Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07067/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07067-91/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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1

 By order dated November 18, 2009, the previously scheduled hearing on the

matters was vacated.

2

 With respect to the various evidentiary objections raised by the parties, to the

extent the Court has relied herein on any evidence to which an objection has been made,

the objection is overruled, and to the extent the Court has not relied on such evidence, the

Court does not reach the objection. Additionally, HP’s unopposed Request for Judicial

Notice, filed December 15, 2008, is hereby granted and PICA’s Motion to Strike Declaration

of Robert Creswell, filed November 6, 2009, is hereby denied. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MMCA GROUP, LTD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-06-7067 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART HEWLETTPACKARD COMPANY’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PICA

CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court are (1) defendant Hewlett-Packard Company’s (“HP”) Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed

October 31, 2008, and (2) defendant PICA Corporation’s (“PICA”) Motion for Summary

Judgment, or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 24, 2008. 

Both motions have been fully briefed, including supplemental briefing by all parties.1

Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions,

the Court rules as follows.2

//

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3

 The HP Services Agreement contains a choice-of-law provision selecting Delaware

law. (See Smart Decl. Ex. F § 17.6.) Further, throughout the briefing, both MMCA and HP

rely on Delaware statutory and case law as support for their respective arguments,

irrespective of whether the claim at issue is contractual in nature.

2

A. HP’s Motion

1. First Claim for Relief (Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage)

In response to HP’s motion, plaintiff MMCA Group, Ltd. (“MMCA”) concedes it

“cannot state an actionable claim for intentional interference with prospective economic

advantage against HP.” (See Opp’n at 24:13-16.) 

Accordingly, HP is entitled to summary judgment on MMCA’s First Claim for Relief.

2. Second Claim for Relief (Interference with Contractual Relations)

As discussed below, the Court finds persuasive, HP’s argument that it is entitled to

summary judgment on MMCA’s claim for interference with contractual relations. 

First, to the extent MMCA’s claim is based on an allegation that HP interfered with

the HP Services Agreement, HP, as a party to such contract, cannot be held liable for

interference. See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Del. Ch. 1984)

(holding party to contract could not be held liable for tortious interference with said

contract).3

Second, to the extent MMCA’s claim is based on an allegation that HP interfered

with MMCA’s contracts with MMCA’s employees and contractors, such conduct is identical

to the conduct that forms the basis of MMCA’s Third Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract),

to the extent such Third Claim for Relief is predicated on a breach of the “non-solicitation”

clause contained in the HP Services Agreement (see Smart Decl. Ex. F § 17.14);

consequently, such conduct cannot, without more, form the basis of a tort claim. See Del.

State Univ. Student Hous. Found. v. Ambling Mgmt. Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (D.

Del. 2008) (noting “even an intentional, knowing, wanton, or malicious action by the

defendant will not support a tort claim if the plaintiff cannot assert wrongful conduct beyond

the breach of contract itself”). Although “the same circumstances may give rise to both

breach of contract and tort claims if the plaintiff asserts that the alleged contractual breach

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4

 Although MMCA’s misappropriation claim is brought “under California law” (see

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) at 28:8 & ¶ 147), both MMCA and HP, as noted

above, rely on Delaware law for the purpose of defining, as well as limiting the availability

of, MMCA’s cause of action for interference. 

5

HP states it is not moving for summary judgment on MMCA’s breach of contract

claim to the extent such claim is based on an allegation that HP breached the Services

Agreement by refusing to pay certain invoices or by not paying them in timely fashion. 

(See Mot. at 2 n.2.) Accordingly, the Court makes no determination herein with respect to

any such claim.

3

was accompanied by the breach of an independent duty imposed by law,” id., MMCA has

pointed to no such independent duty with respect to solicitation of personnel. 

Further, to the extent MMCA contends HP’s disclosure of names and contact

information constitutes wrongful conduct beyond the breach of the contract itself, such

alleged conduct is identical to the conduct that forms the basis of MMCA’s Fourth Claim for

Relief, by which MMCA alleges a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Under

Delaware law, a statutory cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets “displaces

conflicting tort . . . law.” See 6 Del. Code § 2007(a).4 Consequently, where a

misappropriation claim and another tort claim are based on the same facts, the other tort

claim fails. See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 755 F. Supp.

635, 636-37 (D. Del. 1991) (noting purpose of trade secrets statutory scheme is to

“eliminate other tort causes of action founded on allegations of trade secret

misappropriation”); Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O’Hara, 798 A.2d 1043, 1057 (Del.Super.

2001) (same). 

Accordingly, HP is entitled to summary judgment on the Second Claim for Relief.

3. Third Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract)

To the extent MMCA’s claim is based on an allegation that HP breached the HP

Services Agreement by terminating MMCA’s projects in the Latin America Region (“LAR”)

and in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa Region (“EMEA”), MMCA’s claim is foreclosed

by the language of the Agreement.5

 In particular, the HP Services Agreement expressly

states: “HP may change or terminate a project or activity hereunder, or any portion thereof,

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6

 Although the HP Services Agreement also provides that such Agreement itself

“may be terminated . . . [b]y either party without cause upon sixty (60) days prior written

notice” (see Smart Decl. Ex. F at § 16.1(c)), the Agreement requires no such advance

notice where the termination relates to “Statements of Work” and any “projects” undertaken

thereunder (see id. §§ 5.1, 5.4). 

4

at any time.” (See Smart Decl. Ex. F at § 5.4.)6

 

To the extent MMCA’s claim is based on an allegation that HP breached the HP

Services Agreement by soliciting three unidentified MMCA “associates,” HP, as set forth

below, likewise is entitled to summary judgment. 

In particular, to the extent MMCA’s breach of contract claim is based on a solicitation

alleged to have been made in June 2002 and discovered by MMCA in February 2003 (see

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 34), such claim is barred by the applicable statute

of limitations, the SAC having been filed on November 14, 2006, more than three years

after any such cause of action accrued. See 10 Del. Code § 8106 (providing three-year

statute of limitations for contract claims). Further, to the extent MMCA’s claim is based on

such solicitation as well as on two other alleged incidents of solicitation (see SAC ¶ 78,

108), HP is entitled to summary judgment for the reason that MMCA cannot show it

suffered any damage or loss by reason thereof. See VLIW Technology, LLC v. HewlettPackard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. Supr. 2003) (holding to survive motion to dismiss

claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must demonstrate “resultant damage”). MMCA admits

one such associate “declined” to leave MMCA (see SAC ¶ 108) and MMCA neither argues

nor offers any evidence to show that either of the other two associates acted on the

solicitation or that MMCA otherwise suffered any loss by reason thereof. 

To the extent MMCA’s claim is based on HP’s alleged participation in solicitations by

other entities, HP has failed to show no triable issue exists as to the eight individuals

identified by MMCA as having left MMCA in response to such solicitations, specifically,

Gabriela Toranzo, Rocio Cvar, Tatiana Gomes, Renata Martinho, Mauro Chavez, Jacky

Vandendriessche, Hoda Hafez and Mohammed Shaltout. (See Opp’n at 11-13; Reply at

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7

 HP states it is not moving for summary judgment to the extent MMCA’s

misappropriation claim is based on an alleged misappropriation of pricing information. (See

HP’s Mot. at 2 n.2.) Accordingly, the Court makes no determination herein with respect to

such claim.

5

 5.) Further, HP has not shown MMCA’s indirect solicitation claim is limited to a particular

group of employees or contractors; consequently, HP has not shown such claim can

proceed only to the extent it is based on the eight individuals identified above.

Lastly, to the extent HP contends the HP Services Agreement limits MMCA’s

potential damages (see Smart Decl. Ex. F § 11), HP, on the record presented, has failed to

show its entitlement as a matter of law to the relief requested. In particular, HP fails to cite

to any authority or evidence demonstrating the language of the provision on which HP

relies can only be interpreted in the manner asserted by HP and irrespective of the

particular breach claimed. Additionally, although MMCA has made a minimal showing that

such provision is “unconscionable” or otherwise unenforceable, see Hampton v. WarrenWolfe Associates, Inc., 2004 WL 838847 at *3 (Del.Super. 2004), “the issue of whether

limitation provisions are enforceable” under Delaware law “are matters which generally

should not be decided on . . . summary judgment.” Id. (citing J.A. Jones Construction Co. v.

City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 553 (Del.Super. 1997)).

Accordingly, HP is entitled to summary judgment on the Third Claim for Relief to

extent such claim is based on termination of HP’s services in the LAR and EMEA and on

direct solicitation of MMCA personnel; in all other respects, HP is not entitled to summary

judgment on the claim.

4. Fourth Claim for Relief (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets) 

As discussed below, HP, contrary to its contentions, is not entitled to summary

judgment on MMCA’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.7

 

First, HP has failed to show that as a matter of law any of the trade secrets alleged

by MMCA are not sufficiently defined to form the basis of a misappropriation claim. See,

e.g., Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 2004 WL 1965869 at *6 (Del.Super. 2004) (finding, on

motion for summary judgment, trade secrets sufficiently defined where described as “a

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unique combination of unified characteristics, components, applications, compilations [sic]

of business information, methods, techniques, processes, and operations of marketing,

monitoring, and administration of a college savings program”) (alteration in original). 

Second, HP has failed to show no triable issue exists with respect to the question of

whether MMCA’s alleged trade secrets derive “independent economic value” (see 6 Del.

Code, tit. 6 § 2001(4)) from their secrecy. See Miles, Inc. v. Cookson Am., Inc., 1994 WL

676761 at *10 (Del. Ch. 1994) (noting, “[a]n alleged trade secret derives actual or potential

economic value if a competitor cannot produce a comparable product without a similar

expenditure of time and money”); (see, e.g., Byrne Decl. ¶¶ 6, 13-14; Cherry Decl. ¶ 6). 

Similarly, HP has failed to show no triable issue exists with respect to the question of

whether the alleged trade secrets were “not [ ] of public knowledge or of a general

knowledge in the trade or business.” See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,

475 (1974); Savor, 2004 WL 1965869 at *6 (holding “a unique combination of public

information and ideas can be worthy of trade secret protection” (collecting cases); (see,

e.g., Cherry Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt f

(1995) (noting “[t]rade secret protection can [ ] survive limited non-confidential disclosure if

the information does not become generally known or readily ascertainable by competitors[;]

recognizing information may “remain[ ] sufficiently secret for protection” where “publications

containing the information are unavailable or unlikely to come to the attention of others to

whom the information has value”); (see, e.g.,Cherry Supp. Decl. at 4:21-26, 5:3-4).

Nor, with one exception discussed below, has HP shown no triable issue exists with

respect to whether the alleged trade secrets were disclosed to HP without an obligation to

maintain their confidentiality or otherwise were not the subject of reasonable measures on

the part of MMCA to maintain their secrecy. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 

U.S. at 475 (holding “necessary element of secrecy is not lost . . . if the holder of the trade

secret reveals the trade secret to another in confidence and under an implied obligation not

to use or disclose it”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); (see, e.g., Cherry Decl. ¶¶ 

39-41). The one exception concerns MMCA’s assertion, as a basis for its misappropriation

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7

claim, that “information specific to each prior and ongoing investigation in which each

operative was engaged” constitutes a trade secret. (See Smart Decl. Ex. A at 20:14-15.) 

To the extent such asserted trade secret is defined as encompassing any “Work Product

delivered to HP in the form of written reports or documentation of the results of

investigations,” HP is entitled to summary judgment. (See id. Ex. F § 9.1(a)(v)) (providing

“HP Owns . . . all of the Work Product delivered to HP in the form of written reports or

documentation of the results of investigations”); see also id. § 2.8 (defining “Work

Product”); id. § 9.2(ii) (providing “MMCA Owns . . . Trade secrets”; defining “Trade secrets”

to include “means and methods used to provide investigative services and investigative

functions”).) Because HP has not identified, however, any particular document as being

excluded from trade secret protection by reason of such provision, the Court makes no

determination herein as to whether MMCA is precluded from relying on any such evidence

in support of its claim. 

Lastly, HP has failed to show no triable issue exists with respect to the question of

whether HP misappropriated the alleged trade secrets by the use or disclosure thereof. In

particular, HP has neither submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate a lack of such use

or disclosure nor shown MMCA will be unable to offer such evidence at trial. (See Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Co., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding

moving party must “produce affirmative evidence negating an essential element” of

nonmoving party’s claim or “point to materials on file which demonstrate that a party will not

be able to meet that burden”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, with the limited exception of “Work Product,” HP is not entitled to

summary judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief.

5. Fifth Claim for Relief (Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

 Dealing) 

 As set forth in HP’s argument, HP is entitled to summary judgment on MMCA’s

claim that HP breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In particular, 

as HP points out, MMCA has failed to identify a cognizable “specific implied contractual

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obligation” to be read into the HP Services Agreement. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG

Life Ins. Co., 872 A.2d 611, 630 (Del.Ch. 2005) (holding “to state a claim for breach of an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must identify a specific implied

contractual obligation”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Rather, the “implied” terms

on which MMCA relies are either no different than the express terms set forth in such

Agreement or in conflict therewith. See Metro Communication Corp. BVI v. Advanced

Mobilecomm Technologies, Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 141 n.32 (Del.Ch. 2004) (holding “a party

cannot assert a claim for breach of implied covenants [of good faith and fair dealing] that is

based on exactly the same acts which are said to be in breach of express covenants”)

(internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original) (citing USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing, Inc.,

988 F.2d 433, 439 (3rd Cir. 1993); see also USX Corp., 988 F.2d at 439 (holding “[t]he law

will imply a term only for omitted covenants”) (internal quotation and citation omitted);

Cincinnati SMSA Ltd Partnership v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 993

(Del.Supr. 1998) (holding implied covenant cannot be used “to vary the Agreement ex

post”).

Accordingly, HP is entitled to summary judgment on the Fifth Claim for Relief.

6. Sixth Claim for Relief (Conspiracy)

 It is undisputed that under both Delaware and California law, conspiracy is “not an

independent cause of action” and, consequently, must be “predicated upon an underlying

wrong.” (See Opp’n at 25-26 n.28 (citing Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis

Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997); Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029,

1039 (Del.Supr. 1998).) Here, to the extent MMCA argues its conspiracy claim is based on

its surviving tort claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, such conspiracy claim

nonetheless fails, for the reason that, as discussed above, a claim for misappropriation

displaces other tort claims based on the same allegations. See Total Care Physicians, 798

A.2d at 1057 (holding civil conspiracy claim fails where based on same allegations as

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 This ruling, however, is not intended to preclude MMCA, at trial, from seeking to

prove its misappropriation claim with evidence indicating, on the part of HP and another

entity, a common design to commit a wrong. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24

Cal.3d 773, 784 (1979) (“As long as two or more persons agree to perform a wrongful act,

the law places civil liability for the resulting damages on all of them, regardless of whether

they actually commit the tort themselves.”) (emphasis omitted).

9

 As discussed elsewhere herein, MMCA has produced sufficient evidence to

support a finding that the identities of its employees and contractors constitute trade

secrets.

9

misappropriation claim).8

 

Accordingly, HP is entitled to summary judgment on the Sixth Claim for Relief. 

B. PICA’s Motion

1. First Claim for Relief (Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage)

 As discussed below, PICA has failed to show no triable issue of fact exists with

respect to the issues of whether PICA interfered with MMCA’s relationship with its

employees and contractors or, by reason of such interference, with its relationship with HP.

First, although PICA has produced considerable evidence to support a finding that it

neither knew nor had reason to know the identities of such employees and contractors

constituted trade secrets or that such individuals otherwise were not subject to solicitation,

MMCA has produced evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue with respect thereto. (See,

e.g., Frucht Supp. Decl. Ex. 21 at 2; Cresswell Decl. at 4:2-6, 4:25-27); see also Reeves v.

Hanlon, 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1152-53 (2004) (holding intentional interference with prospective

economic advantage requires “an independently wrongful act – i.e., an act proscribed by

some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal

standard”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).9

 

Similarly, although PICA has produced substantial evidence to support a finding that

it was unaware of MMCA’s relationship with HP until after HP had terminated MMCA’s

services in the LAR and PICA had been selected to perform such services, MMCA has

produced evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue. (See, e.g., Cresswell Decl. at 4:18-24);

see also Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1164 (2003)

(holding elements of claim for intentional interference with economic advantage include

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10 As discussed infra, MMCA also has produced evidence that PICA acquired and

used MMCA’s pricing information in submitting PICA’s bid to HP.

11 MMCA’s Third and Fifth Claims for Relief are asserted only against HP.

10

defendant’s knowledge of relationship).

Accordingly, PICA is not entitled to summary judgment on the First Claim for Relief.

2. Second Claim for Relief (Interference with Contractual Relations) 

Although PICA has offered substantial evidence to counter MMCA’s claim of

interference with contractual relations, as it did with respect to MMCA’s claim of interference

with prospective economic advantage, MMCA, as discussed above, has produced evidence

sufficient to raise a triable issue both as to PICA’s knowledge of MMCA’s economic

relationship with HP and the protected nature of the identities of MMCA’s employees and

contractors. See Reeves, 33 Cal.4th at 1152 (holding “to recover for a defendant’s

interference with an at-will employment relation, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the

defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act”). Additionally, MMCA has produced

evidence that the HP Services Agreement was not terminated at the time PICA took over

the LAR (See, e.g., Cherry Decl. ¶ 73.)10

Accordingly, PICA is not entitled to summary judgment on the Third Claim for Relief.

3. Fourth Claim for Relief (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets)11

Although PICA, again, has submitted considerable evidence, PICA has failed to show

no triable issue exists with respect to the question of whether PICA misappropriated

MMCA’s trade secrets. 

First, for the reasons set forth above with respect to HP’s motion, PICA has failed to

show no triable issue exists as to whether MMCA’s claimed trade secrets, whether

comprised of the identities of individuals or methods of operation, are subject to protection;

additionally, for the reasons set forth above, MMCA has raised a triable issue as to each

defendant’s knowledge thereof. 

Although, as PICA points out, employees generally are free to change employers

when they choose to do so, to the extent PICA argues a trade secret claim cannot, as a

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matter of law, be based upon an employee’s identity, the cases on which PICA relies for

such proposition are distinguishable on their facts and, further, do not purport to

categorically bar such claims. See Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 728 F.2d

1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding, for purposes of exemption under Freedom of

Information Act, “absent the Board’s express promise of confidentiality, a list of names and

addresses of employees that employers are required to give the Board, cannot fairly be

characterized as [ ] ‘trade secrets’”) (citing Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir.

1971) (same)); CNA Fin. Corp. v. Local 743 of Int’l B’hd of Teamsters, 515 F.Supp. 942, 946

(N.D. Ill. 1981) (noting “it is conceivable that an employee list may contain such extensive

and detailed information that would so devastate a company if disclosed to the wrong

person that it could be characterized as a trade secret”); The Finish Line, Inc. v. Foot

Locker, Inc., 2006 WL 146633 at *10 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (holding list of retail shoe chain’s

management personnel not protected as trade secret; noting “‘it is conceivable that an

employee list. . .could be characterized as a trade secret’”) (citing CNA Fin. Corp.); Metro

Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. App. 4th 853, 862 (1994), (holding

“[s]imply hiring personnel who possess the requirements specified by a customer does not

convert the employee into a ‘trade secret’”; finding no violation of trade secret law where

competitor hired radio station’s traffic reporters and anchors).

Next, with respect to the issue of misappropriation, although California has rejected

the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, see Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal.App. 4th 1443

(2002), and although PICA has produced substantial evidence bearing on whether PICA

improperly acquired and/or used any of MMCA’s trade secrets, PICA has failed to show no

triable issue exists with respect to such issues. In particular, MMCA has produced evidence

sufficient to show PICA knowingly and improperly acquired the identities of certain of

MMCA’s employees and contractors and thereafter used that information to retain the

services of those individuals. (See, e.g., Frucht Supp. Decl. filed Oct. 30, 2009, Ex. 21 at 2,

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12 Further, to the extent MMCA has produced evidence showing other individuals

were solicited improperly by PICA but declined the offer (see, e.g., Frucht Suppl Decl. Ex

33; Geonetta Supp. Decl. Exs. 1-3), MMCA’s lack of evidence as to damages is not

necessarily fatal to MMCA’s claim, as MMCA seeks injunctive relief as well. (See SAC at

33:7-9.)

12

Ex. 53; Cresswell Decl. at 4:5-6, 4:25-27); see also Melick Decl. Ex. N at 146-50.)12 Further,

MMCA has produced evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether PICA, in

submitting its bid to HP, improperly acquired and used MMCA’s pricing information. (See,

e.g., Cherry Decl. at 36:6-11; Geonetta Decl. Ex. 11; Cresswell Decl. at 4:18-19, 4:22-24;

Byrne Decl. at 14:12-14; Frucht Supp. Decl. filed Nov. 6, 2009, Ex. 1 at 21; see also Melick

Decl. Ex. N at 149-50). 

 Accordingly, PICA is not entitled to summary judgment on the Fourth Claim for

Relief.

4. Sixth Claim for Relief (Conspiracy) 

PICA’s argument in favor of summary judgment on MMCA’s conspiracy claim is

predicated on a finding that PICA is entitled to summary judgment on each of the three

above-discussed causes of action. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7

Cal. 4th 503, 510-11 (1994) ( “A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give

rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting in damage”)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). As set forth above, however, the Court has found a

triable issue of fact exists as to MMCA’s substantive claims.

Accordingly, PICA is not entitled to summary judgment on the Sixth Claim for Relief.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. HP’s motion is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

a. With respect to the First Claim for Relief, the motion is GRANTED.

b. With respect to the Second Claim for Relief, the motion is GRANTED.

c. With respect to the Third Claim for Relief, the motion is GRANTED to the

extent MMCA claims HP breached the HP Services Agreement by (i) termination of 

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MMCA’s projects in the LAR and EMEA; and (ii) direct solicitation; in all other respects, the

motion as to such claim is DENIED.

d. With respect to the Fourth Claim for Relief, the motion is GRANTED to the

extent such claim is based on information constituting HP’s “Work Product” under the HP

Services Agreement; in all other respects the motion as to such claim is DENIED.

e. With respect to the Fifth Claim for Relief, the motion is GRANTED.

f. With respect to the Sixth Claim for Relief, the motion is GRANTED.

2. PICA’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: January 12, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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