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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 20, 2012 Decided July 13, 2012

No. 11-7037

PAUL DOUGLAS BURKE,

APPELLANT

v.

AIR SERV INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-02335)

David E.R. Woolley argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. Malcolm L. Benge entered an appearance.

Frank A. Silane argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were Richard A. Lazenby, Ivy L. Nowinski, Thomas

J. Whalen, Edward J. Longosz II, Mark A. Johnston, and Daniel

A. Glass.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and BROWN, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Paul Burke, a former

British soldier, was severely wounded in an ambush in

Afghanistan, where he was working for a private security

contractor. Burke sued the transport company that furnished the

helicopter he flew in on and the construction company that

contracted with his employer for his security services, alleging

that they had negligently failed to take appropriate security

measures for his trip. The district court granted summary

judgment for the defendants because Burke failed to proffer --

as District of Columbia law requires -- an expert to testify

regarding the standard of care for such security precautions. 

On appeal, Burke maintains that no expert was required

because, inter alia, “every juror will have seen” such films as

High Noon. Burke Br. 31. Perhaps. But even if they have, we

are puzzled about what they could have learned from those films

that would have been helpful to Burke’s case. After all, Marshal

Kane (Gary Cooper) did not helicopter to his confrontation with

the Miller gang. Nor did he carry, as Burke did, a 9-mm. pistol

and AK-47 assault rifle. No, Kane walked to the fateful

encounter protected only by two revolvers and a tin star. 

Moreover, he did so notwithstanding that the meeting could

hardly have been regarded as an ambush: as the film’s title

makes clear, each side knew precisely what time the showdown

would take place. 

We respect Burke’s long military career and greatly regret

the injuries suffered in the ambush, as well as the death of the

helicopter pilot. But Burke’s reliance on old Westerns rather

than expert testimony to establish the standard of care is “fatal

to [his] negligence claim.” Briggs v. Washington Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Finally -- and more prosaically -- the

Erie doctrine is fatal to his alternative contention that we should

disregard D.C.’s expert testimony requirement altogether.

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I

Burke served in the British military for almost 23 years. He

then became a security consultant for the United Nations World

Food Programme in Afghanistan before accepting a riskier job

for a private security contractor, U.S. Protections and

Investigations (USPI), at almost twice the pay. The Louis

Berger Group (LBG), one of the defendants, was a construction

management company overseeing various projects in

Afghanistan, and it hired USPI to provide security. LBG

engaged the other defendant -- Air Serv International, Inc. -- to

provide helicopter transport to its work sites. 

During his time in Afghanistan, Burke had been ambushed

“lots of times.” Burke Dep. at 271-72 (Feb. 24, 2009). Indeed,

just prior to the ambush giving rise to this case, he authored a

memorandum describing the “tenuous” security situation in

Afghanistan and the recent increase in Taliban attacks against

non-governmental organizations. Paul Burke, USPI SC’s

Briefing for Schools and Clinics at 1 (J.A. 228). As Burke

explained in his deposition, he was specifically concerned about

“opportunist[ic] threat[s]” from the Taliban -- that is, unplanned

attacks like the ambush at the center of this case. Burke Dep. at

129. Burke had also flown in Air Serv helicopters several times

and was aware that they were not armored. Id. at 115. 

Nonetheless, on February 22, 2004, Burke helicoptered to

the village of Taluqan with an engineer and an interpreter to

survey the progress of an LBG project. Burke, who was

equipped with a 9-mm. pistol and AK-47 assault rifle, patrolled

the area around the helicopter while others inspected the

building site. As the party prepared to leave, unknown attackers

opened fire. Burke and the others returned fire and radioed for

help. The firing lasted about thirty minutes. Burke was shot

five times; the pilot was killed; and the engineer was badly

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wounded. The interpreter was able to call by satellite telephone

for help, which arrived roughly an hour after the attack began.

In December 2007, Burke filed this action against LBG and

Air Serv, invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the United States

District Court. Burke alleged that both defendants were

negligent in the security procedures they followed and the

security equipment they provided, see Compl. ¶¶ 50-57, and that

LBG was negligent in hiring and retaining his employer, USPI,

to provide security for the aircraft and personnel, id. ¶¶ 58-70.1

He did not, however, sue his employer. After discovery, the

district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on

two alternative grounds: that Burke had assumed the risk of his

injuries, and that Burke had failed to proffer expert testimony

regarding the standard of care owed to him by the defendants as

required by District of Columbia tort law. Burke v. Air Serv

Int’l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2011). Because

the latter ground is sufficient to resolve this appeal, it is the only

ground we discuss below.

II

Applying the choice-of-law rules of the District of

Columbia to this diversity case, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.

Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), the district court

determined that D.C.’s substantive law governs Burke’s suit. 

“Neither party has objected to this choice of law on appeal, and,

finding no apparent error in the District Court’s choice, we shall

1

Burke also alleged that LBG and Air Serv were liable for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 71-73. 

Because his appellate briefs do not specifically address this claim, let

alone marshal any evidence or legal authority in its support, it is

forfeited. See, e.g., Laurel Bay Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. NLRB, 666

F.3d 1365, 1367 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

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apply District of Columbia law as well.” BWX Elecs., Inc. v.

Control Data Corp., 929 F.2d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

In order to prevail on a negligence claim under D.C. law, a

plaintiff “must prove the applicable standard of care, a deviation

from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship

between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Scales v.

District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 730 (D.C. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a plaintiff “‘must put on

expert testimony to establish what the standard of care is if the

subject in question is so distinctly related to some science,

profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average

layperson.’” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845 (quoting District of

Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 433 (D.C. 2000)). 

Accordingly, if expert testimony were required to establish the

standard of care here, Burke’s failure to offer such testimony

would justify the grant of summary judgment against him. See

id. at 848 (affirming summary judgment because, under D.C.

law, failure to establish the standard of care is “fatal to a

negligence claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also

Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 268-71 (D.C.

2006).

We agree with the district court that D.C. law requires

expert testimony in this case. Burke alleges that the defendants

were negligent in failing to equip his helicopter with appropriate

radio communications equipment, bulletproof blast mats, and a

bulletproof windshield; in not providing other personnel on the

helicopter with body armor, helmets, and face shields; in not

seeking air clearance permission from the proper authorities

prior to the flight; and in hiring security personnel. Compl.

¶¶ 52-70. But the precise precautions a security contractor

should take in a war zone are plainly “beyond the ken of the

average layperson,” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845 (internal quotation

marks omitted). As the D.C. Court of Appeals, adopting an old

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dissenting voice from an analogous Second Circuit case, has

declared: “[C]ourts should not leave it to ‘a jury of tailors and

haberdashers to pass judgment [unaided by expert testimony] on

how to make a wet and rolling deck in a seaway a safe place to

work.’” Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195,

200 (D.C. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Zinnel v. U.S.

Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.

1925) (Hough, J., dissenting)).

Burke maintains that the standard of care in this case is

“‘within the realm of common knowledge and everyday

experience,’” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir.

2009) (quoting Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d at 433). But the D.C.

Court of Appeals has required expert testimony in scenarios far

more familiar to the average juror than an ambush in

Afghanistan.2

 And as our court has noted, “expert testimony is

routinely required ‘in negligence cases . . . which involve issues

of safety, security and crime prevention,’” Briggs, 481 F.3d at

845-46 (quoting Varner, 891 A.2d at 267), including allegations

of “negligent ‘hiring, training, and supervision of . . . security

personnel,’” Farooq v. MDRB, Corp., 275 Fed. App’x 11, 12

2

See, e.g., Katkish v. District of Columbia, 763 A.2d 703, 706

(D.C. 2000) (maintenance of leaning trees); Scott v. James, 731 A.2d

399, 400 (D.C. 1999) (application of hair relaxer); Tillman v.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 695 A.2d 94, 97 (D.C. 1997)

(tightness of handcuffs); Messina v. District of Columbia, 663 A.2d

535, 538 (D.C. 1995) (cushioning for the ground underneath

playground monkey bars); Rajabi v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 650

A.2d 1319, 1322-23 (D.C. 1994) (maintenance of street lights); Toy v.

District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 7 (D.C. 1988) (response when a

prisoner is found hanging in his cell); District of Columbia v.

Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 719-20 (D.C. 1984) (installation of a

crosswalk -- instead of a stop sign, light, or crossing guard -- at an

intersection).

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(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Predzin v. DC Arena Ltd. P’ship, No.

02CA 9582, at 5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2003)).

Our decision in Godfrey v. Iverson is not to the contrary. 

That case involved a brawl at a D.C. nightclub. In the course of

the brawl, the bodyguard of the defendant basketball star beat up

the plaintiff, who then sued for negligent supervision. We held

that no “expert assistance” was needed to “establish the standard

of care for an individual who is present while his personal

bodyguard, acting on his behalf in clearing a room in a

nightclub, beats a customer and causes significant injuries.” 559

F.3d at 573. Burke attempts to convert this holding into a

broader principle that expert testimony is never needed to

establish the standard of care for supervising security personnel. 

But the difference between a barroom brawl and an ambush in

a remote Afghan village is self-evident.

Finally, Burke insists -- in all seriousness -- that lay jurors

could have intuited the proper standard of care from their

knowledge of old Westerns. “Afghanistan,” he explains, “is

comparable to the old ‘Wild West’ -- lawmen, builders, farmers,

ranchers, schoolteachers, entering savage areas subject to armed

marauders and trying to establish peace, civilization and the rule

of law.” Burke Br. 30-31. Because “[e]very juror will have

seen Gunsmoke or High Noon or the Outlaw Josey Wales or

Lonesome Dove,” every juror will know the proper standard of

care. Id. at 31.

We do not understand what relevant standard of care jurors

could have gleaned from these Westerns, let alone how it could

have benefited Burke. As to the first point, it seems plain that

films in which the heroes rode horses and carried six-shooters

can tell the jury little about whether helicopters should be

equipped with satellite radios and bulletproof blast mats, or

whether security personnel should be equipped with body armor. 

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As to the second point, we must have seen different versions of

these Westerns than Burke did. In the versions we saw, the

heroes took hardly any special precautions at all before heading

into their confrontations with the outlaws. Will Kane, for

example, set out to meet the fearsome Miller gang with only two

pistols and his marshal’s badge. And as we have noted above,

this was despite his having had time to take whatever other

precautions were available. Frank Miller, after all, was not

arriving until the noon train. See High Noon (Stanley Kramer

Prods. 1952).3

III

Burke further contends that, even if D.C. law does require

expert testimony in his case, that requirement should not be

applied in a federal court under the Erie doctrine. See Erie R.R.

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).4 This circuit has never

expressly addressed that contention. We have, however,

routinely applied D.C.’s expert testimony rule in diversity

cases.5

3

Due to the cowardice of the townspeople, however, the

precaution of raising a posse was unavailable to Marshal Kane.

4

See Hall v. C & P Tel. Co., 793 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir.

1986) (“It is now well established that this court will apply Erie

principles to the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals.”); see also, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the

Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

5

See, e.g., Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc.,

630 F.3d 217, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Godfrey, 559 F.3d at 571-72;

Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845; Nat’l Tel. Coop. Ass’n v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

244 F.3d 153, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Butera v. District of Columbia,

235 F.3d 637, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Daskalea v. District of Columbia,

227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

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9

The “broad command of Erie,” of course, is that “federal

courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural

law” when sitting pursuant to their diversity jurisdiction. Hanna

v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); see Gasperini v. Ctr. for

Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). The Supreme Court

has evolved a set of tests to determine whether a law is

substantive or procedural for Erie purposes. The “first question”

is whether there is a Federal Rule or statute, the “scope” of

which is “sufficiently broad to control the issue before the

Court.” Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50

(1980); see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,

487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988). If there is, the Federal Rule or

statute governs, state law notwithstanding, “unless it exceeds

statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power.” Shady

Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-64);

see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428 n.7. 

Burke argues that the District’s expert testimony

requirement conflicts with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and

that the latter must therefore control.6

 We disagree. Rule 702

provides: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in

the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based

on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the

6

Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence by statute in

1975. Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. The Rules “may be amended as

provided in” the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072. FED.R.EVID.

1102.

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product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the

expert has reliably applied the principles and methods

to the facts of the case.

As is apparent, Rule 702 determines the circumstances in which

expert testimony is permitted (i.e., admissible). The District’s

rule, by contrast, defines a circumstance in which expert

testimony is required. A federal court can simultaneously apply

both the federal standard regarding what qualifies as expert

testimony and the District rule regarding when qualified expert

testimony is required. They “can exist side by side, . . . each

controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without

conflict.” Walker, 446 U.S. at 752. Thus, because Rule 702

does not “answer[] the question in dispute” -- whether the

plaintiff is required to proffer expert testimony to satisfy his

burden of proof -- it does not preempt the state rule. Shady

Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 

Even if Rule 702 does not resolve the issue, Burke

maintains that the District’s rule is unreasonable and that we

should ignore it as a matter of federal common law. But when,

as here, “no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute,”

Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 27 n.6, we must apply state law if it is

“outcome-determinative” in the relevant sense. Hanna, 380

U.S. at 468; see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428.7

 To make that

determination, we ask whether the failure to enforce state law

“would disserve the so-called ‘twin aims of the Erie rule: 

discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable

7

The Supreme Court has suggested that the outcomedeterminative test may be “an insufficient guide in cases presenting

countervailing federal interests.” Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432 (citing

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)). 

Burke has not identified any countervailing federal interest in this

case.

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11

administration of the laws.’” Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 27 n.6

(quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468); see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at

428. The decision whether to apply a state law under Erie must

be made across the board; if Erie commands application of a

state rule, the rule applies in all diversity cases in federal court,

and vice versa. Therefore we do not simply consider whether

application of the District’s expert testimony rule would

encourage forum shopping or be inequitable in this case alone. 

That is, whether or not Burke himself might have been able to

find an expert to support his claim is not dispositive.

With this framework in mind, it is clear that we must apply

D.C.’s requirement of expert testimony because failing to do so

would undermine the twin aims of Erie.

8

 There will certainly be

8

We note that other circuits have applied similar state rules under

Erie. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750-51

(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a Pennsylvania rule, requiring experts to

testify about causation with a “reasonable degree of medical

certainty,” is “an element of [the] plaintiff’s burden of proof” and

therefore a “substantive” rule that “governs in federal court”); Milam

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1992)

(“[W]here a state in furtherance of its substantive policy makes it more

difficult to prove a particular type of state-law claim, the rule by which

it does this, even if denominated a rule of evidence or cast in

evidentiary terms, will be given effect in a diversity suit as an

expression of state substantive policy.”); Hemingway v. Ochsner

Clinic, 722 F.2d 1220, 1225 n.10 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e find that the

[rule requiring expert testimony to prove the standard of care] is so

closely interrelated with the substantive cause of action of malpractice

in Louisiana that federal courts sitting in diversity cases should apply

the state rule in order to fully realize state substantive policy.”). See

also 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6263, at 204 (1997) (“[S]tate

law controls where it makes a precondition to recovery in a

medical-malpractice action the proffer of expert testimony to prove an

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12

tort cases involving areas of scientific or professional expertise

in which plaintiffs will be unable to find (honest, qualified)

experts who will testify that the defendants violated the relevant

scientific or professional standards. If brought in D.C. Superior

Court, such a case would be dismissed without ever getting to

the jury. If we were to refuse to enforce the D.C. expert

testimony requirement, however, the same case would reach the

jury if brought in federal district court. Such a result would be

outcome-determinative in the relevant sense. It would be likely

to “cause [the] plaintiff to choose the federal court.” Hanna,

380 U.S. at 468 n.9. And it would constitute “an ‘inequitable

administration’ of the law” because an action based on D.C. law,

which would be dismissed in D.C. Superior Court, would

“proceed through litigation to judgment in federal court solely

because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship

between the litigants.” Walker, 446 U.S. at 753 (quoting Hanna,

380 U.S. at 468). Accordingly, we must enforce the D.C. rule

and affirm the judgment of the district court.9

element of the substantive-law claim, such as standard of care or

causation.” (footnotes omitted)).

9

As a last ditch effort, Burke urges us to reverse the district court

because it denied his request, made in his opposition to summary

judgment, that the court reopen discovery to allow him “to try to find

and designate such an expert” if the court “believes that the jury must

receive expert evidence as to the standard of care.” Pl.’s Mem. in

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19. We review such denials for

abuse of discretion, see Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C.

Cir. 2006), and find no abuse here. As the district court noted, “Burke

filed his case in this forum; he should have considered -- at least

before the summary judgment phase -- that its law might be applied to

his claims such that an expert was needed.” 775 F. Supp. 2d at 21

n.12. 

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13

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the defendants is

Affirmed.

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