Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07043/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 8, 2012 Decided June 5, 2012

Re-Issued July 25, 2012

No. 11-7043

ELLI BERN ANGELLINO,

CREATIVE DIRECTOR OF ANGELLINO ARTE,

APPELLANT

v.

ROYAL FAMILY AL-SAUD ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00519)

Christopher J. Deal, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause as amicus curiae in support of the appellant. David W. 

DeBruin was on brief.

Elli Bern Angellino, pro se, argued the cause for the 

appellant. 

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #11-7043 Document #1377095 Filed: 06/05/2012 Page 1 of 15
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Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: “An artist 

is not paid for his labor but for his vision.”1

I.

 Or, in this case, 

not at all. Elli Bern Angellino (Angellino) filed a breach of 

contract action seeking over $12 million from the Royal 

Family Al-Saud (Royal Family) and sixteen of its members 

(collectively, defendants) for failing to pay him for artwork he 

alleges they commissioned. The district court dismissed his 

pro se complaint for failure to prosecute under Local Civil 

Rule 83.23 because Angellino failed to serve process on the 

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 4(f). For the reasons set forth 

below, we reverse the district court’s order of dismissal. 

Angellino is an artist residing in Brooklyn, New York

who in late 2005 reached an agreement with the defendants to 

design, produce and deliver a series of sculptures for them.

2

 1 James Abbott McNeill Whistler quoted in Anu Garg, Another 

Word A Day 163 (2005). 

 

If the defendants accepted a sculpture, they were obligated to 

pay Angellino the amount invoiced for it. If the defendants 

were unsatisfied with a sculpture, they could return it to 

Angellino with no obligation to pay for it. Pursuant to the 

agreement, Angellino designed twenty-nine sculptures in 

2006 and 2007 and, on completion, shipped each one 

addressed to the Saudi Royal Court, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 

The total invoiced amount for the twenty-nine sculptures was 

$12,580,000. The defendants kept the sculptures but never 

paid Angellino for any of them.

2 The facts are taken from Angellino’s complaint and other 

documents he filed in response to the district court’s orders. See 

Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). 

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Angellino ordinarily communicated with the defendants 

through the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Embassy) 

located in Washington, D.C. For instance, when one of the

defendant Royal Family members acknowledged delivery of 

Angellino’s sculpture and thanked him for it, the defendant

sent a letter to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States 

(Ambassador) in Washington, D.C., who then forwarded the 

letter to Angellino in New York. In June 2009, after the 

defendants had failed to pay Angellino for the sculptures, he 

mailed the past-due invoices to the Embassy to the attention 

of the Ambassador. In November 2009, on advice from the 

Embassy, Angellino again mailed the invoices to the Embassy 

but this time to the attention of the Embassy Accountant. 

When the defendants continued to ignore his mailings,

Angellino filed a pro se complaint in the district court on 

March 29, 2010. 

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (Act, FSIA), 28 

U.S.C. § 1608, governs service of process on a foreign state, 

including a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality 

thereof. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1) (“A foreign state or its 

political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality must be 

served in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608.”).3

 3 Section 1608(a) governs service of process on “a foreign state 

or political subdivision of a foreign state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), and 

section 1608(b) governs service on “an agency or instrumentality of 

a foreign state,” id. § 1608(b). 

 On April 8, 

2010, Angellino attempted to serve process on the defendants 

by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the 

Embassy via first class mail. At the time, a foreign official 

sued for “acts done in [his] official capacity” was considered 

an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” service on

whom was governed by section 1608. Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 

F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

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omitted).

4

 Section 1608 prescribes four methods of service—

“in descending order of preference”—and a plaintiff “must 

attempt service by the first method (or determine that it is 

unavailable) before proceeding to the second method, and so 

on.” Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 

39, 52 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Peterson v. Islamic Republic 

of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1129 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). The 

first method of service under section 1608(a) and (b) is “by 

delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in 

accordance with any special arrangement for service between 

the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision” or 

the “agency or instrumentality.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1), 

(b)(1).

5

 4 In 2010, the United States Supreme Court, while noting that 

some actions against an individual official “should be treated as 

actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party in 

interest,” held that a foreign official sued individually for his

official acts is not governed by the FSIA and that “a plaintiff 

seeking to sue a foreign official will not be able to rely on the Act’s 

service of process and jurisdictional provisions.” Samantar v. 

Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282, 2292 & n.20 (2010). As discussed 

infra note 6, Angellino’s complaint did not make clear whether he 

intended to sue the sixteen defendant Royal Family members in 

their official or individual capacities. 

 

5 The other means of obtaining service pursuant to section 

1608(a) are:

(2) if no special arrangement exists, by 

delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint 

in accordance with an applicable international 

convention on service of judicial documents; or

(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs 

(1) or (2), by sending a copy of the summons and 

complaint and a notice of suit, together with a 

translation of each into the official language of the 

foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a 

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Given his practice of communicating with the defendants 

through the Embassy, Angellino believed he was required to 

serve process on the defendants using the same means. But 

when he attempted to serve a copy of the summons and 

complaint by mailing them via first class mail to the Embassy, 

it refused to accept the mailing. Angellino also attempted to 

file proof of service forms with the district court but the court

returned the forms because he had sent them directly to the

district judge’s chambers rather than to the clerk of court’s 

office. See Minute Order, Angellino v. Royal Family Al-Saud, 

No. 1:10-cv-519 (D.D.C. May 17, 2010). The court directed 

Angellino to “review the Local Civil Rules, as well as Federal 

Rule[s] of Civil Procedure 4(j)(1) and . . . 55” before 

submitting the forms to the clerk’s office. Id. The minute 

order made no mention of any substantive deficiency in 

Angellino’s submission. Id. Four days later, Angellino filed 

the proof of service forms with the clerk’s office. 

 

signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by 

the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of 

foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned; or 

(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days 

under paragraph (3), by sending two copies of the 

summons and complaint and a notice of suit, 

together with a translation of each into the official 

language of the foreign state, by any form of mail 

requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 

dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary 

of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the 

attention of the Director of Special Consular 

Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one 

copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to 

the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the 

court a certified copy of the diplomatic note 

indicating when the papers were transmitted.

28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2)-(4). 

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Almost seven months later, on December 2, 2010, the 

district court entered another minute order:

Based upon plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this 

action, the Court hereby ORDERS plaintiff to 

show cause by no later than December 22, 

2010 why this case should not be dismissed 

without prejudice. See Local Civil Rule 83.23 

(“A dismissal for failure to prosecute may be 

ordered by the Court . . . upon the Court’s own 

motion.”).

Minute Order, Angellino v. Royal Family Al-Saud, No. 1:10-

cv-519 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2010) (First Show Cause Order)

(ellipsis in original). Two weeks later, on December 16, 

Angellino attempted to comply with the First Show Cause 

Order. He filed a verified statement explaining that he had 

“effectuated proper service in full compliance with FRCP 

4(j)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1608.” Pl.’s Resp. to First Show 

Cause Order at 2, Angellino v. Royal Family Al-Saud, No. 

1:10-cv-519 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2010). Angellino stated that 

service “was effectuated in accordance with the special 

arrangement for communication and service between the 

Plaintiff and [the defendants]” by which all “communication 

between [Angellino] and [the defendants] was established 

solely via and by means of the Embassy.” Id. As proof of the 

special arrangement, Angellino included a copy of a cover 

letter from the Ambassador forwarding a letter from a Royal 

Family member to him acknowledging receipt of a sculpture. 

Angellino also declared that in the past Embassy officials had 

telephoned him on behalf of two defendants and he attached

United States Postal Service (USPS) records indicating that an 

Embassy official had received the summons and complaint on 

April 8, 2010, but had returned them to the USPS—marked 

“Return to sender; not here”—several days later. 

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On April 11, 2011, after the case was assigned to a 

different district judge, the court concluded that Angellino’s 

response to the First Show Cause Order had failed to 

“demonstrate[] that the required special arrangement exists 

between himself and [d]efendants” and therefore Angellino 

had not “satisf[ied] the service requirements of [FRCP] 4 and 

28 U.S.C. § 1608.” Order at 2, Angellino v. Royal Family AlSaud, No. 1:10-cv-519 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2011) (Second Show 

Cause Order). The court ordered Angellino “either to file 

proof of service or to show cause why this Court should not 

dismiss his claim for failure to prosecute.” Id. In his

response filed two weeks later, Angellino again attempted to 

demonstrate a “special arrangement for service” by 

submitting the same materials he had attached to his response 

to the First Show Cause Order as well as a translated copy of 

the letter sent to him (via the Embassy) by one of the

defendant Royal Family members. See Pl.’s Amended Resp. 

to Second Show Cause Order at 2-4, Angellino v. Royal 

Family Al-Saud, No. 1:10-cv-519 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2011).

On April 29, the district court dismissed Angellino’s 

complaint without prejudice for failure to prosecute based on

Angellino’s failure to establish the existence of a “special 

arrangement for service” on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or 

a political subdivision thereof, his failure to attempt one of the 

alternative methods of service prescribed in section 1608(a) 

and his failure to serve the members of the Royal Family 

pursuant to FRCP 4(f).6

 6 FRCP 4(f) governs service of process on an individual located 

outside the United States. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (providing for 

service, “[u]nless federal law provides otherwise, [on] an individual 

. . . at a place not within any judicial district of the United States”). 

The district court assumed Angellino had sued the sixteen 

individual defendants in their individual capacities and therefore 

looked to FRCP 4(f) to resolve the service of process issue. Before 

us, however, Angellino asserts that he sued the members of the 

 See Order, Angellino v. Royal 

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Family Al-Saud, No. 1:10-cv-519 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2011)

(Dismissal Order). Angellino timely appealed. None of the 

defendants entered an appearance before the district court nor 

has any of them done so on appeal. 

II.

The law is clear that “[d]istrict courts have inherent 

power to dismiss a case sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to 

prosecute or otherwise comply with a court order.” Peterson 

v. Archstone Cmtys. LLC, 637 F.3d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 

see also D.D.C. Local Rule 83.23 (“A dismissal for failure to 

prosecute may be ordered by the Court . . . upon the Court’s 

own motion.”). “[We] review[] such dismissals for abuse of 

discretion.” Peterson, 637 F.3d at 418. “Because disposition 

of claims on the merits is favored[,] the harsh sanction of 

dismissal for failure to prosecute is ordinarily limited to cases 

involving egregious conduct by particularly dilatory plaintiffs, 

after less dire alternatives have been tried without success.” 

Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). A 

dismissal for failure to prosecute due to a “delay in service is 

appropriate . . . only when there is no reasonable probability 

that service can be obtained” or there is a “lengthy period of 

inactivity.” Smith-Bey v. Cripe, 852 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 

1988); see also id. (dismissal of pro se defendant’s complaint 

for failure to prosecute not warranted where “it is probable 

that service could yet be obtained”); Novak v. World Bank, 

703 F.2d 1305, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Although district 

courts have broad discretion to dismiss a complaint for failure 

 

Royal Family “in their official capacities.” Appellant’s Br. 18. 

Nevertheless, it is clear to us that the sixteen individual defendants 

were sued in their individual capacities as Angellino’s breach of 

contract claim does not allege an act of state such that Angellino’s 

action against the individual defendants “should be treated as [an] 

action[] against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party 

in interest.” Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292; see supra note 4.

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to effect service, dismissal is not appropriate when there 

exists a reasonable prospect that service can be obtained.”). A 

“lengthy period of inactivity” may justify dismissal 

“ ‘particularly . . . if the plaintiff has been previously warned 

that he must act with more diligence, or if he has failed to 

obey the rules or court orders, or if he has no excuse for the 

delay, or if there are other factors aggravating the inaction.’ ” 

Smith-Bey, 852 F.2d at 594 (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2370, at 205-07 (1971)). 

 We agree with the district court that Angellino was 

required to serve process on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

under section 1608(a) and on the sixteen defendant Royal 

Family members under FRCP 4(f). See Dismissal Order at 1-

4 (construing Angellino’s pro se complaint to seek relief from

both Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or political subdivision 

thereof, and individual defendants); supra note 6.7

 7 To be clear, we express no opinion whether the Royal Family 

is equivalent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or a political 

subdivision thereof. We understand Angellino’s complaint to seek 

relief from, inter alia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or a political 

subdivision thereof, service of which is governed by section 

1608(a). See Appellant’s Br. at 18-20 (action “[was] [b]rought 

[a]gainst the Defendants as [a] Foreign State”); Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (pro se filing “is to be liberally construed” 

(quotation marks omitted)).

 Turning 

first to service of process under section 1608(a), we believe 

there exists a “reasonable probability” that Angellino can 

effect service given the success of other parties in serving 

process on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under section 

1608(a)(3) and (4). See Clerk’s Certificate of Mailing Note, 

In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 1:03-md-1570 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2005) (“The [U.S.] Embassy in Khartoum 

delivered the summons, complaint and notice of suit pursuant 

to 28 [U.S.C. §] 1608(a)(4) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on June 28, 2005 under cover 

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of a diplomatic note . . . . The diplomatic note constitutes 

transmittal of these documents to the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia as contemplated in [28 U.S.C. §] 1608(a)(4).”);8

Plaintiffs’ Affidavit Requesting Foreign Mailing at 1, Elbasir 

v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 1:04-cv-1706 (D.D.C. Jan. 

7, 2005) (plaintiffs’ request that clerk mail service of process 

to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1608(a)(3));9see also Sealed Summons, UNC Lear Servs., 

Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 5:04-cv-1008 (W.D. 

Tex. Mar. 30, 2005) (service of process on Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia pursuant to section 1608(a)(3)).10

Turning next to service of process on the defendant Royal 

Family members under FRCP 4(f), we note that plaintiffs in 

other federal litigation have successfully effected Rule 4(f) 

service on at least one of the Royal Family members whom

Although Angellino 

has so far been unable to employ the preferred “special 

arrangement” option, we believe there nonetheless exists a 

reasonable probability that he can serve process on the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia using one of section 1608(a)’s 

other options. 

 8 See supra note 5, for service of process pursuant to section 

1608(a)(4). 

9 See supra note 5, for service of process pursuant to section 

1608(a)(3). 

10 As these cases suggest, section 1608(a)(2), which authorizes 

service of process “in accordance with an applicable international 

convention on service of judicial documents,” 28 

U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2), appears inapplicable because the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the 

Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents. 

See U.S. Treaties in Force at 394-95 (2011) available at

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf.

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Angellino names in his complaint.11

 11 Under FRCP 4(f), a person “not within any judicial district of 

the United States” may be served:

See Order Authorizing 

Service of Summons By Mail Pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3) at 1, 

Sharif v. Int’l Dev. Group, No. 1:02-cv-5430 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 

30, 2002) (authorizing service by mail on Royal Family 

member pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3)); see also Consent Motion 

(1) by any internationally agreed means of 

service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, 

such as those authorized by the Hague Convention 

on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 

Documents; 

(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, 

or if an international agreement allows but does not 

specify other means, by a method that is reasonably 

calculated to give notice: 

(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's 

law for service in that country in an action in its 

courts of general jurisdiction; 

(B) as the foreign authority directs in 

response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; 

or 

(C) unless prohibited by the foreign 

country's law, by: 

(i) delivering a copy of the summons 

and of the complaint to the individual 

personally; or 

(ii) using any form of mail that the 

clerk addresses and sends to the individual 

and that requires a signed receipt; or 

(3) by other means not prohibited by 

international agreement, as the court orders. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). 

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at 1, Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., No. 1:02-cv1616 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2003) (Royal Family member “indicated 

to counsel for plaintiffs . . . that he will accept service by 

certified mail”). 

Nor has Angellino engaged in a “lengthy period of 

inactivity” warranting dismissal. Although Angellino failed 

to successfully serve process on any of the defendants in the 

thirteen months between the filing and the dismissal of his 

complaint, his failure was not a result of “inactivity.” 

Angellino attempted to serve process within two weeks of

filing his complaint and, when twice ordered to show cause 

why his complaint should not be dismissed for failure to serve 

process, he promptly responded by explaining to the court 

why he believed he had done so. For example, in response to 

the district court’s Second Show Cause Order reciting that he 

had failed to “demonstrate[] that a special arrangement for 

service exists” and that his mailing of the complaint and 

summons to the Embassy “d[id] not satisfy the requirements 

of . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1608,” Second Show Cause Order at 2, 

Angellino submitted a letter one of the defendants sent to him 

via the Embassy as evidence of a “special arrangement.”

Granted, the Second Show Cause Order informed Angellino 

that he had failed to establish the existence of a “special 

arrangement for service.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (emphasis 

added); see also Int’l Road Fed’n v. Embassy of the Dem.

Rep. Congo, 131 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251 (D.D.C. 2001) 

(contract provision providing “[a]ll notices, demands, or 

requests between Sublessor and Sublessee shall be delivered 

in person, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by 

registered mail” and providing addresses for notification 

constituted “special arrangement for service” under section 

1608(a)(1) (brackets in original)). Nevertheless, Angellino’s

repeated efforts to establish service of process—while 

inadequate—reflect anything but “inactivity,” cf. Hernandez 

v. Norinco N. China Indus., Inc., 120 F. App’x 371, 371-72 

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(D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (failure of plaintiff’s counsel to 

serve process two and one-half years after filing complaint 

warranted dismissal for failure to prosecute), and in no way 

indicate an “intent to abandon the case,” Sykes v. United 

States, 290 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1961), cited in Smith-Bey, 

852 F.2d at 594.

Moreover, the district court did not provide Angellino, a 

pro se plaintiff, “fair notice of the requirements” for serving 

process under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) and FRCP 4(f). Hudson v. 

Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Moore 

v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 

(district court “should supply [pro se party] minimal notice of 

the consequences of not complying with procedural rules”); 

Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (pro se 

prisoner “is entitled to receive notice of the consequences of 

failing to respond with affidavits to a motion for summary 

judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district 

court’s two show cause orders instructed Angellino only “to 

file proof of service or to show cause why [the] [c]ourt should 

not dismiss his claim for failure to prosecute.” Second Show 

Cause Order at 2; see also First Show Cause Order (“Based 

upon plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action, the Court 

hereby ORDERS plaintiff to show cause . . . why this case 

should not be dismissed without prejudice.”). Despite the 

inadequacy of Angellino’s responses, the court never 

explained to Angellino the alternative means by which he 

could attempt service. Only in its order dismissing 

Angellino’s complaint did the court finally inform Angellino 

that he was required to serve process on the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia pursuant to one of the non-“special 

arrangement” alternatives of section 1608(a) and on the 

sixteen defendant Royal Family members pursuant to FRCP 

4(f). In addition, the district court should have cautioned

Angellino that a dismissal without prejudice for failure to 

serve process could affect the viability of his claim depending 

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14

on the applicable statute of limitations. See Moore, 994 F.2d 

at 876 (“District courts do not need to provide detailed 

guidance to pro se litigants but should supply minimal notice 

of the consequences of not complying with procedural 

rules.”); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 672 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed without prejudice, the 

statute of limitations is deemed unaffected by the filing of the 

suit, so that if the statute of limitations has run the dismissal is 

effectively with prejudice.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

As we observed in Moore, “[p]ro se litigants are allowed 

more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct 

defects in service of process and pleadings.” 994 F.2d at 876. 

Viewing all of the circumstances here—the reasonable 

probability that Angellino can obtain service on at least one of

the defendants, Angellino’s dogged (albeit inadequate) 

attempts to effect service of process and the district court’s 

failure to provide “a form of notice sufficiently 

understandable to one in [Angellino’s] circumstances fairly to 

apprise him of what is required” to serve process, Hudson, 

412 F.2d at 1094, and to provide notice of the consequences 

of failing to serve process—we conclude the district court 

abused its discretion in dismissing Angellino’s complaint.12

So ordered.

 

Accordingly, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand 

the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 12 Based on the materials Angellino submitted, we do not believe

the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Angellino 

failed to establish a “special arrangement for service” under section 

1608(a)(1). See supra pp. 9-10, 12. 

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. During the 13 months that this 

case was pending in the District Court, the two district judges

who handled the case gave Angellino ample opportunity to 

pursue the suit. After Angellino’s initial attempt to effect 

service failed, the district judges twice warned Angellino that 

his suit would be dismissed if he did not effect service. Yet 

Angellino never again even tried to serve the defendants. 

Because Angellino repeatedly failed to take the necessary 

steps to effect service and thereby move the suit forward, the 

District Court finally dismissed the case without prejudice. 

(Because the dismissal was without prejudice, Angellino 

could have filed a new suit; he has not done so.)

I find no error in the District Court’s patient handling of 

this matter. Moreover, when a district court dismisses a case 

for failure to prosecute, our review is for abuse of discretion. 

So even assuming the District Court faced a close call in 

deciding whether to dismiss this suit, our deferential standard 

of review surely suggests that we affirm. I respectfully 

dissent.

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