Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03851/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03851-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3538

___________________________

Brian Knowlton, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Douglas Minerd, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Gary Lensenmayer, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Charles R. Wetesnik, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Nancy J. Anderson; Richard F. Angevine; Joe Mullins; Andy Fichthorn; Donald

W. Mills, Jr.

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees

v.

Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan; Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC;

Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan Appeals Committee; Anheuser-Busch

Companies Pension Plan Administrative Committee

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants

___________________________

No. 15-3851

___________________________

Brian Knowlton, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Douglas Minerd, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Gary Lensenmayer, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Charles R. Wetesnik, individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;

Nancy J. Anderson; Richard F. Angevine; Joe Mullins; Andy Fichthorn; Donald

W. Mills, Jr.

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants

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v.

Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan; Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC;

Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan Appeals Committee; Anheuser-Busch

Companies Pension Plan Administrative Committee

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: September 22, 2016

 Filed: February 22, 2017

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MURPHY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Brian Knowlton and eight other named plaintiffs, individually and on behalf

of those similarly situated, brought this class-action lawsuit under the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq., against

Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan,

Anheuser-Busch Companies Pension Plan Appeals Committee, and Anheuser-Busch

Companies Pension Plan AdministrativeCommittee (collectively, Anheuser-Busch). 

Plaintiffs, participants in the Anheuser-Busch salaried employee pension plan, claim

they are entitled to enhanced pension benefits. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). This appeal

concerns the interpretation of Section 19.11(f) of that plan. Adopting the reasoning

of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Adams v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 758

F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2014), the district court concluded Section 19.11(f) applied,

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entitling plaintiffs to enhanced benefits, and granted judgment on the pleadings. We

affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former salaried employees of Busch Entertainment Corporation

(BEC), a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch Companies LLC, which ran SeaWorld theme

parks. As a subsidiary, BEC was a member of the Anheuser-Busch family of

companies, defined under the plan as the “Controlled Group”—the “group of

corporations, trades and businesses . . . of which the Company [Anheuser-Busch

Companies] is a part, as determined from time to time.”

In November 2008, Anheuser-Busch InBev, N.V. (InBev), combined the

Anheuser-Busch Companies. As relevant here, the parties agree the transaction

1

resulted in a “Change of Control” under the plan. Section 19.11(f) of the AnheuserBusch Companies Pension Plan (plan) provides for an enhanced pension benefit for

a plan participant “whose employment with the Controlled Group is involuntarily

terminated within three (3) years after the Change in Control.” It does so by adding

“an additional five (5) years” to the participant’s “Credited Service” for purposes of

calculating the participant’s benefits. At some point in the following year, InBev

announced it was selling BEC to Blackstone Capital Partners V.L.P., to be finalized

on December 1, 2009.

In September 2012, Knowlton and other named plaintiffs in this lawsuit

brought claims to Anheuser-Busch for enhanced pension benefits. They contended

(1) a change in control occurred when InBev combined Anheuser-Busch Companies,

and (2) they were involuntarily terminated from employment with the Controlled

The parties describe this transaction differently: Anheuser-Busch alleged the

1

two entities “combined,” while plaintiffs stated InBev “acquired” Anheuser-Busch

Companies. 

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Group when InBev sold BEC, and they were entitled to enhanced benefits under

Section 19.11(f) of the plan.2

The Anheuser-Busch retirement plan administrator denied the claims. The plan

administrator stated the “purpose for the special benefits under Section 19.11(f) is to

provide additional benefits to individuals who are out of work after they involuntarily

lose their employment within three years after a change in control of Anheuser-Busch

Companies.” According to the plan administrator, eligibility for enhanced benefits

under Section 19.11(f) required “an actual break in an individual’s employment,

rather than simply a change in the owner of the entity employing the individual

during a period of continuous employment.” Plaintiffs appealed the denials of

benefits to the Pension Plans Appeals Committee, which upheld the decisions.

Plaintiffs filed this action to obtain enhanced benefits under the plan. See

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court certified the proposed class under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for Count I of the consolidated complaint,

3

Section 19.11(f) provides in relevant part: 2

The Normal Retirement Benefit, Late Retirement Benefit, Early

Retirement Benefit or Termination Benefit of any Participant under the

Supplement for the Anheuser-Busch Salaried Employees’ Pension Plan

. . . whose employment with the Controlled Group is involuntarily

terminated within three (3) years after the Change in Control . . . shall

be determined by taking into account an additional five (5) years of

Credited Service and, for purposes of Section 4.3 [Early Retirement

Benefits] only, an additional five (5) years of age, and shall in any event

be at least fifteen percent (15%) larger than the Participant’s Normal

Retirement [benefits].

The class is defined as: 3

All persons who were: (a) participants in the Anheuser-Busch

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and plaintiffs moved for partial judgment on the pleadings on Count I, see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(c). The district court adopted the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Adams,

which presented “the identical issue.” See Adams, 758 F.3d at 745-47. In Adams,

plaintiffs were participants in the plan and former employees of the Metal Container

Corporation, which was an Anheuser-Busch Company until InBev sold it to Ball

Corporation. See id. at 745-46. Applying de novo review, the Sixth Circuit held

Section 19.11(f) was unambiguous and the only plausible interpretation of

“involuntarily terminated” was to read that phrase together in context with the words

preceding it—“whose employment with the Controlled Group is involuntarily

terminated.” See id. at 747-48. The Sixth Circuit concluded the plan administrator’s

denial of benefits was “arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 748-49. 

Three months after the district court entered judgment on the pleadings, the

district court granted Anheuser-Busch’s motion for a final order and stay of judgment

pending appeal. Rejecting plaintiffs’ request to calculate the specific amount of 4

benefits due to each class member, the district court simply ordered Anheuser-Busch

to direct the plan administrator to provide each member of the class with the

enhanced pension benefit under Section 19.11(f). The district court further ordered

Anheuser-Busch to make a remedial back payment with interest to those members of

the class whose benefits had already been paid and to make future pension payments

with the benefit of Section 19.11(f) to those members of the class not yet eligible for

Companies Pension Plan in 2008; (b) employed by Anheuser-Busch

Companies, LLC or any of its operating divisions and subsidiaries (the

“Controlled Group”) on both November 17 and November 18, 2008; and

(c) employed as a salaried employee by Busch Entertainment

Corporation when the sale of Busch Entertainment Corporation to the

Blackstone Group closed on or about December 1, 2009. 

The amended consolidated complaint originally contained three counts. In this

4

order, the district court decided the only remaining count, seeking identical relief as

Count I, but for a smaller subset of the class, was moot.

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benefits. The district court stayed its final judgment pending the outcome of any

appeal.

Plaintiffs unsuccessfullymoved to alter or amend the district court’s final order

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The district court emphasized its

previous determination that the plan “will be perfectly capable of calculating and

distributing necessary benefits—including payments it should have already paid out

had it properly interpreted and applied the language of the Plan” and that “the amount

of those payments were not required to be part of the judgment itself.” AnheuserBusch filed notice of appeal, and plaintiffs filed notice of a cross-appeal with a

motion to dismiss Anheuser-Busch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We granted

Anheuser-Busch’s motion to take plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal with the

case. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss the Appeal

After the district court denied their Rule 59 motion, citing Eighth Circuit Local

Rule 47A, plaintiffs moved to dismiss Anheuser-Busch’s appeal on the basis that the

5

district court had not yet issued a final order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (providing our

court jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts of the United States”

(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Faysound Ltd. v. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc.,

952 F.2d 980, 981 (8th Cir. 1991) (discussing Local Rule 47A). “A final judgment

is one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment.’” Borntrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund,

425 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527

U.S. 198, 204 (1999)).

Eighth Circuit Local Rule 47A(b) states: “The appellee may file a motion to

5

dismiss a docketed appeal on the ground the appeal is not within the court’s

jurisdiction. . . . The court will consider the motion and enter an appropriate order.”

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Plaintiffs argue Dieser v. Continental Casualty Co. “confirms” the district

court’s order entering judgment was not final because it failed to calculate the

benefits owed to each member of the class. See Dieser v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 440 F.3d

920, 923 (8th Cir. 2006). Unlike the district court in Dieser, where the district court

“orders did not purport to dispose of all issues in the case,” id., here, the district court

issued final relief because it purported to address and resolve all of the issues in the

case, despite plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary. Cf. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (“[J]udgments . . . where assessment of damages

or awarding of other monetary relief remains to be resolved have never been

considered to be ‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”). Although

plaintiffs contend the order is not final because they were not awarded damages, see

id., the district court considered their argument but decided the nature of their action

was declaratory, and they were not entitled to an award that calculated the benefits

owed. See Welsh v. Burlington N., Inc., Emp. Benefits Plan, 54 F.3d 1331, 1339-40

(8thCir. 1995) (observing the district court has the power “to determine what benefits

are due [under ERISA] and to award them”). This is different from a case like Dieser,

for instance, where a district court forgoes dispensing with all issues presented in the

case, or where it decides liability but refuses to monetize that award—with the

understanding that there is an award left to be calculated. Cf. Albright v. UNUM Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 1995) (determining the “final order

doctrine” prevented the court from assuming jurisdiction where judgment had been

entered against the defendant in an ERISA claim for disability benefits, but the

district court failed to “address specifically what benefits would be owed to [the

plaintiff]”). We are satisfied we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

B. Section 19.11(f) Enhanced Benefits Eligibility

“We review de novo a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” 

Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). “[A] denial

of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo

standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary

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authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Where an ERISAqualifying plan lends discretionary authority to a plan administrator to determine

participants’ benefits, we review the plan administrator’s decision for an abuse of

discretion. See Rutledge v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 481 F.3d 655, 659

(8th Cir. 2007). Under an abuse-of-discretion review, the plan administrator’s

“interpretation of uncertain terms in a plan” will be upheld if that interpretation was

reasonable. King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir.

2005) (en banc). 

Section 14.11 of the plan grants the plan administrator “sole discretion” in the

“interpretation of all Plan provisions,” including whether a “Beneficiary is entitled

to any benefit pursuant to the terms of the Plan.” In adopting the reasoning of 6

Adams, the district court limited its review to the meaning of Section 19.11(f),

without addressing whether Anheuser-Busch’s interpretation of the plan was

reasonable. See Adams, 758 F.3d at 747 (applying de novo review to the question of

whether the “plan language [was] ambiguous”). Finding consideration of the

administrative record unnecessary, the district court determined it need not go

“beyond the words of Section 19.11(f) itself,” see WindstreamCorp. v. Da Gragnano,

757 F.3d 798, 803-04 (8th Cir. 2014), and concluded the only reasonable

interpretation of the section entitled plaintiffs to enhanced benefits. Because the

district court did not analyze the rest of the plan or the plan administrator’s written

decision, Anheuser-Busch argues the district court failed to consider the plan as a

whole and was “unaware of the Plan-based support for the Appeals Committee’s

conclusion that Section 19.11(f) was intended to provide enhanced benefits only to

Section 14.11 also states, “Any construction of the terms of the Plan for which 6

there is a rational basis that is adopted by the Plan Administrator shall be final and

legally binding on all parties.”

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those participants who lose their job, and not to participants who continue in the same

job after a transfer.”

Anheuser-Busch proposes Sections 3.1 and 2.5 of the plan, providing

conditionsfor “Severance fromService Date” and “EmployeeTransfers and Layoffs,”

respectively, support its argument that Section 19.11(f) was not intended to apply to

plaintiffs because they suffered no break in their employment. Section 3.1 defines

vesting of benefits upon severance, and “include[s] for this purpose a termination of

employment in connection with sale of part or all of its interest in an incorporated or

unincorporated business or assets by a member of the Controlled Group.” Because

this section explicitly defines severance to include a change resulting from an asset

sale, Anheuser-Busch asserts Section 19.11(f) does not include the present situation

because, if it did, the drafters of the plan would have stated it. Section 2.5 states that

a transfer or “other change in . . . employment classification . . . shall [not] be treated

as a Break in Service or a termination of employment.” It also provides that if a

transfer shall result in an employee becoming ineligible for plan participation, that

employee will “no longer accrue any benefits under the Plan.” Here, no one is

alleging plaintiffs were transferred from their former positions. Neither section

demonstrates, as Anheuser-Busch contends, that “termination” should mean “loss of

a job” in the sense that Anheuser-Busch wants us to read it.

Second, Anheuser-Busch argues Section 19.11(f) is ambiguous because it

“reasonably supports multiple interpretations” and the plan administrator’s

interpretation must be upheld if it was reasonable. Anheuser-Busch proposes the

phrase “with the Controlled Group” merely clarifies that the employment referenced

in the section means the job that made the participant eligible for the plan. We do not

dispute the phrase “with the Controlled Group” modifiesthe type of employment the

plan was describing; however, “involuntar[y]terminat[ion]” of “employment with the

Controlled Group” cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude the circumstances

present here. 

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The phrase, “whose employment with the Controlled Group is involuntarily

terminated,” must be understood by applying the words’ plain meaning. See Johnson

v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 716 F.3d 813, 819-20 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A paramount

principle of contract law requires usto enforce the terms of an ERISA insurance plan

according to the plan’s plain language in its ordinary sense.” (citation omitted)). As

the Sixth Circuit explained:

Given the fact that “involuntarily terminated” has meaning only

when the thing that is being involuntarily terminated is identified, and

given that the phrase at issue in Section 19.11(f) identifies the thing

being terminated as “employment with the Controlled Group,” it is clear

that when each term in the provision is understood according to its

ordinary meaning, and no term is ignored, eligibility for enhanced

pension benefits pursuant to Section 19.11(f) requires satisfaction of

five elements: (1) that the recipient be a plan participant (2) whose

employment with the Controlled Group (3) is involuntarily terminated

(4) within three years after (5) a change in control.

Adams, 758 F.3d at 748. Plaintiffs here were all salaried participants in the plan, and

on December 1, 2009, when the sale ofBEC finalized, “without the plaintiffs’ consent

and for reasons beyond the plaintiffs’ control,” their employment with the Controlled

Group was terminated. Id. at 749. Whether plaintiffs’ employment continued in the

same capacity once they were no longer employed by a member of the Controlled

Group is irrelevant. Cf. Hunger v. AB, 12 F.3d 118, 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1993)

(concluding “under the plain language of the Plan,” employees who “continued to

performthe same jobs” after the division theyworked in wassold “were [nonetheless]

no longer employed by [their former employer]”). We agree Section 19.11(f) is

unambiguous. 

Even under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, a plan administrator

cannot contradict the plain language of an ERISA plan to deny benefits. See Admin.

Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Gamboa, 479

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F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2007) (“An interpretation that conflicts with the plain

language of a health and welfare plan is an abuse of discretion.”). Anheuser-Busch

cannot reasonably interpret Section 19.11(f) to require plan participants to have been

“out of work after they involuntarily lose their employment within three years after

a change in control.” Nor can the plan administrator reasonably infer “an actual break

in an individual’s employment” isrequired in order for Section 19.11(f) to apply. See

Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v.

Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Ordinarily, courts are to enforce the plain

language of an ERISA plan ‘in accordance with its literal and natural meaning.’”

(citation omitted)). For these reasons, we agree with the district court and the Sixth

Circuit’s conclusion that Section 19.11(f) entitles plaintiffs to an enhanced pension

benefit. 

Because we affirm the judgment on the merits, we need not consider plaintiffs’

alternative argument to apply collateral estoppel—though we have considered the

potentially inequitable result that could have occurred had we reached the contrary

conclusion. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979)

(“Although we are not bound by another circuit’s decision, we adhere to the policy

that a sister circuit’s reasoned decision deserves great weight and precedential value. 

As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law among the circuits,

wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding unnecessary burdens on the

Supreme Court docket.”).

C. Cross-Appeal

In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend if the district court’s decision wasfinal

and appealable (which we have decided it was), the decision still must be reversed

and remanded because the district court failed to make individual calculations of

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enhanced benefits owed to individual members of the class. In this case, we evaluate

de novo the district court’s chosen remedy. See Tussey, 746 F.3d at 338-39. 7

Before addressing plaintiffs’ argument, a brief retreat into procedural history

is useful. After the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Adams, plaintiffs moved for

partial judgment on the pleadings as to Count I, asserting all that was left for the

district court to decide was “the amount of the enhanced benefit to be received by

each class member—a determination that can be made only after Defendants respond

to the discovery.” Subsequent to the district court’s grant of partial judgment on the

pleadings and adoption of Adams, Anheuser-Busch moved for final judgment,

claiming Count I had been “decided in full” and attaching an order issued by the

district court in Adams assupport. See Adams v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., No. 2:10-ev826 (E.D. Ohio Dec. 24, 2014). Upon remand from the Sixth Circuit, the Adams

district court concluded “[t]he relief ordered by the court of appeals can be

accomplished by a judgment ordering the Plan to apply the enhanced benefit

provisions in § 19.11(f) in calculating the pension benefits of class members.” 

Adams v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., No. 2:10-ev-826 (E.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2014). The

Adams district court simply entered judgment ordering “Defendants . . . to cause the

Plan to provide each member of the Amended Proposed Class with the enhanced

pension benefit set forth in Section 19.11(f) of the Plan.” Adams v. Anheuser-Busch

Cos., No. 2:10-ev-826 (E.D. Ohio Dec. 24, 2014).

In Tussey v. ABB, Inc., we held de novo review of the district court’s 7

“‘method of calculating damages’” was appropriate,while the calculations themselves

are “‘reviewed for clear error.’” Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 338-39 (8th Cir.

2014) (quoting Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2011));see also Brown

v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 341 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2003) (reviewing the amount of

the district court’s award of damages under ERISA for an abuse of discretion). 

Whether the district court adequately resolved plaintiffs’ claims is a question that is

“purely legal,” suitable for the “exercise [of] plenary review.” Bd. of Trs. of Trucking

Emps. of N. J. Welfare Fund, Inc.-Pension Fund v. Kero Leasing Corp., 377 F.3d 288,

294 (3d Cir. 2004).

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In response to Anheuser-Busch’s motion, plaintiffs argued the district court

could not issue a final award without a calculation of benefits due to the class in

Count I of the consolidated complaint. Plaintiffs asserted damages could be readily

calculated if discovery proceeded and Anheuser-Busch provided necessary

information about plan participants. Once again mirroring the course of proceedings

in Adams, the district court declined to make any such calculations of benefits owed,

observing plaintiffs had “previously urged this Court to follow the path set forth in

the Adams litigation. Now it is the defendants urging the Court to follow Adams.” 

The district court determined (1) it was not possible to calculate “a concrete damages

number” as one-third of the plaintiffs’ class had not yet made an election with regard

to benefits; and (2) the plaintiffs’ consolidated complaint did “not actually seek

‘damages’ but rather . . . [raised] a question of Plan interpretation and [sought] an

order directing application of the plaintiffs’ interpretation of Section 19.11(f).”

While we understand the desire to dispense with the calculations by ordering

the plan administrator to make them, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion

that plaintiffs’ complaint sought only a declaration that Section 19.11(f) applied. 

Plaintiffs brought this action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which authorizes an

action to recover benefits or to enforce and clarify rights under an ERISA-qualifying

plan. “Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on

entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator’s improper

refusal to pay benefits.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53 (1987). It

is true resolution of Count I depended on an interpretation of the plan, yet, looking

at the prayer of relief in Count I of plaintiffs’ consolidated complaint, plaintiffs

requested the district court:

[e]nter judgment in favor of each named plaintiff and against all the Plan

and Administrators of the Plan for future retirement benefits calculated

on the basis of applying the [Section 19.11(f)] benefit enhancement, and

award them early retirement benefits under Section [19.11](f) of the

Plan . . . with pre-judgment interest on each payment that should have

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been made to them from December 1, 2009 to the date of judgment, and

post-judgment interest, and other such relief as to which they may be

entitled.

In regard to the whole class, plaintiffs requested the district court:

Permit each plaintiff and each class member who would have at any time

prior to the date of judgment qualified for early retirement if his or her

employment with the Controlled Group was treated as terminating on

December 1, 2009 to elect early retirement as of any date after the date

he or she would have first so qualified, and award each who so elects

early retirement benefits under [Section 19.11(f)] of the Plan from and

after the effective date of such election as though he or she had five

additional years of service and five additional years of age, with

prejudgment interest on each payment that should have been made to

him or her from the effective date of such election to the date of

judgment, and post-judgment interest.

(Emphasis added).

Upon examination of these paragraphs in plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in Count

I of the consolidated complaint, plaintiffs made a sufficient request for an actual

award of certain benefits with the application of the enhanced benefit—in addition

to a declaration that Section 19.11(f) applies. See Peabody, 636 F.3d at 373

(“Unsurprisingly, the remedy in a successful action for plan benefits is to receive the

accrued benefits.”). Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructionsto reconsider

the plaintiffs’ prayer for relief and, to the extentrequested and provable, calculate and

award the benefits owed to plaintiffs by applying Section 19.11(f).

Finally, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s oversight of discovery, arguing

Anheuser-Busch has not yet provided them with necessary information so that the

notice requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) can be satisfied. But

see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), advisory committee’s note to 2003 Amendment

(explaining while members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) “have interests

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that may deserve protection by notice,” notice is only “expressly require[d] . . . in

actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)”). “Although broad, the district court’s

authority [to manage class actions] is not without limits. Appellate review is

necessary to assure that the rights of absentee class members are not inundated in the

wake of a district court’s brisk supervision.” Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co. (In re Nissan

Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig.), 552 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs argue

they are unable to verify that the plan administrator has correctly calculated and

distributed enhanced benefits to those class members who have already elected

benefits because the “vast majority of the class members are not only absent but

unknown.” The district court decided information such as “spreadsheets stating the

names, Plan status, and benefits received and to be received” was “immaterial . . . to

the judgment at issue.” Upon remand, the district court may reconsider whether

certain records will assist in its calculation of the requested benefits. Cf., e.g., Day

v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d 817, 835 (8th Cir. 2016).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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