Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00947/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00947-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS LEE DAWKINS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-0947 LKK KJM P

vs.

R. A. CASTRO, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel with an application for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1994 convictions for assault

with a deadly weapon by a prisoner and possession of a sharp instrument by a prisoner. On

September 5, 2001, the district court adopted findings and recommendations filed July 23, 2001,

and granted respondent’s January 3, 2001 motion to dismiss; this action thus was dismissed as

time-barred. On June 10, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the September 5,

2001 dismissal and remanded.

I. July 23, 2001 Findings And Recommendations

On July 23, 2001 the magistrate judge assigned to this case at that time issued the

following findings and recommendations concerning respondent’s January 3, 2001 motion to

dismiss: 

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2

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) was enacted. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) so

that it now provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant

was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of Sacramento County on

July 19, 1994 and sentenced September 9, 1994. His convictions were

affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District on

September 22, 1995. Petitioner did not seek review in the California

Supreme Court. 

Petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court on August 20, 1996 alleging several grounds for relief,

including all the grounds alleged in this action. The petition was denied

on October 30, 1996.

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3

Petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in this court on

December 9, 1996. The application was dismissed on December 1, 1997

due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies as required by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

Petitioner filed a second application for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court on August 6, 1999 arguing he was denied the

right to counsel during the direct appeal of his convictions. That

application was denied October 27, 1999. Petitioner does not assert the

grounds for relief presented in his August 6, 1999 California Supreme

Court application in this action.

This action was filed December 27, 1999. 

Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the enactment of AEDPA. 

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the statute of limitations began to run against

petitioner on April 24, 1996, the date of enactment of the statute. See

Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286

(9th Cir. 1997).

The limitations period ran for approximately four months until petitioner

filed his first state habeas application. The statute was then tolled during

the pendency of the petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), for about

two months. When the application was denied, the limitations period

continued to run. The period ran out in June of 1997.[fn]

Petitioner argues that the court should find that the limitations period was

tolled between August 23, 1997 and December 27, 1999 pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In support of his argument, petitioner asserts that

during that period the state created an impediment to his filing his

application since he was not provided adequate access to his prison’s law

library. However, petitioner’s argument cannot save this action as the

limitations period ran out prior to August 23, 1997. Petitioner’s argument

that the court should equitably toll the limitations period between August

23, 1997 and December 27, 1999 pursuant to Calderon v. United States

District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1997) is equally

ineffective.

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[fn] The pendency of petitioner’s previous application in this court does

not toll the limitations period. Duncan v. Walker, U.S. , 121 S. Ct.

2120, 2124 (2001). Furthermore, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.

1999) does not apply. In Nino, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit found that where a habeas petitioner is attempting to exhaust

state remedies, “the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the

petitioner's final collateral challenge.” Id. at 1006. In this case petitioner’s

claims were exhausted after his first habeas application was denied. 

Accordingly, Nino does not extend the tolling period past the denial of the 

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1

 Since filing of the Ninth Circuit’s remand order in this case, Ford v. Hubbard was

amended and superseded on denial of rehearing. See 330 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2003). For the

purposes of these recommendations, the result reached in the amended decision was the same as

in the original case filed in 2002. Id. at 1100-02. Citations hereafter are to the amended

decision, which, as discussed below, is itself no longer good law.

4

first application. Furthermore, plaintiff was not attempting to exhaust

state remedies between December 9, 1996 and December 1, 1997, while

his prior federal habeas action was pending.

Findings and Recommendations (filed July 23, 2001) at 1-3. These findings and

recommendations were adopted in full by the district court.

II. Remand Order

The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of petitioner’s habeas application as

time-barred and remanded:

At the time the district court dismissed Dawkins’s petition, it did

not have the benefit of our decision in Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d

875, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the district court erred

when it failed to inform a pro se petitioner he would be time barred

upon returning to federal court with exhausted claims). . .

On remand, the district court should examine whether Dawkins

exercised reasonable diligence in exhausting his claims, see

Guillory v. Roe, No. 01-56343, 2003 WL 2013086 (9th Cir. May 6,

2003) (holding petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling

because he failed to diligently exhaust claims), and whether the

claims in Dawkins’s second federal petition relate back to his first

petition. See Ford, 305 F.3d at 889-90 (concluding that claims

raised for the first time in a second petition do not relate back to

the original petition).

Dawkins v. Castro, No. 01-17132, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. May 19, 2003).

Both parties have filed supplemental briefs following the remand order.

III. Analysis

In Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 885 (9th Cir. 2002),1 the Ninth Circuit held that

if the applicable limitations period has expired, a district court may not properly dismiss a habeas

application for failure to exhaust state court remedies without informing the petitioner that any

subsequent application would be time-barred absent equitable tolling. As relevant to this case,

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2

 Because petitioner’s first case had been closed for more than two years by the time he

filed his amended petition, the amended petition became the basis for this action. See Order

(filed May 1, 2000 in CIV-S-96-2125). 

3

 While in Pliler v. Ford the Supreme Court found that district courts are not required to

warn petitioners whose habeas applications are being dismissed for failure to exhaust state court

remedies about any statute of limitations ramifications, the Court suggested that those petitioners

who have been affirmatively misled into thinking a post-exhaustion federal action would not be

time-barred could be entitled to equitable tolling sufficient to render the second federal action

timely. 124 S. Ct. at 2447. In Case No. CIV-S-96-2125, petitioner was not affirmatively misled

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and as noted in the Findings and Recommendations referenced above, petitioner’s first habeas

application, filed in this district as Case No. CIV-S-96-2125, was dismissed on December 1,

1997 for failure to exhaust state court remedies with respect to some of the claims. Petitioner

was informed he could either proceed only on his exhausted claims or return to state court to

exhaust his unexhausted claims and then return to federal court with all of his claims exhausted. 

See Findings and Recommendations (filed Oct. 8, 1997 in CIV-S-96-2125) at 4 n.3. The latter

he elected not to do, as indicated by the face sheet of his “amended petition”; while his amended

petition contained only his previously exhausted claims, it was not filed until more than two

years after his first petition was dismissed. See Am. Pet. (filed Dec. 27, 1999 in CIV-S-96-

21252) at 1 passim; Judgment (entered Dec. 1, 1997 in CIV-S-96-2125). While petitioner also

was informed in 1997 that there is a limitations period applicable to habeas petitions, he was not

specifically informed that any subsequent habeas action would be considered time-barred absent

equitable tolling. Findings and Recommendations (filed Oct. 8, 1997 in CIV-S-96-2125) at 

4 n.3.

The omission of an advisement that claims would be time-barred would have been

considered error under Ford v. Hubbard. However, Ford v. Hubbard (as amended) is no longer

good law. In Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 124 S. Ct. 2441, 2446 (2004), decided after the Ninth

Circuit’s remand in this case, the Supreme Court held that district courts are not required to warn

petitioners whose habeas applications are being dismissed for failure to exhaust state court

remedies about any statute of limitations ramifications.3 In light of Pliler v. Ford, which vacates

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into thinking this action would be timely. As noted above, petitioner was told he could either

proceed with his exhausted claims, or that the federal court could consider all of his claims after

he exhausted his unexhausted claims in state court. Findings and Recommendations (filed Oct.

8, 1997 in CIV-S-96-2125) at 4 n.3. At the same time, petitioner was warned there is a one year

limitations period with respect to habeas corpus petitions. Id. Petitioner was told “[i]n most

cases, the one year period will start to run on the date on which the state court judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking direct review,

although the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review is pending.” Id. Petitioner also was given the statutory

citation for the statute of limitations. Id. Considering all the information provided to petitioner,

petitioner was not affirmatively misled into thinking that if he were to allow Case No. CIV-S-96-

2125 to be dismissed – as he in fact did, without objection --, that a subsequent federal court

action would be timely absent equitable tolling. 

4

 It also could have been argued that after Ford v. Hubbard (as amended) district courts

were required to inform habeas petitioners who had filed petitions asserting both exhausted and

unexhausted clams that the petitioner had the option of seeking a stay of the exhausted claims

while petitioner exhausted state court remedies with respect to the other claims. Ford v.

Hubbard, 330 F.3d at 1099-1100. However, the Supreme Court specifically held in Pliler v. Ford

that district courts are not required to inform litigants regarding the stay option. Pliler v. Ford,

124 S. Ct. at 2445-46. Cf. Rhines v. Weber, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005) (clarifying

that stay-and-abeyance procedure is discretionary, subject to determination of petitioner’s good

cause for failure to previously exhaust and meritorious nature of unexhausted claims). 

6

Ford v. Hubbard, Ford v. Hubbard no longer affects the outcome of this case.4

Based on the then-applicability of Ford v. Hubbard, the Ninth Circuit’s remand

order directed this court to consider whether petitioner exercised “reasonable diligence” in

exhausting his claims after the 1997 dismissal of his first petition, with citation to Guillory v.

Roe, 329 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2003). In Guillory, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a habeas

petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period with respect to a second

habeas petition because the district court erroneously dismissed the petitioner’s first habeas

petition as mixed (one containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) without giving

petitioner the option of amending his petition to omit the unexhausted claims. Ultimately, the

Ninth Circuit found the petitioner in Guillory was not entitled to equitable tolling because he had

not exercised reasonable diligence in exhausting his claims after the first improper dismissal. Id.

at 1017-18. As noted above, because the 1997 dismissal in Case No. CIV-S-96-2125 was not

erroneous under Pliler v. Ford, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling after the 1997

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5

 While a decision in the case of Mayle v. Felix, which the Supreme Court has taken

under submission after oral argument, see 2005 WL 1106581, 73 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. April 19,

2005), might affect the determination of the Ninth Circuit’s question regarding “relation back” of

claims in this case, a decision in Mayle has not issued at the time of this writing.

7

dismissal.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit has directed this court to consider whether the claims in

this action relate back to the claims in petitioner’s previous action. In Ford v. Hubbard, the Ninth

Circuit treated the original petition, which the court deemed improperly dismissed, as stayed

rather than dismissed and then held that the claims asserted in the subsequent petition that had

also been raised in the first petition related back to filing date of the first petition under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d at 1102-04. However, the court found

that claims raised in the second petition that were not raised in the first did not relate back. Id. at

1105.

Again, under Pliler v. Ford, the 1997 dismissal of petitioner’s first habeas petition,

identified as Case No. CIV-S-96-2125, was proper. Given the propriety of the dismissal and

subsequent entry of judgment, “there was no pending petition to which [the] new [1999] petition

could relate back or amend,” Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

Henry v. Lockyer, 528 U.S. 963 (1999), and there is no reason for the court to exercise its

equitable powers to relate the claims in this action back to the prior action. Cf. Anthony v.

Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001).5

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, respondent’s January 3, 2001 motion to dismiss

should be granted, and this action should be dismissed.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s January 3, 2001 motion to dismiss be granted; and 

2. This action be dismissed.

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8

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 3, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1 dawk0947.157(1)

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