Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05389/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05389-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

DARRYLE WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

ART CALDERON, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1: 03 CV F 5389 REC DLB P 

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

[DOCS 29, 48]

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

section 1983. Plaintiff’s was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on August 24, 2005. 

Pending before the Court is the second amended complaint, filed April 25, 2005. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that...the action of appeal...

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). If the Court

determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc).

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In the instant case, plaintiff brings action against the California Department of Corrections,

the Chief Medical Director of the California Department of Corrections, Stuart J. Ryan, the Warden

of CSP-CAL, Dr, Martin Lewis, Chief Medical Officer at CSP-CAL, Medical Appeals Coordinator

Pascus, Dr. Sands, Dr. Nguyen, Dr, Chan, Officer Johnson and the following prison officials at the

California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi: Warden Art Calderon, Chief Medical Officer John

Moor, Dr. Allen Yin, Dr. Vo, Dr. Charles O’Brien, Dr. James Helmer, Dr. Edgardo Capot, Dr. John

A. Baughman, R.N. Karen Brown, R.N. Sherry Klingenberg, Sergeant Blaylock, Sergeant Reed,

MTA Tapia, MTA Renniger, Officers Cherry, Waggoner, Barr, Santos, Woodard, Myers and Cotton.

On October 3, 2005, plaintiff filed an “amendment” to the complaint wherein he dismissed

the claims against defendants in their official capacities and plaintiff dismissed the California

Department of Corrections as a defendant. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied proper medical care beginning December 3, 2002 through

the filing of his complaint. He provides the following narrative regarding his medical care and

treatment:

On December 3, 2002, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Yin, due to complaints of lower back

pain. On December 10, 2002, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Vo and again complained of back pain. 

Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Yin on January 13, 2003, who examined x-rays of plaintiff’s back and

prescribed medication. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. O’Brien on January 27, 2003, who ordered

another x-ray, a urine analysis, and prescribed medication. On February 10, 2003, plaintiff’s

condition worsened. Dr. Helmer examined him on February 10, 2003, and joked about plaintiff’s

condition. Dr. Helmer “made a faulty diagnosis,” and prescribed medication for plaintiff. 

By February 24, 2004, plaintiff suffered paralysis from the waist down. Other inmates told

defendant Tania to go to plaintiff’s cell where Tania denied plaintiff’s request to make a phone call

or have him admitted to the infirmary due to the unbearable pain. On February 22, 2003, defendant

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

Renniger called a physician about plaintiff’s condition. On February 24, 2003, Dr. Helmer and R.N.

Brown went to plaintiff’s cell, and plaintiff explained his condition of paralysis. Plaintiff was

immediately admitted to the infirmary. 

On February 25, 2003 the CCI resident physicians were making their rounds when defendant

Klingenberg told the doctors that plaintiff was “putting on a good performance.” On February 26,

2003, plaintiff asked Klingenberg for a drink of water. Klingenberg told plaintiff that his x-ray

results were normal and to, “get up and get your own water.” Defendant Cotton, influenced by

Klingenberg, also refused to fill plaintiff’s water pitcher. Plaintiff complained to Dr. Helmer about

their comments and they were admonished. 

On February 28, 2003, plaintiff was taken to San Joaquin Community Hospital, where an

MRI was done and plaintiff was admitted for an emergency surgical procedure, a decompressive

lumbar laminectomy. On March 3, 2003, plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and returned to

the CCI infirmary. On March 6, 2003, plaintiff requested the recommended physical therapy from

CMO Moor and was told that CCI did not offer physical therapy. Plaintiff then submitted an ADA1824 Form/Appeal. Plaintiff alleges that Moor refused to respond to his appeal or his request to be

transferred to Richard J. Donovan where a physical therapy program was available. 

On June 25, 2005, plaintiff was transferred to CSP-CAL and he apprised staff of his

medications. On July 3, 2003, he inquired of defendant Levin regarding his physical therapy. 

From August 19, 2003 through March 29, 2005, plaintiff was seen by a psychiatrist in the

Mental Health Services Division. 

On September 4, 2003, defendant Sands scheduled plaintiff to see an orthopedic specialist. 

On September 11, 2003, he saw the orthopedic specialist. Prednisone was prescribed and an MRI

was ordered. The MRI was performed on February 13, 2004.

 On August 12, 2004, Dr. Smith ordered a back brace for plaintiff.

On September 15, 2005, Dr. Sands reissued plaintiff’s medical chrono for various medical

supplies.

On October 19, 2004, Dr. Nguyen ordered tests. 

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

On November 26, 2004, his pain medications were abruptly discontinued.

On December 9, 2004, plaintiff was scheduled for an x-ray.

On December 23, 2004, Dr. Nguyen was alarmed at the size of plaintiff’s hemorrhoids and

sent him to the infirmary where he was examined by a surgeon and “sitz -Baths” were ordered. On

December 24, 2004, defendant Johnson refused to give plaintiff his prescribed hot shower, for which

he filed a citizens/staff complaint on December 28, 2004. 

On January 20, 2005, he was examined by defendant Dr. Chan who told plaintiff that he

would only hear two (2) complaints.

B. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges that by the actions described, the named defendants subjected him to cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also alleges that defendants

failed to provide immediate medical care for his serious and obvious medical needs.

1. Supervisory Defendants

Plaintiff names the Chief Medical Director of CDC, Warden Calderon and Warden Ryan as

defendants based on their supervisory positions. Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed

on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. 

When the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and

0the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d

858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff

must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support

claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 5

(1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that these defendants personally participated in

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at

646. 

2. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves

an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's

civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 6

establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not

support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical

treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1060 (9 Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, th

1136 (9 Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9 Cir. th th

1985). 

In the instant case, plaintiff acknowledges that defendants performed numerous

examinations, prescribed medications, ordered x-rays and testing, and admitted him to the prison

infirmary. Plaintiff was treated at an outside hospital and received an emergency surgical procedure. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not indicate that any of the defendants knew of and disregarded a risk to his

health, but rather, they were attentive to his condition and rendered treatment. That he was, at times,

not given the treatment he would prefer, is not a constitutional issue. 

Plaintiff alleges that one or more of the doctors misdiagnosed his condition. An allegation of

misdiagnosis fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or

'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622

F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician

has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106;

see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 7

1990). With respect to the allegation that R.N. Klingenberg told plaintiff that he was “putting on a

good performance,” this fails to state a claim. Mere verbal harassment is not sufficient to state a

constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

3. Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

Plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that the actions described above also constitute

violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. However, “[t]o establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is

ordinarily required to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 

Where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against

a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103

F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117

S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

In this case, the Eighth Amendment “provides [the] explicit textual source of constitutional

protection . . . .” Patel, 103 F.3d at 874. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment rather than the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs plaintiff’s claims. 

4. State Tort Claims

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants’ actions constitute medical malpractice in violation of

California State Law.

Plaintiff is informed that violation of state law, such as negligence and medical malpractice,

is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, there must be

a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 

Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, plaintiff must first

have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

D. Conclusion

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 8

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the second amended complaint in its

entirety. The Court will grant plaintiff an opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies of this

complaint, but only if plaintiff can allege additional facts in good faith. Failure to cure the

deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint again, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis

v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each

named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a third amended complaint, the previous pleadings no

longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the claims against defendants in their official

capacities, filed October 3, 2005 is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the California Department of Corrections as a

defendant is GRANTED; 

3. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed; and

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third 

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 9

number assigned this case and must be labeled "Third Amended Complaint"; plaintiff must file an

original and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in

accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 14, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-05389-LJO -DLB Document 51 Filed 11/16/05 Page 9 of 9