Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01761/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01761-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERICA D. HAYWOOD, 

Booking #18123564, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

SAN DIEGO CA PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY 

FILING FEES REQUIRED 

BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND AS 

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) 

 ERICA D. HAYWOOD (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the San Diego Sheriff 

Department’s Las Colinas Detention and Re-Entry Facility (“LCDF”), and proceeding 

pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the San 

Diego County Public Defender, Police Department, District Attorney, a Jack in the Box 

franchise and McDonald’s Corporation as Defendants. See Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 1-3. 

While far from clear, it appears Plaintiff seeks to sue all these entities for harassing 

and causing her “problems” at “various places in two States” on “various days [and] 

times.” Id. at 1, 4-6. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence 

civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), nor has she filed a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

/// 

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in any district court of 

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1

 An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay 

this filing fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 in filing and administrative fees required to 

commence a civil action, and she has not filed a Motion to Proceed IFP in compliance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Therefore, her civil action cannot proceed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051. And while the Court would ordinarily grant

Plaintiff leave to file an IFP Motion pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), it finds, for the 

reasons set out below, that doing so would be futile since she is no longer entitled to that 

privilege, she fails to allege she faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the 

time she filed her Complaint, and her claims are legally frivolous. 

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s “Three-Strikes” Bar 

 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). “Prisoners,” however, “face an 

additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee” in installments as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in 

cases where the prisoner: 

. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of 

                                               

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of

serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter 

“Andrews”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed 

IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 

1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing.”). 

III. Application to Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 As an initial matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s pleading and has ascertained 

that it contains no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger of 

serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

/// 

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Instead, Plaintiff’s rambling and disjointed Complaint appears to seek millions of 

dollars in general and punitive damages from several local municipal and national 

corporate entities based on claims that she has been “harassed” by them or their 

employees, who are “racially problematic,” and who have “called security” and disturbed 

her “peace and tranquility” by making her leave their places of business on multiple 

unspecified occasions before she was ultimately arrested on April 14, 2018, for loitering 

and trespass at a Jack in the Box restaurant in San Ysidro, California. See Compl., Doc. 

No. 1 at 4-5, 8; Sierra v. Woodford, 2010 WL 1657493 at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) 

(finding “long, narrative, rambling statements regarding a cycle of violence, and vague 

references to motives to harm” insufficient to show Plaintiff faced an “ongoing danger” 

as required by Cervantes). 

If this were not enough, Plaintiff’s claims are legally frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1) (requiring sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints, or any portions of 

them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.”); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015); Byrd v. Phoenix Police 

Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose 

of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the 

expense of responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citation omitted); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (a 

complaint “is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in fact or law.”). 

And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. That is the case here. 

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Therefore, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Erica D. Haywood, 

currently identified as San Diego County Sheriff Department’s Booking #18123564,2

while incarcerated, has had at least five prior prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed 

on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. 

They are: 

1) Haywood v. Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, et al., Civil Case No. 4:09-

cv-00202 (S.D. Texas, March 12, 2009) (Memorandum Opinion and Order 

granting application to proceed IFP and dismissing civil action with prejudice as 

“legally baseless”) (Doc. Nos. 8, 9) (strike one); 

2) Haywood v. State of Georgia, Civil Case No. 1:10-cv-00039-TWT (N.D. 

Georgia, Feb. 2, 2010) (Order and Opinion granting request to proceed IFP and 

dismissing case as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (Doc. No. 3); (Feb. 3, 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff has been previously identified in San Antonio Texas’s Bexar County Adult 

Detention Center as Inmate #804107, and as Inmate #933519, while she was detained in 

the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia. She admits to having filed one other civil action 

related to her “healthcare neglect,” see Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 7, which this Court presumes 

is Haywood v. Unnamed, S. D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-01263-AJB-NLS (“Haywood 

I”). Plaintiff initially filed Haywood I in the Northern District of Georgia in May 2018, but 

it was transferred to the Southern District of California for lack of proper venue to the 

extent Plaintiff appeared to allege she was being housed in unsafe and unsanitary 

conditions at LCDF. Id., Doc. Nos. 2, 5. On August 24, 2018, Judge Battaglia dismissed

Haywood I however, because Plaintiff failed to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)’s filing fee 

requirement and failed to allege federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id., Doc. No. 9. 

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2010) (Judgment) (Doc. No. 4) (strike two); 

3) Haywood v. Bexar County Sheriff, et al., Civil Case No. 5:11-cv-00448-XR 

(W.D. Texas) (Aug. 1, 2011) (Order & Judgment Dismissing Complaint as 

frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and for seeking relief from immune 

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) and § 1915A(b)(1)-(2)) 

(Doc. Nos. 14, 15) (strike three); 

4) Haywood v. Bexar County Sheriff, et al., Civil Case No. 5:11-cv-00467-XR 

(W.D. Texas) (Aug. 1, 2011) (Order & Judgment Dismissing Complaint as 

frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and for seeking relief from immune 

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) and § 1915A(b)(1)-(2)) 

(Doc. Nos. 8, 9) (strike four); and 

5) Haywood v. Bexar County, Texas, et al., Civil Case No. 5:11-cv-01115-FB 

(W.D. Texas) (Feb. 1, 2012) (Report & Recommendation [“R&R”] to Dismiss 

§ 1983 Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (Doc. 

No. 3); (Feb. 28, 2012) (Order Adopting R&R and Judgment) (Doc. Nos. 7, 8) 

(strike five). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has accumulated more than three “strikes” pursuant 

to § 1915(g), and she fails to make a “plausible allegation” that she faced imminent 

danger of serious physical injury at the time she filed her Complaint, she is not entitled to 

the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).3

                                               

3

 As a result of her litigation history, Plaintiff has also since been denied leave to proceed 

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in the Western District of Texas. See Haywood v. 

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7 

3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. Conclusion and Order 

 For the reasons explained, the Court: 

 (1) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte for failure to pay filing fees 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); 

 (2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous and 

therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and 

 (3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: August 30, 2018 _______________________________________

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

                                               

Director Brad Livingston, et al., Civil Case No. 6:16-cv-00320-RP (Sept. 2, 2016) (Order 

Denying leave to proceed IFP and Dismissing Complaint without prejudice “pursuant to 

the three-dismissal rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”) (Doc. No. 4). 

Case 3:18-cv-01761-MMA-BGS Document 2 Filed 08/30/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7