Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00749/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00749-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES M. WASHINGTON, et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

v.

RONALD RICHARDS, et al., 

 Defendants.

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No. 3:11-CV-00749 DMS (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Richards’ special motion to strike, which Defendant Soda

Partners LLC joined in. (Docs. 4, 7.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ special motion to strike

is granted in part and denied in part.

I.

BACKGROUND

On April 11, 20110, Plaintiffs filed a class action Complaint setting forth ten claims for relief:

(1) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), (2) violation of the California

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), (3) violation of California Business and

Professions Code § 17200, (4) to set aside the trustee’s sale as to lead Plaintiffs only, (5) to cancel the

trustee’s deed as to lead Plaintiffs only, (6) to quiet title, (7) accounting, (8) abuse of process, (9)

trespass, and (10) conversion. Defendant Richards filed a special motion to strike the Complaint

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 on April 15, 2011 (“anti-SLAPP motion”),

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which Defendant Soda Partners joined in. (Docs. 4, 7.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion on

the same day. (Doc. 5.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act

of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States

Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special

motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability

that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16(b)(1). An “act in furtherance

of a person’s right of petition or free speech” includes: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made

before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or

review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in

connection with an issue of public interest; or (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of

the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public

issue or an issue of public interest.” Id. at § 425.16(e). 

The anti-SLAPP movant must first make a threshold showing that the claim for relief being

challenged arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles

& Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1999); Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-56 (2006).

If the Court determines that such a showing has been made, it then looks to whether the party opposing

the motion has demonstrated a reasonable probability of prevailing on the claim. Newsham, 190 F.3d

at 971. 

III.

DISCUSSION

The Complaint states causes of action for violation of the FDCPA, violation of the Rosenthal

Act, violation of § 17200, accounting, abuse of process, trespass, and conversion against Defendant

Richards and claims for violation of § 17200 and accounting against Defendant Soda Partners. Richards

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argues the claims against him relate solely to the filing of an unlawful detainer proceeding against

Plaintiffs on behalf of his client, Soda Partners, and that his conduct is privileged under California Civil

Code § 47. 

The Complaint alleges Defendants had actual knowledge that Plaintiffs owed nothing on their

loans because they had been “securitized” and that the foreclosures on the properties were therefore

invalid, yet initiated unlawful detainer actions nonetheless, thereby aiding and abetting in the fraud

against Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶¶ 6, 13(o).) The Complaint further alleges Defendants violated the debt

collection statutes “in prosecuting the unlawful detainers.” (Id. at ¶ 67.) Plaintiffs also allege

Defendants “obtained access to state courts to evict home owners, under false pretenses, namely, that

Defendants were duly authorized to engage in such activities when in fact they were not.” (Id. at ¶

67(f).) As to Richards specifically, Plaintiffs allege, at the time he filed the unlawful detainer actions

on behalf of his clients, he: 

knew of the material defects of said foreclosure sales. In fact, they were notified and had

personal knowledge of such. However, instead of ceasing their unlawful activities, the

Richards often personally verified the complaints, and in some cases other documents

claiming to have personal knowledge of the complaints for eviction and asserted they

knew their contents to be true. The real facts are that Defendant Richards was and is

fully aware that Plaintiffs’ loans were securitized, and that his clients had no legal right

to foreclose, and intentionally concealed this from the courts in the eviction actions in

order to steal Plaintiffs’ property.

(Id. at ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs allege Richards “used the inherent power of the courts to further [his] ulterior

motives” and “[knew], or should have known, that the foreclosure on the Subject Property was invalid

and illegal, yet defendants pursued possession of the Subject Property via the power of the courts by

filing an improper unlawful detainer action.” (Id. at ¶¶ 101-02.) The Complaint also defines the class

that Plaintiffs seek to represent as “[a]ll persons that have been named defendants in unlawful detainer

actions byRichards, within 1 year preceding the filing of this complaint where the plaintiff [sic] brought

the action after a foreclosure and trustee sale.” (Id. at ¶ 40(a).) The Complaint contains no specific

allegations as to Soda Partners, but presumably intends the allegations of conduct by “Defendants” in

general to include Soda Partners.

As an initial matter, although anti-SLAPP motions may be brought in federal court to strike state

law claims, the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal law claims. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards,

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599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, Defendants’ special motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim

for violation of the FDCPA is denied. As to Plaintiffs’ state law claims for violation of the Rosenthal

Act, violation of § 17200, accounting, and abuse of process, the basis of these claims is Plaintiffs’

allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged bringing of an unlawful detainer action to evict them from

their property. As Defendants have shown, the action of prosecuting an unlawful detainer action is a

protected activity under § 425.16. See Clark v. Mazgani, 170 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1286 (2009)(“There

is no question that the prosecution of an unlawful detainer action is indisputablyprotected activity within

the meaning on section 435.16.”). Accordingly, Defendants have made a threshold showing that

Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the Rosenthal Act, violation of § 17200, accounting, and abuse of

process arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. 

Because Defendants have made a threshold showing that Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the

Rosenthal Act, violation of § 17200, accounting, and abuse of process arise from protected activity under

the anti-SLAPP statute, the Court looks to whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a reasonable probability

of prevailing on these claims. In so doing, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that these claims in the

Complaint are “both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to

sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Kearny v. Foley &

Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir. 2009)(quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 88-89

(2002).).

Plaintiffs do not even address the standard set forth under the anti-SLAPP statute in their

opposition. They argue the claims against Richards and Soda Partners other than for violation of the

FDCPA are “mostly” for aiding and abetting other Defendants “by pursuing an illegal eviction with full

knowledge that it was unlawful.” (Opp. at 3.) However, they make no arguments as to why they have

a reasonable probability of prevailing on their claims against Defendants for aiding and abetting, nor

have they stated a legally sufficient claim for aiding and abetting in the Complaint. Plaintiffs also argue

that the unlawful detainer action against them does not act as res judiciata in the instant action, but they

similarly say nothing about the legal sufficiency of or their likelihood of prevailing on the claims set

forth against Richards and Soda Partners in the Complaint. Because Plaintiffs have not presented the

Court with anything demonstrating a reasonable probability of prevailing on their claims, they have

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At the time they filed the Complaint in this action, Plaintiffs were represented by Michael

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T. Pines. However, on May 10, 2011, Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation filed a Notice to

Plaintiffs of the State Bar Court of California’s Decision and Order of Inactive Enrollment making Mr.

Pines an inactive member of the State Bar of California. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiffs have not since substituted

in new counsel.

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failed to meet their burden under the anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, Defendants’ special motion to

strike Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the Rosenthal Act, violation of § 17200, accounting, and abuse

of process is granted.

However, as to the claims for trespass and conversion against Richards, Plaintiffs allege Richards

“broke into Plaintiffs’ home with no lawful right to do so,” and “looted Plaintiffs’ house, and stole all

of the personal property belonging to Plaintiffs including the family pets.” (Complaint ¶¶ 109, 113.)

Although these allegations may not be legally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, Richards has not

sufficiently shown that these claims arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Accordingly, his special motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claims for trespass and conversion is denied. 

Richards also requests attorneys’ fees in connection with his special motion to strike in the

amount of $13,200.00. Should Richards intend to seek attorneys’ fees in connection with this motion,

he may file a separate motion for attorneys’ fees. However, in light of the circumstances of this case,1

the Court would not look favorably upon such motion. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Richards and Soda Partners’ special motion to strike is

granted in part and denied in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 11, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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