Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02085/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Odis Dietrich Schlosser, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 14-2085-TUC-DCB (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Odis Dietrich Schlosser’s (“Schlosser”) Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner 

raises one ground for relief, that his due process rights were violated because the 

Arizona Supreme Court declared the premeditation instruction given by the trial 

court to be erroneous and, therefore, he was convicted of violating a statute that was 

unconstitutionally vague. Doc. 3 at 1. Because Schlosser’s petition is barred by the 

statute of limitations, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 4:14-cv-02085-DCB Document 9 Filed 09/21/15 Page 1 of 6
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I. Factual and Procedural Background1

 Following a jury trial, Schlosser was found guilty of first degree murder. Ex. 

A at 2.2

 He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. On 

November 8, 2000, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Schlosser’s conviction. 

Id. at 12. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Schlosser’s petition for review on 

March 22, 2001. Ex. B. 

 On February 21, 2012, Schlosser filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

with the Pima County Superior Court which the court construed as a Notice for PostConviction Relief. Exs. C, D. Schlosser argued that his conviction and sentence 

should be vacated for three reasons: (1) there was a significant change in the law 

regarding the premeditation instruction; (2) trial counsel was ineffective because he 

failed to investigate and obtain a surveillance video tape; and (3) the trial court erred 

when it failed to grant his motion for a mistrial after he was seen in handcuffs by one 

juror during a break. Ex. F. The trial court precluded claims two and three (Id. at 3-

4) and found that claim one was not based on federal due process but on a state case 

construing the definition of premeditation (Id. at 6). That claim was denied and 

Schlosser’s petition was dismissed. Id. at 7. 

 

1

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 7. 

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 The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but on February 7, 2013, denied 

relief. Ex. G. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review and on August 1, 2013, the 

Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Ex. H. 

 Schlosser filed his federal habeas petition on May 12, 2014. Doc. 1. 

Respondents contend that Schlosser’s petition is untimely and must be dismissed. 

The Court agrees. 

II. Timeliness 

A. Schlosser’s Petition is Untimely.

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 The limitation period for Schlosser’s habeas petition was triggered on “the 

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Here, 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the Memorandum Decision in 

Schlosser’s direct appeal on March 22, 2001. Schlosser had until June 30, 2001 to 

file a petition for writ of certiorari. (A litigant has 90 days from entry of judgment by 

a state court of last resort in which to seek a petition for a writ of certiorari. Clay v. 

United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003); Sup. Ct. R. 13(1)). Schlosser did not 

petition for certiorari. One year later, on June 30, 2002, his petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus became time-barred. Almost twelve years later, on May 12, 2014, 

Schlosser filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

 Title 8 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) does allow for statutory tolling during the 

pendency of a state post-conviction release proceeding. But here, by the time 

Schlosser filed his state Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on February 21, 2012, the 

statute of limitations had already run so the statutory tolling provisions do not apply. 

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B. Schlosser is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

 “Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.’” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations 

period “only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). “The high threshold of 

extraordinary circumstances is necessary lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. 

 In his Reply, Schlosser only briefly touches on the reasons for the ten year 

delay in filing his habeas petition. He explains that he thought his direct appeal in 

state court proceedings was actually a petition under Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P., and 

that was “the reason for the 10 year gap in filing.” Reply, p. 3. However, even if his 

confusion could somehow constitute an “extraordinary circumstance,” the ten year 

delay establishes without question that he has not pursued his rights diligently. As 

such, his untimely petition is clearly barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Schlosser’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

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 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a 

copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the 

District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first 

obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 14-2085-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 21st day of September, 2015. 

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