Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01912/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01912-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01912-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 22) 

30-DAY DEADLINE

Before the Court for screening is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Because the 

Court finds Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable claim, though he has not done so, the Court 

DISMISSES the matter with leave to amend.

A. Summary of Plaintiff=s Allegations

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred while he was an inmate at Pleasant Valley State 

Prison in 2008-2009 when he contracted Valley Fever. Plaintiff names eight Defendants

including, CDCR Director Susan Hubbard; Receiver J. Clark Kelso; PVSP Warden Yates; CDCR 

Medical Director Dwight Winslow; Appeals Coordinator CCI J. Morgan; Dr. J. Chakatos; Dr. J. 

Fortune; and Dr. Byron Mui. Plaintiff alleges that every one of these Defendants have violated 

his rights: "to Medical Care;" to "Due Process of Human Rights;" to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment; and that they all violated the First, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

However, while Plaintiff lists all of these as claims he is asserting against each of the named 

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defendants, his factual allegations against the individual defendants clearly only apply to one or a 

two of these claims. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to PVSP on July 8, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that 

PVSP is located in a coccidiomycosis, or Valley Fever, endemic zone, and that he was knowingly 

confined in that dangerous environment. In April of 2009, Plaintiff became very ill and was 

subsequently diagnosed with Valley Fever. These events, coupled with his subsequent medical 

treatment, form the basis of Plaintiff's claims in this action. 

While Plaintiff has clarified his allegations and provided more factual details, the Second 

Amended Complaint is extremely difficult to follow. Further, though Plaintiff has identified each 

claim he intends to pursue against each Defendant along with the factual allegations upon which 

he bases each claim, his factual allegations are disjointed, not in chronological order, and are 

extremely convoluted to say the least. Thus, Plaintiff is being given the applicable standards 

based on his stated claims and ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY to correct his pleading 

deficiencies. 

B. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

As stated in the prior screening order, "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to 

all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint 

must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief 

. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of 

what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

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Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Plaintiff would do well to state which constitutional right(s) he feels was violated by a 

given Defendant, or group of Defendants, followed by a chronological and orderly statement of 

his factual allegations of what was done, or not done, which he feels make his claim(s) 

cognizable. 

D. Claims for Relief

1. Eighth Amendment 

a. Conditions of Confinement 

In the context of conditions of confinement, "Prison officials violate the Eighth 

Amendment if they are "deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a prisoner's] serious medical needs." 

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

104 (1976). This standard contains both an objective and subjective element. See Helling v. 

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,35-36 (1993) (discussing objective and subjective elements of Eighth 

Amendment Claim). In the context of exposure to disease, the objective element asks whether 

prison officials have exposed the prisoner to a serious medical risk of disease. To determine 

whether the medical risk to which Plaintiff is exposed is serious, the court considers whether the 

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“risk the prisoner complains of [is] so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to 

expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of 

which he complaints is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate.” Id. at 36 (italics in 

original).

The subjective element of an Eighth Amendment Violation asks whether the prison 

official acted with “deliberate indifference” in denying medical care or exposing the prisoner to 

the risk of disease. For conduct to qualify as “deliberately indifferent” in the context of 

conditions of confinement, the conduct must be shown to be “wanton.” “[T]he constraints facing 

the official” must be considered when determining whether conduct is wanton. Wilson v. Seiter, 

501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). A depravation of a treatment or the exposure to a hazard may be 

wanton only if it was within the official's ability at the time to avoid the exposure to risk or 

deprivation of care. “Wantonness consist[s] of 'acting sadistically and maliciously for the 

purpose of causing harm.” Id., quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-322 (1986). 

Plaintiff bases his claims against Defendants CDCR Director Susan Hubbard, CDCR 

Medical Director Dwight Winslow, and PVSP Warden Yates on the policies and/or procedures 

that led to his placement in PVSP. However, despite having been given the applicable standards 

in the prior screening order, Plaintiff's allegations against them do not address either the objective 

or subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. 

As to the objective component, Plaintiff alleges no facts to indicate that the risk of 

exposure to the spores at PVSP is any higher than in the surrounding community. It is worth 

noting that the attention of Courts and official policy-makers regarding the risk of Valley Fever 

have focused on PVSP and Avenal State Prison. These facilities have drawn particular state and 

district court attention because, although eight California correctional facilities are located in the 

endemic area, these two facilities account for 85% of the occurrence of reported cases of Valley 

Fever in California. See Plata v. Brown, 2013 WL 3200587 (N.D. Cal. 2013) at *2. However, an 

individual who lives out of custody anywhere in the Southern San Joaquin Valley, also runs a

relatively high risk of exposure to Coccidioides immitis spores. Unless there is something about 

a prisoner's conditions of confinement that raise the risk of exposure substantially above the risk 

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experienced by the surrounding community, it cannot be said that the prisoner is forcibly and 

knowingly exposed to a risk the society would not tolerate to meet the objective component of a 

claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

Further, Plaintiff fails to state allegations to meet the subjective component of an Eighth 

Amendment claim. Plaintiff has not shown that the proposed new Defendants acted wantonly in 

formulating the policies and procedures which resulted in Plaintiff's placement in PVSP and 

subsequently at Corcoran State Prison. As noted above the State of California has eight of its 

correctional facilities -- and therefore a substantial proportion of its inmate capacity -- located in 

the Southern San Joaquin Valley. If Plaintiff's allegations (that he was transferred to PVSP where 

Valley Fever is known to be endemic and contracted Valley Fever, with nothing more) were 

cognizable, the State of California would not be able to house any inmates at PVSP or Avenal 

State Prison, and might not be able to house any inmates in any of the eight facilities located in 

the endemic area. 

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which to infer that these 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's risk of exposure to the spores that cause 

Valley Fever. Not only has Plaintiff not alleged any facts from which a finding of deliberate 

indifference could be inferred, the factual background presented in Plata and other cases since 

2005 demonstrate that California policy makers have been attempting for years to accommodate 

constitutional requirements. Thus, Plaintiff fails and is unable to state a cognizable claim against

Defendants CDCR Director Susan Hubbard, CDCR Medical Director Dwight Winslow, and 

PVSP Warden Yates due to the policies and/or procedures that led to his placement in PVSP.

Plaintiff states no allegations against any of the other named Defendants upon which liability for 

his placement at PVSP may be inferred.

b. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ' "significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain." ' " Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

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439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))).

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first Ashow a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

The existence of a condition or injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual=s daily activities, and the existence of chronic or substantial pain are indications of a 

serious medical need. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted); Doty v.

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court accepts that contracting

disseminated Valley Fever is a serious medical need for screening purposes. 

Deliberate indifference is Aa state of mind more blameworthy than negligence@ and 

Arequires >more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner=s interests or safety.=@ Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). ADeliberate indifference 

is a high legal standard.@ Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). AUnder this 

standard, the prison official must not only >be aware of the facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,= but that person >must also draw the 

inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 

how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 

(9th Cir. 2002)). 

In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

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prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). More generally, deliberate indifference Amay 

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 

may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.; 

see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (A[A] finding that the defendant=s activities resulted in 

>substantial= harm to the prisoner is not necessary.@).

Plaintiff's allegations against Dr. Mui, Dr. Chakatos, and Dr. Fortune are exclusively 

based on their involvement in his medical care and treatment. As to Dr. Chakatos and Dr. 

Fortune, Plaintiff alleges that, when he first began to feel ill in April of 2009, he complained to 

Dr. Chakatos of chest pains, coughing, throwing-up, night sweats, fatigue, joint aches, loss of 

appetite, breathing problems, weight loss, staph infections, weakness, headaches, and diarrhea. 

(Doc. 22, p. 18.) Dr. Chakatos indicated that it sounded like Plaintiff was coming down with a 

cold or flu, gave Plaintiff some cough medicine, “a 3-day lay in order,” and sent Plaintiff back to 

his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that despite being aware of the occurrence rate of Valley Fever in 

PVSP, Dr. Chakatos did not order any blood tests or chest x-rays or saliva tests. (Id., at p. 19.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, in that same month,

1

he complained to Dr. Fortune of the same symptoms

with the same result – Dr. Fortune ordered no tests but diagnosed a cold/flu and told Plaintiff to 

drink plenty of fluids. (Id., at pp. 23-24.) This alleged misdiagnosis of Plaintiff with a cold or flu 

rather than Valley Fever when he first consulted Dr. Chakatos and later Dr. Fortune is, at most, 

medical malpractice. See Broughton, 622 F.2d at 460. 

Plaintiff further alleges that on May 4, 2009, he collapsed and was transported to Coalinga 

Medical Center emergency room where he was seen by a doctor who diagnosed him with Valley 

Fever. The doctor told Plaintiff he would need to receive intravenous Amphotericin B for several 

months. (Id., at pp.19, 24.) Eventually, Plaintiff was released with a prescription of Fluconazole. (Id.) 

 

1 Dr. Chakatos and Dr. Fortune treated Plaintiff during the same period of time -- April of 2009 until his transfer to 

another facility.

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Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Chakatos failed to monitor his condition such that he again 

required hospitalization, where it was determined that he had relapsed and he was again placed on 

I.V. Amphotericin B for five months. (Id., at pp. 19-20.) In December of 2009, Plaintiff 

allegedly complained to Dr. Chakatos of chest pains and difficulty breathing for which Dr. 

Chakatos gave Plaintiff a lay-in order and sent him away without medical care. (Id., at p. 20.) 

On January 1, 2011, Plaintiff relapsed and was again sent to the hospital for five months of I.V. 

Amphotericin B. (Id.) When Plaintiff returned to PVSP, Dr. Chakatos took Plaintiff off Fluconazole as well as his inhaler and Vitamin C. (Id.) Plaintiff went over a month without them 

and Dr. Chakatos reported Plaintiff never contracted Valley Fever. (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently 

relapsed and had to be hospitalized and received five months of I.V. medications. (Id.) 

Plaintiff's allegations that Dr. Chakatos interfered with Plaintiff's receipt of Flu-conazole

as prescribed by Dr. Mui may be actionable. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (actions that 

Ainterfere with treatment once prescribed@ are cognizable); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3rd 

Cir. 1990) (finding a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference where prison officials ignored 

private hospital=s treatment orders and refused inmate=s access to prescribed medication); Tolbert 

v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding cognizable claim for deliberate indifference 

where warden refused to authorize prisoner=s receipt of medicine, which was required to prevent 

serious harm to his health, that had been previously prescribed by a physician). However, 

Plaintiff's bases his allegations against Dr. Fortune on Plaintiff allegedly being on Flu-conazole

for Valley Fever "for over 2 years" during which he allegedly had three relapses. (Doc. 22, pp. 

24-25.) In addition to the fact that these allegations against Dr. Fortune completely contradict 

Plaintiff's allegations that Dr. Chakatos interfered with Plaintiff's receipt of his medication to treat 

Valley Fever (he could not have received it for two years straight and had it discontinued during 

the same time), Plaintiff fails to state allegations to show that anything Dr. Chakatos or Dr. 

Fortune did, or failed to do, negatively impacted his medical condition -- let alone was in 

deliberate indifference to a known risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. 

Further, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Fortune did not "have any records that the Plaintiff had 

ever been in the hospital for the relapse of the Valley Fever Cocci disease" . . . . (Id.) and that he 

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did not receive Flu-conazole until approximately three and a half weeks after Dr. Mui2ordered it, 

but he states no allegations to show that Dr. Fortune was responsible for this delay, or that the 

delay caused him any harm (id.). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). 

Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Fortune, like Dr. Chakatos, told Health Care Services in 

Sacramento that Plaintiff did not have Valley Fever, but his allegations do not show that Dr. 

Fortune knew that Plaintiff had contracted Valley Fever, that this statement was made with 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical condition, or that this statement impacted his 

treatment or condition (id.) so as to cause him harm. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096). 

Plaintiff claims Dr. Fortune also told Health Care Service that Plaintiff never had angina 

or a muscle disease called "Rahbdomylosis" (id.), but Plaintiff fails to state any allegations to 

show that any such statements by Dr. Fortune created a known risk of serious harm, or in any way 

negatively impacted Plaintiff's medical treatment (id.) so as to cause him harm; nor does Plaintiff 

explain how these symptoms/conditions. Thus, these claims appear to be unrelated to his Valley 

Fever condition and violate Rule 18. As discussed above, these allegations amount at most to 

medical malpractice, but are not cognizable for deliberate indifference under the Eighth 

Amendment.

Plaintiff's allegations against Dr. Mui are likewise not cognizable. Plaintiff alleges that 

Dr. Mui was the "Disease Control" physician who treated him three times when Plaintiff's 

condition relapsed and he was hospitalized from January 1, 2011 to May 4, 2011; from August 

2012 to December of 2012; and from May of 2013 continuing for another five months. (Doc. 22, 

at pp. 27-28.) Plaintiff alleges that during those hospital stays, he received Amphotericin B 

intravenously, was not made aware of the grave side-effects of the medication, and only saw Dr. 

Mui once. (Id.) Failure to advised Plaintiff of the negative side-effects of a medication utilized to 

control his Valley Fever may constitute, at the most medical malpractice -- which is a form of 

professional negligence. However, "[m]ere >indifference,= >negligence,= or >medical malpractice=

 

2 Elsewhere Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Lymar was the physician who prescribed Flu-conazole for his Valley Fever. 

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will not support this cause of action.@ Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th 

Cir.1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir.2004). Further, if, as implied by Plaintiff's allegations against the other physicians for 

restricting his access to it, the medication that Dr. Mui put Plaintiff on was medically necessary 

and a reasonable choice to be made for his treatment, failure to advise of negative side-effects 

may not even constitute medical malpractice. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim 

against Dr. Mui.

2. Receiver Kelso -- Qualified Immunity 

As noted in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Defendant J. Clark Kelso is the Receiver for 

CDCR's health care system. See Plata v. Schwarzenegger, et al., C01–1351–TEH (N.D.Cal. Jan. 

23, 2008). Upon his appointment in 2008, “[t]he Receiver and his staff [were granted] the status 

of officers and agents of [the Plata Court], and as such [were] vested with the same immunities as 

vest with [the Plata] Court.” Id. Those judicial immunities extend to immunity from suit. See

Pierson v. Ray, 286 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at 

common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within 

their judicial jurisdiction ....”). See also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 4276554 

(E.D.Cal. Nov.29, 2007) (holding that a receiver who was “imbued with the power and authority 

to act in the name of the Court as the Court's officer” and who “acts as a ‘surrogate' of the court” 

had quasi judicial immunity). “[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or 

malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and 

eventual trial.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). There are two primary exceptions to the 

absolute judicial immunity -- where action is not taken in the judicial capacity and where the 

action, “though judicial in nature, is taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” See id. at 

11–12.

Here, Plaintiff's allegations acknowledge that Defendant Kelso was appointed to oversee 

medical care at the prisons in the state of California. (Doc. 22, p.8.) Plaintiff's allegations assert 

that Defendant Kelso is liable for "not monitoring the Valley Fever cocci disease the [sic] 

Plaintiff suffers from the [sic] (Valley Fever Cocci Disease) with great side effects, such as, 

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headaches, upperbody joint pains, stomach cramps, . . . ." (Id., at p. 9.) Plaintiff, thus, asserts that 

Defendant Kelso failed to act properly in his role as Receiver, but fails to show that he acted in a

manner outside of the bounds of all jurisdiction. Accordingly, Defendant Kelso is entitled to 

quasi-judicial immunity and suit may not be maintained against him.3

3. Due Process & Inmate Appeals

Plaintiff's allegations against PVSP Appeals Coordinator CCI J. Morgan are solely based 

on inmate appeals he filed seeking transfer to another facility. (Doc. 22, pp. 15-17.) To this end, 

Plaintiff alleges that if he had been granted the transfer out of PVSP when first requested, he 

would not have suffered three relapses in his condition and may not have contracted the 

disseminated form of Valley Fever. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that he filed an appeal regarding

his transfer from PVSP to Corcoran State Prison, but that Morgan denied it as not an emergency. 

(Id.) 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from deprivations of liberty without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To state such a claim, a plaintiff 

must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. AStates 

may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process 

Clause.@ Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law 

are generally limited to freedom from restraint that Aimposes atypical and significant hardship on 

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.@ Id.

"[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 

procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in 

processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure), citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right 

only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 

Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see 

 

3

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to amend his complaint to allege that Kelso was aware of Plaintiff's medical needs 

and failed to act upon that knowledge, any such allegations would similarly entitle Kelso to absolute quasi-judicial 

immunity because Plaintiff would again be alleging that Kelso failed to act within his capacity as the Receiver of 

CDCR’s health care system.

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also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure 

confers no liberty interest on prisoner). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner=s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability 

under a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows about a 

violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 

correct. AOnly persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against 

a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.@ Greeno 

v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.2005) accord George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th 

Cir. 2007); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 

992-93 (7th Cir.1996). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against Appeals 

Coordinator Morgan based on the denial of his inmate appeals seeking transfer to a facility out of 

the area endemic to Valley Fever. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Morgan did not call his family to let them know he was 

hospitalized and did not tell his family that he had been hospitalized when they called. (Doc. 22, 

at pp. 15-17.) There is no constitutional requirement for any prison staff to advise an inmate's 

family of the inmate's hospitalization. While it would have been courteous for Morgan to have 

done so, this failure does not violate any of Plaintiff's rights under the United States Constitution. 

4. Supervisory Liability 

Plaintiff also alleges that the quality of the medical health care provided to inmates with 

Valley Fever under CDCR Medical Director Dwight Winslow was so poor that it constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment. However, as stated in the prior screening order, supervisory 

personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a 

theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory 

position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically 

alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under 

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section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. 

The Supreme Court has rejected liability on the part of supervisors for “knowledge and 

acquiescence” in subordinates’ wrongful discriminatory acts. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

677 (2009) (“[R]espondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s 

discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this 

argument.”) However, “discrete wrongs B for instance, beatings B by lower level Government 

actors . . . if true and if condoned by [supervisors] could be the basis for some inference of 

wrongful intent on [the supervisor’s] part.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683. Further, the Ninth Circuit 

recently held that where the applicable constitutional standard is deliberate indifference, a 

plaintiff may state a claim for supervisory liability based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and 

acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by others. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). 

It is under this rubric that the traditional and still valid elements of supervisor liability within the 

Ninth Circuit are properly analyzed. 

It is worth restating that A>bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a 

Aformulaic recitation of the elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of 

ruling on a motion to dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an 

assumption of truth.@ Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or 

nonsensical,= but rather because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that 

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conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation.@ Id. 

Plaintiff=s allegations against Director Winslow, based on his personal participation in 

Plaintiff's placement at PVSP have been previously discussed. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts 

indicating that Director Winslow knew of any violations by medical staff under his direction and

failed to act to prevent them, or that Director Winslow promulgated or Aimplemented a policy so 

deficient that the policy >itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights= and is >the moving force of 

the constitutional violation.=@ Hansen v. Black, at 646. Thus, Plaintiff fails and is unable to state 

a cognizable claim against Director Winslow for the medical care and treatment he received from 

doctors after he contracted Valley Fever.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with 

leave to file a third amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time 

to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than 

thirty days from the date of service of this order. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any third amended complaint how the conditions 

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The third amended complaint must allege in specific 

terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless 

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed 

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's third amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes all prior versions, Lacey 

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v. Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY to amend to cure the 

deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his

third amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot"

complaints).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a 

third amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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