Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-99-55477/USCOURTS-ca9-99-55477-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

TIMOTHY C. GANTT, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

No. 99-55477 

D.C. No. 

ERNIE C. ROE; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA, 

CV-98-01487-CM-E 

OPINION 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California 

Carlos R. Moreno, District Judge, Presiding 

Submitted January 16, 2003* 

Submission Deferred January 17, 2003 

Resubmitted November 24, 2003 

Pasadena, California 

Filed November 22, 2004 

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Alex Kozinski and 

Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion by Judge Kozinski 

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

16245 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 1 of 11
16246 GANTT v. ROE 

SUMMARY 

Criminal Law and Procedure/Prosecutorial Misconduct 

The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the district 

court. The court held that the prosecution's failure to disclose 

to the defense evidence that the only physical evidence that 

could link a defendant to a murder and robbery-a matchbook 

with a phone number written inside-was undercut by other 

evidence violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

Appellant Timothy Gantt, convicted in California state 

court of the murder and robbery of Kalpesh Vardham in a Los 

Angeles parking garage, petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court, raising a number of claims, the most significant of which was that the prosecution failed to disclose 

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. Two months after 

the murder, David Rosemond, a local car burglar, had told 

police that he had been il). the garage at the time of Vardham' s 

murder and had seen Gantt beating up the victim. After getting Rosemond's tip, the police arrested Gantt and questioned 

him about the crime. They found that he was carrying a 

matchbook from an Indian restaurant in the Los Angeles area. 

Written inside the matchbook was a 19-digit phone number, 

which turned out to connect to a phone in Bangladesh. The 

prosecution's handwriting expert testified that there were 

good indications the victim possibly wrote the phone number 

in the matchbook. Kevin Shorts, who parked on the sixth level 

of the structure about the time of the crime, said he saw Gantt 

there for about two seconds, with codefendant Michael Smith. 

The parking lot attendant remembered a man who fit Gantt's 

description being in the lot for about only five minutes. The 

prosecution did not disclose that the proprietor of the house 

to which the phone number in the matchbook connected, a 

man named Khan, did not recognize Vardham's photograph, 

or that Khan's son, Ferdous, who worked in the restaurant 

identified by the matchbook, had not recognized Vardham's 

GANTT v. ROE 16247 

face from a photograph. The jury had struggled to reach a verdict. The district court denied Gantt's petition, concluding that 

the evidence was not suppressed within the meaning of Brady, 

because the defense could and should have discovered it 

itself. 

Gantt appealed. 

[1] The prosecution in a criminal case has a duty to disclose 

all material evidence in its possession that is favorable to the 

accused. And the prosecution here had evidence concerning 

the matchbook that it apparently failed to disclose. [2] That 

Ferdous didn't know Vardham undercut its theory: it was not 

likely that Ferdous would have forgotten someone to whom 

he gave his father's phone number. [3] That Khan didn't recognize Vardham's picture could also have been helpful to the 

defense. [4] Brady is not confined to evidence that affirmatively proves a defendant innocent: even if evidence is merely 

favorable to the accused, its suppression violates Brady if 

prejudice results. The evidence the prosecution failed to disclose here surely satisfied the low "favorable to the accused" 

standard. [5] Though defense counsel could have conducted 

his own investigation, he was surely entitled to rely on the 

prosecution's representation that it was sharing the fruits of 

the police investigation. 

[6] The state's case against Gantt was relatively weak. [7] 

The testimony of the parking lot attendant was not merely 

unhelpful to the prosecution, it may have helped the defense. 

[8] The only witness who claimed to have seen the crime was 

Rosemond. But Rosemond was far from an ideal witness. [9] 

Given Shorts's and the parking lot attendant's independently 

inconclusive and jointly inconsistent testimony, and putting 

the matchbook evidence aside, the jury may have been reluctant to find Gantt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on 

Rosemond's testimony alone. Indeed, the jurors could have 

suspected that Rosemond himself killed Vardham, since just 

as much linked him to the crime scene as Gantt and Smith. 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 2 of 11
16248 GANTT v. ROE 

This underscored the importance of the matchbook evidence, 

which provided a circumstantial anchor for Rosemond's story. 

[10] The evidence the prosecution did not disclose to the 

defense was therefore crucially significant. Had the defense 

attorney known about the police interview with Ferdous and 

called him to the stand, and had Ferdous told the same story 

under oath, the jury might have come to doubt the handwriting expert's somewhat tentative conclusions. The jury then 

might have found that, because Ferdous didn't know Vardham and didn't give him the phone number, Vardham didn't 

have the Shalimar matchbook in his possession when he was 

murdered. [11] Had the jurors concluded that the person most 

likely to have given out the phone number did not give itto 

Vardham, this would probably have destroyed the matchbook 

as a link between Gantt and the victim, leaving no physical 

evidence tying Gantt to the crime. The jury would then have 

had to convict based on Rosemond's highly questionable testimony alone. [12] The jury was clearly struggling to reach a 

verdict, and they may well not have convicted without the 

matchbook evidence. Gantt was therefore prejudiced by the 

prosecution's failure to disclose the exculpatory matchbook 

evidence, in particular the evidence about the meeting with 

Ferdous. There was a reasonable probability of a different 

result had the evidence been disclosed. By failing to disclose 

this evidence, the prosecution thus violated its obligation 

under Brady. The contrary conclusion of the state courts was 

an unreasonable application of well-established federal law. 

The judgment of the district court had to be reversed. 

COUNSEL 

Gerson Simon, Los Angeles, California, for the petitioner. 

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, 

Robert R Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 

Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

I 

GANTT v. ROE 16249 

Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, 

Alan D. Tate, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, California, for the respondent. 

OPINION 

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge: 

Petitioner was convicted of murder and robbery in state 

court and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of 

parole. In his federal habeas petition he raises a number of 

claims, the most significant of which is that the prosecution 

failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

Facts 

The victim, Kalpesh Vardham, was found dead on the sixth 

level of a parking garage in downtown Los Angeles, having 

been stabbed 19 times during an apparent robbery. E.R 

19-20. No suspects were found at the scene when police 

arrived. 

Two months later, the police picked up David Rosemond, 

a local car burglar, in connection with an unrelated burglary. 

Rosemond disclosed that he had been in the garage at the time 

of Vardham' s murder and had seen petitioner "beating up" the 

victim. E.R 23-25, RT. 260. After getting Rosemond's tip, 

the police arrested petitioner and questioned him about the 

crime. E.R 25. They found that he was carrying a matchbook 

from Shalimar, an Indian restaurant in the Los Angeles area. 

Written inside the matchbook was a 19-digit phone number, 

which turned out to connect to a phone in Bangladesh. RT. 

381. Petitioner explained that the phone number had been 

given to him by someone he called "Mohamad." LAPD Statement Form (Oct. 22, 1992), in Trav., Exh. J; LAPD Follow-up 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 3 of 11
16250 GANTI v. ROE 

Investigation Form at 3 (Oct. 29, 1992), in Trav., Exh. M. The 

police released petitioner but rearrested him almost a year 

later. He was tried for murder and robbery. 

The key issue at trial was identity. Rosemond testified consistently with his statement to the police. The only other eyewitnesses were a CPA named Kevin Shorts who parked on the 

sixth level of the structure about the time of the crime and 

said he saw petitioner together with one Michael Smith,1 E.R 

20-22, and a parking lot attendant who specially marked the 

tickets of those who didn't have to pay because they were in 

the parking lot for less than five minutes or so. R.T. 225. The 

attendant remembered that the only no-pay that day belonged 

to a car that had entered at 9:08 a.m. and left at 9: 13 a.m.,2 

driven by a black man between 35 and 40 years old and 

weighing about 200 pounds (a description that fit petitioner, 

who was 46 years old at the time, reasonably well), with a 

similarly built passenger. RT. 227, 231-32; see LAPD 

Follow-up Investigation Form at 1 (Oct. 29, 1992), in Trav., 

Exh. M. 

The only physical evidence that could link petitioner to the 

crime was the matchbook with the phone number written 

inside. The prosecution tried to prove that petitioner and 

Smith set out to rob Vardham, and that the robbery had turned 

into a murder; that Vardham had the matchbook on him at the 

time of the crime; and that petitioner lifted it, along with a 

wallet (which the prosecution did not produce), from Vardham's body shortly after stabbing him. There was no evidence 

that the matchbook had traces of blood on it, and no one 

claimed to have seen the matchbook in Vardham's possession. It was the prosecution's theory that someone had given 

1Petitioner and Smith were tried together. Rosemond testified that he 

saw Smith holding a gun while petitioner was beating up the victim. R.T. 

238-39. 

2The ticket, with the time-stamps and the notation "N.P." ("no pay"), 

was introduced into evidence. R.T. 226-29. 

GANTI v. ROE 16251 

Vardham the phone number and, having nothing better to 

write it on, Vardham used the matchbook. The prosecution's 

handwriting expert testified that there were "good indicat~ons" the victim "possibly wrote the numerical notations, partIcularly the numbers 88031227034." RT. 327. 

What the prosecution did not show, because it could not, 

was any connection between the victim and the phone number. The police had called the number and spoken to a man 

in Bangladesh, who said he did not recognize Vardham's 

name. RT. 381-82. This fact was disclosed to the defense 

before trial. RT. 101. The police had also faxed a photograph 

of the victim to authorities in Bangladesh, who showed it to 

the proprietor of the house to which the phone number connected, a man named Khan. Khan did not recognize the face 

in the photograph. The police knew about this by the last day 

of testimony; the prosecutor disclosed Khan's meeting with 

the Bangladeshi authorities to the defense but did not mention 

that Khan had not recognized Vardham's face. See LAPD 

Investigator's Report (Mar. 28, 1994), in Trav., Exh. H ("[On 

March 2,] Mr. Khan told Commissioner Khan that he could 

not recognize the person depicted in the fax photograph. . . . 

Deputy District Attorney Norris [the prosecutor] was advised 

of the above information."); RT. 390-91.3 

In the same meeting with Bangladeshi authorities, Khan 

mentioned that he had a son named Ferdous Khan who lived 

in Los Angeles and worked, of all places, at the Shalimar restaurant. Khan suggested that his son might know the victim. 

In the disclosure to the defense, the prosecutor mentioned the 

existence of Khan's son, RT. 391, but not that the police had 

31t is unclear whether the prosecutor omitted this information on purpose, because he forgot, or because he knew only some of the results of 

the Bangladeshi investigation at that time. But it is clear that the police 

~ne,":, about the p.hotograph by the last day of testimony, and the prosecutIOn IS charged WIth knowledge of the information held by its investigating 

agents. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 

1995); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 4 of 11
16252 GANTT v. ROE 

already met with Ferdous several days before trialapparently unaware that he was Khan's son-and that Ferdous hadn't recognized Vardham's face from a photograph. 

LAPD Investigator's Report (Mar. 28, 1994), in Trav., Exh. 

H ("[On February 23, Ferdous] ... could not identify the photograph of the victim. Deputy District Attorney Norris was 

advised of the above information."). In fact, the prosecutor 

affirmatively represented the opposite-"[W]e have not been 

able to converse with the son"-as he claimed he was "keep [ -

ing] counsel apprised of the ongoing investigation in this 

case." R.T. 390-91; see also R.T. 101. Petitioner claims that 

the defense didn't learn of the meeting with Ferdous until 

over a year after the trial, when it saw a police report that documented the full extent of the investigation. Trav. at 45.4 

Petitioner was convicted of murder and robbery and, having exhausted his state remedies, brought this habeas petition.s 

Discussion 

[1] 1. It has been well established since long before petitioner's conviction became final in 1996 that the prosecution 

in a criminal case has a duty to disclose all material evidence 

in its possession that is favorable to the accused. United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Blackmun, 1.); id. at 685 

4The state does not admit, nor has any court found, that the prosecution 

failed to disclose that Khan and Ferdous did not recognize Yardham's face 

from the photograph. The district court below, in addressing petitioner's 

Brady claim, held that any discovery violation was harmless. In discussing 

petitioner's claim, we assume these facts were not disclosed. But see page 

16262 infra (remanding for resolution of this possible factual dispute). 

5This is petitioner's second federal habeas petition. His first petition 

was dismissed without prejudice. We granted a certificate of appealability 

with respect to (1) the timeliness of the current habeas petition, (2) 

whether petitioner was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct, 

and (3) whether petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective. E.R. 106. The 

parties now agree that the petition was timely. See Appellant's Br. at 

11-13 (filed July 11,2003); Appellee's Br. at 14-19 (filed Aug. 11,2003). 

GANTT v. ROE 16253 

(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 

see also United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 687-88 (9th 

Cir. 1986). And the prosecution here had evidence concerning 

the matchbook that it apparently failed to disclose. To grasp 

the significance of this evidence, one must understand the 

prosecution's theory of the case. 

According to the prosecution, petitioner had the matchbook 

because he took it from Vardham. And Vardham, in turn, had 

it because he had used it as a scratch-pad: Someone gave him 

a number too long to remember, so he wrote it on the matchbook. 

But how did Vardham come to have the number of a man 

in Bangladesh who didn't know him? Obviously, he must 

have gotten it from someone who knew the number-the 

most likely s.uch person being Khan's son, Ferdous, who 

worked at the Shalimar restaurant, where matchbooks with 

the Shalimar logo would be readily available. 6 Thus, for the 

prosecution's theory to work, Vardham must have spoken to 

Ferdous, probably at the Shalimar restaurant, and Ferdous 

must have given him his father's number-which Vardham 

must then have written on a matchbook he picked up for that 

purpose. This is by far the most likely scenario, consistent 

with the prosecution's theory, of why Vardham would have 

had a Shalimar matchbook with Khan's number hand-written 

in it. 

[2] That Ferdous didn't know Vardham undercuts this theory: It is not likely that Ferdous would have forgotten someone to whom he gave his father's phone number. The person 

seeking Khan's number must have offered some legitimate 

reason, and Ferdous must have been sufficiently comfortable 

with the recipient to feel secure that no mischief would come 

of giving it to him; one generally doesn't hand a family mem6Yardham was not a smoker, R.T. 127, so he was unlikely to have been 

carrying the matchbook on him prior to writing the number in it. 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 5 of 11
16254 GANTT v. ROE 

ber's home telephone number to random strangers. If Ferdous 

didn't recognize Vardham, this means that Ferdous didn't 

give him the number, and so Vardham was probably never in 

a position to write the number on the matchbook. And, if 

Vardham didn't write the number in the matchbook, there is 

no reason to believe that petitioner found the matchbook in 

Vardham's pocket. 

[3] That Khan didn't recognize Vardham's picture when it 

was shown to him by Bangladeshi authorities could also have 

been helpful to the defense. After all, the jury could have reasoned that, though the man in Bangladesh didn't remember 

the victim's name, he nevertheless might know him by sight. 

Evidence to the contrary could have helped persuade the jury 

that there really was no connection between Vardham and the 

person whose number was written in the matchbook-and 

therefore that the matchbook didn't come from Vardham at 

all. 

[4] Brady is not confined to evidence that affirmatively 

proves a defendant innocent: Even if evidence is merely "favorable to the accused," its suppression violates Brady if prejudice results. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). The evidence the prosecution failed to disclose here surely satisfies 

the low "favorable to the accused" standard. That these pieces 

of information were found (or their relevance discovered) 

only in time for the last day of testimony underscores that disclosure should have been immediate: Disclosure must be 

made "at a time when [it] would be of value to the accused." 

United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1462 (9th Cir. 

1985). The prosecutor may have been so busy preparing to 

wrap up his case that he failed to connect Khan's revelation 

about his son with the previous interview with Ferdous, or 

failed to grasp the significance of the fact that Khan didn't 

recognize the face in the photograph. But Brady has no good 

faith or inadvertence defense. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 

437-38 (1995); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; cf United States v. 

J 

I 

GANTT v. ROE 16255 

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or 

the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly probative 

of innocence is in his file, he should be presumed to recognize 

its significance even if he has actually overlooked it." (footnote omitted)); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 

(1972) ("[W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor."). 

Even a prompt disclosure after the verdict would have been 

useful in supporting defendant's motion for a new trial, which 

was argued a few months later and focused on the matchbook 

evidence. R.T. 571-75. As it was, these facts seem to have 

lain dormant until petitioner's appellate counsel found the 

investigator's reports a year later. Trav. at 45. 

[5] 2. The district court concluded that the evidence was 

not "suppressed" within the meaning of Brady, because the 

defense could and should have discovered it itselC E.R. 63. 

While the defense could have been more diligent-and, 

indeed, the defense lawyer's failure to investigate the phone 

number himself is part of petitioner's ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim-this does not absolve the prosecution of its 

Brady responsibilities. As the Supreme Court reiterated just 

last Term, "[a] rule ... declaring 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system constitutionally 

7The district court is the only court to have addressed the merits of petitioner's Brady claim. The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's 

conviction without being aware of the Brady violation, and the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied review. Petitioner discovered the failure 

to disclose over a year after he was convicted, and then raised the claim 

in his last two state habeas petitions, both of which were summarily dismissed. We interpret the California Supreme Court's summary denial of 

review without citation of authority to be a decision on the merits. Harris 

v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en bane); see 

also Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). The state 

concedes in its brief that the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's 

Brady claim "on the merits," Appellee's Br. at 25, and does not claim that 

petitioner failed to exhaust the claim. 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 6 of 11
16256 GANTT v. ROE 

bound to accord defendants due process." Banks v. Dretke, 

124 S. Ct. 1256, 1275 (2004). Petitioner's case presents an 

even stronger argument for disclosure than does Banks, 

because defense counsel here relied not merely on the force 

of Brady itself, but also-as with the prosecution's claimed 

"open file" policy in Strickler, 527 V.S. at 276 n.13-on affirmative representations by the prosecution that it was keeping 

the defense apprised of developments in the investigation. 

Though defense counsel could have conducted his own investigation, he was surely entitled to rely on the prosecution's 

representation that it was sharing the fruits of the police investigation. 

3. Showing that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence is not enough to entitle petitioner to habeas 

relief; he must also show that he suffered prejudice-that is, 

that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. Strickler, 527 V.S. at 281-82. To this inquiry we now 

turn. 

[6] The state's case against petitioner was relatively weak. 

Putting aside the matchbook evidence, three witnesses tied 

petitioner to the crime. The first was Kevin Shorts, the CPA, 

who testified only that he saw petitioner and Smith near the 

scene of the crime around the time it happened. While he 

identified both defendants at trial and previously from photo-

. lineups, his testimony was heavily impeached. Soon after the 

crime, Shorts had described petitioner as being in his 20s or 

early 30s, whereas petitioner was 46 at the time of the crime. 

See LAPD Follow-up Investigation Form at 1 (Oct. 29, 1992), 

in Trav., Exh. M. Shorts admitted on the stand that petitioner 

did not, in fact, look like he was in his 20s or 30s. RT. 173. 

Moreover, Shorts saw petitioner for only about two seconds, in circumstances where a positive identification would 

have been quite difficult. He testified that, on the morning of 

the crime, he was driving on the sixth level of the parking 

GANTT v. ROE 16257 

structure looking for an empty spot when his way was 

blocked by another car with one man behind the wheel and a 

second man standing next to it. Shorts stopped about ten feet 

behind the car, which soon drove away, leaving the second 

man behind. RT. 155-56. The driver of the car was facing 

away from Shorts but, as the car started moving, the driver 

looked in his rear-view mirror and Shorts, still waiting 

behind, saw the driver's reflection. R T. 171-72. On the stand 

a year and a half later, Shorts testified that he was positive 

that this two-second rear-view mirror reflection was of petitioner because he had "a very good memory with faces." RT. 

180. 

Shorts's good memory for faces did not, however, extend 

to the second man, whom he first identified as someone 

named Wilson by picking him from a photo-lineup. RT. 399. 

The police eventually excluded Wilson as a suspect, and 

Shorts picked Smith out of another photo-lineup. RT. 170, 

352-53.8 The defense also brought out that a widely publicized $40,000 reward had been offered for information lead8The circumstances of the Wilson misidentification may have cast doubt 

on Shorts's recollection and candor, as well as on the police identification 

procedures. When he spoke to the police, Shorts identified the car he saw 

as having an unusual color. Based on the color and, apparently, also on 

license plate numbers that Shorts gave the police after he had himself hypnotized to enhance his recollection of the event, RT. 167-68, 417, the 

police showed Shorts a picture of Wilson's car, which the witness identified as looking like the one he had seen in the garage the morning of the 

crime. Police then showed Shorts a six-pack photo-lineup that included 

Wilson's picture and, sure enough, Shorts selected Wilson as someone 

who "looked like the pedestrian he had seen." RT. 417. During crossexamination, Shorts repeatedly denied having selected Wilson from a 

photo-lineup, but a detective testified that Shorts had in.fact done so. RT. 

170-71, 177,416-17. In his summation, defense counsel hammered hard 

that Shorts had managed to select the owner of the car shown to him by 

the police, even though this person had no connection whatsoever to the 

crime. Defense counsel argued not only that Shorts was an unreliable witness, but also that the police must have been suggestive in their presentation of the photo-lineup of Wilson, and hence of petitioner and Smith as 

well. R.T. 494-95. 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 7 of 11
16258 GANTT v. ROE 

ing to the arrest and conviction of a suspect in connection 

with the Vardham killing, RT. 363, 399, suggesting that 

Shorts's extraordinary efforts to help the police, including 

getting hypnotized to enhance his memory, showed more of 

an interest in collecting the reward than in telling the truth. 

[7] The testimony of the parking lot attendant was not 

merely unhelpful to the prosecution, it may have helped the 

defense. The attendant did not see the crime, nor could he 

identify petitioner or Smith as having been in the garage on 

the day of the crime. What he did say was that a car with two 

black men loosely fitting the description of petitioner and 

Smith had exited the garage at about the time of the crime, 

having been there five minutes. RT. 228, 231-32; see page 

16250 & n.2 supra. For those two men to have committed the 

crime, they must have entered the garage, driven up to the 

sixth level, accosted and robbed the victim-stabbing him 19 

times as he tried to defend himself-and then driven out 

within the span of five minutes so their ticket could be 

marked as "no pay." 

Implausible as this might be standing on its own, it clashes 

with Shorts's testimony that he saw Smith twice, once while 

looking for a parking space and again four or five minutes 

later, while sitting in his car reading his mail. RT. 159-60, 

175. The crime almost certainly wasn't committed during 

these minutes, because Shorts (who was parked on the level 

where Vardham was killed) had his car door open while he 

was reading his mail, yet didn't hear any screams or other 

sounds of an attack, nor did he see the other black man (the 

driver) return to the scene. 

A detective testified that it would take about one minute to 

drive from the garage entrance to the sixth level, RT. 141-42; 

presumably, it would take some similar time to get back down 

again, for a total of at least two minutes. When added to the 

time Smith was on the sixth level on foot, according to Shorts, 

that would exceed the five minutes the car was in the garage. 

GANTT v. ROE 16259 

This would leave no time for petitioner and Smith to commit 

the crime or for the pedestrian to get back into the car at a 

lower level so the parking lot attendant could observe two 

black men in the exiting no-pay car exactly five minutes after 

it entered. The parking lot attendant's testimony at best adds 

nothing to the prosecution's case and at worst further undermines Shorts's testimony. 

[8] The only witness who claimed to have seen the crime 

was Rosemond. But Rosemond was far from an ideal witness. 

He was a thrice-convicted car burglar who had been up all of 

the previous night smoking crack, and who was in the garage 

the morning of the murder to steal car radios to fuel his drug 

habit. He claimed that the police offered to help him getinto 

a prison drug treatment program and have him incarcerated 

out of state "for [his] protection," and they threatened to 

charge him with the murder if he didn't tell them everything 

he knew. E.R 43-45; RT. 246-47, 291-92. Rosemond testified that, though he saw petitioner beating up (not stabbing) 

the victim, he didn't intervene because it was none of his 

business-but he did come back minutes later to see what was 

in it for him, and he picked the dying victim's ATM card off 

the ground instead of calling for help. When the police 

arrived, they didn't find Rosemond at the scene and weren't 

aware of his claim that he had witnessed the crime until two 

months later. E.R 23-25. Shorts did not testify to seeing 

Rosemond, though they were supposedly on the same level of 

the parking garage at about the time of the crime, nor did 

Rosemond claim to have seen Shorts. 

[9] Given Shorts's and the parking lot attendant's independently inconclusive and jointly inconsistent testimony, and 

putting the matchbook evidence aside, the jury may have been 

reluctant to find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 

based on Rosemond's testimony alone. Indeed, the jurors 

could have suspected that Rosemond himself killed Vardham, 

since just as much linked him to the crime scene as the two 

defendants. This underscores the importance of the matchCase: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 8 of 11
16260 GANTI v. ROE 

book evidence, which provided a circumstantial anchor for 

Rosemond's story. While the handwriting evidence was not 

particularly strong, it could have provided a sufficient basis 

for concluding that the. number in the matchbook was written 

by Vardham, and that the matchbook must therefore have 

been taken by Vardham's assailant at the time of the crime. 

[10] The evidence the prosecution did not disclose to the 

defense was therefore crucially significant. As discussed 

above, this evidence-particularly the fact that Ferdous didn't 

know Vardham-could have severely undermined the handwriting testimony.9 Had the defense attorney known about the 

police interview with Ferdous and called him to the stand, and 

had Ferdous told the same story under oath, the'jury might 

have come to doubt the handwriting expert's somewhat tentative conclusions. The jury then might have found that, 

because Ferdous didn't know Vardham and didn't give him 

the phone number, Vardham didn't have the Shalimar matchbook in his possession when he was murdered. 

[11] The prosecutor spent a good part of his summation 

arguing the importance of the matchbook. RT. 471-74. We 

also know that the jury thought carefully about the matchbook 

because it submitted a question about it: "Regarding the 

phone number inside the matchbook, did anyone at this num- . 

ber know anyone else connected with this case, i.e., [the] victim, his friends, family or Mr. Smith?" RT. 270. The jury was 

thus well aware of the matchbook's significance, and struggled to connect it to anyone involved in the crime. Had the 

jurors concluded that the person most likely to have given out 

the phone number did not give it to Vardham, this would 

9We note that handwriting analysis is, even in the best of circumstances, 

not an exact science. A highly respected district judge has concluded that 

such evidence must be used with caution because it has "serious problems" under the Daubert and Kumho Tire standard for scientific reliability. See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 (D. Mass. 1999) 

(Gertner, J.). 

GANTI v. ROE 16261 

probably have destroyed the matchbook as a link between 

petitioner and the victim, leaving no physical evidence tying 

petitioner to the crime. The jury would then have had to convict based on Rosemond's highly questionable testimony 

alone. 

[12] The jurors had trouble convicting petitioner even as it 

was. On the third day of deliberations, they sent a note indicating that they were "hopelessly deadlocked." E.R 37. The 

next afternoon, the jury requested readbacks of several pieces 

of testimony, including the handwriting expert's statements. 

E.R 39. The jury was clearly struggling to reach a verdict, 

and they may well not have convicted without the matchbook 

evidence. Petitioner was therefore prejudiced by the prosecution's failure to disclose the exculpatory matchbook evidence, 

in particular the evidence about the meeting with Ferdous. 

There is a " 'reasonable probability' of a different result" had 

the evidence been disclosed. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (Blackmun, J.)). By failing to disclose this evidence, the prosecution thus violated its obligation under Brady. The contrary conclusion of the state courts 

was an unreasonable application of well-established federal 

law. See 28 U.S.c. § 2254(d)(1); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). 

4. Petitioner raises other serious issues challenging his conviction. For instance, he alleges additional prosecutorial misconduct: During closing argument, the prosecutor 

mischaracterized him as a drug dealer. Appellant's Br. at 

29-30 (filed Sept. 23, 1999). Also, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel: His attorney failed to produce his own handwriting expert at trial, failed to object to the prosecutor's 

mischaracterization of petitioner as a drug dealer, failed to put 

petitioner on the stand and failed to investigate the matchbook. Id. at 35-54. While these allegations are not trivial, we 

do not address them. Because we conclude that petitioner's 

trial was constitutionally deficient as a result of the Brady violation, we need not deal with these other issues, which are 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 9 of 11
16262 GANTT v. ROE 

unlikely to recur if there is a retrial. If the case returns to us 

ina subsequent appeal by petitioner, we will address the 

issues at that time. . 

* * * 

The case is remanded so that the district court may determine whether the state disputes that· the prosecution failed to 

disclose to the defense that neither Khan nor Ferdous recognized Vardham's photo. If the state does dispute this, the district court shall hold an evidentiary hearing and resolve the 

dispute. If petitioner's claim that this evidence was not disclosed is either conceded or found to be true, the district court 

shall issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus ordering that 

petitioner be released unless he is retried within a reasonable 

time to be set by the district court. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 10 of 11
PRINTED FOR 

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE-U.S. COURTS 

BY WEST-SAN FRANCISCO 

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted 

© 2004 by West, a Thomson Company. 

Case: 99-55477 11/22/2004 ID: 5242702 DktEntry: 67 Page: 11 of 11