Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05017/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 27, 2006 Decided June 9, 2006

No. 05-5017

LAURA GONZALEZ-VERA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND

AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR AND SECRETARY OF STATE,

ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv02240)

Aaron Lloyd, Student Counsel, argued the cause for

appellants. With him on the brief was Michael E. Tigar. Ali A.

Beydoun, Christine Parsadaian, Courtney J. Nogar, Debra L.

Spinelli-Hays, James B. Cowden, Karen Corrie, Laura Rotolo,

Melissa Mandor, and Timothy L. Foden entered appearances.

William H. Goodman and Jennifer M. Green were on the

brief for amicus curiae Center for Constitutional Rights in

support of appellants.

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Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth

L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Barbara L. Herwig, Assistant

Director.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and BROWN,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: The plaintiff-appellants sued the

United States and former Secretary of State and National

Security Advisor, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, seeking damages for

actions allegedly taken in support of the Pinochet regime in

Chile 30-odd years ago. The district court held the plaintiffs’

claims justiciable but dismissed the suit on the grounds that the

United States had not waived its sovereign immunity and the

plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted against Dr. Kissinger. We affirm the judgment of

dismissal but do so on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims

present a nonjusticiable political question.

I. Background

In September 1973 Chilean military officers staged a coup

d’état, ousting the elected President, Salvador Allende, and

installing Augusto Pinochet as chairman of the newly formed

military junta. The plaintiffs allege the Chilean Directorate of

National Intelligence (DINA) thereafter “brutal[ly] repress[ed]”

and attempted “to eliminate” individuals opposed to Pinochet’s

regime. Complaint ¶ 60. They further claim “the United States

and/or Henry Kissinger funded, assisted, ... aided and abetted, ...

acted jointly and conspired with known human rights violators”

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in the “Chilean terror apparatus” to violate the human rights of

the plaintiffs and their relatives. Id. ¶ 2. In particular, the

plaintiffs allege Kissinger “purposefully act[ed] outside the

proper channels of Congressional oversight of covert

operations” to assist and establish contacts with known terrorists

and “authorized” the CIA to assist the military regime. Id. ¶¶

43, 65, 69.

After the release of a report from the United States

Department of State suggesting Kissinger was aware of human

rights violations committed by the DINA, see Hinchey Report

on CIA Activities in Chile (Sept. 18, 2001), available at

http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp, the plaintiffs

brought suit against the United States and Kissinger under the

Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350; the Torture Victim

Protection Act (TVPA), id. § 1350 note; the common law; and

customary international law. Compl. ¶ 10. They sought relief

for, among other things, torture, false imprisonment, wrongful

death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶

115, 152, 163, 175-76.

The United States moved under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because it raised a political question and, in

the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs argued the case

was justiciable and they had stated “cognizable claims” against

both the United States and Kissinger. The district court, terming

it a “close” call whether the claims were justiciable, ultimately

held the political question doctrine was inapplicable. Ruling on

the merits, the court held (1) the claims against the United States

were barred by sovereign immunity and, (2) because Kissinger

had acted within the scope of his employment, the Westfall Act

barred all but possibly the TVPA claim against him, see 28

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U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Assuming arguendo that the Westfall Act

did not bar the TVPA claim against Kissinger, see id. §

2679(b)(2)(B) (allowing suit “for a violation of a statute of the

United States under which such action against an individual is

otherwise authorized”), the district court held the plaintiffs had

failed to state a claim under that Act because they did not allege

Kissinger had acted under color of foreign law. See id. § 1350

note. 

II. Analysis

The plaintiffs ask us to reverse the judgment of the district

court on the grounds that (1) sovereign immunity does not bar

their claims against the United States; (2) they were entitled to

discovery in order to demonstrate Kissinger was not acting

within the scope of his employment; (3) the Westfall Act does

not bar their claim under the ATS; and (4) they have stated a

claim under the TVPA. The Government first argues the case

is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine and, in the

alternative, defends the judgment of the district court on the

merits.

A. Order of Decision

At the outset, the plaintiffs “question whether [the United

States is] procedurally barred from raising th[e] issue” of

justiciability because it did not cross-appeal the district court’s

refusal to apply the political question doctrine. Because “Rule

12(b)(6) is a threshold procedural requirement that cannot

include a determination of the merits of a claim,” the plaintiffs

maintain the Government has “improperly” asked this court “to

consider justiciability prior to analyzing the District Court’s

dismissal.”

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The plaintiffs mistake the nature of our inquiry. A

dismissal based upon the political question doctrine is not an

adjudication on the merits. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413

F.3d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Rather, the doctrine is a

“jurisdictional limitation[] imposed upon federal courts by the

‘case or controversy’ requirement of Art[icle] III”; hence “the

presence of a political question ... prevent[s] the power of the

federal judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party.”

Schlesigner v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,

215 (1974); accord Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432

(D.C. Cir. 2006). It follows that regardless whether the

Government has raised the issue -- in a timely or an untimely

manner or not at all -- we must consider whether the plaintiffs’

claims present a political question lest the court invade the

province of the political branches. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for

a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998).

B. Application of the Political Question Doctrine

The United States argues our decision in Schneider v.

Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (2005), controls this case, rendering all

the plaintiffs’ claims nonjusticiable. Specifically, the

Government argues the claims are nonjusticiable because they

would require the court to pass judgment on a matter of foreign

policy and national security, which subjects are “textually

committed to the political branches,” id. at 194. Alternatively,

the Government argues “there are no judicially discoverable and

manageable standards to apply to the claims here,” thus

precluding any role for the judiciary. The Government also

contends our recent decision in Bancoult v. McNamara “fully

supports application of the political question doctrine” in this

case.

The plaintiffs distinguish Schneider as having presented a

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challenge to the Government’s “policy decision to support

Pinochet’s rise to power,” whereas the present case challenges

specific “acts of torture ... committed after the military

government was already in place.” Because these acts “could

not have been committed in furtherance of any policy decision

to support Pinochet’s rise to power,” they reason, their claims

raise no political question. The plaintiffs also cite Sosa v.

Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004), for the proposition

that “claims based on a narrow class of international norms,

such as ... claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, should be

protected [sic] and adjudicated in U.S. courts.”

The Supreme Court has recognized a half dozen reasons for

which a case may be nonjusticiable under the political question

doctrine:

[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional

commitment of the issue to a coordinate political

department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable

and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the

impossibility of deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial

discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s

undertaking independent resolution without expressing

lack of the respect due coordinate branches of

government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning

adherence to a political decision already made; or [6]

the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one

question.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). As mentioned above,

the United States here argues the first and second reasons; if

either obtains, the courts are without jurisdiction to proceed. See

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Schneider, 412 F.3d at 194.

Despite the plaintiffs’ efforts, we fail to see how this case

can be distinguished from Schneider. In each instance the

plaintiffs brought claims under the common law, international

law, the ATS, and the TVPA. The plaintiffs in Schneider alleged

the United States and Kissinger, in conjunction with certain

Chilean officials, facilitated kidnapping and torture in order to

further the goals of “[k]ey United States policymakers” who had

opposed the election of President Allende. Id. at 191-92. We

held the plaintiffs’ claims nonjusticiable per the political

question doctrine because they challenged “foreign policy

decisions of the United States .... within the province of the

political branches.” Id. at 195. More specifically, the complaint

presented questions “textually committed to a coordinate branch

of government,” running afoul of the first reason stated in Baker

v. Carr. Id. at 194.

The same is true here. The plaintiffs have alleged and

challenged drastic measures taken by the United States and

Kissinger in order to implement United States policy with

respect to Chile. For the court to evaluate the legal validity of

those measures would require us to delve into questions of policy

“textually committed to a coordinate branch of government.” Id.

It is of no moment that the acts alleged in this case took place

after the coup. True, as the plaintiffs state, those acts “could not

have been committed in furtherance of any policy decision to

support Pinochet’s rise to power,” but the difference between

actions taken to place Pinochet in power and actions taken to

keep him in power does not a viable distinction make: Both

types of actions, if they occurred, were “inextricably intertwined

with the underlying” foreign policy decisions constitutionally

committed to the political branches. Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 436.

Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiffs’ purported distinction

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between challenging an “action” and challenging a “policy.” As

we explained in Bancoult, the dichotomy is false; actions taken

in furtherance of foreign relations themselves may “constitute[]

foreign policy decisions.” Id. at 437. 

Such is indeed the case here. Although the plaintiffs

attempt to characterize Kissinger’s acts as ultra vires, Compl. ¶

2, we reiterate what we said in Schneider: Whatever Kissinger

did as National Security Advisor or Secretary of State “can

hardly be called anything other than foreign policy.” 412 F.3d

at 199.

To be sure, we can imagine a case in which a rogue agent

commits an act so removed from his official duties that it cannot

fairly be said to represent the policy of the United States, but this

is not such a case. The plaintiffs allege Kissinger “purposefully

act[ed] outside the proper channels of Congressional oversight,”

Compl. ¶ 43, but that does not take his conduct outside the scope

of his employment; the statutory descriptions of Kissinger’s

positions make clear his duty was to the President, not to the

Congress. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (Secretary of State responsible

for “conduct[ing] the business of the department in such manner

as the President shall direct”); 50 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(b) (function

of National Security Council, of which National Security

Advisor is a member, “to advise the President with respect to the

integration of ... policies relating to the national security” and to

perform “such other functions as the President may direct”).

We need not quarrel with the plaintiffs’ assertion that

certain claims for torture may be adjudicated in the federal courts

as provided in the TVPA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. We simply

observe that such a claim, like any other, may not be heard if it

presents a political question. So it was that, before concluding

the present case is entirely nonjusticiable under the political

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question doctrine, we requested supplemental briefing on the

justiciability of the plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPA. See

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230

(1986) (although “courts are fundamentally underequipped to

formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not

legal in nature .... it goes without saying that interpreting

congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the

federal courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have

seen, however, the plaintiffs were unable to extricate their TVPA

claims from the political question that permeates their complaint.

The plaintiffs having failed to present any cognizable factual

distinction of, or persuasive legal argument for departing from,

our decision in Schneider, that precedent must control this case.

III. Conclusion

In Schneider we held nonjusticiable various claims against

the United States and Dr. Kissinger for measures allegedly taken

in the 1970s to implement the United States’ foreign policy with

respect to Chile. We do so again today. Because the plaintiffs’

claims call into question foreign policy decisions textually

committed to the political branches, they must be and hereby are

Dismissed.

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