3 Unlike our decision in Greenpeace II, 709 F.3d at 1287, the mootness

exception for disputes “capable ofrepetition, yet evading review” does not

apply to this appeal. In 2012, even after the preliminary injunction

expired, Shell continued to hold oil and gas leases in the Chukchi Sea. As

we stated then, there was no reason to believe that Greenpeace would not

renew its protest actions upon Shell’s return to the Arctic. Id. at 1288. 

Indeed, that is exactly what occurred. By contrast, in 2015, Shell called

a halt to all Arctic exploration “for the foreseeable future.” Moreover, the

U.S. Department of the Interior has cancelled further lease sales for the

region through 2017. Thus, at this point, any assertion that Greenpeace is

likely to resume its Arctic protests against Shell would be purely

speculative.

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 9

court imposed only a coercive civil contempt sanction. 

Because the contempt proceeding at issue here is coercive, it

cannot rescue the appeal from mootness.

1. The District Court Issued a Coercive Civil

Contempt Order

A court’s contempt powers are broadly divided into two

categories: civil contempt and criminal contempt. “The

difference between criminal and civil contempt is not always

clear. The same conduct may result in citations for both civil

and criminal contempt.” United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d

996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. UMWA,

330 U.S. 258 (1946)). In distinguishing between criminal and

civil contempt, we must look to the sanction’s “character and

purpose.” Int’l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827

(1994). “The purpose of civil contempt is coercive or

compensatory, whereas the purpose of criminal contempt is

punitive.” Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc.,

539 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States

v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 1986)). The civil

contemnor is said to “carr[y] the keys of his prison in his own

pocket,” whereas the criminal contemnor “is furnished no

key, and he cannot shorten the term by promising not to

repeat the offense.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828–29.

A court may wield its civil contempt powers for two

separate and independent purposes: (1) “to coerce the

defendant into compliance with the court’s order”; and (2) “to

compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” UMWA,

330 U.S. at 303–04; see also Ohr ex rel. NLRB v. Latino

Express, Inc., 776 F.3d 469, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A civil

contempt order can serve to coerce a party to obey a court

order, or it can be intended to compensate a party who has

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10 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

suffered unnecessary injuries or costs because of

contemptuous conduct.” (collecting cases)); Lasar v. Ford

Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2005);Coleman

v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1190 (8th Cir. 1993); Whittaker

Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 1992). 

“The test . . . is ‘what does the court primarily seek to

accomplish by imposing the sanction?’” Falstaff Brewing

Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th Cir.

1983) (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370

(1966)). Because civil compensatory sanctions are remedial,

they typically take the form of unconditional monetary

sanctions; whereas coercive civil sanctions, intended to deter,

generally take the form of conditional fines.

4

See id. at 780

(citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,

444 (1911)). Thus, the ability to purge is perhaps the most

definitive characteristic of coercive civil contempt. Bagwell,

512 U.S. at 829 (“Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil

only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge.”);

see also Lasar, 399 F.3d at 1110.

Further complicating matters, it is possible for sanctions

that were initially imposed for a civil, coercive purpose to

change over time; indeed, civil coercive contempt may

eventually evolve into criminal contempt. Richmark Corp. v.

Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1481 (9th Cir.

4 Whether fines are payable to the opposing party or to the court may

also be a factor in deciding whether they are coercive or compensatory. 

This factor alone, however, is not determinative. Cf. Lasar, 399 F.3d at

1111 (not determinative as between civil and criminal contempts); F.J.

Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1138

n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Whether a fine is payable to the court . . . as opposed

to the complainant is a relevant, although not necessarily determinative,

factor in determining whether a sanction is punitive.” (citing, inter alia,

Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1988))).

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 11

1992) (noting that “the propriety and even the nature of the

contempt sanction can change over time”); see also United

States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983) (stating that the

test for civil contempt on appeal is whether contemnor has the

present ability to comply, not whether it could have complied

in the past); SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp., 824 F.2d 732,

732–33 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that civil contempt may

become criminal over time). This is because, in order to

categorize the contempt properly, a court must look to the

purpose of the contempt at the time it is enforced, rather than

at the time it is imposed. “A court’s power to impose

coercive civil contempt depends upon the ability of the

contemnor to comply with the court’s coercive order,”

something which may change over time. Falstaff Brewing

Corp., 702 F.2d at 778 (citing Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 371).

Here, the district court’s Contempt Order imposes

sanctions “so long as [Greenpeace] activists continue to hang

from the St. John’s Bridge in Portland.” As described above,

the Contempt Order fined Greenpeace $2,500 per hour for the

first 24-hour period it violated the injunction, then

incrementally increased the hourly fine per 24-hour period

until it reached a cap of $10,000 per hour. The sanctions

were thus imposed primarily to coerce Greenpeace into

compliance with the preliminary injunction. Further accrual

of the conditional fines could have been avoided by

Greenpeace at any time, should it have choosen to recall the

activists and comply with the injunction. The district court’s

civil sanctions are therefore properly understood to be

coercive. See also Consol. Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d

591, 596 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court has

recognized that per diem fines like this one are generally

coercive.” (citing Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826)).

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12 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

2. A Coercive Civil Contempt Order Is Moot When

the Underlying Preliminary Injunction

Terminates

As described by our sister circuits, the “general rule”

requires that “[i]f a civil contempt order is coercive in nature

. . . it is mooted when the proceeding out of which it arises

terminates.” Ohr, 776 F.3d at 479–80; see also Travelhost,

Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1995); Klett

v. Pim, 965 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1992) (“A court cannot

impose a coercive civil contempt sanction if the underlying

injunction is no longer in effect.” (citing Shillitani, 384 U.S.

at 370)).

While our own caselaw has never clearly expressed this

principle, it is implicit in the logic of our previous decisions. 

In Frankl v. HTH Corp., for example, we held that an

otherwise-moot preliminary injunction continued to raise a

“live” controversy “because its resolution [was] crucial to a

pending claim for retrospective monetary relief . . . .” 

650 F.3d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). 

While we did not discuss the distinction between

compensatory and coercive civil contempt, our holding was

explicitly premised on the compensatory nature of the

pending contempt proceeding. See also Lasar, 399 F.3d at

1108–09 (finding litigation not moot where compensatory

contempt sanctions still pending); cf. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,

702 F.2d at 780 (recognizing that, in the discovery context,

coercive contempt is unenforceable when compliance with

underlying order becomes “impossible” or “futile”).

The justification for this bright-line distinction between

compensatory and coercive contempts arises out of their

disparate purposes. Once an injunction has been terminated,

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 13

a court may still award compensation to the plaintiff as a

result of injuries caused by its opponent’s contumacy. But a

coercive sanction would no longer serve any purpose: Once

the injunction has expired, there is no longer anything left to

coerce. Instead, enforcing the sanctions could only serve to

punish the contemnor. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (“When

a contempt involves the prior conduct of an isolated,

prohibited act, the resulting sanction has no coercive effect.”). 

Thus, once the underlying injunction has been terminated and

the contemnor can no longer purge its contempt through

compliance, the contempt becomes criminal.

“Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense, and

criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has

not been afforded the protections that the Constitution

requires of such criminal proceedings.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at

826 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

in cases where the underlying proceeding has been rendered

moot, the coercive contempt proceeding must be vacated in

order to avoid a due-process violation. See FTC v. Verity

Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 70 (2nd Cir. 2006); Yashinsky,

170 F.3d at 596 (explaining that the contemnor “need not pay

the [accumulated] fines . . . because those fines no longer

serve the purpose of coercing his compliance . . . and

requiring [him] to pay the accumulated fines now would only

serve to punish him for his intransigence”).

Here, the preliminary injunction has expired and will not

be renewed. Thus, there is no longer anything left for the

district court to coerce Greenpeace to do. Enforcing the feeschedule monetary sanction would only serve to punish

Greenpeace for its past contumacious actions. Accordingly,

the pending contempt proceedings must be vacated. With no

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14 SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE

surviving contempt proceedings, the appeal has lost any

legally significant, present effects; it is therefore moot.5

B. The Underlying Proceeding

Even where one issue in a case has been rendered moot,

others may remain. See, e.g., Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 394;

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497 (1969). As

discussed above, Greenpeace’s appeal of the preliminary

injunction is moot. Shell’s complaint, however, also seeks

damages for injuries allegedly arising out of Greenpeace’s

2015 “Stop Shell” campaign.6 These issues were not settled

– or mooted – either by the expiration of the preliminary

injunction or by Shell’s announcement that it has cancelled

further exploration in the Arctic. Whether and to what extent

Greenpeace injured Shell in the course of its 2015 “Stop

Shell” campaign remains a live controversy as to which the

district court retains the jurisdiction to award appropriate

 

5 Greenpeace also argues that the appeal is not moot because the

preliminary injunction order raised issues on the merits that “could affect

the future of litigation in the district court.” This argument ignores the

rule that “the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court

granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.” 

Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). The validity of the

preliminary injunction may become an issue in future district court

proceedings – but at this point, that is only speculation. We thus leave it

to the district court to address the remaining merits issues in the first

instance.

6 For example, in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint’s Requests for Relief,

Shell prays for “[a]n award of damages including incidental damages for

all economic harm resulting from the tortious actions of Greenpeace Inc.

and the individual defendants, and economic harm to Shell as a result of

tortious actions by others with whom Greenpeace Inc. is acting in

concert.”

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SHELL OFFSHORE V. GREENPEACE 15

relief, if a finding of liability is made. We leave it to the

district court to consider Shell’s remaining claims in the first

instance on remand.

III. CONCLUSION

This appeal is moot, and therefore must be dismissed. 

Accordingly, we also vacate the district court’s July 30, 2015,

Contempt Order. The case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each side shall bear

its own costs on appeal.

DISMISSED and REMANDED.

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