Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02252/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Gregory Watkins,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02252-PHX-SPL (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Charles Gregory Watkins’ (“Petitioner”) Petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). 

Respondents have filed their Answer (Doc. 12). Petitioner did not file a reply. The 

matter is deemed ripe for consideration. 

The Petition contains two ineffective assistance of counsel claims, each containing 

a number of sub-claims. While the Petition is timely, the undersigned finds that all of the 

claims are meritless. In addition, the undersigned finds that one of the sub-claims is 

procedurally defaulted. It is therefore recommended that the Court deny and dismiss the 

Petition. 

I. BACKGROUND 

At 9:53 p.m. and 10:09 p.m. on April 10, 2009, an undercover City of Phoenix 

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police officer called a cell phone number from a restricted line to arrange the purchase of 

forty dollars of crack cocaine. (Doc. 1-1 at 2; Doc. 12-3 at 8). A female answered the 

phone, who agreed to meet the officer in the parking lot of a Church’s Chicken 

restaurant. (Doc. 1-1 at 2; Doc. 12-3 at 10). Two other officers observed the meeting 

place from a discrete location. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). After 10:00 p.m., the officers saw a red 

Ford Bronco turn into the parking lot. (Id.; Doc. 12-3 at 11). The vehicle circled the lot 

multiple times, then moved to the street exit. (Doc. 1-1 at 2; Doc. 12-3 at 12). Officers 

stopped the vehicle after following it for a few blocks. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-3).

The female driver of the vehicle admitted she spoke to the officer to arrange the 

drug transaction. (Id. at 3). Petitioner was sitting in the vehicle’s front passenger seat. 

(Id.). When an officer approached the front passenger side, the officer saw a glass pipe 

and “white rock-like substance” that was consistent with crack cocaine on the floorboard 

immediately behind Petitioner’s seat. (Id. at 3, 6). The substance was later confirmed to 

be crack cocaine with an approximate value of forty dollars. (Id. at 3). A crack pipe was 

also found in the driver’s purse. (Id.). 

Officers searched Petitioner and found the following in the pockets of Petitioner’s 

pants: $1,686 in cash, a cell phone that had received calls from a restricted number at the 

precise times the officer had called to arrange the drug transaction, and a sliver of a white 

rock-like substance later determined to be 9.3 milligrams of crack cocaine. (Id. at 3-4).

On April 17, 2009, Petitioner was indicted on two counts: (i) possession for sale of 

narcotic drugs and (ii) possession of drug paraphernalia. (Doc. 12-1 at 2-3). In June 

2009, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a “Motion to Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice, or, 

alternatively, Motion to Remand for a Redetermination of Probable Cause” (the “Motion 

to Dismiss/Motion to Remand”). (Id. at 10-11). The motion alleged that the indictment 

was predicated on false testimony that on the night of the search, Petitioner possessed 

forty dollars worth of crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia. (Id.). The trial court held 

oral argument on the motion. (Id. at 52-68). The State conceded that the officer 

mistakenly testified before the Grand Jury that the (i) Church’s Chicken restaurant had 

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“been closed for several hours” when the red Ford Bronco pulled into the parking lot and 

(ii) that officers had field-tested the white substance in Petitioner’s pocket prior to the 

Grand Jury proceeding. (Id. at 58-59). Church’s Chicken was actually open until 11:00 

p.m. and officers had not field-tested the substance in Petitioner’s pocket at the time of

the Grand Jury proceeding. (Id.). The substance, however, had been later lab-tested and 

was confirmed to be crack cocaine. (Id. at 59). The State argued that the errors in the 

officer’s testimony were not material because the substance found within Petitioner’s arm 

reach behind the front passenger’s seat was field-tested before the Grand Jury proceeding 

and was confirmed to be forty dollars worth of crack cocaine. (Id.). The State asserted

that even without the evidence of the crack cocaine in Petitioner’s pocket, the State 

would have gone forward and argued that probable cause still would have been found. 

(Id.).

The trial court found that the officer did err in his testimony before the Grand Jury, 

but ruled that the testimony was not a material error “since it appears clear that the charge 

in this case, which is possession for sale of a narcotic drug, clearly relates to the cocaine 

that was behind the seat.” (Id. at 63-64). The trial court noted that the issue as to 

whether Petitioner had constructive possession of the forty dollars in crack cocaine is an 

issue for the trier of fact. Finding that some evidence existed that Petitioner had 

constructive possession of the crack cocaine behind his seat, the trial court denied the 

Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Remand. (Id. at 64). 

On July 21, 2009, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a Motion to Suppress, arguing 

that (i) the traffic stop was not justified; (ii) there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity; and (iii) the search of the vehicle was unlawful. (Id. at 86-97). After holding an 

evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the Motion to Suppress. (Id. at 99-170).

On August 17, 2009, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a Motion in Limine to 

preclude the statements made by the driver of the vehicle Petitioner was in on the night of 

Petitioner’s arrest. (Id. at 176-181). The trial court denied the Motion in Limine. (Doc. 

12-2 at 12). The trial court found that Petitioner and the driver were co-conspirators and 

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the statements made by the driver on the cell phone were in furtherance of that 

conspiracy, thereby rendering the driver’s statements not hearsay under Rule 

801(D)(2)(E) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Id. at 11-12).

On September 1, 2009, a jury found Petitioner guilty of possession for sale of 

narcotic drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Doc. 12-5 at 6; Doc. 12-6 at 77). 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of fourteen years on both counts. (Doc. 12-

4 at 76-80).

Petitioner timely appealed. (Id. at 83-84). Petitioner’s appellate counsel raised 

one claim alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s 

convictions. (Doc. 12-5 at 2-20). On October 13, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 55-62). Petitioner did not petition 

the Arizona Supreme Court for review.

On November 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Id. at 64-66). The trial court appointed PCR counsel. (Id. at 68-69). PCR counsel was

unable to find a colorable claim for relief. (Id. at 71). On May 30, 2012, Petitioner filed 

a pro se PCR petition, which raised two claims. (Id. at 74-111). Petitioner argued that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to prepare and present a proper defense at 

trial . . . .” (Id. at 77). Petitioner also argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise certain additional issues on direct appeal. (Id. at 77-78). On August 

15, 2012, the trial court ruled that the PCR petition failed to raise a colorable claim and 

dismissed the PCR petition. (Doc. 12-6 at 26-31). Petitioner filed a petition for review in 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 33-63). On January 7, 2014, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Id. at 68-72). 

On October 9, 2014, Petitioner filed the Petition seeking federal habeas relief

(Doc. 1). Respondents answered on February 3, 2015 (Doc. 12). Petitioner has not 

replied.

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that Petitioner failed 

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to exhaust the claims in the Petition or that the Petition is barred by the one-year statute 

of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.1

 The following principles are relevant to the review of 

Petitioner’s grounds for habeas relief.

A. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

procedural default doctrine is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not 

disturb state court judgments based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. 

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s 

procedural requirements for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

1 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

B. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits 

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last 

reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or 

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

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132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir.

2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner arguing an 

IAC claim must establish that his or her counsel’s performance was (i) objectively 

deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential 

standard, and “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. 

Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 

371 (2010)). In the habeas context, the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument 

that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard, such that the state court’s 

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rejection of the IAC claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is 

warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray 

v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Hence, a review of Strickland claims under AEDPA is “doubly deferential.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (“We take a ‘highly deferential’ look at 

counsel’s performance [pursuant to Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689], through the ‘deferential 

lens of § 2254(d)’ . . . .”).

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a court must try 

not “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, 

counsel’s representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness such 

that it was outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. 

A reviewing court considers “whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was 

effective. Rogovich v. Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a petitioner has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

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B. Ground One: Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to: (i) investigate the ownership of the cell phone used to arrange 

the drug deal; (ii) investigate the source of the $1,686 in cash found in Petitioner’s 

pocket; and (iii) have the crack pipe found in the vehicle Petitioner was riding in tested

for fingerprints. (Doc. 1 at 13). Petitioner asserts that if trial counsel had conducted the 

above investigations, counsel would have discovered that (i) Petitioner did not own the 

cell phone; (ii) the $1,686 in cash was from Petitioner’s Pell grant; and (iii) the crack pipe 

did not have Petitioner’s fingerprints on it. (Id. at 13-14).

The last state court decision reviewing the above claim is the January 7, 2014 

Arizona Court of Appeals ruling that affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s PCR 

petition. The Court of Appeals explained that “[Petitioner] repeats his claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel but identifies no factual or legal error in the trial 

court’s rejection of those claims. And we have reviewed the record and find no error in 

the courts thorough reasoning and decision.” (Doc. 12-6 at 70). As the Arizona Court of 

Appeals adopted the trial court’s reasoning, the U.S. District Court may review the trial 

court’s decision as part of the review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. Amado 

v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when the last reasoned 

decision is a state appellate court decision which adopts or substantially incorporates 

lower state court decisions, the lower state court decisions may be reviewed as part of the 

review of the state appellate court’s decision). As discussed below, Ground One is 

meritless as the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s IAC claim was not an unreasonable 

application of Strickland. 

1. Performance Prong of the Strickland Test

The trial court found that Petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as defined by prevailing 

professional norms, reasoning as follows:

1. Regarding the $1,686, the trial court noted that to introduce evidence as to the 

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source of the cash, Petitioner would have had to testify at trial. If Petitioner testified, the 

State would have been able to introduce evidence of Petitioner’s prior felony offenses, 

which would have damaged Petitioner’s case. (Doc. 12-6 at 59). The trial court 

concluded that Petitioner’s trial counsel therefore made a reasonable strategy decision. 

(Id.).

2. As to ownership of the cell phone, the trial court noted that a police officer 

testified that the cell phone was found in Petitioner’s pocket. (Id. at 60). The trial court 

found that “[b]ecause ownership (or lack thereof) of the phone was so insignificant as to 

the issue of guilt, Defense Counsel could have legitimately determined that calling a 

witness to prove ownership of the phone would not be helpful to [Petitioner].” (Id.).

3. Finally, the trial court found that it was a reasonable strategy decision by 

Petitioner’s counsel to not test the crack pipe found in Petitioner’s vehicle for fingerprints 

as it allowed counsel to “argue to the jury that the State failed to prove [Petitioner] ever 

touched the pipe.” (Id.).

Although Petitioner disagrees with trial counsel’s strategy, “strategic choices made 

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable.” Earp v. Cullen, 623 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see also Murray, 746 F.3d at 457 (a “defendant’s 

disagreement with trial counsel’s strategy does not constitute deficient performance on 

the part of trial counsel”). Moreover, Petitioner has not proffered any reason as to why 

the trial court’s findings above, as adopted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, are not an 

objectively reasonable application of Strickland. When considering ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show 

that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curium); Bell 

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699 (2002) (stating that a federal habeas petitioner “must do 

more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being 

analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a 

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federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied 

Strickland incorrectly. . . . Rather, he must show that the [state court] applied Strickland

to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”). After reviewing the 

record, the undersigned finds that the Arizona state courts did not unreasonably

determine the performance prong of the two-part Strickland test. 

2. Prejudice Prong of the Strickland Test

The trial court also analyzed Petitioner’s IAC claims under the prejudice prong of 

the Strickland test. The trial court ruled that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable 

probability that his trial counsel’s allegedly ineffective performance affected the verdict, 

finding that:

1. As to the $1,686 in cash, “the jury could have found that the cash in 

[Petitioner’s] pocket and wallet was circumstantial evidence supporting the charge of 

Possession for Sale of Narcotic Drug.” (Doc. 12-6 at 47). 

2. As to the ownership of the cell phone, the trial court noted that even if evidence 

showed that Petitioner did not own the phone, the “jury still heard the testimony of the 

officers that the phone was used to set up the drug deal and the phone was found in 

[Petitioner’s] pocket.” (Id. at 47-48). 

3. Finally, the trial court commented that even if the crack pipe was tested for 

fingerprints, and Petitioner’s fingerprints were not found on the pipe, Petitioner could 

have been found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia pursuant to the theory of 

accomplice liability. (Id. at 48).

Petitioner does not specify how the Arizona state courts erred in determining the 

prejudice prong of Strickland. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25; Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-699. 

The undersigned finds that the Arizona state courts did not unreasonably determine the 

prejudice prong of the two-part Strickland test. First, under Arizona law, a person has 

constructive possession of an item if it can be inferred the person had knowledge of the 

property and dominion or control over the area where it was found. State v. Cox, 155 

P.3d 357, 359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Possession can be sole or joint. Id. Thus, a rational 

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juror could find that another individual owned the cell phone, but also find that Petitioner 

jointly possessed the cell phone. 

Second, the lack of direct evidence such as fingerprints linking Petitioner to the 

crack pipe is not dispositive of Petitioner’s claim because possession may be proven by 

circumstantial evidence. Cox, 155 P.3d at 359; Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from [the record] may be 

sufficient to sustain a conviction.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Finally, Petitioner has failed to establish that there is a “substantial, not just conceivable” 

likelihood of a different result if the jury had heard evidence that the $1,686 in cash 

found in Petitioner’s pocket came from a Pell grant. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. 

In sum, Petitioner has failed to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision 

denying his IAC claims contained in Ground One was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court deny Ground One on the 

merits.

C. Ground Two: Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s: (i) 

Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Remand; (ii) Motion to Suppress; and (iii) Motion in 

Limine. (Doc. 1 at 15-22). The last reasoned state court decision on the above claim is 

the January 7, 2014 Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. 

Regarding the Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Remand, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals held that:

[Petitioner] cites no authority and develops no meaningful 

argument that he is entitled to relief on this ground. Notably, 

although he generally asserts the officer’s testimony 

constituted perjury, he cites no evidence supporting that 

assertion or contradicting the officer’s testimony that the 

misstatements were unintentional. . . . Accordingly, he has 

waived this argument on review, and we do not address it

further. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1) (petition for review 

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shall contain “specific references to the record”); State v. 

Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995) 

(insufficient argument waives claim on review).

(Doc. 12-6 at 71-72). Because the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on the above 

sub-claim by finding that Petitioner failed to comply with Rule 32.9(c)(1) of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, the undersigned concludes that the claim is procedurally

barred on independent and adequate state grounds.2

 The Petition contains no legitimate 

reason to excuse the procedural default of the sub-claim.

3

 

Alternatively, Petitioner’s sub-claim is meritless. As noted by the trial court, there 

was adequate evidence to support the denial of the Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Remand. 

(Doc. 12-6 at 30). The mistakes in the officer’s testimony were not material given that 

forty dollars worth of crack cocaine was found behind Petitioner’s seat. (Doc. 12-1 at 63-

64). An appellate attorney is not ineffective for failing to raise claims which do not have 

a reasonable probability of succeeding or which offer only a remote chance of securing a 

reversal. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989); Pollard v. White, 119 

F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A hallmark of effective appellate counsel is the ability 

to weed out claims that have no likelihood of success, instead of throwing in a kitchen 

sink full of arguments with the hope that some argument will persuade the court.”); 

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (appellate counsel’s failure to 

raise an issue on direct appeal cannot constitute ineffective assistance when “appeal 

2 The State’s Answer does not raise the issue of procedural default. Although procedural default is an affirmative defense which must generally be asserted by the 

State, “the district court retains discretion to consider the issue sua sponte if the 

circumstances warrant.” Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). In 

particular, the court may raise the issue sua sponte where warranted by “principles of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency.” Id.

3 The Petition contains the assertion that Petitioner “is innocent and only stands 

convicted do [sic] state court errors which caused a miscarriage of justice.” (Doc. 1 at 22). This vague and conclusory statement is insufficient to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of Petitioner’s sub-claim. See Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2013) (“we have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to 

overcome otherwise convincing proof of guilt”). 

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would not have provided grounds for reversal”). Appellate counsel’s failure to challenge 

the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Remand on direct appeal does 

not support Petitioner’s IAC claim. 

The Court of Appeals rejected the remaining two sub-claims in Ground Two for 

the following reasons: 

1. As to trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals stated:

[Petitioner] insists the traffic stop of his vehicle was improper 

. . . because “there was nothing suspicious about a random 

vehicle pulling into a place of business that was open” and, in 

any event, the stop was improper because it was “pretextual.” 

But [Petitioner] ignores that the stop was based on a traffic 

violation—not on the driver’s conduct in the parking lot. 

[Petitioner] does not assert there was no traffic violation 

justifying the stop. See generally State v. Livingston, 206 

Ariz. 145, ¶ 9, 75 P.3d 1103, 1105 (App. 2003) (law 

enforcement officer effectuating the stop need only have 

reasonable suspicion to believe individual committed traffic 

violation). And [Petitioner] is incorrect that the stop would 

be improper if it was pretextual. Jones v. Sterling, 210 Ariz. 

308, ¶ 11, 110 P.3d 1271, 1274 (2005) (“[E]vidence seized as 

a result of a traffic stop meeting ‘normal’ Fourth Amendment 

standards is not inadmissible because of the subjective 

motivations of the police who made the stop.”).

(Doc. 12-6 at 71).

2. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

argument that appellate counsel should have challenged the trial court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s Motion in Limine. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was independent

evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy because Petitioner was 

“in a vehicle with another person with drug paraphernalia, and a saleable amount of 

cocaine was in open view, and within ready access of either of the vehicle’s occupants.” 

(Doc. 12-6 at 72). Thus, the statements were admissible as statements by a coconspirator pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. 

Like in Ground One, Petitioner does not present any argument as to how the above 

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Arizona Court of Appeals’ rulings are contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. Petitioner again has failed to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to 

habeas relief. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25; Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-699. The undersigned 

finds that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rulings regarding the claims contained in 

Ground Two are not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. It is therefore recommended

that the Court deny Ground Two on the merits.

D. Petitioner’s Claim of Actual Innocence

In his Petition, Petitioner makes the conclusory statement that he is innocent. 

(Doc. 1 at 22). “Claims of actual innocence . . . have never been held to state a ground 

for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the 

underlying state criminal proceeding.”4 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief based solely on his claim of actual 

innocence of the criminal acts underlying his convictions. See Coley v. Gonzalez, 55 

F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.1995); Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Even if Petitioner’s claim of innocence was a cognizable claim in this habeas proceeding, 

Petitioner has not offered any evidence that affirmatively proves Petitioner’s innocence. 

See Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477. Thus, the claim should be denied if the Court deems 

Petitioner’s statement that he is innocent to be a free-standing actual innocence claim.

E. Petitioner’s Additional Requests

1. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 23). Review of Section 

2254(d) claims “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 

4 The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that a capital habeas petitioner may assert a freestanding actual innocence claim after it found that a majority of the justices in 

Herrera would have supported such a claim. See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The petitioner’s burden in such a case is “extraordinarily high,” and requires a showing that is “truly persuasive.” Id. (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 

417). The capital habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence claim must affirmatively prove that he or she is probably innocent. See id.

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the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. As explained by the U.S. 

Supreme Court, allowing “a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with 

new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first 

instance effectively de novo” would be contrary to the purpose of affording state courts 

the primary responsibility for considering a petitioner’s claims. Id. at 1399 (“It would be 

strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a 

decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court.”). 

Here, all of the grounds for relief in the Petition were adjudicated on the merits in 

Arizona state court. The undersigned has recommended that all of Petitioner’s federal 

habeas claims be denied. Where, as here, “the record refutes the [habeas] applicant’s 

factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to 

hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (a hearing 

is not required if the allegations would not entitle the petitioner to relief under Section 

2254(d)); Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n evidentiary 

hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court 

record.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the Court 

deny Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Request for Appointment of Counsel

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a habeas proceeding. Bonin v.

Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993). “Indigent state prisoners applying for 

habeas corpus relief are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances

indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney

v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). 

However, pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts, “[i]f an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge

must appoint an attorney to represent a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel

appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” Even if an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, a 

district court has discretion to appoint counsel for a habeas petitioner when “the interests 

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of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). 

Petitioner requests the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 1 at 23). The undersigned 

does not find that the interests of justice require the appointment of counsel in this case. 

Petitioner has failed to show that the complexities of the case are such that denial of 

appointed counsel would amount to a denial of due process. Moreover, Petitioner’s 

filings with the Court indicate that Petitioner understands the issues and is capable of 

presenting his arguments to the Court. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 

1987) (affirming the denial of the appointment of counsel where a petitioner’s pleadings 

demonstrated a good understanding of the issues and an ability to present contentions 

“forcefully and coherently”). Finally, the record is adequately developed and the 

undersigned does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. For these reasons, the 

undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for appointment of 

counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. The 

undersigned further recommends that the Court deny and dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) 

with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and 

the appointment of counsel be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claim for relief.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

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should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 30th day of September, 2015. 

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