Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00746/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00746-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John Francis Ree, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00746-TUC-RM

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition”) (Doc. 1). The magistrate judge to whom this case was assigned issued a 

Report and Recommendation (Doc. 17) that recommends denying the Petition. 

 A party may file objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 

within 14 days after being served with a copy of it. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also

Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The district judge must “make a de novo 

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Rule 

8(b) of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. A review of 

the record reflects that the parties have not filed any objections to the Report and 

Recommendation and that the time to file objections has expired. Therefore, the Court is 

not required to review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo. 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (“the district judge must review the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not 

otherwise.” (emphasis in original)). 

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 While 28 U.S.C. § 636 “does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no 

objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte

or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 154 (1985). The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The advisory committee notes to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state 

that, “[w]hen no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no 

clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation” of a 

magistrate judge. The Court will follow this approach and review the magistrate judge’s 

Report and Recommendation for clear error. See Prior v. Ryan, 2012 WL 1344286, *1 

(D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2012) (reviewing for clear error unobjected-to portions of Report and 

Recommendation on § 2254 petition); Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 

(7th Cir. 1999) (“If no objection or only partial objection is made, the district judge 

reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”). 

 After reviewing the record, the Court finds that the magistrate judge’s report 

correctly concludes that Petitioner’s guilty plea precludes him from raising “independent 

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 

of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Petitioner “may only 

attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice 

he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann [v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)].” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. “Counsel’s failure to 

evaluate properly facts giving rise to a constitutional claim, or his failure properly to 

inform himself of facts that would have shown the existence of a constitutional claim, 

might in particular fact situations meet this standard of proof.” Id. at 265-67. “Thus, 

while claims of prior constitutional deprivation may play a part in evaluating the advice 

rendered by counsel, they are not themselves independent grounds for federal collateral 

relief.” Id. at 267. Accordingly, the Court adopts the portion of the magistrate judge’s 

report recommending dismissal of the first three counts of the Petition and will dismiss 

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those counts to the extent that they raise independent claims of constitutional deprivations 

that occurred prior to the entry of Petitioner’s guilty plea. For the reasons discussed 

below, however, the Court will not, at this point in time, dismiss the portions of those 

counts that allege ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 The magistrate judge’s report recommends dismissing the fourth count of the 

Petition as procedurally defaulted. In this count, Petitioner alleges that he lost the 

opportunity to accept a more favorable plea agreement because his trial attorney failed to 

answer a telephone call from him on the last day given by the state for accepting the 

plea.1

 The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Petitioner failed to present this 

claim to the state court and that it is now procedurally defaulted. The Court finds, 

however, that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that Petitioner had to present an 

independent claim for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel to the state court in 

order to assert the ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel as cause for the procedural 

default of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

 In Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000), the Supreme Court held that an 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of 

another claim of constitutional error may itself be procedurally defaulted if not presented 

to the state courts as an independent claim. Unlike a claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel, however, a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction relief counsel

cannot be raised as a freestanding constitutional claim, as “[t]here is no constitutional 

right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 752 (1991); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318-19 (2012) 

(holding that the ineffectiveness of postconviction relief counsel may, under certain 

circumstances, establish cause for the procedural default of a claim of ineffectiveness of 

trial counsel, but that the ineffectiveness of postconviction relief counsel cannot be raised 

as “a freestanding constitutional claim”). Because ineffective assistance of 

 

1

 As discussed below, Count Four of the Petition also alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel on other grounds. 

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postconviction counsel cannot be raised as a freestanding constitutional claim, it was 

erroneous for the magistrate judge to conclude that Petitioner had to raise the 

ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel as an independent claim in state court in order 

to assert, in federal habeas proceedings, the ineffectiveness of that counsel as cause for 

the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 

 Typically, an “attorney’s negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not 

establish cause” for a procedural default. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319. In states such as 

Arizona, however, where claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be raised for 

the first time in postconviction proceedings (rather than on direct appeal), a procedural 

default “will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or 

counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Id. at 1320. Here, as in Martinez, 

Petitioner’s appointed postconviction relief counsel was unable to find any meritorious 

claims, and thus Petitioner filed his petition for postconviction relief pro se. If Martinez

applies, and if Petitioner can establish (1) that his postconviction counsel was ineffective 

under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and (2) that his 

underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is a substantial one, then he may 

be able to overcome the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claim. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Petitioner’s Reply to Respondents’ Limited 

Answer, while inartful, might be construed as raising a Martinez-type argument. (See

Doc. 11 at 6 (“Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may constitute cause for state 

procedural default for purposes of habeas corpus review.”)). Therefore, the Court will 

not dismiss the fourth count of the Petition at this point in time. 

 Both Respondents and the magistrate judge treated the Petition as asserting only 

one claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. “Prisoner pro se pleadings are given 

the benefit of liberal construction.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Construed liberally, the Petition 

alleges multiple bases for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Though only a single 

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count of the Petition is characterized as an ineffective assistance claim, the first two 

counts of the Petition might be construed as including allegations of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. In the first count, Petitioner appears to allege that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in pressuring Petitioner to accept a guilty plea instead of pursuing an 

entrapment defense. In the second count, Petitioner appears to allege that his trial 

counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner to accept a guilty plea instead of going to 

trial and challenging evidence obtained pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional search 

warrant and challenging testimony obtained during an interrogation allegedly infected by 

a Miranda violation. Furthermore, the fourth count of the Petition does not allege 

ineffectiveness solely on the grounds that counsel allegedly caused Petitioner to lose the 

opportunity to accept a more favorable plea agreement. Petitioner also alleges in count 

four that his trial counsel falsely promised him he would obtain clemency and thus only 

serve half of his sentence if he pleaded guilty. Additionally, Petitioner complains that his 

trial counsel assured him not to worry about a second criminal case filed against him but 

then allowed the state to use the case to persuade Petitioner to plead guilty in the case at 

hand. 

 Respondents’ Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus does not 

address the impact of Martinez on the procedural default of Petitioner’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective in allegedly preventing Petitioner from accepting a more 

favorable plea agreement. The Court will therefore order supplemental briefing on the 

issue of how Martinez affects the procedural default of that claim. The supplemental 

briefing shall also address the procedural status of the other allegations of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel contained in the Petition. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 

1. The portion of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 17) that 

recommends dismissing the first three counts of the Petition is accepted and 

adopted, and the first three counts of the Petition (Doc. 1) are dismissed with 

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prejudice to the extent that they allege independent claims of constitutional errors 

that occurred prior to Petitioner’s guilty plea. The portions of the first two counts 

of the Petition that might be construed as alleging ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel will not be dismissed at this time. 

2. The Court declines to adopt the portion of the magistrate judge’s report that 

recommends dismissing the fourth count of the Petition. The fourth count of the 

Petition will not be dismissed at this time. 

3. On or before November 20, 2014, Respondents shall file a supplemental brief 

addressing the impact of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), on the 

procedural default of Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in 

allegedly preventing Petitioner from accepting a more favorable guilty plea. 

Respondents shall include with their supplemental brief all portions of the record 

necessary to determine whether this claim is “substantial.” Respondents’ 

supplemental brief shall also address the procedural status of the other allegations 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel contained in the Petition. 

4. Petitioner shall file a response to Respondents’ supplemental brief no later than 

December 4, 2014. No reply will be permitted absent leave of Court. 

 Dated this 5th day of November, 2014. 

Honorable Rosemary Márquez

United States District Judge

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