Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02517/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02517-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GENERAL CHARLES E. “CHUCK”

YEAGER (RET.), 

Plaintiff,

v. NO. 2:07-cv-02517 FCD GGH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CINGULAR WIRELESS LLC;

BELLSOUTH; SBC COMMUNICATIONS;

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH;

and DOES 1 to 200, inclusive, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendant AT&T

Mobility, LLC’s (“AT&T” or “defendant”) motion for certification

of interlocutory appeal from the court’s December 7, 2009 order

denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292. Plaintiff General Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager 

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the

briefs. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

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(“Yeager” or “plaintiff”) opposes the motion. For the reasons

set forth herein,1 defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

The general rule is that an appellate court should not

review a district court ruling until after entry of a final

judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474

(1978); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459

U.S. 1190 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is however, an

exception to this general rule: 

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal from the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . .

. if application is made to it within ten days . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An interlocutory appeal should be granted

“only in exceptional situations in which allowing [such an

appeal] would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” In re

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing U.S. Rubber

Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). The party

seeking certification of an interlocutory appeal has the burden

to show the presence of those exceptional circumstances. 

Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present

in order for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue

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2 The facts of this case are set forth in the court’s

Memorandum & Order, filed December 7, 2009.

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to be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. An

issue is “controlling” if “resolution of the issue on appeal

could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the

district court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at

1026 (citing U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d at 785). 

Second, there must be substantial ground for difference of

opinion on that issue. A party’s strong disagreement with the

court’s ruling is not sufficient for there to be a “substantial

ground for difference”; the proponent of an appeal must make

some greater showing. See First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F.

Supp. 1107, 1116 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Mere disagreement, even if

vehement, with a court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss does not

establish a ‘substantial ground for difference of opinion’

sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for an

interlocutory appeal.”). Third, an interlocutory appeal must be

likely to materially speed the termination of the litigation. 

This factor is linked to whether an issue of law is

“controlling” in that the court should consider the effect of a

reversal by the court of appeals on the management of the case. 

See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.

This case arises out of the use of plaintiff’s name in a

publication issued by Cingular Wireless entitled “Cingular

Wireless Announces Enhanced Emergency Preparedness Program for

2006 Hurricane Season” (the “Publication”).2 In denying

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court held that the

First Amendment defense did not bar plaintiff’s claims for

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statutory or common law misappropriation because the publication

constituted commercial speech. Similarly, the court held that

plaintiff had raised triable issues of fact regarding his claim

under the Lanham Act,, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), based, in part, on

the court’s conclusion that plaintiff did not need to

demonstrate malice with clear and convincing evidence because

the publication was commercial speech. The remainder of

plaintiff’s claims were derivative of his claims for

misappropriation and violation of the Lanham Act; therefore,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment failed for the same

reasons. 

The court concludes the certification for interlocutory

appeal is appropriate under the circumstances presented in this

litigation. Specifically, the court’s conclusion regarding the

commercial nature of the publication is a threshold matter in

this case. First, resolution of the issue on appeal could

materially affect the outcome of litigation because, if the

Ninth Circuit concludes that the publication at is not

commercial speech, the viability of all of plaintiff’s claims is

called into question. Second, there is substantial ground for a

difference of opinion regarding whether the publication was

commercial speech under both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent. While the court considered the publication in this

case analogous to the publications at issue in Bolger v. Youngs

Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), and Downing v.

Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), there is no

precedential authority directly on point. Finally, because the

determination of the nature of the speech is a controlling issue

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with respect to defendant’s liability, an immediate appeal will

material advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for certification of appeal

pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 12, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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