Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03652/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03652-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREATER NAPA FAIR HOUSING,

et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 07-3652 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

HARVEST REDWOOD RETIREMENT 

RESIDENCE, L.L.C., et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction came on for hearing before this court on

September 26, 2007. Plaintiffs, Greater Napa Fair Housing Center and the individual

plaintiffs (“plaintiffs”), appeared through their counsel, Stuart Seaborn and Liz CristolDeman. Defendants Harvest Redwood Retirement Residence LLC, Redwood Retirement

Residence LLC, and Holiday Retirement Corp. (collectively “defendants”) appeared through

their counsel, Kurt A. Franklin. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered

their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court

hereby DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction, for the reasons stated at the hearing,

and summarized as follows:

1. With respect to standing, defendants’ objections to plaintiff Greater Napa Fair

Housing’s (“Greater Napa”) organizational standing is OVERRULED. The court finds that

Greater Napa has sufficiently alleged that its mission of eliminating discriminatory housing

practices throughout its service area was frustrated as a result of defendants’ actions, and

that Greater Napa has suffered economic losses, all of which is sufficient to establish

organizational standing. See Complaint ¶ 70; see also Smith v. Pacific Properties and

Case 4:07-cv-03652-PJH Document 40 Filed 10/01/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The court notes that, in view of Ms. Duncan’s recent death, standing on her

behalf is only permissible to the extent that a proper substitution is filed allowing her daughter

Mae Louise Whitaker to proceed as Ms. Duncan’s successor in interest. Counsel indicated

at the hearing that such a substitution would be filed as soon as possible, and the court’s ruling

that Ms. Duncan has sufficiently alleged standing is contingent upon the filing of such. 

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Development Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2004)(setting forth elements of

organizational standing). With respect to the individual plaintiffs – Ruby Duncan, Eva

Northern, and their daughters Mae Louise Whitaker and Nancy Northern – defendants’

objections on standing grounds are OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. To the

extent, for example, that these plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for past conduct,

standing has been sufficiently alleged, by virtue of the allegations of harm contained in the

complaint. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 6, 8, 37-46, 47-60.1

 To the extent these plaintiffs seek

prospective injunctive relief, however, they have no standing, as they have failed to allege

continuous or threatened injury or harm – a conclusion with which counsel agreed at the

hearing, when questioned. See also, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043 (9th

Cir.1999)(any person harmed by discrimination under the FHA/FHAA, whether or not the

target of such discrimination, has standing to sue)(allowing damages claims, but not

prospective relief claims, to go forward where plaintiff moved out of residences that formed

subject of her FHA/FHAA claims). 

2. Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs’ claims have become moot, by virtue of

defendants’ voluntary cessation of conduct, is also OVERRULED. The burden of

demonstrating mootness is a heavy one, and the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “an

action for an injunction does not become moot merely because the conduct complained of

was terminated, if there is a possibility of recurrence, since otherwise the defendant's [sic]

would be free to return to [their] old ways.” LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of

Nevada, 434 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, defendants’ assertion that they do not

“intend” to issue eviction notices or to institute meal tray plans in the future, fails to

demonstrate the kind of “absolute” certainty required to establish that the harm cannot

recur again. See id. at 1154 (defendants’ promise that they “ha[d] no intention to use [the

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allegedly unlawful goods] in the future” rejected as insufficient to make “absolutely clear”

that voluntary cessation had occurred). As such, plaintiffs’ claims are not moot, and the

defendants’ arguments on grounds of mootness are hereby rejected.

3. Notwithstanding the above findings, plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction

is denied, for failure to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiffs’

claims. See Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2004)(plaintiff must show “(1) a

strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff

if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4)

advancement of the public interest (in certain cases)”). 

Preliminarily, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a prima facie case of disability

discrimination, as required under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test applied to

claims brought under the Fair Housing Act and its amendments. See, e.g., Gamble v. City

of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1996)(applying Title VII discrimination analysis to

Fair Housing Act claims). Defendants, however, have articulated a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the purported disparate treatment alleged by plaintiffs, by

virtue of testimony indicating: that defendants are an independent living facility that does

not provide personal care services; that defendants’ rental agreements provide that if at

any time a resident becomes incapable of providing for health care or personal needs, or if

a condition develops making the resident a danger to self or others, the resident then

agrees to promptly move out; that defendants’ resident managers did not believe that

caregivers were adequately meeting the needs of certain residents; that any evictions

occurred as a result of a belief that the resident was a danger to herself or others; and that

the meal tray fee policy was instituted because of legitimate issues with meal tray abuse by

caregivers, labor costs, and other concerns. See generally Declarations of David Hall,

Denise Hall, and Tom Ahrens ISO Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Preliminary

Injunction. 

In view of defendants’ articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged

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conduct, it is plaintiffs’ burden to come forward with persuasive evidence of pretext. 

Plaintiffs seek to do so here by proving, as a matter of law, that defendants are not

permitted to make residency decisions based on independent living criteria, or to inquire as

to whether residents satisfy such criteria. Plaintiffs have failed to persuade the court,

however, that such a conclusion is appropriate as a matter of law, and in the absence of

discovery, have also failed to persuade the court that defendants’ articulated

nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged conduct is otherwise pretextual. 

In sum, and for all these reasons, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of

success on the merits of its disability discrimination claims at this juncture. Accordingly, the

motion for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED. 

Additionally, defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Defendants’

corresponding objections to plaintiffs’ declarations, however, are OVERRULED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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