Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00657/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00657-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES ROBINSON, #121865, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-657-MHT

) [WO]

)

WILLIAM KAUFMAN and TIMOTHY )

WIGGINS, )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,James L. Robinson [“Robinson”], a frequent litigant

in this court, challengesthe constitutionality of his arrests on December 23, 2010 for public

intoxication and use of a false identity to obstruct justice. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3.

Specifically,Robinson complainsthatWilliamKaufman, an officer with the Dothan Police

Department,subjected himto a warrantless arrestfor these offenses absent probable cause.

Id. (“Robinson ... was unlawfully and illegally arrested for public intoxication and

obstruction of justice, where officers had no probable cause for said charges to be filed,

when the elements did not exist forsaid charges.”). Robinson further assertsthat Kaufman

and another officer, Timothy Wiggins, conspired with a convenience store clerk to bring

about his arrests. Id. at 4. Robinson seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged

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violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 7.

The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report and supporting

evidentiary materials addressing Robinson’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders

entered herein, the court construes the aforementioned reports as a motion for summary

judgment. Order of September 27, 2011 - Doc. No. 11. Thus, this case is now pending on

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s responses, the court

concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

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summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id.

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish,

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

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at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally

applicable to the current rule.

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In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of [law enforcement] authorities. Unless a prisoner

can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow

him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment

stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Robinson is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence”

which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely

colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id.

at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will

not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find

for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d

202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory

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allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute

of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory

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assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

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withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant

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of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own

conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is

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not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d

984, 986 (11 Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations withoutspecific supporting facts have

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no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by

requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case

and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due

to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11

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Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presentsinsufficient evidence

to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is

appropriate).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

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the Department ofChildren and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthere is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

1279 (11 Cir. 2001) (to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, nonmoving partymust

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produce evidence such that reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford,

906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, Robinson’s pro se status alone does not mandate

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this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In

this case, Robinson failsto demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order

to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Facts

On December 23, 2010, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Robinson entered a

convenience store in Dothan, Alabama. The store clerk determined that Robinson fit the

description of an individual who on two previous occasions stole merchandise from the

store. The store clerk locked Robinson inside the store, called the Dothan Police

Department and advised law enforcement officials of the potential that Robinson was the

individual involved in the prior thefts of merchandise from the store. Robinson demanded

that the clerk open the door so that he could exit the building but the clerk denied this

request. Plaintiff’s Response Affidavit - Doc. No. 24-1 at 2. Robinson became agitated and

began to undertake whatever means necessary to gain his release from the store, including

kicking the door and attempting to pry open the door with an ice scoop. Id. When

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Robinson ascertained that the clerk had contacted law enforcement officials “he went

behind the check out counter” and verbally confronted the clerk. Id. at 3. Robinson then

went to “the entrance exit door [standing] with his arms folded, and awaited on the law

officials [to arrive].” Id.

Upon receiving information froma dispatcher regarding the callfrom the store clerk

in which the clerk reported a possible theft in progress, officers Kaufman and Wiggins

proceeded to the convenience store. While en route to the store, the dispatcher informed

the officers that the suspect was locked in the store and provided them with a description

of the suspect as “a black man wearing a black jacket, blue shirt and blue jeans. Dispatch

then advised [the officers that the store clerk reported] the suspect was kicking the door,

obtained an ice scoop and was hitting the door and had a box cutter on his belt.”

Defendants’ Exhibit 1 to the Special Report - Doc. No. 7-1 at 2. Upon arriving at the

scene, Kaufman could not see in the door due to a vehicle blocking his view. During his

approach to the store, Kaufman had his “weapon out and could see and hear the suspect in

the store yelling, throwing items and acting irate. [The suspect] was holding the handle of

an aluminum ice scoop in his hand. The door to the store was locked. From outside the

store I ordered the suspect to the ground and he complied. The store clerk then unlocked

the door and I entered the store. For may safety I handcuffed the suspect until I could

determine what was going on. The clerk informed me the suspect had been in the store on

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two prior occasions and was suspected of theft. The suspect had left the store before the

police could arrive on the prior occasions [of the thefts which had occurred at the store].”

Id. Kaufman questioned the store clerk about what had transpired that night prior to his

arrival at the store and the clerk advised that no thefts or attempted thefts had occurred. 

After speaking with the store clerk, Kaufman attempted to obtain Robinson’s “side

of the story” at which time the officer recognized Robinson as an individual involved in

a traffic stop conducted the previous night, December 22, 2009, in which Robinson was

a passenger in the stopped vehicle. Id. During the traffic stop, Kaufman obtained a name

and other pertinent information from Robinson. At the time of the convenience store

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incident, Kaufman again requested that Robinson provide his name and relevant personal

information. Kaufman needed the information to “run a check on him. The suspect told

me his name was ‘Clarence Robinson’ and gave his date of birth as June 30, 1953 and his

social security number as xxx-xx-9202. I checked my notes from the night before and this

was the same information he gave then.” Id. at 2-3. Robinson, however, contends that he

did not actually provide this information to Kaufman during their discussion inside the

store but that Kaufman simply assumed he was Clarence Robinson based on their previous

night’s encounter. Plaintiff’s Response Affidavit - Doc. No. 24-1 at 2.

Robinson asserts that the traffic stop resulted in the arrest of the vehicle’s driver for drug possession but advises

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that he suffered no adverse consequences with respect to the incident. It is clear from the record that, other than

obtaining cursory personal information from Robinson through verbal statements, law enforcement officials took no

further action against Robinson.

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While speaking with the suspect, Kaufman observed that “Mr. Robinson had a very

strong odor of alcohol on him; he was slurring his speech and admitted he had consumed

four beers. Mr. Robinson appeared intoxicated and based on my prior law enforcement

experience and my personal observation of Mr. Robinson yelling, throwing things in the

store and his disorderly behavior when I arrived, I believed he was intoxicated to the point

he could endanger himself, other persons or property or by boisterous and offensive

conduct annoy other persons in his vicinity, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-11-10

(1975). I told Mr. Robinson he was under arrest for public intoxication.” Defendants’

Exhibit 1 to the Special Report (Affidavit of William Kaufman) - Doc. No. 7-1 at 3;

Defendants’ Exhibit 2 to the Special Report (Affidavit of Timothy Wiggins) - Doc. No. 7-2

at 2 (“The suspect was unsteady on his feet had slurred speech and appeared to be

intoxicated.... Officer Kaufman told me the suspect was being charged with public

intoxication and I took the suspect to my car to secure him and await transport to the

jail.”).

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Robinson does not dispute the observations made by Kaufman and Wiggins

regarding his emission of a strong odor of alcohol, use of slurred speech and unsteadiness

on his feet nor does Robinson deny that he had been drinking on the night in question or

that the store clerk reported his disruptive behavior inside the store to law enforcement

“A person commits the crime of public intoxication if he appears in a public place under the influence of

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alcohol, narcotics or other drug to the degree that he endangers himself or another person or property, or by boisterous

and offensive conduct annoys another person in his vicinity.” Ala. Code § 13A-11-10.

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officials. Robinson, however, asserts that he does not believe Kaufman actually observed

his disruptive actionsinside the store because, to his knowledge, he was not engaged in this

behavior when Kaufman arrived at the store. Plaintiff’s Response - Doc. No. 24 at 2;

Plaintiff’s Response Affidavit - Doc. No. 24-1 at 3. Robinson hypothesizes that when

Kaufman initially entered the store he did solely under the impression that a possible theft

had occurred and, based on these circumstances, the “intent was to arrive and complete

[his] verymental thought - the intent to arrest” and although Kaufman stated he handcuffed

Robinson for “security precautions ... once he restrained Robinson his mental intent [to

arrest Robinson for theft] was done[,]” even though Kaufman made no actual statement

regarding arrest at that precise time. Plaintiff’s Response Affidavit - Doc. No. 24-1 at 4.

Robinson asserts that since Kaufman had information regarding a possible theft from the

dispatcher his “sole intent [to arrest] was done when he placed handcuffs [on] and

restrained [Robinson] to get his evidence for the theft....” Id. at 5. Robinson alleges that

the initial detention, though not actually identified as an arrest, nevertheless constituted a

full arrest because Kaufman entered the store with the intent “to complete said arrest for

theft....” Id. at 5. Robinson maintains that once Kaufman determined that no theft or

attempted theft had occurred on the night in question Kaufman then, for the first time,

advised Robinson he was “under arrest” and identified the offense underlying the arrest as

“public intoxication.” Id.

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Robinson complains that he should not have been arrested for public intoxication

as, in his opinion, he did not “pose a danger to the store clerk,” he did not harm himself nor

was he threatening or annoying anyone. Id. at 7. Notably, Robinson concedesthat he acted

disruptively while inside the store, approached the clerk behind the counter in a physically

intimidating manner, verbally accosted the clerk and damaged store property while

attempting to exit the store. He likewise does not dispute the officers’ assertions that he

admitted consuming alcohol prior to entering the store, smelled of alcohol, spoke with

slurred speech and was unsteady on his feet.

After the officers secured Robinson in Wiggins’ patrol unit, Kaufman went to his

vehicle and began preparation of an arrest report. In order to complete this report,

Kaufman “entered the name ‘Clarence Robinson’ in [the] in-car computer and pulled up

the driver’s license photograph associated with this name and it did not match the Mr.

Robinson [currently] detained. I had not checked [Robinson’s] photograph the night before

when I had contact with him, I simply checked for warrants on the name he gave me. I

confronted Mr. Robinson about using a false name and [the other inaccurate] information

he had given me and he admitted he gave me his brother’s name and a false date of birth

and social security number. He [then] told me his name was ‘James Robinson.’ When I

checked the name ‘James Robinson,’ the photograph [for this individual] matched and it

showed an outstanding fugitive warrant from the Department of Corrections for a parole

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violation and two outstanding warrants from the Dothan Municipal Court [for failure to

appear on two separate traffic violations]. Mr. James Robinson was then arrested on the

three outstanding warrants. [Based on the evidence in my possession, I believed that] Mr.

Robinson lied to me about [his] identity to avoid being arrested on the warrants therefore

I arrested him for the felony charge of using a false identity to obstruct justice under Ala.

Code § 13A-8-194 (1975).” Defendants’ Exhibit 1 to the Special Report (Affidavit of

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William Kaufman) - Doc. No. 7-1 at 4 (citation to exhibit omitted); Defendants’ Exhibit 3

to the Special Report (Outstanding Warrants for Arrest) - Doc. No. 7-3 at 1-6. As

previously noted, infra at 9, Robinson asserts that he did not provide any identifying

information to Kaufman during the incident at the convenience store and alleges that

Kaufman simply assumed his identity based on the previous night’s encounter. Plaintiff’s

Response Affidavit - Doc. No. 24-1 at 2.

On March 1, 2011, a grand jury for Houston County issued a two count indictment

against Robinson for use of a false identity to obstruct justice and public intoxication.

Defendants’ Exhibit 5 to the Special Report - Doc. No. 7-5 at 1. On July 23, 2012, the

felony charge of obstructing justice by using a false identity was amended to a

misdemeanor charge of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer. On July 26,

“A person commits the crime of obstructing justice using a false identity if he or she uses identification

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documents or identifying information of another person or a fictitious person to avoid summons, arrest, prosecution, or

to impede a criminal investigation.” Ala. Code § 13A-8-194(a). “Obstructing justice using a false identity is a Class C

felony.” Ala. Code § 13A-8-194(b).

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2012,Robinson entered guilty pleasto giving a false name to law enforcement officials and

public intoxication. Defendants’ Exhibit 1 to the Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No.

40-1 at l-2; Defendants’ Exhibit 2 to the Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 40-2 at

l-2.

B. Initial Detention

To the extent Robinson complains Kaufman illegally detained him while obtaining

information relative to the incident at the convenience store, this claim provides no basis

for relief. “The Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and

seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Sharpe,

470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (emphasis in original). In determining whether an investigative

detention is reasonable the Supreme Court has adopted “a dual inquiry ... approach” under

which a court must “examine ‘whether the officer’s action wasjustified at itsinception [by

reasonable suspicion], and whether it wasreasonably related in scope to the circumstances

which justified the interference in the first place.’” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1, 20 (1968); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (internal citations omitted) (A law

enforcement “officer may detain a suspect briefly for questioning although he does not

have ‘probable cause’ to believe that the suspect is involved in criminal activity, as is

required for a traditional arrest.... However, ... the officer[] [must] have a reasonable

suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.”).

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“An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the [detention].” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S 491, 503 (1983).

“[I]n assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the

police diligently pursue their investigation.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709

(1983). There is, however, no “hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible” investigative

detention. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685; Place, 462 U.S. at 709, n.10 (“We understand the

desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clear rule to guide their

conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit

would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their

responses to the demands of any particular situation.”). “While it is clear that ‘the brevity

of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in

determining whether the seizure isso minimally intrusive asto be justifiable on reasonable

suspicion,’ ... [the Supreme Court has] emphasized the need to consider the law

enforcement purposesto be served by the [detention] as well asthe time reasonably needed

to effectuate those purposes.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (internal citations omitted). In

assessing whether an investigatory detention is reasonable, “it [is] appropriate to examine

whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm

or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the

defendant.... A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the

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police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not

indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.” Id. at 686.

Under Terry and its progeny, police can briefly detain a person for investigative

purposes if the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable

facts, that a person they encounter wasinvolved in ... [criminal activithy]....” United States

v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).

“Reasonable suspicion exists when the detaining officer can point to specific

and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from

those facts, reasonably warrant the ... seizure.” United States v. Estrada, 459

F.3d 627, 631 (5 Cir. 2006). Reviewing courts making reasonable suspicion

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determinations “must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case

to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis

for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,

122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In evaluating whether or not an officer’s suspicion is reasonable,

“due weight must be given ... to the specific reasonable inferences which he

is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry, 88 S.Ct.

at 1883. “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere hunch is insufficient to

justify a stop [or investigatory detention], the likelihood of criminal activity

need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls

considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”

Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 352 (5 2010); Hensley, 469 at 229 (“[I]f police have

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a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they

encounter was involved in ... a [criminal offense], then [they may temporarily detain the

suspect] to investigate that suspicion.”); United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 58 (2 Cir.

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1995) (citation omitted) (A brief “investigative detention” is permissible where the officer

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has “‘reasonable suspicion’ to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to

occur.”).

Although the concept of reasonable suspicion is not susceptible to precise

definition, see, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585; Hooper, 935

F.2d at 493, the requisite level of suspicion to make an investigative stop is

“‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the

evidence.’” Villegas, 928 F.2d at 516 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109

S.Ct. at 1585). Still, “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires‘some minimal level

of objective justification’ for making the stop.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109

S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758,

1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)). Consequently, an officer’sinchoate suspicion

or mere hunch is insufficient to justify a Terry-type detention. Sokolow, 490

U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883).

United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1009-1010 (2 Cir. 1992). “The standard for

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determining whether a particular stop [or detention] was justified by reasonable suspicion

is an objective one ... not dependent on the intentions or motivations of the particular

detaining officers.” Id. at 1010. In evaluating whether an investigative detention is

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a court must determine “‘whether the officer’s

action wasjustified at itsinception, and whether the action wasreasonably related in scope

to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’” Sharpe, 470 at

682, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. “[T]he essence of all that has been written is that the

totality of the circumstances–the whole picture–must be taken into account[by the court].”

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1991). The test for reasonable suspicion is

lenient and “not a difficult one to satisfy.” United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 63 (2

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Cir.1977). The law is well settled that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a

policeman who lacksthe precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest

to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).

The circumstances of this case, taken as a whole, are sufficient to demonstrate that

Officer Kaufman had reasonable suspicion to detainRobinson at the time Kaufman entered

the convenience store. Specifically, the store clerk had provided law enforcement officials

information regarding possible criminal activity by Robinson and had detained Robinson

in the store prior to the officers’ arrival at the scene. Kaufman observed Robinson inside

the store acting in a disorderly manner, i.e., yelling and throwing objects. Defendants’

Exhibit 1 to the Special Report (Affidavit of William Kaufman) - Doc. No. 7-1 at 3. It is

likewise clear that Kaufman pursued his investigation in a reasonable and diligent manner

as he placed Robinson under arrest for public intoxication within a few minutes of the

initial detention. “Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to the

legitimate investigation ofthe law enforcement officers. [Robinson] presented no evidence

that the officers were dilatory in their investigation....” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 688. The

defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the initial detention claim.

C. False Arrests

Robinson complains that Kaufman subjected him to illegal arrests for public

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intoxication and obstruction of justice by use of a false identity. Under the circumstances

of this case and well established law, this claim is without merit.

“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Constitution

and can underpin a § 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest

is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest. Case v. Eslinger,

555 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (11 Cir. 2009); Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226,

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1232 (11 Cir.2004); Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir.1996). Probable

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cause exists where the facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials,

derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of

reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.

Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11 Cir.1997).” Brown v. City of Huntsville,

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Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11 Cir. 2010). Probable cause to arrest is present when an arrest

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is “objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances..... This standard is

met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she

hasreasonably trustworthyinformation, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the

circumstancesshown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit

an offense.... Although probable cause requires more than suspicion, it does not require

convincing proof ... and need not reach the [same] standard of conclusiveness and

probability as the facts necessary to support a conviction.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,

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1195 (11 Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[P]robable cause

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is a flexible, common-sense standard.... [I]t does not demand any showing that [the

officer’s belief that an offense has been or is being committed] is correct or more likely

true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).

Upon review of the evidentiary materials filed in this case, the court concludes that

Officer Kaufman had probable cause to arrest Robinson for public intoxication and,

subsequently, obstruction of justice for using a false identity. Initially, when Kaufman

actually placed Robinson under arrest for public intoxication, Kaufman had knowledge of

information which established probable cause to arrest Robinson for this offense.

Specifically, the dispatcher had provided Kaufman details with respect to Robinson’s

actions inside the convenience store, Kaufman had previously observed Robinson acting

in a disruptive manner and, upon speaking with Robinson, Kaufman smelled alcohol

emanating from Robinson and Robinson’s speech was slurred. With respect to the arrest

for obstruction of justice, Kaufman had information within his possession which

demonstrated that Robinson previously provided false information to him regarding

Robinson’sidentity. Based on the facts available to him, Kaufman deduced that Robinson,

in providing this false information, was attempting to avoid arrest on the outstanding

warrants which had been issued against him. In light of the foregoing, summary judgment

is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the illegal arrest claim.

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D. Conspiracy

Robinson asserts that the defendants conspired with the convenience store clerk to

effectuate his arrests for public intoxication and obstruction of justice by use of a false

identity. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 4. “Conspiring to violate another person’s

constitutional rights violates section 1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct.

at186 (1980); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11 Cir.1988), overruled in part on

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other grounds by Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 n.4 (11 Cir.1996).” Rowe v. City

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of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11 2002). “To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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conspiracy, a plaintiff ‘must show that the parties “reached an understanding” to deny the

plaintiff his or her rights [and] prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.’

Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11 Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932, 111

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S.Ct. 2053, 114 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991).... [T]he linchpin for conspiracy is agreement....”

Bailey v. Board of County Comm'rs of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11 Cir.),

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cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 58 (1992). In order for a plaintiff

“to establish the ‘understanding’ or ‘willful participation’ required to show a conspiracy,

... [he] must [produce] some evidence of agreement between the defendants.... For a

conspiracy claim to survive a motion for summary judgment ‘[a] mere “scintilla” of

evidence ... will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could

reasonably find for that party.’ Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11 Cir. 1990).”

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Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283-1284. Merely “stringing together” adverse acts of individuals is

insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133.

The defendants deny that they conspired to obtain Robinson’s arrests and maintain

that his arrests were based on the facts and circumstances available at the time of the

arrests. The court has carefully reviewed the pleadings filed by the plaintiff. There is a

total lack of evidence to support Robinson’s suppositious theory that the defendants

engaged in conspiratorial acts against him. Specifically,Robinson hasfailed to present any

evidence which demonstratesthat the defendants “reached an understanding” to violate his

rights or committed an “actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.” Bailey, 956 F.2d at

1122; Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 468. At best, Robinson’s assertions are self-serving, purely

conclusory allegations which fail to assert those material facts necessary to sufficiently

plead a conspiracy between the defendants and the store clerk. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1133;

Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-557. Consequently, Robinson has failed to produce any

probative evidence of a conspiracy and summary judgment is therefore due to be granted

in favor of the defendants on this claim. Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

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3. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

4. No costs be taxed herein.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before October 29, 2014 the parties may file objectionsto this

Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled must clearly identify the findingsin the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11 Cir. 1982); see also Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1209 (adopting pre-October 1, 1981

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opinions of the Fifth Circuit as binding precedent).

Done this 14 day of October, 2014.

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/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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