Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01006/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01006-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas J. D’Angelo, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CIV 04-1006-PHX-MHM (DKD)

ORDER

Petitioner Thomas J. D’Angelo (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 18, 2004. This matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan who, on June 22, 2007, after conducting an

evidentiary hearing on February 2, and 6, 2006, issued a Report and Recommendation that

recommends that the Court deny the Petition and dismiss it with prejudice. (Dkt.#44). On

August 16, 2007, after receiving an extension, Petitioner filed his objections to the Report

and Recommendation. (Dkt.#50). The Respondents have not filed any opposition to the

Report and Recommendation. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court must review the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations

de novo if objection is made but not otherwise. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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 Prejudice exists where the defendant shows a “reasonable probability” that the result

of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s alleged errors. Id. at 694. 

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc); See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)(“A judge of the court shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made”). “Failure to object to a magistrate judge's

recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact.” Jones v. Wood, 207

F.3d 557, 562 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

The Court has considered the pleadings and documents of record in this case and

agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Petition should be denied and dismissed with

prejudice. In opposition to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the

Petitioner had filed several objections to which this Court has reviewed de novo. Upon such

review, the Court finds unpersuasive the Petitioner’s arguments. Petitioner’s objections relate

to the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims based upon his trial and appellate counsels’ conduct during the representation of

Petitioner at certain stages of the state court proceedings as well as due process violations at

trial. The Court will address those objections now.

A. Trial Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Properly Investigate All Available

Defenses and Failure to Retain and Call a Ballistics Expert For Expert

Opinion at Trial

Petitioner contends that he demonstrated both deficient performance by his trial

counsel, Carrie Chaplin (“trial counsel”), and resulting prejudice due to his trial counsel’s

failure to properly investigate Petitioner’s case. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984) (holding that criminal defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must

show: (1) that attorney’s performance was so deficient that the attorney was not functioning

as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant from receiving a fair trial.).1

 With respect to an inadequate

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investigation, Petitioner argues primarily that trial counsel failed to contact and interview

witnesses who were at a bar with the victim, Les Holden (the “victim”), shortly before the

shooting took place as well as the cab driver who drove the victim shortly before the incident

as well. Petitioner states that such witnesses and investigation could have produced probative

evidence as to the victim’s state of mind shortly before the shooting of the victim, which

Petitioner asserted, at trial, was done in self defense. Petitioner states “[n]othwithstanding the

availability of these witnesses, trial counsel failed to make any attempt to locate these

individuals.” (Petitioner’s Objection, Dkt.#50, p.3). 

In reviewing the record, as determined by the Magistrate Judge, the Petitioner does not

offer a persuasive argument based upon a failure to investigate by trial counsel with respect

to these potential witnesses. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, the Parties had already

stipulated to the victim’s intoxication and several witnesses offered testimony to that effect

at trial as well. In addition, trial counsel introduced evidence suggesting that the victim

became violent when he was intoxicated. While trial counsel did state at the evidentiary

hearing that such witnesses at the bar shortly before the shooting or the cab driver could have

provided relevant information to Petitioner’s trial, the existence of relevant information is not

the test in evaluation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Transcript, Dkt.#47, p.12,

ll. 17-20). Rather, based upon the fact that trial counsel had already brought out at trial

evidence regarding the victim’s propensity for violence while intoxicated and stipulation

between the parties as to the victim’s intoxication, this Court cannot find that trial counsel’s

conduct or inaction in interviewing such witnesses rises to the level of ineffective assistance

of counsel. At best, as noted by the state court and the Magistrate Judge, this argument

appears to be primarily based upon speculation. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088

(9th Cir. 2001) (denying, in part, petition based upon counsel’s failure to investigate where

petitioner failed to identify what witness would have said, thus making reliance thereupon

speculative). 

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It is also worth noting that Dr. Love did not review several of the reports at issue

during the trial. (Transcript, Dkt.#47, pp.46-47).

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Similarly, the Court finds unpersuasive the Petitioner’s argument regarding trial

counsel’s failure to retain and call a ballistics expert to render an expert opinion at trial. First,

and perhaps most notably, Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Edard William Love, Jr.,acknowledged at

the evidentiary hearing that with the benefit of reviewing certain reports and testimony, he

did not know whether the results of the various tests he proposed as to a proper investigation

would have assisted the Petitioner’s case. (Transcript, Dkt.#47, p.53, ll.15-20). Again, as

noted by the trial court, such speculation is insufficient to support an ineffective assistance

of counsel finding.(Respondents’ Answer, Exhibit C).2

 Moreover, Petitioner’s trial counsel

testified that with the brief extension afforded by the trial court, she did interview a court

appointed expert, Mr. Richard Watkins, who disclosed that the state expert’s findings were

reasonable as well as discussed appropriate questions to be raised upon cross-examination of

the state’s expert. (Transcript, Dkt.#47, pp.93-94, ll.6-2). While Petitioner contends that such

use or discussion with the expert was inadequate, the Court cannot find, based upon the

evidence presented, that such conduct by trial counsel was deficient by Sixth Amendment

standards.

B. Appellate Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Raise Strong Issues on Appeal

(1) Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel, Garrett Simpson (“appellate counsel”)

was deficient with respect to his decision or failure to raise the issue of prosecutorial

misconduct on direct appeal. At the evidentiary hearing, appellate counsel testified that he

did not see a persistent, pervasive pattern that would support such a claim on appeal, thus he

decided to focus the appeal elsewhere. (Transcript, Dkt.#47, pp.148, ll. 21-12). In Petitioner’s

objections to the Court, Petitioner contends that such a persistent, pervasive pattern existed

as evidenced by the numerous objections and motions for sanctions filed by trial counsel. In

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fact, Petitioner notes that trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that she expected

that the issue would be raised on appeal and that trial counsel testified that such asserted

misconduct “prejudiced our ability to do the hundred percent best job we could . . . .”

(Transcript, Dkt.#47, pp.129-130, ll.22-1). 

The Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument as to the existence of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel based upon the absence of the assertion of the prosecutorial

misconduct issue on appeal. See State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79 (1998) (“To prevail on a

claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s

misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process.’” (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). Petitioner

cites several examples to support his contention that prosecutorial misconduct was so

persistent and pervasive that it was deficient for appellate counsel not to raise it as an issue

on appeal. 

As an initial matter, it is important to note that some degree of deference is afforded

to an attorney’s decision, after evaluation, as to which arguments to advance on appeal. See

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (“Th[e] process of ‘winnowing out weaker

arguments on appeal and focusing on’ those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence

of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” (quoting Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)). In addition, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the instances

evidencing prosecutorial misconduct are not as strong or persuasive as Petitioner contends.

For instance, Petitioner asserts that the record reveals that the State acted in bad faith by not

preserving material evidence of a 911 phone call made by David Zarra and failed to disclose

the deposition of Mr. Zarra. However, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss based upon the failure to preserve finding it “not grounded in

good faith.” (Respondents’ Answer, Exhibit L, R.T. 8/12/99 at 15). Moreover, the trial court

also concluded that defense counsel was aware of Mr. Zarra’s deposition. (Supplemental

Petition, Exhibit T, p.36). Similarly, the Petitioner’s reliance upon the State’s recorded

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conversation between Petitioner and his trial counsel also does not demonstrate that

prosecutorial misconduct should have been raised on appeal. The record reflects that the

investigator avows that the recording was inadvertent as Petitioner phoned trial counsel at

home, which was not listed as a “legal phone number.” (Supplemental Petition, Exhibit S).

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the record reveals that the State disclosed the phone

call to the court and trial counsel. (Id). Finally, the Court also does not find compelling the

Petitioner’s reliance on the purported late disclosure of the ballistics report authored by the

State’s expert. Notably, in response to trial counsel’s motion for discovery sanction, the trial

court permitted the report as well as offered additional time for trial counsel to prepare. 

In sum, the circumstances surrounding the prosecutorial misconduct issue presented

by Petitioner are not as compelling as Petitioner would have the Court believe. As described

by appellate counsel during the evidentiary hearing and through the record, appellate counsel

did a sufficient review of the record and raised credible issues on appeal. The fact that the

issue of prosecutorial misconduct was not raised does not demonstrate that appellate counsel’s

representation was constitutionally deficient. 

(2) Limitation on Victim’s Prior Conviction

Petitioner raises issue with the Magistrate Judge’s finding as to Petitioner’s claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel based upon appellate counsel’s alleged failure to raise on

appeal the trial court’s restriction as to the admissibility of the victim’s prior conviction for

aggravated assault. According to Petitioner, the restriction by the trial court preventing

Petitioner’s trial counsel from bringing out the specific facts surrounding the crime warranted

that the issue be presented on appeal. However, in reviewing the record, this Court is in

agreement with the Magistrate Judge that such a claim is unpersuasive. For instance,

appellate counsel expressly testified that such a claim was not worth being raised on appeal

because: (1) the victim’s character was already impeached by the fact of the conviction and

was before the jury; and (2) Petitioner testified at trial that he had accidentally fired his

weapon first, which caused appellate counsel to believe the deadly force confrontation was

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sparked by Petitioner and not the victim, which tainted this as a viable issue on appeal.

(Transcript, Dkt.#47, pp.145-146, ll.6-4). While Petitioner clearly disagrees with such an

explanation, that fact is not germane to whether appellate counsel exercised ineffective

assistance of counsel in deciding not to raise this issue on appeal. In reviewing the record,

it is apparent to this Court that Petitioner’s argument is not well supported as there is an

adequate basis in the record for not asserting this argument on appeal.

(3) Improper Jury Instruction as to Alternative Charge

Appellate counsel’s decision not to raise on appeal the issue regarding the instruction

by the trial court to the jury as to both attempted murder and aggravated assault rather than

including aggravated assault as a lesser included offense also does not demonstrate ineffective

assistance of counsel by appellate counsel. As an initial matter, the Court, as noted by

appellate counsel at the evidentiary hearing, fails to see the existence of any prejudice created

by the assertion of both as separate charges rather than the aggravated assaulted charges as

a lesser included. Notably, the trial court dismissed the aggravated assault conviction at the

close of trial. (Respondents’ Answer, Exhibit H, p.22). Moreover, appellate counsel was

justifiably concerned that by raising the issue on direct appeal, the issue could be precluded

on post-conviction review. As such, there is no basis to support an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based upon appellant counsel’s decision not to pursue this issue on appeal. 

C. Petitioner’s Due Process Argument Regarding Trial Court’s Alleged

Erroneous Instruction on the Definition of Premeditation 

Petitioner also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Petitioner’s claim based upon

alleged deficient instructions given to the jury. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the trial

court violated his due process rights by instructing the jury that premeditation did not require

proof of actual reflection. The Magistrate Judge like the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected

this contention on the grounds that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the instruction

“did not deprive Defendant of a right essential to his defense.” (Respondents’ Answer, Exhibit

A ¶ 17; Report and Recommendation, p.11). Again, in reviewing the record and Petitioner’s

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objections, this Court also finds that Petitioner’s all or nothing defense to the charges against

him based upon self-defense and the absence of any objection by Petitioner at trial to the

instruction warrants the denial of Petitioner’s claim. See State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408,

414,15 (1999) (holding that any error regarding premeditation instruction based upon absence

of “actual reflection” did not deprive defendant of a right essential to his defense where the

defendant did not offer any objection at trial and defense rested solely on total innocence or

mistaken identity rather than on absence of actual reflection). 

D. Petitioner’s Due Process Argument Regarding First Degree Burglary

Conviction

Lastly, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding Petitioner’s due

process claim based upon his alleged improper conviction for First Degree Burglary due to

an absence of evidence to support such a charge. Again, as held by the Arizona Court of

Appeals, the Magistrate Judge concluded that such a conviction was supported, in part,

because even assuming that Petitioner had the authority to be in the residence, “his actions far

exceeded the purpose for which . . . [he received] permission to enter the house.”

(Respondents’ Answer, Exhibit A, ¶ 21; Report and Recommendation, p.11); See McCreary

v. State, 25 Ariz. 1, 2-3 (1923) (holding that where permission to enter premises is granted

such permission does not include permission to commit a felony). Petitioner disputes such

a finding stating “[t]he testimony of both Petitioner and Nanci Holder [the victim’s mother]

established that Petitioner had permission to enter the residence, and when he did enter, it was

not with the intent to commit a felony.” (Objections, p.11). However, this argument is not

persuasive as the jury’s verdict is supported by contrary evidence indicating that Petitioner

was not granted permission to enter the house at all, including from the testimony of the

victim himself. 

SUMMARY

After reviewing the Petitioner’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, the Court finds that Petitioner does not advance any grounds warranting

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the relief requested in the Petition. Specifically, Petitioner does not advance any persuasive

argument suggesting the existence of ineffective assistance of counsel by Petitioner’s trial or

appellate counsel nor does Petitioner present a persuasive argument suggesting that

Petitioner’s due process rights were violated in the state court proceedings.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.#44).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED overruling Petitioner’s objections to the Report and

Recommendation. (Dkt.#50). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition and dismissing it with prejudice.

(Dkt.#1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly. 

DATED this 27th day of September, 2007.

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