Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16590/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16590-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 17

COON CREEK ROAD, HAWKINS BAR

CALIFORNIA, TRINITY COUNTY,

APN: 008-760-12, INCLUDING ALL

APPURTANCES AND IMPROVEMENTS

THERETO,

Defendant,

and

LEUNG CHINN; BETTY K. CHINN,

Claimants,

and

BYRON PICKLE,

Claimant-Appellant.

No. 12-16590

D.C. No. 

2:09-cv-01937-G

EB-DAD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 19, 2014—San Francisco, California

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2 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

Filed May 19, 2015

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bucklo;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

SUMMARY**

Civil Forfeiture

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment of default

and final judgment of forfeiture of real property, and held that

the district court erroneously viewed claimant’s failure to

respond to specialinterrogatories the government propounded

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental

Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture

Actions G(6)(c)(i)(A) as a per se basis for striking his claim.

The panel held that the claimant’s failure to answer the

government’s Rule G(6) interrogatories would not have

warranted striking his claim as a discovery sanction without

giving the claimant an opportunity to cure his lack of

response. The panel also held that claimant’s failure to

* The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 3

comply with Rule G(6) did not vitiate his statutory standing

to contest the forfeiture and dismissal of his claim forthwith.

The panel remanded for further proceedings.

Judge Rawlinson dissented because she believed the

majority’s interpretation of the rules applicable to forfeiture

actions conflictedwith the court’s precedent and the decisions

of most other courts that considered the issue, and she would

hold that the district court acted within its discretion in

striking claimant’s claim.

COUNSEL

Editte D. Lerman, Ukiah, California, for Claimant-Appellant.

Kevin C. Khasigian (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney; Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney,

Eastern District of California, Sacramento, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

OPINION

BUCKLO, Senior District Judge:

Byron Pickle (“Pickle”) appeals the district court’s June

15, 2012, default judgment and final judgment of forfeiture

of real property located at 17 Coon Creek Road in Hawkins

Bar, California (the “defendant property”). The judgment

was entered after the court granted the government’s motion

to strike Pickle’s claim and answer based on Pickle’s failure

to respond to special interrogatories the government

propounded pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s

Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and

Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Rule”) G(6)(c)(i)(A), and then

denied Pickle’s motion to stay on the ground that without a

claim, Pickle lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture

action.

It is apparent from the district court’s order that it viewed

Pickle’s failure to answer the Rule G(6) special

interrogatories as a per se basis for striking his claim. 

Because that conclusion is incorrect as a matter of law, we

reverse and remand the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2009, the United States initiated this in rem

action seeking forfeiture of the defendant property. The

forfeiture action was the result of criminal investigations by

the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) into

suspected marijuana trafficking activities by claimant Byron

Pickle, his son, James Pickle, and his brother, Thomas Pickle,

all of whom were arrested after searches executed on the

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 5

defendant property(where Pickle resided), and the “Hennessy

Road property” (where Thomas and James resided), revealed,

inter alia, a large marijuana cultivation site, several hundred

marijuana plants, bagged marijuana, packaging materials,

firearms, and tens of thousands of dollars in cash. James and

Thomas were charged with state drug offenses, but the

District Attorney declined to file criminal charges against

Pickle, and the BNE closed its investigation into Pickle’s

conduct on May 27, 2010.

The government’s verified complaint for forfeiture states

that Pickle is “[t]he recorded owner of the defendant real

property.” It further asserts that “Pickle occupies the main

residence” located on the defendant property, and that one of

Pickle’s sons occupies a travel trailer also located on the

property.

Pickle filed a verified claim in this proceeding on August

11, 2009, in which he likewise stated that he is the “recorded

owner” of the defendant property. Pickle also filed an answer

on September 4, 2009, in which he claimed “an innocent

possessory and/or ownership interest” in the defendant

property.

1

On October 7, 2009, the parties stipulated, and the district

court agreed, to a six month stay of the action based on the

ongoing criminal investigation of Pickle and the ongoing

prosecution of James and Thomas. The stay was extended,

by court-approved stipulation, in May, August, and

November of 2010. In all three of these stipulations, the

parties observed that “it does not appear that any charges will

1 A claim and answer was also filed by Leung and Betty Chinn, who

held liens on the defendant property. Their claim is not at issue on appeal.

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6 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

be filed against claimant Byron Pickle,” but agreed that the

stay was warranted in view of the ongoing prosecution of

James and Thomas, whose anticipated invocation of the Fifth

Amendment would interfere with the government’s ability to

gather relevant information. The November 2010 stay was

set to expire on March 28, 2011, and the parties were directed

to file a status report by March 14, 2011, “advising the Court

whether a further stay is necessary.”

The Joint Status Report the parties submitted pursuant to

the November stay order did not request a further stay of the

proceedings, but instead specified topics for discovery;

proposed discovery deadlines; provided for motions and

filing deadlines; and proposed a trial date. The district court

issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order on March 23, 2011, setting

February 16, 2012, as the discovery cutoff, April 16, 2012, as

the deadline for hearing dispositive motions, and September

11, 2012, as the trial date.

On July 21, 2011, the United States served a Request for

Admissions, General Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories,

and a Request for Production of Documents. The special

interrogatories specifically asked Pickle to:

(1) State your full name for all names by

which you are now known, or have been

known in the past, including any and all

aliases;

(2) State every Social Security Number and

driver's license number you have used

with each name;

(3) State the date and place of your birth;

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 7

(4) State your present residence address; and

(5) Identify and describe with particularitythe

nature of your interest in the defendant

real property.

Pursuant to Rule G(6)(b), Pickle had twenty-one days, i.e.,

until August 15, 2011, to respond to the special

interrogatories.

Pickle did not timely respond to the special

interrogatories, but on August 17, 2011, the parties agreed to

extend the deadline to September 19, 2011. Meanwhile, on

August 2, 2011, Pickle moved to suppress the marijuana

evidence obtained from the search of his property in 2008,

and to dismiss the forfeiture proceedings pursuant to Rule

G(8)(b)(i) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that without

the marijuana evidence, the United States could not state a

claim for forfeiture. Then, on September 6, 2011, Pickle

moved for a stay of the proceedings on the ground that “all of

the discovery requests” the government served on July 21,

2011, sought information that implicated his Fifth

Amendment protection against self-incrimination.

On October 11, 2011, the government filed both an

opposition to Pickle’s motion to stay and a motion to strike

Pickle’s claim. In both of these submissions, the government

argued, inter alia, that Pickle’s failure to respond to the Rule

G(6) special interrogatories caused him to lack the “statutory

standing” required to seek a stay of the proceedings or to

contest the forfeiture of the defendant property.

On October 21, 2011, the district court issued a

scheduling order resetting the dates on which the various

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8 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

pending motions would be heard. The court concluded that

the government’s motion to strike must be resolved before

either of Pickle’s pending motions.

The court granted the government’s motion to strike

Pickle’s claim on December 20, 2011. In the same order, the

court denied Pickle’s motion to stay, explaining that “absent

a claim to the defendant property, Pickle no longer has

standing to contest this forfeiture action.” On June 15, 2012,

the district court entered a judgment of default and final

judgment of forfeiture. Petitioner timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s interpretation of the

Supplemental Admiraltyand MaritimeClaimsRules de novo. 

United States v. $11,500.00 in U.S. Currency, 710 F.3d 1006,

1010 (9th Cir. 2013). While “[d]ismissal of a forfeiture claim

for failure to comply with procedural requirements is

reviewed for abuse of discretion, id. at 1011, a claimant’s

standing “is a threshold issue which we review de novo.”

United States v. 22249 Dolorosa Street, 167 F.3d 509, 511

(9th Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

Pickle assigns three errors to the district court’s final

judgment. First, Pickle claims that the court abused its

discretion by adjudicating the government’s motion to strike

before considering Pickle’s first-filed motion to stay. 

Relatedly, Pickle asserts that the court abused its discretion

when it held that Pickle lacked standing to challenge the

forfeiture once his claim was stricken, reasoning that the

ground on which the claim was stricken would not have

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 9

arisen had the action been stayed. Third, Pickle contends that

the district court abused its discretion by failing to afford him

the opportunity to cure his violation of Rule G(6) prior to

striking his claim.

The challenged district court decisions all rested on one

central error in the district court’s analysis—its conclusion

that it was compelled to strike Pickle’s claim once it

determined that he had failed to comply with Rule G(6). As

we will explain, Pickle’s failure to answer the G(6)

interrogatories would not have warranted striking his claim as

a discovery sanction without giving Pickle an opportunity to

cure his lack of response. Nor did Pickle’s failure to comply

with Rule G(6) vitiate his statutory standing. For both of

these reasons, the district court erred in striking Pickle’s

claim.

1. The constitutional and procedural requirements of claims

pursuant to CAFRA

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000

(“CAFRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 983, governs all in rem civil

forfeiture proceedings commenced on or after August 23,

2000. See United States v. Approximately $1.67 Million

(U.S.) in Cash, 513 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2008). Section

983(a)(4)(A) of the statute provides:

In any case in which the Government files in

the appropriate United States district court a

complaint for forfeiture of property, any

person claiming an interest in the seized

property may file a claim asserting such

person’s interest in the property in the manner

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10 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

set forth in the Supplemental Rules for

Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A).

Rule G(5) of the incorporated Supplemental Rules—

formerly Rule C(6)—enumerates the filing requirements for

a verified claim under CAFRA. It mandates, inter alia, that

a claim: identify the specific property claimed; identify the

claimant and state the claimant’s interest in the property; be

signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury; and be

served on the government attorney identified in the

government’s notice of proceedings. Rule G(5)(a).

Rule G(6), captioned “Special Interrogatories,”

establishes that “[t]he government may serve special

interrogatories limited to the claimant’s identity and

relationship to the defendant property without the court’s

leave at any time after the claim is filed and before discovery

is closed,” and requires answers or objections to be served

within 21 days after the interrogatories are served. We have

explained that the “purpose of [Rule G(6)] is ‘to permit the

government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the

claim is filed to gather information that bears on the

claimant’s standing.’” United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S.

Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Supplemental Rule G Advisory Committee Notes

(subdivision (6)).

Rule G(8)(c)(i) provides that the government may move

to strike a claim:

(A) for failing to comply with Rule G(5) or

(6), or

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 11

(B) because the claimant lacks standing.

Although Rule G(8) authorizes the government to bring a

motion to strike on these bases, the Advisory Committee

Notes to Rule G(8) caution courts that when a motion to

strike is brought pursuant to Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A), “the court

should strike a claim or answer only if satisfied that an

opportunity should not be afforded to cure the defects under

Rule 15. Not every failure to respond to subdivision (6)

interrogatories warrants an order striking the claim.” 

Accordingly, courts typically afford claimants one or even

several opportunities to cure defective Rule G(6) responses,

except where the circumstances indicate that it would be

futile to do so or reflect persistent discovery abuses. See, e.g.,

United States v. Approximately $658,830.00 in U.S.

Currency, No. 2:11-cv-00967 MCE KJN PS, 2011 WL

5241311, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (declining to strike

claim for failure to comply with Rule G(6), quoting Advisory

Committee Notes’ guidance that “‘[n]ot every failure to

respond to subdivision (6) interrogatories warrants an order

striking the claim,’” and therefore affording the claimant

twenty-one days to respond to the special interrogatories);

United States v. $4,656,085.10 in Bank Funds, No. SACV 12-

0219-DOC, 2014 WL 5393858, at *4–*6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15,

2014) (striking claim only after claimant failed to heed an

order compelling her to respond to the government’s special

interrogatories, failed to appear at a hearing on the

government’s motion for a default judgment, and failed to

respond to an order to show cause as to why her claim should

not be stricken); United States v. Approximately $10,000 in

U.S. Currency, No 1:11-cv091845-SKO, 2013 WL 5314890,

at *4–*5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2013) (granting the

government’s unopposed motion to strike after concluding

that claimant had abandoned the litigation generally, as he

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12 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

had not only failed to respond to the government’s special

interrogatories, but had also ceased communicating with his

attorney and had failed to take any steps to retain a new

attorney or proceed pro se).

To pursue a claim, the claimant must demonstrate, in

addition to the usual requirement of establishing Article III

standing, see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,

1146 (2013), compliance with “the jurisdictional procedural

requirements” set forth in Supplemental Rule G(5). United

States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1126

(9th Cir. 2004). Many courts refer to the latter as “statutory

standing” and have held that it is established through

compliance with Rule G. See id.;see also, e.g., United States

v. $487,825.000 in U.S. Currency, 484 F.3d 662, 664 (3rd

Cir. 2007) (“[t]o establish statutory standing in a forfeiture

case, the claimant must comply with the procedural

requirements set forth in Rule C(6)(a) [the predecessor to

Rule G(5)] and § 983(a)(4)(A)).

This circuit and others have stated that standing to contest

a forfeiture action can be conditioned on “strict compliance

with filing requirements.” United States v. 5145 N. Golden

State Blvd., 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

United States v. 1 Street A-1, 978 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir.

1992); see also United States v. $38,570 U.S. Currency,

950 F.2d 1108, 1112–15 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.

Eng, 951 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1991), abrogated on other

grounds by Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996). 

Nevertheless, the term “standing” is something of a

misnomer, as “courts have ‘discretion to overlook the failure

to conform to the requirements of [forfeiture claim rules].’”

United States v. $11,500.00 in U.S. Currency, 710 F.3d 1006,

1012 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. 2659 Roundhill

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 13

Dr., 194 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in

original); see also United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889

F.2d 1258, 1262 (2d Cir. 1989) (excusing technical

noncompliance with procedural rules governing filing of

claims on ground that claimant made sufficient showing of

interest in property).

2. The government’s motion to strike

In this case, the government identified Rule G(8)(c)(A) as

the basis for its motion to strike. It then zeroed in on Pickle’s

failure to answer its Rule G(6) special interrogatories as the

specific ground on which it based its entitlement to relief. 

The government’s motion did not assert that Pickle had failed

to comply with Rule G(5), nor did it claim that Pickle lacked

Article III standing. In fact, in its opposition to Pickle’s

motion to stay, the government stated affirmatively that it did

not contest Pickle’s constitutional standing, (“[a]t this time,

the United States does not contest claimant’s Article III

standing”). Rather, the government argued that “Pickle’s

claim and answer should be stricken . . . for failure to comply

with Supplemental Rule G(6).” The government framed the

issue in its motion to strike as Pickle’s lack of statutory

standing, arguing that “Rule G(6) responses are required to

determine standing,” and that “[s]tatutory standing is

established through strict compliance with Supplemental

Rules G(5) and G(6).”

3. The district court’s order granting the government’s

motion to strike

The district court began its three-page order by

identifying the Rule authorizing the government’s motion as

Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A) and stating that “[t]he government argues

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14 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

that Pickle’s claim and answer should be stricken because

Pickle has failed to respond to the government’s Rule G(6)

Special Interrogatories.” The court then quoted the

government’s recitation of the factual basis supporting its

motion:

[T]he United States’ Rule G(6) special

interrogatories were mailed to the claimant on

July 21, 2011. The claimant’s responses were

due by August 15, 2011. The deadline was

later extended to September 19, 2011. To

date, the Government has not received the

claimant’s answers to the Supplemental Rule

G special interrogatories and the twenty-one

(‘21’) days in which a response is required has

lapsed. (Mot. 4:1-7.)

The court acknowledged Pickle’s argument that his motion

for a stay effectively responded to the special interrogatories

but reiterated its earlier determination that Pickle’s stay

motion could not be decided until the government’s motion

to strike was resolved.

The court went on to find that the “government’s special

interrogatory discovery probes Pickle’s connection to the

defendant property,” and then quoted the provisions of Rule

G(6), stating that, “[t]he government may serve special

interrogatories limited to the claimant’s identity and

relationship to the defendant property without the court’s

leave at any time after the claim is filed but before discovery

is closed,” and that “[a]nswers or objections to these

interrogatories must be served within 21 days after the

interrogatories are served.” (alterations in court order). The

court cited two district court cases from other jurisdictions in

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 15

which forfeiture claims were stricken based on the claimant’s

failure to comply with Rule G(6), and then concluded,

“[s]ince Pickle’s opposition is an ineffective response to the

special interrogatories at issue, the government’s motion to

strike Pickle’s claim and answer because of Pickle’s failure

to answer the subject special interrogatories is GRANTED.”

4. Application of the law to the facts of this case

Although the district court did not expressly hold that

Pickle’s failure to comply with Rule G(6) eviscerated his

statutory standing, its analysis suggests that it agreed with the

government’s argument that noncompliance with Rule G(6)

amounts to a per se statutory standing defect, precluding the

court from taking any action in the case. First, the only facts

the court addressed in its order related to the dates on which

the government served its special interrogatories and on

which Pickle’s responses were due. Additionally, the court

struck Pickle’s claim without further discussion after

concluding that his motion to stay was “an ineffective

response to the special interrogatories,” citing two cases from

other districts that had summarily stricken claims for failure

to comply with Rule G(6). Finally, the court struck Pickle’s

claim without first ordering Pickle to provide adequate

discovery responses or imposing some less severe, nonterminating sanction, as courts routinely do when confronted

with discovery violations.

These factors signal that the court viewed the Rule G(6)

deficiency as something more substantial than a discovery

violation. Indeed, if the district court had concluded that

striking Pickle’s claim was warranted as a discoverysanction,

without giving Pickle an opportunity to cure or reasoning

why such opportunity would be futile, we would conclude

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16 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

that decision was an abuse of discretion. See Rule G(8)

advisory committee’s note (“[T]he court should strike a claim

or answer [under Rule 8(c)(i)(A)] only if satisfied that an

opportunity should not be afforded to cure the defects . . . .”);

see also United States v. $154,853.00 in U.S. Currency,

744 F.3d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district

court abused its discretion in striking a claim for sole reason

that claimant failed adequately to respond to G(6) special

interrogatories); cf. Toth v. Trans World Airlines, 862 F.2d

1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1988).

Rather, the court appears to have concluded that because

“[t]he government’s special interrogatory discovery probes

Pickle’s connection to the defendant property,” the court was

constrained by standing principles to strike Pickle’s claim

forthwith once it determined that he had not strictly complied

with Rule G(6). That conclusion is at odds, however, with

the both the text of Rule G(8) and the decisions of the several

courts of appeals that have applied this provision in cases

where, as here, the claimant’s genuine ownership of the

property was not legitimately in dispute.

First, the structure of Rule G(8)—which contains two

distinct subparts, each authorizing specifically defined

substantive bases on which the government may move to

strike—counsels against the interpretation that a claimant’s

failure to abide by Rule G(6) necessarily constitutes a

standing defect. As noted above, Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B)—the

subpart not invoked by the government in this case—

explicitly authorizes motions to strike “because the claimant

lacks standing.” By contrast, Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A)—the section

the government asserts—authorizes such motions “for failing

to comply with Rule G(5) or G(6).” Construing a claimant’s

failure to comply with Rule G(5) or G(6) to require automatic

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 17

dismissal, as if it were a statutory standing defect, would

appear to render subpart (B) of Rule G(8)(c)(i) redundant,

violating a fundamental canon of construction. Christensen

v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We should

avoid an interpretation that would render the subsections

redundant.”).2

It is true, as noted above, that courts frequently refer to

compliance with Rule G as a whole as a “statutory standing”

requirement under CAFRA. Additionally, the Advisory

Committee Note to Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A) emphasizes the

“special role” of Rule G(6) “in determining claim standing,”

and courts including this one have held that the “purpose” of

Rule G(6) special interrogatories is “to gather information

that bears on the claimant’s standing.” $133,420.00, 672 F.3d

at 635. While these statements undoubtedly fuel a perception

that a claimant’s compliance with Rule G(6) as a whole is a

sine qua non to establish his statutory standing, we believe

that the better view is the one expressed by our Seventh

Circuit colleagues in United States v. Funds in the Amount of

$574,840, 719 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2013): Rule G(8)(c)’s

“use of the term ‘standing’ is unfortunate because striking a

claim is a decision on the merits. It is not a determination

2 We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s view that our decision

“renders meaningless” the text of Rule G(8), which “unequivocally

provides that the government may move to strike a claim due to the

claimant’s failure to comport with the requirements of Rule G(6).”

Dissent, p. 35–36. Rule G(8) indeed authorizes the government to file a

motion on this basis, but it does not compel the court to grant the motion

upon finding non-compliance with Rule G(6). To the contrary, as the

Advisory Committee Note to Rule G(8) makes explicit, “the court should

strike a claim or answer only if satisfied that an opportunity should not be

afforded to cure the defects under Rule 15. Not every failure to respond

to subdivision (6) interrogatories warrants an order striking the claim.” 

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18 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

that the claimant has failed to show that the court has

jurisdiction and so he should seek relief by an alternative

path; it is a determination that he has no interest in the

property.”

Other courts of appeals have similarly observed that the

distinction between Article IIIstanding and statutory standing

is easily blurred, especially where, as here, the claimant

asserts an “innocent owner” affirmative defense to forfeiture. 

For example, the Eighth Circuit has explained:

To qualify as an innocent owner, each

claimant must prove she has an ownership

interest as defined in the statute. As relevant

here, the statute defines the term “owner” to

include “a person with an ownership interest

in the specific property sought to be

forfeited,” and to exclude “a nominee who

exercises no dominion or control over the

property.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6). Although

many cases refer to this issue as part of the

“standing” inquiry, it is in fact an element of

the innocent owner’s claim on the merits.

When claimants have Article III standing but

fail to prove an ownership interest that meets

these statutory criteria, the “statement that

Claimants lacked ‘standing’ is simply another

way of stating that Claimants had failed to

establish on the merits a property interest

entitling them to relief.”

United States v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d 1011,

1014 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Hooper, 229

F.3d 818, 820 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v.

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 19

One 1990 Beechcraft, 1900 C Twin Engine Turbo-Prop

Aircraft, 619 F.3d 1275, 1277 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2010).

In this case, Pickle’s affirmative defense alleges that

Pickle “has an innocent possessory and/or ownership interest

in” the defendant property. To avoid forfeiture on that basis,

Pickle must ultimately establish the innocent nature of his

interest in the defendant property, and his answers to the

government’s special interrogatories are presumably relevant

to that issue. But because it cannot reasonably be disputed

that Pickle’s interest in the defendant property was sufficient

to establish his statutory standing at the inception of the

proceedings—recall that both parties alleged that Pickle was

the “recorded owner” of the defendant property, and the

government further alleged that Pickle and his son both

resided on the property—Pickle’s failure to respond to the

government’s special interrogatories did not alone vitiate his

ability to maintain his claim. See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at

638 (at motion to dismiss stage, “unequivocal assertion of an

ownership interest in the property is sufficient by itself to

establish standing.”).

We thus agree with the conclusion drawn by other courts

of appeals that where a claimant’s Article III and statutory

standing are not reasonably in dispute, his failure to respond

to Rule G(6) special interrogatories does not, in itself, warrant

striking his claim. In United States v. $154,853.00 in U.S.

Currency, the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court’s order

striking a claim for noncompliance with Rule G(6) where the

claimant had adequatelyclaimed to have earned the defendant

funds through legitimate employment. 744 F.3d at 564, 562. 

The court reasoned that this allegation about the source of the

funds was “sufficient to state a colorable ‘ownership

interest’” under CAFRA, and observed that the government

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20 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

had in fact conceded the claimant’s statutory standing to

pursue his claim to those funds. Id. at 564 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(d)(6)(A)). Accordingly, the court held that “no special

interrogatories were necessary to determine standing,” and

that the district court had abused its discretion in striking the

claim. Id. Similarly—and despite the fact that it does not

share our view that an unequivocal assertion of ownership is

sufficient, at the motion to dismiss stage, to establish

statutory standing—the Fifth Circuit has held that, where the

government had admitted facts sufficient to establish the

claimant’s interest in the defendant property, the claimant

“need not have supplemented his claim with additional

evidence” to establish his statutory standing. $38,570,

950 F.2d at 1113.3

Our dissenting colleague’s view that our decision today

conflicts with United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency,

672 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2012), appears to flow from her belief

that there was a legitimate dispute over Pickle’s genuine

ownership of the defendant property. Recalling our

observation in $133,420 that standing is subject to

“adversarial testing,” the dissent faults us for “tak[ing] Pickle

at his conclusory word.” Dissent, pp. 36–37. But this

criticism overlooks that Pickle’s unequivocal assertion of

ownership in his verified claim echoes the government’s own

verified allegations, which likewise assert Pickle’s ownership

3 Although the court concluded that the claimant had standing to

challenge the forfeiture proceeding, it upheld the district court’s decision

to strike his claim and answer on the basis that they were untimely. 

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 21

of the defendant property and additionally assert that Pickle

resides on the property.

4

The dissent’s view that $133,420 compels an outcome

contrary to the one we reach is perplexing for additional

reasons. First, the central issue in $133,420 was the

claimant’s Article III standing; the government’s motion to

strike asserted Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B), and the district court

explicitly noted that the claimant’s procedural compliance

was unchallenged. U.S. v. 133, 420, No. CV-09-8096-PCTNVW, 2010 WL 2594304, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 23, 2010). 

Second, the standing issue was before the court on a motion

for summary judgment. 672 F.3d at 637. Our analysis thus

focused on whether the evidence of record was sufficient to

sustain the claimant’s burden to establish his Article III

standing at that stage of the proceedings. See id. at 639. 

After concluding that the district court correctly discounted

the evidentiary value of the claimant’s verified claim because

it ambiguously asserted “an ownership and/or a possessory

interest in” the defendant property,” id. at 636,5and that the

4 Nor does our decision deprive the government of its entitlement to

“adversarial testing” of Pickle’s continued standing. See dissent, p. 37;

$133,420, 672 F.3d at 642. The government could have moved to compel

substantive answers to its special interrogatories, which the court could

have granted notwithstanding Pickle’s Fifth Amendment objection, as our

discussion in $133,420 suggests. See id. at 637, 643–44. Indeed, our

decision in no way divests district courts of their authority to compel

compliance with Rule G(6) or, indeed, to strike a claim pursuant to Rule

G(8)(c)(i)(A) based on a claimant’s persistent failure to do so. 

5 Specifically, although we held that the claimant’s verified claim

“constitutes evidence for purposes of opposing the government’s motion

for summary judgment,” we concluded that its use of the“and/or”

formulation made it insufficiently specific regarding the nature of the

asserted interest to establish Article III standing. 672 F.3d at 640 (citation

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22 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

court permissibly struck the claimant’s interrogatory

responses, which contained his only unambiguous assertion

of ownership, id. at 640–41, we affirmed the court’s

conclusion that the remaining evidence of standing–the

claimant’s unexplained physical possession of the currency

at the time of seizure–was insufficient to withstand the

government’s summary judgment challenge. Id. at 644. 

Nothing about that conclusion is at odds with our decision

today.

United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.

Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 2013), likewise is not contrary to our

holding. In that case, the funds subject to forfeiture were

recovered from the claimant’s airplane carry-on bag, where

they were discovered inside a suspiciously wrapped package

to which a drug-detection dog alerted. Id. at 561–62. The

claimant’s verified claim “stated only that ‘he[r] interest in

the property herein is an ownership and possessory interest.” 

Id. at 562 (alteration in original). She later amended her

claim to add that “[t]his money . . . is proceeds of my

personal investments in the entertainment industry, and

proceeds from my mother’s estate.” Id. (omission in

original). The court concluded that this assertion of her

interest in the property did not comply with Rule G(5) and

granted the government’s motion to strike her claim on that

basis. Although the government had not issued special

interrogatories pursuant to Rule G(6), the court observed that

“[i]n cases like this one, the Government needs to use the

special interrogatories to test the Claimant’s assertion that she

omitted). The dissent mistakenly states that Pickle’s verified claim

employs the same “and/or” formulation. Dissent, p. 37 and 42 n. 7. In

fact, Pickle’s verified claim states unambiguously, “Byron Pickle is the

recorded owner of the defendant real property.” 

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 23

is the true owner of the defendant property and not merely a

courier for a third party. But to do that, the Government must

know what assertion of ownership the Claimant is making.” 

Id. at 565.

The court’s discussion in $104,250.00 simply illustrates

the unremarkable proposition that Rule G(6) interrogatories

may be necessary to ascertain whether a claimant’s interest is

sufficient to establish his statutory standing to contest a

forfeiture, particularly when the claim itself offers little

explanation of the claimant’s connection to the property. But

neither $104,250.00, nor any other case we have reviewed,

persuades us that in the circumstances of this case, Pickle’s

statutory standing was contingent on his compliance with

Rule G(6).

Finally, we note that the government now argues, for the

first time, that Pickle did not comply with Rule G(5), and that

his “bare assertion of ownership” was inadequate to establish

his statutory standing. Even assuming that these arguments

accurately reflect the law of this circuit, as opposed to that of

the Fifth Circuit, from which defendant’s only citation

emanates, see $38,570 U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d at 1111, and

with which at least one other circuit has expressly disagreed,

see United States v. $196,969.00 U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d

644, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2013) (a “bald assertion” of ownership

strictly complies with Rule G(5)), the government has given

us no reason to deviate from our general practice of declining

to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. 

United States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir.

1990).

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24 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

CONCLUSION

Because the district court’s decision to strike Pickle’s

claim was based on the legally erroneous belief that Pickle’s

failure to comply with Rule G(6) vitiated his statutory

standing to contest the forfeiture and required dismissal of his

claim forthwith, and because Pickle’s failure to answer the

G(6) interrogatories would not have warranted striking his

claim as a discovery sanction without giving him an

opportunity to cure his lack of response, we REVERSE the

judgment of default and final judgment of forfeiture and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Irespectfully dissent. The majority’s misinterpretation of

the rules applicable to forfeiture actions conflicts with our

precedent and the decisions of nearly every other court to

consider the issue we decide.

The rules governing civil forfeiture actions operate in a

unique manner in discerning a claimant’s standing. In

particular, the rules establish a special role for discovery in

determining whether a claimant has standing to challenge a

forfeiture action. At issue in this case is the application of

Rule G of the Supplemental Rules of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset

Forfeiture Actions (Rule G).

Rule G(8)(c)(i) provides:

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 25

(i) At any time before trial, the government

may move to strike a claim or answer: (A) for

failing to comply with Rule G(5) or (6), or (B)

because the claimant lacks standing.

Rule G(8)(c)(i) is not complex in its application. It

expressly provides that “[a]t any time before trial,” the

government may file a motion to strike a claim because the

claimant failed to comply with Rule G(5) or (6) or because

the claimant otherwise “lacks standing.” Id. Rule G(6) is

equally straightforward regarding the government’s

utilization of special interrogatories in determining the

claimant’s standing:

The government may serve special

interrogatories limited to the claimant’s

identity and relationship to the defendant

property without the court’s leave at any time

after the claim is filed and before discovery is

closed. But if the claimant serves a motion to

dismiss the action, the government must serve

the interrogatories within 21 days after the

motion is served.

Rule G(6)(a). It is readily apparent from the language of Rule

G(6)(a) concerning the scope of the special interrogatories

that the claimant’s standing is implicated in any responses. 

It is for that very reason that the special interrogatories are

“limited to the claimant’s identity and relationship to the

defendant property. . .” Id. Consistent with the near

unanimous interpretation of RuleG(6)(a), we have articulated

that:

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26 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

Unlike in typical civil proceedings, the

government maycommence limited discovery

immediately after a verified claim is filed. 

Supplemental Rule G(6)(a) provides that the

government may serve special interrogatories

limited to the claimant’s identity and

relationship to the defendant property without

the court’s leave at any time after the claim is

filed and before discovery is closed. The

purpose of the rule is to permit the

government to file limited interrogatories at

any time after the claim is filed to gather

information that bears on the claimant’s

standing. . . .

United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629,

635 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation, alteration, footnote reference,

and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). “At

any time before trial, the government may move to strike the

claimant’s claim or answer on the basis that the claim or

answer does not comply with Supplemental Rule G(5), that

the claimant has not responded to special interrogatories

propounded pursuant to Rule G(6)(a), or that the claimant

lacks standing. . . .” Id. (citation and footnote reference

omitted) (emphasis added).

“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing

under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the

government the right to question the claimant regarding the

claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property

and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s

standing[.]” Id. at 642 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Indeed, “the text of Rule G(6)(a) itself . . . broadly

allows the government to collect information regarding the

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 27

claimant’s relationship to the defendant property. . . .” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Despite such clarity, the

majority strays from our precedent and that of nearly every

other court in holding that the district court erred in striking

Pickle’s claim because he failed to answer the special

interrogatories relevant to his standing.

Although this appeal is governed by an abuse of

discretion standard of review,1

see United States v.

$154,853.00 in U.S. Currency, 744 F.3d 559, 562 (8th Cir.

2014), the majority curiously faults the district court for

applying the express language of Rules G(6) and G(8) in

accordance with existing precedent. “A district court abuses

its discretion when it makes an error of law, when it rests its

decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when we are

left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court

committed a clear error of judgment. . . .” United States v.

Coeur d’Alenes Co., 767 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The district court committed none of these infractions.

It is telling that the majority recognizes that:

the Advisory Committee Note to Rule

G(8)(c)(i)(A) emphasizes the special role of

1

If we were independently reviewing whether Pickle had standing to

challenge the forfeiture action, our review would be de novo. See United

States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140

(9th Cir. 2008). However, in this appeal, we review the district court’s

grant of the motion to strike Pickle’s claim for an abuse of discretion. See

$133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 637. In any event, based on the weight of

authority establishing that Rule G(6)(a) relates to standing and that a claim

may be stricken based on the claimant’s failure to comport with the rule’s

requirements, the outcome would be the same under de novo review.

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28 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

Rule G(6) in determining claim standing, and

courts including this one have held that the

purpose of Rule G(6) special interrogatories is

to gather information that bears on the

claimant’s standing.

Majority Opinion, p. 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The majority also candidly acknowledges that “courts

frequently refer to compliance with Rule G as a statutory

standing requirement under CAFRA” and that the statements

in the advisory committee note and court cases “undoubtedly

fuel a perception that a claimant’s Rule G(6) compliance is a

sine qua non to establish his standing . . .” Id. Once the

majority recognized that the district court’s decision

comported with Rule G, its Advisory Committee Note,2our

precedent, and the precedent of other courts, an affirmance of

the district court’s decision should have followed. The

majority nevertheless concludes that the district court erred in

striking Pickle’s claim because his failure to respond to the

special interrogatories as required by Rule G(6) was

ostensibly irrelevant to Pickle’s standing. See id. at 16.

 

2

 The Advisory Committee Note for Rule G(6) provides:

It remains useful . . . to permit the government to file

limited interrogatories at any time after a claim is filed

to gather information that bears on the claimant’s

standing. Subdivisions (8)(b) and (c) allow a claimant

to move to dismiss only if the claimant has standing,

and recognize the government’s right to move to

dismiss a claim for lack of standing. Subdivision (6)

interrogatories are integrated with these provisions in

that the interrogatories are limited to the claimant’s

identity and relationship to the defendant property. . . .

Supp. R. G advisory committee note (subdivision (6)).

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 29

I disagree. I would hold that the district court acted

within its discretion in striking Pickle’s claim on a basis that

is unquestionably recognized by our precedent, numerous

rulings from other courts, the language of Rule G, and the

AdvisoryCommittee Note. See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642

(“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under

Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the

right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s

identity and relationship to the defendant property and to

gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing[.]”)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

$154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of

Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited

interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather

information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing

$133,420) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States

v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL

410590, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is

claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the

government to serve special interrogatories to determine

whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized

property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant

has standing. . . .”) (citations and footnote reference omitted);

United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck,

680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (noting that

“[s]tatutory standing is established through strict compliance

with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted)

(emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S.

Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D. Md. 2013) (“To

facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on

standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve

the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the

Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property. 

Indeed, the importance of the standing issue and of the role of

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30 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

the special interrogatories is underscored by Rules G(6)(c)

and G(8)(c)(ii)(A) which provide that the claimant must

respond to the special interrogatories, and [the] court must

determine whether the claimant has standing to contest the

forfeiture, before [the] court addresses any other issue that the

claimant may raise.”) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); United States v. Eleven (11) New Utility Vehicles,

No. 13-1776(GAG), 2014 WL 4385734, at *2 (D. P. R. Sept.

4, 2014) (“To establish statutory standing to contest a

forfeiture action, a claimant must file a claim that complies

with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6). A court may strike

the claim of any claimant who fails to follow the

Supplemental Rules’ procedural dictates.”) (citations

omitted); United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer

&Co., Ltd., 664 F.Supp.2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Because

the procedures prescribed by the Supplemental Rules play an

important role in structuring forfeiture suits and ensuring that

they proceed efficiently, a court is authorized to strike the

claim and/or answer of any claimant who fails to follow the

Rules’ procedural dictates. Courts generallyexpect claimants

to adhere strictly to those requirements. . . .”) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added). The majority’s unsupported

deviation from this overwhelming weight of authority

transforms the straightforward application of an unambiguous

rule into an immeasurably confusing venture.

The majority cites not a single persuasive decision

reversing a district court’s striking of a cl`aim based on the

claimant’s obdurate refusal to comply with Rule G(6). 

Rather, the majority relies on the Seventh Circuit’s approach

in United States v. Funds in the Amount of $574,840,

719 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2013). See Majority Opinion, p.

17. However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision is not helpful,

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 31

because the court never considered the role of Rule G(6) in

striking a forfeiture claim.

In $574,840, the claimants sought a stay of the forfeiture

proceedings based on their ongoing criminal proceedings. 

See 719 F.3d at 650. After denying the motion to stay, the

district court ordered the claimants to respond to the

government’s special interrogatories, including an

interrogatory asking the claimants “to state the sources of the

cash they claimed to own . . .” Id. The district court granted

the government’s motion to strike and held that it lacked

Article III jurisdiction because the claimants refused to

respond to the interrogatories. See id. The Seventh Circuit

determined that the district court erred because “[a]t the

pleading stage Article IIIstanding is something to be alleged,

not proved,” and the Rule G(5)3requirement was in addition

to the pleading necessary to establish Article IIIstanding. Id.

at 651. The Seventh Circuit concluded that “[t]he

government jumped the gun. It gave no reason for opposing

a stay that would defer the litigation of its forfeiture case until

the criminal prosecution of the claimants was resolved. . . .” 

Id. at 653–54. In this context, the Seventh Circuit observed

that Rule G(8)’s “use of the term standing is unfortunate

because striking a claim is a decision on the merits. It is not

 

3

 Pursuant to Rule G(5):

A person who asserts an interest in the defendant

property may contest the forfeiture by filing a claim in

the court where the action is pending. The claim must:

(A) identify the specific property claimed; (B) identify

the claimant and state the claimant’s interest in the

property; (C) be signed by the claimant under penalty

of perjury; and (D) be served on the government

attorney . . .

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32 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

a determination that the claimant has failed to show that the

court has jurisdiction and so he should seek relief by an

alternative path; it is a determination that he has no interest in

. . . .property. . . .” Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, the Seventh Circuit never espoused any rule

applicable to this appeal. Rather, the Seventh Circuit was

applyingRule G(8)(c)(i)(B), which “provides an escape hatch

for the government by allowing it to respond to the claim

with a motion to strike” because the claimant lacks standing. 

Id.; see also Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B).4 The Seventh Circuit did not

consider a motion to strike premised on Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A) –

the provision at issue in this appeal – based on a claimant’s

failure to comply with Rule G(6).5

Notably, in the companion case to $574,840, the Seventh

Circuit emphasized that the government could rely on the

claimant’s failure to comply with Rule G(6) in seeking

dismissal of a forfeiture claim. See United States v.

$196,969.00 U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir.

2013). The government sought to strike a forfeiture claim

because the claimant failed to “spell out his interest in the

property at the outset . . .” Id. In rejecting this assertion, the

Seventh Circuit opined:

4 Significantly, Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A) does not use the term “standing” and

the Seventh Circuit never rejected longstanding precedent holding that

compliance with Rule G(6) is necessary to establish statutory standing. 

Interpreting the court’ssilence on this point as negating the need to adhere

to the requirements of Rule G(6) is unprecedented.

5 As the majority acknowledges, “[t]he government’s motion did not

assert that Pickle had failed to comply with Rule G(5), nor did it claim that

Pickle lacked Article III standing. . . .” Majority Opinion, p. 13.

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 33

[W]e are given no grounds for thinking that a

claimant’s failure to particularize the nature of

his claimed interest beyond what Rule G(5)

requires burdens the government or the courts

unduly. The government can depose the

claimant or serve an interrogatory on him

without leave of court, as expressly authorized

by Rule G(6)(a). If the claimant is

unresponsive, the government can move for

dismissal of the claim and for entry of a

judgment of forfeiture. . . .

Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s rationale

is in lockstep with our precedent. See $133,420, 672 F.3d at

635 (“At any time before trial, the government may move to

strike the claimant’s claim or answer on the grounds that . . .

the claimant has not responded to special interrogatories

propounded pursuant to Rule G(6)(a) . . .”).

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in $154,853.00 is equally

unhelpful to the majority. In that case, the claimant filed an

amended verified claim in which he asserted that $4,500 in

seized money was earned though his employment. See

744 F.3d at 562. During oral argument, the government

conceded that the claimant had statutorystandingwith respect

to the claimed funds. See id. at 564. The Eighth Circuit

concluded that the district court abused its discretion in

striking the claim because “[i]f [the claimant] had already

established standing as to the $4,500, as the government

concedes, then special interrogatories were unnecessary to

determine his standing as to that currency. . . .” Id. Thus, the

district court abused its discretion in striking a claim for

failure to answer special interrogatories that were wholly

unnecessary. In this case, far from conceding standing, the

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34 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

government explicitly and emphatically argued that Pickle

did not satisfy the requirements for statutory standing,

emphasizing that Pickle’s “out-right refusals to respond to

Rule G(6) special interrogatories frustrate any examination

into whether he is a straw owner, nominee, or received the

property via a fraudulent transfer.” Clearly, the Eighth

Circuit’s decision addressed markedly different facts.

The majority’s equating of Pickle’s refusal to answer the

special interrogatories to a discovery issue is discordant. See

Majority Opinion, p. 15 (criticizing the district court for

“view[ing] the Rule G(6) deficiency as something more

substantial than a discovery issue. . . .”). However, the

district court is in good company. A panel of this court has

also characterized the interrogatory process in forfeiture

proceedings as “unlike . . . typical civil proceedings.”

$133,420, 672 F.3d at 635. Rather than raising a run-of-themill discovery issue, a claimant’s adherence to Rule G(6)(a)

goes to the heart of the claimant’s assertion that he has

standing to challenge the forfeiture action. See id. (“The

purpose of the rule is to permit the government to file limited

interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather

information that bears on the claimant’s standing. . . .”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at

642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing

under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the

government the right to question the claimant regarding the

claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property

and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s

standing[.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);

$574,840, 719 F.3d at 650 (stating that “[t]he purpose of such

interrogatories is to smoke out fraudulent claims—claims by

persons who have no colorable claims”); $196,969.00,

719 F.3d at 647 (“The government can depose the claimant or

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 35

serve an interrogatory on him without leave of court, as

expressly authorized by Rule G(6)(a). If the claimant is

unresponsive, the government can move for dismissal of the

claim and for entry of a judgment of forfeiture. . . .”).

The majority reasons that “the structure of Rule G(8) –

which contains two distinct subparts, each authorizing

specifically defined substantive bases on which the

government may move to strike – counsels against the

interpretation that a claimant’s failure to abide by Rule G(6)

necessarily amounts to a standing defect. . . .” Majority

Opinion, p. 16. However, this reading of Rule G(8) directly

conflicts with our precedent and with a plain reading of the

rule. Rule G(8)(c) provides that:

(i) At any time before trial, the government

may move to strike a claim or answer: (A) for

failing to comply with Rule G(5) or (6), or (B)

because the claimant lacks standing.

These subparts are not substantively distinct. Rather, the

subparts relate to potential defects in the claimant’s standing

that may arise during different phases of the forfeiture action. 

Although a claimant, unlike Pickle, may have fully answered

the special interrogatories pursuant to Rule G(6), the claimant

may nonetheless lack standing at some “time before trial,”

such as during the summary judgment stage. See id.; see also

$133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 638 (concluding that “a claimant’s

bare assertion of an ownership or possessory interest, in the

absence of some other evidence, is not enough to survive a

motion for summary judgment”).

In any event, Rule G(8) unequivocally provides that the

government may move to strike a claim due to the claimant’s

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36 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

failure to comport with the requirements of Rule G(6). See

Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A). By holding that Pickle could continue to

contest the forfeiture despite his non-compliance with the

mandates contained in Rule G(6), the majority renders

meaningless this clearly bestowed option to move to strike a

claim. See Majority Opinion, p. 20–21; cf. $133,420.00,

672 F.3d at 635 (“At any time before trial, the government

may move to strike the claimant’s claim or answer on the

grounds that the claim or answer does not comply with

Supplemental Rule G(5), that the claimant has not responded

to special interrogatories propounded pursuant to Rule

G(6)(a), or that the claimant lacks standing. . . .”) (citation

and footnote reference omitted) (emphasis added). Although

the majority appears nonplussed by use of the term

“standing” in Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B), we have nonetheless

articulated that “the purpose of [Rule G(6)(a)] is to permit the

government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the

claim is filed to gather information that bears on the

claimant’s standing. . . .” $133,420.00 at 635 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). “The

issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under

Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the

right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s

identity and relationship to the defendant property and to

gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing[.]” 

Id. at 642 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The majority’s relegation of Rule G(6)(a) to a mere discovery

request unrelated to the claimant’s standing directly conflicts

with our precedent and creates an unwarranted split with

every court that has recognized the relevance of the rule to

the determination of a claimant’s standing, and the

government’s right to use the rule to subject a claim to

adversarial testing.

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 37

The majority also maintains that the district court erred

because “the claimant’s genuine ownership of the property

was not legitimately in dispute. . . .” Majority Opinion, p. 16. 

It is unclear how the majority reaches such a conclusion given

Pickle’s refusal to respond to the special interrogatories,

including the most basic questions concerning his relationship

to the property, and the government’s continuing challenge to

his status. Pickle’s bare assertion in his verified claim that he

“has an innocent possessory and/or ownership in [the]

property” is not dispositive. Rather, the entire point of the

Rule G(6) special interrogatories is to probe the claimant’s

property interest as asserted in his claim. See $574,840,

719 F.3d at 653–54 (observing that “[i]t’s all too easy for

someone who has no colorable claim to property in

government hands to file a claim in the forfeiture

proceeding. . . . Rule G provides an escape hatch for the

government by allowing it to respond to the claim with a

motion to strike . . .”). After all, there would be no point in

providing for special interrogatories if the claimant could

simply assert that he is a record owner in lieu of complying

with Rule G(6). See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The

issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under

Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the

right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s

identity and relationship to the defendant property, and to

gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing[.]”)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added). The majority deprives the government of the

adversarial testing to which it is entitled and simply takes

Pickle at his conclusory word.

Tellingly, forfeiture claims framed in terms of “and/or”

property interests have met with skepticism in our circuit.

For instance, in $133,420.00, we cautioned that:

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38 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

Although [the claimant’s] verified claim was

admissible evidence, its statement that [the

claimant] had an ownership and/or a

possessory interest in the defendant property

is not sufficient to establish his standing. As

we have explained, the claimant must make

clear whether he is asserting a possessory

interest, an ownership interest, or something

else. Because [his] claim used and/or, it was

not sufficiently specific regarding the nature

of [his] claimed interest in the property. More

important, the term and/or left open the

possibility that [the claimant] was claiming

only a possessory interest . . . and an

unexplained possessory interest is insufficient

to establish standing at any stage of a

forfeiture proceeding. . . .

672 F.3d at 640 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). The majority, therefore, assumes too much when it

concludes that there was no legitimate dispute concerning

Pickle’s “genuine ownership of the property” despite Pickle’s

refusal to answer the special interrogatories. Majority

Opinion, p. 16.6

6 The majority’s approach appears to intermingle the requirements for

Article III standing and those of statutory standing in forfeiture actions. 

See, e.g., Majority Opinion, pp. 17–18. “In order to meet the

case-or-controversy requirement ofArticle III, a plaintiff(including a civil

forfeiture claimant) must establish the three elements ofstanding, namely,

that the plaintiffsuffered an injury in fact, that there is a causal connection

between the injury and the conduct complained of, and that it is likely the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” $133,420.00, 672 F.3d

at 637 (citations omitted). “Claimants in civil forfeiture actions can satisfy

this test by showing that they have a colorable interest in the property,

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 39

Additionally, the majority’s conclusion that special

interrogatories were unnecessary because Pickle’s bare

assertion that he was a record owner automatically conferred

standing is unsubstantiated. See Majority Opinion, pp.17–18 

In his motion for stay, Pickle asserted that he was “[t]he

recorded owner” of the property. The government

nonetheless sought special interrogatories to determine if

Pickle was “a straw owner, nominee, or received the property

via a fraudulent transfer. . . .” The government’s efforts to

discern Pickle’s precise property interest were entirely

warranted. “Possession of mere legal title by one who does

not exercise dominion and control over the property is

insufficient even to establish standing to challenge a

forfeiture.” United States v. Vacant Land, 15 F.3d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1994), as amended (citations and alteration omitted). 

Such forfeiture cases may “turn on a finding that the title

holder is a strawman holding nominal title as a subterfuge for

a drug trafficker, rather than being a true owner of an interest

in the property. . . .” Id. Under the majority’s approach, Rule

G(6)(a) becomes meaningless as long as a claimant refuses to

which includes an ownership interest or a possessory interest[.]” Id.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “At the motion to

dismiss stage, a claimant’s unequivocal assertion of an ownership interest

in the property is sufficient by itself to establish standing.” Id. at 638

(citations omitted) (emphasis added). “If the claimant instead asserts a

possessory interest at the motion to dismiss stage, the claimant must offer

some factual allegations regarding how the claimant came to possess the

property, the nature of the claimant’s relationship to the property, and/or

the story behind the claimant’s control of the property. . . .” Id. (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, a claimant’s statutory

standing is independently subject to the claimant’s compliance with Rule

G(6). See id. at 634; see also Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680

F. Supp. 2d at 822 (observing that “[s]tatutory standing is established

through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”)

(citation omitted).

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40 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

answer the special interrogatories and summarily declares

that he is a record owner. Affording a claimant such an

unwarranted escape from the strictures of Rule G(6)(a) is

contrary to the rule’s purpose of permitting the government

to test a claimant’s assertion of a property interest through

special interrogatories. See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 634,

642.

Contrary to the majority’s approach, we have emphasized

the importance of compliance with Rule G(6) even in cases

where the claimant has asserted his Fifth Amendment rights. 

In $133,420.00, we observed that the claimant’s assertion of

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was

an attempt to thwart the adversarial testing contemplated by

Rule G(6)(a). We concluded that the claimant’s reliance on

the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering the special

interrogatories “frustrat[ed] the government’s attempts to test

the veracity of his claim of ownership” and that “his claim of

privilege . . . raises the core concern that his testimony may

furnish one side with what may be false evidence and deprive

the other of anymeans of detecting the imposition.” 672 F.3d

at 642.

The majority’s approach, therefore, is in clear conflict

with our precedent establishing that Rule G(6)(a) implicates

the claimant’s standing and the government has a right to file

a motion to strike a claim when the claimant does not respond

to the special interrogatories. See id. (“The issue of standing

is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule

G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the

claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to

the defendant property, and to gather information that bears

on the claimant’s standing[.]”) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 635 (“At any time

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 41

before trial, the government may move to strike the

claimant’s claim or answer on the grounds that the claim or

answer does not comply with Supplemental Rule G(5), that

the claimant has not responded to special interrogatories

propounded pursuant to Rule G(6)(a), or that the claimant

. . . .standing. . . .”) (citation and footnote reference omitted)

(emphasis added).

Relying on United States v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998,

328 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2003) and United States v. One 1900

Beechcraft, 1900 C Twin Engine Turbo-Prop Aircraft,

619 F.3d 1275, 1277 n.3 (11th Cir. 2010), the majority

attempts to justify its deviation from our binding precedent by

suggesting that standing and the merits of the forfeiture action

are blurred when the claimant asserts an innocent owner

defense. See Majority Opinion, pp. 17–18. “An innocent

owner is an owner who (i) did not know of the conduct giving

rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving

rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected

under the circumstances to terminate such use of the

property. . . .” United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1113

(9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The majority’s innocent owner suggestion is

immeasurably confusing given that Pickle asserted that a stay

was warranted due to pending accusations of “possessing

marijuana for sale, cultivation of marijuana, and other

violations of [California law] pertaining to marijuana.” Pickle

also affirmed that he was “subject to a parallel criminal

investigation” and that he declined to respond to the

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42 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

government’s interrogatories based on his Fifth Amendment

rights.7

In any event, One Lincoln Navigator 1998 and One 1900

Beechcraft did not involve the claimant’s lack of statutory

standing premised on the claimant’s failure to comply with

Rule G(6)(a). Rather, those cases involved an assertion of an

innocent owner defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1)8

and have no relevance to this appeal involving Pickle’s

refusal to provide any support for his asserted property

interest in response to the government’s special

interrogatories. See One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d

at 1014; see also One 1990 Beechcraft, 619 F.3d at 1277 n.3

(clarifying that “[a]lthough many cases refer to the statutory

definition of ownership as part of the standing inquiry, it is in

fact an element of the innocent owner’s claim on the merits”)

(citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In contrast to Pickle’s blanket refusal to comply with Rule

G(6) and provide support for his assertion of a property

interest, the claimants in One Lincoln Navigator 1998 and

One 1990 Beechcraft provided evidence during evidentiary

hearings in support of their claims. See One Lincoln

Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d at 1012–13; One 1990 Beechcraft,

619 F.3d at 1276–77. The majority’s parsing of inapposite

innocent owner cases does not support reversal of the district

7

In his verified claim, Pickle maintained that he had “an innocent

possessory and/or ownership in [the] property.” In his motion for a stay,

he asserted only that he was “[t]he recorded owner” of the property.

 

8

 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1), “[a]n innocent owner’s interest in

property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute. The

claimant shall have the burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent

owner by a preponderance of the evidence.”

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UNITED STATES V. PICKLE 43

court’s striking of Pickle’s claim, particularly in light of our

contrary precedent. See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 634, 642.

Based on its assertion that courts “typically” afford

claimants an opportunity “to cure defective Rule G(6)

responses,” the majority faults the district court for not

providing Pickle a similar opportunity. Majority Opinion, pp.

11–12. However, the record belies any credible claim that an

opportunity to cure was appropriate. This action did not

involve a claimant’s defective responses to the special

interrogatories, but a complete refusal to abide by Rule G(6). 

In this protracted action, which commenced in 2009, the

district court granted numerous stays based on pending

criminal proceedings against Pickle’s relatives. Once it

became apparent that Pickle was not the subject of any

criminal prosecution,9the district court ordered that discovery

be completed by February 16, 2012, and the parties proposed

a September 10, 2012, trial date. Although it was evident that

Pickle was not subject to any criminal proceedings, Pickle

nevertheless refused to answer the special interrogatories and

responded with another motion to stay based on a purported

criminal prosecution that never materialized.10 Pickle refused

to respond to any of the government’s interrogatories,

requests for admission, or requests for production, informed

9 Pickle was unable to demonstrate that he was “the subject of a related

criminal investigation or case” or that his Fifth Amendment rights were

implicated, because the criminal investigation into his activities had been

closed. 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2)(A)&(C).

10 Pickle’s motion to stay filed in 2011 was premised on a 2008 police

report stating that a case against Pickle would be forwarded to the Trinity

County District Attorney’s Office. However, that report also confirmed

that “[n]o charges were filed against Byron Pickle and the case against

him was closed on August 14, 2009.”

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44 UNITED STATES V. PICKLE

the government that he was asserting his Fifth Amendment

rights, refused to attend his scheduled deposition, and filed an

untimely opposition to the government’s motion to strike. 

Pickle’s refusal to respond to the special interrogatories based

on his specious assertion of an ongoing criminal investigation

is entirely distinguishable from the cases cited by the

majority. Considering Pickle’s conduct, the district court was

not compelled to afford Pickle any additional opportunities to

satisfy his obligations under Rule G(6).

The majority’s holding that the district court erred in

striking Pickle’s claim because Pickle’s failure to comply

with Rule G(6) did not implicate his standing is legally

untenable and conflicts with our precedent, as well as that of

nearly every other court considering Rule G(6). The district

court did not abuse its discretion in striking Pickle’s claim

because he refused to respond to the government’s special

interrogatories as required byRule G(6). Once Pickle’s claim

was stricken, Pickle no longer possessed any standing to

contest the forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2)(B)

(providing that, for a stay, the claimant must have “standing

to assert a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding”). Thus,

the district court’s denial of Pickle’s motion to stay due to

lack of standing was entirely proper. I respectfully dissent

from the majority’s contrary holding.

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