Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01440/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 9 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carl Ray Lockwood, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 12-1440-PHX-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Carl Ray Lockwood, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexFlorence, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1). On September 14, 2012, Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 9), and on October

23, 2012, Petitioner filed a traverse (Docs. 12, 13).

BACKGROUND1

In September of 1999, Petitioner pled guilty to sexual conduct with a minor and

attempted sexual conduct with a minor in exchange for the dismissal of 14 other charges.

(Exhs. A, B.) On January 5, 2000, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a presumptive 20-

year term of imprisonment for his conviction of sexual conduct with a minor, to be followed

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 The file stamp of the minute entry at Exh. C is misdated as January 5, 1999.

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by a term of lifetime probation on his conviction of attempted sexual conduct with a minor.2

(Exh. C.)

On March 22, 2000, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief (PCR)

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Exh. D.) In a

simultaneously filed PCR petition, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective and

asked the trial court to correct his sentence. (Exh. E.) The trial court denied relief on August

20, 2001, stating that “[t]he relief requested by [Petitioner] is not compatible with his claims

of error.” (Exh. F.)

In his petition for review filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals on September 21,

2001, Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective, that the factual basis for his guilty

plea had not been established, and that the State had breached the plea agreement. (Exh. G.)

The appellate court denied review on July 25, 2002. (Exh. H.) Petitioner did not seek further

review.

On November 25, 2005, Petitioner filed a successive PCR petition, arguing that his

20-year sentence was imposed in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

(Exh. J.) The trial court dismissed the petition on January 10, 2006, finding that Petitioner

was not entitled to relief under Blakely. (Exh. I.) On May 9, 2006, the Arizona Court of

Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review as untimely. (Exh. K.)

On June 2, 2010, Petitioner filed in the trial court a “Motion for Sentence

Modification for Exceeding Subject Matter Jurisdiction,” in which he argued that the lifetime

probation he must serve following the expiration of his prison sentence violates his rights

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Exh. L.) The trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion without comment. (Exh. M.) Petitioner raised the same issues in a

petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. N.) The appellate court treated

the underlying motion as a Rule 32 petition, and denied review. (Exh. O.) Thereafter, the

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Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s subsequent petition for review without comment.

(Exh. P.)

On July 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief: (1) Lifetime probation violates Petitioner’s Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment;

and (2) Lifetime probation violates Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

equal protection. On September 14, 2012, Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 9), and on

October 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a traverse (Docs. 12, 13).

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

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conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See id. Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a

limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, ––– U.S. –––, –––, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177

L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances

stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace,

544 U.S. at 418).

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The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely.

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on January 5, 2000. On March 22, 2000,

Petitioner filed a timely notice of PCR. The trial court dismissed the Rule 32 proceedings

on August 20, 2001. Petitioner filed a timely petition for review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals on September 21, 2001, and the appellate court denied review on July 25, 2002.

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final on August 24, 2002 – 30 days after the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences, when the time for filing

a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19. The

statute of limitations began to run on August 25, 2002 – one day after the 30-day period –

and expired one year later – on August 25, 2003.

Because the statute of limitations had passed by the time Petitioner filed his November

25, 2005 PCR petition and June 2, 2010 “Motion for Sentence Modification for Exceeding

Subject Matter Jurisdiction,” the petition or motion did not toll the limitations period. See

Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition are

filing conditions which, if not met, preclude a finding that a state petition was properly filed).

An untimely state post-conviction petition does not restart an already expired statute of

limitations. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner filed the

instant habeas petition on July 3, 2012 – almost 9 years after the limitations period expired.

The habeas petition is therefore untimely.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

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timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Here, Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling. Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of

the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not,

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). Moreover,

Petitioner’s unsupported claim of “newly-discovered evidence/material facts” is

unpersuasive. Petitioner fails to cite any newly discovered evidence and appears to abandon

this claim in his traverse. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his

habeas petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of November, 2012.

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