Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00568/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MIRANDA CALDERON,

Petitioner,

v.

R.E. SPEARMAN, Warden,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 14cv0568-WQH(BGS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

STAY AND ABEYANCE

[Doc. No. 7.]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Robert Miranda Calderon (“Calderon”), a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed a fully exhausted Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court is Calderon’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance

(“Motion”) of his Petition. Calderon wishes to raise new claims that have not yet been

exhausted, so he requests a stay of the presently filed Petition and time to subsequently

amend his petition once the new claims are exhausted. Respondent has opposed the

Motion, arguing a stay should not be granted because the Petition does not contain

unexhausted claims and therefore there is no basis to stay the proceedings. For the

reasons outlined below, this Court recommends that the Motion be GRANTED pursuant

to Kelly v. Small1

 and the Petition be stayed and held in abeyance pending exhaustion of

state remedies.

1 Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v.

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). 

1 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 13, 2010, a jury convicted Calderon of the following five counts: 

(1) “three counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm on Jorge Castaneda, Jeffrey

Jensen, and Javier Carrillo” (Penal Code § 245(b); (2) robbery of Jeffrey Jensen (Penal

Code § 211); and (3) “attempted murder of Javier Carrillo” (Penal Code §§ 664,

187(a). (Lodgment 2.) On April 8, 2011, the trial court sentenced Calderon to a

determinate term of 11 years, 4 months plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. 

(Id.) 

On April 28, 2011, Calderon appealed his conviction contending the trial court

erred by: “(1) denying his motion to exclude the witnesses’ photographic lineup

identification; (2) excluding his proposed identification expert; (3) instructing the jury on

attempted voluntary manslaughter; (4) excluding him from a future restitution hearing;

(5) imposing a booking fee; and (6) determining the court security fee.” (Lodgment 3 at

166; Lodgment 6.) On December 19, 2012, the Fourth District California Court of

Appeal, Division One modified the judgment to strike the court security fee of $1,200

and insert the correct fee amount of $200, but affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all

other respects. (Lodgment 6.) Subsequently, on January 30, 2013, Calderon filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 7.) The California

Supreme Court denied the petition without opinion on March 15, 2013. (Lodgment 8.)

On March 12, 2014, Calderon filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

the grounds previously raised on direct appeal. (Doc. No. 1.) Calderon asserts that his

state and constitutional rights were violated when the trial court: (1) denied his motion to

exclude the witnesses’ photographic lineup identification; (2) excluded his proposed

identification expert; and (3) instructed the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter. 

(Doc. No. 1.) Subsequently, on April 15, 2014, Calderon filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus with the California Supreme Court asserting ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel. (Lodgment 9.) This state habeas petition remains pending. 

(Lodgment 10.)

2 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 2, 2014, Calderon filed the instant Motion for Stay and Abeyance. (Doc.

No. 7.) Calderon asks the Court to stay and hold his Petition in abeyance while he

proceeds with his state petition to exhaust his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel claims. (Id.) Moreover, Calderon seeks the Court’s permission to include these

new claims once exhausted in a First Amended Petition. (Id.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion

Exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s

consideration of claims presented in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)

(West 2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). The exhaustion doctrine requires

a habeas petitioner to exhaust state court remedies by providing the state courts with the

opportunity to consider and resolve his federal constitutional claims before presenting

these claims to a federal court. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2013);

see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a petitioner

must exhaust all available state remedies, either through direct appeal of his conviction or

through collateral proceedings). In most instances, a petitioner can exhaust state court

remedies by “fairly represent[ing]” his federal claims to the highest state court available. 

David v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Weaver v. Thompson, 197

F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating a petitioner can provide the state’s highest court with the

opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court)). Fair

presentation of the legal basis of a claim requires a petitioner to alert the state courts that

he is asserting a federal claim. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir.

2005). In the Ninth Circuit, a petitioner must make the basis of his claims “explicit either

by specifying particular provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to

federal case law.” Id. 

Respondent concedes that all three claims presently in Calderon’s Petition have

been fully exhausted in the California state courts. (Doc. No. 10.) Once Calderon’s

conviction became final on December 13, 2010, Calderon pursued a direct appeal of the

3 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

three claims in the Fourth District California Court of Appeal, Division One. (Lodgment

6.) Subsequently, Calderon sought direct review of the three claims in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 7.) Calderon provided the state courts with both the factual

and legal bases of each claim included in his Petition. (Lodgment 3, 7.) With respect to

claim one, Calderon explicitly states the “admission of the pre-trial and in-court

identification violated his right to due process of law” pursuant to the 14th Amendment

of the United States constitution. (Doc. No. 1 at 22.) For claim two, Calderon states the

trial court prejudicially erred in excluding his proposed identification expert and this

violated his federal right “to present a complete defense and due process of law” pursuant

to the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States constitution. (Doc. No. 1 at

29.) Lastly, under claim three, Calderon alleges the “trial court improperly instructed the

jury on the law of attempted voluntary manslaughter,” which violated his constitutional

rights to due process and a fair trial pursuant to the 5th and 14th Amendments of the

United States constitution. (Doc. No. 1 at 33.) Thus, Calderon fairly presented the legal

bases of his three claims by alerting the state courts to the federal nature of the claims. 

Accordingly, Calderon fairly and fully presented all three claims to the California

Supreme Court on direct appeal and has fully exhausted the three claims in his Petition. 

B. Stay and Abeyance

A federal district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance a petition

that contains only exhausted claims. Scott v. Lewis, No. 11-3128, 2013 WL 2951042, at

*1 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2013) (citing Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 144

F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1998)). District courts have applied Kelly not only to stay mixed

petitions2

, but also to stay and hold in abeyance fully exhausted petitions. Broadnax v.

Cate, No. 12CV560 GPC RBB, 2012 WL 5335289, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26 2012) (citing

Sims v. Calipatria State Prison, CV 10-715-DSF (AGR), 2012 WL 1813113 (C.D. Cal.

Feb. 29, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, CV 10-715-DSF AGR, 2012 WL

2

 Mixed petitions contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at

510.

4 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1820914 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) (finding Kelly as the appropriate standard to follow to

stay a fully exhausted petition and allow a petitioner to exhaust additional claims in state

court); Hughes v. Walker, No. 2:10-CV-3024 WBS TJB, 2012 WL 346449, at *9 (E.D.

Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (holding that a court can stay a fully exhausted petition under Kelly

while a petitioner seeks to exhaust new claims). Here, Calderon’s Petition contains only

exhausted claims; therefore, the Petition is not mixed. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510. 

Calderon, however, seeks to stay and hold his fully exhausted Petition in abeyance in

order to exhaust new claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

(Lodgment 9; Doc. No. 7.) Despite the fact that the Petition is not mixed, the approach

set out in Kelly applies. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding

that Kelly applies to stays of fully exhausted petitions).

1. A Stay and Abeyance Pursuant to Kelly

Under Kelly, a federal district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance

a fully exhausted petition in order to provide a habeas petitioner with the opportunity to

proceed back to state court to exhaust unexhausted claims. See Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-

71; see also Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. Kelly does not require that a petitioner show good

cause for his failure to exhaust state court remedies. King, at 1134. Once the petitioner

exhausts the claims in state court, the petitioner may return to federal court and amend his

stayed federal petition to include the newly-exhausted claims. Id. at 1140-41. A

petitioner, however, will only be able to stay his petition and amend it to include the

newly-exhausted claims if those claims are timely, or if those claims are untimely, they

share a “common core of operative facts” with the claims raised in the pending petition. 

See id.; Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). 

2. Timeliness of Calderon’s Claims

A habeas petitioner seeking to use Kelly to amend a fully exhausted Petition must

demonstrate that he timely filed both the federal petition and the state habeas petition

containing the new but unexhausted claims. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 644; King, 564 F.3d

at 1140-41. Calderon filed his federal Petition on March 12, 2014, which is after the

5 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 

Therefore, the Court applies the AEDPA in reviewing the timeliness of his federal and

state habeas petitions. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas corpus

petition in federal court. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). Under the AEDPA, Calderon had one year from the date that his

conviction became final to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court. 

Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on

denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on other

grounds in Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1063 (1999). A habeas petitioner’s conviction becomes final ninety days after

the California Supreme Court denies a petition for direct review. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The California Supreme Court denied Calderon’s petition for review on March 13,

2013. (Lodgment 8.) Accordingly, after ninety days, on June 11, 2013, Calderon’s

conviction became final. Bowen, 188 F.3d 1158-59. Therefore, the statute of limitations

began to run on June 12, 2013. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d

874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that one-year statute of limitations begins to run the day

after the conviction becomes final). Absent allowing for statutory tolling, Calderon had

until June 12, 2014 to timely file his federal habeas petition. As previously indicated,

Calderon timely filed his federal Petition on March 12, 2014, which was well within the

applicable AEDPA statute of limitations period. 

On April 15, 2014, Calderon also timely filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

with the California Supreme Court asserting the new unexhausted claims of ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Lodgment 9.) The AEDPA limitations period

may be subject to statutory tolling due to Calderon’s timely-filed state habeas petition,

Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288. 

i. Statutory Tolling

6 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The AEDPA tolls the one-year statute of limitations period for the amount of time

a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” is

pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,

661 (2010). “An application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 7 (2000). Moreover, in federal courts in California, as long as the petitioner was

“properly pursuing” state court remedies, AEDPA’s “statute of limitations is tolled from

the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects

the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

1999). The AEDPA statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas

corpus petition is pending. See id. Accordingly, the statute of limitations is tolled from

the time the first state habeas petition is filed until state collateral review is concluded. 

Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

In the instant matter, Calderon filed both his federal and state habeas petitions

before the one-year statute of limitations expired. The one-year statute of limitations

under AEDPA expired on June 12, 2014. On April 14, 2014, Calderon properly and

timely filed a state habeas petition raising his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 9.) This claim is

currently pending review. (Lodgment 10.) As such, when Calderon filed his state habeas

petition raising the unexhausted claims, it was timely; therefore, this state petition tolls

the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

Calderon is entitled to statutory tolling from April 14, 2014 until the California

Supreme Court concludes collateral review. Absent any additional tolling, Calderon’s

deadline to timely file a First Amended Petition will be extended in accordance with the

number of days his petition remains pending with the California Supreme Court and is

not currently time-barred. Calderon has met the timeliness factor of Kelly and a stay is

appropriate. Because Calderon has met the first Kelly requirement, the Court need not

address whether his ineffective assistance of counsel claims share a common core of

7 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

operative facts with the claims in the pending Petition. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, Calderon has satisfied Kelly entitling him to a stay and

abeyance order with respect to the claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel. 

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that the Petition be

GRANTED and the Petition should be stayed and held in abeyance to afford Calderon an

opportunity to exhaust his state judicial remedies with regard to his unexhausted claims. 

It is further recommended that following final action by the state court, petitioner be

allowed 30 days to notify the Court that he has completed the exhaustion process in state

court by filing a motion to lift the stay which should be accompanied by a complete

habeas corpus petition containing the pending exhausted and newly-exhausted ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§

636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than July 7, 2014, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

8 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties within 14 days of being served with the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 16, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

9 14cv0568-WQH

Case 3:14-cv-00568-WQH-BGS Document 16 Filed 06/16/14 Page 9 of 9