Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00453/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00453-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANA ALYCIA LACY-CURRY,

Plaintiff.

 v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES

AGENCY, et al., 

Defendants.

_______________________________________

No. C 05-0453 SBA

 

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's First Amended Compla int, which was filed on

September 7, 2005. Pursuant to the Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court has

determined that this action fails to state a claim uponwhichrelief can be granted and improperly seeks monetary

relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. Accordingly, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

During late 2002 or January 2003, Reed Seiden ("Seiden"), a socialworker employed by the County

of Alameda Social Services Agency ("Alameda Social Services Agency"), went to PlaintiffJana Alycia LacyCurry's ("Plaintiff") home for a scheduled visit. First Amended Compl. ("AC") at ¶ 3. However, when Seiden

saw two African American men near Plaintiff's house, he turned away and thus did not keep his appointment

with Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff reported Seiden's refusal to visit her home to Seiden's supervisor. Id.

Seiden subsequently contacted the Oakland Police Department and informed the police that Plaintiff

was suffering frommentalhealth issues, had no electricity in her home, and was unable to care for her children.

Id. at ¶ 4. On February 10, 2003, Seiden also told the Alameda Social Services Agency that, although he did

not know whether Plaintiff ever took the medications ofWellbutrin, Trazidone, and Zyprexa, Plaintiff "needed

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to comply with her medication regime in order to stabilize her situation." Id.

Due to Seiden's report, Lawanda Martin ("Martin"), another social worker employed by the Alameda

Social Services Agency, visited Plaintiff at her home. Id. at ¶ 5. Martin observed that Plaintiff had poor

hygeine, that the refrigerator was not working, and that Plaintiff's front window was broken and was hanging

outside of the house. Id. Plaintiff told Martin that she had attempted suicide "once a long time ago," but that

she was not suicidal and that she did not need to take medication. Id. Plaintiff also told Martin that "people

think [she] is crazy because [she] talk[s] about the ghost in [her] home and how ghosts are messing with [her]."

Id. Martin helped Plaintiff secure a new residence. Id. Plaintiff made arrangements for her children to stay

with friends until she could relocate to the new residence. Id. 

On February 6, 2003, Plaintiff moved into her new residence. Id. at ¶ 5. On February 7, 2003,

Plaintiff's childrenwere scheduled to return to her home. Id. In a meeting that took place between Martin and

Plaintiff on that day, however, Plaintiff told Martin that she had seen the television coming on by itself after she

had unplugged it from the outlet and that her son, Kevin Williams ("Williams"), had observed the same strange

occurrence. Id. Plaintiff's children were not returned to her and, instead, Martin took the children into

protective custody. Id. When Martin filed her report with the Alameda SocialServices Agency, she did not

note in her report that Williams had observed the television turning on by itself. Id. Martin also failed to note

that Plaintiff had told herthatFebruary 7, 2003 was the anniversary ofPlaintiff's mother's death and that Plaintiff

was grieving. Id. Instead, Martin reported to the Alameda Social Services Agency that Plaintiff "wanted her

childrento go to a foster home" and that Plaintiff's children "faced imminent danger and could not be protected

from this danger in the home without removal." Id. Martin further reported that "assisting the mother in

procurement of appropriate housing did not alleviate the situation." Id. 

Subsequently, the Alameda SocialServices Agency petitioned to have Williams permanently removed

fromPlaintiff's custody and to have a legalguardian appointed. Id. at ¶ 8. Consequently, since 2003, Plaintiff

has been engaged in various state court proceedings relating to the custody and guardianship of her children.

Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Throughout the proceedings, the Alameda Social Services Agency has challenged Plaintiff's use

of marijuana formedicinalpurposes, the cleanliness of Plaintiff's home, Plaintiff's failure to take anti-psychotic

medication, and Plaintiff's inability to properly parent her children. Id. at ¶ 7. On April 5, 2003, the courtCase 4:05-cv-00453-SBA Document 42 Filed 12/08/05 Page 2 of 6
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ordered psychiatrist recommended that Plaintiff's children be returned to her. Id. at ¶ 6. The psychiatrist also

stated that "seeing ghosts is normal and not regarded as a symptom of psychosis" and that Plaintiff had "no

psychotic symptoms that[would]render [her] parenting inadequate." Id. In 2004, the psychiatrist also stated

that there was no need for Plaintiff to take anti-psychotic medication. Id. A psychological evaluation with a

second expert revealed that Plaintiff was "depressed" but not psychotic. Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not

prevailed at any ofthe hearings, and legalguardians have been appointed for both children. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff

is currently pursuing her visitation rights in state court. 

On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Alameda Social Services Agency,

Alameda County Superior Court, Martin, the City of Oakland, and Seiden. Also on that date, Plaintiff filed

an application to proceed in forma pauperis("IFP Application"). The case was initially assigned to Magistrate

Judge Chen. On May 11, 2005, Magistrate Judge Chen granted Plaintiff's IFP Application. 

On June 21, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendant City of Oakland. Subsequently, on July

14, 2005, the case was reassigned to this Court. 

On September 7, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant First Amended Complaint. The First Amended

Complaint asserts the following causes of action against the Alameda Social Services Agency, the Alameda

Superior Court, Martin, and Seiden: (1) violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, (2) disability discriminationunder the Americans with Disabilities Act, and (3) violations ofthe California

constitution pursuant to the California Unruh Act.

LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1915 allows commencement of a civil action "without payment offees orsecurity thereof,

by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and] that

the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The benefit of

proceeding in forma pauperisis a privilege, not a right. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir.

1984). Consequently, the statute also authorizes the Court to dismiss a claim filed in forma pauperis "at any

time" if the Court determinesthat:(1) the allegationofpoverty is untrue;(2) the action is frivolous or malicious;

(3) the action fails to state a claim; or (4) the action seeks monetary relief froma defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

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ANALYSIS

Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff has not stated,

and cannot state, a viable claim for relief. Specifically, Plaintiff's claims are clearly barred by the RookerFeldman and Younger abstention doctrines. Additionally, all of the named defendants are immune from the

causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that a federal district court may exercise only original

jurisdictionand thus may not exercise appellate jurisdictionover state court decisions. See Dubinka v. Judges

of the Superior Court of California, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v.Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. FidelityTrust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). "The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from

collateralfederal attack. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals fromstate court decisions,

they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are 'in essence called upon to review the state court decision.'"

Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Board of

Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Modual A/C Systems, Inc., 54 F.Supp.2d 965, 969

(N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that Rooker-Feldman doctrine derived from both federalism and comity) (citing

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1990), Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 783 (1989)). 

The doctrine applies even ifthe state court decision involves a resolution offederallaw. See Feldman,

460 U.S. at 484-86, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (no jurisdictioneven when challenge to constitutional guarantees to due

process and equal protection) (citations omitted); McNair, 805 F.2d at 891. This is because state courts are

considered as competent as the federalcourts to decide issues of federal law. See McNair, 805 F.2d at 891

(citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980), Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975)).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies to decisions by both the state's highest court as well as lower state

courts. See McNair, 805 F.2d at 893 n.3 ("We agree with the Second and Fifth Circuits that the Feldman

doctrine should apply to state judgments even though state court appeals are not final."). Additionally, since

federal review of an interlocutory decision would be a collateral federal attack on a state court decision, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to interlocutory decisions by state courts as well as final decisions.

Napolitano, 252 F.3d at 1029 (citations omitted).

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Further, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 (1971) "and its progeny generally direct federalcourts

to abstain from granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial

proceedings." Hirsch v. Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of California, 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, Younger abstention is appropriate if "(1)there are ongoing

state judicial proceedings, (2) the proceedings implicate importantstate interests, and (3) there is an adequate

opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal questions." Gartrell Constr., Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d

437, 441 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.

423, 432 (1982)). 

Here, since Plaintiff is challenging past decisions made by the Alameda SuperiorCourt relating to her

child dependency proceedings, it is clear that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint falls squarely within the RookerFeldman doctrine. See e.g., Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (no subject matter

jurisdictionwhere plaintiffimplicitly and explicitly sought reversalofCalifornia Court ofAppealdecisionthrough

injunctionagainst appellate judge). Further, since Plaintiff has also admitted that certain state court proceedings

relating to her visitation rights are currently pending, the Younger abstention doctrine also supports dismissal

of her action.

Additionally, Plaintiff's claims against the Alameda Superior Court are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, see Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.

1987), and the Alameda Social Services Agency, Seiden, and Martin enjoy absolute immunity from claims

arising out of child dependency proceedings, see Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department of Social

Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We therefore hold that social workers are entitled to

absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial functions connected with the initiationand pursuit of child

dependency proceedings."). Further, Seiden is also entitled to absolute immunity forreporting suspected child

abuse or neglect to the Oakland Police Department. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 11165.7, 11172. 

Accordingly, since all ofPlaintiff's claims are barred, the Court concludes that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2), Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to close the file and to terminate any pending matters. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 12/7/05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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