Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01376/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAR 3 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

EDWARD G. SCHEPP, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v . 

FREMONT COUNTY, WYOMING, a 

Political Subdivision of the 

State of Wyoming; TIM MCKINNEY, 

Sheriff of Fremont County, 

Wyoming, in his official and 

individual capacity; WILLIAM 

EICHELBERGER, County and 

Prosecuting Attorney fo r Fremont 

County, Wyoming, in his official 

capacity, 

Defendant s-Appellees. 

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No. 88-1376 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. NO. 87-0292J) 

Stephen L. Pevar, American Civil Liberties Union, Denver, Colorado 

(Donald N. Rogers, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with h i m on the briefs), 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jeffrey A. Donne ll, Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., 

Worland, Wy oming, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge , and 

THOMPSON,* Di strict Judg e. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western District of Okl ahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 1 
Edward G. Schepp appeals from an adverse summary judgment and 

denial of a motion to amend his complaint. Schepp brought this 

action against the Fremont County Attorney, Fremont County 

Sheriff, and Fremont County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constit utional violations incident to probation revocation 

proceedings initiated against Schepp in Fremont County, Wyoming. 

Subsequently, Schepp sought to add as an additional defendant the 

state trial court judge who presided at the probation revocation 

hearing. The district court denied the motion to add the state 

trial judge and granted summary judgmen t for all defendants. 1 

Schepp v. Fremont County, Wyo., 685 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Wyo. 1988). 

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's 

order. 

BACKGROUND 

In March 1981 , Schepp pled guilty in Wyoming state court to 

issuing fraudulent checks. Schepp appeared before Judge Robert B. 

Ranck, a Wyoming District Court Judge, who sentenced him to one 

year incarceration, and a one thousand dollar fine. Judge Ranck 

suspended the sentence and placed Schepp on one year probation 

with the sole condition that he make restitution on the checks 

within thirty days. The sentencing order was filed on July 17, 

1981. Schepp did not repay the checks as required under the terms 

of his probation. 

1 Schepp does not appeal that portion of the district court's 

order granting summary judgment to the County Sheriff, and now 

"waives all potential claims against the Sheriff ." Appellant's 

Opening Brief at viii. 

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Accordingly, on July 9, 1982, the Fremont County Attorney 

prepared and signed a petition for revocation of Schepp's probation. The petition was filed by an assistant county attorney in 

the state district court on July 19, 1982, two days after Schepp's 

one-year probation ended. When the petition was filed, Judge 

Ranck ordered revocation proceedings to take place in Lander, 

Wyoming on July 29, 1982. Schepp could not be served at his last 

address, however, and Judge Ranck eventually ordered that a bench 

warrant issue for Schepp's arrest. At the time he issued the warrant, Judge Ranck indicated that Schepp was to be held without 

bail. 

In October 1984, Schepp was arrested in Arizona and extradition proceedings were commenced to return him to Wyoming for the 

probation revocation. Schepp was released on bail in Arizona, 

however, and later "could not be located." Affidavit of Tim 

McKinney, R. Supp. Vol. I, at Tab 31, p.2. Finally, in May 1986 

Schepp was again arrested in Arizona on unrelated charges involving fictitious license plates. Extradition was ordered and Schepp 

was booked into the Fremont Coun ty Jail on Monday, June 2, 1986. 

He was served with a copy of the bench warrant and the county attorney was advised that Schepp was in jail awaiting probation 

revocation proceedings. 

The Fremont County Attorney, William V. Eichelberger, filed a 

motion with Judge Ranck on Thursday, June 5, 1986 for a hearing on 

the petition for revocation and another motion for appointment of 

counsel on Schepp's behalf. Judge Ranck, who lives in Jackson, 

Wyoming, about 165 miles from Lander , did not act on the motion 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 3 
for appointed counsel, and set the revocation hearing for June 23, 

1986, during his regularly scheduled monthly trip to Lander. 2 

Judge Ranck refused to admit Schepp to bail pending the hearing. 

At the June 23 revocation hearing, Schepp admitted that he 

had not complied with the restitution ordered by Judge Ranck as a 

condition of probation . Judge Ranck then revoked Schepp's probation, but ordered that upon receipt of the unpaid amount, Schepp' s 

sentence would be suspended to the time he had served in the 

Lande r County jail awaiting the revocation hearing. Schepp made 

ful l restitution of the outstanding checks at this time and he was 

released unconditionally. Appellant's Opening Brief at vii. 

Schepp filed suit against the defendants in federal district 

court on August 19, 1987, more than a year and one month after he 

had been unconditionally released by the Wyoming courts. In his 

complaint he a l leged the defendants, acting under col or of state 

l aw, had depri ved him of his constitutional rights under the 

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983. Specifically, Schepp claimed that the petition to revoke 

his probation was filed late under Wyoming law, that he was denied 

a prompt prelimi nary hearing to determine probable cause for the 

revocation, that he was denied ba i l pending the revocation hearing, and that he was not appointed counsel to represent him at 

that hearing. 

2 Approxima tel y one week before the scheduled revocation 

hearing the Fremont County Attorney contacted another state 

district court judge to ensure that Schepp's case was dealt with 

as expeditiously as possible. The county attorney was informed 

t hat Judge Ranck , as Senior Judge o f that judicial district , 

intended to retai n Schepp's case for himself. Affidavit of 

William V. Eichelberger, R. Vol. I at Tab 27, pp.4-5. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 4 
On December 4 , 1987, Schepp sought to add Judge Ranck as an 

additional defendant to this lawsuit and assign liability to him 

for at least some of the constitutional depriva tions Schepp claims 

to have suffered. The district court issued its orders denying 

the motion to amend and granting summary judgment for the named 

defendants on February 9, 1988. 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Mo tion to Add Judge Ranck 

Permission to amend a pleading "shall be free ly given when 

justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a}. The decision 

whether to grant a motion to amend the pleadings to add an additional party is generally left to the sound discretion of the 

district court . Phelps v. Wich ita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F .2d 1262, 

1 274 ( lOth Cir. 1 989) . The distr.ict court was clearly justified 

in denying t he motion to amend if the proposed amendment could not 

have withstood a motion to dismiss or otherwise failed to state a 

claim. ~, Farnan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (196 2) (futility 

of amendment adequate justification to refuse to grant leave to 

amend) ; Moore v. Kayport Package Express , Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 

(9th Cir. 1989); Glick v . Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 269 (7th Cir . 

1985); DeLoach v. Woodley, 405 F.2d 496, 497 {5th Cir . 1968) ; see 

also 6 c. Wrigh t & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 1487, at 432 -33 (1971). 

The district court concluded that the proposed amendment naming the state trial court judge as a defendant would be futile 

because "Mr. Schepp could not prevail against Judge Ranck ." R. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 5 
Vol. I, Tab 79 at 2. As we explain below, Sch~pp could not 

recover either monetary damages or declaratory re~ief against 

Judge Ranck; therefore, the district court properly denied the 

motion to amend the complaint. 

As a state court judge , Judge Ranck is entitled to absolute 

immunity for his judici al acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 , 

355-57 (1978}. He is entitled to immunity even if he acted 

maliciously or in excess of his authority. Id.; Glick v. Koenig, 

766 F.2d at 265. Schepp does not allege , nor does it appear fr om 

the record, that Judge Ranck lacked apparent jurisdiction over the 

probation revocation proceedingsi this case was not clearly beyond 

his jurisdiction. See Stump v . Sparkman, 435 u.s. at 356-57 ("A 

judge ••• will be subject to l iability only when he has acted in 

the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction .'") (ci tation omi tted). 

Indeed, Schepp concedes that Judge Ranck is immune from any claim 

for monetary damages arising from this incident. Appellant's 

Brief at 26. 

Schepp argues, however, that h is claim for declara tory judgment against Judge Ranck would not ·be barred by the judge's 

absolu te immunity , and that his motion to add him as a defendant 

should therefore be granted. Although Judge Ranck is not shielded 

by absolute immunity from declaratory or injunctive relief, 

Pulliam v. Allen , 466 u.s. 522, 541-42 {1984), we disagree with 

Schepp's conc lusion that declaratory relief would be available in 

this case. 

The remedy of declaratory judgment is only avail able 11 [i]n a 

case of actual controversy .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2201 . In deter-

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 6 
mining whether Schepp is entitled to declaratory relief, we look 

beyond the initial "controversy" which may have existed at one 

time; rather, we must decide "whether the facts alleged, under all 

the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy 

• of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance 

of a declaratory judgment." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal 

& Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (emphasis added); see 

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147, 148 {1975) (Former inmate was 

not entitled to declaratory relief on his claim that he was 

entitled to due process in connection with parole eligibility 

proceedings; his subsequent parole and eventual release from 

supervision mooted the controversy so that 11 [f]rom [the] date [of 

his complete release] it [was] plain that respondent can have no 

interest whatever in the procedures followed by [the state] in 

granting parole. 11 ); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) 

(The test is not whether a case or controversy may have existed at 

one time; "[t]he proper inquiry [is] whether a 'controversy' 

requisite to relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act exist[s] at 

the time of the hearing [on the claim for declaratory judgment]."); Rex v. Owens ex rel. Oklahoma, 585 F.2d 432, 435 (lOth 

Cir. 1978). 

On July 7, 1986, shortly after his probation had been 

revoked, Schepp's sentence was suspended to the time he had spent 

incarcerated in the Fremont County Jail awaiting the revocation 

hearing and he was released unconditionally. State v. Schepp, 

Crim. No. 3909 (Fremont County District Court, July 7, 1986) 

(order revoking probation and suspending sentence), R. Vol. I, Tab 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 7 
27, Exhibit A. Schepp filed his claim in this case on August 19, 

1987, more than a year and thirty days after his sentence was 

suspended. He did not seek relief against Judge Ranck until he 

filed a motion to amend his pleadings on December 4, 1987. At no 

time during this action for declaratory relief was Schepp in 

custody or on probation in connection with any of the proceedings 

before Judge Ranck. He is now discharged from further proceedings; his suspended sentence could not be revoked at the time of 

the district court's decision, nor can it now be revoked. Wyo. 

Stat. § 7-13-305(c) ("revocation proceedings may be commenced at 

any time during the period of suspension of sentence or probation 

• or within thirty (30) days thereafter •••. "). At the 

time he sought declaratory relief, Schepp risked no real threat or 

likelihood of further injury in connection with any of the alleged 

judicial or official misconduct related to probation revocation. 

Under these circumstances, Schepp's complaint no longer presented 

a "case of actual controversy" on which declaratory judgment could 

be granted.3 

Schepp's claim for declaratory relief does not fall into any 

of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. This is 

not a class action; the complaint does not include as plaintiffs 

3 Schepp is not entitled to declaratory relief even if he has 

suffered uncompensated damage as the result any impropriety in the 

revocation proceedings; such declaratory relief would in no way 

redress those past injuries. See Northern Virginia Women's Med. 

Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1049 (4th Cir. 1980) (County 

judges who dismissed actions against anti-abortion demonstrators 

for trespassing on an abortion clinic's property were shielded 

from liability by absolute immunity; the clinic•s requested 

relief, a declaratory judgment pronouncing the dismissals 

erroneous, would serve no purpose toward redressing its injury, 

and declaratory judgment was denied.). 

-aAppellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 8 
any persons who are presently on probation in Wyoming. Nor is 

Schepp's complaint "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 

The "evading review" doctrine is limited, in nonclass actions, to 

situations where both 11 (1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 

expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the 

same complaining party would be subjected to the same action 

again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 149; see Johansen v. 

City of Bartlesville, Okla., 862 F.2d 1423, 1426 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Before Schepp could be subjected to any further revocation 

proceedings in Lander, he must first be tried and convicted of 

some criminal violation in Wyoming, then released on probation for 

that crime. The record reflects that at the time of his arrest, 

Schepp was living in Arizona, and had to be extradited to Wyoming 

to face probation revocation proceedings. Given the extremely 

remote possibility that Schepp would ever again be subjected to 

probation revocation proceedings before Judge Ranck, this ~ase 

simply does not meet the second prong of the Weinstein test.4 

4 Schepp argues that he is entitled to declaratory judgment 

merely as "guidance" to Judge Ranck or the other defendants 

involved here. This court has previously rejected the claim that 

declaratory judgment is appropriate as "guidance" for future cases 

involving unsettled questions of constitutional law: 

"As to a recurrence of this •.. dispute, there is no 

showing of a 'reasonable expectation' or 'demonstrated 

probability' that the same controversy will recur 

involving the same plaintiffs as the complaining 

parties. 1 The Court has never held that a mere physical 

or theoretical possibility was sufficient to satisfy the 

test stated in Weinstein.' Accordingly we hold that the 

claim for declaratory and injunctive relief under [42 

U.S.C. § 1983] is moot." 

[footnote continued •.• ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 9 
Allowing Schepp to add Judge Ranck as a defendant would have 

been an exercise in futility because Judge Ranck is shielded from 

liability for monetary damages by absolute immunity and Schepp's 

claim for decl aratory judgment had become moot at the time he 

brought this action. 5 Schepp could not prevail against Judge 

Ranck; therefore, the district court properly denied the motion to 

amend the complaint. 

II . Summary Judgment for County Attorney Eichelberger 

Schepp sued William Eichelberger in his official capacity as 

F remont County Attorney .6 Such an "official capacity suit ... 

generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action 

against an enti ty of which an offi cer is an agen t. '' McGhee v. 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

~J~o~h~a~n~s~e~n~~v~·~C~i~t~y~o~f~~B~a~r~t~l~e~s~v~l~·=l~e~,~O~k~l~a~., 862 F.2d at 1426- 27 

(quoting Murphy v . Hunt, 455 u.s. 478, 482 {1982)). 

5 Because Schepp's claim for declaratory relief is moot, we do 

not reach the merits of the action against Judge Ranck under the 

proposed amendment to the complaint. We note in passing, however, 

that the allegations against Judge Ranck appear to raise very 

questionable constitutional claims. In our discussion below of 

his allegations against Fremont County, we conclude that Schepp's 

constitutional rights were not violated by the lack of a preliminary probation revocation hearing. Schepp's claims concerning 

denial of ba il and l ack of appoin ted counsel are equally suspect. 

See generally Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 u.s. 778, 790 (1973) 

( " [T ]he presence and participation of counsel will • .• be both 

undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation 

hearings."); Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 719 {7th Cir. 

1988} (finding no absolute righ t to bail pending parole revocation 

hearing). 

6 To the extent that Schepp's complaint can be read to state a 

claim against Eichelberger personally, as a prosecutor acting 

within the scope of his prosecutorial duties, Eichelberger is 

shielded from personal liability by absolute immunity. See Imbler 

v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 409, 427 {1 976); England v. HendriCkS, 880 

F .2d 281, 285 ( lOth Cir. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 10 
Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642 (lOth Cir. 1981); see Brandon v. Holt, 

469 U.S. 464, 470-73 (1985). Schepp claims that Eichelberger 

violated his constitutional rights in two respects. First, Schepp 

claims that he was arrested, extradited, and incarcerated pursuant 

to an invalid bench warrant issued pursuant to an untimely petition for probation revocation. Second, Schepp contends that 

Eichelberger was partially responsible for denying him a prompt 

preliminary hearing on probable cause for the probation revocation. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 27. These allegations, 

inasmuch as they seek rBlief against Fremont County, are merely 

extensions of Schepp's complaint against the County itself which 

we discuss below. The complaint as it relates to Eichelberger 

therefore fai ls for the same reasons that his complaint against 

the County must fail . 

III. Summary Judgment for Fremont Count y 

On appeal, this Court is "free to affirm a district court 

decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to 

permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the 

district court." Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (lOth 

Ci r. 1988) (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v . Ward, 814 F .2d 883, 887 

(2d Cir. 1987)). We will therefore affirm the district court's 

grant of summary judgment if it appears from the pleadings and the 

affidavits that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, 

and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

l a w. Fed. R. Civ . P. 56(c). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1376 Document: 01019749119 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 11 
Although Schepp 's claim for declaratory judgment is moot, as 

discussed above, Schepp contends that Fremont County is liable for 

money damages under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 for at least some of the ha rm 

he suffered. Specifically, Schepp claims two deficiencies which 

allegedly render the county legally responsible . 7 First , healleges that "Fremont County failed to instruct, supervise , and 

control the Defendants named herein and ••. its [other] 

employees •••• " Amended Complaint , R. Vol. I a t Tab 2la, pp.7-

8 . Second, Schepp claims that "Fremont County apparently has an 

official policy or custom of detaining probation violators in the 

Fremont County J ail without providing an opportunity for a prompt 

initial hearing.u Id . at Tab 2la, p.8. We address each of these 

claims below. 

7 Schepp did not allege in his amended complaint that William 

Eichelberger or Travis Moffat, the Deputy County Attorney who 

filed the petition for revocation, acted as the " f inal 

policymaking authority" of the municipality in the area of 

probation revocation petitions. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 u.s. 

469 , 483 {1986) (plurality opinion). Indeed, Schepp alleged that 

Eichelberger was "acting for and under the direction and control 

of Fremont County." R. Vol. I at Tab 2la, p. 2. Nor did Schepp 

contend that Fremont County had an established policy concerning 

the timing of revocation petitions or that it "officially 

sanctioned or ordered11 the untimely filing of the petition in this 

case . Id. at 480 . 

On appeal , Schepp does not appear to assert either of t hese 

theories of municipal liability. I ndeed , Schepp would be 

precluded from raising these theories for the first time on 

appeal . Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F .2d 1261, 1264 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

("By failing to raise a •.• legal theory before the district 

court, plaintiffs foreclosed themselves from arguing that theory 

on appeal [from summa ry judgment ] or on remand, and plaintiffs' 

counsel cannot now rely on this theory ..•• ") (citing Denis v . 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co ., 791 F.2d 846 , 848-49 {11th Cir. 1986) 

( "Failure to raise [a] •.. theory of relief in the first 

i nstance to the trial court general ly is fatal ... • " );Gilbert 

v . Medical Economics Co ., 665 F.2d 305 , 310 (lOth Ci r. 1981)) . We 

therefore limit our discussion to the two theories of Fremont 

County's liability which Schepp did fairl y raise below. 

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A municipality is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the 

actions of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior or 

vicarious liability. Monell v. New York City Dep' t of Social 

Servs., 436 U. S. 658 , 694-95 (1978) . The Supreme Court has held 

that a municipality may be held responsible under § 1983 for inadequate supervision and training of i ts employees "only where the 

failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights 

of persons with whom the [employees ] come in contact ." City of 

Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 , 1204 (1989). Such deliberate 

indifference arises wher e '' the need for more or different traini ng 

is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the 

violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the 

[municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately 

indifferent to the need." Id. at 1205 ; Archule ta v . McShan, No. 

87-1461 , slip op . at 6 {lOth Cir . March 1, 1990). No such obvious 

likelihood of constitutional deprivation existed in the case of 

Fremont County's probation revocation procedures. 

Schepp specifically alleges that William Eichelberger and 

other Fremon t County personnel were inadequately trained and 

supervised with respect to the untimely filing of the probation 

revocation petition. 8 At the time of Schepp's arrest and ext radi8 In his a ffidavit filed with the motion for summary judgment, 

Eichelberger states that he was not in fact involved with Schepp' s 

case at the t ime the revocation petition was filed. Apparently, 

t he petition was actually filed by Travis Moffat, the "Deputy 

County and Prosecuting Attorney for Fremont County ." Amended 

Compla int, R. Vol. I at Tab 2la, p . 4 ; see Affidavit of William v. Eichelberger , R. Vol. I at Tab 27 , p . 2-.--Schepp's complaints 

concerning denial of bail and failure to appoint counsel are 

attributable solel y to Judge Ranck , who is not a county employee. 

These uncontroverted facts distinguish this case from those 

[footnote continued .•• ] 

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tion, Wyoming law provided: "At any time during the period of 

probation, the court may issue a warrant and cause the 

defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of 

probation •• II Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-304 (1977) (amended 1987). 

This statutory provision had not been interpreted by any court 

prior to the time of Schepp's arrest; therefore, a question 

existed as to whether or not a petition to revoke probation for a 

violation occurring during the period of probation must be filed 

during the formal probationary period or if such a petition could 

be filed within a reasonable time thereafter. 

After Schepp's probation revocation proceedings were coneluded, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided the case of Lackey v. 

State, 731 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1987}. With two of the five justices 

dissenting , the court stated that although "this section obviously 

does not require that revocation proceedings be completed within 

t he probationary period, it does require that such proceedings be 

initiated during the period." Id . at 568. Under the interpretation adopted by the Lackey court, Schepp's revocation petition was 

filed several days late because his one-year probation had expired 

before the filing . 

[ ••. footnote continued] 

circumstances where "liability is predicated on a determination 

that 'the action ••• implements or executes a policy statement ... 

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 

officers' .•• [so that] the local government itself [rathe r than 

its employees or agents] is responsible for the [alleged] 

constitutional deprivation •..• " Owen v. City of Independence, 

445 U.S. 622, 655 n.39 (1980) (quoting Monell v . New York Ci ty 

Dept. of Social Serv ., 436 U.S. at 691). Schepp's o nly theory of 

liability for the untimely filing of the revocation petition is 

the inadequate supervision and training of County employees. 

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Even if it could be said that county employees were inadequately trained and supervised so that Schepp's revocation 

proceedings were commenced several days late, the state law 

requirement established by the Lackey decision was not made clear 

until five years later. Accordingly, there was no apparent need, 

at the time of Schepp's revocation, to instruct the employees in 

the Fremont County Attorney's office to commence revocation 

proceedings prior to the end of formal probation. 

Failure to commence revocation proceedings before the end of 

formal probation does not, in itself, create a significant likelihood that probationers' constitutional rights will be violated. 

In Fremont County's case, allowing the filing of revocation petitions within a short time after the end of probation was reasonable in light of the practicalities involved. Such an approach 

was not clearly proscribed by the uninterpreted statute. Indeed, 

one Wyoming Supreme Court Justice urged just such a statutory 

interpretation in a dissent to Lackey. 731 P.2d at 569 {Brown, 

C.J., dissenting) {"The rule [adopted by the majority] in this 

case grants a probationer a license to run amok during the waning 

days of his probation ... }. The Wyoming Legislature, in what could 

be deemed a negative reaction to the Lackey decision, amended the 

relevant statute that same year to explicitly allow revocation 

proceedings to commence within thirty days after the end of the 

probation period. See Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-305. 

Many states provide that revocation proceedings may commence 

within a reasonable time after the probation period terminates. 

These schemes have not been held to violate probationers' 

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constitutional due process rights. See, ~, Galaktionoff v. 

State, 733 P.2d 628 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987): 

"The trial court had jurisdiction to revoke 

[probationer's] probation ..• despite the fact that 

formal probation terminated prior to the filing of the 

petition to revoke probation. . • . [O]ur probation 

statutes . . • are modeled on the federal law. . . • 

The federal cases interpreting the federal statute have 

uniformly (held that] a court can issue a warrant and 

revoke an individual's probation at any time during the 

maximum f i ve-year probationary period permitted by 18 

U.S.C. §3651 so long as the acts justifying the revocation occur within a probationer's formal period of 

probation." 

Id. at 630 (citing, ~, Gammarano v. United States, 732 F.2d 

273, 277 (2d Cir . 1 984); United Stat es v. Hill, 71 9 F.2d 1402, 

1404 (9th Cir. 1983)~ United Sta t es v. O'Quinn, 689 F.2d 1359, 

1360 (11th Cir. 1982)~ United States v. Blunt, 680 F.2d 1216, 

1218-19 (8th Ci r. 1982); United States v. Swanson, 454 F.2d 1263, 

1265 (7th Cir. 1972)}; see also State v. Berry, 413 A.2d 557 (Md. 

1 980); State v. White, 225 N.W.2d 426 (Neb. 1 975). 

We cannot conclude that Fremont County showed "deli berate 

indifference" in failing to correctly anticipate the Wyoming 

Supreme Court's interpretation of the procedural rule at issue 

here. No real likelihood existed that such a failure would in any 

way violate probationers' constit utional rights. Except for his 

concerns about the lack of a preli minary hearing, whi ch we address 

below, Schepp does not identify any other improper behavior by 

Fremont County personnel or any other basis for assigning liability to the county for inadequate supervision or training. It 

appears clear from the pleadings and the attached affidavits of 

county officials that the count y a t torney and t he sheriff bot h 

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acted properly in all other respects. Schepp's claim of "inadequate training" must fail. 

Schepp's other allegation against the County, that its policy 

permitted the detention of probationers without a preliminary 

hearing, has no merit because Schepp was not deprived of any 

constitutional right by virtue of his not receiving such a hearing. The fundamental purpose 6f a preliminary hearing in probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether probable cause 

exists to believe that the probationer has violated a condition of 

the probation . See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 

(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471, 485 (197 2'). Although a 

preliminary probable cause hearing is generally requ ired to 

satisfy a probationer's constitutional right to due process, such 

a hearing was entirely unnecessary in this case because the 

evidence of probable cause was already before the state court 

judge at the time Schepp was arrested and extradited. 

The sole basis for revoking Schepp's probation was his 

failure to make full restitution by remi tting the amount of unpaid 

checks with the state court. All the ev i dence relating to 

Schepp's failure to pay this amount appeared in Judge Ranck's own 

files, and was known to him at the time the bench warrant for 

Schepp's arrest issued. Judge Ranck was already fully aware of 

all the relevant circumstances , including Schepp's subsequent 

efforts to evade arrest and extradition following revocation. A 

hearing before the same judge who had custody of all the files 

relevant to the probation violation would serve no useful purpose. 

In these limited circumstances, where probabl e cause was evident 

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and obvious to the judge who issued the arrest warrant and 

conducted the revocation hearing, due process does not re~ire the 

empty formality of a preliminary hearing to determine probable 

cause. See Chilembwe v. Wyrick, 574 F.2d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 1978) 

(per curiam} ("[W] here obtaining permission before leaving the 

state is a condition of parole , a parolee's presence in another 

state without such permission is sufficient probable cause to 

believe he [violated] his parole such that a preliminary hearing 

is not required • •. , (T]here are no differences relevant to due 

process between parole revocation and probation revocation.'') 

(citing Stidham v. Wyrick, 567 F.2d 836 (8th Cir. 1977)). 

The other deprivations Schepp complains of, denial of bail 

pending the revocation hearing, and denial of appointed counsel, 

were obviously the sole responsibility of Judge Ranck, and cannot 

be attributed in any way to Fremont County. Schepp's claim 

against Fremont County was properly dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

Schepp cannot seek injunctive or declaratory relief for any 

damages arising out of the probation revocation proceedings 

because such claims for prospective relief are now moot. 'Schepp 

cannot recover money damages from Judge Ranck because he is 

absolutely immune from damages arising from his judicial acts. 

Finally, Schepp cannot recover from Fremont County for its failure 

to correctly anticipate a disputed state supreme court 

interpretation of an ambiguous procedural requirement, or for the 

absence of aprel iminary hearing which would have been no more that 

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a meaningless formality. The district court's order is, in its 

• 

entirety , AFFIRMED. 

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