Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, BUILDING

INDUSTRY LEGAL DEFENSE

FOUNDATION, CALIFORNIA

BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, and

GREENHORN GRANGE,

Plaintiffs,

NO. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS GGH

(CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. CIV. 

S-05-2524 WBS GGH)

and

CITY OF SUISUN, ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

and

TSAKOPOULOS INVESTMENTS, 

TSAKOPOULOS FAMILY TRUST, 

DROSOULA TSAKOPOULOS, and 

GEORGE TSAKOPOULOS,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

v.

UNITED STATES FISH AND

WILDLIFE SERVICE; H. DALE

HALL, Director of the United

States Fish and Wildlife

Service; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; and

DIRK KEMPTHORN, Secretary of

Case 2:05-cv-00629-WBS -KJM Document 234 Filed 12/14/07 Page 1 of 26
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2

the United States Department

of Interior,

Defendants,

and

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BUTTE 

ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, AND 

CALIFORNIA NATIVE PLANT 

SOCIETY,

Defendant-Intervenors. 

BUTTE ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, 

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 

CALIFORNIA NATIVE PLANT 

SOCIETY, SAN JOAQUIN RAPTOR AND 

WILDLIFE RESCUE CENTER, SIERRA 

FOOTHILLS AUDUBON SOCIETY, and 

VERNALPOOLS.ORG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORN, Secretary of 

the Interior, and U.S. FISH 

AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

Defendants. 

----oo0oo----

Currently before the court is plaintiffs Butte

Environmental Council, Defenders of Wildlife, California Native

Plant Society, San Joaquin Raptor and Wildlife Rescue Center,

Sierra Foothills Audubon Society, and Vernalpools.Org’s

(collectively, “plaintiffs”) amended motion for attorneys’ fees. 

The motion stems from this court’s remand order requiring

defendants United States Fish and Wildlife Service, H. Dale Hall,

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3

and Dirk Kempthorn (collectively, “defendants”) to reconsider

various economic exclusions listed in their critical habitat

designation of over 800,000 acres of land in California and

Oregon.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

To avoid repetition, the court will refrain from

reciting the entire factual and procedural background, which

essentially remains the same as in its previous order on the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (Nov. 1, 2006 Order

3-9.) Below, the court only highlights facts relevant to this

motion as well as significant post-order events.

These consolidated cases involved challenges to

defendants’ designation of critical habitat for fifteen vernal

pool species listed as threatened or endangered under the

Endangered Species Act (ESA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540. On August

6, 2003, defendants issued an “initial” critical habitat

designation that excluded more than one million acres from ESA

protection for economic and non-economic reasons. 68 Fed. Reg.

46,684; (Nov. 1, 2006 Order 7:15-18.) In January of 2004,

plaintiffs challenged these exclusions as violations of the ESA,

and the court subsequently remanded the matter to defendants for

reconsideration but did not vacate the designation in the

interim. (Id. at 7:19-23.) After reconsideration, defendants

issued two separate final rules regarding their economic and

non-economic exclusions. 70 Fed. Reg. 11,140 (Mar. 8, 2005)

(detailing non-economic exclusions); 70 Fed. Reg. 46,924 (Aug.

11, 2005) (detailing economic exclusions). 

On December 13, 2005, plaintiffs filed another lawsuit

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alleging that defendants’ revised exclusions continued to violate

the ESA. On November 1, 2006, this court granted plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment on the limited ground that

defendants’ reasoning regarding their revised economic exclusions

failed to adequately consider recovery benefits under the ESA

pursuant to Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife

Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). (Nov. 1, 2006 Order

63:10-16.) In all other respects, plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment was denied and defendants’ motion for summary judgment

was granted. Infra n.10 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the

court remanded the matter back to defendants with instructions to

promptly submit a new final rule that takes the ESA’s recovery

standard under adequate consideration. (Id. at 70-71.) Once

again, the court did not vacate the designation in the interim. 

(Id.) 

On November 16, 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion for

reconsideration, clarification, or amendment pursuant to Rule

59(e). (Pls.’ Mot. to Am. J.) Although the court removed one

paragraph inadvertently included in its prior 71-page opinion,

the court rejected (1) plaintiffs’ claim that the non-economic

exclusions were invalid (Jan. 24, 2007 Order 8:19-9:23); (2)

plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ economic analysis was faulty

and “decline[d] to instruct [defendants’] on remand that it may

not conduct a coextensive analysis” (Id. at 15:3-11); and (3)

plaintiffs’ claim that the economic exclusions should be vacated

during the remand. (Id. at 15:13-17:11.) 

After reconsidering the recovery benefits as instructed

by the court, defendants concluded that the challenged exclusions

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1 Anticipating opposition to their eligibility and

entitlement to attorneys’ fees under the ESA, plaintiffs also

moved for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28

U.S.C. § 2412(a) & (d). (Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Am. Mot. for

Att’ys’ Fees 1:16-18.) In their opposition, however, defendants

do not dispute that the ESA is the governing statute in this

case.

5

remained reasonable and thus made no change to their final

critical habitat designation. (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Am.

Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees 3:24-26.) On May 31, 2007, defendants

subsequently published a clarification for the basis of the

economic exclusions that addressed recovery benefits under

Gifford Pinchot. 72 Fed. Reg. 30279 (May 31, 2007). In their

clarification, defendants also voluntarily addressed other

issues, including recovery benefits related to the non-economic

exclusions originally challenged by plaintiffs in this case. Id.

On July 31, 2007, the court entered final judgment dismissing the

case. (July 31, 2007 J.) 

Plaintiffs now move for an award of attorneys’ fees

under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) of the ESA,1

 contending that they

succeeded in their litigation against defendants when the court

remanded the matter and required defendants to reconsider their

exclusions in light of the recovery standard as delineated in

Gifford Pinchot. In opposition, defendants argue that plaintiffs

are ineligible for an attorneys’ fee award because their success

was de minimis, or in the alternative, that plaintiffs are

entitled to no more than a minimal fee award in light of their

minimal success. 

II. Discussion

A. Eligibility for Attorneys’ Fees Under the ESA

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2 Although the Ninth Circuit has adopted a higher

standard with regard to defendants in ESA cases, the standard by

which to review a plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees remains

unchanged. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 229 F.

Supp. 2d 993, 998 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

6

Under the citizen suit provision of the ESA, a court

may award attorneys’ fees to a party “whenever the court

determines such award is appropriate.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). 

An award of attorneys’ fees is “appropriate” under the ESA where

the plaintiffs have (1) achieved “some degree of success on the

merits,” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983),

and (2) contributed substantially to the goals of the ESA.2

Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Sec’y of the Interior,

748 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir. 1984) overruled on other grounds by

Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir.

1999). 

While defendants admit that plaintiffs obtained a

favorable ruling in the November 1, 2006 Order, they nonetheless

argue that this “success” was so de minimis as to not warrant an

award of attorneys’ fees under the first prong. Specifically,

defendants note that none of the exclusions were vacated during

the remand, and the current critical habitat designation remains

today exactly as it was the day this action commenced. However,

plaintiffs need only show “some degree of success on the merits”

to warrant attorneys’ fee eligibility. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at

694 (emphasis added); see also Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d

644, 649 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The fact that Plaintiff failed to

recover on all theories of liability is not a bar to recovery of

attorney’s fees.”). Here, a judicial finding that defendants

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arbitrarily and capriciously failed to take into account recovery

benefits--in addition to a remand order requiring them to

reconsider economic exclusions in their critical habitat

designation--constitutes, at the very lest, “some degree of

success.” See Li v. Keisler, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2800679 (9th

Cir. 2007) (plaintiffs became prevailing parties by obtaining an

order of remand for agency review of their claims). 

Moreover, the court’s November 1, 2006 decision not to

vacate the exclusions was consistent with its prior 2004 ruling

when “[t]he Court remanded for reconsideration, but did not set

aside the critical habitat designation in the interim.” (Jan. 1,

2007 Order 4:13-15 (referencing the court’s 2004 ruling).) The

court’s prior ruling did not undermine plaintiffs’ success in the

2004 case; in fact, defendants agreed to pay, and the court

sanctioned, an attorneys’ fee award in the previous litigation

over the exclusions. (Levine Decl. ¶ 16.) In the present case,

the court again chose not to obscure “an already incredibly

complex regulation” by vacating the exclusions, but this does not

mean that plaintiffs did not achieve the degree of success

necessary to convey eligibility for an attorneys’ fee award. 

(Id. at 16:23-25.) 

This litigation also substantially contributed to the

goals of the ESA because it ensured that defendants--a federal

administrative body and federal officials--remain in compliance

with the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et

seq., when designating critical habitat. See Ruckelshaus, 463

U.S. at 687 (the purpose of fee-shifting statutes is “to

encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and

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administration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest”

(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 337 (1977), as reprinted in

1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1416); Carson Truckee, 748 F.2d at 525 (“[T]he

dominant consideration [of the ESA] is whether litigation by the

party has served the public interest by assisting the

interpretation or implementation of the . . . Act.” (quoting Ala.

Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Despite

the fact that the designation remained unchanged following

reconsideration, plaintiffs’ efforts nonetheless produced

significant real-world relief in requiring defendants to actually

consider the recovery benefits and provide a detailed

administrative record in support of their efforts--thereby

effectively legitimizing the designation nearly four years after

its original issuance. 

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiffs are eligible

for an award of attorneys’ fees because they have both obtained a

sufficient degree of success and made a substantial contribution

to the goals of the ESA. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1986)

(costs of litigation awarded when citizen performs a public

service by enforcing environmental statutes). 

B. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$202,488.00, which covers work done by their two attorneys, Mr.

Levine and Mr. Segee, on the merits of the case, costs incurred

during the pendency of the case, and work done in preparing and

arguing the motion for attorneys’ fees.

The initial determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees

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is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably

expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). There is a strong

presumption that this “lodestar” figure represents a reasonable

fee. Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.

1987). To calculate the lodestar in this action, the court will

determine the reasonable hourly rate, multiply this rate by the

number of hours that plaintiffs’ counsel reasonably expended to

establish a base fee award, and then determine whether this base

fee award should be further adjusted to account for plaintiffs’

degree of success in the action.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district

court must consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the

attorney requesting fees. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles,

796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1985). In addition, the court is

guided by the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience

and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). 

Here, plaintiffs seek hourly rates of $325 for Mr. Levine and

$275 for Mr. Segee.

Defendants do not dispute the skill, experience, or

reputation of either Mr. Levine or Mr. Segee. Both attorneys

have submitted declarations that demonstrate their distinct

knowledge and experience in environmental and ESA law, including

litigating numerous cases for various client organizations to

enforce the ESA and conserve vernal pool species. (Levine Decl.

¶¶ 2-6; Segee Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.) Mr. Levine has developed his ESA

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3 In the instant action, the court “correctly define[s]

the relevant community as the local forum of Sacramento.” Barjon

v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997).

10

expertise over fourteen years, and he has also served as a law

school instructor for classes on this very subject while

directing the University of Denver Law School’s environmental law

clinic for five years. (Levine Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Mr. Segee has

been a non-profit environmental lawyer since 1997, has extensive

experience enforcing environmental laws against federal agencies,

and has worked on several ESA matters. (Segee Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.) 

The aptitude of plaintiffs’ attorneys was especially crucial in

this case because it required their specialized knowledge of

environmental law. See Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“Environmental litigation is an identifiable practice

specialty that requires distinctive knowledge.”); Palila v.

Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 512 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (D.

Haw. 1981) (“Complex environmental litigation such as this case

requires special skills and specialization beyond that possess by

most attorneys in general practice.”). 

Defendants nonetheless contend that Mr. Levine and Mr.

Segee have proposed unreasonable hourly rates. In support of

their argument, defendants rely on inapplicable cases that, for

example, state hourly rates from non-controlling forums, see

Modesto Irrig. Dist. et al. v. Guitierrez, No. 1:02-CV-06553

(E.D. Cal. July 5, 2006) (attorneys’ fee request related to

hourly rates in the local forum of Fresno)3

 and fail to relate to

environmental litigation or the special skill and experience

involved in such cases. See, e.g., Belliveau v. Thomson Fin.,

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4 Defendants also argue that plaintiffs should only

recover the amount of rates “actually paid.” (Defs. Mem. in

Opp’n. to Pls. Am. Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees 19:1-3.) This argument

is not only devoid of merit, see Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S.

82, 90 (1990) (holding that governing fee statute measures award,

not actual fee that clients pay their lawyers), but also would

negate fee awards in instances--such as the present case--where

non-profit organizations retain pro bono counsel because they

cannot afford to pay for a lawyer.

11

No. 05-11752007, 2007 WL 1660999, at *3-*4 (E.D. Cal. June 6,

2007) (age discrimination case) and DirecTV v. Atwal, No. 03-

2499, 2005 WL 1388649, at *1-*2 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2006) (stolen

cable reception case).4 

In contrast to defendants’ citations and submissions,

plaintiffs’ attorneys have supplied the court with declarations

from several disinterested attorneys as to the range of fees that

attorneys of similar skill, experience, and reputation in the

Sacramento metropolitan area would charge for comparable legal

work in a complex environmental case. (Axline Decl. ¶ 9; Mooney

Decl. ¶¶ 6-8; Wagner Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Further, two recent cases in

this district highlight instances where attorneys with

significant environmental litigation experience were awarded

similar rates to those that plaintiffs’ attorneys now request. 

See Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Troyer, 2006 WL

2346324, at *5-*6 (E.D. Cal. August 16, 2006) (awarding

reasonable hourly rates of $275 (2004), $300 (2005), and $325

(2006) for two environmental attorneys with over fourteen and

nine years of specialized experience) and Soda Mountain

Wilderness Council v. Norton, No. 04-2583, 2006 WL 2054062, at

*5-*6 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2006) (finding a $325 hourly rate to be

reasonable for two environmental attorneys with over sixteen and

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5 While the Ninth Circuit has indicated that time spent

on a fee application can be compensated, see, e.g., Davis v. City

& County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir. 1992),

defendants nonetheless argue that attorney time spent on

negotiating fees and preparing the fee claim requires no special

expertise and thus should be compensated at no more than

associate-level hourly rates. However, defendants fail to offer

any support to justify this argument. Rather, environmental

cases in this circuit have consistently awarded fees related to

work preparing motions for attorneys’ fees at similar rates as

fees for work on the merits of the case. See, e.g., Fed’n of Fly

Fishers v. Daley, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 

Moreover, drafting the present fee motion could not readily have

been delegated to an associate because, given the background of

the complex substantive issues raised in this motion, exercising

billing discretion reasonably necessitated the attention of

experienced ESA attorneys.

12

twenty years experience).5 Therefore, the court will apply

plaintiffs’ requested hourly rates.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

In determining reasonable hours, counsel must submit

time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended. 

“The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the

appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit

evidence in support of those hours worked.” Gates v. Deukmejian,

987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). Those hours may be reduced by the

court if the hours expended are determined to be excessive or

otherwise unnecessary. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. Once

the fee applicant has provided evidence supporting the hours

worked, “the party opposing the fee application has a burden of

rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district

court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours

charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its

submitted affidavits.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98. 

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Defendants argue that plaintiffs have proposed

excessive hours on case development and drafting the complaint,

reviewing the record and summary judgment briefing, and

negotiating fees and preparing the fee motion. 

a. Case Development and Drafting the Complaint

Plaintiffs seek compensation for 68.9 hours spent by

their two attorneys on developing the case and preparing the

complaint. The court recognizes that plaintiffs’ attorneys had a

number of tasks before them, which included reviewing two Federal

Registrar Notices regarding the critical habitat designation,

strategizing with their clients, and drafting and filing the

complaint. However, the court agrees with defendants that the

number of hours is excessive. 

As stated above, plaintiffs’ attorneys were both

experts in environmental litigation with extensive specialty

experience in the conservation of vernal pool species. Given

their backgrounds, and in light of the hourly fees they both

charge, reviewing the record and drafting a complaint relative to

the narrow environmental issues in this action should not have

taken almost seventy hours. See Bell v. United Princeton Props.

Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 721 (3rd Cir. 1989) (“Excessiveness of time

spent in light of an applicant’s expertise is a legitimate reason

for reducing a fee award.”); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d

670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that because “the lodestar

computation is a two-edged sword,” “[a] fee applicant cannot

demand a high hourly rate--which is based on his or her

experience, reputation, and a presumed familiarity with the

applicable law--and then run up an inordinate amount of time

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researching that same law.”). Having reviewed the pleadings and

the records in this case, the court finds a more reasonable

amount of time spent working on case development and preparing

the complaint would have been thirty hours and thus will reduce

plaintiffs’ recovery to this number.

b. Reviewing the Record and Summary Judgment

Briefing

Plaintiffs also seek 395.4 hours for time spent

resolving the merits of the case, which they assert includes time

spent reviewing the copious administrative record compiled by

defendants, successfully resolving informal disputes regarding

the adequacy of the record, composing standing declarations,

opposing defendants’ motion to strike, researching recent

developments in the law, and preparing a motion for summary

judgment. Defendants argue that this number of hours is patently

excessive and suggest limiting plaintiffs’ recovery to no more

than 150 hours, but defendants focus is limited to the time that

it would take to draft the two summary judgment briefs as opposed

to a thorough review of the record and plaintiffs’ additional

related tasks. Thus, the court will decline defendants’

invitation to reduce recovery to 150 hours. However, the court

nonetheless finds that plaintiffs’ hours spent resolving the

merits are excessive. 

While the court acknowledges that the administrative

record in this case was lengthy, it is not clear from plaintiffs’

time sheets exactly where and how the time was allotted for

administrative review. Further, various entries relating to the

summary judgment briefs are duplicative. Having reviewed

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6 In their fee negotiations, defendants contended that

the EAJA, as opposed to the ESA, governs plaintiffs’ fee request

and thus argued that plaintiffs’ had failed to support their

requested rates. (Pls. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pls. Am. Mot. for

Att’ys’ Fees 15:12-20.) This contention forced plaintiffs to

argue the applicability of the EAJA in their opening brief and

secure declarations to provide evidentiary support for their

rates. (Id.); supra n. 3.

15

plaintiffs’ time sheets in light of the case record, the court

finds that 300 hours would have been a more reasonable amount

spent resolving the merits of the case. This is still a very

substantial number of hours. In light of the complexity of the

case and the length of the summary judgment motion, however, this

amount of time is warranted. 

c. Negotiating Fees and Preparing Fee Motion

Finally, plaintiffs seek 156.5 hours for time spent

negotiating and briefing fees and costs. See Comm’r, I.N.S. v.

Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990) (noting that time expended on a

fee motion may be included in calculating plaintiff’s fee award);

Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544

(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that time spent on a fee application can

be compensated). In determining the appropriate number of

recoverable hours, the court must take into account that

plaintiffs were forced to spend more time than would have been

expected on the fees dispute because the parties negotiated over

a period of several days without reaching a resolution. Further,

defendants raised a new legal issue during negotiations regarding

the applicability of the ESA to this suit, which required further

research.6

Nonetheless, the court finds that this figure is an

inordinate amount of attorney time for negotiating fees and

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drafting fee motions. Given the nature of the litigation, the

court finds that eighty hours spent on negotiating fees and

preparing the fee motion is a reasonable figure. See

Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. U.S. Forest Serv., No.

05-1502, 2007 WL 2992132, at *10 (E.D. Cal Oct. 11, 2007) (noting

that, in an ESA case, 76.3 hours spent on fee motion was

reasonable). 

3. Degree of Success

After multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the

hours reasonably expended, the resulting base fee may be further

adjusted based on “other considerations . . . including the

important factor of the ‘results obtained.’” Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 434. Thus, courts may further reduce the fee award to

properly reflect the plaintiff’s level of success in the case.

Id. at 435-36. In determining the plaintiff’s level of success,

the court’s first step is to establish “whether the claims upon

which the plaintiff failed to prevail were related to the

plaintiff’s successful claims.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995). Claims are

related where they “involve a common core of facts” or where they

are “based on related legal theories.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at

434-35. Claims are not related, however, where they are

“distinctly different claims for relief that are based on

different facts and legal theories.” Id.

Where the successful and unsuccessful claims are not

related, the fee award “may not include time expended on the

unsuccessful claims.” Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 901. If the

successful and unsuccessful claims are related, however, the

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court’s second step is to evaluate “the significance of the

overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours

reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. (quoting Thorne v.

City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986)). Full

compensation for the unsuccessful claims is warranted only where

the plaintiff obtains “excellent results.” Id.

Plaintiffs initially contend that the two-part “degree

of success” test does not apply in ESA cases. Not only does

their position oppose relevant precedent, see, e.g., Envtl. Prot.

Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (N.D.

Cal. 2002) (noting that “[w]hile the lodestar is the

presumptively reasonable fee award” in ESA cases, “it may be

adjusted to accommodate degree of success”), but plaintiffs also

support their contention by mischaracterizing the holding of

Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879 (9th Cir.

2004) (“Evans”) (refusing to reduce a full ESA award despite

plaintiffs apparent lack of success). While before the district

court in Evans, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring that the

administrative defendants reconsider designation for nineteen

Evolutionary Significant Units (“ESUs”) of fish, but the

resulting court order required reconsideration for only six of

the nineteen challenged ESUs. Id. at 889. On review of

plaintiffs’ subsequent attorneys’ fee motion, the Ninth Circuit

upheld an award of full compensation. Far from denouncing the

“degree of success” test in ESA cases, the Ninth Circuit found

that the factual record in Evans did not support use of the

“degree of success” test. Id. Specifically, the court held that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

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7 Plaintiffs alleged four separate claims against

defendants in their complaint (Pls. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Am.

Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees 17:22-23; Compl. ¶¶ 44-51), including

claims that defendants (1) unlawfully excluded critical habitat

based on economic impacts (economic exclusion claims) (Compl. ¶¶

44-45); (2) unlawfully excluded critical habitat based on noneconomic impacts (non-economic exclusion claims) (Compl. ¶¶ 46-

47); (3) failed to provide public notice and opportunity for

comment as required by both the ESA and the APA in excluding

areas from critical habitat (Compl. ¶¶ 48-49); and (4) engaged in

an unlawful pattern and practice of violating ESA duties when

designating vernal pool critical habitat. (Compl. ¶¶ 50-51.)

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apply the test where a subsequent consent decree in the

litigation--which mooted the action--remanded defendants’ final

rule for all nineteen ESUs. Id. Therefore, because the consent

decree meant that plaintiffs had indeed succeeded in forcing

consideration of all nineteen ESU designations, the Ninth Circuit

found that a “degree of success” inquiry would be meaningless.

During the course of this litigation, plaintiffs’

alleged four separate cognizable claims against defendants. 

Under the first step of the “degree of success” test, it is

readily apparent that all of plaintiffs’ claims “relate” to one

another because each claim is a natural extension of the others.7

In fact, all of plaintiffs’ claims rely on the same common core

of operative facts--defendants’ designation of critical habitat

in California and Oregon for fifteen vernal pool species listed

as threatened or endangered under the ESA--and revolve around

similar legal theories regarding compliance with the ESA. 

Although plaintiffs’ claims were related, the court

will nevertheless reduce the fee award under the test’s second

step to reflect plaintiffs’ limited degree of overall success in

this case. Of the four claims that plaintiffs’ proffered,

defendants argue that plaintiffs were successful on only one

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minor claim--defendants’ failure to weigh the recovery benefits

of critical habitat in its economic exclusion analysis--and thus

plaintiffs trivial success was “limited in comparison to the

scope of the litigation as a whole.” Hensely, 461 U.S. at

439-40. 

However, the court recognizes the possibility that

plaintiffs may have succeeded on two of their four claims as

opposed to just one. While the November 1, 2006 Order granted

plaintiffs summary judgment with respect to defendants’ failure

to consider the recovery benefits of their economic exclusions,

on remand defendants also voluntarily considered the recovery

benefits of their non-economic exclusions. (Defs.’ Mem. in

Opp’n. to Pls.’ Am. Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees 13:3-5.) Therefore, in

addition to their economic exclusions claim, plaintiffs may also

be deemed to have “prevailed” on their non-economic exclusions

claim under the “Catalyst Theory.” 

The “Catalyst Theory” allows courts to determine

success even absent a ruling on the merits if (1) there is some

causal relationship between the litigation brought and the

practical outcome and benefit realized by the plaintiff, and (2)

the benefit achieved was required by law and was not a gratuitous

act of the defendant. See Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans,

386 F.3d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Evans”) (applying the

“Catalyst Theory” in an ESA case resolved through settlement)

(citing Greater L.A. Council on Deafness v. Cmty. Television, 813

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8 The United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected

use of the “Catalyst Theory” for suits brought under fee shifting

statutes that include the term “prevailing party.” Buckhannon

Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532

U.S. 598, 606 (2001). In contrast, fee shifting statutes--such

as the ESA--that omit the term “prevailing party” and insert the

“whenever . . . appropriate” language for awarding fees are

“meant to expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards

from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties--parties

achieving some success, even if not major success.” Assoc. of

Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 (1983))

(emphasis in original). Thus, both the Supreme Court and the

Ninth Circuit have approved use of the “Catalyst Theory” in

connection with statutes that provide for fee shifting “whenever

. . . appropriate.” Id. (citing Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682

n.1).

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F.2d 217, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1987)).8

There is no question that a causal relationship exists

between the litigation brought and the practical outcome

regarding reconsideration of the non-economic exclusions. In

fact, the sole reason that defendants reconsidered any of their

exclusions, economic or non-economic, was because plaintiffs

achieved some requested relief via the remand order. However,

defendants argue that their reconsideration of the non-economic

exclusions was purely a “gratuitous” act, thus defeating

application of the “Catalyst Theory.” Id.; see also Krocka v.

City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 518 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Where a

plaintiff has obtained benefits to which we now know he was never

entitled, the granting of that relief does not provide grounds

for awarding attorney’s fees. [Plaintiff] did not prevail at

trial, and [defendant]’s decision to gratuitously grant him the

relief he requested does not change that fact.”). 

Plaintiffs argue that defendants did not engage in a

gratuitous act, but instead reconsidered the non-economic

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benefits under the mistaken impression that the court order

mandated such action in the November 1, 2006 Order. Even if this

argument is accepted, plaintiffs nonetheless cannot show that

“the benefit achieved was required by law.” Evans, 386 F.3d at

866. Rather, this case was litigated to a final judgment in

which the court upheld the non-economic exclusions in all

respects. Therefore, any decision to review the legally-valid

non-economic exclusions, mistaken or not, was clearly not

required by law and cannot provide a basis for any fee award. 

In finding that plaintiffs only succeeded with respect

to their economic exclusions claim, the court must limit their

recovery to this success unless they are able to demonstrate that

they nonetheless acheived “excellent results.” See Schwarz, 73

F.3d at 901 (full compensation for unsuccessful claims is

warranted where the plaintiff obtains “excellent results”). To

support a contention of “excellent results” meriting recovery of

their entire award, plaintiffs assert that “remanding the

exclusions to ensure [defendants] address[] recovery was the

fundamental purpose of bringing the lawsuit.” (Pls. Mem. in

Supp. of Am. Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees 1:11-14) (emphasis added.) In

addition to the remand order, however, a review of the record

demonstrates that plaintiffs’ pursuit of an order vacating the

critical habitat designation’s economic and non-economic

exclusions in their entirety was also a fundamental purpose of

the lawsuit. (See Pls. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Am. J.

4:20-24 (“[T]he remedy which best ensures protection of the

fifteen threatened and endangered vernal pool species and their

habitat . . . is vacating the critical habitat exclusions so that

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such areas, as defined in the original proposed rule . . . are

treated as proposed critical habitat during the remand

period.”).) Significantly, when plaintiffs received the November

1, 2006 Order granting them relief based solely on defendants’

inadequate consideration of recovery benefits, they promptly

moved for reconsideration, clarification, or amendment of the

judgment in hopes of receiving the order to vacate that they

originally sought. (Pls. Mot. for Am. J.) 

In light of degree of their actual success, plaintiffs’

cannot be said to have attained “excellent results” meriting full

compensation. Plaintiffs sought an order that would additionally

vacate defendants’ economic and non-economic exclusions and find

that defendants’ overall administration of critical habitat

designation in this matter was unlawful. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-51.) In

these respects, plaintiffs’ claims failed. The lawsuit was

unable to redress many of plaintiffs’ alleged injuries because

the exclusions were not vacated and the critical habitat

designation was unaltered following defendants’ reconsideration

and the court’s subsequent final judgment. As noted above,

plaintiffs indeed achieved a level of legal success sufficient to

render them the prevailing party under the plaintiff-friendly

Ruckelshaus standard, supra section II.A., but not a level that

can be deemed “excellent.”

Still, the court recognizes that plaintiffs’ efforts

ensured, at the very least, proper application of the ESA for the

benefit of the fifteen vernal pool species. While plaintiffs

were unable to garner relief with respect to the non-economic

exclusions, this alone cannot negate the significance associated

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9 The litigation was predominantly focused on the topic

of the exclusions, and arguments with respect to plaintiffs’

third and fourth claims--detailing defendants’ failure to provide

public notice and opportunity for comment, and defendants’

purported unlawful pattern and practice of violating ESA duties,

respectively--were either embedded in the exclusion discussion or

limited to the occasional mention in plaintiffs’ moving papers. 

(See, e.g., Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11:7-9

(“This truncated opportunity for public comment closed on July

20, 2005, only eleven days before the court mandated

deadline for the final rule”).)

10 Defendants further request that the court refuse to

award any of plaintiffs’ fees related to their motion for

reconsideration. While plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration

was substantively unsuccessful, it nonetheless highlighted an

erroneous inclusion in the November 1, 2006 Order and prompted

important clarifications related to all of the claims litigated. 

(Jan. 24, 2007 Order 8-9.) Thus, plaintiffs will recover their

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with a summary judgment order mandating review of defendants’

economic exclusions. Because the vast majority of this

litigation revolved around the economic and non-economic

exclusions,9

 plaintiffs’ considerable success with respect to the

economic exclusions warrants an appropriate award of attorneys’

fees.

Moreover, collateral benefits achieved through the

litigation include that defendants, during any of their future

critical habitat designations, may be more motivated to properly

address the recovery benefits as articulated by the Ninth Circuit

in Gifford Pinchot. See Fed’n of Fly Fishers v. Daley, 200

F.Supp.2d 1181, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the

litigation substantially contributed to the goals of the ESA

because it delineated a proper administrative interpretation of

the statute). Therefore, despite “succeeding” on only one of

four claims, the court will reduce plaintiffs’ base fee award by

50% to reflect their overall degree of success in the case.10

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attorneys’ fees related to their motion for reconsideration, but

they will also be reduced by 50%.

11 Though listed under “Costs,” large portions of

plaintiffs’ requested fees in this subsection--including travel

expenses and postage--are better included within attorneys’ fees

because they are common expenses usually billed to paying

clients. Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 163 F.R.D. 308,

327 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (awarding travel expenses under the ESA’s

attorneys’ fees provision because “it is quite common for clients

to reimburse their attorneys for the time that they spend

traveling to and from court appearances . . . and to reimburse

their attorneys for the costs associated with this travel”); see

also Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Res., 512 F.

Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Haw. 1981) (“In addition, [under the ESA]

plaintiffs are awarded, as part of reasonable attorneys’ fees, $621.50 as reimbursement for travel costs from San Francisco to

Honolulu for oral argument”) (emphasis added). Therefore,

plaintiffs’ requests with respect to this subsection do not

necessarily implicate the “Taxation of Costs” statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920, which only permits recovery of litigation costs in six

narrow categories. See Gopher Oil Co., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of

Cal., 757 F. Supp. 998, 1013 (D. Minn. 1991) (awarding fees

associated with attorney travel, telephone, postage, local

delivery, and office expenses because the narrow constraints of §

1920 were inapplicable where separate relief is available under

environmental fee-shifting statutes).

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C. Costs11

Plaintiffs seek the recovery of $4,257.70 as reasonable

costs, which are noted in their respective declarations. (Levine

Decl. ¶15; Segee Decl. ¶ 11.) The court notes that the

overwhelming majority of costs relate to traveling to Sacramento

for hearings. Because all scheduled hearings in the case related

to plaintiffs’ affirmative case against defendants and would have

been incurred regardless of whether the hearing concurrently

addressed the merits of the Home Builders case, the court will

not reduce the amount of costs per defendants’ argument. 

Like their attorneys’ fees, however, the court will

reduce plaintiffs’ overall recovery of costs by 50% to reflect

their limited success. See Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886,

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899 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the district court may reduce

costs to reflect limited success on the merits”), rev’d on other

grounds, 402 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Jankey v. Beach Hut, No.

05-3856, 2006 WL 4569361, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006) (“As

with the fee award, the Court deducts 60% [of claimed costs] to

account for the case’s limited success.”).

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, attorneys’

fees, litigation expenses, and costs are awarded in the following

amounts:

Case Development/Complaint

Mr. Levine:

6.3 hrs x $325/hr = $2,047.50 +

Mr. Segee:

23.7 hrs x $275/hr = $6,517.50 +

Summary Judgment/Merits Briefing

Mr. Levine:

131.5 hrs x $325/hr = $42,737.50 +

Mr. Segee:

168.5 hrs x $275/hr = $46,337.50 +

Post Judgment/Rule 59 Motion

Mr. Levine:

25.7 hrs x $325/hr = $8,352.50 +

Mr. Segee:

16.1 hrs x $275/hr = $4,427.50 +

Attorneys’ Fees/Cost Negotiation and Motion

Mr. Levine:

72.0 hrs x $325/hr = $23,400.00 +

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Mr. Segee:

8.0 hrs x $275/hr = $2,200.00 +

Costs

Mr. Levine:

= $1,493.23 +

Mr. Segee:

= $2,764.47 +

----------------

TOTAL: $140,277.70

Fifty Percent (50%) Degree of Success Reduction

($140,277.70) x .50

----------------

= FINAL TOTAL: $70,138.85

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for

attorneys’ fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, in

the amount of $70,138.85.

DATED: December 13, 2007

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