Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01169/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01169-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MADERO POUNCIL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JAMES TILTON, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CIV. S-09-1169 LKK/CMK P 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Madero Pouncil is a state prisoner proceeding 

through counsel with this action raising claims under the 

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims violations of his statutory 

and constitutional rights protected by RLUIPA and the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments by virtue of the enforcement against him of 

a state prison regulation prohibiting conjugal visits for inmates 

serving a sentence of life in prison without possibility of 

parole (LWOP). This matter is before the court on defendant 

Jeffrey Beard’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint (FAC) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

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I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed January 22, 2014 

(ECF No. 71) contains the following allegations. Plaintiff is 

serving a sentence of LWOP presently at Mule Creek State Prison. 

FAC at 2. He is “a devout Muslim and has endeavored to live by 

the principles of his faith since converting in 1989.” Id. at 4. 

As a Muslim, Plaintiff believes that it is 

important to marry and maintain a healthy 

marital relationship with his spouse. This 

relationship entails both an intimate 

physical connection as well as an intimate 

emotional bound. Plaintiff believes that a 

husband and wife must engage in sexual 

relations to properly consummate their 

marriage. Additionally, the Muslim faith 

teaches and Plaintiff believes that 

maintaining proper sexual intimacy throughout 

the marriage is necessary to adequately 

satisfy both the spiritual and physical needs 

of each marital partner. A failure to do so 

is grounds for divorce. 

Id. 

In 1999, while in prison, plaintiff married his first wife. 

Id. at 5. In 2002, he requested conjugal visits. Id. The 

request was denied and plaintiff’s administrative grievances were 

unsuccessful. Id. Plaintiff did not file a lawsuit over that 

denial of conjugal visits and he and his first wife subsequently 

divorced. Id. Plaintiff married his second wife on July 14, 

2007. Id. at 5. In 2008, he submitted a family visiting 

application, which was denied pursuant to 15 C.C.R. § 3177(b)(2), 

which categorically bans overnight visits for certain categories 

of inmates, including those serving LWOP sentences. Id. He has 

exhausted administrative remedies. Id. at 6. 

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Plaintiff is only allowed one two hour non-contact visit 

with his wife per week. Id. All physical contact is restricted, 

and plaintiff “is prevented from showing his wife any physical 

affection.” FAC at 6. In prior litigation, defendants have 

justified the categorical prohibition on the grounds of 

institutional security. Id. at 7. The regulation “categorically 

prohibits” plaintiff from having family visits with his wife 

“without further assessment by prison officials to determine 

whether [he] poses a security risk.” Id. Before the regulation, 

he “was free to engage in overnight contact visits with family 

members and would have been eligible to engage conjugal visits 

with a spouse at that time.” Id. Nothing in plaintiff’s prison 

record except the categorical prohibition contained in the 

regulation “would currently prohibit plaintiff from qualifying 

for overnight contact ‘family visits’.” Id. 

Plaintiff claims that the regulation substantially burdens 

the free exercise of his religious faith in violation of RLUIPA. 

He also claims that the regulations deprive him of constitutional 

rights of free exercise of religion, privacy, association and 

marriage, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief enjoining defendant from 

depriving plaintiff of family visits and ordering defendant to 

implement policies which protect the constitutional rights at 

issue in enforcing 15 C.C.R. § 3177(b)(2). 

II. STANDARD 

A dismissal motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenges 

a complaint’s compliance with the federal pleading requirements. 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short 

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” The complaint must give the defendant 

“‘fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.’” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported by 

factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Moreover, this court “must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint,” neither legal conclusions nor conclusory statements 

are themselves sufficient, and such statements are not entitled 

to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Iqbal and 

Twombly therefore prescribe a two-step process for evaluation of 

motions to dismiss. The court first identifies the nonconclusory factual allegations, and then determines whether these 

allegations, taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, “plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

 “Plausibility,” as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does not 

refer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in proving 

the allegations. Instead, it refers to whether the nonconclusory factual allegations, when assumed to be true, “allow[ 

] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

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a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557). A complaint may fail to show a right to relief either 

by lacking a cognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient 

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. First Cause of Action -- RLUIPA

 Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, 

contending that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief 

because prison officials have a compelling interest in prison 

security and denying family visits to inmates serving LWOP 

sentences is the least restrictive means of furthering that 

security interest. 

 In opposition, plaintiff argues that in order to state a 

claim under RLUIPA he is only required to plead facts which show 

that he is seeking to exercise his religious teachings and the 

challenged state practice substantially burdens the exercise of 

his religious faith. Plaintiff contends that the security 

arguments advanced by defendant raise factual questions not 

properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. 

 “Section 3 of RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that ‘[n]o 

government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution 

... even if the burden results from a rule of general 

applicability,” unless the government establishes that the burden 

furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so by 

“the least restrictive means.’ [Footnote omitted.] 42 U.S.C. § 

2000cc–1(a)(1)-(2).” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 

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(9th Cir. 2005). To state a claim under RLUIPA, plaintiff “must 

allege facts plausibly showing that the challenged policy and the 

practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the 

exercise of [his] religious beliefs.” Hartmann v. California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 

(9th Cir. 2013); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994 (under 

RLUIPA, plaintiff has initial burden on “prima facie claim” that 

challenged regulation constitutes “a substantial burden on the 

exercise of his religious beliefs.”) Plaintiff has met his 

initial burden. 

 The justification for the regulation is a matter of proof 

rather than of pleading, and the burden of proving the 

justification is on the defendant. 

Under RLUIPA, prison officials bear the 

burden of establishing that the restriction 

challenged is the “least restrictive 

alternative to achieve” a compelling 

governmental interest. See Warsoldier, 418 

F.3d at 998. “[N]o longer can prison 

officials justify restrictions on religious 

exercise by simply citing to the need to 

maintain order and security in a prison.” 

Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 

989 (9th Cir.2008). They now must demonstrate 

that they “actually considered and rejected 

the efficacy of less restrictive measures 

before adopting the challenged practice.” 

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999. 

Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 

42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-1(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). 

 Defendant relies on two cases for the proposition that the 

regulation at issue is the least restrictive means of furthering 

the state’s interest in prison security, Block v. Rutherford, 468 

U.S. 576, 587 (1984) and Tuvalu v. Woodford, No. 2:04-cv-1724 JAM 

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KJM P. Neither involved a RLUIPA claim and neither analyzed the 

regulation at issue under the standards that apply to defendant’s 

burden on the claim at bar.1 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has adequately stated a 

claim for relief under RLUIPA. Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

will be denied as this claim. 

B. Second Cause of Action 

 Defendant also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983 cause 

of action, which is predicated on both the First and Fourteenth 

Amendment. Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights to free 

exercise of religion, marriage, privacy, and association are 

violated by his exclusion from the family visiting program. In 

so doing, he argues that he is relying on a hybrid of 

constitutional rights, including the exercise of his religion and 

his right to marry, and therefore that this case falls within the 

“hybrid rights” exception to the rule announced in Employment 

Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 

 In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that the 

right to free exercise of religion “does not relieve an 

 

1

 Defendant relies primarily on a state court decision, Pro-Family Advocates 

v. Gomez, 46 Cal.App.4th 1674 (Cal.App.1.Dist. 1996) for the proposition that 

the state’s interest in prison security is the basis for the regulation. In 

relevant part, the question in Pro-Family Advocates was whether certain 

prohibitions on family visits, including for inmates serving LWOP sentences, 

violated the ex post facto clause, and the state court of appeal found that 

“[v]iewed as a whole, the evidence supports the conclusion that – although the 

regulation has a punitive effect and one of its purposes may be penal – it 

also has legitimate, nonpunitive government purposes” including “maintenance 

of institutional security”. Pro-Family Advocates, 46 Cal.App.4th at 1684. 

Defendant has not briefed the question whether the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel precludes relitigation of the asserted basis for the regulation, and 

plaintiff contends he is entitled to conduct discovery on this question, see 

Pls. Opp. to Mot. Dismiss, filed April 7, 2014 (ECF No. 75) at 5. In any 

event, the basis for the ban is not a pleading requirement for plaintiff’s 

RLUIPA claim. 

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individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral 

law of general applicability on the ground that the law 

proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes 

(or proscribes).” Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 

Smith, however, excepts a hybrid-rights claim 

from its rational basis test. In Smith, the 

Court distinguished the strict scrutiny 

imposed in “hybrid situation[s]” in which a 

law “involve[s] not the Free Exercise Clause 

alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 

conjunction with other constitutional 

protections.” 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 

1595. 

Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 For the hybrid-rights exception to apply, however, “a free 

exercise plaintiff must make out a ‘colorable claim’ that a 

companion right has been violated-that is, a ‘fair probability’ 

or a ‘likelihood,’ but not a certitude, of success on the 

merits.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[A] plaintiff does 

not allege a hybrid-rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny 

analysis merely by combining a free exercise claim with an 

utterly meritless claim of the violation of another alleged 

fundamental right or a claim of an alleged violation of a nonfundamental or non-existent right.” Id. at 1208. 

“It is well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional 

right while incarcerated to contact visits or conjugal visits.” 

Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 

(citing, inter alia, Kentucky v. Department of Corrections v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). In Gerber, the Ninth 

Circuit held that “while the basic right to marry survives 

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imprisonment, . . ., most of the attributes of marriage – 

cohabitation, physical intimacy, and bearing and raising children 

– do not.” Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621; cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 

U.S. 126, 131-32 (declining to decide whether the right to 

intimate association survives incarceration; if it does, Turner 

test applies). Thus, plaintiff’s contention that he has a 

hybrid-rights claim subject to strict scrutiny must fail, because 

the associated rights he is claiming, all of which are grounded 

in the right to certain benefits of marriage, do not survive 

incarceration.2

 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s second cause of 

action must be dismissed. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

 1. Defendant’s February 5, 2014 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 

74) is denied as to plaintiff’s first cause of action and granted 

as to plaintiff’s second cause of action; and 

2. Within ten days from the date of this order defendant 

shall file and serve an answer to the first cause of action in 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint. 

DATED: April 22, 2014. 

 

2

 Plaintiff does retain the First Amendment right to free exercise of his 

religious faith, but that right “is limited by institutional objectives and by 

the loss of freedom concomitant with incarceration.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 

1122 (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). To state 

a cognizable claim under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, 

plaintiff must allege facts which show that the challenged regulation is 

neither valid nor neutral with respect to religion. Plaintiff does not 

purport to bring a standard First Amendment free exercise clause claim, as 

distinct from his asserted hybrid rights claim. 

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