Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00960/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00960-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Wrongful Death

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 10/16/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BROOKE MCLAUGHLIN, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

NO. C 04-00960 RS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brooke McLaughlin suffered a horrific attack at the hands of two United States

marines. The marines were convicted of attempted murder and are now serving life sentences. In

this action, McLaughlin seeks to hold the government liable in negligence for the actions the Marine

Corps took or failed to take with respect to the two marines prior to the attack on plaintiff.

The motion was heard on September 6, 2006. After full consideration of the parties’ briefs,

the record herein, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant authorities, the United States’s motion

for summary judgment will be granted.

 II. BACKGROUND

One evening in November of 2000, McLaughlin was walking along Pacific Grove Recreation

Trail in Pacific Grove, California. She was attacked at random by two United States Marines on

liberty, Jessie Carson and Jason Blad. Blad held McLaughlin, while Carson stabbed her

approximately twelve times in the torso, abdomen, and back, and made two slashing cuts to her

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throat. Carson and Blad were eventually arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison.

McLaughlin contends that Carson and Blad’s dangerous propensities were or should have

been known to their fellow marines, and should have been reported up the chain of command. 

McLaughlin relies on all of the following facts: (1) Carson gathered and read books on serial killers,

that he stored in his barracks. He told a sargent who inquired about them that he intended to become

a criminologist; (2) Carson kept a journal describing his fascination with serial killing. Blad and

other soldiers knew the journal existed; (3) Carson and Blad “accumulated a collection of knives and

other weaponry” that they kept in their barracks. One of Carson’s knives, the one used in the attack,

was against regulations because of its blade length. Blad and other marines knew the knife existed. 

Blad also kept a sword, which the room inspector ignored and even complimented; (4) Carson

shared his “depraved and violent fantasies” with other soldiers. One sargent testified that Carson

would come to his room to discuss killing; (5) Carson participated in several “black opps” with a

small group of fellow marines. In these events, the marines would sneak out of barracks, and pretend

they were on military missions, sometimes in civilian neighborhoods; (6) Blad had a history of

suicide attempts before joining the marines. Blad sought out therapy when in the marines, and

disclosed his prior suicide attempts. The therapist gave him only one and a half hours of therapy,

some medications “and sent him on his way.”

McLaughlin contends that these alleged facts, taken together or separately, are sufficient to

give rise to a legal duty owed by the United States towards her, and that there is at least a material

factual dispute as to whether the government’s conduct was a proximate cause of the terrible attack

perpetrated upon her.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary

judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

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The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Id. at 323. If it meets this burden, the moving party is then entitled to judgment as a matter of

law when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his

case with respect to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

The non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party’s properly

supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the

parties. To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth

material facts, i.e., “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,

475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, including

questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2434-35 (1991) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). It is the court’s responsibility “to determine

whether the ‘specific facts’ set forth by the nonmoving party, coupled with undisputed background

or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor

based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if

the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “[w]here the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there

is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Here, although there are numerous details where the facts are in dispute or the record is not

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entirely clear, the focus of the controversy between the parties is whether there is a cognizable legal

claim that arises from the basic facts. As such, the question is not whether there is a material factual

dispute, but whether on the effectively undisputed facts, the United States “is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Limitations on Potential Liability

This action, against the United States government, is brought under the Federal Tort Claims

Act (“FTCA”), which waives sovereign immunity in certain circumstances and under certain

conditions. In relevant part, the FTCA provides that:

[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims

against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or

personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or

employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would

be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or

omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

The “assault and battery exception” to the FTCA, however, provides that the waiver of

sovereign immunity does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising out of assault [or] battery.” 28 U.S.C. §

2680 (h). In addition, it is settled law, and McLaughlin does not argue to the contrary, that the

government is not vicariously liable (through the doctrine of respondeat superior or otherwise) “for

the intentional torts of its employees.” See Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 395-397 (1988).

The “assault and battery exception” has been the subject of significant controversy in the

courts. In United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), a plurality of the United States Supreme

Court concluded that “the arising out of” language in the exception would bar any lawsuit, such as

this one, where the plaintiff’s injuries arose as a direct result of an assault or battery committed by a

government employee. In Shearer, an off duty serviceman attacked and killed another solider. The

plurality opinion rejected an attempt by the victim’s mother to hold the government liable in

negligence for having failed “to exert a reasonably sufficient control over” a soldier that the Army

“knew . . . was dangerous.” 473 U.S. at 54. The plurality opined, 

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 Supreme Court authority subsequent to Shearer has also declined to follow the plurality

opinion. See Sheridan, supra, 487 U.S. at 403 (permitting liability against Government for its own

negligence, notwithstanding that underlying attack on plaintiff was an assault an battery”) and id.

(White, J., concurring) (member of the Shearer plurality disavowing prior views to the extent

inconsistent). 

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it is clear that [plaintiff’s] claim arises out of the battery committed by [the attacker]. 

No semantical recasting of events can alter the fact that the battery was the immediate

cause of [the victim’s] death and, consequently, the basis of [plaintiff’s] claim.

473 U.S. at 54-55.

Were the plurality opinion of Shearer the law, no meaningful distinction between it and this

case could be drawn and McLaughlin’s claims would clearly be barred. The opinion of the Shearer

court, however, in which a majority of the justices joined, rejected liability in that case based on the

“Feres doctrine,” which limits the claims that may arise from injuries to a member of the armed

forces in the course of his or her military service. See 473 U.S. at 57-59. Here, because

McLaughlin was not a member of the military, the “Feres doctrine” is inapplicable and the majority

opinion of Shearer is not controlling.

Although some circuit courts of appeals subsequently adopted the Shearer plurality’s opinion

as law, the Ninth Circuit has not done so. In this circuit, the law is that the “assault and battery

exception” does not preclude a claim against the government where government’s own negligence 

was a proximate cause of the event in which the plaintiff sustained injury. See Bennet v. United

States, 803 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986); Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1987);

Kearney v. United States, 815 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1987); Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437 (9th

Cir. 1996).1 McLaughlin understands these rules, and strenuously argues that she is not attempting

to hold the government vicariously liable for the attack perpetrated by Carson and Blad, but for the

failure of the Marine Corps to act in a way that would have prevented the attack.

Although a claim based on the government’s own negligence is theoretically possible in this

Circuit, the viability of such a claim ultimately turns on California, as opposed to federal, law. The

FTCA permits liability “where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant

in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” See also Sheridan,

supra, 487 U.S. at 401-402 (holding claim against government leading to assault by soldier

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potentially viable based on assumption that state law would permit negligence claim under the

circumstances). Accordingly, the issue before this Court is whether, under California law, the facts

of this case support a claim for negligence against the government.

B. California Negligence Law

Under California tort law, “[g]enerally, one has ‘no duty to act to protect others from the

conduct of third parties.’” Margaret W. v. Kelley R., 139 Cal.App.4th 141, 150 (2006) (quoting

Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (2005)). “That reflects the law’s reluctance to

impose liability for nonfeasance.” Id. 

Accordingly, “A person who has not created a peril is ordinarily not liable in tort merely for

failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another, no matter how great the danger in which

the other is placed, or how easily he or she could be rescued, unless there is some relationship

between them that gives rise to a duty to act.” Id. (quoting 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, §

1038 at pp. 332-333 (10th ed.2005)). As the Margaret court further explained: 

 If there is no duty, there can be no liability, no matter how easily one may have been

able to prevent injury to another. And, while questions concerning whether a duty

has been breached and whether that breach caused a plaintiff's injury may be

questions of fact for a jury, the existence of the duty in the first place is a question of

law for the court. [Citation] The existence and scope of any duty, in turn, depends on

the foreseeability of the harm, which, in that context, is also a legal issue for the

court.

139 Cal.App.4th at 150.

Here, there is no dispute that the “conduct of third parties”–Carson and Blad–was the

immediate cause of McLaughlin’s injuries. Under California law, a duty to protect against the

conduct of third parties must be tethered to some kind of “special relationship.” For example, in

Margaret, the plaintiff was a minor who had been invited into the home of the defendant, and

subsequently suffered an attack at the hands of other minors. The Margaret court had no difficulty

in concluding that “a host parent assumes a special relationship with children invited into her home”

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 Ultimately, however, the Margaret court held that the particular attack on plaintiff, which

occurred after the plaintiff left the defendant’s house, was so unforeseeable that the defendant had

no duty to prevent it. 139 Cal.App.4th at 161.

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 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit specifically cautioned that: “On remand, the trial court

should determine to what extent the sexual molestation took place when Hester was off duty and to

what extent the particular circumstances of the employment relationship created the opportunity for

these crimes.” 803 F.2d at 1505. The clear implication was that the Ninth Circuit left open the

question of whether there was a sufficient relationship to impose negligence liability under

California law.

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and that a duty to safeguard the plaintiff thereby existed. 139 Cal.App.4th at 152.2

In contrast, it is undisputed that McLaughlin had no relationship of any kind to the Marine

Corps–the attack did not occur on military property, and Blad and Carson did not come into contact

with McLaughlin in the course or scope of conducting any military activity. The cases on which

McLaughlin relies mostly involved circumstances where there was some nexus between the plaintiff

and the government; a connection that is wholly absent here. In Bennet, for example, plaintiffs were

parents whose children had been molested by a teacher at a government-run school. 803 F.2d at

1503. Although the molestation occurred off school property, the children had come into contact

with the teacher by virtue of their enrolment at the government school Id.3 In Morrill, the plaintiff

was a “go-go dancer” hired by the military to perform at an on-base club, where she was raped by a

serviceman in the club’s bathroom. 821 F.2d at 1427. In Senger, the plaintiff was a “business

invitee,” attacked on or near government property by a government employee during the course of

performing a service at the government’s request. 103 F.3d at 1442. In each of these situations,

California law recognizes at least some potential duty on the part of the employer to protect third

persons from acts of its employees.

The only Ninth Circuit case finding potential liability without such a clear connection

between the plaintiff and the government is Kearney. There, a serviceman who was “a prisoner in

custody” at an army base managed to leave the base, and bring a woman back to the base before

raping and killing her. 815 F.2d at 535-536. The issue in Kearney, however, was only whether the

“assault and battery exception” wholly-barred the claim, given the then-recent plurality opinion of

Shearer. See Kearney, 815 F.2d at 536. Although the Kearney court described the conduct of the

military that allowed an in-custody prisoner to escape as “negligent,” it did not consider or decide

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 The Fourth Circuit’s opinion after remand in Sheridan is not directly applicable in that the

law of that circuit, unlike the Ninth, is that negligent supervision and hiring claims arising from an

assault or battery remain barred by the “assault and battery exception.” Compare Sheridan, 969

F.2d at 75 with Bennet, 803 F.2d at 1504. Nevertheless, even though claims based on negligent

hiring and supervision may be viable in this circuit in the abstract, California law still requires some

relationship that is not present on these facts.

5

 The United States also brought a motion to exclude McLaughlin’s expert witness from

offering evidence in opposition to this motion and at trial, arguing both that the expert’s opinion was

not properly and timely disclosed, and that the opinions should be excluded under Daubert. As

discussed at the hearing, this motion presents questions of law as to which the expert’s proffered

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whether such “negligence” would be actionable under California law. Rather, the court simply

rejected the argument that the Kearney plurality opinion was controlling, and remanded the action

for further proceedings. 815 F.2d at 538.

Similarly, the one Supreme Court case that involved a plaintiff with no direct relationship to

the government, expressly assumed, based on the parties’ concessions, that state law would

recognize a negligence claim on the facts presented. See Sheridan, supra, 487 U.S. at 401 (“The

District Court and the Court of Appeals both assumed that petitioners’ version of the facts would

support recovery under Maryland law on a negligence theory if the naval hospital had been owned

and operated by a private person.”) Significantly, after remand, the district court and the court of

appeals ultimately found that the facts did not support imposing a duty on the government in that

instance. Sheridan v. United States, 969 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The United States is not liable

for negligence under Maryland law because, given the circumstances presented on this appeal, it

owed no duty to plaintiffs to protect them from the intentional criminal acts of [the serviceman].”).4

There is no doubt that McLaughlin suffered a despicable and depraved attack. As the

Margaret court observed, however, “[t]he issue is not whether plaintiff was the victim of a terrible

wrong nor whether she suffered devastating injury as a result of that wrong, but instead who is liable

under our tort law for her injuries.” McLaughlin has identified numerous instances where Blad and

Carson (together with other Marines, who did not ultimately attack her) violated various rules and

regulations imposed by the military. She has also identified various behavior of Blad and Carson

that she contends should have led others to recognize that they had dangerous propensities. Under

California law, however, that simply is not enough to give rise to a legal duty on the part of the

government to have somehow protected McLaughlin from this attack.5

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opinions have little bearing, and the Court has not relied on the expert’s view as to what the law is or

should be. In light of the outcome of this summary judgment motion, the request to exclude the

expert from testifying at trial is moot.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

C 04-00960 RS 

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 V. CONCLUSION

The motion of the United States for summary judgment is GRANTED, for the reasons set

forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2006 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

C 04-00960 RS 

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Robert E. Cartwright , Jr vicki@cartwrightlaw.com, biz@cartwrightlaw.com

Claire T. Cormier claire.cormier@usdoj.gov

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 10/16/06 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

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