Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00639/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00639-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DESIDERIO GARCIA YBARRA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00639-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF‟S SOCIAL 

SECURITY APPEAL

(ECF Nos. 14, 17, 18)

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Desiderio Garcia Ybarra (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application 

for disability benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the 

Court on the parties‟ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge 

Stanley A. Boone.1

Plaintiff suffers from diabetes mellitus; hypertension; bronchial asthma; history of 

hepatitis C; history of seizures; lower back pain; major depressive disorder, single episode with 

psychotic features; and polysubstance abuse. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Social 

Security appeal shall be denied.

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (See ECF Nos. 7, 8.)

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on May 9, 2013. (AR 72, 

90.) Plaintiff‟s applications were initially denied on August 9, 2013, and denied upon 

reconsideration on May 2, 2014. (AR 124-128, 131-135.) Plaintiff requested and received a 

hearing before Administrative Law Judge Cynthia Floyd (“the ALJ”). Plaintiff appeared for a 

hearing on October 21, 2014. (AR 26-71.) On November 14, 2014, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

was not disabled. (AR 7-20.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff‟s request for review on 

February 18, 2015. (AR 1-3.)

A. Relevant Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified at the October 21, 2014 hearing. (AR 31-61.) Plaintiff was born on 

November 9, 1961. (AR 31.) Plaintiff was 52 years old on the date of the hearing. (AR 32.) 

Plaintiff was 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 243 pounds on the date of the hearing. (AR 32.) 

Plaintiff‟s normal weight is 253 pounds. (AR 32.) Plaintiff is right handed. (AR 33.)

Plaintiff lives in an apartment with his wife. (AR 32.) Plaintiff is receiving food stamps 

and his wife works in a warehouse doing shipping and receiving. (AR 33.) Plaintiff does not 

have a driver‟s license due to child support issues and a DUI he received in the 90s. (AR 33.) 

Plaintiff gets around by bicycle or he takes the bus. (AR 34.) Plaintiff rides his bicycle every 

day and gives rides to his grandchildren. (AR 34.) Plaintiff gets along fine with his 

grandchildren as long as he takes his medication. (AR 34.) If he does not take his medication he 

gets frustrated and angry. (AR 34.)

Plaintiff completed the tenth grade. (AR 35.) He has not had any vocational training or 

certifications. (AR 35.) Plaintiff last did part time seasonal work from 2008 through 2010. (AR 

36.) Plaintiff worked scraping raisins off a tray onto a conveyor belt. (AR 36.) In this job, 

Plaintiff would lift, carry, push, pull or otherwise handle fifty pounds. (AR 37.) Plaintiff would 

also sweep, and remove leaves, branches, and rotten grapes before they ran through the 

dehydrator. (AR 37.) Plaintiff also did the same tasks with prunes. (AR 37-38.) 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

In 2007 and 2008, Plaintiff did production work boxing items for different companies 

through a placement agency. (AR 38.) In this position he would handle thirty to thirty-five

pounds. (AR 39.) He worked for a different temp agency in 2007 doing similar work. (AR 39.) 

In 2006, Plaintiff worked for a company pulling plastic from a conveyor belt to recycle it from 

the other trash. (AR 40.) Plaintiff would handle twenty-five to forty pounds in this position. 

(AR 40.) The last year that he worked Plaintiff received unemployment. (AR 41.) During that 

period of time, Plaintiff was looking for work. (AR 41.) Plaintiff put in applications but never 

got called for a job. (AR 41.) He has not applied for any jobs since 2012. (AR 42.) 

Plaintiff was in prison from 1996 to 1997. (AR 43.) He went back three times for 

violations. (AR 43.) The last time he was in prison was around 2002. (AR 44.) The violations 

were drug related. (AR 44.) 

Plaintiff is unable to work because he hears voices. (AR 42.) Plaintiff used drugs to see 

if they would make the voices stop but they did not and he ended up in the hospital. (AR 42.) 

The voices tell Plaintiff that he is worthless, that people are laughing at him, and when he 

worked he would yell out which got him in trouble. (AR 42-43.) He was embarrassed to tell his 

supervisor that he was yelling because of the voices. (AR 43.) The voices have gotten worse. 

(AR 43.) 

Plaintiff takes medication as it is prescribed. (AR 45.) The medication Plaintiff takes 

helps, but he still hears the voices. (AR 43.) The medication helps calm Plaintiff down and 

helps his depression. (AR 43.) When Plaintiff takes his medication he does not get angry, 

impatient or frustrated and he can converse normally. (AR 46.) If he does not take his 

medication then he is angry and becomes violent. (AR 46.) Plaintiff takes his medication in the 

morning and at night. (AR 46.) About an hour and half after he takes his medication he gets 

drowsy and he has to go lie down and sleep for two, three, or four hours during the day. (AR 45, 

46.) Plaintiff‟s sister manages his medication because his wife and sister are afraid he might try 

to overdose on the medication. (AR 45.) Plaintiff still hears the voices constantly every day 

when he is taking his medication but it does help. (AR 47.) If Plaintiff tries to block the voices 

out they become more “rowdy.” (AR 48.) Plaintiff will argue with the voices, not all the time, 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

but every day. (AR 48.) The voices sound like young kids telling him stuff. (AR 49.)

Plaintiff does not take any medication for his hepatitis C. (AR 60-61.) The doctor told 

him that since he is not using drugs the hepatitis will sometimes go away by itself. (AR 61.) 

Plaintiff had seizures fifteen to twenty years ago. (AR 61.) Plaintiff had an asthma attack a 

couple days prior to the hearing and took an inhaler. (AR 61.) 

Plaintiff cleans, mops, sweeps, cleans the tabletops, and washes dishes. (AR 49.) 

Plaintiff can mop for ten to fifteen minutes and then stops because the voices tell him he looks 

like a wuss and call him names because he is doing a girl‟s job. (AR 45-50.) Plaintiff will take a 

break for ten to twenty minutes where he will sit down and watch television to distract him from 

the voices. (AR 50.) After that he will get up and do another activity. (AR 50.) Plaintiff goes 

to the grocery store to get things for himself but no longer goes with his wife to do grocery 

shopping because he does not like to be around people. (AR 51.) Plaintiff feels like the people 

are looking at him and talking about him so he goes out and sits in the car. (AR 51.) 

Plaintiff has friends but does not associate with them very much. (AR 51.) Plaintiff stays 

away from his friends because he gets angry real fast. (AR 52.) Plaintiff feels sad almost every 

day. (AR 52.) When he gets sad, Plaintiff goes to his room and sits there because he does not 

want to associate with anyone, even his family. (AR 52.) Plaintiff does this once or twice a day 

and stays in his room for a couple hours. (AR 52-53.) Plaintiff feels better when he goes to his 

room. (AR 53.) Plaintiff cries when he feels sad. (AR 53.) Plaintiff can watch television for 

twenty minutes before he has to stop because he hears the voices again. (AR 53.) Plaintiff 

cannot watch an entire television program. (AR 53.) 

Plaintiff does not take a shower every day because sometimes when he is in the shower 

he hears voices telling him he should drown himself. (AR 54.) Plaintiff has suicidal thoughts 

every day. (AR 54.) Plaintiff has told his doctor‟s this and they tell him to sit down and 

meditate or something to relax. (AR 54-55.) Plaintiff goes outside and walks around the block 

once in a while. (AR 55.) Mainly he goes out around the carport in the alley. (AR 55.) Plaintiff 

feels better when he rides his bike because he got exercise. (AR 55.) Plaintiff thought that he 

ate less when he was depressed but his sister said he eats more. (AR 55-56.) Plaintiff has gained 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

weight since he went on the medication. (AR 57.) Plaintiff weighed 220 and has gained weight 

over the last few years. (AR 56.) Plaintiff used to drink a lot so he weighed 250. (AR 56.) He 

lost weight when he started doing drugs. (AR 57.) Since he went off illegal drugs he has gained 

weight. (AR 57.) 

Plaintiff last did illegal drugs in December of 2013. (AR 57.) He was in an outpatient 

drug program called New Connections at the recommendation of his probation officer. (AR 57.) 

Plaintiff goes to the program three times per week. (AR 57.) It is a group program and they talk 

about their problems. (AR 57-58.) There are anywhere from eight to ten people in the group. 

(AR 58.) Plaintiff goes to the program to stay clean but he does not like being around people and 

talking to them. (AR 58.) Plaintiff only talks to the lady. (AR 58.) Plaintiff finds the program 

to be helpful. (AR 58.) Plaintiff has a random drug test once a month in the program. (AR 59.) 

He has not had any dirty tests. (AR 59.)

Plaintiff also goes to two or three AA or NA meetings outside the program on the 

weekends. (AR 59.) Plaintiff sits away from people at the meetings. (AR 60.) They call on him 

to talk, but he tells them he has nothing to say. (AR 60.) 

A vocational expert, Jose L. Chaparro, also testified at the hearing. (AR 62-69.) 

B. ALJ Findings

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

 Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2014.

 Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset 

date of March 1, 2012.

 Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, single 

episode with psychotic features, and polysubstance abuse.

 Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or 

medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments.

 Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels with the following nonexertional limitations: Plaintiff is limited 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

to simple, routine tasks with occasional public contact; and occasional superficial 

contact with coworkers and supervisors.

 Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a hand packager. This 

work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by 

Plaintiff‟s residual functional capacity.

 Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

from March 1, 2012, through the date of this decision.

(AR 12-20.)

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant 

must show that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death 

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five step 

sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520; Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The five steps in the sequential evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is 

disabled are:

Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, 

the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Is the claimant‟s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or 

her ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not 

disabled.

Step three: Does the claimant‟s impairment, or combination of impairments, meet 

or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the 

claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant‟s RFC, when considered with the claimant‟s age, 

education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Stout v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).

Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

In reviewing findings of fact in respect to the denial of benefits, this court “reviews the 

Commissioner‟s final decision for substantial evidence, and the Commissioner‟s decision will be 

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. 

Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec‟y of 

Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting 

Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). However, it is not 

this Court‟s function to second guess the ALJ‟s conclusions and substitute the court‟s judgment 

for the ALJ‟s. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ‟s conclusion that must be 

upheld.”).

IV.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by 1) failing to address his chronic back pain in the 

opinion; 2) rejecting the opinion of his lay witness, Maria Maciel; and 3) in finding Plaintiff‟s 

allegations to be partially credible. Defendant responds that the ALJ 1) had no obligation to 

consider Plaintiff‟s back pain as it was not raised in his disability application or by Plaintiff‟s 

counsel during the hearing; 2) properly considered that Ms. Maciel‟s testimony was not 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

consistent with the medical evidence; and 3) properly assessed Plaintiff‟s credibility. Plaintiff 

replies that the ALJ had an obligation to consider Plaintiff‟s back pain regardless of whether he 

raised the issue since it was present in the medical records. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err by Failing to Address Plaintiff’s Chronic Back Pain

In this instance, Plaintiff did not raise his back pain as a disabling impairment at the 

administrative level, but argues that the ALJ was still required to address his chronic back pain at 

step two to determine if he had any severe impairments. Plaintiff argues that references in the 

medical record to chronic back pain are significant probative evidence that the ALJ was required 

address. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not raise his back pain as a disabling impairment 

during the administrative process and therefore did not preserve the issue for appeal. Defendant 

points out that Plaintiff was represented by counsel who never raised this issue during the 

administrative hearing. 

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The burden 

is on the claimant to prove that he is disabled at steps one through four, at step five the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national 

community that the claimant can perform. Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 

554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). 

As described above, at step two the ALJ is to consider the medical severity of the 

impairments to determine if they meet the durational requirements under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is an impairment or combination of impairments that 

significantly limits the claimant‟s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.152(c). Basic work activities are the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most 

jobs. 20 C.F.R. §404.1521(b). “An impairment is not severe if it is merely „a slight abnormality 

(or combination of slight abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

do basic work activities.‟ ” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting S.S.R. 

No. 96–3(p) (1996)). 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ had to address his chronic back pain regardless of whether 

he raised the issue because the diagnosis was in the medical record. The Ninth Circuit recently 

held in an unpublished case that “[t]he existence of some evidence in the medical records 

regarding these conditions is not sufficient to have put the ALJ and the Appeals Council on 

notice that [the claimant] claimed specifically that these conditions constituted severe 

impairments.” Harshaw v. Colvin, 616 F. App‟x 316 (9th Cir. 2015).2 There is no dispute that 

Plaintiff did not raise his back pain during the administrative proceedings. The Ninth Circuit has 

held that “at least when claimants are represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and 

evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.” Meanel v. Apfel, 

172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended (June 22, 1999). 

During the October 21, 2014 hearing, Plaintiff‟s counsel gave the following opening 

statement.

Your Honor, it‟s my position that claimant suffers from a combination of severe 

physical and mental impairments. He has been diagnosed with diabetes, Exhibit 

11-F/4; hepatitis C, 11-F/4; and hypertension, 11-F/4. The main impairments are 

his mental impairments, which include major depressive disorder, single episode 

severe with psychotic features, 12-F/13; polysubstance dependence in remission 

since approximately December of 2013, 9-F/4. 

And based on that combination, Your Honor, it would be my position that Steps 4 

and 5 of the sequential evaluation, the claimant would not be able to perform any 

of his past relevant work or any other substantial gainful activity on a regular and 

consistent basis. This would be due to significant non-exertional limitations, 

which would include the inability to perform simple tasks or detailed tasks 

because of his impaired memory, impaired concentration, poor social skills, 

depressive symptoms, anger issues, as well as his nervousness and poor 

concentration, the is 7-F/6.

And he would also be unable to accept instructions or performing activities and 

maintaining regular attendance or be able to deal with stress in the workplace and, 

and again, I took that from 7-F/6. And I‟d ask that you take all of that into 

consideration. 

(AR 30-31.) 

 

2 Unpublished dispositions and orders of the Ninth Circuit issued on or after January 1, 2007 may be cited to the 

courts of this circuit in accordance with FRAP 32.1. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b).

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

When the ALJ asked Plaintiff to tell him “what prevents you from working and why you 

feel you can‟t work[,] Plaintiff did not raise any physical limitations. He discussed the voices 

that he hears. (AR 42-43.) Counsel asked Plaintiff about side effects of his medication, his need 

for monitoring of his medications, his anger issues, and the voices that he hears. (AR 43-49.) 

Upon questioning on the types of things that Plaintiff is able to do, he responded that he can mop 

for 10 to 15 minutes before the voices start bugging him and then he has to stop. (AR 49-50.) 

He goes and watches television for 10 to 20 minutes to distract him from hearing the voices. 

(AR 50.) Plaintiff stopped going grocery shopping with his wife because he does not like to be 

around people and he thinks they are talking about him. (AR 51.) Counsel inquired about his 

inability to function due to feeling sad. (AR 52-53.) Plaintiff can only watch television for 

about 20 minutes before the voices start again and he goes to find something else to get the 

voices to leave him alone. (AR 53.) Plaintiff does not like to shower because the voices tell him 

to drown himself and he has suicidal thoughts almost every day. (AR 54.) Counsel elicited 

testimony regarding inconsistent statements on Plaintiff‟s weight and his drug treatment. (AR 

55-60.) 

During the hearing, the ALJ questioned Plaintiff regarding his hepatitis C, history of 

seizures, and asthma. (AR 60-61.) Plaintiff did not raise any other physical issues during the 

hearing. 

Plaintiff‟s counsel did not raise the issue of his back and indicated in her opening 

statement that Plaintiff‟s main impairment was due to his mental health issues. This was also the 

focus of the testimony elicited during the hearing. “Counsel are not supposed to be potted plants 

at administrative hearings. They have an obligation to take an active role and to raise issues that 

may impact the ALJ‟s decision while the hearing is proceeding so that they can be addressed.” 

Solorzano v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-369-PJW, 2012 WL 84527, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012). 

If Plaintiff was alleging disability due to his chronic back pain, he had an obligation to raise the 

issue during the administrative proceedings to provide the Commissioner with the opportunity to 

consider and address the issue. Here, Plaintiff did not provide any notice to the Commissioner 

that he was alleging he was limited in his ability to work due to back pain.

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not resolve the conflict in the medical evidence 

regarding Plaintiff‟s back pain. However, the medical record does not contain any limitations 

due to Plaintiff‟s back condition. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Damania did not reference any back 

pain and his physical examination did not result in any findings of back pain, therefore the ALJ 

was required to resolve this apparent ambiguity. However, Dr. Damania‟s report does not 

contain any ambiguity. Dr. Damania examined Plaintiff‟s back and found “no tenderness to 

palpation in the midline or paraspinal areas. Straight leg raising is negative at 90 degrees. 

Laseque‟s sign is negative. There is no muscle spasm and muscle tone appears to be equal 

throughout.” (AR 385.) Range of motion in Plaintiff‟s back was within normal limits. (AR 

386.)

Plaintiff argues that the mere existence of the notations of chronic back pain are sufficient 

to require the ALJ to address whether this was a severe limitation, however, review of the record 

provides reasons why Plaintiff did not raise the issue. While the record does note a history of 

chronic back pain and occasional notations of pain, the record also indicates no findings of back 

pain on physical examination, even on those occasions where Plaintiff self-reported pain. (AR 

283, 287, 323, 343, 450.) The record also notes normal range of motion in Plaintiff‟s back 

whether or not tenderness was found. (AR 301, 317, 341, 357, 398, 402, 410, 424.) On July 29, 

2013, the record notes, “Pt has mild chronic lower thoracic/upper lumbar back ttp but no point 

ttp or midline vertebral ttp; ROM in back in normal and no skin changes. Pt can flex to touch 

toes with minimal pain.” (AR 402.) On this date, Plaintiff reported that his back pain is chronic 

and unchanged from the past 20 years. (AR 403.) These notations would indicate that the 

failure to raise the issue was because Plaintiff‟s back pain was mild and did not limit his physical 

ability to work.

The ALJ did not err by failing to address Plaintiff‟s chronic back pain as Plaintiff did not 

raise the issue during the administrative proceedings. 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Plaintiff’s Testimony Only Partially 

Credible

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that he allegations were only partially 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

credible. Defendant counters that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff‟s testimony and 

provided three valid reasons for the adverse credibility finding.

“An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other nonexertional impairment.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation 

and citations omitted). Determining whether a claimant‟s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

symptoms is credible, requires the ALJ to engage in a two-step analysis. Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ must first determine if “the claimant has presented 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). This does not require the claimant to 

show that his impairment could be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms that are 

alleged, but only that it reasonably could have caused some degree of symptoms. Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1282. 

Second, if the first test is met and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only 

reject the claimant‟s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms by offering “clear and 

convincing reasons” for the adverse credibility finding. Carmickle v. Commissioner of Social 

Security, 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ must specifically make findings that 

support this conclusion and the findings must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court 

to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant‟s testimony on permissible grounds and did not 

arbitrarily discredit the claimant‟s testimony. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 

2004) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Factors that may be considered in assessing a 

claimant‟s subjective pain and symptom testimony include the claimant‟s daily activities; the 

location, duration, intensity and frequency of the pain or symptoms; factors that cause or 

aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness or side effects of any medication; other 

measures or treatment used for relief; functional restrictions; and other relevant factors. 

Lingenfelter, at 1040; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. In assessing the claimant‟s credibility, the ALJ 

may also consider “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant‟s 

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

by the claimant that appears less than candid; [and] (2) unexplained or inadequately explained 

failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment. . . .” Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284). 

1. Daily Activities

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because the fact that Plaintiff engages in normal 

activities does not detract from his allegations that he is disabled, and the ALJ did not make any 

specific findings of transferability. Defendant replies that the ALJ did not draw the conclusion 

that Plaintiff‟s daily activities were equivalent to work activities, but relied on Plaintiff‟s 

statements regarding his activities to assess the credibility of his allegations regarding the extent 

of his limitations. 

There are two ways for an ALJ to “use daily activities to form the basis of an adverse 

credibility determination: if the claimant's activity contradicts his testimony or if the claimant‟s 

activity meets the threshold for transferable work skills.” Phillips v. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 925, 

944 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Here, the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff‟s activities met the threshold for 

transferable work skills, but that Plaintiff “alleged daily activities that are not limited to the 

extent one would expect given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” (AR 14.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to take care of his own personal hygiene, perform 

household chores, watch television, riding his bicycle, folded clothes, washed laundry, did the 

dishes and yard work, and gives his grandchildren rides on his bicycle. (AR 14, 34-35, 49, 308, 

391, 488.) The ALJ properly considered that Plaintiff‟s daily activities contradict his claims of a 

totally debilitating impairment. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (“Even where those activities suggest

some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant‟s testimony to the 

extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”) 

2. Medical Evidence

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by picking out an isolated visit on which he reported 

that he was doing much better and not hearing voices to discredit Plaintiff nor does the evidence 

support a conclusion that Plaintiff‟s psychotic features appear to be drug induced. Defendant 

counters that the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the medical evidence to determine that Plaintiff‟s 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

testimony regarding his symptoms was only partially credible. 

The determination that a claimant‟s complaints are inconsistent with clinical evaluations 

can satisfy the requirement of stating a clear and convincing reason for discrediting the 

claimant‟s testimony. Regennitter v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 

9th Cir. 1999). While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ relied on one occasion in which the medical 

record indicates he was doing better and did not hear voices, the record shows otherwise. The 

ALJ noted that Plaintiff had a history of drug use, including intravenous drug abuse of heroin 

and there are multiple emergency room visits due to Plaintiff‟s heroin use. (AR 14.) The 

objective findings from these emergency room visits show a normal mood and affect, behavior 

and judgment. (AR 15, 284, 292, 297, 305, 310, 319, 337, 342, 351.) Plaintiff was prescribed 

Zoloft in August 2012 but was non-complaint with his medication. (AR 15, 316, 354.) Plaintiff 

restarted Zoloft on November 14, 2013, and the record demonstrates that he was not compliant 

with his medication. (AR 422, 480, 489, 531, 591, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709, 710). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff‟s credibility was weakened because his psychotic symptoms 

appear to be drug induced according to the attending physicians, and the record contradicts his 

statements that he still hears voices and has side effects from his medication. (AR 18.) The ALJ 

considered that the medical record shows Plaintiff had an altered mental state after a suicide 

attempt on November 28, 2013 which the record notes is likely due to drug use. (AR 15, 448, 

449, 541, 550, 557.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, 

with psychotic features and polysubstance dependence. (AR 15, 591.) Treatment included 

medication therapy which Plaintiff responded well to when he was compliant. (AR 15, 487, 697, 

699, 701, 705.) Upon discharge, Plaintiff denied any mood swings, having suicidal or homicidal 

thoughts, delusions or hallucinations, or any side effects from medications. (AR 16, 592.) The 

record notes that heroin was the likely cause of the altered mental state. (AR 16, 449.)

Review of the records following this incident shows generally normal mental 

examination except for occasional stuttering speech and occasional anxious or depressed mood 

with no hallucinations or delusions. (AR 16, 478, 480, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709.) 

There are no suicidal or homicidal ideations. (AR 16, 478, 480, 489, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

707, 709.) Plaintiff reported that he was no longer hearing voices and that he only occasionally 

got mad at his grandchildren. (AR 16, 697.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive 

disorder, single episode, severe with psychotic features. (AR 16, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 

709.) While Plaintiff was assessed with a GAF of 50, the most recent objective findings were all 

normal, including organized thoughts, insight, judgment, mood, affect, cognition, motor activity 

and speech. (AR 16, 478, 480, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709.) 

Relevant to Plaintiff‟s mental health impairments, the medical record shows that Plaintiff 

has been diagnosed with depression and major depressive disorder (AR 314, 316, 328, 330, 354, 

440, 446, 484, 531, 656, 689, 692); psychiatric problems (AR 387, 484); substance-induced 

psychotic disorder (AR 392); delirium and altered mental state (AR 435, 656). Dr. Khalifa 

diagnosed Plaintiff with opioid dependence in remission; amphetamine dependence in remission; 

history of cocaine dependence; and drug-induced psychotic disorder with hallucinations. (AR 

489.) Dr. Michiel diagnosed Plaintiff with opioid dependence, cocaine dependence in early 

remission, and substance-induced psychotic disorder. (AR 392.) The record does note some 

depression (AR 316, 353, 391, 404, 483, 590); but generally reflects normal psychological 

findings (AR 288, 292, 297, 305, 310, 319, 323, 337, 342, 343, 351-352, 403, 406, 408, 410,

417, 480, 478, 488, 518, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709). While there are occasional reports that 

Plaintiff is reacting to internal stimuli (AR 473, 475), there are also findings that Plaintiff was 

not reacting to internal stimuli (AR 392, 488) and no objective findings of hallucinations upon 

examination (AR 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709).

The ALJ properly considered this evidence in weighing Plaintiff‟s credibility and 

substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ‟s findings that Plaintiff‟s mental health 

symptoms are not as severe as he alleges and that his psychotic symptoms were drug induced.

3. Work History

Plaintiff argues that under the circumstances here, his minimal work history does not 

constitute a clear and convincing reason for the ALJ‟s negative credibility finding. Plaintiff 

argues that Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he had problems maintaining past employment 

due to talking back to the voices on the job. 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

The ALJ considered that Plaintiff had only four years of substantial gainful activity in the 

past fifteen relevant years and stopped working two years prior to the alleged onset of disability 

date. (AR 18, 197-202, 210.) An ALJ may properly consider that a claimant has shown little 

propensity to work in considering the claimant‟s credibility. Thomas, 178 F.3d at 959. The ALJ 

was entitled to determine from Plaintiff‟s limited work history prior to the alleged disability date 

that he lacked motivation to work. Id. 

Further, although Plaintiff testified at the hearing he had problems maintaining a job to 

hearing voices, he also stated that he stopped working due to the work being seasonal two years 

prior to his disability onset date. (AR 210, 41-42.) Testimony that the claimant quit working 

because he was laid off, rather than due to a disability, is a “specific, cogent reason” to discredit 

the claimant‟s testimony. Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended 

(Nov. 9, 2001). The ALJ properly considered that Plaintiff stopped working due to the seasonal 

nature of the work and not due to any impairment. (AR 18.) 

The ALJ provided “clear and convincing reasons” for the adverse credibility finding that 

have substantial support in the record. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1160.

C. Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ is prohibited from rejecting or discrediting lay witness 

testimony as not supported by the medical record. Defendant concedes that the ALJ erred in 

rejecting the lay witness testimony because she is not medically trained, but replies that 

inconsistency with the medical evidence is a germane reason to reject Ms. Maciel‟s statement. 

“In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness 

testimony concerning a claimant‟s ability to work.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053; 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1513(d)(4). “Lay witness testimony is competent evidence and cannot be disregarded 

without comment.” Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nguyen v. 

Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ must give specific reasons germane to 

the witness in discounting the lay witness testimony. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056. ). If the ALJ 

gives reasons for rejecting the claimant‟s testimony that are equally relevant to similar testimony 

provided by lay witnesses, that would support a finding that the lay witness testimony is 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

similarly not credible. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114.

The record includes a letter dated September 20, 2014, from Maria Maciel. (AR 278.) 

The letter states:

To Whom and [sic] May Concern:

I Maria Maciel, I‟ve known Desiderio Ybarra, for over 40 years I‟ve been a close 

friend of the family, and what I know about Desiderio‟s Mental Health I see him 

as a very nervous person and he get‟s [sic] anxiety noise seem to bother him and 

he hear‟s voices and he get very upset at times sometime‟s he doesn‟t even want 

to shower he will get upset and he will fight with us so we try to calm him down

sometime‟s we talk to him and he doesn‟t answer so we just deal with him and

sometime‟s he can be good but he has always been a very nervous person since 

been a child. But I see that he has worsen. 

(AR 278.)

The ALJ stated that “significant weight cannot be given to the witness‟ statement because 

it is simply not consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and observations by medical 

doctors in this case. For example, there were generally normal mental status examinations when 

medicinally compliant and claimant‟s altered mental state was due to drug abuse.” (AR 18.) 

Citing Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009), Plaintiff contends that the Ninth Circuit 

does not permit an ALJ to reject lay witness testimony solely because it is not supported by the 

medical evidence. Defendant argues that Bruce is grossly inconsistent with other wellestablished published Ninth Circuit cases, citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th 

Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001); Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 

972 (9th Cir. 2006); Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009); Blodgett v. Comm‟r, 

534 Fed.Appx. 608, 610-11 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); Rusten v. Comm‟r, 468 Fed.Appx. 

717, 719 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). The Court declines to address this apparent conflict 

because it finds any error in providing reasons germane to Ms. Maciel‟s statements would be 

harmless.

While Plaintiff argues that any error in rejecting the opinion was not harmless, the Court 

disagrees. Although Plaintiff argues that Ms. Maciel‟s statements corroborate Plaintiff‟s 

testimony regarding the functional aspects of his mental impairments, Ms. Maciel‟s opinion does 

not address any specific limitations, but generally describes symptoms which she has observed. 

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Ms. Maciel states that noise bothers Plaintiff, he hears voices, gets upset at times, sometimes he 

is good, but has always been a nervous person and has worsened. The ALJ considered these 

alleged symptoms in determining that Plaintiff has a severe mental impairment and in the 

residual functional capacity assessment. Ms. Maciel‟s statement did not address the frequency or 

severity of Plaintiff‟s symptoms. Further, the reasons provided by the ALJ to discredit Plaintiff‟s 

statements on the severity of his symptoms would equally apply to Ms. Maciel‟s statements. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[w]here lay witness testimony does not describe any 

limitations not already described by the claimant, and the ALJ‟s well-supported reasons for 

rejecting the claimant‟s testimony apply equally well to the lay witness testimony, it would be 

inconsistent with our prior harmless error precedent to deem the ALJ‟s failure to discuss the lay 

witness testimony to be prejudicial per se.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117. Where the ALJ has 

provided germane reasons to reject similar testimony, the court cannot ignore the ALJ‟s 

reasoning and reverse merely because he did not clearly link his determination to those reasons. 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121. 

In this instance, Ms. Maciel did not describe any limitations, but merely stated symptoms 

about which Plaintiff had also testified. The reasons that the ALJ provided for discrediting 

Plaintiff‟s testimony as to the severity of his symptoms would apply with equal force to Ms. 

Maciel‟s testimony. For that reason, the Court finds that if the ALJ erred and did not provide 

germane reasons to reject Ms. Maciel‟s testimony it would be harmless error.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by failing to address 

Plaintiff‟s chronic back pain in the opinion, by rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff‟s lay witness, or 

by finding Plaintiff‟s allegations to be partially credible. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff‟s appeal from the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security is DENIED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be 

entered in favor of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff Desiderio 

Garcia Ybarra. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00639-SAB Document 19 Filed 06/23/16 Page 19 of 19