Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02122/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02122-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS RAY THOMPSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

F. GONZALEZ, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:09-cv-02122-AWI-JLT HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE: 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE PETITION (Doc. 17) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

November 25, 2009. On April 23, 2010, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response. (Doc.

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The

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Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on

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other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal

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petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the instant petition on November 25, 2009. (Doc. 1,

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13). On June 22, 2010, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, contending that the petition

was untimely and that Petitioner failed to state claims upon which habeas relief could be granted. 

(Doc. 17). Petitioner has not filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one-year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from

the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondents to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is based upon a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)’s one-year limitation period, as well as Respondent’s contention that Petitioner has failed

to raise claims upon which habeas relief can be granted. Because Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is

similar in procedural standing to a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal Answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

p. 10).

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corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on November 25, 2009, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this, where the petitioner is challenging a prison

disciplinary or administrative action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded, and

the statute of limitations commences, when the final administrative appeal is denied. Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9 Cir. 2003)(holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an th

inmate’s administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered the

commencement of the limitations period); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9 cir. th

2004)(holding that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until a petitioner’s administrative

appeal has been denied). 

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Petitioner is challenging the results of a prison classification committee review of Petitioner’s

placement in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) held on September 27, 2005. (Doc. 1, p. 4). In a

decision dated November 1, 2005, the classification committee found that Petitioner had a sexrelated offense, based on a 2000 prison disciplinary proceeding in which Petitioner was found to

have committed sexual battery on a correctional officer. (Doc. 1, pp. 4; 24). Petitioner then filed an

administrative appeal of that decision , which was denied at the second level of review on December

28, 2005. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2). Subsequently, Petitioner’s third level appeal was rejected as untimely by

letter on April 24, 2006. (Doc. 1, p. 21). 

Therefore, the limitations period commenced on April 25, 2006, the day after Petitioner’s

third level appeal was denied. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner had one year from that

date, or until April 24, 2007, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his federal petition for

writ of habeas corpus. As mentioned, Petitioner did not file his federal petition until November 25,

2009, more than thirty-one months after the limitations period had expired. Absent any applicable

tolling, therefore, the petition is untimely.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

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allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus petition in the California Superior Court for

the County of Kern on March 29, 2007. (Doc. 17, Ex. 1). The Superior Court denied his petition on

June 12, 2007. (Doc. 17, Ex. 2). Petitioner filed his next petition in the California Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District (“5 DCA”), on May 20, 2008. (Doc. 17, Ex. 3). The 5 DCA denied the th th

petition on July 31, 2008. (Doc. 17, Ex. 4). Petitioner then filed a petition in the California Supreme

Court on January 4, 2009, that was denied on August 26, 2009. (Doc. 17, Ex. 6; 7).

As mentioned, the one-year limitation period commenced on April 25, 2006. Thus, at the

time Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on March 29, 2007, 338 days of his 365-day period

had already elapsed, leaving Petitioner only 27 days remaining on his one-year period. Assuming,

without deciding, that the first state petition was “properly filed” within the meaning of the AEDPA,

the one-year period was tolled during the pendency of that first petition. Normally, in addition to

tolling during the pendency of “properly filed” state petitions, a petitioner is also entitled to tolling

during the intervals between state petitions as long as the petitioner is proceeding to the next higher

level of the state courts and assuming that the petitions are timely filed. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to tolling during the interval following the

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denial of his first petition and the filing of his second because of the lengthy delay between the two

proceedings. The Court agrees. 

In reviewing habeas petitions originating from California, the Ninth Circuit formerly

employed a rule that where the California courts did not explicitly dismiss for lack of timeliness, the

petition was presumed timely and was deemed “pending.” In Evans v. Chavis, 549 U.S.189 (2006),

the Supreme Court rejected this approach, requiring instead that the lower federal courts determine

whether a state habeas petition was filed within a reasonable period of time. 549 U.S. at 198 (“That

is to say, without using a merits determination as an ‘absolute bellwether’ (as to timeliness), the

federal court must decide whether the filing of the request for state court appellate review (in state

collateral review proceedings) was made within what California would consider a ‘reasonable

time.’”). However, “‘[w]hen a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, that [is] the end

of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).’” Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9 Cir. th

2005)(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)). See also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

at 226.

Therefore, under the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pace and Evans,

this Court must first determine whether the state court denied Petitioner’s habeas application(s) as

untimely. If so, that is the end of the matter for purposes of statutory tolling because the petition was

then never properly filed and Petitioner would not be entitled to any period of tolling under §

2242(d)(2), either for the pendency of the petition itself or for the interval between that petition and

the denial of the previous petition. Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148-1149. 

However, if the state court did not expressly deny the habeas petition(s) as untimely, this

Court is charged with the duty of independently determining whether Petitioner’s request for state

court collateral review were filed within what California would consider a “reasonable time.” Evans,

546 U.S. at 198. If so, then the state petition was properly filed and Petitioner is entitled to interval

tolling. 

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In Evans, the Supreme Court found that a six-month delay was unreasonable. Id. The

Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether a delay in filing may deprive

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a petitioner of statutory tolling for the pendency of an otherwise properly filed state petition itself when the state court does

not expressly indicate that the petition was untimely. Presently, Evans only affects entitlement to interval tolling.

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Supreme Court, recognizing that California did not have strict time deadlines for the filing of a

habeas petition at the next appellate level, nevertheless indicated that most states provide for a

shorter period of 30 to 60 days within which to timely file a petition at the next appellate level. 

Evans, 546 U.S. at 201. After Evans, however, it was left to the federal district courts in California

to carry out the Supreme Court’s mandate of determining, in appropriate cases, whether the

petitioners’ delays in filing state petitions were reasonable. Understandably, given the uncertain

scope of California’s “reasonable time” standard, the cases have not been entirely consistent. 

However, a consensus appears to be emerging in California that any delay of sixty days or less is per

se reasonable, but that any delay “substantially” longer than sixty days is not reasonable. Compare 

Culver v. Director of Corrections, 450 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1140-1141 (C.D. Cal. 2006)(delays of 97

and 71 days unreasonable); Forrister v. Woodford, 2007 WL 809991, *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 2007)(88 day

delay unreasonable); Hunt v. Felker, 2008 WL 364995 (E.D. Cal. 2008)(70 day delay unreasonable);

Swain v. Small, 2009 WL 111573 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 12, 2009)(89 day delay unreasonable); Livermore

v. Watson, 556 F.Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D.Cal. 2008)(78 day delay unreasonable; Bridges v.

Runnels, 2007 WL 2695177 *2 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 11, 2007)(76 day delay unreasonable), with Reddick

v. Felker, 2008 WL 4754812 *3 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 29, 2008)(64 day delay not “substantially” greater

than sixty days); Payne v. Davis, 2008 WL 941969 *4 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 31, 2008 (63-day delay “well

within the ‘reasonable’ delay of thirty to sixty days in Evans”). Moreover, even when the delay

“significantly” exceeds sixty days, some courts have found the delay reasonable when the subsequent

petition is substantially rewritten. E.g., Osumi v. Giurbino, 445 F.Supp 2d 1152, 1158-1159

(C.D.Cal. 2006)(3 month delay not unreasonable given lengthy appellate briefs and petitioner’s

substantial re-writing of habeas petition following denial by superior court); Stowers v. Evans, 2006

WL 829140 (E.D.Cal. 2006)(87-day delay not unreasonable because second petition was

substantially re-written); Warburton v. Walker, 548 F.Supp.2d 835, 840 (C.D. Cal. 2008)(69-day

delay reasonable because petitioner amended petition before filing in Court of Appeal). 

Here, the delay between the denial of the first petition on June 12, 2007, and the filing of the

second petition on May 20, 2008, was over eleven months, a period well outside the range of what

district courts, the Ninth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court have considered reasonable

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for California inmates. Evans, 546 U.S. at 198. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling for

the time between the denial of his first petition and the filing of his second. Accordingly, the oneyear period would have re-started the day following the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s first

state court petition on June 12, 2007, i.e., on June 13, 2007, and would have continued to run

unabated and untolled until it expired 27 days later. 

Because the one-year period expired before Petitioner filed either his second or third state

habeas petitions, those petitions afford Petitioner no statutory tolling benefits. A petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. 

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9 Cir. 2001); th th

see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d th

820 (9 Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has th

ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8 Cir. 1999) th

(petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year

limitations period). Therefore, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition is

untimely and should be dismissed.

D. Equitable Tolling

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, __U.S.__, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561

(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9 Cir. 1997). The limitation th

period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control

make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090

(9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way.” Holland, 2010 WL 2346549 at *12; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

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the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on

the record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. Accordingly, Petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling. Thus, the petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

E. Petitioner Has Failed To State A Claim Upon Which Habeas Relief Can Be Granted.

Respondent next contends that the petition should be dismissed because it raises only state

law claims and fails to state a claim for habeas relief because Petitioner does not challenge either the

fact or duration of his confinement. The Court agrees.

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states that the federal courts

shall entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See also, Rule 1 to

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. The Supreme Court has

held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that

custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Furthermore, in order to succeed in a

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim

in state court resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

Petitioner does not allege a violation of the Constitution or federal law, nor does he argue that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Petitioner does not allege that the

adjudication of his claims in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, . . . or resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

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In the petition, Petitioner alleges only that Respondent’s classification of Petitioner and the

disciplinary violation he was found to have committed in 2000 was a violation of California state law

and regulations. Thus, Petitioner raises only state law claims, and, generally, issues of state law are

not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)(“We have

stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-349

(1993)(O’Connor, J., concurring)(“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”). Indeed, federal courts are bound

by state court rulings on questions of state law. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989). “[T]he availability of a claim under state law does not of

itself establish that a claim was available under the United States Constitution.” Sawyer v. Smith,

497 U.S. 227, 239 (1990), quoting, Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). Tinsley v. Borg,

895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991) (“incorrect” evidentiary rulings

are not the basis for federal habeas relief).

Respondent also contends that Petitioner has failed to challenge the fact or duration of his

confinement, a necessary predicate to federal habeas jurisdiction. While the United States Supreme

Court has not addressed whether a challenge to a condition of confinement may be brought in habeas

corpus, see Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9 Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit has held that th

“habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a successful challenge to a prison

condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

859 (9 Cir. 2003)(emphasis supplied). th

Thus, an allegation of SHU confinement, without more, is insufficient to establish habeas

jurisdiction, since that circumstance relates solely to conditions of confinement, not to the legality or

duration of Petitioner’s confinement. For these additional reasons, Respondent’s motion to dismiss

the petition should be granted.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 17), be GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to

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comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and because Petitioner has failed to

state claims upon which habeas relief can be granted.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within fourteen (14) court days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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Case 1:09-cv-02122-AWI-JLT Document 18 Filed 08/02/10 Page 11 of 11