Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01105/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allyson Kesley, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Entertainment U.S.A. Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01105-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Conditional Certification and 

Court-Supervised Notice of Pending Collective Action (Doc. 71), Defendants’ Brief in 

Opposition (Doc. 73) and the Reply (Doc. 84). For the reasons that follow, the Motion 

will be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Allyson Kesley filed this action in May 2014, seeking damages, on behalf 

of herself and a group of similarly situated exotic dancers, for alleged violations of the 

Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Arizona Minimum Wage Act and the Arizona 

Wage Law. On November 21, 2014, the Court granted Kesley’s Motion for Leave to File 

Second Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint (Doc. 67). In addition to 

dropping two of the original named Defendants, the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 

74) substitutes Holly Brooke and La’Shaunta Cooper as the class representatives 

(“Plaintiffs”). Kesley, as well as Kim Jones and Deyonna Wallace, who filed consent 

forms in October 2014, are listed as opt-in plaintiffs (“Opt-in Plaintiffs”). 

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 Plaintiffs seek damages from one individual and six corporate Defendants: (1) 

Entertainment USA, Inc. of Cleveland d/b/a Christie’s Cabaret, “a foreign for-profit 

corporation doing business in Cleveland, Ohio,” (2) J. L. Spoons, Inc., “a foreign forprofit corporation doing business in Brunswick, Ohio,” (3) Christie’s Cabaret of 

Glendale, LLC, “a domestic for-profit company doing business in Glendale, Arizona,” 

(4) Sunset Entertainment, Inc. (FN), “a foreign for-profit company doing business in 

Phoenix, Arizona,” (5) Out West Ventures, Inc., “a domestic for-profit company doing 

business in Guadalupe, Arizona and Tempe, Arizona,” (6) Giovani Carandola, Ltd., “a 

foreign for-profit company doing business in Greensboro, North Carolina,” and (7) Steve 

C. Cooper, “an individual who resides in Tennessee” and “is an owner of the corporate 

Defendants.” Doc. 74 at 4-5. According to the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants 

operate adult entertainment clubs in Greensboro, North Carolina, three Ohio towns—

Brunswick, Canton and Cleveland—and three Arizona cities—Phoenix, Tempe and 

Glendale—all under the name of “Christie’s Cabaret.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs allege, “[u]pon 

information and belief,” that “the Defendants are affiliated corporate entities under 

common ownership and control and are related organizations through, for example, 

common membership, governing bodies, trustees, and/or officers and benefit plans.” Id.

at 5. 

 Plaintiffs Brooke and Cooper allege they were previously employed as exotic 

dancers at Defendants’ clubs, in Phoenix and Tempe, respectively. Id. at 10; Doc. 71-4 at 

1; Doc. 71-5 at 1. Opt-in Plaintiffs also allegedly worked for Defendants as exotic 

dancers. Doc. 74 at 10. Defendants concede that Jones at one time worked at the 

Phoenix club, Doc. 73 at 7, where Kesley claims she, too, was formerly employed, Doc. 

71-3 at 1. But neither the Second Amended Complaint nor any declarations submitted to 

the Court make clear where Wallace danced. 

 The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs had to pay Defendants a 

“house fee” in order to be allowed to perform on any given shift. Doc. 74 at 10. When 

they did perform, Plaintiffs allege they received no wages directly from Defendants and 

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instead had to rely exclusively on tips from Defendants’ customers. Id. Plaintiffs were 

allegedly forced to share those tips with “other non-service employees who do not 

customarily receive tips, including the ‘house mom,’ disc jockeys, and the bouncers.” Id. 

To enforce this arrangement, Defendants sold customers “Christie’s Cabaret 

Certificates,” which patrons could use to purchase dances from Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs 

would return these certificates to Defendants, who would allegedly remit to Plaintiffs a 

cash sum less than the full value of the certificates; the cut retained by Defendants 

“grossly exceed[ed] the fee paid by the club as a merchant fee to the credit card 

companies.” Id. at 10-11. Taken together, Plaintiffs allege, these practices pushed their 

total compensation well below both the federal and state minimum wages. In addition, 

Plaintiffs were often required to work more than 40 hours in a week but were not 

compensated at one-and-a-half times their usual salary for those extra hours. Id. at 12. 

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants justified these alleged willful violations of federal 

law by classifying Plaintiffs as independent contractors rather than employees. Id.; see

also Pfohl v. Farmers Ins. Grp., NO. CV 03-3080 DT (RCx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

6447, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004) (“Independent contractors are not covered by the 

FLSA; that is, there must be an employer-employee relationship for liability to accrue for 

alleged unpaid overtime.” (citation omitted)). Defendants admit in their Answer to the 

Second Amended Complaint that “dance performers do not receive either regular or timeand-a-half wages, or any other compensation from them,” but “deny, in any way, that 

they have violated the FLSA.” Doc. 83 at 9. 

 Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion on November 4, 2014, seeking certification 

under the FLSA of a class defined as “[a]ll current and former exotic dancers who 

worked at any of the seven Christie’s Cabarets at any time during the three year period 

before the granting of this Motion up to the present.” Doc. 71 at 4. The putative 

collective seeks wages and overtime compensation allegedly denied as a result of 

Defendants’ willful FLSA violations. Although Plaintiffs have also alleged violations of 

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Arizona law, they do not at this time seek certification of a Rule 23 class action on those 

claims. Id. at 3 n.3. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Fair Labor Standards Act 

 “The FLSA provides that a covered employer shall not employ any employee ‘for 

a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his 

employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed.’” Wood v. TriVita, Inc., No. CV-08-

0765-PHX-SRB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64585, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2009) (quoting 

29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). The law also mandates that “[e]very employer shall pay to each 

of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of 

goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce, wages” that are “not less than” specified statutory 

rates. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). “Any employer who violates the provisions of [§ 206 or § 

207] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 

minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an 

additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. § 216(b). An action to recover these 

damages “may be maintained against any employer ... in any Federal or State court of 

competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 

themselves and other employees similarly situated.” Id. “The FLSA requires class 

members who are not named in the complaint to affirmatively opt in to the class by filing 

a written consent with the Court.” Wood, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64585, at *5 (citing 29 

U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 256). “The district court has discretion to determine whether a 

collective action is appropriate.” Id. at *6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “Section 216(b) does not define ‘similarly situated,’ and the Ninth Circuit has not 

construed the term. Federal district courts have taken at least three approaches to 

determining whether plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of § 216(b): (1) a twoCase 2:14-cv-01105-NVW Document 92 Filed 12/17/14 Page 4 of 21
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tiered case-by-case approach, (2) the incorporation of the requirements of Rule 23 of the 

current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or (3) the incorporation of the requirements of 

the pre-1966 version of Rule 23 for ‘spurious’ class actions. However, district courts 

within the Ninth Circuit generally follow the two-tiered or two-step approach for making 

a collective action determination.” Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (D. 

Ariz. 2010) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “Under the two-step approach, the court determines, on an ad hoc case-by-case 

basis, whether plaintiffs are similarly situated. This requires the court to first make an 

initial ‘notice stage’ determination of whether plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated.’ At this 

first stage, the court require[s] nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative 

class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. If a plaintiff 

can survive this hurdle, the district court will conditionally certify the proposed class and 

the lawsuit will proceed to a period of notification, which will permit potential class 

members to opt-into the lawsuit. Once the notification period ends, the Court moves on to 

the second step of the certification process. At the second step, in response to a motion to 

decertify the class filed by a defendant, the court makes yet another determination 

whether the proposed class members are similarly situated; this time, however, the court 

utilizes a much stricter standard to scrutinize the nature of the claims.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “While conditional certification at the first stage is by no means automatic, 

Plaintiffs’ burden is light. All that need be shown by the plaintiff is that some identifiable 

factual or legal nexus binds together the various claims of the class members in a way 

that hearing the claims together promotes judicial efficiency and comports with the broad 

remedial policies underlying the FLSA. Given the light burden, motions to conditionally 

certify a class for notification purposes are ‘typically’ granted. To proceed to the 

notification stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs’ allegations need neither be ‘strong [n]or 

conclusive.’” Id. at 925-26 (alteration in original) (citations and some internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Courts recognize that collective action notification normally occurs 

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before the Parties have had the chance to engage in extensive fact discovery. That is why 

in making a determination in whether to conditionally certify a proposed class for 

notification purposes only, courts do not review the underlying merits of the action.” Id.

at 926 (citations omitted). The court’s determination at this first step is “based primarily 

on the pleadings and any affidavits submitted by the parties.” Hutton v. Bank of Am., No. 

CV 03-2262-PHX-ROS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97516, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2007) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Plaintiffs’ Case 

 Like virtually every other district court in the Ninth Circuit, this Court will apply 

the two-step approach to FLSA certification. Plaintiffs easily satisfy this test. 

 The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants had a “practice of failing 

to pay Plaintiffs ... time-and-a-half rate for hours in excess of forty per workweek” and a 

“practice of failing to pay Plaintiffs ... at the required minimum wage rate.” Doc. 74 at 

15-16. In support of this assertion, the declarations submitted to the Court describe 

“policies” that dancers were required to observe as well as “rules propagated by 

Christie’s Cabaret that applied to all the entertainers.” E.g., Doc. 71-4 at 1. Among these 

policies are those listed above: charging a house fee, selling “Christie’s Cash” to 

customers and retaining a portion of Plaintiffs’ tips. The declarations make clear that 

Defendants’ practices “applie[d] to all the exotic dancers,” even if “some exotic dancers 

may have worked more or fewer hours than” others. Id. at 3. More broadly, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendants, whose wage and hour policies “are and were centrally and 

collectively dictated, controlled, and ratified,” have “misclassified Plaintiffs ... as 

independent contractors to avoid Defendants’ obligation to pay them pursuant to the 

FLSA.” Doc. 74 at 6, 12. These assertions, supported by Plaintiffs’ declarations, clearly 

constitute “substantial allegations that the putative class members were together the 

victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). On the face of the pleadings, Plaintiffs have 

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carried their “light” burden of showing that they are similarly situated to other putative 

class members. Id. 

 Defendants do not appear to seriously contest this conclusion. Nevertheless, they 

urge the Court to deny collective certification for a number of reasons. The Court will 

address these grounds in turn. 

 1. Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Allegations

 To win certification, an FLSA plaintiff must show—based on affidavits and 

declarations submitted in support of the pleadings—that she is at least potentially 

“similarly situated” to all potential class members, not merely some portion of them. 

Where a plaintiff cannot adduce even minimal evidence that a subset of possible opt-in 

plaintiffs is “similarly situated,” the class cannot be certified as to that subset. See

Burkhart-Deal v. Citifinancial, Inc., No. 07-1747, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9534, at *11-

12 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010) (“It is not sufficient for Plaintiff to show that she is similarly 

situated to just anyone; instead, she must share the requisite nexus with the employees on 

behalf of whom [she is] seeking to pursue claims. In this case, Plaintiff seeks to pursue 

claims on behalf of FSRs nationwide; thus, for purposes of this litigation, she must satisfy 

the Court that she is ‘similarly situated’ to FSRs nationwide.” (alteration in original) 

(citation, footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Courts have divided over how stringently to apply this principle. In Colson, the 

plaintiff, a sales and marketing representative working in the defendant’s Oregon office, 

sought certification of an FLSA class “consisting of all current and former SMRs 

employed by Defendant Avnet, Inc., along with ‘all other persons employed by 

Defendant in the United States who perform or performed substantially the same duties 

as SMR employees.’” 687 F. Supp. 2d at 917, 926. The plaintiff argued that “because 

Defendant classified all of its SMR employees as exempt, and because all SMR 

employees perform essentially the same tasks nationwide, these elements standing alone 

justify the Court in conditionally certifying a nationwide class for notification purposes 

under the FLSA.” Id. at 927. After noting that “the mere classification of a group of 

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employees—even a large or nationwide group—as exempt under the FLSA is not by 

itself sufficient to constitute the necessary evidence of a common policy, plan, or 

practice,” the court found that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff did “not come close 

to establishing a sufficient evidentiary basis that all SMRs performed similar tasks and 

were, as a discernable class, potentially misclassified as employees exempt from overtime pay requirements.” Id. at 927-28. 

 That evidence consisted primarily of a declaration in the plaintiff’s own name, 

apparently asserting that defendant treated the sales and marketing representatives at its 

40 other offices across the country similarly to the plaintiff.1

 See id. at 928. Because the 

plaintiff “had minimal contact with SMR employees from other states,” the court 

dismissed this evidence as being “based on nothing more than her opinions, which are 

vague and appear to be based on unspecified hearsay from unidentified sources.” See id. 

“While Ms. Colson’s declaration has some value in describing her own experience,” the 

court concluded, “it has no probative value in establishing that she, along with other 

SMRs across the country, ‘were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or 

plan.’” Id. at 928-29 (citation omitted). As a result, the court found “Plaintiff’s claim 

that she is similarly situated to all SMRs” to be “insupportable” and therefore denied 

certification of the plaintiff’s desired nationwide class. Id. at 929-30. 

 Likewise, the Burkhart-Deal court denied FLSA certification of a putative 

nationwide class of the defendant’s financial sales representatives. 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 9534, at *19-20. The lead plaintiff had submitted “affidavits from ten employees 

who worked, at pertinent times, at seventeen Pennsylvania branches; one employee who 

worked at two branches in Washington state; and two employees who worked at three 

California branches,” none of whom “purport[ed] to have personal knowledge of 

violations beyond the branches in which they worked.” Id. at *12-13. For that reason, 

 

1

 The only other evidence before the court was a pair of declarations, one from the plaintiff’s lawyer and another from a man who “was never even employed by Defendant as a SMR, but instead worked as a trainee and then administrative assistant for most of 

his tenure with Defendant.” Id. at 929.

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the court found “Plaintiff has proffered no evidentiary basis for concluding that 

employees at branches in the remainder of the country were affected,” and it limited class 

certification to “those branch offices identified in the declarations where Plaintiff has 

given reason to believe that violations occurred.” Id. at *13, 20. This conclusion turned 

in part, however, on the discretionary nature of the alleged FLSA violation—which, 

“unlike those facially across-the-board actions or policies in which nationwide notice has 

been found appropriate,” “rested, in some branches, on its implementation or 

interpretation by individual managers and employees.” See id. at *15-16. 

 Other courts have been more forgiving. The lead plaintiffs in Allen v. McWane, 

Inc., NO. 2:06-CV-158 (TJW), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81543 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2006), 

filed declarations from workers at six of the defendant’s 13 facilities, which showed that 

“the basic tasks performed by the employees were all similar.” 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

81543, at *10, 15. “Although the affidavits and declarations d[id] not encompass all of 

the Defendant’s facilities,” the court nevertheless found that the plaintiffs had “come 

forward with competent evidence that similarly situated potential plaintiffs exist.” Id. at 

*15-16. After determining that “Plaintiffs ha[d] satisfied their burden to demonstrate that 

a company-wide policy existed,” the court certified a collective action as to all 13 

facilities. Id. at *17. Decisions from some other courts reach similar conclusions. E.g., 

Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., 242 F.R.D. 530, 537-38 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (certifying class 

of employees at over 500 of defendants’ locations based on affidavits covering fewer 

than 80 locations and opt-in consent forms signed by “383 other potential plaintiffs 

employed in fifty cities under at least six contracts”). 

 The disparate results reached in these cases confirm a central tenet of the law 

governing FLSA certification: “Determining whether a collective action is appropriate is 

within the discretion of the district court.” Leuthold v. Destination Am., 224 F.R.D. 462, 

466 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). Certification will depend on the facts and 

circumstances of each individual case; the relevant factors cannot be reduced to a 

checklist. Here, Defendants argue that many of Plaintiffs’ proposed opt-in plaintiffs 

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should be excluded because the pleadings and attached declarations provide an 

insufficient basis for concluding that the alleged practices and wage violations occurred 

at all of Defendants’ establishments. Specifically, the only declarations provided to the 

Court come from dancers who ostensibly worked at clubs in Phoenix (Brooke and 

Kesley) and Tempe (Cooper). There are no declarations authored by dancers at the 

Glendale, Greensboro, Brunswick, Canton or Cleveland locations.2

 

 The Second Amended Complaint alleges that “[a]ll clubs are operated in the same 

manner—misclassifying dancers as independent contractors.” Doc. 74 at 2. In support of 

this assertion, Plaintiffs claim they “worked with other dancers who worked at various 

Christie’s Cabaret locations” and therefore “have first-hand personal knowledge of the 

same pay violations throughout Defendants’ multiple establishments.” Id. at 17-18. In 

addition, “other exotic dancers at Defendants’ various establishments have shared with 

[Plaintiffs] similar pay violation experiences as those described in this complaint.” Id. at 

18. Plaintiffs’ declarations are somewhat less bold. Brooke affirms, for instance, that “I 

know the practices I described herein applied equally to all dancers at the Christie’s 

Cabaret club located in Phoenix, Arizona.” Doc. 71-4 at 3. Cooper makes a similar 

statement regarding the Tempe club. Doc. 71-5 at 4. Neither declaration addresses the 

conditions at or policies of any of Defendants’ other establishments. But even if Brooke 

and Cooper—or Kesley, whose declaration is virtually identical to Brooke’s, see Doc. 71-

3—do have personal knowledge of the other clubs’ practices, that knowledge appears to 

be based on nothing more than the “unspecified hearsay from unidentified sources” that 

the court in Colson found insufficient. 687 F. Supp. 2d at 928. 

 

2

 Plaintiffs attach declarations from Alexandria Cox and Jennifer Martin, who both 

claim to have danced at Defendants’ Cleveland club. Doc. 71-6, 71-7. Those 

declarations were originally sworn as part of a similar 2013 lawsuit brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The court in that case denied collective 

certification after determining that named plaintiff Cox, who had danced at the club for 

only two days, had “presented what has proven through limited discovery to be a Declaration rife with false statements of which she has no direct knowledge.” Cox v. 

Entm’t U.S.A. of Cleveland, Inc., d/b/a Christie’s Cabaret, NO. 1:13 CV 2656 (N.D. 

Ohio Aug. 29, 2014), Doc. 30 at 3-5. The Court will therefore not consider the Cox or 

Martin declarations in deciding Plaintiffs’ Motion. 

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 Given that Plaintiffs have already experienced such difficulty finding others to 

join their case—even at the clubs where they themselves purportedly worked—it makes 

little sense to expand the class to include dancers in farther-flung locations on the basis of 

such flimsy evidence. This is particularly so where the various corporate Defendants are 

separate legal entities, rather than branches of a single defendant corporation, 

notwithstanding Defendant Cooper’s alleged ownership of each corporate Defendant. If 

exotic dancers in Ohio or North Carolina can make substantial allegations regarding wage 

violations at the clubs where they dance, they are free to present their claims to courts in 

those states. But bringing those as-yet unsubstantiated allegations to this Court does not 

promote the orderly, fair and expeditious adjudication of legal controversies. As to 

Defendants’ clubs in Glendale, Greensboro, Brunswick, Canton and Cleveland, Plaintiffs 

have failed to identify a “factual nexus which binds the named plaintiffs and the potential 

class members together as victims of a particular alleged policy or practice.” Id. at 926 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 2. Suitability of the Named Plaintiffs 

 Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs and Opt-in Plaintiffs are not “suitable 

representative[s] for the broad collective that is sought” because of the details of their 

employment—or, rather, independent contractor status. Doc. 73 at 3 (capitalization 

omitted). Specifically, Defendants charge that Brooke has not worked at any of 

Defendants’ establishments since 2008, when she was fired by the Phoenix club “for 

fighting with another entertainer.” Id. at 5. Defendants support this assertion by 

attaching declarations from the Phoenix general manager and three other individuals who 

worked at the club both before and after 2008, and who claim they have not seen Brooke 

since then. See Doc. 73-9, 73-10, 73-12, 73-13. Five other declarants, who began 

working for the club after 2008, each attest they have never known Brooke. See Doc. 73-

5, 73-6, 73-7, 73-8, 73-14. Plaintiffs alleged, in an August 22, 2014 brief supporting a 

previous motion, that “Ms. Brooke was re-hired at the Phoenix location in December 

2008 and continued to work there during the day shift until July 2013.” Doc. 37 at 4. 

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Despite promising to “affirm these facts” in a future supplemental declaration, id. n.10, 

however, Plaintiffs have failed to submit any supporting documentation. 

 This dispute matters because an FLSA claim seeking unpaid minimum wages or 

unpaid overtime compensation must “be commenced within two years after the cause of 

action accrued ... except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be 

commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 

Even assuming Defendants’ conduct was willful, therefore, Brooke cannot state a claim if 

she last worked for Defendants six years ago. The “court does not decide factual disputes 

during the first stage of the certification process.” Longnecker v. Am. Express Co., No. 

2:14-cv-0069-HRH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114501, at *19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2014) 

(citations omitted). Still, “[a]t all times, Plaintiff has the burden of proving she meets the 

‘similarly situated’ requirement.” Rose v. Wildflower Bread Co., No. CV09-1348-PHXJAT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43501, at *33 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2010) (citation omitted). 

“To satisfy this burden, plaintiff must provide the court with detailed allegations 

supported by [declarations] which successfully engage a defendant’s affidavits to the 

contrary.” Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 Here, despite expressly vowing to do so, Plaintiffs have not engaged Defendants’ 

affidavits asserting that Brooke has not worked at the Phoenix club since 2008. 

Plaintiffs’ burden at step one is light, and for this reason courts “declin[e] to resolve a 

dispute between competing affidavits at the first-step analysis stage for FLSA collective 

certification.” Chastain v. Cam, No. 3:13-cv-01802-SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102465, 

at *6 (D. Or. July 28, 2014) (citation omitted). But here the affidavits are not in conflict. 

And light though it may be, Plaintiffs have not carried the burden of showing that Brooke 

is similarly situated to the class of dancers who worked “at any of the seven Christie’s 

Cabarets at any time during the three year period before the granting of this Motion up to 

the present.” Doc. 71 at 4 (emphasis added). 

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 Were Brooke’s declaration the only one attesting to personal knowledge of and 

experience with the policies employed by the Christie’s Cabaret in Phoenix, Plaintiffs’ 

failure to supplement might preclude certification as to dancers who worked there. See

supra Part II.B.1. But courts deciding FLSA certification motions often rely on 

declarations submitted by non-named plaintiffs, e.g., Adams, 242 F.R.D. at 538 (noting 

that “Plaintiffs in this case have provided thirteen declarations from officers employed at 

locations other than their own who have been subject to the same alleged policy” 

(emphasis added)), and Opt-in Plaintiff Kesley claims she, too, worked at Defendants’ 

Phoenix location. 

 Defendants challenge Kesley’s statement that she worked at Defendant Sunset 

Entertainment’s Phoenix dance club for three months in the summer of 2013. A 

“thorough and diligent search” of Sunset Entertainment’s records, ordered by its 

president, Defendant Cooper, allegedly produced no evidence that Kesley ever worked 

there. Doc. 73 at 3. According to exhibits attached to Defendants’ Brief, seven 

individuals who worked at the Sunset Entertainment club—and who, “by dint of their job 

duties, interacted with the independent contractor entertainers on a daily basis”—did not 

recognize Kesley in the photograph that she produced during discovery. Id. at 4.3

 

Nevertheless, Kesley reaffirmed, in a Supplemental Declaration submitted on August 22, 

2014, that “[w]hile [she] do[es] not remember the exact dates, [she] worked as an exotic 

dancer for Christie’s Cabaret during 2013” at its Phoenix location. Doc. 37-1. Because it 

“is not the court’s [role] to resolve factual disputes . . . at the preliminary certification 

stage of an FLSA collection action,” Barrera v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., No. CV-2012-

02278-PHX-BSB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124624, at *16 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2013) 

(ellipsis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), determination of 

whether Kesley in fact worked at Defendants’ Phoenix club will have to await discovery. 

 

3

 Defendants also report in their Brief that they hired a private investigator to conduct a background check on Kesley, which turned up several criminal convictions and 

probation violations. The legal significance of these alleged scrapes with the law is unclear, and so the Court will ignore them. 

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In the meantime, Plaintiffs have—barely—satisfied their light burden for preliminary 

FLSA certification of a class comprising dancers at Defendants’ Phoenix and Tempe 

establishments. 

 Finally, Defendants claim Jones last worked at Defendants’ Phoenix club in May 

2011, outside the two- or three-year statute of limitations for FLSA actions. A 

declaration from the club’s general manager attests to this fact, Doc. 73-12 at 2, and 

Plaintiffs have offered no affidavit to rebut it. Resolving this factual dispute is premature 

at this stage, especially since it does not bear on whether Plaintiffs are similarly situated 

to the class of all dancers at Defendants’ Phoenix and Tempe locations. Accordingly, the 

Court will defer this question until discovery has concluded. 

 3. Personal Jurisdiction 

 Almost as an afterthought, Defendants argue that the Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over the Ohio and North Carolina Defendants. Although the question is moot 

in light of the conclusion in Part II.B.1, the Court will address the issue briefly. 

 “There are two independent limitations on the court’s power to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: the applicable state personal jurisdiction rule 

and constitutional principles of due process. Arizona’s jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements; therefore, jurisdictional inquiries under 

state law and federal due process standards merge into one analysis. Arizona’s long-arm 

statute provides for personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process 

Clause of the United States Constitution.” Stickle v. SCI W. Mkt. Support Ctr., L.P., No. 

CV 08-083-PHX-MHM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83315, at *11-12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 

2008) (citations omitted). “The exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 

violates the protections created by the due process clause unless the defendant has 

‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not 

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ Personal jurisdiction may 

be either general or specific.” Id. at *12 (citation omitted). 

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 “General jurisdiction exists where the defendant’s contacts with the forum state 

are so substantial or continuous and systematic that jurisdiction exists even if the cause of 

action is unrelated to those contacts. The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is 

‘fairly high.’ The defendant’s contacts must approximate physical presence in the forum 

state.” Id. at *12-13 (citations omitted). “Specific jurisdiction exists where the cause of 

action arises out of or relates to a defendant’s activities within the forum. Specific 

jurisdiction is analyzed using a three-prong test: (1) the non-resident defendant must 

purposefully direct its activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or a 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be 

reasonable. Each of these conditions is required for asserting jurisdiction.” Id. at *13 

(citations omitted). 

 “A showing that a defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege of doing 

business in a forum state typically consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the 

forum, such as executing or performing a contract there. ... The purposeful availment test 

is met where the defendant has taken deliberate action within the forum state or if he has 

created continuing obligations to forum residents.” Id. at *13-14 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The second prong of the specific jurisdiction test requires 

that the claim arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum-related activities. A claim 

arises out of a defendant’s conduct if the claim would not have arisen ‘but for’ the 

defendant’s forum-related contacts.” Id. at *14 (citation omitted). “Once the plaintiff has 

satisfied the first two prongs, the defendant bears the burden of overcoming a 

presumption that jurisdiction is reasonable by presenting a compelling case that specific 

jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Seven factors are considered in assessing whether the 

exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is reasonable.” Id. at *14-15 

(citations omitted) (listing factors).

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 The Ohio and North Carolina Defendants clearly lack the “substantial or 

continuous and systematic” contacts with Arizona that are necessary for general 

jurisdiction. Id. at *12 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs plead no facts that might suggest a 

different conclusion. As for specific jurisdiction, nothing in the Second Amended 

Complaint suggests the Ohio and North Carolina Defendants “‘purposefully availed’ 

[themselves] of the privilege of doing business” in Arizona. Id. at *14 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants “share employees, have a common management, pool 

their resources, operate from the same headquarters, have common ownership, and have 

the same operating name.” Doc. 74 at 9. But even if this is true, it does not suggest the 

Ohio and North Carolina Defendants took “actions in the forum, such as executing or 

performing a contract there.” Stickle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83315, at *14 (citation 

omitted). Nor have Plaintiffs stated claims that “arise out of or result from the [Ohio and 

North Carolina Defendants’] forum-related activities.” Id. Instead, any claims against 

those Defendants would be based on conduct that took place exclusively within the 

borders of their respective states. Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden as to the first 

two prongs of the specific jurisdiction analysis; therefore, the Court will not address the 

seven factors that make up the third prong. 

 In their Reply, Plaintiffs attempt to ground personal jurisdiction in their allegation 

that Defendants collectively constitute “a ‘single enterprise’ within the meaning of 3(r)(1) 

of the FLSA.” Doc. 84 at 3. The statutory provision to which Plaintiffs cite defines 

“enterprise” for FLSA purposes as “the related activities performed (either through 

unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business 

purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more 

establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including 

departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements.” 29 U.S.C. § 

203(r)(1). Even if Defendants fit this definition, the existence of personal jurisdiction 

does not follow. The FLSA’s definition of “enterprise” serves to identify which potential 

defendants are subject to the act’s requirements. “In order to be covered by the FLSA’s 

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overtime rules, employees must be ‘engaged in commerce or in the production of goods 

for commerce, or . . . employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce.’ 29 U.S.C. § 

207(a)(1). In other words, coverage exists if either the employee is engaged in commerce 

(individual coverage), 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (defining ‘commerce’ as ‘trade, commerce, 

transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any 

State and any place outside thereof’), or the employer is an enterprise engaged in 

commerce (enterprise coverage), 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (defining ‘enterprise engaged in 

commerce’ as enterprises that, inter alia, have annual gross revenue of $ 500,000 or 

greater).” Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., 346 F.3d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (ellipsis in 

original) (citation omitted). That is, the “enterprise” label may determine which 

employers are obligated to comply with the FLSA, but it is irrelevant to the personal 

jurisdiction inquiry. 

 Accordingly, this Court cannot assert jurisdiction over the Ohio and North 

Carolina Defendants. Even if it could, however, the discretionary factors governing 

FLSA certification would counsel against including the Ohio and North Carolina 

Defendants in Plaintiffs’ class. If this case proceeds to the merits, all members of the 

class will eventually have to prove up their damages. Requiring dancers from Ohio and 

North Carolina to travel 2,000 miles in order to substantiate their claims in this Court 

would cause significant inconvenience. As explained above, see supra Part II.B.1, those 

dancers are free to seek a remedy from courts in their own states, where the burden on all 

parties would be appreciably less onerous. Whether as a matter of jurisdictional 

requirements or merely sound judgment, it does not make sense for this Court to certify 

Plaintiffs’ class as to the Ohio and North Carolina Defendants.

C. Statute of limitations 

 As explained above, an FLSA claim for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid 

overtime compensation must “be commenced within two years after the cause of action 

accrued ... except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be 

commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 

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Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants’ failure to pay minimum wage and overtime 

compensation was willful. Doc. 74 at 12. Absent discovery, the Court cannot determine 

whether this allegation is accurate. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ collective action will be 

provisionally certified for a period of three years prior to the filing of Plaintiffs’ Second 

Amended Complaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 256(a); Anderson v. Ziprealty, Inc., No. CV 12-

0332-PHX-JAT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *9-10 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2013) 

(preliminarily applying three-year statute of limitations, pending discovery). The 

limitations period for any future opt-in plaintiffs will cover the three years immediately 

preceding the date on which they file their consent forms. See 29 U.S.C. § 256(b). 

Following discovery, Defendants may file a motion to decertify the class on the basis that 

any violations were not willful and the two-year limitations period should therefore 

apply. See Anderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *10. 

D. Form of Notice 

 Plaintiffs ask the Court to authorize mailing of the “Important Notice to Dancers at 

Christie’s Cabaret” (Doc. 71-1) and “Consent to Join Wage Claim Against Christie’s 

Cabaret” (Doc. 71-2) that they lodged with their Motion. Plaintiffs propose (1) to send 

the Notice and Consent by both first class mail and email, (2) to “hire a third party class 

action administration company to oversee the mailing of the notice and the forms as it 

deems appropriate,” Doc. 71 at 14, (3) to allow potential opt-in plaintiffs to “execute their 

consent forms online through an electronic signature service,” id. at 15, and (4) to send 

the Notice a second time to any potential opt-in plaintiffs who have not submitted consent 

forms within thirty days of Plaintiffs’ original mailing. Defendants do not resist these 

proposals, and so Plaintiffs’ requests regarding the mailing of their Notice and Consent 

will be granted. 

 For a variety of reasons, however, Defendants do object to the content of the 

proposed Notice. 

 First, Defendants contend the proposed Notice “fails to advise potential opt-ins 

that they may be required to participate in discovery.” Doc. 73 at 13. In their Reply, 

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Plaintiffs agree to add to the Notice an admonition that “By joining this case, you may be 

required to respond to written discovery, appear for a deposition and/or testify at trial.” 

Doc. 84 at 6. Plaintiffs will be ordered to include this language in their revised Notice. 

 Second, Defendants argue the Notice should warn opt-in plaintiffs “in the event 

the Defendants are successful, that the plaintiffs would be liable for the costs of the 

litigation.” Doc. 73 at 13. The only possible purpose this admonishment could serve is 

to “discourage participation in the lawsuit.” Green v. Exec. Coach & Carriage, 895 F. 

Supp. 2d 1026, 1030 (D. Nev. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ requested addition will be denied. See Whitehorn v. 

Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining a 

similar request). 

 Third, Defendants insist the notice should “advise a potential plaintiff that if she is 

deemed to be an employee, that the value of her claim could be offset by the amount of 

the service fees for dances that she obtained and retained.” Doc. 73 at 13. For the reason 

explained immediately above, this request will also be denied. 

 Fourth, Defendants request inclusion of a provision informing potential opt-in 

plaintiffs that by joining the class, they may expose themselves to liability for 

counterclaims. To support this request, Defendants cite to Lessard v. Metro. Life Ins. 

Co., 103 F.R.D. 608 (D. Me. 1984), where the district court, in a Rule 23 class action 

case, directed the named plaintiffs to include in their notice “a thorough explanation in 

plain language, to be approved by the Court prior to sending of the notice, of the fact that 

a counterclaim will be asserted and of its potential effect in the event of a decision 

adverse to the class.” 103 F.R.D. at 614 (emphasis in original). But unlike Defendants 

here, the defendant in Lessard had already filed a counterclaim against the lead plaintiff 

at the time she filed for class certification, and 53 of the 207 potential class members 

were also subject to compulsory counterclaims. Id. at 610. As a result, there was a 

legitimate and substantial likelihood that at least some plaintiffs who elected to remain in 

the class would be served with counterclaims. In FLSA cases that are more on point, 

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courts have frequently rejected defendants’ pleas to include similar warnings. E.g., 

Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126 (JG) (RER), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75817, at 

*23-24 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) (“I think such language is inappropriate. It may have an 

in terrorem effect that is disproportionate to the actual likelihood that costs or 

counterclaim damages will occur in any significant degree.”). Plaintiffs will not be 

required to include notice of potential offset or counterclaim liability to opt-in plaintiffs. 

 Fifth, Defendants ask that the Notice’s header, which reads “United States District 

Court for the District of Arizona,” be removed because it “implies Court sponsorship.” 

Doc. 73 at 14. Alternatively, Defendants seek a disclaimer stating that “The Court has 

not made any determination on the merits and the authorization to distribute this notice 

does not mean that the Plaintiffs have prevailed or will prevail on this matter.” Id. 

Plaintiffs do not oppose this suggestion—which has been endorsed by other courts, see, 

e.g., Schiller v. Rite of Passage, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-0576-HRH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

20508, at *18 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2014)—in their Reply. Because the request is a 

reasonable one, Plaintiffs will be ordered either to remove the Notice’s header or to 

include Defendants’ proposed language. 

 Sixth, Defendants argue Plaintiffs must remove the Notice’s last paragraph, which 

informs potential opt-ins that they “can get more information by calling the dancers’ 

attorneys” and provides contact information for Plaintiffs’ counsel. Doc. 71-1 at 2. 

Potential opt-in plaintiffs who receive the Notice may have numerous questions about the 

lawsuit they are being invited to join. The paragraph in question helpfully informs those 

future class members that, before deciding whether to commit time and possible expense 

to this action, they can direct those questions to a knowledgeable source. Defendants’ 

proposal to remove this section will therefore be denied. In their revised Notice, 

however, Plaintiffs should notify potential opt-in plaintiffs that they are not to contact the 

Court with any questions about Plaintiffs’ suit.

 Finally, Defendants object to a provision in the proposed Order Plaintiffs attached 

to their Motion, which would prohibit Defendants “from communicating, directly or 

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indirectly, with any current or former exotic dancers about any matters which touch or 

concern the settlement of any outstanding wage claims or other matters related to this suit 

during the opt-in period.” Doc. 71-10 at 3. Such “gag order[s]” have “an aura of a prior 

restraint, a measure quite disfavored in the law”—at least where a “Plaintiff has failed to 

create the clear record and specific findings that would justify this Court in considering 

the granting of such a gag order.” See Gambo v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 05 C 3701, 

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37998, at *24 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2005) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs have made no showing that a restriction on Defendants’ communications is 

warranted in this case. The request to prohibit conversations with potential opt-in 

plaintiffs will therefore be denied without prejudice. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Conditional 

Certification and Court-Supervised Notice of Pending Collective Action (Doc. 71) is 

granted to the extent that the Court certifies a collective action comprising all exotic 

dancers who worked at Defendants’ Phoenix and Tempe clubs in the three years prior to 

the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer and, by 

January 9, 2015, shall submit to the Court a revised form of Notice consistent with this 

Order as well as a proposed schedule according to which (1) Defendants shall provide 

Plaintiffs with potential class members’ names and last known addresses and (2) 

Plaintiffs shall send notice. 

 Dated this 17th day of December, 2014. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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