Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03308/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03308-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL CHAMBERS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SANTA CLARA COUNTY ET AL,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-3308 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

On August 18, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss filed by defendants

Stronk and Stein. After careful consideration of the parties’ papers and arguments, the Court DENIES

defendants’ motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Daniel Chambers, a former dependent of the Santa Clara County Juvenile Court, filed

this action in pro per alleging various civil rights and state tort violations. Plaintiff has sued the County

of Santa Clara (“County”) and over 20 County officials and employees, including the Board of

Supervisors, current and former directors of the Santa Clara County Social Services Agency (“SSA”),

and the Department of Family and Children’s Services (“DFCS”). Plaintiff has also sued S. Carey

Stronk and Joan Stein of the Santa Clara County Juvenile Defenders program, who were court-appointed

attorneys for plaintiff. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges ten causes action for claims arising

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law.

 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that his mother, Kelley Tucker (previously known as Kelley Mah)

contacted the Santa Clara County Social Services Agency (“SSA”) in April 1999 after she “became

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 Plaintiff and his brother, Jason Chambers, allegedly sexually molested their half-sister.

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 For example, the complaint alleges that “[a]ll defendants had various meetings, discussion[s]

at various times and various defendants at different times all came to the same conclusion and assisted

and supported the Conspiracy to remove Daniel from his mother, remove custody, prevent reunification,

falsely terminate family reunification services and cause the permanent removal of Daniel and his

siblings from their mother. . . .” Id. ¶ 52.

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aware of her children’s sexual acting out.” SAC ¶ 2.1 The complaint alleges that instead of providing

help and support for plaintiff and his family, the county social worker, defendant Kathleen Dudley,

“began to conscientiously tear Daniel and his family apart.” Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that he spent

4 years and nine months in the care and custody of SSA, and that while in foster care he suffered severe

physical and emotional abuse. Id. at ¶ 4.

Relevant to the instant motion to dismiss, the complaint alleges that defendants Stronk and Stein

“conspired with the social workers and . . . actively and aggressively sided with the county . . . .” Id.

at ¶¶ 41, 52, 55.2

 According to the complaint, Stronk and Stein failed to investigate or interview

plaintiff, “who would have clarified many issues and would have testified that his mother never

physically abused him as well as the fact that his mother did not know about any of the children’s sexual

behaviors prior to the disclosure by [plaintiff’s sister].” Id. at ¶ 43. Plaintiff further alleges that Stronk

and Stein “knew it was determined and reported by two psychologists that what Jason had done didn’t

fall into the legal definition of ‘molest’ and that both psychologists had recommended the family receive

services and counseling with the help of the SSA’s social workers.” Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff also alleges

that, at some point after he had been removed from his mother’s care and released to live with family

friends, the Pattersons, defendant Stein knew that plaintiff has having problems with the Pattersons yet

did nothing to help. Id. at ¶ 54. Finally, the complaint alleges that around January of 2001, plaintiff’s

mother served legal documents on Stronk “and/or” Stein presenting “new evidence and declarations of

withheld evidence”but that they withheld such information from the courts. Id. at ¶ 53(4). 

Now before the Court is a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint filed by defendants

Stein and Stronk.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The question presented by a motion to dismiss

is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer

evidence in support of the claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

In answering this question, the Court must assume that the plaintiff's allegations are true and

must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d

556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance of recovery is

remote, the Court must allow the plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings. See

United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981).

If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The

Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

 Defendants move to dismiss the § 1983 claims on the ground that court-appointed attorneys do

not act under the color of state law. A plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that

(1) “the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law” and that (2)

“this conduct deprived the claimant of a constitutional right.” Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829,

831 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff asserts that Stein and Stronk can be held liable under § 1983 because they

engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 

A Section 1983 action may lie against private parties such as Stronk and Stein if they are “willful

participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).

Although not cited by either party, the Court finds a recent Ninth Circuit case, Kirtley v. Rainey, 326

F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003), particularly instructive. In Kirtley, the Ninth Circuit held that a private

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individual who had been appointed a minor’s guardian ad litem in a family court proceeding was not

acting under color of state law. The Kirtley court’s analysis focused almost exclusively on the statutory

definition of guardian. The guardian ad litem in Kirtley served two primary roles: (1) “an advocate for

the best interests of the child subject to the custody dispute,” and (2) “an independent source of

information for the court regarding the circumstances of the custody dispute,” both of which were to be

carried out independent of judicial influence. Id. at 1093-94. The Court held that although a guardian

was appointed, compensated, subject to qualification, and regulated by the state, Washington law clearly

indicated that the intended benefits of the guardian “flow directly to the child, in whose interests the

guardian must act.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Similar to the guardian ad litem statute in Kirtley, California Welfare and Institution Code

Section 317 provides that “a primary responsibility of any counsel appointed to represent a child

pursuant to this section shall be to advocate for the protection, safety, and physical and emotional

well-being of the child.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317(c). Court-appointed counsel are also

empowered to “make or cause to have made any further investigations that he or she deems in good faith

to be reasonably necessary to ascertain the facts, including the interviewing of witnesses . . . .” Id. at

§ 317(e). In addition, Section 317 further evidences the independence of court-appointed counsel by

providing that these attorneys may invoke the psychotherapist-client privilege, physician-patient

privilege, and clergyman-penitent privilege on behalf of the client further evidences their degree of

independence from the State. Id. at § 317(f). The Court concludes that because of the similarities

between the statutory definitions of the guardian in Kirtley, and that of court-appointed counsel here,

there is sufficient independence from the State that, as a general matter, counsel appointed pursuant to

Section 317 do not qualify as state actors for Section 1983 purposes. 

However, the Kirtley court recognized the theoretical possibility that a plaintiff could plead facts

showing that, despite the statutory role of the guardian ad litem, his or her actions were fairly

attributable to or at the direction of the State. See Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1095 n.5. Here, as discussed

supra, plaintiff has alleged – albeit in a somewhat general way – that defendants Stronk and Stein

conspired with the county to prevent reunification of plaintiff with his mother, despite their knowledge

that plaintiff was not in any danger in his mother’s care. These allegations, if proven, would show that

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 Because the Court concludes that plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1983, the Court DENIES

defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction.

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defendants Stronk and Stein were “willful participants in joint action” with the County, and thus they

could be held liable under § 1983. Although the Court takes note of defendants’ contentions that the

complaint lacks sufficient specificity to proceed against Stronk and Stein, in light of plaintiff’s pro se

status, the Court finds that plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim against these defendants, and DENIES

defendants’ motion.3

 See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A court should liberally

construe pro se civil rights pleadings, affording the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.”). As discussed

at the hearing, defendants Stronk and Stein will file a motion for summary judgment as soon as

practicable.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES defendants’

motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 41). Defendants shall file an answer to the second amended complaint

within 20 days of the filing date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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