Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01230/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01230-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

WUERTH, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-01230 DAD P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), brought on behalf of 

defendants Wuerth and Quevedo. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion, and defendants 

have filed a reply. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned grants defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, but also grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 

II. Background

Plaintiff, who is now incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, is proceeding on his 

original complaint ((Compl.) ECF No. 1), against defendant correctional officers Wuerth and 

 

1

This action is referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 302(c), and Local General Order No. 262.

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Quevedo, based on their alleged deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs while 

he was incarcerated at California State Prison-Sacramento. In his complaint plaintiff alleges that 

each named defendant failed to respond to plaintiff’s requests that he be released to the medical 

unit for a blood pressure check, despite plaintiff’s complaints of untreated high blood pressure 

and dizziness. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, he fell and injured his right shoulder.

More specifically, the complaint alleges as follows. On July 7, 2011, at 6:00 a.m., 

defendant Wuerth failed to release plaintiff from his cell to go to the medical care unit for a blood 

pressure check. “[D]ocumentation will show” that Wuerth “was well inform[ed] by correctional 

officer Viles at 6:00 a.m. to release [plaintiff] to medical.” (Compl. at 3.) Wuerth’s failure to act 

continued until 8:00 a.m. and his misconduct demonstrated “incompetency; inexusable neglect of 

duty; dishonesty under oath [of] a formal promise; [and] willful[] disobedience” [sic]. (Id.) At 

8:00 a.m., on the same day, while nurse Doud was providing medications to prisoners, plaintiff 

asked Doud to “call [him] down to medical for blood pressure check because of dizziness, and the 

missing of June 2011 blood pressure medication.” (Id. at 3.) Doud responded “yes,” and asked 

defendant Quevedo to call plaintiff “down to medical.” (Id.) Defendant Quevedo then stated 

that “the nurse will call you down to medical.”2 (Id.) Defendant Quevedo was “well inform[ed] 

of [plaintiff’s] condition and should have been reasonable under oath a formal promise to do 

something: but the conduct has cause neglect of duty and dishonesty, and willfull disobedience”

[sic]. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff told “both staff worker[s] [that he was] having dizziness and did not 

receive any treatment in the month of June 2011.” (Id. at 2.) Finally, at 9:00 a.m. on the same 

 

2

The allegations of the complaint are unclear as to whether plaintiff is claiming Quevedo or 

Doud informed him that “the nurse” would “call [him] down to medical,” and which “nurse” 

would do the calling. The pertinent allegations are as follows: [Plaintiff] ask nurse Doud could 

she call [plaintiff] down to medical . . . Doud state (yes). I then ask C/O D. Quevedo. She stated 

the nurse will call you down to medical [sic]. (Compl. at 3.) Defense counsel argues these

allegations indicate that nurse Doud told plaintiff she would call him down to medical and, 

therefore, defendant Quevedo reasonably believed that he had no further responsibility in that 

regard. (See Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 22-1 at 6).) Although plaintiff does not address this 

construction of the allegations in his opposition to the pending motion, the court has liberally 

construed these allegations to assert that defendant Quevedo (a female correctional officer) was 

the “she” who spoke to plaintiff, and indicated that “the nurse” (either nurse Doud or the medical 

unit nurse) would call plaintiff to the medical unit. 

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

day, plaintiff attempted to get up to his top bunk, but became dizzy and fell, suffering a complete 

tear to the rotator cuff of his right shoulder. (Id. at 3; Ex. A (ECF No. 1 at 23).) Based on these 

allegations, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined.

At screening, the court found that the complaint appeared to state potentially cognizable 

claims for relief against the named defendants for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. By order filed October 22, 2013, 

previously-named defendant Doud was dismissed from this action without prejudice due to 

plaintiff’s inability to provide the information necessary to serve process on that defendant. (ECF 

No. 25; see also ECF Nos. 19, 20.) Remaining defendants Wuerth and Quevedo now move to 

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

III. Legal Standards for a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

tests the sufficiency of the complaint. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 

581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based on the lack 

of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). See also

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In order to survive 

dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

In determining whether a pleading states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as true all 

material allegations in the complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. 

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In the context of a 

motion to dismiss, the court also resolves doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, 

unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

In general, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe 

such pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

The court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint, however, may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

IV. Discussion

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants contend that the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a cognizable

Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Defense 

counsel argues that the complaint “is devoid of allegations implicating a culpable state of mind by 

the defendants . . . . There simply is no alleged scienter.” (Mot. To Dismiss (ECF No. 22-1) at 

4.) Defense counsel explains:

According to [plaintiff], the [d]efendants negligently, carelessly and 

inexcusably failed to release or call him down to the medical unit to 

check his blood pressure. No facts are alleged to indicate this was a 

purposeful act or omission. Nothing in the allegations raises a 

reasonable inference of any purposeful act.

(Id.)

In his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, plaintiff responds that he 

“inadvertently used the words carelessness and excusable neglect to describe the nature of his 

claim” in his complaint, and that he can provide “sufficient facts [that defendants were] 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff[’s] health and safety.” (Opp’n (ECF No. 23) at 1.) 

Defense counsel replies that “[d]efendants’ conduct cannot be construed as anything more 

than acts of inadvertent omission.” (Reply (ECF No. 24) at 1.)

B. Legal Standards for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Claim

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Ingraham v. 

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977). In the context of prisoner health care:

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 

constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the 

indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the 

prisoner’s needs, or by prison guards in intentionally denying or 

delaying access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with the 

treatment once prescribed. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists 

of two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need 

by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This second 

prong . . . is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference. 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations, punctuation and quotation 

marks omitted). Accord, Lemire v. CDCR, 726 F.3d 1062, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). 

By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the objective 

requirement for sustaining an Eighth Amendment claim. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994). A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). “The 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of 

indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” Id. at 1059-60 (citations 

omitted). 

The subjective requirement for sustaining a deliberate indifference claim is met by 

plausible allegations that a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Mere negligence is insufficient for liability. An official’s failure to 

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not . . . cannot . . . be condemned 

as the infliction of punishment. Instead, the official’s conduct must have been wanton, which 

turns not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official.” 

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires 

‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

835.

Whether a defendant had knowledge of a substantial risk of harm is a question of fact. 

“[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact 

that the risk was obvious. The inference of knowledge from an obvious risk has been described 

by the Supreme Court as a rebuttable presumption, and thus prison officials bear the burden of 

proving ignorance of an obvious risk . . . . [D]efendants cannot escape liability by virtue of their 

having turned a blind eye to facts or inferences strongly suspected to be true . . . .” Coleman v. 

Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

When the risk of harm is not obvious, the requisite knowledge may still be inferred by 

evidence showing that the defendant refused to verify underlying facts or declined to confirm 

inferences that he strongly suspected to be true. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. On the other hand, 

prison officials may avoid liability by demonstrating “that they did not know of the underlying 

facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, 

or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the 

facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Id. at 844. Thus, liability may be avoided by 

presenting evidence that the defendant lacked knowledge of the risk and/or that his response was 

reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 844-45; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 298 (1991); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010).

/////

/////

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

C. Analysis

Here, defendants do not deny that plaintiff’s high blood pressure condition is a “serious 

medical need” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-

60 (“serious medical need” includes medical conditions that a reasonable physician would find 

important for treatment). Nor do defendants contest, at this stage of the action, that plaintiff had 

high blood pressure on the day in question, that this condition was untreated, or that these factors 

may have caused plaintiff’s alleged dizziness, which may have contributed to plaintiff’s fall and 

injury.3Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff has adequately alleged the objective component 

of his Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

However, the court finds that even a liberal construction of plaintiff’s complaint fails to 

support the subjective requirement for stating an Eighth Amendment claim - that defendants 

“kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 837. In this regard, in his complaint plaintiff alleges that defendant Wuerth “was well 

informed” at 6:00 a.m., on the subject day, by correctional officer Viles, to release plaintiff from 

 

3

Included in the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s complaint is the First Level response to his

administrative grievance submitted with respect to these matters, which appear to validate 

plaintiff’s factual allegations concerning his serious medical need. The response to that grievance 

provides in pertinent part: 

You request to know why you were not called down to medical to 

get your blood pressure check. You are ducated twice a week for 

blood pressure checks. Nursing requests custody to call down 

[i]nmates to the treatment area for blood pressure checks. You did 

miss the blood pressure check that day and it is unclear if you did 

receive the message from custody to come to the treatment area in 

the clinic. According to the treatment book over the past year, you 

come to the clinic and got your blood pressure check about 75-80% 

of the time. You are ducated the same days of the week every time 

the doctor renews the order for blood pressure checks. So if you do 

not get called by custody on the days you normally get called down 

to the clinic, come on the date and request to talk to the nursing 

staff for clarification.

You also stated concern in the 602 Appeal related to not receiving 

you[r] KOP medication in June 2011. Your records indicated that 

your prescription had expired. You saw Dr. Ma and a renewal 

order was received [dates not provided], and then you received your 

blood pressure medications . . . .

(Compl. (ECF No. 1), Ex. B at 14.)

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

his cell to go to the medical care unit for a blood pressure check. Even assuming the truth of 

these allegations and that Wuerth failed to so release plaintiff between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.,

the complaint alleges no facts from which defendant Wuerth could reasonably have inferred that 

the failure to promptly release plaintiff to the medical care unit during that two hour period posed

a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. Similarly, plaintiff has alleged no facts from which 

defendant Quevedo, at 8:00 a.m., could reasonably have inferred that failure to immediately

arrange for plaintiff’s release to the medical unit would pose a substantial risk of serious harm to 

him. 

Absent an obvious need for immediate medical care, it appears that custodial staff needed 

to wait for a nursing request from the medical unit to release plaintiff for a blood pressure check. 

See n. 3, above. Plaintiff does not allege that his need for medical care was obvious at the times

in question, only that he told the defendants that he needed a blood pressure check. See Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 842 (obvious risk creates rebuttable presumption that prison official was aware of the 

risk). Moreover, while plaintiff alleges that he told the defendants he was dizzy because he was 

not on blood pressure medication, the court finds that these statements alone would not 

necessarily trigger a reasonable correctional officer to “verify underlying facts” about plaintiff’s 

condition and respond accordingly. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (the trier of fact may infer requisite 

knowledge by a defendant who “refused to verified underlying facts”).4 

Although the First Level Response to plaintiff’s relevant administrative grievance 

indicates that the medical unit may have requested that custodial staff release plaintiff to the 

treatment area (see n. 3, above), it does not indicate when or to whom that request was made. 

While plaintiff would have the court infer that a medical request was received by correctional 

 

4 Consistently, the Second Level response to plaintiff’s administrative grievance rejected similar 

inferences:

An inmate merely saying that he thinks his blood pressure is high, 

does not constitute an emergency to staff that are not trained in the 

medical field. Your request to see medical was not expressed as an 

urgent matter; therefore, it was addressed as soon as possible.

(Compl., Exh. C (ECF No. 1 at 44).)

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

officer Viles, who in turn informed defendant Wuerth, elsewhere plaintiff alleges that he himself 

made the request to Viles, who in turn informed Wuerth to release plaintiff at 8:00 a.m. (See

Compl., Exh. C (ECF No. 1 at 49).) These alleged facts do not support a cognizable deliberate 

indifference claim. 

Of course, it is unfortunate that plaintiff was injured. However, the undersigned finds that 

the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against either defendant Wuerth or defendant 

Quevedo for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Prison officials cannot 

be held accountable under the Eighth Amendment for erroneously believing that the available 

facts demonstrated an insubstantial risk, even if such beliefs prove to be unsound. Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 844. The undersigned’s conclusion is consistent with the adjectives chosen by plaintiff in 

drafting his complaint, which describe defendants’ conduct as incompetent, neglectful, dishonest, 

and wilfully disobedient. (Compl. at 3, 4). This court’s liberal interpretation of the complaint 

may not supply essential elements of plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 

268.

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the court will grant defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim.

D. Leave to File an Amended Complaint

Nevertheless, the undersigned has carefully considered the appropriateness of granting 

leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff states, in his opposition to the pending motion to 

dismiss, that the choice of words in his complaint, such as “carelessness and excusable neglect,” 

was “inadvertent.” (Opp’n (ECF No. 23) at 1.) He states that he “can support sufficient facts” to 

uphold his deliberate indifference claims. (Id.) 

“Leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading ‘could not possibly be cured by 

the allegation of other facts,’ and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs.” Ramirez 

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal citation omitted)). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint without 

leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could 

not be cured by amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Although plaintiff does not identify the additional facts that he says will support his 

claims, the court, out of an abundance of caution, will grant leave to amend to permit plaintiff the 

opportunity to allege facts that he in good faith believes he can prove. Plaintiff is informed, 

however, that facts alleged in an amended complaint “must not be inconsistent with those already 

alleged,” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

If plaintiff chooses to file and serve an amended complaint, the allegations of the 

complaint must clearly identify how each defendant’s alleged misconduct resulted in a 

deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be 

no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 

defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. 

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to the original complaint in 

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22), is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed May 8, 2012, is dismissed with leave to amend.

3. Plaintiff shall, within twenty-eight days after the filing date of this order, file and serve 

an amended complaint that cures the defects noted in this order, and complies with the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the 

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

case number assigned to this action and be titled “Amended Complaint.”

4. Failure to timely comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this 

action be dismissed.

Dated: August 1, 2014

DAD:4

tayl1230.mtd.lta

Case 2:12-cv-01230-MCE-DB Document 27 Filed 08/04/14 Page 11 of 11