Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00755/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00755-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

This is Defendants’ second Motion for Summary Judgment; the first was granted in

part and denied in part. (Doc. #138.) The Court gave Defendants leave to file a second

summary judgment motion because Plaintiff’s Complaint stated a claim under the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) but the Court’s screening Order only

identified the First Amendment claim. (Id.)

WO SVK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald J. Harris, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 06-0755-PHX-GMS (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Ronald J. Harris, who was formerly confined in the Arizona State Prison

system, filed this civil rights action against various officials of the Arizona Department of

Corrections (ADC). The remaining Defendants—Schriro, ADC Director; Bartos, Warden

at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis during the relevant time period;

Linderman, Administrator of Pastoral Activities; Johnson, Deputy Warden ASPCBachman Unit during the relevant time period; and Suwinski, Contract Management

Specialist at ASPC-Lewis during the relevant time period—move for summary

judgment.1

 (Doc. #152.) Although the Court issued a Notice to Plaintiff pursuant to

Rand v. Roland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), advising him of his

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Morrison, an employee of Canteen Correctional Services, Inc. (Canteen), was

subsequently dismissed as a Defendant. (Doc. #115.)

- 2 -

obligation to respond and granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file his response,

Plaintiff did not respond. (Doc. ##155, 158.) The motion is ready for ruling.

The Court will grant the motion and terminate the action.

I. Procedural History and Summary of Motion

In his Complaint, Plaintiff, who is Jewish, alleged that, he was denied regular

kosher meals (Count I) and religious services (Count II). The Complaint seeks damages

and injunctive relief. (Doc. #1.) The Court directed Schriro, Bartos, Johnson,

Linderman, Suwinski, and Morrison2

 to answer Count I and dismissed Count II because it

did not state a claim.

A. First Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment addressed only the First

Amendment claims. The Court noted that Plaintiff raised numerous complaints regarding

the provision of kosher meals and that, on the one hand, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants

“allege the state has a valid set of policies and procedures for kosher meals. Plaintiff

agrees that this is so.” (Doc. #138 at 7.) Thus, as to some allegations, Plaintiff appeared

to claim that Defendants deviated from their valid policies. On the other hand, some of

his allegations and his specific requests for relief appeared to ask for more stringent

procedures than those required by ADC policy. In his request for relief, Plaintiff asks for

“kosher food in approved recognized original kosher packaging only, unopened by

[ADC] staff with [specified kosher symbols] on their packages. . . . Vegetables untouched

by staff in any manner that I can wash myself.” (Doc. #1 at 16.) The Court also noted

that Plaintiff had confused the issues by agreeing that ADC policies are valid and

simultaneously criticizing and complaining about some of them yet not specifically

asking for changes, e.g. the cleansing of the oven and the heating of kosher foods with

non-kosher foods. The Court separately addressed the different types of

claims—deviations from policies and requests for modification of policies—and limited

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the requests for modification of the ADC policies to those requests specifically set forth

in the request for relief in the Complaint. 

As to claims for violation of the First Amendment, the motion was denied

regarding allegations that, in violation of ADC policies, Plaintiff was served meat and

cheese items together and that he saw food items being prepared without saran barriers

between the food and counter tops. It was denied as to claims for damages for failure to

modify the kosher diet policy regarding food packaging and labeling and regarding the

serving of uncut vegetables; the Court found that it could not determine on the record

before it whether ADC would prevail on the third factor under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 89-91 (1987): the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right

would have upon guards, other inmates, and prison resources. And the Court determined

that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to these allegations. (Doc.

#138.)

Summary judgment was granted in all other respects. The Court dismissed Schriro

and Bartos as to claims that Plaintiff’s rights were violated by service and preparation of

food in violation of ADC policies; Plaintiff provided no evidence to establish a link

between their conduct and any alleged violation. The Court also dismissed Suwinski as

to claims requesting modification of ADC policies; there was no evidence that she had

any authority to modify ADC kosher-diet policies. Id.

Defendants moved for reconsideration of so much of the Order arguing that

Plaintiff’s

claims for the modification of the kosher diet policy regarding food packaging and labeling,

and regarding the serving of uncut vegetables are injunctive in nature and should be

dismissed because Plaintiff is no longer in ADC’s custody. (Doc. #139 at 3.) The Court

denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff’s request regarding modifications was fairly

construed as one for damages for failure to provide those modifications as well as injunctive

relief as to those modifications. The Court held that although the injunctive relief is moot,

the damage claims are not. (Doc. #154.)

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

B. Second Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) there is no

individual liability under RLUIPA; (2) money damages are not available under RLUIPA; (3)

claims for injunctive relief are moot; (4) Plaintiff’s religious exercise was not substantially

burdened; (5) Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Free Exercise of religion under Turner

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); and (6) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the

RLUIPA claims. 

II. RLUIPA and Individual and Official-Capacity Claims for Damages and Claims

for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Doc. #1 at 16.) Defendants argue that

all of Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims should be dismissed because (1) the injunctive relief is moot

due to Plaintiff’s release; (2) there is no individual liability under RLUIPA, so damage claims

against Defendants in their individual capacity fail; and (3) damage claims against

Defendants in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. #152 at

4-7.) Plaintiff filed no response.

As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot bring individual or officialcapacity damage claims under RLUIPA and the claims for injunctive relief are moot.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss all RLUIPA claims.

A. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff was released to his term of community supervision on May 24, 2007.

Because Plaintiff has been released from custody, his request for injunctive relief is now

moot. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (prayers for injunctive

relief are mooted by a prisoner’s release or transfer to another facility).

B. Individual Liability for Damages

1. Defendants’ Contentions

 Defendants argue that although RLUIPA created a private cause of action for inmates

whose free exercise rights are violated, the statute was not intended to create a private cause

of action against prison officials in their individual capacity. Sossamon v. Lone Star State

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui

Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1067 (D. Haw. 2002); Boles v. Neet, 402 F. Supp.

2d 1237, 1241 (D. Colo. 2005). (Doc. #152 at 4.)

 Defendants also argue that if the Court concludes that Defendants may be sued in

their individual capacities, Plaintiff must prove that the Defendants acted intentionally, as

opposed to negligently. See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 194, 196 (4th Cir. 2006) (Prison

officials did not act with requisite degree of culpability to be liable in their individual

capacities under RLUIPA where, at most, they acted negligently.) (Doc. #152 at 4.)

2. Analysis

The only Courts of Appeals to have squarely addressed this issue—the Fifth, Seventh,

and the Eleventh Circuits—have held that RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for

damages against individuals. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328-29; Nelson v. Miller, 570 F. 3d

868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007). The Third

Circuit has declined to address the issue. Brown v. Dep't of Corr., 265 Fed.Appx. 107, 111

n. 3 (3d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“We also find it unnecessary to reach the

questions whether individuals may be liable for monetary damages under the RLUIPA and

whether qualified immunity applies here.”). The Fourth Circuit noted a split in the district

courts over the issue, but did not resolve it. Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130 n. 3 (4th

Cir.2006). And as the Fifth Circuit noted in Sossamon, 560 F. 3d at 327 n.23, “[t]he Ninth

Circuit appears to have assumed that a cause of action for monetary relief against state actors

in their individual capacities exists, but its cases contain no analysis and are unpublished,”

citing Campbell v. Alameida, 295 Fed. Appx. 130, 131 (9th Cir.2008) (mem.) (unpublished);

Von Staich v. Hamlet, Nos. 04-16011 & 06-17026, 2007 WL 3001726, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct.

16, 2007) (mem.) (unpublished). In addition, in Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir.

2008), the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in a case involving several

defendants sued in their individual capacities, and in Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989

(9th Cir. 2005), the court reversed the denial of injunctive relief. See also Greene v. Salano

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (9th

Cir. 2008).

 RLUIPA creates a cause of action for suits against “a government”; government is

defined as “(i) a State county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the

authority of a State; (ii) a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity

listed in [that] clause . . . ; and (iii) any other person acting under color of state law. . . .” 42

U.S.C.§ 2000cc-5. As the court in Sossamon noted, this language appears to create a right

against state actors in their individual capacities and it even mirrors the “under color of”

language in § 1983. 560 F. 3d at 327-28. But the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits

nevertheless held that individuals may not be sued for damages under RLUIPA. The

Eleventh Circuit reasoned that RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending

Clause power, not pursuant to the Section 5 power of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715-16 (2005), and that Spending Clause legislation is

not legislation in its operation but operates like a contract, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.

v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273-75. Individual RLUIPA

defendants are not parties to the contract in their individual capacities, and therefore, only

the grant recipient—that is, the state—may be liable for its violation. Id. The Fifth Circuit

also concluded that RLUIPA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and noted that it

also followed the same rule for Spending Clause legislation. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328-29.

Likewise, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[c]onstruing RLUIPA to provide for damages

actions against officials in their individual capacities would raise serious questions regarding

whether Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause,” and so the court

declined to read RLUIPA as allowing damages against defendants in their individual

capacities. Nelson, 570 F. 3d at 889.

 In Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066-70 (9th Cir.2002), the Ninth Circuit

held that RLUIPA is constitutional under the Spending Clause. As the Seventh Circuit noted

 [a]lthough RLUIPA ostensibly includes Commerce Clause underpinnings as

well, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b), there is no evidence in this case that [the]

denial of a religious diet ‘affect [ed] . . . commerce with foreign nations,

among the several States, or with Indian tribes.’ Id. Thus, it strikes us as

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

appropriate, at least in this case, to interpret RLUIPA as an exercise of

Congress's power under the Spending Clause.

Nelson, 570 F. 3d at 886 (citing Smith, 502 F.3d at 1274 n. 9 (reasoning that RLUIPA should

be analyzed as an exercise of Congress's Spending Clause authority when there is no

evidence of an effect on interstate or international commerce)); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328

n. 34 (same). 

Likewise, here, Plaintiff’s claims do not appear to implicate the Commerce Clause,

and so the Court interprets RLUIPA as a Spending Clause enactment, which operates like

a contract with the state, not individual employees of the state. See Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp, 451 U.S. at 17. For the reasons discussed by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,

the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s individual damage claims under RLUIPA.

 C. Official-Capacity Claims for Damages

1. Defendants’ Contentions

As to official-capacity claims, Defendants assert that although RLUIPA provides that

“[a] person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a),

the term “appropriate relief” is not statutorily defined and is not broad enough to waive the

state’s sovereign immunity from money damages. (Doc. #154 at 4-6.) Defendants assert that

the Eleventh Amendment precludes citizens from bringing suit against their own state in

federal court. They note there are exceptions to the broad grant of sovereign

immunity—Congress may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the

Fourteenth Amendment, College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense

Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)(citations omitted); a State may waive its sovereign immunity

by consenting to suit, id.; and a suit may be brought to enjoin a state official under Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), although that exception does not permit a suit for monetary

damages, see Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-89 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. #152

at 5.)

 Defendants further assert that RLUIPA was enacted by invoking congressional

authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715. They

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

Defendants state that the Court should assume, for purposes of this motion, that they

receive federal funds. (Doc. #152 at 5, n.3.) 

- 8 -

argue that Congress cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the

Spending and Commerce Clauses, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73

(1996), and that as to damages, RLUIPA can only avoid the effect of the Eleventh

Amendment if the State has waived its immunity by consenting to suit. (Doc. #152 at 5.)

Defendants contend that although the circuit courts have agreed that RLUIPA

conditions federal funds on a waiver of immunity, they have split on whether it provides for

damages.3

 (Id. at 5-6.) The Eleventh Circuit followed the general rule that courts should

presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated

otherwise. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett

County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). But the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that

a suit for damages is not available under RLUIPA, concluding that RLUIPA does not clearly

alert a state that it will waive sovereign immunity for damage actions by accepting federal

funding. See Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 331; Madison, 474 F.3d at 131-133. 

Defendants assert that although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue

of RLUIPA and monetary damages, the issue was recently addressed in Williams v. Beltran,

569 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1063-65 (C.D. Cal. 2008), where the court followed the Fourth Circuit

and held that RLUIPA cannot provide monetary damages because it does not provide

unambiguous notice of states’ waiver of immunity regarding damages. (Doc. #152 at 6.)

The court stated

[t]he phrase ‘appropriate relief’ is ambiguous, and does not provide the express

language or overwhelming implication that waiver of sovereign immunity

requires. The ambiguity of this phrase is only corroborated by the

disagreement of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits in interpreting its language.

We conclude that a State need not submit to all remedies merely because it

waives its immunity to some forms of relief by receiving federal funds. 

Williams, 569 F.Supp.2d at 1061. The court in Williams viewed Smith’s reliance on

Franklin as inapposite because Franklin involved a suit against a local government, where

sovereign immunity does not apply. Id. at 1061-62.

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

 Thus, Defendants argue that under the rationale in Sossamon, Madison, and Williams,

Plaintiff may only seek injunctive relief for RLUIPA violations; that is, accepting federal

funds does not constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity regarding

damages. (Doc. #152 at 6.)

2. Analysis

 The majority of Courts of Appeals to have considered this issue have held that

official-capacity suits for damages for violations of RLUIPA are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Specifically, the Third Circuit in Scott v. Beard, 252 Fed. Appx. 491, 492-93

(3d Cir. 2007); the Fourth Circuit in Madison, 474 F. 3d at 131; the Fifth Circuit in

Sossamon, 560 F. 3d at 331; the Sixth Circuit in Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F. 3d 794, 801 (6th

Cir. 2009); and the Seventh Circuit in Nelson, 570 F.3d at 885, have all held that there has

been no waiver of sovereign immunity for damage suits under RLUIPA. The only Circuit

to disagree is the Eleventh in Smith, 502 F. 3d at 1276.

It is clear that by voluntarily accepting federal correctional funds, the state consented

to federal jurisdiction for at least some form of relief. See Madison, 474 F.3d at 130;

Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[State] was on clear notice that

by accepting federal funds for its prisons, [it] waived its immunity from suit under

RLUIPA.”). But that does not resolve the issue of the state’s liability for money damages.

Congress can condition funds upon a waiver of “sovereign immunity against liability without

waiving [a State's] immunity from monetary damages awards.” Madison, 474 at 131 (citing

Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,196 (1996); United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30,

32-34 (1992). 

 “In considering whether the Eleventh Amendment applies, . . . cases involving the

sovereign immunity of the Federal Government . . . provide guidance.” California v. Deep

Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 506 (1998). When determining whether a sovereign has

waived its immunity, courts must strictly construe the scope of any alleged waiver in favorof

the sovereign. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. A court may “not enlarge the waiver beyond what the

language requires.” Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (internal

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

citations and quotations omitted) (superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in

D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489, 495 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008)). Consent to suit is never

implied. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247(1985) (superceded by

statute on other grounds). And ambiguities are construed in favor of immunity. Nordic Vill.,

503 U.S. at 34. “In short, ‘[t]o sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of

monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such

monetary claims.’” Madison, 474 at 131 (quoting Lane, 518 U.S. at 192; see also Nordic

Vill., 503 U.S. at 34).

As the Fourth Circuit stated, that “RLUIPA’s ‘appropriate relief against a

government’ language falls short of the unequivocal textual expression necessary to waive

State immunity from suits for damages.” Madison, 474 F.3d at 131; see Sossamon, 560 F.

3d at 331; Cardinal, 564 F.3d at 18; Nelson, 570 F.3d at 884-85. And as the court in

Madison noted, RLUIPA makes no reference to monetary relief—or even to sovereign

immunity generally, and “appropriate relief” is “susceptible to more than one interpretation.”

Madison, 474 F.3d at 131. If Congress intended to effect a State's waiver of Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity from suit for damages as a consequence of accepting

federal funds, it could easily have expressed that intention; for example, the Civil Rights Act

of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (2000), contains a clear waiver of federal sovereign

immunity from monetary relief, providing for federal jurisdiction and permitting a

“complaining party [to] recover compensatory . . . damages” from, inter alia, government

actors. Madison, 474 F.3d at 131, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). 

Finally, the Sixth Circuit recently considered the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Smith,

which found a waiver of sovereign immunity. Cardinal, 564 F.3d at 800-01. In Cardinal,

the court reasoned that Franklin,503 U.S. 60, on which the Smith court relied, was not

applicable to a claim against a State for money damages under RLUIPA. “Franklin did not

involve a claim of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has recognized that Franklin is

not per se applicable to all claims against a State, but only to claims in which a State has

expressly waived its sovereign immunity.” Cardinal, 564 F.3d at 800-01 (citing Lane, 518

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

U.S. at 196-97) (finding that Congress did not waive federal government's sovereign

immunity for monetary damages for claims against it for violations of § 504(a) of

Rehabilitation Act of 1973)). 

This Court is persuaded that the language of RLUIPA, which allows for “appropriate

relief against the government,” does not provide a clear waiver of sovereign immunity as to

damage claims against Defendants in their official capacity. These damage claim will be

dismissed.

III. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

 A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(e) compels the non-moving party to “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [the party’s] pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not establish

a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).

However, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after

adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case and on which the party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the

non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted. Id. at 249-50.

 B. First Amendment

 The First Amendment provides in relevant part that the government shall not prohibit

the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. Nevertheless, free-exercise rights are

“necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve

legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.

342, 348 (1987). To show that his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion has

been violated, a prisoner must demonstrate a burden to a sincerely held belief that is rooted

in religion. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884. To substantially burden the practice of an individual’s

religion, the interference must be more than an inconvenience, Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d

732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), or an isolated incident or short-term occurrence, see Canell v.

Lightner, 143 F.3d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (interference that is relatively short-term and

sporadic was not substantial). The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates “have the right to be

provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of

their religion.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993.)

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

“When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation

is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at

89-91. To determine whether a regulation or policy is reasonably related to a legitimate

penological interest, the court must consider: (1) if there exists a valid, rational connection

between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forth to justify it;

(2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the regulated right that remain open to

the inmate; (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have

upon guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and (4) whether there exist ready

alternatives that fully meet the inmate’s demands at a de minimis cost to valid penological

interests. Id.

In addition, to prevail on any § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). In other words, a particular defendant’s liability under § 1983

only exists where a plaintiff makes a showing of personal participation by the defendant in

the alleged violation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). There is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Id.

IV. Motion for Summary Judgment on the Remaining First Amendment Claims

With the RLUIPA claims dismissed, the Court turns to the summary judgment motion

regarding the remaining First Amendment claims. 

A. Requests for Modifications to Kosher Diet Policy

As previously stated, Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment on the First

Amendment claims was denied as to some claims, including claims for damages for failure

to modify the kosher diet policy regarding food packaging and labeling and regarding the

serving of uncut vegetables. The Court found that it could not determine on the record before

it whether ADC would prevail on the third factor under Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-9: the impact

that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have upon guards, other

inmates, and prison resources. Plaintiff asks for “kosher food in approved recognized

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

original kosher packaging only, unopened by [ADC] staff with [specified kosher symbols]

on their packages. . . . Vegetables untouched by staff in any manner that I can wash myself.”

(Doc. #1 at 16 .) In addition to complaining that packets of salt and condiments do not have

kosher labels, Plaintiff complained about the use of bulk food items, such as Cherrio-style

cereal, that are also used for GP inmates. Plaintiff also alleged that whole vegetables needed

to be washed uncut, but that carrots, onions, celery, other vegetables were cut and “ruined.”

The Court treated these complaints as requests for modifications to the policies for

preparation of kosher meals and analyzed them under Turner.

Defendants now present additional evidence as to these matters. 

1. Defendants’ Contentions

In support of their motion, Defendants submit their Statement of Facts (Doc. #153

(DSOF)) and the declarations of Linderman (id., Ex. A, Linderman Decl.), Johnson (id., Ex.

B, Johnson Decl.), Suwinski (id., Ex. C, Suwinsk Decl.), Rabbi Joseph Shemtov (id., Ex. D,

Shemtov Decl.), Alan Wesley, Eastern Regional Operations Manager for Arizona

Correctional Industries, a division of ADC (id., Ex. E, Wesley Decl.), Mark Horneffer (id.,

Ex. F. Horneffer Decl.), Tamatha Brown, who operates Capital Center Deli (id., Ex. G,

Brown Decl.), and Malinda Strom, Contracts Monitor/Commissary Food Division (id., Ex.

H, Strom Decl.). 

Defendants assert that the changes requested by Plaintiff would have a clear impact

on ADC and other inmates. They argue that for security reasons—the potential for

introducing contraband into the prison—ADC does not permit inmates to purchase food from

outside sources. (Doc. #152 at 19-20, ref. Doc. #61, Affidavit of Edwin Lao, Chief of

Security for Florence Complex ¶ 3.) Defendants assert that vegetables served by ADC are

washed and if they require cutting—such as cabbages, onions, green peppers, whole zucchini

or cucumber, they are cut in the kitchen with a kosher cutting utensil and double wrapped in

plastic wrap. (DSOF ¶ 53.) Rabbi Shemtov attests that this practice does not violate

Kashruth. (Shemtov Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendants also submit evidence that they previously served

whole vegetables on the kosher menu that but inmates complained that they were unable to

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

cut these items and, therefore, were unable to consume them. (DSOF ¶ 54, Linerman Decl.

¶ 11.) 

 Defendants also assert that there would be a significant increase in the cost of kosher

meals if Canteen discontinued the use of bulk kosher items in the meals and used only

individually packaged items. They provide, as an example, evidence of the cost of

purchasing bulk Cherrio-style toasted oats compared to the cost of purchasing individual

servings. Defendants calculate the bulk cost as $.06.5 per ounce. (DSOF ¶ 90.) They

calculate the cost of individual servings purchased from a wholesaler as $.43 per item/ounce

for a 1 ounce size and $.92 per item and $.37 per ounce for a 2.5 ounce size. (Id. ¶ 89,

Brown Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendants assert that Canteen has advised ADC staff that the kosher

menu items are conservatively 25 to 30% cheaper when purchased in bulk rather than in

individual serving sizes. (DSOF ¶ 93, Strom Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendants contend that this is

evident by the $.36.5 per ounce difference between the bulk purchase ($.06.5 per ounce) and

the individual container purchase ($.43 per ounce). They argue that this cost is for only one

item on the kosher diet menu that is purchased in bulk. (Doc. #152 at 17.) 

 Defendants further assert that ADC is on a fixed budget and the State is currently 

running a significant budget deficit, which will require budget cuts. (DSOF ¶ 94.) They

argue that cost to ADC of changing the kosher-diet meals to include individual serving sizes

for each kosher-diet meal would be grossly prohibitive; in 2008 there were 1,965 approved

kosher diets, and the kosher-meal price per meal, per inmate is already the most expensive

diet offered by the ADC at $2.2638, compared to $1, 336 for non-kosher meals. (DSOF ¶¶

91-92, 94, Strom Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendants also contend that because there is a fixed budget,

the extra monies needed to change the kosher diet meals to include individually packaged

servings would have to come out of the general food budget for all inmates and would have

a direct impact on the monies that would be available to pay for non-kosher inmate meals.

Defendants argue that the third Turner factor weighs in their favor.

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

The Court also previously found that Plaintiff offered no ready alternatives, the fourth

Turner factor. (Doc. #138 at 17.)

- 16 -

2. Plaintiff’s Contentions

As stated, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion. Because a verified

complaint may be used as an affidavit opposing summary judgment if it is based on personal

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence, the Court will consider the

allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th

Cir. 1995). As to these matters, in his Complaint, Plaintiff generally alleged that he was

regularly served non-kosher items, such as packets of salt, pepper, and salad dressing. (Doc.

#1 at 6-7.) He alleged that bulk items were replaced with non-kosher items or baggies

without any labeling. He also complained that whole vegetables need to be washed uncut,

but that carrots, onions, celery, other vegetables were cut and “ruined.” (Id.) 

The Court will also consider the allegations in the response to the first summary

judgment motion. (Doc. #133.) There, Plaintiff essentially repeated the assertions in his

Complaint and did not address the impact of the accommodations. (Id.)

3. Analysis

The Court will grant Defendants summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s claims for

damages for failure to provide the requested modifications to its kosher-diet meals. The

Court previously found that the first and second Turner factors—a rational relationship

between food policies and legitimate governmental interests and the availability alternative

means of exercising the right—weigh in favor of Defendants.4

 (Doc. #138 at 15-16.) With

this second motion, Defendants provide evidence as to the third Turner factor—the impact

of the requested accommodations. Specifically, the evidence shows that they looked into

providing uncut vegetables and the purchase of non-bulk, individually packaged food items

and determined what effect those accommodations would have on other inmates and on ADC

operating expenses. As to the request for uncut vegetables, the record shows that when ADC

tried serving vegetables uncut, other inmates complained that they could not eat them

because they could not cut them, and the Court finds there is an obvious security risk in

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

allowing inmates utensils for cutting. Plaintiff does not dispute that other inmates

complained about the uncut vegetables nor does he offer any “ready alternatives” to the

prison’s current policies that would accommodate Plaintiff at a de minimis cost to the prison,

the fourth Turner factor. See Ward, 1 F.3d at 879; O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350 (burden on this

factor is on the plaintiff). 

As to the costs of providing individually packaged foods, Defendants have provided

evidence from the ADC Contract Monitor/Commissary Food Division regarding the cost of

kosher-diet meals and the relative costs of purchasing items in bulk compared to individually

packaged. The evidence, which Plaintiff does not dispute, shows that individually packaged

items are significantly more expensive than bulk purchase items, that ADC operates on a

fixed budget, and that purchase of individually packaged foods would greatly increase the

costs of these foods. These increased costs would come out of the general food budget for

all inmates and would have a direct impact on the monies that would be available to pay for

non-kosher inmate meals. The Court notes that Plaintiff does not claim that Kashruth

requires that foods be separately packaged. The Court finds that on this record, the third

Turner factor weighs in Defendants’ favor.

Thus, the four Turner factors weigh in Defendants’ favor, and they are entitled to

summary judgment on the First Amendment claims for damages regarding failure to modify

the ADC kosher-meals policy.

B. Deviations From Valid Policies

As to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants deviated from their own kosher-meal policies,

the Court denied the summary judgment motion regarding allegations that, in violation of

ADC policies, Plaintiff was served meat and cheese items together and that he saw food

items being prepared without saran barriers between the food and counter tops. (Doc. #138

at 20.) Defendants now assert that to the extent that Plaintiff alleged that Defendants acted

negligently in following valid policies, he fails to state a claim. (Doc. #152 at 18, n.4.) 

The Court agrees that an allegation of negligence would not state a claim cognizable

under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Covenant Media of

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

The Court previously dismissed Schriro and Bartos as to claims that Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights were violated by service and preparation of food in violation of ADC

policies. (Doc. #138 at 20.) Because the claims for damages for failure to modify the

Kosher-diet policy will be dismissed and the RLUIPA claims and all injunctive relief will

be dismissed, no claims remain against them. 

- 18 -

S.C, LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 2007). In Covenant

Media, the Fourth Circuit held that negligent failure to act on the plaintiff’s application to

construct a billboard was not a violation of the First Amendment. However, the court noted

that if Covenant had called, written, or emailed the City to inquire about the status of the

application and the City still refused to respond, such refusal may have established that the

City intentionally refused to act on the application or was deliberately indifferent to the

consequence of having a sign regulation that lacked procedural safeguards. Id. at 437. 

The Court finds that fairly construed, Plaintiff is not alleging negligence.

Defendants also assert that they were administrators who were not involved in meal

preparation or distribution and that they did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s religious

exercise.5

 (Doc. #152 at 11.)

 Specifically, Defendants assert that as the Administrator of Pastoral Activities,

Linderman’s involvement with the kosher diet is to confirm with Rabbi Shemtov that foods

to be served and the procedures to prepare and serve the foods comply with kosher dietary

standards. (DSOF ¶¶ 42, 55.) Linderman attests that his job duties do not include inmate

food service preparation, supervision, or distribution. (Linderman Decl. ¶ 4.)

Defendants further contend that, as the Deputy Warden, one of Johnson’s duties was

overseeing food services. (DSOF ¶ 11.) They assert that he conducted weekly meetings

with the Canteen Manager, toured the chow hall and kitchen, and monitored and sampled

meals and that approximately twice a week, he took a tray off the inmate food line and sat

and ate with the inmates. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) He evaluated the meal for its portion size,

appearance, taste, and quality. (Id.) Johnson attests that his duties did not include ordering

the food items for inmate meals, participating in the meal preparation, supervising the meal

preparation, or supervising meal distribution. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 4-5.) Defendants also assert

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

that he did not ignore Plaintiff’s allegations; for example, Plaintiff complained that the

kosher diet was being prepared by inmates, and, to investigate, Johnson toured and conducted

surprise inspections of the Bachman Kitchen. (DSOF ¶ 71.) They contend that kosher

meals were always prepared by Canteen staff. (Id.)

 Defendants assert that Suwinski, as Contract Management Specialist II at the

ASPC–Lewis, was the liaison between ADC and Canteen; however, her duties did not

include ordering the food items for inmate meals, participating in the meal preparation,

supervising the meal preparation, or supervising meal distribution. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, Suwinski

Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) She attests that her duty was to monitor the contract with Canteen and insure

that Canteen was following kosher preparations. (DSOF ¶ 16, Suwinski Decl. ¶ 5.) She

conducted monthly inspections to make sure kosher standards were being followed. (Id.)

She also addressed issues concerning diets as they were raised by the inmates. (Id.) If there

was a problem with an inmate’s meal tray, Suwinski advised Canteen personnel of the issue

for them to address. (Id. ¶ 69.) Defendants assert that it was not her duty, as a Contract

Management Specialist II, to replace the meal. (Id.) Defendants further assert that Suwinski

was not at the Bachman Unit on a daily basis; her office was located in the Lewis Complex

Business office. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff did not respond. Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint as to these

Defendants are that Linderman misidentified registered trademark symbols for kosher

symbols as did . . . Johnson when specifically confronted.” He asserts that Johnson has

“primary responsibility to supervise the complainee.” (Doc. #1 at 8.) As to Suwinski,

Plaintiff asserted that when she was shown unkosher packs of relish, she had an inmate get

the box, which was marked kosher but “it was for [Heinz] relish packs no longer handed

out.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also reasserted these allegations in his response to the first motion

for summary judgment. (Doc. #133.) In that response, Plaintiff complained that Johnson’s

understanding of Kashruth was limited to the idea that food had to be blessed by a rabbi and

he had “no clue as to the mixing of milk and meat items as a major sacrilege nor did he

understand the biblical laws and significance of Kashruth.” (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff also

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

alleged that he had an exchange with Suwinski concerning a regular problem of substituting

unkosher small hotdogs for kosher knockwurst. (Id. at 3.) He also asserted that the parties’

responses to grievances were that Plaintiff was wrong or that his concerns had been

addressed. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff contended that Johnson stated that kosher food is blessed and

that he saw nothing wrong in the use of pastry that had no pork in it and that Suwinski saw

nothing wrong in using non-kosher cheaper tuna “because of a new revolutionary concept

not included anywhere in Jewish dietary law kosher by nature.” (Id. at 8.) 

The Court will dismiss Linderman, Johnson, and Suwinski. They assert that their job

duties do not included, among other things, supervising the meal preparation or supervising

meal distribution. To prove a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at

371-72, 377. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and, therefore, a

defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92. (1978). “In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where

masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a

misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that a

supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s wrongdoing amounts to the supervisor’s violation

of the Constitution. Id.

Here, the undisputed evidence is that Linderman had no involvement in kosher-diet

matters except to confirm with the Rabbi that foods to be served and the procedures to

prepare and serve the foods complied with kosher dietary standards. The evidence also

shows that Johnson duties were to generally oversee food services. Likewise, although

Suwinski asserts that it was her duty to insure that Canteen was following Kosher meal

preparations, she also asserts that she did not supervise meal preparation or distribution and

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

that she was not present in the Bachman kitchen on a daily basis. Because Plaintiff does not

dispute these assertions, there is no evidence that Johnson or Suwinski had anything other

than a supervisory role, which, by itself, is insufficient for liability. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1949. And Plaintiff’s evidence does not establish any Defendant’s intent to violate Plaintiff’s

First Amendment rights. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the remaining

claim.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. #152). All other matters will remain with the Magistrate

Judge.

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #152) is granted.

(3) The action is terminated with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court must enter 

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 11th day of August, 2009.

Case 2:06-cv-00755-GMS Document 159 Filed 08/11/09 Page 21 of 21