Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05235/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2011 Decided March 29, 2011 

No. 10-5235 

UTHMAN ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED UTHMAN, DETAINEE,

CAMP DELTA

APPELLEE

v. 

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:04-cv-01254) 

Dana Kaervsang, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were 

Ian Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

and Douglas N. Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys, U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

Anthony J. Phillips argued the cause for appellees. With 

him on the brief were S. William Livingston, Roger A. Ford, 

and David H. Remes. Brian E. Foster entered an appearance. 

Before: GARLAND, GRIFFITH, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 1 of 14
2 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

 KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: In response to al Qaeda’s 

attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, 

Congress passed and President Bush signed the Authorization 

for Use of Military Force. The AUMF provides: 

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 

persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 

aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 

2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order 

to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 

against the United States by such nations, organizations 

or persons. 

 

Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001); see U.S.

CONST. art. I. § 8. The AUMF, among other things, 

authorizes the Executive Branch to detain for the duration of 

hostilities those individuals who are part of al Qaeda or the 

Taliban. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 

 Under the AUMF, the U.S. military currently holds 

Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman at the U.S. naval 

base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Exercising his right under 

the U.S. Constitution to judicial review of the basis for his 

detention, Uthman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See 

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Uthman 

contended that he was not part of al Qaeda and therefore was 

not properly detained. Applying a “command structure test,” 

the District Court ruled that the Government had not proved 

that Uthman was part of al Qaeda. The District Court 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 2 of 14
3 

therefore granted the petition and ordered Uthman released 

from U.S. custody. 

 In decisions issued since the District Court’s judgment in 

this case, this Court has rejected “command structure” as the 

test for determining whether someone is part of al Qaeda. 

Our cases have held that the “determination of whether an 

individual is ‘part of’ al-Qaida ‘must be made on a case-bycase basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach 

and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation 

to the organization.’” Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 751-52 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 

725 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 

 Applying the functional standard mandated by our 

precedents, we conclude that the facts found by the District 

Court, along with uncontested facts in the record, demonstrate 

that Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda. We 

therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and 

remand with instructions to deny the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. 

I 

 Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman, a Yemeni 

man, was captured at the Afghan-Pakistani border near Tora 

Bora on December 15, 2001. He was captured in a small 

group that included two al Qaeda members who were Osama 

bin Laden bodyguards and another man who was a Taliban 

fighter.1

 Tora Bora is a cave complex in the mountains of 

 1

 Uthman stated that he was captured with about 20 to 30 other 

men. See J.A. 628 (FBI report from Uthman interview); J.A. 771 

(Intelligence Information Report from Uthman interview); J.A. 638 

(FBI report from Uthman interview). 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 3 of 14
4 

eastern Afghanistan. Al Qaeda forces gathered there in 

December 2001 to wage a major battle against the United 

States and its allies. 

 Soon after his capture, Uthman was transferred to the 

U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He has been 

detained at Guantanamo since January 2002. 

 In 2004, Uthman filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 

challenging the basis for his detention. The Government 

asserted that Uthman was part of al Qaeda and therefore may 

be detained for the duration of the war against al Qaeda 

pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. See 

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); Bensayah v. 

Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 2010).2

 

 The District Court stated that “the key question” in 

determining someone’s membership in al Qaeda “is whether 

an individual receives and executes orders from the enemy 

force’s combat apparatus.” Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 

9, 13 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). The District Court derived that test from two 

previous district court opinions applying this “command 

structure test.” See id. at 12-13 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 

616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009), and Gherebi v. Obama, 

609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009)). After examining the 

evidence, the District Court concluded that the Government 

 2

 This Court has stated that the Executive also may detain 

those who “purposefully and materially support [al Qaeda or 

Taliban forces] in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.” 

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also 

Hatim v. Gates, No. 10-5048, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 

2011). In this case, the Government has asserted that it is seeking 

to detain Uthman only because he was part of al Qaeda. 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 4 of 14
5 

did “not convince the Court by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Uthman received and executed orders from Al 

Qaeda.” Id. at 22. On that basis, the District Court granted 

Uthman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 23. 

 Several of this Court’s cases – all decided after the 

District Court granted Uthman’s petition – have held that the 

“command structure test” does not reflect the full scope of the 

Executive’s detention authority under the AUMF. “These 

decisions make clear that the determination of whether an 

individual is ‘part of’ al-Qaida ‘must be made on a case-bycase basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach 

and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation 

to the organization.’” Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 751-52 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725); see 

also Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(“Nowhere in the AUMF is there a mention of command 

structure.”). To be sure, demonstrating that someone is part 

of al Qaeda’s command structure is sufficient to show that 

person is part of al Qaeda. But it is not necessary. See, e.g.,

Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. Indicia other than the receipt and 

execution of al Qaeda’s orders may prove “that a particular 

individual is sufficiently involved with the organization to be 

deemed part of it.” Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725 (citing Awad, 

608 F.3d at 11). It is thus possible that someone may 

“properly be considered ‘part of’ al-Qaida even if he never 

formally received or executed any orders.” Salahi, 625 F.3d 

at 752 (citing Awad, 608 F.3d at 3-4, 11). 

 In this case, the question therefore is whether, under the 

functional test mandated by our precedents, the established 

facts – that is, those facts found by the District Court or 

otherwise uncontested – show that Uthman more likely than 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 5 of 14
6 

not was part of al Qaeda.3

 Our analysis of that question is de 

novo. See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 

2010). 

II 

 In analyzing whether Uthman more likely than not was 

part of al Qaeda, we consider the following facts, which were 

found by the District Court or are otherwise uncontested: 

 Uthman was captured in December 2001 in the 

vicinity of Tora Bora, an isolated, mountainous area 

where al Qaeda forces had gathered to fight the United 

States and its allies.

 When captured, Uthman was traveling with a small 

group of men, two of whom were al Qaeda members 

and bodyguards for Osama bin Laden and one of 

whom was a Taliban fighter. 

 Leading up to his capture, Uthman’s journey began at 

a religious school in Yemen where al Qaeda had 

successfully recruited fighters. The two al Qaeda 

members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards who were 

later captured with Uthman, as well as the Taliban 

fighter captured with Uthman, also attended the 

Furqan Institute. 

 3

 Our cases have stated that the preponderance of the evidence 

standard is constitutionally sufficient and have left open whether a 

lower standard might be adequate to satisfy the Constitution’s 

requirements for wartime detention. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 

F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 

11 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 & n.4. The 

preponderance of the evidence standard is equivalent to the “more 

likely than not” standard. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. 

Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993); AlAdahi, 613 F.3d at 1106.

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 6 of 14
7 

 Uthman traveled to Afghanistan along a route used by 

al Qaeda recruits. 

 Uthman lied to hide the fact that someone else paid for 

his travel to Afghanistan. 

 While in Afghanistan, Uthman was seen at an 

al Qaeda guesthouse. 

 Uthman’s explanation of why he went to Afghanistan 

and why he was traveling in a small group that 

included al Qaeda members and a Taliban fighter near 

Tora Bora during the battle there involves a host of 

unlikely coincidences.

Uthman argues that those facts do not add up to his being part 

of al Qaeda.4

 As we will explain, we conclude that those 

facts, taken together, are more than sufficient to show that 

Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda.5

 4

 Uthman does not challenge any of the subsidiary factual 

findings of the District Court that the Government currently relies 

on to support Uthman’s detention. (In any event, we see no basis 

for deeming clearly erroneous any of those factual findings. Cf. 

Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 6, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 2010).) Rather, he 

argues that the facts found by the District Court do not establish 

that he was part of al Qaeda. 

5

 Some of Uthman’s other activities during his time in 

Afghanistan are contested. The Government claims, for example, 

that Uthman attended an al Qaeda training camp, fought against the 

Northern Alliance, and himself became one of Osama bin Laden’s 

bodyguards. Uthman responds that those allegations are not true. 

The District Court concluded that the Government did not offer 

sufficient evidence to establish those facts. Because the 

Government has not challenged those aspects of the District Court’s 

decision in this Court, we do not consider those additional 

allegations for purposes of this appeal. We also do not consider the 

Government’s allegation that Uthman was present at a second al 

Qaeda guesthouse. 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 7 of 14
8 

First, Uthman was captured on December 15, 2001, “in 

the vicinity of Tora Bora.” Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 

9, 22 (D.D.C. 2010). As the District Court noted, it was 

“widely known” that Tora Bora was a battleground between 

al Qaeda and the United States and “few, if any 

noncombatants would have been in the vicinity during this 

time.” Id. at 19 n.11. Because “few, if any” non-combatants 

were near Tora Bora, it follows that most, if not all, of those 

in the vicinity of Tora Bora on December 15, 2001, were 

combatants. In a prior case, we found it significant that a 

detainee was captured near Tora Bora in late 2001. See Al 

Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In 

short, the fact that Uthman was captured in December 2001 

near Tora Bora suggests that he was affiliated with al Qaeda. 

Second, the company Uthman was keeping when he was 

captured near Tora Bora in December 2001 makes it even 

more likely that he was part of al Qaeda. See Abdah, 708 F. 

Supp. 2d at 22 (Uthman “was with Al Qaeda members in the 

vicinity of Tora Bora”). Uthman admits that, when captured, 

he was part of a small group including at least five other 

Yemeni men. Two of those men were al Qaeda members and 

have since confessed to being bodyguards for Osama bin 

Laden. Another fought with the Taliban against United States 

forces. One of the bin Laden bodyguards in Uthman’s band 

described the group as “brothers” retreating from battle. In 

our prior cases, we have stated that evidence of association 

with other al Qaeda members is itself probative of al Qaeda 

membership. Cf. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 

(D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 

2010); id. at 3 (noting that al Qaeda fighters treated Awad “as 

one of their own”); see also Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 

753 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (district court may be able to “infer from 

Salahi’s numerous ties to known al-Qaida operatives that he 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 8 of 14
9 

remained a trusted member of the organization”). So it is 

here. 

 Being captured in the company of a Taliban fighter and 

two al Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards 12 

miles from Tora Bora in December 2001 might not be 

precisely the same as being captured in a German uniform 12 

miles from the Normandy beaches in June 1944. But it is 

still, at a minimum, highly significant. And absent a credible 

alternative explanation, the location and date of Uthman’s 

capture, together with the company he was keeping, strongly 

suggest that he was part of al Qaeda. And there is more. 

Third, the narrative of Uthman’s journey before his 

capture suggests that it was not an accident that he ended up 

near Tora Bora on December 15, 2001, in the company of two 

al Qaeda members who were Osama bin Laden’s bodyguards, 

as well as a Taliban fighter. That narrative begins with 

Uthman’s studies at the Furqan Institute, a religious school “at 

which other men were recruited to fight for Al Qaeda.” 

Abdah, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Uthman downplays this 

particular fact, noting that most students at the school 

probably did not become al Qaeda fighters. Uthman’s 

argument ignores two points. First, attendance at such a 

school – which was a fruitful al Qaeda recruiting ground – is a 

fact that, while perhaps not alone of great significance, can 

assume greater significance when considered in light of other 

facts suggesting al Qaeda membership. Cf. Al-Adahi, 613 

F.3d at 1105-09; Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 16. Second, the two al 

Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards and the 

Taliban fighter captured with Uthman in the vicinity of Tora 

Bora also attended the Furqan Institute. Uthman admitted he 

knew all of them from the Institute, including the Osama bin 

Laden bodyguard and former Furqan Institute student who 

described the group as “brothers.” Uthman’s long association 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 9 of 14
10 

with those three fellow travelers, dating back to their shared 

time at an al Qaeda recruiting ground, renders it rather 

unlikely that their travel together near al Qaeda’s embattled 

stronghold at Tora Bora in December 2001 was a coincidental 

reunion of old schoolmates. Cf. Salahi, 625 F.3d at 753; AlAdahi, 613 F.3d at 1105, 1107; Awad, 608 F.3d at 3, 9-10. 

Fourth, after studying at the Furqan Institute, Uthman 

“traveled to Afghanistan along a route also taken by Al Qaeda 

recruits.” Abdah, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Specifically, 

Uthman flew from Sana’a, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan. 

From Karachi, he traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan, and 

then by taxi to a Taliban office there. From Quetta, a Taliban 

official arranged for Uthman’s transportation to Kandahar, 

Afghanistan. Uthman’s route is similar to the paths of 

admitted al Qaeda members now in U.S. custody. This Court 

has stated that traveling to Afghanistan along a distinctive 

path used by al Qaeda members can be probative evidence 

that the traveler was part of al Qaeda. See Al Odah, 611 F.3d 

at 16. Uthman again argues that this fact alone is not 

significant, as people who were not al Qaeda recruits may 

have followed the same track. But the fact that Uthman 

followed a common al Qaeda route nonetheless makes it 

somewhat more likely that he was an al Qaeda recruit. See 

Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105; cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 

U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987) (“individual pieces of evidence, 

insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation 

prove it”). 

Fifth, Uthman’s route to Afghanistan is even more 

suspicious because he lied about how he paid for the trip. The 

Government contends that a Yemeni sheikh who supported 

terrorism funded Uthman’s journey. In his sworn statement to 

the District Court, Uthman said he raised the funds himself 

primarily by working at summer jobs selling food at a 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 10 of 14
11 

roadside shack. The Government says this explanation is 

preposterous, observing that Uthman would have had to earn 

more than three times the average Yemeni’s annual income in 

only a few summers’ unskilled work. The District Court 

agreed with the Government, finding that Uthman received 

the funds from the sheikh, as Uthman originally told 

interrogators. Abdah, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Although the 

District Court made no finding as to whether that sheikh 

supported terrorism, its determination that Uthman’s trip to 

Afghanistan was financed by the sheikh necessarily means the 

court found Uthman’s sworn statement that he paid for his 

own travel to be false. Uthman’s false explanation is relevant 

here because, as we have said in another case, “false 

exculpatory statements are evidence – often strong evidence – 

of guilt.” Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1107 (citing United States v. 

Penn, 974 F.2d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 1992), and United States 

v. Meyer, 733 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1984)). 

Sixth, once he reached Afghanistan, Uthman was seen at 

an al Qaeda guesthouse. See Abdah, 708 F. Supp. 2d. at 22. 

In two prior cases, this Court has stated that staying at an al 

Qaeda guesthouse is “powerful – indeed ‘overwhelming’ – 

evidence” that an individual is part of al Qaeda. Al-Adahi, 

613 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 

873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) (alterations omitted). The reason 

for that assessment is plain: It is highly unlikely that a visitor 

to Afghanistan would end up at an al Qaeda guesthouse by 

mistake, either by the guest or by the host. Uthman retorts 

that he was only seen at an al Qaeda guesthouse, which does 

not necessarily mean that he was staying there. True, but just 

being present at an al Qaeda guesthouse is hardly the kind of 

innocent fact that can be tossed aside as insignificant. 

Moreover, absent another explanation (and Uthman provides 

none), the most plausible reason for Uthman’s presence at an 

al Qaeda guesthouse is that he was affiliated with al Qaeda 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 11 of 14
12 

and staying at the guesthouse. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 

1108. That implication is strongly buttressed by the fact that 

Uthman did not have his passport when he was captured. As 

this Court has explained, surrendering one’s passport was 

“standard al Qaeda and Taliban operating procedure[]” when 

checking into an al Qaeda guesthouse in Afghanistan. Al 

Odah, 611 F.3d at 15. 

Seventh, Uthman’s account of his activity in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan involves many coincidences that are perhaps 

possible, but not likely. According to Uthman, he went to 

Afghanistan to teach the Koran. As of September 11, 2001, 

he was in Kabul, teaching the Koran, although he does not 

remember the names of any of his students and cannot 

describe his school in Kabul.6

 Unlike many civilians living in 

Kabul at the time, Uthman remained in the capital as the 

United States began its attack against the Taliban regime. 

Only after the Taliban and its al Qaeda allies lost control of 

Kabul did Uthman choose to leave. Although he wished to 

flee to Pakistan, Uthman did not take the eastward road 

through the Khyber Pass that leads directly to Pakistan. 

Instead, Uthman took the long way home. He fled south, 

parallel to Pakistan’s border, into rugged, mountainous terrain 

– following his interpreter, he claims.7

 Unfortunately, as the 

story goes, his path led him near Tora Bora, where Osama bin 

Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri happened to have relocated 

and where it was widely known that al Qaeda was gathering 

for a major battle against the United States and its allies. 

There, in the Afghan mountains, he chanced to meet up with 

 6

 In Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 

we found significance in the fact that a detainee could not 

remember the names of any students he allegedly had taught. 

7

 In Al Odah, we found significance in a detainee’s similarly 

circuitous route out of Afghanistan into Pakistan by way of Tora 

Bora. Id. at 16. 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 12 of 14
13 

schoolmates from his school days in Yemen. Unfortunately 

for Uthman, those schoolmates also happened to be two al 

Qaeda members who were Osama bin Laden bodyguards and 

a Taliban fighter. Then, Uthman finally chose to enter 

Pakistan – as it turns out, at the height of the U.S. 

bombardment of Tora Bora and al Qaeda’s flight from 

Afghanistan – where he says he was mistaken for an al Qaeda 

fighter and detained. 

 Uthman’s account piles coincidence upon coincidence 

upon coincidence. Here, as with the liable or guilty party in 

any civil or criminal case, it remains possible that Uthman 

was innocently going about his business and just happened to 

show up in a variety of extraordinary places – a kind of 

Forrest Gump in the war against al Qaeda. But Uthman’s 

account at best strains credulity; and the far more likely 

explanation for the plethora of damning circumstantial 

evidence is that he was part of al Qaeda. When presented 

with similar circumstantial evidence in prior cases, we have 

had no trouble reaching the conclusion that the detainee more 

likely than not was part of al Qaeda. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d 

1102; Al Odah, 611 F.3d 8; Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 

416 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad, 608 F.3d 1; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 

866. So too here. 

* * * 

 To sum up, in the years leading up to his capture, 

Uthman’s life was intertwined with al Qaeda’s operations. 

Uthman attended a school in Yemen where al Qaeda 

successfully recruited. He traveled to Afghanistan along a 

route used by al Qaeda recruits. He lied about how he paid 

for that journey. He was seen at an al Qaeda guesthouse in 

Afghanistan. He traveled to an isolated mountainous region 

near what was then al Qaeda’s last stronghold in Afghanistan, 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 13 of 14
14 

during a major battle there. He was captured on December 

15, 2001, in a small group that included two al Qaeda 

members who were Osama bin Laden’s bodyguards and a 

Taliban fighter. He did not have a passport with him. And he 

has not credibly explained why he went to Afghanistan or 

how he found himself traveling with a small group that 

included two al Qaeda members who were Osama bin Laden 

bodyguards and a Taliban fighter near Tora Bora in December 

2001. 

 We do “not weigh each piece of evidence in isolation, but 

consider all of the evidence taken as a whole.” Al Odah, 611 

F.3d at 15 (quoting Awad, 608 F.3d at 6-7); see also Al-Adahi, 

613 F.3d at 1105-07. Uthman’s actions and recurrent 

entanglement with al Qaeda show that he more likely than not 

was part of al Qaeda.8

 We therefore reverse the judgment of 

the District Court and remand with instructions to deny 

Uthman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

So ordered. 

 8

 In recounting the evidence, we do not imply that all of the 

evidence in this case is necessary to find someone part of al Qaeda. 

We hold only that the evidence in this case is sufficient to find that 

Uthman was part of al Qaeda. 

USCA Case #10-5235 Document #1300403 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 14 of 14