Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01969/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Cole, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Kone Elevators, Inc., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-1969-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff Daniel Cole was hired by defendant Kone, Inc. ("Kone") as an elevator

mechanic's helper on June 16, 2004. Cole alleges that within one week of employment Kone

employees began repeatedly harassing him by calling him names and making comments

regarding homosexual activity. Less than three months later, plaintiff was fired, allegedly

as a result of poor job performance. He then filed this action claiming that he was sexually

harassed by a male co-worker, Chris Allard, whose conduct created a hostile work

environment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); that he was terminated in retaliation for

complaining about the harassment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); and that actions

by Allard constituted battery under state law. The court now has before it defendants Kone

and Allard's motion for summary judgment (doc. 20), plaintiff's response (doc. 26), and

defendants' reply (doc. 31).

Case 2:05-cv-01969-FJM Document 33 Filed 11/14/06 Page 1 of 6
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Although Cole refers to harassment by multiple, unnamed co-workers in his

complaint, he discusses harassment by co-worker Chris Allard only in opposition to

defendants' motion for summary judgment. Cole, who is heterosexual, alleges that on July

10, 2004, Chris Allard wrote on Cole's lunch box and measuring tape "I (heart) men" and

"I'm Gay and it's Okay." Thereafter, on "at least five occasions," Allard referred to Cole as

"homosexual Dan." Response to Defendants' SOF ¶ 13. On three different occasions, Allard

asked Cole if he had ever engaged in sodomy. Cole complained to his supervisor Duane

Browning that Allard was harassing him with homosexual taunting. Browning suggested that

he "shrug it off" and did not warn Allard to stop. Id. ¶ 22. 

Count I

Cole alleges in Count I of his complaint that Allard's conduct constituted sexual

harassment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998), the Supreme Court held

that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII. The Court provided three examples

of evidentiary routes by which a plaintiff could show same-sex harassment: (1) a plaintiff

can establish "explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity" motivated by sexual desire;

(2) a plaintiff can show that "the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence

of women [or men] in the workplace"; or (3) a plaintiff can "offer direct comparative

evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex

workplace." Id. at 80-81, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. The Court emphasized, however, that Title VII

"does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace." Id. at 80, 118 S. Ct.

at 1002. Instead, the plaintiff "must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely

tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discriminat[ion] . . .

because of . . . sex.' " Id. at 81, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (emphasis and alterations in original). 

Cole contends that his claim fits within the first example of same-sex harassment

recognized by the Supreme Court–harassment motivated by sexual desire. He characterizes

Allard's comments as "homosexual flirtations." Response at 5. He submits his own

declaration that he believed Allard was "expressing his desire to have homosexual relations"

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with him, Cole Declaration ¶2, although in his previous deposition, when asked if he thought

Allard was propositioning him, Cole responded, "I think he was taunting me." Cole

Deposition at 80. In Oncale, the Supreme Court recognized that a presumption of sexual

motivation in same-sex harassment cases is available if there is credible evidence that the

harasser is homosexual. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. In the present case,

however, there is no evidence, aside from the conduct in question, that Allard, who is

married, is a homosexual. 

Cole's inconsistent personal beliefs about Allard's motivation is insufficient to create

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Allard's conduct was motivated by sexual

desire, and therefore constituted discrimination "because of sex." Nor has he developed any

other theory that would support an inference of discrimination based on his sex. In sum,

Cole has failed to show that Allard's conduct, though offensive and inappropriate in any

employment setting, constitutes discrimination because of sex. 

Even if we assumed that the alleged discrimination was because of sex, the outcome

would nevertheless be the same because Cole has also failed to establish that the harassment

created a hostile work environment. A hostile work environment exists "[w]hen the

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment." Harris

v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (quotation omitted). The

environment must be both objectively offensive to a reasonable person and subjectively

offensive to this particular plaintiff. Faragher v. City of Baca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118

S. Ct. 2275, 2283; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22, 114 S. Ct. at 367; Brooks v. City of San Mateo,

229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). When determining whether an environment is sufficiently

hostile to a reasonable person, the court must consider all the circumstances, including the

"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371. A court must also

consider "the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its

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target." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. "[S]imple teasing, offhand comments,

and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes

in the 'terms and conditions of employment.' " Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S. Ct. at 2283

(citations omitted). "These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to

ensure that Title VII does not become a 'general civility' code." Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S.

at 80, 118 S. Ct. at 1002). In fact, the "conduct must be extreme." Id. at 788, 118 S. Ct. at

2284. 

Cole alleges that during his three-month employment Allard called him names

approximately five times, questioned him about homosexual activity three times, and wrote

homosexual slurs on his personal property twice. He also claims he found an advertisement

for men's underwear in his lunch box. Cole admitted that rough language and lewd behavior

are often prevalent at construction sites. He further admitted that he continued to socialize

with his co-workers, including Allard, as recently as the last week of his employment. Based

on the foregoing, we conclude that the complained of conduct was not sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create a hostile work environment. 

Because Cole has presented insufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude

that Cole was discriminated against because of his sex, and further because insufficient

evidence is presented to establish that the alleged conduct was so objectively offensive as to

alter the conditions of his work environment, we grant defendants' motion for summary

judgment on Count I. 

Count II

Cole also contends that he was terminated in retaliation for his complaints of sexual

harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, Cole must show that 1) he engaged in a protected activity; 2) he suffered an

adverse employment decision; and 3) there was a causal link between the protected activity

and the adverse employment decision. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,

1064 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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There is no dispute that Cole engaged in a protected activity by complaining about the

alleged harassment and that his termination qualifies as an adverse employment action.

Defendants contend, however, that the decision-making manager did not know about the

protected activity and therefore there is no causal link between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action. 

To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that "engaging in the protected activity

was one of the reasons for his firing and that but for such activity he would not have been

fired." Id. at 1065 (alterations omitted). "An employer may be held liable under Title VII

even if it had a legitimate reason for its employment decision, as long as an illegitimate

reason was a motivating factor in the decision." Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept.,

424 F.3d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). "Essential to a causal

link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected

activity." Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Defendants contend that there is no causal link between Cole's alleged complaints of

harassment and his termination because the manager responsible for Cole's termination, Ben

Malmberg, had no knowledge of Cole's complaint prior to his termination, but instead

terminated Cole because of poor job performance. Cole counters that he "repeatedly"

complained to his supervisor, Duane Browning, regarding the harassment. Response at 6.

He speculates that Browning must have relayed the harassment complaints to Keith

Gronberg, the job foreman, who in turn must have conveyed the complaints to Malmberg,

the supervisor who eventually terminated Cole. 

Other than Cole's speculation, however, there is no evidence that Malmberg was

aware of the harassment complaints. See Malmberg Deposition at 44, 57. "[M]ere allegation

and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment." Nelson

v. Pima Cmty. College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996), cf. Hernandez v. Spacelabs

Med., Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1113-1115 (9th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment on causation

inappropriate where plaintiff offered "substantial circumstantial evidence" that the decision

maker had knowledge of plaintiff's protected activity). We conclude that Cole has failed to

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Cole does not respond to this argument. This is a separate and independent reason

to conclude that Cole's battery claim fails as a matter of law. See LRCiv 7.2(i); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e). 

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demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action; accordingly we grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count II. 

Count III

In Count III, Cole asserts a state law battery claim against Allard, alleging that Allard

poured metal shavings into his underwear. Under Arizona law, "[a]n actor is subject to

liability to another for battery if the actor intentionally engages in an act that results in

harmful or offensive contact with the person of another." Duncan v. Scottsdale Med.

Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 309, 70 P.3d 435, 438 (2003). Allard moves for summary

judgment, arguing that Cole's claim is based on mere "guesswork and imagination" and

therefore is insufficient to support a claim for battery under Arizona law.1

 

In his deposition, Cole admitted that he did not see Allard take any action at all

regarding the metal shavings, and further did not feel anything drop down his pants or notice

anything in his pants until he later stood up and started walking around. Cole Deposition at

118-20. We conclude that Cole's assumptions as to the source of the metal shavings are

insufficient to overcome defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Picow v. Baldwin,

77 Ariz. 395, 399, 272 P.2d 613, 615 (1954) (directed verdict on assault claim proper where

plaintiff could not identify who hit him but only assumed it was the defendant). 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendants motion for

summary judgment (doc. 20). 

DATED this 14th day of November, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-01969-FJM Document 33 Filed 11/14/06 Page 6 of 6