Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01695/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01695-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM M. DOUGHTIE, No. CIV S-06-1695-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

L.E. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court are petitioner’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on August 1, 2006, respondent’s answer (Doc. 14),

filed on November 28, 2006, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 16), filed on January 8, 2006.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The Prosecution’s Case

A., born in October 1988, is the daughter of P.D., who married

defendant when A. was four and one-half hears old. Defendant separated

from P.D. in April 2001 but remained in contact with A.

According to A., defendant “inappropriately” touched her “maybe

80 to 100” times, although “[i]t could have been more than that” because

“it was a long time ago.” About 70 to 80 percent of those times,

defendant’s fingers went inside her vagina.

The first incident occurred in Yucaipa when A. was “probably four

or five.” Defendant blindfolded her and said they were going to play a

guessing game. He put his penis in her mouth and told her it was a pickle.

The family eventually moved to Bomark Way in Sacramento. In

the back yard of the house, defendant built a wood fort and placed inside

of it a foam mattress and blankets. When A. was seven or eight years old,

defendant took her inside the fort and touched her vagina under and over

her clothes.

When A. was in fourth grade and was eight or nine years old, the

family moved to Greenlawn Way where they lived until she was in eighth

grade. “A majority of what happened happened at that address,” which

was approximately 80 to 85 percent of the touchings. Most of these

incidents involved defendant rubbing A.'s vagina both inside and outside

her clothes after everyone else had gone to bed.

When A. was in the seventh grade and was either 12 or 13 years

old, defendant took her into her mother's bedroom and tried to take off A.'s

overalls. While he and A. were fighting, defendant ripped the button holes

on her overalls, “French kissed” her, and touched her “boobs” and vagina

over her clothes.

Approximately one week later, defendant French kissed A. again

and got into a “shoving match” with her when he tried to rip off her

clothes. Defendant hit A. in the face, giving her a black eye. She told her

mother she got the black eye in basketball practice.

During Christmas of 2000, defendant came into A.'s bed and

“started rubbing on [her].” He put his mouth on her vagina through her

clothes and “breathed on [her] for a few minutes.”

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In April of 2001 defendant separated from A.'s mother. The

molests continued. That Easter, while at A.'s grandparents' home in Mt.

Lassen, defendant took off A.'s overalls and touched her vagina.

During Christmas 2001, when A. was in the eighth grade and was

13 or 14 years old, she went to her uncle Al and Aunt Darlene's house. 

Defendant sat down on the couch, pulled her on top of him, and touched

her “boobs” and French kissed her. When A. stopped defendant from

taking off her bra, he told her he was doing “these things” to show her

“how to act when boys wanted to do those things with [her] when [she] got

older.” He added that “he would feel comfortable doing anything with

[her] that [she] had questions about besides actually having sex with

[her].”

In April 2003, when A. was 14 years old, defendant called her “out

of the blue” on her cellular phone and said he would pick her up after

school. After they ate at Taco Bell, he suggested they “roll through the

park naked together.” A. told him he was “nasty.” Defendant then took

her to a shopping mall where he bought her a pair of $75 tennis shoes. In

the car, defendant told her that he wanted $75 worth of kisses and, that for

$75, she “should probably even suck his dick.” A. refused and told him to

take her home. That was the last incident between them.

A. waited until ninth grade to tell a friend about the molests. She

had not previously disclosed the molestation because defendant had told

her not to tell and she was scared because he had a temper. He was also

the only “dad” she had ever had and [she] thought “[m]aybe that's what

dads were supposed to do.”

In the summer between ninth and tenth grade, A. and her mother

“got in a really big argument.” A.'s mother commented that A. should live

with defendant until they both “cooled down.” A. responded, “why, so he

can molest me some more[?]” A.'s mother did not call the police.

Two days later, A. and her brother went to Colorado to visit their

grandparents for two months. While in Colorado, A. called her mother

and told her she wanted to “press charges” against defendant when she got

back.

A couple of months later when they returned, A. complained to her

mother that she had not done anything about what A. had told her. It was

then they called police.

The next day A. told a police officer that defendant had molested

her 30 times. A month or two later, after thinking more about it, she told

Detective Mary Saporito that defendant had molested her 80 to 100 times

and that she struggled or fought back 30 to 40 percent of the time.

On December 3, 2003, Detective Saporito set up a pretext

telephone call between A. and defendant. During the call, defendant

denied he had stuck his penis in A.'s mouth when she was blindfolded,

denied he had given her a black eye, and denied he had put his fingers in

her vagina. He admitted he may have touched her vagina in a nonsexual

way once when she was taking a bath and apologized if he had “ever

touched [her] inappropriately.” He explained that “sometimes . . . a parent

likes to feel more loved” and that “it sounds sickening, and it sounds

wrong and all this.”

/ / /

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On January 22, 2007, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, concluded that 2

California determinate sentencing law was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), to the extent it allows

imposition of an aggravated term based on facts found by the judge and not the jury. See

Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007). 

4

On December 5, 2003, Detective Saporito conducted a videotaped

interview with defendant in the sheriff's office. Defendant initially denied

he had molested A. When told his voice stress analysis “showed

deception,” he admitted he had French kissed A. and stuck his fingers in

her vagina “maybe 10 to 20 times.”

The Defense

Dr. Richard Leo, an associate professor of psychology and

criminology, testified regarding false confessions and the tactics of police

interrogation. There were “several hundred documented cases” of false

confessions, some of which occurred when people who initially claimed

innocence became temporarily convinced they “did it” after continually

being accused of the crime.

Defendant testified that during the interview with Detective

Saporito, he had no memory of kissing A. or putting his fingers in his

vagina. He only was repeating what the detective had told him. At trial,

he denied ever touching A. “with the intent of gratifying [his] own sexual

pleasure[s].”

B. Procedural History

Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of one count of committing a lewd

and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years, and 19 counts of committing a lewd

and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years by force or duress. All 20 counts

involved the same victim. The trial court sentenced petitioner to 3 years for each count – the

lower term provided under California’s determinate sentencing law. The trial court imposed

“full, separate, and consecutive” terms for each count, for an aggregate sentence of 60 years in

prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence in an opinion

issued on January 18, 2006. On March 29, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied direct

review “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled” after the United

States Supreme Court determines the effect of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), on

California sentencing law.2

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state court

decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the governing

law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate that

Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the wrong

legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases

to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See id. at 406. 

If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to determine first

whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th

Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which case federal

habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question is whether

the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

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or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct.

1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be

found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly

erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to

give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two claims in this petition. First, petitioner argues that his due

process rights were violated. Specifically, he argues:

Only five of the twenty counts were based upon evidence of

specific acts of child molestation; the remaining fifteen counts were based

upon “generic” evidence that [petitioner] molested the victim in a similar

manner on an estimated number of unspecified, separate occasions; those

fifteen counts should have been charged as a single violation of [California

Penal Code] section 288.5, subdivision (a), requiring the reversal of the

counts supported only by “generic evidence.”

/ / /

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Second, petitioner argues that his right to trial by jury was violated when the court imposed “full,

separate, and consecutive” terms for each count. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge – not

the jury – made the factual findings necessary to impose such terms. 

A. Counts Based on Generic Evidence

In rejecting petitioner’s due process claim that the convictions are improperly

based on “generic evidence,” the California Court of Appeal stated:

There was also no due process violation in charging defendant with

multiple counts of lewd and lascivious acts by force or duress. . . . [¶] . . .

Our Supreme Court has held that “generic testimony” to support child

molestation charges does not deprive a defendant of his due process right

to notice of the charges against him and his right to present a defense to

those charges. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317-321). While

the court also explained that for generic testimony to be sufficient, the

victim must “describe the kind of act or acts committed with sufficient

specificity,” “describe the number of acts committed with sufficient

certainty,” and “describe the general time period in which these acts

occurred,” it also emphasized that “[a]dditional details regarding the time,

place, or circumstances of the various assaults . . . are not essential to

sustain a conviction.” (citation omitted). 

A.’s testimony regarding the molests at the Greenlawn residence

satisfied these requirements. She testified that defendant “inappropriately”

touched her “maybe 80 to 100" times and that 80 to 85 percent of those

touchings occurred at the Greenlawn residence where she lived from

fourth to eighth grade. Of the total touchings, 70 to 80 percent of the time

defendant’s fingers went inside her vagina and 30 to 40 percent of the time

she “struggled or fought back.” Many of the incidents at the Greenlawn

residence involved defendant rubbing her vagina both inside and outside

her clothing after everyone else had gone to sleep. 

The court concludes that the victim’s “generic testimony” did not violate petitioner’s due process

rights. 

In his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, petitioner reproduced

verbatim the arguments he presented to the Court of Appeal. Similarly, in the instant petition,

petitioner merely attaches his state court briefs. Therefore, this court does not have the

advantage of any argument from petitioner as to why the state court’s denial of this claim was

either contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling federal law. 

/ / /

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As respondents correctly note, the standard for petitioner’s due process claim is

that the defendant must be given notice of the charges against him and a fair opportunity to

defend against them. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). In opposing

petitioner’s claim, respondents point to a very similar case in which the Ninth Circuit concluded

that the defendant had not been denied either of the Chambers requirements by a statute allowing

“generic evidence.” In Brodit v. Chambra, the petitioner had claimed that “he was deprived of

notice and a fair opportunity to respond to the state’s charges because section 288.5 allowed the

state to charge him with three or more acts of sexual abuse occurring on unspecified dates. . . .” 

350 F.3d 985, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state court’s

rejecting of Brodit’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of United

States Supreme Court precedent. See id. 

In this case, as in Brodit, the record reflects that petitioner had fair notice of each

of the 20 counts charged against him and that he had a fair chance to challenge each charge

during his trial. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. Therefore, the court finds that this claim

lacks merit. 

B. Imposition of Full, Separate, and Consecutive Sentences

California Penal Code § 1170.1(a) requires that, except as otherwise provided by

law, the aggregate term of imprisonment for all consecutive sentences shall be the “sum of the

principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for applicable

enhancements . . . .” The principal term is the greatest term of imprisonment. Subordinate terms

for each consecutive offense “. . . shall consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment

prescribed for each other felony conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is

imposed. . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 1170.1(a). California Penal Code § 667.6(c) provides an

exception for certain sex offenses. Specifically, the statute allows for “full, separate, and

consecutive” terms for each violation if the crimes involve the same victim or same occasion. 

The trial court is empowered to determine whether the crimes involve the same victim or

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occasion. See Cal. Penal Code § 667.6(d). 

At the outset, because petitioner was sentenced under California’s determinate

sentencing law, the court addresses the impact of Cunningham v. California on this case. In

Cunningham, the Supreme Court concluded that the determinate sentencing law is

unconstitutional to the extent it allows an aggravated term to be imposed based on facts

determined by the trial judge and not the jury because the middle-level term is the prescribed

statutory maximum. See 127 S.Ct. at 871. 

To the extent petitioner seeks federal habeas relief under the ruling in

Cunningham, the court concludes that such relief would not be available for two reasons. First,

Cunningham does not apply retroactively to convictions which became final before it was

decided. See Fennen v. Nakayema, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2007 WL 1742339 (E.D. Cal., June 14,

2007); Rosales v. Horel, 2007 WL 1852186 (S.D. Cal., June 26, 2007); Salerno v. Schriro, 2007

WL 2153584 (D. Ariz., July 24, 2007). In this case, petitioner’s conviction became final in 2006,

before Cunningham was decided in January 2007. 

Second, the rule announced in Apprendi and Blakely, and applied to the

determinate sentencing law in Cunningham, simply do not apply on the facts of this case. Here,

petitioner was not sentenced to the aggravated term on any of the 20 counts. Rather, as clearly

demonstrated by the state court’s abstract of judgment, petitioner was sentenced to the low term

of three years on each count. Nothing in Cunningham implicates the low term. Further,

Cunningham does not address consecutive sentences. 

The gravamen of petitioner’s argument is that, by allowing the trial judge – not

the jury – to find facts which determine whether he would be subject to “full, separate, and

consecutive” sentences, § 667.6(d), as applied in this case, violates the constitutional right to trial

by jury under Blakely. The court does not agree. Under Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham, 

any fact which increases the sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be determined by a

jury. In this case, the abstract of judgment shows that petitioner was sentenced to the low term of

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three years on each of the 20 counts. Under § 667.6(d), the court added the 20 three-year terms

to arrive at the aggregate term of 60 years. None of the individual terms was increased beyond

the low term of three years by virtue of any fact found by the judge in imposing “full, separate,

and consecutive” sentences under § 667.6(c). Rather, application of § 667.6(d) merely allowed

the state court to add the full terms together. Petitioner was not subject to an aggravated sentence

on any of the counts as a result of judicial fact-finding. 

For these reasons, the court concludes that the state court’s rejection of this claim

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied; and

2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 6, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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