Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00705/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00705-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC DARBY, *

 *

Petitioner, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION 04-00705-BH-B

 *

GWENDOLYN C. MOSLEY, *

 *

Respondent. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

Eric Darby, a state prisoner currently in the custody of

Respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The petition has

been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 8

(b)(1). The undersigned has conducted a careful review of the

record and finds that no evidentiary hearing is required to resolve

this case. Following a complete review of this action, the

undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed as barred by

the statute of limitations, and that judgment be entered in favor

of Respondent Gwendolyn C. Mosley and against Petitioner Eric Darby

on all claims.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner, who entered a guilty plea in the Mobile County

Circuit Court, was convicted of murder and first degree robbery on

February 15, 2002, and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life

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imprisonment. (Ex. 1, p. 4). Petitioner did not appeal his

conviction or sentence.

2. On or about September 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a

petition pursuant to Ala.R.Crim.P. 32, which the trial court denied

on February 13, 2003. (Ex. 1, pgs. 50-51). Petitioner filed an

appeal before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed

the trial court’s decision, and overruled Petitioner’s application

for rehearing. (Doc. 16, Ex. 1C, Ex. 1E). Petitioner then filed a

petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied by the Alabama

Supreme Court. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered its

certificate of judgment on December 12, 2003. (Doc. 16, Ex. 1G).

 3. Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on September

16, 2004, alleging that his convictions are void as the result of

a defective indictment, and that the convictions violate the 5th

Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy. (Doc. 1) 

Petitioner contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

convict and sentence him for robbery because the indictment did not

charge him with that offense. Petitioner also contends that

because his offenses were committed as part of the same

transaction, he should have been convicted and sentenced only on

the murder charge, and not the related robbery charge. 

Respondent’s Answer to Petitioner’s habeas petition (Doc. 13)

contains the defense that Petitioner’s claims are barred by the

one-year limitation period set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and

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Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by the April

24, 1996, enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, § 101(Supp. II 1997) (“AEDPA”), a state

prisoner seeking a federal habeas corpus remedy must file his

federal petition within one year of the "conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review". 

The Act provides that: 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgement of a State court. The limitations period shall run from

the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d).

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In a criminal case a notice of appeal by a defendant shall

be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days after

pronouncement of sentence. Al. R. Crim. P. 31.1.

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Under the statute, the one-year statute of limitations for the

filing of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus commenced in

Petitioner’s case on March 29, 2002, “the date on which the

judgment became final by the expiration of the time for seeking

[direct review].” In other words, because Petitioner did not file

a direct appeal, his conviction became final on March 29, 2002, the

date on which the time for filing a notice of appeal with the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals expired.1

 Accordingly,

Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition no

later than March 29, 2003, unless the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA were properly invoked. The record reflects that Petitioner’s

habeas petition was not filed until September 16, 2004, 537 days

after expiration of the one-year limitations period. As a result,

Petitioner’s habeas petition must be dismissed as untimely unless

he can demonstrate that the tolling provisions were triggered

during this period. 

§ 2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA provides for the tolling of the

limitations period pending state court review of a properly filed

application for post-conviction relief. See In Re Hill, 437 F.3d

1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006). Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition

(Ex. 1, p. 17) on September 12, 2002, thereby tolling the

limitations period. At the time the limitations period was

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tolled, 198 days remained. The limitations period resumed running

on December 12, 2003, the date on which the Alabama Court of

Appeals issued its certificate of judgment denying Petitioner’s

Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 16, Ex. 1G). Once the limitations period

resumed, Petitioner had 198 days, or until June 28, 2004, in which

to file his federal habeas petition. Petitioner, however, did not

file his federal habeas petition until September 16, 2004, more

than two months after the expiration of the previously tolled AEDPA

limitations period. 

Before recommending dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for

habeas relief as untimely, the undersigned must determine whether

Petitioner has pled extraordinary circumstances which require a

contrary conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that: 

Section 2244 is a statute of limitations, not a

jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable

tolling “when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik

v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269[, 1271 (11th Cir.

1999)]. Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy

which is typically applied sparingly. See Irwin v.

Dept. Of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct.

453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990).

Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). See also

Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616,

618-19 (3rd Cir. 1998)(“equitable tolling is proper only when the

‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a

limitation period] unfair.’... [g]enerally, this will occur when

the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way...been prevented from

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asserting his or her rights.’...[t]he petitioner must show that he

or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and

bringing [the] claims.’... [m]ere excusable neglect is not

sufficient.”). Moreover, in the Eleventh Circuit, as a general

rule, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard applied in this

circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of

the federal habeas petition, rather than the circumstances

surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Secretary of

Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965 (2002); Drew v. Department of

Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2002).

Apart from the claims raised in his habeas petition,

Petitioner has failed to present facts tending to establish that he

is entitled to an equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations

period. Where Respondent has asserted the defense of statute of

limitations and Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of

establishing extraordinary circumstances which would justify the

equitable tolling of § 2244's one year statute of limitations, the

undersigned must recommend that this case be dismissed as timebarred.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is the opinion of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge that Petitioner’s petition for

habeas corpus relief should be DENIED. It is so recommended.

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The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this recommendation. 

DONE this 16th day of February 2007. 

 /S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation

or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service

of this document, file specific written objections with the

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo

determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the

factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in

part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a

“Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The

objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at

the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth

the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a

copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate

judge, although a copy of the original brief may be

submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment

of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

Case 1:04-cv-00705-BH-B Document 18 Filed 02/16/07 Page 8 of 9
3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate

judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are

adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of

the transcript.

DONE this 16th day of February 2007.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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