Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02388/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02388-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM CECIL THORNTON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-2388 JLS (POR)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE

vs. OF APPEALABILITY

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Defendant.

On October 13, 2011, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) On October 20,

2011, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because it failed

to include a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the

prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2), as required of prisoners. (October 20 Order 1, ECF No. 3.) In that Order, the Court

also dismissed the case without prejudice because Petitioner filed his action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, instead of § 2254, see White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding

that § 2254 is the proper jurisdictional basis for a habeas petition brought by an individual “in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment”). (October 20 Order 1-2.) On November 16, 2011, the

Court denied his second application to proceed IFP as moot, because the Petition had already been

dismissed. (November 16 Order, ECF No. 5.) Petitioner now appeals that November 16 Order

denying his application to proceed IFP as moot. (Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 6.) The Court of

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Appeals has remanded Petitioner’s appeal to this Court for the limited purpose of granting or

denying a certificate of appealability (“COA”). (Order to Issue COA, ECF No. 10.) 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges the sex offender conditions of his parole as unconstitutional. 

(Petition 2.) He argues that being classified as a sex offender based on his 1987 conviction in

Tennessee for sexual battery violates “due process, ex post facto and equal protection laws as

applied to me in California.” (Id.) Specifically, he objects to certain conditions of parole

mandated by California’s Jessica’s Law1, including residency restrictions and GPS monitoring. 

(See Dec. 29, 2008 Order of Superior Court, Attach. B to Petition.) These restrictions were placed

on his parole following his release from custody resulting from a March 28, 2006 conviction for

receiving stolen property. (Id.) When Petitioner first filed his habeas petition in San Diego

County Superior Court on November 3, 2008, he was incarcerated in the R.J. Donovan

Correctional Facility for a parole violation. (Id.) He was subsequently released on parole on

December 16, 2008. (Id.) 

The state court initially issued a stay of the residency requirements in anticipation of the

resolution of the issue by the California Supreme Court in then-pending In re E.J., 47 Cal.4th 1258

(2010). However, the court lifted this stay when Petitioner was again incarcerated due to a

January 22, 2010 conviction for robbery and petty theft. (See April 14, 2010 Order of Superior

Court, Attach. H to Petition.) Petitioner was sentenced to three years in state prison. (Id.) The

state court then denied his petition because “the issue regarding Petitioner’s conditions of parole

has been rendered moot,” as he was no longer subject to any of the conditions of parole that

formed the basis of his petition. (Id.) That denial was affirmed in a reasoned opinion by the

California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District (see July 27, 2010 Order of Court of

Appeal, Attach. N to Petition) and summarily by the California Supreme Court (see Feb. 2, 2011

Order of Supreme Court, Attach. P to Petition). 

1

 California voters approved the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law

in 2006 as Proposition 83. It requires sex offenders (1) to reside more than 2,000 feet away from

schools and from parks where children regularly gather, and (2) to be monitored by a global

positioning system (GPS) device. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 3003.5(b) (2000-foot radius), 3000.07 (GPS

use required during parole). 

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LEGAL STANDARD

This Court is under an obligation to determine whether a COA should issue in this matter

and must “indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the standard for issuing a certificate, or

state its reasons why a certificate should not be granted.” United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268,

1270 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A COA is authorized “if the applicant has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

Where, as here, the petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s

underlying constitutional claim, a COA “should issue if the prisoner can show: (1) ‘that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling’; and

(2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right.’” Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). As both of these components are necessary to

obtain a COA, the Court may resolve either issue first, but resolution of the procedural issue first

has been encouraged by the Supreme Court. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 485; see also

Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877, 884 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2001). 

ANALYSIS

Upon the review of the record, the Court determines it may be debatable whether the

Petition was incorrectly filed under 28 U.S.C. § 22412

 instead of 28 U.S.C. § 22543. In general,

state prisoners must make all habeas challenges under § 2254, and may not seek relief under

§ 2241 if it would be available under § 2254. See Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir.

1999) (per curiam). However, there are a few situations in which a state prisoners must seek

2

 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides the federal courts with general habeas corpus jurisdiction. See

Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 608 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1999). It states: “Writs of habeas corpus

may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge

within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The descendant of § 14 of the Judiciary

Act of 1789, courts have held that prisoners may file § 2241 petitions under certain circumstances in

which petitions under § 2254 (for state prisoners) or § 2255 (for federal prisoners) are unavailable. 

See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 n.1, 661-663 (1996) (holding that AEDPA did not repeal

authority of United States Supreme Court to entertain original habeas petitions pursuant to § 2241, but

adding that authority to grant relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254). 

3

 28 U.S.C. § 2254 allows a state prisoner to challenge his detention by filing a petition for

habeas corpus in federal court “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

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habeas relief by filing a § 2241 petition because § 2254 does not apply to their claims—such as

when they challenge pretrial detention, McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 882, 824 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003),

or certain decisions of the parole board, Tyler v. United States, 929 F.2d 451, 453 n.5 (9th Cir.

1991) (stating that § 2241 is the proper vehicle for obtaining judicial review of a parole board

decision instead of § 2255). 

Here, the Court dismissed Petitioner’s claims as improperly brought under § 2241,

reasoning that Petitioner, a state prisoner, could have filed his application under § 2254 to

challenge the conditions of his custody on parole, and thus was required to do so. Because the

Court interpreted his habeas petition as one alleging “he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), it found relief under § 2241 would be improper. This

conclusion is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the habeas statute, which “adopt[s]

the majority view that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state

prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging

his underlying state court conviction. . . . § 2254 is properly seen as a limitation on the general

grant of habeas authority in § 2241 that is triggered by a state prisoner who is in custody pursuant

to a state court judgment.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on

other grounds by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, in situations such as this one where the petitioner challenges the conditions of

his parole, courts have allowed prisoners or parolees to proceed under both § 2254 and § 2241. 

Compare Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming denial on the merits of § 2241

petition challenging parole condition restricting residency as unconstitutional), and Winters-El v.

U.S. Parole Comm’r, No. 06-CV-00047-GAF (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007) (denying § 2241 petition

challenging conditions of parole as moot where parole had been revoked), affirmed on other

grounds by 320 Fed. Appx. 697 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished), with Hundal v. Ochoa, 2012 WL

487905 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012) (denying § 2254 petition challenging imposition of modified sex

offender registration requirements on parole as premature where prisoner was not yet subject to

parole conditions), and Seidel v. Powers, 2009 WL 365761, No. 06-CV-4638-DDP (C.D. Cal. Feb.

11, 2009) (denying on the merits a § 2254 petition challenging imposition of special parole

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conditions and subsequent decision of parole board to revoke the petitioner’s parole based on

violation of several of these conditions). In light of this, and putting aside the other concerns

addressed below, it seems jurists of reason could possibly debate whether a prisoner’s challenge to

parole conditions imposed as required by state law is properly brought under § 2254, as a

challenge to the conditions of custody, or under § 2241, as a challenge to a parole board decision.

But even if the Court’s stated reason for dismissal was erroneous, independent procedural

grounds exist for the dismissal of this Petition. First, it does not present a cognizable case or

controversy. Because Petitioner’s parole was terminated when he was convicted of another crime

and re-incarcerated, his challenge of the parole conditions imposed in 2008 is moot. “A habeas

petition is moot where a petitioner’s claim for relief cannot be redressed by a favorable decision of

the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus.” Thomas v. Yates, 637 F. Supp. 2d 839, 840 (E.D. Cal.

2009); cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (habeas petition challenging parole revocation was

moot where petitioner had been re-released on parole and the term of his imprisonment had

expired); Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1001-01 (9th Cir. 2005) (habeas petition challenging

deferral of release on parole was moot where petitioner had been released and subsequently reincarcerated for violating parole). Petitioner has not shown that he has been released on parole or

that he is currently subject to the conditions of which he complains.

Second, Petitioner’s history of excessive and redundant filings in this district support yet

another independent ground for the dismissal of this action. The Petition is duplicative of several

cases previously filed to challenge these same parole conditions on the same grounds. See

Thornton v. Schwarzenneger, et al., Case No. 10-CV-1583-RBB (S.D. Cal. filed July 28, 2010);

Thornton v. Cate et al., Case No. 11-CV-0190-LAB-JMA (S.D. Cal. filed Jan. 27, 2011); Thornton

v. Cavalin, et al., Case No. 11-CV-1484-IEG-POR (S.D. Cal. filed July 1, 2011); Thornton v.

Cavalin, et al., Case No. 11-CV-0108-BEN-CAB (S.D. Cal. filed July 1, 2011) (dismissing claims

as duplicative and frivolous); Thornton v. Cate et al., Case No. 11-CV-1485-BEN-WMC (S.D.

Cal. filed July 1, 2011) (same); Thornton v. Cavalin, et al., Case No. 11-CV-2309-MMA-PCL

(S.D. Cal. filed Oct. 5, 2011) (same). And the Court has already dismissed as duplicative a laterfiled petition challenging the same parole conditions. Thornton v. Cate et al., Case No. 12-CV-

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0118-JLS-RBB (S.D. Cal. filed Jan. 13, 2012). Thus, the Petition could have been dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as frivolous. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105

n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). Indeed, on appeal in one of these duplicative cases, the Ninth Circuit ruled

that Petitioner’s repeated filings in this district challenging his sex offender parole conditions are

frivolous. See Thornton v. Cavalin, et al., No. 11-56358 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2011) (summarily

affirming district court on independent basis that the case was duplicative and frivolous). 

For these reasons, Petitioner has made no showing that a jurist of reason would find the

Court’s dismissal of this Petition debatable. The case having been properly dismissed, the Court

cannot see a reason to doubt its November 16, 2011 denial of Petitioner’s second motion to

proceed IFP as moot, which is the subject of Petitioner’s appeal. Accordingly, the Court declines

to issue a certificate of appealability on the issue presented for appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 4, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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