Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02512/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NICHOLAS HOROWITZ; and CHAD 

HAMBY, 

 Plaintiffs,

 vs. 

GC SERVICES LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, 

 Defendant.

Case No. 14cv2512-MMA RBB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

[Doc. No. 28] 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 

PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

[Doc. No. 34] 

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL; 

[Doc. No. 29] 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO 

FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL; 

[Doc. Nos. 31, 40, 44] 

VACATING THE PRETRIAL 

CONFERENCE AND TRIAL DATES 

Defendant GC Services Limited Partnership (“Defendant” or “GCS”) moves for 

summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Doc. No. 28. Plaintiffs 

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Nicholas Horowitz and Chad Hamby move for partial summary judgment. Doc. No. 34. 

The Court found this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, Doc. No. 28, and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ 

motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. No. 34. 

BACKGROUND1

 In December 2012, Plaintiff Hamby purchased a computer from QVC on an 

installment plan as a gift for his brother. Doc. No. 42-2. Plaintiff Horowitz was 

uninvolved in the purchase. To complete the purchase, Plaintiff Hamby gave QVC his 

billing and contact information, including a phone number ending in 9515 (“the 9515 

number”). At the time of the purchase, the 9515 number was connected to a landline 

telephone that both Plaintiffs Hamby and Horowitz used at the residence they both 

resided in. Plaintiffs were not married, but had had been in a relationship up until 

approximately February or March 2013. After Plaintiffs separated, Plaintiff Horowitz 

“agreed to pay for the phone bills for the couple’s phone lines for one year after the 

separation.” See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 6. In March 2013, one of the Plaintiffs requested that 

the 9515 number be converted into a wireless line.2

 At that time, the account 

corresponding to the 9515 number was in Plaintiff Hamby’s name, but Plaintiff Hamby 

did not have access to or use the 9515 number after March 2013. See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 

10. Plaintiff Hamby was unable to and did not access any voicemails left for the 9515 

number at any time after March 2013. Beginning in March 2013, the 9515 number was 

used exclusively by Plaintiff Horowitz. In order to check the voicemails left for the 9515 

number, Plaintiff Horowitz would use a third-party visual voicemail service called 

 

1

 The following facts are undisputed unless stated otherwise. 

2

 Defendant disputes whether the landline was converted into a wireless line. See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 9; Doc. No. 

42-2, ¶ 8. 

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YouMail, which would send Plaintiff Horowitz an email with the audio file of the 

voicemail. 

In July 2013, QVC provided GCS with Plaintiff Hamby’s outstanding account 

balance for collection as well as the 9515 number. Prior to calling the 9515 number, 

GCS ran the phone number “against a database of all known cell phone numbers 

including wireless numbers ported from landlines (‘cell phone scrub’).” See Doc. No. 

42-2, ¶ 16. The GCS cell phone number database is updated daily through a file from 

Interactive Marketing Solutions. On July 20, 2013, at 5:29 a.m., a supervisor at GCS 

uploaded the 9515 number into the QVC “campaign” for that day on LiveVox, a dialing 

system. See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶¶ 14, 15.3

 That same day, GCS ran the 9515 number 

through a cell phone scrub, which did not report that the number was within the database 

of known cell phone numbers. A GCS employee, Ruby Cisneros, dialed the 9515 

number in LiveVox’s “preview mode.” See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 29; Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 14. 

“In a preview calling campaign, manual human intervention is required to launch the 

call,” as “GCS representatives are presented with numbers to dial, ‘preview’ the number, 

and then are given the option to either call the number or skip the number.” See Doc. No. 

42-2, ¶ 20. When Cisneros dialed the 9515 number in preview mode on July 20, 2013, 

she received an automated message stating, “I’m afraid we are unable to answer your call 

right now, but please leave a message and someone will get back to you as soon as 

possible.” See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 30. Then, Cisneros left a voicemail stating, “Hello. This 

message is for Chad Hamby. My name is Ruby Cisneros. I’d appreciate it if you can 

return my phone call, and you can reach me at (866) 862-2789.”4

 Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 19; 

Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. O. 

 

3

 Unless noted otherwise, all citations to paragraphs in Doc. No. 39-2 refer to Plaintiffs’ list of undisputed 

material facts and Defendant’s corresponding responses, and not Defendant’s list of additional undisputed 

material facts. 

4

 Although Defendant purportedly left two other voicemails at the 9515 number prior to July 20, 2013, the Court 

previously held that Plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations from bringing FDCPA claims based on 

earlier voicemails. See Doc. No. 13. Also, based on the briefing on the pending motions for summary judgment, 

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When Cisneros called the 9515 number, the caller ID did not display a caller name, 

but displayed only the phone number (760) 979-5306 (“the 760 number”), which 

belonged to GCS. Area code 760 corresponds to Southern California. “The July 20 

voicemail originated from GCS’s San Antonio call center.” Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 21. GCS 

did not actively block its name on the caller ID; rather, LiveVox generally displays 

names in the caller ID as blank. The voicemail was left in accordance with GCS policy. 

Plaintiff Horowitz, and not Plaintiff Hamby, received the July 20 voicemail. Due to the 

voicemail, Plaintiff Horowitz lost one of the 2,000 minutes allotted pursuant to the phone 

plan.5

 

On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff Horowitz called GCS at the 760 number and identified 

himself as Plaintiff Hamby. See Doc. No. 42-2. During the call, Plaintiff Horowitz 

“asked for information on Hamby’s account, including the identity of the creditor, 

amount owed, [] written communications sent to Hamby,” and “information on GCS’ 

phone systems, including its use of cell phone scrubbers, caller ID display systems, the 

identities of the owners of GCS, and then threatened to file a lawsuit against GCS at the 

end of the call.” See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 36. Approximately one year later, on July 16, 

2014, Plaintiff Horowitz called GCS three times. During the second call, Plaintiff 

Horowitz identified himself as Plaintiff Hamby, and initially spoke with Kenneth Wallace 

who later transferred the call to Nancy Zamora. “GCS made an audio recording of the 

call, but no call recording disclosure was provided prior to the transfer.” Doc. No. 42-2, 

¶ 38. GCS does not have a recording of the call after it was transferred to Zamora. 

During the third call, Plaintiff Horowitz again identified himself as Plaintiff Hamby, and 

spoke with Rosa Botello. GCS recorded the call, but did not disclose that it was doing so. 

On July 18, 2014, Plaintiff Horowitz called GCS four times “to obtain facts for filing this 

 

Plaintiffs appear to limit all of their claims to the July 20, 2013 voicemail. See Doc. No. 41, at p. 7:14–26 

(referring only to the July 20 voicemail with regard to the TCPA claim). 

5

 Defendant disputes that Plaintiff Hamby lost any minutes because Hamby did not have access to the 9515 line 

nor was he financially responsible for the plan. 

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lawsuit.” Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 40. In his first call, Plaintiff Horowitz identified himself as 

Plaintiff Hamby and spoke with Julian Coney, but the call disconnected quickly. GCS 

recorded the call, but did not provide a disclosure regarding its recording. GCS does not 

have an audio recording of Plaintiff Horowitz’s second call on July 18, 2014. In Plaintiff 

Horowitz’s third call that day, Plaintiff identified himself as Plaintiff Hamby and spoke 

with Elizabeth Rodriguez. GCS recorded that call without informing Plaintiff Horowitz. 

In the fourth call, Plaintiff Horowitz spoke with Eiphany Golston, but GCS does not have 

an audio recording of that conversation. During that same call, Plaintiff Horowitz was 

transferred to Deborah Guerra. GCS recorded Plaintiff’s conversation with Guerra, but 

did not inform him of the recording. 

Regarding all 2014 calls from Plaintiff Horowitz to GCS for which there are 

recordings, the recordings began before either Plaintiff or representatives of GCS began 

speaking. See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 29. Pursuant to GCS policy, GCS representatives were 

supposed to inform Plaintiff Horowitz that the call was going to be recorded during the 

“initial greeting portion” of the call. See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 29. For all calls for which 

there are recordings, GCS’s representatives either did not inform Plaintiff Horowitz that 

the calls were being recorded at all, or only informed him of the recordings when 

Horowitz asked whether the call was being recorded at the end of the conversation. See

Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 31. 

On July 21, 2014, Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior Court of the 

State of California, County of San Diego, North County. On October 21, 2014, 

Defendant GCS removed the action to this Court. Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated: 

(1) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; (2) the 

Rosenthal Act, California Civil Code section 1788 et seq.; (3) the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act (“TCPA”) 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.; and (4) the California Invasion of 

Privacy Act (“CIPA”), California Penal Code section 631 et seq. The parties have filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ claims. See Doc. Nos. 28, 34. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or 

the part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court 

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing 

the basis of its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and 

discovery that demonstrate absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the 

suit under applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 

(1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. 

The party opposing summary judgment cannot “‘rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of [its] pleading’ but must instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 

515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 827 (2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)). 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to File Documents Under Seal 

Defendant moves to file Exhibits 1, 4, 5, and 7 to its motion for summary judgment 

under seal pursuant to the protective order (Doc. No. 24) issued by the assigned 

magistrate judge. See Doc. No. 29. Defendant contends that these exhibits should be 

filed under seal because they include “confidential, proprietary, and/or commercially 

sensitive business information” regarding GCS and other non-parties, and contain 

personal financial information regarding Plaintiff Hamby. See Doc. No. 29. 

Also pursuant to the protective order, Plaintiffs move to file under seal an 

unredacted version of their motion for summary judgment, as well as an unredacted 

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version of Brett M. Weaver’s declaration in support of the motion for summary 

judgment, accompanying Exhibits D, F, L, and X, an unredacted version of their separate 

statement of undisputed facts. See Doc. No. 31. Plaintiffs also move to file under seal 

unredacted versions of their opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 

Exhibits A and B to Brett M. Weaver’s declaration in opposition to Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment, as well as an unredacted version of their reply in support of their 

motion for summary judgment. Doc. Nos. 40, 44. Plaintiffs state that these pleadings 

quote deposition testimony and refer to exhibits that Defendant has marked as 

confidential for the reasons stated above. 

 Courts have historically recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public 

records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 

Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 n.7 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 

‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 

Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). Where a 

party moves to file under seal a motion or documents attached to a motion, the focus is on 

the underlying motion and whether it is “more than tangentially related to the underlying 

cause of action.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 

(9th Cir. 2016). Where the motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the 

movant must show compelling reasons for overcoming the presumption in favor of public 

access. Id. at 1096–97. Otherwise, a party need only show good cause. Id.

Here, the parties’ motions for summary judgment are more than tangentially 

related to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. After reviewing the parties’ filings, the Court 

finds the parties have demonstrated compelling reasons for overcoming the presumption 

in favor of public access. See Center for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096–99. Accordingly, 

the Court GRANTS the parties’ motions to file documents under seal. See Doc. Nos. 29, 

31, 40, 44. 

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B. Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

 Defendant makes evidentiary objections to parts of the declaration submitted by 

Brett M. Weaver in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, as well 

as several of the accompanying exhibits. Doc. No. 39-1. Because the Court does not rely 

on any of the evidence to which Defendant objects, as illustrated below, the Court 

OVERRULES Defendant’s objections as moot. 

C. Article III Standing 

 Defendant argues the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because 

both Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. To have constitutional standing, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate an (1) injury in fact, (2) which is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct 

of the defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. 

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Defendants rely almost exclusively on 

the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 

1540, as revised (May 24, 2016) to argue that neither plaintiff has suffered a sufficiently 

concrete injury to satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirement. In Spokeo, the 

plaintiff alleged Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”), which is a “people search engine,” violated the 

Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”) in a putative class 

action. Id. at 1544. Some of the information that Spokeo gathered and disseminated in 

response to searches of the plaintiff’s name was inaccurate. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff 

alleged that the Spokeo profile regarding him falsely stated that “he is married, has 

children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree,” 

which harmed his employment prospects. Id. at 1546. The district court dismissed the 

complaint for lack of Article III standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that the 

plaintiff had alleged that Spokeo had violated his statutory rights and not just those of 

others similarly situated, and that the plaintiff’s personal interests in how the defendant 

handled his credit information were individualized. Id. at 1544. Thus, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded the plaintiff had alleged an injury in fact. Id. at 1545. The Supreme Court 

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concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s “analysis was incomplete” because the Ninth Circuit 

only addressed whether the plaintiff had alleged a sufficiently particularized injury, but 

not also whether the alleged injury was concrete. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for consideration of the concreteness of the 

plaintiff’s injury. Id.

 Regarding the injury-in-fact prerequisite, the Supreme Court explained that 

“Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the 

right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Id. at 1547–48. 

Rather, a plaintiff must have “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 

‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” 

Id. at 1548 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears 

the burden of establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 

Regarding concreteness, the Court emphasized that an injury must be real—it must 

“actually exist,” and not be abstract. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548. However, intangible 

injuries may also be concrete. Id. at 1549. The Supreme Court noted that in determining 

whether an intangible injury is sufficiently concrete, it is helpful to look to historical 

practice as well as whether Congress has identified the injury as cognizable. Id. 

However, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean 

that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute 

grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate 

that right.” Id. The Court stated that the plaintiff in Spokeo could not “allege a bare 

procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact 

requirement of Article III” because a “violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural 

requirements may result in no harm.” Id. at 1549–50. But, “[t]his does not mean, 

however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness.” Id. at 

1549. “For example, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if 

their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.” Id. (providing slander per se as an 

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example). Thus, “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient 

in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact.” Id. “In other words, a plaintiff in 

such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” 

Id. (emphasis in original). Lastly, the Supreme Court gave two examples of violations of 

the FCRA’s procedural requirements that are unlikely to result in any harm or present a 

material risk of harm: (1) where “a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the 

required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information” and the information is 

accurate; and (2) where a consumer reporting agency reports an inaccurate zip code 

because it is “difficult to imagine how [that], without more, could work any concrete 

harm.” Id. at 1550. The Supreme Court remanded for the Ninth Circuit’s consideration 

of “whether the particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk 

sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement,” as one of Congress’s purposes in 

enacting the FCRA was to put in place procedures designed to decrease the risk of 

dissemination of false information. Id.

 Here, as an initial matter, Plaintiff Horowitz does not only allege a bare procedural 

violation, but rather alleges he suffered a concrete injury in that he received a voicemail 

at the phone number that he exclusively used, spent time returning the phone call, and 

lost one of the available minutes on the phone plan that he exclusively paid for. Also, 

GCS recorded several of Plaintiff Horowitz’s calls without disclosing that it was doing 

so. Because Plaintiff Horowitz alleges claims based on alleged omissions in GCS’s 

voicemail message, GCS’s alleged use of an automated dialing system in making the call 

to leave the voicemail, and the recording of Horowitz’s calls, Horowitz has sufficiently 

demonstrated constitutional standing to bring all of the causes of action he asserts—those 

provided for by the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act, the TCPA, and the CIPA. 

Regarding Plaintiff Hamby, the issue of constitutional standing is a closer call, but 

under this Circuit’s precedent, Plaintiff Hamby has constitutional standing to assert some 

violations of the FDCPA—namely, those violations based on Defendant’s alleged failure 

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to disclose its name and that it was attempting to collect a debt, and for using misleading 

means to attempt to collect a debt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e(11), and 

1692e(10). Regarding those FDCPA claims, the Court finds Tourgeman v. Collins 

Financial Services, Inc., 755 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) instructive. In Tourgeman, the 

plaintiff had purchased a computer to be shipped to his parents’ home in California, 

financing the purchase through Dell Financial Services (“Dell”). Id. at 1112–13. Dell’s 

records indicated that the plaintiff had an outstanding debt, which was transferred for 

collection to Collins Financial Services (“Collins”). Id. at 1113. Collins’s collection 

agency sent allegedly misleading letters to the plaintiff’s parents’ home. Collins referred 

the matter to a law firm as well, which sent another letter to the parents’ home. Id. Then, 

the law firm filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff in California superior court. Id. During 

that litigation, the plaintiff learned of the letters. Id. In response, the plaintiff sued 

Collins and the law firm (“the defendants”) in federal court alleging violations of the 

FDCPA. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 1112. 

On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked both Article III and 

statutory standing to sue for violations of the FDCPA based on the letters because the 

plaintiff admitted he did not receive the letters when they were sent. Id. at 1114. Thus, 

the defendants argued that “consumers who never receive the offending communication 

have suffered no injury in fact.” Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that a plaintiff need not 

suffer pecuniary or emotional harm to have suffered an injury in fact. As an example, the 

Ninth Circuit pointed to a United States Supreme Court opinion holding that a plaintiff 

who poses as an apartment hunter seeking to “ferret out violations” of the Fair Housing 

Act (“FHA”) has standing to sue for violations of the FHA based on a defendant’s false 

statement that no apartments are available for the plaintiff. Id. at 1115 (citing Havens 

Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982)). The Court framed the 

plaintiff’s injury as an injury to her “statutorily created right to truthful housing 

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information” and was a cognizable injury in fact “regardless of whether the plaintiff 

actually hoped to reside in the defendant’s housing complex.” Id. “The tester plaintiff 

possessed standing not because she had been ‘deprived . . . of the benefits that result from 

living in an integrated community’ but simply because her ‘statutorily created right to 

truthful housing information’ had been infringed.” Id. (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 374–

75) (internal citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit then cited to several other situations in 

which courts have found Article III standing despite the absence of pecuniary or 

emotional damages where the plaintiffs alleged “violation[s] of the rights conferred by 

statute.” Id. at 1116. 

Based on the facts of Tourgeman, the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded: 

Although Tourgeman could not have suffered any pecuniary 

loss or mental distress as the result of a letter that he did not 

encounter until months after it was sent—when related 

litigation was already underway—the injury he claims to have 

suffered was the violation of his right not to be the target of 

misleading debt collection communications. The alleged 

violation of this statutory right—like those rights at issue in 

Havens, Robins, and the other cases that we have noted—

constitutes a cognizable injury under Article III. [. . .] We 

conclude, therefore, that Tourgeman has constitutional 

standing. 

Id. 

 Under Tourgeman, Plaintiff Hamby undoubtedly has constitutional standing to 

allege violations of the FDCPA based on Defendant’s alleged failure to disclose both the 

name of the collection agency and that the caller was attempting to collect a debt, and for 

using allegedly deceptive means in an attempt to collect an alleged debt. However, the 

Court must consider the effects of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Spokeo. 

The Court concludes that the Spokeo decision has limited instructive value in this case, 

and is not at odds with Tourgeman for the following reasons. Significantly, the Spokeo

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decision addressed the FCRA, and not the statute at issue here, the FDCPA. Further, the 

Spokeo majority opinion does not actually resolve whether the plaintiff in that case 

alleged a sufficiently concrete injury, but instead remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit 

for its determination. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1544 (“This Court takes no position on the 

correctness of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion [that the plaintiff sufficiently 

alleged Article III standing].”). 

Also, as the Court interprets Spokeo, the Supreme Court did not purport to alter the 

law regarding standing, but rather to reiterate and clarify it, as evidenced by the Supreme 

Court’s citation to its prior opinions regarding standing. See id. at 1550 (citing two 

previous Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that deprivation of a procedural 

right without harm to some concrete interest is insufficient to confer Article III standing). 

In other words, it is not a new requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete 

injury in the context of an alleged statutory violation; what Spokeo clarified is that 

sometimes a procedural violation of a statute constitutes a concrete injury, and sometimes 

it does not. See id. at 1549 (“[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can 

be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff 

in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has 

identified.”). Unfortunately, the Spokeo Court only concluded that a procedural violation 

of the FCRA is insufficient, and was understandably silent as to procedural violations of 

other statutes not at issue in that case, such as the FDCPA. Accordingly, Spokeo does not 

affect the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Tourgeman that the plaintiff’s assertion of 

procedural violations of the FDCPA amounted to a concrete injury.6

 In Tourgeman, the 

Ninth Circuit framed the plaintiff’s asserted injury in broad terms as “the violation of [the 

plaintiff’s] right not to be the target of misleading debt collection communications.” 

 

6

 The Ninth Circuit explicitly concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated a cognizable injury under Article III, 

and in order for an injury to be cognizable, it must be concrete. See Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1116. Thus, despite 

that the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state that the injury was concrete, the Court infers that it made the 

prerequisite finding. 

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Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1116. Plaintiff Hamby—being similarly situated to the 

Tourgeman plaintiff, as alleged debtors and the targets of debt collectors’ 

communications—clearly enjoys the same right, which he alleges was violated. 

It is also noteworthy that, even assuming Spokeo overruled Tourgeman, Spokeo

stated that even a risk of real harm caused by a procedural violation may constitute a 

concrete injury. In line with Spokeo, in enacting the FDCPA, Congress plainly sought to 

implement procedures that would decrease the risk that debt collectors would use 

deceptive means in attempting to collect debts and, similarly, decrease the risk that 

consumers would be so deceived, putting them in positions whereby they are unable to 

make fair decisions regarding how to respond to communications from debt collectors. 

See Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1121 (“By ensuring that consumers are fully and truthfully 

apprised of the facts and of their rights, the FDCPA enables them ‘to understand, make 

informed decisions about, and participate fully and meaningfully in the debt collection 

process.’”); see also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 

1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what 

Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing 

debtors[.]”). Here, Plaintiff Hamby was the target of Defendant’s debt collection efforts, 

which Plaintiffs contend were misleading and/or otherwise violated the FDCPA. When 

Defendant left the allegedly offending voicemail at the 9515 number, which had been 

provided to Defendant as Plaintiff Hamby’s phone number, and stated that the message 

was for Hamby, Defendant created a material risk of real harm—a risk that Hamby would 

be informed of the existence of and content of the allegedly illegal voicemail, and be 

deceived by it. In sum, Plaintiff Hamby sufficiently demonstrates Article III standing to 

sue for FDCPA sections 1692d(6), 1692e(11), and 1692e(10) and the Rosenthal Act, for 

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purported violations of those FDCPA provisions.7 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 

1692e(11), 1692e(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. 

In addition to those FDCPA claims discussed above, Plaintiff Hamby claims 

Defendant violated the FDCPA’s provision prohibiting a debt collector from “[c]ausing 

charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose 

of the communication” and thus, the Rosenthal Act as well. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5); 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. Unlike the FDCPA provisions discussed above which prohibit 

deceptive debt collection practices, section 1692f(5) specifically contemplates an injury 

in the form of charges. It is undisputed that Plaintiff Hamby did not use the 9515 number 

and was not financially responsible for the corresponding phone plan. Therefore, despite 

that Plaintiffs both used the phone plan, i.e., the 2,000 allotted minutes, and thus Plaintiff 

Hamby lost the ability to use one of the allotted minutes on the plan, it is undisputed that 

he did not pay for those minutes, so he cannot be said to have incurred charges. See Doc. 

No. 42-2, ¶ 47; see also Thomas v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp., 100 F. Supp. 3d 

937, 947 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (stating, regarding a California Unfair Competition Law claim 

that “[i]f unwanted telemarketing calls deplete some of these allocated minutes, the 

holder has lost something of economic value”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiff 

Hamby does not demonstrate a concrete injury as contemplated by section 1692f(5) and 

does not have Article III standing to sue for a violation of that section. The Court thus 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Hamby’s section 

1692f(5) claim. 

Lastly, Plaintiff Hamby asserts a violation of the TCPA.8

 However, in enacting the 

TCPA, Congress sought to protect people from unsolicited, automated phone calls 

because they cause a nuisance and constitute invasions of privacy. Cabiness v. Educ. 

 

7

 The Rosenthal Act states that debt collectors must comply with the FDCPA, provisions 1692b to 1692j, which 

encompasses all of Plaintiffs’ FDCPA causes of action in this case. Accordingly, the Rosenthal Act claims rise 

and fall with the FDCPA claims. 

8

 Plaintiff Hamby is not asserting a claim under the CIPA. See Doc. No. 41, p. 17, n.9. 

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Fin. Sols., LLC, No. 16-CV-01109-JST, 2016 WL 5791411, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 

2016). Plaintiff Hamby cannot be said to have suffered an injury as contemplated by the 

TCPA because Plaintiff Hamby did not receive the offending voicemail, nor was Plaintiff 

Hamby financially responsible for the plan governing the 9515 number. 

Further, even were the Court to find Plaintiff Hamby has constitutional standing to 

assert a violation of the TCPA, Plaintiff Hamby would not have statutory standing 

because the TCPA contemplates liability to the “called party” or the “recipient” of 

offending calls. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). “The only logical interpretation of 

‘called party’ as used in this section is the ‘actual recipient.’” Olney v. Progressive Cas. 

Ins. Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2014). “Because section 227(d) 

unambiguously uses ‘called party’ to mean the actual recipient, ‘called party’ should 

carry the same meaning in other provisions. Id. (citing Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., 857 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1321 (S.D.Fla. 2012) (“The use of ‘called party’ to 

unambiguously refer to the actual recipient in another section of the TCPA is compelling 

evidence that the term carries the same meaning in other provisions.”)). This 

interpretation also comports with the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) 

Declaratory Ruling and Order of July 10, 2015, which stated that a “‘called party’ is best 

understood to mean the subscriber to whom the dialed wireless number is assigned 

because the subscriber is ‘charged for the call’ and, [. . .] a non-subscriber customary 

user, [as] the person whose privacy is interrupted by unwanted calls.” See In the Matter 

of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 F.C.C. 

Rcd. 7961, 8001 (2015) (hereinafter “2015 FCC Order”). Plaintiff Hamby was neither 

charged for the voicemail nor a customary user of the 9515 number. For the foregoing 

reasons, Plaintiff Hamby lacks both Article III and statutory standing to sue for a 

violation of the TCPA, and the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff Hamby’s TCPA claim. 

// 

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D. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claims 

To prevail on a FDCPA claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff has been 

the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt, (2) the defendant 

attempting to collect the debt qualifies as a “debt collector,” and (3) the defendant 

committed some act or omission in violation of the FDCPA. Monreal v. GMAC Mortg., 

LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (S.D. Cal. 2013); see also Gutierrez v. State Farm Mut. 

Ins. Co. (Gutierrez I), 2012 WL 398828, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012); Janti v. Encore 

Capital Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 3058260, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010). Plaintiffs allege 

that Defendant violated the following FDCPA provisions: (i) § 1692d(6) for failing to 

disclose the name of the collection agency, (ii) § 1692e(11) for failing to disclose that the 

debt collector is attempting to collect a debt, (iii) § 1692e(10) for using deceptive means 

in an attempt to collect an alleged debt, and (iv) § 1692f(5) for causing charges to be 

made to the cell phone bill. The Court discusses each alleged violation in turn. 

i. Section 1692d(6) 

 First, Plaintiffs allege GCS violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) by omitting GCS’s name 

in the voicemail message left on July 20, 2013. Section 1692d(6) states: 

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural 

consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person 

in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the 

general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a 

violation of this section: 

[. . .] 

(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, 

the placement of telephone calls without 

meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). Section 1692b governs a debt collector’s communications “with 

any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information 

about the consumer.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 

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 Defendant argues Plaintiff Horowitz lacks statutory standing to bring this claim 

because he is a non-consumer. See Doc. No. 28. Under section 1692a(3), “[t]he term 

‘consumer’ means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). It is undisputed that only Plaintiff Hamby was allegedly liable 

for the debt owed to QVC and is accordingly the “consumer,” as defined by section 

1692a(3). However, section 1692d does not limit statutory standing to consumers. 

Rather, section 1692d states that a debt collector must not engage in the prohibited 

conduct as to “any person.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Further, section 1692b does not 

create an exception here. Plaintiffs do not allege a violation of section 1692b and section 

1692b is not otherwise applicable to this case because, as evidenced by the July 20 

voicemail, GCS did not call the 9515 number and leave a message in order to reach a 

person “other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about 

the consumer.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. In the July 20 voicemail, the GCS representative 

stated that the voicemail was meant for Chad Hamby, the consumer, and thus the 

representative did not leave the voicemail in order to speak with Plaintiff Horowitz 

regarding Plaintiff Hamby’s whereabouts. Accordingly, GCS’s call does not fall within 

the exception provided by section 1692b. 

 Further, the cases that Defendant cites in support of its argument are unpersuasive 

for the proposition that Plaintiff Horowitz cannot sue under 1692d(6). For example, in 

Sanchez v. Client Servs., Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2007), the court found a 

plaintiff who received a phone call regarding a debt her mother allegedly owed lacked 

statutory standing under the FDCPA, but it is silent as to what provisions of the FDCPA 

the court was referring to. Further, the court based its determination on the fact that the 

plaintiff did not fall within the definition of “consumer” in section 1692a(3). Id. at 1155, 

n.3. While the ability to sue under some provisions of the FDCPA may be dependent on 

one’s status as a consumer, the plain language of section 1692d does not limit liability to 

consumers. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) 

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(stating there is “no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words 

by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes”). Also, in Sclafani v. 

BC Servs., Inc., No. 10-61360-CIV-HUCK, 2010 WL 4116471 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010) 

and Worsham v. Accounts Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 497 F. App’x 274 (4th Cir. 2012), the 

courts found the defendants did not violate section 1692d(6) because the subject phone 

calls fell within the exception under section 1692b. Sclafani, 2010 WL 4116471 at *2; 

Worsham, 497 F. App’x at 277–278. As discussed above, Defendant’s voicemail does 

not fall within that exception. It is also noteworthy that the Sclafani court, although 

ultimately concluding that the section 1692b exception applied, stated, “[s]ection 1692d 

does not require that the person alleging a violation be a consumer.” Id. Thus, the Court 

is satisfied that Plaintiff Horowitz’s status as a non-consumer does not preclude him from 

asserting a cause of action under section 1692d(6). 

 Defendant also argues the FDCPA does not provide a right to “meaningful 

disclosure of the caller’s identity” to Plaintiff Horowitz, as a non-consumer, because if 

debt collectors were required to disclose their identity to third parties, they would 

necessarily violate section 1692c(b). See Doc. No. 28. Section 1692c(b) restricts debt 

collection agencies from communicating with third parties in connection with the 

collection of any debt, except as provided in section 1692b. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 

In Fashakin, the court stated that it was sympathetic to the defendant’s argument that “a 

debt collector confronted by a third-party gatekeeper [. . .] while attempting to contact the 

debtor, cannot both provide meaningful disclosure pursuant to § 1692d(6) and comply 

with the requirements of § 1692c(b).” Fashakin v. Nextel Commc’ns, No. 05-CV-3080 

(RRM), 2009 WL 790350 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009). The court “harmonized” the 

two provisions by recognizing that (1) “the meaningful disclosure requirements of § 

1692d(6) only apply when the telephone calls being placed are made directly to the 

consumer” or a party whom the consumer has consented to receiving communication, 

and “(2) that debt collectors, who, in attempting to reach a debtor, instead speak with a . . 

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. receptionist or . . . third-party, may not make a meaningful disclosure of identity to this 

third-party without running afoul of [section 1692c(b)].” Id. at *8. 

However, it does not follow that Defendant had to either leave a voicemail lacking 

the disclosures required by section 1692d(6) or leave a voicemail that violates section 

1692c(b). As the Eleventh Circuit as well as other courts have noted in relatively similar 

circumstances, “even if Niagara’s assumption [that leaving required disclosures on 

voicemails would violate 1692c(b) if heard by third parties] is correct, the answer is that 

the Act does not guarantee a debt collector the right to leave answering machine 

messages.” See Edwards v. Niagara Credit Sols., Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 

2009); Sclafani, 2010 WL 4116471 at *3 (allowing a third party non-consumer to sue for 

a violation of section 1692d(6)) (“If BC Services could not leave voice messages that 

simultaneously complied with the multiple applicable provisions of FDCPA, it should not 

have left the offending voice messages.”). Thus, Defendant was not required to, nor had 

a right to, leave a voicemail at the 9515 number. For the foregoing reasons, the Court is 

unpersuaded that, based on Defendant’s rock-and-a-hard-place argument, it must 

conclude that non-consumers may not allege violations of section 1692d despite that the 

provision does not explicitly limit liability to consumers, and in fact, provides for liability 

to “any person.” 

As an alternative ground, Defendant contends it is entitled to summary judgment 

on this claim based on a bona fide error defense pursuant to section 1692k(c), which 

provides a “narrow exception to strict liability under the FDCPA.” See Clark v. Capital 

Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006). Specifically, 

section 1692k(c) states:

A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought 

under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a 

preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional 

and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 

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maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any 

such error. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). The debt collector has the burden of proof in demonstrating 

the bona fide error affirmative defense applies. See Forkum v. Co-Operative Adjustment 

Bureau, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 959, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

 Defendant argues it maintains “reasonable policies and procedures to avoid 

violations of the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act,” including a “comprehensive training 

program.” See Doc. No. 28, pp. 17–18. Defendant contends that “as it pertains to the 

allegations in this case, the GCS collectors were explicitly trained to avoid disclosing any 

information in a voicemail regarding a consumer’s debt to a non-consumer such as 

Horowitz” and, “[t]he voicemails confirm that the collectors acted in accordance with 

their training.” See Doc. No. 28. However, Plaintiffs do not allege GCS illegally 

disclosed information regarding a consumer’s debt to a non-consumer. Plaintiffs allege 

the opposite—that Defendant was required to, and failed to, comply with disclosure 

requirements under section 1692d(6) when it chose to leave a voicemail at the 9515 

number. Accordingly, it’s unclear how Defendant’s policies and procedures protect it 

from liability. 

At most, the Court can construe Defendant’s assertion of the defense as an 

argument that Defendant made a legal mistake—however reasonable or unreasonable—

regarding the constitutional and/or statutory standing of persons situated as Plaintiffs are 

in this case. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the FDCPA’s bona 

fide error defense does not apply “to a violation resulting from a debt collector’s 

mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.” Jerman v. Carlisle, 

McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 576–77 (2010). The Supreme 

Court stated, “[o]ur law is [] no stranger to the possibility that an act may be ‘intentional’ 

for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct 

violated the law.” Id. at 582. Further, the Supreme Court found “force in the suggestion 

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[. . .] that the broad statutory requirement of procedures reasonably designed to avoid 

‘any’ bona fide error indicates that the relevant procedures are ones that help to avoid 

errors like clerical or factual mistakes.” Id. at 587. Defendant only points to procedures 

that are supposed to guard against violations of the law, but those do not shield Defendant 

from liability according to Jerman. Accordingly, Defendant has not satisfied its burden 

to demonstrate that its conduct is exempt from liability under section 1692k(c). 

 Because Defendant makes no further arguments in support of its motion for 

summary judgment on this claim, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiffs’ section 1692d(6) claim. 

The Court now turns to Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of summary judgment in 

their favor on this claim. Plaintiffs argue that it is undisputed that Defendant’s July 20 

voicemail “failed to meaningfully disclose that it was coming from a debt collector.” 

Doc. No. 34. Plaintiffs are correct. “The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed what is 

required to satisfy the ‘meaningful disclosure’ element of § 1692d(6), however district 

courts in the Circuit increasingly agree that meaningful disclosure ‘requires that the caller 

must state his or her name and capacity, and disclose enough information so as not to 

mislead the recipient as to the purpose of the call.’” Moritz v. Daniel N. Gordon, P.C., 

895 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Courts in this Circuit have concluded 

that where a debt collection agency’s employees fail to disclose the defendant’s identity 

and the nature of defendant’s business in calls or messages, they violate section 

1692d(6)’s meaningful disclosure requirement. Id. (citing Costa v. Nat’l Action Fin. 

Servs., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2007) and Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. 

Associates, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). Defendant does not 

dispute the content of the voicemail, and the agent leaving the voicemail only stated her 

name, but not that she was calling on behalf of GCS, or the nature of GCS’s business as a 

debt collection agency. See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 19; Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. O. 

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to 

their section 1692d(6) claim. Doc. No. 34. 

ii. Section 1692e(11)

 Second, Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) by failing to 

disclose that it was attempting to collect an alleged debt. Section 1692e(11) states: 

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any 

debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, 

the following conduct is a violation of this section: 

[...] 

(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written 

communication with the consumer and, in 

addition, if the initial communication with the 

consumer is oral, in that initial oral 

communication, that the debt collector is 

attempting to collect a debt and that any 

information obtained will be used for that purpose, 

and the failure to disclose in subsequent 

communications that the communication is from a 

debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not 

apply to a formal pleading made in connection 

with a legal action. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 

Defendant argues Plaintiff Horowitz lacks statutory standing to bring this claim 

because he is not a consumer as defined by section 1692a(3). Doc. No. 28. Defendant is 

correct. Liability under section 1692e(11) is limited to consumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(11). As noted above, Horowitz is not a consumer under the FDCPA because it is 

undisputed that he was not “obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt” to GCS. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Accordingly, only Plaintiff Hamby, as the alleged debtor, has 

standing to assert a violation of this provision. Defendant’s only other argument as to 

why it is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff Hamby’s claim under section 

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1692e(11) is that Plaintiff Hamby does not have constitutional standing, but the Court 

rejects that argument, as discussed above.9

 

At first blush, the Court finds summary judgment appears appropriate in Plaintiff 

Hamby’s favor. For example, the majority of courts find voicemails are communications 

that must conform to the disclosure requirements of section 1692e(11). See e.g., Lensch 

v. Armada Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2011); Horkey v. JVDB & 

Associates, Inc., 333 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2003); Pasquale v. Law Offices of Nelson & 

Kennard, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Further, summary judgment 

appears appropriate based on the explicit requirements of section 1692e(11) and the 

undisputed content of Defendant’s July 20 voicemail. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 

However, Plaintiffs do not move for summary judgment on this claim. See Doc. 

No. 34. A court may grant summary judgment sua sponte where warranted. See 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. However, 

the Ninth Circuit has reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in a similar 

scenario, Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1993). In Buckingham, the 

district court, after only hearing argument on the defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at 742–743. The Ninth 

Circuit reversed, stating that the district court should have provided the defendant an 

opportunity to raise any disputed issues of material fact it would wish to in opposition of 

summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 742. Accordingly, Defendant must be 

afforded the opportunity to address whether the Court should enter judgment in Plaintiff 

Hamby’s favor on his claim for a violation of section 1692e(11). 

// 

// 

 

9

 Defendant generally states that it is entitled to the bona fide error defense with regard to Plaintiffs’ FDCPA 

claims, but does not explain how it would be entitled to such a defense as to the alleged violations of sections 

1692e(11), e(10), or f(5). See Doc. Nos. 28, 39, 47. Accordingly, Defendant has not satisfied its burden to 

demonstrate its entitlement to the defense as to any claims arising out of those sections. 

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Thus, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Defendant may serve and file a response to this Order on or before 

December 23, 2016. 

2. Plaintiff may serve and file a response to this Order on or before

January 6, 2017. 

3. The trial of this matter previously scheduled for February 7, 2017, as well 

as the Pretrial Conference set for January 17, 2017, are VACATED and 

will be reset subsequent to the Court’s final determination of which 

issues are appropriate for summary judgment. 

iii. Section 1692e(10) 

 Third, Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), which prohibits 

“[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect 

any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s 

use of a local phone number—the 760 number—to call the 9515 number from San 

Antonio, Texas violated this provision. See Doc. No. 34. Plaintiff argues “this 

duplicitous act could frustrate a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her 

response to the call.” See Doc. No. 34. Defendant contends it is entitled to summary 

judgment on this claim because the 760 is number is not false and thus “there was no 

false information contained on Horowitz’s caller ID display.” See Doc. No. 28. It is 

undisputed that when Defendant called and left the July 20 voicemail, the caller 

identification listed the 760 number, but did not display a name corresponding to the 

number. Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 31. The parties also do not dispute that the 760 number 

“belonged to GCS at the time” of the July 20 call, and that “GCS did not actively block 

(or push) display of its name on the caller ID.” Id. 

 Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Defendant’s use of a number with 

a local area code to place a call from a different state violated the FDCPA. “Whether 

conduct violates § 1692e requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether 

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the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication.” Forkum v. 

Co-Operative Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 959, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

 “A debt collector’s liability under § 1692e of the FDCPA is an issue of law.” Id. (citing 

Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Servs., Inc., 660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011)). Here, 

the Court finds the least sophisticated debtor would not find Defendant’s conduct 

deceptive because the 760 number belonged to Defendant, and Defendant’s July 20 

voicemail provided a phone number with an 866 area code. The provision of an 866 

phone number undermines the idea that the least sophisticated debtor would think the 

caller was local. Also, a handful of courts have granted summary judgment in favor of 

debt collectors in relatively similar cases. See e.g., Scheffler v. Integrity Fin. Partners, 

Inc., No. CIV. 12-188 DWF/TNL, 2013 WL 9768539, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2013) 

(granting summary judgment in the defendant’s favor where the defendant had called 

from Minnesota, but used a Kansas number that it owned); Bien v. Stellar Recovery, Inc., 

No. CA 14-366 S, 2015 WL 5554670, at *3 (D.R.I. Sept. 21, 2015); Carman v. CBE 

Grp., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1234 (D. Kan. 2011). As a final note, Plaintiffs point 

the Court to a GCS employee’s deposition testimony to make an argument regarding 

GCS’s intentions behind using local phone numbers. However, GCS’s intentions are not 

relevant to whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled. 

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiffs’ claim based on 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 

iv. Section 1692f(5) 

 Fourth, Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5) by causing 

charges to be made to Plaintiffs’ cell phone bill in the form of one lost minute on their 

2,000-minute plan. As discussed above, only Plaintiff Horowitz has standing to allege a 

violation of this section of the FDCPA. Section 1692f(5) prohibits “[c]ausing charges to 

be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the 

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communication,” which includes, but is not limited to, charges such as “collect telephone 

calls and telegram fees.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5). 

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because it did 

not conceal the purpose of its phone call. Defendant argues it was required to refrain 

from disclosing to Plaintiff Horowitz that it was attempting to collect Plaintiff Hamby’s 

debt, and that Plaintiff Hamby was not charged. The Court agrees that Plaintiff Hamby 

cannot sue under this section. However, the Court, as discussed above, rejects 

Defendant’s rock-and-a-hard-place argument as an argument for nonliability to Plaintiff 

Horowitz. Defendant makes no further arguments in support of its motion to dismiss this 

claim. Plaintiff Horowitz contends it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim 

because Horowitz lost a minute on his cell phone plan, which he paid for. Plaintiff 

produces a Verizon bill indicating that the July 20 voicemail caused the loss of one 

minute on the plan. Defendant does make any arguments nor produce any evidence to 

dispute that Plaintiff Horowitz lost a minute on the plan he paid for. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff Horowitz’s claim for violation of section 1692f(5), and DENIES Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment as to that claim. 

E. Rosenthal Act Claims 

Plaintiffs also bring claims for violations of California’s Rosenthal Act. The 

Rosenthal Act is California’s version of the FDCPA, as it “mimics or incorporates by 

reference the FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes available the FDCPA’s remedies for 

violations. Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012); see Cal. 

Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. Accordingly, whether an act “violates the Rosenthal Act turns 

on whether it violates the FDCPA.” Riggs, 681 F.3d at 1100. Rosenthal Act violations 

and FDCPA violations are viewed identically. Thus, the Court’s above rulings regarding 

the parties’ motions for summary judgment as to the FDCPA claims apply equally to 

Plaintiffs’ Rosenthal Act claims. 

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F. Telephone Consumer Protection Act Claim 

Additionally, Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated the TCPA. As discussed, only 

Plaintiff Horowitz has standing to bring this claim. The purpose of the TCPA is to 

protect the privacy interests of telephone users by placing restrictions on unsolicited, 

automated telephone calls. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 

(9th Cir. 2009). Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA prohibits “mak[ing] any call 

(other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of 

the called party)10 using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or 

prerecorded voice–(iii) to any telephone number assigned . . . to the cellular telephone 

service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). In other words, to prove a TCPA claim, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant called a cellular telephone number. See

Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012); 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). “The term ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ means ‘equipment 

that has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a 

random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.’” Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 

227(a)(1). 

In response to Plaintiffs’ assertion that they ported the 9515 number from a 

landline to a cellular plan in March 2013, Defendant argues “the testimony and records 

reflect only that in March 2013, one of the Plaintiffs requested the 9515 Number be 

converted from a landline phone to a wireless phone.” See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶ 7. 

Defendant states, “[t]here is no evidence in the record as to when the 9515 Number was 

actually converted to wireless.” Id. (emphasis in original). However, Defendant’s 

response merely amounts to an argument that Plaintiff has not sufficiently proven the line 

was ported to a cellular plan, rather than producing any evidence to demonstrate that the 

line was in fact not converted. Further, the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the 

 

10 The parties do not dispute that neither one of the plaintiffs consented to the call, and that Defendant did not call 

the 9515 number for emergency purposes. 

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line was ported in March 2013. In sworn deposition testimony, both Plaintiff Hamby and 

Plaintiff Horowitz state that the line was ported from a landline to a wireless service. 

Plaintiff Hamby recalls that occurred around “February 28th of 2013,” while Plaintiff 

Horowitz recalls it occurring in March 2013. Additionally, Plaintiffs provide a record 

that Verizon produced in response to Plaintiffs’ subpoena, which indicates that someone 

made a port request for the 9515 number, and that the “customer’s old provider [] agreed 

to release the number to Verizon Wireless” on March 26, 2013. Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. N 

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs also provide a Verizon Wireless bill, which indicates that 

the 9515 number was included on a plan allowing texting and calling from July 16, 3013 

to August 15, 2013. See Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. W (describing the plan as “Nationwide 

TLK&TXT Share 2000”). That evidence, in combination, suffices to demonstrate that 

the 9515 number had been ported to a cellular plan by the time of the July 20 voicemail. 

The Court now turns to whether either party is entitled to summary judgment on 

the issue of whether Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). 

Defendant argues it did not use an ATDS because the call was “made in preview mode, 

which entails a GCS manager selecting the numbers to be dialed that day by creating a 

‘campaign’ and loading the campaign into GCS’ dialing system.” Doc. No. 28. Then, “a 

specific number is presented to an agent, who then [. . .] must launch the call manually” if 

the agent chooses to. See Doc. No. 28. Defendant argues that “[b]ecause human 

intervention was required to make the call, it was not made with an ATDS.” See Doc. 

No. 28. Plaintiff does not dispute those facts, but rather argues that, under the law, the 

system is an ATDS. Plaintiff relies heavily on the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Declaratory 

Ruling and Order,11 which discussed the definition of autodialers. See Doc. No. 34; 2015 

FCC Order. The FCC stated: 

 

11 “Since the statute’s passage in 1991, the FCC has issued regulations expanding the statutory definition of an 

ATDS, and this Court is bound by those rulings under the Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 

2342(1). See Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2015). 

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We reaffirm our previous statements that dialing equipment 

generally has the capacity to store or produce, and dial random 

or sequential numbers (and thus meets the TCPA’s definition of 

“autodialer”) even if it is not presently used for that purpose, 

including when the caller is calling a set list of consumers. We 

also reiterate that predictive dialers, as previously described by 

the Commission, satisfy the TCPA’s definition of “autodialer” 

for the same reason. 

See 2015 FCC Order, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 7971–72 (emphasis added). Later in the FCC 

Order, the FCC again emphasized, “that Congress intended a broad definition of 

autodialer, and that the Commission has already twice [stated] that autodialers need only 

have the ‘capacity’ to dial random and sequential numbers, rather than the ‘present 

ability’ to do so.” Id. at 7974. “Hence, any equipment that has the requisite ‘capacity’ is 

an autodialer and is therefore subject to the TCPA.” Id. The FCC Order also touches on 

the interplay of human intervention, stating that one of the “basic functions of an 

autodialer [is] to ‘dial numbers without human intervention.’” Id. at 7975. “How the 

human intervention element applies to a particular piece of equipment is specific to each 

individual piece of equipment, based on how the equipment functions and depends on 

human intervention, and is therefore a case-by-case determination.” Id. 

 Here, the evidence submitted by the parties is inconclusive. For example, in 

GCS’s Chief Compliance Officer and Legal Counsel Brad Batig’s deposition, Batig 

describes in some detail LiveVox, which is the “telephone dialing system” that GCS uses. 

See Doc. No. 34, Exh. D at 13. Batig further states that “preview mode” is just “one of 

the functions within LiveVox.” See Doc. No. 30-1, Exh. 7 at 60. At the time of the July 

20, 2013 voicemail, there were three other dialing modes available on LiveVox—

predictive mode, preview mode, and manual mode. Id. at 68–70. The three modes ran 

“through separate set[s] of queuers,” which constitute separate hardware. Id.

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Accordingly, Defendant may have sufficiently demonstrated that there was some human 

interaction used, and perhaps required, to make phone calls when GCS’s system was in 

preview mode, but Defendant has not sufficiently foreclosed the possibility that its 

system also had the capacity to “store or produce, and dial random or sequential 

numbers.” See 2015 FCC Order, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 7972. Also, Batig indicates that 

GCS’s system may also function as a predictive dialer, which, it is well-settled, would 

“satisfy the TCPA’s definition of ‘autodialer.’” See 2015 FCC Order, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 

7972. Likewise, Plaintiff does not produce evidence sufficient to dispel the uncertainty 

surrounding GCS’s system’s capacities—for example, any expert testimony. Thus, 

having reviewed the parties’ summary judgment motions and associated evidentiary 

exhibits, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether 

Defendant used an ATDS when it called the 9515 number on July 20. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES both Defendant’s and Plaintiffs’ motions for 

summary judgment as to Plaintiff Horowitz’s TCPA claim. Because the Court is unable 

to determine as a matter of law whether Defendant used an ATDS, the Court need not 

consider whether Plaintiff Horowitz would be entitled to treble damages for such a 

violation. 

G. California Invasion of Privacy Act Claim 

 Lastly, Plaintiff Horowitz asserts a violation of the CIPA. Section 632.7 of the 

CIPA imposes penalties on “[e]very person who, without the consent of all parties, 

intercepts or receives and intentionally records . . . a communication transmitted between 

. . . a cellular radio telephone and a landline . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 632.7(a) (emphasis 

added). To prove a violation of section 632.7, a plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence: (1) that [the defendant] recorded a call with [the plaintiff], (2) that one of 

the parties to the recorded call was using a cell phone, and (3) that [the plaintiff] did not 

consent to the recording.” See Nei Contracting & Eng’g, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pac. 

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Sw., Inc., No. 12-CV-01685-BAS(JLB), 2016 WL 4886933, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 

2016). 

 Consent is a complete defense to a claim under § 632.7. AJ Reyes v. Educ. Credit 

Mgmt. Corp., No. 15CV628-BAS-JMA, 2016 WL 2944294, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 

2016). “Consent may be express or may be implied in fact from the ‘surrounding 

circumstances indicating that [the party to the call] knowingly agreed to the 

surveillance.’” See Nei, 2016 WL 4886933 at *3 (quoting United States v. Van Poyck, 77 

F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996)). Thus, “a warning at the outset of a conversation is 

sufficient to comply with Section 632.7.” Maghen v. Quicken Loans Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 

1141, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2015); see also Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 

4th 95, 118, 137 P.3d 914, 930 (2006). However, it is not necessary to give such a 

warning in every circumstance. Maghen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 1145. 

 Here, GCS has recordings of the following six calls made by Plaintiff Horowitz to 

GCS: 

1. A July 16, 2014 call between Horowitz and Rosie Bortello 

2. A July 16, 2014 call between Horowitz and a male speaker 

3. A July 16, 2014 call between Horowitz and Rosie Bortello12

4. A July 18, 2014 call between Horowitz and a male speaker named Julian 

5. A July 18, 2014 call between Horowitz and Elizabeth Rodriguez 

6. A July 18, 2014 call between Horowitz and Deborah Guerra13

See Doc. No. 34, Exh. Q–V. 

Defendant does not dispute that those calls were recorded. However, GCS does 

not have recordings of two July 18, 2014 phone calls between Horowitz and Epiphany 

 

12 The transcriber who transcribed the audio recordings refers to a “Rosie Patella.” See Doc. No. 34, Exh. Q, S. 

In its briefing, GCS refers to the same agent as “Rosie Botello.” The Court assumes GCS, who employed Botello, 

has knowledge of the correct spelling, and thus adopts GCS’s spelling. 

13 At the beginning of this call, Plaintiff spoke with Epiphany Golston, who then transferred Plaintiff’s call to 

Guerra. See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 43. The parties do not dispute that GCS has no recording of the conversation 

between Horowitz and Golston. Id. 

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Golston, or his conversation on July 16, 2014 with Nancy Zamora. See Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 

38. Defendant moves for summary judgment in its favor as to those calls, arguing that 

because “the uncontroverted evidence establishes that there [are] no recordings,” 

Horowitz “cannot meet his burden of establishing a violation of CIPA.” See Doc. No. 28. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that GCS does not have such recordings. Plaintiff makes no 

arguments, nor produces any evidence, to oppose Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s CIPA claims insofar as they are based on those calls. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff Horowitz’s CIPA claims based on the July 18, 2014 calls with Golston, and the 

July 16, 2014 conversation with Zamora. 

Regarding the six recorded calls, Defendant argues that Horowitz consented to the 

recording of his initial call to Botello on July 16, 2014 because toward the end of the call, 

he asked Botello if the call was being recorded, and when she said that it was, he said 

“okay” prior to asking Botello one more question, then ending the call. Doc. No. 42-2, ¶ 

37; Doc. No. 28-7, Exh. 17. Defendant contends that Horowitz did not “object or request 

deletion of the recording.” Doc. No. 39. Defendant fails to cite any authority supporting 

the idea that one can retroactively consent to violations of the CIPA, nor does Defendant 

cite to authority requiring a plaintiff to object or request deletion of a recording in order 

to have a viable claim for violation of the CIPA. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s initial call to Botello on July 

16, 2014. 

As its final argument, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s CIPA claims are barred by 

the doctrine of unclean hands because Horowitz identified himself as Hamby, tried to 

obtain information regarding Hamby’s account, “attempted to obtain confidential 

information on GCS’ business operations and systems, [] threatened to sue,” and refused 

to tell GCS his grounds for such a lawsuit. See Doc. No. 28. Defendant argues that, “[i]n 

light of the litigious history of both Plaintiffs, there can be no other conclusion than that 

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these calls were made in an effort to conjure additional claims against GCS.” Id. 

However, the doctrine of unclean hands is inapplicable here. For the doctrine to apply, 

“there must be a direct relationship between the misconduct and the claimed injuries so 

that it would be inequitable to grant the requested relief.” Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. 

v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 979 (1999), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 

3, 2000) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). Here, Horowitz’s “misconduct” 

does not have a direct relationship to his claimed injuries. What Horowitz said in his 

phone calls is essentially irrelevant to his claim that GCS invaded his privacy by 

recording his calls without first disclosing that it was doing so. Further, the transcripts of 

the six recorded calls indicate that Horowitz was trying to obtain information regarding 

Hamby’s account, which it appears GCS had substantial trouble locating. Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s CIPA 

claims based on the remaining recorded calls. 

Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment in his favor as to the six recorded calls. 

While there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant recorded these 

phone calls without first disclosing that it was doing so,14 there exists a genuine dispute 

of material fact as to whether Plaintiff impliedly consented to the recording of any of 

these phone calls. For example, when Plaintiff first called GCS on July 23, 2013, the 

agent he spoke to immediately informed him that the call may be monitored or recorded. 

See Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. P. Then, on July 16, 2014, in Plaintiff’s first call that day, he 

asked a GCS representative at the end of their conversation, “Hey, Rosie, is this a 

recorded line?” See Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. P. Rosie Botello responded, “Yes, sir, this is a 

recorded line.” Id. Moreover, in Plaintiff’s first call on July 18, 2014, Plaintiff asked, at 

the end of his conversation, whether the call was being recorded, to which the agent 

responded that it was. See Doc. No. 34-2, Exh. T. Accordingly, after any one of these 

 

14 See Doc. No. 39-2, ¶¶ 29, 31. 

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phone calls, a reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff was put on notice that any 

subsequent phone calls to GCS would be recorded and thus, impliedly consented to the 

recordings. This is particularly true of Plaintiff’s second call to Rosie Botello—the agent 

that had told him earlier that same day that “this is a recorded line.” See Doc. No. 34-2, 

Exh. P. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment on his CIPA claims. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 

PART Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 28, and GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 

No. 34. Based on the Court’s above findings regarding Plaintiff Hamby’s 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(11) claim, the Court also VACATES the trial currently set for February 7, 2017, 

as well as the Pretrial Conference set for January 17, 2017. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 12, 2016 

 

Hon. Michael M. Anello 

United States District Judge 

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