Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02959/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02959-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY AROCHA,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. SAUCEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-2959 LKK KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff requests that the court appoint counsel. District courts lack authority to require counsel 

to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 

U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request an attorney to 

voluntarily to represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

When determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the court must consider plaintiff’s 

likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro 

se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 

(9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse discretion in declining to appoint counsel). The 

burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances 

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Case 2:11-cv-02959-MCE-KJN Document 119 Filed 07/10/14 Page 1 of 2
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common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not 

establish exceptional circumstances that warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. 

Having considered the factors under Palmer, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to 

meet his burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of 

counsel at this time.

Pending before the court is defendants’ summary judgment motion filed May 2, 2014, and 

defendants’ motion to dismiss filed May 9, 2014. Plaintiff has filed his second request for an 

extension of time to file and serve an opposition to defendants’ pending motions. Plaintiff 

requests an extension of sixty day. The grounds of this request are that plaintiff is housed in 

administrative segregation and does not have adequate access to his legal property. Good cause 

appearing, plaintiff’s motion for extension of time is granted. 

In the motion for appointment of counsel, plaintiff also moves to compel the Warden to 

allow him access to seven cubic feet of his legal property. In his motion for extension of time, 

plaintiff explains that inmates in administrative segregation are allowed to store six cubic feet of 

their legal property and are only granted access to one cubic foot of their legal property at a time. 

Plaintiff has not shown good cause to order the Warden to deviate from the regulations 

regarding access to legal property by inmates in administrative segregation. Because plaintiff has 

been granted sixty days to file his opposition, plaintiff should have adequate access to his legal 

property.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel and to compel (ECF No. 118) is 

denied without prejudice;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 116) is granted; and

3. Plaintiff is granted sixty days from the date of this order in which to file and serve his 

oppositions to defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. 

Dated: July 10, 2014

Aroc2959.31+36sec

Case 2:11-cv-02959-MCE-KJN Document 119 Filed 07/10/14 Page 2 of 2