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Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 

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FILED · Uoited Stares Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 

a corporation organized and existing 

under the laws of the United States of 

America, 

Pl~intiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MARY M. BERRY, Personal Representative ) 

of ELDON BERRY, Deceased; THEOBELLE G. ) 

COLLINS, Personal Representative ·of ) 

LARRY COLLINS, Deceased; MARY M. BERRY, ) 

an individual; THEOBELLE G. COLLINS, ) 

an individual, ) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

ALFALFA COUNTY BANCSHARES, INC., an 

Oklahoma Corporation, 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

NOV 16 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6232 

(D.C. No. 89-96-A) 

(W .D. Okla.) 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6232 Document: 010110051301 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff commenced this action in an attempt to recover on a 

promissory note executed by the deceased, Collins and Berry, in 

favor of United Oklahoma Bank in the principal sum of $760,000.00 

and to foreclose on certain stock of Alfalfa County Bancshares, 

Inc. pledged as security. The defendants rejected plaintiff's 

claims as untimely pursuant to Oklahoma's nonclaim statute. Okla. 

Stat. tit. 58, SS 331 et~ (1965) required that every personal 

representative give the creditors of the estate notice of the 

probate proceeding by publication in a newspaper in the county of 

probate for two consecutive weeks. Creditors must present their 

claims within two months of the initial publication or be forever 

barred. The district court found that plaintiff's claims were 

time barred and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

We affirm. 

The court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo, 

viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. See Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 

1987). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in Tulsa 

Professional Collection Services. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 

(1988), plaintiff argues its claims were incorrectly time barred. 

2 

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/ The Supreme Court in Pope struck down Oklahoma's notice to 

probate creditors statute, specifically Okla. Stat. tit. 58, S 333 

(1965), holding the constructive notice provisions to be in 

violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1 

The Court gave consideration to the state's interest in the 

expeditious administration and completion of probate proceedings, 

but found that requiring actual notice to known or "reasonably 

ascertainable" creditors would not unduly burden the states' goals 

in enacting such nonclaim statutes. Tulsa Professional Collection 

Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. at 489-90. 

An examination of the chronology of events in this case 

reveals that the announcement of the Pope decision followed the 

other relevant dates. Berry died July 5, 1987. His personal 

representative caused the first notice to creditors to be 

published on October 8, 1987. The plaintiff filed its claim 

against the estate on November 3, 1988, more than one year later. 

Collins died on December 12, 1987, and first publication of notice 

to creditors appeared on March 31, 1988. The plaintiff filed its 

claim against the estate on November 7, 1988, more than six months 

later. The decision in Pope was announced April 19, 1988. 

This court has addressed the issue of retroactive application 

several times in the past. E.E.O.C. v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 

1377 (10th Cir. 1984) (retroactivity is appropriate unless the new 

decision overrules past precedent on which the parties may have 

1 The Oklahoma legislature amended its nonclaim statute to 

conform to the actual notice requirements of Pope. This amendment 

became effective as to probate proceedings commenced on or after 

November 1, 1988. Okla. Stat. tit. 58, SS 331 et .!filL. (Supp. 

1988) (Historical Note). 

3 

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• " relied); Dersten v. Van Buren, 828 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(whether a judicially created rule of law which breaks with 

precedent should be applied retroactively is generally decided on 

a case-by-case basis). The Tenth Circuit's most recent discussion 

of the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision is 

found in Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 

1988), in which the court determined that the decision in 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), would not be applied 

retroactively. In making this determination the court applied the 

Supreme Court's three-pronged test for retroactive application as 

articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971): 

(1) "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must 

establish a new principle of law, either by overruling 

clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, .. or by deciding an issue of first impression whose 

resolution was not clearly foreshadowed"; (2) the court 

"'must •.• weigh the merits and demerits in each case 

by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, 

its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective 

operation will further or retard its operation;'" and 

(3) the court must "weigh the inequity imposed by 

retrospective application." 

Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d at 714-15 (citations 

omitted). 

The analysis set forth in Chevron Oil has "consistently been 

utilized where changes in statutes of limitations or other aspects 

of the timeliness of a claim are at issue." Occhino v. United 

States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1308, n.7 (8th Cir. 1982); see also 

Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 51-53 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd on 

other grounds, 462 U.S. 650 (1983); Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, 

Inc., 652 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); Wachovia Bank & Trust 

4 

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, Co., N.A. v. National Student Mktg Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 346-48 

(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). 

A majority of states have nonclaim statutes which comport 

with the Oklahoma law. The constitutionality of these statutes 

has been consistently upheld by most courts. Falender, Notice to 

Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due?, 63 N.C.L. 

Rev. 659, 660 n.7, 661 n.8 (1985) (collecting statutes and cases). 

In defining what constitutes a "clear break" with precedent, 

the Sixth Circuit in Carter v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, 850 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 

457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)) stated 

"such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to 

constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced 

an older one .... " Such a break has been recognized 

only when a decision ... overturns a longstanding and 

widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, 

but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority 

has expressly approved. 

(Emphasis added.) 

The valid statutory authority upon which these defendants 

relied at the time the probate of these estates was commenced 

required only constructive notice to creditors, whether known or 

unknown. The defendants relied upon and complied with this 

authority and had no reason to doubt the constitutionality of the 

statute. 

The question of whether Pope decided an issue of first 

impression, not clearly foreshadowed, is not so apparent. The 

Supreme Court's prior decisions in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 

& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (statutory notice given to known 

beneficiaries of judicial settlement of accounts by trustee of a 

5 

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• 

, 

common trust fund held in contravention of the fourteenth 

amendment), and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 

(1983)(manner of notice provided to mortgagee of pending tax sale 

held violative of due process clause of the fourteenth amendment), 

may have predicted the Pope decision. 

Assuming that Pope is a clear break with precedent even 

though foreseeable, we next turn to the analysis of whether 

retroactive application of Pope would further or retard the 

operation of the probate notice statute in question. By 

distinguishing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), the 

Supreme Court removed nonclaim statutes from the self-executing 

status enjoyed by statutes of limitations stating that unlike 

statutes of limitations, judicial involvement in nonclaim statutes 

constituted sufficient state action to trigger fourteenth 

amendment concerns. Tulsa Professional Collection Services. Inc. 

v. Pope, 485 U.S. at 486-87. The purpose served by nonclaim 

statutes remains the same: to give peace of mind to heirs and to 

facilitate the expedient administration of the probating of 

estates. It does not logically follow that retroactive 

application of Pope would well serve the statute or its purpose. 

Finally, we must look for an inequitable result if 

retroactive application is allowed. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 

U.S. at 107. 

Having very little indication in the record of the nature or 

extent of the estates involved, it is difficult to assess what 

inequities may result to defendants if Pope is allowed retroactive 

application. However, we can state with some certainty that a 

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, 

denial of retroactive application results in plaintiff's claims 

being forever barred. It is undisputed that plaintiff had actual 

notice of the deaths of Collins and Berry by at least July 22, 

1988. Plaintiff's subsequent November, 1988 claims were still 

outside the two-month period. If we conclude that defendants 

complied with the requirements of the law at the time and 

plaintiff's failure to bring its claims in a timely fashion was 

due to its own negligence, it would work an injustice to give the 

claims validity at the expense of defendants. 

Because we hold that retroactive application of Pope is not 

correct, we find no need to reach the merits of plaintiff's other 

arguments. We have reached the same result as did the district 

court, but on different grounds. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

7 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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