Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02164/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN L. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF 

GREGORY J. AHERN, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-02164 CW (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations that occurred

while he was housed at Santa Rita Jail. He has been granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis.

The Court now conducts its initial review of the complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any

case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable

claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally

construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation

omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). This includes evidence that a

supervisor implemented "a policy so deficient that the policy

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving

force of the constitutional violation." Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446;

see Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001). 

II. Exhaustion 

A question which must be answered before Plaintiff can proceed

with his claims is whether he has exhausted available

administrative remedies with respect to each claim. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134,

110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide

that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

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prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this section, an action

must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available

administrative remedies before he filed suit, even if the prisoner

fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether

they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all "available"

remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be "plain, speedy and effective." Id. at

524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001). Even

when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance

proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to

suit. Id. at 741. The purposes of the exhaustion requirement

include allowing the prison or jail to take responsive action,

filtering out frivolous cases and creating an administrative

record. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525.

Section 1073 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

provides county jail inmates with a right to "appeal and have

resolved grievances" relating to their confinement. 

Here, it is not clear that Plaintiff exhausted his available

administrative remedies before filing his federal complaint on May

18, 2009. Plaintiff contends that he "presented two grievances,

first one being tracking #09G-50649, 4-11-09 and 09G-50670 4-15-

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09," both of which he has attached to his complaint. (Compl. at

2.) However, Plaintiff does not allege whether he received

responses to his two grievances from the highest level of review

available to him. As to grievance #09G-50649, it was "received" by

Defendant Fesmire on April 11, 2009; however, it states that the

grievance "can not [sic] be resolved at this level." (Attach to

Compl., Grievance #09G-50649.) There is no indication as to

whether grievance #09G-50649 was forwarded to the Sergeant. (Id.) 

Meanwhile, grievance #09G-50670 was "received" by Deputy

Christensen on April 15, 2009; however, there is no further

information indicating whether it was resolved by Deputy

Christensen or whether it was forwarded to the Sergeant. (Attach

to Compl., Grievance #09G-50670.) It thus appears Plaintiff has

not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). 

Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff's claims are

unexhausted and subject to dismissal. Therefore, Plaintiff's

complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend his complaint to prove

that he exhausted all of his claims against each Defendant before

he filed this action. If Plaintiff did exhaust his administrative

remedies with respect to any or all of those claims before filing

this action, he may amend his complaint within thirty days to so

allege, as set forth below. If he had not exhausted his claims

before he filed this complaint, he must wait until he has done so

and then file a new complaint. In that instance, the present

complaint would be dismissed without prejudice.

//

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III. Named Defendants

The only Defendants named in this complaint are Alameda County

Sheriff Gregory Ahern and Deputy Fesmire. In the body of the

complaint, Plaintiff mentions a desire to sue the Classification

Deputies who placed him in administrative segregation for nondisciplinary, allegedly retaliatory, reasons. If Plaintiff is

unable to determine the names of these individuals he may later

attempt through discovery to ascertain their names and then move

for leave to amend his complaint to add them as defendants. 

However, Plaintiff must explain what these individuals did that

caused the violation of specific constitutional rights. See Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (liability may be

imposed on individual defendant under §1983 only if plaintiff can

show that defendant proximately caused deprivation of federally

protected right). Conclusory allegations of wrongdoing, similar to

his allegations in the instant complaint, will not do. Id. A

person deprives another of a constitutional right within the

meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the

plaintiff complains. Id. at 633. As mentioned above, Plaintiff is

cautioned that there is no respondeat superior liability under §

1983. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. That is, under no

circumstances is there liability under § 1983 solely because one is

responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Id.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Sheriff Ahern are insufficient for

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this reason. If he is to be included in any amended complaint,

Plaintiff must plead a claim against him as specified above.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order,

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint as set forth above, if he

has already exhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff must

use the attached civil rights form, write the case number for this

action -- Case No. C 09-02164 CW (PR) -- on the form, clearly label

the complaint "Amended Complaint," and complete all sections of the

form. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the

original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he

wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992); King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987); London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644

F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981). He may not incorporate material

from the original complaint by reference. Plaintiff's failure to

file an amended complaint by the deadline will result in the

dismissal of this action without prejudice. If he has not already

exhausted his remedies, he may file a new complaint after he has

done so.

2. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's Orders in a timely fashion. Failure

to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

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3. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a blank civil

rights form along with a copy of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 5/7/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN L. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPT. et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV09-02164 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 7, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached and a blank civil rights

form, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter

listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Kevin L. Hopkins PFN #AKV-006

Santa Rita Jail

5325 Broder Blvd.

Dublin, CA 94568

Dated: May 7, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:09-cv-02164-CW Document 18 Filed 05/07/10 Page 8 of 8