Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01549/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01549-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1121 Trademark Infringement (jurisdiction)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROFIL INSTITUT FUR

STOFFWECHSELFORSCHUNG GMBH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv1549-LAB (BLM)

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE; AND 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

[Docket number 17.]

vs.

PROSCIENTO, INC.,

Defendant.

This is one of two related cases involving intellectual property disputes between these

parties. Both cases concern the "Profil" trademark; this case also alleges misappropriation

of trade secrets. In case 16cv1549, Plaintiff Profil Institut für Stoffwechselforschung GmbH

("Profil") is suing its onetime subsidiary ProSciento, Inc. (formerly known as Profil Institute

for Clinical Research, Inc.) for trademark infringement. ProSciento recently filed a

counterclaim. There are two "Profil" marks at issue, one a U.S. mark and one an EU mark,

but the briefing suggests that use of each mark is not limited to the place of its registration,

and that there is some spillover into the other mark's territory.

/ / /

/ / /

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Partial Mootness

The Court is obligated to address jurisdictional issues even if the parties do not raise

them. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). At

a hearing in the related case, 16cv2762, Profil Institut für Stoffwechselforschung GmbH v.

Prosciento, Inc., the Court held a hearing on Profil's motion for a preliminary injunction

involving alleged trademark infringement in the EU. At that hearing, Defendant's counsel

announced that the company was changing its name to ProSciento. The Court accepted this

representation and concluded that, going forward, ProSciento would be unlikely to use the

"Profil" trademark in the EU and would be abandoning further use of the trademark. In light

of this, the Court ordered the parties to show cause why claims for injunctive relief

concerning use of the trademark were not moot. (Docket no. 32.)

Before either party filed briefing, ProSciento filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,

claiming that it owns the trademark and asking the Court to enjoin Profil from using it. The

Court denied the motion without prejudice, noting that ProSciento had no counterclaim

pending, and that mootness had not yet been addressed. The parties filed responses to the

Court's order to show cause, saying that ownership of the mark is still being actively disputed

and that ProSciento intends to keep using it in the U.S. This change in position causes

concern; a party should not benefit from contradictory factual assertions. But the

circumstances do not suggest an intent to mislead the Court. The Court accepts that the

parties both intend to use the mark in the United States, and its ownership is actively

contested. The order to show cause is therefore DISCHARGED.

Motion to Dismiss

ProSciento filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Docket no. 17) to dismiss the

amended complaint (the "FAC"). Three agreements which were mentioned in the amended

complaint are attached as exhibits were attached to the motion. (Docket no. 17-2.) Profil

does not dispute these documents' authenticity or object to the Court's considering them in

connection with the motion; in fact, its own briefing refers to these documents and relies on

them.

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Judicial Notice

The motion was accompanied by requests for judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201.

Most of the documents (Exhibits A through I) are journal articles. Profil objects to the Court's

taking notice of those, and points out they are not authenticated. Profil does not object to the

Court's taking notice of Exhibits J or K, which are records from the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office (USPTO).

The journal articles are offered to show that certain alleged trade secrets are not in

fact secret, and that the information has been made public through articles like these. 

"Courts may take judicial notice of publications introduced to indicate what was in the public

realm at the time . . . ." Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d

954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010). Profil is correct that these articles have not been authenticated.

See Madeja v. Olympic Packers, LLC, 310 F.3d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court was

not required to take notice of unauthenticated documents). Profil also argues that while the

articles cover generally the same subject matter as the trade secrets, the trade secrets

include information not in the articles. Assuming this is true, the articles would not be helpful

at this stage of litigation. The request for judicial notice of Exhibits A through I is therefore

DENIED. But Exhibits J and K meet the standards for notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201, and

the unobjected-to request for judicial notice of those exhibits is GRANTED.

Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss

A Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), only "a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," is required, in order

to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). The well-pleaded facts

must do more than permit the Court to infer "the mere possibility of conduct"; they must show

that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts all

allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most

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favorable to the non-moving party. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National League of

Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). At the pleading

stage, the Court may consider not only the complaint itself, but also documents it refers to,

whose authenticity is not questioned, and matters judicially noticed. Zucco Partners LLC v.

Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009). 

ProSciento raises the statute of limitations as a defense. A claim may be dismissed

as untimely on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only when the running of the statute of limitations is

apparent on the face of the complaint. United States ex rel. Air Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre

Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013).

If a motion to dismiss is granted, leave to amend is ordinarily granted unless

amendment would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2000) (en

banc).

Factual Background

Profil, a German entity, was ProSciento's parent corporation. The two companies are

in the business of medical research. In 2003, Profil created ProSciento (then Profil Institute

for Clinical Research) as a subsidiary. In 2008, the companies formally separated, but

worked together under a Cooperation Agreement that terminated in 2012. The Cooperation

Agreement is attached to ProSciento's motion to dismiss as Exhibit A. One of the

agreement's provisions was that the companies' work would be coordinated, and that they

would each use a similar logo that incorporated the word "Profil". Profil alleges it owned the

"Profil" mark at this time, and was granting ProSciento a license to use it. 

In 2009, ProSciento filed an application to register the "Profil" mark in the United

States. Also in 2009, the two companies entered into a Lease Agreement for devices known

as Biostators. The Lease Agreement is attached to the motion to dismiss as Exhibit B. Profil

says it developed and owned trade secrets regarding use of Biostators and related

technology and procedures, and that both the Cooperation Agreement and the Lease

Agreement included provisions intended to protect trade secrets. (FAC, ¶ 26.)

/ / /

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After the Cooperation Agreement terminated, the parties entered into a

Non-Disclosure Agreement ("NDA"). The NDA is attached as Exhibit C to the motion to

dismiss. It included a provision concerning the protection of Profil's interest in trademarks and

trade secrets. 

Profil alleges that ProSciento fraudulently registered the "Profil" mark with the USPTO

by falsely claiming it had used the mark first, when in fact Profil had. Profil alleges

ProSciento falsely claimed its first use of the mark occurred on December 31, 1999, before

ProSciento was even formed. Profil alleges other false statements regarding the first use of

that mark. (FAC, ¶¶ 46-52.) ProSciento did not tell Profil it was attempting to register the

mark, and Profil first discovered the registration attempt "in or about 2010". (Id. ¶¶ 5, 53.) 

The registration was issued on May 17, 2011. 

The two companies' relationship soured, and beginning May 18, 2016, ProSciento

made it clear it intended to compete with Profil. (FAC, ¶¶ 5-6.) Profile filed this action on

June 20, 2016, bringing the following claims:

Claim 1, for a declaration that Profil is the mark's prior user and owner; 

Claim 2, for cancellation of the mark as invalid based on Profil's first use and

ownership;

Claim 3, for cancellation of the mark for fraud in its procurement; 

Claim 4, for cancellation of the mark for misuse;

Claim 5, for trademark infringement and unfair competition under California

law;

Claim 6, for trade secret misappropriation under federal law; and

Claim 7, for trade secret misappropriation under California law.

ProSciento's motion seeks dismissal of claims 2, 3, 6, and 7 with prejudice. 

Discussion

To a great extent, the standard for ruling on motions to dismiss controls the outcome

of this motion. Much of what ProSciento's motion asks the Court to do is inappropriate at the

pleading stage.

/ / /

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Incontestability

ProSciento argues Claims 2 and 3 are barred because the trademark is now

incontestable under 15 U.S.C. § 1065. Profil does not dispute that the mark has achieved

incontestability, but argues that exceptions apply. 

With regard to Claim 2, Profil argues that incontestability is not valid against the senior

user of the mark. Although there is some inconsistency in decisional law, the law of this

Circuit favors Profil's position. See Kabushiki Kaisha Megahouse v. Anjar Co. LLC, 2014 WL

5456523 at *5 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 20, 2014) (discussing conflicting authority). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that "the label of 'incontestability' is rather

misdescriptive," and that "[a]n incontestable registration is still subject to certain defenses

or defects, set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1115 . . . ." KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting

Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2005). Among the defects that provide an

exception are claims "[t]hat the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was

obtained fraudulently . . . ." § 1115(b)(1). Because fraud in registration or procurement of

incontestability is an exception to incontestability, Claim 3 is not barred.

Statute of Limitations

ProSciento also argues that Claims 6 and 7 are time-barred, because both the federal

and state limitations periods for trade secrets misappropriations claims are three years and

the alleged misappropriation began four years ago. It cites Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,

Inc., 822 F. Supp. 634, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1993) and MedioStream, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 869

F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2012), arguing that the claim accrues as of the first

misappropriation. The limitations period runs from the time alleged misappropriation is

actually discovered, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been

discovered, and a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim. Cal. Civ. Code §

3426.6; 18 U.S.C. §1836(d). 

Although the Cooperation Agreement allowed ProSciento to use the alleged trade

secrets, it continued to use them continuously after the agreement was terminated, around

April 4, 2012. If its use amounted to misappropriation, ProSciento argues that the claim

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accrued shortly after the Cooperation Agreement was terminated, and Profil had three years

from that time to bring suit. ProSciento maintains that the FAC fails to allege facts that would

suggest Profil was unable to discover the misappropriation, and therefore has not pled facts

suggesting it is entitled to tolling.

Statutes of limitations are an affirmative defense, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and a plaintiff

is not required to plead facts in anticipation of it. Unique Functional Products, Inc. v. JCA

Corp., 2012 WL 1416201, at *2 (S.D. Cal., Apr. 23, 2012).

ProSciento asks the Court to conclude that Profil was failed in its obligation to

investigate reasonable suspicions of misappropriation. (Docket no. 17-1 at 19:11-21.) The

FAC does not, however, make plain that "even the most cursory investigation" (id. at 19:16)

would have revealed misuse of the Biostators. Nor can the Court conclude that because the

Cooperation Agreement had terminated, the parties' cooperative relationship had ended, as

ProSciento argues. For example, after it was terminated, the parties entered into the NDA

in order to protect trade secrets. A reasonable inference from that might be that the parties

were maintaining some kind of cooperative relationship. Another reasonable inference is that

ProSciento did not give Profil any reason to suspect it was doing anything improper.

In addition, Profil has attached two June 20, 2016 demand letter to the FAC. (Docket

no. 5, Exs. A and B.) This letter demands the return of all proprietary information, and

identifies the Biostator machines as well as various documents and information. Accepting

these letters at face value, it would appear Profil had consented, or thought it may have

consented, to ProSciento's retaining the trade secrets, and had come to realize they were

being misappropriated. In other words, ProSciento's retention of the Biostator machines,

documents, and information did not give Profil any reason for concern for some time after the

Cooperation Agreement was terminated. The fact that the parties had entered in to the NDA

further supports this inference.

The reasoning ProSciento asks the Court to engage in might be acceptable at trial. 

But the FAC simply does not provide the level of factual information that would make this

clear as a matter of law. ProSciento's characterization of the situation could, in the end, turn

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out to be correct. But when the Court has to draw this many inferences from factual

pleadings and supply additional facts, the running of the limitations period cannot be said to

appear on the face of the complaint.

Pleading Standards: Fraud

ProSciento cites the heightened pleading standard for fraud under Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b), and argues that Claim 3, for cancellation based on fraud, is inadequately pled. 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[a]ny false statements made in an incontestability

affidavit may jeopardize not only the incontestability claim, but also the underlying

registration." Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1990). Various false

statements will suffice to show fraud. See id. (citing examples). See also Halo Mgt., LLC

v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing standards for trademark

cancellation based on fraud in registration). The Court accepts as true the allegations that

Profil first used the mark in the U.S. in 1999, that ProSciento was created in 2003, that in

2008 Profil and ProSciento formally separated, and that at the time of the application Profil

was using the mark in U.S. commerce. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 21, 30, 33.) This would make several

of ProSciento's statements in the 2009 application and affidavit false, most significantly the

representations that ProSciento was the mark's senior user, that ProSciento first used the

mark in 1999, and that no one else had the right to use the mark. (FAC ¶¶ 46-49.) 

Much of ProSciento's argument depends on its status as a subsidiary of Profil. But

in 2009 when it submitted the materials, the two companies had already separated and

ProSciento was no longer Profil's subsidiary. ProSciento cites no authority to support its

contention that former subsidiaries are treated the same as current ones for purposes of

trademark registration. It cites the Trademark Man. of Exam. Proc. § 903.05 (5th ed. 2007)

for the proposition that use by a related company can be the "first use" date (Docket no. 17-1

at 23:27), but this section does not stand for that proposition. The intended citation may

have been § 1201.03, but even under that section, it does not appear that ProSciento was

a related company at the time it submitted the application. 

The FAC alleges sufficient facts to plausibly suggest ProSciento knew these facts

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were false, that they were material, and that the USPTO relied on them. The facts given in

the FAC are specific enough to put ProSciento on notice of the particular fraudulent conduct

it is charged with, i.e., "the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged."

See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009).

Trade Secrets: Pleading Standards

The Court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Profil's state law claims (FAC, 

¶ 10), and therefore applies state substantive law but federal procedural law. Cortez v. Skol,

776 F.3d 1046, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2015). Although the parties have cited and relied on state

pleading standards, pleading standards are procedural, and the Court therefore applies

federal rather than state pleading standards. See Hatton v. Bank of America, N.A., 2015 WL

6739137, at *3 (E.D. Cal., Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

In federal court, plaintiffs seeking relief for misappropriation of trade secrets must

identify what they are, and should describe it with sufficient particularity to separate it from

either matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those skilled in

the trade. Imax Corp. v. Cinema Technologies, Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1998).

While Imax applied the standard at the summary judgment stage, the pleading standard at

this stage requires only notice and plausibility. This requirement has been applied, in a more

relaxed form, at the pleading stage. In Modus LLC v. Encore Legal Solutions, Inc., 2013 WL

6628125 at *7-8 (D. Ariz., Dec. 17, 2013), for example, the court found it adequate to allege

that its trade secrets consisted of software programs it created or modified and that it used

in the provision of its business services.

Significantly, Profil was the source of the trade secrets, and should know what they

are well enough to be able to plead a claim. This is not a case where discovery is needed,

or might be needed, to allege facts identifying the trade secrets. 

/ / /

/ / /

Trade Secrets: Discussion

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The FAC gives general categories of the things Profil considered to be trade secrets. 

(FAC, ¶ 26.) The first demand letter attached to the complaint also asks for those categories

things to be returned. (Docket no. 5 at 29-30.) They are:

• Biostator machines;

• Standard Operating Procedures and written manuals for the Biostator

machines to perform Glucose Clamp Studies;

• methods and procedures for using the Biostator machines with the

appropriate pumps and tubing, and how to perform necessary maintenance

of the machines when performing Glucose Clamp Studies;

• methods and procedures for preparing clinical development plans to

perform clinical studies;

• methods and procedures for performing insulin-sensitivity assessment with

Glucose Clamp Studies; methods and procedures in the design,

performance, and data analysis of clinical studies;

• methods and procedures for data management and analysis;

• database design, computer software, and procedures for implementing a

database to manage and recruit volunteers for various clinical studies.

Id. The second letter repeats this information but also elaborates, explaining that Profil

developed the software for the purpose of analyzing results and reporting. (Docket no. 5 at

34.) The Cooperation Agreement further identifies the trade secrets. (Docket no. 17-2, Ex.

A at 40-41.) 

 Some of these are not adequately differentiated from general knowledge within the

trade, or general public knowledge for that matter. For example, the Biostator machines

themselves are identified as a trade secret. The machines' existence and general nature is

not a secret, however. It may be that Profil is seeking to have the machines themselves

returned, or that the machines' design or some aspects of it are trade secrets. But whatever

the trade secret is supposed to be is not very clear. On the other hand, Standard Operating

Procedures and manuals for operating the Biostator machines seem to be materials Profil

authored. The volunteer database and program codes, and their general functions are

described in the Cooperation Agreement. (Docket no. 17-2, Ex. A at 41.) But the "methods

and procedures" items are never very well identified, nor are the aspects of them that amount

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to trade secrets adequately differentiated from what is more generally known. Clearly, others

in the industry who perform the same or similar functions use methods and procedures as

well. Whatever it is that distinguishes the trade secrets from those should be adequately

identified. For example, the FAC does not make clear whether Profil created these

procedures or modified existing procedures, or whether the procedures are generally known

or used within the industry. 

The Court concludes that the Standard Operating Procedures and written manuals

for the Biostator machines to perform Glucose Clamp Studies; and computer software, and

procedures for implementing a database to manage and recruit volunteers for various clinical

studies are adequately identified. The Biostator machines are adequately identified only if

the FAC is seeking return of the machines themselves; otherwise, they are not. The

remainder are not adequately identified. 

Because not all of the trade secrets are adequately identified, it is difficult to say

whether Profil took adequate steps to maintain their status as trade secrets. In some cases,

it will be clear as a matter of law that the precautions were inadequate. But the FAC and the

agreements make clear Profil took some steps, and their briefing points those out. (See FAC 

¶ 27; Docket no. 17-2, Ex. A at 42, ¶ 11 and Ex. C at 1, ¶ 4) Whether those steps were

reasonable under the circumstances is a question of fact that is appropriately resolved either

at the summary judgment stage or trial. See Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys,

Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2003) (whether measures taken to protect trade secrets

were reasonable is generally a question of fact for the jury, and only in extreme cases can

be decided as a matter of law).

Conclusion and Order

The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court finds

the FAC adequately identifies only some of the trade secrets. Claims regarding

misappropriation of the Standard Operating Procedures and written manuals for the Biostator

machines to perform Glucose Clamp Studies; and computer software, and procedures for

implementing a database to manage and recruit volunteers for various clinical studies are

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adequately pled. Assuming Profil is seeking return of the Biostator machines, they are

adequately identified as well; but otherwise, that portion of the claim is not adequately pled. 

The remainder of the trade secrets are not adequately identified, and to the extent the

misappropriation claim concerns those trade secrets, it is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. But because it is very likely Profil can successfully amend, it may do so within

21 calendar days of the date this order is issued.

In all other respects the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 31, 2017 ___________________________________

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge 

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