Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00327/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

XINGZHONG (“FRANK”) SHI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-13-S-327-NE

)

ALABAMA A & M UNIVERSITY, )

TRENT MONTGOMERY, )

DANIEL WIMS, and DR. )

ANDREW HUGINE, JR., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Xingzhong (“Frank”) Shi, who is proceeding pro se, initiated this

action on February 19, 2013, by filing an application under § 706(f) of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), for appointment of an attorney. The 1

court denied plaintiff’s request for appointment of an attorney and ordered plaintiff

to file “an amended complaint, setting forth all claims he wishes to assert against all

defendants, referring to the federal statutes he relies upon to support each of his

claims, and complying with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”2

Plaintiff complied with that order by filing an Amended Complaint on April 15,

 Doc. no. 1. 1

 Doc. no. 2, at 1. 2

FILED

 2013 Jul-15 PM 04:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 1 of 24
2013. The case presently is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss the

3

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also filed a response to the motion to dismiss, 4

purporting to add an additional claim and a new defendant. The court will construe

5

that response as a motion for leave to amend plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. So

construed, the motion is due to be granted. Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

granted in part and denied in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim Upon

Which Relief Can Be Granted

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that

pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

 Doc. no. 7. 3

 Doc. no. 15. 4

 Doc. no. 21. 5

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 2 of 24
(2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,

550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at

557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint astrue, we “are not bound to accept astrue a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure fromthe hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, asthe Court of Appeals observed,

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 3 of 24
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis added).

“‘Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted

by attorneys’ and are liberally construed.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th

Cir. 1998)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1): Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction

Federal district courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, “‘empowered to hear

only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article

III of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional

grant authorized by Congress.” University of South Alabama v. The American

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d

1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, an “Article III court must be sure of its

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own jurisdiction before getting to the merits” of any action. Ortiz v. Fiberboard

Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998)). 

A motion to dismiss a case for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction is governed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). When ruling upon a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

6

asserting a lack of jurisdiction on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint, as with a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true. See

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).

7

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts constitutional claims through the

remedial vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as statutory claims pursuant to § 706(f) 8

Rule 12(b)(1) provides that “a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack 6

of subject-matter jurisdiction. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 7

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

the close of business on September 30, 1981.

 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: 8

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any

Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 5 of 24
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), against the following 9

defendants: Trent Montgomery,Dean ofthe College of Engineering, Technology, and

Physical Sciences at Alabama A & M University (“A & M”); Daniel Wims, Provost

and Vice-President of Academic Affairs at A & M; Andrew Hugine, A & M’s

President; and the A & M University Grievance Committee. All of plaintiff’s claims

arise out of his former employment with A & M. Those claims are discussed in more

10

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides every person with the right to sue those acting under color of state

law for violations of federal constitutional and statutory provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

is merely a vehicle by which to bring these suits; it does not create any substantive federal rights.” 

Williams v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007)

(citing Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583 (11th Cir.1996)). 

 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) provides, in pertinent part, that 9

If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is

dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the

filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c)

or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action

under this section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a case

involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, or the

Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person

aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a

government, governmental agency, or political subdivision,shall so notifythe person

aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be

brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be

aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any

person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment

practice. Upon application bythe complainant and in such circumstances as the court

may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may

authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or

security.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

See generally Amended Complaint. 10

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 6 of 24
detail below.

A. Claim 1

For his first claim, plaintiff assertsthat defendant Trent Montgomery placed him

on Administrative Leave Without Pay between August 25 and December 31, 2011,

because plaintiff had questioned Montgomery at a college-wide meeting on August

15th of that year. According to plaintiff, Montgomery’s actions deprived him of his

“rights as an Associate Professor and a legal Alabama state employee.” Plaintiff also 11

alleges that Montgomery’s “decision was baseless, and arbitrary, or conscience

shocking, in a constitutional sense. It is a violation of the substantive due process

simpliciter [sic].” Plaintiff asserts this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 12

B. Claim 2

For hissecond claim, plaintiff assertsthat defendant Trent Montgomery illegally

appointed an individual named Venkata Atluri as the Interim Chair of the Computer

Science Department at A & M during the winter of 2010.

13

That appointment was an act of power abusing, violating AAMU

regulations for appointing interim chair and depriving the rights of other

CS faculty members (including me) to be appointed or voted for that

position.

 Amended Complaint, at 4. 11

Id. 12

Id. at 5. 13

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 7 of 24
That appointment was discriminatory since Atluri only received a

Ph.D in Zoology in India and a MS in [Computer Science] degree from

[A & M] with an Associate Professor title, while Dr. Jian Fu (from

China) received a Ph.D in [Computer Science] from UAH with a Full

Professor title.

The appointment was discriminatory since I (fromChina) received

a Ph.D degree in Applied Math from UAH with a minor in [Computer

Science], 5-years of hands-on industry experience doing software

maintenance & development and with an Associate Professor title.

That appointment is a violation of the substantive due process

simpliciter [sic].14

Plaintiff also asserts that Montgomery did not listen to his opinions, or those of

other Computer Science Department faculty and staff, during and after a meeting held

on January 5, 2011, despite the fact that most Computer Science faculty members

expected to be able to vote on who would serve as Interim Chair of the department.15

Finally, plaintiff assertsthat Montgomery ignored a letter sent to himduring the winter

of 2012 by all Computer Science Department faculty and staff, asking for a vote on

the position of Interim Chair. Plaintiff asserts this claim through 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

16

which he refers to as addressing “civil action for deprivation of rights,” as well as

under § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

Id. (alterations supplied). 14

Id. 15

Id. 16

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 8 of 24
C. Claim 3

For his third claim, plaintiff asserts that the A & M University Grievance

Committee neglected its duty to properly handle his complaint against Montgomery’s

decision to place him on Administrative Leave Without Pay. According to plaintiff:

17

The negligence of [the Grievance Committee’s] duty to handle my

complaint deprived my rights to seek redress (justice and fairness and

worker rights), violating [A & M] regulations for handling grievance.

The negligence of its duty was conscience shocking, in a

constitutional sense.

The negligence of its duty is a violation of the substantive due

process simpliciter [sic].18

Plaintiff alleges this claim through the remedial vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as it

asserts a “[c]ivil action for deprivation of rights.”19

D. Claim 4

For his fourth claim, plaintiff assertsthat defendant Daniel Wims terminated his

employment in December of 2011 “without stating any reason.” According to 20

plaintiff, Wims’ decision

was an act of discrimination, power abusing, and retaliation against me

for protesting his appointment of [Trent Montgomery] as the new dean

 Amended Complaint, at 6. 17

Id. (alterations supplied). 18

Id. (alteration supplied). 19

Id. at 7. 20

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 9 of 24
of the newly re-organized college, and an act of endorsing

[Montgomery’s] wrongdoings.

That decision was arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a

constitutional sense. . . .

That decision is a violation of the substantive due process

simpliciter.21

Plaintiff also asserts that the termination decision

completely deprived ALL my worker/civil rights as an Associate

Professor at [A & M] and a legal Alabama state employee, including the

right to work and the right to receive RETIREMENT BENEFIT (if one

works for 10 or more years at AAMU), which is so far the main source

of income for my wife and me after my retirement.22

Plaintiff bases this claim upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act.

Plaintiff also provided an attachment with some additional allegations to

support Claim 4. He asserts that he never received any communication from the

Grievance Committee about its investigation into his complaint about being placed on

administrative leave without pay. He claims that he did nothing wrong, except to

complain about the previous Dean’s wrongdoings, and to protest the appointment of

Montgomery as the new Dean (i.e., the Interim Chair of the Computer Science

Department). He had received very good job performance reviews, and the Computer

Science Department had a shortage of qualified instructors, at the time he was placed

Id. (alterations supplied). 21

Id. (alteration supplied). 22

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 10 of 24
on administrative leave and eventually terminated. In fact, he had received a

promotion from Assistant to Associate Professor only eighteen months before being

terminated. According to plaintiff, he had been sending emails complaining about

23

the former Dean’s behavior, and calling for Montgomery’s resignation, since April of

2011, but no one ever responded to his correspondence or informed him that it was

inappropriate. Plaintiff also complains that A & M selected an African-American

female employee to receive tenure over him in 2007, because that decision prevented

plaintiff from gaining tenure when he received a promotion in 2010. 

24

E. Claim 5

For his fifth claim, plaintiff asserts that Wims and Hugine “re-organized ALL

[A & M’s] schools and departmentsin 2011, DIS-ALLOWING ANY DISCUSSIONS

among lower level administrators or faculty/staff.” According to plaintiff, the

25

reorganization was “DICTATORIAL and an act of POWER ABUSING, violating one

of the most important US values — democracy. That decision was arbitrary, or

conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Plaintiff also assertsthat Wims and

26

Hugine are “UNWILLING to listen to others; they seem to do whatever they want to,

 Amended Complaint, at 8. 23

Id. at 9. 24

Id. at 11 (alteration supplied, capitalization in original). 25

Id. (capitalization in original). 26

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 11 of 24
never caring about others’ civil rights.” Plaintiff bases this claim upon 42 U.S.C. §

27

1983. 

F. Demands

At the conclusion of his claims, plaintiff makes the following demands:

I am making a request for a jury of my peers to hear my case. I am

requesting the jury and the court to investigate (1) the legitimacy of the

dean T. Montgomery’s decision to place me on “Administrative Leave

With Pay,” (2) [A & M] Grievance committee’s negligence of its duty to

handle my officially submitted and accepted complaint, and (3) the

Provost D. Wims’ decision to terminate my employment.

I am asking that the jury and the court compensate me for all my

financial loss from being denied due process under law and for the

mental suffering of me and my family. Should the verdict be in my favor,

I am also asking the jury and the court to direct the defendants to publicly

apologize to me for their wrongdoings. 

28

G. Proposed New Claim 6

In plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, which the court has

construed as a motion for leave to amend plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, plaintiff

seeks to add a sixth claim against a new defendant, the Alabama A & M Board of

Trustees (“the Board”), as well as against all the defendants previously named in

claims 1-5. The new claim essentially seeks to hold the Board liable for all of the

wrongdoings alleged in plaintiff’s previous claims. More specifically, plaintiff

Id. (capitalization in original). 27

Id. at 13 (alteration supplied). 28

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 12 of 24
alleges:

Events:

1.[Montgomery] (baselessly) placedme on “Administrative Leave

with Pay” for 4+ months (8/25/2011-12/31-2011) sorely [sic] due to my

behavior (questioned him a couple of issues) at the college-wide meeting

on 8/15/2011, depriving ALL my rights as an Associate Professor and a

legal Alabama state employee. (As I stated in claim 1 in my amended

complaint).

2. [Montgomery]illegally appointed Venkata Atluri asthe interim

chair of the [Computer Science] dept. in winter 2010 (As stated in claim

2 in my amended complaint.)

3. [The A & M Grievance Committee] neglected its duty to handle

my officially submitted and accepted complaint against the dean’s

decision to place me on “Administrative Leave with Pay” (and the

intended complaint against the Provost’s decision). (As stated in claim

3 in my amended complaint.)

4. [Wims] (discriminatorily) terminated my employment in Dec

2011 without stating any reason. (As stated in claim 4 in my amended

complaint.)

5. [Wims and Hugine] reorganized [A & M’s] schools and

departments in 2011, dis-allowing ANY discussions among lower level

administrators or faculty/staff. (As stated in claim 5 in my amended

complaint.)

Claim:

1. [Montgomery’s, Wims’, and Hugine’s] decisions and [the

Grievance Committee’s] negligence of its duty were baseless, or

discriminatory, or arbitrary or conscience shocking, in a constitutional

sense.

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 13 of 24
2. They directly violated related [A & M] regulations and

guidelines in the [A & M] Faculty/Administrative Staff Handbook as I

stated in my amended complaint.

3. They were violations of the substantive due process simpliciter

[sic].

4. They violated the statutes § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or Ala. Code § 16-49-

21, or Ala. Code § 16-49-22.[29]

5. Though defendants [Montgomery, Wims, Hugine, and the

Grievance Committee] disrespected or defied the authority of related [A

& M] regulations and that of [A & M] Board of Trustees and these four

defendants are responsible for their violations and disrespect and defy

[sic] of authorities, [A & M] Board of Trustees shall be charged with all

corresponding duties, liabilities and responsibilities, per Ala. Code § 16-

49-22.30

III. DISCUSSION

A. Board of Trustees as Proper Party

Defendants assertthat any of plaintiff’s claims that are asserted against Alabama

A & M University, as an entity, are not viable because the University itself is not

capable of being sued. Defendants are correct that the University’s Board of Trustees,

not the University itself, would be the proper party to any of plaintiff’s claims. See

Ala. Code §§ 16-49-21 (“The Governor, by virtue of his or her office, and the trustees

appointed from the several congressional districts of the state and the nation at large,

See Section III(A), infra, for a discussion of these Alabama statutes. 29

 Doc. no. 21, at 1-2 (alterations supplied, emphasis in original). 30

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 14 of 24
pursuant to Section 16-49-20, and their successors in office are constituted a body [31]

corporate under the name of Board of Trustees for Alabama Agricultural and

Mechanical University.”); 16-49-22 (“Such corporation shall have all the rights,

privileges and franchises necessary to the promotion of the ends of its creation and

shall be charged with all corresponding duties, liabilities and responsibilities.”); 16-

49-24 (“The board of trustees created by this chapter for Alabama Agricultural and

Mechanical University shall have exclusive jurisdiction, power and authority with

regard to the supervision, management and control of Alabama Agricultural and

Mechanical University . . . .”). 

Even so, it is unclear which of the claims in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

defendants believe to be asserted against the University. Plaintiff clearly states that

the defendants named in his Amended Complaint are Trent Montgomery, Daniel

Wims, Andrew Hugine, and the University’s Grievance Committee. Neither the

University itself nor its government Board of Trustees is separately named. 

Defendants have not addressed whether the Grievance Committee is a properly named

defendant, and the court has no basis by which to consider that issue sua sponte. 

32

It is clear, nevertheless, that plaintiff’s proposed new Claim6, which is asserted

Section 16-49-20 creates and dictates the membership of the A & M Board of Trustees. 31

See Ala. Code § 16-49-20.

As discussed in the following section, however, any § 1983 claims against the Grievance 32

Committee are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 15 of 24
against all current defendants and the Board of Trustees, is proper and should be

allowed. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint to add

Claim 6 will be granted. Although defendants have not separately moved to dismiss

Claim 6, the court will consider whether any of the arguments defendants asserted in

their existing motion to dismiss also should be applied to Claim 6. 

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s constitutional claims against them pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh

Amendment states: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.” U.S. Const., amend. XI. The Supreme Court long ago “extended the

Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.” Board of

Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citing,

33

e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) ). 34

In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the 33

Supreme Court held that Congress did not validly abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity to suits

by private individuals when enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and,

accordingly, such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See also Kimel v. Florida Board of

Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress did not validly abrogate the states’ sovereign

immunity to suits by private individuals when enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 and, accordingly, such suits also are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

In Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity

34

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 16 of 24
The Eleventh Amendment has been construed in a manner that bars federal

courts fromhearing suits commenced by private litigants against non-consenting states

for the retrospective recovery of money damages. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363

(“Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by

citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment’s applicability to

suits by citizens against their own States. The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh

Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in

federal court.”) (citations omitted); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,

73 (2000) (“[T]he Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits

against nonconsenting States.”) (alteration supplied). 

Thus, the Eleventh Amendment thus is a limitation on the judicial power of

United States courts under Article III of the Constitution, and federal courts

accordingly “lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.” McClendon v. Georgia Department of Community Health, 261 F.3d

1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment shields not only states and state officials sued in an

official capacity from federal court actions, but also “state instrumentalities,” Regents

barred a citizen from suing his own State in federal court, even when the basis of his claim was a

federal question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Hans v. Louisiana,

134 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1890); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999).

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 17 of 24
of the University of California v, Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997), and other “arm[s] of

the state.” Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.

274, 280 (1977) (alteration supplied); see also Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding that, “in the absence of consent[,] a suit

in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is

proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment”) (alteration supplied). 

The Eleventh Amendment also shields state officials sued under § 1983 in an

“official capacity” from federal court actionsseeking money damagesfor past actions

allegedly in violation of the Constitution or federal statutes, because such claims are

tantamount to a suit against the state itself; and, absent waiver or consent, the Eleventh

Amendment bar remains intact. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785

n.2 (1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Carr v. City of Florence,

916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (observing that, in such cases, “the state is

considered the real party in interest because an award of damages would be paid by

the state”).

Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but

rather is a suit against the official’s office. . . . As such, it is no different

from a suit against the State itself.

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Summit

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Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 28 Filed 07/15/13 Page 18 of 24
Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he

Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against state officials where the state is, in fact,

the real party in interest.”). 

Here, plaintiff has asserted constitutional claims against the A & M Board of

Trustees, the A & M Grievance Committee, and three University officials: Trent

Montgomery, a former Dean; Daniel Wims, the Provost and Vice President of

Academic Affairs; and Andrew Hugine, the President of the University. Courts have

consistently held that state universities and their Boards of Trustees are

instrumentalities of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Harden v.

Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 1985); Eubank v. Leslie, 210 F. App’x 837,

844-45 (11th Cir. 2006); Harris v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,

846 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1233 (N.D. Ala. 2012). By the same logic, this court concludes

that the Grievance Committee, as an entity, also would be an instrumentality of the

state. Thus, the A & M Board of Trustees and Grievance Committee enjoy Eleventh

Amendment immunity from constitutional claims for money damages. As a result, 35

There is a well-recognized exception to EleventhAmendment immunityfor suits byprivate 35

individuals against state officials seeking declaratory relief or prospective injunctive relief for

continuing violations of federal law. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 1599-60 (1908) (holding

that a state official who has acted unconstitutionally may be sued in his official capacity for

prospective injunctive relief because such a suit “does not affect the State in its sovereign or

governmental capacity,” and, an official who commits an unconstitutional act is deemed “stripped

of his official or representative character”). There is no indication that the exception should apply

in this case, because plaintiff has requested money damages, not declaratory or prospective

injunctive relief. 

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plaintiff’s Claim 3 — which is a § 1983 claim asserted solely against the A & M

Grievance Committee — is barred. Similarly, all § 1983 claims in the new Claim 6

that are asserted against the Board of Trustees also are barred. 

The University officials named as defendants — Montgomery, Wims, and

Hugine — also enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, insofar as plaintiff’s

constitutional claims are asserted against themin their official capacities. Plaintiff did

not specify in his Amended Complaint whether his claims were asserted against

Montgomery, Wims, and Hugine in their official, or individual, capacities. He also

did not make any argument on that subject in his response to defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Even so, in the spirit of construing the pro se plaintiff’s pleadingsliberally, 36

the court will interpret the Amended Complaint as asserting constitutional claims

against the individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities. See

Williams v. Bryant, No. 1:08-CV-2336-RWS, 2009 WL 901008, *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar.

31, 2009). The official-capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but

the individual-capacity claims will remain, subject to defendants’ other argumentsfor

dismissal. 

C. Failure to Satisfy Pleading Standards

Defendants also assert that, notwithstanding any issues about immunity or

See doc. no. 20. 36

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naming the proper party, plaintiff’s claims also fail because they do not satisfy the

pleading standard elucidated in the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal decisions. 

According to defendants, “Plaintiff fails to allege how any actions taken by the

[defendants] against Plaintiff give rise to any cause of action.” The court does not 37

agree with defendants that plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient factual detail to

support his claims, especially given the liberal standard for construing pleadings 38

filed by pro se parties. 

Moreover, the cases cited by defendants to support dismissal of plaintiff’s

claims are distinguishable. Cyprian v. Auburn University, Montgomery, No.

2:10–cv–226–MEF, 2010 WL 1904284 (M.D. Ala. May 10, 2010), did not involve a

pro se plaintiff, so the court in that case could apply a stricter standard to determine

the sufficiency of the pleadings. The second case cited by defendants, Hampton v.

Magnolia HavenNursing Home, No. 3:10cv910–WKW, 2011 WL 588354 (M.D. Ala.

Jan. 19, 2011), did involve a pro se plaintiff, but the complaint in that case contained

much less detail than Mr. Shi’s complaint in this case. In Hampton:

Plaintiff’s complaint consists of a fill-in-the-blank form which the

court makes available for use by litigants, a copy of a “Notice of Right

to Sue issued by the EEOC on July 30, 2010, and a copy of what appears

Doc. no. 16 (defendants’ brief in support of motion to dismiss), at 14 (emphasis in original, 37

alteration supplied). 

This conclusion applies to the claims asserted in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, as well 38

as his new Claim 6. 

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to be the first page of plaintiff’s EEOC charge. (Doc. # 1). In paragraph

4 of the complaint, regarding “[t]he acts complained of in this suit[,]”

plaintiff has written “Pregnancy Discrimination.” In paragraph 7, which

asks for the name and other information regarding the individual who

discriminated against the plaintiff, plaintiff has written her own name. 

Paragraph 9 of the form begins with the language, “The nature of my

complaint, i.e., the manner in which the individual(s) named above

discriminated against me in terms of the conditions of my employment,

is as follows:” and concludes with thirteen blank lines; on the first of

these lines, plaintiff has written “PregnancyDiscrimination.” (Complaint,

¶¶ 4, 7, 9). She states that the alleged discrimination took place at

“Magnolia Haven Nursing Home” on or about “August 4th, 2009,” that

she “was laid off[,]” and that defendant’s conduct was discriminatory

with respect to her “sex.” (Id., ¶¶ 5, 8, 10).

Hampton, 2011 WL 588354, at *1 (alterations in original, footnotes omitted). The

district court held that the complaint did not satisfy the pleading standards set forth in

Twombly and Iqbal because it

provides no factual context for the adverse employment decision she

challenges in this court. She does not allege that she was pregnant at or

near the time of the employment action. Even if she had made such an

allegation, she also does not allege who made the decision that she

should be “laid off,” or suggest that anyone making or influencing that

decision knew or suspected that she was pregnant. While she draws a

legal conclusion that defendant has engaged in “pregnancy

discrimination,” plaintiff’s complaint — construed liberally — includes

no facts suggesting thatshe wastreated differently fromother employees

because of her pregnancy. 

Id. at *2. 

In contrast, in the present case, plaintiff has done much more than complete a

fill-in-the-blank form and state that he suffered discrimination. He has submitted a

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thirteen-page complaint with his claims clearly and separately delineated. While the

complaint could, no doubt, contain more factual detail, the court concludes that what

plaintiff has stated is sufficient to “nudge[] [his] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible,” especially considering plaintiff’s pro se status. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570 (alterations supplied). Accordingly, the claims that remain after

defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity has been considered will not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that plaintiff’s response to

defendants’ motion to dismiss be construed as a motion for leave to further amend

39

his Amended Complaint and, as so construed, it is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion

to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Claim 3, asserted

solely against the University Grievance Committee of A & M, is DISMISSED. Any

portions of Claim 6 that assert § 1983 claims against the Board of Trustees as an entity

also are DISMISSED. Finally, all § 1983 claims against the individual defendants,

Trent Montgomery, Daniel Wims, and Andrew Hugine, in their respective official

capacities are DISMISSED. 

The parties are directed to proceed forthwith to discovery on all remaining

 Doc. no. 21. 39

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claims pursuant to the Uniform Initial Order.40

DONE this 15th day of July, 2013.

______________________________

United States District Judge

 Doc. no. 18. 40

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