Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01479/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01479-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAWRENCE V. HAHN and COLDSTREAM 

ADVENTURES UNLIMITED, INC., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

PAM ARMAS, SIERRA DISTRICT 

SUPERINTENDENT, DONALD K. 

SCHMIDT, TARA LYNCH, DEAN 

OETLE, MIKE ROMINGER, and Does 

1 through 100, INCLUSIVE 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

 

Case No. 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Pam Armas, 

Donald K. Schmidt, Tara Lynch, Dean Oertle, and Mark Rominger’s 

(collectively “Parks Employees” or “Defendants”) motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure (Doc. # 15). Plaintiffs Lawrence Hahn and Coldstream 

Adventures Unlimited, Inc. (collectively “Hahn” or “Plaintiffs”) 

1 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

oppose the motion. (Doc. # 16). For the reasons set for below1, 

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

This Court views the facts and draws inferences in the 

manner most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-moving party. 

Since August 1994, Plaintiff Hahn asserts he owned estates in 

real property, all within Placer County, consisting of 

approximately a 59-acre parcel of land located at 8975 

Coldstream Road, as well as two recorded easements across 

parcels, which Hahn alleges entitle him to access areas within 

both Coldstream Canyon and Emigrant Canyon, via portions of 

Coldstream Road, for any lawful purpose, including, but not 

limited to commercial activities. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 44. Hahn has operated a snowmobile tour 

business, as well as other commercial activities on and around 

his property. SAC ¶¶ 42, 43. 

In the present action, Defendants are sued in their 

individual, personal capacities while acting under color of 

legal authority. SAC ¶¶ 6-12. Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges that 

Parks Employees detained and cited Hahn and Coldstream 

Adventures without probable cause for operating a business in 

1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 230(g). 

2 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the state park without the proper concessionaire’s license. SAC 

¶ 57(b). Hahn also accuses Parks Employees of “knowingly 

fraudulently urging the District Attorney of Nevada County to 

prosecute criminal charges against Plaintiff Hahn, without 

probable causes to believe that Plaintiff had violated any law” 

and “knowingly and intentionally suppressing evidence.” SAC ¶ 

57(c)(d). Hahn asserts that Parks Employees’ criminal 

investigations of his activities “were taken in response to 

Plaintiff Hahn’s free speech and associative activities,” 

including “plaintiffs’ First Amendment free speech 

rights/communications with/right to communicate with clients and 

potential clients, as well as Plaintiff Hahn’s freedom to 

associate for commercial purposes with the individuals of his 

choice.” SAC ¶ 84. Hahn also alleges that Parks Employees 

intentionally sought to discriminate against him, humiliate him, 

and deplete his financial resources “by requiring that he defend 

himself against criminal charges brought without probable cause 

and maliciously by defendants.” SAC ¶ 103. In addition to 

damages, Hahn seeks a declaration that “plaintiffs are entitled 

to conduct commercial activities in the aforesaid area” and an 

order “restraining defendants from unlawfully harassing 

plaintiffs in any manner.” SAC, Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ E, G. 

Specifically, Hahn’s Second Amended Complaint alleges seven 

causes of action against Parks Employees for: (1) Violation of 

3 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) Violation of 

the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (3) Violation of 

Procedural Due Process, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (4) Violation of 

Substantive Due Process, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (5) Violation 

of Equal Protection, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (6) Declaratory 

Relief; and (7) Injunctive Relief. 

In the instant motion, Defendants seek the dismissal of the 

First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth claims for relief on the grounds 

that (1) the Third and Fourth claims for relief fail to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) the Court lacks 

jurisdiction over the First and Sixth claims for relief; and (3) 

the State of California (“State”) is an indispensible party. 

II. OPINION 

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint 

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of 

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” 

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. 

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff 

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a 

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the 

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the 

4 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. 

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United 

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Indeed, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 

2009)(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). 

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which 

the plaintiff alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009)(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Only where a plaintiff has failed to 

“nudge [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to 

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. When 

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, “a court should 

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 

give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.

5 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth Claims for Violations of 

Procedural and Substantive Due Process

 Hahn’s Third and Fourth claims for relief allege that Parks 

Employees knowingly and intentionally suppressed evidence as 

part of the August 3, 2007 and July 18, 2008 detentions and 

subsequent criminal cases against him. SAC ¶¶ 96, 104. Hahn 

alleges that these actions violated his right to procedural and 

substantive due process, causing injury. SAC ¶¶ 97, 99, 105-

106. 

 The United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland held 

that the prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights 

if it fails to turn over evidence that is “material either to 

guilt or to punishment.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In order to 

prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) 

the evidence at issue is favorable, either because it is 

exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) such evidence was 

suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

(3) prejudice resulted. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-

82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Nonetheless, 

“where the defendant is aware of the essential facts enabling 

him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence, the 

Government does not commit a Brady violation by not bringing the 

evidence to the attention of the defense.” Raley v. Ylst, 470 

F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, there can be no Brady

6 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violation where the defendant is aware of the exculpatory 

evidence. Id.

 Here, Hahn not only alleges that he knew about the alleged 

exculpatory evidence, but also that his attorneys provided the 

evidence to the Parks Employees. SAC ¶ 104. As such, Hahn 

cannot establish a violation of due process under Brady. 

Moreover, Hahn makes no attempt to oppose Defendants’ Brady

violation argument. As such, Plaintiffs have conceded that no 

due process violation exists for failure to disclose exculpatory 

evidence because Plaintiff Hahn knew about the evidence. 

 Additionally, Hahn argues that Parks Employees participated 

in a conspiracy to single him out, prosecute him without 

probable cause, and made false accusations against him in 

violation of his due process rights. Opp. Brief at p. 2-3. 

Hahn’s allegations of conspiracy, however, are conclusory and 

are not supported by specific material facts. Hahn merely 

alleges in conclusory fashion that all of the named Defendants 

“agreed to participate in a conspiracy.” SAC ¶ 56, line 9. 

Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish 

conspiracy. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 

(9th Cir. 1989). 

 Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment principles, rather than 

those of due process, govern this case. See Galbraith v. County 

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). The Fourth 

7 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amendment addresses “pretrial deprivations of liberty,” Albright 

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994), also at issue here, so 

“[the Fourth] Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 

‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these 

claims.” Id. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

395 (1989)). Hahn appears to concede the Third and Fourth 

claims for relief should not be brought as a due process 

violation. In Hahn’s Opposition Brief he states that “a claim 

for malicious prosecution, under Section 1983, better suits the 

factual allegations set for in the SAC than do the existing 

Third and Fourth Claims, which allege violations of procedural 

due process and substantive due process, respectively.” Pls’ 

Opp. at 2, line 13-15, p. 12 lines 16-19. Accordingly, this 

Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations in their Third and 

Fourth claims do not support claims under due process. As such, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth 

claims for procedural and substantive due process violations is 

GRANTED with prejudice. 

C. Plaintiffs’ First and Sixth Claims for Violation of the 

First Amendment and Declaratory Relief

 The underlying issue in both the First and Sixth claims for 

relief is the extent of Hahn’s easement rights in relationship 

to the State of California’s property rights. The First Claim 

for violation of the First Amendment would require the Court to 

8 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

delve into the scope of Hahn’s easement rights under state law. 

“[P]roposals to engage in commercial transactions are not 

accorded First Amendment protection [where] the underlying 

transaction is illegal.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 

1309, 1312-1313 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, as a threshold question 

to resolve the First claim, this Court would be required to 

adjudicate whether Hahn had a property right to lawfully conduct 

business in light of the easement and title dispute. Similarly, 

Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim for declaratory relief asks the Court to 

make a judicial determination of Hahn’s property rights. To do 

so, the Court would first need to decide the State’s property 

rights. 

Hahn is in reality asking the Court to adjudicate a 

property dispute between Hahn and the State of California. Hahn 

concedes in his Opposition Brief that the allegations concerning 

the easement and quiet title dispute should be deleted from his 

complaint. Pls’ Opp. at 8, lines 7-8. As explained in Parks 

Employees’ opening brief, any adjudication of Hahn’s property 

rights in relationship to the State would by necessity implicate 

the State’s property rights. Defs’ Mot. at 8-14. Because the 

State has a protectable property interest affected by the First 

and Sixth claims for relief, it is an indispensible party. As 

an indispensible party, the State of California must be joined 

where feasible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Shermoen v. United 

9 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992). However, under the 

Eleventh Amendment, this action cannot be brought against the 

State in federal court. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. 

Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977). Hahn 

makes no attempt to dispute the cases discussed in Parks 

Employees’ opening brief for this argument. As such, the proper 

forum to adjudicate the State’s and Hahn’s respective fee 

ownership and easement rights is in State Court. Accordingly, 

the claims that require an adjudication of the State’s property 

rights, the First and Sixth claims for relief, are dismissed. 

The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ First and Sixth claims for relief with prejudice. 

D. Right to Travel

 Plaintiffs request leave to amend their SAC to add a new 

theory for recovery, namely that Parks Employees violated Hahn’s 

fundamental right to interstate travel by depriving him of the 

use of Coldstream Road for commercial purposes. The Supreme 

Court has recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. 

Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 

(1986). However, burdens placed on travel generally, such as 

gasoline taxes, or minor burdens impacting interstate travel, 

such as toll roads, do not constitute a violation of that right. 

See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). 

10 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Here, Hahn does not allege that Park Employees completely 

prevented his use of public roads or that they excluded him from 

certain geographical areas. Rather, Hahn’s allegations are 

limited to his commercial operations. Hahn alleges that Park 

Employees asserted that Hahn’s rights to use Coldstream Road 

“were exclusively residential in nature.” SAC ¶ 53, p. 11, 

lines 14-19. Hahn also alleges that Park Employees asserted 

that he may only use the area within Donner Memorial State Park 

(“DMSP”) for commercial purposes if he obtains a 

concessionaire’s permit. SAC ¶ 83 at p. 2-3. 

The requirement for a concessionaire’s permit, however, 

only affects Hahn’s operation of a commercial business within 

DMSP. It does not affect Hahn’s right to travel. Here, the 

permit requirement for commercial operations is similar to the 

kind of minor burden that does not unconstitutionally impose the 

right to travel. See Lauran v. U.S. Forest Service, 141 

Fed.Appx. 515, *520, 2005 WL 1523488 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 

Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 

2006). As such, the facts underlying this dispute simply do not 

constitute a violation of the right to travel. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ request to amend to add a new theory of recovery for 

a violation of Hahn’s right to travel is DENIED. 

11 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. Malicious Prosecution

 Plaintiffs also request that this Court grant them leave to 

amend the SAC to add a claim for malicious prosecution, under 42 

U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in 

their SAC sufficiently state a claim for malicious prosecution 

based on the alleged “fraud and perjury, committed during the 

course of and for the purpose of denying Plaintiff Hahn his 

fundamental right to equal protection under the law.” Pls’ Opp. 

at 10, lines 8-10. 

 The essential elements of malicious prosecution are the 

same in criminal and civil contexts. The malicious prosecution 

plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior proceeding, 

commenced by or at the direction of the malicious prosecution 

defendant, was: (1) pursued to a legal termination favorable to 

the plaintiff; (2) brought without probable cause; and (3) 

initiated with malice. Ayala v. KC Envtl. Health, 426 F. Supp. 

2d 1070, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2006). To prevail, a malicious 

prosecution plaintiff “must show that the defendants prosecuted 

her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so 

for the purpose of denying her equal protection or another 

specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 

68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Here, Hahn fails to articulate facts that Park Employees 

denied him “equal protection or another specific constitutional 

12 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

right.” Hahn even concedes in his Opposition Brief that 

“Plaintiff [sic] have not specifically alleged that the 

conspiracy, fraud and perjury were conducted with the intent of 

depriving Plaintiff Hahn of his right to equal protection under 

the law.” Pls’ Opp. at 12, lines 4-5. Hahn’s allegations in 

the SAC are mere speculation, and are therefore insufficient to 

state a claim for malicious prosecution. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This is particularly true in 

a suit such as this one where the government-official defendants 

are entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity to free 

them from the burdens of litigation, including disruptive 

discovery. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (U.S. 

2009). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend to 

add a claim for malicious prosecution is DENIED. 

III. ORDER 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth claims for 

relief is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiffs’ request to file a third amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 8, 2010 

13 

Case 2:09-cv-01479-JAM-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/09/10 Page 13 of 13