Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02032/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unircd States (ourt of Appeals 

Tenth Cir,~ui7 

FEB 12 1990 

.ROBERT L. J..IOECKER 

UNITED STATES couRT OF APPEALS Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EDWARD M. McCONNELL , · 

Petitioner/Appellee, 

v. 

T.C. MARTIN, Warden, 

Federal Correctional Institute, 

El Reno, Oklahoma, 

Respondent/Appellant, 

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Respondent. 

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No. 88-2032 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 88-150-W) 

Sylvia Royce, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (William S. 

Price, U.S. Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and William Lee 

Borden, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma with her on 

the brief) for Respondent/Appellant. 

Donald V. Morano, Chicago, Illinois for Petitioner/Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 1 
EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal by the Warden of the Federal Correctional 

Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma from an order of the United 

States District court for the Western District of Oklahoma 

granting appellee Edward M. McConnell's petition for habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court ruled that a warrant 

for parole violation issued by the United States Parole Commission 

("the Commission") against McConnell had been executed while 

McConnell was awaiting trial on new federal charges, and that it 

was improper for the Commission to order that McConnell's original 

sentence, from which he had been paroled, run consecutive to the 

new federal sentence that he received for subsequent convictions. 

We hold that the attempted execution of the parole violator 

warrant was contrary to its clear terms and unauthorized, and 

therefore it was invalid. Thus, the Commission had the authority 

to withdraw the first warrant and to issue a second warrant which 

ultimately was properly filed as a detainer. The Commission's 

subsequent decision to revoke McConnell's parole and order the 

first sentence run consecutive to release from the second sentence 

was proper. Accordingly, we reverse. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 2 
BACKGROUND 

On March 17, 1981, McConnell was paroled from an aggregate 

seventeen year prison term for conspiracy to distribute narcotics, 

bank robbery, escape, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and a 

firearms violation. On February 9, 1985, while out on parole, 

McCon·nell was arrested in the Eastern District of Tennessee for 

possession of narcotics and several firearms violations stemming 

from his possession of a semiautomatic rifle. Two days later, on 

February 11, 1985, the Parole Commission issued a parole violator 

warrant charging that the alleged possession of firearms and 

narcotics violated the terms of McConnell's parole. The 

Commission sent that warrant to the United States Marshal's Office 

for the Eastern District of Tennessee. On the front of the 

warrant there was a printed instruction directing the Marshal to 

execute the warrant by taking the named parolee into custody. On 

the back of the warrant, the following typed instruction 

appeared: "NOTE: Do not execute this warrant if subject is being 

held in custody on other Federal, State, or Local charges, unless 

otherwise ordered by the Commission. (See accompanying 

instructions on Form H-24.)" R. I. at 7 (exhibit K) (emphasis in 

original). The accompanying instructions on the Form H-24 that 

the Commission had marked stated: "The· parolee is awaiting trial 

or sentencing on new charges: place a detainer and assume custody 

when released." Id. 

On February 19, 1985, a Deputy United States Marshal for the 

Eastern District of Tennessee made a return of the warrant to the 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 3 
United States Parole Commission by completing the back of the 

warrant. The return stated that the warrant was "executed" on 

February 19, 1985, by arresting McConnell and committing him to 

the Knox County Jail in Knoxville, Tennessee. R. I at 7 (exhibit 

K., p. 3). 

On April 9, 1985, McConnell pleaded guilty to the narcotics 

and weapons charges for which he was being held in custody pending 

trial and the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Tennessee imposed an eight-year sentence, ordering 

that it be served consecutive to the previous aggregate sentence 

from which McConnell had been paroled. 

On April 18, 1985, the United States Parole Commission 

ordered the withdrawal of the original warrant, R. I. Doc. 7 

(exhibit L), and issued a new parole violator warrant against 

McConnell to replace the one issued ~n February 11, 1985. 1 R. I. 

Doc. 7 (exhibit N). The Commission ordered that the warrant 

issued April 18, 1985, be filed as a detainer. R. I. at 7 

(exhibit 0). That warrant was filed as a detainer against 

McConnell. Dist. Ct. Op. at 2. 

A year later, on April 9, 1986, the Parole Commission held a 

combined hearing to decide whether to revoke McConnell's parole of 

his original sentence as well as to assess his eligibility for 

parole on the new sentence. At that hearing, the Commission 

revoked McConnell's parole and ordered that the remainder of the 

original sentence run from the date of his release from the April 

1 The Commission also issued a telex instructing the Marshal's 

Office in Tennessee to "[u)nexecute the previously executed 

warrant and lodge same as a detainer." Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 4 
9, 1985 sentence imposed for the narcotics and weapons offenses, 

with no time to be credited for the period since McConnell's 

original parole. 

On February 1, 1988, McConnell petitioned for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Oklahoma. McConnell argued that because the original 

parole violator warrant was "executed" on February 19, 1985, the 

date the return of the warrant was completed, his original 

sentence had commenced running again on that date, and the Parole 

Commission's decision that the sentence run consecutive to his 

release on the second sentence was unlawful. The district court 

agreed and granted McConnell's· writ. 

The district court held that the Commission had authorized 

execution of the February 1, 1985 warrant, and that once validly 

executed, the parole violator warrant could not be withdrawn and 

McConnell's underlying sentence therefore commenced running again 

as of the date of the execution of the warrant. The district 

court ordered that McConnell's original sentence run concurrently 

with the second sentence and that he be credited with time on the 

original sentence from February 19, 1985, the date that the 

district court concluded that the warrant had been executed. 

Respondent appealed that judgment to this court. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 5 
- DISCUSSION 

In section one we analyze the terms of the parole violator 

warrant and conclude that it unambiguously directed the Marshal 

not to execute the warrant if McConnell was in custody. In 

section two we hold that, because the attempted execution of the 

warrant contrary to its terms was invalid, the warrant was 

properly withdrawn by the Commission and replaced by the second 

warrant which was properly filed as a detainer. 

1. The Parole Violator Warrant Did Not Authorize 

The Marshal To Execute It. 

Under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 

18 u.s.c. §§ 420t-42i8 (1976) 2 ("the Act") the Commission may 

issue a warrant to retake a parolee if the parolee is alleged to 

have violated parole. 18 u.s.c. § 4213(a)(2). If the Commission 

issues a warrant, then the Act provides the method for its 

execution: 

Any officer of any Federal penal or correctional 

institution, or any Federal officer authorized to serve 

criminal process within the United States, to whom a 

warrant issued under this section is delivered, shall 

execute such warrant by taking such parolee and 

returning him to the custody of the regional 

2 Pub • L • 9 8-4 7 3 , Tit 1 e I I , § § 218 ( a ) ( 5 ) , 2 3 5 ( Oct 12 , 19 8 4 ) , 9 8 

Stat. 2027, repealed sections 4201 to 4218 of the Act, effective 

Nov. 1,. 1986. However, those sections remain applicable for five 

years to individuals who committed offenses prior to the effective 

date. Therefore, those sections of the Act apply in the present 

case and indication of the repeal is omitted in all subsequent . references. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 6 
commissioner, or to the custody of the Attorney General, 

if the Commission shall so direct. 

18 u.s.c. § 4213(d) (emphasis added). 3 

In this case, however, the warrant made clear that the 

Commission had directed that it not be executed. On the back of 

the warrant, directly above the portion to be completed by the 

United States Marshal and returned to the Parole Commission, was 

the following language: "NOTE: Do not execute this warrant if 

subject is being held in custody on other Federal, State, or Local 

charges, unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. (See 

accompanying instructions on Form H-24.)" R. I. at 7 (exhibit K. 

at 3) (emphasis in original). That instruction was applicable at 

the time the warrant was issued and at the time it was allegedly 

executed because McConnell was being held in federal custody for 

other charges. Dist. Ct. Op. at 4. The marked instruction on the 

Form H-24, which was cross-referenced in the warrant, read as 

follows: "The parolee is awaiting trial or sentencing on new 

charges: place a detainer and assume custody when released." 

3 In his brief, McConnell argues that he was taken into "custody" 

pursuant to the parole violator warrant because he was held in 

pretrial detention pursuant to that warrant. Appellee's Br. at 6-

7. The government disputes that characterization. Appellant's 

Reply Br. at 2-3. Evidently, the district court did not rely on 

the pretrial detention in deciding that McConnell was taken into 

custody-under the parole violator warrant. Rather, the district 

court reasoned that the completion of the return on the back of 

the warrant demonstrated execution, whether or not official 

custody was transferred from the new charges to the warrant. 

Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. We do not reach the issue of whether 

McConnell was ever actually taken into custody under the parole 

violator warrant because, as explained below, we hold that the 

Commission did not authorize the Marshal to execute the warrant by 

taking McConnell into custody and therefore the warrant could not 

be validly executed. 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 7 
R. I. at 7 (exhibit Kat ·3). 4 Evidently, the United States 

Marshal either disregarded or failed to notice both the 

Commission's condition for execution of the warrant and the 

directions on the accompanying form H-24 because_he completed the 

return on the warrant indicating that he had executed it. 

The district court concluded that "the instructions given the 

Marshal were inconsistent and did not expressly prohibit execution 

of the warrant." Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. We believe that conclusion 

is clearly erroneous. Although the district court correctly noted 

that the printed language on the front of the warrant ordered the 

Marshal to take McConnell and hold him in custody, the district 

court ignored the more specific instruction and qualifying 

conditions on the reverse side of the warrant and in the 

accompanying Form H-24, which made clear that the order to execute 

was conditioned on the parolee not being in custody on new 

charges. 

In concluding that the Commission had authorized the 

execution of the warrant, the district court relied on the 

4 The parole violator warrant issued by the Commission on 

February 11, 1985 against McConnell directed the Marshals to file 

it as a detainer. McConnell was not convicted until April 9, 

1985. There is a division of authority on the question of whether 

the Commission has the statutory power to order that a warrant be 

lodged as a detainer prior to the time that the parolee is 

convicted. Compare Goodman v. Keohane, 663 F.2d 1044, 1046-~7 

(11th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), with Hopper v. United States Parole 

Commission, 702 F.2d 842, 847 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983}; Heath v. United 

States Parole Commission, 788 F.2d 85, 88-90 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied 479 U.S. 953 (1986). 

We do not reach the issue of whether the Commission has 

statutory authority to instruct that a warrant be filed as a 

detainer before the parolee has been convicted. Whether or not 

the Commission is authorized to order that a warrant be filed as a 

detainer prior to a conviction, such an instruction is clearly 

inconsistent with immediate execution. 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 8 
Commission's choice of instructions from among the various preprinted alternatives on the Form H-24. The district court pointed 

out that the instruction that had been marked on the accompanying 

Form H-24 did not explicitly instruct the Marshal not to execute 

the wa1rant, whereas two other instructions that were not checked 

were more explicit in that regard. However, the first of the 

alternative instructions would only apply in a situation where the 

Commission was uncertain whether the parolee is at large or is in 

the custody of federal or state authorities. 5 The second of the 

alternative instructions states that, in addition to not executing 

the warrant, the Marshal is not to file a detainer. 6 Here, these 

alternative instructions would not have been appropriate because 

the Commission knew McConnell was in custody, and it wanted a 

detainer filed against him. There was nothing ambiguous about the 

instruction that the Commission did give to the Marshal. He was 

told unequivocally "[d]o not execute this warrant if subject is 

5 That direction provided as follows: 

Please assume custody as soon as possible or when located. NOTE: 

if the parolee is alieady in the custody of federal or state 

authorities, do not execute this warrant. Place a detainer and 

notify the Commission for further instructions. Also, if a 

criminal arrest warrant has been issued for parolee, execution of 

such criminal warrant shall take precedence and the Parole 

Commission is to be notified before its warrant may be executed. 

R. I. at 7 (exhibit K. at 1) (emphasis in original). 

6 That instruction provided as follows: 

The parolee is awaiting trial or sentencing on new charges: hold 

the warrant in abeyance until you receive further instructions. 

Do not execute this warrant if the parolee is released on bond. A 

detainer is not to be filed. 

R. I. at 7 (exhibit K. at 1) (emphasis in original). 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 9 
being held in custody on other Federal ••. charges," as the 

Marshal knew to be the case. He was further instructed 

affirmatively to "place a detainer and assume custody when 

released." The United States Marshal simply disregarded the 

unambiguous directions of the Parole Commission. Therefore, the 

attempted execution was unauthorized. 7 

2. The Marshal's Attempted Execution Was Invalid. 

We have found only two cases confronting the question of 

whether a parole violator warrant can be validly executed contrary 

to the instructions of the Parole Commission. However, both of 

those cases agree that execution of a parole violator warrant in a 

manner contrary to that authorized by the parole authority is 

invalid. Whether a parole violator warrant can be validly 

executed contrary to its terms is a question of law. Accordingly, 

we review this issue de novo. See United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 

863 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1988). 

In United States v. Cox, 475 F.2d 837, 838 (9th Cir. 1973), a 

federal parole officer learned of charges pending against Cox, a 

federal parolee, and issued a parole yiolator warrant. In 

transmitting the warrant to the United States Marshal's Office, 

the parole officer attached a form letter with a variety of 

7 In concluding that the Parole Commission authorized the 

execution of the warrant, the district court also relied in part 

on the Parole Commission's telex ordering the Marshal's Office to 

"unexecute" the warrant issued February 11, 1985. We believe the 

district court's reliance on the Commission's characterization was 

misplaced. If this telex is of any significance, it is simply 

further evidence that the Commission had not intended to authorize 

the execution of the warrant. 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 10 
standard instructions. Id. at 839. The instruction marked by the 

Commission directed the Marshal to hold the warrant in abeyance 

and to inform the Parole Board if the charge did not result in a 

conviction. Id. The instruction letter was misplaced, and the 

Marshals arrested Cox. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that, because 

the instruction letter directed that the warrant be held in 

abeyance, the warrant was invalid for purposes of Cox's arrest. 

Id. at 841. 

"The power to defer necessarily creates the power to 

give implementing instructions to defer. It is an 

emphasis of form over substance to argue that the 

warrant itself must call for its delayed execution, and 

that an accompanying ~etter is insufficient." 

Id. (quoting Chieppa v. Krimsky, 169 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 

1959). 

In Henrigue v. United States Marshal, 476 F. Supp. 618, 626 

(N.D. Cal. 1979), a parolee, Henrique, was arrested after the 

expiration date of the parole violator warrant had passed. The 

parole violator warrant issued against Henrique stated that it 

could not be executed after March 31, 1978. Id. at 621. On the 

basis of that warrant, Henrique was arrested by FBI agents on June 

13, 1978. Id. The district court held that the agents had no 

authority to take Henrique into custody because there was no 

outstanding warrant against him, only an expired warrant. 

Id. at 626. The court concluded that "[o]f necessity, federal 

officers must rely on the warrant itself when making an arrest. 

They cannot be expected to act on facts and circumstances not 

disclosed in the warrant; to do so would destroy the purpose of 

the warrant." Id. 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 11 
( 

Cox and Henrique both recognized that any attempt to execute 

a parole violator warrant in contravention of its terms is 

invalid. Both of those cases dealt with the issue in evaluating 

the validity of an arrest. However, we believe the principle 

should apply with equal force when determining whether a parole 

violator warrant was validly executed such that the parolee's 

sentence commences to run again from that date if the Commission 

decides to revoke parole. As discussed above, the Parole 

Commission alone has the power to choose whether to order that a 

parole violator warrant be executed or be filed as a detainer. 

That power to choose would be substantially impaired if a United 

States Marshal could frustrate it by executing a parole violator 

warrant that the Commission had directed was not to be executed. 8 

8 Similarly, it is a well-established principle that the 

magistrate issuing a search warrant controls the manner of its 

execution. See United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 410-11 

(10th Cir. 1986). If a search exceeds the scope of the warrant 

authorizing the search, the role of the magistrate in determining 

the boundaries of the search is impermissibly circumvented. 

Accordingly, the use of evidence obtained by improperly executed 

warrants is suppressed. See id. 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 12 
CONCLUSION 

Because the parole violator warrant dated February 11, 1985 

was never validly executed, the Commission had the authority to 

withdraw it. 9 The Commission properly withdrew that warrant and 

issued a new warrant dated April 18, 1985. The new warrant was 

subsequently filed as a detainer after McConnell had been 

convicted. The Commission held a hearing combining the initial 

hearing on McConnell's new sentence with the parole revocation 

hearing for his previous sentence on May 22, 1986. At that 

hearing, t~e Commission decided that McConnell's parole should be 

revoked and his violator sentence would commence to run upon his 

release or parole from his second conviction. Because we believe 

that the Commission acted within its authority and that 

McConnell's custody pursuant to the Commission's decision is 

proper, the district court's order granting habeas corpus relief 

is REVERSED. 

9 The withdrawal of the parole violator warrant in this case 

does not violate this Circuit's rule that the Commission may not 

withdraw a parole violator warrant if it has ·been validly 

executed. See Still v. United States Marshal, 780 F.2d 848 (10th 

Cir. 1985).-

In Still, the parole-violator warrant did not instruct the 

federal officer to file the warrant as a detainer, but rather to 

execute it by taking Still into custody. Id. at 850 n.2. The 

warrant was subsequently validly executed when the Marshal took 

Still into federal custody. Id. After the warrant had been 

executed according to its terms, the Commission attempted to 

withdraw it. Id. at 850. This court held that the Commission's 

attempted withdrawal exceeded its statutory authority. Id. at 

851-52. By contrast, our holding in this case is only that a 

parole violator warrant is not validly executed if the attempted 

execution is contrary to the Commission's specific instructions, 

and since the warrant was never validly executed, it can be 

withdrawn. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2032 Document: 010110159040 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 13