Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00428/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), if “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded

by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and

disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable

opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule

56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMIRO REYES, DOLORES REYES, 

and DESIREE REYES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, et 

al., 

Defendants.

CIV S-04-0428 FCD PAN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

—NFN—

On July 6, 2005, the court heard defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint and plaintiffs’ opposition thereto. 

The court construed defendants’ motion as one for summary

judgment1 and directed the parties to file supplemental briefing. 

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2 Dolores Reyes died April 22, 2005, at the age of 64. See copy of

Certificate of Death attached to Defendants’ Notice filed June 10, 2005. The

certificate states her cause of death was Alzheimers Disease which began eight

years previous. 

3 The following defendants were personally served with a copy of the

summons and complaint and filed their motion to dismiss on September 24, 2004: 

County of San Joaquin, Dario Marenco (sued as Marengo), Steve Gutierrez,

Victor Mow, Jack Sieglock (sued as Siglock), Leroy Ornellas, Manuel Lopez,

Terrence Dermody (sued as Terrance), Sheryle Sparks (sued as Sheryl), Joseph

Chelli, Robert Winkler, Marchell Smith (sued as Marcell), and Hilary Silver,

M.D. The following defendants joined in the motion to dismiss May 2005,

2

The court now issues these findings and recommendations.

Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on May 21, 2004,

alleging violations of their First, Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and

state law causes of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, defamation and false imprisonment. The

complaint challenges an order of temporary public conservatorship

over the person and estate of plaintiff Dolores Reyes, now

deceased,2 who was the wife of plaintiff Ramiro Reyes and the

mother of plaintiff Desiree Reyes. Defendants include members of

the San Joaquin Board of Supervisors (Marenco, Gutierrz, Mow,

Sieglock, and Ornellas), the County Administrator (Lopez), the

County Counsel (Dermody), Deputy County Counsel (Sparks), Human

Services administrators (Chelli and Valadez), Human Services

analysts (Winkler and Taylor), a Human Services physician

(Silver), a Human Services social worker (Smith), a Public Health

nurse (Giles), a Department of Aging administrator (Moore), and a

private physician (Malak).3

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asserting they were “later served:” Edward Allum, Linda Valadez, Marycorrine

Giles (sued as Tammie), Diane Taylor, Alicia Baylor, Wendy Moore, Lindy Turner

(sued as Linda), Merly Sumuraga (sued as M. Sumuraga), Taymour Malak, M.D. 

3

The court previously appointed Mr. Reyes guardian ad

litem for both Mrs. Reyes and Desiree but on July 6, 2005,

vacated the appointment for Desiree as she had reached 18 years

of age, and held that the appointment for Mrs. Reyes was vacated

upon her death. 

Neither Mr. Reyes nor Desiree represent the estate of

Mrs. Reyes and therefore each proceed in this action upon only

their respective personal claims. The court determined at the

hearing that plaintiffs have standing to pursue only their claim

that the temporary conservatorship of Mrs. Reyes violated their

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must

establish there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A fact is “material” if it affects the right to recover under

applicable substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit

evidence that establishes issues upon which the movant bears the

burden of proof; if the movant does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of

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4 The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings” and

assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. To survive summary judgment, the opponent must

do more than simply show there is some “metaphysical doubt” as to the material

facts. Id. at 586. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find in the opponent’s favor, there is no genuine

issue for trial. Id. at 587. While on summary judgment, the inferences drawn

from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party; if the factual context renders plaintiff’s claims

implausible, plaintiff must come forward with more persuasive evidence than

would otherwise be necessary. Id.

4

evidence to support the opponent’s burden. Celotex Corporation

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). To avoid summary judgment

on an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof,

the opponent must present affirmative evidence sufficiently

probative such that a jury reasonably could decide the issue in

favor of the opponent. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall

set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and

shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify

to the matters stated therein.” The opponent need not produce

evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to

avoid summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the

questions are (1) whether the evidence could be submitted in

admissible form and (2) “if reduced to admissible evidence” would

it be sufficient to carry the party’s burden at trial. Id., at

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327. A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979).

To make out a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs

must demonstrate deprivation of a federal constitutional or

statutory right under color of law. Dang Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d

476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991); Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce,

954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs claim

defendants’ imposition of a temporary public conservatorship over

the person and estate of Mrs. Reyes was accomplished

“fraudulently [and] with malicious intent,” and violated

plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights “not to be

denied liberty, including family relations, without due process

of the law.” Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 7. 

The right to familial association is a recognized liberty

interest under the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected from

state interference without due process of law. The right extends

not only to the reciprocal rights of parents and their minor

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5 “It is well established that a parent has a fundamental liberty

interest in the companionship and society of his or her child and that the

state’s interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is

remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This constitutional interest in familial

companionship and society logically extends to protect children from

unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents. 

Moreover, the First Amendment protects those relationships, including family

relationships, that presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the

necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special

community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively

personal aspects of one’s life.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

685 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

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children (see, e.g., Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651

(9th Cir. 1985), but to the rights of parents toward their adult

children (see, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

685 (9th Cir. 2001), Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744

(9th Cir. 1986), and Curnow by and Through Curnow v. Ridgecrest

Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991)), the rights of adult

children toward their parents (Curnow, supra, 952 F. 2d at 325,

Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987),

overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199

F. 3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999)), and the rights of a spouse (Byrd v.

Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998).5 

“To recover for a violation under § 1983 for interference

with familial rights, a plaintiff must show that the defendant

acted with deliberate indifferen[ce] to these rights,” Venerable

v. City of Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (E. D. Cal.

2002), citing Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998)

(excessive force), or the government’s actions constitute

“unwarranted interference” with an individual’s rights to

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familial association, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 250 F.3d

at 686.

“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known

or obvious consequence of his actions.” Kennedy v. City of

Ridgefield, 411 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations and

internal quotations omitted). “Unwarranted interference”

includes governmental actions that are vexatious and unnecessary,

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 781-782 (1982), harassing,

unfounded or unreasonable, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.

19, 45, (1973), and arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably

irrelevant, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 332 (1936). 

Due process requires that the challenged law, policy or goal “not

be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means

selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object

sought to be attained.” Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S.

502, 525 (1934).

The following facts are undisputed. Mrs. Reyes was

diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in the mid-1990s, rendering

her by 2002 nonverbal, nonresponsive, subject to seizures and

unable to care for herself yet physically mobile. Mrs. Reyes

resided with her son Paul Reyes, who was the designated payee for

Mrs. Reyes’ public benefits. Mrs. Reyes was cared for by family

members, including Paul, Desiree and Mr. Reyes although the

couple was separated.

In 2002, Mr. Reyes requested the assistance of the San

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6 Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief (Mr. Reyes’ July 13, 2005 Statement,

p. 1, and (b) Plaintiff’s Objection to Establishing a Conservatorship, p. 1,

lines 27-28); and Giles Decl., ¶ 3F.

7 MaryCorinne Giles, who was the APS investigator assigned to Mrs.

Reyes, states that “[b]ecause Ms. Reyes was only on SSI assistance, it was

difficult to place her in privately owned facilities . . . . There are only a

few locked facilities in the area. I worked for six months on trying to

find[] a suitable placement for Ms. Reyes, including looking in San Joaquin

County, up to Sacramento, out to the Bay Area, and down to Fresno, but I was

not able to place her.” Giles Decl., ¶ 3I.

8 The parties dispute the reasons why these potential placements

failed. Mr. Reyes states that neither facility provided bed railings (but

recommended sedation as an alternative) (Mr. Reye’s Statement, at p. 2) while

defendants state Mr. Reyes was demanding and difficult (Giles Decl., ¶ 3L). 

The parties also dispute the timing of these visits. Defendants assert both

visits took place after Mrs. Reyes’ February 2003 hospitalization, and with

the assistance of St. Joseph Hospital. Giles Decl., ¶¶ 3K, L. Mr. Reyes

asserts he visited one facility prior to Mrs. Reyes’ hospitalization, and one

thereafter, both upon the recommendation of APS. Mr. Reye’s Statement, at pp.

1-2) 

9 MaryCorinne Giles states, “The only other viable option was

Crestwood Manor.” Giles Decl., ¶ 3M. Crestwood Manor Stockton is a

residential skilled nursing facility owned and operated by Behavioral Health,

Inc. See http://www.crestwoodmanor.com/stockton.html. Its services include

“long-term treatment and services to people with a primary medical diagnosis

and an underlying behavioral diagnosis–for example Alzheimer’s or diseaserelated dementia.” Id.

8

Joaquin County Adult Protective Services (APS) to obtain

residential care for Mrs. Reyes in a secure skilled nursing

facility.6 APS had difficulty identifying appropriate local

facilities that met Mrs. Reyes’ needs7 but Mr. Reyes visited at

least two facilities that he found unsatisfactory.8 

In February 2003, Mrs. Reyes was hospitalized at St.

Joseph’s Hospital following a seizure. 

In an effort to obtain long-term placement at nearby

Crestwood Manor,9 which defendants assert “require all persons

they accept to be conserved, i.e., have a conservator appointed

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10 The appointment was for a thirty-day period commencing upon the

Conservator’s oath. The order appointed the county public defender to

represent Mrs. Reyes in further proceedings for permanent conservatorship. 

11 February 19, 2003, Order of the San Joaquin Superior Court

Appointing Temporary Conservator, p. 1. Exhibit 1 to Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice, p. 7.

9

for them” (Giles Decl., ¶ 3M), APS implemented conservatorship

proceedings. Defendants state without opposition that “[b]oth

Mr. Reyes and his son expressly agreed to the referral and to

seeking the conservatorship.” Giles Decl., ¶ 3N. 

On February 19, 2003, the San Joaquin County Superior

Court appointed the Public Conservator as temporary conservator

of Mrs. Reyes.10 The appointment was based upon the affidavit of

Dr. Taymour Malak, M.D., Mrs. Reyes’ physician.11 The superior

court stated (Feb. 19. 2003, Order Appointing Temporary

Conservator, p. 1):

Upon review, the Court finds that said affidavit

demonstrates the necessity for a temporary conservatorship

investigation for the County of San Joaquin, as it appears

that said individual is gravely disabled within the meaning

of Section 5008(h) of the Welfare and Institutions Code as

the result of mental disorder and is unable to accept

treatment voluntarily.

California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008(h)

provides that “gravely disabled” means, “A condition in which a

person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide

for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or

shelter.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5008(h)(1)(A). The

supporting affidavit of Dr. Malak, dated February 2, 2003,

reflected an examination date of December 12, 2002, and states

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12 Declaration of Physician or Psychologist That Conservatee is Gravely

Disabled, p. 1. Exhibit 1 to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, p. 9.

13 February 19, 2003, Petition for Appointment of Conservator, pp. 1-2,

Exhibit 1 to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, pp. 1-2.

14 At the hearing plaintiffs also challenged document citations to 1800

N. California Street and 2800 N. California Street. Defendants confirmed at

the hearing and subsequently that these addresses refer respectively to St.

Joseph’s Medical Center and the office of Dr. Taymour Malak. Defendants’

Supplemental Brief, at p. 5, n. 5 and pertinent text. The addresses are

reflected accurately in the papers submitted to this court.

10

that Mrs. Reyes was gravely disabled pursuant to section 5008(h)

due to “Alzheimer’s disease, dementia and anxiety.”12

Also on February 19, 2003, following appointment as

temporary conservator, the Public Conservator filed a petition

for permanent conservatorship. The petition states that Mrs.

Reyes was evaluated by Dr. Hilary Silver, M.D., who “has

determined the proposed conservatee to be gravely disabled as a

result of a mental disorder.” The petition also states that

“[t]he proposed conservatee is now at the San Joaquin County

Mental Health Center. . .”13 

Plaintiffs maintain–and defendants do not disagree–that

both statements are false. By all accounts, Mrs. Reyes was never

examined by Dr. Silver, a psychiatrist, and never resided at the

San Joaquin County Mental Health Center. These statements are at

the heart of plaintiffs’ litigation.14

The petition for permanent conservatorship also included

(1) the February 2, 2003, Declaration of Dr. Malak, (2) the

appointment of temporary conservatorship, and (3) the order

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15 The following reports–set forth in a separate exhibit before this

court–may also have been included in the petition for permanent

conservatorship. See Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 3. An

unsigned investigative report dated March 12, 2003, recommends that Mrs. Reyes

be found gravely disabled due to mental disorder. Id., at p. 1. An undated

and unsigned report recommends that Mr. Reyes rather than the Public

Conservator be appointed permanent conservator based on the following: (1) a

supporting statement from Dr. Malak obtained March 12 providing, “I think [Mr.

Reyes] can [take care of Mrs. Reyes], he did before. So I think for the most

part he took good care of her at home. Appeared reasonably taken care of, no

decubitus ulcers or signs;” and (2) Mr. Reyes arranged for three family

members to care for Mrs. Reyes through the “In Home Support Services” program

and stated his intent to be appointed conservator. Id., at pp. 5-6.

11

appointing temporary conservatorship.15 Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice, Exhibit 1, p. 9. 

In anticipation of the hearing on permanent

conservatorship, defendants “served” papers upon Mrs. Reyes. Mr.

Reyes’ Statement, at p. 2. “They just threw the papers down at

her” and these papers “contained [the] fraudulent affidavi[t]s.” 

Id. 

In response, Mr. Reyes filed with the superior court an

“Objection to Establishing of a Conservatorship” wherein he

stated in full (March 11, 2003, Objection, at pp. 1-2, Attachment

to Mr. Reyes’ Statement):

Objector, Ramiro Reyes, is the husband of the proposed

conservatee, Dolores Reyes.

Objector contends that there is no need for a

conservatorship.

The proposed conservatee suffers from Alzheimer’s

Disease and has so for several years. Objector, along with

his son, Paul Reyes, has provided her all necessary care. 

Objector has tried to obtain a full care facility for the

proposed conservatee, however, none is available in San

Joaquin County that meets her needs. Objector fears that by

appointing the County as the conservator to which he

strongly objects, the County will only put the conservatee

on medicines to completely sedate her so that she requires

no care and would not enjoy any quality of her life as she

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16 Statement of Desiree Reyes at p. 1, Mr. Reyes’ Statement, Cover

Sheet. 

12

is currently able to despite her disease.

Recent newspaper coverage about the San Joaquin

conservator office increases objector’s strong feelings that

the County of San Joaquin should not be appointed a

conservator, and if any conservator is to be appointed, it

should [be] the undersigned, Ramiro Reyes.

The proposed conservatee has no assets that need any

administration. To the extent a power of attorney is

needed, the proposed conservatee has provided the

undersigned with a power of attorney.

On March 21, 2003 (order filed April 1), the superior

court terminated the temporary conservatorship and dismissed the

petition for permanent conservatorship. The order provides no

rationale but the attached minute order states that Mr. Reyes was

questioned and the “matter dropped.” Defendants aver, “The

County dropped the conservatorship proceedings” when it became

clear the family “changed their minds about this whole placement

process.” Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum, at p. 3. Mr.

Reyes states that, upon questioning by the judge about Mrs.

Reyes’ current placement (a hospital, not a mental facility) and

the absence of a testifying psychiatrist, Ms. Sheryle Sparks,

Deputy County Counsel, “asked that the case be dismissed.” Mr.

Reyes’ Statement, at pp. 2-3. 

Mrs. Reyes was cared for at St. Joseph’s Hospital from

February 10 to March 23, 2003,16 and therefore throughout the

period of her temporary conservatorship (February 19 to March

21). She died April 22, 2005, at the Hospice House of San

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17 Dolores Reyes died at the Hospice House of San Joaquin (Certificate

of Death attached to Defendants’ Notice filed June 10, 2005), a nonprofit

residential care facility that is “Medicare/Medi-Cal certified” (see

www.hospicesj.org/about.asp).

13

Joaquin.17 

 Mrs. Reyes’ temporary conservatorship reflects the

relevant time period for assessing the alleged violation of

plaintiffs’ rights to familial association. Only during this

period was the county authorized to make medical and other

decisions for Mrs. Reyes or deny plaintiffs access to her.

Plaintiffs do not assert, however, they were denied

access to Mrs. Reyes or input in her care, nor even that they

were opposed to the temporary conservatorship. 

Plaintiffs’ principal complaint is that defendants acted

with malice in relying upon, under penalty of perjury,

“fraudulent affidavits” stating that Mrs. Reyes resided at the

county mental health facility and had been examined by

psychiatrist Dr. Silver. However, these admittedly incorrect

statements were filed in support of the petition for permanent

conservatorship, not temporary conservatorship. The superior

court did not rely on these statements. Moreover, plaintiffs’

written opposition to the petition for permanent conservatorship

did not even challenge these statements, focusing instead on the

possibility of unnecessary sedation. 

Plaintiffs also challenge the assessment, made pursuant

to the petitions for both temporary and permanent

conservatorship, that plaintiff was gravely disabled as a result

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18 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders (4th Ed.

1994), at pp. 139-143. 

14

of a “mental disorder.” Plaintiffs argue that Alzheimer’s

disease is not a mental disorder and to so characterize it has

falsely and maliciously interfered with the family’s privacy and

due process rights. However, this designation is consistent with

(1) Dr. Malak’s assessment Mrs. Reyes was “gravely disabled” as a

result of “Alzheimer’s disease, dementia and anxiety,” and

(2) the American Psychiatric Association’s inclusion of “Dementia

of the Alzheimer’s Type” in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of Psychiatric Disorders.

18 Moreover, the characterization of

plaintiff’s uncontroverted dementia as a “mental disorder” was

essential to the initiation of the temporary conservatorship

proceedings to which plaintiffs acceded. Dr. Malak made his

assessment on a form that defined “gravely disabled” “within the

meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008(h) as a

result of a mental disorder.” It is only in tandem with the

false statements that plaintiff was examined by Dr. Silver and

resided at the county mental health facility that the diagnosis

“mental disorder” took on an inappropriate meaning.

I find that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden

of demonstrating defendants acted with deliberate indifference or

unwarranted interference in obtaining and maintaining temporary

public conservatorship of Mrs. Reyes. Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate defendants acted vexatiously or arbitrarily or

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disregarded a known harmful consequence of their actions. 

Rather, in light of all the circumstances, defendants actions

were reasonable.

 Accordingly, I recommend that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

Honorable Frank C. Damrell, Jr., the United States District Judge

assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Written

objections may be filed within ten days after being served with

these findings and recommendations. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” The failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 31, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

Case 2:04-cv-00428-FCD-PAN Document 30 Filed 08/31/05 Page 15 of 15