Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06542/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06542-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY WILLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH MULLINS, et al., 

Defendants.

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CIV-F-04-6542 AWI LJO

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO STRIKE

DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS

Two separate motions seek to strike the answers of Defendant Mora and Defendants

Mullins, Silvius, and the City of Bakersfield (“City Defendants”). All Defendants have filed

oppositions. The matter was taken under submission without oral argument. 

I. History

Gary Willis (“Plaintiff”) was a registered occupant of a motel on March 27, 1996. That

day, a Kern County Narcotics Enforcement Team entered the motel room, searched it, and

arrested Plaintiff. The team consisted of four members: Bakersfield Police Officer Joseph

Mullins; Bakersfield Police Officer Silvius; Kern County Deputy Sheriff Hood; and California

State Parole Officer Diane Mora. Joseph Mullins told Diane Mora that Plaintiff was on parole;

Diane Mora arranged for the team of officers to search the motel room. Plaintiff contends he was

not on parole. Based on evidence collected from the search, Plaintiff was ultimately convicted of

a felony and spent over six years in state prison. The California Supreme Court overturned

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Plaintiff’s conviction on June 3, 2002. See People v. Willis, 28 Cal. 4th 22 (Cal. 2002). Plaintiff

was released on August 31, 2002. Plaintiff first filed this suit in the Central District of California

on May 3, 2004. He filed his amended complaint on September 16, 2004. Transferred File, Doc.

14. At a hearing on November 8, 2004, the trial judge ordered the case transferred to the Eastern

District of California due to improper venue. 

The named defendants in the case were the four officers who took part in the March 27,

1996 arrest; former California Governor Pete Wilson; current California Governor Arnold

Schwarzenegger; former CDC Director C.A. Terhune; former CDC Director Richard Rimmer;

current CDC Director Jeanne Woodford; the City of Bakersfield; Mayor of Bakersfield Harvey

Hall; Bakersfield City Council Member Irma Carson; Bakersfield City Council Member Sue

Benham; Bakersfield City Council Member Mike Maggard; Bakersfield City Council Member

David Couch; Bakersfield City Council Member Harold Hanson; Bakersfield City Council

Member Jacquie Sullivan; and Bakersfield City Council Member Mark Salvaggio. Plaintiff sues

all persons in both their official and individual capacities. The amended complaint contained

nine causes of action: (1) monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiracy to

commit count one; (3) monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a policy, practice, procedure,

and custom of committing Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations; (4) monetary relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against [the Bakersfield Officials] for the City’s policy of indemnifying

police officers in civil rights cases; (5) declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 finding that

there is a custom, pattern and practice of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations by police

in California; (6) injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 preventing all Defendants from

engaging in violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment; (7) monetary relief under RICO

for loss of actual employment and employment opportunities; (8) monetary relief for conspiracy

to commit count seven; and (9) monetary relief under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 for violation of

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Transferred File, Doc. 14. 

The Defendants fell into two groups, which are separately represented by counsel: those

affiliated with the City of Bakersfield and those affiliated with the State of California. Both

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groups filed motions to dismiss. Docs. 5 and 7. Plaintiff opposed both motions. Docs. 10 and 14. 

Oral argument was held on March 28, 2005. The motions to dismiss were granted in part and

denied in part on April 18, 2005. By Order, all Defendants except Mora, Mullins, Silvius, and

the City of Bakersfiled were dismissed; claims three, seven, eight, and nine were dismissed with

limitations to claims one, two, and four. Doc. 33. 

On May 11, 2005, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default. Doc. 39. Defendant Mora

and City Defendants then filed answers. Docs. 40 and 41. Subsequently, the clerk’s office

entered default on May 12, 2005. Doc. 42. Defendant Mora and City Defendants then made

motions to set aside default. Docs. 43 and 48. Magistrate Judge O’Neill issued orders on June

22, 2005 setting aside default against all remaining Defendants. Docs. 60 and 61. 

Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed motions to strike the answers on May 20, 2005. Docs. 44 and

47. Defendants opposed the motions. Docs. 51 and 54. Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary

judgment. Doc. 45. Defendants opposed the summary judgment motion as well. Docs. 52 and

55. Plaintiff’s three motions were scheduled for oral argument on July 11, 2005. On July 6,

2005, the court issued an order taking the motions to strike under submission and resetting the

briefing schedule and oral argument for the summary judgment motion. Doc. 65. 

City Defendants also filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to impose Rule 11

sanctions on defense counsel for filing a answer after the clerk’s entry of default. Doc. 52. There

is no record of such a motion in the docket of the case; it does not appear that Plaintiff’s counsel

properly filed such a motion in accord with the electronic filing requirements of the Eastern

District. As no sanctions motion has been filed, the court need not address the issue.

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Jurisdiction Arguments

First, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s request to enter default cut off Defendants’ ability to

file any papers in the case. Doc. 44, Motion to Strike, at 3:7-13; Doc. 47, Motion to Strike Mora

Answer, at 3:7-13. As Defendant Mora points out, in the only case cited by Plaintiff in support

of his argument, it is the entry of default (not a request directed at the clerk’s office to enter

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default) which acted to limit the party’s ability to make further filings with the court in that case.

Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1927). Further, the decision in Clifton was based

upon “Rule 16” of the “equity rules promulgated in 1912.” Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 897

(4th Cir. 1927). Plaintiff makes no explanation of how the then applicable rules are related to the

current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not

state that a request to enter default works to cut off a defendant’s ability to file papers. 

Second, Plaintiff claims that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the answer because

there was no proper certificate showing proof of service. Doc. 44, Motion to Strike City Answer,

at 3:17-22; Doc. 47, Motion to Strike Mora Answer:15-21. For proof of service, Defendants

provided the declarations of individuals who placed the answers in their office’s internal mail

collection system (which would then be sent through the U.S. Post Office system) as opposed to

actual U.S. Post Office. See Docs. 40 and 41. Plaintiff does not claim that service was not

effected; his substantive response to the answers plainly demonstrate that his attorney actually

received those documents. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5(d) states that “All papers after the

complaint required to be served upon a party, together with a certificate of service, must be filed

with the court.” The Advisory Committee that wrote this language in 1991 stated: “Subdivision

(d). This subdivision is amended to require that the person making service under the rule certify

that service has been effected. Such a requirement has generally been imposed by local rule.

Having such information on file may be useful for many purposes, including proof of service if

an issue arises concerning the effectiveness of the service.” Advisory Committee Notes, 1991

Amendment. 

The key purpose of requiring a certificate of service is to assure the court that a pleading

has been served on all relevant parties. When receipt of the pleading by those parties is

established, the adequacy of the certificate becomes secondary. See Russell v. City of

Milwaukee, 338 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (“the absence of a certificate does not require the

invalidation of the paper where service is not contested or where the court finds that service was

accomplished”); Ives v. Guilford Mills, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The

question then becomes whether the Amended Complaint, although served on the parties and filed

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with the Court, should be disregarded because of the absence of a certificate of service. The

Court concludes that it should not. The principal importance of the certificate of service is to

provide the Court with clear proof that service has been accomplished. Where actual service is

not contested, there is little point to invalidating an Amended Complaint for lack of a

certificate”). Since Plaintiff’s attorney did receive the answers, the potential inadequacy of the

proofs of service need not be addressed. 

Plaintiff’s attorney has opted out of the Eastern District’s system for receiving electronic

service of documents as described in Local Rule 5-135(g). City Defendants ask that Plaintiff’s

attorney be compelled to opt in to the system to prevent such disputes in the future and to

comport with the Eastern District’s expressed desire for attorneys to file and receive all

documents electronically. Doc. 51, City Opposition, at 4:17-21. At this time, the court will not

require Plaintiff’s attorney to receive service of documents electronically. However, the court

notes the rather frivolous nature of Plaintiff’s argument requiring the proper showing of proof of

service. The court also notes that Plaintiff’s attorney has continued to make objections of this

type to Defendants’ filings. Doc. 70. These objections are similarly frivolous in nature. 

Plaintiff’s attorney is cautioned that any future, similar objections to proof of service will result

in a court order mandating the receipt of documents electronically. 

B. Substantive Objections to Defendants’ Defenses

Plaintiff seeks to have all of Defendants’ affirmative defenses stricken. Motions to strike

material from an answer are for the purpose of eliminating “any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). When dealing

with an insufficient defense, courts are “slow to grant motions to dismiss affirmative defenses. A

defendant should be given the opportunity to prove his allegations if there is any possibility that

the defense might succeed after full hearing on the merits.” Purex Corp. v. General Foods Corp.,

318 F. Supp. 322, 323 (C.D. Cal. 1970). “The presence of a substantial or seriously disputed

question of law will preclude a district court from granting a motion to strike.” Mohegan Tribe v.

Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Conn. 1982). Nevertheless, a motion to strike “is

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appropriately granted where the defense is clearly legally insufficient, as, for example, when

there is clearly no bona fide issue of fact or law.” United States v. 729.773 Acres of Land, 531 F.

Supp. 967, 971 (D. Haw. 1982) (citations omitted). A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is

committed to the discretion of the court. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gemini

Management, 921 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1990).

First, Plaintiff states that this court’s Order granting in part and denying in part

Defendants’ motions to dismiss precludes Defendants from asserting the defense of failure to

state a claim. Doc. 44, Motion to Strike City Answer, at 7:9-16; Doc. 47, Motion to Strike Mora

Answer, at 7:14-22. Both Defendant Mora and City Defendants raise the affirmative defense that

Plaintiff’s assertions do not state a cause of action. Doc. 41, Mora Answer, at 2:11-13; Doc. 40,

at 2:18-19. When a defendant raises failure to state a claim as an affirmative defense, such a

defense “brings up for consideration the question of whether or not the complaint, on its face,

sets forth a cause of action.” Marcus v. Hinck, 28 F. Supp. 945, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). In

resolving the prior motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court has already dealt with this

issue. Defendant Mora does not oppose the elimination of this affirmative defense (number 2).

Doc. 54, Mora Opposition, at 3:25-27. City Defendants’ affirmative defense (paragraph 5) on

this matter is stricken. City Defendants claim “that discovery had not yet produced all of the

facts upon which a failure to state a claim defense applies.” Doc. 51, City Opposition, at 6:15-16. 

Here, City Defendants have mistaken the nature of a failure to state a claim defense, which only

looks at a plaintiff’s allegations on their face without regard to facts established through

discovery. 

City Defendants also argue that Rule 12(h)(2) implies the preservation of this defense

even after it has been raised in a motion to dismiss. Doc. 51, City Opposition, at 6:22-28. The

rule states “A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defense of

failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection of failure to state a legal

defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by

motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2). 

The proper interpretation of Rule 12(h)(2) is that “a defendant waives all defenses and objections

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which he does not present either by motion or in his answer except that the defense of failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted may also be made by a later pleading if one is

permitted or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits.” Black, Sivalls

& Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1949). The defense that a complaint fails

to state a claim on its face is not waived even if it is omitted from the first responsive pleading to

that complaint; it is preserved through trial. However, once a court has ruled, Rule 12(h)(2) does

not revive the issue. Striking these affirmative defenses does not prejudice Defendants in any

way on motions for summary judgment or at trial. The affirmative defense stricken is simply the

argument that Plaintiff’s operative complaint fails to state a claim on its face; Defendants are free

to develop facts to attack the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s legal case in further proceedings. The

court notes that in the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims were not addressed.

See Doc. 26. Defendants are free to challenge those claims for failure to state a claim in

accordance with Rule 12(h)(2). 

Second, Plaintiff asserts that the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Willis

must be applied in this case to collaterally estop Defendants from asserting qualified immunity

and consent. Doc. 44, Motion to Strike City Answer, at 10:11-12:21; Doc. 47, Motion to Strike

Mora Answer, at 9:14-11:23 and12:7-9. Whether the state court decision, which resolved

criminal matters between the State of California and Plaintiff, can be used to collaterally estop

Defendants, who are individual police officers and a municipality, is a complex and uncertain

proposition. The issue is a highly disputed issue of law; a motion to strike is not the proper

means to resolve this point. Defendant Mora’s affirmative defenses 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 20 are not

stricken. City Defendants’ affirmative defense contained in paragraph 16 is not stricken. 

Third, Plaintiff attacks Defendants’ statute of limitations defenses. Doc. 41, Mora

Answer, at 4:17; Doc. 44, Motion to Strike City Answer, at 9:24-10:4. Defendants raised the

issue of statute of limitations in the motions to dismiss. This court determined that Plaintiff’s

claims are not time barred. Doc. 26, Order, at 9:11. The facts relevant to the statute of

limitations analysis in this case are clear cut and uncontested. Defendant Mora has stated that

she has no objection to the elimination of the statute of limitations affirmative defense (number

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17). Doc. 54, Mora Opposition at 3:25-27. City Defendants’ statute of limitations defenses

(paragraphs 11 and 12) are also stricken. 

Fourth, Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendants’ affirmative defenses that are solely applicable

to state law and negligence claims. Doc. 44, Motion to Strike City Answer, at ; Doc. 47, Motion

to Strike Mora Answer, at 7: 4 and 9:6. “Conduct by persons acting under color of state law

which is wrongful under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 or § 1985 (3) cannot be immunized by state law.”

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980). Negligence, in and of itself, is not a basis for a

Section 1983 suit; a plaintiff must show a violation of a constitutional or legal right. See Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (“in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a

violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely negligent

conduct may not be enough to state a claim”). Whether the conduct that gave rise to the violation

may be characterized as “negligent” is immaterial for Section 1983 purposes. Therefore,

defenses to negligence in tort are insufficient as a matter of law to Section 1983 suits. 

Defendant Mora has stated that she has no objection to the elimination of affirmative

defenses 1, 10, 16, 18, and 19 in light of Plaintiff’s representations. Doc. 54, Mora Opposition at

3:25-27. Plaintiff has stated that “there are no state law claims” and “no negligence counts are

contained in the complaint.” Doc. 47, Motion to Strike Mora Answer, at 7: 4 and 9:6. Based on

these representations, the court will strike those defenses. As a consequence, Plaintiff is

estopped from raising state law or negligence claims in this action. In addition, there are two

related affirmative defenses Defendant Mora does not concede. Affirmative defense 3 states that

any recovery based on common law tort should be reduced in proportion to the fault attributed to

other parties. Doc. 41, Mora Answer, at 2:19-20. Because the defense relates solely to

negligence and state law claims, it is stricken. Plaintiff also argues that affirmative defense 14

(Cal. Gov’t Code §985 mandating the setoff of any judgment by collateral source payments) must

be stricken as it is a state law defense that is invalid in a Section 1983 suit. Doc. 47, Motion to

Strike Mora Answer, at 7:3-5. However, the court notes that in at least one instance, Cal. Gov’t

Code §985(b) has been applied in a Section 1983 suit adjudicated in California. See Oberfelder

v. Bertoli, 67 Fed. Appx. 408 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished). As Plaintiff has not provided any

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case law directly on point and the law appears to be less than clear cut, the request to strike the

defense is denied. 

Plaintiff has similarly made representations disclaiming negligence and state law claims

with regard to the City Defendants. Doc. 44, Motion to Strike City Answer, at 9:6 and 9:19-20. 

City Defendants do not concede their affirmative defenses. A review of the answer shows that

the affirmative defenses in paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14 are defenses solely to negligence

and state law claims. They are properly stricken as such defenses are legally insufficient. 

Plaintiff also seeks to have the defense in paragraph 15 (allegations that Plaintiff failed to

mitigate damages) stricken. In Section 1983 cases, evidence of mitigation is relevant for

determining damages. See Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685

(1996). Plaintiff has stated that though he seeks these defenses to be stricken, he does not

content that “defendants may not contest the damages amount that will be sought.” Doc. 44,

Motion to Strike City Answer, at 10:9-10. The court understands that all Defendants may present

defenses to the amount of damages that are due in the event Plaintiff succeeds in establishing

liability. 

All other requests to strike are insufficiently detailed and inadequately briefed. As they

may involve substantially disputed issues of law, the requests to have them stricken must be

denied. 

III. Conclusion

1. Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant Mora’s answer in its entirety is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s motion to strike City Defendant’s answer in its entirety is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant Mora’s affirmative defenses numbered 1, 2, 3,

10, 16, 17, 18, 19 is GRANTED. 

4. Plaintiff’s motion to strike City Defendants’ affirmative defenses in paragraphs 5, 6, 8,

9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

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0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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