Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00960/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00960-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 10-0960 RS (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

*E-Filed 7/9/10*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

ROGER MAX KELLER,

Petitioner,

v.

B. CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 10-0960 RS (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

This is a federal habeas corpus action filed by a pro se state prisoner pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied. 

BACKGROUND

In 1989, an Orange County Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of second degree

murder. The trial court sentenced petitioner to fifteen years to life. In 2008, the Board of

Parole Hearings (“Board”) found petitioner unsuitable for parole on grounds that he “would

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society and or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” (Ans., Ex. 1 at 32.) In response to the Board’s decision, petitioner sought, though

was denied, relief on state collateral review. (Pet. at 4–5.) This federal habeas petition

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Petitioner’s attorney asserted that the 2009 psychological evaluation was not reliable

because it was based on an inaccurate diagnosis of petitioner as having anti-social personality

disorder. (Id. at 26.) In its decision denying parole, the Board noted those objections, but stated

that “there was sufficient other elements considered by the doctor aside from the issue of the

anti-personality disorder.” (Id. at 35.) 

No. C 10-0960 RS (PR)

2 ORDER DENYING PETITION

followed. 

In reaching its decision, the Board considered the facts of the commitment offense. In

1987, petitioner strangled to death a twenty-four year old woman, Alisa Gardiola, after

having had sex with her, and then dumped her nude corpse in a park. (Ans., Ex. 1 at 32–33). 

In addition to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board cited as factors 

in its decision petitioner’s social history, his psychological report, and his behavior in prison. 

Petitioner’s social history includes “problematic relationships” with his wives. Petitioner

admitted violating a retraining order his second wife had obtained out of concern for her

safety. (Id. at 32.) Petitioner has admitted and then later denied that he physically abused

either of his wives. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner also had a poor work history in that he had a

difficult time getting along with co-workers, as exemplified by petitioner’s death threats

against them. (Id. at 33.) 

Petitioner’s 2009 psychological report was not favorable. Assessed as presenting a

“moderate” risk of future violence,1

 petitioner “was unable to express any understanding

regarding what led [him] to commit the crime and what steps he would need to take to

prevent a similar act in the future.” (Id. at 18.) “Without understanding what led to the

commission of the crime,” the report went on to say, “he will not be able to outline a plan for

the future designed to prevent a similar act from occurring.” (Id. at 21.) Petitioner has

indicated that he was angry with the victim before he killed her, but he does not know why

he was angry. (Id. at 23.) 

As for his institutional behavior, petitioner received a citation for disruptive behavior

against a correctional officer in 2007, which occurred after his last parole hearing. (Id. at 35,

38.) While in prison, petitioner has received seven citations for serious misbehavior, and

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three for minor infractions. (Id.) In light of all these factors, the Board concluded that

petitioner posed an unreasonable threat to public safety and denied him parole. (Id. at 32.) 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner alleges that the Board’s decision

violated his right to due process because (1) it was not supported by some evidence of

petitioner’s current dangerousness; (2) the Board relied again on the unchanging factors of

the commitment offense; and (3) petitioner has served in excess of the term set by

California’s sentencing matrix.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decision but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

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Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision violated his right to due process because it

was not based on “some evidence” that he currently poses an unreasonable risk to public

safety. Due process requires that the Board’s decision to deny a California prisoner parole be

supported by “some evidence” of current dangerousness. Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d

546 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Pearson v. Muntz, No. 08-55728, 2010 WL -- (9th Cir. May 24,

2010) (per curium). Accordingly, in reviewing federal habeas claims that a California

prisoner was denied parole in violation of due process, courts must “decide whether the

California judicial decision approving the governor’s [or the parole board’s] decision

rejecting parole was an “unreasonable application” of the California “some evidence”

requirement, or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence.” Hayward, 604 F.3d at 562–63. 

The commitment offense alone does not always provide evidence that a petitioner

poses a current threat to public safety. Id. at 562. The offense does not establish current

dangerousness “unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or

post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state” supports an

inference of dangerousness. Id., citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1214 (Cal. 2008). 

Here, the record shows that there was “some evidence” to support the state court’s

approval of the Board’s parole denial. First, the circumstances surrounding the commitment

offenses suggest that petitioner can behave violently, and lacks sufficient self-control and

self-understanding. Second, the record establishes that petitioner’s pre- and post-conviction

history supports an inference of current dangerousness — in particular his turbulent marriage

history, his 2009 psychological evaluation, and his 2007 citation for serious misbehavior. 

While a rating of “moderate” is not conclusively prohibitive, it does constitute some

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evidence of current dangerousness in addition to the commitment offense, as does

petitioner’s 2007 citation for disruptive behavior. See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 570–71

(Berzon, J., concurring). 

Turning to the instant matter, it is reasonable to infer from this record of past and

recent violence and misbehavior that, if released, petitioner currently poses an unreasonable

risk of danger to society, or a threat to public safety. Because the Board’s decision is

supported by sufficient evidence in the record, including circumstances other than those of

the commitment offense, petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision was unsupported by

“some evidence,” or was based solely on the circumstances of the commitment offense, or

otherwise violated his right to due process, is without merit. Accordingly, petitioner’s claims

that the Board’s decision was not supported by some evidence, and that the Board relied

solely on the unchanging circumstances of the commitment offense are DENIED. 

Petitioner’s contention that he has served a sentence in excess of the term set by

California’s sentencing matrix is without merit. The Board is under no duty to use the matrix

once it has determined that a prisoner is unsuitable for parole. In Re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1069, 1071 (2005). This claim is DENIED. 

In sum, the state court’s approval of the Board’s decision, therefore, was not an

“unreasonable application” of the California “some evidence” requirement, nor was it “based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” 

CONCLUSION

The state court’s denial of petitioner’s claims did not result in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor

did it result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition is

DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of

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reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 6) is DENIED as moot. 

The Court granted petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis prior to petitioner’s filing

his motion. 

This order terminates Docket No. 6. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent, terminate the pending motion,

and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 8, 2010 RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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