Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00281/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00281-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANETRA A JOHNSON, CASE NO. CV F 09-0281 LJO DLB

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

Plaintiff, DISMISS (Doc. 37)

vs.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,

et. al, 

Defendants.

 /

On March 12, 2010, the defendants in this action moved for an order dismissing the complaint

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Janetra A. Johnson (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights and employment action. Plaintiff filed an opposition on 

April 12, 2010. Defendants filed a reply on April 23, 2010. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), this matter 1

was submitted on the pleadings without oral argument and the hearing was vacated. Having considered

the moving, opposition and reply papers, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of plaintiff’s employment with the National Guard and the United States

Air Force Reserve. Plaintiff alleges various employment discrimination claims, tort claims and other

constitutional or statutory claims arising from her employment.

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges that she was a member of the National

Guard of the United States, the Air National Guard of California and the Air Force Reserve. (Doc. 20,

 The opposition was untimely under Local Rule 230, but the Court elected to consider plaintiff’s arguments. The

1

Court granted defendants an extension of time for defendants to respond to the opposition.

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TAC p. 3:2-5.) Plaintiff was a National Guard Military Technician - a hybrid military and civilian

position. (Doc. 39, Plaintiff’s opposition p.6:137.) Beginning in 2003, plaintiff was in the Logistics

Readiness Squadron, as a GS-9, Logistics Manager. (Doc. 20, TAC p.3:7-10.) In 2005, plaintiff applied

for a GS-11 Budget Analyst position, but was not selected on a “discriminatory basis” because she is

black. (Doc. 20, TAC p.12:20-25, p.13: 3-6.) 

Plaintiff learned she was pregnant in March 2007 and began having health issues. She alleges

she was overworked and her pleas for assistance were unanswered. (Doc. 20, TAC p.18:3-17.) In

June/July 2006, plaintiff took time off due to a pregnancy. (Doc. 20, TAC p.14-16.) She says as a result

of her pregnancy she suffered employment discrimination and harassment. (Doc. 20, TAC p.17.) She

also alleges that when she informed her supervisor of the medical need to take time off, the supervisor

pried into her private medical records. (Doc. 20, TAC p. 19:3-16.) 

On July 9, 2006, plaintiff alleges that she met with a military flight doctor which resulted in

misdiagnosis, malpractice and neglect. She returned to work on July 10, 2006 and was under

“surveillance.” (Doc. 20, TAC p. 21.) She took maternity leave on October 24, 2006 and returned to

work on January 1, 2007. (Doc. 20, TAC p. 21:23-26.) Upon her return, she tried for the GS11

Logistics Management position but did not get the position. (Doc. 20, TAC p.21-22.) She resigned at

the end of 2007 and in February 2008 started working in a temporary position in the services offices for

the Mission Support Group. (Doc. 20, TAC p. 23-24.) She applied for a GS-07 Management and

Program Assistant in the same office. She did not receive this job and on May 2, 2008, she filed a

complaint with the “Technician and MilitaryEO offices.” (Doc. 20, TAC p. 24:21-22.) She alleges that

due process was violated in connection with the processing of this complaint. (Doc. 20, TAC p.32-33.)

She also faults the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission regarding review of “agency resources

and procedures.” (Doc. 20, TAC p. 38.) On or about May 9, 2008, her temporary employment was

terminated. (Id. at 24:23-24.)

Plaintiff alleges that following claims:

1. Adverse Actions and Unpaid Wages

2. Tort of civil conspiracy

3. Breach of confidence

4. Discrimination - Psychiatric

5. Discrimination - Race

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6. Discrimination - Sex

7. Discrimination - Retaliation/reprisal

8. Distress - negligent and intentional infliction of emotional and physical distress

9. Due process violations

10. Harassment, intimidation and fear

11. Medical misdiagnosis and malpractice

12. Misrepresentation - tort of appropriation

13. Neglect of affirmative employment plan

14. Negligent hiring, supervision, training and retention

15. Slander and defamation

16. Violation of Privacy Act and HIPAA laws and directives

17. Wrongful termination

18. Noncompliance with personnel programs; grievance, merit, health, leave, privacy, Title

VI and VII

19. Other violations.

Each of the named defendants are military personnel, of various rank, who during the course of the

alleged harm to plaintiff acted within “the course and scope” of their employment. 

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(b)(1) - Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

A party may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a whole, it appears

to lack jurisdiction either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec.

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979) th

Defendants contend plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Fundamentally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). The presumption is that

federal courts are “without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Fifty Associates v.

Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9 Cir. 1970). Limits on federal jurisdiction must th

neither be disregarded nor evaded. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98

S.Ct. 2396 (1978). 

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen,

511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396. This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient

allegations to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action.

McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); F.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(1). When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the complaint

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are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from

the face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co., 594 F.2d at 733; Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F.Supp.

899, 903 (E.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9 Cir. 1992). th

B. Rule 12(b)(6) - Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

pleadings set forth in the complaint. A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion

to dismissfor failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations of the complaint

in question, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and

resolves all doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir.

2008); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

A claim has facial plausibility,"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Ashcroft v. Iqbal, – U.S.

–, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual

content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling

the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

A court is “free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences

and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Farm Credit Services v.

American State Bank, 339 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “While a complaint attacked

by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct.

1955, 1964-65 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when

construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a

cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In

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practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127

S.Ct. at 1969. If a plaintiff fails to state a claim, a court need not permit an attempt to amend a

complaint if “it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts.” 

Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

C. All of Plaintiff’s Common Law Tort Claims are Barred by the Feres Doctrine

Plaintiff alleges numerous common law tort claims. Defendants argue that all of plaintiff’s tort

claims arise in the course of her service in the National Guard. All of plaintiff’s alleged torts, including

her claim for medical malpractice, arose in the context of her service in the National Guard. Therefore,

defendants argue all of her claims are barred by the Feres doctrine.2

1. Feres v. United States Overview

In Feres, the Supreme Court carved out a significant exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.3

Under the principles established in Feres v. United States, a person may not sue the government for

injuries incident to service in the military. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 S.Ct. 153,

(1950) (“[T]he Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen

where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”). Courts applying the

Feres doctrine have given it a broad reach, barring recovery by members of the armed services for

injuries that may not appear to be closely related to their military service or status. Jackson v. U.S., 110

F.3d 1484, 1486-87 (9 Cir. 1997) ("practically any suit that implicates the military judgments and th

decisions runs the risk of colliding with Feres"). 

Whether the Feres doctrine bars an FTCA claim is a question of law. Jackson v. United States,

110 F.3d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir.1997). Suitsthat implicates military judgments and decisions runs the risk

Defendants also argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for the various tort claims.

2

Defendant present declarations from personnel who are responsible for managing tort claims and who attest plaintiff did not

file any such claim. The Court does not reach this argument because the motion can be resolved without considering

testimony.

"The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious conduct by the United States." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Craft,

3

157 F.3d 697, 716 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). The FTCA is a broad waiver of the federal government's sovereign

immunity: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner

and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances...." 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also 28 U.S.C. §§

1346(b)(1), 2679.

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of colliding with Feres doctrine of intramilitary immunity. Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800 (9th Cir.

1997). In Bowen, plaintiff's status as member of National Guard triggered application of the Feres

doctrine of intramilitary immunity to bar his tort and constitutional claims against federal and state

militaryofficials, arising from involuntarytermination of plaintiff's tour of dutyin Active Guard/Reserve

(AGR) program. His claims were barred under Feres even though he was serving as member of Alaska

Air National Guard under direct authority of state officers, and he was not on active duty with United

States Air Force Reserve. Indeed, members of the National Guard and the Reserves are servicemembers

for purpose of the Feres doctrine barring members of the armed services from bringing tort suits against

the government for injuries that arise out of activity incident to their military service. Jackson, 110 F.3d

at 1486.

2. Common Law Tort Actions are Barred by Feres

Plaintiff’s common law tort claims are barred by the Feres doctrine. Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d

395, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 55, 102 L.Ed.2d 33 (1988). In Stauber,

plaintiff and defendants were civilian mechanics employed by Alaska Army National Guard. Plaintiff

sued three fellow employees of a similar status for intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel.

Stauber, 837 F.2d at 396. Plaintiff alleged that over a five-year period, the three defendants had

harassed him both on- and off-base, during regular work-duty hours and after hours, and made

statements to third parties that harmed his reputation. The Court held that the Feres applied because the

parties were subject to the direct command of active-duty military officers, the parties' conduct was

subject to military discipline and the parties shared the same direct military relationships whether on

civilian or military status.

Here, plaintiff alleges claims of conspiracy, defamation, slander, wrongful termination, breach

of confidence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and misrepresentation. 

Each of these claims arise from her military employment and as the direct result of conduct of her

militarysupervisors. She challenges direct militaryauthorityand conduct. Accordingly, all of plaintiff’s

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common law claims are barred by the Feres doctrine.4

3. Medical malpractice claims are barred by the Feres doctrine

Medical malpractice claims also are barred bythe Feres doctrine. Jackson v. U.S., 110 F.3d 1484

(9th Cir. 1997). In Jackson, an inactive reservist brought a medical malpractice action after he had cut

his hand during inactive-duty training and was examined and treated at a Navy hospital. The doctors

did not tell him that he had to have surgery within 7-10 days of the injury to avoid permanent nerve

damage. Id. at 1486. The Court held that under Feres, a service member cannot recover for medical

malpractice arising out of care given in a military hospital.

Here, plaintiff also alleges medical malpractice. Plaintiff alleges that Fresno Air National Guard

failed to provide her the necessary care for her health, pregnancy, and stress. (Doc. 20, TAC p.27.) She

alleges that the medical clinic was negligent in its program and services and did more harm than good. 

(Doc. 20, TAC p.27.) Plaintiff’s claim arises from the care she was given at the militarymedical clinic. 

Accordingly, her claim is barred by Feres.

4. No Title VII Claims for Military Personnel

The Feres doctrine usuallyarises in connection with the FTCA, but its applicability is not limited

to that context. Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705 (9 Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 815, 118 S.Ct. 62, th

(Feres applied to Title VII action brought by member of Marine Corps). Specifically, uniformed

members of the military cannot bring a Title VII cause of action. Gonzalez v. Department of Army, 718

F.2d 926, 928 (9 Cir. 1983) (neither Title VII nor its standards are applicable to persons who enlist or th

The Feres doctrine does not bar every tort claim a member of the military might bring against the United

4

States. In considering whether the Feres doctrine applies, the courts examine the totality of the circumstances and consider

several factors: the place where the negligent act occurred, the duty status of the plaintiff at the time, the benefits accruing

to the plaintiff from his military status, and the nature of the plaintiff's activities at the time of the negligent act. McConnell

v. United States, 478 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.2007). Whether a service member's injury is "incident to service" and

therefore, barred under the Feres doctrine, the Ninth Circuit employs a case-by-case approach, addressing four factors:(1)

the place where the negligent act occurred, (2) the duty status of the plaintiff when the negligent act occurred, (3) the benefits

accruing to the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's status as a service member, and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities at

the time the negligent act occurred. McConnell v. U.S., 478 F.3d at 1095. For instance, a military member is injured or killed

while enjoying recreational or medical benefits without any connection between those benefits and person's miliary status

may not be barred by Feres. Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844 (9th Cir.1996) (a soldier who fell into a steep wastewater

drainage channel after an off-duty afternoon of relaxation and beer drinking). Feres doctrine will not bar a suit when the

serviceperson's injuries have no relationship to military duties. Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 809, 115 S.Ct. 58 (1994). In the instant case, however, each of plaintiff’s tort claims arise from some act related to her

on-the-military-job activities. She challenges conduct directly arising from her military service. Accordingly, Feres bars

these tort claims.

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apply for enlistment in any of the armed forces of the United States.); compare Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dept.

of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1484 (9 Cir. 1997) (civilian employees of the Army, Navy or Air th

Force have the same right to pursue Title VII actions as other federal employees.) Title VII applies to

Guard technicians except when they challenge personnel actions integrally related to the military's

unique structure. Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 748 (9th Cir. 1995). The Feres doctrine is applicable

"whenever a legal action 'would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding management,

discipline, supervision, and control of members of the armed forces of the United States.'” Zaputil v.

Cowgill, 335 F.3d 885, 887 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Here, plaintiff challenges numerous military management and supervisory decisions made by

different military personnel, allegedly due to her race, her pregnancy and her other disabilities. She

alleges she was “non-selected” to certain positions within the California Air National Guard, based upon

fitness criteria and other selection criteria. (See e.g, TAC p.21-22 (not selected because she wanted to

become an officer.)) She claims she was “non-selected” to the Budget Analysis position in 2007 and

they hired someone with accounting experience and who was a member of the fighter squadron. She

alleges that the military role was a job requirement. She claims non-selection to the Management and

Program Assistant in the Services Office. She complains that the position involved a dual status military

technician position affecting both civilian employment and militarygrade/rank. Plaintiff challenges each

of the decisions made by her military supervisors. 

This Court is without jurisdiction to review her Title VII claims. Each claim involves a review

of decisions by military supervisors and that supervisor’s decision regarding management and control

of members of the armed forces. Accordingly, the Title VII claims are barred by Feres.

5. Sex/Pregnancy Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff alleges discrimination claims related to her gender and pregnancy. Plaintiff alleges that

she took time off work for pregnancy related problems, she returned and was “passed up for a promotion

within her office, her permanent employment and expert status removed, and she was prohibited from

seeking employment outside the office and was harassed and subjected to excessive physical fitness

test.” (Doc. 20, TAC p . 17-18.)

Here, plaintiff challenges personnel action related to the military structure. She challenges

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conduct related to receiving a promotion. She challenges conduct related to her employment status. She

challenges other aspects of her employment relationship. These claims are related to the decision

regarding the military structure and decision making process. As such, they are barred by Feres.

D. Violation of Privacy Act and HIPAA Laws and Directives

Plaintiff challenges the disclosure of certain medical information under the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). HIPAA, however, does not provide any private

right of action. U.S. v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926 (9 Cir. 2009); Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC,

th

499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir.2007) (“HIPAA itself provides no right of action.”). Accordingly,

plaintiff’s HIPAA claim is barred. 

Plaintiff alleges that the “Privacy Act” has been violated. Defendants argue that this is the

Privacy Act of 1974. Defendants argue that the Privacy Act claims are both time barred and that she

failed to exhaust.

The PrivacyAct of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a et seq. prohibits federal agencies from disclosing “any

record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to

another agency” without the consent of “the individual to whom the record pertains,” unless the

disclosure falls within one or more enumerated exceptions to the Act. Id. § 552a(b). The Act also creates

a private cause of action against an agency for its wilful or intentional violation of the Act that has “an

adverse effect on an individual.” Id. § § 552a(g)(1)(D).

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff alleges defendant Stine entered false information regarding her military

fitness test but she does not allege that she exhausted her administrative remedies. 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a precondition to bringing an action for damages

under the Privacy Act. See Hewitt v. Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1379 (9 Cir. 1986) comparing §

th

552a(g)(1)(A) (action for order to amend record permitted when agency review resulted in denial of

request or agency refused to review) with § 552a(g)(1)(C) (permits action where agency's failure to

maintain proper records results in adverse determination against individual). 

The statute of limitations for a Privacy Act claim, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5), commences at the time

that a person knows or has reason to know that the request has been denied. Englerius v. Veterans

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Admin., 837 F.2d 895, 897 (9 Cir. 1988). The Privacy Act has a two year statute of limitations. 5

th

U.S.C. §552a(g)(5).

Plaintiff claims that medical records were disclosed on June 26, 2006, and medical examination

in July 2006. (Doc. 20, TAC p.18-19, p. 20:23.) Plaintiff alleges that the medical information was

disclosed in June 2006. (Doc. 20, TAC p. 25.) Plaintiff alleges that “she took her concerns to

management and Stines [sic] child was removed from the childcare program and Johnson [sic] children

was place [sic] in the program.” (Doc. No. 20 at 26:18-21). Plaintiff’s claim that Stine entered false

information into the computer system regarding her performance on the military fitness test to tamper

with her chances of being promoted is not cognizable as she makes no claim that she exhausted her

administrative remedies. Because she did not file this lawsuit until February 13, 2009, no claim can be

stated for this alleged of the Privacy Act. 

E. Violation of the Family Medical Leave Act

Plaintiff alleges that she was denied medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. (Doc.

20, TAC p. 37.)

FMLA grants private and federal employees an entitlement to periods of leave for certain

enumerated circumstances. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); 5 U.S.C. § 6382(a)(1). Title II of the

FMLA, 5 U.S.C. § 6381 et seq., governs leave for federal civil service employees with more than twelve

months of service; Title I, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., governs leave for private employees and federal

employees not covered by Title II. See Russell v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Title II does not provide a private right of action to remedy a federal employer’s action violating FMLA

rights. See Russell, 191 F.3d at 1019 (the absence of an express waiver of the government's sovereign

immunity in Title II of the FMLA bars private suits for violations of its provisions.); accord Cavicchi

v. Secretary of Treasury, 2004 WL 4917357 (11 Cir. 2004). th

Plaintiff was a federal employee at the time of the alleged denial of her FMLA rights. As a

federal employee, she may not pursue a claim pursuant to the FMLA. Accordingly, the FMLA claims

will be dismissed.

F. Rehabilitation Act

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims are barred by the one year statute of

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limitations.

Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a Federal agency is required to make reasonable

accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified handicapped employee, unless

the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on its operations.

29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a); see 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Act requires that federal agencies "reasonably

accommodate an employee's disability." McLean v. Runyon, 222 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.2000). A

one-year statute of limitations applies to the Rehabilitation Act Section 504 claim. Douglas v.

California Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812, 823 (9 Cir. 2001). th

No failure is alleged which occurred within one year of filing the complaint. Plaintiff filed her

complaint on February 13, 2009. Plaintiff does not allege any failure to accommodate any alleged

disability that occurred after February 13, 2008. The Rehabilitation Act claim is barred by the statute

of limitations for events that occurred more than one year prior, on February 12, 2008, to the filing of

the complaint.

G. Title VI and Due Process

Plaintiff alleges violation of Title VI for discrimination in her employment and that this

discrimination violated her Due Process. (Doc. 20, TAC p. 10:6; 34:18.)

Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandates, “No person in the United

States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied

the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Section 601 bans recipients of federal funding from

intentionally discriminating against individuals “on the ground of race, color, or national origin” in

connection with any program or activity covered by Title VI. Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d

846, 850 (9 Cir. 2009). Under Title VI, Congress abrogated state immunity from damages under Title th

VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d

517 (2001). Thus, Title VI does not apply to federal agencies implementing federal programs. Maloney

v. Social Security Admin., 517 F.3d 70 (2 Cir. 2008). Thus, plaintiff does not have a claims under Title nd

VI.

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H. Dismissal of Claims against Individual Defendants

Plaintiff has alleged claims against numerous individual defendants, all of whom are alleged to

be military officers “acting within the course and scope of [his/her] employment.”5

Federal employees are not personally liable for torts committed while acting within the scope

of their employment. In actions on tort claims against named federal officers or employees, if the

AttorneyGeneral certifies theywere acting in their “official capacity” at the time in question, the United

States must be substituted as the sole defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).

Here, the United States does not provide the certification. It seeks, however, to dismiss the

individuals on the grounds that the allegations merely allege wrongful conduct by the individuals “in the

course and scope” of their employment. Thus, the proper party is the United States, assuming a claim

could be alleged. 

The Court agrees. The U.S. Government is, of course, the real party in interest as to claims

regarding U.S. properties or interests. See United States v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 765 F.Supp. 643, 646 

(D OR 1991). Federal employees are not personally liable for torts committed while acting within the

scope of their employment. The real party in interest is the United States Government and the exclusive

remedy is an action against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1);

Billings v. United States, 57 F3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the individual defendants will

be dismissed.

I. The Mindes Test

Plaintiff argues that her claims are judicable, notwithstanding the Feres doctrine, because of the

four part test stated in Mindes v. Seaman. 

In Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit adopted a standard for

determining whether a court should review internal military affairs. Under the Mindestest, as modified

by the Ninth Circuit, a person challenging a military decision generally first must satisfy two threshold

elements before a court can determine whether review of his claims is appropriate: 

Plaintiff alleges claims against the following individuals: Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley, Maj. Gen

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William H Wade; Col. Johnathan Flaugher; Col. David Bandini; Lt. Col. John Cotter; Lt. Col mark Groves; Maj. Jahromi

Shahzad, Jam. Raymond Greer; Lt Michael Yamamoto; CMS Michael L. Hunt; CMS Johnny Leal; SMS Michelle Fields;

MSG James Patton; and MSG Shirley Stine. (Doc. 20, TAC p. 3-7.)

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(a) a violation of [a recognized constitutional right] a federal statute, or military

regulations, and (b) exhaustion of available intraservice remedies. 

Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068 (9 Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff alleges both of these threshold th

requirements, a court then weighs four factors to determine whether judicial review of the claims is

appropriate. These factors include:

(1) The nature and strength of the plaintiff's claim.

(2) The potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused. 

(3) The extent of interference with military functions. 

(4) The extent to which military discretion or expertise is involved. 

Wilkins v. U.S., 279 F.3d 782, 788 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Arguably, plaintiff has alleged a violation of constitutional right, or a federal statute applicable

to the military or a military regulation. Plaintiff arguably alleges exhaustion of available intraservice

remedies, one of the threshold requirements. She alleges she submitted a complaint to the Joint Forces

Headquarters, California Air National Guard that she pursued her claims through any intraservice

process or other administrative process. (Doc. 20, TAC p.33-35.) For purposes of this motion, the Court

considers the threshold requirements met.

In the present case, the Court finds that the four factors in the second phase of the test, on

balance, do not favor a finding that plaintiff's employment claims are reviewable by this Court. The last

two factors dispositively weigh against review. Plaintiff's claims concerning her treatment within the

military structure, lack of promotion and supervision and failure to transfer are a personnel matters, and

the facts alleged do not show that her interest in judicial review of these personnel decisions is stronger

than the National Guard's interest in making decisions based on military standards and needs. The third

factor, the extent of interference with military functions, and the fourth factor, the extent to which

military discretion or expertise is involved, are generally considered together. Military discretion and

expertise are plainly involved in the personnel decision at issue. It is not the judiciary's role in our

system of government to enter the sphere of the military and determine what constitutes adequate

training. Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1075. “Courts have declined to review a variety of employment actions

involving military personnel because, in the military, ‘overriding demands of discipline and duty’

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prevail, demands which do not have a counterpart in civilian life.” Mier, 57 F.3d at 749. The Ninth

Circuit has stated that “change in duty assignments are subject to the non-review ability rule.”Covington

v. Anderson, 487 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir.1973). The Ninth Circuit adopted this rule because “[a]ny

attempt of the federal courts, absent some direction or permission from Congress to do so, to take over

review of military duty assignments, commands and promotions would obviously be fraught with

practical difficulties for both the armed forces and the courts.” Id. (quoting Arnheiter v. Ignatius, 292

F.Supp. 911, 921 (N.D.Cal.1968)). The Court would be required to scrutinize numerous personnel

decisions by many individuals as they relate to plaintiff’s employment which would involve the very

sensitive area of military expertise and discretion. Accordingly, plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional

claims regarding her employment are dismissed as nonreviewable.

J. Leave to Amend

Typically, leave to amend is freely given under the Rule 15. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, this

Court “should freely give leave when just so requires.” Here, plaintiff has had two prior opportunities

to amend the complaint to address the same challenged allegations. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss

will be granted without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismissis GRANTED with prejudice. The clerk of this

Court is directed to CLOSE this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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