Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00083/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00083-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANICE PIGOTT, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0083-WS-C

 )

SANIBEL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion to Disqualify Defendant’s

Counsel Samuel G. McKerrall (doc. 39). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for

disposition.

Plaintiffs’ position is that defendant Sanibel Development, LLC’s counsel of record,

Samuel G. McKerrall, must be disqualified from representing Sanibel in these proceedings

because he “has presented himself as a fact witness in this cause by filing an affidavit” in earlier

motion practice. (Motion to Disqualify, ¶ 2.) According to plaintiffs, McKerrall’s affidavit

includes “factual assertions ... which go to the heart of the issues presented,” such that he “is

subject to deposition and to being called as a witness.” (Id., ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs further maintain that

disqualification is necessary because McKerrall has written letters to nonparties that reflect an

“intimate knowledge” of Sanibel’s business operations. (Id., ¶ 4.) On these grounds, plaintiffs

contend that McKerrall must be disqualified under Rule 3.7 of the Alabama Rules of

Professional Conduct.

The law is clear that a civil litigant “is presumptively entitled to the counsel of his choice,

[and] that right may be overridden only if compelling reasons exist.” In re BellSouth Corp., 334

F.3d 941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Macheca Transport Co. v. Philadelphia Indem. Co., 463

F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A party’s right to select its own counsel is an important public

right and a vital freedom that should be preserved; the extreme measure of disqualifying a

party’s counsel of choice should be imposed only when absolutely necessary.”) (citations

omitted). “The party moving to disqualify counsel bears the burden of proving the grounds for

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1 The text of this rule is identical to that set forth in Rule 3.7 of the American Bar

Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally Roberts v. Hutchins, 572

So.2d 1231, 1234 n.3 (Ala. 1990) (recognizing that “[t]he new Alabama Rules of Professional

Conduct were adopted from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar

Association”). Many other states have likewise adopted the ABA’s Model Rules, so other

jurisdictions’ interpretations of their states’ version of Rule 3.7 are instructive in construing

Alabama’s Rule 3.7.

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disqualification.” BellSouth, 334 F.3d at 961. Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the potential for abuse

by opposing counsel, disqualification motions should be subjected to particularly strict scrutiny.” 

Macheca, 463 F.3d at 833 (citation omitted); see also Herrmann v. GutterGuard, Inc., 2006 WL

2591878, *6 (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2006) (observing that disqualification orders are harsh sanctions

that should be resorted to sparingly and that disqualification motion brought by opposing counsel

should be viewed with caution because of potential misuse as a technique of harassment); In re

Employment Discrimination Litigation Against Alabama, 453 F. Supp.2d 1323, 1332 (M.D. Ala.

2001) (“because a motion for disqualification is such a potent weapon and can be misused as a

technique of harassment, the court must exercise extreme caution in considering it to be sure it is

not being used to harass the attorney sought to be disqualified”) (citation omitted).

“[R]ules of professional conduct generally disapprove of lawyers testifying at

proceedings in which they are also advocates.” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1246 (11th Cir.

2001). Like every other attorney who appears in this District Court, McKerrall is bound by

Local Rule 83.5(f), which provides in pertinent part that all attorneys appearing here shall read

and abide by “the ethical limitations and requirements governing the behavior of members of the

Alabama State Bar.” Id. As such, there is no question that McKerrall is duty-bound in this case

to comply with Rule 3.7(a) of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as

follows: “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a

necessary witness, except where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the

testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3)

disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.” Id. (emphasis

added).1

 The critical question is whether McKerrall is “likely to be a necessary witness” within

the meaning of Rule 3.7.

In construing Rule 3.7, Alabama appellate courts have explained that “[a] necessary

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witness is one who has crucial information in his possession which must be divulged.” Bradford

v. State, 734 So.2d 364, 369 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999). “The necessity standard requires more than

mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify.” Id. In fact, numerous courts in other

jurisdictions examining the same or substantially similar ethical prohibitions on counsel acting

as both witness and advocate have held that disqualification is warranted only if there is no other

evidence available to prove facts as to which the attorney has personal knowledge. See, e.g.,

Macheca, 463 F.3d at 833 (interpreting Missouri’s version of Rule 3.7 to mean that “an attorney

is a necessary witness only if there are things to which he will be the only one available to

testify”); Mettler v. Mettler, 928 A.2d 631, 633 (Conn.Super. 2007) (under Rule 3.7, “[a]

necessary witness is not just someone with relevant information, however, but someone who has

material information that no one else can provide”); Knowledge A-Z, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 857

N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ind.App. 2006) (“If the evidence that would be offered by having an opposing

attorney testify can be elicited through other means, then the attorney is not a necessary

witness.”) (citation omitted); Clough v. Richelo, 616 S.E.2d 888, 891-92 (Ga.App. 2005)

(interpreting analogous Georgia rules as requiring party seeking disqualification under Rule 3.7

to demonstrate “that the lawyer’s testimony is relevant to disputed, material questions of fact and

that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts”); Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., 158

S.W.3d 147, 153 (Ark. 2004) (adopting standard that disqualification is warranted under Rule

3.7 only if evidence of which attorney has personal knowledge “is unobtainable elsewhere”);

State v. Van Dyck, 827 A.2d 192, 194 (N.H. 2003) (“A lawyer is a necessary witness if his or her

testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere.”) (citation omitted); World Youth

Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists Merchandising Exchange, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (D. Colo. 

1994) (same).

The Court concurs with these authorities and construes the “necessary witness” standard

of Rule 3.7 of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct as requiring the party seeking

disqualification to establish that relevant, material evidence could not be obtained other than by

calling the attorney as a witness. In addition to being a common-sense reading of the rule that

comports with myriad case authorities construing identical language in other jurisdictions, such a

narrow construction of this rule promotes the objectives of mandating disqualification only in the

presence of compelling circumstances, safeguarding a civil litigant’s right to counsel of its

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choice, and preventing manipulation of the ethical rules by adverse litigants to secure tactical

advantages.

Sanibel has unequivocally stated that it does not intend to call McKerrall as a witness at

trial for any purpose (doc. 43, at 5). It will be bound by this representation. Thus, the

disqualification motion hinges on plaintiffs’ desire to call McKerrall as a witness. But plaintiffs’

filings neither explicitly argue nor implicitly suggest that McKerrall possesses personal

knowledge of material information that no one else can provide. To be sure, plaintiffs make

much of the Affidavit of Samuel McKerrall filed in this action on April 3, 2007. (Doc. 18, at

Exh. A.) But this short, perfunctory Affidavit is confined to the following facts: (a) McKerrall is

Sanibel’s acting general counsel; (b) the total number of units in the Sanibel development is 108;

(c) at least 9 of those units were sold under contracts obligating Sanibel to erect a condominium

building within a period of two years; and (d) at least 9 units were never made available to the

public but were instead sold to persons engaged in bona fide land sales businesses. (Id.) There

is absolutely no reason to believe that any of these facts lies within the exclusive purview of

McKerrall. Logic and common sense tell us that there are any number of other forms of

evidence that plaintiffs might use to establish the number of units in the development, as well as

the numbers of units sold under mandatory two-year contracts and the numbers of units sold to

persons engaged in bona fide land sales businesses. Thus, these facts should be readily

obtainable through other documents and witnesses, without the need to call McKerrall, whose

testimony on those points would simply be cumulative. Plaintiffs have made no showing to the

contrary. In short, then, the McKerrall Affidavit may have been ill-advised in inviting this kind

of Rule 3.7 challenge; however, nothing in its terms transforms McKerrall into a necessary

witness. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Knotts, 52 S.W.3d 555, 556 (Ky. 2001) (“The limited and

specialized use of an affidavit by an attorney, who does not testify at trial for his clients,

provides an insufficient justification to allow opposing counsel to deprive a party of its right to

counsel of its choice ... absent a showing that the information contained therein is unobtainable

from other sources.”).

Plaintiffs also point to two letters sent by McKerrall to nonparties that plaintiffs contend

are indicative of McKerrall’s “intimate knowledge of how Sanibel participated in the flipping of

condominiums.” (Doc. 39, ¶ 4.) Assuming that this information is relevant to a disputed issue in

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this case, plaintiffs have not shown that McKerrall’s testimony is crucial to an understanding of

how Sanibel’s alleged flipping scheme worked. Surely other witnesses have “personal

knowledge of Sanibel’s sales and marketing structure” (doc. 45, ¶ 6). In any event, plaintiffs

have failed to demonstrate that McKerrall’s testimony is necessary to these issues or that this

evidence is not obtainable through other avenues.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of this Court that plaintiffs have failed to

carry their burden of establishing that McKerrall is a necessary witness at the trial of this case, as

required in order for disqualification to be appropriate under Rule 3.7 of the Alabama Rules of

Professional Conduct. While McKerrall might prove to be a helpful or useful witness, there is

no reason to believe that he is a necessary witness. All appearances are that any relevant facts

within his personal knowledge are obtainable by plaintiffs through other witnesses and

documents. There being no grounds at this early stage of the litigation to support plaintiffs’

contention that their rights would be prejudiced if Sanibel were permitted to continue being

represented by the counsel of its choice in this action, the Joint Motion to Disqualify (doc. 39) is

denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of September, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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