Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02334/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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• 

UNITED 

vs. 

HERBERT 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUL ;.; .. 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

G. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) No. 84-2766 

) No. 85-2334 

) 

MILLER, II, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(84-00270) 

Charles J. Carroll of Dill and Dill, P.C. of Denver, Colorado, 

Attorneys for Appellant. 

Thomas M. O'Rourke, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado and 

Michael J. Norton, Acting U.S . Attorney, Denver, Colorado, 

Attorneys for Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and MCKAY, Circuit Judge , and 

GARTH, senior circuit Judge.* 

GARTH, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Leonard I. Garth, United States Senior circuit 

Judge for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 1 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal arises from the defendant Herbert Miller 

II's 18 u.s.c. §1001 conviction for making fraudulent statements 

in an effort to deceive and obstruct the tax authorities. Because the merits of Miller's direct appeal (84 -2776) were never 

decided by this Court for reasons stated hereinafter, we have 

before us as well an appeal (85-233 4) from the denial of Miller's 

motion to vacate and set aside his conviction on grounds of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm both Miller's 

conviction at 84-2776 and the order denying his 28 u.s .c . §2255 

application to set aside his conviction (85-2334 ). 

I. 

In a November 1984 bench trial before the district 

court for the District of Colorado (Carrigan, J.), Miller, a tax 

attorney and accountant, was convicted on three counts of making 

false statements in violation of 18 u.s.c. §1001. 1 Miller had 

been found guilty of orchestrating the back-dating of deeds, pen1. 18 USC §1001 (1976) "Statements or entries generally" reads 

as follows: 

Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of a ny 

department or agency of the United States knowingly and 

willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any 

trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any 

false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document 

knowing the same to contain any false, ficti tious or 

fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more 

than $10,000 or imprisoned no more than five years , or 

both. 

2 

;. 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 2 
sian plan reports and other financial documents in order to avoid 

tax liabilities. 2 

We have before us now a much delayed direct appeal of 

this conviction (84-2776) as well as Miller's appeal of the 

district court's subsequent denial of his application made under 

28 USC §2255 to set aside his conviction (85-2334). Both claims 

essentially rest on assertions raised by Miller's third attorney 

(Mr. Carroll) that Miller had received inadequate assistance of 

counsel at trial by his then counsel (Mr. Calder). An explanation of the procedural evolution of these appeals will be helpful 

in defining the issues before us. 

A. 

Miller was convicted after a bench trial on November 

26-27, 1984. On December 4, 1984 he filed motions for a new 

trial and/or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). 

These motions were denied on December 10, 1984. With the deadline for filing an appeal approaching, Miller on December 20, 

1984 filed a notice of appeal from his conviction, as well as 

from the order denying him a new trial or JNOV. on March 15, 

1985, Miller was sentenced to five years on each of the three 

counts on which he was convicted, to be served concurrently. 

2. The record reveals that Miller's secretaries back-dated 

documents at his instruction. While representing private parties 

before the United States Tax Court, Miller offered into evidence 

deeds and other documents verified and vouched for by him as a 

notary and purportedly dated September 3, 1980. In fact, these 

documents were falsely dated by two of his secretaries sometime 

in October 1982. 

3 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 3 
, 

On April 4, 1985, Miller filed a motion to substitute 

new counsel for his original counsel. At about that time, the 

court ordered that Miller undergo psychiatric exami nation pursuant to a determination of his suitability for parole, 18 u.s . c. 

§4205(d), and this Court then stayed Miller's direc t appeal pending the action of the trial court. 

B. 

On July 1, 1985 the district court judge suspended 

imposition of Miller's sentence and placed Miller on a five-year 

term of probation. 3 In the meantime, however, on June 28, 1985 

Miller had filed a motion to set his conviction aside pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. §2255. The grounds he alleged were the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel and his own incompetency to stand 

trial. Following hearings that addressed those grounds, the 

district court on July 11, 1985 denied that motion. 4 Miller 

timely appealed that order. 28 u.s.c. §2107. 

With his third lawyer (Mr. Carroll} in charge, Miller 

on August 14, 1986 filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 

December 14, 1984 Order, which had denied him a new trial. Alternatively, his motion sought to supplement the record, alleging 

3. Judge Carrigan, responding to evidence or at least claims of 

alcohol-induced aberrant behavior by Miller and claims of postVietnam stress (e.g., Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for 

Relief, July 10, 1985, at 7, 17, 70-75, 100-01) also ordered that 

Miller reside for 120 days in a community treatment center and 

that he take part in an alcohol treatment program as well as 

mental health counseling. 

4. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 11, 

1985, at 149. 

4 

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newly discovered evidence. On the basis of briefs, the district 

court on November 13, 1986 issued a certification of the District 

Court indicating that, upon remand of the Miller record from the 

Court of Appeals, it would grant the Motion to Reconsider and 

consider the case for a new trial. This court then remanded both 

appeals. 

At an August 12, 1988 status conference, the district 

court judge granted Miller's original Motion for a New Trial 

pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 33. The Government appealed, claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order a new trial 

on the basis of Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 33. 

c. 

This court in March 1989 determined that the district 

court had no jurisdiction to order a new trial under Fed. R.Cri m. 

Pro. 33 because Miller•s Motion for Reconsideration was filed out 

of time. U.S. v. Miller. 869 F.2d 1418, .1421 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

We predicated our holding on the nature of the new claims ("newly 

discovered evidencen) Miller had raised . 

Following this ruling, this court on May 2, 1989 returned both of Miller's pending appeals to active status and 

consolidated them. The result of the proceedings we have recounted is that we have before us: (1) the original direct appeal of 

Miller's underlying conviction for v iolating 18 u.s.c. §1001 ( a t 

84-2776); and (2) Miller's appeal from the denial of his motion 

brought under 28 u.s.c. §2255 to set aside his conviction (at 85-

2334) . 

5 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 5 
II. 

Miller now rests his consolidated appeal solely on 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 

In reviewing this consolidated appeal, we are to be 

guided, except if clearly erroneous, by the historical facts 

found by the district court judge, while our review of the ulti -

mate legal issues is plenary. Strickland v. Washington, 46 6 u.s. 

668 (1983) prescribes our standard of review for attorney performance relative to the effective assistance of counsel . To sueceed in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant 

must show ''deficiency plus prejudice." Accordingly, in regard to 

Miller 's trial, we must answer the questions: (a) did Mr. Calder, 

Miller's trial attorney, provide Miller with that quality of 

counsel which Strickland has held to be "ineffective assistance 

of counsel" under the Sixth Amendment; and (b) but for the 

alleged deficiencies of his trial counsel, might Miller have been 

found not guilty? 

Thus, the inquiry before us --in both Miller's direct 

appeal and in our review of h.is motion to set aside his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255-- is whether any or all of Mil -

ler's claims add up to ineffective assistance of trial counsel as 

defined by Strickland and recently construed by this court in 

5. At the hearing of Miller's motion to vacate and set aside his 

conviction, the district court on July 11, 1985 denied Miller's 

claim of incapacity to stand trial. The district court also 

denied Miller's claim of incompetency of counsel. Miller has not 

raised any claim before us of his incapacity to stand trial. Nor 

has he raised any issue before us respecting the back-dating of 

tax documents. 

6 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 6 
u.s. v. Rivera, 85-1768, 85-1771 (lOth Cir., Apr. 4, 1990) (en 

bane) slip op. at 18-24. A mixed law and fact review such as 

Strickland obliges us to view the "totality of the evidence 

before the judge and jury" cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 u.s. 335, 342 

(1980). In doing so, as another Court of Appeals has ruled, 

the presumption of correctness accorded the 

factual determinations of the state [trial) 

court ••• applies only to the historical facts 

underlying the attorney's performance but not 

to the ultimate conclusion as to whether or 

not effective assistance has been rendered. 

Wykoff v. Nix, 869 F.2d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations 

omitted). Accord, Laws v. Armantrout. 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th 

Cir. 1988) (en bane), Davis· v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522, 1537 (11th 

Cir. 1987). See also. u.s. v. Golub, 694 F.2d 207, 212-14 (lOth 

Cir. 1982), u.s. v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 643 (lOth Cir. 

1982), Dyer v, Criso. 613 F.2d 275, ~78 (lOth cir. 1980). 

In addition, insofar as we review Miller's habeas 

motion, as well as his direct appeal, we are instructed to be 

particularly deferential to the circumstances at the time of 

trial. As the Supreme Cou~t has put it, 

The reasonableness of counsel's performance 

is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective 

at the time of the alleged error and in light 

of all the circumstances, and the standard of 

review is highly deferential. 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 u.s. 365, 381 (1986) (citing Strickland, 466 u.s., at 688-89). 

Because the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel is the 

right to effective assistance of counsel, a conviction must be 

overturned where counsel's defense so "undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial system that the trial cannot b e 

relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 46 6 

u.s. at 686. To succeed with such a claim, however, a defendant 

7 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 7 
must show both that his attorney's performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel's 

inadequacies the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 u.s., at 688, 694. As this court has put it, a 

defendant must "prove that his counsel's performance was [both] 

deficient [and] prejudicial," and he must do so in view of the 

strength of the government's case. Rivera, slip. op. at 24. 

Application of this "deficiency-plus-prejudice" test 

must be predicated, however, on the presumption that counsel's 

conduct was reasonable and that it will be reviewed from a 

contemporaneous perspective, without excessive benefit of hindsight. On the basis of Strickland and the lower court record, 

which we have independently reviewed, we cannot say that Miller 

was deprived of the effect~ve assistance of counsel. Examining 

Miller's claims, which we discuss below, we agree with the district court's July 1985 conclusion that Miller's trial may not 

have been 11 perfect, 11 but it was nfair."6 

III. 

Shortly after Miller's initial sentencing, evidence of 

certain mental andjor physical problems besetting Miller began to 

emerge. In particular, a court-ordered psychiatric examination 

arguably revealed that Miller had alcohol-related amnesia, and 

that he was subject to fantasizing and bouts of depression. In6. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 11, 

1985 , at 149. According to Strickland, "the ultimate focus of 

inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding .•.• " 466 U.S. at 696. 

8 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 8 
deed, Miller's second attorney (Mr. Steinberg) hinged his unsuccessful June 28, 1985 motion to vacate and set aside the conviction on these grounds. Thus, Steinberg argued that Miller had 

been incompetent to stand trial and that Miller suffered from 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The former argument relied, 

in the first instance, on Miller's psychiatric and alcohol problems as grounds for Miller's incompetency. Steinberg additionally argued that Mr. Calder's failure to inquire adequately into 

these problems and then to raise them at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which required the setting aside 

of Miller's conviction. 7 Psychiatrists and other witnesses 

testified extensively.on these issues before the district court 

in July 1985, 8 but Judge Carrigan found the claims factually and 

legally wanting, and, as earlier noted, denied Miller's motion. 

IV. 

To substantiate his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, Miller charges that trial counsel, Calder: (1) failed to 

investigate his client's mental condition, thereby sacrificing 

possible defenses ; (2) failed to make requisite motions in the 

course of trial; (3) was inadequately prepared for his courtroom 

presentations, particularly for his opening; (4) failed to impeach allegedly vulnerable prosecution witnesses; and (5) failed 

7. See June 28, 1985 motion to vacate and set aside defendant's 

conviction, ~~7-11, vol. I, Ex. 10. 

8. Indeed, most of the July 1 and July 10-11 hearings were 

devoted to this topic: passim, 7-50, 71-73. 

9 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 9 
to have Miller, whom he had put on the stand, clearly and unambiguously deny his guilt. We turn to each of these claims. 

In regard to each of the claims alleged by Miller, we 

must "\indulge a strong presumption' that the decision [of trial 

counsel] was based on 'sound trial strategy'" formulated at the 

time of trial. u.s. v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 413 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 u.s. at 689). In this connection also, 

we must defer to the district court judge's determinations made 

at the post-trial hearings of July 1985. 

A. 

We have referred above (supra at n.5) to Miller's earlier claim, rejected by the district court and not raised here, 

that Miller lacked the capacity to stand trial. Miller now claims 

that trial counsel Calder had a responsibility to ascertain that 

he, Miller, suffered from mental disorders or incapacities that 

affected his trial. See n. 3, supra. Miller charges that by 

failing to discover and investigate these matters, Calder allegedly forfeited possible defenses --namely that Miller was incapable of participating effectively in his own defense, and was 

incapable of forming the mens ~ requisite for commission of the 

crime with which he was charged. 

The government, in response, contends that such disabilities as Miller asserts, if they existed at all, were alleged 

for the first time in the course of his post-conviction parole 

report investigation, 18 u.s.c. §4205(d). The government thus 

argues that Miller, for whatever reasons, and to his own detri10 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 10 
ment, did not come forward with this information until after 

trial and until after Calder's assistance as trial counsel had 

already been provided. 

The adequacy or reasonableness of an attorney's action 

is necessarily conditioned by the defendant's own actions or 

inaction. Thus, Miller now faults Calder for failing to investigate his mental health and behavioral history. But, Miller has 

not established that Calder was even aware until after trial, 

when the judge ordered a probation report, that Miller had ever 

seen a psychiatrist. With the exception of those instances where 

a defendant's behavior or demeanor should communicate to his 

counsel or the Court that the defendant suffers from a mental 

disability, incapacity or impairment, an investigation, such as 

the investigation that Miller claims his trial attorney fail ed to 

conduct, cannot be charged as a claim of "ineffective assistance 

of counsel" when the essential and foundational information 

required to trigger such an investigation is withheld from the 

defendant's attorney by the defendant himself. As this court has 

noted, "[t]he reasonableness of an attorney's decision not to 

conduct an investigation is directly related to the information 

the defendant has supplied." Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 

1233 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

The Third Circuit has also held that counsel cannot be 

faulted for "failing to raise claims as to which the client has 

neglected to supply the essential underlying facts ... clairvoyance 

is not required of effective trial counsel." Dooley v. Petsock . 

11 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 11 
816 F.2d 885, 891 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, Calder cannot be held 

responsible for Miller's failure to inform him of the full import 

and breadth of his symptoms and claimed incapacities, 9 especially where some aspects lay beyond the scope of reasonable investigation. Counsel may only be held responsible for his own derelictions. Under the circumstances, it was not because he was 

derelict as counsel, that Calder, during a post-trial interview 

with the presentence investigator, became aware for the first 

t . th t ' 11 d . t . 10 ~me a M~ er ha seen a psych~a r~st. 

Moreover, at the July 1985 hearings two psychiatrists 

testified. After the sentencing hearing on July 1, 1985 and the 

subsequent July 10 hearing on Miller's motion to set aside his 

conviction, the district court, having reviewed the psychiatric 

testimony of Miller's two psychiatric experts, found that neither 

doctor had "stated (an] opinion that the defendant (Miller] was 

not competent to stand trial ... that he was unable to understand 

the nature and object of the proceedings against him, that he was 

unable to consult with counsel, or that he was unable to assist 

9. It is significant that Judge Carrigan, after taking testimony 

from psychiatrists, found that Miller was capable of standing 

trial and assisting in his own defense. Judge Carrigan rejected 

the mental incompetency claims at that time. Tr. of Hearing on 

Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 11, 1985, at 149-50 . This 

finding, which is not clearly erroneous, bears tangentially on 

Miller's claim that his counsel was ineffective in not investigating Miller's competency. 

10. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 10, 

1985, at 71-73, 87, 93. This hearing concerning Miller's mental 

health problems focusses on psychiatric treatment Miller received 

after initial sentencing. 

12 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 12 
in preparing his defense." 11 We will not disturb these findings. Nor has Miller, on whom the burden to do so rests, called 

our attention to anything in the record which would substantiate 

any claim that he did not have the requisite mental state to 

commit the offenses with which he was charged. 

B. 

Miller also argues, in a slightly different guise, that 

his trial attorney Calder failed to make motions concerning Miller's mental health problems, and failed to move for continuances. We have discussed the issue of Miller's mental health 

problems above, and reject this claim of Miller's for the same 

reasons we have rejected his "failure to investigate" claim. 

With respect to Miller's complaint t .hat Calder did not 

move for continuances, the government responds that Calder made a 

normal range of motions for a trial of this nature. When this 

issue was raised at the July 1985 hearings, Calder testified that 

he abjured frivolous motions and because he was trying a bench, 

rather than a jury trial, groundless motions could backfire. The 

district court judge found credible and persuasive Calder's position that he "didn't feel that there were any motions that were 

necessary or appropriate other than the one I filed. 1112 

11. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 11, 

1985, at 149; see also at 13, 40, 104. 

12. Id., at 121. In fact, the district court judge agreed that 

motions were often abused: " ••. we get them by the yard and 

bushel around here. And as it turns out seldom are any of them 

ever very serious. 11 Id., at 120. 

13 

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The motion to which Calder was apparently referring was 

a motion that Calder recalled he had made seeking a continuance 

to the original trial date. Calder claimed that his objection 

"fell on deaf ears. " 13 But, he could not remember whether such 

a motion for a continuance appeared in the pleadings. 14 . Miller 

therefore contends that Calder "did not exercise the required 

diligence to ensure [that the motion] ha d been [rnade] . 11 15 

Even assuming that an actual motion had not been fil ed, 

we are not disposed to hold that the failure to make such a motion in the context of Miller's bench trial, or the failure of a 

trial court to grant such a motion, would give rise to a presumption that Calder was, within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment, 

ineffective as counsel for this reason. As this court has recently reconfirmed, a defendant's retrospective claims, that he 

would have fared better at trial if his trial counsel had filed 

more or different motions, requires evidence of resul ting prejudice. U. S. v. Rivera, 85-1768, 85-1771 (lOth Cir., Apr. 4, 1990) 

(en bane) slip op. at 19, 21, 23. Cf. u.s. v. Cronic, 466 u.s. 

648, 661 (1984) (discussing failure of district court to grant a 

continuance) • Miller has failed to demonstrate any prejudice 

that he has suffered as a result of Calder's actions in this 

respect. 

13. ~at 74. 

14. Id. 

15. Appellant's Brief, at 14. 

14 

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c. 

Miller alleges that trial counsel Calder was both inadequately prepared for his courtroom presentation and did not conduct himself effectively. Calder later acknowledged that, " surprised by the abruptness of the people resting," he was not prepared with his opening, which had been reserved until the start 

of Miller's case. Calder sought a recess to "set the strategy of 

the order of my witnesses, and the content ... of an opening statement." The record reveals that, after the recess, Calder called 

defense witnesses without making an opening. 16 

While counsel has the option of opening at a trial, and 

an opening may be deemed helpful, Miller has not made us aware of 

any authority that requires that an opening be made. Here, Calder, while he could have referred in an opening to evidence that 

he intended to produce, did produce such evidence at trial 

through witnesses. Most importantly, Calder argued on Miller's 

behalf in summation on the basis of the evidence taken at trial. 

We do not condone foregoing any rights or options available to a 

defendant, but we cannot say that a strategic decision to eschew 

an opening constitutes --without more-- ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

Our review of the record, and particularly of Calder's 

testimony taken at the July 10, 1985 hearing, satisfies us that 

Calder was sufficiently prepared for trial and performed adequately at trial. As Judge Carrigan stated in a collateral con16. Trial Tr., Nov. 26, 1984, at 102-3. 

15 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 15 
text, " ... most trials are not perfect. I've never seen a perfect 

one yet. 1117 There is, in fact, considerable substantive evidence, adduced at the July 10, 1985 hearing, establishing that 

Calder had undertaken significant trial preparation. The testimony reveals that Calder discussed witnesses and their usefulness 

to the defense with Miller. Calder spent over 100 pre-trial 

hours interviewing, preparing, researching and investigating. 

Calder appeared to have believed that Miller was innocent, and he 

formulated a trial strategy consistent with that belief. Evidently as a result of this belief, Calder and Miller consider ed, 

b t . t d t 1 b . 18 u reJec e , a governmen p ea arga1n. 

Although experience is obviously no guarantee of competent or effective representation, it cannot be irrelevant that 

Calder had experience as both a prosecutor and a defense attorney 

and had tried about 100 cases in each capacity. Calder had discussed with Miller whether to try Miller's charges to the cour t 

or to a jury, and Calder had prepared voir dire, discovery r e -

t d . . t t. 19 ques s, an JUry 1ns rue 1ons. Among other witnesses, Calde r 

called to testify was the client whose Tax Court case led to t he 

charges against Miller; another former secretary to Mi ller; a n17. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief 1 July 1 1 , 

1985 , at 1 5 0. 

18. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 10-11, 

1985, at 77, 75-80, 79, and 81. The trial transcripts also reveal that Calder cross-examined most of the government's witnesses, prepared exhibits, and sought to introduce evidence t h at 

he believed was exculpatory. 

19. ~at 63-70, 84-85, 123, and 79 respectively. 

16 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 16 
other ex-employee of Miller; three character witnesses; and the 

20 IRS agent involved in the Tax Court case. When the government 

called one of Miller's former secretaries as a prosecution 

witness, and sought to introduce evidence of Miller's back-dating 

other documents, not part of the indictment, Calder objected, and 

his objections were upheld. 21 See, e.g .. U.S. v. Rivera, slip 

op. at 18-24 (rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on inadequate preparation and failure to make 

motions). The record does not sustain Miller's charge of inadeguate preparation, presentation, and trial conduct. 

D. 

Miller next alleges that Calder failed to impeach government witnesses by discrediting them with instances of their 

. d t 22 own pr~or con uc • 

20. Trial Transcript, November 26-27, 1984, at 96-113, 116, 149, 

120-25, 157-58, 192-96, respectively. 

21. ~ at 33-36. 

22. As noted, at 2 and n. 2, supra , Miller was convicted at a 

bench trial on three counts of knowingly using false documents 

(deeds of trust and a Stipulation of Facts) in matters before the 

United States Tax Court. 

The two secretaries testified that, on Miller's instruction, 

they had back-dated deeds of trust. In addition, the IRS attorney who had represented the IRS in the Tax court proceeding 

testified as to the Stipulation. 

Besides the testimony of its witnesses, the government 

submitted physical evidence. The chief exhibits, all bearing Miller's signature, consisted of two deeds of trust for the profitsharing plan and pension plan of one of Miller's clients, whic h 

were found by the trial court to be fraudulently back-dated. A 

pre-trial Stipulation of Facts prepared by Miller for the United 

states Tax Court also contained references to the deeds of trust 

that were later determined to be fraudulently back-dated. That 

Stipulation repeated and incorporated the false datings and cer-

( continued •.. ) 

17 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 17 
Testimony against Miller at trial was offered by two 

former secretaries. Miller claims that Calder's failure to attack their credibility left their testimony unimpeached and 

denied Miller a fair trial. More specifically, Miller charges 

that, although Calder was aware that one of these secretaries, 

Sandra Eddy, had once filed a false report of sexual assault,B 

Calder failed to use that information to attack her overall 

credibility. 

The other secretary implicated in the back-dating, 

Kitty Longmire, was under investigation for theft and forgery at 

the time of Miller's trial. She was charged with use of a fictitious affidavit to persuade a bank to deposit into her own 

account a check made out to a client of Miller's. 24 Two months 

after trial, and during the pendency of Miller's first post-trial 

22. ( ... continued) 

tifications of the deeds of trust. Tr. Tr. at 84-90; Govt. Exhibits 1-3. 

23. Eddy had worked for Mill er from June 1982 to Ma rch 1983. on 

Sept. 30, 1984, five days before Miller's indictment and two 

months before his trial, she filed charges of sexual assault 

against a former suitor. Subsequent to an investigation, she 

herself was charged with giving false inf ormation to a public 

Official. On November 21, 1984, just three days before Miller's 

own trial, she signed a Motion for Deferred Judgment that allowe d 

her to enter a nolo plea, which, following a mandatory psychiatric examination and 150 days of good behavior, would be vacated 

and the charges dismissed. Vol. I, Ex. 15. 

24. Longmire, while still working for Miller, intercepted a u.s . Treasury check intended for one of Miller's clients and used a 

false affidavit and signatures to deposit it in her own account. 

Bank auditors became suspicious and reported the matter to the 

government. The government filed an Information and, shortly 

after Miller's trial, offered her a plea agreement, allowing her 

to plead guilty to one count of violating 18 usc § 1003 (fraudulent endeavor to cash a false or forged financial instrument) . 

18 

~· 

Appellate Case: 85-2334 Document: 01019438057 Date Filed: 07/05/1990 Page: 18 
motions, Longmire pled guilty to one count of second-degree 

forgery and received a suspended sentence of two years. Here 

too, Miller charges that Calder failed to impeach her credibi lity 

and discredit her testimony by confronting her in cross exami nation with her illegal conduct. 

The government responded to Miller's claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel in failing to cross-examine Sandra 

Eddy regarding her illegal conduct, by asserting that such crossexamination would have been barred. The government relied on two 

cases of this court, U.S. v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406, 407 (lOth Cir. 

1974) and Tafoya v. United States, 386 F.2d 537, 539 (lOth Cir. 

1967), which held that only previous convictions and not previous 

acts of misconduct which do not result in conviction may be used 

to impeach a witness's credibility. 

The record discloses that Calder had apparently been 

aware of the fact that Eddy "had a prior false report of an alleged sexual assault on her." 25 However, nothing appears i n the 

record to disclose whether Calder's choice not to examine Eddy in 

regard to this false report was a matter of strategy or of 

carelessness, and the burden in this respect, as it is in establishing all the purported deficiencies of counsel, must be 

carried by Miller. Moreover, absent Miller's demonstration of 

"how cross-examination [of Eddy on this topic) might have changed 

the outcome of the trial," a decision as to cross-examination, 

25. Tr. of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief, July 10, 

1985, at 128. 

19 

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even a decision not to cross-examine at all, "could simply have 

been part of trial counsel's strategy." u.s. v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 

1465, 1468 (lOth cir. 1989). 

We acknowledge that the government's reliance on Turner 

and Tafoya may well have been misplaced, because Fed.R.Evid. 

608(b), adopted subsequent to those cases, would not require a 

conviction for purposes of impeachment, if, in the di scretion of 

the court, the cross-examination of the witness as to the misconduct concerned the witness's credibility. 26 But that reliance, even if mistaken, does not relieve Miller of the heavy 

burden of proof imposed upon him not only to establish that his 

counsel's performance in this respect was not strategic, but was 

unreasonably ineffective. That ineffectiveness, if such it wa s, 

must meet the standard for prejudice required for a different 

verdict to have resulted. Strickland, 466 u.s., at 688, 694. 

Nor do we understand how secretary Longmire's problems 

with the law, which apparently had not yet surfaced at the time 

of Miller's trial, could have been used to affect her testimony. 

The record is unclear as to whether Calder knew she was under investigation at a time when any additional inquiry as to her conduct might have proved fruitful to Miller. The record is clear, 

however, that it was not until two months after Miller's trial 

26. Thus, as this court has put it, under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b): 

a defendant may impeach a Government witness 

by cross-examining him about specific instances of conduct not resulting in conviction if 

such conduct is probative of the witness• 

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 

U.S. v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (lOth cir. 1987). 

20 

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that she pled guilty to fraudulently cashing a false or forged 

financial instrument, even though the Information charged her 

with having forged a check endorsement in the year 1982 --before 

Miller's trial. 

As previously noted, the mere failure to cross-examine 

a witness does not necessarily require a finding of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Voigt, 877 F.2d at 1468. Moreover, in 

this case, that failure did not affect the substance of 

Longmire's testimony but could only have affected her credibility. 

Of more significance, Miller has not sustained the 

strickland burden of proving that Calder's representation, by 

failing to cross-examine Eddy or Longmire as to their misconduct, 

fell below the prevailing professional norm and that this failure 

prejudiced his defense. As this court has held, in addition to 

Strickland's "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," a 

reviewing "court need not determine whether counsel's performance 

was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the 

defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 11 U.S. v. 

Jones, 852 F.2d 1275, 1277 (lOth Cir. 1988) (citing Strickland, 

27 466 u.s. at 697). 

E. 

Finally, Miller claims that during his own testimony he 

was never asked, in so many words, "do you deny the charges made 

27. See note 22, supra. 

21 

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against you7 11 Thus Miller states that he never had an opportunity to assert his innocence as to the charge of back-dating. 

Miller reinforces this claim by referring to the 

court's colloquy with Calder after the defense had rested. Judge 

Carrigan at that time offered to let Calder reopen the defense 's 

case because he, the Judge, did not recall that "any direct question [had been) asked as to the real charge here . '' Trial Tr. at 

202. Miller also refers to a statement made by Judge Carrigan at 

a later status conference, held on August 12, 1988, where Judge 

Carrigan indicated he would give Miller a new trial. At that 

time, Judge Carrigan stated: 

••. as I recall, the defendant took the stand, 

but was never asked by his counsel whether he 

did these things •.•• which just seemed highly 

unlikely i n a competent defense of a criminal 

case, and with evidence from the two secretaries ... aga inst him, and his not denying 

that evidence, that was crucial in my mind. 

Tr. of Status Conference o f August 12, 1988, at 4-5. 

Miller further claims that Calder could have called some rebuttal 

witnesses who might have testified to Miller's claims of inno28 

cence. 

28. Carroll, Miller's third counsel, claimed at this same August 

12, 1988 status conference that Calder should have called as witnesses an FBI investigator, who would testify that Miller had 

denied his guilt. Carroll also asserted that a another former 

secretary of Miller's might have been subpoenaed to provide favorable testimony as to Miller's alleged office practices. The 

government argues that the testimony of the investigator would 

not have been admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) and 802 (hearsay) and that the record does not permit us to assess those 

claims, which were first mentioned some four years after trial at 

the August 12, 1988 status conference. As with the other claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel that we have discussed, this 

(continued ... ) 

22 

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The government responds by properly calling our attention to the principle that, when the record is silent as to the 

reason for counsel's decision, a reviewing court must "'indulge a 

strong presumption' that the decision [of trial counsel] was 

based on 'sound trial strategy'" u.s. v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 413 

(lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting Strickland, 466 u.s. at 689). The government also speculates that a direct question seeking a direct 

answer might not have been asked because Calder may have feared 

that Miller "would have committed perjury in response" to such a 

• 29 quest1on. 

We will not indulge in speculating whether Miller would 

or would not have admitted or denied the charges made against him 

in so many words. our review of the record discloses to us a 

consistent, albeit indirect, avowal of innocence on Miller's part 

with an attendant reciprocal indirect denial of the charges 

against him. 30 We are , of course, troubled by this aspect of 

Miller's appeal, p"articularly because of Judge Carrigan's later, 

revised assessment of the trial proceedings, which Judge Carrigan 

arrived at some four years after his initial ruling. 

It is understandable that Miller on this appeal relies 

heavily on the August 12, 1988 Status Conference ruling of Judge 

28. ( ... continued) 

rebuttal witness claim of Miller's does not meet the Strickland 

standard. 

29. Appellee's Brief, at 12. Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 u.s. 

157, 166-73 (1986); u.s. v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 811 (lOth Cir. 

1988). 

30. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 142-44, 186-7. 

23 

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Carrigan, which contained a certification to this court that, if 

we were to remand Miller's proceedings to the district court, 

Judge Carrigan would grant Miller a new trial. We have noted 

supra, at typescript 5 that Judge Carrigan had no jurisdiction 

over the Miller proceedings in 1988 --nearly four years after 

trial-- to consider Miller's application. U.S. v. Miller, 869 

F.2d 1418, 1421 (lOth Cir. 1989). However, even given Judge 

Carrigan's own change of position, we are not persuaded that his 

views, as formulated nearly four years after trial, should 

"trump11 his own earlier determinations-- determinations predicated on hearings held while the evidence, the trial, and the 

testimony of witnesses were all still fresh in his mind. 31 

Strickland, 466 u.s., at 690, requires that we reject 

hindsight and assess the reasonableness of an attorney's perf ormance at the time of trial. This principle, when considered together with our own review of the record and of Judge Carriga n's 

trial findings of November 1 984 as well as h i s determination made 

in July 1985 that Calder was not ineffective, is of greater significance to us and more persuasive than Judge Carrigan's August 

1988 certification. 

31. At Judge Carrigan's hearings of July 1, 10 and 11, 1985 numerous witnesses we r e interrogated and over 150 pages of testimony 

was taken . Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1508-9 (lOth Cir. 

1987); rev'd on other grounds, Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 154 5 

(1988) (en bane), rev'd sub nom, Saffle v. Pa rks, 110 s.ct. 1257 

(1990); u.s. v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 n.2 (lOth Cir. 198 5} 

(fact-finding hearings on ineffective assistance claims not obligatory). 

24 

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There have been other instances where the effectiveness 

of counsel has been challenged by a defendant and in which 

troublesome actions or inactions of trial counsel have been 

identified. But, as we have earlier stated, we have held in s uc h 

instances that 11 [a] court need not determine whether counsel's 

performance was deficient before examining. the prejudice suffered 

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 11 

Jones, 852 F.2d at 1277. Even if we were to hold that the 

failure to give Miller an opportunity to explicitly deny, rather 

than indirectly deny, the backdating of documents with which he 

was charged, exhibited a deficiency on Calder's part, the record 

as a whole does not establish that this one omission prejudiced 

Miller's claim of innocence and, thus, his defense. To succeed 

here, Miller must demonstrate that Calder's actions, singly or in 

gross, were so ineffective that a new trial would result in a 

verdict of not guilty. Our review of these proceedings satisfies 

us that Miller has failed to carry his requisite burden in t his 

respect. See, Rivera, supra. 

v. 

Thus, we answer the questions that we posed at the 

outset of this opinion (supra at typescript 6} by holding that 

Miller has not borne his required burden of proving that 

counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing 

professional norms and that, even if unreasonable representation 

were to be assumed, Miller had suffered insufficient prejudice to 

warrant a new trial. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 u.s. 365, 381 

25 

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(1986); Strickland, 466 u.s. at 688-9. Accordingly, we will 

affirm Miller's conviction at 84-2776 and the district court 

order which denied Miller's § 2255 application to set aside his 

conviction. 

26 

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