Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01872/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01872-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY JEROME SMITH,

Booking # 18125428,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SAN DIEGO CENTRAL JAIL; SAN 

DIEGO COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL 

GROUP; GEORGE BAILEY 

DETENTION FACILITY MEDICAL 

GROUP/STAFF; SAN DIEGO COUNTY 

SHERIFF,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01872-JLS KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff, Anthony Jerome Smith, is a pretrial detainee at George Bailey Detention 

Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California. He has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). Because Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP 

complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court GRANTS him leave to proceed without 

full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but DISMISSES

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his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§ 1915A(b).

Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the 

certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the 

average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has 

no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14) (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified prison certificate, 

verified by an accounting officer at GBDF, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.

CAL. CIVLR 3.2. (See ECF No. 2 at 4.); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This certificate shows 

that Plaintiff had an available balance of $0.00 at the time of filing. Therefore, the Court 

will not assess Plaintiff an initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts 

as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure 

to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, DECLINES to 

“exact” the an initial partial filing fee because his prison certificate shows he “has no means 

to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and DIRECTS the Watch Commander at GBDF to 

collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward 

them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, 

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 

are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

I. Improper Defendants & Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

The Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff names the San Diego Central Jail, the San 

Diego Central Jail Medical Group, George Bailey Detention Facility, the George Bailey 

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Detention Facility Medical Group and the entire San Diego County Sheriff’s Department

as Defendants, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 

granted. 

Local law enforcement departments, like the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, 

municipal agencies, or subdivisions of that department or agency, are not proper defendants 

under § 1983. See Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 

(“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading 

a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook Cnty. Jail, 814 

F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who 

violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a 

‘person.’”). 

While the County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, a 

proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978); Hammond v. Cnty. of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988), Plaintiff has not 

named the County as a Defendant. Moreover, as a municipality, the County may be held 

liable under § 1983–but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional 

deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, 

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the County, or a 

“final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs 

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of 

recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 

(9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged constitutional 

deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom.’” Id. (quoting 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might 

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plausibly suggest” that the County itself violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez 

v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards 

to Monell claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 

provides for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced 

by affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally 

required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights).

II. Medical Care Claims 

Plaintiff contends that unidentified members of the Jail and its “Medical Group”

failed to “properly treat Plaintiff’s ongoing medical condition due to lack of proper and 

untreated medical care.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.)

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier 

v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s Eighth 

Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims alleged to 

violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff does not identify a specific medical condition. He claims he suffers 

from “unremitting hiccups, nausea causing vomiting, [and] difficulty keeping food down,” 

along with “labored breathing,” (ECF No. 1 at 4), but he fails to include any further “factual 

matter” sufficient to show or describe how or to what extent his medical needs were 

objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining 

a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat ... could result in further 

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled on other 

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor 

or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence 

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of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ 

need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

Moreover, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff’s symptoms were “objectively 

serious” medical conditions, nothing in his Complaint supports a “reasonable inference that 

[any individual] defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. See Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient 

facts to indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 

501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; 

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990)). A difference of opinion between a pretrial detainee and the doctors or 

other trained medical personnel at the Jail as to the appropriate course or type of medical 

attention he requires does not amount to deliberate indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 

681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate course of treatment does not by itself 

show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged have caused harm. See McGuckin, 

974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th 

Cir. 1985); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[D]elay in providing 

a prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does not constitute an Eighth Amendment 

violation.”). 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint, as currently pleaded, does not 

include facts to show that any individual San Diego Jail or George Bailey Detention 

Facility official actually knew of, yet disregarded any serious medical need. See Gibson v. 

Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[D]eliberate indifference 

requires the defendant to be subjectively aware that serious harm is likely to result from a 

failure to provide medical care.”). Nor does it allege that any decision to refuse or delay a 

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particular course of medical treatment caused him actual harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d 

at 1060. Without more, Plaintiff’s Complaint currently amounts only to “unadorned, the 

defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” which “stop[] short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief’” as to any constitutionally

inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

557).

III. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix 

the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Ste. 5300, San Diego, 

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California, 92158.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be 

complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim 

not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

If Plaintiff fails to follow these instructions and/or files an Amended Complaint that 

still fails to state a claim, his case may be dismissed without further leave to amend. See 

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage 

of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2018

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