Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00702/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00702-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROCHELLE WYNES, et al, No. 2:10-cv-00702-MCE-GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KAISER PERMANENTE HOSPITALS,

et al,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

The dispute arises over the termination of Plaintiffs by

Defendant employer on alleged grounds of age and disability

discrimination. Kaiser Permanente Hospitals, Kaiser Permanente,

Inc., Ruby Gartrell, Luann Lemay, Henry Amos, Maria Zayac,

Barbara Voors, and Cornelius Stewart (“Defendants”) have now

filed concurrent motions: (1) a Motion to Dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) with respect to both entire claims 1

and as to individual defendants; and (2) a Motion to Strike

certain aspects of Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f). 

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 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 2

allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint unless otherwise specified. 

 The Complaint also names Kaiser Permanente, Inc. as a 3

defendant. However, Defendants assert that this organization is

in Southern California and never employed any of the Plaintiffs. 

 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 4

establishes 40 as the threshold age to qualify for protection. 

29 U.S.C. § 631(a)

2

Following a review of the implicated statutes and an application

of the relevant case law, Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

is GRANTED with leave to amend and Defendants’ 12(f) Motion to

Strike is also GRANTED.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs Rochelle Wynes, Carmela Ray, Linda Baerresen, and

Marsha Scribner (“Plaintiffs”) were registered nurses employed by

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals for a significant length of time

before they were terminated in 2008 and 2009. At the time of 3

their termination, Plaintiffs were employed as senior discharge

planners (also referred to as “patient care coordinators”). All

named Plaintiffs are over 40 years of age.4

Plaintiff Scribner was terminated in November, 2008 when she

was 64 years of age. Plaintiff Ray was terminated in February,

2009. Plaintiff Baerresen was terminated in October, 2008 at 59

years of age. Plaintiff Wynes was terminated in March, 2009 at

52 years of age. 

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3

According to Plaintiffs, they each made a charge of

employment discrimination with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH” or “Department”), the state agency

responsible for receiving and investigating employment

discrimination claims under California law, and concurrently with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or

“Commission”) within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment

practice they allege. On March 24, 2009, the DFEH issued a

notice of case closure and right-to-sue letter to Plaintiff Wynes

on March 24, 2009 and the Complaint was filed within one year of

that date as required by statute. Since receiving the right-tosue letter, Plaintiff Wynes has submitted additional charges to

the DFEH which has yet to result in an investigation or a rightto-sue letter. 

The remaining Plaintiffs have filed employment

discrimination charges with the DFEH but have not yet received

case closure notices. More specifically, Plaintiff Baerresen

submitted charges to DFEH on September 25, 2009 alleging age,

race, and disability discrimination and the matter remains under

investigation; Plaintiff Scribner submitted charges to DFEH on

June 30, 2009 alleging age discrimination and the matter is still

under investigation; and Plaintiff Ray submitted charges to DFEH

in March, 2010 alleging ethnic and age discrimination and the

matter has yet to be investigated. 

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4

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 23, 2010 alleging

numerous state and federal claims: (1) wrongful termination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; (2) violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.;

(3) discrimination and retaliation by individual defendants in

violation of federal and state law; (4) wrongful termination in

violation of public policy; (5) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; (6) breach of contract; (7) (unnumbered in

Complaint) violation of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009

(“Act”), Pub. L. 111-2, §§ 2-5, 123 Stat. 5 (2009);

(8) violations of the provisions of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat.

829 (1974); and (9) assault and battery against Defendant Maria

Zayac. Plaintiffs’ Complaint also implicates § 701 of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(3). This Court

must now determine whether: (1) Plaintiffs have asserted

sufficient factual allegations to survive Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss; and (2) the cited language in the Complaint is relevant

to the dispute. 

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. 

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5

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.

1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair

notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 555

(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain

something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

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6

B. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “(T)he function of a 12(f)

motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing

with those issues prior to trial....” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. Fantasy, Inc. v.

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (rev’d on other

grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Impertinent matter consists

of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the

issues in question. Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss attacking:

(1) Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims with respect to individual claimants

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiffs’

ADA claims against individual defendants as well as arguing that

Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the statutory requirements to bring

a civil suit; (3) Plaintiffs’ discrimination and retaliation

charges against individual defendants; (4) Plaintiffs’ wrongful

termination charge; 

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7

(5) Plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Lilly Ledbetter Pay

Act; and (6) Plaintiffs’ cause of action under ERISA. (Defs.’

Mem. of P & A in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 1). A review of

the implicated federal statutes and the applicable case law

reveal that Defendants have the prevailing argument.

1. ADEA Claims

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs Ray, Baerresen, and

Scribner have not exhausted the statutorily required

administrative remedies. (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in Support of

Mot. to Dismiss 2). Plaintiffs assert that charges of employment

discrimination were filed concurrently with the DFEH as well as

with the EEOC within 180 days of the discovery of the commission

of the unlawful employment practices. (Complaint ¶ 9). 

Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that they are now opting to waive

their rights under the California Fair Housing and Employment

Act, Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12900-12996, and proceed in the instant

litigation presumably under 29 U.S.C. § 626(f). (Pls.’ Opp. to

Mot. to Dismiss 2). That action, however, does not correct the

deficiencies in the Complaint. 

In California, an individual who first files a complaint

with the DFEH must file the same charge with the EEOC within 300

days of the alleged unlawful practice. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B);

Bean v. Crocker Nat. Bank, 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979). 

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8

It is important to note that the Supreme Court has concluded that

filing a timely charge with the EEOC is not a prerequisite to

suit in federal court, but rather, “is subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). 

Under California law, an aggrieved individual alleging

workplace discrimination must exhaust administrative remedies

before he or she may bring a civil suit. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12960(b). In order to satisfy this requirement, the individual

must file a verified complaint with DFEH within one year of the

alleged workplace discrimination and obtain notice from the

Department of the right-to-sue. Cal. Gov’t Code § 1260(d). This

letter may be obtained upon the request of the complainant or by

the DFEH upon completion of its investigation. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 1265(b). Such a letter is a prerequisite to commencing civil

litigation under the FEHA. See, e.g., Denny v. Universal City

Studios, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (1992). Federal courts

overseeing litigation implicating the FEHA have reached the same

conclusion. See, e.g., Davenport v. Board of Trustees of State

Center Community College Dist., 654 F. Supp. 2d. 1073, 1088 (E.D.

Cal. 2009) (holding that, to bring a civil action under FEHA, the

aggrieved person must exhaust the administrative remedies

provided by California law).

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9

The ADEA provides a cause of action for aggrieved

individuals as defined by the suit; however, such a right

terminates upon the commencement of an action by the EEOC.

29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). Additionally, the ADEA establishes that,

if the charges are dismissed or otherwise terminated by the

Commission, it must then notify the complainant who may then

commence a civil suit within 90 days of receipt of such notice. 

29 U.S.C. § 626(e).

California is a deferral state under the ADEA, meaning that

the EEOC has agreed to defer cases to the appropriate state

entity for preliminary investigation. McConnell v. General

Telephone Co. of California, 814 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1987) cert.

denied 484 U.S. 1059 (1988). Consequently, contrary to

assertions by Defendants, Plaintiffs have satisfied the filing

requirement with the EEOC. However, Plaintiffs have failed to

exhaust administrative remedies because they have not received

the right-to-sue letter from the DFEH. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v

Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) (holding that, in states having laws

prohibiting discrimination proscribed by the ADEA, an aggrieved

person must resort to appropriate state remedies before bringing

an age discrimination suit in federal court). Therefore,

Plaintiffs Baerresen, Ray, and Scribner have failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted because they have not

exhausted their state administrative remedies.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADEA

claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is GRANTED

with leave to amend. 

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2. ADA Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ ADA claims against

individual Defendants Gartrell and LaMay are deficient because

(i) neither are “employers” as defined by the statute, and

(ii) Plaintiffs have yet to receive a right-to-sue letter from

the DFEH, they have not exhausted the required administrative

remedies. (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in Support of Mot. to Dismiss

3). Following a review of the pertinent statutes and applicable

case law, Defendants again have the prevailing argument.

(i) Individuals

Although both parties cite Walsh v. Nevada Department of

Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2006), they arrive at

different conclusions. Plaintiffs contend that individuals can

be held liable under the ADA and cite in support of Judge

Fletcher’s dissenting opinion in Miller v. Maxwell’s

International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding

that an individual can be personally liable under sections 701

through 718 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

Additionally, Plaintiffs attempt to draw a factual distinction in

that the defendants in Walsh were government employees and that

“the principals [sic] enunciated therein are not applicable and

should not be extended to private sector employers.” (Pls.’ Opp.

to Mot. to Dismiss 3). However, Plaintiffs ask this Court to

decide against applying what is clearly established law within

the Ninth Circuit.

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In Walsh, the Court closely analyzed the language of the ADA

and concluded that, because Title I of the ADA adopts both a

definition of “employer” and a remedial scheme that is “identical

in many respects” to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

the bar against individual agents of the employer established in

Miller, supra, in Title VII civil suits applies to the ADA. 

Walsh, 471 F.3d at 1038. Such are the circumstances in the

instant case. Plaintiffs are bringing ADA claims against

individual Defendants Gartrell and Lemay, individual agents of

the employer, which is clearly prohibited in the Ninth Circuit. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to

the ADA claims against individual defendants is GRANTED with

leave to amend. 

(ii) Exhaustion

In support of their contention that Plaintiffs Wynes and

Baerresen have failed to exhaust the required administrative

remedies, Defendants point to the fact that Baerresen has yet to

receive a right-to-sue letter from the DFEH. (Defs.’ Mem. of P &

A in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 4). 

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 Plaintiff Wynes’ right-to-sue letter concerned “wrongful 5

termination based upon age, gender, racial, and freedom of

association discrimination, including harassment and retaliation

claims.” (Complaint ¶ 10). 

12

Additionally, Defendants also note that Wynes, in her initial

charge filed with the DFEH, did not allege disability

discrimination and, as a result, has submitted additional charges

to the Department to, presumably, provide grounds for this

claim. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not deny the fact that they have not 5

received the appropriate right-to-sue letters.

The ADA requires that a person bringing a civil suit under

the Act (1) timely file with the EEOC and (2) receive notice from

the Commission of a right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1);

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). In

deferral states such as California, the initial pursuit of state

administrative remedies is a mandatory step in the process of

obtaining relief under the ADA. London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644

F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1981). California law, like its federal

counterpart, requires a complainant to receive a notice of rightto-sue before commencing a civil lawsuit. Denny, 10 Cal. App.

4th. Plaintiff Baerresen has not received such a letter and her

charge remains under investigation by DFEH. Additionally, where

claims are not originally raised with the EEOC or the equivalent

state agency, a federal district court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over them in a civil case. Shah v. Mt. Zion

Hospital and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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With respect to Plaintiff Wynes’ right-to-sue letter, the ADA

violations were not originally included in the charge filed with

the DFEH. Therefore, this Court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADA claims

due to Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust state administrative

remedies is GRANTED with leave to amend.

3. Discrimination and Retaliation

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs Wynes and Baerresen’s

cause of action for discrimination and retaliation in violation

of federal and state law against individual defendants Gartrell,

Lemay, and Amos should be dismissed because the statutes cited do

not provide for relief against individuals. (Defs.’ Mem. of P &

A in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 4). In response, Plaintiffs

halfheartedly support the claim against individuals and reassert

that such a cause of action exists against employers. Plaintiffs

cite the ADA, the ADEA, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, The Civil

Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Fair Labor

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., in their opposition

brief. (Pls.’ Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 4). However,

Plaintiffs only cite the ADA in their Complaint. Aside from a

reference to the ADA, Plaintiffs do not cite any state or federal

statute in the cause of action. As already established, the ADA

does not provide causes of action against individual defendants. 

Walsh, 471 F.3d at 1038. 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third

Cause of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend.

4. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Defendants attack Plaintiffs Ray, Baerresen, and Scribner’s

Fourth Cause of Action on two grounds. First, Defendants argue

that “a claim of wrongful termination in violation of

public...must identify a specific statute or regulation that the

plaintiff claims the employer violated.” (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A

in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 5). Having failed to cite such a

statute, argue Defendants, the cause of action should be

dismissed. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed

to plead the necessary factual allegations to support their

claim. (Id.) The essence being that this showing is not

sufficient to satisfy Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007). 

In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs cite several statutes,

both state and federal, that establish an employee’s property

interest in his or her employment and career. (Pls. Opp. to Mot.

to Dismiss 4). Moreover, citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcots Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993),

Plaintiffs argue that they have met the Rule 8 pleading standards

and cite specific paragraphs within the Complaint that they

believe do so. (Pls. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 5). 

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Rule (8)(a)(2) requires “more than labels and conclusions”

and must contain “something more than a statement of facts that

merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation and

citation omitted). The Supreme Court approvingly cited 5 Wright

& Miller § 1202, 94: “Rule 8(a) ‘contemplates the statement of

the circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the

claim presented’ and does not authorize a pleader’s ‘bare

averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.’” Id. at

556, fn 3.

When evaluated against the Twombly backdrop, Plaintiffs’

Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at

555. The specific paragraphs in the Complaint pointed to in

Plaintiffs’ opposition brief appear to be a series of conclusory

statements that do not contain detail to adequately notify the

Defendants of the Plaintiffs’ claim and the grounds upon which it

is based with respect to Plaintiffs Ray, Baerresen, and Scribner. 

The Complaint states “the details of their respective

terminations will be more fully provided and described in an

amended complaint when a right to sue or determination letters

are received.” (Complaint ¶ 41). Such a statement suggests that

Plaintiffs themselves are concerned about the factual

shortcomings of the Complaint. Allegations of discrimination and

retaliation must be supported by the circumstances, occurrences,

and events that both provide a context for the claim and serve as

a source of relief. Id. In the instant case, such factual

allegations are absent from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 

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 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have failed to 6

identify a specific state or federal statute within the cause of

action. Such an omission leaves both the Court and Defendants

unclear as to the specific remedies Plaintiffs seek and, as noted

by the California Supreme Court, to “guess at the nature of the

public policies involves.” Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,

7 Cal. 4th 1238 (1994). 

16

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

Fourth Cause of Action with respect to Plaintiffs Ray, Baerresen,

and Scribner is GRANTED with leave to amend.6

5. Lilly Ledbetter Pay Act of 2009

Defendants also take issue with Plaintiff Wynes’ unnumbered

cause of action under the Lilly Ledbetter Pay Act of 2009, Pub.

L. 111-2, §§ 2-5, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). Defendants argue that the

purpose of the Act was to extend the statute of limitations of

preexisting anti-discrimination statutes and not to create an

independent cause of action. (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in Support of

Mot. to Dismiss 7). 

Defendants correctly assert that the Act was intended to

modify the statute of limitations imposed on certain

discrimination claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 

Plaintiffs may seek damages for discriminatory wage practices;

however, such a cause of action must arise under another statute. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Wynes’

unnumbered cause of action is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

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6. ERISA Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Seventh Cause of Action,

violation of the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829

(1974), should be dismissed because there is no factual

allegation to support the claim. (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in

Support of Mot. to Dismiss 7). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs

have failed to allege which of them were eligible for an ERISA

covered plan and have not stated under which plan they would have

been eligible for benefits. (Id.) 

Section 510 “incorporates the enforcement structure of

ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, section 502, which generally

provides that civil actions may be brought by participants,

beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor. Lessard

v. Applied Risk Management, 307 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2002)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Section 510 of

ERISA provides, in relevant part: 

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,

suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate, against a

participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to

which he is entitled under the provisions of an

employee benefit plan...or for the purpose of

interfering with the attainment of any right to which

such participant may become entitled under the plan. 

29 U.S.C. § 1140. The purpose of section 510 is to prevent

actions which would “cut off or interfere with a participant’s

ability to collect present or future benefits or which punish a

participant for exercising his or her rights under an employee

benefit plan.” Lessard, 307 F.3d at 1024. 

///

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The Lessard court goes on to observe that it is a violation of

federal law for an employer to discharge an employee or otherwise

“discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising

any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an

employee benefit plan. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1140) (emphasis

added). A right must first exist under the plan for a plaintiff

to be able to recover under a discrimination charge. See Wright

v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding ERISA does no more than protect benefits which are due

to employee under the plan).

Given the standard articulated above, Plaintiffs’ ERISA

claims, as stated in the Complaint, are clearly deficient. At

the very minimum, the Complaint should specify which Plaintiffs

were eligible for benefits and which benefits established a right

under the ERISA. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ ERISA cause of action

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’

Seventh Cause of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

7. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Causes of Action

Having failed to allege a viable federal claim, with only

Plaintiff’s state law claims remaining, this Court ceases to have

subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). The Court declines to exercise its supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state causes of action and they

are dismissed without prejudice. 

///

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The Court need not address the merits of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss with respect to the remaining state law causes of action

as those issues are now moot.

 

B. Motion to Strike

Defendants filed a 12(f) motion to strike on grounds:

(1) that the Complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination,

but does not include a cause of action or claim for relief for

such discrimination; (2) the Complaint improperly alleges factual

allegations that may only be addressed by the National Labor

Relations Board; and (3) the Complaint improperly purports to be

brought on behalf of unidentified plaintiffs in violation of

Rule 10(a). (Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 1-2).

1. Racial/Ethnic Discrimination 

Defendants argue that the allegations of racial and ethnic

discrimination are immaterial, and should therefore be stricken.

(Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in Support of Mot. to Strike 4). Because

there is no cause of action for racial discrimination, contend

Defendants, the language is irrelevant to the matter in dispute. 

The references to the ethnicity/race of the individual

Plaintiffs is not materially related to the claim for relief. 

Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527. Plaintiffs do not explicitly

assert a cause of action for race discrimination in the

Complaint, and such discrimination is not subsumed within any of

the cited causes of action. 

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Therefore, the references to the race of the individual

Plaintiffs is not pertinent to the issues in dispute.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike the language

alleging racial and ethnic discrimination from the Complaint is

GRANTED. 

2. NLRA

Defendants contend that the language in the Complaint

asserting that Plaintiffs were retaliated against for labor

organization activities implicates the National Labor Relations

Act (“NLRA”), 23 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in

Support of Mot. to Strike 3). As a consequence, Defendants

assert that such disputes are within the original jurisdiction of

the National Labor Relations Board, and “neither federal nor

state courts have jurisdiction to grant relief.” (Id.) 

It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that neither

state nor federal courts have jurisdiction over suits directly

involving activity which is arguably subject to provisions of the

NLRA relating to the rights of employees to organize and

collectively bargain and to unfair labor practices. Berlault v.

Local 40, Super Cargoes and Checkers of Intern. Longshoremen’s

and Warehousemen’s Union, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974); See also

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v.

Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). Defendants’ conduct, as

described in the Complaint, implicates rights extended to

employees under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 

///

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Plaintiffs allege that Defendants retaliated against them for,

inter alia, “attempting to organize protests and criticism,” as

well as “advocating for improved working conditions and pay.” 

(Complaint ¶¶ 15, 17). Such interference by an employer is

expressly prohibited by the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and must be

adjudicated before the NLRB, as it is within the primary

jurisdiction of the NLRB to adjudicate the status of such

conduct. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike the language

within the Complaint implicating the NLRA is GRANTED.

3. Unnamed Plaintiffs

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ Complaint improperly

purports to be brought on behalf of an unknown number of unnamed

additional plaintiffs. (Defs.’ Mem. of P & A in Support of Mot.

to Strike 2). Rule 10(a) requires that each party be named in

the caption at the commencement of a lawsuit. Rules 20 and 23

serve as a corollary to this requirement and allow additional

parties to join under two circumstances: (i) if they assert any

right to relief jointly, severally, or if the relief arose from

the same transaction; and (ii) if it is a class action. The

instant litigation does not fall under either of those

exceptions. 

Traditionally, however, a Court can nonetheless allow for

plaintiffs to proceed with an action if compelling reasons are

presented. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop

Estate, 596 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 7

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g).

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It is the Plaintiffs burden to establish a need to proceed

anonymously. Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214

F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs have not alleged any such

compelling justifications for anonymity. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike the language

within the Complaint referencing additional plaintiffs is

GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED with leave to amend and

Defendants’ 12(f) motion to strike (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED, also

with leave to amend.7

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 12, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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