Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00114/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00114-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIK MARTINEZ, No. 2:14-cv-0114-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

BRYAN FLICKER,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s complaint is vague. He appears to be alleging that his First

Amendment rights to free exercise of religion has been violated. However, he fails to allege

sufficient facts for the court to evaluate that claim. Rather, the allegations in the complaint

revolves around the prison officials’ response, or lack thereof, to his inmate grievance regarding

some denial of his religious freedom. He states that defendant Flicker denied his freedom of

religion by failing to address his inmate grievance; and that defendants Hoovey, Honea, and

Smith were notified, but failed to respond.

II. DISCUSSION

To the extent plaintiff’s claim centers on the lack of response to his inmate

grievance, he cannot state a claim. Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to

the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988);

see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty

interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any

particular grievance process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or

failing to properly process grievances. Numerous district courts in this circuit have reached the

same conclusion. See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL 1051947 (N.D. Cal 1999) (finding that

failure to properly process grievances did not violate any constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra,

1996 WL 506863 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison officials’ failure to properly process

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and address grievances does not support constitutional claim); James v. U.S. Marshal’s Service,

1995 WL 29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend because failure

to process a grievance did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994

WL 245967 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that prisoner’s claim that grievance process failed to

function properly failed to state a claim under § 1983). Prisoners do, however, retain a First

Amendment right to petition the government through the prison grievance process. See Bradley

v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, interference with the grievance process

may, in certain circumstances, implicate the First Amendment. 

Here, other than the lack of response to his inmate grievance, it does not appear

plaintiff is claiming interference. Rather, he appears to be concerned simply that his grievance

was not granted. To that extent, plaintiff cannot state a claim.

In addition, many of the defendants named appear to be supervisors. Supervisory

personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability

under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the

notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government officials, regardless of their title, can

only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Supervisory personnel who

implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and

the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be liable even where such

personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942

F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948.

To the extent plaintiff alleges defendants Hoovey, Honea, and Smith were all

notified about the lack of response to his grievance, and failed to act, such allegations do not state

a claim. Only if the defendants were actually personally involved in the denial of a constitutional

right would plaintiff have a claim under § 1983. 

To the extent plaintiff’s claim is actually a denial of his religious rights, he fails to

provide any facts as to how his rights were denied, and by whom. To state a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the

named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official

personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual

defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First

Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus,

for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good

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health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d

196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are required to provide prisoners facilities

where they can worship and access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse,

428 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required to supply clergy at state

expense. See id. Inmates also must be given a “reasonable opportunity” to pursue their faith

comparable to that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts. See

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free

exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See

McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the penological interest in

a simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish

inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d

873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in

getting inmates to their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258

F.3d 930, 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim inmates’ First Amendment challenge to prison

work rule).

Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),

prison officials are prohibited from imposing “substantial burdens” on religious exercise unless

there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of

satisfying that interest. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d

978, 986 (9th Cir. 2006). RLUIPA has been upheld by the Supreme Court, which held that

RLUIPA’s “institutionalized-persons provision was compatible with the Court’s Establishment

Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA ‘alleviates exceptional government-created

burdens on private religious exercise.’” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005)). Congress achieved this goal

by replacing the “reasonableness test” articulated in Turner with the “compelling government

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interest” test codified in RLUIPA at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See id. 

Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial

burden of establishing that the defendants substantially burdened the practice of his religion by

preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125

F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier,

418 F.3d at 994-95 (analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define what

constitutes a “substantial burden,” pre-RLUIPA cases are instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing

cases defining “substantial burden” in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial

burden on the practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials’ conduct 

“burdens the adherent’s practice of his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act

forbidden by the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a

religious experience which the faith mandates.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51

(9th Cir. 1987). The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. See id. at 851. In the

context of claims based on religious diets, a plaintiff must prove that prison officials refused to

provide a diet which satisfies his religious dietary laws or that the available prison menu

prevented him from adhering to the religious dietary laws mandated by his faith. See Bryant v.

Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, plaintiff does not specifically allege a violation of his religious rights. 

However, as that appears to be the underlying issue involved, plaintiff will be provided an

opportunity to clarify his claim, and provide sufficient facts to support such a claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: April 19, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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