Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03603/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03603-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEE DAVID THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03603-EDL 

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 32

On December 4, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For 

the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and the complaint is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 1, 2005, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage from America’s Wholesale Lender and 

purchased the Subject Property. (RJN Ex. A.)1 The deed of trust (“DOT”) identifies ReconTrust 

Company, N.A.2as Trustee and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the 

 

1 Defendant asks that the Court take judicial notice of a number of documents related to the 

subject property that are recorded with the San Mateo County County Recorder’s Office. (See

Dkt. 33, Judicial Notice Request (“RJN”) at 2-3.) Several courts in mortgage foreclosure cases, 

including this one, have taken judicial notice of similar documents. See, e.g., Salenfriend v. Green 

Tree Servicing, LLC, 14-cv-3251, Dkt. 30 at 2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014) (Laporte, J.); Ford v. 

Wells Faro Home Mortgage, 2008 WL 5070687, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2008) (Conti, J.); 

Valasquez v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 4938162, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

17, 2008) (Hamilton, J.). Plaintiff opposes the request and appears to argue that because 

Defendant submitted copies of these documents and not the originals, the documents cannot be 

authenticated. However, Plaintiff provides no basis for concluding that these documents are not 

true and correct copies of San Mateo County’s records and these documents “are part of the public 

record and are easily verifiable.” Ford, 2008 WL 5070687, at *2; see also Valasquez, 2008 WL 

4938162, at *3 (“on a motion to dismiss, a court may properly look beyond the complaint to 

matters of public record”); Fed. R. Evid. 902. Consequently, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

request.

2 ReconTrust is a subsidiary of Bank of America that provides financial services to the mortgage 

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beneficiary and nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns. (Id.) On February 

22, 2010, MERS assigned “all beneficial interest” under the DOT to “The Bank of New York 

Mellon FKA The Bank of New York As Trustree for the Certificateholders CWALT, Inc. 

Alternative Loan Trust 2005-43 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-43.” (RJN Ex. 

B.) Plaintiff subsequently defaulted on the loan and, on February 24, 2010, ReconTrust recorded a 

notice of default. (RJN Ex. C.) Thereafter, several notices of trustee’s sales were recorded. (RJN 

Exs. D-G.) On April 3, 2014, Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom & Winters LLP, was substituted as 

Trustee. (RJN Ex. H.) Although the most recent sale was noticed for July 29, 2014, it was 

rescinded. (RJN Ex. J.) Neither party alleges that a sale has occurred.

On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action. On September 3, 2014, Defendant moved to 

dismiss the original complaint. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition. Subsequently, on October 22, 

2014, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to file an opposition, which the Court granted. 

Plaintiff thereafter filed a “voluntary motion to dismiss” that the Court construed as a notice of 

non-opposition to Defendant’s motion. The Court granted Defendant’s motion and dismissed the 

complaint without prejudice except to Plaintiff’s Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”) and Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”) claims, which the 

Court dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. 20 at 3 (finding that Defendant “is not a ‘debt collector’ 

within the meaning of either the FDCPA or the RFDCPA”).) On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff 

filed an amended complaint.

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II. STANDARD

A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “sufficient factual 

matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The reviewing 

 

industry. (See Cmpl. ¶ 30.)

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Plaintiff’s opposition was filed late and exceeds the page limit. In its reply, Defendant asks that 

the Court disregard Plaintiff’s opposition, noting that the Court previously warned Plaintiff to 

comply with the rules. (See Dkt. 14 (granting Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time and 

stating that “Plaintiff is warned that he must comply with the Local Rules henceforth.”).) 

However, the Court need not decide this issue because, even considering Plaintiff’s opposition, the 

Court grants Defendant’s motion.

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court’s “inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 

580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A court need not, however, accept as true the complaint’s “legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 

supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Thus, a reviewing court may begin “by identifying 

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of 

truth.” Id. Furthermore, a court also need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters 

properly subject to judicial notice.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s First Claim for Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) 

“The FCRA was enacted to promote the equitable use of consumer credit information and 

to ensure fairness and accuracy within the credit reporting system.” Banga v. Chevron U.S.A. 

Inc., 2013 WL 71772, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013) (Spero, J.). The FCRA thus limits the 

purposes for which a consumer credit report can be obtained. Id. The FCRA allows a consumer 

to “assert a private cause of action for either willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA.” 

Id. Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to prove a violation of the FCRA. For 

example, Plaintiff simply alleges that “there was absolutely no reason for Defendant to obtain 

Plaintiff’s credit report.” (Cmplt. ¶ 38.) This is a conclusory allegation and insufficient to 

demonstrate why Defendant had no permissible purpose. Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that 

Defendant “knowingly and willfully” violated the FCRA but provides no factual basis for that 

assertion. See Banga, 2013 WL 71772, at *10 (“a plaintiff may demonstrate ‘willfulness’ by 

showing a ‘reckless disregard’ of statutory duty. . . . A defendant acts in reckless disregard if the 

defendant's action ‘is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but 

shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated 

with a reading that was merely careless.’” (quoting Bateman v. American Multi–Cinema, 623 F.3d 

708, 711 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2010))).

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B. Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Violation of Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1785.25(a), California 

Consumer Credit Reporting Agency (“CCCRA”)

The CCCRA provides that “[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific 

transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should 

know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). Plaintiff pleads 

the element of unlawful conduct under this statute but does not allege that Defendant violated the 

CCCRA. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim. 

C. Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

“The elements for a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) 

outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (4) causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Love 

v. Permanente Med. Grp., 2013 WL 1402890, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) (Rogers, J.). 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim as his factual allegations are conclusory and are not pled with 

particularity. (See Cmplt. ¶¶ 48-50.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Declaratory Judgment/Quiet Title

“A quiet title action must include: (1) a description of the property in question; (2) the 

basis for plaintiff’s title; and (3) the adverse claims to plaintiff's title.” Kelley v. Mortgage Elec. 

Registration Sys., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Illston, J.). Plaintiff’s claim 

fails because he does not allege that he has paid the outstanding debt on which the mortgage is 

based. Id. (“Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are the rightful owners of the property, i.e. that 

they have satisfied their obligations under the Deed of Trust. As such, they have not stated a claim 

to quiet title.”); Miller v. Provost, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1703, 1707 (1994) (“[A] mortgagor of real 

property cannot, without paying his debt, quiet his title against the mortgagee.”). Indeed, Plaintiff 

admits that “he has failed to make payments on his mortgage[] since April []2009.” (Opp. at 23.) 

E. Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for Wrongful Foreclosure

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim fails, among other reasons, for 

failure to allege tender. Under California law, “[a] valid and viable tender of payment of the 

indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust.” 

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Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 15 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117 (1971); Odinma v. Aurora 

Loan Servs., 2010 WL 2232169, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2010) (Laporte, J.) (“‘The rules which 

govern tenders are strict and are strictly applied.’” (quoting Nguyen v. Calhoun, 105 Cal. App. 4th 

428, 439 (2003))); see also Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 578 

(1984) (“It is settled that an action to set aside a trustee’s sale for irregularities in sale notice or 

procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the 

property was security.”). California district courts follow Karlsen in examining wrongful 

foreclosure claims. Anaya v. Advisors Lending Group, 2009 WL 2424037, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

3, 2009) (“Plaintiff offers nothing to indicate that she is able to tender her debt to warrant 

disruption of non-judicial foreclosure”); Alicea v. GE Money Bank, 2009 WL 2136969, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2009) (Ware, J) (“When a debtor is in default of a home mortgage loan, and a 

foreclosure is either pending or has taken place, the debtor must allege a credible tender of the 

amount of the secured debt to maintain any cause of action for foreclosure.”); Montoya v. 

Countrywide Bank, 2009 WL 1813973, at * 11-12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009) (Ware, J) (“Under 

California law, the ‘tender rule’ requires that as a precondition to challenging a foreclosure sale, or 

any cause of action implicitly integrated to the sale, the borrower must make a valid and viable 

tender of payment of the debt”). The application of the “tender rule” prevents “a court from 

uselessly setting aside a foreclosure sale on a technical ground when the party making the 

challenge has not established his ability to purchase the property.” Williams v. Countrywide 

Home Loans, 1999 WL 740375, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1999) (Conti, J). Here, Plaintiff’s 

claim necessarily fails for failure to allege tender of the outstanding amount due on the loan. The 

cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite. Onofrio v. Rice, 55 Cal. App. 4th 413, 424 (1997), 

declined to apply the tender rule where the plaintiff attacked the validity of the underlying debt. 

55 Cal. App. 4th at 424. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff admits that he fell behind on his mortgage 

payments. Furthermore, Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. App. 4th 89, 112-13 (2011), 

acknowledges that the tender rule is generally the applicable rule and cites limited exceptions, 

none of which are applicable here. 

F. Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for Quasi-Contract and Eighth Claim for “No Contract”

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A “quasi-contractual recovery rests upon the equitable theory that a contract to pay for 

services rendered is implied by law for reasons of justice. . . . [T]here is no equitable basis for an 

implied-in-law promise to pay reasonable value for services rendered when the parties have an 

actual agreement covering compensation.” 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution § 5; see also Willman v. 

Gustafson, 63 Cal. App. 2d 830, 830-32 (1944) (“It is no doubt the law that where services are 

rendered by one person at the request of another, and the promisor and promisee are not related, a 

promise to pay the reasonable value of such services will be implied. It is also the law, and 

admitted to be such by appellant, that no such promise can be implied if there is a special 

agreement to pay a fixed sum.”). “No contract” is not a claim.

Plaintiff’s claims appear to allege that Defendant has no right to receive payment/foreclose 

on Plaintiff’s loan because it was improperly securitized and assigned. As an initial matter, these 

claims were not pled in the original complaint and are therefore improper because Plaintiff did not 

seek leave of the Court before adding them. See Dkt. 20 (granting Plaintiff leave to amend claims 

asserted in the original complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (requiring the amending party to seek 

leave of the Court). Plaintiff also fails to address these claims in his opposition. Furthermore, 

judicially noticed exhibits demonstrate that there was a contract between the Parties. (See RJN 

Ex. A (DOT identifying MERS as the beneficiary and nominee for the lender and the lender’s 

successors and assigns) and RJN Ex. B (agreement assigning assigned “all beneficial interest” 

under the DOT from MERS to “The Bank of New York Mellon FKA The Bank of New York As 

Trustree for the Certificateholders CWALT, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2005-43 Mortgage PassThrough Certificates, Series 2006-43”).) Plaintiff’s equitable recovery is thus barred by the 

existence of this contract. See 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution § 5; Willman, 63 Cal. App. 2d at 830-

32. 

G. Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief “is a remedy, not a cause of action.” Gomez v. Wells Fargo Home 

Mortgage, 2011 WL 5834949, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (Beeler, J.) (quoting Martone v. 

Burgess, 2008 WL 3916022, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug.25, 2008) (Wilken, J.). Consequently, 

“[b]ecause all of Plaintiffs’ other claims fail, the claim for injunctive relief fails, too.” Id.

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H. Negligence

Plaintiff does not allege a claim for negligence in his amended complaint, but nevertheless 

argues negligence in his opposition. The Court previously dismissed a negligence claim asserted 

in the original complaint. Even if Plaintiff had asserted a negligence claim, such a claim would be 

preempted by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (“No requirement or prohibition may be 

imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . 

section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of person who furnish information to 

consumer reporting agencies”); Davis v. Maryland Bank, 2002 WL 32713429, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 

June 19, 2002) (Armstrong, J.) (holding that “the FCRA preempts both state statutory and 

common law causes of action which fall within the conduct proscribed under section 1681s–

2(1)”).

IV.CONCLUSION

The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because this Court previously 

granted Plaintiff leave to amend and Plaintiff failed to cure the defects in his complaint, leave to 

amend would be futile. Consequently, the first amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2015

______________________________________

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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