Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02030/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02030-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The court recognizes it had defendant Filippello’s name spelled incorrectly on the 1

docket. This has been corrected to reflect the correct spelling. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADLEY M. HIXON, No. CIV S-06-2030-MCE-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MCSP ADMINISTRATION 

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 20), filed

April 9, 2007. Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative

remedies. Plaintiff has filed an opposition. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his civil rights complaint on September 12, 2006 and an amended

complaint on November 9, 2006. On December 12, 2006 this court issued an order stating that

service was appropriate for defendants Knipp, Baker, Sanchez, and Filippello. Defendants 1

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appeared by filing this motion to dismiss based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff has filed two inmate grievances: one on August 17, 2006 and one on September 11,

2006. The first grievance was partially granted on December 12, 2006, at the second level and

referred to the Office of Internal Affairs. The second was denied at the first level on October 25,

2006. 

In plaintiff’s complaint he alleges that defendants engaged in a pattern of verbal

and sexual harassment calculated to cause plaintiff psychological damage in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant Baker was harassing him due to

his homosexuality, “spreading discriminating bias comments” and “has caused harassment and

taunts by my peers” by his derogatory statements. Plaintiff alleges defendant Sanchez verbally

harassed him and told “other inmates to ‘get their money’ [meaning] other[s] to come have sex

with me with is strictly prohibited in CDC prisons and that was a violation to cause sexual harm

against me.” In addition, plaintiff claims defendant Sanchez placed “hateful materials (signs) on

my door” which caused other inmates to taunt plaintiff. Plaintiff next alleges defendant

Filippello also verbally harassed him “calling me a ‘faggot & queer’” and at least attempting to

get another inmate to physically assault him. Finally, petitioner alleges defendant Knipp was

“deliberately indifferent” when informed of the harassment he was receiving from the other

correctional officers. He states “Capt. Knipp has let his officers put my life at a great risk of

sexual harm assaults and threats and he continued to let his officers harass and taunt me until I

was placed in MCSP Ad-Seg.” 

II. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies is properly

the subject of an unenumerated motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). See Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). “In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleading and decide disputed

issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that administrative remedies have not been

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exhausted, the unexhausted claim should be dismissed without prejudice. See id. at 1120. 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss, that this action should be dismissed

because plaintiff failed to exhausted all administrative remedies. 

Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative

remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory

regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling

Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of

the complaint, compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies

while the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). The

Supreme Court recently addressed the exhaustion requirement in Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910

(2007), and held: (1) prisoners are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in

the complaint because lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and

proved by the defendants; (2) an individual named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be

named in the grievance process for exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable

procedural rules that a prisoner must follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not

by the PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some,

but not all, claims are unexhausted. The Supreme Court also held in Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct.

2378, 2385-88 (2006), that, in order to exhaust administrative remedies, the prisoner must

comply with all of the prison system’s procedural rules and that partial compliance is not enough.

A prison inmate in California satisfies the administrative exhaustion requirement

by following the procedures set forth in §§ 3084.1-3084.7 of Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations. In California, inmates “may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). These regulations require the prisoner to proceed through several

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levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution; (2) formal appeal; (3) second level appeal to institution

head; (4) third level appeal to the director of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation. A decision at the third formal level, which is also referred to as the director’s

level, is not appealable and concludes a prisoner’s departmental administrative remedy. See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) and 3084.5(e)(2). Departmental appeals coordinators may

summarily deny a prisoner’s untimely administrative appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3084.3(c)(6) and 3084.6(c). If a group of inmates intend to appeal the same decision or action,

one grievance form is used and a list of the participating inmates must be attached. The list must

be legible and state the inmates’ names, departmental identification numbers, and housing

assignment. The form must also be signed by all participating inmates. Currently, California

regulations do not contain any provision specifying who must be named in the grievance. 

In certain circumstances, the regulations make it impossible for the inmate to

pursue a grievance through the entire grievance process. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 939

n. 11 (9th Cir. 2005). Where a claim contained in an inmate’s grievance is characterized by

prison officials as a “staff complaint” and processed through a separate confidential process,

prison officials lose any authority to act on the subject of the grievance. See id. at 937 (citing

Booth, 532 U.S. at 736 n. 4). Thus, the claim is exhausted when it is characterized as a “staff

complaint.” See id. at 940. If there are separate claims in the same grievance for which further

administrative review could provide relief, prison regulations require that the prisoner be notified

that such claims must be appealed separately. See id. at 939. The court may presume that the

absence of such a notice indicates that the grievance did not present any claims which could be

appealed separate from the confidential “staff complaint” process. See id. 

Here, plaintiff filed two inmate grievances. On August 17, 2006, plaintiff filed a

his first inmate grievance, Log. No. MCSP A-06-02664. As defendants acknowledge, in this

grievance, plaintiff alleges he was being sexually and verbally harassed by correctional staff

assigned to Facility A at Mule Creek State Prison. This grievance was partially granted at the

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second level of review and was referred to the Office of Internal Affairs. Plaintiff was not

advised that any appeal of this decision was possible. 

Plaintiff filed his second grievance, Log No. MCSP C-06-02085, on September

11, 2006, wherein he alleges he was sexually and verbally harassed by correctional officers,

specifically Officer T. Shirley and others, assigned to Yard A at Mule Creek State Prison. This

grievance was denied at the first level response. The prison indicated the allegations were

unverifiable speculation that could not be proved or disproved, and were found to be

unsubstantiated. Plaintiff was advised he could appeal this decision, which he apparently did not

do. 

Defendants argue neither of these inmate grievances exhausted plaintiff’s

administrative remedies. First, defendants argue the actions complained of in plaintiff’s inmate

grievances do not constitute the same actions alleged in his complaint. Second, defendants argue

the individuals identified in plaintiff’s inmate grievances are not the same as the defendants in

this action. Finally, defendants argue plaintiff did not pursue his inmate grievances to the

furthest level and therefore failed to exhaust for not complying with CDCR’s procedural rules. 

None of these arguments are sufficient.

Defendants’ third argument, that plaintiff failed to pursue his grievance to the

final level is sufficient as to plaintiff’s second grievance filed on September 11, 2006. This

grievance was only pursed to the first level response where it was denied. Plaintiff has not

pursued it any further. However, as to plaintiff’s first grievance, filed August 17, 2006, the

prison partially granted this grievance and referred it to the Office of Internal Affairs. Where a

claim contained in an inmate’s grievance is characterized by prison officials as a “staff

complaint” and processed through a separate confidential process, prison officials lose any

authority to act on the subject of the grievance. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 937. Thus, the claim is

exhausted when it is characterized as a “staff complaint.” See id. at 940. As plaintiff’s first

grievance was characterized as a “staff complaint” and plaintiff was not given the option of any

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further appeals, this grievance was exhausted.

Defendants’ second argument, that the individuals named in petitioner’s grievance

were different than the named defendants is likewise insufficient grounds for a motion to

dismiss. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has held an individual named as a defendant

does not necessarily need to be named in the grievance process for exhaustion to be considered

adequate. See Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 922-23. Thus, plaintiff’s grievance that staff on A facility are

harassing him, is sufficient for the harassment complained of by the named individuals. 

Finally, defendants argue the actions complained of in plaintiff’s inmate

grievances do not constitute the same actions alleged in his complaint. However, as the

defendants themselves indicate in their motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s complaints, both in his first

grievance and in his complaint, raise the issue of being sexually and verbally harassed. On a

motion to dismiss, the court must construe the pleadings in pro se prisoner cases liberally and in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In so doing, this court cannot find that the harassment

complained of in plaintiff’s prison grievance is not related to the harassment complained of in his

complaint. If, as the defense argues, the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is to

afford the prison an opportunity to address the inmate complaint internally, then in this case the

plaintiff has done so. In his prison grievance, plaintiff clearly complains about the sexual and

verbal harassment he alleges he has been subjected to. Regardless of the exact details of the

harassment, the prison was put on notice that such harassment could in fact be occurring. 

Therefore, this argument is not sufficient to support a motion to dismiss.

The defendants do raise another argument, albeit quite inarticulately. This

argument is that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencement of

this action as required by 45 U.S.C. §197e(a). See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F3d 1198, 1199 (9th

Cir. 2002) The defendants correctly state the law, but mention this issue only in passing, and it is

not articulated well. However, before this court is the issue of whether the plaintiff properly

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exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this case. The defendants have provided the

court copies of plaintiff’s 602 inmate grievances. The first grievance, which would be the

operative grievance as it was properly exhausted as far as plaintiff could, was in fact submitted

prior to the commencement of this action. However, submission of the inmate grievance is not

“exhaustion” of all available administrative remedies. Plaintiff must wait to receive the decision

of the prison, see Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15 §3084.5), which did not happen in this case until December 12, 2006, after this case

was filed. Therefore, plaintiff has not in fact exhausted his administrative remedies. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendant’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 20) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 17, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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