Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01754/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01754-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE BOLDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. CAVAZOS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01754-BAM-PC

ORDER DISMISSING THE SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE 

A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE IN 

THIRTY DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).1 

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at CSP Lancaster, brings this civil rights action against correctional 

officials employed by the CDCR at CSP Corcoran. Plaintiff’s claims stem from the confiscation 

and disposal of Plaintiff’s television. Plaintiff alleges that on February 10, 2012, prison officials 

confiscated and disposed of his television pursuant to an established state procedure. Plaintiff 

alleges that he used the television for religious purposes as well as for educational purposes. 

Plaintiff alleges that the television was disposed of without affording Plaintiff the opportunity to 

send it to an outside source to have it repaired.

This action proceeds on the July 16, 2015, second amended complaint. The original 

complaint was filed in this action on October 29, 2012. On March 21, 2013, an order was 

entered, dismissing the complaint and granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 

(ECF No 8.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, and on January 10, 2014, an order was 

 

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Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge on November 7, 2012. (ECF No. 5.)

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entered, finding that the first amended complaint failed to state any claims for relief and 

dismissing this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 

11.) Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, and on March 20, 2015, this action was affirmed in part, 

vacated in part, and remanded. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s free 

exercise, unreasonable search, due process (related to the grievance process), and unauthorized 

deprivation of property claims. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Plaintiff’s due process claim 

alleging an authorized deprivation of property was properly dismissed. However, dismissal 

without leave to amend was improper because it was not clear that Plaintiff could not cure the 

defect through amendment. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, and on July 16, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint that is now before the Court. The sole claim that 

remains is Plaintiff’s due process claim regarding deprivation of his property pursuant to an 

authorized procedure. 

 An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process 

Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n. 13 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 

1524 (9th Cir. 1985). An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state 

procedures, regulations, or statutes. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 422, 436 

((1982); Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). Authorized 

deprivations are permissible if carried out pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably related to a 

legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Due Process 

Clause is violated only when the agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without 

underlying statutory authority and competent procedural protections.” Nevada Dept. of 

Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 

1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 976 (2012). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly disposed of his television without giving him 

the opportunity to have it repaired. In the original complaint and first amended complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges that this was done pursuant to “well established” state procedure. Plaintiff’s 

central claim, however, restated in the second amended complaint, is that the grievance process 

was flawed. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Gonzales was responsible for disposing of Plaintiff’s 

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television pursuant to an authorized procedure. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Gonzales also 

participated in the grievance process, denying Plaintiff’s grievance at the first level of review. 

Chief Deputy Warden Cavazos denied Plaintiff’s grievance at the second level of review. 

Plaintiff alleges that Chief Deputy Warden Cavazos “failed to address the fact that Sergeant J. 

Gonzales had functioned in two capacities in the same event being appealed.” (First. Am. 

Compl. at 5:14.) Plaintiff makes a similar allegation as to Appeals Examiner Davis, who denied 

Plaintiff’s grievance at the third level. It appears that Plaintiff is complaining about the role 

Sergeant Gonzales played in the incident rather than the taking of the television set.

As noted above, so long as correctional officials comply with underlying statutory 

authority and competent procedural protections, due process is satisfied. Plaintiff appears to 

claim that because Sergeant Gonzales denied Plaintiff’s grievance at the first level of review, 

competent procedural protections were not complied with. Plaintiff fails to distinguish between 

the due process required for property deprivation and his due process interest in the grievance 

process. As noted in the dismissal order of January 10, 2014, Plaintiff does not have a specific 

right to a grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003.) Any claim 

related to the inmate grievance process is not before the Court. 

Plaintiff does not allege that the underlying state procedure is not reasonably related to a 

legitimate penological interest. Plaintiff fails to identify the statutory authority for the procedure 

at issue. Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, section 3190, governs what property is 

allowable. Section 3191 governs disposal of personal property. Specifically, section 3191(c) 

sets forth five options that an inmate has to dispose of property prohibited under section 3190. 

There are no facts alleged from which the Court can discern whether or what process Plaintiff is 

challenging. 

The remaining issue before the Court is the taking of Plaintiff’s personal property, and 

the process associated with that taking. Regarding the taking of Plaintiff’s personal property, the 

fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard 

before the government may deprive a person of a protected interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nev. Dep’t. of 

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Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2011) is on point. In Greene, the Nevada 

Department of Corrections changed its policy, creating a ban on inmate possession of 

typewriters. Id. at 1017. The ban was system-wide, and all inmates were notified of the new 

policy. Id. Even though the plaintiff inmate in Greene was not given an individual predeprivation hearing, the Ninth Circuit found that his due process rights were not violated because 

he had been notified of the ban and given ample time to comply with it. “With respect to the 

personal property of prisoners, that is all the process that is due.” See Id. at 1019; see also Wolff 

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 5439, 556 (1974)(“[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due 

Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the 

nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed.”) 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that support a claim that the underlying statutory 

authority for the deprivation of his property was not reasonably related to a legitimate

penological purpose or that he did not have any notice of the underlying statutory authority. In 

the second amended complaint, Plaintiff merely alleges that he was not provided with any type 

of hearing before his television was disposed of. Therefore, Plaintiff does not state a claim for 

relief on his remaining claim of authorized deprivation of personal property. There are not

enough facts alleged in the second amended complaint from which the Court can determine 

whether Plaintiff plausibly was deprived of due process. The Court will dismiss this claim with 

leave to file a third amended complaint. Plaintiff must allege facts indicating what, exactly, 

happened. Plaintiff must allege why correctional officials took his television, i.e., whether was it 

inoperable, or unauthorized, and what specific process was used. Plaintiff refers to a “well 

established state procedure,” but does not identify that procedure. Plaintiff must specifically 

identify the statute, regulation, or prison policy that correctional officials used to take his 

property. A bare allegation that property was taken pursuant to established procedure without 

notice or a hearing, is insufficient to state a claim for relief. The second amended complaint 

must therefore be dismissed. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to file a third amended 

complaint.

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint should be confined to the taking of his property and 

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associated procedure. The third amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but 

must state what each defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and 

focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are 

alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), 

and must be “complete in and of itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in 

an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers 

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed July 16, 2015, is dismissed for failure 

to state a claim;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

A third amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file a third amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order 

and failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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