Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00815/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00815-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Margo Tarkington, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-815-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income on January 12, 2004, claiming a disability onset date of November 25, 2003.

Dkt. #12A, Tr. 53-55, 378-81. The application was denied. Tr. 47-50, 382. A hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was held on August 16, 2006. Tr. 390-418.

The ALJ issued a written decision on October 23, 2006, finding Plaintiff not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 15-21. This decision became Defendant’s final

decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 6-8. Plaintiff then commenced this

action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. #1.

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step sequential evaluation

process. The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four. To establish disability,

the claimant must show (1) she is not currently working, (2) she has a severe physical or

mental impairment, and (3) the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) her

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residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes her from performing her past work. At step

five, the Commissioner bears the burden of showing that the claimant has the RFC to perform

other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had several impairments that are severe when considered

in combination: post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, a

schizoaffective disorder, a psychotic disorder, and an affective disorder. Tr. 17. The ALJ

determined that these impairments were not severe enough to meet or equal a listed

impairment. Tr. 18. The ALJ concluded that while Plaintiff was not able to perform her past

work as a kitchen worker, care giver, and janitor, she was not completely disabled because

she had the residual functional capacity to perform light unskilled work with restrictions.

Tr. 18-19.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step five by assigning considerable weight to the

opinion of a non-examining doctor and failing to properly consider treating source opinions,

Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, and a third-party function report. Dkt. #23.

Defendant concedes that the ALJ erred. Dkt. ##27-28. The Court will therefore reverse

Defendant’s administrative decision denying benefits. See Robbins v. SSA, 466 F.3d 880,

882 (9th Cir. 2006) (The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits must be reversed “if it

is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error”). 

Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded for an award of benefits because the

improperly rejected evidence shows that she is disabled and that evidence must be credited

as true on remand. Dkt. ##23 at 28, 29 at 2-6. Defendant urges the Court not to follow the

“credit as true” doctrine and seeks a remand to allow the ALJ to give legally proper reasons

for rejecting evidence. Dkt. #28.

The “credit as true” doctrine applies when an ALJ fails to provide legally sufficient

reasons for rejecting a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. The overwhelming

authority in this Circuit makes clear that the doctrine is mandatory where there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made and

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See Varney v. Sec. of HHS, 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988); Swenson v. Sullivan,

876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 & n.11 (9th Cir.

1989); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1292 (9th Cir. 1996); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729 (9th Cir. 1998); Harman v. Apfel,

211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000); Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 278 F.3d 920, 926

(9th Cir. 2002); McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Moisa v.

Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593-95

(9th Cir. 2004); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007); Lingenfelter v. Astrue,

504 F.3d. 1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).

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it is clear from the record that the claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act.1

Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work because she has difficulty learning and

concentrating on specific tasks, suffers from depression and anxiety, and experiences

symptoms of paranoia and has panic attacks when around other people. Tr. 402-11.

Defendant does not dispute that the ALJ’s sole reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony –

that it is not consistent with the objective medical evidence (Tr. 19) – is legally deficient.

Vocational expert Sandra Richter opined that if Plaintiff had the mental limitations she

testified to at the hearing, “she would not be able to work.” Tr. 415-16. The ALJ accepted

Ms. Richter’s opinions. Tr. 19, 412-15.

Because it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff

disabled if her testimony were to be credited as true, “a remand for further proceedings

would serve no useful purpose.” Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 730 (9th Cir. 1998); see

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will not remand for

further proceedings where, taking the claimant’s testimony as true, the ALJ would clearly

be required to award benefits[.]”) Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007)

(remanding for an award of benefits where it was “‘clear from the record that the ALJ would

be required to determine the claimant disabled’”) (citation omitted). The Court will remand

the case for an award of benefits.

Defendant notes that in Vasquez v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2008), he has

sought en banc review of the credit-as-true rule and that petition for review is currently

pending before the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. #28 at 1 n.1. Until an en banc panel reverses course,

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however, this Court must follow Varney and its progeny. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (neither a district court nor a three-judge panel may overrule a prior

decision of the court unless it has been “undercut by higher authority to such an extent that

it has been effectively overruled”).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s administrative decision denying benefits is reversed.

2. The case is remanded to Defendant for an award of benefits.

3. Defendant’s motion for remand (Dkt. #27) is denied to the extent it seeks a

remand for further proceedings.

4. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

DATED this 8th day of May, 2009.

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