Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_13-cv-00514/USCOURTS-alsd-2_13-cv-00514-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

 VANESSA GILL, :

:

 Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-00514-KD-B

 :

vs. :

:

 BOBBY BARRETT, et al., :

:

 Respondents. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Vanessa Gill, a state inmate in the custody of Respondent 

Bobby Barrett, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas 

corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Gill challenges the 

validity of her 2008 conviction in the Circuit Court of Dallas 

County, Alabama, for capital murder, for which she was sentenced 

to life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Doc. 7 at 

3). This action was referred for report and recommendation 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(2)(R), 

and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Following 

a thorough review of the petition and record, the undersigned 

finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on the 

issues.1

																																																							 1 Because Gill filed her federal habeas petition after April 

24, 1996, this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). "AEDPA expressly limits the extent to 

which hearings are permissible, not merely the extent to which 

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2

Having carefully considered Gill’s petition, Respondents’

answer, and Gill’s response, the undersigned finds that Gill’s 

petition is due to be denied. Accordingly, it is recommended 

that Gill’s habeas petition be denied in its entirety and that 

judgment be entered in favor of Respondents and against 

Petitioner, Vanessa Gill, and that if Gill seeks the issuance of 

a certificate of appealability, her request be denied, along 

with any request to appeal in forma pauperis. 

I. Findings of Fact and Procedural Background.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the facts 

of this case as follows:2

The State presented evidence that [Gill] and the 

victim were married. It also presented evidence that, 

on March 24-25, 2006, the victim was severely beaten 

about his head and arms [and] that he died as a result 

of his injuries.

																																																																																																																																																																																					

they are required." Kelley v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corrs., 377 F. 3d 

1317, 1337 (11th Cir. 2004). Gill has failed to establish that an 

evidentiary hearing is warranted in this case. Birt v. 

Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 591 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“The 

burden is on the petitioner . . . to establish the need for an 

evidentiary hearing.”).

2 AEDPA directs that a presumption of correctness be afforded 

factual findings of state courts, "which may be rebutted only by 

clear and convincing evidence." Bui v. Haley, 321 F. 3d 1304, 1312 

(11th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). "This 

presumption of correctness applies equally to factual 

determinations made by state trial and appellate courts." Id.

(citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S. Ct. 764, 66 L. 

Ed. 2d 722 (1981)). These facts are recited in the unpublished 

memorandum opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on 

Gill's direct appeal of her trial and conviction. See Gill v. 

State, CR-08-0512 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)(Doc. 17-3).		

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Bill Wright testified that, on March 24-25, 2006, 

he was a deputy with the Dallas County Sheriff's 

Department and that he responded to a call at [Gill’s] 

and the victim's residence. As he approached the 

residence, he observed a white vehicle that did not 

have its headlights on quickly pulling out of a field 

that was beside the residence. He contacted dispatch 

about that vehicle.

Wright testified that, when he arrived at the 

residence, he saw the victim on the ground 

approximately twenty feet from the garage of the 

residence. He was bleeding heavily, primarily from 

his head, and was trying to speak, but was gurgling 

blood. [Gill], who had made the emergency 911 

telephone call, told him that the victim had been 

attacked by two or three people and that the people 

had run toward the front of the house, which was the 

opposite direction of the vehicle he had seen. 

Although there was a lot of blood at the scene, 

Wright did not observe any on the appellant when he 

arrived. He also testified that [Gill] was upset, but 

that, in retrospect, he would have expected her to be 

more upset under the circumstances. Wright testified 

that [Gill] attempted to assist him in performing 

mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but had to stop when 

something burned her lips. Officers later found a 

white powder, which was lye drain cleaner, on and near 

the victim's body. 

Deputies attempted to stop a white Pontiac Grand 

Prix on Highway 22, but the driver would not pull 

over. After a high speed chase, during which several 

vehicles were hit, the vehicle stopped. The driver, 

who was seen talking on a cellular telephone and 

identified as Curtis Cook, Jr., a nephew of [Gill], 

was the only person in the vehicle.

Officers found large amounts of blood, what 

appeared to be pieces of hair and scalp, and drain 

cleaner at the scene. They also found $5,000 in cash 

in one of the victim's pockets and several hundred 

more in another pocket. They did not find a shovel at 

the scene.

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A search of Cook's vehicle revealed drops of what 

appeared to be blood on the armrest, two $100 bills, 

and a silver cellular telephone. In the trunk, 

officers found an aluminum baseball bat that had blood 

and pieces of flesh on it and a Halloween mask that 

had the white powder drain cleaner on it. Forensic 

testing revealed that blood on the baseball bat and on 

Cook's shirt matched the victim's blood.

Dr. Alfredo Paredes, a medical examiner employed 

by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, 

performed the autopsy on the victim's body. He 

testified that it appeared that the victim had been 

hit at least six times in the face, on the top of the 

skull, and the side of his head with a blunt 

instrument. Parades also testified that the victim's 

face was covered with blood and was swollen and bluish 

black, that he had multiple crushing fractures on the 

top and base of the skull, and that his scalp and 

brain were severely bruised. Based on his 

examination, he concluded that the victim died as a 

result of multiple blunt force trauma. He further 

testified that the injuries could have been made by a 

baseball bat. Finally, he testified that the victim's 

body was covered with a white powdery substance that 

was caked on his arms and face with the blood and very 

difficult to remove. 

Curtis Cook, Jr. testified that [Gill] is his aunt, 

that they were very close, and that she told him that 

the victim beat her up and cheated on her. He also 

testified that, at some point, [Gill] asked him to beat 

up the victim, break his legs, and throw lye in his eye 

to teach him a lesson for beating her up and cheating on 

her. Cook further testified that [Gill] wanted him to 

harm one of the victim’s girlfriends. He testified that 

[Gill] said that she would make sure he was taken care 

of and that he took that to mean monetarily because he 

had indicated to her that he needed money. He also 

testified that [Gill] told him he would be compensated 

for helping her. 

Cook testified that [Gill] telephoned him on his

cellular telephone around 2:00 p.m. on March 24, 2006, 

and told him that was the day to beat up the victim. 

She telephoned him a second time within the next hour 

and told him to get prepared. They agreed that he 

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would drive to Selma and meet her in a parking lot and 

that they would get a hotel room. After meeting and 

getting a hotel room, he followed her to the property 

that was beside her house and stayed in an area behind 

the house until [Gill] telephoned him to tell him they 

were going outside.

Cook testified that he took a baseball bat with him 

and that [Gill] gave him some lye. She telephoned him 

several times during the evening and told him when to 

attack the victim. Cook testified that, when the victim 

came out of the residence, he hit him with the baseball 

bat, that they fought and fell to the ground, that he 

straddled the victim and repeatedly hit him in the head, 

and that he threw lye in the victim's eye. At some 

point, the appellant told him that that was enough and 

to get off of the victim. He also testified that she 

asked him what he wanted, indicating money and handed 

him some money. Finally, he testified that he then got 

into his vehicle and drove away, that law enforcement 

officers were following him, that he telephoned his 

wife, and that he finally stopped.

Cook admitted that he killed the victim, but 

stated that he did not intend to. He stated that he 

attacked the victim because he wanted to help his 

aunt. Cook also admitted that he made a statement to 

law enforcement officers after he was arrested and 

stated that it was a drug deal gone bad and that the 

victim had come at him. However, he explained that he 

did so in an effort to help himself and [Gill] and to 

keep from getting into trouble. He also stated that 

they did not intend for the victim to die and that, 

after the fact, [Gill] told him not to tell anyone 

about it.

Odell Gill Jones, the victim’s second cousin 

testified that she had a long telephone conversation 

with [Gill] less than one week before the victim was 

killed. During that conversion, [Gill] said that the 

victim was a jealous person; that he was jealous of 

Cook; and that, if he ever hit her, she would have her 

brother beat him up.

Jones testified that, after the killing, [Gill] 

told her three men were there, that one was beating 

the victim with a bat, that she hit him with a shovel, 

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and that they threw a big pile of cocaine in his face. 

She also testified that no one would throw cocaine 

away. Jones testified that the appellant did not 

appear to be upset after the victim was killed. She 

further testified that, while they were visiting after 

the victim was killed, [Gill’s] sister told her 

someone was in the Walmart parking lot waiting for her 

and that [Gill] said she would telephone them later. 

Finally, Jones testified that the appellant said, 

"[T]hey can't say I killed Marshall for his money 

because the deeds in Mama’s name." (R. 422.)

Investigator Roy Freine of the Dallas County 

Sheriff's Department testified that she [sic] spoke to 

[Gill] at her house on the night of the murder. He 

testified as follows regarding her statement about the 

offense:

She, basically, told me that her husband was getting 

ready to go to Phoenix, Arizona. Initially, it was 

kind of shocking but she told me he was going to 

purchase drugs.

When they were getting ready to leave, that she went 

back inside and could hear her husband screaming and 

hear some commotion. And she went back outside and 

seen her husband being attacked by one guy with a 

stick or bat or something in his hand and she said she 

saw another guy at the corner of the house. And she 

got the phone and dialed 911, the guys fled.

(R. 467-68.)

Freine also spoke to Cook on the night of the 

murder. At first, Cook denied being there. Later, he 

stated that he and the victim got into a 

confrontation, that it had to do with drugs, that it 

was an accident, and that he did not mean to kill the 

victim. Subsequently, Cook stated that [Gill] was 

going to pay him to assault the victim.

Rachel Cook, Curtis Cook’s wife, testified that 

Cook telephoned her around midnight on the night the 

victim was killed. At that time, he sounded scared 

and shocked and told her he had messed up. Afterward, 

he told her he might have killed someone, but that he 

did not mean to; that [Gill] had paid him $5,000 to go 

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to Selma and beat up the victim; that he needed the 

money; and that he and [Gill] had talked about it for 

a while and thought it was the best way to teach the 

victim a lesson because he had been cheating on her.

Rachel testified that [Gill] showed up at her 

house the next day and asked her not to say anything 

to anyone, that there would not be anyone to help Cook 

with his attorney if she went to jail, and that she 

did not mean for him to get caught. [Gill] also told 

her she would help with an attorney for Cook and that 

she would help her with the children. Rachel 

testified that [Gill] wanted to give her some money 

and arranged to meet her at Walmart, but [Gill] was 

not there. Instead, [Gill] telephoned her and told 

her that her sister's husband would meet her. He did 

meet her and gave Rachel $500 from [Gill].

Several defense witnesses testified on the 

[Gill’s] behalf. Also, [Gill] testified on her own 

behalf and stated that she did not have anything to do 

with the death of the victim and that she did not ask 

Cook for assistance in that regard. She testified 

that, on the night of the murder, she talked to Cook 

on the telephone and agreed to loan him $100 to pay 

his rent. [Gill] testified that, later that night, 

she saw someone attacking the victim, that she grabbed 

a shovel, and that three people subsequently ran from 

their property.

[Gill] testified that she never suggested to 

Rachel that she was personally involved in the 

victim's death and that she did not offer Rachel 

money. She also testified that she did not give lye 

to Cook.

Gill v. State, CR-08-0512 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2009) 

(unpublished mem. op.) (Doc. 17-3 at 1-6). 

Gill was indicted on August 30, 2006 for capital murder, in 

violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(7) of the Code of Alabama, for hiring 

her nephew, Curtis Cook, Jr., to beat up her husband for the sum 

of $5,000.00. (Doc. 7-1 at 13). She was re-indicted on October 

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17, 2006, in a two count indictment for capital murder and murder. 

The first indictment was quashed. (Id. at 14). Gill pleaded not 

guilty to the charges against her and was tried by a jury in 

December of 2008. (Id.). On December 15, 2008, Gill was convicted 

of capital murder in the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama, 

and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole. (Doc. 7 at 3).

 Following her conviction, Gill sought a new trial based upon 

alleged jury tampering and the Government’s alleged failure to 

reveal the existence of a leniency deal between the State and 

Cook. The trial court conducted a post-trial hearing on February 

18, 2009, and denied the motion.(Doc. 7-1 at 889-915; see also, 

infra at subsection 5). On April 23, 2009, Gill appealed her 

conviction and sentence to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals Court affirmed Gill’s 

conviction and sentence in an unpublished memorandum opinion, Gill 

v. State, CR-08-0512 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2009) (mem. op.), 

and denied her application for rehearing. (Doc. 19 at 7). The 

Alabama Supreme Court denied Gill’s petition for writ of 

certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment on September 10, 

2010. Gill v. State, CR-08-0512 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2008) 

(Doc. 19 at 7). 

On August 11, 2011, Gill filed a post-conviction Rule 32 

petition with the trial court.(Doc. 7-1 at 1396-1405). The 

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petition was supplemented on August 22, 2011 (Id. at 1406-1418), 

and was amended on September 29, 2011 (Doc. 19 at 8). On April 6, 

2012, the trial court denied Gill’s petition and amended petition 

as to each ground, and Gill again appealed. (Doc. 7-1 at 1586-

1643; 7-2). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court and Gill’s application for rehearing 

was overruled. Gill v. State, CR-11-1141 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 

14, 2012) (mem. op.) (Doc. 19 at 8). The Alabama Supreme Court 

denied Gill’s petition for certiorari review, and a certificate of 

judgment of affirmance was issued on August 16, 2012. (Id.). 

Gill then filed the instant petition for federal habeas 

relief.3 In her petition, Gill lists seven grounds in support of 

her petition for habeas relief. (Doc. 7 at 1). The petition has 

been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration. The Court will 

consider each of Gill’s claims in turn. 

II. Discussion.

Before addressing the merits of Gill’s claims, the Court sets 

out the standard governing federal review of habeas claims. As 

noted supra, this Court’s review of Gill’s claims are governed by 

																																																							 3 Gill originally filed her petition in the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which is the 

district where she is currently imprisoned. (Doc. 7 at 1; Doc. 17 

at 5). On October 23, 2013, the case was transferred to the 

Southern District of Alabama, which is the district where Gill was 

convicted and sentenced.(Id. at 14).

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AEDPA. Under AEDPA, “the role of the federal court . . . is 

strictly limited." Jones v. Walker, 496 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 

2007). Specifically, § 2254(d) provides:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 

- -

 (1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

 (2)resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

 (e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court 

shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall 

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Thus, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the 

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently from the way the United 

States Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 

146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641, 123 

S. Ct. 1848, 155 L. Ed. 2d 877 (2003)(a federal court will disturb 

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a state habeas court’s decision on the merits only if the 

petitioner shows that the decision was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established constitutional 

law as determined by the United States or if the decision rested 

upon an unreasonable factual determination.). “[A] state prisoner 

must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 2013, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87, 

178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011). In other words, "if some fair-minded 

jurists could agree with the state court's decision, although 

others might disagree, federal habeas relief must be denied. . . . 

[T]he deference due is heavy and purposely presents a daunting 

hurdle for a habeas petitioner to clear." Loggins v. Thomas, 654 

F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct. 38, 181 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2011) (AEDPA standard 

is purposely onerous because "federal habeas relief functions as a 

guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice 

system, and not as a means of error correction") (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

170, 181, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011) (AEDPA 

standard "is a difficult to meet ... and highly deferential 

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that 

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12

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt")(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, in evaluating Gill’s § 2254 petition, the Court 

takes great care to abide by the stricture that "[a] federal court 

may not grant habeas relief on a claim a state court has rejected 

on the merits simply because the state court held a view different 

from its own." Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1355 (11th Cir. 

2011); see also Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 675 F.3d 

1277, 1286, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6501 (11th Cir. 2012) ("This 

inquiry is different from determining whether we would decide de 

novo that the petitioner's claim had merit."). Having established 

the proper standard of review, the Court turns to Gill's claims.

1. Claim One.

Gill asserts that her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

were violated by the state court’s unreasonable application of the 

standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.

Ct. 2782 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). According to Gill, the trial 

court’s denial of her motion for acquittal was improper given the 

fact that Curtis admitted “that he committed the murder, and also 

admitted that, the most he was authorized to do by defendant Vanessa 

Gill was to assault the deceased victim.” (Doc. 7-1 at 14). 

According to Gill, there was insufficient evidence that she had the 

“particularized intent” to murder her husband, and no evidence was 

presented that connected her directly to the murder. (Id. at 17-

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13

21). Respondents counter that this claim was raised in the state 

courts and properly denied on the merits. (Doc. 17 at 6).

 The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee assures that 

no criminal conviction shall stand “except upon sufficient proof-

-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond 

a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the 

offense.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 

2787, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). “In assessing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a state court conviction in 

a habeas proceeding, the relevant question is ‘whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”. Erwin 

v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 568 Fed. Appx. 

749, 751 (llth Cir. 2014)(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 319). The 

court reviews the essential elements of the crime as defined by 

state law to determine whether the essential elements of the crime 

as defined by state law have been meet. Erwin, 568 Fed. Appx. at 

751. 

 In Alabama, one who hires another to commit a murder may be 

convicted of the capital murder offense delineated in §13A-5-

40(a)(7), Code of Alabama, under the theory of accomplice 

liability. §13A-5-40(a)(7) requires (1) proof of an intentional 

murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary 

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gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Ex parte Woodall, 

730 So.2d 652, 658 (Ala. 1998). Under this theory, “[t]he 

accomplice. . .is criminally responsible for acts which are the 

direct, proximate, natural result of the conspiracy formed,” but 

[the defendant] is not responsible for any special act, not within 

the scope of the common purpose, but growing out of the individual 

malice of the perpetrator. Id. at 658. (the Alabama Supreme Court 

held that evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support 

the defendant’s capital murder conviction in connection with the 

murder of his mother where the state presented evidence that the 

defendant had hired someone to kill his brother and had advised 

him that his sister might be visiting, and if necessary, would 

need to be dealt with, and that the Defendant knew his mother 

resided at the residence and would likely be present.);see also

Burton v. Campbell, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133679 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 

27, 2009)(although the defendant was not the actual person to pull 

the trigger, he had the requisite intent to sustain the murder 

conviction where there was evidence that he was the one who 

planned the robbery and he took weapons to the robbery site). 

In this case, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

rejected Gill’s sufficiency argument, and stated, in part, 

that: 

The appellant argues that the State did not present 

sufficient evidence to support her conviction for 

capital murder. Specifically, she appears to contend 

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that the State did not establish that she had the 

particularized intent that the victim be killed.

The appellant was charged with committing murder for 

hire. See § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975.

“The following are capital offenses:

“. . .

“(7) Murder done for a pecuniary or other 

valuable consideration or pursuant to a contract or 

for hire.”

§ 13A-5-40(a), Ala. Code 1975.

 A defendant who does not personally commit

act of killing which constitutes the murder is not 

guilty of a capital offense defined in subsection (a) 

of this section unless that defendant is legally 

accountable for the murder because of complicity in 

the murder itself under the provisions of Section13A2-23, in addition to being guilty of the other 

elements of the capital offense as defined in 

subsection (a) of this section.

Also, § 13A-5-40(c), Ala. Code 1975.

. . .

 At trial, the State proceeded under an 

accomplice liability theory. Alabama’s accomplice 

liability statute provides:

“A person is legally accountable for the behavior 

of another constituting a criminal offense if, 

with the intent to promote or assist the 

commission of the offense: 

“. . .

“(2) He aids or abets such other person in 

committing the offense. . .”

§ 13A-2-23, Ala. Code 1975.

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“The words ‘aid and abet’ encompass all 

assistance by acts, words of encouragement, or 

support, or presence, actual or constructive, to 

render assistance should it become necessary. 

Wright [v. State], 494 So.2d 936 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1986); Sanders v. State, 423 So.2d 348 (Ala. Cr. 

App. 1982). Actual participation in the crime 

need not be proved by positive testimony to 

convict someone of aiding and abetting. ‘The jury 

is to determine whether the appellant’s 

participation exists and the extent of it from 

the conduct of the parties and all the testimony 

presented.’ Walls v. State, 378 So.2d 1186, 1191 

(Ala. Cr. App. 1979), cert. denied, Ex parte 

Walls, 378 So.2d 1193 (Ala. 1980). Such facts 

as the defendant’s presence in connection with 

his companionship, and his conduct at, before and 

after the commission of the act, are potent 

circumstances from which participation may be 

inferred.”

Henry v. State, 555 So.2d 768, 769 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1989)

.. . . .

“’[w]here the evidence is conflicting as to the 

defendant’s connection as an accomplice or coconspirator, a jury question is presented.’ 

Sanders v. State,[423 So.2d 348 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1982), citing Watkins v. State, 357 So. 2d 

156, 160 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, 

357 So.2d 161 ([Ala.]1978).”

Henry, 555 So.2d at 770.

. . .”’”The question of intent is hardly ever 

capable of direct proof. Such questions are 

normally questions for the jury. McMurphy v. 

State, 455 So.2d 924 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); 

Craig v. State, 410 So.2d 449 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1981), cert. denied, 410 So.2d 449 (Ala. 1982). 

Loper v. State, 469 So.2d 707, 710 (Ala. Cr. App. 

1985). “Where one assaults another by the use of 

a deadly weapon, the law will infer from that 

fact that he designed to accomplish the probable 

and natural results of his act, in the absence 

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of proof to the contrary.” Snipes v. State, 364 

So.2d 424, 426 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978).’

“Oryang v. State, 624 So.2d 989, 994 (Ala. Cr. 

App. 1994).”

Wilson v. State, 777 So. 2d 856, 932-33 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 1999).

“Pulling the trigger is only one factor in 

determining intent to kill. Ritter v. State, 375 

So.2d 270, 274-275 (Ala. 1979). From the 

testimony concerning the defendant’s words and 

actions during the course of the robbery, the 

jury had sufficient evidence from which to infer 

that the defendant was prepared to kill, intended 

to kill and supported Watkins in his killing of 

Mr. Mayfield and, thus, that the defendant was an 

accomplice to the intentional killing [the 

victim].”

Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111, 1113 (Ala. 1982). 

Finally, “’[w]hether a non-triggerman aided and 

abetted the actual killing itself, such as by being 

present to render assistance in the killing itself if 

it becomes necessary, will almost always be a jury 

question.’” Gamble v. State, 791 S.2d 409, 445 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2000).

Based on the evidence set forth in detail above, 

the jury could have reasonably concluded from the 

weapon used and the nature of the assault, the fact 

that the appellant waited so long into the attack to 

tell Cook to stop, the appellant’s actions and 

reactions to the killing, and the self-serving nature 

of Cook’s statements that the appellant intended for 

Cook to kill the victim. Accordingly, her argument to 

the contrary is without merit.

(Doc. 17-3 at 6-13.)

Applying § 2254 and the presumption of correctness that 

attaches to the state courts’ factual findings, this court cannot 

say that Gill is entitled to habeas relief on this issue. Gill 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 17 of 54
18

has not shown, pursuant to § 2254 (d), that the decisions of the 

state courts were contrary to or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or that the 

decision of the Alabama courts were based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the state-court proceedings. While Gill contends that there was no 

evidence of a planned scheme to murder her husband, and that her 

alleged accomplice (Cook) told investigators and later testified 

at trial that Gill asked him to beat up her husband and break his 

legs, not kill him, the undersigned finds that the jury had before 

it evidence that, if believed, warranted the rejection of Gill’s 

contention that there was no evidence of an intent to kill. 

As found by the appellate court, there was sufficient 

evidence, including testimony regarding the type of weapon used 

(i.e., baseball bat), and the severity of injuries sustained by 

the victim, upon which to convict Gill 4 . Indeed, multiple 

witnesses described the brutal injuries that led to the victim’s 

death. For instance, the forensic pathologist testified that the 

																																																							 4 While Gill argues there is no direct proof of her intent to kill 

her husband, the appellate court correctly found that

circumstantial evidence is sufficient as long as the jury believes 

beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty. See Edwards v. 

State, 139 So. 3d 827, 836 (Ala. Crim. App. March 29, 2013) 

(quoting White v. State, 314 So. 2d 857 (Ala. 1975), cert. denied, 

423 U.S. 951 (1975) ("’Circumstantial evidence alone is enough to 

support a guilty verdict of the most heinous crime, provided the 

jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is 

guilty.’")).

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19

victim “died as a result of multiple blunt force injuries” to the 

face, side of the head, and top of the skull, which were 

consistent with a bat, but he “had no injuries from the neck 

down.” (Doc. 7-1 at 400-01). Moreover, Investigator Mike Grantham 

testified that he found the victim’s scalp flesh located “as far 

away as 20 feet” from the victim’s body, leading him to opine that 

the “blows. . .used to cause this trauma was [sic] so significant, 

that once the flesh was torn from the body it actually flew that 

far.” (Id. at 331-32). The fact that the victim did not sustain 

any injuries below the neck and that flesh from his head was 

located as far as 20 feet from his body conflicts with Cook’s 

testimony that there was no intent to kill the victim, and that 

Gill only requested that he beat up her husband and break his legs 

in order to teach him a lesson. Moreover, there was testimony 

that Gill was present and stood by and watched as Cook delivered a 

number of blows to the victim’s head area before finally 

intervening. This evidence, along with testimony that Gill 

orchestrated Cook’s encounter with her husband on the night of the 

brutal attack, that notwithstanding the brutal beating endured by 

her husband, Gill had no blood on her when authorities arrived, 

that Gill’s demeanor and lack of emotion in the hours and days 

following the incident were not consistent with that expected of 

someone who had recently witnessed the brutal beating of her 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 19 of 54
20

husband 5 , and that Gill offered payment to Cook’s wife in an 

effort to silence her regarding Cook’s involvement in the victim’s 

death, further supports the appellate court’s finding. 

Accordingly, based upon the evidence presented, the undersigned 

finds that a rational finder of fact could have, by fair 

inference, found that Gill intended that her husband be killed, 

that Gill enlisted Cook to carry out the killing, that she helped 

to facilitate the killing, and that her husband was killed “for a 

pecuniary or other valuable consideration or pursuant to a 

contract or for hire”. The fact that the jury could have drawn 

contrary inferences favoring Gill based on the same evidence is of 

no moment because habeas relief is only proper 'where there is no 

possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state 

court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents.'

See Morton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 1157, 1166 (11th 

Cir. 2012) ("[W]e may issue a writ of habeas corpus only 'where 

there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the 

state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's 

precedents.'") (citations omitted.).

																																																							 5 Sheriff’s Deputy Bill Wright testified that in retrospect, 

he would have expected Gill to be more “upset” (id. at 290, 295); 

Likewise, Investigator Mike Grantham testified that he “had never 

been to a crime scene that is this horrendous where they were 

calm. . .”(id. at 392), and Odell Jones, the victim’s cousin, 

stated that she expected Gill to be more upset, but instead, Gill 

just told the story of her husband’s death “so eas[ily].” (Id. at 

528).

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21

2. Claim Two.

Gill claims that the trial court “so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process” when it responded erroneously to a question from the 

jury. (Doc. 7-1 at 27). Specifically, Gill argues that in 

responding to a question from the jury, the trial court stated 

that the case “involved” complicity rather that stating the case 

“allegedly involved” complicity. (Id.). Gill presented this 

claim to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal, 

and in its memorandum rejecting Gill’s claim, the court stated:

We have reviewed the trial court’s oral charge and its 

supplemental instructions in response to the jury’s 

question. Taken in context of the entire charge, we 

do not believe a trial court was stating as a fact 

that the case involved complicity. Rather, we find 

that the instructions, taken as a whole, were 

sufficient to inform the jury that it was its duty to 

determine whether the appellant was complicit in 

Cook’s actions. Therefore we do not find that there 

was any reversible error in this regard. 

(Doc. 17-3 at 14). 

This claim involves the interpretation and application of 

state law by state courts. Federal review of the propriety of 

jury instructions from a state trial is very limited. See Agan v. 

Vaughn, 119 F. 3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Our limited role 

on habeas review, when faced with a challenge to a state law jury 

charge, is to determine whether any error or omission in the jury 

charge was so prejudicial as to amount to a violation of due 

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22

process.") (citing Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F. 2d 1053, 1055 

(11th Cir. 1983). "A defendant's right to due process is not 

violated unless an erroneous instruction, when viewed in light of 

the entire trial, was so misleading as to make the trial unfair." 

Id. 

Upon review of the record, the undersigned finds that the 

trial court originally instructed the jury regarding the law of 

complicity by charging:

. . . [T]here is an element of law called complicity 

which means a person is legally accountable for the 

behavior of another person constituting a crime if, 

with intent to promote or assist in the commission of 

a crime, she either procures, induces, or causes such 

other person to commit the crime or aides or abets 

such other person in committing the crime. That 

complicity charge would apply to the Count Two which 

is the murder charge in this case.

(Doc. 7-1 at 848). Later, in response to a second question from 

the jury regarding the element of intent as it relates to capital 

murder, the trial judge restated the entirety of his original 

charge regarding the elements of capital murder and intentional 

murder, and instructed the jury as follows: 

This case involves complicity. Basically, I’m going to 

give you the law on complicity again. A person is legally 

accountable for the behavior of another person constituting 

a crime if with intent to promote or assist in the 

commission of a crime she either procures, induces, or 

causes such other person to commit the crime, or aides or 

abets such other person in committing the crime.

So basically, if you find that the defendant procured, 

induced, or caused Curtis Cook to commit the crime or 

either aided and abetted Curtis Cook in committing the 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 22 of 54
23

crime, then she would be guilty for his actions. 

(Doc. 7-1 at 857) (emphasis added). 

Having reviewed the record, the Court agrees with the Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals, for the reasons stated in its 

memorandum opinion, that the trial court did not err with respect 

to its reinstruction on the issue of complicity. The record 

reflects that in response to a second question from the jury 

regarding intent, the court misspoke when it stated that the case 

“involved complicity,” before proceeding to give the jury the 

charge on “complicity” again. There is no allegation that the 

instruction on “complicity” was incorrect, and the record reflects 

that the Court made clear that Gill could only be found guilty 

under a complicity theory if the jury found that she procured, 

induced or caused Curtis Cook to commit the crime. (Doc. 7-1 at 

857). In the trial, the prosecution never alleged or sought to 

prove that Gill personally held a weapon and fatally struck her 

husband; rather, the State attempted to prove that Gill caused the 

demise of her husband by contracting with Cook, and helping to 

facilitate her husband’s death. Thus, it was appropriate for the 

trial court to instruct the jury on complicity, and taking the 

jury instructions as a whole, the undersigned finds that Gill has 

failed to show that the trial court’s omission of the word 

“alleged” when referring to “complicity” rendered her trial 

fundamentally unfair. Indeed, no reasonable fact finder could 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 23 of 54
24

have understood the instruction that “this case involved

complicity” to be a fact of the case. Thus, Gill has failed to 

state a cognizable federal habeas claim.

3. Claim Three.

In claim three, Gill asserts that her Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated by the trial court’s admission of gruesome 

and inflammatory photographs of the victim’s body, post-mortem, at 

the crime scene. (Doc. 7-1 at 29). As noted by the Respondent, 

while Gill challenged the trial court's admission of this evidence 

on direct appeal, she did not argue that the admission violated 

these constitutional provisions. The claim was presented merely as 

one of state law, based on potential undue prejudice, irrelevance, 

and abuse of discretion for the trial court to hold them 

admissible. (Doc. 17-2 at 47-52). Because Gill did not fairly 

present this claim to the state courts and alert them to the 

federal nature of her claim, the claim is procedurally barred 6 . 

See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 

1998)(“Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state 

prisoner “fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in 

																																																							 6 The doctrine of procedural default provides that ‘[i]f the 

petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer 

available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar 

federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or 

the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” 

Smith v. Jones, 256 F. 3d 1135, 1138 (llth Cir. 2001).

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 24 of 54
25

order to give the State the opportunity to pass on and correct 

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’”). 

Assuming arguendo that the claim was not procedurally 

defaulted, Gill has not established that she is entitled to habeas 

relief on this claim. In response to Gill’s assertion, on direct 

appeal, that she was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of 

the photographs, the Alabama Court of Appeals, in its memorandum 

opinion rejecting her claim, stated, in part, that:

We have reviewed the photographic evidence in this 

case, and we find that it was neither unduly 

prejudicial nor inflammatory. Rather, the evidence 

was relevant to depict the nature and extent of the 

injuries the victim suffered and the crime scene and 

made it possible for the jury to view them, to 

corroborate Cook's testimony about the murder, and to 

aid in presenting other testimony about the victim's 

body and the crime scene. Therefore, the trial court 

did not err in admitting the photographic evidence.

(Doc. 17-3 at 16). Claim three involves the interpretation and 

application of state law by state courts. Thus, as with the state 

law issues discussed above, the issue of whether the trial court 

erred in admitting these photographs will be reviewed on federal 

habeas only to determine whether the alleged state trial error was 

"material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant 

factor," Shaw v. Boney, 695 F. 2d 528, 530 (11th Cir. 1983), and 

rendered "the entire trial fundamentally unfair." Carrizales, 699 

F. 2d at 1055; see also Smith v. Newsome, 876 F. 2d 1461, 1468 n.8 

(llth Cir. 1989)(“Federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 25 of 54
26

are not empowered to correct erroneous evidence rulings of state 

trial courts.”)

"Generally, photographs are admissible into evidence 

in a criminal prosecution 'if they tend to prove or 

disprove some disputed or material issue, to 

illustrate or elucidate some other relevant fact or 

evidence, or to corroborate or disprove some other 

evidence offered or to be offered, and their admission 

is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.'" 

Bankhead v. State, 585 So. 2d 97, 109 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1989), remanded on other grounds, 585 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 

1991), aff'd on return to remand, 625 So. 2d 1141 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1992), rev'd, 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 

1993), quoting Magwood v. State, 494 So. 2d 124, 141 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 

1986). "Photographic exhibits are admissible even 

though they may be cumulative, demonstrative of 

undisputed facts, or gruesome." Williams v. State, 506 

So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (citations 

omitted). In addition, "photographic evidence, if 

relevant, is admissible even if it has a tendency to 

inflame the minds of the jurors." Ex parte Siebert, 

555 So. 2d 780, 784 (Ala. 1989). 'This court has held 

that autopsy photographs, although gruesome, are 

admissible to show the extent of a victim's injuries.' 

Ferguson v. State, 814 So. 2d 925, 944 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 2000), aff'd, 814 So. 2d 970 (Ala. 2001). 

"'[A]utopsy photographs depicting the character and 

location of wounds on a victim's body are admissible 

even if they are gruesome, cumulative, or relate to an 

undisputed matter."' Jackson v. State, 791 So. 2d 979, 

1016 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), quoting Perkins v. State, 

808 So. 2d 1041, 1108 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 

808 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2001), judgment vacated on other 

grounds, 536 U.S. 953, 122 S. Ct. 2653, 153 L. Ed. 2d 

830 (2002), on remand to, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002)."

McCray v. State, 88 So. 3d 1, 63-64 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) 

(quoting Brooks v. State, 973 So. 2d 380, 393 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2007). 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 26 of 54
27

Having reviewed a description of the photographs at issue 

through the testimony at trial, the State of Alabama’s exhibit 

list (Doc. 7-2 at 115-16), and the attached photographs (id. at 

183-94), the Court agrees with the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals, for the reasons stated in its memorandum opinion, that 

the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the crime 

scene, including photographs of the victim’s body and gruesome 

wounds. While Gill argues that the photographs did not ‘bear upon 

a relevant issue in the case such as motive, opportunity, or 

knowledge’ (Doc. 19 at 24-25) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)), the Court 

disagrees. The photographs not only corroborated the testimony of 

the forensic pathologist and Cook, they also bore on the severity 

of the attack, and thus the issue of whether the victim’s death 

was intentional, as well as motive, opportunity and knowledge. 

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the trial court did err with 

respect to the admission of the photographs, Gill has not 

demonstrated how their admission adversely affected her trial so 

as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Indeed, the 

testimony of Cook, his wife, and the forensic pathologist provided 

strong evidence against Gill such that even if the photographs 

were erroneously admitted, they did not render the trial 

fundamentally unfair. Thus, Gill fails to state a cognizable

federal habeas claim. Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1296 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 27 of 54
28

(11th Cir. 1992)(“The introduction of graphic photographic 

evidence rarely renders a proceeding fundamentally 

unfair.”)(internal citations and punctuation omitted.)

4. Claim Four.

Gill claims her right to due process was violated when she 

was denied a fair trial due to jury tampering because Kathy 

Harris, a prosecution supporter, was seen talking to “a couple of 

jurors” (Doc. 7-1 at 359), and the trial court failed to conduct a 

hearing to identify and evaluate possible juror bias7. 

The record reflects that during the trial, it was brought to 

the court’s attention that possible jury tampering had occurred. 

Specifically, the court was notified that Kathy Harris, a 

spectator, was seen talking to jurors. Gill’s counsel requested 

that the court question Ms. Harris regarding the allegation. (Doc. 

7-1 at 360). During a lunch recess outside the presence of the 

jury, the court questioned Ms. Harris as follows:

THE COURT: What’s your name?

																																																							 7 Here again, it does not appear that Gill presented this as a 

federal claim to the state courts. She instead argued that 

supporters of the prosecution tampered with the jury and that the 

trial court did not adequately investigate the allegations. On 

direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that 

because Gill’s counsel did not object to the trial court’s 

handling of the jury tampering allegation at trial, the issue was 

not preserved for appellate review. (Doc. 17-2 at 53-57). The 

court nevertheless addressed the merits of the claim and held that 

Gill had not made a sufficient showing that the jury was biased 

against her. The undersigned finds that assuming arguendo that 

this claim was not procedurally defaulted, it fails on the merits. 

(Doc. 17-3 at 16-18).

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 28 of 54
29

SPECTATOR: Kathy Harris.

THE COURT: Somebody said they thought you might have been 

talking to a juror in the hall.

SPECTATOR: No, I hadn’t talked to any jurors. Honestly, 

I didn’t.

THE COURT: That’s fine. 

MS. LYNCH: Do we need to find out who she is for

the record? I don’t know if she’s related to the case. 

MR. OXFORD: She’s married - -

MR. MCPHILLIPS: She’s married to one of the brothers of 

Marshall Gill [the victim].

THE COURT: I thought all his family was on your side?

MR. MCPHILLIPS: I thought so too.

THE COURT: I think the jury will let me know if 

something happens. 

MR. MCPHILLIPS: Your Honor, there are a bunch of half 

brothers I don’t know about. 

(Id. at 414). 

Gill’s counsel did not object to the court’s handling of the 

jury tampering issue and did not pursue the issue any further 

until after the jury returned its guilty verdict. At that point, 

Gill’s counsel moved for a mistrial based, inter alia, on jury 

tampering.8 

																																																							 8 After the jury returned its verdict, Gill, through her 

attorney, moved for a mistrial on the basis of all previous noted 

objections, particularly that a “Ms. Harris (a family member 

friendly to the prosecution) was seen and overheard talking with 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 29 of 54
30

During a post-trial hearing on Gill’s request for a new 

trial, conducted on February 18, 2009, Gill’s counsel again raised 

the allegation of jury tampering. Prior to the hearing, Gill’s 

counsel had filed a motion to have all 12 jurors subpoenaed to 

testify at the hearing as to possible jury contamination. While 

the motion was pending, Gill’s counsel subpoenaed the jurors from 

the trial. When the trial court learned of the subpoenas on the 

morning of the hearing, all of the jurors were released because 

Gill’s counsel had not received permission from the court to 

subpoena the jurors, and because the trial court determined that 

Gill had not made a threshold showing which warranted compelling 

the jurors to testify. (Doc. 7-1 at 41; 877-78). 

At the hearing, Asberry Gill [the victim’s brother] and Wanda 

Steele [Gill’s sister], both testified that they observed Ms. 

Harris talking with a member of the jury. (Doc. 7-1 at 874-77; 

882-87). They also testified that they did not “actually hear 

what [Ms. Harris] said” to the juror, (id. at 876-77; 884). 

According to Mr. Asberry, he approached Ms. Harris as she sat 

speaking with a juror and Ms. Harris introduced him to the juror 

																																																																																																																																																																																					

members of the jury.” (Doc. 7-1 at 40). Defense counsel argued 

as follows:

We also think that there were some people talked to 

among some of the jurors by someone the other side 

although we are not sure who they were. We brought that 

information to you earlier on.

Id. 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 30 of 54
31

and he too “spoke to [the juror].” (Id. at 886-87). Following the 

testimony, the trial court found “no grounds to either grant a new 

trial or to set aside the verdict” and denied Gill’s motion. (Id. 

at 915). 

As noted supra, Gill argued on direct appeal that supporters 

of the prosecution tampered with the jury and that the trial court 

failed to adequately investigate the claims. (Doc. 17-3 at 17); 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in its memorandum rejecting 

Gill’s claim, stated:

As soon as the allegations of jury tampering were 

brought to its attention, the trial court investigated 

the allegations and questioned the person who had been 

accused of tampering with jurors and satisfied itself 

that no such tampering had occurred. The appellant 

did not object to the trial courts method of handling 

the allegations concerning Harris, and she did not 

request any further investigation when the alleged 

tampering was made known. See Watson v. State, 439 

So. 2d 762, 769 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that, 

“[t]o be timely, an objection must be interposed as 

soon as the ground for the objection becomes 

apparent”). Also, although the appellant raised this 

argument again in her motion for a new trial, that 

motion was not sufficient to preserve this issue for 

our review. See Hamrick v. State, 548 So. 2d 652

(Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that, absent a timely 

and sufficient objection at trial, a post-trial motion 

will not preserve an issue for appellate review).

Moreover, the people who witnessed the alleged 

jury tampering admitted that they did not know what

was said. Nevertheless, they made the conclusory 

allegation that Harris's [sic] actions prejudiced or

might have prejudiced the jurors against the

appellant. Without more than the mere allegation of

exposure to some speculative outside influence, the

appellant has not made sufficient allegations to

support a conclusion that, even if Harris had been

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 31 of 54
32

speaking to one of the jurors, the jury might have

been prejudiced against her. See Ex parte Apicella,

809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001).

(Doc. 17-3 at 17-18). 

In her petition before this court, Gill contends that she was 

denied a fair trial due to “contamination by extraneous 

influence”, and by the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing 

to investigate the jury tampering claim. The Sixth Amendment, 

made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause, protects a criminal defendant’s right to a 

fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. Parker v. Gladden, 385 

U.S. 363, 364, 87 S. Ct. 468, 470, 17 L. Ed. 2d 420. (1966). 

Integral to this right is the requirement that a jury base its 

verdict on the evidence presented at trial. See Turner v. State of 

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472, 85 S. Ct. 546, 549, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424 

(1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed. 

2d 751 (19610(To be impartial, a juror must base his or her 

decision on the evidence presented in the case.). 

"In any trial, there is initially a presumption of jury 

impartiality; prejudice will not be presumed, but can be 

demonstrated by a defendant by a preponderance of credible 

evidence." United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 714 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827, 100 S. Ct. 51, 62 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1979) 

(citations omitted). "Such prejudice may be shown by evidence that 

extrinsic factual matter tainted the jury's deliberations; any 

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33

'prejudicial factual intrusion' denies a defendant [her] rights to 

trial by an impartial jury and to challenge the facts adverse to 

[her] that are made known to the jury." Id. (quoting United States 

v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975); Remmer v. United 

States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654, 1954-1 

C.B. 146 (1954)). In Remmer, the Supreme Court explained:

In a criminal case, any private communication, 

contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a 

juror during a trial about the matter pending before 

the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively 

prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of know rules of 

the court and the instructions of the court made 

during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. 

The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden 

rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after 

notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such 

contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).

It is only when the defendant has made a colorable showing of 

extrinsic influence that the court must investigate the asserted 

impropriety. United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1051 

(11th Cir. 1987). Such a colorable showing must consist of 

evidence that is "clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible 

..." United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(citing United States v. Barshov, 733 F. 2d 842, 851 (11th Cir. 

1984)). "Cases dealing with the degree of investigation required 

fall along a continuum focusing on two factors: the certainty that 

some impropriety has occurred and the seriousness of the 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 33 of 54
34

accusation." Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d at 1051 (citations omitted). 

"The more speculative or unsubstantiated the allegation of 

misconduct, the less burden there is to investigate; the more 

serious the potential jury contamination, especially where alleged 

extrinsic influence is involved, the heavier the burden to 

investigate." Id.

As found by the appellate court on direct appeal, the trial 

court acted promptly when Gill’s counsel reported alleged jury

tampering during Gill’s trial. The trial court questioned Ms. 

Harris, who was married to one of the victim’s brothers, and who 

was alleged to be friendly towards the prosecution. Ms. Harris 

denied any contact with the jurors, and no juror reported any such 

contact to the court. In light of the fact that Gill’s counsel 

did not request that any further action be taken, and the fact 

that the allegation was not substantiated during trial, the trial 

court’s investigation was reasonable under the circumstances. 

While Gill’s counsel presented two witnesses at the post 

trial hearing, who testified that they observed Ms. Harris 

speaking to one or more unidentified jurors, there was no 

evidence, let alone any assertion, that the alleged discussions 

related to a matter pending before the jury. Both witnesses 

testified that they did not hear what Ms. Harris said to the 

jurors. Additionally, while one of the witnesses, Mr. Asbury

Gill, testified that Ms. Harris introduced him to one of the 

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35

jurors, he did not identify the juror to whom he was purportedly 

introduced, nor did allege that there was any discussion regarding 

the case during the brief introduction. 9 In the absence of any 

evidence that Ms. Harris sought to speak with any of the jurors 

about the case, or did in fact speak to them about the case, the 

trial court concluded that Gill had not made a threshold showing. 

Likewise, on direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Appeals concluded 

that “[w]ithout more than the mere allegation of exposure to some 

speculative outside influence, the appellant has not made 

sufficient allegations to support a conclusion that, even if 

Harris had been talking to one of the jurors, the jury might have 

been prejudiced against her.” (Doc. 17-3 at 18.). Gill has not 

demonstrated that her right to a fair trial was violated due to 

any improper contact with the jury. The state courts made 

specific findings that the trial court inquired about the alleged 

improper contact, and determined that there was no evidence of 

extrinsic communications with the jury about the case. Gill has 

not overcome the presumption of correctness afforded to these 

findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). She has failed to show that the 

																																																							 9 Additionally, there is nothing in the record that suggests that 

Ms. Harris was actually friendly towards the prosecution. The 

court transcript reflects that Ms. Harris was married to one of 

the half brothers of the deceased, and Mr. Asbury Gill was the 

brother of the deceased. While Mr. Asbury Gill was a witness for 

the defense, there is nothing reflecting that Ms. Harris offered 

any testimony in the case or that she was in fact friendly towards 

the prosecution.

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36

state court’s finding regarding her jury tampering claim was 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. Thus, Gill is not entitled to habeas relief on this 

claim10.

Claims Five and Seven. 

In claim five, Gill asserts that her right to Due Process was 

violated because the State failed to disclose the deal that it 

made with Cook, the main witness against Gill, in exchange for his 

testimony against her. Gill contends that the State’s misconduct 

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 

2d 215 (1963). In claim seven, Gill makes a related argument in 

that she contends that she was denied a fair trial because the 

State “deliberately” withheld the fact that Cook, their main 

witness, lied on the witness stand when he testified under oath 

that he had not received leniency from the prosecution in exchange 

for his testimony. In support of her claims, Gill points to the 

fact that while Cook testified that he had not been offered a plea 

agreement nor a promise of leniency, following Gill’s conviction, 

																																																							 10 In her brief, Gill asserts that following the trial, her counsel 

presented the affidavit of Ms. JoAnn Hurt, who was dismissed from 

the jury before deliberations due to health problems. Ms. Hurt did 

not report any contact with Ms. Harris. Ms. Hurt instead reported 

that before the trial, she heard several jurors state that they 

knew that Gill was guilty. However, there is nothing in the record 

indicating that Ms. Hurt ever identified the jurors who made the 

purported statements.

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37

he was permitted to pled guilty and was sentenced to 25 years to 

life, which means that unlike Gill, he is eligible for parole. 

Gill also relies on an affidavit that Cook provided after his 

sentencing, and nearly two years after Gill’s trial, in which he 

recanted his trial testimony and asserted that his counsel and 

counsel for the prosecution had coached him to give false 

testimony against Gill. According to Cook, the prosecutors and 

his attorney met with him multiple times to discuss his testimony, 

and he was given a type written timeline with dates, times and 

facts that they wanted him to testify to although the information 

conflicted with his personal knowledge. Cook stated that 85% of 

his testimony was based on information provided by the prosecutors 

and his counsel, and that it was clear to him that in return for 

testifying “their way”, he would receive leniency. (Doc. 7-1 at 

85-87). 

The record reflects that during Gill’s trial, Cook was 

questioned extensively regarding the existence of any plea 

agreement or promise or offer of leniency, and he repeatedly 

denied that any agreement or offer had been made. Cook testified 

as follows:

[PROSECUTOR:] Why are you testifying today, Curtis?

[COOK:] Because it’s the right thing to do. And I promise 

the Lord, you know, I would do what’s right. And I told my 

mom and dad I would do what’s right.

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38

[PROSECUTOR:] Okay, Let me ask you this: Has anybody - -

me, your lawyer, anybody - - said that you were going to get 

anything out of this?

[COOK:] No, ma’am.

. . . 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] . . . And Miss Lynch brought out the fact 

that you’re not seeking anything to gain, no deal, et

certera?

[COOK:] No, sir. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But you certainly do expect, do you not, 

from this testimony at least to get something out of it? 

That’s your hope isn’t it? 

[COOK:] No, sir. I wanted to get myself right with God. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Well, you know, you have been indicted 

for and due to be tried later for capital murder are you not? 

[COOK:] Yes, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And you know what the severe consequences 

are for capital murder? There are generally two different 

possibilities if convicted?

[COOK:] Right, yes, sir. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Right. And you are trying to avoid one 

of those or both of those possibilities, aren’t you?

[COOK:] No, sir. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Yes, sir. And you know, with all due 

respect, I know you have a fine, excellent attorney over 

here, Bruce Maddox. No question about it he’s one of the 

best criminal defense lawyers around. But you are aware that 

your attorney has certainly been conferring with the district 

attorney’s office back and forth throughout this trial - -

[COOK:] True

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39

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] - - and the days before this trial 

haven’t you?

[COOK:] Yes, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And with all due respect, you know, with 

the help and assistance from your family, you have obviously 

made arrangements to take care of Mr. Maddox, have you not? 

To your knowledge, he’s not doing it for free, is he?

. . .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Well, although you say there’s no deal 

been promised and I heard that from you and from the district 

attorney’s office. But at the same time, you certainly 

expect, after your time here on the stand, that you will get 

some consideration one way or the other out of it don’t you 

or hope that don’t you?

[COOK:] I’m not expecting anything sir.

. . .

(Doc. 7-1 at 457; 466-67). 

Following her conviction, Gill sought a new trial, and in 

preparation for a hearing on her motion, Gill’s counsel issued 

subpoenas to Cook’s counsel, Bruce Maddox, the deputy district 

attorney, Shannon Lynch, and the district attorney, Michael 

Jackson, in attempt to have them testify under oath as to whether 

or not any deal for leniency had been made between Cook and the 

State. At the hearing, the attorneys objected to the subpeoneas, 

and the trial court sustained their objections. (Id. at 907-910). 

The trial circuit court explained that “[t]he attorneys have 

throughout this case consistently said there is no deal. They 

told me that as an officer of the court. I am not going to 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 39 of 54
40

subject them to taking the stand to testify about it. . . . 

Unless you[, Petitioner,] have something that shows they lied to 

me.” (Doc. 7-1 at 889-915).

Gill’s counsel then sought to question Cook’s parents 

regarding their knowledge of any deal that Cook has made with the 

State for leniency in exchange for his testimony. Both of Cook’s 

parents took the stand and denied any knowledge of or being privy 

to any deal between Cook and the State. (Doc. 7-1 at 897-900). 

Based on the record before it, the trial court denied Gill’s

motion to set aside the verdict or grant a new trial. (Id. at 

914-15). 

On direct appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, 

the appeals court rejected Gill’s claim that the prosecution 

attorneys failed to reveal the deal, and observed: 

During the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the 

trial court stated that the attorneys had consistently 

stated, as officers of the court, that there was not a 

deal. It also stated that it was satisfied with those 

representation, but that it would consider evidence that 

showed that the attorneys had lied. The defense did not 

present any such evidence. Instead, it simply continued 

to make the unsupported allegation that Cook must have 

made a deal in exchange for his testimony. Because the 

attorneys and Cook repeatedly assured the trial court 

that there was not a deal and because the appellant made 

only speculative assertions to the contrary, we do not 

find that there was any error in this regard. 

(Doc. 17-3 at 20-21). 

Later, Gill filed a Rule 32 petition in which she again 

alleged that the state had failed to disclose a plea agreement 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 40 of 54
41

with Cook, and that juror misconduct violated her right to due 

process. Subsequent thereto, she supplemented her petition and 

alleged newly discovered evidence in the form of the affidavit of 

Cook 11 . As noted supra, in the affidavit, Cook recanted his 

testimony implicating Gill, and asserted that it was clear to him 

that in exchange for giving testimony favorable to the 

prosecution, he would receive leniency. In lieu of an evidentiary 

hearing, the Court directed the parties to submit affidavits, 

interrogatories or depositions. (Doc. 17-10 at 5-6). The State 

																																																							 11Cook’s affidavit included assertions that:

The DA Sharon Lynch and my attorney Bruce Maddox both 

met with me, with all of us discussing what I was 

supposed to say in the same room. We met like this 

multiple times, in the front conference room of the 

Dallas County Jail, on at least three times. At one 

point, I was even given a type written timeline with 

times and dates on one side, and the facts they wanted 

me to say on the other. These were all different from 

how I wanted to testify and were not my personal 

knowledge. I was told to memorize this time line for my 

testimony against Vanessa Gill. This time line of 

theirs ended up being 85% of my testimony at trial. I 

was told by my attorney, Brue Maddox, at the time, to 

“get rid of this piece of paper,” meaning the timeline. 

The guards at the Dallas County Jail witnessed these 

meetings and can testify to the same. 

It was clear to me that in return for memorizing their 

timeline and testifying their way, that I would receive 

leniency. 

Vanessa Gill did not ask me to harm Marshall Gill in any 

way what so ever. 

(Doc. 7-1 at 87). 

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42

submitted affidavits from the prosecuting attorney, Cook’s 

attorney, the lead investigator, and a sergeant who also 

investigated Marshall Gill’s murder. Each of the affidavits 

essentially refuted Cook’s allegations, including his assertion 

that his testimony was coached, and that he was offered a plea 

deal or leniency.(Id.)

In its order denying Gill’s Rule 32 petition, the trial court 

found that Gill’s juror-misconduct claim was precluded because it 

had already been addressed at trial and on appeal. The court 

found with respect to Gill’s remaining claims that:

There is simply no credible evidence to support her 

arguments. The only evidence presented by Defendant is 

that of a three time convicted felon, Curtis Cook. His 

testimony at trial aligned completely with what he 

told investigators the night of and immediately after 

the murder and what he told his own wife prior to any

police involvement. There is absolutely no evidence to 

show that there was any police misconduct or 

misconduct by the District Attorney or by the 

Defendant's own attorney. The newly discovered 

evidence is not credible and is unworthy of belief.

(Doc. 7 at 27-29). 

On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that 

Gill’s claim that in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), the State had entered into a plea deal with Cook in 

exchange for his testimony, and subsequently covered it up, was 

barred because the issue had been raised and addressed on direct 

appeal. However, the appellate court went on to address the Cook 

affidavit in connection with Gill’s claim that it constituted 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 42 of 54
43

newly discovered evidence which required her conviction be set 

aside and that she be given a new trial. (Doc. 17-10). In 

rejecting Gill’s appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, 

stated in its memorandum opinion:

Gill argues that this [Cook’s] affidavit 

exonerates her and establishes that the State did in 

fact have a plea agreement with Cook prior to his 

testifying at her trial. Although the Brady claim in 

her initial petition was precluded, Rule 32.2, Ala. R. 

Crim. P., does not prevent Gill from raising it as 

newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 32.1(e), 

Ala. R. Crim. P. See Barbour v. State, 903 So. 2d at 

868. . . 

The State submitted the affidavits of Shannon 

Lynch, the prosecuting attorney; Bruce Maddox, Curtis 

Cook's defense attorney; Captain Roy Freine, the lead 

investigator on the murder of Marshall Gill; and 

Sergeant Michael Granthum who also investigated the 

murder of Marshall Gill. Each of these individuals 

essentially refuted Curtis Cook's allegations.

Bruce Maddox, Cook's defense attorney, stated 

that Cook's version of the events leading to Marshall 

Gill's death did not match any of the information that 

he received during his representation of Cook. 

According to Maddox, he met with Cook several times 

prior to his testifying at Gill's trial in order to 

review his testimony. Maddox further stated: "I had a 

typed version of my notes (because my handwriting is 

difficult for others to read) that I reviewed with Mr. 

Cook. He made one potential correction which I wrote 

in by hand. . . . I never instructed Mr. Cook to 'get 

rid' of anything.'' (C. 326-27.)

Shannon Lynch stated that she never had any 

contact with Curtis Cook during the investigation of 

the case until a week before Gill's trial. Lynch 

stated that she met with Cook and his attorney in order 

to confirm that Cook's testimony was consistent with 

what the evidence in the case reflected. According to 

Lynch, she only met with Cook one time and never 

pressured him to testify a certain way. Lynch stated 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 43 of 54
44

that ''[a]t no time was any pressure applied or any 

promises made to Mr. Cook regarding this case." (C. 32 

9.)

Both Captain Freine and Sergeant Granthum stated 

that they did not make any promises to Cook in exchange 

for his testimony. Freine stated that Cook initially 

denied involvement in the crime but, after speaking 

with his family, admitted his involvement in the 

murder. Freine further stated that the evidence 

collected during the investigation corroborated Cook's 

testimony at trial.

. . .

A review of the record from Gill v. State, (CR-08-

0512, October 30, 2009) 64 So. 3d 1153 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2009) (table), reveals that in addition to 

Cook's testimony at trial, Cook admitted on at least 

two previous occasions that he was paid by Vanessa 

Gill to assault her husband. Captain Freine testified 

that, when he interviewed Cook for the second time, 

Cook admitted that Gill paid him "to injure Mr. Gill's 

legs and try to blind him with some Red Devil Lye." 

(R2. 474.) Additionally, Cook's wife, Rachel Cook, 

testified that Curtis Cook called her from his 

cellular telephone while he was being chased by the 

police after the incident occurred. Mrs. Cook 

testified that her husband sounded scared and that she 

could hear the sirens in the background. She stated 

that "[Curtis] told me that he might have killed 

somebody and that he didn't mean to. . . . And later 

he told me that Vanessa [Gill] had paid him $5,000 to 

come to Selma that night and he was supposed to just 

beat Marshall up. And said he was supposed to break 

his legs with a bat." (R2. 501.) Since there was 

other testimony at trial corroborating Cook's 

testimony, we do not find Cook's post-trial 

recantation to be credible. Accordingly, Gill's 

newly-discovered-evidence claim is without merit and 

the circuit court did not err by denying it.

(Doc. 17-10 at 3, 5-8) (footnote omitted). 

The Due Process Clause requires the state to disclose 

exculpatory evidence to the defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 

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45

U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). In Napue v. 

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 268-69, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 

(1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S. 

Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a 

defendant's right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment 

may be violated where the prosecution deliberately misleads a 

jury, or allows misleading testimony to go uncorrected, with 

respect to any promises offered a key prosecution witness in 

exchange for his testimony. A Napue/Giglio violation is a subset 

of a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 

10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), in which the Court held "that the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 

or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. "There are three 

components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must 

be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or 

because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed 

by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice 

must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 

S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Thus, in order to establish 

a Brady claim, petitioner must show that: (1) evidence was 

suppressed by the prosecution in that it was not known to 

petitioner and not available from another source; (2) the 

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46

evidence was favorable or exculpatory; and (3) the evidence was 

material to the question of petitioner's guilt. See Carter v. 

Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000); Luton v. Grandison, 44 

F.3d 626, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1994); see also, Strickler v. Greene, 

527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999); 

Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33 L. Ed. 

2d 706 (1972). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing each of 

these three elements. See Carter, 218 F.3d at 601. 

As noted supra, while the state courts held that Gill’s Brady

claim was barred because it was raised and addressed on direct 

appeal, they did consider the Cook affidavit as newly discovered 

evidence, and evaluated it along with the other evidence of 

record. The appeals court concluded that the Cook affidavit was 

not credible. Gill has not demonstrated that the state courts’ 

factual finding was erroneous. As determined by the trial court, 

Cook’s trial testimony established that Gill orchestrated the 

fatal beating of her husband by Cook for compensation. Cook’s 

trial testimony was corroborated by his wife, who spoke to him by 

telephone immediately after the brutal beating, and before Cook 

had been questioned by police. She testified that Cook told her 

that he had beaten the victim at the behest of Gill, and that days 

later, Gill offered to pay her to keep silent, and subsequently 

arranged for $500 to be given to her in a Walmart parking lot. 

Additionally, Cook’s attorney, the state prosecutors and 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 46 of 54
47

investigators provided affidavits which disputed Cook’s claim that 

they coerced him into giving trial testimony that was favorable to 

the prosecution in exchange for a lighter sentence. For instance, 

Cook’s attorney stated that he took notes of his discussions with 

Cook about the murder, that because his handwriting was bad, he 

had his notes typed, and that when he was reviewing them with 

Cook, Cook clarified some of the information he had recorded; 

thus, there were some handwritten changes. Cook’s lawyer denied 

that there was any offer of a plea or of leniency. Likewise, 

Cook’s own parents testified under oath during the hearing on 

Gill’s motion for a new trial, and they too denied knowledge of 

any plea deal or leniency offered to Cook, and indicated that they 

believed Cook testified at trial because he desired to get things 

right 12 . Against this backdrop of evidence, the state courts 

found that Cook’s affidavit was simply not credible. This factual 

finding by the state court is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. Gill has not shown that the decisions of the state 

courts were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law or that the decisions of those 

courts were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

																																																							 12 While Cook’s affidavit asserted that he had at least three 

meetings with the prosecution and his attorney during which they 

coached him on his testimony, and that jail personnel could 

confirm the meetings, defense witness Beverly Huffman, a Dallas 

County Corrections Officer, testified at trial that she was aware 

of only one meeting at the jail between the prosecutor, Miss 

Shannon Lynch, and Cook. (Doc. 7-1 at 755-56.)

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48

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceedings. 

Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has observed that post-trial 

recantations should be viewed with “extreme suspicion”. See

United States v. Santiago, 837 F. 2d 1545, 1550 (llth Cir. 1988). 

Thus, Gill’s claims five and seven are without merit.

6. Claim Six.

In count six, Gill argues that her conviction and sentence 

should be set aside due to newly discovered evidence, namely the 

Cook affidavit, which proves a due process violation, and that she 

is actually innocent of the charge for which she was convicted. 

(Doc. 7-1 at 55-58). For the reasons set forth above with respect 

to claims five and seven, Gill’s due process claim is likewise 

without merit. Further, to the extent Gill is attempting to raise 

a free standing claim of actual innocence, this claim does not 

present a cognizable basis for federal habeas corpus relief. 

Federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not 

imprisoned in violation of the Constitution, not to correct errors 

of fact. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S. Ct. 

853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). A claim of innocence is not itself 

a constitutional claim. Rather, it is a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred 

constitutional claim considered on the merits. Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 315, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995). To 

satisfy Schlup, a petitioner must first "support [her] allegations 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 48 of 54
49

of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial." 

Id. at 324. The petitioner must then demonstrate that "it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

[her] in light of the new evidence." Id. at 327. However, the 

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available only 

where the prisoner supplements her constitutional claim with a 

colorable showing of factual innocence. The Supreme Court has not 

held that it extends to freestanding claims of actual innocence.

Here, the exception is inapplicable because in claim six, 

Gill does not seek to excuse a procedural default so that she may 

bring a defaulted constitutional claim challenging her conviction. 

Instead, she appears to be seeking seeks habeas relief based on 

her claim that she is factually innocent of murder. She is not 

entitled to federal review of this claim. Further and 

alternatively, even if a free-standing actual innocence claim by a 

defendant not under sentence of death were cognizable, any such 

claim by Gill fails. To prevail on such a claim, she would have to 

meet an "extraordinarily high" standard. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 426. 

The petitioner must show new facts unquestionably establishing her 

innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317. Gill has provided no such 

evidence. As noted supra, Gill’s innocence claim rests solely on 

the recanted affidavit of Cook. The state courts reviewed the 

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50

Cook affidavit, along with the other evidence of record, including 

Cook’s trial testimony, and the testimony of his wife, and 

determined that the post-trial recantation was not credible. The 

Cook affidavit was not consistent with the trial evidence 

reflecting the weapon used and the nature of the injuries 

sustained by the victim, nor was it consistent with the testimony 

of Cook’s wife nor Captain Freine, who both testified that Cook 

admitted to them the night of the murder that he was paid by Gill 

to assault her husband. Accordingly, the Cook affidavit falls way 

short of unquestionably establishing Gill’s innocence. Thus, she 

is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

III. Certificate of Appealability. 

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 

"[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant." Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases (December 

1, 2009). A certificate of appealability may issue only where "the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a habeas 

petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, without reaching the 

merits of any underlying constitutional claim, "a COA should issue 

[only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 50 of 54
51

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. 

Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000). Where a habeas petition is 

being denied on the merits, of an underlying constitutional claim, 

as in this case, a certificate of appealability should issue only 

when the petitioner demonstrates "that reasonable jurists would 

find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong." Id. ("To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a 

habeas prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right, a demonstration that, under Barefoot [v. 

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 

(1983)], includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.") 

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). In 

the instant action, Gill has failed to show that the state courts 

rendered decisions that were neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable applications of, clearly established federal law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

None of Gill’s claims would warrant the issuance of a 

Certificate of Appealability in this case. For the reasons 

discussed above, she has failed to establish that there was 

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52

insufficient evidence to convict, that the instructions to the 

jury and admissibility of photographs into evidence were 

unconstitutional, and has further failed to show that the jury was 

tampered with, that the prosecution failed to reveal a deal made 

with its main witness or failed to disclosed impeaching evidence. 

And, lastly, Petitioner has not presented credible evidence of 

actual innocence. Accordingly, the Court finds that the decision 

of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was a reasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Under the circumstances, reasonable 

jurists could not debate whether any of her claims should be 

resolved in a different manner or were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further on the merits. The 

recommendation that these claims be denied is based on the 

straightforward application of clear Circuit precedent, and no 

reasonable jurist could differ on the appropriate disposition of 

the claims on the record presented. It is thus recommended that 

the Court deny any request for a Certificate of Appealability.

IV. Conclusion. 

Based on the foregoing, it is the recommendation of the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge that Gill's petition for habeas 

corpus relief be denied, that this action be dismissed, and that 

judgment be entered in favor of the Respondents, and against the 

Petitioner, Vanessa Gill. It is further recommended that any 

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53

motion for a Certificate of Appealability or for permission to

appeal in forma pauperis be denied.

Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA GenLR 72(c). The parties 

should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the 

right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was 

informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on 

appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper 

objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error 

if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In 

order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate 

Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination 

is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 53 of 54
54

refers to the briefing done by the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific. 

DONE this 26th day of May, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:13-cv-00514-KD-B Document 21 Filed 05/27/16 Page 54 of 54