Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04019/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04019-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 14-cv-04019-LHK

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

AUBREE REGINA DEI GRATIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

RODNEY JAY STAFFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04019-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO 

CHANGE VENUE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 28, 31, 205

Plaintiff Aubree Regina Dei Gratia, also known as Rosalie Guancione (“Plaintiff”), brings 

this action against Rodney J. Stafford, Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Jeffrey 

Rosen, District Attorney of the County of Santa Clara, and Alexis Causey, Deputy District 

Attorney of the County of Santa Clara (collectively, “Defendants”). Before the Court are two 

motions to dismiss, one filed by Judge Stafford (“Mot. 1”), the second filed by Defendants Causey 

and Rosen (“Mot. 2”). ECF Nos. 28 & 31. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for 

Mandatory Change of Venue.” ECF No. 205. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds 

this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing 

scheduled for January 29, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. The Court also VACATES the case management 

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conference in this matter, also scheduled for January 29, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. Having considered the 

parties’ submissions, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for mandatory 

change of venue as moot, for the reasons stated below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following factual background is drawn from the statement of facts in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, the documents attached to the Defendants’ request for judicial notice, and the 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Plaintiff is a resident of San Jose, California. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 10. On December 

24, 2010, Santa Clara Police issued Plaintiff a traffic ticket. Id. ¶ 85; Mot. 2 at 2. On March 13, 

2011, Plaintiff received a second traffic ticket. Id. ¶ 89. On or about December 6, 2013, Plaintiff 

sought to remove her traffic ticket cases to U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of 

California. Id. ¶¶ 45, 50-51. On February 4, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

action because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a state court criminal action. ECF No. 69-

2 (Defendants Causey and Rosen’s request for judicial notice of U.S. Bankruptcy Court order 

dismissing Plaintiff’s case). 

Judge Stafford presided over the subsequent misdemeanor trial of Plaintiff’s two traffic 

tickets. ECF No. 32-1 (Defendants Causey and Rosen’s request for judicial notice of superior 

court trail minutes). Defendant Causey was the deputy district attorney prosecuting the trial. ECF 

No. 32-1. The trial lasted from September 3 to September 5, 2014, after which the jury returned a 

guilty verdict. Id.; Compl. ¶ 114.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the instant action on September 4, 2014. See Compl. The 

thrust of Plaintiff’s allegations is that her two traffic tickets were prosecuted “in the complete 

absence of jurisdiction,” apparently because Plaintiff believed she removed her traffic ticket cases

to U.S. Bankruptcy Court, where the action was subsequently dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 44, 54-55. Plaintiff 

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also alleges that the statute of limitations to prosecute her for her traffic tickets had run before her 

trial. Id. ¶¶ 86, 90. Plaintiff further alleges that the prosecutions resulted in a “double jeopardy 

violation” due to the “impaneling of a jury in two traffic ticket cases.” Id. ¶ 42. In addition, 

Plaintiff appears to believe that pursuant to “common law copyright” she owns the rights to her 

name, “Rosalie Aubree Guancione,” as well as her alias, “HI&RH Empress Aubree Regina Dei 

Gratia.” Id. ¶¶ 10; 70. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that each time Defendants used her name in a 

court document, they infringed “on the copyright of Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 109. Finally, Plaintiff alleges 

that the Defendants are “responsible for setting custom and policy for the SUPERIOR COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, in the conduct of prosecution of violations of 

rights, including civil rights.” Id. at 4 (capitalization in original). Plaintiff asserts twelve causes of 

action: one claim of fraud in connection with the prosecution of her traffic tickets in spite of the 

alleged “lack of jurisdiction”; seven claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of her Fourth, 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, also in connection with the prosecution of her 

traffic tickets; one claim of conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for “supporting letters of 

Office of State Attorney General and Office of City Attorney”; one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 

for “Double Jeopardy” and “Failure to Enforce and Protect a Civil Right”; and two claims of 

copyright violations. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiff seeks $1.5 million in compensatory damages, $1.5 

million in punitive damages, and $8 million for the alleged violations of her common law 

copyright. Id. at 23. 

On September 25, 2014, Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss. Mot. 1 & Mot. 2. 

Defendants Rosen and Causey also filed a request for judicial notice. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff did not 

file a timely opposition to either motion to dismiss pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(a). However, 

on October 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Strike . . . Defendant Rosen’s and Causey’s 

Motion to Dismiss.” ECF No. 56. Plaintiff also filed an “Objection to Defendant Rosen’s and 

Causey’s Motion to Dismiss” on October 14, 2014. ECF No. 60. Similarly on October 20, 2014, 

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Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Strike . . . Defendant Stafford’s Motion to Dismiss.”1ECF No. 64. 

Defendants Rosen and Causey filed a reply on October 23, 2014, as well as a supplemental request 

for judicial notice. ECF Nos. 68 & 69. Judge Stafford filed a reply on November 3, 2014. ECF No. 

204.

On October 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Mandatory Change of Venue.” ECF No. 

205. Defendants Rosen and Causey filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on November 12, 

2014. ECF No. 207. Judge Stafford joined the opposition of Defendants Rosen and Causey on 

November 13, 2014. ECF No. 215. Plaintiff did not file any reply in support of her motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “plead enough facts 

to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. A court must 

determine whether the facts in a complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 

 

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Plaintiff also filed no less than 40 motions to strike in relation to Judge Stafford’s motion to 

dismiss. ECF Nos. 71; 75; 78; 81; 84; 87; 90; 93; 96; 99; 102; 105; 110; 111; 113; 116; 119; 121; 

123; 129; 132; 133; 140; 143; 146; 149; 152; 155; 158; 161; 164; 165; 168; 171; 174; 177; 180; 

183; 186; & 189. Each motion to strike is substantially identical: each one requests that the Court,

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b) and 12(f), strike all references to a specific case 

cited in Judge Stafford’s motion to dismiss, on the grounds that the case is “not material” and was 

cited “to baffle, lie and confuse the court regarding the nature of Plaintiff’s Affidavit of 

Complaint.” See, e.g., ECF No. 71, ¶¶ 31-32 (requesting that the Court strike all references to 

Federation of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996)). At least 

two of Plaintiff’s motions to strike do not even reference a specific case, but ask the Court to strike 

“all references to the case” cited in Judge Stafford’s motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 102 & 105. Rule 

12(f) permits a court to strike “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” in a 

“pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added). A motion to dismiss is not a “pleading” within 

the meaning of the Rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (pleadings include “a complaint’: “an answer to a 

complaint”; “an answer to a counterclaim”; “an answer to a crossclaim”; “a third-party 

complaint”; “an answer to a third-party complaint”; and “a reply to an answer”); Foley v. Pont, 

No. 2:11-CV-01769-ECR -V, 2013 WL 782856, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2013) (“Motions to strike 

apply only to pleadings, and courts are unwilling to construe the rule broadly and refuse to strike 

motions, briefs, objections, affidavits, or exhibits attached thereto.”) (emphasis in original). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions to strike are denied in their entirety.

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Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 

F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A] court may generally consider only allegations contained in 

the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.” 

Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). In addition, a court need not accept as 

true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, legal characterizations, or unwarranted 

deductions of fact in the complaint. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Where, as here, an action is brought by a pro se litigant, the court should liberally 

construe the plaintiff’s pleadings. Eldridge v. Block, 932 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Leave to amend should be granted unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot 

be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). If 

amendment would be futile, a dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 

386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

The Court first addresses the requests for judicial notice filed by Defendants Causey and 

Rosen. ECF Nos. 32 & 69. Although a district court generally may not consider any material 

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may take judicial notice of 

documents referenced in the complaint, as well as matters in the public record, without converting 

a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 

(9th Cir. 2001) overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 

1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either 

“generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

Public records, including judgments, court proceedings, and other court documents, are proper 

subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, Defendants Causey and Rosen request judicial notice of six documents pertaining to 

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Plaintiff’s related proceedings in Santa Clara County Superior Court, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, and 

the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. ECF Nos. 32-1; 32-2; 32-3; 69-1; 69-2; 

& 69-3. Because records of other court proceedings are proper subjects of judicial notice, see 

Black, 482 F.3d at 1041, the Court GRANTS Defendants Causey and Rosen’s requests.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants raise numerous grounds to dismiss the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Judge Stafford argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, as 

well as the Eleventh Amendment. Mot. 1 at 4-7. Judge Stafford also argues that the RookerFeldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, or in 

the alternative that the doctrine of Younger abstention prohibits this Court from interfering in 

Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal proceedings. Id. at 8-9. Judge Stafford also argues that Plaintiff’s 

claims are unsupported by the facts, are implausible, and that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 

claim under § 1983. Id. at 9-10. 

Defendants Rosen and Causey also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention. Mot. 2 at 3-4. They also argue that 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred until her criminal case is final and terminates in Plaintiff’s 

favor, and that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 5. 

Finally, Rosen and Causey argue that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action, or state a claim 

against Defendant Rosen because he had no involvement in Plaintiff’s prosecution. Id. at 6, 7-10. 

As discussed more fully below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent that 

they operate as a de facto appeal of criminal proceedings in Santa Clara County Superior Court, 

are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the 

doctrines of judicial immunity and prosecutorial immunity, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

copyright violations. Therefore, the Court need not address Defendants’ numerous arguments in 

the alternative regarding dismissal.

a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is somewhat unclear, it appears Plaintiff may be requesting 

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that this Court reverse Plaintiff’s convictions for two traffic violations in state court. The

Complaint is replete with allegations that Plaintiff’s prosecution for two traffic tickets, which 

occurred in Santa Clara County Superior Court, was improper. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 

hearings related to the prosecutions were conducted without subject matter or personal 

jurisdiction; that the prosecutions commenced after the applicable statute of limitations had run; 

and that the prosecutions violated the principle of double jeopardy and res judicata. Compl. 1-2. 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from this Court to the effect that, inter alia, the “[s]tate court lost 

jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s traffic violations because Plaintiff removed the matters to U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court, and that the prosecutions were barred by res judicata and double jeopardy. Id. 

at 2-3. Liberally construing the complaint of a pro se plaintiff, the Court understands Plaintiff may

seek reversal of Plaintiff’s state court convictions.

This Court cannot grant Plaintiff the relief that Plaintiff seeks, pursuant to the so-called 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising 

subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment. Bianchi 

v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Put another way, “[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts 

as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state 

court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal 

district court.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has explained that this prohibition arises in part

through a negative inference from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which grants jurisdiction to review a state 

court judgment in the United States Supreme Court. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). “That is, while § 1257 explicitly authorizes the United States Supreme Court to 

hear an appeal from a state court judgment, it impliedly prohibits the lower federal courts from 

doing so.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139.

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s traffic tickets were prosecuted in Santa Clara 

County Superior Court. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 54-55. Therefore, even assuming Plaintiff were 

correct that these prosecutions occurred in the absence of jurisdiction, or that the statute of 

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limitations on Plaintiff’s traffic tickets had run, Plaintiff cannot appeal these alleged errors to the

U.S. District Court. Indeed, this Court would not even have subject matter jurisdiction over such 

an appeal. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. Rather, Plaintiff must seek relief from the state Court of 

Appeal. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks reversal of the outcome of proceedings or

her convictions in state court for her two traffic violations, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff, in her filings related to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, asserts that this Court 

cannot dismiss the claims of a pro se plaintiff without granting leave to amend. See, e.g., ECF No. 

56, at 5. This is incorrect. Although “[p]ro se plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend 

their complaints to overcome any deficiencies,” leave to amend need not be granted where it

“clearly appears the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 

1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). As already discussed, to the extent Plaintiff seeks a reversal of her 

state criminal court convictions, this Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over such 

claims, a deficiency which Plaintiff could not overcome by amendment. Therefore, insofar as

Plaintiff’s claims operate as a de facto appeal of Plaintiff’s cases in state superior court, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff’s claims without leave to amend.

b. Plaintiff’s Copyright Infringement Claims

Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action alleges copyright infringement under the common law. 

Compl. at 23. Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action alleges copyright infringement under Title 17 of 

the Copyright Act. Id. Plaintiff alleges that she has “a common law copyright” on her name “in all 

forms, and abbreviations.” Id. ¶ 70. Plaintiff also claims to have a “copyright license usage fee” on 

her name of $500,000 per use. Id. ¶ 71-72. Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated her alleged 

copyright by printing Plaintiff’s name in court documents in connection with her traffic ticket 

prosecutions. Id. ¶ 109.

Plaintiff’s two copyright claims fail. As to the eleventh cause of action for common law 

copyright infringement, even assuming that Plaintiff has a common law copyright on her name, 

“[t]he Copyright Act of 1976 preempts common law copyright claims, unless the claims arose 

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from ‘undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978.’” Mention v. Gessell, 714 F.2d 87, 90 

(9th Cir. 1983) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2)); Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 

1137 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, although Plaintiff does not specify when the Defendants violated her 

alleged common law copyright, the allegedly infringing activity occurred in connection with 

Plaintiff’s prosecution for two traffic violations. See Compl. ¶¶ 109. Plaintiff was issued these 

traffic tickets on December 24, 2010 and March 13, 2011, and the trials for Plaintiff’s tickets did 

not commence until September 2014. Compl. ¶¶ 85, 89. This was well after January 1, 1978, and 

therefore Plaintiff’s common law copyright cause of action fails as a matter of law. See Mention, 

714 F.2d at 90 (holding that common law copyright claim was legally barred where the allegedly 

infringing activities occurred after January 1, 1978). 

Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action for copyright infringement under Title 17 of the 

Copyright Act similarly fails. To bring a claim under Title 17, Plaintiff must establish, inter alia, 

ownership of a valid copyright. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 

2000). Plaintiff does not claim to have a valid statutory copyright in her name, nor could she. In 

general, a party cannot obtain statutory copyright protection for his or her personal name. See 37 

C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (no copyright protection for names). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of copyright 

infringement under Title 17 also fails as a matter of law. See Turner v. Peterson, No. C 12-0887 

JSW PR, 2012 WL 2792416, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2012) (dismissing claim of copyright 

infringement for alleged violation of copyright in personal name).

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

copyright claims. Moreover, because Plaintiff’s copyright claims fail as a matter of law, they 

cannot be cured by amendment. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims without leave to 

amend. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078

c. Plaintiff’s Claims Regarding Her Prosecution

Finally, Plaintiff brings ten causes of action against all Defendants alleging fraud and 

violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 for acts taken in connection with Plaintiff’s 

prosecution for two traffic violations. Compl. at 23-24. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s fraud 

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allegation and seven causes of action under § 1983 is that the Defendants prosecuted Plaintiff or 

presided over her prosecution in the absence of personal or subject matter jurisdiction and after the 

statute of limitations had run, erroneously denied her right to counsel, or refused to hold hearings 

requested by Plaintiff. Compl. at 23 ([Count One]: “Fraud: for admission of lack of jurisdiction 

after self recusal . . . two counts, one in each of two cases”); id. ([Count Two]: “conduct of 

hearings in complete absence of personal jurisdiction, 2 counts, for two cases”); id. at 24 ([Count 

Three]: “conduct of hearings in complete absence of subject mater jurisdiction”); id. at 24 ([Count 

Four]: “refused to conduct a hearing on challenge of jurisdiction”); id. ([Count Five]: “delay and 

failure to hear ex parte motions prior to trial”); id. ([Count Six]: “double jeopardy conduct of trial 

in case settled res judicata”); id. ([Count Seven]: “conduct of trial for violations years beyond 

statute of limitations for misdemeanour” [sic]); id. ([Count Eight]: “refusal to allow assistance of 

counsel of choosing, and refusal to allow counsel of choosing in courtroom”). 

In addition, Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action, brought pursuant to § 1985, asserts a claim of 

conspiracy involving “supporting letters of Office of State Attorney General and Office of City 

Attorney.” Id. The only detail Plaintiff offers in connection with her claim of conspiracy is that the

Defendants engaged in a “conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, conspiracy to violate” Plaintiff’s 

Constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 110. Plaintiff appears to believe that after she removed her traffic ticket

cases to U.S. Bankruptcy Court, and when the Bankruptcy Court dismissed her cases for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, the dismissal served as an adjudication on the merits for the purposes 

of res judicata. Id. ¶¶ 47-49; see also id. at 23. Plaintiff then claims that “Defendants, acting in 

concert, conducted a trial after being served with the final order of dismissal” in Plaintiff’s traffic 

ticket cases. Id. ¶¶ 64-65, 110. Finally, Plaintiff brings a tenth cause of action for a claim under 

§ 1986 of “Double Jeopardy.” Id. at 23. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the empanelling of a 

jury to decide Plaintiff’s two traffic ticket cases triggered the principles of double jeopardy. Id.

¶ 42. For these alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks $5 million in compensatory and punitive 

damages. Id. at 23.

The Court finds that the ten causes of action described above as asserted against Judge 

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Stafford are barred by the principle of judicial immunity. It is well-established that judges are 

absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for damages for their judicial acts, “even when such acts 

are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quotation omitted); accord Ashelman, 793 F.2d at

1076. Judicial immunity similarly bars claims brought pursuant to §§ 1985 and 1986, as well as 

claims for fraud, for conduct in the judge’s performance of official duties. Agnew v. Moody, 330 

F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir. 1964) (judicial immunity bars claims under §§ 1985 and 1986); Dubin v. 

Real, 191 F. App’x 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2006) (judicial immunity bars civil claim of fraud). An act 

is judicial when it is a “function normally performed by a judge” and the parties “dealt with the 

judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Judicial immunity may apply even where a 

judge is alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy with prosecutors. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078. 

Judges are subject to liability for damages only when they act in the clear absence of all 

jurisdiction, or perform non-judicial acts. Id. at 356-57; Stump, 435 U.S. at 360.

Here, although Plaintiff does not detail what role if any Judge Stafford played in the 

allegedly wrongful conduct, Plaintiff’s allegations are premised on the fact that Judge Stafford 

presided over Plaintiff’s trial for two traffic violations. See Compl. ¶ 14 (alleging Judge Stafford 

“at all times relevant to this complaint, was acting as a duly appointed or elected, believed part 

time, STATE official of the California Judicial Council” and “perform[ed] his duties as Judge”) 

(capitalization in original). Presiding over judicial proceedings or making rulings in such a venue 

are judicial acts covered by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Goldblatt v. Doerty, 503 F. App’x 

537, 537 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, Judge Stafford presided over proceedings related to Plaintiff’s 

violations of state law and therefore properly acted within his jurisdiction. Accordingly, judicial 

immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Judge Stafford.

In her filings in relation to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff appears to argue that judicial 

immunity does not apply to Judge Stafford because Judge Stafford allegedly “act[ed] to violate a 

well established law” and therefore acted “outside of the qualified immunity of his office.” ECF 

No. 64, at 16. However, “[j]udicial immunity applies however erroneous the act may have been, 

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and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff,” even where the 

acts at issue are alleged to be unlawful. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

argument that judicial immunity does not bar her claims because Judge Stafford acted unlawfully 

fails.

As for Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages brought against District Attorney Rosen 

and Deputy District Attorney Causey, the Court finds that these claims are prohibited by the 

doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Claims for monetary damages against prosecutors may be

barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). 

This immunity applies to conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 

process,” and protects prosecutors when they perform traditional activities related to the initiation 

and presentation of criminal prosecutions. Id.; accord Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 976 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Prosecutorial immunity bars allegations for, among other things, malicious 

prosecution, conspiracy in connection with criminal prosecutions, or prosecutions for crimes that 

are alleged to be beyond the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 

1008-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (prosecutorial immunity bars claim of malicious prosecution); Ashelman, 

793 F.2d at 1075-78 (prosecutorial immunity extends to claim of conspiracy to predetermine 

outcome of trial); McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987) (prosecutorial 

immunity precludes claim that prosecution was conducted after statute of limitations had run).

Here, as with Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Stafford, Plaintiff’s ten causes of action 

detailed earlier are premised on Defendants Rosen and Causey’s alleged involvement in Plaintiff’s 

prosecution. Although Plaintiff does not detail the specific roles of either Rosen or Causey in the 

allegedly wrongful conduct, judicially noticeable documents show that Causey was the deputy 

district attorney who prosecuted the trial for Plaintiff’s two traffic tickets. ECF No. 32-1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint, meanwhile, raises claims against all the Defendants for involvement in 

prosecuting Plaintiff’s case. See, e.g., Compl. at 23 (alleging, inter alia, Defendants participated in 

the “conduct of hearings in complete absence of personal jurisdiction . . . [and] subject mater 

jurisdiction” and “conduct of trial for violations years beyond statute of limitations”). Therefore,

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Plaintiff appears to assert a claim against Causey for Causey’s role in prosecuting Plaintiff’s case, 

specifically Causey’s decision to bring the case and Causey’s conduct at hearings and in trial. See 

id. (asserting causes of action for “conduct of hearings” and “conduct of trial”). However,

prosecutorial immunity prohibits claims premised on conduct “intimately associated with the 

judicial phase of the criminal process,” including activities related to the initiation and 

presentation of prosecutions. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against 

Causey are barred by prosecutorial immunity

As for Plaintiff’s claims against District Attorney Rosen, Plaintiff alleges that Rosen 

“supervises and establishes the custom and policy of the Office of the District Attorney . . . to 

prosecute natural men and women, for allegations of criminal violations of the state penal code, 

and local codes and ordinances.” Id. ¶ 15. Yet prosecutorial immunity bars claims brought against 

a supervisory prosecutor, such as a district attorney, for management tasks “directly connected 

with the prosecutor’s basic trial advocacy duties,” including general office supervision. Van de 

Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 346 (2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that District 

Attorney Rosen violated Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights because Rosen “supervises and 

establishes the custom and policy” of the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office is also 

barred by prosecutorial immunity.

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The Court also notes that Plaintiff misapplies the doctrines of res judicata and double jeopardy. 

In general, “[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on any claims that were raised or 

could have been raised in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). For res judicata to apply, there must be, inter alia, “a 

final judgment on the merits.” United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 

F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the 

U.S. Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s improperly removed traffic ticket cases acted as a 

final judgment on the merits such that res judicata prohibited the subsequent prosecution of these

cases in Santa Clara County Superior Court. See Compl. ¶¶ 46-48; id. at 23. However, dismissal 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not operate as a final judgment on the merits, and 

therefore does not preclude a subsequent lawsuit on the same issue. Brand v. United States, 942 

F.2d 790, 790 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished). As to Plaintiff’s claim of double jeopardy, the 

doctrine of double jeopardy bars successive punishments or successive prosecutions for the same 

criminal offense. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). Plaintiff does not allege that 

she was punished or prosecuted successively for the same criminal offense. In fact, a plain reading 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that she was prosecuted for two separate traffic tickets in Santa 

Clara County Superior Court, stemming from two separate incidents. See Compl. ¶¶ 85, 89.

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As Plaintiff appeared to argue with regard to Judge Stafford, Plaintiff appears to claim that 

immunity should not preclude her claims against Causey and Rosen because Plaintiff sued them in 

their “private capacity” and they “act[ed] outside of the qualified immunity of their office, and 

have no good faith immunity.” ECF No. 56, at 17; ECF No. 60, at 6. Plaintiff does not otherwise 

explain this argument, and in any event it misses the mark. Whether Plaintiff’s claims against 

Rosen and Causey are precluded by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity depends on whether 

their alleged wrongful acts are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 

process,” such as the initiation of prosecution and the conduct of hearings, or supervision of such 

activities. Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343. As already discussed, this is the case here.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds of 

prosecutorial and judicial immunity are GRANTED. Moreover where, as here, prosecutorial and 

judicial immunity bar a plaintiff’s claims, those deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. 

Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims without leave to 

amend.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for “Mandatory Change of Venue”

Before the Court concurrent with Defendants’ motions to dismiss is Plaintiff’s “Motion for 

Mandatory Change of Venue.” ECF No. 205. Plaintiff seeks transfer of the instant case to a 

“neutral county in accordance with California law,” due to Plaintiff’s belief that she cannot “get a 

fair trial in this county.” Id. at 1, 6. Plaintiff seeks transfer to a U.S. District Court in Sacramento 

County, San Francisco City and County, Alameda County, or “any neutral County in reasonable 

proximity.” Id. at 5-6. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites exclusively to California law, 

including California Codes of Civil Procedure § 394 and California Government Code § 955. Id. 

at 10-14.

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not contend that venue is improper in this District. Nor 

could she. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in any judicial district where, inter 

alia, “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. 

1391(b). Plaintiff acknowledges in her motion for mandatory change of venue that “the facts 

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described herein describe events that have occurred within the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA.” 

ECF No. 205, at 2 (capitalization in original). Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes clear that all 

the relevant events occurred within the County of Santa Clara. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 14-16, 86-95. 

Therefore, venue in this District is proper. Moreover, this Court has already determined that 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law, and should be dismissed with 

prejudice. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for mandatory change of venue as 

moot.3

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiff’s 

claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion for mandatory change of venue is DENIED 

as moot. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

 

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The Court also notes that Plaintiff, in her motion for mandatory change of venue, relies wholly 

on state law in support of her claim. ECF No. 205, at 1 (stating that the “motion seeks to properly 

change the venue to a neutral county in accordance with California law”) (emphasis added); id. at 

12-14 (arguing that action should be transferred pursuant to California Government Code § 955 

and Code of Civil Procedure § 394). However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to 

proceedings in U.S. District Court, with certain exceptions that do not apply to the instant 

litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Plaintiff cites no federal rule in support of her argument regarding 

change of venue. Moreover, the state laws upon which Plaintiff relies are inapplicable to her case. 

California Government Code § 955 governs actions in which the state is named as a defendant. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 955. This is not the case here. California Code of Civil Procedure § 394 governs 

the transfer of cases where a county, city, or local agency is a defendant, and that defendant files a 

motion to transfer the case. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 394. Here, Plaintiff has not named a city, county, or 

local agency as a defendant, and even if Plaintiff had, the motion to transfer was filed by Plaintiff, 

not by any of the Defendants. Therefore, § 394 does not apply to this case. 

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