Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01150/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MAGDELINE B. BERUMEN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-1150 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02722-MJW) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Magdeline B. Berumen appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the 

Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability benefits. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm. 

I. Background 

Berumen applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income benefits, alleging her disability commenced April 4, 2007, when she was 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 

32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

February 10, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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38-years-old. The agency denied her application and following a hearing, an 

Administrative Law Judge found Berumen not disabled. The Appeals Council denied 

Berumen’s review request. 

After Berumen sought review of the ALJ’s decision in district court, the 

Commissioner filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency for 

rehearing. On remand, the same ALJ conducted a second hearing and again denied 

her claim, applying the five-step sequential evaluation process. See Lax v. Astrue, 

489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). At step one, the ALJ noted Berumen had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset date of her alleged disability. 

At step two, the ALJ found Berumen had the following severe impairments: 

fibromyalgia, asthma, migraine headaches, and anxiety. At step three, the ALJ found 

Berumen did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

equaled a listed impairment. 

The ALJ then assessed Berumen’s residual functional capacity (RFC), 

concluding she could perform sedentary work with some additional restrictions. At 

step four, the ALJ determined Berumen couldn’t perform her past relevant work as a 

telephone solicitor and customer service representative but at step five, she could 

perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 

The Appeals Council concluded that the ALJ’s decision complied with the 

remand order and denied further review. Berumen then filed this action in district 

court and the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The magistrate 

judge affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Berumen appeals. 

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II. Discussion 

When the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ’s decision is the 

Commissioner’s final decision. See Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 

2003). “We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct 

legal standards were applied.” Id. at 760. “Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It 

requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, 

we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” 

Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

On appeal, Berumen argues the ALJ: (1) “improperly rejected the 

uncontroverted opinions of physical restrictions from two treating physicians,” 

Aplt. Br. at 12; and (2) “did not properly account for the moderate deficits in 

concentration, persistence, and pace that she found Ms. Berumen to have,” id. at 28. 

The magistrate judge’s decision affirming the ALJ’s denial of Berumen’s 

disability claim thoroughly analyzed and rejected these arguments. We agree with the 

magistrate judge’s assessment of Berumen’s claims and rather than repeat that 

analysis here, we offer a few clarifying comments. 

Berumen argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her treating physician 

opinions. Although Berumen does not challenge the ALJ’s determination that the 

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opinions were not entitled to controlling weight, she asserts that the ALJ did not 

provide adequate reasons for “rejecting”1

 those opinions. Aplt. Br. at 17. As the 

magistrate judge explained, the ALJ gave reasons for assigning little weight to the 

opinions and those reasons were supported by the record evidence. An ALJ is not 

required to discuss all of the factors for weighing a medical source opinion in 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). 

The ALJ’s analysis of the treating-physician opinions here is “sufficiently specific to 

make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight [she] gave to the treating source’s 

medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Berumen also complains that the ALJ improperly substituted her own opinion 

for that of the two treating physicians when making the RFC determination because 

the ALJ included a ten-pound lifting restriction in the RFC when her physicians had 

restricted her to lifting five pounds. She appears to argue that an ALJ may not make 

an RFC finding that differs from a physician’s opinion unless the ALJ relies on a 

conflicting medical opinion. See Aplt. Br. at 24-26. We disagree. 

In Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012), we rejected the 

argument “that the components of an RFC assessment lack substantial evidentiary 

 1

 We disagree with this characterization as the ALJ did not reject the opinions, 

but instead stated that she was assigning them “little weight,” Admin. R., Vol. III at 

441. Moreover, although Berumen claims that the ALJ “obviously” rejected the 

opinions because she “did not follow the restrictions,” Aplt. Br. at 14, that statement 

is not accurate. Both the ALJ’s RFC and the treating-physician report conclude that 

Berumen should be limited to standing/walking for a total of two hours in an eight 

hour day. See Admin. R., Vol. III at 437; id., Vol. II at 378. 

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support unless they line up with an expert medical opinion.” As we noted in Chapo, 

“[t]here is no requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence between an 

RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity in question.” 

Id. Moreover, as the magistrate judge explained in rejecting Berumen’s argument 

below, it is ultimately the ALJ’s responsibility, not a physician’s, to assess a 

claimant’s RFC from the medical record. See Aplt. App. at 138 (citing Chapo, 

682 F.3d at 1288). 

Berumen also argues the ALJ failed to properly account for her moderate 

limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace in assessing her RFC. As the 

magistrate judge explained, an ALJ is not obligated to specifically include these 

types of limitations in a claimant’s RFC based solely on a finding at the distinct stepthree analysis that a claimant has moderate difficulties in these areas. Further, the 

magistrate judge agreed with the Commissioner that an RFC for unskilled work 

addresses more than just skill transfer, noting the Commissioner’s policy describing 

the mental activities generally required for such work. The magistrate judge 

determined that the ALJ’s RFC for unskilled work adequately accounted for 

Berumen’s credible limitations and was supported by substantial evidence. 

Our recent decision in Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2015), lends 

further support to the magistrate judge’s analysis. In Vigil, as here, the ALJ found at 

step three that the claimant experienced moderate difficulties in concentration, 

persistence, and pace. And the ALJ in Vigil, like the ALJ here, took those difficulties 

into account in formulating the RFC by limiting the skill level of the claimant’s work 

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to an SVP2

 of one or two. The claimant argued, as Berumen does here, that “the ALJ 

should have included in his RFC his specific concentration, persistence[,] and pace 

limitations, rather than account for those limitations by restricting his RFC to 

unskilled (SVP one or two) work.” Vigil, 805 F.3d at 1203. But we found no error 

by the ALJ, noting “that limiting the plaintiff to an SVP of only one or two[] 

adequately took into account his moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, 

and pace.” Id. at 1204. The same reasoning holds true here. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed for substantially the same 

reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s order of March 11, 2015. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

 2

 “SVP” is short for “specific vocational preparation.” Vigil, 805 F.3d at 1201. 

“SVP refers to the time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire 

the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a specific 

job-worker situation.” Id. at 1201 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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