Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00082/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00082-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN I. MCALLISTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.E. GUNJA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00082-OWW-SKO PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

(Doc. 31)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff John I. McAllister (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of

civil rights by federal actors. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Martin, McCarty, Gordon, Boister,

and Brown retaliated against Plaintiff for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff also

claims that Defendant Schultz violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights through his deliberate

indifference to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety.

On January 4, 2010, Defendants McCarty, Gordon, Brown, Schultz, and Martin filed a

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #31.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 17, 2010. 1

(Doc. #35.) Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition on February 25, 2010. (Doc. #36.) 

Plaintiff filed a surreply on March 29, 2010. (Doc. #37.)

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Defendant Boister has not made an appearance in this action. On April 29, 2009, a summons was returned

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unexecuted as to Defendant Boister. (Doc. #20.) The summons indicated that Boister was deceased.

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I. Background

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims against Defendants for deliberate indifference to an

excessive threat to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment and claims for retaliation

against Plaintiff’s exercise of his right under the First Amendment to file grievances against the

government. Plaintiff alleges that he was seriously injured by a softball on February 14, 2004. He

claims that the layout of the softball field in the prison yard posed an excessive risk to inmates

walking down a walkway near the softball field. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Schultz was aware

of the inherently dangerous conditions of the softball field, but did nothing to protect inmates like

Plaintiff from harm. Plaintiff concludes that Schultz’s inaction caused him to be hit by a softball,

causing permanent blindness in his eye.

Plaintiff also claims that he filed a complaint regarding his injury through the prison’s

administrative appeal system. Plaintiff claims that Defendants transferred Plaintiff from his job as

a repairman to a job as an electrician and later fired him from that job in retaliation for the filing of

his administrative complaint. Plaintiff also claims that he was transferred to the Federal Correctional

Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana (“Terre Haute”) in June 2005 in retaliation for Plaintiff’s

complaint. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Martin, McCarty, Gordon, Boister, and Brown are liable

for retaliating against him.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

On January 4, 2010, Defendants McCarty, Gordon, Brown, Schultz, and Martin filed a

motion for summary judgment. Defendants Brown, Gordon, Martin and McCarty argue that they

are entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because Plaintiff

has failed to present any evidence that supports the inference that he was fired from his job in

retaliation for filing an administrative complaint, and has presented no evidence to support the

inference that Plaintiff was transferred to Terre Haute in retaliation for filing an administrative

complaint. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 7:24-12:17.) Defendants contend

that Plaintiff was not fired from his prison job in retaliation for filing an administrative complaint,

as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff continued to work for more than a year after he filed his

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administrative complaint concerning the softball incident. (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.

10:24-26.) Defendants argue that Defendants Martin and McCartywere not even aware that Plaintiff

had filed an administrative complaint about his softball injury (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.

J. 11:4-7); Defendant Brown had no role in responding to Plaintiff’s complaint and had no

involvement in Plaintiff’s work assignments (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11:8-10); and

Defendant Gordon supervised a different work crew, had no authority over Plaintiff’s work

assignments, and was not aware that Plaintiff was injured until he read the complaint in this action

(P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11:11-15.) Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was

transferred to Terre Haute because Plaintiff requested a transfer, and not in retaliation for filing an

administrative complaint. (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11:20-12:17.)

Defendant Schultz argues that he is entitled to summaryjudgment because Plaintiff has failed

to present any evidence to support the inference that Schultz acted with deliberate indifference

toward an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 12:18-19:14.) 

Schultz also argues that Plaintiff’s injuries were the result of a freak accident, and not an objectively

unreasonable danger. (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 13:22-14:19.)

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (P. & A. in Supp. of

Mot. for Summ. J. 19:15-25:2.) Defendants argue that nothing about the softball incident would

have reasonably put Schultz on notice that his failure to act was unconstitutional. (P. & A. in Supp.

of Mot. for Summ. J. 21:14-23.) Defendants further argue that Martin, McCarty, Gordon, and Brown

could not have reasonably known that their actions violated a clearly establish constitutional right

because they did not even know about Plaintiff’s administrative complaints, were not involved in

removing Plaintiff from his job, and did not act in a retaliatory manner. (P. & A. in Supp. of Mot.

for Summ. J. 24:1-18.)

C. Plaintiff’s Opposition

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants were aware of the danger posed by the

softball field. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Schultz and Martin were standing by the north

corner of the yard and saw softballs hit the sidewalk and almost hit other prisoners. (Pl.’s Mot. in

Opp’n of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., and Mem. of P. & A. 7:25-8:1.) Plaintiff contends that the risk

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of injury was obvious. (Opp’n 8:9-11.) Plaintiff asserts that he observed Schultz witness the

softballs hit the sidewalk, and presents affidavits from other prisoners who have observed the same. 

(Opp’n 8:4-8.) Plaintiff argues that this evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on the

question whether Schultz acted with deliberate indifference. (Opp’n 10:15-22.)

Plaintiff further argues that he states a claim for retaliation. (Opp’n 12:1-16:5.) Plaintiff

argues that the right to be free from retaliation was clearlyestablished (Opp’n 14:3-27); and contends

that his transfer to Terre Haute was adverse because it was unsafe, unsanitary, and was a “pigsty” 

(Opp’n 12:3-8).

D. Defendants’ Reply

In their reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to provide

any evidence that Defendants fired Plaintiff from his prison job. (Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. 2:15-4:21.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that

Defendants had any role in transferring Plaintiff to Terre Haute. (Reply 4:22-6:5.) Finally,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that Defendant Schultz acted

with deliberate indifference. (Reply 6:6-8:14.)

E. Plaintiff’s Surreply

On March 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Replyto Defendants[sic] Motion forSummary

Judgment.” (Doc. #37.) Plaintiff’s reply was filed after, and in response to, Defendants’ reply to

Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In terms of proper motion practice, the

Local Rules explicitly recognize the filing of a motion, an opposition to the motion, and a reply to

the opposition. See Local Rule 230(b)-(d). The rules governing motion practice in prisoner actions

also limit explicit recognition to the motion, opposition, and reply. See Local Rule 230(l). “All such

motions will be deemed submitted twenty-eight (28) days after the service of the motion or when the

reply is filed, whichever comes first.” Local Rule 230(l).

Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Local Rules explicitly recognize

Plaintiff’s filing, otherwise known as a surreply. Plaintiff has not filed a motion requesting

permission to file a surreply and the Court did not ask Plaintiff to submit a surreply. Thus, Plaintiff’s

filing is improper and the Court will recommend that it be stricken from the record.

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II. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may move for summary judgment

“if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” “[A] party seeking summary judgement always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Id. at 322. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23. Afterthe moving partymakes a sufficient showing

regarding such failure of proof, the nonmoving partymust then “go beyond the pleadings and by [his

or] her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)).

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure of Proof

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial and there is a complete failure of proof concerning essential elements of Plaintiff’s case. 

However, the Court notes that summary judgment is only appropriate “after adequate time for

discovery.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

A review of the docket reveals that on September 14, 2009, Defendants moved for a stay of

discovery pending Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc #27.) Defendants indicated

that Plaintiff served on Defendants a request for production of documents which included a request

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for the “personnel file” of each of the Defendants. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Stay

Disc. Pending Resolution of Qualified ImmunityDefense 2:18-24.) Defendants’ motion was granted

on November 18, 2009. (Doc. #30.) Thus, when Defendants’ filed their motion to dismiss,

discovery had been stayed and Plaintiff did not receive responses to his document production

request.

It is doubtful that Plaintiff has received “adequate time for discovery” to oppose Defendants’

argument that there is a failure of proof concerning essential elements of Plaintiff’s case. At the

same time, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not submitted an affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(f)showing that he “cannot present facts essential to justify [his] opposition” and

that the Court should accordingly deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or “order a

continuance to enable affidavits to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken.” Further, Plaintiff

has not properly objected to Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. Plaintiff has made no 2

argument that further discovery would enable Plaintiff to present facts essential to oppose

Defendants’ motion. However, this failure likely stems from Plaintiff’s pro se status and lack of 3

legal education. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (court has

duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their claim due

to ignorance of technical procedural requirements and pro se pleadings are liberally construed,

particularly where civil rights claims are involved). In their motion for a stay of discovery,

Defendants attached a set of document production requests propounded by Plaintiff. (Decl. of

Benjamin E. Hall in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Stay Disc. Pending Resolution of Qualified Immunity

Defense, Ex. A.) Having reviewed the document requests, it is apparent that further discovery may

Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 260(b) requires that Plaintiff’s opposition “reproduce the itemized facts

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in the Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are undisputed and deny those that are disputed,

including with each denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory

answer, admission, or other document relied upon in support of that denial.”

The Court also notes that Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants’ motion to stay discovery. However, in

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fairness to Plaintiff, Defendants’ motion for a stay requested a stay “pending resolution of the issue of qualified

immunity.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Stay Disc. Pending Resolution of Qualified Immunity Defense 1:18-21.) Defendants did

not express an intent to move for summary judgment on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure of proof. Thus, it was unclear

whether Defendants’ motion would rely on matters outside the pleadings, and Plaintiff may not have thought it

necessary to object to the stay.

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lead to the discovery of evidence that Plaintiff may use to oppose Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

The Court will denyDefendants’ motion with respect to their arguments regarding Plaintiff’s

failure of proof without prejudice to Defendants’ ability to re-file their motion after adequate time

for discovery.

C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s claims. “The

doctrine of qualified immunityprotects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “The protection of qualified immunity applies

regardless of whether the government official’s error ‘is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a

mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,

567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Because qualified immunity serves as an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability, questions regarding qualified immunity should be resolved

at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Id.

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence

for resolving claims of qualified immunity. First, a court must decide whether the facts alleged by

a plaintiff set forth a violation of a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Second, if the

plaintiff has satisfied the first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. If the defendant did not violate a

clearly established constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from

plaintiff’s claims. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)). However, the Supreme Court has since held that the Saucier sequence is not mandatory in

all cases and courts may resolve the “clearly established” question first when the Saucier sequence

would result in a “substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have

no effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. at 818.

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1. Defendant Schultz Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity From Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Schultz violated Plaintiff’srights guaranteed bythe Cruel and

Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect Plaintiff from the threat

of falling softballs hit from the prison’s softball field. As discussed below, the Court finds that

Defendant Schultz is entitled to qualified immunity because the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not

make out a violation of a constitutional right.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and

“embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.’” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.

1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1)

the objective requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the subjective

requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

The objective requirement that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious” is met where the

prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The subjective

requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” is met where the prison

official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S.

at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under

which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment protects prisoners not onlyfrom inhumane methods of punishment but also from

inhumane conditions of confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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Prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). “[W]hile conditions

of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they ‘must not involve the wanton and

unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981)).

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Schultz fails to meet the objective

standard of a “sufficiently serious” deprivation. The threat of injury from softballs is not so

objectively serious that it could be characterized as “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” 

Plaintiff’s injury from the softball, while serious, was nothing more than an “unforeseeable

accident.” See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Franics v.

Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (An “unforeseeable accident” that interfered with execution did

not “add an element of cruelty” to the execution. “The situation of the unfortunate victim of this

accident is just as though he had suffered the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain

in any other occurrence, such as, for example, a fire in the cell block”)). The Eighth Amendment

does not provide a guarantee that Plaintiff will be protected from random accidents.

The facts alleged by Plaintiff fail to demonstrate a risk of harm so excessive that it

constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court cannot fathom a softball scenario so inherently

dangerous that being asked to traverse a walkway adjacent to a softball field is so objectively

unreasonable that society would condemn it as cruel and unusual. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1950 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be

a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (Eighth Amendment draws

its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society). 

Walking near a softball field is neither “cruel” nor “unusual.” That Plaintiff suffered serious injury

from the softball does not per se create a constitutional violation. The Eighth Amendment legal

standards speak of “excessive risks,” implying an element of probability. Serious injuries from low

probability accidents do not fall within the purview of the Eighth Amendment. See Helling, 509

U.S. at 36 (“prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society

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chooses to tolerate”); Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2004) (“the risk of being hit by a

softball as a result of a hazardous field condition is not one that ‘today’s society chooses not to

tolerate’”) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to constitute a violation of

his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Defendant Schultz is entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court notes that the findings made in these Findings and Recommendations deviate from

the findings made in the Court’s January 13, 2009 screening order. (Doc. #13.) In the screening

order, the Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a cognizable claim under the Eighth

Amendment against Defendant Schultz based on the dangerous conditions of the softball field. 

However, the Court’s January 13, 2009 screening order was issued before the Supreme Court

rendered its decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), on May 18, 2009. Iqbal clarified

the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) pleading standard. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that

a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atlantic v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The Supreme Court clarified that the pleading standard

focuses on plausibility, not mere probability. Id. at 1949.

The Court’s January 13, 2009 screening order was issued before Iqbal and found that

Plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient because it was possible that the softball field was so dangerous

that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The screening order was based on the rationale that it was

possible that at trial, Plaintiff would be able to demonstrate that the softball field was unusually

dangerous and that the danger of falling softballs was so severe that it was cruel and unusual

punishment for prisoners to walk near the field.

It is clear under Iqbal that the rules for pleading are not so lenient as to allow Plaintiff to

proceed on his claim without pleading additional facts that pushes his claims across the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. See id. Given the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s

complaint, it simply is not plausible that the softball field posed a “sufficiently serious” risk to

Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff has alleged no facts to suggest that the softball field was unusually

dangerous, and it is not plausible to infer that an ordinary softball field poses a risk to a person’s

safety that is so serious that it could be characterized as a cruel and unusual hazard in a prison yard. 

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See id. at 1950 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

sense”). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the pleading standard set forth

in Iqbal.

The Court finds that Defendant Schultz is entitled to qualified immunity from the claims

raised in Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that plausibly demonstrate that

Defendant Schultz violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right. However, the Court notes that pro se

litigants are typically given leave to amend a complaint if it is at all possible that the deficiencies in

their pleading can be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007)

(recognizing longstanding rule that leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend

was made unless the court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation

of other facts); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (pro se litigant must be given

leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

could not be cured by amendment). The Court advises Plaintiff that he may file a motion requesting

leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) if he believes that he can plead

facts that plausibly demonstrate that the softball field posed a serious risk to his safety. See Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) (“a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s

written consent or the court’s leave”). However, Plaintiff is also advised that any such motion must

include a description of the additional facts that Plaintiff intends to plead so that the Court can

determine whether an amendment would satisfy the Iqbal pleading standard. 

2. Defendants McCarty, Gordon, Brown and Martin Are Not Entitled To

Qualified Immunity With Respect To Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claims

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims. Defendants concede that in the context of the qualified immunity defense, “the

. . . prohibition against retaliatory punishment is clearly established law in the Ninth Circuit.” (P.

& A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 24:3-5.) Defendants nonetheless argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity because Defendants Martin, McCarty, Gordon, and Brown did not have any role

in the processing of Plaintiff’s administrative complaints and did not remove Plaintiff from his job

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in the Facilities Department. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff was transferred from USPAtwater pursuant to Plaintiff’s own request and that Defendants had no role in selecting Terre Haute

as the transfer destination.

Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity relies on matters outside the pleadings.

Defendants point to assertions made in their own declarations to support their contention that they

had no role in processing Plaintiff’s administrative complaint, were not involved in removing

Plaintiff from his job, and did not transfer Plaintiff to Terre Haute. As noted earlier, there has not

been adequate discovery in this matter to grant judgment in Defendants’ favor based on matters

outside the pleadings. See discussion supra Part II.A. Through further discovery, Plaintiff may be

able to obtain evidence to rebut Defendants’ assertions. The Court will recommend that Defendants’

qualified immunitydefense be denied without prejudice to their ability to raise it again after adequate

discovery has been conducted.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court finds that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is premature because

Plaintiff has not had sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery to present facts essential to justify

his opposition. However, based on matters entirely within the pleadings, the Court finds that

Defendant Schultz is entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s surreply, filed on March 29, 2010, be STRICKEN from the record;

2. Defendant Schultz be dismissed from this action based on the defense of qualified

immunity;

3. Defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment be denied, without prejudice, on all other

grounds; and

4. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants McCarty,

Gordon, Brown, Schultz, Martin and Boister .

4

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

In separate order, the Court will order Plaintiff to show cause why Defendant Boister should not be

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dismissed from this action due to Plaintiff’s failure to move to substitute Boister’s estate as a defendant.

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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