Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_92-cv-04040/USCOURTS-arwd-4_92-cv-04040-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

MARY TURNER, et al. PLAINTIFFS 

v. Case No. 4:92-cv-04040 

LEWISVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 DEFENDANT

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Intervene and Declare Lafayette County School District 

Unitary filed by the Arkansas Department of Education and Board of Education (collectively, 

“ADE and SBE” or the “Agencies”). ECF No. 95. The Agencies seek to intervene in this case 

pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The Agencies additionally 

seek a declaration that Lafayette County School District (“LCSD”) has achieved unitary status and 

ask the Court to terminate the operative consent decree. Id. LCSD filed a response in opposition. 

ECF No. 101. The Agencies filed a reply in support of their motion. ECF No. 103-1. The Court 

finds the matter ripe for consideration. 

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit was filed in April 1992 by a staff member and parents and guardians of minor 

African American students in the Lewisville School District No. 1.0F

1

 In March 1993, the Court 

dismissed the case with prejudice subject to the terms of a consent decree (hereinafter the “Turner

Decree”). ECF Nos. 9, 10. The Turner Decree, in relevant part, enjoined Defendants from

1 Plaintiffs’ claims in this case were originally asserted against Lewisville School District No. 1 and other defendants. 

On November 23, 2015, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to substitute LCSD in place of Lewisville School District 

No. 1 because Lewisville School District No. 1 had been consolidated with the Stamps School District to form the 

Lafayette County School District. ECF No. 26. The Court found that the substitution allowed the continuation of the 

case because Lewisville School District No. 1 had ceased to exist and had been succeeded by LCSD.

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“engaging in any policies, practices, customs or usages of racial discrimination in any school 

operation including, but not limited to faculty assignments, student assignments, and the treatment 

of black and other minority pupils within the school system.” ECF No. 9, ¶ 4; ECF No. 27-1, ¶ 4. 

Moreover, the Turner Decree provided that “[t]he district shall hereafter maintain a unitary, 

racially non-discriminatory school system wherein all schools are effectively and equitably 

desegregated and integrated.” ECF No. 9, ¶ 13; ECF No. 27-1, ¶ 13. The Turner Decree further 

stated that “[t]he Court shall have continuing jurisdiction of [the decree] in order to [e]nsure 

compliance with the spirit and terms of [the decree].” ECF No. 9, ¶ 18; ECF No. 27-1, ¶ 18. 

The Agencies filed the instant motion arguing that it is no longer necessary for the Court 

to supervise LCSD, and thus the Court should terminate the Turner Decree. ECF No. 96, p.1. 

Further, because LCSD has not yet sought termination, the Agencies request that the Court allow 

them to intervene to seek termination themselves. Id. LCSD opposes the motion. ECF No. 101. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), a timely motion for leave to intervene “shall” be granted 

“when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 

of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair 

or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately 

represented by existing parties.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

738 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1984). In the Eighth Circuit, “a party seeking to intervene must establish 

Article III standing in addition to the requirements of Rule 24.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis 

Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009). “The requirements for Article III standing are (1) 

injury, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 759 

F.3d 969, 974–75 (8th Cir. 2014); Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d at 833-34. First, the 

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prospective intervenor “must clearly allege facts showing an injury in fact, which is an injury to a 

legally protected interest that is ‘concrete, particularized, and either actual or imminent.’” Metro.

St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d at 834 (quoting Curry v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 

420, 422 (8th Cir. 1999)). Second, the party seeking to intervene must establish “a causal 

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “[I]n other words, the intervenors alleged injury must be ‘fairly 

traceable to the defendant’s conduct.’” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, 759 F.3d at 975 (quoting 

Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d at 834). Lastly, the prospective intervenor must establish 

that a “favorable decision will likely redress the injury.” Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d at 

834. “Abstract injury is not enough.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). 

III. DISCUSSION

The Agencies argue that they are entitled to intervene because the “State must ensure that 

Arkansas’ students receive a constitutionally adequate education.” ECF No. 96, p. 3. The 

Agencies assert that although “the State has delegated some power over education policy to school 

districts, it retains the ultimate authority.” Id. To support this assertion, the Agencies point to 

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-11-105(a)(1), which states that the SBE shall “[h]ave general supervision of 

the public schools of the state.” Id. They further argue that consent decrees, like the Turner

Decree, interfere with the State’s authority over education policy by bringing in federal courts. Id. 

Additionally, the Agencies argue that they cannot count on the school district to represent their

interests as it has not yet sought to “free itself of judicial oversight.” ECF No. 96, pp. 4-5. Thus, 

the Agencies argue, “to ensure that a party to the case represents its sovereign interests, the State 

must itself step in.” Id. at 5. LCSD argues that the Agencies do not have Article III standing and 

have “not made the necessary showing to justify intervention pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal 

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Rules of Civil Procedure,” and thus the Court should deny the Agencies’ Motion to Intervene. The 

Court agrees with LCSD. 

The Agencies have not established that they have Article III standing to intervene on behalf 

of LCSD. In fact, the Agencies never directly address their own Article III standing. The Agencies 

argue that “Lafayette’s consent decrees involve federal courts in education policymaking, which 

directly implicates the State’s Interests” and that the “State has an obvious federalism interest in 

not having its education policy subject to federal court supervision.” ECF No. 103-1, pp. 1, 4. 

The Agencies assert that their legally protected interest flows from Ark. Code Ann § 6-11-

105(a)(1), which grants the State of Arkansas “general supervision” over the school districts, and 

the Rules Governing Standards for Accreditation of Arkansas Public School and School Districts

3-A.10 (2020).1F

2

 However, the Court finds that the Agencies’ asserted interest is not particularized 

enough to establish an injury-in-fact in this case. See Sierra Club v. Entergy Arkansas LLC, 503 

F. Supp. 3d 821 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (finding that the Arkansas Attorney General’s Consumer Utility 

Rate Advocacy Division (CURAD) and coalition of electric consumers failed to establish injury 

in fact necessary for standing to intervene based on alleged economic interest and injury, because 

injuries were speculative and because potential intervenors failed to establish that injuries from 

rate increases were sufficiently particularized, and not of the type shared by the general public); 

Harrison v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 78 F.4th 765 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming district court’s decision 

disallowing the State of Louisiana to intervene in a case involving student discipline issues because 

the State’s asserted interest in the case was too vague to survive the standing requirements of 

2

 “If the Division is unable to verify the public school district’s efforts to comply with the submitted detailed plan 

required by these Rules, the Division shall recommend to the State Board of Education whether the public school 

district should be placed on Accredited—Probation status in accordance with these Rules.” 

https://adecm.ade.arkansas.gov/Attachments/Standards_for_Accreditation_(Effective_7-1-20)_155605.pdf. 

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Article III). Simply stating an interest in the litigation does not establish Article III standing.2F

3

 

United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 677 (2023) (“A ‘telling indication of the severe constitutional 

problem’ with [a state’s] assertion of standing to bring this lawsuit ‘is the lack of historical 

precedent’ supporting it.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.

477, 505, (2010))). 

The Agencies have not alleged facts showing an injury to a legally protected interest that 

is “concrete, particularized, and either actual or imminent.” Curry, 167 F.3d at 422. Because the 

Court finds that the alleged injury-in-fact is too speculative, it need not address the traceability or 

redressability factors. Thus, the Court concludes that the Agencies have failed to establish Article 

III standing which is required for successful intervention. Because the Court determines that the 

Agencies have not demonstrated standing, the Court finds that the Agencies’ motion should be 

denied without reaching the merits of the requirements of intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 24(a).3F

4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Agencies’ Motion to Intervene 

and Declare Lafayette County School District Unitary (ECF No. 95) should be and hereby is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 29th day of March, 2024. 

/s/ Susan O. Hickey 

Susan O. Hickey 

Chief United States District Judge

3 The Agencies’ arguments present an overly expansive view of Article III standing. By their logic, any state or 

state agency could intervene in federal litigation that involves issues of state law. 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) provides that “A motion to intervene . . . must state the grounds of intervention 

and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.” While the 

Agencies did file a memorandum brief in support of their motion (ECF No. 86), the Court notes that the Agencies did 

not file the requisite accompanying pleading pursuant to Rule 24(c). 

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