Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00004/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00004-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARDELL COWART,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAHMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:16-CV-00004-AWI-SKO (PC)

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR 

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO 

PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO 

BE COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

Plaintiff, Gardell Cowart, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action 

on January 4, 2016.1 (Doc. 1.)2 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

 

1

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint, which was denied on February 9, 2016, as 

unnecessary under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) since he has not previously amended his complaint and 

defendants have not filed a responsive pleading. (See Doc.s 12, 13.) However, despite the lapse of more than two 

months, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, so his original complaint is before the Court for screening. 

2

All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015). 

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

(“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California -- where the majority of acts he complains of occurred. 

Plaintiff names prison staff from High Dessert State Prison (“HDSP”) (Dr. C. Abdur Rahman) 

and SATF (Warden Stu Sherman; CEO C. Cryer; CMO Ugwueze; Dr. Ngozi Igbinoza; Dr. 

Kandkhorova; Dr. Scharffenberg; Correctional Counselor II (“CCII”) T. May; and Associate 

Warden (“AW”) B. Odle), an outside neurological surgeon from San Luis Obispo, California (Dr. 

Donald Ramberg); and Sierra Vista Medical Center in San Luis Obispo, California. Plaintiff 

seeks monetary damages and “appropriate orders according to federal constitutional law, that 

provide justifiable relief which holds defendants responsible . . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 10 (emphasis in 

original).)

Plaintiff’s allegations are based on the care and treatment he received for his cervical 

spine -- including surgical intervention, a subsequent infection, and pain management.

As discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiff has stated one cognizable claim, but he may 

be able to amend to correct the deficiencies so as to make additional claims cognizable. Thus, he 

is being given the applicable standards based on his stated claims and leave to file a first amended 

complaint, or he may notify the Court that he desires to proceed only on the claim found 

cognizable in this order, or he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

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exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and 

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as 

concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were 

violated by each Defendant and its factual basis. Where the allegations against two or more 

Defendants are factually intertwined, Plaintiff need not repeat the factual allegations separately 

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against each Defendant. Rather, Plaintiff should present his factual allegations and identify 

whichever Defendants he feels are thereby implicated.

2. Exhibits

Plaintiff=s Complaint is comprised of approximately 10 pages of factual allegations 

followed by 234 pages of exhibits. 

The Court is not a repository for the parties= evidence. Originals, or copies of evidence 

(i.e., prison or medical records, witness affidavits, etc.) need not be submitted until the course of 

litigation brings the evidence into question (for example, on a motion for summary judgment, at 

trial, or when requested by the Court). If Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his amended complaint, 

each exhibit must be specifically referenced. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c). For example, Plaintiff must 

state Asee Exhibit A@ or make a similar notation directing the Court to the specific exhibit Plaintiff 

is referencing. If the exhibit consists of more than one page, Plaintiff must also reference the 

specific page of the exhibit (i.e. ASee Exhibit A, page 3@). 

At this point, the submission of evidence is premature as Plaintiff is only required to state 

a prima facie claim for relief. Plaintiff is reminded that, for screening purposes, the Court must 

assume that Plaintiff=s factual allegations are true. It is unnecessary for a plaintiff to submit 

exhibits in support of the allegations in a complaint. Thus, if Plaintiff chooses to file a first 

amended complaint, he would do well to simply state the facts upon which he alleges a Defendant 

has violated his constitutional rights and refrain from submitting exhibits. 

3. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

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(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

Plaintiff must clearly identify individual Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each 

violation of his constitutional rights and the factual basis for each violation to place each 

Defendant on notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s allegations against “CSATF staff,” or “prison officials,” or 

“prison staff” are insufficient to link any named Defendant to offensive acts. Further, Plaintiff’s 

allegations fail to show that the outside neurological surgeon from San Luis Obispo, California 

(Dr. Donald Ramberg) and/or Sierra Vista Medical Center in San Luis Obispo, California 

engaged in acts “under color of state law” for his claims against them to be cognizable under 

section 1983.

4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a)

Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) states that "[a] party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, 

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party." 

"Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not 

be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different 

defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, 

multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing feesfor the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any 

prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees." George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

//

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The fact that claims are premised on the same type of constitutional violation(s) (i.e. for 

insufficient medical treatment) against multiple defendants does not make them factually related. 

Claims are related where they are based on the same precipitating event, or a series of related 

events caused by the same precipitating event. Plaintiff is advised that if he chooses to file a first 

amended complaint, and fails to comply with Rule 18(a), all unrelated claims will be stricken.

Permissive joinder of defendants is allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

20(a)(2) where “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the 

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 

transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will 

arise in the action.” Thus, where a plaintiff complains of treatment to a specific body part by all 

of the named defendants, they may be asserted in the same action if Plaintiff seeks relief against 

them jointly, severally, or in the alternative and there is a common question of law or fact.

5. Statute of Limitations

Prisoners generally have four years from the date the claim accrues to file their action. 

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387–88 (2007) (applicable statute of limitations is California's 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (establishing a twoyear statute of limitations in § 1983 cases); and California Civil Procedure Code § 352.1(a) 

(providing a tolling of the statute of limitations for two years for persons imprisoned on a 

criminal charge). The date that Plaintiff filed this action, January 4, 2016, is the determinative 

date regarding the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 1.) Thus, any claims based on events 

prior to January 4, 2012 are barred. 

Plaintiff states a number of allegations against Dr. C. Abdue Rahman while Plaintiff was 

housed at HDSP which related to events that occurred in 2010 and 2011. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6.) Thus, 

Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Rahman are barred since untimely. 

D. Claims for Relief

1. Serious Medical Need 

Plaintiff’s allegations are entirely premised on the care and treatment (or lack thereof) for 

his cervical spine. 

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Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘ “significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” ’ ” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

“Indications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include the existence of an injury 

that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the 

presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic or substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). For screening 

purposes, the condition of Plaintiff’s cervical spine (which required multiple surgeries and 

became infected) is accepted as a serious medical need. 

Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and 

“requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’ ” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). “Deliberate indifference 

is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). “Under this 

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the 

inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have 

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been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no 

matter how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). More generally, deliberate indifference Amay 

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 

may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.; 

see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

a. 2011 - January 8, 2015

Plaintiff alleges that, in 2011, he was transferred to CSATF where he currently resides. 

(Doc. 1, p. 6.) Dr. Igbinoza became his primary care provider. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. 

Igbinoza reviewed his medical file but, despite Plaintiff’s complaints of severe pain, discomfort 

which badly disrupted Plaintiff’s sleep, Dr. Igbinoza ignored the “documented and verified 

medical condition” of Plaintiff’s cervical spine until 2015. (Id.) As previously stated, any 

allegations pertaining to events that occurred prior to January 4, 2012 are untimely and barred. 

Thus, only incidents that occurred thereafter are considered. Plaintiff fails to state any specific 

facts that show what acts he feels Dr. Igbinoza did or failed to do that amounted to deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff must state allegations with sufficient specificity to 

alert Dr. Igbinoza as to the basis of Plaintiff’s claims against him -- merely stating that Dr. 

Igbinoza was aware of his condition and ignored it is too conclusory to be cognizable. Thus, 

Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against Dr. Igbinoza for the treatment he provided, or 

failed to provide, from January 5, 2012, through January 8, 2015.

b. January 9, 2015 - January 30, 2015

 Plaintiff alleges that, on January 9, 2015, he was transported to Sierra Medical Center 

where Dr. Ramberg performed a “cervical laminectomy, foraminotomy” of the C5-6/6-7 levels of 

his spine. (Doc. 1, p. 6.) Plaintiff complains that he was not given any antibiotics before or after 

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the surgery. (Id.) Three days after the surgery, Plaintiff was transported back to the general 

population of CSATF with aftercare instructions from Dr. Ramberg for pain medication, dressing 

changes, and follow-up appointments. (Id., pp. 6-7.) Despite “showing signs of possible 

infection” at the surgical site, he was not transported to Mercy Hospital until January 24, 2015, 

where he was examined, diagnosed with a MRSA infection, and was immediately scheduled for 

surgery with Dr. Serxner. (Id., p.7.) Plaintiff was in severe pain during his stay at the hospital 

and was transported back to CSATF on January 30, 2015. (Id.)

Plaintiff attempts to state a claim against Dr. Ramberg for not prescribing antibiotics for 

him both before and after the January 9, 2015, surgery. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege 

anything more than a difference of opinion between himself and Dr. Ramberg over whether 

antibiotics should have been prophylactically prescribed for his surgery. This is insufficient to 

state a cognizable Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 

Further, before it can be said that a prisoner=s civil rights have been abridged with regard to 

medical care, Athe indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere >indifference,=

>negligence,= or >medical malpractice= will not support this cause of action.@ Broughton v. Cutter 

Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 

claim against Dr. Ramberg for any actions pertaining to the January 9, 2015 surgery or his 

aftercare. 

 c. February 2015 - March 2015

Upon arrival at CSATF after being treated the first time for the MRSA infection, Plaintiff 

was placed in the medical center for treatment which consisted of Vancomycin (an antibiotic) via 

“PCC line” since there was a danger that his vein might collapse if it was given intravenously. 

(Doc. 1, p. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that, during the time period when he was at CSATF, he was in 

severe pain from multiple changes in his medications; he was not allowed to contact his family; 

and that subsequent to leaving the medical facility at CSATF, he “had to remove (PCC line) due 

to harsh treatment by staff and fear that amounted to heightened duress.” (Id.) None of these 

allegations are sufficiently linked to any Defendant named in this action to be cognizable. 

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Plaintiff alleges that during this time, Dr. Igbinoza changed his pain medication to Tylenol 

#3 instead of Morphine which Dr. Ramberg prescribed after the January 9, 2015 surgery. (Id., p. 

8.) Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Dr. Igbinoza unreasonably ignored the treatment plan of 

a more specialized physician, Dr. Ramberg, by changing Plaintiff’s prescribed pain medication 

from Morphine to Tylenol #3. See Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(concluding that reliance on “non-specialized” medical conclusions may constitute deliberate 

indifference to a plaintiff’s medical needs), overruled on other grounds by Peralta, 744 F.3d 

1076; Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]llegations that a prison 

official has ignored the instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician are sufficient to state a 

claim for deliberate indifference.”). Thus, Plaintiff states a claim for deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs against Dr. Igbnoza for changing Plaintiff’s pain prescription from 

Morphine to Tylenol #3.

Shortly thereafter, because of neck and chest pain, Plaintiff was transported to San 

Joaquin Community Hospital in Bakersfield. (Id.) He was found to have a fluid collection at the 

C5-6, C6-7, and T1-2 levels of his spine which was suspected of being a MRSA relapse. (Id.) He 

was placed back on Vancomycin and returned to CSATF where he was placed under the care of 

Dr. Schraffenberg. (Id.) Dr. Schraffenberg examined Plaintiff and ordered an MRI which,

though it could not be entirely completed due to Plaintiff’s pain, revealed a new “large disc 

herniation at C5-6, C6-7.” (Id.) Plaintiff was referred back to Dr. Ramberg who recommended a 

third surgery which. (Id.) Despite Plaintiff’s continuing high degree of pain, “CSATF medical 

staff” declined to authorize this surgery request. (Id.) 

These allegations are not cognizable against Dr. Schraffenberg as they fail to show that he 

was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s condition. Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations acknowledge 

that Dr. Schraffenberg examined him, ordered an MRI, and that Plaintiff was thereafter referred 

to Dr. Ramberg for surgical consultation. It appears as though Plaintiff named Dr. Schraffenberg 

as a defendant in this action merely because he was a physician who saw and examined Plaintiff 

through the course of his care. 

//

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These allegations also fail to state a cognizable claim against Dr. Ramberg for merely 

recommending a third surgery for Plaintiff. Further, while declining to authorize a surgery 

recommended by a specialist may amount to deliberate indifference, Plaintiff’s allegation that it 

was declined by “CSATF medical staff” is insufficient to link the denial of his surgery to any 

state actor for liability to attach under section 1983. 

d. April 7, 2015 

On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to Facility A where Dr. Sunduram became his 

primary care physician. (Id.) Despite Plaintiff’s multiple complaints of pain which only allowed 

him to sleep 2-3 hours per night, Dr. Sunduram instructed Plaintiff to request mental health 

treatment, suggesting that there Plaintiff might obtain prescriptive medication which would 

promote sleep. (Id.) However, Dr. Sunduram recommended this without addressing the pain 

which caused Plaintiff’s difficulty with sleep. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal seeking pain 

management treatment which was partially granted at the first level and noted “no further 

deliberate indifference.” (Id., p.9.) These allegations amount to a difference of opinion with Dr. 

Sunduram’s treatment plan, which as previously indicated, is not cognizable. See Estelle, 429 

U.S. at 107. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the handling of his inmate appeal fail since 

not linked to any named Defendant.

e. September 2015

On September 16, 2015, Plaintiff alleges he was taken to the Unit Classification 

Committee (“UCC”). (Doc. 1, p. 9.) The UCC asked Plaintiff if his medical needs were being 

met at CSATF; Plaintiff responded in the negative and stated that he was “high risk medical” and 

required a higher level of care than CSATF is designated. (Id.) The UCC action acknowledged 

that Plaintiff is medically designated “high risk” but noted that he was “taken to UCC for 

appropriate housing due to high risk and annual review. UCC elects Chino (IM) recommendation 

and CSATF (Alt) overriding medical to house.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal on 

September 23, 2015, regarding inappropriate housing by the UCC which was “reluctantly denied” 

because of a lack of bed space at an intermediate healthcare institution. (Id.) 

//

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 Plaintiff remains in severe pain and has requested surgical intervention due to “no 

prescribed medication relief.” (Id.) Plaintiff is still unable to sleep more than 3 hours per night 

and “staff is aware, but does not help.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that CSATF is not a high risk 

medical care facility, but that Defendants May, Odle, and Stusherman have forced him to stay 

there because of their decision as the UCC solely because of overcrowding. (Id.) 

In determining whether a prison official responded reasonably to a known risk, the 

resources available to the official, including financial resources, or the lack thereof, may be 

considered. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruling Snow v. 

McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012) and Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) 

to the extent they can be read to preclude jurors from considering lack of resources in cases 

involving claims for money damages against prison officials who lack authority over budgeting 

decisions). Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for the UCC decision which 

inappropriately housed him. If Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for inappropriate housing for 

his medical condition, it is not cognizable. Further, injunctive relief by way of appropriate 

housing is also not cognizable since Plaintiff is no longer housed at CSATF. 

2. Inmate Appeals

It appears that Plaintiff intends to grieve the actions of various Defendants for their 

involvement in the processing and reviewing of his 602 inmate appeals related to the delay of 

radiation therapy and surgery for his keloids.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To state a cause of action for 

deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for 

which the protection is sought. AStates may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 

which are protected by the Due Process Clause.@ Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which 

Aimposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.@ Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

//

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A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any 

substantive right upon the inmates.@ Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing

Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a 

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of 

grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 

(9th Cir. 1988). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the 

procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 

Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing a prisoner=s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for 

liability under a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows 

about a violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is 

not correct. AOnly persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling 

against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A 

guard who stands and watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a 

guard who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not.@ 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 

656-57 (7th Cir.2005); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 

97 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7th Cir.1996). 

Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in inmate appeals, 

Plaintiff fails, and is unable to prove the elements of a constitutional violation purely for the 

processing and/or reviewing of his inmate appeals. However, Plaintiff may be able to prove the 

elements for a claim under the Eight Amendment for deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs against medical personnel involved in reviewing his inmate appeals. If Plaintiff 

meets his burden of proof as to the elements of a claim against a defendant for deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs, he will likely also be able to meet his burden of proof as 

to the elements of a claim against defendants with medical training if they reviewed and ruled 

against Plaintiff in his medical grievances/appeals on that same issue

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3. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff may have named some of the Defendants because they hold 

supervisory positions. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the 

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. 

//

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Thus, Plaintiff does not, and cannot state a cognizable claim against any state actors 

merely because their subordinates violated Plaintiff's rights. 

4. Supplemental Jurisdiction -- State Law Claims

As mentioned above, many of Plaintiff’s allegations imply that he has been subjected to 

circumstances that might amount to medical malpractice under California law. Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. ' 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the 

district court Ashall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action within such 

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III,@ except 

as provided in subsections (b) and (c). A[O]nce judicial power exists under ' 1367(a), retention of 

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.@ Acri v. Varian 

Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). AThe district court may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed 

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court 

has cautioned that Aif the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be 

dismissed as well.@ United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Supplemental jurisdiction will not be extended to state law claims beyond the 

circumstances of the specific claims under section 1983 that a plaintiff proceeds on. Further, 

Under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), set forth in California Government Code 

sections 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against a public 

employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presented the claim to the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board (“VCGCB” or “Board”), and the Board acted on 

the claim, or the time for doing so expired. “The Tort Claims Act requires that any civil 

complaint for money or damages first be presented to and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” 

Munoz v. California, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776 (1995). The purpose of this requirement is “to 

provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to 

settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 

12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974) (citations omitted). Compliance with this “claim presentation 

requirement” constitutes an element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or 

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official. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Thus, “failure to allege 

facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a 

claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” Id. at 1239 

(fn.omitted).

Plaintiff fails to state any allegations to show compliance with the CTCA so he may 

proceed on his claims under California law in this action. However, if Plaintiff has complied with 

the CTCA, jurisdiction over his claims under California law will only be allowed to proceed in 

this Court as long as he has federal claims pending on the same case or controversy.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has only stated a cognizable claim against Dr. 

Igboniza for violation of the Eight Amendment when he changed Plaintiff’s pain medication from 

Morphine as prescribed by Dr. Ramberg to Tylenol #3. Plaintiff must notify the Court of his 

decision to proceed on this cognizable claim, file a first amended complaint, or file a statement of 

voluntary dismissal within 30 days of the service of this order. If Plaintiff needs an extension of 

time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension within that same 

time-frame.

If Plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 

1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the 

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

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(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL:

a. file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, not to exceed twenty-five pages, excluding exhibits; or

b. notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a first amended 

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the Court 

as viable/cognizable in this order; or

c. file a notice of voluntary dismissal of the entire action; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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