Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07033/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07033-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 12, 2012 Decided April 17, 2012

No. 11-7033

JERRY YOUNGBEY AND RUBIN BUTLER,

APPELLEES

v.

DARIN MARCH, DET., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00596)

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellants. With him on the briefs were Irvin B. Nathan,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna

M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General.

James C. Cox argued the cause for appellees. With him on

the brief were Craig A. Cowie, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Frederick

V. Mulhauser. Elaine Goldenberg entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Concurring opinion by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

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PER CURIAM: Ms. Jerry Youngbey and Mr. Rubin Butler

(“appellees”) brought an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against a number of District of Columbia Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”) law enforcement personnel (“appellants”

or “officers”). Appellees’ complaint asserts that various officers

and their supervisors violated appellees’ Fourth Amendment

rights by planning and conducting a 4:00 a.m. search on a

warrant that did not authorize a nighttime search and breaking

and entering into appellees’ home without knocking and

announcing their presence. The complaint also alleges

additional Fourth Amendment claims and a variety of local law

claims – including assault, false arrest, trespass to chattels and

conversion, trespass to realty, negligence per se, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress – that are not at issue in this

appeal. The District of Columbia was also a defendant before

the District Court, but it has not joined in this appeal. 

Following discovery, appellants moved for summary

judgment, asserting, inter alia, that they were entitled to

qualified immunity on the claims relating to the officers’

nighttime search and their alleged failure to knock and

announce. The District Court rejected appellants’ claims of

qualified immunity, finding that appellants’ failure to knock and

announce before entering into appellees’ home and the nighttime

search violated appellees’ clearly established rights under the

Fourth Amendment. Youngbey v. District of Columbia, 766 F.

Supp. 2d 197, 211, 217 (D.D.C. 2011). Appellants now seek

interlocutory review, claiming that the District Court erred in

denying them qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce

and nighttime search claims. Appellants contend that they

committed no constitutional violations in their execution of the

search warrant. They further claim that, even if their actions are

determined to be unconstitutional, they are nonetheless entitled

to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly

established law. 

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We agree that appellants are entitled to qualified immunity

because neither their no-knock entry of appellees’ home nor

their nighttime search violated “clearly established law.” See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243–44 (2009) (“An officer

conducting a search is entitled to qualified immunity where

clearly established law does not show that the search violated

the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). We are therefore constrained to reverse

the judgment of the District Court and remand the case.

I. Jurisdiction and the Applicable Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified

immunity as a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that

a district court ruling denying qualified immunity, to the extent

that it turns on an issue of law, is subject to immediate appeal

under the collateral order doctrine). It is clear here that the

District Court’s denials of appellants’ requests for qualified

immunity “‘turn[] on . . . issue[s] of law.’” Int’l Action Ctr. v.

United States, 365 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530). For purposes of this appeal,

appellants do not contest that they failed to knock and announce

before entering into appellees’ home; and there is no dispute that

appellants executed the search warrant during the nighttime.

Therefore, the dispute before the court does not concern “which

facts the parties might be able to prove” in support of their

claims. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995). Rather, the

question here is whether appellees’ asserted rights were clearly

established when appellants executed the search warrant. This

involves issues of law which “must be resolved de novo on

appeal.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (citation

omitted); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 n.9; Estate of

Phillips v. District of Columbia, 455 F.3d 397, 402–03 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). 

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II. The Legal Framework Governing Applications of

Qualified Immunity

We need not address on this appeal whether the officers’

no-knock, nighttime search violated appellees’ Fourth

Amendment rights. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–38, 243. The

dispositive question here is whether, given the circumstances

presented by the undisputed record facts, a reasonable police

officer would have known that the failure to knock or the

nighttime search violated appellees’ clearly established Fourth

Amendment rights. In other words, the protection of qualified

immunity is available if “a reasonable officer could have

believed that [his or her actions were] lawful, in light of clearly

established law and the information the officers possessed.”

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court “adopted this criterion of ‘objective

legal reasonableness,’ rather than good faith, precisely in order

to ‘permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to

trial.’” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 813 (1982)). “[I]n

practice . . . [the inquiry] turns on the objective legal

reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules

that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Wilson,

526 U.S. at 614 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Qualified immunity thus “operates to ensure that

before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their

conduct is unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is

not to say that an official action is protected by qualified

immunity unless the very action in question has previously been

held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law

the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In determining whether the legal rules at issue are clearly

established, a court must look to “cases of controlling authority

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in [its] jurisdiction.” Id. at 617. If there is no such controlling

authority, then we must determine whether there is “a consensus

of cases of persuasive authority.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (explaining that in the

absence of “controlling authority,” a “robust ‘consensus of cases

of persuasive authority’” is necessary to demonstrate clearly

established law (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617)). Since we

have found neither controlling precedent of the Supreme Court

or this circuit, nor a consensus of persuasive authority from our

sister circuits, we must reverse.

Because this appeal challenges the denial of appellants’

motions for summary judgment, “we are required to view all

facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving part[ies],” appellees Youngbey and Butler.

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.2 (2004) (per curiam)

(citation omitted). We turn now to the relevant facts underlying

appellees’ Fourth Amendment claims. 

III. The Material Facts

On July 16, 2008, Robert Mallory was murdered near the

1500 block of F Street, N.E., in Washington, D.C. In the weeks

following the murder, appellant March, the lead detective on the

case, gathered information that identified John Youngbey, the

son of appellee Youngbey, as the principal suspect. On August

13, 2008, Detective March submitted an application for warrants

to search three residences, including the home of appellees

Youngbey and Butler at 1312 Queen Street, N.E., in

Washington, D.C. March’s affidavit in support of the warrants

states that Mallory died from “multiple gunshot wounds to the

body.” Aff. in Support of an Application for Search Warrant

(“Aff.”) 1, reprinted in Joint App. (“J.A.”) 44. John Youngbey

is identified in the affidavit as having confessed to a third party

that he shot Mallory. According to the affidavit, the shooting

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was prompted by Mallory’s derogatory comment about the

girlfriend of one of John Youngbey’s friends. The affidavit also

states that the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency

identified John Youngbey’s last home address as 1312 Queen

Street, N.E., and that a check of the Washington Area Law

Enforcement System’s computerized database listed 1312 Queen

Street, N.E., as John Youngbey’s current address. 

Based on March’s affidavit, a judge of the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia found probable cause to believe that

certain evidence related to the murder could be found at 1312

Queen Street. The warrant authorizes the police to search for

“[f]irearms, ammunition, holsters, cleaning equipment, receipts,

photographs, [and] papers that document criminal activity and

that link the defendant to the address.” Superior Court of the

District of Columbia Search Warrant (“Warrant”), J.A. 43. A

preprinted portion of the warrant states that law enforcement

officers 

ARE HEREBY AUTHORIZED within 10 days of the date

of issuance of this warrant to search in the daytime/at any

time of the day or night, the designated (person) (premises)

(vehicle) (object) for the property specified[.]

Id. No part of the reference to “daytime/at any time of the day

or night” on the warrant form is crossed out, circled, or

otherwise marked. 

With this warrant in hand, Detective March sought the

assistance of the MPD’s Emergency Response Team (“ERT”).

Members of the ERT are consulted when a warrant is considered

“high risk.” The warrant for 1312 Queen Street was categorized

as high risk because police officers suspected that John

Youngbey had used an assault rifle to kill Mallory. 

In their statements of undisputed facts submitted in support

of their motions for summary judgment, all but one of the

appellants averred that John Youngbey was suspected of using

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an assault rifle, assault weapon, assault gun, automatic weapon,

or a high-powered weapon to kill Mallory. See Defs.’ [Bruce

and Dumontt] Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is

No Genuine Issue ¶ 1, 5, J.A. 334–35 (“automatic weapon” and

“high-powered weapon”); Def. Raymond Chambers’ Statement

of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Dispute ¶ 6, J.A. 215

(“high-powered assault rifle”); Def. [March’s] Statement of

Material Facts as to Which There Is No Dispute ¶ 9, J.A. 194

(“assault weapon”); Defs. Miller and Thompson’s Statement of

Material Facts as to Which There Is No Dispute ¶ 1, J.A. 286

(“assault weapon”); Def. Larry Scott’s Statement of Material

Facts as to Which There Is No Dispute ¶ 3, J.A. 210 (“assault

gun”). In addition, the undisputed facts indicate that before

undertaking the search of 1312 Queen Street, the executing

officers reviewed the affidavit in support of the warrant. See

Def. Raymond Chambers’ Statement of Material Facts as to

Which There Is No Dispute ¶ 10, J.A. 215. 

Appellees have never contested the information contained

in the affidavit supporting the search warrant; nor have they

contested that appellants were familiar with that affidavit before

undertaking the search. In addition, the appellees do not contest

that before the appellant officers and supervisors conducted the

search, they had reason to believe that John Youngbey used an

assault rifle to kill Mallory. These facts are thus conceded by

appellees.

Following its usual practice, the ERT prepared an

“Operational Plan for (H[igh] R[isk] W[arrant])

Service.” E.R.T. Operational Plan, J.A. 49. The Operational

Plan does not specify the time of day for the search. Nor does

it mention that the search is for an assault rifle. John Youngbey

is mentioned in the Plan as one of “the persons involved in the

shooting.” Id. However, the portion of the Plan entitled

“SUSPECT INFORMATION” is blank, id. 50, and the Plan

does not otherwise characterize or describe John Youngbey. 

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At approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 20, 2008, appellants

executed the search warrant at 1312 Queen Street. For purposes

of this appeal, appellants do not dispute that they failed to knock

or announce their presence before breaking the front window of

appellees’ home and entering the residence.

IV. The Knock-and-Announce Issue

1. The Knock-and-Announce Requirement and

Exceptions to the Rule

The Fourth Amendment “incorporates the common-law

requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock

on the door and announce their identity and purpose before

attempting forcible entry.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.

385, 387 (1997) (citation omitted); see also Hudson v. Michigan,

547 U.S. 586, 589 (2006) (describing the common law principle

as “ancient”). This rule protects against personal injury that

may result from violence by a surprised resident and the

destruction of property that may result from forced entry, and it

preserves “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be

destroyed by a sudden entrance.” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594

(citations omitted). “These interests are not inconsequential.”

Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5. 

The knock-and-announce requirement is not inviolate,

however. The Supreme Court has recognized that it can “give

way ‘under circumstances presenting a threat of physical

violence,’ or ‘where police officers have reason to believe that

evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were

given.’” Id. at 391 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,

936 (1995)). 

In amplifying this point, the Court in Richards held that,

[i]n order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must

have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing

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their presence, under the particular circumstances, would

be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective

investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the

destruction of evidence. 

Id. at 394 (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether the

manner of executing a search warrant is consistent with the

Fourth Amendment, neither the law enforcement officials nor

reviewing courts may “dispens[e] with case-by-case evaluation”

of the circumstances particular to the search at hand. Id. at 392.

As described in Richards, exceptions to the knock-andannounce standard based on “general categor[ies] of criminal

behavior present[] at least two serious concerns.” Id. First, such

exceptions result in “considerable overgeneralization.” Id. at

393. In rejecting a Wisconsin decision allowing police officers

to dispense with the knock-and-announce rule whenever a

search warrant was issued in connection with a felony drug

investigation, the Court explained: 

[W]hile drug investigation frequently does pose special

risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not

every drug investigation will pose these risks to a

substantial degree. For example, a search could be

conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a

residence have no connection with the drug activity and

thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy

evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being

searched for were of a type or in a location that made them

impossible to destroy quickly. In those situations, the

asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and

maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual

privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry.

Wisconsin’s blanket rule impermissibly insulates these

cases from judicial review.

Id. (footnote omitted).

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The second serious concern motivating the Court’s

rejection of categorical exceptions to the knock-and-announce

rule is the ease with which “the reasons for creating an

exception in one category can . . . be applied to others.” Id. at

393–94. For example, in Richards, the Court explained that

Wisconsin’s rationale for categorically suspending the knockand-announce rule in felony drug cases could easily be extended

to “[a]rmed bank robbers” who “are, by definition, likely to have

weapons.” Id. at 394. “If a per se exception were allowed for

each category of criminal investigation that included a

considerable – albeit hypothetical – risk of danger to officers or

destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the

Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be

meaningless.” Id. Consequently, the Court concluded that, “in

each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question

to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the

particular entry justified dispensing with the

knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. (emphasis added).

When assessing the particular circumstances of a case,

courts must apply an objective standard of reasonableness. See

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). “Subjective

intentions play no role in ordinary . . . Fourth Amendment

analysis.” Id. Information tending to demonstrate “officers’

actual motives do not bear on our objective assessment of

reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161,

1166 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

2. Analysis

As we stated in United States v. Crippen, 371 F.3d 842

(D.C. Cir. 2004), “[t]here are . . . no bright-line rules or per se

exceptions to the knock and announce requirement; we must

therefore evaluate each claim of exigent circumstances upon ‘the

facts and circumstances of the particular entry.’” Id. at 845

(quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394). Unsurprisingly, appellants’

argument to this court focuses on all of the circumstances that

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presented a threat of physical violence during their execution of

the search warrant. See Appellants’ Br. at 22–23.

The main point is that the undisputed record in this case

belies appellees’ claim that the information possessed by the

officers and their supervisors consisted of nothing more than

“the mere suspected presence of an assault rifle” at 1312 Queen

Street. Appellees’ Br. at 43. What the undisputed factual record

shows is that the information in the possession of the officers

responsible for the no-knock entry of 1312 Queen Street

included the kind of particularized facts required by Richards.

It is uncontested that, before the search, each of the officers was

familiar with the lead detective’s affidavit supporting the

warrant. Thus, each knew that Mallory had died of multiple

gunshot wounds. They also knew that John Youngbey was

reported to have confessed to killing Mallory. Moreover, there

was no information conveyed to the officers to suggest that

anyone other than John Youngbey had shot Mallory. In

addition, the officers knew that a judicial officer had found

probable cause to believe that a search of 1312 Queen Street

would uncover a firearm and other evidence related to the

homicide. The officers also knew that the affidavit supporting

the judicial officer’s finding of probable cause stated that both

the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency and the

Washington Area Law Enforcement System’s computerized

database listed 1312 Queen Street, N.E., as John Youngbey’s

residence. 

It is also uncontested that, before they executed the

warrant, the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to believe

that the weapon used by John Youngbey was an assault rifle,

and that the firearm which was the object of the search warrant

was that assault rifle. Moreover, the officers and their

supervisors had reasonable suspicion to know, based on the

affidavit, that John Youngbey had been provoked to kill over

nothing more than a verbal slight directed at the girlfriend of

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another individual. Finally, the affidavit made clear that John

Youngbey did not kill in the heat of the moment; he drove away,

then returned with a weapon and killed Mallory. 

In short, contrary to what appellees argue, before the

officers acted to break into appellees’ home, they and their

supervisors had more than enough particularized information to

avoid the evils of “overgeneralization” described in Richards.

There can be no question that the information that the officers

possessed prior to their execution of the warrant was ample and

particularized and, thus, sufficient to ensure that the officers’

actions could not be “impermissibly insulate[d] . . . from judicial

review.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 393.

In addition, the quantity and quality of the information that

the officers had before their no-knock entry gives real content to

the objective legal reasonableness inquiry that a court must

undertake in determining whether the officers violated

appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights. In other words,

appellants’ claims justifying their no-knock search reflect more

than just a “hypothetical” risk of danger to the officers. Id. at

394. 

Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 1997), the

decision upon which appellees heavily rely, gives us no pause in

reaching this conclusion. In Kornegay, the plaintiff sued the

police after they had executed a no-knock entry of her home as

part of their search for a person, Shannon Selby, suspected of

being the accomplice to a murder. The search warrant was for

both Selby and the gun used to commit the murder. See id. at

394, 397. The Third Circuit concluded that there was at least a

question of fact as to whether the no-knock entry “violated

clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have been aware.” Id. at 400. The court’s

conclusion rested largely on the weakness of the evidence

implicating the alleged accomplice in the shooting, as well as

the absence of any evidence whatsoever tying him to the gun.

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Thus, the court explained, “the officers knew that Selby had not

shot the murder victim.” Id. In fact, “the officers had

conflicting evidence about whether Selby was even involved in

the murder.” Id. Moreover, the officers did not “have evidence

that [Selby] possessed the gun that was used.” Id. As the court

found, “[t]here [was] nothing in [the] record to suggest that the

officers had information that the murder weapon was in Selby’s

possession. He did not fire the fatal shot, he was not even

reported to have been armed at the scene, and nothing suggests

that the police had information that the shooter gave Selby the

weapon after the shooting.” Id. at 398. 

Kornegay does little to assist appellees, because the more

detailed information in the possession of the police officers here

bears on the circumstances the police could expect to encounter

in searching 1312 Queen Street. In particular, in contrast to the

police in Kornegay, the officers here had probable cause to

believe that the shooter, not a possible accomplice, lived at the

residence they were searching. In addition, in contrast to the

police in Kornegay, the police here at least had some reason to

think that the shooter would be in possession of the weapon for

which they were searching. The officers here had information

that John Youngbey had asserted that he committed the murder,

and there was no information that the gun had ever been in the

possession of anyone but John Youngbey. In addition, in this

case, the information in the affidavit submitted in support of the

search warrant gave reasonable grounds to believe that the

shooter was easily provoked to violence and that, once

provoked, he was not inclined to back down. There was no such

evidence in Kornegay. 

Appellants rely heavily on three decisions – United States

v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998), United States v. Geraldo, 271

F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and United States v. Crippen, 371

F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2004) – in support of their positions that

they committed no violations of appellees’ Fourth Amendment

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rights and that the law was not clearly established that a noknock entry in this particular situation was unconstitutional. In

each of the cited decisions, the court found that the searching

officers had reasonable suspicion of danger sufficient to justify

suspension of the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce

requirement. 

In Ramirez, a judge issued a no-knock warrant granting

permission to search Hernan Ramirez’s home. See 523 U.S. at

68. The subject of the search was a prisoner who had escaped

by slipping his handcuffs and knocking over a deputy sheriff.

Id. The prisoner had twice before attempted escape. The first

time, “he struck an officer, kicked out a jail door, assaulted a

woman, stole her vehicle, and used it to ram a police vehicle.

Another time he attempted escape by using a rope made from

torn bedsheets.” Id. The prisoner was also “reported to have

made threats to kill witnesses and police officers, to have

tortured people with a hammer, and to have said that he would

‘not do federal time.’” Id. (citation omitted). The no-knock

warrant was obtained on the basis of this information, plus an

initial siting of the escapee at the home of Ramirez by a

confidential informant and a second siting at the Ramirez home

by the informant and a law enforcement official. “Around this

time, the confidential informant also told authorities that

[Ramirez] might have a stash of guns and drugs hidden in his

garage.” Id. at 68–69. Relying on the fact that the subject of the

search “was a prison escapee with a violent past who reportedly

had access to a large supply of weapons” and had “vowed that

he would ‘not do federal time,’” the Court concluded that the

officers “certainly had a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that knocking

and announcing their presence might be dangerous to

themselves or to others.” Id. at 71.

In Geraldo, FBI agents entered a residence to execute a

search warrant without fully complying with the knock-andannounce requirement. This court upheld the entry as

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reasonable, because the agents had information that the premises

they were searching – an active site for drug sales – had been

robbed, and a man residing there “had been seen wearing a

revolver, allegedly to protect the residence from additional

robberies.” 271 F.3d at 1118. Citing Ramirez, the court found

that the presence of a firearm, combined with circumstances

giving rise to a specific threat of violence to the executing

officers, excused the police from full compliance with the

knock-and-announce rule. “Because the agents had specific

knowledge that [a resident] kept a firearm to protect against

intruders and therefore might be quick to use it, the agents had

reason to suspect danger.” Id. The court concluded that because

“the officers’ belief that they were entering a dangerous

situation was objectively reasonable, they were not required to

knock and wait for a response.” Id.

In Crippen, this court upheld as reasonable a search in

which police officers knocked and announced, but waited only

four seconds before breaching the house. See 371 F.3d at 843.

In that case, the police had “learned from a confidential

informant that Crippen, a convicted felon, had several weapons

in his house,” including a sawed-off shotgun and two semiautomatic pistols. Id. On the basis of this information, the

police obtained a search warrant. However, before the warrant

was executed, the confidential informant told the police that

Crippen was trying to acquire a rocket launcher. A few days

later, the informant reported that he had seen a rocket launcher

in Crippen’s residence. Id. Police officers executing the search

were briefed on how quickly this weapon of war could be armed

and how, if it were fired at an officer standing in a doorway, “it

would go straight through [him].” Id. (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Taking judicial notice of the

fact that “[a] rocket launcher (a/k/a a bazooka), is a highpowered weapon designed for use against hardened targets –

such as armored tanks,” id. at 846 (citation omitted), the court

concluded that “[t]he unconventional nature of the weapon and

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the speed with which it could be loaded sufficed to create an

exigency that ripened almost immediately after the officers

knocked and announced their presence and purpose,” id.

(citation omitted). The court therefore concluded that the search

satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

All that we need answer is whether the facts and reasoning

of these cases are close enough to the particular circumstances

of the search of 1312 Queen Street to warrant the conclusion

that a reasonable officer, possessing the information that

appellants here possessed, could reasonably (even if, arguendo,

mistakenly) decide that the danger posed by the situation

justified suspension of the knock-and-announce requirement.

To put it another way, we ask: Were the applicable legal rules

so clearly established that any reasonable officer would have

been aware that a no-knock entry of 1312 Queen Street would

violate the Fourth Amendment? We think not.

As noted above, in determining whether the Fourth

Amendment rights at issue are clearly established, a court must

look to “cases of controlling authority in [its] jurisdiction.”

Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617. Ramirez, Geraldo, and Crippen

involve circumstances that differ from the situation faced by

appellants in this case. However, these authorities are close

enough to the particular circumstances of the search at issue here

that we can say, with assurance, that the law was not clearly

established that a no-knock entry in this particular situation was

unconstitutional. In other words, these authorities certainly

“[do] not show that the search [here] violated the Fourth

Amendment.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243–44 (citation omitted).

And we can find no other “controlling authority” to support the

contrary conclusion. Therefore, having carefully considered the

controlling precedent of the Supreme Court and this circuit, as

well as the authority from our sister circuits, we agree with

appellants that their no-knock entry of appellees’ home did not

violate “clearly established law.” 

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V. The Nighttime Search Issue

Appellees make the further claim that appellants’ nighttime

search violated their Fourth Amendment rights, because, given

the circumstances of this case, “[n]o reasonable officer could

have believed that the warrant authorized a nighttime search.”

Appellees’ Br. at 11. The District’s warrant form authorizes the

officers “to search in the daytime/at any time of the day or

night.” The judge who issued the warrant did not cross out,

circle, or otherwise mark either “in the daytime” or “at any time

of the day or night.” Appellees conclude that, “[u]nder clearly

established law, [this] silence cannot be read as approval of

nighttime execution.” Id. at 11–12. We can find no “clearly

established law” under the Fourth Amendment that supports

appellees’ position that, under the circumstances here, “[n]o

reasonable officer could have believed that the warrant

authorized a nighttime search.” Id. at 11.

There are several reasons why appellees’ argument fails.

First, as the Fourth Circuit noted in United States v. Rizzi, “[t]he

Supreme Court . . . has never held that the Fourth Amendment

prohibits nighttime searches.” 434 F.3d 669, 675 (4th Cir.

2006). We agree. Appellants acknowledge that “the timing of

a search might affect its reasonableness,” but they rightly argue

that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not include a specific

protection against executing a warrant at night.” Appellants’ Br.

at 31.

Second, in an effort to advance their respective positions,

the parties point us to numerous cases addressing the validity of

nighttime searches on assorted warrants under a variety of

circumstances. Our review of these cases and our independent

research of the issue convinces us that there is no “clearly

established law” under the Fourth Amendment prohibiting

nighttime searches where the warrant is unmarked or silent as to

the authorized time of execution. In particular, we can find

neither “controlling authority” nor a “consensus of cases of

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18

persuasive authority,” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617, to support

appellees’ claim that clearly established law under the Fourth

Amendment required the nighttime search here to be explicitly

authorized by the terms of the warrant. And we can find no such

applicable authority to support appellees’ claim that, given the

particular circumstances of this case, a reasonable officer would

have known that the nighttime search violated clearly

established law under the Fourth Amendment.

Third, we reject appellees’ argument that “no reasonable

officer could have believed that a nighttime search conducted

pursuant to a warrant authorizing only a daytime search was

consistent with the Fourth Amendment,” Appellees’ Br. at 12,

because this argument is based on a false premise. The warrant

in this case does not “authoriz[e] only a daytime search.”

Rather, the literal terms of the warrant authorize the officers “to

search in the daytime/at any time of the day or night,” with no

express limitation. Viewing this undisputed fact in the light

most favorable to appellees, the warrant is silent on the time of

execution. The language of the warrant certainly cannot be

construed to authorize only a daytime search. 

Appellees urge that the search warrant in this case

contravenes the law of the District of Columbia and thus violates

their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. On this

point, appellees contend that

under D.C. law, an issuing judge can authorize a nighttime

search only if the requesting officer requests one and

presents facts to establish one of three narrow statutory

justifications for nighttime execution. The requesting

officer in this case did neither. . . . [T]he constitutional

violation was searching a home at 4 AM without a warrant

authorizing the search (or exigent circumstances).

Appellees’ Br. at 12. 

Appellees essentially assert that where local law informs a

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constitutional requirement – here, the principle that “warrants

must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates,” Dalia v.

United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (citation omitted) – we

should consider it. Relatedly, they urge that a reasonable officer

cannot generally rely on a warrant that is inconsistent with the

law, see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 & n.4 (2004), and

that the warrant itself sets the boundaries for a reasonable

search, see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140–41 (1990).

As Appellees explain, 

The Constitution demands that the reasonableness of

a search be decided “by a neutral and detached magistrate

instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often

competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v.

United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The need for such

judicial supervision is nowhere more critical than when the

police engage in a search like this one – a destructive 4 AM

home invasion.

. . . . 

Reading the default form as allowing a nighttime

search, rather than requiring specific authorization from the

neutral judge, undermines the role of the judge in

supervising when a nighttime search is warranted and in

preventing unnecessarily intrusive searches. As the facts

of this case demonstrate, reading the default form to allow

a nighttime search would allow the District’s officers

routinely to evade this critical review, just as they did in

this case. 

Appellees’ Br. at 23–24. 

There are two problems with this argument, such that we

cannot say that Appellees’ understanding of the law accurately

captures the “clearly established law” under the Fourth

Amendment. First, the Supreme Court has held that the

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protections and strictures of the Fourth Amendment are not

defined by local law. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174

(2008) (“A State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy

among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but its

choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less

restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional.”); see

also Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257 (“Nothing in the language of the

Constitution or in this Court’s decisions interpreting that

language suggests that . . . search warrants . . . must include a

specification of the precise manner in which they are to be

executed.”).

Second, even assuming, arguendo, that state-law

protections control our Fourth Amendment inquiry, D.C. law on

nighttime searches is, at best, unclear. The D.C. Code provides

that “in the absence of express authorization in the warrant

pursuant to section 23-521(f)(5), [a search warrant] shall be

executed only during the hours of daylight.” D.C. CODE §

23-523(b) (2001 & Supp. 2011). Section 23-521(f)(5), in turn,

stipulates that the warrant

shall contain . . . a direction that the warrant be executed

during the hours of daylight or, where the judicial officers

have found cause therefor, including one of the grounds set

forth in section 23-522(c)(1), and authorization for

execution at any time of day or night.

Id. § 23-521(f)(5).

These statutory provisions do not address the circumstances

that we face here, i.e., a situation in which the terms of the

warrant authorize the officers “to search in the daytime/at any

time of the day or night,” without any express limitations.

Furthermore, section 23-521(f)(5) apparently contains a

typographical error, substituting “and authorization” for “an

authorization.” See D.C. CODE § 23-521(f)(5) (Supp. V 1978)

(“an authorization”); id. (1981) (“and authorization”). We

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21

understand the correct words to be “an authorization,” and the

parties agree. Regardless, the error only contributes to the

statute’s lack of clarity. The main point, however, is that an

alleged violation of local law is not dispositive of the Fourth

Amendment issue.

We have little trouble in concluding that there is no clearly

established law under the Fourth Amendment that prohibits the

nighttime execution of a warrant, where, as here, the warrant

does not prohibit such a search. Neither controlling precedent

from the Supreme Court or this circuit, nor a consensus of

persuasive authority from our sister circuits show that the

nighttime search here violated the Fourth Amendment.

VI. Conclusion

Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity because

neither their no-knock entry of appellees’ home nor their

nighttime search violated “clearly established law.” The

judgment of the District Court on these issues is hereby

reversed, and the case is remanded for trial on the remaining

issues.

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1

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with

my colleagues that the question to be addressed in this appeal is

not whether the officers’ no-knock, nighttime search violated

appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights, but, rather, whether the

officers’ actions violated clearly established law. I write

separately merely to highlight what I believe to be some salient

matters related to the knock-and-announce issue. 

I think it is a close question whether appellants’ failure to

knock and announce their presence before entering appellees’

home violated appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights. I do not

believe, however, that appellants’ actions violated clearly

established law.

 As the per curiam opinion makes clear, the Supreme

Court’s decision in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997),

is crucially important to the disposition of the no-knock issue.

In Richards, the Court explicitly rejected reliance on categorical,

per se, or blanket rules to justify exceptions to the general

standard that police officers executing a search warrant must

knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose

before attempting forcible entry of a dwelling. See id. at

387–88. 

The appellants responsible for the no-knock entry into

appellees’ home claim that they were justified in their actions

because of the threat of physical violence involved in executing

the warrant at 1312 Queen Street. Relying primarily on United

States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998), United States v. Geraldo,

271 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and United States v. Crippen,

371 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2004), appellants argue that they

committed no constitutional violations in the execution of the

search warrant. In the alternative, they argue that “the law was

not clearly established that a no-knock entry in this particular

situation was unconstitutional.” Appellants’ Br. at 27.

Appellees counter that appellants’ asserted reasonable

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suspicion of danger is not sufficiently particularized, but rather

rests on nothing more than a prohibited categorical rule or

procedure. Appellees contend that “[g]eneralized claims that a

murder suspect, a drug dealer, or an armed robber might be

violent and be at the home to be searched, or that the item

sought is a firearm, are insufficient.” Appellees’ Br. at 13.

Relying primarily on Richards, appellees argue that the law

prohibiting reliance on such blanket rules is so clearly

established that any reasonable officer would have been aware

that invocation of such an exception violated the Fourth

Amendment. Appellees claim that

[t]he District takes the position that a search for a gun in a

murder suspect’s home always justifies a no-knock entry.

Indeed, at times, the District goes [so] far as to suggest that

the mere suspected presence of an assault rifle, with nothing

more, would justify the failure to knock and announce. It

is impossible to square that position with controlling

Supreme Court precedent.

Appellees’ Br. at 43 (citations omitted). 

In further support of their position, appellees point to cases

from several of our sister circuits holding that information

regarding the presence of a firearm in the place to be searched

is, without more, insufficient to excuse a failure to adhere to the

knock-and-announce requirement. See United States v. Moore,

91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d

790, 795 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216,

1218 (8th Cir. 1993). Finally, in support of their argument,

appellees rely heavily on Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392

(3d Cir. 1997).

As explained in the per curiam opinion, exceptions to the

knock-and-announce rule based on general categories of

criminal behavior are prohibited by Richards. Indeed, in

Crippen, this court made it clear that

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3

[t]here are . . . no bright-line rules or per se exceptions to

the knock and announce requirement; we must therefore

evaluate each claim of exigent circumstances upon “the

facts and circumstances of the particular entry.” 

371 F.3d at 845 (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394).

Thus, there can be little doubt that, under Richards, the

mere presence of a firearm, without more, cannot justify a noknock entry. Were it otherwise, the police would always be free

to execute a no-knock entry whenever the crime under

investigation is possession of a firearm. Richards explicitly and

unequivocally prohibits such categorical exceptions to the

knock-and-announce requirement. Moreover, as appellees point

out, the cited decisions from the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth

Circuits endorse this principle, as do decisions from the Fourth

and Ninth Circuits. See Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th

Cir. 1998); United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir.

1976). 

Appellants do not seriously contest appellees’ contentions

regarding Richards. In their argument to this court, appellees do

not rely exclusively on the fact that the crime under

investigation was an armed murder or that the object of the

search was a firearm. Rather, they focus on all of the

circumstances that posed a threat of violence during the

execution of the warrant. See Appellants’ Br. at 22–23.

Appellants note, in passing, that there is a statement in Crippen

asserting that Geraldo “explicitly reserved the question whether

the mere presence of a gun could be sufficient” to excuse police

from the knock-and-announce requirement. Crippen, 371 F.3d

at 845 (citing Geraldo, 271 F.3d at 1118). This is a curious

assertion, because it runs directly counter to the Supreme

Court’s holding in Richards and finds no support in Geraldo. In

any event, appellants certainly do not rest their case on this

misplaced dicta. The law is exactly as indicated elsewhere in

Crippen: “There are . . . no bright-line rules or per se exceptions

USCA Case #11-7033 Document #1369196 Filed: 04/17/2012 Page 24 of 27
4

to the knock and announce requirement.” 371 F.3d at 845

(citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394).

On the record before us, a court might agree with appellees

that appellants’ no-knock entry contravened the strictures of the

Fourth Amendment. However, for the reasons stated in the per

curiam opinion, I agree that, before the officers entered into

appellees’ home, they had enough particularized information to

avoid the evils of “overgeneralization” noted in Richards. See

520 U.S. at 393. The record in this case is thus unlike a

situation that might be presented if officers sought to justify a

failure to follow the knock-and-announce requirement on little

more than the type of criminal investigation involved. 

Appellees rely heavily on Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120

F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 1997), in support of their claim that

appellants’ actions in this case abridged the commands of

Richards. The warrant in Kornegay authorized a search for a

person, Shannon Selby, who was suspected of being the

accomplice to a murder, and for the gun used to commit the

murder. See id. at 394, 397. The warrant was issued on the

strength of police information indicating that the plaintiff’s

home was the residence of the accomplice. Id. at 397–98. The

district court held that a no-knock entry was justified because

the “warrant was for a first degree murder suspect who was a

known drug dealer with previous arrests for felony offenses

involving the use of a weapon, and the gun used in the murder

had not been recovered.” Id. at 398 (citation omitted). 

As described in the per curiam, the Third Circuit reversed.

Relying primarily on Richards, the Third Circuit concluded that

“the reasons offered in support of [the no-knock] search merely

‘consisted of generalities that bore no relation to the particular

premises being searched or the particular circumstances

surrounding the search.’ That conclusion suggests either that the

officers’ concern that Selby was armed and dangerous was

unreasonable or that the officers employed a generalized

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5

procedure that was unreasonable as applied to Kornegay’s

home.” Id. (citation omitted). Citing Richards, the court

concluded that “the risks generally surrounding murder

investigations did not necessarily create an exigent circumstance

in this case.” Id. at 399.

As the per curiam opinion points out, however, Kornegay

does not advance appellees’ position, because, in contrast to

Kornegay, the officers in this case had particularized

information bearing on the danger that the police could

encounter in executing the search warrant, including a

reasonable suspicion to believe that John Youngbey had used an

assault weapon to shoot the victim multiple times. It is quite

clear from the per curiam opinion that the sum total of the

circumstances faced by the officers in this case supports

inferences of risk greater and more specific than those

“generally surrounding murder investigations.” 

Appellees also argue that appellants’ reliance on United

States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998), United States v. Geraldo,

271 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and United States v. Crippen,

371 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2004) is misplaced. There is something

to this argument. An assault rifle is a formidable weapon, but it

is not a weapon of war capable of breaching a hardened target

– such as an armored tank – as was the bazooka at issue in

Crippen. Moreover, there is no evidence that the officers here

were aware of specific threats of violence of the sort that the

police searching the premises in Geraldo faced. And appellants

do not suggest that John Youngbey had anything approaching

the violent history toward law enforcement personnel that the

escapee in Ramirez exhibited. Indeed, appellants’ Operational

Plan does not characterize John Youngbey as posing a particular

risk to the searching officers. Nonetheless, appellants assert that

Ramirez, Geraldo, and Crippen conclusively support their claim

that their no-knock search did not violate appellants’ Fourth

Amendment rights. It is far from clear to me that appellants’

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6

actions did not violate appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights, but

I agree with the per curiam opinion that we need not reach this

matter.

Ramirez, Geraldo, and Crippen involve circumstances that

differ from the situation faced by appellants in this case, and

thus may not support appellants’ contention that they committed

no violation of appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Nonetheless, I agree with my colleagues that “these authorities

are close enough to the particular circumstances of the search at

issue here that we can say, with assurance, that the law was not

clearly established that a no-knock entry in this particular

situation was unconstitutional.”

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