Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01010/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01010-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERINA TERESA PURCELLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL,

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:18-cv-01010-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 

SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Doc. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 26, 2018, Plaintiff Serina Teresa Purcella (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for supplemental security 

income (“SSI”). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were 

submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate 

Judge.2

 

1 On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See

https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on September 12, 2019). He is therefore 

substituted as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 

C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper 

defendant”).

2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 11, 12.)

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI payments, alleging she 

became disabled on December 8, 2003 due to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), celiac 

disease, and heart problems. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 151, 153–54, 174–75, 196, 210, 365.) 

Plaintiff was born on December 20, 1964 and was 49 years old on the date the application was filed. 

(AR 160, 195.) She has a high school education, past work experience in home patient care, and 

last worked full-time in 2004. (AR 16, 174–75, 196.

A. Summary of Relevant Medical Evidence

1. Community Psychiatry Associates 

On August 29, 2014, Plaintiff presented to Community Psychiatry Associates for treatment 

of her anxiety and depression. (AR 523.) Plaintiff reported she suffered from depression since 2008 

and her “depression ha[d] been severe lately due to [a] medical condition.” (AR 523.) Plaintiff 

reported experiencing the following symptoms: “poor concentration”; “poor appetite due to celiac 

disease”; “hopelessness and worthlessness”; “persistent anxiety”; and “panic attacks any time she 

leaves home.” (AR 523.) The examining physician recommended treatment including Zoloft and 

Trazodone, in addition to the other psychotropic medications Plaintiff was already prescribed. (See 

AR 523, 527.) 

At a September 15, 2014 follow up appointment, Plaintiff reported panic attacks that 

involved chest pain, trouble swallowing, coughing, lightheadedness, nausea, and feeling like she 

was going to pass out. (AR 522.) Plaintiff stated these panic attacks happened “every time she 

leaves home.” (AR 522.) On October 6, 2014, Plaintiff reported “irritability” and that she was 

“dwelling on her panic.” (AR 521.) Plaintiff admitted she “hits her husband” and has done so “for 

many years.” (AR 521.) This behavior was attributed to her family being physically abusive to her. 

(AR 521.) Plaintiff reported episodes of palpitations and dizziness, that her energy and 

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concentration were poor, and that she was “angry.” (AR 521.) Plaintiff returned on October 24, 

2014, and reported that she had low energy, high anxiety, and an “okay” mood. (AR 520.) 

2. Jordan De-Paz, M.D.

On June 6, 2014, Plaintiff presented to family practice physician Jordan De-Paz, M.D., for 

treatment of dermatitis, celiac disease, and hypertension. (AR 616.) Dr. De-Paz recommended 

Plaintiff take Metropolol for her hypertension, Hydroxyzine for her dermatitis, and other 

medications for her anxiety. (See AR 619.) On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff returned for a follow up 

appointment after an emergency room visit. (AR 612.) Dr. De-Paz noted that Plaintiff was seen at 

the hospital for chest pain. (AR 612.) Dr. De-Paz directed Plaintiff to take Nitrostat for her 

hypertension and then return for a blood pressure check. (AR 615.) 

Plaintiff returned on July 4, 2014, for her blood pressure check. (AR 610.) Dr. De-Paz 

found that Plaintiff’s blood pressure was within normal limits and directed her to continue her 

medications and follow-up as needed. (AR 611.) On July 29, 2014, Plaintiff returned for treatment 

of “pain and itching in face” and other problems including anxiety disorder, hypertension, and celiac 

sprue. (See AR 606.) Dr. De-Paz noted that Plaintiff was prescribed to take Clonazeapm, 

Doxycycline Hyclate, Hyroxyzine, Isosorbide Mononitrate, Metroprolol, and Nitrostat daily. (AR 

606.) 

3. Michael Cohn, Ph.D.

On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff reported to psychologist Michael Cohn, Ph.D., for a 

consultative psychiatric examination. (AR 528–32.) Dr. Cohn noted that Plaintiff complained of 

anxiety with panic attacks and depression and that she suffered from these issues since she was 

“young.” (AR 528.) Dr. Cohn noted that Plaintiff saw a psychiatrist every three weeks and may be 

seeing a counselor as well, although that was unclear and “[Plaintiff] herself does not seem to know.” 

(AR 528.) Plaintiff reported that “everyone” in her family has mental illness. (AR 529.) Plaintiff 

reported she was able to take care of personal hygiene without difficulty, was able to pay bills and 

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handle cash appropriately, and was able to make decisions on a daily basis. (AR 529.) Dr. Cohn 

noted that Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence and pace were “adequate.” (AR 529.) 

Dr. Cohn diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety disorder and noted that Plaintiff’s mood and affect 

were anxious. (AR 530–31.) As to Plaintiff’s functional abilities, Dr. Cohn opined that Plaintiff 

was unimpaired in understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple or complex instructions; 

moderately impaired in relating and interacting with coworkers and the public; unimpaired in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, and unimpaired in completing day-to-day work activity; 

unimpaired in accepting instructions; unimpaired in maintaining regular attendance; and unimpaired 

in performing work activities. (AR 531–32.) 

4. Ritu Malik, M.D.

On March 26, 2015, endocrinologist Ritu Malik, M.D. performed a consultative examination 

of Plaintiff. (AR 567–69.) Dr. Malik opined that Plaintiff could sit for at least six hours in an eighthour workday; stand and/or walk for at least six hours in an eight-hour workday; lift and carry 50 

pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently; and had no postural, manipulative, visual, 

communicative, or environmental limitations. (AR 569.) 

5. Doris Karam, M.D.

On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff established care with internist Doris Karam, M.D. (AR 684.) 

Dr. Karam treated Plaintiff for abdominal pain and other complications following her 

cholecystectomy. (AR 684.) Dr. Karam noted that Plaintiff’s abdomen was “very distended and 

very tender.” (AR 688.) On November 23, 2015, Dr. Karam diagnosed abdominal pain and diarrhea 

and back pain. (AR 682.) On January 29, 2016, Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room for severe 

abdominal pain. (AR 758.) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Karam on February 24, 2016 for a follow-up 

visit after her hospitalization. (AR 672.) Dr. Karam indicated Plaintiff may suffer from ulcerative 

colitis and referred Plaintiff to a gastroenterologist. (AR 676.) On June 10, 2016, Dr. Karam 

assessed hematuria and referred Plaintiff to a urologist. (AR 670.) 

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On November 1, 2016, Dr. Karam treated Plaintiff for back pain. (AR 653.) Dr. Karam 

noted that Plaintiff had coccyx tenderness and diagnosed sacrococcygeal disorder. (AR 657.) Dr. 

Karam ordered a lumbar MRI for Plaintiff’s back issues. (AR 657.) On November 29, 2016, Dr. 

Karam assessed coccydynia and lumbar radiculopathy. (AR 651.) On February 14, 2017, Dr. 

Karam ordered an MRI for Plaintiff’s headaches and referred Plaintiff for a neuropsychiatry 

evaluation due to memory loss issues. (AR 643.) 

On February 28, 2017, Dr. Karam completed a psychiatric medical source statement. (AR 

577.) Dr. Karam opined that Plaintiff had marked limitation in her ability to maintain concentration 

and attention; withstand stress and pressures associated with work; understand, remember or carry 

out instructions; deal with the public; and moderate limitation in her ability to understand, remember

and carry out instructions and relate and interact with coworkers. (AR 577.) Dr. Karam opined that

Plaintiff’s impairment and associated limitations were “permanent” and that Plaintiff was likely to 

miss more than half of the work days every month due to her mental issues. (AR 577.) 

6. Leonard Rubin, M.D.

On April 14, 2017, internist Leonard Rubin, M.D. completed a medical source statement 

regarding Plaintiff’s physical impairments. (AR 844.) Dr. Rubin opined that Plaintiff could lift 

and/or carry up to 20 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally; could sit, stand, or walk for 

six hours in an eight-hour workday; and had some manipulative limitations in her left hand. (AR 

844–50.) Dr. Rubin opined that Plaintiff had no other limitations. (See AR 847–50.) 

7. Michael Lace, Psy.D.

On April 17, 2017, psychologist Michael Lace, Psy.D. completed a medical source statement 

regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (AR 834–35.) Dr. Lace opined that Plaintiff was 

moderately impaired in her ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and 

coworkers, and mildly impaired in all other functional abilities. (AR 834–35.) 

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8. State Agency Physicians

On January 16, 2015, Sandip Sen, M.D., a Disability Determination Services medical 

consultant, assessed Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity (RFC).

3

(AR 204–05.) Dr. Sen 

opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to work in coordination with or in 

proximity to others; interact appropriately with the public; accept instructions and respond 

appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and get along with coworkers without exhibiting 

behavioral extremes; and had no significant limitation in all other functional abilities. (AR 205–

206.) 

Upon reconsideration on March 13, 2015, another Disability Determination Services 

medical consultant, A. Garcia, M.D., agreed with all of Dr. Ocrant’s RFC findings and the 

limitations he found. (AR 218–20.)

B. Administrative Proceedings

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on January 16, 2015, 

and again on reconsideration on April 29, 2015. (AR 225–29, 233–37.) On May 29, 2015, Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 240–42.)

On March 30, 2017, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before an ALJ as to her

alleged disabling conditions. (AR 171–194.) Plaintiff testified that she experiences constant pain 

in her back, neck, hands, and legs. (AR 179.) She stated that her medications for her mental 

impairments make her “very drowsy, incoherent, dizzy, off balance” and that she showers “every 

other day” and has to sit down in the shower. (AR 180.) She testified that she sits in a recliner with 

 

3 RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work 

setting on a regular and continuing basis of eight hours a day, for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. 

TITLES II & XVI: ASSESSING RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY IN INITIAL CLAIMS, Social Security 

Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions 

that result from an individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. “In determining 

a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records, lay 

evidence, and ‘the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable 

impairment.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).

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a heating pad on her lower back all day except when she is using the restroom because she is in so 

much pain. (AR 181.) Plaintiff takes Neurontin, Clonazepam, and Baclofen three times a day every 

day. (AR 182, 187.) She testified that she has anger issues due to PTSD stemming from sexual 

abuse from relatives early in life. (AR 188.) She stated she cannot work full time because her 

mental health medications “leave [her] incoherent and tired.” (AR 191.) 

A Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified very briefly at the hearing. (AR 193.) The VE testified 

for the sole purpose of classifying Plaintiff’s previous job. (AR 193.) The VE testified that 

Plaintiff’s past work was as a home attendant, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) code 

354.377-014, which was medium work with a specific vocational preparation (SVP)4of 3. (AR 

193.) The ALJ then excused the VE and closed testimony. (AR 193.) 

C. The ALJ’s Decision

In a decision dated May 22, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined 

by the Act. (AR 151–62.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920. (AR 153–61.) The ALJ decided that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since the application date of July 28, 2014 (step one). (AR 53.) At step two, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “colitis, status-post cholecystectomy”; “mild 

lumbar degenerative disc disease”; “coccydynia”; “cervical spondylosis, status-post anterior 

cervical discectomy at C5-C6”; anxiety disorder; panic disorder; and PTSD. (AR 153–54.) The 

ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

medically equaled one of the Listings (step three). (AR 154–56.)

The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and applied the RFC assessment at steps four and 

 

4 Specific vocational preparation (SVP), as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a typical 

worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a 

specific job-worker situation. DOT, Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). 

Jobs in the DOT are assigned SVP levels ranging from 1 (the lowest level – “short demonstration only”) to 9 (the highest 

level – over 10 years of preparation). Id.

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five. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (“Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your 

residual functional capacity ... We use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four 

and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.”). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

retained the RFC:

to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) limited to simple 

routine tasks with no more than occasional interaction with co-workers, 

supervisors, and the public, with no requirement for collaborative work.

(AR 156.) Although the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected 

to cause the alleged symptoms[,]” he rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony as “not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (AR 158.) At step five, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work. (AR 160.) The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff was a younger individual age 18–49 on the date the application was filed, and subsequently 

changed age category to “closely approaching advanced age,” had at least a high school education, 

and was able to communicate in English. (AR 160.) The ALJ then determined: 

Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a 

finding that [Plaintiff] is “not disabled,” whether or not [Plaintiff] has 

transferable job skills[.]

Considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform[.]

(AR 160–61) (citations omitted). 

The ALJ determined that the Grids dictated a finding of no disability without considering 

additional exertional or non-exertional limitations. (AR 161.) The ALJ found that with Plaintiff’s 

RFC, “[t]he unskilled occupational job base is not significantly eroded so long as [Plaintiff] is able 

to meet these basic mental demands” and Plaintiff, “with the decisional residual functional capacity 

herein, would be able to meet these demands.” (AR 161.) Therefore, the ALJ found Plaintiff was 

not disabled. (AR 161.)

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Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the Appeals Council, which denied review on 

May 23, 2018. (AR 1–6.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Applicable Law

An individual is considered “disabled” for purposes of disability benefits if he or she is 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

However, “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her] physical or 

mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] 

previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

“The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining 

whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The Ninth Circuit has provided the 

following description of the sequential evaluation analysis:

In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step 

two and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the ALJ 

proceeds to step three and considers whether the impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

[a]pp. 1. If so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If not, the ALJ 

proceeds to step four and assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing her 

past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to 

step five and examines whether the claimant has the [RFC] . . . to perform any other 

substantial gainful activity in the national economy. If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or 

‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett, 

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180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).

“The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of 

the analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 

1989)). “However, if a claimant establishes an inability to continue her past work, the burden shifts 

to the Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work.” Id. (citing Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687).

B. Scope of Review

“This court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits [only] 

when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined 

as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 

1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098). “Put another way, substantial 

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). 

“This is a highly deferential standard of review ...” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ’s findings will be upheld if supported by 

inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id.; see, e.g., Edlund, 253 F.3d at 

1156 (citations omitted) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the 

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.”).

Nonetheless, “the Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 

specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 

143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] 

conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Finally, courts “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

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454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)). Harmless error “exists when it is clear from the record 

that ‘the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Tommasetti, 

533 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is 

harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 

556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in the following respects: (1) improperly relying upon 

the Grids, instead of obtaining testimony from a VE, regarding Plaintiff’s social limitations and their 

effect on the occupational base; (2) failing to properly evaluate Dr. Rubin’s opinion that Plaintiff’s 

impairments cause manipulative and postural limitations; and (3) failing to include work-related 

limitations in the RFC consistent with Plaintiff’s limitations and failing to offer any reason for 

discounting Plaintiff’s limitations related to colitis. (Doc. 20 at 1–2.) The Court agrees with 

Plaintiff on the first issue and will remand the case for the ALJ to obtain further testimony from a 

VE. 

A. The ALJ Erred at Step Five Relying Exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

And Neglecting to Obtain the Testimony of a VE Regarding the Effect of Plaintiff’s 

Social Limitations on the Occupational Base.

1. Legal Standard

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”) provide a uniform conclusion about disability 

for various combinations of age, education, previous work experience, and residual functional 

capacity. The Grids allow the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process and encourage 

uniform treatment of claims based on the number of jobs in the national economy for any given 

category of residual functioning capacity. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983) 

(discussing creation and purpose of the Grids).

The Commissioner may apply the Grids in lieu of taking the testimony of a vocational expert 

only when the Grids accurately and completely describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations. See 

Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, the Commissioner generally may not 

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rely on the Grids if a claimant suffers from non-exertional limitations because the Grids are based 

on exertional strength factors only. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(e). 

“The use of the grids to find a claimant not disabled can be appropriate when both exertional and 

nonexertional limitations are alleged,” but only where ALJ finds that the plaintiff’s “nonexertional 

limitations do not significantly affect [her] exertional capabilities.” Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991). 

“If a claimant has an impairment that limits his or her ability to work without directly affecting his 

or her strength, the claimant is said to have non-exertional . . . limitations that are not covered by 

the Grids.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(d), (e)).

In cases where the Grids are not fully applicable, the ALJ may meet his burden under step five 

of the sequential analysis by propounding to a vocational expert hypothetical questions based on 

medical assumptions, supported by substantial evidence, that reflect all the plaintiff’s limitations. 

See Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). Specifically, where the Grids are 

inapplicable because plaintiff has sufficient non-exertional limitations, the ALJ is required to obtain 

vocational expert testimony. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).

2. Analysis

The ALJ included in Plaintiff’s RFC that she was “limited to simple routine tasks with no 

more than occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, with no requirement 

for collaborative work.” (AR 156.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s non-exertional 

limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled medium work.” (AR 161.) 

The ALJ accordingly declined to obtain the testimony of a VE regarding Plaintiff’s social limitations 

and the effect on her occupational base, and instead relied on the Grids to determine that Plaintiff 

was not disabled. (AR 161.)

Defendant contends that the “majority of the . . . Grid occupations are inherently compatible 

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with the ALJ’s RFC limitation to unskilled occupations requiring limited interpersonal interactions” 

and thus the ALJ was entitled to rely on the Grids in this case. (Doc. 25 at 5.) The Court disagrees. 

In Terrill v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00751-BAM, 2018 WL 4503429, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 

19, 2018), the court reversed the ALJ’s denial of benefits because the ALJ improperly relied on the 

Grids in a situation similar to this case. In that case, the plaintiff contended that the ALJ was 

required to ask a VE to consider her ability to perform medium jobs due to limitations to “no more 

than occasional face-to-face interaction with . . . the general public, coworkers and supervisors.” Id.

at *2. The court held that the ALJ erred in failing to obtain the testimony of a VE, reasoning that 

“where an ALJ specifically limits a claimant’s ability to interact with coworkers and supervisors, 

such a limitation conflicts with the basic requirements of unskilled work and has the potential to 

significantly erode the occupational base.” Id. at *4 (collecting cases).

The Court agrees with the analysis in Terrill and finds the case is nearly indistinguishable 

from this case. Like in Terrill, the ALJ here limited Plaintiff to “occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public.”5

 (See AR 156.) The ALJ in this case went even further, 

however, and limited Plaintiff to no collaborative work with others.

6

 (See AR 156.) Because the 

ALJ limited Plaintiff to occasional interaction and no collaborative work with others, the ALJ was 

required to obtain the testimony of a VE as to the effect of those limitations on her occupational 

base, and erred in relying on the Grids to direct a finding of no disability. See Terrill, 2018 WL 

 

5 Defendant cites to George v. Berryhill, 727 F. App’x 287, 290–91 (9th Cir. 2018), and Cowen v. Commissioner of Soc. 

Sec., 400 F. App’x 275, 277 (9th Cir. 2010), in support of its position. (Doc. 25 at 5.) Cowen is distinguishable from 

this case because there, the ALJ limited the Plaintiff only to “limited public contact.” See 400 F. App’x at 277. 

Similarly, in George it is unclear what social limitations were imposed by the ALJ, although the decision implies, but 

does not state, that they consisted solely of “little contact with supervisors or coworkers.” See 727 F. App’x at 291. 

Here, the ALJ limited Plaintiff considerably more extensively than in Cowen or George, to “simple routine tasks with 

no more than occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, with no requirement for collaborative 

work.” (See AR 156.) 

6 This finding appears to conflict with the ALJ’s finding that “a substantial loss of ability to respond appropriately to 

supervisors or coworkers would severely limit the potential occupational base” under SSR 85-15. (See AR 161.) The 

ALJ does not sufficiently explain why Plaintiff is limited to no collaborative work with others, when the ALJ found she 

is unlimited in her ability to respond appropriately to supervisors or coworkers, and can “occasionally” interact with 

supervisors and coworkers. 

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4503429, at *3–4; see also Dubord v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-1402-CMK, 2018 WL 

1638866 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2018); Little v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1153–

54 (D. Or. 2011); Gonzales v. Astrue, No. 1:09-CV-01306-GSA, 2010 WL 4392911 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

9, 2010); Stark v. Astrue, No. 07-6465, 2009 WL 2566723 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); Shankles v. 

Astrue, No. 09-1258, 2010 WL 5169077 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010); Galinski v. Astrue, No. C11-

516-RSL-JPD, 2011 WL 7070323, at *16 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 

B. The ALJ’s Error Was Not Harmless

The Court now turns to the analysis of whether this error by the ALJ was harmless. The 

Ninth Circuit “ha[s] long recognized that harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act 

context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 

925, 932 n.10 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the harmless error analysis applies where the ALJ errs by 

not discharging their duty to develop the record). As such, “the court will not reverse an ALJ’s 

decision for harmless error.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885).

An error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted); see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that an error is also harmless “‘if the 

agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,’ even if the agency ‘explains its decision with less than 

ideal clarity’” (quoting Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004)). “In 

other words, in each case [courts] look at the record as a whole to determine whether the error alters 

the outcome of the case.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. “[T]he nature of [the] application” of the 

“harmless error analysis to social security cases” is “fact-intensive―‘no presumptions operate’ and 

‘[courts] must analyze harmlessness in light of the circumstances of the case.’” March v. Colvin, 

792 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121). “[T]he burden of showing 

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that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” 

Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409 (citations omitted).

Here, the ALJ’s error was not harmless because the error caused the ALJ to determine that 

Plaintiff was not disabled without the benefit of the testimony of a VE. The VE’s testimony is 

crucial as it may determine Plaintiff’s occupational base and whether she can perform any jobs at 

all, considering her non-exertional, social limitations. See Terrill, 2018 WL 4503429, at *4–5. The 

Court therefore also finds that the ALJ’s error was not harmless, see, e.g., Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 

(citations omitted) (stating that an error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination”), and the remand of this matter is appropriate. 

C. The ALJ’s Error Warrants Remand for Further Proceedings

In her briefing, Plaintiff requests that the Court remand the case for the ALJ “to determine 

the impact of Plaintiff’s social limitations on the available job base” after obtaining the testimony 

of a VE. (Doc. 20 at 12.) 

Where the ALJ commits an error and that error is not harmless, the “ordinary ... rule” is “to 

remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099

(citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit recognized a limited exception to this typical course where 

courts “remand[] for an award of benefits instead of further proceedings.” Id. at 1100–01 (citations 

omitted); see also id. at 1100 (noting that this exception is “sometimes referred to as the ‘credit-astrue’ rule”). In determining whether to apply this exception to the “ordinary remand rule,” the court 

must determine, in part, whether (1) “the record has been fully developed;” (2) “there are 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made;” and (3) 

“further administrative proceedings would be useful.” Id. at 1101 (citations omitted). As to the last 

inquiry, additional “[a]dministrative proceedings are generally useful where the record has not been 

fully developed, there is a need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities, or the presentation of further 

evidence . . . may well prove enlightening in light of the passage of time.” Id. (citations omitted). 

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Ultimately, “[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence or simply to award 

benefits is in [the court’s] discretion.” Swenson, 876 F.2d at 689 (citation omitted).

Here, the Court finds that the “credit-as-true” exception to the “ordinary remand rule” is 

inapplicable because additional administrative proceedings would be useful. Further, Plaintiff does 

not request that the Court award benefits. On remand, the ALJ should address the error described 

in this Order by obtaining the testimony of a VE regarding Plaintiff’s social limitations and the 

effect of those limitations on the occupational base. 

Accordingly, the Court will remand this case for further proceedings. 

D. The Court Declines to Determine Plaintiff’s Remaining Assertions of Error

As the Court finds that remand is appropriate for the ALJ to obtain the testimony of a VE 

regarding Plaintiff’s social limitations and the effect of the limitations on her occupational base, the 

Court does not reach Plaintiff’s remaining assertions of error. (See Doc. 20 at 13–16); cf. Newton 

v. Colvin, No. 2:13-cv-2458-GEB-EFB, 2015 WL 1136477, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2015) 

(“As the matter must be remanded for further consideration of the medical evidence, the court 

declines to address plaintiff’s remaining arguments”); Willmett ex rel. A.P. v. Astrue, No. 2:10-cv01201 KJN, 2011 WL 3816284, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (“Because this legal error warrants 

remanding this matter for further proceedings, the undersigned does not reach the remainder of [the] 

plaintiff’s arguments seeking reversal of the ALJ’s and Appeals Council’s decisions.”). 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is, therefore, VACATED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in 

favor of Plaintiff Serina Teresa Purcella and against Defendant Andrew Saul, Commissioner of 

Social Security.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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