Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01840/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01840-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The BPT was abolished on July 1, 2005 and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. 

See CAL. GOV. CODE § 12838.4. The Court will continue to use "BPT" to denote the past actions of

the Board of Parole Hearings, the real party in interest.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC LA VON THRASHER,

Petitioner,

v.

JILL BROWN, Acting Warden,

Respondent. ______________________________________

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No. 05-1840 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison (hereinafter "SQSP"), filed this pro se action

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is now submitted for the

Court's consideration of the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is

DENIED. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in the San Diego County Superior Court for two counts of

first-degree murder, one count of kidnapping and one count of second-degree burglary with

enhancements. (Resp't Ex. 1 at 1.) He was sentenced to life in prison with minimum eligible parole

eligibility of seven years. The present petition does not challenge Petitioner's underlying conviction. 

Rather, it challenges the denial of his parole suitability by the Board of Prison Terms (hereinafter

"BPT") in 2002.1

On October 16, 2002, at Petitioner's seventeenth parole hearing, the BPT denied Petitioner

parole. (Resp't Ex. 4.) The BPT's determination was based on the circumstances of Petitioner's

commitment offense, his May 23, 2002 psychological report, and opposition to parole made by the

Deputy District Attorney and the next of kin of one of the victims. (Id.)

Petitioner sought habeas relief in state court. On December 26, 2003, the Marin County

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 The Superior Court's order incorrectly indicated the date of Petitioner's parole hearing as

October 16, 2003 instead of October 16, 2002. (Resp't Ex. 2. at 1:20, 2:20.)

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Superior Court denied Petitioner's state habeas petition because it did not find that the BPT had

abused its discretion in considering Petitioner's suitability for parole.2

 (Resp't Ex. 2.) The

California Supreme Court summarily denied his state habeas petition on March 30, 2005. (Pet'r Ex.

C.)

On May 4, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition (docket no. 1). On December 12, 2005, 

the Court issued an order to show cause (docket no. 2). On February 7, 2006, Respondent filed an

Answer (docket no. 3). On March 9, 2006, Petitioner filed a Traverse (docket no. 4). The Court will

proceed to consider the merits of Petitioner's due process claim relating to the BPT's 2002 parole

denial. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. AEDPA

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter "AEDPA"), a district

court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

"adjudicated on the merits" in state court only if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court has "adjudicated" a

petitioner's constitutional claim "on the merits" for purposes of § 2254(d) when it has decided the

petitioner's right to post-conviction relief on the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim

advanced, rather than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state

court review on the merits. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,

546 U.S. 963 (2005). It is error for a federal court to review de novo a claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in state court. See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-43 (2003).

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A. Review of Parole Suitability Decisions

Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging the denial of

parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006);

Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also McQuillion v. Duncan,

306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (assuming without deciding that AEDPA deferential standard of

review under § 2254 applies to such decisions).

B. Section 2254(d)(1)

Challenges to purely legal questions resolved by the state court are reviewed under

§ 2254(d)(1), under which a state prisoner may obtain habeas relief with respect to a claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that

was "contrary to" or "involved an unreasonable application of" "clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

402-04, 409 (2000). While the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have

independent meaning, see id. at 404-05, they often overlap, which may necessitate examining a

petitioner's allegations against both standards. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1149-50

(9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003).

1. Clearly Established Federal Law

"Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"

refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of

the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. "Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the

source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court's jurisprudence." Id. "A federal court may

not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from

[the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). If there is

no Supreme Court precedent that controls on the legal issue raised by a petitioner in state court, the

state court's decision cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established

federal law. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The fact that Supreme Court law sets forth a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether

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constitutional rights were violated "obviates neither the clarity of the rule nor the extent to which the

rule must be seen as 'established'" by the Supreme Court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. There are,

however, areas in which the Supreme Court has not established a clear or consistent path for courts

to follow in determining whether a particular event violates a constitutional right; in such an area, it

may be that only the general principle can be regarded as "clearly established." Andrade, 538 U.S.

at 64-65. When only the general principle is clearly established, it is the only law amenable to the

"contrary to" or "unreasonable application of" framework. See id. at 73.

Circuit decisions may still be relevant as persuasive authority to determine whether a

particular state court holding is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent or to

assess what law is "clearly established." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

2. "Contrary to"

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A "run-of-the-mill state-court decision" that

correctly identifies the controlling Supreme Court framework and applies it to the facts of a

prisoner's case "would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause." Williams, 529

U.S. at 406. Such a case should be analyzed under the "unreasonable application" prong of

§ 2254(d). See Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000).

3. "Unreasonable Application"

"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411; accord

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Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state court's application

of governing federal law must be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable); Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam) ("unreasonable" application of law is not equivalent to

"incorrect" application of law). 

Evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the relevant

rule's specificity; if a legal rule is specific, the range of reasonable judgment may be narrow; if it is

more general, the state courts have more leeway. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664

(2004). Whether the state court's decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record

that court had before it. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 651 (2004) (per curiam).

The "objectively unreasonable" standard is not a clear error standard. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-

76 (rejecting Van Tran's use of "clear error" standard); Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067-69 (acknowledging the

overruling of Van Tran on this point). After Andrade, "[t]he writ may not issue simply because, in our

determination, a state court's application of federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise. While the

'objectively unreasonable' standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of

deference to the state courts than [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] previously afforded them." Id. In examining

whether the state court decision was unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court's

method as well as its result. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003).

C. Section 2254(d)(2)

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of

the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). An

unreasonable determination of the facts occurs where the state court fails to consider and weigh

highly probative, relevant evidence, central to the petitioner's claim, that was properly presented and

made part of the state court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). A

district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless

the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(e)(1). 

II. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas corpus

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial

remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state

court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to

raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34

(1987). It is undisputed that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to the claims raised in

his federal petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Although Petitioner is not challenging the validity of his underlying criminal conviction, the

facts regarding the commitment offense were relied upon by the BPT to deny Petitioner parole in

2002. The facts regarding the circumstances surrounding the offense were read into the record at the

hearing. The Court includes that summary here:

[O]n June 16th of 1971, Thrasher had intended to rob Anthony's Fish Grotto

in La Mesa, California. He knew that the 64-year-old female victim, Diane

Northrup, was the manager of the establishment. He apparently broke into

Mrs. Northrup's house to wait for her to return home. While waiting, a

neighbor, the 70 year old female victim Freda Hopper . . . entered the house

after placing a paper bag on the porch of Mrs. Northrup's home. Mrs. Hopper

attempted to retreat when she observed Thrasher in the house. He then shot

her in the hip and in the stomach before she could get out the door. Seeing

she was alive, he got a pillow and placed it under [her] head and shot her in

the head with the nine-millimeter pistol. Reports indicate that Thrasher then

went to the home of his brother-in-law, William Bush, and told him that he

had just killed a woman. When it got dark on the same evening, Thrasher

returned to Mrs. Northrup's residence and entered the residence with a key

taken from Mrs. Hopper.

After his arrest, Thrasher confessed to the police to the killing of the victims

Hopper and Northrup. Thrasher indicated that after returning to Mrs.

Northrup's residence, he waited and confronted her in her residence as she

entered. Thrasher and Mrs. Northrup returned in her vehicle to Anthony's

Fish Grotto where Thrasher reportedly robbed the establishment of $2,412

dollars. Thrasher then shot Mrs. Northrup in the head three times as she sat in

her vehicle.

Thrasher was arrested at approximately 12:15 a.m. on June 17th of 1971,

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wearing an Army uniform and was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by

his 18-year-old sister. Twenty minutes after Thrasher's arrest, the vehicle and

the body of Mrs. Northrup was discovered. Mrs. Northrup was slumped

behind the wheel of her vehicle. Thrasher subsequently directed officers to an

alleyway where the murder weapon was found.

And then the prisoner's version as it is spelled out in the 2002 Board report is

that Thrasher continues to accept responsibility for the crime and emphasizing

that he was 17 years of age at the time and approached life from the

standpoint of getting whatever he wanted. He indicates that the details

surrounding the offense are accurately documented in the existing data and he

states that he is remorseful and realizes that he cannot change what has

occurred.

(Resp't Ex. 4 at 9:25-11:20 [brackets added].)

DISCUSSION

I. Existence of a Protected Liberty Interest

Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed for want of subject matter

jurisdiction because Petitioner has no federally protected liberty interest in parole under California

Penal Code section 3041. (Answer ¶ 4.) Before reaching the merits of Petitioner's claim, the Court

addresses Respondent's argument that Petitioner has no protected liberty interest in parole which

would entitle him to the protections of due process at parole suitability hearings. 

Respondent relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 844 

(2005), as authority for his contention that the California statute does not create a liberty interest in

parole. This argument has been rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 ("California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after

[Dannenberg]."); see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Thus, in accord with Sass, Petitioner was

entitled to the protections of due process at his BPT hearing. Furthermore, the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to decide whether Petitioner's right to due process was

violated by the BPT. 

II. Due Process Claim

A. Applicable Legal Standard

"In analyzing the procedural safeguards owed to an inmate under the Due Process clause, [a

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court] must look at two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or

property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural safeguards." Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d

910, 913 (9th Cir. 2003). The second prong of this test is satisfied if (1) the inmate has been

afforded an opportunity to be heard and, if denied parole, informed of the reasons underlying the

decision and (2) "some evidence" supports the decision to grant or deny parole. See Sass, 461 F.3d

at 1129 (adopting some evidence standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)).

"To determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of

the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). 

The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence

that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Hill is clearly established law in the parole

context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts for applying the Hill "some evidence"

standard on this point: Biggs, Sass, and Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275, slip op. 8335, 8344 (9th Cir.

July 13, 2007), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275, slip op. 14647 (9th Cir.

November 6, 2007). Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time as a

predictor of parole suitability: "The Parole Board's decision is one of 'equity' and requires a careful

balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary

to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation." 

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely on

the nature of the crime and the prisoner's conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that "[o]ver

time . . ., should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation,

denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs's offense and prior conduct would

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raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole." Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which

criticized the Biggs statements as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the court: 

"Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. (commitment offenses in combination

with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole at subsequent parole

consideration hearing). Sass also put to rest any idea from Biggs that the commitment crime and

pre-offense behavior only support the initial denial of parole. Recently, Irons determined that due

process was not violated by the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny

parole for a prisoner sixteen years into his seventeen-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all

three cases (Irons, Sass and Biggs) in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to

deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with

due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of years

required by his sentence." Irons, No. 05-15275, slip op. 8449. Interpreting this statement from Irons

to suggest that the offense can only be relied on until the minimum number of years has been

reached would suffer the same problem that Sass identified in Biggs: it is not the holding of the

case. The dicta in Biggs and Irons are speculative and do not determine when a denial of parole

based solely upon the commitment offense or pre-offense behavior violates due process. Neither

logic nor Irons compel a decision that such reliance must cease when the prisoner reaches the

minimum number of years in his sentence, such as the fifteenth year of a fifteen-to-life sentence.

The upshot of these three cases is that the BPT can look at immutable events, such as the

nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the prisoner is not

currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight to be attributed to

those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future dangerousness as the

years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and Irons). Sass did not dispute

the principle that, other things being equal, a murder committed fifty years ago is less probative of a

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prisoner's current dangerousness than one committed ten years ago. Not only does the passage of

time in prison count for something, exemplary behavior and rehabilitation in prison count for

something according to Biggs and Irons. Hill's standard might be quite low, but it does require that

the decision not be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the crime might eventually make for

an arbitrary decision.

What little guidance has come from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review should

be extremely deferential to the original decisionmaker in the parole context. In addition to the very

low evidentiary standard that Hill imposes, other Supreme Court comments suggest that the

judiciary should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive nature of a parole board's decision. 

See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). "No ideal,

error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been

and will continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors

combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of the actual parole

decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state

experimentation." Id.

B. Parole for Murderers in California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term being

life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A first degree

murder conviction yields a minimum term of twenty-five years to life and a second degree murder

conviction yields a base term of fifteen years to life imprisonment. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at

1078; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190. The upshot of California's parole scheme described below is that a

release date normally must be set unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is so great

that parole is a rarity rather than the norm for murderers.

A BPT panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible release

date "and shall normally set a parole release date . . . . The release date shall be set in a manner that

will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to

the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial Council may issue and

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any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release dates." CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides: The panel shall set a release date,

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or

offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date,

therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting. 

Id. § 3041(b).

One of the implementing regulations, Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations § 2401

provides: "A parole date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section

2402(c). A parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). 

A parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public." The regulation also

provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released from prison." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(a). 

In making its determination, the parole board may consider "[a]ll relevant, reliable

information available," including,

the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental

state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment

offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and

present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be

released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in finding of unsuitability. 

Id. § 2402(b).

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include the nature of the commitment

offense, and consideration of whether "[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner." Id. § 2281(c). This includes consideration of the number of victims,

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 One axis of the matrix concerns the relationship between murderer and victim and 

the other axis of the matrix concerns the circumstances of the murder. The choices on the axis for

the relationship of murderer and victim are "participating victim," "prior relationship," "no prior

relationship," and "threat to public order or murder for hire." The choices on the axis for the

circumstances of the murder are "indirect," "direct or victim contribution," "severe trauma," or

"torture." Each of the choices are further defined in the matrix. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,

§ 2403(b).

12

whether "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner," whether the victim

was "abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense," whether "[t]he offense was carried out

in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering," and

whether "[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense." Id.

Other circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are a previous record of

violence, an unstable social history, previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental

health problems related to the offense, and serious misconduct in prison or jail. See id.

Circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for parole include no juvenile

record, a stable social history, signs of remorse, that the crime was committed as a result of

significant stress in the prisoner's life, a lack of criminal history, a reduced possibility of recidivism

due to the prisoner's present age, that the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has

developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release, and that the prisoner's institutional

activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. See id. § 2281(d).

The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms that prisoners with

indeterminate sentence should serve before they are released on parole. The matrix provides three

choices of suggested "base terms" for several categories of crimes. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,

§ 2403. If, as in Petitioner's case, the base offense is two counts of first-degree murder with the use

of a dangerous weapon (firearm), the matrix of base terms ranges from a low of twenty-eight,

twenty-nine, or thirty years, to a high of thirty, thirty-one, or thirty-two years, depending on some of

the facts of the crime.3 See id. § 2403(b). Although the matrix is to be used to establish a base term,

this occurs only once the prisoner has been found suitable for parole. See id. § 2403(a). 

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's expectancy in

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early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-

71.

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should "normally" receive "uniform" parole dates for

similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies "unless [the

Board] determines" that a release date cannot presently be set because the

particular offender's crime and/or criminal history raise "public safety" concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing

in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender's criminality presents a continuing

public danger.

Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets and parenthesis in original). Indeed, the very regulation that

includes the matrix states that "[t]he panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found

suitable for parole." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2403(a) (emphasis added). "[T]he Board,

exercising its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by

considering the dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner's crime individually." 

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071 (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court's determination

of state law is binding in this federal habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988);

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979).

The California Supreme Court has determined that the facts of the crime can alone support a

sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner is laudable. 

"While the board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the

inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before concluding that the

particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for the prisoner's release." 

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (2002), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient

basis for denying parole" but might violate due process "where no circumstances of the offense

reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for that offense"). Granted the Ninth Circuit has stated that in some cases, "indefinite

detention based solely on an inmate's commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his

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rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows

from the relevant California statutes." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665; see also Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 n.5. 

C. Analysis

1. Opportunity to Be Heard and Reasons for Denial

Having stated that California inmates still maintain a liberty interest, the Court analyzes the

next prong of the Biggs test. Under the second prong of the Biggs test, the first question pertains to

whether Petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard and whether he was given reasons for the

parole denial. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1126; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.

Petitioner fully participated in his parole hearing as evidenced by the transcript of the

hearing. (Resp't Ex. 4.) Throughout the hearing, Petitioner was given the opportunity to make

comments or objections in response to the BPT's statements, clarify any misunderstandings and give

statements regarding his parole eligibility. (Id.) In addition, the BPT laid out detailed reasons for

denying Petitioner parole, which are discussed further below. The Court finds that the BPT satisfied

the requirements for due process under this prong. 

2. "Some Evidence" Standard

The next question is whether there was some evidence to support the BPT's decision to deny

parole. What little guidance has come from the Supreme Court suggests that the "some evidence"

standard is extremely deferential to the original decision-maker. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454

(examination of the entire record is not required nor is an independent assessment of the credibility

of witnesses or weighing of the evidence; the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the decision-maker). Moreover, the

Supreme Court's comments suggest that the judiciary should be quite mindful of the subjective and

predictive nature of a parole board's decision. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13 ("No ideal, error-free

way to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will

continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors combined

with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of the actual parole decisionmakers in

predicting future behavior.").

a. The 2002 Parole Hearing

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At the 2002 parole suitability hearing, the BPT found that Petitioner was "not suitable for

parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if

released from prison." (Resp't Ex. 4 at 52:6-9.) Below are the factors the BPT considered in

making its determination to deny parole:

(1) The Commitment Offense

The panel found some evidence supporting its determination of Petitioner's unsuitability for

parole based on a finding that:

The offense was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner. Two

victims were attacked and killed in two separate incidents. The offense was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an executionstyle murder. The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. And the motive for the

crime was very trivial in relationship to the offense. 

(Id. at 52:9-18.)

In deciding that this was a two-year denial, the BPT reiterated the violent nature of the

crime and the manner in which it was carried out:

[T]he hearing Panel finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would

be granted at a hearing during the following two years. And, specifically, for

the way that the crime was committed in that you killed one woman in a

home, took another to a restaurant, and ended up murdering her after her

restaurant was robbed. Two of the victims were killed and the offense was

carried out in a very dispassionate and calculated manner and in a manner

which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering

and the motive for the crime was very trivial in relation to the offense.

(Id. at 56:25-57:12 [brackets added].)

While the BPT did commend Petitioner for his educational achievements, future parole

plans, and receiving positive support from prison staff, it exercised its authority under state law

to make a finding of unsuitability for parole based on the commitment offense. (Resp't Ex. 4 at

55:9-11, 55:22-56:22); see Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

at 682-83.

(2) Petitioner's Psychological Report

The BPT also relied on Petitioner's most recent psychological report in support of its

decision to find him unsuitable for parole. (Resp't Ex. 4 at 53:8-13.) This report was authored

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by forensic psychologist Dr. Erich Rueschenberg on May 23, 2002. (Pet'r Ex. F.) Dr.

Rueschenberg stated in his report that Petitioner "falls into a category that reflects a moderate

risk of violence in the community." (Id. at 6.) Additionally, the BPT acknowledged

Petitioner's psychological report prepared by Dr. Les Carr in 1999, which indicated that

Petitioner's Antisocial Personality Disorder is "improving," and that Petitioner's "violence

potential is judged to be average for this population of inmates." (Resp't Ex. 4 at 53:13-21.) 

The BPT stated that Petitioner's violence potential as observed by Dr. Carr "is not acceptable

as comparing [Petitioner] to other inmates as to releasing him to the community." (Id. at

53:21-23.)

(3) Need for Further Observation and Evaluation

The BPT examined factors of suitability that would support parole, i.e., that Petitioner

had plans for where to live and work if released (id. at 26:24-30:22), that he completed an

Associate in Arts (AA) degree and his x-ray technician certification (id. at 55:25-26), and that

his prison behavior had been exceptional because he has received exceptional work reports and

participated in numerous religious and self-help programs (id. at 55:26-56:22). However, the

BPT relied upon Petitioner's 1994 evaluation report, which indicated the difficulty of

"predict[ing] the degree of danger outside of the prison setting of someone who has been

incarcerated for the past 20 years and essentially all of his adult life." (Id. at 54:21-25.) 

Furthermore, the evaluation report stated that Petitioner "will continue to need some sort of

external structure and support to help control his behaviors and compensate for controls that

may not have been internalized earlier in his life." (Id. at 55:2-6.) The BPT determined that "a

longer period of observation and evaluation of the prisoner is required before the Board should

find the prisoner is suitable for parole." (Id. at 57:16-19.)

(4) Opposition to Parole

The Deputy District Attorney and the next of kin of one of the victims opposed

Petitioner's suitability for parole. (Id. at 55:15-22.) 

Deputy District Attorney Richard Sachs stated:

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 I attended a hearing in 1997 on this individual and when he spoke about the

offense, we asked him how he felt about it and whether the victim had begged

for her life as he drove her out to execute her, speaking of Ms. Northrup. And

he became very angry when discussing this subject and this is still an area

that's completely unexplored as to his feelings for the victim's, his remorse,

his attitude toward the offense currently, his insight to the offenses, all

completely unexplored and all potentially very explosive. And I would add

one other factor which is that psychological reports whether he has one in this

batch that says he's a low degree of threat is not a reliable predictor of his

future dangerousness in an uncontrolled environment and in a free society.

(Id. at 40:11-27.)

The grandson of Mrs. Northrop addressed the BPT and stated, "two women were

brutally slain, two elderly women that posed no threat to this man, no physical threat to this

man at all." (Id. at 47:3-6.) Moreover, he added that he would return every year to protest

Petitioner's parole. (Id. at 47:13-16.) The daughter of the same victim also spoke before the

BPT, stating: 

Murder is a word I've lived with for the last 30 years. I don't believe that he

should ever be released. He may do it again. We don't know what he's going

to do when he gets out. He took a woman from me, from my family. She was

an outstanding mom and to die by somebody sticking a gun at her head.

(Id. at 48:3-49:22.)

(5) Conclusion

As noted supra, the panel identified the fact-specific reasons to support its conclusion

that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, the record shows

that the BPT's findings were supported by some evidence. The records show that the BPT

conducted a thorough review and consideration of Petitioner's individual factors tending to

show unsuitability and suitability for parole. Indeed, the BPT recognized and commended

Petitioner's exceptional work reports and exemplary prison behavior, participation in

educational programs, vocational training and certification, and parole plans. Nevertheless, the

BPT found that Petitioner was not yet suitable for parole because "the positive aspects of

[Petitioner's] behavior do not outweigh the factors of unsuitability." (Id. at 56:22-24.) Rather,

the BPT concluded that before Petitioner could be found suitable for parole, a longer period of

observation and evaluation is required. (Id. at 57:16-19.)

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Having reviewed the facts of the crime as recited by the BPT and the other reasons

stated for finding Petitioner ineligible for parole, the Court finds that there was some evidence

in the record to support the BPT's decision. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. 

b. Other Arguments

Petitioner makes two additional arguments: (1) the BPT's denial of parole based on his

commitment offense violates Biggs, and (2) the BPT's refusal to set a parole date results in

imposition of punishment disproportionate to standards established under the state's sentencing

matrix. The Court finds that these arguments must fail. 

(1) Biggs Argument

Petitioner argues that the BPT "relies heavily on Petitioner's crime as the primary

reason the Board denied parole." (Traverse at 6.) Moreover, he claims that the BPT's "primary

objective should not have been to focus on the crime but instead on Petitioner's rehabilitation." 

(Id.) He cites Biggs for the proposition that "continued reliance on the circumstances of the

offense runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation." (Pet. at 21-22.)

In Biggs, the prisoner was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life following a

1985 first degree murder conviction. In the case before the Ninth Circuit, Biggs challenged the

1999 decision by the BPT finding him unsuitable for parole despite his record as a model

prisoner. Id. at 913. While the Ninth Circuit rejected several of the reasons given by the BPT

for finding Biggs unsuitable, it upheld three: (1) the commitment offense involved the murder

of a witness, (2) the murder was carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous disregard for the

life and suffering of another, and (3) Biggs could benefit from therapy. Id. The Ninth Circuit

found no due process violation and upheld the prisoner's parole denial based solely on the

nature of the crime and conduct before incarceration. Id. at 916.

Petitioner's reliance on Biggs to support his argument that denial of suitability in his

individual case is misplaced. First, although the Ninth Circuit in Biggs cautioned the BPT that

continued reliance in future parole suitability hearings on the commitment offense may violate

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due process, id. at 916-17, it did so only in dicta. Not only is it not Supreme Court law, but the

Ninth Circuit has also recently criticized the statements in Biggs as being improper and beyond

the scope of the dispute before the court. The Ninth Circuit stated, "Under AEDPA, it is not

our function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129. Sass confirmed that "evidence of [a prisoner's] prior offenses and the gravity of his

convicted offenses constitute some evidence to support the [b]oard's decision." Id. In light of

Sass, the BPT's consideration of Petitioner's conviction offense, prior criminal conduct, lack of

remorse and other factors satisfies the minimal "some evidence" requirement. Secondly, it

must be noted that the BPT did not rely solely on the commitment offense in denying

Petitioner suitability for parole. The BPT relied on several factors, including Petitioner's

underlying offense, his psychological evaluation reports, his need for further observation and

evaluation, as well as statements opposing his parole made by the District Attorney and the

next of kin of one of the victims.

Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to Petitioner's claim because he cannot rely on

the dicta in Biggs to demonstrate that the BPT violated his due process rights by denying him

parole suitability.

(2) Matrix Argument

Petitioner further claims that the BPT violated his right to due process because he is

overdue for release under the BPT's sentencing matrix. (Pet. at 14.) 

As explained previously, the matrix is not consulted and a term is not set under state

law unless and until the prisoner is found suitable for parole. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at

1070-71; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2403(a). Petitioner was not found suitable for parole;

therefore, the matrix did not need to be consulted. Moreover, the BPT determined that

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole after considering the factors outlined above. Thus,

Petitioner's claim that there was "no real evidence" to deny him parole is unavailing. Even if

Petitioner had a due process right in having state law followed by the parole authority, state

law was followed by the BPT. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim is without merit.

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c. Superior Court Denial

In denying Petitioner's state habeas petition, the Marin County Superior Court held that

the BPT did not err in determining Petitioner's unsuitability for parole:

[The BPT] had good reason to conclude that Petitioner would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released

from prison. The commitment offense itself was carried out in an especially

cruel manner: Petitioner murdered one victim; he took another victim to a

restaurant and murdered her after her restaurant was robbed. Petitioner has an

unstable social history; and the psychological reports suggest that he is still a

risk to public safety if released. The San Diego County District Attorney and

the victim's family oppose parole.

(Resp't Ex. 2 at 2-3.) 

Because the superior court's decision is the last reasoned decision regarding Petitioner's

challenge to the BPT's denial of his parole, the Court will review the decision under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085,

1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). Having reviewed the facts of the crime

as recited by the BPT and state court, and the other reasons stated for finding Petitioner ineligible for

parole, the Court does not find evidence to refute the fact that the BPT's decision was supported by

some evidence. The Court concludes that the state court's decision to uphold the BPT's denial of

parole was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), nor was it contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, id. § 2254(d)(1).

Accordingly, Petitioner's due process challenge to the denial of parole by the BPT is

DENIED.

III. Ex Post Facto Claim Based on Failure to Adhere to the Sentencing Matrix

Petitioner argues that his life sentence with the possibility of parole after seven years

has been altered by the BPT in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In effect, Petitioner

claims that his sentence has been changed to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after

twenty-five years or a life sentence without the possibility of parole. (Pet. at 33.)

"The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law

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which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed;

or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed." Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032,

1033 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). "In accord with these purposes . . . two

critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be

retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must

disadvantage the offender affected by it." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). 

Petitioner does not claim that a new law is being applied retroactively to his case. 

There are no allegations that the State has changed the formula to calculate parole eligibility or

suitability as applied to Petitioner. See Nulph v. Faatz, 27 F.3d 451, 455-56 (9th Cir. 1994)

(the ex post facto prohibition forbids the States from enhancing the measure of punishment by

significantly reducing a prisoner's opportunity to shorten his prison term by altering the

"substantive formula" used to calculate parole eligibility or suitability). The facts show that

Petitioner's earliest eligible parole date was November 11, 1978, and he had sixteen previous

parole hearings prior to the 2002 hearing. (Pet. at 3.) The Court finds that there is no

cognizable claim for an ex post facto violation based on the Petitioner's allegations. 

Accordingly, Petitioner's ex post facto claim is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this Order, terminate all pending

motions, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 12/10/07 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THRASHER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BROWN et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-01840 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on December 10, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Eric La Von Thrasher B-37948

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, CA 94964

Dated: December 10, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

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