Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00892/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00892-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES LACKEY, 

Petitioner,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

Civil No.: 16cv0892 JAH 

Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR 

CORRECT HIS SENTENCE UNDER 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 

Petitioner James Lackey moves this Court to vacate and correct his sentence under 

28 U.S.C. section 2255. Respondent opposes the motion. After a thorough review of the 

record and the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES 

Petitioner’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

On December 6, 1993, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of armed bank 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a) and (d) and one count of using a firearm 

during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c). On February 24, 1994, 

upon finding Petitioner qualified as a career offender, the Hon. Irma E. Gonzalez sentenced 

him to 300 months in prison on count 1 and 60 months on count 2, to run consecutively, 

followed by supervised release for 5 years on count 1 and 3 years on count 2 to run 

concurrently. 

cr

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
2 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Petitioner appealed his conviction, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Petitioner filed a document entitled “Ex Parte Motion Requesting this Court’s Directive 

Instructions; Referencing the Filing of a Late Section 2255 motion” which Judge Gonzalez 

construed as a motion to vacate under section 2255 and denied. Petitioner sought 

reconsideration of the order which Judge Gonzalez granted and provided Petitioner an 

opportunity to file an amended motion pursuant to section 2255. Judge Gonzalez denied 

the motion and Petitioner appealed. The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion for a 

certificate of appealability. 

 On April 12, 2016, Petitioner, appearing pro se, filed a motion seeking relief under 

section 2255, and later, sought to amend the motion through counsel. Noting Petitioner 

filed an application for leave to file a second or successive petition with the Ninth Circuit, 

this Court stayed the matter until the Ninth Circuit issued its decision. The Ninth Circuit 

granted the application and directed this Court to proceed on Petitioner’s amended motion 

filed on June 3, 2016. This Court lifted the stay of the proceedings and set a briefing 

schedule on the amended motion. Respondent filed an opposition and Petitioner filed a 

reply. Thereafter, Petitioner filed supplemental briefing. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A section 2255 motion may be brought to vacate, set aside or correct a federal 

sentence on the following grounds: (1) the sentence “was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States,” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose 

such sentence,” (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” or (4) 

the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 

DISCUSSION

 Petitioner moves this Court to vacate and correct his sentence under section 2255 

based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, ___, U.S. ___, 135 

S.Ct. 2551 (2015). He asserts, based upon the ruling in Johnson, he is not a career offender 

because his conviction for first degree burglary under California Penal Code section 459 is 

not a crime of violence, his conviction for robbery under California Penal Code section 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
3 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

211 is not a crime of violence and his conviction for armed bank robber under 18 U.S.C. 

section 2113(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence. He further argues his armed bank 

robbery conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c). 

 In opposition, Respondent argues the motion should be dismissed for procedural 

default because Plaintiff failed to raise this argument in his appeal to the Ninth Circuit and 

as untimely because it was filed beyond the one year limitations period. Respondent further 

argues the motion is without merit because Johnson does not apply to collateral cases 

challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) 

and armed bank robbery remains a violent felony post Johnson. 

 In reply, Petitioner maintains any procedural default is excused by cause and 

prejudice because his claim was not reasonably available to him at the time of sentencing 

and additional custodial time caused by an erroneous sentencing enhancement is 

prejudicial. He further argues his petition, which was filed within a year of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Johnson is timely, and he should prevail on the merits of his claim 

because Johnson retroactively applies to the guidelines. 

 Petitioner also filed supplemental briefing following the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Beckles v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct 886 (2017) and argues the decision 

does not foreclose his motion. He also filed supplemental briefing following the decision 

in Sessions v. Dimaya, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2018 WL 1800371 (2018) in support of his argument 

that his conviction for using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 

924(c) must be vacated. 

I. Procedural Bar

 A federal prisoner who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal procedurally defaults 

the claim and must demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence to obtain relief 

under section 2255. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). 

 Respondent argues Petitioner did not argue that his convictions for federal armed 

bank robbery or for California robbery were not crimes of violence for the purpose of 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
4 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

qualifying as a career offender in his appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Respondent further argues 

Petitioner fails to show cause and prejudice for his procedural default. 

 Petitioner maintains any procedural default is excused by cause and prejudice 

because his claim was not reasonably available to him at the time of sentencing and 

additional custodial time caused by an erroneous sentencing enhancement is prejudicial, 

and, alternatively, he can show actual innocence in regards to the section 924 claim. 

 A petitioner may demonstrate cause if his “constitutional claim is so novel that its 

legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 

Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson, vagueness challenges to the residual clause 

of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) were not reasonably available. Similarly, 

the possible extension of the reasoning of Johnson to the guidelines’ similar language was 

not reasonably available. As such, Petitioner demonstrates cause. 

 Petitioner also demonstrates prejudice because an application of an incorrect 

Guidelines range and sentencing affects a defendant’s substantial rights. Molina-Martinez 

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346-47 (2016); United States v. Bonilla-Guizar, 729 

F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). 

II. Timeliness

 Respondent argues Petitioner is barred by the one year statute of limitations. A 

motion filed under section 2255 must be filed within a year of 

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental 

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 

movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
5 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff contends his motion is timely because it was filed within a year of the 

decision in Johnson, which he asserts recognized that the language of the residual clause 

was unconstitutionally vague. 

A. Guidelines

 In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the “residual clause” of the ACCA, which 

authorized a sentence enhancement based on a finding that a defendant’s prior conviction 

“present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” was unconstitutionally 

vague and could not be relied upon to enhance a sentence. 135 S.Ct. 1557. The Court 

determined the decision in Johnson was substantive and has retroactive effect on collateral 

review in Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016). In Beckles, the 

Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the holding in Johnson applies to the 

residual clause of section 4B1.2(a) of the guidelines which contains the same language as 

the ACCA residual clause. The Court determined the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a) 

is not void for vagueness, reasoning the Guidelines are merely advisory, guiding a court’s 

discretion, and do not implicate vagueness concerns of notice and preventing arbitrary 

enforcement. 137 S.Ct. at 892 - 895. Petitioner contends Beckles is not applicable to his 

motion because he was sentenced when the Guidelines were mandatory. He contends his 

sentence is unconstitutional under the holding of Johnson. 

 The Court agrees the holding in Beckles does not apply to Petitioner’s motion 

because he was sentenced prior to the decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 

(2005), which determined the Guidelines were advisory. Contrary to Petitioner’s 

contention, the Supreme Court did not determine whether its holding in Johnson should be 

extended to the mandatory Guidelines pre-Booker. See Beckles, 137 S.Ct. at 896 n.4 

(Sotomayor, J. concurring) (“That question is not presented by this case and I, like the 

majority take no position on its appropriate resolution”). The holding in Beckles clearly 

relies upon the advisory nature of the Guidelines. As such, this Court does not agree that 

Johnson applies to Petitioner’s challenge to the language of the mandatory Guidelines. 

Nearly all the courts in the Ninth Circuit addressing the issue have determined that 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
6 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

extending the reasoning of Johnson to the sentencing enhancements of the pre-Booker 

Guidelines is a new rule not recognized by the Supreme Court in Johnson. See United 

States v. Gildersleeve, 2017 WL 5895135 (D.Or. November 2017); United States v. 

Patrick, 2017 WL 4683929 (D.Or. October 2017); United States v. Colasanti, 282 

F.Supp.3d 1213 (D.Or. September 2017) (Finding the right recognized in Johnson is 

limited to the ACCA’s residual clause); United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 2017 WL 3269231 

(S.D.Cal. August 2017); United States v. Beraldo, 2017 WL 2888565 (D.Or. July 2017) 

(Finding the right asserted by the petitioner has not been recognized by the Supreme 

Court); Hirano v. United States, 2017 WL 2661629 (D. Hawaii June 2017) (Determining 

the petitioner’s claim for relief from sentencing enhancements requires a new rule that must 

come from the Supreme Court); Hodges v. United States, 2017 WL 1652967 (W.D.Wash. 

May 2017). This Court agrees with the sound reasoning of these district courts. Petitioner 

seeks to extend the rule in Johnson which must come from the Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, Johnson is not applicable and Petitioner’s motion is untimely. 

B. Section 924(c)

 Petitioner maintains his conviction for using a firearm during a “crime of violence” 

under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c) must be vacated because his conviction for armed bank 

robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the statute. Section 924(c) defines a 

“crime of violence” as an offense that is a felony and 

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person or property of another, or 

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person 

or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Courts generally refer to clause (A) as the “force clause” and to 

clause (B) as the “residual clause.” See United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1256 

(9th Cir. 2017). 

 Petitioner argues the definition of crime of violence in the residual clause of section 

924(c) is identical to the provision of 18 U.S.C. section 16 the Ninth Circuit found 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
7 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unconstitutionally vague in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) after Johnson. 

He further argues the “force clause” of the statute is identical to the force clause of the 

Career Offender Guidelines. 

 Respondent argues Johnson does not invalidate section 924(c) because the Court 

made clear in its decision that the reach of Johnson is limited. Respondent further argues 

section 924(c) does not suffer from the same flaws as the ACCA’s residual clause and the 

holding of Dimaya is not applicable here. 

 In his supplement briefing filed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions 

v. Dimaya, Petitioner argues the Supreme Court rejected the arguments asserted by 

Respondent here in the context of section 16(b) and did not limit its holding to section 

16(b). Petitioner further asserts the dissent explicitly acknowledged the holding called into 

question convictions under the residual clause of section 924(c). 

 The Supreme Court in Johnson limited the application of its holding to the residual 

clause of the ACCA. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563. (“Today’s decision does not call into 

question application of the Act to...the remainder of the Act’s definition.”). As such, 

Johnson is not applicable to Petitioner’s conviction under section 924(c) and his petition is 

untimely. 

 Additionally, in United States v. Wright, the Ninth Circuit held that armed bank 

robbery under 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a) and (d) qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 

U.S.C. section 924(c)(3) “because one of the elements of the offense is a ‘taking by force 

and violence or by intimidation’.” 215 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). Following the 

decision in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly determined no intervening authority 

has overruled Wright and it remains controlling precedent. See United States v. Cross, 691 

Fed.Appx. 312 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Pritchard, 692 Fed.Appx. 349 (9th Cir. 

2017); United States v. Jordan, 680 Fed.Appx. 634 (9th Cir. 2017). On February 1, 2018, 

the Ninth Circuit, again determined armed bank robbery under section 2113(a) and (d) 

qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c) in United States v. Watson. 881 F.3d 

782 (9th Cir. 2018). The court in Watson utilized the categorical approach in making its 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
8 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determination that armed bank robbery qualified as a crime of violence under the force 

clause. The categorical approach compares the elements of the statutory offense to the 

generic definition of a crime of violence and determines whether the offense matches or is 

broader than the generic definition. See Mathis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 

2243, 2248 (2016); United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006). The 

court reasoned that a conviction for armed bank robbery requires proof of all the elements 

of unarmed bank robbery, and therefore, armed bank robbery does not require conduct that 

involves less force than unarmed bank robbery. Watson, 881 at 786. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s argument that his conviction under section 924(c) must be vacated because his 

conviction for armed bank robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence is without merit. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. section 2254, a district court 

“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant” in Section 2255 cases such as this. A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial 

of a Section 2255 habeas petition unless he obtains a certificate of appealability from a 

district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 

F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain authority to issue 

certificates of appealability under AEDPA). A certificate of appealability is authorized “if 

the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, a petitioner must show that: (1) the 

issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the issues in a 

different manner, or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)). 

 Based on this Court’s review of the record, this Court finds no issues are debatable 

among jurists of reason and no issues could be resolved in a different manner. This Court 

further finds that no questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
9 

16cv0892 JAH Criminal No.: 93cv0821 JAH 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence is DENIED; 

 and 

 2. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability. 

DATED: April 30, 2018 

 

 _________________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

Case 3:16-cv-00892-JAH Document 2 Filed 04/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9