Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01083/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01083-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

v. 

Carlos Alvarez-Espinoza, 

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV-12-01083-PHX-DGC (SPL)

 CR-08-0611 PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 Carlos Alvarez-Espinoza, who is now confined in the United States Penitentiary in 

White Deer, Pennsylvania, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. CVDoc. 1; CRDoc. 388.1

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Steven P. Logan issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the 

motion be denied. CVDoc. 10. Movant filed a written objection to the R&R. CVDoc. 

16. No party has requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will 

accept the R&R and deny the motion. 

I. Background.

 Movant does not object to the R&R’s recitation of facts, and therefore the Court 

will adopt it summarily. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment against 

Movant, charging him with fifteen felony counts on January 7, 2009. 

CVDoc. 10 at 1. The government moved to dismiss two counts at the commencement of 

 1

 As in the R&R, documents filed in CV-12-0183-PHX-DGC will be referred to 

as “CVDoc” and documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-08-00611-PHXDGC, will be referred to as “CRDoc.” 

Case 2:12-cv-01083-DGC Document 17 Filed 05/28/13 Page 1 of 5
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the jury trial on June 15, 2009, in Arizona District Court. Id. The jury found Movant 

guilty of all the remaining charges. Id. at 2. The charges related to the harboring of 21 

smuggled aliens at a residence in Phoenix, Arizona, including the use and possession of a 

firearm in relation to a crime of violence. Id. at 1-2. The District Court imposed 

sentences totaling in combination of 1644 months (137 years) of imprisonment. Id. 

After sentencing, Movant filed a timely Notice of Appeal raising four issues, including 

that the court erred in not dismissing the indictment after the government failed to retain 

Osmund Sanchez as a witness when Sanchez had provided the basis for the search 

warrant. Id. at 2-3. As to that issue, the Ninth Circuit found that Defendant could not 

show that the government acted in bad faith and caused prejudice to his case because “as 

conceded at oral argument, he cannot make any such showing.” CRDoc. 354-1 at 2. The 

Ninth Circuit affirmed Movant’s convictions and sentences (id. at 3), and entered its 

formal mandate on December 28, 2010 (CRDoc. 354). Movant then filed the instant 

motion, which raises eight grounds for relief. CVDocs. 1 & 2; CRDocs. 388 & 389. 

 The R&R concludes that Movant’s grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted, 

precluded, or fail on the merits. CVDoc. 10 at 16. 

II. Discussion.

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 

must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Movant’s only objection is to the R&R’s determination 

with respect to Ground Two (Doc. 16 at 5), and the Court has reviewed that specific 

objection de novo.

2

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 The R&R recommends that to the extent Ground Two “claims that, 

notwithstanding Osmund Sanchez, other unnamed material witnesses were released 

without defense interviews” (CVDoc. 10 at 13 n. 8), that the claim is procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal and “Movant has not shown that 

prejudice resulted from appellate counsel’s failure to raise the claim” (id.). Movant 

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A. Ground Two.

 Ground Two claims that Movant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated because material witnesses were deported or released prior to Movant having 

opportunity to interview or depose them. CVDoc. 1 at 5; CVDoc. 2 at 17-22; CRDoc. 

388 at 5; CRDoc. 389 at 17-22. “To show that the government’s deportation of a an 

alien-witness violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth 

Amendment right to compulsory process, [the defendant] must show that the government 

acted in bad faith and that this conduct resulted in prejudice to his case.” United States v. 

Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Ding, 

930 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 1991)). The R&R finds that because Movant raised this issue 

on direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the argument precludes Movant from 

raising the same issue in his § 2255 motion. CVDoc. 10 at 13-14 (citing United States v. 

Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Issues disposed of on a previous direct 

appeal are not reviewable in a subsequent § 2255 preceding.”)). Movant objects to the 

R&R’s preclusion determination and argues that United States v. Leal-Del Carmen, 697 

F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2012), constitutes a subsequent change in the law that requires a 

different outcome. CVDoc. 16 at 5-7. 

 The R&R finds that “Leal-Del Carmen was confronted with the same issues, 

applied preexisting precedent, and arrived at the same conclusion as in United States v. 

Ramirez-Lopez, 315 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).” CVDoc. 10 at 14. Movant argues that 

this finding was error because Ramirez-Lopez was withdrawn and the appeal dismissed. 

CVDoc. 16 at 6 (citing United States v. Ramirez-Lopez, 315 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003), 

withdrawn by United States v. Ramirez-Lopez, 327 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Court 

agrees that the R&R erred when it cited Ramirez-Lopez, but this does not render the 

 does not appear to object to this portion of the R&R’s recommendation, and instead 

limits his objection to the R&R’s recommendation that Ground Two be denied with 

respect to the deportation of Osmund Sanchez. CVDoc. 16 at 5. The Court has 

limited its de novo review accordingly. 

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R&R’s conclusion wrong. The Ninth Circuit cited Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d at 1174, 

in its memorandum opinion in this case, rejecting Movant’s argument that the 

government’s failure to retain a witness constituted a constitutional violation. CRDoc. 

354-1 at 2. Leal-Del Carmen and Gastelum-Almeida apply the same precedent. 

Compare Leal-Del Carmen, 697 F.3d at 969-70 (citing Dring, 930 F.2d at 693-94, and 

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864-65 & 872-73 (1982), with 

Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d at 1174 (citing Dring, 930 F.2d at 693-94, and ValenzuelaBernal, 458 U.S. at 872-73)). Movant argues that Leal-Del Carmen establishes a 

presumption that a removed witness’s testimony is favorable to the defendant (CVDoc. 

16 at 15), but the case did not establish any such presumption. Leal-Del Carmen applies 

the longstanding bad faith requirement, and holds that the government acts in bad faith 

when it deports an alien witness the government knows to possess potentially exculpatory 

evidence. 697 F.3d at 970 (“Once the government is aware that an alien has potentially 

exculpatory evidence, it must treat that person as a material witness and give defense 

counsel the opportunity to interview him and make a reasoned determination whether to 

seek his retention pending trial. . . . The government remains free to deport witnesses it 

has no reason to believe possess exculpatory evidence.”). The deportation of the alien 

witness in Leal-Del Carmen was a constitutional violation because “the government 

publicly admitted that it actually knew of the deported witness’ potentially exculpatory 

testimony.” CVDoc. 16 at 14 (emphasis in original). Leal-Del Carmen does not change 

in Ninth Circuit law. See Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d at 1174 (applying bad faith test 

and stating that bad faith occurs when government deports a witnesses to gain an unfair 

tactical advantage at trial).3

 

 Movant also argues that his “appellate counsel was ineffective to the extent he 

actually ‘conceded’ lack of bad faith or prejudice.” CVDoc. 16 at 5-7. But Movant’s 

 

3 The only “presumption” discussed in Leal-Del Carmen concerns a missing witness instruction. 697 F.3d at 974. Such an instruction is not at issue in this motion. 

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§ 2255 motion raises ineffective assistance of counsel only with respect to trial 

counsel, not appellate counsel (see CVDoc. 1 at 5-6, CVDoc. 1-1), and Movant cannot 

raise in this Court arguments that were not included in his original § 2255 motion. See 

Greenhow v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d 633, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“Allowing parties to litigate their case fully before the magistrate and, if unsuccessful 

to change their strategy and present a different theory to the district court would 

frustrate the purpose of the Magistrates Act.”), overruled on other grounds by United 

States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 

1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.”).

 The Court agrees with the R&R that Movant is precluded from re-litigating ground 

two because the Ninth Circuit ruled on the same argument in Movant’s direct appeal. 

CVDoc. 10 at 13-14. See Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159, 160 (9th Cir. 1972) 

(“The law in this circuit is clear that when a matter has been decided adversely on appeal 

from a conviction, it cannot be litigated again on a 2255 motion.”). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Magistrate Judge Steven P. Logan’s R&R (Doc. 10) is accepted. 

2. The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) is denied. 

 3. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 24th day of May, 2013. 

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