Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00182/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00182-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD B. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:11-cv-182-OWW-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE

APRIL 20, 2011

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Donald B. Willams (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court

for screening is Plaintiff’s February 2, 2011 Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

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such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Though Plaintiff has filed five complaints in this

action, none of those have been substantively screened by the Court. 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed

misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.

Id. at 1949-50. 

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is a prisoner currently housed at California State Prison at Corcoran. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks to sue the following defendants for denial of adequate medical care:

(1) The State of California; (2) The Department of Corrections; (3) K. Allison, Warden; and

(4) Chief Medical Officer. Plaintiff alleges that all defendants are sued “in their ‘Official’

capacities and acting under the ‘color of law.’” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff seeks “an injunction

preventing them from denying necessary medical treatment to the plaintiff,” as well as $1

in damages and $1 punitive damages. (Id. at 2.) 

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Neither May nor Myers are listed as Defendants in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 1

Plaintiff has been a type II insulin-dependent diabetic since 2001. He suffers from

both hypo- and hyper-glycemia, i.e. low and high blood sugar levels. On September 27,

2010, without having conducted any medical tests, LVN Nurse May instructed the custody

officers in Plaintiff’s dorm to confiscate all of Plaintiff’s diabetes medication. May acted on

orders from PA Myers, who acted on orders from the Chief Medical Officer. Plaintiff has 1

received no medical treatment for his diabetes since September 27, 2010.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against the State and Department of Corrections

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against

an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053

(9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114,

1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144

(1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]he State of California has not waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal

court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir.

1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As a result, Plaintiff’s claim against the

State of California is barred by the State’s immunity from suit.

The Eleventh Amendment also bars suits against state agencies. See Natural

Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996);

Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding

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that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.

1989). Because the California Department of Corrections is a state agency, it is also

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 

Because both the State of California and the Department of Corrections are immune

from suit, Plaintiff cannot recover from these parties. If Plaintiff chooses to file an

amended complaint, he should omit the State of California and the Department of

Corrections as defendants.

B. Claims Against Warden Allison

To state a claim for a constitutional violation under section 1983, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that each Defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court recently

emphasized that the term “supervisory liability,” loosely and commonly used by both courts

and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “Government officials may not

be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of

respondeat superior.” Id. at 1948. Rather, each government official, regardless of his or

her title, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Therefore, Plaintiff must demonstrate

that each Defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Id. at 1948-49. 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to attribute any wrongful action to Warden Allison.

The law does not allow Plaintiff to hold Allison liable based solely on his position as

Warden of CSP-Corcoran. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege how Allison

personally violated his constitutional rights. If Plaintiff cannot allege any violation of his

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constitutional rights based on Allison’s personal actions, he should omit Allison as a

defendant. 

C. Claims Against the Chief Medical Officer

Plaintiff claims that the Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) instructed the medical staff

not to treat Plaintiff’s diabetes. He seeks an injunction that would prevent the CMO from

denying him “necessary medical treatment”, as well as compensatory and punitive

damages.

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The

two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical

need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds,

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal

quotations omitted)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Id. (citing

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official

must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id.

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27 Plaintiff also fails to name LVN May and PA Myers as Defendants. It appears that he could 2

state an Eighth Amendment violation against both of these individuals. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff

may include these parties if he so wishes. 

at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “‘If a prison official should

have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations satisfy the deliberate indifference

standard by asserting that the CMO instructed his staff to deny Plaintiff treatment for his

serious medical condition. Thus, Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment

claim. However, Plaintiff has failed to provide a name for the Chief Medical Officer. The 2

Court cannot order service on the Chief Medical Officer until he is identified. See Robinett

v. Correctional Training Facility, 2010 WL 2867696 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (court cannot

order service on “John Doe” defendants). 

Additionally, as pled, Plaintiff cannot recover all of the relief he seeks in his

Complaint. Plaintiff explicitly states that all Defendants in this action, including the CMO,

are named in their official capacities. (Compl. p. 1.) The Supreme Court has held that a

suit against a state-employed individual in his official capacity is “no different from a suit

against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Because the CMO is employed by the State of California, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks

monetary damages from the CMO in his official capacity, such claim is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1353-54 (9th Cir.

1988). Thus, Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages as long as the Defendants are

named in their official capacities. If Plaintiff amends his complaint, he should either name

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the Defendants, including the CMO, in their individual capacities or omit any claim for

monetary damages.

Plaintiff’s Complaint also seeks injunctive relief. Suits against state officials in their

official capacities for declarative or prospective injunctive relief are not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This exception applies even

if the injunctive relief would cost the state money, as long as the money is for prospective

relief. Id.; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-69 (1974) (dismissing how

prospective injunctive relief can drain state coffers). Thus, Plaintiff has stated a cognizable

claim against the CMO for prospective injunctive relief. However, as noted above, the

Court cannot order service until he names the CMO. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that, as pled, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. The Court will provide Plaintiff time to file an amended complaint

to address the potentially correctable deficiencies noted above. See Noll v. Carlson, 809

F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff should read this Screening Order carefully

before preparing his amended complaint. 

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged incident

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Plaintiff

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also

demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his

rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

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 The Court notes that, contemporaneous with his original Complaint, Plaintiff filed a document 3

entitled “Petition for an Order: for an: Emergency Injunction for Medical Care” that included facts not pled

in his Complaint. The Court has not considered these additional allegations in preparing the instant

Screening Order. Similarly, in screening Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court will consider only the

allegations in the amended complaint and will not refer to any other document to determine whether he

has stated a cognizable claim. Plaintiff should include all relevant facts in his amended complaint. 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. Plaintiff should focus his Amended

Complaint on the denial of medical treatment for his diabetes and those individuals who

were directly involved with the denial of such care.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55,

57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Amended Complaint,” refer to

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

3

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to file

an amended complaint by April 20, 2011; 

2. Plaintiff shall caption the document “Amended Complaint” and refer to the

case number 1:11-cv-182-OWW-MJS (PC); and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

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failure to prosecute and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2011 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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