Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00926/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00926-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

T.B., a minor, by and through his )

parent, G.B., ) 2:07-cv-926-GEB-CMK

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CHICO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; )

CHET FRANCISCO; MAUREEN DIETZ; )

DALE DURNIAK; DAVE SCOTT; CHERI )

McGUIRE; ERIC SNEDEKER; and JOYCE )

BURDETTE, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for dismissal of certain claims from Plaintiff’s

complaint. The complaint alleges state and federal claims arising

from several encounters between Plaintiff, who has a developmental

disorder, and employees of Defendant Chico Unified School District

(“the District”) including Defendants Chet Francisco (“Francisco”),

Maureen Dietz (“Dietz”), Dale Durniak (“Durniak”), Dave Scott

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Since Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll 1

allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Williams ex

rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Prods. Co., 523 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2008).

2

(“Scott”), Cheri McGuire (“McGuire”), Eric Snedeker (“Snedeker”), and

Joyce Burdette (“Burdette”) (collectively, the “individual

Defendants”). Specifically, Defendants seek dismissal of: Plaintiff’s

substantive due process claim; Plaintiff’s state law claims against

the District; Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants

Francisco, Scott, Snedeker and Burdette; and Plaintiff’s negligent

infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claim. The District also

moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against it. 

Plaintiff opposes the motions. 

PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Plaintiff was diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental

Disorder, which makes him “highly sensitive to sounds and touch,” and

causes him to “misread social cues and ha[ve] [] difficulties coping

with transitions.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 22-23.) In the Fall of 2005,

Plaintiff was enrolled in a “full inclusion” first grade class at a

school within the District. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 25.) 

On October 13, 2005, Plaintiff refused to return a paint

brush to a teacher at the end of class time. (Id. ¶ 31.) The teacher

forcibly took the paint brush away, which caused Plaintiff to become

upset and push his desk. (Id. ¶ 32.) In response, District employees

“physically seized [Plaintiff] by grabbing [him] by the shoulders” and

“shoved [him] into the hallway.” (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) While in the

hallway, Defendant McGuire, the school principal, “pinn[ed]

[Plaintiff] to the wall by forcing him into a seated position while

pushing him down.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff freed himself, but

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

“[f]urther down the hallway he was forcefully seized again . . . .” 

(Id. ¶ 37.) District employees “seized [Plaintiff] by grabbing [his]

wrists and pulling [his] arms over his head.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff

alleges that at this point, Defendant Dietz, a District employee,

“seized [Plaintiff] by grabbing [him] by his shirt and dragged him

into a small room against his will.” (Id. ¶ 40.) Dietz then “used

her full body weight to immobilize [Plaintiff].” (Id. ¶ 41.) The

school called Plaintiff’s mother, and when she arrived, she “witnessed

[] Deitz pinning [Plaintiff] between a table and chair with her full

body weight, while choking [Plaintiff] on the shoulders and neck.” 

(Id. ¶ 43.) 

Plaintiff alleges that District employees also seized him by

“grabbing” him and “holding” him on January 31, 2006, February 1, 2006

and February 28, 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 59-62.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that on May 19, 2006, a District

employee “seized [Plaintiff] by grabbing his wrist and held him

inappropriately.” (Id. ¶ 63.) Following this incident, the District

employee “informed other teachers of [Plaintiff’s] disabilities so the

other teachers would keep children away from [Plaintiff,] depriving

him of the right to fully benefit from his education.” (Id. ¶ 64.)

Plaintiff further alleges that on June 19, 2006, while at

school, he “became upset and asked to call [his] mother. However, [a

District employee] . . . did not allow [Plaintiff] to call his

mother.” (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) When Plaintiff left the classroom in an

attempt to find his mother, Defendant Durniak “aggressively seized

[Plaintiff] by grabbing his wrist . . . then hit [Plaintiff] on the

nose.” (Id. ¶¶ 67-68.)

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standard is well known and need 2

not be repeated here.

4

Plaintiff alleges substantive due process, equal protection,

Fourth Amendment, and California Education Code section 49001 claims

against the individual Defendants. Plaintiff also alleges

Rehabilitation Act, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and

California Civil Code section 51(b) claims against the District. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges state law claims for assault, battery,

negligence, false imprisonment, NIED, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress against all Defendants.

DISCUSSION2

I. Substantive Due Process Claim

The individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s

substantive due process claim, arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations of

excessive force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, rather

than the substantive due process theory of liability. (Mot. at 5:9-19

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1998)).)

“‘[E]xcess force by a [school official] against a student

violate[s] the student’s constitutional rights.’” Preschooler II v.

Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1996)). Under

Graham v. Connor, courts must “analyze claims of excessive force under

a more specific constitutional provision, if one applies, rather than

the general notion of substantive due process.” Doe ex rel. Doe v.

State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). “The

consequences of a teacher’s force against a student at school are

generally analyzed under . . . the Fourth Amendment, although

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

historically courts applied substantive due process analysis . . . .” 

Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1180.

Plaintiff counters that the Doe court held “it may be

possible for a school official to use excessive force against a

student without seizing or searching the student,” and under those

circumstances, the claim “might be more appropriately analyzed under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the

Fourth Amendment.” Doe, 334 F.3d at 909. Plaintiff argues he

“asserts many injurious facts which are not exclusive to search and

seizure” and therefore are properly analyzed as a substantive due

process claim. (Opp’n at 3:20-21.) Plaintiff alleges he was shoved,

dragged, choked, hit, restrained, seized, grabbed, pinned down, pushed

and held. (See Compl. ¶¶ 32-68.) But the individual Defendants have

shown that these allegations are properly analyzed as seizures under

the Fourth Amendment, not as substantive due process violations. See

Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1180 (holding that teacher’s seizure of

student and alleged slapping, beating and “slamming” must be analyzed

under Fourth Amendment). Therefore, Plaintiff’s substantive due

process claim based on those allegations is dismissed.

Plaintiff contends his substantive due process claim is also

based on: (1) a District employee’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s private

information about his disability to other teachers on May 19, 2006;

and (2) a District employee’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to

communicate with his mother on June 19, 2006. (Compl. 

¶¶ 64, 66; Opp’n at 3:24-26.) The individual Defendants have not

shown that these allegations must be analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment; therefore, the motion to dismiss these two claims is

denied.

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The claims at issue are Plaintiff’s claims for assault, 3

battery, negligence, false imprisonment, NIED, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and violation of California Civil Code § 51(b).

6

II. State Law Claims Against the District

The District also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law

claims against it, arguing these claims are barred by its Eleventh

Amendment immunity defense. (Mot. at 6:7-7:5.) The District argues 3

that “California public school districts are considered an ‘arm of the

state’ and are entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit

in Federal Court.” (Id. at 6:20-22 (citing Belanger v. Madera Unified

Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming district

court’s holding that a California “school district is protected by the

Eleventh Amendment”)).)

Plaintiff concedes that the District “is a state agency for

purposes of the Eleventh Amendment” and “Defendants are correct that

the Eleventh Amendment bars state claims as to the District, but only

to the extent[] that the relief sought is retrospective.” (Opp’n at

4:20-21.) Plaintiff argues that his state law claims against the

District should not be dismissed because he seeks injunctive relief. 

(Id. at 5.) 

However, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek

either damages or injunctive relief against a state, an ‘arm of the

state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v.

Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (citing

Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

Plaintiff contends his request for injunctive relief is allowable

under the Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) exception to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. (Opp’n at 5.) This exception does not apply to

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the state claims at issue. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.

44, 73 (1996) (holding Ex Parte Young exception applies to a “suit

against a state official . . . seek[ing] only prospective injunctive

relief in order to ‘end a continuing violation of federal law’”)

(quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). Accordingly, the

District’s motion is granted on Plaintiff’s state law claims.

III. State Law Claims Against Francisco, Scott, Snedeker and Burdette

Defendants Francisco, Scott, Snedeker and Burdette seek

dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims against them, arguing

Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements

under the California Tort Claims Act since Plaintiff’s tort claim

filed under that Act did not name them. (Mot. at 7-8.) Plaintiff

counters he has complied with the Act. (Opp’n at 6-9.)

“A plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion requirements of

the California Tort Claims Act when alleging ‘a cause of action

against a public employee . . . for injury resulting from an act or

omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee . . . .’” 

Wilson-Combs v. Cal. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 2008 WL 2080764, *6

(E.D. Cal. May 14, 2008) (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2). Among the

requirements for presenting a tort claim is to include the “name or

names of the public employee or employees causing injury, damage, or

loss, if known.” Cal. Gov. Code § 910(e).

Plaintiff argues these Defendants have waived this argument

since they failed to notify Plaintiff upon the presentation of his

tort claim that it was insufficient. (Opp’n at 6:21-25 (citing Cal.

Gov’t Code § 911 (stating defenses based on sufficiency of Tort Claims

Act claim are waived “by failure to give notice of insufficiency [to

the claimant] with respect to the defect or omission”)).) Defendants

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

counter “[t]his is not a situation where the claim was defective, it

is a situation where the claim appears valid on its face and Plaintiff

simply left out the names of some of the individuals he subsequently

sued.” (Reply at 5:14-17.) Plaintiff has not shown that the

Defendants named in the Tort Claims Act claim should have realized who

the missing defendants were and notified Plaintiff of the

insufficiency of his claim. Accordingly, the defense that Plaintiff’s

Tort Claims Act claim was insufficient has not been waived.

Plaintiff argues he has substantially complied with the tort

claim presentation requirements. (Opp’n at 7:23-8:5.) “Where there

has been some compliance with all the required elements, but the

compliance has been defective, courts employ the substantial

compliance test.” Freeman v. City of Fresno, 2005 WL 1378946, *12-13 

(E.D. Cal. June 7, 2005) (citing City of San Jose v. Sup. Ct. of Santa

Clara County, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 456 (1974)).

The substantial compliance standard is met if “there

sufficient information disclosed on the face of the filed claim to

reasonably enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation

of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of a

lawsuit.” City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 456. Defendants Francisco,

Scott, Snedeker and Burdette do not assert that Plaintiff’s tort claim

did not enable the District to adequately investigate the merits of

the claim or settle it prior to Plaintiff’s lawsuit; they only argue

that Plaintiff’s tort claim identified other District employees and

failed to specifically identify them. (Mot. at 8:7-9.) The Freeman

court held that the substantial compliance standard is met when a

plaintiff names the public employees known to him, even if the

plaintiff fails to name every employee who is ultimately named as a

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The District also seeks dismissal of this claim on this 4

ground, but the claim against the District has already been dismissed

based on the District’s Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.

9

defendant in the federal action. Freeman, 2005 WL 1378946 at *13

(denying motion to dismiss against public employee not named in Tort

Claims Act claim since plaintiff’s “failure to name each and every

individual involved . . . is not fatal to h[is] tort claims against

[the employee who was not named]”). Since these Defendants have

failed to show that Plaintiff’s tort claim does not meet the

substantial compliance standard, this portion of the motion is denied.

IV. NIED

The individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s NIED

claim, arguing it is “duplicative of Plaintiff’s . . . negligence”

claim. (Mot. at 8:19-21.) Plaintiff responds, “To the extent that 4

Plaintiff’s separate claims for negligent infliction of emotional

distress are included in a claim for negligence, Plaintiff requests

that his damages for emotional distress be permitted to be pleaded

under that cause of action.” (Opp’n at 10:1-4.)

“Under California law, there is no independent tort of NIED. 

Rather, NIED is simply a form of negligence . . . .” Pappas v.

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 3500691, *3 (E.D.

Cal. Dec. 19, 2005) (internal citations omitted) (citing Potter v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993)). In his

opposition brief, Plaintiff in essence concedes that his NIED claim is

insufficient; he requests leave to amend his complaint to add a

request for emotional distress damages under his negligence claim. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NIED claim is dismissed “as a separate cause

of action but [] Plaintiff [is given] leave to plead emotional

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

distress damages due to Defendants’ negligence.” Thomas v. Hickman,

2006 WL 2868967, *24 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006).

V. Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Against the District

The District seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages against it, arguing Plaintiff’s claims do not support

punitive damages against a public entity. (Mot. at 9.) However,

Plaintiff only seeks punitive damages on his state law claims against

the District, which have already been dismissed based on the

District’s Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. Accordingly, the

motion to strike need not be reached. 

SUMMARY

The dismissal motion is granted on (1) Plaintiff’s

substantive due process claim based on allegations that Plaintiff was

shoved, dragged, choked, hit, restrained, seized, grabbed, pinned

down, pushed and/or held; (2) Plaintiff’s state law claims against the

District; and (3) Plaintiff’s NIED claim. The remainder of the

dismissal motion is denied. The motion to strike is not reached.

Plaintiff is granted ten days leave from the date on which

this order is filed to file an amended complaint curing curable

deficiencies in a dismissed claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Case 2:07-cv-00926-GEB-CMK Document 19 Filed 08/14/08 Page 11 of 11