Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07470/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 

OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEICA MICROSYSTEMS INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-07470-LHK (VKD)

ORDER RE PROTECTIVE ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 48

Plaintiff The Regents of the University of Michigan (“UM”) and defendant Leica 

Microsystems Inc. (“Leica”) ask the Court to resolve their dispute concerning the terms of a 

proposed protective order that will govern the exchange of disclosures and discovery in this 

action. Dkt. No. 48. The parties represent that they have agreed to most of the terms of a 

proposed order based on this District’s model protective order for patent cases.1 Their dispute 

concerns whether in-house counsel for a Receiving Party may have access to discovery material 

designated “Highly Confidential – Attorneys Eyes Only” (“HC/AEO”) by the Producing Party, as 

permitted by optional section 7.3(b) of the model order. In addition, the parties also dispute 

whether the UM’s proposed designated in-house counsel, Jason Garr, meets the requirements of 

section 7.3(b) or should otherwise have access to Leica’s HC/AEO discovery material.

For the reasons explained below, the Court denies without prejudice the parties’ competing 

1 The parties refer to the Patent Local Rule 2-2 Interim Model Protective Order, which governs 

unless and until the Court enters a different protective order, and also to the Model Stipulated 

Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive Confidential Information 

and/or Trade Secrets, which is substantially the same as the interim order except that some

provisions are designated “optional.”

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 52 Filed 04/10/20 Page 1 of 6
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requests for entry of their respective protective orders.

I. BACKGROUND

In this action, UM asserts that Leica infringes one of UM’s patents relating to fluorescence 

detection of tagged molecules in a sample of material. Dkt. No. 1. Among other things, the 

complaint recites that Leica declined UM’s pre-suit invitation to take a license to the patent. Id.

¶¶ 22, 47, 49-52.

UM argues that the protective order in this case should include optional section 7.3(b) of 

the model order, which provides that a Receiving Party may disclose material designated HC/AEO 

to “[n]ot more than one Designated House Counsel of the Receiving Party (1) who has no

involvement in competitive decision-making, (2) to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for

this litigation, (3) who has signed the ‘Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound’ (Exhibit

A), and (4) as to whom the procedures set forth in paragraph 7.4(a)(1), below, have been

followed.”2 Dkt. No. 48-1 at 10. UM proposes to designate Jason Garr as its Designated House 

Counsel under this provision. Dkt. No. 48 at 2 & n.1. According to UM, Mr. Garr is an Associate 

General Counsel for UM who advises UM’s Office of Technology Transfer on licensing and 

litigation matters. Id. UM says that Mr. Garr’s role is “exclusively legal” and that he does not 

provide business advice and is not involved in competitive decision-making. Id. UM represents 

that Mr. Garr did not participate in any pre-suit discussions with Leica. Id. at 4.

Leica argues that the protective order should not permit in-house counsel for either party to 

view all HC/AEO material produced in discovery. Id. at 5. In addition, Leica argues that

considering Mr. Garr’s responsibilities in advising UM’s Office of Technology Transfer, 

disclosure of Leica’s HC/AEO material to him would risk misuse of that information for 

competitive purposes. Id. at 7. Leica points out that UM’s website identifies Mr. Garr as 

practicing in the area of intellectual property “prosecution” as well as licensing and litigation. See 

https://ogc.umich.edu/attorneys-staff/jason-garr/. Leica also says that Mr. Garr is a potential fact 

2 Proposed section 7.4(a)(1) requires a Receiving Party to provide certain information about its 

Designated House Counsel to the Producing Party in advance of disclosing HC/AEO material to 

such in-house counsel.

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witness with respect to UM’s willful infringement allegations. Id. at 7-8.

II. DISCUSSION

In the Ninth Circuit, material produced in pretrial discovery is presumptively public. See 

In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 425-26 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district court to protect parties from 

“undue burden or expense” in discovery by ordering that “a trade secret or other confidential 

research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a 

specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Ordinarily, the party resisting disclosure of its information 

must show good cause for entry of a protective order. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 

at 424, 426.

Here, the parties ask the Court to resolve a dispute regarding the terms of an umbrella 

protective order intended to govern the handling of discovery material to be produced over the 

course of the action. The parties have stipulated to most of the terms of the protective order, 

including a two-tier designation scheme that gives outside counsel (and specified others) access to 

material designated HC/AEO, but gives a broader range of people, including certain party 

employees, access to material designated “Confidential.” See Sections 7.2(a) & (b), 7.3(a). The 

agreed portions of the proposed protective order also include a mechanism for challenging 

confidentiality designations one party believes are too restrictive after the designation is made, 

reflecting the prospective nature of the proposed order. See Section 6. 

The disputed provision, section 7.3(b) of the model order, if adopted, would apply to all 

material the parties may designate as HC/AEO during discovery. The parties agree that material 

may only be designated HC/AEO if it would qualify for protection under Rule 26(c) and if its 

“disclosure . . . to another Party or Non-Party would create a substantial risk of serious harm that 

could not be avoided by less restrictive means.” See Section 2.8.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Brown Bag Software 

v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992) are the leading cases on the propriety of 

restricting in-house counsel’s access to an adversary’s confidential discovery material. Both cases 

caution against protective orders that arbitrarily distinguish between outside counsel and in-house 

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counsel; they require instead that a district court evaluate the specific factual circumstances that 

may or may not warrant treating outside counsel and in-house counsel differently. See U.S. Steel, 

730 F.2d at 1468; Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1470-71. This evaluation requires the Court 

to consider the material to be disclosed and the role and responsibilities of the in-house counsel to 

whom disclosure is proposed. See Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1470-71 (describing 

necessity of specific factual inquiry).

The Court is not able to resolve the parties’ dispute on the record presented. At this point, 

the Court is not asked to make specific findings as to whether any particular discovery material 

should or should not be disclosed to in-house counsel who meet the requirements of section 7.3(b). 

In fact, the parties’ joint submission reflects disagreement (or perhaps uncertainty) about the kinds 

of discovery material that may be designated HC/AEO by each side. As for Mr. Garr specifically, 

the parties disagree about the nature of his role and responsibilities as in-house counsel for UM. 

Neither party presents evidence on this point. UM describes Mr. Garr’s responsibilities at a high 

level of generality in a footnote, and Leica disputes UM’s description by reference to information 

posted on UM’s website. These circumstances distinguish this dispute from a number of the cases 

on which the parties rely in which district courts have exercised their discretion to permit or bar 

in-house counsel’s access to an adversary’s confidential discovery material based on a more fully 

developed factual record. 

Given the intended purpose of the proposed protective order—i.e. to facilitate both parties’

production and disclosure of confidential discovery material on a prospective basis—the Court 

disagrees with UM’s suggestion that the matter may be resolved by simply finding that Leica, the 

party seeking more restrictive protections, has failed to meet its burden to show good cause to 

exclude in-house counsel of either party from access to the Producing Party’s HC/AEO discovery 

material. The Court requires a more specific showing from both parties in order to resolve this 

dispute. 

The Court can provide guidance on one point based on the parties’ joint submission and 

the present record. UM argues that because UM is a university and does not design, make or sell 

any products in competition with Leica, none of its in-house counsel are engaged in “competitive 

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decision-making” and therefore should be permitted access to Leica’s confidential discovery 

material. See Dkt. No. 48 at 3. This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, although 

many of the cases that address whether in-house counsel should have access to confidential 

discovery material involve disputes between competitors, neither U.S. Steel nor Brown Bag 

Software holds that restrictions on in-house counsel’s access are limited to circumstances whether 

the parties compete and in-house counsel is involved in competitive decision-making. To the 

contrary, both cases emphasize the broader point that the district court must examine the particular 

factual circumstances and not make arbitrary distinctions based on assumptions. UM’s proposed 

section 7.3(b) relies exclusively on whether in-house counsel engages in competitive decisionmaking to distinguish between in-house counsel who are and are not eligible to view HC/AEO 

discovery material. But that single criterion (at least as construed by UM) is not well-suited to this 

case and does not assist the Court in deciding whether particular in-house counsel should be 

allowed to view particular discovery material or whether permitting such access will subject a 

party to undue burden or expense.

Second, while UM and Leica are not competitors in the same way the parties in U.S. Steel

and Brown Bag Software were, they may well compete on other relevant dimensions. For 

example, the complaint suggests that both parties have prosecuted patents in the fluorescence 

detection field. See Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 48.

3 Although the record is not developed on this point as to 

UM and Leica, universities can and do compete with other universities, research institutions, and 

private entities for such rights. See, e.g., https://synbiobeta.com/with-the-recent-patent-news-whoowns-crispr-now/ (describing competition for patent rights to CRISPR-related technology). 

Moreover, to the extent one of UM’s objectives is to license its inventions to entities like Leica 

and Leica’s direct competitors, Mr. Garr’s role in advising UM’s Office of Technology Transfer 

on such matters may well place him in the difficult position of avoiding inadvertent use or 

disclosure of Leica’s confidential information in the course of fulfilling his responsibilities to UM 

in a manner similar to circumstance the Ninth Circuit considered problematic in Brown Bag 

3 The parties agree that if in-house counsel is given access to HC/AEO discovery material a patent 

prosecution bar is appropriate. Dkt. No. 48 at 2.

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Software.

In sum, whether particular in-house counsel should be barred from accessing particular 

discovery material does not depend on whether in-house counsel’s responsibilities fit a narrow 

definition of competitive decision-making arising in a context where the parties are direct 

competitors for commercial products or services. The analysis is more nuanced and case-specific.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court denies, without prejudice, the parties’ competing requests for entry of their 

respective protective orders. The parties may re-submit their dispute to the Court together with 

supporting material that addresses the concerns outlined above. The parties’ joint submission 

should comply with the discovery dispute resolution procedures in Judge DeMarchi’s Standing 

Order for Civil Cases, except that the parties may also submit evidence or other material that they 

believe is necessary for the Court’s resolution of their dispute.

Alternatively, because it appears that there remains room for agreement, the parties may 

wish to confer further about categories of HC/AEO information that may be disclosed to in-house 

counsel. See Dkt. No. 48 at 6 (Leica suggesting that it may be willing to disclose some financial 

information to in-house counsel for UM). If the parties do reach agreement, they may submit a 

stipulated proposed protective order for the Court’s consideration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2020

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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