Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00039/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00039-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

 

 

 DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF KYLE PRZYSIECKI,

by and through its administrators,

MICHAEL PRZYSIECKI and VENUS

ANGELIQUE HISAW; MICHAEL

PRZYSIECKI, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

ORDER

vs.

SHANNON DUANE EIFERT; COUNTY

OF IMPERIAL; IMPERIAL COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; UNITED

STATES; STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND

RECREATION; CALIFORNIA

HIGHWAY PATROL; and DOES 1-50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge: 

The matter pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. # 32), filed by Defendant the United States.

Background

Plaintiffs’ action arises out of the death of Kyle Przysiecki, a 15 year old minor who 

was killed in a motor vehicle collision on land owned by the United States Government. 

FAC, ¶ 1. On January 5, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants Shannon

Duane Eifert, County of Imperial, Imperial County Sheriff’s Department, United States

Case 3:07-cv-00039-WQH-RBB Document 49 Filed 11/02/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), State of California Department of Parks and

Recreation, California Highway Patrol and Does 1-50. (Doc. # 1). Plaintiffs’ Complaint

alleges causes of action against the BLM pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80, and 28 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On March 12, 2007, the BLM filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based, in

part, on Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing an

administrative claim with an appropriate federal agency prior to bringing their civil action

in federal court, as required by the FTCA. (Doc. # 11). In an Order filed on April 14,

2007, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ causes of action against the BLM for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. (Doc. # 14). The Court found that Plaintiffs presented an

administrative claim to the BLM on October 24, 2006 and filed suit in federal court on

January 5, 2007. The Court determined that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the FTCA’s

exhaustion requirements because they filed suit less than six months after presenting their

administrative claim with the BLM, and as of the date they filed suit, the BLM had not yet

denied Plaintiffs’ claim. Id.; see FAC, ¶ 22. The Court granted BLM’s Motion to Dismiss,

and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant BLM without prejudice. (Doc. # 14). 

On July 9, 2007, after the BLM denied Plaintiffs’ administrative claim, Plaintiffs

filed the FAC. (Doc. # 28). The FAC names the United States as a Defendant, and alleges

causes of action against the United States pursuant to the FTCA and 28 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On July 30, 2007, the United States filed the Motion to Dismiss the FAC, pursuant

to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States

moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims on grounds that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because the case was originally filed before Plaintiffs exhausted their

administrative remedies as required by the FTCA. The United States moves to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims on grounds that it is not a proper party to a claim brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. 

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

Case 3:07-cv-00039-WQH-RBB Document 49 Filed 11/02/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

attack the substance of the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations even though the

allegations are formally sufficient. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir.

1989). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the court has

subject matter jurisdiction over its claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

Discussion

I. Plaintiffs’ FTCA Claims. 

The United States moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims against the United

States on grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. to Dismiss, p. 3. 

The United States contends that Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint before they

exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, and that Plaintiffs have

not “cured” this jurisdictional defect by amending their original Complaint to add the

United States as a new FTCA defendant after exhausting their administrative remedies. Id.

at 5. The United States contends that the FAC does not constitute a new action. The

United States contends that if Plaintiffs wish to litigate their FTCA claims against the

United States, they must file a new suit. Id. 

Plaintiffs contend that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over their FTCA

claims against the United States. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the original Complaint was

premature because it was filed prior to the exhaustion of their administrative remedies. 

Plaintiffs contend that the FAC alleges a “new” FTCA action against a “new” defendant,

and therefore constitutes a new lawsuit. Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, p. 3. Since the

FAC named the United States as a Defendant for the first time and satisfied the

jurisdictional requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted, Plaintiffs contend it is

the functional equivalent of a new complaint. Id. at 5-6. 

The United States, as a sovereign, can only be sued to the extent it waives its

sovereign immunity and consents to be sued. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608

(1990). Pursuant to the FTCA, a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit in federal

court against the United States in tort is the filing of an administrative claim with the

Case 3:07-cv-00039-WQH-RBB Document 49 Filed 11/02/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiffs rely on several cases where courts have allowed parties to file amended complaints

containing FTCA claims despite the initial premature filing of their original complaints. See Duplan,

188 F.3d at 1199-1200; Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 257, 266-67

(5th Cir. 2004); Filaski v. U.S., 776 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). However, these cases are

distinguishable. In Duplan, the parties and the court expressly agreed to treat the amended complaint

as a new suit. 188 F.2d at 1199-2000. Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any similar agreement. In

Filaski, the plaintiff was excusably ignorant to the federal presence in his case at the time he

commenced his civil action. 776 F. Supp. 117. Here, Plaintiffs were not ignorant to the federal

presence in their case as evidenced by the fact that they commenced their administrative claim as

required by the FTCA prior to filing their civil suit. Finally, Positive Black Talk did not involve

claims under the FTCA. 

- 4 - 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

appropriate federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Jerves v. U.S., 966 F.2d 517, 518-19 (9th

Cir. 1992). Once the administrative claim has been filed, the federal agency has six months

to act. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The claimant can file a civil suit under the FTCA only after

the agency either denies the claim in writing or fails to make a final disposition of the claim

within six months after it is filed. Id. Thus, “‘[t]he statutory procedure is clear.’ A tort

claimant may not commence proceedings in court against the United States without first

filing her claim with an appropriate federal agency and either receiving a conclusive denial

of the claim from the agency or waiting for six months to elapse without a final disposition

of the claim being made.” Jerves, 966 F.2d at 519. 

A lawsuit filed prior to the exhaustion of a claimant’s administrative claim is

premature and must be dismissed. McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). As a general

rule, a premature complaint cannot be cured through amendment, but instead the claimant

must file a new suit.1

 Duplan v. U.S., 188 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing

Sparrow v. USPS, 823 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (E.D. Cal. 1993). “Allowing claimants

generally to bring a new suit under the FTCA before exhausting their administrative

remedies and to cure the jurisdictional defect by filing an amended complaint would render

the exhaustion requirement meaningless and impose an unnecessary burden on the judicial

system.” Duplan, 188 F.3d at 1199. 

A premature complaint may not be cured by amending the complaint to add the

United States as a new FTCA defendant after the administrative exhaustion period has

expired. See Gaerman v. F.B.I., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25611 (C.A.O.D. 2003), aff’g

2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10926 (9th Cir. 2005); Hines v. New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

Case 3:07-cv-00039-WQH-RBB Document 49 Filed 11/02/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

18172 (S.D.N.Y.). For example, in Gaerman, plaintiffs filed a premature suit under the

FTCA against individual defendants and the FBI. Plaintiffs sought to amend their

complaint to add the United States as a defendant after the administrative exhaustion period

expired. Despite the United States being added as a new defendant, the court dismissed

plaintiffs’ FTCA claims, holding that plaintiffs’ premature complaint “cannot be cured by

amendment, but instead, plaintiff must file a new suit.” 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25611. 

Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint on January 5, 2007, less than six months after

presenting an administrative claim to the BLM, and prior to the BLM’s denial of Plaintiffs’

claim. FAC, ¶ 22. Therefore, the original Complaint was premature and the Court did not

have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims. By amending the original

Complaint to add the United States as a new FTCA defendant after exhausting their

administrative remedies, Plaintiffs have not cured the jurisdictional defect created by the

premature filing of the original Complaint. See Gaerman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25611. 

To permit Plaintiffs’ premature filing of an FTCA action to be cured by filing an amended

complaint after Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies would be inconsistent

with case law and the rationale behind the jurisdictional prerequisite mandated by the

FTCA. Plaintiffs must commence a new suit in order for the Court to have subject matter

jurisdiction over their FTCA claims against the United States, which they have not done. 

The FAC is not the equivalent of commencing a new suit. The Court finds that Plaintiffs

have failed to meet their burden of proving that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction

over their claims against the United States brought under the FTCA. The United States’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims against the United States is GRANTED.

II. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claim.

The United States contends that Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim should be dismissed 

on grounds that the United States is not a proper party to an action brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and that Plaintiffs failed to oppose the United States’ Motion to Dismiss this claim. 

Mot. to Dismiss, p. 7; Reply in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, p. 5. 

The United States is not a proper defendant in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §

Case 3:07-cv-00039-WQH-RBB Document 49 Filed 11/02/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 07cv0039 WQH (RBB)

1983. Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1240 (3d Cir. 1970); accord Fixel v. United

States, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18366. Plaintiffs do not oppose the Motion to Dismiss their

section 1983 claim against the United States. The United States’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against the United States is GRANTED.

Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC (Doc. # 32), 

filed by the United States is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’s claims against Defendant United

States are DISMISSED. 

DATED: November 2, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00039-WQH-RBB Document 49 Filed 11/02/07 Page 6 of 6