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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 9, 2015 Decided June 5, 2015

No. 13-5272

LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT AND AUMUA AMATA,

INTERVENORS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-01143)

Neil C. Weare argued the cause for appellants. With him 

on the briefs were Robert J. Katerberg, Murad S. Hussain, 

Elliott C. Mogul, and Dawn Y. Yamane Hewett.

Jessica Ring Amunson and Erica L. Ross were on the 

brief for amicus curiae David B. Cohen in support of 

appellants. 

David J. Debold and Molly M. Claflin were on the brief 

for amici curiae Citizenship Scholars in support of appellants. 

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Eugene D. Gulland was on the brief for amici curiae

Certain Members of Congress and Former Government 

Officials in support of appellants. 

Krim M. Ballentine, filed the brief as amicus curiae in 

support of appellant.

Wynne P. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

Michael F. Williams argued the cause and filed the brief 

for intervenors for appellee American Samoa Government 

and Congresswoman Aumua Amata.

Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Dina B. Mishra, and Adam I. Klein 

were on the brief for amici curiae Scholars of Constitutional 

Law and Legal History in support of neither party. 

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and SILBERMAN and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: In our constitutional republic, 

Justice Brandeis observed, the title of citizen is superior to the 

title of President. Thus, the questions “[w]ho is the 

citizen[?]” and “what is the meaning of the term?” Aristotle, 

Politics bk. 3, reprinted in part in READINGS IN POLITICAL 

PHILOSOPHY 55, 61 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1938), are no less 

than the questions of “who constitutes the sovereign state?”

and “what is the meaning of statehood as an association?” 

We are called upon to resolve one narrow circumstance

implicating these weighty inquiries. Appellants are 

individuals born in the United States territory of American 

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Samoa. Statutorily deemed “non-citizen nationals” at birth, 

they argue the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause 

affords them citizenship by dint of birthright. They are 

opposed not merely by the United States but by the 

democratically elected government of the American Samoan 

people. We sympathize with Appellants’ individual plights, 

apparently more freighted with duty and sacrifice than 

benefits and privilege, but the Citizenship Clause is textually 

ambiguous as to whether “in the United States” encompasses 

America’s unincorporated territories and we hold it 

“impractical and anomalous,” see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 

75 (1957), to impose citizenship by judicial fiat—where doing 

so requires us to override the democratic prerogatives of the 

American Samoan people themselves. The judgment of the 

district court is affirmed; the Citizenship Clause does not 

extend birthright citizenship to those born in American 

Samoa. 

I

The South Pacific islands of American Samoa have been 

a United States territory since 1900, when the traditional 

leaders of the Samoan Islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u 

voluntarily ceded their sovereign authority to the United 

States Government. See Instrument of Cession by the Chiefs 

of Tutuila Islands to United States Government, U.S.-Tutuila, 

Apr. 17, 1900. Today the American Samoan territory is 

partially self-governed, possessing a popularly elected 

bicameral legislature and similarly elected governor.1

 

Complaint at 13 ¶ 27, Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 

 1 Although it possesses significant institutions of local selfgovernance American Samoa is classified as a “non-self-governing 

territory” by the United Nations General Assembly. See generally 

U.N. Charter ch. XI. 

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88 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01143). The territory, however, 

remains under the ultimate supervision of the Secretary of the 

Interior. See Exec. Order No. 10,264 (June 29, 1951) 

(transferring supervisory authority from the Secretary of the 

Navy to the Secretary of the Interior).

Unlike those born in the United States’ other current 

territorial possessions—who are statutorily deemed American 

citizens at birth—section 308(1) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act of 1952 designates persons born in American 

Samoa as non-citizen nationals.2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1). 

Below, Appellants challenged section 308(1), as well as State 

Department policies and practices implementing the statute, 

see, e.g., 7 FAM § 1125.1(b), on Citizenship Clause grounds 

and under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district 

court rejected Appellants’ arguments and dismissed the case 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 

2013); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal 

Appellants reassert only their constitutional claim. Our 

review is de novo. Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 

F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

II

The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United 

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 

the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. Both Appellants and the 

 2 Persons born in the Philippines during the territorial period, which 

ended in 1946, were likewise statutorily designated non-citizen 

nationals. 

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United States government3 agree the text and structure of the 

Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously leads to a single 

inexorable conclusion as to whether American Samoa is 

within the United States for purposes of the clause. They 

materially disagree only as to whether the inescapable 

conclusion to be drawn is whether American Samoa “is” or 

“is not” a part of the United States. See generally JOHN 

BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (17th ed. 

2002) (“The devil is in the detail[s].”). 

A

Appellants rely on a comparison of the first and second 

clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment—the Citizenship and 

Apportionment Clauses, respectively. They argue the former 

is framed expansively through use of the overarching term “in 

the United States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1, while 

the latter speaks narrowly in terms of apportionment of 

representatives “among the several States,” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In contrast, the 

Appellees look to differences between the Thirteenth and 

Fourteenth Amendment.4

 Partly relying on dictum from 

 3 Unlike the United States Government, Intervenors—the American 

Samoan Government and Congressman Faleomavaega—

exclusively argue Appellants’ interpretation is foreclosed by 

precedents from the Insular case line. 4 The United States Government also argues, “even if Plaintiffs 

were correct that . . . the Fourteenth Amendment should generally 

confer birthright citizenship[,] . . . Congress’s direct modification of 

that status by statute trumps that interpretation.” Brief of 

Respondent-Appellee at 26, No. 13-5272 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2014) 

(relying on Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971)). This 

argument is novel, if curious. Yet it erroneously conflates 

Congress’s broad powers over naturalization with authority to 

statutorily abrogate the scope of birthright citizenship available 

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Justice Brown’s judgment for the Supreme Court in 

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the United States 

Government argues the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits 

slavery “within the United States, or any place subject to their 

jurisdiction,” id. at 251 (emphasis added), while the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause applies to 

persons “born . . . in the United States, and subject to the 

jurisdiction thereof,” id. (emphasis added). According to the 

Government the Thirteenth Amendment’s phraseology 

contemplates areas “not a part of the Union, [which] [a]re still 

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” while the 

Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a “limitation to persons 

born or naturalized in the United States, which is not extended 

to persons born in any place ‘subject to their jurisdiction.’” 

Id.

Neither argument is fully persuasive, nor does it squarely 

resolve the meaning of the ambiguous phrase “in the United 

States.” The text and structure alone are insufficient to divine 

the Citizenship Clause’s geographic scope. The difference 

between the Citizenship and Apportionment Clauses could 

suggest the former has a broader reach than the latter. See

United States v. Diaz-Guerrero, 132 F. App’x 739, 740–41 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory 

interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a 

statute demonstrates . . . [intent] to convey a different 

meaning for those words . . . .”). But, even if this is the case, 

Appellants’ argument does not resolve the question at issue 

because both text and structure are silent as to the precise 

contours of the “United States” under the Citizenship Clause. 

 

under the Constitution itself. Congress’s authority for the latter is 

wanting. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137, 178 (1803) (“[T]he constitution is superior to any ordinary act 

of the legislature.”).

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Even if “United States” is broader than “among the several 

States,” it remains ambiguous whether territories situated like 

American Samoa are “within” the United States for purposes 

of the clause. The Government’s argument is similarly 

incomplete. While the language of the Thirteenth 

Amendment may be broader than that found in the 

Citizenship Clause, this comparison yields no dispositive 

insight as to whether the Citizenship Clause’s use of the term 

“United States” includes American Samoa or similarly 

situated territories. 

Appellants rely on scattered statements from the 

legislative history to bolster their textual argument. See, e.g., 

CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890, 2894 (1866) 

(“[The Citizenship Clause] refers to persons everywhere, 

whether in the States, or in the Territories or in the District of 

Columbia.”) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). “[T]he legislative 

history of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . like most other 

legislative history, contains many statements from which 

conflicting inferences can be drawn . . . .” Afroyim v. Rusk, 

387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967). Here, and as a general matter, 

“[i]solated statements . . . are not impressive legislative 

history.” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 78 (1984). 

B

Appellants and Amici Curiae further contend the 

Citizenship Clause must—under Supreme Court precedent—

be read in light of the common law tradition of jus soli or “the 

right of the soil.” See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 

U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (“The constitution nowhere defines the 

meaning of . . . [the word “citizen”], either by way of 

inclusion or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by 

the affirmative declaration that ‘all persons born or 

naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 

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thereof, are citizens of the United States.’ In this, as in other 

respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common 

law, the principles and history of which were familiarly 

known to the framers of the constitution.”) (internal citation 

omitted). 

The doctrine of jus soli is an inheritance from the English 

common law. Those born “within the King’s domain” and 

“within the obedience or ligeance of the King” were subjects 

of the King, or “citizens” in modern parlance. See Calvin’s 

Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 399 (1608). The domain of the King 

was defined broadly. It extended beyond the British Isles to 

include, for example, persons born in the American colonies. 

Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 

99, 120–21 (1830). 

After independence the former colonies continued to look 

to the English common law rule. See, e.g., id. at 164–65. 

Following the Constitution’s ratification the principal 

exception to jus soli was for African Americans born in the 

United States, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 

393, 404–05 (1857); an exception necessarily repudiated with 

the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.5

 Relying on 

the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Wong Kim 

Ark, 169 U.S. 649, Appellants and Amici Curiae accordingly 

argue the geographic scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Citizenship Clause should be read expansively as the 

 5 During the pre-constitutional period of confederation, “[p]aupers, 

vagabonds and fugitives from justice” were excepted from the 

“privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” 

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (emphasis added). It was 

only after “the adoption of the Constitution [that] it became 

necessary in many cases to determine whether an individual in a 

given case was a citizen of the United States.” Peter Hand Co. v. 

United States, 2 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1924) (emphasis added).

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“domain” of the sovereign under background jus soli 

principles. 

We are unconvinced, however, that Wong Kim Ark

reflects the constitutional codification of the common law rule 

as applied to outlying territories. As the Ninth Circuit noted 

in Rabang v. INS, the expansive language of Wong Kim Ark

must be read with the understanding that the case “involved a 

person born in San Francisco, California. The fact that he had 

been born ‘within the territory’ of the United States was 

undisputed, and made it unnecessary to define ‘territory’ 

rigorously or decide whether ‘territory’ in its broader sense

meant ‘in the United States’ under the Citizenship Clause.” 

35 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Nolos v. Holder, 

611 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 2010); Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 

914, 920 (2d Cir. 1998).6 “It is a maxim, not to be 

disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to 

be taken in connection with the case in which those 

expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may 

be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a 

subsequent suit when the very point is presented for 

decision.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 679.

 6 Because it may also bear upon the impractical and anomalousness 

inquiry, we note the vast practical consequences of departing from 

our sister circuits’ decisions. Despite Appellants’ contentions to the 

contrary, there is no material distinction between nationals born in 

American Samoa and those born in the Philippines prior to its 

independence in 1946. Contra Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 42–

43 (attempting to distinguish the Philippines context because that 

territory was acquired via conquest and because it was always the 

purpose of the United States to eventually withdraw its 

sovereignty). The extension of citizenship to the American Samoan 

people would necessarily implicate the United States citizenship 

status of persons born in the Philippines during the territorial 

period—and potentially their children through operation of statute. 

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And even assuming the framers intended the Citizenship 

Clause to constitutionally codify jus soli principles, birthright 

citizenship does not simply follow the flag. Since its 

conception jus soli has incorporated a requirement of 

allegiance to the sovereign. To the extent jus soli is adopted 

into the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of allegiance is 

manifested by the Citizenship Clause’s mandate that 

birthright citizens not merely be born within the territorial 

boundaries of the United States but also “subject to the 

jurisdiction thereof,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; see 

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655 (“The principle embraced all 

persons born within the king’s allegiance, and subject to his 

protection. . . . Children, born in England, of [] aliens, were [] 

natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, 

of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born 

during and within their hostile occupation of part of the king’s 

dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born 

within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as 

would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the 

king.”). 

Appellants would find any allegiance requirement of no 

moment because, as non-citizen nationals, American Samoans 

already “owe[] permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); see also Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 

at 155 (“[A]llegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of 

obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose 

protection he is; and allegiance by birth, is that which arises 

from being born within the dominions and under the 

protection of a particular sovereign.”). Yet, within the context 

of the Citizenship Clause, “[t]he evident meaning of the[] . . . 

words [“subject to the jurisdiction thereof”] is, not merely 

subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the 

United States, but completely subject to their political 

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jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate 

allegiance.” Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884) 

(emphasis added). It was on this basis that the Supreme Court 

declined to extend constitutional birthright citizenship to 

Native American tribes. See id. at 99 (“The Indian tribes, 

being within the territorial limits of the United States, were 

not, strictly speaking, foreign states; but they were alien 

nations, distinct political communities . . . .”). As even the 

dissent to Elk recognized, “it would be obviously inconsistent 

with the semi-independent character of such a tribe, and with 

the obedience they are expected to render to their tribal head, 

that they should be vested with the complete rights—or, on 

the other, subjected to the full responsibilities—of American 

citizens. It would not for a moment be contended that such 

was the effect of this amendment.” Id. at 119–20 (Harlan, J., 

dissenting). Even assuming a background context grounded 

in principles of jus soli, we are skeptical the framers plainly

intended to extend birthright citizenship to distinct, 

significantly self-governing political territories within the 

United States’s sphere of sovereignty—even where, as is the 

case with American Samoa, ultimate governance remains 

statutorily vested with the United States Government. See

Downes, 182 U.S. at 305 (White, J., concurring) (doubting 

citizenship naturally and inevitably extends to an acquired 

territory regardless of context). 

III

Analysis of the Citizenship Clause’s application to 

American Samoa would be incomplete absent invocation of 

the sometimes contentious Insular Cases, where the Supreme 

Court “addressed whether the Constitution, by its own force, 

applies in any territory that is not a State.” Boumediene v. 

Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See also King v. Morton, 520 

F.2d 1140, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The Insular Cases, in the 

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manner in which the results were reached, the incongruity of 

the results, and the variety of inconsistent views expressed by 

the different members of the court, are, I believe, without 

parallel in our judicial history.”). 

“The doctrine of ‘territorial incorporation’ announced in 

the Insular Cases distinguishes between incorporated 

territories, which are intended for statehood from the time of 

acquisition and in which the entire Constitution applies ex 

proprio vigore, and unincorporated territories [such as 

American Samoa], which are not intended for statehood and 

in which only [certain] fundamental constitutional rights 

apply by their own force.” Commonwealth of N. Mariana 

Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Appellants and Amici contend the Insular Cases have no 

application because the Citizenship Clause textually defines 

its own scope. See Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & 

Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 590 n.21 (1976) 

(“[T]he Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 

(1904) . . . [held] that the Constitution, except insofar as 

required by its own terms, did not extend to the Philippines.”) 

(emphasis added). We conclude the scope of the Citizenship 

Clause, as applied to territories, may not be readily discerned 

from the plain text or other indicia of the framers’ intent, 

absent resort to the Insular Cases’ analytical framework. See

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 726 (While the “Constitution has 

independent force in the territories that [is] not contingent 

upon acts of legislative grace[,] . . . because of the difficulties 

and disruptions inherent in transforming . . . [unincorporated 

territories] into an Anglo-American system, the Court adopted 

the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the 

Constitution applies . . . only in part in unincorporated 

territories”).

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Amici Curiae suggest territorial incorporation doctrine 

should not be expanded to the Citizenship Clause because the 

doctrine rests on anachronistic views of race and imperialism. 

But the Court has continued to invoke the Insular framework 

when dealing with questions of territorial and extraterritorial 

application. See id. at 756–64. Although some aspects of the 

Insular Cases’ analysis may now be deemed politically 

incorrect, the framework remains both applicable and of 

pragmatic use in assessing the applicability of rights to 

unincorporated territories. See id. at 758–59 (“[T]he Court 

devised in the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use 

its power sparingly and where it would be most needed” in 

recognition of the “inherent practical difficulties of enforcing 

all constitutional provisions always and everywhere.”). See 

also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (“The 

Constitution . . . contains grants of power, and limitations 

which in the nature of things are not always and everywhere 

applicable and the real issue in the Insular Cases [is] . . .

which [] of [the Constitution’s] provisions [a]re applicable by 

way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and 

legislative power in dealing with new conditions and 

requirements” arising in the territorial context). 

As the Supreme Court in Boumediene emphasized, the 

“common thread uniting the Insular Cases . . . [is that] 

questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and 

practical concerns, not formalism.” 553 U.S. at 764. While 

“fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights” remain

guaranteed to persons born in the unincorporated territories, 

id. at 758 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 

Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890)), the 

Insular framework recognizes the difficulties that frequently 

inure when “determin[ing] [whether a] particular provision of 

the Constitution is applicable,” absent inquiry into the 

impractical or anomalous. See id.; see also Downes, 182 U.S. 

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at 292 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he determination of what 

particular provision of the Constitution is applicable, 

generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the 

situation of the territory and its relations to the United 

States.”). 

A

American citizenship “is one of the most valuable rights 

in the world today.” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 

144, 160 (1963). “The freedoms and opportunities secured by 

United States citizenship long have been treasured by persons 

fortunate enough to be born with them, and are yearned for by 

countless less fortunate.” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 

U.S. 490, 522 (1981). Accordingly, even if the Insular 

framework is applicable, Appellants cite to a bevy of cases to 

argue citizenship is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Afroyim v. 

Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 

(1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); 

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 103 (1958) (plurality op.). But those 

cases do not arise in the territorial context. Such decisions do 

not reflect the Court’s considered judgment as to the existence 

of a fundamental right to citizenship for persons born in the 

United States’ unincorporated territories. Cf. Wong Kim Ark, 

169 U.S. at 679.7

 

 7 This Court, like the lower court, “is [also] mindful of the years of 

past practice in which territorial citizenship has been treated as a 

statutory, and not a constitutional right.” Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 

98. “[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of 

the Constitution by long use . . . . Yet an unbroken practice . . .

openly [conducted] . . . by affirmative state action . . . is not 

something to be lightly cast aside.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of 

New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).

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“Fundamental” has a distinct and narrow meaning in the 

context of territorial rights. It is not sufficient that a right be 

considered fundamentally important in a colloquial sense or 

even that a right be “necessary to [the] []American regime of 

ordered liberty.” Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 

(9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 

149 n.14 (1968)). Under the Insular framework the 

designation of fundamental extends only to the narrow 

category of rights and “principles which are the basis of all

free government.” Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 

(1904) (emphasis added); Downes, 182 U.S. at 283 

(“Whatever may be finally decided by the American people as 

to the status of these islands and their inhabitants . . . they are 

entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be 

protected in life, liberty, and property . . . even [if they are] 

not possessed of the political rights of citizens of the United 

States.”).

In this manner the Insular Cases distinguish as 

universally fundamental those rights so basic as to be integral 

to free and fair society. In contrast, we consider nonfundamental those artificial, procedural, or remedial rights

that—justly revered though they may be—are nonetheless 

idiosyncratic to the American social compact or to the AngloAmerican tradition of jurisprudence. E.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. 

298 (constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to 

unincorporated territories as a fundamental right); see also

Downes, 182 U.S. at 282 (“We suggest, without intending to 

decide, that there may be a distinction between certain natural 

rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against 

interference with them, and what may be termed artificial or 

remedial rights which are peculiar to our own system of 

jurisprudence.”). 

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We are unconvinced a right to be designated a citizen at 

birth under the jus soli tradition, rather than a non-citizen 

national, is a “sine qua non for ‘free government’” or 

otherwise fundamental under the Insular Cases’ constricted

understanding of the term. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of 

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 

F.2d 374, 386 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Regardless of its 

independently controlling force, we therefore adopt the 

conclusion of Justice Brown’s dictum in his judgment for the 

Court in Downes. See 182 U.S. at 282–83. “Citizenship by 

birth within the sovereign’s domain [may be] a cornerstone of 

[the Anglo-American] common law tradition,” Brief for 

Petitioner-Appellant at 48, Tuaua v. United States, No. 13-

5272 (D.C. Cir. April 25, 2014), but numerous free and 

democratic societies principally follow jus sanguinis—“right 

of the blood”—where birthright citizenship is based upon 

nationality of a child’s parents.8 See Miller v. Albright, 523 

U.S. 420, 477 (1998) (citing various authority “noting the 

‘widespread extent of the rule of jus sanguinis.’”); Graziella 

Bertocchi & Chiara Strozzi, The Evolution of Citizenship: 

Economic and Institutional Determinants, 53 J.L. & ECON.

95, 99–100 (2010) (jus sanguinis has traditionally 

predominated in civil law countries, whereas jus soli has 

historically been the norm in common law countries). 

In states following a jus sanguinis tradition birth in the

sovereign’s domain—whether in an outlying territory, colony, 

or the country proper—is simply irrelevant to the question of

citizenship. Nor is the asserted right so natural and intrinsic 

to the human condition as could not warrant transgression in 

civil society. See generally Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147. 

 8 “In the United States, nationality may be predicated either on jus 

soli . . . or on jus sanguinis . . . .” Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 

453, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (the latter is conferred statutorily).

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“[C]itizenship has no meaning in the absence of difference.” 

Peter J. Spiro, The Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 MICH. L.

REV. 1492, 1509 (2003). The means by which free and fair 

societies may elect to ascribe the classification of citizen must 

accommodate variation where consistent with respect for 

other, inherent and inalienable, rights of persons. To find a 

natural right to jus soli birthright citizenship would give 

umbrage to the liberty of free people to govern the terms of 

association within the social compact underlying formation of 

a sovereign state. Cf. Aristotle, Politics bk. 3, reprinted in 

part in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55, 87 (Francis 

W. Coker ed., 1938) (“The basis of a democratic state is 

liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can 

only be enjoyed in such a state[.]”).9

B

The absence of a fundamental territorial right to jus soli 

birthright citizenship does not end our inquiry. “The decision 

in the present case does not depend on key words such as 

‘fundamental’ or ‘unincorporated territory[,]’ . . . but can be 

reached only by applying the principles of the [Insular] 

[C]ases, as controlled by their respective contexts, to the 

situation as it exists in American Samoa today.” King, 520 

F.2d at 1147. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758 (“It may well 

be that over time the ties between the United States and any of 

its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of 

constitutional significance.”). “[T]he question is which 

guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the 

particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the 

 9 The case before us pertains only to the permissibility of

designating American Samoans as nationals, rather than citizens. 

We need not decide whether constitutional impropriety would arise 

if persons born in an unincorporated territory were also denied 

national status. 

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possible alternatives which Congress had before it.” Reid, 

354 U.S at 75. In sum, we must ask whether the 

circumstances are such that recognition of the right to 

birthright citizenship would prove “impracticable and 

anomalous,” as applied to contemporary American Samoa. 

Id. at 74. 

Despite American Samoa’s lengthy relationship with the 

United States, the American Samoan people have not formed 

a collective consensus in favor of United States citizenship. 

In part this reluctance stems from unique kinship practices 

and social structures inherent to the traditional Samoan way 

of life, including those related to the Samoan system of 

communal land ownership. Traditionally aiga (extended 

families) “communally own virtually all Samoan land, [and] 

the matais [chiefs] have authority over which family members 

work what family land and where the nuclear families within 

the extended family will live.” King, 520 F.2d at 1159. 

Extended families under the authority of matais remain a 

fundamentally important social unit in modern Samoan 

society. 

Representatives of the American Samoan people have 

long expressed concern that the extension of United States 

citizenship to the territory could potentially undermine these 

aspects of the Samoan way of life. For example Congressman 

Faleomavaega and the American Samoan Government posit 

the extension of citizenship could result in greater scrutiny 

under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, imperiling American Samoa’s traditional, 

racially-based land alienation rules. Appellants contest the 

probable danger citizenship poses to American Samoa’s

customs and cultural mores. 

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The resolution of this dispute would likely require 

delving into the particulars of American Samoa’s present 

legal and cultural structures to an extent ill-suited to the 

limited factual record before us. See King, 520 F.2d at 1147 

(“The importance of the constitutional right at stake makes it 

essential that a decision in this case rest on a solid 

understanding of the present legal and cultural development 

of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on 

unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts.”). We 

need not rest on such issues or otherwise speculate on the 

relative merits of the American Samoan Government’s Equal 

Protection concerns. The imposition of citizenship on the 

American Samoan territory is impractical and anomalous at a 

more fundamental level. 

We hold it anomalous to impose citizenship over the 

objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as 

expressed through their democratically elected 

representatives.

10 See Brief for Intervenors, or in the 

Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoa Government 

and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 23–35, Tuaua v. 

United States, No. 13-5272 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2014) 

(opposing constitutional birthright citizenship). A republic of 

people “is not every group of men, associated in any manner, 

[it] is the coming together of . . . men who are united by 

common agreement . . . .” MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE 

PUBLICA bk. I, ch. 25, 26–35 (George H. Sabine & Stanley B. 

 10 We address only whether the Citizenship Clause mandates the 

imposition of birthright citizenship where doing so overrides the 

wishes of an unincorporated territory’s people. We do not doubt 

Congress’s general authority to, in its discretion, naturalize persons 

living in the United States’s unincorporated territories nor do we 

question the expansive scope of birthright citizenship in the 

incorporated territories or opine on the general scope of Congress’s 

powers under the Territorial Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

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Smith trans., Prentice Hall 1929). In this manner, we 

distinguish a republican association from the autocratic 

subjugation of free people. And from this, it is consequently

understood that democratic “governments . . . deriv[e] their []

powers from the consent of the governed,” Kennett v. 

Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 41 (1852); under any just

system of governance the fount of state power rests on the 

participation of citizens in civil society—that is, through the 

free and full association of individuals with, and as a part of, 

society and the state.

11 

“Citizenship is the effect of [a] compact[;] . . . [it] is a 

political tie.” Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 141 

(1795) (distinguishing citizenship from the feudal doctrine of 

perpetual allegiance). “[E]very [] question of citizenship[] . . . 

[thus] depends on the terms and spirit of [the] social 

compact.” Id. at 142. The benefits of American citizenship 

are not understood in isolation; reciprocal to the rights of 

citizenship are, and should be, the obligations carried by all 

citizens of the United States. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 

92 (1958) (“The duties of citizenship are numerous, and the 

discharge of many of these obligations is essential to the 

security and well-being of the Nation.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.

 11 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It has not a 

little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, 

that it never had a ratification by the People. . . Owing its 

ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same 

authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. . . . The 

possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying 

the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere 

sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire 

ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the People. The 

streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that 

pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”) (emphasis 

omitted).

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14 (James Madison) (“[T]he kindred blood which flows in the 

veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they 

have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their 

Union.”). 

Citizenship is not the sum of its benefits. It is no less 

than the adoption or ascription of an identity, that of “citizen” 

to a particular sovereign state, and a ratification of those 

mores necessary and intrinsic to association as a full 

functioning component of that sovereignty. See Minor v. 

Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165–66 (1874) (“There 

cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a 

political community, such as a nation is, implies an 

association of persons for the promotion of their general 

welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a 

member of the nation formed by the association.”). At base 

Appellants ask that we forcibly impose a compact of 

citizenship—with its concomitant rights, obligations, and 

implications for cultural identity12—on a distinct and

unincorporated territory of people, in the absence of evidence 

that a majority of the territory’s inhabitants endorse such a tie

and where the territory’s democratically elected

representatives actively oppose such a compact.

We can envision little that is more anomalous, under 

modern standards, than the forcible imposition of citizenship 

 12 See also, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh 

and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal 

Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 

HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 169 (1999) (arguing that statutorily

“[f]orcing American citizenship upon Indigenous [Native 

American] people [destructively] transformed [their] political 

identity”).

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against the majoritarian will.13 See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 1, 

73 (recognizing self-determination of people as a guiding 

principle and obliging members to “take due account of the 

political aspirations of the peoples” inhabiting non-selfgoverning territories under a member’s responsibility);

14

Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941 (endorsing 

“respect [for] the right of all peoples to choose the form of 

government under which they will live”); Woodrow Wilson, 

President, United States, Fourteen Points, Address to Joint 

Session of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918) (“[I]n determining all []

questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations 

concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims 

of the government whose title is to be determined.”) (Point 

V). See also Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (“American 

Samoans take pride in their unique political and cultural 

practices, and they celebrate its history free from conquest or 

involuntary annexation by foreign powers.”). To hold the 

contrary would be to mandate an irregular intrusion into the 

autonomy of Samoan democratic decision-making; an 

exercise of paternalism—if not overt cultural imperialism—

offensive to the shared democratic traditions of the United 

States and modern American Samoa. See King v. Andrus, 452 

F. Supp. 11, 15 (D.D.C. 1977) (“The institutions of the 

present government of American Samoa reflect . . . the 

democratic tradition . . . .”). 

 13 Complex questions arise where territorial inhabitants 

democratically determine either to pursue citizenship or withdraw

from union with a state. Such scenarios may implicate the 

reciprocal associational rights of the state’s current citizens or the 

right to integrity of the sovereign itself. 

14 But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).

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IV

For the foregoing reasons the district court is 

Affirmed. 

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