Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00763/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00763-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sara Marie Phillippi, an individual, on

behalf of herself and the statutory

beneficiaries of Joseph Phillippi, deceased;

Angela Phillippi, an individual; Estate of

Joseph Phillippi, a legal entity, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Maricopa County, a political subdivision

of the State of Arizona; Sheriff Joseph

Arpaio, in his official capacity as Sheriff

of Maricopa County; Betty Adams, in her

official capacity as director of Correctional

Health Services; Registered Nurse Donald

McBride, in his individual and official

capacities; Registered Nurse Joseph A.

Ablett, in his individual and official

capacities; Lt. J. McGlone, in her

individual and official capacities; Nurse

Practitioner Anna Hanson, in her

individual and official capacities; Sandi

Wilson, in her official capacity as Deputy

County Manager, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-0763-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the following: (1) a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings filed by Defendants Maricopa County, Betty Adams and Donald McBride (Doc.

12); (2) a Motion to Convert Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to a Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Plaintiffs (Doc. 20); and (3) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants

Case 2:10-cv-00763-GMS Document 48 Filed 02/23/11 Page 1 of 10
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Joseph Ablett, Anna Hanson, and Sandi Wilson (Doc. 39). For the reasons stated below, the

Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

(Doc. 12), grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39), and

denies as moot Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convert Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.

20).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. (Doc. 18). On April

6, 2009, Phoenix police arrested Joseph Phillippi for trespassing, after he was found on

another person’s front yard, possibly intoxicated and in need of medical assistance. Mr.

Phillippi was transported to the Fourth Avenue Jail. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Phillippi

was taking Keppra, an anti-seizure medication, the abrupt discontinuation of which can

increase the frequency of seizures, according to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that Maricopa

County Correctional Health Services (“CHS”) was aware that Mr. Phillippi was being

prescribed this medication because during his September 2008 incarceration, he had to be

hospitalized after CHS failed to timely provide him with Keppra. The Complaint also alleges

that during his intake, Mr. Phillippi alerted staff to the fact that he had a history of seizures

and was taking Keppra. Defendant Ablett noted that Mr. Phillippi appeared to be under the

influence of drugs or alcohol, but he did not refer Mr. Phillippi for a medical assessment or

treatment. 

The next morning, Mr. Phillippi was assigned to Release Tank 1, which has “concrete

floors, walls and barriers.” Mr. Phillippi suffered a seizure, fell, and struck his head either

on the “solid-surface fixtures or the cement cell floor.” Medical staff arrived, finding Mr.

Phillippi “on his back on the ground with noisy respirations”, with an elevated pulse, and

initially unresponsive. After being escorted to medical, Mr. Phillippi’s vitals were checked,

showing blood pressure of 195/103, pulse 135, and O2 saturation at 92% on room air. 

Defendant Lt. McGlone ordered that provisions be made for Mr. Phillippi’s immediate

release. Defendant Hanson apparently approved the order. When Defendant McBride, a

registered nurse, called for transport, he did not communicate any need for emergency

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transport, and instead accepted transport within thirty minutes without lights or sirens. He

told the ambulance dispatcher that the county was not to be billed for the transportation. 

Approximately ninety minutes after Mr. Phillippi suffered a seizure and hit his head,

he was transported to the hospital. During that time, he again became unresponsive. Upon

admission, he had a Glasgow Coma Scale of 4 and was found to have a massive subdural

hematoma. Life support was discontinued on April 8, 2009. The medical examiner concluded

that Mr. Phillippi died as a result of blunt force trauma to his head.

Plaintiffs raise a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all Defendants and a Negligence

and/or Gross Negligence against Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County. Additionally,

Plaintiffs raise claims of wrongful death pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-611 (2011) and violations

of Article 2, Sections 2 and 15 of the Arizona Constitution, which the Court construes as

claims against Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County, as discussed below.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – Notice of Claim

A motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) is generally assessed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.

1980). The Court must construe the pleadings “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party,” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 360 (9th Cir.

2005), and will only grant the motion “when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving

party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fajardo v. Cnty. of L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). In ruling on such a motion, the

Court cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings unless the motion is treated as one for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(d).

Under Arizona’s notice of claim statute, “[p]ersons who have claims against a public

entity or a public employee shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept

service for the public entity or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil

procedure within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-

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1

 To the extent that Defendants Ablett, Hanson and Wilson raise the same or similar

issues in their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39), those arguments will be addressed here.

2

 As discussed below, the Court grants in part Defendants’ requested relief to the

extent that the FAC asserts state law claims against individual Defendants Adams, McBride,

Ablett, Hanson and Wilson. Plaintiffs confirm that the FAC should not assert state law claims

against those Defendants. Therefore, the Court need not treat the Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings as a motion for summary judgment to decide this matter. 

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821.01(A) (2011). The statute “permits an action against a public entity to proceed only if

a claimant files a notice of claim that includes (1) facts sufficient to permit the public entity

to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed, (2) a specific amount for which the

claim can be settled, and (3) the facts supporting the amount claimed.” Backus v. State, 220

Ariz. 101, 104, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (2009). 

Defendants Maricopa County, Adams and McBride contend that Plaintiffs’ notice of

claim was deficient in the following ways: (1) it fails to name certain individual parties sued;1

(2) it names the Clerk of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, but fails to state a claim

against Maricopa County, the actual party sued; and (3) it does not explicitly state the amount

for which Plaintiffs would be willing to settle their claims against the county separate and

apart from the amount for which they would be willing to settle their claims against

Defendant Sheriff Arpaio. (Doc. 12).

Plaintiffs’ FAC states the following:

As to Plaintiff’s claims under Arizona state law, Plaintiff served a timely notice

of claim upon Defendants [sic] Arpaio and Defendant Maricopa County pursuant to

A.R.S. § 12-821.01, which complied in all ways with the statute, was timely served,

and deemed denied by operation of statute. 

(Doc. 18). Plaintiffs are correct that under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, if a court intends to consider matters outside the pleadings on a 12(c) motion, the

court should treat the motion as one for summary judgment and provide the parties

opportunity for discovery. The Court need not convert the motion here to a motion for

summary judgment because, even considering the notice of claim, the Court agrees with

Plaintiffs, with one exception,2 that the notice of claim was not deficient in the ways raised

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by Defendants.

First, Plaintiffs have raised several state law claims against the individual Defendants,

including a wrongful death claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-611. (Doc. 18). Defendants assert,

however, that the notice of claim failed to address Defendants Adams, McBride, Ablett,

Hanson and Wilson, and that Plaintiffs failed to serve them with a notice of claim. Therefore,

according to Defendants, Plaintiffs are barred from bringing any state law claims against

those Defendants. (Doc. 12, 34). Plaintiffs concede that they did not seek in the FAC to set

forth any state law claims against the specified individual Defendants. (Doc. 19). To the

extent, therefore, that the FAC could be read to state such claims, they are dismissed.

Second, Defendants assert that the notice of claim fails to name Maricopa County as

a potential defendant or allege any wrongdoing by the county, but rather names the Clerk of

the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, which Defendants assert is a non-jural entity.

(Doc. 12). This argument lacks merit. The notice of claim statute requires Plaintiffs to serve

the notice of claim on a person authorized to accept service for the county. A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A). The notice of claim was addressed to and served on the Clerk of the Maricopa

County Board of Supervisors. Defendants do not assert that the Clerk is not authorized to

accept service. Rather, they seek to characterize the notice of claim as stating claims directly

against the Clerk because it was so addressed. First, it is a complaint, not the notice of claim,

that designates the parties to a lawsuit. The Clerk was never raised in the FAC as a party to

Plaintiffs’ claims. Second, nothing in the notice of claim suggests that the Clerk is a party as

opposed to the designated agent for service. And, to the extent moving Defendants suggest

that the notice of claim does not adequately set forth the factual basis for the claims against

the county, a brief review of the notice itself discredits this argument. Cf. Backus, 220 Ariz.

at 106, 203 P.3d at 504 (suggesting that a trial judge may review the adequacy of the facts

establishing the basis of liability because § 12-821.01 requires a claimant to describe facts

“sufficient to permit” the public entity to evaluate its liability). 

Beginning on page 2 of the notice of claim, Plaintiffs state that employees of

Maricopa County CHS were negligent and/or grossly negligent in caring for Mr. Phillippi,

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3

 As an aside, Defendants appear to drop their argument regarding the adequacy of the

facts in the notice of claim. This argument is not mentioned at all in the Reply, and in their

conclusion, Defendants simply request that the state law claims asserted against Defendants

Adams and McBride be dismissed. (Doc. 34).

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causing his death. (Doc. 12, Ex. 1; Doc. 19). The notice of claim clearly asserts that

“Maricopa County [is] vicariously liable for the actions of [its] employees, who, at the time

of the acts described in this letter, were acting in the scope and course of their employment.”

(Doc. 12, Ex. 1). It also states that Plaintiffs are bringing a wrongful death action. The notice

of claim then describes in detail the basis for liability, including what Plaintiffs believe to be

Maricopa County CHS’ role in Mr. Phillippi’s death. Among the allegations in the notice of

claim are that Maricopa County CHS failed to properly assess, monitor and treat Mr.

Phillippi during the time he was detained; failed to track chronic illnesses among inmates,

including Mr. Phillippi; failed to deliver needed medications; and then after Mr. Phillippi had

at least one seizure, during which he hit his head, the county employees failed to provide him

with needed medical care for financial reasons–specifically telling the ambulance dispatcher

that Mr. Phillippi could wait thirty minutes for an ambulance and confirming that the county

would not be billed. (Doc. 12, Ex. 1). It appears that attached to the notice of claim were a

number of supporting documents, but those documents have not been provided to the Court.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have met the statutory requirement of setting forth facts in the notice

of claim that would allow the county to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed.

See Howland v. Arizona, 169 Ariz. 293, 299, 818 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting

that a “notice of claim should give the public entity notice of the nature of the claim, the

general facts upon which the claim is based,” and must contain “an assertion of liability on

behalf of the State in regard to a specifically described event sufficient to allow the State to

investigate and determine its potential liability” (internal quotation marks omitted)).3

Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were required to specify a separate amount for

which they would be willing to settle their claims against each Defendant referred to in the

notice of claim. Put another way, the notice of claim provided that each Plaintiff was willing

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to settle the case for $600,000 total, but did not list the settlement amount for each

Defendant. Plaintiffs contend that Arizona law does not require separate settlement demands

for each defendant, citing Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 220 Ariz. 214, 204 P.3d

1063 (Ct. App. 2008). 

This precise issue was addressed in Havasupai, in which the defendants argued that

plaintiff’s failure to “state separate settlement demands made to each public entity or public

employee accused of wrongdoing . . . deprived [each defendant] of a meaningful opportunity

to separately settle his, her or its portion of the claim.” Id. at 231, 204 P.3d at 1080. The

Arizona Court of Appeals interpreted the plaintiff’s notice of claim as alleging harm that

resulted from the combined acts performed by a group of purported wrongdoers. Id. The

court concluded that nothing in the notice of claim statute required a claimant to assert

separate settlement demands against each wrongdoer. Id. The statute simply provides that the

claim must “contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts

supporting that amount.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The Defendants in this case have not cited

any authority that would suggest that the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statute is

incorrect. The Court has no reason to second-guess the Arizona court’s interpretation of a

state statute, and therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the notice of claim is not

deficient for failure to assert separate settlement demands.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants Ablett, Hanson and Wilson also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 39). To survive

dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain

more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations. . . it must plead ‘enough factsto state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d

1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard

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“asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short

ofthe line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a

motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have raised claims substantively based on Judge

Wake’s remedial order in Graves v. Arpaio, CV-77-0479, and that under Green v. McKaskle,

788 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir. 1986), the Court must dismiss the § 1983 claims. Green does

state that “remedial court orders per se, apart from independent constitutional grounds

affirmed there, cannot serve as a substantive basis for a § 1983 claim for damages because

such orders do not create ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.’” Id. (quoting § 1983). However, it also explains that a remedial order “might be

important for purposes of providing notice to prison officials of clearly established rights.”

Id. at 1122–23 (citing as examples Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1386 (11th Cir. 1982)

(“[remedial court] order not only clearly defined the constitutional rights of the Alabama

prisoners, but also served to put the defendant[s] on notice”); Jackson v. State of Miss., 644

F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (remedial decree “clearly established . . . constitutional

rights”)). In their Reply, Defendants also suggest that Plaintiffs are attempting to assert some

additional cause of action for “deliberate indifference to a judicial opinion.” (Doc. 47). 

In the FAC, Plaintiffs reference Judge Wake’s remedial order in the section that sets

forth the facts and established rights related to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. The FAC alleges,

however, that the underlying constitutional violation being asserted for § 1983 purposes is

a violation of Mr. Phillippi’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 18). Thus, Plaintiffs’ reference

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4

 At one point, Defendants seem to be arguing that Defendant Adams, who is not one

of the Defendants included in the Motion to Dismiss, should also be dismissed as a party. In

arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Defendant Wilson, Defendants add

Defendant Adams by including her in parentheses next to each argument related to Defendant

Wilson. Defendant Adams did not join the other Defendants in moving to dismiss Plaintiffs’

claim, and therefore, to the extent that Defendants attempt to argue on her behalf, the Court

will not consider those arguments.

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to the remedial order appears to be neither an attempt to raise some additional indifference

claim nor to use that reference as the substantive basis for the § 1983 claim. Rather, Plaintiffs

contend that the order supports their argument that Defendants were on notice of Mr.

Phillippi’s recognized rights and of the continuing violations of those rights in the Maricopa

County jail system. See Green, 788 F.2d at 1122–23. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion as

to that point is denied.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Deputy

County Manager Sandi Wilson, in her official capacity. (Doc. 39).4

 They assert the following

arguments: (1) that Plaintiffs have failed to assert facts that show Wilson personally

participated in the violation of Mr. Phillippi’s rights; and (2) that the claim against Wilson

in her official capacity is really a claim against Maricopa County, and therefore the claims

against her should be dismissed. (Doc. 39).

An official may be liable under § 1983 if a plaintiff alleges facts that support the

inference that the official enacted or enforced a policy or practice that resulted in the denial

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“County officials can be held liable under § 1983 if they act as ‘lawmakers or . . . those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.’” (citing Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978))). Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that, upon

information and belief, Wilson is a final policymaker and “acts as the operational head of

CHS through control of the allocation of resources and the adoption or rejection of systems

for addressing” various deficiencies. (Doc. 18, 46). They allege that Wilson was put on

notice “by various individuals with expertise in health care that the policies and practices in

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place for the maintenance of medical records are inadequate.” They assert that these policies,

among others, have resulted in serious injury and death of pretrial detainees. Additionally,

the Complaint asserts that Wilson has notice that medical personnel have a “pattern or

practice” of failing to pass out medications, causing serious injury or death to detainees.

Moreover, the Complaint states that Wilson was aware of, but failed to implement, an order

in the Graves v. Arpaio case, “requiring that pretrial detainees within the Maricopa County

jail system receive health screening prior to placement in the general population sufficient

to identify and begin treatment of physical illnesses and provide necessary medication

without interruption.” At this stage, Plaintiffs have pled enough factsto state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face. If Wilson did in fact enact or enforce a policy or practice that

resulted in the denial of Mr. Phillippi’s constitutional rights, then she may be liable for those

violations separate from the county’s liability. Accordingly, she is properly named as a party

and the claim against Wilson will not be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 12) is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is granted to the extent that the FAC states any state law

claims against individual Defendants Adams and McBride. It is denied on all other grounds

asserted in the motion.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39) is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. It is granted to the extent that the FAC states any state law claims

against individual Defendants Ablett, Hanson and Wilson. It is denied on all other grounds

asserted in the motion.

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convert Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to a Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20) is DENIED as moot.

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2011.

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