Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_06-cv-01601/USCOURTS-ared-4_06-cv-01601-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - 42:1983 Civil Rights

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Defendant received permission from the Court to file his brief in response to the pending

Motion to Remand on, or before December 15, 2006. As of the date of this Order, he has not

filed such a brief.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

WARREN PROPERTIES, INC. PLAINTIFF

VS. CASE NO. 4:06CV001601 JMM

FELIX D. TAYLOR DEFENDANT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

and Motion for Contempt, and plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.1

 For the reasons stated below, the

Motion to Remand is granted and the Motions for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and for

Contempt are denied.

On November 7, 2006, defendant removed an Order of Possession from the Circuit Court of

Pulaski County pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and § 1441, and sought permission from the Court to

proceed in forma pauperis. In his Notice of Removal defendant contended that he could not

enforce his counterclaims based upon the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 because the state court failed to make provisions for his being blind.

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Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand contending that the Court lacked jurisdiction because 

(1) the removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); (2) a defense or counterclaim raising

federal issues cannot serve as a basis for federal question jurisdiction; and (3) diversity jurisdiction

is lacking. 

On November 29, 2006, defendant filed a Motion for Contempt contending that plaintiff,

plaintiff’s counsel, and certain state officials who are not parties to this case should be held in

contempt because they were aware that the state court did not have jurisdiction over his case.

I. Facts

Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer complaint against defendant on October 3, 2006

contending that defendant, a month-to-month tenant, failed in July, August, and September of 2006

to pay his $405.00 monthly rent. Defendant was served with the complaint on October 4, 2006 by

a process server who offered to read him the summons and other documents. Defendant waived

his right to have the documents read to him.

On October 12, 2006, plaintiff gave defendant notice of the November 7, 2006 hearing by

certified mail, and by civil process server who verbally read the letter to defendant. On October 24,

2006, defendant filed an answer to the unlawful detainer and pled counterclaims based upon the

ADA and § 1983 along with allegations that he had been constructively evicted because he had

been denied a handicapped parking space, handicapped equipment, modifications to his apartment

to make it accessible, repairs, and that plaintiff had taken his automobile.

As a result of the hearing, which plaintiff did not attend, the state court found that defendant

was in default on his rental payments and issued an Order of Possession.

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Exhibit #1 to plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.

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II. Discussion

Defendant was served with a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief on

October 4, 2006.2

 He filed his Notice of Removal on November 7, 2006. Under 28 U.S.C. §

1446(b), a defendant has thirty days from receipt of service of a copy of the initial pleading setting

forth the claim for relief to file a Notice of Removal. Because defendant filed his Notice of

Removal on the thirty-fourth day of receiving such notice, his Notice of Removal is untimely.

Removal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) “only if it can be predicted by reference

to a law of general application that the defendant will be denied or cannot enforce the specified

federal rights in the state courts.” Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 1794, 16

L.Ed.2d 925 (1966). Defendant’s notice of removal fails to establish nor does he point to any law

of general application which would predict that he cannot enforce or present the ADA or § 1983

claims in Pulaski County Circuit Court. Moreover, based upon the record there is no evidence that

the state court failed to accommodate defendant’s disability. Removal under § 1443(2) is not

available as plaintiff is not a federal officer or agent.

Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 based upon federal question or diversity jurisdiction also

fails. In Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,, 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002)

the United States Supreme Court held that counterclaims cannot serve as the basis for federal

question jurisdiction. Because defendant’s removal is based upon his counterclaims of violations

of the ADA and § 1983, this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction. C.f. Schinzing v. Mid-States

Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2005) (counterclaims cannot serve as the basis for Federal

Circuit jurisdiction).

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In his answer to the Unlawful Detainer action, defendant sought as relief, dismissal of the

complaint against him, $1,500,065.13 in damages under the ADA, $15,000.00 in damages for the

damages and loss of his automobile, a sum in excess of $75,000.00 under § 1983, and

approximately $8,000,000.00 in punitive damages under the ADA and § 1983. 

Defendant’s ADA counterclaims are cognizable under Title III of the ADA which provides

that no one “who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation” may

discriminate against anyone “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of ··· any

place of public accommodation.” Under Title III, defendant is not be entitled to compensatory or

punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Pona v. Cecil Whittaker’s, Inc., 155 F.3d 1034 (8th

Cir. 1998) ( private plaintiff can obtain only injunctive relief, not compensatory and punitive

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)) (District Judge Panner, concurring). 

While defendant would be entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983, he

has failed to state such a claim as plaintiff is not a state actor. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 939 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2755 n. 21, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (a private party's mere

invocation of state legal procedures does not constitute state action). Therefore, diversity

jurisdiction is lacking because the only amount in controversy is $15,000.00 for damages to his

automobile and for the loss of his automobile. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (amount in controversy must

exceed the sum or value of $75,000.00).

 “A district court may impose civil contempt sanctions for one of two purposes: to

compensate parties aggrieved by contumacious conduct or to coerce compliance with the court's

orders.” Chaganti & Associates, P.C. v. Nowotny, F.3d , 2006 WL 3488725 (8th Cir. 2006). 

Neither of these two reasons for imposing civil contempt exists in this case. Defendant’s Motion

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for Contempt is without merit.

III. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is granted (#9) and defendant’s Motions to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis and for Contempt are denied (#1 and #11). The Clerk of the Court is directed to return the

file to the Pulaski County Circuit Court forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 19 day of December , 2006.

 

James M. Moody

United States District Court

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