Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03002/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03002-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Section 1987 authorizes the United States attorneys, marshals, deputy marshals, the United States magistrate 1

judges, with the power to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders, and any other officer specifically empowered by the President

to institute prosecutions of the violations of certain civil rights statutes. Obviously, plaintiffs have no authority to prosecute

the defendants under this statute.

-1-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

ROBERT D. JOHNSTON; and

MELANIE K. JOHNSTON PLAINTIFFS

v. Civil No. 06-3002

JASON BRISCO, in his official 

capacity as an officer of the Harrison

Arkansas Police Department and in his

individual capacity; et al., DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned for report and recommendation are the motions to dismiss filed

by separate defendant Johnny L. Nichols, attorney-at-law (Doc. 87), separate defendant Erwin

L. Davis, attorney-at-law (Doc. 96), and separate defendants Michael Dodson, attorney-at-law,

and Joseph Paul Smith, attorney-at-law (Doc. 101). The plaintiffs responded to the motion to

dismiss filed by Johnny L. Nichols (Doc. 97). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this case under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986,

1987 and 1988. They maintain their First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 1

Amendment rights have been violated. Plaintiffs also purport to assert a claim under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

To avoid confusion, we will refer to the Johnstons by their first names.

2

-2-

According to the amended complaint, on January 3, 2004, plaintiffs allege that while

traveling northbound on Highway 65 Officer Jason Brisco began following the plaintiffs’

vehicle. Complaint at ¶ 34. Robert Johnston was driving and Melanie Johnston and their two

children were passengers in the vehicle. Id. 

2

Brisco followed the plaintiffs’ vehicle approximately ten miles to the Harrison city limits.

Complaint at ¶ 35. After reaching Harrison, Brisco initiated a traffic stop with lights and siren.

Id. 

Plaintiffs allege Robert immediately pulled into a well-lighted service station. Brisco

indicated the reason for the stop was that Robert had been driving all over the road and going

about six miles over the speed limit. Complaint at ¶ 36. Plaintiffs state they knew this was not

true as they were using their speed control. Id. at ¶ 37. Further, they believed the dash camera

in the patrol vehicle would negate Brisco’s claim that they were driving all over the road. Id.

 Brisco returned to the car and told Robert to exit the vehicle. Complaint at ¶ 38. Robert

asked why he had to get out of the car. Id. at ¶ 39. According to plaintiffs, Brisco refused to

give a reason and became aggressive and threatening. Id. at ¶ 41. 

Plaintiffs allege Brisco pulled out a club and threatened to bust out the car window.

Complaint at ¶ 41. Robert then asked to call for an attorney and was denied the right. Id. at ¶¶

43-44. Brisco then lunged into the vehicle and struck Robert with his fist. Id. at ¶ 45. Brisco

also smashed the window with his club. Id. at ¶ 46.

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-3-

To prevent further violence, plaintiffs state they drove away. Complaint at ¶ 47. As they

drove away, plaintiffs state Brisco hit the window where the plaintiffs’ son was seated. Id. at ¶

48.

Plaintiffs allege theywere pursued byBrisco and other officers for two hours before their

vehicle was disabled by gunfire and they fled on foot. Complaint at ¶¶ 49-54. Plaintiffs assert

they were pursued by all terrain vehicle, dogs, and helicopter. Id. at ¶ 55. Plaintiffs’ children,

who were age two and age six at the time, were with them. Id. at ¶ 57.

On January 5, 2004, plaintiffs and their children were surrounded by a SWAT team and

ordered to lie face down on the ground. Complaint at ¶ 57. Plaintiffs allege they were

handcuffed but not informed that they were under arrest and not informed of any charges. Id.

at ¶ 58.

Once in custody, Robert was confined in a padded cell. Complaint at ¶ 59. Plaintiffs

allege the children were interrogated. Id. James Johnson of the Arkansas Department of Human

Services, Division of Children and Family Services (DHS), advised Melanie that the children

were being taken into custody. Id. at ¶ 61. Melanie provided the name, address, and phone

number of the children’s grandparents, who were locally available and willing to care for the

children. Id. Despite this, the children were put in foster care. Id.

Bail was set in the amount of $25,000 for Melanie. Complaint at ¶ 64. Melanie was

released and although the seventy-two hour hold pursuant to which the DHS took custody of the

children had expired, DHS did not return the children to their parents. Id. at ¶ 65. 

Bail was set in the amount of $150,000 for Robert. Complaint at ¶ 67. Robert was

released on January 8th. Id. On January 8th, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody which

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 3 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-4-

plaintiffs alleged falsely stated they were currently incarcerated and there were no known persons

who had any claim to custody or visitation. Id. at ¶ 68. Plaintiffs assert they did not receive

copies of any petitions, orders, or other documents regarding the custody of their children until

November of 2004. Id. at ¶ 70.

On January 9, 2004, the plaintiffs appeared in court before Judge John Putman.

Complaint at ¶ 73. They were represented by Johnny Nichols. Id. Plaintiffs indicate they were

both charged with aggravated assault on Brisco as a result of a lie he told. Id. at ¶ 74.

Specifically, Brisco claims his arm was caught in the window and he had to break the window

to free himself. Id.

On January 13, 2004, plaintiffs appeared before Judge Gary Isbell and were given an

immediate unsupervised extended home visit with their children. Complaint at ¶ 77. However,

the children remained in the custody of DHS because of the continued incarceration of the

parents. Id. Plaintiffs point out that they were not incarcerated at the time. Id.

On February 4, 2004, Johnny Nichols filed a petition to withdraw as plaintiffs’ counsel.

Complaint at ¶ 81. Plaintiffs then hired Erwin Davis to represent them. Id. On February 10,

2004, an adjudication hearing was held and the children were ordered returned to their home with

their parents. Complaint at ¶ 83. 

Plaintiffs allege that Davis failed to act in their best interests and the prosecuting attorney

failed to provide discovery in a timely manner. Complaint at ¶¶ 87-92. Ten months after the

traffic stop, plaintiffs state new and vindictive charges of simultaneous possession of drugs and

a firearm were filed against them. Id. at P 97.

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 4 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-5-

Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Arkansas Judiciary Discipline Committee against

Judge Webb. Complaint at ¶ 105. Despite this, Judge Webb refused to recuse himself. Id.

Plaintiffs then retained Michael Dodson. Complaint at ¶ 106. On April 8, 2005, when

plaintiffs were to appear at the Boone County Courthouse, Dodson called to advised them that

the Harrison Police Force and all the Boone County Sheriff’s Department were at the courthouse

as a show of force against the plaintiffs. Id. at ¶¶ 107-108. Plaintiffs allege there were snipers

on the roof and they were told to exit the vehicle with their hands in the air. Id. at 108.

According to plaintiffs, someone had reported to the Harrison Daily Times that the plaintiffs had

made some type of threat. Id. at 109.

Plaintiffs assert they had counsel to represent them and declined to subject their children

to another nightmarish episode in Boone County. Complaint at ¶ 110. Although Dodson

appeared, he did not file an entry of appearance, and plaintiffs allege this facilitated the adding

of failure to appear charges to their already pending charges. Id.

On April 27, 2005, the plaintiffs were arrested and again jailed in Boone County.

Complaint at ¶¶ 111-112. Dodson entered an appearance for the plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 111.

However, plaintiffs states he then ignored their demands that he request a change of venue, file

a motion for dismissal, and refused to accept their phone calls. Id. at ¶ 113. When Dodson did

meet with them, plaintiffs state it was in the jail’s interrogation room that had audio and video

recording equipment used by law enforcement. Id. 

Plaintiffs maintain the conditions they were incarcerated under were deplorable.

Complaint at ¶ 114. They maintain they were denied outside exercise, their meals contained no

fresh fruit and vegetables and contained no variety, the bed linens were not laundered on a

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 5 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-6-

regular basis, video cameras were in constant use and jailers, regardless of their sex, were able

to view all prisoners, the woman’s shower stall could be easily seen from the parking lot, and

they had no access to a law library. Id. at ¶ 114-121.

On July 22, 2005, Dodson and Joseph Paul Smith informed plaintiffs a plea agreement

had been worked out for them that involved probation for both the plaintiffs. Complaint at ¶

122. Plaintiffs agreed to accept the plea agreement. Id. However, plaintiffs later found out

they had been deceived. Id. at ¶ 123. The agreement was actually five years probation for

Melanie and a three year prison sentence followed by probation for Robert. Id. at ¶¶ 123-124.

Plaintiff assert that when they paid Dodson and Smith in April of 2005 they were told if the case

ended without trial there would be a substantial refund of the fee. Id. at ¶ 125. However, no

refund has been made. Id. Plaintiffs also state they never received a copy of the plea agreement

they were forced to sign. Id. at ¶ 126.

The complaint then asserts sixteen separate counts. The counts allege violations of

various constitutional rights and the last count asserts a violation of the Racketeer Influenced

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

DISCUSSION

As noted above, motions to dismiss have been filed by Johnny L. Nichols, Erwin Davis,

Michael Dodson, and Joseph Paul Smith. These individuals are attorneys retained by the

plaintiffs to represent them in connection with the criminal charges filed against them and/or to

assist them in connection with the custody proceedings involving their two children.

Johnny L. Nichols brings this motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of Rules

12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 87). He contends the

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 6 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-7-

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs filed a response to

the motion to dismiss on October 4, 2006. (Doc. 97 & Doc. 98). 

Erwin Davis moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 96). He

contends that he is a privatelypracticing attorneyand cannot be considered a state actor. Further,

he contends the plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead any alleged violations of their rights

under any law with particularity and specificity. 

Michael Dodson and Joseph Paul Smith moves to dismiss the claims against them

pursuant to Rule 12(b)6) and Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 101).

They contend they are private attorneys engaged in the practice of law and are not involved in

any state action. Further, they contend the plaintiffs have failed to state claims under the federal

statutes cited.

“On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court applies the same standard as in a

12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Glover v. Merck & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 994,

996 (D. Minn. 2004)(citing St. Paul Ramsey County Medical Ctr. v. Pennington County, S.D.,

857 F.2d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir. 1988)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, we must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and accept the

allegations of the complaint as true. Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiffs proceed pro se. The court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Holloway v. Lockhart, 792 F.2d 760, 761-62 (8th Cir.

1986)(citations omitted). Nevertheless, in treating the factual allegations of the complaint as true

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court “do[es] not ... blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 7 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-8-

the pleader from the facts.” Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.

1990)(citations omitted). 

As noted above, the complaint contains sixteen separate counts. In count one, plaintiffs

allege a violation of their First Amendment rights. Specifically, they allege they were denied the

right to have the facts of their case heard. Complaint at ¶ 128. They maintain Judge Webb

refused to rule on motions filed in his court or even acknowledge their multiple requests that he

review the facts of the case, the evidence of their innocence, and the violations of their civil

rights. 

In count two, plaintiffs allege a violation of their Second Amendment right to keep arms.

They point out a pistol that was in their vehicle was seized by the Harrison Police Department.

Complaint at ¶ 132. They allege the pistol remains in the possession of the police department

and all motions to return the seized property have been ignored by the State of Arkansas and

Judge Webb. Id. Further, they allege their right to keep arms has forever been infringed by their

forced acceptance of the false felony charges. Id. at ¶ 133.

In count three, plaintiffs allege violations of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiff allege Brisco had no reason to demand that Robert

exit his vehicle. Complaint at ¶ 138. Further, they allege the property that was seized was not

illegal to possess and was not used in any crime. Id. at ¶ 139.

In count four, plaintiffs allege violations of the Fifth Amendment right to due process.

Specifically, they allege they were deprived of their freedom and property although they had

committed no crime. Complaint at ¶ 144. They indicate an indictment was issued by Fred

Kirkpatrick based on a false affidavit prepared by Brisco. Id. They assert a probable cause order

was signed by Judge Putman although he had spoken to neither of the plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 145.

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 8 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-9-

Further, plaintiffs allege they were denied the right to contact anyone, denied the right to a

prompt first appearance, and denied the right to a formal arraignment. Id. at ¶ 146. 

In count five, entitled violation of Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury,

plaintiffs allege that they hired counsel to assist in their defense, Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and

Smith, and no counsel assisted or defended them. Complaint at ¶ 153. Plaintiffs allege Nichols,

Davis, Dodson, and Smith acted contrary to plaintiffs’ bests interests and direct instructions. Id.

Plaintiffs allege the defendants acted under the color and pretense of state law, statutes,

ordinances, regulations, or customs. Id. at ¶ 155. It is further alleged defendants adopted a

policy of the wrongful execution of judgments and deprivation of due process rights and other

civil rights of citizens including the plaintiffs. Id. 

In count six, plaintiffs allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against

excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs allege excessive bail was set in

January of 2004 and again in May of 2005. Complaint at ¶¶ 160-161. Further, they contend the

amount of the fines were excessive. Id. at ¶ 162.

In count seven, plaintiffs assert violations of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial. Plaintiffs allege Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and Smith were

employed to assist the plaintiffs and ensure their rights were exercised for their benefit.

Complaint at ¶ 170. Instead, it is alleged plaintiffs were denied such assistance and plaintiffs’

rights were waived without their knowledge or consent. Id. 

In count eight, plaintiffs assert violations of their Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due

Process rights. Plaintiffs allege they were not provided with paperwork involving the case,

hearings on the custody issues were held ex parte, and they were informed of a court appearance

with less than twenty-four hours notice. Complaint at ¶ 177. While the defendant attorneys are

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 9 of 16 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-10-

not mentioned by name in this count, it appears that at least some of the actions on which this

claim are based may have been taken by one or more of the attorneys retained by the plaintiffs.

While neither Nichols, Davis, Dodson, nor Smith are mentioned by name in count nine,

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Equal Rights Under the Law, plaintiffs do refer to legal

professionals. Complaint at ¶ 187. Plaintiffs allege the defendants used their status as, among

other things, legal professionals to the impairment, injury and detriment of plaintiffs. Id. 

In count ten, plaintiffs assert general violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. They allege:

Defendants, under color of statute, ordinance, or custom subjected the Plaintiffs

to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the United

States Constitution and laws including but not limited to: (a) Deprivation of the

right to be secure in his person; (b) Deprivation of the protection against

excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment; (c) Deprivation of the

right to due process at law; (d) Deprivation of the right of equal protection under

the law; (e) Deprivation of the right to redress; (f) Deprived of rights to privileges

[and] immunities of the law; (g) deprived of the rights of free speech; and (h)

Deprived of the right to counsel and access to the courts.

Complaint at ¶ 193.

Count eleven, conspiracy to interfere with rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, although it does

not mention Nichols, Davis, Dodson, or Smith by name, alleges all defendants conspired to, and

did deter, by force, intimidation, and threat the due course of justice with the intent to deny the

plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. Complaint at ¶¶ 200-201. Similarly, count twelve,

action for neglect to prevent under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, alleges each and every defendant had the

opportunity and obligation to assist the plaintiffs in their pursuit of justice and instead chose to

further the wrongs against the plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 208.

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-11-

Count thirteen purports to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Count fourteen alleges

that as the result of the wilful actions of each and every defendant the plaintiffs were imprisoned

against their will and against the laws of the United States. Complaint at ¶ 209. Count fifteen

alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiffs assert that all of the defendants

knowingly, with sadistic and malicious intent, acting in concert, attempted to circumvent justice

by implementing and advocating a tidal wave of fear, intimidation, and violence against the

plaintiffs. Complaint at ¶ 226. Finally, in count sixteen, plaintiffs maintain that each and every

defendant has violated RICO and caused the plaintiffs to be imprisoned against their will. Id. at

¶ 236.

Section 1981 “provides that all persons shall have the same right to ‘make and enforce

contracts’ and the right to ‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the

contractual relationship.’” Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004)(quoting

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b)).

In this case, plaintiffs rely upon the Full-and-Equal Benefit clause of § 1981 rather than

the Right-to-Contract clause. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under this clause

of § 1981, plaintiffs must show that: (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) the defendants

intended to discriminate on a constitutionally prohibited basis; and (3) that the discrimination

interfered with a protected activity as defined in § 1981. Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d

at 839. Further, a showing of state action is required. Adams v. Boy Scouts of AmericaChickasaw Council, 271 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 2001)(citing Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food

Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-12-

Although plaintiffs appear to allege that the conduct of all defendants amounts to a

violation of § 1981, the complaint contains no allegation that Nichols, Davis, Dodson, or Smith

interfered with plaintiffs’ participation in a “protected activity.” Instead, at most, the complaint

contains allegations that plaintiffs paid these attorneys to represent them with respect to criminal

charges lodged in Boone County and the attorneys’ performance did not live up to their

expectations and was in fact detrimental to plaintiffs. “Even though civil-rights pleadings are

viewed liberally, ‘[s]uch pleadings must nonetheless not be conclusory and must set forth the

claim in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.’”

Bediako, 345 F.3d at 839 (quoting Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 1976)).

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim as against these defendants should be dismissed. 

Under counts eleven and twelve, plaintiffs allege the defendants have violated 42 U.S.C.

§ § 1985 & 1986. The plaintiffs’ factual allegations do not support claims based upon these

statutes. A claim under § 1985 is premised upon the existence of an alleged conspiracy which

must be motivated by a class-based animus. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506

U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993). Plaintiffs have not alleged they are members of a protected class nor

have they alleged that the alleged conspiracy was based upon a class-based animus. Finally, no

claim exists under § 1986 as in order to be liable under § 1986 a defendant must have neglected

or refused to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. See Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902, 906 (8th

Cir. 2001)(citing Brandon v. Lotter, 157 F. 3d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Gatlin v.

Green, 362 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 2004)(a § 1986 claim must be predicated upon a valid §

1985 claim).

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-13-

In count thirteen, plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 does not

provide for a separate cause of action. See e.g., Rose v. Kenyon College, 211 F. Supp. 2d 931,

939 (S.D. Ohio 2002). Section 1988 merely provides for the application of common law in civil

rights proceedings brought under other statutes and for attorneys’ fees and experts’ fees in civil

rights cases. Id.

Next, in counts five, seven, eight, ten, fourteen, and fifteen of the complaint, plaintiffs

assert, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that they were unconstitutionally arrested, detained and

denied a fair trial. Defendants Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and Smith are not identified in any

factual allegation contained in the complaint as participating in the actual arrests, as causing

these arrests to take place, or failing to prevent the same. 

The elements of a § 1983 claim are: “(1) the defendants acted under color of state law,

and (2) the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal

right." Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 596 (8th Cir.2003) (citation and quotations

omitted). While plaintiffs allege that certain defendants: were involved in the arrests, in bringing

false charges against plaintiffs, in misleading the court regarding their incarceration in

connection with the custody of their children, and authored and prepared false affidavits, the

complaint contains no factual allegations indicating that Nichols, Davis, Dodson, or Smith,

perpetrated any of these acts or, in fact, had anything to do with causing or effecting plaintiffs’

arrests or incarceration.

Moreover, private attorneys do not act under color of law and are not subject to suit under

§ 1983. DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999). Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and Smith

were not acting under color of state law while representing the plaintiffs in connection with the

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-14-

criminal charges. See e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed.

2d 509 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law when performing traditional

functions as counsel); DuBose, 187 F.3d at 1002-1003 (“[C]onduct of counsel generally does not

constitute action under color of law.”); Dunn v. Hackworth, 628 F.2d 1111, 1112 (8th Cir.

1980)(“The actions of privately retained counsel are not considered state action and therefore

cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.”).

This fact is not altered by plaintiffs naked assertion that all the defendants conspired to

perpetrate or accomplish the complained of actions. A conspiracy claim requires allegations of

specific facts showing a meeting of the minds among the alleged conspirators. Snelling v.

Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200-01 (8th Cir. 1992)(en banc). No such specific factual allegations

are found in the complaint with respect to Nichols, Davis, Dodson, or Smith. 

Finally, we believe the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under RICO against

Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and Smith. Section 1962(c) of RICO makes it “unlawful for any person

employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in . . . interstate . . . commerce, to conduct

or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern

of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). “Section 1964(c) allows a private party, who

has been injured in his property from a RICO violation, to sue for damages.” Wisdom v. Fist

Midwest Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 1999). “To state a RICO claim, the

[plaintiffs] must show ‘(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering

activity.’” Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S. Ct. 3275,

87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985)). 

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-15-

For a pattern to exist there must be at least two acts of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(5). These acts must be related and must “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal

activity.” United Healthcare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., 88 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir.

1996)(citation omitted). In defining racketeering activity § 1961(1) lists the various predicate

acts that will support a RICO claim. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 

Here, plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ racketeering activity consists of violating the

constitutional rights of citizens, including the denial of due process, causing families and citizens

to expend time for court appearances and court costs, fines, or fees as a result of unlawful arrests,

discouraging through investigations of underlying allegations of unlawful detainment, false

police reports, police brutality, use of excessive force, and denial of due process. Complaint at

¶ 233. Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and Smith are four attorneys who were retained, at various times,

by the plaintiffs to assist the plaintiffs in some aspect of handling the criminal charges against

the plaintiffs or with respect to the custody proceedings involving plaintiffs’ two children. None

of the attorneys were involved in making the arrests at issue or bringing criminal charges against

the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ RICO claims fail because they have not allege the existence predicate

acts that may constitute racketeering activity under RICO. Moreover, there is no suggestion that

the predicate acts amount to, or pose a threat of, continued criminal activity. 

CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend that the motions to dismiss (Doc. 87, Doc. 96 & Doc. 101) be

granted and that all claims against Johnny L. Nichols, Erwin L. Davis, Michael Dodson, and

Joseph Paul Smith be dismissed. 

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-16-

The parties have ten days from receipt of this report and recommendations to file

objections to the same pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 18th day of October 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 119 Filed 10/18/06 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:

<pageID>