Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01541/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01541-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE JAMAL ROBINSON, Civil

No.

10cv1541-LAB (CAB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Respondent.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry Alan Burns

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Andre Jamal Robinson, (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner who is proceeding pro se with

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No.

1, hereinafter “Pet.”.] Petitioner challenges his February 22, 2006 San Diego County Superior Court

conviction after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder and found that Petitioner personally used a

firearm during the commission of the offense. [Id. at 2.] In addition, the jury found true a special

circumstance that Petitioner committed murder while he was engaged in the commission of a rape. [Id.; See

also lodgment 8 at 1-2.] Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for a term of life without the possibility

of parole. [Pet. at 1.]

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

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28 The People charged Southerland as a codefendant. However, prior to trial, the trial court 1

severed the cases against Robinson and Southerland. Southerland [was] not a party to [the] appeal. 

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Division One. (Lodgments 4, 5, and 7.) On March 26, 2008, that court filed an unpublished opinion

unanimously affirming the judgment. (Lodgment 8.) Petitioner's ensuing petition for review was denied

by the California Supreme Court on June 11, 2008. (Lodgments 9, 10.) Petitioner did not file a petition for

certiorari in the United Sates Supreme Court. [Doc. 1 at 3.]

In addition to the direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San

Diego County Superior Court, Case No. HS 11052, on March 16, 2009. (Lodgment 11). It was denied on

April 1, 2009. (Lodgment 12.) On June 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

raising the same issues before the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District. (Lodgment 13).

That petition was denied in a reasoned decision on September 9, 2009. (Lodgment 14). On November 12,

2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus before the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment

15.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on May 12, 2010. (Lodgment 16.)

On, July 19, 2010 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254.[Doc. No. 1.] On December 23, 2010 Respondent filed an answer, a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in support thereof, and lodged a portion of the state record with the Court. [Doc. No. 13.]

Petitioner filed his Traverse to the petition on May 5, 2011. [Doc. No. 23.]

II. UNDERLYING FACTS

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness). The relevant facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

A. The People’s case

On March 22, 1995, at approximately 2:00 a.m., the victim, Pamela Shelley, went to work

as a prostitute in the area of 32nd Street and Ocean View in San Diego. At some time before 4:00

a.m., Robinson [Petitioner] and Adrian Southerland propositioned Shelley for sex. Shelley agreed

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to have sex with the two men. Southerland drove Robinson and Shelley to Lauderbach Park in

Chula Vista.

After the group got out of the car, Robinson began to hit Shelley and told her to remove her

clothes. Holding a gun in his hand, Robinson told Shelley to perform oral sex on him. Southerland

had oral and vaginal sex with Shelley. Southerland then held Shelley’s feet back while Robinson

had vaginal sex with her. At some point during the sex acts, Robinson held a gun to Shelley’s head.

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When Robinson finished, Shelley started to get up off the ground. As she did so, Robinson shot

her several times in the torso with a gun. Shelley died from the gunshots. 

DNA evidence taken from Shelley’s mouth and vagina matched Robinson’s DNA. In

addition, Robinson’s fingerprint was on a beer bottle that police found at the scene. The People

played an audiotaped confession for the jury in which Robinson admitted to raping and shooting

Shelley. 

B. The Defense

Robinson testified at his trial. Robinson stated that on the night in question, he had

consensual sex with Shelley in the park. After he and Shelley finished having sex, Southerland

began to have sex with Shelley. Robinson walked a short distance away. After approximately five

minutes, Robinson heard two or three gunshots. Robinson turned and saw Shelley on the ground

and Southerland running toward him. Robinson ran to the car, and Southerland got in the car. After

reaching the car, Robinson asked Southerland something to the effect of, “Why did you shoot her?”

Southerland did not answer. Robinson and Southerland drove to Robinson’s apartment complex,

and Robinson went into his apartment. Robinson believed that after Southerland dropped off

Robinson, Southerland went to a nearby apartment to pick up his children. 

Robinson testified that his confession to the police was false. He maintained that he had just

“[given] in and told them what I thought they wanted to hear.”

(Lodgment 8, at 2-4.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district courtshall entertain

an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (emphasis added).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus

petitions filed after 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the

state court decided a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). This standard is

“difficult to meet,” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011), and is “highly deferential,”

demanding that “state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.

19, 24 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has clearly limited federal courts reviewing petitions for habeas

relief to claims based upon federal questions: “it is not the province of the federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court

is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish

a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record “to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.” Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75-76 (2003)); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). As long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002).

“In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent

‘unreasonable,’ the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.” Wiggins v.

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (citation omitted). “The state court's application must have been

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 520-21 (citation omitted). 

Further, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State Court shall be presumed to be correct,”

and Petitioner may only rebut this presumption by presenting “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (e)(1). 

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B. Analysis 

Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds: 1) evidence used to convict Petitioner was

obtained in violation of his MirandaRights andRight to Counsel; 2)ineffective assistance oftrial counsel;

3) the government failed to admit evidence that was favorable to Petitioner at trial in violation of Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 4) Petitioner’s right to due process under the fifth and fourteenth

constitutional amendments were violated when the court failed to instruct the jury on a lesser-included

offense to murder; 5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; 6) cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the eighth constitutional amendment, due to an excessive imposition of a fine; and 7)

Petitioner is actually innocent. [Pet. at 6-9, 13-24.] 

Respondent contends that 1) this Court must defer to the determinations of the state court; 2)

Grounds One, Three, Four, and Six are procedurally barred; 3) the state courts’ determination that

Petitioner’s confession was properly obtained was an objectively reasonable application of controlling

federal constitutional authority; 4) the state courts’ determination that the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim lacked merit was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law; 5) Petitioner fails to establish a discovery violation under Brady v. Maryland; 6) Petitioner fails to

show a constitution violation based on alleged instructional error; 7) the state court’s determination that

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel’s claim lacked merit was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; 8) Petitioner’s claim that the state court

imposed an excessive restitution fine does not state a cognizable federal question; and 9) Petitioner failed

to make a prima facie showing of actual innocence. [Doc. 13-1, hereinafter “Ans.” at 6-21.]

Petitioner presented each of these claims to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review.

[Pet. at 6-9, 19, 21, 24; Lodgments 9, 15.] The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petitions

for review. (Lodgments 10, 16.) In Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Court adopted a

presumption which gives no effect to unexplained state court orders but “looks through” them to the last

reasoned state court decision. Petitioner raised the same arguments to the Appellate Court in the same

fashion in which he presented them to the California Supreme Court. [Compare Lodgments 4 and 5

(Appellant’s Opening Brief and supplemental opening brief) with Lodgment 9 (Petition for Review) and

compare Lodgment 13 (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus before Appellate Court) with Lodgment 15

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(Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court).] The California Court of Appeals denied

the claims in two reasoned opinions. (Lodgments 8 and 14.) The Court will therefore look through the

silent denials by the California Supreme Court to the appellate court opinions. 

1. Procedural Default as to Claims One, Three, Four, and Six

Respondent contends that claims 1, 3, 4, and 6 are procedurally defaulted because the state court

denied these claims on the grounds that Petitioner failed to state a claim for prima facie relief under People

v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474-75 (1995). [Ans. at 8; Lodgment 14.] Respondent argues that the procedural

bar expressed in Duvall constitutes an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal review. Ans.

at 8.] In a reasoned opinion, the appellate court stated in pertinent part:

Petitioner contends that his confession was involuntary and/or taken in violation of Miranda v.

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. [Claim 1 to the Federal Petition.] Petitioner admits, however, that

he was “mirandized” upon his arrival at the police station. Petitioner does not allege that he was

threatened, abused, or otherwise mistreated. Nor does petitioner allege that he requested counsel

and that request was denied. Petitioner bears the burden of proving a prima facie case for habeas

relief, and petitioner has not met this burden. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474-475.)

Petitioner’s request for relief on this ground is denied. 

Petitioner next contends that, at his murder trial, the prosecution failed to disclose “favorable”

evidence, including ship logs, a drawing of Lauderbach Park, and fingerprint and DNA evidence;

however, petitioner does not explain how this evidence is relevant or would tend to exculpate him.

Petitioner’s request for relief on this ground is denied. (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp.

474-475.) 

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed an error of law in responding negatively to the

jury’s question as to whether they could convict petitioner of a lesser offense.... He further

contends that the restitution fines and fees assessed are excessive and constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Both] of these issues could have been raised

on appeal. (See In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759). In any event, petitioner does not state a

claim for prima facie relief on [either] of these grounds and his requests for relief on these grounds

are denied. (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 474-475.)

(Lodgment 14.)

Respondent argues that the procedural bar expressed in Duvall constitutes an independent and

adequate state ground to bar federal review. [Ans. at 8.] A state procedural default arises from the

“adequate and independent state law doctrine,” which provides that the United States Supreme Court lacks

jurisdiction to review a judgment of a state court which “rests on a state law ground that is independent

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729

(1991). On direct review of a state court judgment, the resolution of a federal claim would not affect a

judgment which rests on a state ground independent of the federal claim. Id. The Supreme Court would,

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in effect, be issuing an advisory opinion on the federal claim, something the Court lacks jurisdiction to do.

Id.

The adequate and independent doctrine has been extended to federal habeas actions. Id. Although

a federal habeas court does not review a judgment of a state court, it decides whether a state prisoner is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. at 729-30. When the “adequate

and independent ground” for a state court’s rejection of a federal claim involves a violation of state

procedural requirements, a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim, and this Court cannot

reach the merits of the federal claim. Id. To do so would allow a habeas petitioner to avoid the limitation

on direct review by the Supreme Court, avoid the habeas exhaustion requirement, and undercut “the

States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes.” Id. at 730-32.

Despite a procedural default, however, this Court may still consider the habeas claim “unless the

last state court rendering a judgment in the case “‘clearly and expressly’” states that its judgment rests on

a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472

U.S. 320, 327 (1985), quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).). Additionally, the Court

may reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can demonstrate (1) cause for the

procedural default and actual prejudice from the claimed violation, or (2) that the failure to review the

claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Because procedural default is an affirmative defense, the state must initially plead procedural

default. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). Once the state has asserted the existence

of an adequate and independent state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the

petitioner who must place this defense at issue by “asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate

the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent

application of the rule.” Id. at 586. If the Petitioner meets his burden of placing the defense at issue, the

ultimate burden to demonstrate the adequacy of a state procedural bar is on the State. Id.

Here, the state appellate court denied the above-stated claims in Petitioner’s state petition with a

citation to Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474-75, and the California Supreme Court apparently adopted such a

finding in denying the petitions for review. (Lodgment Nos. 14, 16.) Under Duvall, a habeas corpus

petitioner must “i) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii)

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include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent

portions of trial transcripts and affidavits. Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the

basis of the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing... [T]he burden is on the

petitioner to establish grounds for his release.” Id. at 474. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The

citation to Duvall makes it clear that the state court denied the state petition of the claims at issue here

based on Petitioner’s failure to plead a prima facie case for relief. Further, Respondent has asserted that

such a ruling constitutes an adequate and independent state bar, precluding federal habeas review. [Ans.

at 8]. See also Medley, 506 F.3d at 869 (recognizing in the dissenting opinion that a state court’s dismissal

citing Duvall constituted a dismissal on procedural grounds for failure to meet the requirements for

properly proceeding on a habeas claim in state court, and indicating that the claim would have been

procedurally barred on this ground had the state raised the issue in its answer.)

“For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must not be

interwoven with federal law.” LaCrosse v Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Michigan

v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41; Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting Coleman,

501 U.S. at 735 (“Federal habeas review is not barred if the state decision ‘fairly appearsto rest primarily

on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law.’”). “A state law is so interwoven if ‘the state has

made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the

determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.” Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985).

To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for the decision must be well-established and

consistently applied. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498

U.S. 411, 424 (1991) (“A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was

‘firmly established and regularly followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court.”). Although a state

court’s exercise of judicial discretion will not necessarily render a rule inadequate, the discretion must

entail “the exercise of judgment according to standards that, at least over time, can become known and

understood within reasonable operating limits.” Morales, 85 F.3d at 1392.

While the ultimate burden of proving adequacy rests with the Respondent, the Petitioner must place

the state’s affirmative defense of independent and adequate state procedural grounds at issue “by asserting

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specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure.”Bennett, 322 F.3d at

586. Therefore, because Respondent has asserted the affirmative defense of procedural default, the burden

shifts to Petitioner to place this affirmative defense at issue. Id.

Petitioner, however, has not argued that the state procedural bar is inadequate or that it is

inconsistently applied. Petitioner cites no authority and no factual allegations to rebut Respondent’s

procedural default defense. Therefore, Petitioner has not met his burden under Bennett. This Court thus

finds that the state courts dismissed Petitioner’s claims on independent and adequate state procedural

grounds, and accordingly finds that claims 1, 3, 4, and 6 are procedurally defaulted. 

The Court may still reach the merits of the claims, however, if Petitioner can establish cause and

prejudice or if a miscarriage of justice will occur by this Court’s failure to reach the merits of the claim.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

a. Cause and Prejudice

To demonstrate “cause,” Petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which impeded

his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301,

1305 (9th Cir. 1996). For example, a petitioner can demonstrate cause by showing interference by state

officials, the unavailability of the legal or factual basis for a claim, or constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). A petitioner cannot demonstrate cause to

excuse a procedural default where the cause is fairly attributable to the petitioner’s own conduct. McCoy

v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992). Nor can a petitioner show cause for a procedural

default where the petitioner bears “the costs associated with an ignorant or inadvertent procedural default”

or “where the failure to raise a claim is a deliberate strategy.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752.

Here, Petitioner states in a heading that “state procedural default should be excused due to

ineffective assistance of trial and post conviction counsel under the ‘cause and prejudice’ prong.” [Doc.

23, hereinafter “Trav.” at 7.] Petitioner’s argument under said heading, however, provides no supporting

facts to substantiate this argument. Indeed, as the relevant claims were dismissed by the appellate court

in response to Petitioner’s habeas petitions that he prepared pro se, ineffective assistance of counsel cannot

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Although, as Respondent points out, the appellate court also cited Petitioner’s failure to raise 2

Claim 6 in the direct appeal as another reason for denying that claim (Lodgment 14 citing In re Dixon,

41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953)) the Court’s independent dismissal of the claim on Duvall grounds makes the

ineffective assistance of counsel argument moot for procedural default purposes.

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serve as a cause of his failure to properly present his claims. Petitioner presents no further argument on 2

this issue and thus has not demonstrated cause to excuse the procedural default of claims 1, 3, 4, and 6.

Even if Petitioner were able to establish cause, he fails to establish prejudice from the alleged

violations of federal law. To establish the prejudice necessaryto overcome a procedural default, Petitioner

must show “not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). (emphasis in original.) “Prejudice [to

excuse claims procedurally barred in a habeas case] is actual harm resulting from the alleged error.”

Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). Petitioner fails to show that actual harm arose from

the violations he alleges. Furthermore, as the Court discusses below, Petitioner has failed to show that any

of these procedurally-defaulted claims have merit. Therefore, these alleged errors did not infect the trial

with error of constitutional dimensions, and no actual harm resulted. Petitioner has thus failed to carry

his burden of proof regarding cause and prejudice.

b. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

The Court may also reach the merits of the procedurally-defaulted claims if Petitioner can

demonstrate that the failure to do so would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). The Supreme Court has limited the “miscarriage of justice” exception to habeas

petitioners who can show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent.” Id. “Actual innocence” means factual innocence, not merely legal

insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable doubt is not enough. See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379

(9th Cir. 1997). To show actual innocence, Petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Here, Petitioner has failed to carry this burden. Petitioner has not provided a colorable showing

of factual innocence in supplementary post-trial evidence. Indeed he has presented none. Instead, his

arguments are based on facts already in the record, and, as before the state court, provides no additional

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 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that: 3

[C]ourts are empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the merits of habeas

petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that could be

developed below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar. See

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 [] (1997) (“We do not mean to suggest

that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first; only that it

ordinarily should be. It is wasteful of both our resources and that of the litigants

to remand to the district court a case in which that court improperly found a

procedural bar, if the ultimate dismissal of the petition is a foregone conclusion.”). 

Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more complex than the merits issues

presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to proceed

to the merits if the result will be the same. 

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner was interviewed for approximately an hour and a half, during which he acknowledged 4

knowing Mr. Southerland, and denied ever having seen the victim, Ms. Shelley, when shown a

photograph from her DMV records. (Lodgment 1 at 248-263). The transcript of that interview is not part

of the record before the Court, and Petitioner does not claim that evidence obtained from that interview

was improperly used against him.

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evidence to support his claims. The exception simply does not apply in this case, and a miscarriage of

justice would not result from upholding the procedural bar. The Court, therefore, is precluded from

considering the merits of these claims. 

Even if these claims were not procedurally barred, however, they lack merit.3

c. The Merits

i. Claim 1 - Miranda/ Massiah Violation

Petitioner’s first claim is that the evidence used to convict him (presumably, although not

specifically stated, his confession) was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and his right to counsel

in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. [Pet. at 6.]

On May 27, 2004, San Diego District Attorney Investigator Michael Howard and Chula Vista

Detective Mark Jones traveled to Norfolk, VA pursuant to a search warrant permitting them to interview

the Petitioner, obtain a DNA sample, and to search his residence for a .22 caliber pistol. [Pet. at 6.] (See

also Lodgment 1 at 247-248.) At some point following the search, Naval Criminal Investigative Service

4

Agent Scott Campbell stated to Petitioner, “You need to talk to these guys because this Southerland fellow

[], I don’t know about him and if your D.N.A. matches you[’re] toast.”[Pet. at 6.]

On June 9, 2004, the Agent Campbell entered the USS Harry S Truman’s “Brig” (jail), where Mr.

Robinson was on watch as the Brig Watch Commander, and stated, “Mr. Robinson N.C.I.S. Agt. Scott

Campbell, San Diego has issued a warrant for your arrest, life as you’ve known [it] just ended.” [Id.]

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Petitioner claims that while he was being searched, Agt. Campbell stated, “Mr. Robinson......Mr.

Robinson look at me, your going to talk to Det. Howard and Agt. Jones again, you remember them don’t

you?[”] Petitioner claims that Agt. Campbell did not advise him of his Miranda Rights or his Article 31

Bravo Rights (according to Petitioner, the Military equivalent to Miranda Rights,) nor did he obtain a

signed waiver of rights. [Id.] Petitioner claims that Agt. Campbell then placed him in a 4x6 disciplinary

segregation cell with a sheet placed over it, preventing him from seeing out. [Id.] 

Subsequently, Petitioner claims he asked to use the phone but was denied by order of Agt.

Campbell. [Id.] He also claims that, although he had not been officially charged, he was required to

identify himself as a prisoner, and request permission for all his actions, for example, “Prisoner Robinson

request permission to exit cell, Prisoner Robinson request permission to use the head, Prisoner Robinson

request permission to flush, Prisoner Robinson request permission to wash hands, Prisoner Robinson

request permission to enter cell, etc.” [Id. at 6, 13.] Petitioner claims he was then paraded through

hundreds of sailors as a public spectacle escorted by a six man security detail to retrieve a change of

clothes. [Id. at 13.] 

On June 10, 2004, Petitioner claims that Lieutenant Dustin Wallace, a legal officer, presented

Petitioner with discharge papers, and informed him that “due to the nature of the accusation we have to

separate you from the Navy. Basically, if you do not sign these papers, the Navy will try you and when

you get done doing our time San Diego comes [and] gets you and tries you.” [Id.]

Finally, petitioner claims that, after being in custody for 24 hours, he was flown off of the ship to

the Norfolk Naval Station to await the arrival of Det. Howard and Agt. Jones. While waiting, Agt.

Campbell apparently stated, “You need to talk with these guys because, this Southerland fellow is not a

good friend and they already know you’re the shooter.” Upon arrival of Det. Howard and Agt. Jones, Mr.

Robinson was transported to the Virginia Beach Police Department, placed in a room for an hour or so,

and then “Mirandized” by Det. Howard and interrogated by Det. Howard, Agt. Jones, and Agt. Campbell.

[Id.] 

In sum, Petitioner claims that Agt. Campbell, as a federal officer, member of Petitioner’s naval

chain-of-command, and one of the interrogators, did not advise Petitioner of his rights, instead keeping

Petitioner in custody for 24 hours, and subjecting him to “ploys destructive to human dignity.” [Id.]

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Specifically, Petitioner claims that Agt. Campbell’s actions placing Petitioner “in a prisoner’s uniform,

plac[ing] him in a disciplinary cell, denying him a phone call to seek counsel, hav[ing] him identify

himself as a prisoner, [] parading him in front of hundreds of sailors with a 6 man security detail despite

not having any Disciplinary Hearing, was a demoralizing ploy to overcome his will to resist talking to

detectives... [and] Agt. Campbell’s statement to Mr. Robinson while en route to a formal interview was

a psychological ploy to enervate him and cajole him to talk to detectives thus constituting interrogation.”

[Id.]

Respondent argues that the state courts properly denied this claim on the grounds that Petitioner

failed to present a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief under the standards set forth in

Miranda. [Ans. at 9-11.]

According to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a suspect who is subject to

custodial interrogation must be advised of his federal constitutional right to remain silent and his right to

have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "Absent such

interrogation, there [is] no infringement of the right . . . and there [is] no occasion to determine whether

there ha[s] been a valid waiver." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 (1981). “Interrogation” includes

not only direct custodial questioning by law enforcement officers, but its “functional equivalent.” Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). A functional equivalent of questioning is “any words or

actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police

should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301. 

The mere failure on the part of the police to provide a suspect with full Miranda warnings is not,

in and of itself, a violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights. U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004).

“Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence.” Id.

Here, Petitioner does not dispute that he was given Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation

that lead to his confession that was ultimately used against him at trial. [Pet. at 13.] Rather, he argues that

because he was in custody for over 24 hours, and was subjected to what he describes as “ploys destructive

to human dignity” while in custody without first receiving his Miranda warnings, that his constitutional

rights were violated. [Id.] Petitioner also agues that police conduct prior to his Miranda warnings,

specifically Agt. Campbell’s comments en route to the formal interview that “You need to talk to these

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 The Court finds the Petitioner’s authority cited to be inapposite to the circumstances of the 5

instant case since Petitioner here did not make any incriminating pre-Miranda statements. See e.g. Doc.

23 (traverse) at 10, citing U.S. v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906, 909-10 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding continued

questioning of defendant after he responded “no” to officer's question of whether defendant wanted to

talk to officer violated defendant's right to remain silent); U.S. v. Orso, 266 F.3d. 1030, 1033-34 (9th

Cir. 2001) (abrogated by Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), but in any event, involving preMiranda statements that were used against the defendant at trial); United States v. Perez, 948 F.Supp.

1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving suppression of pre-Miranda statement); Blackmon v. Johnson, 145

F.3d 205 (5thCir. 1998) (pre-Miranda conversation lead to incriminating statements).

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guys because this Southerland fellow is not a good friend,” and “They know you’re the shooter,” amounted

to the “functional equivalent” of an interrogation as described by the Supreme Court in Innis, 466 U.S. at

301. [Trav. at 9-10.] Petitioner claims he was subject to a “‘two part investigation’ in which officers

question suspects and deliberately delay Miranda warning in order to provoke a confession.” [Id. at 10.]

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present facts to support his claim of a Miranda

violation. Petitioner does not allege that he was subject to any questioning while in custody prior to his

formal interrogation, and even if he was, Petitioner does not allege that any pre-Miranda statements were

used against him at trial. Absent such allegations, Petitioner cannot prevail on a Miranda claim. See

Patane, 542 U.S. at 631 (Miranda violations only occur upon the admission of unwarned statements at

trial); See also Gavin. v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that although police violated

petitioner’s Miranda rights by continuing to question her after she requested counsel, petitioner was not

entitled to habeas relief because the statement used against her at trial was elicited three days later, after

proper Miranda warnings had been given.) 

5

Moreover, Petitioner does not allege, nor does a review of the transcript of the interrogation and

the ensuing confession reveal, that the confession itself was involuntary or obtained under coercive

circumstances. (See generally Lodgment 3.) Indeed, Investigator Howard clearly advised Petitioner of

his Miranda rights prior to any questioning. (Id. at 2-4.) And, following the recitation of each right,

Petitioner clearly, and without coercion, waived his rights prior to his confession. (Id.)

Petitioner also claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as articulated by Massiah v.

United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), was violated when his request to make a phone call was denied. [Pet.

at 13; Trav. at 9.] In Massiah, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner was denied his basic Sixth

Amendment protections when his incriminating statements, which federal agents had deliberately elicited

from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his retained counsel, were used against him at

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his trial. 377 U.S. at 206. Here, Petitioner never explicitly requested counsel. [Pet. at 13.] Petitioner argues

that “any reasonable prudent person would conclude that an arresttee requesting use of a phone is seeking

counsel.” [Trav. at 9.] But even if such a request could be considered a request for counsel, as set forth

above, the Court finds that the Petitioner had expressly waived his right to counsel prior to his confession,

and Petitioner alleges no incriminating statements were used against him at trial that were made prior to

that waiver. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the state courts’ rulings that the Petitioner failed to

present a prima facie showing that his confession was admitted at trial in violation of his constitutional

rights were objectively reasonable under controlling federal constitutional authority. Therefore, because

claim 1 is procedurally defaulted, and in any case would fail on the merits, the Court RECOMMENDS

that the Petition be DENIED as to this claim.

ii. Claim 3 - Brady Violation

In his third claim, Petitioner alleges that his conviction was unconstitutionally obtained through

the government’s misconduct in failing to admit evidence that was favorable to the petitioner at trial. [Pet.

at 8, 17.] His claim centers around three items: 1) the U.S.S. Harry S Truman’s security desk journal; 2)

Petitioner’s own drawing of Lauderbach park depicting his location at the time of the murder; and 3) beer

bottles, wrappers, and cigarette butts that were disposed of by a parks department employee, which were

not collected by the state’s evidence technician from the scene of the crime. [Id.]

The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that a prosecutor must disclose all material

evidence, including impeachment evidence, to the defendant. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 678 (1985). In order to establish a Brady violation, Petitioner must show (1)

the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the withheld evidence

was exculpatory or impeachment material; and (3) he was prejudiced by the failure to disclose. See

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).) The Court

finds that Petitioner has failed to meet this standard. 

With respect to the ship logs, Petitioner claims this evidence would show, “when Mr. Robinson

was taken into custody, and by whom, show a signed waiver of rights if done, show all of his movements,

ie his being paraded through hundreds of his shipmates unnecessarily and against protocol.” [Pet. at 8.]

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But this evidence, even if Petitioner could show it had been suppressed by the government in the first

instance, would not be relevant to Petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime. Nor does it appear from

the record that it would be impeaching, as Petitioner testified as to these circumstances himself (see

lodgment 1 at 332-334,) and the prosecution presented no witness to rebut these statements. The jury was

also exposed to the facts and circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s arrest from the defense’s closing

argument. (Lodgment 1 at 338-400). Petitioner does not allege any facts to suggest that he was prejudiced

by the failure of the prosecution to admit these logs into evidence. 

As to the materiality of the Petitioner’s drawing of Lauderbach park depicting his location on the

night in question, Petitioner claims that “(1) It is the same location where state witness Hugo Martinez ...

testified to picking up beer bottles and cigarette butts, (2) corroborates Mr. Robinson’stestimony as to his

location in the park on the night of the incident and (3) most importantly it impeaches the prosecution’s

version of events.” [Trav. at 12.] Even if Petitioner could successfully show that the state willfully

suppressed the drawing, and that it was exculpatoryand/or impeaching, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that

the absence of the drawing as evidence was prejudicial to his case. See Bagely, 473 U.S. at 678. Indeed,

as Respondent points out, the jury heard the audiotape of Petitioner’s interview with police during which

he drew the picture of the park. (Lodgment 1 at 270-71; Lodgment 3 at 46). Moreover, Petitioner testified

as to his location in the park at the time of the incident. (Lodgment 1 at 326-27.) Likewise, as Petitioner

admits, the jury heard testimony from parks employee Hugo Martinez as to the location he found the

wrappers and cigarette butts and that he disposed of them prior to finding the body. (Trav. at 12; lodgment

1 at 47-71.)

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish a “reasonable probability” that any of the

allegedly suppressed evidence would have altered the outcome of his trial. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.

Accordingly, the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim based on the determination that Petitioner failed

to “explain how this evidence is relevant our would tend to exculpate him,” (lodgment 14 at 1) was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Early, 537

U.S. at 8 (stating that “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

[Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be contrary to clearly established federal

law). Therefore, because claim 3 is procedurally defaulted, and in any case would fail on the merits, the

Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED as to this claim.

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 It is unclear to as to which code sections the Petitioner is citing. The Court has reviewed the 6

California Penal Code and California Criminal Jury Instructions and is unable to identify the specific

jury instructions that Petitioner cites. 

See Lodgment 1 at 365-381 for argument and discussion on the record with respect to the 7

inclusion of an instruction regarding lesser included offenses.

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iii. Claim 4 - Instructional Error

In his Fourth Claim, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser

offense was a violation of his constitutional right to due process. [Pet. at 9, 18; Trav. at 13-14.]

Specifically, Petitioner claims that the trial court should have given instructions on “§ 250 lesser included

offenses, § 631 Acquittal First, and § 33 Partial Verdict.” [Doc. 1 at 9.] Petitioner also argues, without 6

specification, that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on a lesser related (as opposed to

included) offense. [Doc. 23 (traverse) at 13-14.] 

In support of his claim, Petitioner cites the fact that while the jury was deliberating, the trial court

received a note from the jury asking, “Can the Defendant be found guilty for any lesser crimes such as

rape, fleeing a crime scene, et cetera?” [Id. at 9; lodgment 1 at 428: 9-11.] In addressing the note with

counsel, the trial court stated, “...we had gone over lessers and the people’s theory was felony murder,

which does not have any lessers. And the people were not proceeding under aiding and abetting or

conspiracy or premeditated. So that’s why there are no lessers so the answer would be no.” (Lodgment

1 at 428:17-21.) After the respective counsel argued their positions to the court, the defense position 7

being that the court should respond with an instruction on rape as a lesser-related offense (id. at 428-431,)

the court found as follows:

The court’s position is that the people do have the charging prerogative. They have not

charged it as a rape. They would be precluded, under the statute of limitations, from charging the

rape. They have elected to go under a felony murder rule theory, very harsh election. It’s all or

nothing basically. It’s a result of the charging prerogative and the people have pursued that single

theory.

So I think your disagreement is with their theory, but I know of no case law that would

allow, at this late date, to change to give them the option of an uncharged felony, which is past the

statute of limitation, even with a waiver, to go to them when the people have not elected to charge

that, even if it were possible. Therefore, the court will answer this as follows: No. 

(Lodgment 1 at 431; See also Pet. at 9.)

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner does not specify any lesser offenses on which he claims

the court should have instructed the jury, nor would such an instruction be consistent with the defense

theory at trial – a point that defense counsel expressly recognized in the discussion with the trial court as

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to whether or not to include jury instructions on lesser offenses:

Mr. Bradley: I think that the state of the evidence is that [the prosecution] is arguing only

the felony murder theory, only the theory that Mr. Robinson is the shooter, and I’m arguing

that Mr. Robinson neither participated in a rape, nor shot anyone...I think under those

circumstances, we don’t need any lessers at this point...

***

The Court: Okay so what you’re saying is, fortrial tactical purposes and under the evidence

that has been educed at trial, it’s all or nothing? It’s either felony murder or it’s not?

Mr. Bradley: ...What I’m saying at this point is, I don’t think I can make an argument,

based on the evidence, that’s somewhere in between. 

The Court: And that’s based on your assessment of the evidence and your assessment of

all the elements for the lesser included?

Mr. Bradley: Yes.

(Lodgment 1 at 375.). Mr. Bradley’s argument is consistent with the evidence and argument the defense

presented at trial. (See Lodgment 1 at 307:16-19 (Petitioner’s testimony that he did not rape or murder

the victim); 324:20-329:21 (Petitioner’s testimony as to consensual sex with the victim, and fact that he

did not fire the shots); 398:14-19 (defense closing argument “Mr. Robinson testified to you that he did not

rape Pamela Shelley, and he testified to you that he did not kill Ms. Shelley. If there is a reasonable

possibility that what he told you in this courtroom is true, then this felony murder rule does not apply,

because he told you that he did not participate in any felony.”).)

In general, a state court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on lesser offenses in a non-capital

case is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 928-929 (9th Cir.

2000) (failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses did not present a federal question). Indeed, as the

state appellate court recognized in dismissing Petitioner’s direct appeal with respect to the trial court’s

failure to instruct on the lesser-related offense of accessory after the fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has

expressly held that a defendant has no Constitutional right to an instruction on a lesser-related offense.

(Lodgment 8 at 6-7, citing Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 97 (1998).) Further, there is no “clearly

established law,” as determined by the Supreme Court, that requires giving a lesser-included offense

instruction in a non-capital case. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 929; Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th

Cir.1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.1999). In light of

the offenses charged, the evidence and arguments presented at trial, and the fact that Petitioner does not

present a federal question under AEDPA because there is no “clearly established law” as determined by

the Supreme Court regarding lesser included or related offenses in non-capital cases, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s argument as to lesser offenses should be DENIED.

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With respect to the Petitioner’s argument that the Court should have instructed the jury as to

“acquittal first” and “partial verdict” (Pet. at 9,) the Court will consider whether the trial court’s alleged

omission of these instructions “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.’” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) “Before a federal

court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial in which [a challenged] instruction was used,

it must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally

condemned,’ but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146. A federal court examining a federal habeas petition determines

whether the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to instructional error by looking

at the total context of events at trial: “‘not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such

instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may

result in the judgment of conviction.’” Frady, 456 U.S. at 169 quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

While it is unclear as to the precise instructions Petitioner claims should have been given,

regarding “acquittal first,” the jury was specifically instructed that “[u]nless the evidence proves the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not

guilty.” (Lodgment 2 at 27.) With respect to an instruction on “partial verdict,” the jury was instructed

as to all elements of felony murder (id. at 67,) the underlying felony of rape, (id. at 69,) personal use of

a firearm (id. at 73,) and special circumstances murder in commission of a felony (id. at 83.) Without

deciding whether a partial verdict would have been accepted under these circumstances, there is no

evidence in the record, and Petitioner alleges no facts to indicate, that had the jury been instructed as to

the availability of a partial verdict, the outcome to petitioner would have been any different. The Court

therefore finds that the trial court’s decision not to sua sponte instruct on “acquittal first” or “partial

verdict” did not so infect the trial as to result in a violation of due process. 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Therefore,

because claim 4 is procedurally defaulted, and in any case would fail on the merits, the Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED as to this claim.

/

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iv. Claim 6 (Excessive Fine)

In claim 6, Petitioner argues that he suffers from cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the court imposed on him an excessive restitutionary

fine. [Pet. at 21.] He contends that on August 16, 2006, the trial judge imposed an “unauthorized and

excessive fine of $10,000.” [Id.] Citing California law, Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly

awarded the fine by failing to consider Petitioner’s inability to pay, and by failing to take into account the

victim’s lifestyle in determining the award. [Id.] 

Petitioner raised the same arguments in his habeas petitions before the state courts. (Lodgment 11

at 18-19; Lodgment 13 at 30-31). The appellate court rejected the claim based on Petitioner’s failure to

raise the claim on direct appeal, citing Dixon, and for failure to present a prima facie claim for relief, citing

Duvall. (Lodgment 14). In considering the merits of the claim, the Superior Court considered the state law

with respect to the imposition of restitution fines, and held that “a defendant’s present ability to pay is

irrelevant when imposing a restitution fine, [and] absent compelling and extraordinary reasons, does not

violate due process. (People v. McGhee, (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 710).” (Lodgment 12 at 9-10). The

Superior Court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the restitution fine imposed is excessive

or unconstitutional, and denied the claim. [Id. at 10.] 

The United States Supreme Court has clearly limited federal courts reviewing petitions for habeas

relief to claims based upon federal questions. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 62. The Court will only consider,

therefore, Petitioner’s argument that the fine is in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. “The Eighth Amendment provides that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.” Norris v.

Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a fine must

be “‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.’” United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d

1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (applying the

Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause to punitive forfeitures)). Given that Petitioner was convicted

of committing serious and violent crimes, the Court finds that the $10,000 fine imposed by the state court

was not so grossly disproportionate to his offenses that it violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to consider whether the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of excessive fines extends to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald

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v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3035 n. 13 (2010). Accordingly, the Court finds that the state courts’ rulings

were not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court

precedent. Therefore, because claim 6 is procedurally defaulted, and in any case would fail on the merits,

the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED as to this claim.

2. Claims 2 and 5 (Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel)

In Claims 2 and 5, which have not been procedurally defaulted, Petitioner argues that 1) trial

counsel was ineffective due to his failure to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation, to interview or call

character witnesses to testify, and to present certain evidence trial [Pet. at 7, 15-16 (ground 2)); and 2)

Petitioner was prejudiced by post-conviction counsel’s failure to assert an ineffectiveness of trial counsel

claim, failure to raise a Brady violation, failure to assert Mr. Southerland had the means, motive, and

opportunity to commit the charged offense, and failure to raise the court’s failure to instruct the jury on

lesser-related offenses to murder. (Id. at 19-20 (ground 5).) 

A defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when a defense

attorney’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, thereby prejudicing the

defense. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Counsel’s errors must be so serious that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or

unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). In assessing counsel’s performance, the

court employs a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable

professional judgment. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5-6; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The burden lies with

the Petitioner to rebut the presumption that his respective counsel were competent. See U.S. v. Chronic,

466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). The court’s review of counsel’s performance is “doubly deferential when it is

conducted through the lens of federal habeas.” Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6. 

Petitioner raised both claims, with the same supporting facts, in his habeas petitions before the

State Courts. (Lodgment 11 at 5-7, 16-17; Lodgment 13 at 11-16, 27-28; Lodgment 15 at 9-11, 17-18.)

As the California Supreme Court summarily denied the habeas petition, the Court will “look through” to

the Appellate Court’s consideration of both issues on the merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. In a reasoned

decision, the Appellate Court stated:

Petitioner also contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial

because trial counsel failed to interview relevant witnesses and because trial counsel was

“presumptively inadequate.” Petitioner further contends that he was deprived of effective

assistance of counsel on appeal because appellate counsel failed to raise various arguments, failed

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to assert that Mr. Southerland had means, motive and opportunity to commit the murder, and failed

to request that the “jury be instructed on lesser related offenses to murder.” “[A] defendant

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under the federal or state Constitution must show both

deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice

under a test of reasonable probability of a different outcome.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th

353, 445; accord Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687). Petitioner has not

demonstrated that his trial or his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient, nor has he

demonstrated that the outcome of his trial or his appeal would have been different had counsel

engaged in the actions now urged by Petitioner. Petitioner’s requests for relief on these grounds

are denied. 

(Lodgment 14 at 2). (See also lodgment 8 at 4, 7-11 (denying Petitioner’s argument on direct appeal that

trial counsel erred in failing to request an instruction on accessory after the fact).) The issue before this

Court, therefore, is whether the state courts’ denial of Mr. Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(d).

With respect to Petitioner’s allegation that trial counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of

his confession [Pet. at 7; Trav. at 10-11,] the record indicates that trial counsel was aware of the

circumstances of Petitioner’s arrest and subsequent interrogation because he elicited testimony to that

effect during trial. (See e.g. lodgment 1 at 331-338 (direct examination of Petitioner regarding

circumstances of confession). Defense counsel also raised the circumstances of the confession in his

closing argument, and urged the jury to consider such circumstances when deciding whether or not they

should take the confession to be true. (Id. at 399-400.) Based on the record, this court finds that the court

of appeal’s analysis and conclusion that Petitioner failed to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance

of counsel for failure to investigate was not unreasonable. Moreover, counsel is not required to raise a

futile argument. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994). As set forth above, even assuming all the

facts Petitioner raises are true, the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s confession do not rise to the

level of a Miranda violation, and any argument to the contrary would have been unsuccessful. 

With respect to the Petitioner’s argument that trial counsel did not call witnesses which would have

testified as to Mr. Southerland’s character, and trial counsel’s failure to introduce certain evidence at trial,

the Court finds that the record supports the state courts’ ruling. There were tactical reasons for defense

counsel’s actions at trial, and counsel’s actions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness

so as to prejudice the defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, this Court finds that the

court of appeals’ decision is not an unreasonable determination of the facts, nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law. This court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that

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Petitioner’s Claim 2 for ineffective assistance of trial counsel be DENIED.

Petitioner has likewise failed to meet his burden with respect to his arguments in Claim 5 that his

appellate counsel was ineffective. In order to prevail on this claim, Petitioner must show that 1) appellate

counsel acted unreasonably in failing to discover and brief a non-frivolous issue, and 2) it is reasonably

probable that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise that issue, Petitioner would have prevailed in his

appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-286 (2000).

As set forth above, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Brady violation, ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, and instructional error arguments all lack merit. Accordingly, appellate counsel’s tactical

decision not to raise those issues on the direct appeal was not objectively unreasonable, nor was Petitioner

prejudiced by such a failure. Accordingly, the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim on any of the

aforementioned bases was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court

precedent.28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

Petitioner also argues that his appellate counsel erred in failing to argue that trial counsel was

ineffective due to his failure to assert that Mr. Southerland had “means, motive, and opportunity to commit

the charged offense.” [Pet. at 19-20; Trav. at 15-16, citing Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706 (8th Cir.

1982).] In Henderson, the district court granted habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

when it heard testimony, that was never presented at the petitioner’s trial, indicating that another suspect

had the means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime. 926 F.2d at 710-712. The Eighth Circuit

upheld the district court’s finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a viable defense

and for failing to investigate the plausible defense theory that anothersuspect committed the murder, and

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present this theory in the state post-conviction proceeding.

Id. at 712-714. Unlike the situation in Henderson, Petitioner’s trial counsel specifically elicited testimony

from Mr. Robinson at trial that he “heard a series of gunshots” while Mr. Southerland was having sex with

the victim, that Mr. Southerland had a .22 caliber pistol with him the night of the murder, that he saw Mr.

Southerland running towards him coming from the direction in which the shots were fired and where the

victim was lying on the ground, and that he asked Mr. Southerland why he shot the victim. (Lodgment

1 at 326-328.) As the jury was presented with this evidence, and nevertheless convicted Petitioner of the

crime charged, the Court finds that the evidence supports the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim on

this basis, and accordingly RECOMMENDS that claim 5 be DENIED.

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3. Claim 7 (Actual Innocence) 

In his final claim, Petitioner argues that he is innocent of all charges against him, is unlawfully

incarcerated, and has the right to have his claims heard on the merits. [Pet. at 24-25; Trav. at 17-18.]

Petitioner raised this issue in his state court habeas petitions (lodgment 11 at 20-21, lodgment 13 at 32-34,

lodgment 15 at 22-24) and such petitions were denied. (Lodgments 12, 14, and 16, respectively.) 

The appellate court did not address this claim in its opinion, but denied the habeas petition in its

entirety, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (Lodgments 14 and 16,

respectively). Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial

of a claim or claims. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. Since the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” the Court will conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether

the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim.

Early, 537 U.S. at 8. "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]" the state court decision will not be "contrary to" clearly established

federal law. Id. 

Actual innocence does not by itself provide a basis for habeas relief. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315

(1995). Rather, it is a “‘gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred

constitutional claim considered on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).

To prevail on this claim, Petitioner must present new evidence demonstrating that it is “more likely than

not” that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327. “The required evidence must create a colorable claim of actual innocence, that the petitioner

‘is innocent of the charge for which he [is] incarcerated,’ as opposed to legal innocence as a result as a

result of legal error.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Schlup, 513

U.S. at 321). “‘[A] colorable showing amounts to establishing that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner in light of the new evidence.’” Gandarela, 286 F.3d

at 1085-86 (quoting Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 396 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Actual innocence” means

factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable doubt is not enough. See

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Wood, 130 F.3d at 379. 

Here Petitioner raises no “new evidence,” but rather reargues the merits of other claims he has

already made in this petition, which, as set forth above, have no merit. [See Pet. at 24-25; Trav. at 17-18

(citing Miranda/ Massiah violations, instructional error, Brady violations, ineffective assistance of counsel

as the basis for this claim).] Accordingly, he has failed to meet the Schlup standard here, and the Court

RECOMMENDS that Claim 7 should be DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter, and based upon the above discussion, this Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this action be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge

is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 9, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 9, 2011

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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