Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02524/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES GREER, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2524 KJM

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (“Commissioner”) denying an application for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) under

Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or remand and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion

for summary judgment. 

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 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 1

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, disability

is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) &

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In a decision dated June 22, 2005, the ALJ determined plaintiff was not disabled.1

The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council

denied plaintiff’s request for review. The ALJ found plaintiff has a severe impairment of back

pain but this impairment does not meet or medically equal a listed impairment; plaintiff is not

substantially credible; plaintiff can perform light work with an at-will sit/stand option; plaintiff

cannot perform his past relevant work, there are a significant number of sedentary jobs which

plaintiff can perform; and plaintiff is not disabled. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 17. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ disregarded severe impairments, improperly evaluated the medical

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evidence and improperly discredited his testimony. Plaintiff also requests consideration of

additional evidence. 

II. Standard of Review

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is

based on proper legal standards under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the

record as a whole supports it. Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing

Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a

preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975)). “It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The

record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986),

and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion

weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the

ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see also

Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226,

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in

weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Analysis

A. Severity of Impairments

Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored several diagnosed disorders at step two of the

sequential analysis. An impairment is “not severe” only if it “would have no more than a

minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work, even if the individual’s age, education, or work

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experience were specifically considered.” SSR 85-28. The purpose of step two is to identify

claimants whose medical impairment is so slight that it is unlikely they would be disabled even if

age, education, and experience were taken into account. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 

“The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 

Smolen v. Chater 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d

1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to recognize as severe diagnosed conditions of

radiculopathy and numbness in the lower extremities. Although the burden is on plaintiff at step

two of the sequential evaluation, see Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998), counsel

for plaintiff has offered no meaningful argument in support of the claim that the ALJ erred at step

two. A mere recitation of medical diagnoses does not demonstrate how each of the conditions

included in that recitation impacts plaintiff’s ability to engage in basic work activities. Put

another way, a medical diagnosis does not an impairment make. 

In finding that plaintiff had a severe impairment of back pain, the ALJ relied on

the opinion of consulting orthopedist, Dr. Chu. AT 15, 281-286. In assessing plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity, Dr. Chu considered plaintiff’s complaints of radiculopathy and numbness. 

AT 282, 285. The ALJ also relied on the opinion of treating physician, Dr. Neubuerger, who also

considered the combined effects of all plaintiff’s symptoms, including radiculopathy and

paresthesias. AT 15, 254-256. In relying on the opinions of these physicians, who properly

considered all of plaintiff’s impairments and diagnosed conditions in assessing plaintiff’s

limitations, the ALJ committed no error at step two of the sequential analysis.

B. Medical Opinions 

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ improperly rejected the limitations assessed by

examining physician Dr. Benrazavi and state agency physician Dr. Clancey, and that in so doing,

the ALJ posed hypotheticals to the vocational expert that did not include all of plaintiff’s

limitations. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered

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by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th

Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record,

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons, that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory,

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

Dr. Benrazavi opined that plaintiff could stand and walk two to four hours per

eight-hour workday. AT 420. Dr. Clancey assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to

stand and/or walk to be at least two hours in an eight-hour workday. AT 406. The vocational

expert testimony relied on by the ALJ in finding plaintiff was not disabled was predicated on a

hypothetical posing only a sedentary capacity for work with an at-will sit/stand option. AT 17,

713. Sedentary work requires no more than two hours of standing or walking. Social Security

Rule 83-10. Because the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert was consistent with the

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limitations assessed by Drs. Benrazavi and Clancey, plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ assessed

excessive stand/walk limitations is meritless.

Plaintiff further contends that the treating physicians found plaintiff had severe

physical impairments that limited his functional capacity, referencing an argument made in the

administrative proceedings. AT 9-10. However, as discussed above, the ALJ relied on Dr.

Neubuerger’s opinion that plaintiff could perform light work, which is consistent with the

residual functional capacity assessed by the ALJ. AT 17, 255. With respect to the reports from

Dr. Armstrong cited by plaintiff, the reports contain no opinions of functional limitations. 

AT 303-305, 323. A possibility of future treatments or surgery does not ipso facto equate to

disability. AT 323. The ALJ did not err in his consideration of the medical evidence. 

C. Credibility

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony. The ALJ

determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the ALJ’s discretion

if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., Saelee v. Chater, 94

F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an explicit credibility

finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be supported by “a specific,

cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first

consider objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947

F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment,

the ALJ then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors,

medication, treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider:

(1) the applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

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1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR

55406-01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity

and effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be

relevant. Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure

to seek treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by

the ALJ in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional

impairment. See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may

rely, in part, on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458

(9th Cir. 1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172,

177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering,

the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and

convincing.” Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.

1999). 

In rejecting plaintiff’s testimony that back pain precluded all work activity, the

ALJ considered normal objective findings of Dr. Chu, as well as Dr. Armstrong’s assessment that

plaintiff’s fusion was solid. AT 15, 284-285, 318. The ALJ also considered the conservative and

minimal nature of the treatment, including selective blocks rather than surgery, and plaintiff’s use

of over-the-counter pain medication. AT 15, 323, 701. The ALJ also factored plaintiff’s

activities of daily living, including homeschooling his daughter and driving her around, as well as

performing household chores, into the credibility analysis as inconsistent with plaintiff’s claim

that he could not even perform sedentary work. AT 16, 704-706. The factors considered by the

ALJ all were valid and supported by the record. The ALJ’s credibility determination was based

on permissible grounds and will not be disturbed.

D. New Evidence

Plaintiff has submitted additional medical records and a declaration listing various 

medical providers. A case may be remanded to the Secretary for the consideration of new

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evidence if the evidence is material and good cause exists for the absence of the evidence from

the prior record. Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 812 F.2d 509, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1987). Here the

additional evidence is immaterial. The date of the ALJ’s decision is June 22, 2005 and the

residual functional capacity assessments contained in the additional information plaintiff

provides are dated November 7, 2006 and March 30, 2007, well past the date of the decision at

issue. There is no reasonable possibility that this new evidence would have changed the outcome

of the case. Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir.

1984). As to the progress notes dated 2004, this evidence either is duplicative of the evidence

already contained in the administrative record or contains no functional limitations that

contradict the ALJ’s decision. The court therefore declines to consider the additional evidence.

The ALJ’s decision is fully supported by substantial evidence in the record and

based on the proper legal standards. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or remand is denied, and

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

DATED: March 27, 2008.

006

greer.ss

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