Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00940/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00940-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE BRIDGES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-0940 DAD P

vs.

SUZAN L. HUBBARD, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed November 2, 2009, plaintiff’s first amended

complaint was dismissed with leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff has now filed

a second amended complaint.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell

Atlantic, 550 U.S. 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

BACKGROUND

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff names S. Hubbard, R.K. Wong, R.S.

Johnson, D.J. Davey, G. Marshall, R. Ivicevich, R. Marquez, J. Marsh, and J. Crandell as

defendants. Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2005, he received a prison rules violation report

(“RVR”) charging him with conspiracy to murder peace officers. According to plaintiff, the

charge against him was fabricated and ultimately dismissed. However, on August 9, 2005,

defendant Wong re-issued the RVR, and on December 27, 2005, defendant Ivicevich conducted

an administrative hearing with respect to the charge. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ivicevich

falsely reported that plaintiff had approved of the defendant’s use of documents from defendants

Marshall and Marquez, which were deemed “illegal” at a previous disciplinary hearing. Based in

part on these challenged documents, defendant Ivicevich found plaintiff guilty of the rule

violation as charged and referred him to the Inmate Classification Committee (“ICC”). Although

plaintiff did not forfeit any good-time credits due to a time-constraint violation, the ICC assessed

him a forty-eight month security housing unit term and transferred him to CSP-Corcoran to serve

that disciplinary term. (Compl. Attach. at 7-12 & Ex. P.)

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DISCUSSION

The allegations in plaintiff’s second amended complaint remain so vague and

conclusory that the court is still unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or

fails to state a claim for relief. The second amended complaint does not contain a short and plain

statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible

pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that

support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency,

733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

the overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has

failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the second amended complaint

must be dismissed. In the interests of justice, the court will grant plaintiff leave to file a third

amended complaint.

If plaintiff elects to file a third amended complaint, he is advised of the following

legal standards that govern the claims that he is attempting to present. First, in the prison

context, a viable First Amendment retaliation claim entails five elements: (1) an assertion that a

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson,

408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, in a third amended complaint, plaintiff must

specifically explain the reason why defendants retaliated against him, how the retaliatory

disciplinary hearing chilled the exercise of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and why the

retaliatory disciplinary hearing did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

Second, plaintiff appears to claim that the disciplinary hearing at issue violated his

rights under the Due Process Clause. One alleging a due process violation must demonstrate that

he was deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then

show that the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky.

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Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); see also McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). In his second amended complaint, plaintiff sufficiently alleges

facts showing that the procedures relating to his disciplinary hearing were deficient. However,

plaintiff fails to first allege any facts demonstrating that he was deprived of a liberty or property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Therefore, in a third amended complaint, plaintiff

should allege facts demonstrating how the conditions of his forty-eight month confinement in

security unit-housing imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on him in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995); Resnick v. Hayes,

213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that placement in a secured housing unit did not give

rise to a liberty interest because plaintiff failed to allege that his conditions of confinement were

materially different from those imposed on other inmates in administrative segregation or general

prison population). 

Plaintiff is finally informed that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order

to make his third amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that the third amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, if plaintiff files a third amended complaint

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s April 16, 2010 second amended complaint (Doc. No. 26) is

dismissed;

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

third amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the third amended complaint must

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bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”;

failure to file a third amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a

recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a

civil rights action.

DATED: April 27, 2010.

DAD:sj

brid0940.14a(2)

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