Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_17-cv-00090/USCOURTS-alsd-1_17-cv-00090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES DLESTER CRANDLE, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 17-0090-KD-C

HONORABLE JUDGE BOB SHERLING,:

et al.,

:

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

James Dlester Crandle, a state pretrial detainee housed in the Mobile County 

Metro Jail, has filed a petition seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

(Doc. 1). This matter has been referred to the undersigned for the entry of a report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 

72(a)(2)(R). It is recommended that Crandle’s petition be DISMISSED without 

prejudice, prior to service, to afford him an opportunity to exhaust all available state 

remedies.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Piecing together the allegations contained in the petition (see Doc. 1, at 6-8), with 

those contained in the motion to dismiss (Doc. 3), it appears to the undersigned that 

Crandle was arrested on July 29, 2016 and incarcerated in the Mobile County Metro Jail 

on charges related to the robbery and shooting of 90-year-old Booker Green (compare 

Doc. 1 with Doc. 3). Bond was set at $250,000 by Mobile County District Judge Bob 

Sherling, which petitioner complains that he cannot afford to pay (Doc. 1, at 2 & 7) and, 

therefore, contends, violates his Eighth Amendment rights (id. at 6). In the petition, 

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Crandle seeks to challenge: (1) the seizure of his cell phone without a warrant; (2) his 

arrest on “hearsay;” (3) the unconscionable $250,000 bond, as well as the district court’s 

reliance on inaccurate evidence (that is, that he was purportedly out on bond at the time 

of his arrest on July 29, 2016) in setting the bond (see id. 6-7); and (4) the purported lack 

of evidentiary support for the charges lodged against him (see Doc. 3). Concurrent with 

filing his habeas complaint, Crandle filed a motion to proceed without prepayment of 

fees and costs (Doc. 2) and a motion to dismiss (see Doc. 3).1

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A district court has the power under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases “to examine and dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other 

pleading by the state.” Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999); see Jackson v. 

Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e 

hold that the district court possessed the discretion to raise sua sponte the timeliness 

issue.”); Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Even though the limitations 

period is an affirmative defense, a federal habeas court has the power to raise 

affirmative defenses sua sponte, as the district court did in this case.”). Rule 4 provides, 

in pertinent part, that “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits 

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the 

petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 4.

 1 In light of the contents of this report and recommendation, Crandle’s motion to 

proceed without prepayment of fees (Doc. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT, as is his motion to dismiss 

the state charges pending against him (Doc. 3).

In addition to the foregoing, the undersigned would simply note that habeas corpus is 

not the proper vehicle for Crandle to request this Court to “grant [him] a civil lawsuit[] against 

Det. Nick Crepeau[ and] A.D.A. Jennifer Wright for discriminating[] (sic) and assassinating [his] 

character to the public.” (Doc. 1, at 8.) 

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Provided two requirements are satisfied, a state pretrial detainee like Crandle

can raise constitutional claims in a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2241. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hughes, 2012 WL 255759, *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 5, 2012), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 253975 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 2012). First, the petitioner 

must be “in custody,” albeit “not pursuant to the final judgment of a state court[,]” id., 

citing Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), and, 

second, he “must have exhausted his available state remedies.” Id.; see Braden v. 30th 

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 488-489 & n.4, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1126-1127 & 

n.4, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973) (finding petitioner had satisfied § 2241(c)(3)’s “in custody” 

requirement and that he had exhausted “all available state remedies as a prelude to this 

action.”). 

Here, Crandle is incarcerated in the Mobile County Metro Jail awaiting trial on 

unknown charges arising in Mobile County, Alabama. Therefore, he satisfies the “in 

custody” requirement for purposes of § 2241.

Turning to the second requirement, the United States Supreme Court in Braden, 

supra, certainly gave every indication that a petitioner must exhaust all available state 

remedies under an action brought pursuant to § 2241. See 410 U.S. at 485-489, 93 S.Ct. at 

1125-1127. “Although the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 itself does not contain 

an exhaustion requirement, this circuit has determined that the requirements of 28 

U.S.C. § 2254, including exhaustion of state remedies, apply to a subset of petitioners to 

whom § 2241(c)(3) applies, i.e., those who are ‘in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Robinson, supra, at *2 n.3 (citations 

omitted); see also Skaggs v. Morgan, 2012 WL 684801, *3 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012) (“Despite 

the absence of an exhaustion requirement in the statutory language of § 2241(c)(3), a 

body of case law has developed holding that although § 2241 establishes jurisdiction in 

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the federal courts to consider pretrial habeas corpus petitions, federal courts should 

abstain from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be 

resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other state procedures 

available to the petitioner.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 684766 (N.D. 

Fla. Mar. 2, 2012).

A claim for federal habeas corpus relief is not exhausted so long as a petitioner 

“has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the 

question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “Section 2254(c) requires only that state 

[petitioners] give state courts a fair opportunity to act on their claims.” See O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1732, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (emphasis in

original; citations omitted). “Because the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the 

state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before 

those claims are presented to the federal courts, we conclude that state [petitioners] 

must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by 

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at 

845, 119 S.Ct. at 1732; see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-481, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2369, 

129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (“The federal habeas corpus statute . . . requires that state 

[petitioners] first seek redress in a state forum.”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477, 

93 S.Ct. 1827, 1830, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“If . . . habeas corpus is the exclusive federal 

remedy . . ., then a [petitioner] cannot seek the intervention of a federal court until he 

has first sought and been denied relief in the state courts, if a state remedy is available 

and adequate.”). 

A habeas claim is deemed to be exhausted when ”it is fair to assume that further 

state proceedings would be useless.” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 

1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). This standard is met when the precise issue raised in a 

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habeas petition has been “fairly presented” to the state’s highest court. See id. (citation 

omitted). The exhaustion requirement is not met “where the claim has been presented 

for the first and only time in a procedural context in which the merits will not be 

considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons therefor[.]’”Id. (citation 

omitted). If the claims raised in a federal habeas corpus petition have not been 

exhausted, the petition should be dismissed. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 & 7-8, 

103 S.Ct. 276, 277 & 278, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982). Each and every claim raised in the petition 

must be exhausted to the state’s highest court and it is the petitioner’s burden to show 

that all claims have been fairly presented to that court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 

520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (“[O]ur interpretation of § 2254(b), (c) 

provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any 

claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.”); 

Morales v. Shannon, 2007 WL 1877977, *3 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2007) (“A petitioner must 

exhaust state remedies as to each of his federal claims.”); United States ex rel. Quezada v. 

Uchtman, 2006 WL 3341200, *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2006) (“[T]he petitioner must properly 

assert each claim at each and every level in the state court system, either on direct 

appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings.”).

The exhaustion requirement is excused if “there is either an absence of available 

State corrective process[] or . . . circumstances exist that render such process ineffective 

to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) & (ii). A failure to 

exhaust has been excused where, because of prior rulings, resort to the state courts 

would be futile. See Allen v. State of Alabama, 728 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1984). 

Exhaustion has also been excused where the state has unreasonably delayed in acting 

on the petitioner’s efforts to invoke state remedies or fails to address the petition 

without explanation. See, e.g., Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A 

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federal habeas petitioner need not wait until his state petitions for relief are exhausted, if 

the state court has unreasonably or without explanation failed to address petitions for 

relief.”), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938, 112 S.Ct. 1478, 117 L.Ed.2d 621 (1992); Cook v. Florida 

Parole & Probation Comm’n, 749 F.2d 678, 679 (11th Cir. 1985) (“State remedies will be 

found ineffective and a federal habeas petitioner will be excused from exhausting them 

in the case of unreasonable, unexplained state delays in acting on the petitioner’s 

motion for state relief.”). Finally, other special or exceptional circumstances may also 

excuse exhaustion. See, e.g., Clarke v. Grimes, 374 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1967) (“It is true 

that under Fay v. Noia, the federal trial court has broad discretion to hear a habeas 

corpus petition though state remedies have not been exhausted, if there are 

circumstances which demand relief to protect the rights of the prisoner.”).

In this case, Crandle certainly has not exhausted his claims (see Doc. 1, at 6-8) in 

the Alabama Supreme Court nor has he established any basis for this Court to excuse 

the exhaustion requirement. Because petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims in state 

court, he is not entitled to relief pursuant to § 2241.

In addition to the foregoing, 

under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should abstain 

from intervening in a state criminal prosecution until all state criminal 

proceedings are completed and a petitioner exhausts available state 

remedies, unless the petitioner demonstrates (1) evidence of bad faith 

prosecution, (2) irreparable injury if abstention is exercised by the federal 

court, or (3) the absence of an adequate alternative state forum where the 

constitutional issues can be raised. Only in the most unusual 

circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way 

of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has 

been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts. Absent 

such exceptional circumstances, a pretrial detainee may not adjudicate the 

merits of his constitutional claims before a judgment of conviction has 

been entered by a state court. Derailing of a pending state proceeding by 

an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court 

is not allowed. Federal habeas relief should not be used as a pretrial 

motion forum for state prisoners.

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Robinson, supra, at *2 (internal citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted). Nothing 

about Crandle’s allegations establish evidence of bad faith prosecution nor do his sparse 

allegations entitle him to review under the “irreparable injury” exception recognized in 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746, 755, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). See id. at *3. 

Finally, petitioner has made no showing that he has no available state corrective 

process, nor does he present any argument warranting “federal court interference in the 

normal functioning” of Alabama’s criminal processes. Id. As noted by the Robinson

court, the state courts of Alabama offer “adequate and effective state procedures for 

review of [petitioner]’s constitutional claims either before trial or, in the event 

[petitioner] is convicted, through appellate and post-conviction proceedings.” Id. 

Because Crandle has not established any reason for this Court to excuse him 

from the exhaustion requirement, his § 2241 petition is due to be dismissed without 

prejudice to afford him the opportunity to exhaust all available state court remedies 

before pursuing federal habeas corpus relief.

“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal 

may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). State pretrial detainees, like Crandle, “must obtain a 

COA to appeal the denial of a federal habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2241.” Daker v. Warren, 2012 WL 2403437, *8 (N.D. Ga. June 25, 2012) (citations omitted); 

see also Hiteshaw v. Butterfield, 262 Fed.Appx. 162, 163 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2008) 

(“Hiteshaw’s detention arises out of a state court pre-trial detention order issued after 

the court found probable cause to believe that Hiteshaw was a sexually violent predator 

under the Jimmy Ryce Act. Our reasoning in Medberry supports that Hiteshaw’s 

detention arises out of process issued by a state court because the detention arose from 

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a state court detention order[; thus, petitioner was required to obtain a COA to 

appeal.]”);2 Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.3 (11th Cir.) (“[S]tate prisoners 

proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a COA to appeal.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900, 124 

S.Ct. 258, 157 L.Ed.2d 181 (2003). A certificate of appealability may issue only where 

“the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(2). Where, as here, a habeas petition is being denied on procedural 

grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying constitutional claim, “a COA 

should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct 

in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 

L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 

L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must ‘sho[w] that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition 

should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 

“adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”’”). Inasmuch as the petitioner 

has not exhausted state remedies and has not established any reason for this Court to 

excuse him from exhaustion of those remedies, a reasonable jurist could not conclude 

either that this Court is in error in dismissing Crandle’s petition, without prejudice, for 

want of jurisdiction or that Crandle should be allowed to proceed further, Slack, supra, 

529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the 

district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not 

 2 There is simply no question but that Crandle’s detention arises out of process 

issued by an Alabama state court.

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conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the 

petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.”). 

Because a § 2241 petitioner must obtain a COA to appeal, the same as a § 2254 

petitioner, the undersigned simply notes that Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 

Cases provides for the following procedure: “Before entering the final order, the court 

may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 

Accordingly, if there is an objection to this recommendation by Bass, he may bring this 

argument to the attention of the district judge in the objections permitted to this report 

and recommendation. Brightwell v. Patterson, CA 11-0165-WS-C, Doc. 14 (Eleventh 

Circuit order denying petitioner’s motions for a COA and to appeal IFP in a case in 

which this Court set out the foregoing procedure); see also Castrejon v. United States, 2011 

WL 3241817, *20 (S.D. Ala. June 28, 2011) (providing for the same procedure), report and

recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3241580 (S.D. Ala. July 29, 2011); Griffin v. DeRosa, 2010 

WL 3943702, *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2010) (providing for same procedure), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Griffin v. Butterworth, 2010 WL 3943699 (N.D.Fla. Oct. 5, 

2010). 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that James Dlester Crandle’s habeas corpus 

petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be DISMISSED without prejudice to afford 

him an opportunity to exhaust all available state remedies. Petitioner is not entitled to a 

certificate of appealability and, therefore, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

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written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c)(1) & (2). The parties should note that under Eleventh 

Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was 

informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal 

for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing 

before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 14th day of March, 2017.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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