Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02404/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02404-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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JOANNE K. 

v. 

DOROTHY M. 

and 

PUBLISH 

.. FILED 

Unned States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circufr 

NOV 15 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PETRINI, .) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 88-2404 

) 

HOWARD; EDWARD T. DOLER, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants, ) 

) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT ) 

OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN ) 

AFFAIRS, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 87-1165M) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Eileen Paez, Albuquerque, New Mexico for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, William L. Lutz, 

United States. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Barbara L. Herwig 

and John S. Koppel, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materi~lly 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th· Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 1 
Before McKAY, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

During the period from August, 1983, to June, 1987, Joanne 

Kathleen Petrini (plaintiff) was employed by the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs (BIA) as a special education teacher at the San Felipe 

Elementary School (San Felipe) located in New Mexico. Plaintiff's 

employment contract was not renewed in 1987 allegedly in 

retaliation for her expressing concerns about the conditions and 

practices at San Felipe. Subsequently, plaintiff brought this 

action seeking damages from, among others, Dorothy M. Howard, an 

assistant principal at San Felipe, and Edward T. Doler, the 

principal at San Felipe, (together, defendants). Plaintiff 

t d B. 1 asser e a ivens claim for alleged interference with rights· 

under the first amendment and state law tort and contract claims, 

2 apparently based on New Mexico law. 

Defendants have appealed from an order of the district court 

denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground that 

plaintiff's Bivens claim is barred by the doctrine of qualified 

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

2 The complaint was not made part of the record. We have 

supplemented the record with the complaint pursuant to 10th Cir. 

R. 11.1.1. 

2 

of 

Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 2 
immunity, and plaintiff's state law tort claims are barred by the 

doctrine of absolute immunity. 3 On appeal, defendants have not 

confined their arguments to the viability of their qualified and 

absolute immunity defenses. Instead, defendants have argued for 

the first time that the remedial scheme of the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-459, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) 

(codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C.) (CSRA) prevents 

plaintiff from asserting her constitutional claim and her state 

law tort claims. We agree that the remedies available to 

plaintiff are constrained by the CSRA and, for the reasons set 

forth below, we reverse the district court's determination. 4 

Bivens Claim 

In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Supreme Court, for 

the first time, refused to recognize a Bivens remedy for 

unconstitutional activities in federal personnel decisions. 

Holding that the plaintiff was limited to the remedial scheme of 

the CRSA, the Court explained: 

3 Ordinarily, a denial of summary judgment is not appealable. 

However, the denial of substantial claims of qualified immunity 

and absolute immunity are appealable as of right under Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985), and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982). 

4 A federal appellate court, as a general rule, will not 

reverse a judgment on the basis of issues not presented below. 

Pell v. Azar Nut Co., 711 F.2d 949, 950 (10th Cir. 1983). This 

rule, however, is not absolute. A federal appellate court is 

justified in reversing a judgment on the basis of issues not 

raised below when, as here, the issues involved are questions of 

law, the proper resolution of which are beyond reasonable doubt, 

and the failure to address the issues would result in a 

miscarriage of justice. Stahmann Farms, Inc. v. United States, 

624 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1980). 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 3 
Federal civil servants are now protected by an 

elaborate comprehensive scheme that encompasses 

substantive provisions forbidding arbitrary action by 

supervisors and procedures--administrative and 

judicial--by which improper action may be redressed. 

They apply to a multitude of personnel decisions that 

are made daily by federal agencies. Constitutional 

challenges to agency action ... are fully cognizable 

within this system. 

Id. at 385-86. 

The Court recently reiterated its cautious approach to 

extending Bivens remedies into new contexts in Schweiker v. 

Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). There the Court declined to 

provide a Bivens remedy for social security claimants challenging 

the termination of their benefits. The Court stated that "[w)hen 

the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has 

provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for 

constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its 

administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies." 

Id. at 423. 

This court has recently applied Bush and Chilicky to 

claimants situated similarly to plaintiff and declined to create 

Bivens remedies in light of the CSRA. Lombardi v. Small Business 

Admin., 889 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1989); Brothers v. Custis, 886 

F.2d 1282 (10th Cir. 1989); Hill v. Department of Air Force, 884 

F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). 

Plaintiff attempts to escape the rationale of Bush and Chilicky by 

arguing that she did not have access to the CSRA framework and, 

even if she did, her Bivens claim does not challenge conduct 

amounting to a "prohibited personnel practice" within the meaning 

of the CSRA, ~ 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1982). However, plaintiff, as a 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 4 
BIA educator, could have availed herself of the procedures and 

remedies of the CSRA by petitioning the Office of the Special 

Counsel and alleging a prohibited employment practice. See 5 

u.s.c. § 1206(a)(l) (1982); see also Brothers, 886 F.2d at 1284 

(recourse to the Office of the Special Counsel is sufficient 

access to CSRA for purposes of Bush and Chilicky). Furthermore, 

the alleged conduct underlying plaintiff's Bivens claim, 

retaliation for the exercise of first amendment rights, is plainly 

cognizable as a prohibited employment practice. Spagnola v. 

Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(discussing 5 u.s.c. 

§ 2302(b)(ll) (1982)). Therefore, since the CSRA accommodates 

plaintiff's constitutional challenge, creation of a Bivens remedy 

for her is unwarranted. See,~, Hill, 884 F.2d at 1321. 

State Law Tort Claims 

As we understand plaintiff's complaint, her state law tort 

claims are premised on a number of alleged activities which 

preceded the nonrenewal of her contract by the BIA. Specifically, 

plaintiff alleged that defendants made false statements to others 

regarding an unspecified disease she contracted from a student 

during the l985-86 school year. Plaintiff also alleged that 

defendants harassed her over minor incidents occurring in the 

classroom and gave her unfavorable employment evaluations. These 

actions, according to plaintiff, constituted defamation and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff further 

alleged that defendants tortiously interfered with her prospective 

employment relationship with the BIA. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 5 
'' 

This court has never addressed the effect of the CSRA on 

challenges to federal personnel actions brought under state law. 

In Bush and Chilicky, the refusal to create Bivens remedies in 

certain contexts was premised on the discretionary exercise of 

judicial restraint. This court, obviously, does not have 

discretion to deny application of the state common law asserted by 

plaintiff. In arguing that the CSRA nevertheless prevents 

plaintiff from asserting her tort claims, defendants have relied 

principally on Berrios v. Department of Army, 884 F.2d 28, 31 (1st 

Cir. 1989), and Broughton v. Courtney, 861 F.2d 639, 644 (11th 

Cir. 1988), where the courts held that state law challenges to 

federal persorinel actions within the scope of the CSRA are 

"preempted" by the CSRA. 

We agree with the analysis of Berrios and Broughton. Federal 

law may supersede state law in several different ways. First, 

Congress may preempt state law, or, second, the federal scheme may 

be sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the presumption 

that Congress intended to leave no room for state law or, third, 

state law may conflict with federal law. California Fed. Sav. & 

Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987)(discussing the 

.preemptive effect of Title VII on state law). It is beyond 

dispute that the CSRA was intended to provide the exclusive 

procedure for challenging federal personnel decisions. Thus, 

adjudication of state law claims within the scope of the CSRA 

would "create an obstacle to the attainment of Congress's goal of 

unifying challenges to federal personnel decisions in a single 

administrative forum." Broughton, 861 F.2d at 641. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 6 
On appeal plaintiff argues, as she did in support of her 

Bivens claim, that the activities upon which she premised her 

state law tort claims are not prohibited by the CSRA. In our 

view, plaintiff's allegations that defendants harassed her over 

minor incidents occurring in the classroom, gave her unfavorable 

employment evaluations, and interfered with her prospective 

employment relationship with the BIA clearly describe matters 

covered by the CSRA. See 5 u.s.c. § 2302(b)(ll) (1982)(supervisor 

may not take any action violating any of the merit system. 

principles of section 2301), 2302(b)(4) (1982)(employees should 

not be deceived or willfully obstructed with respect to competing 

for employment), and 2302(b)(10) (1982)(employees should not be 

discriminated against for conduct which does not adversely affect 

an employee's performance). Therefore, plain~iff's tort claims 

based on these activities are preempted by the CSRA. We emphasize 

that we do not decide that the CSRA preempts all state law tort 

actions by federal employees. We only hold that when such actions 

complain of activities prohibited by the CSRA they are preempted 

by the CSRA. 

The only state law tort claims asserted by plaintiff that are 

arguably outside the scope of the CSRA are the defamation and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims based on the 

alleged publication of false statements regarding a disease she 

contracted from a student. However, while this appeal was 

pending, Congress enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform 

and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 

4563 (1988) (the Reform Act). This new law, which is retroactive, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 7 
codifies the doctrine of absolute immunity and forces persons 

injured by common law torts committed by federal employees within 

the scope of their employment to seek redress against the United 

States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Although neither 

party has addressed this legislation, it apparently would apply to 

this case. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff's defamation and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims based on the 

alleged publication of false statements should be remanded to 

allow the district court to determine, in accordance with the 

procedures under the Reform Act, whether these claims can be 

maintained as claims against the United States under the FTCA. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico denying defendants' motion for 

summary judgment on plaintiff's Bivens claim and plaintiff's state 

law tort claims is REVERSED. The cause is REMANDED with 

directions to conduct further proceedings under the Reform Act 

with respect to plaintiff's defamation and intentional infliction 

of emotional distress claims based on the alleged publication of 

false statements. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2404 Document: 01019953150 Date Filed: 11/15/1990 Page: 8