Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00156/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00156-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS J. WINSTON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-0156 FCD GGH P

vs.

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 

PRISON TERMS, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in 1976 of two counts of first

degree murder, kidnap for robbery and three counts of first degree burglary. This action is

proceeding on the amended petition filed March 8, 2001, which raises two claims: 1) petitioner

has a liberty interest in having a parole date set; and 2) the Board of Prison Term (BPT)

regulations contain vague criteria for determining suitability. Petitioner is specifically

challenging the March 31, 1998, decision by the BPT finding him unsuitable. 

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On March 27, 2002, the district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss. On

March 21, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order regarding

petitioner’s claim alleging vague criteria for suitability. On March 29, 2005, the court ordered

respondent to file an answer addressing the remaining claim. On April 8, 2005, respondent filed

an answer. On June 1, 2005, petitioner filed a traverse. After carefully reviewing the record, the

court recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA

“worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

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AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

In reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a habeas petition, the court “looks

through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234

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F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct.

2590 (1991)). In the instant case, the San Joaquin Superior Court issued a reasoned decision

denying petitioner’s habeas petition which raised the vagueness claim. Answer, Exhibit 4. The

California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s habeas

corpus petitions. Answer, Exhibit 4; Petition, Exhibit F. Accordingly, the court looks through to

the reasoned decision of the Superior Court. 

III. Discussion

Although due process does not require the existence of a parole scheme,

California has established one. Not all of the myriad procedures of the parole setting system are

pertinent here. The court sets forth that part of the statutory section that is pertinent:

(a) In the case of any prisoner sentenced pursuant to any provision of law, other 

than Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, the Board 

of Prison Terms shall meet with each inmate during the third year of 

incarceration for the purposes of reviewing the inmate’s file, making 

recommendations, and documenting activities and conduct pertinent to granting 

or withholding postconviction credit. One year prior to the inmate’s minimum 

eligible parole release date a panel consisting of at least two commissioners of 

the Board of Prison Terms shall again meet with the inmate and shall normally 

set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5. The panel shall consist 

solely of commissioners or deputy commissioners from the Board of Prison

Terms.

The release date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform terms for 

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public, 

and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial Council may 

issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release 

dates. The board shall establish criteria for the setting of parole release dates and 

in doing so shall consider the number of victims of the crime for which the 

prisoner was sentenced and other factors in mitigation or aggravation of the 

crime. 

Cal. Penal Code § 3041.

In compliance with the statutory mandate, the Board of Prison Terms issued

regulations which guide it in finding prisoners convicted of life offenses with parole eligibility

for parole setting. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402 sets forth the criteria for determining whether

an inmate is suitable for parole. Section 2402(a) provides that regardless of the length of time

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served, a prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel

the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. 

Section 2402(c) sets forth the circumstances tending to show unsuitability. The

court lists those of significance here:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate 

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style manner.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or 

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner 

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted 

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim. 

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental 

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in 

prison or jail.

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to indicate suitability:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to the victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

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(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for the Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome . . .

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.

In order to put the instant claim in context, the court will first set forth the factual

background of petitioner’s offense as summarized at the March 31, 1998, hearing. This summary

does not appear to be disputed:

On December the 20th, 1974, the four foot, 11 inch, 90 pound body of the victim, 

Elsie Puttchoff, P-U-T-T-C-H-O-F-F, was discovered at her residence. The 

residence had been burglarized and ransacked by inmate Winston and crime 

partner, Michael Jerome Lawrence. Several personal were [sic] items removed 

from the residence. The victim’s death was caused by multiple stab wounds 

which were inflicted by her kitchen knife by inmate Winston. That was count 

seven. The body of a 24 year old victim, James Mumsford, M-U-M-S-F-O-R-D, 

was discovered on December the 29th, 1974, at approximately 7:30 a.m. in the 

alley behind 6011 West Boulevard.

*****

The officers went to his residence, notified next of kin and found the body of his 

wife who had [sic] murdered and raped. Both victims had been shot in the back 

of the head with a 38 caliber pistol. Investigation disclosed that inmate Winston 

had secured a 38 revolver from Arlee Atkins, that’s A-R-L-E-E, A-T-K-I-N-S, on 

count eight. On 1/1/75, inmate Winston and three codefendants entered a market 

with the intention of robbery and shot the owner in the abdomen and left buttock, 

count ten. On 1/7/75, Winston and three codefendants removed clothing, food 

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 In its decision, the BPT stated that petitioner has previously sexually assaulted another

person. Answer, Exhibit 4, p. 30. At the hearing, the Deputy District Attorney stated that

petitioner had raped the 78 year old woman he murdered in 1970. Id., p. 24. Because the panel

did not discuss in detail the 1970 offense, the court does not find that it found petitioner

unsuitable because he had committed a sexually sadistic offense. § 2402(c)(4). 

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and a 19 inch television from a home at 3455 West 74th Street in Los Angeles, 

count 11. Then on 1/8/75, victim heard his dog barking, grabbed a gun, and went 

to the back of his residence. He observed a man coming through the door with a 

rifle. The victim shot the man with his revolver. The man returned his fire. 

Another man attempted to grab the victim’s gun and a struggle ensued. The 

victim was hit on the head with the rifle butt. According to police investigations, 

Winston and two codefendants committed the burglary, taking nine hundred 

dollars in cash and it was the inmate Winston who struck the victim in the head. 

Answer, Exhibit 4, pp. 11-12.

The 1998 panel found petitioner unsuitable for parole on the following four

grounds.1 First, the panel found that petitioner’s offenses were carried out in a manner which

demonstrated a callous disregard for human suffering. Answer, Exhibit 4, p. 30; §2402(c)(1)(D). 

Second, petitioner’s offenses involved multiple victims. Answer, Exhibit 4, p. 30;

§2402(c)(1)(A). Third, the panel found that petitioner had a previous record of violence based on

his 1970 murder conviction as a juvenile. Answer, Exhibit 4, pp. 13, 30; § 2402(c)(2). Fourth,

the panel found that petitioner had an unstable social history based on his persistent pattern of

tumultuous relationships and criminal behavior. Answer, Exhibit 4, p. 31; § 2402(c)(3). The

BPT summarized petitioner’s prior criminal record as follows:

...[P]rior record as a juvenile in February of ‘68 for burglary; 4/18 of ‘68, he was 

convicted on burglary and sent to camp. December ‘68, he was arrested for auto 

theft; February l ‘69 for burglary. On July of ‘69, he was arrested for battery in 

which his mother was the victim of that crime. In September of ‘69 he was 

arrested for armed a [sic] robbery, was sent to a foresting camp where he was 

released. 2/16 of ‘70. 7/70, he was arrested and convicted on a first degree

murder and was sent to CYA.

Answer, Exhibit 4, pp. 12-13. 

A statute (or regulation) is void for vagueness “if it fails to give adequate notice to

people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it invites arbitrary and

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discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1989). The

threshold question in a vagueness challenge is “whether to scrutinize the statute for intolerable

vagueness on its face or whether to do so only as the statute is applied in a particular case.” 

Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984).

Where speech or other constitutionally protected conduct is not the subject of a

statute or regulation and is not otherwise implicated in the case and if related constitutional rights

are not expressly invoked in a challenge to facial validity, the court need only examine the

vagueness challenge under the facts of a particular case and decide whether, under a reasonable

construction of the statute or regulation, the conduct in question is prohibited. United States v.

Hogue, 752 F.2d 1503, 1504 (9th Cir. 1985). Finally, “[i]n scrutinizing a statute for intolerable

vagueness as applied to specific conduct, courts must ‘take the statute as though it read precisely

as the highest court of the state has interpreted it.” Schwartzmiller, 752 F.2d at 1348.

In the instant case, speech is in no way implicated. Accordingly, the court will

determine whether, under a reasonable construction, petitioner had notice that the at-issue factors

would apply to him based on the circumstances of his commitment offense.

The factors set forth in § 2402(c) used by the BPT to determine whether the

prisoner committed his offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner are objective,

i.e. easily verifiable, and subjective, i.e. based on the opinions of the decision-maker. As will be

discussed below, because the objective factors used by the BPT to find petitioner unsuitable were

easily verifiable, petitioner had reasonable notice that they would apply to him. However,

because the subjective factors were not easily understood, the court finds that petitioner did not

have notice that they would apply to him. 

The BPT found petitioner unsuitable pursuant § 2402(c)(1)(A), which provides

that the existence of multiple victims tends to show unsuitability. The existence of multiple

victims is an objective factor which may be easily verified. Petitioner had reasonable notice that

this factor would apply to him based on the circumstances of his commitment offenses. 

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Accordingly, this factor is not unconstitutionally vague.

The BPT also found petitioner unsuitable pursuant to § 2402(c)(2) which provides

that a previous record involving infliction or attempted infliction of serious injury, particularly at

a young age, tends to show unsuitability. As discussed above, petitioner was convicted of

murder as a juvenile. Whether a prisoner has a previous record involving infliction or attempted

infliction of serious injury is an objective factor which is easily verifiable. Petitioner had

reasonable notice that this factor would apply to him. Accordingly, this factor is not

unconstitutionally vague.

The BPT found petitioner unsuitable pursuant to § 2402(c)(3) which provides that

a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others tends to show unsuitability. The

BPT apparently based this finding on petitioner’s criminal history as no other discussion

regarding petitioner’s social history occurred during the portion of the hearing when the BPT

announced its decision as to this factor

After reviewing California case law, this court can find no clear definition of what

constitutes an unstable social history pursuant to § 2402(c)(3). The court has found several cases

which have found that the prisoner’s criminal history in addition to other factors could constitute

an unstable social history. For example, in In Honesto, 130 Cal. App. 4th 81, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d

653 (2004), the California Court of Appeal found that the prisoner’s 21 misdemeanor

convictions, failure on probation, failure to complete high school, unemployment and history of

alcohol abuse supported the BPT’s finding that the prisoner had an unstable social history. 130

Cal. App. 4th at 97, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 at 664. In In re Scott, 119 Cal. App. 4th 871, 15 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 32 (2004) the California Court of Appeal found that the prisoner did not have an

unstable social history because he had no history of substance abuse, no medical or psychiatric

problems, an excellent employment history, and no arrests or charges other than those stemming

from the instant offense. 119 Cal. App. 4th 895, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 49.

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In the unpublished case of In re Bush, No. H024715, 2003 WL 21246781 (2003),

the California Court of Appeal found that the BPT erred by citing the prisoner’s criminal history

as showing an unstable social history. The state appellate court stated that while the prisoner’s

criminal history was a proper factor tending to show unsuitability under other sections of the

regulations which specifically addressed criminal history, the BPT could not “double count” the

prisoner’s criminal history to find him unsuitable for having an unstable social history. In

analyzing challenges to statutes or regulations on vagueness grounds, the court may consider

unpublished state court opinions. Nunez by Nunez, 114 F.3d 935, 943 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1997).

Based on the cases cited above, it is fairly clear that California courts would not

find that a prisoner had an unstable social history based on their criminal history alone. For that

reason, the court finds that petitioner did not have adequate notice that this factor would apply to

him. 

Finally, the BPT found petitioner unsuitable on grounds that offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. §

2402(c)(1)(D). Two recent California Supreme Court cases discussed the standards the BPT may

use in finding a prisoner unsuitable for parole based on the subjective parole suitability criteria

concerning the circumstances of the commitment offense, such as § 2402(c)(1)(D).

In In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 683, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 161 (2002), the

California Supreme Court stated that in order for the BPT to find a petitioner unsuitable based on

the circumstances of the crime, the murder had to be “particularly egregious.” In Rosenkrantz,

the California Supreme Court reasoned that,

In some circumstances, a denial of parole based upon the nature of the offense 

alone might rise to the level of a due process violation–for example where no 

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or 

violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense. 

Denial of parole under these circumstances would be inconsistent with the 

statutory requirement that a parole date normally shall be set “in a manner that 

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will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in 

respect to their threat to the public...” 

29 Cal. 3d at 683, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161.

In In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1095, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 440 (2005) the

California Supreme Court changed the standard set forth in Rosenkrantz so that the BPT could

find a petitioner unsuitable for parole based on the circumstances of the crime so long as the

violence or viciousness of the inmate’s crime was “more than minimally necessary to convict

him of the offense for which he is confined.” Of course, as the dissent in Dannenberg pointed

out, this standard is completely unreviewable. 34 Cal. 4th at 1102, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 446. The

minimal elements of the crime are simply that a person dies at the hands of another with the

perpetrator exhibiting the requisite intent. Any fact in addition to this could be one viewed as

“more than minimally necessary to convict.” For example, one BPT panel may believe that use

of a knife per se causes undue suffering; another may believe use of any weapon where death is

not instantaneous, probably the vast majority of murders, exhibits callousness. A conclusion can

easily be reached by those who want to claim that the facts of any murder are such that they

prove more than those facts minimally necessary for a conviction.

The subjective criteria for parole suitability related to the circumstances of the

commitment of the offense were difficult enough to apply in the first place just based on their

wording, yet as worded with the Rosenkrantz definition of “particularly egregious,” an inmate

and a BPT official would have sufficient understanding to apply the regulatory sections. That is,

generally, an ax murder accompanied by death could easily be viewed as “particularly egregious”

because such murders are clearly out of the norm, i.e., fortunately they do not happen with great

frequency and they involve a more callous disregard for life and suffering. Although every

murder is tragic and most senseless in retrospect, a shooting arising out of the passions of a

longstanding simmering dispute would not normally appear to fit the egregious category. But,

according to Dannenberg, every murder could fit the category “more than minimally necessary to

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convict” because there is no set of “minimally necessary circumstances” (as opposed to required

elements) set forth in the law. No person could actually know how the regulation would be

applied in a particular case because application is so arbitrary, and depends entirely on the

subjective, personal opinions of the decisionmakers. For these reasons, the court finds that

“gravity” regulations, including §2402(c)(1)(D) (offense carried out in a manner showing

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering), have become indecipherable in terms of

their application—they can mean anything to anybody. That is unconstitutional vagueness.

Although the court has found that two of the regulations relied on by the BPT to

find petitioner unsuitable are constitutionally vague, the petition should be denied because the

BPT also relied on two other regulations which are not unconstitutionally vague. Because the

denial of this claim by the Superior Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court authority, the petition should be denied.

Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition should be denied as moot

because petitioner has had subsequent parole suitability hearings. Under Article III, § 2 of the

Constitution, an action is moot if it no longer presents a case or controversy. “Once a convict’s

sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended

incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit

is to be maintained.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998).

Petitioner is still in custody as a result of the 1998 suitability hearing. That he has

had suitability hearings since that time does not render his challenge to the 2001 hearing moot. 

See Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004) (expiration of SVP commitment term did

not moot petitioner’s case regarding the expired commitment proceedings even though new

proceedings had been commenced). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 8/15/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

win156.157

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