Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-03060/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-03060-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VINCENT E. COFIELD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MIRANDA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-3060-KJM-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that defendants Miranda, Abdur-Rahman, and Lee were deliberately 

indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants move for 

summary judgment, arguing inter alia, that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

before filing suit. ECF No. 46. Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion and defendants have filed a 

reply.1

 ECF Nos. 49, 50. For the following reasons, defendants’ motion must be granted. 

I. Exhaustion under the PLRA 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions [under section 1983 of this title] until such administrative 

 1

 The court has not considered plaintiff’s unauthorized surreply (ECF No. 51) in resolving 

defendants’ motion, as neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the court’s local rules 

provide for such a response. The Clerk of the Court should therefore terminate defendants’ 

motion to strike plaintiff’s surreply (ECF No. 52). 

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remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Prison conditions” subject to 

the exhaustion requirement have been defined broadly as “the effects of actions by government 

officials on the lives of persons confined in prison . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2); Smith v. 

Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d 198, 200 (2d 

Cir. 2002). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a grievance must alert prison officials to the 

claims the plaintiff has included in the complaint, but need only provide the level of detail 

required by the grievance system itself. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007); Porter v. 

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002) (purpose of exhaustion requirement is to give officials “time 

and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case”). 

 Prisoners who file grievances must use a form provided by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, which instructs the inmate to describe the problem and outline the 

action requested. The grievance process, as defined by California regulations, has three levels of 

review to address an inmate’s claims, subject to certain exceptions. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.7. Administrative procedures generally are exhausted once a plaintiff has received a 

“Director’s Level Decision,” or third level review, with respect to his issues or claims. Id. 

§ 3084.1(b). 

 Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 

741 (2001), and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). For a remedy to be 

“available,” there must be the “possibility of some relief . . . .” Booth, 532 U.S. at 738. Relying 

on Booth, the Ninth Circuit has held: 

 [A] prisoner need not press on to exhaust further levels of review once he has 

received all “available” remedies at an intermediate level of review or has been 

reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are available. 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007). To bear this burden: 

a defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at 

unexhausted levels of the grievance process or through awaiting the results of the 

relief already granted as a result of that process. Relevant evidence in so 

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demonstrating would include statutes, regulations, and other official directives that 

explain the scope of the administrative review process; documentary or testimonial 

evidence from prison officials who administer the review process; and information 

provided to the prisoner concerning the operation of the grievance procedure in 

this case . . . . With regard to the latter category of evidence, information provided 

[to] the prisoner is pertinent because it informs our determination of whether relief 

was, as a practical matter, “available.” 

Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (citations omitted). 

 If under the Rule 56 summary judgment standard, the court concludes that plaintiff has 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120, overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

II. Summary Judgment Standard 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary 

judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant 

to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury 

to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 

(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment 

motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury. 

The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 

or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to 

“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally, 

under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if 

any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 

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U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving 

party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248; Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is crucial 

to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party seeking 

summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When the 

opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party 

need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters 

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-

24 (“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a 

summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a 

material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that 

is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). Whether a factual dispute is material is 

determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the opposing party 

is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its claim that party fails 

in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

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of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 322. 

Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine 

the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in 

question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial on 

the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual 

claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit 

or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue 

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to 

demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such 

that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial. 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s 

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255; 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the 

proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American 

Int’l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., 

dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at 

issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th 

Cir. 1995). On the other hand, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 

U.S. at 587 (citation omitted); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (if the evidence presented and any 

reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it could not support a judgment in favor of the 

opposing party, there is no genuine issue). Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen cases lacking any 

genuine dispute over an issue that is determinative of the outcome of the case. 

 Defendants’ motion included notice to plaintiff informing him of the requirements for 

opposing a motion for summary judgment, including the warning that if plaintiff failed to submit 

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evidence in opposition, his case could be dismissed and there would be no trial. See Woods v. 

Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. Sept. 2012); 

see also Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166 (providing that a motion for summary judgment, and not a 

motion to dismiss, is the proper means of asserting the defense of failure to exhaust, where 

evidence extrinsic to the complaint is submitted). 

III. Discussion 

Plaintiff proceeds on his claims of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical 

needs against defendants Miranda, Abdur-Rahman, and Lee. The claims arise from the following 

allegations: (1) that Miranda took plaintiff’s medications, asthma inhalers and medical appliances 

when plaintiff arrived at High Desert State Prison on March 28, 2012; (2) that Drs. AbdurRahman and Lee refused to follow the recommendations of a pulmonary specialist, refused to 

examine plaintiff, and refused to give plaintiff needed x-rays; and (3) that Dr. Lee interfered with 

plaintiff’s medical treatment by cancelling a sleep study and titration that Dr. Abdur-Rahman had 

ordered. See ECF Nos. 29 (operative complaint, dated November 20, 2013); ECF No. 31 

(February 19, 2014 Screening Order). 

Plaintiff initially asserted the claims against defendants Miranda and Abdur-Rahman in 

his first amended complaint, which he delivered to prison staff for mailing on March 14, 2013.2 

ECF No. 14 at 69. That complaint did not include the claims against Dr. Lee, who was not added 

as a defendant until plaintiff submitted another amended complaint for mailing on June 5, 2013. 

See ECF No. 20 at 18-22. Accordingly, the court must determine: (1) whether plaintiff exhausted 

his administrative remedies regarding his claims against Miranda and Abdur-Rahman prior to 

March 14, 2013; and (2) whether plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his 

claims against Lee prior to June 5, 2013.3 See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 

 2

 Because this complaint did not comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the court did not screen it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff 

subsequently complied with the court’s order to file an amended complaint correcting this defect. 

ECF No. 20. 

3

 Defendants argue that plaintiff was required to exhaust all of his claims, including those 

against Lee, prior to March 14, 2013 because the March 14, 2013 complaint “raised [the] 

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2014) (“new” claims added to a lawsuit via amendment that are exhausted prior to the amendment 

comply with the exhaustion requirement). If plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies 

prior to these dates, the court must determine whether plaintiff may be excused from the prefiling exhaustion requirement. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Defendants’ evidence shows that plaintiff failed to complete the exhaustion process as 

required by the PLRA. As noted, plaintiff presented the court with his claims against defendants 

Miranda and Abdur-Rahman on March 14, 2013, and against defendant Lee on June 5, 2013. 

Although plaintiff filed an appeal regarding the claim he now asserts against Miranda in this 

action (log number HDSP HC 12026036), that appeal was not resolved at the final level of review 

until April 22, 2013, over a month after he presented that claim to this court. See ECF No. 46-4 

(“Robinson Decl.”) ¶ 8, Ex. B. He also submitted several appeals that relate, at least in part, to 

his claim against Abdur-Rahman. See ECF No. 54 (“Silkwood Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-9 Exs. C, D, and G 

(log numbers HDSP HC 12026829 and HDSP HC 12026601), Ex. E (log number HDSP HC 

13027216), Ex. F (log number HDSP HC 13027251); see also ECF No. 20 at 94 (log number 

HDSP HC 13027178 and log number HDSP ADA 13021236); ECF No. 29 at 49-50 (log number 

HDSP HC 13027178). However, none of those appeals was decided at the third level of review 

before March 14, 2013. Silkwood Decl., Ex. A; Robinson Decl. ¶¶ 9-13. And, with respect to the 

claim against defendant Lee, the record shows that plaintiff did not file any appeal that was 

resolved at third level of review prior to June 5, 2013. Robinson Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. A.4

 Thus, 

defendants have shown that plaintiff filed this action prematurely, before resolution of any 

appeals addressing the incidents giving rise to these claims. There is simply no dispute as to any 

genuine issue of material fact regarding this question. 

 

deliberate indifference claims against Defendants.” ECF No. 46-2 at 9-10 & n. 3. Review of that 

complaint does not support defendants’ position. The March 14, 2013 complaint does not raise a 

claim against defendant Lee. See ECF No. 14. 

4

 As noted, defendants’ motion erroneously argues that plaintiff was required to exhaust 

all of his claims, including those against defendant Lee, by March 14, 2013. Defendants are able 

to meet their burden on summary judgment, notwithstanding this error, because the evidence 

submitted with their motion demonstrates that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative 

remedies for his claim against defendant Lee prior to June 5, 2013. 

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As discussed above, to defeat summary judgment plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a 

genuine dispute over a material issue of fact as to whether he actually exhausted available 

remedies, or as to whether he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement. He does not 

claim to have actually exhausted his administrative remedies. He does, however, point to various 

causes for his failure to exhaust. First, he blames his housing situation, stating that on some 

unknown date, he was housed in a cell with poor ventilation and poor sanitation, that he was then 

transferred to an isolation cell, and then housed in a cold and wet cell. ECF No. 49 at 3. He does 

not explain how, if at all, this should excuse his failure to exhaust. 

Next, he claims that defendants retaliated against him for “trying to get his medical issues 

resolved” and intentionally delayed their responses to his appeals to see if plaintiff would 

“succumb to the constant attacks and retaliations.” Id. at 3, 8, 9. Plaintiff does not explain how he 

was retaliated against or how any purported act of retaliation prevented him from exhausting his 

administrative remedies for the claims raised in this action. 

In addition, plaintiff fails to show how any particular response to an appeal was delayed. 

Nor does he link these vague and generalized accusations to a specific appeal that could have 

served to exhaust his administrative remedies for the claims presented in this case but for the 

circumstances that he allegedly faced. Plaintiff appears to concede that he only pursued his 

appeals through the second level of review, claiming that thereafter, his appeals “simply 

disappeared” and that he was transferred to another institution. Id. at 9. Plaintiff offers no details 

regarding appeals that “disappeared,” nor does he explain how being transferred to another 

institution prevented him from exhausting his administrative remedies. Notably, plaintiff does 

not claim to have ever even attempted to submit an appeal to the third level of review. For these 

reasons, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute over a material issue of fact 

as to whether he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement. He provides no evidence to 

counter defendants’ evidence that he did not exhaust available remedies. Nor does he present 

evidence which demonstrates that exhaustion should be excused. Thus, there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material facts as to whether plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies 

that were available to him prior to presenting his claims to this court. 

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In light of the absence of and genuine dispute that plaintiff failed to comply with the 

exhaustion procedure, or that his failure in this regard should not be excused, defendants’ 

summary judgment motion must be granted.5 See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, 

but it did not. The actual statue makes exhaustion a precondition to suit.”); Vaden v. Summerhill, 

449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (prisoner brings an action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 

when he submits his complaint to the court). 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of the Court terminate 

defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s surreply (ECF No. 52), that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 46) be granted, that judgment be entered in defendants’ favor, and 

that this action be closed. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: October 7, 2015. 

 5

 For this reason, and because exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)), 

the court need not address defendants’ alternative grounds for summary judgment. 

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