Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01952/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01952-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 When Petitioner filed his petition, his name on the caption

was spelled as "Bently;" therefore, the Clerk of the Court used

that spelling on the court file and the Court's ECF database. The

record shows that the correct spelling of Petitioner's name is

"Bentley," which is how Petitioner spells his name on the signature

line of his petition and traverse. (Pet. at 7; Traverse at 12.) 

Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk to correct the spelling of

Petitioner's name to "Bentley."

2 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BENTLEY,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Warden;

JAMES DAVIS, Chairman,

Board of Parole Hearings,

Respondents. /

No. C 06-1952 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner John Bentley,1 proceeding pro se, has filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging as a violation of his constitutional rights the

denial of parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings

(Board).2

 

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3 The State claims that under Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing

Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section § 2254, the proper respondent is

A.P. Kane, the warden at the Correctional Training Facility where

Petitioner is incarcerated. (Answer at note 1.) In its October

26, 2006 Order, the Court noted that it was the State's practice in

prisoner petitions challenging parole decisions to designate James

Davis, the Chairman of the Board of Parole Hearings as the proper

Respondent. Accordingly, the Court substituted him as Respondent. 

The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to include Kane and Davis

as Respondents in this action. 

4

 In 1991, the California Court of Appeal stayed his sentence

for second degree robbery. (Pet. at 3.)

2

Respondents have filed an answer.3 Petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

In November, 1990, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second

degree robbery and kidnapping to commit robbery.4 (Resp't Ex. 1,

Abstract of Judgment at 1.) The Los Angeles County Superior Court

sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole. (Resp't Ex.

3, Subsequent Parole Suitability Hearing Transcript at 1.) 

Petitioner began serving his sentence on February 7, 1991, and his

minimum eligible parole date was September 10, 1997. (Id.)

At Petitioner's sixth parole suitability hearing on June 3,

2004, the Board considered the following information, derived from

the Los Angeles County Probation Officer's Report, about the

kidnaping and robbery:

The victim, who describes himself as being diabetic and

in need of food at the time of the alleged offenses, left

his business location at about 11:30 p.m. on October 20,

1990 en route to home with the intention of taking care

of his medical condition.

In proceeding to an automobile parked nearby, the victim

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reportedly was confronted with the armed defendant who

pointed a handgun at the victim's head and demanded the

keys to the victim's vehicle. Fearing for life and

safety, the victim complied by giving the keys to the

defendant who then ordered the victim to enter the

vehicle which defendant proceeded to drive away from the

location. The vehicle was subsequently driven to an upon

[sic] a freeway where it was stopped. With the handgun

pointed at the victim's head, the defendant proceeded to

demand the victim's wallet and money and, further fearing

for life and safety, the victim complied. At this point,

the victim was ordered to exit the vehicle which was

driven from the location leaving the victim along the

freeway. The victim then proceeded to a call box and

contacted police.

At about 10:59 p.m. on October 28, 1990, patrolling

police officers observed a parked vehicle in proximity to

closed businesses. Considering this to be suspicious,

police proceeded to investigate and determined a stolen

status for thef [sic] vehicle. Police then confronted an

occupant, identified as defendant asleep inside the

vehicle. Defendant was arrested and subsequently

identified himself with different names and dates of

birth. The vehicle was determined to be the property of

the victim. Defendant declined a statement to police but

made a spontaneous statement of only stealing a car and

not robbing anyone. The victim subsequently identified

the defendant as the assailant on October 20, 1990.

(Resp't Ex. 2, Probation Officer's Report at 2-3.)

Petitioner's disciplinary history consists of six rules

violation reports (CDC-115) and six disciplinary memos (CDC-128)

while incarcerated. (Id. at 27, 29.) He received his most recent

CDC-115 on October 6, 2002, for refusing to move. (Id. at 27.) 

The remaining CDC-115s were for refusing to report to work,

engaging in mutual combat with a cellmate in 1996, failing to

report in 1993 and 1994, and possessing contraband (sandpaper) in

1993. (Id. at 28.) His six CDC-128s were for failing to report,

smoking, and having an unexcused absence. (Id. at 29.)

While incarcerated, Petitioner has participated in various

vocational courses. In 1997, he completed a vocational course in

dry cleaning. (Id. at 23.) He participated in, but did not

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complete, three other vocational courses in air conditioning,

refrigeration and radiology, as well as welding and metal

fabrication. (Id. at 24.) 

Petitioner earned his GED in 1994. (Id. at 23.) He worked in

the laundry prior to being assigned as a tutor, receiving average

work reports and a couple of laudatory chronos. (Id.) At the time

of his sixth parole suitability hearing, Petitioner was working as

a woodworker at the Prison Industry Authority (PIA), where he was

earning satisfactory work reports. (Id.) Since 1996, he has

continued to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). (Id. at

25.) He has also participated in Narcotics Anonymous (NA) and

various other self-help programs, including Reintegration Into

Society, Lifeplan for Recovery, Prison Fellowship, Anger

Management, and Creative Options. (Id. at 25-27.) 

In addition to Petitioner's prison record, at his sixth parole

suitability hearing, the Board considered his prior criminal

record, social history, parole plan, files and prior transcripts,

as well as any new psychiatric reports. (Id. at 4-5.) 

The Board reviewed Petitioner's personal background, noting

that he has an unstable social history that includes separation of

his parents when he was nine, followed by intermittent foster care. 

(Id.) Petitioner smoked marijuana at age twelve and abused alcohol

at age fourteen. (Id.) He dropped out of high school in the

eleventh grade. (Id.) Also, as a teen, he became addicted to

cocaine and had an "approximately $150.00 a day habit." (Id.) 

Petitioner testified that if the Board granted parole he

intended to live with his mother, Marilyn Luce, in San Bernardino

County. (Id. at 32.) His stepfather, Mike Luce, wrote to the

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Board to confirm that Petitioner was guaranteed a job with D and L

roofing company. (Id. at 34.) His brother also wrote a letter

asking the Board to grant Petitioner parole. (Id. at 35.) 

Petitioner stated that he planned to attend AA and NA if released

on parole. (Id.) He also informed the Board that he had been

studying real estate for the past six or seven years, and that he

planned eventually to pursue a career in real estate. (Id. at 37.)

The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office opposed

granting Petitioner parole. (Id. at 45-47.) The Deputy District

Attorney suggested that parole be denied because Petitioner had

"one of the worst social histories [the Deputy District Attorney]

has seen." (Id. at 45.) He pointed out that while Petitioner

attended AA, Petitioner still needed to overcome his addiction

problem: 

. . . I would think that he, the inmate, could gain some

insight into learning the steps, if for no other reason

than because it is one expression -- It goes further than

just to listen to these individuals express their life

experiences. It's the steps that have encouraged these

individuals to express their life experiences and to tell

the listening audience how they cope with their stresses. 

And I don't think this individual has learned anything in

terms of coping with stress or of doing things according

to the way they should be done. He in essence is going

to do it his own way, regardless.

(Id. at 48.) 

The Board reviewed Petitioner's psychological report dated

November 8, 2002, which indicated that his violence potential

within a controlled institutional setting was "significantly below

average relative to the inmate population." (Id. at 29.) The

Board found the psychological report "inconclusive" because it did

not mention Petitioner's CDC-115 on October 6, 2002. (Id. at 55.) 

The Board considered a more recent February 17, 2004 Correctional

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Counselor's report that Petitioner posed "a high degree of threat

to the public." (Id. at 30-31.) The report concluded that

Petitioner's "unwillingness to follow the rules in the institution"

may reflect what he would do in the community. (Id.) 

After a brief deliberation, the Board concluded that

Petitioner was "not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released from prison." (Id. at 53.) The Board issued a oneyear denial of parole. (Id.) In support of its decision, the

Board cited the "dispassionate" and "especially cruel and callous

manner" in which the commitment offense was carried out. (Id.) 

The Board also stated that Petitioner had an unstable social

history. (Id. at 55.) The Board stated that Petitioner had an

"escalating pattern of criminal conduct" and had "failed to profit

from society's previous attempts to correct his criminality,"

including juvenile probation, juvenile camp, adult probation and

county jail. (Id. at 54.) His juvenile record consists of three

burglary arrests, two runaways, and a vehicle theft. (Id.) As an

adult, Petitioner was convicted of burglary and four counts of

forgery before the commitment offense. (Id.) Finally, the Board

noted that Petitioner's parole plans were "okay." (Id.)

The Board, while acknowledging Petitioner's participation in

AA since 1996, noted its concern that he was "just going through

the motions" and not gaining the necessary insight. (Id. at 57.) 

The Board recommended that Petitioner participate in self-help and

substance abuse programs "to discuss, understand, and cope with

stress in a non-destructive manner." (Id. at 55.) The Board felt

that "[u]ntil progress is made, the prisoner continues to be

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unpredictable and a threat to others." (Id.) The Board concluded

by commending Petitioner on his above average work reports in the

PIA furniture factory, on receiving his GED, and on his

participation in self-help programs. (Id. at 55-56.) However, the

Board found that these positive aspects did not outweigh the

unsuitability factors. (Id. at 56.) The Board encouraged

Petitioner to "remain disciplinary free, continue to participate in

self-help and substance abuse programs, and cooperate with

clinicians in the completion of a new clinical evaluation for the

next hearing." (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with

the Los Angeles County Superior Court challenging the Board's

decision. On October 27, 2004, the superior court denied the

petition, finding that "the record contains 'some evidence' to

support the Board's finding that Petitioner is unsuitable for

parole," based on his unstable social history and his participation

in "serious misconduct while incarcerated, most recently in 2002." 

(Resp't Ex. 4 at 1.) The court also found inconclusive the

November, 2002 psychological report where the evaluator concluded

that Petitioner would pose no greater risk in the community than

the average citizen. (Id. at 2.) The court found that it was not

clear if the evaluator fully considered Petitioner's disciplinary

record since incarceration, including his most recent disciplinary

violation. (Id.) The court rejected the Board's conclusions that

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole based upon the circumstances

of the commitment offense and his past criminal history, stating:

There is no evidence in the record that the commitment

offense was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in

manner." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402(c)(1).) 

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Further, while the record reflects Petitioner did have a

criminal record prior to the commitment offense, there is

no evidence that Petitioner had previously "inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim." (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402(c)(2).) 

(Id.) 

After the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court issued summary denials, Petitioner brought this federal

habeas petition.

LEGAL STANDARD

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge

to a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is

contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of

the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Respondents concede that Petitioner has exhausted his state

remedies by filing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. Where, as here, the highest state court

to reach the merits issued a summary opinion which does not

explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

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§ 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits.

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In

this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner's claim is the opinion of the Los Angeles County

Superior Court. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that the Court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction on the grounds that denial of state parole does not

affect a liberty interest protected by the United States

Constitution. However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the

contention that California prisoners have no liberty interest in

parole and thus have no federal due process rights in connection

with parole eligibility. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to decide

whether Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated by the Board's determination that he was not suitable for

parole. 

II. Due Process Claim

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

by the Board's decision to deny parole because that decision was

not supported by "some evidence." (Pet. at 2.) Petitioner's

claim fails.

Because California prisoners have a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in release on parole, they cannot be

denied a parole date without the procedural protections necessary

to satisfy due process. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902. A parole

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board's decision must be supported by "some evidence" to satisfy

the requirements of due process. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455 (1985); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir.

1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). The evidence

underlying the board's decision must have some indicia of

reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd.

of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In denying Petitioner's request for parole, the Board first

cited as evidence the especially cruel, callous and dispassionate

nature of the commitment offense by stating:

. . . the victim Alan Wong was locked into his

automobile when the prisoner Bentley approached him with

a handgun pointed at his head and demanded the keys to

the vehicle. The victim gave the prisoner the keys

because he was in fear of his life and safety. The

prisoner also demanded that the victim get into the

vehicle with him. They drove off together. They drove

down the freeway for a distance, at which time the

prisoner stopped on the freeway and asked the victim for

his wallet and money. He took the money, then told the

victim to get out of the vehicle, and the prisoner drove

off with the victim's vehicle. He was arrested in the

vehicle approximately eight days later. The victim was

not physically injured during the robbery. 

(Resp't Ex. 3 at 53-54.)

As mentioned above, the Board cited as evidence Petitioner's

escalating pattern of criminal conduct, psychological assessment,

and most recent CDC-115 on October 6, 2002. (Id. at 54-55.) The

Board also cited Petitioner's unstable social history and need for

more self-therapy before release. (Id. at 54.) Petitioner

completed various vocational programs and participated in personal

self-help as well as substance abuse programming. (Id.) However,

the Board noted that the positive aspects of Petitioner's profile

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did not outweigh the unsuitability factors. (Id. at 56.)

Petitioner argues that the Board's finding that the nature of

his offense outweighed the positive aspects of his profile was not

supported by the evidence. He relies on Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit found that parole denial based

solely on the gravity of the commitment offense can initially

satisfy due process requirements, and that the "some evidence"

standard could be satisfied by the Board's consideration of the

gravity of the offense. However, in dicta, the Biggs court held

that courts may also consider the parole board's decision-making

process over time: "The Parole Board's decision is one of

'equity' and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the

factors considered . . . . A continued reliance in the future on

an unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative

goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation." Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

The Ninth Circuit has not specified the number of denials or

the length of time served beyond the minimum sentence that would

constitute a due process violation. Petitioner had been denied

parole by the Board five times; this was his sixth parole

suitability hearing. In Irons v. Carey, the Eastern District of

California court granted a habeas petition challenging the Board's

denial of parole after a similar number of parole hearings where

the petitioner had served sixteen years of a seventeen years to

life sentence for second degree murder with a two-year enhancement

for use of firearm where all factors indicated suitability for

parole; however, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 358 F. Supp. 2d 936,

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947 (E.D. Cal. 2005), rev'd, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007) (given

the egregiousness of the commitment offense, due process not

violated when Board deemed petitioner unsuitable for parole prior

to expiration of his minimum term). In another case, the Eastern

District court granted a habeas petition, finding a due process

violation in the denial of parole at the petitioner's twelfth

parole suitability hearing after he had served twenty-four years

of a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for first

degree murder where all factors indicated suitability for parole. 

See Johnson v. Finn, 2006 WL 195159, *12 (E.D. Cal. 2006); appeal

docketed, No. 06-17042 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2006). The Ninth

Circuit has recently reversed a district court's habeas denial,

upon finding a due process violation based on the governor's

reliance on the "unchanging factor" of the gravity of the

commitment offense to reverse the Board's grant of parole. See

Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 2008). The Board

had granted parole at the petitioner's eleventh parole suitability

hearing after he had served twenty-seven years of a fifteen years

to life sentence for second degree murder. Id. The Ninth Circuit

found that the governor's reversal of the Board's decision was not

supported by any evidence that the petitioner's release would

threaten public safety. Id.

The Board here relied on more than the "unchanging factor" of

Petitioner's commitment offense and criminal history in denying

him parole. Although the "cruel and callous" nature of

Petitioner's commitment offense and his criminal history weighed

heavily in the Board's determination, his unstable social history,

his prison disciplinary history, his abuse of alcohol and illegal

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drugs, as well as the district attorney's opposition also

counseled against parole. (Resp't Ex. 3 at 53-59.) The Board's

conclusion that Petitioner needed more exposure to self-help and

substance abuse programs to understand and cope with stress

contributes to "some evidence" for denying him parole. (Id. at

55.)

The Los Angeles County Superior Court concluded that the

record contained "some evidence" to support the Board's finding

that Petitioner is unsuitable for parole. (Resp't Ex. 4 at 1.) 

The California state courts' denial of Petitioner's claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling

federal law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of facts. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled

to relief, and his due process claim is DENIED. 

The Ninth Circuit's evolving guidance in Biggs, Sass, Irons,

and Hayward suggests that the Board can continue to evaluate

static factors, including the nature of the commitment offense and

pre-conviction criminality, in deciding whether to grant parole. 

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. The weight to be attributed to those

immutable events, however, should decrease as a predictor of

future dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner

demonstrates favorable behavior. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17;

Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. Should Petitioner continue to follow the

Board's advice by attending self-help programming and maintaining

a positive disciplinary record, continued parole denials based on

Petitioner's commitment offense alone could eventually give rise

to a due process violation. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17;

Hayward, 512 F.3d at 547.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/13/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BENTLY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

A.P.KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-01952 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on March 13, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

John Bently E-83807

ED-176U

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Patricia Webber Heim

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: March 13, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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