Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00535/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00535-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SURVJUSTICE INC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ELISABETH DEVOS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-00535-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 107

Plaintiffs SurvJustice, Inc., Equal Rights Advocates, and Victim Rights Law Center 

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action for injunctive relief against Defendants U.S. 

Department of Education (the “Department”), Secretary Elisabeth D. DeVos, and Acting Assistant 

Secretary for Civil Rights Kenneth L. Marcus (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Plaintiffs seek to 

vacate the Department’s policy regarding enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments 

of 1972, as detailed in Department guidance issued on September 22, 2017. (Dkt. No. 86 at ¶ 1.)

2

 

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, (Dkt. No. 107), of this 

Court’s October 1, 2018 order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claim under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706, (Dkt. No. 81). After careful consideration of the parties’ 

briefing, the Court concludes that oral argument is not needed, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and 

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion because the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019) warrants reconsideration of the October 2018 order to the 

extent it dismissed Plaintiffs’ APA claim with prejudice. 

//

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 18 & 36.)

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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BACKGROUND

The factual background and procedural history of this case are detailed in the October 2018 

order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. (See Dkt. No. 81 at 2-

8.) As relevant here, Plaintiffs alleged that the Department’s Title IX policy guidance issued in 

September 2017 (“2017 Guidance”) is arbitrary and capricious and thus violates the APA. The 

Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ APA claim with prejudice, concluding that the 2017 Guidance did not 

constitute “final agency action” for purposes of judicial review under the APA. (Id. at 16-20 

(concluding that the 2017 Guidance failed the second prong of Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 

178 (1997) (requiring that the challenged government action be “one by which rights or 

obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”)).) 

On February 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

of the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ APA claim, (Dkt. No. 103), which the Court granted, (Dkt. 

No. 104). Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b) thereafter. (Dkt. No. 107.) The motion is fully briefed, (see Dkt. Nos. 115 &

116). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), a court order that does not terminate the action “may be revised at 

any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and 

liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica 

Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (“As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the 

case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an 

interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b), a party seeking reconsideration of an interlocutory order 

must show one of the following: (1) “a material difference in fact or law exists from that which 

was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is 

sought”; (2) “[t]he emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of 

such order; or (3) [a] manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal 

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arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.”3 N.D. Cal. Civ. 

L.R. 7-9(b). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that reconsideration of the Court’s October 2018 order is warranted based 

on the Ninth Circuit’s “intervening decision” in Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th 

Cir. 2019). (Dkt. No. 107 at 3.) Plaintiffs assert that Gill “clarifies what actions constitute ‘final 

agency action’ under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).” (Id.) Defendants counter that “Gill 

does not represent a change in the law, and nothing in Gill casts doubt upon this Court’s 

conclusion that the [2017] Guidance is not final agency action.” (Dkt. No. 115 at 5.) The Court 

disagrees. As discussed below, Gill reflects “shifting precedent” warranting reconsideration on 

the issue of finality and the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ APA claim with prejudice. See United 

States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing district courts’ inherent 

authority to reconsider interlocutory orders “based on shifting precedent.”). 

I. APA Claims Generally and the Bennett Test

Under the APA, a plaintiff may seek judicial review of “final agency action for which there 

is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Determining whether an agency action is 

“final” is a two-step process. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78. The action must first “mark the 

consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Next, “the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been 

determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Id. at 178 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

As previously discussed, the Court’s October 2018 order determined that that the 2017 

Guidance did not constitute final agency action for purposes of judicial review under the APA 

because the Guidance did not produce legal consequences, and thus failed the second Bennett 

 

3 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration under Local

Rule 7-9(b), (see Dkt. No. 104), based on Plaintiffs’ initial showing and argument regarding “[t]he 

emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring” after the Court’s October 2018 

order, (see Dkt. No. 103 at 3-4). The Court now addresses the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration under the Local Rule 7-9(b) standard. 

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prong. (Dkt. No. 81 at 16-20.) In reaching that determination, the Court noted that the 2017 

Guidance is not binding on schools and does not require them to comply with the Guidance or face 

legal consequences, but instead, “merely provides ‘information’ for schools regarding how the 

Department’s Office of Civil Rights will assess [a school’s] compliance” with existing law—Title 

IX and its implementing regulations. (Id. at 18.) Thus, “if a school is in compliance with Title IX 

and its regulations, it need not change its policies in response to the 2017 Guidance.” (Id. (noting 

that “voluntarily changing a policy in response to an agency’s nonbinding enforcement guidance is 

not the same as being required to do so by the guidance itself.”) (emphasis added)).) 

Plaintiffs argue that Gill provides “ample grounds” for the Court to reconsider that 

determination because the Gill court held both that “nonbinding policies can result in legal 

consequences under Bennett,” and “practical effects alone can render an agency action final.”

(Dkt. No. 107 at 4, 7-12.) 

II. Gill 

The plaintiffs in Gill sued the Department of Justice under the APA, challenging federal 

government action that “standardize[d] the sharing of terrorism-related information through the 

adoption of a ‘Functional Standard.’” 913 F.3d at 1182. The Functional Standard governed the 

collection, sharing, and use of Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) by federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies through a nationwide information repository (“eGuardian”) accessible 

to all Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (“NSI”) participants. Id. The 

government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part “that the Functional standard did not 

constitute final agency action pursuant to the APA.” Id. at 1184. The district court denied that 

motion, but later granted summary judgment in favor of the government on other grounds. The 

plaintiffs appealed that ruling. 

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that it “review[s] de novo whether agency action is 

final,” and that in determining finality for purposes of an APA claim, “[w]e focus on the practical 

and legal effects of the agency action and interpret finality in a pragmatic and flexible manner.” 

Id. (quoting Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

The government argued that the Functional Standard did not constitute final agency action 

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under the second Bennett prong because it “merely provides guidelines for [agencies’] voluntary 

participation and does not impose binding obligations.” Id. (alteration in original). The plaintiffs 

countered that “the Functional Standard has legal force because the Department can revoke an 

agency’s eGuardian membership for violating the terms of the eGuardian User Agreement, which 

requires compliance with the Standard.” Id. at 1184-85. Further, the plaintiffs argued that 

“compliance with the Functional Standard is a practical requirement of the NSI, and that this 

‘condition on participation’ renders the Functional Standard final.” Id. at 1185. The court agreed 

with the plaintiffs on both scores, concluding that “the Functional Standard constitutes final 

agency action because it has legal and practical effects.” Id.

First, the Gill court determined that the Functional Standard produced legal consequences 

despite its nonbinding nature. The court noted:

To be sure, participation in the NSI remains within the agencies’ 

discretion. And, absent that participation, the Functional Standard 

does not obligate analysts or agencies to send SAR information or 

penalize them for sending non-complaint SARS. But, as the 

Department conceded below, once an agency decides to participate, 

the eGuardian User Agreement permits the Department to revoke 

agency membership for violating various policies, including the 

Functional Standard. 

Id. The court determined that potential revocation of eGuardian membership constituted a legal 

consequence sufficient to demonstrate finality and satisfy the second Bennett prong. In doing so, 

the court noted that the Functional Standard was not “materially distinguishable” from the 

challenged agency action in Oregon Natural Desert. Id. (“Like the suspension of permits in 

Oregon Natural Desert, 465 F.3d at 988, eGuardian membership revocation is a legal 

consequence.”). 

The court further concluded that “[t]he Functional Standard is also final agency action 

because of its practical effects,” based on the agencies’ understanding of the consequences of 

noncompliance—revocation of eGuardian membership. Id. (discussing Havasupai Tribe v. 

Provencio, 906 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2018)). In doing so, the court noted:

[B]ecause the eGuardian User Agreement permits the Department to 

revoke participating agencies’ access for failure to comply with the 

Functional Standard, once an agency joined the NSI there was the 

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immediate understanding that its analysts would conform to the 

Functional Standard when submitting SARs.

Id. Thus, the court’s holding regarding finality based on the practical effects of the Functional 

Standard relied on the same grounds as the court’s holding regarding finality based on the 

Functional Standard’s legal consequences—the existence and effect of the eGuardian User 

Agreement. 

III. Gill’s Effect on this Action

As previously discussed, Plaintiffs assert that Gill represents a change of law warranting 

reconsideration of the Court’s October 2018 order because the Gill court extended and broadened 

previous Ninth Circuit rulings by holding both that “nonbinding policies can result in legal 

consequences under Bennett,” and “practical effects alone can render an agency action final.” 

(Dkt. No. 107 at 4, 7-12.) The Court addresses each argument in turn, and agrees that Gill

warrants reconsideration of the October 2018 order to the extent the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ 

APA claim with prejudice.

4

 

A. Legal Consequences

Plaintiffs argue that “Gill extends the holding of Oregon Natural Desert,” because it holds 

“that even loss of membership in a voluntary program based on a breach of a user agreement, 

rather than a statute or regulation, is a legal consequence under Bennett where that agreement 

requires that the participant comply with agency policies.” (Dkt. No. 107 at 7.) Plaintiffs assert 

that like the user agreement in Gill, schools here “sign agreements (in the form of assurances) 

agreeing not only to comply with the Title IX statute and regulations, but also with policies like 

the challenged guidance.” (Id. at 7-8 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, 

Assurance of Compliance, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/boy-scouts-

 

4 Defendants argue that, as a threshold matter, Gill does not represent a “material change in the 

law” and is thus “an inadequate basis for reconsideration.” (Dkt. No. 115 at 8.) The Court 

disagrees. The Ninth Circuit has noted that district courts have the inherent authority to reconsider 

interlocutory orders “based on shifting precedent.” Martin, 226 F.3d at 1049 (addressing 

reconsideration in the context of then C.D. Cal. Local Rule 7.16(b) (now C.D. Cal. Local Rule 7-

18), which tracks the “change in law” requirement for reconsideration under N.D. Cal. Local Rule 

7-9(b)). Although Gill does not represent a sea change in APA caselaw but instead relies on 

precedent, it does reflect “shifting precedent” as an extension of how the Ninth Circuit determines 

finality for purposes of APA claims. Thus, Gill is a proper basis for Plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration. 

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assurance-form.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Revised Assurances Template, 

https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/reviseded18100576.pdf).)5 The Assurance 

of Compliance6states, in pertinent part:

The applicant provides this assurance for the purpose of obtaining 

Federal grants, loans, contracts (except contracts of insurance of 

guaranty), property, discounts, funds made available through the U.S. 

Department of Education, or other Federal financial assistance from 

the Department. This assurance applies to all Federal financial 

assistance from or funds made available through the Department, 

including any that the applicant may seek in the future.

U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Assurance of Compliance. Applicants assure that they will comply with Title 

IX, among other statutes, as well as “[a]ll regulations, guidelines, and standards issued by the 

Department under any of these statutes.” Id. (emphasis added). The Assurance specifies that it “is 

binding on the applicant,” and applicants “must comply” with it “to continue receiving Federal 

financial assistance from the Department.” Id. Thus, the Assurance provides that if the applicant 

fails to comply, “the financial assistance can be terminated and the applicant can be declared 

ineligible to receive further assistance.” Id. If the 2017 Guidance constitutes the type of 

“guidelines” referenced in the Assurance, then Gill supports Plaintiffs’ contention that the

Guidance produces legal consequences; specifically, the potential termination of financial 

assistance for failure to comply. 

Defendants offer two arguments as to why the Court should reject Plaintiffs’ “assurances 

argument” regarding the legal consequences of the 2017 Guidance. First, Defendants argue as a 

“threshold reason” that the argument is untimely because it “was not presented in the first 

amended complaint, and it was mentioned in only one cursory paragraph of Plaintiffs’ opposition 

 

5 The Court takes judicial notice of the “assurances” documents because they are matters of public 

record whose accuracy is not subject to reasonable dispute. See Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 

1377 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage district courts may take judicial notice 

of official government documents). The Court cannot, however, draw inferences from those 

documents “or take notice of facts that might reasonably be disputed” at this stage. See United 

States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice at the Rule 

12(b)(6) stage of the existence of documents but not factual matter within the documents that was 

“subject to reasonable dispute.”). 

6 For purposes of this motion, the Court will address only the Assurance of Compliance. The 

Revised Assurances Template cited by Plaintiffs was issued in May 2017 and by its terms expired 

on September 30, 2017. See

https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/reviseded18100576.pdf.

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to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.” (Dkt. No. 115 at 9 n.1.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs now 

present the argument, which was timely raised in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, in 

the context of this action’s similarity to the intervening change in law reflected in Gill. Thus, the 

assurances argument is suitable for purposes of reconsideration. 

Second, Defendants argue that the 2017 Guidance “is distinct from the ‘regulations, 

guidelines, and standards’ referred to in the assurance.” (Id. at 9.) Defendants further argue that 

they “do[ ] not contend—and to be abundantly clear, will not contend and hereby disclaim[ ] any 

contention—that the 2017 Guidance is among the documents with which a recipient promises to 

comply when it signs an Assurance of Compliance.” (Id. at 9-10.) Defendants’ stance clearly 

differs from the government’s position in Gill, wherein the government conceded at the summary 

judgment stage that “once an agency decides to participate, the eGuardian User Agreement 

permits the Department to revoke agency membership for violating various policies, including the 

Functional Standard.” See Gill, 913 F.3d at 1185 (finding that the eGuardian membership 

revocation is a legal consequence for purposes of the second Bennett prong). 

Defendants’ argument, however, can succeed at the motion to dismiss stage only if they

have established as a matter of law that the 2017 Guidance is not the type of “guidelines” referred 

to in the Assurance. They have not. Attorney argument that the guidelines referred to in the 

Assurance do not encompass the 2017 Guidance does not meet Defendants’ burden, especially on 

a motion to dismiss where all plausible inferences must be drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor. Further, 

Defendants’ identification of other guidelines that they contend are the type of guidelines 

contemplated by the Assurance, (see Dkt. No. 48 at 15), does not mean that as a matter of law the 

2017 Guidance does not also constitute such “guidelines.” Defendants’ citation to the statute 

describing the administrative and judicial process for terminating federal funding, (see Dkt. No. 

115 at 10), likewise does not satisfy their burden because it does not address the Assurance’s 

affirmative statement that “financial assistance can be terminated and the applicant can be 

declared ineligible to receive further assistance” for failure to comply, see U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 

Assurance of Compliance. While a more fulsome record may establish that the 2017 Guidance is 

not encompassed by the Assurance, the Court cannot conclude based on the current record that as 

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a matter of law the Assurance does not encompass the 2017 Guidance and that the failure to 

follow the Guidance therefore cannot produce a legal consequence—withholding of federal funds

for violating the Assurance. That said, Defendants are correct that the first amended complaint 

does not reference the Assurance of Compliance. Thus, Gill does not warrant reconsideration of 

the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ APA claim; it does, however, warrant reconsideration of the 

Court’s dismissal with prejudice. Indeed, Plaintiffs assert that “[i]f this Motion is granted, 

Plaintiffs will include allegations about these assurances in their amended complaint.” (Dkt. No. 

116 at 4 n.4.) 

B. Practical Effects

Plaintiffs argue that Gill “holds that practical effects can independently establish finality” 

regardless of the legal consequences of the challenged government action. The Court is not 

convinced that the Gill court’s holding regarding finality based on the practical effects of the

Functional Standard can carry that weight. The holding instead appears intertwined with the 

court’s holding regarding the legal consequences because both rely on the eGuardian User 

Agreement. The Gill court noted that in Havasupai, the court “held a Forest Service Mineral 

Report was a ‘practical requirement to the continued operation’ of a mine—and therefore final 

agency action—because the parties ‘understood that mine operations would not resume until’ the 

Mineral Report’s determination of valid existing rights ‘was completed.’” Gill, 465 F.3d at 1185

(quoting Havasupai, 906 F.3d at 1163). The Gill court found that the eGuardian User Agreement 

triggered a similar “immediate understanding” because participating agencies knew that they had 

to “conform to the Functional Standard when submitting SARs” or else their membership would 

be revoked. Id. Thus, the practical effects of the Functional Standard were tied to the eGuardian 

User Agreement—just like the Functional Standard’s legal consequences. In other words, the 

practical effects were not entirely independent of the legal consequences. 

The Assurance provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he applicant understands that it must 

comply with” not only “Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 

1681 et seq.,” but also “[a]ll regulations, guidelines, and standards issued by the Department” 

under Title IX “in order to continue receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department.” 

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U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Assurance of Compliance. As with the legal consequences of the 2017 

Guidance, if the “guidelines” referenced in the Assurance encompass the 2017 Guidance, and 

universities and colleges believe that they do, then Gill supports the conclusion that the 2017 

Guidance constitutes final agency action based on its practical effects. 

***

Gill reflects “shifting precedent” regarding the issue of finality and the facts in that case

are sufficiently analogous to those here based on the Assurance of Compliance schools must sign 

to receive federal funding. Accordingly, the Court concludes that reconsideration of its October 

2018 order is warranted to the extent it dismissed Plaintiffs’ APA claim with prejudice. The first 

amended complaint does not reference the assurance documents; however, Plaintiffs assert that 

“[i]f this Motion is granted, Plaintiffs will include allegations about these assurances in their 

amended complaint.” (Dkt. No. 116 at 4 n.4.) Thus, the Court dismisses the APA claim with 

leave to amend to include additional factual allegations regarding the finality of the 2017 

Guidance. 

IV. Defendants’ Additional Grounds for Dismissal

Defendants’ opposition to the instant motion notes that “even if the Court were to 

reconsider its determination that the 2017 Guidance is not final agency action, that would not 

necessarily mean that the Court would reverse its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ APA claims.” (Dkt. No. 

115 n.3.) The Court would instead “need to evaluate Defendants’ alternative arguments in favor 

of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ APA claims.” (Id.) The Court agrees. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint argued that dismissal of 

Plaintiffs’ APA claim was warranted both under Rule 12(b) for lack of standing and under Rule 

12(b)(6) because the 2017 Guidance does not constitute final agency action and Plaintiffs have an 

adequate remedy outside of their APA claim.

7

 The Court’s October 2018 order concluded that 

 

7 Defendants also argued that dismissal was warranted “because the 2017 Guidance is not a 

legislative rule” requiring notice and comment under 5 U.S.C. § 553.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 26.) 

Defendants’ opposition to the instant motion reiterates those grounds for dismissal “if the Court 

were to reconsider its determination that the 2017 Guidance is not final agency action.” (Dkt. No. 

115 at 12 n.3.) Plaintiffs note, however, that their “APA claims do not include a notice and 

comment claim, as Defendants previously recognized.” (Dkt. No. 116 at 6 n.6 (citing Defs.’ 

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Plaintiffs demonstrated standing for their APA claim, and as previously discussed, Gill warrants 

reconsideration as to whether the 2017 Guidance constitutes final agency action under Bennett. 

The Court must thus address whether dismissal is otherwise warranted because Plaintiffs have an

adequate remedy. 

Review of agency action under the APA requires that a plaintiff have “no other adequate 

remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have an adequate 

remedy—they can sue schools “directly under Title IX.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 26.) Defendants further 

argue that “if Plaintiffs believe that universities are acting inconsistently with Title IX because of 

how [the Department] is interpreting the statute, that is the course they are required to follow.” (Id.

(citing Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 383 F.3d 1047, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 

2004)). The Court disagrees. 

In Nat’l Wrestling Coaches, the “appellants . . . consistently maintained that, in subscribing 

to Department of Education enforcement policy interpretations, the universities themselves

adopted unlawful policies and engaged in unlawful activities.” Id. at 1048. The court denied 

appellants’ petition for rehearing “because appellants [had] a private cause of action directly 

against the universities to seek redress for any proscribed acts of sex discrimination committed by 

the universities.” Id. (citing as controlling the court’s decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. 

Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“WLF”)). Therefore, appellants’ action against the 

Department was “barred under 5 U.S.C. § 704” based on the existence of an adequate remedy. 

The Court finds the dissent in this out-of-circuit case more persuasive, in that it 

distinguishes “WLF and kindred cases [in which] the agency was accused only of failing to stop or 

penalize illegal behavior by educational institutions,” and notes that “by contrast, the agency 

[here] is charged with bullying those institutions into adopting unlawful practices.” Id. at 1051. 

The dissent concludes that while “it is quite logical to have plaintiffs obtain relief through actions 

directly against wrongdoers when the agency’s only role is neglect, it makes little sense to extend 

WLF to a context where the agency itself is, as alleged here, the driving force behind the 

 

Reply in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 48 at 13).) Thus, the Court need not address dismissal 

on those grounds. 

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Northern District of California

illegality.” Id. Here too, Plaintiffs allege that the Department is the “driving force behind the 

illegality” in issuing the 2017 Guidance. Plaintiffs seek to vacate the 2017 Guidance and are 

claiming injury—frustration of organizational mission and diversion of resources—resulting from 

the issuance of the Guidance, not necessarily its implementation by schools. Based on Plaintiffs’ 

alleged injuries and the nature of the relief sought, the alternative remedy offered by the 

Department—suing individual schools—offers only “doubtful and limited relief,” and is therefore 

an inadequate remedy under the APA. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 901 (1988)

(“[D]oubtful and limited relief . . . is not an adequate substitute” sufficient to bar review under 

Section 704). 

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the APA claim to the extent 

Defendants argue dismissal is warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 704 based on the existence of an 

adequate remedy. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of 

the Court’s October 2018 order based on Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 

2019). The Court amends its dismissal of the APA claim with prejudice to a dismissal with leave 

to amend. Further, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the APA claim to the extent 

dismissal is based on the existence of an adequate alternative remedy. Plaintiffs shall file an 

amended complaint within 30 days of this Order.

The Court will hold an initial case management conference on May 2, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. A 

joint case management conference statement shall be filed one week before.

This Docket disposes of Docket No. 107.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:18-cv-00535-JSC Document 121 Filed 03/29/19 Page 12 of 12