Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03233/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03233-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The court notes that plaintiff alleges the Order of Service misconstrued his claims. 

Plaintiff clarifies what his intended claims are. The court’s misinterpretation of plaintiff’s claims

does not affect its ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely.

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GARY HALL, JR.,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

JAMES TILTON, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. C 07-3233 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff, a California prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The court ordered service of plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Per order filed on

October 16, 2008, the court found that, when liberally construed, plaintiff alleged that he was

improperly transferred and placed into Level III housing while classified as a Level II inmate

and when he attempted to dispute his housing, prison officials retaliated against him. The court

concluded that plaintiff stated cognizable claims of retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment,

as well as claims of a violation of due process and equal protection.1

Defendants move to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on

*E-FILED - 6/29/10*

Case 5:07-cv-03233-RMW Document 130 Filed 06/29/10 Page 1 of 7
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 On December 8, 2009, plaintiff filed his opposition to defendants’ motion. On

December 21, 2009, defendants filed their reply. On December 22, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion

to amend his opposition. On February 9, 2010, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend. 

On February 24, 2010, defendants filed a reply to the “amended opposition.” On March 2, 2010,

plaintiff filed his amended opposition. Plaintiff also filed a motion requesting the court to deny

defendants’ reply to his unfiled amended opposition. A review of defendants’ December 21 and

February 24 replies reveals no substantially different arguments. Thus, the court concludes that

acceptance of defendants’ February 24 reply would not prejudice plaintiff. The court takes note

of plaintiff’s objection and denies plaintiff’s motion to disregard defendants’ February 24 reply. 

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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the ground that the claims are time-barred. Plaintiff filed an opposition, and an amended

opposition. Defendants filed a reply to the original opposition and the amended opposition.2

 For

the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On October 4, 1994, plaintiff was classified as a Level II prisoner by the Classification

Staff Representative and ordered transferred from a Level III state prison to the Correctional

Training Facility (“CTF”), which was a Level II state prison. (Complaint at 1.) In 2000, several

sections of CTF were reclassified from a security level two to a security level three. (Id., Ex. B.) 

On November 2, 2001, plaintiff appeared before the CTF-North Facility Unit Classification

Committee for his annual hearing and was told he was still classified and housed at a Level II

facility. (Complaint at 2, Exs. E, I.) 

Beginning in May 2002, prison staff attempted to move plaintiff from CTF-North to CTF

Central because CTF-North Facility B Yard was being converted from Level II to Level III in

order to accommodate the growing number of Level III inmates, however, plaintiff refused to

move. (Complaint at 2, Ex. F.) In June 2002, prison staff again attempted to move plaintiff to

move to CTF-Central because the North B Yard was being converted and the staff needed to

move all the Level II inmates to a Level II housing unit. (Complaint at 2, Ex. H.) Again,

plaintiff refused.

On October 25, 2002, Associate Warden Cohen distributed a memorandum (“minimemo”) to inmates housed at CTF-North, outlining the security housing designations of CTFNorth Facility. (Complaint, Ex. M at 45.) In the mini-memo, Cohen states that in 2000, CTFNorth was re-designated as a Level III facility in all areas except the dorms, which remained a

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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Level II designation. (Id.) Cohen explains that for Level II inmates, “lifer inmates are to be

housed in the North Dorm. Lifer inmates currently housed in a Cell environment will be

required to move to North dorm or CTF Central Facility upon bed availability.” (Id.) 

On October 26, 2004, plaintiff appeared at a unit classification hearing in which he was

“put on notice” that he was housed in a Level III facility as a Level II inmate. In April 2005,

Jeanne Woodford, the Director of the California Department of Corrections allegedly visited

CTF-North Facility and was surprised to learn that Level I, II, and III prisoners were being

housed together. (Complaint at 10-11.) On April 17, 2005, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance

appeal challenging his “unlawful” retention at a Level III housing unit while he was a Level II

inmate for over four years. (Complaint, Ex. O.) Specifically, plaintiff argued that he was

unlawfully housed in a Level III facility with Level III inmates without a classification hearing

or CSR endorsement, and was subject to more restrictive atmosphere. (Complaint at A, Ex. O.) 

After exhausting his administrative appeal, plaintiff filed the underlying federal civil rights

action.

ANALYSIS

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is that

of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S. 261, 276 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, the

current version of the general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the twoyear period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1 and is the applicable statute in

§ 1983 actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). This version

became effective on January 1, 2003. Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.

2007). “[A]ny cause of action that was more than one-year old as of January 1, 2003 would be

barred under the previous one-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 1133.

Federal law determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations

begins to run in a § 1983 action. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law,

a claim generally accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action.” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92. 

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 On March 4, 2010, plaintiff moved to voluntarily withdraw his claim of retaliation. 

The court grants his motion. Accordingly, the court will not determine whether the retaliation

claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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The parties dispute when plaintiff’s housing claims arose.3

 Defendants argue that

plaintiff’s claims are untimely because the causes of action accrued in 2000, or at the very latest,

October 25, 2002, the date Cohen distributed his mini-memo. Plaintiff disputes this and

contends that at least through January 2003, he was assured that he was housed in a Level II

facility as a Level II inmate and it wasn’t until October 26, 2004, when he was “officially put on

notice that he was in fact housed at a Level III housing facility (CTF-III) as a Level II inmate.” 

(Am. Opp. at 11-12.) 

Unfortunately for plaintiff, his housing claims are time-barred because he did not submit

his federal complaint to prison officials for filing until June 14, 2007, more than three years after

his claims accrued, which occurred at the latest, on October 25, 2002. Plaintiff’s contention that

his claims accrued at the earliest on October 26, 2004 is unavailing. 

Accrual ultimately depends on the substantive basis of the claim. See, e.g., Lukovsky v.

San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008) (employment discrimination claim accrues

upon awareness of the actual injury, i.e. the adverse employment action, not when plaintiff

suspects a legal wrong, i.e. that the action was discriminatory); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486

F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying single publication rule to internet website posting of

the summary of plaintiff’s disciplinary action and holding that claim arose when the offensive

summary first appeared in printed California Bar Journal because that publication informed - or

should have informed - plaintiff that summary also appeared on website). Regardless of whether

plaintiff considered Cohen’s mini-memo to be an “official” notification that CTF-North had been

redesignated a Level III facility from a Level II facility in 2000, the mini-memo gave plaintiff

reason to be aware of his alleged injury. See TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92. 

To determine the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims, he must allege discrete acts that would

violate the Constitution that occurred within the limitations period. See RK Ventures, Inc. v.

City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). In RK Ventures, Inc., appellants filed a

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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civil rights action alleging that the appellees unlawfully commenced a nuisance abatement

proceeding against them. In assessing whether such claims were time-barred, the Ninth Circuit

directed that courts should look at when the operative decision occurred and should separate

from those decisions the inevitable consequences. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that the

action accrued when the city decided to institute proceedings and the police chief sent a letter to

appellants giving notice of the abatement of the nuisance. Id. “The continued prosecution of the

action within the limitations period was the inevitable consequence of the initiation of the

abatement proceedings.” Id. “The actual beginning of the abatement hearing . . . was simply the

effect of [the decision to institute formal abatement hearings] and was not a separately

unconstitutional act.” Id. Thus, the question, for purposes of determining the timeliness of

claims then, is when the operative decision is made rather than when it was carried out. See id.

at 1059; Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 7 (1981) (per curiam) (noting that the focus is on the

date of the alleged illegal act rather than the point at which the consequences of the act were

realized).

Here, a review of the record demonstrates that in 2000, CTF-North was redesignated

from Level II security facility to a Level III security facility. (Complaint, Ex. B.) On May 16,

2002, plaintiff was told that he was moving to a CTF-Central from CTF-North and plaintiff

refused to move. (Complaint, Ex. F.) Plaintiff stated that did not care about the Level III

inmates. As a result, plaintiff pleaded guilty to a rules violation report. (Id.) In that report, the

reporting employee stated, “Due to a mission change at CTF-North Facility ‘B’ Yard involving

the conversion from a Level II Yard to a Level III Yard, Level II lifers are being moved from

North Facility to Central Facility.” (Id.) On June 26, 2002, plaintiff was ordered to move to

CTF-Central. (Complaint, Ex. H.) Plaintiff stated he did not want to go. In the resulting Rules

Violation Report, the reporting employee stated, “Due to a mission change at CTF-North ‘B’

Yard involving the conversion from a Level II to a Level III yard, all inmates are being moved

from Whitney Hall cell living to a Level II housing unit to accommodate the arrival of Level III

inmates.” (Id.) Plaintiff again pleaded guilty and stated that he did not want to move to CTFCentral. (Id.)

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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In a mini-memo address to the inmates dated October 25, 2002, Associate Warden Cohen

detailed the conversion of CTF-North facility housing. (Complaint, Ex. M.) In the mini-memo,

Cohen expressed his recognition that “there is a great deal of confusion concerning inmatehousing designations at North Facility.” (Id.) “As you know in the year 2000, North facility was

re-designated a level III facility based on a projected increase of Level III inmates throughout

the prison system.” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) The mini-memo further stated that although the

conversion process has been slower than anticipated, prison staff were going to expend a

“renewed effort” to complete the conversion process. (Id.) Even giving plaintiff the benefit of

the doubt that the May and June 2002 attempts to move him were not reason enough to make

him aware of his alleged injury, when plaintiff learned of the contents of the mini-memo, he

became aware -- or should have been aware -- that he was a Level II inmate being housed in a

Level III facility. See, e.g., Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1050-51 (reinforcing in an employment

discrimination case that a cause of action accrues plaintiff when becomes aware of the adverse

decision and not when plaintiff recognizes the consequences of the action).

Thus, the court concludes that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, at the latest, on October

25, 2002, the date of the mini-memo. Plaintiff’s complaint then was due one-year later, on

October 25, 2003. However, plaintiff, who is serving a “term of less than for life,” is also

entitled to tolling. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the

disability of imprisonment delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. 

Id. A California prisoner serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole, such as plaintiff,

is imprisoned for a term of less than life and therefore is entitled to tolling under section 352.1(a)

and has three years to bring a § 1983 claim for damages. See Martinez v. Gomez, 137 F.3d

1124, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, plaintiff’s statute of limitations expired on October

25, 2005, more than one and a half years before plaintiff filed his federal complaint in this case. 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the case as untimely.

Alternatively, now that plaintiff has clarified his housing claims in his amended

opposition and related pleadings, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s second amended complaint

for failure to state a claim. Even if plaintiff’s claims were timely, it appears that they are not

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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cognizable. See Myron v. Landsberger, 476 F.3d 716, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff contends that he has been improperly housed at a Level III institution and

alleges various errors and failures to comply with regulations in the classification process. He

claims that his retention in a Level III facility as a Level II inmate violated his right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment. However, misclassification does not inflict pain so as to be

cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 719. Plaintiff also

asserts that the alleged wrongful housing resulted in due process violations. However, this also

does not state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249

(1983) (inmates have no due process liberty interest in prison transfers). Plaintiff has not

demonstrated how the conditions at a Level III facility significantly differ from a Level II

facility, or alleged that the classification will affect the duration of plaintiff’s sentence. See

Myron, 476 F.3d at 718. Thus plaintiff’s housing at a Level III facility does not present an

“atypical and significant hardship” such that it created a liberty interest. See id. Accordingly,

the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s second amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary withdrawal of his relation claim is GRANTED. (Docket

No. 125.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss as untimely is GRANTED. (Docket No. 96.) All

remaining motions are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: RONALD M. WHYTE

 United States District Judge

6/29/10

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