Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02015/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02015-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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* This motion was determined suitable for decision without oral

argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

1 The background section discusses the allegations in

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which must be accepted as true for

the purposes of a motion to dismiss. (See supra page 3.) 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RON POLI, )

) 2:05-2015-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

MOUNTAIN VALLEYS HEALTH )

CENTERS, INC., RITE AID )

CORPORATION, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendant Thrifty Payless DBA Rite Aid Corporation (“Rite

Aid”), moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of

public policy, negligence, and invasion of privacy under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Mem. of P & A in Supp. of Mot.

to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 2.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Mountain Valleys Health

Center (“Mountain Valleys”) as a physician assistant and nurse

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practitioner from 2002 until November 2005. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”)

¶¶ 7, 19.) While employed by Defendant Mountain Valleys, Plaintiff

and other physician assistants often received prescription

recommendations from doctors, transmitted the prescription to a

pharmacy, and had the prescription filled for personal use. (Id.

¶ 9.) On one occasion, Plaintiff told a doctor he was extremely

depressed and he had taken his girlfriend’s Xanax, an anti-depressant

prescription drug, on several occasions. (Id. ¶ 7.) The doctor told

Plaintiff his use of the drug was appropriate and gave his approval

and recommendation. (Id.) Plaintiff called a pharmacy operated by

Defendant Rite Aid and told the pharmacist that the doctor recommended

his continued use of Xanax. (Id. ¶ 8.) The pharmacy provided

Plaintiff with twenty (20) Xanax pills. (Id.) 

On August 31, 2004, an officer of the Shasta County

Sheriff’s Department stopped Plaintiff while he was driving a car. 

(Id. ¶ 11.) The officer discovered prescription drugs inside the car. 

(Id.) The Sheriff’s Department conducted an investigation into the

origin of the prescription drugs, during which it contacted Defendant

Mountain Valleys and requested Plaintiff’s medical records. (Id. ¶

12.) Defendant Mountain Valleys did not have any medical records on

Plaintiff. (Id ¶ 8.) Defendant Mountain Valleys subsequently called

Defendant Rite Aid and obtained Plaintiff’s prescription records. 

(Id. ¶ 14.) 

On October 11, 2005, Plaintiff was placed on indefinite

administrative leave pending an investigation into his alleged

possession of a prescription drug without physician approval. (Id.

¶ 15.) On October 28, 2004, Plaintiff received a letter in which the

administrative leave was reaffirmed and Plaintiff was informed he

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could resume work only if he received a satisfactory evaluation from a

licensed mental health professional and/or diversion program. (Id.) 

Plaintiff visited a mental health professional, but did not admit

himself into a substance abuse program. (Id. ¶ 17.) On November 23,

2004, Plaintiff received a letter notifying him that the Board of

Directors had voted to terminate his employment. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

Plaintiff has sued Defendant Rite Aid alleging that “[i]n

wrongfully releasing Plaintiff’s medical information, Defendant [Rite

Aid] violated public policy by failing to comply with 42 U.S.C. 1320,”

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). 

(Id. ¶ 9.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges California state law claims

against Defendant Rite Aid for negligence and invasion of privacy. 

(Id. ¶¶ 51-60.) 

DISCUSSION

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

all material allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the plaintiff is given

the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the

allegations in his complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Accordingly, a motion to

dismiss must be denied “unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). 

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if the

plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A

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plaintiff fails to state claim by either (1) failing to present a

cognizable legal theory, or (2) failing to plead sufficient facts to

support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). “If a complaint is

dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be

granted unless the court determines that allegation of other facts

consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the

deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806

F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

A. Violation of Public Policy

Defendant Rite Aid argues Plaintiff’s claim for violation of

public policy seeks to “impermissibly enforce HIPAA” because “the

authority to enforce HIPAA resides exclusively with . . . the

Secretary of Health and Human Services.” (Def.’s Reply at 4.) 

Plaintiff alleges he “has properly stated a cause of action against

Rite Aid for violating public policy by improperly disclosing

Plaintiff’s personal medical information without his consent as

required by [HIPAA].” (Pl.’s Opp’n 4.) 

“HIPAA imposes requirements on the Department of Health and

Human Services, health plans, and healthcare providers involved in the

exchange of health information [in order] to protect the

confidentiality of such information . . . .” Johnson v. Quander, 370

F. Supp. 2d 79, 99 (D.D.C. 2005). In addition, HIPAA “provides for

both civil and criminal penalties for individuals who improperly

handle or disclose individually identifiable health information.” Id.

However, HIPAA “specifically indicates” that the Secretary of Health

and Human Services “shall pursue the action against an alleged

offender, not a private individual.” Johnson, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 100;

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Logan v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 357 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 (D.D.C.

2004). Accordingly, “HIPAA does not expressly provide for a private

cause of action.” O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 173

F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1178 (D. Wyo. 2001); Logan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 155. 

Furthermore, HIPAA does not impliedly provide for a private

cause of action. O’Donnell, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1179; Logan, 357 F.

Supp. 2d at 155; Johnson, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 100. “In order to

determine whether a private cause of action is implicit in a statute

not expressly providing one, the critical inquiry is whether Congress

intended to create a private cause of action.” O’Donnell, 173 F.

Supp. 2d at 1179. By delegating enforcement of HIPAA to Secretary of

Health and Human Services, Congress evinced an intent to preclude

enforcement by private individuals. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532

U.S. 275, 286-287 (2001) (“The express provision of one method of

enforcing [a statute] suggests Congress intended to preclude others.”) 

“Review of HIPAA’s enforcement provisions reveals no congressional

intent to create a private right or remedy.” O’Donnell, 173 F. Supp.

2d at 1179. 

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for violation

of HIPAA because no express or implied private cause of action exists

under the statute. Although Plaintiff seeks to circumvent this

limitation by alleging a claim for “violation of public policy”

premised on Defendant Rite Aid’s failure to comply with HIPAA, to

recognize such a claim would be tantamount to creating a cause of

action where none exists. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-287

(“Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them [is

not] a proper function . . . for federal tribunals.”). Therefore,

Defendant Rite Aid’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for

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“violation of public policy” with prejudice is granted because

Plaintiff has “fail[ed] to present a cognizable legal theory,”

Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533-34, and “the allegation of other facts

. . . could not possibly cure the deficiency,” Schreiber, 806 F.2d at

1401. 

B. Negligence

Defendant Rite Aid also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s

negligence claim, arguing it did not have a duty to withhold

Plaintiff’s prescription records from Defendant Mountain Valleys. 

(Def.’s Mem. 7.) Plaintiff contends Defendant Rite Aid “improperly

seeks to argue the factual merits of the case” by “giving after the

fact excuses why it disclosed Plaintiff’s private information.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) Plaintiff asserts the motion to dismiss should be

denied because he has properly alleged the existence of a duty as well

as the other requisite elements of a negligence claim. (Id. at 7.) 

To state a negligence claim, Plaintiff must allege “four

elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages.” 

Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff

alleges “Defendants had a duty not to disclose medical information

without adequate cause or a proper subpoena. Defendants breached this

duty by disclosing Plaintiff’s medical information to a third party

without adequate cause or a proper subpoena. As a proximate result

. . . Plaintiff has become mentally traumatized, distressed and

aggravated.” (FAC ¶¶ 51-54.) Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged each

of the four elements of negligence. Although Defendant Rite Aid

contends it does not owe Plaintiff a duty, on a motion to dismiss, all

material allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer, 416

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U.S. at 236. Consequently, Defendant Rite Aid’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s negligence claim is denied. 

C. Invasion of Privacy

Defendant Rite Aid argues Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy

claim should be dismissed because “Plaintiff did not have a reasonable

expectation that his pharmacy records would remain private from

Mountain Valleys . . . .” (Def.’s Mem. at 6.) Plaintiff contends

Defendant Rite Aid “improperly seeks to argue the factual merits of

the case” by “giving after the fact excuses why it disclosed

Plaintiff’s private information.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) Plaintiff

argues that the dismissal motion should be denied because he “has pled

facts showing . . . [he] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in

keeping confidential his personal medical information . . . .” (Id.

at 8.) 

To state an invasion of privacy claim, Plaintiff must allege

(1) a legally protected privacy interest, 2) a reasonable expectation

of privacy under the circumstances, and (3) conduct by Defendant Rite

Aid amounting to a serious invasion of a protected privacy interest. 

Egan v. Schmock, 93 Fed. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal 2000)

(citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 7 Cal. 4th

1, 39-40 (1994)). “A ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy is an

objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted

community norms . . . . [and is] relative to the customs of the time

and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his

neighbors and fellow citizens.” Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 37. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Rite Aid released his prescription records to his

employer, Defendant Mountain Valleys, without his consent, adequate

cause or proper subpoena. (FAC ¶ 56.) Giving Plaintiff “the benefit

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of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from. . . [his]

allegations,” a reasonable person could have an expectation of privacy

under the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant

Rite Aid’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim is

denied because it does not appear “beyond a doubt” that Plaintiff can

prove “no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Rite Aid for violation

of public policy is dismissed with prejudice. Defendant Rite Aid’s

motion to dismiss is otherwise denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 11, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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