Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00814/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00814-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

FRANCIS HORN, an individual

Plaintiff,

v. 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS; ASSOC. WARDEN

K.M. CHASTAIN, individually;

CHIEF DEPUTY WARDEN STILES,

individually; CORRECTIONAL

OFFICER J. GRADY,

individually; MTA W. VAN

SANDT, individually; RN T.

MEEKS, individually; RN G.

LAUCIRICA, individually; RN J.

MARSTON, individually; FRANK

CHRISTIAN, individually, and

DOES 1 through 250 INCLUSIVE, 

Defendants.

No. CIV-S-05-0814 MCE/KJM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

----oo0oo----

In this action, Plaintiff Francis Horn (“Horn”) seeks

damages stemming from the death of her son while incarcerated in

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Individual defendants include Associate Warden K.M. 1

Chastain (“Chastain”), Chief Deputy Warden Stiles (“Stiles”),

Correctional Officer J. Grady (“Grady”), MTA W. Van Sandt (“Van

Sandt”), RN T. Meeks (“Meeks”), RN G. Laucirica (“Laucirica”), RN

J. Marston (“Marston”), and inmate Frank Christian (“Christian”). 

 Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a 2

“Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Defendants, Department of Corrections, Laucirica, and 3

Christian were not joined to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Prior

to the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was unclear to the

2

a California state prison. In addition to filing against the

State of California (“State”) and the Department of Corrections,

Plaintiff has included various correctional officers and

employees as defendants as well as another inmate.1

Plaintiff asserts three claims alleging federal

constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In

addition, Plaintiff’s complaint includes nine state law claims

alleging wrongful death, medical malpractice, failure to furnish

medial care for a prisoner, failure to provide adequate medical

personnel and facilities, fraud, obstruction of justice, abuse of

process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”),

and negligence. The Plaintiff’s complaint, which was originally

filed in state court, was removed to this Court in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) based upon the alleged § 1983

violations. 

On May 6, 2005, the California Attorney General filed a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), on behalf of the State only. Defendants Chastain, 2

Stiles, Grady, Van Sandt, Meeks, and Marston joined the motion to

dismiss on June 9, 2005.3

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which Defendants had or had not been served and/or joined in the

motion. At the hearing, however, Defendants’ counsel stated in

open court that the “Notice of Joinder to the Motion to Dismiss”

was intended to constitute an appearance on behalf of all of the

individual Defendants. 

 The facts as stated in this section are taken directly 4

from the Plaintiff’s complaint. 

3

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff’s son Gilbert M. Salazar (“Salazar”) was an inmate

at the California State Prison at Sacramento, California. Salazar

died in prison on or about January 11, 2003 and his death was

ruled a suicide by the Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff alleges that Salazar was beaten to death by his

cellmate, Defendant Christian. Plaintiff claims that Defendants

Chastain and Stiles, as members of the State Prison’s

classification committee, violated applicable standards and

regulations by deciding to house Salazar with Christian because

Defendants were aware that Salazar and Christian had been

involved in prior altercations. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants engaged in a “cover up” to rule Salazar’s death a

suicide when they knew he had been killed by Christian. In the

alternative, Plaintiff claims that Salazar committed suicide

because of the violence and abuse he suffered at the hands of

Defendant Christian. 

Plaintiff also alleges that medical attention for Salazar

was delayed because Defendant Grady, the correctional officer who

discovered Salazar, was not carrying a “personal alarm” which

caused a delay in responding which hastened Salazar’s death. 

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the medical staff that treated

Salazar did not provide him with adequate or proper medical

treatment which also lead to his death.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th

Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to

state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle

her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d

1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees

Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996). 

If a complaint on its face includes allegations disclosing

an absolute defense or bar to recovery, a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,

614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). 

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide

whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, leave to amend should

be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Bring Certain Claims on Her Son’s

Behalf.

1. Section 1983 Claims

In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts three § 1983 claims

against the individual Defendants on grounds that said Defendants

exhibited “deliberate indifference” to her son’s medical health

and safety needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the extent that he was subjected to cruel and

unusual punishment. Defendants now move to dismiss these claims,

arguing that because the § 1983 claims are for injuries Salazar

suffered prior to his death, Plaintiff can only bring the claims

in a representative capacity. 

In order to properly maintain these claims, Plaintiff must

have standing as a representative or successor in interest under

the California state survival statute. See Moreland v. Las Vegas

Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating

that in a § 1983 action, the party bringing a survival action

must show that the particular state’s law allows a survival

action and that the plaintiff meets the requirements for bringing

such an action); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 377.60. 

California’s survival statute allows a successor in interest

to bring a claim on behalf of the decedent when the decedent does

not have a personal representative. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 377.30. A

person seeking to file an action as a decedent’s successor in

interest, however, must file an affidavit to that effect. Cal.

Civ. Proc. § 377.32. 

///

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Although Plaintiff contends that the § 1983 claims only 5

arose upon her son’s death, she states that she is aware of

authority where the plaintiff did not sue in her representative

capacity and the civil rights claims were dismissed.

6

These requirements have not been satisfied in this case inasmuch

as Plaintiff’s claims are only made on her individual behalf. 

 Because each § 1983 claim is based on actions by the

Defendants constituting “deliberate indifference to the

plaintiff’s son,” Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims belong to Salazar

(Compl. ¶¶51, 53, 55) (emphasis added). The Court agrees with

Defendants that Plaintiff must bring the § 1983 claims as

presently asserted in a representative capacity. Because

Plaintiff has not complied with the statutory requirements for

bringing such claims, she lacks standing and the § 1983 claims

contained in her complaint must be dismissed.

In opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

appears to concede that her § 1983 claims as plead are survival

claims and that she must have standing under state law to bring

such claims. Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that she can maintain 5

her own § 1983 claim based on a Fourteenth Amendment right

violation: a mother’s right to the society and companionship of

her son. See Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 286 (9th

Cir. 1991); Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th

Cir. 1985) (“[E]xisting Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent

establish that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the companionship and society of his or her child.

The state’s interference with that liberty interest without due

process of law is remediable under section 1983.”). 

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Plaintiff did not raise this direct § 1983 claim in her

complaint and only now identifies it in opposition to Defendants’

motion to dismiss. Plaintiff urges the Court to allow her to

amend her complaint so that she may allege a direct § 1983 claim

based on a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, as

opposed to any constitutional rights that accrued to her son. 

Given these allegations, Plaintiff will be permitted to

amend her complaint. In addition to alleging sufficient facts in

her complaint to support a direct Fourteenth Amendment violation

claim, Plaintiff should also be afforded the opportunity to amend

her complaint so as to bring Salazar’s § 1983 claims in a

representative capacity. See Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners

of Calif., 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] complaint

should not be dismissed if it states a claim under any legal

theory, even if the plaintiff erroneously relies on a different

legal theory.”). Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims as stated in the Tenth, Eleventh, and

Twelfth Causes of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend.

2. State Claims

In addition to challenging the validity of Plaintiff’s §

1983 claims, Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s state

claims, also arguing that Plaintiff does not have standing to

bring the claims as Salazar’s representative.

As with the § 1983 claims, Defendants contend that all the

state causes of action, except for the wrongful death claim, must

be dismissed because they are survival actions and Plaintiff

failed to file an affidavit with the Court as required by

California law. 

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

In opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff claims

that all causes of action are hers. Plaintiff argues that she was

not required to file an affidavit because she is not bringing the

claims as Salazar’s successor in interest. (Opp’n 14:20-21).

Plaintiffs’s claims for fraud, corruption and malice,

obstruction of justice, abuse of process, and IIED are not

survival actions because, according to the complaint, they relate

to the “cover up” of Salazar’s death. A survival action, on the

other hand, is brought for injuries suffered by the decedent

before his death. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1459 (7th ed. 1999);

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 377.34. 

Although Plaintiff’s individual claims for fraud, corruption

and malice, obstruction of justice, abuse of process, and IIED

may consequently be maintained, her claims for medical

malpractice, failure to furnish medical care, failure to provide

adequate medical personnel and facilities, and negligence

undisputedly belong to Salazar. These actions relate to injuries

Salazar suffered prior to his death. Although Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants’ acts or omissions in those areas proximately

caused her injury as well, the person directly injured was

Salazar. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27). Thus, while these claims may serve

as factual bases for Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, the causes

of action are not hers to raise.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot cure this defect in

her complaint by making representative claims on behalf of

Salazar because any such filing would be late at this juncture.

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Defendants rely on Coats v. K-Mart Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d, 961

(1989), arguing that Plaintiff cannot file her claim in a

representative capacity because the claim would not “relate back”

and would be barred by the statute of limitations. 

In Coats, the decedent’s mother brought a wrongful death

claim against K-Mart as administratix of the decedent’s estate.

Decedent’s mother was not appointed administratix until five

years after the complaint was filed. The court did not allow the

late appointment of the decedent’s mother as administratix of the

estate to relate back to the filing of the original complaint.

Id. at 967. However, the court based its decision on the fact

that the decedent’s mother knew or should have known that she was

not the administratix at the time she filed the complaint and had

made no effort to be timely appointed. Id. at 968. 

This case may be factually distinguishable both in terms of

the time that has elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff’s

complaint and Plaintiff’s particular circumstances in terms of

whether she should have taken earlier steps to ensure

representation of her son’s interests. In addition, the Coats

holding was called into question by Cloud v. Northrop Grumman

Corp., 67 Cal. App. 4th, 995 (1998), which noted a 1941

California Supreme Court decision holding that an amendment to a

claim may substitute a real party in interest as long as the

cause of action stays the same. Klopstock v. Superior Court, 17

Cal.2d 13 (1941). Additional California case law also suggests

that an amended complaint that merely makes a technical change in

the capacity in which the plaintiff sues on the same cause of

action will relate back to the original filing of the complaint.

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff listed Cal. Gov’t Code § 822.2 as the sole basis 6

of her fraud, corruption and malice claim. Cal. Gov’t Code §

822.2 only addresses the liability of public employees and not

public entities. Even so, it is clear from the complaint that

Plaintiff brings the claim against both the individual Defendants

and the State. 

10

Dominguez v. City of Alhambra, 118 Cal. App. 3d 237, 243 (1981).

The Court finds that because California law may allow

Plaintiff to bring these claims in a representative capacity as

Salazar’s successor in interest, the complaint can potentially be

cured by granting leave to amend. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Causes of Action are dismissed

with leave to amend. 

While the remainder of Plaintiff’s state law claims cannot

be dismissed on standing grounds, certain of those claims

nonetheless fail on a substantive basis. 

B. Plaintiff’s claims for Fraud, Obstruction of Justice, and IIED

cannot be Maintained as Currently Stated.

1. Fraud, Corruption and Malice

Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action, for “fraud, corruption

and malice” is based on Cal. Gov’t Code § 822.2. This code 6

section provides immunity to public employees for an injury

caused by misrepresentation unless they are guilty of “actual

fraud, corruption or actual malice.” This code section does not

create a separate cause of action for “fraud, corruption, and

malice.” 

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Rather, it establishes a requirement that “in addition to the

essentials of common law deceit,” the plaintiff must also allege

that the public employee was motivated by “corruption or actual

malice, i.e., a conscious intent to deceive, vex, annoy or harm.”

Masters v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assoc., 32

Cal. App. 4th 30, 42 (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to

impose liability on a public employee for misrepresentation,

Plaintiff is required to allege common law deceit as well as

corruption or actual malice. 

California Civil Code § 1710 defines four kinds of

actionable deceit (or fraud): (1) intentional misrepresentation;

(2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) concealment; and (4) failure

to perform a promise. See also Masters v. San Bernardino County

Employees Retirement Assoc., 32 Cal. App. 4th 30, 41-42 (1995).

All types of fraud require that the Defendant acted “with intent

to induce [the plaintiff] to alter his position to [the

plaintiff’s] injury or risk.” Cal. Civil Code § 1709. Thus, all

types of actionable fraud require justifiable reliance with

resulting damage based on that reliance. 

Plaintiff’s fraud claim is based on allegations that the

Defendants covered up her son’s death and ruled it a suicide.

(Compl. ¶41). To establish a claim for fraud, Plaintiff will have

to show that she relied on Defendants’ misrepresentation to alter

her legal position. See Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams &

Russell, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1324, 1331-32 (1986). In Plaintiff’s

case, however, there is no indication that Plaintiff relied on

Defendants’ misrepresentation regarding her son’s death to her

detriment. 

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Because Plaintiff’s complaint consequently does not state a claim

for fraud, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fifth Cause of

Action is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

2. Obstruction of Justice

Defendants contend that the claim for obstruction of justice

should be dismissed because it is a criminal offense, not a state

tort or a constitutional wrong. In response, Plaintiff argues

that a motion to dismiss should not be used to dispose of a

“novel legal theory that can best be assessed after factual

development.” (Opp’n 21:10-13, citing Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d

814, 818-19 (2nd Cir. 1995)). 

Obstruction of justice is far from a “novel legal theory.”

In California, obstruction of justice covers a group of criminal

offenses that are defined by statute. 2 Witkin, California Crim.

Law § 1 (3d ed. 2000). Plaintiff is not the first to attempt to

bring a civil obstruction of justice claim. In Agnew v. Parks,

172 Cal. App. 2d 756 (1959), a civil plaintiff brought suit

alleging obstruction in the orderly prosecution of her

malpractice action consisting of false representation and

concealment of evidence. The court noted that the common law

crime for obstruction of justice was not recognized under

California statutes but that the separate offenses for perjury

and concealment of evidence were designated under the statutes.

Still, the court explicitly held that “no civil right can be

predicated upon a mere violation of a criminal statute.” 

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Id. at 765. See Ting v. U.S., 927 F.2d 1504, 1515 (9th Cir.

1991), citing Agnew, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756 (stating that civil

actions for damages or injuries arising from false testimony or

perjury are not recognized in California). Thus, California

clearly does not recognize a civil claim for any offense for

obstruction of justice. 

Because obstruction of justice is a criminal offense that

California courts have refused to recognize as a civil action,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable

claim. Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss the claim for

obstruction of justice is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants contend that Horn has failed to state a claim for

IIED. To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege “(1)

extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the

intention of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

defendant’s outrageous conduct . . . .” Christensen v. Superior

Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991) (alteration in original)

(internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff must also allege that

the defendant’s conduct occurred in the presence of the plaintiff

of whom the defendant was aware. Id. at 903, 906. See also Smith

v. Pust, 19 Cal. App. 4th 263, 274 (1993) (“[I]t is not enough

that an act be outrageous to state a cause of action for [IIED].

Intentional means more than the nonaccidental nature of the

wrongful act. The act must also be directed at the plaintiff or

in the presence of the plaintiff.” 

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

(emphasis in original)), citing Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 903. 

The “extreme and outrageous conduct” that Plaintiff alleges

Defendants engaged in includes the decision to house Salazar with

Defendant Christian and the alleged “cover up” of Salazar’s

murder. Nowhere in her complaint does Plaintiff allege that this

conduct was directed at her. Plaintiff has not alleged that the

she was witness to or that the decision to house Salazar with

Defendant Christian was directed at her. Furthermore, although

Defendants’ alleged cover-up of Salazar’s death may very well

constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct, nothing in

Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that the alleged misconduct was

directed at her with the intent to cause her severe emotional

distress.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

for IIED is GRANTED. Plaintiff will, however, be accorded leave

to amend.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Second, Third, Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Causes of

Action are dismissed with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action is dismissed without leave to

amend. Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all other causes of

action is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 10, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00814-MCE -KJM Document 20 Filed 08/11/05 Page 15 of 15