Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00320/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00320-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY GIBBS,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAQUEL DE GLORIA,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00320-DMR 

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO 

DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IFP 

APPLICATION AND REMAND TO 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 

COUNTY OF MARIN

Re: Dkt. No. 2

Defendant Raquel De Gloria removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 from 

Superior Court of California, County of Marin, where it was pending as a complaint for unlawful 

detainer against Defendant. The Notice of Removal states two grounds for removal: that the 

Complaint presents a federal question such that the case could have originally been filed in this 

Court and that diversity exists between the parties. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6, 10.) Defendant has 

also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). On January 22, 2016, Plaintiff 

filed a motion to remand the case to Marin County Superior Court. [Docket No. 16.]

When a notice of removal is filed, the court must examine it “promptly,” and, “[i]f it 

clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not 

be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary remand.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4). 

Defendant has not yet filed a declination or consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Therefore, the court issues herein a Report and Recommendation 

and reassigns this case to a District Judge for final disposition, with the recommendation that the 

IFP application be granted and that summary remand be ordered.

I. IFP APPLICATION

Having evaluated Defendant’s financial affidavit, the court finds that she has satisfied the 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and therefore recommends that the IFP 

application be granted. The court next turns to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a “federal court is presumed to lack 

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. 

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). “[T]he presence or 

absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which 

provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the 

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) 

(quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). That rule applies equally to 

evaluating the existence of federal questions in cases brought initially in federal court and in 

removed cases. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 

n.2 (2002). Relevant for purposes here, a federal question exists only when it is presented by what 

is or should have been alleged in the complaint. Id. at 830. The implication of a federal question 

through issues raised by an answer or counterclaim does not suffice to establish federal question 

jurisdiction. Id. at 831; see also ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 

Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] case may not be removed to federal 

court on the basis of a federal defense, . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s 

complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the 

case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original)).

According to Defendant’s Notice of Removal, a federal question arises because 

“Defendant’s Demurrer . . . depends on the determination of Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s 

duties under federal law.” (Notice of Removal ¶ 10.) The complaint that Plaintiff filed in Marin

County Superior Court, however, simply alleges a state cause of action under unlawful detainer. 

(Compl.) Whatever Defendant intends to argue in response to this allegation does not give rise to 

removal jurisdiction. See Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831; see also Nguyen v. Bui, No. 12-501 

HRL, 2012 WL 762156, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that affirmative defenses based 

upon Federal Truth in Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act do not confer 

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//

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federal jurisdiction upon state unlawful detainer claim). 

III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

A district court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332. “[I]n determining whether a challenged jurisdictional amount has been met, district courts 

are permitted only to assess the allegations in a complaint and not the validity of any asserted 

defenses . . . .” Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1993). Potential 

defenses to all or part of a plaintiff’s claim do not affect the amount in controversy, because the 

defense may be shown to be invalid. See Riggins v. Riggins, 415 F.2d 1259, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 

1969) (noting that statute of limitations defense might bar portion of relief sought did not affect 

amount in controversy). Similarly, the amount in controversy is determined without regard to any 

counterclaim to which a defendant may be entitled. See Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 

789 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Defendant avers that this case fulfills the diversity jurisdiction requirements. (Notice of 

Removal ¶ 6.) However, she does not allege the citizenship of the parties, nor does she allege the 

amount in controversy. However, the face of the Complaint unequivocally states that the action is 

a “limited civil case,” and that the amount demanded “does not exceed $10,000.” (Compl.) As 

Plaintiff seeks $33.33 per day for Defendant’s refusal to vacate the property beyond December 5, 

2015, the total potential damages at the time of removal were less than $2,000, far below the 

$75,000 minimum required to establish diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is no basis for 

exercising diversity jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court recommends that Defendant’s IFP application be granted 

and that this action be remanded to the Marin County Superior Court. The court further 

recommends that Plaintiff’s motion to remand be denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to 

reassign this case to a District Judge.

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Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2016

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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