Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01168/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01168-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melissa Marie Pronovost, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Comm’r of the

Social Security Admin., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-1168-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees (doc. 19) and

memorandum in support (doc. 20), defendant’s response (doc. 21), and plaintiff’s reply (doc.

22).

This is a motion for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) of the

Social Security Act. Section 406(a) governs fees for representation of a Social Security

claimant in administrative proceedings, and § 406(b) applies to fees for representation before

a court. In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, §

406(b) fees are not paid by the losing party but by the prevailing claimant out of the past-due

benefits awarded. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 795, 122 S. Ct. 1817, 1822 (2002).

On March 15, 2013, we granted the Commissioner’s motion to vacate the agency

decision denying benefits and to remand the matter for further administrative proceedings

(doc. 17). On remand, the administrative law judge granted plaintiff’s application for

Case 2:12-cv-01168-FJM Document 23 Filed 12/22/14 Page 1 of 3
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disability insurance benefits and awarded past and future benefits. 

Pursuant to § 406(b), when a claimant obtains a favorable judgment under the Social

Security Act, “the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for

. . . representation [before the court], not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due

benefits.” Id. § 406(b)(1)(A). The award of attorney’s fees must not only be within the 25%

maximum, but it must be “reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807,

122 S. Ct. at 1828. The court provides “an independent check” to ensure that contingency

fee agreements between Social Security claimants and their lawyers will “yield reasonable

results in particular cases.” Id. Claimant’s counsel bears the burden of showing that the

statutory requirement of reasonableness has been satisfied. Id. 

Here, plaintiff retained counsel under a contingency fee agreement whereby plaintiff

agreed to pay counsel 25% of any past-due benefits recovered. Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks

fees under § 406(b) in the amount of $31,707.50, representing 25% of the past due benefits

awarded. Because § 406(b) fees are payable out of the award of past-due benefits, the

Commissioner has no direct financial stake in the decision to award fees, and accordingly the

Commissioner declined to assert a position on either the propriety or the amount of the

requested fee (doc. 21).

We must “approach [a § 406(b)] fee determinations by looking first to the contingentfee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 808, 122 S. Ct. at

1828. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in the 25% contingency-fee agreement

between plaintiff and her counsel. In fact, agreements providing for fees of 25% of past-due

benefits are the “most common fee arrangement between attorneys and Social Security

claimants.” Id. at 800, 122 S. Ct. at 1824. Therefore, on its face, the fee agreement is

reasonable. 

However, we must also test the resulting fee award for reasonableness under the

circumstances of the particular case. A fee resulting from a contingent-fee arrangement is

unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court if the lawyer provided

substandard representation, delayed the case in order to increase the accrued amount of pastCase 2:12-cv-01168-FJM Document 23 Filed 12/22/14 Page 2 of 3
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due benefits, or, as is most relevant here, if the requested fee is “large in comparison to the

amount of time counsel spent on the case.” Id. at 808, 122 S. Ct. at 1828. Although “the

Supreme Court flatly rejected [the] lodestar approach” to § 406(b) fees, Crawford v. Astrue,

586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), we nonetheless will consider lodestar factors (hourly

rates and reasonable hours expended) in determining whether a requested § 406(b) fee is

reasonable in a particular case. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808, 122 S. Ct. at 1828-29.

Here, counsel expended 40.7 hours of work in the district court, resulting in an hourly

rate of $779.05. We recognize that the equivalent hourly rate of a contingent fee is often

greater than a lodestar fee because the contingent fee method often compensates attorneys

for the risk undertaken in representing clients on a contingency basis. Crawford, 586 F.3d

at 1150. But in this particular case, counsel did not assume a significant risk in accepting

representation given that the Commissioner readily acknowledged error and requested a

reversal and remand. 

Unlike the lawyers in Crawford, plaintiff’s counsel in this case did not voluntarily

reduce his fee request from the 25% contracted rate based on his own evaluation of the fees

sought in comparison to the amount of time spent on the case. See id. at 1151-52. Instead,

counsel seeks the full 25% of past-due benefits awarded. But under the circumstances of this

case, an hourly rate of almost $800 is excessive. Given the minimal amount of work

performed or risk assumed by counsel in the district court proceedings, we conclude that an

award of fees in the amount of 10% of the past-due benefits, or $12,683.00 is reasonable

(resulting in an hourly rate of $311.62). 

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART plaintiff’s

motion for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and awarding fees in

the amount of $12,683.00 (doc. 19). 

DATED this 22nd day of December, 2014.

Case 2:12-cv-01168-FJM Document 23 Filed 12/22/14 Page 3 of 3