Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00930/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00930-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QURIO HOLDINGS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISH NETWORK CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00930-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

TRANSFER 

Re: Dkt. No. 46

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Qurio Holdings, Inc.’s motion to transfer venue to the 

Eastern District of North Carolina (“EDNC”). Defendants DISH Network LLC and DISH 

Network Corporation1oppose the motion and argue that the case should remain in this district. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with Defendants and accordingly DENIES the 

motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Northern District of Illinois (“NDIL”), seeking 

injunctive relief and damages for infringement of United States Patent Nos. 8,102,863 (entitled 

“High-Speed WAN to Wireless LAN Gateway”), 7,787,904 (entitled “Personal Area Network 

Having Media Player And Mobile Device Controlling The Same”), and 8,879,567 (entitled “HighSpeed WAN To Wireless LAN Gateway”). Dkt. No. 17 (“FAC”).

On the same day that Plaintiff filed this action, it also filed two separate actions in the 

NDIL asserting infringement of the same three patents against DirecTV, LLC and Comcast Corp. 

None of Plaintiff’s patent infringement actions remain in the NDIL. 

 

1 At the June 4, 2015 hearing, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant DISH 

Network Corporation from this action without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 80.

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First, on February 9, 2015, Plaintiff’s action against Comcast Corp. was transferred to the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“EDPA”) (“Comcast Action”). Dkt. No. 46 (“Mot.”) at 3. 

Second, and most relevant here, on February 24, 2015, Plaintiff’s action against Defendants was 

transferred to this district. Qurio Holdings, Inc. v. DISH Network Corp. et al., Case No. 3:15-cv00930-HSG, Dkt. Nos. 37, 39 (N.D. Cal.) (“DISH Action”). The NDIL found that the Northern 

District of California (“NDCA”) was a “clearly more convenient” venue for the DISH Action than 

the NDIL because “[m]any if not most of the accused functionalities were developed there, and a 

number of significant non-party infringement-related witnesses reside there.” Dkt. No. 37 (“NDIL 

Order”) at 12-13. 

Finally, on May 4, 2015, Plaintiff’s action against DirecTV was transferred to this district. 

Qurio Holdings, Inc. v. DirecTV, LLC, Case No. 3:15-cv-01986-HSG, Dkt. Nos. 72-73 (N.D. Cal.) 

(“DirecTV Action”). In ruling on the transfer, the NDIL considered cross-motions to transfer 

venue similar to the motion pending before this Court in the DISH Action: Plaintiff argued that the 

case should be transferred to the EDNC, and Defendant argued that the case should be transferred 

to the NDCA. DirecTV Action, Dkt. No. 72.

On May 21, 2015, this Court related the DirecTV and DISH Actions. Dkt. No. 78.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in New Hampshire. 

FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff’s New Hampshire office is “the place where Qurio’s high level officers direct, 

control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Dkt. No. 62 (“Reply”) at 2. Plaintiff also 

asserts, however, that it “has its principal place of business in Raleigh, North Carolina,” where 

Plaintiff’s “engineering activities” and “research and development” occur. Id. at 2; Mot. at 9-10. 

None of the named inventors of the patents-in-suit are currently employed by Plaintiff. See Mot. 

at 13, 15; Dkt. No. 79. The lawyers who prosecuted the patents-in-suit are located in Cary, North 

Carolina. Mot. at 10. 

Defendant Dish Network LLC has its principal place of business in Colorado. FAC ¶ 3. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant infringes the patents by making and distributing “products and 

services that allow users to transfer and display video and other content from Defendant[’s] wide 

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area network, including but not limited to Defendant[’s] television broadcasting services and 

DVR, Hopper and Sling products and services.” Id. ¶ 16. Defendant avers that the inventors of 

the Sling functionality, who are not affiliated with Defendant, reside in the NDCA. Dkt. No. 55 

(“Opp.”) at 18.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the 

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 

where it might have been brought.” The purpose of this statute is “to prevent the waste of time, 

energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary 

inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). 

“[T]he fact that an action has been transferred once does not preclude the transferee court 

from entertaining a subsequent motion to transfer.” Techshell, Inc. v. Incase Designs Corp., No. 

11-cv-04576-YGR, 2012 WL 692295, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). However, where a plaintiff seeks a transfer back to the original transferor court, the 

transferee court should not retransfer “except under the most impelling and unusual circumstance 

or [unless] the transfer order is manifestly erroneous.” Ametek, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 

90-cv-20278-DLJ, 1990 WL 10072473, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 1990) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (brackets in original). 

When ruling on a motion to transfer under § 1404(a), courts consider “both public factors 

which go to the interests of justice and private factors, which go to the convenience of the parties 

and witnesses.” Brackett v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 810, 820 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 

Private interest factors include “ease of access to sources of proof, plaintiff’s choice of forum, 

relative convenience to parties, and relative convenience to witnesses.” Id. Public interest factors 

include “degrees of court congestion, local interest in deciding local controversies, potential 

conflicts of laws, and burdening citizens of an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Id. at 821. It is 

the moving party’s burden “to show that when these factors are applied, the balance of 

convenience clearly favors transfer.” Trend Micro Inc. v. RPost Holdings, Inc., No. 13-cv-05227-

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WHO, 2014 WL 1365491, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2014).

B. Defendant’s Threshold Arguments Do Not Mandate Denial Of The Motion To 

Transfer Venue

Defendant argues at the outset that the Court should not consider the merits of Plaintiff’s 

motion because 1) Plaintiff allegedly misrepresents the facts regarding the location of its principal 

place of business, and 2) public policy disfavors relitigating a motion to transfer in the transferee 

forum. As described below, the Court is not persuaded by these threshold arguments and therefore 

finds it proper to rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s motion.

1. Alleged Factual Misrepresentations

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s motion misrepresents the location of its principal place of

business in an attempt to manipulate the § 1404(a) convenience factors. See Opp. at 7-10. 

Plaintiff contends that its representations in the present motion to transfer are inconsistent with its 

previous statements in this case regarding its principal place of business. 

The Court declines to consider the consistency, or lack thereof, of Plaintiff’s factual 

representations as a threshold issue. The Court finds Defendant’s argument more relevant to the 

analysis of the various convenience factors below. Furthermore, the Court notes that the NDIL 

Order indicates that Plaintiff has previously represented that the EDNC is one of its “home” 

districts. See NDIL Order at 6 (noting that Plaintiff did not want the action transferred to its 

“home district” at the time because Plaintiff indicated it “might have had difficulty obtaining 

personal jurisdiction over DISH in New Hampshire or in North Carolina”).

2. Retransfer Threshold Requirements

Defendant next argues that this Court should not consider Plaintiff’s motion because

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the NDIL Order was “manifestly erroneous,” or that 

“impelling and unusual” circumstances exist such that the retransfer is justified. 

As noted above, this issue typically arises in the context of a motion by a plaintiff to 

transfer venue back to the original court in which the suit was filed. In this case, even if the Court 

were to find that the NDIL Order was “manifestly erroneous,” such finding would not affect the 

pending motion since the NDIL did not consider the convenience of litigating the DISH Action in 

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the EDNC. Therefore, the concerns raised by traditional motions to retransfer, which necessarily 

require transferee courts to review the decisions of transferor courts, are not present here. 

However, “the rationale behind the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate changed 

circumstances” ”—i.e., the rationale that forum shopping should be strongly discouraged—“is just 

as applicable in this case.” Bobosky v. Adidas AG, No. 10-cv-00630-PK, 2010 WL 4853295, at *6 

(D. Or. Oct. 8, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by No. 10-cv-00630-PK, 2010 WL 

4828392 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 2010). In Bobosky, the plaintiffs originally filed suit in Texas. Id. at 

*2. After the defendant’s motion to transfer the case to Oregon was granted, the plaintiffs

attempted to argue that venue would be more appropriate in Illinois. Id. at *6. The Oregon court 

noted that it was “troubled by plaintiffs’ attempts at forum shopping” and held that, because no 

evidence of changed circumstances was presented, the plaintiffs had not “satisfied the threshold 

requirement for a motion to transfer venue.” Id. at *7.

The facts here are similar to those in Bobosky. Plaintiff did not argue that the EDNC was 

the most convenient forum until after Defendant successfully transferred the action to this Court. 

Nor has Plaintiff made a compelling argument that changed circumstances justify the motion. 

Plaintiff’s only argument is that its original reason for filing all three patent infringement actions

in the NDIL—to litigate the cases as efficiently as possible in a single judicial district—is no 

longer applicable, since the Comcast Action was transferred to the EDPA, the DISH Action was 

transferred to the NDCA, and Plaintiff expected the DirecTV Action to be transferred to the 

EDNC at the time the pending motion was briefed. Of course, circumstances have since changed 

again: the NDIL found that the NDCA is a more convenient forum for the DirecTV Action than 

the EDNC, and now both the DirecTV Action and the DISH Action have been transferred to the 

NDCA. As such, Plaintiff’s justification for its original choice of forum actually supports denial

of its present motion to transfer venue, since the three cases can be litigated most efficiently if at 

least two cases are in the same district. 

The Court doubts that Plaintiff has demonstrated the requisite “changed circumstances” to 

justify this motion. However, the Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff’s motion is 

proper, since the balance of the convenience factors also demonstrates that the motion must be 

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denied.

C. The DISH Action Could Have Been Brought In The Eastern District of North 

Carolina

Plaintiff argues that the DISH Action could have been brought in the EDNC because that 

district has personal jurisdiction over Defendant DISH Network LLC and venue is proper there. 

Defendant does not contest those assertions, but argues that Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to

satisfy its threshold burden under § 1404(a) because it has not shown that the DISH Action could 

have been brought in the EDNC against DISH Network Corporation, which this Court recently 

dismissed as a Defendant in this case. 

The Court need not “confine its venue consideration to the facts as they existed at the time 

of the complaint.” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by transferring cases to districts in which venue 

would have been improper as to certain defendants who had settled with the plaintiff before the 

transfer occurred). Considering the facts as they exist now, venue is proper in the EDNC as to 

DISH Network LLC, the only Defendant remaining in this action. The Court therefore finds that

Plaintiff has shown that the DISH Action could have been brought in the EDNC as required by 

§ 1404(a).

D. Private Interest Factors

1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Plaintiff argues that its choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference. While this is 

generally true, see Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 

1986), such deference is not warranted for a plaintiff’s second choice of venue. See Bobosky, 

2010 WL 4853295, at *6 (“[A]lthough a plaintiff’s first choice of venue is strongly favored, 

subsequent venue choices are not given the same deference because, if they were, a motion to 

transfer venue could become an unchecked tool for the plaintiff to shop among forums and 

between judges.”) (internal quotaton marks omitted); Tiffany v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No. 06-cv02524-SBA, 2006 WL 2792868, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006) (declining to give any 

“presumption of deference for the Plaintiffs’ second choice of forum”). 

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The Court finds that this factor is neutral. Plaintiff’s choice of the EDNC as a forum is not 

entitled to deference because it is Plaintiff’s second-choice forum.

2. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

Aside from witness testimony, which is discussed further below, neither party points to any 

non-documentary sources of proof that will be relevant to this lawsuit. Furthermore, neither party 

argues that the transportation of evidentiary documents will impose any undue burden. “With 

technological advances in document storage and retrieval, transporting documents does not 

generally create a burden.” David v. Alphin, No. 06-cv-04763-WHA, 2007 WL 39400, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2007). The Court finds that this factor is neutral.

3. Convenience to Parties

Plaintiff argues that the EDNC is a more convenient forum because Plaintiff’s “principal 

place of business” is in Raleigh, North Carolina, it “has always been headquartered in the EDNC,” 

and traveling to three different districts to litigate these patent infringement actions would place 

undue financial and operational burdens on a small company of fewer than ten employees. Mot. at 

10. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues, Defendant is headquartered in Colorado and will therefore 

be no more inconvenienced by litigating in the EDNC than it would be by litigating in the NDCA. 

Id. at 11.

The Court agrees that litigating this case in the EDNC would not be any less convenient 

for Defendant than litigating in the NDCA. However, the Court finds that overall this factor is 

neutral, at best. Litigating the DISH Action in the EDNC would be more convenient for Plaintiff 

than the NDCA if this were the only action that required Plaintiff’s attention. But there are two 

other related actions pending, one of which—the DirecTV Action—was recently transferred to 

this district over Plaintiff’s objection that it belonged in the EDNC. Since Plaintiff must continue 

to litigate the DirecTV Action in this district, it would not be any more convenient to Plaintiff for 

the Court to transfer the DISH Action to the EDNC. Indeed, keeping both actions in the NDCA

and coordinating their schedules would likely be more convenient for Plaintiff than litigating the 

two actions in separate districts.

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4. Convenience to Witnesses

Convenience to witnesses “is often the most important factor considered by the court when 

deciding a motion to transfer for convenience.” Kannar v. Alticor, Inc., No. 08-cv-05505-MMC,

2009 WL 975426, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). When 

considering this factor, courts should give primary consideration to third-party, as opposed to 

employee, witnesses. Id. 

Plaintiff avers that “all of [its] personnel and witnesses that are expected to testify at trial 

reside in North Carolina,” and specifically identifies two non-party witnesses—Alfredo Isssa and 

Greg Evans, the named inventors of the patents-in-suit—who reside in the EDNC. Mot. at 13, 15; 

Dkt. No. 79. Defendant avers that six individuals who developed the Sling technology that is 

incorporated into Defendant’s allegedly infringing products reside in the NDCA and are no longer 

affiliated with Defendant. Opp. at 18. Defendant argues that the testimony of these individuals is 

“particularly relevant” to the litigation “because they developed and filed patent applications for 

the accused [Sling technology] before the patents-at-issue were filed.” Id. 

The Court finds that this factor is neutral. Like the convenience of the parties, the 

convenience of the party witnesses is not dramatically increased by transferring this action to the 

EDNC. While Plaintiff’s party witnesses reside in the EDNC, they will be required to travel to the 

NDCA anyway to testify in the DirecTV Action. Indeed, Plaintiff’s original intention was to 

consolidate its lawsuits in a single district—the NDIL, which would at most be only slightly more 

convenient for its North Carolina-based witnesses than the NDCA—to streamline the efficiency of 

the litigation and, presumably, increase the convenience of its witnesses. Furthermore, the Court 

finds that the parties have identified third-party witnesses with relevant testimony who reside in 

both the NDCA and the EDNC.

2

 While Plaintiff speculates that “it is virtually certain that Mr. 

Issa will not voluntarily travel to the NDCA to testify,” Reply at 13, the Court does not find this to 

 

2

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant “has not identified any relevant non-party 

witnesses with relevant testimony in the NDCA.” Reply at 9-10. Defendant has done more than 

“merely provide a list of names.” Id. at 10. Defendant specifically names six inventors of the 

Sling technology, Opp. at 18, which Plaintiff alleges is incorporated into the infringing products,

FAC ¶ 16. Furthermore, Defendant specifically describes the relevance of those individuals’ 

testimony. See Opp. at 18. 

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be a persuasive reason to transfer the case to the EDNC since Plaintiff was willing to take its 

chances that Mr. Issa would not voluntarily travel to the NDIL to testify. In sum, this factor does 

not weigh heavily for or against transfer.

E. Public Interest Factors

1. Local Interest

This factor takes into account the current and transferee forums’ interests “in having 

localized controversies decided at home.” Decker, 805 F.2d at 843. Plaintiff argues that because 

its “day-to-day operations” are located in the EDNC, and the named inventors of the patents-insuit also reside there, the EDNC has a specific interest in protecting the property rights of its 

citizens. Reply at 13-14. 

However, courts in this district have indicated that forums where the operative facts 

occurred also have an interest in deciding a case. In patent cases, the preferred forum is that forum 

which is the “center of the accused activity”—i.e., “where the defendant is alleged to have 

developed, tested, researched, produced, marketed, and made sales decisions concerning the 

accused product.” Sorensen v. Daimler Chrysler AG, No. 02-cv-04752-MMC, 2003 WL 

1888866, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, it 

appears that the “accused activity” occurred in both the District of Colorado—where the accused 

products were produced and marketed—and the NDCA—where the Sling technology incorporated 

into the accused products was developed, researched, and tested. The Court therefore finds that 

this factor is neutral.

2. Familiarity With Patent Law

Patent claims are governed by federal law, with which all federal courts are familiar. See 

In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court 

correctly concluded that both the transferor and the transferee federal courts were equally capable 

of applying patent law to infringement claims). Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor is 

neutral.

3. Judicial Economy

The parties dispute whether patent infringement cases proceed to trial more quickly in the 

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NDCA than in the EDNC. See Mot. at 20 (arguing that the “median time to trial for all civil cases 

in the NDCA is 30.9 months, and in the EDNC is 27.0 months”); Opp. at 24 (listing statistics that 

demonstrate that patent infringement cases proceed to “claim construction” and “mature 

termination” at a faster pace in the NDCA than in the EDNC). 

The Court finds that the “time to trial” statistics, while generally relevant when considering 

this factor, are not compelling here where there is no apparent material difference in efficiency 

between the EDNC and the NCDA. More importantly, as Plaintiff recognizes, “[c]ourts have 

consistently held that judicial economy plays a paramount role in trying to maintain an orderly, 

effective, administration of justice and having one trial court decide all of these claims clearly 

furthers that objective.” In re Google Inc., 412 F. App’x 295, 296 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see Mot. at 

19-20. Keeping the DISH Action and the DirecTV Action in the NDCA will therefore “lead to the 

most efficient resolution of both cases.” Mot. at 20. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor 

weighs against transfer of the case to the EDNC.

III. CONCLUSION

The balance of the convenience factors does not clearly weigh in favor of transfer. Most of 

the factors are neutral, while the critical consideration of judicial economy weighs against transfer. 

Furthermore, the particular facts underlying this motion raise serious concerns regarding forum 

shopping. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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