Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02684/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

PysLISH 

Uniced. States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cira~it 

JUL 19 1990 

UNITED STA.'TES 'COURT OF APPEALS 

TEMTl! CIRCUIT : AOBERT L HOECKER 

FREDERICK ~RENCE WHITE, JR.; ) 

BENJAMIN L. STAPONSKI, JR., ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

Clerk 

v . ) 

) 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, INC., ) 

) 

No. 88-2684 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 88-20538) 

Gwen G. Caranchini, Kansas City, Missouri, for Plaintiffs• 

Appellants. 

Paul Scott Kelly, Jr. (R. Kent Sellers with him on the brief) of 

Gage & Tucker, Kansas City, Missouri, for Defendant~Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, McWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Circuit JUaqes~ 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge . 

. 

Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 1 
This diversity case commenced, as one for wrongful discharge, 

breach of contract, and slander under Kansas law. The appeal is 

from the district court's order granting defendant General Motors 

Corporation's (GM) motion for summary judgment on all counts. See 

White v. General Motors Corp., 699 F •. Supp. 1485 {D. Kan. 1988). 

Plaintiffs, Frederick Lawrence White, Jr. and Benjamin L. 

Staponski, Jr., contend that the following errors by the district 

court require the reversal of its order: (1) the district court 

failed to appropriately apply Kansas law protecting whistleblowers from retaliatory discharge; (2 ) the releases signed by 

White and Staponski, which were relied on by the district court in 

dismissing their retaliatory discharge and breach of implied 

employment contract actions, are void due to duress, fraud, 

ambiguity, and unconscionability; (3) summary judgment was not 

appropriate because there remained i ssues of fact to be resolved 

in White's slander action. 1 

Summary judgment is proper when no material issues of fact 

are in dispute, and only issues of law remain. All disputed facts 

must be resolved in favor of the party resisting summary judgment. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standards as the district court. Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 

1557, 1561 (lOth Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

1 We do not reach the merits on the claims of breach of implied 

employment contract because we hold that the releases are valid 

and conclusively bar any action deriving from claims to continued 

employment or the method of plaintiffs' termination. By their 

terms, however, the releases do not bar actions based on GM's 

behavior after the terminations. The validity of the releases is 

therefore irrelevant to White's slander action, which we consider 

separately. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 2 
White and Staponski were both sixth level supervisors at GM's 

Fairfax plant in Kansas City, Kansas. In May 1987, White and 

Staponski's employment at GM was terminated under GM's Special 

Incentive Separation Program (SISP). Acceptance of SISP required 

signing a written "Statement of Acceptance," which provided that 

in exchange for lump sum payments, some career retraining and job 

search skills training, and certain insurance benefits, the 

terminated employees would release all claims to future employment 

with GM and would 

"release and forever discharge General Motors and its 

officers, directors and employes from all claims, 

demands, and causes of action, known or unknown, which I 

may have based on the cessation of my employment at 

General Motors. This release specifically includes any 

possible claims I may have under the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act, the fair employment practice or civil 

rights act of 1964, and any other federal, state, or 

local law, order, or regulation, or the common law 

relating to employment and any claims for breach of 

employment contract, either express or implied. 

I further agree not to institute any proceedings 

against General Motors or its officers, directors, 

agents, employes, or stockholders, based on any matter 

relating to the cessation of my employment at General 

Motors, including, without limitation, actions under the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the fair 

employment practice or civil rights law of 1964." 

I R. tab 10, Exs. 2-A, 2-B. 

Plaintiffs were given two weeks off with pay to consider the 

SISP offer. During this time, they arranged to consult an 

attorney. 2 GM notes that despite White and Staponski's professed 

2 GM correctly points out that although the attorney provided 

plaintiffs with no advice, due to their decision not to retain 

him, that does not affect the fact they had an opportunity to gain 

legal advice during the two weeks they considered the proposal; 

moreover, plaintiffs' consultation with an attorney clearly 

indicates that they were aware that legal advice would be 

beneficial to them. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 3 
dislike of the separation terms, they signed the releases, and 

have retained the lump sum payment and other benefits provided. 

GM contends, therefore, that White and Staponski's claims for 

retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and slander are barred 

by the terms of the releases. 

White and Staponski assert that the releases were executed 

under duress and cannot, therefore, act to bar their claims. 

Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that their supervisors at GM 

gave them two choices--either accept the terms of SISP or be 

terminated with no benefits. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that 

the releases were ambiguous, that their agreement to participate 

in SISP was induced by fraud, and that the terms of their 

separation were unconscionable. Plaintiffs contend that they were 

forced to accept the SISP because they complained of defective 

brake installation at the Fairfax plant. 

I 

Kansas adheres to the employment at will doctrine, and we are 

therefore required to presume, absent an agreement to the 

contrary, that any employment relationship may be severed by 

either party at any time, for any reason. Palmer v. Brown, 242 

Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685, 687 (1988); Polson v . Davis, 635 F. Supp. 

1130, 1149 (D. Kan. 1986), aff'd, 895 F.2d 705 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

However, Kansas does recognize an exception to the doctrine which 

allows a wrongful discharge suit when an at-will employee is fired 

for a reason that contravenes some established public policy. 

Palmer, 752 P.2d at 687-90; Coleman v. Safeway St ores, Inc., 242 

Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645, 647-649 (1988). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 4 
White and Staponski allege that during the last year of their 

employment they complained to GM management of various defects in 

brake installations at the Fairfax plant; their complaints were 

met with resistance; and they were reprimanded by plant 

supervisors for having drawn attention to the def ects. Plaintiffs 

contend that their reports to GM managers constitute 

whistleblowing within the parameters of the Kansas Supreme Court ' s 

opinions in Palmer and Coleman. We agree. In Palmer, the court 

defined whistleblowing as "the good faith reporting of a serious 

infraction of . . . rules, regulations, or the law ( affecting 

public health, safety or general welfare] by a coworker or an 

employer to either company management or law enforcement 

officials." 752 P.2d at 690. Termination in retaliation for 

whistleblowing is an actionable tort, despite Kansas' continued 

adherence to employment at will . Id. 

Nevertheless, to maintain an action for wrongful discharge, 

White and Staponski must demonstrate that they were treated 

differently because of their whistleblowing activity. See id. at 

690 (plaintiff bears burden of proving that she was discharged in 

retaliation for whistleblowing). It is undisputed that plaintiffs 

were only two of many employees who were offered participation in 

the SISP. To rebut the inference of no dissimilar treatment that 

arises from this fact, plaintiffs claim that other employees 

offered participation in SISP were told they could remain at GM in 

some unspecified positions even if they refused SISP; only White 

and Staponski were threatened with certain discharge if they 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 5 
. 3 

refused the program. We accept White and Staponski's factual 

summary of their termination because all factual questions must be 

resolved in favor of the parties resisting summary judgment. We 

therefore assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that White and 

Staponski were constructively terminated because of · their 

whistleblowing activities. Had they not executed the releases at 

issue in this case, they would have had a colorable wrongful 

discharge action. We therefore turn to the validity of the 

releases. 

II 

Kansas law favors resolution of disputes through compromise 

and release. See Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 

P.2d 788, 803 (1980). The existence of a release is an 

affirmative defense; the defendant bears the burden of 

establishing it. Tabor v. Lederer, 205 Kan. 746, 472 P.2d 209, 

211 (1970). 

White and Staponski contend that the releases they signed are 

ineffective due to fraud, ambiguity, and duress. We disagree. 

3 White and Staponski do not argue that they were never told of 

the possibility of remaining at GM. Instead, they appear to argue 

that they were informed just before signing the release of the 

possibility that they could remain at GM in a position of "extreme 

vulnerability." Furthermore, they allege that when asked to 

define "extreme vulnerability," GM supervisors stated that it 

meant a job from which White and Staponski were certain to be 

fired. They do not allege that they requested, and were refused, 

more time to consider this new wrinkle. Nor do they allege that 

they would have accepted the unspecified positions had they been 

offered earlier. Because factually the jobs of extreme 

vulnerability appear only to represent a delay of what was 

presented to the plaintiffs as inevitable firing, we will treat 

the offer as a nullity and assume, for the purpose of this appeal, 

that plaintiffs were threatened with termination because of their 

whistleblowing activities. 

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Plaintiffs failed to allege with particularity any fraud in the 

inducement of the releases. There is no evidence that GM 

misrepresented or withheld any information necessary to the 

plaintiffs' decisionmaking. The district court properly granted 

summary judgment on this issue. 

Moreover, the release documents, which were identical in 

substance, were each only one page long. Although specific 

statutes were mentioned, there is no indication that plaintiffs 

were confused regarding what rights they were waiving. Each 

testified in deposition that he understood his rights and that by 

executing the release he was waiving them. I R. tab 50 at Ex. 7 

p. 61-64 (White deposition); id. at Ex. 8, p. 54 (Staponski 

deposition). White and Staponski, despite reciting a laundry list 

of alleged ambiguities in the releases, do not assert any 

confusion or disagreement between the parties regarding the terms 

of SISP. 

Plaintiffs were given two weeks to consider GM's offer: they 

had the opportunity to talk to an attorney; they contacted 

personnel at GM to ask questions; they attended one of the career 

training sessions offered by GM and talked about the proposal with 

other offerees. We think that Kansas would adopt the view that 

the fourteen day consideration period was reasonable and 

noncoercive. Cf. Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 193-94 

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988) (in ADEA context, 

acceptance of early retirement proposal voluntary if offerees had 

time to consider it and consult attorney; fifteen days not 

unreasonable). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 7 
Plaintiffs argue that GM's threats against their jobs 

constituted duress and that this invalidates the releases. Other 

jurisdictions, in the age discrimination context, have held that 

threats of termination may void releases signed in conjunction 

with early retirement programs, dependent, of course, on the 

facts. See Paollilo v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 821 F.2d 81, 84-

85 (2d Cir. 1987); Henn v. National Geographic Soc., 819 F.2d 824, 

828-29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987); Bodnar, 843 

F.2d at 193-94; Annotation, What Constitutes Duress by Employer or 

Former Employer Vitiating Employee's Release of Employer from 

Claims Arising Out of Employment, 30 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1984). See 

also Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 

1970) (recognizing threat of termination as duress in action to 

rescind employee stock transfer). Kansas has not considered this 

"economic duress" issue in an employment context. We must 

therefore predict what the Kansas Supreme Court would decide in a 

case like that before us. The Kansas Supreme Court has said 

whether facts as alleged by a party are sufficient to constitute 

duress is a question of law, Hastain v. Greenbaum, 205 Kan. 472, 

470 P.2d 741, 746 (1970); thus, we review de novo the district 

court's holding that plaintiffs did not sign the SISP releases 

under duress. 

While Kansas recognizes duress when one party, by a threat, 

deprives another of that free will essential to the formation of a 

legal contract, it is clear that not all threats, even if 

unlawful, will give rise to a defense of duress. Id. The Kansas 

Supreme Court stated that "a transaction cannot be held to have 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 8 
been induced by duress, notwithstanding any threats which may have 

been made, where the party had and took an opportunity for 

reflection and for making up his mind, and where he consulted with 

others and had the benefit of their advice, especially where he 

was advised by his counsel." Id. at 748 (quoting 1 Black on 

Recission and Cancellation, 2d ed., § 223 at 630-631) (emphasis 

added). It is undisputed that plaintiffs in the instant case took 

two weeks off with pay to consider the offer, during which time 

they consulted with each other, with GM officials, with other 

offerees, and with an attorney. We do not believe that the Kansas 

Supreme Court would approach the duress issue differently because 

of the parties' employment relationship, and we think it would 

hold that there was not enough to go to a jury on the duress issue 

in this case. 

White and Staponski argue that the releases they signed are 

void for unconscionability. They argue, inter alia, that the 

releases are unconscionable because they were printed forms drawn 

up by GM, because GM's bargaining power exceeded theirs, because 

the contract was offered on a take it or leave it basis, and 

because the terms were ambiguous or deceptive. See Wille v. 

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903, 906-

907 (1976). 

In order to be unconscionable the agreement must be "so 

outrageous and unfair in its wording or its application that it 

shocks the conscience or offends the sensibilities of the court, 

or is against public policy." Adams v. John Deere Co., 13 Kan. 

App. 2d 489, 774 P.2d 355, 357 (1989). Thus, unfairness alone is 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 9 
not enough--the unfairness must rise to a level of outrage or 

contravene public policy. 

Without repeating previous discussion, we observe that 

plaintiffs were given ample time and opportunity to consider the 

offer. They were paid a substantial sum of money ($54,869.88 to 

White, $66,136.40 to Staponski), were provided with c ontinuing 

medical insurance coverage, and were off ered training courses to 

facilitate their career change. In context, the terms of 

plaintiffs' separation from GM do not appear unconscionable. Our 

collective conscience is not shocked. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the court must consider the fraud 

and duress i n the inducement of the contracts in order to evaluate 

unconscionability. We agree that such circumstances as fraud and 

duress, if they were present, should influence the determination 

of unconscionability, see Wille, 549 P.2d at 907; however, we have 

determined as a matter of law that the plaintiffs have failed to 

present sufficient evidence of fraud or duress to survive a motion 

for summary judgment. 

Because we hold that the releases signed by plaintiffs are 

not voidable due to fraud, ambigui ty, duress, or 

unconscionability, plaintiffs' claims for wro ngful discharge and 

breach of contract are barred by the releases. Summary judgme nt 

on the claims of retaliatory discharge and breach of employment 

contract was properly granted. 

III 

The district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff 

White's slander claim was also proper. In his pleadings and 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 10 
affidavit, White asserts that he applied for a job as a store 

manager trainee with Westlake Hardware. He discussed the job with 

several persons at Westlake, including Cynthia Mason. During one 

of his discussions with Mason, he stated that he had been forced 

out by GM, after eleven years of service. He claims that during 

this conversation, Mason mentioned a lawsuit against GM, then 

corrected herself, and made "some mention" of his being a 

"troublemaker." II R. tab 44, Ex. A-47. From this he concludes 

that Mason must have contacted GM and that someone at GM must have 

referred to him as a troublemaker. 

GM has introduced the affidavit of Cynthia Mason, in which 

she stated that she has not discussed White with anyone at GM. 

Id. Ex. A-48. GM has also introduced the affidavits of GM 

personnel supervisors, who stated that neither they nor anyone 

known to them had accused White of being a troublemaker in 

response to a request for a reference .

4 Faced with these 

affidavits, White cannot rest on his contention that GM has 

introduced no affidavits swearing that no one at GM has said 

anything defamatory to anyone at Westlake. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the plaintiff's burden 

to introduce specific evidence of what was said, by whom, and to 

whom. Schulze v. Coykendall, 218 Kan. 653, 545 P.2d 392, 396-97 

(1976). White's affidavit, which fails to ascribe any defamatory 

statements to GM, is not sufficient to raise a material question 

of fact, and White's case must fail. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 

4 These officials were identified by plaintiffs as being the ones 

to whom Mason spoke (or was likely to have spoken). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2684 Document: 01019570012 Date Filed: 07/19/1990 Page: 11 
at 322 ("[T]he plain language of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56(c) mandates 

the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear 

the burden of proof at trial."). We therefore affirm the district 

court's grant of summary judgment on White's slander claim. 

IV 

GM has requested an award of sanctions and attorney's fees 

against the plaintiffs because, it argues, this appeal is 

frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 38; 28 U. S . C. § 1927; Tenth Cir. R. 

46.5. We deal with sanctions levied by the district court upon 

plaintiffs and their attorney for the filing of this lawsuit and 

their actions in the district court in a companion appeal, White 

v. General Motors Corp., Nos. 89-3159 & 89-3182, ___ F.2d __ __ 

(lOth Cir. 1990) (White II), filed today. We there affirm in part 

and reverse in part, remanding for further proceedings in 

accordance with standards we set out in the opinion. Given the 

fact that we affirm the district court's dismissal of the lawsuit 

on its merits, and that we find plaintiffs' actions in the 

district court sanctionable, it might seem an easy determination 

to award sanctions against plaintiffs and/or their counsel for 

bringing this appeal. But that is not so. 

Had plaintiffs forthrightly acknowledged their signing of a 

release at the time of their termination, and then attacked the 

releases on an economic coercion/unconscionability theory in an 

age discrimination action, that portion of their case certainly 

would not have been frivolous. In Paollilo, 821 F.2d 81, the 

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Second Circuit overturned a grant of summary judgment in an 

analogous case in which the employee was given only six days to 

sign an early retirement agreement. In Bodnar, 843 F.2d 190, 

another similar case, the Fifth Circuit struggled a bit before 

finding that giving employees fifteen days to decide on an early 

retirement program was enough to deny an age discrimination claim. 

With the aid of these cases, we think plaintiffs could have 

formulated a whistleblowing claim also that could not have been 

considered frivolous. 

Thus, plaintiffs might have articulated nonfrivolous claims 

in district court, but did not do so. On appeal they did a 

somewhat better job, and the briefs and arguments on the duress 

and whistleblowing issues, though poorly done, cannot, considered 

by themselves, be deemed frivolous. we decline to hold that an 

appeal is frivolous per se if the presentation of the issues in 

district court was bad enough to be sanctionable. Such a 

draconian rule would make sanctions available in nearly every 

appeal of a case dismissed for failure to state a claim, unless 

the appellant is successful. This would constitute too great a 

chill of advocacy. Therefore, we hold that sanctions are not 

proper here for the appeal on the duress and whistleblowing 

issues. 

On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments that the releases 

were void due to fraud and ambiguity, and plaintiff White's appeal 

of his slander claim, are patently frivolous. Plaintiffs fail to 

cite any evidence of fraud perpetrated by GM and seem totally 

confused regarding exactly what can constitute fraud. On the 

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issue of ambiguity, plaintiffs argue, even in the face of their 

own deposition testimony that they understood the documents they 

signed, that the releases were ambiguous. They were not. And 

plaintiff White's appeal of the court's summary judgment on his 

slander claim, despite his inability to produce any evidence of 

what was said, by whom and to whom, is also a c lear and obvious 

loser. These arguments, however, constitute only a very small 

portion of plaintiffs' briefs on appeal. 

Unfortunately, clearly losing and frivolous issues are raised 

often in otherwise legitimate appeals. A check of recent cases 

reveals at least thirty-one published opinions of the Tenth 

Circuit since January 1988 in which we regarded issues raised by 

the parties as too unworthy or frivolous to even discuss. Perhaps 

we ought to sanction lawyers, and if appropriate their clients, 

for pressing arguments on appeal that obviousl y have no merit. 

But for now we choose to pass our judgment on the appeal as a 

whole. Because arguments concerning whistleblowing and Kansas' 

recognition of economic duress as a basis for setting aside a 

release appear to form the principal basis of plaintiffs' briefs 

on appeal, we will overlook the fact that plaintiffs' lesser 

arguments regarding fraud, ambiguity, and the merits of the 

slander judgment are clear losers. Cf. Granado v. Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue, 792 F.2d 91, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1986) (awarding 

Fed. R. App. P . 38 sanctions, despite appellant's one nonfrivolous 

argument, because twenty-two of twenty-four pages of appellant's 

brief concerned frivolous arguments), cert. denied , 480 U.S. 920 

(1988). 

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ACCORDINGLY, the district court's granting of summary 

judgment is AFFIRMED, and sanctions on appeal are DENIED. 

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