Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07138/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07138-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1998 Decided February 16, 1999

No. 97-7138

Mergentime Corporation, et al.,

Appellants/Cross-Appellees

v.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Consolidated with

No. 97-7139

No. 97-7140

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cv01055)

Philip Allen Lacovara argued the cause for appellant/

cross-appellee Mergentime Corporation. With him on the

briefs were Gary A. Orseck and Mark S. Davies.

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Richard K. Willard argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee Perini Corporation. With him on the briefs were

Stephen A. Fennell, Brian J. Leske and John R. Keys, Jr.

Robert S. Fischler entered an appearance.

W. Stanfield Johnson argued the cause for appellees/crossappellants. With him on the briefs were George D. Ruttinger, Gerard J. Stief, Robert J. Kniaz and Robert L. Polk.

Before: Henderson, Randolph and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: This case requires us to interpret

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63, which applies when a

district judge becomes unable to proceed and is replaced by a

successor judge. The original judge in this case presided

over a 45-day bench trial, during which the parties presented

more than 50 witnesses and introduced more than 4,000

exhibits. Because the original judge became terminally ill

after the close of evidence and could only make partial

findings of fact and conclusions of law before he died, the

successor judge faced two discrete tasks: adjudicating posttrial motions challenging the original judge's findings and

conclusions, and making findings and conclusions of his own

regarding the unresolved issues. Stating that he would not

"second guess" the original judge's findings and conclusions,

the successor judge refused to consider the parties' post-trial

motions. Then, without allowing the parties to recall witnesses, the successor judge made further findings and conclusions from the record. Because we hold that the successor

judge's refusal to adjudicate post-trial motions and to consider recalling witnesses violated Rule 63, we reverse.

I

In 1985, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority awarded a $50.9 million contract to build the Shaw

Street station and associated tunnels on Metro's Green Line

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to a joint venture consisting of two construction companies,

Mergentime Corporation and Perini Corporation, appellants

in this case. WMATA soon awarded the joint venture a

second contract to build the Green Line's U Street station

and associated tunnels for $44.3 million. The contracts, which

contained standard provisions governing contract modification, default termination, and dispute resolution, called for the

completion of the Shaw Street work by March 1989 and the U

Street work by August 1989.

From the outset, both projects experienced unexpected

difficulties that caused substantial delays and cost overruns.

For example, the Department of Public Works rejected the

contractors' request to close Rhode Island Avenue (as

WMATA's bid invitation had specified). This required significant changes in utility relocation plans that were important to

the early stages of construction of the Shaw Street station.

The contractors also encountered unanticipated soil conditions

as they tunneled north from the Shaw Street station, requiring the use of time-consuming and expensive grouting techniques to stabilize the soil.

Invoking the "changes" clause of the contracts, the contractors submitted claims for equitable adjustments to the contract price seeking compensation for expenses resulting from

these unforeseen problems. WMATA paid some of these

claims, but slowly. By early 1988, the contractors were

running a deficit of over $8.6 million on the Shaw Street

project alone. To make matters worse, the contractors dissolved their joint venture at the end of 1987, though they did

not immediately inform WMATA. Mergentime bought out

Perini's interest for $1.5 million. This capital outlay, coupled

with the fact that Perini was no longer making capital contributions to the project, worsened Mergentime's financial

straits.

In April 1989, the contractors sued WMATA in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging

that WMATA's failure to pay their claims for additional work

constituted a breach of the Shaw Street contract. They

sought $18.5 million in damages and a declaration that they

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had no obligation to continue working. In the meantime,

work on the two projects slowed significantly. By the following summer, Mergentime had drastically reduced its workforce, falling weeks if not months behind schedule.

In an effort to rejuvenate the projects, the contractors and

WMATA entered into a written agreement in August 1989,

which, recognizing that most of the completion dates in the

original contracts had passed, established revised "milestone"

completion dates of September 1 and December 15, 1990 for

Shaw Street and U Street, respectively. The contractors

promised to use their "best efforts" to complete the projects

by those dates in exchange for WMATA's promise to pay the

contractors $4.4 million against their outstanding reimbursement claims and to use its "best efforts" to settle the remainder of those claims as promptly as possible. WMATA also

agreed to relinquish any right to terminate the contract for

default based on events that had occurred prior to the

agreement. In return, the contractors agreed not to stop

working based on prior events, including WMATA's failure to

process their reimbursement claims. Apart from the reciprocal waivers of the right to terminate, the agreement expressly

disclaimed any intent by the parties to relinquish their claims

in the pending lawsuit, which the parties asked the district

court to hold in abeyance.

Mergentime resumed work in September. It progressed

satisfactorily for a few months, but by December work had

once again slowed substantially. Mergentime complained to

WMATA that because of its cash flow problems it would be

unable to complete the work unless WMATA processed its

outstanding reimbursement claims. In response, WMATA

gave Mergentime an advance of $1 million in December 1989,

and another advance of $1.6 million in February 1990. Although these advances briefly revitalized Mergentime's progress, each burst of energy was short-lived. By the spring of

1990, Mergentime had all but ceased working at both sites.

Asserting that the September and December 1990 milestone dates were no longer attainable, WMATA issued "show

cause" letters to the contractors. (By then WMATA knew

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that the contractors had dissolved their joint venture, but it

was not entirely clear whether Perini, which remains a party

to this litigation, retained its obligations under the original

contracts.) Responding to the show cause letters and continuing to insist that further progress hinged on the settlement of outstanding claims, Mergentime demanded an additional $7.9 million as a condition of returning to work.

WMATA terminated the contracts for default on May 11,

1990.

Reviving their dormant lawsuit, the contractors added

claims for breach of the U Street contract, breach of the

August 1989 agreement, and wrongful termination. WMATA

counterclaimed to recover so-called "excess reprocurement

costs"--expenses incurred in hiring other contractors to complete the work covered by the contracts. During a 45-day

bench trial, the parties presented over 50 witnesses and

submitted over 4,000 exhibits.

Following the close of evidence, the district judge developed a terminal illness. As the illness worsened, he continued to work heroically, issuing a 251-page opinion containing

partial findings of fact and conclusions of law in July 1993.

Observing that "[t]his case is about how not to build a subway

system," the judge held that WMATA justifiably terminated

the contracts for default and was entitled to $16.5 million in

excess reprocurement costs, that the contractors' Shaw

Street reimbursement claims had "substantial, if not complete, merit," and that the contractors had failed to establish

their entitlement to prove those claims with the beneficial

"total cost" accounting method. Mergentime Corp. v.

WMATA, No. 89-1055, at 1, 242, 247, 249 (D.D.C. July 30,

1993) ("July 1993 Order"). The judge said that he was unable

to quantify the contractors' entitlement to reimbursement for

its Shaw Street claims or to draw any conclusions regarding

the merits of the contractors' U Street claims. See id. at

248-49. The judge died two days later.

After the case was reassigned to a successor judge, the

contractors filed motions to amend the original judge's findings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 and for a new

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trial under Rule 59. WMATA filed a motion to correct

"inadvertent omissions" in the original judge's damages calculations. The parties also filed briefs suggesting procedures

for resolving the issues left open by the original judge.

Following more than a year of inaction, the parties asked

the successor judge to schedule a status conference to discuss

the court's plan for proceeding. Instead of holding a status

conference, the successor judge issued an order summarily

denying all pending motions, explaining that he would not

reconsider any issues already decided by the original judge

because he was only "attempting to finish the case as [the

original judge] would have had he survived long enough."

Mergentime Corp. v. WMATA, No. 89-1055, at 4 (D.D.C.

Apr. 7, 1995) ("April 1995 Order"). The order also established a two-round briefing schedule with respect to the open

issues, directing the parties to support their arguments by

citing to the existing record. See id. at 12-13. Briefing

occurred throughout the summer and fall of 1995. Two years

later, in July 1997, the successor judge issued his findings and

conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, awarding

the contractors $4.25 million on their outstanding claims.

Mergentime Corp. v. WMATA, No. 89-1055 (D.D.C. July 22,

1997) ("July 1997 Order"). He also ordered post-judgment

interest to run from the date of his July 1997 final judgment,

not from the original judge's July 1993 partial judgment.

Mergentime Corp. v. WMATA, No. 89-1055 (D.D.C. Sept. 18,

1997) ("September 1997 Order").

On appeal, the contractors claim that the procedure the

successor judge adopted for disposing of the post-trial motions and resolving the issues left open by the original judge's

death violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63. On the

merits, they challenge many of the findings and conclusions of

both judges. Cross-appealing, WMATA claims that postjudgment interest should run from the date of the original

judge's July 1993 judgment.

II

As originally adopted in 1937, Rule 63 provided:

If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a

judge before whom an action has been tried is unable to

perform the duties to be performed by the court ...

after verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge ... may

perform those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied

that he cannot perform those other duties because he did

not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may in

his discretion grant a new trial.

According to this rule, if a judge became unable to proceed

after verdict or judgment, a successor judge could take over

and resolve post-trial motions without automatically having to

retry the case. The rule made no provision for a judge

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nal judge became unavailable at any point prior to return of a

verdict in a jury trial or the filing of findings of fact and

conclusions of law in a bench trial, courts interpreted Rule 63

to require complete retrial. See Whalen v. Ford Motor

Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); ArrowHart, Inc. v. Philip Carey Co., 552 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1977).

Because the growing length of federal trials increased the

likelihood that the inability of a judge to continue would

interrupt a trial before verdict or judgment, Rule 63 was

substantially broadened in 1991 to allow successor judges to

take over at any point after trial begins, thus creating a more

"efficient mechanism" for completing interrupted trials without causing "unnecessary expense and delay." Fed. R. Civ. P.

63 advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment). However,

recognizing that "injustice ... may result if the substitute

judge proceeds despite unfamiliarity with the action," id.,

amended Rule 63 also imposes additional responsibilities on

successor judges. The rule now provides:

If a trial or hearing has been commenced and the

judge is unable to proceed, any other judge may proceed

with it upon certifying familiarity with the record and

determining that the proceedings in the case may be

completed without prejudice to the parties. In a hearing

or trial without a jury, the successor judge shall at the

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request of a party recall any witness whose testimony is

material and disputed and who is available to testify

again without undue burden. The successor judge may

also recall any other witness.

Balancing efficiency and fairness, the new rule thus allows

successor judges to avoid retrial, but only to the extent they

ensure that they can stand in the shoes of the predecessor by

determining that "the case may be completed without prejudice to the parties."

In this case the successor judge served two distinct Rule 63

functions. The first, which flowed from the parties' post-trial

motions, called upon him to review the original judge's findings and conclusions. In this sense, the successor judge

assumed the role that the original rule contemplated: taking

over "after ... findings of fact and conclusions of law are

filed." The second role arose from the original judge's inability to make findings and conclusions regarding every issue.

This required the successor judge to assume the role specifically contemplated by amended Rule 63: taking over any

time after "a trial or hearing has been commenced."

According to the contractors, the successor judge violated

Rule 63 in three ways: by failing to consider post-trial

motions; by failing expressly to certify his familiarity with

the record; and by refusing to recall witnesses. Mindful of

the successor judge's two distinct roles in this case, we

consider each claim in turn.

Failure to Consider Post-trial Motions

We begin with the contractors' argument that the successor

judge violated Rule 63 by failing to reconsider the original

judge's findings pursuant to their Rule 52 and Rule 59

motions. According to WMATA, the successor judge did in

fact consider the contractors' post-trial motions, but simply

denied them. The record does not support WMATA's assertion.

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In his April 1995 Order, the successor judge said specifically that he would "not accept the parties' invitations to secondguess the conclusions [the original judge] reached," and that

he would thus "deny all motions that seek to revisit issues

clearly decided by" the original judge. April 1995 Order at 2

& n.1. The successor judge cautioned the parties that any

"[a]rguments that attempt to second-guess [the original

judge's] Opinion or to open up issues that have already been

decided will not be considered." Id. at 3 (emphasis added).

Instead, the successor judge "accept[ed] the factual and credibility determinations that [the original judge] made" and

urged the parties "to pursue any claim of error [with respect

to the original judge's findings] on appeal." Id. at 2, 3 n.3.

In a later order, the successor judge chastised the contractors

for attempting to relitigate the original judge's findings,

stating again: "To the extent that the parties are dissatisfied

with the [original judge's] rulings, an appeal [to the Court of

Appeals] is open to them. This Court will not sit as an

appellate court with respect to any of [the original judge's]

rulings." July 1997 Order at 6 n.2.

Despite these indications that the successor judge gave no

consideration to the contractors' post-trial motions, WMATA

insists that he actually did consider them, pointing to his

statement in the April 1995 Order that he had "examined the

extensive record in this case, including [the original judge's]

251 page opinion and all the filings that followed the reassignment." April 1995 Order at 2. According to WMATA, the

fact that the successor judge said that he had examined the

record and the filings before he said that he was denying the

contractors' pending motions demonstrates that he fully considered the motions and then denied them on their merits.

We cannot tell what the successor judge meant when he

said that he had examined the "record." As WMATA concedes, he could not have meant that he had examined the trial

exhibits; the parties had reclaimed them after the original

judge died. Indeed, without the trial exhibits, understanding

many of the contractors' arguments would have been impossible. For example, the contractors' Rule 52 motion contended

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duced absolutely no evidence to refute WMATA's claimed

excess reprocurement costs. According to the contractors,

the original judge overlooked the testimony of Dennis Hammond, the reprocurement contractor's project manager, who

testified regarding his "cost compilation" document, a trial

exhibit that detailed reprocurement costs different from those

claimed by WMATA. We reviewed the transcript of Hammond's testimony ourselves and found it totally incomprehensible without simultaneously referring to the cost compilation

exhibit. We doubt that the successor judge could have

understood Hammond's testimony--and hence the contractors' reprocurement cost arguments--without also referring

to the exhibit. Since the successor judge did not have the

exhibit when he ruled on the post-trial motions, we think he

could not have considered those motions before denying them.

By refusing to consider the post-trial motions, the successor judge failed to comply with Rule 63. After all, the

original judge could not have refused to consider them.

Although district courts enjoy wide discretion to grant or

deny post-trial motions, see Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d

1418, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1992), they cannot refuse to exercise

that discretion. See Charles A. Wright et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure s 2818, at 194 (2d ed. 1995) ("If the

trial judge has failed to exercise discretion at all, as when he

is under the mistaken apprehension that he has no power to

grant the relief sought, the appellate court can review that

decision and can order the judge to exercise his discretion.");

12 Moore's Federal Practice s 59.54[3] (Matthew Bender 3d

ed. 1998); cf. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(district court violated in forma pauperis statute by refusing

to exercise discretion regarding whether to waive filing fee).

Since Rule 63 requires a successor judge to stand in the shoes

of the original judge, the successor judge in this case assumed

the original judge's obligation to exercise his discretion with

respect to the contractors' post-trial motions. It would be

unfair to "deny a litigant's right to try to persuade the court

that it has erred simply because the judge who rendered the

original decision is unavailable and cannot be called on to

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reconsider the matter." 12 Moore's Federal Practice

s 63.05[1].

Quoting from our decision in Thompson v. Sawyer,

WMATA argues that a successor judge's Rule 63 obligation

"does not encompass relitigation of all issues decided by the

predecessor judge." 678 F.2d 257, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The

issue in Thompson, however, was whether the successor

judge erred in refusing to overturn a decision that the

original judge made years before he died. The plaintiffs thus

had ample opportunity to convince the original judge that he

had erred. In this case, the contractors had no such opportunity because the original judge died two days after issuing his

order. As Thompson put it, a successor judge's "reconsideration of errors may be especially appropriate where the predecessor judge cannot perform the task himself." Id.; see also

United States Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., 668 F.2d 172, 176

(3d Cir. 1981) (a successor judge is empowered to reconsider

legal issues "to the same extent that his or her predecessor

could have").

The circumstances of this case made careful consideration

of the post-trial motions particularly important for two reasons. First, although the original judge struggled to resolve

as much of this complex case as possible before his death, it

would be unrealistic to assume that he made no mistakes in

his 251-page opinion. Indeed, WMATA itself filed a posttrial motion seeking to correct what it called "inadvertent

omissions" in that opinion. And at oral argument, WMATA

conceded that the original judge made at least one mistake to

the contractors' detriment: He found that by signing the

August 1989 agreement the contractors waived their breach

of contract claim arising from WMATA's allegedly unreasonable delays in processing their claims. This finding was

erroneous because in the August 1989 agreement the contractors waived only their right to terminate performance because of the alleged breach, not their right to sue for breach.

The contractors argued this point in their post-trial motion,

but the successor judge never considered it.

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The second reason for carefully considering the post-trial

motions relates to the successor judge's dual role. More than

merely assuming the validity of the original judge's findings,

the successor judge relied on those findings in making additional findings of his own with respect to the issues left

unresolved by the original judge. For example, the original

judge found that the adverse impact caused by the disapproval of the contractors' plan for controlling traffic on Rhode

Island Avenue ceased by November 6, 1986. See July 1993

Order at 222. The contractors specifically challenged this

finding in their post-trial motion. Without considering their

challenge, the successor judge then limited the contractors'

damages on their Rhode Island Avenue claim to those incurred before November 6, expressly relying on the original

judge's previous finding regarding the Rhode Island Avenue

closure. See July 1997 Order at 10-11. In other words, the

validity of the successor judge's own findings regarding the

unresolved issues depends in part on whether the original

judge's findings were valid--a question the successor judge

was asked to consider, but never did.

Failure to Certify Familiarity with the Record

In January 1995, by which time the successor judge still

had not established a schedule for resolving the open issues,

the contractors sent him a letter reminding him of Rule 63's

requirement that he "certify[ ] familiarity with the record"

and suggesting that before he did anything he should retrieve

the trial exhibits and certify his familiarity with them. In

response, the successor judge issued the April 1995 Order,

which identified the outstanding issues and scheduled two

rounds of briefing. The order instructed the parties that

their briefs should "highlight specific pages in the transcript,

specific exhibits, and specific pages in [the original judge's

opinion] that support their particular arguments." April 1995

Order at 3. "This type of detailed support," the successor

judge said, would "ensure that [he was] as prepared as

possible to rule on the remaining issues without prejudice to

either party," id., and would be "adequate to allow [him] to

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meet the standard established for successor judges" in Rule

63. Id. at 3 n.2.

The contractors now argue that the successor judge violated Rule 63 because he never expressly certified his familiarity

with the record before resolving the outstanding issues. This

argument implicates the two distinct Rule 63 roles the successor judge performed in this case. See Perini Br. at 26 (the

successor judge's "failure to certify, before either ruling on

[the contractors'] motion for reconsideration or adjudicating

the open issues, violate[d] Rule 63").

We need not consider whether the successor judge erred in

refusing to certify familiarity with the record with respect to

his first role (deciding the contractors' post-trial motions); as

we have concluded, he failed to consider those motions. See

supra at 10-12. We therefore turn to the contractors' argument that the successor judge should have certified his

familiarity with the record before ruling on the open issues.

We begin with a few basics. First, successor judges need

only certify their familiarity with those portions of the record

that relate to the issues before them. See Canseco v. United

States, 97 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) ("To certify her

familiarity with the record, the successor district judge will

have to read and consider all relevant portions of the record."); see also Moore's Federal Practice s 63.04[3]. Second, the extent of the certification obligation depends upon

the nature of the successor judge's role in a given case. A

successor judge who inherits a jury trial before the close of

evidence must become familiar with the entire record in order

to have the context necessary to rule on evidentiary objections based on relevance. By comparison, a successor judge

who inherits a case after the entry of verdict or judgment and

who must consider only a narrow post-trial motion--such as

one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence regarding a

single factual finding--need only review the portion of the

record relevant to that particular issue.

In this case, the contractors do not challenge the procedures by which the successor judge determined which portions of the record were relevant to the open issues, and for

good reason: Faced with a record containing 4,000 exhibits

and thousands of pages of trial transcript, the successor judge

wisely entrusted the parties to guide him through the massive

record and point him to the material relevant to their arguments. Far from an abdication of his Rule 63 duties, this

procedure made perfect sense.

Rather than claiming that the successor judge gathered the

wrong material, the contractors argue that due to the lack of

express certification we cannot know whether he reviewed the

material he did gather. We think this argument elevates

form over substance. Although the successor judge nowhere

actually stated that he had reviewed the voluminous appendices of exhibits and transcript excerpts that the parties submitted along with their open issues briefs, we have no doubt

that he did. After all, he told the parties that he needed

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these record excerpts to "satisfy the mandate of Rule 63."

April 1995 Order at 3 n.2. The successor judge obviously

required this exercise to ensure that the parties directed him

to each item in the record relevant to the outstanding issues.

We simply do not believe that he then proceeded to ignore

these materials in the process of making his findings and

conclusions.

To be sure, express certification would have been preferable, for it would have avoided this issue. We find no error

here, however, because the procedure the successor judge

ordered together with the language he used demonstrate that

he complied with Rule 63's basic requirement: that a successor judge become familiar with relevant portions of the

record.

Failure to Recall Witnesses

In their opening district court brief regarding the outstanding issues, the contractors emphasized Rule 63's requirement

that "[i]n a hearing or trial without a jury, the successor

judge shall at the request of a party recall any witness whose

testimony is material and disputed and who is available to

testify again without undue burden." Their brief stated:

[We] question[ ] whether the issues such as those canvassed [in] the [April] 1995 Order can be determined

fairly and reliably by a review of the transcript passages

and exhibits cited in the parties' briefs....

... [A]ssuredly some open issues will turn on credibility determinations, for example, disputes about relative

responsibility for changes and delays, damage computations, and adjustments.... In this brief, [we] rel[y] on

testimony and exhibits in evidence. If WMATA challenges their reliability or credibility, [we] request[ ] that

appropriate witnesses be recalled.

In their reply brief, filed after WMATA submitted its opening

brief identifying the testimony it believed supported its positions on the unresolved issues, the contractors once again

argued that the successor judge would have to recall certain

of WMATA's witnesses. As an example, they pointed to

WMATA's damages expert, who they claimed had "selfdestruct[ed] on cross-examination." The contractors offered

to submit a complete list of other such witnesses after

WMATA submitted its surreply, but the successor judge

never afforded the contractors an opportunity to do so before

issuing his July 1997 order deciding the remaining issues.

The contractors now argue that the successor judge should

have recalled WMATA's damages expert as well as other

witnesses before resolving the open issues. WMATA, relying

on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Canseco, supra, responds

that recalling witnesses is not always necessary because

sometimes successor judges can evaluate witness credibility

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from the record. See 97 F.3d at 1227 ("In the event the

sufficiency of the evidence depends upon the credibility of a

witness whose credibility is in question, and that credibility

cannot be determined from the record, the successor judge

will have to recall the witness...."). The successor judge in

Canseco, however, was only called upon to review her predecessor's findings. Here the successor judge made fresh

findings of his own. While Rule 63 allows successor judges to

make findings of fact based on evidence heard by a predecessor judge, the 1991 advisory committee note makes clear that

this practice is appropriate only "in limited circumstances,"

such as when a witness has become unavailable or when the

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particular testimony is undisputed or immaterial. A successor judge, according to the advisory committee note, would

"risk error to determine the credibility of a witness not seen

or heard who is available to be recalled." Thus, whatever

latitude successor judges may have to determine credibility

from the record in the context of reviewing an original judge's

findings, we hold that in the context of making new findings

the plain language of Rule 63 controls: If a party so requests,

the successor judge "shall ... recall any witness whose

testimony is material and disputed and who is available to

testify again without undue burden."

We thus agree with the contractors that the successor

judge failed to comply with Rule 63. Nothing in the record

indicates that the successor judge determined that WMATA's

damages expert was unavailable or that his testimony was

immaterial or undisputed--the only permissible reasons for

not recalling witnesses when making fresh findings. Moreover, the successor judge never afforded the contractors an

opportunity to suggest which additional witnesses they

wished to recall.

III

This brings us to the question of relief. Because this case

has lingered in this post-trial posture for more than five

years, and because the contractors' challenges to the original

judge's findings and conclusions are fully briefed, we could

address the merits ourselves were the successor judge's

failure to consider the parties' post-trial motions the only

error in this case. See Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 60

F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Where the trial court has

erroneously failed to exercise its discretion, we may either

remand or, if the record is sufficiently developed, decide the

issue ourselves.").

But the successor judge's failure to consider recalling witnesses before making his own findings has left a gap that an

appellate court cannot fill. Although we could give the

contractors an opportunity (through supplemental briefing) to

list the witnesses they wish to recall, we think that Rule 63's

witness recall calculus is best performed by the judge ultimately responsible for fashioning findings based on the evidence. Moreover, given the sheer number of witnesses in

this case and the stringent recall requirements imposed by

Rule 63 when making new findings, we think it virtually

inevitable that remand would be necessary to allow the

successor judge to hear new testimony.

Unable to resolve this case once and for all, we vacate the

April 1995 and July 1997 Orders and remand for the successor judge to proceed in accordance with Rule 63. To step in

the shoes of the original judge as the rule requires, the

successor judge first must consider the parties' post-trial

motions to the same extent an original judge would have.

Once he disposes of those motions, the successor judge should

turn to the task of making findings and conclusions regarding

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the unresolved issues, giving appropriate consideration to

whether witnesses must be recalled.

We realize this remand will impose substantial burdens on

a district judge who has already expended enormous amounts

of time and energy on this case. But the requirements of

Rule 63 and the principles of fairness inherent in them

require no less.

IV

We turn finally to WMATA's cross-appeal, in which it

challenges the successor judge's determination that postjudgment interest runs from the date of his July 1997 judgment, not from the original judge's July 1993 judgment.

Even though we have vacated the July 1997 judgment, we

address this issue now because it is fully briefed and because

it will almost certainly arise again once the successor judge

issues a new order resolving the open issues.

The original judge entered judgment in favor of WMATA

for $16.5 million in July 1993. Nearly four years later, in

July 1997, the successor judge resolved the open issues and

entered judgment in the contractors' favor for $4.25 million.

To perfect their appeal, the contractors posted a bond in the

amount of $13.2 million, which they calculated by netting the

two judgments and adding interest from the date of the

second judgment through January 31, 1999. Objecting to the

amount of the bond, WMATA argued that under 28 U.S.C.

s 1961 (1994)--providing that post-judgment interest "shall

be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment"--

interest should run from the date of the first judgment, not

the second.

Relying on this court's opinion in Hooks v. Washington

Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the successor

judge ruled that calculation of post-judgment interest from

the date of the second judgment was proper. We agree.

Hooks held that section 1961 requires post-judgment interest

to be calculated from the date the district court enters final

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See

id. at 618. To be sure, Hooks involved the difference between a final Rule 54(b) judgment and a clerk-entered judgment under Rule 58(1), while this case involves the difference

between a final Rule 54(b) judgment and an interim judgment. Even if this distinction means that Hooks does not

directly control here, we think that its finality principle best

resolves the post-judgment interest question on the facts of

this case. The original judge entered partial judgment in

1993 only because he knew he was unable to resolve all

issues. Had he lived, he would have had no reason to enter

judgment for WMATA until he ruled on all of the parties'

claims. The original judge's decision to address WMATA's

claims before turning to the contractors' claims was simply

fortuitous, particularly given that WMATA is a counterclaimant. Under these circumstances, allowing post-judgment inUSCA Case #97-7138 Document #416362 Filed: 02/16/1999 Page 17 of 19
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terest to run from the date of the original judge's order would

be unfair.

WMATA argues that the Supreme Court's post-Hooks

opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,

494 U.S. 827 (1990), requires the opposite result. In Bonjorno, after a jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the

district court entered judgment on August 22, 1979. Citing

insufficient evidence, the district court subsequently vacated

that judgment. A jury returned a second verdict in the

plaintiff's favor on December 2, 1981, and the district court

entered judgment on that verdict on December 4, 1981.

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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions

relevant here: First, under 28 U.S.C. s 1961, is interest

calculated from the date of the jury verdict (December 2) or

the date that the court subsequently entered judgment on

that verdict (December 4)? Second, is interest calculated

from the date of a legally insufficient judgment (1979) or the

subsequent correct judgment (1981)? See id. at 834. The

Court answered the first question by holding that postjudgment interest runs from the date of the judgment entered upon a verdict, not the date of the verdict itself. See id.

at 835. With respect to the second question, the Court held

that interest should not be calculated from the date of a

judgment later determined to be unsupported by the evidence, stating that post-judgment interest includes "the time

between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment

by the defendant." Id. at 835-36 (internal quotation omitted).

Relying on this language, WMATA argues that interest

should run from the date the original judge first entered

judgment in its favor because it was on that date that he

"ascertained" its damages.

WMATA misreads Bonjorno. Not only does the "ascertainment" language have little to do with the invalid judgment

passage in which it appears, but WMATA neglects to mention

that the Court quoted that language from Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1987), a case that it

expressly rejected in answering the first question by holding

that interest runs from the date of the judgment, not the date

of jury ascertainment. See Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 834. While

we cannot explain Bonjorno's internal inconsistency, we are

certain that nothing in it requires interest in this case to run

from the date of the original judge's decision. At most,

Bonjorno holds that "judgment" means judgment, not verdict,

and that "judgment" means valid judgment, not invalid judgment. Our holding that on the facts of this case interest runs

from the second, final judgment comports with both principles.

So ordered.

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