Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02186/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02186-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN NEWS AND 

INFORMATION SERVICES, INC. et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM D. GORE, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 12CV2186 BEN (KSC)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Docket No. 95]

Defendants County of San Diego, William D. Gore, and Jan Caldwell, the only 

remaining defendants in this action, move for summary judgment on the remaining 

claims for First Amendment retaliation and failure to train. Plaintiff James C. Playford 

has filed an Opposition addressing the First Amendment retaliation claim and Defendants 

have filed a Reply. (Docket Nos. 98, 100.) Defendants argue that there is no evidence 

Gore or Caldwell directed or provided any information that encouraged the arrests of 

Plaintiff and there is strong evidence of probable cause for each arrest. Defendants 

additionally argue that the First Amendment retaliation claim is barred by Heck v. 

Humphrey. The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on both claims.

///

///

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested numerous times by San Diego County 

Sheriff’s Department (SDCSD) deputies for engaging in First Amendment activities —

videotaping matters of public interest.1 Plaintiff argues that he was targeted for arrest by 

Sheriff Gore and Sherriff’s Department Public Information Officer Caldwell because of 

these activities, although he either pleaded no contest or was found guilty at trial for all 

the relevant arrests. Following seven motions to dismiss, three motions to strike, and one 

motion to amend, two claims remain in this case: (1) First Amendment retaliation against 

Gore and Caldwell and (2) failure to train against the County and Gore.

Putting aside legal conclusions asserted as facts, the evidence produced by the 

parties is largely undisputed, at least as to issues that are material. 

I. Plaintiff’s Evidence of Animus

A. SDPD Media Credentials

Plaintiff obtained press credentials, issued by the San Diego Police Department

(“SDPD”), in 2007. (Decl. of James C. Playford and Edward A. Peruta (“PP Decl.”)2¶ 

7.) In July 2008, Plaintiff filmed an incident between SDCSD deputies and Allen Baker 

outside a bar that he posted online. (Id. ¶ 9-10.) He also testified as a witness for Baker 

in Baker’s criminal prosecution and in Baker’s civil trial against the deputies.3 Plaintiff 

says the deputies harassed and intimidated him not to testify, although there is no 

explanation of when or how. (Id. ¶ 11.) The City warned Plaintiff in August 2009 by 

letter that his press credentials were in danger of being revoked because the City had 

 

1 The Court does not consider the May 25, 2012 arrest because the Court found Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim could not proceed on the basis of that arrest, made within a crime scene 

that Plaintiff alleged he defiantly refused to leave. (See September 17, 2014 Order at 8-9.)

2 The Court notes that the declaration is combined for both Plaintiff and Peruta with specific paragraphs 

attributed to each and signed by both.

3 Defendants accurately note that the civil case that Baker, and Plaintiff initially, brought against the 

deputies resulted in a verdict for the deputies. Baker v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 09CV1194 BEN 

(WMC), Docket No. 75 (jury verdict in favor of deputies).

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received information from SDCSD concerning Plaintiff’s questionable recollection of 

facts in complaints and court actions.4 (Id. ¶ 13.) The letter cited a SDPD policy 

indicating media credentials could be revoked if the holder refused to follow an order 

from police or fire department personnel that interfered with an investigation. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

In October 2009, Plaintiff posted video of what Plaintiff describes as a makeshift brothel 

in McGonigle Canyon that the SDPD, not the SDCSD, had denied existed. (Id. ¶¶ 119.) 

Plaintiff’s media credentials were not renewed in January 2010. 

B. Plaintiff’s Photograph

Caldwell testified that she provided the lobby deputies at the Sheriff’s 

Administrative Center a photograph of Plaintiff out of concern for deputy safety. 

(Caldwell Dep. at 66:2-9.) Caldwell was not directed by her supervisors to provide the 

photo. (Id. 68:21-25; Decl. of Jan Caldwell ¶ 3.) She indicates it was based on her own 

and on others’ interactions with Plaintiff in which he was aggressive, argumentative, and 

caustic. (Id. 67:8-68:17.) With the exception of the funeral noted below, Caldwell 

indicates she did not disseminate the photograph beyond the lobby deputies and 

instructed them no further than letting them know the photograph was being provided for 

deputy safety. (Caldwell Dep. 71:9-25; 72:22-73:6; Caldwell Decl. ¶ 4; Supplemental 

Decl. of Jan Caldwell (“Supplemental Caldwell Decl.”) ¶ 2.) That building was of 

specific concern because Plaintiff came in frequently. (Caldwell Dep. at 72:1-8.) A 

photograph was provided to the Miramar base in 2015 (not to deny access, but just to be 

aware of who he was) when a funeral for the former Sheriff was being held there. (Id.

74:12-24.) 

The parties dispute when Caldwell provided a photograph of Plaintiff to the lobby 

deputies. In her deposition, taken in March 2016 Caldwell initially indicates that she 

 

4 At some point in time, Caldwell contacted the SDPD public information officer about Plaintiff and his 

behavior, (Dep. of Jan Caldwell (“Caldwell Dep.”) 40:9-41:3), however, it is unclear if this was the 

same contact referenced in the August 2009 letter. 

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provided a photograph “a few years ago.” (Id. 65:9-12.) When asked for a more specific 

time, she indicates she does not remember. (Id. 65:21-66:1.) In her Declaration in 

support of Defendants’ Motion, she indicates she provided the photograph to the front 

desk out of security concerns on May 31, 2012, shortly after Plaintiff’s arrest in a 

multiple-fatality accident scene on May 25, 2012 and his increasingly aggressive 

behavior. (Caldwell Decl. ¶ 4.) In Opposition, Plaintiff relies on his Declaration that he 

took a picture of a photograph of him at the Sheriff’s Administrative Center in 2009-2010 

with a handwritten note stating “Per Jan Caldwell, J.C. Playford is no longer ‘Media.’” 

(PP Decl. ¶ 23.) He also indicates in a different paragraph of his Declaration that the 

photograph was provided in 2010 when his media credentials were not renewed. (Id. ¶ 

21.) The picture he took was included in a March 30, 2011 examiner.com article. (Id. ¶ 

24.) However, after reviewing that photograph, submitted in opposition to the Motion, 

Caldwell indicates that it is not the photograph she provided, she does not recognize that 

photograph, and she does not know who provided it. (Supplemental Caldwell Decl. ¶ 1.) 

Caldwell attached a copy of the email she sent with Plaintiff’s photograph on May 31, 

2012 to her Supplemental Declaration. 

II. Arrests

A. February 28, 2010

The following summary of events on February 28, 2010 is based primarily on the 

Declaration of Deputy Thomas Seiver. (Decl. of Thomas Seiver (“Seiver Decl.”).) Any 

variations or particular points raised by Plaintiff are included; however, the facts of the 

February 28, 2010 encounter are largely undisputed. Seiver was standing on the shoulder 

of a road between two patrol cars with Deputy Jason Ward and was attempting to 

interview an individual who had been brandishing a handgun at a residence in Ramona. 

(Seiver Decl. ¶¶ 2-3). As the interview began, Plaintiff began yelling from across the 

street while holding a video camera. (Id. ¶ 3.) The deputies tried to ignore him, but the 

individual being interviewed became nervous, began focusing on Plaintiff, and stopped 

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responding to Seiver’s questions. (Id.) Plaintiff then crossed the street and approached 

one of the patrol cars. (Id.) Seiver asked him to move away several times. (Id.) Plaintiff 

initially moved away a little, however, he returned to the same spot within a couple of 

minutes. (Id.) At this point, Seiver had to stop the interview because the individual was 

so upset that Plaintiff was there. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff was hostile and acting irrational. 

(Id. ¶ 4.) Seiver again asked him to move back so he could complete the interview. (Id.) 

After arguing with Seiver for several minutes, Plaintiff refused to move. (Id.) Seiver 

moved toward Plaintiff and directed him to move back. (Id.) Plaintiff eventually did, but 

continued yelling at the deputies and the individual as they attempted to complete the 

interview. (Id.) Seiver did not stop Plaintiff from filming. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff largely does not dispute these facts. He adds that the deputies did not 

demand that the individual being interviewed be interviewed in a non-public area and that 

the area was not cordoned by law enforcement. (PP Decl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff additionally 

declares that Ward observed that the nearest Plaintiff came to Seiver was 10-15 feet.5 

(PP Decl. ¶ 31.) He also emphasizes, consistent with Seiver’s declaration, that he was 

not arrested at the scene. (PP Decl. ¶ 34; Seiver Decl. ¶ 6.) 

After reviewing his audio recording of the event, Seiver requested a warrant for 

violation of Penal Code § 148 — delaying or obstructing an officer. (Seiver Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Seiver specifically indicates in his Declaration that he requested the warrant because he 

believed Plaintiff had obstructed and delayed his investigation and the arrest was not in 

retaliation for anything.6 (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10.) He also indicates that he was not directed by 

 

5 This is not entirely accurate. Deputy Ward’s report of his observations was that Plaintiff was 

approximately ten feet from him. (PP Decl., Ex. 6.) The witness statements in the report indicate those 

witnesses observed Plaintiff within 10-15 feet from the deputies and 15 feet from the witness. (Id.) As 

Plaintiff is the non-moving party, the Court will assume that Plaintiff came within 10-15 feet of the 

deputies.

6 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges that Seiver arrested him, in part, because 

Plaintiff filed an Internal Affairs complaint against Seiver over this interaction. However, in moving for 

summary judgment Defendants produced evidence that no Internal Affairs complaint was ever filed by 

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anyone to make the arrest. (Id. ¶ 10.) Caldwell similarly indicates that she never gave 

any direction to deputies regarding Plaintiff’s arrests nor did Gore give her any direction 

regarding Plaintiff. (Caldwell Decl. ¶ 3; Supplemental Caldwell Decl. ¶ 3.) 

In a trial consolidated with another § 148 charge for the March 9, 2010 arrest, 

discussed below, the jury deadlocked. (Def.’s Notice of Lodgment, Ex. D, [ECF No. 95-

7 at 74].) Plaintiff then pleaded no contest to disturbing the peace, California Penal Code 

§ 415(2). (Ex. D [ECF No. 95-7 at 81].)

B. March 9, 2010

On March 9, 2010, Seiver was speaking to a woman in an Albertson’s parking lot 

in Ramona who was suicidal and threatening to kill others. (Id. ¶ 7.) She was mentally 

disturbed and Seiver was trying to determine if she needed to be taken into custody 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150. (Id.) Seiver was trying to get her into 

the patrol car voluntarily to avoid the use of force. (Id.) She had agreed to go to the 

patrol car, but as they walked that way, she commented that she did not want her picture 

taken. (Id.) Plaintiff was filming them and asking her questions. (Id.) As they got 

closer, Seiver told Plaintiff to stay back. (Id.) The woman was getting angry and said 

she was going to grab the camera. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to move out of the way, started

arguing with Seiver, and advanced toward them. (Id.) Seiver told him to get back 

several times, but when he was about 10 feet away, the woman screamed and charged at 

Plaintiff. (Id.) Seiver put himself between them and another deputy had to get control of 

the woman. (Id.) After the deputies calmed down the woman and had placed her in the 

patrol car, Plaintiff was arrested for violating Penal Code § 148. (Id. ¶ 9.) As with the 

prior arrest, Seiver indicates that he did not prevent Plaintiff from filming, he arrested 

him based on his conduct at the scene, the arrest was not in retaliation for anything, and 

 

Plaintiff against Seiver. (Declaration of Jeff Duckworth ¶¶ 2, 6.) Plaintiff does not dispute this in his 

Opposition. 

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he was not directed by anyone to make the arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Again, Plaintiff does not 

dispute these facts in any way. He says he did not interfere, but does not dispute Seiver’s 

version of the interaction. (PP Decl. ¶ 39.) Additionally, Plaintiff notes, as with the prior 

incident, the interview was taking place in a public area. (Id. ¶ 36.) 

As noted above, this charge was consolidated with the charge for the February 28, 

2010 incident. After the jury deadlocked, Plaintiff pleaded no contest to disturbing the 

peace.

C. December 1, 2011

On December 1, 2011, Deputy Brendan Cook encountered Plaintiff at the site of a 

bomb threat at the Vista office of a Congressman, where Cook was helping evacuate 

people and maintain a safe perimeter. (Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A, 1-53, 1-

56-57.) One of the people Cook was evacuating pointed out Plaintiff and said that he had 

been with protesters earlier (there had been a protest earlier in the day) and that Plaintiff 

was in the building right before the bomb threat. (Id. 1-58.) Cook observed Plaintiff 

walking at a hurried pace towards the perimeter wearing jeans covered with grease and 

oil. (Id. 1-59.) This concerned Cook because, according to Cook, building bombs could 

involve getting dirty. (Id.) At the time Cook encountered him, Plaintiff had walked 

within the perimeter past at least one patrol car. (Id.) He was filming with a hand-held 

camera intermittently. (Id. 1-60-61.) Cook told Plaintiff he needed to stop and back out 

of the perimeter. (Id. at 1-60) Plaintiff began arguing with Cook, but did back out. (Id.)

7

 

Cook then tried to talk to him, but Plaintiff refused to give his name after being asked 

numerous times. (Id. 1-61.) 

 

7 Cook indicated that Plaintiff had progressed passed at least one patrol car that was serving as a 

perimeter and may have passed a second. Plaintiff declares that he did not “progress[] beyond the 

established motor vehicle detour point or yellow police-tape cordoned boundaries.” (PP Decl. ¶ 45.) 

These versions are not necessarily in conflict and even if they are, the dispute is not material because 

Plaintiff did back out of the perimeter and the encounter with Cook proceeded outside the perimeter. 

(Ex. A at 1-60.) 

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Plaintiff was not detained or arrested at this point. However, Cook became 

concerned that Plaintiff might be trying to detonate a bomb because he was holding up 

his cell phone and the camera and aiming both at the doors where the bomb was 

suspected to be located. (Id. 1-63-64.) Plaintiff does not dispute this is what he did, but 

emphasizes that there were other individuals in the vicinity that were using cell phones. 

(PP Decl. ¶¶ 46, 48.) Cook told Plaintiff to “hang up” the phone four or five times and he 

did not. (Id. 1-65.) Cook then took Plaintiff’s phone and closed it, took his camera and 

put it down, detained Plaintiff, and asked Plaintiff to sit on the ground. (Id. 1-65-66) 

Plaintiff refused to answer whether he was carrying any weapons and was yelling and 

screaming at Cook. (Id.) Eventually, after Plaintiff refused numerous requests to sit 

down, Cook physically sat him down and put him in handcuffs. (Id. 1-66, 1-68.) 

Plaintiff continued to refuse to provide answers such as his name, his reason for being

there, whether he was carrying weapons, and whether he was going to detonate a bomb. 

(Id. 1-68.) When Cook explained that he took Plaintiff’s cell phone because he was 

worried Plaintiff was detonating a bomb, Plaintiff began screaming and yelling that Cook

was crazy, but still did not indicate who he was or why he was there. (Id. 1-69.) 

At some point Plaintiff said he was a reporter with a news station and asked people 

in the crowd to call the news station. (Id. 1-69-70.) When Cook asked if he was a 

reporter, Plaintiff refused to answer. (Id. 1-71.) Cook had no idea who Plaintiff was 

before this encounter and had not been briefed about him. (Id. 1-77.) According to 

Edward Peruta, President of American News, Cook contacted him to verify Plaintiff’s 

media status and Peruta verified Plaintiff was issued media credentials by American 

News. (PP Decl. ¶¶ 49-50.) 

Cook had to call in other units from evacuation and perimeter responsibilities to 

assist Cook with Plaintiff. (Id. at 1-74.) Cook was the only law enforcement personnel 

on the west perimeter at that time. (Id. 1-66, 1-71.) 

///

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At trial, Plaintiff argued a First Amendment defense — that he did not do anything 

wrong because everything he did was protected by the First Amendment and Cook was 

not lawfully performing his duties when he detained and arrested Plaintiff. (Id. 2-82-89.) 

Plaintiff was found guilty of violating § 148(a)(1) by a jury. (Def.’s Ex. B, ECF 95-7 at 

3.) Plaintiff raised his First Amendment rights on appeal as well. (Def.’s Ex. C, 

Appellant’s Brief.) His conviction was unanimously affirmed. (Id. 051.) 

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . . The evidence of 

the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 

favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

157 (1970)). However, the inferences that may be drawn are not limitless. T.W. Elec. 

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1987). Inferences 

must be based on specific facts and only “‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’” inferences may be 

drawn. Id.; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th 

Cir. 1989). 

A moving party bears the initial burden of showing there are no genuine issues of 

material fact. Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citing T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630). The moving party can do so by negating

an essential element of the non-moving party’s case, or by showing that the non-moving 

party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s 

case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to 

show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Horphag Research Ltd., 475 F.3d at 1035. 

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“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes 

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As a 

general rule, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” will be insufficient to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for the non-moving party. Id. at 252. “Summary judgment procedure is properly 

regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the 

Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 

determination of every action.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 327 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).

I. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim is premised on the idea that he was 

arrested at these scenes because he showed up at crime scenes and filmed deputies. But, 

the undisputed evidence establishes that he was not arrested in retaliation for filming 

these events or because the SDCSD, or Gore, or Caldwell was retaliating against him for 

other times he was filming. He was arrested for interfering with these deputies’ ability to 

investigate and respond to dangerous situations and crimes, not for filming.8 

“In order to establish a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, [a 

plaintiff’s] evidence must demonstrate that the [defendants]’ conduct would chill a 

 

8 The Court notes that Penal Code § 148, the statute Plaintiff was charged with violating, was recently 

amended to add a subsection (g). It provides:

The fact that a person takes a photograph or makes an audio or video recording of 

a public officer or peace officer, while the officer is in a public place or the person 

taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place he or she has the right 

to be, does not constitute, in and of itself, a violation of subdivision (a), nor does it 

constitute reasonable suspicion to detain the person or probable cause to arrest the 

person

Cal. Penal Code § 148(g) (emphasis added). Based on the undisputed evidence of the events leading to 

Plaintiff’s arrests, he was not arrested for filming “in and of itself.” Id. He was arrested for defying 

deputies’ directions to back away and get out of the way because his conduct was preventing them from 

doing their jobs — interviewing an individual about a crime, securing a potentially mentally ill 

individual without the use of force, and securing a bomb threat location. 

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person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activity.” Ford v. City of 

Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 

F.3d 1221, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2006)). “In addition, the evidence must enable [a plaintiff] 

ultimately to prove that the [defendant’s] desire to chill his speech was a but-for cause of 

their allegedly unlawful conduct.” Id. (citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 639 F.3d 896, 

916-17 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

A. Causation

The absence of causation as to Gore and Caldwell is dispositive. It is a narrow 

issue because this Motion only concerns Gore and Caldwell. The Court must determine 

whether Plaintiff has put forth evidence that Gore or Caldwell retaliated against him for 

engaging in First Amendment activities. There is no evidence that Gore or Caldwell 

directed, encouraged, or otherwise had anything to do with any of Plaintiff’s arrests. 

The only evidence of Caldwell’s involvement is that she provided a photograph of 

Plaintiff to the lobby deputies at the Sheriff’s Administrative Center. This is insufficient 

in numerous respects. First, the evidence reflects that Caldwell did not provide a 

photograph of Plaintiff until 2012, after all of his arrests. Caldwell had never seen the 

photograph Plaintiff saw at the desk in 2010 and did not provide it. A photograph 

provided after Plaintiff’s arrests cannot show retaliatory animus for his arrests. Second, 

even if the Court assumes Caldwell did deliver the photograph in 2010, it only indicates 

Plaintiff was no longer considered “media,” consistent with his media credentials not 

being renewed. This single photograph, observed only at this location, is not sufficient to 

infer that Caldwell directed or encouraged Plaintiff’s arrests in retaliation for videotaping 

deputies. This is particularly the case when the arresting deputies indicate they arrested 

him only for interfering with their duties and not in retaliation for anything. Nor is it 

consistent with the deputies’ responses to his videotaping at the first two arrests — he 

was never asked to stop filming. He was only asked to move further away as to the first 

and out of the way of a mentally ill individual being escorted to a patrol car as to the 

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second. There is no evidence as to Gore’s involvement in any of Plaintiff’s arrests or that 

he otherwise had any involvement in any matters related to Plaintiff.

No reasonable juror could find from the undisputed facts that Caldwell or Gore 

was the but-for cause of Plaintiff’s arrests.

B. Probable Cause and Retaliatory Motive

When there is “very strong evidence of probable cause and very weak evidence of 

retaliatory motive,” a First Amendment retaliation claim cannot survive summary 

judgment. Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(distinguishing Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1231 (finding a First Amendment retaliation claim 

could proceed despite probable cause for arrest when evidence of probable cause was 

weak and evidence of retaliatory motive was strong)). As the Ninth Circuit has 

explained, if such claims could survive summary judgment, “nearly every retaliatory First 

Amendment claim would survive summary judgment [because] there is almost always a 

weak inference of retaliation whenever a plaintiff and a defendant have had previous 

negative interactions.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s evidence of retaliatory motive is weak because it the inference is based 

on nothing more than previous negative interactions, most of which have no connection 

to Gore or Caldwell. Plaintiff’s media credentials were not renewed by SDPD. Neither 

Gore nor Caldwell issued or revoked Plaintiff’s SDPD media credentials. Plaintiff 

himself points to his reporting of a brothel SDPD had claimed did not exist as a motive 

for retaliation, but there is no evidence connecting that to Gore or Caldwell. Similarly, 

there is no evidence connecting Caldwell or Gore to SDPD’s reference to SDCSD in its 

August 2009 letter. Caldwell contacted SDPD at some point about Plaintiff’s credentials, 

but there is no evidence connecting that contact to SDPD’s warning letter. As to the 

lobby photograph of Plaintiff, as explained above, even if the Court assumes Caldwell 

did provide a photograph of Plaintiff to the lobby deputies in 2010, there is no evidence it 

was disseminated any further by Caldwell or Gore, or anyone else, and particularly not to 

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the arresting deputies. Additionally, assuming there was some connection between Gore 

or Caldwell and Plaintiff’s arrests, the evidence of retaliatory motive is weakened further 

by the fact that Plaintiff was never stopped from filming during the February 28 and 

March 9 incidents and was only stopped at the third incident because the deputy thought 

he might be trying to detonate a bomb.

There is strong evidence of probable cause for each arrest. As to the first arrest, 

Plaintiff interfered with Seiver’s efforts to interview an individual about a crime. His 

conduct was distracting the individual being interviewed to the point that the individual

stopped responding to Seiver’s questions. Seiver had to stop the interview numerous 

times to direct Plaintiff away. Plaintiff defied Seiver’s directions to move further away, 

returning within a couple minutes to the same spot. Plaintiff seems to claim that his 

interference was the deputies’ fault because they failed to demand that the interview be 

completed in a non-public place. Although Plaintiff’s obstruction and delay of the 

deputies might be even clearer if he had been in a cordoned-off or non-public area, his 

interference, as it was, provided probable cause for his arrest. 

As to the second arrest, Plaintiff clearly ignored Seiver’s directive to get out of the 

way as the deputy tried to move a suicidal individual threatening to kill others into a 

patrol car without using force. Instead, Plaintiff advanced as Seiver directed him back. 

Plaintiff’s advance aggravated the unstable individual. Again, Seiver did not attempt to 

stop Plaintiff from filming. Plaintiff had advanced within ten feet when the suicidal 

individual charged Plaintiff, requiring the physical altercation Seiver was attempting to 

avoid. Again, Plaintiff notes it was a public parking lot, but in this instance, Seiver was 

trying to persuade the suicidal individual into a patrol car, the sort of non-public space 

Plaintiff suggests is a prerequisite for his conduct to have actually delayed or obstructed

an officer performing his duties. 

///

///

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As to the third arrest, Plaintiff was convicted of the crime for which he was 

arrested. In California, a conviction is conclusive evidence of probable cause. 9 Plumley 

v. Mockett, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1052 (2d Dist. 2008). The facts of the arrest only 

strengthen the evidence of probable cause. The Court will not repeat the facts laid out 

above, but Plaintiff defied the directions of a deputy evacuating people and attempting to 

secure a perimeter for a bomb threat. The deputy was concerned Plaintiff might be 

attempting to detonate a bomb. Plaintiff’s only basis to dispute probable cause for this 

arrest is that other people were using cell phones too. However, other people had not 

been pointed out as being of concern by an evacuating individual and other people were 

not aiming their cell phone and camera directly at the location where the bomb was 

suspected to be. 

The Court does not discount that Plaintiff has had negative interactions with 

SDCSD. However, as described above, there is strong evidence of probable cause and 

weak evidence of retaliatory motive by Gore or Caldwell. “[H]olding that this case 

survives summary judgment would provide almost no ‘protection for government 

officials from the disruption caused by unfounded claims.’” Dietrich, 548 F.3d at 901

(citing Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1232). 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim is barred as to the third arrest by Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, a plaintiff cannot “recover damages for [an] allegedly 

 

9 The Court does not address the implications of Plaintiff’s no contest plea for evaluating probable cause 

because Defendants failed to address it. In Opposition, Plaintiff emphasized he did not plead guilty as 

represented by Defendants, but rather, pleaded no contest as to the first two arrests and argued California 

Penal Code § 1016 prohibits the use of a nolo contendere plea for a non-felony in civil suits. Defendants 

did not address this issue. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s indignation at the suggestion he 

pleaded guilty is misplaced. While the Court agrees he pleaded no contest based on the undisputed 

record, the confusion is of Plaintiff’s own making. The Amended Complaint, Second Amended 

Complaint, and TAC all allege he “pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace.” (AC ¶ 99; SAC ¶ 103; TAC 

¶ 98 (emphasis added).) And more significantly, Plaintiff’s Declaration filed in support of his 

Opposition to this Motion states, “I . . . accepted the plea bargain, and pleaded guilty to disturbing the 

peace.” (PP Decl. ¶ 42 (emphasis added).) 

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unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless the conviction has 

been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. 512 U.S. at 486-87. In short, the Court 

“must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction.” Hooper v. Cnty. of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1130 

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). “If the answer is yes, the suit is barred.” Id. Here, a 

judgment in favor of Plaintiff based on the third arrest would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction because the facts asserted at his trial, including that other 

people were using cell phones is the same. Plaintiff raised a First Amendment defense at 

trial and the First Amendment was the basis for his unsuccessful appeal of his conviction. 

If the Court were to find that Plaintiff’s arrest was in retaliation for his First Amendment 

activities rather than for his violation of the law, it “would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction.” Id.

The Court grants summary judgment to Caldwell and Gore on Plaintiff’s claim for 

First Amendment retaliation.

II. Failure to Train

The failure to train claim is asserted against Gore and the County. Plaintiff’s 

Opposition does not address the failure to train claim, however, the Court may not grant 

summary judgment by default. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 

2013). “In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain 

employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizen’s rights may rise to the level of 

an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 61 (2011) (“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most 

tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”). The “failure to train . . . must 

amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained 

employees come into contact.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 

(1989)). Under this standard, a municipal actor would have to be on notice of “an 

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omission in their training program that causes . . . employees to violate citizens’ 

constitutional rights.” Id. Generally, a pattern of similar violations is necessary because 

the conduct does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference unless the decisionmakers 

have notice of the deficiency and elect not to do anything. Id. at 62. 

Here, there is no evidence of any constitutional violation, certainly not a pattern of 

constitutional violations, that would provide notice of a deficiency in training. Plaintiff’s 

pleas and convictions for each of his arrests would also suggest that there are no 

constitutional violations taking place, i.e. to the extent Plaintiff’s arrests could provide 

notice of a deficiency, it is dispelled by his pleas and convictions on those arrests. 

Additionally, the only evidence in the record as to training does not reflect a deficiency. 

Seiver indicated in his declaration that he knows based on his training that law 

enforcement activities in public are subject to being filmed and he has never prevented 

anyone from filming him in the performance of his duties. (Seiver Decl. ¶ 11.) Cook 

indicated anyone can film as long as they are outside the perimeter. (Ex. A at 1-63.) The 

only evidence in the record on training does not suggest any deficiency.

The Court grants summary judgment to Gore and the County on Plaintiff’s claim 

for failure to train.

CONCLUSION

The Motion is GRANTED. The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants 

Gore, Caldwell, and the County on Plaintiff’s remaining claims for First Amendment 

retaliation and failure to train. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2016

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