Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00269/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00269-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY ERVIN,

Plaintiff, 

vs. No. CIV S-05-0269 LKK GGH PS

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This proceeding was referred to this

court by Local Rule 72-302(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and was transferred from the

Northern District of California on February 7, 2005. 

Presently before the court are the State Bar’s motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed February 28, 2005; plaintiff’s request for entry

of default against all defendants, filed March 9, 2005; motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by defendants Judicial Council, Superior Court of

California - County of Sacramento (“Superior Court”), Virga, Cecil, McMaster, and Castellanos,

filed March 15, 2005; and plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice, filed March 9, 21, 29, and 31, 

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 Plaintiff had previously filed another action in the Northern District, subsequently

transferred to the Eastern District, CIV S-04-2387 DFL PAN, but on December 23, 2004, it was

dismissed without prejudice per plaintiff’s request. When plaintiff filed this later action in the

Northern District, he added the State Bar and the Judicial Council as defendants.

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2005. Having determined that oral argument was not necessary, but having reviewed the parties’

papers, the court now issues the following order and findings and recommendations.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in the Northern District of California on

November 22, 2004, alleging violations of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) as to all defendants, and conversion as to defendant Castellanos.

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 On February 7, 2005,

the Northern District transferred the action to this court. 

Plaintiff is a non-practicing attorney with electro-impulse cardiovascular disease

and congenital heart murmur arrhythmia, who alleges that these disorders substantially limit

major life activities such as hearing, speaking, walking, and performing manual tasks. He has

sued the Judicial Council, Superior Court in Sacramento County, four judges assigned to that

bench, and the State Bar. Most of the allegations concern prior lawsuits plaintiff was involved in

which were litigated in that court. He complains of various actions by the judges in handling his

cases which he alleges violated his rights under the ADA. In addition, he has a state law claim of

conversion against defendant Castellanos, a judicial commissioner. As for the State Bar, plaintiff

claims that his status as “not entitled” to practice implies that he is insane, and violates the ADA. 

Plaintiff seeks damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims which would entitle

plaintiff to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 (1994);

Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal may be based

either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support

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cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of

California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1984). The court construes the pleading in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). General allegations are presumed to

include specific facts necessary to support the claim. NOW, 510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803,

quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached

exhibits. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to

accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States

Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public

record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria

Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). “The court

is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or

unwarranted deductions of fact. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972). Unless it is clear that no

amendment can cure its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend

the complaint before dismissal. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir.2000) (en

banc); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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 Although not raised by defendants, the court briefly considered whether the RookerFeldman doctrine applies to this case. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S. Ct.

149, 150 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct.

1303, 1311-1312 (1983). Under these cases, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction to

review legal errors in state court decisions. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has “clarified”

Rooker-Feldman nearly out of existence in this Circuit. Indeed, after Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,

359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004), even claims on their merits that were reviewed and decided in

state court can be re-reviewed in federal court as long as the pleader of the complaint does not

expressly assert that he is seeking review of a state law error. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142:

“Kougasian does not, in these causes of action, allege legal errors by state courts; rather, she

alleges wrongful acts by the defendants, such as negligently designing the ski run.... It is true that

the factual allegations and legal claims in these four causes of action are almost identical to the

allegations and claims asserted in state court...but that is not sufficient reason to find the causes

of action barred by Rooker-Feldman.” In any event, even if a federal plaintiff is expressly

seeking to set aside a state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman does not apply unless a legal error

by the state court is the basis for that relief. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d at 1140.

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III. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 2

A. Failure to State A Claim Under the ADA

In order to state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a

plaintiff must allege four elements: 

(1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is

otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some

public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff

was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was

otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of

the plaintiff’s disability.

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). The alleged violation

must have been committed by a public entity, and only the public entity can be sued. Miller v.

King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004).

Because the four individual judges are not public entities, the Title II ADA

discrimination claims against them should be dismissed. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff conclusorily alleges “retaliation” against judges Virga and

Cecil. ADA retaliation claims may be brought against individuals. Miller v. King, supra. See

also Ostrach v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 957 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Cal.1997). Although this ADA

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“retaliation” individual liability conclusion is not without contrary authority, another overriding

reason mandates that liability against the judges may not be imposed here—judicial immunity. 

All of the complained of actions were taken within the jurisdiction of the sued judges in litigation

events, the litigation having been commenced in state court by plaintiff herein. Judge Cecil is

alleged to have “forc[ed] an adverse ruling on Plaintiff.” Judge Virga is alleged to have

retaliated by assigning plaintiff’s case to Judge Cecil. As such, judicial immunity protects these

judges from suit. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331

(1978); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.1996). 

In regard to the Judicial Council and Superior Court, plaintiff alleges that they

“use[d] Plaintiff’s Bar status designation ‘NOT ENTITLED’ to treat Plaintiff as insane, mentally

incompetent, and therefore not entitled to his civil rights. Plaintiff’s true disabling condition is

Electro-impulse Cardiovascular Disease. Plaintiff is not insane as portrayed and conveyed by

Defendants.” Compl., ¶ 30. 

These defendants contend that such bare allegations do not state a claim under

Title II. Plaintiff’s opposition states only that he requests judicial notice of filings and

documents associated with his state court case. It contains no points and authorities. 

Furthermore, plaintiff has not alleged what facts or circumstances were involved in this

allegation. Plaintiff’s opposition has, in essence, waived opposition. Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365

F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Kohler v Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1182 (9th Cir. 2001.) 

Bare contentions, unsupported by explanation or authority, are deemed waived. See FDIC v.

Garner, 126 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997) (claim waived when no case law or argument in

support is presented); Seattle School Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996)

(party who presents no explanation in support of claim of error waives issue); see also Pelfresne

v. Village of Williams Bay, 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.1990); (“A litigant who fails to press a

point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by showing why it is sound despite a lack of

supporting authority . . . forfeits the point. We will not do his research for him.”); Johnson v.

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Indopco, 887 F. Supp. 1092, 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding argument unsupported by relevant

authority, or by demonstration of why it is a good argument despite lack of authority, constitutes

mere assertion not meriting court’s attention). Therefore, defendants Judicial Council and

Superior Court for the County of Sacramento should be dismissed.

B. Conversion Claim against defendant Castellanos

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Castellanos, a Judicial Commissioner in Superior

Court, deleted some passages from an electronic tape recording of a court trial involving

plaintiff, and “stole [] plaintiff’s complaining document from the Department of Administrative

Commissioner...” Compl., ¶¶ 14, 15. 

Having found the federal claims fail to state claims on which relief can be granted,

the undersigned will recommend that this court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

this state law claim. See Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1102

(9th Cir.1995).

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

In place of a substantive opposition, plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice on

March 31, 2005, asking the court to take notice of plaintiff’s tort claim filed on August 18, 2004,

a letter from plaintiff to Judge Wilken, plaintiff’s notice of damages regarding this action but not

filed herein, a letter from plaintiff to Judge Karlton, and plaintiff’s application for temporary

restraining order and declaration in support thereof, filed in this action on March 28, 2005. All

documents are attached to the request for judicial notice.

The party requesting judicial notice bears the burden of persuading the court that

the particular fact is not reasonably subject to dispute and is capable of immediate and accurate

determination by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned and

supplying the court with the source material needed to determine whether the request is justified. 

In re Tyrone F. Conner Corp., Inc., 140 B.R. 771, 781-82 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Specifically, the party must submit to the court a formal pleading, entitled “Request for Judicial

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Notice” that enumerates (1) the basis for taking judicial notice, and (2) the item to be noticed

(with copies, preferably certified, of the files or materials attached). William W. Schwarzer et al.,

California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 14:192 (1998); American Glue

& Resin v. Air Products & Chemicals, 835 F. Supp. 36, 40-41 (D. Mass. 1993) (a court may take

judicial notice of records in related state court proceedings, provided certified copies of the state

court records are submitted). Because plaintiff did not enumerate the basis for taking judicial

notice, the court cannot judicially notice any of the documents. Plaintiff’s request is therefore

denied.

IV. STATE BAR’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The State Bar’s motion is based on failure to state a federal constitutional claim

because plaintiff suffered no deprivation under the ADA, because the State Bar is judicially

immune, and because plaintiff has failed to satisfy the federal standard for equitable relief.

The complaint alleges that “the State Bar publishes on its website that Plaintiff is

‘NOT ENTITLED’ AND ‘INVOLUNTARILY INACTIVE’ and thereby portrays and conveys to

computer users pursuant to CA Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6007.a that Plaintiff is insane.” 

Compl., ¶29. In this regard, plaintiff states that attorney Kearney, Jr. harassed plaintiff into

submitting to inactive bar status as part of an unethical agreement to limit plaintiff’s practice. 

(Id.) 

These allegations are similarly vague to those made against the Judicial Council

and Superior Court. Plaintiff’s opposition states only that he requests judicial notice of two

words, “vacate” and entirety,” and makes frivolous procedural objections to the Bar’s motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff has not alleged what facts or circumstances were involved in this allegation,

and makes no substantive argument in opposition. Based on the case law previously cited, the

court also deems this bare contention against the State Bar waived, since it is presented without

supporting explanation, argument, or authority. Therefore, the State Bar should also be

dismissed. 

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Plaintiff’s March 9, 2005 request for judicial notice in regard to this motion is

denied. Plaintiff’s March 29, 2005 request for judicial notice does not state the basis for taking

judicial notice and is also denied.

V. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

This request, filed March 9, 2005, seeks default of all defendants for failure to

answer or respond after the Northern District Court’s February 7, 2005 order denying the Judicial

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and transferring the case to this district, and after this court’s

February 15, 2005 order vacating without prejudice the State Bar’s motion to dismiss.

When the action was pending in the Northern District, defendants, who may not

have been served, nevertheless appeared when they made their motion to dismiss and motion to

transfer. The motions suspended defendants’ requirement of filing an answer, Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(a)(4)(A). The Northern District did not reach the motion to dismiss, but simply transferred

the action to the Eastern District. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was still pending when this

action was opened in the Eastern District on February 10, 2005. The undersigned vacated

defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice to its renewal on February 15, 2005, thereby

starting the ten day clock within which to file an answer. Id. Plaintiff fails to take into account,

however, that in computing the “ten day” limitation, one does not take into account weekends, 

and one adds three days extra time for mail service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e). 

Therefore, defendants’ renewed motion on February 28, 2005, was well within time limits, and

stopped the time running in which to file an answer. Therefore, plaintiff’s request for entry of

default is denied. Plaintiff ’s request for judicial notice, filed March 21, 2005, is denied as

unnecessary. Judge Jenkins’ February 7, 2005 order is already part of the file in this action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s requests

for judicial notice, filed March 9, 21, 29, and 31, 2005, are denied.

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant State Bar’s motion to dismiss, filed February 28, 2005, be granted.

2. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default, filed March 9, 2005, be denied.

3. Motion to dismiss by defendants Judicial Council, Superior Court -

Sacramento Court, Virga, Cecil, McMaster, and Castellanos, filed March 15, 2005, be granted.

4. Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend against the public entities on the

remote chance he will be able to state a claim against them.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 5/12/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076

Ervin269.mtd.wpd

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