Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03309/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03309-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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SRM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Filiberto Batista de la Paz,

Petitioner

-vsD. Elliott, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-05-3309-PHX-JAT (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Buckeye,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October

5, 2005 (#1). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was indicted in the Gila County Superior Court on August 12, 1999 on

counts of transportation of marijuana for sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, use of

narcotic drugs, use of dangerous drugs, and driving under the influence of drugs. (Answer, #16,

Exhibit A, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the Answer, #16 are referenced hereinafter as “Exhibit

__.”) The charges stemmed out of a traffic stop on August 9, 1999, which resulted in a search

of Petitioner’s vehicle and his arrest. (Exhibit B, Traffic “Warning.”)

/ /

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B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner’s counsel, Anna Ortiz, filed a Motion to Suppress (Exhibit C) the fruits of

the stop and search, based upon the fact that Petitioner had not committed a traffic violation,

and was stopped solely to be issued a traffic warning. The motion was denied, and the case was

set for trial on March 28, 2000. (Exhibit D, M.E. 2/29/00.) Petitioner failed to appear for

trial, and was convicted in absentia on the transportation and paraphernalia charges. The state

dismissed the remaining charges. Sentencing was postponed until Petitioner’s apprehension.

(Exhibit E, M.E. 3/28/00; Exhibit F, M.E. 3/29/00; Exhibit G, Verdict.) 

A bench warrant (Exhibit H) was issued for Petitioner’s arrest. Over four years later,

on or about May 27, 2004, Petitioner was apprehended . (Exhibit I, Executed Warrant.) 

Petitioner subsequently retained attorney Homero Torralba to represent him at

sentencing. (Exhibit J, Pre-Sentence Report at 5; Exhibit N, Motion to Withdraw.) However,

when Petitioner appeared for sentencing on September 27, 2004, he was while still being

represented by Anna Ortiz. (Exhibit K, M.E. 9/27/4.)

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years on the transportation

charge, and one year on the paraphernalia charge. (Exhibit K, M.E. 9/27/4.) On the same date,

Petitioner signed a “Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction” (Exhibit L), detailing

Petitioner’s rights to appeal and post-conviction relief. The notice was in both English and

Spanish. (Exhibit M.) 

In April, 2000, the trial court advised the parties, including Petitioner through trial

counsel Anna Ortiz, of the need to relocate the trial exhibits, in particular the impounded bales

of marijuana. (Exhibit P.) On January 13, 2005, the Court advised attorney Ortiz of the

impending destruction of trial exhibits. (Exhibit Q.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal, or otherwise pursue a direct appeal. (Petition,

#1 at 2.) In his Petition, Petitioner argues that “the petitioner’s attorney [led] the petitioner

to believe an appeal was filed, when in fact it wasn’t.” (Petition, #1 at 5.)

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 Almost a year after sentencing, on August 15, 2005, Petitioner wrote to the trial court

asking for his trial records, including exhibits and transcripts. On August 22, 2005, Petitioner

wrote to the trial court again requesting all of his trial records, stating his intent to file an

appeal. (Exhibit R.) On September 16, 2005, the Clerk of the trial court wrote Petitioner,

providing a form of “Notice of Appeal,” and advising him of the need to file the notice in order

to appeal and have counsel appointed. The notice related that appointed appellate counsel

would be able to access the trial record. (Exhibit S.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner asserts that he filed a notice of post-conviction relief on September 29,

2004, but admits that the petition for post-conviction relief was “not filed.” (Petition, #1 at

2.) Petitioner did file pro se a“Request for Preparation of Post-Conviction Relief Record”

on September 29, 2004. (Petition, #1, Exhibits after p. “7".) In his Petition, Petitioner argues

that “Petitioner attempted to file a Rule 32 proceeding, but filed the wrong documents and time

limits ran out.” (Petition, #1 at 5.)

In the meantime, on October 14, 2004, Attorney Torralba filed a Motion to Withdraw

(Exhibit N), noting that he had been retained to “represent defendant through the sentencing

phase of his case,” but that “[a]fter the sentencing hearing [he] agreed to explore possible

issues for appeal.” The motion was based upon the fact that counsel had “received notice that

Mr. Batista de la Paz had requested a Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. Pro., record in forma

pauperis.” The motion was granted on November 12, 2004. (Id.)

Petitioner never sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals on his post-conviction

relief proceedings. (Petition #1 at 2.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced this proceeding by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on October 5, 2005. Petitioner’s Petition asserts four grounds for relief: (1) the search was

conducted improperly; (2) various errors and misrepresentations prior to and during trial; (3)

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ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (4) admission of false evidence.

On November 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to Amend” (#11), which

the Court construed to be a motion to supplement the record with the traffic warning attached

to the motion. The Motion was granted. (Order 1/5/6, #15.) 

On January 20, 2006, Respondents filed their Answer (#16), arguing that Petitioner’s

claims are all procedurally defaulted, and this his Petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

On April 24, 2006, Petitioner filed his Reply (#22), arguing that his procedural default

was caused by attorney Homero Torralba’s ineffective assistance, i.e. his failure to file a PCR

petition or direct appeal, despite being paid to do so, and despite having represented that he did

so.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies on his claims,

because he never fairly presented the claims to the state appellate courts. They further argue

that the claims are now procedurally defaulted, and thus must be dismissed with prejudice.

A. EXHAUSTION

Exhaustion Required - Generally, a federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner only if available state remedies have been

exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine,

first developed in case law has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking

habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim.

Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S.

1023 (1982). 

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

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1

 The undersigned notes that Respondents argue that the reasoning of Swoopes was undermined by Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). However, Castillo was decided after Baldwin, leaving this Court to conclude that the Ninth

Circuit has found Swoopes to have survived Baldwin. 

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petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals

has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).1

Petitioner’s Claims Not Exhausted - Respondents argue and the record reflects that

Petitioner did not present the federal claims raised in this Petition to the state appellate courts.

Indeed, Petitioner has apparently never made a state appellate filing. Because Petitioner failed

to fairly present his federal claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, his grounds for relief were

not properly exhausted. Ordinarily, that would mandate the dismissal of his claims, albeit

without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). 

B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

However, Respondents argue that Plaintiff has not merely failed to exhaust, but has

procedurally defaulted his un-presented claims. As an alternative to presenting his claims to

the highest state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating

that no state remedies remained available at the time the federal habeas petition was filed.

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.

1989). If, however, the bar to presenting the claims is of the petitioner’s own making, then he

may be precluded from seeking habeas relief. 

If state remedies are not available because the petitioner failed to

comply with state procedures and thereby prevented the highest state

court from reaching the merits of his claim, then a federal court may

refuse to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). This failure to comply with reasonable

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state procedures is usually characterized as “procedural default.” Where an unexhausted claim

would clearly be barred as a result of a procedural default, dismissal without prejudice is not

necessary, and the claim may be dismissed with prejudice as procedurally defaulted. Johnson

v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, to the extent that Petitioner’s claims are now

procedurally defaulted, they are barred from consideration. 

Plaintiff can no longer seek direct review. Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for

filing a direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover,

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See

generally Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. 

Similarly, Plaintiff can no longer seek review by petition for post-conviction relief.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which

are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within

thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the

later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to

successive petition). While Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted

that any of these exceptions are applicable to him. 

Accordingly, it appears that Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted.

Dismissal with prejudice of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is

generally proper absent “cause and prejudice” to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S.

1, 11 (1984); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Cause and Prejudice - If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim,

he may not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and

prejudice” sufficient to excuse the default. Reed, 468 U.S. at 11. “Cause” is the legitimate

excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). “Because of

the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has

not given the term “cause” precise content.’” Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th

Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme

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Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor

external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available to counsel, (citation omitted), or that “some interference by

officials”, (citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 Although both “cause” and “prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default,

a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause.

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10

(9th Cir.1991).

Petitioner argues in his Reply that he has good cause for his failure to properly exhaust

his state remedies, because Attorney Torralba rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when

he failed to filed a PCR petition or direct appeal. 

 Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly exhaust

claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th

Cir. 1998). However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel showing “cause” is itself

subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986);

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). Accordingly, “[t]o the extent that petitioner is

alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for the default, the exhaustion

doctrine requires him to first raise this ineffectiveness claim as a separate claim in state

court.” Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioner has not done so.

Petitioner offers no legitimate cause which precluded him from properly exhausting

his state remedies. Accordingly, the undersigned does not reach the question of “actual

prejudice.” See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended

to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Failure to establish cause may be excused

under exceptional circumstances, for instance “where a constitutional violation has probably

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resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

496 (1986) (emphasis added). This standard for “actual innocence” is the same as that applied

in evaluating whether to allow successive habeas petitions. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,

338 (1992). That standard was articulated in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) as

follows: 

[T]he prisoner must “show a fair probability that, in light of all the

evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with

due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have

been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial,

the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his

guilt.”

Id., 477 U.S., at 455, n. 17, quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on

Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970).

Here, Petitioner does not argue that he was actually innocent of the charges for which

he was convicted. At most, he argues that evidence of his guilt was improperly admitted. Any

such evidence must still be considered by this court in determining Petitioner's "actual

innocence." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 455 n. 17. Moreover, the substance of his habeas claims

all focus on procedural aspects of the prosecution, or claims of improper admission of

evidence, not on his actual guilt or innocence.

C. SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION

None of the grounds for relief in Petitioner’s Petition were properly exhausted, and

they are all now procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has failed to show valid cause to excuse his

procedural default, or actual innocence to allow this Court to consider his claims not

withstanding his procedural default. Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed with

prejudice. Reed, 468 U.S. at 11. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed October 5, 2005 (#1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section

2254 proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: June 5, 2006 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\05-3309-1r RR 06 05 09 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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