Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01370/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, et al., CASE NO. CV F 10-1370 LJO MJS

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ F.R.Civ.P. 12

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs. (Doc. 12.)

CITY OF MODESTO, et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Modesto (“City”) and nine City peace officers seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ 1 2

unlawful arrest and excessive force claims in the absence of sufficient legal grounds and factual

allegations. Plaintiffs “concede that Defendants’ arguments have merit” and seek to file an amended

complaint to “correct the defects appearing on the face of the original complaint.” This Court considered

defendants’ F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the December 6, 2010

The defendant City peace officers are City Police Chief Roy Wasden (“Chief Wasden”), Lieutenant Ron

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Cloward (“Lt. Cloward”), officers John Buehler (“Officer Buehler”), Jeff Sprueill (“Officer Spruiell”), James Murphy

(“Officer Murphy”), Casey Graham (“Officer Graham”), Florencio Costales (“Officer Costales”), Ronny Ziya (“Officer

Ziya”), and Mark Fontes (“Officer Fontes”). The City and the nine defendant City peace officers will be referred to

collectively as “defendants.” The eight defendant City line officers (excluding Chief Wasden) will be referred to collectively

as the defendant officers.

Plaintiffs are Miguel Rodriguez (“Mr. Rodriguez”), Charisse Fernandez (“Ms. Fernandez”), and Adrian

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Alizaga (“Mr. Alizaga”) and will be referred to collectively as “plaintiffs.”

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hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). This Court DISMISSES plaintiffs’ claims and GRANTS

plaintiffs leave to amend to the extent delineated below.

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiffs’ Arrests

On February 8, 2009 at around 1 a.m., plaintiffs gathered at Mr. Alizaga’s Modesto home to

celebrate his birthday. A police officer knocked at the door, and Mr. Alizaga’s dog ran out when he

opened the door. As Mr. Alizaga tried to retrieve the dog, Officers Spruiell and Ziya grabbed Mr.

Alizaga, threw him to the ground and handcuffed him “for no apparent reason.” Officers Spruiell and

Ziya struck Mr. Alizaga with their batons. Mr. Alizaga was booked on charges of resisting arrest, a

misdemeanor.

Mr. Rodriguez came out of the house, observed Mr. Alizaga’s arrest, and wanted to find out the

reason. Mr. Rodriguez stood peaceably on the home’s front lawn and attempted to learn from police

why Mr. Alizaga was arrested. Officers Ziya, Fontes and Murphy arrested Mr. Rodriguez without

having observed him commit a criminal offense. During the arrest, Officer Fontes shot Mr. Rodriguez

with his Taser, and Officer Ziya struck Mr. Rodriguez’ arm with his baton. Officer Murphy gave the

“bite command” to his K-9 which bit Mr. Rodriguez. 

When Mr. Rodriguez was handcuffed and walked to a patrol car, unidentified officer Doe

Defendant No. 1 put a shotgun to Mr. Rodriguez’ back and banged his head against the roof of the patrol

car. Doe Defendant No. 1 attempted to break Mr. Rodriguez’ bad leg after Mr. Rodriguez had alerted

the officer of a prior injury to the leg. Mr. Rodriguez screamed: “What are you doing to me? I have a

daughter!” Doe Defendant No. 1 responded: “Fuck your daughter, you piece of shit!” 

The police threw Mr. Rodriguez “roughly” in the back of a patrol car to injure his bad leg. The

police took Mr. Rodriguez to a hospital for medical clearance and then to jail. Mr. Rodriguez was

released the following morning at about 1 a.m. with a citation for resisting arrest, a misdemeanor. 

When the police arrested Mr. Alizaga and Mr. Rodriguez, Ms. Fernandez came outside and

observed Mr. Alizaga and Mr. Rodriguez being beaten. As Ms. Fernandez stood on the home’s porch

The factual recitation is derived generally from plaintiffs’ complaint (“complaint”), the target of defendants’

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challenges.

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and watched, Officer Buehler grabbed Ms. Fernandez, threw her to the ground, and handcuffed her for

“no apparent reason.” Unidentified officer Doe Defendant No. 2 struck Ms. Fernandez several times

with his club when Ms. Fernandez lay face-down on the front lawn, handcuffed and screaming for help. 

Officer Souza held a police dog next to Ms. Fernandez’ head for no reason. Police placed Ms. 4

Fernandez in a patrol car’s back seat and ignored her repeated requests for an explanation. Ms.

Fernandez was transported to a hospital for medical clearance, was taken to jail, was charged with

resisting arrest, and released with a citation for resisting arrest, a misdemeanor. 

Lt. Cloward was the “ranking officer” on the scene and did nothing to restrain the unlawful

behavior of officers under his command.

Plaintiffs’ Injuries

Plaintiffs claim to have suffered multiple contusions and abrasions and emotional distress. Ms.

Fernandez further claims cervical strain.

Plaintiffs’ Claims

The complaint alleges 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983") claims for unreasonable seizure and 

failure to adequatelytrain, supervise and discipline officers (collectivelythe “section 1983 claims”). The

complaint further alleges tort claims of assault and battery and false arrest/false imprisonment. These

claims will be discussed in greater detail below. The complaint seeks to recover compensatory and

punitive damages and attorney fees.

Plaintiffs’ Nolo Contendere Pleas

On February 10, 2009, a misdemeanor criminal complaint was filed to charge each plaintiff with

a count of violation of California Penal Code section 148(a) (restricting, delaying or obstructing peace

officer). Plaintiffs entered nolo contendere pleas to charges against them.

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

Defendants raise several F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) challenges to the complaint’s section 1983 and tort

claims.

The complaint does not name “Officer Souza” as a defendant.

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A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where

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there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that aremerelyconclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court th

“need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” U.S. ex rel.

Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9 Cir.1986), and must not “assume that the [plaintiff] can th

prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if

“it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon

Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

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Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint “must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). th

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently

explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A

claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

. . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). th

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address a motion to dismiss:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

For a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally cannot consider material outside the

complaint. Van Winkle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1162, n. 2 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 

Nonetheless, “judicial notice may be taken of a fact to show that a complaint does not state a cause of

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action.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67, 70 (9 Cir. 1956); see th

Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 984 (9 Cir. 1997). A court properly may take th

judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings’” and consider them for purposes of the

motion to dismiss. Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). th

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ challenges to plaintiffs’ claims.

Official Capacity

The complaint names Chief Wasden and the defendant officers in their “official capacities.” 

Defendants argue that pursuing Chief Wasden and the defendant officers in their official capacities in

the section 1983 claims is “procedurallyimproper” given that the complaint also names the City as “their

employing public entity.”

Plaintiffs concede that “the claims against the individual officers should be brought against them

in their individual capacities and not in their official capacities.”

Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). The U.S. Supreme Court has further explained:

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government

official for actions he takes under color of state law. . . . Official-capacity suits, in

contrast, “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of

which an officer is an agent.” . . . As long as the government entity receives notice and

an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to

be treated as a suit against the entity.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985) (citations omitted). 

An official capacity action is not against the public employee personally, “for the real party in

interest is the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099. “An official capacity suit against a

municipal officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity.” Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los

Angeles County Sheriff, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9 Cir. 2008). th

Local government officials sued in their official capacities are “persons” under section 1983 in

cases where a local government would be suable in its own name. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55, 98

S.Ct. 2018. “For this reason, when both an officer and the local government entity are named in a

lawsuit and the officer is named in official capacity only, the officer is a redundant defendant and may

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be dismissed.” Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Vance v. County of Santa

Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). “Section 1983 claims against government officials in

their official capacities are really suits against the governmental employer because the employer must

pay any damages awarded.” Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9 Cir. 2002). th

“[I]t is no longer necessary or proper to name as a defendant a particular local government

officer acting in official capacity.” Luke, 954 F.Supp. at 204. As the district court in Luke, 954 F.Supp.

at 204, explained:

A plaintiff cannot elect which of the defendant formats to use. If both are named, it is

proper upon request for the Court to dismiss the official-capacity officer, leaving the

local government entity as the correct defendant. If only the official-capacity officer is

named, it would be properfor the Court upon request to dismissthe officer and substitute

instead the local government entity as the correct defendant.

The Defendant Officers

Defendants contend that the defendant officers are not subject to an official capacity claim under

section 1983 in that they do not hold City police department positions to cloak them as “a

governmentally authorized decision maker.”

Chief Wasden

Defendants characterize an official capacity claim against Chief Wasden as “redundant to the

Monell claim against the defendant City because Chief Wasden was employed as the Chief of Police.” 

“Section 1983 claims against government officials in their official capacities are really suits against the

governmental employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” Bulter v. Elle, 281 F.3d

1014, 1023, n. 8 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Defendants are correct, and plaintiffs concede, that Chief Wasden and the defendant officers are

subject to section 1983 claims in their individual capacities only. As such, dismissal of the section 1983

claims in Chief Wasden and the defendant officers’ official capacities is warranted.

Officers Graham And Costales

Defendants seek Officers Graham and Costales dismissal in that their names merely appear in

the complaint’s caption and paragraph identifying the defendant officers and the complaint “fails to

reveal a single factual allegation” against them. Defendants fault the complaint’s absence of facts

“which constitute any actionable claim against either of them.”

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In their opposition papers, plaintiffs fail to address Officers Graham and Costales. As such, this

Court is unclear whether plaintiffs seek to amend to add allegations as to them. In an abundance of

cause, Officers Graham and Costales are dismissed without prejudice. 

Fourteenth Amendment Claim

The complaint’s first section 1983 claim references the Fourteenth Amendment in its heading

and alleges:

1. Plaintiffs “were arrested without having committed any offense in the presence of a

police officer and without the police having probable cause to believe they had

committed any felony offense”; and

2. The defendant officers used unreasonable force to subject plaintiffs to “unreasonable

seizure” to violate the “Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Bold added.)

Defendants contend that the complaint lacks a Fourteenth Amendment claim cognizable under

section 1983 in that plaintiffs’ excessive force claims invoke the Fourth Amendment.

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9 Cir. 1988). th

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811 (quoting

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). Section 1983 and other

federal civil rights statutes address liability “in favor of persons who are deprived of ‘rights, privileges,

or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042

(1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 996 (1976)). “The first inquiry

in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the

Constitution and laws.’” Baker, 443 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979). Stated differently, the first step

in a section 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 (1994). “Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of

rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” Baker,

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443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’

against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

“substantive due process,” must be the guide of analyzing these claims.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865,

1871 (1989)). “[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the

Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific

provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272,

n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219 (1997).

In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court

determined that section 1983 excessive force claims are addressed under the Fourth Amendment’s

reasonableness standard:

[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force – deadly or not –

in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen should

be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather than

under a “substantive due process” approach. Because the Fourth Amendment provides

an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically

intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

“substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ excessive force claim invokestheFourthAmendment towarrant

its dismissal to the extent it alleges a “violation of substantive due process rights.”

Plaintiffs explain theFourteenthAmendment reference “merelyexpresses the fact that the Fourth

Amendment is made applicable against local law enforcement officials via that FourteenthAmendment.”

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they do not intend to pursue a claim for violation of Fourteenth Amendment

due process and “request that the claim be read simply as a Fourth Amendment claim.”

Plaintiffs request is granted in that the complaint’s first section 1983 claim is dismissed to the

extent it attempts to allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

False Arrest

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ nolo contendere pleas bar plaintiffs’ false arrest claims.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-488, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court

explained:

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We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been

so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a [plaintiff] seeks damages

in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,

the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the

plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to

proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. 

“Heck says that ‘if a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts stands and is fundamentally

inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action

must be dismissed.’” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9 Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. th

1128, 125 S.Ct. 2938 (2005) (quoting Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9 Cir. 1996)). Heck

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objectives include “preserving consistency and finality, and preventing ‘a collateral attack on [a]

conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.’” Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9 Cir. 2000) th

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-485, 114 S.Ct. 2364). “[F]or purposes of the Heck analysis, a plea of

nolo contendere in a California criminal action has the same effect as a guilty plea or jury verdict of

guilty.” Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1999).

Defendants argue that Heck bars plaintiffs’ section 1983 false arrest claim in that a judgment

favorable to plaintiffs on such claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions arising

from their nolo contendere pleas. Defendants note that to prevail on a section 1983 false arrest claim,

each plaintiff would need to “demonstrate that there was no probable cause” for arrest. Defendants

continue that plaintiffs lack a section 1983 false arrest claim in the absence of allegations that their

convictions have been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, invalidated by a state tribunal

or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Plaintiffs agree that Heck bars their section 1983 false arrest claims but contend their excessive

force claim is not so barred in that plaintiffs’ convictions “merely establish that the police had probable

cause to arrest Plaintiffs, not that the force they used in making the arrests was reasonable.”

Plaintiffs’ section 1983 false arrest claim falls squarely under Heck’s bar in that plaintiffs seek

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to recover for alleged unconstitutional detentions which have neither been reversed, expunged, declared

invalid nor call into question. A successful false arrest claim here would necessarily imply the invalidity

of plaintiffs’ nolo contendere pleas, which are inconsistent with the defendant officers’ alleged wrongs

subject to the complaint’s section 1983 false arrest claim. Plaintiffs are correct that Heck bars only their

false arrest claim, not their excessive force claim.

Monell Liability

The complaint’s second section 1983 claim is entitled “Failure to Adequately Train, Supervise

and Discipline Officers – 14 Amendment” and alleges that the City and Chief Wasden: th

1. “[H]ad a statutory duty to adequately train their police officers in the use of force, and

specifically in the proper use of police dogs, tasers and batons”; and

2. “[W]ere deliberately indifferent to their duties to properly train, supervise and discipline

Modesto police officers.”

Defendants characterize the claim as seeking Monell liability against the City and as an official

capacity claim against Chief Wasden to warrant is dismissal against Chief Wasden on grounds discussed

above. Defendants fault the claim’s failure to allege the defendant officers’ deprivation of rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment and in turn facts to establish the City’s Fourteenth Amendment violation to

invoke Monell liability.

A local government unit may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018

(1978); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct.

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275 (1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). “Federal case law th

has long barred respondeat superior liability against state actors in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.” Fed. of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Claimants suing state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “must establish that their alleged injury was the

result of a ‘policy or custom’ of that state actor.” African American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1215. 

“[A] municipalitycannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell, 436 U.S.

at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2018. The local government unit “itself must cause the constitutional deprivation.” 

Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 th

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(1993). Because liability of a local governmental unit must rest on its actions, not the actions of its

employees, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory and demonstrate that the alleged

constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). To maintain a civil rights claim against a local government,

a plaintiff must establish the requisite culpability (a “policy or custom” attributable to municipal

policymakers) and the requisite causation (the policy or custom as the “moving force” behind the

constitutional deprivation). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gable v. City of Chicago, 296

F.3d 531, 537 (7 Cir. 2002). th

“Liability may attach to a municipality only where the municipality itself causes the

constitutional violation through ‘execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.’ ” Ulrich v.

City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694,

98 S.Ct. 2018). A municipal “policy” exists when “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is

made from among various alternatives bythe official or officials responsible for establishing final policy

with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292; Fairley v.

Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1044, 123 S.Ct. 659 (2002).

A municipal policy or custom is established by showing: (1)“a longstanding practice or custom

which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “that the

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or

acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “that an official with

final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.”

Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 984-85 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Defendants argue that a section 1983 claim that the City failed to adequately train, supervise and

discipline police officers depends on whether City final policymakers “have caused the deprivation of

rights at issue by policies which affirmatively command that it occur, . . . or by acquiescence in a

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local

governmental entity.” See Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702

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(1989) (citations omitted).

“[I]nadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure

to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come in

contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989). “Only where a

municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’

to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’

that is actionable under § 1983.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197. Moreover, “it is therefore

difficult in one sense even to accept the submission that someone pursues a ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate

training,’ unless evidence be adduced which proves that the inadequacies resulted from conscious choice

– that is, proof that the policymakers deliberately chose a training program which would prove

inadequate. And in the second place, some limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability

through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional . . .” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.

808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985). 

The U.S. Supreme Court has elaborated on an inadequate training claim:

But it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees

the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to

result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the

failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the

city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.

In resolving the issue of a city's liability, the focus must be on adequacy of the

training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform. That a

particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability

on the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a

faulty training program.

Harris, 489 U.S. at 390-391, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (footnotes omitted).

As to failure to train employees, the Ninth Circuit has explained:

The custom or policy of inaction, however, must be the result of a “conscious,” . . . or

“‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with

respect to the subject matter in question.’” 

. . .

A local governmental entity's failure to train its employees can also create § 1983

liability where the failure to train “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

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persons” with whom those employees are likely to come into contact. . . . “[F]or liability

to attach in this circumstance the identified deficiency in a [local governmental entity's]

training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury.” . . . In other words, a

plaintiff must show that his or her constitutional “injury would have been avoided” had

the governmental entity properly trained its employees. . . .

Lee, 250 F.3d at 681 (citations omitted.)

A section 1983 plaintiff alleging a policy of failure to train peace officers must show: (1) he/she

was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the local government entity had a training policy that amounts

to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights of persons’ with whom its peace officers are likely to

come into contact; and (3) his/her constitutional injury would have been avoided had the local

government unit properly trained those officers. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 463. “[A]bsent evidence of

a ‘program-wide inadequacy in training,’ any shortfall in a single officer’s training ‘can only be

classified as negligence on the part of the municipal defendant – a much lower standard of fault than

deliberate indifference.’” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 484-485 (quoting Alexander v. City and County of

San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9 Cir. 1994)). th

In short, “the identified deficiency in a city’s training program must be closely related to the

ultimate injury.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197.

The complaint broadly alleges deliberate indifference to train police officers in “proper use of

police dogs, tasers and batons.” The complaint lacks factual allegations of deliberate indifference, that

is, a conscious choice to pursue an inadequate training program. The complaint fails to allege facts to

demonstrate an obvious need for more or different training. At best, the complaint raises inferences that

individual officers may have been inadequately trained. Plaintiffs acknowledge the second 1983 claim

“is an imperfect attempt to state a Monell claim.” This Court agrees. The complaint does not even

allege that plaintiff’s injuries would have been avoided had different training been employed. The

section 1983 failure to adequately train claim is insufficiently pled to warrant its dismissal without

prejudice and subject to an attempt to amend consistent with the above Monell principles.

State Tort Claims

The complaint’s third claim alleges that defendants “committed the torts of assault and battery

against Plaintiffs.” The complaint’s fourth claim alleges that defendants falsely arrested plaintiffs

“without having witnessed any of them commit any criminal offense and without probable cause to

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believe that any of them had committed any felony offense.”

Defendants fault the complaint’s failure to allege compliance with claim filing requirements of

the California Government Claims Act (“Claims Act”), Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 810, et seq., or facts to

excuse Claims Act requirements.

The Claims Act describes the specific steps which must be taken before a civil action for money

or damages may be brought against a public entity. Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316,

146 Cal.Rptr. 224 (1978). The Claims Act requires timely filing of a proper claim as condition

precedent to maintenance of an action. Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4 (presentment of a written

claim to the applicable public entity is required before a “suit for money or damages may be brought

against a public entity”); County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co., 16 Cal.App.3d 383, 390,

94 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1971). California Government Code section 911.2(a) provides: “A claim relating to

a cause of action for death or for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months

after the accrual of the cause of action. A claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented

. . . not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action.” California Government Code section

911.4(a) permits a “written application” to a public entity for leave to present an untimely claim. 

California Government Code section 911.4(b) requires such application “within a reasonable time not

to exceed one year after the accrual of the action.” 

The claims procedures applicable to actions against public employees are the same for actions

against public entities. Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 950-950.6. Compliance with the claims statutes is

mandatory. Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624, 630, 145 P.2d 570 (1944). Failure to file a claim

is fatal to the cause of action. Johnson v. City of Oakland, 188 Cal.App.2d 181, 183, 10 Cal.Rptr. 409

(1961). “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation

requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer [or dismissal] for failure to state a

cause of action.” State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 538 (2004). A “plaintiff

must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliancewith the claim presentation requirement.” State

v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1243, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 534. “Accordingly, submission of a claim

within [six months] is a condition precedent to a tort action against either the employee or the public

entity.” Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 838,129 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1976).

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Plaintiffs attribute as a drafting “oversight” failure to allege Claims Act compliance. Plaintiffs

claim that they complied with Claims Act filing requirements. Plaintiffs are granted an attempt to allege

their compliance.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES with prejudice the section 1983 claims against Chief Wasden and the

defendant officers in their official capacities and PERMITS the section 1983 claims to

proceed against Chief Wasden and the defendant officers in their individual capacities

only;

2. DISMISSES without prejudice this action against Officers Graham and Costales;

3. DISMISSES with prejudice the first section 1983 claim only to the extent based on a

Fourteenth Amendment violation and unlawful or false arrest;

4. DISMISSES without prejudice and with leave to amend the second section 1983 Monell

claim;

5. DISMISSES without prejudice and with leave to amend the assault and battery and false

arrest/false imprisonment claims based on California law;

6. ORDERS plaintiffs, no later than December 10, 2010, to file a first amended complaint

consistent with this order; and

7. ORDERS defendants, no later than December 28, 2010 to file a response to plaintiffs’

first amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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