Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00370/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Madeline Holandes, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00370-TUC-DTF

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Madeline Holandes filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security 

(Commissioner). (Doc. 1.) Before the Court are Holandes’s Opening Brief, Defendant’s 

Opposition to Holandes’s Opening Brief, and Holandes’s Reply. (Docs. 23, 25, 28.) The 

parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 13.) Based on the 

pleadings and the administrative record submitted to the Court, this matter is remanded 

for benefits.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Holandes filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) on 

November 20, 2008. (Administrative Record (AR) 290.) She alleged disability from 

January 4, 2003. (Id.) At a hearing, Holandes revised her onset date to January 25, 2007. 

(AR 70, 102.) Holandes’s application was denied upon initial review (AR 197) and on 

reconsideration (AR 204). A hearing was held on August 3, 2010 (AR 96-172), after 

which ALJ George W. Reyes found that Holandes was not disabled (AR 180-88). The 

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Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. (AR 194-95.) 

After a second hearing on February 13, 2012 (AR 36-95), the ALJ found Holandes not 

disabled at Step Four (AR 18-30). The Appeals Council denied Holandes’s request to 

review that decision. (AR 1.) 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

 Holandes was born on April 16, 1962, making her 46 years of age at the onset date 

of her alleged disability. (AR 159.) She had experience working at a bank, as a cashier, 

and as a correctional officer. (AR 308.) 

 Holandes stopped working in 2003, and was diagnosed by Dr. Jeffrey Loomer 

with fibromyalgia. In 2004, she underwent gastric bypass surgery and over time her 

fibroyalgia symptoms improved. However, the symptoms returned in 2006 and she began 

seeing Dr. Loomer again in 2007. 

 The ALJ concluded that Holandes had fibromyalgia but he determined she could 

perform light work with frequent balancing and stooping; occasional climbing of ramps/ 

stairs, kneeling, crouching or crawling; and never climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds. (AR 

25.) Based on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ concluded Holandes could perform 

her past relevant work as a bank teller. (AR 29.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to evaluate DIB claims. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983). To 

establish disability the claimant bears the burden of showing that (1) she is not working; 

(2) she has a severe physical or mental impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals 

the requirements of a listed impairment; and (4) her RFC precludes her from performing 

her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in 

substantial numbers in the national economy. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th 

Cir. 2007). If the Commissioner conclusively finds the claimant “disabled” or “not 

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disabled” at any point in the five-step process, she does not proceed to the next step. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The findings 

of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn the decision to 

deny benefits only “when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported 

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must 

resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the 

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision, 

however, “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hammock v. 

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence 

that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). 

DISCUSSION 

 Holandes argues the ALJ committed four errors: (1) the ALJ improperly evaluated 

the treating physician opinions and the medical evidence; (2) the ALJ erroneously 

evaluated Holandes’s credibility; (3) the ALJ failed to properly consider lay witness 

testimony; and (4) the ALJ improperly disregarded the vocational expert’s testimony. The 

medical records span close to ten years and the ALJ emphasized that the period at issue is 

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the time between January 25, 2007, the alleged onset date, and June 30, 2008, the date 

Holandes was last insured. 

Treating Physicians 

 Holandes argues the ALJ should have given more weight to her treating 

physicians, Drs. Loomer, Howard and Weiss. All three of these doctors opined that 

Holandes had limitations that would prevent her from sustaining work activity. 

 Contrary to the three treating physicians, consulting physician Martha Goodrich 

concluded that there was not a continuous 12-month period during which Holandes had 

fibromyalgia symptoms resulting in functional limitations. (AR 821.) Dr. Goodrich stated 

that Holandes’s condition was “fairly episodic with long periods of muscle pain and 

weakness and long periods of normal activity.” (Id.) Dr. Goodrich opined that Holandes 

could perform light work, with limitations to only occasionally climb stairs, kneel, crouch 

or crawl, and never climb ladders. (AR 821-22.) The ALJ gave this opinion substantial 

weight, finding it consistent with the evidence, and he adopted Dr. Goodrich’s findings as 

Holandes’s RFC. (AR 29.) 

 Generally, a treating physician’s opinion is afforded more weight than the opinion 

of an examining physician, and an examining physician’s opinion is afforded more 

weight than a nonexamining or reviewing physician’s opinion. Holohan v. Massanari, 

246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001). When there are contradictory medical opinions 

such as there are in this case, to reject a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ must 

provide “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 The Commissioner contends that Drs. Loomer’s and Howard’s opinions were 

provided after Holandes’s date last insured. The ALJ did not rely on this fact to discount 

their opinions. Further, these doctors treated Holandes during the relevant time period 

and discussed that period in their opinions. The timing of these treating physician’s 

opinions does not entitle them to less weight than that of Dr. Goodrich, which was based 

on a review of records a year after Holandes’s last insured date. Cf. Smith v. Bowen, 849 

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F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases holding that evaluations conducted after 

expiration of an insured’s status are relevant to pre-expiration disability). 

 Dr. Loomer 

 Dr. Jeffrey Loomer, a rheumatologist, treated Holandes from January 2007 and 

offered an opinion on her abilities on September 10, 2010. (AR 935-36.) Dr. Loomer 

stated that Holandes’s condition had deteriorated over time, with increased episodes of 

depression, fatigue, muscle pain, and malaise, since January 2007. (AR 935.) He stated 

that medication had been helpful at times for her sleep, but it left her groggy in the 

morning and she continued to experience extreme daytime fatigue. (Id.) He noted that 

Holandes had global muscle tenderness and pain, with multiple fibromyalgia tender 

points. (Id.) Dr. Loomer opined that Holandes could not lift even ten pounds on a 

repetitive basis, and should avoid bending, stooping and climbing. (Id.) He stated that her 

symptoms are unpredictable, and on some days she would be capable of limited activity 

but on other days she could do nothing; thus, he concluded she could not do sustained 

activity. (AR 935-36.) 

 The ALJ declined to give controlling weight to Dr. Loomer’s opinion because he 

found that it was “too restrictive in light of the contemporaneous treatment notes.” (AR 

27.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Loomer precluded any repetitive lifting, but he found this 

was inconsistent with her level of activity: in June 2007, she was exercising for an hour 

when possible; in July 2007 she was responding positively to Lyrica and having less 

fibromyalgia flares; and in February 2008, she was working out regularly and the 

fibromyalgia was stable. (Id.) Further, she did not see a pain specialist until March 2010, 

indicating that prior to that time Lyrica and antidepressants were sufficient. (Id.) 

 First, the Court looks at the ALJ’s rationale that Holandes’s level of activity was 

inconsistent with Dr. Loomer’s opinion regarding lifting. In June 2007, as noted by the 

ALJ, Holandes wrote down on a form that she walked/jogged occasionally, for an hour 

“when possible.” (AR 496.) The doctor recorded that same day that her ability to exercise 

was inhibited by her condition, she was sedentary, and she was not doing regular weightCase 4:13-cv-00370-DTF Document 29 Filed 11/03/14 Page 5 of 11
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bearing exercises. (AR 521.) At that same appointment, her doctor noted that her energy 

level had significantly decreased, she was fatigued, and her symptoms were not 

controlled with current medication. (AR 520, 521.) In July, Holandes told a doctor that 

she was having fewer fibromyalgia flares and her symptoms were controlled, as noted by 

the ALJ, but at best her pain was a 3/10. (AR 511.) She was walking “some” for 10-15 

minutes, but experienced chronic fatigue and napped every day. (AR 511, 909.) In 

February, Holandes reported working out regularly and fibromyalgia was stable. (AR 

506, 508.) In April, Dr. Loomer recorded increased achiness and significant fatigue, with 

a desire to nap. (AR 907.) Similarly, in July 2008, Dr. Loomer noted fibromyalgia was 

stable but she had excessive fatigue. (Id.) 

 The record does not indicate activity inconsistent with a strict limitation on lifting. 

There is no evidence she regularly lifted anything significant. Exercise was recommended 

by her doctors (AR 120, 512), however, Holandes exercised only inconsistently. The 

record indicates “working out” involved walking short distances with her husband or on a 

treadmill where she could hold on. (AR 54-55, 73-74.) Further, Holandes was often 

incapacitated in the days after she exercised or did anything active. (AR 55, 67, 73, 82, 

112-13.) She and her husband both reported that he did all of the household chores (AR 

146, 148-49, 342, 359), and there is no evidence to the contrary. Her activities of daily 

living were minimal, she showered only once a week, almost never socialized, and spent 

most of her day in the recliner chair. (AR 76-80, 114-19, 148-49, 340-41, 344, 358.) Even 

when Holandes’s fibromyalgia was stable, treatment notes indicate she experienced pain 

and extreme fatigue. 

 Second, the ALJ discounted Dr. Loomer’s opinion because Holandes was 

successfully treated with Lyrica and antidepressants until March 2010. The record 

supports the ALJ’s finding that prior to that time, Lyrica and other medications were 

generally “controlling” her pain and limiting her fibromyalgia flares. However, that does 

not undermine Dr. Loomer’s opinion about her limitations in 2007 and 2008. During that 

time, Holandes still experienced flares and as opined by the doctors suffered from 

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excessive fatigue. Dr. Loomer indicated that fatigue impeded her ability to work. 

Additionally, Holandes’s stability was based on a very inactive lifestyle. A short walk or 

other activity could cause days of pain. The fact that Holandes reported an increase in 

pain and depression beginning in November 2009 (AR 851), does not establish that her 

symptoms prior to that time were not disabling. 

 The ALJ failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 

Loomer’s opinion. 

 Drs. Howard and Weiss 

 On April 7, 2009, Holandes’s primary care physician Dr. Paul Howard stated that 

she had fibromyalgia and her condition had deteriorated since January 2008. (AR 798.) 

Dr. Howard stated that Holandes took medication that allowed her to conduct activities of 

daily living but not any vocational activity. (Id.) He noted that as a side effect to the 

medications, she experienced dizziness, fatigue and blurry vision, which precluded her 

from doing sustained activity. (Id.) He remarked that she could not work because her 

condition was unpredictable. (Id.) He stated that Holandes was limited in her ability to do 

any lifting, bending, stooping, crawling or climbing. (Id.) On October 6, 2010, 

Holandes’s new primary care physician, Dr. Vasanta Weiss, stated that she agreed with 

the opinion provided by Dr. Howard. (AR 937.) 

 The ALJ gave limited weight to Dr. Howard’s opinion finding it vague and based 

on subjective complaints and reports of side effects, with no functional testing. (AR 27.) 

The ALJ also found that Dr. Howard’s opinion was contradicted by his October 2007 

clearance for Holandes to have plastic surgery. (Id.) Dr. Howard stated at that time that 

Holandes was free of symptoms that would preclude surgery and her physical exam was 

within normal limits. (Id.) The ALJ also noted that Dr. Howard’s records indicated that, 

in February 2008, Holandes was back at the gym and was not having any depression. 

(AR 28.) The ALJ gave limited weight to Dr. Weiss because she had only seen Holandes 

once and merely agreed with Dr. Howard. (Id.) 

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 The ALJ did not support his finding that Dr. Howard’s opinion was “vague.” Dr. 

Howard provided a diagnosis, identified medication side effects and specified functional 

limitations. Fibromyalgia is diagnosed based on the patient’s identification of symptoms, 

not on any confirmable testing. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 

2004). Therefore, Dr. Howard was obligated to rely upon Holandes’s self-reporting. The 

ALJ did not identify any functional testing that Dr. Howard might have done to more 

accurately quantify Holandes’s limitations. It is error to require objective evidence for 

fibromyalgia because it cannot be measured in those terms. Id. at 594. 

 There is no evident contradiction between Dr. Howard’s opinion on Holandes’s 

limitations and his clearance for her to have surgery in October 2007. Dr. Howard ran an 

ECG, CBC and CMP, none of which were contraindicative for surgery. (AR 583.) The 

ALJ fails to articulate any reason why fibromyalgia would negatively impact Holandes’s 

heart or blood levels, such that surgery would be precluded. Dr. Howard did note for the 

surgeon Holandes’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia and her current medications. (Id.) The ALJ 

failed to explain why surgical clearance contradicted Dr. Howard’s opinion that Holandes 

could not perform sustained activity, and the connection is not obvious to the Court. 

 As identified by the ALJ, Dr. Howard’s February 2008 record indicated 

Holandes’s fibromyalgia was stable. (AR 508.) However, the other records from before 

and after this period, indicate Holandes was experiencing significant fatigue. (AR 511, 

520, 907, 909-10.) SSR 12-2p, which covers evaluation of fibromyalgia, provides that the 

agency will “consider a longitudinal record whenever possible because the symptoms of 

FM can wax and wane so that a person may have ‘bad days and good days.’” When the 

full record is examined, it is evident that even when Holandes’s fibromyalgia was 

considered stable, she had significant fatigue and periodic flares. The ALJ failed to 

provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Howard’s opinion. 

 The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Weiss’s opinion was based on a specific, legitimate 

reason supported by substantial evidence. The record demonstrates that Dr. Weiss first 

saw Holandes in late 2010, more than two years after the expiration of her insured status. 

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She did not offer a retrospective opinion on Holandes’s functionality during the relevant 

time period, and she had only one visit with her before providing an opinion. 

Additionally, in merely agreeing with Dr. Howard, the opinion does not carry 

independent weight. 

 Conclusion and Substantial Evidence 

 The ALJ’s rejection of the opinions of Drs. Howard and Loomer was not 

supported by specific legitimate reasons or substantial evidence. After rejecting all of the 

treating doctors, the ALJ gave substantial weight to a non-examining physician, Dr. 

Goodrich. A nonexamining physician’s opinion is, without more, not substantial evidence 

to reject the opinion of a treating physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. 

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984)). When weighing a non-examining 

physician’s opinion, the ALJ should evaluate how much of the record Dr. Goodrich 

considered, including whether she reviewed the opinions of treating physicians. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 1527(c)(3). There is no documentation regarding what records Dr. Goodrich reviewed 

before issuing her July 2009 opinion. Dr. Howard issued his opinion several months 

before, in April 2009; however, it appears this was not considered by Dr. Goodrich. 

When discussing medical source statements, she cited only a 2003 opinion by Dr. 

Loomer. (AR 826.) 

 Dr. Goodrich opined that Holandes’s impairment was episodic, therefore, she 

concluded Holandes did not experience a 12-month period of functional limitations. 

However, she found that Holandes experienced “long periods of muscle pain and 

weakness,” (interspersed with periods of normal activity) and could do light activity 

“during the majority of the . . . claim period.” (AR 821.) The Commissioner’s role is to 

assess whether a claimant can work on a “sustained basis,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), and 

“[o]ccasional symptom-free periods – and even the sporadic ability to work – are not 

inconsistent with disability.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 833. The ALJ did not reconcile how 

Holandes could work if, during a 12-month interval, she had substantive periods of time 

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when her symptoms were exacerbated and she could not do even light activity. The ALJ 

erred in his rejection of the opinions of Drs. Loomer and Howard. 

CONCLUSION 

 A federal court may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand a social security case. 42 

U.S.C. ' 405(g). When a court finds that an administrative decision is flawed, the remedy 

should generally be remand for “additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Ventura, 

537 U.S. 12, 16 (2006) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 

(1985)); see also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). However, a 

district court should credit as true treating physician opinions that were improperly 

rejected by the ALJ and remand for benefits if: 

(1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the testimony; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record 

that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such 

evidence credited. 

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 

995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (precluding remand for further proceedings if the purpose is 

solely to allow ALJ to revisit the medical opinion he rejected). The Ninth Circuit recently 

clarified that application of the credit as true rule is mandatory unless the record creates 

serious doubt that the claimant is disabled. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. 

 As discussed above, factor one is satisfied because the ALJ failed to provide 

adequate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Loomer and Howard. Because the 

vocational expert testified regarding the limitations found by Drs. Howard and Loomer, 

there are no outstanding issues requiring further proceedings. In applying factor three, the 

Court credits as true the doctors’ opinions on Holandes’s functional limitations not their 

opinion that she was wholly unable to work. The treating doctors opined that Holandes 

experienced dizziness, extreme daytime fatigue and blurry vision, could not lift any 

weight on a regular basis, and could do no sustained activity because she could not 

predict the days when she would be unable to go to work. (AR 798, 935-36.) 

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 The vocational expert testified that a person could not perform any competitive 

work if she could not stay on-task for two hours at a time, would have more than 12 

absences in a year, or could not lift 10 pounds repetitively. (AR 91-93.) Holandes’s 

treating doctors determined that she was limited in ways that the vocational expert 

testified would preclude work. In light of her extreme fatigue, dizziness and 

unpredictable ability to attend work, she would be unable to stay on task or not miss more 

than 12 days of work. Additionally, the doctors found her unable to lift any weight 

repeatedly. Thus, based on the testimony of the vocational expert called by the ALJ, it is 

clear the ALJ would find Holandes disabled if the treating physicians’ opinions were 

credited as true. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, application of the credit as true rule is 

mandatory and directs a finding that Holandes is disabled. Because the Court finds 

Holandes entitled to an award of benefits based on the ALJ’s error in his weighing of the 

treating doctor’s opinions, it does not consider Holandes’s other claims. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND 

REMANDED for an award of benefits. The Clerk of Court should enter judgment and 

close this case. 

 Dated this 3rd day of November, 2014. 

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