Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01499/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01499-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL WAYNE HILL,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-01499-HSG (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner did not file 

any opposition to the motion, and the time to do so has passed. 

BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2009, in Alameda County Superior Court, petitioner was sentenced to a 

term of life without the possibility of parole consecutive to a term of 25 years to life, after he and 

codefendant Deandre Maurice Hill were convicted of murder during a robbery. People v. Hill, 

Nos. A124123, A124244, 2011 WL 213573, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2011). On January 25, 

2011, the California Court of Appeal modified the judgment so as to strike a parole revocation fine 

but otherwise affirmed. Id. at *27. The California Supreme Court denied review on April 20, 

2011. Ex. B.1

On May 6, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court 

of Appeal. Ex. C. The petition was denied on May 9, 2013. Id. Petitioner then filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on November 26, 

 

1 All references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by respondent in support of the 

motion to dismiss.

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2013. Petition at 21.2

Petitioner then filed this action, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The petition has a 

signature date of March 19, 2014 and was stamped “filed” at the Court on April 1, 2014. As a pro 

se prisoner, petitioner receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which deems most 

documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. See Stillman 

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will assume he gave the petition to 

prison officials for mailing on the date he signed it, i.e., March 19, 2014, and deem the federal 

petition filed as of that date. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on 

April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the 

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct 

review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was 

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during 

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is 

excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Here, the judgment became final and the limitations period began on July 19, 2011, ninety

days after the California Supreme Court denied review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 

(9th Cir. 1999) (if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme 

Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day period 

defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires). The presumptive deadline for petitioner to file his 

 

2 All page numbers used herein refer to those affixed to the top of the page by the court’s 

electronic filing program.

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federal petition was July 18, 2012. He missed that deadline by more than a year, so unless he 

qualifies for tolling, the petition is untimely. 

A. Statutory Tolling

Petitioner does not claim he is entitled to statutory tolling. Even if petitioner had claimed 

such tolling, however, he would not be eligible for it. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the one-year 

limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application for review remains “pending” in state court until it 

“has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002).

Here, petitioner did not file his first state habeas petition until May 6, 2013, over eight 

months after the limitations period under AEDPA had expired. Consequently, the state petition 

neither tolled nor revived the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of statutory 

tolling. 

B. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 

circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). “[A] petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). 

The diligence required to establish entitlement to equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

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citation omitted). Where a petitioner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds 

upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas 

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 

(9th Cir. 2005). Further, such petitioner must show “his untimeliness was caused by an external 

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 

1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Petitioner does not argue he was prevented from filing his petition on time. Nor is there 

anything in the record to support such a finding.

Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of equitable 

tolling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as untimely is GRANTED. 

2. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

3. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/20/2015

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