Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00308/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00308-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA AGUILAR, 

Plaintiff,

v.

MCKESSON CORPORATION; BAYER 

HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS, 

INC.; BAYER PHARMA AG; AND, 

BAYER OY,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-CV-00308-LJO-SKO

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND.

(ECF No. 9)

Defendant Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Bayer”) removed this case from state 

court based on diversity jurisdiction. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Maria Aguilar’s 

(“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand, filed April 6, 2016 (ECF No. 9). Bayer filed its Opposition on April 

21, 2016 (ECF No. 10), and Plaintiff filed a Reply on April 27, 2016 (ECF No. 13). The Court deems 

the matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 230(g). Having 

considered the record in this case, the parties’ briefing, and the relevant law, the Court will grant 

Plaintiff’s motion for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

This suit is a product liability case stemming from Plaintiff’s use of the intrauterine 

contraceptive device known as “Mirena.” See, generally, Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-2. On 

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December 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages and Request for Jury Trial in the 

Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Tulare. See id. In particular, she alleges 

that her Mirena use, placed by her doctor Dr. Martha Monica Rivera of Family HealthCare 

Network, caused her to develop pseudotumor cerebri, also known as idiopathic intracranial 

hypertension (“PTC/IIC”). See, generally, Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff asserts nine causes of 

action against Bayer, Bayer AG, Bayer OY (together, “the Bayer Defendants”), and McKesson for: 

(1) negligence; (2) strict liability for design defect; (3) strict liability for failure to warn; (4) breach 

of express warranty; (5) breach of implied warranty; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) fraudulent 

misrepresentation; (8) fraud by suppression and concealment; and (9) punitive damages. See id.

Plaintiff alleges that the Bayer Defendants and McKesson were negligent in the 

manufacture, marketing, and sale of Mirena. See id. at ¶¶ 166-186. Plaintiff alleges that McKesson 

is currently the largest distributor of pharmaceuticals in the nation and is also involved in several 

levels of marketing, advertising, and promoting products for its drug-manufacturing clients. See id 

at ¶¶ 24, 28, 35. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that McKesson marketed, distributed, promoted, sold, 

manufactured, designed, developed, licensed, formulated, tested, packaged, labeled, produced, 

created, made, constructed, assembled, and advertised Mirena. See id. at ¶¶ 28, 164, 171, 179, 191-

92, 200, 213, 234, 238, 249, 278, 306. Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant to this case, 

McKesson packaged, marketed, distributed, promoted, and sold Mirena in California, including 

Tulare County. See id. at ¶ 24. She further alleges McKesson supplied the Mirena that Plaintiff used 

which subsequently caused her injuries and damages. See id. at ¶ 26. 

It is undisputed that Defendant Bayer is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in New Jersey; Bayer Pharma AG is a global pharmaceutical corporation organized under 

the laws of Germany; Bayer Oy is a corporation organized under the laws of Finland; McKesson is 

a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California; and, 

Plaintiff is a citizen of Tulare County, California. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9-12; Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 5. 

On the basis of diversity jurisdiction, Defendant Bayer timely removed this case on March 

4, 2016, within 30 days of February 3, 2016, the date that Plaintiff served the summons and 

Complaint upon Bayer. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1-3 at ¶ 3. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Civil actions not involving a federal question are removable to a federal district court only if 

there is diversity of citizenship between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Section 1332 requires 

that there be complete diversity; that is, each plaintiff’s citizenship must be diverse as to each 

defendant’s citizenship. Id. A defendant may remove a civil action that alleges claims against a 

non-diverse defendant when the plaintiff has no basis for suing that defendant, or in other words, 

when that defendant has been fraudulently joined. McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 

1339 (9th Cir.1987).

On a motion to remand, the removing defendant faces a strong presumption against 

removal, and that party bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper by a 

preponderance of evidence. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-404 (9th Cir.

1996); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992). A case removed from state court 

should be remanded if it appears that the case was removed improvidently or without jurisdiction. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

For example, where a non-diverse defendant has been “fraudulently joined” to an otherwise 

completely diverse case, that defendant’s citizenship is disregarded for diversity jurisdiction 

purposes. See, e.g., United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001); McCabe, 811 F.2d at 

1339). However, there is a “general presumption against fraudulent joinder.” Hunter v. Philip 

Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A defendant is fraudulently 

joined when [a] ‘plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure 

is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.’” Kwasniewski v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, —

Fed. Appx. –––, No. 13-17390, 2016 WL 722952, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2016) (quoting McCabe,

811 F.2d at 1339); see also Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants, LLC, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1169-70 

(E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A] non-diverse defendant is deemed fraudulently joined if, after all disputed 

questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, 

the plaintiff could not possibly recover against the party whose joinder is questioned.”) (citing 

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Kruso v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989)). In determining whether a 

non-diverse defendant has been improperly joined, courts may look beyond the pleadings and 

examine the factual record. McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339. “Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear 

and convincing evidence.” Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th 

Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied and that 

the citizenship of the unidentified Doe defendants is immaterial for determining diversity 

jurisdiction. See, generally, ECF No. 9; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 13, 22-24. Rather, Defendant 

Bayer argues that McKesson was fraudulently joined to this action, therefore, its citizenship does 

not affect diversity. Bayer concedes that McKesson distributes and sells Mirena, see ECF No. 1-3 at 

¶ 17, but claims via a declaration1that McKesson did not manufacture, distribute, market, or 

promote the particular unit that injured Plaintiff. See ECF No. 1-7; ECF No. 1-3 at ¶ 20. Defendants 

emphasize that to counter Harrop’s declaration Plaintiff merely relies on allegations made on her 

information and belief, which Defendants argue is insufficient to survive its opposition to remand. 

The parties dispute whether Defendant McKesson was fraudulently joined, and whether its

California citizenship defeats removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (providing that a case may not 

be removed solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction if any defendant “is a citizen of the State in 

which such action is brought”).

Central to the parties’ dispute is whether McKesson played a role in the distribution chain 

that supplied Plaintiff’s care provider with her Mirena. Bayer relies on three cases where discovery 

revealed that McKesson did not distribute the product about which the plaintiff complained, and 

where for that reason the respective courts denied the plaintiff’s motions to remand. See Tucker v. 

McKesson Corp., Case No. C10-2981 SBA, 2011 WL 4345166, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) 

 

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Brett Harrop, VPDO, Regional Sales & Operations, Western Division, at McKesson, declares that “McKesson does not 

now distribute, nor has it ever distributed, Mirena to Dr. Martha Monica Rivera of Family HealthCare Network, 400 E. 

Oak Ave., Visalia, California, 93291, as identified by Plaintiff’s counsel as the healthcare provider who placed Plaintiff’s 

Mirena and the facility where her Mirena was placed.” Decl. of Brett Harrop (“Harrop Decl.”), ECF No. 1-7 at ¶ 3. 

Moreover, “McKesson does not now market, promote, manufacture, design, develop, license, formulate, test, package, 

label, produce, create, make, construct, assemble, or advertise Mirena.” Id. at ¶ 4.

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(finding fraudulent joinder where plaintiff “admits that further discovery has shown that 

‘McKesson did not distribute morphine to [decedent’s] pharmacy’”); Aronis v. Merck & Co., No. 

CIV. S-05-0486WBSDAD, 2005 WL 5518485, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2005) (finding that plaintiff 

made no allegation that McKesson “ever handled the specific pills that were allegedly the cause of 

her injuries,” thus concluding that McKesson had been fraudulently joined); see also Martinez v. 

McKesson Corp., No. 37-2015-00028477-CU-MT-CTL (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) (finding 

defendant was fraudulently joined where defendant’s evidence demonstrated that McKesson did not 

distribute the subject product to plaintiff’s doctor; denying motion to remand).

Despite that like Tucker, Aronis, and Martinez, the instant Defendant cites to evidence 

which indicates that McKesson did not directly supply the allegedly offending product, this case is 

easily distinguished on its facts. Unlike the three exemplar cases, Bayer does not foreclose the 

possibility that McKesson distributed Plaintiff’s Mirena. In support of its argument, Defendant 

Bayer relies entirely on Harrop’s declaration to show no distribution link exists between McKesson 

and Plaintiff’s Mirena. But Harrop’s declaration states that McKesson’s sole purchasers for Mirena 

are facilities operated by the federal government, including the Public Health Service. See Harrop

Decl., ECF No. 1-7 ¶ 2. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had a Mirena placed by her doctor at the 

Family HealthCare Network. See ECF No. 1-8 ¶ 2. Here, unlike the plaintiffs in Tucker, Aronis, 

and Martinez, Plaintiff Aguilar argues that because her care facility is a Federally Qualified Health 

Center which falls within the purview of the Public Health Service Act, there is evidence to support 

that McKesson may have distributed her Mirena to a Public Health Service intermediary which, in 

turn, distributed it to the Family HealthCare Network. In other words, there is evidence that it is at 

least possible that McKesson remains in the chain of distribution. See ECF No. 9:5-10. This 

potential link is absent from Tucker, Aronis, and Martinez. 

Thus, unlike those cases, Plaintiff demonstrates more than mere speculation on which to 

base her “information and belief” that McKesson was in the relevant distribution stream. In sum, 

the Court finds that Defendant’s evidence does not establish conclusively that McKesson was not 

upstream in the supply channel in relation to Plaintiff’s Mirena. For the purposes of a fraudulent 

joinder determination, this factual dispute must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. Nasrawi, 776 F. 

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Supp. 2d at 1169-70 (citing Kruso, 872 F.2d at 1426). 

The fraudulent joinder standard “is not whether plaintiffs will actually or even probably 

prevail on the merits, but whether there is any possibility that they may do so.” Cont’l Ins. Co. v. 

Foss Maritime Co., Case No. C02-3936 MJJ, 2002 WL 31414315, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2002); 

see also Hung Duong v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-01257-AWI-SA, 2014 WL 4634998, 

at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014) (collecting cases). 

Here, that possibility remains. Vertical distributors can be held liable for defective products 

under California law. See, e.g., Zachman v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 15-CV-04285-RS, 2015 WL 

7717190, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2015) (citing Bailey v. Safeway, Inc., 199 Cal. App. 4th 206, 

2013 (2011) (“The doctrine of strict products liability imposes fault on all participants in the chain 

of distribution of a defective product.”); Bostick v. Flex Equip. Co., Inc., 147 Cal. App. 4th 80, 88 

(2007); Jimenez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 473, 477–78 (2002); Edwards v. A.L. Lease & Co., 

46 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1033 (1996); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 

994 (1991)); see also Great W. Cas. Co. v. Navistar, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-01940-KJM, 2015 WL 

5103678, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015). Therefore, “it is not obvious that [Plaintiff’s] strict 

liability claim against McKesson is meritless.” Id.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation based upon “information and belief2” that 

McKesson distributed her Mirena is sufficient to survive Bayer’s opposition to remand based on 

fraudulent joinder. See, e.g., Hatherley v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIV. 2:13-00719 WBS, 2013 WL 

3354458, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2013) (citing Rivera v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, CV 12–

02921 GAF JEMX, 2012 WL 2031348, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (finding similar allegations 

sufficient to defeat a finding of fraudulent joinder of a distributor defendant) (collecting cases); see 

also Zachman, 2015 WL 7717190, at *4 (finding it not “obvious” that plaintiff’s strict liability 

claim against McKesson was meritless, thus finding no fraudulent joinder, and granting remand 

 

2 Under California law, a “‘[p]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal 

knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true.’” Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.

4th 531, 550 (2007) (quoting Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal. 2d 788, 792 (1951)). “When a plaintiff lacks knowledge 

and the means of obtaining knowledge of facts material to his or her cause of action because the matters are peculiarly 

within the knowledge of the adverse party, and the pleader can learn of them only from statements of others, the pleader 

may plead what he or she believes to be true as a result of information (hearsay) the pleader has received.” Dey v. Cont’l 

Cent. Credit, 170 Cal. App. 4th 721, 725 n. 1 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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based on the lack of complete diversity). For these reasons, Defendant Bayer fails to meet its heavy 

burden of establishing fraudulent joinder.

CONCLUSION

Because it is undisputed that McKesson’s principal place of business is in California and 

Plaintiff is a citizen of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), the Court finds that the 

parties lack complete diversity. The Court concludes that McKesson’s California citizenship defeats 

removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 9) is 

GRANTED. Therefore, this case is HEREBY REMANDED to the Superior Court of California 

for the County of Tulare. 

Finally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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