Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-03520/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-03520-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS DANIEL CLARK,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. JEFFREY BEARD,

Defendant.

Case No. 11-cv-03520-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

BEARD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND ADDRESSING 

OTHER PENDING MOTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Douglas Daniel Clark, an inmate on death row at San Quentin State Prison 

(“SQSP”), filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff then filed an 

amended complaint, in which he alleges only one claim—a First Amendment challenge to a prison 

regulation limiting his 602 inmate appeals. Dkt. 21-1. Plaintiff claims that when he first arrived 

at SQSP in 1983, inmates were allowed to file two appeals every seven days and this rule was 

“rarely enforced.” Id. at 6. He further claims that in 1987 he filed “a dozen or more appeals in a 

week, and not one was blocked . . . .” Id. at 7. Then in 2011, section 3084.1(f) of Title 15 of the 

California Code of Regulations as quoted in SQSP’s Operational Procedure 608—currently in 

effect and “created by the signature of [Defendant] Chappell”—“slash[ed] [Plaintiff’s] right to 

appeal any adverse event” because the regulation limits his appeals to “one issue, in one appeal, in 

any two weeks . . . .” Id. at 4. Plaintiff argues that this restriction violates his First Amendment 

rights to access the courts and “seek redress [from the] government.” Id. at 3. For example, 

apparently prior to filing his amended complaint, Plaintiff had intended to file four appeals in one 

week, but the regulation prevented him from doing so. Id. at 21. He seeks injunctive relief and 

monetary damages. Id. at 3, 9. 

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff named SQSP Warden Kevin Chappell and former 

Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Matthew 

Cate as Defendants. Id. at 1. However, the Court later granted Plaintiff’s request to substitute the 

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new Secretary, Dr. Jeffrey Beard, for former Secretary Cate. Dkt. 48. The Court found Plaintiff’s 

claim cognizable and served Defendants Chappell and Beard.

1

 Dkts. 40, 48. Specifically, the 

Court stated as follows:

The right of meaningful access to the courts extends to 

established prison grievance procedures. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 

F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) [abrogated on other grounds by 

Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001)]; accord Hines v. Gomez, 853 

F. Supp. 329, 331-32 (N.D. Cal. 1994). This right is subsumed 

under the First Amendment right to petition the government for 

redress of grievances, see id. at 333, and protects both the filing, see 

id., and content, see Bradley, 64 F.3d at 1279, of prison grievances. 

Regulations which punish an inmate for using “hostile, sexual, 

abusive or threatening” language in a written grievance, for

example, are not reasonably related to penological2interests and 

therefore violate the First Amendment. See id. at 1279-82.

Here, Plaintiff may bring a First Amendment challenge to a 

prison policy limiting his inmate appeals on the ground that the 

policy is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 

See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (2003) (applying 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Liberally construed, 

Plaintiff’s aforementioned allegations state a cognizable First 

Amendment claim under section 1983. . . .

Dkt. 40 at 3-4 (footnote added).

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested that the Court remove Defendant Chappell as a named 

Defendant. Dkt. 63. Defendants did not oppose Plaintiff’s request (dkt. 65 at note 1), and the 

Court dismissed all claims against Defendant Chappell. Dkt. 77. Therefore, Defendant Beard 

(hereinafter “Defendant”) is the sole remaining Defendant in this action.

Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

3

in which he argues that

the regulation limiting non-emergency appeals does not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

Dkt. 65 at 6. Defendant further argues that even if the regulation does infringe on Plaintiff’s First 

 

1 Regardless of commitment circumstances, every person confined or residing in facilities 

of the department is subject to the rules and regulations of the Secretary, and to the procedures 

established by the warden, superintendent, or regional parole administrator responsible for the

operation of that facility. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3001. 

2

Penological means related to the “study of penal institutions, crime prevention, and the 

punishment and rehabilitation of criminals, including the art of fitting the right treatment to an 

offender.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

3

Prior to the dismissal of all claims against him, Defendant Chappell had joined Defendant 

Beard in the motion for summary judgment. Because Defendant Chappell is no longer part of this 

action, the Court considers the arguments in the motion to be made solely by Defendant Beard.

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Amendment rights, it is nevertheless valid because it is reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests. Id. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge 

the prison regulation at issue, and that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion and disputes the facts and representations offered 

by Defendant. Dkts. 68-69. Plaintiff has also filed a declaration in support of his opposition. Dkt. 

70. Defendant filed a reply to the opposition. Dkt. 71. Plaintiff then filed a sur-reply4 without 

first seeking approval from the Court as required by Local Rule 7.3(d). Dkt. 73. Defendant 

moves to strike this sur-reply, and Plaintiff has since requested the Court’s permission to file the 

sur-reply. Dkts. 75, 76. The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply 

(dkt. 75), GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file a sur-reply (dkt. 76), and considers it part of the record. 

 For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. Dkt. 65. 

DISCUSSION

I. BACKGROUND

A. Prison Appeals Process

CDCR inmates “may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the 

department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse 

effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a). However, 

they are limited to filing “one appeal every 14 calendar days unless the appeal is accepted as an 

emergency appeal.” Id. § 3084.1(f). There is no limit to the number of emergency appeals an 

inmate may file. Dkt. 65 at 9.

SQSP personnel “screen all appeals prior to acceptance and assignment for review.” Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.5(b); see also Davis Decl., Dkt. 65-1 at 2. If the appeal states a 

comprehensible issue, staff then accept the appeal and enter it into the Inmate Appeals Tracking 

System (“IATS”). Davis Decl., Dkt. 65-1 at 2. If the inmate has submitted an appeal within the 

last fourteen days, IATS “does not allow the new appeal to be accepted.” Id. But if staff members 

 

4 Although Plaintiff’s filing is entitled “Plaintiff’s Reply to the Defendants’ Reply to Reply 

[to] Motion to Dismiss Proceedings,” the Court construes it as his sur-reply. Dkt. 73.

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designate the appeal as an emergency, they will override IATS and accept the appeal. Id. If staff 

reject or “screen out” the appeal, the inmate may correct and re-submit the appeal within thirty 

days. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.6(a)(2). SQSP allows inmates to re-submit screened-out 

appeals up to four times. Davis Decl., Dkt. 65-1 at 2. 

Although Title 15 provides that “no reprisal shall be taken against an inmate or parolee for 

filing an appeal,” it still deems submitting “more than one appeal in a 14 calendar day period”

“misuse or abuse” that “may lead to appeal restriction.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 §§ 3084.1(d), 

3084.4(a). In fact, upon confirmation of continued abuse, prison authorities may restrict an inmate 

“to one non-emergency appeal every 30 calendar days for a period of one year.” Id. § 3084.4(g). 

Additionally, Title 15 “does not prohibit the pursuit of disciplinary sanctions for violation of 

department rules.” Id. § 3084.1(d). 

B. Plaintiff’s Appeals

SQSP Appeals Coordinator M.L. Davis submitted two separate declarations in support of 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and reply, respectively. Dkts. 65-1, 72.5 According to 

Davis, Plaintiff has submitted 556 appeals since 1996.

6

 Davis Decl., Dkt. 65-1 at 4; Davis Decl. 2, 

Dkt. 72 at 1. Plaintiff disputes this number and alleges that “well over 100 of the listings are not 

filed appeals.” Dkt. 69 at 19. Davis responds that the disputed appeals “were screened out before 

being accepted at the first level,” but “were still submitted to the appeals office.” Davis Decl. 2, 

Dkt. 72 at 2. Despite any disagreement over the exact number of appeals Plaintiff filed, both 

parties agree that the prison regulation at issue limits the number of appeals he may file. Dkts. 21-

1 at 3-4, 65 at 8. Furthermore, both parties agree that SQSP officials have rejected appeals from 

Plaintiff based on the regulation’s non-emergency appeal limitation. Dkt. 21-1 at 23; Davis Decl., 

Dkt. 65-1 at 4; Dkt. 69 at 9. Thus, while the Court notes Plaintiff’s objections to Davis’s 

declarations, it recognizes that determining the actual number of Plaintiff’s appeals is unnecessary 

to resolve the instant summary judgment motion. The pertinent issue at hand is whether the 

 

5

For citation purposes, the Court will refer to the second declaration as “Davis Decl. 2.” 

6 Although Plaintiff has resided in SQSP since 1983, the appeals tracking system does not 

provide data on Plaintiff’s appeals before 1996. Davis Decl. 2, Dkt. 72 at 1.

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challenged regulation’s limitation on appeals violates Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where the record shows there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Id. On an 

issue where the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, however, the moving party 

need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 

Id. at 325. 

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party 

to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id at 324; Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Self-serving affidavits may 

establish a genuine issue of material fact as long as “they state facts based on personal knowledge 

and are not too conclusory.” Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Still, the Court may grant summary judgment when the nonmoving party’s evidence is merely 

colorable, or is not significantly probative. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. 

When there is a genuine dispute to the facts, the Court must view those facts “in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). But, 

“where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 

party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587. Finally, if the 

nonmoving party fails to show a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims that the challenged regulation limiting him to only 

one non-emergency appeal every fourteen days violates his First Amendment rights. Specifically, 

Plaintiff claims the regulation “attack[s] and chill[s]” his rights to access the courts and seek 

redress from the government. Dkt. 21-1 at 3. To remedy this alleged violation, Plaintiff requests 

the Court to ban Defendant from imposing “limits on the number of non-frivolous 

grievance/appeals.” Id. He wants “all non-frivolous appeals to be filed, without a limit of appeals 

per week, or per month.” Id. at 9.

While an inmate’s right to meaningful access to the courts extends to established prison 

grievance procedures, Bradley, 64 F.3d at 1279, inmates have no constitutional right to a specific

grievance procedure, Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a 

grievance procedure.”)). Although inmates do not have a constitutional right to a particular 

grievance procedure, courts have held that inmates may not be retaliated against for using an 

available grievance procedure or for the content of their appeals. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley 64 F.3d at 1276. For example, in Bradley v. Hall, the Ninth Circuit 

invalidated an Oregon Department of Corrections’ prison regulation, and held that “prison 

officials may not punish an inmate merely for using hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening 

language in a written grievance.” 64 F.3d at 1281-82.

Here, unlike the plaintiff in Bradley, Plaintiff did not allege in his amended complaint that 

he was retaliated against because of the content of any of the appeals he filed. As explained 

above, the Court’s Order for Service recognized only Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim 

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challenging the prison regulation (dkt. 40 at 4), and it did not address any claim for retaliation.

7

 In 

his complaint, Plaintiff specifically argued that the challenged regulation infringes on his First 

Amendment rights because it prevents him from filing an unlimited number of non-emergency 

appeals. However, Plaintiff has no First Amendment right to file appeals in the first place. See 

Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. In addition, Plaintiff fails to show that he holds a constitutional right to 

file an unlimited number of non-emergency appeals. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. Since

Plaintiff cannot show that the challenged regulation infringes on his First Amendment rights, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim must fail. 

Assuming arguendo that the challenged regulation did infringe on Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights, the regulation would be still be lawful because it relates to a legitimate 

penological interest. “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. 

at 89 (finding prison regulation limiting inmate to inmate correspondence valid as related to 

security interests, but regulation controlling an inmate’s right to marry invalid as not reasonably

related to either security or rehabilitative interests). The Supreme Court has established a fourfactor test to determine the validity of such a prison regulation: (1) whether there is a “valid, 

rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 

forward to justify it;” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain 

open to prison inmates;” (3) “the impact [an] accommodation of the asserted constitutional right 

will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally;” and (4) 

the “absence of ready alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. A plaintiff challenging the law or 

 

7

In his opposition, Plaintiff seems to allege the challenged regulation’s limit on nonemergency appeals, in and of itself, constitutes retaliation. See generally Dkt. 69. Plaintiff also 

alludes to retaliation by referencing his former placement on appeal restriction, which limited him 

to filing one appeal every thirty days. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff further contends that prison officials 

threatened him, placed him in “the hole,” and physically assaulted him because he filed appeals. 

Id. at 13. Finally, Plaintiff accuses SQSP Correctional Counselor V. Sanford of retaliation based 

on Plaintiff filing his opposition to the summary judgment motion in the instant action. Dkt. 73 at 

2-3, 17-25. The Court will not consider the aforementioned claims of retaliation at this time 

because Plaintiff cannot raise new claims that were not previously raised in his amended 

complaint. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue these retaliation claims, he may file a new complaint 

alleging such claims in a separate civil rights action after first exhausting his administrative 

remedies.

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regulation bears the burden of proving the prison regulation is invalid. Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. 

Also, federal courts must accord substantial deference to prison administrators because they “bear 

a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for 

determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” Id.

The First Turner Factor: Defendant argues “there is a valid, rational connection between 

the prison regulation limiting the number of non-emergency appeals an inmate may file and 

CDCR’s legitimate governmental interest justifying the regulation.” Dkt. 65 at 13. According to 

Title 15, CDCR’s appeal procedure “is intended to provide a remedy for inmates and parolees with 

identified grievances and to provide an administrative mechanism for review of departmental 

policies, decisions, actions, conditions, or omissions that have a material adverse effect on the 

welfare of inmates and parolees.” Cal Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1. Defendant notes, however, 

that administering the appeals system requires significant correctional resources. Dkt. 65 at 13-14. 

Defendant asserts that limiting the number of non-emergency appeals ensures that all inmates have 

access to the appeal procedures.8 Id. at 14. Defendant also argues that the limitation conserves 

prison resources, which in turn protects institutional safety and security. Id. Defendant suggests 

that if every inmate at SQSP were to file as many appeals as Plaintiff wishes, the appeals office 

would be unable to provide proper review or investigate legitimate inmate concerns.9 Id. at 14-15. 

The Court recognizes that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that 

requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within 

the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85. 

“Prison administration . . . has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and 

 

8

The Court rejects Defendant’s comparison of the limit on inmate appeals to “the federal 

court’s ability to manage its docket by entering pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.” Dkt. 

65 at 14. Section 3084.1(f) prevents an inmate from filing more than one non-emergency appeal 

within a fourteen day period regardless of his or her past use of the procedure. Federal courts, on 

the other hand, may impose pre-filing restrictions only where the litigant has demonstrated prior 

abuse of the court system. De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).

9

The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s argument that the appeals office is capable of 

handling more appeals because SQSP allowed inmates to file more appeals in the past. Dkt. 73 at 

8, 10. Plaintiff provides no evidence to counter Defendant’s argument that the appeals office 

would be unable to handle more appeals without devoting more resources to the screening and 

investigation process. 

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separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.” Id. at 85. “Where a state 

penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the 

appropriate prison authorities.” Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)

overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989)). Despite this 

deferential standard, where appropriate, the court must also look to see if the action of prison 

officials is an “‘exaggerated response to prison concerns.’” Bradley, 64 F.3d at 1281 (quoting 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).

The Court finds that Defendant has carried his burden of establishing a rational connection 

between the challenged regulation’s limitation on filing non-emergency appeals and the welfare of 

inmates. Limiting non-emergency appeals permits each inmate to access the appeal system by 

ensuring that one inmate does not preempt the system with an inordinate amount of appeals. 

Additionally, the limitation conserves prison resources; if the prison was forced to dedicate more 

attention to appeals management, such a diversion of resources may weaken institutional safety 

and security. Considering the deference courts owe state prison authorities, see Overton, 539 U.S. 

at 132, the Court finds these rationales sufficiently valid to form a rational connection between the 

regulation and the asserted government interest. 

Even while viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that he

has failed to present specific evidence showing there is a genuine issue regarding the connection 

between the challenged regulation’s limitation and the welfare of inmates. Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant has limited his appeals, but does not address Defendant’s contention of a valid and 

rational connection between the regulation and the welfare of inmates. Instead, he argues there is 

no penological interest because past policies show that SQSP is capable of allowing more appeals. 

Dkt. 73 at 8-11. This alone does not show that Defendant is exhibiting an “exaggerated response” 

to a prison concern. Under the deference afforded to state prison authorities, see Overton, 539 

U.S. at 132, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument unavailing and accepts Defendant’s penological 

interest rationales. Accordingly, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could find only for 

Defendant here, and thus there is no material issue of fact regarding the first Turner factor.

The Second Turner Factor: This factor asks “whether there are alternative means of 

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exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Supreme 

Court has noted that “[w]here ‘other avenues’ remain available for the exercise of the asserted 

right, courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to 

corrections officials’ . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.” Id. (citing Jones v. North 

Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 128, 131 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 

(1974)). The Court notes that while Defendant limits Plaintiff’s ability to file appeals, he does not 

outright ban it. First, Plaintiff can file any emergency appeal without restriction. Second, Plaintiff

can file non-emergency appeals, as long as he complies with the time period requirements. Third, 

even if Plaintiff does not comply with those requirements, SQSP affords him the opportunity to 

correct his “screened out” non-emergency appeals. Dkt. 65 at 15. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he may file multiple emergency appeals, but he argues that 

such “emergencies” are defined much more narrowly than Defendant suggests. Dkt. 68 at 7. 

Specifically, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s general description that an “emergency appeal is one 

that indicates a risk of harm.” Id. Plaintiff claims that in practice, emergency appeals are used 

only for “serious risk of safety, security, life and limb, injury,” and not the more general definition

of any harm to the inmate. Id. Plaintiff argues that most of his appeals would qualify as 

emergencies under the “any harm” standard and he would not need to bring this lawsuit if that 

were the case. Id. He also argues that prison regulations require him to file an appeal within thirty

days of when the underlying event occurs. Dkt. 69 at 8. Combined with the one non-emergency 

appeal per fourteen-day restriction, Plaintiff argues that the opportunity to correct his rejected 

appeals is quite restricted and not nearly as forgiving as Defendant implies. Id at 8-9.

While Plaintiff attacks the sufficiency of the alternative means, he does not suggest that he 

is without an alternative. It is thus beyond dispute that the CDCR and SQSP provide alternatives 

for Plaintiff to exercise his First Amendment right besides filing multiple non-emergency appeals 

within fourteen days. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a material dispute 

of fact regarding the existence of alternative means and must rule for Defendant on the second 

Turner factor. 

The Third Turner Factor: This factor considers the “the impact [an] accommodation of the 

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asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Again, the Supreme Court warns that where 

accommodation “will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts 

should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.” Id. (citing 

Jones, 433 U.S at 132-133). Defendant reiterates that allowing inmates to file unlimited appeals 

will allow one inmate to preempt the prison staff’s time and resources. Dkt. 65 at 15. Defendant

also points out that staff use substantial prison resources to investigate claims and that the 

allocation of resources would “be greatly affected” if inmates are allowed to file unlimited nonemergency appeals. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that SQSP is “designed to handle over 90,000 appeals a year.” Dkt. 69 at 

11. But Plaintiff’s estimate is based on the possibility that every inmate files the maximum

number of appeals. Plaintiff does not ground his assertion in any specific evidence or discuss how 

the prison could handle an increased number of appeals without sacrificing resources from other 

correctional needs. Plaintiff has thus failed to create a material dispute of fact regarding how 

unlimited non-emergency appeals would affect the allocation of prison resources. The Court finds 

in favor of Defendant on the third Turner factor. 

The Fourth Turner Factor: Finally, this factor considers the, “absence of ready 

alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Supreme Court views an absence of a ready alternative 

as “evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 

U.S. 576, 587 (1984)). While this factor is not a least restrictive alternative test, the “existence of

obvious, easy alternatives” may show that the regulation is not reasonable, but an “exaggerated 

response” to prison concerns. Id. “[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully 

accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may 

consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” 

Id. at 91.

Defendant maintains that there is no ready alternative to the limitation on non-emergency 

appeals. Dkt. 65 at 16. Specifically, Defendant argues the regulation is “narrowly tailored” to 

address the concern over the burden that allowing unlimited appeals would impose on prison staff. 

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Id. Defendant also cites the fact that inmates may file unlimited emergency appeals to show that 

the regulation does not endanger inmate safety. Id. 

Meanwhile, Plaintiff again argues that in the past, prison officials allowed him to file more 

than one appeal every fourteen days. Dkts. 21-1 at 6-7; 73 at 6, 8. However, Plaintiff does not 

propose a less restrictive limitation as a potential remedy. Rather, he seeks the ability to file 

“without a limit of appeals per week, or per month.” Id. at 9. Moreover, Plaintiff does not 

provide any evidence as to why the fourteen-day rule is an “exaggerated response” to prison 

concerns. Put simply, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that a ready alternative exists. Id. at 4. 

While SQSP might be able to implement a less restrictive limitation, Plaintiff has not put 

forth a material dispute as to the availability of a ready alternative. Even if the Court were to 

construe the references to his prior appeal allowances as offering a ready alternative, Plaintiff has 

not shown that such a change would involve de minimis costs to valid penological interests. Thus, 

the Court has no basis to find that the challenged regulation’s limitation is unreasonable. 

Accordingly, the Court rules once again for the Defendant because the fourteen-day restriction on 

non-emergency appeals satisfies the fourth and final Turner factor. 

Based on its consideration of the Turner factors, the Court finds that even if the challenged 

regulation infringes on Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, it is nevertheless valid as it relates to a 

legitimate penological interest. In sum, because Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence 

of a First Amendment violation for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in his favor, Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.10

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply is DENIED. Dkt. 75.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply is GRANTED. Dkt. 76.

3. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. 65.

 

10 The Court’s finding that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 

on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim obviates the need to address Defendant’s alternative 

arguments regarding standing and an entitlement to qualified immunity.

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4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate pending motions, and close 

the file.

5. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 65, 75, and 76. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

July 20, 2015

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