Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01552/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01552-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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 Record citations are to documents in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations

are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

3:15-cv-01552 LB

ORDER

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

San Francisco Division

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

 CHARLES KINNEY,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. 3:15-cv-01552 LB

ORDER DENYING MR. KINNEY’S

MOTION TO STAY THE COURT’S

REMAND ORDER

[Re: ECF No. 16]

Defendant Charles Kinney removed an attorney disciplinary action brought against him by the

California Supreme Court. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.1

) On May 15, 2015, the court remanded

the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Order, ECF No.

13.) Three days later, on May 18, 215, Mr. Kinney filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 59 and 60 that asked the court to reconsider its remand order. (Motion for

Reconsideration, ECF No. 14.) A few days after that, on May 26, 2015, Mr. Kinney filed a motion

asking the court to stay its remand order. (Motion to Stay, ECF No. 16.)

On May 27, 2015, the court issued an amended remand order that fixed a citation error.

(Amended Order, ECF No. 18.). The court also issued an order denying Mr. Kinney’s motion for

reconsideration, and the court amended that order on June 2, 2015. (Order Denying Reconsideration,

ECF No. 19; Amended Order Denying Reconsideration, ECF No. 22.) In doing so, the court made

Case 3:15-cv-01552-LB Document 23 Filed 06/02/15 Page 1 of 3
UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the court finds this matter suitable for determination

without oral argument and vacates the June 11, 2015 hearing date noticed by Mr. Kinney.

3:15-cv-01552 LB

ORDER 2

clear that it remanded the attorney disciplinary action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, not for a defect in removal procedure as Mr. Kinney suggested in his

motion for reconsideration. 

Now, the court denies Mr. Kinney’s motion to stay the remand order.2 Mr. Kinney wants the

court to stay its remand order “pending his motion to vacate [(i.e., his motion for reconsideration)]

and the disposition of his upcoming appeal, writ of mandamus and request for other relief from the

Ninth Circuit.” (Motion to Stay, ECF No. 16.) The court denied Mr. Kinney’s motion for

reconsideration, so that leaves only Mr. Kinney’s “upcoming” appeal or petition to the Ninth Circuit.

None has yet been filed. 

Mr. Kinney says that his motion “is made pursuant to” Civil Local Rules 7-10, which pertains to

ex parte motions, and 65-1, which pertains to temporary restraining orders, and Rule 65(b), which

also pertains to temporary restraining orders. (Motion to Stay, ECF No. 16 at 2.) None of these rules,

however, provide authority for staying the court’s remand order. Mr. Kinney later identifies the legal

standard for staying an action pending appeal. That standard, as recited by the Ninth Circuit, is as

follows:

In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724

(1987), the Supreme Court set forth “the factors regulating the issuance of a stay” as

follows: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to

succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a

stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties

interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Consistent with

these factors, we had previously articulated the standard for granting a stay pending

appeal in Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1983). See also L.A.

Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir.

1980).

In ruling on a motion for a stay pending appeal, we employ “two interrelated legal

tests” that “represent the outer reaches of a single continuum.” Lopez, 713 F.2d at

1435 (internal quotation marks omitted). “At one end of the continuum, the moving

party is required to show both a probability of success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. We have recently applied, as an alternative test

at this end of the continuum, a test originally formulated for granting a preliminary

injunction: “(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, [and] (2) the possibility

of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted[.]” Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir.2007). “At the other end of

the continuum, the moving party must demonstrate that serious legal questions are

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ORDER 3

raised and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Lopez, 713 F.2d at

1435. “These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the

required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success

decreases.” Winter, 502 F.3d at 862. Further, we “consider ‘where the public interest

lies' separately from and in addition to ‘whether the applicant [for stay] will be

irreparably injured absent a stay[.]’' Id. at 863 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776, 107

S.Ct. 2113) (first alteration in Winter). 

Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th

Cir. 2008). 

Even assuming that this standard applies to requests to stay a remand order, and even assuming

that it applies in the absence of a pending appeal, the court concludes that Mr. Kinney has not met it.

For the reasons the court has explained in its orders remanding the action and denying

reconsideration, Mr. Kinney is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his appeal. Any appeal will be

limited to review of the court’s conclusion that Mr. Kinney did not fulfill the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 1443 and thus subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking over the action. The court considered

Mr. Kinney’s arguments on this issue, rejected them, and it was not a close call. The court also is not

persuaded that Mr. Kinney will suffer irreparable harm, as he may raise his federal and

constitutional rights before the California Supreme Court upon remand. See Hirsh v. Justices of the

Supreme Court of California, 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995). Conversely, a stay will substantially

harm the State Bar and the California Supreme Court, which has an interest in policing the conduct

of California attorneys. See In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th 430, 453 (Cal. 2000). The State Bar and the

California Supreme Court cannot effectively do this if attorneys facing discipline can improperly

remove disciplinary actions to federal court even when subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. As

long as the action is in federal court, the State Bar and the California Supreme Court cannot fulfill

their function. For this reason, the public interest also lies in favor of allowing the remand to go

forward. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2015 _______________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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