Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01396/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01396-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN O’DONNELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

MICHAEL NEDD, Deputy Director of 

Operations of the Bureau of Land 

Management; WILLIAM PERRY 

PENDLEY, Deputy Director of Policy 

and Programs of the Bureau of Land 

Management; DAVID BERNHARDT, 

Secretary of the Interior; A. STEWART, 

Agent with the Bureau of Land 

Management; IMPERIAL COUNT OF 

CALIFORNIA; IMPERIAL COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; RAYMOND 

LOERA, Sheriff of Imperial County, 

California; AND DOES 1 TO 100 

INCLUSIVE,

 Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. No. 11]

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendant United States of America, et al.’s 

(collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff John O’Donnell’s (“Plaintiff”) 

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (“Bivens”), Federal 

Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claims. See generally Doc. 

No. 11. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ motion and Defendants filed a reply. See

Docs. No. 13, 15. Having carefully considered the pleadings in this action, and for the 

reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with 

leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that sometime in November 2016, unidentified Bureau of Land 

Management (“BLM”) officers arrived at Plaintiff’s truck camper. Doc. No. 5 at 5. The 

truck camper was Plaintiff’s temporary residence and was located on federal land outside

of Ocotillo Springs, California. Id. The BLM officers “falsely accus[ed] [Plaintiff] of 

various offenses, including drug use and littering.” Id. The BLM officers then conducted a

“dog search” and entered Plaintiff’sresidence. Id. During the search, Plaintiff alleges BLM 

officers detained him and did not allow him to enter his residence. Id. Plaintiff claims the 

BLM officers “stole bottles of his medication, cigarettes, and a plaque signed by celebrity 

skate border Tony Hawk.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges several days later, “BLM officers again arrived at [Plaintiff’s] 

campsite to harass him” and accuse him of littering. Id. Plaintiff then moved residences

because of the continued harassment. Id. at 6. Soon after, Plaintiff “learned that BLM 

officers had been asking several people in the town of Ocotillo about his whereabouts.” Id.

Then, “vehicles began to drive across [Plaintiff]’s property in the middle of the night and 

shined bright lights directly into his trailer.” Id. This continued until Plaintiff’s family hired 

private security for his residence. Id. Upon the departure of security, however, the 

harassment continued. Id. Plaintiff further contends BLM officers and Imperial County 

Sheriff’s (“ICS”) officers combined forces to harass and persecute him. Id.

On July 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging various 

causes of action. See Doc. No. 1. On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) alleging: (1) Bivens claim for violation of 5th amendment rights 

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

against Defendants; (2) Bivens claim for violation of 4th amendment rights against 

Defendants; (3) FTCA claim against Defendants Michael Nedd (“Nedd”), William Perry

Pendley (“Pendley”), David Bernhardt (“Bernhardt”), A. Stewart (“Stewart”) and the 

United States of America (“United States”); and (4) § 1983 claim against Defendants. Id.

On January 22, 2020, Defendant United States filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See generally Doc. No. 

11. On February 21, 2020, Defendants Imperial County, Imperial County Sheriff’s Office, 

and Sheriff Raymond Loera filed a notice of non-opposition to Defendant United States’

motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 13. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ 

motion and Defendants filed a reply. See Doc. Nos. 13, 15. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Under Rule 

12(b)(1), a defendant may seek to dismiss a complaint for “lack of jurisdiction over the 

subject matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the 

party asserting jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 

375, 377 (1994); see also Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 

Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, Rule 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal 

theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss 

a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible 

when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the non-conclusory 

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

‘factual content’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Determining whether a complaint states 

a plausible claim for relief will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court 

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be “facial” or 

“factual.” See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a 

facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are 

insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, whereas in a factual attack, the 

challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke 

federal jurisdiction. See Id. If the defendant brings a facial attack, a district court must 

assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and construe them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. See United States v. One 1997 Mercedes E420, 175 F.3d 

1129, 1130-31 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if, on its face, the 

complaint fails to allege grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction as required by Rule 

8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.

328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Morrison v. Amway Corp. 323 F.3d 920, 924 

n. 5 (11th Cir. 2003).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal 

conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, 

the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the 

complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is 

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not contested and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court determines that a complaint fails 

to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Doe v. United States, 58 

F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

A. Bivens Claims Against Defendant United States

Defendants argue that the United States enjoys immunity from suit unless immunity 

is expressly waived. Doc. No. 11 at 10. Defendants allege the court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction because the United States has made no such waiver for Plaintiff’s Bivens claims 

against the Untied States. Id. Plaintiff concedes the United States is not a proper Defendant. 

Doc. No. 14 at 3. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action against the United States. 

B. Bivens Claims Against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, and Bernhardt

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to properly state Bivens claims against 

Defendants Nedd, Pendley and Bernhardt. Doc. No. 11 at 11. Defendants state Plaintiff’s 

claims are improperly based on Defendants’ official capacity, or in the alternative, rely on 

a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 12. Further, Defendants allege that without specific 

claims regarding Defendants conduct in their individual capacity, the Court should dismiss 

the Bivens claims. Id. Plaintiff argues the Bivens claims have been brought against 

Defendants Nedd, Pendley and Bernhardt in their individual capacity. Doc. No. 14 at 6. 

Plaintiff acknowledges respondeat superior liability has not been recognized in Bivens

actions, but states “[Plaintiff] has no other way to obtain [the needed] discovery” to 

substantiate the claims. Id. This needed discovery includes: “(1) the number of officers that 

were involved in [Plaintiff’s alleged] harassment; (2) the names of the officers involved in 

[Plaintiff’s alleged] harassment; (3) reports relat[ed] to [Plaintiff’s alleged] harassment, or 

(4) video/audio files related to [Plaintiff’s alleged] harassment.” Id. Plaintiff then alleges,

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the BLM and the Department of the Interior are in possession of this evidence. Id. As such, 

Plaintiff has alleged Bivens claims against Defendants Nedd and Pendley because they are 

heads of the BLM. Id. Plaintiff also has alleged Bivens claims against Bernhardt because 

he is the Secretary of the Interior. Id.

In a Bivens action, the plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, through his own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676 (citing Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 

Bivens actions are “not designed to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates.” 

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2017). As such, “vicarious liability is inapplicable 

to Bivens” actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Further, “[g]overnment officials may not be held 

liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat 

superior.” Id. at 676. Rather, a plaintiff must “plead and prove that the defendant acted 

with discriminatory purpose.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). 

Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly pled Defendants Nedd, Pendley, or Bernhardt, 

through their own actions, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s SAC 

contains no allegations that Defendants Nedd, Pendley, or Bernhardt were involved or 

knew of Plaintiff’s alleged harassment. Additionally, as Plaintiff concedes, there is no 

precedent for respondeat superior liability in a Bivens action. Doc. No. 14 at 6. Instead, 

Plaintiff asserts the BLM and Department of the Interior hold evidence of Plaintiff’s 

harassment. As such, Plaintiff argues these entities’ respective heads are proper defendants. 

However, Plaintiff’s need for discovery does not allow him to circumvent stating a 

plausible claim. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678–79).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and 

second causes of action against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, and Bernhardt, with leave to 

amend.

///

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. FTCA Claim Against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, and Stewart

Next, Defendants argue the United States is the only proper defendant in Plaintiff’s 

FTCA claim. Doc. No. 11 at 13. Defendants state the FTCA allows for a “suit against the 

United States [as] the exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal agencies and federal 

employees....” Id.(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b)(1)). Plaintiff concedes the United States is 

the only proper defendant under the FTCA. Doc. No. 14 at 3. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action against 

Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, and Stewart. 

D. Section 1983 Claim Against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, 

and the United States

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s §1983 claim cannot be brought against

Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, or the United States because of their 

positions as federal government actors. See Doc. No. 11 at 14. Defendants contend that 

“[f]ederal officials can be liable under § 1983 only where there is a sufficiently close nexus 

between their challenged actions and State conduct.” Id. Defendants allege that “no such 

nexus exists here” and the Court should accordingly dismiss the federal government actors 

from the claim. Id. Plaintiff concedes that the § 1983 claim cannot stand against Defendants 

Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States. See Doc. No. 14 at 7. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause 

of action against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

19cv1396-JAH (MDD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

• Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action against Defendant United States

are DISMISSED with prejudice.

• Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action against Defendants Nedd, 

Pendley, and Bernhardt are DISMISSED with leave to amend.

• Plaintiff’s third cause of action against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, 

and Stewart is DISMISSED with prejudice.

• Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, 

Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

• Plaintiff may file an amended Complaint on or before December 10, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 10, 2020

 

_________________________________

John A. Houston

United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-01396-JAH-MDD Document 17 Filed 11/10/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8