Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02115/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02115-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1441ac Removal- Account Receivable

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19-cv-2115-AJB-MDD

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

614 SHADY LANE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANTOINETTE ROAN, DERELL 

MCKELVEY, and TANISHA 

MACKELVEY,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-2115-AJB-MDD

ORDER:

(1) SUA SPONTE REMANDING THE 

CASE BACK TO SAN DIEGO 

SUPERIOR COURT;

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

AND

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN 

ORDER SHORTENING TIME ON 

MOTION TO REMAND

(Doc. Nos. 3, 5)

Defendants Antoinette Roan, Derell McKelvey, and Tanisha Mackelvey removed 

the current unlawful detainer case to federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) Although no motion to 

remand has been filed, the Court has a continuous duty to evaluate its jurisdiction over 

cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(3). Thus, for the reasons herein, the Court REMANDS this 

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action back to San Diego Superior Court and DENIES Defendants’ motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis as moot and DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte application for an 

order shortening time on motion to remand as moot.

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I. DISCUSSION

Congress has authorized a defendant to remove a civil action from state court to 

federal court. 28 U.S.C. §1441. However, the removing party “always has the burden of 

establishing that removal was proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 

1992). The district court must remand any case previously removed from a state court “if 

at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). Moreover, there is a strong presumption against removal 

jurisdiction. Thus, doubts as to whether the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction 

must be resolved in favor of remand. See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 

1996); see also Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any 

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). 

Although Plaintiff has not moved the Court to remand, “a district court’s duty to 

establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See 

United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Courts may consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 

(9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an 

‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo 

Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States v. S. 

Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)). 

Defendants’ Notice of Removal asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. The federal statute cited raises federal question jurisdiction.

For the reasons explained below, the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction nor 

 

1 The Court notes that while Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for an order shortening time on motion 

to remand, Plaintiff never actually filed a motion to remand the action.

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diversity jurisdiction over this action. 

Here, Defendants’ current Notice of Removal is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

alleging that there is federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants simply state 

that a “federal question exists because Defendant’s Demurrer, a pleading depend [sic] on 

the determination of Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s duties under federal law.” (Doc. No. 

1 at 2.) However, Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer complaint does not establish federal 

question jurisdiction. Defendants might assert a federal defense; however, a federal defense 

alone is insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Furthermore, diversity jurisdiction cannot be 

established as there is no diversity of citizenship amongst the parties and the amount in 

controversy is less than $75,000. 

As the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants’ motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis is moot as well as Plaintiff’s ex parte application for an order 

shortening time on motion to remand. 

II. CONCLUSION 

Because Defendant cannot establish federal jurisdiction, removal was improper. The 

Court REMANDS the case back to San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, DENIES Defendants’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis as moot and 

DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte application for an order shortening time on motion to remand 

as moot. The Court Clerk is ordered to then close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2019

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