Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02169/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02169-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Counsel was appointed on July 9, 2003.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEODORE W. WILSON, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-2169 MCE KJM P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel1 with an action for violation of

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges violation of the Eighth Amendment and medical

malpractice, a state negligence claim. Defendant Segundino Obedoza’s March 14, 2005 motion

for summary judgment is before the court; defendant Obedoza is the only defendant remaining in

this action. The court heard oral argument with respect to defendant’s motion on April 27, 2005.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges as follows in his second amended complaint:

11. On October 3, 2001, Plaintiff went to see [defendant] Dr.

Obedoza for treatment for his eye which had been exposed to a

chemical contaminant. Plaintiff complained that his right eye was

burning, tearing, burning, and suffered from spasms.

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12. Dr. Obedoza asked if Plaintiff woke up with any eye problems,

stating that if the eye problems were a result of exposure to a 

chemical it would likely affect both eyes. Dr. Obedoza stated that

Plaintiff’s eye problems were most likely caused by an infection. 

Plaintiff requested that Dr. Obedoza rinse his eye out. Dr.

Obedoza refused, stating that Plaintiff’s condition was because of

an eye infection and he would prescribe medication for it.

13. A nurse attempted to rinse Plaintiff’s eye. When Dr. Obedoza

saw the nurse attempting to rinse Plaintiff’s eye, he demanded that

she stop. Plaintiff had to rinse out his own eye after leaving the

medical facility.

14. Plaintiff was later given eye drops. Plaintiff’s eyes continued

to burn even after the use of the drops.

15. Plaintiff was later treated by another doctor who determined

that he had a chemical burn on his cornea. Plaintiff’s treating

physician stated the medication prescribed by Dr. Obedoza for

Plaintiff’s eye was inadequate.

16. As a result of Defendant Obedoza’s failure to properly treat

Plaintiff’s eye, plaintiff has suffered a permanent eye injury.

Am. Compl. at 2:20-3:10. For purposes of defendant’s motion, defendant does not appear to

challenge any of these allegations.

Plaintiff asserts that defendant Obedoza’s actions violated plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and amounted to negligence

under California law. Id. at 3-4.

III. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment extends to

medical care of prison inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). In order to state

a section 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, a

prison inmate must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. The nature of a defendant's responses must be

such that the defendant purposefully ignores or fails to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible

medical need in order for “deliberate indifference” to be established. McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v.

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Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). Deliberate indifference may occur when prison

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or may be demonstrated by

the way in which prison officials provide medical care. Id. at 1059-60; cf. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682

F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). A showing of merely inadvertent or even negligent medical

care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Frost v.

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998). A difference of opinion about the proper course of

treatment is not deliberate indifference nor does a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials

over the necessity for or extent of medical treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See,

e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242

(9th Cir. 1989).

Defendant Obedoza claims he is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim because, he asserts, there is no genuine issue of material fact with

respect to whether Obedoza was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s exposure to a harmful

chemical. 

In evaluating defendant’s motion, the court assumes the facts in plaintiff’s

complaint are true and notes the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff was exposed to a chemical

called “break.” Def’t’s Mem. P. & A. In Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. (MSJ), Ex. F at 97-98. The

“Material Safety Data Sheet” or “MSDS” is a publication that, among other things, provides

information regarding how to treat exposure to harmful chemicals. Opp’n, Ex. G at 40-41. The

MSDS in this case indicates that the following course of action should be followed if someone is

exposed to “break”: 

Immediately and imperatively flush eyes with lots of running water

for at least 15 minutes, lifting the upper and lower eyelids to ensure

flushing of the entire surface. Prompt medical attention is

essential.

Id., Ex. C. Defendant does not dispute that the proper treatment for exposure to “break” is found

in the MSDS. Additionally, plaintiff submits an affidavit from Dr. John D. Hofbauer, in which

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 Defendant objects to Hofbauer’s affidavit because “Hofbauer was never disclosed by

plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).” Reply at 1-2. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: “A party that without

substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to

amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is

harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or

information not so disclosed.” Defendant has not provided sufficient information for the court to

sustain his Rule 26 objection. He provides no discussion of the parties’ efforts with regard to

Rule 26, and whether a Rule 26 conference ever was held. He also does not indicate whether he

sought information through discovery on the identity of plaintiff’s medical experts hired

following the court’s order of September 1, 2004, and if so whether such discovery requests were

unanswered. Defendant also objects to Hofbauer’s declaration based on Rule 56(e), as lacking

foundation, not “set[ting] forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,” and as making an

improper legal conclusion as to the deliberate indifference of defendant’s actions. Reply at 2. In

his declaration, Hofbauer sets forth detailed information on his medical experience, and describes

with specificity the information he reviewed prior to preparing his declaration. Hofbauer Decl.

¶¶ 3-4. His medical conclusions, thus, are based on a proper foundation. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Defendant

is correct, however, that Hofbauer does not have the expertise to render a legal opinion as to

deliberate indifference. Therefore, defendant’s objection is sustained as to paragraph 7 of

Hofbauer’s declaration, but otherwise overruled. 

6

Hofbauer indicates that the proper treatment for exposure to “break” is to copiously irrigate the

eye for thirty minutes and until the pH level reaches 7. Id., Ex. I (Hofbauer Decl.) at ¶ 5. 

Hofbauer also claims “the eyelids need to be everted and the fornices swept with a cotton tip

applicator.” Id.

2

Prior to arriving in the medical unit, plaintiff had rinsed his eye for at least fifteen

minutes. Id., Ex. F at 98-99. Plaintiff relayed this information to defendant. MSJ, Ex. I at 

¶ 6. Plaintiff also told defendant he had not had any problems with his eye on that particular day

before being exposed to “break.” Opp’n, Ex. F at 109. 

Defendant admits he did not consult the MSDS prior to treating plaintiff. Opp’n,

Ex. G at 40:4-6. He asserts he did not consult the MSDS because he believed plaintiff was

suffering from an eye infection and not a chemical burn. Id. at 40:20-41:6. Nothing in the record

suggests that plaintiff explained to defendant in any detail the manner in which he rinsed his eye,

that is, whether plaintiff rinsed under his eye lids. After defendant had seen plaintiff, defendant

stopped Nurse Ramos from further irrigating plaintiff’s eye after plaintiff complained to the

nurse of continuing pain. Id., Ex. F at 113-116. 

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Given this record, there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether

defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s right eye being exposed to a harmful

chemical. Plaintiff informed defendant that he started experiencing pain in his right eye only

after being exposed to “break.” But defendant failed to take account of plaintiff’s report in the

way he provided medical care, saying simply he did not believe plaintiff’s eye problems were

caused by chemical exposure. Although defendant proceeded to treat plaintiff, there is evidence

before the court from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant’s actions

constituted deliberate indifference. Defendant declined to consult the MSDS for break; the

MSDS does not say a person should not be treated for exposure to break if he feels a burning

sensation in only one and not both eyes. Defendant’s insisting that Nurse Ramos stop treating

plaintiff’s eye is unexplained. When plaintiff returned to the medical clinic the day after he

visited defendant, for a follow up visit with Dr. McElroy, defendant commented that plaintiff’s

eye looked better, when, according to plaintiff, it actually looked worse:

To put it in perspective, when Dr. Obedoza first examined my eye

the visable [sic] portion of my sclera was about 50% red, the

following day it was about 95% red and my eyelids were swollen. 

Opp’n, Ex. F at 168:6-25. The competing “spins” on defendant’s series of actions in response to

plaintiff’s chemical exposure are for the trier of fact to resolve. Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment with respect to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be denied. 

 IV. Medical Malpractice

With respect to plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim, defendant argues, among

other things, that the claim should be dismissed because the claim presents important issues of

state law as yet undecided by California courts. With regard to supplemental jurisdiction, the

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relevant federal statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly

provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which

the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of

the United States Constitution. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In other words, “[a] district court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a pendent

state law claim if there is a substantial federal claim so related to it that they form part of the

same case or controversy or arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.” United States ex

rel. Hill v. Teledyne, Inc., 103 F.3d 143 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether claims form part

of the same “case or controversy,” a court looks to the elements a party needs to prove to prevail

on the claims. Id. 

As indicated above, to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff must

prove defendant’s acts or omissions were sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs; a showing of deliberate indifference requires proof that defendant

purposefully ignored or failed to respond to plaintiff’s pain or possible medical need. Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106. Plaintiff also must prove that he suffered harm as a result of defendant’s

deliberate indifference. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th

Cir. 1985). Under the Eighth Amendment, medical malpractice is insufficient to demonstrate

deliberate indifference. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). To prove

his medical practice claim, plaintiff needs to establish (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and 

(4) damages. See, e.g., Galvez v. Frields, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1420 (2d Dist. 2001). With

regard to causation, plaintiff must prove within a reasonable medical probability based on

competent medical testimony that defendant’s negligent care caused his injury. Jones v. Ortho

Pharmaceutical Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 402-03 (2d Dist. 1985). While plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment and medical malpractice claims are not completely coextensive in terms of the proof

required, to the extent they are based on defendant’s actions in response to plaintiff’s request for

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medical care, they do arise from the same “nucleus of operative fact.” 

However, the federal law of jurisdiction also provides that district courts may

decline to exercise jurisdiction if, among other reasons, “the claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). In exercising its discretion under section 1367, a

court must first identify a “factual predicate” that corresponds to a statutory basis for declining

jurisdiction, and then determine “whether remanding the pendent state claims comports with the

underlying objective of ‘most sensibly accommodat[ing]’ the values of ‘economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity.’” Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court

(C.D. Cal.), 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

As defendant’s briefing makes clear, to prevail on his medical malpractice claim,

plaintiff also will need to fend off defendant’s argument, that the claim fails because plaintiff’s

sole remedy for his work-related injury is workers’ compensation. MSJ at 5-7; Reply at 5-8. The

resolution of this question will require examination of evidence related to whether the

Department of Corrections, as plaintiff’s employer with respect to his laundry job, or defendant

himself assumed a separate role other than as employer in the form of defendant’s treatment of

his injury. See Hendy v. Losse, 54 Cal.3d 723 (1991). Such evidence is likely to include

employment and workers’ compensation records, and other information unrelated to the facts

underlying plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Thus there is a factual predicate corresponding

to the novel state law basis for declining jurisdiction. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1557; 28

U.S.C. 1367(c)(1). 

Resolution of the medical malpractice claim also will require application of

California state law with respect to employment and workers’ compensation. Defendant claims

that the Hendy case makes clear that plaintiff’s sole remedy is workers’ compensation. See

Hendy, 54 Cal. 3d at 740-42. Plaintiff also cites to Hendy and engages in statutory construction

to argue that defendant had a separate statutory and professional duty, independent of his

employment relationship with the Department of Corrections, to provide plaintiff with medical

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care. Opp’n at 14-24; see also Cal. Labor Code §§ 3370, 3601, 3602. Hendy, which does appear

to be the case most closely analogous to this one, involves the medical malpractice claim of a

professional football player treated by a team physician; in resolving the case, the California

Supreme Court held that workers’ compensation provided the player’s sole remedy. Id. Based

on a review of Hendy, the other cases cited by both parties, as well as this court’s independent

research, it is apparent that California courts have not yet addressed, either directly or through

consideration of facts more closely analogous than those in Hendy, the precise question raised by

this case: whether an inmate, with more limited choices than a professional ball player, who is

injured while working at his prison job and then alleges injury at the hands of a doctor employed

by the Department of Corrections can maintain a malpractice action against the doctor or is

confined to seeking relief under the workers’ compensation laws. This part of plaintiff’s

complaint raises novel and complex issues of California law, as indicated by the parties’ briefing

on the question. While a modicum of judicial economy would be realized by this court retaining

pendent jurisdiction, the interests of fairness and comity weigh strongly in favor of allowing the

state courts the first opportunity to resolve plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim. This court thus

will recommend declining the exercise of jurisdiction over this claim, without prejudice to

plaintiff’s refiling it in state court. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s March 14, 2005 “Motion For Summary Judgment” be denied as

to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim; and

2. Plaintiff’s state medical malpractice claim be dismissed without prejudice to

refiling in state court. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 21, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

wils2169.57

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