Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-05445/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-05445-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff’s claim against the State of California was dismissed on September 18, 2000 by District Judge 1

Ishii. By order filed January 29, 2001, District Judge Ishii dismissed defendants Farmon, Mekkam and Hernandez

from this action. On June 4, 2003, defendants Adams, Scott and Champ were dismissed from this action for failure

to state a claim.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KANDEE GILBERT LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:00-CV-5445-AWI-DLB-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

(Doc. 129)

A. Procedural History

This is a civil rights action filed by plaintiff Kandee Gilbert Lewis (“Plaintiff”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is

proceeding on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed January 5, 2001, against defendants

Baron, Castellanos, Eby, I. Kent, S. Kent, Rawlings, Schei, Sooter and Wilson. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants failed to take appropriate action to protect her from an attack by another inmate on May

23, 1999. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Rawlings failed to provide her appropriate medical

treatment for her injuries. On December 22, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary

1

judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 31, 2006.

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B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Postpone Consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment.

In her opposition, plaintiff requests a stay of this motion and additional time to conduct 

discovery. Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party

opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts

essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for

judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is

just.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that in order to prevail on a Rule 56(f) motion, the party “must show

(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further

discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist

the summary judgment motion.” State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.2d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998).

“In making a Rule 56(f) motion, a party opposing summary judgment ‘must make clear what

information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment.’” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d

850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518

(9th Cir. 1987)). The burden is on the party seeking to conduct additional discovery to put forth

sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists. Volk v. D. A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d

1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff has not met her burden as the party moving for relief from responding to defendant’s

motion pending further discovery. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that she has not had ample time

to conduct discovery because she was awaiting a settlement offer from defendants does not provide

a basis to postpone ruling on defendants’ motion forsummary judgment. She has not identified any

specific discovery she requires to oppose the motion or how it might preclude summary judgment.

This case has been pending since March 17, 2000. Discovery was opened in December 2004 and

prior to that the parties engaged in extensive briefing on the issues. The deadlines in this case have

been extended on multiple occasions and plaintiff was given an extension in which to file her

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Given the history of this case, Plaintiff’s

conclusory assertion that she needs to conduct discovery is insufficient to support a Rule 56(f)

motion and her request to postpone ruling on this motion and reopen discovery is denied. 

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B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the moving party’s burden to establish that

there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). 

As to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, “where the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id.

In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the

district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e.,

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a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d

626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d

1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369

U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810

F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Statement of Undisputed Facts

1. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was an inmate housed at the Central California

Women’s Facility (CCWF) in Chowchilla, California. Am Compl. p.1.

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2. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were employed by the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation and worked at CCWF. Am. Compl.

3. On Thursday, May 20, 1999, inmate McMillan was released from the Enhanced Out-Patient

Program and placed in 506-03 with Plaintiff and six other inmates. Am. Compl. p.1.

4. On Friday, May 21, 1999, McMillan was acting strangely and stated to Plaintiff that she had

not eaten all day, nor received her medication. She also stated that she was receiving

psychiatric medication and medication for diabetes. Plaintiff fed McMillan fruit, soup and

crackers, then informed housing staff and Officer Schei. Am. Compl. p. 1. McMillan was

not acting violently toward anybody at that time. Plaintiff’s concern was for McMillan, not

for herself. Depo. Gilbert-Lewis, 12:24-25 - 13:1.

5. On Saturday, May 22, 1999, at about 10:15 a.m., McMillan began banging her head on the

bathroom wall and pulling her hair out. Officer Castellanos responded to the room, viewed

McMillan’s injury and recorded the occurrence in the officers’ daily log book. Am. Compl.

p.1.

6. Later the same day, McMillan was observed talking to herself in the mirror, saying she was

bad, ugly and evil. When the roommates attempted to comfort her, McMillan entered the

bathroom stall and began throwing toilet paper rolls at several of the roommates. Officer

Castellanos responded and referred McMillan to the B-yard clinic for evaluation. McMillan

was seen in the clinic and later returned to her room. Am. Compl. p.1.

7. During the relevant time period, Officer Castellanos was working as a correctional officer

in housing unit 506. He was assigned to unit 506 one day a week which was Saturdays and

he worked second watch which is from 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. It is Officer Castellanos’

practice to remove any inmate from a situation where he believes the inmate poses a threat

to herself or another person. If Officer Castellanos had seen any signs that led him to believe

that it was not safe for McMillan to remain in that particular room, he would have contacted

his supervisor immediately to have McMillan moved. If any of McMillan’s roommates had

stated that McMillan had threatened them or was behaving in a threatening manner toward

them, he would have taken action to have her moved. It is and has always been Officer

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Castellanos’ practice and custom to act in this manner. If he did not take such action, that

indicates at the time, he did not have any reason to believe that McMillan was a threat to

anyone. Decl. of P. Castellanos, ¶¶ 4-6. 

8. On Sunday, May 23, 1999, at about 5:30 p.m., correctional officer Sooter and Lewis found

McMillan in the bathroom crying. Feces were smeared on the walls and there was blood on

the floor. Officer Sooter called a female officer to assist him in getting McMillan out of the

bathroom because she refused to come out and was exposed from the waist down. Am.

Compl. p. 2. Plaintiff stayed with McMillan and tried to assist her while Officer Sooter went

to get a female officer. Depo. of Gilbert-Lewis, 20:15-18, 21:6-7.

9. Correctional Officer Branch responded and Plaintiff assisted her in helping McMillan change

her sanitary napkin and get dressed. McMillan was taken to the clinic for evaluation. The

clinic referred McMillan to the prison hospital for further evaluation. Am. Compl. p.2;

Depo. Of Gilbert-Lewis, 22:3-7. The roommates cleaned up McMillan’s mess with gloves

and disinfectants given to them by officers. Depo. of Gilbert-Lewis, 21:3-5.

10. At approximately 7:30 p.m., Sergeant I. Kent entered the room and informed Plaintiff and

the other roommates that she was aware of the problem but that McMillan would be

returning to the room. Sergeant Kent advised the roommates that McMillan would be further

evaluated by the mental health staff the following morning. Am. Compl. p. 2.

11. If an inmate poses a threat to other inmates and Sergeant Kent is aware of such a threat and

has reason to believe such a threat exists, she can remove the inmate from that situation so

as to preserve the safety and security of the institution, other inmates, and staff. It is Kent’s

practice to remove inmates whom she believes pose a threat to others and place them in a

different dorm, cell, or administrative segregation. In accordance with that practice, Sergeant

Kent can attest that if she did not remove McMillan on May 23, 1999, it was because she did

not believe McMillan posed a threat to others. Sergeant Kent would not leave an inmate in

a situation where the inmate or someone else could be harmed. Decl. of Kent, ¶¶ 4-5.

12. At approximately 8:50 p.m., McMillan began throwing her property on the floor, jumping

up and down and screaming. Correctional Officers Wilson, Baron and Sooter responded and

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removed everyone out of the room except for McMillan. The officers spoke to her at length,

convinced her to calm down and clean up her mess. Everyone else was returned to the room

and they prepared for the institutional count. Am Compl. p. 3.

13. At approximately 11:45 p.m., Plaintiff and McMillan were involved in an altercation during

which McMillan scratched Plaintiff. Am. Compl. p. 3, Dec. of S. Kent, ¶ 5.

14. Sergeant Eby and Lieutenant S. Kent responded to the room, took everyone out of the room

and questioned them separately. Am. Compl. p. 3.

15. Lieutenant Kent was the watch commander on the night of the altercation between McMillan

and Lewis. Lieutenant Kent wrote a CDC 114-D, Administrative Segregation Unit

Placement Notice, for McMillan advising her of the reasons she was being placed in

administrative segregation. According to the CDC 114-D, McMillan was removed from the

housing unit and placed in administrative segregation because on May 23, 1999, at

approximately 2345 hours, she was having problems in her assigned room with Plaintiff.

Correctional Officer Hall responded to yelling in “A” hall, and observed Plaintiff standing

at the door. Plaintiff stated that McMillan scratched her shoulder when she took papers away

from her, which she was tearing up. McMillan was questioned bySergeant Eby and admitted

to scratching Plaintiff. McMillan was placed in administrative segregation due to battery on

Plaintiff and her being deemed a threat to the safety and security of the institution, staff and

others. Decl. of Kent, ¶¶ 3, 5.

16. Plaintiff does not believe Sergeant Eby or Lt. Kent were aware that McMillan was having

problems in her dorm prior to May 23, 1999. Depo. of Gilbert-Lewis 37:1-9.

17. Prior to the incident, Lieutenant Kent was not aware of any issues or problems between

Plaintiff and McMillan and he did not have any reason to believe that McMillan’s presence

in housing unit 506-03 posed a danger or threat to any other inmates. Decl. of S. Kent, ¶ 6;

Depo. of Gilbert-Lewis, 36:20-25, 37:1-9. Furthermore, as soon as he became aware that

McMillan posed a threat to others, she was immediately removed and placed in

administrative segregation. Decl. of S. Kent, ¶ 6.

18. Lieutenant Kent did not complete a CDC 837, Crime/Incident Report because one was not

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warranted under the circumstances. The criteria for a CDC 837, is that a weapon be used or

that there is serious bodily injury. In this case, there was no weapon or serious injury to

Plaintiff. Decl. of S. Kent, ¶ 7.

19. Plaintiff was seen by Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) Rawlings who evaluated her and

completed a CDC 7219, Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence. MTA Rawlings

examined Plaintiff on May 24, 1999, at about 12:10 a.m. and noted on his report that Plaintiff

stated, “I/m McMillan attacked me from behind, attempted to strangle me and scratched me.”

Decl. of Rawlings, ¶ 5. Rawlings also noted that Plaintiff had sustained three scratches of

the right side of the neck. Rawlings recommended that Plaintiff clean her scratches with

soap and water and an alcohol pad. No further treatment was necessary. Plaintiff was

released to return to her housing unit. Decl. of Rawlings, ¶ 6. 

20. It is Rawlings’ practice to thoroughly evaluate an inmate who has been involved in such an

incident and to complete a CDC 7219 noting any and all injuries. If Plaintiff had sustained

additional injuries, Rawlings would have noted those on the CDC 7219. Decl. of Rawlings,

¶ 6. Furthermore, this incident occurred during first watch and at that time of night, there

was no physician on duty. However, if Plaintiff’s injuries were serious and required

additional attention, Rawlings would have immediately taken her to the emergency room to

be seen by the registered nurse on duty. Decl. of Rawlings, ¶ 8.

21. The reason Plaintiff was not provided additional treatment orreferred to the emergency room

was because her injuries were minor scratches and did not require additional medical

attention. Decl. of Rawlings, ¶ 8.

22. There is no medical evidence that Plaintiff was seriously injured on May 23, 1999. Decl. of

S. Suryadevara, M.D. ¶¶ 5, 12. Plaintiff was seen by medical staff numerous times over the

past several years and did not make any complaints of ongoing medical concerns relating to

the May 23, 1999 incident. Decl. of S. Suryadevara, M.D. ¶¶ 6-11. While Plaintiff did

complain during the July 15, 1999 and July 20, 1999 visits about being attacked by another

inmate, her discomfort was related to Tonsillitis, not the May 23 incident. Decl. of S.

rd

Suryadevara, M.D. ¶10. 

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 Verified complaints and oppositions constitute opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary judgment 2

rule if they are based on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-

1400 (9th Cir. 1998). The asserted facts must be based on an inmate’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence,

and not merely on the inmate’s belief. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curium); Lew

v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In conjunction with its review of

defendants’ motion, the court has treated plaintiff’s complaint and opposition as opposing affidavits to the extent

possible.

9

 

D. Discussion

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In her second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on May 23, 1999, she was assaulted

by inmate McMillan, who suffered from mental health problems and took psychiatric medication at

the time of the assault. Inmate McMillan was placed in a cell with plaintiff and six other inmates

2

on May 20, 1999. On May 21, 1999, inmate McMillan was “acting strangely,” and plaintiff

informed correctional officer Schei about this fact. On May 22, 1999, inmate McMillan banged her

head on the bathroom stall several times and pulled her hair out, prompting one of plaintiff’s

cellmates to inform officer Castellanos of the situation. Plaintiff alleges that later on May 22, 1999,

McMillan was talking to herself in the mirror and began throwing toilet paper at the cellmates.

Officer Castellanos recorded the occurrence in the log book and referred McMillan to “B-yard clinic”

for evaluation. Inmate McMillan was seen at the clinic, and was then returned to plaintiff’s cell.

The next day, May 23, 1999, plaintiff found McMillan in the bathroom where she had smeared feces

and blood on the walls. Plaintiff assisted correctional officer Branch in coaxing inmate McMillan

out of the bathroom and to the clinic. Later that evening, correctional sergeant Marquez informed

plaintiff that she was aware of plaintiff’s safety concerns, but advised her that inmate McMillan

would be returning to the room; Sgt. Marquez asked that plaintiff and the other inmates deal with

McMillan’s presence one more night until she could be evaluated by mental health staff the

following morning. That evening at 8:50 p.m., McMillan got out of bed, threw her property on the

floor, jumped around, and screamed. Correctional officers Wilson, Baron, and Sooter arrived,

removed the other inmates from the cell, spoke to McMillan, and then returned Plaintiff and the

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other inmates to the cell with McMillan. Later that night at approximately 11:45 p.m., McMillan

“attacked me [plaintiff] from behind, choking me, and as I pried her hands from my throat,

consequently scratched and gouged my neck, right scapula and right shoulder; then kicked me once

I freed myself.” As a result of the attack, plaintiff suffered “3 moon-shaped avulsions to the neck,

contusions and lacerations to the throat, neck and scapula and shoulder areas.” Shortly after the

injury, plaintiff informed officer Hall of what had happened. Officer Hall called Sgt. Eby and Lt.

Kent. The inmates were questioned about the incident. Plaintiff was taken from the cell and her

wounds were inspected by MTA Rawlings who told plaintiff to wash the wounds with soap and

water. Rawlings stated he did not have anything else with him to clean her wounds. The following

morning, plaintiff received no further medical treatment, and was told there were no orders to

cleanse her wounds and she had to submit a co-pay in order to see a doctor.

Plaintiff states that McMillan’s condition deteriorated and within the following month she

was housed in a step up room, returned to the EOP, placed on suicide watch in the prison hospital

and eventually transferred to Patton State Hospital. 

Plaintiff alleges that no incident report had been filed regarding her injuries because they

were not deemed serious enough by prison staff to warrant a report. Because plaintiff felt that an

incident report should have been filed, she submitted an inmate appeal (602) regarding the incident

with inmate McMillan. 

Plaintiff contends that defendants Baron, Castellanos, Eby, I. Kent, S. Kent, Schei, Sooter

and Wilson failed to protect her resulting in an assault by inmate McMillan. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Rawlings failed to provide adequate medical care for her injuries.

2. Failure to Protect Claim

 To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

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confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials

may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting

evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence

on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s

conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

The moving defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no

evidence which would have led a reasonable person to believe that McMillan was a threat to plaintiff

or anyone else, thereby requiring that she be removed from that housing unit. Defendants therefore

argue there is no evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference and they are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law of plaintiff’s failure to protect claim. The Court separately addresses

plaintiff’s allegations and the evidence against each defendant below. 

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(a) Defendant Schei

Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference against defendant Shei is based on the fact that on

Friday, May 21, 1999, plaintiff informed defendant Schei that McMillan was “acting strangely”, had

not eaten all day and that she hadn’t received her medication. UDF 4. Plaintiff admits that at time,

McMillan was not acting violently toward anyone and that plaintiff’s concern was for McMillan.

Id. To this point, McMillan had not acted in such a way that a reasonable person could have

foreseen the events of May 23, 1999. The Court finds that Schei is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law because based on this undisputed evidence, there are no facts from which he could have

drawn an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. 

(b) Defendant Castellanos

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Castellanos is based on the fact that on May 22, 1999, he

responded to two incidents with McMillan. On the first occasion, McMillan was banging her head

against the wall. Officer Castellanos viewed the injury and recorded the occurrence in the daily log

book. UDF 5. Later the same day, Castellanos responded to the room where McMillan was talking

to herself. UDF 6. At this time, Castellanos sent McMillan to the clinic for further evaluation. Id.

This evidence is not disputed by plaintiff, nor does plaintiff provide any additional evidence.

Plaintiff seems to argue that if Castellanos would have read the log book when he began his shift,

he would have known about McMillan’s behavior the previous day. Depo. of Gilbert-Lewis, 14:23-

25 - 15:1-7. However, even if he did, the undisputed evidence establishes that after observing

McMillan on two (2) occasions, Castellanos sent her for further evaluation at the clinic. The Court

finds that defendant’s response to McMillan’s behavior was reasonable under the circumstances and

he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(c) Defendant Sooter

The undisputed evidence establishes that on May 23, 1999, defendant Sooter found McMillan

in the bathroom crying, exposed form the waist down, with feces smeared on the walls and blood

on the floor. UDF 8. Plaintiff voluntarily stayed and helped McMillan while defendant Sooter

called for assistance. Id. At this time, McMillan was referred to the clinic and the clinic referred

her to the prison hospital for further evaluation. UDF 9. Sooter, like Castellanos responded

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appropriately. That medical staff eventually sent her back to the housing unit, has no bearing on

Sooter’s liability. Sooter is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(d) Defendant I. Kent

On May 23, 1999, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Sergeant Kent went to talk to plaintiff and the

other inmates and informed them that she was aware of the problems but that McMillan would be

returning to the room. UDF 10. The evidence establishes that while McMillan had been acting

strangely the previous two days, she had not been violent towards anyone. She had been evaluated

by the clinic and medical staff and released back to her room. Based on this evidence, it was not

unreasonable for Sergeant Kent to allow McMillan to remain in the room. While in hindsight her

judgment was perhaps in error, the evidence does not establish that she was deliberately indifferent

to a substantial risk to Plaintiff. 

(e) Defendants Wilson, Baron and Sooter

Th undisputed evidence shows that defendants Wilson, Baron and Sooter responded to the

room on May 23, 1999 at about 8:30 p.m. in response to McMillan throwing her property to the

floor, jumping up and down on it and screaming. UDF 12. Plaintiff alleges the officers removed

everyone from the room except McMillan, who they spoke to at length and convinced to calm down

and clean up the mess. Id. The officers then left to prepare for the institutional count. It was not

until 11:45 p.m that Plaintiff was attacked by McMillan. UDF 13. Plaintiff supplies no other

evidence in support of her claims against defendants Wilson, Baron and Sooter and therefore, the

Court finds these defendants are also entitled to judgment as a matter of law in that there is no

evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to plaintiff. 

(f) Defendants Eby and S.Kent

Sergeant Eby and Lieutenant Kent responded on May 23, 1999 at about 11:45 p.m., after the

altercation between Plaintiff and McMillan. UDF 14. Plaintiff does not believe these defendants

had any knowledge of McMillan’s problems prior to this. See Depo. of Gilbert-Lewis, 36:20-25 -

37:1-9. Accordingly, defendants Eby and Kent are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as there

is no evidence that either had knowledge of any risk to plaintiff. While plaintiff argues that

defendant Kent should have filed an incident report regarding the altercation, there is no evidence

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that his failure to do so resulted in any harm to plaintiff. 

In summary, as to defendants Baron, Castellanos, Eby, I. Kent, S. Kent, Schei, Sooter and

Wilson, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that these defendants could have or should have taken

steps to protect her from the unfortunate attack by inmate McMillan, beyond those that they did. To

the extent plaintiff claims the mental health polices at the prison which permitted McMillan to be

housed in plaintiff’s dorm, caused her injuries, she has failed to submit any evidence that these

defendants had any control over inmate McMillan’s placement. Accordingly, the court finds that

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against

them. 

3. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need

Plaintiff alleges that MTA Rawlings failed to adequately treat her injuries on May 23, 1999.

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that defendant Rawlings was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs. 

Rawlings arrived to see Plaintiff after the altercation. UDF 19. He looked at her wounds and

instructed her to wash them with soap and water. Id. Plaintiff states that she asked him to cleanse

them due to the incident earlier involving blood and feces. Am. Compl. p. 3. Plaintiff states that

he gave her an alcohol pad and told her that was all he had but that he would return later. Id.

Plainitff contends Rawlings never returned and she went to the clinic the following morning where

she was told that there were no orders to cleanse her wounds and that she would have to submit a

co-pay to see a doctor. Am. Compl. p.4. Rawlings completed a CDC 7219 Medical Report of Injury

or Unusual Occurrence which states that Plaintiff sustained three scratches on the right side of the

neck. UDF 19. While Rawlings doesn’t specifically remember the incident, he states that it is his

practice to thoroughly evaluate an inmate who has been involved in an incident such as the one at

issue here, and if Plaintiff’s injuries were serious and required medical attention, he would have

immediately taken her to the emergency room. Decl. of Rawlings, ¶ 8. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

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Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

as plaintiff is here, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim

of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The undisputed facts establish that after Plaintiff was assaulted and injured on May 23, 1999,

defendant Rawlings provided her with the medical care he thought was appropriate given what he

viewed as minor injuries. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that defendant Rawlings knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Indeed, Plaintiff was

seen by medical staff later and there is no medical evidence that she was seriously injured on May

23, 1999. UDF 22. Even if defendant Rawlings erred in his assessment of plaintiff’s injuries, there

is no evidence that he was deliberately indifferent to her needs. Plaintiff’s opinion as to the urgency

of her condition and what should have been done to treat it more immediately is insufficient to raise

a triable issue of fact with respect to whether defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious

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medical need. Because plaintiff has not presented any evidence that defendant Rawlings acted with

deliberate indifference during his involvement in plaintiff’s medical care, defendant Rawlings is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s claim against him. 

V. Conclusion

The courtfinds that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s claim

that they violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety

and to her medical needs. Therefore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, filed December 22, 2005, be GRANTED, thus concluding this action in its

entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 23, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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