Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00484/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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Plaintiffs are recording companies Priority Records LLC, Virgin Records America, Inc., Sony BMG Music 1

Entertainment, Atlantic Recording Corporation, BMG Music, UMG Recordings, Inc., and Warner Bros. Records Inc. and

will be referred to collectively as “plaintiffs.”

Defendant filed no timely papers to oppose default judgment or to seek relief from default. Pursuant to

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this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(c), no opposing party is entitled to oral argument in the absence of timely filed opposition

papers.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRIORITY RECORDS LLC, CASE NO. CV F 06-0484 AWI LJO

et al.,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON

Plaintiff, DEFAULT JUDGMENT MOTION

(Doc. 22.)

vs.

LOUIE RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this sound recording copyright infringement action, plaintiffs seek a default judgment against

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defendant Louie Rodriguez (“defendant”) forstatutory damages ($6,000), costs ($420), and a permanent

injunction to prevent defendant’s infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrighted sound recordings. This Court

considered plaintiffs’ default judgment motion on the record and without oral argument and VACATES

the January 19, 2007 hearing pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(c) and (h). As discussed 2

below, this Court RECOMMENDS to GRANT plaintiffs a $6,420 default judgment and a permanent

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The below factual recitation is based on plaintiffs’ papers and this Court’s record. 3

Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references will be to Title 17 of the United States Code, the Copyright 4

Act.

The complaint’s Exhibit A lists the following as some of plaintiffs’ copyrighted sound recordings subject 5

to this action: (1) “A Gangsta’s Fairytale,” on album “AmeriKKKa’s Most Wanted,” by artist “Ice Cube” (SR# 145-579);

(2) “Lay Low,” on album “Tha Last Meal,” by artist “Snopp Dogg” (SR# 105-226); (3) “Back To Life,” on album “Keep

On Movin,” by artist “Soul II Soul” (SR# 105-226); (4) “No Ordinary Love,” on album “Love Deluxe,” by artist “Sade” (SR#

183-731); (5) “Firecracker,” on album “In The Purest Form,” by artist “Mass Production” (SR# 9-707); (6) “This Is For The

Lover In You,” on album “Three For Love,” by artist “Shalamar” (SR# 28-517); (7) “Roni,” on album “Don’t Be Cruel,”

by artist “Bobby Brown” (SR# 93-332); and (8) “Dress You Up,” on album “Like a Virgin,” by artist “Madonna” (SR# 59-

442).

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injunction to prevent defendant’s infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrighted sound recording. 

BACKGROUND3

Beginning in January 2006, plaintiffs’ investigators detected that defendant: (1) had 840 music

files on his computer; (2) used an online media distribution system over a peer-to-peer file-sharing

network; and (3) distributed music files to millions of people who used peer-to-peer networks.

Plaintiffs’ counsel sent defendant a letter to advise him of detected copyright infringement and

availability to resolve the matter without litigation. 

After settlement was not reached, plaintiffs, on April 21, 2006, filed their complaint for copyright

infringement, pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (“Copyright Act”), to 4

allege that they are owners or licensees of exclusive United States copyrights to specific sound

recordings which are subject to a valid Certificate of Copyright Registration issued by the Register of 5

Copyrights. The complaint further alleges that defendant:

. . . has used, and continues to use, an online media distribution system to download the

Copyrighted Recordings, to distribute the Copyrighted Recordings to the public, and/or

to make the Copyrighted Recordings available for distribution to others. In doing so,

Defendant has violated Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution.

Defendant’s actions constitute infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights and exclusive rights

under copyright.

On July 29, 2006, defendant was served with the summons and complaint by substitute service.

Plaintiffs sent defendant an August 29, 2006 letter to advise defendant that he was subject to default

entry and judgment and to urge defendant to respond to plaintiffs’ complaint or contact plaintiffs’

representatives to attempt to settle. After this Court’s clerk entered a September 6, 2006 default against

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F.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) notice “is only required where the party has made an appearance.” In re Roxford 6

Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9 Cir. 1993). th

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defendant, plaintiffs served defendant by U.S. Mail a copy of the default entry. Plaintiffs’ research

reveals that defendant is no less than age 31 and not in military service and that his current address is

the same at which he was served.

On December 4, 2006, plaintiffs filed their papers to seek a default judgment against defendant

for statutory damages ($6,000), costs ($420), and a permanent injunction to prevent defendant’s

infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrighted sound recordings. Defendant has neither appeared in this action

nor opposed default judgment. 

DISCUSSION

Default Judgment Standard And Factors

A court (not clerk) default judgment is required when the claim is for an amount that is not

certain or capable of being made certain by computation. See F.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). Generally, a clerk’s

entered default establishes a defendant’s liability:

Rule 55 gives the court considerable leeway as to what it may require as a

prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment. “The general rule of law is that upon

default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of

damages will be taken as true.” (citations omitted). Geddes v. United Financial Group,

559 F.2d 557, 560 (9 Cir. 1977). th

Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-918 (9 Cir. 1987). th

A full scale evidentiary hearing on a default judgment is not required in every case. See

F.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2); James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5 Cir. 1993). The amount of damages may be th 6

fixed by affidavits or declarations. Transportes Aereos De Angola v. Jet Traders Invest. Corp., 624

F.Supp. 264 (D. Del. 1985); see Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Granting default judgment is within a court’s sound discretion. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d

915, 924 (9 Cir. 1986). Factors whether to grant default judgment include: th

1. Substantive merits of plaintiff’s claim;

2. Sufficiency of the complaint;

3. Amount of money at stake;

4. Possibility of prejudice to plaintiff if relief is denied;

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5. Possibility of dispute as to material facts in the case;

6. Whether default resulted from excusable neglect; and

7. “The strong policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the

merits.”

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9 Cir. 1986). th

“In applying this discretionary standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.”

PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999).

As will be seen, evaluation of the above factors favors default judgment for plaintiffs.

Merits And Complaint’s Sufficiency

Plaintiffs contend that substantive merits and complaint’s sufficiency factors “require that the

allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint state sufficient claims for relief.” As noted by plaintiffs, plaintiffs

must demonstrate that defendant violated an exclusive right of a copyright owner to prevail on a

copyright infringement claim. Section 106 provides in pertinent part that “the owner of a copyright

under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work

in copies of phonorecords; . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the

public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending . . .” As plaintiffs explain,

section 106 provides a copyright owner the exclusive right to copy or distribute copyrighted work to the

public, including sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).

Section 501(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights

of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”

Under section 501(b), the “legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled

. . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the

owner of it.”

The complaint alleges that plaintiffs are owners or licensees of exclusive United States

copyrights to specific sound recordings which are subject to a valid Certificate of Copyright Registration

issued by the Register of Copyrights. The complaint further alleges that defendant, without plaintiff’s

permission, has used, and continues to use, an online media distribution system to download the

copyrighted sound recordings, to distribute the copyrighted sound recordings to the public, and/or to

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make the copyrighted sound recordings available for distribution to others to violate plaintiffs’ exclusive

rights of reproduction and distribution.

The complaint is sufficiently plead to indicate the substantive merits of plaintiffs’ claims for

copyright infringement.

Amount At Stake

Pursuant to sections 504 and 505, plaintiffs seek statutory damages of $6,000 for copyright

infringement and costs of $420. Under the Copyright Act, a copyright owner may elect statutory, rather

than actual, damages “for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for

which any one infringer is liable individually . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000

as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(a), (c)(1). A plaintiff may recover statutory damages

whether or not there is adequate evidence of the actual damages suffered by plaintiff or of the profits

reaped by defendant to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy to discourage infringement. Los

Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9 Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

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525 U.S. 1141, 119 S.Ct. 1032 (1999). “Statutory damages are particularly appropriate in a case, such

as this one, in which defendant has failed to mount any defense or to participate in discovery, thereby

increasing the difficulty of ascertaining plaintiff’s actual damages.” Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F.Supp.2d

1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

As plaintiffs seek minimum statutory damages of $6,000 (eight infringements multiplied by

$750), their statutory damages request is reasonable and proper. 

In a copyright infringement action, “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full

costs by or against any party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. A award of costs: (1) deters future copyright

infringement, Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C.1981); (2)

ensures that all holders of infringed copyrights will have equal access to the court to protect their works,

Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Brothers, Inc., 337 F.Supp. 859, 863 (S.D.Ohio 1971); and (3)

penalizes the losing party and compensates the prevailing party, Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491

F.Supp. 908, 915 (D. Conn. 1980); A&N Music Corp. v. Venezia, 733 F.Supp. 955, 959 (E.D. Penn.

1990). Plaintiffs’ costs of $420 ($350 filing fee and $70 process server fee) are reasonable and

appropriate to award to plaintiffs to serve copyright interests.

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Prejudice To Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs argue that without default judgment, they “would be denied the right to judicial

resolution of their claims, and would be without other recourse for recovery.” Plaintiffs note that if

defendant’s conduct remains unchecked, defendant “will be free to pursue similar activities in the

future.”

Plaintiffs correctly point to prejudice from denial of default judgment in that they would be

denied effective relief without defendant’s participation in this action.

Absence Of Material Factual Dispute

Plaintiffs argue that with the clerk’s default entry against defendant, the complaint’s allegations

are taken as true to vitiate a genuine dispute as to material facts. Defendant’s failure to contest plaintiffs’

claims demonstrates absence of a dispute as to material facts. This Court is satisfied that there is no

material factual dispute.

Absence Of Excusable Neglect

Plaintiffs contend that entry of default against defendant did not result from excusable neglect

in that on July 29, 2006, substitute service of the summons and complaint was accomplished, and

defendant failed to respond. Plaintiffs sent defendant an August 29, 2006 letter to advise defendant that

he was subject to default entry and judgment and to urge defendant to respond to plaintiffs’ complaint

or contact plaintiffs’ representatives to attempt to settle. After defendant failed to respond to the letter,

this Court’s clerk entered default against defendant on September 6, 2006. Plaintiffs served defendant

by U.S. Mail a copy of the default entry, and defendant continued to fail to respond to plaintiffs’ claims.

There is no evidence default resulted from excusable neglect in that service of the complaint appears

proper and plaintiffs attempted to obtain defendant’s response to plaintiffs’ claims.

Public Policy

Although cases should be decided on the merits when reasonably possible, such preference alone

is not dispositive. PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Security Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal.

2002). Defendant’s failure to respond to plaintiffs’ claims renders a decision on the merits impractical,

if not impossible. See PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Preference to decide a case on its merits does

not preclude default judgment. PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Here, plaintiffs are entitled to default

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Plaintiffs identify copyrighted sound recordings as: (1) “A Gangsta’s Fairytale,” on album “AmeriKKKa’s 7

Most Wanted,” by artist “Ice Cube” (SR# 145-579); (2) “Lay Low,” on album “Tha Last Meal,” by artist “Snopp Dogg” (SR#

105-226); (3) “Back To Life,” on album “Keep On Movin,” by artist “Soul II Soul” (SR# 105-226); (4) “No Ordinary Love,”

on album “Love Deluxe,” by artist “Sade” (SR# 183-731); (5) “Firecracker,” on album “In The Purest Form,” by artist “Mass

Production” (SR# 9-707); (6) “This Is For The Lover In You,” on album “Three For Love,” by artist “Shalamar” (SR# 28-

517); (7) “Roni,” on album “Don’t Be Cruel,” by artist “Bobby Brown” (SR# 93-332); and (8) “Dress You Up,” on album

“Like a Virgin,” by artist “Madonna” (SR# 59-442).

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judgment despite this Court’s inability to determine the merits arising from defendant’s failure to

respond to plaintiffs’ claims.

Evaluation of the above factors weighs in favor of default judgment for plaintiffs. As discussed

above, plaintiffs are entitled to recover $6,000 statutory damages and $420 costs. The only remaining

issue is a permanent injunction against defendant.

Permanent Injunction

Plaintiffs contend that “they will be irreparably harmed if a permanent injunction is not issued

to prevent Defendant’s reproduction and distribution of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works” and that an

injunction “will further the public’s interest in upholding copyright protections.” Plaintiffs seek the

following injunction:

Defendant shall be and hereby is enjoined from directly or indirectly infringing

Plaintiffs’ rights under federal or state law in Plaintiffs’ copyrighted sound recordings7

and in any other sound recording, whether now in existence or later created, that is

owned or controlled by Plaintiffs (or any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate record label of

Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”), including without limitation by using the Internet

or any online media distribution system to reproduce (i.e., download) any of Plaintiffs’

Recordings, to distribute (i.e., upload) any of plaintiff’s recordings, or to make any of

Plaintiffs’ Recordings available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to lawful

license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs. Defendant also shall destroy all copies

of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that Defendant has downloaded onto any computer hard drive

or server without Plaintiffs’ authorization and shall destroy all copies of those

downloaded recordings transferred onto any physical medium or device in Defendant’s

possession, custody, or control.

Irreparable Harm

Section 502 empowers this Court to grant injunctive relief:

Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may . . .

grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent

or restrain infringement of a copyright.

17 U.S.C. § 502(a).

Injunctive relief is a traditional remedy for copyright infringement, see, e.g., United Feature

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Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., Inc., 569 F.Supp. 1475 (S.D. Fla.1983), and is especially favored

where there is a history of continuing infringement and a substantial threat of continued infringement.

Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Global Arts Prod., 45 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999); see Walt

Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 568 (D.C. Cir.1990). In such cases, a district court may issue a

broad permanent injunction to protect present works and to protect works not yet created. Sony Music,

45 F.Supp.2d at 1347; see Pacific and Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.1984).

“Generally, a showing of copyright infringement liability and the threat of future violations is sufficient

to warrant a permanent injunction.” Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F.Supp. 923, 940 (N.D. Cal.

1996).

To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs note that they must show a likelihood of success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control

Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9 Cir. 1989). However, upon entry of default against a defendant, th

a plaintiff need not show irreparable harm in that default satisfies the element of success on the merits.

Sony Music, 45 F.Supp.2d at 1347. The only difference in the elements to grant a permanent, as opposed

to a preliminary, injunction is the need to show success on the merits, not merely likelihood of success.

Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546, n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1404, n. 12 (1987); Sony

Music, 45 F.Supp.2d at 1347. 

Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s conduct causes plaintiffs irreparable injury which cannot be fully

compensated or measured by money. Plaintiffs point to defendant’s “widespread” infringements of

numerous copyrighted sound recordings through an online media distribution system with millions of

potential users. Plaintiffs characterize defendant’s infringement as “viral” in that recordings available

over an online media distribution system are available for further unlawful distribution by downloading

users. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 331-332 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d,

273 F.3d 429 (2 Cir 2001) (Internet recipients of digital works are able to duplicate copyrighted works nd

and transmit perfect copies so that the “process potentially is exponential rather than linear” and

“threatens to produce virtually unstoppable infringement of copyright.”) 

Plaintiffs further point to the absence of evidence that defendant has ceased infringing plaintiffs’

copyrighted sound recordings or that defendant would cease without an injunction. Plaintiffs note that

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defendant’s absence of response to plaintiffs’ claims fails to assure that defendant’s infringement has

ceased and “highlights that Defendant does not take seriously the illegality of his conduct.” See Jackson,

255 F.Supp.2d at1103 (Copyright infringement “defendant's lack of participation in this litigation has

given the court no assurance that defendant's infringing activity will cease. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled

to permanent injunctive relief.”);PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1178 (default judgment included permanent

injunction because “in the absence of opposition by the non-appearing defendant, it cannot be said that

it is ‘absolutely clear’ that Defendant's allegedly wrongful behavior has ceased and will not begin

again.”)

Plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable harm in that their copyrighted sound recordings remain

subject to continued, repeated infringement without an injunction.

Public Interest

Plaintiffs argue that a permanent injunction will protect public interest to uphold copyright

protections. “Since Congress has elected to grant certain exclusive rights to the owner of a copyright

in a protected work, it is virtually axiomatic that the public interest can only be served by upholding

copyright protections and, correspondingly, preventing the misappropriation of the skills, creative

energies, and resources which are invested in the protected work.” Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin

Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3 Cir. 1983). An “injunction is necessary to preserve the rd

integrity of the copyright laws which seek to encourage individual effort and creativity by granting

valuable enforceable rights.” Atari Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620

(7 Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 176 (1982) (preliminary injunction). th

Public interest protection further supports a permanent injunction in this case.

Scope Of Injunction

Plaintiffs argue that their requested injunction is specific and reasonably seeks to protect “all of

plaintiffs’ existing and future copyrights.” Plaintiffs note that they “continually create new copyrighted

works that would be potentially vulnerable to infringement if the injunction were limited to existing

works.” Plaintiffs conclude that their requested injunction “properly seeks to prevent the reproduction

and distribution of Plaintiffs’ existing and future works.” (Italics in original.) “The weight of authority

supports the extension of injunctive relief to future works.” Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan

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Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392-1393 (6 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156, 117 S.Ct. th

1336 (1997) (citing numerous cases). Where liability has been determined adversely to the infringer,

there has been a history of continuing infringement, and a significant threat of future infringement

remains, a court “is well within its equitable powers to enjoin infringement of future registered works.”

Oth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F.Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

Plaintiffs correctly note that their proposed injunction is sufficiently specific due to the scope of

defendant’s infringement, need to protect plaintiffs’ copyrighted recordings and public interest to uphold

copyright protection. Plaintiffs establish that their proposed injunction is appropriate to protect existing

and future works.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons discussed above, this Court RECOMMENDS to:

1. AWARD plaintiffs $6,000 as statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. §504(c);

2. AWARD plaintiffs costs of $420 under 17 U.S.C. §505; and

3. ISSUE the following injunction:

Defendant shall be and hereby is enjoined from directly or indirectly infringing

Plaintiffs’ rights under federal or state law in the following copyrighted sound

recordings:

1. “A Gangsta’s Fairytale,” on album “AmeriKKKa’s Most Wanted,” by artist “Ice Cube”

(SR# 145-579);

2. “Lay Low,” on album “Tha Last Meal,” by artist “Snopp Dogg” (SR# 105-226);

3. “Back To Life,” on album “Keep On Movin,” by artist “Soul II Soul” (SR# 105-226);

4. “No Ordinary Love,” on album “Love Deluxe,” by artist “Sade” (SR# 183-731);

5. “Firecracker,” on album “In The Purest Form,” by artist “Mass Production” (SR# 9-707);

6. “This Is For The Lover In You,” on album “Three For Love,” by artist “Shalamar” (SR#

28-517);

7. “Roni,” on album “Don’t Be Cruel,” by artist “Bobby Brown” (SR# 93-332); 

8. “Dress You Up,” on album “Like a Virgin,” by artist “Madonna” (SR# 59-442);

and in any other sound recording, whether now in existence or later created, that is

owned or controlled by Plaintiffs (or any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate record label of

Plaintiffs) (“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”), including without limitation by using the Internet

or any online media distribution system to reproduce (i.e., download) any of Plaintiffs’

Recordings, to distribute (i.e., upload any of Plaintiffs’ recordings, or to make any of

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Plaintiffs’ Recordings available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to lawful

license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs. Defendant also shall destroy all copies

of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that Defendant has downloaded onto any computer hard drive

or server without Plaintiffs’ authorization and shall destroy all copies of those

downloaded recordings transferred onto any physical medium or device in Defendant’s

possession, custody, or control.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this action,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 72-304. No later than January 22,

2007, any party may file written objections to these findings and recommendations with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties and otherwise in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(b). Such

a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.”

Responses to objections shall be filed and served no later than February 2, 2007 and otherwise in

compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(d). The district judge will review the magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendations, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district judge’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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