Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-05618/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-05618-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAMI SULZBERG,

Plaintiff,

v.

HAPPIEST MINDS TECHNOLOGIES 

PVT. LTD.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-05618-SVK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE AND 

DENYING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 

NOTICE

Re: Dkt. No. 8

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Tami Sulzberg alleges that Defendant Happiest 

Minds Technologies engaged in employment discrimination on the basis of race and national 

origin against individuals who are not South Asian and who are not of Indian national origin. See

Dkt. 1 (Complaint) at ¶¶ 1, 29. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss and/or strike, 

which also includes a request for judicial notice. Dkt. 8, 8-3. The parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 7, 15. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

deems this motion suitable for determination without oral argument. Based on a review of the 

parties’ submissions, the case file, and relevant law, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss, 

motion to strike, and request for judicial notice for the reasons discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Happiest Minds provides information technology and consulting services. 

Dkt. 1 (Complaint) at ¶ 1. Defendant is headquartered in India and has some employees in the 

United States. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff Tami Sulzberg, who is a Caucasian woman born in the United 

States, worked for Defendant in in the United States a sales role from January 17, 2018 until 

May 19, 2018. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 26. Plaintiff contends that her termination was the result of 

Defendant’s pattern or practice of discriminating against non-South Asian and non-Indian 

Case 5:19-cv-05618-SVK Document 26 Filed 12/03/19 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

employees. Id. at ¶ 27. 

Plaintiff brings this case individually and on behalf of the putative class of “[a]ll 

individuals who are not of South Asian race and Indian national origin who applied for positions 

with (or within) Happiest Minds in the U.S. and who were not hired and/or who Happiest Minds 

involuntarily terminated.” Id. at ¶¶ 2, 29. Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981. Id. at ¶¶ 38-48.

Defendant seeks to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 8. Defendant also seeks to strike the class action claims pursuant 

to Rule 12(f). Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts 

may consider only “the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Corinthian Colls., 

Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, the 

court must assume the plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is 

not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This 

“facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot 

be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t. of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless the 

Case 5:19-cv-05618-SVK Document 26 Filed 12/03/19 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

court finds it “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

B. Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) enables a court to strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The function of a Rule 12(f) motion is “to avoid the 

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with 

those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 

2010).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

1. Sufficiency of class allegations

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has “failed to meet the basic requirements to sustain a class 

action” because she has “failed to allege the existence of an ascertainable class” and has not 

alleged “a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved.” Dkt. 8-1 

at 4. Defendant also argues that a class action is not the superior method of addressing the alleged 

discrimination, and that the purported class is not numerous enough to justify class status. Id. at 7-

8.

Courts in this District have held that Rule 12(b)(6) is not a proper vehicle for dismissing 

class claims, for several reasons. See Meyer v. National Tenant Network, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 

1096, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2014) and cases cited therein. First, Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to argue 

that the opposing party has “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” and “[a] 

class action is a procedural device, not a claim for relief.” Id. (citing Clerkin v. MyLife.com, No. 

No. C 11-00527-CW, 2011 WL 3809912, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011). Second, other Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure exist to address impertinent allegations and class certification. Meyer, 10 

F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (citing Clerkin, 2011 WL 3809912, at *3)). Third, a different standard of 

review applies to decisions on class certification than orders on motions to dismiss. Meyer, 10 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1104 (citing Clerkin, 2011 WL 3809912, at *3)).

The Court finds these other decisions from courts in this District instructive. Defendant’s 

Case 5:19-cv-05618-SVK Document 26 Filed 12/03/19 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

attacks on Plaintiff’s class allegations are better made in the context of a Rule 23 motion for class 

certification, after appropriate development of the record. 

2. Interplay with DHS determination regarding foreign workers

Defendant asserts that most of the foreign staff it has hired have received employment 

visas from the Department of Homeland Security under the H and L-visa categories. Dkt. 8-1 at 8. 

Defendant argues that because its foreign staff were “all vetted and approved as highly skilled 

individuals in specialty occupations by DHS prior to their employment with Happiest Minds, 

Plaintiff’s claims of racial and national origin bias and disparate treatment in Happiest Minds’ 

hiring and retention practices must fail.” Id.

Defendant has failed to provide legal or factual support for its argument that the grant of 

visas to some of its foreign workers renders Plaintiff’s claims fatally implausible and subject to 

dismissal. This Court follows courts in this District and others that have rejected similar 

arguments. See Heldt v. Tata Consultancy Svcs., Ltd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (rejecting as “misplaced” argument on motion to dismiss that defendant’s use of visa 

programs “must be non-discriminatory by definition and plaintiffs can never show that the named 

plaintiffs (or any class members) were discriminated against as a result of [defendant’s] use of the 

visa programs”); see also Koehler v. Infosys Techs. Ltd. Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 940, 949-50 (E.D. 

Wisc. 2015) (holding that complaint sufficiently stated claim for disparate impact under Title VII 

where plaintiff alleged discriminatory practices that involved employing large numbers of foreign 

workers holding visas).

Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of DHS “operating instructions” 

concerning the H-visa and L-visa programs. Dkt. 8-3. Because the Court’s foregoing ruling 

rejecting Defendant’s arguments concerning the relationship of these visa programs to the 

allegations of the complaint does not depend on the substantive requirements of the H-visa or 

L-visa programs, the Court hereby DENIES the request for judicial notice, without prejudice to 

renewal of the request if the DHS operating instructions become relevant to other aspects of the 

case. 

Case 5:19-cv-05618-SVK Document 26 Filed 12/03/19 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

3. Conclusion on motion to dismiss

Defendant’s attacks on the class allegations in the complaint are premature, and assuming

Plaintiff’s allegations are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the 

Court must on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint adequately states plausible claims under 

Title VII and Section 1981. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss.

B. Motion to strike

In the notice of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that “the Court should 

strike the class-action claims by Plaintiff, as she failed to identify a certain class and failed to show 

she is an adequate class representative.” Dkt. 8 at 2. Defendant failed to articulate an argument in 

support of a motion to strike in its memorandum of points and authorities, separate from its 

argument that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim, instead simply requesting that the Court 

“strike/dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.” See Dkt. 8-1 at 9. As such, Defendant has 

failed to offer any legal support for its motion to strike the class allegations in the complaint under 

Rule 12(f) because it has failed to explain what about those allegations is “redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f); see also Meyer, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 1104. In 

any event, it is rare to strike class allegations at the pleadings stage, id., and the Court declines to 

do so in this case. Therefore, the motion to strike is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and 

request for judicial notice are DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 3, 2019

SUSAN VAN KEULEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:19-cv-05618-SVK Document 26 Filed 12/03/19 Page 5 of 5