Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00197/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00197-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Civil Enforcement of Employee Benefits

---

1

16-CV-197-CAB-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENS BOY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE FOR 

ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC. et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-CV-197-CAB-BLM

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[Doc. Nos. 94]

On June 13, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 

Defendants now move for their attorneys’ fees under ERISA § 502(g)(1). See 29 U.S.C. § 

1132(g)(1). The motion has been fully briefed and the Court deems it suitable for 

submission without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

Defendants do not seek all of the fees they incurred litigating this case. Instead, they 

seek only fees that they contend are “attributable to defense obligations for which 

[Plaintiff] and his lawyers are most culpable, their positions were most egregious, and a 

fee award is most warranted to deter others from relentlessly pursing [sic] groundless 

theories and tactics in complete disregard for the legal context and amount in controversy.” 

[Doc. No. 94-1 at 6.] More specifically, Defendants seek three categories of fees: (1) fees 

Case 3:16-cv-00197-CAB-BLM Document 101 Filed 07/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2

16-CV-197-CAB-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

related to their motion to dismiss; (2) fees related to their defense of Plaintiff’s discovery 

demands; and (3) fees related to the filing of the instant fee motion. 

Section 502(g)(1) states that “[i]n any action under this subchapter . . . by a 

participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable 

attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” To obtain an award under this section, 

the fee claimant must have “achieved some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt v. 

Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Having obtained summary judgment in their favor, there is no question that 

Defendants succeeded on the merits. Nevertheless, the Court declines to exercise its 

discretion to award them fees.

The Ninth Circuit has identified five factors that district courts must apply in the 

exercise of their discretion to award fees under this section:

(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability 

of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of 

fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar 

circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all 

participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant 

legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ 

positions.

Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Simonia v. 

Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]istrict 

courts must consider the Hummell factors after they have determined that a litigant has 

achieved some degree of success on the merits.”). “[N]o single Hummell factor is 

necessarily decisive.” Simonia, 608 F.3d at 1122.

1. Culpability or Bad Faith

Defendants argue that Plaintiff and his attorneys are culpable for the fees in 

connection with the motion to dismiss, which the Court granted. However, the simple fact 

that several of Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed is not evidence of culpability or bad faith. 

If anything, that Plaintiff did not oppose dismissal of two of the three claims that were 

Case 3:16-cv-00197-CAB-BLM Document 101 Filed 07/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3

16-CV-197-CAB-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

subject to the motion demonstrates good faith insofar as Plaintiff conceded the merits of 

Defendants’ arguments rather than make specious arguments in opposition.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff and his attorneys are culpable based on what 

Defendants allege was an “extraordinary amount of discovery that they persisted in 

pursuing.” [Doc. No. 94-1 at 8.] In support, Defendants point to the two motions to compel 

Plaintiff filed and language from the orders on those motions that Plaintiff’s discovery 

requests were overbroad. However, both of Plaintiff’s motions to compel were granted in 

part. Moreover, the crux of the discovery disputes centered on the standard of review to 

be applied to the benefits determination at issue. [See Doc. No. 40 at 9 (noting that the 

briefs in connection with the first motion to compel “focus primarily on the applicable 

standard of review”).] In the end, the Magistrate Judge determined that the undersigned 

was likely to hold that an abuse of discretion standard applied, but ultimately, that issue 

was never resolved because the Court granted summary judgment based on a de novo 

review. That being said, if the Magistrate Judge had determined that de novo review was 

likely to be applied, it is possible that she would have ordered Defendants to provide even 

more of the discovery sought in the motions to compel.1

For these reasons, and based on the Court’s review of the record and observations of 

Plaintiff’s and his counsel’s performance in this case, the Court does not find that they 

acted culpably or in bad faith in connection with their opposition to the motion to dismiss 

or in discovery so as to justify an award of attorneys’ fees.

2. Ability to Satisfy A Fee Award

Defendants argue that based on Plaintiff’s current income and his counsel’s fees 

from this and a separate state court case between these parties, they have the ability to 

 

1 Notably, although the undersigned did not determine whether de novo or abuse of discretion review 

applies, the summary judgment order pointed out that “Plaintiff raise[d] legitimate concerns about the 

procedures used by the Plan and the Committee to administer Plaintiff’s claim, and whether, as a result of 

those procedures, the Committee’s decision denying Plaintiff severance benefits warrants deference. . . .” 

[Doc. No. 92. At 6.]

Case 3:16-cv-00197-CAB-BLM Document 101 Filed 07/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4

16-CV-197-CAB-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

satisfy a fee award. However, it seems implicit that this Hummell factor should only come 

into play if the Court is otherwise inclined to award fees based on the other Hummell

factors. Because the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s conduct in litigating this lawsuit 

warrants a fee award, his ability to pay is immaterial.

3. Deterrence

Defendants ask for well over $200,000 in attorneys’ fees. Such an award would 

undoubtedly deter other ERISA litigants. However, because the Court does not find that 

Plaintiff or his counsel acted culpably or in bad faith, such deterrence weighs against a fee 

award. See Simonia, 608 F.3d at 1122 (holding that given the good faith actions of the 

party from whom attorneys’ fees were sought, “we do not wish to deter others from acting 

in the same manner.”) Indeed, although he ultimately failed in his claims, Plaintiff made 

numerous legitimate points about the procedures used by Defendants in administering the 

Plan as part of his argument that a de novo review applied. If a de novo review applied to 

Plaintiff’s claims (which the undersigned never decided), Plaintiff possibly would have 

been entitled to much more of the discovery sought in the motions to compel.2 The Court 

does not want to deter other parties from making good faith arguments that de novo review 

applies in an ERISA case and from seeking all the discovery to which they would be 

entitled if such a standard of review applied.

4. Whether Defendants Sought to Benefit All Plan Participants

Defendants argue that they benefitted other participants by defending against 

“Plaintiff’s baseless claims.” However, while Plaintiff ultimately lost, neither his claims 

nor his arguments in support of his discovery motions were frivolous. Further, regardless 

of whether the ultimate result here may have benefitted other Plan participants, the Court 

is hardly convinced that Defendants’ primary purpose in this litigation was to benefit other 

 

2 Based on Defendants’ position that Plaintiff was entitled to such limited discovery, they could have filed 

an early motion for summary judgment and possibly avoided these discovery disputes entirely. If 

anything, that Defendants waited until the deadline for dispositive motions demonstrates that even they 

did not believe Plaintiff’s position that de novo review applies was frivolous.

Case 3:16-cv-00197-CAB-BLM Document 101 Filed 07/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5

16-CV-197-CAB-BLM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

participants as opposed to simply avoiding a severance payment to Plaintiff. In any event, 

the allegedly culpable conduct about which Defendants complaint primarily involves 

discovery disputes. The Court is even less convinced that Defendants’ actions in 

connection with those discovery disputes could have benefited other plan participants or 

were taken with such an intent. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of 

awarding attorneys’ fees.

5. Relative Merits of the Parties’ Positions

As stated above, the allegedly culpable or bad faith conduct at issue primarily 

concerns two motions to compel filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s motions to compel were in 

fact granted in part. Moreover, the Court never reached the question of which standard of 

review applies. If, as Plaintiff argued, de novo review was appropriate, then Plaintiff may 

have had even more success on his motions to compel. Further, the underlying dispute 

here involves Defendants handling of Plaintiff’s claim for severance benefits. Although 

the Court ultimately affirmed the denial of benefits, Plaintiff raised legitimate issues with 

the procedures Defendants’ utilized to handle his claim. Accordingly, although Plaintiff 

lost, his positions were not so unmeritorious or frivolous as to justify sanctions.

In sum, after consideration of each of the Hummell factors, the Court declines to 

exercise its discretion to award the attorneys’ fees sought by Defendants. Defendants’ 

motion for attorneys’ fees is therefore DENIED. It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-00197-CAB-BLM Document 101 Filed 07/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5