Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01700/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01700-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

-1- 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GABRIEL BERRY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 

[Doc. No. 36]

 

 Young Cho, counsel for Gabriel Berry (“Plaintiff”), moves for an award of 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $20,400.00. See Doc. 

No. 36-1.1

 Andrew Saul, the Commissioner for Social Security, (“Defendant”) takes no 

position on the reasonableness of counsel’s request. The Court found the matter suitable 

for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 37. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees. 

BACKGROUND

                                               

1

 All citations refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

Case 3:16-cv-01700-MMA-AGS Document 38 Filed 12/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
 -2- 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed this social security appeal challenging the denial 

of his application for disability benefits. See Doc. No. 1. The parties filed cross-motions 

for summary judgment, and the assigned magistrate judge issued a well-reasoned Report 

recommending that the Court grant Plaintiff’s motion. See Doc. Nos. 19, 22, 31. On 

September 6, 2017, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety and 

remanded the action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. See 

Doc. No. 32. 

 On remand, the administrative law judge found Plaintiff disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act as of January 5, 2009. See Doc. No. 36-3 at 13, 14. 

On August 21, 2019, the Social Security Administration issued a Notice of Award, which 

acknowledged Plaintiff’s past-due benefits amounted to $81,987.42. See Doc. No. 36-4 

at 3. Plaintiff’s counsel now moves for an award of $20,400.00 in attorneys’ fees for 

representing Plaintiff in this action, with credit for the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(“EAJA”) fees previously paid in the amount of $8,800.00, thus asking for certification of 

the net fee of $11,600.00. See Doc. No. 36-1, at 2, 8. 

LEGAL STANDARD2

 “Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court entering judgment in favor of [a social 

security] claimant who was represented by an attorney ‘may determine and allow as part 

of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the 

total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 

judgment.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 

§ 406(b)(1)(A)). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful 

claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff’s counsel brings this motion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)(B), which governs the 

procedures surrounding fee awards. Doc. No. 36 at 1. In part, § 1383 provides that “[t]he provisions of 

section 406 of this title . . . shall apply to this part to the same extent as they apply in the case of 

subchapter II of this chapter. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)(A). Given this and the fact that counsel’s 

motion also relies upon § 406, the Court construes counsel’s motion as a request for § 406(b) fees. See

De La Cruz v. Astrue, No. 1:08CV0782 DLB, 2012 WL 6136446, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012). 

Case 3:16-cv-01700-MMA-AGS Document 38 Filed 12/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
 -3- 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).3

 “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 

§ 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’ . . . 

‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness[.]’” 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). When 

determining reasonableness of the fee award, courts must consider “whether the amount 

need be reduced, not whether the loadstar amount should be enhanced.” Id. at 1149. 

While there is not a definitive list of factors, courts should consider “the character of the 

representation and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. 

“The court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits 

that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 

 Finally, “an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the 

[amount of the total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives] will be increased by 

the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due 

benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 

DISCUSSION

 On March 26, 2013, Plaintiff and the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing 

entered into a Social Security Representation Agreement (“Agreement”). Doc. No. 36-2. 

Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel a contingency-fee of up to 

25% of past-due benefits awarded by the Commissioner. See Doc. No 36-1 at 9; see also

Doc. No. 36-2. The administrative proceedings became final in August 2019 when the 

Social Security Administration issued its Notice of Award. See Doc. No. 36-4. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total award of $20,400.00 in attorneys’ fees and “bases this fee 

                                               

3

 The lodestar calculation does not apply to the instant motion. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 802 

(explaining that the lodestar method is applicable to “disputes over the amount of fees properly shifted 

to the loser in the litigation” whereas “Section 406(b) is of another genre: [i]t authorizes fees payable 

from the successful party’s recovery”); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (“SSDI attorneys’ fees, in 

contrast, are not shifted. They are paid from the award of past-due benefits and the amount of the fee, 

up to 25% of past-due benefits, is based on the agreement between the attorney and the client.”). 

Case 3:16-cv-01700-MMA-AGS Document 38 Filed 12/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
 -4- 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on 25% of the net payable past due benefits.” Doc. No. 36-1 at 3. Counsel argues that 

the amount sought in the instant motion “falls within the range of reasonable” 

considering “counsel’s firm expended 50.65 combined hours before the District Court 

from the two civil actions that were necessary to the eventual granting of benefits.” Id. at 

2. Additionally, if granted by the Court, this award would then be further reduced by the 

$8,800.00 that has already been received in attorneys’ fees under the EAJA. Id. 

As an initial matter, the Court notes a seeming discrepancy in the gross and net 

award sought. Counsel’s notice of motion states that the gross fee is $21,900.00. Doc. 

No. 36 at 1. However, counsel’s memorandum of points and authorities provides that the 

amount sought is $20,400.00. Doc. No. 36-1 at 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8. Counsel states that he 

seeks “a fee of $20,400.00 representing 25% of past due benefits.” Id. at 6. Counsel 

represented Plaintiff “on a contingency fee basis of 25%.” Id. at 9; see also Doc. No. 36-

2 at 1. A fee award of $21,900.00 would exceed 25% in light of the $81,987.42 in past 

due benefits. Accordingly, the Court finds counsel’s motion as one seeking attorneys’ 

fees for $20,400.00. 

Relatedly, counsel claims the net fee—after accounting for the $8,800.00 

previously paid—is $13,100.00 in his notice of motion and three times in the 

memorandum of points and authorities. Doc. No. 36 at 2; Doc. No. 36-1 at 6, 7. 

However, counsel’s memorandum of points and authorities also claims twice that the net 

fee is $11,600.00. Doc. No. 36-1 at 2, 8. Given the discussion regarding the gross fee, 

supra, the Court finds the intended net fee sought is $11,600.00. 

 Upon careful review of the documents submitted, and the applicable law, the Court 

finds that counsel’s fee request is reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel expended 50.65 hours 

on this case. Doc. No. 36-1 at 2; Doc. No 36-5 at 2, 4. The de facto hourly rate is 

$402.76, which falls on the low end of the range that has been approved by courts in 

similar cases, including this Court.4

 See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (approving de facto

                                               

4

 The de facto hourly rate is calculated by dividing the $20,400.00 fee request by 50.65 hours. 

Case 3:16-cv-01700-MMA-AGS Document 38 Filed 12/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
 -5- 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902 in 2009); Martinez v. Berryhill, No. 13-cv-272-JLS 

(JLB), 2017 WL 4700078, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2017) (approving de facto hourly rate 

of $886.52 and noting that “[w]hile such an hourly rate is on the higher end charged for 

social security appeals, the Court nonetheless concludes that the fee is reasonable in the 

present case.”); Richardson v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-1456-MMA (BLM), 2017 WL 1683062, 

at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) (approving de facto hourly rate of $770); Nash v. Colvin, 

No. 12-cv-2781-GPC (RBB), 2014 WL 5801353, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2014) 

(approving de facto hourly rate of $656); Sproul v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-1000-IEG (DHB), 

2013 WL 394053, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30 2013) (approving de facto hourly rate of 

$800). Plaintiff’s counsel has also submitted a billing statement detailing the work 

performed to litigate this case in federal court. See Doc. No. 36-5. Moreover, “[c]ounsel 

assumed the risk of nonpayment inherent in a contingency agreement,” and the requested 

fee award of $20,400.00 does not exceed the 25% “statutory cap[.]” Moreno v. Berryhill, 

No. 13-cv-8492-PLA, 2018 WL 3490777, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2018). 

 Finally, there is nothing in the record to suggest substandard performance by 

counsel, delay, or a disproportionate amount of time spent on this case relevant to the 

benefits at stake. As a result of counsel’s work, Plaintiff received a highly favorable 

decision and a significant award of past-due benefits. Thus, none of the factors outlined 

in Gisbrecht favor reducing the fee award, and the Court concludes that counsel’s request 

for attorneys’ fees is reasonable. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 3:16-cv-01700-MMA-AGS Document 38 Filed 12/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
 -6- 16cv1700-MMA (AGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for 

attorneys’ fees and APPROVES an award in the amount of $20,400.00 to the Law 

Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, offset by $8,800.00 in EAJA fees previously received, 

resulting in $11,600.00 payable to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 27, 2019 

 _____________________________ 

 Hon. Michael M. Anello 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:16-cv-01700-MMA-AGS Document 38 Filed 12/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6