Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05582/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JAMES GOREE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, JR., et al., )

)

Respondents. )

 )

1:03-cv-05582-TAG HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 

RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

serving a sentence of fifty-four-years-to-life, pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of

California, County of Madera, following his conviction by jury of the following: (1) rape during the

commission of a burglary (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 261(a)(2), 667.61(a), (d)); (2) first-degree burglary

(Pen. Code § 459); and (3) intimidating a witness (Pen. Code § 136.1(b)(1)). (CT 165-167). 

Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced by his admission of a prior felony conviction for residential

burglary, pursuant Penal Code § 667, subds. (c)-(e), § 1170.12, and §1192.7(c)(18). (Id.; Doc. 11,

Augmentation on Appeal (“AA”), p. 30; RT 8, Sentencing Hearing). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate

District (“5th DCA”), raising two claims: (1) failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the

definition of “force” as an element of rape; and, (2) failure to charge Petitioner with felony witness

intimidation. (Doc. 10, Exh. A). On April 10, 2002, the 5th DCA issued an unpublished decision

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28 Mirabel does not speak English. 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

affirming Petitioner’s conviction. (Doc. 10, Exh. D, App.). On May 21, 2002, Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on June 19, 2002. (Doc. 10,

Exh. E). In his petition for review, Petitioner raised the two arguments listed above. (Doc. 10, Exh.

D). In addition, Petitioner also contended that the 5th DCA’s opinion violated due process by

ignoring valid legal arguments raised by Petitioner, specifically the two appellate issued raised by

Petitioner in the 5th DCA. (Id.). 

On April 24, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus petition, raising the two issues

he had raised in the 5th DCA, as well as the additional argument related to the arbitrariness of the 5th

DCA’s decision (Doc. 1). On August 11, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. (Doc.

10). Petitioner did not file a traverse. Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted the

claims in his petition. (Doc. 10, p. 2). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the facts as summarized by the 5th DCA:

At trial, Mirabel C. testified that on April 5, 2000, she opened the door of her

apartment to take out the trash when defendant grabbed her in a “choke hold,”

forced her back inside and then to the bedroom where he “signed” for her to close

the blinds and to take off her skirt and panties. She tried to break free but was 1

pulled back. She had trouble breathing and was seeing spots due to his choke hold. 

Even though he was unarmed, she was fearful for her life.

He then raped her.

After the act was completed, defendant began looking around the room and picking

up certain items and then putting them down. He demanded money from her;

however, she had none. Defendant then told her “no 911" and made a fist, gesturing

to her. He left. Mirabel then called a friend, who then called the police to report the

rape. 

A physical examination of Mirabel showed no objective signs of trauma.

After being detained, defendant gave a statement at the police station. He said he

had gone to Mirabel’s apartment to use the phone. While he was there, she lifted up

her skirt and flirted with him. She invited him to have sex; he declined because he

was getting married. He then left the apartment. Five minutes later, he admitted he

lied and that they did have sex, but it was consensual. In a later, transcribed,

interview, defendant stated he was in need of mental help because he could not

control himself and had to have sex “all the time.” He indicated he wanted to write

a letter of apology. In the letter, he stated:

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U.S. District Court

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“Dear Miss, I’m so sorry for what I did to you. I feel bad for fighting you

today. My name is Michael. Please forgive me, Miss, it will never happen. 

I put that on my mom. I’m so sorry to hurt you and your family. I have a

problem I have to get fixed. I need help. So please find it in your heart to

forgive me for my sin, Love Mike. So sorry, Michael.”

(Doc. 10, Exh. D, App., pp. 2-4).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the

United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Madera County Superior

Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(d). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on

other grounds by, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed

after statute’s enactment). The instant petition was filed on April 24, 2003, after the enactment of

the AEDPA, and thus it is governed by the AEDPA.

II. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) will not be granted unless the

adjudication of a prisoner’s claim (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States” or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an unreasonable determination of /

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412-413. 

///

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The first prong of federal habeas review involves the “contrary to” and “unreasonable

application” clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This prong pertains to questions of law and mixed

questions of law and fact. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407-410; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it

confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but

reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. at 405. A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established

federal law “if the state court applies [the Supreme Court’s precedents] to the facts in an objectively

unreasonable manner.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. at 141. Consequently, a federal court may not

grant habeas relief simply because the state court’s decision is incorrect or erroneous; the state

court’s decision must also be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003), 

citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409. Section 2254(d)(1)’s reference to “clearly established

Federal law” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412; Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 412; Barker v. Fleming, 423 F. 3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second prong of federal habeas review involves the “unreasonable determination” clause

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under

§ 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s

claims “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v.

Wood, 114 F.3d at 1500 (when reviewing a state court’s factual determinations, a “responsible,

thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment”). 

A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it would not be

debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id. ; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir.

2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004). The AEDPA also requires that

considerable deference be given to a state court’s factual findings. A state court’s factual findings are

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28 For purposes of clarity the Court will address Petitioner’s claims in a sequence different from 2

the sequence they were presented in the petition. 

U.S. District Court

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presumed to be correct, and such presumption of correctness may be rebutted only by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to

the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state court decided the petitioner’s claims on the

merits but provided no reasoning for its decision, the federal habeas court must independently review

the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-982 (9th Cir.

2002). Where the state court denied the petitioner’s claims on procedural grounds or did not decide

such claims on the merits, the deferential standard of the AEDPA do not apply and the federal court

must review the petitioner’s ’s claims de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.

2002).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

The instant petition alleges the following grounds for relief:

Ground 1. In affirming Petitioner’s conviction, the Court of Appeal arbitrarily

ignored non-frivolous issues raised by Petitioner, and thereby deprived

Petitioner of his right to a decision on his appeal reached by procedures

comporting with the demands of due process.

Ground 2. Petitioner was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to jury trial and due process by the trial court’s failure to instruct on an

element of the offense. 

Ground 3. Petitioner was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right

to be informed of the nature of the charge against him when he was

convicted of a felony on the basis of an information charging a

misdemeanor. 

(Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). 

Each of Petitioner’s claims will be addressed below.2

Ground Two: Petitioner was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights to jury trial and due process by the trial court’s failure to

instruct on an element of the offense.

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on one of

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the elements of the offense of forcible rape, i.e., the element of “force.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). Petitioner

contends that in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of “force,” his constitutional right to due

process and a jury trial were violated. (Id.). Petitioner’s contentions are without merit.

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Section 2241(c)(3) of Title 28 of the

United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless he is “in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Section 

§ 2254(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person

in custody upon the legality of that custody . . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).

Federal habeas review is limited to claims that are set out as described above.

Petitioner’s Ground Two claim challenges a jury instruction. A federal writ is not available for

alleged error in the interpretation or application os state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)(“[f]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors

of state law.”); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a challenge to

a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim cognizable in a federal habeas

corpus action. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[I]t is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Id.

at 68; Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-349 (1993). 

To obtain federal habeas relief for errors in the jury charge, Petitioner must show that the ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Estelle

v. McGuire , 502 U.S. at 71-72; Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114

(9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. at 72. The Court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury

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as a component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982), citing

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154-155 (1977). Furthermore, even if it is determined that the

instruction violated Petitioner’s right to due process, Petitioner can only obtain relief if the

unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in actual

prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)(whether the error had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.); see Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034,

1039 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support

a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the

showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154-155.

Moreover, a petitioner whose claim, as here, involves the omission of an instruction “bears an especially

heavy burden,” because an omission is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Id.

at 155.

In People v. Griffin, 33Cal.4th 1015 (2004), theCalifornia Supreme Court addressed the precise

issue raised by Petitioner, and held, contrary to Petitioner’s contention, that the trial court was under “no

duty to specially instruct sua sponte on the commonly understood definition of force as it is used in the

[state] rape statute.” Id. at 1028. In People v. Griffin, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, forcible

rape against the victim, the minor daughter of defendant’s girlfriend. Id. at 1021. On appeal, a majority

of the Court of Appeal concluded that the definition of “force,” as used in the forcible rape statute, has

a “specialized legal meaning that would not be known to the average lay juror, and requires proof of

‘physical force substantially different from or substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the

lewd act....’” Id. This is the identical argument Petitioner made in the 5th DCA, in the California

Supreme Court, and makes now in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

In People v. Griffin, the California Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeal,

holding that the 1980 revisions in the forcible rape statute had eliminated the element of resistance,

which “was the Legislature’s response to concerns that rape victims who resisted their attackers

oftentimes suffered greater physical injuries than victims who did not resist, and to the further

circumstance that prosecutors were increasingly either unable or unwilling to file rape charges where

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In his Opening Brief in the 5th DCA, Petitioner argued that “[f]orce has to mean something 3

more than ‘against the will of the alleged victim’ and something more than the act of intercourse

itself....” (Doc. 10, Exh. D, App., p. 9). 

U.S. District Court

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victim resistance could not be proved.” People v. Griffin, 33 Cal. 4th at 1024, quoting People v. Barnes,

42 Cal.3d 284, 302 (1986). 

The California Supreme Court explained the evolution of the forcible rape element of

“force” as follows:

Whereas, prior to the 1980 amendment of section 261, conviction of forcible rape

required that the accused employ that degree of force necessary under the

circumstances to overcome the victim’s resistance,...under the modern rape statute, the

jury no longer evaluates the element of force in terms of whether it physically prevents

the victim from resisting or thwarting the attack.... ‘[T]he fundamental wrong at which

the law of rape is aimed is not the application of physical force that causes physical

harm. Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the integrity of a woman’s will and the

privacy of her sexuality from an act of intercourse undertaken without her consent.” 

Griffin, 33 Cal.4th at 1025 (emphasis supplied). Thus, the modern state law of forcible rape does not

require that “force” cause physical harm; rather, “force” plays “merely a supporting evidentiary role, as

necessary only to insure an act of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim’s will.” Id. The

California Supreme Court’s explanation of the role of “force” in the crime of forcible rape is directly

contrary to the position urged by Petitioner in this action.3

In People v. Griffin, the California Supreme Court also rejected the contention - also made by

Petitioner in the instant case - that the failure to define “force” as a term of art in the context of forcible

rape would lead to situations where “painful misunderstandings become forcible sex crimes.” (Doc. 10,

Exh. D, App., p. 10). In rejecting such a contention, the California Supreme Court reasoned as follows:

When two adults engage in consensual sexual intercourse, whether with or without

physical force greater than that normally required to accomplish an act of sexual

intercourse, the forcible rape statute is not implicated. The gravamen of the crime of

forcible rape is a sexual penetration accomplished against the victim’s will by means

of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.

As reflected in the surveyed case law, in a forcible rape prosecution the jury determines

whether the use of force served to overcome the will of the victim to thwart or resist

the attach, not whether the use of such force physically facilitated sexual penetration

or prevented the victim from physically resisting her attacker. The Legislature has

never sought to circumscribe the nature or type of forcible conduct that will support a

conviction of forcible rape, and indeed, the rape case law suggests that even conduct

which might normally attend sexual intercourse, when engaged in with force sufficient

to overcome the victim’s will, can support a forcible rape conviction.”

People v. Griffin, 33 Cal.4th at 1027 (emphasis in original).

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Thus, the question for the Griffin jury was “simply whether defendant used force to accomplish

intercourse with [the victim] against her will, not whether the force he used overcame [the victim’s]

physical strength or ability to resist him.” People v, Griffin. 33 Cal. 4th at 1028. From that perspective,

the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court “was under no duty to specially instruct sua

sponte on the commonly understood definition of force as it is used in the rape statute.” Id. Applying

the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in People v. Griffin to the instant case, it is patent that no state

law violation occurred. Because Petitioner’s argument hinges entirely on the assumption that some

special meaning of the word “force” requires a defining jury instruction, and because the California

Supreme Court has rejected such an assumption as erroneous, Petitioner’s argument cannot be sustained.

Because Petitioner has failed to make out even a violation of state law, he necessarily fails to

establish any federal constitutional violation in the trial court’s failure to give a sua sponte instruction

on “force.” The California Supreme Court has found no error under state law. A federal court must

defer to state court interpretations of state law unless the interpretation violates due process. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983)(federal court bound to accept state

court’s construction of its own statutes); Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993); ; McSherry

v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1989)(federal habeas court bound by state court’s construction

of its own penal statute). Moreover, as mentioned above, the “fact that [an] instruction was allegedly

incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Here,

no state court violation occurred. No federal violation occurred because no “clearly established” federal

law requires that California trial courts sua sponte instruct juries on a definition of “force” under

California’s forcible rape statute. Thus, the state

court’s decision in this regard was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

Moreover, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is structural 

error, or had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-796 (2001), quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Here, any instructional error is properly characterized as a trial error, rather than a structural error,

because, as the California Supreme Court in People v. Griffin indicated, “force” is not a separate and

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distinct element of the offense of forcible rape, but rather, it “plays merely a supporting evidentiary role,

as necessary only to insure an act of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim’s will.” People

v. Griffin, 33 Cal. 4th at 1025. Applying the Brecht v. Abrahamson federal harmless error standard, the

Court finds that the error, if any, would have been harmless. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637-

638. Because the instant case is on collateral review, Respondent need only show that the error did not

have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 623, quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 

Here, the jurors could have reasonably believed the victim’s testimony that she did not consent

to intercourse with Petitioner. Given the substantial evidence that Petitioner did in fact overcome the

victim’s lack of consent through his conduct, instructing the jury on the definition of “force,” as that

term has been explained in People v. Griffin, could not have reasonably had an effect on the jury’s

deliberations, was not actuallyprejudicial, and was therefore harmless. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

at 622- 623, 638. Hence, Ground Two must be denied.

Ground Three: Petitioner was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him when he

was convicted of a felony on the basis of an information charging a

misdemeanor.

Following the preliminary hearing, Petitioner was charged by criminal information with, inter

alia, one count of violating California Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1), attempting to prevent and dissuade the

victim from making a report of her victimization. (CT 15). Under California law, § 136.1(b)(1) is a

“wobbler.” People v. Neely, 124 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1261 (2004). California Penal Code § 17(b)

authorizes the reduction of “wobbler” offenses–crimes that, in the trial court’s discretion, may be

sentenced alternately as felonies or as misdemeanors–upon imposition of a punishment other than state

prison or by declaration as a misdemeanor after a grant of probation. Pen. Code § 17(b)(1), (3). Put

another way, a wobbler is “a special class of crime which could be classified and punished as a felony

or misdemeanor depending upon the severity of the facts surrounding its commission.” People v.

Superior Court (Perez), 38 Cal.App.4th 347, 360 n. 17 (1995). 

During trial, the prosecutor realized that the information expressly referred to Count Three, the

Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1) charge, as a “misdemeanor” and sought leave of court to amend it to a felony

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as a “typographical error.” (AA, p. 10). The prosecutor pointed out that, as a wobbler, the evidence

required was the same whether the crime was considered a misdemeanor or a felony. (Id.). Petitioner

objected and argued prejudice, although Petitioner’s counsel never explained how Petitioner would be

prejudiced by the amendment. (Id.). 

Petitioner claims now that the amendment permitted by the trial court was never acted upon by

the prosecutor and therefore “Petitioner remained charged with a misdemeanor but was convicted of a

felony.” (Doc. 10, Exh. D, p. 18). The 5th DCA treated the issue as one of “notice” and concluded that

Petitioner had not been prejudiced by the amendment since, as a wobbler, the charge itself did not

change, only the possibility of receiving a felony sentence had changed. Thus, Petitioner “was given

notice and opportunity to defend.” (Doc. 10, Exh. E, App., p. 5). The Court agrees with the 5th DCA’s

ultimate conclusion. However, because Petitioner’s argument is twofold, i.e., variance between the

charging document and the crime for which he was committed and lack of notice, the Court will address

both issues.

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right to be clearly

informed of the nature and cause of the charges in order to permit adequate preparation of a defense.”

Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1990). The notice provision of the Sixth Amendment

is incorporated within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is

fully applicable to the states. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-274 (1948); see Gray v. Raines, 662 F.2d

569, 571 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Here, Petitioner was not denied notice of the charge. The amendment only made it possible that

the trial court, in its discretion, could sentence Petitioner to state prison as well as to county jail or

probation. The charge itself, the elements of the charge, the evidence required to prove the charge, the

evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution’s theory of the case, and the defense all

were identical regardless of whether the wobbler charge resulted in a felony or misdemeanor sentence.

Under these circumstances, Petitioner was not denied adequate notice of the charge. 

Petitioner’s characterization of events as having been charged with amisdemeanor but convicted

of a felony is inaccurate. The prosecutor was granted leave to amend, Petitioner was put on notice that

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Count Three was being charged and tried as a felony, and any incidental failure to interlineate the word

“felony” in the charging document is irrelevant and de minimis. 

Under California law, a trial court may “order or permit an amendment of an indictment,

accusation or information, or the filing of an amended complaint, for any defect or insufficiency, at any

stage of the proceedings....” Cal. Pen. Code § 1009. In granting the motion to amend, the trial court

indicated that it would “modify the instruction” relating to intimidation of a witness. (AA, p. 10). The

instruction on § 136.1(b)(1) was accordingly modified to reflect that it was a felony. (CT 115). Thus,

the jury was made aware that it was deliberating on a charge considered to be a felony. 

While no actual inter-lineation reflecting the felony status of the charge was made on the

charging document itself, the Court considers this irrelevant and de minimis. Under California law,

“[n]o accusatory pleading is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be

affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form which does not prejudice a substantial

right of the defendant upon the merits.” Cal. Pen. Code, § 960.

A variance in proof occurs when “the charging terms of the indictment are left unchallenged, but

the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” U.S.

v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting United States v. Von 

Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984))(emphasis supplied). A variance requires reversal only when

the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Id.

Here, Petitioner’s contentions notwithstanding, he has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting

from the trial court’s granting of the motion to amend. This was the conclusion reached by the 5th DCA

in its opinion, and it is also the conclusion reached by this Court. The facts adduced at trial supported

a conviction on the wobbler, either as a felony or a misdemeanor. The evidence adduced by the

prosecution was not “materially different” from those alleged in the information. Petitioner has not

demonstrated how the amendment impacted his rightsin anyway under either state orfederal law. Thus,

the state court’s rejection of this argument was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Hence, Ground Three must be denied.

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Ground One: In affirming Petitioner’s conviction, the Court of Appeal arbitrarily

ignored non-frivolous issues raised by Petitioner, and thereby

deprived Petitioner of his right to a decision on his appeal reached by

procedures comporting with the demands of due process. 

Petitioner contends that the 5th DCA “arbitrarily ignored non-frivolous issues” raised by

Petitioner, thereby violating his constitutional due process right. (Doc. 1, p. 3). This argument is

without merit.

As to Ground Two, Petitioner maintains that the 5th DCA failed to address the issue raised by

Petitioner, i.e., whether the “force” used in a rape “must be of a kind that might reasonably induce fear

in the mind of the victim,” and instead concluded that the degree of force need not be greater than that

required to accomplish the act of intercourse. (Doc. 1, p. 3). As discussed previously, however, this was

precisely the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Griffin. 

People v. Griffin, 33 Cal.4th at 1028 (“The question for the jury in this case was simply whether

defendant used force to accomplish intercourse with [the victim] against her will, not whether the force

he used overcame [the victim’s] physical strength or ability to resist him.”). Thus, although at the time

Petitioner originally filed his petition, this issue had not been decided by the state’s highest court, the

People Griffin decision resolved this issue in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner. As mentioned,

this Court must defer to a state court’s interpretation of its own laws, and here, the

5th DCA’s decision anticipated the holding in People v. Griffin and is entirely consistent with its result.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

As to Ground Three, Petitioner maintains that the prosecution “never actually filed or inserted

any amendment” and therefore Petitioner “remained charged with a misdemeanor, but was convicted

of a felony.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). The Court is unable to parse out of Ground One a constitutional issue that

is separate and distinct from Ground Three, which raises the identical issue. Since the Court has already

resolved Ground Three against Petitioner, no basis exists to conclude in Ground One that the 5th DCA’s

decision somehow violated Petitioner’s due process rights.

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ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1), is DENIED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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