Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01463/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 1/ The remaining defendants, Jones, Clegg, Blakee, and Stricklin, do

not move for summary judgment at this time, as they concede that

whether they used excessive force on Plaintiff is a jury question.

1 09CV1463 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARNELL DUKES,

Plaintiff,

v.

K SPENCE, ET AL.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

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Civil No. 09-CV-1463-L(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[DOC. NO. 39]

 

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on

behalf of defendants Spence, Smith, and Ponce (collectively,

“Defendants”).1/ (Doc. No. 39.) Defendants claim immunity from suit

and argue that they did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

rights because they either did not use force or the force they used

was reasonable. The undersigned agrees and RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ motion be GRANTED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2/ The factual background is largely adapted from Defendants’ motion.

Much of the facts are undisputed. Where facts are disputed, the

undersigned will state so.

3/ All page references to documents contained on the Court’s docket are

to the Court Clerk’s renumbered pages, not the document’s native

pagination.

2 09CV1463 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2/

A. General Factual Background Based on The Complaint and

Plaintiff’s Deposition

Plaintiff, Darnell Dukes, is a California state prisoner who

is serving a life sentence for a kidnap for ransom conviction. On

June 10, 2007, Plaintiff was housed at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (Doc. No. 39-3 at

8.)3/ On that day, Plaintiff was involved in a fight with another

inmate, Frison, as they walked to church services. (Id. at 10.)

Defendant Correctional Officer Smith was on duty and ordered both

combatants to get down on the ground, as was the standard protocol.

(Id. at 12.) All other inmates on the yard complied with this

order. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff understood that Smith’s order meant

that he was to lay down on his stomach on the ground. (Id. at 12-

13.) However, neither Plaintiff nor inmate Frison complied. (Id.)

Instead, they both crouched down in anticipation of the other’s

continued attack. (Id. at 14-15.) Defendant Smith claims he

approached Frison and shoved him to the ground. (Doc. No. 39-6 at

2.) As soon as he did so, Smith claims that Plaintiff lunged onto

Frison and continued the fight. (Id.) While admitting the lunged

at Frison, Plaintiff claims he and Frison lunged at each other

simultaneously. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 16-17.) In any event, Smith

sprayed Plaintiff in the face with pepper spray. (Id. at 17-18.)

Plaintiff, who had been in “more than a few” prison fights in the

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3 09CV1463 

past, understood that he would be pepper-sprayed if he did not

comply with Smith’s orders. (Id. at 19.)

By this point, other officers had arrived at the scene.

Plaintiff claims he was walking backwards and trying to get on the

ground. (Id. at 18.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff was trying

to run away and fought the officers who tried to take him into

custody. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 18-19; Doc. No. 39-6 at 2.) In any

event, an officer struck Plaintiff with a baton several times.

(Doc. No. 48-2 at 6.) Plaintiff claims that several unidentified

officers then “flopped” onto him, took him to the ground, and

handcuffed him. (Id. at 8; Doc. No. 1 at 4-5.) He claims he was

beaten after he was handcuffed and claims he did not struggle as he

was being handcuffed. (Doc. No. 1 at 4-5; Doc. No. 48-2 at 7-8.)

Plaintiff was then escorted to the “program office,” to

discuss the fight, was then taken to the medical office for

evaluation and treatment, and then was placed in administrative

segregation. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 20-21.)

B. Plaintiff’s Original Allegations Against Defendants Based on

The Complaint And Plaintiff’s Deposition

1. Allegations Against Defendant Smith

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Smith should not have

sprayed him with pepper spray. (Doc. No. 1 at 4 (“K. Smith . . .

sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray[,] which was totally unnecessary.”).) Defendant further alleges that Smith participated in

Plaintiff’s beating and participated by kicking, dragging, and

punching him. (Id.) However, at deposition, Plaintiff stated he

did not know who was attacking him. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 6, 10.)

Plaintiff also stated that he did not believe he should have been

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4 09CV1463 

sprayed in the first place, or that at least both he and Frison

should have been sprayed - not just Plaintiff. Thus, the only

wrongful conduct Plaintiff primarily assigned to Smith was the very

act of spraying pepper spray, an act which Smith does not dispute.

(Doc. No. 39-3 at 32 (“Q: So as I understand your testimony, the

only claim you’re making against Smith in this lawsuit is that he

pepper-sprayed you and he shouldn’t have, correct? A: Yes.”).)

2. Allegations Against Defendant Ponce

Defendant Ponce is a correctional officer at RJD and was

present on the day of Plaintiff’s fight. Ponce prepared a report

that detailed his involvement in the incident: he arrived at the

scene, other officers handcuffed Plaintiff, and Ponce escorted

Plaintiff away without ever using force on him. (Doc. No. 1 at 17

(incident report); see also Doc. No. 39-5 at 2.).

Without providing any basis for his belief, Plaintiff’s

Complaint makes the conclusory allegation that Ponce was involved in

the alleged beating after he was handcuffed. (Id. at 4 (“Defendant’s [sic] B. Jones and J. Ponce where [sic] both involved in the

illegal beating of Plaintiff.”) This is the only statement in

Plaintiff’s Complaint that resembles a factual allegation against

Ponce.

At deposition, Plaintiff stated that Ponce was present while

Plaintiff fought Frison but admitted that Ponce did not lay a hand

on Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 28 (Q: . . . Other than that, so

that Ponce’s report is wrong, what did Ponce do? Did he lay hands

on you during the fight? A: No.”).)

Plaintiff then quickly turned the discussion to Ponce’s

incident report, which he claimed was falsified to help a fellow

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5 09CV1463 

officer. (Id. at 27.) This allegation appeared nowhere in the

Complaint. Specifically, Ponce allegedly lied about who escorted

Plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed another officer, Jones, escorted him,

while Ponce’s report stated that Ponce escorted Plaintiff. (Id. at

28.) Regardless of who escorted Plaintiff away from the fight

scene, Plaintiff stated that whoever escorted him did not “harm” him

in any way. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 14.) That officer merely warned

Plaintiff not to spit on him as Plaintiff was trying to spit out the

pepper spray. (Id.) Plaintiff initially interpreted this warning

as a threat but could not explain how it was a threat at deposition.

(Id.)

Then, seemingly contradicting his earlier statement that

Ponce never laid hands on him, Plaintiff stated that he “believed”

Ponce “flopped” on him, meaning that Ponce “threw” himself on

Plaintiff as other officers tried to take him into custody. (Doc.

No. 39-3 at 29.) This allegation also appears nowhere in the

Complaint. When asked why he believed Ponce “flopped” on him,

Plaintiff essentially admitted that he had no factual basis for this

belief:

Q. . . . And did you see him do that? Other than

saying he’s a big guy, did you see him do that?

A. I mean, it’s common sense. He’s the biggest guy

out there.

Q. I didn’t ask you about common sense. I asked you

a really specific question: Did you see him do it?

A. No. But, I mean, I –

. . . .

Q. Did you hear his voice at the time of the altercation?

A. No, I did not, I don’t believe. I don’t recall.

(Id. at 29-30.)

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6 09CV1463 

3. Allegations Against Defendant Spence

Lieutenant Spence was the supervisor who investigated the

fight, the officers’ use of force, and who prepared an incident

report after interviewing the involved officers and inmates. (Doc.

No. 1 at 14 (incident report).) Plaintiff alleges Spence is liable

because he failed to stop the correctional officers’ falsification

of their reports. (Id. at 5 (“Defendant K. Spence failed in this

regard because he allowed all named Defendant’s [sic] to cover-up

[sic] their illegal actions and in the attempt to change and falsify

medical reports.”).) Plaintiff initially made no other allegations

against Spence.

At deposition, Plaintiff admitted that Spence was not

physically present when Plaintiff claimed he was beaten and did not

know whether Spence ever “attacked” him. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 22, 26.)

He agreed that he sued Spence only because “he was the overseer of

everything, an that he approved the incident reports that were sent

to Sacramento.” (Id. at 23.) He confirmed these were the only

bases for his suit against Spence and mentioned no other allegedly

improper conduct by him. (Id.)

C. Plaintiff’s New Factual Allegations And Theories

Plaintiff raises the following new factual allegations and

theories of liability in his opposition to Defendants’ motion for

the first time since filing his Complaint on July 6, 2009, including

during his deposition on April 21, 2010. In his opposition to the

instant motion, Plaintiff agreed “fully with Defendants [sic]

statement of undisputed facts with exception to the Defendants [sic]

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28 4/ It should be of no surprise to Plaintiff that Defendants “excluded”

these theories since they appear for the first time in his

opposition to their motion.

7 09CV1463 

exclusion of” the new allegations summarized below.4/ (Doc. No. 45

at 5.)

1. New Theory Against Defendant Smith

Plaintiff now alleges: “The number of bursts from Smith’s

O.C. aerosal [sic] canister has never been in dispute. It is in

dispute however the duration of the single burst, a duration that

the Court may note has never been calculated by Defendants and by

which Plaintiff estimates as 7-10 seconds and excessive in light of

the attendant circumstances.” (Doc. No. 45 at 7 (all-caps font

removed).) Plaintiff now disputes the duration of time he was

sprayed in addition to his original allegation that he should not

have been sprayed in the first place.

2. New Theory Against Defendant Ponce

Also for the first time, Plaintiff now argues that Ponce, as

the officer who escorted him away from the fight scene, “assumed the

responsibility for ensuring that Plaintiff was afforded ample

opportunity to decontaminate after becoming knowledgeable that

Plaintiff was suffering from the after effects of pepper spray

exposure.” (Doc. No. 45 at 7-8.)

3. New Theory Against Defendant Spence

Plaintiff now alleges that Spence, as a supervisor, “retained

a corresponding duty to ensure that proper decontamination was given

to alleviate the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,

suffering[,] and agony opposed [sic] to merely assuming that proper

decontamination would be provided.” (Id. at 6 (all-caps font

removed).) Plaintiff’s new theory against Spence is based solely on

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8 09CV1463 

his supposed failure to ensure that Plaintiff received sufficient

water shortly after being pepper-sprayed. Again, this new allegation was absent from the Complaint, and Plaintiff failed to mention

it in his deposition when he was asked whether he sued Spence for

any reason other than his supposed failure to stop the falsification

of reports and to prevent the alleged coverup. (See Doc. No. 39-3

at 23.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) mandates the grant of

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for granting a motion

for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of

a directed verdict. Judgment must be entered “if, under the

governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the

verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51

(1986). However, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment

should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.; see also

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of

the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.”) (alteration

omitted).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as

would apply at a trial on the merits, including Plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Lack of

a genuine issue of material fact on a single element of a claim for

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9 09CV1463 

relief is sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that claim.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other evidence, and

“‘showing’ -- that is, pointing out to the district court -- that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id. at 325; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material

issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and

requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish,

beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine dispute for trial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for

the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d

736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Rule 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 327, 380 (2007).

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10 09CV1463 

B. Special Rules Applicable to Pro Se Plaintiffs

“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to

liberally construe the inartful pleading of pro se litigants. It is

settled that the allegations of [a pro se litigant’s complaint]

however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d

1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotations

omitted; alteration in original).

This rule, however, “applies only to a plaintiff’s factual

allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989).

“‘[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

86 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471

(9th Cir. 1992) (same) (per curiam).

Although the Court must construe pleadings liberally, “[p]ro

se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern

other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995)

(same) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

because Plaintiff cannot establish that they violated his Eighth

Amendment rights. As explained below, the undersigned agrees.

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11 09CV1463 

1. Legal Background: The Eighth Amendment

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive

physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core

judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1992). Where prison officials have acted in response to an

immediate disciplinary need, because of the risk of injury to

inmates and prison employees and because prison officials will not

have time to reflect on the nature of their actions, the “malicious

and sadistic” standard, as opposed to the “deliberate indifference”

standard, applies. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21

(1986).

Because the use of force relates to the prison official’s

legitimate interest in maintaining security and order, the Court

must be deferential when reviewing the necessity of using force.

See id. at 321-22. In order to establish excessive force, the

plaintiff needs to meet a threshold of evidence. Where evidence of

excessive force is “woefully sparse,” the plaintiff fails to raise

a dispute of fact regarding an excessive force claim. Henderson v.

City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the failure to deny allegations of non-cooperation that would

justify increased force can support a grant of summary judgment

against the plaintiff. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth.,

261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001).

When determining whether the force is excessive, the Court

should look to the “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate;

(2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between

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5/ The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s new theory, that he was

sprayed for 7 to 10 seconds, be disregarded as both untimely and

inconsistent with the record. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232

F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] new theory of liability at the

summary judgment stage would prejudice the defendant who faces 

12 09CV1463 

that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably

perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7

(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). Although the Supreme Court has

never required a showing that an emergency situation existed, “the

absence of an emergency may be probative of whether the force was

indeed inflicted maliciously or sadistically.” Jordan v. Gardner,

986 F.2d 1521, 1528 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993).

Moreover, there is no need for a showing of a serious injury

as a result of the force, but the lack of such an injury is relevant

to the inquiry. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9 (“[T]he extent of

injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest ‘whether

the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a

particular situation, ‘or instead evinced such wantonness with

respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a

knowing willingness that it occur.’”) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at

321.).

2. Smith Is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Smith revolves around Smith’s use

of pepper spray against him. Plaintiff originally claimed that

Smith should never have sprayed him. At deposition, he objected

that inmate Frison was also not sprayed. And in his opposition

papers, he raised the new theory that Smith’s spraying him for 7 to

10 seconds, rather than 1 to 2 seconds, was an Eighth Amendment

violation.5/

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(contd.)

different burdens and defenses under this second theory of

liability.”) (citations omitted). The Court’s obligation to read

the pleadings liberally in pro se cases extends to facts actually

contained in the pleadings and does not grant a pro se plaintiff

free rein to ambush the opposition with new facts and theories as he

wishes. In this case, the “7 to 10 second” allegation appeared for

the first time, since July, 06 2009, in an opposition to summary

judgment. Plaintiff never mentioned it in his deposition and has

never indicated that he disputed the duration he was sprayed. His

only indication has been that he took umbrage at being sprayed in

the first place. Although the Court must construe pleadings

liberally, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of

procedure that govern other litigants,” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), which in this case means requiring

Plaintiff to properly plead factual allegations and preventing him

from ambushing Defendants as he pleases. See Pickern v. Pier 1

Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing

to allow the plaintiff to advance new theories “presented for the

first time in [the plaintiff’s] opposition to summary judgment”);

Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Simply put, summary judgment is not a procedural second

chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.”) (internal quotations

omitted); Ortiz v. Lopez, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1082 (E.D. Cal.

2010) (“[A] plaintiff cannot oppose summary judgment based on a new

theory of liability because it would essentially blind side the

defendant with a new legal issue after the bulk of discovery has

likely been completed.”).

13 09CV1463 

The use of pepper spray “may be reasonable as a general

policy to bring an arrestee under control, but in a situation in

which an arrestee surrenders and is rendered helpless, any reasonable officer would know that a continued use of the weapon or a

refusal without cause to alleviate its harmful effects constitutes

excessive force.” LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961

(9th Cir. 2000); see also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of

Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding repeated

spraying of passive protestors constituted excessive use of force

when the officers had control over the protestors).

Here, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Smith showed

considerable restraint and sprayed Plaintiff only after Smith had

ordered the combatants to lie on the grounds, both combatants

refused the order and instead crouched on the ground, and Plaintiff

lunged at inmate Frison. Plaintiff does not dispute that Smith

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6/ Even if true, the Fact that inmate Frison was not sprayed is

irrelevant. The undersigned’s focus is properly on Plaintiff’s

actions and the reasonableness of the force used in response

thereto.

7/ For the same reasons stated in footnote 5, the undersigned

recommends that Plaintiff’s new theory of liability, that he should

have been given a faster opportunity to rinse the pepper spray off

his face, be disregarded. This new theory appears for the first

time in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment

motion.

14 09CV1463 

sprayed him one time to cease his forward lunge.6/ The spray had its

desired effect, as Plaintiff ceased his forward attack and stumbled

backwards.

Addressing the remaining Hudson factors, there is no evidence

that Plaintiff suffered injury, the need for the use of force was

high because Plaintiff was in the midst of lunging at Frison, and

the low level of force used was reasonable given Plaintiff’s

impending attack.

Ultimately, the evidence that Smith used excessive force

against Plaintiff is not “woefully sparse”; it is nonexistent.

There is no dispute of fact whether the force used by Smith was

restrained and designed to restore order; it was. As a result,

Smith’s use of force was reasonable and lawful, and he is entitled

to summary judgment.

3. Ponce is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Ponce was involved in

beating him.7/ However, at deposition, Plaintiff admitted that this

allegation was pure conjecture, based on his belief that it was

“common sense” that Ponce “flopped” on him since he was the biggest

officer on the yard. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 29.) Plaintiff then

contradicted himself when he admitted that he never saw Ponce or

heard his voice during the incident, and he admitted that Ponce

never laid a hand on him during the fight or its aftermath. (Id. at

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28-30.) For his part, Ponce avers that he was not involved in

restraining Plaintiff and used no force on him. (Doc. No. 39-5 at

2.) He merely appeared on-scene shortly before Plaintiff was

handcuffed and escorted Plaintiff away from the scene without using

any force. (Id.) Plaintiff’s self-contradicted belief notwithstanding, the record simply contains no evidence that Ponce was

involved in the alleged beating in any way or that he used any force

whatsoever on Plaintiff.

At deposition, Plaintiff further alleged that Ponce falsified

his report to protect his friend, Jones. (Id. at 28.) Specifically, Ponce allegedly wrote in his report that he (Ponce) escorted

Plaintiff when in fact Jones escorted Plaintiff. (Id.) Not only

does this allegation not make sense, it is not an act that violates

the Eighth Amendment.

First, this allegation makes no sense because nothing

happened to Plaintiff when he was escorted. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 14

(“Q: And when you were escorted to the program office, the

escorting officer taunted you, but he didn’t harm you in any way,

did he? A: Well, no. He made threats if I spitted [sic] on him.

I was trying to spit the pepper spray out of my mouth and stuff like

that.”).) It is illogical that Ponce would falsify a report to

protect Jones when nothing happened.

Second, falsification of a report, even if true, is not an

act that violates the Eighth Amendment. That Amendment is violated

by “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992), such as when the conditions of an inmate’s

confinement are inhumane, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). It is inconceivable how the act of falsifying a report in

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8/ For the same reasons stated in footnote 5, the undersigned

recommends that Plaintiff’s brand new theory of liability, that he

should have been given a faster opportunity to rinse the pepper

spray off his face, be disregarded, as it appears for the first time

in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion.

16 09CV1463 

the manner Plaintiff claims violates the Eighth Amendment’s

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

Based on the above, there is no dispute of fact that Ponce

violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights; he did not. Ponce is

entitled to summary judgment as a result.

4. Spence is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Spence is based solely on his

status as the supervisor who oversaw the immediate investigation of

the fight and the officers’ use of force.8/

Supervisors are only personally liable for damages under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the evidence shows that they participated in,

directed, or knew of the alleged constitutional violations, and

failed to intervene to prevent them. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “[D]irect, personal participation is not

necessary to establish liability for a constitutional violation.”

al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kwai

Fun Wong v. U.S. INS, 373 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2004)), cert.

granted on other grounds, 79 U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010)

(questions presented available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/

10-00098qp.pdf). “Supervisors can be held liable for the actions of

their subordinates (1) for setting in motion a series of acts by

others, or knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by

others, which they knew or reasonably should have known would cause

others to inflict constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or

inaction in training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3)

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for acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by subordinates;

or (4) for conduct that shows a ‘reckless or callous indifference to

the rights of others.’” Id. (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles,

946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Any one of these bases will

suffice to establish the personal involvement of the defendant in

the constitutional violation.” Id.

The record is completely deficient of any evidence - or even

an allegation - that Spence personally participated in the use of

force against Plaintiff at any time. There is no evidence whatsoever that Spence was even present when Plaintiff claims he was

beaten. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 22 (“Q: . . . . Was Lieutenant Spence

present physically when you claim you were beaten by the officers?

A: Not that I recall.”).)

Nor is there any evidence that Spence set forth in motion the

events that led to Plaintiff’s alleged beating. Indeed, Plaintiff

himself set those events in motion when he fought Frison, refused to

lie on the ground, and lunged at Frison. Plaintiff and Frison, not

Spence, were responsible for setting into motion the events that led

Smith to spray Plaintiff and the other officers to take him into

custody.

Nor is there any evidence that Spence acquiesced to the

alleged constitutional deprivation Plaintiff suffered. (Cf. Doc.

No. 39-4 at 2 (“I was in the program office when I heard the yard

alarm. I immediately went outside, rounded the corner, and saw

inmate Dukes, who was already handcuffed, being pulled to his feet.

I did not see anyone use any force on Dukes.”) (emphasis added).)

Because there is no evidence that he witnessed the fight or

Plaintiff being taken into custody, there is no reason to believe he

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should have known that the officers’ account of the events differed

from how those events actually transpired, as Plaintiff baldy

asserts he must have. Thus, there is no evidence that he acquiesced

to any constitutional violation by submitting a report he knew was

false. Indeed, in his opposition, Plaintiff even “agrees fully with

Defendants [sic] statement of undisputed facts,” (Doc. No. 45 at 5),

which avers that “[t]here was no ‘cover up’ of any facts,” and that

“Spence’s report of the incident is simply a synopsis of the events

described by the officers at the scene,” (Doc. No. 39-2 at 4).

Nor is there any evidence – or even an allegation – that

Spence displayed “culpable action or inaction in training, supervision, or control of subordinates.” There is nothing in the record

that indicates Spence’s supervision or poor training of officers led

to the alleged use of excessive force in the first place.

Finally, Spence’s conduct falls far short of demonstrating a

“reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” No

credible evidence exists that his conduct showed any indifference to

Plaintiff’s rights, much less a reckless or callous one.

Ultimately, there is no dispute of fact that Spence violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights; he did not. Spence is entitled

to summary judgment as a result.

B. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment

because they are immune from suit. Because Plaintiff cannot make 

out a constitutional violation against any of them, the undersigned

agrees.

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1. Qualified Immunity Legal Standard

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity

“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975

(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). The defense of qualified immunity allows for errors in

judgment and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law. . . . [I]f officers of reasonable

competence could disagree [whether a specific action was constitutional], immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). Qualified immunity balances the interests of “the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815

(2009). The Court must determine “whether, in light of clearly

established principles governing the conduct in question, the

officer objectively could have believed that his conduct was

lawful.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.

1998).

The Court engages in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the

facts shown “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and

(2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the

time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at

815-16. The Court may consider these steps in any order it wishes.

Id. at 818.

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If the Court first considers whether the facts shown make out

a violation of a constitutional right, “there is no necessity for 

further inquiries concerning qualified immunity” if the Court

determines that no constitutional violation has been made out.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other

grounds by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.

A constitutional right is clearly established when “it would

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. The issue becomes

whether the law officer could have reasonably believed that the

officer’s conduct was lawful. Generally, this is a mixed question

of law and fact requiring a determination regarding whether an

objectively reasonable officer would have believed that exigent

circumstances existed to justify the force used in light of the

information possessed by defendant. Id. at 205-06.

Any genuine dispute of material fact concerning the underlying facts of what the officer knew or what the officer did are

questions of fact for the jury. Acosta v. City and County of San

Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Sinaloa Lake

Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.

1995). However, where the essential facts are undisputed, the

reasonableness of the officer’s actions is properly determined by

the court. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n, 70 F.3d at 1099.

2. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

The undersigned begins with Saucier’s first prong: whether

the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, make out a constitutional violation.

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a. Smith

The totality of plaintiff’s own pleadings and facts against

Smith establish that Smith sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray only

one time after Plaintiff (1) was involved in a fist fight in prison,

(2) refused to stop fighting when ordered, (3) refused to lie on the

ground and instead squatted, and (4) lunged toward inmate Frison to

continue the fight. These facts establish a reasonable and

proportional use of force, not a sadistic or malicious infliction of

force that violates the Eighth Amendment. As further explained

above, Plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation

against Smith.

b. Ponce

As Plaintiff admitted in his deposition, the extent of

Ponce’s alleged acts against him involved only falsifying a report

to state that he (Ponce), not Jones, escorted Plaintiff from the

fight scene. Because the act of falsifying a report fails to

inflict pain in an unnecessary and wanton manner, or create inhumane

conditions of confinement, Plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation against Ponce.

c. Spence

As Plaintiff admitted in his deposition, his suit against

Spence was based on his status as the supervisor who submitted an

alleged falsified report of the fight and subsequent use of force,

and for his failure to prevent the officers’ falsification of their

reports.

“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action--where masters do not

answer for the torts of their servants--the term ‘supervisory

liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each

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Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only

liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining

whether there is a violation of clearly established right to

overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is

required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged

with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Plaintiff’s bare allegations notwithstanding, there is a

complete dearth of evidence that any of the officers falsified their

reports or that Spence knew about the alleged falsifications. The

officers’ reports show that their use of chemical agents, physical

force, and batons was well-documented. (See Doc. No. 1 at 14-27.)

Beyond asserting that the reports were falsified, Plaintiff fails to

explain how any of the officer falsified their reports. Indeed, in

his opposition, Plaintiff contradicts himself when he states that he

“agrees fully with Defendants [sic] statement of undisputed facts,”

(Doc. No. 45 at 5), which avers that “[t]here was no ‘cover up’ of

any facts,” and that “Spence’s report of the incident is simply a

synopsis of the events described by the officers at the scene.”

(Doc. No. 39-2 at 4.) If there was no cover-up, Spence logically

could not have acquiesced to any cover-up. There simply are no

facts that support Plaintiff’s contention that Spence violated the

Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional

violation against Spence.

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d. The Undersigned’s Immunity Inquiry Ends At the

First Prong

Because Plaintiff has failed to make out a constitutional

violation against any of the Defendants, the undersigned’s inquiry

ends there. After all, it would be futile to attempt to determine

whether a constitutional right was clearly established when no such

violation exists in the first place. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201

(“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the

allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity.”); see also Tennison v. City & County

of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1092 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (same;

recognizing Pearson’s partial overruling of Saucier); Reedy v.

Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223-24 & n.36 (3d Cir. 2010) (same).

Based on the foregoing, all three Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity and are immune from suit. The undersigned

therefore recommends that Defendants’ motion be granted on this

additional basis.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 4, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 18, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 4, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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