Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03575/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03575-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO KAB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas Wayne Derello, Jr.,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Unknown Sanchez, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 18-03575-PHX-MTL (JFM)

ORDER

Plaintiff Douglas Wayne Derello, Jr., who is currently confined in Arizona State 

Prison Complex-Eyman, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(Doc. 1.) Defendant Harris moves for summary judgment, and Plaintiff opposes.1 (Docs. 

38, 86, 109.)2 

I. Background

In his Complaint, Plaintiff relevantly alleged as follows. On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff 

was transferred to the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and 

brought four legal boxes, a trash bag full of legal papers, and his cane with him. (Doc. 7 

at 3.) An officer confiscated the property and told Plaintiff that he would go through the 

legal materials and return them to Plaintiff, but Sanchez told Plaintiff his property would 

not be returned. (Id.) Sanchez then asked Plaintiff if he was still suing the prison and when 

1 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 

962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 44.)

2 Defendant did not file a reply in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment.

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Plaintiff replied affirmatively, Sanchez stated that in that case, Plaintiff would not get any 

property. (Id.) On June 19, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate letter regarding his 

property and cane to a correctional officer and Defendant Harris, the property supervisor. 

(Id. at 4.) On June 26, Plaintiff told Defendant Harris that he filed a grievance regarding 

the withholding of his legal property and Harris responded “I will show you what your 

grievance filing mean[s] to me” and several weeks later, Harris sent Plaintiff a document 

indicating that his property was being stored. (Id.) 

After that, the more Plaintiff requested his legal property “the wors[e his] plight 

became” and although Plaintiff informed Defendant Doe about the adverse treatment 

against him, Doe did nothing about it. (Id. at 4-5.) When Plaintiff was moved to a new 

unit, he discovered that his property had been inventoried by Defendant Lewis and his 

purchased clothing and a lot of his legal material were missing and when he returned to his 

original unit “four days later,” he went “through the same problems with Harris [regarding 

his] legal material.” (Id. at 7.) On November 2, a property officer delivered a lot of 

Plaintiff’s legal documents and told Plaintiff that Harris instructed the officer to give the 

legal property to Plaintiff and that the officer would try to find Plaintiff’s clothes and the 

rest of his legal work. (Id. at 5.) On November 7, Sanchez and another officer went to 

Plaintiff’s cell and asked him if he was going to file another grievance against her regarding 

his property, and when he arrived at the new unit, all the property he received from the 

property officer was gone. (Id.) 

On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 

First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Harris and Sanchez, a failure to 

supervise claim against Defendant Doe, and an Eighth Amendment medical care claim 

against Defendant Igwe. (Id. at 8-9.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and 

Defendants. (Id. at 10.) Thereafter, Defendant Doe was dismissed because Plaintiff did 

not file a timely notice of substitution and Defendant Sanchez was dismissed for failure to 

timely effect service of process. (Docs. 45 and 58.) 

. . . .

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Defendant Harris3argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to the First 

Amendment retaliation claim asserted against him because Plaintiff failed to properly 

exhaust his available administrative remedies. (Doc. 38.) 

II. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment 

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 

movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 

produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 

1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 

to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 

favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 

it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 

citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

3 Defendants Sanchez and Doe also joined in the Motion for Summary Judgment, 

but because those Defendants were subsequently dismissed, the Court will not discuss 

whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his available administrative remedies as to his claims 

against those Defendants. 

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At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 

all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 

materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

B. Exhaustion 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” 

administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 

Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 

934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in 

accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 

(2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available 

administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must 

demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that 

showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in 

fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there 

is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The 

ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate 

if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner, shows a 

failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166, 1168; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

If summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to exhaustion 

should be decided by the judge; a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of 

exhaustion. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170-71. But if a court finds that the prisoner exhausted 

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administrative remedies, that administrative remedies were not available, or that the failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused, the case proceeds to the merits. Id.

at 1171. 

III. Facts

A. Grievance Procedure

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment includes a copy of Department Order 

(DO) 802, Inmate Grievance Procedure, which governs the ADC’s administrative 

grievance process (hereinafter the “ Grievance Procedure” ). (Doc. 42-1 at 12-24.) 

Pursuant to the Grievance Procedure, the first step in resolving a complaint is, within 

ten workdays of the action which caused the complaint, for the inmate to discuss the issue 

with staff in the area most responsible for the complaint or through submission of an 

Informal Complaint Resolution Form. (Id. at 15, DO 802.20 §§ 2-1-2.2.) If an inmate is 

unable to informally resolve the complaint, the inmate must submit the Informal Complaint 

Resolution form (“ informal grievance” ) to the CO III in their unit within 10 workdays of 

the action which caused the complaint; a response must be provided in 15 workdays. (Id.

at 16, DO 802.20 §§ 2.2-2.3.) If the inmate is dissatisfied with the response, the inmate 

may submit a formal grievance. (Id. at § 2.4.) 

For non-medical grievances, within five workdays of receiving the response from 

the CO III to the informal grievance, the inmate must submit a formal grievance to the CO 

IV Grievance Coordinator. (DO 802.30 § 3.2.) Within fifteen workdays, the Deputy 

Warden must prepare a response to the grievance. (Id. at § 3.6) If dissatisfied with the 

response, within five workdays of receipt of the response, the inmate may appeal to the 

Warden. (Id. at 13-14, DO 802.04.) Within twenty workdays, the Warden must prepare a 

response to the grievance. (Id.) If dissatisfied with the response, within five workdays of 

receipt of the response, the inmate may appeal to the Director. (Id. at 17, DO 802.40 § 

4.1.) The decision of the Director is final and the ADC considers the Director’ s decision 

to constitute exhaustion of all remedies. (Id. at § 4.6.) 

. . . .

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B. Plaintiff’s Grievances

On October 23, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Informal Complaint Resolution 

stating that he was moved to a new unit on October 12, but four days later was moved back 

and when he came back, a lot of his legal paperwork was missing and so were his clothes. 

(Doc. 86 at 22.) In the Informal, Plaintiff provided a list of the clothes he was missing and 

stated that he “believe[s] it was purposefully done” and “this is wrong.” (Id.) 

On November 15, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance through the 

emergency procedure stating that he was trying to speak to someone to no avail about his 

“retaliation that is staff-related.” (Doc. 42-3 at 14.) B. Monaghan responded that based on 

the description, Plaintiff’s issue did not meet the criteria for an emergency grievance, but 

that the request was passed on to CO McCarthy via phone on November 15, 2017. (Doc. 

42-3 at 14.) 

On November 30, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance form stating that 

the October 23 Informal had gone unanswered. (Doc. 86 at 21.) Most of the Informal is 

illegible. (See id.) On December 8, 2017, CO III Brown noted that the Inmate Grievance 

was “unprocessed” because on December 7, 2017, Brown had a “face to face with 

[Plaintiff] to determine the nature of [his] grievance. [Plaintiff] stated that [he was] missing 

legal boxes. [Plaintiff] made no informal attempt per DO 1002. However, [Brown] spoke 

with the CDU staff and they . . . confirmed that [Plaintiff’s] legal boxes are there. [Plaintiff] 

exchanged two of them last week.” (Doc. 86 at 21.) On December 13, 2017, Plaintiff 

attempted to appeal the denial of the grievance; Plaintiff stated that Brown should have 

considered the October 23 informal to be the informal resolution for the November 15, 

grievance, but that appeal was denied because “there is no grievance to appeal.” (Doc. 42-

3 at 20.) 

On December 17, 2017, Plaintiff attempted to submit an Inmate Grievance form, 

which is largely illegible. (Doc. 42-3 at 24.) The Court can glean that Plaintiff complains 

that “Sgt. Harris” would not give Plaintiff his legal material for the “past fo[u]r days.” (Id.) 

In the grievance under “proposed resolution,” Plaintiff requests the return of his legal 

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documents and states that he had been trying to obtain his legal boxes from “Sgt. Harris” 

since January 2017. (Id.) CO III Brown returned the grievance as “unprocessed” because 

“no informal attempt and out of time frames to submit an informal resolution per DO 802.” 

IV. Discussion

Defendant Harris argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff 

did not timely submit a standard grievance appeal to the Director or Director’s level 

regarding the allegations against Harris. 

In Response, Plaintiff asserts that CO III Brown made the grievance process 

unavailable to him because she refused to log Plaintiff’s grievances. (Doc. 86 at 5.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that he filed grievances against Harris while at SMU, but CO III Riefer 

filed the grievance as medical when it was not a medical grievance. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff 

asserts that as a result of Brown’s and Riefer’s actions, the grievance process was 

effectively unavailable to him. 

Although most of Plaintiff’s grievance documents are illegible, ADC officials 

provided responses to the grievances based on the illegible contents; Defendant has made 

no attempt to provide the Court with legible copies or to provide transcripts of the contents 

of the grievances. 

Although Defendant has met his burden by showing that there is an administrative 

grievance process that was available to Plaintiff, Plaintiff argues that the grievance process 

was effectively unavailable because, in part, CO III Brown refused to process his 

grievances. Indeed, although it is difficult to read, CO III Brown returned a grievance as 

“unprocessed” that complained about Defendant Harris’s conduct over the “past fo[u]r 

days” and incorrectly stated that the grievance was untimely and indicated that because it 

was “untimely,” Plaintiff would not be able to grieve the issue. As such, Plaintiff has met 

his burden of showing that the grievance process was effectively unavailable to him 

because CO III Brown refused to process a timely grievance regarding Defendant Harris 

withholding Plaintiff’s legal boxes. Moreover, the grievance documents show that CO III 

Brown incorrectly stated that Plaintiff did not submit an informal grievance regarding his 

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legal boxes when she refused to process his November 30, 2017 Inmate Grievance, but 

Plaintiff’s October 23, 2017 informal grievance does state that his legal documents were 

missing. Defendant has not provided any explanation as to the discrepancies in these 

responses, did not file a reply in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, and does 

not provide legible documents to the Court or explain how CO III Brown could have 

properly responded substantively to grievances that were illegible. Accordingly, 

Defendant Harris has not met his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the grievance 

process was available to Plaintiff and Harris’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be 

denied. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) and Plaintiff’s Motion requesting computer use (Doc. 

141). 

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) is denied.

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion requesting computer use (Doc. 141) is denied as moot

because the Court ordered that Plaintiff be provided a word processor to respond to Igwe’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment.4 

Dated this 6th day of February, 2020.

4 See Doc. 140. 

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