Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03627/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03627-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3627

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Roderick Nunley

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant

v.

Michael S. Bowersox

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: January 14, 2015

 Filed: April 27, 2015 

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Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Roderick Nunley pled guilty in Missouri state court to the kidnapping, rape, and

murder of a fifteen year old girl named Ann Harrison. After Nunley waived his right

to jury sentencing, the state court sentenced him to death. He now brings this 28

U.S.C. § 2254 action alleging that the state denied his constitutionally protected

liberty interest in the right to capital jury sentencing as articulated in Ring v. Arizona,

536 U.S. 584 (2002), and later applied retroactively under Missouri law by State v.

Appellate Case: 13-3627 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/27/2015 Entry ID: 4268869 
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The district court1

 denied Nunley's

petition, and we affirm. 

In January 1991, Nunley pled guilty in a Missouri court to kidnapping, raping,

and murdering Ann Harrison. The state court sentenced Nunley to death, and shortly

thereafter he filed a post conviction motion attempting to withdraw his guilty plea and

alleging that his sentencing judge had been drinking prior to the sentencing

proceeding. Nunley's motion to withdraw his plea was denied. He then appealed to

the Missouri Supreme Court. That court entered a summary order "vacating the

judgment and remanding for a new penalty hearing, imposition of sentence and entry

of new judgment," but it did not "reverse the plea" or order "a new plea hearing." 

State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). On remand, Nunley

moved to withdraw his guilty plea and requested jury sentencing. The state trial court

denied his motion and again sentenced Nunley to death. The Missouri Supreme Court

affirmed, reasoning that Nunley had "waived his right to trial by jury when he pleaded

guilty" and had "testified at his plea hearing he understood he had a right to a jury trial

and he was waiving the right." Id. at 923.

Nunley filed a § 2254 petition in April 2000 challenging his conviction. He

alleged that the state court had violated his constitutional rights when it denied his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his request for jury sentencing. During the

pendency of Nunley's federal habeas petition, the United States Supreme Court issued

its decision in Ring that the Sixth Amendment gives defendants the right to have a

jury "find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." 

536 U.S. at 609. Nunley then supplemented his § 2254 petition to include a claim

under Ring. A short time later the Supreme Court decided that Ring did not apply to

cases that were "already final on direct review." Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,

1

 The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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358 (2004). Nunley then argued in his § 2254 petition that the Missouri Supreme

Court had applied Ring retroactively as a matter of state law in Whitfield, see 107

S.W.3d at 268–69, thereby entitling him to capital jury sentencing even though his

case was already final on direct review. We denied Nunley's petition, ruling that the

state law "issue he raises" should be "addressed in the first instance—if at all—by a

state court." Nunley v. Bowersox, 394 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2005).

Thereafter, the Missouri Supreme Court set Nunley's execution date for October

20, 2010, and Nunley moved to recall the mandate. He argued that his sentence

violated Ring because a judge had made the factual findings which supported the

"aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." See 536

U.S. at 609. He again argued that Whitfield had applied Ring retroactively as a matter

of Missouri law. See 107 S.W.3d at 268–69. The state supreme court denied his

motion, reasoning that Nunley had waived his right to jury sentencing when he made

the strategic decision to plead guilty. See State v. Nunley, 341 S.W.3d 611, 621 (Mo.

2011) (en banc). 

Nunley then filed a supplemental habeas petition in federal court arguing that

Whitfield had guaranteed his right to have a jury find the aggravating circumstance

necessary for imposition of the death penalty, and the supreme court's refusal to grant

his request for jury sentencing thus deprived him of a "liberty interest" secured by the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). The

federal district court denied his petition. We later granted a certificate of appealability

on whether Nunley had a liberty interest in the retroactive application of Ring and on

whether the state supreme court had unreasonably applied Hicks or made an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record.

We review legal issues presented in a habeas petition "de novo, but we review

any underlying factual findings for clear error." Baranski v. United States, 515 F.3d

857, 859 (8th Cir. 2008). The "focus of our inquiry is whether the state supreme court

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acted contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law." Losh v.

Fabian, 592 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2010). In § 2254 proceedings, a "federal court

may not re-examine a state court's interpretation and application of state law." 

Schleeper v. Groose, 36 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Nunley argues that he has a liberty interest in capital jury sentencing because

Whitfield applied Ring retroactively in Missouri. See Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at

268–69. He asserts that if "a State has provided for the imposition of criminal

punishment in the discretion of the trial jury," a defendant in such a case has a liberty

interest that the "Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by

the state." Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted). Nunley contends that the

Missouri Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under

Hicks by refusing to recognize his right to jury sentencing. 

The record indicates, however, that Nunley unequivocally waived his right to

jury sentencing when he pled guilty. At that time the state trial court informed Nunley

that by entering a guilty plea, he was giving up his constitutional right to trial by jury

and his right to jury sentencing. Nunley acknowledged these warnings and waived his

rights. He has since admitted that he made a strategic choice to waive jury sentencing

because he believed a court was less likely to be inflamed by the details of his crime

than a jury. After the trial court sentenced him to death, Nunley changed his tactics

and moved to withdraw his plea. Although the state supreme court later vacated the

trial court's judgment and remanded "for a new penalty hearing, imposition of

sentence and entry of new judgment," it did not "reverse the plea" or order "a new plea

hearing." Nunley, 923 S.W.2d at 916, 919. Nunley's guilty plea and waiver of jury

sentencing thus remained in effect on remand, and he has not established that the state

supreme court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by denying his

motion to withdraw his plea. See Losh, 592 F.3d at 823.

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Nunley argues that his waiver was not knowing or voluntary because at the time

he pled guilty, capital defendants had "no recognized right" to have a jury find the

aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See Halbert

v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623 (2005). Nunley nevertheless has no recognized

federal right under Ring given that the Supreme Court did not make that decision

retroactive. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358. State law offers him no additional relief. 

The Missouri Supreme Court has explained that Whitfield only applies to cases in

which a judge imposed the death penalty after a jury deadlocked over a defendant's

sentence; it does not apply to defendants "who strategically pled guilty to avoid jury

sentencing." Nunley, 341 S.W.3d at 622 (citing Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 261–62). 

We "may not re-examine a state court's interpretation and application of state law" in

deciding a § 2254 petition, and Nunley's argument under Whitfield thus fails. See

Schleeper, 36 F.3d at 737.

Nunley also challenges the constitutionality of the statutory scheme under

which he was convicted, asserting that it violated Ring and Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000). The relevant Missouri statute provided that no "defendant who

pleads guilty to a homicide offense . . . shall be permitted a trial by jury on the issue

of punishment to be imposed, except by agreement of the state." Mo. Stat. § 565.006

(1991). Nunley nevertheless cites two supreme court opinions from other states which

held that statutes linking a guilty plea to an automatic waiver of jury sentencing

violate Ring. See People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 499 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); State

v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 803 (S.D. 2006).

The Missouri Supreme Court rejected Nunley's challenge to Mo. Stat. §

565.006, and its conclusion was not an "unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law." See Losh, 592 F.3d at 823. We have stated that "in the

habeas corpus context, the objective reasonableness of a state court's application of

Supreme Court precedent may be established if our sister circuits have similarly

applied the precedent." Colvin v. Taylor, 324 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 2003). The

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Fourth Circuit has concluded, as did the Missouri Supreme Court, that "neither

Apprendi nor Ring holds that a defendant who pleads guilty to capital murder and

waives a jury trial under the state's capital sentencing scheme retains a constitutional

right to have a jury determine aggravating factors." Lewis v. Wheeler, 609 F.3d 291,

309 (4th Cir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Ring indicates that

"fairminded jurists could disagree" with Nunley's challenge to Missouri's plea statute,

and thus the state supreme court's conclusion was not an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. See Armstrong v. Hobbs, 698 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th

Cir. 2012).

Finally, Nunley argues that the state supreme court made an "unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court" by

concluding that he had waived his right to jury sentencing. See Davis v. Norris, 423

F.3d 868, 881 (8th Cir. 2005). Nunley contends that he revoked his waiver by

requesting a jury for his second sentencing proceeding after remand and that the state

supreme court's conclusion to the contrary was unreasonable. The record establishes,

however, that the Missouri Supreme Court had only remanded the case for a new

penalty hearing. See Nunley, 923 S.W.2d at 916. The court never reversed the plea

or ordered a new plea hearing. Id. Given that Nunley's waiver was still in effect when

he attempted to adopt a new strategy and requested jury sentencing at his second

capital penalty proceeding, the state supreme court did not make an unreasonable

factual determination in light of the evidence presented. See Davis, 423 F.3d at 881.

For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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