Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00386/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00386-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BNSF Railway Company; Matthew

Kelly McCauley; and Joel Frederick

Briggs, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

The Honorable Delbert W. Ray, Sr., et

al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-0386-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants The Honorable Delbert W. Ray, Sr. and Jolene Cooney (“Tribal

Defendants”) ask the Court to modify the existing preliminary injunction to permit them to

seek dismissal of the underlying lawsuit in Tribal Court. Doc. #107. During a telephone

conference with the parties on June 7, 2006, the Court requested briefing. The Court has

now reviewed memoranda filed by the parties. Docs. ##107, 112, 113.

A. Background.

The Sullivan Defendants filed suit against Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company

(“BNSF”) in Hualapai Tribal Court, 2004-CV-150 (the “Sullivan Lawsuit”), asserting claims

stemming from a December 21, 2003 accident at U.S. DOT Crossing #025225B involving

BNSF. BNSF subsequently filed a complaint in this Court seeking to permanently enjoin the

Sullivans and the Tribal Court from pursuing the Sullivan Lawsuit, arguing that the Tribal

Court does not have jurisdiction over the claims (Doc. #1). BNSF requested a temporary

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restraining order, which was granted on February 8, 2005, and a preliminary injunction,

which was granted on March 10, 2005. Doc. #38. The preliminary injunction directs the

Tribal Court and Sullivan Defendants to halt all prosecution of the Sullivan Lawsuit. Id.

For reasons stated in detail on the record at a March 3, 2005, hearing, the Court

concluded that the Tribal Court most likely does not have jurisdiction in the Sullivan Lawsuit

under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), because neither of Montana’s

exceptions applies. Id. at 565-66. The Court found that the first Montana exception most

likely does not apply because the parties have not entered into the kind of consensual

relationship required by that exception. See Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170,

1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (“consensual relation cases . . . ‘involve[] either direct regulation by a

tribe of non-Indian activity on the reservation or lawsuits between a private party and the

tribe or tribal members arising from an on-reservation transaction or agreement’”) (quoting

County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Court found that the

second exception most likely does not apply because the underlying tort in this case, although

clearly tragic, does implicate the “political integrity, the economic security, or the health or

welfare of the tribe” as contemplated by the narrowly-construed second exception. See

Todecheene, 394 F.3d at 1181 (“Despite its seemingly broad sweep . . . the self-government

exception is rather narrow”) (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)

(“Read in isolation, the Montana rule’s second exception can be misperceived . . . . [A]

tribe’s inherent power does not reach beyond what is necessary to protect tribal

self-government or to control internal relations”)); see also Burlington Northern R.R. v. Red

Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the deaths of two tribal members

from a train collision did not threaten the political integrity of the tribe or implicate the

second Montana exception).

The Tribal Defendants opposed this ruling. They argued that the Tribal Court has full

jurisdiction to adjudicate the Sullivan Lawsuit. Following entry of the preliminary

injunction, the Tribal Defendants sought broad discovery to support their claim that Tribal

Court jurisdiction extends to the lawsuit. The Court denied their broad discovery requests,

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noting that relevant Ninth Circuit law permits only limited discovery in such cases.

Doc. #69.

The Tribal Defendants now seek to have the Sullivan Lawsuit dismissed from Tribal

Court on jurisdictional grounds. Their memorandum fails to explain the precise jurisdictional

basis for such a dismissal, but documents submitted with their memorandum suggest that the

Tribal Defendants seek to have the Sullivan Lawsuit dismissed so that this Court will not

reach a final decision on the permanent injunction request by BNSF. Doc. #108, Ex. A.

B. Discussion.

The Court concludes that the preliminary injunction should not be modified. This

decision is based on three considerations. 

First, the Court has already preliminarily concluded that the Tribal Court may not

exercise jurisdiction over the Sullivan Lawsuit under the Montana doctrine. The appropriate

course for a federal court to follow in such a case is to enjoin all further proceedings in the

Tribal Court. The Court has done so in the preliminary injunction, and will consider whether

that injunction should be made permanent after further briefing. 

Second, modifying the preliminary injunction would risk improper entanglement by

this Court in Tribal Court proceedings. The Sullivan Defendants, fearing that a dismissal of

their action in Tribal Court would prejudice their right to proceed in other jurisdictions, ask

the Court to exercise close control over the Tribal Court proceedings. Doc. #112. They ask

the Court to review and approve any Tribal Court order, to require that the Tribal Court

permit an appeal, and to make clear that the Tribal Court may only enter a dismissal “without

prejudice.” Id. BNSF similarly asks the Court to modify the preliminary injunction only to

permit the filing of a specific kind of motion in Tribal Court, and to require that the Tribal

Court proceed on an expedited basis. Doc. #113. 

Such close control of Tribal Court proceedings by this Court would be entirely

inappropriate. The Tribe is a sovereign entity, and its courts are separate and distinct judicial

bodies. Other than the jurisdictional requirements found in federal cases such as Montana,

this Court has no supervisory authority over the Tribal Court. Were the preliminary

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The Court notes apparent concern by the Tribe that the undersigned judge is

unfavorably disposed to the Tribe and determined to limit its power. Doc. #108, Ex. A. The

Court notes that the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order have nothing to

do with this Court’s view of the Tribe. Those rulings were based solely upon an application

of federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Ninth Circuit

in cases such as Montana, 450 U.S. 544, and Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059. That law, under the

Court’s preliminary analysis, prohibits a Tribe from exercising jurisdiction over a non-tribal

member in a case such as the Sullivan Lawsuit. Likewise, the Court has limited the Tribal

Defendants’ access to discovery in this case not because of any unfavorable view of the

Tribe, but because Ninth Circuit law provides that such discovery may be limited. See

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Corp. v. Fort Peck, 323 F.3d 767, 775 (9th Cir.

2003) (consideration of an injunction motion under Montana “does not require that the

district court permit wholesale discovery. Rather, the district court may tailor limited

discovery before . . . entertaining a motion for summary judgment.”). Finally, the Court

notes that the issue to be decided in this case is narrow – whether the Tribal Court may

exercise jurisdiction over the Sullivan Lawsuit under the Montana doctrine. The Court has

no intention of making broad pronouncements about Tribal authority or the Tribe’s ability

to control BNSF in settings other than the Sullivan Lawsuit.

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injunction to be modified to permit the Tribal Defendants to file the motion they seek, it is

entirely possible that the Sullivan Defendants or BNSF would return to this Court if they felt

that proceedings in the Tribal Court were inconsistent with the modification or otherwise

disadvantageous. They might ask this Court to control what is happening in Tribal Court or

to rescind the modification of the preliminary injunction in the midst of the Tribal Court’s

consideration of the Tribal Defendants’ motion. Such entanglement in the Tribal Court are

inconsistent with the deference due such courts and with the narrow issue presented by this

case. The Court will not make a modification that invites such entanglement.

Third, it appears that the Tribal Defendants seek to have the preliminary injunction

modified for the purpose of dismissing the Sullivan Lawsuit so that this Court will not reach

the merits of the permanent injunction. Having previously asserted that the Tribal Court has

full jurisdiction over the Sullivan Lawsuit, the Tribal Defendants now argue that the Tribal

Court should dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. Such a change in position does not

provide a sound basis on which to modify the preliminary injunction entered under the

Montana doctrine.1

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IT IS ORDERED that the Tribal Defendants’ request for a modification of the

preliminary injunction (Doc. #107) is denied. Briefing on BNSF’s summary judgment

motion shall proceed under the existing schedule.

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

Case 3:05-cv-00386-DGC Document 115 Filed 06/27/06 Page 5 of 5