Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03100/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03100-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Environmental Cleanup Expenses

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSAL PARAGON CORP.; SUNQUEST

PROPERTIES, INC.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-03100 MJJ

ORDER re MOTION TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is Defendants Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited, Ingersoll-Rand

Company, Schlage Lock Company, and Touch-Plate International, Inc.’s, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Complaint (Doc. #20). Plaintiffs Universal Paragon Corporation and Sunquest Properties, Inc., have

filed an Opposition (Doc. #23), and Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. #28). For the following

reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion. 

I. Legal Standard - Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal

sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the Court ordinarily limits its review to the face

of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta

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Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

Further, dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of a claim. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). In

considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as

true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234

F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs have owned extensive real property in the Baylands area of San Francisco and

Brisbane, California, since 1989. Defendants are owners and lessors of certain real property located

near, and in some cases contiguous to, Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’

manufacturing activities caused substantial soil and groundwater contamination to Plaintiffs’ property.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that their property became substantially contaminated with a variety of

hazardous substances, including chromium, lead, oil, zinc, trichloroethane, trichloroethelene,

dichloroethlylene, perchloroethylene, and vinyl chloride. 

In March 1994, March 1995, and March 1996, Plaintiffs and Defendants signed three

consecutive agreements, which tolled all limitations periods as to Plaintiffs’ state and federal claims

relating to the contamination. In December 1996, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal court against

Defendants, seeking damages, indemnity, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief for the contamination

caused to Plaintiffs’ property. The parties, however, continued to cooperate to develop a remedial action

plan and to resolve the lawsuit. Plaintiffs allege that, “[d]uring 1999 and 2000, Defendants promised

Plaintiffs that, if Plaintiffs dismissed the [federal lawsuit] without prejudice and agreed to toll the statute

of limitations, the [p]arties would work together to analyze the nature, source, and extent of

contamination in the vicinity of the [p]arties’ respective property and develop remedial plans.” Plaintiffs

allege that, in reliance on these promises and representations, they agreed to dismiss their federal

lawsuit. Soon thereafter, the parties executed a Tolling and Cooperation Agreement and a Mutual

Access Agreement (collectively, “the 2000 Agreement”). After the terms of the 2000 Agreement

expired, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants agreed to extend its terms, including the tolling of the

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limitations periods, while the parties negotiated and engaged in mediation to remediate the

contamination. Plaintiffs aver that, “[i]t is in reliance on these representations by Defendants that

Plaintiffs agreed not only to move forward with investigation and negotiations[,] but also to refrain from

refiling their Federal Claims against Defendants.” The parties continued to work together toward a

mutual cleanup effort until early 2005. At this time, Plaintiffs allege that the parties arrived at an

impasse and mediation stopped. As a result, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 29, 2005. 

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) cost recovery under Sections 107

and 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility Compensation and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 and § 9613; (2) continuing nuisance; (3) nuisance per se; (4) public

nuisance; (5) negligence; (6) negligence per se; (7) trespass; (8) indemnity; (9) breach of contract; (10)

strict liability; (11) violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §

6972(a); (12) declaratory relief seeking a determination of Plaintiffs’ liability, if any, with respect to

the investigation, testing, and cleanup of the contamination and Plaintiffs’ damages; and (13) promissory

estoppel. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety. With respect to

Plaintiffs’ federal claims under CERCLA and RCRA, Defendants argue that both claims fail as a matter

of law. Thus, Defendants request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, and dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Alternatively, Defendants argue that several of Plaintiffs’ state law claims are time-barred, and are

therefore subject to dismissal. The Court will assess each of these arguments, in turn. 

III. Discussion

A. CERCLA Claim

Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief is entitled, “CERCLA Section 107(a) for Cost Recovery,” and

alleges in relevant part: 

 98. Under Sections 107 and 113 of [CERCLA], Plaintiffs seek

payment from Defendants for all past, present, and future response costs

incurred in response to Defendants’ release of hazardous substances. As

the past and current owners of Defendants’ Property and as the entities

responsible for the release and continued threat of the release of

hazardous substances into the groundwater, Defendants, and each of

them, are liable for the groundwater contamination pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a). 

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 102. Defendants, and each of them, are jointly and severally liable to

Plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) for all or part of the past,

present, and future costs of response, including without limitation,

investigation, and remediation expenses, attorneys’ fees, oversite costs and interest, resulting from the release by Defendants of hazardous

substances in connection with Defendants’ Property, in an amount to be determined at the time of trial.

Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the ground that Plaintiffs cannot recover under either Section

107(a) or 113(f) of CERCLA. 

1. Overview of CERCLA §§ 107 and 113

Section 107(a) of CERCLA authorizes a cause of action for cost recovery, whereby a party may

initiate a suit to recover “necessary costs” incurred in responding to a release or threatened release of

hazardous substances against any of four classes of “potentially responsible persons” (“PRPs”). These

PRPs include: (1) current owners and operators of contaminated facilities; (2) previous owners and

operators of contaminated facilities; (3) generators of hazardous substances; and (4) transporters of

hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Concurrently, § 113(f) of CERCLA “allows persons who

have undertaken efforts to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances to seek

contribution from other parties liable under CERCLA.” Specifically, Section 113(f) provides, in

relevant part: 

 (1) Contribution

Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable

or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or

following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section

9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this

section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed

by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate

response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the

court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall

diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the

absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607

of this title.

(2) Settlement

A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in

an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for

claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.

Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable

persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability

of the others by the amount of the settlement.

(3) Persons not party to settlement

(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State

for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such

action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek

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contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to

in paragraph (2).

2. Defendants’ Challenges to § 113 Claim

Defendants first argue that, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks contribution under §

113(f), Plaintiffs must plead and prove either that: (1) they are subject to a civil action under CERCLA

§§ 106 or 107(a); or (2) they are parties to an administrative or judicially-approved settlement that

resolves their liability to the United States or a State. Because Plaintiffs cannot make these allegations,

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot recover under § 113(f). In support, Defendants cite Cooper

Industries. v. Aviall Services, 543 U.S. 157 (2004), wherein the Supreme Court held that a private party

may not obtain a judgment for contribution under § 113(f)(1) unless that party has been sued under §

106 or § 107 of CERCLA. 

In their response, Plaintiffs argue that the final clause of § 113(f)(1) relieves them of this

requirement. However, in Cooper, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument, stating that this

clause, “does not itself establish a cause of action; nor does it expand § 113(f)(1) to authorize

contribution actions not brought ‘during or following’ a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action; nor does it

specify what causes of action for contribution, if any, exist outside § 113(f)(1).” Thus, Plaintiffs are

foreclosed from making this argument. 

Reviewing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are bringing their claim

“during or following” a civil action pursuant to § 106 or § 107. Nor have Plaintiffs alleged that they

have resolved their liability to the United States or California by entering into a judicially-approved

settlement agreement, such that they would be permitted to bring a claim pursuant to § 113(f)(3)(B).

Taken together, because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the requirements under § 113(f)(1) or

§113(f)(3)(B), Plaintiffs’ are precluded from bringing a contribution claim pursuant to § 113(f). 

3. Defendants’ Challenges to Plaintiffs’ § 107 Claim

Having determined that Plaintiffs are foreclosed from proceeding under § 113, the Court must

assess whether Plaintiffs have plead a cognizable claim under § 107. As indicated above, “Section 107

of CERCLA authorizes suit against certain ‘responsible parties’ to recover costs incurred in cleaning

up hazardous waste disposal sites.” The Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298,

1300 (9th Cir. 1997). Under § 107(a), a PRP is liable for: “(A) all costs . . . incurred by the United States

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In fact, the defendants in that matter conceded that the plaintiff was entitled to assert a

contribution claim under § 107. Id. at 1305. 

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Government or a State or an Indian tribe . . . [and] (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred

by any other person [.]” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B).

In their Motion, Defendants contend that, to the extent Plaintiffs assert a claim for total cost

recovery pursuant to § 107 of CERCLA, Plaintiffs are precluded from bringing such a claim because

they are a PRP. In Support, Defendants cite Pinal Creek. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned,

“[b]ecause all PRPs are liable under [Section 107], a claim by one PRP against another PRP necessarily

is for contribution . . . [and] [a] PRP’s contribution liability will correspond to that party’s equitable

share of the total liability and will not be joint and several.” 118 F.3d at 1301. Thus, the court held that,

“under CERCLA, a PRP does not have a claim for the recovery of the totality of its cleanup costs

against other PRPs, and a PRP cannot assert a claim against other PRPs for joint and several liability.”

Id. at 1306. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that under Pinal Creek they are

precluded from seeking to recover the total cleanup cost from Defendants. In fact, Plaintiffs indicate

that they are only seeking contribution from Defendants, which they argue is not precluded under either

Cooper or Pinal Creek. The Court agrees. 

In Pinal Creek, the Ninth Circuit’s holding was limited to the issue of whether a PRP could

recover all of its cleanup costs from other PRPs pursuant to a claim under § 107 and § 113, in tandem.

As indicated above, the court held that, because a PRP necessarily shares responsibility for the cost of

cleanup, it could not recover against other PRPs based on a joint and several liability theory. 118 F.3d

at 1306. However, the court did not hold that a PRP-plaintiff is precluded from seeking contribution

under § 107. To the contrary, the court acknowledged that “a claim for contribution . . . is embedded

in the text of § 107.”1

 Id. at 1301; see also W. Prop. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, (9th Cir.

2004). This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s language in Key Tronic Corporation v. United

States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994), wherein the Court recognized that § 107 and § 113 both authorize

causes of action for contribution that are “similar and somewhat overlapping.” See also CooperIndus.,

125 S. Ct. at 586-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 

Further, several district courts have addressed the issue of whether § 107 impliedly authorizes

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a claim for contribution in light of both Cooper and Pinal Creek, and have held that such a claim does

exist. See Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Taecker, 2005 WL 1367065, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2005);

Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., 2005 WL 1417152, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2005); Ferguson v. Arcata

Redwood Co., 2005 WL 1869445, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005); Aggio v. Aggio, 2005 WL 2277037,

at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2005). In each of these decisions, the court concluded that the Ninth Circuit

has recognized a claim for contribution, whether express or implied, exists under § 107, which is

unaffected by the Cooper decision. The Court finds the reasoning in these decisions sound and, based

upon the current state of the case law assessing claims under § 107 and § 113, is compelled to reach the

same conclusion here. Accordingly, the Court finds that to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to recover the

totality of their cleanup costs against Defendants pursuant to § 107, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

Motion to dismiss such claim. However, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek only equitable contribution

against Defendants pursuant to § 107, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion. 

Moreover, because Plaintiffs’ § 107(a) claim survives, a basis for federal subject matter

jurisdiction exists in this case. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ request that the Court refuse

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims and dismiss the case.

B. Plaintiffs’ Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Claim

In their Eleventh Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs assert a claim under the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq. Defendants move to dismiss this claim because

Plaintiffs have failed to provide the required notice under § 6972(b)(2)(A), and because the State of

California has already addressed the relief that Plaintiffs seek. At oral argument on Defendants’ Motion,

Plaintiffs indicated that they withdraw their RCRA claim. Accordingly, the Court DENIES AS MOOT

Defendants’ Motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ RCRA claim. 

C. Timeliness of Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot state a valid claim for negligence, negligence per se,

indemnity, strict liability, or declaratory relief because the three-year statute of limitations applicable

to these claims has expired. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(b). Likewise, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim is time-barred, because Plaintiffs failed to bring it within the fouryear limitations period applicable to breach of contract claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.

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2 Further, Defendants argue that it is undisputed that Defendants Ingersoll-Rand Company

and Touch-Plate International did not enter into any tolling agreement with Plaintiffs until March 2000.

Defendants argue that, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they discovered that Defendants caused

or contributed to the contamination in November 1993. However, Plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit

until December 27, 1996 - after the three-year statute of limitations period had expired. Defendants

submit that the 2000 Agreement did not apply to, or otherwise extend the limitations periods for these

claims against Ingersoll-Rand and Touch-Plate because they had already lapsed. 

8

In support, Defendants contend that pursuant to the 2000 Agreement, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss

the federal lawsuit without prejudice, and the parties agreed that the that the limitations periods as to

all of Plaintiffs’ actual or alleged claims would be tolled until July 1, 2001. Defendants contend that

after the July 1, 2001 date expired, and the parties did not execute any agreement further tolling the

limitations period, the applicable limitations periods “commenced running.” Thus, Defendants assert

that the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’ negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, indemnity, and

claim for declaratory relief expired on July 1, 2004 - three years after the expiration of the 2000

Agreement. Similarly, Defendants argue that, with respect to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the

limitations period expired on July 1, 2005 - four years after the expiration of the 2000 Agreement.

Because Plaintiffs did not file this lawsuit until July 25, 2005, Defendants contend that all of the above

claims are time-barred.2

Plaintiffs proffer two theories in response to Defendants’ statute of limitations challenges. First,

Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “to the period following the dismissal

of the federal lawsuit and throughout the period when Plaintiffs were working in good faith with

Defendants to investigate and resolve the contamination issues.” Under California law, “equitable

tolling ‘reliev[es] plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies

he, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.’”

Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Addison v. Cal., 146 Cal.

Rptr. 224, 226 (1978)). Toward this end, the statute of limitations is tolled under the doctrine of

equitable tolling if the plaintiff pursues his remedy in another forum and the actions satisfy three factors:

(1) timely notice to the defendants in filing of the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to the defendants in

gathering evidence for the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct in filing the second

claim. Id. Generally, “California’s fact-intensive test for equitable tolling is more appropriately applied

at the summary judgment or trial stage of litigation.” Id. at 1276. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, “[a]t

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Furthermore, Defendants’ argument regarding the expiration of the statute of limitations period

requires the Court to consider facts outside the Plaintiffs’ Complaint regarding the terms of the parties’

agreements and their effect on the limitations period. Particularly, the parties have offered varying

accounts of their respective understandings regarding the running of the limitations period after the

parties’ 2000 Agreement expired. Consequently, resolution of the timeliness issue is more appropriately

addressed at the summary judgment stage based on a full evidentiary record. 

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a minimum, determining the applicability of equitable tolling necessitates a resort to the specific

circumstances of the prior claim: parties involved, issued raised, evidence considered, and discovery

conducted. Thus, the question ordinarily requires reference to matters outside the pleadings, and is not

generally amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, where review is limited to the complaint

alone.” Id. at 1276. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit admonished that, unless it is evident from the fact

of the complaint that plaintiff could not prevail on the equitable tolling issue, the “fact-intensive test for

equitable tolling is more appropriately applied at the summary judgment or trial stage of litigation.” Id.

Here, although it is questionable whether the doctrine applies in light of the fact that Plaintiffs did not

pursue any remedy in another forum, but rather filed and voluntarily dismissed their prior lawsuit in the

district court, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ argument at this stage. Accordingly, because

Plaintiffs have raised a colorable argument supporting application of the doctrine of equitably tolling,

the Court denies without prejudice Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims as timebarred.3

Second, and perhaps more persuasively, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are equitably estopped

from raising any statute of limitations defense. California courts have recognized that, “[a] defendant

will be estopped to invoke the statute of limitations where there has been ‘some conduct by the

defendant, relied on by the plaintiff, which induces the belated filing of the action.’” Shaffer v. Debbas,

21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also Doheny Park Terrce Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.,

34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 157, 165-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). In Shaffer, the court noted that, “whether estoppel

exists - whether the acts, representations or conduct lulled a party into a sense of security preventing him

from instituting proceedings before the running of the statute, and whether the party relied thereon to

his prejudice - is a question of fact and not of law.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged:

Verbally and by their actions, representatives of Defendants indicated

their understanding and agreement to extend the 2000 Tolling Agreement

throughout the negotiation and mediation process with Plaintiffs as well

as the regulatory agencies. Furthermore, representatives of Defendants continued to assure Plaintiffs of their continuing agreement to toll the

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In their Reply, Defendants argue that, “[c]ontract law governs this dispute, [and] there is no

equitable principle to modify the terms of a written contract expressly resolving the limitations period

for claims between the contracting parties.” (Reply at 5.) In the same vein, Defendants assert that

California law requires a writing signed by the contracting parties to extend limitations periods. The

Court finds neither argument persuasive. With respect to Defendants’ first argument, equitable tolling

and equitable estoppel operate outside any agreement that the parties had regarding the controlling

limitations periods. Contrary to Defendants’ characterizations, the doctrines of equitable tolling and

equitable estoppel are not a rules of contractual interpretation or modification. To be sure, neither one

is used to read terms into a contract or reform an agreement. Rather, the doctrines operate wholly

outside of and irrespective of the parties’ agreements. Further, unlike equitable tolling, which extends

a limitations period, equitable estoppel operates after a limitations period has expired, and holds that,

despite this lapse, a party may still assert its claim. See Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 165. Thus, because equitable estoppel does not extend the limitations period, any

statutory writing requirement is irrelevant.

5

In their Motion, Defendants contend that at least with respect to Ingersoll-Rand Company and

Touch-Plate International, it is clear that the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’ claims has expired.

However, because Plaintiffs’ equitable tolling and equitable estoppel theories apply to all Defendants,

the Court declines to reach this issue at this juncture. 

10

statute of limitations during this time frame. It is in reliance on these representations by Defendants that

Plaintiffs agreed not only to move forward with investigation and negotiations but also to refrain from

refiling their Federal Claim against Defendants. 

(Compl. at ¶ 74.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs have set forth at least a colorable argument that

Defendants are equitably estopped from arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.4

 Thus, this

argument also supports the Court’s denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on the running of

the statute of limitations.5 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES IN PART AND GRANTS IN PART

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #20) as follows: With respect to Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief,

to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to recover their entire cleanup cost from Defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 107, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request to dismiss such claim. To the extent that

Plaintiffs’ are asserting a contribution claim against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 107, the Court

DENIES Defendants’ request to dismiss such claim.

Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Eleventh Claim for Relief is DENIED AS MOOT.

Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims as untimely is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. 

Further, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Doc. #21).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2005. MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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