Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00335/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00335-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWIN WHITESPEAR,

No. 2:06-cv-00335-MCE-KJM-P

Petitioner,

v. ORDER

TERESA A. SCHWARTZ, Warden,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

State prisoners have two potential avenues to remedy

violations of their federal constitutional rights, a habeas

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a civil suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Dist., 423

F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 480 (1994). 

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2

First, under § 2254, a prisoner may file a petition for writ of

habeas corpus challenging the underlying basis for detention

initiated through state court proceedings, on grounds that his or

her ongoing confinement violates the United States Constitution

or other federal laws. Second, under § 1983, a prisoner may

protest the conditions of confinement, such as inadequate medical

care or inhumane treatment, on grounds that incarceration under

such conditions also runs afoul of federally guaranteed rights. 

The objective of these two avenues of redress is markedly

different, since § 2254 challenges the basis of the state court

conviction in its entirety, whereas § 1983 takes issue only with

the terms under which an individual is confined and does not

reach the more fundamental question of whether a prisoner is

being wrongfully jailed in the first place.

On February 16, 2006, petitioner initiated this action,

through counsel, seeking a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. 

Hence petitioner explicitly sought to invalidate the entire basis

of his ongoing confinement in state prison. The factual

background of the petition is as follows. In 1982, petitioner

was sentenced to a prison term of fifteen-years-to-life, in the

state prison system operated by the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), following his conviction

that year for second degree murder. Petitioner’s conviction

stemmed from a murder he committed during the course of a

residential burglary.

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3

When the victim returned home unexpectedly, petitioner proceeded

to subdue him by various means, including tying his hands

together. Later, petitioner killed the victim by striking him on

the head with a cement block.

On February 10, 2005, after serving approximately twentythree (23) years in the CDCR, petitioner’s eligibility for parole

was considered after being previously rejected on ten separate

occasions. Pet. at 4-5. At the conclusion of this eleventh

parole hearing, the hearing panel found that petitioner, then 69

years of age, was suitable for parole because he no longer posed

“an unreasonable risk of danger to society.” Pet. at 5-7. In

June of 2005, however, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed

that finding on grounds that petitioner still posed an

unreasonable risk of danger to society given both the nature of

his crime and petitioner’s extensive criminal history prior to

1982.

After three attempts to obtain his release through state

court habeas corpus proceedings, petitioner filed the present 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of California on February 26, 2006. His

federal habeas petition asserted the same constitutional

infirmities that had previously been both raised and rejected in

the California courts.

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 The local rules of this court authorize the assigned 1

magistrate judge, in this instance Judge Mueller, to handle cases

brought by a person in custody under both § 2254 and § 1983. 

E.D. Local Rule 72-302(c)(17). 

4

On December 11, 2006, Magistrate Judge Kimberly J. Mueller found 1

that because petitioner might be entitled to release on parole,

the CDCR had to respond to the allegations in his petition. 

Consequently, on February 9, 2007, the Attorney General for the

State of California (“AG”) responded to the habeas petition on

behalf of the CDCR, asserting that Governor Schwarzenegger’s

decision to deny parole was in accord with the United States

Constitution. Petitioner filed a reply to the AG’s response on

February 21, 2007. In a later supplement to that reply filed on

March 21, 2007, counsel for petitioner advised the court that

petitioner had been denied parole for a twelfth time on December

8, 2006, and provided citations for cases relevant to

petitioner’s claims. 

On February 4, 2008, approximately ten and a half months

after the filing of petitioner’s supplemental reply, counsel for

petitioner, Mr. Marc Grossman, filed a Notice of Death, informing

the court as follows:

Counsel for petitioner . . . regretfully

notifies the court that [petitioner] died in

prison on January 28, 2008. Approximately

nine months earlier [petitioner] had been

diagnosed by prison doctors as suffering from

early cancer, which was confirmed by outside

specialists who requested appropriate and

timely treatment, which the prison medical

staff steadfastly refused to administer or

provide for until [petitioner’s] death.

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5

The petition was filed two years ago on

February 16, 2006. Briefing was completed

and the case was fully submitted one year ago

on February 21, 2007. This is approximately

the tenth death of a petitioner that has

occurred during the delayed adjudication of

such a petition which, counsel respectfully

suggests poses a reprehensible waste of

personal, legal and judicial resources and of

human life, and a contravention of the speedy

remedy of habeas corpus prescribed by the

Rules and the Supreme Court. Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-495 (1973); Fay

v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-402 (1963); Fierro

v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1996);

Graham v. Squier, 132 F.2d 681, 682-683 (9th

Cir. 1942). 

In light of the record before the court, which is summarized

above, and the accusations of judicial mishandling both

explicitly and implicitly made in the foregoing Notice, the court

feels compelled to respond directly to the allegations levied by

Mr. Grossman.

As an initial matter, Mr. Grossman suggests that this court

is somehow at fault for petitioner’s failure to receive adequate

medical care. There are two fundamental problems with this

assertion. First, the court was never informed either by

petitioner or his counsel that petitioner was in failing health

before it received the aforementioned February 4, 2008 Notice of

Death. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, this court has

no jurisdiction in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas case to remedy

issues pertaining to proper medical care, which as stated above

relate to the conditions of petitioner’s confinement rather than

to the constitutional propriety of the ongoing confinement

itself.

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6

The only remedy the court can provide in a habeas case like this

one was release on parole if the court found Governor

Schwarzenegger’s decision to deny petitioner parole to be

constitutionally flawed. If either petitioner or his counsel

felt that the level of health care being provided by CDCR was

placing petitioner’s life in jeopardy, petitioner or his counsel

could at any time have initiated an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

challenging the conditions of his confinement in that regard and

requested immediate injunctive relief. No such action was

initiated before petitioner’s death.

Mr. Grossman’s February 4, 2008 Notice of Death also implies

that the court failed to act diligently in not resolving 

petitioner’s habeas petition sooner, particularly given the

medical issues faced by petitioner. Any inference in that regard

is misplaced. As stated above, this court was never given any

indication that petitioner was in failing health. Mr. Grossman 

could easily have informed the court of petitioner’s health and

requested expedited consideration of his habeas petition; indeed,

he did just that in one of his other habeas cases on March 14,

2007. See Jhanjar v. CDCR, CIV-F-06-0637-AWI-TAG. 

Ironically, Mr. Grossman made his request in Jhanjar during

the very period of time he alleges that petitioner here was

diagnosed with cancer, and within a week of the time he filed a

supplemental notice in this case on March 21, 2007. 

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 It must be emphasized that even had the court ruled on 2

petitioner’s § 2254 petition for habeas corpus, that ruling would

not have addressed the claim now being levied by petitioner’s

counsel that petitioner was receiving inadequate medical care

while in state prison. That claim would have been the proper

subject of a § 1983 claim which, as indicated above, was never

filed on petitioner’s behalf.

7

Had Mr. Grossman requested expedited treatment similar to that

sought in Jhanjar, the court could at least have considered

whether petitioner’s habeas request should have been decided on

an expedited basis, and ahead of other pending cases, due to

petitioner’s deteriorating health. Mr. Grossman’s failure to

either notify the court or request expedited handling deprived

the court of that opportunity. In addition, California Penal 2

Code § 1170 (e)(2) permits the state court to resentence

petitioner if it found that he suffered from an incurable

condition likely to result in death within six months, and if

petitioner would no longer be a threat to public safety under the

circumstances. Mr. Grossman provides no indication that he

availed himself of that state court opportunity for relief on

behalf of his client, either. 

Mr. Grossman further asserts that ten persons have died

while awaiting adjudication of their habeas petitions, and opines

that such circumstances constitute “a reprehensible waste of

personal, legal and judicial resources and of human life, and a

contravention of the speedy remedy of habeas corpus prescribed by

the Rules and the Supreme Court.” 

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8

Mr. Grossman fails, however, to offer any proof in support of his

assertion that ten persons have died awaiting completion of

federal habeas proceedings; nor does he provide any geographic or

temporal boundaries for that sweeping assertion. The undersigned

is unaware that any other habeas petitioner with a claim pending

in his court has died prior to adjudication of the petitioner’s

request. Given that fact, and the unsubstantiated nature of Mr.

Grossman’s general claim that ten prisoners have in fact died,

his reference to such information means little and appears

nothing more than a transparent attempt to impugn the integrity

of this court. 

Finally, any suggestion that petitioner’s case had been

pending an inordinate amount of time prior to his death, and that

he consequently was treated unfairly, is patently untrue. 

Resolution of a habeas case two years after filing or one year

following submission is in no way extraordinary given the volume

of such claims pending in this district.

In sum, while the court regrets that petitioner’s writ of

habeas corpus remained unresolved at the time of his death, Mr.

Grossman himself made no effort to facilitate the process by

advising the Court that Petitioner had a life threatening illness

which could have entitled him to expedited relief.

It is, at best, blatantly unfair for Mr. Grossman to suggest

that the court did not act diligently when Mr. Grossman, as

petitioner’s advocate, failed to bring the pertinent facts before

the court’s attention.

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At worst, Mr. Grossman’s Notice of Death represents a direct and

unwarranted attempt to smear the operation of this court, and its

process, without justification.

Because the relief authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 can no

longer be provided in this action, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

present action be dismissed.

Dated: February 29, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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