Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01239/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01239-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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As discussed below, the California Supreme Court 1

subsequently denied review of an intermediate appellate court

decision that could have provided definitive guidance on whether

plaintiffs must prove intentional disability discrimination under

the Unruh Act to obtain damages.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD WILSON,

NO. CIV.S-05-1239 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

 O R D E R

v.

HARIA and GOGRI CORP. dba TO BE PUBLISHED

JACK-IN-THE-BOX #551; OPT

GOLDEN HILLS VAC, LLC,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA") and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh

Act") by failing to remove architectural barriers at its restaurant.

Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The

court previously stayed the motion pending the potential resolution of

a question of state law by the California Supreme Court. This court now

1

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 All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 2

 At several points, defendant notes that the only evidence 3

supporting plaintiff’s factual allegations is his own declaration.

This is, however, sufficient to meet plaintiff’s initial burden on

summary judgment, and as defendant repeatedly fails to tender any

probative evidence in opposition, the court may appropriately treat

these allegations as effectively undisputed.

 Defendant notes that, on one occasion in 2006, the owner and 4

operator of the restaurant allegedly observed plaintiff walking

without the assistance of a cane or a wheelchair. Decl. of

Maheshkumar Gogri (“Maheshkumar Decl.”) ¶ 4. 

2

resolves the matter based on the parties papers and after oral argument.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I. Facts2

Plaintiff Ronald Wilson is a 70 year old disabled man.

Plaintiff suffers from severe idiopathic neuropathy, peripheral

neuropathy (“silent disease”) with symptoms of ALS (a.k.a. Lou

Gehrig’s disease), and motor-sensory neuropathy. Decl. of Ronald 3

Wilson (“Wilson Decl.”) ¶ 3. Because of his condition, plaintiff

experiences stiffness, muscle twitching, shaking, weakness, and

spasms. Id. When traveling in public, plaintiff uses a cane,

wheelchair, or both. Plaintiff also owns a van with a spinner knob 4

and has been issued a disability placard by the state of California.

Plaintiff regularly visits the defendant Haria and Gorgri

Corporation’s restaurant, a Jack-in-the-Box. He retained receipts to

the restaurant from thirteen separate visits over 2005-2006. Wilson

Decl. ¶ 11. In each of these visits, plaintiff alleges that there

were several architectural barriers in place that prevented plaintiff

from enjoying full and equal access to the goods and services at the

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 Defendant does not dispute that these barriers were in 5

existence at the time of plaintiff’s visits but merely claims that

they have since been remedied.

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restaurant. 

There is no dispute that after commencement of the instant suit,

at least some of these barriers were removed. Plaintiff maintains,

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however, that there are six outstanding barriers that had yet to be

remedied as of August 24, 2006. Wilson Decl. ¶ 16. Specifically,

plaintiff identified the following six barriers: (1) the cut-out curb

ramp had a slope of 8.8% at the top and 12.6% at the bottom; (2) the

door to the men’s restroom did not have a 12-inch strike side

clearance on the push side, the door pressure was 12 pounds, and the

door did not open to a full ninety degrees; (3) the toilet paper

dispenser was 42 inches from the back wall; (4) the restroom

handle/lock was not accessible; (5) none of the accessible seating in

the restaurant was designated as accessible with signage; and (6) the

disabled parking space lacked the words “No Parking” painted in the

access aisle. Id.

With respect to at least two of the barriers, defendant claims

that they have been remedied as of November 27, 2006 (the date that

the declaration of Maheshkumar Gogri was executed). First, defendant

contends that the words “no parking” are now painted in the access

aisle of the disabled parking spot. Gogri Decl. ¶ 11. Second,

defendant maintains that the toilet paper dispenser is now in

compliance with all regulations. Id. However, plaintiff visited the

restaurant on November 30, 2006 and took photographs that show that

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the dispenser is still 42 inches from the back wall. Wilson Decl. II,

¶ 3(c), Ex. E.

With respect to the issue of signage for accessible seating in

the restaurant, defendant contends that the placards are often stolen,

vandalized, or otherwise obscured by customers, and that it is the

policy of the restaurant to replace the placards in such

circumstances. Id. Accordingly, defendant states that if plaintiff

observed the absence of required signage, it was because the placards

were in the process of being replaced. Id. When plaintiff visited

the restaurant on November 30, 2006, he found that the signage was

still missing, and took photographs to document his observations. 

Wilson Decl. II, ¶ 3(f), Ex. F.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157

(1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in

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reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See

id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court

demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set

forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as

to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also First Nat'l

Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor

Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853.

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support

of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S.

at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1998). The

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

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material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987)), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g &

Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute,

the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact

conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'

differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S.

at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the

"purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess

the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee's note on 1963 amendments); see also Int’l Union of

Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska,

Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); see also In

re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The

evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 477

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U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). See also

Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air,

and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against defendant Haria and

Gogri Corp, seeking damages under state law and injunctive relief

under the ADA. With respect to damages, defendant argues that, in

light of recent California case law, proof of intent to discriminate

on the basis of disability is required for damages under section 52(a)

of the Unruh Act. With respect to injunctive relief, defendant

contends that the alleged violations have either been remedied or

would cost too much to remedy, and that the alleged violations do not

render the restaurant or its facilities inaccessible. For the reasons

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 The fact that defendant asserts that plaintiff was observed 6

walking without the aid of a cane or wheelchair on one occasion is

not sufficient to create a genuine dispute regarding this issue.

Gogri Decl. ¶ 11. Such an event would not negate the fact that

plaintiff’s numerous medical conditions nevertheless constitute a

substantial limitation on his ability to walk. See 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j) (defining substantial limitation as either a total

inability to perform major life activity or a significant

restriction on the same). 

8

set forth below, plaintiff’s motion is granted.

A. ADA Claim

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people

with disabilities in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §

12182(a). One form of such discrimination is the failure to remove

architectural barriers. 24 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). In order to

prove discrimination stemming from an architectural barrier, plaintiff

must demonstrate that (1) he is disabled, (2) the facility in question

is a place of public accommodation, (3) the facility contains an

architectural barrier, (4) the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the

architectural barrier precluding his full and equal access to the

facility. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12188(a).

There is little dispute that most of these elements are present

in the case at bar. First, given that plaintiff is unable to walk

without the use of a mobility aid (e.g., wheelchair or cane), there is

no genuine dispute that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.6

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining disability as a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity).

Second, a restaurant is a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §

12181(7)(B). Third, assuming the alleged architectural barriers

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 The Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on this issue, but courts 7

are generally in agreement that whether barrier removal is readily

achievable is an affirmative defense. See Colorado Cross

Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P’ship, 264 F.3d 999,

1002-03 (10th Cir. 2001); Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks,

Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006). See also Lentini v.

Calif. Ctr. for the Arts, 270 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding

that whether an accommodation “fundamentally alters” a service or

facility is an affirmative defense).

In Colorado Cross, the Tenth Circuit established a burdenshifting framework in which the plaintiff bears in the initial

burden of production but the defendant bears the ultimate burden

of persuasion. 264 F.3d at 1002-03. The plaintiff must first

suggest a method of barrier removal and proffer evidence that the

method meets the statutory definition of readily achievable. Id.

Thereafter, the burden shifts to the defendants to rebut that

showing and prove that the suggested method is not readily

achievable. Id.

Here, defendant has failed to plead that barrier removal is

not readily achievable in its answer. Accordingly, the defense is

waived. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 819

(9th Cir. 2004). While plaintiff has not come forward with any

evidence regarding barrier removal, he need not do so where such

evidence would be unnecessary, given defendant’s waiver. In

contrast, the Colorado Cross court noted that the defendant in that

case had properly pled that barrier removal was not readily

achievable as an affirmative defense. Id., n.3. 

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exist, plaintiff satisfies the requirement of actual knowledge, given

that he personally encountered them during his multiple visits to the

restaurant. Fourth, while defendant would ordinarily be entitled to

prove that the removal of the alleged architectural barriers is not

“readily achievable” (given that the facility was in existence prior

to the passage of the ADA in 1993), the court holds that this is an

affirmative defense, which defendant has waived. Accordingly, the 7

only remaining issue is whether the architectural barriers alleged by

plaintiff were in place during his visits, and whether they continue

to exist.

///

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 Title III gives the Department of Justice authority to 8

develop regulations implementing the requirements of the ADA. 42

U.S.C. § 12186(b). Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney

General adopted the ADA Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAGs")

codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, Appendix A. See Fortyune v. Am.

Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).

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1. Cut-Out Curb Ramp

Defendant concedes that the slope of the cut-out curb ramp is in

violation of ADAAG § 4.7.2 and 4.8.2. However, it defends this non8

compliance on two grounds. First, defendant states, without any

accompanying evidence, that fixing the grade “would be several

thousand dollars.” Gogri Decl. ¶ 11(b). However, as noted above,

defendant waived its ability to make this argument when it failed to

plead that the barrier removal was not “readily achievable” as an

affirmative defense. Second, defendant maintains that the degree of

non-compliance is de minimis and did not render the restaurant

inaccessible. The argument misapprehends the law. Ultimate access is

not a defense under the ADA. See Boemio v. Love’s Rest., 954 F. Supp.

204, 208 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“The standard cannot be ‘is access

achievable in some manner’. We must focus on the equality of access.

If a finding that ultimate access could have been achieved provided a

defense, the spirit of the law would be defeated.”).

2. Restroom Door

There is no genuine dispute that the men’s restroom door is

inaccessible in several respects. First, there is not a 12-inch

strike side clearance on the push side of the door required by ADAAG §

4.13.6. Defendant claims that fixing this violation would cost

$70,000 and that it does not render the restroom inaccessible. Both

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these arguments are unavailing, for the reasons noted above. Second,

the door pressure required to open the door is 12 pounds, exceeding

the 5 pound maximum allowed by ADAAG § 4.13.11. Defendant has no

response to this contention and its accompanying evidence. Third,

plaintiff presents evidence that the door-stop prevents the door from

opening to a full 90 degrees. ADAAG § 4.13.5. Again, defendant fails

to respond to this point. 

3. Toilet Paper Dispenser

Plaintiff also provides evidence that the toilet paper dispenser

is too far from the back wall. Specifically, it is 42 inches away,

exceeding the maximum 36 inches allowed. ADAAG § 4.17.3; Fig. 30(d).

Wilson Decl. II, ¶ 3(c), Ex. E. Defendant states that the dispenser

was moved and was in compliance as of November 27, 2006. However,

plaintiff visited the restaurant on November 30, 2006, and took

pictures of the restroom, placing a measuring tape along the wall to

document the distance from the back wall to the dispenser. There is

no genuine dispute that the dispenser location is still in violation.

4. Interior Door Handle of Restroom Door

Plaintiff states that the inside door handle of the restroom

door requires tight grasping, pinching, or twisting of the wrist to

operate, in violation of ADAAG §§ 4.27.4 and 4.13.9. Defendant has no

response to this, aside from stating that “It is impossible to comply

with a Complaint like this since it is so unclear.” Gogri Decl. ¶

11(e). Having failed to produce any evidence, there is no genuine

dispute that the door handle is in violation of ADAAG §§ 4.27.4 and

4.13.9.

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5. Signage for Accessible Seating

Defendant concedes that the required signage is often absent,

but claims that this is due to constant theft and vandalism. However,

plaintiff’s evidence indicates that as of November 30, 2006, after

defendant's opposition was filed, the signage was absent, just as it

was absent on each of plaintiff’s previous visit. While the court

must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of defendant, here, it

would be unreasonable for the court to presume that the signage

happens to have been stolen all thirteen times that plaintiff can

document that he visited the restaurant. Accordingly, there is no

genuine dispute that defendant has violated the relevant ADAAGs

regarding required signage. ADAAG §§ 4.1.2(7), 4.1.16(3), 4.30.3.

6. “No Parking” Painted in Access Aisle

Plaintiff concedes that, at present time, defendant has remedied

this problem. Accordingly, the motion with regard to this issue is

moot.

In sum, the court finds that there is no genuine dispute that

plaintiff has satisfied all the elements of his ADA claim with respect

to all five of the outstanding architectural barriers described above

that have yet to be removed. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment for the ADA claim is granted.

B. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment with respect to his

state law cause of action under the Unruh Act and the Disabled Persons

Act (“DPA”), and seeks damages under the former. Both statutes

incorporate the ADA by reference. The Unruh Act was amended in 1992

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 The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review 9

on January 17, 2007.

13

to include the following language (now codified at Cal. Civ. Code §

51(f)): “A violation of the right of any individual under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall

also constitute a violation of this section.” One critical difference

between the ADA and the Unruh Act, however, is the available remedy. 

The Unruh Act provides for a minimum damages of $4,000 per violation,

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a), while the only remedy available under Title

III of the ADA is injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). Under

the ADA, damages are not recoverable. Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856,

858 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, defendant argues that in order to obtain damages

authorized by the Unruh Act, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant

had an intent to discriminate. The argument is premised upon a recent

California intermediate appellate court decision, Gunther v. Lin, 50

Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), which was decided after

plaintiff’s motion was filed. Where the highest court of a state has

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not pronounced upon an issue of state law, as is the case here, a

federal court sitting in diversity must use its own best judgment to

predict how that court would decide the issue. Takahashi v. Loomis

Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980). 

In conducting this analysis, a federal court looks to guidance

from state appellate court opinions, well-reasoned decisions from

other jurisdictions, and treatises. U.S. v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 443

(9th Cir. 2002). Because a federal court must take into account “all

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available data,” Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.

1982), the decision of a California intermediate appellate court is 

not controlling. Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482

(9th Cir. 1986) ("‘[D]ecisions by California Courts of Appeal are

merely data’") (quoting Am. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. EM-KAY Eng’g Co., 478

F. Supp. 809, 813 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (Karlton, J.)). Of course, such a

decision “is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is

convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state

would decide otherwise.” Estrella, 682 F.2d at 817.

1. Prior Ninth Circuit Law

As a threshold matter, the court notes that the holding of

Gunther directly contradicts that of Lentini v. Calif. Ctr. for the

Arts. 270 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2004). There, the Ninth Circuit held

that because plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent under the

ADA, plaintiffs also need not prove discriminatory intent under the

Unruh Act, which imported ADA standards of liability. Id. at 847.

This holding was in accord with the extant case law at the time, which

also held that intent was not required. See, e.g., Presta v.

Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers, 16 F. Supp. 1134, 1135 (N.D. Cal.

1998) (“Because the Unruh Act has adopted the full expanse of the ADA,

it must follow, that the same standards for liability apply under both

Acts.”).

Gunther’s holding raises the issue for district courts

as to whether they are bound by Lentini or are now obligated to

reconsider the matter in light of the subsequent opinion by an

intermediate court of the state. The state of the law is less

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 Compare In re E&S Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 10

1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862,

866 (10th Cir. 2003), Aceto v. Zurich Ins. Co., 440 F.2d. 1320,1322

(3rd Cir. 1971), and Nussbaum v. Mortgage Serv. America Co., 913 F.

Supp. 1548, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1995) with Taco Bell Corp. V. Cont'l Cas.

Co., 388 F.3d. 1077-79 (7th Cir. 2004).

 The problem is particularly troublesome in California. I 11

have previously noted the relative weakness of the doctrine of

stare decisis in California jurisprudence. See Froyd v. Cook, 681

F. Supp. 669, 672 n.9 (E.D. Cal. 1988). There, after examining the

status of the doctrine within the state, I observed that a “federal

district court need give no greater weight to intermediate

appellate decisions than the superior court of the state does."

Id.; see also Ortland v. County of Tehama, 939 F. Supp. 1465, 1468

(E.D. Cal. 1996). I am not aware of any change in California law

bearing upon the issue.

This is so even though the California Supreme Court denied 12

review in Gunther. Denial of review is "not [] without

significance," but review may be denied for any number of reasons

(including, for instance, the fact that there is not yet an

appellate district split on an issue), and it does not necessarily

signal the California Supreme Court's approval of a particular

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than clear. In In re Watts, the Ninth Circuit held that an

intervening decision by an intermediate court requires that

court to reconsider a previous contrary opinion. In re Watts,

298 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). This does not answer the

question of whether a district court is free to disregard the

Circuit’s previous opinion, a question which has divided courts

around the country. Happily, this court need not answer that 10

question. Whatever else is true, it is clear that federal 11

courts are free to disregard the decisions of intermediate state

courts where there is “convincing evidence” that the state's

highest court would decide differently. In re Watts, 298 F.3d

at 1083. Here, there is convincing evidence suggesting that the

decision is not likely the law of the state of California.12

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26 case. DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178 (1962).

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 2. Gunther

In short, Gunther held what every other court before it has

rejected: that proof of intent is required to collect damages for

disability discrimination under the Unruh Act, which authorizes a

minimum of $4,000 per violation. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325; Cal. Civ.

Code § 52(a). The court reached this conclusion by interpreting the

1992 legislation that amended the Unruh Act to include disability

discrimination. Specifically, it found that this legislation did not

overrule Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1172

(1991), which, in rejecting a disparate impact theory of sex

discrimination, noted that the statute’s language (e.g., “denies,”

“aids or incites a denial,” “make any discrimination,” and “offense”)

appeared to cover only intentional discrimination. This language was

not altered by the 1992 legislation.

Conceptually, then, Gunther envisions a two-step process for

obtaining damages: first, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant

engaged in discrimination, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, and second, that the

discrimination was intentional, Cal. Civ. Code § 52. According to

Gunther, the 1992 legislation altered the first step (by expanding the

class of prohibited discrimination to include disability

discrimination) but did nothing to alter the second step.

Gunther’s reasoning is flawed from the outset. Its conclusion

is premised on the view that the Unruh Act is comprised only of

Section 51, but this divorces the law from its enforcement provision

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 Furthermore, as discussed below, the legislative history to 13

Section 51(f) also indicates that the legislature viewed the Unruh

Act as comprising both Sections 51 and 52.

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in Section 52. While Gunther notes that, by its own terms, the Unruh

Act comprises only Section 51, the case that Gunther cites for this

proposition goes on to say that courts “have consistently described as

Unruh Civil Rights Act claims causes of action based under seemingly

related provisions set forth in sections of the Civil Code that follow

section 51.” Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 756

(2002). Indeed, even the Harris court referred to the Unruh Act as

encompassing the enforcement provision found in Section 52. 52 Cal.

3d at 1172 (referring to Section 52 as “the language of the Act”).13

Accordingly, when the 1992 legislation made a violation of the ADA a

per se violation of the Unruh Act, it also intended that these victims

of disability discrimination would be entitled to the remedies

afforded in the enforcement provision.

a. Plain Meaning

The traditional rules of statutory construction compel the same

conclusion. The first step of statutory construction is to assign the

“usual and ordinary meanings” to the words of a statute. Wells v.

One2One Learning Found., 29 Cal. 4th 1164, 1170 (2006). “If the words

themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it

said, and the statute's plain meaning governs.” Id.

Here, the language of the 1992 legislation, codified in (now)

Section 51(f), could not be clearer: “A violation of any right of any

individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of this

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 “[T]his bill would make a violation of the ADA a violation of the 14

Unruh Act. Thereby providing persons injured by a violation of the ADA

with the remedies provided by the Unruh Act (e.g., right of private

action for damages, including punitive damages).” 

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section.” As noted above, “this section” refers to the Unruh Act,

including its enforcement provision in Section 52. Every court to

have considered the issue with the exception of Gunther has read

Section 51(f) as not requiring proof of intent. See, e.g., Lentini,

370 F.3d at 847; Presta, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1136; Hubbard v. Twin Oaks

Health and Rehabilitation Ctr., 408 F. Supp. 2d 923, 928-99 (2004)

(Karlton, J.); Boemio, 954 F. Supp. at 208.

b. Legislative History

The legislative history of Section 51(f) reveals an intent to

include unintentional disability discrimination within the scope of

the Unruh Act. The Assembly Committee on Judiciary report on AB 1077

(as amended January 2, 1992, p.2) stated that the bill would: “Make a

violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Act. Thereby providing

persons injured by a violation of the ADA with the remedies provided

by the Unruh Act (e.g., right of private action for damages).” The

description in the Senate Committee on Judiciary report on AB 1077 (as

amended June 1, 1992, p. 5) expressed a similar view.14

Also of particular significance is a letter from a labor law

advisor for the California Chamber of Commerce to the bill’s author

which stated that the proposed bill would expose operators of places

of public accommodations “to greater liability [than the ADA], even

for unintentional violations of the new federal standard.” Gunther,

50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 337 (quoting letter from Malanie Wiegner, Labor

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 The court in Cross ultimately declined to exercise 15

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's Unruh Act claims in the

interests of comity. Here, however, and in contrast to Cross,

defendants have not filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental

state law claims. Furthermore, the court finds that the issue of

state law presented by the instant action is not particularly novel

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Law Advisor, California Chamber of Commerce, to Honorable Bruce

Bronzan, dated June 1, 1992, at page 2).

Gunther sweeps this letter aside. The court argues that the

Disabled Persons Act “does indeed [] allow for greater liability for

the ADA than the ADA itself allows.” Id. at 337. But, quite

obviously, the legislature was voting on changes to the Unruh Act, not

the DPA, and the letter was referring to the higher liability imposed

by the former, not the latter. Of course, a lone letter is not

controlling, but, as the only piece of legislative history to squarely

address the issue of intent, it is nonetheless extremely relevant.

And it is certainly more relevant than the inference Gunther attempts

to draw from the “little opposition” that the bill drew from business

groups. Id. at 337. 

As the court in Cross recently noted in a post-Gunther decision,

"the result under Gunther [] leaves a successful ADA plaintiff without

a corresponding Unruh Act remedy [and] undermines the California

legislature's purpose in passing section 51(f) to provide that a

violation of the ADA is also a violation of the Unruh Act." Cross v.

Pac. Coast Plaza Invs., L.P., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16138, *15 (S.D.

Cal. Mar. 6, 2007). Like the court in Cross, this court also

"presumes that the California legislature did not intend section 51(f)

to be a law that is all bark and no bite." Id., at *15-16. 15

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or complex in light of the overwhelming body of case law finding

that proof of intent is not required.

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c. Liberal Construction

If the language of the Section 51(f) were ambiguous, and the

legislative history unclear -- which they are not -- the California

Supreme Court has also held that the Unruh Act must be interpreted “in

the broadest sense reasonably possible” in order to “banish

[discriminatory] practices from California’s community life.” 

Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 76 (1985);

see also Presta, 16 F. Supp. at 1136; Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57

Cal. 2d 463, 468 (1962). If this statement is to have any force

beyond mere rhetoric, it must be applied to situations such as this

one, where a court might construe a statute in two different ways, one

narrow and one broad.

Moreover, liberal construction of the Unruh Act is needed to

banish the discriminatory practices at issue here. As Judge Henderson

recognized in Presta, disability discrimination is simply different

than other forms of discrimination. “Combating discrimination as it

affects persons with disabilities requires recognizing . . . that

often the most damaging instances in which rights of persons with

disabilities are denied come not as the result of malice or

discriminatory intent, but rather from benevolent inaction when action

is required.” 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. See also Boemio, 954 F. Supp.

at 208 n.4. 

As discussed below, there is an obvious practical connection

between the availability of the $4,000 damage minimum and the

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enforcement of the ADA. Second, injunctive relief was already

available in 1992, when the Unruh Act was amended to include

disability discrimination. Because of the “sweeping” coverage of

California’s Unfair Competition Law, see Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins.

Co., 78 Cal. App. 4th 952, 964 (2000), injunctive relief for ADA

violations was already available under state law. Accordingly, if

this court were to follow Gunther, it would nullify the 1992

legislation, and it is clear that courts may not conclude that the

legislature engaged in an idle gesture. Viking Pools v. Maloney, 48

Cal. 3d 602, 609 (1998).

d. Other Canons of Statutory Construction

Gunther also relies upon three canons of statutory construction:

avoidance of statutory redundancy/nullification, the rule of

reasonable construction, and legislative acquiescence. 50 Cal. Rptr.

4th at 327-33, 338-39. As explained below, the court finds that none

of these canons alters the conclusion that the Unruh Act covers

unintentional ADA violations.

i. Avoiding Statutory Redundancy/Nullification

First, Gunther argues that if the Unruh Act were read to include

unintentional ADA violations, it would nullify the DPA or render it

redundant. The DPA has been interpreted to authorize damages of no

less than $1,000 per violation, even where no intent to discriminate

is shown. See Donald v. Café Royale, 218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 177 1990). 

According to Gunther, “the two statutes [the Unruh Act and the DPA]

dovetail nicely. Where there is intentional discrimination, there is

a four times larger minimum penalty; if there isn’t, plaintiff still

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 At the same time, it is not clear that the two prohibit the 16

same class of conduct, and it is possible that the DPA prohibits

a smaller category of discrimination tied to physical places. The

Unruh Act entitles all individuals to “full and equal

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in

all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 51. By contrast, the DPA’s language is narrower. It

provides disabled people “with the same right as the general public

to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks,

walkways, public buildings, medical facilities, including

hospitals, clinics and physicians’ offices, public facilities and

other public places.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54(a). Accordingly, it is

an open question whether the DPA covers discrimination unconnected

to a physical location, as in insurance discrimination, or

discrimination on the internet.

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interpretation also risks nullifying Section 51(f).

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recovers, but less.” Gunther, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331.

I cannot agree. The DPA and the Unruh Act are inevitably

redundant in some respects, no matter how the court construes the

latter. Gunther characterizes the DPA as covering only unintentional 16

discrimination, and the Unruh Act as covering only intentional

discrimination, but such is not the case. Rather, the DPA authorizes

damages for both intentional and unintentional discrimination, because

intent is simply irrelevant under the statute. See Café Royale, 218

Cal. App. 3d at 177 (“Viewing the statute reasonably and in a

commonsense fashion compels the conclusion that no intent element is

set forth.”). Accordingly, the portion of the DPA covering

intentional discrimination is inevitably redundant with the portion of

the Unruh Act covering intentional discrimination.17

ii. Rule of Reasonable Construction

Second, Gunther argues that the rule of reasonable construction

also points toward adopting its interpretation of the Unruh Act. Id.

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 One cannot but help noting the pious recognition of the 18

statute's salutary purpose before each deprivation of a benefit

under the statute.

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at 338. See Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 4th 1272,

1291 (“To the extent [] examination of statutory language leaves

uncertainty, it is appropriate to consider the consequences that will

flow from a particular interpretation”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Gunther argues that its interpretation is the more

reasonable one for two reasons. First, it purportedly avoids

redundancy, an issue addressed above. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 338.

Second, it allegedly avoids the “gross abuses of the judicial system”

that have been caused by an interpretation of the Unruh Act embracing

monetary liability for unintentional ADA violations (e.g., the Ninth

Circuit’s holding in Lentini). Id.

Gunther argues that ADA litigation has been spurred by the

minimum $4,000 penalty for “unintentional technical violations of the

ADAAGS” and cites with approval the lamentation of one district court

that “[d]espite the important mission of the ADA, there are those

individuals who would abuse its private cause of action provision by

filing lawsuits solely with the intent to profit financially.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

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As an initial matter, the fact that the Unruh Act contains a

damages provision that happens to provide an incentive for its

enforcement hardly lends support for a claim that the law is being

undermined. Because insufficient public resources have been invested

in enforcing the law, and in educating the public about the ADA, this

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that a person has filed multiple lawsuits does not make him or her

a vexatious litigant. Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., 411 F.

Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“[T]he number of lawsuits

plaintiff has filed does not reflect that he is a vexatious

litigant; rather, it appears to reflect the failure of the

defendants to comply with the law.”). 

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task has been left to private parties and their attorneys. It would

be fundamentally unfair to, on the one hand, deny disabled people the

benefit of public enforcement, while, on the other, deprive them of an

incentive for their efforts at private enforcement.19

Furthermore, there is no basis in law for distinguishing between

“real” violations of the ADA and merely unintentional “technical”

violations of the ADA. A court cannot pick and choose which

violations it deems serious enough to warrant relief under the Unruh

Act. Presumably, no court would argue that placing a toilet paper

dispenser too far for a disabled person to reach with ease -- which is

what the defendant in this case did -- is merely a “technical”

violation. The legislature has drawn clear lines with respect to what

is legal and what is illegal, and it is not for a court to arbitrarily

decide which violations are serious enough to warrant relief.

iii. Legislative Acquiescence

Third, Gunther invokes the doctrine of legislative acquiescence

in finding that the legislature did not overrule Harris. Gunther, 50

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 327. In short, it contends the California

legislature is presumed to be aware of prior judicial constructions of

statutes. While the presumption is not conclusive, Harris, 52 Cal. 3d

at 1156, it is a factor to be considered. Here, Gunther argues that

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since the legislature amended the Unruh Act in 1992, but failed to

change the language construed by Harris as requiring intent, the

legislature approved of the court’s judicial construction.

The doctrine of legislative acquiescence is of little assistance

here. First, as noted above, the case law prior to Gunther has

uniformly held that intent was not required to obtain damages for

disability discrimination. If the legislature had acquiesced to

anything, it was that body of case law spanning multiple years, not a

few lines from Harris. Second, even if the court acquiesced to

Harris, it is impossible to know which part they acquiesced to.

Harris rejected a disparate impact theory of sex discrimination for

multiple reasons, including, for example, the fact that there was no

language or history to suggest that the legislature envisioned

disparate impact as a viable claim, and that federal decisions at that

time were in conflict as to the availability of that claim. 52 Cal.

3d at 1172-73.

Finally, Gunther’s discussion of legislative acquiescence is

circular. Application of the doctrine serves to reinforce Gunther’s

interpretation of the statute only if one accepts, as a starting

point, that the text of the statute does not evince an intent to

authorize damages for unintentional ADA violations. In other words,

if one were to construe Section 51(f) as authorizing damages for

unintentional ADA violations based on its language, as the courts did

in Lentini and Presta, it would make no sense to say that the

legislature acquiesced to a judicial construction entirely contrary to

what it in fact intended. 

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In sum, the court concludes that a plaintiff may obtain damages

under the Unruh Act for violations of the ADA even without a showing

of intentional discrimination. In light of both the legislative

history of the statute, and the directive to interpret the statute as

broadly as possible to effectuate its purposes, the court finds that

Gunther does not control. Accordingly, the relief requested is hereby

granted, and plaintiff is entitled to $52,000 for defendant’s thirteen

violations of the Unruh Act.

IV. Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment is granted as to the ADA claim

and the Unruh Act claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 22, 2007.

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