Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01179/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01179-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Samuel Rudolph Rotondo,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-06-1179-PHX-SMM (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Samuel Rotondo, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison

Complex, Eyman Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) and Respondents’ Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 10). Petitioner did not file a

reply. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss the petition on the

ground that it is time barred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2000, Petitioner was convicted on one count of first degree murder, five

counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault and one count of

theft in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) Petitioner was sentenced on

February 8, 2001. (Answer, Ex. F.) 

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Petitioner timely appealed, challenging only his sentences, and on March 7, 2002, the

Arizona Court of Appeals remanded the matter for resentencing. (Answer, Exs. G, H & A.)

On June 28, 2002, the trial court affirmed its previously-imposed sentences on all counts.

(Answer, Ex. I.) 

Petitioner timely appealed the re-sentencing and filed an Anders brief on November

8, 2002. (Answer, Ex. J & K.) On April 15, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner's sentences. (Answer, Ex. L.) Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme

Court for review.

On July 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief; his pro se Rule

32 petition was filed on June 8, 2004. (Answer, Exs. M & N.) On August 24, 2004, the trial

court dismissed the Rule 32 petition as untimely. (Answer. Ex. P.) On September 15, 2004,

Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, which the trial court denied on November 11, 2004.

(Answer, Ex. Q & S.) Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review.

On July 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief; his

subsequently filed petition ("Second Rule 32 Petition") claimed that his sentence violated

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Answer, Ex. T & U.) On March 7, 2006, the

trial court ruled that Petitioner's Second Rule 32 Petition was time-barred and without merit.

(Answer, Ex. W.) Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals on

April 6, 2006. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on March 19, 2007. (Arizona

Court of Appeals docket at http://www.cofad1.state.az.us/casefiles/cr/cr060299.pdf.) 

On April 27, 2006, while the petition was pending before the Arizona Court of

Appeals, Petitioner filed his present federal habeas petition in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) The

Petition presents eleven claims for relief:

1. Ground 1: Petitioner was sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington;

2. Ground 2: Petitioner's Confrontation Clause right and his right to a fair trial

were violated when the trial court permitted hearsay testimony by an officer;

3. Ground 3: Petitioner was denied a fair trial because the trial court unduly

limited cross-examination of one of the victims by allowing hearsay statements

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at trial;

4. Ground 4: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because of his

counsel's performance at trial;

5. Ground 5: Petitioner's constitutional rights were violated when the trial court

failed to consider all mitigating evidence on all counts;

6. Ground 6: The trial court failed to weigh all of the mitigating evidence

together to determine whether the mitigating circumstances were sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency on all counts, in violation of Petitioner's state

and federal constitutional rights;

7. Ground 7: The trial court's rejection of the mitigating evidence on the ground

that it did not excuse the criminal conduct violated Petitioner's constitutional

rights;

8. Ground 8: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal;

9. Ground 9: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on resentencing;

10. Ground 10: The prosecutor failed to disclose information regarding another

suspect in the area in violation of state and federal law; and

11. Ground 11: The trial court failed to properly conduct a formal re-sentencing

in violation of Petitioner's state and federal constitutional rights. 

DISCUSSION

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations

begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

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Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Of these possible starting dates, only the first and third are relevant to the present

action. Petitioner does not allege that he was unconstitutionally impeded from timely filing

the present federal Petition. Nor does Petitioner allege that his Petition is predicated on

newly-discovered evidence that could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise

of due diligence. 

The judgment against Petitioner became final on May 15, 2003, 30 days after the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence, when Petitioner's opportunity to

petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review had expired. See Rule 31.19(a), Ariz. R.

Crim. P. (stating that defendant has 30 days after the filing of a decision to file a petition for

review by the Arizona Supreme Court); see also 28 U. S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (stating that a

judgment becomes final at the later of either the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review). Although direct review is not normally complete until

the time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has expired, see

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999), certiorari can only be sought following

a decision or denial of discretionary review by the state court of last resort, i.e. the Arizona

Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13. Thus, in the present case, the 90 days allowed for the

filing of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is not considered

in calculating when Petitioner's judgment became final. 

Petitioner alleges in his Petition, however, that his sentence violates Blakely. Blakely

was decided on June 24, 2004. See 542 U.S. 296 (2004). If Blakely recognized a new

constitutional right and made that right retroactive to cases on collateral review then,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Petitioner's statute of limitations began to run on June

24, 2004. However, Blakely does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See Schardt

v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the statute of limitations began

to run on May 15, 2003, the date that his conviction became final, not on the date that the

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Blakely decision was issued. 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed application for

state post-conviction relief is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, however,

Petitioner's subsequent notices of post-conviction relief were not timely filed. (Answer, Exs.

P & W.) Accordingly, they were not “properly filed” and did not continue the statutory

tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 408-09 (2005); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S.

4, 8 (2000).

 Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases. Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir.1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner has not argued that he was unable to

timely file the pending petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

The last day of the limitations period was May 13, 2004, the one-year anniversary of

the trial court’s judgment and sentence. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2001) (calculating the 1-year period using the “anniversary method” of Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(a)). The instant petition was filed on April 27, 2006. It is therefore time-barred.

Consequently, the Court does not reach the respondent’s alternate argument concerning

procedural default.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-06-1179-

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PHX-SMM.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to

Petitioner and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 27th day of March, 2007.

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