Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01481/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREVIYON DESHAWN REW,

Petitioner,

v.

DEAN BORDERS, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18cv1481 LAB (MDD)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS 

PETITION

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Treviyon Deshawn Rew, a state prisoner proceeding with a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition” or “Pet.”), challenges his 

conviction for murder and torture in San Diego Superior Court case no. SCS263789. The 

Court has read and considered the Petition, [ECF No. 1], the Answer and Memorandum 

of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer [ECF No. 7-1], the lodgments and 

other documents filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by both parties.1 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the petition be DENIED.

/ / /

 

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to 

those imprinted by the court’s electronic case filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v. Fraley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The state appellate court recounted the facts as follows:

Counts 1, 2, and 3 (Attempted Murder of Sean Simpson)

On July 22, 2010, at about 1:00 a.m., Sean Simpson parked his car at 

his apartment complex and got out of the car. Immediately afterwards, Rew 

pointed a gun in Simpson’s face. Simpson told Rew to take the car, adding: 

“My bad, cuz.” Rew replied, “Cuz what? I’m a Blood.” Simpson 

immediately lay face down on the ground in the hope his life would be 

spared, and in order to facilitate Rew’s taking the car. A male entered the 

passenger side of Simpson’s car and Rew entered the driver’s side. Shortly 

afterwards, Rew and the person in the passenger seat both fired gunshots at 

Simpson. Simpson was in a coma for almost one month. Simpson was 

required to use a colostomy bag for one year. At the time of trial, Simpson 

still suffered numbness in his leg, and between seven to nine bullets and 

bullet fragments were lodged in his body. He could no longer fully carry out 

his previous job duties. Simpson identified Rew in a photo lineup.

Counts 4, 5, and 6 (Robbery of Irish Tourists) [FN 4]

[FN 4: Although the jury deadlocked on these charges, we 

mention the underlying facts here to evaluate the trial court’s 

decision to deny Rew's motion to sever the charges.]

San Diego Police Detective Mary Grace Gibbins testified that on July 

22, 2010, three female tourists were robbed of their cell phones and cameras 

at gunpoint as they stood outside a hostel in Ocean Beach. Approximately 

two weeks later, police recovered a digital camera belonging to one of the

victims. Rew’s pictures were among those found in the camera.

///

///

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Counts 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 (Crimes against Martin Rodriguez and Carlos 

Avila)

Martin Rodriguez testified that on July 24, 2010, at approximately 

2:00 a.m., after a night of drinking, he and Carlos Avila slept in Rodriguez’s 

car. Rodriguez heard a banging on the car window and someone shouting, 

“Get the fuck out.” Shortly afterwards, Rew fired a gunshot that shattered 

the car window, causing glass to hit Rodriguez’s face. Rew demanded 

Rodriguez’s car keys, which fell. Rew grabbed them, fired another shot, ran 

and drove away in a different car. One bullet was lodged in the roof of 

Rodriguez’s car and narrowly missed Avila’s torso, while another bullet,

which matched that used by Rew’s .38-caliber gun, was lodged in Avila’s 

shoe.

Counts 7, 8, 9 and 10 (Robbery of Jesse Aceves and Manuel Cuevas)

Jesse Aceves testified that on July 24, 2010, at approximately 3:00 

a.m., finding no hotel in San Diego, he and Manuel Cuevas stopped in 

National City and slept in the car they had been driving. Aceves heard a 

noise and woke up. Rew pointed a gun at Aceves, and ordered him out of 

the car. Rew hit Aceves in the face with the gun, demanded money, fired a 

shot to the side of Aceves’s head, and fired two more shots to the ground. 

Rew also demanded Cuevas’s money. Rew took approximately $3,000 from 

the victims, their cell phones, a laptop and Cuevas’s passport.

Count 17 (Possession of a Concealed Weapon)

On July 25, 2010, at approximately 8:55 p.m., San Diego Police 

Officer Mario Perez and his partner were on patrol when Officer Perez saw 

Rew quickly walking away from a Mazda and looking nervous upon seeing 

the police. Officer Perez exited his vehicle and talked to Rew. Rew put his 

hand in his right front shorts pocket. Officer Perez decided to pat down Rew 

for weapons and found in Rew’s right front pocket a Taurus revolver that 

was loaded with five .38-caliber bullets. Officer Perez handcuffed Rew. 

Police later ascertained the Mazda belonged to Rew’s great-greatgrandfather who, along with Rew, gave police permission to search it. In the 

Mazda, police found a loaded .45-caliber Sig Sauer semiautomatic weapon, 

a cell phone and a camera.

/ / /

/ / /

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Count 18 (Evading a Peace Officer)

On July 28, 2010, San Diego Police Officer Tobia Terranova 

responded to a police call regarding a suspect travelling in a vehicle. Officer 

Terranova saw the suspect car, activated his overhead lights and siren, and 

followed it. Rew disregarded several traffic signs as he led police on a high 

speed chase. Eventually, Rew stopped the car in the middle of the road, got 

out, ran over fences and eluded the police. Rew ended up at the home of his 

good friend, David Ruiz, and told him he had just crashed a car in a highspeed chase. Hours later, police found Rew hiding in Ruiz’s home. Police 

arrested both Rew and Ruiz, but never charged Ruiz.

Ruiz testified that in July 2010, Rew said he had shot someone who 

referred to Rew as “cuz,” which Rew, as a Crip gang member, disliked. 

Ruiz knew Rew was calling people on the telephone and asking them to hide 

guns. Rew also was selling a cell phone, and Ruiz’s relative, Daniel 

Camargo, bought the phone. One day, Rew went to Ruiz’s house wanting to 

take some pictures with a camera, including pictures of Rew with a gun on 

his person. Ruiz had told police that he had seen Rew carry a .38-caliber 

gun, and another friend of Rew’s carried a gun that looked like a .22-caliber 

pistol. Ruiz said he believed Rew belonged to the 5/9 Brim gang.

Police Investigation

National City Police Sergeant Derek Aydelotte investigated the 

attempted murder of Simpson, and learned Rew had recently been arrested 

in a Mazda vehicle. Pursuant to a warrant, Officer Aydelotte searched 

Rew’s residence and found a key to Simpson’s Toyota, Cuevas’s passport, a 

sawed-off shotgun that was chambered with 30-30 rounds of ammunition 

and a box of .25-caliber ammunition. Officer Aydelotte learned of the 

Ocean Beach robbery, and saw photographs of Rew taken with a stolen 

camera. In one photo, Rew posed with a large amount of cash.

Salvador Moreno, with the aid of surveillance video footage showing 

Moreno in different stores, testified that on different occasions in July 2010, 

Rew gave him money to buy ammunition for Rew’s different caliber 

weapons, including .25-caliber and 30-30 bullets. One day, Moreno saw 

Rew with a .38-caliber revolver in his pocket. Rew told Moreno that he had 

chopped the stalk of a rifle for ease of carry and for it to cause more damage. 

Moreno stated Rew was a member of the 5/9 Brim gang. Moreno identified 

a vehicle that Rew drove, which Rew had described as “hot,” meaning it was 

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stolen. On July 27, 2010, Rew called Moreno and said, “Know who this is? 

I don’t want to say any names. They got a video of someone buying 

bullets.”

On cross-examination, Moreno testified police contacted him on July 

27, 2010, and he was concerned he was a suspect in the criminal matters 

involving attempted robbery, carjacking, and robbery, but he was not 

arrested. Moreno testified that for the past two and a half years the district 

attorney had paid for his rent, utility expenses, food, clothes, and phone bill. 

On redirect examination, Moreno testified that the district attorney’s 

payments were occasioned by his having to relocate due to safety concerns.

(Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26 at 4-8.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Treviyon Deshawn Rew was charged in a third amended consolidated 

information with three counts of attempted murder, a violation of California Penal Code 

(Penal Code) §§ 187(a) and 664 (counts one, twelve and thirteen), one count of 

carjacking, a violation of Penal Code § 215(a) (count two), three counts of assault with a

firearm, a violation of Penal Code § 254(a)(1) (counts three, eight, and ten), five counts 

of robbery, a violation of Penal Code § 211 (counts four, five, six, seven and nine), one 

count of receiving stolen property, a violation of § 496(a), one count of attempted 

carjacking, a violation of Penal Code §§ 251(a) and 664 (count fourteen), two counts of 

assault with a deadly weapon, a violation of Penal Code § 245(a)(1) (counts fifteen and 

sixteen), one count of having a concealed weapon, a violation of Penal Code § 

12025(a)(2) (count seventeen), and one count of evading a police officer, a violation of 

California Vehicle Code § 2800.1(a) (count eighteen). (Lodgment No. 17, ECF No. 8-17 

at 51-59.) The information also alleged various firearm enhancements, specifically that 

Rew was armed with a firearm during the commission of the crimes, within the meaning 

of Penal Code § 12022(a)(1) (counts one, two, seven, nine, twelve, thirteen and fourteen), 

that Rew personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm, within the meaning 

of Penal Code § 12022.53(d) and e(1) (counts one and two), and that Rew personally 

used a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.5(a) (counts four through six), 

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as well as gang allegations, specifically that Rew committed the offenses for the benefit 

of, at the direction of and in association with a criminal street gang, within the meaning 

of Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1) (counts one, two and three), and that he did so with the 

specific intent to promote and assist criminal conduct by gang members, within the 

meaning of Penal Code § 186.22(b)(4) (count two). (Id.) The information also contained 

an allegation that Rew committed the offenses while released on bail, within the meaning 

of Penal Code § 12022.1(b) (counts one through sixteen). (Id.) 

Following a jury trial, Rew was convicted of counts one through three and seven 

through seventeen. (Lodgment No. 18, ECF No. 8-18 at 142-46.) The jury did not return 

a verdict on counts four through six. (Lodgment No. 13, ECF No. 8-13 at 11.) Rew was 

sentenced to a prison term of 63 years and eight months plus 65 years-to-life. (Lodgment 

No. 16, ECF No. 8-16 at 33.)

Rew appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth 

Appellate District. (Lodgment Nos. 21-25, ECF Nos. 8-21 – 8-25.) The state appellate 

court upheld Rew’s conviction in a written, unpublished opinion but determined that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancements contained in counts one 

through three. (Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26.) The appellate court struck the gang 

enhancements and the firearm use enhancements associated with counts one and two and 

remanded the case to the superior court for resentencing. (Id. at 36-38.) Rew then filed a 

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without 

citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 27-28, ECF Nos. 8-27 – 8-28.)

Rew next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego Superior 

Court. (Lodgment No. 29, ECF No. 8-29.)2 The superior court denied the petition in a 

written opinion. (Lodgment No. 30, ECF No. 8-30.) He then filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the state appellate court, which that court denied in a written, 

 

2 Rew was resentenced in the San Diego Superior Court on June 17, 2016, eight days 

after he filed his habeas corpus petition in that court. (Pet., ECF No. 1-3.)

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unpublished opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 31-32, ECF Nos. 8-31 – 8-32.) Rew filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which denied the 

petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 33-34, ECF Nos. 8-33 – 8-34.)

Rew filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on June 27, 2018. 

(ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer and Memoradum of Points and Authorities in 

Support of Answer on September 27, 2018. (ECF Nos. 7, 7-1.) Rew did not file a 

Traverse.

IV. DISCUSSION

Rew’s petition contains five claims. Claim one alleges a due process violation 

stemming from his re-sentencing hearing. Claim two alleges the jury was misinstructed. 

In claim three, Rew alleges his severance motion was improperly denied. Rew contends 

his trial counsel was ineffective in claim four. And in claim five, Rew argues that gang 

evidence admitted at trial rendered his trial unfair. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 34-47.)

Respondent argues that all of Rew’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Answer, 

ECF No. 7-1 at 9, 11, 18-21, 19 n.4, 26.) In addition, Respondent contends claims one, 

two and three do not present a federal question, and, in the alternative, the state court’s 

rejection of the claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 21-31.) As to claims four and five, Respondent 

argues the state court’s resolution of those claims was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 31-36.) 

A. Procedural Default

The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default is an affirmative 

defense, in order to establish a claim is procedurally defaulted, Respondent must first 

“adequately [plead] the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural 

ground . . . .” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to place 

the defense at issue, Rew must then “assert[] specific factual allegations that demonstrate 

the inadequacy of the state procedure . . . .” Id. The “ultimate burden” of proving 

procedural default, however, belongs to the state. Id. If the state meets its burden under 

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Bennett, federal review of the claim is foreclosed unless Rew can “demonstrate cause for 

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The Supreme Court has 

limited the “miscarriage of justice” exception to petitioners who can show that “a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). In Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 

379 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that “actual innocence” means factual 

innocence, not simply legal insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable doubt is not 

enough. 

A state procedural rule is “independent” if the state law basis for the decision is not 

interwoven with federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). A ground is “interwoven” with federal law if the state 

has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law 

such as the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed. 

See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). “To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural 

ground, a state rule must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Walker v. 

Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009).) 

All cases cited by a state court must be independent and adequate to bar federal review of 

the claims. Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2000). 

1. Claim One: Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing to Present Youth Offender 

Evidence

Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied Rew’s habeas corpus 

petition in which he raised this claim, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s decision to determine whether the claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). With regard to claim one, that Rew’s 

due process rights were violated when he was denied an opportunity to present evidence

which would be relevant to future youth offender parole hearing pursuant to California 

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Penal Code § 3051 and § 4801(c), the state appellate court concluded as follows:

The claim that Rew is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to submit 

information that may be relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing is 

barred because it was not raised at the resentencing hearing. Before Rew 

was resentenced in June 2016, the statutes authorizing parole hearings for 

offenders who had not yet reached the age of 23 years when they committed 

their offenses were in effect (Pen. Code §§ 3051, 4801, subd. (c)), and the 

Supreme Court of California had ruled that the parties must be given a 

sufficient opportunity “to make a record of the juvenile offender’s 

characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board 

[of Parole Hearings], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to 

‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether 

the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious 

crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation]” (People v. 

Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284). Rew admits, however, that at the 

resentencing hearing he did not request an opportunity to present evidence 

regarding any youth-related factors pertinent to his crimes and culpability. 

“[J]ust as a defendant generally may not raise on appeal a claim not raised at 

trial [citation], a defendant should not be allowed to raise on habeas corpus

an issue that could have been presented at trial.” (In re Seaton (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 193, 200.) In any event, Rew has not identified any youth-related 

information that would bear favorably on his future parole prospects and that 

he would have presented had he been granted a hearing at which to do so. 

Without such information, this court cannot determine that the lack of any 

such hearing will result in “‘excessive punishment’ in violation of the 

Constitution,” as alleged by Rew, or will otherwise prejudice him. His 

conclusory assertions to that effect are insufficient to sustain his pleading 

burden. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.)

(Lodgment No. 32, ECF No. 8-32 at 2-3.)

Respondent argues the state appellate court’s citation to In re Seaton invokes 

California’s contemporaneous objection rule, which is independent and adequate. 

(Answer, ECF No. 7-1 at 19.) In Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002), the 

Ninth Circuit stated that California’s contemporaneous objection rule has been 

consistently applied “when a party has failed to make any objection to the admission of 

evidence.” Id. at 1125, citing Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The issue in Rew’s case, however, is not the failure to object to the admission of evidence 

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but rather the failure of the trial court to provide Rew with an opportunity to present 

evidence relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing. It is not clear to this Court 

that In re Seaton is an independent and adequate state procedural ground applicable to the 

issue raised by Rew. 

Established precedent in the Ninth Circuit dictates that a court’s decision on the 

issue of procedural default is to be informed by furthering “the interests of comity, 

federalism, and judicial efficiency.” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 

1998). Thus where, as here, deciding the merits of a claim proves to be less complicated 

and less time-consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a court may 

exercise discretion in its management of the case to reject the claims on their merits and 

forgo an analysis of cause and prejudice. Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 

1982). Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of claim one.

2. Claims Two and Three: Instructional Error and Denial of the Motion to Sever

Respondent contends that claims two and three are also procedurally defaulted. 

(Answer, ECF No. 7-1 at 19 n. 4.) Because the California Supreme Court summarily 

denied Rew’s habeas corpus petition in which he raised these claims, this Court must 

“look through” to the state appellate court’s decision to determine whether the claims are 

procedurally defaulted. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The state appellate court concluded as 

follows:

Rew’s claims alleging instructional error and erroneous refusal to 

sever counts for trial are barred because they were considered and rejected 

on appeal. “[L]egal claims that have previously been raised and rejected on 

direct appeal ordinarily cannot be reraised in a collateral attack by filing a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 

476.) Rew has not identified any jurisdictional error, fundamental 

constitutional error, or change in law that would warrant reconsideration of 

these previously rejected claims. (Id. at p. 478.)

(Lodgment No. 32, ECF No. 8-32 at 3.)

The relevant page of In re Reno cited by the appellate court, page 476, reads as 

follows:

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There may be no more venerable a procedural rule with respect to 

habeas corpus than what has come to be known as the Waltreus rule; that is, 

legal claims that have previously been raised and rejected on direct appeal 

ordinarily cannot be reraised in a collateral attack by filing a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus.

In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 476.

This is simply a restatement of the rule announced in In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 

218, 225 (1965). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that a citation to Waltreus does 

not bar federal review. See Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2003); Calderon v. 

United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996); Samoya v. 

Ayers, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, Respondent has not 

met his burden under Bennett to “adequately [plead] the existence of an independent and 

adequate state procedural ground . . . .” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Claims two and three

are therefore not procedurally defaulted. 

3. Claims Four and Five: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Admission of 

Gang Evidence

Respondent argues claims four and five are procedurally defaulted because the 

state appellate court concluded the claims were untimely, citing In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th at 

459-60, People v. Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302 (1949), and In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 

(1953). (Answer, ECF No. 7-1 at 19.) In Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307 (2011), the 

Supreme Court concluded that California’s untimeliness rule is independent and 

adequate. Id. at 321-22. Accordingly, Respondent has “adequately [plead] the existence 

of an independent and adequate state procedural ground . . . .” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

Rew has not asserted any “specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of 

the state procedure . . . .” and federal review of the claim is therefore foreclosed unless 

Rew can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Rew has not offered any

cause for the default and, as discussed below in section IV(B)(5) and (6), he has not 

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established either actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage because the claims are

meritless.

B. Merits

Rew contends in claim one that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to ensure he 

had an opportunity to present evidence at his re-sentencing hearing which would be 

relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing under California Penal Code §§ 3051 

and 4801(c). In the alternative, he claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

ask for such a hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 34-37.) Rew contends in claim two that the 

jury was not properly instructed because the trial court failed to tell the jury they could 

consider any leniency witnesses may have received from the prosecution when evaluating 

their testimony. (Id. at 37-41.) In claim three, he argues the trial court should have 

granted his severance motion because the admission of evidence relating to the carjacking 

and shooting of Sean Simpson was inflammatory and because the strength of the 

evidence for each count “was so variant” that a weak case on any one of the charges 

would be tried with a stronger case, thus permitting the jury to convict Rew of the weak 

charges based on evidence of the stronger charges. (Id. at 41-42.) In claim four, he 

alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to identify and present witnesses and for 

failing to consult a ballistics expert. (Id. at 42-43.) Finally, in claim five, he argues gang 

evidence admitted at trial, which the appellate court concluded was insufficient to support 

the jury’s true finding on the gang allegations, prejudiced his right to a fair trial by 

inflaming the jury with evidence that should not have been admitted. (Id. at 43-44.)

1. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s 

habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the 

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, 

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). The Court may also grant relief if the state court’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. If 

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal 

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the 

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled 

on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

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means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

2. Denial of an Opportunity to Present Youth Offender Evidence (claim one)

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 

460 (2012), which held that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile 

defendant violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 470. Following Miller, the California 

legislature enacted Penal Code §§ 3051 and 4801(c) in 2013 to comply with Miller. See

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3051, 4801(c) (West 2018). Penal Code § 3051 applies to “any 

prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger, or was under 18 years of age as specified in 

paragraph (4) of subdivision (b), at the time of his or her controlling offense.” Cal. Penal 

Code § 3051(a). The law provides for a “youth offender parole hearing” at which the 

Board of Parole Hearings is to “give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth 

as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and 

increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” Cal. Penal 

Code § 4801(c).

Following his conviction in this case, Rew appealed to the California Court of 

Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District alleging, in part, that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the jury’s “true” finding on the gang enhancement allegations. 

(Lodgment Nos. 21, 23, 24, ECF Nos. 8-21, 8-23, 8-24.) In February of 2016, the 

California Court of Appeal agreed with Rew and remanded his case for resentencing. 

(Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26 at 37-38.)3In May of 2016, the California Supreme 

Court decided People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261 (2016), which found that a limited 

remand to the sentencing court for the purpose of developing evidence relevant to a 

future youth offender parole hearing was appropriate for those cases which fell under the 

provisions of Penal Code §§ 3051 and 4801(c) but had concluded prior to Franklin. Id. at 

 

3 The state appellate court concluded the firearm allegations contained in counts one and 

two also had to be stricken. (Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26 at 37-38.)

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286-87. Rew was resentenced on June 17, 2016 to 45 years plus 50 years-to-life in 

prison. (Pet., ECF No. 1-3 at 2-9.) Rew did not present any evidence relevant to a future 

youth offender parole hearing at the resentencing hearing. He argues in this Petition that 

the sentencing court has a sua sponte duty to ensure Rew had the opportunity to present 

such evidence. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 35-36.)4

As Respondent notes in the Answer, the question whether the sentencing judge was 

required to provide Rew, sua sponte, with an opportunity to present youth offender 

evidence at his re-sentencing is a matter of the state court’s interpretation of state law and 

therefore not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 

(1991); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Moreover, Rew’s claim he was denied an opportunity to 

present youth offender information at his resentencing is not properly brought in a federal 

habeas corpus action. In Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth 

Circuit held that a prisoner may only bring claims via a federal habeas corpus action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if they “lie at the ‘core of habeas corpus,’” which are 

challenges to the validity of a state court conviction or the duration of a state court 

sentence. Id. at 927, 930. Rew’s claim that he did not have an opportunity to present 

youth offender evidence at his resentencing hearing does not challenge the validity of his 

conviction or the duration of his sentence. If Rew were to be granted relief as to this 

claim, he would, at most, be entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he could present 

evidence relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing. At that future parole hearing, 

Rew may or may not be granted parole and have his sentence shortened. Accordingly, 

Rew’s claim may not be brought via a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition and may only be 

brought, if at all, via a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Id. at 927, 930.

Finally, even if this Court could consider the claim on the merits, Rew has not 

 

4 Rew argues that in the alternative, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

evidence relevant to a future youth offender hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 36-37.) That 

portion of claim one will be addressed in Section IV(B)(5) along with Rew’s other

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

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established he is entitled to relief. A federal due process violation occurs when an error 

in the state court conviction process renders a proceeding fundamentally unfair. 

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). On federal habeas review, this Court 

must determine whether any such error had a substantial and injurious effect on the 

outcome. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Assuming a due process 

violation did occur, Rew has not established prejudice pursuant to Brecht. He has not 

directed this Court to any evidence relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing that 

he would have presented at his re-sentencing hearing. Further, the Court is unable to 

determine the effect of any such evidence because the outcome of Rew’s future youth 

offender parole hearing is unknowable at this time.

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of Rew’s claim that the trial 

court violated his federal due process rights when it improperly failed to provide him an 

opportunity to present youth offender evidence at his re-sentencing hearing is not 

cognizable in this action and any federal due process error is harmless. Rew is not 

entitled to relief as to this claim. 

3. Jury Instructions (claim two)

In claim two, Rew argues that the trial judge misinstructed the jury when he failed 

to include leniency from the prosecutor in CALCRIM No. 226, which provides the jury 

with factors they may consider in determining the credibility of a witness. (Pet., ECF No. 

1 at 37-41.) He contends that portion of the instruction should have been given because 

two prosecution witnesses, David Ruiz and Salvador Moreno, had criminal liability 

arising from Rew’s case but received lenient treatment from the prosecutor. (Id.) 

Respondent argues this claim does not present a federal question and, in the alternative, 

the state court’s resolution of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer, ECF No. 7-1 at 26-28.)

Rew raised this claim in both his direct appeal and in the habeas corpus petition he 

filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment Nos. 22, 24, 31, ECF Nos. 8-22, 8-

24, 8-31.) Because the state appellate court on habeas review imposed a procedural bar,

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which this Court has concluded was not independent and adequate, it did not decide the 

merits of this claim. The California Court of Appeal’s opinion on direct review is the last 

reasoned state court decision addressing the claim and therefore it is that decision to 

which this Court must defer. That court wrote:

B. Applicable Law

“Generally, a party may not complain on appeal about a given 

instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence unless the 

party made an appropriate objection.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.) In determining whether instructional error was 

harmless, “[a] reviewing court considers ‘the specific language challenged, 

the instructions as a whole[,] the jury’s findings’ [citation], and counsel’s 

closing arguments to determine whether the instructional error ‘would have 

misled a reasonable jury.’” (People v. Eid (201) 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 883.)

C. Analysis

On appeal, Rew contends the issue was not forfeited, claiming that 

defense counsel confusingly replied to the trial court, “Yes. No.” Contrary 

to Rew, we do not detect that defense counsel was confused. Understood in 

context, defense counsel, having ascertained that the court was referring to 

CALCRIM No. 226, affirmed that information by saying, “Yes.” He 

immediately proceed to answer the court’s question regarding whether it 

should include the other optional materials by saying, “No.” We therefore 

conclude this claim is forfeited. The defense declined the court’s

opportunity to request more specific instruction with any other bracketed 

portion of CALCRIM No. 226. Therefore, Rew may not claim error on 

appeal. (Accord, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 675 [noting that 

a standard jury instruction can amount to a pinpoint instruction and finding 

forfeiture in defendant’s failure to request the pinpoint instruction].)

In any event, any error was harmless. The court’s instruction 

informed the jury to consider whether Ruiz and Moreno were biased because 

of their personal relationship with Rew. Further, the jury heard testimony 

regarding the prosecutor’s supposed leniency toward Ruiz and Moreno, a 

point that defense counsel reiterated during oral argument. Nonetheless, the 

jury convicted Rew based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt: As to 

counts 1 to 3, Simpson identified Rew in a photo lineup, and his car key was 

found at Rew’s house. As to counts 7 through 10, police found Cuevas’s 

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passport at Rew’s house, and photos retrieved from the stolen camera of 

Rew posing with a large amount of cash, possibly that stolen from Aceves 

and Cuevas. As to counts 12 through 16, the bullet lodged in Avila’s shoe 

matched that of Rew’s gun. As to count 17, the police found the concealed 

weapon during the pat down of Rew. The evidence supporting the evading a 

peace officer charge was based on the police officer’s description of Rew’s 

clothes, which matched that found at Ruiz’s house upon Rew’s arrest. 

Therefore, we conclude it was not reasonably probable that if the court had 

instructed regarding leniency or bias Rew would have received a more 

favorable outcome.

(Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26 at 22-23.)

Instructional error can form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief only if it is 

shown that “‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process.’ [citation omitted].” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 

(9th Cir. 2006), (citing Cupp v. Naugh’ten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973); Henderson v. 

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). The allegedly erroneous jury instruction cannot be 

judged in isolation, however. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Rather, it must be considered in 

the context of the entire trial record and the instructions as a whole. Id.

CALCRIM No. 226 gives the jury a list of things they may consider in determining 

the credibility of witnesses. The instruction contains several optional paragraphs that can 

be added depending on the facts of any particular case. (Lodgment No. 18, ECF No. 8-18 

at 302 [CALCRIM No. 226].) The paragraph that states “Was the witness promised 

immunity or leniency in exchange for his or her testimony?” was not included, and Rew 

claims this was error that “unfairly bolstered the People’s case as it prevented the jury 

from considering a factor which would have lessened the credibility of the only 

prosecution witnesses who claimed they (1) saw Petitioner with guns, and (2) heard him 

make incriminating statements.” (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 40.) 

Ruiz testified that Rew arrived at his house on the evening of July 28, 2010 in a 

frantic state, telling Ruiz that he had been in a high-speed chase with police and had 

crashed his car. (Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 8-8 at 80-81.) Ruiz let Rew stay at his house 

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overnight and in the morning, Ruiz returned from a doctor’s appointment for his son to 

find police at his house. (Id. at 82.) Police eventually located Rew inside Ruiz’s house 

and arrested Ruiz and Rew. (Id. 80.) Ruiz also testified that on or about July 22 or 23, 

2010, Rew came to Ruiz’s house and told Ruiz he had shot someone because the person 

had “cuzzed” him. (Id. at 84-85.)5 Ruiz also testified that Rew used his phone to call 

friends and family and ask them to hide his guns, that Rew had taken pictures of Ruiz 

with a camera that was later linked to the robbery of two women in Ocean Beach, that he 

had seen Rew in possession of a .38 special handgun, and that Rew had been with another 

person who possessed a .22 caliber handgun. (Id. at 91-98.) On cross examination, Ruiz 

testified police told him he could be arrested and threatened to report him to Child 

Protective Services for endangering his son by appearing in the photos with Rew. (Id. at

108-09.) Police were “really on [his] case,” and would come to his house every week to 

pressure him to cooperate, threaten him with arrest, and threaten to have his child taken 

away. (Id. at 111-12, 117-18.)

Moreno testified he purchased bullets for a .25 caliber weapon, a sawed-off 

shotgun, a twin gauge shotgun, and a .38 caliber weapon. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 8-9 

at 11-39.) Moreno testified that he purchased the .22 caliber ammunition on July 2, 2010, 

he purchased the sawed-off shotgun and twin gauge shotgun ammunition on July 12, and 

he purchased the .38 caliber ammunition on July 23. (Id. at 17-18, 25.) Rew’s crimes 

were committed between July 22 and July 28. (Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26 at 4-7.) 

When Rew arrived at Moreno’s house on July 23, he was driving Simpson’s gray Toyota 

which Rew told Moreno was “hot,” meaning stolen. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 8-9 at 

25-27; Lodgment No. 6, ECF No. 8-6 at 10.) Moreno saw Rew in possession of a .25 

caliber weapon a few weeks before Rew asked him to buy bullets the first time and with a 

 

5 Blood gangs and Crip gangs are rivals. Crip gang members refer to each other as “cuz.” 

“Cuzzing” means calling a Blood gang member “cuz,” a sign of disrespect. (Lodgment 

No. 11, ECF No. 8-11 at 72.)

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.38 caliber revolver on July 23 when Moreno purchased the .38 caliber ammunition. 

(Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 8-9 at 13, 37.) Moreno also testified that Rew was a member 

of the 5/9 Brims gang. (Id. at 43.) On cross-examination, Moreno admitted that he was 

questioned by police about Rew’s crimes and he was worried he could be implicated in 

them. (Id. at 47.) He testified he would do “whatever [he] could not to be a defendant in 

those kind of charges,” and that he “told the police whatever [he] felt they wanted to hear 

from [him].” (Id.) Moreno conceded he had never been arrested or charged in 

connection with Rew’s crimes and that the District Attorney’s office had paid him 

approximately $12,000 a year for two years. (Id. at 47-51.)

The jury was instructed to “use your common sense and experience” in evaluating 

testimony and to consider whether “the witness’s testimony was influenced by a factor 

such as bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a 

personal interest in how the case was decided.” (Lodgment No. 18, ECF No. 8-18 at 302 

[CALCRIM No. 226].) A juror using his or her common sense and experience would 

consider how Ruiz’s and Moreno’s personal relationship with Rew and the financial 

payments, threats of prosecution and threats of being reported to Child Protective 

Services could influence their testimony. In addition, the jury instructions told the jury 

that before they could consider Ruiz’s and Moreno’s testimony, they had to determine 

whether they were accomplices in Rew’s crimes, and if they so determined they should 

view their testimony with caution. (Id. at 314-15 [CALCRIM No. 334].) They were 

further instructed that they were to give the testimony of accomplices “the weight you 

think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the other 

evidence.” (Id. at 315.) 

Considering the instructions provided to the jury as a whole, as this Court is 

required to do under Estelle, the jury was sufficiently alerted to the fact that they should 

consider any benefits or leniency Ruiz and Moreno received in evaluating their 

credibility, and therefore “the ailing instruction by itself [did not] so infect[] the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Clark, 450 F.3d at 904, citing 

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Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 and Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146. The state court denial of this claim 

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme 

Court law. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 4. Nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Rew is not entitled to relief as to this 

claim. 

4. Severance Motion (claim three)

Rew argues in claim three that the state court improperly denied his severance 

motion, thereby rendering his trial fundamentally unfair. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 41-42.) 

Specifically, he contends that the facts surrounding the carjacking and shooting of 

Simpson were inflammatory and the strength of the evidence presented for the other 

crimes was “so variant” that it is likely the jury convicted Rew of crimes based on the 

sum total of all of the evidence rather than evidence specific to those crimes. 

Respondent argues Rew does not state a cognizable federal claim and, in the alternative, 

the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer, ECF No. 7-1 at 28-31.)

As with the preceding claim, Rew raised this claim in both his direct appeal and in 

the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment Nos. 

22, 24, 31, ECF Nos. 8-22, 8-24, 8-31.) Because the state appellate court on habeas 

review imposed a procedural bar, which this Court has concluded was not independent 

and adequate, it did not decide the merits of this claim. The California Court of Appeal’s 

opinion on direct review is the last reasoned state court decision addressing the claim and 

therefore it is that decision to which this Court must defer. That court wrote:

We conclude the court did not err by consolidating the charges, which 

with the exception of the concealed weapon and evasion of a peace officer 

counts, involved assaultive conduct that Rew committed over a three-day 

span. As the court explained, the evidence relating to the different crimes 

was cross-admissible. Specifically, police found at Rew’s home evidence 

relating to Simpson’s car and Cuevas’s passport. The photos in the camera 

also showed Rew displaying some money, which the jury reasonably could 

conclude was part of the approximately $3,000 that Rew had robbed from 

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Aceves and Cuevas. Further, Moreno’s testimony and the video surveillance 

tapes established that Moreno bought for Rew different caliber ammunition 

matching the weapons that Rew used in the different crimes. Under People 

v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 38, the cross-admissibility of evidence 

alone sufficed to justify the trial court’s decision to deny Rew’s motion to 

sever. We discern no prejudice to Rew from the joinder of charges.

(Lodgment No. 26, ECF No. 8-26 at 19-20.)

“The Supreme Court has never held that a trial court’s failure to provide separate 

trials on different charges implicates a defendant’s right to due process.” Collins v. 

Uribe, No. 11-56297, 564 Fed. Appx. 343 (9th Cir. 2014)6citing Collins v. Runnels, 603 

F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Martinez v. Yates, No. 13-16154, 2014 WL 

5293673 (9th Cir., Oct. 17, 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 

2012). “Because [there is] no clear answer to the question presented, . . . ‘it cannot be

said that a state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.’” Wright v. 

Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77

(2006)).

In any event, even if Rew had identified clearly established federal law permitting 

him to exert a due process right, it was not violated here because his trial was not 

fundamentally unfair. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the 

question, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “‘[f]ederal habeas is available for improper 

consolidation only if the simultaneous trial ‘actually render[ed the] state trial 

fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 

1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th

Cir. 1991). California Penal Code section 954 states “[a]n accusatory pleading may 

charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or . . . two 

or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate 

 

6 Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(c), “Unpublished decisions and orders of [the Ninth 

Circuit] issued on or after January 1, 2007 may be cited to the courts of this circuit in 

accordance with FRAP 32.1.”

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counts . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 954 (West 2008). Joinder of counts is favored because 

it promotes efficiency. People v. Myles, 53 Cal. 4th 1181, 1200 (2012). Although under 

California law, a trial court “may in its discretion order that the different offenses or 

counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately,” Cal. Penal Code § 954, 

the first consideration in whether to grant severance is whether the evidence would have 

been cross-admissible in separate trials. People v. Armstrong, 1 Cal. 5th 432, 456 (2016). 

If the evidence underlying the charges in question would be cross-admissible, “that factor 

alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial 

court’s refusal to sever properly joined charges.” Id., quoting People v. Soper, 45 Cal. 

4th 759, 775 (2009). 

In Rew’s case, as the state court found, the evidence was clearly cross-admissible. 

During the search of Rew’s house, police found Sean Simpson’s car key, linking him to 

the attempted murder, carjacking, and assault with a firearm of Simpson (counts one 

through three), and a passport belonging to Manuel Cuevas, linking him to the robbery 

and assault with a firearm involving Cuevas (counts nine through eleven) and Jesse 

Aceves. (Lodgment No. 7, ECF No. 8-7 at 57-59.) When Rew was stopped and arrested 

on July 25, 2010, officers found one handgun in his pocket and one handgun and a 

camera in his car. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 8-10 at 99-106.) The camera was 

determined to have been stolen, linking Rew to the robbery of the Irish tourists (counts 

four through six). (Id. at 105; Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 8-8 at 130-37.) The camera had 

photos of Rew displaying a large amount of cash, which could have been the cash stolen 

from Cuevas and Aceves (counts nine through eleven). (Lodgment No. 7, ECF No. 8-7 

at 73-76.) The gun in Rew’s pocket (count seventeen) was found to have been the one 

used in the attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon of Carlos Avila (counts 

thirteen, sixteen) and Martin Rodriguez (counts twelve, fourteen and fifteen). (Lodgment 

No. 11, ECF No. 8-11 at 18-23, 41.) 

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

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Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 4. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Rew is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (subclaim one and claim four)

Rew argues his trial counsel was ineffective for three reasons. First, in claim one, 

he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present youth offender 

evidence at his resentencing. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 36-37.) In claim four he contends 

counsel was ineffective when he failed to consult with a ballistics expert and failed to 

investigate potential witnesses from a list Rew provided to counsel. (Id. at 42-43.) 

Respondent argues the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer, ECF No. 

7-1 at 31-32.)

Rew raised these claims in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 3, ECF No. 8-33.) The state supreme court denied the 

petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 34, ECF No. 8-34.) This Court 

must therefore “look through” to the state appellate court’s decision denying Rew’s 

habeas corpus petition as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court

wrote:

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, warranting vacatur 

of a judgment of conviction based on counsel’s failure to discover and 

present certain evidence at trial, the “petitioner must demonstrate that 

counsel knew or should have known that further investigation was 

necessary, and must establish the nature and relevance of the evidence that 

counsel failed to present or discover.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 

883, 937.) Rew has not identified the ballistics expert or other witnesses that 

he faults his trial counsel for not interviewing or calling at trial. Nor has he 

set out the allegedly exculpatory testimony that any of these witnesses would 

have provided at trial. In the petition for writ of habeas corpus that Rew 

filed in the superior court in June 2017, he stated that he would “be 

supplementing this Petition in the near future with a declaration listing those 

witnesses and a [sic] summarizing what their testimony would have been at 

trial.” Rew repeats that statement, with the same typographical error, in this 

court. The promised declarations has yet to materialize, however. Rew’s 

“unadorned and unexplained assertions of ineffective assistance of 

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counsel . . . are inadequate to satisfy his pleading burden.” (In re Reno, 

supra, at pp. 499-500.)

Lodgment No. 32, ECF No. 8-32 at 3.)

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced 

by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by showing “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 

506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

Further, Strickland requires “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance . . . be 

highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a “strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 

686-87. The Court need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if 

the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697. “The standards 

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply 

in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) 

(citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the 

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there 

is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

Although Rew raised his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

youth offender evidence at his resentencing in the habeas corpus petitions he filed in the

San Diego Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal Court, those courts did not 

address the merits of the claim. (Lodgment Nos. 29-32, ECF Nos. 8-29 – 8-32.) Rew 

also raised the claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California Supreme 

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Court, which denied the petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 33-34, 

ECF Nos. 8-33 – 8-34.) The California Supreme Court’s silent denial is presumed to be a 

decision on the merits, and thus this Court must determine whether the denial was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 784-85; Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

California Penal Code § 3051 governs youth offender parole hearings. The statute 

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(d) The board shall conduct a youth offender parole hearing to 

consider release. At the youth offender parole hearing, the board shall 

release the individual on parole as provided in Section 3041, except that the 

board shall act in accordance with subdivision (c) of Section 4801.

(e) The youth offender parole hearing to consider release shall provide 

for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. The board shall review and, 

as necessary, revise existing regulations and adopt new regulations regarding 

determinations of suitability made pursuant to this section, subdivision (c) of 

Section 4801, and other related topics, consistent with relevant case law, in 

order to provide that meaningful opportunity for release.

(f)(1) In assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and 

risk assessment instruments, if used by the board, shall be administered by 

licensed psychologists employed by the board and shall take into 

consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of 

adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and 

increased maturity of the individual.

(2) Family members, friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and 

representatives from community-based organizations with knowledge about 

the individual before the crime or his or her growth and maturity since the 

time of the crime may submit statements for review by the board.

Cal. Penal Code § 3051.

California Penal Code § 4801 further outlines the factors a parole board is to 

consider youth offender cases:

(c) When a prisoner committed his or her controlling offense, as defined in 

subdivision (a) of Section 3051, when he or she was 25 years of age or 

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younger, the board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole pursuant 

to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of 

youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any 

subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with 

relevant case law.

Cal. Penal Code § 4801(c).

For Rew’s original sentencing, counsel filed a mitigation brief, an interview with 

Rew’s grandfather, and a psychological evaluation. (Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 8-16 at 

9.) In addition, counsel argued for a mitigated sentence and presented the following

mitigating evidence:

[MR. DUDLEY]: I think it also – what I would say – and I don’t 

want to repeat what I presented in our report, but I do want to talk briefly 

about some of those mitigating factors, because I think they are factors that –

the facts of the case are ugly. But there are reasons to believe that this 

young man may be, as opposed to some other people in this position, maybe 

older people, people who have been around longer, people who have been 

less abused – there’s a reason to believe that this person, with the right –

presented with the right programs and such in prison, could actually come 

out as a rehabilitated individual. I think that’s clear from Dr. Carroll’s 

report, that we presented.

And I would just briefly go through the fact that we have someone 

who was essentially, tossed around through his very early childhood, from 

his mother to his grandmother, to the Polinsky Center, to foster homes, then 

to his aunt, and finally into Mr. Jefferson’s hands. And I would submit that 

by age 14, when that occurred, it maybe was a bit too late to undo a lot of 

the damage.

I think in particular, there are many circumstances that could be 

brought specifically to the attention of the Court, but I think the fact that he 

was, essentially, waterboarded by his grandmother repeatedly for not being 

able to clean the house at age three or four, speaks, really a lot about what 

this young kid went through as a child.

He also of extremely short stature compared to other people, which 

subjected him to bullying. I know we hear a lot about bullying in our 

society today, but this is somebody who was physically, for his entire 

childhood, unable to respond to the verbal and physical bullying that he went 

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through. And I don’t think it can be doubted that that had to have a 

tremendous impact on his mentality.

In fact, Mr. Jefferson, in his statement, describes Treviyon as having 

an inferiority complex pretty much his entire childhood due to his size, to 

the point where, when Mr. Jefferson first got custody, in his teenage years, 

of Mr. Rew, they thought about putting him through some sort of hormone 

therapy, which apparently was rejected by other members of the family. So 

it was that significant of a circumstance.

This, of course, led to, not surprisingly, a really – corroborated a 

substantial substance abuse problem that Mr. Rew has had. And the Court is 

aware that he committed this offense at age 18. So it’s just a matter of years 

after he was in Mr. Jefferson’s custody. The whole inferiority complex issue 

is going on. Now he’s abusing marijuana. He’s abusing cocaine on a daily 

basis. He is abusing ecstasy as often as he can. We have somebody who’s 

got a truly severe drug problem, that is undoubtedly related to the harshness 

of the childhood that he went through.

So I believe that – and I recognize the Court’s hands are statutorily 

tied to a great extent by the counts of conviction and the mandates of the 

legislature. But to the extent that the Court can show some mitigation here, I 

thinks it’s justified in that he was 18 years old when this happened. He’s 

only 21 now. The harshness of the life that he’s been through, and the fact 

that with proper and intensive counseling, and maybe some additional 

maturity, that there is – and I think Dr. Carroll is absolutely correct.

There is a strong possibility that Mr. Rew is a person who can become 

a productive member of society, who can gain control over that depth of, I’m 

sure, what must be a terrible feeling within his soul about what he’s

experienced, himself, in life. And he could actually come through this and 

come out of this as a productive and good citizen.

(Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 8-16 at 17-19.)

Given what counsel presented at Rew’s original sentencing hearing, Rew has not 

shown that counsel’s performance at his resentencing was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687. Counsel presented a substantial amount of mitigation evidence at Rew’s first 

sentencing, including a statement in mitigation, an interview with Rew’s grandfather 

detailing Rew’s chaotic and abusive upbringing, and a psychological report. (Lodgment 

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No. 16, ECF No. 8-16 at 9.) Rew does not explain what further evidence counsel could 

have or should have presented at his resentencing hearing. For the same reason, Rew has 

also not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. He has not established the failure to place additional information relevant to a future 

youth offender parole hearing into the record will change the outcome of his parole 

hearing. Id.

As to Rew’s claims regarding counsel’s failure to consult with a ballistics expert 

and investigate and interview witnesses, Rew does not identify any ballistic experts 

counsel should have consulted, what such experts would have offered as testimony in 

Rew’s case, and how that testimony would have helped Rew’s defense. Rew also does 

not identify what witnesses he told counsel about, what those witnesses would have said, 

and how those witness’s testimony would have altered the outcome of his case. Without 

this information, Rew has not established either the deficient performance prong of 

Strickland, or the prejudice prong. Id. at 687, 694; see also James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 

(9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”)

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 4. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Rew is not entitled to relief as to this claim

6. Admission of Gang Evidence (claim five)

In claim five, Rew contends the admission of gang evidence, which the state 

appellate court found was insufficient to support the jury’s true findings on the gang 

enhancements contained in counts one, two and three and the weapons enhancements in 

counts one and two, violated his federal due process rights and denied him a fair trial. 

(Pet., ECF No. 1 at 43-44.) He argues the evidence should never have been admitted 

because it was insufficient to support those enhancements and its admission was therefore 

prejudicial to Rew’s case. (Id.) Respondent contends the claim fails to present a federal 

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question and, in the alternative, Rew did not suffer prejudice from the admission of the 

gang evidence because he admitted to being a gang member shortly before he shot 

Simpson. (Answer, ECF No. 7-1 at 33-38.)

Rew raised this claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 3, ECF No. 8-33.) The state supreme court denied the 

petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 34, ECF No. 8-34.) This Court 

must therefore “look through” to the state appellate court’s decision denying Rew’s 

habeas corpus petition as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court 

denied the claim on procedural grounds, writing as follows:

Rew also raised this claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the San Diego 

Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 29, ECF No. 8-29.) The superior court likewise imposed 

a procedural bar but also decided the claim on the merits. (Lodgment No. 30, ECF No. 8-

30 at 7-10.) After quoting extensively from People v. Albarran, 149 Cal. App. 4th 214 

(2007), cited by Rew, and noting that gang evidence is “admissible if it is logically 

relevant to some material issue in the case, other than character evidence, is not more 

prejudicial than probative and is not cumulative . . . ,” the superior court wrote:

Here, notwithstanding his reliance on Albarran, petitioner does not 

allege that the so-called “gang evidence” was not relevant and admissible 

regarding the substantive charges. Nor does lack of relevance or 

admissibility apparent from his description of the evidence at trial. (See, 

Petn., pp. 10-23, especially pp. 10-11.) Petitioner cites no authority for 

ordering a new trial on all charges simply because there was insufficient 

evidence to support a duly alleged gang enhancement. 

(Id. at 8-10.)

A state court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling cannot form the basis for federal 

habeas relief unless federal constitutional rights are affected. Whelchel v. Washington, 

232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000) citing Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir.

1987). “While a petitioner for federal habeas relief may not challenge the application of 

state evidentiary rules, he is entitled to relief if the evidentiary decision created an 

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absence of fundamental fairness that ‘fatally infected the trial.’” Ortiz-Sandoval v. 

Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996) quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 

1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A] trial court's ruling does not violate due process unless 

the evidence is ‘of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Windham v. Merkle, 

163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Admission of 

evidence violates due process “[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences the jury may 

draw from the evidence.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

a due process error is found, the Court must then determine if it had a “substantial and 

injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622. 

As Respondent notes, there is no clearly established Supreme Court law which 

holds that prejudicial evidence is inadmissible or violates due process. Indeed, the 

Supreme Court expressly reserved deciding that issue in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

75, n.5 (1991); see Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008); Alberni v. 

McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the admission of 

evidence as a violation of due process. Although the Court has been clear 

that a writ should be issued when constitutional errors have rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair, [citation omitted], it has not yet made a clear ruling 

that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. Absent such 

“clearly established Federal law,” we cannot conclude that the state court’s 

ruling was an “unreasonable application.

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000) and Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).

In any event, even if the gang evidence was improperly admitted it did not have a 

substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. As to counts one 

through three, victim Simpson identified Rew in court and in a pre-trial lineup. 

(Lodgment No. 6, ECF No. 8-6 at 14; Lodgment No. 7, ECF No. 8-7 at 69.) Simpson’s 

car keys were found at Rew’s house. (Lodgment No. 7, ECF No. 8-7 at 57.) Ruiz 

testified that on or about July 22 or 23, 2010, Rew came to Ruiz’s house and told Ruiz he 

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had shot someone because the person had “cuzzed” him. (Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 8-8 

at 84-85.) When Rew arrived at Moreno’s house on July 23, he was driving Simpson’s 

gray Toyota which Rew told Moreno was “hot,” meaning stolen. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF 

No. 8-9 at 25-27; Lodgment No. 6, ECF No. 8-6 at 10.) As to counts seven through 

eleven, victim Aceves identified Rew as his assailant in court. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF 

No. 8-9 at 143.) Cuevas’s passport was found during the search of Rew’s home. 

(Lodgment No. 7, ECF No. 8-7 at 58-59.) Photos of Rew with a large amount of cash, 

which could have been the cash stolen during the Aceves and Cuevas robbery, were 

found on the camera stolen from the Irish tourists. (Id. at 73.) As to counts twelve 

through sixteen, the bullet extracted from victim Avila’s shoe matched the gun retrieved 

from Rew’s pocket upon his arrest. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 8-10 at 63; Lodgment 

No. 11, ECF No. 8-11 at 23.) As to count seventeen, Officer Mario Perez testified that on 

July 25, 2010, he saw Rew walking away from a car and acting suspiciously; he stopped 

Rew, frisked him, and found a gun in Rew’s front pocket. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 

8-10 at 99.) As to count eighteen, Officer Terranova testified he tried to pull Rew over 

on July 29, 2010. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 8-10 at 78-80.) Rew eventually stopped 

the car, got out, and ran away. (Id. at 80-82.) Thus, there was substantial evidence 

admitted at trial, including eyewitness identification and physical evidence, which 

supported each of the crimes of which Rew was convicted independent of the gang 

evidence upon which the jury would have made. See Smith v. Scribner, 384 Fed. Appx. 

672, 673 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[an] error cannot be said to have had a substantial 

and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict [when there is] overwhelming independent 

evidence introduced against [the defendant] at trial”).

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 4. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Rew is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

///

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to Chief United States 

District Judge Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be 

entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 22, 2019 any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than May 6, 2019. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 5, 2019

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