Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02202/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02202-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AUGUSTUS NELSON,

CDCR #C-66719,

Civil No. 11cv2202 DMS (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION FOR

PERMISSION TO FILE

SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT TO

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT;

AND

(2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

DOUG J. DEGEUS, Appeals Coordinator;

NANCY GARCIA, Office Technician;

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 21, 2011, Augustus Nelson (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Centinela State Prison located in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se,

submitted an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Motion

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

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The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his

Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Oct. 19, 2011

Order at 5-6. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On December 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed his

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), along with a “Motion for Permission to File Supplement to

Plaintiff’s Exhibits” [ECF No. 7]. In this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to add additional exhibits to

his First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED and the Court will consider the

exhibits filed with this Motion, along with Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. 

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

As the Court stated in the previous screening Order, notwithstanding IFP status or the

payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case

it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to

sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

/ / /

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“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

In early 2007 Plaintiff was charged with a serious rules violation. (See FAC at 4-5.)

Plaintiff was later found guilty of a rules violation and this finding was upheld by the Institution

Classification Committee on May 31, 2007. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff attempted to file administrative

grievances to overturn this disciplinary conviction but he claims Defendants Degeus and Garcia

refused to timely process his grievances. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff claims he has a “1st Amendment

claim” which is “interwined with a 14th Amendment claim as the procedural due process

violation adversely affected Plaintiff’s liberty interest.” (Id. at 14.)

However, where a particular provision of the Constitution “‘provides an explicit source

of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,” that provision

must be the guide for analyzing Plaintiff’s claims. Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994)). Thus, the Court will construe

Plaintiff’s claims as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.

/ / / 

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The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: “[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed

by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or

property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

223-27 (1976). To state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or

property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the

government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000).

 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in

an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement

to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate

claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”)); accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75

(4th Cir. 1994) (1995); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that prison official

deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison

grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison

regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if

Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not

expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads nothing to suggest how

the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances resulted in an

“atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural adequacy of inmate grievance

procedures, his First Amended Complaint, once again, fails to state a due process claim. 

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Additionally, it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint that his

claims against Defendant Degeus and Garcia are time barred. Where the running of the statute

of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is

proper. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993). Because section

1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of

limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004);

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th

Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of limitations was one year. Jones, 393 F.3d at

927. Effective January 1, 2003, the limitations period was extended to two years. Id. (citing

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). 

Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause

of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Hardin v. Staub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989) (federal law

governs when a § 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual ... the tort

cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or

omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955

(“Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of the action.” ). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for actions they were alleged to have taken

in July of 2007. Thus, Plaintiff would have reason to believe that his constitutional rights were

violated more than four years ago. Id.; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. However,

Plaintiff did not file his Complaint in this case until September 21, 2011, which exceeds

California’s statute of limitation. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927.

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest how or why California’s two-year statute of

limitations might be tolled for a period of time which would make his claims timely. See, 

e.g., CAL.CODE CIV.P. § 352.1 (tolling statute of limitations “for a maximum of 2 years” during

a prisoner’s incarceration); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that CAL.

CODE CIV.P. § 352.1 tolls a California prisoner’s personal injury claims accruing before January

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1, 1995 for two years, or until January 1, 1995, whichever occurs later, unless application of the

statute would result in a “manifest injustice.”). 

Pursuant to Fink, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, accruing in 2007, would be tolled

for two years. California’s two-year statute of limitations would then begin to run -- requiring

Plaintiff to file this action against these Defendants no later than July of 2011. Generally,

federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding equitable tolling. Fink, 192 F.3d at 914;

Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988). Under California law,

however, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) he

must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must be the product of forces beyond

his control; and (3) the defendants must not be prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling.

 See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App.

1994); Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916.

Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which, if proved, would support the

equitable tolling of his claims. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir.

1993). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Degeus and Garcia must be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because it appears from the face of the pleading that

Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1277.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Permission to File Supplement to Plaintiff’s Exhibits [ECF

No. 7] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1.

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Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may

be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 3, 2012

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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