Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04733/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04733-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Antonio Hernandez,

Plaintiff,

v. 

PGA Holdings LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-04733-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On July 16, 2019, Antonio Hernandez filed a collective action complaint against 

Defendants for failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”). (Doc. 1.) The parties’ joint case management report, filed 

on September 20, 2019, stated that “Zachariah Owen is currently the only Opt-In Plaintiff.” 

(Doc. 28 at 2.) The Court has no notice of any other opt-in plaintiffs.

A scheduling order issued on September 24, 2019 (Doc. 30), and the parties 

exchanged Mandatory Initial Discovery Program responses within the next few days 

(Docs. 31, 32). 

The docket reflects no activity between September 2019 and May 13, 2020, when 

Opt-In Plaintiff Zachariah Owen and Defendants filed a stipulation to dismiss Mr. Owen 

with prejudice (Doc. 33), and Plaintiff Antonio Hernandez’s counsel, Clifford P. Bendau, 

II and Christopher J. Bendau of Bendau & Bendau PLLC (“Plaintiff’s Counsel”) filed a 

motion to withdraw as counsel of record without client consent (Doc. 34). Plaintiff’s 

counsel avers that “withdrawal is necessary in light of Plaintiff’s unwillingness and/or 

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inability to effectively communicate with his own counsel in connection with this action,” 

specifically noting “Plaintiff’s failure to cooperate with respect to providing responses to 

counsel’s requests for information and documentation pertaining to his case, responses to 

settlement discussions, and general failure to communicate with his counsel, including but 

not limited to, responding to emails and telephone calls timely or otherwise.” (Doc. 34 at 

2-3.)

The stipulation to dismiss Opt-In Plaintiff Owen will be granted. As such, 

Hernandez will be the sole plaintiff in this action, and he is apparently not participating. 

Without Hernandez’s participation, this action will not be permitted to linger on the 

docket.1 “It is within the inherent power of the court to sua sponte dismiss a case for lack 

of prosecution.” Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984). “When considering 

whether to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution, the district court must weigh the court’s 

need to manage its docket, the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, and 

the risk of prejudice to the defendants against the policy favoring disposition of cases on 

their merits, and the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. “Only ‘unreasonable’ delay 

will support a dismissal for lack of prosecution.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed 

dismissal without prejudice for a delay as short as four weeks, noting that “[a] relatively 

brief period of delay is sufficient to justify the district court’s sending a litigant to the back 

of the line.” Id. at 497.

The Court will order Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed 

without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff must file a memorandum, not to exceed 

five pages, by June 17, 2020. The Court is interested in knowing (1) the reason why 

Plaintiff has failed to communicate with his counsel, (2) the prejudice, if any, to Plaintiff 

if this case were dismissed without prejudice—particularly whether any statute of 

limitations would bar the case from being filed anew, and (3) Plaintiff’s suggestions as to 

how the case could proceed expeditiously from this point forward, if the Court were to 

1 Dismissal of this action would affect only Hernandez, as other “putative plaintiffs 

remain free to vindicate their rights in their own suits.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 

Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 77 (2013).

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determine that dismissal is not an appropriate sanction at this time.

As for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel, Ninth Circuit law 

suggests a “justifiable cause” standard applies when, as here, the client does not

affirmatively consent to the withdrawal request. Lovvorn v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 704, 706 

(9th Cir. 1941) (“An attorney may not, in the absence of the client’s consent, withdraw 

from a case without justifiable cause; and then only after proper notice to his client, and on 

leave of the court.”). “Justifiable cause” is not a terribly demanding standard, and the 

professional considerations listed in ER 1.16 will often satisfy it, so long as other factors 

don’t outweigh those considerations. Gagan v. Monroe, 2013 WL 1339935, *4 (D. Ariz. 

2013) (“Factors that a district court should consider when ruling upon a motion to withdraw 

as counsel include: (1) the reasons why withdrawal is sought; (2) the prejudice withdrawal 

may cause to other litigants; (3) the harm withdrawal might cause to the administration of 

justice; and (4) the degree to which withdrawal will delay the resolution of the case.”).

Plaintiff has failed to respond to his counsel’s attempts to communicate, and he has 

failed to respond to their motion to withdraw as counsel. Any prejudice to him is of his 

own making. Furthermore, withdrawal will not harm the administration of justice or 

greatly delay resolution of this case. If Plaintiff fails to respond to the order to show cause, 

this action will be dismissed, and if Plaintiff responds with satisfactory reasons for allowing 

the case to proceed, a very short timeframe will be established in which Plaintiff will be 

required to engage new counsel or proceed pro se individually.2 Justifiable cause supports 

Plaintiff’s Counsel’s withdrawal request, which will be granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that stipulation to dismiss Opt-In Plaintiff Owen (Doc. 33) is 

granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s motion to withdraw as 

2 Plaintiff may not proceed pro se on behalf of others similarly situated. Simon v. 

Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing “the general rule 

prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in 

a representative capacity”); Koch v. CHS Inc., 2012 WL 6093891, *2 (D. Idaho 2012)

(general rule “holds true for pro se plaintiffs seeking to bring collective action suits under 

the F LSA”).

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counsel of record (Doc. 34) is granted. Clifford P. Bendau, II and Christopher J. Bendau 

of Bendau & Bendau PLLC are withdrawn as counsel of record for Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall update Plaintiff’s 

contact information as follows:

Antonio Hernandez

6112 N. 67th Ave., Apt. 217

Glendale, AZ 85391

(623) 512-8404

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a memorandum by June 17, 

2020, not to exceed five pages, showing cause why this case should not be dismissed for 

failure to prosecute.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to file a memorandum showing 

cause why this case should not be dismissed by June 17, 2020, the Clerk of Court shall 

dismiss this action without prejudice.

Dated this 28th day of May, 2020.

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