Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00422/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00422-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dung Van CHAU, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Respondent. 

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No. CIV 03-00422-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

This case was transferred to this Court from the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit for a de novo determination of Petitioner's citizenship. Chau v. INS, 247

F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). Since then, the Court has allowed the parties substantial

time to develop the factual and legal bases for their positions. Pending before the Court is

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 54). While the Court has not

conducted a hearing, it is capable of reaching a legal decision on the Record before it.

Therefore, after considering the arguments raised by the parties in their briefings and the

entire case file, the Court hereby issues the following Memorandum of Decision and Order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed.

Mr. Chau ("Chau" or "Petitioner") was born in Saigon, Vietnam on November 8,

1971. (Pet'r's SOF ¶ 1; Resp't's SOF ¶ 1.) His mother, Thi Mai Chau ("Ms. Chau"), is a

native and citizen of Vietnam. (Pet'r's SOF ¶ 2; Resp't's SOF ¶ 7.) Neither Petitioner nor Ms.

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1

Petitioner disputes Form I-590, which shows he entered the United States as a refugee

(Pet'r's Obj. to Resp't's SOF ¶ 1), but also admits that he indeed entered this country as a

refugee (Resp. at 4). The Court finds that Petitioner's evidentiary Objections to the

immigration forms proffered by Respondent are not well-taken, however, as the documents

fall within an exception to the hearsay rule (i.e., FRE 803(8)), and because documents need

not be authenticated at the summary judgment stage. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 324 (1986). Additionally, the Court notes that Chau himself offers documents that are

not authenticated (and, in at least one instance, proffers the same document as Respondent).

See, e.g., Pet'r's Ex. 1 at p. 0295 and Resp't's Ex. 5 at p. 0321. 

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Chau know the specific identity of Petitioner's father. (Pet'r's Resp. at 7, lines 11-12; Resp't's

SOF ¶ 11.) Ms. Chau claims that she met Petitioner's father on two occasions at a bar in

Vietnam and that she was pregnant one month after meeting. (Trans. of Deportation Hr'g at

p. 74, lines 2-4, p. 75, line 11.) She reports that she did not speak English and Petitioner's

father did not speak Vietnamese. (Id. at p. 98, lines 1-6.) She states that he was in the U.S.

forces in Vietnam because he was dressed in a paratrooper’s uniform when she met him. (Id.

at lines 8-11.) Ms. Chau reports that his name was "Nick" (or "Net") and that he was tall and

dark with a dimple on a cheek. (Id. at lines 11, 20-24.) Ms. Chau states she has had no

further contact with Petitioner's father. (Id. at p. 75, lines 11-12.) She states that Petitioner

resembles his father because he is tall and dark, and he had a dimple on his cheek as a child.

(Id. at lines 2-6.)

Petitioner states that his father was an African-American because he was given a

nickname of "Dung Medan," which means "Dung a Black American." (Id. at p. 104, lines

24-25 - p. 105, line 1.) Petitioner entered the United States with his mother and half-brother

on December 4, 1984 as a "refugee" under § 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.1

He was domiciled in Arizona from that time until he reached the age of twenty-one. On June

8, 1987, Petitioner's status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident alien.

//

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2

Although the INS is no longer an independent agency and its functions have been

transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, the Court will refer to Respondent as

"INS" throughout this Order to preserve consistency.

3

The Court will "refer to Public Law 97-359 as the 'Amerasian Immigration Act,' one

of names by which it is commonly referred." Chau, 247 F.3d at 1028-29 n. 4.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"2

 or "Respondent") initiated

deportation proceedings against Chau in 1996. The INS charged that Chau was subject to

deportation because (1) he is not a citizen of the United States, and, (2) therefore, he is

deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994), Immigration and Nationality Act

("INA") § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not

arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. 

In proceedings before the Immigration Judge ("IJ"), Chau asserted that he was not

deportable; Chau claimed he is a derivative citizen of the United States

pursuant to Section 301 of the INA (8 U.S.C. §1401) and provisions of Pub. L. No. 97-359

(the "Amerasian Immigration Act"3

 or "AIA"), 96 Stat. 1716 (1982) (codified in 8 U.S.C. §

1154(f)). Chau argued that because he was admitted to the United States as a child of a

United States citizen under the AIA, and because § 301's requirements were met, he

established his derivative citizenship pursuant to Section 301(g) of the INA (8 U.S.C.

§1401). 

 On March 3, 1998, the IJ found that Chau entered the United States under the AIA,

which provided evidence of his derivative citizenship. The IJ further determined that Chau's

father likely met the residency requirement of INA § 301. Consequently, the IJ concluded

that the INS had failed to show that Chau had no claim to citizenship, and that Chau is a

derivative citizen of the United States. Chau's deportation proceedings were terminated. The

INS appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and, on March

19, 1999, the BIA sustained the appeal and ordered Chau deported from the United States.

The BIA rejected the IJ's finding that Chau had entered the United States pursuant to the AIA

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and concluded that Chau failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his

unknown father satisfied the residency requirement of INA § 301. 

 Chau then petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the BIA’s

decision. Chau contended that "INA § 242(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A), entitles him

to a determination by th[e] court that he is a United States national and, therefore, not

deportable." Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). In the alternative, Chau

"request[ed] that [the court] transfer this matter to the United States District Court for

Arizona for a de novo determination of his claim to United States citizenship, pursuant to

INA § 242(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B)." Id. at 1027-28. 

 In his petition, Chau "conten[ded] that his entry into the United States under the

Amerasian Immigration Act . . . is undisputed and that such entry mandates a determination

by this court that he is a citizen or that the only remaining factual question precluding a

determination of citizenship is whether his father met the residency requirements of INA §

301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970)." Id. at 1030. Chau also argued that he is "'a derivative citizen'"

because "Congress, in enacting the Amerasian Immigration Act, conferred citizenship on all

persons immigrating to the United States under the provisions of that Act." Id. In the

alternative, he contended that 

because the Amerasian Immigration Act classifies its beneficiaries as children

of United States citizens, entry into the United States under that Act (1)

precludes the INS from contesting [his] claim that he is the only child of a

United States citizen and (2) leaves only the question of whether [his] father

met the residency requirements of § 301.

Id. The Ninth Circuit did not adopt either argument. Id.

The Ninth Circuit also found that there were "genuine factual disputes precluding a

determination . . . of Chau's derivative citizenship." Id. at 1032. Therefore, the Ninth

Circuit transferred the matter to this Court "for a de novo hearing on Chau's claim to United

States citizenship." Id. The Ninth Circuit identified the following "genuine issues of fact

material to Chau's claim to derivative citizenship: the identity of Chau's father, whether Chau

immigrated to the United States under the provisions of the Amerasian Immigration Act, and

whether his father met the residency requirement of § 301." Id. at 1030. 

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On June 3, 2002 and September 9, 2002, this Court conducted status hearings. On

October 18, 2002, the INS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11), arguing that

Chau could not establish derivative citizenship because he does not know the exact identity

of his father. The Court denied that Motion on September 15, 2003. (Doc. No. 19)

Addressing an issue initially raised by the Ninth Circuit in a footnote, Chau, 247 F.3d at 1032

n. 8, the Court found that Chau, as a child born out of wedlock, is required to meet the

heightened proof-of-paternity requirement of INA § 309, as a matter of law. The Court

further found that questions of fact remain regarding whether or not Chau can meet those

proof-of-paternity requirements. In addition to that legitimation requirement, the Court

reiterated the genuine issues of fact previously identified by the Ninth Circuit: [1] the identity

of Chau's father, [2] whether Chau immigrated to the United States under the provisions of

the Amerasian Immigration Act, and [3] whether his father met the residency requirements

of § 301. Subsequent to that Order, the parties engaged in further discovery until the filing

of the instant Motion.

On August 10, 2005, the INS filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 54) which this Court now considers. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive

law determines "which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the

evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party." Id.; see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

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A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial." Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The party opposing summary judgment "may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . party's pleadings, but . . . must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda

Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

The Court now engages in a de novo review to determine whether Chau is able to

establish eligibility for derivative citizenship pursuant to INA §§ 301 and 309 by the required

preponderance of the evidence. Chau, 247 F.3d at 1032; See Sanchez-Martinez v. INS, 714

F.2d 72, 74 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983). 

To prove derivative citizenship under § 301, Chau must establish by a preponderance

of the evidence that his father was a U.S. citizen at Chau's birth and that his father was

physically present in the United States for ten years, five of which occurred after the age of

fourteen. In addition, because Chau was born out of wedlock, he must also show by a

preponderance of the evidence that his father met INA § 309's legitimation requirements.

Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59 (2001). If Chau establishes those three elements by a

preponderance of the evidence, he derives U.S. citizenship and cannot be deported.

Before analyzing those three statutory elements, the Court first addresses an issue of

fact which goes to Chau's ability to establish the identity/citizenship of his father: whether

Chau immigrated to the United States under the provisions of the Amerasian Immigration

Act.

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1. Whether Chau Immigrated to the United States under the AIA

Whether Chau immigrated to the United States under the AIA arises as an issue of

material fact through the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding that, although not sufficient

per se to convey citizenship, entry into the United States under the AIA "is itself evidence,

which is to be given whatever 'probative force' the determination 'intrinsically commands.'"

Chau, 247 F.3d at 1030-31. Thus, if Chau entered the United States under the provisions of

the AIA, his Amerasian immigration status would provide some evidence as to his father's

citizenship. 

Although Chau previously argued that he entered the United States pursuant to the

AIA (Doc. No. 15 at 4; Chau, 247 F.3d at 1030), he now admits that he actually entered into

the United States as a "refugee" pursuant to INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157. (Doc. No. 61 at 4.)

Nevertheless, Chau maintains that he was "sought out as a result of the [AIA] and deemed

to be qualified for transfer to the United States under the [AIA]." (Id.) Chau entered the

United States with his mother and half-brother, and argues that he entered under refugee

status due to an anomaly in the AIA which required a mother to "irrevocably release" her

child for immigration. (Id. at 4-5.) While the AIA does not allow a mother to accompany

her child of a United States soldier father to the United States (8 U.S.C. § 1154(f)), refugee

status contains no irrevocable release requirement and allows a family to immigrate together.

 (Resp.'t's SOF, ¶ 18; Doc. No. 63 at Attachment 1, Report of Proposed Expert Witness.)

Thus, Chau contends that even though he entered as a refugee, he was only "placed in this

status in order to allow his family members to accompany him." (Id. at 5.) 

The INS, however, argues that the Attorney General, in granting refugee status, made

no determination that Chau satisfied the requirements of the AIA. While the AIA required

a "reason to believe" finding that Chau's father was an American citizen (Doc. No. 63 at 4),

the INS contends that refugee status on account of being Amerasian required only a finding

that the appearance of the Amerasian applicant indicated that his father was other than

Vietnamese. (Id.) Thus, a lower standard existed for attaining refugee status than that

required under the AIA. Accordingly, INS argues that, with respect to Chau's entry to the

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United States, U.S. Immigration officials made no determination that provides "probative

force" as to Chau's claim that his father was a United States citizen because he entered as a

refugee. (Id.) 

Whether or not Chau could have upheld a "reason to believe" finding before a U. S.

Immigration official that his father was a United States citizen, however, is not before this

Court. Rather, the undisputed fact remains that Chau was admitted to the United States under

INA § 207's refugee provision, which evidences no determination as to the citizenry of

Chau's father. Therefore, the first issue of fact identified by the Ninth Circuit has been

resolved, as the parties agree that Chau entered the United States as a refugee, rather than

under the AIA.

2. Identity/Citizenship of Chau's Father

The Court now proceeds to the first of three elements Chau must show by a

preponderance of evidence to establish derivative citizenship.

INA § 301 first requires Chau to furnish sufficient evidence from which a reasonable

person may conclude that his father was a citizen of the United States at the time of Chau's

birth. See INA § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401; see also Chau, 247 F.3d at 1030. With Chau's

immigration status as a "refugee" pursuant to INA § 207 providing no evidence of Chau's

father's citizenship, Chau relies exclusively upon Ms. Chau's recollections of his natural

father to prove this element. Thus, Ms. Chau's statements that Chau's father's name was

"Nick," that he appeared to be an African-American, and that he wore the uniform of an

American paratrooper (Doc. No. 61 at 6) represent the sole evidence before this Court

supporting Chau's claim that his natural father was a U.S. citizen. The INS has neither

produced nor proffered any evidence to contradict Ms. Chau's statements. From Ms. Chau's

recollections regarding the identity of his father, Chau extrapolates that it is more likely than

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4

Chau's reliance on the AIA standard that an immigration official need only "reason

to believe" that Chau was fathered by a U.S. citizen is misplaced, as it is undisputed that

Chau immigrated to the United States as a refugee, not under the AIA. As stated supra,

whether Chau could have entered under the AIA is irrelevant and not before the Court.

5

In addition to a lack of statistical evidence, it appears no records search, such as a

military records search through the Military Personnel Records division of the National

Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, was conducted using the statements of Ms. Chau.

Indeed, it is unlikely such a search would be productive, given the sparse information that

Ms. Chau recollects.

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not, "statistically speaking," that Chau's father was a U.S. citizen.4

 (Id. at 7.) Absent from

Chau's filings, however, is any statistical evidence to support this assertion.5

 

In summary judgment analysis this Court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and as such, this Court takes as true Ms. Chau's

statements for purposes of this Motion. Braxton-Street, 769 F.2d at 530. Her pertinent

statements are as follows:

Q: Was [Chau's father] Vietnamese or American?

A. He was an American.

Q: How do you know he was an American?

A: Because he - - he was in the U.S. forces in Vietnam. And when he get a

leave, he visited me in the - - in the bar and he was dressed in a - - in the

uniform of a paratroopers.

Trans. of Deportation H'rg at p. 74, lines 5-11.

Therefore, Ms. Chau's statement that Chau's natural father was an American is based

on her recollection that he was in the U.S. forces, dressed in the uniform of a paratrooper.

However, even taking as true her statement that he was in the U.S. forces and wore a

paratrooper's uniform, the Court notes that no evidence exists that a man who appears to be

a U.S. serviceman must necessarily be one. 

Moreover, service in the United States armed forces, in and of itself, does not confer

citizenship on a serviceman. While the Court is unable to locate case law exactly on point,

a related line of cases in which the alien-serviceman himself is attempting to change his

immigration status to national is instructive. In Reyes-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit

held that service in the U.S. armed forces does not alter an alien's immigration status. 363

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6

Although neither party raises the issue, the Court notes that the Supreme Court has

deemed the physical presence requirement constitutional. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58-59.

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F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Theagene v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.

2005) (same). Therefore, participation in the armed forces is not per se evidence of

citizenship.

Thus, even when Ms. Chau's statements are taken as true, the Court finds a reasonable

person could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that Chau's father was a U.S.

citizen. Regardless of whether Chau's father appeared to be or actually was a U.S.

serviceman, military service alone does not establish citizenship. Without more evidence

than what is contained in this case's scant Record, it is unlikely that the parties would be able

to successfully locate records providing independent evidence to support the facts asserted.

3. INA § 301's Physical Presence Requirement

INA § 301 also requires that Chau provide sufficient evidence from which a

reasonable person may conclude that Chau's father, before Chau's birth, was physically

present in the United States for at least ten years, with at least five years of physical presence

after his father's fourteenth birthday.6

 See INA § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401; see also Chau, 247

F.3d at 1030. A serviceman's period of honorable service may be included to satisfy the

physical presence requirement. INA § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. 

In arguing this issue, Chau states that "statistical evidence will demonstrate the

probability that his father . . . met the residency requirements" (Doc. No. 61 at 7.) However,

as with the identity of his father, Chau furnishes no statistical evidence to support his

assertion. 

Chau may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of . . . [his] pleadings, but . .

. must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV. P.

56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 585-88. Further, the INS need not disprove

matters on which Chau has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Without

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7

Indeed, even assuming "Nick" was a U.S. serviceman, the Court notes that one could

speculate endlessly upon a number of scenarios that call into question whether "Nick" met

the physical presence requirement, such as whether "Nick" survived the war and whether his

military service was honorable. 

8

In addition to the two requirements described by the Court, infra, the post-1986

version contained an additional requirement that the citizen-father agree in writing to provide

financial support for the child until the child turns eighteen. 

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facts or evidence, the Court cannot infer that Chau's father met § 301's physical presence

requirement. To do otherwise would be to engage in pure speculation. 

Therefore, given Chau's failure to produce any evidence regarding § 301's physical

presence requirement, this Court finds the record lacking in evidence upon which a

reasonable person could find that Chau's father met that requirement.7

 Furthermore, because

a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial," this Court must find all other facts immaterial.

Id. at 323. 

4. INA § 309's Legitimation Requirement 

The final element Chau must establish by a preponderance of the evidence is the

legitimation requirement of INA § 309. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59. Although the Court

hereby incorporates pages five through eleven of its September 15, 2003 Order (Doc. No. 19)

regarding the legitimation requirement, the Court now summarizes its previous findings.

At the outset, the Court notes that two versions of § 309 exist. Because Chau was

born before 1986 when the statute was amended, he "falls within a transitional rule which

allows him to elect application of either" the post- or pre-1986 version of § 309. Id., 533

U.S. at 60. In its previous Order, the Court assumed that Chau would elect application of the

pre-1986 version of § 309, as it is less rigorous than the post-1986 version.8

As outlined by the Court in its previous Order, INA § 309 (8 U.S.C. § 1409) crossreferences § 8 U.S.C. 1101(c)(1), which provides:

The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years

of age and includes a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence

or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in

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the United States or elsewhere, . . . if such legitimation . . . takes place before

the child reaches the age of sixteen years, and the child is in the legal custody

of the legitimating . . . parent or parents . . . at the time of such legitimation.

8 U.S.C. 1101(c)(1) (1982). Thus, Chau must be legitimated according to the law of

Arizona, where he was domiciled, and Chau must have been in the legal custody of his father

as defined by Arizona law, in order to meet the third element for derivative citizenship. 

The Court previously analyzed Arizona's legitimacy law, which provides that "[e]very

child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education as

if born in lawful wedlock." ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (1975). The Court concluded in its

previous Order that this issue constituted an issue of fact because the identity of Chau's father

was unknown. 

In order to meet § 309's legitimation requirement, Chau must also have been in his

father's legal custody according to Arizona law. In its September 2003 Order, this Court

examined Arizona law regarding custody and found that Chau would have been in the legal

custody of his father if "parentage has been established." See In re Appeal in Maricopa

County Juvenile Action No. JD-4974, 785 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). The Court

again concluded that an issue of fact existed, as the identity of Chau's father was unknown.

 While the Court therefore previously found that an issue of fact existed as to this

legitimation requirement, the Court now finds that these facts are necessarily rendered

immaterial due to Chau's complete failure of proof concerning § 301's citizenship and

physical presence elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

CONCLUSION

In reaching its decision, the Court is mindful that this case presents difficult issues and

that the application of the law may result in hardship. However, the Court is bound to apply

the law. After having provided both sides ample opportunity to marshal evidence and brief

the law, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Chau has "fail[ed] to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case" because he has not

provided (1) sufficient evidence that his father is a U.S. citizen and (2) any evidence to

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establish INA § 301's physical presence requirement. See id. at 322. Consequently, because

the Court finds that Chau has failed to provide facts sufficient to entitle him to relief as a

matter of law, the Court will grant INS's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Therefore, having conducted the de novo determination regarding Chau's claim of

U.S. citizenship as requested by the Ninth Circuit,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 54) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is returned to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings. 

 DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-00422-SMM Document 64 Filed 03/29/06 Page 13 of 13