Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06758/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06758-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD ISHIHARA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

KATSUTO OUNE, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C 06-6758 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO DISMISS, TO STRIKE, OR

FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is plaintiffs Gerald Ishihara, Yoshiko Ishihara, and South City

Press, Inc.’s “Motion to: (1) Dismiss Cross-Complaint Of Defendant Haruko Shinoda

Makitani For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted; (2) To Strike

Portions Of Answer And Cross Complaint Filed; Or Alternatively (3) For A More Definite

Statement,” filed December 15, 2006. Defendant Haruko Shinoda Makitani (“Makitani”)

and defendant Katsuto Oune (“Oune”) have filed separate oppositions. Plaintiffs have not

filed a reply. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the

motion, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the

hearing scheduled for February 2, 2007, and rules as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks an order striking certain affirmative

defenses from Oune’s initial answer and dismissing certain claims set forth in Oune’s initial

cross-complaint, is hereby DENIED as moot, because Oune, on January 8, 2007, filed a

Case 3:06-cv-06758-MMC Document 41 Filed 01/30/07 Page 1 of 3
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1

A motion to dismiss is not a “responsive pleading.” See Crum v. Circus Circus

Enterprises, 231 F. 3d 1129, 1130 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000).

2

The “cross-defendants” named in Makitani’s “Cross-Complaint” are the three named

plaintiffs, as well as Paul Currier. Makitani’s pleading was filed in state court. In light of the

removal, to the extent Makitani seeks relief against the three named plaintiffs, the pleading

is now more properly denominated a “counterclaim,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 13(b), and,

to the extent Makitani seeks relief against Paul Currier, the pleading is now more properly

denominated a “third-party complaint,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 14.

2

First Amended Answer and Counterclaim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing party may

amend pleading “once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is

served”);1

 Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F. 2d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding “amended

pleading supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent”), cert.

denied, 353 U.S. 947 (1957).

2. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks an order dismissing from Makitani’s

“Cross-Complaint”2 the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, is hereby GRANTED,

and such causes of action are, with respect to such plaintiffs, hereby DISMISSED without

leave to amend. By said causes of action, Makitani alleges claims for, respectively,

comparative indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief as to indemnification. Although

such claims may be appropriate against one whom Makitani alleges is liable to her if she is

found liable to plaintiffs, Makitani fails to cite any authority, and the Court has located none,

providing that a defendant can bring such claims against a plaintiff. Cf. American

Motorcycle Ass’n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591 (1978) (holding indemnification

and contribution doctrines provide for “equitable distribution of loss among multiple

tortfeasors”).

3. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks an order dismissing from Makitani’s

Cross-Complaint the Fourth Cause of Action, is hereby DENIED because, as pleaded, said

cause of action is sufficient to state a claim for unpaid wages. Although plaintiffs deny

Makitani will be able to establish the truth of her allegation that she has not been paid for

work performed, such argument is premature at the pleading stage.

4. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks an order striking Affirmative Defenses 15

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and 28 from Makitani’s answer, is hereby GRANTED; Makitani states she does not oppose

such request. (See Makitani’s Mem. of P. & A., filed January 11, 2007, at 6:6.)

5. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks an order striking Affirmative Defenses 18

and 19 from Makitani’s answer, is hereby GRANTED, with leave to amend as requested by

Makitani. (See id. at 6:7-9.)

6. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks an order striking from Makitani’s answer

any affirmative defense other than Affirmative Defenses 15, 18, 19, and 28, is hereby

DENIED. Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, a defendant provides fair notice of an affirmative

defense by a “bare assertion” identifying the affirmative defense. See Daingerfield Island

Protective Soc. v. Babbitt, 40 F. 3d 442, 444 (D.C. Cir.1994) (holding affirmative defense

stating “claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations” sufficient to provide

plaintiff notice); cf. Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778, 785-86 (D. Haw.

1993) (holding affirmative defense stating defendant “intended to rely upon any other

matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” insufficient to provide plaintiff fair

notice of “other” affirmative defenses on which defendant intended to rely).

7. Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent it seeks from Makitani a more definite statement

as to any affirmative defense, is hereby DENIED. Although a motion for a more definite

statement is properly granted where “a party cannot reasonably frame a responsive

pleading,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), plaintiffs are not required to file a pleading in response

to an answer. Plaintiffs may, of course, request by way of discovery further specification as

to the bases for the affirmative defenses.

8. If Makitani intends to file an amended answer, such pleading shall be filed no

later than February 15, 2007.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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