Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00388/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00388-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leroy Wiggins, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-00388 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February

23, 2012. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 14) on July 20, 2012.

Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 15) to the answer to his petition

on July 27, 2012. 

I Procedural History

On June 17, 2002, a Maricopa County grand jury returned

an indictment charging Petitioner with sixteen separate counts:

three counts of sale or transportation of dangerous drugs, class

2 felonies; nine counts of sale or transportation of narcotic

drugs, class 2 felonies; one count of manufacture of narcotic

drugs, a class 2 felony; one count of possession of marijuana

for sale, a class 4 felony; one count of possession for sale of

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1

 The indictment also charged two other defendants with

various related crimes.

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narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony; and one count of possession of

dangerous drugs for sale, a class 2 felony. See Answer, Exh. C.1

Pursuant to a written plea agreement signed by

Petitioner on May 1, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to three

counts of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs, all class 2

felonies, and acknowledged two prior felony convictions. Id.,

Exhs. D & E. In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the

state dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment and

agreed not to allege a third prior felony conviction. Id. 

On December 10, 2004, pursuant to his guilty plea, the

state court sentenced Petitioner to presumptive terms of 15.75

years imprisonment on each of the three count of conviction,

with the sentences on the second and third counts to run

concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence

imposed on the first count of conviction. See id., Exh. H.

Accordingly, the aggregate sentence imposed is 31.5 years

imprisonment.

On October 25, 2011, Petitioner filed notice that he

was seeking state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id., Exh. I. In his

notice of post-conviction relief Petitioner asserted: (1) he was

forced into entering a plea agreement in violation of his Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) his defense counsel

was ineffective because she knew that he had been coerced into

signing the plea agreement and failed to file a timely action

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seeking post-conviction relief; and (3) the untimeliness of his

Rule 32 action should be excused because there were newly

discovered material facts that would have changed the verdict or

sentence and his failure to file a timely action was not his

fault. Id., Exh. I.

The state trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s

Rule 32 action as untimely on November 1, 2011. Id., Exh. J.

The court concluded that Petitioner had not stated an exception

to the timeliness rule as stated in Rule 32.1(e) and Rule

32.1(f) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court

noted Petitioner had not alleged any newly discovered facts and

had “shown virtually no diligence in filing” his petition, i.e.,

that six and a half years had passed since the deadline for

filing a timely Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. J. The state trial

court also concluded that the petition was untimely pursuant to

Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The state

court noted Petitioner’s claims were more properly presented

pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a).

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the trial court’s

decision dismissing his Rule 32 action, which motion was

apparently never decided. Id., Exh. K. On February 2, 2012,

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision

dismissing his Rule 32 action by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Id., Exh. M. In his petition for review Petitioner argued he

was coerced into the plea agreement, that he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel, and that his

failure to timely file a Rule 32 action should be excused

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because he was not at fault for the failure. In the petition

for review Petitioner also alleged that he was subjected to

prosecutorial misconduct in violation of his Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The Arizona Court of Appeals declined review of the

trial court’s decision dismissing Petitioner’s Rule 32 action on

February 10, 2012, finding that Petitioner had failed to seek

review of the relevant decision within thirty days, as required

by the state’s procedural rules. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner did

not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court.

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because:

1. The Arizona Court of Appeals erroneously concluded

that his petition for review of the trial court’s dismissal of

his Rule 32 action was not timely.

2. The Arizona Court of Appeals wrongly dismissed

Petitioner’s petition for review without “hearing” his claim

that he was coerced into entering a plea agreement in violation

of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

3. He was subjected to prosecutorial misconduct in

violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

4. Petitioner was sentenced in violation of Arizona

state criminal statutes.

5. Petitioner did not receive effective assistance of

counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

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6. Petitioner’s right to due process was violated when

the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for review

as untimely.

7. Petitioner’s right to due process was violated when

the trial court failed to rule on his motion for reconsideration

from the dismissal of his Rule 32 proceedings.

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s federal habeas

action was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations

and that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Respondents also assert

that Petitioner did not properly exhaust his habeas claims in

the state courts and that Petitioner has not shown cause for nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claims.

Respondents also maintain that Petitioner’s fourth claim for

relief does not state a claim cognizable in a federal habeas

action.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Petitioner’s state court conviction became final on

March 10, 2005, ninety days after he was sentenced.

Accordingly, the statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s

federal habeas action expired on March 10, 2006. The pending

habeas petition, filed February 23, 2012, was filed almost six

years after the statute of limitations expired.

Although the relevant federal statute allows that the

statute of limitations may be tolled by the pendency of a

properly filed action for state post-conviction relief,

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action for state post-conviction relief,

filed in 2011, could not and did not re-start the alreadyexpired statute of limitations. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

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endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

In reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends that he “has established proof of extraordinary

circumstance” and, accordingly, that he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Petitioner asserts he

relied on his defense counsel to file a timely action for state

post-conviction relief and that she did not and, accordingly,

that any procedural error was not his fault. Petitioner

contends that he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his

habeas claims notwithstanding his failure to exhaust those

claims because of extraordinary circumstances. Petitioner

asserts that he was not given his Miranda rights prior to being

arrested. Petitioner contends that his sentence constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment and that he has been subjected to

deliberate indifference. Petitioner also argues that he was

“over-sentenced” in violation of Arizona’s statutes and his

right to due process of law.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the

circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A

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petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Equitable tolling may be available when a petitioner can

establish they are so mentally ill that they are incompetent.

Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Bills, 628 F.3d at 1098. However, the vicissitudes of

prison life are not “extraordinary” circumstances that make it

impossible to file a timely habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

Furthermore, most alleged errors by a petitioner’s

counsel do not per se constitute an “extraordinary circumstance”

warranting equitable tolling. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564;

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959-61; Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047,

1058 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Randle v. Skolnik, 131

S. Ct. 474 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2009). It is not sufficient that counsel was negligent; only

representation that meets the extraordinary misconduct standard

can be a basis for applying equitable tolling. See Porter, 620

F.3d at 959. The United States Supreme Court concluded in

Holland that federal courts could equitably toll the statute of

limitations for filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

when a petitioner’s attorney failed to satisfy professional

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standards of care. See 130 S. Ct. at 2563–64. The Supreme

Court held that “at least sometimes, professional misconduct ...

[could] amount to egregious behavior and create an extraordinary

circumstance that warrants equitable tolling.” Id. Equitable

tolling has been applied when an attorney's misconduct is

“sufficiently egregious,” i.e., for example when a privatelyretained attorney failed to prepare a petition and also kept the

petitioner’s case file so that it was “unrealistic” to expect

the petitioner to file pro se. See Porter, 620 F.3d at 959-60;

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800–01. See also Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d

1311, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner does not assert that he is actually

innocent, but instead emphasizes that he was improperly

sentenced. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling

of the statute of limitations based on the theory of actual

innocence.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

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2

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).2 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

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errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2011). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

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the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

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and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner did not present his prosecutorial misconduct

claims to the state trial court in his Rule 32 action.

Petitioner presented some of his other claims to the state trial

court and the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32 action, in

which relief was denied based on Petitioner’s failure to timely

assert these claims and his failure to timely seek review of the

trial court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 action. As stated supra,

Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding waiver and the

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timeliness of claims have been found to be an adequate and

independent basis for affirming a petitioner’s convictions and

sentences and denying federal habeas relief. Accordingly,

unless Petitioner can establish cause for and prejudice from his

procedural default of his claims in the state courts, the Court

should not consider the merits of his claims.

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

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properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

In his reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

asserts he relied on his defense counsel to file a timely action

for state post-conviction relief and that she did not and,

accordingly, that any procedural error was not his fault.

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a hearing on the

merits of his habeas claims notwithstanding his failure to

exhaust those claims because of extraordinary circumstances.

Petitioner asserts that he was not given his Miranda rights

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prior to being arrested. Petitioner contends that his sentence

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and that he has been

subjected to deliberate indifference. Petitioner also argues

that he was “over-sentenced” in violation of Arizona’s statutes

and his right to due process of law.

Respondents argue:

Furthermore, even assuming Petitioner is

entitled to the effective assistance of PCR

counsel, he has not explained why it took

more than 6.5 years to file his pro se PCR

notice after counsel’s alleged failure to

timely commence his “of-right” PCR

proceeding. This gap, without further

explanation, hardly demonstrates due

diligence on Petitioner’s part. Petitioner

has not suggested any additional external,

objective factor that reasonably prevented

him from properly raising his claims in the

state courts nor has he shown prejudice.

Petitioner has not established cause for his failure to

fairly present his claims to the Arizona state courts

Additionally, Petitioner has not established prejudice arising

from the procedural default of his claims. Therefore, the Court

need not consider the merits of the claims absent a showing that

a fundamental miscarriage of justice will otherwise occur.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

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of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not assert his factual innocence and

Petitioner admitted to committing the conduct establishing his

guilt of the crimes of conviction. Accordingly, no fundamental

miscarriage of justice will occur absent a consideration of the

merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims.

C. Claims not cognizable in a section 2254 action

Additionally, Petitioner’s fourth claim for relief may

be denied regardless of any issue regarding the petition’s

timeliness or Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims in the

state courts.

In Ground IV of his habeas petition, Petitioner argues

that he was “over sentenced” when the state court “double

count[ed]” his prior felony convictions. Doc. 1. Federal

habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the

interpretation or application of state law, including a state’s

statutes regarding imposition of sentences. See Estelle v.

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McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). To the

extent that Petitioner asserts his sentence violated his right

to due process because it was improper pursuant to Arizona

statutory law, Petitioner has not stated a claim for federal

habeas relief. See Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th

Cir. 2002). Although Petitioner asserts that his right to due

process was violated because the state allegedly did not follow

its sentencing statutes, the characterization of this claim in

this fashion does not render it cognizable on federal habeas

review. See Cacoperdo v. Demonsthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th

Cir. 1994); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir.

2002).

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s federal habeas action was not timely

filed. Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the

statute of limitations nor is Petitioner entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Petitioner has not

established that his failure to file a timely habeas action was

attributable to some outside force and Petitioner has not shown

due diligence in progressing his claims. Additionally,

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims by

not properly exhausting them in the state courts. Petitioner

has not established cause for nor prejudice arising from his

procedural default of his claims. Petitioner does not allege

his actual innocence of the crimes of conviction. With regard

to Petitioner’s fourth claim for relief, this assertion does not

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present a claim on which habeas relief may be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Wiggins’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

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in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 13th day of August, 2012.

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