Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-00042/USCOURTS-ca10-04-00042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 0
Nature of Suit: other
Cause of Action: 

---

1 Honorable Sidney B. Brooks, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United

States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE STEPHEN M. HARMSEN, also

known as Steve Harmsen,

Debtor.

BAP No. UT-04-042

THE SOCIETY OF LLOYD’S,

Appellant,

Bankr. No. 03B-33637

 Chapter 7

v.

STEPHEN M. HARMSEN,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT

Filed February 2, 2005

Before McFEELEY, Chief Judge, BOHANON, and BROOKS1

, Bankruptcy

Judges.

This case originated in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District

of Utah.

The judgment of that court is AFFIRMED.

For the Panel:

Barbara A. Schermerhorn, Clerk of Court

By:

Deputy Clerk

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 1 of 23
1 Honorable Sidney B. Brooks, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United

States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.

FILED

U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

of the Tenth Circuit

February 2, 2005

Barbara A. Schermerhorn

Clerk PUBLISH

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE STEPHEN M. HARMSEN, also

known as Steve Harmsen,

Debtor.

BAP No. UT-04-042

THE SOCIETY OF LLOYD’S,

Appellant,

Bankr. No. 03B-33637

 Chapter 7

v. OPINION

STEPHEN M. HARMSEN,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Utah

Michael N. Zundel of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, Utah, for

Appellant.

Steven A. Wuthrich, Montpelier, Idaho, for Appellee.

Before McFEELEY, Chief Judge, BOHANON, and BROOKS1

, Bankruptcy

Judges.

BROOKS, Bankruptcy Judge.

The creditor, The Society of Lloyd’s (“Lloyd’s” or “Creditor”), timely

appeals the Order of Dismissal and Memorandum Decision (“Order of Dismissal”)

entered on April 13, 2004, by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District

of Utah. The Order of Dismissal was entered after a trial on the involuntary

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 2 of 23
2 Compare Appellant’s “Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal and

Standard of Review (Lloyd’s Appellate Brief at 1-3) with Appellant’s “Summary

of Argument”(Lloyd’s Appellate Brief at 13-14, and “Argument Point I” sections

A-F (Lloyd’s Appellate Brief at 14-29). 

3 853 F.2d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1988).

4 The “almost per se rule” is a “rule” under which a minority of courts are

“purportedly disinclined to permit an involuntary petition where there is only a

single creditor.” In re Feinberg, 238 B.R. 781, 784 (8th Cir. BAP 1999),

judgment vacated (8th Cir. BAP December 16, 1999). The majority of courts that

have considered this issue have rejected this rule on the basis that there are no

statutory grounds for not permitting single creditor involuntary petitions. See,

e.g., Concrete Pumping Service, Inc. v. King Constr. Co., Inc. (In re Concrete

Pumping Service, Inc.), 943 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1991).

-2-

petition filed by Lloyd’s against the putative debtor, Stephen M. Harmsen

(“Harmsen”). Lloyd’s argues that the Order of Dismissal was entered in error

because the bankruptcy court erroneously concluded that the Debtor was generally

paying his debts as they became due.

The Creditor’s issues on appeal are not clearly defined or carefully

delineated2

 but can be summarized as follows: 

(a) The bankruptcy court improperly imposed on the Creditor an

expanded burden of proof under the Tenth Circuit’s “totality of the

circumstances” test in evaluating whether an order for relief should

enter in an involuntary bankruptcy case set as set forth in Bartmann

v. Maverick Tube Corp.

3

(b) The bankruptcy court either improperly invoked the “Almost Per Se

Rule” or should have not invoked the Rule.4

(c) The bankruptcy court erroneously concluded that the putative debtor,

Harmsen, was generally paying his debts as they became due. 

Underlying this appeal is the Creditor’s view that the putative debtor,

Harmsen, through a well crafted, self-serving business structure and a carefully

timed, insider-controlled business foreclosure on his assets, wrongfully deprived

the Creditor of an ability to execute on its judgment against the Debtor.

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 3 of 23
5 Harmsen posits a third response—or issue on appeal—which is (a) not

raised by the Appellant and (b) was not decided by the bankruptcy court. The

panel will, therefore, not address Harmsen’s arguments that: (a) Lloyd’s lacked

standing to file the involuntary petition, and (b) Lloyd’s debt is subject to a bona

fide dispute.

6 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)-(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(e). 

-3-

Lloyd’s requests that this Court conclude that Harmsen was generally not

paying his debts as they became due and remand this matter to the bankruptcy

court to determine if Harmsen has twelve or more creditors who qualify to be

counted under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) and if not, direct that the bankruptcy court

enter an order for relief.

The appellee, Harmsen, responds to Lloyd’s appeal by arguing that:5

(a) Lloyd’s allegation that the bankruptcy court did not properly allocate

the burden of proof is incorrect and really a disguised effort to alter

the “clearly erroneous” appeal standard.

(b) The bankruptcy court did not commit error in considering various

factors under the “totality of circumstances” test and its findings of

fact were not clearly erroneous.

The parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction because they have

not elected to have the appeal heard by the United States District Court for the

District of Utah.6

 For the reasons stated, the bankruptcy court’s Order of

Dismissal is AFFIRMED.

I. Background

Lloyd’s filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against Harmsen on August

9, 2003. Lloyd’s states that Harmsen owed it $390,983.57 based upon a judgment

entered in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. On March 11

and 12, 2004, the bankruptcy court conducted a trial on the involuntary petition

and issued its thirty page Memorandum Decision dismissing the petition on April

13, 2004. 

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 4 of 23
-4-

Other than the facts involving the nature, amount and status of the various

financial obligations of Harmsen, the facts relevant to the case are not materially

disputed.

A. Harmsen’s Businesses

Harmsen manages several business owned by himself and his family. The

finances and transactions by and among Harmsen, his family, and his related

businesses are complex and convoluted. At times, Harmsen is a financial

accommodator to his family businesses. At other times, the businesses are the

accommodator to Harmsen. At all times, a clear and crisp delineation between

Harmsen and his businesses does not emerge. Moreover, the debt owed by

Harmsen to Lloyd’s is not a routine obligation. Understanding this case and the

dispute between the parties requires a description of the relationships, and the

financial arrangements and transactions between and among Harmsen, his

businesses, and his family.

The businesses of Harmsen and his family include, among others: S. R. C.

Corporation, d/b/a Steve Regan Co. (“SRC”); West American Finance

Corporation (“WAFCO”); Mud Creek Hydro Corporation; HH Land and Title

Company; H.K. Hydro Inc.; and H.F.L.P., L.C. Of these various businesses, SRC

and WAFCO are those businesses where Harmsen focuses his involvement. SRC

and WAFCO each have an estimated value of $1 million to $1.5 million. 

SRC compensates Harmsen, its manager, in the sum of $36,000.00 per

annum plus a bonus, in the range of $125,000.000 to $150,000.00 per annum, if

the company is profitable. SRC uses several of Harmsen’s credit cards to

purchase items needed by the business. Harmsen also uses those credit cards for

personal and family expenses and purchases. At the end of the year, a

reconciliation is made offsetting the commingled personal charges made on the

credit cards by Harmsen against the remaining compensation that may be due to

him.

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 5 of 23
7 R. at 12-16 and 49-51, in Appendix at 321-325 and 340-342. This panel

recognizes that it is not evident from the bankruptcy court’s Order of Dismissal

that the findings of this sentence or the findings of this paragraph were the basis

for any of the bankruptcy court’s findings. However, the heart of the appeal by

Lloyd’s is that the bankruptcy court did not consider all of the evidence

sufficiently and did not adequately address alleged actions of Harmsen that may

be construed as “fraud, artifice or sham.” Consequently, this panel has reviewed

the entire record in rendering this decision. 

8 R. at 51, lines 1-4 and 18-21, in Appendix at 342.

-5-

WAFCO pays Harmsen, its manager, the sum of $75.00 per hour for

services rendered. He is also compensated in the form of payment of all

unreimbursed medical, insurance, and dental expenses of himself and his family. 

Until June of 2003, WAFCO was owned (1) 50% by H.F.L.P., L.C. and (2) 50%

by Harmsen’s brother, Randall Harmsen, who has been identified as the president

of the company since 1995. H.F.L.P., L.C. is owned by Harmsen’s children who

have a 70% ownership interest and Harmsen’s wife who has a 30% ownership

interest. In June of 2003, all interests of Harmsen and his wife in these entities

was terminated by foreclosure pursuant to a 1996 judgment WAFCO holds against

Harmsen and his wife in the original amount of $2,215,907.11, plus interest. 

While Harmsen’s brother, Randall Harmsen, was the named president of

WAFCO since 1995, the testimony at trial revealed that Randall Harmsen’s role

in the management of WAFCO was, at best, minimal, and, arguably, non-existent,

and his knowledge of the company was very general.7

 Instead, the decisionmaker for the company was Harmsen, who had run the company on a day-to-day

basis since 1991.8

 

Again, as with SRC, Harmsen’s personal credit cards have been used by

WAFCO and business and personal charges were commingled. As of August 9,

2003, approximately $30,000 had been earned by Harmsen and remained unpaid

by WAFCO. 

B. Harmsen’s Debts

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 6 of 23
9 The District Court Judgment and a subsequent partial satisfaction of

judgment entered in the federal district court on April 24, 2003, form the basis for

Lloyd’s $390,983.57 claim. 

-6-

1. Obligation to Lloyd’s

Prior to the filing of the involuntary petition, Harmsen participated in

certain insurance commitments by assuming a portion of a syndicate’s risks in the

English insurance market regulated by Lloyd’s. In November of 1996, Lloyd’s

sued Harmsen in England and a judgment was subsequently entered against

Harmsen in favor of Lloyd’s on March 11, 1998 in the sum of £208,344.57, plus

interest at the rate of 8% per annum (“English Judgment”). 

Lloyd’s thereafter sought to enforce the English Judgment by bringing suit

against Harmsen and others in the United States District Court for the District of

Utah (“District Court”). The District Court granted Lloyd’s motion for summary

judgment and entered judgment against Harmsen on March 17, 2003 for the

principal amount of the English Judgment, together with interest, for a total of

£235,084.48 as of December 8, 2002 (“District Court Judgment”).9

 Harmsen

appealed the judgment and the matter is currently under advisement before the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the trial before the bankruptcy court, no

evidence was produced to demonstrate that Harmsen has made any payments on

the balance of the District Court Judgment after the filing of a Partial Satisfaction

of Judgment, which was filed with the United States District Court on March 24,

2003, indicating that a credit against the principal amount of the English

Judgment was made on August 19, 1998.

2. WAFCO Debt

In 1992, Harmsen and a partner owned equal interests in a company that

sought to develop a hydro-electric plant in Twin Falls, Idaho. Harmsen

personally guaranteed a development loan from Jamaica Water and Power and

pledged all assets that he owned at the time to secure the loan. Permits for the

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 7 of 23
10 R. at 60-61, in Appendix at 347-348. Again, this panel recognizes that this

finding or the findings of this paragraph were not expressly the basis for any of

the bankruptcy court findings. However, as stated infra at n. 7, the primary focus

of the appeal by Lloyd’s is that the bankruptcy court did not consider all of the

evidence sufficiently and did not adequately address alleged actions of Harmsen

that may be construed as “fraud, artifice or sham.” Thus, this panel has reviewed

the testimony with respect to the circumstances and negotiations leading to the

WAFCO Judgment and has summarized the same herein.

11 R. at 61-63, in Appendix at 348-350.

12 R. at 89, in Appendix at 362.

-7-

plan could not be obtained and the project failed. 

In 1996, as a result of the project’s failure, Harmsen and others entered into

an agreement with WAFCO whereby (a) WAFCO paid and acquired the Jamaica

Water and Power secured claim and (b) judgment was entered against Harmsen

and others in favor of WAFCO in the amount of $2,215,907.11, plus interest

(“WAFCO Judgment”). Accordingly, Harmsen pledged most, if not all, of his

non-exempt assets to WAFCO at about the same time as Lloyd’s commenced its

action in 1996 in England. In conjunction with the agreement to enter into a

judgment, WAFCO agreed to forbear enforcement of the judgment until

September 1, 2000. The forbearance agreement was entered into by Harmsen’s

brother, Randall Harmsen, as president of WAFCO, by Harmsen, as president of

Cogeneration Intermountain, Inc., Cogeneration, Inc., and SRC, as well as by

Harmsen, individually, and on behalf of Kelly Harmsen, his wife. 

The record reflects that the testimony of Randall Harmsen at trial was that,

while he was the named president of WAFCO, he had little, if any, substantive

involvement in the negotiations leading to the WAFCO Judgment.10 Instead it

was Harmsen who made the decisions in connection with the agreement.11

Moreover, the law firm representing WAFCO in taking the judgment against

Harmsen and eventually executing on his assets also had represented Harmsen for

many years and had handled personal matters for Harmsen, on occasion.12 In

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 8 of 23
13 R. 21-22, 48-52, in Appendix at 327-328, 339-343. See also Appendix at

217.

14 The bankruptcy court noted that the financial impact of the constable sale was that Harmsen’s net worth went from $1,771,426.00 as of March 1, 2003, to

less than $0. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court noted that it could not focus on

this balance sheet approach as it would be 

engaging in the very pitfall Congress wanted to avoid in

implementing § 303(h)(1). Further, such an approach fails to take

into account the totality of circumstances proscribed by the Tenth

Circuit. “A debtor might be insolvent under the balance sheet test,

but may be paying his debts as they become due.” This is exactly the

case we have here.

(continued...)

-8-

addition, until May 1, 2003, Harmsen held a power of attorney from Randall

Harmsen which allowed him to sign Randall’s name to any WAFCO documents as

president.13

Harmsen agreed to cooperate in the orderly liquidation of the pledged

collateral and certain assets were transferred to WAFCO as partial payment on its

claim. Harmsen leased back his residence, one of the transferred assets, from

WAFCO on the condition that he pay rent in the amount of the underlying

mortgage, insurance, property taxes, utilities, and all repairs and maintenance.

On September 1, 2000, the date upon which the balance was due under the

forbearance agreement, Harmsen failed to pay WAFCO the remaining balance. 

WAFCO then executed upon its Judgment and a constable sale (foreclosure) was

held on June 17, 2003. The collateral was transferred to WAFCO pursuant to the

constable’s sale and a partial satisfaction of judgment was filed January 20, 2004. 

According to the partial satisfaction of judgment, after credits from the sale, a

balance of $865,227.50, plus applicable interest remained due. Since January 20,

2004, WAFCO has taken no action to collect the remaining balance due it. At the

evidentiary hearing before the bankruptcy court, no evidence was produced to

demonstrate that Harmsen had made any payments on the remaining balance after

January 20, 2004.14

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 9 of 23
14 (...continued)

(Order of Dismissal at 19, n. 33, in Appendix at 54) (citation omitted).

15 Lloyd’s maintains that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding Lloyd’s

had adequate remedies under state law “where only six weeks prior to the

[involuntary] Petition a competing creditor (controlled by the Debtor) seized and

sold at execution sale virtually all of the Debtor’s non-exempt personal property,

after threatening Lloyd’s that it would do so if Lloyd’s did not compromise its

claim against the Debtor.” (Lloyd’s Appellate Brief at 2).

-9-

The WAFCO execution on Harmsen’s assets, in close time proximity to

Lloyd’s execution on its judgment and Harmsen’s current use of those assets -

including his home - is the centerpiece of Lloyd’s dissatisfaction with the

bankruptcy court’s Order of Dismissal and the argument on this appeal.15

 3. Other Debts

In addition to the debt to Lloyd’s and WAFCO, there were other obligations

owed by Harmsen or related entities. Included in these were three not

insubstantial real estate obligations. First, there was an obligation to California

National Bank on apartments located in California and owned by WAFCO. There

were also obligations flowing from this rental including an account with San

Diego Gas and Electric as well as Time Warner Cable. Second, there was an

obligation owed to Washington Mutual Bank secured by real property owned by

H.F.L.P., L.C. Third, there was an obligation to Western Farm Credit Properties

Bank secured by real property in Nevada owed by H.H. Land and Cattle

Company. At the evidentiary hearing before the bankruptcy court, no evidence

was produced to demonstrate that Harmsen was not current on any of these 

obligations at the time of filing. Nevertheless, it was not Harmsen who made

payments on these obligations, it was his related companies.

Harmsen also had lines of credit with: American Express, Delta Sky Miles,

Bank of America Flight Fund Visa, Capital One, MBNA America, Salt Lake City

Credit Union Visa, and GM. At the evidentiary hearing, the evidence reflected

that these accounts were current and in some instances, actually reflected a credit

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 10 of 23
-10-

balance. However, at trial Harmsen indicated that he did not make the payments

on these cards. Harmsen’s companies paid the monthly billings and at the year

end, Harmsen’s compensation was adjusted, or offset, accordingly.

Harmsen had outstanding utility bills with Comcast, Newspaper Agency

Corp., Questar, Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities, and Utah Power

and Light. At the evidentiary hearing, the evidence reflected that these accounts

were current. Again, Harmsen does not pay these utilities, his related companies

do.

Harmsen had doctor and professional bills to: N. Branson Call, M.D.;

Thomas Liddle, D.D.S.; Gerald S. Sumerhays, DDS; HJ Associates, LC; Steven

Lybbert; Steven Wuthrich; Melenaite Vi. With respect to the doctor and dentist

bills, the evidence at trial reflected that these billings were either current or

awaiting a determination/payment from Harmsen’s insurance. While there was a

balance due on HJ Associates, LC, the bankruptcy court did not consider this debt

as being “due” based upon testimony that Harmsen and HJ Associates had a long

term relationship and that they were working on an agreement to reach a discount

regarding the billing. Steven Lybbert and Steven Wuthrich were Harmsen’s

attorneys and based upon the evidence at the evidentiary hearing, the billings to

the attorneys were current. Melenaite Vi was a landscaper and the evidence at the

evidentiary hearing reflected that payments to her were current.

Harmsen also had brokerage fees that were owed to two brokerage firms for

margin loans. At the evidentiary hearing before the bankruptcy court, no

evidence was produced as to the repayment of the principal of the margin loans

and the evidence indicated that interest accrual was being paid or serviced as

required.

Harmsen had a small obligation due at the time of filing to F.Weixler

Company, but this amount, while past due, was $20.40 and the bankruptcy court

determined that based upon the ledger history, this debt was being paid as it

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 11 of 23
16 Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991)

17 Id.

18 Clark v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Wes Dor, Inc.), 996 F.2d 237,

241 (10th Cir. 1993). 

-11-

became due.

Harmsen had tax obligations outstanding at the time of filing, but the

evidence before the bankruptcy court was that Harmsen had obtained extensions

and payments were being timely made.

Finally, Harmsen had two ongoing obligations with clubs. The evidence at

trial indicated that Harmsen had not made payments for his dues, but there was no

evidence that these were ongoing obligations.

C. The Order of Dismissal

In a lengthy and detailed opinion the bankruptcy court concluded that it did

not need to reach a determination with respect to the required number of creditors

under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) because Harmsen was generally paying his debts as

they became due. The bankruptcy court concluded that Lloyd’s failed to carry its

burden to demonstrate that Harmsen was not, generally, paying his debts as they

became due under the “totality of the circumstances test.” 

II. Standard of Review

We review the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo.

16 De

novo review requires an independent determination of the issues, giving no

special weight to the bankruptcy court’s decision.17 On the other hand, we review

the bankruptcy court’s findings upon which its legal conclusions are based under

the more deferential clearly erroneous standard.18 

III. Issues on Appeal

As noted at the outset of this opinion, each of the parties has identified

several issues on appeal. This Court synthesizes the central issues on appeal as

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 12 of 23
19 853 F.2d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1988).

20 In re Caucus Dist., Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 918 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1989). 

21 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 303.14[1][e](Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.

Rev. 2003).

-12-

follows:

A. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in its application of the burden of

proof in determining that the debtor was generally paying his debts

as those debts came due.

B. Whether the bankruptcy court improperly adopted the “Almost Per

Se Rule” by focusing on only select factors or failed to properly

consider the “totality of the circumstances” test as adopted by the

Tenth Circuit in Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp.19

C. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing the involuntary

petition on the ground that Harmsen was generally paying his debts

as they became due on the date of the petition.

IV. Discussion

A. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in its Application of the

Burden of Proof in Determining That the Debtor Was Generally

Paying His Debts as Those Debts Came Due 

The application of the burden of proof is a question of law, reviewable de

novo. The petitioning creditor has the burden of demonstrating that the debtor is

not generally paying his debts as they become due.20 Once the petitioning

creditor has met its burden, the burden shifts to the debtor to show that the debts

in question are subject to a bona fide dispute.21

Lloyd’s asserts that the bankruptcy court’s analysis of 11 U.S.C.

§ 303(h)(1) is flawed because the court considered several factors that have no

bearing on the question of whether “the debtor is generally not paying such

debtor’s debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 13 of 23
22 Lloyd’s Appellate Brief at 1-2.

-13-

bona fide dispute.” According to Lloyd’s, the bankruptcy court improperly

allocated to Lloyd’s the burden of proving that Harmsen was not “generally

paying his debts as they became due” by requiring Lloyd’s to prove, as part of its

case, that:

(a) the Involuntary Petition was in the best interests of all of the

Debtor’s other creditors; 

(b) Lloyd’s had no other adequate remedy under state law; 

(c) Lloyd’s motives were something other than a self-centered

desire to get paid;

(d) neither businesses employing the Debtor nor creditors of those

businesses would be harmed by the Debtor’s bankruptcy; and 

(e) Lloyd’s was not improperly forum shopping when choosing to

proceed in Bankruptcy Court against the Debtor.22

Consequently, Lloyd’s urges, because these factors were included in the court’s

rationale, the petitioning creditor was improperly required to prove these items.

We conclude that the bankruptcy court applied the correct standard in

examining whether the “debtor is generally not paying . . . debts” and that 

Lloyd’s never met its burden. Specifically, the bankruptcy court held:

[T]he burden rests upon the petitioning creditor to prove that the

debtor was not paying his debts once due. In addition, courts have

consistently held that the determination of whether a debtor was

paying his debts once due must be made as of the date the

involuntary petition was filed.

“Congress has indicated that the primary issue in involuntary

proceeding is and should be whether the debtor is generally not

paying his debts as they become due . . . .” For this reason, the Court

will comply with Bartmann’s “totality of the circumstances” test and

focus its inquiry on the nature and amount of Harmsen’s debts and

the general circumstances surrounding his payment or nonpayment of

said debts, and then turn to the balancing test weighing the debtor’s

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 14 of 23
23 Order of Dismissal at 21-22, in Appendix at 56-57 (citations omitted).

24 Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1546. 

25 In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 143 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)

(“The term ‘generally’ was not defined in order to avoid the result [of a]

mechanical test . . . and give to the bankruptcy courts enough leeway to be able to

deal with the variety of situations that will arise.”).

-14-

and creditors’ divergent interests in proceeding in bankruptcy.23

As was recognized by the bankruptcy court, in determining whether a

creditor has met its burden under 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1), the Tenth Circuit has

concluded that the “bankruptcy court should examine the totality of the

circumstances, balancing the interests of the debtor with those of the creditors.”24

The Tenth Circuit has neither articulated a specific burden, nor set out a series of

factors to consider in ascertaining whether a debtor is “generally not paying . . .

debts.” Instead, the Tenth Circuit utilizes a flexible case-by-case approach

allowing the bankruptcy court, as the trial court, to receive and consider all

admissible evidence presented, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and

argument of counsel, and make its determination as to whether the creditor has

met its burden. 

Congress, by using the term “generally” in 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) and by

not defining that term further, avoids a mechanical test and allows the bankruptcy

court to have the ability to deal with a variety of situations as they are

presented.25 Thus, the bankruptcy court’s consideration of (a) whether the

involuntary petition was in the best interests of the debtor and all creditors, (b)

whether Lloyd’s had other available remedies under state law, (c) the harm or

consequences Harmsen’s bankruptcy filing might visit on his related businesses or

those businesses’ creditors or (d) whether Lloyd’s was forum shopping when

choosing to proceed in bankruptcy court against the Debtor, was not improper as

those questions can be considered in the panoply of factors in rendering a

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 15 of 23
26 See Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1546. Furthermore, we observe that the

bankruptcy court found that the “Petitioner believes this Court should grant relief

because it makes the Petitioner’s collection efforts easier.” (Order of Dismissal at

29 in Appendix at 64). It does not appear that the bankruptcy court allocated a

burden here. Instead, it appears to be an observation or characterization of the

argument made by Lloyd’s at trial. It is dicta.

27 In re Feinberg, 238 B.R. 781, 784 (8th Cir. BAP 1999). 

28 See, e.g., In re Smith, 123 B.R. 423 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1990), aff’d, 129 B.R.

262 (M.D.Fla. 1991); In re LeSher International, Ltd., 32 B.R. 1 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 1982). 

-15-

decision under 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).26 While the bankruptcy court considered

such aspects of the case within the context of the “totality of circumstances” test

it did not establish or impose a burden of proof beyond that contemplated in

Bartmann.

B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Adopt the “Almost Per Se Rule”

and the Bankruptcy Court Correctly Applied the “Totality of

Circumstances” Test Mandated by the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals

The dominant theme contained in the appellate briefs filed by Lloyd’s is

that the trial court did not correctly and fully consider the “totality of

circumstances” surrounding Harmsen’s financial situation and payment of debts. 

The central feature of this contention is that the bankruptcy court erred in

invoking the “Almost Per Se Rule.”27 

The “Almost Per Se Rule” is a standard whereby the bankruptcy court

treats the “generally not paying” analysis in involuntary cases brought by one

creditor with a bias against granting relief.28 In other words, under the “Almost

Per Se Rule” the fact that only one creditor brings an involuntary petition is

viewed as a factor—perhaps the predominant factor—against entering an order for

relief.

Lloyd’s acknowledges that the bankruptcy court never articulated or

referenced the “Almost Per Se Rule” as a basis for its decision. And, Lloyd’s

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 16 of 23
29 Lloyd’s Appellate Brief at 25.

-16-

recognizes that the bankruptcy court “presaged” its analysis by using the Tenth

Circuit’s “totality of the circumstances” test balancing the interests of the putative

debtor with those of the creditors test.

Then, in a summary statement, Lloyd’s articulates the main thrust of its

appeal stating that:

Despite acknowledgment of the correct standard, rather than look at

all of the circumstances, the bankruptcy court “focused” on some of

the circumstances and ignored others, for example, the fact that

Harmsen had lost to WAFCO at execution sale only six weeks prior

to the Involuntary Petition virtually all of his nonexempt personal

property and that the sale occurred only after WAFCO threatened

Lloyd’s that it would execute on all of the Debtor’s assets if Lloyd’s

would not compromise its claim against the Debtor. These facts and

others showing the Debtor’s dire financial condition, and indicating

also a “scheme, artifice or trick” to prefer another creditor and

isolate Lloyd’s, were never mentioned by the Bankruptcy Court in its

analysis as Bartmann requires.29

Put another way, Lloyd’s argues that taking the cumulative impact of all the

circumstances and evidence produced at the trial, the bankruptcy court did not

consider the machinations, manipulations, and legal gymnastics of the Debtor,

which constituted a “scheme, artifice or trick,” and that the Court should have

entered an Order for Relief.

Although not entirely clear, Lloyd’s seemingly maintains that either the

bankruptcy court (a) did invoke the “Almost Per Se Rule,” and then failed to

consider an exception to that rule—“fraud, trick, artifice, or scam”—which would

justify entering an order for relief against Harmsen, or (b) the Court did not

invoke the “Almost Per Se Rule,” but it failed to consider and make findings

relative to Harmsen’s and WAFCO’s alleged machinations and legal gymnastics,

which should have been, but were not, incorporated into the Bartmann “totality of

the circumstances” test.

This Court concludes that the trial court did consider and did address

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 17 of 23
30 Order of Dismissal at 29, n. 61, in Appendix at 64.

31 Crown Heights Jewish Comm. Council, Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 202

B.R. 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).

32 Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted).

-17-

Creditor’s contention that Harmsen’s conduct, business, and

transactions—whether construed as legitimate legal machinations or “fraud, trick,

artifice or scam”—supported entry of an order for relief. Thus, whether the

bankruptcy court actually invoked the “Almost Per Se Rule” or simply followed

the Bartmann “totality of the circumstances” test, it fulfilled its duty to consider

this issue advanced by Lloyd’s. While the bankruptcy court addressed it

somewhat obliquely and by way of a footnote, it did it nonetheless. Specifically,

in footnote 61, the bankruptcy court stated:

[Lloyd’s] raises a defense that Harmsen committed a fraud, artifice,

or scheme which would allow the bankruptcy court to retain

jurisdiction. In a single creditor case, some courts have granted

relief upon such a showing. This is not a single creditor case. Even

if it were, the evidence does not support a finding that Harmsen

committed a fraud, artifice, or scheme in relation to the WAFCO

Judgment and execution sale.30

Lloyd’s notes that in the case of In re Fischer31 the court commented that in

those courts where the “Almost Per Se Rule” is adopted, there are two limited

exceptions to its application. 

The first exception arises in “an exceptional case” where the sole

creditor of the debtor “would otherwise be without an adequate

remedy under State or Federal law (other than bankruptcy law) if

denied an order for relief [. . .]” The second exception to this rule

applies where there is “a showing of special circumstances

amounting to fraud, trick, artifice or scam.”32

Lloyd’s contends that after the bankruptcy court set up an impermissible

hurdle for Lloyd’s to prove that the involuntary petition was in the “best interests

of all creditors,” it concluded that the exceptions to the “Almost Per Se Rule” did

not apply because this was not a single creditor case. Lloyd’s avers that the

bankruptcy court, in making this observation, contradicted its own conclusion that

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 18 of 23
33 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.

34 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). 

35 Id. 

-18-

this was, in essence, a two-party dispute. We do not believe that footnote 61

contradicts the conclusion that this is essentially a two-party dispute. The finding

that this is not a single creditor case is not clearly erroneous. Indeed, there are at

least two major unpaid creditors, Lloyd’s and WAFCO. 

Moreover, based on the record before the bankruptcy court and the

arguments made on this appeal, it cannot be said that Lloyd’s has not argued that

if the “Almost Per Se Rule” exists, an order for relief should enter on the

involuntary petition because Harmsen has ostensibly “committed a fraud, artifice,

or scheme.” In effect, Lloyd’s, not the bankruptcy court, is the party that raised

this issue at trial and the bankruptcy court evidently relegated the import of such

defense to a footnote in the Order of Dismissal. 

We conclude that the reference of the bankruptcy court that “the evidence

does not support a finding that Harmsen committed a fraud, artifice, or scheme in

relation to the WAFCO Judgment and execution sale” is not clearly erroneous. 

The elements of “fraud, artifice, or scheme. . .” require the trier of fact—the

bankruptcy court—to assess the credibility of witnesses. This panel shall give

due regard to the bankruptcy court in judging the credibility of the witnesses as

related to the evidence.33 Where, as here, the evidence is plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse the findings of

the bankruptcy court “even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier

of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”34 Moreover, “[w]here

there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between

them cannot be clearly erroneous.”35

This panel has reviewed the decision of the bankruptcy court in detail and

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 19 of 23
36 If, as Lloyd’s puts forth, the bankruptcy court must enter an order for relief

based upon the seemingly manipulated architecture of Harmsen’s personal and

business interests that insulated him from suits in the context of a voluntary

petition under Chapter 11, it could conclude that the very reasons cited by

Lloyd’s allegedly warranting the entry of an Order for Relief in this involuntary

case would otherwise warrant dismissal of a Chapter 11 voluntary petition. In

analyzing the “good faith” of a voluntary Chapter 11 case, courts have concluded

that consideration of the “totality of circumstances” is required. In re Winslow,

123 B.R. 641, 646 (D.Colo. 1991), aff’d, 949 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Situations wherein “good faith” has been found lacking warranting dismissal

include those cases involving:

(1) use of bankruptcy as a vehicle to defraud others, (2) persistent

failure to comply with applicable court orders, rules or procedures,

(3) use of the bankruptcy process to escape familial obligations, (4)

the secretion of property and other efforts to avoid the disclosure of

assets, (5) use of the bankruptcy system simply to avoid the

consequence of prior misconduct, (6) the filing of a case to avoid an

obligation under circumstances in which the debtor is not in need of

reorganization, (7) the absence of legitimate debt, (8) the absence of

any likelihood of rehabilitation, (9) use of bankruptcy as a vehicle to

resolve disputes solely between equity participants, (10) use of the

bankruptcy process merely to frustrate the rights of creditors

(particularly with respect to single asset cases) or to coerce unfair

treatment, (11) successive filings without any change in financial

condition, and (12) the so-called new debtor syndrome, in which a

debtor is created, or property is transferred, solely for the purpose of

commencing a bankruptcy case. 

7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1112.07[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. Rev. 2003)

(citations omitted). 

-19-

concludes that contrary to the suggestion of Lloyd’s, the bankruptcy court did not

adopt the “Almost Per Se Rule.” Did the bankruptcy court consider the fact that

(1) this case was brought by one creditor, (2) no other creditors joined the

involuntary complaint, and (3) there were other appropriate forums to resolve the

dispute? Yes. But, these considerations were not isolated from other

considerations and analysis in the bankruptcy court’s decision. The bankruptcy

court’s discussion does not constitute an adoption by that court of the “Almost

Per Se Rule” in light of the detailed analysis in the bankruptcy court’s decision of

the various other factors in this case.36

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 20 of 23
37 In re H.I.J.R. Properties Denver. 115 B.R. 275 (D.Colo. 1990).

38 Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1546.

39 In re Petro Fill, Inc., 144 B.R. 26, 29 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 1992).

40 183 B.R. 437 (Bankr. W.D.La. 1995). 

-20-

C. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the

Involuntary Petition on the Ground That Harmsen Was

Generally Paying His Debts as They Became Due on the Date of

the Petition

A bankruptcy court’s factual finding that a debtor is, or is not, generally

paying his debts as they come due will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.37

As stated above, the Tenth Circuit has not set out a specific standard or narrow

test in analyzing the question of whether “the debtor is generally not paying such

debtor’s debts as such debts become due,” but it looks to the “totality of the

circumstances, balancing the interests of the debtor with those of the creditors.”38 

We believe that the bankruptcy court’s decision, here, under the case-by-case

approach utilized by the Tenth Circuit is correct and appropriate. It carefully

balanced the grounds for entering an order for relief on the involuntary petition

with the intrinsic risk involved because an involuntary bankruptcy case is

“extreme in nature and carries with it serious consequences for the alleged debtor,

such as a loss of credit standing, interference with its general business affairs, and

public embarrassment.”39

The bankruptcy court stated that in focusing its inquiry on the nature and

amount of Harmsen’s debts and the general circumstances surrounding his

payment or nonpayment of said debts, it found it useful to look to tests adopted in

other jurisdictions for determining whether a debtor is generally paying his debts. 

First, the bankruptcy court looked to the four-pronged analysis utilized by the

court in In re Norris.

40 In Norris, the court looked to: (1) the number of unpaid

claims; (2) the amount of such claims; (3) the materiality of the nonpayments; and

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 21 of 23
41 Id. at 456.

42 In re West Side Comty. Hosp., 112 B.R. 243, 256 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1990). 

43 The factors presently listed in Collier on Bankruptcy include: 

— the debtor’s ability to satisfy only small periodic payments, not

long-term obligations;

— the debtor’s making regular payments only on small, recurring

obligations, not on larger debts;

— the rapid decline in the value of the debtor’s assets resulting

from asset sales rather than profit generating activity;

— the amount of the debtor’s debts compared to the debtor’s

yearly income;

— the debtor’s voluntary shutdown of operations;

— the insider’s deferred payment on account of loans payable to

them;

— serious allegations regarding the conduct of the debtor’s

business;

— the apparent bad faith evidenced by corporate officers taking

loans despite the company’s financial distress;

— payments made by insiders both before and after filing;

— payments made by third parties or a waiver of claims by a third

party;

— the debtor’s statement of a subjective desire to pay the debts;

— the debtor’s liquidation of its assets;

— the fact that debtor’s defaults are only on extraordinary debts;

— the fact that payments have been made by some partners

(continued...)

-21-

(4) the debtor’s overall conduct in its financial affairs.41 Second, the bankruptcy

court looked to cases using a two-pronged test: (1) whether a debt should be

included as a debt in “generally not paying” calculation; and (2) comparing the

number and amount of unpaid debts with the number and amount of paid debts.42

Third, the bankruptcy court also noted the numerous factors listed by Collier on

Bankruptcy.43

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 22 of 23
43 (...continued)

individually even though the debts were those of the

partnership;

— the fact that the due and unpaid debts are made up entirely of

claims of the petitioning creditors while other nonpetitioning

creditors are all paid.

2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 303.14[1][b] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. Rev.

2003) (citations omitted).

The author of the treatise goes on to say: “No one factor is more

meritorious than another; what is most relevant depends on the facts of each

case.” Id.

-22-

The facts surrounding Harmsen’s financial affairs and his related

businesses are unique. In particular, the transactions involving Harmsen and

WAFCO draw scrutiny. However, it is clear from the record and the bankruptcy

court opinion that the bankruptcy court had the opportunity to ascertain the

credibility of the witnesses, assess the evidence presented, and examine the

arguments of counsel. Moreover, the factual findings of the bankruptcy court are

supported by the record. The failure, if it can be viewed as such, of the

bankruptcy court to identify each and every possible factor in making its decision

is of no avail. 

Taken as a whole, the record supports the conclusion that Harmsen was

generally paying his debts on a regular basis at the time of the filing of the

involuntary petition with the exception of the District Court Judgment and the

WAFCO Judgment. Thus, we cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court’s factual

finding that under the totality of the circumstances, Harmsen is generally paying

his debts as they come due is clearly erroneous. 

V. Conclusion

The decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.

BAP Appeal No. 04-42 Docket No. 65 Filed: 02/02/2005 Page: 23 of 23