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Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

Nos. 15-12919; No. 15-13079

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:08-cv-00829-MSS-KRS

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION,

 Plaintiff-Appellees, 

versus

NORTH AMERICAN CLEARING, INC., et al., 

 Defendants, 

RICHARD L. GOBLE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(July 13, 2016)

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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

In these consolidated appeals, Richard Goble appeals the district court’s 

denial of two motions—one seeking relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 

and another seeking to compel the return of property that was allegedly frozen—

following a lawsuit brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 

in which Goble was found to have violated securities laws while managing his 

company, North American Clearing, Inc. (“NACI”). Goble argues that the district 

court abused its discretion by denying those motions, in which he argued the 

district court should reconsider its earlier orders in light of a bankruptcy court 

order finding that certain transfers from NACI to Goble were not fraudulent and 

that NACI was not undercapitalized at the time of the transfers. Goble argues that 

the bankruptcy court’s findings show that the SEC committed a fraud on the 

district court. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of both of Goble’s motions.

I.

We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Am. 

Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 

1999). We review the denial of a Rule 60(d)(3) motion for abuse of discretion. 

Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 285 (11th Cir. 1987). We may affirm a decision 

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of the district court on any ground supported by the record. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade 

Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007).

Rule 60(b)(3) provides relief from a final judgment where the opposing 

party has committed fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Motions under Rule 60(b)(3) 

must be brought within one year of the relevant order or judgment. Id. 60(c)(1). 

The movant must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing 

party obtained the order or judgment through fraud. Cox Nuclear Pharm., Inc. v. 

CTI, Inc., 478 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007). Mere conclusory statements of 

the existence of fraud will not suffice. Booker, 825 F.2d at 283-84.

Rule 60(b)(6), or “the catchall provision,” authorizes relief for “any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(6); Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

Relief under this clause is an extraordinary remedy which may be invoked only 

upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, and that, absent such relief, an 

extreme and unexpected hardship will result. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 

677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984). Rule 60(b)(6) motions must demonstrate that the 

circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief. Cano, 435 F.3d at 

1342.

Rule 60(b) motions must be filed within a “reasonable time,” or, for 

subsections (1), (2), and (3), within a year of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 

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Importantly, the fact that the rule itself imposes different time limits on motions 

under Rule 60(b)(6) and 60(b)(1)-(3), has led to the conclusion that the grounds 

specified under the other subsections will not justify relief under subsection (6). 

Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 n.3 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 1981). In 

other words, “[w]here either Clauses (b)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) provide coverage 

for the movant’s claim, relief may not be obtained pursuant to Clause (b)(6).” Gulf 

Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 480, AFL-CIO, 

460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1972). Moreover, the one-year limitation is not tolled 

by an appeal and cannot be circumvented by the use of Rule 60(b)(6). Id.

After the one-year period for filing a Rule 60(b)(3) motion has passed, a 

party may bring an independent action for relief under Rule 60(d), which allows a 

court to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3); 

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985). The “fraud 

on the court” standard is more exacting than the standard for fraud under Rule 

60(b)(3), encompassing only the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a 

judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an 

attorney is implicated. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 

1978).1

 To succeed in an action under Rule 60(d), a party must show: (1) a 

 1 Rozier and other cases before 2007 explained the standard under what was then known 

as the “savings clause” of Rule 60(b), which now appears in Rule 60(d) after the rule was 

restyled in 2007. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2006) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) (2007).

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judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be enforced; (2) a 

good defense to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; 

(3) fraud, accident, or mistake which prevented the defendant in the judgment from 

obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the 

part of defendant; and (5) the absence of any remedy at law. Travelers Indem. Co., 

761 F.2d at 1551. The party seeking relief from judgment must establish the fraud 

by clear and convincing evidence. Booker, 825 F.2d at 285.

When events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a 

situation in which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaningful relief, the 

case is moot and must be dismissed. Florida Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. 

State of Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th 

Cir. 2000). An appellant who raises an issue for the first time in a reply brief is 

deemed to have waived that argument, even if the appellant is pro se. Lovett v. 

Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goble’s Rule 

60 motion for relief from judgment, because he had not shown that a fraud on the 

court had occurred. First, to the extent that Goble sought the return of his property 

seized under the temporary restraining order (“TRO”), his motion is moot because

that TRO is no longer in effect and none of his property was ever seized. See 

Florida Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc., 225 F.3d at 1217. To the extent he was 

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challenging the order granting a protective order and appointing a trustee for the 

liquidation of NACI, Goble could not obtain relief from that order under Rule 

60(b), because his motion was made well after the one-year period for filing Rule

60(b)(3) motions had passed and could not be construed as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion 

to circumvent the one-year limitation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Gulf Coast Bldg. & 

Supply Co., 460 F.2d at 108. 

Finally, Goble did not show the requisite fraud on the court to state an 

independent action under Rule 60(d)(3). The bankruptcy court’s order—which 

was not binding on the district court in any event—is not relevant to the issue of 

whether the district court’s protective order was appropriate. Because Goble has 

offered no evidence of fraud apart from conclusory allegations that the SEC falsely 

accused him of misconduct, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying his motion for relief from judgment.

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for post-judgment relief de 

novo. See Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Legal arguments not briefed are deemed abandoned and will not be addressed, 

even when the party is pro se. Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 

1994).

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The filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over 

those aspects of the case that are the subject of the appeal. Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 

1037, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001). A district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a 

motion that is inextricably intertwined with issues addressed in orders that are the 

subject of a pending appeal. RES-GA Cobblestone, LLC v. Black Constr. & Dev., 

LLC, 718 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013). Issues are inextricably intertwined if 

one issue may not be resolved without deciding the other issue. See Edwards v. 

Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that this Court lacked 

jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion to reassign the case to another 

judge, because review of the certified issues did not require resolution of that 

issue).

Because he does not argue on appeal that the district court had jurisdiction to 

grant his motion to compel, Goble has abandoned that argument. Irwin, 40 F.3d at 

347 n.1. The district court’s determination was correct, however, because Goble’s 

motion to compel was inextricably intertwined with the issues raised in his motion 

for relief from judgment. RES-GA Cobblestone, 718 F.3d at 1314. For the district 

court to decide whether Goble was entitled to the relief sought in his motion to 

compel, it would necessarily have had to determine whether the fraud on the court 

alleged in his Rule 60 motion had occurred, which was an issue in his appeal of the 

Rule 60 motion. Goble’s filing of a notice of appeal as to the denial of his Rule 60 

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motion therefore divested the district court of jurisdiction over his motion to 

compel. Bush, 261 F.3d at 1064. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Goble’s motion to compel.

For the foregoing reasons,

2 the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

 2 Other arguments raised on appeal by Goble are rejected as without merit.

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