Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01508/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01508-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Mothershead, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County, et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV07-1508-PHX-DGC

ORDER

On April 3, 2003, Defendant Lindsay Ellis, who was then serving as a Maricopa

County Superior Court Commissioner pro tem, appointed a guardian and conservator for

Plaintiff Robert Mothershead. Plaintiff has now sued Defendant Ellis in this Court, alleging

that the appointment violated his constitutional rights, caused him economic harm, and

entitles him to punitive damages. Dkt. #1. 

Defendant Ellis has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt #4. Defendant Ellis argues that she is absolutely

immune from liability for actions she took as a judicial officer, that the Eleventh Amendment

deprives the Court of jurisdiction to hear a case against a state officer acting in her official

capacity, and that this Court should abstain from interfering in ongoing state proceedings.

Federal law grants absolute immunity to judges acting in their judicial capacities.

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)

335, 347 (1872)). Arizona common law and statutory law also grant immunity to judges for

judicial acts. Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dept., 690 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1984); Lavit

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Defendant Ellis would be entitled to judicial immunity even if a commissioner pro

tem could somehow be viewed as not an official judge. Judicial immunity protects persons

whose functions “amount to ‘an integral part of the judicial process.’” Acevedo, 690 P.2d at

40 (quoting Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965)). Three factors

determine whether a person’s conduct is integral to the judicial process: (1) whether the

conduct was ordered by a court, (2) whether the conduct closely related to the judicial

process, and (3) whether the conduct impacts a court decision. Lavit, 839 P.2d at 1145. All

three factors are satisfied in this case. Defendant Ellis’s conduct was ordered by the

presiding judge; her work was closely related to the judicial process; and Defendant Ellis did

more than merely impact a court decision, she made a court decision. 

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The Court does not address the merits of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Ellis

violated his constitutional rights.

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v. Superior Court in and for County of Maricopa, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1992); A.R.S. § 12-820.02(A)(1). 

The parties do not dispute that a superior court commissioner is a judge under Arizona

law. In this case, Defendant Ellis served as a commissioner pro tem pursuant to an order

issued by the presiding civil judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court. Dkt. #1, ¶ 6.

Plaintiff acknowledges that Commissioner Ellis was acting as a judge in his case. Id.

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Plaintiff acknowledges the doctrine of judicial immunity, but argues that it should not

apply in this case because he has alleged extreme violations of his constitutional rights.2

Judicial immunity applies, however, even in extreme cases – even when a judicial officer is

accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1961);

Acevedo, 690 P.2d at 40 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347). 

Plaintiff also asserts that the doctrine of judicial immunity should be regarded as the

exception, not the rule, and should be construed narrowly. The authority cited by Plaintiff,

however, concerns municipal immunity, not judicial immunity. See Galati v. Lake Havasu

City, 920 P.2d 11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). Absolute judicial immunity has long been

recognized as essential to the functioning of an independent judiciary. The doctrine is “not

for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public,

whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with

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independence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (quotation marks

and citation omitted). 

Defendant Ellis clearly is entitled to judicial immunity in this case. Because her

motion to dismiss will be granted on this basis, the Court need not address her Eleventh

Amendment and abstention arguments.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Ellis’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #4) is granted. 

DATED this 10th day of October, 2007.

Case 2:07-cv-01508-DGC Document 7 Filed 10/10/07 Page 3 of 3