Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00734/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00734-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SVK 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Keith P. Nance, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Allen Miser, et al. 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-0734-PHX-RCB (DKD)

 O R D E R 

 Defendants move for reconsideration of this Court’s Order entered on October 7, 

2013. (Doc. 71.) The Court denies the motion. 

 Plaintiff Keith P. Nance, an inmate confined by the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (ADC), filed this pro se civil rights action alleging denial of a Halal diet with 

meat and denial of a shaving waiver, in violation of his religious exercise rights. (Doc. 

9.) Plaintiff also asserted an Equal Protection claim. Defendants moved for summary 

judgment. (Doc. 54.) The Court dismissed the damage claims under the Religious Land 

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and denied the motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. 69.) 

 Defendants now seek reconsideration, alleging that the Court committed clear 

error because (1) it shifted the burden to Defendants without requiring Plaintiff to meet 

his initial burden to submit evidence regarding a substantial burden to his religious belief, 

and (2) it denied Defendants qualified immunity. (Doc. 71.) The Court will deny the 

Motion because the Court did not commit clear error, and Defendants’ motion is nothing 

more than disagreement with the Court’s decision. 

 In addition Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel; the Court will deny the 

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motion. (Doc. 70.) 

II. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration 

 A. Legal Standard 

 Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. 

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Mere 

disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Leong 

v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988). Rather, reconsideration 

is appropriate only “in the face of the existence of new evidence, an intervening change 

in the law, or as necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” Navajo Nation v. Confederated 

Tribes of Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). A motion for 

reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time 

when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. 

v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Nor may a motion for 

reconsideration repeat any argument previously made in support of or in opposition to a 

motion. Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. 

Ariz. 2003). 

B. Discussion 

 1. Sincerely Held Belief and Substantial Burden 

 In its Order, the Court stated that under both the RLUIPA and First Amendment 

analysis, Plaintiff must initially show that the religious practice at issue—consuming a 

Halal diet that includes Halal meat—satisfies two criteria: (1) the proffered belief must be 

sincerely held, and (2) the claim must be rooted in religious belief and not purely secular 

philosophical concerns. (Doc. 69 at 7, citing Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 

1994).) If the inmate makes his initial showing, he must establish that prison officials 

substantially burden the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in 

conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. (Doc. 69 at 10, citing 

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008).) 

 It is undisputed that Defendants do not offer a Halal diet with meat; rather they 

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offer a Kosher diet and a vegetarian diet. Plaintiff asserted that he defiles himself eating 

non-halal meats, which interfere with his spirituality and prayer life, and that he believes 

that the practice of eating Halal meats is a part of worship to Allah as established in the 

Qur’an. (Doc. 59 at 5.) He asserted that the standard and Kosher diets are haram (not 

permitted) and the vegetarian and vegan diets require that he forgo Halal slaughtered 

meat, which he believes he is commanded to eat. (Id. at 5-6.) 

 Defendants claim that under the Court’s Order, all an inmate needs to do is profess 

what his sincere religious belief requires and that the failure of prison officials to provide 

the item he wants pressures him to abandon his beliefs. (Doc. 71 at 3-4.) They object to 

the lack of a requirement for documentation supporting his entitlement or that no 

organized or recognized religious support or affiliation is required. (Id. at 4.) But as this 

Court stated in the Order, the right to religious practice “is not limited to beliefs which 

are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 

Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981). Plaintiff is therefore not required to 

show that consuming a Halal diet that includes meat is mandated as a part of the Islamic 

religion; rather, he is required to show that he sincerely believes that eating such a diet is 

consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85; see Parks v. Brooks, 302 Fed. 

Appx., 611, 612 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (reversing a grant of summary judgment 

on a RLUIPA claim because the Ninth Circuit concluded that the sincerity of the 

plaintiff’s alleged religious belief in the need for a Kosher diet could not be determined 

without a trial). 

 Defendants offered little or no evidence that Plaintiff’s belief was not a sincerely 

held religious belief, and they cite no cases requiring documentation of such beliefs. In 

EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de 

Puerto Rico, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the sincerity of a Seventh-Day 

Adventist’s beliefs were suspect because he lied on an employment application, was 

divorced, worked five days a week instead of six, and took an oath before a notary 

public—actions inconsistent with his professed religious beliefs. 279 F.3d 49, 56-57 (1st 

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Cir. 2002). But the court held only that the defendant had raised a triable issue of fact. 

Id. at 57. The court also noted that the finding of sincerity generally depends on the 

factfinder’s assessment of the plaintiff’s credibility and that “[c]redibility issues such as 

the sincerity of [a plaintiff’s] religious belief are quintessential fact questions. As such, 

they ordinarily should be reserved ‘for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary 

judgment.’” Id. at 56 (internal citations omitted). Likewise, in Patrick v. LeFevre, the 

Second Circuit reasoned that “[s]crutiny of a prisoner’s sincerity is often essential in 

‘differentiating between beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are 

animated by motives of deceptions and fraud.’” 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). The 

court emphasized that courts are “singularly ill-equipped to sit in judgment on the verity 

of an adherent’s religious beliefs” and held that summary judgment was inappropriate 

because the subjective issue of sincerity of belief was a question of fact; “assessing a 

claimant’s sincerity of belief demands a full exposition of facts and the opportunity for 

the factfinder to observe the claimant’s demeanor during direct and cross-examination.” 

Id. at 157. Patrick was cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in Spence v. World 

Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 As to a requirement of support for a belief by an organized or recognized religious 

group, this appears to the Court to be requiring evidence of objective accuracy, not 

sincerity of belief. In Jackson v. Mann, the Second Circuit rejected a district court’s 

reliance on a rabbi’s determination that an inmate was not Jewish for purposes of a 

prison’s Kosher diet; the Second Circuit reasoned that whether an inmate’s beliefs are 

entitled to First Amendment protection turns on whether those beliefs are sincerely held, 

not on an ecclesiastical question whether the inmate is a Jew under Jewish law. 196 F.3d 

316, 320-21 (2nd Cir.1999). The Jackson court reasoned that the prison “erroneously 

substituted the objective ‘accuracy’ of [the inmate’s] assertion that he is Jewish for the 

correct test—whether [the inmate’s] beliefs are ‘sincerely held.’” 196 F.3d at 320; see 

also Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593-94 (2d Cir. 2003) (the role a religious feast 

played in a prisoner’s practice of Islam determined whether there had been a substantial 

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burden to his religious practice, not the testimony of Muslim clerics as to the proper 

celebration of the feast); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 2008). 

 This Court correctly found a triable issue of fact regarding a sincerely held 

religious belief. (Doc. 69 at 8-10.) 

 Regarding substantial burden, the Court stated that if Plaintiff establishes that a 

Halal diet with meat is a sincerely held belief, denial of the diet is a substantial burden. 

(Doc. 69 at 10, citing Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“We have little difficulty in concluding that an outright ban on a particular religious 

exercise is a substantial burden on that religious exercise.”).) The Court also noted that 

Defendants’ evidence was inadequate to establish that the vegetarian diet offered is either 

Kosher or Halal. (Doc. 69 at 11.) 

 The Court finds this case distinguishable from Hartmann v. Calif. Dep’t. of Corrs. 

and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2013), on which Defendants now rely. In 

Hartmann, the plaintiffs challenged prison officials’ failure to hire a Wiccan chaplain. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no substantial burden to religious practice 

because the plaintiffs failed “to plead any factual allegations showing their religious 

exercise was so burdened as to pressure them to abandon their beliefs.” Id. at 1125. The 

court reasoned that instead of claiming they had been pressured to abandon their religious 

beliefs, plaintiffs were “seeking additional religious accommodations beyond those 

already provided by the prison to facilitate the religious exercise of their Wiccan faith.” 

Id. In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that he must eat Halal meat and that the practice 

is part of worship to Allah as established in the Qur’an. Defendants refuse to provide a 

diet with Halal meat; therefore, Plaintiff is pressured to abandon his religious belief 

regarding his need to eat Halal meat. 

 The Court did not improperly shift the burden, and defense counsel’s hyperbole 

and remarks about “shrimp cocktail Tuesday” and “Eggs Benedict” Sunday are not a 

substitute for analysis based on case law or a substitute for evidence. (Doc. 71 at 4, 5.) 

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 2. Qualified Immunity 

The Court denied Defendants qualified immunity for the first 7 months after 

Plaintiff requested his religious diet and shaving waiver; Defendants did not dispute 

Plaintiff’s assertions that he was initially denied the diet and waiver based on his reincarceration, which was deemed evidence of the lack of a sincere belief. (Doc. 69 at 

16.) After the Director approved the diet and shaving waiver, Plaintiff was offered either 

a Kosher or vegetarian diet, which he refused, and the shaving waiver. In their Motion 

for Summary Judgment, Defendants failed to make an argument of any kind as to 

qualified immunity for that period and again make no argument on reconsideration. 

There was no error regarding denial of qualified immunity for this period. 

 The Court also denied Defendants qualified immunity for the period after Plaintiff 

was offered either a Kosher or vegetarian diet. This is a closer question. The Court notes 

that although Defendants raised qualified immunity in both their Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration, other than Curry v. California Dep’t of 

Corrs., 2013 WL 75769 (N.D. Cal. 2013), they cited to no cases specifically discussing 

qualified immunity in religious diet cases. In Curry, the court granted qualified 

immunity as to the inmate’s Kemetic-diet request, made by a practitioner of Shetaut 

Neter, but also found no constitutional violation where the defendant prison officials 

provided evidence for a full analysis under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) and 

RLUIPA. Curry, 2013 WL 75769, at * 17. 

 For purposes of a qualified immunity determination, “the right allegedly violated 

must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it 

was clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); see Dunn v. Castro, 

621 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (when deciding whether there has been a violation of 

a clearly established right for qualified immunity, a court must strike the proper balance 

in defining that right.) A right is clearly established if its contours are “sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. 

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Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior case with the 

identical facts showing that a right is clearly established; it is enough that there is 

preexisting law that provides a defendant “fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful. 

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065. 

 Although there is no clearly established right to a Halal diet with meat, for 

purposes of the First Amendment, there is a clearly established right to a religious diet 

that meets the inmate’s religious dietary needs unless there is a legitimate penological 

reason to deny it. Moreover, the Court finds that it is clearly established that sincerely 

held religious beliefs are entitled to protection whether or not prison officials deem them 

central or valid tenets of the inmate’s faith. The Shakur Court clearly explained that the 

Supreme Court disapproved the centrality test, finding it inappropriate for courts to 

“question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of 

particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-885. 

 Defendants argued that they would have believed their conduct was reasonable 

because there was no precedent requiring prison officials to provide a Halal diet with 

meat, other Muslim inmates did not require a Halal diet with meat, and Defendants’ 

inquiries demonstrated that consuming Halal meat is not an Islamic requirement. (Doc. 

54 at 6, 9-10.) But that argument did not address Plaintiff’s sincerely held belief. 

Defendants appeared to argue that the only religious beliefs that are protected by the First 

Amendment are those held by a majority of practitioners of a particular faith or those that 

prison officials have determined are correct or valid and that as long as those beliefs are 

accommodated, their conduct was reasonable. Moreover, Defendants did not address, 

even cursorily, the Turner factors.1

 Defendants now assert that “[t]he minute details underlying Qur’anic 

interpretations of religious diet and individual inmate interpretation of these requirements 

 

1

 The Court dismissed the RLUIPA claim for damages although Defense counsel failed to make such a request; the Court notes that Defendants also failed to address the 

RLUIPA factors. 

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in this case demonstrate exactly why Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.” 

(Doc. 71 at 7.) They argue that they have in the past accommodated Muslims with a 

choice of either a Kosher or vegetarian diet “approved by the outside religious authorities 

Defendants rely on for counsel in these matters.” (Id. at 8.) Defendants’ argument here 

is essentially the same argument made before. As noted, the Court finds this is a close 

question, but it finds no clear error. 

 The Court notes that as a practical matter, Plaintiff’s damage claims for the period 

before he was approved for the shaving waiver and religious diet remain. More 

importantly, the claim for injunctive relief on the religious diet remains and implicates 

the same evidentiary issues as those for the damage claim for the period after Plaintiff 

was offered either a Kosher diet or a vegetarian diet. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

There is no constitutional right for an indigent litigant to have appointed counsel 

in a civil case. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff=s case is 

beyond the pleading stage, so his right of access to the court is not at issue and, therefore, 

cannot justify appointment of counsel. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) confers on a court 

the discretion to “request” counsel to represent an indigent civil litigant, but this circuit 

has limited the exercise of that power to “exceptional circumstances,” based upon such 

factors as the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to 

articulate his claims in light of their complexity. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 

1335 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff offers nothing to show a likelihood of success or any 

special complexity of issues in this case. (Doc. 70.) The request is denied. 

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 IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to 

Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 71) and Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 70), and the Motions are denied. 

 DATED this 27th day of November, 2013. 

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