Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02074/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Earl Dewayne Cain, 

Petitoner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-02074-PHX-ROS

ORDER

On August 16, 2013, Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

(Doc. 18). Petitioner filed timely objections. For the following reasons, the R&R will be

adopted in full.

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Where any party has

filed timely objections to the R&R, the district court’s review of the part objected to must be

de novo. Id. Petitioner filed timely objections, meaning the Court must conduct a de novo

review. But having done so, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the petition is

untimely. 

Given the date his convictions became final, Petitioner had until April 24, 1997 to file

a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner did not file his federal petition until

September 27, 2012, meaning it is obviously untimely absent some type of tolling. There are

Case 2:12-cv-02074-ROS Document 20 Filed 09/24/13 Page 1 of 3
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two types of tolling possibly applicable to Petitioner’s claims: statutory and equitable.

Neither applies in this case.

Dealing first with statutory tolling, the best-case scenario for Petitioner is the

following. Petitioner’s one-year clock on the filing of his federal petition began to run on

August 2, 1996 when there was a definitive ruling denying his first state petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 18 at 10). Petitioner did not commence his second petition for postconviction relief until June 5, 1997. Upon filing his second petition, the one-year clock

stopped running due to statutory tolling but 307 days had already run between August 2,

1996 and June 5, 1997. Cf. Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010)

(calculating one-year period by adding up numerous periods when clock was running).

Petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief was denied on December 21, 2000.

Therefore, on December 22, 2000, the one-year clock again started to run. And the clock ran

out on February 18, 2001. Accordingly, even under this generous interpretation of the record

and application of statutory tolling, this petition is untimely by over ten years.

In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner emphasizes that he filed many other petitions

for post-conviction relief between 2001 and 2012. Those petitions, however, have no bearing

on the issue of statutory tolling. Once the one-year clock ran out, the filing of additional

state petitions did not restart the clock. In other words, the fact that Petitioner’s fifth petition

for post-conviction relief was denied by an Arizona court only four months before he filed

his this federal petition does not render the federal petition timely.

As for equitable tolling, Petitioner has not identified any “extraordinary

circumstances” that made it “impossible to file [his] petition” within the one-year period.

Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Petitioner’s lack

of counsel and confusion regarding the applicable limitations period are not sufficient to

establish equitable tolling. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e

have never accepted pro se representation alone . . . as an excuse for prolonged inattention

when a statute’s clear policy calls for promptness.”); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d

1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law is not,

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itself, a circumstances warranting equitable tolling.”). And, at the very least, the record

shows Plaintiff did not pursue his rights with “reasonable diligence.” Ford, 683 F.3d at 1237.

None of Petitioner’s other objections have merit and the R&R will be adopted in full.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 18) is ADOPTED. The

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in

forma pauperis on appeal are DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by

a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

DATED this 24th day of September, 2013.

Roslyn O. Silver

 Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:12-cv-02074-ROS Document 20 Filed 09/24/13 Page 3 of 3