Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06139/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06139-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The complaint is entitled “Third Amended Complaint;” however, a review of the record shows it is actually 1

plaintiff’s second amended complaint. The original complaint was filed on August 2, 2000, and the first amended complaint

was filed on March 12, 2001. (Court Docs. 1, 14.) 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD R. LEACH, 1:00-cv-06139-LJO-GSA-PC

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

TO DENY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ON

vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TOM CAREY, T. DREW, (Docs. 66, 99)

D. SCHROEDER, and HAWS,

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN TWENTY

Defendants. DAYS

 /

Plaintiff Donald R. Leach (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now pending is the defendants’ motion for

qualified immunity on summary judgment.

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 2, 2000. (Court Doc. 1.) This action proceeds on

plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed December 2, 2002, against defendants Tom Carey, T. Drew,

D. Schroeder, and Haws (“defendants”). (Court Doc. 46.) On March 12, 2004, defendants filed a 1

motion for summary judgment. (Court Doc. 66.) On August 23, 2004, the court denied summary

judgment on plaintiff’s failure to protect claim and on the defense of qualified immunity. (Court Doc.

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By the court’s order of August 23, 2004, defendant Lim was dismissed from the action, leaving only defendants 2

Carey, Drew, Schroeder, and Haws. (Court Doc. 78.)

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78.) Summary judgment was granted as to all other claims, leaving only plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

failure to protect claim at issue. Id. On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the district 2

court failed to use the appropriate legal standard to decide the qualified immunity issue and remanded

the ruling for reconsideration. (Court Doc. 95 at 5 ¶1.) On April 26, 2007, defendants filed a

supplemental motion for summary judgment, addressing the remanded issue. (Court Doc. 99.) On May

25, 2007, plaintiff filed an opposition, and on June 1, 2007, defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s

opposition. (Court Docs. 100, 101.) 

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS OF FAILURE TO PROTECT

Plaintiff alleges in the second amended complaint that he used to be an active validated member

of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang, but he dropped out of the gang. Plaintiff maintains that once an

inmate drops out of a gang he can no longer be housed at any institution or housing unit where active

validated members of the prison gang are housed. Plaintiff alleges that defendants were made aware by

inmate Steven Fischel on August 2, 1999, that plaintiff was going to be stabbed because plaintiff had

dropped out of the gang. Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to protect him from a physical attack

by validated Aryan Brotherhood gang members on August 3, 1999. Plaintiff alleges he suffered

disfigurement, physical injury, severe pain, and emotional distress as a result. 

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as

to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance

solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

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summaryjudgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever

is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth

in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party

to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely

upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of

affidavits, and/or admissible discoverymaterial, in support ofits contention that the dispute exists. Rule

56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing partymust demonstrate that the fact in contention

is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818

F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue offact conclusively in itsfavor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute

be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W.

Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and

to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c). The

evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

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 Plaintiff filed neither a separate statement of disputed facts nor admitted or denied the facts set forth by defendants 3

as undisputed. See Local Rule 56-260(b). Therefore, the court was left to compile the summary of undisputed facts from

defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and plaintiff’s verified complaint. A verified complaint in a pro se civil rights

action may constitute an opposing affidavit for purposes of the summary judgment rule, where the complaint is based on an

inmate’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence, and not merely on the inmate’s belief. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d

196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curium); Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); F.R.C.P. 56(e).

Because plaintiff neither submitted his own statement of disputed facts nor addressed defendants’ statement of undisputed

facts, the court accepts defendants’ version of the undisputed facts where plaintiff’s verified complaint is not contradictory.

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inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). 

IV. Statement of Undisputed Facts3

1. Plaintiff was a validated member of the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) gang but was

subsequently validated as a gang drop out.

2. On July 24, 1996, plaintiff was stabbed by another inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison

(PBSP) and then placed in administrative segregation because of concerns for his safety,

if he remained in the general population.

3. On March 19, 1998, the institutional classification committee (ICC) for Facility IV-B at

CSP- Corcoran. Plaintiff asked to be placed on the A1 Reintegrated Mix Exercise Yard.

The committee noted that plaintiff was a validated AB dropout, had completed the

debriefing process, but noted that he was considered a “regular SHU inmate.” The

committee placed him on the B1 Control Compatible Exercise Yard to exercise with

White and Southern Hispanic inmates. Because of plaintiff’s dropout status and recent

behavior, the committee did not find a “soft” yard warranted at that time.

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4. On March 31, 1998, a classification services representative (CSR) approved plaintiff’s

transfer to the California Correctional Institution, Level IV (CCI-IV) based on a

confidential chrono dated the same day. 

5. On May 28, 1998, plaintiff arrived at CCI-III-Reception Center. While awaiting a bus

to take him to CCI-IV A, plaintiff was involved in a fight with another inmate in a

holding cage and was placed in administrative segregation.

6. On May 29, 1998, a classification committee saw plaintiff who said that he could

program in the general population at CCI-IVA. The committee noted that the other

inmate with whom he had fought had been sent to CCI-IVB. The committee referred

plaintiff to the Institutional Gang Investigator for evaluation of his current gang status.

7. On Sunday, June 14, 1998, defendant Haws, a correctional lieutenant who was the IGI

at the prison, reviewed plaintiff’s central file. Lieutenant Haws noted that an August 24,

1987, chrono stated that a polygraph examination of plaintiff had shown him to be

deceptive which was attributed to his close association with inmate Wendell “Blue”

Norris, a validated AB associate. That chrono also stated that plaintiff had been stabbed

by AB members, had nearly died of his wounds, and was in disfavor with the gang.

Lieutenant Haws noted that a January 26, 1988, chrono stated that plaintiff had

undergone a second polygraph examination which showed truthfulness in response to

relevant questions. The author of that memo recommended that plaintiff be considered

an AB dropout. A third chrono dated January 10, 1996, validated plaintiff as an AB

dropout. Haws concluded that plaintiff’s dropout status should not change and

recommended his transfer to an institution commensurate with his classification score

and gang status, but that his activities should be closely monitored and documented

whenever gang activity or involvement was present.

8. On June 17, 1998, a unit classification committee (UCC) did an initial and annual

review, reduced his custody level, and placed him on the waiting list for a job in support

services.

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9. On May 12, 1999, a classification committee saw plaintiff for annual review and

evaluation as to whether he should be transferred to another institution in light of his

disciplinary history. The committee referred him to the IGI for a gang status update,

noting that he was a validated former AB member and that Sensitive Needs Placement

was appropriate. The committee also referred plaintiff to a CSR and recommended that

he be transferred to the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (C/SATF) or

Calipatria IV on an override, noting that Sensitive Needs placement was appropriate

because of his gang defector status. Plaintiff agreed with the committee’s

recommendation. 

10. On June 9, 1999, a classification committee, assessing plaintiff’s program and housing

following review of his suitability for parole by the Board of Prison Terms (BPT),

retained plaintiff in his present program pending CSR review and approval of the transfer

recommendation.

11. On June 15, 1999, a CSR approved plaintiff’s transfer to Calipatria IV for Sensitive

Needs Placement.

12. On June 30, 1999, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation and charged with

a disciplinary violation for possession of an inmate-manufactured hypodermic syringe

while he was at San Joaquin Community Hospital. He was found guilty of the violation.

13. On July 29, 1999, inmate Fishel learned that plaintiff was going to be stabbed because

the AB had information that he was a drop out. Fishel asked another inmate to contact

the “security squad” so he could talk to them about it. Leach claims that defendant

Schroeder, a correctional officer at the prison, subsequently told Lieutenant Haws who

arranged a “debriefing.”

14. On August 2, 1999, the IGI received a telephone call from Lieutenant Zanchi, the CCI-IV

A SHU Lieutenant. Lieutenant Zanchi said that an inmate had information regarding an

assault on an inmate in the CCI-IV A mainline and that the only information they had

that it was to happen that day and that the inmate would speak only with the IGI. Later

that day, the inmate spoke with defendant Drew from the IGI’s staff. Officer Drew did

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a memo to ISU Capt. Dalton setting forth what he was told. Officer Drew reported that

the inmate claimed he had been trying to see the IGI for the past two months and that he

wanted to drop out of the AB and would do anything to keep safe. Officer Drew’s

opinion was that the main reason the inmate wanted to be interviewed was to inform the

IGI that he wanted to debrief. He asked the inmate if he had information about an inmate

who was going to be assaulted that day. The inmate said he did not know if it would be

that day, but it would be “real soon” and that the inmate’s name was Leach. Officer

Drew asked the inmate who was going to do the assault, but the inmate said he did not

know. Officer Drew told the inmate that the debriefing process would not start until

further notice and that if the inmate had any other information about staff or inmate

assaults, he should tell the IGI. The inmate said he did not have any other information

regarding assaults.

After the interview, Drew contacted Sergeant Goodman, the CCI-IV A SHU Sergeant,

and told him about the possible assault on plaintiff and that, in his opinion, the inmate

informant’s main reason for being interviewed was to advise the IGI of his desire to

debrief.

The same day, Officer Drew also contacted Lieutenant Prudhomme, the CCI-IV A

lieutenant where plaintiff was housed, and told him about the possible assault on

plaintiff. Officer Drew told Prudhomme that he had not been able to corroborate the

information and that the main reason the inmate informant had wanted to talk to the IGI

was to tell the unit that he wanted to debrief. 

15. On August 3, 1999, at approximately 2:30 p.m., plaintiff was stabbed by inmate

Howerton while they were playing basketball on the main exercise yard. 

16. Plaintiff had a one-half inch long by one-half inch deep wound in the left upper back, one

and one-half inch long by one-half inch deep wound in the left lateral thigh, a one-quarter

to one-half inch stab or puncture wound to the left upper back distal to wound #2, a onehalf inch long by one-quarter inch deep wound to the mid back, and a one-quarter inch

wound distal to the mid back. 

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17. On August 12, 1999, plaintiff was transferred to CCI-IV A and placed in administrative

segregation pending review to determine his future housing and program needs.

18. On August 19, 1999, a classification committee reviewed plaintiff’s administrative

segregation placement and noted the June 15, 1999, CSR approval of transfer to

Calipatria-IV for Sensitive Needs placement. The committee placed him on a walk alone

(W/A) yard and single cell status.

19. On September 16, 1999, a classification committee reviewed plaintiff’s placement and

noted that he had asked that his transferto Calipatria-IV be deferred because of a medical

hardship which prevented his wife from traveling long distances and to locations below

sea level. The committee recommended that the transfer to Calipatria-IV be rescinded

and that plaintiff be transferred to SATF-IV for sensitive needs placement based on

medical hardship. Plaintiff was retained in administrative segregation on walk-alone

status, but was cleared for double-cell housing because of the absence of in-cell

misconduct.

20. On October 14, 1999, a classification committee reviewed plaintiff’s placement and

continued him on walk-alone yard, but returned him to single-cell status.

21. On November 2, 1999, a CSR approved plaintiff for transfer to SATF-IV sensitive needs

placement and retention in administrative segregation pending transfer.

22. On November 9, 1999, an ICC continued plaintiff on walk-alone/single-cell status in

administrative segregation. 

23. On November 15, 1999, plaintiff was transferred to SATF-IV where he is currently

housed.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity on Summary Judgment

 Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the

initial inquiry, or first prong, is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

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injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step, or second prong,

is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. In resolving these issues, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of

plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).

 The first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is not at issue here. The Ninth Circuit affirmed

the district court’s determination that plaintiff’s allegations, if true, were sufficient to show that

defendants’ conduct violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore,

the first prong of the inquiry set forth in Saucier has been met.

As to the second prong, the district court must now reconsider whether the constitutional right

was “clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. A particularized inquiry must be made,

“undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. To

determine whetherthe right was clearlyestablished, the court must determine whether “it would be clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201-02;

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). “If the law did not put the officer on notice

that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “This is true even if defendants did violate Leach’s Eighth

Amendment rights.” (Jgmt, Leach v. Lowe, 04-16815 at 5 ¶1 (9 Cir. 2006)). “Conversely, where

‘various courts have agreed that certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not

distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the case at hand,’ the officers would not be

entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).

The Ninth Circuit directs us to the particularized inquiry at issue in the present case, “whether,

at the time [defendants] were investigating the potential threat to Leach, [defendants] violated a clearly

established constitutional right by not immediately and preemptively removing Leach from the general

prison population.” (Jgmt, Leach 04-16815 at 5 ¶1.) The court must decide “whether there existed any

analogous facts, circumstances or authority for the proposition that [defendants] should have reasonably

known under the circumstances that they were violating Leach’s constitutional rights.” Id.; See Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (the unlawfulness of a clearly established right must be apparent

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from existing authorities); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055,

1065-66 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Under California law in effect since 1980, an inmate who presented a known safety risk was

required to be removed from the general population and confined in Administrative Segregation. Title

15 of the California Code of Regulations § 3335(a) states:

When an inmate's presence in an institution's general inmate population presents an

immediate threat to the safety of the inmate or others, endangers institution security or

jeopardizes the integrity of an investigation of an alleged serious misconduct or

criminal activity, the inmate shall be immediately removed from general population

and be placed in administrative segregation. Administrative segregation may be

accomplished by confinement in a designated segregation unit or, in an emergency, to

any single cell unit capable of providing secure segregation.

15 CA ADC §3335(a). 

In case law, the court looks first to precedent which is binding in the Ninth Circuit and which

existed at the time defendants were investigating the threat against Leach on August 2, 1999. 

Defendants agree that, as a general proposition, the law was clearly established that, if an officer

knows of an excessive risk to an inmate’s safety and infers from the facts of which he was aware that

a substantial risk of harm exists, he would violate the Eighth Amendment by disregarding it or not

reasonably responding to it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

In Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), the Ninth Circuit held that prison

officials’ conduct was not cruel and unusual punishment when they did not “lock up” an inmate to

protect him, even though they knew the inmate had lodged a complaint concerning a “threat made

against his life” by fellow inmate John Carrello. Carrello told officials [about plaintiff], “You had

better lock him up, because I am going to get him.” On the following day Carrello threw a pitcher

of scalding hot coffee into plaintiff’s face and beat him with the empty coffee pot. The court held

that the officials’ conduct did not “shock the conscience or violate fundamental fairness,” and the

punishment did not go “beyond legitimate penal aims.”

In U.S. v. Tolias, 548 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit held that the fact that

defendant was an admitted homosexual did not make a sentence of five years’ imprisonment cruel

and unusual punishment, even though assaults and homosexual rapes occurred in prisons. According

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to the court, the test for cruel and unusual punishment was whether the penalty is so out of

proportion to the crime committed that it shocks a balanced sense of justice.

In Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit held that various state

officials were deliberately indifferent when they failed to reduce the level of violence at a

penitentiary at which eight inmates and two guards were killed, there was a “potentially explosive”

atmosphere with a high level of violence caused by overcrowding and other conditions, guard

brutality was the norm, and there was an inadequate grievance system.

In Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F. 3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held that prison officials

were not deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s safety when they failed to maintain an oven in the

facility’s family visiting unit, and the oven door fell off its hinges, causing second degree burns to

inmate’s forearm. 

None of the Ninth Circuit cases cited above is similar to the case at hand in both facts and

law. The facts in Williams are the most similar, because defendants Carey, Haws, Drew, and

Schroeder, as the defendants in Williams, knew about a threat made by one inmate against another

and failed to act before the threat was carried out. However, the law defining cruel and unusual

punishment changed between Williams in 1969 and Leach’s attack in 1999. The test used in 

Williams to establish cruel and unusual punishment was whether the conduct “shocked the

conscience.” By 1999, the test used was whether the conduct showed “deliberate indifference.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. It follows that the Ninth Circuit rulings noted above cannot be said to

have put defendants on notice that their conduct in Leach’s situation would be unlawful. 

Absent binding precedent, the court looks to all available decisional law, including the law of

other circuits and district courts, to determine whether the law was clearly established. Osolinski, 92

F.3d at 936. The court next turns to rulings of district courts in the Ninth Circuit. In Capps v.

Atiyeh, 559 F.Supp. 894 (D.C. Or. 1983), the court concluded that the level of violence at the prison,

which had risen with the prison population and included assaults, fights, self-mutilations, and group

disturbances, did not warrant the inference that the state was deliberately indifferent to the inmates’

safety. 

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In Balla v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corrections, 595 F.Supp. 1558 (D.C. Idaho 1984), the court

was unwilling to find that involuntary double celling, which had a direct correlation with the level of

violence in medium custody, was unconstitutional on personal safety grounds.

In Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the court held that prison officials

were not deliberately indifferent to inmate safety when they failed to consider prior assaultive

behavior in making cell assignments, because it was not clear that defendants knew the parameters of

the problem.

The court now turns to the law of other circuits. In Taylor v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections,

69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995), the court found that evidence was sufficient to warrant trial against a

warden who delegated responsibility over prison transfers to subordinates, knew subordinates were

approving transfers without adequate reviewing inmate records, knew there were widespread sexual

assaults, knew that small, youthful prisoners were vulnerable to sexual pressure, and information in

plaintiff's file would have disclosed that he was a vulnerable prisoner when he was transferred to

dangerous camp.

In Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1996), the court held that plaintiff is not required to

prove that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate,

but only to show that the official had knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.

Defendants cite rulings from jurisdictions other than the Ninth Circuit that excuse prison

officials, in particular situations, from providing protective housing to inmates who may be under

threat of assault. Defendants also cite rulings from other jurisdictions granting qualified immunity to

prison officials who reported threats of assaults to supervising officers, as Schroeder did, or who

investigated threats or referred them to proper authorities for investigation, as Drew and Haws did. 

Defendants argue that at the time of the investigation, courts had not found that the Eighth

Amendment required prison officials to place a prisoner in protective custody while they investigated

unconfirmed information of a threat to the inmate’s safety. It is clear that such a decision would

have placed defendants on notice that their conduct was unlawful. However, even assuming for

discussion that no such decision was made, this does not prove that defendants were not on notice. 

The Supreme Court held that for purposes of qualified immunity, officials can still be on notice that

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their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances, as notice does not require

that facts of previous cases be materially or fundamentally similar to the situation in question. Hope

536 U.S. at 741. In fact, the court expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be

“fundamentally similar” and found that “cases with ‘materially similar’ facts” are not necessary to

find that “the law is clearly established.” Id. That same year, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[N]either

Farmer nor subsequent authorities has fleshed out ‘at what point a risk of inmate assault becomes

sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes.’” Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301

F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that a reasonable

officer in defendants’ shoes, knowing what defendants knew, could not have mistakenly but

reasonably perceived that releasing Leach unprotected onto the main exercise yard while they

conducted an investigation was not unlawful. Plaintiff alleges that defendants were aware that

someone was planning to attack him, and they failed to remove him from the main yard, thereby

subjecting him to the assault. The facts are undisputed that by August 2, 1999, officers were aware

of a report by an inmate informant that another inmate had threatened to stab Leach, “real soon.” 

Drew, who interviewed the informant on August 2, 1999, took the information but questioned the

informant’s credibility. Drew believed the informant’s main reason for speaking out was to inform

the IGI that he wanted to debrief. Drew reviewed Leach’s file but could not corraborate the

informant’s story. Drew did a memo to ISU Capt. Dalton setting forth what he was told by the

informant. Drew then reported to Sergeant Goodman, Lieutenant Prudhomme about the threatened

assault and shared his opinion that the informant lacked credibility. Lieutenant Prudhomme was

planning to interview plaintiff to determine whether the threat was credible enough to warrant

protective housing or some other protective measure, but the interview did not take place that day. 

Defendants knew about Leach’s background and classification. Leach’s prison file showed

that he was an at-risk inmate who had needed protection before. Leach had been stabbed by another

inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison in 1996 and placed in administrative segregation out of concerns

for his safety if he remained in the general population. Leach had been a member of the Aryan

Brotherhood prison gang, but was now validated as a drop out from the gang and classified as a

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“sensitive needs placement” inmate who needed protection. In June 1998, defendant Haws reviewed

Leach’s file, which documented that in 1987 Leach had been stabbed by AB gang members, had

nearly died from his wounds, and was in disfavor with the gang. Haws concluded that plaintiff’s

dropout status should not change and recommended his transfer to an institution commensurate with

his classification score and gang status. Haws also concluded that Leach’s activities should be

closely monitored and documented whenever gang activity or involvement was present. In mid-June

1999, a Classification Services Representative approved Leach to be transferred from CCI to another

institution and placed on a Sensitive Needs yard because of his disciplinary history and gang status. 

By August 3, 1999, Leach had not been transferred, and Lt. Prudhomme had not interviewed Leach

about the informant’s story. 

Even if a reasonable officer would have shared Drew’s opinion that the informant was not

credible or the information about the planned assault was not clear, he still would have understood

that Leach could be in danger. A reasonable officer in defendants’ shoes would know that Leach

was a validated drop out from the AB prison gang. A reasonable officer, knowing Leach’s

background and knowing that Leach was specifically named as the potential victim of a stabbing that

would happen “real soon,” would know that Leach may need protection to prevent serious injury. A

reasonable officer would know that any inmate who is a validated drop out from a dangerous prison

gang could be in immediate danger if placed in a recreation yard with members of the gang. A

reasonable officer would understand that Leach had enemies; that it was possible the informant’s

report was true; that a stabbing could occur as early as that day; and that Leach should be protected

from harm. As previously stated, the law was already established in 1999 that “if an officer knows

of an excessive risk to an inmate’s safety and infers from the facts of which he was aware that a

substantial risk of harm exists, he would violate the Eighth Amendment by disregarding it or not

reasonably responding to it.” 

Based on the foregoing and viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that

it would have been clear to reasonable officers in defendants’ shoes that failing to remove Leach

from the main yard when they had information that another inmate was planning to attack Leach

“real soon,” would pose a substantial risk of serious harm. A reasonable officer would find it

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unacceptable under constitutional law to release an at-risk inmate into the recreation yard while an

investigation was pending to determine whether the inmate should be released into the recreation

yard. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and

recommends that defendants’ motion for qualified immunity on summary judgment be denied. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity on summary judgment be DENIED; and 

2. This action now proceed only on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect

claim against defendants Tom Carey, T. Drew, D. Schroeder, and Haws.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty

(20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10)

court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 31, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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