Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02479/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Erin Rae Espinosa,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-02479-PHX-RM (DTF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Erin Rae Espinosa (Espinosa or Petitioner), formerly confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition). (Doc. 1.) Before the Court are the Petition, Respondents’ 

Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Answer), Petitioner’s reply and 

two notices of supplemental authority filed by Petitioner (Docs. 21, 26, 27, 28.) This matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 16.) 

As more fully set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the district 

court, after its independent review, dismiss the Petition.

BACKGROUND

In November 2014, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with one count of 

aggravated driving under the influence (DUI). (Doc. 21-1 at 3-4.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarized the evidence underlying Petitioner’s offense as follows: 

¶2 In the afternoon of August 18, 2011, Michelle Murphy waited in her 

parked car to pick up her daughter from school. Espinosa was also parked in 

the lane of waiting cars and was five or six feet directly in front of Murphy. 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 1 of 27
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After a few minutes, Espinosa’s vehicle rolled backwards and collided with 

Murphy’s car. Murphy exited her vehicle to check on Espinosa who appeared 

“dazed” and responded negatively to Murphy’s stated intent to call the 

police. Before arriving at the school, Murphy had observed Espinosa driving 

erratically.

¶3 Another parent contacted police officer Kunde who was nearby, and 

Kunde responded to the scene. As the officer talked with Espinosa through 

her open driver side window, he noticed an ignition interlock device near the 

middle console, and Espinosa’s vehicle rolled forward and backward a 

couple times before Kunde directed her to park in the school’s driveway. As 

she pulled away, Espinosa drove over the curb before coming to a stop. When 

Espinosa exited her vehicle to look for her driver license and registration in 

the back of the vehicle, she was “very unstable on her feet” and “wobbling[.]” 

Espinosa informed Kunde that she had not been drinking, but she had taken 

three doses of her prescribed clonazepam earlier that day.[] She did not find 

her license, which the state subsequently learned was revoked and subject to 

a number of restrictions.[] 

¶4 Kunde administered field sobriety tests, and Espinosa exhibited 

numerous signs of impairment. A horizontal gaze nystagmus test revealed 

six out of six clues of possible neurological impairment. Kunde arrested 

Espinosa, and after reading her the “admin per se implied consent” form, a 

phlebotomist obtained Espinosa’s consent to draw two samples of blood. The 

phlebotomist also advised Espinosa of her right to an independent blood test. 

The state’s testing of one of the blood vials indicated an amount of 

clonazepam approximately twice the upper limit of the therapeutic range. 

(Doc. 21-3 at 67-68.) This Court presumes the correctness of the court of appeals’ recitation 

of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per 

curiam); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 762 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (affording the factual 

findings of the Arizona appellate court “a presumption of correctness” that a petitioner has 

the burden of rebutting with clear and convincing evidence).

A jury found Espinosa guilty as charged and later determined that she committed 

the offense while on probation for a felony offense. (Doc. 21-1 at 13-15.) The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to a presumptive term of 2.5 years’ imprisonment with 30 days of 

presentence incarceration credit. (Doc. 21-1 at 17-21.)

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 2 of 27
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Id. at 23-25. Petitioner filed an opening 

brief presenting seven claims. Id. at 27-103. The appeal was fully briefed. (Doc. 21-2 at 2-

135; Doc. 21-3 at 2-64.) On March 13, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a 

memorandum decision rejecting Petitioner’s claims and affirming her conviction and 

sentence. (Doc. 21-3 at 66-82.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court and the state filed a notice of acknowledgment. Id. at 84-97, 99. The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review on August 31, 2018. Id. at 112. A few weeks earlier, on 

August 3, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. (Doc. 1.)

On August 28, 2018, the district court entered an order dismissing the claims alleged 

in Ground Two and the first part of Ground Three of the Petition because Espinosa failed 

to refer to or identify any federal basis for them. (Doc. 8 at 3.) As such, the Petition presents 

four grounds for relief:

Ground One: The prosecutor committed “numerous intentional acts of 

prosecutorial misconduct” that violated Espinosa’s right to due process; 

Ground Three (part two): The superior court erred when it denied Espinosa’s 

motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure because the evidence was insufficient; 

Ground Four: The superior court erred when it declined to reconsider its 

ruling denying Espinosa’s motion to suppress evidence “because the State 

waived its alternative argument, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13–3925, by failing to 

preserve [its] argument in the superior court”; and 

Ground Five: The superior court erred when it denied Espinosa’s “motion 

for alternative relief, including dismissal of the charge, with prejudice, based 

on the State’s violation of its duty to collect and preserve until time and (sic) 

trial, a sample of her blood for her independent chemical analysis.”

(Doc. 1 at 23, 42, 59–74.) Respondents filed their Answer arguing the Petition should 

be denied because all except for one of the claims alleged in Ground One and the claim 

alleged in part two of Ground Three are procedurally defaulted without excuse, the claim 

alleged in Ground Four is precluded from habeas review and the one exhausted claim 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 3 of 27
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

alleged in Ground One and the claim alleged in Ground Five are without merit. (Doc. 

21.) 

ANALYSIS

The Petition is Timely

Because the Petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). The AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). See Furman v. Wood, 190 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitations period begins to run on the date when “the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on August 31, 2018. Several weeks 

earlier, on August 3, 2018, Petitioner filed her Petition. The Petition is timely.

Ground Four is Precluded from Habeas Review

In Ground Four, Petitioner claims the trial court committed reversible error in 

denying her second motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of her motion to 

suppress the results of her blood alcohol test in an apparent violation of her rights under 

the Fourth Amended to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 64, 68.) Petitioner urges

that the state waived its alternative good faith exception argument by failing to raise this

argument in the trial court when it filed its response to her second motion for 

reconsideration of her motion to suppress. She argues that the trial court and court of 

appeals erred when it determined the state did not waive its good faith exception argument. 

Id.; Doc. 26 at 14. Respondents argue that Ground Four is barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 

U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976), and that Petitioner’s claim is really a claim under state law rather 

than a Fourth Amendment claim. (Doc. 21 at 18-20.)

“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the 

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at 

his trial.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 494–95. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that Stone bars 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 4 of 27
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas relief based upon claims challenging the constitutionality of the state prisoner’s 

arrest and seizure. See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1178 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(collecting cases from the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits 

applying Stone to challenges against warrantless arrests); Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504, 

509 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying Stone to arrests pursuant to a warrant). 

“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, 

not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir 1996) (citing Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 

610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990); and Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

“Consequently, once it is established that a petitioner has had an opportunity to litigate his 

or her Fourth Amendment claim (whether or not he or she took advantage of the state’s 

procedure), the court’s denial of the claim is a conclusive determination that the claim will 

never present a valid basis for federal habeas relief.” Graham v. Costello, 299 F.3d 129, 

134 (2d Cir. 2002).

It is undisputed that Petitioner litigated her motion to suppress the results of her 

blood alcohol test in the trial court. (Doc. 21-3 at 10-12.) In considering the issue on direct 

appeal, the court of appeals held:

¶25 Espinosa argued in her motion to suppress the blood test results that 

the admin per se read to her was unduly coercive, resulting in her involuntary 

consent to draw the blood. Thus, Espinosa asserted, the warrantless blood 

draw violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment. In making this 

argument, Espinosa focused on the language in the admin per se form that 

‘required’ her to submit to a blood test. In response, the state relied on State 

v. Brito, 183 Ariz. 535 (App. 1995), abrogated by State v. Valenzuela, 183 

Ariz. 535 (2016). In Brito, this court held that the same ‘require to submit’

language that Espinosa challenged in the admin per se did ‘not misstate the 

law[.]’ Id. at 539. We also reviewed the record for fundamental error and did 

not find the ‘requirement’ language resulting in Fourth Amendment 

violations. Id.; Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 309, ¶ 32.

¶26 On April 26, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court issued its opinion in 

Valenzuela abrogating Brito, 239 Ariz. at 309, ¶ 33. In doing so, the Court 

held that ‘consent given solely in acquiescence to the admonition used here 

and in Brito is not free and voluntary under the Fourth Amendment and 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 5 of 27
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cannot excuse the failure to secure a warrant.’ Id. The Court concluded, 

however, that the officer who read the admin per se to Valenzuela was 

following ‘binding precedent [i.e. Brito] that had sanctioned the use of the 

admonition ..., and the good faith exception [to the exclusionary rule] 

therefore applies.’ Id. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial 

of Valenzuela’s motion to suppress breath and blood test results that the state 

used to secure two DUI convictions. Id. at 301-02, 310, ¶¶ 5-6, 35.

¶27 The same day the Court issued Valenzuela, Espinosa filed her second 

motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration – in light of Valenzuela’s

holding – of the court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Espinosa also 

argued that the state had waived any argument that the good faith exception 

would apply in the case by failing to raise such an argument in response to 

Espinosa’s motion to suppress and first motion for reconsideration. Agreeing 

with the state that the good faith exception applied to render admissible the 

blood test results, the court declined to reconsider its order denying the 

motion to suppress.

¶28 Espinosa argues the court erred in failing to reconsider the denial of 

her suppression motion. Espinosa appears to repeat her contention that the 

state waived its good faith exception argument by failing to raise it in 

response to the motion to suppress or in response to Espinosa’s first motion 

for reconsideration.

¶29 We reject this argument. When the state responded to the motion to 

suppress, and when Espinosa first moved for reconsideration, our supreme 

court had yet to publish Valenzuela and overturn Brito. Brito was, therefore, 

good law at the time, and the state would have no reason to argue for 

application of the good faith exception. By arguing for application of the 

good faith exception in its post-Valenzuela response to Espinosa’s second 

motion for reconsideration, the state properly preserved the issue. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion. State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75, 79, ¶ 12 (2002) 

(exercising discretion to address merits of arguments that were arguably 

waived).

(Doc. 21-3 at 75-77.) (Footnote omitted.) 

Petitioner contends the appellate court’s determination that the state did not waive 

its good faith argument is unsupported in the record, that the state courts inconsistently 

apply the “waiver of argument” rule and that the court of appeals “refused to apply the 

correct and controlling constitutional standards.” (Doc. 1 at 68.) In support of her position 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 6 of 27
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

she cites Miranda v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2005) and Gamble v. State of 

Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978). 

This Court agrees with Respondents that Miranda v. Leibach does not support her 

position that the Arizona courts have inconsistently applied “the waiver of argument rule.” 

In Miranda, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized:

Despite the inconsistent treatment of the waiver rule in the Illinois courts, 

Miranda faces an uphill slope in the effort to demonstrate that the rule is not 

an adequate basis for the appellate courts decision to abstain from the merits 

of his Fourth Amendment claim. 

394 F.3d at 995. The Seventh Circuit held that federal habeas review of the petitioner’s 

Fourth Amendment claim was procedurally barred because the state appellate court’s 

decision was based on the petitioner’s waiver and rested on an adequate and independent 

state ground. Id. at 996 (“In our view, what dooms Miranda’s argument vis-a-vis the 

adequacy of the waiver rule is his own concession before the Illinois Appellate Court that 

he had waived the Fourth Amendment claim.”). The Seventh Circuit alternatively 

determined that Miranda had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment 

claim and, as such, the claim was barred by Stone v. Powell. Id. at 1001 (“Because the 

court’s finding could be construed as one focused on the point in time at which Chavez 

gave his statement inculpating Miranda, and because there was at least some evidentiary 

support for the court’s finding so construed...Miranda had a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court...”). This Court determines that 

Miranda does not support Petitioner’s argument.

In Gamble v. State of Oklahoma, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 

Circuit held the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was not barred by Stone where the 

state courts failed to consider a United States Supreme Court case “almost directly on 

point.” 583 F.2d at 1163-64. The Tenth Circuit held the petitioner’s opportunities to litigate 

his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts were not “fair” within the meaning of 

Stone. 583 F.2d at 1163-64. Gamble does not help Petitioner. Petitioner here has pointed 

to no authority that is “directly on point” that the state courts refused to consider that would 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 7 of 27
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have compelled the granting of her second motion for reconsideration. The court of 

appeals’ decision rests on the determination that the law the state relied on – Brito – was 

good law at the time. After Brito was overruled, the state argued for the application of the 

good faith exception thereby “properly preserving the issue.”

This Court also agrees with Respondents that a fair reading of Petitioner’s claim in 

Ground Four establishes that her claim does not concern the state courts’ Fourth 

Amendment analysis. Rather, Petitioner’s claim in Ground Four concerns the proper 

remedy under Arizona law for alleged violations of Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Indeed, in stating her claim, Petitioner alleges the trial court committed error when it denied 

her second motion for reconsideration of her motion to suppress because the state waived 

its alternative argument pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3925. See Doc. 1 at 64. Section 

3924(C), Title 13, Arizona Revised Statutes, provides that a trial court:

Shall not suppress evidence that is otherwise admissible in a criminal 

proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace 

officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation.

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3925(C). Significantly, federal habeas relief does not lie for errors 

of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“We have stated many 

times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”) 

In sum, generously construing Petitioner’s claim in Ground Four as a Fourth 

Amendment claim, this Court determines that habeas review is precluded by Stone v. 

Powell, supra. 

The Claims Alleged in Ground One (Except One) and Part Two of the Claim 

Alleged in Ground Three Are Unexhausted 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges a host of prosecutorial misconduct claims. (Doc. 

1 at 23.) Petitioner contends that she exhausted her prosecutorial misconduct claims by 

presenting them to the court of appeals in her direct appeal. Respondents argue Petitioner 

did not properly exhaust all her prosecutorial misconduct claims as the court of appeals 

determined that she waived all but one of the claims. (Doc. 21-3 at 69-70.) Accordingly, 

Respondents contend all of Petitioner’s claims in Ground One are unexhausted except for 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 8 of 27
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

her claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct 

during rebuttal closing arguments. (Doc. 21 at 9-11.)

In part two of Ground Three, Petitioner claims the trial court erred when it denied 

her motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. (Doc. 1 at 59.) Respondents argue that Petitioner did not properly exhaust this 

claim because she failed to present this claim as a federal constitutional claim in her direct 

appeal. Respondents insist Petitioner relied solely on Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., and a 

single state court case interpreting a state statute and the court of appeals resolved her claim 

based on Arizona law. (Doc. 21 at 12-15.)

As explained below, this Court agrees with Respondents and determines that the 

claims alleged in Ground One (except for the claim of prosecutorial misconduct during 

rebuttal closing argument) and part two of the claim alleged in Ground Three are 

procedurally defaulted. 

Exhaustion/Procedural Default

A federal court may only consider a petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas 

corpus if “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Wooten 

v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner 

to fairly present his federal claims at the trial level and to “invok[e] one complete round of 

the State’s established appellate review process,” presenting the same federal claim to each 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 

(1999). In Arizona, a prisoner does not exhaust a claim for federal review in a non-capital 

case unless he has presented it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Castillo v. McFadden, 

399 F.3d 993, 998 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010–

11 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

A claim is only “fairly present[ed]” when a petitioner “clearly state[s] the federal 

basis and federal nature of the claim, along with relevant facts.” Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 

322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (“If state 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 9 of 27
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal 

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under 

the United States Constitution.”). “[T]he petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim 

explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal 

basis is ‘self-evident,’ . . . or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the 

same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds.” Lyons 

v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added; internal citations 

omitted), modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).

A corollary to the exhaustion requirement, the “procedural default doctrine” - which 

limits a petitioner from proceeding in federal court where his claim is procedurally barred 

in state court - “has its roots in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state 

court judgments based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds.” Dretke 

v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) 

(“When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal 

claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”). 

There are two types of procedural bars, “express and implied.” Robinson v. Schriro, 

595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). A claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally 

defaulted, when a petitioner attempted to raise it in state court and the state court expressly

applied a procedural bar resting on an independent and adequate state law ground to avoid 

considering the merits of the claim. See Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802–05; see also 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating procedural default 

“applies to bar federal habeas review when the state court has declined to address the 

petitioner’s federal claims because he failed to meet state procedural requirements”) 

(internal quotation omitted). In determining whether the state courts have imposed a 

procedural bar, the district court reviews the “last reasoned opinion” of the state courts. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803; Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A claim is also technically exhausted, but implicitly procedurally defaulted, when a 

petitioner has not raised it in state court, but a return to state court to exhaust it would be 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 10 of 27
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

futile considering state procedural rules. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848 (finding claims 

procedurally defaulted because habeas petitioner was time-barred from presenting his 

claims in state court); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (noting that claims are barred from 

habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now find 

the claims procedurally barred”). 

This Court analyzes Petitioner’s claims alleged in Grounds One and part two of 

Ground Three under the foregoing rubric.

Ground One: Petitioner states her claim in Ground One as follows:

The state’s trial counsel committed numerous intentional acts of 

prosecutorial misconduct to gain a tactical advantage which included his lack 

of candor toward the tribunal that when combined violated Petitioner’s right 

to due process of law.

(Doc. 1 at 23.) In her direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor committed 

numerous intentional acts of misconduct. (Doc. 21-1 at 28, 53-67.) The court of appeals 

held:

¶8 Espinosa argues the state “willfully engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct, by which it gained a tactical advantage, through its deliberate 

indifference and intentional ignorance of its repeated errors during its three 

prior grand jury presentations against appellant.” She also summarily asserts 

the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing a theory of guilt at trial that 

was different from the theory pursued at the preliminary hearing and by 

making a ‘frivolous motion’ to call defense counsel to testify. Espinosa 

additionally contends the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury during 

opening statement and closing arguments regarding (1) the date ‘this case’ 

started[;] (2) the number of times the state filed charges against her[;] (3) the 

fact that, at the time of the incident, Espinosa was on probation for ‘an 

offense’ without clarifying that the offense was a felony; (4) a misstatement 

of law; and (5) a stipulation that purportedly did not exist. Finally, Espinosa 

claims: ‘Reckless prosecutorial misconduct by destruction of [Espinosa’s] 

blood sample prior to trial.’

¶9 Espinosa does not properly develop these arguments. She generally 

does not indicate where in the record she objected on prosecutorial 

misconduct grounds, and she cites no applicable supporting authority. 

Accordingly, Espinosa has abandoned and waived these issues. See State v. 

Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“In Arizona, opening briefs must present 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 11 of 27
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant’s 

position on the issues raised. Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes 

abandonment and waiver of that claim.”); State v. Lindner, 227 Ariz. 69, 70 

n.1, ¶2 (App. 2010) (Appellate court will not address a defendant’s 

undeveloped arguments).

(Doc. 21-3 at 69-70.) The court of appeals addressed the merits of one of Petitioner’s 

prosecutorial misconduct claims, namely, her claim that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct during rebuttal closing arguments. Id. at 70-71.

The case law that the court of appeals relied upon in determining that Petitioner 

waived and abandoned all but one of her prosecutorial misconduct claims, Carver and 

Lindner, relied on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.13(c)(1)(vi). See, e.g., Carver, 

771 P.2d at 1391 (citing Rule 31.13(c)(1)(vi)); Lindner, 252 P.3d 1033 n.1 (same). Rule 

31.13(c)(1)(vi), Ariz. R. Crim. P., renumbered effective January 1, 2018 as Rule 

31.10(a)(7), requires opening briefs to set forth an “’argument’ that contains ... appellant’s 

contentions with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal 

authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellate 

relies[,]” and “for each issue, references to the record on appeal where the issue was raised 

and ruled on, and the applicable standard of appellate review with citation to supporting 

legal authority.” See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7). Respondents argue that the application 

of Rule 31.10(a)(7) is firmly established and regularly followed in Arizona and, as a result, 

federal habeas review is precluded. 

Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if 

the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal 

question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728. This Court 

agrees with Respondents that the application of Rule 31.10(a)(7) is firmly established and 

regularly followed in Arizona. See, e.g., Carver, 771 P.2d at 1390 (collecting cases); State 

v. Foshay, 370 P.3d 618, 627 n. 2-4 (Ariz. App. 2016) (relying on Rule 31.13(c)(1) in 

declining to consider several cursory assertions where the defendant failed to develop any 

supporting argument and determining those issues waived); State v. West, 362 P.3d 1049, 

1069 n.9 (Ariz. App. 2015) (declining to consider allegation of prosecutorial misconduct 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 12 of 27
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

where defendant failed to comply with Rule 31.13(c)(1)(vi)); State v. Lopez, 175 P.3d 682, 

687 n.5 (Ariz. App. 2008) (declining to address defendant’s argument that did not comply 

with Rule 31.13(c)(1)(vi)); Bersane v. Ryan, 2010 WL 1195162, at *23 (D. Ariz. 2010) 

(where state appellate court declined to address double jeopardy claim for failure to comply 

with Rule 31.13(c)(1)(vi), such determination is independent of federal law). The Arizona

Court of Appeals’ application of Rule 31.10(c)(7), Ariz. R. Crim. P., is an independent and 

adequate state law ground determination that prohibits federal habeas review of Petitioner’s 

prosecutorial misconduct claims, except the prosecutorial misconduct claim that the court 

of appeals rejected on the merits. 

In sum, this Court determines that the prosecutorial misconduct claims alleged in 

Ground One (except for the claim alleging prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal closing 

argument) are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

Ground Three: Petitioner states part two of her claim in Ground Three as follows:

The superior court committed reversible error by denying Petitioner’s motion 

for directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., that 

she made in her second trial after the state rested its case-in-chief.

(Doc. 1 at 59.) Petitioner raised this claim in her direct appeal but did not present the issue 

as a federal constitutional violation. See Doc. 21-1 at 28-29, 77, 90-91. Petitioner failed to 

cite any federal constitutional authority in the argument section of her opening appellate 

brief on this issue. Id. at 90-91. The court of appeals held:

¶22 Espinosa also contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for 

judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

20. Espinosa appears to argue that the state presented insufficient evidence 

that her driver license was revoked at the time of the incident.

¶23 We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion. State v. 

Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 (1993). “A judgment of acquittal is appropriate 

when ‘no substantial evidence [exists] to warrant a conviction.’” State v. 

Nunez, 167Ariz. 272, 278 (1991) (quoting State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 

345 (1984)); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). “Substantial evidence is proof 

that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of 

a defendant guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 13 of 27
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

290 (1996).

¶24 Substantial evidence supports a conclusion that Espinosa’s driver 

license was revoked and restricted at the time of the incident. See A.R.S. 28-

§ 1383(A)(1) (“A person is guilty of aggravated [DUI] if the person ... 

[c]omits a [DUI] when the person’s driver license or privilege to drive is 

suspended, canceled, revoked or refused or while a restriction is placed on 

the persons’ driver license or privilege to drive as a result [of a prior DUI 

conviction].”). A custodian of records testified that, commencing October 

18, 2010, Espinosa’s driver license was revoked for 36 months, and on March 

8, 2011, Espinosa applied for and received a SIIRDL, which allowed her to 

drive during the revocation period. The court did not err in denying 

Espinosa’s Rule 20 motion.

(Doc. 21-3 at 75.)

A federal court may consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus only if the 

petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731. To fairly present a claim to the appropriate 

state courts, the petitioner must have described the operative facts and the federal legal 

theory that support the specific claim. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 31 (2004); 

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Full and fair presentation . . . requires 

a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference 

to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to 

relief.”).

This Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner did not fairly present part two 

of the claim alleged in Ground Three to the Arizona Court of Appeals. While there may be 

similarities between Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim under Arizona law and a due 

process sufficiency of evidence claim, “raising a state claim that is merely similar to a 

federal claim does not exhaust state remedies.” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022

(9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner did not fairly present part two of the claim alleged in Ground 

Three as a federal constitutional claim to the state courts.

Petitioner cannot now return to state court to exhaust her prosecutorial misconduct 

claims in Ground One or her claim in Ground Three. These claims are barred because 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 14 of 27
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Arizona’s procedural requirements would render futile a return to state court to exhaust 

these claims. Rule 32.2(a)(3), Ariz. R. Crim. P., precludes post-conviction relief on any 

claim that could have been raised on direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); Murray

v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Schriro, 401 F.Supp.2d 1013,

1021 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2015); Shrum, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178, ¶ 12 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc). If 

Petitioner returned to state court to exhaust the above referenced claims in Grounds One 

and Three, the state court would find them precluded under Rule 32.2(a). Although Rule 

32.2(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P., exempts certain types of claims from preclusion, the above 

referenced claims alleged in Grounds One and part two of Ground Three do not meet any 

of these exceptions. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). 

In sum, this Court determines that all but one of the prosecutorial misconduct 

claims alleged in Ground One are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. The 

claim alleged in part two for Ground Three was not fairly presented and is procedurally 

defaulted.

The Procedural Default Cannot be Excused

The district court may review a procedurally defaulted claim only if the petitioner 

alleges and proves cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. To establish “cause,” a petitioner must 

demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded [petitioner]’s 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (internal 

quotation omitted). To show “prejudice,” a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged 

constitutional violation worked to the prisoner’s “actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 

456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401, 

403 (9th Cir. 2012); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). And, to prove a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” a prisoner must establish that, in light of new 

evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 15 of 27
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondents argue the procedural default of the above referenced claims alleged in 

Grounds One and Three cannot be excused. (Doc. 21 at 16-17.) Respondents urge that 

Petitioner has not met her burden to establish cause and prejudice nor has she made a 

colorable showing of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 17. 

Petitioner admits that she did not discuss any grounds to excuse the procedural 

default of her claims in her Petition. (Doc. 26 at 12.) In her reply, Petitioner argues that 

the district court should excuse her failure to exhaust and reach the merits of her 

procedurally defaulted claims because: (1) “[u]nder the rationale of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 

U.S. 1 (2012), this is an equitable reason to excuse any procedural default[]”; (2) the 

procedural bar the court of appeals imposed on Petitioner’s federal constitutional claims 

should not be enforced by the district court under the adequate and independent state 

grounds doctrine; and (3) a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of “the 

state’s numerous intentional acts of prosecutorial conduct to gain a tactical advantage[.]”

(Doc. 26 at 6, 7-10 and 12.)

Petitioner’s reliance on Martinez v. Ryan is misplaced. The United States Supreme 

Court has explained:

The premise of Martinez is incompetent counsel. Indeed, the premise is two

incompetent counsel – trial counsel and state PCR counsel. This quite 

different circumstance is reflected in the Court’s more lenient rule in 

Martinez for excusing procedural default. [...]

Under the new Martinez rule, a procedural default by state PCR counsel in 

failing to raise trial-counsel IAC is excused if there is ‘cause’ for the default. 

The Court wrote in Trevino, summarizing its holding in Martinez:

We consequently read Coleman as containing as exception, 

allowing a federal habeas court to find ‘cause,’ thereby 

excusing a defendant’s procedural default, where (1) the claim 

of ‘ineffective assistance of trial counsel’ was a ‘substantial’ 

claim; (2) the ‘cause’ consisted of there being ‘no counsel’ or 

only ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the 

‘initial’ review proceeding in respect to the ‘ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim’; and (4) state law requires 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 16 of 27
- 17 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] ... be 

raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.’ Martinez, 

1132 S.Ct. at 1318-19.

Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Trevino v. Thaler, __ 

U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013)). Here, Petitioner has not raised a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Thus, the narrow ground to excuse the procedural default of a 

petitioner’s unexhausted claims established by Martinez v. Ryan is inapplicable.

Petitioner has not convinced this Court that the Arizona Court of Appeals’

invocation of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7) as grounds for its refusal to consider Petitioner’s

prosecutorial misconduct claims is not an adequate and independent state law ground. In 

support of her argument Petitioner discusses Pennsylvania’s fugitive-disentitlement. (Doc. 

26 at 8-9.) She argues that “[u]nlike Pennsylvania’s fugitive-disentitlement doctrine, 

Arizona’s rule allowing courts to ignore a party’s argument that is sufficiently cited in the 

record deviates sharply from federal practice.” Id. at 9. She also reiterates her argument 

that the superior court should have determined that the state waived the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 10. 

“To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural ground,” capable of barring federal habeas 

review, “a state rule must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Johnson v. Lee, 

136 S.Ct. 1802, 1805 (2016) (quoting Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (1991). “A 

State’s procedural rules are of vital importance to the orderly administration of its criminal 

courts; when a federal court permits them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal 

justice system.” Johnson, 136 S.Ct. at 1807 (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 447, 

525 (2005). This Court determines that Petitioner has not established that the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ invocation of Rule 31.10(a)(7) is not an adequate and independent state law 

ground. As laid out above, Rule 31.10(a)(7), Ariz. R. Crim. P., is firmly established and 

has been regularly followed in the Arizona state courts. See pp. 12-13, supra. 

Lastly, this Court rejects Petitioner’s claim that, due to the alleged intentional acts 

of prosecutorial misconduct, a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the 

procedural default of her claims was not excused. Petitioner’s argument on this point is:

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 17 of 27
- 18 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The state argues that its repeated acts of prosecutorial misconduct in the 

superior court does not qualify as a fundamental miscarriage of justice that 

excuses a procedural default. Ms. Espinosa contends that it does.

(Doc. 26 at 12.) Petitioner has failed to put forth what is required of her to establish a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice; namely, that, considering new evidence, “it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [her].” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

327. Petitioner’s argument makes no mention of new evidence and fails to articulate how, 

given this (unmentioned) new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted her.

In sum, this Court determines there are no grounds upon which it can recommend 

that the district court excuse the procedural default of the above discussed claims alleged 

in Grounds One and Three of the Petition.

The Sole Exhausted Claim Alleged in Ground One and the Claim Alleged in 

Ground Five Are Without Merit

As explained below, this Court determines that Petitioner’s prosecutorial 

misconduct claim based on the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct during rebuttal closing 

arguments alleged in Ground One and her claim that the trial court committed reversible 

error when it denied her motion to dismissed based on the state’s failure to preserve a 

sample of her blood for independent testing are without merit.

Standard of Review under the AEDPA

Congress intended AEDPA to foster federal-state comity and further society’s 

interest in the finality of criminal convictions. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 

(2007) (“AEPDA’s] design is to ‘further the principles of comity, finality, and 

federalism.’”) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003)). Congress’ very 

purpose in enacting the AEPDA was “to restrict the availability of habeas corpus relief.” 

Greenwalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1275 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds

recognized by Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 645, 658-61 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In the AEDPA, Congress set forth “a difficult to meet and highly deferential 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 18 of 27
- 19 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions must 

be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 536 U.S. at 81. (Internal punctuation 

omitted.) The district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus, “only on the basis of some 

transgression of federal law binding on state courts.” Middleton, v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 

1085 (9th Cir. 1985).

The AEDPA limits the availability of habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the 

merits to circumstances where the state court’s disposition either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner bears the burden of proving his claims fit one of the criteria 

in paragraph (d). Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181; Lambright v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n. 

16 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law when the court 

has applied a rule of law that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court 

precedent or has encountered a set of facts that are “materially indistinguishable” from a 

Supreme Court decision and yet reached a different result than the Supreme Court. Early 

v. Packer, 537 US. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Under § 2254’s “unreasonable application” 

clause, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applies clearly established 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not 

mean that the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

Richter explained:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 19 of 27
- 20 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fair[-]minded disagreement.

562 U.S. at 101. “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” 

Id. Section 2254(d)(1) sets “a daunting standard – one that will be satisfied in relatively 

few cases.” Taylor v. Maddox, 336 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In determining whether the state courts’ resolution of a claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, the district court must review 

the last reasoned state court judgment addressing the claim. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 

1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803). The reviewing federal court is to 

be “particularly deferential to [its] state court colleagues.” Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 

(9th Cir. 2004). The federal habeas court presumes the state court’s factual determinations 

are correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Ground One: Petitioner argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during 

rebuttal closing argument. (Doc. 1 at 30.) In rejecting this claim, the court of appeals held:

¶10 Espinosa also contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during 

rebuttal closing argument by making disparaging comments about defense 

counsel. Such comments include:

[T]he defense’s job is to create reasonable doubt in your 

mind[,]...they try to distract your attention[.] What the defense 

normally tries to do is...to deflect your attention to matters 

which really aren’t part of that list. ... [The witness] almost had 

these crammed down his throat. ... Ladies and gentlemen, 

distraction.

¶11 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must 

demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

Donnely v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). “Reversal on the basis 

of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be ‘so pronounced and 

persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” State v. 

Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611 (1992) (quoting United States v. Weinstein, 762 

F.2d 1522, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Blevins, 555 F.2d 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 20 of 27
- 21 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1326, 1240 (5th Cir. 1997))); see also State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 608, 616 (1997).

¶12 When considering a motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial 

misconduct, a trial court should first consider whether the prosecutor’s 

statements called jurors’ attention to matters the jury was not justified in 

considering to reach its verdict, and the court then considers the impact those 

statements had on the jury. Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616. “Jury argument that 

impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is ... improper.” State 

v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, 59 (1998). However, “[c]riticism of defense 

theories and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument.” United States v. 

Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997). 

¶13 Applying the foregoing principles to the challenged statements in this 

case, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comments were not improper. See 

State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 305, ¶ 37 (2000) (“Excessive and emotional 

language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited 

by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment 

upon the evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before 

the jury.”); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171-72 (1990) (determining 

prosecutor’s arguments that defense counsel “blind-sided witnesses,” created 

a “smoke screen,” and relied on “inuendo and inference” to support her 

“outrageous” argument was “not improper”). No misconduct occurred.

(Doc. 21-3 at 70-71.)

As pointed out by Respondents, Petitioner fails to argue that the court of appeals 

unreasonably applied United States Supreme Court precedent in rejecting her prosecutorial 

misconduct claim. (Doc. 1 at 30-32.) Petitioner instead refers to her state court briefing 

submitted in her direct appeal in which she cites state court case law. Id. This is insufficient 

to meet her burden of establishing, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ rejection of her prosecutorial misconduct claim was “contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.” 

The Supreme Court has made clear that Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), 

is the “clearly established Federal law” applicable to a prosecutor’s alleged improper 

comments for purposes of AEDPA review. Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2153 

(2012)). Under Darden, “a prosecutor’s improper comments will be held to violate the 

Constitution only if they ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 21 of 27
- 22 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974))). “[T]he appropriate standard of 

review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is ‘the narrow one of due process, and not 

the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 

U.S. at 642). “The past decisions of th[e United States Supreme] Court demonstrate that 

the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 

219 (1982). 

“Prosecutors have considerable leeway to strike ‘hard blows’ based on the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 

638, 652 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). Even 

when prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation, such 

misconduct provides grounds for habeas relief only if that misconduct is prejudicial under 

the harmless error test set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it has a substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 

(9th Cir. 1996).

Petitioner has failed to explain how the Arizona Court of Appeals’ analysis is “so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 

103. Petitioner argues she has “satisfied [the AEDPA] standard based upon the fact that 

more than two thirds of the then ten trial jurors in [P]etitioner’s initial trial were ‘leaning’ 

in favor of returning a verdict of not guilty at the time [her first trial was] declared a 

mistrial.” (Doc. 1 at 25. This Court disagrees. The inference that the prosecutor’s remarks 

caused the jury in Petitioner’s second trial to return a verdict of guilty is speculation. 

This Court determines that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on her claim in 

Ground One that the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument.

Ground Five: Petitioner contends in Ground Five that the trial court committed 

reversible error when it denied her motion to dismiss based on the state’s failure to preserve 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 22 of 27
- 23 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a sample of her blood for her independent chemical analysis. (Doc. 1 at 70.) In rejecting 

her claim on direct appeal, the court of appeals held:

¶30 Espinosa argues the trial court should have granted her motion to 

dismiss or, alternatively, to suppress the blood test evidence because the state 

violated its duty to preserve until trial the second sample of her blood so she 

could independently test it. “We defer to the superior court’s factual findings, 

but we review its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Storholm, 210 Ariz. 

199, 200, ¶ 7 (App. 2005).

¶31 To provide context, the record reveals the following[:] Espinosa did 

not request the blood sample from the state until August 12, 2016, almost 

five years after the DUI incident. In response to Espinosa’s request, the state, 

not knowing the sample had been destroyed, immediately took steps to assist 

Espinosa in obtaining the sample from police, including forwarding to her a 

release authorization form. On the day Espinosa requested the second blood 

sample directly from police, the parties first learned that the sample no longer 

existed. The record indicates police destroyed the blood kit based on previous 

prosecutors inadvertently notifying them by way of a disposition notice in 

September 2014 (Disposition Notice) that a case filed in 2013 against 

Espinosa stemming from the same driving incident had been dismissed with 

prejudice.

¶32 Espinosa’s argument that the state had a duty to preserve the second 

blood sample is unavailing. The phlebotomist advised Espinosa at the time 

of the blood draw of her right to have her “blood drawn and tested by an 

independent source[.]” Thus, Espinosa knew at the time of her arrest that she 

had an opportunity to obtain an independently drawn blood sample for 

testing. This opportunity is all that due process requires. See A.R.S. § 28-

1388(C) (2012) (“[The [DUI suspect who is] tested shall be given a 

reasonable opportunity to arrange for any ... qualified person of the person’s 

own choosing to administer a test or tests in addition to any administered at 

the direction of a law enforcement officer.”); State v. Olcan, 204 Ariz. 181, 

184, ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (“[Section 28-1388(C)] grants a defendant a 

reasonable opportunity to arrange for a competent person to draw an 

independent sample of the defendant’s blood and analyze that sample 

regardless whether the state has collected, analyzed, and preserved a portion 

of the defendant’s blood.”). Espinosa apparently chose not to seek an 

independent blood draw, and she points to nothing in the record indicating 

the state improperly interfered with her attempt, if any, to do so. Indeed, the 

phlebotomist recommended a nearby medical center where Espinosa could 

have her blood drawn and tested. Cf. Oshrin v. Coulter, 142 Ariz. 109, 111 

(1984) (holding due process violation occurs when DUI suspect request at 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 23 of 27
- 24 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the time police collect a breath sample that they keep an extra sample for 

independent testing, charges are subsequently dropped, and the extra breath 

sample is destroyed before charges are re-filed); Amos v. Bowen, 142 Ariz. 

324, 326-29 (App. 1984) (affirming dismissal of DUI charges with prejudice 

where defendant requested an independent blood draw at time of arrest and, 

while transporting defendant to a medical center to obtain the sample, police 

officer investigated separate criminal matter for two hours).

¶33 Espinosa’s reliance on case law in unhelpful. In State v. Kemp, 168 

Ariz. 334, 1991), the [Arizona] supreme court held that if police preserve a 

sample of a DUI suspect’s blood for independent testing until trial, they 

“need not advise the suspect of his right to obtain a portion of the same 

sample for independent testing, at least when the sample taken by law 

enforcement officers will still be available for testing by the defendant at the 

time of trial.” Id. at 336-37. Here, Espinosa was advised of her right to obtain 

her own blood sample. Accordingly, Kemp is irrelevant. State v. Velasco, 165 

Ariz. 480 (1990), and State v. Sanchez, 192 Ariz. 454 (App. 1998), are also

in applicable. Those cases addressed the state’s former obligations regarding 

preservation of DUI suspects’ breath samples. Velasco, 165 Ariz. at 488; 

Sanchez, 192 Ariz. at 481. Moreover, due process does not require law 

enforcement to provide DUI suspects their own breath samples for 

independent testing. Storholm, 210 Ariz. at 200, ¶ 8.

¶34 Because Espinosa had an unfettered opportunity to obtain an 

independent blood sample for testing, the state did not violate her due process 

rights by inadvertently destroying the second blood sample. The trial court, 

therefore, did not err by denying Espinosa’s motion. See A.R.S. § 28-

1388(C) (“The failure or inability to obtain an additional test by a person 

does not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the test or tests taken 

at the direction of a law enforcement officer.”).

(Doc. 21-3 at 77-78.)

Petitioner does not contest the court of appeals’ recitation of the facts. Rather, she

argues the court of appeals’ analysis “conflicts with numerous controlling Arizona 

appellate court cases” and with Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). (Doc. 1 at 70–

73.) The “numerous controlling Arizona appellate court cases” that Petitioner refers to are 

the same cases that the court of appeals distinguished in its decision, Velasco and Kemp. 

See Doc. 1 at 71-73. In her Petition, Petitioner merely quotes language from her opening 

brief submitted in her direct appeal. She fails to explain how the court of appeals’ decision 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 24 of 27
- 25 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law

as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 

As pointed out by Respondents, “the police do not have a constitutional duty to 

perform any particular tests.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59. In order for a state to have a 

constitutional duty to preserve evidence, the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory 

value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed[] and be of such a nature that 

the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 

available means.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488–89 (1984). Neither 

Youngblood nor Trombetta impose a duty to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence. See, 

e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Trombetta did not 

impose a duty to obtain evidence” and “Youngblood does not directly apply because it dealt 

with failure to preserve rather than failure to gather potentially exculpatory evidence”). 

(Emphasis in original.) Accordingly, this Court determines that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals did not unreasonably apply Youngblood or Trombetta (which is the applicable 

United States Supreme Court precedent) when it held that Petitioner’s due process rights 

were satisfied because she had an “unfettered opportunity to obtain an independent blood 

sample for testing[.]” See Doc. 21-3 at 78.

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on her claim in Ground Five in the absence

of any clearly established federal law imposing a duty on the state to collect potentially 

exculpatory evidence. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2008) (a state 

court’s decision on an issue cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal 

law when there is no clearly established federal law directly addressing that issue); Holley 

v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 

70, 77 (2006)) (“When there is no clearly established federal law on an issue, a state court 

cannot be said to have unreasonably applied the law as to that issue.”).

Assuming, arguendo, the law was clearly established (and this Court determines 

that Petitioner has not established such), Petitioner’s claim in Ground Five still lacks merit. 

A petitioner must demonstrate that the failure to collect the evidence was motivated by bad 

faith and the evidence was material. See, e.g., Miller, 868 F.2d at 1120 (“Since, in the 

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 25 of 27
- 26 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

absence of bad faith, the police’s failure to preserve evidence that is only potentially 

exculpatory does not violate due process, then a fortiori neither does the good faith failure 

to collect such evidence violate due process.”). (Emphasis in original.) Here, Petitioner 

cannot establish the requisite bad faith. For instance, the court of appeals determined that 

there was no support in the record for Petitioner’s suggestion that the state somehow 

interfered with her attempt, “if any,” to obtain an independent blood draw and that the 

state’s destruction of the second blood sample was inadvertent. See Doc. 21-3 at 77 

(“Espinosa apparently chose not to seek an independent blood draw, and she points to 

nothing in the record indicating the state improperly interfered with her attempt, if any, to 

do so.”); Id. at 78 (“...the state did not violate her due process rights by inadvertently 

destroying her second blood sample.”) 

In sum, this Court determines that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the 

merits of her claim alleged in Ground Five.

RECOMMENDATION

Ground Four of the Petition is precluded from habeas review. The claims alleged in 

Ground One (except the claim alleging prosecutor misconduct during rebuttal closing 

argument) and part two of Ground Three are procedurally defaulted without excuse and 

barred from habeas review. The claim in Ground One alleging that the prosecutor engaged 

in misconduct during rebuttal closing argument and the claim alleged in Ground Five are 

without merit. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the district court, after 

its independent review, DISMISS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 26 of 27
- 27 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. 

If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the 

parties should use the following case number: 2:18-cv-02479-RM.

Dated this 6th day of March, 2020.

Case 2:18-cv-02479-RM Document 29 Filed 03/06/20 Page 27 of 27