Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03714/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03714-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELISSA LORRAINE RUSS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DRY CREEK RANCHERIA BAND OF

POMO INDIANS,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-03714 CRB

ORDER

Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss. For the reasons set

forth below, the proceedings are STAYED until Plaintiffs exhaust the tribal remedies

available to them.

BACKGROUND

The dispute in this case involves a Tribal Redevelopment and Relocation Agreement

(“Agreement”) executed between Plaintiffs and Defendant. Complaint ¶¶ 1,6, 7. Under the

Agreement, Plaintiffs agreed to convey to the Tribe their rights and interests in their

residences on the Dry Creek Rancheria reservation (which had been designated for

“economic redevelopment” pursuant to a proposed gaming and casino project). Id. ¶¶ 13, 27,

39, 45, 46. In exchange, the Tribe agreed to help Plaintiffs locate permanent replacement

housing, to provide a monthly “relocation allowance” to the Plaintiffs, and to pay the cost of

such replacement housing up to a certain amount. Id. ¶¶ 14, 18, 28, 40, 45.

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1 Two days prior to oral argument on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed an

Amended Complaint in which they named as defendants not only the Dry Creek Rancheria Band

of Pomo Indians (who had been named in the original Complaint), but also several of the Tribe’s

officers in their “individual” and “official” capacities. The Amended Complaint also added a

claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Because the identity of the defendants and the content of the

claims do not affect the Court’s analysis with respect to the dispositive issue in this motion, i.e.

the Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust tribal remedies, the Court will refer to the named defendants in

the Amended Complaint as “Defendant” for purposes of this order. All citations in this order

are to the original Complaint.

2

Plaintiffs allege that the Tribe did not help them find permanent replacement housing

and did not provide them with money to purchase replacement housing. Id. ¶ 66. According

to Plaintiffs, the Tribe’s Board of Directors unilaterally informed them that their contract had

expired, that Defendant no longer had any legal obligation to them, and that the Tribe would

terminate their relocation allowance in ninety days. Id. ¶¶ 23, 36, 42, 54, 62. Plaintiffs

complaint sets forth seven causes of action: (1) breach of written contract; (2) specific

performance; (3) imposition of constructive trust; (4) fraud and deceit; (5) conversion; (6)

negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) wrongful eviction. See id. ¶¶ 12-120.

Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant puts forth

two arguments: (1) that this Court must stay the proceedings or dismiss the case because

Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust tribal remedies; and (2) that Defendant is immune from suit

because of its status as a recognized Indian tribe.1

DISCUSSION

“[C]onsiderations of comity direct that tribal remedies be exhausted before the

question is addressed by the District Court.” Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15

(1987). Indeed, the exhaustion of tribal remedies is “a prerequisite” to any exercise of this

Court’s authority. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.3

(9th Cir. 1991). 

The exhaustion requirement, however, is prudential rather than jurisdictional. See

Wellman v. Chevron, 815 F.2d 577, 578 (1987) (noting that the district court’s dismissal

should have been based on comity, rather than lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, “the

exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional bar” and “[f]ederal courts may stay proceedings

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2 Plaintiffs argue that, by considering information provided by Defendant regarding

exhaustion of tribal remedies, the Defendant has turned its motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment. This contention is without merit. Accepting this view would render the

exhaustion requirement meaningless: the Court would then need to decide any motion to dismiss

and any jurisdictional issues prior to deciding the question of exhaustion. Ninth Circuit law,

however, clearly requires the exhaustion of tribal remedies before the court can exercise its

authority over the case. Burlington Northern, 940 F.2d at 1245 n.3. 

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and retain jurisdiction pending exhaustion of tribal court remedies.” Burlington Northern,

940 F.2d at 1245 n.3.

Defendant asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that under the law and custom of the

Dry Creek Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians, Plaintiffs have the opportunity to seek reversal

of decisions by the Tribe’s Board of Directors by taking the matter before the Dry Creek

Rancheria Tribal Council. See Decl. of Harvey Hopkins in Support of the Defendants’ Reply

Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss ¶¶ 3, 5. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs must

exhaust this remedy before they may invoke the authority of the federal courts. This Court

agrees.2

Although Plaintiffs argue that exhaustion is not required in this case, none of the

exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply in this case. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins.

Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985) (“Exhaustion would not be required

where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in

bad faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or

where exhaustion would be futile . . . .”). Plaintiffs note that exhaustion is not required

where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is conducted in bad faith or is motivated by a desire

to harass, but they offer no explanation about why the Tribe’s conduct in this case might

have been in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has

held that assertions of bias or bad faith must first be asserted in the tribal venue itself, which

the Plaintiffs have not done in this case. See A& A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain

Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Nor is there any reason to think that it would be futile to seek relief before the Tribal

Council. The question here is not whether Plaintiffs are likely to obtain relief before the

Tribal Council, but whether an additional, plausible avenue of relief remains available to

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them through Tribal institutions. See Johnson v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 174 F.3d 1032,

1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the exhaustion of tribal remedies is unnecessary where there

is no tribal forum available); see also Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead

Reservation, Montana, 529 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that exhaustion would

have been futile where the Tribal Court indicated that it would deny relief because it lacked

authority to reverse the relevant ruling by the Tribal Council). Here, although there is some

overlap in the membership of the Board of Directors and the Tribal Council, there is no

indication that the Tribal Council has denied or will deny Plaintiffs relief.

Plaintiffs also argue that exhaustion is not required where it is plain that the tribal

court lacks jurisdiction over the dispute. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement,

however, is precisely to give the tribal authority the opportunity to determine its own

jurisdiction over the matter before a federal court interferes. See Burlington Northern, 940

F.2d at 1244 (“‘The federal courts should not even make a ruling on tribal court jurisdiction .

. . until tribal remedies are exhausted.’” (quoting National Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S.

at 1228))). Here, Plaintiffs have not presented their jurisdictional argument to any tribal

institution. Moreover, the subject matter of this case — an economic redevelopment project

and any accompanying housing relocation program for tribal members living on the

reservation — would appear to be a matter subject to tribal jurisdiction. Whatever the Tribal

Council’s jurisdiction, it cannot be said that this matter clearly falls outside the scope of that

institution’s authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (“Indian

tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights in

matters of local self-government.”). The cases cited by Plaintiffs, both of which involve

disputes between Indian tribes and non-Indians, are inapposite. See Strate v. A-1

Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001).

Here, Defendants have identified the Tribal Council as an entity that is capable of

addressing Plaintiffs’ claims and providing them with relief from the actions of the Board of

Directors. It does not matter that the Tribal Council is not a judicial body, nor does it matter

that the remedy available to the Plaintiffs is administrative in nature. See Santa Clara

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G:\CRBALL\2006\3714\Order 1.wpd 5

Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65-66 (“Nonjudicial tribal institutions have also been recognized as

competent law-applying bodies.” (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975))); see

also Burlington Northern, 940 F.2d at 1246 (requiring the exhaustion of “tribal

administrative proceedings”). Plaintiffs are therefore required to seek redress from the Tribal

Council before seeking relief in this Court.

For the reasons set forth above, the proceedings are STAYED until the Plaintiffs have

exhausted the tribal remedies available to them. Because the parties have represented to the

Court that a meeting of the Tribal Council will take place soon, this Court will proceed to

schedule a settlement conference before a magistrate judge, which shall be held in the event

that Plaintiffs are unable to obtain relief from the Tribal Council.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2006

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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