Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01114/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01114-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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 Sanford’s complaint raises claims under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 1

§§ 12101 et seq., Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 et

seq., the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq.,

California Health and Safety Code §§ 19955, the Unfair Business

Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq., and for

negligence per se. The motion for summary judgment, however,

discusses only the ADA and the Unruh Act. This order does not

address causes of action Sanford does not raise in the motion. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES SANFORD, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSEVILLE CYCLE, INC.,

SACRAMENTO MOTOR SPORTS, INC.,

and CYNTHIA JOHNSTON, 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 04-1114 DFL CMK

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

James Sanford, a disabled individual, alleges that Roseville

Cycle, Inc., Sacramento Motor Sports, Inc., and Cynthia Johnston

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”), the

Unruh Civil Rights Act (“the Unruh Act”), and other state

statutes. Sanford reached a settlement agreement with Roseville 1

Case 2:04-cv-01114-JAM-CMK Document 38 Filed 02/12/07 Page 1 of 8
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Cycle and Sacramento Motor Sports, resulting in their dismissal

with prejudice. Since filing an unsuccessful request for

exemption from the court’s electronic filing requirement on March

15, 2005, Johnston has failed to respond to motions, requests for

discovery, and court orders. On July 3, 2006, Sanford filed a

motion for summary judgment concerning the ADA and the Unruh Act

claims. Johnston did not file an opposition. For the following

reasons, the court GRANTS the motion as to six of the alleged

barriers and DENIES the motion as to the remaining three. 

I.

The facts in this case are undisputed. Sanford, unable to

walk and with limited use of his upper body and hands, must use a

motorized wheelchair for mobility. On March 16, 2004, he visited

the Honda Store in Elk Grove, CA, roughly fifteen miles from his

home, to purchase items for his son. During his visit, Sanford

encountered numerous barriers that denied him full and equal

access to the facility. In his summary judgment motion, he

alleges that the following architectural features served as

barriers: (1) the absence of tow-away signs in the parking lot;

(2) the absence of an accessible path of travel from public

property to the store entrance; (3) the absence of detectable

warnings where the path of travel crosses vehicular pathways or

curb cuts; (4) the absence of disabled parking spaces, access

aisles, and appropriate signs; (5) absence of International

Symbol of Accessibility (ISA) signs for accessible routes,

parking, and entrances; (6) an excessive slope to the store’s

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 Although Sanford alleges additional barriers in his 2

complaint and expert report, the court limits this order to the

list of barriers Sanford expressly identified in his motion. 

 Sanford does not allege ADA-independent grounds for 3

finding Unruh Act violations in the motion.

 Johnston filed an answer to the complaint: “Due to a lack 4

of information and belief, Defendant hereby generally denies each

and every allegation in Plaintiff’s Complaint and further prays

that Plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint.” The answer lacks

sufficient specificity to create a material dispute of fact. 

3

front entrance; (7) sales counters at an excessive height; (8) an

improperly placed toilet paper dispenser in the men’s restroom;

and (9) exposed pipes under the men’s restroom sink. Sanford 2

argues that Johnston, through her silence, has conceded all the

factual elements required to find ADA violations. Sanford also

argues that each ADA violation found by the court necessitates a

finding of an Unruh Act violation. See Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c). 3

II.

Johnston failed to oppose Sanford’s motion for summary

judgment. The absence of an opposition does not independently

justify granting the motion. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983

F.2d 943, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1993). However, since Johnston failed

to oppose Sanford’s factual allegations, the court accepts them

as true. The court also relies upon Sanford’s unanswered 4

requests for admission. Conlon v. United States, --- F.3d ----,

2007 WL 92678, at *3 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Sanford’s factual allegations establish the following

required elements of an ADA claim: Sanford is a disabled

individual; the Honda Store, containing the alleged barriers, is

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 The court relies upon the expert report only for evidence 5

of barriers alleged in the complaint and summary judgment motion. 

Sanford may not rely upon the expert report to allege barriers

not identified in the complaint. White v. Divine Invests., Inc.,

No. Civ.S-04-0206, 2005 WL 2491543, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7,

2005). Moreover, the court rejects Sanford’s reading of ADA

standing authority and reaffirms its prior holding that a

plaintiff, by encountering a barrier, does not obtain “the right

to perform a wholesale audit of the defendant’s premises. 

Martinez v. Longs Drugs Stores, Inc., No. CIVS-03-1843, 2005 WL

2072013, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2005). 

 Since Sanford addresses only ADA and Unruh Act violations 6

in the motion, the court does not decide whether the alleged

architectural barriers violate other state laws. 

4

a place of public accommodation either owned, leased, or operated

by Johnston; Sanford’s requested architectural modifications are

readily achievable; and Sanford has encountered the barriers

listed in his motion. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182. Sanford also 5

establishes that he would have returned to the store but for the

alleged barriers. However, not all the architectural features

encountered by Sanford violate the ADA. For several alleged 6

barriers, Sanford relies in part or entirely upon the California

Building Code and California Vehicle Code to demonstrate an ADA

violation. These regulations are irrelevant for ADA purposes. 

The ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities

(ADAAG) are the exclusive standards for judging compliance with

the ADA. See, e.g., Sanford v. Del Taco, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-2154,

2006 WL 2669351, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2006). In this

instance, the ADAAG also serves as the standard for Unruh Act

violations, given Sanford’s purely derivative Unruh claims. See

Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c). The barriers identified in Sanford’s

summary judgment motion are discussed individually below. 

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A. Tow-Away Signs

The ADA requires that accessible parking spaces “be

designated as reserved by a sign showing the symbol of

accessibility.” ADAAG § 4.6.4. The signs must be placed so as

not to be obscured by parked vehicles. Id. No other applicable

location restrictions exist. The absence of tow-away signs at

the parking lot entrance does not violate the ADA.

B. Exterior Accessible Path of Travel

The ADA requires at least one accessible route from public

streets to a facility’s entrance. Id. § 4.3.2(1). Johnston

violates the ADA by failing to provide an accessible route. 

C. Detectable Warnings

The ADA requires detectable warnings where “a walk crosses

or adjoins a vehicular way, and the walking surfaces are not

separated by curbs, railings, or other elements between the

pedestrian areas and vehicular areas.” Id. § 4.29.5. The

warnings are intended “to warn visually impaired people of

hazards on a circulation path.” Id. § 3.5. Because Sanford is

not visually impaired, he lacks standing to challenge the absence

of such warnings. See Martinez, 2005 WL 2072013, at *4. 

D. Disabled Parking Spaces and Features

The ADA requires designated parking for the disabled, with

aisles providing an accessible route to the facility’s entrance

and unobscured signs. ADAAG §§ 4.6.3, 4.6.4. Johnston violates

the ADA by not providing compliant spaces, aisles, and signs.

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E. ISA Signs for Accessible Routes

The ADA requires ISA signs identifying accessible routes,

parking, and entrances. Id. § 4.1.2(7). Sanford’s claim is

duplicative as to accessible exterior route and parking signs. 

The absence of accessible entrance and interior route signs,

however, are previously unaddressed ADA violations. 

F. Front Entry Slope

Sanford erroneously argues that ADAAG § 4.3.7 governs the 4%

slope in front of the store’s entrance door. The section only

applies to areas classified under the ADA as ramps with a slope

greater than 1:20 (5%). The ADA, however, requires “the floor or

ground area within the required clearances” for non-power

assisted doors to “be level and clear.” Id. § 4.13.6. The 4%

slope at the entrance door violates this ADAAG section. 

G. Sales Counters

The ADA requires “areas used for transactions that may not

have a cash register but at which goods or services are sold or

distributed” to be no taller than 36 inches. Id. § 7.2(1). The

43-inch and 40-inch tall counters identified by Sanford violate

this requirement. 

H. Toilet Paper Dispenser

The only restriction placed by the ADA on toilet paper

dispenser placement is that it be mounted at a minimum height of

19 inches. Id. Figure 29b. The dispenser’s 6-inch protrusion

from the wall does not violate ADAAG’s dispenser-specific

requirements. Id. § 4.16.6. The ADA’s general protruding object

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restriction is also inapplicable since Sanford does not allege

that the leading edge is between 27 and 80 inches from the floor. 

Id. § 4.4.1. Although Sanford alleges that the placement

“interferes” with a disabled person’s movement from a wheelchair

onto the toilet, the allegation is too vague to be actionable

under the ADA’s maneuvering space requirements. Id. Figure 8e. 

I. Exposed Pipes

The ADA requires that “hot water and drain pipes under

lavatories shall be insulated or otherwise configured to protect

against contact.” Id. § 4.19.4. The unwrapped pipes under the

sink in the men’s restroom violate the ADA. 

III.

For the reasons above, the court GRANTS summary judgment for

barriers related to: (1) the exterior path of travel; (2)

disabled parking spaces and their related features; (3) required

ISA signs; (4) the slope of the front entry; (5) checkout

counters; and (6) the exposed pipes in the men’s restroom. The

court DENIES summary judgment as to (1) tow-away signs; (2) 

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detectable warnings; and (3) the toilet paper dispenser’s

placement in the men’s restroom. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/9/2007

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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