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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PHYLLIS B. LIEBSON and 

JOHN LIEBSON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

FILED 

United St•tes Court of APP••~ 'l'l'"th (;(rcult 

JAN 0 2 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 94-2210 

NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, 

JOHN THOMAS, DARELD KERBY, 

LAWRENCE BARRERAS, JEROME TAFOYA, 

and BARRY HERTZOG, 

Defendants~Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV-94-418-M) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Kathrin Kinzer-Ellington of Catron, Catron & Sawtell, P.A., Santa 

Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Paul M. Schneider, Legal Bureau/RMD, State of New Mexico, Santa 

Fe, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before TACHA, LOGAN, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs Phyllis B. Liebson and John Liebson filed this 

action, alleging that defendants, the New Mexico Corrections 

Department and various department officials, violated Ms. 

Liebson's constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also asserted several 

state law claims, all of which were remanded to state court. 

Neither the propriety of the district court's decision to remand 

Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 1 
plaintiffs' state law claims nor the merits of those claims is at 

issue here. The individual defendants in this matter, John 

Thomas, Dareld Kerby, Lawrence Barreras, Jerome Tafoya, and Barry 

Hertzog, appeal the district court's denial of their motion to 

dismiss Ms. Liebson's 42 u.s.c. § 1983 claims on qualified 

immunity grounds. We reverse and remand.l 

Plaintiff Phyllis B. Liebson was employed as a librarian by 

the Santa Fe community College. Pursuant to a joint powers 

agreement between the College and the New Mexico Corrections 

Department, she was assigned to provide library services to the. 

inmates housed in the maximum security unit of the New Mexico 

State Penitentiary. A corrections officer was present in the 

library at all times that she was on duty until March 21, 1992, 

when defendants changed the library hours and the schedule of the 

officer assigned to the library. On March 26, 1992, Ms. Liebson 

was on duty in the library with no officer present. She was 

kidnapped, held hostage, and sexually assaulted by an inmate 

library assistant. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit, alleging that defendants' 

decision to change the schedule of the corrections officer in the 

library was the proximate cause of Ms. Liebson's injuries, and 

that defendants' decision deprived Ms. Liebson of her 11 right to 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously tha~ oral argument would not materially. 

assist the determination of this appeal. ~Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 2 
liberty without due process of law and without equal protection of 

the law, and deprived her of property, privileges, and immunities 

secured to her by the laws and Constitution of the United States.n 

The question presented by this appeal is whether the district 

court erred in denying qualified immunity to the individual 

defendants on Ms. Liebson's § 1983 due process claim. Because 

qualifie~ immunity is a question of law, we review the district 

court's decision de novo. Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1489 

{10th Cir. 1994). In so doing, we must accept all of the wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true and must construe 

them in the light most favorable to Ms. Liebson. See Mascheroni 

y. Board of Regents of Univ, of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), 

In Siegert v, Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231·33 (1991), the 

Supreme Court clarified the appropriate framework for reviewing 

claims of qualified immunity. Under this framework, a court must 

first determine whether the plaintiff 11 has asserted a violation of 

a constitutional right at all. 11 Id. at 232. If the court 

detenmines that plaintiff has asserted the violation of a 

constitutional right, the court must then dete~ine whether that 

right was clearly established so that reasonable officials in 

defendants' situation would have understood their conduct violated 

that right. Mafchir, 35 F.3d at 1490, 

Following the Siegert framework, we must first decide whether 

Ms. Liebson has asserted the violation of her due process rights. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 3 
Generally, state actors are liable under the due process clause 

only for their own acts and not. for the violent acts of third 

parties. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

However, we recently noted there are two recognized exceptions to 

this general rule. Id. The first exception, known as the special 

relationship doctrine, 11 exists when the state assumes control over 

an individual sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to provide 

protection to that individual . . . " ~ See DeShaney y. 

Winnebago County pept. of Social Serys., 489 u.s. 189, 199-200 

(explaining that 11When the Stat.e takes a person into its custody 

and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes 

upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his 

safety and general well-being 11 ). The second exception, sometimes 

referred to as the 11 danger creationu theory, provides that a state 

may also be liable for an individual's safety 11 if it created the 

danger that harmed the individual .... 11 Id. ~Medina v . 

. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495-99 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

(explaining that police officers who engaged in a high speed car 

chase could be liable for creating a special danger faced by a 

bicyclist, but were protected in that case by their shield of 

qualified immunity) . 

Here, plaintiff seeks to invoke both exceptions in pursuit of 

her § 1983 due process claim. In her complaint, Ms. Liebson 

alleges that a 11 special relationship 11 existed between defendants 

and herself "[b]y virtue of her assignment to the North Facility 

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Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 4 
of the Penitentiary of New Mexico,n and that defendants breached 

their duty to provide protection to her by revising the library 

hours and removing the corrections officer from the library. Ms. 

Liebson also alleges she was 11 kidnapped, held hostage and sexually 

assaulted by a prison inmate, 11 and that 11 [d]efendants' removal of 

the correction officer from the . . . library was a negligent act 

and was a direct and proximate cause 11 of her injuries. 

We find that Ms. Liebson has failed to allege an actionable 

due process claim. Although it is perhaps a close question, we 

reject the assertion that a 11 Special relationship 11 existed bet~een 

Ms. Liebson and defendants sufficient to trigger an affirmative 

duty on the part of defendants to protect Ms. Liebson. In 

particular, without downplaying the dangerous conditions that 

undoubtedly existed in the penitentiary, we believe the consensual 

nature of the employment relationship between Ms. Liebson and 

defendants differentiates this case from those in which a 11 Special 

relationship 11 has been found to exist. Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 572. 

Ms. Liebson's presence in the prison library, both before and 

after the guard was removed, was completely voluntary. By her 

employment with the college and assignment to the prison library 

under the joint powers agreement/ she was free to come and go each 

day of her employment. Through this employment relationship, she 

was not taken into state custody and held against her will. 

Likewise 1 we find that the 11 danger creation11 theory is 

inapplicable under the alleged facts. Although Ms. Liebson has 

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Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 5 
alleged that defendants acted negligently in changing the hours of 

the library and removing the corrections officer, there is nothing 

alleged in the complaint that we believe 11 shocks the conscience.n 

Id. More specifically, we are not convinced that Ms. Liebson has 

alleged any nconduct that was so egregious, outrageous and fraught 

with unreasonable risk so as to shock the conscience. 11 Id. at 576. 

Although this case is similar to L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 

119 (9th Cir. 1992), cert, denied 113 s. Ct. 2442 (1993), we 

believe it is distinguishable. In Grubbs, the plaintiff was a 

registered nurse employed by the State of Oregon at a medium 

security custodial institution for young male offenders. Although 

plaintiff was assured at the time she was hired that she would not 

be required to work alone in the medical clinic with violent sex 

offenders, the defendant supervisors subsequently selected an 

inmate who was a known violent sex offender to work alone with 

plaintiff. Once alone, the inmate assaulted, battered, kidnapped, 

and raped the plaintiff. In concluding plaintiff had asserted a 

cognizable § 1983 claim, the court noted that, in her complaint, 

plaintiff alleged defendants knowingly assigned the inmate to work 

with her despite their knowledge that (a) the inmate was not 

qualified to work in the clinic; (b) the inmate had an 

extraordinary history of unrepentant violence against women and 

girls; (c) the inmate was likely to assault a female if left alone 

with her; (d) the inmate and plaintiff would be alone together; 

and (e) plaintiff would not be prepared to defend herself against 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 6 
an attack by the inmate. 1£. at 121. Based upon these 

- allegations, the .court concluded that defendants had independently 

created an opportunity for and facilita,ted the inmate's assault on 

plaintiff. IQ. at 121-22. 

Here, in contrast, plaintiffs have not alleged any such 

"conscience-shocking" facts. Although plaintiffs have alleged 

that defendants' removal of the security officer was done with 

"deliberate indifference and in complete disregard" of Ms. 

Liebson's rights, they have not alleged any specific facts, as did 

the plaintiff in Grubbs, to indicate that defendants' actions were 

egregious, outrageous, or fraught with unreasonable risk., 

Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Liebson has 

alleged an actionable due process claim, we are not convinced the 

due process rights at issue were so clearly established that 

reasonable officials in defendants' situation would have 

understood their conduct violated those rights. In March 1992, 

the point in time when defendants changed the schedule of the 

officer assigned to the library, the law was clearly established 

that state officials had no constitutional ·duty to protect 

citizens from the actions of private parties. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 

at 195-97. At the other end of the spectrum, it was also clearly 

established that state officials had a duty to protect individuals 

whom they had taken involuntarily into their physical custody and 

control. See~~ at 199-200.· Relying upon Estelle y. Gamble, 

429 u.s. 97 (1976), Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 u.s. 307 (1982), and 

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Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 7 
·; __ .; . ;_.- :---·· "' ,_ 

/ ·.-. ---.,, •''' --. ', __ 

·---. ·; ·--.-- . <. 

City of Revere v. Massa-chusetts Gen. Hasp., 463 u.s. 239 (1983), 

the DeShaney court indicated that 

it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the 

individual's freedom to act on his own behalf -- through 

incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar 

restraint of personal liberty -- which is the 

ndeprivation of libertyn triggering the protections of 

the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to 

protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by 

other means. 

489 u.s. at 200. 

Although Ms. Liebson asserts that DeShaney and the cases 

cited therein clearly established a constitutional duty on the 

part of defendants to protect her because of their physical 

control over her while she .was working in the prison library, we 

disagree, Simply put, Ms. Liebson's situation is not so closely 

analogous to the custodial relationships addressed by DeShaney or 

the cases cited therein to consider her constitutional claim 

clearly established in March 1992. 

In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that states are 

constitutionally required to provide medical care to incarcerated 

prisoners because they are unable to take care of themselves as a 

result of the state's deprivation of their liberty. 429 u.s. at 

103-04. Similarly, in Youngberg, the Court determined the 

Constitution required states to provide necessary medical care to 

involuntarily committed mental patients in order to ensure their 

reasonable safety. 457 u.s. at 314-16. In City of Revere, the 

Court held the responsible government agency must provide medical 

8 

ed during 

irror those 

ified 

~I 959 

strate a 

tion and 

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:ir. 1995). 

:lude that 

.DeShaney to 

.~ious to put 

' 

I was 

19 F. 3d 1522, 

17 (11th Cir. 

some 

te 

1t as those 

1ation as an 

analogous to 

;J,gberg, and 

~blished in 

duty to 

~ Trigalet 

Appellate Case: 94-2210 Document: 01019279824 Date Filed: 01/02/1996 Page: 8 
v. Young, 54 F.3d 645, 648 (lOth Cir. 1995), c~rt. genied, 116 

s.ct. 340 (1995). 

Nor are we persuaded that the law was clearly established in 

March 1992 that defendants' decision to change the library hours 

and the hours of the corrections officer assigned thereto was 

sufficient to trigger liability under the 11 danger creation 11 

theory. Although Ms. Liebson cites White v, Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 

(7th Cir. 1979), and WOQd y. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990), we find those cases 

clearly distinguishable. 

Both White and NQQg involved police officers who, in 

effecting the arrests of drivers of vehicles, abandoned passengers 

in the vehicles to fend for themselves in dangerous situations. 

In White, the passengers were three minor children abandoned on a 

busy Chicago highway at night and in cold weather. 592 F.2d at 

382. In Wood, the passenger was a woman abandoned at 2:30 a.m. in 

a high crime area. 879 F.2d at 586. 

In White, the Seventh Circuit held that the unjustified and 

arbitrary refusal of police officers to lend aid to children 

endangered by the performance of official duty, where that refusal 

ultimately results in physical and emotional injury to the 

children, 11 indisputably breaches the Due Process Clause." 592 

F.2d at 383. Accordingly, under the facts alleged by the 

plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit.held that the officer's conduct 

clearly represented an intrusion into the children's personal 

10 

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integrity, a liberty interest protected by the due process clause, 

and shocked the conscience, running against fundamental notions of 

fairness. Id. at 383-86. 

Similarly, in NQgg, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff had 

raised a genuine issue of fact suggesting the defendant officer 

acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's interest in 

personal security. 879 F.2d at 588. In particular, the Ninth 

Circuit noted that the officer had 11 allegedly acted in callous 

disregard for [plaintiff's] physical security, a liberty interest 

protected by the Constitution.n Id. at 589. 

Here, the facts alleged by Ms. Liebson are substantially 

different than those alleged in White or Wood. Although Ms. 

Liebson has alleged that defendants acted negligently and with 

11 deliberate indifference 11 to her rights, we find nothing about 

defendants' conduct, as alleged in the complaint, that is 

comparable to the reckless and conscience-shocking conduct alleged 

in White and Wood. Accordingly, we find White and Wood wholly 

insufficient to establish that defendants' actions were clearly 

prohibited. 

For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the district 

court denying qualified immunity to defendants is reversed, and 

this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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