Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00705/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00705-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN CORNWELL, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, San Quentin State Prison,

Respondent.

No. 2:06-cv-00705 TLN KJN

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR 

ORDER TO PRODUCE TRIAL COUNSEL’S 

DEFENSE FILE (Doc. 134)

Following this court’s prior consideration and decision concerning petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d) claims, and specifically concerning petitioner’s claims 3 and 34, respondent seeks an 

order of this court directing petitioner’s trial counsel to produce his defense file to respondent’s 

counsel. Following consideration of the motion and related pleadings, the undersigned finds 

respondent’s request should be limited by its purpose, as explained below, but otherwise granted.

I. Relevant Specific Background 

On February 15, 2018, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations wherein it was 

recommended, in relevant part, the court find petitioner’s claim 3 satisfied the requirements of 

§ 2254(d), and that consideration of claim 34 be deferred until consideration of any procedural 

default issues. (Doc. 119.) Ultimately, on March 19, 2019, the Findings and Recommendations 

were adopted in full by the district judge. (Doc. 129.) 

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Thereafter, in a joint status report of September 3, 2019, the parties specifically addressed the 

issue of discovery concerning claims 3 and 34. (Doc. 131.) Petitioner advised he intended to 

“seek discovery as to all sub-claims of Claims 3 and Claim 34” and respondent “anticipate[d] 

seeking an order . . . to obtain trial counsel’s defense file.” (Id. at 2-3.)1 

Following the undersigned’s order concerning the deadlines applicable to the discovery (Doc. 

133), respondent filed the Motion for Order to Produce Trial Counsel’s File. (Doc. 134.) 

Petitioner opposed the motion (Doc. 135) and respondent replied thereto (Doc. 137). 

At this juncture then, discovery is being conducted prior to this court’s consideration of the 

procedural bars asserted by respondent concerning claims 3 and 34 and prior to any evidentiary 

hearing on those same claims sought by petitioner.

II. Legal Standards

Parties in a habeas proceeding are not entitled to discovery as a matter of course. Bracy v. 

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Rather, “[a] party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of 

discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if and to the extent that, the judge 

in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not 

otherwise.” Rule 6, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Good cause is shown by the presentation of 

“specific allegations” demonstrating the need for the discovery. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09 

(quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). The Ninth Circuit has held that discovery 

is proper where essential to resolution of a claim. Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 

2005); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[D]iscovery is available . . . at the discretion of the district court judge for good cause shown, 

regardless of whether there is to be an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1009. 

“A district court in a habeas proceeding ‘need not conduct full evidentiary hearings,’ but may

instead ‘expand the record . . . with discovery and documentary evidence.’” Williams v. 

1 In the joint status report, respondent indicated the “procedural default challenges are limited to 

Claim 3(e), whether trial counsel unreasonably failed to rebut the prosecutor’s argument that 

because Mr. Cornwell was not insane at the time of the 1983 and 1992 crimes, there was no 

mitigation and Claim 34, ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel.” (Doc. 131 at 2.) And

petitioner indicated he would be seeking “an evidentiary hearing on Claim 3” following the 

“completion of the discovery process ....” (Doc. 131 at 3.) 

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Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 590 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 275, 277 

(9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). “It may . . . be perfectly appropriate, depending upon the nature of 

the allegations, for the district court to proceed by requiring that the record be expanded to 

include letters, documentary evidence, and . . . even affidavits.” Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 

1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 2012) as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (May 25, 2012) 

(quoting Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1970)). The scope and extent of 

the discovery permitted under Rule 6(a) is a matter confined to the discretion of the district court. 

See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909; see also McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 

1999) (en banc) (finding the district court’s imposition of a protective order limiting the use of 

discovered materials should be upheld as not an abuse of discretion).

In Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals held that a habeas corpus petitioner who raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 716, 718-20. However, the privilege is 

waived only “to the extent necessary to give [respondent] a fair opportunity to defend against [the 

claim].” Id. at 720. Thus, in such cases a court should impose a waiver “no broader than needed 

to ensure the fairness of the proceedings before it.” Id. Further, discovery of attorney-client 

communications requires a narrowly drawn protective order. Id. at 720-25. To avoid waiver, a 

petitioner may abandon his claim. Id. at 721, 723.

Following Bittaker, courts have typically issued protective orders that “restrict the identity of 

those working for the state who may have access to the documents and prohibit the use of the 

documents on any retrial should the petitioner be successful on habeas.” Ervine v. Warden, 214 

F.Supp.3d 917, 920 (E.D. Cal. 2016). 

III. Discussion

The Parties’ Pleadings

Respondent requests the court order petitioner2 to produce “the trial defense file” to 

respondent within the time designated by the court. Respondent claims production by order is 

2 Respondent advised he is informed and believes counsel for petitioner in these proceedings is in 

possession of the defense trial counsel files.

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necessary in order to defend against petitioner’s claims because, where petitioner is challenging 

the effectiveness of counsel’s representation during the penalty phase of the trial for a failure to 

present mitigating evidence of petitioner’s family background and mental illness, “all information 

normally contained in trial files is relevant and necessary.” Respondent states that information 

may include, but not be limited to, petitioner’s “statements about his family background and 

mental illness, counsel’s investigation, and counsel’s trial strategy,” as well as “relevant present 

sense impressions of the strengths and weaknesses of various defense strategies” and records of 

“conversations between counsel and [p]etitioner regarding trial strategy.” (Doc. 134.)

 In opposing the motion, petitioner complains the request “is overly broad, irrelevant, not 

likely to lead to relevant information, and/or is without persuasive authority.” Petitioner contends 

respondent has not demonstrated good cause and thus the request should be “entirely” denied, or 

alternatively, limited to those lacking a demonstrable showing of good cause. Petitioner also 

argues that certain materials pertaining to his family background and mental health “may be 

protected from disclosure by the psychotherapist-patient privilege ....” (Doc. 135.)3

 In reply to petitioner’s opposition, respondent reasserts the materials sought are indeed 

relevant where petitioner “cannot prevail on his claim unless he shows that all fairminded jurists 

would agree there was no acceptable reason for what counsel did” and that waiver of the attorneyclient privilege in these circumstances “is clear.” Respondent maintains this court should order 

petitioner “to produce trial counsel’s defense file to [r]espondent or withdraw his ineffective 

assistance claim.” (Doc. 137.)

Findings

Respondent’s motion is a request for everything in defense trial counsel’s files. Yet, 

discovery is being conducted as to petitioner’s claims 3 and 34, specifically concerning 

allegations of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. To the degree defense counsel’s files 

contain material relevant only to the guilt phase and are unrelated to any claim of ineffective 

3 To the degree petitioner argues that if discovery is permitted and disclosure of defense trial 

counsel’s file is required “it should be reciprocal and result in disclosure of the government’s 

files,” referring to his separate motion for discovery, petitioner is advised his requests will be duly 

considered and separately addressed. 

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assistance of counsel in the penalty phase, disclosure is not appropriate. Harris v. Nelson, 394 

U.S. 286, 297 (1969) (holding that broad-ranging inquiry is neither necessary nor appropriate in 

the context of a habeas corpus proceeding). Hence, limitations will be imposed in accord with the 

subject of the claims at issue in discovery. 

To entirely deny respondent’s request herein where the undersigned has previously found 

petitioner presented a prima facie case to the California Supreme Court of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel during the penalty phase would amount to an abuse of discretion for it 

would be unfair to ask respondent to defend against petitioner’s claim in the absence of materials 

that may be relevant to the ultimate determination. Jones, 114 F.3d at 1009 (“a court's denial of 

discovery is an abuse of discretion if discovery is indispensable to a fair, rounded, development of 

the material facts”) (quoting Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

In the Findings and Recommendations regarding claim 3, and the deficiency prong of the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the undersigned found petitioner “made a prima facie 

showing that counsel acted unreasonably in preparing for the penalty phase and in presenting 

evidence at the penalty phase. To the extent the California Supreme Court found otherwise, it did 

so unreasonably.” (Doc. 119 at 93.) As for the prejudice prong, the undersigned concluded: 

“Petitioner need not prove his claim at this point. He only needed to show the California 

Supreme Court that there was a reasonable likelihood he could succeed on this claim when the 

evidence was fleshed out. And the state court was required to consider the evidence proffered in 

the light most favorable to petitioner in making its determination. Under those standards, this 

court cannot understand how the California Supreme Court could have determined petitioner 

failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice. This court finds petitioner has satisfied 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d) for claim 3.” (Doc. 119 at 96.)

Respondent submitted objections to the Findings and Recommendations specifically as to 

claim 3. Respondent argued a fairminded jurist could have concluded that where petitioner 

“affirmatively misled counsel” about his family background, representing he had a “happy family 

life,” further investigation “would have been a waste of limited investigate resources.” (Doc. 127 

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at 4.) Respondent cited counsel’s interviews of petitioner’s family members and the information 

provided by those family members, noting “family members did not describe the family 

background that [he] now details, thus giving counsel no reason to further investigate” his family 

life. (Doc. 127 at 5.) As for mental health in particular, respondent notes trial counsel retained a 

psychologist and obtained related records; the expert determined that petitioner suffered from 

“bipolar disorder, had mild brain damage, and had learning disabilities, but had not been on any 

medications since 1987, and was functioning normally,” revealing no mental condition. 

Respondent objected to the findings for faulting defense counsel “for not obtaining more records 

and more experts,” but argued the “Supreme Court has never required counsel to obtain more 

than one expert,” that counsel has no duty to second-guess an expert’s conclusions, and has no 

duty to “uncover every available record,” arguing “because one could agree that counsel did a 

reasonably substantial investigation” concerning petitioner’s background. (Doc. 127 at 7.) 

Respondent further objected concerning strategy, arguing a fairminded jurist could agree that 

counsel’s penalty phase strategy was reasonable. (Doc. 127 at 7-9.) Lastly, respondent objected 

to the findings on this claim with regard to prejudice, stating “a fairminded jurist could agree that 

[p]etitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that a mitigation case built on the postconviction information his habeas counsel obtained would have avoided the death penalty,” citing 

record evidence in support of his position. (Doc. 127 at 9-12.) Respondent concluded his 

objections by asserting a fairminded jurist could agree that petitioner had not met his applicable 

burden and that the court should “reject the Findings and Recommendations and deny habeas 

relief on this claim.” (Doc. 127 12-13.)

Despite respondent’s objection to the findings as they related to claim 3, the district court 

adopted them in full, and referred the matter back to the undersigned for further proceedings. 

(Doc. 129.) 

On March 21, 2019, the undersigned issued an order directing the parties to file a joint 

status report, noting that procedural default determinations remain to be made as asserted in 

respondent’s motion to dismiss (including claims 3 and 34). (Doc. 68.) 

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In the joint status report, respondent indicated the “procedural default challenges are 

limited to Claim 3(e), whether trial counsel unreasonably failed to rebut the prosecutor’s 

argument that because Mr. Cornwell was not insane at the time of the 1983 and 1992 crimes, 

there was no mitigation[,] and Claim 34, ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel.” (Doc. 

131 at 2.) And petitioner indicated he would be seeking “discovery as to all sub-claims of Claims 

3 and 34.” (Doc. 131 at 2.) Petitioner further indicated he would be seeking “an evidentiary 

hearing on Claim 3” following the “completion of the discovery process ....” (Doc. 131 at 3.) 

Petitioner opposes respondent’s motion as “vague, over-broad and ambiguous” and 

therefore argues it is incompatible with “the dictates of Habeas Rule 6 ....” Petitioner argues 

respondent’s request “seeks to construct a post-hoc rationalization of trial counsel’s indisputable 

failure to conduct an adequate investigation at the penalty phase of the trial,” and that 

respondent’s request, including petitioner’s statements, present sense impressions of defense 

strategies and conversations between defense trial counsel and petitioner are disfavored because 

reviewing courts should not second guess strategic decisions nor construct strategic defenses 

which counsel did not offer. (Doc. 135 at 3-5.) 

Given the nature of petitioner’s allegations in claims 3 and 34, and the procedural posture 

of the case at present, it is appropriate to permit disclosure of the requested files as limited herein. 

Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d at 1179; Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d at 743; Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 

720. 

In the same way a petitioner seeking discovery pursuant to Rule 6 is not required to 

demonstrate that he will ultimately prevail on the underlying claim, respondent need not 

demonstrate he will ultimately prevail in defense of petitioner’s underlying claim. See, e.g., 

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909 (“It may well be, as the Court of Appeals predicted, that petitioner will be 

unable to obtain evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual judicial bias in the trial of his 

case, but we hold that he has made a sufficient showing . . . to establish ‘good cause’ for 

discovery”); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d at 743. 

By limiting the disclosure of materials from defense trial counsel files to documentation

speaking to the issue of defense counsel’s representation of petitioner during the penalty phase, 

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including any and all investigative efforts concerning same, and including but not limited to any 

“statements [by petitioner] about his family background and mental illness, counsel’s 

investigation, and counsel’s” penalty phase strategy, as well as “relevant present sense 

impressions of the strengths and weaknesses of various defense strategies” and records of 

“conversations between counsel and [p]etitioner” regarding penalty phase strategy, fairness is 

afforded both parties. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909. 

Petitioner has waived the attorney-client privilege by raising claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 718-720. That is also true of the work product 

privilege. Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 721 n.6 (“Although our decision is couched in terms of the 

attorney-client privilege, it applies equally to the work product privilege, a complementary rule 

that protects many of the same interests”) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 

(1981)). And, In Alvarez v. Woodford, 81 Fed. Appx. 119 (2003), the Ninth Circuit stated that 

the same concerns giving rise to waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product 

protections at issue in Bittaker, foreclosed Alvarez’s “argument that the documents are protected 

by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. To allow Alvarez to at once claim that his mental state 

was not properly investigated and presented by counsel and also claim that the government is 

barred from accessing information about his mental state is simply inequitable.” Id. at 120. 

Petitioner asserts the information in defense trial counsel’s files is not relevant because the 

focus of the claims is “on what was not presented at the penalty phase of the trial, compared to 

what could have been presented . . . .” (Doc. 135 at 8.) Nevertheless, despite the earlier finding 

that petitioner established a prima facie case for relief in the California Supreme Court, materials 

relevant to petitioner’s family history, mental health or illness, and strategies specific to the 

penalty phase could be relevant to the defense of the claim moving forward. 

In sum, the undersigned finds respondent has good cause to obtain information from 

defense trial counsel files concerning the penalty phase because that information may prove 

essential in defense of petitioner’s claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel.

//

//

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Respondent’s Motion for Order to Produce Trial Counsel’s File (Doc. 134) is granted 

in part. Within thirty days of the date of this order, petitioner shall produce trial 

defense counsel’s file or files, as limited in this order, to respondent.

2. Subject to the protective order issued below, the court declares a waiver of petitioner’s 

attorney-client privilege, work product privilege and psychotherapist-patient privilege 

with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as specifically asserted in 

claims 3 and 34.

3. For purposes of the habeas corpus litigation in this matter, all privileged

communications or materials obtained by the State of California from trial defense 

counsel’s files for purposes of responding to petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, as described in claims 3 and 34, shall be deemed confidential. 

Until such time as this court may order otherwise, these communications or materials 

may be used only by representatives of the Office of the California Attorney General, 

and persons working under their direct supervision, and only for purposes of litigating 

claims 3 and 34 as presented in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pending before 

this court. 

Disclosure of the contents of the communications or materials themselves may not 

be made to other persons or agencies, including any other law enforcement or 

prosecutorial personnel or agencies, without an order from this court. The order 

extends to respondent and all persons acting on behalf of respondent in this 

proceeding, including but not limited to persons employed by the Office of the 

California Attorney General, persons working on this matter who are employed by 

California governmental divisions other than the Attorney General, persons retained 

by respondent for any investigative or consulting work on this matter, and any expert 

consultants or witnesses assisting respondent. 

This order shall continue in effect after the conclusion of the habeas corpus 

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proceedings and specifically shall apply in the event of retrial of all or any portion of 

petitioner’s criminal case, except that either party maintains the right to request 

modification or vacation of this order by way of a noticed motion.

Dated: February 8, 2022

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