Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00589/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00589-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT BAKER, ) CIV-S-05-0589 GEB KJM

)

Plaintiff, ) ORDER

)

v. )

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

 )

Defendants State of California (“State”), California Youth

Authority (“CYA”), Roderick Hickman (“Hickman”), Tim Mahoney

(“Mahoney”), and Walter Allen, III (“Allen”) move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former ward of a CYA correctional facility. 

(Compl. ¶ 1.) On January 20, 2004, CYA employees allegedly “attempted

to require and force [Plaintiff] to sign a ‘contract’ admitting he was

a gang member and agreeing to desegregate [and] integregate the blocks

without violence.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges he “refused to sign

said ‘contract’ whereupon he was attacked and beaten by guards. . . .” 

(Id.) At the relevant time, Defendants Hickman, Mahoney, and Allen

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(collectively, “Supervisory Defendants”) “were State employees,

supervisors, and/or officials.” (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff brought suit against the Supervisory Defendants

for assault and battery (first claim) and negligent supervision,

hiring, training, employee discipline, and operation of a correctional

facility (second claim); and against the Supervisory Defendants, the

State, and the CYA for fraud and concealment (third claim); conspiracy

(fourth claim); violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (fifth claim); violation of California

Civil Code section 52.1 (sixth claim); negligence per se (seventh

claim); failure to summon medical care under California Government

Code section 845.6 (eighth claim); and violation of California Civil

Code section 51.7 (ninth claim).

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. “On a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll factual allegations set

forth in the complaint ‘are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to [P]laintiff . . . .’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Epstein v. Wash. Energy

Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996)).

A. The State and the CYA

The State and the CYA move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s

fifth claim which alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983"),

arguing that “states and state agencies are not defined as ‘persons’

for purposes of § 1983 . . . and, therefore, are not subject to suit

under § 1983.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 10.) Since only “persons”

are liable under § 1983 and “a State is not a ‘person’ within the

meaning of § 1983,” the State and the CYA’s motion to dismiss

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Plaintiff’s fifth claim is granted. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).

The State and the CYA also argue they are immune from

liability on Plaintiff’s state claims. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) 

California Government Code section 844.6 provides that “a public

entity is not liable for . . . [a]n injury to any prisoner.” Cal.

Gov’t Code § 844.6(a)(2). “[A] ward . . . at a juvenile correction

center . . . [is] a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the relevant

immunity provisions of the Government Code.” May v. County of

Monterey, 139 Cal. App. 3d 717, 719 (1983). Since the State and the

CYA, as public entities, are immune from suit on Plaintiff’s state

personal injury claims, the State and the CYA’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and ninth claims is

granted. 

However, Plaintiff’s eighth claim alleges the State and the

CYA are liable under California Government Code section 845.6 which

provides: “a public employee, and the public entity where the employee

is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable [for injury

proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain

medical care for a prisoner in his custody] if the employee knows or

has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical

care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical

care.” The State and the CYA argue that Plaintiff’s eighth claim

should be dismissed because “there is nothing other than vague and

conclusory allegations that any of the [S]upervisory Defendants knew

of or had reason to know that Plaintiff required immediate care [and]

the Complaint fails to allege with any specificity that the injuries

were serious . . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 14.) 

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Plaintiff alleges Defendants “knew or had reason to know

that [Plaintiff] was in need of immediate medical care. Despite such

knowledge, [Defendants] failed to take reasonable action to summon

such medical care for [P]laintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 41.) The State and the

CYA counter that these allegations are insufficient because they are

“vague and conclusory” and because “the Complaint fails to allege with

any specificity that the injuries were serious.” (Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 14.) However, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants

“assaulted and battered [him,] repeatedly striking him . . . kicking

him . . . ‘spraying’ him with chemical agents . . . [and performing]

knee drops to the back of [P]laintiff’s head” are sufficient to

support the inference that Defendants knew or had reason to know that

Plaintiff suffered serious injuries requiring immediate medical care. 

(Compl. ¶ 8.) Therefore, the State and the CYA’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s eighth claim is denied. 

B. The Supervisory Defendants

1. Assault and Battery

The Supervisory Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first

claim for assault and battery, arguing that “Plaintiff has not alleged

that any of these [Supervisory] Defendants intended to cause harmful

or offensive contact . . . as required under California law.” (Defs.’

Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) However, Plaintiff alleges that several CYA

employees “intentionally assaulted and battered [him] and/or watched

him be [subjected to] the use of unreasonable and excessive force,

including repeated[] strik[es to] his face and body . . . even though

[P]laintiff was not resisting the guards,” and as a result,

“[P]laintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries . . . .” (Compl.

¶¶ 10, 12, 14.) Plaintiff contends the Supervisory Defendants are

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liable since they allegedly “approved or ratified said above conduct

by allowing a custom or practice and maintaining a policy which

accepts or directs said conduct” (id. ¶ 12) and “an employer who

ratifies conduct is liable therefor” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. Dismiss at 2

(emphasis added)). However, Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisory

Defendants are “state employees, supervisors and/or officials.”

(Compl. ¶ 12 (emphasis added).) Since Plaintiff has not alleged that

the Supervisory Defendants assaulted or battered him, this portion of

the motion is granted. 

2. Negligent Supervision, Hiring, Training, Employee 

Discipline, and Operation of a Correctional Facility

The Supervisory Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s

second claim for negligent supervision, hiring, training, employee

discipline, and operation of a correctional facility “because that

[claim] may be asserted only against an employer.” (Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 4.) However, “[A supervisory] public officer [could be]

responsible for the acts or omissions of subordinates [where the

supervisor] has directed such acts to be done, or has personally cooperated therein . . . .” Payne v. Bennion, 178 Cal. App. 2d 595,

598-99 (1960) (emphasis added) (quoting Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199

(1922)). “There is no rule prohibiting a suit against a [state]

officer or employee by one injured as a result of the negligence of

such officer or employee arising in connection with performance of the

duties of his employment.” Collenburg v. County of Los Angeles, 150

Cal. App. 2d 795, 803 (1957). “Supervisory liability [can be] imposed

against a supervisory official in his individual capacity for his own

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control

of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional

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deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.”

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisory Defendants “were

aware that employees . . . had abused wards and/or had a history of

violence or use of excessive force” and that the Supervisory

Defendants “intentionally, knowingly, and/or negligently hired, and

failed to supervise, train, discipline and address and prevent the

wrongful abuse of Wards and thereby authorized and approved the use of

unreasonable and excessive force . . . [on Plaintiff].” (Compl. ¶¶

17, 18.) Since Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim against the

Supervisory Defendants for negligent supervision and training, the

Supervisory Defendants’ motion to dismiss that portion of Plaintiff’s

claim is denied. However, since Plaintiff has not stated a claim

against the Supervisory Defendants for negligent hiring, employee

discipline, and operation of a correctional facility, that portion of

the Supervisory Defendants’ motion is granted.

3. Fraud and Concealment

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s third claim for

fraud and concealment, arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations are

“nothing more than conclusory statements.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at

8.) Plaintiff alleges that “After the incident, [Defendants] filed

false written reports concerning the incident” and “made false

statements, distortions, misrepresentations, and concealed facts

concerning the events leading up to and including those occurring on

January 20, 2004.” (Compl. ¶ 21.) 

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Plaintiff must “identify the circumstances of the fraud such

that the [D]efendant[s] can prepare an adequate answer from the

allegations.” In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 794

(S.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d

1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff’s allegations have sufficient

specificity; therefore, this portion of the motion is denied. 

4. Conspiracy

The Supervisory Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s

claim for conspiracy, arguing that “[e]ven if Plaintiff could bring a

claim against [the Supervisory Defendants] for civil conspiracy,

Plaintiff has failed to allege any of [the] elements.” (Defs.’ Mot to

Dismiss at 9.) “In order to state a [conspiracy claim], a complaint

must allege ‘(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2)

the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage

resulting.’” Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 631 (1972)). 

Plaintiff has alleged that “[on] or about January 20, 2004

[Defendants] knowingly and willfully agreed and conspired among

themselves to assault and batter [Plaintiff]” and “furthered said

conspiracy by lending aid and encouragement to each other to commit

and continue said assault and battery.” (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 25.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “engaged in a conspiracy to

deny plaintiff any medical attention . . . for the injuries and harm

he suffered as a result of said assault and battery,” and “engaged in

a conspiracy to cover-up, conceal, and misrepresent” facts surrounding

the alleged assault and battery and denial of medical attention. (Id.

¶¶ 26, 27.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the conspiracy,

“Plaintiff suffered economic and non-economic damages.” (Id. ¶ 29.) 

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Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim for conspiracy; therefore, this

portion of the motion is denied.

5. Violation of Constitutional and Civil Rights

The Supervisory Defendants also seek dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that

“The wrongful acts, including the policy, custom and practice of the

use of excessive force and abuse by defendants . . ., the assault and

battery against plaintiff; the negligent supervision, hiring,

training, discipline of [State and CYA] employees and operation of

[the CYA] correctional facility; fraud; concealment; conspiracy; and

deliberate disregard of medical care, all violated [Plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom

from unnecessary or excessive force. . . .” (Compl. ¶ 31.) 

The Supervisory Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims should be dismissed since “Plaintiff has failed to allege any

facts showing that [the Supervisory Defendants] were in any way

responsible for the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights.” (Defs.’ Mot to Dismiss at 10-11.) However, Plaintiff argues

his complaint alleges “not only an affirmative act in creating and

enforcing a policy of excessive force but also allege a failure to

act, i.e. to remedy the oppressive policy or custom of excessive

force- to which they were deliberately indifferent.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Mot. Dismiss at 6.) Since the Supervisor Defendants could be liable

“in [their] individual capacit[ies] for [their] own culpable action or

inaction . . ., for [their] acquiescence in the constitutional

deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others,”

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Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim and this portion of

the Supervisory Defendants’ motion is denied. Larez, 946 F.2d at 646.

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims, arguing that “[i]nsofar as Plaintiff raises

independent Eighth Amendment claims, such claims are inextricably

linked to the Fourteenth Amendment claims” and “Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims are subsumed by the Eighth Amendment claims.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 11.) “[T]he Due Process Clause [of the

Fourteenth Amendment] affords [a prisoner] no greater protection than

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause [of the Eighth Amendment].” 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). However, “An inmate who

is injured as a result of a prison official’s deliberate indifference

to his safety may maintain a damage action for the deprivation of his

civil rights under the [E]ighth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments.” 

Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Whitley, 475

U.S. 312). Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied.

6. California Civil Code Section 52.1

The Supervisory Defendants contend Plaintiff’s sixth claim

under California Civil Code section 52.1 should be dismissed since

“Plaintiff does not plead that [the Supervisory Defendants] personally

threatened to physically abuse or harm Plaintiff or that they

interfered with Plaintiff’s civil rights by using threats or

intimidation.” (Defs.’ Mot to Dismiss at 12.) But since this claim

includes the allegation that Defendants “attempted to require and

force [Plaintiff] to sign a ‘contract’ [and when Plaintiff] refused to

sign said ‘contract’ . . . he was attacked and beaten by guards”

(Compl. ¶ 7), this portion of the motion is denied.

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7. Negligence Per Se

The Supervisory Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s

claim for negligence per se because “Plaintiff has done no more than

simply state that [the Supervisory Defendants] have mandatory duties

under California laws and regulations, and that their actions breached

these duties.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 13.) Defendants argue that

“Plaintiff has failed to plead any causal connection between the

actions of Defendants and any violations of these laws.” (Id.) 

However, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to withstand this

motion; therefore, the motion is denied. 

8. Failure to Summon Medical Care

The Supervisory Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s

eighth claim for failure to summon medical care. The motion is denied

because Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state this claim.

9. California Civil Code Section 51.7

The Supervisory Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s ninth

claim for violation of California Civil Code section 51.7 because

“Plaintiff completely fails to allege that any of the Defendants were

motivated by gender or national origin animus.” (Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 15.) Under California Civil Code section 51.7(a): “All

persons . . . have the right to be free from any violence, or

intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or

property because of their race, color, [or] national origin . . . .” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(a). Plaintiff alleges Defendants “segregated

Wards into ‘gangs’” and that segregation “included dividing Wards by

race.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants “attempted

to require and force [Plaintiff] to sign a ‘contract’ admitting he was

a gang member and agreeing to desegregate [and] integrate the blocks

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without violence.” (Id. ¶ 7.) However, since Plaintiff has failed to

allege that the Supervisory Defendants were motivated by gender or

national origin animus, this portion of the motion is granted.

CONCLUSION

The State and the CYA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third

through seventh and ninth claims is granted; but their motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s eighth claim is denied. The Supervisory

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and ninth claims is

granted; their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim is granted

in part and denied in part; and their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

remaining claims is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 11, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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