Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01720/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01720-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1121 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

SEBASTIAN BROWN PRODUCTIONS,

LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MUZOOKA, INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-CV-01720-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

Re: Dkt. No. 37 

Plaintiff Sebastian Brown Productions, LLC (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants Muzooka, Inc. 

(“Muzooka”), Shawn Wilson (“Wilson”), Chester Aldridge (“Aldridge”) and Ivory Octaves, LLC 

(“Ivory Octaves”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for unfair competition and trademark infringement 

under federal and state law. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. ECF No. 37. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the 

record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. 

 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

1. Plaintiff’s Business 

Plaintiff is a California limited liability company headquartered in Livermore, California. 

Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff owns and operates the digital media storefront MuZook at muzook.com. Id. 

Plaintiff aims to create “a new and unique art form in multi-media books, multi-media audio, 

and/or audiovisual works,” including ebooks, multi-media songs, short films, and music videos. 

Id. ¶ 13. Through muzook.com, Plaintiff advertises and sells downloadable music, videos, and 

books, including works of fiction and non-fiction incorporating “narrative textual content, music, 

and illustrations.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 21. Additionally, muzook.com has “an artists’ collaboration program 

. . . to promote cooperation among various creative artists” in making “literature, music, video, 

movies, soundtracks, e-books, concerts and other forms of entertainment.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 15. 

Plaintiff claims ownership of the service mark “MUZOOK,” based on one pending 

trademark application and one issued trademark registration. Id. ¶ 16. Both properties stem from 

a common intent-to-use (“ITU”) application for “MUZOOK” filed on September 12, 2011 by the 

individual J. Michael Miller (“Miller”). Id.; ECF No. 47 (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, 

or “RJN”), Exs. A-B. The ITU application sought to register “MUZOOK” for, among other 

similar services, “[c]ollaboration tools and services, namely telecommunication access services 

allowing parties to view, listen to, adapt, and share materials.” RJN Ex. A. 

On August 30, 2013, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) granted a request to 

divide the ITU application into a “parent” application, serial number 85420834, and a “child” 

application, serial number 85980000. Id. Exs. A-B. The parent application encompasses the 

original ITU application, and thus seeks to register “MUZOOK” for a range of similar 

“[c]ollaboration tools and services.” Id. Ex. A. By contrast, the child application seeks to register 

“MUZOOK” for narrower services, including “[c]ollaboration services, namely, 

telecommunication access services which allow parties to view, adapt, and share materials such as 

narrative textual content, music and illustrations in works of fiction and non-fiction.” Id. Ex. B. 

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Miller filed a statement of use in the child application, which the PTO accepted on 

September 11, 2013. Id. Accordingly, the PTO issued U.S. Trademark Registration Number 

4,419,977 for “MUZOOK” for the services claimed in the child application on October 15, 2013 

(the “Registered Mark”). The first use in commerce of the Registered Mark was recorded as of 

August 14, 2013. Id. Miller has not assigned the Registered Mark and remains its owner. Id.

On the other hand, Miller assigned the interest in the parent application to Plaintiff on 

November 25, 2013. Id. Ex. A. Plaintiff has not filed a statement of use for the parent 

application, and thus the parent application remains pending (the “Pending Mark”). Id. The PTO 

has granted five extensions of time for Plaintiff to file a statement of use. Id. However, Plaintiff 

has allegedly used the Pending Mark—along with the Registered Mark—in connection with 

Plaintiff’s Internet presence and business promotions. Compl. ¶ 18. 

2. Defendant’s Business 

Defendant Muzooka is a Delaware corporation and the successor to Ivory Octaves. 

Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendants Wilson and Aldridge are cofounders, directors, and officers of 

Muzooka. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Defendants operate the website muzooka.com as well as a dedicated mobile 

app called Muzooka. Id. ¶¶ 2, 24. The website and mobile app allow users to stream audio in the 

form of music playlists or individual tracks, and offer “interactive capabilities” for sharing 

listening activity through social media. Id. ¶ 24. The website and app also allow users to browse 

artist biographies, view art in connection with those biographies, and purchase select tracks. Id. 

Additionally, Defendants operate “Muzooka” Twitter, Facebook, and Tumbler accounts in 

connection with the website and mobile app. Id. 

Muzooka filed for the trademark and service mark “MUZOOKA” (the “Muzooka Mark”) 

on December 19, 2011. ECF No. 46-1, Ex. D.1

 Muzooka first used the Muzooka Mark in 

 

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 Defendants do not include the Muzooka Mark registration in their request for judicial notice, see 

ECF No. 47, but attach a copy to their reply brief, ECF No. 46-1 Ex. D. The registration is a 

matter of public record, and “[i]n deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), a court may look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record.” See Shaw 

v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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commerce in December 2011. Id. The PTO registered the Muzooka Mark on December 10, 2013, 

as U.S. Trademark Registration Number 4,448,314. Id. The Muzooka Mark is registered for, 

among other services, “computer software for use in the delivery, distribution and transmission of 

digital music and entertainment-related audio, video, text and multimedia content.” Id. 

B. Procedural History 

On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Delaware. ECF No. 1. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have used the Muzooka 

Mark in direct competition with Plaintiff since at least March 11, 2013. Id. ¶¶ 25, 30. According 

to Plaintiff, Defendants’ use of the Muzooka Mark in connection with “the distribution of 

electronically-delivered media, including audio, visual, and audiovisual works” and the offering of 

“new music and interactive experiences to users” is “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to 

deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of Defendants’ products and services.” Id. ¶¶ 30, 33. 

On that basis, Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (1) unfair competition; (2) infringement of 

common-law trademark rights; and (3) unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1125(a). Id. ¶¶ 39-54. Plaintiff seeks damages and the disgorgement of profits, as well as an 

order enjoining Defendants’ use of the Muzooka Mark and requiring the destruction of materials 

bearing the Muzooka Mark. Id. at 12-13. 

Plaintiff filed an executed summons for Muzooka on January 8, 2014. ECF No. 5. 

Plaintiff filed executed summonses for the remaining defendants on February 25, 2014. ECF Nos. 

6-8. On June 5, 2015, after no appearance by Defendants, Plaintiff moved for entry of default. 

ECF No. 10. On June 6, 2014, the Delaware district court entered default as to all defendants. 

ECF No. 11. The parties then stipulated to set aside the entry of default, which the Delaware 

district court granted on June 11, 2014. ECF No. 12. On March 30, 2015, the Delaware district 

court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants and transferred 

the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. ECF No. 27. 

On April 16, 2015, the Court issued a case management scheduling order. ECF No. 29. 

On July 6, 2015, Defendants Muzooka, Aldridge, and Wilson filed the instant motion to dismiss. 

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ECF No. 37 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff opposed the motion on July 20, 2015. ECF No. 45 (“Opp.”). On 

July 27, 2015, the three defendants replied and filed a request for judicial notice. ECF No. 46; 

RJN. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires a 

plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, see 

Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look beyond the plaintiff’s 

complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion 

for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor must the 

Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Mere 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). 

B. Rule 12(b)(5) Service of Process 

“Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural 

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requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 

484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); see also Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 350 

(1999) (“In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court 

ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant.”). “Once 

service is challenged, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that service was valid under Rule 

4.” Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 4A Charles A. Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2003)). “[N]either actual 

notice, nor simply naming the person in the caption of the complaint, will subject defendants to 

personal jurisdiction if service was not made in substantial compliance with Rule 4.” Crowley v. 

Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2013) (brackets omitted). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) governs service of individuals within a judicial 

district of the United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Pursuant to that rule, service may be effectuated 

by “following state law for servicing a summons in an action brought in courts of general 

jurisdiction where the district court is located or where service is made.” Id. Rule 4(e) permits 

three additional methods of service: (1) delivering copies of the summons and complaint to the 

individual personally; (2) leaving copies of the summons and complaint at the individual’s 

dwelling; and (3) delivering copies of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized to 

receive service. Id.

C. Leave to Amend 

If the court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 

amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose 

of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Nonetheless, a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith 

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

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amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 

522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendants contend that Ivory Octaves must be dismissed because Ivory Octaves does not 

exist. Defendants also contend that Wilson and Aldridge must be dismissed because of 

insufficient service of process. Defendants further contend that the complaint should be dismissed 

as to all defendants for failure to state a claim. The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 

A. Ivory Octaves 

Defendants argue that no plausible claim for relief can be stated against Ivory Octaves 

because the company is no longer in operation. Mot. at 7. In the complaint, Plaintiff 

acknowledges that Ivory Octaves “filed a certificate of conversion and incorporation with the 

Delaware Secretary of State and become Muzooka, Inc. as of January 1, 2013.” Compl. ¶ 3. In 

the opposition, Plaintiff abandons any claim against Ivory Octaves as a separate entity, and notes 

that “Ivory Octaves, LLC and Muzooka are one and the same.” Opp. at 10. Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against Ivory Octaves with prejudice. 

B. Service of Process 

On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Delaware. ECF No. 1. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff then had 120 days, 

or until May 6, 2014, to serve Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). According to Defendants, 

Plaintiff has not yet properly served Wilson or Aldridge. Mot. at 8. Defendants do not dispute 

that Muzooka was properly served. 

Plaintiff counters that Wilson and Aldridge were served on February 25, 2014. ECF No. 6, 

8. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff “deliver[ed] a copy of [the summons and the 

complaint] to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process” for 

Wilson and Aldridge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(C). Plaintiff relies on the executed summonses 

for Wilson and Aldridge filed with the Court. ECF Nos. 6, 8. Each summons provides that the 

summons was served on “Stewart Permar, the UPS Store, who is designated by law to accept 

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service of process on behalf of Muzooka, Inc.” ECF Nos. 6, 8 (emphasis added). However, these 

summonses plainly fail to comply with Rule 4(e)(2)(C). Nowhere do the summonses—or any 

other allegations by Plaintiff—indicate that Permar was authorized to accept service for Wilson or 

Aldridge. See ECF Nos. 6, 8;2 see also Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 801 (noting plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing proper service).

Rather than defend the summonses’ compliance with Rule 4, Plaintiff argues that the Court 

should excuse the delay and set a date for proper service.3 Opp. at 11-12. The Court “must extend 

time for service upon a showing of good cause” by Plaintiff. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 976. In the 

Ninth Circuit, “[a]t a minimum, ‘good cause’ means excusable neglect.” In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 

507, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, “a plaintiff may be required to show the following factors 

in order to bring the excuse to the level of good cause: ‘(a) the party to be served received actual 

notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer no prejudice; and (c) plaintiff would be 

severely prejudiced if his complaint were dismissed.’” Id. (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 

754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)). Further, “[a] defendant’s affirmative actions, which frustrate service, 

may constitute good cause for failure to effect timely service . . . .” Hearst v. West, 31 Fed. App’x 

366, 368 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The first two factors that courts may consider in evaluating good cause are clearly met in 

 

2

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Defendants’ first motion to dismiss in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, that 

neither of them authorized Permar to accept service. See Mot. at 2 (citing Wilson and Aldridge 

declarations). This Court may not “look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint” to matters outside the 

pleadings, unless the Court refers to judicially noticeable facts or matters of public record. Shaw, 

56 F.3d at 1129 n. 1; Shwarz, 234 F.3d at 435. Defendants did not request judicial notice of these 

declarations, nor do Defendants argue that the declarations are matters of public record. See Mot. 

at 2. Accordingly, it is improper for this Court to consider the declarations of Wilson and 

Aldridge in ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

3

 On October 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed two additional summonses with the Court, one each for 

Wilson and Aldridge. ECF Nos. 53-54. The new summonses indicate that Plaintiff left a copy of 

the summons, complaint, and additional Court filings with an associate at the law firm 

representing Defendants. ECF Nos. 53-54. It is not clear whether Wilson or Aldridge authorized 

this associate to accept service on their behalves. Plaintiff does not point to any provision of Rule 

4, or to Delaware or California state law, that permits service in this manner. Accordingly, this 

Order expresses no opinion on whether Wilson and Aldridge have been properly served as of the 

time of this Order. 

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this case. First, Wilson and Aldridge have long had actual notice of the lawsuit. Second, 

Defendants do not argue that any prejudice would result from permitting service. Both individuals 

joined the June 10, 2014 stipulation to set aside the entry of default in the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Delaware. ECF No. 12. That stipulation states that the parties, including Wilson 

and Aldridge, began settlement discussions on February 12, 2014. Id. Additionally, Wilson and 

Aldridge have actively litigated the case by filing a motion to transfer venue and multiple motions 

to dismiss, including the instant motion to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 13, 37; see also Cox v. Cnty. of 

Yuba, No. 2:09-CV-01894-MCE-JFM, 2011 WL 590733, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (noting 

lack of prejudice when the delay in service does not impact the defendants’ ability to adequately 

defend their positions). 

However, the third good-cause factor is not met. Plaintiff does not assert that Plaintiff will 

suffer any prejudice from dismissal of this action, let alone be “severely prejudiced.” See In re 

Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512. Moreover, Plaintiff offers no reason to excuse Plaintiff’s facially 

improper service. See id. (noting good cause requires “excusable neglect” (emphasis added)). 

Plaintiff does not explain why Plaintiff was able to engage in discussions with Defendants’ 

counsel and yet unable to serve Wilson and Aldridge. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. McInnis, 

No. 10-CV-01614-LHK, 2010 WL 3366413, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010) (finding no good 

cause shown when the plaintiff fails to explain why the plaintiff could serve defendants with a 

Clerk’s notice but not the summons and complaint). Although Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ 

counsel refused to provide Wilson’s and Aldridge’s addresses to Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not request 

those addresses until July 6, 2015—two months after the deadline for service under Rule 4(m). 

See ECF No. 45-1 (Declaration of Anthony H. Handal). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish 

good cause. 

Absent good cause, courts have discretion “to extend the time for service or to dismiss the 

action without prejudice.” In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 513. The Ninth Circuit has not set forth 

specific factors to consider in making discretionary determinations under Rule 4(m). Id. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “a district court may consider factors like a statute of 

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limitations bar, prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.” Efaw 

v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts may also consider whether the plaintiff 

has substantially complied with the service requirements. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., 2010 WL 

3366413, at *1. 

Although Plaintiff has not established good cause, the Court exercises its discretion to 

grant an extension of the time for service. As noted, Wilson and Aldridge have actual notice of 

the lawsuit, and have had such notice since at least February 2014. See ECF No. 12. Defendants 

claim no prejudice from the delay. See generally Mot. at 8. Moreover, Plaintiffs have attempted 

service on Wilson and Aldridge. See ECF Nos. 6, 8. Additionally, there is no dispute that 

Muzooka was properly served. Plaintiff asserts the same claims against Muzooka, Wilson, and 

Aldridge; thus, adjudicating the claims together will promote judicial efficiency. Therefore, the 

Court finds that an extension of service will best serve the interests of the “just, speedy and 

efficient disposition” of Plaintiff’s claims. See Full Circle Sales, Inc. v. Organic Alliance, Inc., 

No. 10-CV-01615-LHK, 2010 WL 3324707, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2010) (granting extension 

of time for service when one defendant had actual notice and settlement discussions were 

ongoing). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Wilson and Aldridge 

for insufficient service of process and hereby ORDERS Plaintiff to properly serve Wilson and 

Aldridge within thirty (30) days of this Order. Service should include the summons, complaint, 

initial case management order, and any supplemental filings required by Civil Local Rule 4-2. No 

further extensions shall be granted. 

C. Failure to state a claim 

Defendants offer two reasons to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim: (1) the 

complaint impermissibly lumps all the defendants together such that no defendant is on notice of 

the claims against it; and (2) Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a violation of federal or state law. 

The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 

1. Impermissible Lumping of Defendants 

Defendants argue that the complaint “fails to provide fair notice to Defendants of the 

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claims being asserted against them as the Complaint merely alleges wrongdoing against 

‘Defendants’ without specifying which Defendant may have committed the act. Each Defendant 

is entitled to know the specific acts or omissions which it must defend.” Mot. at 4 (citation 

omitted). Defendants further argue that the complaint attributes the conduct of “Defendants” to 

Wilson and Aldridge “without providing any reason or basis for lumping Defendants together or 

specifying individual wrongful conduct,” or offering any allegations “to support piercing the 

corporate veil of Muzooka.” Id. at 5. Plaintiffs counter that Wilson and Aldridge share liability 

for Muzooka’s trademark infringement because Wilson and Aldridge had control of Muzooka and 

“infringed or induced infringement” of Plaintiff’s trademark. Opp. at 9-10. 

As a general rule, when a pleading fails “to allege what role each Defendant played in the 

alleged harm,” this “makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for individual Defendants to 

respond to Plaintiffs’ allegations.” Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., No. 14-CV-02147-

LHK, 2015 WL 5118509, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (quoting In re iPhone Application 

Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)). 

Accordingly, a complaint which “lump[s] together . . . multiple defendants in one broad allegation 

fails to satisfy [the] notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2).” Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., Inc., 

926 F. Supp. 948, 961 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 

(N.D. Cal. 1988)). A plaintiff “must identify what action each Defendant took that caused 

Plaintiffs’ harm, without resort to generalized allegations against Defendants as a whole.” In re 

iPhone, 2011 WL 4403963, at *3. Put another way, a plaintiff’s allegations must “provide 

sufficient notice to all of the Defendants as to the nature of the claims being asserted against 

them,” including “what conduct is at issue.” Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-CV-04137 

JCS, 2014 WL 1338297, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014). 

Construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—as the Court must in 

ruling on a motion to dismiss, see Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031—the Court finds that the complaint 

does not impermissibly lump Defendants together in stating claims for direct infringement and 

unfair competition. Viewed favorably, Plaintiff alleges that Wilson and Aldridge, while directors 

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and officers of Muzooka, committed the acts of infringement described in the complaint. Compl. 

¶¶ 4-5. In other words, the complaint alleges that “Defendants”—including Wilson, Aldridge, and 

Muzooka—used the allegedly infringing Muzooka Mark, including by operating muzooka.com 

and the Muzooka Twitter, Facebook, and Tumbler accounts. Id. ¶¶ 24-31. The Court finds that 

such allegations “provide [Muzooka, Wilson, and Aldridge] sufficient notice as to the nature of the 

claims asserted,” including “what conduct is at issue.” See Villalpando, 2014 WL 1338297, at *5. 

Compare Adobe Sys. Inc., 2015 WL 5118509, at *10 (finding complaint provided sufficient notice 

when allegations were “that all the Defendants infringed Adobe’s trademarks and copyrights, and 

that Blue Source specifically sold infringing products”), with Gen-Probe, 926 F. Supp. at 960 

(finding complaint did not provide sufficient notice when it was unclear which claims applied to 

which defendants). 

Moreover, Wilson and Aldridge may be held liable for acts of trademark infringement that 

they committed, even if the infringement was for the benefit of Muzooka. See Comm. for Idaho’s 

High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that individuals that formed 

a corporation with an infringing name were liable under the Lanham Act for using in commerce a 

name which is likely to confuse). “[A] corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable 

for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he 

acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf.” Id. (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac 

Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Coastal Abstract Serv., 

Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding corporate officer liable 

for making an actionable statement under the Lanham Act); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 

816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1987) (“A corporate official may be held personally liable for tortious 

conduct committed by him, though committed primarily for the benefit of the corporation. This is 

true in trademark infringement and unfair trade practices cases.”). Accordingly, the Court declines 

to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff improperly lumps the defendants together in 

the allegations about Defendants’ infringement of Plaintiff’s trademark rights. 

While the Court finds the complaint itself does not impermissibly lump Defendants 

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together, Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss does impermissibly lump Defendants 

together. In response to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiff asserts that Wilson and Aldridge share 

liability with Muzooka because each defendant committed acts of infringement and because 

Wilson and Aldridge have contributory or vicarious liability for inducing infringement of 

Plaintiff’s trademark. Opp. at 9-10. However, the claims for relief do not differentiate between 

inducers (Wilson and Aldridge) and non-inducers (presumably, Muzooka). See Compl. ¶¶ 39-54. 

In fact, the claims for relief do not refer to inducement at all. See id. (noting “Defendants have 

used, in connection with goods and/or services, a false designation of origin . . .” (emphasis 

added)). Moreover, there are no factual allegations about inducement in the complaint, save for 

the conclusory allegation that Wilson and Aldridge “personally committed and/or induced the 

commission of acts of infringement.” See id. ¶¶ 4-5. Instead, the factual allegations—like the 

claims for relief—allege only acts of direct infringement of Plaintiff’s trademark rights. See id.

¶¶ 24-31. Accordingly, if Plaintiff does intend to state a claim for secondary liability, Plaintiff 

impermissibly lumps Defendants together. See Gen-Probe, 926 F. Supp. at 960 (finding 

complaint did not provide sufficient notice when it was unclear which claims applied to which 

defendants). 

Consequently, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that the 

complaint states a claim for inducing infringement of Plaintiff’s trademark rights. The Court 

dismisses with leave to amend, as Plaintiff could cure the deficiencies identified herein by 

including some factual specificity as to whether any inducement claims apply to particular 

defendants. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (district court should give leave to amend if the pleading 

can be cured by the allegation of other facts). The Court otherwise DENIES Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss as to impermissibly lumping defendants together. 

2. Sufficiency of the Allegations 

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim for relief. 

Mot. at 5-7. In the briefing on this motion, both parties focus on Plaintiff’s claims for common 

law trademark infringement and Lanham Act unfair competition. Neither party separately 

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addresses Plaintiff’s claim for state law unfair competition. See generally id.; Opp. Accordingly, 

the Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claims for common law trademark infringement and Lanham 

Act unfair competition, and then turns to Plaintiff’s state law claim for unfair competition. 

a. Common Law Trademark Infringement and Lanham Act Unfair Competition 

i. Elements of the Causes of Action 

Plaintiff asserts common law trademark infringement and Lanham Act unfair competition 

claims against all Defendants. Both of these claims require Plaintiff to allege: (1) ownership 

interest in a mark, and (2) the likelihood of the infringing mark being confused with the plaintiff’s 

mark. See Wood v. Apodaca, 375 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947-48 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (California common 

law) (citing Am. Petrofina v. Petrofina of Cal., Inc., 596 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1979); Brookfield 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (unfair 

competition under the Lanham Act). An ownership interest is demonstrated through priority of 

use. See Wood, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 948 (citing Am. Petrofina, 596 F.2d at 897 (“[W]hosoever first 

adopts and uses a trade name, either within or without the state, is its original owner.”)); Sengoku 

Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic in trademark 

law that the standard test of ownership is priority of use.”). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead either element of common law trademark 

infringement or Lanham Act unfair competition. According to Defendants, (1) Plaintiff lacks an 

ownership interest in “MUZOOK” because Defendants have priority of use, and (2) Plaintiff fails 

to sufficiently allege a likelihood of confusion between “MUZOOK” and Defendants’ Muzooka 

Mark. Mot. at 5-7. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not alleged a protectable 

ownership interest, the Court need not address the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s likelihood of 

confusion allegations. 

ii. Ownership of a Mark 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks an ownership interest in “MUZOOK” because 

Plaintiff does not establish use of the Registered or Pending Marks prior to December 2011, when 

Defendants first used the Muzooka Mark in commerce. Mot. at 7. Plaintiff only cursorily 

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responds to this argument. See Opp at 10-11. However, Plaintiff may seek to claim priority of use 

on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff owns the Registered and Pending Marks, and thus has priority of use 

dating back to the filing of the applications for registration; and (2) Plaintiff used the Registered 

and Pending Marks in commerce before Defendants used the Muzooka Mark. The Court 

addresses these grounds in turn. 

First, Plaintiff asserts that priority of use is established by the date that the applications for 

the Registered and Pending Marks were filed: September 12, 2011. Opp. at 10; Compl. ¶¶ 16, 20.4 

When proving ownership of a mark, registration on the principal register in the PTO is “prima 

facie evidence . . . of the registrant’s ownership of the mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); see also 

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047. Therefore, once a mark is registered, the registrant is granted a 

rebuttable presumption of ownership dating back to the filing date of the ITU application for 

federal registration. See Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1111 n.3 

(9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the date an ITU application was filed “becomes the applicant’s 

constructive-use date”). “This gives the applicant priority of use over anyone who adopts the 

mark after the constructive-use date.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)). Accordingly, Plaintiff 

claims September 12, 2011, the date that the ITU applications for the Registered and Pending 

Marks were filed, as the date of Plaintiff’s first use of the Registered and Pending Marks. Compl. 

¶¶ 16, 20. 

Defendants first contend that Plaintiff cannot rely on the Registered Mark to demonstrate 

priority because Plaintiff is not the owner of the Registered Mark. Mot. at 5-6. The Court agrees. 

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Registered Mark was assigned to Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 20; 

 

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and Lanham Act unfair competition claims, “[r]egistration under the Lanham Act has no effect on 

the registrant’s rights under the common law, which requires a mark to have been used in 

commerce before a protectable ownership interest in the mark arises.” Dep’t of Parks & 

Recreation for State of Cal. v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, the Court considers the impact of registration on priority of use only for Plaintiff’s 

Lanham Act unfair competition claim. By contrast, the Court considers below Plaintiff’s use of 

the Registered and Pending Marks in commerce to determine any priority of use for Plaintiff’s 

Lanham Act unfair competition and common law trademark infringement claims. 

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Opp. at 10. However, there is no assignment of the Registered Mark recorded with the PTO. See 

RJN Ex. B. Rather, an individual (Miller) is listed as the owner of the Registered Mark. Id. 

Plaintiff points to no other facts or authority supporting Plaintiff’s ownership of the Registered 

Mark. Although this Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true for the purposes of a 

motion to dismiss, see Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031, the Court need not accept as true allegations 

contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, see Shwarz, 234 F.3d at 435. Because judicially 

noticeable facts show that Plaintiff does not own the Registered Mark, Plaintiff cannot establish 

priority of use based on the Registered Mark. See Shwarz, 234 F.3d at 435. 

Defendants next contend that Plaintiff cannot rely on the application for the Pending Mark 

to claim priority. Mot. at 6-7. Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff’s ownership of the Pending 

Mark, but argue that Plaintiff cannot use the ITU application to establish priority because the 

Pending Mark is not registered. Id. Again, the Court agrees with Defendants. As discussed 

above, the filing date of an ITU application may be used as the constructive-use date of the mark, 

which provides priority of use over anyone who later adopts the mark. See Zombondo Entm’t, 

LLC, 602 F.3d at 1111 n.3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)). However, this constructive-use date is 

established only once the mark is registered. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“Contingent 

on the registration of a mark . . . the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute 

constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority . . . . (emphasis added)); CreAgri, Inc. v. 

USANA Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626, n.7 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]s long as an applicant’s mark is 

eventually granted registration on the principal register . . . the filing of an intent to use application 

constitutes ‘constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect.’”). 

The Pending Mark has not been registered. RJN Ex. A. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot claim 

priority rights from the date the ITU application for the Pending Mark was filed. See Zombondo 

Entm’t, LLC, 602 F.3d at 1111 n.3. 

Second, other than through registration, Plaintiff may claim priority of use by alleging that 

Plaintiff used “MUZOOK” in commerce before Defendants used the Muzooka Mark in 

commerce. See Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for State of Cal. v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 

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1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing use in commerce under California common law); see 

also Sengoku Works Ltd., 96 F.3d at 1219 (discussing ownership under the Lanham Act and 

noting that “the party claiming ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in the 

sale of goods or services”). Defendants argue that they began using the Muzooka Mark as early as 

December 2011, and Plaintiff has failed to show that Plaintiff used the Pending Mark before that 

date. Thus, Defendants say, Plaintiff has no protectable interest in a mark and cannot state a claim 

for common law trademark infringement or Lanham Act unfair competition. 

The Court agrees with Defendants. Having reviewed the complaint, it is not clear when 

Plaintiff first began to use the Pending Mark in commerce. The complaint alleges only that 

Plaintiff has “for several years” engaged in promoting the production of creative works and 

developing the MuZook website. Compl. ¶ 12. Moreover, Plaintiff does not offer a first date of 

use in opposition to the motion to dismiss. See generally Opp. This is insufficient to show that 

Plaintiff used the Pending Mark in commerce before Defendants used the Muzooka Mark in 

December 2011. See ECF No. 46-1, Ex. D (Muzooka Mark record of registration, which indicates 

a first use in commerce of December 2011). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged priority of use 

over Defendants. 

In summary, Plaintiff cannot establish a protectable interest in the Registered Mark 

because Plaintiff is not the owner of the Registered Mark. Additionally, Plaintiff cannot establish 

a protectable interest in the Pending Mark because Plaintiff has failed to establish priority of use 

over Defendants, either through the application for the Pending Mark or the actual use in 

commerce of the Pending Mark. However, as Plaintiff could conceivably plead facts establishing 

prior use, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s common law trademark 

infringement and Lanham Act claims with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (district 

court should give leave to amend if the pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts). 

b. Plaintiff’s State Unfair Competition Claim 

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claims, Plaintiff asserts a claim for “unfair competition” under state law. Compl. ¶¶39-43. It is 

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not clear from the face of the complaint whether Plaintiff intends to state a claim for common law 

or statutory unfair competition. See Cal. Civ. Code § 17200 (unfair competition); Sybersound 

Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing common law tort of 

unfair competition). The complaint does not identify the nature of this claim. See Compl. ¶¶39-

43. Additionally, the relief requested does not help identify Plaintiff’s claim, as Plaintiff seeks 

only an injunction under this claim. See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 

1996) (noting compensatory damages are available under the common law tort of unfair 

competition, but not the unfair competition statute (citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 

Cal. 4th 1254, 1265-66 (1992))). 

 The parties’ briefs on the instant motion do not identify the nature of Plaintiff’s unfair 

competition claim. Neither party indicates whether Plaintiff raises a common law or statutory 

claim, and neither party addresses this claim separately from the common law trademark 

infringement and Lanham Act unfair competition claims. Rather, Defendants argue generally that 

the complaint provides only conclusory allegations, Mot. at 5-7, while Plaintiff generally responds 

that the allegations are sufficient, Opp. at 5-10. Given that the Court cannot determine what claim 

Plaintiff alleges, Plaintiff has failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim with leave to amend. See 

Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532 (noting that a district court may grant leave to amend when 

amendment of the complaint could cure the identified deficiencies). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows: 

 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against Ivory 

Octaves with prejudice; 

 The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against Wilson and 

Aldridge due to insufficient service of process, and ORDERS Plaintiff to serve 

Wilson and Aldridge within thirty (30) days of this Order; 

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 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims with leave to amend 

to the extent that Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have secondary liability for 

inducing acts of infringement, and otherwise DENIES Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss all claims for impermissibly lumping Defendants together; and 

 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims with leave to amend 

on the grounds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief. 

Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiff shall do so within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Failure to meet the 

thirty-day deadline to file an amended complaint or failure to cure the deficiencies identified in 

this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff may not add new 

causes of action or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Rule 

15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 11, 2015 

______________________________________ 

LUCY H. KOH 

United States District Judge 

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