Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02426/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02426-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT VILLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:11-cv-00876-SKO PC 

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANTS STEADMAN AND

GONZALES FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM, AND TRANSFERRING ACTION TO

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(Doc. 1) 

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Robert Villa, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 31, 2011. The Court is required to screen

complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or

portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. 28U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported bymere conclusory statements,

do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts “are not required

to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.

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2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true,

legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th

Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim

for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his validation as a gang associate, allegedly in retaliation

against him for filing a grievance and for assisting other inmates with filing grievances. Plaintiff was

incarcerated at Centinela State Prison during the operative events. Following Plaintiff’s validation

and the assessment of a Security Housing Unit (SHU) term, he was transferred to the California

Correctional Institution (CCI) on May 21, 2010, where he remains incarcerated.

To the extent that Plaintiff has stated any cognizable claims for relief arising out of his gang

validation, the events occurred almost exclusively at Centinela State Prison. Venue for claims

arising out of events at Centinela State Prison is proper in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. While venue for claims which accrued at CCI is proper in this

division, only two defendants named in the complaint worked at CCI, and Plaintiff has not alleged

facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim for relief against either of those defendants.

Defendant Steadman, who is or was a Chief Deputy Warden at CCI, allegedly violated

Plaintiff’s right to due process on June 24, 2010. Defendant Steadman was the chairperson of the

committee conducting Plaintiff’s initial SHU review hearing following his transfer to CCI. Plaintiff

complained to the committee that he had been wrongfully validated and he was being retained

without a 114-D form. Defendant said he was aware of the issue but to “602 it.” (Comp., ¶73.) 

These facts do not support a plausible claim for relief under section 1983, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-

50; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005) (to state a due process

claim, the plaintiff must first identify the existence of a protected liberty interest); Bruce v. Ylst, 351

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F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (regarding gang validation issues, prisoners are entitled to the

minimal procedural protections of adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and periodic review),

and to the extent that Plaintiff believes staff at CCI violated his constitutional rights separately

following his transfer to CCI, those claims are not properly joined with the claims arising out of his

validation at Centinela State Prison, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950,

952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may file a

separate suit challenging his current conditions of confinement at CCI, but he may not litigate

unrelated claims against unrelated parties in this suit. 

RegardingDefendant Gonzales, who was the Warden at CCI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

was involved in transferring Plaintiff to CCI in retaliation against him for filing a grievance. There 1

are no factual allegations supporting Plaintiff’s bare assertion that Defendant Gonzales was

personally involved in transferring him from Centinela State Prison to CCI for retaliatory reasons. 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. Given that Plaintiff was validated, assessed a SHU term, and transferred

from Centinela State Prison, allegedly in retaliation for a grievance he filed while at Centinela, it is

unclear how the warden of the receiving institution hundreds of miles away could have been

personallyinvolved in those actions, but assuming that Plaintiff maybe able to allege additional facts

sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Gonzales, a substantial part of the events nonetheless

occurred at Centinela State Prison. 

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991) (courts have

broad discretion regarding severance); Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986)(court

may raise defective venue sua sponte). Retaining the action in a division in which one defendant was

located at one time and against whom a claim does not currently lie is not convenient for the other

The current Acting Warden of CCI is Michael Stainer. The Court is unaware if or where Defendant

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Gonzales is currently employed

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defendants or the potential witnesses and it is not in the interest of justice. This action should have 2

been filed in the Southern District of California, where the operative events occurred, and the Court

shall therefore order it transferred.

III. Order

For the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Steadman and Gonzales are dismissed, without

prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983; and

2. This action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District

of California.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2011 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Given that Plaintiff had been validated and assessed a SHU term prior to his transfer to CCI, the Court can

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discern no grounds for a viable due process claim against Defendant Steadman, Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221; Bruce,

351 F.3d at 1287, leaving only Defendant Gonzales against whom a claim might be stated, although even that is

speculative at best at this juncture, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Doe I, 572 F.3d at 681.

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