Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01997/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01997-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAVIN B. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-01997-BAS-AGS

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS (ECF No. 5)

AND

(2) DISMISSING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE DEFENDANT 

UNRUH 

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, et al., 

Defendants.

On September 29, 2017, Plaintiff Gavin B. Davis, proceeding pro se,

commenced this action against Defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 

and John Gregory Unruh. (ECF No. 1.) Davis alleges that Unruh committed domestic 

terrorism by “cyberstalking” him in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (domestic 

terrorism/Patriot Act) and 47 U.S.C. § 223 (use of telecommunications device in 

interstate commerce to harass). (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 21 (ECF No. 1)). Plaintiff further 

alleges that the FBI failed to investigate this cyberstalking, despite Plaintiff 

“provid[ing] direct evidence” of this activity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 

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U.S.C. §§ 241-242, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

(Compl. ¶ 21.)

On December 4, 2017, the FBI moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on various 

grounds. (ECF No. 5.) Specifically, the FBI argues that it is not subject to civil 

liability under Plaintiff’s theories. (Id.) Additionally, the FBI states that the United 

States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to these claims, and 

therefore, argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Id.) When Plaintiff 

did not initially respond to the FBI’s motion, the Court granted the unopposed motion 

and sua sponte dismissed the claims against Defendant Unruh for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 6.) The Court later vacated its Order, and granted 

Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to respond to the FBI’s motion. (ECF No. 

9.) When granting this extension, the Court gave Plaintiff notice of its previous ruling 

dismissing Defendant Unruh’s claims. (Id. at 3.) On June 12, 2018, Plaintiff opposed 

the FBI’s motion. (ECF No. 10.)

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the foregoing reasons, the 

Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE the FBI’s Motion to Dismiss and sua sponte

DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant 

Unruh.

I. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss an action based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial 

decree.” Id. (citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 

limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 

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asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, “[w]hen subject matter 

jurisdiction is challenged under the Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff 

has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” Kingman Reef 

Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting 

Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001), 

abrogated on other grounds Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). The Court 

may raise the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any point in 

the proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 

574, 583-84 (1999). 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may 

also dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Serv. 

Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 

(9th Cir. 1981). 

The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true 

and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual 

allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim 

has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement 

to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Despite the 

deference the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court 

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to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that 

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). 

As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint which has 

been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when 

“the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 

II. Discussion

A. FBI

Plaintiff alleges claims against the FBI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. §§ 

241-242 (conspiracy against rights and deprivation of rights under the color of law), 

and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). These claims fail 

because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the FBI for these claims and because the 

FBI is not subject to liability under these statutes and case law.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the FBI for Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and Bivens based on sovereign immunity. Under the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity, the United States may not be sued unless it expressly consents to be sued 

or unequivocally waives sovereign immunity. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 

206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its 

consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction”); Gilbert 

v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. King, 395 

U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). There has been no waiver of sovereign immunity by the FBI for 

the claims alleged by Plaintiff. See Kaiser v. Blue Cross of California, 347 F.3d 1107, 

1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists for Bivens

claims); Gerritsen v. Consulado General De Mexico, 989 F.2d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 

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1993) (affirming the dismissal of section 1983 claims against the FBI by stating 

“what matters is that the FBI is a federal agency and that Congress has not revoked 

its immunity”). Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims, and the 

claims must be dismissed.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that the FBI violated his constitutional rights under 

Bivens also fails. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1994). In F.D.I.C. v. 

Meyer, the Supreme Court expressly declined to extend the category of defendants 

for Bivens claims from federal agents to also include federal agencies. Id. Thus, 

parties may not sue federal agencies, like the FBI, in Bivens actions. See id.; see also 

West v. City of Mesa, 708 Fed. Appx. 2008, 291 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against the FBI fails.

Lastly, no private right of action exists under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242. See 

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that sections 241 and 

242 “provide no basis for civil liability” and do not give rise to a civil cause of action).

“[T]he fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not 

automatically give rise to a private right of action.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,

442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (quotation omitted). “Instead, the statute must either 

explicitly create a right of action or implicitly contain one.” In re Digimarc Corp. 

Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also 

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001 (Scalia, J.) (“Like substantive 

federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal laws must be created by 

Congress”); Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092 (finding that criminal provisions that provide 

no basis for civil liability do not give rise to a civil cause of action); Chrysler Corp. 

v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (“[T]his Court has rarely implied a private right 

of action under a criminal statute.”). Many courts have determined that an allegation 

that a criminal statute was violated is insufficient to state a claim. See, e.g., Jianjun 

Xie v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 12-02950 CRB, 2012 WL 5869707 at *6 

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(N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 18 U.S.C. §§ 

241-242 claims against the FBI.

Accordingly, because no other facts could cure the deficiencies outlined above, 

the Court GRANTS Defendant FBI’s motion and DISMISSES WITH 

PREJUDICE claims against FBI.

B. Defendant Unruh

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendant Unruh based on two federal criminal 

statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (domestic terrorism) and 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (use of 

telecommunications device in interstate communications to annoy, abuse, harass, or 

threaten any person). As discussed above and in this Court’s previous order, “the fact 

that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not 

automatically give rise to a private right of action.” Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at

568 (quotation omitted); (see also ECF No. 6.) “Instead, the statute must either 

explicitly create a right of action or implicitly contain one.” In re Digimarc Corp. 

Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d at 1230 (citation omitted).

Neither statute Plaintiff seeks to invoke in his Complaint is a criminal 

provision providing for a private cause of action. (See ECF No. 6.) Thus, various 

courts have concluded allegations that these criminal statutes were violated are 

insufficient to state a claim. See Jianjun Xie, No. C 12-02950 CRB, 2012 WL 

5869707 at *6 (holding that harassment under 47 U.S.C. § 223 provides no civil 

remedy); Cox v. Randazza, No. 2:13-cv-00297-MMD-VCF, 2013 WL 6408736, at 

*6 (D. Nev. Nov. 27, 2013) (stating that claims under 47 U.S.C. § 223 are not 

properly brought in a civil complaint); Sloan v. Truong, 573 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829 

(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); Boyd v. City of Oceanside Police Dep’t, No. 11-cv-3039-

LAB (WMc), 2013 WL 5671164, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (finding no private 

civil right of action under domestic terrorism statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2331); Archer v. 

City of Taft, No. 1:12-cv-00261-AWI-JLT, 2012 WL 1458136, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 

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26, 2012) (same). This Court agrees. To the extent Plaintiff is claiming federal 

jurisdiction because of a violation of a federal criminal statute, he fails to state a claim 

and the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging some other state law claim, because there are 

no allegations about the amount in controversy, he fails to state sufficient information 

to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court. Therefore, the Court 

DISMISSES sua sponte the Complaint against Unruh. However, the Court will give 

Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint against Unruh only. If Plaintiff elects to file 

an amended Complaint against Unruh, he must put the basis of his claim and why it 

belongs in federal court. Simply alleging violation of a federal criminal statute is 

insufficient. 

III. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE the FBI’s Motion to Dismiss. 

(ECF No. 5.) The Court sua sponte DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the 

remaining claims against Defendant Unruh, but gives Plaintiff leave to file an 

amended Complaint against Unruh only. Any amended Complaint must address the 

concerns expressed by the Court in this Order and must be filed no later than August

16, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 16, 2018

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