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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 3, 2002 Decided August 20, 2002

Nos. 00-7210 & 00-7211

Republican National Committee and

Haley Barbour,

Appellees

v.

Gene Taylor, et al.,

Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00691)

Lawrence R. DeMarcay III argued the cause for appellant

Gene Taylor. With him on the briefs was George J. Fowler

III. Bruce E. Aitken entered an appearance.

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Charles P. Resor argued the cause pro se.

Thomas W. Kirby argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief was Jan W. Baran.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: After publishing an offer to pay

one million dollars to the first person who could demonstrate

that a statement about Republican plans for Medicare spending was false, the Republican National Committee (RNC)

denied all claims for the prize. Two of those claims are now

before this court. The RNC prevailed in the district court on

its motion for summary judgment, and we affirm.

I

In December 1995, the Republican National Committee ran

an advertisement in the newspapers USA Today and Roll

Call. The ad is reproduced at the end of this opinion, and we

summarize its most salient features here. Prominently featured at the top of the ad is a photograph of Haley Barbour,

then chair of the RNC, holding an oversized check for one

million dollars, payable to "your name here." Next to and

below Barbour's image, the following text appears:

Heard the one about Republicans 'cutting' Medicare?

The fact is Republicans are increasing Medicare spending by more than half. I'm Haley Barbour, and I'm so

sure of that fact I'm willing to give you this check for a

million dollars if you can prove me wrong.

The advertisement goes on to assert that under the Republican plan, the government would increase Medicare spending

over the next seven fiscal years, culminating in a 2002 expenditure 62% higher than that in 1995. In the bottom right

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portion of the ad, framed in a border to look like a coupon,

the following appears:

[Photo not available electronically.]

The ad then invites readers who disagree with the bold text

in quotation marks (the "Challenge Statement") to check a

box labeled "I don't believe you, Haley" and return the

coupon with their analyses of "why you are wrong" to the

RNC's Washington, D.C. address.

Approximately eighty people across the country did not

believe Haley and mailed in claims for the million-dollar prize.

The RNC responded to each claimant by sending him or her

a form letter rejecting the claim as incorrect, and enclosing a

Congressional Budget Office report. After one rejected

claimant filed a breach of contract suit in the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia, the RNC and Barbour (hereinafter the RNC) posted a million-dollar bond and filed a statutory interpleader action against all of the claimants in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Mississippi, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ss 1335, 2361. The MissisUSCA Case #00-7210 Document #696716 Filed: 08/20/2002 Page 3 of 13
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sippi district court subsequently determined that Washington,

D.C. was the more appropriate forum, and transferred the

interpleader action to the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1404(a). Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Taylor, No. 4:97CV5LN (S.D. Miss.

Mar. 19, 1997) (hereinafter Mississippi Decision).

When the case was transferred to the federal district court

in this district, a number of the original interpleader defendants failed to press their claims, and their cases were

dismissed. One claimant settled with the RNC. The RNC

then moved for summary judgment against the remaining

claimants, on two principal grounds: (1) that the advertisement was merely a "parody" and not binding on the RNC;

and (2) that even if the ad were an offer to contract, the

Challenge Statement was not false. Although the court

rejected the first argument, it accepted the second and granted summary judgment against all of the claimants. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Taylor, No. 97-0691 (D.D.C. July 6,

2000) (hereinafter District Court Decision).

Only four claimants appealed the grant of summary judgment. One appeal was dismissed because the appellant failed

to file a timely notice of appeal. Another panel of this court

summarily affirmed the judgment against a second. The

appeals of the remaining two claimants, Representative Gene

Taylor and Charles P. Resor, are addressed in this opinion.1

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1 The RNC moved to dismiss Taylor's appeal on the ground

that his notice of appeal, although signed by out-of-town counsel,

was not signed by a member of the district court bar, in violation of

D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 83.2(c)(1) ("All papers submitted by nonmembers of the Bar of this Court must be signed by such counsel

and by a member of the Bar of this Court joined in compliance with

this Rule."). As the notice of appeal is a district court filing, Fed.

R. App. P. 3(a)(1), the local rule is made applicable by Fed. R. App. P.

1(a)(2) ("When these rules provide for filing a motion or other

document in the district court, the procedure must comply with the

practice of the district court."). Nonetheless, we deny the motion.

While a notice of appeal must be signed by counsel, Fed. R. Civ. P.

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II

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). As an initial matter, we must

determine which jurisdiction's law applies. None of the

parties addressed this question in their briefs, relying instead

on "the general law of contracts" and citing decisions from a

myriad of state and federal courts.

In a case like this one, in which jurisdiction is founded on

the diversity of the parties' citizenship, we apply the choiceof-law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.

Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Young Women's Christian

Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co. of Canada, 275 F.3d 1145, 1150

(D.C. Cir. 2002). The fact that the RNC filed the case under

the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. s 1335, does not

change the analysis as that statute rests on diversity jurisdiction. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503 (1941) (applying

forum state's choice-of-law rules in statutory interpleader

action); see Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1320-21

(8th Cir. 1991). Moreover, although this case was transferred

to the federal district court for the District of Columbia, we

continue to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state--Mississippi--in which the case was originally filed. Ferens v. John

Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).

In deciding choice-of-law questions, Mississippi applies the

"center of gravity" test. Sheppard Pratt Physicians, P.A. v.

__________

11(a), the Supreme Court has recently held that even the complete

absence of a signature does not deprive a court of appeals of

jurisdiction, Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 766 (2001). A

fortiori, an error as to which attorney signed the notice is nonjurisdictional. Under such circumstances, a court of appeals has discretion to treat a filing irregularity "as it considers appropriate." Fed.

R. App. P. 3(a)(2). And because "imperfections in noticing an appeal

should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is

appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court," Becker,

532 U.S. at 767, we decline to dismiss the appeal for this technical

violation.

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Sakwa, 725 So. 2d 755, 757 (Miss. 1998) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Conflict of Laws s 188 (1971)); see Gann v.

Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1995). As best

we can determine from the record, the jurisdiction that is the

center of gravity of this case is the District of Columbia--the

location of the RNC's headquarters, the place where one of

the two newspapers carrying the advertisement is published,

and the address to which all of the claims were mailed.

Indeed, that was essentially the reason given by the Mississippi district court for transferring the case to the District of

Columbia in the first place. See Mississippi Decision, slip op.

at 9 ("[T]he clear focus of the events giving rise to this action

was the District of Columbia, from which the 'contest' or

'challenge' was devised and published and to which all 'contestants' or 'challengers' sent their responses.").2 Moreover,

where, as here, the parties do not raise the choice-of-law issue

either in the district court or on appeal, courts generally

apply the law of the jurisdiction in which they sit. See, e.g.,

Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701 F.2d 879, 882-83 (11th

Cir. 1983); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws s 136

cmt. h; Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws

s 12.19, at 426-27 (2d ed. 1992). In any event, none of the

parties cited any Mississippi cases in their briefs, and at oral

argument none suggested any way in which Mississippi law

differs from that of the District of Columbia on the issues

that are relevant to our decision. We will therefore apply the

contract law of the District in resolving this appeal.

III

In the district court, the RNC contended that its advertisement was intended merely as a parody, and not as a document that could bind it to make payment to a successful

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2 The only factor weighing in favor of Mississippi law is that it

is the state of residence of Barbour and of one of the interpleader

defendants, Representative Taylor. Both individuals, however,

worked in Washington, D.C. at the time, see Mississippi Decision,

slip op. at 7, 9, and at oral argument Barbour argued that D.C. law

should apply.

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claimant. The district court rejected that contention, holding

that the ad was "an offer for a valid unilateral contract, which

anyone could have accepted by rendering performance in the

manner indicated." District Court Decision, slip op. at 9.3

On appeal, the RNC does not dispute that holding. We

therefore turn to the remaining question: the meaning of the

contract offered by the RNC.

Under District of Columbia law, the meaning of a contract

"is an issue for the finder of fact only if the contractual

language is ambiguous, i.e., where its interpretation depends

upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence or upon a choice of

reasonable inferences from such evidence." Dodek v. CF 16

Corp., 537 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. 1988) (citations omitted).4

"Ambiguity exists only if the court determines that proper

interpretation of the contract depends upon evidence outside

the contract itself," and "[w]hether such ambiguity exists is a

__________

3 See Opton, Inc. v. FDIC, 647 A.2d 1126, 1134 n.6 (D.C. 1994)

(stating that a unilateral contract is one in which the promissor

makes a promise in exchange for a proposed act, and that "[p]erformance of the act constitutes acceptance of the offer, and at that

point a contract comes into being" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Minton v. F.G. Smith Piano Co., 36 App. D.C. 137 (1911)

("The advertised offer of a reward or premium for the performance

of a specified act is a proposition submitted to all persons who may

accept and comply with its conditions. Until accepted it may be

withdrawn; but when accepted, it becomes a binding contract

between the proposer and the acceptor who shall have performed

the service or done the act required."); cf. Rosenthal v. Al Packer

Ford, Inc., 374 A.2d 377, 379-82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (discussing "prove me wrong" cases).

4 See 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485

A.2d 199, 205 (D.C. 1984) (holding that "the interpretation of an

integrated contract is a question of law unless it depends on the

credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable

inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence" (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts s 212(2) (1981))); see also id. at 205

n.6 ("Analytically, of course, the question of what the parties

intended is clearly a question of fact. But the courts have long

called it a question of law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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question of law for the court to determine." Id. at 1092-93.

Where, as here, "[n]one of the parties ... contends that

extrinsic evidence is at issue," but instead the parties "merely

present[ ] two competing versions of what [they] intended by

the disputed language," the contract's meaning is a question

for the court to decide. Id. at 1093; see 1010 Potomac

Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.

1984). In any case, we do not regard the Challenge Statement as ambiguous with respect to either of the two claims

that remain in this case.

A

As noted above, the Challenge Statement consists of the

following two sentences:

In November 1995, the U.S. House and Senate passed a

balanced budget bill. It increases total federal spending

on Medicare by more than 50% from 1995 to 2002,

pursuant to Congressional Budget Office standards.

Representative Taylor does not disagree with the second

sentence's assertion regarding increases in Medicare spending. Letter from Taylor to Barbour 1 (Dec. 14, 1995) (J.A. at

121). Instead, he focuses on the first sentence, and argues

that it is false because the bill in question, which all agree

was H.R. 2491 of the 104th Congress, did not and could not

actually balance the budget in fiscal year 1996. Taylor does

not dispute that the bill included a plan for 1996 through 2002

that, if followed, would have balanced the budget by fiscal

year 2002. But Taylor argues (without disagreement from

the RNC) that the bill did not even purport to balance the

budget completely in 1996. See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: December 1995

Update at 10 ("Under the policies of the Balanced Budget

Act, the deficit would decline to $151 billion in 1996"). As a

consequence, Taylor concludes, it is false to describe the bill

as a "balanced budget bill."

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There are two problems with Taylor's reading of this

sentence. First, the sentence does not appear to represent

an independent assertion, but instead serves merely as a

referent for the assertion (and challenge) contained in the

second sentence, which declares: "It increases total federal

spending on Medicare...." That is, the first sentence simply makes clear that the "it" in the second sentence is the

"balanced budget bill." This conclusion is confirmed by the

fact that, other than the words "a balanced budget bill" in the

first sentence, there is no mention anywhere in the advertisement of a claim that Republicans are balancing (or have

balanced) the budget. By contrast, the point of the ad,

repeated in virtually every section and in bold letters, is

plainly its assertion that "Republicans are increasing Medicare spending."

Nor is "a balanced budget bill" an obscure or surprising

way to refer to the bill in question, since the first sentence of

H.R. 2491 states: "This Act may be cited as the 'Balanced

Budget Act of 1995.' " H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-350, at 1

(1995). And Taylor does not dispute that H.R. 2491 was

commonly referred to as the "balanced budget bill." Nonetheless, he argues that the Challenge Statement "should have

read 'the balanced budget bill,' " rather than "a balanced

budget bill," "if the RNC had wanted to indicate that it was

referring to H.R. 2491 specifically and not the task of balancing the budget." Taylor Br. at 25. This seems to us,

however, to put too much weight on the substitution of the

indefinite for the definite article, and is insufficient to create

ambiguity as to the meaning of the advertisement.

Second, even if we were to read the first sentence of the

Challenge Statement as making an affirmative claim that the

bill would balance the budget rather than merely increase

Medicare spending, we cannot read it as claiming to do so in a

single year. Again, almost every section of the advertisement

refers to the Republicans' plan for spending over seven years,

culminating in 2002. Indeed, the second sentence of the

Challenge Statement itself refers to spending "from 1995 to

2002." Thus, we find no ambiguity with respect to this claim,

and conclude that the Challenge Statement does not falsely

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allege that the Republicans' plan would balance the federal

budget in a single year.

B

Charles Resor's claim focuses on the second sentence of the

Challenge Statement: the assertion that H.R. 2491 "increases

total federal spending on Medicare." Resor does not dispute

that the bill, if passed, would have increased Medicare spending. See Resor Br. at 8-9. But he contends that the

assertion that the bill "increases" spending is false because

the President vetoed the bill and Congress never overrode

the veto.5 As Resor explains, "only 'laws,' not 'bills,' can

increase federal spending." Resor Br. at 16 (citing U.S.

Const. art. I, s 7, cl. 2).

The flaw in Resor's argument is that the present tense,

"increases," is both commonly and grammatically used to

indicate future action. See American Heritage Book of

English Usage s 68 (1996). A search of Westlaw's "AllNews"

and "Congressional Record" databases, for example, discloses

hundreds of instances in which journalists and members of

Congress describe the effect of unenacted legislation with

variants of the phrase, "This bill increases ... ," by which the

speaker means that the bill will do so if and when it becomes

law.6 Nor could a reader of the advertisement have been

__________

5 H.R. 2491 was passed by both houses of Congress in November 1995, was presented to the President on November 30, 1995,

and was vetoed on December 6, 1995. See District Court Decision,

slip op. at 10-11; CCH Inc., Congressional Index, 104th Congress

at 35,055 (1996). The advertisement appeared in USA Today on

December 12, 1996, and in Roll Call at approximately the same

time.

6 See, e.g., For the Record, Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 2001, at T17

("The bill increases spending for the National Missile Defense by 60

percent.... "); Education Bill Passes, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2001,

s 4, at 2 ("The bill increases the role of the federal government in

local schools...."); 148 Cong. Rec. H5246 (daily ed. July 23, 2002)

(statement of Rep. Chambliss) ("[T]his bill increases funding for

this important facility...."); 148 Cong. Rec. S4044 (daily ed. May

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misled into thinking that the RNC's claim was that the bill

was already enacted, or that it would have force before it was

enacted. As Resor himself notes, the Constitution distinguishes between a "bill" and a "law,"7 and the Challenge

Statement correctly refers to H.R. 2491 as a "bill" passed by

"the U.S. House and Senate." Indeed, the advertisement

expressly refers to its spending projections as a "plan."

In his letter to the RNC, Resor wrote: "Your statement,

perhaps, would have been correct if it had used the words

'would have increased' instead of 'increases,' " thus "acknowledg[ing] the hypothetical nature of the statement." Letter

from Resor to Barbour 1 (Dec. 12, 1995) (J.A. at 64) (emphasis added). Yet, in fact the advertisement does use almost

the precise formulation suggested by Resor. Immediately to

the left of the box containing the Challenge Statement, the ad

states: "[U]nder our plan, the government would spend $289

billion on Medicare" (emphasis added). It thus provides the

very indication of conditionality that Resor says was required

to make the assertion true. And while Resor insisted at oral

argument that this court is not permitted to look outside the

(framed) box to determine the meaning of the Challenge

Statement, District of Columbia law is to the contrary.8 We

__________

8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("This bill increases spending for

land and water conservation programs...."); see also United

States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283 n.2 (1943) ("[T]he Bill

'increases substantially the criminal penalties....' " (quoting H.R.

Rep. No. 75-2139, at 4 (1937))); United States ex rel. Springfield

Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(" '[T]he Senate bill increases incentives, financial and otherwise, for

private individuals to bring suits....' " (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345,

at 1-2 (1986))).

7 U.S. Const. art. I, s 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have

passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it

become a Law, be presented to the President of the United

States....").

8 See Dodek, 537 A.2d at 1096 (noting that the "general rule is

that contracts will be read as a whole, and every part will be

interpreted with reference to the whole"); Davis v. Davis, 471 A.2d

1008, 1009 (D.C. 1984) (indicating that "to find a writer's intent," a

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therefore find no ambiguity with respect to Resor's claim, and

conclude that the Challenge Statement's assertion that H.R.

2491 "increases total federal spending" is not rendered false

by the fact that the President ultimately vetoed the bill.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the RNC's

Challenge Statement is not ambiguous with respect to the

two claims at issue on this appeal, and that, as a matter of

law, the Statement is not false with respect to either claim.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

__________

court should "construe[ ] the document as a whole"); cf. United

States v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 83 F.3d 1507, 1511 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (noting the "cardinal principle of contract construction: that a

document should be read to give effect to all its provisions" (quoting

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63

(1995))).

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[Ad not available electronically.]

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