Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01730/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01730-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

PAUL VERRELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROC AZ VILLA ANTIQUA LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CIV 14-1730-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Verrell’s Motion for Leave to File 

Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 10), Defendants ROC AZ Villa 

Antiqua, LLC and Bridge Property Management, LLC’s Response thereto (Doc. 15), and 

Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 16). 

Factual and Procedural Background 

 On October 1, 2012, Plaintiff was assaulted during a get-together at Mirabella 

Apartment Homes, property owned by ROC AZ Villa Antiqua and managed by Bridge 

Property Management. (Doc. 15 at 2.) Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint in Pima County 

Superior Court on September 30, 2013. (Id.) The initial Complaint did not name the 

recently convicted Shawn Lamar Johnson (“Johnson”), who was found guilty of 

assaulting Verrell in state court on May 2, 2014. (Id.; Doc. 10-2) On February 12, 2014, 

Defendants, both limited liability companies whose principle place of business is Utah, 

filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as Plaintiff is a resident of 

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Arizona and the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff 

filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint on May 9, 2014. (Doc. 11.) The 

Amended Complaint seeks to add two new defendants to the case: (1) Shawn Johnson 

and (2) Valley Protective Services of Tucson, LLC (VPS). (Id. at 2.) Both parties sought 

to be joined in the Amended Complaint are Arizona residents and, as such, joinder of 

either Defendant would deprive the Court of jurisdiction. (Doc. 15 at 2.) 

 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) Legal Standard 

The governing law for granting a leave to file an amended complaint that would 

add defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction after removal 

from a State court is 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).1 Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 

(C.D. Cal. 1999) (the more liberal and permissive standards of Rule 15(a) do not apply 

when an amendment is diversity-destroying). This decision to grant leave is left to the 

discretion of the district courts. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th 

Cir. 1998). The following five factors have historically guided the Court in deciding 

whether to deny Plaintiff’s de facto joinder of non-diverse parties or permit joinder and 

inevitably remand the action to State court: (1) whether the parties sought to be joined are 

needed for just adjudication; (2) whether joinder is intended solely to defeat federal 

jurisdiction; (3) whether the claims against the new defendant appear valid; (4) whether 

denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff; and (5) the timeliness of the motion. Ansley 

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 215 F.R.D. 575, 580 (D. Ariz. 2003); see also IBC Aviation 

Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 

(N.D. Cal. 2000). No single factor is decisive, and the Court may weigh each factor as it 

sees fit. Cf. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 691. 

 

1 “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the 

action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).

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Analysis 

 The first factor to consider is whether the addition of the parties sought to be 

joined in the lawsuit is paramount to the just adjudication of the case. When evaluating 

this factor, courts typically consider whether a party would meet a less restrictive variant 

of the “necessary” standard under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19(a). IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. 

Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 

2000); see also Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that under 

§ 1447(e) the court has more flexibility to allow joinder of non-diverse parties than Rule 

19(a) analysis). The Ninth Circuit has described necessary parties under Rule 19 as 

persons “having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made a party, in 

order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide and finally determine 

the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it.” 

CP Nat'l. Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting 

Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L.Ed. 158 (1854)). The necessity 

standard is also met when “failure to join will lead to separate and redundant actions.” 

IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. Here, Shawn Johnson has an acute 

interest in the controversy because he is a named non-party at fault by Defendants. 

Absent joinder, in order for Plaintiff to recover against Johnson, or VPS, it would require 

a separate and redundant lawsuit against the parties in state court. Judicial economy and 

fairness to counsel support granting the leave to amend. A separate action in state court 

would waste a great deal of judicial resources adjudicating the exact same factual 

circumstances that would need to be resolved in the federal court. Moreover, in a case of 

comparative negligence, it is even more important that the factual issues be adjudicated 

and resolved by the same trier of fact so that fault is consistently and equitably 

apportioned between all of the implicated parties. Defendants argue that although the 

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underlying incident is the same and the legal claims are similar, the basis of the claims 

against the Defendants are different than for the other two parties. However, this fact 

does not relieve the need to avoid redundant litigation of the same controversy. Nor does 

it allow for a single trier of fact to justly allocate comparative fault. The parties’ necessity 

for just adjudication favors granting leave to amend. 

 The second factor to consider is Plaintiff’s motive behind the attempt to amend the 

complaint. The court must “look with particular care” at plaintiff's motive as to prevent 

fraudulent joinder that would amount to unfair gamesmanship. Desert Empire Bank v. 

Ins. Co. of North Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.1980). However, there is a general 

presumption against fraudulent joinder, and the burden of proof is on the defendant to 

prove fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing evidence. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. 

Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants argue that because 

Johnson’s identity was known from the outset of the case,2

 Plaintiff’s “good faith” in 

filing the motion at this time may be impugned and the motion’s only objective in 

naming the new parties is to destroy federal diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff counters this 

accusation by stating that at the original time of filing, the state criminal case against 

Johnson was still pending, and had Plaintiff sued Johnson at that time, it may have had 

adverse repercussions in the criminal case. Plaintiff also contends that he decided to 

amend his complaint and add Johnson as a party to the case after he learned from defense 

counsel that Johnson was to be named as a non-party at fault.3

 Defendants have not 

provided clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent joinder and admit that leave to 

amend with respect to VPS was likely made in good faith. Moreover, “[s]uspicion of 

diversity destroying amendments is not as important now that § 1447(e) gives courts 

 

2

 Johnson was named as the assailant in the original Complaint. 

3

 While Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint was filed on May 8, 2014, a day before Defendant’s Notice of Non-parties at Fault, an email exchange dated April 11, 2014, proves that defense counsel informed counsel for plaintiff that they would be naming Johnson as a non-party at fault. 

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more flexibility in dealing with the addition of such defendants.” IBC Aviation Servs., 

Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. The Court does not find that Plaintiff’s motive weighs 

against granting leave to amend. 

 The third factor is whether the claims against the new parties appear valid. If 

claims against the parties are facially meritless it would weigh in favor of denying 

amendment. Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The Court 

concludes, and neither party disagrees, that the claims against Johnson are strong. 

Johnson has been convicted for the assault in the state court and will likely share in the 

comparative fault. Additionally, the strength of the claims further alleviates the concern 

of fraudulent joinder considered supra. Defendants argue that the claim against VPS is 

weak. While the Court agrees that the claims are certainly not as strong as those claims 

against Johnson, they do not appear entirely meritless.4

 Ultimately, as long as one of the 

claims is strong enough to grant leave to amend the complaint, it does not matter the 

relative or absolute strength of each individual claim. That determination would be a 

matter best left to the state court on remand. Cf. Boon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 

1016, 1025 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (deciding that, under a § 1447(e) analysis, the court “need 

not consider the validity or strength” of a claim that eventually would be heard by the 

state court). 

 The next factor to consider is whether the denial of joinder would prejudice 

Plaintiff. This factor takes into consideration: (1) whether denying the amendment would 

force the plaintiff to choose between the costs of redundant litigation arising out of the 

same facts or foregoing potential claims against the parties sought to be joined; and (2) if 

the statute of limitations would bar the filing of an original complaint in the state court. 

 

4

 The Court does not have enough information to engage in a hypothetical motion for summary judgment on the claims as some courts have done in analyzing this factor under a motion to amend complaint pursuant to § 1447(e). E.g., Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; but see Goodman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (analyzing the strength of the claim only so far as to determine whether Plaintiff’s 

pleading was a “mere sham” to return to state court). 

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See Ansley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 215 F.R.D. 575, 581 (D. Ariz. 2003); IBC Aviation 

Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. Forcing a plaintiff to choose between redundant 

litigation or to forgo valid claims is an unnecessary judicial hurdle for a party seeking 

relief and fair adjudication. Likewise, a plaintiff could be prejudiced if his claim would 

be time-barred as an original action in state court and the court did not grant leave to 

amend so that the new claim would relate back to the original complaint, thereby 

rendering it timely and permissible. It is uncontested that the statute of limitations 

pertaining to the claims has not run in this case.5

 Generally, a federal court may be less 

inclined to permit diversity-destroying joinder if the plaintiff could still potential seek 

relief in state court. See Clinco, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1083. However, because the claims 

against the sought parties arise out of the same factual circumstances, it is to the 

economic benefit of all parties, and the judicial system, to have the entire controversy 

adjudicated only once. To force Plaintiff to proceed with expensive litigation in state 

court against Johnson and VPS would create avoidable prejudice. This factor favors 

granting leave to amend. 

 The last factor to consider is the extent to which the attempted amendment is 

timely. Courts weigh this factor by considering the current stage of litigation and whether 

there has been an undue delay in seeking amendment. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1012; see also Lopez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 

1983) (holding that a delay of six months after removal and just four days prior to the 

hearing on a motion for summary judgment was an undue delay). Here, Plaintiff filed his 

Motion before the Case Management Order was issued and before major discovery was 

conducted, and any dispositive motions were filed. In fact, Plaintiff filed his Motion one 

day before the Defendants provided notice of non-parties at fault. Thus, the Court does 

 

5

 Arizona has a two-year statute of limitations on claims involving personal injuries such as this one. A.R.S. § 12-542. The injury occurred on October 1, 2012, therefore, the statute of limitations does not run until October 1, 2014. 

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not find that the filing was untimely. 

 In conclusion, after weighing the aforestated factors under the discretionary 

standard of § 1447(e), the Court finds amendment is warranted. 

 Further, as complete diversity of citizenship no longer exists between the parties, 

this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. The Court, 

therefore, will remand this matter to the state court. 

 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall file the lodged Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) 

pursuant to the ECF Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual § II.H. 

2. This matter is REMANDED to the Pima County Superior Court (Cause # 

C20135473) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447. 

 3. The Clerk of Court shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of 

the Pima County Superior Court. 

 4. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in this 

matter. 

 Dated this 16th day of July, 2014. 

Case 4:14-cv-01730-RM Document 24 Filed 07/18/14 Page 7 of 7