Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00403/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00403-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The record indicates that Plaintiff was to be released from

prison on December 17, 2006. See, e.g., Shipman Decl. at ¶ 6 & Ex. C. 

As of the date of this Order, however, Plaintiff has not filed a

change of address with the Court.

K:\COMMON\Adler\CASES\David v. Giurbino\r&r re motion to dismiss.wpd 06cv0403

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MITCHELL MORAN DAVID,

Plaintiff,

v.

G.J. GIURBINO, Warden, et al.,

Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 06-CV-0403-BTM (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS COMPLAINT AND STRIKE

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

[Doc. No. 8] 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Complaint and Strike Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive

Damages [Doc. No. 8]. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to

the motion. The Court found the motion suitable for submission

without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court recommends that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED in its

entirety.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding in pro se, is currently incarcerated

at Centinela State Prison (“Centinela”).1

 Plaintiff is Native

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A CDC Form 115 or “Rules Violation Report” is the document used

by prison officials to report “misconduct [which] is believed to be a

violation of law or is not minor in nature.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3312(a)(3). A CDC Form 115 initiates the prison disciplinary

process.

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American and is an enrolled member of the Bishop Paiute Tribe. 

Compl. at 3 & Ex. A. On December 21, 2003, Centinela prison

officials issued Plaintiff a CDC Form 115, or “Rules Violations

Report”,2 for not complying with the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR’s”) grooming regulations

by wearing his hair at a length that extended below the shirt

collar. Compl. at 3 & Ex. B. At that time, California Code of

Regulations, Title 15, Section 3062(e) provided:

A male inmate’s hair shall not be longer than three

inches and shall not extend over the eyebrows or below

the top of the shirt collar while standing upright. 

Hair shall be cut around the ears, and sideburns shall

be neatly trimmed, and shall not extend below the mid

point of the ear.

Compl. at Ex. H. As a result of the Rules Violation Report, the

prison assessed 30 days of credit loss against Plaintiff on

December 28, 2003. Shipman Decl. at ¶ 4 & Ex. A.

On April 4, 2004, prison officials issued Plaintiff another

Rules Violation Report for failing to abide by the grooming

regulations. Compl. at 3 & Ex. C. The Rules Violation Report

noted that Plaintiff’s hair was “considerably longer than the

allowed standards.” Compl. at Ex. C. On June 27, 2004, prison

officials issued Plaintiff a third Rules Violation Report for

failing to comply with the prison’s grooming standards. Compl.

at 3 & Ex. D. Plaintiff was again assessed 30 days of credit

loss. Shipman Decl. at ¶ 4 & Ex. A. Plaintiff states that he

informed prison officials upon each write-up that he wore his

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California state prisoners who are by classification committee

action removed from an assignment for repeated disciplinary rules

violations are considered “voluntarily unassigned” in Work Group C. 

Group C prisoners earn no worktime credits, enjoy no family visits,

and have limited canteen, telephone, yard, and mail access. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3044(b)(5)(A) & (f)(3). 

4

During the UCC Annual Review, Plaintiff was also restored a 90

day credit loss relating to a May 11, 2003 Rules Violation Report,

which Plaintiff does not relate to his claims in this case. 

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hair long because it was part of his cultural and religious

beliefs. Compl. at 3. 

On September 28, 2004, Plaintiff appeared before a Unit

Classification Committee (“UCC”) for an Annual Review. Compl. at

4 & Ex. F. The UCC deemed Plaintiff to be a “program failure”

and placed him on Work Group/Privilege Group C/C status. Id. As

a result of his C/C status designation, Plaintiff lost his

employment in vocational welding, various privileges, and the

ability to earn “good time” or worktime credits. Id.; see also

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3044(b)(5)(A) & (f)(3).3 According to

Plaintiff, he requested to be taken off of “C-status” numerous

times but was never referred to the UCC because he remained noncompliant with the prison’s grooming standards. Compl. at 5 &

Ex. G. 

On September 27, 2005, Plaintiff again appeared before a UCC

for an Annual Review. Shipman Decl. at Ex. A. At that time,

Plaintiff was restored the 30 day loss of credit relating to the

December 2003 Rules Violation Report, as well as the 30 days of

credit loss relating to the June 2004 Rules Violation Report. 

Shipman Decl. at ¶ 4 & Ex. A.4

In the meantime, the Ninth Circuit held that the CDCR’s

grooming regulations for male prisoners violated the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.

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5

This occurred after Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February

22, 2006.

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§ 2000cc-1, because the policy was not the least restrictive

means to achieve the state’s compelling interest in maintaining

prison safety and security. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

989 (9th Cir. July 29, 2005). In response to Warsoldier and

other litigation, the CDCR filed emergency changes to its

grooming regulations. See Initial Statement of Reasons (“ISOR”)-

Grooming/Programs, dated Dec. 29, 2005, attached to Compl. at Ex.

H. The new grooming regulations, in relevant part, allowed an

inmate’s hair to be any length “but [hair] shall not extend over

the eyebrows, cover the inmate’s face or pose a health and safety

risk.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3062(e) (2006). The changes,

which were operative on January 17, 2006, became final on July

27, 2006. Def.’s Mem. at 5; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3062 and

history thereof. 

On March 7, 2006, Plaintiff was reinstated to Work

Group/Privilege Group (“WG/PG”) A1A from WG/PG C/C status with an

effective date of September 24, 2004 (i.e., the date on which

Plaintiff had been placed on WG/PG C/C status). Shipman Decl. at

¶ 5 & Ex. B.5

 This change in Plaintiff’s status resulted from

the modifications made to the grooming regulations. See Shipman

Decl. at Ex. B. According to Plaintiff’s “Chronological History”

at Centinela, all credit losses have been restored, and as of

March 9, 2006, Plaintiff’s release date had been restored to

December 17, 2006. Shipman Decl. at ¶ 6 and Ex. C. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 22, 2006, Plaintiff commenced this action

alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

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1983. He alleges three counts in his Complaint: First, that

Defendants G.J. Giurbino, the Warden at Centinela, and Jeanne

Woodford, the then-director of the CDCR, violated his rights to

free exercise of religion and due process under RLUIPA by doing

nothing to assist him with respect to the enforcement of the

prison’s grooming policy against him; second, that Defendants

Giurbino and Woodford violated his right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment by doing nothing about the punishment

rendered against him for not complying with the grooming policy

despite the requirements of RLUIPA; and third, that Defendant A.

Hernandez, a Correctional Captain serving as the Commanding

Officer on D-Yard, violated his rights to due process, freedom of

religion, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment by not

taking him off of “C-status” despite the requirements of RLUIPA. 

Compl. at 3-5. Plaintiff seeks $200,000 in general damages,

$200,000 in punitive damages, an injunction preventing Defendants

from “any type of retaliation, the disciplining of myself along

with other Native American practitioners,” and “that my [A1A]

status be restored, and all 115 write-ups be dismissed[, and] . .

. my original release date restored from 2/19/07 to 12/17/06.” 

Id. at 7-8. 

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and

strike the claim for punitive damages pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1),

12(b)(6), and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be based on a facial or a factual

attack on jurisdiction. A facial attack challenges the

sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

2004). A factual attack, on the other hand, challenges the

substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations. St. Clair

v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). In

resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court “may review

evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d

at 1039. The court also “need not presume the truthfulness of

the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. 

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the

complaint. A claim can only be dismissed if it “appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan,

792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974). Unless it appears beyond a doubt that the

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plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim, a

complaint cannot be dismissed without leave to amend. Conley,

355 U.S. at 45-46; see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129-

30 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of

the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson,

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled in the

law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in

pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of

counsel.”). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil

rights complaint, however, a court may not “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd.

of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty.

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “The

plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the

plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation

omitted). 

B. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

the court to strike from “any pleading any insufficient defense

or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a [Rule] 12(f) motion

to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must

arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those

issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697

F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the

grounds that: (1) Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages against

Defendants in their official capacities is barred; (2)

Plaintiff’s demands for injunctive relief and restoration of

workgroup status and service credits are moot; and (3) Defendants

are each entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants also seek to

strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Defs.’ Mem. at 4-

11.

As a preliminary matter, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

request for judicial notice of the documents attached to the

Declaration of L. Shipman, Litigation Coordinator at Centinela,

which were submitted in support of Defendants’ motion. These

materials constitute the records and reports of an administrative

body, which are matters of judicial notice. See United States v.

Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2003); Walker v.

Woodford, 454 F.Supp. 2d 1007, 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2006). Although

the Court has considered these materials in ruling on this

motion, the Court need not convert the motion to dismiss into a

motion for summary judgment. A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1) may “rely on affidavits and any other evidence properly

before the court.” St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201. Further, a court

deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may consider

matters of judicial notice without converting the motion into a

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6

The result of this recommendation, if adopted, would be that, at

this stage, Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claims remain as to each

defendant, and Plaintiff’s damages claim remains as to Defendant

Hernandez in his individual capacity only. No damage claims would

remain as to Defendants Giurbino and Woodford. But see discussion at

“Mootness of Claims for Injunctive Relief” (Section IV.B) and

“Qualified Immunity” (Section IV.C) sections, infra.

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motion for summary judgment. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. 

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s damages claims to

the extent they are based on acts taken in their official

capacities. The Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s section

1983 claims against state actors sued in their official

capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 66 (1989). It does not, however, bar damage actions against

state officials for acts taken in their personal or individual

capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff

has sued Defendants Giurbino and Woodford solely in their

official capacities, and Defendant Hernandez in both his

individual and official capacity. See Compl. at 2. Thus, this

Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED

with prejudice to the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages against

Defendants in their official capacities.6

B. Mootness of Claims for Injunctive Relief

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s injunctive

relief claims on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over those claims as they have been rendered moot. 

To prevail on his request for injunctive relief, Plaintiff

must demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable injury and the

inadequacy of legal remedies. See Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T.

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v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1996). These

well-established standards for injunctive relief must also be

viewed in conjunction with the requirements of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (“PLRA”). See Gomez v.

Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although the PLRA

significantly affects the type of prospective injunctive relief

that may be awarded, it has not substantially changed the

threshold findings and standards required to justify an

injunction.”). The PLRA provides, in pertinent part: 

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to

prison conditions shall extend no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right

of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court

shall not grant or approve any prospective relief

unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly

drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right, and is the least

intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1129. 

Defendants argue that the 2006 amendments to the grooming

regulations and the restoration of Plaintiff’s Work

Group/Privilege Group status and service credits render

Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief moot. The Court agrees. 

“Mootness is like standing, in that if it turns out that

resolution of the issue presented cannot really affect the

plaintiff’s rights, there is, generally speaking, no case or

controversy for the courts to adjudicate; no real relief can be

awarded.” Smith v. Univ. of Washington Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188,

1193 (9th Cir. 2000). “Where the activities sought to be

enjoined already have occurred, and the . . . courts cannot undo

what has already been done, the action is moot, and must be

dismissed.” Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862,

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7 See ISOR-Grooming/Programs, dated Dec. 29, 2005 at p. 2,

attached to Compl. at Ex. H (“Existing subsection 3062(f) is

renumbered to 3062(e) and amended to allow inmates to maintain their

hair at any length, but it shall not extend over the eyebrows or cover

the inmates’ face or pose a health and safety risk. This text is a

direct result of lawsuits, (Warsoldier v. Woodford, Mayweathers v.

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871 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] suit for injunctive relief is

normally moot upon the termination of the conduct at issue[.]”). 

Further, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief do not

fall into the recognized exception to moot claims for cases which

are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). To fit within this exception,

Plaintiff must show he is realistically threatened by a

repetition of the violation, and that absent court-ordered

injunctive relief preventing the harm, he will be subject to

immediate and irreparable future injury. City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 111 (1983). Here, there is no realistic

threat that the former grooming regulations will be re-enacted or

re-applied to Plaintiff. See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214,

1243 (9th Cir. 2000). Like the regulation at issue in White,

nothing in the amended grooming regulations, their legislative

history or the Office of Administrative Law’s rulemaking record

suggests the amendments are a mere temporary measure enacted by

the CDCR. In fact, the amendments to the grooming regulations go

even further than any injunction this Court might issue. The

amendments to the grooming regulations represented a material

change in CDCR policy, and are “broad in scope and unequivocal in

tone,” insofar as they explicitly recognize the CDCR’s need to

make systemwide changes to comply with RLUIPA’s least restrictive

means test as well with as the requirements of Warsoldier.7

 See,

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Newland, and In re Corey Williams) regarding the religious rights of

inmates. The Department has been ordered to comply with [] [RLUIPA]

which provides that the government may not impose a substantial burden

on an inmate’s exercise of religion unless the regulation in question

furthers a compelling state interest in the least restrictive

manner.”).

8

Because the Court has already recommended that Plaintiff’s

damage claims against Defendants Giurbino and Woodford, who were sued

in their official capacities only, be dismissed, the Court’s

recommendation here that the injunctive relief claims be dismissed

will result in the dismissal of all claims against Defendants Giurbino

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e.g., White, 227 F.3d at 1243. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation or a

demonstrated probability that he will again be disciplined in any

manner, by way of a loss of credits, loss of privileges, change

in WG/PG status, or change of release date, due to the CDCR’s

former grooming policies. Defendants have shown that, effective

January 17, 2006, the grooming regulation at issue in this case

was amended, and is no longer in force, and that any disciplinary

measures taken against Plaintiff as a result of the previous

grooming regulation have been withdrawn. The Court finds the

record before it sufficient to show the enforcement of the CDCR’s

former grooming policy “could not reasonably be expected to

recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Absent a case or

controversy, this Court is without jurisdiction to award any

further injunctive relief. Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S.

625, 631 (1979). See also Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler,

464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (“Federal courts lack jurisdiction to

decide moot cases because their constitutional authority extends

only to actual cases or controversies.”) 

The Court accordingly recommends that Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief be dismissed as moot.8

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and Woodford if both recommendations are adopted. With respect to

Defendant Hernandez, who was sued in both his official and individual

capacities, the Court’s recommendations thus far, if adopted, will

result in only Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages against

Hernandez in his individual capacity remaining. However, see

discussion at “Qualified Immunity” section (Section IV.C), infra. 

9

If the Court’s first recommendation, concerning Eleventh

Amendment Immunity, is adopted (see Section IV.A, supra), qualified

immunity need only be considered as to Defendant Hernandez. In the

event that recommendation is not adopted, qualified immunity should be

considered as to the damage claims against all three defendants. 

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C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants further contend that they are entitled to

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on their qualified

immunity. The entitlement to qualified immunity “is an immunity

from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 

“[Q]ualified immunity operates ‘to ensure that before they are

subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is

unlawful.’” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)

(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). The defense

of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).9

1. Step One - Constitutional or Statutory Violation

The threshold question in a qualified immunity analysis is

whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a

constitutional or statutory violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the

allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

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201; see also Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071,

1078 (9th Cir. 2003). The right at issue in this case is found

in Section 3 of RLUIPA, which provides, in relevant part, that

[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on

the religious exercise of a person residing in or

confined to an institution . . . even if the burden

results from a rule of general applicability, unless

the government establishes that the burden furthers a

compelling governmental interest, and does so by the

least restrictive means.

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994 (citing 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)) (quotations and emphasis omitted). For

purposes of RLUIPA, “religious exercise” includes “any exercise

of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system

of religious belief.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).

Defendants do not appear to contest that the first prong of

the Saucier analysis has been met. See Def.’s Mem. at 8-9

(asking the Court to assume arguendo that a violation occurred in

this case). The Court finds, taking the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has adequately set forth

allegations which, if proved, would show a violation of his

RLUIPA rights. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-1001. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s allegations survive the first

prong of qualified immunity analysis, the Court must turn to the

next inquiry. 

2. “Clearly Established” Law

The second prong of Saucier asks “whether the right was

clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. A right is

“clearly established” when its contours are “sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Id. at 202. This does not mean “that an

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the

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very action in question has previously been held unlawful,” but

rather, that “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness

must be apparent.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. The salient question

is whether the state of the law at the time gave officials “fair

warning” that their conduct was unconstitutional. Id. at 740. 

Defendants here argue that it would not have been clear to a

reasonable prison official that charging Plaintiff with

violations of the then-existing grooming standard,

notwithstanding Plaintiff’s objections to complying with the

standard because of his religious beliefs, was clearly contrary

to law. Defendants set forth two arguments in support of their

position: First, that the officials “were acting and relying

upon a duly enacted California regulation”; and second, that “the

state of the law at the time did not reasonably put Defendants on

notice that enforcing the regulation against Plaintiff was

clearly unlawful.” Def.’s Mem. at 9. 

As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Giurbino and Woodford violated his rights by doing nothing to

assist him with respect to the enforcement of the prison’s

grooming policy against him or as to the punishment accordingly

rendered against him, and that Defendant Hernandez violated his

rights by not taking him off of “C-status.” The alleged

violations in this case, therefore, arguably occurred between

December 2003, when Plaintiff received his first Rules Violation

Report in relation to the prison’s grooming standards, and was

disciplined for his non-compliance, and March 2006, when

Plaintiff’s WG/PG A1A status was reinstated and he was apparently

fully restored to the position in which he would have been had

the former grooming standards not been imposed upon him. 

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RLUIPA is relatively new, having only become effective on

September 22, 2000. It was not until the issuance of Warsoldier

in July 2005 that the Ninth Circuit applied RLUIPA to

California’s prison grooming standards. In Warsoldier, the Ninth

Circuit found that the CDCR had failed to demonstrate that its

then-existing grooming policy was the least restrictive means

necessary to ensure prison safety and security, and held that the

plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits of his RLUIPA claim

challenging the grooming policy. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 1002. 

Before Warsoldier, several courts, including the Ninth Circuit,

had addressed whether prison grooming regulations satisfied

RLUIPA’s predecessor statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act (“RFRA”), and concluded that they did. See, e.g., May v.

Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding Oregon’s prison

grooming regulations did not violate RFRA); Diaz v. Collins, 114

F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that Texas prison

regulations on hair length were related to security and finding

the “security interest at stake cannot meaningfully be achieved

appropriately by any different or lesser means than hair length

standards.”); Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503, 504 (11th Cir.

1996) (“We thus join [other courts] in finding that a reasonable

hair length regulation satisfies [RFRA’s] least restrictive means

test.”).

In light of these cases, and the absence of case law

applying RLUIPA to prison grooming standards before Warsoldier,

it would not have been apparent to a reasonable official that the

CDCR’s former grooming policy was unlawful. Indeed, the opposite

conclusion would have been equally, if not more, plausible. 

Thus, it cannot be said that Defendants were on “fair warning”

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10The motion to strike is rendered moot if all of the above

recommendations are adopted.

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that their conduct, during the time period involved in this case,

was unconstitutional. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 740. The record

demonstrates that Plaintiff’s credit losses were restored in

September 2005, shortly after the Warsoldier decision, which in

turn reinstated his December 17, 2006 release date, and that

Plaintiff’s WG/PG status was restored in March 2006, shortly

after the amended grooming regulations took effect. Plaintiff,

who did not oppose the instant motion, provides no argument that

reasonable officials in Defendants’ positions would have known at

the relevant times that they were violating a clearly established

right. Because Plaintiff has not shown the violation of a

clearly established right under RLUIPA, Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for damages. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants’ request for

dismissal based on qualified immunity be GRANTED.

D. Motion to Strike Punitive Damages10

Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s claim for

punitive damages pursuant to Rule 12(f) on the basis that

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts entitling him to

punitive damages as a matter of law. Defs.’ Mem. at 6-7. 

Punitive damages are available under section 1983. See,

e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991). 

However, state officials sued in their official capacities are

immune from punitive damages. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d

517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, no punitive damages may be

sought from Defendants Giurbino or Woodford, who were sued in

their official capacities only. 

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In order to be entitled to punitive damages as to Defendant

Hernandez, who was sued in both his official and individual

capacities, Plaintiff would be required to establish that

Hernandez acted with an “evil motive” or demonstrated “reckless

callous indifference” to his constitutional rights. See Smith v.

Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The Court agrees with Defendants

that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that Defendant

Hernandez acted with the requisite evil motive or reckless

indifference. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to

strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages be GRANTED.

E. Other Counts

Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to raise three

separate counts. See Compl. at 3-5. Upon a close reading of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that each of the counts

arise out of an alleged violation of RLUIPA. Although the

Complaint briefly alludes to “freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment” (Count 2) and “due process, freedom of religion, and

freedom from cruel and unusual punishment” (Count 3) (see Compl.

at 4-5), there is otherwise no indication that Plaintiff intends

to pursue any claims other than under RLUIPA. Even if the

Complaint could be construed as attempting to allege a separate

claim for cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiff fails to meet

the pleading requirements for such a claim. In order to assert a

claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements, including an

objective requirement and a subjective requirement. See Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d

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11“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or

omissions must deprive an inmate of ‘the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities.’” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087 (citation omitted). A

prisoner meets the objective requirement by alleging the deprivation

of what courts have defined as a basic human need. Id. at 1088.

The subjective requirement, relating to the prison official’s

state of mind, requires “deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1087. 

“Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court must analyze each

claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment

violations may not be based on the “totality of conditions” at a

prison. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982).

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1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).11 Plaintiff does not make the

requisite allegations in his Complaint. Moreover, with respect

to Plaintiff’s references to “freedom of religion” and “due

process” in Count 3, Plaintiff himself appears to construe these

as rights arising under RLUIPA. See Compl. at 3 (alleging

“freedom of religion” and “due process” claims pursuant to RLUIPA

as Count 1). Accordingly, no separate discussion of any other

constitutional or statutory violations other than those alleged

under RLUIPA is necessary.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court recommends that

the District Judge issue an Order GRANTING Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the complaint and strike the claim for punitive damages

in its entirety, or, more specifically:

1. GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to the extent

that the Complaint seeks damages against Defendants in their

official capacities;

2. GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

injunctive relief claims as moot;

3. GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on qualified

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immunity grounds; and

4. GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s claim

for punitive damages.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties on or before February 21, 2007. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on or before

March 7, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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