Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02153/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02153-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vickey Sarantis, a single woman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

ADP, Inc., a foreign corporation, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-06-2153-PHX-LOA

ORDER

The Court concludes that oral argument on Defendant’s motions in limine,

docket ## 109 - 115, is unnecessary because the parties have provided the Court with

adequate briefing on the issues. Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197,

1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that if the parties provided the district court with complete

memoranda of the law and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral argument

would not be required). Oral argument on the motions in limine scheduled for August 26,

2008 is vacated.

1. Motion In Limine Regarding Post Employment Atmosphere at ADP

Defendant ADP moves to preclude in limine “any evidence related to the work

environment at ADP after the termination of [Plaintiff’s] employment with Defendant.”

(docket # 109 at 1) Defendant claims that “Plaintiff submitted as an exhibit to her Response

to the Motion for Summary Judgment a transcript of a voicemail purportedly left by ADP

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

employee Shannon Radloff wherein Radloff states, somewhat cryptically, that she is aware

of ‘unethical stuff’ going on, and questions whether she should go to HR or not. According

to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, that voice message somehow demonstrates that ADP’s

Human Resources Department is not a reliable vehicle to redress issues.” Id. at 2. Defendant

also points out that in Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts supporting Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff mentions in a footnote:

[Cameron] Crouch has herself continued the “culture” at ADP by

favoring male employees in recent times in return for their

agreeing to have affairs with her. One such example of that

favoritism (and of how ADP’s written policies are easily

disregarded) is a DM [AH] who recently was arrested for a DUI

offense and his driving privileges were taken away. Instead of

firing him as would have comported with ADP’s written policy

manual, this man was given a “driver” (another sale [sic] rep in

training) by Ms. Crouch to drive him to sales calls and customer

appointments at ADP’s expense.

Id. Defendant argues that this evidence is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims, will result

in “mini-trials” essentially confusing the jury, creating undue delay in the trial, and under

Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid., “the probative value of any evidence gleaned from such testimony

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice it will create against

Defendant.” Id. at 3.

Recently, the Supreme Court in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,

___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 170 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (ADEA reduction-in-force case)

acknowledged that discriminatory acts by other supervisors may be relevant and admissible

in evidence. It also confirmed that “[a] district court is accorded a wide discretion in

determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the probative

value of [the proffered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility

is a matter first for the district court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . . .” Id. at

1145. (citation omitted). The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s reversal of the district court

and remanded, “directing the district court to clarify its order [which] would have been the

better approach in this case. . .With respect to evidentiary questions in general and Rule 403

in particular, a district court virtually always is in the better position to assess the

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

admissibility of the evidence in the context of the particular case before it.” Id., 128 S.Ct. at

1146.

Plaintiff contends, as illustrated in Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d

321, 336 (6th Cir. 2008) and Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110-112 (3d

Cir. 1999), that “[a]cts which occurred outside of the Plaintiff’s presence should be allowed

[in evidence] because the very meaning of “environment” is [t]he surrounding conditions,

influences or forces which influence or modify.” (docket # 127 at 2) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Although Defendant casts a large net and fails to define “any evidence related

to the work environment at ADP,” the Court finds that these two events occurring at ADP

after Plaintiff was terminated are not relevant under Rule 402, Fed. R. Evid., to whether

Plaintiff “was subjected to severe or pervasive conduct that altered the conditions of her

employment” or whether Plaintiff was terminated because she engaged in protected

activities. (docket # 102 at 9, 13) If marginally relevant, its relevance is substantially

outweighed by the undue delay admission (“mini-trials” as ADP calls it) of this evidence

would cause in the trial of this case. Rule 403 and 404(b), Fed.R.Evid. Moreover, the

generic, non-specific acts cited by Plaintiff in her Response that occurred after her

termination fail to fairly demonstrate that such statements are relevant and otherwise

admissible. The Court will not deny a timely-filed motion in limine solely on the ipse dixit

of adverse counsel when such counsel provides no specifics to the Court. Finally, the cases

of Hawkins and Hurley are unavailing to Plaintiff without the specificity required for the

admissibility of similar acts of harassment, known or unknown to Plaintiff. Lampert v.

Clackamas County, 2005 WL 730636, * 6 (D. Or. 2005) (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,

833 F.2d 1406, 1415-16 (10th Cir. 1987) (evidence that a number of employees had been

sexually harassed by the plaintiff's supervisor was admissible as proof of the plaintiff’s

hostile work environment); Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C.Cir. 1985) ( “Even a

woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII claim if she

were forced to work in an atmosphere where such harassment was pervasive.” ).

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

On June 6, 2007, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring

ADP to reinstate Plaintiff to her former position. (docket # 44)

- 4 -

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Post

Employment Atmosphere at ADP, docket # 109, is GRANTED. Unless Defendant’s

representative, attorneys or witnesses open the door, Plaintiff is hereby precluded from

offering evidence, directly or indirectly, related to misconduct at or by ADP, limited to only

that identified in Defendant’s motion, occurring after Plaintiff’s termination on May 29,

2007 and, again, on June 26, 2007 and thereafter, after the Court denied Plaintiff’s

application for a preliminary injunction and terminated the TRO.1

 In the event that

Plaintiff’s counsel believes that Defendant has opened the door to this prohibited area,

Plaintiff’s counsel shall first raise the issue with the Court and defense counsel outside the

presence of the jury to obtain leave of the Court to question any witness in this prohibited

area.

2. Motion In Limine Regarding Equitable Remedies

Defendant moves for an order precluding Plaintiff from “introducing any

evidence regarding equitable remedies, including but not limited to, back pay and front

pay[]” because such remedies are “a matter for the Court, and not the jury, to determine.”

(docket # 110 at 1) Plaintiff requests the Court “consider an advisory verdict by the jury with

regard to back pay, front pay and reinstatement.” (docket 128 at 1)

The Ninth Circuit has made clear “that there is no right to have a jury

determine the appropriate amount of back pay under Title VII, [or] the ADA, even after the

Civil Rights Act of 1991. Instead, back pay remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by

the district court in its discretion.” Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1069

(9th Cir. 2005).

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Rule 39(c), FED.R.CIV.P., provides in relevant part:

c) Advisory Jury; Jury Trial by Consent. In an action not triable of right by a

jury, the court, on motion or on its own:

(1) may try any issue with an advisory jury; . . . .

3

 Other circuits also condone the use of an advisory jury under Rule 39(c),

FED.R.CIV.P., in discrimination cases. Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 415 F.3d 265, 271

(2d Cir. 2005); Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2000);

Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1980). 

- 5 -

The Court agrees with Plaintiff and will use the practice approved in Rule

39(c)(1),2

 FED.R.CIV.P., approved by the Ninth Circuit3 in Millemann v. Multnomah Educ.

Serv. Dist., 168 F.3d 500, * 5 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) and by District

Judge Campbell in E.E.O.C. v. GLC Restaurants, Inc., 2007 WL 30269 * 8 (D.Ariz. 2007)

(“[T]he Court will seek an advisory verdict from the jury on [front and back pay] issues.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c). Because evidence concerning front and back pay will be relevant to this

advisory verdict, and will not be unfairly prejudicial to Defendants, [Defendant’s motion in

limine] is denied.”).

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Equitable

Remedies, docket # 110, is DENIED.

3. Motion In Limine Regarding Undisclosed Witnesses

Defendant moves to preclude Plaintiff from “introducing testimony from

witnesses not previously disclosed [but] identified in Plaintiff’s portion of the Joint Pretrial

Order [that] were not previously identified within Plaintiff’s disclosures or discovery

responses.” (docket # 111 at 1) Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s decision to withhold

disclosure of the identity of such persons until this moment (and long after discovery closed)

is highly prejudicial to Defendant and justifies the exclusion at trial of these witnesses.” Id.

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Plaintiff’s argument that “Defendant has waived any perceived shortcoming or late

disclosure by their own actions in May, 2008,” when they served Defendant’s Tenth and

Eleventh Supplemental Disclosure Statements on Plaintiff is unavailing. One party’s

alleged violation of the disclosure requirements does not justify a violation by the adverse

party. Defendant has filed a motion in limine; Plaintiff has not.

- 6 -

Defendant claims nine of Plaintiff’s witnesses were never timely identified in Plaintiff’s Rule

26(a), FED.R.CIV.P., disclosures or in Plaintiff’s answers to Defendant’s discovery requests.

Id. at 2. Defendant requests that the Court exclude all nine witnesses from testifying at trial

because “[t]he first time that any of these witnesses were disclosed [was] in Plaintiff’s Joint

Proposed Final Pretrial Order, lodged on May 28, 2008.” Id. Moreover, their late disclosure

long after discovery closed is not harmless to Defendant because ADP has had “no

opportunity” to depose these trial witnesses. Id. Discovery closed in this case on October

5, 2007, docket # 63, approximately six months before Plaintiff’s counsel allegedly disclosed

these witnesses for the first time when he submitted “Plaintiff’s portion of the Joint Pretrial

Order.” (docket # 111 at 1)

Plaintiff’s Response denies that these specific witnesses were “not disclosed

and identified by Plaintiff in a timely manner.” (docket # 129 at 1) She asserts that “[a]ll

nine of the listed witnesses at issue were disclosed by Plaintiff in her Supplemental

Disclosure Statement provided to ADP’s counsel on May 23, 2008” in response, and as

rebuttal witnesses, to Defendant’s Tenth and Eleventh Supplemental Disclosure Statements

served on Plaintiff in May, 2008.4 Id. at 2. Alternatively, Plaintiff contends “[i]t is premature

to rule on whether or not any of these witnesses will be able to provide probative rebuttal

information that will be useful for the triers of fact.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Response identifies each of the disputed witnesses and how each

will purportedly rebut Defendant’s evidence:

(1) The first four, Messrs. Weinbach, Butler, Coppola and Martone, are

ADP executives whose names are all over the numerous e-mails that

have been disclosed by ADP and they will provide important rebuttal

evidence about ADP’s probable testimony about (a) how ADP’s

executives were not knowledgeable or had no involvement in creating

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

and/or tolerating the hostile environment and sexually harassing

behavior at ADP and (b) about ADP’s size, market share and net worth.

(2) Lydiett Esparza will offer rebuttal evidence relating to the evidence

that ADP plans to introduce by means of some or all of the 29 new

witnesses listed in ADP’s Tenth and Eleventh Supplemental Disclosure

Statements. In addition, Ms. Esparza will provide valuable supporting

and/or rebuttal evidence relating to certain of ADP’s retaliatory actions.

(3) Similarly Richard J. Galván, Esq. will provide rebuttal evidence

about certain of ADP’s retaliatory actions. 

(4) Vivian Bush and Joe Guesic are former ADP employees who will

rebut certain expected testimony from ADP’s witnesses about how

Plaintiff was treated fairly by ADP and/or about the alleged

non-existence of any hostile atmosphere at ADP before, during and

after Plaintiff’s employment at ADP.

(5) Dimitri Arabatzis will be available to rebut ADP’s expected

testimony about how, as ADP will allege, Plaintiff did not suffer

emotionally or physically and did not properly avail herself of

psychological counseling and other related issues. Mr. Arabatzis

provided a declaration on February 1, 2008 in this matter in connection

with ADP’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ADP has thus known

about him for over four months now.

(docket # 129 at 2-3)

Defendant’s Reply argues that Plaintiff’s disclosures are untimely because

Rule 26(a)(3)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P., “provides that pretrial disclosures may be made at least 30

days before trial ‘unless otherwise directed by the court.’” (docket # 145 at 2) ADP contends

that since Judge Campbell “directed the parties to complete discovery, which includes

complying with the disclosure requirements, by October 5, 2007[,]” Plaintiff’s failure to

disclose these witnesses by October 5, 2007 violates Judge Campbell’s July 5, 2007 Order,

docket # 63, and Rule 26(a)(3)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. ADP provides no authority for this

argument other than the Rule itself.

Federal Rule of Procedure 26(a) mandates early disclosure of the parties’

intended trial witnesses and exhibits. Rule 26(e), FED.R.CIV.P., also requires parties to

timely supplement all discovery, such as interrogatory answers, when the disclosing party

learns “that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect”.

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Rule 37(c)(1) provides, in relevant part: A party that without substantial justification

fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response

to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted

to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so

disclosed.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1).

6

 Rule 26(a)(1)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P.,expressly excludes initial disclosure of impeachment information:

 a) Required Disclosures.

 (1) Initial Disclosure.

- 8 -

Rule 37(c)(1),5

 FED.R.CIV.P., “gives teeth” to these disclosure requirements by authorizing

the imposition of sanctions as Rule 37(c)(1) “clearly contemplates stricter adherence to

discovery requirements, and harsher sanctions for breaches of this rule . . . .”). Fonseca v.

Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 849, 846 (9th Cir. 2004) (preclusion of

witness disclosed by pro se plaintiff one month after the supplemental disclosure deadline

reversed because late disclosure was both “substantially justified” and “harmless.”); Yeti by

Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). “The Advisory

Committee Notes describe it as a ‘self-executing,’ ‘automatic’ sanction to ‘provide[ ] a

strong inducement for disclosure of material . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 advisory committee’s

note (1993). Id.

“Two express exceptions ameliorate the harshness of Rule 37(c)(1): The

information may be introduced if the parties’ failure to disclose the required information is

substantially justified or harmless.” Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1106. The burden to prove substantial

justification or harmlessness is on the party facing sanctions. Id. at 1107. Moreover, the

district court has wide latitude in exercising its discretion to issue sanctions under Rule

37(c)(1). Id. at 1106 (citing Ortiz-Lopez v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo Y

Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 248 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2001)). 

 Unlike case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses, impeachment witnesses need not

be revealed in pretrial disclosures. Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(1) and (ii)6

 and 26(a)(3),7 Fed.R. Civ.P.;

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 (A) In General. Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise 

 stipulated or ordered by the court, a party must, without awaiting a 

 discovery request, provide to the other parties:

 (i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 

 individual likely to have discoverable information--along with the subjects

 of that information--that the disclosing party may use to support its claims 

 or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; . . . .

Rule 26(a)(1)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added).

7

 Rule 26(a)(3) also expressly exempts trial impeachment information:

(3) Pretrial Disclosures.

(A) In General. In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and

(2), a party must provide to the other parties and promptly file the following

information about the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely

for impeachment: . . . .

Rule 26(a)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added).

8

 “Impeachment is ‘an attack on the credibility of a witness.’ [T]o attack the

credibility of witnesses by the presentation of evidence showing that facts asserted or relied

upon in their testimony are false is to impeach by contradiction.” Wegener v. Johnson, 527

F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal

- 9 -

Harrison v. Taiwan Super Young Co., Ltd., 105 F.3d 665, * 2 (9th Cir. 1997)(unpublished)

(“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the Rule 26(e) objection to

admission of the videotape to impeach [plaintiffs]”); Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory,

407 F.3d 852, 869 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005) (“In accordance with

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A) & (3), evidence offered ‘solely for impeachment purposes’ does

not have to be disclosed prior to trial.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Morales, 2008 WL

2622875 * 4 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Denty v. CSX Transp., 168 F.R.D. 549, 550 (D. Or. 2000)

(surveillance videos used solely for impeachment purposes not discoverable).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not define the meaning of “rebuttal”

or “impeachment” evidence but many federal courts have. Unlike impeachment evidence,8

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Practice and Procedure § 6096 (1990)). 

9

 Rule 611(a) provides:

The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the

interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)

avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from

harassment or undue embarrassment. 

Rule 611(a), Fed.R.Evid.

- 10 -

the function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove evidence of the

adverse party. United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975). “Rebuttal is a term of art, denoting evidence introduced

by a plaintiff to meet new facts brought out in [the] opponent’s case in chief.” Lubanski v.

Coleco Industries, Inc., 929 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1991) (since certain rebuttal evidence was

available to plaintiff during her case-in-chief and the testimony she sought to rebut was not

unexpected, district court acted well within its discretion in refusing to allow the evidence)

(citing Morgan v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 606 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1979));

U.S. v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 818 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The purpose of rebuttal evidence is to

explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The determination of what constitutes proper rebuttal

evidence [lies] within the sound discretion of the [district court].” Lubanski, 929 F.2d at 47

(citing Hickok v. G.D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1974)); Toth v. Grand

Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 345 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The district court’s discretion to exclude

proffered rebuttal testimony is not unlimited.”); United States v. LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 52

(1st Cir. 1999). Moreover, Rule 611(a),9

 Fed.R.Evid., empowers the district court to enforce

the traditional principle that evidence offered to rebut must accomplish the function of

rebuttal to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove evidence of the adverse party. U.S. ex rel.

Poong Lim/Pert v. Dick Pacific/Ghemm, 2006 WL 568321, * 2 (D. Alaska 2006)

(“Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) grants the trial court substantial discretion in controlling the

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 It is important to note that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Undisclosed

Witnesses, docket # 111, does not argue that Plaintiff’s disclosure of these nine trial

witnesses violated Fed. Rule of Civ. P 26(e)(1)(A)’s mandate that Plaintiff “timely”

supplement her prior disclosures, responses and answers to interrogatories. Therefore, this

argument is deemed waived.

11 Rule 26(a)(3)(B), FED.R.CIV.P., provides in relevant part:

 (B) Time for Pretrial Disclosures; Objections. Unless the court orders

otherwise, these disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial . . . .

- 11 -

presentation of evidence to make it ‘effective for the ascertainment of the truth’ and ‘avoid

needless consumption of time.’ Rule 611(a) does not provide a basis for the admission of

evidence where some other evidence rule makes it inadmissible.”); United States v. Colomb,

419 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 6162, at 338 (1993)).

The Court disagrees that Plaintiff’s disclosure of these nine witnesses in May

2008 constitutes a violation of Rule 26(a)(3)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P.10 Rule 26(a)(3)(B),11

FED.R.CIV.P., provides that “unless the court orders otherwise,” pretrial disclosures “must

be made at least 30 days before trial.” Rule 26(a)(3)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. By its plain and

ordinary terms, one of two deadlines controls pretrial disclosures: 1) as ordered by the court,

or 2) at least 30 days before trial. Defendant’s Motion acknowledges that Plaintiff’s

disclosures were made on or around May 28, 2008, nearly four months before the September

22, 2008 trial. Nevertheless, Defendant argues these trial witnesses should have been

disclosed on or before October 5, 2007, when discovery closed. The Court disagrees.

Defendant reads Judge Campbell’s July 5, 2007 Order too broadly. The close

of discovery on October 5, 2007 is not synonymous with a supplementation of discovery

deadline of October 5, 2007 per Rule 26(a), FED.R.CIV.P. Since Judge Campbell set no

express deadline for supplementation of disclosures and responses prior to the parties’

stipulation to try this case before a magistrate judge, the default deadline established by the

Rule 26(a)(3)(B) (“at least 30 days before trial”) applies. See, Samson Tug and Barge Co.,

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

Inc. v. United States, 2008 WL 3200695. * 3 (D. Alaska 2008); BC Technical v. Ensil Intern.,

2008 WL 131200, * 1 (D. Utah 2008). Had Defendant desired a date certain that the parties

were required to identify trial witnesses and exhibits before the close of discovery, ADP

should have requested one in the November 2006 joint Case Management Report, docket #

13, or at a Rule 16 scheduling conference before Judge Campbell. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Undisclosed

Witnesses, docket # 111, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is hereby

precluded from calling witnesses Selina Macias, Roxanne Sandoval, Timothy Dobbins and

Marcia Berwald in Plaintiff’s case-in-chief but she may call any or some of them solely for

non-cumulative, relevant impeachment or rebuttal testimony. Of course, impeachment on

collateral matters is not permitted.

4. Motion In Limine Regarding Alleged Affair

Defendant also moves for an order “precluding Plaintiff Sarantis from

introducing any evidence, eliciting any testimony, or making comments during opening or

closing statements related to an alleged affair between Ken Olden and a subordinate, C.C.”

(docket # 112 at 1) C.C.’s true and complete name is not disclosed to protect her privacy

rights as a non-party. Defendant contends that Plaintiff intends to show that Olden, Plaintiff’s

supervisor, began relying on C.C. for assistance, to the exclusion of Cassy Loera, Olden’s

former assistant, who purportedly “kept notes about her perceptions of Mr. Olden and

Defendant’s workplace. These notes included her perception that Mr. Olden and CC were

engaged in an extramarital affair.” Id. at 2. ADP seeks a pretrial ruling excluding this

evidence as inadmissible under Rules 401, 402 or 403. FED.R.CIV.P.

Plaintiff contends that “[e]vidence of a supervisor’s affair with an employee,

adverse affects of said affair on other employees, and other evidence of the work

environment at ADP is relevant and probative and should be considered[,]” citing Hurley,

174 F.3d at 111 (“Evidence of other acts of harassment is extremely probative as to whether

the harassment was sexually discriminatory and whether the [Defendant] knew or should

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

have known that sexual harassment was occurring despite the formal existence of an

anti-harassment policy.”). Plaintiff argues that “evidence of Mr. Olden’s . . . extramarital

affair in the workplace, and testimony of other discrimination will support Plaintiff’s claim

of being subject to a hostile work environment.” (docket # 130 at 2) Plaintiff claims that “if

one employee gives in to a supervisor’s sexual advances and especially if said employee is

rewarded with employment benefits thereafter[,]” such evidence is “highly probative” of

sexual harassment and of a hostile environment.” Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff impliedly acknowledges Defendant’s contention that Loera has no

personal knowledge of the affair, that there were no admissions to her by Olden, that Loera

solely bases her opinion of the existence of the affair between Olden and C.C. because she

saw them “behind closed doors,” that Loera “believed” that he was involved in an intimate

relationship, and that Loera believed that said relationship affected the work relationship

between her, Mr. Olden and another employee.

Absent Loera’s personal knowledge of the affair, the admission by Olden of

the affair at his deposition or trial, or the testimony of C.C. or others with personal

knowledge of the affair, Loera’s opinion testimony is speculative and not admissible under

Rule 701, Fed.R.ofEvid. Such a speculative opinion would not be “helpful to a clear

understanding of the testimony or a fact in issue.” Rule 701(b), Fed.R.of Evid.; Nationwide

Transport Finance v. Cass Information Systems, Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1059 - 1060 (9th Cir.

2008) (“If Nationwide offered Carney's testimony as lay opinion, the district court could

exclude it because the testimony was not “helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony

or a fact in issue.”).

Since this Magistrate Judge is unfamiliar with the anticipated trial testimony,

the Court will follow the wisdom of the Sixth Circuit in Sperberg v. The Goodyear Tire and

Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975) (warning against entering “orders in limine

that exclude broad categories of evidence”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975), and will

follow the “better practice . . . to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they

arise.” The Court will conditionally grant the Motion until and unless Plaintiff’s counsel

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

demonstrates to the Court’s satisfaction outside the presence of the jury that Olden’s alleged

affair with another ADP employee is admissible.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Alleged

Affair, docket # 112, is conditionally GRANTED. Unless Defendant’s representative,

attorneys or witnesses open the door, Plaintiff is hereby precluded from offering evidence,

directly or indirectly, related to an alleged affair Olden had with another female employee

at ADP. In the event that Plaintiff’s counsel believes that Defendant has opened the door to

this prohibited area or if testimony becomes available establishing the necessary foundation

and relevance of Olden’s alleged affair with another female employee, Plaintiff’s counsel

shall first raise the issue with the Court and defense counsel outside the presence of the jury

to obtain leave of the Court to question any witness in this prohibited area.

5. Motion In Limine Regarding Google

Defendant seeks a pretrial “order precluding Plaintiff Sarantis from introducing

any evidence, or commenting in opening or closing statements that she remains unable to

find employment because prospective employers ‘Google’ her name (or use any other search

engine) and see that she filed the instant lawsuit; or in any other manner informing the jury

that a record of this litigation is accessible through “Google” or any other search engine.”

(docket # 113 at 1) Defendant argues that “should be precluded from introducing this

evidence or asserting this argument in opening or closing statements because she cannot

recover damages allegedly incurred as a result of the litigation she initiated[,]” citing Blakey

v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 731, 736 n.3 (D. N.J. 1998) (holding that plaintiff

in hostile work environment case could not recover from emotional distress caused by the

litigation); Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (noting the

“wisdom” of precluding recovery for mental anguish stemming from the litigation process);

Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[a]n alleged tortfeasor

should have the right to defend himself in court without hereby multiplying his damages . .

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

. .”). Id. at 2. Defendant relies, in part on Federal Rule of Evidence 602 precludes testimony

from witnesses who do not have personal knowledge about the testimony given. Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff responds by arguing that “ADP retaliated and wrongfully terminated

the Plaintiff for allegedly falsifying her resume and revealing company secrets.” (docket #

131 at 2) Plaintiff argues that her “damages do not arise out of the litigation process as ADP

asserts [but] arise out of the retaliatory action taken by ADP when ADP terminated the

Plaintiff and indirectly disseminated a negative employment reference en mass.”

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Google,

docket # 113, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff and her counsel are

hereby precluded from mentioning in opening statement or eliciting testimony from any

Plaintiff’s witness that Plaintiff is or was unable to find employment due to her termination

from ADP until and unless such witness first testifies that s/he has personal knowledge that

her termination from ADP, as learned through a Google or similar search engine, is a reason

why Plaintiff was not hired for that job. If there are several reasons why Plaintiff was not

hired subsequent to her termination from ADP, Defendant may request and submit an

appropriate limiting instruction.

6. Motion In Limine Regarding Net Worth

Defendant seeks an in limine order “precluding the Plaintiff [and her counsel]

from introducing any evidence regarding ADP’s size, market share, financial condition,

and/or net worth during the liability phase of this trial, including during opening statements.”

(docket # 114) ADP, “one of the largest HR companies in the world,” contends that “[i]t is

unduly and unfairly prejudicial for evidence regarding Defendant’s size, market share,

financial condition, and/or net worth, to become entangled in the jurors’ minds with evidence

regarding Defendant’s liability on Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims.” Id. at 1-

2. Defendant cites as authority, in part: Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th

Cir. 1977) (citing Blankenship v. Roundtree, 219 F.2d 597, 598 (10th Cir. 1955); Lagudi v.

Long Island R.R. Co., 775 F. Supp. 73, 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (evidence regarding damages

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

presented at the liability stage “may well serve only to confuse the jury as to the separate

issues of liability and damages”); Mid-Continent Cabinetry, Inc. v. George Koch & Sons,

Inc., 130 F.R.D. 149, 152 (D. Kan. 1990) (evidence of a defendant’s net worth or financial

condition is inadmissible until the plaintiff has first proved a prima facie case of liability for

punitive damages). Id.

Plaintiff responds by arguing that “ADP is a large corporation specializing in

advising on HR issues speaks to the standard of reasonable care ADP should have exercised

in this case.” (docket # 132 at 2) Her counsel’s argument continues with “the fact that ADP

had such specialized knowledge and failed to prevent a sexually hostile environment is a

central theme in Plaintiff’s offer of proof. Such evidence will be used to rebut ADP’s

affirmative defense that they took prompt action to correct the harassment (if the affirmative

defense applies).” Id. Counsel boldly states that “all evidence related to the size, and

business of ADP should be included for purposes of demonstrating the standard of care to

which ADP should be held and for showing ADP’s liability.” Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff provides no authority to support her argument that ADP is, or should

be, held to a higher standard of care than any other employer. While what ADP does as a

business is relevant and admissible as background information, the size of ADP, its market

share, financial condition, and/or net worth will not be admissible until such time as Plaintiff

presents sufficient evidence that warrants an instruction on punitive damages.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine Regarding Net Worth,

docket # 114, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff and her counsel are

hereby precluded from mentioning in opening statement, closing argument or eliciting

testimony from any witness the size of ADP, its market share, financial condition, and/or net

worth until such time as Plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on

punitive damages. Once Plaintiff and her counsel have established sufficient evidence to

warrant an instruction on punitive damages, and this Court agrees upon request outside the

presence of the jury, Plaintiff may introduce evidence of ADP’s size, its market share,

financial condition, and/or net worth for purposes of assisting the jury in determining the

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

amount, if any, of punitive damages to punish ADP. Moreover, during closing argument,

Plaintiff’s counsel may engage in appropriate argument, consistent with the Court’s

instructions, that ADP knew or should have known that its conduct was unlawful.

7. Motion In Limine to Bifurcate liability issues from punitive damages.

Finally, Defendant seeks “an order bifurcating punitive damages and

precluding introduction of financial condition evidence during the liability phase.” (docket

# 115) Defendant argues that its “profitability and financial condition have no bearing on

liability and are relevant only as to the proper amount of punitive damages, once liability for

such damages is established.” Id. at 1. It claims that “[t]he introduction of such evidence

prior to a finding that Defendant is liable for punitive damages is unnecessary and

prejudicial.” Id. ADP relies, in part, on Rule 42(b), FED.R.CIV.P.

Citing Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U. S. 526, 534 (1999),

Plaintiff points out that “[i]n a Title VII action, the jury may award both compensatory and

punitive damages to ‘[s]o long as a Title VII plaintiff proffers sufficient evidence from which

a jury could conclude that an employer acted willfully,’” and the conduct was “egregious.”

Plaintiff’s counsel claims he “ will proffer evidence to the jury which could lead the jury to

conclude that ADP acted intentionally and with reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.”

Id. at 2.

The Court has no reason to believe that the jury in the trial of this case will be

unable to follow the Court’s instructions not to consider Defendant’s size, net worth, etc. on

the issue of liability.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine to Bifurcate evidence

separating liability issues from punitive damages, docket # 115, is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating the Court’s prior order setting oral

argument on motions in limine for Tuesday, August 26, 2008.

DATED this 27th day of August, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-02153-SRB Document 148 Filed 08/28/08 Page 17 of 17