Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00308/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00308-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

B. Spain, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 07-0308-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

EMC Mortgage Company, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

The primary issue currently before the court is the

propriety of entering a pre-filing order against plaintiff

pro se, B. Spain. In Spain v. EMC Mortgage Co., 2008 WL

752610 (D. Ariz. March 18, 2008) (“Spain I”), the first of

four comprehensive orders issued in this case, the court

explicitly warned plaintiff that:

 Given his numerous filings, most of them wholly 

 without merit, coupled with the tone and form of 

 those filings, [he] [wa]s dangerously close to 

 crossing the line from permissible use of the 

 judicial process to flagrant abuse[.]

Id. at *8. Plaintiff Spain did not heed that warning or 

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 277 Filed 09/27/10 Page 1 of 27
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1 In addition to that bankruptcy action, prior to the commencement of the

present action, plaintiff commenced two other federal district court actions:

Spain v. Eagleburger Group, No. CV 06-0712-PHX-ROS (“Eagleburger I”); and Spain v.

Eagleburger Group, No. CV-08-1089-PHX-DGC (“Eagleburger II”). Pursuant to Fed. R.

Evid. 201, this court takes judicial notice of all orders issued in the bankruptcy

case, and in Eagleburger I, and Eagleburger II.

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subsequent ones. Instead, plaintiff’s “repeated attempts 

. . . to misuse the courts” have resulted in, among other

things, the “needless[] squander[ing]” of judicial and other

resources. See O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir.

1990). Consequently, as fully discussed below, the court

finds ample justification for the entry of a pre-filing order

against plaintiff Spain.

Background

I. The Bankruptcy Case 

Well before commencing this action, plaintiff Spain had

“extensive involvement” as “a claimant in a District of

Arizona bankruptcy proceeding . . . span[ning] more than a

decade.”1 Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *1. That bankruptcy

had its genesis in a 1978 judgment of dissolution entered by

the Superior Court in Maricopa County. As part of that

judgment, the Superior Court awarded several properties

located in Creede, Colorado (“Colorado properties’) to Norma

J. Hurt. See Eagleburger I, Doc. 92 at 1; and Eagleburger

II, 2009 WL 307280, at *1. In 1985, Ms. Hurt filed for

bankruptcy in the District of Arizona. Eagleburger II, 2009

WL 307280, at *1. 

In Eagleburger II, Judge Campbell outlined plaintiff

Spain’s involvement as a claimant in that bankruptcy action:

On April 3, 1990, the bankruptcy court issued an 

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order approving a stipulated settlement agreement 

disposing of all claims against the bankruptcy

estate (“Settlement Agreement”). See In re Norma

Hurt, No. 85-3802-PHX-RGM, Adv. No. 87-199

(Bankr.D.Ariz. Apr. 3, 1990). Spain and other

claimants appealed the bankruptcy court's order,

arguing in part that the Settlement Agreement was

unenforceable due to misrepresentation and fraud.

The order was affirmed. See In re Hurt, BAP No.

AZ-90-1142/AZ-90-1174 RJMe (BAP 9th Cir. June 1,

1992); In re Hurt, No. 92-16538, 1994 WL 224263, 26

F.3d 130 (9th Cir. May 26, 1994), cert. denied sub

nom., Kachina Plywood, Inc. v. Hurt, 513 U.S. 1190,

115 S.Ct. 1253, 131 L.Ed.2d 134 (1995), and Pace v.

Hurt, 514 U.S. 1098, 115 S.Ct. 1829, 131 L.Ed.2d 749

(1995).

In January 2003, Bankruptcy Judge James Marlar 

confirmed the bankruptcy estate's sale of the 

Colorado Properties to the City of Creede. See In re

Hurt, No. B-85-03802-JMM (Bankr.D.Ariz. Jan.

31,2003). ITNX, Inc., an entity allegedly controlled

by Spain and Pace, appealed from Judge Marlar's

confirmation order. The order was affirmed. See In

re Hurt, BAP No. AZ-98-1532-KPRy (BAP 9th Cir. Sept.

13, 1999); In re Hurt, No. 00-15088, 2001 WL 615282,

9 Fed. Appx. 780 (9th Cir. June 5, 2001).

Eagleburger II, 2009 WL 307280, at *1 (footnote omitted). 

As this court pointed out in Spain I, after finding that

“plaintiff’s liens and encumbrances . . . placed upon the

real properties of [the bankrupt estate of Norma J. Hurt]

[were] null and void[,] . . . , the Bankruptcy Court . . .

enjoined [Spain] from bringing any action or filing, or

causing to be filed any lien or claim against the property of

[the bankrupt estate][.]” Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *1

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Plaintiff

also signed a settlement agreement which stated the same, and

additionally stated that ‘[Spain agrees] that . . . all

objections to the sale of any real properties now pending 

. . . are waived and withdrawn.’” Eagleburger I, Doc. 92 at

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2:5-7. 

II. Eagleburger I

Unwilling to concede defeat, “in 2004 plaintiff commenced

a federal court action in Colorado[,]” which eventually was

transferred to this district and assigned to Judge Silver. 

See Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *1. Among the defendants in

that case were Bankruptcy Judge Marlar, and counsel who had

represented Ms. Hurt in the bankruptcy proceeding. See

Eagleburger II, 2009 W 307280, at *1. In Eagleburger I,

plaintiff Spain alleged that defendants violated the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 

Eagleburger I, Doc. 92 at 2:21-22. In particular, plaintiff

“alleged that the Colorado Properties were not part of the

Settlement Agreement and that the defendants made

misrepresentations and filed fraudulent documents in the

Bankruptcy Case.” Eagleburger II, 2009 WL 307280, at *1

(citation omitted). Plaintiff “further alleged that Judge

Marlar knowingly approved the fraudulent Settlement Agreement

in confirming the sale of the Colorado Properties.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Judge Silver dismissed that case for failure to state a

claim “on the ground that Spain’s claims could have been

raised in the Bankruptcy Case and were therefore barred by

the doctrine of res judicata.” See id. (citation omitted). 

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to vacate that order because

supposedly it was “void for lack of jurisdiction.” 

Eagleburger I, Doc. 96 at 1:28 - 2:1. Because plaintiff did

“not explain how th[at] Court lack[ed] jurisdiction[,]” Judge

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Silver denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate. Id. at 2:3-6. 

Plaintiff Spain responded by filing a motion to

disqualify Judge Silver. See id., Doc. 97. Judge Silver

denied that motion, explaining that “[t]he Court has already

entered judgment against Plaintiff, dismissed the action and

complaint, and denied [his] motion to reopen the case and

vacate the dismissal order.” Id., Doc. 98 at 1:20-21. Judge

Silver unequivocally stated: “At this point, no further

pleadings or motions in this Court are allowed.” Id.,at

1:20-22. She therefore denied “as moot” plaintiff’s motion,

and directed him to “not file any more motions in th[at]

Court, as the case is closed.” Id. at 23-24. Judge Silver

also “ordered . . . the Clerk of the Court . . . not to

accept further motions or pleadings in th[at] case.” Id. at

2:3-4 (emphasis omitted). 

III. Eagleburger II

The foregoing did not deter plaintiff Spain from

continuing to litigate with respect to the bankruptcy case. 

Evidently dissatisfied with the outcome in Eagleburger I,

plaintiff “fil[ed] a complaint against Judge Silver and all

defendant’s named in [her] case with the exception of [Ms.]

Hurt.” Eagleburger II, 2009 WL 307280, at *2 (citation

omitted). Plaintiff Spain asserted “RICO claims based on an

alleged conspiracy between Defendants to deprive Spain of his

purported ownership of the Colorado properties[,]” which were

the subject of the Hurt bankruptcy. Id. (citation omitted). 

Defendants and plaintiffs alike filed a host of motions in

that case. 

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Finding that the complaint before him was “nearly

identical to the second amended complaint [(“SAC”)]” in

Eagleburger I, and that Judge Silver had “dismissed the [SAC]

on the merits, and final judgment was entered in favor of

Defendants and against Spain[,]” Judge Campbell held that res

judicata barred the claims before him. See id. (citations

omitted). Judge Campbell also dismissed the claims against

Judges Silver and Marlar on judicial immunity grounds. See

id. at *3. Additionally finding that judicial immunity would

bar plaintiff’s proposed section 1983 claims against those

two Judges, Judge Campbell also denied plaintiff’s motion to

amend his complaint. Id. 

Moreover, Judge Campbell granted the motion by Judges

Silver and Marlar “enjoin[ing] Spain from filing in th[a]t

Court, absent prior permission, any suit against Defendants

concerning the Colorado Properties.” Id. at *4 (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1651). Judge Campbell soundly reasoned:

Spain's claims relating to the Colorado Properties

have been repeatedly denied. . . . With each

judicial failure, [Spain] file[s] the next cause of

action, creating a snowballing effect by naming the

same defendants and adding attorneys and judges [he

holds] responsible for [his] defeat. . . . Spain's

claims are not only numerous, but patently without

merit. . . 

Id. (citations, internal quotation marks and footnote

omitted). Judge Campbell then directed the Clerk of the

Court to terminate that action. Id. at *5, ¶ 6. 

IV. The Present Case

A. Spain I

“Slightly more than a month” after Judge Silver barred

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plaintiff from further filings in Eagleburger I, plaintiff

Spain filed the present action. Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at

*1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It was

readily apparent to the court that plaintiff’s first amended

complaint (“FAC”) herein, bore a “striking resemblance” to

his amended complaint in Eagleburger I. Id. “[T]he factual

predicate [did] differ[]” between those two complaints in

that the Colorado properties were at issue in Eagleburger I,

whereas the property at issue here “is located at 2258 East

Alpine Drive, Mesa, Arizona (‘the property’)[.]” Id. at *3

(citation omitted). Plaintiff Spain alleged the same legal

theory though as he did in Eagleburger I – alleged RICO

violations.” See id. at *1. Indeed, “many parts [of

plaintiff’s FAC] [we]re identical to his amended complaint”

in Eagleburger I. Id. at *2. This court found that

“similarity” to be “significant because in [Eagleburger I]

the court granted defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement . . . , noting that it was ‘an understatement[]’ to

refer to plaintiff’s complaint therein as ‘unorganized[.]’”

Id. (citation omitted). This court found “the same” to be

“true here.” Id.

Despite “plaintiff’s scattershot approach to pleading[,]”

and his “lengthy recitations to cases which on their face

appear[ed] largely irrelevant[,]” the court did address

defendants’ standing arguments in Spain I. Id. at *3. The

court addressed those arguments although it had “serious

reservations as to whether the FAC in its current form

“perform[ed] the essential functions of a complaint.” Id.

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(quoting McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.

1996)). Plaintiff did not address the standing issue in

Spain I. See id. at *4. Instead, as to one defense motion,

“with no basis,” plaintiff simply “respond[ed] that that

motion [wa]s ‘ . . . a substantive and procedural

nullity[.]’” Id. (citation omitted). “Except for asserting

different names,” that was also plaintiff’s response to

another defense motion. Id. Plaintiff took “a different but

equally unresponsive approach” to yet another defense motion. 

Id. Plaintiff “devote[d] the bulk” of that response “to

arguing that it ‘[wa]s nothing more and nothing less than a

frivolous demurrer[.]’” Id. (citation omitted). 

After thoroughly discussing why plaintiff’s FAC did not

sufficiently allege standing, the court found that it

“lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction[,] and so “denie[d] as

moot all remaining pending motions[.]” See id. at *5 - *7. 

Primarily because of “the Ninth Circuit’s general reluctance

to deny pro se litigants an opportunity to amend, the court

[did] allow plaintiff to amend his complaint[]” though. Id.

at *8. The court cautioned plaintiff, however: 

Before filing any amended complaint, . . . plaintiff

would do well to seriously consider the numerous

apparent defects discussed in defendants' motions,

such as the lack of personal jurisdiction by the

Ruyle defendants and defendant Huston, and the fact

that arguably this action is an impermissible

collateral attack on prior court proceedings. The

court stresses that these are just two of the

seeming defects, which are too countless to

enumerate, in the FAC-and two which at first glance

it does not appear can be cured by amendment.

Id. The court further advised plaintiff, among other things,

that if he “has any doubt as to the pleading requirements

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under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he can consult,

among other sources, the Rule's Appendix of Forms, which are

“‘intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of

statement which the rules contemplate.’” Id. (quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P. 84). 

At that point, the court gave plaintiff the first of

several warnings pertaining to “the manner” in which he was

“conduct[ing] this litigation[.]” Id. Given his conduct “to

date, as well as his extensive prior litigation involvement

documented in the record, the court caution[ed] him regarding

the use of the courts in a vexatious fashion.” Id. 

Although the court found that “[a]t th[at] juncture the

plaintiff ha[d] not engaged in a ‘flagrant abuse of the

judicial process[,]’” it opined that “[g]iven his numerous

filings, most of them wholly without merit, coupled with the

tone and form of those filings, plaintiff [wa]s dangerously

close to crossing the line from permissible use of the

judicial process to flagrant abuse[.]” Id. (quoting Molski,

500 F.3d at 1057). The court further advised plaintiff that

it would “not look favorably upon the filing of an amended

complaint which does not fully comport with the relevant

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and governing case law.” 

Id. The Court allowed plaintiff 30 days in which to file and

serve his amended complaint. See id.

B. Spain II

Rather than filing and serving an amended complaint as

the court allowed, plaintiff “filed a ‘motion to vacate[,]’

asserting that Spain I [wa]s ‘facially void[.]’” Spain v. EMC

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Mortg. Co., 2008 WL 2328358, at *1 (D.Ariz. June 4,

2008)(“Spain II”) (citation omitted). After defendants

promptly responded or joined in responses filed by other

defendants, plaintiff filed three additional motions and

lodged a SAC with the court, but he did not reply to any of

those responses or joinders. That flurry of motion activity

is outlined in Spain II, and incorporated herein by

reference. See id. 

Partially due to his pro se status, this court overlooked

the fact that in moving to vacate plaintiff did not rely upon

the proper Rule. See id. at *2. The court could not so

easily overlook the “largely incomprehensible” nature of

plaintiff’s motion, however. See id. Nor could the court

overlook the fact that plaintiff “simply disagree[d] with

[this court’s] rulings in Spain I. Id. As this court held,

“[p]laintiff’s dissatisfaction [wa]s not a proper basis for

reconsideration[.]” See id. (citing cases). Additionally,

plaintiff did not fully comply with LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1) in

moving to vacate. Id. Accordingly, the court denied

plaintiff’s motion to vacate. Id. at *5. 

Although styled differently, plaintiff filed two other

“virtually identical” motions, which the court jointly

considered in Spain II. Basically, plaintiff was seeking an

extension of time in which to file his SAC. In arguing for a

“good cause” extension of time, plaintiff vowed that “if an

extension of time [wa]s not granted, he w[ould] ‘wast[e]

judicial resources and the Court’s time[.]’” Id. at *3

(quoting Resp. (Doc. 136)) (emphasis added). This court

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found “[p]laintiff’s ready willingness to ‘wast[e] judicial

resources and the Court’s time[]’ [to be] troubling to say

the least.” Id. (citation omitted). The court conceded that

“[p]erhaps when read in isolation, [it] would be willing to

overlook th[at] statement.” Id. But, “[w]hen read in

conjunction with plaintiff’s motion to vacate, with its

vituperative tone, the court f[oun]d[] that once again

‘plaintiff is dangerously close to crossing the line from

permissible use of the judicial process to flagrant

abuse[.]’” Id. (quoting Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *8). 

After carefully examining the four factors pertinent to a

finding of excusable neglect, this court held that “because 

. . . it appear[ed] that plaintiff Spain’s delayed filing did

not result from deviousness or willfulness,” it was “willing

to give him some leeway.” Id. at *4 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Thus, “the court, in its discretion,

grant[ed] plaintiff an extension of time in which to file and

serve his SAC.” Id. at *5. Concluding, the court added that

“[d]espite [its] leniency this time, plaintiff is forewarned

that it will not look so favorably upon similar future

motions.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

C. Spain III

In Spain v. EMC Mortg. Co., 2009 WL 464983 (D.Ariz. Feb.

24, 2009) (“Spain III”), this court had before it plaintiff’s

SAC and “various potentially dispositive motions, which

called to mind “the immortal words of baseball sage Yogi

Berra . . . , ‘This is deja vu all over again.’” Id. at *1

(footnote omitted). That comment was prompted by the fact

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that “[d]espite this court’s admonitions and guidance in

terms of repleading, plaintiff . . . Spain’s SAC b[ore] a

striking resemblance to his . . . FAC[.]” Id. The SAC

“appear[ed] to be a slightly shorter ‘cut and paste version’

of the FAC, suffer[ing] from many of the same infirmities as

the FAC.” Id. Necessarily then, defendants’ reiterated their

dismissal arguments pertaining to the FAC. See id. at *5. 

Before resolving the motions to dismiss, given the

numerous and in some instances untimely submissions, the

court had to first “clarify the scope” of what it would

“consider[] on th[os]e motions.” Id. at *2. The court

refused to consider a number of plaintiff’s filings including

four “replies to a reply,” because they were duplicative,

violative of the Local Rules, or simply irrelevant. See id.

at *2. In a similar vein, the court denied plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration because he did not comply with

LRCiv 7.2. Id. at *3. Plaintiff Spain was well aware of

“the necessity of complying with” that Rule “which the court

discussed at some length in Spain II[.]” Id.

Next, the court addressed the parties’ respective

standing arguments. In contrast to Spain I, where plaintiff

claimed that he had standing by virtue of his “ownership

interest in Aurora Management[,]” in Spain III plaintiff

sought to establish that he had “an ownership interest in the

Alpine property itself.” Id. at *4. Plaintiff

unsuccessfully attempted to allege his ownership interest in

the Alpine property by relying upon a “promissory note, [a]

Warranty Deed,” and copies of 30 checks. Id. at *6. 

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As to the Warranty Deed, this court explained:

Despite what plaintiff might believe, that Deed did

not convey any portion of the Alpine property to him

individually. It is plain from the face of the

Warranty Deed that the property was conveyed to the

“ABS PROPERTY TRUST[,]” and to plaintiff solely in

his capacity as trust “Beneficiary[.]” Doc. 88 at 6.

However, “the beneficiary of a trust generally is

not the real party in interest and may not sue in

the name of the trust.” Orff v. United States, 358

F.3d 1137, 1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Thus, as a trust

beneficiary, plaintiff lacks standing to pursue

claims on behalf of the trust.

Id. at *6. In summarizing its holdings, the court reiterated:

The Warranty Deed . . . does not support a finding

that plaintiff has standing here because on its face

that Deed shows that plaintiff is a trust

beneficiary and, as such, is not the real party in

interest. Any rights which that Deed may establish

in the subject property are rights belonging to the

ABS Property Trust-not to plaintiff. To the extent

plaintiff believes that he has been deprived of his

rights as a trust beneficiary, then he has sued the

wrong parties. 

Id. at *8. Consequently, this court found that “[a]t the end

of the day, at most, the SAC, just like the FAC, alleges

injuries which ‘were suffered, if at all, by Aurora, Alpha

Mega and/or Bing Four, not by plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Spain

I, 2008 WL 752610, at *5 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)) (emphasis added). So, although the SAC

“remain[ed] largely incomprehensible and undeniably

confusing[,]” it was “ascertainable . . . that despite

amendment, plaintiff . . . failed to cure the fundamental

defect of standing.” Id. at *6 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Significantly, in Spain III plaintiff “persisted in . . .

using a vituperative tone,” despite this court’s earlier

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caution against such conduct. See id. at *7 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff also “cast[]

disparaging remarks against” one of the defense counsel,

asserting that that particular lawyer was “harass[ing]”

plaintiff. Id. This court found that assertion

“[r]emarkabl[e]” given that “arguably, it [wa]s the other way

around.” Id. Continuing, the court explained that, “[as]

the record amply demonstrates, at this point, plaintiff’s

repetitive and non-responsive filings border on harassment.” 

Id. However, in large part because the court was dismissing

the SAC with prejudice and directing entry of judgment in

defendants’ favor, and that the case be terminated, the court

saw no need for a pre-filing order at that time. See id. at

*9.

D. Spain IV

Following dismissal of this action with prejudice and

entry of judgment in defendants’ favor, plaintiff filed a

wholly baseless “Motion for New Trial, Rehearing, and

Reconsideration[.]” See Spain v. EMC Mortg. Co., 2009 WL

2590100, at *8 (D.Ariz. Aug. 20, 2009) (“Spain IV”). As

recounted in Spain IV, plaintiff based that motion upon a

“purportedly ‘corrected’ Warranty Deed[:]”

Plaintiff claims that the Warranty Deed upon which 

the court focused in Spain III had a ‘typographical

error[,] in that it ‘was erroneously made out to ABS 

PROPERTY TRUST & B. Spain Beneficiary [,]’ rather

than to plaintiff as ‘an individual[.]’ . . . Since

the issuance of Spain III, plaintiff asserts that

that ‘error has . . . been corrected . . . by

re-recording the original deed.’ . . . Apparently

plaintiff re-recorded the original deed to ‘correct

grantee information[,]’ on March 6, 2009-ten days

after the issuance of Spain III. . . . More

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particularly, rather than indicating as it did in

the Spain III record that the ‘GRANTEE’ was ‘ABS

PROPERTY TRUST B.Spain, Beneficiary[,]’ the

Warranty Deed now reads that the ‘GRANTEE’ is ‘ABS

PROPERTY TRUST B. Spain, Beneficiary

Individually[.]’ . . . Plaintiff readily admits

that he made this ‘alteration[.]’ . . . 

Id. at *1(citations and footnote omitted). 

The court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial for

the patently obvious reason that there had been no trial. 

See id. at *3. Likewise, the court denied plaintiff’s motion

for reconsideration. Those reasons are incorporated by

reference herein, but several bear repeating as they are

particularly illustrative of plaintiff’s dubious litigation

tactics. 

First, as discussed in Spain IV, “[t]he court disagrees

with plaintiff’s characterization of the original deed as

containing a ‘typographical’ error.” Id. at *5. As this

court reasoned:

This supposed typographical error arises from the

fact that the conveyance there was to plaintiff in

his capacity as a trust ‘beneficiary’ as opposed to

‘individually.’ Transposing an entire word,

especially when those words are spelled quite

differently, is not a mere typographical error,

despite how plaintiff tries to portray it. A

typographical error would be, for example, the

difference between the word ‘data’ and the word

‘date.’ It is easy to see how in transcription those

two words inadvertently could be interposed one for

the other. The same is not true, however, of the

words ‘beneficiary and ‘individually.’

 Id. Second, as further explained in Spain I:

[T]the timing of plaintiff's ‘discovery’

significantly undermines his argument that the

original deed was ‘erroneously made out.’ . . . That

‘discovery’ was not until two and a half years 

after the Warranty Deed is dated, and after

plaintiff reviewed Spain III and realized that his

trust beneficiary status was disadvantageous to him

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in terms of pursuing this litigation. . . . Thus,

the court gives no credence to plaintiff's assertion

that the original Warranty Deed had a typographical

error.

Regardless of the foregoing, what is abundantly 

clear is that the ‘corrected’ Deed did not surface 

until more than a week after the issuance of Spain

III when apparently plaintiff re-recorded the Deed

to reflect the supposedly new grantee information.

Id. at *6 (citations omitted). As the foregoing readily

shows, in pursuing these claims, plaintiff will go to almost

any length, including altering documents. 

After finding plaintiff’s remaining reconsideration

arguments to be without merit, the court was “compelled to

comment, as it ha[d] previously, upon the manner in which

plaintiff has conducted this litigation.” Id. at *7. 

Essentially, the court found that “since Spain I” plaintiff

“has done nothing to dispel the court of th[e] view[]” that

he was coming “dangerously close to crossing the line from

permissible use of the judicial process to flagrant abuse[.]” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

court thus advised the parties that it was “seriously

considering entering a pre-filing order . . . precluding any

further filings by plaintiff in this action.” Id. at *8. 

The court suggested that “[s]uch an order also might,

perhaps, preclude plaintiff from any further filings

generally as to the transaction which is the subject of this

lawsuit[.]” Id. 

The court allowed plaintiff “15 days from the date of

entry of th[at] order in which to file and serve a memorandum

of law and any supporting documentation which he deem[ed]

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appropriate directed to the issue of the propriety of

entering a pre-filing order[.]” Id. Defendants were given “10

days thereafter to file and serve a response, if any[,]” but

the court plainly stated, “[n]o reply shall be permitted

unless so directed by the court.” Id.

The parties timely filed their respective memoranda in

accordance with Spain IV. Blatantly disregarding that order,

plaintiff filed two untimely and unauthorized memoranda – a

“Supplemental Information to Memorandum of Points and

Authorities against the Entry of a pre-filing Order” (Doc.

272), and a “Supplement” entitled “B. Spain’s memorandum of

law objecting to the propriety of Judge Broomfield’s entering

a pre-filing order and motion for a pretrial scheduling

conference” (Doc. 273) (bold emphasis added). The court will

not consider the merits of the “Supplemental Information” or

the second memorandum of law as they are in direct

contravention of Spain IV, but it will briefly address

plaintiff’s motion for a pretrial scheduling conference. 

At the same time, the court recognizes that those two

untimely and unauthorized filings are relevant to the issue

of whether a pre-trial order is necessary in this case. 

Those two filings reaffirm plaintiff’s disregard for the

judicial process and, more specifically, orders of this

court. This time instead of waging personal attacks on

defense counsel, plaintiff has elected to attack the court in

a similarly inappropriate manner. Furthermore, plaintiff’s

“Supplemental Information” evinces his declared intent to

“‘wast[e] judicial resources and the Court’s time[.]’” See

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Spain II, 2008 WL 2328358, at *3 (citation omitted). That

submission consists of nothing more than plaintiff’s 20 page

“Response to Motion to Enjoin Vexatious Litigation” in

Eagleburger II, and Judge Silver’s order in Eagleburger I

denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate therein. 

Discussion

I. Pre-filing Order

Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),

district courts have “the inherent power to enter pre-filing

orders against vexatious litigants.” Molski, 500 F.3d at

1057 (citation omitted). That power is not unfettered

though. In De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.

1990), the Ninth Circuit “outlined four factors for district

courts to examine before entering pre-filing orders.” Id.

(citation omitted). “First, the litigant must be given

notice and a chance to be heard before the order is entered.” 

Id. (citing De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147). Second, the district

court must compile ‘an adequate record for review.’” Id.

(quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148). These two factors “are

procedural considerations – that is, the factors define [a]

specific method or course of action that district courts

should use to assess whether to declare a party a vexatious

litigant and enter a pre-filing order.” Id. at 1057-58

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The next two factors “are substantive considerations–that

is, the[se] factors help the district court define who is, in

fact, a ‘vexatious litigant’ and construct a remedy that will

stop the litigant’s abusive behavior while not unduly

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infringing the litigant’s right to access the courts.” Id.

at 1058. The first of these substantive factors requires the

district court to “make substantive findings about the

frivolous or harassing nature of the plaintiff’s litigation.” 

Id. at 1057 (citation omitted). The next substantive factor

requires that “the vexatious litigant order . . . be narrowly

tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered.’” Id.

(quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148). The court will consider 

these factors seriatim in light of the extensive record

outlined herein regarding plaintiff’s litigation tactics. 

A. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard

Contemplating the entry of a pre-filing order against

plaintiff, in Spain IV, this court indicated its “[k]een[]

aware[ness] of the ramifications of such an order[.]” Spain

IV, 2009 WL at *8. Therefore, “in accordance with De Long v.

Hennessey, . . . , and its progeny,” the court g[a]ve[]

plaintiff notice . . . that it is considering entering such

a[] [pre-filing] order.” Id. (citation omitted). Further,

the court explicitly advised plaintiff, “[a]s the Hennessey

line of cases requires, [he] shall have an opportunity to be

heard in this regard.” Id. 

As plaintiff readily concedes in his “Memorandum of

Points and [A]uthorities [A]gainst the Entry of a [P]refiling Order[,] . . . this obviously is [his] opportunity to

be heard[.]” Memo. (Doc. 270) at 4:21 (emphasis added). The

court thus finds that plaintiff had adequate notice and an

opportunity to be heard, as this Circuit requires prior to

the entry of a pre-filing order.

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B. Record for Review

“An adequate record for review should include a listing

of all the cases and motions that led the district court to

conclude that a vexatious litigant order [i]s needed.” De

Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. Here, as just discussed, that record

consists of plaintiffs’ litigation activities and resultant

court orders in this action, as well as those in three other

actions. What emerges from that record is a disturbing

pattern by plaintiff of repetitive and baseless filings

against these defendants. The record further shows that

plaintiff’s conduct herein is not isolated. The record is

replete with orders by this court and others discussing the

meritless nature of plaintiff’s claims, as well as his

numerous problematic filings and questionable litigation

tactics. 

C. Frivolous or Harassing Nature of Filings

The third De Long factor “gets to the heart of the

vexatious litigant analysis[.]” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059. In

making the necessary “substantive findings as to the

frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions[,] 

. . . the district court must look at both the number and

content of the filings as indicia of the frivolousness of the

litigant’s claims.” Id. (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted) (emphasis added). A showing of litigiousness

is not enough. “The plaintiff’s claims must not only be

numerous, but also be patently without merit.” Id. (citation

and internal quotation mark omitted). In fact, in Molski the

Ninth Circuit “reemphasize[d] that the simple fact that a

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plaintiff has filed a large number of complaints, standing

alone, is not a basis for designating a litigant as

vexatious.” Id. at 1061 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). The Molski Court further “emphasize[d] that

the textual and factual similarity of a plaintiff’s

complaints, standing alone, is not a basis for finding a

party to be a vexatious litigant.” Id. 

By the same token though, “[f]rivolous litigation is not

limited to cases in which a legal claim is entirely without

merit.” Id. at 1060. “It is also frivolous for a claimant

who has some measure of a legitimate claim to make false

factual assertions.” Id. A person “may cross the line into

frivolous litigation by asserting facts that are grossly

exaggerated or totally false.” Id. at 1062. 

The Ninth Circuit has found that “the Second Circuit’s

five-factor standard [adopted in Safir v. United States

Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19 (2nd Cir. 1986)] provides a helpful

framework for applying” this Circuit’s two substantive

factors – findings of frivolousness or harassment and

narrowly tailored pre-filing orders. See id. at 1058

(citation omitted). The five Safir factors are:

(1) the litigant's history of litigation and in 

particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing, 

or duplicative suits; (2) the litigant's motive in 

pursuing the litigation, for example, whether the 

litigant had a good faith expectation of prevailing; 

(3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; 

(4) whether the litigant has caused unnecessary 

expense to the parties or placed a needless burden

on the courts; and (5) whether other sanctions would

be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.

Id. (citation omitted). Employing that framework to the

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record before it, it is easy to see the need for a carefully

circumscribed pre-filing order against plaintiff B. Spain. 

1. Plaintiff’s Litigation History

Plaintiff Spain’s litigation history, as explicated

herein, reveals a persistent litigant who unceasingly

continues to pursue claims against parties, even when those

claims are clearly without merit. Despite being given

considerable leeway by this court, plaintiff did not address

the numerous substantive defects in his complaints. Instead,

when he did not succeed on the merits, plaintiff resorted to

filing numerous motions, some of which were duplicative, many

of which were largely incomprehensible, and all of which had

little or no bearing on the issues. 

2. Litigant’s Motive

Given the number of defendants, many whom have an

extraordinarily attenuated, if any, relationship to the

events complained of, and the vitriol frequently expressed in

plaintiff’s filings, plaintiff Spain’s primary motive here

clearly appears to be to harass defendants. See Gabor v.

County of Santa Clara Bd. of Supervisors, 2008 WL 902407, at

*7 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 31, 2008), aff’d without pub’d opinion, 363

Fed.Appx. 456 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is unclear whether

plaintiffs[] are bringing this action for purposes of

harassing the named defendants, although based on the number

of defendants and the vitriol expressed in the instant

complaint, it would appear that there may be some intent to

harass.); see also Boustred v. Government, 2008 WL 4287570,

at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 17, 2008) (three actions sufficient to

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support vexatious litigant order where actions contained

“similar rambling, largely incomprehensible claims” and named

“numerous defendants including ones having no connection” to

conduct alleged). 

3. Represented by Counsel

Plaintiff is appearing pro se here, as he did in

Eagleburger I and Eagleburger II, and at various times during

the bankruptcy proceeding. Generally courts are protective

of pro se litigants. As this court first admonished

plaintiff in Spain I, however, “‘[f]lagrant abuse of the

judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one

person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly

could be used to consider meritorious claims of other

litigants.’” Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *8 (quoting Molski,

500 F.3d at 1057). Therefore, plaintiff Spain’s pro se

status does not excuse his highly questionable and harassing

litigation tactics. Cf. Doran v. Vicorp Restaurants, Inc.,

407 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1118 (C.D.Cal. 2005) (“Since fewer

sanctions are available against a pro per litigant, the power

to declare him vexatious becomes an important tool for the

courts to manage their docket and prevent frivolous claims.”) 

 4. Unnecessary Expense or Needless Burden

As earlier stressed, plaintiff threateningly declared

that “if an extension of time [wa]s not granted, he w[ould]

‘wast[e] judicial resources and the Court’s time[.]’” Id. at

*3 (quoting Resp. (Doc. 136)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff

made good on his word. Plaintiff’s modus operandi throughout

this litigation has been one of persistently filing motions

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and other submissions which are baseless. The court has been

considerably lenient with plaintiff, primarily because of his

pro se status. Rather than productively using the

opportunities which the court has accorded him, plaintiff has

“forced defendants to undertake unnecessary expense to defend

themselves from baseless claims[,]” and respond to numerous

unwarranted filings. See Gabor, 2008 WL 902407, at *7. In

the same way, this court has expended considerable time and

effort reviewing and ruling on plaintiff’s baseless claims

and motions. See id. For example, as the Poli & Ball

defendants accurately stated, when plaintiff filed his SAC,

which, “bore a ‘striking resemblance to his [FAC][,]’” they

and the other defendants were “forced . . . to file an

additional round of motions to dismiss.” Resp. (Doc. 274) at

2:18-19 (quoting Spain III, 2009 WL 464983, at *1). And,

instead of “respond[ing] to the merits of those motions,

plaintiff resorted to personal attacks upon counsel[,]” as

mentioned earlier. Id. at 2:19-20 (citation omitted). 

Thus, the court finds that plaintiff Spain has “caused

unnecessary expense to the parties and ha[s] placed a

needless burden on the courts.” See Gabor, 2008 WL 902407,

at *7. 

5. Adequacy of Other Sanctions

When viewed in isolation, plaintiff’s filings and

litigation tactics are problematic. When viewed in the

aggregate, however, and in light of the governing legal

principles, their vexatious and harassing nature become

patently obvious. As the record demonstrates, it seems that

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unless and until a court expressly prohibits plaintiff Spain

from future filings, he will persist in abusing the court’s

process by filing meritless claims and motions. Especially

because plaintiff has not heeded any of this court’s prior

warnings regarding the manner in which he has conducted this

litigation, the need for a carefully circumscribed pre-filing

order is readily apparent. 

D. Narrow Tailoring 

“[C]autious[ly] review[ing] . . . the pertinent

circumstances[,]” as this Circuit requires, the court finds

that it is necessary and proper to enter a pre-filing order

in the format set forth below. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057. 

This is part of this courts “‘affirmative obligation to

ensure that judicial resources are not needlessly squandered

on repeated attempts by litigants to misuse the courts.’” 

See Englerious v. U.S. Government, 2009 WL 1393558, at *2

(W.D.Wash. May 15, 2009) (quoting O’Loughlin, 920 F.2d at

618. 

In issuing this pre-filing order, the court stresses the

limited nature of the relief which it is granting. Plaintiff

is enjoined from making any further filings in this action,

Spain v. EMC Mortg. Co., et al., CV 07-0308 PHX-RCB. 

Plaintiff is further enjoined from filing any further actions

in the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona pertaining to the underlying real property

transaction, i.e., the Alpine property, which is the subject

of this lawsuit, without first following the procedures

outlined below. 

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II. Motion for Pre-Trial Scheduling Conference

In light of the foregoing, the court hereby DENIES as

moot plaintiff Spain’s motion for a pre-trial scheduling

conference (Doc. 273).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that

plaintiff B. Spain has engaged in vexatious litigation in the

present action. Therefore, because this action is closed, no

further pleadings or motions are allowed herein, i.e., Spain

v. EMC Mortg. Co., et al., No. CV 07-0308-PHX-RCB. Further,

plaintiff shall not file any other actions in the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona pertaining

to the underlying real property transaction, i.e., the Alpine

property, which is the subject of this lawsuit, without

complying with the following procedure. Plaintiff B. Spain

shall first lodge the proposed complaint with this Court in

accordance with section II(H) of the Electronic Case Filing

Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual for the

District of Arizona. No defendant need initially respond to

that lodged complaint, however. 

Instead:

 [this] Court shall review the [lodged] complaint

and determine whether the complaint should be

summarily denied, or whether it should proceed. If

the Court summarily denies the relief requested and

dismisses the complaint, the summary denial and

dismissal order and complaint shall be placed on the

docket. If th[is] Court allows the complaint to

proceed, th[is] Court will direct the Clerk of Court

to open a proceeding, assign a case number, and Mr.

[Spain] may proceed according to the Federal Rules

of [Civil] Procedure or by other appropriate

[lawful] means.

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See In re GTI Holdings, LLC, 420 B.R. 1, 17 (Bankr. D.Ariz.

2009).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) that plaintiff B. Spain is ENJOINED from filing in

this court, subject to the procedures set forth above, any

suit against defendants pertaining to the Alpine Property;

and 

(2) that plaintiff B. Spain’s Motion for a Pretrial

Scheduling Conference is DENIED (Doc. 273).

DATED this 27th day of September, 2010.

Copies to plaintiff pro se and counsel of record

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