Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00402/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00402-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MD 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Joseph Benge, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-0402-PHX-DGC (BSB) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Robert Joseph Benge, who is incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Lewis (“ASPC-Lewis”), brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (Doc. 1). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a “Motion Requesting Preliminary 

Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order.” (Doc. 12.) Seven days later, Plaintiff 

filed his Motion again, adding four pages that were apparently missing from the original 

motion, and exhibits. (Doc. 16.) Defendants Corizon and Tucker filed a Response to 

Plaintiff’s Motions (Doc. 25) and Defendants Pratt and Ryan filed a separate Response 

(Doc. 31). Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motions. (Doc. 36.) Plaintiff has also 

filed a “Motion Requesting Appointment of Expert Witness to Assist/Preliminary 

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order Hearing.” (Doc. 39.) 

I. Background 

 A. Complaint 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking damages and asserting two Counts of the denial 

of constitutionally adequate medical care. (Doc. 1.) In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that his 

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Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was denied immediate treatment for a 

fractured tibia in May 2012. Plaintiff did not receive an MRI until July 3, 2012, which 

showed “an incomplete transverse fracture through the medial tibial,” and Plaintiff did 

not receive the results of the MRI until a visit with an orthopedic surgeon on 

November 15, 2012. (Doc. 1 at 9-10.) As a result of the lack of immediate treatment, 

Plaintiff avers that he has suffered permanent injury and continuing pain. 

 In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated 

when, on multiple occasions, he did not receive prescribed pain medication. Plaintiff 

alleged that on June 18, 2013, his prescription medications Gabapentin and Propranolol 

were abruptly discontinued for three months because Defendant Mahler failed to renew 

those prescriptions and failed to give Plaintiff’s chart to the healthcare provider. Plaintiff 

also claimed that Mahler refused to arrange for Plaintiff to see a healthcare provider for 

pain management issues. Plaintiff alleged that on September 18, 2013 Defendant Tucker 

abruptly discontinued Plaintiff’s Baclofen 60 mg daily and reduced his Gabapentin from 

3200 mg daily to 600 mg, even though both were prescribed for “neurovascular 

compromise, muscle spasms for the fracture[d] tibia that was never treated.” (Doc. 1 at 

18.) Plaintiff’s Tramadol 50 mg twice daily for pain management related to an eye 

condition was stopped on November 5, 2013 and his Gabapentin 600 mg daily was 

stopped “cold turkey” on January 16, 2014 and has not been renewed. (Id.) Plaintiff saw 

an outside eye specialist on January 14, 2014, who wrote a prescription for Tramadol 300 

mg twice daily for pain management, but Defendant Tucker refused to prescribe this 

medication for Plaintiff. 

 The Court determined that Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently stated a claim and 

ordered Defendants Ryan, Pratt, Wexford, Merchant, and Mahler to answer the 

allegations in Count I and Defendants Ryan, Pratt, Corizon and Tucker to answer the 

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allegations in Count II. (Doc. 6.) The Court dismissed the remaining Defendants without 

prejudice.1

 B. Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 

In his two Motions, Plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of the following: 

(1) “adequate pain management medication(s)” (“Baclofen 60 mg daily, Tramadol 300 

mg daily, and Gabapentin 3200 mg daily”), which were “suddenly discontinued without 

explanation”; (2) physical therapy for his fractured tibia; (3) four consultations that were 

denied by Corizon in the past fifteen months; (4) supportive walking shoes with custom 

orthotics; and (5) an evaluation by a neurosurgeon in order to have an electromyography 

and nerve conduction test (“EMG/NCV”) for “nerve damage from [Plaintiff’s] untreated 

fracture[d] tibia.” (Doc. 16 at 2-3.) 

 Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court compelling Defendants Ryan, Pratt and 

Corizon to provide Plaintiff with the following: (1) pain management medications 

(Tramadol 300 mg daily, Gabapentin 3200 mg daily, and Baclofen 60 mg daily); (2) a 

support cane; (3) physical therapy twice a week for 120 days; (4) medical ice as needed; 

(5) supportive walking shoe(s) and custom orthotics; (6) an appointment to see a 

podiatrist; (7) an appointment to see a neurosurgeon to have an EMG/NCV test 

performed, as well as a CT scan or MRI; (8) and a knee brace. (Doc. 16 at 19-21.) 

Plaintiff also seeks an order requiring Librarian R. Padilla and Paralegal Uliberry, who 

are not named as Defendants in this case, “to stop den[y]ing Plaintiff meaningful access 

to this Court with their interference with regards to legal photocopies.” (Id. at 20.) 

II. Legal Standard 

 “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

1

 The Court also found that Plaintiff had stated a claim against Defendant Nurse 

Doe but did not order service on the unidentified Defendant. In a subsequent Order, the 

Court ordered that Josh Santos be substituted for Defendant Nurse Doe in Count I of the 

Complaint and that Santos answer Count I. (Doc. 51.) 

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520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

show that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm without an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an 

injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only 

show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than 

likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the 

‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’ and the other two Winter

factors are satisfied.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2011)). Under this serious questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . 

must be balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker 

showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072. 

 Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each 

element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 

1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a 

mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law 

clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on 

prisoner litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and 

requires that any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means 

necessary to correct the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

III. Analysis 

 A. Photocopies 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Librarian R. Padilla and Paralegal Uliberry 

in the form an order that they “make legal photocopies without hindering/delay as long as 

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[P]laintiff’s signature is submitted on a[n] ‘Inmate Request for Withdrawal’ form.” (Doc. 

16 at 5.) Padilla and Uliberry are not parties to this action. Ordinarily, the Court cannot 

issue an injunction dealing with individuals and matters outside of the claim at issue. See 

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969). 

An exception to that rule arises where the injunctive relief sought is related to 

access to the courts. See Prince v. Schriro, et al., CV 08-1299-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 

1456648, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2009) (“a nexus between the preliminary relief and the 

ultimate relief sought is not required”) (citing Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 

(9th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff’s allegations concerning interference with his access to the 

court may therefore be addressed. 

 The constitutional right of access to the courts is only a right to bring petitions or 

complaints to the federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to litigate 

them effectively once filed with a court. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996); 

see also Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1995). To maintain an access-tothe-courts claim, an inmate must submit evidence showing an “actual injury” resulting 

from the defendant’s actions. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. With respect to an existing 

case, the actual injury must be “actual prejudice . . . such as the inability to meet a filing 

deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348-49. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he has been “frustrated or kept from pursuing a nonfrivolous 

First Amended Complaint” and that Uliberry’s statement to him about being a “jail-house 

lawyer” has “discouraged” him from taking more aggressive steps to receive copies of 

any First Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 16 at 4-5.) These allegations do not evidence any 

actual injury. Indeed, the docket reflects that Plaintiff has filed several motions and 

notices since filing his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, including a Motion to File a 

First Amended Complaint. (See Docs. 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 46, 47, 49.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s request for an order that Librarian R. Padilla and Paralegal Uliberry “stop 

den[y]ing Plaintiff meaningful access to this Court with their interference with regards to 

legal photocopies” is denied. 

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B. Medical Care 

 The Court finds that injunctive relief regarding Plaintiff’s medical care is 

inappropriate at this time because Plaintiff fails to establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits of his claim or that he faces imminent irreparable injury absent an injunction. 

 To prevail on an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, a prisoner must 

demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are 

two prongs to the deliberate-indifference analysis. First, a prisoner must show a “serious 

medical need.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations omitted). A “‘serious’ medical need 

exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury 

or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). 

 Second, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s response to that need was 

deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is met if the prisoner 

demonstrates (1) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s medical need and 

(2) harm caused by the indifference. Id. However, “a mere ‘difference of medical 

opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.’” 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

 Plaintiff alleges that in September 2013, Defendant Tucker abruptly discontinued 

his Baclofen prescription and “drastically altered” his Gabapentin prescription from 3200 

mg to 600 mg daily. (Doc. 1 at 18.) He further alleges that in November 2013 his 

Tramadol prescription was “stopped cold turkey,” that his Gabapentin was not renewed 

after January 2014, and that his Tegretol prescription was “stopped cold turkey” for six 

days in November 2013 and again for six days in December 2013. (Id.) 

 In response, Defendants present evidence that while Plaintiff was prescribed 

Baclofen, a muscle relaxant, for a period of time, it is not approved for use in treating 

musculoskeletal pain such as Plaintiff’s and common practice in the medical community 

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is to not prescribe narcotic muscle relaxants such as Baclofen to treat long-term chronic 

pain because they are highly addictive and lose their effectiveness over time. (Doc. 25, 

Ex. A ¶ 26.) As for Plaintiff’s Gabapentin allegations, Defendants assert that Defendant 

Tucker tried several different combinations of medications to treat Plaintiff’s pain and restarted Plaintiff on Gabapentin at 600 mg in September 2013, at Plaintiff’s request, 

because Plaintiff reported that the Tramadol gave no relief, but that Gabapentin gave him 

some relief. (Doc. 25 at 8; Ex. A ¶ 25.) Defendants further assert that between October 

and December 2013, Plaintiff was taking Tegretol, Pamelor, Tramadol (until Nov. 6, 

2013), and Gabapentin. (Doc. 25, Ex. A ¶ 27.) In January 2014, however, Plaintiff’s 

Gabapentin was discontinued because Plaintiff reported that he no longer received relief 

from Gabapentin, and Tucker then planned to start Plaintiff on Naprosyn to attempt to 

relieve his pain. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

 As to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Tramadol, Defendants present evidence that 

in January 2014, Dr. Heller recommended Tramadol for Plaintiff’s degenerative eye 

disease, keratoconus, a condition not normally associated with pain. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) 

Plaintiff had subsequent visits to Dr. Heller in February and April 2014, but Plaintiff did 

not complain of eye pain during those visits and Heller did not repeat the Tramadol 

recommendation on either of those visits. (Id. ¶ 30.) Further, Plaintiff did not complain 

to Tucker about eye symptoms following Dr. Heller’s Tramadol recommendation, and 

Tucker did not prescribe Tramadol because it presents problems in a prison setting, is 

addictive, and because, in January 2014, Plaintiff was already taking Gabapentin (until 

January 10, 2014), Tegretol, and Pamelor for pain. (Id. ¶ 31.) Later, in May 2014, 

Plaintiff reported no relief with Naprosyn and requested Gabapentin and Tramadol, and 

so Tucker discontinued the Naprosyn and Pamelor and “submitted a non-formulary drug 

request for Gabapentin and Tramadol for pain.” (Id. ¶ 34.) 

 As to Plaintiff’s other requests, Plaintiff received a knee brace in April 2013 and 

Defendant Tucker submitted a consult for medical shoes in May 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 16, 34.) 

Tucker noted during the May 2014 visit that Plaintiff’s symptoms “alluded to plantar 

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fasciitis/bursitis,” and that Plaintiff “was amenable to attempting medical shoes first 

rather than orthotics.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff was also provided information on exercises for 

plantar fasciitis. (Id.) Tucker contends that a podiatric consultation is not necessary at 

this time while they “exhaust[] conservative measures[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff did submit a 

health care request for a cane in May 2013, but Tucker “has always noted” Plaintiff “to 

have normal gait and no distress with ambulation” and so a cane “would not be necessary 

for his current health status.” (Id. at 32.) 

 In addition, Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff’s fractured tibia has 

“completely healed” and that his pain is likely due to pes bursitis caused by tightness in 

the hamstrings. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 28.) On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff met with Dr. John 

Vanderhoof, an outside orthopedist, who noted that Plaintiff’s pain complaints were 

consistent with pes bursitis and that x-rays revealed mild degenerative joint disease of the 

left knee and that his left foot x-ray was negative. (Id. ¶ 36.) Dr. Vanderhoof 

recommended “aggressive physical therapy and some anti-inflammatories.” (Id. ¶ 36.) 

Plaintiff had his first physical therapy appointment on July 29, 2014, and the physical 

therapist recommended 6-8 follow-up visits. (Id. ¶ 37.) On July 31, 2014, Tucker “made 

a consultation request for 6-8 more” physical therapy visits, and on August 5, 2014, 

Tucker prescribed a trial of Indocin for Plaintiff’s chronic pain. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) 

 Finally, Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff has not “presented any motor or 

sensation defects on examination,” making a consultation with a neurosurgeon 

unnecessary. (Id. ¶ 35.) 

 The Court finds that on this record, Plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood that he 

will succeed on his deliberate indifference claim. The record at this juncture establishes, 

at most, a disagreement about how to treat Plaintiff’s symptoms, and that is insufficient to 

establish a constitutional violation. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. 

 Accordingly Plaintiff’s Motions Requesting a Preliminary Injunction and a 

Temporary Restraining Order are denied. 

/ / / 

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IV. Motion to Appoint Expert 

 In his Motion, Plaintiff asserts that appointment of an orthopedic surgeon as an 

expert is warranted because of the “botched” diagnosis of his leg injury and because of 

the subsequent “indifference to his serious pain and illness.” (Doc. 39 at 2-3.) In civil 

cases, the Court has the discretion to appoint expert witnesses, with the expert’s fees to 

be allocated pursuant to court order as provided by Rule 706(c). Under Rule 706, experts 

are properly appointed in the court’s discretion to assist the trier of fact in evaluating 

contradictory or complex evidence. Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability 

Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (independent expert appointed to assist court 

in evaluating conflicting evidence of elusive disease of unknown origin); McKinney v. 

Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1510-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting court’s discretion to appoint 

expert in case involving complex scientific issues concerning effects of secondary 

cigarette smoke), vacated on other grounds, Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991). 

But appointment is not appropriate for the purpose of assisting a litigating party for his 

own benefit. See Carranza v. Fraas, 763 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119-20 (D.D.C. 2011); 

Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 198 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995). 

 Plaintiff has not shown issues of requisite complexity requiring appointment of an 

expert witness. Plaintiff appears to make this request for his own assistance, which is 

outside the scope of Rule 706. Moreover, Rule 706 contemplates that an expert will be 

paid by the parties, but Defendants would be required to bear the entire cost because 

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. It is not appropriate or equitable to require 

Defendants to bear the burden of paying an expert witness to present Plaintiff’s point of 

view. Finally, the Court does not find the medical issues presented to be sufficiently 

complex, thereby necessitating an expert. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 359 (7th 

Cir. 1997) (deliberate indifference toward prisoner’s medical needs “did not demand that 

the jury consider probing, complex questions concerning medical diagnoses”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Appointment of an Expert is denied. 

/ / / 

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IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff’s 

Motions “Requesting Preliminary Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order” (Docs. 

12 and 16) and Plaintiff’s “Motion Requesting Appointment of Expert Witness to 

Assist/Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order Hearing” (Doc. 39). 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motions “Requesting Preliminary Injunction and a Temporary 

Restraining Order” (Docs. 12 and 16) are denied. 

 (3) Plaintiff’s “Motion Requesting Appointment of Expert Witness to 

Assist/Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order Hearing” (Doc. 39) is 

denied. 

 Dated this 23rd day of February, 2015. 

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