Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-06219/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-06219-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORLANDO CRESWELL,

Petitioner,

 v.

P.D. BRAZELTON, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-12-6219 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Orlando Creswell, a California prisoner, has filed this

pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging a judgment of conviction from Santa Clara County

Superior Court. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer, and

Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the reasons set forth below,

the petition is DENIED.

I

On October 30, 2009, Petitioner and his codefendant Raul

Mata were convicted by a jury of multiple offenses related to

several violent robberies they committed. Docket No. 18, Ex. A

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(“CT”) at 197-200, 202-03 and 274-75. With the addition of

recidivist enhancements, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 50

years to life with a consecutive sentence of 31 years. CT at 274-

75. Petitioner’s sentence was based on his admission on crossexamination that he had sustained the priors. However, the question

of whether Petitioner suffered the prior convictions was not tried

by the jury, and Petitioner did not object to the discharge of the

jury. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction in October 2010,

arguing that his conviction should be reversed for the following

reasons: erroneous denial of request for substitution of counsel;

prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of trial counsel;

and cumulative error. He also argued that his sentence should be

set aside because the prior conviction allegations had not been

proven true. Docket No. 18, Ex. C. Petitioner was also

simultaneously seeking habeas relief. On April 25, 2011, as his

appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

state appellate court seeking reversal of his conviction on the

following grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for

failure to consult an eyewitness identification expert and failure

to object to prosecutorial misconduct; Petitioner was entitled to

substitution of counsel; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

through the court’s denial of Petitioner’s application for ancillary

funds; and cumulative error. Docket No. 18, Ex. F.

The appellate court addressed both the appeal and the

habeas petition in a reasoned opinion on August 19, 2011. The

appellate court upheld the conviction but remanded the case for a

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court trial on his prior convictions and for resentencing. People

v. Mata, et al., No. H035445, 2011 WL 3652528, (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.

19, 2011), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 16, 2011). The

appellate court found that Petitioner had waived his right to a jury

trial on the truth of his prior conviction allegations when he

failed to object to the jury discharge but that he was entitled to a

court trial on the prior conviction allegations. Mata, 2011 WL

3652528, at *12-*13. On September 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, raising the

same arguments raised in his appeal. Docket No. 18, Ex. I. The

petition for review was denied on November 16, 2011. Docket No. 18,

Ex. J.

On March 16, 2012, the trial court held a court trial on

Petitioner’s prior convictions and found that the prior convictions

were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed the same sentence

as before. Docket No. 18, Ex. L at 5-22. Petitioner appealed this

finding on July 6, 2012, arguing that the sentence should be vacated

because it violated his right to a speedy trial and that the

judgment should be modified to reflect additional custody credit. 

Docket No. 18, Ex. M. On May 30, 2013, the appellate court agreed

to modify Petitioner’s judgment to reflect the custody credit but

otherwise denied the appeal. Docket No. 18, Ex. P. On August 14,

2013, Petitioner presented his speedy trial claim to the California

Supreme Court, which declined to review the claim. Docket No. 18,

Exs. Q and R. 

 On December 7, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition alleging a due process violation related to his prior

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conviction allegations.

II

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

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principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in conducting

its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the

state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden

of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas

review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011). 

When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). In Petitioner’s

case, the last reasoned decision addressing the claim in the instant

petition is the California Court of Appeal’s August 19, 2011

opinion.

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner’s

claim.

//

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In his traverse, Petitioner advances an additional argument.

He argues that the court trial on his prior conviction allegations

violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by allowing the prosecution a

second opportunity to try him on the prior convictions. Docket No.

19 at 4. A petitioner may not raise new claims for habeas relief in

a traverse. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.

1994). 

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III

Petitioner argues that due process requires that the

prosecution bear the burden of ensuring that Petitioner has a jury

trial on his prior convictions pursuant to Section 1025 of the

California Penal Code and that therefore a not-true finding should

have been entered in the record with respect to the prior

convictions upon the discharge of the jury.1

 Petitioner’s claim is

a state law claim. His right to a jury trial to prove his prior

convictions arises solely from a state statute. Mata, 2011 WL

3652528 at *13 (“Creswell’s right to a trial by jury on the prior

conviction allegations is not derived from either the United States

Constitution or the California Constitution; rather, it is a purely

statutory right granted him under section 1025. People v. Wiley

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 589, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541.”). 

Federal habeas relief is unavailable for violations of state law or

for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law,

see Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011); and

Petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). Habeas relief is denied for

this claim.

//

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the U.S. Court of Appeals under Rule

22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 02/17/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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