Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-00114/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-00114-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MEGAN GARCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:18-CV-02079-KOB

)

PAMELA CASEY, SCOTT GILLILAND, )

SUE ASHWORTH, and BRIAN K. )

RATLIFF, )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________________)

)

VICTOR REVILL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 2:19-CV-00114-KOB

v. )

)

PAMELA CASEY, SCOTT GILLILAND, )

SUE ASHWORTH, and BRIAN K. )

RATLIFF, )

) THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO 

BOTH CASES

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the court on three motions for reconsideration (Garcia Docs. 49 

and 55, and Revill Doc. 36), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), regarding this 

court’s memorandum opinion and accompanying order of August 1, 2019 (Garcia Docs. 46, 

47).

1 Plaintiffs Megan Garcia and Victor Revill separately filed motions asking the court to 

 1 To prevent confusion regarding the two docket sheets for these consolidated cases, the court 

uses “Garcia Doc.” to refer to docket entries in the case filed by Megan Garcia, 2:18-CV-02079-

KOB, and “Revill Doc.” to refer to docket entries in the case filed by Victor Revill, 2:19-CV00114-KOB.

FILED

 2020 Feb-12 AM 11:17

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:19-cv-00114-KOB Document 48 Filed 02/12/20 Page 1 of 6
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reconsider the state-agent immunity defense that Defendants raised in their motions to dismiss.

(Garcia Doc. 49 and Revill Doc. 36.)2 Defendants Pamela Casey and Scott Gilliland filed a joint 

motion asking the court to reconsider whether Defendants sufficiently raised the argument that 

Plaintiffs’ factual assertions failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Garcia 

Doc. 55 and Revill Doc. 38.) For the reasons explained below, the court will GRANT Plaintiffs’ 

motions to reconsider and DENY Defendants’ motion to reconsider. Pursuant to this order, the 

court will vacate the prior memorandum opinion and order and substitute a new memorandum 

opinion and order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Ms. Garcia’s Counts Two and 

Three and as to Mr. Revill’s Counts Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen.

Standard of Review

Motions filed under Rule 59(e) present “an extraordinary remedy [that] is employed 

sparingly.” Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1267–

68 (N.D. Ala. 2006). Motions for reconsideration should not be a “‘knee-jerk reaction to an 

adverse ruling.’” Rueter, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1267–8) (quoting Summit Medical Center of 

Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (M. D. Ala. 2003)). A party cannot use a 

motion for reconsideration “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence 

that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 

U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008). 

Although “as a rule, parties are not entitled to two bites at the apple,” occasions arise 

when “reconsideration should be entertained.” Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 667 (11th Cir. 

1990). Such occasions include when “newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or 

 2 Garcia Doc. 49 and Revill Doc. 35 are identical documents, both filed by Ms. Garcia. Mr. 

Revill filed Revill Doc. 36. 

Case 2:19-cv-00114-KOB Document 48 Filed 02/12/20 Page 2 of 6
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fact” justify granting such a motion. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). The 

decision whether to grant a Rule 59 motion lies within the sound discretion of the district court.

Id.

Defendants’ Motion

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, filed after Plaintiffs’ motions to reconsider,

seeks a second bite at the apple; the motion contends that the court should have analyzed whether

Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a). (Garcia Doc. 55 and Revill Doc. 38.) The court’s 

memorandum opinion of August 1, 2019 found that Defendants’ motions to dismiss did not 

argue that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on a lack of plausibly alleged facts. (Garcia 

Doc. 46 at 8.) Instead, the court analyzed the five affirmative defenses that Defendants raised in 

their motions to dismiss and granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions. Defendants 

now ask the court to reconsider, and they argue that they did in fact argue that Plaintiffs’ alleged 

facts did not support claims upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a). 

Defendants’ original motions to dismiss contain the following three references to alleged

factual insufficiency. First, in their introductions, both motions to dismiss state, without further 

elaboration, that “Plaintiff has further failed to state a claim against the DA and Assistant DA for 

which relief can be granted.” (Garcia Doc. 26 at 4; Revill Doc. 2 at 3.) Second, both motions

include a boilerplate “Standard of Review” section that recites the basic rules presented in 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

(Garcia Doc. 26 at 10–11; Revill Doc. 2 at 10–11.) Third, in the discussions of the prosecutorial 

immunity defense, both motions state that Plaintiffs claims “appear to be based on conjecture.” 

Case 2:19-cv-00114-KOB Document 48 Filed 02/12/20 Page 3 of 6
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(Garcia Doc. 26 at 11; Revill Doc. 2 at 11.) Defendants’ motions contain no other references to 

alleged factual insufficiency, pursuant to Rule 8(a). 

Noting Defendants’ paucity of argumentation regarding alleged factual insufficiency, Ms. 

Garcia pointed out in her brief opposing the motions to dismiss that Defendants only raised five 

affirmative defenses but did not allege a failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted

based on insufficiently pled facts. (Garcia Doc. 27 at 1.)

Even after Ms. Garcia brought this lack of factual insufficiency argumentation to 

Defendants’ attention, Defendants’ two reply briefs presented only marginally more relevant 

analysis than what appeared in the motions to dismiss. Instead of offering substantive arguments 

why any claim failed as a matter of law, Defendants’ reply briefs re-stated the standard espoused 

in Twombly and Iqbal, referred back to the meager allegations proffered in the motions to 

dismiss, asserted generally that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were “conclusory” or “speculative,” 

discussed differences between the original and amended complaints, and added a First 

Amendment defense. (Garcia Docs. 29 at 1–4 and 33 at 1–6.) 

The argument mostly closely analogous to a factual insufficiency argument appears on 

page five of “Defendants’ Supplemental Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Casey and Gilliland’s 

Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 33). There, Defendants purport to attack Plaintiffs’ defamation claims 

by referencing two U.S. Supreme Court cases and an Eleventh Circuit opinion for the proposition 

that “allegations of injury to reputation alone do not support a § 1983 claim for violation of due 

process.” Cypress Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F.3d 1435, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). But even in this section, 

Defendants do not explain how the stated rule applies to anything that appears in the Plaintiffs’

two complaints. 

Case 2:19-cv-00114-KOB Document 48 Filed 02/12/20 Page 4 of 6
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Plaintiffs bring a total of 18 claims. In their motions to dismiss, Defendants chose to 

attack these claims with a series of affirmative defenses. But nowhere in either their motions to 

dismiss or in the supporting briefs do Defendants offer tenable arguments why any of these

claims are factually insufficient. “[T]he party moving for dismissal has the burden of proving 

that no claim has been stated.” Union Ins. Co. v. Blakeney Palmer Co., LLC, No. 7:12-CV04072-RDP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195343, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 6, 2013). Conversely, the 

court has no burden to parse through the complaint looking for a reason to grant a defendant’s 

motion to dismiss. See Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 299 n.57 (S.D. 

Ala. 2006) (“[T]he court is under no duty to exercise imagination and conjure what a plaintiff 

might have alleged, but did not, and do counsel’s work for him or her. . . . [T]he onus is upon the 

parties to formulate arguments”) (internal citations omitted).

Because Defendants here never sufficiently alleged a factual insufficiency argument, 

their motion to reconsider is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

Regarding Plaintiffs’ two motions to reconsider (Garcia Doc. 49 and Revill Doc. 36), on 

second look, the court agrees with Plaintiffs and finds that Defendants did not meet the burden 

imposed on their affirmative defense of state-agent immunity. Specifically, Defendants failed to 

show that they were acting in a function that would entitle them to state-agent immunity at the 

time they allegedly defamed Ms. Garcia and Mr. Revill. Instead of first looking at whether 

Defendants were engaged in a protected function, the court jumped to the conclusion that 

because Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants acted under color of state law, then the state-agent 

immunity doctrine applied. (Garcia Doc. 46 at 23.) But whether Defendants acted under color of 

state law is wholly irrelevant to state-agent immunity. The court should have first questioned 

Case 2:19-cv-00114-KOB Document 48 Filed 02/12/20 Page 5 of 6
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whether Defendants demonstrated that they were engaged in a protected function. See Ex parte 

Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000). Because applying the correct analysis leads to a 

different result than the court’s original finding, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ motions for 

reconsideration should be granted.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the court committed a manifest error of law by applying 

the wrong standard, so the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motions to reconsider and VACATES its 

memorandum opinion and order of August 1, 2019. (Garcia Docs. 46, 47.) The court will 

substitute a new memorandum opinion and order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to 

Ms. Garcia’s Counts Two and Three and as to Mr. Revill’s Counts Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, 

and Thirteen.

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of February, 2020. 

____________________________________

KARON OWEN BOWDRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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