Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01673/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01673-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

---

1 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SANDY NISSOU-RABBAN, an 

individual, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A.; 

NORDSTROM, INC.; and EQUIFAX 

INFORMATION SERVICES LLC, 

 Defendants. 

Civil No. 15-cv-1673-JAH (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A.’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. # 27) 

INTRODUCTION 

 Presently before the Court is Defendant Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.’s (“Capital 

One”) Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 27). The motion has been fully briefed by the 

parties. For the reasons set forth below, Capital One’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

In this suit, Plaintiff Sandy Nissou-Rabban (“Plaintiff”) seeks redress under the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and California’s Consumer 

Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1785.1 et seq. for Capital 

One’s alleged inaccurate reporting of debt that was discharged in bankruptcy and failure to 

investigate after Plaintiff disputed information on her credit report. 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 12
2 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Factual History 

On November 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States 

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 22.) Capital One 

was included as a creditor in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 24–26. On February 

24, 2015, the bankruptcy court granted Plaintiff’s petition and discharged, in relevant part, 

her debt to Capital One. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27, 30. Capital One received notice of the discharge on 

approximately February 25, 2014. Id. ¶ 26. 

On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff received a copy of her credit report from Equifax 

Information Services LLC, a credit reporting agency (“CRA”). Id. ¶¶ 43, 71. The report 

indicated that Capital One reported to Equifax that amounts owed on two accounts Plaintiff 

held with Capital One had been “charged off.”1 Id. Specifically, with respect to Plaintiff’s 

Capital One account ending in 830*, the credit report stated: 

 Status – Charge Off 

 Charge Off Amount: $8,435 

 Additional Information – Charged Off Account 

Id. ¶ 43. As to Plaintiff’s second Capital One account ending in 490*, the report stated: 

 Status – Charge Off 

 Charge Off Amount: $332 

 Additional Information – Charged Off Account. 

Id. ¶ 71. 

In May, 2015, Plaintiff sent written notice to Equifax disputing the accuracy of the 

information reported about her Capital One accounts. Id. ¶¶ 55, 83. Plaintiff asserted in 

the letter that her credit report should not include any activity on those accounts that 

occurred on or after November 24, 2014, the day she filed her bankruptcy petition. Id. ¶¶ 

57, 85. Plaintiff also contended that her credit report should state that her Capital One 

accounts were current and had a $0 balance. Id. In response, Equifax notified Capital One 

 

1

 The term “charge off” indicates that the creditor has treated the account receivable as “bad 

debt” or “a loss or expense because payment is unlikely.” Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

No. C12–3895 TEH, 2012 WL 5497950, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012). 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 12
3 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Plaintiff disputed the accuracy of the reported status of her accounts. Id. ¶¶ 58, 60, 

86, 88. 

Plaintiff alleges that Capital One failed to reasonably investigate the disputed 

account information and review all relevant information as required by statute. Id. ¶¶ 62–

64, 90–92. Therefore, Capital One continued to report that her accounts had been “charged 

off,” instead of correcting the report to state that her accounts were current. Id. ¶¶ 61, 89. 

As a result, Plaintiff initiated the instant action alleging, in pertinent part, that Capital One 

had illegally and inaccurately reported derogatory collection information on Plaintiff’s 

credit report after she filed her bankruptcy petition on November 24, 2014, and had failed 

to reasonably investigate and fix the disputed information. Id. at ¶ 31, 44, 72. 

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against defendants Capital One, Nordstrom, Inc., and 

Equifax Information Services LLC (collectively “Defendants”) on July 28, 2015. (See Doc. 

# 1). On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

alleging that Defendants violated the FCRA and CCRAA. (See Doc. # 19). 

On November 20, 2015, Capital One filed its Motion to Dismiss First Amended 

Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Doc. # 

27). In December, 2015, upon the parties’ joint motions, Plaintiff’s claims against 

defendants Nordstrom, Inc. and Equifax Information Services LLC were dismissed with 

prejudice. (See Docs. # 35, 36). On January 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief to 

Capital One’s motion to dismiss. (See Doc. # 37). Capital One filed a reply brief on January 

15, 2016. (See Doc. # 38). On January 19, 2016, this Court took Capital One’s motion 

under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. (See Doc. # 39). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) 

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable legal theory. Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). Under 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 12
4 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is required to set forth a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and 

“give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible 

when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In other words, 

“the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must 

be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the reviewing court must 

assume the truth of all factual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the 

form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). “Nor 

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider facts alleged in the 

complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached 

to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court takes 

judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court 

determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 12
5 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts. Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). 

DISCUSSION 

A. FCRA Claims 

Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, 

promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. 

of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). To ensure that credit reports are accurate, the 

FCRA imposes certain duties on furnishers that provide credit information to CRAs. 

Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009). Section 

1681s–2(a) of the FCRA bars furnishers from reporting information they know or have 

reason to believe is inaccurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(1)(A). There is no private right of 

action to enforce § 1681s–2(a). Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 

1059–60 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, there is a private right of action to enforce § 1681s–2(b), which is the 

statute that Plaintiff alleges Capital One violated. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. Section 

1681s–2(b) requires furnishers who receive notice that a consumer disputes information on 

a credit report to: (1) conduct an investigation, (2) review all relevant information provided 

by the CRA, (3) report the results of the investigation to the CRA, (4) report those results 

to all other CRAs to which the person furnished information if the disputed information is 

found to be incomplete or inaccurate, and (5) modify, delete, or permanently block 

reporting of that item when reporting to a CRA if the disputed information is found to be 

inaccurate, incomplete, or unverifiable after reinvestigation. Id. § 1681s–2(b). “These 

duties arise only after the furnisher receives notice of dispute from a CRA; notice of a 

dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger furnishers’ duties under 

subsection (b).” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. Further, “[a] furnisher does not report 

‘incomplete or inaccurate’ information within the meaning of § 1681s–2(b) simply by 

failing to report a meritless dispute . . . . It is the failure to report a bona fide dispute, a 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 12
6 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dispute that could materially alter how the reported debt is understood, that gives rise to a 

furnisher’s liability under § 1681s–2(b).” Id. at 1163. 

Capital One moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FCRA claims, arguing that Plaintiff failed to 

allege both that the Capital One account information on her credit report was inaccurate 

and that Capital One did not adequately investigate the disputed information. These 

arguments are discussed in turn. 

1. Plaintiff Failed to Allege Essential Dates to Support Her FCRA Claims 

First, Capital One argues that Plaintiff’s only private right of action under the FCRA 

is for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b). (Doc. # 27-1, pg. 9). Capital One next asserts 

that, in order to state a viable claim under § 1681s–2(b), Plaintiff must allege facts showing 

that Capital One reported inaccurate information. Id. at 10. Capital One argues that 

Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to meet this showing because it is not inaccurate or 

incomplete to report account delinquencies while an account holder’s bankruptcy 

proceedings are ongoing. Id. at 11–13. 

In response, Plaintiff reiterates the allegations set forth in her FAC and argues that 

these allegations sufficiently establish her FCRA claims. (See Doc. # 37, pg. 2). Plaintiff 

appears to argue that she sufficiently alleged that the reported account information was 

inaccurate by contending that Capital One reported the information after she filed her 

bankruptcy petition. Id. Plaintiff asserts that alleging that a creditor reported an account 

as charged off after the account holder filed for bankruptcy is sufficient to plead that the 

creditor reported inaccurate information. Id. at 3–4 (citing Montgomery v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, No. C12–3895 TEH, 2012 WL 5497950 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012)). 

In reply, Capital One argues that Plaintiff still fails to allege that the reported 

information is inaccurate. (Doc. # 38, pg. 3). Again, Capital One contends that it is 

permissible—and not inaccurate—for a furnisher to report factually true information about 

the status of a delinquent account during the pendency of a bankruptcy action involving 

that account. Id. at 3–4 (citing Mortimer v. JP Morgan Chase, Nat’l Assoc., No. C 12–1936 

CW, 2012 WL 3155563 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012)). Next, Capital One contends that 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 12
7 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Montgomery is inapposite because it involved a creditor that reported a charged off account 

after discharge, whereas the instant case involves reporting after the filing of a bankruptcy 

petition. (Doc. # 38, pg. 5). Further, Capital One asserts that Plaintiff has offered no 

authority stating that the date a person files a bankruptcy petition is the last date that a 

creditor can report negative information regarding that person’s account. Id. at 4–5. 

Here, Plaintiff did not adequately plead facts, especially dates, to sufficiently allege 

her FCRA claims against Capital One. As Capital One notes, Plaintiff must assert that the 

reported information was incomplete or inaccurate to adequately allege her FCRA claim. 

Mortimer, 2012 WL 3155563, at *3 (holding that a § 1681s–2(b) FCRA claim was 

insufficiently alleged where the plaintiff did not assert that the reported information was 

incomplete or inaccurate and dismissing claim); Iyigun v. Calvary Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 

CV–12–8682–MWF (JEMx), 2013 WL 950947, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (holding 

that the plaintiff’s FCRA claims failed where the plaintiff did not plead in the complaint 

that the reported information was inaccurate). Because Plaintiff argues the reported 

information was inaccurate based on when it was reported, Plaintiff must allege sufficient 

facts, including dates, demonstrating that the reported information was, in fact, inaccurate. 

Harrold v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. C 12–2987 WHA, 2012 WL 4097708, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (dismissing FCRA claims as insufficiently alleged where the 

plaintiff’s complaint failed to provide specific dates, including when the furnisher reported 

the delinquency and when the payments were missed). Pleading specific dates in the FAC 

is especially crucial to sufficiently assert these claims because a furnisher that reports 

payment delinquencies during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings does not report 

incomplete or inaccurate information. Harrold, 2012 WL 4097708, at *4 (internal citation 

omitted) (stating that “reports of delinquencies in payment while bankruptcy proceeding 

are still ongoing is not ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ information”); accord Mortimer, 2012 

WL 3155563, at *3. 

Plaintiff did not plead in her FAC the essential dates necessary to sufficiently allege 

her FCRA claims against Capital One. For example, Plaintiff never provided the date that 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 12
8 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Capital One allegedly reported that Plaintiff’s accounts had been charged off, never alleged 

whether this reporting occurred during the pendency of her bankruptcy proceedings or after 

the date of discharge, and did not explain to which billing period the charged off balance 

corresponds. Instead, Plaintiff offered only vague allegations that Capital One “reported 

derogatory information . . . after November 24, 2014,” the date Plaintiff filed her 

bankruptcy petition. (Doc. # 19 ¶¶ 44, 72). However, these allegations are insufficient to 

demonstrate that the reported information was inaccurate. Mortimer, 2012 WL 3155563, 

at *3; Harrold, 2012 WL 4097708, at *4. By omitting these essential dates and relying 

upon vague and conclusory allegations, Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to 

demonstrate that the reported information was inaccurate, which is fatal to her FCRA 

claims. 

Capital One’s argument that Plaintiff failed to allege that the reported information 

was inaccurate or incomplete implies that Capital One reported that Plaintiff’s accounts 

were charged off during the pendency of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings. Because that 

information is not alleged in the FAC or substantiated elsewhere in the parties’ pleadings, 

the Court declines to infer when Capital One allegedly reported the disputed information. 

Reasonable inferences from the allegations of the FAC should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party—not in Defendant’s favor. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). In any event, such 

an inference would be based on conjecture and therefore unreasonable. However, Capital 

One’s argument is well-taken because, to the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations are based on 

a report made while Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing, Plaintiff failed to 

sufficiently allege that Capital One reported incomplete or inaccurate information. 

Additionally, the Court finds unpersuasive the three cases cited by Plaintiff in 

support of her assertion that she sufficiently pled that the reported information was 

inaccurate. In Montgomery, the plaintiff alleged that a furnisher reported to a CRA that 

the plaintiff’s debt “was charged off after the debt was discharged in bankruptcy.” 

Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C12–3895 TEH, 2012 WL 5497950, at *4 (N.D. 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 12
9 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cal. Nov. 13, 2012). Here, Plaintiff makes no such allegation as to whether the debt was 

reported charged off before or after discharge. Instead, she alleges only that the debt was 

reported as charged off after the date she filed her bankruptcy petition. However, as 

explained herein, it is the bankruptcy discharge date, as opposed to the date a bankruptcy 

petition is filed, that is the crucial date. Further, the two additional cases to which Plaintiff 

cites are factually distinguishable and irrelevant. See Groff v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 

Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 537, 541–42 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (holding that the defendant-bank 

did not violate the FCRA by failing to report to a CRA that the plaintiff was making 

mortgage payments after discharged from bankruptcy); accord Horsch v. Wells Fargo Home 

Mortg., 94 F.Supp.3d 665, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 

2. Plaintiff Failed to Sufficiently Allege that Capital One Did Not Reasonably 

Investigate the Disputed Information

Capital One further alleges that Plaintiff’s FCRA claims should be dismissed because 

Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that Capital One did not reasonably 

investigate the disputed information. Id. at 14. Instead, Capital One contends that Plaintiff 

offered only conclusory assertions, so Plaintiff’s FCRA claims should be dismissed. Id. at 

16. In opposition, Plaintiff again summarizes the allegations set forth in her FAC and 

contends that these allegations sufficiently established her FCRA claims. (See Doc. # 37, 

pg. 2). 

In the FAC, Plaintiff admits that she received notice that her account was 

reinvestigated after she sent her written notice of dispute to Equifax. (See Doc. # 19, ¶¶ 

60, 88). However, Plaintiff appears to argue that Capital One’s reinvestigation was 

unreasonable because had Capital One adequately investigated, it would have removed the 

disputed account “charge off” notifications from her credit report. Id. ¶¶ 62–66, 90–94. In 

support of her claims, Plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations that Capital One “failed 

to conduct a reasonable investigation with respect to the disputed information” and “failed 

to review all relevant information provided by Plaintiff in the dispute. . . .” (See Doc. # 19, 

¶¶ 62, 63, 90, 91). 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 12
10 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FCRA for 

failure to reasonably investigate. Plaintiff admitted that her dispute was investigated and 

offered no factual allegations demonstrating how Capital One failed to conduct a reasonable 

investigation or review all relevant information. “Plaintiff cannot attempt to impose a 

further requirement of ‘validation’ in section 1681s–2(b), above and beyond that of 

‘reasonable investigation,’ where none exists.” Berberyan v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. CV 

12–4417–CAS (PLAx), 2013 WL 1136525, at *5 (C.D. Mar. 18, 2013) (dismissing FCRA 

claim that the furnisher failed to reasonably investigate where the plaintiff “fail[ed] to offer 

any factual allegations supporting her contention that defendant’s investigation of her 

disputed account was unreasonable”); see also Mestayer v. Experian Information Solutions, 

Inc., Case Nos. 15–cv–3645–EMC; 15–cv–3650–EMC, 2016 WL 631980, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 17, 2016) (dismissing FCRA claim that the furnisher failed to reasonably investigate 

the disputed account information where the plaintiff alleged the furnisher had failed to 

review relevant information rendering its investigation unreasonable but offered no factual 

allegations in support thereof). “Plaintiff must allege at least some facts that could support 

a plausible claim that defendant acted unreasonably in carrying out its investigation.” 

Berberyan, 2013 WL 1136525, at *5. Because Plaintiff failed to do so, these claims must 

be dismissed as well. 

In sum, because Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that Capital One reported 

inaccurate or incomplete information and did not allege facts to substantiate her contention 

that Capital One failed to reasonably investigate the disputed account information, Plaintiff 

failed to state a claim for relief under the FCRA, and Plaintiff’s FCRA claims are dismissed. 

B. CCRAA Claims 

The FCRA preempts state law claims “relating to the responsibilities of persons who 

furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)(ii); see 

also Mestayer, 2016 WL 631980, at *4. However, this preemption does not apply to 

California Civil Code § 1785.25(a), thus a plaintiff may assert a CCRAA claim against a 

furnisher under that section. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)(ii). Section 1785.25(a) prohibits 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 12
11 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a person from “furnish[ing] information on a specific transaction or experience to any 

consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is 

incomplete or inaccurate.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.25(a). 

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that Capital One violated the CCRAA by: (1) furnishing 

information to a CRA when Capital One knew or should have known the reported 

information was incomplete or inaccurate in violation of Cal. Civ. Code 1785.25(a), and 

(2) failing to adjust Plaintiff’s account information after receiving notice that Plaintiff 

disputed the information. (Doc. # 19, ¶¶ 54, 82, 118). Although Plaintiff does not specify, 

Plaintiff’s second claim appears to allege a violation of California Civil Code § 1785.25(b).2 

Capital One argues that Plaintiff’s CCRAA claims should be dismissed because they are 

either insufficiently alleged or preempted by the FCRA. In opposition, Plaintiff reiterates 

the allegations set forth in her FAC and contends that these allegations sufficiently state 

her claims. (Doc. # 37, pg. 2). Plaintiff makes no argument specific to her CCRAA claims 

and offers no authority in support of her CCRAA claims. 

Here, too, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim under the CCRAA. To the 

extent that Plaintiff asserts CCRAA claims against Capital One based on Capital One’s 

alleged failure to “adjust Plaintiff’s accounts” after receiving notice that Plaintiff disputed 

the reported account information, Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the FCRA and 

dismissed with prejudice. See Harrold v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. C 12–2987 

WHA, 2012 WL 4097708, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (dismissing with prejudice 

 

2 Section 1785.25(b) of the California Civil Code states: 

A person who (1) in the ordinary course of business regularly and 

on a routine basis furnishes information to one or more 

consumer credit reporting agencies about the person’s own 

transactions or experiences with one or more consumers and (2) 

determines that information on a specific transaction or 

experience so provided to a consumer credit reporting agency is 

not complete or accurate, shall promptly notify the consumer 

credit reporting agency of that determination and provide to the 

consumer credit reporting agency any corrections to that 

information, or any additional information, that is necessary to 

make the information provided by the person to the consumer 

credit reporting agency complete and accurate.

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 12
12 15cv1673 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

section 1785.25(b) claim as preempted by the FCRA). Plaintiff also failed to sufficiently 

allege a claim under § 1785.25(a) of the CCRAA. “Because the CCRAA’s requirements of 

completeness and accuracy mirror those found in the FCRA, judicial interpretations of the 

federal provisions are ‘persuasive authority and entitled to substantial weight when 

interpreting the California provisions.’” Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C12–3895 

TEH, 2012 WL 5497950, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012). As explained above, Plaintiff 

failed to allege sufficient facts and dates showing that Capital One reported inaccurate 

information. The Court adopts the same reasoning with regards to Plaintiff’s CCRAA claims 

and dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1785.25(a) claims with leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Capital One’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s CCRAA claims based on the premise that 

Capital One failed to adjust Plaintiff’s accounts after Plaintiff disputed the accuracy of the 

reported information are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Otherwise, Plaintiff’s claims 

are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND within 30 days of the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 21, 2016 

______________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

Case 3:15-cv-01673-JAH-RBB Document 52 Filed 09/21/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 12