Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03130/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03130-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alex Ramsey, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-3130-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling With

Regard to the Statute of Limitations (Doc. #78) and Defendants State of Arizona and Mario

Gabaldon's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Dismiss Second

Amended Complaint (Docs. #83 & 84). The Court now rules on the motions.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court granted Defendant Mario Gabaldon's Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated

August 24, 2006 (Doc. #57). The Court dismissed the state law claims against Gabaldon

because Plaintiff failed to serve a notice of claim on Gabaldon as required by A.R.S. §12-

821.01. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's §1983 civil rights claims against Gabaldon for failure

to file within the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider the

Court's dismissal of Gabaldon and the other defendants on September 17, 2006 (Doc. #61).

The Court denied the motion on September 21, 2006 (Doc. #63), then vacated that Order

(Doc. #64) and set a briefing schedule for the Motion to Reconsider and a hearing on the

motion (Doc. #65).

In its December 6, 2006 Order (Doc. #75), the Court granted the Motion for

Reconsideration and vacated its August 24, 2006 Order. The Court's December 6 Order

Case 3:05-cv-03130-JAT Document 90 Filed 03/13/07 Page 1 of 6
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The Court did not mention the failure to file a notice of claim in the December 6

Order.

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granted Mr. Gabaldon's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. The Court dismissed both the

state law claims and the §1983 civil rights claims against Mr. Gabaldon for failure to file

within the applicable statute of limitations.1

 The Court dismissed the claims against Mrs.

Gabaldon for the same reason and explicitly stated that it had not considered the merits of

Mrs. Gabaldon's failure to serve argument. The Court also dismissed the claims against the

State of Arizona based on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.

On December 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling with

Regard to the Statute of Limitations (Doc. #78). Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its

dismissal on statutes of limitations grounds of the claims against the Gabaldons. Defendants

State of Arizona and Mario Gabaldon filed a response to the motion to reconsider that also

includes a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Before reaching the merits of Plaintiff's motion, the Court will address briefly

Defendants' argument that the motion is moot given Plaintiff's stated intention to dismiss the

claims against Mr. Gabaldon in federal court. Counsel for Defendants State of Arizona and

Mr. Gabaldon claim that Plaintiff's counsel told them that he would drop the federal case

against the State of Arizona and Mr. Gabaldon in favor of pursuing the state court action.

In his reply in support of the motion to reconsider (Doc. #85), however, Plaintiff stated that

he would not drop his federal case against Defendants if the Court does not grant the relief

requested in the motion. The Court therefore must consider the merits of Plaintiff's motion.

Plaintiff makes two arguments for relief from the Court's dismissal of the claims

against the Gabaldons. First, Plaintiff claims that the Court erred in dismissing all the claims

against the Gabaldons because Plaintiff presented evidence outside the pleadings that

demonstrated the Court could not resolve the case on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Namely,

Plaintiff argues the factual allegations in the pleadings and the affidavit he submitted after

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This ruling applies only to the malicious prosecution claim.

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his first motion to reconsider support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff's

second argument relates specifically to the state law claim for malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff contends the Court erred in dismissing that claim because the statute of limitation

did not begin to run until his release from jail.

A. EQUITABLE TOLLING

To support his equitable tolling argument, Plaintiff relies primarily on an affidavit

filed nearly two months after he filed his first motion for reconsideration and one week after

the hearing on that motion. Plaintiff waited that long to file the affidavit, even though he had

knowledge of everything in it at the time he filed his Complaint, his Opposition to the

motions to dismiss, and his first Motion to Reconsider. The Court need not and will not

consider the untimely affidavit. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993). For all the reasons stated on pages 6-8 of the Court's December 6, 2006 Order,

the factual averments in the Complaint do not create a tolling issue. The Court affirms its

earlier ruling on this point.

B. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

1. State Claim

Plaintiff raises a valid argument regarding the running of the statute of limitation on

his state malicious prosecution claim. In Arizona, a claim for malicious prosecution does not

accrue until the prosecution terminates in the plaintiff's favor. Glaze v. Larsen, 83 P.3d 26,

29 (Ariz. 2004). The plaintiff must file the claim within one year of accrual. A.R.S. §12-

541. The charges against Plaintiff were dismissed on October 7, 2004. Plaintiff filed this

action on October 6, 2005. Plaintiff therefore timely filed his malicious prosecution claim

against Mr. Gabaldon.2

Although the Court erred in dismissing the malicious prosecution claim on statute of

limitations grounds, the dismissal stands on other grounds. In its August 24 Order (Doc.

#57), the Court dismissed all the state law claims against the Gabaldons for failure to serve

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a notice of claim. The Court did not mention that defense in its December 6 Order (Doc.

#75), which vacated the earlier order. On reconsideration, the Court dismisses all the state

claims against the Gabaldons for failure to serve a notice of claim - in addition to dismissing

all state claims, except the malicious prosecution claim, for failure to file within the

applicable limitations period. 

Arizona law requires persons who have claims against a public entity or a public

employee, like Mr. Gabaldon, to file a notice of claim with the person authorized to accept

service within 180 days after the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. §12-821.01. If the person

sues both the public employer and employee, the person must serve a notice of claim on the

individual as well as the employer. Johnson v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 1382, 1382-85

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). 

Plaintiff did not serve a notice of claim on Mr. Gabaldon as required by A.R.S. §12-

821.01. Plaintiff claims his failure to serve notice on Mr. Gabaldon resulted from excusable

neglect because, as a pro se claimant, he did not understand the requirements of the statute.

He relies on Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Ariz. 1990) in arguing that "because

compliance with §12.821[.01] is not jurisdictional, issues of excusable neglect or

incompetence under the statute are to be resolved like any other disputed issue of fact in the

case." (Doc. #85, p.7) (quoting Pritchard, 788 P.2d at 1181). Pritchard, however, was

decided under a prior version of the statute that specifically included an exception for

excusable neglect; hence the language, "excusable neglect or incompetence under the

statute." Id. (emphasis added). The Arizona legislature has since repealed that provision.

The current statute does not contain an exception for excusable neglect. 

Even if an exception for "excusable neglect" somehow still exists, Plaintiff's proffered

reason for failure to serve Mr. Gabaldon would not fall under such an exception. A pro se

claimant's inability to comply with legal requirements does not constitute excusable neglect.

See Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)(rejecting petitioner's argument

that his ignorance of the law robbed him of the ability to fend for himself in court and that

his failure to timely file should therefore be viewed as "excusable neglect," and stating, "it

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is well established that ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner,

generally does not excuse prompt filing.").

Because Plaintiff did not serve a notice of claim on Mr. Gabaldon as required by

A.R.S. §12-821.01, the Court's dismissal of the state malicious prosecution claim against the

Gabaldons stands. 

2. §1983 claim

Plaintiff has not argued specifically for reconsideration of the dismissal of his §1983

malicious prosecution claim on the same basis he has argued for reconsideration of the state

claim, but the Court's finding on the accrual of the state claim for malicious prosecution

necessitates discussion of the federal claim. Like the state claim, Plaintiff's §1983 claim for

malicious prosecution accrued, at the earliest, when he was released from jail. See RK

Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1060 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). Consequently,

dismissal of the §1983 claim for malicious prosecution on statute of limitations grounds was

inappropriate.

Also like the state claim, however, independent grounds for dismissal of the federal

claim exist. Plaintiff sued Mr. Gabaldon in his individual and official capacities for purposes

of the §1983 claims. Mr. Gabaldon has Eleventh Amendment immunity for the §1983 claims

against him in his official capacity. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836,

839 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, he has absolute immunity for the federal malicious

prosecution claim against him in his individual capacity.

Social workers, like Mr. Gabaldon, have absolute immunity from §1983 suits for their

discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial actions. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 895-99 (9th

Cir. 2003). In Miller, the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of immunity from §1983 claims

enjoyed by social workers. Id. The Miller court found that social workers enjoy absolute

immunity for discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial actions, but only qualified immunity for

discretionary decisions and recommendations that "are not functionally similar to

prosecutorial or judicial decisions." Id. at 898. By definition, a malicious prosecution claim

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proceeds against a social worker for his quasi-prosecutorial actions. Mr. Gabaldon therefore

has absolute immunity for the §1983 malicious prosecution claim.

On reconsideration, the Court affirms its dismissal of all claims, except the state and

federal malicious prosecution claims, for failure to file within the applicable statute of

limitations. The Court additionally dismisses all state claims, including the malicious

prosecution claim, for failure to comply with A.R.S. §12-821.01. Finally, the Court

dismisses the §1983 malicious prosecution claim based on Mr. Gabaldon's absolute

immunity.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #78), but

denying all relief requested.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING the State of Arizona and Mario Gabaldon's

Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #84) as moot because the Court's

earlier dismissal of the State of Arizona and Mr. and Mrs. Gabaldon stands. The Clerk of the

Court shall terminate the State of Arizona and Mr. and Mrs. Gabaldon from the case.

DATED this 12th day of March, 2007.

 

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