Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02235/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 After the motion was taken under submission, the case was reassigned to the

undersigned due to the retirement of Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL ALCALA FARIAS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2235 FCD EFB PS

vs.

NEW FOLSOM STATE PRISON,

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on November 4, 2005. This action is

properly before this court pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(21). On December 15, 2005,

defendants L. Santos, Manya Edwards, Donald M. Henrikson, Jereann Lefever Garwood, Joann

Morales, Sean Sollinger, and Gregory Capra (referred to collectively as the “defendants”) filed a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim. On December 23, 2005, plaintiff filed an opposition to that motion. The

hearing was vacated and the matter taken under submission.1

////

////

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 The court notes that “New Folsom State Prison” is the former name of “California State

Prison, Sacramento.” See, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California

State Prison, Sacramento, available at http://www.cya.ca.gov/visitors/fac_prison_sac.html (last

visited October 1, 2006).

2

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff for the death of his son,

George O. Alcala (“Alcala”), which occurred on May 31, 2000 while Alcala was incarcerated in

the New Folsom State Prison.2

 Although the complaint lacks coherence in form and substance, it

appears that plaintiff alleges that defendants killed Alcala, or otherwise concealed the true cause

of Alcala’s death. Plaintiff has attached numerous documents to his complaint, which is filed on

a form used by prisoners to file a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is

not clear why plaintiff used this form since he does not appear to be incarcerated. 

The first attachment to the complaint is a letter from the Sacramento County

Coroner’s Office dated October 10, 2000. That letter explains that the coroner was required by

law to perform an autopsy on Alcala because he died in state custody. The letter states that the

cause of death was determined to be “suicide by hanging.” The letter further explains that none

of Alcala’s organs were harvested and that the incisions on Alcala’s body were necessary only to

perform the autopsy. Based on handwritten notes made by plaintiff on this and other documents,

it appears that he believes the coroner harvested Alcala’s organs for donation. The next

document attached to the complaint is a letter dated June 21, 2000, from the Office of the District

Attorney for Sacramento County. That letter notes that plaintiff’s inquiries regarding his son’s

death were forwarded to the Office of Internal Affairs. Following this attachment is a letter from

the Department of Corrections Office of Internal Affairs addressed to plaintiff and dated

September 20, 2000. That letter addresses plaintiff’s belief that his son “was shot in the head

(murdered) and after his death, his organs and blood were donated without . . . authorization.” 

The letter reiterates that the incisions on Alcala’s body were left by the autopsy and that the

coroner determined the cause of death was suicide by hanging. Next, plaintiff attaches

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 On October 26, 2005, the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento entered

judgment in favor of defendant Sacramento County and against plaintiff on defendants’

demurrer. That court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, holding that

plaintiff’s action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The court’s ruling

was also based on plaintiff’s failure to allege compliance with the tort claims act with regard to

its claims against the County. See Declaration of Shanan L. Hewitt in Support of Motion to

Dismiss, Exhibit B.

3

correspondence from the State of California Government Claims Branch. Those letters indicate

that plaintiff’s claim was rejected by the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board

(the “Board”), which recommended that plaintiff’s claims be resolved through formal legal

action. It appears that plaintiff tried to amend his claim, but that the Board rejected it as

untimely and again recommended filing an action in court. 

The next document attached to the complaint appears to be an “amended

complaint” filed with the Superior Court of California for the County of Sacramento on either

August 22 or 24, 2005. The next series of documents include a death certificate for Alcala and

the Coroner’s report. Plaintiff also attaches what seem to be copies of photos of his son,

although the quality is too poor to determine their subject.

Defendants’ exhibits to the motion to dismiss show that plaintiff filed a state court

action for his son’s alleged wrongful death. See Declaration of Shanan L. Hewitt in Support of

Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit B. The Sacramento Superior Court dismissed that action without

leave to amend based, in part, on the running of the applicable statute of limitations.3

 Following

that dismissal, plaintiff filed the present action with this court. 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, defendants argue that: (1) plaintiff’s claims are barred by

the applicable statute of limitations, former California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340(3);

(2) plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; and, (3) plaintiff has

failed to comply with, or allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. The

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted based on the running of the

statute of limitations.

A. Standard

A complaint should not be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims which would

entitle plaintiff to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994); Cervantes v. City of

San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal may be based either on the lack of

cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal

theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of

California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1984). The court construes the pleading in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). General allegations are presumed to

include specific facts necessary to support the claim. NOW, 510 U.S. at 256 (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached

exhibits. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to

accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States

Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public

record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (abrogated on other grounds by Astoria

Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)). “The court is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Unless it is clear that no amendment

can cure its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the

complaint before dismissal. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc);

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that the applicable one-year statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s

claim for wrongful death. Plaintiff filed this action on November 4, 2005. As discussed below,

the undersigned finds that the cause of action accrued by June, 2000. The issue presented is

whether, from the face of the complaint, plaintiff has failed to comply with the applicable statute

of limitations.

Where it is apparent on the face of the complaint that the action is barred by the statute of

limitations, the action may be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Jablon v. Dean

Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Such a motion to dismiss “can be granted only

if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff

to prove that the statute was tolled.” Id. 

Although inartfully plead, it appears that the complaint together with its

attachments makes a claim for wrongful death. That cause of action, whether brought under

state law on the basis of diversity, or as a survival action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is

absolutely barred by the statute of limitations. 

Again, the court notes that the complaint is filed on a form used by prisoners for

filing civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although plaintiff is not a prisoner, it is

possible that he seeks to bring a survival action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Survival actions

are permitted under § 1983 if authorized by applicable state law. Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126,

1131 (9th Cir. 1998). California law applies to this case and permits survival actions. See

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

 California Civil Procedure Code § 377.60 (as written in 2000 when plaintiff’s claim

accrued) permitted survival actions to be brought by the decedent’s personal representative or by

decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if

there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the surviving spouse, who

would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.

5

 The statute was revised in 2002 and set forth in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. The new

statute extends the limitations period from one year to two years, and has an effective date of

January 1, 2003. The new statute does not apply retroactively. Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro

Bay, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1028-29 (2004). Therefore, the statute of limitations as formerly

set forth in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 340(3), applies to this case. 

6

California Civil Procedure Code (“Cal. Civ. Proc. Code”) § 377.60.4 However, the law limits

who may bring survival actions, and plaintiff has failed to allege that he is Alcala’s personal

representative or any other person permitted by statute to bring the action. Even so, as discussed

below, plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, whether brought pursuant to § 1983 or under state law,

is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

The applicable statute of limitations in this case is former California Code of

Civil Procedure § 340(3).5

 This statute applies to personal injury actions, including wrongful

death actions, and actions brought pursuant to § 1983. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 340(3); Norgart

v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 404 (1999); Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650, 653

(9th Cir. 2000) (the statute of limitations for an action brought under § 1983 is the forum states

statute of limitations for personal injury). Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3), the

applicable statute of limitations period is one year.

Plaintiff’s claims relate solely to the alleged wrongful death of his son, which

occurred on May 31, 2000 – over six years ago. Claims under § 1983 accrue when a plaintiff

“knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Trotter v. Int'l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 13, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983). The

law in California is similar with regard to accrual of actions. Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 389, 391

(wrongful death action accrues on the date of death or when the plaintiff discovers, or has reason

to discover, the cause of action). Based on the attachments to the complaint, it appears that

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

plaintiff had notice of his son’s death very soon after the actual date of death. For example, a

letter from the Sacramento District Attorney to plaintiff, dated June 21, 2000, responds to

plaintiff’s inquiries and suspicions regarding the true cause of Alcala’s death. Another letter

from the Department of Corrections Office of Internal Affairs dated September 20, 2000,

responds to plaintiff’s belief that his son “was shot in the head (murdered) and after his death, his

organs and blood were donated without . . . authorization.” Based on these and other

attachments, it is clear that plaintiff had sufficient knowledge regarding the facts giving rise to

his allegations of wrongful death several years before filing this complaint and shortly after the

May 31, 2000, date of death. This action was filed on November 4, 2005. With the accrual of

the cause of action in 2000, plaintiff clearly failed to file this complaint within the one year

limitations period prescribed in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340(3). 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint is time barred.

C. Res Judicata

The moving defendants argue that this action should be dismissed based on the

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Under the doctrine of res judicata, “‘[a] final

judgment on the merits bars a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies over

the same cause of action.’” The Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985)). The

doctrine of res judicata consists of two concepts, issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, and

claim preclusion, or res judicata. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465

U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). “Claim preclusion [res judicata] refers to the effect of a judgment in

foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determination that it

should have been advanced in an earlier suit.” Id. Res judicata “bars the assertion of any theory

of recovery that could have been asserted in the first action.” Fund for Animals, 962 F.2d at

1398 (citing Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988)). The proper

application of res judicata requires several conditions to be met. First, there must be an identity

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

of the claim and an identity of the parties. Western Radio Servs. Co. v.Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189,

1192 (9th Cir. 1997). In addition, there must be a final judgment on he merits regarding that

prior claim. Id.

“Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law

necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a

different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Dodd v. Hood River County, 59

F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 1995). Collateral estoppel “applies only where it is established that (1)

the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to

be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the

first proceeding.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Thus, under both res judicata and collateral estoppel, there must be a final

judgment on the merits and identity of the parties as to both proceedings. The court notes that

the entire state court action was dismissed without leave to amend. See Declaration of Shanan L.

Hewitt in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit B (order granting defendants’ demurrer without

leave to amend). A dismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits. 

Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297

F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, there exist some discrepancies as to the identity of the parties in the

state court action and the present action. In this action, plaintiff alleges a claim for wrongful

death against multiple defendants who appear to be employed by the Sacramento County

Coroner’s Office, the Department of Corrections, and various other individuals. As discussed

above, plaintiff brought a claim for wrongful death in state court in 2005. Defendants

characterize that action as against the County of Sacramento, Sacramento County Coroner’s

Department, and Deputy Coroner L. Santos. See Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

(“Motion to Dismiss”), at 6:24-28. Defendants then state that in the present action, plaintiff now

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

names Sacramento County Deputy Coroner Manya Edwards, Donald M. Henrikson, M.D.,

Jereann Lefever Garwood, Joann Morales, Sean Sollinger and Gregory Capra. See Motion to

Dismiss at 7:1-15. However, based on the exhibits attached to the supporting declaration of

defendants’ motion to dismiss in this action, it appears that those defendants may have also been

named in the state court action. See Declaration of Shanan L. Hewitt in Support of Motion to

Dismiss (“Hewitt Decl.”), Exhibit A at 4. 

As “Exhibit A” to the Hewitt Declaration, defendants attach the civil cover sheet

and complaint form filed in state court on June 5, 2005, wherein it appears that plaintiff names as

defendants New Folsom State Prison, the Sacramento County Coroner, “Lieutenant S.D. Akin

#13566,” and Deputy Coroner L. Santos. See, Hewitt Decl., Exhibit A at 2. Further confusing

the matter is another document in defendants’ “Exhibit A,” which was filed in state court by

plaintiff on March 11, 2005 (apparently before he filed the complaint), and which appears to

request an extension of time to serve the complaint on a long list of defendants. See Hewitt

Decl., Exhibit A at 4. The defendants named in that document include all of the same

defendants named in the present federal action, except “Ray Bracamontes” and “Robert

Poncilla.” Id. These exhibits filed by defendants muddy, rather than clarify, the issue of which

parties were named in the state court action. Undoubtedly, the difficulty in discerning which

entities and individuals are named as defendants is due to the incoherence of the pleadings filed

in both actions. Whatever the source of the confusion, the lack of clarity over which parties

were named in the state court suit undermines the element of identity of parties. Accordingly,

the court declines to recommend dismissal on the additional basis of res judicata, finding that the

“identity of parties” element is not sufficiently satisfied. In any event, the court finds that the

statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s claims and is dispositive with regard to the dismissal of this

action.

////

////

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

////

D. California Tort Claims Act

Next, defendants argue that the action should be dismissed based on plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act. Specifically, defendants argue that

because the complaint is one against a public entity and public employees, plaintiff had to first

present it to the “clerk, secretary, or auditor of the public entity, or [mail] it to one of these

people or to the entity’s governing body at its principal office.” Motion to Dismiss, at 8:3-10. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s filing of a claim with the Victim’s Compensation Claims Board

was not sufficient to comply with this mandate of the California Tort Claims Act. 

While it appears that plaintiff has failed to comply with claim presentation

requirement of the California Tort Claims Act, which bars any claim plaintiff is purporting to

assert under that Act, it is possible as discussed above, to construe plaintiff’s claim as a survival

action made under § 1983 given plaintiff’s use of a § 1983 complaint form. There is no formal

requirement for the exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies for claims made under

§ 1983. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975). In fact, it is settled law that a plaintiff

need not comply with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Acts when bringing a

federal civil rights action. Lacey v. C.S.P. Solano Medical Staff, 990 F. Supp. 1199, 1206-07

(E.D. Cal. 1997). Plaintiff’s compliance with the California Tort Claims Act is irrelevant to the

extent his claim is construed as one made pursuant to § 1983. However, for the reasons stated

above, the court finds that the statute of limitations bars any claim under § 1983.

NON-MOVING DEFENDANTS

In the complaint, plaintiff names other defendants, including “New Folsom State

Prison,” “S.D. Akin, Lieutenant #13566,” “Officer Snyder,” “Officer Roth #53176,” “Dr.

Turella,” “Officers Richar [sic] Bishop, badge 36187,” “Jessie Ramsey, badge 425-98,” “CDC

Officer Abney,” “Ray Bracamontes,” and “Roberto Poncilla” (the “non-moving defendants”). 

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

 Moreover, it appears that plaintiff never served these non-moving defendants with a

summons and copy of the complaint. Plaintiff filed proofs of service as to “Deputy L. Santos

Coroner’s Dept.,” “Thomas Moore Agent in charge Dept. of Corrections,” and “Wasco State

Prison.” Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), if a defendant is not served within 120 days of filing

the complaint, the court may dismiss the complaint without prejudice as to that defendant. The

complaint was filed on November 4, 2005. No return of service was ever filed as to these

defendants. 

11

////

////

These defendants have not joined in the motion to dismiss. However, the same analysis above

applies to the other defendants as well to the extent plaintiff attempts to assert their liability for

the wrongful death alleged in the complaint. The complaint’s only allegations relate to the

alleged wrongful death of Alcala. Any such claims are time barred for the same reasons stated

above.6

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the claims against the non-moving

defendants also be dismissed with prejudice based on the running of the statute of limitations. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death, whether brought under California state law or as a

survival action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted on the basis that the action is time

barred;

2. This action be dismissed with prejudice as to all named defendants; and 

3. The Clerk be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 3, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-02235-FCD-EFB Document 34 Filed 10/04/06 Page 12 of 12