Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00670/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00670-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 For ease of reference, all citations to page numbers of docketed items

are to the page assigned by the court's case management and electronic case filing

(CM/ECF) system.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allan Kenneth Morgal, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 07-0670-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Maricopa County Board of )

Supervisors, )

)

Defendant. ) )

On April 3, 2012, the Honorable Edward C. Voss, United

States Magistrate Judge (“the Magistrate Judge”), denied

plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a[n] Amended Complaint

(Doc. 140). Ord. (Doc. 144) at 2:16-171. Currently pending

before the court are plaintiff pro se Allan K. Morgal’s

timely filed objections to that denial (Doc. 147). 

Background

Assuming familiarity with the prior proceedings, as

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2 After Judge Murguia’s elevation to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

the present case was reassigned to this court. Doc. 126. 

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relevant here, it is only necessary to recount what

transpired on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

and thereafter. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of,

among others, the defendant Maricopa County Board of

Supervisors (“the Board”). In so doing, the district court

reasoned that plaintiff, who is challenging healthcare

services at two Maricopa County jails, did not present any

“evidence of a pervasive County policy of denying adequate

medical care.” Memo. (Doc. 122-1) at 3.2 The district court

held that its grant of summary judgment “rendered moot[]”

four pending motions in limine and plaintiff’s “Motion to

Conduct In Camera Review[.]” Ord. (Doc. 116) at 11:10-16. 

 On his pro se appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that

“[w]hen the district court granted summary judgment for the

[Board],” plaintiff “had under submission five requests that

the district court order the [Board] to produce a specified

official report purporting to identify specific systemic

problems with healthcare services at the Maricopa County

Jail.” Memo. (Doc. 122-1) at 2-3. In that regard, plaintiff

Morgal “submitted” to the Ninth Circuit “a copy of a document

dated February 24, 2006 entitled ‘Revised Accreditation

Report on the Health Care Services at Maricopa County

Sheriffs [sic] Office-Detention Bureau’ and naming the

National Commission on Correctional Health Care [(“NCCHC”)]

as the author.” Id. at 3 n. 1. The Ninth Circuit

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“supplement[ed] the record to include th[at] [2006 NCCHC

report] only for the limited purpose of identifying it as the

subject of Morgal’s discovery submissions to the district

court[.]” Id. at 3 n. 1 (citation omitted). In light of

those five unresolved discovery “requests,” the Ninth Circuit

held that summary judgment in the Board’s favor was improper. 

That Court thus “vacate[d] and remand[ed] for further

proceedings, including, if applicable, resolution of any

discovery request by either party relating to the [February

24, 2006] NCCHC report.” Id. at 3. The Ninth Circuit’s

memorandum was filed on July 8, 2011, and the judgment took

effect that date. See Docs. 122-1; and Mandate (No. 09-

17313) at 1. The mandate did not issue though until August

8, 2011. 

More than a month later, on September 15, 2011, plaintiff

filed three separate motions, including a motion to re-open

discovery, which had been closed since March 26, 2008. See

Ord. (Doc. 12) at 2, ¶ 6. The primary basis for that motion

was plaintiff’s claim that the “discovery” of the 2006 NCCHC

report “led to relevant material facts requiring [the]

depositions” of two former directors of Correctional Health

Services (“CHS”), a Supervisors member, the head of the

Office of Management and Budget, and the Deputy County

Manager. Mot. (Doc. 123) at 2. In denying that motion, the

Magistrate Judge observed that the plaintiff just as easily

could have taken the depositions of those individuals

earlier, “during the discovery phase[.]” Ord. (Doc. 133) at

2:17. Furthermore, plaintiff did not offer any reason why he

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did not do that. The Magistrate Judge also explained that

“[p]laintiff’s recent receipt of the NCCHC report did nothing

[to] change what he needs to prove to prevail in this action

and thus provides no basis to re-open discovery to allow

these additional depositions.” Ord. (Doc. 133) at 2:14-16. 

 On December 19, 2012, approximately eleven days after

denial of that motion to re-open discovery, plaintiff filed a

motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). See Mot. (Doc. 134) at 1. Plaintiff

filed that motion even though, pursuant to the Rule 16

Scheduling and Discovery Order (“Rule 16 Order”), the

deadline for amending the complaint was October 26, 2007. 

See Ord. (Doc. 12) at 2, ¶ 4. In seeking leave to amend,

plaintiff claimed, as he had before, that the defendant was

“misle[a]d[ing] the Court as to the dating of the [NCCHC]

report and its contents.” Mot. (doc. 134) at 1. Plaintiff

likewise argued, again, as he had previously, that the

defendant should not “be rewarded” for purportedly not

“disclosing relevant documentation[,]” such as the 2006 NCCHC

report, “that was requested prior to the close of discovery.” 

Id. at 2 and 1. Plaintiff sought leave to amend his

complaint to include the following “facts and others[:]”

The [2006 NCCHC] report illustrated that the 

. . . Supervisors were well aware of problems 

with medical treatment at the county jails. 

[The Supervisors] w[ere] well aware of staff 

shortages that fell below federal guidelines 

and did nothing to correct the problem. 

Defendant states that the accreditation with 

NCCHC was in good standing when in fact 

during the timeframes [sic] of the complaint 

the County Jails were placed on probation 

and the accreditation was later completely 

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rescinded.

Id. at 2. The Magistrate Judge, agreeing with the defendant,

denied plaintiff’s request fo file an amended complaint

because plaintiff did not attach as an exhibit “a copy of the

proposed amended pleading[]” as LRCiv 15.1 requires. See

Ord. (Doc. 139) at 1:21-22.

Roughly two weeks after the denial of that request to

amend, on February 21, 2012, plaintiff again sought leave to

amend his complaint. The asserted basis for amendment was

plaintiff’s claim that “[t]he Defendants [sic] post-event

conduct includes with-holding [sic] critical information that

the Plaintiff repeatedly requested prior to the close of

discovery.” Mot. (Doc. 140) at 1. Plaintiff’s motion

included nothing more, but this time he did attach a copy of

his proposed amended complaint (“the AC”). 

Depicting plaintiff’s motion to amend as “nothing more

than an attempt . . . to make an end-run around” the prior

order denying his request to re-open discovery, the Board

strongly opposed allowing amendment. See Resp. (Doc. 141) at

1:20-21. In opposing amendment, the Board primarily argued

that plaintiff’s motion was untimely, and allowing amendment

at this late date would be not only prejudicial, but also

futile. 

Denying leave to amend, the Magistrate Judge looked not

only to plaintiff’s bald reference to the Board’s alleged 

“with-holding [sic] [of] critical information,” but also to

some of the AC’s newly added allegations. See Ord. (Doc.

144) at 1:21. The Magistrate Judge observed that plaintiff

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alleged that the Board had “hired outside consultants” who

made recommendations, such as changing to an electronic

records system[,]” which “BOS disregarded . . . and cho[]se

not” to do. See Prop. Amend. Co. (Doc. 140-1) at 15. The

Magistrate Judge further observed that plaintiff’s AC

includes an allegation that in February 2006, “the jails[’]

accreditation with the [NCCHC] was placed on probation after

a routine review uncovered major deficiencies.” See id. at

17. The AC likewise includes an allegation that a member of

the Board allegedly admitted that an electronic medical

records system should have been installed earlier. See id. 

The Magistrate Judge noted that since the 2007

commencement of this action, plaintiff has been claiming that

Correctional Health Services “had a policy or custom of

providing inadequate health care to jail inmates[.]” Id. at

2:6-8 (citation omitted). The Magistrate Judge concluded,

however, that “[p]laintiff’s reference to Defendant

withholding information and to the NCCHC in his proposed

amended allegations d[id] not add to [that] claim.” Id. at

2:8-9. Given the Magistrate Judge’s remark that “this case

was remanded by the Ninth Circuit to resolve any discovery

requests relating to the [NCCHC] report, if applicable[,]”

evidently, in denying leave to amend, the scope of the remand

also was a consideration. See at 2:12-13. 

Although he broadly contends that the order denying him

leave to amend was “both . . . clear error and . . . contrary

to law[,”] plaintiff objects only to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that the “‘amended allegations d[id] not add to

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his claim[.]’” Obj. (Doc. 147) at 1 (quoting Ord. (Doc. 144)

at 2:9). From plaintiff’s standpoint, the 2006 NCCHC report

“adds a great deal to the original complaint as it shows that

the [Board] ha[d] been aware of constitutional violations

within the County jails for decades and refused to fund both

staff positions and a record keeping system due to costs.” 

Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff claims, although he does not

elaborate, that he will “suffer a great injustice and

prejudice” if this court affirms denial of his motion for

leave to amend. See id. at 2. Plaintiff reiterates his firm

belief that the Supervisors’ “[c]ounsel has not cooperated in

good faith with discovery[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Discussion

I. Preliminary Issues

A. Plaintiff’s Reply

Before addressing plaintiff’s objections to the denial of

his motion seeking leave to amend, there are two preliminary

issues. The first is plaintiff’s mistaken belief that he

“filed a timely reply that” the Magistrate Judge did “not

review[][.]” Obj. (Doc. 147) at 1 (emphasis added). In

short, as fully explained below, that reply was untimely. 

Thus, the Magistrate Judge had no obligation to consider it.

On February 21, 2012, plaintiff filed his motion for

leave to file an amended complaint. See Mot. (Doc. 140) at

1. In accordance with LRCiv 7.2(c), the Board timely filed

its response on March 14, 2012. As LRCiv 7.2(d) allows,

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3 That Rule allows a moving party to file a reply memorandum within seven

days after service of the responsive memorandum. Here, the Board filed and served

its responsive memorandum on March 14, 2012. Computing the time in accordance with

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(A), that date, as “the event that triggers the period[,]” is

excluded. Based upon the type of service, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d),

plaintiff had three additional days, beyond the seven under LRCiv 7.2(d), in which

to file a reply. Because the last day of the period was on a Sunday, as

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C) permits, plaintiff had until the next day “that is not a

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday[,]” i.e., until Monday, March 26, 2012, by which

to file his reply. 

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plaintiff then had until March 26, 2012,3 by which to file his

reply. Plaintiff did not do that however; he filed his reply

on April 3, 2012. Because the plaintiff’s reply was

untimely, it was not clear error for the Magistrate Judge not

to consider that reply. What is more, although filed on

April 3, 2012, plaintiff’s untimely reply was not entered

until April 4, 2012. See Reply (Doc. 146); and the Notice of

Electronic Filing associated therewith. Hence, because the

Magistrate Judge’s order was filed on April 3, 2012, and

entered at 3:37 p.m. that same date, as his order indicates,

the Magistrate Judge could not have known of that untimely

filing. See Ord. (Doc. 144) at 1:17-18.

B. Denial of Motion to Re-open Discovery

The second preliminary issue also pertains to timeliness.

Plaintiff further claims that the Magistrate Judge’s earlier

denial of plaintiff’s motion to re-open discovery, “is in

error contrary to law[.]” Obj. (Doc. 147) at 2. That denial

order was filed and served on December 8, 2011. See Ord.

(Doc. 133). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), plaintiff thus

had 14 days “after being served with a copy[]” of that order

in which to “serve and file objections” thereto. In other

words, again computing the time in accordance with Rule 6,

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plaintiff had until December 26, 2011, in which to file and

serve any objections to the order denying his motion to reopen discovery. Plaintiff did not file any objections within

that time frame, however. Instead, he waited nearly three

and a half months, until April 13, 2012, when he filed his

objections to the order denying leave to amend. Thus, to the

extent plaintiff is objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s

December 8, 2011, order denying plaintiff’s motion to re-open

discovery, such objection is untimely. 

II. Leave to Amend

A. Standard of Review

“Generally, a motion for leave to amend the pleadings is

a nondispositive matter that may be ruled on by a magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).” Cazares v. Morris,

2011 WL 2414543, at *2 (D.Ariz. June 16, 2011) (citing, inter

alia, JJCO, Inc. v. Isuzu Motors America, Inc., 2009 WL

3818247, *2 (D.Haw. Nov. 12, 2009) (magistrate judge's denial

of a motion for leave to amend complaint is not a dispositive

ruling) (citing, in turn, U.S. Dominator, Inc. v. Factory

Ship Robert E. Resoff, 768 F.2d 1099, 1102 n. 1 (9th Cir.

1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized

in Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.

1996) (noting that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend

its Complaint was properly treated as a nondispositive motion

when the magistrate judge granted the plaintiff’s motion)). 

There are circumstances, such as when a “magistrate judge

denies a party the opportunity to assert a new claim or

defense[,]” or “when the denial is specifically premised on

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futility[,]” that courts have “view[ed] a magistrate judge’s

denial of a motion for leave to amend as a dispositive

ruling.” JJCO, Inc., 2009 WL 3818247, at *3 (citing cases). 

That “view is not universal[,]” as the court in JJCO, Inc.

astutely observed however. Id. at *3 (citing Hall v. Norfolk

S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding a

magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to amend on grounds of

futility to be nondispositive and subject to review for clear

error by the district court)). 

Even if that view was universally held, in the present

case, the Magistrate Judge’s denial of leave to amend did not

deprive the plaintiff of “the opportunity to assert a new

claim or defense[.]” See JJCO, Inc., 2009 WL 3818247, at *3

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Nor did the Magistrate

Judge “specifically premise[]” denial of leave to amend upon

futility. See id. (citations omitted). Therefore, his order

denying plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to amend is nondispositive under this line of reasoning. 

Given that the challenged order is non-dispositive,

plaintiff is correct – the clearly erroneous or contrary to

law standard applies here. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)

(“[a] judge . . . may reconsider any pretrial matter under

this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the

magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to

law[]”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) (a district court “must consider

timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the

order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law[]”). 

“‘The clearly erroneous standard applies to the magistrate

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judge’s factual findings[.]’” Williams v. U.S., 2012 WL

406904, at *3 (quoting Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell,

245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D.Cal. 2007)). On the other hand,

“‘the contrary to law standard applies to the magistrate

judge’s legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo.’” Id.;

see also Jones v. Corrections Corp. of America, 2011 WL

1706838, at *4 (D.Ariz. May 5, 2011) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he contrary to law standard 

. . . permits independent review of purely legal

determinations by the magistrate judge.”)

In the present case, plaintiff is not challenging any

factual findings by the Magistrate Judge. Rather, he is

challenging the Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusion denying

leave to amend. Thus, applying the contrary to law standard,

this court will engage in an independent, de novo review of

that denial.

B. Governing Legal Standards

“A decision is ‘contrary to law’ if it applies an

incorrect legal standard or fails to consider an element of

the applicable standard.” Forouhar v. Asa, 2011 WL 4080862,

at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 13, 2011) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Likewise, “a magistrate judge’s

decision is ‘contrary to law’ when it fails to apply or

misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of

procedure.” Gabriel Technologies Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,

2012 WL 849167 at *1 (S.D.Cal. March 13, 2012) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Magistrate Judge denied leave to amend primarily

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4 As in Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.

1992), plaintiff Morgal “did not specifically request that the court modify its

scheduling order; he merely [sought leave] to amend his complaint.” See id., at

608 (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, this court will follow the approach

endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Johnson and construe plaintiff Morgal’s motion

for leave to amend as a motion to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16. See

id.; see also Zest IP Holdings, LLC v. Implant Direct Mfg., LLC, 2012 WL 175411,

at *1 n.1 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 2012) (finding that Johnson permits “construing a motion

to amend a pleading under Rule 15 as a motion to modify a scheduling order under

Rule 16[]”). 

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because “Plaintiff’s reference to [the Board] withholding

information and to the NCCHC in his proposed amended

allegations d[id] not add to his claim.” Ord. (Doc. 144) at

2:8-9. In denying leave to amend, however, the Magistrate

Judge overlooked the fact that a Rule 16 scheduling order had

been filed in this case. That omission was contrary to law

because, as explained herein, at least in the first instance,

plaintiff’s motion to amend should have been examined in

light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4) and the case law construing

it. 

In the Ninth Circuit, where, as here, a motion for leave

to amend is filed after entry of a Rule 16 scheduling order,4

the movant cannot “appeal to the liberal amendment procedures

afforded by Rule 15[.]” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist

West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2006). Instead, the

movant must “satisfy the more stringent ‘good cause’ showing

required under Rule 16.” Id. (emphasis in original); see

also Himmelfarb v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat. Ass’n, 2011 WL

4498975, at *3 n. 3 (D.Haw. Sept. 26, 2011) (The plaintiff

“had to satisfy the more rigorous ‘good cause’ standard

established by Rule 16[]” where he filed that motion outside

the time period set in the scheduling order.) Rule 16(b)(4)

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expressly states that “[a] schedule may be modified only for

good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

16(b)(4). “The district court is given broad discretion in

supervising the pretrial phase of litigation, and its

decisions regarding the preclusive effect of a pretrial order

. . . will not be disturbed unless they evidence a clear

abuse of discretion.” C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano

Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.

denied sub nom. C.F. v. Corbett, 132 S.Ct. 1566 (U.S. Feb.

21, 2012) Id. at 984 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted) (omission in original). 

“A court’s evaluation of good cause is not coextensive

with an inquiry into the propriety of the amendment under 

. . . Rule 15.” Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d at 609

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)(emphasis

added). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which

focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an

amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule

16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers the

diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Id. Put in a

slightly different way, “‘[t]he focus of the inquiry is upon

the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.’”

Farnan, 654 F.3d at 984 (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). 

Courts within this Circuit “have articulated and

undertaken [a] three-step inquiry in resolving the question

of ‘diligence’ in the context of determining good cause under

Rule 16[.]” Grant v. United States, 2011 WL 5554878, at *4

(E.D.Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), adopted, 2012 WL 218959, at *1

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(E.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2012). Under that inquiry:

[T]o demonstrate diligence under Rule 16's 

“good cause” standard, the movant may be required 

to show the following: (1) that []he was diligent 

in assisting the [c]ourt in creating a workable 

Rule 16 order; (2) that h[is] noncompliance with 

a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, 

notwithstanding h[is] diligent efforts to comply, 

because of the development of matters which could 

not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at 

the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and 

(3) that []he was diligent in seeking amendment 

of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that 

[]he could not comply with the order.

Id. (quoting Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608

(E.D.Cal. 1999)) (other citation omitted). The diligence

obligation is ongoing. “Parties must ‘diligently attempt to

adhere to that schedule throughout the subsequent course of

the litigation.’” Trejo v. City of Shafter, 2011 WL 6130894,

at *1 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 8, 2011) (quoting Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at

607) (other citation omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that, “[t]he

district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking

the extension.’” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee’s note). By the same

token though, “carelessness is not compatible with a finding

of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” 

Id. Finally, while “the existence or degree of prejudice to

the party opposing the modification might supply additional

reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon

the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id.

(citation omitted). “If that party was not diligent, the

inquiry should end.” Id. That is because, “[a]s the Ninth

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Circuit explained in Johnson . . . , once the district court

has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16 

. . . , a motion seeking to amend pleadings is governed first

by Rule 16(b), and only secondarily by Rule 15(a).” 

Laureate, 186 F.R.D. at 607). That means that if the Rule 16

good cause standard is not met, there is no need to “reach

the Rule 15(a) standard.” See B2B CFO Partners, LLC v.

Kaufman, 2011 WL 2713887, at *4 (D.Ariz. 2011) (holding that

it “need not reach the Rule 15(a) standard[]” where

plaintiffs did not satisfy the Rule 16(b) standard). 

C. Analysis

On July 26, 2007, a Rule 16 Order was entered in this

case. In ordering “that the parties shall comply with the 

. . . deadlines and discovery orders[]” enumerated therein,

that Order contained the following explicit warning:

THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE

DEADLINES SET FORTH IN THIS RULE 16 SCHEDULING ORDER SHALL BE

STRICTLY ENFORCED.

Ord. (Doc. 12) at 1 (emphasis in original). That Scheduling

Order further mandated:

4. Motions to Amend the Complaint, and to join additional parties shall be

filed no later than Friday, October 26, 2007 .

Id. at 2, ¶ 4 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff did not file

the motion to amend which is the subject of this court’s

review until February 21, 2012, however. As explained herein,

under these “case-specific circumstances, the ‘diligence’

inquiry . . . turn[s][,]” primarily upon “consideration of

[plaintiff’s] diligence “between the discovery of new

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5 The Board’s response did include a legal analysis, but, for the most

part, it missed the mark. That is because the Board focused almost exclusively

upon untimeliness, prejudice and futility – factors which, in accordance with Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), typically are

considered when deciding the propriety of allowing amendment under Fed.R.Civ.P.

15(a). Because plaintiff’s motion to amend was filed after entry of the Rule 16

Order, as explained above, as a prerequisite to amendment, plaintiff must satisfy

Rule 16(b)(4)’s more stringent good cause standard. Only if plaintiff meets that

burden, does Rule 15(a) become relevant. Therefore, the bulk of the Board’s

response was not directly relevant. 

6 Opposing amendment, the Board, purporting to quote from Scognamillo v.

Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, 587 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1155-56 (N.D.Cal. 2008),

stated, “‘Plaintiff has not addressed the ‘good cause’ standard and has offered no

justification for the delay in seeking to amend his complaint. Absent a showing

of good cause, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint is denied.’” Resp. (Doc.

141) at 2:22-24. That quote appears nowhere in Scognamillo, however. So, although

the Board recognizes that Rule 16's good cause standard is implicated here, it did

not provide any pertinent case law. Likewise, the Board did not analyze diligence,

which is central to the good cause inquiry.

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information and the motion to amend[.]” See Aldan v. World

Corp., 267 F.R.D. 346, 357 (N. Mar. I. 2010). 

In seeking leave to modify the Rule 16 Order to allow

amendment, plaintiff has the burden of establishing good

cause within the meaning of that Rule. Plaintiff’s motion is

void of any case law, statutes or rules, however.5 As earlier

noted, the sum total of his motion is plaintiff’s bald

assertion that the Board’s “post-event conduct includes withholding [sic] critical information that the Plaintiff

repeatedly requested prior to the close of discovery.” Mot.

(Doc. 140) at 1. The Board’s opposition raised the specter

that Rule 16's good cause standard has some relevancy here.6

Given the absence of a reply, and plaintiff’s failure to

address good cause initially, clearly, he has made no attempt

to establish the requisite good cause.

Plaintiff’s silence on that issue does not necessarily

preclude a finding that he acted diligently with respect to

the first two steps of the good cause inquiry, though. As to

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the first step, there is nothing to suggest that plaintiff was

not “diligent in assisting the [c]ourt in creating a workable

Rule 16 order[.]” See Grant, 2011 WL 5554878, at *4 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). As an aside, the court

observes that given the Board’s seeming awareness that “good

cause” is the governing legal standard here, presumably, if it

believed that plaintiff had not been diligent in this regard,

the Board would have so argued, but it did not. 

As to the second good cause factor, as the record shows,

plaintiff’s noncompliance with the Rule 16 Order’s October 26,

2007, deadline for filing his motion to amend “occurred . . .

because of the development of matters which could not have

been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the

Rule 16 scheduling conference[.]” See id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). In particular, when the parties

entered into the Rule 16 Order on July 26, 2007, plaintiff

could not have anticipated the motion practice which would

ensue, beginning in the spring of 2009, with respect to the

2006 NCCHC report. Nor could he anticipate that he would not

receive that report until roughly two and a half years later,

in January, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal. See

Appellant’s Reply (No. 09-17313) (Doc. 17) at 3. 

Despite the foregoing, plaintiff’s good cause showing

falters, and ultimately fails, at the third step of the

inquiry. Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that he

“was diligent in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once

it became apparent that []he could not comply with the order.” 

See Grant, 2011 WL 5554878, at *4 (citations omitted). There

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7 In an April 13, 2009, letter which the Supervisors construed as a

“Motion to Produce[,]” plaintiff requested, among other documents, an NCCHC report.

 See Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to Produce (Doc. 66-1) at 1:28-2:1. Because that letter

is not part of the record, there is no way of knowing for certain whether at that

time plaintiff was seeking the 2006 version of the NCCHC’s report. Further

muddying the waters is the fact that in its response, the Board objected to the

production of NCCHC reports for years other than 2006. As this dispute continued,

however, it became clear that, despite what the Board presumed, all along

plaintiff had been seeking the 2006 version of the NCCHC report.

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is more than sufficient proof in the record that, from

plaintiff’s standpoint, the 2006 NCCHC report was important to

his theory of liability in this lawsuit, and that it had been

well before February 21, 2012, when he filed the motion to

amend which now is under review. Since April 13, 2009,

plaintiff had been attempting to procure that report,7 and

eventually he did. On May 10, 2010, plaintiff supplied the

2006 NCCHC report to the Ninth Circuit on his appeal. See

Appellant’s Reply (No. 09-17313) (Doc. 17) at 2, ¶ 3. Thus,

obviously plaintiff was in possession of the 2006 NCCHC report

when the mandate was filed on August 8, 2011. Moreover, on

September 15, 2011, when plaintiff filed three post-appeal

motions, he specifically relied upon that report in two of

those motions. One of plaintiff’s bases for seeking

appointment of counsel was the Board’s alleged denial of the

existence of the 2006 NCCHC report. Mot. (Doc. 124) at 1. 

That report also formed the basis for plaintiff’s motion to

re-open discovery, also filed that same date. 

 Thus, under the particular facts of this case, plaintiff

has not shown that he acted diligently when, instead of

seeking amendment at least by September 15, 2011, when he

filed three other post-appeal motions – two of which were

based in part upon the 2006 NCCHC report – he waited until

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December 19, 2011, more than four months after entry of the

mandate, to file his first motion to amend; and this second

motion to amend was not filed until more than six months after

entry of the mandate. Cf. Laureate, 186 F.R.D. at 609

(denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint

because it was not supported by good cause in that, inter

alia, plaintiff was “silent as to whether any new and

previously unavailable information justified the requested

amendment[]” and she “fail[ed] to show diligence in filing her

motion to amend[]”) (citation and footnote omitted). 

The present case thus stands in sharp contrast to cases

such as Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, 2006 WL 3533039, at *2

(N.D.Cal. Dec. 7, 2006), and Rants v. WHPacific Inc., 2010 WL

4622164, at *2 (W.D.Wash. Nov. 4, 2010), where, based upon a

showing of good cause, the courts allowed amendment after the

filing of a Rule 16 order. Plaintiff Navarro filed her motion

to amend “within two weeks of discovering [through depositions

of defendants’ employees] the basis of her new allegations.” 

Navarro, 2006 WL 3533039, at *2. The Navarro court reasoned

that “[p]laintiff showed diligence by seeking leave to amend

her complaint upon learning of the basis of her new claims.” 

Id. The same cannot be said of plaintiff Morgal who, although

he had the basis for his purported new claims in his

possession on August 8, 2011, waited considerably longer than

two weeks before seeking leave to amend. 

Acting with similar haste as plaintiff Navarro, plaintiff 

Rants likewise acted diligently by filing her motion to amend

to add two new defendants less than two weeks after the

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deadline for the filing of any such motions. See Rants, 2010

WL 4622164, at *2. Plaintiff Morgal did not act with similar

promptness. He did not seek leave to amend at the first

available opportunity after entry of the mandate. 

Additionally, allowing amendment at this late date would

“create . . . meaningful issues of case management and . . .

impair the efficient adjudication of th[is] action[]” given

that this case has been pending for more than five years; the

time for discovery has long since passed; and the Board’s

summary judgment motion on remand is pending. See id. at *2

(citation omitted). These factors bolster a finding of lack

of diligence in the present case. Consequently, unlike

Rants, where allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint might

have “assist[ed] [in] the efficient adjudication of th[at]

action because” the addition of two defendants “prevent[ed]

the potential for multiple lawsuits[,]” adding allegations

based upon the 2006 NCCHC report at this late date would have

the opposite effect here. See id.

Lastly, the court notes that the sole basis for

plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint

was, as mentioned earlier, his bald assertion that “[t]he

Defendants [sic] post-event conduct includes with-holding

[sic] critical information that the plaintiff repeatedly

requested prior to discovery.” Mot. (Doc. 140) at 1. 

Generously construing that assertion as an attempt to show

good cause, still, plaintiff has not satisfied his burden in

that regard. That unsupported contention does not come close

to establishing good cause within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P.

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16(b)(4). 

Moreover, in June and July 2009, when the issue of

disclosing the 2006 NCCHC report was the subject of several of

the parties’ motions, plaintiff continually referred to the

Board’s alleged failure to disclose and mislead him with

respect to that report, among other documents. See, e.g.,

Not. of Mis-Representation (Doc. 70) at 1 (“Counsel has still

not forwarded or disclosed the NCCHC report that has been

requested numerous times over the last 60 days.”); Pl.’s Resp.

to Mot. in Limine (Doc. 95) at 1 (accusing defense counsel of

“hiding” document and “providing false information to the

Court” regarding, among other things, the 2006 NCCHC report);

Pl.’s Reply (Doc. 91) at 2-3 (claiming that defense counsel

“had a duty to disclose but cho[]se to hide[,]” among other

documents, the 2006 NCCHC report); and Mot. to Conduct in

Camera Review (Doc. 101) at 1-2 (maintaining that defense

counsel “mislead[] this Court as to the reports[,]” including

the 2006 NCCHC report). Clearly, plaintiff was not diligent

in waiting more than six months after the issuance of the

mandate to seek amendment on his long-held theory that defense

counsel withheld the 2006 NCCHC report. 

Because plaintiff Morgal has not met his burden of showing

good cause under Rule 16, “the inquiry should end.” See

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. As the Ninth Circuit permits,

however, this court will also consider the “existence or

degree of prejudice” to the Board, as the party opposing

modification, as those factors “might supply additional

reasons to deny a motion[]” to modify under Rule 16. Id. 

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When the court does that, it finds that allowing amendment at

this late date likely would require re-opening discovery

which, in turn, would be prejudicial to the Board, and further

delay the resolution of this case. This is all the more so

given the Board’s pending summary judgment motion filed in

light of the remand. See Melbye v. Accelerated Payment

Technologies, Inc., 2011 WL 6754088, at *3 (S.D.Cal. Dec. 22,

2011) (plaintiff did not demonstrate good cause where, among

other things, the “parties ha[d] already engaged in, and

completed, discovery[;]” and defendant had “also filed a

summary judgment motion[]”) So, although not critical to its

finding that plaintiff did not act diligently in seeking leave

to amend, in the present case, this prejudice factor does

provide an additional reason for denying that motion. 

To conclude, after engaging in an independent, de novo

review of the Magistrate Judge’s denying plaintiff’s motion

for leave to a file an amended complaint, although this court

reaches the same conclusion as did the Magistrate Judge –

that plaintiff’s motion must be denied – it does so for

different reasons. As thoroughly discussed above, the basis

for this court’s denial is plaintiff’s failure to satisfy

Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4)’s good cause standard. 

Conclusion

 To the extent plaintiff is objecting to the Magistrate

Judge’s December 8, 2011, order denying plaintiff’s motion to

re-open discovery, such objection is untimely. Accordingly,

the court overrules that objection. Further, because

plaintiff Morgal has not met his burden of showing good cause

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under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4), this court finds that plaintiff’s

“Motion for Leave to File a[n] Amended Complaint” was properly

denied, albeit for different reasons than the Magistrate

Judge offered.

Further, in light of this court’s May 1, 2012, order

vacating the time frames set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s

March 23, 2012, order, and “Defendant’s Notice of Service of

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 151), the court

hereby ORDERS that:

(1) plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from date of

entry of this order in which to file and serve a response

thereto, if any. If plaintiff desires to file a response,

except for the time frames set forth therein, such response

otherwise shall comport with the Magistrate Judge’s March 23,

2012, Order (Doc. 143), a copy of which is attached hereto and

incorporated herein; and;

(2) within fifteen (15) days after service of plaintiff’s

response, if any, the defendant may file a reply, if any.

DATED this 5th day of June, 2012.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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