Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02873/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02873-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pearl Wilson, Personal Representative

of the Estate of Phillip Wilson,

deceased; and Terry Wilson and Pearl

Wilson, surviving parents of Phillip

Wilson,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Maricopa County, a public entity, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-04-2873-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants have filed a mot ion to dismiss the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

(“MCSO”) from this case, arguing that it is not a jural entity subject to suit. Doc. #12.

Plaint iffs have filed a response to the motion and Defendants have filed a reply. Docs.

##13, 17. 

The parties agree that there is no controlling Arizona case on point. Arizona courts

have expressly declined to resolve the issue. See Flanders v. Maricopa County, 54 P.3d

837, ¶ 66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). Judges on this court have reached differing conclusions.

Compare Agster v. Maricopa County, No. CV-02-1686-PHX-JAT (March 3, 2005 Order),

with Hayes v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, No. CV-03-2550-PHX-NVW (July 28, 2004

Order). 

The parties agree that Maricopa County is a political subdivision subject t o suit.

Indeed, Arizona statutes expressly so provide. See A.R.S. §§ 11-201(A)(1), 11-202(A).

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Arizona stat ut es further provide that the sheriff is an enumerated officer of the County.

See A.R.S. § 11-401(A)(1). As with ot her enumerated county officers, the statutes permit

the sheriff “by and with the consent of, and at salaries fixed by ” t he count y board of

supervisors, to “appoint deputies, stenographers, clerks and assistants necessary to

conduct t he affairs of their respective offices.” A.R.S. § 11-409. Because the sheriff has

exercised this authority and created a subst antial office to assist him in carrying out his

responsibilities, Plaintiffs argue that the MCSO const itutes a separate political subdivision

subject to suit in this case.

Plaintiffs cite McClanahan v. Cochise College, 540 P.2d 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975),

in support of their position. McClanahan st at es that “[t]he attributes which are generally

regarded as distinctive of a political subdivision are that it exists for the purpose of

discharging some function of local government, that it has a prescribed area, and that it

possesses aut hority for subordinate self-government by officers selected by it.” Id. at 747.

Plaintiffs argue that the MCSO sat isfies each of these criteria: it exists for the purpose of

discharging the core governmental function of law enforcement, it operates within the

prescribed area of Maricopa County, and it possesses authority to select officers for

purposes of self-government.

Although the Court agrees that the three-part test in McClanahan appears to be

satisfied, the Court has difficulty distinguishing these three distinctive attribut es from

those already belonging to Maricopa County. Because many offices within county

government could be said to satisfy t hese three requirements, Plaintiffs’ logic would seem

to suggest that many parts of the Count y ’s operation constitute separate political

subdivisions subject to suit. The Court cannot agree with t his broad proposition,

particularly when the Arizona Legislature specifically has stated that the County is a

political subdivision with authorit y t o sue and be sued and has not made the same

declaration with respect to the MCSO. See A.R.S. §§ 11-201(A)(1), 11-202(A). 

The MCSO is a sub-part of the Count y . The fact that the statutes identify the

sheriff as one of nine enumerated Count y officers and authorize the sheriff to hire other

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employees t o assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities does not, in the Court’s

view, reveal an intent on the part of the Legislature to treat the MCSO as a separate

political subdivision. Other cases support this conclusion. See Pierre v. Schlemmer, 932

F. Supp. 278, 280 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (“‘Where a police department is an integral part of the

city government as the vehicle t hrough which the city government fulfills it policing

functions, it is not an entity subject to suit.’”) (citation omitted); Jacobs v. Port Neches

Police Dep’t, 915 F. Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that a sheriff’s department was

not a proper party to the suit because the county had not expressly “grant[ed] the servient

agency with jural authority”); Sullivan v. Chastain, No. Civ.A.SA04CA0803XR, 2005 WL

354032, *2 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing a county constable office because “an entity

without a separate jural existence is not subject to suit”); see also Del Tufo v. Township

of Old Bridge, 650 A.2d 1044, 1046 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (“‘Old Bridge

Township Police Department’ is probably not a jural entity and is therefore probably not

subject to suit in its own name.”).

Plaintiffs also argue that t he Court need not decide this issue for the same reason

that the Arizona Court of Ap p eals declined to decide it in Flanders. The Court does not

agree. Flanders declined to decide the question because it already had affirmed the

judgment and its collectibility on other grounds. See Flanders, 54 P.3d ¶ at 66. Moreover,

the Court of Appeals in Flanders specifically instructed that counsel and courts should

“resolve questions of proper parties and ‘jural’ entities at the outset of the case rather than

after the verdict.” Id. at ¶ 66 n. 11. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss shortly after

the case management conference and thereby complied with the Court of Ap peals’

direction that these issues be raised and resolved early.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that there is no “case or cont roversy” concerning the status

of the MCSO as a jural entit y . T his argument is simply incorrect. Plaintiffs have sued the

MCSO. A motion to dismiss the MCSO has been filed. A clear controversy exists. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown the MCSO to be a jural entity

sep arate from Maricopa County. The Court cannot conclude from the statutes that t he

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Arizona Legislat ure int ended the MCSO to have such status. And although the three-part

test applied to a community college dist rict in McClanahan appears to be satisfied, the

Court cannot comfortably conclude that the test should be used to create new and

sep arate political subdivisions out of sub-parts of larger entities the Legislature has

expressly declared to be political subdivisions. 

Plaintiffs have sued the County and individual defendants. Dismissal of the MCSO

will not deprive them of any remedy to which they are entitled.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office motion to

dismiss (Doc. #12) is granted.

DATED this 15th day of November, 2005.

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