Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01933/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01933-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE JONES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1933 ALA P

vs.

LIEUTENANT E. SANDY, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

____________________________/

Plaintiff Leslie Jones is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Defendant’s January 31, 2007, motion

for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s February 15, 2007, petition for writ of mandamus. 

Plaintiff has also filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the

reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in

part. 

I

On July 26, 2002, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance against Defendant Sandy. 

Complaint at 4. On August 26, 2003, Plaintiff’s cell was searched by Cadet Mabon. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Cadet Mabon confiscated all of Plaintiff’s prescribed medicine and hygiene

items, while confiscating nothing from Plaintiff’s cell mate. Id. When Plaintiff questioned

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Cadet Mabon as to why he was confiscating Plaintiff’s medicine, according to Plaintiff, Cadet

Mabon said that he was ordered to do so by a female supervisor whose name he did not know. 

Id. at 5. Later another officer told Plaintiff that a Sergeant had told the officer to inform Plaintiff

that Defendant Sandy had ordered the property taken and that Plaintiff would have to ask

Defendant Sandy for the property back. Id. That evening Plaintiff was taken to the prison clinic

due to high blood pressure resulting from stress and lack of medication. Id. 

Additionally, in May of 2003, Plaintiff settled a lawsuit involving staff at another

institution. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that those staff were friends of Defendant Hughes who 

retaliated against Plaintiff by refusing to process his family visitation application based on the

false claim that Plaintiff had an “R-suffix” conviction, which denotes a sex offense. Id. at 6-7. 

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgement on January 1, 31, 2007, denying Plaintiff’s

allegations. 

II

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the record before it contains

“no genuine issue as to any material fact” and, thus, “that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In determining whether to grant summary

judgment, the Court will view the facts and inferences from these facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986). Here, the Plaintiff is the nonmoving party.

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A

material fact is any factual dispute that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon mere allegations or

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denials in the pleadings or papers, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue for trial. Id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable

or is not significantly probative, a court may grant summary judgment. California Architectural

Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III

 “The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under

color of law constitutes a violation of the Eight Amendment.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials are deliberately indifferent

to a prisoner’s medical needs.” Id. at 1057. 

“In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts.” Jett v.

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “First, the plaintiff must show a ‘serious medical

need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059). “Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent.” Id. A plaintiff can show a defendant’s response was deliberately

indifferent by demonstrating “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference ‘may appear

when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.’” Id. (quoting McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059). 

“A prison official acts with ‘deliberate indifference . . . only if [he or she] knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d 1057. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the

inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “‘[D]eliberate

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indifference to medical needs may be shown by circumstantial evidence when the facts are

sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.’” Id. at 1057 n.4

(quoting Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Sandy ordered Plaintiff’s medications seized. 

Complaint at 5. Plaintiff alleges that these medications were not expired and that Plaintiff’s

possession was proper. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was without medication for four days. 

Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed Facts at 5. Plaintiff has also alleged that because he

was without these medications, he suffered a bout of extremely high blood pressure, which

required medical treatment. Complaint at 5. 

It is established that deliberate indifference is found when a prison official “intentionally

interfer[s] with... treatment once prescribed.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165(9th

Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Plaintiff has alleged that

Defendant Sandy ordered the confiscation of Plaintiff’s medications for the purpose of punishing

the Plaintiff. Defendant Sandy denies these allegations. As such, this court finds there is a

genuine issue as to a material fact and therefore Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

denied as to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Sandy’s actions were deliberately indifferent. 

IV

Plaintiff has alleged that the actions of both Defendant Sandy and Defendant Hughes

were motivated by a desire to retaliate against Plaintiff’s filing of lawsuits and grievances. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech may

support a § 1983 claim. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). “Within the

prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”

Id. at 567-68; see also Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)

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(explaining that a plaintiff must plead facts which suggest “that the protected conduct was a

‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant's decision”) (citation omitted). 

A

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Sandy ordered Plaintiff’s medication confiscated in

retaliation for Plaintiff filing a grievance against Defendant Sandy. If true, such an order would

constitute an adverse action against Plaintiff. Additionally a prisoners filing of grievances is a

protected First Amendment right. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. Finally, while the searching of

prison cells certainly serves to reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal, specifically

safety, there is no support for the proposition that any legitimate correctional goal is advanced by

ordering the confiscation of an inmates prescribed medication for purposes of retaliation. 

Defendant Sandy argues that Plaintiff, “remained prolific in the exercise of his First

Amendment right” and therefore Defendant’s actions did not chill Plaintiff’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights. Motion for Summary Judgment at 10. However, “it would be unjust to

allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an

unusually determined plaintiff persist in his protected activity. Rhodes, 403 F.3d at 569 (quoting

Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The proper inquiry is “whether an officials acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary

firmness from future First Amendment activities” and not whether this Plaintiff’s speech was

actually suppressed. Id. The denial of medication would chill or silence a person of ordinary

firmness from future First Amendment activities. 

Thus, the court finds there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant

Sandy ordered Plaintiff’s medication confiscated in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a grievance. 

Therefore Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff’s claim that

Defendant Sandy ordered Plaintiff’s medication confiscated in retaliation against Plaintiff. 

B

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Hughes wrongly ascribe Plaintiff an “R custody”

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suffix and denied Plaintiff’s family visit in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a lawsuit against three

of Defendant Hughes’ friends and previous co-workers from a different prison. 

In May of 2003 the California Prison system implemented California Code of

Regulations Title 15, Section 3177 (“section 3177"). See Defendants Separate Statement of

Undisputed Facts Exhibit F. Under California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 3177:

Family visits shall not be permitted for inmates convicted of a

violent offense involving... any sex offense ...which includes, but is

not limited to the following Penal Code sections.... 

(A) Inmates may be prohibited from family visiting where

substantial documented evidence or information of the misconduct

(described above) exists, without a criminal conviction. 

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §3177(b)(1)-(b)(1)(A) (2007) (emphasis added).

On June 20, 2003, Plaintiff’s request for a family visit was denied pursuant to section

3177 because Plaintiff had been arrested for assault with intent to commit rape on July 12, 1989. 

Plaintiff contends that section 3177 applies only to criminal convictions or offenses perpetrated

against a minor or family member. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment at 9-10. 

Plaintiff is mistaken.

Paragraph (1) of section 3177 provides that an inmate may not have family visits if that

inmate has been convicted of a violent offense involving a minor or family member, or any sex

offense. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §3177(b)(1) (2007)(emphasis added). Subsection (A) to

paragraph (1) provides that, “Inmates may be prohibited from family visiting where substantial

documented evidence or information of the misconduct described in section 3177(b)(1) exists,

without a criminal conviction.” Id. 

Plaintiff correctly points out that California Penal Code section 220, the penal code

which corresponds to Plaintiff’s arrest, is not one of those listed in section 3177 (b)(1). 

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment at 9. However, as noted above, section 3177 (b)(1)

is also applicable to any sex offense. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §3177(b)(1) (2007). Assault with

the intent to commit rape is a sex offense under California law. People v. Pierce, 104

Cal.App.4th 893, 898 (2002). 

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The obvious correctional goal of section 3177 is to prohibit inmates who may pose a

danger from coming in contact with the visiting public. Inmates with substantial evidence of sex

offenses, but not convictions, are included in the policy because victims of sex offenses are

frequently too afraid to testify, which prevents conviction. A fact which Plaintiff acknowledges. 

Defendant’s Deposition of Plaintiff at 104. 

Therefore, the court finds that the actions of Defendant Hughes reasonably advanced a

legitimate correctional goal. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations cannot support a claim of retaliation by

Defendant Hughes. As such, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Defendant

Hughes will be granted. 

Additionally, On February 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a writ of mandamus, asking the court

to order the Department of Corrections to reinstate Plaintiff’s family visits. As the court sees no

grounds for such an order, Plaintiff’s writ will be denied. 

/////

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s January 31, 2007, motion for summary judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Sandy was deliberately indifferent;

2. Defendant’s January 31, 2007, motion for summary judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Sandy retaliated against the Plaintiff;

3. Defendant’s January 31, 2007, motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

with respect to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Hughes retaliated against Plaintiff; and

4. Plaintiff’s February 15, 2007, writ of mandamus is DENIED. 

/////

DATED: December 6, 2007

 /s/ Arthur L. Alarcón 

 UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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