Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00489/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00489-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Garrett J. Deetz,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-13-00489-PHX-DJH (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the undersigned on referral from the District Judge. Pending 

before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39). Defendants have 

not filed a response, and the response deadline has passed. See Local Rule of Civil 

Procedure 7.2(c) (providing that a response must be filed within fourteen days after 

service of the motion). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the 

Court deny the Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39) on the basis that Plaintiff’s 

proposed Second Amended Complaint (lodged at Doc. 39-1) would be futile.

1

1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a magistrate judge has the authority to hear and 

determine certain “non-dispositive” pretrial motions in cases where the parties have not 

consented to a magistrate judge’s exercise of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has not addressed whether a magistrate judge’s denial of a plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to amend a complaint is “dispositive.” Accordingly, the undersigned is ruling on 

the Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39) by this Report and Recommendation. 

 

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I. Background

Plaintiff is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex (“ASPC”), Special 

Management Unit I, in Florence, Arizona. On March 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Civil 

Rights Complaint by a Prisoner (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the Court 

dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 25) on April 14, 2014. The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) alleges two counts 

of inadequate medical care in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff 

named the following defendants: (i) Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections; (ii) Jane Valenzuela, Facility Health Administrator for ASPC-Tucson; (iii) 

Maria Figueroa, Community Liaison; (iv) Dr. Zoran Vukcevic, a physician at ASPCFlorence; (v) Wexford Health Services, Inc. (“Wexford”); and (vi) Corizon Health 

Services, Inc. (“Corizon”). 

On September 30, 2014, the Court screened Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 25) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court dismissed without prejudice 

Defendants Ryan, Figueroa, Wexford, and Corizon from the action for failure to state a 

claim. (Doc. 23 at 8-11). The Court found that Plaintiff did state a § 1983 medical claim 

against Defendants Vukcevic and Valenzuela. The Court thus ordered Defendants 

Vukcevic and Valenzuela to answer both counts in the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 

23 at 11-12). 

On January 27, 2015, Defendant Vukcevic filed his Answer (Doc. 36) to the First 

Amended Complaint. On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff’s newly-retained counsel filed a 

Notice of Appearance (Doc. 38) and a Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39). The 

Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39) requests leave to file Plaintiff’s proposed Second 

Amended Complaint (lodged at Doc. 39-1). 

II. Legal Standards Governing Motions for Leave to Amend 

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides that “leave [to amend a 

pleading] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” A district court has the 

discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend. See, e.g., Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 

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F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010); Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of Amer., 232 F.3d 719, 725 

(9th Cir. 2000). That discretion is “especially broad where the court has already given a 

plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint . . . .” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 347 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining “the rule that a 

district court has broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend, particularly where the 

court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint to 

allege federal claims”).

Although Rule 15(a) is very liberal, courts “need not grant leave to amend where 

the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces 

an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis

West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). These factors, however, are not given 

equal weight. “Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for 

leave to amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lockheed

Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where the 

legal basis for a cause of action is tenuous, futility supports the refusal to grant leave to 

amend.”).

Here, because the Court has previously given Plaintiff the opportunity to amend 

his Complaint (Doc. 1), the Court’s discretion in ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 

Amend (Doc. 39) is especially broad. 

III. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1) consolidates the two 

Eighth Amendment claims in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) into one 

claim. Plaintiff continues to assert that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 

Defendants were allegedly deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. As 

Plaintiff now has counsel, the proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1) is not 

entitled to the same liberal construction applied to Plaintiff’s prior pro se filings. See 

U.S. v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 463 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that rule of liberal 

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construction is for the benefit of the pro se prisoner). The proposed Second Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 39-1) seeks to add a number of Defendants to the action:

1. Wexford;

2. Corizon;

3. Charles Ryan;

4. Jane Valenzuela, Facility Health Administrator (“FHA”) at ASPCTucson;

5. Unknown FHA at ASPC- Florence; and

6. Numerous medical providers employed by Defendant Ryan, Wexford, 

or Corizon:

i. Dr. Zoran Vukcevic

ii. Arlene McKamey

iii. Unknown Holder

iv. Unknown Wright

v. Unknown Ainslie

vi. Darla Duran

vii. Unknown Brower, Unknown VanCuran, and Doe 4

viii. Unknown Salyer

ix. Unknown McGowan

x. John or Jane Does 1-10

As stated in the Court’s prior screening order (Doc. 23), not every claim by a 

prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth or 

Fourteenth Amendments. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the 

defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure 

to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. 

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Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted).

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); see also 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a 

high legal standard.”). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both 

know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health. That is, “the official must both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Because deliberate indifference is a high legal standard, mere indifference, 

medical malpractice, or gross negligence will not support a cause of action under the 

Eighth Amendment. See Broughton v. Cutter Labs, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(per curiam); Lemire v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 

1062, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013). In addition, a delay in medical treatment does not constitute 

a violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the delay causes further harm. Shapley v. 

Nevada Board of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam). 

Finally, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel 

regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a 

deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Instead, “a prisoner must show that the chosen course of treatment was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

IV. Plaintiff’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint Would be Futile

In its September 30, 2014 screening order, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to 

state a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Ryan as Plaintiff failed to allege 

facts to support that Defendant Ryan “knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff had 

serious medical needs but that Ryan nevertheless failed to act to ensure those needs were 

addressed.” (Doc. 23 at 9). Similarly, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a 

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deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Wexford and Corizon as Plaintiff failed 

to allege facts to “support that either Wexford or Corizon promulgated or endorsed a 

policy or custom that resulted in the violation of [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, 

including how and when.” (Doc. 23 at 11). 

The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 

39-1) would be futile. Regarding Defendants Ryan, Wexford, Corizon, and Unknown 

FHA at ASPC-Florence, the proposed Second Amended Complaint fails to allege any 

facts sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted in the Court’s September 30, 2014 

screening order (Doc. 23). Regarding Defendant medical providers McKamey, Holder, 

Wright, Ainslie, Duran, Brower, VanCuran, Salyer, McGowan, and John or Jane Does 1-

10, Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1) at most alleges 

negligence against some of the medical providers. Again, negligence, gross negligence, 

and medical malpractice do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Broughton, 

622 F.2d at 460; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1082. 

Finally, the proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1) would be futile 

even against current Defendants Vukcevic and Valenzuela.

2 In finding that Plaintiff’s 

First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) stated a claim against Defendant Vukcevic, the 

Court’s screening order (Doc. 23 at 11) cited Plaintiff’s allegations that (i) Defendant 

Vukcevic indicated that he would order pain medication for Plaintiff, but failed to do so 

and (ii) Plaintiff requested a plan concerning his Hepatitis C, but Defendant Vukcevic 

only took blood and did not follow-up. The proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 

2 An amended complaint supersedes a prior complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 

1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court treats an original complaint as

nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (“after amendment the original pleading no longer 

performs any function and is treated thereafter as non-existent”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Any cause of action that was raised in the original complaint and 

that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not 

alleged in a proposed amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

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39-1 at 3) does not reiterate these allegations, but instead contains the vague and 

conclusory statement that “Defendant Vukcevic was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 

rights by deliberately disposing of a kidney stone without analyzing it in order to provide 

appropriate treatment, and by knowing of Plaintiff’s conditions but failing to provide 

appropriate testing and treatment.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that vague and conclusory allegations do not 

support a cause of action). The proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1 at 11) 

also states that “Defendant Vukcevic ordered a CT scan, ‘lab & meds,’ and a follow up 

with a doctor in 3 weeks.” The proposed Second Amended Complaint, however, does 

not make any allegation that connects that statement with Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant 

Vukcevic acted with deliberate indifference regarding Plaintiff’s medical needs.

In finding that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) stated a claim 

against Defendant Valenzuela, the Court’s screening order (Doc. 23 at 11) cited 

Plaintiff’s allegation that Plaintiff “submitted an informal resolution concerning 

[Plaintiff’s] medical issues that were causing him extreme pain for a lengthy period to 

FHA Valenzuela, but that Valenzuela failed to act to address the lack of treatment of 

Plaintiff’s condition.” The proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1 at 3) does 

not reiterate this allegation, but instead contains the vague and conclusory allegation that 

Defendant Valenzuela was “deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights by ignoring his 

requests for assistance.” See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

Because Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39-1) fails to 

sufficiently raise an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s 

serious medical needs, the undersigned finds that granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 

Amend (Doc. 39) would be futile. 

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court deny 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 39).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 23rd day of April, 2015. 

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