Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-03908/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-03908-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIUS ROY BRAGG, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

R.W. RUSSELL, Et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 02-3908 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket Nos. 30, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, which the Court dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff then filed an

amended complaint, and the Court ordered service of Plaintiff's claims against state

prison employees for the use of excessive force, the failure to provide procedural

protections at a disciplinary hearing, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious

medical needs. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to all

claims and a motion to dismiss the medical claim as unexhausted. Plaintiff has filed an

opposition to Defendants' motions and a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 1 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

2

Defendants have filed a reply. This order addresses the dispositive motions as well as

Plaintiff's pending procedural motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff raises three claims for relief. In the first claim he alleges that on May 25,

2001, while he was being held at San Quentin State Prison (SQSP) on a lay-over from

Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP) en route to a court appearance, Defendant Russell, the

SQSP Receiving & Release officer, used excessive force against him. 

In the second claim Plaintiff alleges that on September 5, 2001 Defendant

Carmichael, a PBSP hearing officer, found him guilty of battery on Defendant Russell at

a disciplinary hearing which did not meet the requirements of due process. As a result,

Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of three years in the Segregated Housing Unit (SHU). 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Schwartz, an associate warden at PBSP, wrongly

denied his administrative appeal of the hearing.

In the third claim Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McLoughlin – a dental assistant

at PBSP, Defendant Spencer – a dentist at PBSP, and Defendant Winslow – the Health

Care Manager at PBSP, acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs

from April through July of 2003 by failing to provide him with adequate dental care. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

demonstrate that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are

those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 2 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

3

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the

moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof

at trial, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go

beyond the pleadings and, by its' own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving

party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that

precludes summary judgment. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If

the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court must

consider all of the evidence submitted in support of both motions to evaluate whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists precluding summary judgment for either party. The

Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1135

(9th Cir. 2001).

B. Excessive Force Claim

1. Facts

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Russell used excessive force against him. 

The facts pertinent to this claim are taken from the verified pleadings, declarations and

supporting documents submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to

Defendants Russell's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff's cross-motion for

summary judgment.

Plaintiff's Facts:

On May 24, 2001 Plaintiff traveled on a prison bus from PBSP for a court

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 3 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

4

appearance. En route, there was an overnight layover at SQSP. Plaintiff alleges that

when the bus arrived at SQSP, Defendant Russell, the Receiving & Release (R&R)

officer at SQSP, was yelling insults at and shoving the inmates getting off the bus,

although Plaintiff was not shoved. 

The next morning Plaintiff arrived at R&R to board the bus. He noticed that

Defendant Russell was handling prisoners roughly and shoving them. Plaintiff was

placed in a padlocked cell until it was his turn to board the bus. When his turn came, an

officer told Defendant Russell that Plaintiff needed to be strip-searched and handcuffed

while still in the cell because he was from the SHU at PBSP. However, Defendant

Russell responded in strong terms that he didn't care, and said that he would "beat

[Plaintiff's] skinny ass if he give me any lip." Defendant Russell opened the cell door,

which Plaintiff exited without restraints. Defendant Russell then asked Plaintiff what he

was holding in his hands. Plaintiff explained that it was a pair of thermal underwear

which the bus driver had allowed him to bring because the cell windows were missing at

the prison where Plaintiff was headed. Defendant Russell swore at Plaintiff and told him

to "face the screen." Defendant Russell then said that he was going to throw the thermal

underwear away. Plaintiff asked him to confirm with the bus driver that he was allowed

to have the thermal underwear. Instead, Defendant Russell threw the thermal underwear

in the trash.

Plaintiff, who was three feet away from the cell unit door, then took one step

toward the door and yelled to the bus driver. At that point, Defendant Russell grabbed

Plaintiff by the neck violently and gave him a hard push, which caused Plaintiff to fall

outside of the door frame. Seven or eight other officers then jumped on Plaintiff.

Defendant Russell sat on top of Plaintiff with his knee in Plaintiff's back, holding

Plaintiff's head and violently pulling it back and forth. Before he let Plaintiff up,

Defendant Russell stomped on Plaintiff's right hand. As a result of Defendant Russell's

actions, Plaintiff suffered a gash on his right hand, for which he received a butterfly stitch

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 4 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

5

and band-aids, and a large bump on his head.

Plaintiff filed a staff complaint requesting an investigation into Defendant

Russell's behavior. The official complaint process was initiated by personnel at SQSP by

way of a staff misconduct review sheet dated June 8, 2001. (Pl.'s Ex. B-108.) On June

20, 2002 Plaintiff received notice from E. DeRusha, a Correctional Counselor I, that he

had spoken with a sergeant at SQSP who had told him that the "investigation should not

have taken so long," and that it had been completed "2 months ago," but Plaintiff had not

been notified. (Pl.'s Ex. E-200.) DeRusha provided Plaintiff with a copy of the

memorandum from the Employee Relations Officer at SQSP which stated that Plaintiff's

complaint that "a San Quentin staff member was less than professional when dealing with

you" had been sustained, that is, that the investigation had found "a preponderance of

evidence to prove the allegations[] made in the complaint," and that appropriate

administrative action had been taken. (Pl.'s Ex. C). 

Defendant's Facts:

On May 25, 2001, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Defendant Russell was working

his assignment as a R&R officer at SQSP. Along with another officer he was loading

inmates onto a bus, designated as CDC Bus Schedule "T."

Defendant Russell escorted Plaintiff from the holding cell located at the front of

the R&R area to the search area, near the unit's front door. He attempted to conduct an

unclothed body search of Plaintiff. To do this, he ordered Plaintiff to "strip out," meaning

to remove his clothing. Plaintiff did not comply with this direct order. Instead, Plaintiff

turned and fled out the front door of R&R. 

To prevent Plaintiff from fleeing to the outside area (the lower yard at SQSP),

Defendant Russell attempted to place his left hand on Plaintiff's left elbow. In response,

Plaintiff slapped Defendant Russell's left hand away with his right hand. Plaintiff ran

away from Defendant Russell, down nearby steps, and turned toward Defendant Russell. 

Plaintiff swung his right closed fist at Defendant Russell's chest area, but failed to make

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 5 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

6

contact. In so doing, however, Plaintiff turned and exposed his right back and shoulder

area to Defendant Russell. 

Concerned with his own safety and the safety of the prison, Defendant Russell

placed his right hand on Plaintiff's right arm and placed his left hand on Plaintiff's back

and shoulder area. Using both hands, Defendant Russell pushed Plaintiff to the ground to

subdue him and to prevent him from attempting to strike Defendant Russell. At no time

did Defendant Russell strike Plaintiff with a closed fist.

Once Plaintiff was on the ground, several other officers arrived to assist with

restraining Plaintiff and to secure him in handcuffs. Plaintiff ceased struggling and

Defendant Russell placed him in handcuffs. Once Plaintiff was in handcuffs, Defendant

Russell assisted him to a standing position and released him to another officer who

escorted him to a holding cell.

Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary and seen by an MTA, who wrote on the

medical report that, "Inmate has lacerations on knuckles of middle two fingers of L hand. 

No other injuries." (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0006.) According to the report, the injuries were

cleaned and dressed with hydrogen peroxide and band-aids, and Plaintiff was released

from the infirmary. (Id.)

2. Applicable Law

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). "After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

"[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . .

whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 6 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

7

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1992); see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir.

2001). In determining the nature of the use of force, a court may evaluate the need for

application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the

extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at

7.

It is not necessary that a prisoner have suffered significant injury in order to

prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for use of excessive force. Id. at 9. 

Contemporary standards of decency are always violated when prison officials maliciously

and sadistically use force to cause harm whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

However, the scope of the Eighth Amendment is not without limitation: The Eighth

Amendment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of

mankind. Id. at 9-10. Although a prisoner may believe that his rights were violated, "not

every push or shove . . . violates [his] constitutional rights." Id. at 9 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

3. Analysis

The Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of triable fact regarding

whether Defendant Russell used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. As conceded by Defendant, it is undisputed that force was used. The

question then becomes whether the use of force was malicious and sadistic. Applying the

criteria set out in Hudson, the material facts relevant to such a determination are clearly in

dispute. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Russell knew there was no need to use force but

nevertheless used an amount of force intended to cause injury. Defendant Russell alleges

that Plaintiff disobeyed a direct order, attempted to flee, and resisted attempts to be

restrained, thereby requiring Defendant Russell to use a sufficient amount of force to

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 7 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

8

subdue and handcuff Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered more than de minimis

injury as a result of the use of force. Defendant Russell claims Plaintiff suffered nothing

more than minor lacerations. In short, Plaintiff alleges facts which, if found to be true,

show that Defendant Russell applied force maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm, and Defendant Russell alleges facts which, if found to be true,

show that he applied force in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. 

Because there are material facts in dispute regarding the intent with which force was

applied, neither Defendant Russell nor Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on this claim. 

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Russell argues that even if the underlying facts are in dispute as to

whether he acted with the requisite intent to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, he

is entitled to qualified immunity.

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Claims of qualified immunity require a two-step

analysis. First, the court must consider whether the fact alleged, taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the defendant's conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the allegations do not

establish the violation of a constitutional right, there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity. Id. If the allegations could make out a constitutional

violation, however, the court must then ask whether the right was clearly established –

that is, whether "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. If an officer makes a reasonable mistake as to

what the law requires, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 205. 

The qualified immunity inquiry is separate from the constitutional inquiry for a

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 8 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

9

claimed violation of the Eighth Amendment. Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692-93

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Estate of Ford v. Caden, 301 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002)

(extending Saucier to Eighth Amendment claims)). Thus, qualified immunity is not

precluded where a triable issue of fact exists regarding the defendant's underlying intent. 

Id. In excessive force cases, qualified immunity operates to protect officers from the

sometimes "hazy border between excessive and acceptable force," Saucier, 533 U.S. at

206, and will apply if the officer had a mistaken but reasonable belief about the amount of

force that the law allowed in the situation he confronted, id. at 207-08. See, e.g.,

Marquez, 332 F.3d at 693 (prison guard entitled to qualified immunity where belief in

need for use of force was reasonable, even if it was mistaken). The qualified immunity

analysis does not take "20/20 vision of hindsight" into account, but rather gives deference

to the judgment of reasonable officers at the time of the occurrence. Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

With respect to the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the facts which

Plaintiff alleges, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, could show that

Defendant Russell's conduct violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free

from the use of excessive force, as discussed above. 

The Court next looks to whether this right was clearly established at the time of the

confrontation. It was. The law defining the contours of the right was first established in

Whitley v. Albers, where the Supreme Court recognized that security risks in the prison

setting create a potential for harm to prison staff and inmates alike, and that an additional

possibility for harm is created for inmates against whom force might be used to quell such

risks. 475 U.S. at 320. Mindful of the responsibility of prison administrators to avert

security risks, ensure the safety of prison staff, and take reasonable measures to guarantee

the safety of inmates, the Court held that any standard for determining whether excessive

force had been used must "adequately capture the importance of such competing

obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 9 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

10

necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second

chance." Id. The Court concluded that "the question whether [a security] measure taken

inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id. at 320-21 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

In light of the clearly established law in existence at the time of Defendant

Russell's actions, the sole remaining question is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer standing in his position that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted? Accepting Plaintiff's facts as true, see Martin v. City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d

1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the Court concludes that it would not be clear to a reasonable

officer in Defendant Russell's situation that his conduct was unlawful. 

First, even if he was mistaken about Plaintiff's intent, it would not be unreasonable

for an officer in Defendant Russell's position to believe that by taking a step toward the

door Plaintiff was attempting to leave the area without authorization. 

Second, a reasonable officer in Defendant Russell's position could have concluded

that he needed to use force in order to prevent Plaintiff from doing so. Defendant Russell

knew that Plaintiff was not handcuffed (as he should have been) and that he was a

maximum security prisoner from the SHU at PBSP, the most restrictive of prison

facilities. Because Plaintiff and Defendant Russell had just engaged in a somewhat

heated exchange pertaining to Defendant Russell's authority to throw out Plaintiff's

thermal underwear, Defendant Russell also could have reasonably concluded that Plaintiff

might not respond to a verbal command to stop. The security risk posed by a nonhandcuffed inmate free on the prison yard thus would lead an officer in Defendant

Russell's position to reasonably believe that he must immediately act to restrain Plaintiff,

and that pushing Plaintiff to the ground was the fastest and safest way to do so. 

Third, it was reasonable for Defendant Russell to conclude that even after pushing

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 10 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

11

Plaintiff down he needed to physically restrain Plaintiff until he was handcuffed, and that

the safest and most effective way to ensure this was by sitting on Plaintiff with his knee in

Plaintiff's back. 

Finally, although Defendant Russell's conduct of violently pulling Plaintiff's head

back and forth and stomping on Plaintiff's hand might seem excessive in hindsight, a

reasonable officer in Defendant Russell's position could have concluded that in order to

keep Plaintiff on the ground until he was handcuffed the use of such force was necessary. 

Cf. Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2004) (gratuitously kicking in the

groin an inmate who was handcuffed and lying on the cell floor was conduct which no

reasonable person could believe was constitutional). 

In sum, based on the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, it was not unreasonable for

Defendant Russell to believe, even if mistakenly, that Plaintiff was trying to flee and, 

faced with the circumstance of having an non-handcuffed maximum security SHU inmate

running free on the yard, to use an amount of force which, according to Plaintiff, resulted

in a gash on his right hand and a bump on his head. Accordingly, qualified immunity is

GRANTED to Defendant Russell. 

C. Disciplinary Hearing Claim

1. Facts

Plaintiff claims that his right to due process was violated by a disciplinary hearing

at which he was found guilty in absentia after his request to postpone the hearing was

denied. He also claims that his administrative appeal of this matter was wrongly denied. 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

On May 25, 2001 a rules violation report (RVR) was issued against Plaintiff for

battery on a peace officer, based on the events which had transpired between Plaintiff and

Defendant Russell. On July 20, 2001 the RVR was referred to the District Attorney's

office for a determination whether criminal charges would be brought. On July 31, 2001

the Marin County District Attorney provided written notice that Plaintiff would not be

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 11 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

12

prosecuted for the May 25, 2001 incident. Defendants assert that Plaintiff was notified of

the District Attorney's decision on July 31, 2001 as well, and Plaintiff does not dispute

this fact.

On August 30, 2001 Plaintiff received his copy of the RVR. Under CCR § 3320, a

hearing must be held within thirty days from the date the inmate receives his copy of the

RVR. Plaintiff claims that upon receiving the RVR he told the officer who gave it to him

that he wanted to postpone the hearing. Although the grounds upon which he asked for

postponement are not entirely clear from the content of Plaintiff's pleadings, the copies of

his administrative appeals which he has attached as exhibits show that he apparently

sought postponement both because he was waiting for notification on the status of the

referral to the District Attorney's Office and because he was waiting for a report from the

Investigative Services Unit, witness statements, and an answer from the Federal Bureau

of Investigation regarding his allegations that he had been assaulted by Defendant

Russell. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not sign the section on the RVR form requesting

postponement of the hearing pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 15 (CCR)

section 3316(c), which provides that an inmate may request postponement of his

disciplinary hearing pending the outcome of a referral to the District Attorney's Office by

signing and dating the RVR form. A disciplinary hearing postponed under this section

must be held within thirty days after written notice is received that the prosecuting

authority does not intend to prosecute. Id. § 3316(c)(1)(C). The form itself shows that

the box for requesting a postponement is checked, but in the signature section it says

"refused to sign." (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0004.) The reason why Plaintiff's signature isn't

on the form is not clear. According to Plaintiff's amended complaint, the officer wrote in

"refused to sign" after telling Plaintiff that it wasn't necessary for him to sign the form at

that point if the reason for postponement was because he was waiting for an answer from

the District Attorney's Office. (Compl. at 3-C.) In his administrative appeal on the issue

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 12 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

13

Plaintiff stated slightly different facts, saying that the officer checked the appropriate

boxes for postponement and assignment of an investigative employee after telling

Plaintiff he could postpone the hearing, but Plaintiff then told the officer that, "I would

sign it at the time of the assignment[.] [S]he said okay but she would put down I refused

to sign until that time." (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0021.) In another variation, in his opposition

to Defendants' motion for summary judgment Plaintiff states that he did not find out that

"refused to sign" had been written on the form until some time after the fact. (Opp. at 5.) 

It is undisputed that on September 5, 2001 Plaintiff was found guilty of the RVR at

a disciplinary hearing which he did not attend. According to Plaintiff, while he was

exercising in his cell Defendant Carmichael came to the gate outside of the cell and told

him that he wanted Plaintiff to attend the disciplinary hearing on the RVR. Plaintiff

responded that he had postponed the hearing. Defendant Carmichael acknowledged that

Plaintiff had checked the box on the RVR form asking for postponement but stated that

he hadn't signed the form and therefore the hearing had to go forward. In his amended

complaint and his opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

states that he told Defendant Carmichael that he needed more time to collect information

from investigative reports and witnesses. Defendant Carmichael then decided that

Plaintiff couldn't go to the hearing. In his administrative appeal on the issue Plaintiff put

the facts a bit differently, stating that he told Defendant Carmichael that he was waiting

for the District Attorney's Office to finish its investigation of the charges against him, that

the question whether he had signed the RVR form never came up, and that Defendant

Carmichael tried to "force" Plaintiff to have the hearing. When Defendant Carmichael

became "loud and standoffish" Plaintiff states "I said I wanted to postpone and that I was

going back to the cell because I didn't want any problems." (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0021.) 

In both scenarios Plaintiff returned to his cell and Defendant Carmichael found Plaintiff

guilty of the RVR in absentia. As punishment for the RVR Plaintiff was sentenced to an

additional three years in the SHU.

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 13 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

14

Plaintiff appealed the finding of guilt on the ground that the hearing should not

have gone forward because he had requested postponement. The appeal was denied

because Plaintiff's refusal to sign the request for postponement rendered it invalid, and

also because the reason for the postponement request – waiting to hear back from the

District Attorney's Office – was moot in light of the July 31, 2001 notice declining to

prosecute.

2. Applicable Law

Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by the

nature of the penal system. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prison

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of

rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. See id. But the Due Process

Clause requires certain minimum procedural protections where serious rules violations

are alleged, the power of prison officials to impose sanctions is narrowly restricted by

state statute or regulations, and the sanctions are severe. See id. at 556-57, 571-72 n.19. 

Wolff established five constitutionally-mandated procedural requirements for

disciplinary proceedings. First, "written notice of the charges must be given to the

disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to

marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Id. at 564. Second, "at least a brief period of

time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for

the appearance before the [disciplinary committee]." Id. Third, "there must be a 'written

statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary

action." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, "the

inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Id. at 566. And fifth, "[w]here an

illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues makes it unlikely

that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 14 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

15

comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to

have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the

staff." Id. at 570. 

In order to meet the minimum requirements of procedural due process outlined in

Wolff, the findings of a prison disciplinary board also must be supported by some

evidence. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). The relevant question is

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. 

See id.

The Due Process Clause requires only that prisoners be afforded those procedures

mandated by Wolff and its progeny; it does not require that prisons comply with their

own, more generous procedures. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (9th Cir.

1994). A prisoner's right to due process is violated "only if he [is] not provided with

process sufficient to meet the Wolff standard." Id. 

3. Analysis

a. Protected liberty interest

The placement of a California prisoner in the SHU as a result of disciplinary

proceedings is subject to Wolff's procedural protections if (1) state statutes or regulations

narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the punishment, and (2) the

liberty interest implicated by the punishment is one of "real substance." See Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995).

California's regulations concerning discipline provide explicit standards that

narrowly fetter official discretion. Under these regulations, officials must find that a

preponderance of the evidence substantiates the charge before guilt may be found and

punishment assessed. Absent such a finding the inmate may not be placed in isolation nor

segregation, nor assessed good-time credits. See also CCR § 3320(a) (requiring notice);

id. § 3320(b) (requiring hearing). Because a prisoner may not be disciplined unless

explicit substantive and procedural requirements are met, the disciplinary standards and

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 15 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

16

procedures meet the first prong of the Sandin test. See Walker, 14 F.3d at 1419 (finding

Nevada regulations, which are similar to California's, create liberty interest). 

A liberty interest of "real substance" under the second prong of the Sandin test will

generally be limited to freedom from restraint that imposes "atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," Sandin, 515

U.S. at 484, or from state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,"

id. at 487. Because Plaintiff was not assessed a forfeiture of time credits as a result of the

disciplinary hearing, the question here is whether the disciplinary sentence of three years

in the highly-restricted PBSP SHU qualifies as an atypical and significant hardship.

Typically, placement in segregated housing in and of itself does not implicate a

protected liberty interest. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003);

see, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86 (inmate's thirty-day placement in disciplinary

segregation, where conditions mirrored conditions imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation and protective custody, did not result in type of atypical,

significant deprivation for which state might create liberty interest); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59

F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (under Sandin no liberty interest when inmate placed in

disciplinary segregation for fourteen days). However, the circumstances of a particular

case may sometimes result in segregation working an atypical and significant hardship on

an inmate so that it does implicate a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Wilkinson v.

Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394-95 ( 2005) (indefinite placement in Ohio's "supermax"

facility, where inmates are not eligible for parole consideration, imposes an "atypical and

significant hardship within the correctional context"); Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078-79

(protected liberty interest implicated when wheelchair-assisted inmate was put in a SHU

not designed for disabled persons, because the placement forced him to endure a situation

far worse than a non-disabled person sent to the SHU would have to face).

Based on the record in the present case, the Court cannot find as a matter of law

that Plaintiff's placement in the PBSP SHU for three years did not amount to an atypical

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 16 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

17

and significant hardship. However, even if the Court assumes that a protected liberty

interest was implicated under these circumstances, the Court also finds that Plaintiff's

right to due process was not violated.

b. Due process

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Carmichael's refusal to allow him to postpone his

hearing until he was able to collect documentation and interview witnesses in support of

his defense violated his right to a fair hearing. 

First, Plaintiff claims he was entitled to postponement until the question whether

the District Attorney's Office would seek criminal prosecution was resolved. This

argument is without merit, however, because it is undisputed that the question was

resolved as of July 31, 2001, when the prison and Plaintiff were notified that the District

Attorney had declined to prosecute. Thus, whether Plaintiff refused to sign the RVR form

or not, seeking postponement of the hearing on this ground was a moot point by the time

he was called to attend his disciplinary hearing on September 5, 2001. Accordingly,

Defendant Carmichael properly denied the request.

Plaintiff next claims that he was entitled to a postponement until he had a chance

to interview witnesses. However, he does not allege that he identified these witnesses for

Defendant Carmichael, explained what steps he had taken – or would need to take – to

obtain their testimony, or described the testimony that he anticipated they would give. He

also does not provide such information here. While Wolff allows an inmate a limited

right to call witnesses, it is illogical to argue that the right is implicated whenever a

prisoner asserts that he intends to call unidentified witnesses to present undescribed

testimony and does not explain how and when he intends to obtain their testimony. 

Accordingly, Defendant Carmichael's refusal to postpone the hearing so that Plaintiff

could obtain witness testimony did not violate the mandates of Wolff. 

Plaintiff claims that the hearing should have been postponed until he received the

results of the staff misconduct investigation he had initiated with respect to Defendant

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 17 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1Plaintiff also claims that he was awaiting the results of a complaint he had filed with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, he has provided no information at all regarding when

he filed this complaint or its resolution. Accordingly, the Court finds that his claim of an alleged

right to postponement on this ground is entirely unsubstantiated and without merit.

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

18

Russell.1 As discussed above in the section of this order addressing Plaintiff's excessive

force claim, Plaintiff filed a staff complaint requesting an investigation into Defendant

Russell's behavior. The official complaint process was initiated by personnel at SQSP by

way of a staff misconduct review sheet dated June 8, 2001. (Pl.'s Ex. B-108.) On June

20, 2002 Plaintiff received notice from E. DeRusha, a Correctional Counselor I, that he

had spoken with a sergeant at SQSP who had told him that the "investigation should not

have taken so long," and that it had been completed "2 months ago," but Plaintiff had not

been notified. (Pl.'s Ex. E-200.) DeRusha provided Plaintiff with a copy of the

memorandum from the Employee Relations Officer at SQSP which stated that Plaintiff's

complaint that "a San Quentin staff member was less than professional when dealing with

you" had been sustained, that is, that the investigation had found "a preponderance of

evidence to prove the allegations[] made in the complaint," and that appropriate

administrative action had been taken. (Pl.'s Ex. C). 

The Court finds that while the results of the investigative process might well have

been of benefit to Plaintiff had they been available at the time of his disciplinary hearing,

Defendant Carmichael's refusal to postpone the hearing until the investigation was

concluded did not violate Plaintiff's right to due process under Wolff. Although an

inmate has the right under Wolff to present documentary evidence in support of his

defense, that right is limited by correctional and institutional concerns. See Wolff, 418

U.S. at 566. A legitimate correctional concern is the prompt resolution of disciplinary

charges. Such promptness not only encourages the confidence and cooperation of

inmates by ensuring that they do not linger under the specter of unresolved allegations

and that they have the opportunity to mount a defense before memories and witnesses

fade, it also places a premium on prison administrators' need to punish troublemakers

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 18 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

19

without undue delay. Thus, while Wolff sanctions the presentation of evidence in an

inmate's defense, it does not require that inmates be given unlimited time to gather that

evidence. 

This is not a case where Plaintiff requested a postponement in order to gather

documentary evidence which he knew was available but needed more time to obtain (such

as gathering already-prepared reports or accessing information already in existence in

prison files). Rather, he knew only that an investigation into his complaint of staff

misconduct had been initiated at SQSP on June 8, 2001. When the investigation would

be concluded was wholly outside of Plaintiff's control. And, as the facts show, the

investigation was not concluded until some time around April 2002 – approximately

seven months after Plaintiff asked for postponement – and Plaintiff did not learn of the

results until June 20, 2002. Under these facts, Defendant Carmichael's refusal to allow

postponement of the hearing until the investigation was completed was not a violation of

Plaintiff's right to present evidence under Wolff.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that because the disciplinary hearing was held in absentia

Defendant Carmichael's finding of guilt cannot be upheld. However, because Plaintiff

did not appear at the hearing he did not present any evidence in his defense. Thus, the

only evidence before Defendant Carmichael was the report prepared by Defendant

Russell. The sequence of events as alleged by Defendant Russell is set forth in detail in

the section of this order addressing Plaintiff's excessive force claim. The facts are more

than sufficient to meet the "some evidence" standard required by Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. at 454. See id. (the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board).

Accordingly, Defendant Carmichael's motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

c. Denial of administrative appeal

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Teresa Schwartz, an associate warden at PBSP,

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 19 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

20

wrongly denied his appeal of the disciplinary hearing. A supervisor may be liable under 

§ 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, the Court has found no constitutional violation occurred with respect to

Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing. Therefore, Defendant Schwartz's rejection of Plaintiff's

appeal did not amount to a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, Defendants Schwartz's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,

and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

D. Dental Care Claim

1. Facts

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

On June 5, 2003 Plaintiff submitted an inmate administrative appeal (Log No.

PBSP -03-01578), in which he stated that "some two (2) months ago" he had submitted a

sick-call slip with respect to his lower left tooth, complaining that the filling had come out

and requesting an interview. In the appeal he complained that no action had been taken

since, causing more damage to the tooth. He also stated that he was supposed to be seen

for a dental "follow-up" visit to check on his tooth care and to be provided with a special

toothbrush. He stated that he should not have to wait until he was in an "emergency

status" to receive care. He requested a follow-up visit, that the issue of periodontal

disease be addressed, a "toothbrush remedy," and "dental replacements." (Defs.' Ex. A,

AGO 0022.) 

On June 13, 2003 Defendant McLoughlin, a dental assistant, responded to the

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 20 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

21

appeal as follows:

Regarding the first action requested, you are currently listed for routine

dental treatment as per your request [for services form] (7362) stating,

"filling came out, no real pain." Regarding the second action requested, the

currently issued toothbrush has been deemed adequate to provide daily

plaque removal.

(Id.)

On that same date, in response to Defendant McLoughlin's answer, Plaintiff filed a

formal level appeal in which we wrote:

Of course when I put in the dental request I had no real pain and I thought it

important to point it out, however 2 months has gone by and thats [sic] a

different story. Also I have been evaluated previously by another dentist for

[periodontal] disease. This person answering hasn't even examined my

teeth & this tooth thing isn't adequate.

(Id.)

On June 18, 2003 Defendant Spencer, a dentist, interviewed and examined

Plaintiff and then wrote a response to Plaintiff's formal level appeal, telling him that a

special toothbrush had been ordered for his periodontal disease and that he had been

scheduled to be seen in the dental clinic on June 19 to have his filling restored. (Defs.'

Ex. A, AGO 0023.)

On June 19, 2003 Plaintiff received a filling for his tooth. 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that at some point after Defendant McLoughlin's

June 13, 2003 response but before Plaintiff's June 19, 2003 dental examination, Plaintiff

was already at the medical clinic and asked the dentist, Dr. Hechanova if he could be seen

that day. According to Plaintiff, Defendant McLouglin intervened, saying that he was

already on a list to be seen some other time, and Dr. Hechanova then said that Defendant

McLoughlin had already cleaned the tools for the day and didn't want to work on any

more patients. (Pl.'s Compl. at 3-E.)

Plaintiff alleges that the day after his tooth was filled he spoke to Defendant

Spencer about getting treatment for his periodontal disease. According to Plaintiff,

Defendant Spencer responded that there was no money in the budget to treat periodontal

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 21 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

22

disease, that once Plaintiff's tooth got loose it would just have to be extracted, and that

dental work other than extractions, fillings, and minor tooth cleaning was not done at

PBSP. (Id. at 3-F.)

On July 10, 2003, in response to Defendant Spencer's June 18, 2003 answer to

Plaintiff's formal level appeal, Plaintiff filed a second level appeal, with the reasons stated

as follows:

(1) No definite answer with respect to timely dental appointment,

reasonable length of wait to be seen (2) Dental work which may be needed

other than that which is offered at the institution if need be (added) 

(3) Budget which is dispensed for that purpose (if any). 

(Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0023.)

On July 29, 2003 Plaintiff received a second level appeal response from Defendant

Winslow, the Health Care Manager at PBSP, who reviewed Plaintiff's complaints of delay

and inadequate dental services. Defendant Winslow noted that in response to the process

started by Plaintiff's June 5, 2003 appeal he had received an examination on June 18,

2003 and had his tooth filled on June 19, 2003, and Defendant Winslow saw no delay in

Plaintiff's treatment. Defendant Winslow told Plaintiff that if he needed additional dental

work he should submit a request for services and he would be scheduled as soon as

possible based on his dental needs. Defendant Winslow told Plaintiff that his request for

a budget was beyond the scope of the appeals process. (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0028.)

On August 20, 2003 Plaintiff filed a third level appeal in which he stated that he

was dissatisfied with Defendant Winslow's response and sought further review because:

The delay was when I submitted the actual medical form (CDC 7362) two

(2) months previous which isn't disputed by Dr. Spencer's account and

reasonable time to be seen without filling out a complaint (602 [form]) is

what I sought. Also an answer to the denial of specific medical care on not

the teeth in question that was filled, but the ones requiring more extensive

work which may or may not be able to be done on site.

(Pl.'s Ex. F-301.)

This appeal was addressed by a Director's Level Appeal Decision dated November

6, 2003, which found that Plaintiff had received the treatment he requested in his initial

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 22 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Plaintiff also brings his claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Because Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner, however, the claim must be brought

under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Accordingly,

Plaintiff's due process claim is DISMISSED. 

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

23

appeal, including follow-up treatment, and that the treatment was adequate and had not

been delayed. (Decl. of N. Grannis in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Ex. B.)

Plaintiff's medical records show that after his tooth was filled on June 19, 2003 he

was not seen in the dental clinic again for treatment until May 13, 2004. (Defs.' Ex. A,

AGO 0034.)

In the present action, Plaintiff claims that Defendants McLoughlin, Spencer and

Winslow acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of

the Eighth Amendment2 because: (1) Defendant McLoughlin did not promptly respond to

his initial request for dental care and actively delayed his attempts to obtain treatment; 

(2) Defendant Spencer acknowledged at his June 20, 2003 meeting with Plaintiff that

periodontal disease is serious and requires specialized care but he refused to allow such

care, employed no regular dentists for emergencies or routine dental services, did not

enforce rules requiring that dental care be provided as soon as possible, and did not

provide or make available prompt emergency dental care; and (3) Defendant Winslow

refused to provide adequate and specialized dental care for budgetary reasons.

2. Motion to Dismiss

In addition to moving for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's medical

claim Defendants move to dismiss the claim on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 23 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

24

administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by

those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." CCR§ 3084.1(a). In order to

exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed

through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a

CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee,

and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Id.

§ 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the

administrative remedies exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed administrative appeals regarding inadequate

dental care through all levels of review. What is disputed is the nature of the appeals and

whether they addressed the issues raised in the present action. The Court has reviewed

Plaintiff's administrative appeals and the responses thereto, and has compared them to the

medical claims he raises in this action. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has exhausted

his administrative remedies with respect to his medical claims. Accordingly, Defendants'

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust is DENIED.

3. Applicable Law

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc); see also Hunt v. Dental Dep't , 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (serious medical

needs can include serious dental needs). Whether the Eighth Amendment has been

violated in a particular situation involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness

of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need. See

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. 

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id.

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 24 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

25

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or

patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a

medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities, or the existence

of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious

need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60.

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for deliberate

indifference to be established, therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on

the part of the defendant and resulting harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

4. Analysis

a. Defendant McLoughlin

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McLoughlin's delay in responding to his first

request for dental care amounts to deliberate indifference. This claim is without merit. It

is undisputed that when Plaintiff sent in his first sick call slip some time around April 5,

2003 he stated that he had lost a filling but was not in pain. And it is undisputed that

upon receiving this request for care Defendant McLoughlin scheduled Plaintiff for

routine dental treatment. It is also undisputed that, between the time Plaintiff filed his

first request for care in April of 2003 and his first level appeal on June 13, 2003, he did

not make further facts known to Defendant McLoughlin which would have led her to

infer that he was suffering from a serious medical need. Even when viewed in the light

most favorable to him, the facts alleged by Plaintiff simply cannot support a finding that

he was suffering from a serious medical need when he first requested dental care for a

lost filling, that Defendant McLoughlin knew or should have known that a serious

medical need existed at the time of Plaintiff's first or second requests, or that she acted

with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Delay in providing a prisoner

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 25 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

26

with dental treatment, standing alone, does not constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff also alleges that after he made clear in his first level appeal that he was in

pain Defendant McLoughlin still did not arrange to provide him with immediate

treatment, as evidenced by her unwillingness to allow him to be seen by a dentist for an

unscheduled visit. This claim, too, is without merit. Within five days after Plaintiff filed

his first level appeal he was seen by Defendant Spencer. In the interim, Defendant

McLoughlin, a dental assistant, was under no obligation to allow Plaintiff to be seen

without an appointment. Her refusal to do so does not amount to deliberate indifference,

especially where Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was suffering from a problem so

severe that Defendant McLoughlin's actions caused him significant harm. See id.

For these reasons, Defendant McLoughlin's motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

b. Defendant Spencer

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Spencer acted with deliberate indifference because

he acknowledged at his June 20, 2003 meeting with Plaintiff that periodontal disease is

serious and requires specialized care but also refused Plaintiff's request for such care

because of budgetary concerns which did not allow for adequate staffing and treatment

methods at PBSP. 

The failure to provide treatment because of a tight budget can amount to deliberate

indifference. See Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d at 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, however,

Defendant Spencer did not fail to treat Plaintiff. The undisputed facts show that

Defendant Spencer was not employed at PBSP until 2003, and that he first saw Plaintiff

in the cell pod on February 28, 2003, when he responded to a request for services form. 

Defendant Spencer noted that Plaintiff had pain, swelling and redness, and diagnosed a

dental abscess. He gave Plaintiff antibiotics and Motrin and scheduled him for a dental

appointment. (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0043.) On March 3, 2003 Defendant Spencer

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 26 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

27

extracted Plaintiff's number twelve tooth because of advanced periodontitis. (Defs.' Ex.

A, AGO 0041.) On March 21, 2003 Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Hechanova, who extracted

Plaintiff's number six tooth, also because of advanced periodontitis. (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO

0040.) On June 19, 2003 Plaintiff had his filling replaced. On June 20, 2003 Plaintiff

alleges he spoke to Defendant Spencer about his ongoing treatment concerns. Plaintiff

was not seen for dental care again until May 12, 2004, on which date Defendant Spencer

advised Plaintiff that he needed to have his number five, seven, eight and nine teeth

extracted. Plaintiff refused. The next day, Plaintiff received a full-mouth scaling and a

prescription for vitamins C and D and calcium supplements. He also received a

periodontal charting. (Defs.' Ex. A, AGO 0037-0039.) On August 4, 2004 Defendant

Spencer renewed the prescriptions, and on August 17, 2004 Plaintiff's number seven and

eight teeth were extracted. (Defs. Ex. A, AGO 0034.) On August 24, 2004 and October

27, 2004 Plaintiff received dental checkups at which he was advised that his number five

and nine teeth needed to be extracted. Those teeth were extracted on December 8, 2004,

at which time Plaintiff was fitted for partial dentures. (Decl. of Dr. Spencer in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment at 4:3-5.) 

Because the undisputed facts show that Defendant Spencer did not fail to treat

Plaintiff, the question becomes whether the treatment he provided was acceptable under

Eighth Amendment standards. "A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and

prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim." 

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). And a showing of nothing

more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of

treatment over another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate

indifference. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to

prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a plaintiff

must show that the course of treatment the doctor chose was medically unacceptable

under the circumstances and that he chose this course in conscious disregard of an

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 27 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

28

excessive risk to plaintiff's health. Id. at 1058. 

This Plaintiff has not done. Even if, as Plaintiff alleges, Defendant Spencer

admitted to him that there were more specialized treatments available which PBSP could

not provide, this does not amount to a showing that the alternative treatment which

Defendant Spencer chose was medically unacceptable or was chosen in conscious

disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health. The record shows that Defendant

Spencer's mode of treatment was to provide prophylactic care in the form of toothcleaning and scaling, prescription of dietary supplements, and a special toothbrush; to

provide palliative care in the form of antibiotics and Motrin for pain and swelling caused

by periodontitis; and to extract teeth when there was extensive bone loss or infection. 

Although Plaintiff disagrees with the choice of treatment provided, he has not show that

such choice amounts to deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Hallett, 296 F.3d at 746

(upholding district court's finding of no Eighth Amendment violation where dentists did

not provide routine prophylactic treatment for patients with periodontal disease but could

refer them to a hygienist for tooth-cleaning and/or scaling in their discretion). 

Even when Plaintiff's allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to him,

they do not raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether Defendant Spencer acted

with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Accordingly, Defendant

Spencer's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for

summary judgment is DENIED.

c. Defendant Winslow

Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant Winslow liable for the same failings attributed

to Defendant Spencer, that is, for refusing to provide adequate and specialized dental care

at PBSP for budgetary reasons. However, the Court has found no underlying

constitutional violation as the result of alleged inadequate dental treatment. Thus, there is

no ground on which to find Defendant Winslow liable for having violated Plaintiff's

constitutional rights. See Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446. Accordingly, Defendant Winslow's

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 28 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

29

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary

judgment is DENIED.

E. Plaintiff's Pending Motions

Plaintiff has moved for an order compelling discovery, for the appointment of

counsel, for the appointment of a medical expert, and for a stay of proceedings until

discovery matters are resolved. The Court DENIES these motions. In ruling on

Plaintiff's claims the Court has construed all facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

and the discovery he seeks would have no bearing on the Court's legal rulings. Nor is

Plaintiff entitled to the appointment of counsel or a medical expert. Because of this, a

stay of proceedings is not required. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is

DENIED. (Docket no. 30.)

2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Docket no. 30.) 

3. Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. (Docket no. 36.)

4. Plaintiff's motions to compel discovery, for the appointment of counsel, for the

appointment of a medical expert, and to stay proceedings are DENIED. (Docket nos. 38,

40, 42, 44.)

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL 

United States District Judge

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 29 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Addressing Pending Motions 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.02\Bragg3908.MSJ.Grant.ECK

On , a copy of this order was mailed to 

the following:

Julius Roy Bragg

D-35666

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500/D1201L

Crescent City, CA 95531

Trace O. Maiorino

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Ave.

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Case 5:02-cv-03908-JF Document 49 Filed 09/26/06 Page 30 of 30