Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00833/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00833-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILMON EARL NICHOLS, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : CIVIL ACTION 04-0833-BH-M

STEPHEN BULLARD, : 

Respondent. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an Alabama

inmate which was referred for report and recommendation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72.2(c)(4),

and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. This

action is now ready for consideration. The state record is

adequate to determine Petitioner's claims; no federal

evidentiary hearing is required. It is recommended that this

habeas petition be dismissed as time- barred and that judgment

be entered in favor of Respondent Stephen Bullard and against

Petitioner Wilmon Earl Nichols pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d).

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree burglary,

following a guilty plea, in the Circuit Court of Mobile County

on May 31, 2002 for which he received a sentence of life in

the state penitentiary (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3; Doc. 9, Exhibit RX-A,

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p. 2). Nichols did not appeal his conviction or sentence

(Doc. 1, p. 3). He did, however, file a motion to set aside

his guilty plea— treated as a Request to Reconsider

Sentence—which was denied on August 16, 2002 (Doc. 9, Exhibit

RX-A, p. 3). 

Petitioner filed a State Rule 32 petition on January 14,

2004 (Doc. 9, Exhibit RX-A, pp. 9-20). Following the denial

of the petition by the lower court, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial, finding the claims to be

procedurally defaulted and without merit (Doc. 9, Exhibit RXC). On December 10, 2004, a Certificate of Judgment was

entered on Nichols’s Rule 32 petition by the Alabama Supreme

Court (Doc. 9, Exhibit RX-D). 

Nichols filed a complaint with this Court on December 30,

2004, raising the claim that the State Court was without

jurisdiction to render judgment or impose a sentence against

him because the indictment, which charged him with firstdegree burglary, was amended to charge second-degree burglary

(Doc. 1). Respondent has answered the petition, arguing that

it should be dismissed as it was not filed within the one-year

statute of limitations period (Doc. 9, pp. 5-6). Respondent

refers to provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter AEDPA) which amended, in

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1“In a criminal case a notice of appeal by the defendant shall

be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (six weeks)

after pronouncement of the sentence, provided that the notice of

appeal may be oral, as provided in Rule 3(a)(2).” 

2The Court notes that Nichols’s motion to reconsider his

sentence did not affect the appeal time of his conviction and

sentence as the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “a

motion for reconsideration of sentence does not extend the time for

filing notice of appeal.” Martinez v. State, 602 So.2d 504, 505

(Ala. Crim. App. 1992).

3

pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The specific provision

states as follows: 

A 1-year period of limitation shall

apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the

latest of the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Goodman v.

United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 9, 2002,

the forty-second day after his sentencing on which Nichols

could have appealed his conviction. Ala.R.App.P. 4(b)(1).1

At that point, the AEDPA statute of limitations clock began to

run.2 Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition was not filed in

this Court until December 30, 2004, more than a year after the

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3This Court entered an Order on June 30, 2005, ordering Nichols

to file a pleading with this Court, no later than July 20, 2005, why

this action should not be dismissed as time-barred (Doc. 10). As of

this date, Petitioner has filed no response. 

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Statute of Limitations period had expired. 

Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition in State court on

January 14, 2004, more than five months after the grace period

had expired. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held

that “[a] state court petition [] that is filed following the

expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period

because there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster

v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). Petitioner’s

Rule 32 petition was filed too late to toll the statute.

Clearly, Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition was filed

well beyond the one-year limitations period and filed in

violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Court finds that

Petitioner has provided no cause for ignoring the dictates of

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.3

Therefore, this action is time-barred.

For the reasoning stated herein, it is recommended that

this habeas petition be dismissed as time-barred and that

judgment be entered in favor of Respondent Stephen Bullard and

against Petitioner Wilmon Earl Nichols pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d).

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation

or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service

of this document, file specific written objections with the

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo

determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the

factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings

and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by

filing a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after being

served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions

of the recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for the objection. The objecting party

shall submit to the district judge, at the time of

filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a

different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted

to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of

the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or

judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

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magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay

the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required

before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 22nd day of July, 2005.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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