Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01173/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01173-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Margaret Dominguez, individually and on

behalf of S.D., a minor child, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Andrew Shaw; Kreg Klein; Alfonso

Flores; Johnathon Conn; City of Phoenix;

Unknown Denny, 

Defendants. 

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CV 10-01173-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants' second motion for partial summary judgment (doc.

66), plaintiffs' response (doc. 69), and defendants' reply (doc. 70). In addition to filing a

supplemental statement of facts (doc. 67), defendants incorporate their statement of facts

filed in support of the first motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 29). 

I. Background

This action arises out of plaintiffs' arrests by the defendant officers. For the purposes

of this motion we consider undisputed facts as true and review disputed facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Anthoine v. N. Cent. Cntys. Consortium, 605 F.3d

740, 745 (9th Cir. 2010). Our order addressing defendants' first motion for partial summary

judgment detailed the circumstances leading up to Margaret Dominguez and her minor son

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S.D.'s arrests by defendants (doc. 65). We review the facts relevant to the instant motion.

S.D. and his friend J.M. were waiting for a ride home from Margaret on May 4, 2009,

when they observed Phoenix police arresting J.M.'s brother. J.M. became agitated, and the

police told the boys to leave the scene. In the meantime, Margaret arrived in her car. S.D.

and J.M. entered the car. According to defendants, Margaret pushed Officer Klein out of the

way and stepped inside the car. DSOF ¶ 20 (doc. 29). Margaret denies pushing Officer

Klein. Pls.' Summary of Disputed Facts ("PSODF") ¶ 17 (doc. 68). Officer Klein removed

Margaret from her car.

Upon witnessing this exchange, S.D. became upset. He got out of the passenger door

and walked quickly to the back of the car. Defendants claim that S.D. swung his fists and

hit Officer Denny, who was trying to prevent S.D. from reaching the back of the car. DSOF

¶ 25 (doc. 29). Officer Denny responded by executing a defensive "sprawl move," which

tackled S.D. to the ground. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. S.D. denies swinging his fists at or grabbing

Officer Denny. PSODF ¶¶ 20, 23, 24. According to S.D., he was "violently slammed" onto

the ground by Officers Denny and Conn as he reached the back of the car. PSOF ¶ 9.

Officers Denny, Conn, and Flores worked together to try and place S.D. in handcuffs.

Another minor at the scene, S.W., grabbed Officer Denny's vest and tried to pull him

backwards. In response, Officer Flores pulled S.W. away. S.W. struck Officer Flores in the

face. Officer Flores left S.D. and Officers Conn and Denny to arrest S.W. 

During S.D.'s arrest, he was struck by Officer Denny. Officer Conn had his knee on

S.D.'s back. It took the officers approximately ten seconds to place both handcuffs on S.D.'s

wrists. According to S.D., Officer Conn kept his knee on S.D.'s back even after S.D. was

handcuffed, while Officer Denny struck him several times on his head and face. PSOF ¶ 11.

S.D. claims that Officer Denny then forced his face into the gravel, grinding it back and

forth. Id. ¶ 12. Although defendants acknowledge that S.D. sustained facial abrasions, they

deny using any force on S.D. after he was handcuffed. DSOF ¶ 45. S.D. contends that

Officer Flores failed to intervene to prevent Officer Denny's use of force. PSOF ¶ 13. 

In 2010, S.D. was adjudicated delinquent by the Superior Court of Arizona in

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Maricopa County for the offenses of resisting arrest in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2508 and

threatening and intimidating Officer Klein in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1202. DSOF, Ex. A

at 4. The adjudication has not been reversed, appealed, or set aside.

Plaintiffs assert claims for (1) assault and battery, (2) false imprisonment, (3)

negligence, and (4) excessive force and false imprisonment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On September 30, 2011, we granted in part defendants' motion for partial summary judgment

relating to S.D.'s § 1983 claims (doc. 65). Defendants now move for partial summary

judgment on the following: (1) S.D.'s claim for assault and battery (count one); (2) S.D.'s

claim for false imprisonment (count two); (3) S.D. and Margaret's claims for negligence

(count three); and (4) S.D.'s claims that Officers Denny, Conn, and Flores acted in concert

to accomplish assault and battery and false imprisonment, and Margaret's claims that Officers

Shaw and Klein acted in concert to accomplish assault and battery and false imprisonment.

Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23, 29, 30, 38, 39 (doc. 25). 

II. Liability of Police Officers for Negligence

Defendants argue that Arizona police officers cannot be liable for simple negligence

when taking discretionary action in the course of their official duties. The Arizona

legislature has taken a different view. When enacting the Actions Against Public Entities

or Public Employees Act in 1984 (codified at A.R.S. §§ 12-820 to 12-823), the legislature

affirmed the settled notion that governmental immunity from tort liability "is the exception

and liability the rule." City of Tucson v. Fahringer, 164 Ariz. 599, 600 n.4, 795 P.2d 819,

820 (1990). See also Backus v. State, 220 Ariz. 101, 104, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (2009) (noting

the "overarching policy" in Arizona of "holding a public entity responsible for its conduct").

The Arizona Supreme Court explicitly recognized the legislature's constitutional authority

to direct the manner in which actions may be brought against the state. Clouse ex rel. Clouse

v. State, 199 Ariz. 196, 203, 16 P.3d 757, 764 (2001). Clouse held that the Arizona

Constitution permits the legislature to "define those instances in which public entities and

employees are entitled to immunity." Id. The legislature acted within this authority when

it adopted A.R.S. § 12-820.02.A, which outlines when a public employee receives qualified

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immunity. Id. Clouse noted that the "specific statutory grant" of immunity afforded public

employees was a decision "for the legislature, not for the court." Id. 

Defendants argue that because A.R.S. § 12-820.02 does not address police use of

force, statutory direction is lacking and we must follow Clouse's instruction to apply common

law principles of immunity. See id. (describing cases where the court applied common law

principles "in the absence of any statutory direction"). Defendants cite Landeros v. City of

Tucson, 171 Ariz. 474, 831 P.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1992), in support of their argument that

common law principles prevent police officers from facing liability for simple negligence.

Even if defendants are correct in their assessment of Arizona negligence law (which we

reject), Landeros is distinguishable. Landeros held that police officers cannot be liable for

simple negligence for their role in crime investigation. Id. at 475, 831 P.2d at 851. This

conclusion was based on the public's "vital stake" in vigorous crime investigation, which may

be hampered if officers faced liability for simple negligence. Id. (citation omitted). But this

case deals not with alleged negligence in an investigation, but with alleged negligence in use

of physical force against Arizona citizens. The public has an interest in ensuring that police

officers do not use more force than is justified against their citizens, even if excessive force

is applied as the result of a mistake in judgment. We do not find Landeros controlling here.

Arizona's legislature expressly determined that public entities and officials acting

within the scope of their employment are not liable for the actions detailed in A.R.S. § 12-

820.02(A) unless the conduct was intentional or grossly negligent. The enumerated actions

in A.R.S. § 12-820.02(A) do not include a public employee's use of force. The legislature

did not elect to place use of force into the narrow exceptions granting qualified immunity,

and it is not our place to override this decision. See Clouse, 199 Ariz. at 203, 16 P.3d at 764.

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claims simply

because they are police officers.

III. Application of Heck to S.D.'s State Law Claims

Our September 30, 2011 order addressed the application of Heck to S.D.'s juvenile

delinquency adjudication. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).

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S.D. clarified in his response to the first motion for partial summary judgment that

he did not mean to assert claims in count four against Officers Shaw and Klein. Accordingly,

we dismissed S.D.'s § 1983 claims against Officers Shaw and Klein. Order at 3.

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Heck demands dismissal of a § 1983 damages action if a plaintiff's criminal conviction arises

out of the same facts as his § 1983 claim, "is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful

behavior" for which damages are requested, and his conviction has not been expunged or

otherwise vacated. Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). We concluded that

Heck was applicable to S.D.'s juvenile delinquency adjudication for resisting arrest. Order

at 4-5. On that basis, we granted summary judgment to defendants on S.D.'s § 1983 false

imprisonment claim in its entirety, and on S.D.'s § 1983 excessive force claim with respect

to force allegedly inflicted on S.D. prior to being placed in handcuffs. However, we denied

summary judgment on the excessive force claim because disputed facts remain as to whether

defendants used force on S.D. after he was handcuffed.1

Defendants now move for summary judgment on S.D.'s state law claims, arguing that

Heck similarly operates to bar S.D.'s state law false imprisonment claim in its entirety, and

bars S.D.'s assault, battery, and negligence claims up until the time that S.D. was handcuffed.

Plaintiffs argue that Arizona state courts have not applied Heck to state law claims and that

we should not be the first to do so. According to plaintiffs, Heck's specific references to §

1983 claims shows that the Supreme Court does not intend its holding to apply to state

claims. In holding that § 1983 damages actions are barred when success on these claims

would necessarily invalidate a valid criminal conviction, Heck applied the principle that

common law tort actions are inappropriate methods to challenge the validity of criminal

convictions. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. Heck explicitly relied on principles

of state tort law in supporting its conclusion. Preventing collateral attacks on criminal

convictions via § 1983 claims addressed the Supreme Court's "long expressed [] concerns for

finality and consistency." Id. at 484-85, 114 S. Ct. at 2371. 

The Arizona Supreme Court discussed concerns for "finality and respect for

judgments," similar to those raised in Heck, in holding that a state law claim for legal

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2

 We refer to Heck, but, of course, we realize that the application of the principle

underlying Heck to state claims is an issue arising under state, not federal, law.

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malpractice arising during criminal proceedings does not accrue until the criminal matter has

been terminated in the defendant's favor. See Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 32-35, 83 P.3d

26, 32-35 (2004). Applying Heck to S.D.'s state law claims will similarly promote finality

and respect for Arizona's adjudication of S.D.'s delinquency. Otherwise, we would bar S.D.

from seeking money damages under federal law yet allow him to seek money damages for

the same conduct under state law. This is nonsensical. Allowing a plaintiff to attack the

validity of his state criminal adjudication using state tort law would undermine Arizona's

interest in promoting respect for and finality of state court judgments. 

Thus, we proceed with evaluating S.D.'s state law claims for false imprisonment,

assault and battery, and negligence under Heck.

2

 If success on these claims would

necessarily undermine S.D.'s juvenile adjudication, the claims have not yet accrued and are

barred. 

IV. S.D.'s False Imprisonment Claim

False imprisonment is "the detention of a person without his consent and without

lawful authority." Cullison v. City of Peoria, 120 Ariz. 165, 169, 584 P.2d 1156, 1160

(1978). As such, a plaintiff challenging his arrest via a false imprisonment claim must

establish its unlawfulness. Defendants argue that S.D. cannot show that his arrest lacked

probable cause without necessarily invalidating his adjudication of delinquency for resisting

arrest. Plaintiffs do not dispute this contention, and we agree that a finding that S.D.'s arrest

was unlawful would necessarily invalidate the adjudication of delinquency that stemmed

from that arrest. Summary judgment is granted to defendants on S.D.'s false imprisonment

claim. 

V. S.D.'s Assault and Battery Claim

To recover for battery, plaintiff must provide that defendants "intentionally engage[d]

in an act that result[ed] in harmful or offensive contact" with the plaintiff. Duncan v.

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Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 309, 70 P.3d 435, 438 (2003). Assault

requires proof that defendants acted with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact. See

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965). As we explained in our September 30, 2011

order, a person can only be found guilty of resisting arrest in Arizona if the arresting officer

acted lawfully, because a person cannot justifiably resist arrest unless an officer's use of force

is unlawful. See A.R.S. § 13-2508(A), id. § 13-404(B)(2); State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229,

232, 986 P.2d 897, 900 (Ct. App. 1998); Order at 5-6. Here, the parties agree that defendants

used force to place S.D. in handcuffs. The juvenile court found that S.D. struggled until he

was placed into handcuffs, which led to a finding that S.D. was delinquent for resisting

arrest. DSOF, ex. A at 3-4. And it is undisputed that S.D.'s juvenile adjudication has not

been reversed or otherwise set aside. Thus, any claim that defendants committed an assault

or battery on S.D. prior to him being placed in handcuffs would invalidate his adjudication

of delinquency and is barred by Heck. 

S.D. claims that defendants continued to strike him and ground his face into the gravel

even after he was handcuffed. Defendants deny these allegations. A dispute of material fact

remains as to whether force was used on S.D. after this point. We therefore grant summary

judgment to defendants on S.D.'s assault and battery claim up to the point he was handcuffed,

but deny summary judgment with respect to S.D.'s allegations of assault and battery after he

was handcuffed.

VI. S.D.'s Negligence Claim 

To prove negligence under Arizona law, a plaintiff must show (1) a duty that required

defendant to conform to a particular standard of care, (2) defendant's breach of that duty, (3)

a "causal connection between" breach and injury, and (4) actual damage. Gipson v. Kasey,

214 Ariz. 141, 143, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007). S.D. alleges that the "excessive nature" of

defendants' conduct in arresting S.D. and the failure of defendants to intervene in each others'

"unlawful, excessive, abusive conduct" amounts to negligence. Compl. at 6. S.D. alleges

that the City of Phoenix is liable under respondeat superior. Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that a finding of negligence in this case would not be inconsistent with

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 S.D. also alleged in the amended complaint that the officers acted in concert when

they falsely imprisoned him. Because we already granted summary judgment to defendants

on S.D.'s false imprisonment claim, we do not address this argument.

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the elements of resisting arrest. But as explained above, a finding that S.D. resisted arrest

equates to a finding that the officers acted lawfully in making the arrest. Thus, any finding

that defendants' conduct in arresting S.D. was negligent would invalidate the juvenile court's

finding that S.D. resisted arrest. Similarly, an officer's failure to intervene in an arrest cannot

be negligent if the arrest was lawful. Accordingly, Heck bars S.D.'s negligence claim up

until the point that he was placed in handcuffs. A jury could find, however, that defendants

were negligent in either inflicting force on S.D. after he was handcuffed or by failing to

intervene to prevent the post-arrest use of force. We thus grant summary judgment to

defendants on S.D.'s negligence claim up to the point he was handcuffed, but deny summary

judgment to defendants with respect to defendants' alleged conduct after S.D. was

handcuffed.

VII. Plaintiffs' Claims That Defendants Were Acting in Concert

Finally, we address plaintiffs' "acting in concert" claims. Specifically, Margaret

alleges that Officers Klein and Shaw acted in concert when they committed assault and

battery and falsely imprisoned her. S.D. alleges that Officers Denny, Conn, and Flores acted

in concert when they committed assault and battery on him.3

 Joint and several liability no

longer exists in Arizona unless a statutory exception applies. A.R.S. § 12-2506(A). One

such exception is when both defendants were "acting in concert" to commit an intentional

tort. Id. §§ 12-2506(D)(1); 12-2506(F)(1). Defendants act in concert when they "enter[] into

a conscious agreement to pursue a common plan or design to commit an intentional tort and

actively tak[e] part in that intentional tort." Id. § 12-2506(F)(1). Defendants argue that there

is no evidence that the officers were acting in concert. Plaintiffs contend that sufficient

evidence exists. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson

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v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (internal citations

omitted).

We first address Margaret's allegations regarding Officers Klein and Shaw. "[A] party

opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere

allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256, 106 S. Ct. at 2514. When a non-moving party fails to

properly support an assertion of fact, we may grant summary judgment if it is warranted.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Here, despite plaintiffs' assertions in their response to the instant

motion that Officers Klein and Shaw "worked together to physically arrest" Margaret,

Response at 12, plaintiffs point to no evidence in the record that Officer Shaw assisted

Officer Klein in any aspect of Margaret's arrest. Indeed, Officer Shaw is not even mentioned

in plaintiffs' statement of facts, other than to confirm that S.D. did not intend to assert claims

against him. Plaintiffs have not shown that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether

Officers Shaw and Klein acted in concert to commit assault and battery or falsely imprison

Margaret Dominguez. Accordingly, we grant summary judgment to Officers Klein and Shaw

on Margaret's claims that they acted in concert.

S.D. alleges that Officers Denny, Conn, and Flores acted in concert to commit assault

and battery on S.D. In order for Officers Denny, Conn, and Flores to be held jointly and

severally liable, plaintiffs must show that each officer (1) entered into a conscious agreement

to commit assault and battery on S.D. and (2) actively participated in the assault and battery.

See A.R.S. § 12-2506(F)(1). A conscious agreement to commit a tort may be implied from

the alleged tortious conduct itself; evidence of a verbal agreement is not necessary. Chappell

v. Wenholz, 226 Ariz. 309, ¶ 12, 247 P.3d 192, 195 (Ct. App. 2011). Chappell held that a

jury could find that defendants consciously agreed to commit battery on the plaintiff "by

collectively joining in the fight in full sight of each other." Id. Here, it is undisputed that

Officers Denny and Conn worked together to arrest S.D. Plaintiffs contend that both Officers

Denny and Conn used physical force on S.D. after he was handcuffed, PSODF ¶ 29, while

defendants deny the use of physical force after this point. DSOF ¶ 45. A jury could find that

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Officers Denny and Conn consciously agreed to commit assault and battery by each using

force on S.D. while in sight of each other. And a jury could also find that each officer

actively participated in the tort by using force. Contrary to defendants' argument, there is

sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that Officers Denny and Conn acted in concert

to commit assault and battery on S.D. 

We do not reach the same conclusion with respect to Officer Flores. Both parties

agree that Officer Flores went to assist Officers Denny and Conn with S.D.'s arrest. It is

undisputed that at this time, another minor at the scene, S.W., struck Officer Flores in the

face. He then left S.D. and Officers Denny and Conn to arrest S.W. Plaintiffs argue that

Officer Flores intended to assist Officers Denny and Conn in their use of force and failed to

intervene to prevent their use of force. PSOF ¶ 13. Because Heck bars S.D.'s assault and

battery claim up until the point that S.D. was completely handcuffed, Officer Flores's role

in anything that occurred prior to this point is immaterial to this motion. Instead, the relevant

time period is the time after S.D. was handcuffed. Even if we were to conclude that a jury

could reasonably infer that Officer Flores consciously agreed to commit an assault and

battery on S.D. after he was handcuffed because of his prior involvement in the attempt to

handcuff S.D., we cannot conclude that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that

Officer Flores actively participated in an assault and battery after S.D. was handcuffed.

Plaintiffs do not allege that Officer Flores had physical contact with S.D. after he was

handcuffed. And we do not agree that a failure to intervene in this case constitutes active

participation. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence suggesting that Officer Flores either knew

that the officers would continue to assault S.D. after the arrest was complete or witnessed any

use of force post-handcuffs. Indeed, the undisputed facts suggest that Officer Flores had no

further involvement with S.D. after he left to pursue S.W., an exit that occurred prior to the

successful handcuffing of S.D.

In sum, plaintiffs have not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact

as to Officer Flores' participation in the alleged assault and battery on S.D. We therefore

grant summary judgment to defendants on S.D.'s claims that Officer Flores acted in concert,

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but deny summary judgment to defendants on S.D.'s claims that Officer Denny and Officer

Conn acted in concert to commit assault and battery.

VIII. Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART defendants'

motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 66). 

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING summary judgment for defendants on S.D.'s false

imprisonment claim in count two.

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING summary judgment for defendants on S.D.'s assault,

battery, and negligence claims in counts one and three up to the point that S.D. was

handcuffed.

IT IS ORDERED DENYING summary judgment to defendants on S.D.'s assault,

battery, and negligence claims in count one and three with respect to force allegedly inflicted

on S.D. after he was handcuffed.

IT IS ORDERED DENYING summary judgment to defendants on Margaret

Dominguez's negligence claim in count three.

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING summary judgment to defendants on Margaret

Dominguez's claims that Officers Klein and Shaw acted in concert pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-

2506(D)(1).

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING summary judgment to defendants on S.D.'s claims

that Officer Flores acted in concert pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2506(D)(1).

IT IS ORDERED DENYING summary judgment to defendants on S.D.'s claims that

Officers Denny and Conn acted in concert pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2506(D)(1).

This leaves the following claims against the following parties for trial:

Margaret Dominguez's claim for assault and battery (count one) against Klein and

Shaw (severally, but not joint) and against the City of Phoenix;

Margaret Dominguez's claim for false imprisonment (count two) against Klein and

Shaw (severally, but not joint) and against the City of Phoenix;

Margaret Dominguez's claim for negligence (count three) against all defendants;

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Margaret Dominguez's § 1983 claims (count four) against Klein and Shaw;

S.D.'s claim for assault and battery (count one) for conduct occurring after he was

handcuffed against Denny and Conn (jointly and severally), against Flores (severally, but not

joint), and against the City of Phoenix;

S.D.'s claim for negligence (count three) for conduct occurring after he was

handcuffed against all defendants;

S.D.'s § 1983 excessive force claim (count four) for conduct occurring after he was

handcuffed against Denny, Conn, and Flores. 

DATED this 15th day of December, 2011.

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