Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07161/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 7, 2013 Decided July 5, 2013

No. 11-7155

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF 

AMERICA, AFL-CIO AND SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF 

CARPENTERS,

APPELLANTS

v.

OPERATIVE PLASTERERS’ & CEMENT MASONS’

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES &

CANADA, AFL-CIO,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00353)

No. 11-7161

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF 

AMERICA, AFL-CIO AND SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF 

CARPENTERS,

APPELLANTS

v.

USCA Case #11-7161 Document #1445278 Filed: 07/05/2013 Page 1 of 32
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OPERATIVE PLASTERERS’ & CEMENT MASONS’

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES &

CANADA, AFL-CIO,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02212)

Alice Chih-Mei Chen argued the cause for the appellants. 

Daniel M. Shanley was on brief.

Keith R. Bolek argued the cause for the appellee. Brian 

A. Powers was on brief. 

Robert D. Kurnick and Richard M. Resnick were on brief 

for amici curiae Building and Construction Trades 

Department, et al. in support of the appellee. 

Before: HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 

unconsolidated cases Nos. 11-7155 and 11-7161, two 

unions—the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 

America (UBCJA) and one of its locals, the Southwest 

Regional Council of Carpenters (SWRCC) (collectively,

Carpenters)—appeal the district court’s confirmation of two 

arbitration awards in favor of a third union, the Operative 

Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International Association 

(Plasterers). In addition to pressing their merits arguments, 

the Carpenters contend that the cases are moot and request 

USCA Case #11-7161 Document #1445278 Filed: 07/05/2013 Page 2 of 32
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vacatur of the district court judgments on either basis. 

Concluding that we have jurisdiction, we affirm the district 

court’s grants of summary judgment to the Plasterers. 

I. Background

In 1997, voters in the Los Angeles Unified School 

District (LAUSD) approved funding for a massive capital 

improvement program involving both the renovation of 

existing facilities and the construction of new ones (LAUSD 

Program). In May 2003, the LAUSD executed a project labor 

agreement (PLA)—the Project Stabilization Agreement (PSA 

or Agreement)—with the Los Angeles/Orange Counties

Building and Construction Trades Council (LACTC) and the 

local chapters of several unions in order to stabilize labor

relations on LAUSD Program construction sites. See infra

Part IV.A (discussing PLAs). The SWRCC and the 

Plasterers’ Local 200 (Local 200)—the Plasterers’ local 

chapter—are both parties to the Agreement. The Agreement 

provides that all contractors and subcontractors awarded work 

by the LAUSD must accept the Agreement’s terms and must 

“evidence their acceptance by the execution of . . . [a] Letter 

of Assent.” PSA § 2.5(b), Joint Appendix at 253, United Bhd.

of Carpenters & Joiners v. Operative Plasterers’ & Cement 

Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 11-7155 (Frye JA). Contractors and 

subcontractors awarded work pursuant to the Agreement must 

recognize “the [LACTC] and the signatory local Unions as 

the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees 

engaged in Project Work” for “the period when the 

employee[s are] engaged in Project Work.” Id. § 3.1, Frye JA 

256. 

Under the Agreement, the contractors are exclusively 

responsible for assigning work to particular employees. But 

given that more than thirty locals and dozens of contractors 

and subcontractors are parties to the Agreement, opportunities 

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for conflict over which employees should perform what work 

abound. A conflict “between two or more groups of 

employees over which is entitled to do work for an employer” 

is known as a “jurisdictional dispute.” NLRB v. Radio & 

Television Broad. Eng’rs Union, Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573, 

579 (1961) (CBS). Section 10(k) of the National Labor 

Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 160(k), authorizes the 

National Labor Relations Board (Board) to decide a 

jurisdictional dispute if it arises as part of an unfair labor 

practice charge under section 8(b)(4)(D), Int’l 

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. NLRB, 884 

F.2d 1407, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Sea-Land), unless “the 

parties to such dispute . . . agree[] upon methods for the 

voluntary adjustment of[] the dispute,” 29 U.S.C. § 160(k); 

see also Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 130, 132 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989) (“National labor policy favors the private 

settlement of jurisdictional disputes between two unions.”). 

The Agreement contains a jurisdictional dispute 

resolution provision declaring that “[a]ll jurisdictional 

disputes between or among Building and Construction Trades

Unions party to th[e] Agreement[] shall be settled and 

adjusted according to the” Plan for the Settlement of 

Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry (Plan). 

PSA § 8.2, Frye JA 272. Established in 1948 by the Building 

and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, the 

Plan is an arbitration mechanism the courts and the Board

have long recognized as an adequate jurisdictional dispute 

resolution method under section 10(k). See NLRB v. 

Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 120 n.5 

(1971); Heavy Constr. Laborers’ Local 60, 305 N.L.R.B. 762, 

763 (1991). All decisions rendered pursuant to the Plan are 

“final, binding and conclusive on the contractors and Union 

parties to” the Agreement, PSA § 8.2, Frye JA 272, and all

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employers must make work assignments “in accordance with 

the Plan,” id. § 8.1, Frye JA 272.

A. Arbitration Awards in No. 11-7161 and No. 11-7155

On June 30, 2009, the Board certified the SWRCC as the 

exclusive bargaining representative of the construction 

employees of Jordan Interiors, Inc. (Jordan). At some point in 

2009, Clark Construction Group, LLC subcontracted with 

Jordan to perform plastering work at the Central Region 

Middle School No. 7 Project (No. 7 Project) and Jordan 

became a party to the Agreement. After learning that Jordan 

intended to assign the work to its own SWRCC-represented 

employees, the Plasterers filed a complaint with the Plan 

Administrator claiming that the plastering work at the No. 7 

Project fell within Local 200’s jurisdiction. 1

 The UBCJA (on 

behalf of its local, the SWRCC) refused to participate in the 

Plan arbitration, arguing that the Board’s then-recent 

certification of the SWRCC as the exclusive bargaining 

representative of Jordan’s construction employees ousted the 

arbitrator of authority to arbitrate the dispute. On November 

10, 2009, Plan arbitrator Tony A. Kelly determined that the 

plastering work at the No. 7 Project belonged to the Plasterers

(Kelly Award). 

In 2010, S.J. Amaroso Construction (Amaroso) 

subcontracted with Frye Construction, Inc. (Frye) 2 to perform 

plastering work at the South Region Elementary School No. 

11 Project (No. 11 Project) and Frye thereafter became a party 

to the Agreement either in 2010 or 2011. Frye assigned the 

 1 The Plasterers brought the complaint because the Plan 

requires that national and international unions arbitrate disputes on 

their locals’ behalf. 

2 We refer to Frye and Jordan collectively as the Employers.

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work to its own employees, who were represented by the 

SWRCC. The Plasterers filed a complaint pursuant to the

Plan alleging that the plastering work at the No. 11 Project 

fell within Local 200’s jurisdiction. While the complaint was 

pending, on February 2, 2011, the Board certified SWRCC as 

the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit 

consisting of all of Frye’s construction employees. Before 

arbitrator Thomas G. Pagan, the UBCJA (again, on behalf of 

the SWRCC) argued that Pagan lacked authority to arbitrate. 

On February 7, 2011, Pagan determined that the plastering 

work at the No. 11 Project also belonged to the Plasterers

(Pagan Award).3

B. District Court Proceedings

The Carpenters petitioned the district court to vacate the 

Kelly Award and the Plasterers counterclaimed to confirm it. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the 

Carpenters and vacated the Kelly Award. Operative 

Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n v. Jordan Interiors, 

Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2010) (Jordan Interiors I). 

It concluded that Jordan became a party to the Agreement on 

January 20, 2009. Id. at 52. Because the June 30, 2009 Board 

certification of the SWRCC postdated Jordan’s entry into the 

Agreement, the court reasoned that the certification 

effectively terminated the contractual relationship between 

Jordan and Local 200, thereby stripping the arbitrator of

authority to arbitrate the jurisdictional dispute. Id. at 57. The 

Plasterers timely appealed. 

While their appeal was pending, the Plasterers also 

moved before the district court under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(1), seeking relief from the summary 

 3 Beginning in Part II, we refer to the Pagan Award in Frye and 

the Kelly Award in Jordan collectively as the Awards.

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judgment grant against them. They argued that, although the 

district court correctly determined that Jordan became a party 

to the Agreement in January 2009 on a different project, it did 

not become a party as to the No. 7 Project until October 2009. 

Because Jordan joined the Agreement after the Board’s June 

30, 2009 section 9(a) certification, the certification could not 

have terminated the Agreement with respect to Jordan and 

Local 200. The district court agreed and entered an order 

notifying this Court that, were the case remanded, the district 

court would grant the Plasterers’ Rule 60(b) motion. We 

remanded; the district court then granted the Plasterers’

motion, vacated its summary judgment grant to the Carpenters 

and granted summary judgment to the Plasterers, thereby

confirming the Kelly Award. Operative Plasterers’ & Cement 

Masons’ Int’l Ass’n v. Jordan Interiors, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 

241, 242–43 n.1, 247–48 (D.D.C. 2011) (Jordan Interiors II). 

The Carpenters timely appealed. 

The Carpenters also petitioned the district court to vacate 

the Pagan Award and the Plasterers counterclaimed for 

enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment to 

the Plasterers, thus confirming the arbitration award. United 

Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Operative Plasterers’ & 

Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, 826 F. Supp. 2d 209, 221

(D.D.C. 2011) (Frye). The Carpenters timely appealed. 

II. Mootness 

The district court’s statutory jurisdiction to enforce the 

Awards arises under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), (c), Burns Int’l Sec. 

Servs., Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 47 

F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1995), and we have statutory jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our constitutional jurisdiction, 

however, is not so clear. See Mayor of Nashville v. Cooper, 

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867) (court must have statutory 

and constitutional jurisdiction to hear case). Given that many 

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months had passed between the dates the Employers first 

assigned the work pursuant to the PLA and the perfecting of

these appeals, at oral argument we ordered the parties to brief 

whether these cases had become moot. The briefs revealed 

that both the No. 7 and No. 11 Projects are complete. In light 

of that fact, the Carpenters now contend that the cases are 

moot and ask that we vacate the district court judgments on 

that basis. The Plasterers argue that we have jurisdiction 

under the “capable of repetition but evading review” 

exception to the Article III mootness doctrine. 

“Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution permits federal 

courts to adjudicate only actual, ongoing controversies.” 

McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct, 264 

F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted); see 

also Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013). A case 

remains live “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, 

however small, in the outcome of the litigation.” Knox v. Serv. 

Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) 

(quotation marks omitted). The case must remain live “at all 

stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is 

filed.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974); 

see also Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 

(1990). “[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on 

appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant ‘any 

effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing party, the appeal 

must be dismissed.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United 

States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 

U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).

In National Football League Players Association v. Pro 

Football, Inc., the labor arbitrator ordered the employer to

suspend delinquent employees before the end of the 

professional football season. 56 F.3d 1525, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 

1995), vacated in other part on reh’g, 79 F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 

1996). The employer refused to comply and the union sought 

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enforcement of the arbitration award; the professional football 

season ended, however, before we heard the appeal. Id. at 

1528. We held that the enforcement action was moot because 

an order mandating compliance with the arbitrator’s award—

which required action before the season’s end—would be 

wholly ineffectual as the season had ended. Id. at 1529. 

Similarly here, vacatur of the arbitration awards would 

provide the Carpenters no relief because the plastering work 

to which vacatur would entitle them no longer exists. 

These cases are therefore moot unless the “capable of 

repetition but evading review” exception applies. The 

exception applies if “ ‘(1) the challenged action was in its 

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 

expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the 

same complaining party would be subjected to the same 

action again.’ ” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) 

(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)); 

see also S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 

(1911) (announcing exception). The party invoking the 

exception bears the burden of showing that both elements are 

satisfied. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 

F.3d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

We examine the “evading review” prong first. To evade 

review, the challenged action must be incapable of surviving 

long enough to undergo Supreme Court review. Christian 

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District 

of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Recent 

census data reveals that educational construction projects like 

the No. 7 and No. 11 Projects typically last no longer than

approximately two years—and therefore individual work 

assignments on those projects last for even shorter periods. 

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table 2: Average Number of Months 

from Start to Completion for State and Local Construction 

Projects Completed in 2010–2011, by Value and Type of 

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Construction (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/

construction/c30/pdf/t211.pdf. In light of the “rule-of-thumb” 

that “orders of less than two years’ duration ordinarily evade 

review,” the Awards comfortably satisfy the “evading review” 

prong. LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 978 (D.C. Cir. 

1998). Moreover, in the “quintessential jurisdictional 

dispute” the employer is neutral as to which group of 

employees should perform the work. Int’l Longshoremen’s & 

Warehousemen’s Union, Local 14 v. NLRB, 85 F.3d 646, 652 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (Sierra Pacific); see also CBS, 364 U.S. at 

579 (“[I]n most instances, [the quarrel] is of so little interest 

to the employer that he seems perfectly willing to assign work 

to either [group of employees] if the other will just let him

alone.”). A delay in the completion of a particular work 

assignment can postpone the completion of an entire 

construction project and jeopardize the employer’s ability to 

obtain future contracts. It therefore has good reason to 

comply quickly with an arbitration award and complete a 

given work assignment notwithstanding an unresolved 

judicial challenge to the award. Because the judiciary is 

ordinarily unable to keep pace with the employer’s need to 

complete the work assignment, the Awards are “by [their] 

very nature short in duration, so that [they] could not, or 

probably would not, be able to be adjudicated while fully 

live.” Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 

1985) (quotation marks and emphases omitted). 

Whether the disputes are “capable of repetition” is a 

closer question. “This prong requires that the same parties 

will engage in litigation over the same issues in the future.” 

Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 633 

(D.C. Cir. 2002). The party invoking the exception must 

show “a reasonable degree of likelihood that the issue will be 

the basis of a continuing controversy between the[] two 

parties.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The 

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relevant inquiry, however, is not “whether the precise 

historical facts that spawned the plaintiff’s claims are likely to 

recur.” Del Monte, 570 F.3d at 324. Rather, “[t]he ‘wrong’

that is, or is not, ‘capable of repetition’ must be defined in 

terms of the precise controversy it spawns,” to wit, “in terms 

of the legal questions it presents for decision.” People for the 

Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 

422–23 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Here, the alleged “wrong” is the Carpenters’ loss of work 

caused by the award of the work to a different union pursuant 

to a standard arbitration provision in a PLA. The question, 

then, is whether the Carpenters are reasonably likely to suffer 

this legal wrong again. “In estimating the likelihood of an 

event’s occurring in the future, a natural starting point is how 

often it has occurred in the past.” Clarke v. United States, 915 

F.2d 699, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). Because the parties 

have already arbitrated three jurisdictional disputes arising 

under the Agreement, which continues to govern all 

construction work awarded before its September 30, 2013

expiration, it is not unreasonable to expect another dispute to 

arise between them before the Agreement expires.

But we do not confine our inquiry to disputes arising 

under the Agreement. Admittedly, in reviewing an arbitration 

award, we are reviewing the interpretation of the particular 

terms of a particular contract. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. 

Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In an ordinary 

contract dispute, the uniqueness of those terms might make 

the case so “highly fact-specific” that it would not likely 

recur. Gittens, 396 F.3d at 424. Here, however, the terms of 

the Agreement are hardly unique. As the amici point out, the 

Plan is incorporated into hundreds of PLAs worth tens of 

billions of dollars. And the Agreement’s recognition clause—

the only specific clause on which the Carpenters base their 

arguments—is a common provision in PLAs. See Bldg. Indus. 

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Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. City of New York, 678 F.3d 184, 

186 (2d Cir. 2012) (BIECA).

4

 Indeed, numerous

jurisdictional disputes have arisen between these parties under 

other PLAs. See, e.g., Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 348 

N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2006) (Standard Drywall II) (resolving 

jurisdictional disputes between SWRCC and Local 200 at 

ninety-seven job sites, including three covered by PSA); Sw. 

Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 346 N.L.R.B. 478, 478 (2006) 

(Standard Drywall I) (resolving jurisdiction dispute between 

SWRCC and Local 200 at educational construction site). 

Granted, those disputes did not result in arbitration. But given 

the ubiquity of the Plan in PLAs and the frequency of 

jurisdictional clashes involving the Carpenters and the 

Plasterers, future arbitrable jurisdictional disputes raising the

same legal issue between them seem reasonably likely to 

 4 Compare also PSA § 3.1, Frye JA 256 (“The Contractor 

recognizes the Council and the signatory local Unions as the 

exclusive bargaining representative for the employees engaged in 

Project Work. Such recognition does not extend beyond the period 

when the employee is engaged in Project Work.”), with BLDG. &

CONSTR. TRADES DEP’T, AFL-CIO, STANDARD PROJECT LABOR 

AGREEMENT art. III, § 1, available at http://www.bctd.org/FieldServices/Project-Labor-Agreement.aspx (“The Contractors 

recognize the signatory Unions as the sole and exclusive bargaining 

representatives of all craft employees within their respective 

jurisdictions working on the Project within the scope of this 

Agreement.”), and NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF DESIGN & CONSTR., 

PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENT COVERING NEW CONSTRUCTION OF 

IDENTIFIED CITY OWNED BUILDINGS & STRUCTURES art. 4, § 1, 

available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/mocs/downloads/pdf/pla/

PLA%20DDC%20New%20Construction.PDF (“The Contractors 

recognize the signatory Unions as the sole and exclusive bargaining 

representatives of all employees who are performing on-site 

Program Work, with respect to that work.”).

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occur. These cases, then, are not moot and we proceed to the 

merits.

III. Procedural Issues

Although the Carpenters’ merits arguments are, in the 

main, identical in both cases, each appeal presents unique 

procedural arguments which we address first. 

A. No. 11-7161 (Jordan Interiors I and II)

The Carpenters argue that the district court erred in 

granting the Plasterers’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion in Jordan

Interiors II and further erred in denying its motion to 

consolidate Jordan Interiors II and Frye or, in the alternative,

in not allowing rebriefing of the issues presented in Jordan

Interiors II. We review the grant of a Rule 60(b) motion, the 

denial of a motion for consolidation and the denial of a 

motion for further briefing for abuse of discretion. See 

Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (Rule 60(b)); Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons & 

Plasterers Int’l Union, 543 F.2d 224, 228 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 

(consolidation); Asemani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 167 Fed. 

App’x 806, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (briefing).

Designed to strike a balance between finality and the 

demands of justice, see Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 

191 (D.C. Cir. 2006), Rule 60(b) authorizes the district court 

to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for . . . 

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” so long 

as the motion is filed within “a year after entry of the 

judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (c)(1). The Carpenters 

claim that granting the Rule 60(b) motion was error because 

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the Plasterers’ failure to press their date-based “defense”5

before Jordan Interiors I issued was strategic and therefore 

not excusable. Br. of Appellants 50, United Bhd. of 

Carpenters & Joiners v. Operative Plasterers’ and Cement 

Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 11-7166 (Jordan Br. of Appellants). 

The Carpenters thus do not challenge the district court’s 

determination that Jordan Interiors I was premised on a 

factual error but instead argue that the Plasterers are 

responsible for that error. But the Plasterers referred

specifically to the October 22, 2009 Letter of Assent in 

multiple district-court filings. The district court nevertheless 

missed the references and, realizing its mistake, sought to 

correct Jordan Interiors I by granting the Plasterers’ motion. 

Even if the Carpenters were correct in their reading of the 

record below, the district court did not err in granting the 

motion. See Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 

F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“When a party timely 

presents a previously undisclosed fact so central to the 

litigation that it shows the initial judgment to have been 

manifestly unjust, reconsideration under rule 60(b)[(1)] is 

proper even though the original failure to present that 

information was inexcusable.”). Given that Jordan Interiors I

turned on the district court’s mistaken understanding of the 

record and that the Plasterers complied with the timing 

requirement of Rule 60(c), the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in granting the motion. 

The district court denied the Carpenters’ motion for 

consolidation or additional briefing because it concluded that 

“the parties previously had ample opportunity to make 

arguments concerning” the timing issue. Order at 4, United 

 5 The Carpenters call the question of when Jordan joined the 

Agreement a “defense.” When Jordan joined is more correctly 

characterized as a question of fact. 

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Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Operative Plasterers’ & 

Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 09-cv-2212 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 

2011). The Carpenters nevertheless contend that the denial of 

their motion “deprived [them] of the chance to thoroughly 

argue” the timing issue. Jordan Br. of Appellants 49–50. But 

they concede that they “would have proffered the largely 

same legal theories” had the district court permitted 

consolidation or rebriefing. Reply Br. of Appellants 31, 

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Operative Plasterers’ 

& Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 11-7161. Because the

Carpenters had nothing new to say, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying briefing and argument on the 

timing issue. 

B. No. 11-7155 (Frye)

The Carpenters also argue that the district court erred by 

failing to accord Jordan Interiors I preclusive effect in Frye. 

In Jordan Interiors I, the district court held that the arbitrator 

was without authority to award the disputed work to the 

Plasterers because the Board’s section 9(a) certification of the 

SWRCC, which occurred after Jordan became a party to the 

Agreement, terminated the Agreement as between Jordan and 

Local 200. Jordan Interiors I, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 57. In Frye, 

the Carpenters argued that Jordan Interiors I estopped the 

Plasterers from defending the validity of the Pagan Award. 

The district court declined to give Jordan Interiors I estoppel 

effect because to do so with a judgment premised on a 

“misstatement of relevant fact . . . . would be unfair.” Frye, 

826 F. Supp. 2d at 215.

Although we ordinarily review a district court’s estoppel 

ruling premised on “basic unfairness” for abuse of discretion, 

see Connors v. Tanoma Mining Co., 953 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992) (citing Jack Faucett Assoc’s, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 118, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), here, we need 

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not reach the merits of the issue. On the very day the district 

court announced its judgment in Frye, it granted the 

Plasterers’ Rule 60(b) motion and vacated Jordan Interiors I

with respect to the Kelly Award. Jordan Interiors II, 826 F. 

Supp. 2d at 242–43 n.1; see also Klapprott v. United States, 

335 U.S. 601, 614–15 (1949) (Rule 60(b) power is power to 

“vacate judgments”). A judgment vacated either by the trial 

court or on appeal has no estoppel effect in a subsequent 

proceeding. See United States v. Lacey, 982 F.2d 410, 412 

(10th Cir. 1992) (“A judgment that has been vacated, 

reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all 

conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral 

estoppel. The same is true, of course, of a judgment vacated

by a trial court.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Dodrill 

v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985). The district court 

therefore correctly declined to give Jordan Interiors I

estoppel effect in Frye.

IV. Merits

As this case is before us on appeal from summary 

judgment grants, our review is de novo. Calhoun v. Johnson, 

632 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We note at the outset 

that the Carpenters do not challenge the merits of the Awards. 

See Nat’l Postal Mail Handlers Union v. Am. Postal Workers 

Union, 589 F.3d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining 

deferential standard of review of labor arbitration awards). 

Instead, the Carpenters challenge the arbitrators’ authority to 

make the Awards and also argue that the Awards contravene 

public policy. Before addressing their arguments, we briefly 

explain the law governing the Agreement.

A. Sections 8(f), 9(a) and PLAs

“Under sections 9(a) and 8(a)(5) of the [NLRA], 

employers are obligated to bargain only with unions that have 

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17

been ‘designated or selected for the purposes of collective 

bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit 

appropriate for such purposes.’ ” Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 330 F.3d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 

§ 159(a)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (“It shall be an 

unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain 

collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject 

to the provisions of section [9(a)].”); see also Int’l Ladies’ 

Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738–39 

(1961). “A union can achieve the status of a majority 

collective bargaining representative through either Board 

certification or voluntary recognition by the employer . . . .” 

Raymond F. Kravis Ctr. for Performing Arts, Inc. v. NLRB, 

550 F.3d 1183, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Section 8(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f), carves out 

a limited exception to section 9(a)’s majority support 

requirement within the construction industry. Section 8(f)

provides, in pertinent part:

It shall not be an unfair labor practice . . . for an 

employer engaged primarily in the building and 

construction industry to make an agreement covering 

employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, 

will be engaged) in the building and construction 

industry with a labor organization of which building 

and construction employees are members . . . because 

[] the majority status of such labor organization has 

not been established under the provisions of section

[]9 prior to the making of such agreement . . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 158(f). “Under this exception, a contractor may 

sign a ‘pre-hire’ agreement with a union regardless of how 

many employees authorized the union’s representation.” Nova 

Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 534; see also Allied Mech. Servs., Inc. 

v. NLRB, 668 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Congress 

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enacted this limited exception because construction employers 

must know their labor costs up front in order to generate 

accurate bids and must “have available a supply of skilled 

craftsmen ready for quick referral.” NLRB v. Local Union No. 

103, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron 

Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 348 (1978) (Higdon) (quotation 

marks omitted). In addition, traditional union organization is 

not conducive to the brief, project-to-project periods workers

spend in the employ of any single contractor. See Bldg. & 

Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 

507 U.S. 218, 231 (1993) (Boston Harbor); see also Higdon, 

434 U.S. at 349.

A union that is party to a section 8(f) agreement serves as

the section 9(a) exclusive bargaining representative of the unit 

it purports to represent for the duration of the section 8(f) 

agreement. Viola Indus.-Elevator Div., Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 

306, 306 (1987), enforced 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992);

John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1385 (1987)

(Deklewa), enforced sub nom. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, 

Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 

F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988). But its section 9(a) status is limited 

in significant respects. A union party to a section 9(a) 

agreement is entitled to a conclusive presumption of majority 

status for up to three years, during which time decertification

petitions are barred.6 Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 

U.S. 781, 786 (1996). But under section 8(f), a union is

entitled to no such presumption and parties may therefore file 

decertification petitions at any time during a section 8(f) 

relationship. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 534. Moreover, 

 6 A section 9(a) certification absent any collective bargaining 

agreement entitles the certified union to a one-year presumption of 

majority status. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 

482 U.S. 27, 37 (1987). 

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when a section 9(a) agreement expires, the presumption of 

majority support requires the employer to continue bargaining 

with the union unless the union has in fact lost majority 

support or the employer has a good-faith reason to believe 

such support has been lost. See Auciello Iron Works, 517 U.S. 

at 786–87 (citing NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 

494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990)). But “because the union enjoys no 

presumption that it ever had majority support” under section 

8(f), the employer can refuse to bargain once a section 8(f) 

agreement expires. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 534.

Even while operative, a section 8(f) agreement is not set 

in stone. If a union party to an 8(f) agreement “successfully 

seeks majority support, the prehire agreement attains the 

status of a [section 9(a)] collective-bargaining agreement 

executed by the employer with a union representing a 

majority of the employees in the unit.” Higdon, 434 U.S. at 

350. “Generally, a union seeking to convert its section 8(f) 

relationship to a section 9(a) relationship may either petition 

for a representation election or demand recognition from the 

employer by providing proof of majority support.” M & M 

Backhoe Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.3d 1047, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). But “a vote to reject the signatory union will void the 

8(f) agreement and will terminate the 8(f) relationship.” 

Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1385.

As a PLA, the Agreement is a particular type of section 

8(f) pre-hire agreement. We have previously explained that 

a PLA is a multi-employer, multi-union pre-hire 

agreement designed to systemize labor relations at a 

construction site. It typically requires that all 

contractors and subcontractors who will work on a 

project subscribe to the agreement; that all contractors 

and subcontractors agree in advance to abide by a 

master collective bargaining agreement for all work on 

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the project; and that wages, hours, and other terms of 

employment be coordinated or standardized pursuant 

to the PLA across the many different unions and 

companies working on the project.

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 

F.3d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Multi-employer, multi-union 

PLAs are commonplace in the construction industry because

they serve the unique needs of the construction-industry labor 

market. Robert W. Kopp & John Gaal, The Case for Project 

Labor Agreements, CONSTR. LAW., Jan. 1999, at 5–7; Henry 

H. Perritt, Keeping the Government out of the Way: Project 

Labor Agreements under the Supreme Court’s Boston Harbor 

Decision, 12 LABOR LAW. 69, 71–76 (1996). A PLA

typically requires employers to recognize the signatory unions 

as the collective bargaining representatives of the employees 

engaged in work thereunder; to secure labor from union hiring 

halls; and to agree to the terms of the PLA before working on 

projects governed by the PLA. BIECA, 678 F.3d at 186. A 

PLA also typically standardizes wages, work rules and hours; 

provides for the supremacy of the PLA over conflicting 

provisions of individual collective bargaining agreements; and 

contains no-strike, union security and dispute resolution 

provisions. See id. The Agreement, a prototypical PLA, 

contains all of these provisions. 

B. Arbitrators’ Authority

The Carpenters argue that arbitrators Kelly and Pagan

lacked authority to enter their respective Awards. “An 

arbitrator’s power is both derived from, and limited by, the 

collective-bargaining agreement.” Barrentine v. Ark.-Best 

Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981). Because an 

arbitrator cannot rule on matters the parties have not agreed to 

arbitrate, see AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Comm’cns Workers of Am., 

475 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1986) (“[A]rbitrators derive their 

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authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have 

agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.”), 

a fortiori he cannot decide the rights of non-parties. 

The Carpenters challenge the arbitrators’ authority on 

three bases. First, they argue that the Agreement is void as 

between Local 200 and the Employers because the duty of 

exclusive bargaining forbids an employer in a section 9(a) 

relationship with one union from entering into a section 8(f) 

agreement with any other union. Second, they argue that the 

Board’s certification of the SWRCC in effect decertified 

Local 200 as the representative of the Employers’ workers

and voided the Agreement as between Local 200 and the 

Employers. Finally, the Carpenters argue that the disputes are 

representational in nature and therefore beyond the 

arbitrators’ authority. 

1. SWRCC’s § 9(a) Certifications and Right of Exclusive 

Representation in PLA Context

The Carpenters first argue that “the principle of exclusive 

representation precludes any Section 8(f) agreement between 

[the Employers] and [Local 200].” Br. of Appellants 32, 

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Operative Plasterer’s 

& Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 11-7155 (Frye Br. of 

Appellants); Jordan Br. of Appellants 31. They contend that

because the section 9(a) certifications trigger the duty of 

exclusive bargaining, the Employers cannot also enter a 

multi-unit PLA—like the Agreement—because doing so 

would violate their duty to bargain only with the SWRCC

over work assignments. 

We need not decide whether section 9(a) categorically

permits the Agreement. The Carpenters concede that the 

Agreement between the Employers and all signatory unions is 

permissible under section 8(f). See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 

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at 230 (approving multiemployer, multi-union PLAs under 

section 8(f)). But, they argue, the Agreement is unlawful 

under section 9(a) because, unlike section 8(f), an employer in 

a section 9(a) relationship owes the union a duty of exclusive 

bargaining. Section 8(f) is an exception to the majority 

support requirement, however, not to the exclusive bargaining 

requirement of sections 9(a) and 8(a)(5). See Madison Indus., 

Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 (2007); Deklewa, 282 

N.L.R.B. at 1387 & n.50. As we have explained, a union 

party to a section 8(f) agreement serves as the limited section 

9(a) representative of the bargaining unit it purports to 

represent during the term of that agreement. Deklewa, 282 

N.L.R.B. at 1387; see also id. at 1386 (“It is clear that the 

imposition of enforceable contract obligations on signatories 

to an 8(f) agreement is contingent, in part, on the signatory 

union possessing exclusive representative status.”).

7

 Section 

8(a)(5) forbids an employer in a section 8(f) agreement from 

repudiating the agreement and negotiating with a nonsignatory union (at least while the agreement is in effect) in 

precisely the same way that section 8(a)(5) forbids an 

employer from refusing to bargain with a union certified 

under section 9(a). See Local No. 150, Int’l Union of 

Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 

 7 We previously rejected the Board’s pre-Deklewa

interpretation of section 8(f) in favor of the one it articulated in 

Deklewa. See Local 150, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 

480 F.2d 1186, 1190–91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Deklewa, 282 

N.L.R.B. at 1387–88. Moreover, seven sister circuits have 

explicitly adopted the Board’s interpretation of section 8(f). Am. 

Automatic Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 209, 215 n.3 (4th 

Cir. 1998) (citing cases). Only the Fourth Circuit has rejected 

Deklewa and did so because of preexisting contrary circuit 

precedent. Indus. TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 

(4th Cir. 1997) (citing Clark v. Ryan, 818 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 

1987)). 

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1973) (“[A]n employer[] who has entered into a validly 

executed § 8(f) pre-hire agreement . . . should be held to the 

same standard of conduct in regard to unfair labor practices as 

an employer who has entered into a collective bargaining 

agreement with a union certified to have majority status.”); 

see also GEM Mgmt. Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 489, 501 (2003). The 

Carpenters’ argument therefore fails because if, as the 

Carpenters concede, the Agreement does not violate the duty 

of exclusive bargaining under section 8(f), it does not do so 

under section 9(a).

8

 

 8 The Carpenters also argue that section 8(f) agreements cannot 

“trump the Section 7 [of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157] rights of 

workers at any time.” Frye Br. of Appellants 31; Jordan Br. of 

Appellants 30. We agree but the Carpenters fail to point to 

anything in the Agreement that violates section 7’s guarantee of the 

rights of self-organization and collective bargaining. Unions and 

employers are free to alter the scope of bargaining units—even 

units certified pursuant to section 9(a)—by entering into multi-unit 

agreements like the Agreement. See The Idaho Statesman v. NLRB, 

836 F.2d 1396, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Utility Workers Union, 203 

N.L.R.B. 230, 238 (1973), enforced 490 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1974);

Shell Oil Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 988, 995 (1972) (“It is well settled that 

the parties to a collective-bargaining relationship may voluntarily

agree . . . to the enlargement or alteration of an existing unit, or to 

the merger of separate units, theretofore recognized by the parties 

or found by the Board to be appropriate for the purposes of 

collective bargaining.” (emphasis in original)), review denied sub 

nom. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 

1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973). We therefore cannot conceive of how the 

voluntary merger of the units represented by the SWRCC and Local 

200 in this run-of-the-mill PLA violates section 7. Moreover, given 

that the NLRA “not only tolerates but actively encourages 

voluntary settlements of work assignment controversies between 

unions,” Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 266 

(1964), we see nothing in the Agreement’s arbitration provisions 

that violates section 7. 

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2. Certification of SWRCC qua Decertification of Local 

200

Relying on Deklewa, the Carpenters next argue that by 

certifying the SWRCC as the exclusive bargaining 

representative of the Employers’ employees, the Board 

necessarily decertified Local 200 as the representative of 

those Employees, thereby voiding the Agreement as between 

the Employers and Local 200. Their argument proceeds as 

follows: the Agreement’s recognition clause—which provides 

that “[t]he Contractor recognizes the Council and the 

signatory local Unions as the exclusive bargaining 

representative for the employees engaged in Project Work,” 

PSA § 3.1, Frye JA 256—obligates signatory employers to 

recognize all of the signatory unions as the exclusive 

representatives of each and every employee. Under Deklewa, 

if a bargaining unit subsequently votes to reject the union 

purporting to represent it under a section 8(f) agreement, that 

vote “will void the [section] 8(f) agreement and will terminate 

the [section] 8(f) relationship.” Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 

1385. The Carpenters reason that the employees’ vote in 

favor of the SWRCC also in effect rejected, and therefore 

decertified, Local 200. And under Deklewa those 

decertifications voided the Agreement between Local 200 and 

the Employer, terminating the arbitrator’s authority.9

 

 9

The parties dispute whether the Employers joined the 

Agreement before or after the SWRCC was certified. If the 

Employers became parties after the SWRCC was certified, its 

certifications could not have decertified Local 200 because, even 

under the Carpenters’ theory, the Employers had not yet recognized 

Local 200. We decline to resolve the dispute because, even 

assuming arguendo the Employers became parties to the 

Agreement before the certifications, the certifications did not 

decertify Local 200.

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We reject the Carpenters’ reading of the Agreement’s 

recognition clause. The clause merely requires what section 

8(f) permits: employers must recognize the signatory unions 

as the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees 

they purport to represent—for work governed by the

Agreement—irrespective of any showing of majority support 

and irrespective of whether a particular employee is in fact a 

member of the signatory union. See Trustees of S. Cal. IBEWNECA Pension Trust Fund v. Flores, 519 F.3d 1045, 1047–48 

(9th Cir. 2008); see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 

U.S. 270, 279 (1956) (“Like other contracts, [a collective 

bargaining agreement] must be read as a whole and in the

light of the law relating to it when it was made.”). Because 

the Agreement’s recognition clause did not require the 

Employers to recognize Local 200 as the representative of 

their employees, the Board’s certification of the SWRCC did 

not affect the contractual relationship between the Employers

and Local 200. In fact, assuming arguendo that the 

representation certifications took place after the Employers

joined the Agreement, the employees’ election can be seen as 

ratifying the Employers’ and the SWRCC’s decisions to enter 

into the section 8(f) Agreement. See Comtel Sys. Tech., Inc., 

305 N.L.R.B. 287, 290 & n.14 (1991). The section 9(a) 

certifications of the SWRCC therefore did not void the 

Agreement as between the Employers and Local 200.

3. Representational vs. Jurisdictional Nature of the 

Dispute

Finally, the Carpenters argue that the dispute between the 

unions is representational, not jurisdictional. Because the 

Board has exclusive jurisdiction over representation 

questions, see Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 669 v. 

Herman, 234 F.3d 1316, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2000), they argue 

that the arbitrators had no authority to decide the dispute 

between the Carpenters and the Plasterers. But as the 

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Carpenters concede, Local 200 disclaims any interest in 

representing the Employers’ employees. Local 200 claims 

that it only wants to obtain the plastering work for its

members and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. 

Because this case is simply “a contest between two groups of 

employees . . . actively contend[ing] for disputed work,” the

dispute is paradigmatically jurisdictional. Sea-Land, 884 F.2d 

at 1411 (emphases deleted); see also Sierra Pacific, 85 F.3d at 

652. The Carpenters’ argument thus rests on an unstated 

assumption, to wit, that the section 9(a) certifications entitle 

their members to all work contracted out to the 

Employers pursuant to the Agreement. 

Their assumption—and therefore their argument—suffers

from a fatal flaw: the Board’s certification of a particular 

bargaining unit is not a determination of the work to which 

that unit is entitled. As the Supreme Court has explained: 

[A] Board certification in a representation proceeding 

is not a jurisdictional award; it is merely a 

determination that a majority of the employees in an 

appropriate unit have selected a particular labor 

organization as their representative for purposes of 

collective bargaining. It is true that such certification 

presupposes a determination that the group of 

employees involved constitute an appropriate unit for 

collective bargaining purposes, and that in making 

such determination the Board considers the general 

nature of the duties and work tasks of such employees. 

However, unlike a jurisdictional award, this 

determination by the Board does not freeze the duties 

or work tasks of the employees in the unit found 

appropriate. Thus, the Board’s unit finding does not 

per se preclude the employer from adding to, or 

subtracting from, the employees’ work assignments. 

While that finding may be determined by, it does not 

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determine, job content; nor does it signify approval, in 

any respect, of any work task claims which the 

certified union may have made before this Board or 

elsewhere.

Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 269 (1964) 

(quotation marks omitted). The Board has further clarified 

that 

its sole function in representation proceedings is to 

ascertain and certify the name of the bargaining 

representative, if any, that has been designated by the 

employees in the appropriate unit. It is not the Board’s 

responsibility in representation proceedings to decide 

whether employees in the bargaining unit are entitled 

to do any particular work or whether an employer has 

properly reassigned work from employees in the 

bargaining unit to other employees.

Gas Serv. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 445, 447 (1963). The Board’s 

certification of the SWRCC as the exclusive bargaining 

representative of the Employers’ employees thus decides

nothing about the work to which those employees are entitled

under the Agreement.

10 Because this dispute is 

 10 In fact, when the Board resolves a jurisdictional dispute 

under its section 10(k) authority, a section 9(a) certification is but a 

single factor of a multi-factor test. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 

Lodge No. 1743, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410–11 (1962); see also, 

e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 196, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 

slip op. at 5–6 (July 24, 2012). Although such certification “favors 

awarding the disputed work to employees represented by” the 

certified union, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, 354 

N.L.R.B. No. 112, slip op. at 5 (Nov. 30, 2009), it is not 

dispositive. Indeed, the Board has awarded work to an uncertified 

union over a certified one. See, e.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s & 

Warehousemen’s Union, Local 8, 324 N.L.R.B. 666, 667–68 

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quintessentially jurisdictional and a section 9(a) certification 

does not resolve work assignment questions, the arbitrators 

were plainly authorized to make the Awards. 

C. Consistency with Other Law

The Awards are interpretations of the Agreement and

treated as part of the Agreement itself. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 

1475 (“In the absence of fraud or an overreaching of authority 

on the part of the arbitrator, he is speaking for the parties, and 

his award is their contract.” (quotation marks omitted)). As

with any contract, “an arbitration award that is in explicit 

conflict with other laws and legal precedents[] is 

unenforceable.” Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 550 F.3d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union 

v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (“A court’s refusal to 

enforce an arbitrator’s award under a collective-bargaining 

agreement because it is contrary to public policy is a specific 

application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the 

common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that 

violate law or public policy.”). “[T]he question of public 

policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts. Such a 

public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, 

and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal 

precedents and not from general considerations of supposed 

public interests.’ ” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 

Int’l Union of United Rubber, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 

461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 

324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). 

 

(1997). Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s 

previous approach that made representation certifications nearly 

dispositive. See Plasterers’ Local, 404 U.S. at 130–31.

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The Carpenters argue that the Awards are invalid because 

they run counter to a sister circuit’s decision as well as a

Board order arising from a series of disputes between Local 

200 and the SWRCC. The history of these disputes is laid out 

in detail by the Ninth Circuit in Small v. Operative Plasterers’ 

& Cement Masons’ International Association, Local 200, 611 

F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010), to which we refer only as necessary

to reject the Carpenters’ argument. In Small, the district court 

enjoined Local 200 from prosecuting two state-court lawsuits 

against the SWRCC while the Board determined whether that 

litigation constituted an unfair labor practice. Id. at 489. The

Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that because the law suits

would undermine two previous Board section 10(k) 

determinations, see Standard Drywall II, 348 N.L.R.B. at

1252; Standard Drywall I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 478, the Board 

was likely to conclude that the suits violated section 

8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D). Id. at 

493–94.

The Board subsequently ruled that the lawsuits enjoined 

in Small, as well as several arbitration awards obtained by 

Local 200, in fact constituted unfair labor practices under 

section 8(b)(4)(D) because they conflicted with the Board’s 

earlier section 10(k) determinations of several jurisdictional 

disputes decided in the SWRCC’s favor. Operative 

Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 200, 357 

N.L.R.B. No. 160, slip op. at 4–7 (Dec. 30, 2011) (Standard 

Drywall III). The Board ordered Local 200 to 

[c]ease and desist from . . . [t]hreatening, coercing, or 

restraining SDI, or any other person or employer 

engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting 

commerce, where an object of their actions is to force 

or require the employer to assign plastering work to 

Local 200’s members, rather than to its own 

employees who are not members of Local 200.

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Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 

200, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 179, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 31, 2011) 

(Standard Drywall IV). This language closely tracks that of

section 8(b)(4)(D) and is plainly intended to enjoin Local 200 

from violating that provision.

We begin with the proposition that seeking arbitration “is 

not coercive for the purposes of § 8(b)(4)(D).” Ga.-Pac., 892 

F.2d at 132; see also Brockton Newspaper Guild, 275 

N.L.R.B. 135, 136 (1985). A party violates section 

8(b)(4)(D), however, if it subverts a section 10(k) decision by 

seeking arbitration of a jurisdictional dispute after the Board 

has determined the dispute pursuant to section 10(k). SeaLand, 884 F.2d at 1413–14; see also N. Cal. Dist. Council of 

Laborers, 292 N.L.R.B. 1035, 1035 (1989). Although the 

Carpenters argue that the Board’s certification orders have the 

same effect as a section 10(k) determination, “a Board 

certification in a representation proceeding is not a 

jurisdictional award.” Carey, 375 U.S. at 269 (quotation 

marks omitted). Because the Board has made no section 

10(k) determination that the Awards could subvert, the 

Awards conflict neither with Small nor with the Board’s 

Standard Drywall IV order.

The Carpenters next argue that, because the Employers 

are not parties in this litigation, the district court could not 

order the Employers to subcontract the disputed work to 

Local 200-staffed subcontractors. We agree, but this issue is 

of no significance because the district court did not order the 

Employers to do anything. The Employers’ absence from this 

litigation is therefore irrelevant.

The Carpenters also argue that, because the Awards will 

likely require the Employers to subcontract the disputed work 

to firms employing Local 200 members, the Awards violate 

section 4107 of the California Public Contract Code, which 

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places certain limitations on the ability of prime contractors to 

substitute subcontractors or permit the reassignment of 

previously awarded subcontracts. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE

§ 4107(a), (b). We need not wade into California public 

contracting law. The arbitrators determined only that the 

disputed work belonged to the Plasterers and the district court 

affirmed their determinations. Nothing in the Awards or the

district court orders violates California law because they do 

not require the Employers to enter into any subcontracts; they

leave the question of the nature of the parties’ compliance 

unanswered.11

Finally, the Carpenters argue that, because the Plasterers 

disclaim any intent to represent the Employers’ employees, 

the Agreement violates section 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(e). Relevant here, section 8(e) prohibits subcontracting 

agreements—agreements between an employer and a union in 

which the employer promises to subcontract work only to 

unionized employers. See Truck Drivers Local Union No. 413 

v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But section 

8(e) also contains a “construction industry proviso” excepting 

the construction industry from its prohibition on 

subcontracting agreements as to “contracting or 

subcontracting work to be done at the site of the 

construction.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(e); see also Woelke & Romero 

Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 657 (1982); Donald 

Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 873 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 

1980). 

The Carpenters do not identify a particular clause of the 

Agreement that, they claim, violates section 8(e). Instead, 

 11 And, in any event, the rights protected by section 4107 

belong to subcontractors. See S. Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holders, 

Inc., 71 Cal. 2d 719, 727 (1969); R.J. Land & Assocs. Const. Co. v. 

Kiewit-Shea, 69 Cal. App. 4th 416, 421 (1999). 

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they contend that the Plasterers’ “scheme” violates section 

8(e) under the Supreme Court’s decision in Connell 

Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 

100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) because the Plasterers have no 

intention of representing the Employers’ employees. But 

Connell held only that a “stranger” agreement—a 

subcontracting agreement between a union and contractor 

where (1) the union does not seek to represent the contractor’s 

employees and (2) the two parties are not in a collective 

bargaining relationship—does not fall within the construction 

industry proviso. Connell, 421 U.S. at 627–28, 636. In 

contrast, the proviso protects “subcontracting clauses that are

sought or negotiated in the context of a collective-bargaining 

relationship,” Woelke & Romero, 456 U.S. at 648, and Local 

200 and the Employers are parties to a section 8(f) 

multiemployer, multi-union collective bargaining agreement,

see Donald Schriver, 635 F.2d at 873, 875 (section 8(f)

agreement qualifies as collective bargaining agreement under 

Connell). The Agreement therefore is not a stranger 

agreement under Connell.

For the foregoing reasons, in No. 11-7155 and No. 11-

7161 we affirm the district court’s grants of summary 

judgment to the Plasterers, thereby confirming the arbitrators’ 

Awards in their favor. 

So ordered.

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