Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00319/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00319-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Bryant and Andrea Bryant, 

individually and as husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

The City of Goodyear; William R. 

Newman, Jr. and Jane Doe Newman, 

husband and wife, Mark Brown and Jane 

Doe Brown, husband and wife; Ralph 

McLaughlin and Jane Doe McLaughlin, 

husband and wife; and Jeff Rogers and Jane 

Doe Rogers, husband and wife, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-00319-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 89). The Court 

now rules on the Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 15, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants (Doc. 1). 

On June 5, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants. (Doc. 6). 

In September 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and a Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment. In May 2013, the Court granted the Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment and granted the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 81). In its Order, the 

Court found that certain state law claims asserted by Plaintiffs were barred because 

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Plaintiffs failed to properly comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim statute, Arizona 

Revised Statutes section 12-821.01. (Id.). The Court granted summary judgment as to 

those state law claims. The Court also granted the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

Amended Complaint. The Court noted that, although Plaintiffs included various facts in 

their complaint and listed various constitutional violations, Plaintiffs failed to allege or 

explain how the facts alleged supported their legal theories. (Id.). The Court nonetheless 

granted Plaintiffs leave to amend, but warned that Plaintiffs needed to correct the 

deficiencies in any amended complaint. (Id.). 

 Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for partial reconsideration of the Order partially 

granting the summary judgment motion. (Doc. 85). Plaintiffs argued that, to the extent 

the Court granted judgment on the state law claims because they filed their complaint 

before serving their notice of claim, that judgment was in error.1

 The Court denied the 

Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 108). 

 On May 28, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 84). In 

their Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 84), Plaintiffs allege as follows: 

 In 2001, Plaintiff David Bryant (“Mr. Bryant”) joined the Goodyear Police 

Department. (Doc. 84 at ¶ 19). In 2008, Mr. Bryant was promoted to sergeant. (Id. at ¶ 

21). Mr. Bryant routinely received performance reviews describing him as an exemplary 

employee and police officer and he was awarded numerous commendations. (Id. at ¶ 22). 

In 2009, Mr. Bryant applied for and received a position of Sergeant of the Street Crimes 

Unit of the Goodyear Police Department (the “SCU”), where he had direct supervision 

over the four officers in the SCU. (Id. at ¶ 23). Because the unit was a new entity, at the 

time of the events referenced in the complaint, there was no Goodyear Police Department 

policy in place for the SCU and Sergeant Bryant was in the process of drafting such a 

policy. (Id. at ¶ 25). The nature of SCU work meant that its officers were often out of 

1

 Although this was one basis for the dismissal of certain state law claims against 

certain Defendants, the Court also granted judgment on certain state law claims against 

certain Defendants because those claims accrued more than 180 days before Plaintiffs 

served any of the Defendants with a notice of claim. (Doc. 81). 

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the station in undercover operations that caused them to be “off the grid.” (Id. at ¶ 28). 

Mr. Bryant was required to perform duties outside the unit’s normal hours of service and, 

in addition to his responsibility for the SCU, Mr. Bryant supervised three non-SCU 

officers, oversaw the Goodyear Police Department’s off-duty program, and occasionally 

covered Parol Sergeant duties. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-30). 

 In 2010, Mr. Bryant was preparing the SCU for an operation that required the SCU 

to raid a facility and serve search warrants the following morning at 5:30 a.m. (Id. at ¶ 

33). Because of the danger involved in the next day’s operation and the early timeframe, 

Mr. Bryant, with the permission of Commander Cusson, allowed the SCU to go home 

early in the afternoon to be with their families and rest for the upcoming operation. (Id. 

at ¶ 34). The enforcement operation the following day took approximately 15 hours 

making up for the early release the day before. (Id. at ¶ 35). 

 A news story about a City of Phoenix police officer arrested for putting in time 

while performing off-duty jobs scared SCU officers and, as a result, those officers 

reported to Bryant’s supervisor that they put down ten hours on the day they were 

released early, but only worked five hours. (Id. at 36). Those officers claimed that Mr. 

Bryant told them such action was “blessed” by his superiors. (Id.). Mr. Bryant denies 

that statement. (Id.). Those reports triggered an internal affairs investigation. (Id.). 

 The internal affairs investigation was led by Defendant Sergeant Rogers 

(“Rogers”). (Id. at ¶ 37). Rogers had little experience in internal affairs investigations 

and had not attended internal affairs trainings at the time he started the investigation of 

Mr. Bryant. (Id.). Rogers’ investigation culminated in a criminal referral against Mr. 

Bryant. (Id. at 38). Rogers violated Goodyear Police Department policy because he did 

not end the internal affairs investigation once the criminal investigation was started and 

failed to bring exculpatory information the attention of criminal investigators. (Id. at 38). 

Rogers also leaked information regarding the internal investigation to Mr. Bryant’s union 

representative in an attempt to force Mr. Bryant off the force. (Id. at 38). 

 Defendant Ralph McLaughlin (“McLaughlin) directed Defendant William 

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Newman (“Newman”) to perform the criminal investigation. (Id. at ¶ 39). Defendant 

Newman later provided false testimony to a Grand Jury regarding Mr. Bryant. (Id. at ¶ 

40). McLaughlin leaked the indictment issued by the Grand Jury.2

 (Id. at ¶ 41). 

Defendant Mark Brown (“Brown”) approved of this leak. (Id.). Feeling singled out and 

unwelcome at Goodyear Police Department, Mr. Bryant accepted a job as head of 

security at a large warehouse firm. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-43). 

 McLaughlin then held a press conference regarding the indictment against Bryant, 

where Mr. Bryant’s picture was repeatedly shown in connection with a 17-count felony 

indictment. (Id. at ¶¶ 45, 47). Mr. Bryant was scheduled to begin his new job the day 

after the press conference aired, but, before he started, his new employers informed him 

he could no longer work for them. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47). After its investigation, the Maricopa 

County Attorney’s Office voluntarily moved to dismiss all charges against Bryant. (Id. at 

¶ 51). 

 In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert twenty-five claims of 

violations of federal and state law against Defendants. 

 Defendants now move to dismiss Counts 1-4, 6-7, and 9-25 of the Amended 

Complaint. Defendants have not moved to dismiss counts 5 or 8 as alleged against 

Defendant Newman and Defendant McLaughlin, respectively. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) for 

two reasons: 1) lack of a cognizable legal theory and 2) insufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep=t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must 

 

2

 Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs do not allege to whom Defendant 

McLaughlin allegedly leaked the Grand Jury indictment. Based on subsequent 

allegations, the Court will assume, solely for the purposes of this Order, the allegation is 

that Defendant McLaughlin leaked the Grand Jury indictment to one or more members of 

the media. However, the Court should not make (or have to make) such unwarranted, 

unsupported inferences. 

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meet the requirements of Rule 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice 

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

 A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, 

states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility exists if the 

pleader pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal 

“probability,” but plausibility requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully. Id. 

 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the 

facts alleged in a complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint, and 

the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Shwarz v. United 

States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 III. ANALYSIS 

 A. COUNTS 17-25 

Defendants seek to dismiss Counts 17-25 because Plaintiffs failed to properly 

comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim Statute. Count 17 is a state law malicious 

prosecution claim against Defendant Rogers; Count 18 is a state law malicious 

prosecution claim against Defendant City of Goodyear; Count 19 is a state law abuse of 

process claim against Defendant Rogers; Count 20 is a state law abuse of process claim 

against Defendant City of Goodyear; Count 21 is an intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claim against Defendant Rogers; Count 22 is an intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim against Defendant City of Goodyear; Count 23 is a gross 

negligence claim against Defendant Rogers, Count 24 is a gross negligence claim against 

the City of Goodyear, and Count 25 is a claim for aiding and abetting tortious activity 

against Defendant Rogers. (Doc. 84). 

 In response to Defendants’ argument that Counts 17-25 should be dismissed, 

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Plaintiffs argue that, for the reasons articulated in their Motion for Reconsideration of the 

Court’s prior Order, they did comply with the Notice of Claim statute. Plaintiffs filed 

their Response to the Motion to Dismiss before the Court ruled on their Motion for 

Reconsideration. However, pursuant to the Court’s analysis in its Order on Defendants’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 81) and the Court’s Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 108), 

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim statute. 

 Plaintiffs argue alternatively that, even if they failed to comply with Arizona’s 

Notice of Claim statute, Defendants should be estopped from arguing that they failed to 

comply because Defendants did not bring this motion until “June of 2013, after almost a 

full year of discovery.” (Doc. 100 at 3). In Response, Defendants argue that waiver is 

inapplicable here because, at all times during this litigation, they have acted consistent 

with the intention to assert a Notice of Claim statute defense and asserted their defense 

under the NOC statute as soon as it was procedurally appropriate. 

 “The [Arizona] notice of claim statute is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable 

tolling.” Jones v. Cochise County, 187 P.3d 97, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). “Waiver by conduct must be established by evidence of 

acts inconsistent with an intent to assert the right. A party may assert an affirmative 

defense in its pleadings and still waive that defense by conduct.” Id. (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). “Waiver may be found when a governmental entity has taken 

substantial action to litigate the merits of the claim that would not have been necessary 

had the entity promptly raised the defense.” Id. at 105. 

 Defendants were served with the Amended Complaint in June 2012. Defendants 

listed failure to comply with the Notice of Claim statute as an affirmative defense in their 

Answer to the Amended Complaint, which they filed on July 30, 2012. In September 

2012, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ state law 

claims, wherein Defendants sought summary judgment based on Plaintiffs’ failure to 

comply with the Notice of Claim statute. The Court had this Motion under advisement 

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until May 6, 2013. On May 28, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint and, on 

June 19, 2013, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss seeking to dismiss the state 

law claims based on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim statute. 

 Plaintiffs argue that, before Defendants filed their Partial Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Defendants sent written discovery requests to Plaintiffs and made their initial 

disclosures. Plaintiffs further argue that, after Defendants filed their Partial Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Defendants continued to engage in discovery. Plaintiffs argue that 

these actions are inconsistent with intent to assert the Notice of Claims statute as an 

affirmative defense. 

 With regard to Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants waived their defense because 

they continued to engage in discovery after they filed their Partial Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Plaintiffs’ reasoning in wholly without merit. Discovery in this case was not 

stayed by an order of the Court pending the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Partial Motion 

for Summary Judgment. If Defendants failed to engage in discovery in anticipation of 

this Court’s possible rulings on their Motion for Summary Judgment, they would have 

run afoul of this Court’s Orders. This Court will not find waiver on the basis that 

Defendants continued to engage in discovery pending this Court’s decision on pending 

motions. 

 Moreover, failure to comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim statute is a factintensive issue, which was not apparent on the face of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

On July 30, 2012, Defendants raised that issue as an affirmative defense in their Answer 

and moved for summary judgment pursuant to that affirmative defense on September 14, 

2012. Under these circumstances, the Court does not find Defendants’ conduct to be 

inconsistent with an intent to assert the affirmative defense of failure to comply with 

Arizona’s Notice of Claim statute. 

 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 17-25 is granted. 

 B. COUNT ONE 

Defendants next seek to dismiss Count One of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

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Complaint. Count One of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is alleged against 

Defendant Rogers and is entitled “Civil Rights Violation 42 U.S.C. §1983.” The two 

substantive allegations under this Count are: 

 Rogers, in his role as police sergeant for the City of 

Goodyear, under the color of state law, wrongfully instigated 

a criminal investigation into the working hours of Plaintiff 

David Bryant without probable cause. 

. . . 

 Rogers’ actions as described above led to Bryant’s 

illegal arrest in violation of Bryant’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment protections against unreasonable seizure of a 

person. 

(Doc. 84 at ¶¶ 122-123). 

 Defendants argue that Count One fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted because it is not clear what legal theory Plaintiffs are attempting to assert. 

Defendants argue that, if Plaintiffs intended to allege a claim related to the initiation of an 

investigation, such claim must fail because there is no legally cognizable § 1983 claim 

for the initiation of a criminal investigation without probable cause. Defendants further 

argue that, to the extent Count One was intended to be an illegal seizure claim, that claim 

must fail because Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that Mr. Bryant was ever seized. 

 In Response, Plaintiffs argue that the Second Amended Complaint “contains 

allegations supporting a claim for unreasonable seizure in violation of Bryant’s Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Plaintiffs argue that, because the Second Amended 

Complaint alleges that an indictment was issued, reasonable inferences to be made are 

that a summons was issued and that Bryant was booked and released. Plaintiffs further 

argue that “Bryant was prohibited from traveling out of state without prior order of the 

court,” which can be a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

 Although Plaintiffs argue that it can be inferred from the fact that an Indictment 

issued that Mr. Bryant was “booked and released,” it is not clear to the Court that such an 

inference is inevitable. Moreover, requiring Defendants and the Court to make inferences 

from the facts alleged in the complaint in order to state a claim is insufficient to survive a 

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motion to dismiss. Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(stating that conclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss.). Moreover, although Plaintiffs argue that “Bryant was prohibited 

from traveling out of state without prior order of the court,” Plaintiffs did not include any 

such allegations in their Second Amended Complaint. Further, although Plaintiffs allege 

that Rogers initiated a criminal investigation against Mr. Bryant, Plaintiffs include no 

allegations or argument that would lead the Court to conclude that Rogers is responsible 

for an illegal seizure of Mr. Bryant. 

 As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support a legally 

cognizable claim under the Fourth Amendment and, thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Count One is granted. 

 C. COUNTS TWO, FOUR, AND NINE 

 Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of a procedural due 

process violation in Counts Two, Four, and Nine of their Complaint. Count Two of 

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is alleged against Defendant Rogers and is 

entitled “Procedural Due Process-Internal Affairs Investigation.” In Count Two, 

Plaintiffs allege that Rogers wrongfully continued an internal affairs investigation after 

he started a criminal investigation into Mr. Bryant. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bryant was 

entitled to have the internal affairs investigation cease once the criminal investigation had 

begun. 

 Count Four is alleged against Defendant Rogers and is entitled “Leak of Internal 

Affairs Investigation.” In Count Four, Plaintiffs allege that Rogers violated Mr. Bryant’s 

due process rights by leaking Rogers’ conclusions from the internal affairs investigation 

in an effort to force Mr. Bryant to resign from the police force. 

 Count Nine is alleged against Defendant McLaughlin and is entitled “Procedural 

Due Process.” In Count Nine, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant McLaughlin ratified the 

actions of Rogers in continuing the internal affairs investigation and taking the statement 

of Bryant after the criminal investigation had started in violation of his procedural due 

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process rights and rights under the Fifth Amendment. 

 Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have 

failed to allege any property or liberty interest that was deprived by Defendants’ actions. 

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Bryant was deprived of a right contained in Arizona 

Revised Statutes section 38-1101(2), which provides: 

Before the commencement of any interview described in this 

section, the employer shall provide the law enforcement 

officer or probation officer with a written notice informing 

the officer of the alleged facts that are the basis of the 

investigation, the specific nature of the investigation, the 

officer’s status in the investigation, all known allegations of 

misconduct that are the reason for the interview and the 

officer’s right to have a representative present at the 

interview. The notice shall include copies of all complaints 

that contain the alleged facts that are reasonably available, 

except for copies of complaints that involve matters pursuant 

to federal laws under the jurisdiction of the equal employment 

opportunity commission. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1101(2). Plaintiffs allege that they have alleged facts 

supporting a violation of section 38-1101 because they alleged that Rogers never 

informed Bryant that he expanded the scope of the investigation or that he had referred 

the matter for a simultaneous, overlapping criminal investigation. Plaintiffs argue that 

they alleged that Bryant only received notice that the interview was related to timesheets 

on the a day prior to an enforcement operation and that the questioning violated Bryant’s 

due process rights because Rogers questioned Bryant about his logging into the CAD 

system and his timesheets. 

 Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, it is not clear whether, under Arizona 

Revised Statutes section 38-1101, Defendants were even required to inform Mr. Bryant 

that there was a simultaneous criminal investigation or that the notice was insufficient 

such that it did not encompass questioning about logging into the CAD system and his 

timesheets. Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating that section 38-

1101(2) gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Likewise, 

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Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts leading to the conclusion that the City of Goodyear’s 

policy to shut down an internal affairs investigation once a criminal investigation was 

started gave them a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Two is granted. 

 With regard to Count Four, Plaintiffs argue that “Bryant had a right pursuant to 

City of Goodyear policy not to have the internal affairs investigation leaked. Roger’s 

leaked the information in an effort to force Bryant to resign . . . . Certainly, adverse 

employment actions were taken against Bryant and are alleged in the second amended 

complaint.” (Doc. 100 at 6). It is difficult to follow Plaintiffs’ logic as to how this states 

a due process violation. 

 “A section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process . . . has three elements: 

(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the 

interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 

F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). It is not clear what liberty or property interest Plaintiffs 

are claiming was violated in Count Four. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Count Four is granted. 

 With regard to Count Nine, Plaintiffs argue that McLaughlin violated Mr. Bryant’s 

due process rights by permitting: 

Rogers to violate policy and ask questions of Bryant 

regarding the criminal matters after the criminal investigation 

was underway. McLaughlin was in charge of Rogers, knew 

the conduct was improper, and permitted it anyway. Mr. 

Bryant was forced to testify regarding matters for which he 

was then subject to a criminal investigation. He was not told 

of the criminal investigation. This violated his rights pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 38-1101(2) as well as his procedural rights 

created by the custom and practice of the department. 

Again, it is not clear what liberty or property interest Plaintiffs are claiming was violated 

in Count Nine. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Nine is granted. 

 D. COUNTS SEVEN AND TEN 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a substantive due process claim in 

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Counts Seven and Ten of their Complaint. Count Seven is alleged against Defendant 

Newman and is entitled “Substantive Due Process/Lying Before the Grand 

Jury/Destruction of Evidence.” Count Ten is alleged against Defendant McLaughlin and 

is entitled “Substantive Due Process.” 

 In Count Seven, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Newman violated Bryant’s 

substantive due process rights by: depriving him of his right to have the criminal charges 

reviewed by a Grand Jury, by lying to the Grand Jury, destroying relevant exculpatory 

evidence, and failing to disclose such exculpatory evidence until after the filing of the 

criminal charges. 

 In Count Ten, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant McLaughlin approved and 

permitted Defendant Newman to present false testimony to the Grand Jury in violation of 

Bryant’s substantive due process rights. 

 Defendants argue that Counts Seven and Ten should be dismissed because 

Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts to support an inference that Defendant Newman 

and Defendant McLaughlin’s actions deprived Plaintiffs of life, liberty or property, much 

less in a way that would shock the conscience. In Response, Plaintiffs argue that they 

have stated a due process claim of deliberate fabrication of evidence. 

 To sustain a deliberate fabrication of evidence claim, a plaintiff must: 

at a minimum, point to evidence that supports at least one of 

the following two propositions: (1) Defendants continued 

their investigation of [plaintiff] despite the fact that they knew 

or should have known that he was innocent; or (2) Defendants 

used investigative techniques that were so coercive and 

abusive that they knew or should have known that those 

techniques would yield false information. 

Costanich v. Dep’t of Social and Health Svcs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Newman lied to the Grand Jury, destroyed 

exculpatory evidence, and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Plaintiffs further 

allege that Defendant McLaughlin knew about these actions and approved of them. 

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Although Defendants assert that these allegations are conclusory, Plaintiffs have alleged 

enough facts to state a claim for deliberate fabrication of evidence in Counts Seven and 

Ten. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Seven and Ten is denied. 

 E. COUNT THREE 

Defendants move to dismiss Count Three and, in response, Plaintiffs concede that 

Count Three should be dismissed. (Doc. 100 at 8). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Count Three is granted. 

 F. COUNT SIX 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of selective prosecution 

in Count Six. Count Six is alleged against Defendants Newman, McLaughlin, Brown, 

and the City of Goodyear and is entitled “Selective Prosecution-Equal Protection.” In 

Count 6, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Newman, McLaughlin, and Brown 

authorized or ratified the criminal investigation and criminal 

referral of Sergeant Bryant on the premise that the lack of 

presence on the CAD system for the number of hours on the 

claimed time sheets amounted to stealing from the City of 

Goodyear. No one else was investigated or prosecuted under 

this theory. 

(Doc. 83 at ¶¶ 141-142). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for 

selective prosecution based on a class-of-one theory because Plaintiffs have failed to 

allege facts that Mr. Bryant was intentionally treated differently than others similarly 

situated and because the decision-making alleged is discretionary. 

 In response, Plaintiffs argue that they alleged that Mr. Bryant was intentionally 

treated differently than others similarly situated because they alleged that the entire Street 

Crimes Unit often worked “off-the-grid,” and all time sheets versus hours actually 

worked for the entire Street Crimes Unit would have shown the same discrepancy, but 

only Bryant was prosecuted for the discrepancy. Plaintiffs further argue that they alleged 

that Mr. Bryant was intentionally treated differently than others similarly situated because 

they alleged that officers outside the SCU would have similarly discrepancies between 

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their timesheets and the CAD system and they were not investigated and prosecuted. For 

the purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they 

were intentionally treated differently than others similarly situated. 

 Moreover, although Defendants correctly argue that the existence of discretion 

standing alone cannot be an equal protection violation, Plaintiffs have alleged that 

discretion was being exercised in a way that resulted in Mr. Bryant being treated less 

favorably than others. See Towery v. Brewer, 672 F.3d 65, 660-661 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“Absent any pattern of generally exercising the discretion in a particular manner while 

treating one individual differently and detrimentally, there is no basis for Equal 

Protection scrutiny under the class-of-one theory. In other words, the existence of 

discretion, standing alone, cannot be an Equal Protection violation. At the very least, 

there must be some respect in which the discretion is being exercised so that the 

complaining individual is being treated less favorably than others generally are.”). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Six is denied. 

 G. COUNT ELEVEN 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted based on a “right of privacy” and, thus, Count Eleven should be dismissed. 

Count Eleven is alleged against Defendant McLaughlin and is entitled “Right to 

Privacy.” In Count Eleven, Plaintiffs allege that McLaughlin, by holding an illegal press 

conference violated Arizona state law and defamed Bryant for the purpose of trying to 

improve his own reputation and that of the Goodyear Police Department, and, as a result, 

invaded the privacy rights of the Bryants. 

 Plaintiffs argue that 

Arizona law prohibits the publishing of the indictment prior 

to the time the accused person is in custody of or is served 

with a summons. See A.R.S. § 38-2813. In the instance case, 

Defendant McLaughlin held a press conference prior to 

Bryant’s possession of the indictment. In doing so, 

McLaughlin obliterated a privacy right under A.R.S. §38-

2813. 

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(Doc. 100 at 10-11). It is not clear to the Court the basis of Plaintiffs’ legal claim, either 

from the allegations in their Second Amended Complaint or in their argument in response 

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs cite to Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 

U.S. 433, 510 (1970) in support of their argument that they have stated a right of privacy 

claim, but Constantineau is a case regarding procedural due process and it is unclear how 

Plaintiffs’ “right of privacy” claim states a procedural due process violation. Likewise, 

although Plaintiffs appear to argue that Arizona Revised Statutes section 38-2813 

guarantees them a privacy right, the Court has been unable to locate that statute. 

Moreover, even if such a statute existed, it is unclear how it would support Plaintiffs’ 

“right of privacy” claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Eleven is 

granted. 

 H. COUNTS TWELVE, THIRTEEN, AND FOURTEEN 

Defendants next argue that Counts Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen should be 

dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

against Defendant Brown in those Counts. 

 Count Twelve is alleged against Defendant Brown and is entitled “Civil Rights 

Violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Lack of Probable Cause.” In Count Twelve, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendant Brown was the final policymaker for the City of Goodyear Police 

Department. Plaintiffs further allege that Brown was aware that there was no policy 

requiring Bryant to be logged into the CAD system during working hours, Defendant 

Brown met with Newman regarding his investigation, and Defendant Brown acted with 

extreme negligence or reckless indifference to the rights of Bryant by permitting 

Newman and/or McLaughlin to refer the matter to the County Attorneys’ office without 

probable cause to believe a crime was committed. 

 Count Thirteen is alleged against Defendant Brown and is entitled “Lack of 

Probable Cause-Improper Policy.” In Count Thirteen, Plaintiffs allege that Brown was 

the final policy maker for the City of Goodyear Police Department. Plaintiffs allege that 

Brown had a policy of not turning over sensitive investigations to competent outside 

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investigators and this policy dictated that unqualified individuals would investigate 

Bryant. Plaintiffs allege that this policy led to the “Constitutional violations describe[d] 

in this complaint.” (Doc. 84 at 24). 

 Count Fourteen is alleged against Defendant Brown and entitled “42 U.S.C. § 

1983 Hours Policy – Brown.” In Count Fourteen, Plaintiffs allege that Brown was the 

final policy maker for the City of Goodyear Police Department. Plaintiffs further allege 

that it was Brown’s policy not to pay officers for work performed outside the officers’ 

scheduled hours. Plaintiffs allege that this policy led to the violation of Bryant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights by contributing to his arrest without probable cause. 

 Defendants argue that, while it is not clear whether Plaintiffs’ claims are asserted 

against Defendant Brown in his official capacity as a policy maker or in his individual 

capacity under a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted under either theory. 

 Defendants first argue that, to the extent Plaintiffs intend to assert claims against 

Defendant Brown in his official capacity, they have failed to do so because they have not 

alleged a policy or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 

 In response, Plaintiffs argue that: 

 Bryant’s Constitution [sic] rights included the right to 

not be falsely accused of a crime based on fabricated 

evidence created by an incompetent investigation. Bryant’s 

rights forbade a state actor lying in a grand jury hearing to 

secure an indictment. Bryant’s rights prevent his seizure 

without probable cause. Brown’s policy of not turning over 

sensitive internal investigations to objective, competent 

outside investigators directly resulted in these violations of 

Bryant’s rights. SAC at ¶¶ 114,118. As is typical of internal 

investigations, outside investigators possess an objective view 

of the situation and proper training techniques. Brown’s 

policy already led to an incompetent investigation in the 

Pendleton matter. SAC at ¶ 114. Brown’s policy constituted 

the moving force behind these constitutional violations. 

(Doc. 100 at 11). 

 “[T]o impose liability based on a policy of deliberate inaction, the plaintiff must 

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establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that 

the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy [was] the ‘moving force behind the 

constitutional violation.’” Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 Plaintiffs allege two policies: (1) Brown’s policy not to pay officers for work 

performed outside the officers’ scheduled hours; and (2) Brown’s policy of not turning 

over sensitive investigations to competent outside investigators. Although Plaintiffs 

insist that whether these policies led to constitutional violations is a question of fact, 

Plaintiffs must allege some causal connection between Brown’s alleged policies and 

constitutional injuries sustained by Mr. Bryant. Taking the facts alleged by Plaintiffs as 

true that Brown had policies of not paying officers for work performed outside the 

officers’ scheduled hours and of not turning over investigations to outside investigators, it 

is not clear how these policies or practices are closely related to any constitutional 

injuries allegedly sustained by Mr. Bryant. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 379 (1989) (“the identified deficiency in the training program must be closely 

related to the ultimate injury.”). As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted against Defendant Brown based on a policy or practice as 

alleged in Counts Thirteen and Fourteen, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 

Thirteen and Fourteen is granted. 

 Defendants next argue that, to the extent Plaintiffs intend to assert claims against 

Defendant Brown in his individual capacity, Plaintiffs have failed to state claim upon 

which relief can be granted because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendant Brown 

was personally involved in any violations of Mr. Bryant’s constitutional rights and have 

failed to allege any causation connection between Defendant Brown’s conduct as a 

supervisor and any constitutional violation sustained by Mr. Bryant. 

 Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled that Brown knew about the acts of 

his subordinates that resulted in violations of Mr. Bryant’s constitutional rights and 

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Brown failed to prevent them. Plaintiffs argue that it can be inferred from their 

allegations that “Brown knew that his officers conjured evidence of a non-existent crime 

and yet allowed them to continue their investigation based on false evidence.” (Doc. 100 

at 13). 

 “A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violations if 

the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and 

failed to act to prevent them.” Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 

1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As discussed above, 

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Mr. Bryant was selectively prosecuted by 

Defendants Newman, McLaughlin, Brown, and the City of Goodyear. As a result, 

Plaintiffs have stated a claim for supervisory liability in Count Twelve against Defendant 

Brown. 

 Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Twelve is denied. 

 I. COUNTS FIFTEEN AND SIXTEEN 

 Defendants next move to dismiss Counts Fifteen and Sixteen for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 Count Fifteen is asserted against the City of Goodyear and is entitled “Civil Rights 

Violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” In Count Fifteen, Plaintiffs allege that the City of 

Goodyear had a policy that officers would turn their timesheets in prior to the end of the 

week, requiring officers to estimate the hours they would work the last days of the pay 

period. Plaintiffs further allege that the City had a policy of discouraging overtime and 

requiring 40 hours of work a week regardless of when the 40 hours was completed. 

Plaintiffs allege that it was the “Chief’s policy” not to reimburse for hours worked 

outside the times for work shown on the department schedule. Plaintiffs allege that these 

policies violated federal and state labor laws. Plaintiffs allege that, based on these 

policies, “the City made a referral to the County Attorney’s Office for a criminal 

indictment by willfully ignoring hours Bryant worked and artificially shorting his hours 

to exclude time he spend on City-related activities.” 

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 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the City of 

Goodyear based on an unlawful policy or practice theory. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiffs have provided no allegations as to how Goodyear’s alleged policies of 

discouraging overtime, requiring officers to turn in their timesheets before the end of the 

pay period, and not paying officers for de minimis time worked caused the alleged 

constitutional violations. 

 In response, Plaintiffs argue that the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently 

alleges that the City’s policy of “routinely violating laws” by not paying for time worked 

directly resulted in Defendant Newman providing false testimony to the grand jury. 

Plaintiffs allege that, because of the City’s policy of not paying for work performed 

outside an officers’ designated work schedule, Newman testified that Officer Bryant did 

not work on a particular day when the evidence showed Bryant working that day outside 

of his designated scheduled hours. 

 It is not enough for Plaintiffs to simply allege a policy and conclude that the policy 

resulted in a constitutional deprivation. Rather, Plaintiffs must allege facts supporting a 

causal connection between an alleged policy and a constitutional deprivation. See 

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs 

do not support their theory that Newman fabricated evidence and lied to the Grand Jury 

because the City had an alleged policy of not paying for work performed outside the 

officers’ designated work schedule. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted against the City of Goodyear based on an alleged 

unlawful policy. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Fifteen is granted. 

 Count Sixteen is asserted against the City of Goodyear and is entitled “Failure to 

Train.” In Count Sixteen, Plaintiffs allege that the City of Goodyear has a history and 

pattern of failing to adequately train its officers in investigation techniques leading to 

Constitutional violations. Plaintiffs further allege that the City of Goodyear’s failure to 

train its officers in investigation techniques and protocols lead to abuses and mistakes in 

homicide and sex crime investigations. Plaintiffs allege that the failure to properly train 

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Rogers in investigation techniques led to Rogers’ negligent investigation and the 

Constitutional violations Rogers committed. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim against the City of Goodyear based on a 

failure to train theory fails because that claim is solely based on Plaintiffs’ allegations 

that Goodyear Police Department failed to properly train its officers on how to properly 

conduct an internal affairs investigation. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to 

allege any facts showing that Goodyear’s alleged failure to properly train its officers led 

to a constitutional injury. 

 In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged that the City of Goodyear failed 

to train its officers on how to conduct an investigation and that the failure of those 

officers to properly conduct an investigation resulted in Mr. Bryant sustaining 

constitutional injuries. Plaintiffs argue that, if the City of Goodyear properly trained its 

officers, Mr. Bryant would not have sustained any constitutional injuries. 

 “[I]nadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only 

where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with 

whom the police come into contact.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-389. 

 “In resolving the issue of a city’s liability, the focus must be on adequacy of the 

training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform. That a 

particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability 

on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a 

faulty training program.” Id. at 390-391 (internal citations omitted). Negligent 

administration of a program or evidence that “an injury or accident could have been 

avoided if an officer had had better or more training sufficient to equip him to avoid the 

particular injury-causing conduct” do not suffice to impose failure to train liability on a 

City. Id. at 391. “Moreover, for liability to attach, the identified deficiency in a city’s 

training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury.” Id. 

 In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bryant sustained constitutional injuries based 

on the conduct of Goodyear Police Department officers’ conduct and that conduct would 

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not have occurred if those officers were properly trained by the City of Goodyear. These 

allegations are sufficient to state a claim against the City of Goodyear for failure to train. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Sixteen is denied. 

 IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 89) is granted as to 

Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Nine, Eleven, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Seventeen, 

Eighteen, Nineteen, Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, 

and Twenty-Five and denied as to Counts Six, Seven, Ten, Twelve, and Sixteen. 

 The claims that remain in the Second Amended Complaint are: Count Five alleged 

against Defendant Newman; Count Six alleged against Defendants Newman, 

McLaughlin, Brown, and the City of Goodyear; Count Seven alleged against Defendant 

Newman; Count Eight alleged against Defendant McLaughlin; Count Ten alleged against 

Defendant McLaughlin; Count Twelve alleged against Defendant Brown; and Count 

Sixteen alleged against Defendant City of Goodyear. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2013. 

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