Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08215/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08215-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tyrone James Sam, 

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

United States of America 

Respondent/Plaintiff.

No. CV-14-08215-PCT-JAT (BSB)

 CR-12-08176-PCT-JAT 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Movant/Defendant Tyrone James Sam (Movant) has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside, or Correct Sentence by a person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

(Doc. 1.)1

 Respondent/Plaintiff, the United States of America (the government), has filed 

a response asserting that the § 2255 motion should be denied. (Doc. 4.) Movant has filed 

a reply in support of his motion. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

recommends that the § 2255 motion be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Factual Background 

 The events giving rise to Movant’s conviction, summarized below, are set forth in 

the plea agreement and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). (Doc. 10, Ex. A at 

5-6; Doc. 12, Ex. B.)2

 On July 6, 2012, nine-year-old Jane Doe (the victim), her mother, 

 

1

 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-14-08215-PCT-JAT (BSB). 

Citations to “CR Doc.” are to the docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-12-08176- PCT-JAT. 

2

 The PSR and the draft PSR are filed under seal as Exhibits B and I at docket 12. 

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and her siblings spent the night at her grandmother’s house in Hunter’s Point, Arizona. 

Hunter’s Point is in the Navajo Indian Reservation. The victim and her siblings slept in 

the living room. The victim’s mother slept in a bedroom. (Doc. 12 , Ex. B, at ¶ 3.) 

Around 1:00 a.m. on July 7, 2012, the victim’s grandmother picked up Movant from 

work and took him to her house. (Doc. 19, Ex. A at 5.) 

 While the victim was sleeping, Movant picked her up and put her on his lap. (Id.) 

He then covered them both with a blanket. (Id. at 6.) Movant pulled down his pants and 

underwear. (Id.) He also pulled down the victim’s pants and underwear. (Id.) Movant 

then touched the victim’s buttocks and the outside of her upper thigh with his hands and 

his penis. (Id.) The victim tried to call to her family, but Movant covered her mouth 

with his hand. (Id.) The victim started to cry and her mother entered the living room. 

(Id.) At that point, Movant jumped up, while his pants and underwear were still around 

his ankles. (Id.) The victim’s pants and underwear were also still pulled down. (Id.) 

 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interviewed the victim’s uncle. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. C.) He was sleeping in the living room the night of the incident. He 

described hearing a voice say, “don’t.” (Id. at 2.) He also heard one of the girls crying 

and heard Movant say “shhhh.” (Id.) He saw Movant on the couch “with the two girls,” 

but it was too dark for him to tell what was happening. (Id.) He got up to confront 

Movant at the same time the victim’s mother entered the room. (Id.) The victim’s uncle 

saw that Movant’s pants were open and his belt buckle was undone. (Id.) He estimated 

that these events took place around 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. (Id.) 

 The victim was interviewed by a child forensic interviewer. (Doc. 12, Ex. B at 

¶ 4.) She told the interviewer that Movant “tried to put his thing in me.” (Id.) She also 

said that Movant showed her money to prevent her from telling the police what 

happened. (Id.) The victim’s siblings were interviewed and gave the same account as the 

victim. (Doc. 12, Ex. B at ¶ 6.) The victim’s mother took her to the hospital to be 

examined. (Id. at ¶ 3) During a sexual assault examination, the victim’s body was 

swabbed in a few locations for the presence of DNA. (Doc. 10, Ex. D.) The swabs were 

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sent to the FBI laboratory and examined for the presence of blood and semen. (Id.) 

Analysis revealed the presence of male DNA on a swab from the victim’s hip and a swab 

from her buttocks. (Id.) The government contacted Movant’s attorney, Lorna Spencer, 

who stated that Movant would provide a DNA sample. (Doc. 10, Ex. E.) On December 

20, 2012, Movant consented to a search, which entailed the collection of two buccal 

swabs to develop a DNA profile for comparison. (Id.) The DNA analysis report, dated 

January 10, 2013, excluded Movant as a contributor of the male DNA on the samples 

taken from the victim’s hip and buttocks. (Doc. 10, Ex. F.) 

B. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

On July 31, 2012, Movant was indicted in the District of Arizona on one count of 

attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 

§ 2241(c) (Count One), and one count of abusive sexual contact, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(5), and 2246(3) (Count Two). (CR Doc. 1.) 

 On February 6, 2013, Movant, represented by Lorna Spencer, participated in a 

change of plea hearing before Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns. (Doc. 10, Ex. G.) 

During that proceeding, Movant entered a guilty plea to Count Two pursuant to a plea 

agreement. (Id.) The plea agreement stipulated that “the sentence imposed shall not 

exceed fifteen years imprisonment.” (Id. at 2.) Magistrate Judge Burns found that 

Defendant was “competent to enter” a guilty plea, the “guilty plea [was] knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily made,” and was supported by a factual basis. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. H at 17.) Magistrate Judge Burns issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending that the assigned district judge accept Movant’s guilty plea. 

(CR Doc. 28.) Approximately two weeks later, on February 19, 2013, Elizabeth 

Kruschek was substituted as counsel for Movant. (CR Doc. 29.) 

 Movant’s sentencing was set for April 29, 2013, and a draft presentence 

investigation report (draft PSR) was prepared. (Doc. 12, Ex. I.) The draft PSR calculated 

Movant’s United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) range as forty-six to fiftyseven months’ imprisonment, based on a total offense level 21 and a criminal history 

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category III. (Doc. 12, Ex. I at ¶ 50.) The draft PSR reached this calculation using 

U.S.S.G § 2A3.4, abusive sexual contact, to determine the offense level. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-

13.) However, the draft PSR did not apply the cross-reference in § 2A3.4(c)(1),which 

states “if the offense involved criminal sexual abuse or attempt to commit criminal sexual 

abuse, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2242, apply § 2A3.1, (criminal sexual abuse; 

attempt to commit criminal sexual abuse).” See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1. The government 

objected to the draft PSR on that basis. (CR Doc. 30.) 

 Following the government’s objection, and before sentencing, the probation 

officer prepared the PSR and applied the cross-reference in §2A.34(c)(1), which resulted 

in a base offense level 30, with an additional four-level enhancement under § 2A3.1(b)(2) 

because the victim was under twelve years of age. (Doc. 12, Ex. B at ¶¶ 12 and 13.) The 

probation officer re-calculated Movant’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 135 to 168 

months’ imprisonment, based on a total offense level 31 and a criminal history category 

III. (Id., Ex. B at ¶¶ 21 and 27.) The probation officer recommended a sentence of 150 

months’ imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release. (Id. at 15, Sentencing 

Recommendation.) The PSR noted that if Movant had been convicted of Count One of 

the indictment for attempted aggravated sexual abuse, he would have faced a mandatory 

minimum sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. (Id., Ex. B at ¶ 63.) 

 The court scheduled the sentencing hearing for April 29, 2013. (CR Doc. 35.) 

During that hearing, the district judge granted Kruschek’s motion to withdraw as counsel 

and appointed Marc Victor to represent Movant. (CR Docs. 35, 36.) The district judge 

rescheduled Movant’s sentencing to June 20, 2013, and then later rescheduled it to 

August 7, 2013. (CR Docs. 36, 38.) At the sentencing hearing, on August 7, 2013, the 

district judge rejected the February 6, 2013 plea agreement, but not Movant’s guilty plea. 

(CR Doc. 41; Doc. 10, Ex. J at 3-5.) The district judge found that “there [was] no 

meeting of the minds” regarding Movant’s sentencing exposure. (Doc. 10, Ex. J at 2-3.) 

The district judge explained that Movant “envisioned that he was entering into a plea 

agreement with a sentencing range of 37 to 46 months,” and the government envisioned 

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that “considering relevant conduct, [the] case would justify a sentence in the range of 135 

to 168 months . . . .” (Doc. 10, Ex. J at 4.) The district judge advised that if Movant 

“wish[ed],” he would set a status hearing to determine whether Movant “want[ed] to 

withdraw from his guilty plea.” (Id.) The district judge explained that because he had 

rejected the plea agreement, Movant had “an absolute right to withdraw from his guilty 

plea,” but if he chose not to do so, he would be sentenced on the guilty plea without the 

benefit of the plea agreement. (Id. at 5-6.) 

 Movant’s counsel, Victor, stated that Movant had informed him that if the district 

judge rejected the plea agreement, he would withdraw from the guilty plea. (Id. at 9.) 

Victor asked for an opportunity to rework the plea agreement with the government. (Id.) 

The government explained that Movant “got a major benefit out of [the] plea agreement,” 

because a conviction of attempted aggravated sexual abuse carried a mandatory thirtyyear sentence,” which Movant avoided by entering the plea agreement. (Doc. 10, Ex. J at 

10.) 

 After hearing from counsel, the district judge reaffirmed his ruling rejecting the 

plea agreement, and stated that “the ball was in [Movant’s] court as to whether he [was] 

going to withdraw his guilty plea or not.” (Id. at 11.) The district judge indicated that he 

would give the government and Movant time to determine whether they would revise the 

plea agreement. (Id. at 11-13.) The district judge vacated the sentencing hearing and set 

a status conference on August 21, 2013 for Movant to advise the Court if he wanted to 

withdraw his guilty plea. (Id. at 11-13; CR Doc. 41.) The district judge indicated that if 

Movant elected to withdraw from his guilty plea, he would set the trial for September 17, 

2013. (Doc. 10, Ex. J at 4.) At the August 21, 2013 status hearing, which Movant 

attended with attorney Victor, the district judge noted that Movant “need[ed] additional 

time to decide if he wishe[d] to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial or consider 

the revised plea agreement.” (CR Doc. 47.) Therefore, the district judge set another 

status hearing on August 27, 2013. (Id.) 

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 On August 27, 2013, Movant pleaded guilty to Count Two pursuant to “a new plea 

agreement” (the revised plea agreement). (Doc. 10, Ex. K at 2; CR Doc. 53.) The district 

judge accepted Movant’s guilty plea, finding that the guilty plea was “knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily made and there [was] a factual basis for it.” (Doc. 10, Ex. K 

at 17.) He also accepted the revised plea agreement. (Id.) In accordance with the terms 

of the revised plea agreement, the district court sentenced Movant to 135 months’ 

imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release. (Id at 27-33; Doc. 10, Ex. L.) On 

the government’s motion, the district judge dismissed Count One of the indictment. (Id.) 

C. § 2255 Motion 

 On November 3, 2014, Movant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1.) Movant alleges that his attorneys were 

ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Id.) Movant alleges two grounds for 

relief asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) “for failing to defend him using 

available DNA evidence” (Doc. 1 at 22), and (2) “by presenting [him] with a plea 

agreement unnecessarily discarding fundamental constitutional rights without crafting an 

adversarial argument for [him] based on available and irrefutable evidence of [his] 

innocence.” (Id. at 30.) 

 In its response, the government’s counsel advises the Court that he contacted 

Movant’s attorneys. (Doc. 10 at 5.) Kruschek and Victor declined to provide an affidavit 

related to Movant’s claims. Although Spencer agreed to prepare an affidavit, the 

government had not received a statement by the time it filed its response to the § 2255 

motion. (Id.) To date, the government has not supplemented the record with any 

statements from Movant’s former attorneys. In his reply, Movant requests an evidentiary 

hearing. (Doc. 17.) 

As set forth below, the Court finds that Movant’s claims lack merit. The Court 

also finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. Therefore, the Court recommends 

that the motion be denied. 

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II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

 To obtain relief for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 (1984). When reviewing counsel’s 

performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of 

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects 

of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The court 

need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient 

showing on one. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to 

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that 

course should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating 

that “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider 

the other”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 

(2010)). If counsel has misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea negotiation, 

or improperly coerced a defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s performance may 

be found deficient. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) 

(counsel’s erroneous legal advice about possibility of conviction that led to rejection of 

plea offer constituted deficient performance). “If a plea bargain has been offered, a 

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defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept 

it.” Id. at 1387. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong when a petitioner has pleaded 

guilty, he must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citations omitted). 

III. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Movant argues that trial counsel advised him to plead guilty 

without disclosing the DNA test results to him.3

 This testing excluded Movant as a 

contributor of the male DNA in the samples taken from the victim’s body. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. F.) Movant asserts that trial counsel Spencer coerced him to “sign the plea 

agreement” on February 6, 2013, without providing him with the DNA test results, which 

were available in January 2013. (Doc. 1 at 15.) Movant asserts that if he had been aware 

of the DNA test results, he would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial. 

(Id. at 27.) 

A. The Court Rejected the February 6, 2013 Plea Agreement 

 As an initial matter, the Court cannot grant relief based on claims related to the 

February 6, 2013 plea agreement because Movant was not convicted or sentenced based 

on that plea agreement. As previously discussed, on August 7, 2013, the district judge 

rejected the February 6, 2013 plea agreement. (Doc. 10, Ex. J.) Therefore, his conviction 

and sentence are not based on that plea agreement, he is not in federal custody based on 

that plea agreement, and there is no conviction pursuant to that plea agreement for the 

Court to set aside, even if trial counsel was ineffective in connection with that plea 

agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

 Moreover, assuming that Spencer’s performance was deficient for failing to 

provide Movant with the DNA test results before he signed the plea agreement on 

February 6, 2013, Movant cannot establish that she was ineffective because he cannot 

 

3

 Movant raises a similar claim that counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty when the DNA evidence “exonerate[d] him.” (Doc. 1 at 22.) Movant also 

raises this claim in Ground Two, as discussed in Section IV. 

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show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Specifically, as set forth below, 

Movant’s assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been aware of the 

DNA results is contradicted by the record in this case. 

B. Movant Knew of the DNA Test Results When He Pleaded Guilty 

 Movant states that the DNA test results “were made known to him” on April 25, 

2013, after he pleaded guilty and entered a plea agreement on February 6, 2013.4

 

(Doc. 17 at 3.) However, Movant was present several months later at the August 7, 2013 

hearing during which the district judge rejected the February 6, 2013 plea agreement. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. J at 2, 5.) The district judge explained that because he had rejected the plea 

agreement, Movant had “an absolute right to withdraw from his guilty plea.” (Id. at 5-6.) 

He advised that if Movant “wish[ed],” he would set a status hearing to determine whether 

Movant “want[ed] to withdraw from his guilty plea.” (Id.) Movant’s counsel, Victor, 

stated that Movant had informed him that if the district judge rejected the plea agreement, 

he would withdraw his guilty plea. (Id. at 10.) Victor asked for an opportunity to rework 

the plea agreement with the government. (Id.) 

 To allow the government and Movant time to try to revise the plea agreement, the 

district judge vacated Movant’s August 7, 2013 sentencing and scheduled an August 21, 

2013 status conference for Movant to advise the court if he wanted to withdraw his guilty 

plea. (Id. at 12-13; CR Doc. 41.) The district judge stated that if Movant elected to 

withdraw from his guilty plea, trial would be set for September 17, 2013. (Doc. 10, Ex. J 

at 4.) Thus, Movant had knowledge of the DNA test results when the February 6, 2013 

plea agreement was rejected and when the district judge specifically advised Movant that 

he could withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial, or attempt to rework a plea 

agreement with the government. 

 During the August 21, 2013 status hearing, Movant’s counsel Victor advised the 

district judge that Movant “need[ed] additional time to decide if he wishe[d] to withdraw 

 

4

 At that time, Movant was represented by Elizabeth Kruschek. (CR Docs. 29, 36.) A few days later, Victor became Movant’s attorney. (CR Docs. 35, 36.) 

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his guilty plea and proceed to trial or consider the revised plea agreement.” 

(CR Doc. 47.) Therefore, the court set another status hearing for August 27, 2013. (Id.) 

At this point, Movant had been aware of the DNA test results for approximately four 

months. (Doc. 17 at 3.) With knowledge of the DNA test results, on August 27, 2013, 

Movant pleaded guilty to Count Two pursuant to a revised plea agreement. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. K at 2; CR Doc. 53.) The district judge accepted Movant’s guilty plea, finding that it 

was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and there [was] a factual basis for 

it.” (Doc. 10, Ex. K at 17.) He also accepted the revised plea agreement. (Id.) 

 Movant states that he became aware of the DNA test results on April 25, 2013. 

Thus, the record establishes that before Movant pleaded guilty pursuant to the revised 

plea agreement on August 27, 2013, Movant was aware of the DNA test results. After 

the district judge rejected the February 6, 2013 plea agreement, he specifically advised 

Movant that he could withdraw his guilty plea, and allowed Movant additional time to 

consider that decision and additional opportunities to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Nonetheless, Movant chose to plead guilty pursuant to the revised plea agreement on 

August 27, 2013. He was aware of the DNA test results for several months before 

August 27, 2013, when he pleaded guilty and entered the revised plea agreement. 

Considering this procedural history, the record does not support Movant’s assertion that 

he would have proceeded to trial if he had been earlier advised of the DNA test results. 

(Doc. 1 at 27.) 

 C. Movant Was Not Coerced into Pleading Guilt 

In Ground One, Movant also generally asserts that counsel was ineffective for 

coercing him to plead guilty by improperly advising him of the sentencing range. (Doc. 1 

at 28.) Movant does not attribute this alleged conduct to any particular attorney. (Id.) 

Moreover, Movant’s claim is contradicted by his words and conduct at the August 27, 

2013 plea hearing. 

 A defendant’s plea colloquy is given great weight in determining whether the plea 

was voluntarily and knowingly made. See United States v. Boniface, 601 F.2d 390, 393 

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(1979.) During the August 27, 2013 hearing, Movant acknowledged that he reviewed the 

plea agreement with counsel, and confirmed that he was not pressured to enter a guilty 

plea. (Doc. 10, Ex. K.) Movant confirmed that he had not had any substances that could 

interfere with his ability to understand the hearing. (Id. at 3, 5-6.) He stated that he was 

satisfied with counsel’s representation. (Id. at 7.) Movant confirmed that he was 

voluntarily entering the plea agreement and that he was not “pushed or pressured” to do 

so. (Id. at 9.) Movant confirmed that he understood that he “d[id]n’t have to enter into 

[the plea agreement] if he “d[id]n’t want to.” (Id. at 9.) The district judge confirmed that 

Movant had read the revised plea agreement, gone over it with counsel, and understood 

that agreement. (Id. at 5, 9.) Movant confirmed that he signed the revised plea 

agreement on August 27, 2013. (Id. at 9.) He confirmed that counsel explained 

“everything” in the revised plea agreement and that he “really didn’t have any questions” 

about it. (Id. at 9.) 

 The district judge confirmed that under the revised plea agreement, Movant was 

pleading guilty to Count Two of the indictment, charging him with abusive sexual 

conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(5), and 2246(3), a Class A Felony. 

(Id. at 9-10.) Movant agreed that he was pleading guilty to that crime. (Id. at 9-10.) The 

district judge explained the maximum statutory penalties for the offense to which Movant 

was pleading guilty. (Id. at 10.) Specifically, the “crime could carry with it a maximum 

fine of $250,000, a maximum term of imprisonment of life, or [he] could get both, and a 

term of supervised release of five years to life.” (Id.) Movant confirmed that he 

understood his sentencing exposure if he went to trial on Count Two of the indictment. 

(Id.) The district judge explained that under the revised plea agreement, the court could 

impose a special assessment of $100 for each count of conviction. (Id. at 10-11.) 

 The district judge further explained that under the revised plea agreement, Movant 

and the government stipulated that the “cross-reference” applied and that Movant would 

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 135 months, which is 11.25 years. (Id. at 11-

12.) Movant indicated that he understood the stipulation. (Id. at 12.) The district judge 

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reiterated that if the court accepted the revised plea agreement, Movant would be 

sentenced to 11.25 years’ imprisonment. (Id.) The district judge also discussed that 

Movant could be sentenced to a term of supervised release from five years to life. (Id. at 

10.) Movant indicated that he understood his sentencing exposure under the revised plea 

agreement. (Id.) 

The district judge discussed the constitutional rights that Movant was waiving by 

pleading guilty and the government’s burden if the case went to trial. (Id. at 7-8, 12-13.) 

Movant affirmed that he understood those rights and the government’s burden and 

wanted to give up his rights and enter a plea of guilty. (Id. at 7-8, 13.) The district judge 

explained that Movant was also waiving his right to appeal and to bring a collateral 

attack. (Id. at 15.) Movant stated that he understood that waiver. (Id. at 15-16.) 

 The district judge set forth the elements of the offense to which Movant was 

pleading guilty, and confirmed that Movant understood those elements. (Id. at 12-13.) 

The district judge read the factual basis that was set forth in the revised plea agreement. 

(Id. at 13-14.) Movant agreed with the factual basis, agreed that those facts were true, 

and agreed that the government could prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt if the 

case went to trial. (Doc. 10, Ex. K at 13-14.) 

 The district judge reiterated that Movant was charged with violating 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(5), and 2246(3), abusive sexual contact. (Id. at 16.) Movant 

then pleaded guilty to violating those provisions. (Id. 16-17.) Movant confirmed that he 

was “pleading guilty to this crime because [he was] guilty.” (Id. at 17.) The district 

judge found that Movant’s “plea [was] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made and 

that there [was] a factual basis for it.” (Id.) The district judge accepted the plea and the 

revised plea agreement. (Id. at 17-18.) 

 The court then proceeded to sentencing. (Id. at 18.) Movant confirmed that he 

had reviewed the PSR and the addendum with counsel and that he understood those 

documents. (Id.) The district judge discussed the objections to the PSR and resolved 

them. (Id. at 19-22.) The district judge approved the adjusted offense level of 34 and 

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granted the government’s motion to subtract three levels based on Movant’s acceptance 

of responsibility. (Id. at 22-23.) Before imposing Movant’s sentence, the district judge 

gave Movant the opportunity to address the court. (Id. at 23.) Movant expressed remorse 

for the “wrong” that he had done, and “apologize[d] for the past hearings and all the time 

that [the court] wasted here in the courtroom seeing [him] over and over . . . .” (Id. at 23-

24.) Movant did not express any dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation or indicate 

that he did not want to enter a guilty plea or the revised plea agreement. (Id.) In 

accordance with the revised plea agreement, the district judge sentenced Movant to 11.25 

years’ imprisonment followed lifetime supervised release. (Id. at 27.) 

 Movant alleges that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known the results 

of the DNA testing. However, he pleaded guilty under the revised plea agreement several 

months after he was made aware of those results. Additionally, during the August 27, 

2013 hearing, Movant stated that he wanted to plead guilty, admitted the crime to which 

he was pleading guilty, and stated that he was not pressured to enter a plea. “Statements 

made by a defendant during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity 

in subsequent proceedings attacking the plea.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 

1236 (9th Cir. 2008). When, as here, a collateral challenge rests on allegations that 

contradict a movant’s sworn statements, the Ninth Circuit has held that claim fails. See 

Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases and rejecting a 

movant’s challenge to his guilty plea that was contradicted by his sworn statements 

during the change of plea hearing). 

 Because Movant pleaded guilty pursuant to the revised plea agreement several 

months after he became aware of the DNA test results, he cannot show that if counsel has 

earlier advised him of the DNA test results he would have rejected a plea offer and 

proceeded to trial. Additionally, the record of the August 27, 2013 hearing contradicts 

Movant’s unsupported allegations that he was coerced into pleading guilty. Therefore, 

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Movant cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on those 

allegations.5

 

IV. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for advising him to 

enter a plea agreement that waived his fundamental rights “without crafting an 

adversarial defense for [Movant] based on available and refutable evidence of [his] 

innocence.” (Doc. 1 at 30.) Movant’s claim is based on DNA evidence, witnesses, and 

electronic evidence. As set forth below, this claim lacks merit. 

A. Advice to Plead Guilty Despite DNA Evidence 

 Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty when 

the DNA evidence indicated that he was innocent of the charged crimes. (Doc. 1 at 31.) 

Because the district judge rejected the February 6, 2013 plea agreement and Movant 

ultimately pleaded guilty under a revised plea agreement on August 27, 2013, the Court 

construes this claim as alleging that trial counsel Victor was ineffective for advising 

Movant to accept the revised plea agreement and plead guilty on August 27, 2013. As set 

forth below, Movant cannot establish that counsel was ineffective on this basis. 

 As set forth above in Section II, the Court applies Strickland, to claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court first determines whether counsel’s 

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688. “The first prong — constitutional deficiency — is necessarily linked to the 

practice and expectations of the legal community: ‘The proper measure of attorney 

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.) On 

 

5

 Movant also suggests that Lorna Spencer was ineffective for failing to “immediately” seek DNA testing. (Doc. 1 at 26.) However, Movant does not explain how this failure prejudiced him, and he cannot make this showing because DNA testing was obtained and revealed to Movant before he pleaded guilty pursuant to the revised plea agreement on August 27, 2013. To the extent Movant argues that Spencer was ineffective for advising him to enter the February 6, 2013 plea agreement, he cannot establish prejudice because the district court rejected that plea agreement. To the extent 

Movant’s claim is directed at counsel Kruschek, his claim fails because she did not 

represent Movant at the time of his August 27, 2013 guilty plea. 

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the performance prong, the question is not what counsel might have done differently, but 

whether counsel’s decisions were reasonable from counsel’s perspective at the time. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The reviewing court starts from a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable conduct. Id. at 690. Movant 

has not shown that counsel performed deficiently by advising him to plead guilty despite 

the lack of a DNA match, because other evidence connected Movant to the alleged 

crimes and Movant benefitted under the plea agreement. 

 The record included the statements of several witnesses including the victim, her 

mother, her siblings, and her uncle that are discussed in Section I.A. In these statements, 

the witnesses gave similar accounts of the incident and identified Movant as the 

individual who engaged in the offense conduct. See Section I.A. Thus, although DNA 

testing excluded Movant as a match for DNA found on samples taken from the victim, 

there was other evidence from which a reasonable juror could have convicted Movant. 

Thus, counsel did not perform deficiently by advising Movant to plead guilty to the 

revised plea agreement. 

 Additionally, the revised plea agreement substantially benefitted Movant. Under 

the revised plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss Count One of the 

indictment, which carried a thirty-year mandatory prison sentence. (Doc. 12, Ex. B at 

¶ 63.) The revised plea agreement provided that Movant would plead guilty to abusive 

sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(5), and 2246(3). (Doc. 10, 

Ex. A.) That crime carried a maximum fine of $250,000, a maximum term of 

imprisonment of life, or both, and a term of supervised release of five years to life. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. K at 10.) The PSR, which was prepared before Movant entered his guilty 

plea to the revised plea agreement, found that Movant’s guidelines range was 135 to 168 

months’ imprisonment, and recommended a sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. B at ¶ 50, Sentencing Recommendation at 15.) The revised plea agreement 

stipulated to a less significant sentence. Specifically, the plea stipulated to term of 11.25 

years’ (135 months’) imprisonment. (Doc. 10, Ex. A at 2.) Considering the potential 

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sentence Movant faced if he proceeded to trial, and the witnesses’ statements connecting 

Movant to the charged offenses, counsel was not deficient in advising Movant to plead 

guilty despite the fact that Movant’s DNA did not match DNA that was found on the 

victim. Accordingly, Movant has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test and 

this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

B. Failure to Investigate Before Giving Plea Advice 

 Movant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter a 

guilty plea without having investigated other evidence that supported Movant’s assertion 

that he was innocent. (Doc. 1 at 17, 31.) Movant claims that cell phone records, 

surveillance footage, and statements from witnesses would have supported a defense that 

he was somewhere else when the alleged crime was committed. (Doc. 1 at 31.) Movant 

argues that the “legal representation rendered by counsel was not reasonable,” and that 

had counsel investigated evidence related to his claim that he was elsewhere, “it is likely 

no charges would have remained on which to criminally indict [Movant].” (Id.) The 

Supreme Court has stated that in guilty plea cases, when the alleged error of counsel is 

the failure to investigate, “the determination whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the defendant 

by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that 

discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the 

plea.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. As set forth below, even assuming that counsel’s 

performance was deficient for failing to investigate the evidence to which Movant refers 

in his motion, Movant’s claim fails because he cannot establish prejudice. 

 Movant has not specified how further investigation would have provided counsel 

with additional information or evidence that would have changed counsel’s advice to 

Movant. He states that witnesses could have testified that he was elsewhere when the 

crimes occurred, but does not specifically identify those witnesses, the nature of their 

testimony, or whether they would have testified at trial. (Doc. 1 at 18.) In his reply, 

Movant names several witnesses, Ivan Kee, Elliot Bia, Cynthia Bia, and Jack Bencomo, 

and generally states that they “could have given accounts of [Movant’s] whereabouts on 

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or about the hours of 5-6:00 AM (time approx.) given in [the victim’s uncle’s] 

testimony.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) Movant, however, does not allege where he was at the time 

the crime allegedly occurred, describe the specific nature of the witnesses’ alleged 

testimony, or indicate whether they would have testified at trial. Thus, the Court cannot 

conclude that had counsel investigated these witnesses, counsel would have advised 

Movant differently regarding pleading guilty. 

 Movant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

surveillance footage. (Doc. 1 at 20.) Movant states that surveillance footage from a “gas 

station” and a “store” would have shown that he was not present when the alleged crime 

occurred. (Id.) Movant, however, does not identify his location at the time the crime 

allegedly occurred, identify the specific businesses or other locations which counsel 

should have investigated for surveillance footage of Movant, or specify when he was at 

those locations. Movant’s conclusory allegations regarding surveillance footage are 

insufficient to establish that trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate this 

potential evidence, or to show that there is a reasonable probability that had counsel 

conducted such an investigation, counsel would have advised Movant differently. 

 Movant further alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

cell phone records that would have shown he was not present when the crime allegedly 

occurred. (Doc. 1 at 21.) Again, Movant’s allegations are conclusory. He does not 

allege where he was around the time of the alleged incident or explain why cell phone 

records would have indicated that he was not at the scene when the alleged crimes were 

committed. (Id.) The only evidence in the record regarding the time of the incident is the 

victim’s uncle’s statement, which includes his guess that it occurred between 5:00 and 

6:00 a.m. (Doc. 10, Ex. C.) Thus, the time of the incident was uncertain. Movant’s 

conclusory allegations regarding cell phone records do not establish that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate cell phone data. 

 Moreover, despite Movant’s own belief that witnesses and other evidence 

supported his contention that he was not at the scene when the alleged crime occurred, 

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Movant signed the August 27, 2013 plea agreement and admitted to the factual basis of 

his guilty plea in writing. He also admitted the factual basis during the change of plea 

hearing. Thus, Movant entered his guilty plea despite his awareness of the existence of 

potentially exculpatory evidence. Movant has not shown that there is a reasonable 

probability that he would have rejected the revised plea agreement and proceeded to trial 

but for counsel’s alleged failure investigate the case. See Moore v. Adduci, 2013 WL 

2417947, at *13 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2013) (finding that petitioner’s guilty plea was 

knowing and voluntary when he was aware of exculpatory evidence at the time he 

entered his plea); Brown-Monroe v. McDonald, 2012 WL 6140408, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 

Sept. 10, 2012) (petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that discovery of 

evidence would have led counsel to change advice to plead guilty when counsel was 

aware of the facts at the time of petitioner’s guilty plea.) Therefore, Movant’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to investigate fails. 

V. Allegations Directed at Trial Counsel Victor 

 The Procedural History section of the § 2255 motion includes several allegations 

of ineffective assistance directed specifically to trial counsel Victor. (Doc. 1 at 16-17.) 

These allegations are not identified as a separate ground for relief and, with the exception 

of the failure-to-investigate allegation, are not included in Grounds One or Two. 

However, in an abundance of caution, the Court considers these allegations below. 

A. Failure to Withdraw Plea Agreement and Guilty Plea 

 Movant asserts that when Victor was assigned, he “immediately” told him “he did 

not want to take the plea he had signed,” that he had signed that plea because his previous 

attorney had thrust it on him in open court, and that he wanted to go to trial. (Doc. 1 at 

16.) The record reflects that Victor began representing Movant on April 29, 2013. 

(CR Doc. 36.) Several months later, the district court rejected the plea agreement that 

Movant had entered on February 6, 2013. (CR Doc. 41.) Because the district rejected the 

February 6, 2013 plea agreement, Movant cannot show that attorney Victor was 

ineffective for failing to move to withdraw that plea agreement. 

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 Movant also argues that Victor “never filed a motion to withdraw [his] plea.” 

(Doc. 1 at 17.) Liberally construed, Movant argues that Victor failed to withdraw his 

guilty plea. In his motion, Movant does not specify whether he actually instructed Victor 

to withdraw his guilty plea or when he may have done so. (Id.) In his reply, Movant 

expands this claim and asserts that he gave Victor “a handwritten ‘motion to withdraw 

plea’ on or about August 27, 2013, which he also had notarized by C.C. Clawson of the 

C.C.A. in Florence, AZ (which should be shown in a log at the facility) between Aug. 7th 

and Aug. 26th . . . .” (Doc. 17 at 7.) The Court need not consider Movant’s allegations 

that are raised for the first time in his reply. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 

504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (claim raised for first time in a reply will not be considered). 

 Moreover, even if Movant gave counsel a handwritten motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, Movant’s actions during the August 27, 2013 hearing contradict his assertion 

that he wanted to reject the revised plea offer, withdraw his previous guilty plea, and 

proceed to trial. As discussed in Section III, the record reflects that, after the district 

judge rejected the February 6, 2013 plea agreement, he specifically advised Movant that 

he could withdraw his guilty plea. The district judge gave Movant sufficient time and 

opportunities to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 27, 2013, Movant pleaded guilty to 

a revised plea agreement. The record reflects that Movant’s guilty plea pursuant to the 

revised plea agreement was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. During the 

August 27, 2013 hearing, the district judge gave Movant an opportunity to address the 

court, and Movant did not indicate that he desired to withdraw his February 6, 2013 

guilty plea, reject the revised plea agreement, and proceed to trial. See Section III. 

Accordingly, even assuming Victor was ineffective for failing to file Movant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, he has not shown that he was prejudiced because, despite his 

claim that he prepared a written motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Movant proceeded 

with the August 27, 2013 plea hearing and entered a guilty plea pursuant to revised plea 

agreement. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 

 

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B. Failure to Investigate 

 Movant argues that Victor, like his other attorneys, was ineffective for failing to 

investigate evidence before advising him to plead guilty. (Doc. 1 at 17.) The Court 

addressed this claim in Section III and does not reiterate that discussion. 

C. Failure to Argue for Favorable Sentencing Recommendation 

 Movant also asserts that Victor “ultimately failed to argue for a sentencing 

recommendation made by the US Probation Officer preparing the PS[]R, which was 

significantly lower than the sentence [Movant] received.” (Doc. 1 at 17.) Movant does 

not specifically identify the sentencing recommendation to which he refers. Petitioner 

has not supported this claim with argument, citations to legal authority, or citations to the 

trial record. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed as unduly vague and conclusory. 

See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (vague or conclusory 

claims without supporting factual allegations warrant summary dismissal of § 2255 

motion); see also Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory allegations 

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.’”)). 

Additionally, the PSR recommended a sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment (Doc. 12 at 

16), and Movant was sentenced to 135 months’ imprisonment. (Doc. 10, Ex. L.) 

Therefore, this claim lacks merit. 

D. Failure to File Notice of Appeal 

 In the procedural history section of his motion and in his reply, Movant asserts 

that counsel Victor coerced him to plead guilty by promising him that he would file a 

direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at 17; Doc. 17 at 11.) Movant does not include this allegation in 

either of his grounds for relief. However, assuming Movant intended to raise this as a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim fails because as discussed in Section 

III, Movant confirmed in open court that he entered his guilty plea voluntary, was not 

pressured to enter his plea, and that he understood the waiver of his right to appeal. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. K.) 

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 To the extent the motion can be construed as asserting that counsel Victor was 

ineffective for failing to file a notice of direct appeal — a claim that Movant does not 

specifically make — Movant waived this claim by waiving his collateral review rights in 

the August 27, 2013 plea agreement and by confirming that waiver during the plea 

hearing. (Doc. 10, Ex. A at ¶ 6 (waiving right to file a collateral attack, including a 

§ 2255 motion); Ex. K at 15-16.) See Lewis v. United States, 2009 WL 4694042, at *4 

(D. Ariz. Dec. 4, 2009) (concluding that waiver of collateral review rights in plea 

agreement waived claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal).6

 

VI. Actual Innocence Claim

 In Section VIII of his motion, Movant alleges actual innocence as “cause” to 

overcome “any potential procedural bar” to this Court’s review of claims. (Doc. 1 at 35.) 

When a movant has procedurally defaulted a claim, that claim can be considered in a 

§ 2255 proceeding if the movant demonstrates either “cause” and actual “prejudice,” or 

that the failure to consider his defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); United States v. Frady, 

456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982). The government has not asserted a procedural bar to review of 

Movant’s claims. Therefore, he does need to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. 

 The § 2255 motion, however, could be liberally construed as asserting a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence based on the DNA test results. (Doc. 1 at 35.) 

The Supreme Court “has not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief 

based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___U.S.__, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993)). 

Thus, Movant’s freestanding claim of actual innocence does not appear to be a 

recognized claim that is subject to § 2255 review. 

 

6

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ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary. See Washington v. 

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, in the context of § 2255 challenges, the waiver of collateral review rights does not bar ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to plea negotiations). 

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 However, the Ninth Circuit has assumed that freestanding actual innocence claims 

are cognizable in both capital and non-capital cases, and has articulated a minimum 

standard of proof applicable to such claims. See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). “[A] habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence 

claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove 

that he is probably innocent.” Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 

442–44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 

 Assuming that Movant properly asserts a freestanding claim of actual innocence in 

this § 2255 motion, his guilty plea is a relevant factor in determining whether he 

establishes such a claim and, in this case, his plea undermines his claim. See Chestang v. 

Sisto, 522 Fed. App’x. 389, 390 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that the fact that petitioner 

pleaded guilty to charges while being represented by counsel, while not outright 

precluding actual innocence claim, “seriously undermine[d]” petitioner’s claim that 

another committed the crime); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(assuming that the gateway actual innocence exception applies in guilty plea context). 

Movant was aware of the DNA test results several months before he pleaded guilty 

pursuant to the revised plea agreement in August 27, 2013. Movant admitted the factual 

basis underlying his conviction. (Doc. 10, Ex. A.) He signed the revised plea agreement 

that contained the factual basis, and agreed with the factual basis in open court. (Doc. 10, 

Exs. A, K.) Additionally, as discussed in Section IV.A, the government had evidence 

that connected Movant to the crime even in the absence of a DNA match. Because 

Movant admitted the factual basis supporting his conviction, and the government had 

evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that he was guilty, Movant’s 

claim of actual innocence based on the DNA analysis lacks merit.7

 

 

7

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review rights. 

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VII. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Movant requests an evidentiary hearing. Under § 2255, “a district court must 

grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, ‘[u]nless 

the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is 

entitled to no relief.’” United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The court may deny a hearing if the 

movant’s allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim for relief or “are so 

palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal.” United 

States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2011). To 

warrant a hearing, therefore, the movant must make specific factual allegations which, if 

true, would entitle him to relief. Withers, 638 F.3d at 1062; McMullen, 98 F.3d at 1159. 

Conclusory assertions in a §2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing. United 

States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980). Because the motion, briefing, and 

records of the underlying criminal case conclusively show that Movant is not entitled to 

relief, the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required. See Blaylock, 20 

F.3d at 1465. 

VIII. Conclusion 

As set forth above, the record in this case establishes that Movant knowingly and 

voluntarily entered a guilty plea pursuant to the revised plea agreement. The § 2255 

motion should be denied because Movant’s claims lack merit. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Movant has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of December, 2015. 

 

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