Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04888/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04888-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALPI INTERNATIONAL, LTD,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANGA SUPPLY, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-04888-HSG 

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 

TO SHOW CAUSE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 44, 46, and 63

Plaintiff Alpi International, Ltd. (“Alpi”) produces and sells soft foam and molded plastic 

toys known as “stress relievers.” These squeezable toys come in a variety of shapes, and can be 

branded with corporate or other logos. Defendant Anga Supply, LLC (“Anga”) is a direct 

competitor in the same business. Alpi alleges that 18 of Anga’s products infringe its copyrighted 

designs. Anga has filed a counterclaim asserting that Alpi’s products infringe 43 of its 

copyrighted designs, the rights to which Anga purportedly purchased for $80 six months after Alpi 

initiated this action.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. Dkt. Nos. 44 (“Alpi Mot.”) and 46 (“Anga 

Mot.”). Alpi’s motion asserts that: (1) Anga cannot recover damages prior to April 28, 2014, the

date it purchased its purported rights to the 43 designs it asserts in its counterclaim; (2) Anga is 

not entitled to attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 because Alpi’s sales of those designs predate 

Anga’s June 2, 2014 copyright registrations; (3) Anga cannot prove infringement for several 

works because Alpi’s sold its designs before Anga contends they were created; and (4) Anga’s 

counterclaim sounds in champerty. See Alpi Mot. Anga’s motion asserts that: (1) Alpi cannot 

prove infringement because undisputed evidence shows that Anga’s products were independently 

created; and (2) Alpi’s asserted designs are not sufficiently similar to Anga’s products to support a 

finding of infringement. See Anga Mot. The Court held a hearing on both motions on April 9, 

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2015.

On May 8, 2015, the Court issued an order to show cause. Dkt. No. 63 (“OSC”). As a 

threshold matter, the Court found that Alpi’s four-page opposition failed to engage with the 

relevant legal standard. Id. at 3. Rather than identifying the shared protectable characteristics 

between its eighteen asserted designs and Anga’s accused products, Alpi’s argument on 

infringement consisted solely of the conclusory observation that the similarities between its bull 

design and Anga’s bull “far outweigh[ed] any differences.” Dkt. No. 58 at 2. Alpi inexplicably 

failed to address the other seventeen toy designs at issue in its claims. Id. The Court also 

observed that many of Anga’s asserted designs—like its orange and pear toys—although not 

challenged by Alpi on summary judgment, appeared to constitute the very same kind of stock, 

scène à faire designs Anga argued did not support a finding of infringement in its summary 

judgment motion against Alpi. See Anga Mot. 4-9. In its order to show cause, the Court directed 

Alpi and Anga to: (1) identify the protectable elements shared between its designs and the 

allegedly infringing works, and (2) explain why each element is protectable or (at the very least) is 

part of a group of otherwise unprotectable elements that, by their selection or arrangement, are 

sufficient to trigger copyright protection. See OSC at 6. The Court further directed Anga to 

identify the evidence that creates a triable issue of fact concerning whether Alpi copied Anga’s 

asserted works. Id. at 7.

The parties filed briefs pursuant to the Court’s order to show cause on May 22, 2015, Dkt. 

Nos. 64 (“Alpi OSC Br.”) and 66 (“Anga OSC Br.”), and filed responses on May 29, 2015, Dkt. 

Nos. 92 (“Alpi OSC Resp.”) and 91 (“Anga OSC Resp.”). Neither party fully complied with the 

Court’s order. Although the Court was explicit that the parties were to identify shared protectable 

traits “for each and every product at issue,” Dkt. No. 63 at 6-7, Alpi performed that analysis for 

only seven of its asserted designs, see Alpi OSC Resp. at 7-19 (identifying shared protectable 

traits between Alpi and Anga bull, hammerhead shark, sea lion, shark, dolphin, orca, and chicken 

toys). Alpi’s brief is silent on the existence of protectable elements in its frog, horse, astronaut, 

penguin, and cow designs. See id. Although Anga’s brief nominally addressed each of its 43 

asserted designs, it ignored the Court’s direction to “explain why each element is protectable.” 

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OSC at 7. For example, Anga’s “explanation” for its donut design reads, in its entirety, 

“particular size and color contrast.” Anga OSC Br. at 4. 

The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and the relevant case law, where 

provided. However, as described below, the parties have failed to meaningfully argue or support 

their positions with respect to much of the relief requested in their motions. Accordingly, while 

this Order disposes of the parties’ motions for summary judgment in their entirety, the Court will 

not decide several of the issues raised due to the parties’ failure to provide adequate briefing.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “the court shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of 

the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a 

material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” See id. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must 

view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Id. at 254. 

The question is “whether a jury could reasonably find either that the [moving party] proved his 

case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing law or that he did not.” Id. 

“[A]ll justifiable inferences must be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” See United Steelworkers 

of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citation omitted).

The moving party must inform the district court of the basis for its motion and identify 

those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits, if 

any, that it contends demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A party opposing motion for summary judgment 

“may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also 

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. The opposing party need not show the issue will be resolved 

conclusively in its favor. See id. at 248-49. All that is necessary is submission of sufficient 

evidence to create a material factual dispute, thereby requiring a jury or judge to resolve the 

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parties’ differing versions at trial. See id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Shared Protectable Elements

As the Court explained in its May 8, 2015 order to show cause, the touchstone of the 

copyright infringement inquiry is the identification of shared protectable elements between the 

copyrighted design and the allegedly infringing design. “To distinguish between permissible 

lifting of ideas and impermissible copying of expression, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed a twopart ‘extrinsic/intrinsic’ test.” Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010), 

as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 21, 2010) (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 

F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994)). At the initial “extrinsic” stage, the court examines the 

similarities between the copyrighted and challenged works, determines whether shared elements 

are protectable, and identifies the standard to be applied at the intrinsic stage. Id. “For example, 

ideas, scenes a faire (standard features) and unoriginal components are not protectable” and thus 

cannot form the basis of an infringement claim. Id. When the unprotectable elements are “filtered 

out,” what remains is the author’s protectable expression. Id. 

The court then determines what standard will apply at the intrinsic stage based the breadth 

of possible expression. “If there’s a wide range of expression . . . then copyright protection is 

‘broad’ and a work will infringe if it’s ‘substantially similar’ to the copyrighted work.” See id. at 

913-14 (citation omitted). In contrast, subjects that permit only a narrow range of expression 

warrant “thin” copyright protection, whereby a challenged work must be “virtually identical” to 

infringe. Id. (citations omitted). 

 If the allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work share common protectable 

elements, the finder of fact (usually a jury) is asked to apply the standard for infringement 

determined by the Court during the extrinsic stage—either substantially similar or virtually 

identical, respectively—at the intrinsic stage. The intrinsic inquiry “examines an ordinary 

person’s subjective impressions of the similarities between two works, [and] is exclusively the 

province of the jury.” Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However, a finding of similarity between two works “can’t be 

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based on similarities in unprotectable elements.” Mattel, 616 F.3d at 916. “When works of art 

share an idea, they’ll often be ‘similar’ in the layman’s sense of the term . . . . The key question 

always is: Are the works substantially similar beyond the fact that they depict the same idea.” Id. 

at 917. 

1. “Thin” Copyright Protection Applies 

This case concerns the parties’ copyright claims over small soft foam and molded plastic

squeeze toys. The designs asserted by Alpi are molded in the shapes of a variety of farm and 

ocean animals; the designs asserted by Anga run the gamut from a concrete mixer to a donut to a 

human kidney. Even a cursory perusal of the images of the parties’ products confirms that the 

soft-foam medium places significant constraints on the possible range of expression. For example, 

the appendages and horns on Alpi and Anga’s toy animals are uniformly more rounded and less 

defined than those of the real-life animals they depict. While the soft foam material allows for 

some grooves on the body of each animal, such as those placed on the body of Alpi and Anga’s 

chicken to represent feathers, see Dkt. No. 64-7 at 2, they allow for exceptionally little detail. 

Eyes and nose holes are represented by black dots, see id., and gills are represented by black lines 

or omitted completely, see Dkt. No. 64-2 at 2. While the soft foam or molded plastic designer is 

afforded some degree of choice when creating toys, those choices are severely constrained by the 

nature of the medium. 

The subjects of the parties’ designs further reduce the range of possible expression. As the 

Court observed in its May 8, 2015 order to show cause, “the shapes, bearings, colorings, and 

expressions of Alpi’s toy animals appear to be ‘approximately true to life,’ insofar as small 

squeeze toys can approximate the natural world.” OSC at 6. Similarly, Anga’s designs largely 

approximate what an orange, pear, donut, shipping container, book, or fire hydrant look like in real 

life. The designs at issue are not fantastical. They are not exceptionally original. With the 

possible exception of Anga’s penguin and chick toys, they are clearly not caricatures. Instead, 

their defining features appear to be the “standard” or “stock” characteristics that the Ninth Circuit 

has repeatedly held are not afforded copyright protection at all, let alone broad copyright 

protection. See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff “may 

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not prevent others from copying aspects of his [jellyfish] sculptures resulting from . . . jellyfish 

physiology”); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (“No copyright 

protection may be afforded to the idea of producing stuffed dinosaur toys or to elements of 

expression that necessarily follow from the idea of such dolls. . . . . [A]ny similarity in expression 

resulting from either the physiognomy of dinosaurs or from the nature of stuffed animals [is not 

protectable].”). In short, there are only so many ways that a designer can portray a relatively 

realistic shark, chicken, fire hydrant, or pear in the soft foam and molded plastic mediums. 

In Mattel, the Ninth Circuit performed a similar analysis and held that relatively undetailed 

doll sculpts of “fashion forward” women warranted only narrow copyright protection. 616 F.3d at 

915. Like the squeezable toys at issue in this case, the doll sculpt medium addressed in Mattel

provided a limited range of possible expression. See id. at 908 (“A sculpt is a mannequin-like 

plastic doll body without skin coloring, face paint, hair or clothing.”). Like Alpi here, the plaintiff 

in Mattel argued that the dolls sculpts warranted broad copyright protection because the dolls had 

exaggerated features that could be depicted in a variety of ways. See id. at 915. The Ninth Circuit

disagreed. Instead, the panel observed that:

Dolls depicting young, fashion-forward females have to have 

somewhat idealized proportions-which means slightly larger heads, 

eyes and lips; slightly smaller noses and waists; and slightly longer 

limbs than those that appear routinely in nature. But these features 

can be exaggerated only so much: Make the head too large or the 

waist too small and the doll becomes freakish, not idealized.

Id. Accordingly, the panel held that the doll sculpt form of expression was “highly constrained” 

and that “[b]ecause of the narrow range of expression, the preliminary sculpt is entitled to only 

thin copyright protection against virtually identical copying.” Id. (citation omitted). The panel 

compared this limited range of expression to the detailed sketches that were also at issue in the 

case. See id. at 915-16. In contrast, designers creating a sketch:

may vary the face paint, hair color and style, and the clothing and 

accessories, on top of making minor variations to the sculpt. One 

doll might have brown eyes with bronze eyeshadow, wavy auburn 

hair, leather boots, a blue plaid mini matched with a black buttondown, silver knot earrings and a barrel bag. Another might have 

green eyes with pink eyeshadow, brown hair in a messy bun, gold 

wedges, dark skinny jeans matched with a purple halter, a turquoise 

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cuff and a clutch, along with a slightly different body and facial 

structure.

Id. at 916. Based on the range of possible clothing, styling, makeup, accessories, and 

combinations thereof, the panel found that the district court did not err in affording the doll 

sketches broad copyright protection against substantially similar works. Id. 

The foam and plastic toys at issue in this case clearly fall on the sculpt side of the spectrum

and are thus entitled to only “thin” copyright protection. Alpi’s purported “protectable elements” 

all involve slight exaggerations to the physique of its toys’ real-world models. See, e.g., Alpi OSC 

Resp. at 8 (identifying the “exaggerated upward slant” of its bull design’s upper body as a 

protectable element). Assuming such variations warrant copyright protection at all, these are the 

exact type of minor exaggerations that the Ninth Circuit found merit only narrow copyright 

protection. See Mattel, 616 F.3d at 915. As with the “fashion forward” female doll sculpts at 

issue in Mattel, a soft foam or plastic toy designer can only exaggerate a toy bull’s features so 

much before it no longer looks like a bull. This is especially true where the medium provides 

relatively little opportunity to add detail. The rudimentary, relatively undetailed designs presented 

in this case do not approach the range of possible expression permitted by the detailed sketches at 

issue in Mattel. Alpi’s toys do not have eyelids, let alone eye shadow. 

2. Alpi’s Asserted Designs

Anga does not, at least at this stage of the litigation, challenge the existence of some shared 

protectable elements between Alpi’s asserted designs and Anga’s allegedly infringing works. 

Anga Mot. at 6 (questioning whether, but not arguing that, the particularized expressions of Alpi’s 

designs are protected by copyright law). Instead, Anga has moved for summary judgment on the 

ground that, once the unprotectable elements of each toy are filtered out, its and Alpi’s works are 

not “virtually identical.” Anga Mot. at 6-9; see, e.g., id. at 7 (arguing that certain dissimilarities 

between Alpi and Anga’s respective chicken designs render them not virtually identical). 

Summary judgment under the extrinsic test is “not highly favored” in copyright cases. See 

L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Shaw v. 

Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990)). Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the 

court can conclude, after viewing the evidence and drawing inferences in a manner most favorable 

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to the non-moving party, that no reasonable juror could find [the extrinsic test met].” Id. (citation 

omitted). “Where reasonable minds could differ on the issue . . . , however, summary judgment is 

improper.” Id. (citation omitted).

Although the Court is skeptical that each of Alpi’s bull, hammerhead shark, sea lion, shark, 

dolphin, orca, and chicken designs possesses protectable elements, the Court does not (on the 

evidence provided at this stage of the litigation) hold that no reasonable juror could find that Alpi 

and Anga’s designs are virtually identical. See L.A. Printex Indust., 676 F.3d at 848 (“A rational 

jury could find that despite some differences between Defendants’ design and C30020, the 

similarities in the selection, coordination, and arrangement of bouquets and three-leaf branches are 

sufficiently substantial to support an inference of copying.”). Alpi’s designs are all extraordinarily 

similar to Anga’s allegedly infringing works. The salient question for the jury (or, if appropriate, 

for the Court on a proper motion) will be whether those similarities arise from protectable 

elements or from the unprotectable elements that necessarily flow from the idea of small, animalshaped foam and plastic squeeze toys.1

B. Access to the Copyrighted Works

To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) ownership of a 

valid copyright; and (2) copying of the original elements of the protected work. See Feist 

Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Kling v. Hallmark Cards, 

Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000). Absent direct evidence of copying, the second element 

of the claim requires a threshold fact-based showing that alleged infringer had “access” to the 

asserted work. . . .” Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation 

omitted). To prove access, the party asserting infringement must show that the alleged infringer

had “an opportunity to view or to copy [its] work.” Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482. To do so, 

it must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable possibility” or “reasonable opportunity” for the 

defendant to view the asserted works, not simply a “bare possibility” it did so. Id. A “reasonable 

 

1 However, because Alpi did not identify any protectable elements in its frog, horse, astronaut, 

penguin, and cow designs (despite a Court order to do so, see OSC at 6), the Court will grant 

Anga’s motion for summary judgment as to those designs. 

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possibility” of access can be proven through circumstantial evidence “in one of two ways: (1) a 

particular chain of events is established between the plaintiff's work and the defendant’s access to 

that work . . . , or (2) the plaintiff’s work has been widely disseminated.” Id. 

However, even where evidence of access is lacking, a “striking similarity” between the 

works may give rise to a permissible inference of copying. Id. at 485 (“in the absence of any 

proof of access, a copyright plaintiff can still make out a case of infringement by showing that the 

songs were ‘strikingly similar’”). However, striking similarity is a high bar. “At base, ‘striking 

similarity’ simply means that, in human experience, it is virtually impossible that the two works 

could have been independently created.” 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 

Copyright § 13.02[B] (2005). That is, “[t]o show a striking similarity between works, a plaintiff 

must produce evidence that the accused work could not possibly have been the result of 

independent creation.” Seals-McClellan v. Dreamworks, Inc., 120 Fed.Appx. 3, 4 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

In this case, Anga concedes that it has no direct or circumstantial evidence that Alpi had 

access it is asserted designs. See Anga OSC Br. at 7-8. Alpi has submitted some circumstantial 

evidence that Anga had access, see Dkt. No. 93, but it did so through a declaration that: (1) 

accompanied its opposition to Anga’s response to the Court’s order to show cause, well after its 

deadline to file an opposition to Anga’s motion for summary judgment, where Alpi was obligated 

to submit such facts; and (2) relies in large part on inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, for 

purposes of this motion, the Court does not consider any evidence submitted by the parties. 

However, because all of the asserted and allegedly infringing works are so similar, the Court does 

not, at this time, exclude the possibility that a jury could find the works “strikingly similar” and 

thus create a permissible inference of copying even without evidence of access.

C. Alpi’s Prior Use of its Allegedly Infringing Products

Alpi argues that at least some of Anga’s infringement claims must fail because Alpi sold 

several of its allegedly infringing designs before Anga alleges it created them. See Alpi Mot. at 5-

6. In support of its argument, Alpi submitted excerpts from catalogues it created in the 1990’s and 

early 2000’s. See Dkt. No. 45-3. However, the resolution of the images submitted to the Court is 

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so poor that the Court cannot rule at this time—as a matter of law—that the squeeze toys 

represented in those exhibits are exactly the same as those alleged to infringe in this case. 

Accordingly, the question of whether Alpi’s allegedly infringing works actually predate the works 

that they are alleged to infringe will not be decided on summary judgment.

D. Availability of Pre-Purchase Damages

Alpi argues that Anga is not entitled to damages prior to April 28, 2014 (the date of its 

purchase of the copyrights at issue in its counterclaim), because the assignment conveying its 

interests in those copyrights did not include an express assignment of causes of actions that 

accrued prior to the date of assignment. Alpi Mot. at 3-4. Anga responds that the case law upon 

which Alpi bases its motion applies only to patents, and that no authority supports Alpi’s position 

with respect to copyrights. See Dkt. No. 53 (“Alpi Opp.”) at 1-2.

The Court finds that neither party has sufficiently briefed the issue. Alpi cites seemingly 

dispositive language in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 

42 (9th Cir. 1933), without informing the Court that the relevant language appears in Judge 

McCormick’s dissent, not the majority opinion. Neither party references any other decisions from 

this Circuit. Accordingly, the Court will defer this question and instruct the parties to provide 

additional briefing should the question of pre-assignment damages become a salient issue in this 

litigation.

E. Attorney’s Fees

Alpi moves for summary judgment on Anga’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees pursuant to 

17 U.S.C. § 505 on the ground that the copyrights asserted by Anga were all registered years after 

Alpi’s accused products were brought to market. See Alpi Mot. at 4. Anga does not dispute that, 

to the extent Alpi’s products infringe, that infringement commenced years before it registered its 

copyrights. Anga Opp. at 2-3. Instead, Anga contends that a plaintiff may be entitled to 

attorney’s fees if the defendant’s “infringing activities continue after the registration of the 

copyrighted work.” Anga Opp. at 3. Anga cites no authority for its “continued infringement” 

theory, which is inconsistent with governing Ninth Circuit authority. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. 

Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the first act of infringement

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in a series of ongoing infringements of the same kind marks the commencement of one continuing 

infringement under § 412.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court holds that Anga may 

not recover attorney’s fees related to its counterclaim.

F. Champerty

Alpi moves for summary judgment on Anga’s counterclaim on the basis that it arises in 

champerty. Alpi Mot. at 6-7; see also Champerty, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“An 

agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler 

helps pursue the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”). 

Alpi cites a single Missouri appellate decision—which addresses a very different factual situation 

and applies Missouri law—in support of its argument. Mot. at 6 (citing Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. 

P’ship v. Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). In other words, Alpi has failed to 

support its position with any relevant legal authority. The Court cannot decide this issue on the 

briefing provided by Alpi.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Anga’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect 

to Alpi’s claims arising from its bull, hammerhead shark, sea lion, shark, dolphin, orca, and 

chicken designs, and GRANTED with respect to the claims arising from Alpi’s frog, horse, 

astronaut, penguin, and cow designs. Alpi’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED in all 

respects with the exception of its argument concerning the availability of attorneys’ fees related to 

Anga’s counterclaim. On that limited ground, Alpi’s motion is GRANTED.

The parties are ORDERED to appear before the undersigned at a Case Management 

Conference at 2 p.m. on August 18, 2015 in Courtroom 15, 18th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 

San Francisco.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

8/5/2015

Case 4:13-cv-04888-HSG Document 107 Filed 08/05/15 Page 11 of 11