Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04432/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04432-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORENO ET AL,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 AUTOZONE, INC,

Defendant. /

No. C05-04432 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS NINTH CLAIM

IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Autozone, Inc.’s Motion To Dismiss Ninth Claim In First

Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 112.) 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES WITH

PREJUDICE the Ninth Claim in Medrano’s First Amended Complaint.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michele Medrano ( “Medrano”) seeks remuneration for a series of claimed wage

and hour law violations against her former employer Defendant Autozone, Inc. (“Autozone”). Her

original complaint contained no claims for civil penalties under California Private Attorneys’

General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Labor Code § 2698, et seq. On April 9, 2007, this Court granted

Medrano leave to amend her complaint to seek PAGA remedies, over the objection of Autozone. 

(Docket No. 109.) On April 12, 2007, Medrano filed her First Amendment Complaint which added,

as its Ninth Claim, a request for civil penalties under PAGA. (Docket No. 110.) 

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

In opposing Medrano’s earlier request to amend her complaint, Autozone had, inter alia,

asserted that the statute of limitations barred Medrano from seeking PAGA remedies. This Court,

however, granted leave to amend at that time because it considered the statute of limitations issue

more amenable to resolution in a Rule 12 or Rule 56 context. (Docket No. 109.) 

Autozone now brings a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the

Ninth Claim. Alternatively, Autozone seeks entry of summary judgment against Medrano on the

Ninth Claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally, dismissal is proper only when the

plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or failed to allege sufficient facts under a

cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d

780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988);

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, dismissal is

appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

a claim. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and

construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d

428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

ANALYSIS

A. The One-Year Limitations Period Of California Code of Civil Procedure §

340(a) Applies To Medrano’s Ninth Claim For PAGA Civil Remedies.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) imposes a one-year statute of limitations upon

“[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an

individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.” There can

be no serious dispute that the civil penalties that Medrano seeks to recover under PAGA are a

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a) provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of this code that

provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or any of its

departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be

recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former

employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3.”

2

 Nor does the PAGA provision providing an automatic procedural right to amend an existing complaint in state

court within 60 days of exhausting administrative remedies alter the operation of the statute of limitations. See Cal. Lab.

Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(C). The fact that leave to amend has been granted does not safeguard a newly-added cause of action

from a demurrer (in state court) or a Rule 12 motion (in federal court) based on a statute of limitations defense.

3

“penalty” within the meaning of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a). Caliber Bodyworks,

Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 4th 365, 374-76 (2005). Accordingly, a one-year statute of

limitations will apply unless PAGA “prescribes a different limitation.” To attempt to avoid the oneyear statute of limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a), Plaintiff advances several

arguments, none of which persuade this Court.

First, Plaintiff argues that in implementing PAGA, the state legislature decided that the

recovery of civil penalties under PAGA should not be subject to any statute of limitations. The

Court finds this contention unsupported. The sole provision in PAGA that Medrano cites, California

Labor Code § 2699(a), makes no reference to the statute of limitations and merely authorizes the use

of civil actions to recover the civil penalties set forth in PAGA.1

 Moreover, Medrano’s position is

directly contradicted by the wording of Section 2699.3(d), the section of PAGA which imposes

administrative exhaustion requirements. Section 2699.3(d) states: “The periods specified in this

section are not counted as part of the time limited for the commencement of the civil action to

recover penalties under this part.” Section 2699.3(d) is clearly intended to toll the limitations period

for bringing a civil action to recover PAGA penalties while the plaintiff is pursuing administrative

remedies. Section 2699.3(d) therefore obviously recognizes the existence of an underlying

limitations period, and would be rendered a mere surplusage if none existed. 

Medrano’s position is also not supported by the legislative history to which she cites. (Mac

Farlane Decl., Exh. A.) The discussion of a technical amendment found therein describes an intent

only to avoid conflating the concepts of standing and of a limitations period. It does not reflect an

intent to remove PAGA from the ambit of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a), nor to

prevent PAGA claims from being subject to any statute of limitations.2

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Second, Medrano argues that because recovery of civil penalties under PAGA is not

considered an assignable “cause of action” (see Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO

v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2007)), a statute of limitations defense is inapplicable. 

Medrano, however, cites no authority for the proposition that a statute of limitations does not apply

merely because there is no assignable cause of action. By its own terms, California Code of Civil

Procedure § 340(a) still applies to an “action upon a statute for a penalty”, and does not distinguish

between actions where the statute authorizing recovery of the penalty creates the underlying

statutory violation, and actions where it does not. Moreover, the fact that the right to recover PAGA

remedies arises from the violation of a different, underlying section of the Labor Code does not

prevent the application of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a). See People v. Grant, 52 Cal.

App. 2d 794, 799-800 (1942) (limitations period of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a)

applied to actions brought under forfeiture statute triggered after “violation of any of the provisions

of this chapter”).

Third, Medrano argues that California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) does not apply to

discretionary penalties. In Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 112 (1995), the

court determined that California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) did not apply to the civil penalty

provided for in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Id. at 132-133. The Act provided that

“[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful, the judgment may include, in

addition to the amounts recovered under subdivision (a), a civil penalty which shall not exceed two

times the amount of actual damages.” Id. at 132 n.8. Jensen concluded that the one-year limitations

period of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) “applies only where the penalty is

mandatory”, and did not apply where the court ultimately had discretion under the Act to

“determine[] whether to allow up to double damages.” Id. at 133. Medrano asserts that Jensen

precludes the application of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) here as well. 

After examining the provisions of PAGA, however, this Court concludes that the civil

penalties set forth therein are better characterized as mandatory, and not discretionary, for purposes

of a limitations period analysis under California law. While the statute at issue in Jensen employed

the discretionary wording that a court “may include” additional civil penalties, PAGA expressly

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

provides that “there is established a civil penalty for a violation of these provisions”, and delineates

the dollar amounts of the penalties. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f). Although PAGA provides a court

with some limited discretion to reduce such awards – indicating that the court “may award a lesser

amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and

circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary

and oppressive, or confiscatory” (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2)) – that determination is subject to a

specific, articulated standard. Though the amount of the civil penalty under PAGA can therefore

vary in some circumstances, this Court regards the penalty is still essentially mandatory. 

This conclusion is buttressed by the decision in Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield, Co., 107 Cal.

App. 4th 967 (2003), which followed Jensen but found a civil penalty to be mandatory where the

statute in question required a penalty but permitted the court to determine the amount by considering

a variety of factors. There, the statute stated:

In assessing the amount of a civil penalty for a violation of this

chapter, the court shall consider all of the following: (A) The nature

and extent of the violation. (B) The number of, and severity of, the

violations. (C) The economic effect of the penalty on the violator. (D)

Whether the violator took good faith measures to comply with this

chapter and the time these measures were taken. (E) The willfulness

of the violator’s misconduct. (F) The deterrent effect that the

imposition of the penalty would have on both the violator and the

regulated community as a whole. (G) Any other factor that justice

may require.

Id. at 977 n.8. The Shamsian court, finding a civil penalty determined by reference to such

malleable factors to nonetheless be mandatory, applied the limitations period of California Code of

Civil Procedure § 340(a) to the civil penalty before it. Id. at 978. Given that the trial court assessing

the penalty in Shamsian had even more scope of discretion than would this Court under California

Labor Code § 2699(e)(2), this Court concludes that the PAGA civil penalties must be treated as

mandatory.

Finally, Medrano argues that if a statute of limitations is applied to the PAGA remedies, the

Court should use the longer statutes of limitations for the underlying cause of actions, such as her

claim for unpaid wages. Medrano offers no authority, however, that would permit this Court to

disregard the express language of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) and apply a different

limitations period. The Court declines to do so.

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The Court sees no inequity in applying the general rule here given that PAGA specifically tolls the limitations

period while the administrative remedies are being pursued. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(d). Had Medrano notified the

California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of her PAGA claim within a year of her employment at Autozone, the

limitations period would have been tolled at least until she received her right-to-sue letter, and arguably through the 60-day

period in which she had an automatic right to amend her complaint as well. 

6

B. A One-Year Limitations Period Bars Medrano’s Ninth Claim Seeking PAGA

Civil Penalties.

Medrano asserts that her PAGA claim did not accrue until she received a “right to sue”

letter from the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency in January 2007. This is not

the law in California. The mere existence of statutory conditions precedent to maintaining a suit

does not affect the date on which the cause of action is considered to have accrued. See Wilson v.

Department of Public Works, 271 Cal. App. 2d 665, 669 (1969). Myers v. Eastwood Care Center,

Inc., 31 Cal.3d 628 (1982), to which Medrano cites, does not alter this analysis. In Myers, the

California Supreme Court determined that an enforcement action brought by the state did not

accrue until a licensee notified the state it intended to contest the citation or penalty. Myers

explained that this result was dictated by the fact that “the action here is an enforcement action

which may not be maintained until there is something requiring enforcement.” Id. at 635. Myers

further explained that “the enforcement action is brought not upon the original violation, but to

effectuate the administrative decision once the licensee has informed the director of its intent to

contest the decision.” Id. Medrano’s Ninth Claim, in contrast, is not an enforcement action and

accrues, per the general rule, when the wrongful act was committed. See id. at 634.3

Medrano does not dispute that her employment with Autozone ended in April 2005. 

(Docket No. 105, Exh. A.) She did not start pursuing the prerequisite administrative remedies

required by PAGA under December 2006, when she first served statutory notice on Autozone and

the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of a demand for a PAGA investigation. 

(Id.) She received her right-to-sue letter in January 2007 (Docket No. 105, Exh. B) and sought

leave to amend her complaint to assert a PAGA claim in February 2007. The passage of

approximately 20 months between the accrual of her Ninth Claim and her first pursuit of

administrative remedies is fatal to the claim under the one-year limitations period. Medrano

cannot take advantage of a relation-back doctrine to cure the untimeliness of her claim, as the

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

 Because this Court dismisses Medrano’s Ninth Claim under Rule 12, there is no need to reach Autozone’s

alternative request for Rule 56 relief.

7

PAGA notice is a condition precedent to filing suit. “A subsequent pleading which sets out the

subsequent performance of a statutory condition precedent to suit cannot relate back to the time of

the filing of the original complaint and thereby toll the running of the period of limitation, since

the rule of relation back does not operate to assign the performance of a condition precedent to a

date prior to its actual occurrence.” Wilson, 271 Cal. App. 2d at 669. 

Accordingly, Medrano’s Ninth Claim is untimely and must be dismissed.4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES WITH

PREJUDICE the Ninth Claim in Medrano’s First Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-04432-CRB Document 119 Filed 06/05/07 Page 7 of 7