Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05291/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05291-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2011 Decided June 10, 2011

No. 10-5291

HUSSAIN SALEM MOHAMMED ALMERFEDI, DETAINEE AND

SALEM MOHAMMED SALEM ABDULLA ALMERFEDI, AS NEXT

FRIEND OF HUSSAIN SALEM MOHAMMED ALMERFEDI,

APPELLEES

v.

BARACK OBAMA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-01645)

Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Heath Gershengorn,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Douglas N. Letter and

Matthew M. Collette, Attorneys. 

S. William Livingston argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Jason A. Levine and David H. Remes. 

Judith B. Chomsky, Brian E. Foster, and Alan A. Pemberton

entered appearances. 

USCA Case #10-5291 Document #1312587 Filed: 06/10/2011 Page 1 of 19
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Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: The United States

appeals from the district court’s decision granting Hussain

Salem Mohammad Almerfedi’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The district court concluded that the government failed

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that

Almerfedi was, as alleged, “part of” al Qaeda. The government

contends that this conclusion was erroneous because the district

court incorrectly found certain evidence unreliable, thereby

improperly excluding it from consideration, and failed to give

sufficient weight to the reliable evidence it did consider. We

agree, and conclude as a matter of law that the government has

demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Almerfedi

can be detained. We therefore reverse the district court’s

decision granting Almerfedi’s petition.

I.

Almerfedi was captured in Tehran by Iranian authorities

sometime after September 11, 2001. He was turned over to

Afghani authorities in March 2002 as part of a prisoner

exchange. Then, in May 2003, he was, in turn, transferred to

Guantanamo Bay by United States forces. Little in the record

indicates the circumstances of his apprehension in Iran, or his

Afghan custody. The evidence the government presents to

support its allegation that Almerfedi is “part of” al Qaeda comes

from two sources: Almerfedi’s own admissions and the

statements of another Guantanamo detainee, Humoud al-Jadani.

USCA Case #10-5291 Document #1312587 Filed: 06/10/2011 Page 2 of 19
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A Yemeni national, Almerfedi submits that he left his home

of Aden, in southern Yemen, sometime in 2001 in order to seek

a better life in Europe. He set out with approximately $2,000,

which he asserts he obtained by doing various menial jobs and

by selling qat. Almerfedi said that he bribed a guard at the

Pakistan Embassy to obtain a visa, and thereafter traveled to

Lahore, Pakistan, where he stayed at the headquarters of Jama’at

Tablighi, an Islamic missionary organization, which U.S.

intelligence has designated a Terrorist Support Entity. That is

a category of organizations that has “demonstrated intent and

willingness to provide financial support to terrorist

organizations,” or to provide “witting operational support” to

terrorist groups.

Almerfedi stayed at the Jama’at Tablighi center for two and

one half months. He acknowledged that he stayed for free,

paying only for food. He said that he kept to himself during this

time because there were very few Arabic speakers like himself

at the headquarters. He asserts that, in fact, he met only one

other Arabic speaker while at the headquarters – Mohammad

Ali. Ali, according to Almerfedi, offered to help Almerfedi

travel to Europe by smuggling him into Iran, then to Turkey, and

finally to Greece. Almerfedi accepted, paying Ali much of his

life savings. They traveled from Lahore to the Iranian border,

bribing border guards to cross into Iran before moving into

Tehran. But then, instead of traveling towards Turkey, the two

went in the opposite direction – 896 kilometers east – to

Mashad, Iran, where they spent a month. They then returned to

Tehran, where Almerfedi was captured by the Iranian

authorities. When captured, Almerfedi admits that he still had

at least $2,000 in cash, which the Iranians confiscated.

The government contends that Almerfedi, after he had

returned to Tehran from Mashad, stayed at an al Qaeda-affiliated

guesthouse. To support this allegation, the government relies on

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statements Almerfedi made to al-Jadani while both were at

Guantanamo Bay. Al-Jadani reported that Almerfedi told him

that Almerfedi was housed in a guesthouse in Tehran maintained

by al Qaeda in 2002 or 2003. And al-Jadani disclosed that other,

unnamed detainees had said that a “Hussain al-Adeni” was an al

Qaeda facilitator who resided at a guesthouse in Tehran. The

government believes that Hussain al-Adeni was the same person

as Almerfedi because the nisha1 “al-Adeni” means “from Aden,”

which is where Almerfedi is from. According to the

government, there was only one Hussain from Aden at

Guantanamo Bay.

Although Almerfedi does not contest much of the

government’s narrative, he disputes that he ever stayed at an al

Qaeda-affiliated guesthouse in Tehran. He points out that the

dates al-Jadani reports Almerfedi having been at a guesthouse in

Tehran are obviously incorrect – because it is undisputed that

Almerfedi was captured by the Iranians in December 2001 or

January 2002, Almerfedi could not have been at a guesthouse in

2002 or 2003. 

Almerfedi, moreover, offers an innocent explanation for his

travels. He says that he began his journey by proceeding

through Pakistan for two reasons: he thought it would be easier

for him to obtain a visa to Europe from Pakistan than from

Yemen, and he wished to travel to Europe with Jama’at Tablighi

in the hope that he could take advantage of the travel discounts

it gives to its members, even though he admits that he was not

a member of the organization and he repeatedly resisted

attempts by Tablighi members to recruit him. He does not

1

 A nisha is a secondary Arabic name that describes the

occupation, descent, tribe or residence of a person. The government

alternatively refers to “al-Adeni” as a kunya, which can be used to

represent the region an individual is from.

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explain how they spoke to him since he contends he spoke only

Arabic, or why they permitted him to remain at the headquarters

despite his continued rebuffs.

The September 11 attacks, according to Almerfedi,

interfered with his plans to travel to Europe with the Jama’at

Tablighi, and so he paid Ali to smuggle him to Europe. He

explains that he went to Mashad because he was in Ali’s control

and had little independent experience with foreign travel, and

stayed there because Ali remained there. After his month in

Mashad – during which time Almerfedi said that he sat all day

in a house rented by Ali – Almerfedi claims that he began to

worry that Ali had deceived him because the two took no further

steps towards Europe. After raising this concern, Almerfedi

contends that he and Ali returned to Tehran, where he was

arrested. 

Following his detention at Guantanamo Bay, Almerfedi

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The government alleged

that Almerfedi was “part of” al Qaeda because he served as an

al Qaeda facilitator, which is why he possessed an unexplained

large amount of cash at the time of his capture.2

 The district

court granted Almerfedi’s petition. It refused to consider alJadani’s statements, finding them unreliable. The district court,

however, did recognize that Almerfedi’s explanations for his

travels were both “perplexing” and “not . . . convincing.” 

Nevertheless, after reviewing all of the evidence, the court

2

 As we have explained, the government may detain any

individual “engaged in hostilities . . . against the United States,” who

“purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United

States or its coalition partners,” or who “is part of the Taliban, al

Qaeda, or associated forces.” Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C.

Cir. 2010); see also Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir.

2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9 n.1 (D.C Cir. 2010). 

USCA Case #10-5291 Document #1312587 Filed: 06/10/2011 Page 5 of 19
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concluded that the government had not met its burden to show

by a preponderance of the evidence that Almerfedi was “part of”

al Qaeda.3 

II.

The government, on appeal, points out that the district

court’s decision was issued before we decided Al-Adahi v.

Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), holding that district

courts must not consider each piece of government evidence by

itself, but rather in connection with all the other evidence. It is

argued that the district court erroneously rejected al-Jadani’s

statements as unreliable without considering them in light of the

balance of the government’s evidence. The government also

contends that the district court committed error by giving

insufficient weight to the rest of the evidence – particularly the

incredible nature of Almerfedi’s explanations. The government

maintains that these errors are errors of law and seeks a remand

to order the district court to reevaluate the evidence.

Almerfedi argues, rather persuasively, that at least as to the

government’s argument concerning al-Jadani’s statement, it is

really challenging the district court’s fact finding – which we

can only reverse under a clear error standard. As for the

remaining evidence, Almerfedi contends that the district court

properly weighed it to conclude that the government had not

demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Almerfedi

was “part of” al Qaeda.

* * *

3

 The district court noted that Almerfedi had been approved for

transfer from Guantanamo Bay. But whether a detainee has been

cleared for release is irrelevant to whether a petitioner may be detained

lawfully. See Awad, 608 F.3d at 11.

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At oral argument, able counsel for petitioner compared the

government’s evidence in this case against two standards: first,

the evidence the government has produced in other cases, and

second, the burden of proof necessary for a criminal conviction–

which is, of course, beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to

the first comparison, the government’s evidence may well have

been stronger in previous cases than in this case. But that is

irrelevant; all of those cases were not close. See, e.g., Esmail v.

Obama, — F.3d —, 2011 WL 1327701 (D.C. Cir. 2011);

Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Adahi,

613 F.3d 1102; Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir.

2010); Awad, 608 F.3d 1. We listed all the evidence supporting

the government in those cases without needing to consider the

minimum amount of evidence that would establish a

preponderance.

Turning to counsel’s criminal case comparison, we

understand why counsel would seek to analogize a habeas case

to a criminal case – in the latter situation, which is appealed

after trial only by a defendant, we must ask ourselves whether

the government’s proof meets a strict hypothetical standard –

beyond a reasonable doubt. But that is not the analytical

framework called for by the preponderance of evidence standard

used in civil cases, which applies to these detainee habeas

corpus petitions. 

The preponderance standard instead asks the court simply

to “make a comparative judgment about the evidence” to

determine whether a proposition is more likely true than not true

based on the evidence in the record. Lindsay v. NTSB, 47 F.3d

1209, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods.,

Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622

(1993). It does not require a court to reach a conclusion about

whether that proposition is actually true; “[c]ertainty [is] not

necessary, nor [is] absence of any reasonable doubt.” Id. In

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other words, “[t]he preponderance of the evidence standard

requires the party with the burden of proof to support its position

[only] with the greater weight of the evidence.” Nutraceutical

Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006);

accord United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 523 n.9

(9th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d

1251, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The preponderance of the

evidence standard generally puts evidence on an evenly

balanced scale.”). That does not mean that we simply weigh, in

a mechanical sense, the number of pieces of probative evidence

on the government’s side against that offered by a petitioner. 

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 n.3 (1970) (Harlan, J.,

concurring). Rather, the court makes a judgment about the

persuasiveness of the evidence offered by each party and

decides whether it is more likely than not that the petitioner

meets the detention standard.4

* * *

A district court’s decision granting or denying a habeas

petition is a mixed question of law and fact. The court’s specific

factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, whereas its

ultimate determination – whether a detainee’s conduct justifies

detention – is a question of law reviewed de novo. See

Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2010). On

review, we ask whether the evidence in the whole record –

taking into account the premise that two unreliable pieces of

information may corroborate each other, Bensayah v. Obama,

610 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2010) – establishes that a

4

 Our cases have stated that the preponderance of the evidence

standard is constitutionally sufficient and have left open whether a

lower standard might be adequate to satisfy the Constitution’s

requirements for wartime detention. See, e.g., Uthman, 637 F.3d at

404 n.3.

USCA Case #10-5291 Document #1312587 Filed: 06/10/2011 Page 8 of 19
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petitioner’s detainability is more likely justified than not (under

de novo review).5

 As we noted, the court is never called upon to

decide whether a petitioner definitively meets the detention

standard – instead, it merely makes a comparative judgment

about the evidence. 

In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), a plurality of

the Supreme Court – to be sure considering due process

limitations – suggested the appropriate framework for a court’s

determination of the ultimate legal question whether an

individual could be detained: the government must put forth

credible facts demonstrating that the petitioner meets the

detention standard, which is then compared to a detainee’s facts

and explanation. 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion). The

ultimate burden, under our cases, is on the government.6

 We

have said that this Hamdi approach “mirrors” the preponderance

standard. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. This approach meets “the

goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or

local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while

giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth

meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact

an enemy combatant.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality

5

 That the preponderance burden governs resolution of an

ultimate legal issue is not without analogy. In determining the

voluntariness of a criminal confession, the government must establish

voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.

Reed, 522 F.3d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But the ultimate issue of

voluntariness is a legal question that is reviewed de novo. Id. There,

as here, the court must ask whether, as a matter of law, there are

sufficient facts on the record to demonstrate the ultimate legal issue by

a preponderance of evidence.

6

 The Hamdi plurality, however, contemplated putting the burden

of proof on the detainee once the government had put forth credible

evidence.

USCA Case #10-5291 Document #1312587 Filed: 06/10/2011 Page 9 of 19
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opinion). The government’s evidence, then, must meet at least

a certain minimum threshold of persuasiveness.7

 But that is

worlds apart from the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as the

evidence need not convince the court of the doubtless merit of

the detention.

* * *

In this case, the government seeks to satisfy its burden by

deploying Almerfedi’s own admissions. First, Almerfedi

acknowledges that he stayed for two and a half months at

Jama’at Tablighi, an Islamic missionary organization that is a

Terrorist Support Entity “closely aligned” with al Qaeda. 

Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2010). He

asserts he refused to join the organization and remained largely

incommunicado, but he stayed there for free. Although that

evidence is probative, by itself it presumably would not be

sufficient to carry the government’s burden because there are

surely some persons associated with Jama’at Tablighi who are

not affiliated with al-Qaeda. But if we add Almerfedi’s travel

route, which is quite at odds with his professed desire to travel

7

 As an example, if the only evidence the government offered in

a particular case was that a petitioner had been apprehended with an

AK-47 in rural Afghanistan – which would be at least probative – it

would not be sufficient to establish a basis for detention. Possession

of a rifle is commonplace in Afghanistan, and therefore does not

meaningfully distinguish an al Qaeda associate from an innocent

civilian. But the government could satisfy its burden by showing that

an individual was captured carrying an AK-47 on a route typically 

used by al Qaeda fighters. Cf. Al-Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8,

11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (significant that individual captured near Tora

Bora in late 2001). And, of course, that a petitioner trained at an al

Qaeda camp or stayed at an al Qaeda guesthouse “overwhelmingly”

would carry the government's burden. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873

n.2. 

USCA Case #10-5291 Document #1312587 Filed: 06/10/2011 Page 10 of 19
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to Europe (and brought him closer to the Afghan border where

al Qaeda was fighting), and also that he had at least $2,000 of

unexplained cash on his person when captured, notwithstanding

his claim to have given that much to Ali (which was all he

brought from Yemen), the government’s case that Almerfedi is

an al Qaeda facilitator is on firmer ground. 

We conclude that all three facts, when considered together,

see Awad, 608 F.3d at 7, are adequate to carry the government’s

burden of deploying “credible evidence that the habeas

petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria,” Hamdi, 542

U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion). We consistently have found

such circumstantial evidence damning, see Uthman, 637 F.3d at

407 (collecting cases), and sufficient to distinguish a petitioner

from the “errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid

worker.” So too here. 

Almerfedi therefore must “rebut [the government’s]

evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the

criteria.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion). He has

not. He offers no evidence other than an explanation for his

behavior. The district court correctly, in our view, did not credit

his account. It labeled his reasons for residing with Jama’at

Tablighi “not . . . convincing,” concluding that Almerfedi had

not explained why he stayed with Jama’at Tablighi, what he was

doing during that period of time, and why he did not seek out

other Arabic speakers aside from Mohammad Ali. See

Almerfedi, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 30. And it regarded Almerfedi’s

explanations for traveling to Mashad as “perplexing.” Id. at 27. 

The district court, however, erred by ignoring the implication of

what it found to be dubious accounts because “false exculpatory

statements” amount to evidence in favor of the government. AlAdahi, 613 F.3d at 1107; cf. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Center, 156

F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The jury can conclude that

an employer who fabricates a false explanation has something

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to hide; that ‘something’ may well be discriminatory intent [–

the ultimate legal issue].”). In sum, we regard the government’s

evidence, combined with Almerfedi’s incredible explanations –

as satisfying the government’s burden without regard to

consideration of al-Jadani’s statements.

Nevertheless, we agree with the government’s implicit

argument that the district court clearly erred in regarding alJadani’s statements as unreliable – merely “jail house gossip.” 

Although this is a factual finding of the district court, it was not

a credibility determination based on witness testimony. See

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985). 

The district court rejected al-Jadani’s statements about

Almerfedi’s direct admissions concerning Almerfedi’s time in

an al-Qaeda guesthouse because al-Jadani said that Almerfedi

told him that Almerfedi was in that guesthouse in 2002 and

2003, whereas he had been captured earlier than those dates. 

However, one of the reports of al-Jadani’s interrogations gives

both an incorrect date and a correct date for Almerfedi’s capture. 

The other report of his interrogation gives only the correct date. 

The government acknowledges the discrepancy in dates, but

persuasively argues that al-Jadani’s timing confusion is

inconsequential. And it points out that al-Jadani’s “reliability

has been established” – with support in a classified declaration.8

The district court was also unpersuaded that al-Jadani’s

recounting of other detainee conversations confirmed

Almerfedi’s admission because al-Jadani did not identify those

8

 The government argued below that the evidence showed that al

Qaeda maintained guesthouses in Tehran, which the district court

noted but did not adopt as a finding. It, of course, buttresses alJadani’s statements. Nor did the district court “find” that al Qaeda

used hotels in Mashad as way stations for fighters despite the

government’s assertion. See Concurrence at 1.

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other detainees. We think, however, it is quite understandable

that al-Jadani would be reluctant to point them out to U.S.

authorities. The district court also emphasized that they referred

not to Almerfedi by last name, but rather only to “Hussain alAdeni.” Yet, as we noted, the phrase “al-Adeni”, in Arabic,

means “from Aden” – which, of course, is Almerfedi’s home. 

Buttressing al-Jadani’s credibility and that of the unnamed other

detainees, al-Jadani reported to his interrogators the

circumstances of “Hussain al-Adeni’s” capture, which included

arrest by the Iranians, transfer to the Afghans, and ultimate

transfer to the Americans. These circumstances match

Almerfedi’s unique experiences and therefore make clear that

Hussain Almerfedi and Hussain al-Adeni are the same man. 

(Indeed, the government maintains that there was only one

Hussain from Aden at Guantanamo Bay.) That detailed

description of Almerfedi’s travels further indicates that alJadani’s occasional mistakes in dates are inconsequential. 

Based on this evidence, we conclude that the district court

clearly erred in finding unreliable al-Jadani’s statements. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons we conclude as a matter of law

that the district court erred in applying the preponderance

standard and in finding unreliable the statements of al-Jadani. 

We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to the district

court to deny Almerfedi’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

So Ordered.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment. I join the court in holding that the government

met its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that its detention of petitioner Hussain Almerfedi is

lawful based on the evidence in the record regarding: (1)

Almerfedi’s two and one half month stay at the Jama’at Tablighi

center in Lahore, Pakistan; (2) his eastward travel from Tehran

to Mashad near the Afghan border in late 2001 or early 2002,

which was 500 miles in the opposite direction of his purported

destination of Greece via Turkey; (3) his possession upon his

capture thereafter in Tehran of a large unexplained sum of

money; and (4) undisputed evidence about the existence of Bin

Laden-funded “guesthouses” in Tehran and the use of hotels in

Mashad as waystations for fighters traveling to or fleeing from

Afghanistan. See generally Maj. Op. at 10–11. Viewed

together, this evidence supports a reasonable inference that

Almerfedi was an al-Qaeda facilitator by the time of his capture

in early 2002. Almerfedi presented no evidence that would

suffice to “rebut [the government’s] evidence with more

persuasive evidence,” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534

(2004).1

 The district court found that Almerfedi’s explanation

of his travels was “not . . . a convincing explanation,” Almerfedi

1

 In connection with being approved for release from

Guantanamo, Almerfedi notes in his brief that the report on his

voluntary polygraph examination in 2003 stated that “it appeared he

had been truthful” when he denied ever associating with al Qaeda and

when he explained his reasons for leaving home in Yemen. The

reliability of such evidence is not beyond doubt, see United States v.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309–11 & nn. 6–8 (1998), but, in any event,

the report noted that Almerfedi’s description of his stay at the Jama’at

Tablighi center for over two months months “appeared unrealistic.” 

Report of Polygraph Examination May 2, 2003, JA 374. Further, the

determination whether to release a detainee pursuant to the Executive

Order of Jan. 22, 2009 involves a different question not at issue in a

habeas corpus proceeding. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.

Cir. 2010).

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2

v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 30 (D.D.C. 2010), and was “at

the very least, perplexing,” id. at 27. These findings are not

clearly erroneous and their implications buttress the

government’s “credible evidence,” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, that

Almerfedi’s behavior and travel route fit the profile of an alQaeda facilitator. See Maj. Op. at 11 (referring to false

exculpatory statements). 

The court, consequently, need go no further to conclude that

the district court erred, under a preponderance of the evidence

standard, in granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

But it has, Maj. Op. at 12–13, and I write separately to explain

why I am unable to join the majority’s analysis of certain

recorded statements by another Guantanamo detainee, Humoud

al-Jadani. 

Under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the district

court must “determine whether a proposition is more likely true

than not true based on evidence in the record,” Maj. Op. at 7

(emphasis added). The majority rejects the district court’s

evaluation of al-Jadani’s statements based on unnamed sources

as “jailhouse gossip” and “inherently unreliable,” Almerfedi, 725

F. Supp. 2d at 25. The district court found that the government

cited no record evidence to verify that Almerfedi had been

transferred to Guantanamo by the time of the first set of alJadani statements, id. at 24 n.4, or that al-Jadani was referring

specifically to Almerfedi, see id. at 26. 

The majority implies that this court owes a lesser standard

of deference to the district court’s factual findings regarding alJadani’s statements because the district court did not make “a

credibility determination based on [live] witness testimony.” 

Maj. Op. at 12. Our review, however, of “a district court’s

factual findings [is] for clear error, regardless of whether the

factual findings were based on live testimony or, as in this case,

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3

documentary evidence.” Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C.

Cir. 2010). The court explained in the identical procedural

context that “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” Id. at 7 (quoting Boca Investerings

Partnership v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 629–30 (D.C. Cir.

2003)). If the district court’s factual finding is “plausible in

light of the record viewed in its entirety,” this court “may not

reverse” because “[w]here there are two permissible views of

the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be

clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting Overby, 595 F.3d at 1294)

(omission in original). 

The record evidence does not lead to a “firm conviction”

that the district court’s analysis of al-Jadani’s statements was

mistaken, much less implausible. The first set of statements by

al-Jadani purported to recount statements by four unnamed

Guantanamo detainees that someone referred to as “Hussein

((Al-Adeni))” stayed in a Tehran “guesthouse” in late 2000 into

early 2001. Almerfedi, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 24–25. The district

court found these statements were “inherently unreliable”and

“jailhouse gossip” because al-Jadani did not identify the four

detainees or the sources for their information, id. at 25. This

evaluation by the district court is “plausible in light of the

record,” Awad, 618 F.3d at 7, inasmuch as the dates these

sources provided, as related by al-Jadani, are inconsistent with

the date of Almerfedi’s departure from Yemen in September

2001, Almerfedi, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 25. The majority

hypothesizes that it is “quite understandable” that al-Jadani

would be reluctant to identify the four detainees. Maj. Op. at 13. 

Even if true, the district court’s finding was consistent with the

proposition that a damning accusation from unidentified sources

without any indication of the basis for their knowledge provides

no basis to credit the accusation even if the person recounting

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the accusation is otherwise credible. Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378

U.S. 108, 113–14 (1964). And, as the district court found, the

government had not verified that Almerfedi was at Guantanamo

by the time al-Jadani recounted this information. Id. at 24 n.4. 

The government states for the first time in its reply brief that at

the time of al-Jadani’s statements Almerfedi was “the only

person named Hussein from Aden at Guantanamo,” Reply Br.

4 (emphasis in original).2

 Assuming this argument is properly

before the court, but see Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112,

1117 (D.C. Cir. 2008), a website cited in the reply brief as

support does not, as asserted, assist the government, id. at 14

n.2.3

2

 The government also states in its reply brief that Almerfedi

was the only person named “Hussein” at Guantanamo at the time. 

Reply Br. 4. Almerfedi’s given name is “Hussain” not “Hussein.” 

This may be a typographical error in the reply brief or both spellings

may be alternative transliterations of the same Arabic name. 

3

 The extra-record Department of Defense website

(http://www.defense.gov/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf) is

a list of the detainees at Guantanamo from January 2002 through May

15, 2006, with the date and location of their birth, but not their

residence prior to the time of capture. Assuming the court may take

judicial notice of this document, in that its contents are “not subject to

reasonable dispute” and “capable of accurate and ready determination

by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,”

FED. R. EVID. 201, the document is of limited value. In its opening

brief, the government explained that “al-Adeni” or “al-Adani” is a

kunya, i.e., an honorific indicating the bearer is a father or mother

(with a father’s beginning with “Abu”), although some insurgents use

a kunya representing the region they are from; by contrast, a nisha

may describe the occupation, descent, tribe or residence of the person

and begins with “al.” Appellant’s Br. 35 (citing a 2008 Defense

Intelligence Agency (“DIA”) report on “Names, Alias, Kunyas and

Variants”). The majority rejects the government’s view that “alAdeni” is a kunya, concluding it is, if anything, a nisha. Maj. Op. at

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By contrast, al-Jadani identified two sources for his

information about al Qaeda guesthouses in Tehran and how

those sources obtained their knowledge, specifically that the

sources had themselves stayed in the guesthouses. The district

court described this evidence, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 24, and in

findings never rejected it, instead concluding, in effect, that

assuming the existence of such guesthouses, the government had

not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Almerfedi

was ever in Iran before the fall of 2001, id. at 25. Absent a

finding to which this court could defer, our review is de novo. 

See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 945

n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1998). As the government notes, “the district

court did not question the reliability of al-Jadani’s statements

relaying information he received directly from al-Qaiti, who

provided detailed — and consistent — information about the

operation of al-Qaeda guesthouses in Tehran.” Pet’r’s Br. 44. 

Of course, the existence of the guesthouses and whether

Almerfedi stayed in a such a house are two different questions;

Almerfedi contests only the latter, leaving the former evidence

unrebutted. 

The second set of statements by al-Jadani purport to be a

conversation with “Hussain al-Adeni.” Almerfedi, 725 F. Supp.

2d at 26 & n.6. The district court did not credit these statements

because there was an insufficient basis in the record to conclude

4. The website list of detainees indicates Almerfedi was the only

Guantanamo detainee named Hussein who was born in Aden. The list,

however, does not refer to the place of the detainee’s residence, and

a suggestion that a nisha is based on place of birth would contradict

the government’s evidence defining nishas. But see Maj. Op. at 4 n.1. 

Thus the list does not confirm that Almerfedi was the only detainee

named Hussain (or Hussein) to have resided in Aden; at least two

other detainees named Hussain (or Hussein) were born in Yemen. 

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that al-Jadani was referring to Almerfedi and other government

evidence did not corroborate al-Jadani’s account, id. at 26–27;

Maj. Op. at 13. The district court’s conclusion that the

statements “cannot be credited” and are “unreliable,” Almerfedi,

725 F. Supp. 2d at 27, is at least “plausible in light of the

record,” Awad, 608 F.3d at 7. To the extent the majority

suggests that the circumstances of al-Adeni’s capture seem to

match those of Almerfedi (who was arrested by Iran, transferred

to Afghan custody, and then transferred to U.S. custody) and

posits this path was “unique,” Maj. Op. at 13, the government

neither makes such a claim nor points to record evidence that

would undermine the district court’s conclusion that the

coincidence of paths “add[s] little” to the government’s case that

Almerfedi stayed in Tehran guesthouses, Almerfedi, 725 F.

Supp. 2d at 27, much less to show that this evaluation was not

plausible.

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