Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02848/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02848-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

REGINALD DALE BARNES,

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

UNITED COUNCIL OF HUMAN 

SERVICES, 

 Defendant. 

Case No: C 19-2848 SBA 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS AND MOTION 

FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER

 

Plaintiff Reginald Dale Barnes has filed a pro se complaint to challenge an unlawful 

detainer (“UD”) judgment rendered in favor of Defendant United Council of Human 

Services (“UCHS”) in San Francisco County Superior Court. This matter is now before the 

Court on Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and motion for a 

temporary restraining order (“TRO”). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies 

Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, dismisses the Complaint and denies the motion for 

TRO as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff resides at 196 Jerrold Avenue, San Francisco, California. According to the 

documents attached to his Complaint, that address is a “Hope House residence” operated by 

Defendant UCHS. Compl. Ex. B, Dkt. 1 at 11. On or about August 13, 2018, UCHS 

notified Plaintiff by letter that the lease between the Hope House Program and the landlord 

had expired with no option of renewal. Id. As a result, UCHS’s planned to relocate 

Plaintiff to a residence located at 1315 Newall Avenue, San Francisco. Id. 

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Though it is not entirely clear from the record presented, it appears that Plaintiff did 

not vacate his residence. Consequently, on February 11, 2019, UCHS filed a UD action 

against Plaintiff in San Francisco County Superior Court. Id. Ex. F, Dkt. 1 at 16. On May 

3, 2019, the superior court granted UCHS’s motion for summary judgment. Id. On May 9, 

2019, Plaintiff appealed the ruling to the appellate department of the superior court. Mot. 

for TRO, Dkt. 3 at 3. The status of the appeal is not alleged. However, the records 

provided by Plaintiff indicate that final judgment was entered on May 15, 2019, and that a 

writ of possession was issued by the court on or about May 17, 2019. Id. at 8. On May 22, 

2019, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department issued a Notice of Vacate. Id. at 3.1

Plaintiff has now filed the instant action against UCHS along with a request to 

proceed IFP. Dkt. 1, 2. The Complaint does not allege any claims but seeks to stay the writ 

of possession on the ground that the superior court erred in rendering judgment in favor of 

UCHS. In his motion for TRO, Plaintiff requests that this Court stay the writ pending 

resolution of his appeal from the judgment in the UD action. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Court is permitted to screen complaints brought by litigants proceeding in forma 

pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject 

to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. 

A complaint is frivolous under § 1915 where subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Pratt v. 

 1 A judgment awarding possession to the plaintiff in a UD action does not 

automatically oust the tenant from the premises. Rather, the plaintiff must execute on the 

judgment through writ of possession procedures. See id. § 1170.5(a) (“if the plaintiff 

prevails, a writ of execution shall be issued immediately by the court upon the request of 

the plaintiff”); id. § 712.010 (“After entry of a judgment for possession or sale of property, 

a writ of possession or sale shall be issued by the clerk of the court upon application of the 

judgment creditor and shall be directed to the levying officer in the county where the 

judgment is to be enforced.”); Bedi v. McMullan, 160 Cal. App. 3d 272, 276 (1984) (“A 

valid writ of execution is the ultimate indispensable element of the legal process by which a 

party entitled to possession of the property acquires possession.”). Once the court clerk 

issues the writ, the plaintiff must provide the writ to the sheriff’s department, which then 

posts a Notice to Vacate on the subject premises. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1161; Lamanna 

v. Vognar, 17 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 4, 6 (1993). 

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Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 

Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION 

The threshold question presented is whether the Court has the authority to afford 

Plaintiff the relief he seeks; namely, an order enjoining UCHS from enforcing the writ of 

possession issued by the state trial court following the judgment in favor of UCHS in the 

UD action. It does not. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack 

jurisdiction to review state court rulings. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 

482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). This doctrine 

“prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that 

is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 

1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 

2003)). A federal action constitutes a de facto appeal where “claims raised in the federal 

court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 

adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling....” Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 

898. 

Here, Plaintiff contends that the superior court erred in entering judgment in favor of 

UCHS and therefore the Court should stay the writ of execution while his state court appeal 

remains pending. See Compl., Dkt. 1 at 1, 6-8. As noted, a writ of execution is the 

mechanism to enforce a UD judgment. See Bedi, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 276. As such, the 

writ issued to UCHS is inextricably intertwined with the UD judgment, which the Court has 

no authority to review. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 

284 (2005) (recognizing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 

those judgments”); e.g., Dancy v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. C 10-2602 SBA, 2010 

WL 11639683, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to 

deny a request to enjoin eviction proceedings). 

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Apart from the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff 

is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Anti-Injunction Act states that 

“[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State 

court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its 

jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” Id. This Court as well as numerous 

others have concluded that a request to enjoin eviction proceedings is precluded under the 

Anti-Injunction Act. Dancy, 2010 WL 11639683, at *3 (citing cases); see also Michener v. 

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. C 12-2003 PJH, 2012 WL 3027538, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

July 24, 2012) (“An injunction against the unlawful detainer action is not expressly 

authorized by Congress. Nor is such an injunction necessary to aid this court’s jurisdiction. 

A party to an action in state court litigating possession of real property or the right to 

tenancy does not implicate this exception....”).2

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims 

and no amendment would cure such deficiency. Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP is DENIED. 

Plaintiff’s motion for TRO is DENIED as moot. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 5/28/19 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

 2 Dismissals under Rooker-Feldman and the Anti-Injunction Act are for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 

2007); Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Indian Nation v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax 

& Trade Bureau, 843 F.3d 810, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2016). Jurisdictional dismissals are 

without prejudice. See Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

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