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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50553

COASTAL HABITAT ALLIANCE,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JERRY PATTERSON, In his official capacity as Commissioner of the Texas

General Land Office; CHAIRMAN BARRY SMITHERMAN, In his official

capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Public Utility Commission; JULIE

CARUTHERS PARSLEY, In her official capacity as Commissioner of the

Texas Public Utility Commission; PAUL HUDSON, In his official capacity as

Commissioner of the Texas Public Utility Commission; PATTERN GULF

WIND L.L.C., Wholly owned by Pattern Energy Group, L.P.; PPM ENERGY,

INC.,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:07-CV-985

Before REAVLEY, PRADO and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 17, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 09-50553

This is an appeal from the district court's order dismissing the instant case

on the pleadings. We AFFIRM.

Plaintiff/Appellant Coastal Habitat Alliance ("Alliance") seeks declaratory

and injunctive relief against two Texas agencies for failing to perform an

environmental consistency review and for not allowing public comment on the

private construction of energy-generating wind farms along the Texas Gulf

Coast. The Alliance argues that the agencies agreed to implement these

procedures in exchange for federal funding of their state coastal management

program ("Texas Program") under to the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16

U.S.C. § 1451, et seq. The Alliance claims that the agencies' failure to implement

these procedures violates preemptive federal law under the Supremacy Clause

of the Constitution and violates the Alliance's Due Process rights under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. It also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief

against the private developers who are constructing the wind farms.

The district court held that the Alliance lacked standing to bring its

preemption claim because it failed to allege that the agencies had caused

particularized harm and because the federal program contained no private cause

of action. The district court further held that the Alliance lacked standing for

its other claims because the claims lacked redressability.

We review a district court's dismissal on the pleadings for lack of

jurisdiction de novo. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Labuzan, 579 F.3d 533, 538

(5th Cir. 2009).

The Alliance argues that the district court erred in disregarding what it

claims are its "procedural rights" to a consistency review and public comment to

challenge the construction of wind farms. The Alliance concedes that the Texas

law requiring a consistency review and public comment was repealed before the

federal government approved the Texas Program. However, the Alliance argues

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No. 09-50553

that the repeal of that law is preempted by the Coastal Zone Management Act,

because the Texas Program continues to cite to the repealed law.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that

"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in

the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.

CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly, "it is a 'fundamental principle of the

Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state law.'" Planned

Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 336 (5th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S. Ct.

2288, 2293 (2000)). The Supremacy Clause itself "is not a source of any federal

rights." Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 562 F.3d 724, 730 (5th Cir.

2009) (quotes and cite omitted). However, this Court has recognized that "there

is an implied right of action to enjoin state or local regulation that is preempted

by a federal statutory or constitutional provision . . . ." Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 334.

To establish a preemption claim, we look to see if there is anything in the State

law that conflicts with federal law, or if the federal law provides for rights or

benefits that the State law unreasonably impedes. See id. at 336-37.

The Coastal Zone Management Act specifically disavows any attempt to

preempt state law. In 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1), the Act states that "[n]othing in

this chapter shall be construed . . . to diminish either Federal or state

jurisdiction, responsibility, or rights in the field of planning, development, or

control of water resources, submerged lands, or navigable waters . . . ." A review

of this language and the Act's statutory history has led the Supreme Court to

conclude that "Congress clearly intended the [Act] not to be an independent

cause of pre-emption except in cases of actual conflict[.]" Cal. Coastal Comm'n

v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 591, 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1987) (emphasis

in original).

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As for any "actual conflict," nothing in the Act expressly requires Texas to

provide for public participation and consistency reviews in wind farm

construction. Rather, the Act generally requires that before receiving approval,

the Secretary of the Interior must find the State Program provides for an

adequate planning process and general techniques for control of land use

involving the construction of energy facilities. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(11).

While a state may opt in its program to employ consistency reviews, public

hearings, and judicial review of the construction of energy facilities, other

techniques may also be employed. See id. In the instant case, it was the

repealed Texas law, not federal law, which specifically applied these procedures

to wind farm construction.

Furthermore, the operative language of the Act is not directed at the

States at all. Rather, it is primarily directed at the Secretary and subsidiary

agencies, who must confirm that any prospective plan submitted by a State

contains certain procedures before the plan may be approved. See 16 U.S.C. §

1455(d) ("Before approving a management program submitted by a coastal state,

the Secretary shall find the following: . . . ."). Inasmuch as these procedures

include those sought by the Alliance, this language has further been interpreted

as "focus[ing] on the class of persons on whom a duty is imposed . . . and not on

a class of intended beneficiaries . . . ." New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. & Energy

v. Long Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 422 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal cites and

quotes omitted). As the duties outlined in the Act are directed primarily at the

Secretary, we do not find that a State's purported failure to comply with the prerequisites for a plan's approval create an "actual conflict" between State and

federal law, giving rise to a private-party preemptive "procedural right" of

enforcement.

Indeed, the Act articulates its own method of ensuring a State's continuing

compliance with the Act, namely suspension and withdrawal of federal funding.

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See § 1458 (requiring Secretary to conduct continuing reviews of a state's

program and permitting Secretary to suspend financial assistance and withdraw

approval of a state's program for noncompliance). Therefore, inasmuch as the

Texas program has failed to properly implement its own program, it is the

withdrawal of funding, not the recognition of a preemptive "procedural right,"

that is the Congressionally intended method of ensuring compliance. "It is

telling that the Act specifies a mechanism for enforcing the consistency

requirement against state and city agencies without mention of any private right

of action." George v. NYC Dep't of City Planning, 436 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir.

2006).

1

To summarize, we find no basis to recognize preemptive federal

"procedural rights" under the Act that would force the Texas agencies to conduct

a consistency review and allow for public participation before authorizing the

private construction of wind farms. As there are no "procedural rights" in the

Act to bestow upon the Alliance, we agree with the district court that the

Alliance has failed to demonstrate that it suffered a concrete and particularized

legally-cognizable harm. The Alliance has thus failed to establish any standing

to prosecute its claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,

112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).

As we find no cognizable claims against the Texas agencies, the Alliance's

derivative claims against the private defendants must also fail.

AFFIRMED.

The Alliance argues that the Act's lack of a private right of action is irrelevant,

1

because in Sanchez, we recognized that there is an implied right of action to enjoin state or

local regulations that are preempted by federal law. See Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 334. However,

this argument misses the point. In Sanchez, the plaintiffs sought access to the benefit of

federal funding that was being dispensed through a state program. Id. at 327. In the instant

case, the federal benefit the Alliance seeks is the grant of "procedural rights" to challenge the

construction of wind farms. In other words, the benefit the Alliance seeks in the instant case

is the "right" itself. However, no such "right" exists under the Act that Texas law is impeding,

and therefore the Alliance lacks standing to bring its claims.

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