Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01550/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01550-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2675 Federal Tort Claims Act - Disposition by Agency Req

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA SANCHEZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and 

DOES 1 through 50,

 Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-1550-AJB-AGS

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS, (Doc. No. 13)

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 

COMPLAINT, (Doc. No. 19)

Defendant United States of America (“United States”) moves to dismiss with 

prejudice Plaintiff Linda Sanchez’s (“Sanchez”) complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Doc. No. 13.) Sanchez

filed an opposition to the United States’ motion to dismiss. (See Doc. No. 15.) In addition, 

Sanchez requested leave to amend the complaint, or in the alternative, Sanchez asked for 

continuance of the motion and leave to conduct discovery into SYHC’s rules, policies, and 

procedures. (Doc. Nos. 15, 19.) The United States filed an opposition in part to Sanchez’s 

motion for leave to amend the complaint. (See Doc. Nos. 16, 20.) Pursuant to Civil Local 

Rule 7.d.1, the Court finds the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without 

oral argument. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS the United States’

motion to dismiss, and GRANTS Sanchez’s motion for leave to amend her complaint.

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I. BACKGROUND

Sanchez brings this complaint under the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”).

(Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.) Sanchez alleges her psychiatrist, Leon Fajerman, 

“committed acts of sexual harassment and contact against” Sanchez for three months—

from “May 2017 to mid-July 2017.” (Id. ¶ 3.) The alleged events took place at San Ysidro 

Health Center (“SYHC”), a federally qualified health center, where Sanchez claims Dr. 

Fajerman has a “history and practice of committing sexual acts against his patients.” (Id.

¶ 4.) Sanchez details several incidents in which Dr. Fajerman acted inappropriately, 

including groping her, showing up at her home, and pushing her onto his couch while 

groping her, kissing her, and pressing his genitalia against her. (Id. ¶¶ 19–31.) Sanchez

states, unbeknownst to her, Dr. Fajerman was being investigated for similar conduct by the 

Medical Board, resulting in his license being suspended. (Id. ¶¶ 34–36.) As a result, 

Sanchez’s future appointments with Dr. Fajerman were cancelled and a nurse practitioner 

“cut” her medication “by two-thirds without any taper” causing her to go into “withdraws.” 

(Id. ¶ 36.) Finally, Sanchez claims SYHC dropped her from care several times without 

explanation which caused delays in her medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 37.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 6, 2018, Sanchez filed her complaint against the United States, alleging 

claims for negligent hiring and supervision under the Federal Torts Claims Act. (Compl. 

¶¶ 40–53.) On August 21, 2019, the United States filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the discretionary function exception. (Doc. No. 13.)

Sanchez opposed the motion, and the United States replied. (Doc. Nos. 15–16.) Then on 

January 30, 2020, Sanchez filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. (Doc. No. 19.) 

The United States opposed in part, and Sanchez replied. (Doc. Nos. 20, 23–24.) This order 

follows.

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack 

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. 

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The party asserting subject 

matter jurisdiction has the burden of persuasion for establishing it. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 

559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an action 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting 

extrinsic evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 

2003). Where the party asserts a facial challenge, the court limits its inquiry to the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). The Court assumes plaintiff’s “[factual] allegations to be true and draw[s]

all reasonable inferences in [her] favor.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 

2004). Where the party asserts a factual challenge, the Court may consider extrinsic 

evidence demonstrating or refuting the existence of jurisdiction without converting the 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. The United States argues 

Sanchez’s complaint fails to state a claim that is facially outside of the discretionary 

function exception to the FTCA. (Doc. No. 13 at 2.) Thus, the Court considers the 

allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Sanchez. 

B. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint

Rule 15(a) governs leave to amend prior to trial. A party may amend its pleading 

once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it; or, if the pleading is one requiring 

a response, within 21 days after service of the responsive pleading or motion. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing 

party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice 

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

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The grant or denial of leave to amend is in the Court’s discretion. Swanson v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). “In exercising this discretion, a court must 

be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather 

than on the pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 

1981). Consequently, the policy in favor of granting leave to amend is applied with extreme 

liberality. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181–82 (1962).

IV. DISCUSSION

While the United States’ motion to dismiss was fully briefed and pending, Sanchez 

filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. (Doc. No. 19.) The United States opposed, 

in part, Sanchez’s motion for leave to amend, arguing that although it did not necessarily 

oppose Sanchez’s amendments, it opposed allowing the amendments to render moot its 

previously filed motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 20.) After review of the parties’ arguments,

and with consideration for judicial economy, the Court agrees with the United States and

finds it appropriate to address the United States’ pending motion to dismiss. Thus, the 

Court will first begin with the United States’ motion to dismiss, and will then turn to 

Sanchez’s motion for leave to amend. 

A. The United States’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Discretionary Function Exception

Where suit is brought against the United States, federal courts have no jurisdiction 

absent the United States’ consent to be sued. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 

538 (1980). Certain federal statutes provide limited exceptions to this general rule. For 

example, the FTCA grants the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil 

actions against the United States for damages “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 

omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office 

or employment. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

However, FTCA’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by discretionary 

function exception. This exception precludes claims against the United States which are 

“based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 

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discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 

Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). In 

order to determine whether the discretionary function exception applies, a court must 

engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) the court must determine whether the challenged conduct 

involves an element of judgment or choice, see Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 

536 (1988); and (2) if the conduct involves some element of choice, the court must 

determine whether the conduct implements social, economic, or political policy 

considerations, see Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs 

are required to advance a claim that is facially outside the discretionary function exception 

in order to defeat a motion to dismiss. Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th 

Cir. 1992). 

In the instant motion, the United States argues the first step of the test is satisfied 

because Sanchez fails to identify a federal statute, regulation, or policy that required 

specific course of action by SYHC to respond to allegations against Dr. Fajerman. (Doc. 

No. 13 at 7.) Furthermore, the United States contends, the second step is satisfied because 

the SYHC’s hiring, supervision, and retention of Dr. Fajerman involved an element of 

choice based on social, economic, or political policy considerations. (Id. at 8.) Therefore, 

the United States asserts the “discretionary function” exception bars Sanchez’s lawsuit.

In her Opposition, Sanchez does not dispute the first prong and concedes the 

discretionary function exception generally applies to employment decisions.

1

(Doc. No. 15 

at 8.) But Sanchez disputes the second prong, arguing the “discretionary function” 

exception should not apply “where Government fails to act after receiving notice of illegal 

behavior.” (Id. at 5.) The crux of Sanchez’s argument is that “no policy could possibly 

support [United States’] failure to respond to notice of illegal conduct.” Id. In her 

complaint, Sanchez alleges “SYHC continu[ed] to schedule appointments for Dr. Fajerman 

to see [Sanchez] despite knowing or having reason to know that he posed a danger to his 

 

1 However, in her motion for leave to amend, Sanchez states she now has sufficient facts to mount an 

attack on the first prong of the discretionary function exception. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 13.)

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clients.” (Compl. ¶ 48.) Thus, Sanchez contends the discretionary function exception is 

inapplicable because there is no plausible policy consideration that could support the 

United States’ failure to act. 

With regard to the second prong of the discretionary function exception analysis, 

generally, the decisions relating to the hiring, supervision, and retention of employees 

involve policy judgments of the type Congress intended the discretionary function 

exception to shield. See Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir.2000) (holding

negligent employment, supervision and training claims “fall squarely within the 

discretionary function exception”); see also Gourgue v. United States, No. 12CV-1490-

LAB, 2013 WL 1797099, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013) (“[T]he Government’s decision 

of how to train and supervise its employees is the kind of decision that 

the discretionary function was designed to protect because it is susceptible to a policy 

analysis.”). The challenged action “need not be actually grounded in policy 

considerations,” it simply needs to be, “by its nature, susceptible to a policy analysis.” 

Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Sanchez argues this Court should follow the reasoning in Tonelli v. United States, 

60 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 1995). There, the court recognized that issues of employee 

supervision and retention generally involve the permissible exercise of policy judgment 

and fall within the discretionary function exception. Id. 496. However, the court held that 

where the United States is put on notice of illegal conduct, the choice no longer involves 

plausible policy considerations. Id. However, this Court is not bound by the Eight Circuit 

decision when the Ninth Circuit has applied the discretionary function exception in similar 

circumstances, and reached a contrary conclusion. In addition, the facts in Tonelli are 

distinguishable from the facts present in this case. Here, Sanchez merely alleges “SYHC 

knew or should have known about Dr. Fajerman’s history and practice of sexual contact 

(or attempted sexual contact) with patients.” (Compl. ¶ 36.) In contrast, the plaintiffs in 

Tonelli alleged the United States had actual and detailed notice of an employee’s ongoing 

illegal conduct and failed to act to the plaintiffs’ own complaint. Tonelli, 60 F.3d at 494–

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95. As currently pled, there is neither an indication that the United States failed to act in 

response to Sanchez’s complaints nor are there facts pled as to the specifics of the notice 

the United States allegedly had. 

This case is more analogous to Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009).

There, the plaintiff claimed the Church negligently supervised and retained a priest whom 

it knew or should have known that “had a history of sexually abusing children.” Id. at 1083.

The court held the plaintiff’s causes of action for negligent hiring and supervision, and 

failure to warn are barred by the discretionary function exception. Id. at 1085. The court 

reasoned that some of the policy considerations affecting the Church’s decision could have 

been the harm to its reputation, the effect of pastoral stability on parishioners’ well-being,

and staffing shortages. Id. Thus, the court concluded the Church’s decision was susceptible 

to policy considerations. Id.

Similarly, here, Sanchez alleges “SYHC knew or should have known about Dr. 

Fajerman’s history and practice of sexual contact (or attempted sexual contact) with

patients,” and “he should not have been hired or retained.” (Compl. ¶¶ 47, 50.) In 

Opposition, Sanchez asserts Holy See is not applicable here because it involved decision 

regarding notice of prior illegal conduct while in Tonelli, the United States had a notice of 

ongoing illegal conduct. (Doc. No. 15 at 9.) However, for the purposes of the second prong 

of the two-step test, the decision need not actually be based on policy considerations.

Rather, this prong is met when the decision is simply susceptible to policy considerations. 

Assuming, arguendo, SYHC had notice of ongoing illegal conduct, the decision regarding 

the retention and supervision of Dr. Fajerman is still susceptible to policy considerations. 

In the case of Dr. Fajerman, SYHC might have decided to retain him to avoid 

unnecessarily alarming other patients while investigation was ongoing, or SYHC might 

have tried to balance insuring public safety and providing fairness to the accused. 

Furthermore, the complaint alleged that “after Dr. Fajerman’s medical license was 

suspended by the Medical Board, SYHC cancelled Sanchez’s outstanding appointments.” 

(Compl. ¶ 36.) At this point, the retention of Dr. Fajerman no longer involved any policy 

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considerations. In contrast, SYHC’s decision to retain and supervise an employee while 

the employee’s license was being reviewed for suspension included policy considerations 

such as fairness to the accused and public safety. These types of social, economic, or 

political policy considerations could have influenced SYHC’s decision to hire, supervise 

or retain Dr. Fajerman. This is the kind of judgment the discretionary function exception 

was designed to shield. Therefore, the second prong of the two-step inquiry is met, and 

Sanchez’s complaint as pled is barred by the discretionary function exception. As such, the

United States’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

B. Sanchez’s Motion for Leave to Amend 

Having addressed the United States’ motion, the Court now turns to Sanchez’s 

motion for leave to amend. Sanchez requests leave to add new facts reflecting:

• Recently discovered information indicating SYHC employees had actual notice of 

acts of sexual misconduct by Dr. Fajerman prior to the allegations of misconduct 

that form the basis of Sanchez’s negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim;

• Recently obtained SYHC policy and procedure regarding provider sexual 

misconduct, which Sanchez argues is relevant to the first prong of the discretionary 

exception doctrine analysis; and

• Recently discovered information and intervening California case law supporting a 

direct negligence claim, which is a separate claim from Sanchez’s claim for 

negligent supervision and retention.

(Doc. No. 19 at 5.)

In sum, based on these proposed facts, Sanchez requests leave to add: (1) new facts 

in support of Sanchez’s negligent supervision and retention claim, (2) a direct negligence 

claim against the United States for failure to protect against foreseeable sexual abuse, and 

(3) a direct negligence claim against the United States for failure to protect against 

foreseeable criminal conduct. (Id. at 5–6.) After review of the proposed amendments, and 

finding no undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, the Court finds it appropriate to 

GRANT Sanchez leave to amend her complaint. See Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 

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566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant 

leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading.”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion to 

dismiss Sanchez’s complaint. (Doc. No. 13.) Moreover, the Court also GRANTS

Sanchez’s motion for leave to amend. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.”). 

Sanchez will have twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to file her amended 

complaint addressing the deficiencies noted herein. Failure to file an amended complaint 

will result in dismissal of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2020

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