Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01757/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-1757-PHX-RCB (MEA) 

 O R D E R 

Plaintiff Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr., who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex, Browning Unit in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 1, 2.) 

Plaintiff later filed a motion for recusal of Magistrate Judge Aspey and a motion for 

appointment of counsel. (Doc. 7, 8.) The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to 

amend and deny the motions. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing fee will be 

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a 

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the 

fees according to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 

Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of 

advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. 

Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to 

decide whether the court was required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s 

Complaint will be dismissed failure to state a claim, but because it may possibly be 

amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 

III. Complaint 

 Plaintiff alleges three counts for threat to safety or failure to protect and use of 

excessive force. Plaintiff sues the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director 

Charles L. Ryan and the following current or former prison staff employed at the 

Florence Complex: Warden Lance R. Hetmer; Deputy Warden (DW) Greg Fizer; 

Criminal Investigator Kathy Ingulli; Assistant Chief of Security DW Barnes; Sergeants 

Blaine Moore and Unknown Quintero; Special Security Officers D. Gidcumb and L. 

Brass; and Corrections Officer II (CO II) Cisneros. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, 

compensatory, and punitive relief. 

 Plaintiff’s claims primarily concern events that occurred after he was transferred 

to the Florence Complex, Central Unit, Cell Block 4 (CB4). Plaintiff alleges the 

following facts, which are summarized in chronological order: at some point, an incident 

occurred between Plaintiff and CO IIs Norris and Valentine and Plaintiff was charged 

with assaulting Norris and Valentine. On May 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed a grievance 

asserting that Norris and Valentine used excessive force against him and claiming that 

prison staff refused to document his resulting injuries. At a May 26, 2011 disciplinary 

hearing, DW Barnes found Plaintiff guilty of assaulting the officers. Plaintiff appealed 

contending that Barnes had failed to give the appropriate weight to Plaintiff’s eye 

witnesses and that Barnes failed to consider medical evidence. Plaintiff does not indicate 

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the outcome of his appeal or allege whether or how he was sanctioned. 

 On June 13, 2011, while Plaintiff was housed in the Kasson Unit in the Florence 

Complex, Criminal Investigator Ingulli informed Plaintiff that he was being criminally 

investigated for assaulting Norris and Valentine. Plaintiff waived his Fifth Amendment 

right to remain silent and “invited” Ingulli to record his interrogation. Ingulli warned 

Plaintiff that if he lied to her, he would be disciplined via the prison’s internal 

disciplinary system. Plaintiff responded that he had already been disciplined and that 

there was not much more that she could do to further discipline him. Ingulli warned 

Plaintiff that she would make sure that he was punished if he lied to her. Plaintiff took 

Ingulli’s statement as a “potential” death threat, which he claims caused him to live in 

constant fear of being violently assaulted. 

 Plaintiff was later transferred to CB4 in the Central Unit. In CB4, ADC staff 

ordinarily formed a “make shift” line of officers posted along the route to outdoor 

recreation, rather than personally escorting each inmate outside. Under that system, 

approximately every 40 seconds, an inmate would be released from his cell to walk 

unescorted to recreation. To go outside, CB4 inmates had to descend a flight of stairs and 

walk through a dark basement where there was no video or audio surveillance and where 

other inmates were housed. Ordinarily, officers were posted at each end of the basement 

because of the risk of violence at those spots. When an inmate reached the basement 

door, which was adjacent to inmate cells, he had to turn sideways to go through the door 

outside. When recreation ended, inmates followed the reverse process in returning to 

their cells. 

 On September 7, 2011, Plaintiff went to recreation, apparently without incident. 

At 8:30 p.m., CB4 staff began returning inmates to their cells from recreation. In 

preparation for return to his cell, Plaintiff’s hands were restrained behind his back. As he 

walked through the basement back towards his cell, Plaintiff noticed that neither 

Cisneros, nor any other officer, was posted at the usual spot in the basement. An inmate 

in one of the basement cells reached through his cell bars and grabbed Plaintiff’s 

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handcuffs, pulling Plaintiff towards him. Plaintiff dimly saw Cisneros about 30 yards 

ahead with her back towards him, apparently ushering other inmates into their cells. The 

inmate who grabbed Plaintiff punched and stabbed him in the chest with a pen-like object 

and Plaintiff screamed.1

 As Plaintiff pulled away from the cell, his left hand came free 

from his restraints. As Plaintiff attempted to staunch the bleeding, he saw Cisneros 

running towards him. Plaintiff stumbled and fell to one knee somewhat away from his 

attacker as Cisneros ordered him to lie down. Plaintiff asserts that he complied with her 

order, but that Cisneros pepper-sprayed him in the face.2

 The pepper-spraying caused 

Plaintiff’s eyes, nose, chest, and lungs to burn and triggered asthma symptoms and 

breathing difficulties. By the time other staff arrived, Plaintiff was lying face down in a 

prone position. Plaintiff contends that Cisneros used excessive force by pepper spraying 

him after he had been assaulted by another inmate and despite having complied with her 

order. 

 Plaintiff was escorted to medical where he was found to have been stabbed once in 

the upper left pectoral muscle. Plaintiff was given a tetanus shot and breathing treatment 

for his asthma. He was cleared by medical staff and a nurse told him that a doctor would 

examine him and provide pain medication in the morning.3

 

 Plaintiff was then taken to a supervisor’s office in the yard office, where Inmate 

Thornburg, whom Cisneros had identified as the assaulting inmate, was being held. 

Moore and Cisneros interrogated Plaintiff. During the questioning, Plaintiff denied that 

he had instigated the assault and maintained that he was the victim. Cisneros conferred 

with Moore concerning her report and asked Moore whether she should state that 

 

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 Plaintiff’s allegations are somewhat ambiguous regarding whether he was punched and stabbed multiple times, or only punched multiple times and stabbed once. 

2

 Plaintiff denies that Cisneros issued multiple orders and contends that he complied with her order. 

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 Plaintiff did not see a doctor until about 20 days later. Plaintiff asserts the doctor was upset because Plaintiff’s mother had called a Facility Health Administrator (FHA) complaining about the lack of treatment for a “visable infection.” Plaintiff alleges no facts to support that he suffered any aftereffects from the assault or pepper-spraying or that he sought further treatment prior to seeing a doctor about 20 days after the incident. 

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Plaintiff had thrown punches. Moore told her to say that she saw Plaintiff standing in 

front of Thornburg’s cell and that Thornburg and Plaintiff were both throwing punches at 

one another. When DW Fizer called, Moore told Fizer that no weapon had been found in 

Thornburg’s cell. Moore also told Fizer that Cisneros had not witnessed the stabbing, but 

that disciplinary charges were going to be issued. Cisneros charged Plaintiff with 

fighting and placed him in an isolation cell in CB3.4

 The next morning at 6:15 a.m., Special Security Officers Gidcumb and Brass, and 

Sergeant Quintero interrogated Plaintiff about the incident and asked, “how the hell did 

swing shift officers get it so messed up that they would implicate Inmate Thornburg 

#229524 . . . as the assailant[?]” (Doc. 1 at 3G.) Quintero told Plaintiff that he knew that 

Plaintiff had run up to cell 4A20 in which Inmate Garcia was housed, rather than cell 

4A21 in which Thornburg was held, and that Plaintiff had begun throwing punches at 

Garcia. Plaintiff told Quintero that his left wrist restraint had come loose when he was 

attacked and denied that he had assaulted anyone. Quintero noted Plaintiff’s long history 

of protective segregation issues, including attacks by other inmates, and Plaintiff’s name 

having appeared on a Mexican Mafia “targeted kill list”. Plaintiff responded that he had 

never been told that his name was on such a list and demanded protection from future 

assaults. 

 Gidcumb then asked Plaintiff if he knew Garcia, who had recently moved into the 

CB4A run in the basement. According to Plaintiff, Gidcumb alluded to Garcia as 

controlling the cellblock for another inmate affiliated with the Mexican Mafia and that 

Mexican Mafia would not “approve” Plaintiff’s return to CB4. Plaintiff denied knowing 

Garcia. Quintero told Plaintiff that the report indicated that Plaintiff had run up to cell 

4A20 and had thrown punches at Garcia for “personal disrespect issues.” (Id. at 3H.) 

Plaintiff again denied having assaulted anyone and denied knowing Garcia. Brass then 

 

4

 Plaintiff contends that Cisneros was not at her assigned post and fabricated a story to justify her use of force against him. He contends that but for her abandonment of 

her assigned post, and Defendants’ inadequate staffing and procedures concerning maximum security inmates, he would not have been assaulted. 

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told Plaintiff that Garcia had confessed to stabbing Plaintiff. At the conclusion of the 

interrogation, Plaintiff was placed in CB7 and issued a disciplinary ticket for fighting 

Garcia.5

 

 On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Letter to DW Fizer seeking 

an investigation into staff misconduct and a criminal investigation into the stabbing 

incident. On October 26, 2011, Fizer denied Plaintiff’s request. 

 At Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing on November 15, 2011, Plaintiff called eight 

witnesses. Plaintiff denied “slip[ping] his cuffs” or assaulting anyone. Plaintiff was 

found guilty, but does not allege how he was sanctioned. Plaintiff appealed the same day. 

On December 7, 2011, DW Barnes dismissed the disciplinary charge after concluding 

that documentation did not support that Plaintiff had been the aggressor or had initiated 

the attack. 

 Plaintiff contends that Defendants knew or should have known that the basement 

area was dangerous, understaffed, outdated and posed a threat to inmates and staff. He 

asserts, on “personal knowledge and belief,” that Ryan, Hetmer, Fizer, Ingulli, Barnes, 

Moore, Quintero, Gidcumb, Brass, and Cisneros abused their authority by “playing” 

Plaintiff off against “known enemies by manipulating inmate placement housing.” (Doc. 

1 at 3A, 7.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants knew before moving him to the CB4 that 

his name was on a “targeted prison kill list” but housed him on the same tier with “known 

enemies.” (Id. at 3B.) Plaintiff does not identify who those “known” enemies were or 

allege facts to support that either Plaintiff, or any of the Defendants, knew or should have 

known that Garcia posed a threat to Plaintiff. 

 In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that while Ryan, Hetmer, Fizer. Barnes, Moore, and 

Quintero were not directly involved in the September 7 incident, they acted with 

deliberate indifference towards a substantial risk of serious injury to him. That is, 

 

5

 Plaintiff contends that Ryan, Hetmer, Fizer, Barnes, Moore, Quintero, Gidcumb, 

Brass, and Cisneros implemented a custom of not informing Plaintiff of death threats against him. 

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Plaintiff asserts that they knew of a substantial threat to his safety but failed to act to 

protect him. In particular, he contends that the above Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent by housing him in General Population (GP) despite knowing that he was on a 

Mexican Mafia “targeted ‘kill list’” and he contends that they employed a makeshift 

recreation line with insufficient staff that allowed 

supermaximum inmates to be violently assaulted undetected, continue to 

implement a practice of conducting recreational services by and through the 

basement “potential death trap” door under extreme inadequate lighting at 

night time with no audio or visual surveillance, lack of cell searches to 

recover prison made shanks, lax discipline, investigations, supervision, 

fabrication or use of force and disciplinary reports, failure to advise inmates 

of reasonable known death threats, [and] overcrowding. 

(Doc. 1 at 4B.) 

 Plaintiff contends that Quintero’s statement that Plaintiff had a long history of 

protective segregation issues and of previous attacks on him shows that the above 

Defendants acquiesced in a deficient policy concerning the safety of inmates. Plaintiff 

contends that Quintero’s statement supports an inference that the above Defendants knew 

that Plaintiff should be separated from GP inmates, but that he was placed in GP where 

he could be stabbed “multiple times” by an inmate with known ties to the prison gang 

that had targeted Plaintiff. (Id. at 4C.) Plaintiff also contends that the above Defendants 

are liable where Cisneros pepper-sprayed Plaintiff, rather than assist him, after he was 

stabbed, and then attempted to cover-up her actions in her reports. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

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affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Threat to Safety 

Plaintiff designates Counts I and II as claims for threat to safety or failure to 

protect. A claim for threat to safety arises under the Fourteenth Amendment as to pretrial 

detainees and under the Eighth Amendment as to convicted inmates, but the standard is 

the same. To state a claim under § 1983 for threats to safety, an inmate must allege facts 

to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm and 

that officials were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 832-33 (1994). To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege 

facts to support that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate 

safety. Id. at 837. That is, “the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which 

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must 

also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Id. 

 Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that any of the Defendants knew, or 

should have known, prior to the September 7 assault, that Garcia posed a substantial

threat to Plaintiff.6

 Indeed, Plaintiff denied knowing Garcia. While Plaintiff alleges that 

Gidcumb referred to Plaintiff being on a targeted kill list of the Mexican Mafia, Plaintiff 

does not allege facts to support that any of those Defendants knew, or should have 

known, that he was a target prior to the September 7 assault or that they knew or had 

reason to know that Garcia was affiliated with the Mexican Mafia prior to September 7. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations reflect that Garcia admitted to prison officials after the 

 6

 Plaintiff’s assertion that Ingulli’s statement that he would be punished if he lied 

to her after he stated that he had already been disciplined is not sufficient to support that 

Ingulli, or anyone else, posed a substantial threat to his safety. Verbal threats or abuse, 

absent more, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Somers v. Thurman, 

109 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir.1997); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 

1987)). Plaintiff otherwise to allege any facts to support that Ingulli was in any way 

involved with his transfer to CB4 or had any reason to know or believe that Garcia posed 

a threat to Plaintiff, much less that she engineered such placement. 

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incident that he (Garcia) had attacked Plaintiff and informed prison staff that Plaintiff 

was a target and would not be “approved.” The mere fact that Plaintiff had previously 

been assaulted or had protective segregation issues is not sufficient to support that any of 

the Defendants knew or should have known that Garcia posed a substantial threat to 

Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff also fails to allege facts to support that the lack of 

surveillance, poor lighting, or inadequate staffing posed a substantial threat to his safety 

where Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that assaults regularly or repeatedly 

occurred in that portion of the cellblock or facts to support that any Defendant knew, or 

should have known of such risks. Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that 

any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference towards his safety and Counts I and II, 

these counts will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

B. Excessive Force

 Plaintiff designates Count III as a claim for excessive force against Cisneros. The 

Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force claims by pretrial detainees, see Lolli v. 

County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003), while the Eighth Amendment 

applies to excessive force claims of convicted inmates, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). Under both, force 

may not be used maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson, 

503 U.S. at 7; Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2005). The question is 

whether an officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting him, without regard to underlying intent or motivation. Lolli, 

351 F.3d at 415 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). The Court must balance the nature 

and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing governmental interests. Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that when he was attacked, Cisneros had her back to 

him, but came running after Plaintiff screamed. Plaintiff acknowledges that one of his 

hands came loose and that he was attempting to repel the attack. While Plaintiff alleges 

that he complied with Cisneros’s order to get down, his other allegations support that 

Cisneros’s use of pepper spray under the circumstances was objectively unreasonable 

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where two inmates appeared to be throwing punches and one of Plaintiff’s restraints had 

come off. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for use of excessive force. 

V. Leave to Amend 

 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a 

first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will 

mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If 

Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended 

complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First 

Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its 

entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original 

Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count. 

 A first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original 

complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised 

in the original complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without 

prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

VI. Plaintiff’s Motions 

As noted above, Plaintiff has filed a motion for recusal of Magistrate Judge Aspey 

and a motion for appointment of counsel. These motions will be denied. 

A. Recusal

 The Court considers whether recusal in this matter is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455. Section 455(a) provides that a United States judge or magistrate judge “shall 

disqualify” himself in any proceeding in which his “impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” Section 455(b)(1) provides that a judge must also disqualify himself, where 

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he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of 

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]” Recusal pursuant to § 455(b) is 

required only if the bias or prejudice stems from an extra-judicial source, not from 

conduct or rulings during the course of the proceedings. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 

842 F.2d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); United States v. Studley, 

783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (judge’s prior adverse rulings are insufficient cause for 

recusal). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute [a] valid basis for a bias or 

partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Adverse rulings 

should be appealed; they do not form the basis for a recusal motion. Further, where the 

judge forms opinions in the courtroom, either in the current proceeding or in a prior 

proceeding, these opinions “do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless 

they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible.” Id. 

 Plaintiff fails to allege or show any basis for recusal under § 455. Rather, he 

complains of the Court’s rulings in previous cases filed by him.7

 As discussed above, 

adverse rulings are not a basis upon which the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned for purposes of § 455(a). The Court does not have a personal bias or 

prejudice concerning Plaintiff or other potential parties to this action or personal 

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts at issue in this proceeding. For these reasons, 

the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. 

B. Appointment of Counsel

 Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel due to limitations on access to legal 

resources for inmates. There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a 

civil case. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 

 

7

 At this juncture, this Court has not yet referred pretrial matters to Magistrate Judge Aspey and will not do so unless or until Plaintiff files an amended complaint that states a claim against one or more properly named defendants. If and when pretrial matters in this case are referred to Magistrate Judge Aspey, Plaintiff may file an objection if he disagrees with a ruling by Magistrate Judge Aspey under Rule 72(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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1982). In proceedings in forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent 

any person unable to afford one. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A determination with respect to 

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issue involved. Id. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Having considered both elements, it does not appear at this time that exceptional 

circumstances are present that require the appointment of counsel in this case. Plaintiff is 

in no different position than many pro se prisoner litigants. Moreover, the Complaint is 

replete with voluminous citations to case law. The Court will deny without prejudice 

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. 

VII. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

 C. Copies

 Because Plaintiff is currently confined in ASPC-Eyman and this case is subject to 

General Order 13-11, Plaintiff is not required to submit an additional copy of every filing 

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for use by the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 

5.4. If Plaintiff is transferred to a prison other than ASPC-Eyman, he will be notified of 

the requirements regarding copies for the Court that are required for inmates whose cases 

are not subject to General Order 13-11. 

 D. Possible “Strike”

 Because the Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff 

fails to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the 

dismissal may count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil 

judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more 

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner 

is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

E. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 

F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any 

order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial 

filing fee. 

(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff 

has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in 

compliance with this Order. 

 (4) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of 

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Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with 

prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

(5) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a 

civil rights complaint by a prisoner. 

(6) Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and for appointment of counsel are denied. 

(Doc. 7, 8.) 

DATED this 24th day of March, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 9 Filed 03/24/14 Page 15 of 18
Revised 5/1/2013

Instructions for Prisoners Applying for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in a Civil Action (Non-habeas) in Federal Court

You must pay the $350.00 filing fee plus the $50.00 administrative fees for a civil action.

If you later file an appeal, you will be obligated to pay the $455.00 filing fee for the appeal.

If you have enough money to pay the full $400.00 filing and administrative fees, you should

send a cashier’s check or money order payable to the Clerk of the Court with your complaint.

If you do not have enough money to pay the full $400.00 filing and administrative fees, you

can file the action without prepaying the fees. However, the court will assess an initial partial filing

fee. The initial partial filing fee will be the greater of 20% of the average monthly deposits or 20%

of the average monthly balance in your prison or jail account for the six months immediately

preceding the filing of the lawsuit. The court will order the agency that has custody of you to

withdraw the initial partial filing fee from your prison or jail account as soon as funds are available

and to forward the money to the court.

After the initial partial filing fee has been paid, you will owe the balance of the $350.00

filing fee (you will not be required to pay the $50.00 administrative fee). Until the filing fee is paid

in full, each month you will owe 20% of your preceding month's income. The agency that holds you

in custody will collect that money and forward it to the court any time the amount in your account

exceeds $10.00. The balance of the filing fee may be collected even if the action is later dismissed,

summary judgment is granted against you, or you fail to prevail at trial.

To file an action without prepaying the filing fee, and to proceed with an action in forma

pauperis, you must complete the attached form and return it to the court with your complaint. You

must have a prison or jail official complete the certificate on the bottom of the form and attach a

certified copy of your prison or jail account statement for the last six months. If you were

incarcerated in a different institution during any part of the past six months, you must attach a

certificate and a certified copy of your account statement from each institution at which you were

confined. If you submit an incomplete form or do not submit a prison or jail account statement with

the form, your request to proceed in forma pauperis will be denied.

Even if some or all of the filing fee has been paid, the court is required to dismiss your action

if: (1) your allegation of poverty is untrue; (2) the action is frivolous or malicious; (3) your

complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (4) your complaint makes a

claim against a defendant for money damages and that defendant is immune from liability for money

damages.

If you file more than three actions or appeals which are dismissed as frivolous or malicious

or for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, you will be prohibited from filing any

other action in forma pauperis unless you are in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 9 Filed 03/24/14 Page 16 of 18
Revised 5/1/2013 1

Name and Prisoner/Booking Number

Place of Confinement

Mailing Address

City, State, Zip Code

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

)

 , ) CASE NO. 

Plaintiff, )

)

 vs. ) APPLICATION TO PROCEED

) IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

 , ) BY A PRISONER

Defendant(s). ) CIVIL (NON-HABEAS)

)

I, , declare, in support of my request to proceed in the above

entitled case without prepayment of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, that I am unable to pay the fees for these

proceedings or to give security therefor and that I believe I am entitled to relief.

In support of this application, I answer the following questions under penalty of perjury:

1. Have you ever before brought an action or appeal in a federal court while you were incarcerated or detained?

GYes GNo If "Yes," how many have you filed? .

Were any of the actions or appeals dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted? GYes GNo If "Yes," how many of them? .

2. Are you currently employed at the institution where you are confined? GYes GNo

If "Yes," state the amount of your pay and where you work. 

3. Do you receive any other payments from the institution where you are confined? GYes GNo

If "Yes," state the source and amount of the payments. 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 9 Filed 03/24/14 Page 17 of 18
Revised 5/1/2013 2

4. Do you have any other sources of income, savings, or assets either inside or outside of the institution where

you are confined? GYes GNo

If "Yes," state the sources and amounts of the income, savings, or assets. 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above information is true and correct.

DATE SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

CONSENT TO COLLECTION OF FEES FROM TRUST ACCOUNT

I, , hereby consent to having the designated correctional officials at this

institution release to the Court my trust account information. I further consent to having the designated correctional

officials at this institution withdraw from my trust account the funds required to comply with the order of this Court

for the payment of filing fees in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

My consent includes withdrawal from my account by correctional officials of partial initial payments to this

Court equal to 20% of the greater of:

(A) the average monthly deposits to my account for the six-month period preceding my filing of this

action, or

(B) the average monthly balance in my account for the six-month period preceding my filing of this

action.

My consent also includes monthly withdrawals from my account by correctional officials of an amount equal

to 20% of each month’s income. Whenever the amount in my account reaches $10.00, correctional officials will

withdraw that amount and forward it to the Court until the required filing fee is paid in full. I understand that I am

liable for paying the entire fee, even if my case is dismissed by the Court before the fee is fully paid.

DATE SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICIAL

AS TO STATUS OF APPLICANT’S TRUST ACCOUNT

I, , certify that as of the date applicant signed this application:

(Printed name of official)

The applicant’s trust account balance at this institution is: $

The applicant’s average monthly deposits during the prior six months is: $

The applicant’s average monthly balance during the prior six months is: $

The attached certified account statement accurately reflects the status of the applicant’s account.

DATE AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE TITLE/ID NUMBER INSTITUTION 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 9 Filed 03/24/14 Page 18 of 18