Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05255/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05255-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISADORE HENRY, 

 

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

BURGEIS, et al., )

)

Defendants )

____________________________________)

CV F 03 5255 AWI DLB P

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

DENYING THE APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

ORDER DENYING MOTION

REGARDING UN-INCARCERATED

WITNESSES

(Documents #106 & #108)

This action proceeds on plaintiff Isadore Henry’s first amended complaint, filed June 12,

2003. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections, brings this

civil rights action against correctional officials for violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff alleges

that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of exposure to

environmental tobacco smoke at CCI. Trial in this action is set for April 18, 2006. 

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed several motions regarding trial. Two of these

motions are addressed in this order. 

A. Motion for Reconsideration

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate

Judge’s order denying Plaintiff’s request for the voluntary assistance of counsel. Motions to

reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460

Case 1:03-cv-05255-AWI-DLB Document 116 Filed 02/28/06 Page 1 of 5
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(9 Cir. 1983) (en banc); Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987). To th

succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to

reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp.

656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. th

1987). The court reviews a motion to reconsider a Magistrate Judge’s ruling under the “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(a); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980); Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d

1404, 1414 (9 Cir. 1991). A motion for reconsideration is not the proper avenue for raising th

arguments and legal theories that could have been, but were not, raised before the Magistrate

Judge issued the order from which reconsideration is sought. In re Agric. Research & Tech.

Group, Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 542 (9 Cir.1990). th

To succeed in his motion, Plaintiff must show that the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his

request for counsel was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. There is no constitutional right to

counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Title 28

U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the power to "request" that counsel represent a

litigant who is proceeding is forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This does not give the

courts the power to make "coercive appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist.

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant

under Section 1915 only in “exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which requires an

evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9 Cir.1997) withdrawn in part on other grounds on reh'g en th

banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9 Cir.1998) (en banc); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9

th th

Cir.1986). 

Plaintiff has failed to make a showing that statutory grounds exist that entitle Plaintiff to

reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for counsel. The

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Magistrate Judge’s order was not clear error. Plaintiff appears able to present his claims

adequately, and the issues at this stage of the case are issues of fact. Plaintiff’s prior filings,

including the pretrial order, are comprehensive and focused. Plaintiff has filed numerous

motions throughout this action. Although Plaintiff’s filings do not always achieve the quality of

papers that are usually prepared by lawyers, Plaintiff’s motions have been articulate and

organized. Plaintiff is correct that he would be served by the assistance of counsel, and the court

is not unsympathetic to Plaintiff’s desire for counsel. However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized

that “any pro se litigant certainly would be better served with the assistance of counsel,” and as

such the Plaintiff must “show that because of the complexity of the claims he was unable to

articulate his positions.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. Plaintiff has made no such showing. As

such, Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s order.

B. Motion Regarding Un-Incarcerated Witnesses

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion informing the court that Plaintiff does not

have appropriate sums of money for obtaining the attendance of un-incarcerated witnesses. 

Plaintiff appears to ask the court to issue subpoenas for his prospective witnesses and waive or

provide the witness fees. Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status in this action. 

Plaintiff attaches a copy of his prison trust account statement, indicating that Plaintiff only has an

available balance on $60.64. Plaintiff explains how each of the un-incarcerated witnesses is

relevant to his case. Plaintiff also states that none of these witnesses will appear voluntarily at

trial. 

Plaintiff has already been given instructions on obtaining the presence of un-incarcerated

witnesses. Plaintiff has been informed that if an un-incarcerated witness will not testify

voluntarily, Plaintiff must fill out a subpoena for each such witness and provide a money order

made payable to each witness for $40.00, plus the witnesses’ travel expenses.

In Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff appears to ask that the court waive the witness fees and

fees for travel expenses. Plaintiff does not have the ability to pay these fees but desires these

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 One case holding the opposite is of note. In William v. Carter, 10 F.3d 563 (8th 1

Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not allowing

subpoenas to be served on all of the pro se prisoner’s witnesses. While William does not

specifically discuss whether the prisoner paid the witnesses’ fees or the court waived them, there

is an implication that the fees were waived. Assuming William stands for the proposition that

the court has the power to waive witness fees in a civil case, the Eighth Circuit is in the minority

and most other circuits have found the court cannot waive witness fees. See, e.g., Boring v.

Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir.1987); Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 289 (6th

Cir.); McNeil v. Lowney, 831 F.2d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir.1987). Because this court is in the Ninth

Circuit it is bound by the Ninth Circuit’s finding that witnesses fees cannot be waived by the

court.

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witnesses to testify at trial. The court has no authority to order any un-incarcerated witness to

appear at trial without requiring the plaintiff to pay witness fees. The Supreme Court has

declared that “the expenditure of public funds [on behalf of an indigent litigant] is proper only

when authorized by Congress.” United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has found that the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, does not provide for

the payment of fees or expenses of an indigent litigant’s witnesses. See Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d

478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993); Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1989). While 28 U.S.C. 1

1915 provides for service of process to an indigent litigant’s witnesses, it does not waive the

payment of fees or expenses for those witnesses. Hadsell v. C.I.R., 107 F.3d 750, 752 (9th Cir.

1997). Because inmate fees and milage is a payment going directly to the witness for their time

and expenses, and not to the court, it is not the type of fee the court has the power to waive. 

Based on the nature of these fees and case authority, Plaintiff’s motion for the court bring unincarcerated witnesses to trial must be denied. However, Plaintiff will be able to call any of the

named Defendants who appear at trial as witnesses. In addition, Plaintiff may call any other of

Defendants’ witnesses if there are present and Plaintiff has listed them as witnesses in his pretrial statement. Finally, Plaintiff may cross-examine any other witness that Defendants call to

testify.

//

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ORDER

Accordingly, the court ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s order

denying counsel is DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s motion for the attendance of un-incarcerated witness without

payment of witness fees is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

9h0d30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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