Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06134/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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The requests concerned information granted to Plaintiff through a 1

discovery motion in a case in which he was the defendant charged with a

traffic citation issued to him by Chief Thomason. The case was dismissed

before discovery was completed, so Plaintiff sought the information through

the Freedom of Information Act. The requests were returned by the U.S. Postal

Service as “not deliverable as addressed.” Plaintiff then delivered them in

person. (Doc. 43-6 ¶¶ 1-2). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

GERALD L. BRUMLEY PLAINTIFF

V. NO. 04-6134

CITY OF ROCKPORT, CHIEF

DAVID THOMASON, AND OFFICER

BRANDON THOMASON DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Separate Defendants City of Rockport

(“Rockport”), Chief David Thomason (“Chief Thomason”) and Officer

Brandon Thomason (“Brandon”) alleging an illegal search and seizure

and an unlawful arrest and detention. Currently before the Court

is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 30). 

I. Background

This case arises out of events surrounding the stop and

detention of Plaintiff on the afternoon of October 11, 2002, in the

parking lot of the Rockport Municipal Building. Plaintiff alleges

he went to the building to deliver three envelopes containing

Freedom of Information Act requests. Plaintiff states he placed 1

the three envelopes on Darlene Reeves Shockey’s (“Mrs. Shockey”)

desk, took a photograph of the envelopes on the desk with a

Polaroid camera, and left the building. (Doc. 43-6 ¶ 4).

Plaintiff alleges Mrs. Shockey asked, “What’s this?” to which he

responded, “Here’s some mail for you.” After he took the

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photograph, Mrs. Shockey asked, “What’s that for?” Plaintiff

responded with, “My record.” (Doc. 45-7; Brumley Dep. at 11).

Chief Thomason and Brandon were parked approximately 750 feet

from the building. Chief Thomason received a call from Mrs.

Shockey on his cell phone telling him that someone threw items at

her, took pictures, and left. Mrs. Shockey was crying and upset.

She gave Chief Thomason a description of the vehicle the suspect

was driving. 

Plaintiff alleges he traveled approximately three or four car

lengths in the parking lot when two police cars, driven at a high

rate of speed by Chief Thomason and Brandon, arrived with blue

lights flashing. Defendants contend that Plaintiff stopped his

vehicle when they entered the driveway and that neither police car

activated its blue lights. Plaintiff’s testimony reflects that

because the police cars were traveling at a high rate of speed with

their lights on, he had the impression that they wanted him to stop

and he did. (Doc. 45-7; Brumley Dep. at 14). Plaintiff alleges

Chief Thomason blocked him from moving forward and Brandon parked

behind him crosswise of the driveway. (Doc. 1 ¶ 8). All parties

exited their vehicles. Plaintiff alleges Chief Thomason and

Brandon began a verbal tirade against him. They called him a

“damned crazy,” “crazy nut,” “crazy bastard,” and a “damned nut”.

Chief Thomason asked Plaintiff to “find something else to do other

than acting crazy.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 9). Brandon repeatedly asked

Plaintiff, “Why don’t you get a job, instead of running around

being a crazy?” (Doc. 1 ¶ 9). Plaintiff alleges Chief Thomason

seized his camera. Defendants contend Plaintiff voluntarily handed

Chief Thomason the camera, along with a Polaroid photograph that

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Plaintiff admits he took for the purpose of giving to the

Defendants. Both parties agree the camera was returned to the

Plaintiff before he left. Chief Thomason talked with Mrs. Shockey

a second time and learned that the man in the parking lot was the

one who created the disturbance. She also told Chief Thomason that

she wanted to “press charges” against the Plaintiff. Chief

Thomason cited Plaintiff with obstructing governmental operations

and harassment. The charges were subsequently dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges the stop and detention lasted “well over 25

minutes” (Doc. 43-6 at 18). Defendants contend the stop lasted

seven or eight minutes. (Doc. 11; Brandon Thomason Dep. at 14).

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants ask the Court

to grant summary judgment as to all parties. In addition, they

contend they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. Discussion

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122

F.3d 559, 562 (8 Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden th

of establishing the absence of issues of material fact in the

record and of establishing that it is entitled to judgement as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986). Once the moving party has met this

burden, the non-moving party may no longer rest on the allegations

in its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts by affidavit

and other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact

exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In this case then, Plaintiff

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

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doubt as to the material facts, “Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986),

rather, he must convince the court that there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in his favor. See Nat’l. Bank

of Commerce of El Dorado, Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 607

(8 Cir. 1999). If a plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient th

to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and

on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, then the

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and all other

facts are rendered immaterial. See Thelma D. By Delores A. v. Bd.

of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 932 (8 Cir. 1991). th

In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a

constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity

defense must be considered in proper sequence. See Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). A court required to rule upon the

qualified immunity issue must consider the threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right? See id. at 201. The next sequential step is

to ask whether the right was clearly established. See id. The

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted. See id. at 202.

Plaintiff alleges an illegal search and seizure and unlawful

arrest and detention. Our Constitution provides that ‘the right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

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violated.’ U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court

has always recognized that, ‘No right is held more sacred, or is

more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every

individual to the possession and control of his own person, free

from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and

unquestionable authority of law.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88

S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1967). In Terry, the Supreme

Court stated that a police officer must be able to point to

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion upon

the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.

See id. at 21. It is an objective standard: would the facts

‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action

taken was appropriate? See id. Whether the particular facts known

to the officer amount to an objective and particularized basis for

a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is determined in light

of the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Garcia, 23

F.3d 1331, 1334 (8 Cir. 1994). th

Chief Thomason alleged Mrs. Shockey called him on his cell

phone, told him someone threw items at her, took pictures, and

left. Mrs. Shockey described the suspect’s vehicle. When the

Defendants pulled into the parking lot moments later, they observed

a vehicle that matched the description given to Chief Thomason by

Mrs. Shockey. They stopped the vehicle. Mrs. Shockey told Chief

Thomason during a second phone call that the person in the parking

lot was the person who created the disturbance. A reasonable

officer in Chief Thomason’s position could have believed that

stopping the Plaintiff was an appropriate police action. It could

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Plaintiff was given a citation for obstructing governmental operations 2

and harassment, which under Ark. R. Crim. Pro. 5.2 an officer is authorized to

do. Commentary to that rule recognizes that it is a “solution to the problem

facing an officer who must deal with the petty misdemeanant and his victim.” 

An officer may arrest an individual if the officer has reasonable cause to

believe that such person has committed any violation of law in the officer’s

presence. See Ark. R. Crim. Pro. 4.1. In this situation, Chief Thomason had

an upset victim who wanted to “press charges.” Neither Chief Thomason nor

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not be clear to him that his conduct was unlawful in this

situation.

Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and detention claim depends upon

25 minutes or so time he was detained and then subjected, he

contends, to verbal abuse. There is no rigid time limit on an

investigatory detention. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.

675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). In determining

whether a period of time is excessive, we must consider the “law

enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time

reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.” Id. Rule 3.1 of

the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may,

in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person

who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is

about to commit (1) a felony, (2) a misdemeanor involving

danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or

damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary

either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or

to determine the lawfulness of his conduct. An officer acting

under this rule may require the person to remain in or near

such place in the officer’s presence for a period of no more

than fifteen (15) minutes or for such a time is reasonable

under the circumstances.

Chief Thomason stopped the Plaintiff after receiving a phone

call from Mrs. Shockey advising him someone threw items at her and

took photographs. He talked with both Mrs. Shockey and the

Plaintiff to ascertain what occurred. He wrote Plaintiff a

citation for obstructing governmental operations and harassment.2

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Brandon observed any criminal behavior from Plaintiff from which they could

make an arrest. (Chief Thomason Dep. at 24; Brandon Thomason Dep. at 19-20.) 

Chief Thomason was authorized under the rule and the circumstances to issue a

citation to the Plaintiff because, based on the situation, there was

reasonable cause for him to believe the Plaintiff committed a misdemeanor. 

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We do not find his detention for the 25 minutes to be an

unreasonable amount of time under the circumstances. Accordingly,

we find Defendant Chief David Thomason and Defendant Officer

Brandon Thomason are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff alleges Chief Thomason and Brandon called him a

“crazy nut,” “damned crazy,” “crazy bastard,” and “damned nut” as

part of a verbal tirade they executed against him. Name-calling is

not a constitutional violation. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,

1338 (8 Cir. 1985). Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has held that th

a threat constitutes an actionable constitutional violation only

when the threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as to shock the

conscience or if the threat exerts coercive pressure on the

plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the deprivation of a

constitutional right. See King v. Olmsted County, 117 F.3d 1065,

1067 (8 Cir. 1997). Chief Thomason’s statements that the th

Plaintiff “find something else to do other than acting crazy,” and

Brandon’s question of “why don’t you get a job, instead of running

around being a crazy?” do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation as they are not sufficient to “shock the conscience.”

They are, at best, verbal harassment. 

Plaintiff alleges Chief Thomason seized his camera. A seizure

under the Fourth Amendment occurs when there is “some meaningful

interference with an individual’s possessory interest in that

property.” Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d 745, 750 (8 Cir. 2003). th

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Chief Thomason was told and Plaintiff admits that Plaintiff took at

least one photograph of Mrs. Shockey. Chief Thomason’s examination

of Plaintiff’s camera was part of his investigation. Plaintiff’s

camera was returned during his detention. We do not find that the

examination of the camera by Chief Thomason was a seizure under the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

Rockport cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In

determining whether a municipality is subject to liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, courts analyze whether a “municipal custom or

policy” caused, or led to, a deprivation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d

792, 802 (2004). The Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any

constitutional injury was the result of an official policy or

widespread custom. Rockport is mentioned but only to show that it

is located in Hot Spring[s] County and that Chief Thomason and

Brandon work as police officers in Rockport. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2-4).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff attempts in his statement of material facts

in dispute (Doc. 46) to attribute the actions of Chief Thomason to

Rockport by asserting that Chief Thomason is a decision maker and

policymaker and establishes customs for police operations for

Rockport (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 1-2). In a motion for summary judgment, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56( c) provides the court may consider “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any.” Chief Thomason denied

developing any policies or personal policies (Doc. 43-3; Chief

Thomason Dep. at 24). Plaintiff has not set forth any other

specific facts by affidavit and other evidence showing that Chief

Thomason is a decision maker, policymaker or establishes customs

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Plaintiff’s statement of material facts in dispute also alleges the 3

City of Malvern, Arkansas, failed to provide proper training of Rockport

police officers. We note that the City of Malvern is not a party to this

action.

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for police operations in Rockport as required by Rule 56( c).3

While the situation could, no doubt, have been handled more

appropriately by the Defendants, the causes of action against them

must be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgement is GRANTED and the Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. All parties are to bear their own costs and fees.

The jury trial scheduled for the week of January 23, 2006, is

cancelled. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3 day of November, 2005. rd

/s/ Robert T. Dawson

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

 

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