Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07754/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07754-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

HELIO, LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PALM, INC.,

Defendant. 

No. C 06-7754 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 34, 78]

Before the Court is plaintiff Helio, LLC’s motion to dismiss this action without prejudice

[Docket No. 78] and defendant Palm, Inc.’s request for terms and conditions if dismissal is granted

without prejudice, or, in the alternative, request for dismissal with prejudice [Docket No. 85]. After

reading and considering the arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate

for resolution without a hearing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 78. For the reasons that follow, the Court

GRANTS the motion to dismiss, but with terms and conditions. The Court also DENIES Helio’s motion

for a preliminary injunction [Docket No. 34] as moot.

BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2006, Helio filed a complaint against Palm asserting trademark infringement.

Concurrently with the complaint, Helio filed an application for a temporary restraining order. This

application was denied after a hearing on December 21, 2006. Helio currently has a pending motion

for a preliminary injunction. See Docket No. 34. 

Helio asserts that Palm’s advertising campaign using the slogan “Not Just a Cell Phone. A

Treo.” infringes its own advertisements utilizing the phrases “Don’t call it a phone” and “Don’t call us

a phone company.” Palm used this phrase in outdoor advertising, in print media, and on Internet

websites. Palm’s advertising campaign using the slogan has been winding down in recent months and

is, or soon will be, finished. Helio contends that it has therefore achieved the objective of its litigation,

and now seeks to dismiss this action without prejudice to its being allowed to refile this suit should Palm

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again use the slogan in the future. 

Palm agrees this suit should be dismissed, but it objects to dismissing it without terms and

conditions. First, it requests that the Court first rule on the motion for preliminary injunction. In

addition, Palm requests

the Court enter an order prohibiting Helio from challenging the conclusions of Palm’s

surveys in any future litigation, or, in the event Helio wishes to make such a challenge,

the payment of Palm’s fees and costs incurred in opposing plaintiff’s motions for a TRO

and preliminary injunction, and the fees associated with these surveys. Such fees would

be paid retroactively if and when Helio mounted such a challenge. Palm further requests

an order providing that any discovery that has been exchanged in this action can be used

in any subsequent action between the parties.

Docket No. 85, at 12. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

After an answer has been filed, as is the case here, an “action shall not be dismissed at the

plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems

proper.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). A court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule

41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some “plain legal prejudice” as a result. See

Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (2001); Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla Int’l B.V., 889 F.2d

919, 921 (9th Cir. 1989) (the purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is “to permit a plaintiff to dismiss an action

without prejudice so long as the defendant will not be prejudiced . . . or unfairly affected by dismissal”);

Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Legal prejudice is “prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, some legal argument.”

Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996). For instance, prejudice may

be the loss of a federal forum, the right to a jury trial, or a statute-of-limitations defense. See id. Legal

prejudice is not constituted by the expense incurred in defending a lawsuit, in potentially having to

defend in a second litigation or in another forum, or merely because the plaintiff would gain a tactical

advantage by the dismissal. See Smith, 263 F.3d at 976; Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97.

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ANALYSIS

1. Ruling on the Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Before granting the dismissal of this action, Palm requests the Court first make factual findings

on the merits of the pending preliminary injunction motion, and enter findings that there is no consumer

confusion on the parties’ respective slogans; that there is no secondary meaning with respect to Helio’s

slogan; and that Helio has no likelihood of success on the merits. Palm contends that the strength of the

evidence that it has put forward in opposition to the preliminary injunction is in fact the reason for

Helio’s requested dismissal. As both parties agree this case should be dismissed, the preliminary

injunction is now moot. 

The case Palm relies on for nevertheless seeking a ruling on the preliminary injunction is

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a habeas petitioner’s motion to dismiss his

petition three months after a summary judgment motion had been filed and after a magistrate judge

issued a report and recommendation on the summary judgment motion. Id. 

There is other authority supporting the proposition that a voluntary dismissal may not be

appropriate where the sole reason for the plaintiff’s request for dismissal is apprehension regarding a

possible adverse ruling on a pending post-trial or dispositive motion. See, e.g., Williams v. Ford Motor

Credit Co., 627 F.2d 158, 160 (8th Cir. 1980) (dismissal without prejudice was not appropriate after a

trial and where the only apparent reason for the party’s seeking dismissal was to avoid an adverse ruling

on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); Pace v. Southern Express Co., 409 F.2d 331,

344 (7th Cir. 1969) (weighing fact that summary judgment motion had been filed in denying dismissal

without prejudice). 

A ruling on a preliminary injunction, is not of course, a ruling on a dispositive motion. It is a

preliminary assessment of the likelihood of success where there is a danger of an irreparable injury. It

is not binding in future litigation and a ruling would not offer issue or claim preclusion on points ruled

upon in the preliminary injunction. Thus, a ruling on the preliminary injunction that is moot would be

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both a waste of judicial resources and of no real value to either of the parties. 

2. Palm’s Requested Conditions for Dismissal

a. Surveys

Palm relates that it commissioned two consumer surveys by independent marketing experts to

defend against Helio’s trademark infringement claim. These surveys allegedly demonstrate that Helio’s

slogans have no secondary meaning and that there is no evidence of a likelihood of confusion between

the two entities’ advertising campaigns. Palms states that it expended approximately $80,000 in this

effort.

Palm requests that dismissal of this action be conditioned on either (1) prohibiting Helio from

challenging the conclusions of Palm’s two surveys in any future litigation, or, (2) in the event that Helio

wishes to make such a challenge, the payment of Palm’s fees and costs incurred in opposing Helio’s

motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and the fees associated with the

surveys, to be paid retroactively if and when Helio mounts such a challenge. 

i. Conclusions of the Surveys

Palm cites no authority to support essentially requiring its proffered evidence be deemed

factually admitted as a condition for allowing dismissal without prejudice.

ii. Payment of Costs and Fees

It is appropriate then to consider Palm’s alternative requests. First, it requests fees and costs for

opposing the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction. It is clearly within the district

court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs as a condition of granting voluntary dismissal

pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Doing so is commonplace and serves the purpose of protecting the defendant

from undue prejudice. See, e.g., Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC v. City of Emeryville, 2007 WL 81911, at

*5 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Here the plaintiff seeks dismissal because Palm’s advertising campaign is winding

down, if not already finished. There is strong evidence that Helio has known that Palm’s advertising

campaign relying on the slogan “Not Just a Cell Phone. A Treo.” would be terminating at about this

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time since at least the temporary restraining order. See, e.g., Docket No. 83 (Roberts Decl., Exs. A, C).

Thus, much of the costs incurred by Palm could have been avoided had Helio dismissed this action when

it first learned that the campaign was winding down. It is therefore equitable to require Helio to

compensate for those fees and costs. On the other hand, a defendant may only be awarded the payment

of costs and attorney’s fees for work which cannot be used in any future litigation of these claims. See

Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97; Koch v. Hankins, 8 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993). It is likely that at least

some of the work performed by Palm would be useful in a future action on between the parties on this

claim. Thus, conditioning the dismissal of this case on the payment of costs and fees, to be paid if Helio

reinstitutes this case, is appropriate, but such costs and fees must be limited to those associated with

work that cannot be used in any future litigation. 

b. Discovery

Palm also requests that the dismissal be conditioned on any discovery exchanged in this lawsuit

being allowed for use in any subsequent action between the parties. Such a request will help relieve

Palm of potentially duplicative expenses in the event of subsequent litigation. See Gonzalez ex rel.

A.R.Z. v. Tyrell, 2006 WL 1706167, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2006). Under the authority granted by Rule

41(a)(2) to dismiss only “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper,” the Court grants

this condition to the extent that the future litigation encompasses the same matters presented in this case

and such future action comes before this Court. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction [Docket No. 34] as moot.

It is further ORDERED that Helio’s motion to dismiss this action [Docket No. 78] is granted, but with

conditions. These conditions include the following: (1) if Helio should decide to refile this lawsuit in

the future, Helio shall, as a condition of filing, bear any of Palm’s costs from this suit which Palm is able

to demonstrate cannot be used in the future litigation of these claims, and (2) any discovery exchanged

in this lawsuit is allowed in a subsequent action related to this trademark infringement claim between

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the parties that comes before this Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 6, 2007 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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