Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00404/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00404-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DILLMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TUOLUMNE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-00404-LJO-SKO

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Docket No. 37)

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 23, 2013, Plaintiffs Michael Dillman and Stephen Dillman ("Plaintiffs") 

filed a "Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint." (Doc. 37.) On January 7, 2014, 

Defendants Tuolumne County ("County") and Deputy David Vasquez ("Vasquez," collectively

"Defendants") filed an opposition. (Doc. 41.) Plaintiffs filed a reply on January 15, 2014. (Doc. 

42.) The Court reviewed the parties' briefs and all supporting materials, and finds this matter 

suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 

District of California's Local Rule 230(g). As such, the hearing set for January 22, 2014, is 

VACATED. 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' "Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended 

Complaint" is GRANTED.

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

Plaintiffs allege that on September 18, 2011, Plaintiff Pastor Michael Dillman, after 

conducting Sunday morning service at his church in Manteca, California, and his son, Plaintiff Stephen 

Dillman, drove to Lake Donnell in Tuolumne County, California, to go fishing. (SAC ¶ 10.) As was 

their custom and practice over the years, Plaintiffs placed their own motor on a thirteen-foot Valco 

aluminum boat at Lake Donnell. (SAC ¶ 11.) There was no registration, insignia, or identification on 

the boat. Id. According to Plaintiffs, for the last thirty years they and other fisherman have left 

aluminum boats moored at Lake Donnell. Id. It has been common practice to pack in one's own 

motor, place it on one of the moored boats, take the boat fishing, and then return the boat to the dock. 

Id. In fact, in or around 2010, Michael Dillman purchased an aluminum boat identical to the boat 

Plaintiffs used on September 18, 2011, and left that boat at Lake Donnell for his own use and for use 

by other fishermen. Id. Two aluminum boats purchased by Plaintiffs are moored currently at Lake 

Donnell. Id. 

While Plaintiffs were out on Lake Donnell on September 18, 2011, an employee of Tri-Dam 

Project, the entity that operates the facility at Lake Donnell, called the Tuolumne County Sheriff’s

Department to report seeing two unidentified men place a motor on an aluminum boat that allegedly 

belonged to Tri-Dam Project. (SAC ¶ 12.) The men then took the boat out fishing. Id. The Tri-Dam 

Project employee viewed these events on surveillance cameras at Lake Donnell. Id. 

After returning from fishing, Plaintiffs were met by Defendant Tuolumne County Sheriff’s 

Deputy David Vasquez, who ordered them up a ladder at the dam facility and informed them they were 

under arrest for joyriding in a boat, trespass, and vandalism. (SAC ¶ 13.) Defendant Vasquez then 

handcuffed Plaintiffs with their hands behind their backs, in a "high, tight and painful manner." Id. 

Michael Dillman explained to Deputy Vasquez that he was a pastor and community leader, and that he 

was unarmed and posed no threat to him. Id. Michael Dillman also explained to Deputy Vasquez that 

he was a Vietnam War veteran and suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") and 

 

1 The factual background is taken from the summary of Plaintiffs' factual allegations set forth in the Court's order of 

July 23, 2013, on Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 24) and is based on Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 

("SAC"). (Doc. 15.)

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

extreme claustrophobia. Id. At the time of the incident, Michael Dillman was 63 and suffered from 

arthritic shoulder pain, which was exacerbated by the high and tight handcuff placement behind his 

back. Id. Upon being cuffed, he began to feel pain immediately, which escalated to "an excruciating 

level." Id. 

Michael Dillman pled with Deputy Vasquez to cite and release him and his son and to refrain 

from placing them into the back of the police vehicle with their arms cuffed behind their backs. (SAC 

¶ 14.) Michael Dillman told Deputy Vasquez that he feared if he was placed in such a position in the 

back of a vehicle with the windows rolled up, he would suffer a PTSD episode. Id. He pled with 

Deputy Vasquez to loosen the cuffs to reduce the pain or to cuff him in front and to crack the window 

in the back of the vehicle so he could get air. Id. Deputy Vasquez finally agreed to "double cuff"

Michael Dillman. Id. However, Michael Dillman’s hands remained behind his back and the cuffs 

were extremely tight on his wrists. Id.

Plaintiffs were "shoved" into the back of Deputy Vasquez’s vehicle and immediately 

transported to the Tuolumne County Jail in Sonora, California, over an hour drive from Lake Donnell. 

(SAC ¶ 15.) A portion of the drive was on a bumpy road, and both men were cuffed behind their 

backs in an extremely painful manner. Id. Plaintiff Michael Dillman continued to plead with Deputy 

Vasquez to crack the window and loosen his handcuffs. Id. Instead of doing so, Deputy Vasquez 

cursed Michael Dillman and threatened to "hog tie his ass!" Id. Michael Dillman then suffered a 

"PTSD episode" during the transport to the Tuolumne County Jail. Id. 

When Plaintiffs arrived at the Tuolumne County Jail they were cursed and humiliated by 

Tuolumne County Sheriff’s Department personnel. (SAC ¶ 17.) Michael Dillman was then called a 

"psycho preacher" and was forced to completely undress in the presence of two female deputies, who 

openly commented on his nakedness. Id. Stephen Dillman was not strip-searched. Id. Michael 

Dillman was then separated from his son and placed naked in a small padded cell on cold concrete and 

given no way to cover his nakedness or protect himself from the cold. Id. After approximately two 

hours in that padded cell, Michael Dillman was returned to a holding cell with his son. Id. 

Plaintiffs were released from custody at approximately 1:00 a.m. on September 19, 2011.

(SAC ¶ 18.) According to Plaintiffs, Jail personnel refused to return money that had been confiscated 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

from them during the booking process. Id. Instead, Plaintiffs were given a voucher card, which 

required them to wait until the banks opened in the morning before they could access any money. Id. 

Tuolumne County chose to prosecute Plaintiffs, and a criminal jury trial commenced on 

February 6, 2012. (SAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs were acquitted of all charges. Id.

Plaintiffs' SAC alleged causes of action for (1) violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against all Defendants, (2) violation of civil rights pursuant to California’s Bane Civil Rights 

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 against all Defendants, (3) battery against Vasquez, (4) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress against Vasquez and "Certain Yet to Be Named Individual 

Defendants," and (5) negligence against Vasquez and "Certain Yet to Be Named Individual 

Defendants." (Doc. 15.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs' first amended complaint against Defendants and Does 1-25 was filed in the 

Tuolumne County Superior Court on February 13, 2013, and removed to this Court on March 18, 

2013. (Doc. 1.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 19, 2013, which was granted in 

part and denied in part on May 7, 2013. (Docs. 9, 14.) 

On May 24, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the SAC. (Doc. 15.) On June 10, 2013, County filed a 

motion to dismiss and Vasquez filed an answer. (Docs. 16, 17.) On July 23, 2013, the Court 

granted County's motion without leave to amend as to Plaintiffs' claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, and denied the motion as to the claims arising under California's Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. 

Civ. Code § 52.1. (Doc. 24.) 

A scheduling conference was held on September 24, 2013, before Magistrate Judge Sheila 

K. Oberto, during which the parties addressed the issue of Plaintiffs' request to file a third 

amended complaint. (Doc. 29.) On September 30, 2013, the Court issued a scheduling order that 

set forth the following requirements regarding amendments to the parties' pleadings:

The parties have agreed that Plaintiffs may amend the complaint to add additional 

facts. As such, by no later than November 22, 2013, the parties shall file a 

stipulation requesting leave to amend to add those facts, and any proposed amended 

complaint shall comply with the Court's prior rulings in this action. 

Further, Plaintiffs indicated that they will be seeking to add additional defendants. 

If the parties agree to this amendment, the additional defendants shall be included 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

in the stipulation amending the complaint to add the additional facts which shall be 

filed by no later than November 22, 2013. If the parties do not agree to the allow 

Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to add additional defendants, any motions 

requesting leave to amend the pleadings must also be filed by no later than 

November 22, 2013. 

The parties are advised that filing motions and/or stipulations requesting leave to 

amend the pleadings by November 22, 2013, does not reflect on the propriety of the 

amendment or imply good cause to modify the existing schedule, if necessary. All 

proposed amendments must (A) be supported by good cause pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 16(b) if the amendment requires any modification to the existing schedule, 

see Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992), and 

(B) establish, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), that such an amendment is not 

(1) prejudicial to the opposing party, (2) the product of undue delay, (3) proposed 

in bad faith, or (4) futile, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

(Doc. 30, 3:9-26.)

On November 19, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to extend time to file their 

third amended complaint, which Defendants opposed on November 21, 2013. (Docs. 31, 33.) On 

November 27, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiffs' ex parte application for an extension of time to 

file a motion to amend and ordered that Plaintiffs either file a stipulated amended complaint or a 

motion to amend by no later than December 23, 2013. (Doc. 34.)

On December 23, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to amend. (Doc. 37.) On 

December 26, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the Declaration of Joseph L. Wright in Support of the Motion 

to Amend, revising the proposed third amended complaint and removing certain identified Doe 

Defendants. (Doc. 39.) Defendants filed an opposition on January 7, 2014, and Plaintiffs' reply 

was filed on January 15, 2014. (Docs. 41, 42.)

III. DISCUSSION

The Court issued a scheduling order on September 30, 2013, advising the parties that "[a]ll

proposed amendments must (A) be supported by good cause pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) if 

the amendment requires any modification to the existing schedule, . . . and (B) establish, under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), that such an amendment is not (1) prejudicial to the opposing party, (2) the 

product of undue delay, (3) proposed in bad faith, or (4) futile." (Doc. 30, 3:19-26 (citations 

omitted).)

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Here, Plaintiff is seeking to file a third amended complaint that (1) adds additional facts, 

and (2) identifies and adds Doe Defendants 1-5 as Paul Harrison, Kim Quincy, Eric Roberts, 

Amanda Roos, and Troy Silva (collectively, "Identified Doe Defendants"). (Docs. 37, 39.) 

Defendants do not oppose the addition of the facts, but oppose amending the complaint to add the 

Identified Doe Defendants. (Doc. 41.)

A. Plaintiffs Exhibited Diligence and Good Cause as Required under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 16(b)

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides that the district court must issue a 

scheduling order that limits the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete 

discovery, and file motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1)-(3). Once in place, "[a] schedule may be 

modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The "good 

cause" requirement of Rule 16 primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 

amendment. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. "The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it 

cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Id. (internal 

citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Good cause may be found to exist where the moving party shows, for example, that it: 

(1) diligently assisted the court in recommending and creating a workable scheduling order, see In 

re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 228 (1st Cir. 1997), (2) is unable to 

comply with the deadlines contained in the scheduling order due to issues not reasonably 

foreseeable at the time of the scheduling order, see Johnson, 975 F.3d at 609, and (3) was diligent 

in seeking an amendment once the party reasonably knew that it could not comply with the 

scheduling order, see Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (E.D. Cal. 1996); 

see also Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999). "If [the] party was not 

diligent, the inquiry should end." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. If the court finds that there is good 

cause to modify the schedule, the court then turns to Rule 15(a) to determine whether the 

amendment sought should be granted. Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 607 ("As the Ninth Circuit 

explained in [Johnson], once the district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Rule 16 which establishes a timetable for amending pleadings, a motion seeking to amend 

pleadings is governed first by Rule 16(b), and only secondarily by Rule 15(a)."). 

2. Analysis

As a scheduling order was issued in this action (Doc. 30), the "schedule may be modified 

only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Whether good cause 

exists to modify a scheduling order rests on whether the party seeking the modification has been 

diligent. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

Here, Plaintiffs do not request a modification to the schedule. (Doc. 37.) Pursuant to the 

September 30, 2013, scheduling order, the non-expert discovery deadline is September 19, 2014, 

the expert disclosure deadline is September 26, 2014, the supplemental expert disclosure deadline 

is October 10, 2014, and the expert discovery deadline is November 14, 2014. (Doc. 30.) As 

such, there are nearly eight (8) months remaining until the first discovery deadline for non-expert 

discovery. However, as Defendants rightly contend, the newly Identified Doe Defendants have 

not yet been served, may have different defense counsel, and may require additional time for 

discovery. Thus, although Plaintiffs have not requested that the Court modify the scheduling 

order, allowing Plaintiffs to add the Identified Doe Defendants may require modification.

As such, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs have been diligent in seeking to amend 

the complaint. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. The Court has previously considered the issue of 

Plaintiffs' diligence, and determined that Plaintiffs were diligent. (Doc. 34, 3:17.) In granting the 

Plaintiffs' ex parte application to modify the scheduling order to allow Plaintiffs an extension of 

time to file the instant motion to amend the complaint, the Court found that:

Plaintiffs have been diligent. Plaintiffs are seeking to amend the complaint to add 

Doe Defendants, and indicate that they believed those names would be disclosed by 

Defendants in their Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. (Doc. 31, 2:21-23.) The 

initial disclosures were ordered to be completed on or before October 31, 2013, 

(Doc. 30, 4:3), and names of the Doe Defendants were not disclosed. (Doc. 31, 

2:22.) Defendants indicate that such disclosure was not required. (Doc. 33, 

8:24-25.) Plaintiffs subsequently propounded discovery to learn the identities of 

the Doe Defendants. (Doc. 31, 2:19-20.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to act diligently by waiting to propound 

discovery in this action. (Doc. 33, 4:21-5:5.) However, since this case's removal 

from Tuolumne County Superior Court on March 18, 2013, there were two motions 

to dismiss pending, which were not resolved until July 23, 2013. (Docs. 9, 16, 24.) 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Further, the scheduling order was not issued until September 30, 2013. (Doc. 30.) 

As such, discovery in this action did not open until that time, and the parties were 

precluded from propounding discovery requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) ("A party 

may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as 

required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure 

under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by 

court order.") Therefore, Plaintiffs' propounding of discovery requests seeking the 

identities of the Doe Defendants within less than two months of discovery being 

opened in this action, and less than one month after realizing that the Doe 

Defendants would not be identified in the initial disclosures, is diligent. 

(Doc. 34, 3:17-4:7.)

As the Court previously determined, Plaintiffs were precluded from propounding discovery 

requests until discovery opened in this action, and they propounded discovery requests within less 

than two months of discovery being opened and less than one month after determining that the 

Doe Defendants were not identified in Defendants' initial disclosures. (Doc. 34, 4:4-7.) As such, 

Plaintiffs did not delay in bringing discovery requests seeking the identities of the Identified Doe 

Defendants and have been diligent in seeking to amend the complaint once the identities were 

discovered.

Plaintiffs have brought this motion within the time period authorized by the Court (see 

Doc. 34) and have been diligent in seeking the identities of the Doe Defendants and in moving to

amend of the complaint. As such, Plaintiffs show good cause to request amendment. Thus the 

Court turns to Rule 15(a) to determine whether the amendment sought should be granted. 

Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 607.

B. Plaintiffs' Amendment is Warranted Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that a party may amend its pleading only by 

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party and that leave shall be freely given when 

justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2). The Ninth Circuit has instructed that the policy 

favoring amendments "is to be applied with extreme liberality." Morongo Band of Mission 

Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The factors commonly considered to determine the propriety of a motion for leave to 

amend are: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, and (4) futility of 

amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Ninth Circuit has held that it is the 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight. Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Absent prejudice, or a strong 

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, a presumption in favor of granting leave to 

amend exists under Rule 15(a). Id. Further, undue delay alone is insufficient to justify denial of a 

motion to amend. Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally, "liberality in 

granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or 

parties." DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987); contra Union Pac. 

R.R. Co. v. Nev. Power Co., 950 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Amendments seeking to add 

claims are to be granted more freely than amendments adding parties.").

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs are seeking to amend the complaint to add additional facts and the Identified Doe 

Defendants. (Doc. 37.) Defendants do not oppose the addition of the facts, but oppose amending 

the complaint to add the additional defendants. (Doc. 41.) Defendants contend that they will be 

prejudiced by the amendment and Plaintiffs unduly delayed in seeking amendment. 

a. Prejudice to the Opposing Parties

As consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight, the Court 

considers this factor first. Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052. The existing Defendants 

contend that the proposed third amended complaint "will effectively add an entirely new set of 

claims, based on an entirely separate incident than that which is currently pending between the 

parties." (Doc. 41, 3:17-18.) Defendants assert that County and Vasquez are only potentially 

liable for the acts committed at the dam and in the police car, and that they have nothing to do 

with the allegations regarding misconduct at the jail. (Doc. 41, 3:18-21.) Defendants further 

assert that the newly named Defendants will also be prejudiced because they do not share similar 

interests as County and Vasquez and will require additional discovery. 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants were on notice from the beginning that there were 

unknown Doe Defendants that had yet to be ascertained and who were allegedly liable for the 

incident occurring at the jail. (Doc. 42, 4:9-11.) As such, Plaintiffs assert that existing Defendants 

cannot show that they will be prejudiced by the amendment.

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

While Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are seeking to add an entirely new set of claims 

based on a separate incident at the jail, as opposed the incidents at the dam and in the police car 

that are currently before the Court, Defendants have been on notice of these allegations. Plaintiffs'

prior complaints have set forth allegations regarding the incident at the jail, and alleged that there 

were "Certain Yet to Be Named Individual Defendants" who were allegedly liable for their actions 

at the jail. (See, e.g., Doc. 1, First Amended Complaint, pp. 6-39, ¶¶ 16, 17, 37, 38, 54, 55, 56, 59, 

60, 64, 66; Doc. 15, Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 18, 42, 43, 60, 61, 62, 63; Doc. 39.) As 

such, Plaintiffs are not seeking to add "an entirely new set of claims," as Defendants contend, but 

are instead seeking to name the Doe Defendants whose identities were not know at the time of the 

filing of the complaint.

The Ninth Circuit has held that "where the identity of the alleged defendant is not known 

prior to the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to 

identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, 

or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds." Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980) (quotation 

and citation marks omitted). "A district court abuses its discretion by denying leave to amend 

where the complaint's deficiencies could be cured by naming the correct defendant." Crowley v. 

Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, this Court 

noted that "Defendants do not address the viability of the strip search-related constitutional claims 

against the Doe Defendants," but informed the parties that "Doe Defendants are permitted where 

federal question jurisdiction lies." (Doc. 14, 24:6-7.) Additionally, the Court cited Wakefield, 

177 F.3d at 1163, and informed the parties that Plaintiffs "should be given an opportunity through 

discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover 

the identities." (Doc. 14, 24:8-10.)

Here, Plaintiffs have now ascertained the identities of the Doe Defendants and are seeking 

to name them in the complaint. Although Defendants County and Vasquez may not be liable for 

the alleged actions brought against the Identified Doe Defendants, the allegations at the dam, in 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

the police car, and at the jail all arise from the same incident and set of circumstances -- Plaintiffs'

arrest at the dam and subsequent transport and incarceration at the jail. Further, both Plaintiffs' 

first and second amended complaints contained allegations concerning the Identified Doe 

Defendants and the incident at the jail. Defendants have not shown how they would be prejudiced 

by defending against claims that have been identified in Plaintiffs' prior pleadings. 

Rule 15 provides that leave to amend "shall be freely granted when justice so requires." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). "Rule 15 reflects the limited role assigned to pleadings in federal court, 

which can be described as providing the parties involved with fair notice of the general nature and 

type of the pleader's claim or defense." Grier v. Brown, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 

2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendants had fair notice of the allegations 

against the Identified Doe Defendants (see Docs. 1, 15), and were aware that Plaintiffs were 

permitted to conduct discovery to ascertain the identities of the Doe Defendants. (Doc. 14, 

24:6-10.) Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that it is an abuse of discretion for the district court 

to deny leave to amend when a complaint's deficiencies could be cured by naming the correct 

defendant. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 978. As such, Defendants' contention of prejudice lacks merit 

and does not support denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend. 

b. Undue Delay

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to act diligently in seeking to identify the 

Doe Defendants and amendment should be denied due to Plaintiffs' undue delay. (Doc. 41, 

4:18-6:6.) As discussed above, the Court previously found that Plaintiffs were diligent in

propounding discovery requests regarding the identities of the Doe Defendants once the discovery 

period was opened in this action. (See Doc. 34.) Further, undue delay alone is insufficient to 

justify denial of a motion to amend. Bowles, 198 F.3d at 758 (9th Cir. 1999). As such, this factor 

does not weigh against granting Plaintiffs' motion. 

Defendants do not contend that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith or that the proposed 

amendment would be futile, and the Court finds that these factors do not weigh against allowing 

Plaintiffs to amend the complaint. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. at 182. Plaintiffs have thus

shown that amendment is warranted under Rule 15(a).

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

C. Courts Have Discretion Under Rule 4(m) to Grant an Extension of Time to Serve 

Complaint

Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs failed to comply with Federal Rule of Procedure 

4(m), and serve the Doe Defendants in a timely manner. Defendants assert that the complaint 

should not be amended to name the Doe Defendants. 

Rule 4(m) states in pertinent part:

Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the 

complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--

must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that 

service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for 

the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

The 120–day period for service of the summons and complaint applies to Doe defendants. 

See Morris v. Barra, No. 10CV2642-AJB BGS, 2012 WL 1059908, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 

2012). However, Rule 4(m) "requires the district court to grant an extension of time when the 

plaintiff shows good cause for the delay" but "permits the district court to grant an extension even 

in the absence of good cause." Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). "On its 

face, Rule 4(m) does not tie the hands of the district court after the 120–day period has expired. 

Rather, Rule 4(m) explicitly permits a district court to grant an extension of time to serve the 

complaint after that 120–day period." Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to amend the complaint to 

add the Identified Doe Defendants because the additional Defendants were not served within 

120 days of the filing of the SAC on May 24, 2013. (Doc. 41, 8:1-9:15.) Defendants urge the 

Court to deny Plaintiffs' motion, because "Plaintiffs cannot show good cause for their undue delay 

in bringing the present motion, nor for their failure to comply with Rule 4(m)." (Doc. 41, 9:2-4.)

As discussed above and previously decided by the Court, Plaintiffs did not unduly delay in 

bringing the present motion and seeking to amend the pleadings. (See Doc. 34.) Once discovery 

opened in this action, Plaintiffs timely sought the identities of the Doe Defendants. Further, the 

Court had previously informed the parties that Plaintiffs were permitted to conduct discovery to 

ascertain the identities of the Doe Defendants. (See Doc. 14, 24:6-10 ("Defendants do not address 

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the viability of the strip search-related constitutional claims against the Doe Defendants. Doe 

defendants are permitted where federal question jurisdiction exists. Wakefield v. Thompson, 

177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 'the plaintiff should be given an opportunity 

through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not 

uncover the identities').") As Plaintiffs were diligent in seeking the identity of the Doe 

Defendants, the Court has discretion to permit an extension of time under Rule 4(m) to allow 

service of the Identified Doe Defendants. See Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1040; Mann, 324 F.3d at 1090. 

As such, Plaintiffs shall be permitted to effectuate service on the Identified Doe Defendants.

D. Plaintiffs' Proposed Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs shall file their third amended complaint within two (2) days from the date of this 

order. The Court notes, however, that in several places Plaintiffs' proposed third amended 

complaint refers to the Identified Doe Defendants as "Does 1 through 6" instead of by their names. 

(See, e.g., Doc. 39, pp. 8-22, ¶¶ 30, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 55f, prayer for relief no. 4). Plaintiffs shall 

revise the third amended complaint so that the Identified Doe Defendants are identified by their 

actual names and not referred to as Does 1 through 6.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to amend scheduled for January 22, 2014, is 

VACATED;

2. Plaintiffs' "Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint" is GRANTED;

3. Within two (2) days of the date of this order, Plaintiffs shall file a revised third 

amended complaint that comports with the requirements set forth in this order; 

4. Plaintiffs are directed to procure summonses from the Clerk of the Court for the 

newly Identified Doe Defendants; 

5. Plaintiffs shall serve the newly Identified Doe Defendants within forty-five (45) 

days of the issuance of the summonses; and

//

//

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

6. Defendants' responsive pleadings shall be due within the time period set forth under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 21, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00404-SKO Document 44 Filed 01/21/14 Page 14 of 14