Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-01330/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-01330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

OSCAR CHAIDEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J. VANGILDER, et. al.,

Defendants. /

No. 1:16-cv-1330 NJV (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 25.)

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

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allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained

the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of excessive force and was denied medical

care. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). "After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

. . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and

citation omitted). With respect to excessive force, the core judicial inquiry is whether force

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). But not every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at 9. The

Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes

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from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of

force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Id. An inmate who

complains of a push or shove that causes no discernable injury almost certainly fails to

state a valid excessive force claim.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to

that need. Id. at 1059. 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only

“be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison

medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Plaintiff alleges that on June 4, 2015, correctional officers Vangilder and Vasquez

were engaging in unprofessional conduct and ‘horsing around’ with each other when

Vangilder discharged a chemical agent grenade near plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff states he felt a

severe burning sensation in his skin and eyes when the chemical agent vapors entered his

cell. Plaintiff attempted to obtain medical attention and but his pleas for help were ignored

by Vangilder and Vasquez. Liberally construed, these allegations of excessive force and

denial of medical attention are sufficient to proceed.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Cupp, Cuska, Ohland, and Melton knew that

the expended grenade dispersed painful chemical vapors, that plaintiff had been exposed

to the vapors, that plaintiff had not been decontaminated or given medical attention, that

the pod had not been decontaminated, and that there was no air circulating into the pod. 

Despite this knowledge, Cupp, Cuska, Ohland and Melton did nothing to aid plaintiff.

Liberally construed, these allegations of denial of medical attention are sufficient to

proceed.

CONCLUSION

1. The clerk shall issue a summons and Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent form

and the United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, the summons,

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent form, copies of the complaint with

attachments and copies of this order on defendants Vangilder, Vasquez, Cupp, Cuska,

Ohland, and Melton.

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty days from the date of service, defendants shall file a

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported

by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming

from the events at issue. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved

by summary judgment, they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary

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judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served on the

plaintiff.

b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendants shall also serve,

on a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.

4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and

Wyatt notices must be given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss

for nonexhaustion is filed, not earlier); Rand at 960 (separate paper requirement).

c. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the

court and served upon defendants no later than thirty days from the date the motion was

served upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING,"

which is provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

If defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff failed to exhaust his

available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should take

note of the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION)," which is

provided to him as required by Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003).

d. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than

fifteen days after the opposition is served upon them.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

3. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on defendants, or

defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

document to defendants or defendants' counsel.. 

4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the

parties may conduct discovery.

5. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice

of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure

to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2016. 

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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