Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00678/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00678-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTON EWING

Plaintiff,

vs.

K2 PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, LLC 

and DANIEL KLEIN,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 16cv0678-LAB (AGS)

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S 

OBJECTION TO DENIAL OF EX 

PARTE MOTIONS [Dkt. 145]

Plaintiff Anton Ewing filed a series of ex parte motions and notices in which he 

personally attacked defense counsel and sought to have her held in contempt. Judge 

Averitte denied these motions and ordered Ewing to pay defense counsel $2,214 in fees 

and costs pursuant to Rule 37. Ewing objects1to the magistrate judge’s order. For the 

reasons discussed below, the objection is OVERRULED. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 37 requires the Court order a party who unsuccessfully brings a motion within 

the scope of the rule to pay the opposing party fees and costs, including attorneys’ fees, 

unless the moving party shows “the motion was substantially justified or other 

 

1 Plaintiff refers to his filing as an “appeal,” but the Court construes it to be an objection 

under FRCP 72(a).

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circumstances make the award unjust.” FRCP 37(a)(5)(B). Monetary sanctions, 

including those ordered under Rule 37, are not dispositive. Maisonville v. F2 America, 

Inc. 902 F.2d 746, 747-748 (9th Cir. 1990). A party may object to non-dispositive pretrial 

orders of a magistrate judge within fourteen days. FRCP 72(a). The objection will not be 

sustained unless the order is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

DISCUSSION

Ewing’s objection is wide-ranging and imprecise. Other than cursory references 

to Rule 37, “Local Rules,” and “a similar order . . . just a few years ago,” he cites no legal 

authority whatsoever. But looking past that, his contentions appear to be as follows: First, 

awarding fees under Rule 37 is “impossible” because discovery is closed. Dkt. 145 at 2.

Second, Rule 37 only permits payments to a “party or deponent,” not opposing counsel. 

Id. Third, defendant has not actually paid or does not actually owe his counsel fees for 

opposing Ewing’s ex parte motions. Id. Fourth, that he “was never given an opportunity 

to speak prior to imposition of the $2214.” Id. at 5. And fifth, Ewing cannot afford the 

fees, and being made to do so “would render serious financial hardship and be unjust 

under the circumstances.” Id. at 3. The Court takes each in turn. 

To the first point, “the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that Rule 37 ‘provide[s] 

comprehensively for enforcement of all [discovery] orders, including Rule 26(c) protective 

orders,’” like the one Ewing brought. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 5:11-

cv-01846-LHK (PSG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11778, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014)

(citations omitted). Accordingly, Ewing’s motion for protective order is subject to Rule 37.

Whether discovery was closed when Ewing chose to file his meritless motion for 

protective order is of no consequence.

To the second point, at least one Ninth Circuit decision has affirmed an order 

requiring the payment of attorneys’ fees to opposing counsel. David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 

F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1977). But the appropriateness of the payee in David was not directly 

at issue, so the Court does not find that decision instructive here. Id. at 415. In any event, 

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“neither Klein nor his counsel take any issue with Plaintiff paying the fees and costs to the 

attorney trust account for Klein, the payee being ‘Revolve Law Group Attorney Trust 

Account.’” Dkt. 150 at 2. The Court therefore modifies the order to require Ewing pay 

Revolve Law Group Attorney Trust Account instead of Wright.

Third, Ewing asserts that Klein has not paid or does not owe his counsel fees, and 

that this somehow immunizes Ewing from monetary sanctions based on fees. Klein’s 

counsel, however, states that she is not representing Klein pro bono, and that attorneys’ 

fees would be available even if she were. Dkt.150 at 2-3. The Court agrees. See In re 

Stine, 254 B.R. 244, 252 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (“To the extent that the bankruptcy court 

considered Stine's pro bono representation a special circumstance that would make an 

award of attorney's fees unjust, the court also erred.”); Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. 

Comm'n, 242 F.3d 227, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourts have consistently held that 

entities providing pro bono representation may receive attorney's fees where appropriate, 

even though they did not expect payment from the client . . . .”).

Fourth, Ewing argues the fee award is improper because he “was never given an 

opportunity to speak prior to imposition of the $2214.” Id. at 5. While it is true that Rule 

37(a)(5) provides movants the “opportunity to be heard,” that opportunity is satisfied by 

the parties’ briefing. See Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164-65 

(9th Cir. 2003). Klein’s response to Ewing’s motion for protective order included a request 

for sanctions in an amount equal to his attorneys’ fees. Dkt. 92 at 4. Ewing filed a onepage reply personally attacking defense counsel rather than addressing the request. Dkt. 

93. Ewing had an opportunity to be heard, he just chose not to use it.

Fifth, Ewing argues imposing the fees would be unjust under the circumstances 

because doing so would cause him “serious financial hardship.” Ewing represents he has 

been unemployed for years and that his bank statements would substantiate his inability 

to pay. Dkt. 145 at 3. Klein encourages the Court to be skeptical of these representations. 

Dkt. 150 at 3. Ewing has filed 24 lawsuits in this District, and in a draft settlement 

agreement with Klein, requested Klein make his settlement payment to a Limited Liability 

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Company. Id. at 3. Thus, Klein argues, Ewing’s bank statements may not serve as an 

accurate proxy for Ewing’s ability to pay because Ewing’s income from settling lawsuits 

may be in the separate bank accounts of entities Ewing controls. Id. at 3. Klein also 

points out that in this and other lawsuits currently pending Ewing alleges that he has a 

business. Id. at 3. Klein argues Ewing must be lying because he cannot both have a 

business and be unemployed. Id. at 4. Klein urges the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions 

on Ewing sua sponte for misrepresenting his employment status. Id. at 4. The Court 

declines Klein’s invitation to impose Rule 11 sanctions, but considers the discrepancies 

identified in determining whether the fee award at issue is unjust. 

The Court would be more inclined to show Ewing leniency if his pattern of 

misrepresentations and unprofessional conduct showed any sign of abating. This Court 

has repeatedly warned Ewing about misrepresentations, including by striking one of

Ewing’s recent filings that misrepresented findings made by another judge in this District. 

Dkt. 155 at 1-2. While the Court acknowledges that the stricken document was filed after 

the objection at issue here, it is unfortunate that Ewing’s current objection contains 

similarly misleading statements. Ewing writes, “[i]mportantly, Magistrate Averitte made a 

finding that no sanctions were warranted under Rule 11 . . . .” Dkt. 145 at 5. The docket, 

however, shows the Court merely “declined to levy any sanction at that time” and went 

on to admonished Ewing “that he is expected to cooperate with opposing counsel in a 

professional manner and that he must strictly comply with Rule 11 or the Court would 

consider a more severe sanction, including dismissal, in the future.” Dkt. 151. 

At best, Ewing demonstrates a habit of confusing leniency for vindication. At worst 

he is dishonest. Either way, this backdrop makes it difficult to find the sanction here 

unjust. Ewing was ordered only to pay the costs he imposed on defendants by choosing 

to file meritless motions, and the Court has repeatedly forgiven conduct warranting 

harsher sanctions throughout this litigation. To the extent Ewing’s representation that

overruling his objection will cause financial hardship is true, that hardship was avoidable. 

At the very least, Ewing has not shown the magistrate judge’s order was clearly erroneous 

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or contrary to law.

Finally, in his objection, Ewing reiterates accusations made in his ex parte motions. 

To the extent the Court should construe these as objections to denial of the underlying 

motions rather than the imposition of fees pursuant to Rule 37, the objections are also 

overruled, both on the merits for reasons specified by the magistrate judge and for 

mootness in light of this Courts recent order to enforce the settlement agreement between 

the parties. 

CONCLUSION

Ewing’s objection is OVERRULED. The Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying 

Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motions (Dkt. 131) is MODIFIED such that Ewing shall pay the 

$2,214.00 to the Revolve Law Group Attorney Trust Account. Alternatively, if Ewing 

insists that these sanctions would cause him unjust financial hardship, he may submit to 

a debtor’s exam to be conducted by Magistrate Judge Averitte. If Ewing elects a debtor’s 

exam, Defendants shall have the right to examine the financial records of Ewing and any 

business entities he owns or is similarly associated with. Defendants will also be able to 

cross-examine him at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Averitte will 

have the authority to impose a sanction of up to $2,214 on Ewing for the reasons set out 

above. If Judge Averitte finds Ewing has misrepresented his financial condition, he may 

also recommend that this Court impose further sanctions. Ewing is ORDERED, by

October 19, 2018, to either: (1) pay the $2,214.00 to the Revolve Law Group Attorney 

Trust Account and file a notice with the Court to that effect, or (2) notify the Court that he 

intends to submit to a debtor’s exam.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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