Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00709/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00709-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ERHOMOBHENE AZEKE,

Petitioner,

 v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General of

the United States, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

No. C-07-0709 MMC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; VACATING

HEARING

Before the Court is petitioner John Erhomobhene Azeke’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Respondents have filed a return; petitioner has filed a reply. Having considered

the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the petition, the Court finds the matter

appropriate for resolution without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), hereby VACATES

the April 27, 2007 hearing, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, was placed in removal proceedings on February 12,

2004, based on charges that he overstayed his visa and entered into a fraudulent marriage

for purposes of obtaining a “visa or other documentation.” (See Deiss Decl. Ex. A.) On

January 18, 2005, an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered petitioner removed to Nigeria, finding

the charge of overstaying a visa, but not the charge of marriage fraud, had been proven by

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 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of the asylum petition as untimely, found the IJ’s

denial of withholding of removal based on the adverse credibility determination to be

supported by the record because of “significant discrepancies and inconsistencies that go

to the heart of the respondent’s claim,” and found “no error” in the denial of petitioner’s

application for voluntary departure because “[t]he record establishe[d] that there [was]

evidence showing that the respondent engaged in fraudulent activity to obtain immigration

benefits.” See id.

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clear and convincing evidence. (See id. Ex. E.) With respect to the latter charge, however,

the IJ stated that although the IJ was not “mak[ing] an outright finding” of marriage fraud,

petitioner had “not testified credibly . . . , and there [was] some evidence that [he] engaged

in fraud to obtain immigration benefits.” (See id. at 12-13.) The IJ rejected petitioner’s

claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure, and noted that

petitioner’s testimony was internally inconsistent and conflicted with petitioner’s own

documents, that petitioner was evasive in answering questions, and that petitioner was not

convincing “in any manner to which he testified.” (See id.) In an order dated March 16,

2006, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed.1 (See id. Ex. F.) 

On June 6, 2006, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (“ICE”)

detained petitioner pursuant to the order of removal; petitioner remains in custody. (See

Petition ¶ 16.) On June 9, 2006, petitioner filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals a

petition for review and motion for a stay of removal. (See id. Ex. H.) On October 20, 2006,

the Ninth Circuit granted petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal. (See id.) The petition for

review remains pending before the Ninth Circuit.

DISCUSSION

On February 2, 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Relying on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001), petitioner argues that the

government has unlawfully held him in custody for longer than six months without

justification. 

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court addressed whether an alien subject to a final order

of removal may be detained “indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a period

reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal.” See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682

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(emphases in original). The Court noted that “[w]hen an alien has been found to be

unlawfully present in the United States and a final order of removal has been entered, the

Government ordinarily secures the alien’s removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory

‘removal period,’ during which time the alien normally is held in custody.” See id.; see also

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Although, by statute, certain categories of aliens “may be detained

beyond the removal period,” see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)),

the Supreme Court, to avoid due process concerns, construed the statute to mean that

such detention may not “exceed[ ] a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” See

id. at 689-90, 699. In particular, the Court held that after a six-month period of detention

pursuant to the issuance of a final removal order has elapsed and “the alien provides good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that

showing.” See id. at 701. The alien may continue to be held in custody only “until it has

been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” See id.

Contrary to the argument in the petition, as well as in defendant’s opposition,

Zadvydas does not apply in the circumstances presented here. As noted, Zadvydas

addressed the length of time beyond the removal period that an alien may be held in

detention. Here, as petitioner concedes in his reply, the removal period has not yet begun. 

Where a “removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of

the alien,” the removal period does not begin until, at the earliest, “the date of the court’s

final order.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1104

n.12 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the removal order is stayed pending judicial review, the ninety-day

[removal] period begins running after the reviewing court’s final order.”). Here, as noted

above, the Ninth Circuit has stayed petitioner’s removal pending review of the removal

order, and the petition for review remains pending before the Ninth Circuit. Consequently,

there is no “final order” of the Ninth Circuit. As the removal period has not begun, the

holding of Zadvydas with respect to the length of time an alien may be held in custody after

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 Moreover, the circumstances of the instant action are not remotely comparable to

those at issue in Zadvydas, where the government had been unable to find a country to

which the petitioners therein could be deported. Here, the sole reason for the

government’s delay in deporting petitioner is that petitioner sought, and received, a stay of

removal from the Ninth Circuit.

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 As noted, the IJ, in finding petitioner lacked credibility, found petitioner’s testimony

to be internally inconsistent and in conflict with petitioner’s other evidence, and the Board of

Immigration Appeals affirmed those findings.

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such period begins to run has no application to petitioner.2

In petitioner’s reply, he argues, for the first time, that he should be released from

custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), because the “government has not offered any

reasons why Petitioner’s release from custody would be dangerous to the community or

that he is a flight risk.” (See Reply at 7:11-12.) Pursuant to § 1226(a), “an alien may be

arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the

United States”; pending such decision, the Attorney General may, inter alia, “continue to

detain the alien” or release the alien on bond or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a). The BIA has held that “[a]n alien generally is not and should not be detained or

required to post bond except on a finding that he is a threat to national security, or that he

is a poor bail risk.” See Matter of Patel, 15 I&N Dec. 666, 666 (1976). Contrary to

petitioner’s argument, however, ICE expressly found petitioner to be “a prime candidate for

flight risk” because of “his choice to enter into a sham marriage solely to circumvent

immigration law” and his “attempts to deceive the United States Government through

litigation determined by the IJ and BIA to lack consistency.”3

 (See Deiss Decl. Ex. I at 7.)

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “[d]etention during removal proceedings

is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,

531 (2003); see also id. at 526 (noting Supreme Court’s “longstanding view that the

Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period

necessary for their removal proceedings”). Although, as petitioner points out, the Sixth

Circuit has held that, consistent with due process, “the INS may detain prima facie

removable aliens for a time reasonably required to complete removal proceedings in a

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 The Court recognizes that Kim and Ly addressed detention pursuant to § 1226(c),

which requires the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is removable

“because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes.” See Demore, 538

U.S. at 513. Here, there is no contention that petitioner has been convicted of a crime,

and, consequently, § 1226(c) does not apply; rather, § 1226(a) applies, which permits the

Attorney General to release aliens, other than those within the scope of § 1226(c), pending

completion of removal proceedings.

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timely manner,” see Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added),4

the Sixth Circuit further noted that “[a] bright-line time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas,

would not be appropriate for the pre-removal period [because] hearing schedules and other

proceedings must have leeway for expansion or contraction as the necessities of the case

and the . . . judge’s caseload warrant,” see id. at 271. Assuming, arguendo, the Ninth

Circuit would follow Ly, petitioner’s reliance thereon is unavailing. The time petitioner has

spent in custody is attributable to petitioner’s appeal and there is no showing the resolution

of that appeal has been delayed by reason of any lack of diligence on the part of the

Government. Indeed, the pendency of the appeal has been extended as a result of

petitioner’s request for an additional 60 days in which to file his opening brief, which the

Ninth Circuit granted. There is nothing unreasonable about the length of time petitioner’s

appeal has been pending and, consequently, nothing to suggest that petitioner has been

detained for an unreasonable amount of time.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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