Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-55111/USCOURTS-ca9-09-55111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BAPPI LAHIRI, an individual; 

SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

ANTHONY KORNARENS, Esquire,

Movant-Appellant, No. 09-55111

v. D.C. No.

UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO  2:02-cv-08330-

DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION, a ODW-CT

Delaware corporation; INTERSCOPE OPINION

RECORDS, a corporation;

AFTERMATH RECORDS, a business

entity form unknown; ANDRE

RAMELLE YOUNG,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 9, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed June 7, 2010

Before: Harry Pregerson and Robert R. Beezer,

Circuit Judges, and Suzanne B. Conlon,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Conlon

*The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon, United States District Judge for

the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

8127

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 1 of 11
COUNSEL

Curtis A. Cole, Matthew Levinson, Cole Pedroza, LLP, Pasadena, California, for the movant-appellant.

Russell J. Frackman, Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp, LLP, Los

Angeles, California, Jeffrey D. Goldman, Loeb & Loeb, LLP,

Los Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

CONLON, District Judge:

Anthony Kornarens is an attorney specializing in copyright

law. Kornarens was severely sanctioned by the district court

for his five-year bad faith pursuit of a frivolous copyright

infringement claim. In its 21-page order, the district court

awarded defendants $247,397.28 in attorneys’ fees and

$10,808.76 in costs, under 28 U.S.C. § 19271 and the court’s

inherent sanctioning power. Kornarens appeals, contending

the sanctions were unwarranted and excessive.2 We disagree

and affirm.

I

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A district

court’s imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and its findings of fact for clear error. Pac. Harbor

1

28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the

court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees

reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 

2Kornarens’ client, plaintiff Bappi Lahiri, appealed the district court’s

summary judgment order in defendants’ favor (Lahiri v. Universal Music

& Video Distrib., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2007)), but voluntarily dismissed the appeal. 

8130 LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 2 of 11
Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1117

(9th Cir. 2000). An attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously “multiplies the proceedings” may be required to pay

the excess fees and costs caused by his conduct. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927. Recklessness suffices for § 1927 sanctions, but sanctions imposed under the district court’s inherent authority

require a bad faith finding. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t,

276 F.3d 1091, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (attorney’s knowing

and reckless introduction of inadmissible evidence was tantamount to bad faith and warranted sanctions under § 1927 and

the court’s inherent power); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989,

993-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (attorney’s reckless misstatements of

law and fact, combined with an improper purpose, are sanctionable under the court’s inherent power). 

The parties dispute whether a bad faith finding must be

supported by clear and convincing evidence. This court has

not addressed the burden of proof required for a sanctions

award. See, e.g., In re Lehtinen, 564 F.3d 1052, 1061 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2009) (declining to address burden because clear and

convincing evidence of misconduct supported bad faith finding and imposition of sanctions under the court’s inherent

authority); F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev.,

Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1143 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). The

burden of proof issue need not be resolved here because the

district court’s bad faith finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

II

Kornarens represented Bappi Lahiri, who in 1981 composed the song Thoda for an Indian movie. Lahiri composed

Thoda for compensation under an agreement with the film’s

producer, Pramod Films. The parties agreed the law of India

controls the underlying copyright issues. Under Indian law,

Pramod Films, not Lahiri, owned the Thoda copyright as a

work for hire. Pramod Films later assigned its Thoda rights to

Saregama India Limited (“Saregama”). 

LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO 8131

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 3 of 11
Twenty-one years later, Kornarens filed suit on Lahiri’s

behalf, claiming defendants Universal Music & Video Distribution Corporation, Interscope Records, Aftermath Records

and Andre Ramelle Young (“defendants”) used unauthorized

excerpts of Thoda in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a), and engaged in unfair competition under parallel

California law for failure to credit Lahiri’s authorship. Kornarens, a copyright specialist, did not include a copyright

infringement claim in the original complaint.

Three months later the Supreme Court granted certiorari in

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S.

1099 (2003). The central issue in Dastar was whether Lanham Act false designation claims were limited to producers of

tangible goods, and excluded Lanham Act protection for

authors of ideas, concepts or communications embodied in the

goods. An adverse decision by the Supreme Court would

clearly jeopardize Lahiri’s Lanham Act and parallel unfair

competition claims.

Three months after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in

Dastar, Lahiri registered a copyright in Thoda with the United

States Copyright Office. On June 2, 2003, the Supreme Court

issued its opinion limiting Lanham Act false designation

claims to producers of tangible goods. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003). Three

weeks later, Kornarens amended Lahiri’s complaint to add a

Thoda copyright infringement claim under the United States

copyright issued a few months earlier. This became Lahiri’s

sole claim on August 15, 2003, when the district court dismissed his Lanham Act and parallel unfair competition claims

under Dastar.

Meanwhile, based on Pramod Films’ assignment of the

Thoda copyright, Saregama sued defendants for infringement.

Lahiri and Saregama’s lawsuits, asserting conflicting claims

of a Thoda copyright, ultimately were consolidated before the

United States District Court for the Central District of Califor8132 LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 4 of 11
nia. Defendants moved to stay the consolidated cases and proposed to submit the competing copyright ownership claims by

Lahiri and Saregama to an Indian court for resolution. Alternatively, defendants moved for summary judgment against

Lahiri on the ground that he did not own a valid copyright in

Thoda; defendants argued that Saregama owned the copyright

under Indian law. Lahiri and Saregama filed cross-motions for

summary judgment on their conflicting claims to ownership

of a Thoda copyright. 

After the district court requested supplemental briefing on

whether the consolidated cases should be stayed, Kornarens

submitted an agreement that he mischaracterized as resolving

the issue of copyright ownership between Lahiri and Saregama, purporting to moot the need for a stay and the crossmotions for summary judgment between Lahiri and Saregama. The district court credited Kornarens’ characterization

of the agreement as resolving conflicting copyright ownership

claims. Contrary to Kornarens’ representations, Lahiri and

Saregama agreed to a 30/70% (respectively) split of any copyright infringement recovery from defendants, and the agreement explicitly referred to co-ownership of the Thoda

copyright only for purposes of these consolidated cases. Relying on the purported co-ownership settlement agreement, the

district court erroneously concluded Lahiri was the co-owner

of the Thoda copyright. This error resulted in the denial of

defendants’ summary judgment motion against Lahiri predicated on the meritorious contention Lahiri lacked a copyright

interest in Thoda. Defendants’ argument that Saregama

owned the Thoda copyright under Indian law was rejected by

the district court without analysis. Contentious litigation

ensued for three more years, resulting in an additional 233

docket entries and three rounds of trial preparation.

On August 9, 2007, the district court granted defendants’

renewed summary judgment motion against Lahiri. After a

thorough analysis, the district court concluded Lahiri did not

have a copyright interest in Thoda under Indian law. Lahiri v.

LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO 8133

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 5 of 11
Universal Music & Video Distrib., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1172

(C.D. Cal. 2007).3 Defendants then moved for $800,752.00 in

attorneys’ fees and $93,787.44 in costs under § 1927 and the

court’s inherent authority to sanction attorney misconduct.

The sanctions issues were fully briefed and the district court

held a hearing before issuing its detailed 21-page order granting defendants’ motion, but substantially reducing the award

defendants sought.

III

[1] Kornarens argues the district court abused its discretion

by sanctioning him for knowingly and recklessly pursuing a

frivolous copyright infringement claim and litigating that

claim in bad faith. The record supports the district court’s

findings and imposition of sanctions. The parties agreed that

resolution of Thoda’s ownership is governed by the Indian

Copyright Act, 1957, and the Indian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the act in Indian Performing Right Soc’y Ltd. v.

E. Indian Motion Pictures Ass’n and Others (“IPRS”), A.I.R.

1977 S.C. 1443. Unequivocally, the law of India vests a copyright in a movie score composed for compensation in the film

company; the composer has no copyright interest absent an

agreement to the contrary. Had Kornarens, a self-described

experienced copyright lawyer, made even a cursory investigation into the circumstances of Lahiri’s 21-year old composition of Thoda, he would have known Lahiri had no copyright

interest in music he composed for hire. 

On appeal, Kornarens argues he reasonably relied on an

expert in Indian law, as well as his unsupported assertion that

Lahiri represented he owned the Thoda copyright. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting similar arguments. The law of India is straightforward and the IPRS decision is in English. Indeed, there is nothing legally remarkable

3After summary judgment was entered against Lahiri, defendants

quickly settled with Saregama. 

8134 LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 6 of 11
or unique about applicable Indian law that would reasonably

require expert advice. Generally, a composer who creates a

film score for hire forfeits a copyright interest in his work.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C § 101 (a work made for hire includes a

work specially ordered or commissioned for use as part of a

motion picture if the parties expressly agree in a signed, written instrument that the work shall be considered a work made

for hire), § 201(b) (the employer or other person for whom the

work made for hire was prepared owns the copyright unless

the parties expressly agree otherwise in a signed, written

instrument); Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d

1136, 1140-43 (9th Cir. 2003) (composer of television series

music for hire did not own copyright in the music).

[2] Kornarens attempted to justify his untenable interpretation of Indian copyright law by misrepresenting the IPRS

decision: he cited the immaterial concurring opinion as the

Indian Supreme Court’s holding. He repeatedly misquoted

Gee Pee Films, Pvt. Ltd. v. Pratik Chowdhury and Others,

G.A. No. 2756 of 2001 and C.S. No. 356 of 2001, for the

proposition that a film producer does not have a copyright

interest in songs that it commissions. Gee Pee expressly

involved non-film music. Kornarens inserted the parenthetical

“(film company)” into a quotation from Gee Pee to support

his misrepresentation the case involved Indian film music.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

Kornarens’ misrepresentations of Indian law evidenced his

bad faith and recklessness in pursuing Lahiri’s copyright

claim. 

[3] Kornarens now concedes his written submissions to the

district court contained “mistakes.” However, viewed in the

context of the history of this litigation, the court did not abuse

its discretion in finding that Kornarens acted recklessly and in

bad faith in pursuing a frivolous copyright claim for five

years. Kornarens’ amended complaint asserted a contrived

United States copyright claim created by registration of a 21-

year old composition after his Lanham Act and unfair compeLAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO 8135

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 7 of 11
tition claims were placed in jeopardy by the Supreme Court’s

grant of certiorari in Dastar. Lahiri composed Thoda for a

film produced in India, under an agreement with an Indian

film producer for financial compensation. Pursuit of a copyright claim without inquiring whether Lahiri composed Thoda

for hire would be reckless under the laws of either India or the

United States. The district court did not err in its factual findings or abuse its discretion in concluding that Kornarens’

repeated misrepresentations of Indian copyright law clearly

evidenced his recklessness and bad faith.

[4] After the sanctions motion was filed and the district

court’s decision was impending, Kornarens attempted to

cause the judge’s recusal by retaining the judge’s former law

firm to defend him against the sanctions motion. The district

court’s consideration of this manipulative tactic as evidence

of bad faith was not an abuse of discretion. The district court

reasonably inferred that Kornarens’ intent was to have the

case assigned to a new judge who would be unfamiliar with

the protracted history of this litigation.4

Kornarens contends the initial denial of summary judgment

precludes imposition of sanctions because the decision

“placed [the district court’s] imprimatur of propriety” on

Lahiri’s copyright claim. The record strongly suggests otherwise. The summary judgment denial was predicated on Kornarens’ misleading submission of the Lahiri-Saregama

settlement as purportedly recognizing Lahiri as the co-owner

of the copyright; the agreement only applied “ownership” to

a split of an anticipated recovery in this litigation. The record

demonstrates Kornarens misled the district court by use of a

settlement agreement that deceptively used ownership language, but did not convey or recognize co-ownership of

Thoda. In any case, a court may revisit prior decisions in a

4Over the five-year history of this litigation, three different judges of the

United States District Court for the Central District of California were

assigned to this case. 

8136 LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 8 of 11
case and correct errors while the case is still pending. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817

(1988). Similarly, Kornarens’ argument that he acted in good

faith reliance on the settlement agreement in his continued

pursuit of Lahiri’s copyright claim is frivolous, given the

restrictive language of a document Kornarens himself submitted to the district court.

[5] Kornarens argues that no single instance of misconduct

cited by the district court justified the imposition of sanctions.

Kornarens ignores the record. The district court’s bad faith

finding was based on the cumulative effect of his litigation

conduct for more than five years. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that Kornarens

acted recklessly and in bad faith and his conduct caused

unreasonably protracted and costly litigation over a frivolous

copyright claim. Accordingly, sanctions were not an abuse of

discretion.

IV

Kornarens challenges the reasonableness of the

$258,206.04 award. He suggests that if the imposition of

sanctions is upheld, the amount should not exceed

$21,310.26. However, the district court’s sanctions order

explains in detail its reduction of defendants’ claimed

$894,539.44 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The award is explicitly limited to excess costs and fees incurred in defending

against Lahiri’s copyright infringement claim, and excludes

litigation expenses for his dismissed Lanham Act and unfair

competition claims. The award therefore excludes all fees and

costs incurred before September 1, 2003.

[6] The district court used a traditional lodestar analysis of

defendants’ contemporaneous billing records. Because defendants used single entries for tasks pertaining to both Saregama

and Lahiri’s consolidated copyright claims, the district court

apportioned only half of the billings to Lahiri. This was a conLAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO 8137

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 9 of 11
servative approach. The record reflects that Kornarens initiated most of the litigation activity resulting in defendants’

excessive fees and costs. An apportioned percentage is not an

abuse of discretion because it would be impossible to determine with mathematical precision the fees and costs generated

only by Kornarens. The Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 340 F.3d 829, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2003); Salstrom v.

Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1996).

[7] The district court reviewed samples from the fee application and calculated an 80% block billing rate. The district

court identified attorneys and paralegals who were primarily

responsible for block billing, and reduced 80% of their billable hours by 30%. This was permissible and not an abuse of

discretion. Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing California State Bar’s Committee on

Mandatory Fee Arbitration’s report that block billing may

increase time by 10 to 30%). The district court further

excluded fees incurred because of court-requested supplemental information and made an additional 10% across-the-board

reduction for excessive and redundant work. Moreno v. City

of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). This was

a reasoned exercise of discretion.

In reducing defendants’ recovery of costs by $82,978.68,

the district court carefully excluded inadequately documented

costs, as well as taxable costs not included in defendants’ bill

of costs. The significantly reduced award of recoverable costs

was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

V

CONCLUSION

[8] The district court’s authority to sanction attorneys

under § 1927 and its inherent disciplinary power must be

exercised with restraint and discretion. The record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that Kornarens

8138 LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 10 of 11
engaged in a pattern of bad faith litigation conduct over an

extended time period. He pursued a meritless copyright

infringement claim that directly resulted in excess fees and

costs. Beyond question, Kornarens acted recklessly. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable

and carefully considered attorneys’ fees and costs.

AFFIRMED.

LAHIRI v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC AND VIDEO 8139

Case: 09-55111 06/07/2010 ID: 7361850 DktEntry: 32-1 Page: 11 of 11