Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00882/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00882-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 Joseph has already filed an answer. Thus, the Court construes Joseph’s motion as

a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

1 09cv882 BTM (WVG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL LOWRY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09cv882 BTM (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

v.

METROPOLITAN TRANSIT BOARD

MTBS, et al.,

Defendant.

Defendants Metropolitan Transit System (“MTS”) (erroneously sued as Metropolitan

Transit Board MTBS) and Torrence Joseph have moved to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. 43].1

 Defendants Heritage Security Services (“Heritage”) also

moves separately for dismissal of the FAC. Plaintiff has not opposed the motions. For the

following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motions to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to arise out of an incident that occurred on September

15, 2007. That day, Plaintiff allegedly exited the “929" bus at “12thand Imperial” and planned

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to board the San Diego trolley going toward Old Town. Plaintiff makes several factual

allegations concerning what happened next. He claims that (1) trolley security officers Jerrod

Gressett and Torrence Joseph assaulted Plaintiff and tried to break his wrists by handcuffing

him, resulting in swelling to his wrists and hands; (2) Gressett and Joseph punched Plaintiff,

grabbed his shirt, and threatened to beat him up; (3) Gressett forged Plaintiff’s name on a

Notice to Appear issued to Plaintiff; (4) Joseph and Gressett falsely accused Plaintiff of

fighting with other people at the station; and (5) trolley security officers falsely imprisoned

Plaintiff for eight hours.

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in April, 2009. Defendants MTS and Joseph

moved to dismiss it, and the Court dismissed the Complaint against MTS entirely, but not

against Joseph. Defendant Heritage did not move to dismiss the original complaint because

it failed to receive notice of it.

Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging eight causes of action

against all Defendants: (1) violation of his civil and constitutional rights; (2) false swearing;

(3) assault and battery; (4) forgery; (5) identity theft; (6) defamation; (7) false imprisonment;

and (8) false arrest.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required only to set forth

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and

“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When reviewing a motion to

dismiss, the allegations of material fact in plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). But only factual allegations must be

accepted as true—not legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the

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factual allegations ”must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for

relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Additionally, courts construe pro se pleadings liberally on a defendant’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895, (9th Cir. 2002).

The liberal construction rule “is particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). But this rule “applies only to [a] plaintiff’s factual

allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.” Bruns v. National Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint on several different

grounds. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim for

violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section

1983 provides that:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead “(1) a violation of rights

protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by

conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,

1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Local government units can be “persons” under § 1983. Monell v. New

York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 882 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Construing Plaintiff’s factual allegations liberally, it appears that he claims a

deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution when he

was allegedly assaulted.

Plaintiff sues a local government entity (MTS), a private corporation (Heritage), and

individuals (Joseph and Gresset). As MTS points out, however, a local government entity

will only face liability under section 1983 if the alleged constitutional deprivation was the

product of a policy or custom of the local government unit. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Similarly, a private corporation is only liable under § 1983

if the alleged deprivation resulted from a policy or custom. See id.; Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Srvc., 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d

778 (7th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff can also establish section 1983 liability of a local government

entity or private corporation for “failure to train” its municipal employees. See City of Canton,

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 

Plaintiff makes the following allegations regarding MTS and Heritage’s policies and

procedures: 

How is there policies toward people coming from the games react to them and

what is there policies toward these people they say nothing about it in there

policies and procedures in which I have a copy of they only if you smell of

alcohol they could have after shave on or rinsed out there mouth with Listerine

and that has alcohol in it. . . . In which Metropolitan Transit Corporation who

are liable in the hiring and training of security officers in which it had failed to

do should go over there policies and work more in to not violating the people

rights should be briefed in any changes in law which they fail to do. . . . There

policies don’t state anything about the manner of a person, and failed to prove

anything as far as drunk in public and failing to so that anything they did not

use a breathalyzer to determine if I had alcohol in the system to determine all

of the trolley security officer should carry an Intoxilyer 5000 and a BAC

Datamaster to determine who is drunk or not and none of them do. The

customs of Metropolitan Transit should be reviewed because and from what

I have read in there policies they have nothing . . . about what there security

people do there nothing states anything as far as discipline or firing of these

officers. . . . Defendants Joseph and Gressett were hired by Metropolitan

Transit Systems, Heritage Security Systems with negligence to training

methods in constitutional right and civil right law.

Plaintiff’s allegations are largely unintelligible. Although he alleges that MTS’s policies

and training are deficient, the allegations are vague and implausible. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949 (allegations must include facts and be plausible to survive motion to dismiss). He

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does not draw a connection between his constitutional injuries and a policy or custom, which

he must do to state a claim under § 1983. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403. Similarly, he fails

to draw a connection between his injuries and MTS’s or Heritage’s failure to train their

employees. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against MTS and Heritage are

DISMISSED without prejudice. 

Plaintiff has also alleged constitutional claims against two individual Defendants:

Gresset and Joseph. Gresset and Joseph do not argue that the claims against them should

be dismissed, and therefore the Court declines to do so.

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Against MTS

Plaintiff has stated a federal constitutional claim against the two individual defendants,

and the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a). The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s state law claims against MTS.

MTS argues that Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed for failure to allege

compliance with the California Government Claims Act (“CGCA”). Pursuant to the CGCA,

a Plaintiff must first present a written claim to a public entity and wait for the board to act

upon it before bringing a claim for money or damages against that public entity. Cal. Gov.

Code § 945.4. A plaintiff’s failure to plead compliance with this requirement of the CGCA is

cause for dismissal. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d 621,627 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the CGCA. Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s

state law claims against MTS are DISMISSED without prejudice.

C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Against Heritage and the Individual Defendants

Plaintiff alleges several state-law claims against Gresset and Joseph, as well as 

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Heritage, their alleged employer. Heritage may be liable for the actions of its alleged

employees through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Baptist v. Robinson, 143 Cal. App.

4th 151, 160 (2006) (employer vicariously liable for torts of employee under doctrine of

respondeat superior).

Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiff’s seven state-law causes of action for

failure to state a claim. The Court addresses each one below.

1. False Swearing

The Court construes this as a claim for perjury. But under California law, there is no

civil cause of action for perjury; it is a criminal offense. Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior

Court, 20 Cal. 4th 464, 472 (1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s perjury claims against all

Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice, as it is clear that further amendment would be

futile. Franklin v. Murphy, 245 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (permitting dismissal with

prejudice where deficiencies would not be cured by amendment).

2. Assault and Battery

To establish a claim for assault, a plaintiff must allege that he was placed into

imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact. See Lowry v. Standard Oil Co. of

Cal., 63 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7 (1944). To establish a claim for battery, a plaintiff must allege (1)

defendant intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with

plaintiff; (2) without plaintiff’s consent; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury

to the plaintiff. Fluharty v. Fluharty, 59 Cal. App. 4th 484, 497 (1997).

Plaintiff alleges that Gresset and Joseph repeatedly punched him, grabbed his shirt,

threatened him, and handcuffed him tightly, causing injury. Construing this allegation

liberally, Plaintiff has stated claims for assault and battery against Gresset, Joseph, and

Heritage as their alleged employer. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Heritage’s Motion to

Dismiss the assault and battery claims.

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2

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff cites to People v. Cooper, 83 Cal. App. 3d 121, 129

(1978), which states that “[i]t s not necessary, . . . that a party whose name has been forged

has suffered actual damage.” But this case refers to the crime of forgery, not a civil claim for

identity theft. A civil claim requires alleging damages. See Fremont Indem. Co., 148 Cal.

App. 4th at 119.

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3. Forgery

There is no civil cause of action based on forgery alone. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s forgery claim.

4. Identity Theft

Although there is no cause of action called identity theft, such a claim may be

construed as a claim for conversion of intangible personal property. See CTC Real Estate

Servs. v. Lepe, 140 Cal. App. 4th 856, 860–61 (2006) (“One’s personal identifying

information can be the object of theft.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The

elements of a claim for conversion of intangible property are “(1) the plaintiff’s ownership or

right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant’s disposition of the property in a

manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) resulting damages.”

Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp., 148 Cal. App. 4th 97, 119 (2007).

Here, Plaintiff appears to allege that one of the Defendants (Plaintiff does not allege

who) forged his signature on the misdemeanor notice to appear. According to the notice to

appear, which Plaintiff attached to his original Complaint, the signature only indicates a

promise to appear and is not an admission of guilt. Although Plaintiff arguably alleges the

first two elements of identity theft, Plaintiff fails to allege how the purported identity theft

injured him. The signature on the notice to appear is not an admission of guilt and is only

a promise to appear before the San Diego Misdemeanor Arraignment Court at a stated time.

Even assuming one of the Defendants forged his signature, Plaintiff has failed to tie the

forgery to an injury he suffered.2

 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice the

claim for identity theft.

//

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3

 Although no Defendant has raised this defense, the Court also notes that the

common-interest exception to defamation likely applies here. If Gressett and Joseph

discussed Plaintiff’s alleged fighting with each other or other security officers, the

communication would likely be privileged under the common interest exception to

defamation. See Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) (A statement is privileged if made “[i]n a

communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also

interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford

a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3)

who is requested by the person interested to give the information.”)

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5. Defamation

To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must plead the “intentional publication of

a statement of fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which

causes special damage.” Ringler Assocs. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1165,

1179 (2000). The publication may be written or oral, and communication to a single person

is sufficient. Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges the “statements that where [sic] made by Joseph and Gressett

are not true that I was fighting with other people and fighting with them.” These minimal

allegations fail to state a claim for defamation. Plaintiff has failed to plead publication

because it is unclear when Defendants made those statements and to whom they made

them.3 His general allegations are too vague to state a claim and the Court therefore

DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s defamation claim. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(threadbare allegations insufficient to state a claim).

6. False Imprisonment

To establish a civil claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the

nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for

an appreciable period of time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital, 80 Cal. App.

4th 485, 496 (2000).

Plaintiff has stated a claim for false imprisonment. Plaintiff claims that he was “falsely

[i]mprisoned for over 8 hours when Metropolitan Transit System Trolley Security accused me

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of being drunk in public in which I was not.” Construed liberally, Plaintiff alleges all the

elements of false imprisonment: he was confined against his will, without cause, for an

appreciable period of time. 

Heritage argues Plaintiff has not made specific allegations against it and it should

therefore be dismissed. But Plaintiff mentions Gresset and Joseph in his false imprisonment

cause of action, and they are allegedly Heritage’s employees. Accordingly, Heritage may

be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the Court DENIES Heritage’s Motion

to Dismiss the false imprisonment claim.

7. False Arrest

Plaintiff alleges a claim for false arrest. But false arrest and false imprisonment are

not separate torts. Rather, false arrest is simply one form of false imprisonment. Cummings

v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1422 (1988). Accordingly, the Court will treat

these allegations as one cause of action.

8. De Facto Government Civil Conspiracy to Violate Rights

The Court is unclear what cause of action Plaintiff attempts to allege in this claim. 

The claim is nonsensical and virtually impossible to understand. Given that Plaintiff has

already alleged a violation of his constitutional rights, and that this cause of action fails to

state a cause of action, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim for a

government civil conspiracy to violate rights.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice this suit against

MTS in its entirety. The Court also DISMISSES without prejudice the constitutional claims

against Heritage, but the constitutional claims against the individual defendants survive.

Furthermore, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice as to all Defendants, the false swearing

claim, and DISMISSES without prejudice the forgery, identity theft, defamation and

government civil conspiracy claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s surviving state-law claims are the claims

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against Heritage and the individual defendants for assault and battery, false imprisonment

and false arrest.

If Plaintiff wishes to file a Second Amended Complaint correcting the deficiencies

above, he must do so within fourteen days of the issuance of this order. This is the last

amendment the Court will permit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 16, 2010

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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