Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03592/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03592-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTAGIO CORPORATION,

Plaintiff, No. C 06-3592 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IN PART AND

TIGER OAK PUBLICATIONS, INC., DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN PART

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, for summary

adjudication, came on for hearing before this court on October 31, 2007. Plaintiff, Intagio

Corporation (“Intagio”), appeared through its counsel, Russell I. Glazer. Defendant, Tiger

Oak Publications, Inc. (“Tiger Oak”), appeared through its counsel, James M. Dombroski. 

Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES summary judgment in

part and GRANTS summary judgment in part, for the reasons stated at the hearing, and

summarized as follows. 

1. Summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor is GRANTED with respect to

defendant’s affirmative defense of fraud, insofar as defendant’s fraud claim rests on the

assertions that (1) plaintiff’s agent and/or employee fraudulently induced defendant’s

employee, Mr. DiMarino, to sign the agreements in question by failing to disclose to him

that a cash fee was required; and (2) plaintiff’s agent and/or employee conspired with Mr.

DiMarino to fraudulently conceal execution of the agreements from defendant’s President,

Mr. Craig Bednar. First, as a matter of law, defendant cannot raise a disputed issue of fact

as to whether the cash fee was disclosed, since the evidence demonstrates that the

Case 4:06-cv-03592-PJH Document 185 Filed 11/14/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Although defendant’s counterclaims were stricken by order of the court dated

September 21, 2007, the court nonetheless refers to the allegations contained therein, in view

of the fact that defendant’s affirmative defense of fraud states, “the averments of which are

made in Tiger Oak’s counterclaims herein.” 

2

Corporate Client Trading Agreement, and the PowerPoint presentation sent to Mr. DiMarino

on August 4, 2005, adequately disclosed the existence of a cash fee. See, e.g., Cohen v.

Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other

grounds in Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l., Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 941 (9th Cir. 2001). Second,

the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Bednar was aware of plaintiff’s proposed

agreements prior to execution of the agreements; plaintiff cannot, therefore, be said to

have concealed the agreements from him.

To the extent, however, that defendant’s fraud defense alleges other means by

which fraud was committed by plaintiff, as set forth in paragraphs 13-23 of defendant’s First

Amended Answer and Counterclaim1

, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to

defendant’s affirmative defense alleging Mr. DiMarino’s lack of authorization to enter into

the agreements in question. Neither side disagrees that the fundamental question before

the court is whether the undisputed facts, taken as a whole, support the conclusion that Mr.

DiMarino had a reasonable belief that Mr. Bednar granted him the authority to execute the

agreements with plaintiff. See, e.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638,

643-44 (Cal. 1964)(actual authority “arises as a consequence of conduct of the principal

which causes an agent reasonably to believe that the principal consents to the agent’s

execution of an act on behalf of the principal”)(“to establish actual or ostensible authority

the principal’s consent need not be express”). The court finds, however, that a material

dispute of fact exists with respect to this fundamental issue whether Mr. Bednar’s actions

could have led Mr. DiMarino to reasonably believe that he possessed actual authority to

enter into the contracts at issue. See Lewicky Decl., Ex. O; cf., e.g., Bednar Decl., ¶¶ 3-6. 

As such, the matter must accordingly be decided by the trier of fact. 

Case 4:06-cv-03592-PJH Document 185 Filed 11/14/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to defendant’s remaining

affirmative defenses is DENIED. The affirmative defenses shall remain in the case. In the

event that a jury determines that defendant did, in fact, validly enter into the underlying

agreements, the defenses will then go to the arbitrator for resolution. 

The court furthermore OVERRULES defendant’s evidentiary objections, filed in

opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-03592-PJH Document 185 Filed 11/14/07 Page 3 of 3