Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-19-55213/USCOURTS-ca9-19-55213-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS JASON MILAM, AKA 

Thomas J. Milam,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KELLY HARRINGTON, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-55213

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-04745-

JAK-MRW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 4, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed March 25, 2020

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Andrew D. Hurwitz,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

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2 MILAM V. HARRINGTON

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel vacated the district court’s judgment 

dismissing California state prisoner Thomas Milam’s habeas 

corpus petition as untimely, and remanded for further 

proceedings.

The panel held that the district court erred by 

categorically concluding that Milam’s retention of counsel 

meant that his claimed severe mental illness could not have 

been an extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from 

complying with AEDPA’s time limits. The panel explained 

that if Milam’s impairment prevented the monitoring of his 

state habeas lawyer, and if monitoring would have prevented 

state habeas counsel from waiting so long between filings, 

Milam’s impairment could have been a but-for cause of the 

untimely filing. 

The panel also held that the district court applied the 

wrong legal standard in evaluating whether state habeas 

counsel’s misconduct supported equitable tolling. Because 

the district court erroneously thought that true abandonment 

by counsel was required, it did not consider whether 

counsel’s misconduct qualified as an extraordinary 

circumstance under all the facts of the case. 

The panel remanded for the appropriate analysis.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MILAM V. HARRINGTON 3

COUNSEL

Michael T. Drake (argued), Deputy Federal Public 

Defender; Amy M. Karlin, Federal Public Defender; Federal 

Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for 

Petitioner-Appellant.

Shira Seigle Markovich (argued), Deputy Attorney General; 

Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; 

Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney 

General, Los Angeles, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

Thomas Milam’s family retained counsel to represent 

Milam in his state habeas corpus proceedings. That lawyer 

filed three unsuccessful petitions in the California courts, but 

the long delays between the filings left Milam ineligible to 

claim statutory tolling for much of the one-year statute of 

limitations for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. 

When Milam filed his federal petition, the state objected to 

it as untimely, and Milam sought equitable tolling, claiming 

both severe mental impairment and that state habeas 

counsel’s misconduct caused the untimely federal filing. 

The district court concluded that because Milam was 

represented by retained counsel during the state habeas 

process, any mental impairment during that period was 

“irrelevant” to equitable tolling. And the district court 

concluded that any misconduct of state habeas counsel did 

not warrant equitable tolling because it did not amount to 

“abandonment.”

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4 MILAM V. HARRINGTON

We hold that the district court erred in its refusal to 

consider whether Milam’s claimed impairment was the 

cause of the untimeliness of the federal filing, despite his 

representation by state habeas counsel, and that the district 

court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating whether 

state habeas counsel’s misconduct supported equitable 

tolling. We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of 

the § 2254 petition and remand for further proceedings.

I

Milam is serving a life sentence for various California 

state convictions, all of which became final on July 29, 2008. 

In August 2007, Milam’s mother hired an attorney to 

represent him in state habeas proceedings. That attorney 

filed Milam’s first state petition for habeas corpus in Los 

Angeles Superior Court on October 15, 2008, 78 days after 

Milam’s conviction became final. The petition was denied 

on the merits on December 22, 2008. On August 11, 2009—

232 days later—the state habeas lawyer filed an “essentially 

identical” second habeas petition with the California Court 

of Appeal. That petition was denied on the merits on 

September 9, 2009. On December 14, 2009—96 days 

later—the state habeas lawyer filed another “essentially 

identical” habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, 

which summarily denied it on June 23, 2010. The delay 

between the state filings left Milam ineligible for statutory 

“gap tolling” of the one-year federal statute of limitations 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for the period after the denial 

of the Superior Court petition. See Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 

929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014).1

1 Moreover, Milam’s state supreme court petition could not give rise 

to statutory tolling because it was filed after the one-year federal deadline 

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MILAM V. HARRINGTON 5

In February 2011, Milam’s family retained new counsel 

to represent him in federal habeas proceedings. That 

attorney filed a § 2254 petition on June 3, 2011, 1039 days 

after Milam’s state convictions had become final. The state 

moved to dismiss the motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). Milam’s federal habeas counsel did not file an 

opposition, and the petition was dismissed in May 2012.

In 2018, the district court granted Milam relief from the 

2012 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 

60(b), citing “strong proof of attorney abandonment by the 

Federal Habeas Lawyer.”2 Milam then sought equitable 

tolling for the period between the denial of his first state 

habeas petition and retention of federal counsel, claiming 

that during this period “his mental impairment combined 

with the ineffective assistance of his [state habeas] counsel 

made it impossible to meet the filing deadline for his federal 

habeas petition.”3 Milam submitted an expert report opining 

that Milam did not know at any relevant time what was 

required for a timely habeas filing. The expert further 

opined:

Even with the assistance of others, [Milam] 

does not possess the capacity to understand 

what is required of him. He would be entirely 

had passed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003).

2 Federal habeas counsel has since been disbarred.

3 Milam does not seek, nor is he entitled to, equitable tolling for the 

period between the dates his state convictions became final and his first 

state habeas petition was filed. There is no dispute that Milam qualifies 

for statutory tolling for the 68-day period during which his first state 

habeas petition was pending.

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6 MILAM V. HARRINGTON

dependent on others to act on his behalf to 

review, understand, complete and submit the 

necessary legal paperwork.

A magistrate judge issued an order suggesting that 

Milam’s “mental health issues [were] irrelevant to the 

equitable tolling because Petitioner was represented by an 

attorney during his incarceration.” But the magistrate judge 

asked for supplemental briefing about whether the state 

attorney’s “role in the state habeas proceedings could 

properly constitute attorney abandonment under Ninth 

Circuit law.” After receiving that briefing, the magistrate 

judge recommended denial of equitable tolling. He again 

stated that “proof of Petitioner’s mental and psychological 

problems is irrelevant to this analysis,” because retaining “a 

lawyer to represent him in state court habeas proceedings 

meant that his developmental issues were no impediment to 

pursuing habeas relief.” And, the judge recommended that 

because the state habeas lawyer’s misconduct was not “true 

‘abandonment’ under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 

authority,” it could not support equitable tolling. The district 

court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation and dismissed Milam’s petition as 

untimely, but granted a certificate of appealability.

II

“The dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus as 

time-barred is reviewed de novo.” Spitsyn v. Moore,

345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “If the facts underlying 

a claim for equitable tolling are undisputed, the question of 

whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled 

is also reviewed de novo. Otherwise, findings of fact made 

by the district court are to be reviewed for clear error.” Id.

(citation omitted).

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MILAM V. HARRINGTON 7

III

“A habeas petitioner is ‘entitled to equitable tolling only 

if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way and prevented timely filing.’” Fue v. Biter, 842 F.3d 

650, 653 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). This “exercise of a 

court’s equity powers must be made on a case-by-case basis” 

and “enables courts to meet new situations that demand 

equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary 

to correct particular injustices.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649–

50 (cleaned up). The petitioner “bears the burden of 

showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to 

him.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 

2002).

In seeking equitable tolling, Milam contended that his 

late federal filing was caused by mental impairment and 

attorney misconduct. The district court deemed Milam’s 

mental impairment “irrelevant” because he had counsel 

during the state habeas proceedings. It also concluded that 

state habeas counsel’s misconduct could not support 

equitable tolling because it fell short of “abandonment.” The 

district made two errors of law in that analysis.

A

To obtain equitable tolling because of mental 

impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental 

impairment was an “extraordinary 

circumstance” beyond his control by 

demonstrating the impairment was so severe 

that either

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8 MILAM V. HARRINGTON

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or 

factually to personally understand the 

need to timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him 

unable personally to prepare a habeas 

petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in 

pursuing the claims to the extent he could 

understand them, but that the mental 

impairment made it impossible to meet the 

filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably 

available access to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(cleaned up). Equitable tolling for a mental impairment does 

not “require a literal impossibility,” but instead only “a 

showing that the mental impairment was ‘a but-for cause of 

any delay.’” Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100).

The “availability of assistance is an important element to 

a court’s diligence analysis,” but we have stressed that it is 

only “part of the overall assessment of the totality of 

circumstances that goes into the equitable determination.” 

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1101. Even when legal assistance is 

available, “a petitioner’s mental impairment might justify 

equitable tolling if it interferes with the ability . . . to 

cooperate with or monitor assistance the petitioner does 

secure.” Id. at 1100.

The district court erred by categorically concluding that 

Milam’s retention of counsel meant that his “mental illness 

could not have been an extraordinary circumstance that 

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MILAM V. HARRINGTON 9

prevented him from complying with AEDPA’s time limits.” 

As Bills expressly notes, equitable tolling for mental 

impairment is available in “myriad circumstances,” 

including cases with petitioners “employing counsel.” Id. 

at 1099. “The relevant question is: Did the mental 

impairment cause an untimely filing?” Id. at 1100 n.3. The 

fact that a petitioner was represented by counsel, while 

relevant to the analysis, does not categorically resolve the 

ultimate question. If Milam’s impairment prevented the 

monitoring of his state habeas lawyer, and if monitoring 

would have prevented state habeas counsel from waiting so 

long between filings, Milam’s impairment could have been 

a but-for cause of the untimely federal filing. See Forbess, 

749 F.3d at 841.

In refusing to treat the retention of counsel during the 

relevant period as automatically foreclosing an impaired 

petitioner’s claim to equitable tolling, Bills is consistent with 

the approach taken by our sister Circuits. In Riva v. Ficco, 

for example, the First Circuit faulted a district court’s 

“failure to consider whether the counseled filings enjoyed 

the petitioner’s effective participation” and remanded “for 

further development of the record with a view toward 

determining whether the petitioner’s mental illness so 

severely impaired his ability effectively to pursue legal 

relief, either on his own behalf or through counsel.” 

615 F.3d 35, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit has 

taken a similar approach. See Stiltner v. Hart, 657 F. App’x 

513, 523–26 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Bills and awarding 

equitable tolling to a petitioner unable “to monitor the legal 

assistance provided for him by a fellow prisoner or an 

attorney to make sure that they met the relevant deadline”). 

Moreover, Bills is consistent with our treatment of equitable 

tolling in other contexts. See Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 

1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (awarding equitable tolling to Title VII 

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10 MILAM V. HARRINGTON

plaintiff whose “mental illness . . . precluded her from 

exercising an agency relationship with the attorney who 

handled her EEOC case”).

In holding that the district court erred when it refused to 

consider evidence of Milam’s mental impairment simply 

because he had counsel during the periods at issue, we do 

not suggest that Milam is entitled to equitable tolling without 

a further showing. Even if Milam suffered from a mental 

impairment while represented by state habeas counsel, 

equitable tolling requires that the impairment be a “but-for” 

cause of his untimely federal filing. See Forbess, 749 F.3d 

at 841. Milam claims that but for that impairment, he would 

have monitored state habeas counsel’s filings to be sure that 

his federal habeas rights were preserved. The district court 

never addressed either whether Milam was actually impaired 

or, if so, whether that impairment caused the untimely 

federal filing. “Mindful of the Supreme Court’s observation 

that ‘often the exercise of a court’s equity powers must be 

made on a case-by-case basis,’ we find it appropriate for the 

district court in the first instance to apply the facts of the case 

to the legal standards we set forth today.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 

1101 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 649–50).

B

Equitable tolling may also be justified because of 

“serious instances of attorney misconduct.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 652. But, “a garden variety claim of excusable 

neglect, such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer 

to miss a filing deadline, does not warrant equitable tolling.” 

Id. at 651–52 (cleaned up). Merely ineffective performance 

of state post-conviction counsel does not give rise to 

equitable tolling. Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1067–68.

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MILAM V. HARRINGTON 11

The district court concluded that state habeas counsel’s 

misconduct was insufficient to warrant equitable tolling 

because it was not “true ‘abandonment’ under Supreme 

Court and Ninth Circuit authority.” We have stressed, 

however, that equitable tolling can be “based on a range of 

attorney misconduct not limited to abandonment.” Luna v. 

Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 2015). Because the 

district court thought abandonment was required, it did not 

consider whether Milam’s state habeas counsel’s 

misconduct qualified as an “extraordinary circumstance” 

under all the facts of this case. We therefore remand for the 

appropriate analysis.

IV

The state argues that even if Milam obtains all the 

equitable tolling he seeks, his federal petition would still be 

untimely. We disagree. Milam’s federal habeas petition was 

filed 1039 days after his state conviction became final, so he 

must obtain at least 674 days of tolling for his petition to be 

timely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Corjasso v. Ayers, 

278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (“AEDPA allows a 

petitioner just 365 days to complete the entire process of 

filing a fully-exhausted federal habeas petition.”); see also

Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (holding that § 2244(d) is subject 

to equitable tolling).

If Milam completely succeeds in his assertions of 

equitable tolling, his federal petition would be timely. 

Milam seeks tolling (both equitable and statutory) not only 

for the 616 days his state habeas petitions were pending, but 

also for (at least) the 224-day period between the denial of 

his last state habeas petition and his retention of federal 

habeas counsel. If Milam is successful on both scores, the 

resultant 840 days of tolling would make his federal petition 

timely. We of course express no opinion as to whether 

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12 MILAM V. HARRINGTON

Milam is entitled to equitable tolling and if so, in what 

amount; we note only that the tolling he seeks, if awarded, 

would be sufficient to bring his petition within the one-year 

federal limitations period.

V

For the reasons above, we vacate the judgment of the 

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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