Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00892/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00892-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Scott Lee DeShaw, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00892-PHX-JAT (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner initiated this action on May 18, 2015 by filing a Motion to Hold Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Abeyance Pending Exhaustion of Appellate Issues in State 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) The Court recommends the 

Petition be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to Petitioner’s failure to 

obtain advance leave from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to file 

a second-or-successive habeas petition in this Court. 

I. Prior Federal Habeas Proceeding 

 In 1997, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Maricopa County Superior Court of 

first degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery, and was sentenced to natural life for 

the murder and consecutive terms of imprisonment for the other counts. (Doc. 8-1 at 24, 

31, 38.) On October 29, 1998, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction and sentence, and on May 27, 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review. (Doc. 8-1 at 25, 31.) Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which 

was denied. (Doc. 8-1 at 25.) Petitioner then filed his first habeas corpus petition, 

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challenging his conviction and asserting that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments were violated (1) when the trial court failed to suppress evidence seized due 

to an illegal search and seizure, and (2) when the prosecutor made certain statements 

during his closing argument. (Doc. 8-1 at 25.) On March 14, 2002, this Court denied 

habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 8-1 at 30-35.) On February 20, 2003, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed. (Doc. 8-1 at 36-37.) 

II. State Proceedings post-Miller

 On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 

2455 (2012), in which the Court held that imposition of a mandatory life sentence 

without the possibility of parole on a person who was less than 18 years of age at the time 

of an offense violated the Eighth Amendment absent individualized consideration of the 

offender’s age. On June 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a successive state petition for postconviction relief in the trial court based on Miller. (Doc. 8-1 at 38.) On July 8, 2013, 

the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s successive post-conviction petition. (Doc. 8-1 at 38-

39.) On April 21, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief. 

(Doc. 8-1 at 42-44.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme 

Court. On January 5, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review. State of Arizona v. Deshaw, CR-15-0156-PR, 2016 Ariz. LEXIS 9 (Jan. 5, 2016). 

III. Successive Habeas Proceedings 

 On May 18, 2015, Petitioner filed this pending “Protective Petition,” in which he 

asserts one ground for relief—that his “continued incarceration violates the Eighth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and [the] U.S. Supreme Court[‘s]” decision in 

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). (Doc. 1 at 16-23.) On the same day, 

Petitioner filed his Motion to hold his Petition in abeyance. (Doc. 1 at 1-4.) In his 

Motion, Petitioner requested the Court stay this matter pending the outcome of his 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at 3.) This Court denied as 

moot Petitioner’s request to stay the matter because the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

Petitioner’s petition for review. State of Arizona v. Deshaw, CR-15-0156-PR, 2016 Ariz. 

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LEXIS 9 (Jan. 5, 2016). (Doc. 11.) 

IV. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 Respondents assert that because “the Ninth Circuit has not granted Petitioner’s 

application to file a second or successive habeas petition, this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over the petition.” (Doc. 8 at 3.) Respondent is correct. “Before a second or successive 

application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move 

in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider 

the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Because Petitioner has not received 

permission to file a successive petition in this court, the court is without jurisdiction and 

the petition must be dismissed. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (holding that 

district court lacks jurisdiction over unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition); 

Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). 

 Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3(a), this matter would be referred to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. “Petitioner’s failure to obtain leave to file from the Circuit 

justifies dismissal without prejudice, and Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3(a) plainly requires the 

Court to refer the petition to the Circuit.” Taylor v. Gonzales, CV 14-06394-VBF-JC, 

2014 WL 4826167, *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014). But on May 12, 2015, Petitioner filed 

an Application for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition with the Ninth Circuit. 

(Doc. 8-1, Ex A, at 11.)1

 Because Petitioner’s request to file a successive petition is 

pending before the Ninth Circuit, this Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the matter. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court is without 

subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition now under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The 

 

1

 Once Petitioner filed his Application with the Ninth Circuit, the statute of 

limitations was tolled. See Orona v. United States, 826 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 

filing of a second or successive application in our court tolls the 1–year statute of limitations . . . until our court rules on the application.”). 

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Court will therefore recommend that the Petition (Doc. 1) be dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of November, 2016. 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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