Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cv-00394/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cv-00394-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Justin Lane,

Plaintiff,

v. 

City of Tucson, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-22-00394-TUC-BGM

ORDER 

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 60.) The 

motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. 65, 68.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ 

motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

against all Defendants survives summary judgment as does Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment property interest claim against the city of Tucson. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment liberty interest claim is dismissed, and the individual Defendants are entitled 

to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s property interest claim. 

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Justin Lane has been employed by the Tucson Police Department (“TPD”)

in various law enforcement roles for over two decades. (Doc. 61-3 at 109.) In 2018, Lane 

was promoted from lieutenant to captain and received a raise. (Doc. 61, DSOF 44.2) As 

part of his official duties as a captain, Lane was tasked with reviewing the findings of an 

1 The facts in the background section are stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as 

the nonmoving party. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2

“DSOF” stands for Defendants’ Statement of Facts. (See Doc. 61 at 1-61.) 

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internal investigation into an officer-involved shooting and recommending discipline for 

several police officers. (Id. DSOF 52-53.) Lane’s review and recommendation was 

memorialized in an official personnel report. (Id. DSOF 38; Doc. 61-4 at 8.) Prior to filing 

his official report, Lane submitted a draft report to TPD Chief of Police Chris Magnus. 

(Docs. 66, PSOF ¶ 14; 67 at 4.3) After sharing his draft with Chief Magnus, word of the 

report quickly spread among higher-ranking officers within the TPD’s executive leadership 

team. (Id. PSOF ¶¶ 15-18.) A handful of the officers disagreed with Lane’s interpretation 

of the department’s use-of-force policy in his draft. (Id.; Doc. 67 at 4.4) In the draft, Lane

recommended that the officer who discharged his firearm in the shooting be exonerated 

from the charge of violating the department’s use-of-force policy. (Doc. 66, PSOF ¶ 14.) 

This was contrary to the investigation’s recommendation and against the wishes of some

executive leadership team members. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 15-19, 21; Doc. 61-5 at 16-18, 99-108.) 

On May 19, 2020, at the direction of one of his superiors, Lane drafted an internal

memorandum, separate and distinct from his draft report, which explained Lane’s position 

that the officer discharged his firearm consistent with department’s use-of-force policy. 

(Docs. 66, PSOF ¶ 19; 61-2 at 113-14; 67 at 5-6.) The superior officer requested that Lane 

draft the memorandum so that Chief Magnus could evaluate Lane’s analysis along with the 

other recommendations and feedback from executive leadership team members. (Doc. 67 

at 6.) Much to the chagrin of some leadership team members, including Lane’s supervisor, 

Assistant Chief of Police Kevin Hall, Lane’s memorandum repeated the conclusion that 

3

“PSOF” stands for Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts. (See Doc. 66 at 9-18.) 

4 This citation refers to a portion of Lane’s April 4, 2022 TPD personnel report, which is 

appropriate supporting evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A). 

Defendants argue that any of Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts that rely on the report “do not 

create a genuine dispute of material fact.” (Doc. 68 at 3.) The Court disagrees. “[T]he 

nonmoving party need not produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in 

order to avoid summary judgment.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 

953 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up). Rather, as long as the evidence “could be 

presented in an admissible form at trial,” it may be considered. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 

F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the statements written in Lane’s report could be 

presented in an admissible form at trial, e.g., Lane’s direct testimony. 

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the officer’s actions were justified and his recommendation that the officer be exonerated 

for his use of force in the incident. (Docs. 66, PSOF ¶¶ 19, 21; 61-2 at 112-17.) 

On June 16, 2020, notwithstanding Assistant Chief Hall’s opposing memorandum

and admonishments from other higher-ranking officers, Lane submitted his official review 

and recommendation of the officer-involved shooting in a TPD personnel report. (Docs. 

66, PSOF ¶ 22; 61-2 at 118-122.) While Lane agreed that discipline was appropriate for 

the officers involved in the shooting, including the termination of the firing officer, his 

report was critical of the department’s lack of supervision and leadership over the incident 

and gang-related investigations overall. (Doc. 61-2 at 118-22.) Lane insinuated that the

lack of supervision had placed the safety of the officers and the public in jeopardy. (Id. at 

118-19, 122.) A number of executive leadership team members were rankled by the report

and Lane’s use-of-force analysis. (Docs. 66, PSOF ¶¶ 21, 23, 25-27; 61-3 at 1-2.5) 

On June 30, 2020, Deputy Chief of Police Chad Kasmar met with Lane at a local 

coffee shop. (Doc. 61-5 at 136.) During the meeting, Kasmar informed Lane that his useof-force analysis in the shooting incident was aligned with past practices. (Doc. 61-4 at 

16.) Kasmar warned Lane that he had the authority to demote commanders and that he 

would demote Lane if he had to. (Id.) Kasmar testified that he made it clear to Lane that 

although he was one of Lane’s biggest advocates, their personal relationship would not get 

in the way of Lane’s reassignment if the chief made that decision. (Doc. 61-5 at 139.) 

On July 21, 2020, the TPD terminated the officer who had discharged his weapon 

in the shooting incident that Lane reviewed. (Doc. 67-4 at 2.) Sometime in July 2020, 

Chief Magnus notified Lane that he had not been selected for a vacant assistant chief 

position for which Lane had applied. (Doc. 67-2 at 5.) During this notification, Magnus 

5 Assistant Chief Hall was so perturbed by Lane’s report that he submitted his own report 

on the matter. (See Doc. 61-3 at 1-2.) In his report, Hall states, “Captain Lane ... has 

presented an account of the incident that inappropriately strays from a fact-based analysis 

into the arena of assumption and personal bias that conflates opinion with factual 

information. That will be addressed in another forum . . . . [Lane’s] perspective is [not] 

congruent with the expectations of the controlling general order, the training provided by 

Academy staff over the past several years, or the office of the Chief of Police.” (Id.) 

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informed Lane that his testimony at the upcoming civil service hearing for the terminated 

officer would be “Exhibit A” and his written opinion would be “Exhibit B” at the hearing. 

(Id. at 175:6-11.) Also during this time frame, the decision was made to demote Lane from 

captain to lieutenant at a meeting between Magnus, Deputy Chief Kasmar, Assistant Chief 

Hall, and two other assistant police chiefs. (Doc. 61-5 at 47:23-50:4, 51:23-52:3.) One of 

the topics discussed at the meeting was Lane’s interpretation of the department’s use-offorce policy that was included in his memorandum and final report. (Id. at 51:7-52:3.) 

On August 13, 2020, Deputy Chief Kasmar and Assistant Chief Hall informed Lane 

that he was going to be “reassigned” from captain to lieutenant effective August 16, 2020. 

(Doc. 61, DSOF 231.) Around that time, Hall provided Lane with a negative performance 

evaluation that Hall had drafted a few days earlier. (Doc. 67 at 8, 24-29.) The evaluation 

was critical of Lane’s recently submitted interpretation of the department’s use-of-force 

policy, as well as several other aspects of Lane’s performance as a captain. (Id. 24-29.) In 

the evaluation, Hall stated that Lane “struggled with the conclusions of the investigators,” 

and that Lane’s logic was “flawed and inconsistent with policy and agency philosophy[.]” 

(Id. at 28.) Hall also asserted that Lane’s viewpoint was based on an outdated analysis and

that it highlighted a disconnect between Lane and “the direction and philosophy of the 

department.” (Id.) Hall concluded that the disconnect demonstrated that Lane had a “lack 

of intellectual humility that inhibits critical decision-making.” (Id.) 

On August 16, 2020, Lane was formally demoted and his salary was reduced. 

(Docs. 61, DSOF 45; 61-3 at 98.) 

On September 8, 2020, Lane was instructed to attend a civil service hearing later 

that week via a city of Tucson internal memorandum. (Doc. 61-5 at 214.) The hearing 

concerned the termination appeal of the officer who discharged his firearm in the public 

shooting incident. (Doc. 67-4 at 2.) Prior to being instructed to attend the hearing, Lane 

had proactively contacted the attorney representing the officer. (Doc. 61-4 at 75:12-76:6.) 

Lane informed the attorney that the officer acted in compliance with the department’s 

existing use-of-force policy and that Lane dissented in the officer’s investigation. (Id. 70:2-

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15.) Lane also informed the attorney that the department had misapplied its policy, failed 

to consider the totality-of-the-circumstances standard, and misconstrued the officer’s 

statement. (Id. 73:3-17.) Lane was instructed to attend the officer’s termination appeal 

hearing only because he initiated contact with the officer’s attorney. (Id. at 75:12-76:6.) 

On September 11, 2020, Lane testified on behalf of the terminated officer in front 

of the civil service commission. (Doc. 67-4 at 3.) During his testimony, Lane explained 

why he believed that the officer had complied with the department’s use-of-force policy 

during the incident. (See Doc. 61-3 at 15-16, 30-48, 60-65, 70-73, 78-94.) The commission 

agreed with Lane’s analysis and concluded that the officer had been terminated without 

cause. (Doc. 67-4 at 9.) It reinstated the officer and awarded him full backpay. (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute of material fact “if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and facts are material if 

they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[T]o carry its burden of production, the moving 

party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's 

claim ... or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential 

element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 

v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party carries 

its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense. Id. 

at 1103. If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the nonmoving party has no obligation 

to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial. Id. at 1102–03. At summary judgment, the nonmovant’s evidence is to 

be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 255. Where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

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nonmoving party, there is no need for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

DISCUSSION

This case was removed to federal court on Lane’s allegations that the city of Tucson 

and the individual Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (See Doc. 1-3 at 13-35.) 

Lane contends that Defendants unlawfully retaliated against him for his First Amendment 

protected speech and that they denied him Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process 

liberty and property interests by using an inaccurate and defamatory performance review 

to unlawfully demote him and tarnish his reputation. (Id. at 30-35.) 

Defendants bring their summary judgment motion arguing that there are no genuine 

disputes of material facts and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 

60 at 4-17.) In support of their position, Defendants assert that: (i) Lane fails to establish 

that his speech was protected; (ii) Lane fails to establish any due process violations; (iii) 

only Defendants Magnus and Hall can be individually liable for the alleged constitutional 

violations; (iv) the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (v) Lane 

fails to establish a Monell claim against the city of Tucson. (Id. at 4-17.) The Court 

addresses these arguments in turn. 

I. Lane’s Protected Speech

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has developed a series of 

sequential steps to analyze First Amendment retaliation claims brought by government 

employees. Hernandez v. City of Phoenix, 43 F.4th 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2022). Those steps 

are: 

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the 

plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the 

plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate 

justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the 

general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse 

employment action even absent the protected speech.

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Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). The plaintiff bears the burden of 

production on the first three steps. Id. at 1070-71. If the plaintiff meets his burden, the 

burden shifts to the defendant on the last two steps. Id. In the analysis at hand, only the 

first two steps are at issue. (See Doc. 60 at 4 (“[T]he inquiry should end after the second 

question because Lane cannot establish that his speech was protected”)); see also Dodge v. 

Evergreen Sch. Dist. #114, 56 F.4th 767, 777 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that the protected 

speech inquiry is broken down to the first two steps of the retaliation analysis). 

Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Lane’s 

First Amendment retaliation claim because Lane fails to demonstrate that he engaged in 

protected speech. (Doc. 60 at 4.) The Court disagrees. While Lane’s memorandum and 

personnel report were not provided as a private citizen and are not protected, his civil 

service commission testimony addressed matters of public concern and was provided as a 

private citizen and is protected. Accordingly, Defendants’ summary judgment motion on 

the merits of Lane’s First Amendment retaliation claim is denied.

A. Speech Addresses Matters of Public Concern 

The first step in the First Amendment retaliation analysis is determining whether 

the challenged speech addresses a matter of public concern. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070. 

Whether speech addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law for the court to 

decide. Greisen v. Hanken, 925 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2019). In making this

determination, the content, form, and context of the challenged statements are analyzed. 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). Of the three factors, content is the most 

important. Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 2009). In 

reviewing a statement’s form and context, the focus is on the “point of the speech,” looking 

at such factors as the employee’s motivation and intended audience. Ulrich v. City & Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 979 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). As to the content, the 

speech must concern “issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable 

the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of their 

government.” McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth 

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Circuit broadly defines the public concern element as “[s]peech that can fairly be 

considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 

community[.]” Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); 

see also Tucker v. State of Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996)

(reiterating that the circuit has “defined public concern speech broadly to include almost 

any matter other than speech that relates to internal power struggles within the workplace”). 

The speech at issue here is Lane’s May 19, 2020 memorandum, June 16, 2020 

personnel report, and September 11, 2020 civil service commission testimony. (Docs. 60 

at 5; 65 at 5.) The statements within this speech addressed the TPD’s use-of-force policy 

as it applied to an officer-involved public shooting. (See Docs. 61-2 at 113-14, 120-22; 

61-3 at 9-22, 24-48.) The statements also addressed the department’s alleged lack of 

supervision and leadership over the events leading up to the shooting and over gang-related 

investigations overall. (See Docs. 61-2 at 114, 118-19, 122; 61-3 at 71.) The speech was

disseminated during a time of heightened scrutiny over police conduct and supervision, as 

the highly publicized George Floyd incident occurred on May 25, 2020, which resulted in 

months of public protests in Tucson. (Docs. 61, DSOF 94; 66, PSOF ¶ 20.) 

Lane’s speech in the middle of a national uproar over police violence undoubtedly

addresses matters of public concern. See City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-

84 (2004) (explaining that public concern is something “that is a subject of legitimate news 

interest ... and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication”). That the 

speech encapsulated Lane’s view that the officer’s use of force was within policy is 

irrelevant to the analysis. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987) (instructing 

that the “inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question 

whether it deals with a matter of public concern”). The speech can also fairly be considered 

to address officer preparedness in responding to crime, which is also constitutionally 

protected. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 866 (9th Cir. 1999), as 

amended on denial of reh'g (July 15, 1999) (“[A]n opinion about the preparedness of a vital 

public-safety institution ... goes to the core of what constitutes speech on matters of public 

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concern”). As such, the challenged speech addressed matters of public concern. 

1. Counterarguments Unpersuasive 

In addition to determining that Lane’s speech addressed matters of public concern, 

the Court finds Defendants’ arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. Defendants assert 

that Lane’s speech failed to address matters of public concern because Lane was instructed

to draft his memorandum and report as part of his official duties; the written materials were 

addressed to Lane’s chain of command; Lane was instructed to attend the commission 

hearing via a City memorandum; and Lane testified in front of the civil service commission 

while on duty and was paid for his time. (Doc. 60 at 6-7.) Defendants add that Lane’s 

speech did not address any alleged injustice, illegality, or wrongdoing, and assert that he 

was not advocating for any change in the TPD’s use-of-force policy. (Id. at 7.) 

To begin, Defendants’ assertion that Lane’s speech did not address any alleged 

injustice, illegality, or wrongdoing is inaccurate. Lane proactively testified on behalf of a 

terminated police officer over whom the TPD had conducted a faulty investigation. (Doc. 

66, PSOF ¶ 50.) It was Lane’s opinion that the department misapplied its use-of-force 

policy, failed to consider the totality of circumstances standard, misconstrued the officer’s 

statement, and wrongfully terminated the officer when he had actually acted within the 

department’s guidance. (Docs. 61-3 at 13:22-25, 14:25-15:22; 61-4 at 73:3-19.) The fact 

that the commission ruled that the officer’s use of force was within policy and that he was 

terminated without cause reinforced Lane’s position. (See Doc. 67-4 at 9.) 

Defendants also overlook the Ninth Circuit’s broad definition of the public concern 

element and disregard its warning that “[i]t is only when it is clear that the information 

would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of governmental 

agencies that speech of government employees receives no protection under the First 

Amendment.” Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 978 (cleaned up). Defendants also ignore the court’s 

repeated instruction that a plaintiff’s private rather than public expression of his views “is 

not determinative of whether [his] expression is entitled to protection.” Thomas v. City of 

Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 

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823 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up) (observing that “[r]eports pertaining to others ... can still 

be protected under the public concern test”). Moreover, Lane’s public safety commentary 

has been held to be of “vital interest to citizens in evaluating the performance of their 

government,” Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), and the competency 

of the police force has been recognized as “a matter of great public concern,” McKinley, 

705 F.2d at 1114. 

Finally, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a public employee’s testimony 

addresses a matter of public concern “if it contributes in some way to the resolution of a[n] 

... administrative proceeding in which ... significant government misconduct is at issue—

even if the speech itself would not otherwise meet the Connick test were [the court] to 

consider it in isolation.” Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 

2004). As such, Defendants counterarguments are denied. 

B. Testimony Provided as Private Citizen

The second step in the First Amendment retaliation analysis is to determine whether 

Lane spoke in his capacity as a private citizen or pursuant to his official job duties when 

making the challenged speech. Karl, 678 F.3d at 1071. The First Amendment does not 

protect an employee’s speech when the employee’s statements are made pursuant to his 

official duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Whether an employee’s 

speech is pursuant to his official duties is a mixed question of fact and law. Posey v. Lake 

Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008). The “scope and 

content of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a question of fact[,]” while the “ultimate 

constitutional significance of the facts as found” is a question of law. Id. at 1129-30. The 

plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his speech was spoken in the capacity of a private 

citizen and not a public employee. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. 

Determining the scope of Lane’s official duties “is a practical one.” Garcetti, 547 

U.S. at 424. Formal job descriptions often bear limited resemblance to the employee’s 

actual duties and listing a given task in an employee’s job description is not sufficient to 

demonstrate the task is within the scope of the employee’s official duties. Id. at 424-25. 

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Due to the fact-intensive nature for determining the scope of an employee’s duties, the 

Ninth Circuit has promulgated a few guiding principles to assist courts with the 

determination. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2013). 

First, in a highly hierarchical employment setting such as law enforcement, whether 

or not the employee confined his communications to his chain of command is a relevant

factor. Id. at 1074. “When a public employee communicates with individuals or entities 

outside of his chain of command, it is unlikely that he is speaking pursuant to his [official] 

duties.” Id. Second, the subject matter of the communication is highly relevant to the 

determination whether the speech is protected. Id. at 1074-75. “When an employee 

prepares a routine report, pursuant to normal departmental procedure, about a particular 

incident or occurrence, the employee’s preparation of that report is typically within his job 

duties.” Id. at 1075. Third, “when a public employee speaks in direct contravention to his 

supervisor’s orders, that speech may often fall outside of the speaker’s professional duties.” 

Id. “[T]he fact that an employee is threatened or harassed by his superiors for engaging in 

a particular type of speech provides strong evidence that the act of speech was not, as a 

‘practical’ matter, within the employee’s job duties.” Id. 

The parties disagree whether Lane spoke as a public employee or private citizen 

when drafting his memorandum and report and when testifying in front of the civil service 

commission. (Docs. 60 at 7-8; 65 at 5-7.) Defendants assert that Lane’s statements owe 

their existence to the TPD’s policies and procedures that require a supervisor to review 

internal investigations and recommend discipline where appropriate. (Doc. 60 at 8.) 

Defendants add that based on Lane’s own admissions, it is an undisputed fact that his 

speech was performed in his official capacity. (Id.) Lane asserts that he drafted his 

memorandum and report as a private citizen because his written statements contravened 

his superiors’ instructions to find that that the firing officer violated the department’s useof-force policy. (Doc. 65 at 5.) He also asserts that his testimony was given as a private 

citizen because he proactively contacted the terminated officer’s attorney to offer 

supporting information; testifying on behalf of a terminated officer and against the 

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department’s interest was not part of his official duties; and Defendants’ arguments to the 

contrary are insufficient as a matter of law to prove otherwise. (Id. at 5-7.) The Court 

analyzes each instance of Lane’s challenged speech to determine whether he spoke 

pursuant to his official duties or as a private citizen when making the statements. 

1. Memorandum and Report Drafted Pursuant to Official Duties

It is undisputed that Lane was directed to review an internal investigation into an 

officer-involved shooting as part of his official duties as a captain. (See Docs. 61, DSOF 

32; 61-4 at 7-8; 66, PSOF ¶¶ 9-10.) It is also undisputed that due to a discrepancy between 

the internal investigation’s findings and Lane’s findings, Lane was instructed to draft a 

memorandum to his supervisor summarizing the reasons why he disagreed with the 

investigation’s findings. (Docs. 66, PSOF ¶ 19; 67 at 5-6; 68 at 2.) And despite Lane’s

independent findings, he concurred with his chain of command’s recommendation that the 

officer responsible for discharging his firearm should be terminated in his personnel report. 

(Docs. 66, PSOF ¶ 13; 68 at 2.) Even believing his evidence and drawing all justifiable 

inferences in his favor, the Court concludes that Lane acted pursuant to his official duties 

when he drafted and submitted his memorandum and report. 

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, a deputy district attorney conveyed concerns regarding the 

accuracy of an affidavit in support of a search warrant in a memorandum to his supervisors. 

547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006). The memo explained the attorney’s concerns and recommended 

case dismissal. Id. Based on the attorney’s statements, a meeting was convened to discuss 

the affidavit with employees of the local sheriff’s department including the affiant. Id. The 

meeting became contentious when a sheriff’s lieutenant criticized the attorney’s handling 

of the case. Id. Despite the attorney’s concerns, one of his supervisors decided to proceed 

with the prosecution. Id. At a suppression hearing, the attorney was called by the defense 

and testified as to his observations about the affidavit. Id. at 414-15. The trial court 

rejected the challenge to the warrant and the attorney was reassigned to a different position, 

transferred to another courthouse, and denied a promotion. Id. at 415. 

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In ruling that the expressions in the attorney’s memorandum were made pursuant to 

his official duties, the Supreme Court observed that the attorney drafted the memo because 

“that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do.” Id. at 421. The Court 

opined that it was irrelevant whether the attorney experienced gratification from drafting 

the memo and instructed that restricting speech that owes its existence to a public 

employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe on the employee’s liberties as a 

private citizen. Id. at 421-22. The Court determined that the attorney’s supervisors were 

not prohibited from evaluating his performance simply because the attorney’s duties 

sometimes required him to write. Id. at 422. The Court concluded that refusing to 

recognize First Amendment claims based on an employee’s work product does not prevent 

the employee from participating in public debate. Id. 

This Court sees little factual distinction between the Garcetti memo and the memo 

and report written in the case at hand. Here, at the direction of his superiors, a former 

police captain drafted his review of an internal investigation into an officer-involved useof-force incident and arrived at a different conclusion. (Docs. 61-2 at 118-122; 66, PSOF 

¶¶ 9-13.) Before he filed his official report, the captain was asked to explain his analysis

in a memorandum to his supervisor. (Docs. 61-2 at 112-114; 66, PSOF ¶ 19; 67 at 5-6.) 

The memo and report concerned a subject matter that the captain had previously addressed 

and the assignment was given to him due to a conflict of interest in the disciplined officer’s

chain of command. (Docs. 61-3 at 9; 66, PSOF ¶ 10.) The memo and report were made 

pursuant to a captain’s official duties, as was participation in internal conversations and 

debate surrounding his analysis. (Doc. 66, PSOF ¶¶ 9-11, 16, 18-19.) As such, the 

statements in the memo and report were made by Lane pursuant to his official duties as a 

captain and the speech is unprotected.6

6 The fact that some of the statements in Lane’s memo and report were in contravention to 

the wishes of his chain of command, alone, does not convert the statements into protected 

speech. See Ohlson v. Brady, 9 F.4th 1156, 1166 (9th Cir. 2021) (ruling that “Dahlia does 

not stand for the proposition that speech in defiance of orders is always a strong indication 

that an employee is speaking as a private citizen and the speech protected”). 

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2. Commission Testimony Provided as Private Citizen

While the statements in Lane’s memorandum and report were made pursuant to his 

official duties as a captain, his testimony in front of the civil service commission was not.

There is sufficient evidence in the record that demonstrates that Lane was not testifying 

pursuant to his official duties when he appeared before the civil service commission on 

behalf of a terminated police officer. Lane’s day-to-day captain duties included reviewing 

internal investigations into alleged incidents of officer misconduct and leading a division 

within the police force, but there is no evidence to suggest that they also included testifying 

on behalf of a terminated officer at his appeal hearing. The fact that the testimony was 

provided to an entity outside of Lane’s chain of command and was given against the 

explicit admonition of Chief Magnus also indicates that the testimony was given in a 

private rather than public capacity. 

In Lane v. Franks, the Supreme Court ruled that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by 

a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for 

First Amendment purposes.” 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2014). The plaintiff in Lane was a

program director for a state community college. Id. at 231-32. As the director, the plaintiff 

was responsible for the program’s day-to-day operations and finances. Id. at 232. Upon 

auditing the program’s expenses, the director learned that a state representative was on the 

program’s payroll but was not working. Id. The director informed the college’s president 

and was warned that firing the representative could have negative repercussions for him 

and the college. Id. The director fired the representative, which prompted an FBI 

investigation. Id. The director then twice testified at the representative’s criminal trials

concerning the events that led to her termination. Id. at 233. The director was ultimately 

terminated by a new college president, which caused the director to bring suit against the 

president for First Amendment retaliation. Id. at 234. 

In reversing the district court’s summary judgment ruling in the president’s favor, 

the Court observed that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the 

scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes .... 

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even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned 

during that employment.” Id. at 238. The Court explained that sworn testimony in a 

judicial proceeding is a “quintessential example of speech as a citizen” because “[a]nyone 

who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.” 

Id. The Court ruled that any separate obligation as an employee, such as showing up to 

court dressed in a professional manner, is separate from the obligation to speak the truth 

and that such obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a private citizen. Id. at 239. 

In the context of Lane and under the guiding principles promulgated by Dahlia v.

Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2013), this Court concludes that Lane’s civil 

service commission testimony was provided in his capacity as a private citizen and is 

protected. It is an undisputed fact that the civil service commission hearing at which Lane 

testified concerned a termination appeal by the officer that Lane described in his memo 

and report as comporting with the department’s use-of-force policy. (Docs. 61, DSOF 63; 

66 at 3.) It is also an undisputed fact that the officer requested that Lane be subpoenaed to 

testify at the hearing, which then prompted the City to issue its memorandum to Lane. 

(Docs. 66, PSOF ¶¶ 28-30, 50; 68 at 2.) It is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis whether

Lane’s testimony “relate[d] to his public employment or concern[ed] information learned 

during that employment.” 573 U.S. at 238. Rather, the critical question is whether Lane’s 

testimony “is itself ordinarily within the scope of [the] employee’s duties, not whether it 

merely concerns those duties.” Id. at 240. 

The fact that Lane affirmed defense counsel’s leading deposition question that he 

appeared before the civil service commission in his “capacity as a TPD lieutenant for the 

police department” fails to adequately support Defendants’ proposition that Lane testified 

in his official capacity as a matter of law. See Garnett v. ADT LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 

1125 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (ruling that statements based on improper legal conclusions are not 

facts and can only be considered as arguments on a motion for summary judgment). 

Additionally, while Defendants proffer a TPD general order concerning court attendance 

and interviews, the order fails to demonstrate that department employees must testify at

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civil service commission hearings or show that commission attendance and testimony are 

part of a captain’s official duties. (See Doc. 61-2 at 81 (“Attendance at such a hearing is 

mandatory for any employee who is duly notified.”) (emphasis added)); Garcetti, 547 U.S. 

at 425 (“[T]he listing of a given task in an employee's written job description is ... no[t]

sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s

professional duties for First Amendment purposes”). 

Finally, the transcript of Lane’s civil service commission testimony spans over 

ninety pages and includes references to Lane’s position that the terminated officer’s use of 

force was justified and within department policy, his responses to hypothetical use-of-force 

scenarios, and Lane’s controversial opinion that the officers in the incident were not 

afforded the necessary guidance, leadership, and tools to be expected to accomplish their 

mission. (See Doc. 61-3 at 13-48, 50-57, 71-72, 78-94.) This testimony goes well beyond 

Lane’s “opinion that the officer did not violate the policy” and “should not be disciplined.” 

(Doc. 60 at 7.) As such, Lane’s civil service commission testimony was provided as a 

private citizen, and Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the issue is denied. 

II. Protected Property Interest in Continued Employment7

“The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty 

or property by the government without due process.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 

995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). A procedural due process claim under section 1983 has 

two elements: (i) “a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest,” 

and (ii) “a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood 

Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). As it concerns Lane’s property 

interest claim, only the first element is contested by Defendants. (See Doc. 60 at 9-11.) 

A government employee has a constitutionally protected property interest in 

continued employment when he has a reasonable expectation or a legitimate claim of 

entitlement to it. Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (9th Cir. 1988). “A state law 

7 The Court addresses Defendants’ summary judgment due process arguments in separate

sections according to Lane’s alleged property and liberty interests. 

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limiting the grounds upon which an employee may be disciplined, demoted, or discharged, 

such as conditioning such actions upon a finding of ‘good cause,’ creates a reasonable 

expectation of continued employment, and thus a protected property right.” Lara v. 

Cowan, 848 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (D. Ariz. 1994) (citing Brady, 859 F.2d at 1548). “Where 

state employees serve at the will of the appointing authority, however, there is no such 

reasonable expectation of continued employment, and thus no property right.” Brady, 859 

F.2d at 1548. 

Defendants argue that Lane’s property interest claim fails as a matter of law because 

the captain “assignment” is not a civil service protected position. (Doc. 60 at 10.) 

Defendants assert that the city’s charter and civil service rules are not triggered when the 

chief of police “reassign[s]” an officer serving in the captain position because the captain 

“assignment” is not a protected position. (Id. at 10.) Defendants suggest that Lane is an 

at-will employee because of a department general order which provides that the “[c]hief of 

[p]olice may make appointments to non-[c]ivil [s]ervice grade positions (e.g., [p]olice 

[l]ieutenant assigned as [c]aptain) at his/her discretion.” (Id. at 10.) 

Lane argues that the record establishes that he has a reasonable expectation of 

continued employment in his police captain position. (Doc. 65 at 8.) Lane invokes Arizona 

law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-1101-1120, and asserts that his demotion serves as “disciplinary 

action” under the statute, id. at § 1101(3). Under Arizona law, a law enforcement officer 

can only be subject to disciplinary action for just cause. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1103(A). 

Lane argues that it is undisputed that he was “demoted” under the ordinary meaning of the 

term and that just cause was required for his demotion under state statute. (Doc. 65 at 9.) 

Lane concludes that even if the state statute did not apply to his demotion, Defendants 

could not demote him for bad cause in violation of the law. (Id. at 10.) 

A. Lane Demonstrates Genuine Issue of Material Fact

Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Lane was deprived of a protected property interest in his police captain 

position. The record indicates that on August 16, 2020, Lane was demoted from captain 

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to lieutenant for what can reasonably be inferred to as unsatisfactory performance. (See, 

e.g., Docs. 61-5 at 7-12, 16-18, 67 at 24-30.) To effectuate the demotion, Lane’s grade 

was lowered from 321 to 320 and his salary was reduced from $56.45 to $50.63 per hour, 

a wage differential greater than ten per cent. (Doc. 61-3 at 98.) Additionally, there is 

sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that Lane was demoted 

without just cause in contravention of the relevant Arizona statute, and Defendants fail to 

challenge the second element of Lane’s property interest claim. (See Doc. 60 at 9-11.) 

In addition to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the first element 

of a property interest claim, Defendants fail to provide convincing legal arguments to 

demonstrate that Lane was an at-will employee. Despite Defendants’ assertions to the 

contrary, none of the exceptions to classified service found in the city’s charter or code are 

applicable to TPD police captains. See Tucson City Charter, ch. 22, § 3(a); Tucson Code 

§§ 10-4(1)-(2). To the extent that language in the department’s general order conflicts with 

the city charter or state law, the general order lacks the force and effect of controlling law. 

See Civ. Serv. Comm'n of City of Tucson v. Foley, 257 P.2d 384, 387 (Ariz. 1953). Under 

Tucson’s charter, Lane was entitled to a civil service commission hearing regardless of 

whether he was “reassigned” or demoted because he suffered a reduction in pay and 

position. See Tucson City Charter, ch. 22, § 3(c) (“Persons who have served through their 

probationary period and who have received permanent appointment in the classified service 

shall not be removed, suspended without pay, discharged, or reduced in pay or position, 

except for just cause”); City of Tucson v. Simpson, 323 P.2d 689, 692 (Ariz. 1958) (“The 

rules and regulations adopted by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to the mandate of 

the city charter provide for an appeal to the Commission by a permanent employee who 

has been suspended, demoted, or reduced in pay or position.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ 

summary judgment motion on Lane’s property interest claim is denied. 

III. Failure to Establish Liberty Interest Claim

The liberty interest protected by the due process clause encompasses a public 

employee’s freedom to work and earn a living. Portman, 995 F.2d at 907. “An individual 

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has a liberty interest in employment protected by the Due Process Clause if the personnel 

action is for reasons that might seriously damage his standing in the community, or if it 

effectively precludes future work in the individual's chosen profession.” Stiesberg v. State 

of Cal., 80 F.3d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). 

To establish a due process liberty interest claim for loss of reputation, a government 

employee must demonstrate: (i) the public disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by the 

government; (ii) the accuracy of which is contested; plus (iii) the alteration of a right or 

status recognized by state law. Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 982. “If an employee makes these 

showings, and was not provided a ‘name-clearing’ hearing, the employee has been denied 

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Perez v. City of Roseville, 926 F.3d 511, 

523 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Lane’s

liberty interest claim because he fails to demonstrate that the statements in his performance 

evaluation impacted his ability to get employment elsewhere and his future with the TPD. 

(Doc. 60 at 13.) Defendants add that there is no evidence showing that the evaluation was 

provided to a prospective employer and that no one made a request for Lane’s personnel 

file. (Id.) Defendants also argue that Lane had an opportunity to submit a rebuttal to his 

performance evaluation, but that he chose not submit anything until April 2022 (Id. )

Lane argues that it is irrelevant whether anyone requested or viewed his evaluation 

because placement of the evaluation in his file, in the face of a state statute mandating 

release upon request, constitutes publication of the information under law. (Doc. 65 at 12.) 

Lane asserts that the evaluation is stigmatizing because it “essentially” accuses him of 

violating the department’s code of conduct. (Id.) Lane includes Hall’s comment that he 

“seemingly does not or cannot recognize the worth of ideas or concepts that conflict with 

his own” as an example of a code of conduct violation accusation. (Id.) Lane adds that

other evaluation statements accuse him of failing to engage with the community and such 

accusations could seriously damage his standing in the community. (Id. at 13.) 

The Court concludes that Lane fails to produce sufficient evidence to establish a 

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genuine issue of material fact on the first element of a due process liberty interest claim. 

He fails to proffer evidence demonstrating that Arizona law classifies his personnel file, 

and the performance evaluation located therein, as a public record subject to release upon 

request; and he fails to offer evidence demonstrating that the statements in his performance 

evaluation impair his reputation for honesty or morality or rise to the level of stigmatization 

required to preclude all future employment in his chosen profession. As such, Defendants’ 

summary judgment motion on this claim is granted, and the claim is dismissed. 

A. Lack of Evidence Demonstrating Public Disclosure 

For an employee’s liberty interest to be implicated, stigmatizing statements must be 

published. Portman, 995 F.2d at 907; see also Learned v. Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 933 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (observing that defamatory remarks that do not go beyond others employed by 

department do not satisfy publication requirement). In Cox v. Roskelley, stigmatizing 

information about a Washington State employee was placed in the employee’s personnel 

file. 359 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004). The court held that “absent expungement, placement 

of stigmatizing information in an employee's personnel file constitutes publication when 

the governing state law classifies [the] personnel file as a public record.” Id. at 1112

(emphasis added). Washington law classified the employee’s personnel file as a public 

record and mandated disclosure upon request of all materials contained in the file. Id. at 

1112-13. As such, based on Washington law, placement of stigmatizing information in the 

employee’s file constituted publication sufficient to trigger constitutional protection. Id.

Here, Defendants assert that there is no evidence showing that Lane’s performance 

evaluation was provided to the outside police department to which Lane applied and that 

no one has made a request for his personnel file. (Doc. 60 at 13.) Lane responds by 

asserting that it is irrelevant whether anyone actually requested or viewed his evaluation

because placement of the evaluation in his personnel file, “in the face of a state statute 

mandating release upon request,” constitutes publication sufficient to trigger a protected

liberty interest. (Doc. 65 at 12.) Lane provides no further details and fails to reference 

Arizona law or cite to evidence in the record that supports his claim. (See id.) 

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In the face of a valid evidence-based challenge by Defendants, the Court cannot 

credit Lane’s conclusory response.8 Additionally, there is no credible evidence in the 

record suggesting that there was public disclosure of Lane’s performance evaluation by 

Defendants. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (ruling that where the reasons 

for a municipal police officer’s discharge were not made public, there was no basis for a 

reputational liberty interest claim). Lane testified that he submitted an employment 

application with another police department and that the application was denied. (Doc. 61-

4 at 19-22.) But Lane only speculates that it was publication of his performance evaluation 

that prevented him from going further in the application process. (Id. at 27-30.) At 

summary judgment, speculative testimony is insufficient to create a genuine issue of 

material fact on a necessary element of a claim. See Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979) (instructing that conclusory testimony is insufficient to 

raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment). As such, Lane fails to produce 

sufficient evidence that the alleged stigmatizing statements in his performance evaluation 

were publicly disclosed, and his claim is dismissed. 

B. Statements Fail to Infringe Protected Interest

In addition to finding that Lane failed to produce evidence demonstrating public 

disclosure of his performance evaluation, the Court also finds that Lane fails to produce

evidence which demonstrates that the statements in his evaluation rise to the level of 

stigmatization required to preclude all future employment in his chosen profession or

impair his reputation for honesty or morality. As such, the statements fail to infringe a 

protected liberty interest and the claim fails. 

8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), 

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”); Rivera v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger 

Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.) (“Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data 

cannot defeat summary judgment.”). 

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A statement is sufficiently stigmatizing if the government discloses the employee’s 

dismissal was for “reasons that might seriously damage his standing in the community,” or 

if the dismissal “effectively precludes future work in the individual’s chosen profession.” 

Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). “Charges that carry the stigma of 

moral turpitude such as dishonesty or immorality may implicate a liberty interest, but 

charges of incompetence or inability to get along with others do not.” Portman, 995 F.2d 

at 907. Moreover, charges of substandard performance may not rise to the level necessary 

to infringe a protected liberty interest. Debose v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 700 F.2d 1262, 1266 

(9th Cir. 1983). Where a plaintiff fails to present evidence that he is actually precluded 

from future employment in his chosen profession, summary judgment is appropriate. See

Merritt, 827 F.2d at 1373; Bollow v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 

1101 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In the situation at hand, there is no evidence in the record that demonstrates the 

statements in Lane’s performance evaluation rise to the level of stigmatization required to 

infringe upon a protected liberty interest. While the statements are pointed and specific, 

they focus on Lane’s alleged inability to satisfactorily perform his duties as a police captain

and to get along with others within the department. (See, e.g., Doc. 67 at 34 (criticizing 

Lane’s lack of supervision over a code enforcement project); id. at 33 (citing apparent 

interpersonal issues between Lane and a TPD lieutenant).) The statements also challenge 

Lane’s intellectual humility, ability to take constructive criticism, and willingness to 

consider the opinions of higher-ranking officers. (See, e.g., Doc. 67 at 32 (“Lane’s 

willingness to change or be open to other opinions or ideas that conflict with his own was 

not at a level that I expected for a senior-level leadership position”); id. at 33 (“This lack 

of intellectual humility is concerning as I find this characteristic to be a core component of 

any effective leadership style”).) 

Furthermore, Lane fails to reference any statements that could be seen to impair his 

reputation for honesty or morality, (see Doc. 65 at 11-14); and there is no evidence in the 

record demonstrating that the statements in Lane’s evaluation prevented him from being 

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employed in a law enforcement profession or serving as a higher ranking officer in his own

municipal police department. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Lane remains 

employed as a lieutenant with the TPD and that he has earned accolades in his current role. 

(See Doc. 61-3 at 109-11.) As such, there is no infringement of Lane’s reputational liberty

interest, and Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the claim is granted. 

IV. Qualified Immunity Shields Officials From Property Interest Claim 9

“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009) (cleaned up). Whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity 

at summary judgment involves two questions: (i) whether the facts, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the official violated a constitutional right; 

and (ii) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Tolan 

v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014). “Either question may be addressed first, and if the 

answer to either is “no,” then the [official] cannot be held liable for damages.” Gordon v. 

Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 968 (9th Cir. 2021).

A. Clearly Established Prong 

Defendants challenge the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity 

analysis in their summary judgment motion. (See Doc. 60 at 14-15.) Defendants assert 

that they had no way of knowing that Lane’s speech would be protected under the facts of 

this case and that his “reassignment” was done in compliance with TPD general orders and 

civil service rules and regulations. (Id. at 15.) Lane argues that Chief Magnus was aware 

that his demotion was unlawful when Magnus informed the press that he could not 

discipline Lane based on the content of his testimony because it could appear retaliatory. 

9 Defendants failed to raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in their answer. 

(See Doc. 21 at 9-11.) However, since Plaintiff fails to demonstrate prejudice, the qualified 

immunity defense has not been waived. See Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“In the absence of a showing of prejudice, ... an affirmative defense may 

be raised for the first time at summary judgment”). 

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(Doc. 65 at 15.) Lane adds that the impropriety of the city’s actions was deemed beyond 

debate in Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. at 246, and that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Brady v. 

Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1553 (9th Cir. 1988), established precedent concerning his due 

process liberty interest claim. (Id.)

Whether a constitutional right is clearly established is purely a question of law for 

the court to decide. Gordon, 6 F.4th at 968. “To be clearly established, a legal principle 

must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 

U.S. 48, 63 (2018). “The rule must be settled law, which means it is dictated by controlling 

authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Id. at 63 (cleaned up). It 

is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. Id. “The precedent 

must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the 

particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. “Reasonableness is judged against the 

backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct, and a case directly on point is not required, 

but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” DePaul Indus. v. Miller, 14 F.4th 1021, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). It 

is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that the right violated was clearly established at the time 

of the alleged misconduct. Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

1. First Amendment Right Clearly Established

To determine if a right was clearly established, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, at 

the time of the officers’ action, the state of the law gave the officers fair warning that their 

conduct was unconstitutional.” Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 

2013), abrogated on other grounds by Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019). At the time 

of Lane’s demotion in August 2020, the law in this circuit gave fair notice that it would be 

unlawful for a government employer to retaliate against an employee on account of 

testimony the employee gave under oath and outside the scope of his ordinary job duties. 

In Lane v. Franks, the Supreme Court held that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by 

a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for 

First Amendment purposes.” 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2014). The Court added that the speech 

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is protected even when the testimony relates to the employee’s public employment or 

concerns information learned during that employment. Id. 

In Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 

qualified immunity ruling in favor of the defendant chief of police, instructing that the court 

had framed the inquiry “much too narrowly.” 710 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013). In 

Ellins, the plaintiff police officer brought a section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim 

against the city and its police chief related to the chief’s delay in certifying the officer for 

a pay increase due to the officer’s role in no-confidence vote against the chief. Id. at 1054-

55. The court ruled that the plaintiff’s “First Amendment right to be free from retaliation 

for engaging in protected speech was clearly established in 2009.” Id. at 1065. The court 

instructed that since 1968, “the Supreme Court established that public employees have a 

First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for commenting on matters of public 

concern, even when the protected comments are critical of their employers.” Id. The court

concluded its qualified immunity analysis by also observing that as of 2009, it was clearly 

established that a “deprivation of an employee’s salary is unconstitutional if levied in 

retaliation for protected speech.” Id. 

In Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, the Ninth Circuit declared that it was “clearly 

established [in 2008] that a subordinate officer can be liable under § 1983 for retaliating 

against an employee even if he also has legitimate, non-retaliatory motives.” 678 F.3d 

1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012). The court also observed that “it was clearly established since 

at least 2007 that testifying pursuant to a subpoena in a judicial or administrative 

proceeding of public concern constitutes protected speech.” Id. at 1074.

In Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, the Ninth Circuit ruled that it was clearly 

established that “it would be unlawful to retaliate against an employee for having testified 

in a criminal proceeding pursuant to a subpoena.” 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). 

These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized 

constitutional protection for public employees who speak as private citizens on matters of 

public concern and have denied qualified immunity to officials who retaliate against them. 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the issue of qualified immunity 

in the First Amendment context is denied. 

2. Protected Property Right Not Clearly Established

While the Court concludes that Lane’s First Amendment right to engage in protected 

speech without retaliation was clearly established by August 2020, the same cannot be said 

about his protected property interest in continued employment under Arizona law. Lane 

alleges and reasserts that the Arizona Peace Officers’ Bill of Rights, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-

1101-1120, provides him with a protected property interest in his municipal police captain 

position. (Docs. 1-3 at 34-35; 65 at 8-9.) But the Arizona statute, passed in 2014 and 

amended in 2022, is not clear whether it creates a protected property interest in continued 

employment at a specific position within a municipal police department.

10

 Nor has Lane 

referenced any Arizona court that has considered the question. (See Doc. 65 at 15.) Since 

Lane fails to reference any case law that reinforces his alleged property interest in 

continued employment, he fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

existing precedent has placed the statutory question beyond debate.11 As such, Lane’s 

property interest in his captain position under Arizona law is not one that every reasonable 

official would know, and the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on 

this claim. 

V. Individual Liability 

To be individually liable under section 1983, a defendant must have had “personal 

participation in the alleged rights deprivation.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir. 2002). A defendant deprives another of a constitutional right if he “does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 

10 See Blunt v. Town of Gilbert, No. CV-23-02215, 2024 WL 2722167, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 

28, 2024) (observing that the Peace Officers’ Bill of Rights was initially passed in 2014 

and amended in 2022). 

11 Even if Lane meant to assert that Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1553 (9th Cir. 1988),

is long-standing Ninth Circuit precedent that establishes his property interest violation, the 

case, which interpreted Oregon law, is insufficient to place the Arizona statutory issue 

beyond debate. 

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required to do that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains.” Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up). “The inquiry into causation must 

be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Id. When 

multiple officers act to cause the plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation, each officer’s 

individual liability is predicated upon his “integral participation” in the alleged violation. 

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007). “Integral 

participation” does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, “it does require some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly 

caused the violation.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12. 

At this point in the Court’s analysis, the only remaining claim that implicates the 

individual Defendants is Lane’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Lane’s due process 

liberty interest claim has been dismissed, and the Court has determined that the individual 

Defendants are qualifiedly immune from Lane’s due process property interest claim. That 

said, Defendants argue that neither Assistant Chief Hall nor Deputy Chief Kasmar can be

held individually liable for Lane’s alleged unlawful demotion because Chief Magnus was 

the sole person who had the authority to make that decision, and he did not delegate that 

authority. (Doc. 60 at 14.) In response, Lane argues that while Magnus may have made 

the final decision regarding Lane’s demotion, it was a decision shared by his deputy and 

assistant chiefs. (Doc. 65 at 16.) Believing Lane’s evidence and drawing all justifiable 

inferences in his favor, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record to 

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Assistant Chief Hall and Deputy Chief 

Kasmar personally participated in Lane’s alleged unlawful demotion. The Court evaluates 

the evidence implicating Hall and Kasmar in the demotion in turn. 

A. Assistant Chief Hall

Lane provides undisputed evidence that Assistant Chief Hall, and other executive 

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involved shooting, (Doc. 66, PSOF ¶¶ 15-17), issued a memorandum contradicting his 

findings, (id. PSOF ¶ 21), and prepared and issued a negative performance evaluation in 

connection with his demotion, (id. PSOF ¶¶ 31-33).12 Hall also participated in a meeting 

where Lane’s demotion was discussed among Chief Magnus, Deputy Chief Kasmar, and 

others, and there was a unanimous consensus to demote Lane. (Doc. 61-5 at 48:25-52:9.) 

Finally, Hall required Lane to initial the department’s revised use-of-force policy after the 

civil service commission affirmed Lane’s position that the officer’s use of force was within 

policy. (Docs. 66, PSOF ¶¶ 51-54; 67-4 at 8-9.) This evidence is sufficient to create a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Assistant Chief Hall personally participated in 

Lane’s unlawful demotion. As such, Defendants’ summary judgment motion concerning

Assistant Chief Hall’s individual liability is denied. 

B. Deputy Chief Kasmar

It is an undisputed fact Deputy Chief Kasmar threatened to demote Lane if he did 

not change his use-of-force findings in the officer involved shooting. (Doc. 66, PSOF 

¶ 26.) It is also an undisputed fact that Kasmar and Hall then personally informed Lane he 

would be demoted, effective August 16, 2020. (Id. PSOF ¶ 31.) Finally, it is undisputed 

that Kasmar was present when Chief Magnus, Assistant Chief Hall, and other leadership 

team members discussed Lane’s demotion and the decision to demote him was unanimous. 

(Doc. 61-5 at 48:25-52:9, 155:15-20.) This evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether Deputy Chief Kasmar personally participated in Lane’s 

unlawful demotion. As such, Defendants’ summary judgment motion concerning Deputy 

Chief Kasmar’s individual liability is denied. 

VI. Monell Claims Survive

A municipality may be held liable for civil rights violations when action pursuant 

to official municipal policy causes a constitutional tort. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of 

12 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party asserting that a fact cannot be 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, which may include evidence filed by the opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1)(A). 

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City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There are three situations in which isolated 

constitutional violations are sufficient to establish a municipal policy. Christie v. Iopa, 176 

F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). One of those situations is where the person causing the 

violation has “final policymaking authority.” Id. Whether an official has final 

policymaking authority is a question of state law for the court to decide. Id. 

It is undisputed that Chief Magnus demoted former captain Justin Lane in August 

2020, and that Magnus is a final policymaker for purposes of establishing Monell liability. 

(Doc. 60 at 16-17.) The Court has determined that whether Lane was demoted for unlawful 

retaliation and whether he received proper procedural protection for his demotion are 

genuine issues of material fact for a jury to decide. As such, the city of Tucson cannot 

escape Monell liability for the alleged unconstitutional acts of one of its officials with final 

policymaking authority, and Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the issue is denied. 

CONCLUSION

As a former police captain with the Tucson Police Department, Justin Lane authored

a memorandum and official report that was critical of an internal investigation’s findings 

against an officer involved in a public shooting. Lane also expressed his criticism at a civil 

service commission hearing on behalf of the officer who had since been terminated. The 

officer was exonerated and restored to his position, but weeks before the hearing, Lane was 

demoted. Believing Lane’s evidence, and drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor, 

Lane’s claims that he was unlawfully demoted in retaliation for his protected speech and 

that he was deprived of a protected property interest without sufficient procedural due 

process survive summary judgment and will go to a jury. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) is 

granted in part and denied in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ summary judgment motion is 

granted as to the merits of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest claim and to 

the qualified immunity of the individual Defendants on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment 

property interest claim. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ summary judgment motion is 

denied as to the merits of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the merits of 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment property interest claim, the qualified immunity of the 

individual Defendants on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, and the individual 

liability of the Defendants on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Defendants’

summary judgment motion on the issue of Monell liability as it applies to the surviving

constitutional claims is also denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims will proceed to trial: (i) 

First Amendment retaliation against the city of Tucson, Chief Magnus, Assistant Chief 

Hall, and Deputy Chief Kasmar; and (ii) unlawful deprivation of a property interest against 

the city of Tucson. 

Dated this 31st day of December, 2024.

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