Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07116/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 2012 Decided June 7, 2013

No. 11-7116

AUDRICK PAYNE,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-00163)

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellees. With her on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna

M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

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Opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS concurring in part

and concurring in the judgment.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Audrick Payne, who was

discharged from his position as an elevator inspector for the

District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs, sued the District and four supervisory employees for

violation of the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection

Act (“DCWPA”), along with several other theories of liability. 

The district court granted judgment in favor of the defendants on

all claims. Appellant now seeks reversal of the district court

judgment as to the whistleblower claims. Because we agree

with the district court that the relevant statute provided no cause

of action against individuals, and that an amendment so

providing was not retroactive, and further agree that Payne has

not established causation between his allegedly protected

activity and his discharge, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

Background

A. Factual Background

The published opinion of the district court sets forth the

background facts of this litigation in some detail. See Payne v.

District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D.D.C. 2010); see

also Payne v. District of Columbia, 808 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.D.C.

2011) (denying plaintiff’s motion to amend judgment); Payne v.

District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2008)

(dismissing other claims in the original complaint). Therefore,

we will not exhaustively revisit that history, but rather will set

forth only sufficient factual background for clarity of analysis. 

The District of Columbia Department of Consumer and

Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”) hired appellant as an elevator

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inspector in September of 2001. From the beginning of his

tenure, Payne observed that the frequency and quality of

inspections was not, at least in his opinion, up to the standards

required for either safety or regularity. Indeed, in his filings in

the district court and before us, Payne produces instances of

serious and even tragic accidents allegedly attributable to the

deficient inspections he decried for years.

Among the options available to an inspector who has found

a violation is “tak[ing] an elevator out of service.” Payne shut

down “considerably more” elevators than other inspectors. By

Payne’s own account, his supervisors overruled him and put

elevators back in service with a frequency that he described as

“all the time.” This apparently was typical of Payne’s

relationship with higher-ups in the Department. For example, in

his 2003–04 performance evaluation, the rating official

commended his good intention but noted a “tend[ency] to be

regid [sic].” In his 2005–06 evaluation, the rater referred to his

need “to minimize actions that may be seen as being overzealous

instead of thorough.” And as noted, his superiors overruled him

at times when he took elevators out of service and also

reprimanded him for issuing what they saw as overly large fines. 

Payne was particularly disturbed by what he saw as

deficiencies and conflicts in a third-party inspection program in

which the Department outsourced some inspection duties to

private contractors. Specifically, Payne noted that a former

Department inspector operating a private consulting business

which was registered as a third-party inspector had improperly

allowed the installation of elevators to commence at a large

apartment complex before the issuance of permits. Payne issued

a stop work order and $21,000 fine. Thereafter, his superiors

overruled him and allowed the third-party inspector to complete

the inspection of the construction. A little over a week later, an

elevator user fell to her death due to a faulty elevator. Payne

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spoke to the Washington Post about this incident and

specifically the fact that the inspections were conducted by a

third-party inspector whom he named. Although Payne

emphasizes this incident in his filings, the record does not reflect

whether the Department was aware that Payne had spoken to the

Washington Post.

More germane to the issues before us, in February 2005,

Payne gave testimony before a committee of the Council of the

District of Columbia on “the state of elevators in the District of

Columbia.” In his testimony, he attributed the death of a

firefighter to an outdated alarm system and testified more

generally that the District was not devoting adequate resources

to inspection of elevators.

On March 1, 2006, a local television news program, Fox 5

News, telecast a feature on “dangerous elevators.” In its

coverage it referred to “repeated failures in the District’s

elevator inspection process.” Documents bearing Payne’s

handwriting and signature appeared in the telecast. Soon after

the story ran, the Acting Director of the DCRA called a meeting

to discuss the Fox 5 story and a Department administrator told

Payne that when he saw this story, he knew that Payne was

involved.

In March 2006, Payne once more testified before the

District Council committee on the subject of elevator safety. He

testified that conditions were worse than they had been at the

time of his prior appearance. In his deposition in the district

court proceedings, Payne testified that his supervisor was very

upset that his name had been brought up “a number of times” in

Payne’s testimony before the committee, but Payne did not offer

any evidence to support his statement about the supervisor’s

anger.

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While the above events were unfolding, in addition to

performing his duties as an employee of the Department, Payne

also headed a private commercial business, Payne and

Associates, Inc. (“P.A.I.”), engaged in the elevator inspection

business. See Payne v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 2d at

204. The Department received complaints from the Apartment

and Office Building Association that Payne was soliciting

elevator inspection work for his private commercial business

while he was on official duty for the District of Columbia. 

According to the Vice President of the Association, Payne

“approached several AOBA members, identified himself as a

DCRA elevator inspector, and solicited work for” P.A.I., while

officially on duty. The AOBA official alleged that Association

members were afraid that Payne would retaliate against them by

shutting down their elevators if they did not do business with

him. In August 2005, the Department referred the matter for

investigation to the District of Columbia Office of Inspector

General (“OIG”). 

The OIG undertook the requested investigation, which

continued for more than a year. Six witnesses contacted by the

OIG confirmed that Payne had attempted to solicit work for his

private business while conducting inspections for the District of

Columbia. Four witnesses reported that they had personally

observed such solicitations. One of them, Mark Dorsey, an

elevator consultant for EMCOR Facilities Services, a facility

management company providing maintenance and consulting

services for various buildings, reported that Payne had “often

solicited personal business as a third-party inspector” from

Dorsey while Payne was performing inspections for the DCRA. 

Dorsey corroborated his statements by producing a “Payne and

Associates” business card, which he stated that he had received

from Payne. This witness also reported that he had witnessed

Payne soliciting personal business from an elevator company

while performing DCRA inspections.

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A project officer and superintendent for Archstone Smith,

a company operating apartment communities in Washington,

DC, and other cities, Eric Holst and Tim Pagano, also provided

information concerning Payne’s solicitation of private business. 

According to the Archstone Smith officials, Payne distributed

his P.A.I. business cards while conducting a reinspection of an

elevator as a DCRA inspector. They related that Payne

discussed several code violations with them. When they advised

Payne that they intended to use a third-party inspector to correct

the violations, he “stated that he would not allow a [third-party]

inspector to conduct the re-inspection because the elevator had

not been inspected since 1996.” Payne displayed both his

DCRA and P.A.I. business cards and advised that he had a thirdparty consulting and inspection business. Payne later returned

to conduct a second inspection at the Archstone Smith property

and “again distributed his business cards.” 

Stephen Weaver, a former DCRA employee and himself a

third-party inspector, reported that “on at least two occasions,

while conducting inspections for DCRA,” Payne had attempted

to solicit work as a third-party inspector and provided Weaver

with his P.A.I. business card. Two other witnesses who did not

provide first-hand evidence of Payne’s solicitation provided

hearsay to the effect that other members of the business

community had told them of similar conduct by Payne. One

stated that Payne had “solicited several elevator mechanics”

under contract to her company for his business. 

On April 14, 2006, the OIG interviewed Payne himself. 

Payne acknowledged that he had established Payne and

Associates in 1998, but had not actually begun doing business

until October of 2005. He stated that the only business he

conducted on behalf of his private company was while he was

on annual leave and was outside of the District of Columbia. He

further claimed that he had never solicited personal business

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while on government duty and denied having provided anyone

with his personal business card except upon request. However,

he did not offer any explanation for the three business cards that

OIG had obtained from the contractors and building managers

who had alleged his abuse of authority. The Office of the

Inspector General issued its final report on the Payne

investigation on November 3, 2006, concluding “that Payne had

solicited work for his personal business as a third-party

inspector while on duty in violation of D.C. Code § 1–618.02.” 

Payne v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 196, 204.

 

While the investigation was unfolding, on September 13,

2006, the Department issued a memorandum to all elevator

inspectors stating, “Before sealing an elevator out of service,

you must contact your supervisor for approval.” The

memorandum also listed four other officials to call in the event

that the supervisor could not be contacted. The memorandum

only permitted sealing without prior notice to the higher officials

in the event of “imminent danger.” On October 16, 2006, the

Department issued a notice of suspension to Payne alleging that

on September 27, 2006 and September 28, 2006, he had taken

elevators out of service without notice to his supervisor or the

other officials. In his deposition for this proceeding, Payne

admitted to having taken elevators out of service without calling. 

On November 3, 2006, while the proposal to suspend Payne

for violating the elevator sealing policy was pending, the

Inspector General issued the final report finding that Payne had

violated District ethics laws and recommending that the

Department “take appropriate action.” The Director of the

Department issued a letter to Payne noticing his summary

termination on November 9, 2006, citing the ethical and legal

violations set forth in the report of the Inspector General. 

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After his termination, Payne pursued a course of

administrative review and mediation described in the district

court’s opinion. See Payne v. District of Columbia, 741 F.

Supp. 2d at 205. In the end, Linda Argo, Acting Director of the

Department, rejected Payne’s final appeal and ordered his

termination on September 17, 2007.

On January 28, 2008, Payne filed action against the District

of Columbia and four individual officials of the District of

Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs: 

Linda Argo, Patrick Canavan, Lisa Morgan, and Nicholas

Majett. In his original complaint, Payne set out nine counts

alleging various theories of liability. In an amended complaint

filed May 9, 2008, he re-alleged nine counts against the same

government and individual defendants. On December 30, 2008,

the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts

VI through IX for reasons not material to the present appeal. 

Payne v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C.

2008).

The litigation continued in district court with respect to

Counts I through V, alleging claims against the District of

Columbia and the four individuals. Count I alleged a claim

based on the District of Columbia Whistleblowers Protection

Act. Count II alleged a violation of the First Amendment of the

United States Constitution. Counts III through V alleged other

constitutional and civil rights violations, which are no longer

raised in this litigation. On September 29, 2010, the district

court considered and granted the defendants’ motions for

judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment as to

Counts I through V of the complaint. Thereafter, Payne timely

filed notice of appeal. Payne raises no issue in this appeal with

respect to the judgment in favor of defendants on Counts III

through V.

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B. Statutory Background

Although Payne is appealing from summary judgment

entered on both the District of Columbia statutory theory and the

First Amendment theory, the principal thrust of his appeal is

directed toward the District of Columbia Whistleblower

Protection Act. That Act, as in effect at the time of Payne’s

employment, provided:

A supervisor shall not threaten to take or take a prohibited

personnel action or otherwise retaliate against an employee

because of the employee’s protected disclosure or because

of an employee’s refusal to comply with an illegal order.

D.C. Code § 1–615.53 (2001). The statute defined “protected

disclosure” as:

any disclosure of information, not specifically prohibited by

statute, by an employee to a supervisor or a public body that

the employee reasonably believes evidences:

(A) Gross mismanagement;

(B) Gross misuse or waste of public resources or funds;

(C) Abuse of authority in connection with the

administration of a public program or the execution of a

public contract;

(D) A violation of a federal, state, or local law, rule, or

regulation, or of a term of a contract between the District

government and a District government contractor which is

not of a merely technical or minimal nature; or

(E) A substantial and specific danger to the public health

and safety.

D.C. Code § 1–615.52(a)(6). The term “public body” as used in

§ 615.52(a)(6) includes the DC City Council. Id. §

1–615.52(a)(7)(A). 

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Payne contended in the district court and contends before us

that his termination was in retaliation for his disclosure before

the City Council of gross mismanagement and misuse or waste

of public resources by the DCRA. The district court ruled that

Payne’s whistleblower claims could not survive the summary

judgment motion and entered judgment in favor of the

defendants. We agree and affirm the judgment of the district

court.

II. Analysis

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in

favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., John C. Flood of Va.,

Inc. v. John C. Flood, Inc., 642 F.3d 1105, 1109 (D.C. Cir.

2011). Summary judgment may be granted when there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In

this case, we determine that the district court correctly granted

summary judgment and that the defendants were entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

A. The Individual Defendants

We will first consider the grant of summary judgment

dismissing the case against the individual defendants because it

is sustainable on a ground not applicable to the judgment in

favor of the District. The DCWPA provides:

(a) An employee aggrieved by a violation of § 1–615.53

may bring a civil action before a court or a jury in the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking relief

and damages, including but not limited to injunction,

reinstatement to the same position held before the

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prohibited personnel action or to an equivalent position, and

reinstatement of the employee’s seniority rights, restoration

of lost benefits, back pay and interest on back pay,

compensatory damages, and reasonable costs and attorney

fees . . . . A civil action brought pursuant to this section

shall comply with the notice requirements of § 12–309.

D.C. Code § 1–615.54(a) (2001). As the district court noted,

this section does not explicitly state against whom an action

under the DCWPA may be brought. Nonetheless, upon

examination, we conclude, as did the district court, that the

DCWPA in effect at the time of Payne’s bringing of his lawsuit

“does not provide a cause of action against individual”

supervising employees. Payne v. District of Columbia, 741 F.

Supp. 2d at 211.

As the district court observed, “the overall context of the

statute strongly suggests that this provision was intended only to

authorize suits against the District of Columbia.” Id. at 210. 

The forms of relief set forth in the statute—injunction,

reinstatement, restitution of benefits, and backpay—could be

recovered only against the employer District of Columbia, not

against the individual supervisors. Further, the statute “requires

compliance with” a notice of claim statute, D.C. Code § 12–309,

governing only the bringing of actions “against the District of

Columbia.” Id. As the notice provision in the DCWPA does not

separately specify application to actions against the District and

its agencies, it is reasonable to conclude, as did the district court,

that the statute contemplated no other actions than those.

Further, the statute as then in effect

place[d] the burden of proof “on the employing District

agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

alleged action would have occurred for legitimate,

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independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged

in activities protected by this section.”

Payne v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (quoting

D.C. Code § 1–615.54(b)). We agree with the district court’s

reasoning that this explicit placement of the burden on “the

employing District agency” evidences that the DCWPA in effect

at the time did “not contemplate that individual supervisors

could be named as defendants.” Id.

On appeal, Payne wisely does not argue that the statute in

effect at the time of the events under litigation created a cause

of action against individual defendants. Rather, he relies on an

amendment to the statute passed in 2009, which provided that:

An employee aggrieved by a violation of § 1–615.53 may

bring a civil action against the District, and, in his or her

personal capacity, any District employee, supervisor, or

official having personal involvement in the prohibited

personnel action . . . .

Whistleblower Protection Amendments Act of 2009, § 2(c),

D.C. Code § 1–615.54(a)(1) (2010). Had that amendment been

in effect at the time of Payne’s allegedly retaliatory discharge,

he might have stated a claim for relief against the individuals. 

Unfortunately for Payne, it was not in effect. Therefore, Payne

has no claim against the individuals unless the amendment is

retroactive. Again unfortunately for Payne, it is not.

Under District of Columbia law:

As a general rule, statutes are to be construed as having

only a prospective operation, unless there is a clear

legislative showing that they are to be given a retroactive or

retrospective effect. 

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Wolf v. D.C. Rental Accommodations Comm’n, 414 A.2d 878,

880 n.8 (D.C. 1980); see also Payne v. District of Columbia, 741

F. Supp. 2d at 211. Otherwise put: “[R]etroactive applications

of legislation are not to be presumed absent express legislative

language or other clear implication that such retroactivity was

intended.” Redman v. Potomac Place Assocs., LLC, 972 A.2d

316, 319 n.4 (D.C. 2009).

Not only is there no express legislative language or other

clear implication that retroactivity was intended, but also

nothing about the amendment suggests other than the normal

prospective application presumed for legislative acts. Payne

valiantly argues to the contrary, but his argument is unavailing. 

He relies upon the proposition that “[u]nless a contrary

legislative intent appears, . . . changes in statutory law applying

only to procedure apply to pending cases.” Appellant’s Brief at

24 (citing Montgomery v. District of Columbia, 598 A.2d 162,

166 (D.C. 1991) (quoting 2 N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory

Construction § 41.09, at 396 (1986))). While we do not reject

that as a basic proposition, it simply has nothing to do with this

case. Payne argues that we must construe section 2(c) as

procedural because the D.C. Council’s committee report on the

2009 Act discussed that section 2(c) under a heading entitled

“Procedural barriers to recovery.” But the committee report

cannot bear the weight Payne places on it. The discussion of

section 2(c) comes at the very end of the section and contains no

indication, other than the heading, that the legislature even

considered whether the change was substantive or procedural.

We have previously discussed the difference in substantive

and procedural statutory changes with specific reference to

retroactivity in LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

In that case, we offered by way of example that “a statute is

merely procedural in a strict sense” if it affects “say, setting

deadlines for filing and disposition.” Id. at 162 (quoting Lindh

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v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). On the other hand, a “revision[] of prior law to change

standards of proof and persuasion in a way favorable” to one

party over the other goes “beyond ‘mere’ procedure to affect

substantive entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Lindh at 327). 

The amendment at issue before us goes far beyond the

amendments discussed in LaFontant and Lindh. This

amendment does not just affect substantive entitlement to relief,

it creates such an entitlement. The creation of a new cause of

action is hardly a procedural amendment. It is difficult to

conceive of anything more substantive. In light of that fact, the

committee report nowise constitutes the sort of “clear legislative

showing” required for a substantive amendment to be given

retroactive effect. Wolf, 414 A.2d at 880 n.8; cf. Bhd. of R.R.

Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29

(1947) (“[T]he heading of a section cannot limit the plain

meaning of the text”). Therefore, the generality cited by Payne

is irrelevant. The district court rightly ruled that the statute had

no retroactive application. We affirm the summary judgment

granted by the district court.

B. Claims Against the District

We agree with the district court that while Payne may have

pleaded a cause of action against the District under the DCWPA,

the evidence before the court at summary judgment did not

make out a prima facie case, and that therefore, there being no

genuine dispute of material fact, the district court properly

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In order

to recover under the terms of the Act, the plaintiff must first

establish that he has made a “protected disclosure.” A protected

disclosure includes one made to “a public body” evidencing

types of mismanagement, waste, and abuse as set forth in the

Act. D.C. Code § 1–615.52(a)(6). It is not seriously disputed

that Payne has made out those elements of his claim for relief. 

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But that is not the end of the requirements.

To make out a claim under the Act, plaintiff’s evidence

must also support a retaliatory element. That is, he must show

that a supervisor has “take[n], or threaten[ed] to take, a

prohibited personnel action or otherwise retaliate[d] against an

employee because of the employee’s protected disclosure.” 

D.C. Code § 1–615.53 (emphasis added). 

In analyzing the claim, as we are applying substantive law

of the District of Columbia, “[o]ur duty . . . is to achieve the

same outcome we believe would result if the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals considered the case.” Shaw v.

Marriott Int’l, Inc., 605 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Thus, as in Shaw, our analysis of the applicable District of

Columbia statutes recognizes the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals’s interpretation as binding. See id. at 1043. 

In conducting the analysis of the prima facie case under the

DCWPA, we must use the burden-shifting framework

established by McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). See Crawford v. District of Columbia, 891

A.2d 216, 221 (D.C. 2006); Johnson v. District of Columbia,

935 A.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C. 2007). In order to make out a prima

facie case at the summary judgment stage in a whistleblower

case, a plaintiff is required to produce evidence of retaliation

sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude “that his protected

activity was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited

personnel action.” Payne v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp.

2d at 213. While the establishment of a prima facie case would

shift the burden of proof to the defendant employer, Payne has

not established his prima facie case of a causal connection

between his disclosures to the Council and the action

terminating his employment and, therefore, the burden has not

shifted. While the District has provided substantial evidence of

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its reasons for terminating Payne, independent of his disclosures,

we need not look to those reasons as Payne has not made it past

the prima facie hurdle. 

As the district court aptly declared, Payne “has produced no

direct evidence that DCRA’s decisions were motivated by

Payne’s testimony.” Id. Of course this is unsurprising, and it is

indeed common that causation elements dependent upon the

intent of an actor would be proven by circumstantial rather than

direct evidence. Payne’s difficulty is that he has produced no

circumstantial evidence of causation either. Payne’s proffered

evidentiary theory is that the “temporal proximity” between the

protected disclosure and the termination is circumstantial

evidence of causation. While it is true that “temporal

proximity” can provide circumstantial evidence of causation,

there is no temporal proximity in the evidence in this case. 

The gap between the protected activity and the alleged

retaliation is approximately eight months. The district court

rightly rejected this theory. As the district court noted, in

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 935 A.2d at 1120, the DC

Court of Appeals rejected a “four-month lapse of time as proof

of a causal connection between the protected disclosures and the

adverse actions.” We conclude that the district court’s decision

correctly follows District of Columbia precedent. Once the time

between a protected disclosure and a negative employment

action has stretched to two-thirds of a year, there is no “temporal

proximity” that supports a causal connection between the two,

nothing else appearing. Here, nothing else pertinent appears. 

All Payne really offers is evidence that he made a protected

disclosure and that at a later time he suffered a termination. The

fact that one event precedes another does not in itself evidence

causation.

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C. The First Amendment Claim

Although Payne’s complaint asserted a claim under the First

Amendment, we cannot find error in the district court’s grant of

summary judgment, as Payne has forfeited any such claim on

appeal. We have long held that this court does not normally

consider “points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate

distinctly the party’s thesis.” Miller v. Avirom, 384 F.2d 319,

321–22 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Payne has not asserted his First

Amendment claim before us. 

In his principal brief, there are three references to the First

Amendment. The first reference, however, is not in the

argument section of the brief at all, but only in his statement of

issues and even there, the reference is subsumed in a single

sentence describing his claims in the district court. See

Appellant’s Brief at 1. Similarly, the second reference is not

part of his argument either, but is only an inclusion of the First

Amendment in a list of “statutes” set forth at the beginning of

his brief. See id. at 10.

Only the third reference to the First Amendment is even

contained in the argument portion of his brief, and that reference

is not actually part of the argument, but only of a heading

reading, “The District Court erred in finding Payne failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the DCWPA or

the First Amendment.” Id. at 26. There is no development by

Payne of his alleged First Amendment claims, and thus, we must

conclude that he has forfeited them. In so concluding, we note

that when appellee raised this forfeiture in its responding brief,

Payne’s reply brief takes issues with the proposition, but still

can cite no reference to his original brief that develops the

theory as it must to warrant our consideration.

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment. On appeal, Audrick Payne contends that the

district court erred in granting judgment on his claims against

four individual District government employees because an

amendment enacted in 2009 to the D.C. Whistleblower

Protection Act, D.C. Code § 1-615.54(a) (2001), was retroactive. 

See Appellant’s Br. 25-26. As the court acknowledges, Op. at

12, Payne does not argue on appeal that the statute, prior to the

2009 amendment, authorized claims against individual

employees. See Appellant’s Br. at 24. He has therefore waived

any such claim. See Evans v. Sebelius, No. 11-5120, 2013 WL

2122072, at *3 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2013) (citing Ark Las Vegas

Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 1-098 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); 

New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Consequently, this court has no occasion to decide whether D.C.

Code § 1-615.54(a), prior to the 2009 amendment, allowed suits

against individual District government employees, and the

court’s discussion of this question of District of Columbia law,

Op. at 11-12, is dictum, which this court has long recognized is

of no precedential value, see Gersman v. Grp. Health Ass’n,

Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d

581, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1943); cf. Banks v. Chesapeake & Potomac

Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Otherwise, I concur in holding that, under District of

Columbia, law, the 2009 amendment to D.C. Code § 1-615.54(a)

(2001) is not retroactive in the absence of some clear indication

that the Council of the District of Columbia intended the

amendment to operate retroactively. See Op. at 13. I also

concur in affirming the grant of summary judgment on Payne’s

claims against the District of Columbia. See id. at 14-18.

USCA Case #11-7116 Document #1440053 Filed: 06/07/2013 Page 19 of 19