Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02739/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02739-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLENE TOWNSEND,

VIVIAN MENTA and DORINDA

IRON CLOUD, heirs of decedent, MICHAEL ESPERANZA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

IMPERIAL COUNTY; and

DOES 1 to 50, Inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-2739-WQH (PCL)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE

ORDER AS TO PLAINTIFFS’

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF

GEOFFREY HOLBROOK AND

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order as to

Plaintiffs’ Notice of Deposition of Geoffery Holbrook and Request for Documents,

filed on May 2, 2014. (Doc. 30.)

According to his declaration, Mr. Holbrook’s involvement in this litigation

stems from his role as Senior Deputy County Counsel for the Defendants, County

of Imperial and his placement on the Death Review Team responsible for

investigating Michael Esperanza’s death. (Id. at 11.) Mr. Holbrook has provided

legal advice to Defendant’s counsel, and his “singular role” as a member of the

Death Review Team was to provide legal advice. (Id. at 11.)

/ / /

/ / /

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II. DISCUSSION

Federal law authorizes federal courts to issue protective orders in connection

with discovery. F.R.C.P. Rule 26(c). The Court may, for good cause and after good

faith attempts by the parties to resolve the dispute without court action, issue an

order to protect a party or person. (Id.) Any such order, however, requires that the

court’s determination “identify and discuss the factors it considered in its ‘good

cause’ examination to allow appellate review of the exercise of its discretion.”

Phillips v. Gen. Motors, 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.2002). Generally, “those

opposing discovery are required to carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery

should be denied.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975).

Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of

Evidence prohibit taking the deposition of an opposing party’s attorney. Shelton v.

America Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.1986); Johnston

Development Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348,

352 (D.N.J.1990). In fact, Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

permits a party to take the testimony of “any person ” by deposition, without leave

of court. The Rule sets forth certain exceptions to this provision, none of which

exempt a party’s attorney from being subject to deposition. See NFA Corp. v.

Riverview Narrow Fabric, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 83, 84 (D.N.C.1987).

Citing the lack of any prohibition in the Federal Rules against obtaining the 

deposition of adverse counsel, at least one court has held that a party seeking a

protective order to preclude its attorney’s deposition must bear the burden, under

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of demonstrating good cause to

preclude or limit the testimony. Johnston, 130 F.R.D. at 352, citing Cipollone v.

Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3rd Cir.1986).

However, other courts have held that because of the negative impact that

deposing a party’s attorney can have on the litigation process, the taking of

opposing counsel’s deposition should be permitted only in limited circumstances,

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and that the party seeking to depose another party’s attorney must demonstrate the

propriety and the need for the deposition. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327; Harriston v.

Chicago Tribune Company, 134 F.R.D. 232, 233 (N.D.Ill.1990); Hay and Forage

Industries v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 687, 689 (D.Kan.1990); West

Peninsular Title Company v. Palm Beach County, 132 F.R.D. 301, 302

(S.D.Fla.1990); Advance Systems, Inc. of Green Bay v. APV Baker PMC, Inc.,

124 F.R.D. 200, 201 (E.D.Wis.1989); NFA Corp., 117 F.R.D. at 85. For example,

when a party’s attorney is a fact witness, such as an “actor or a viewer.” Am. Cas.

Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Krieger, 160 F.R.D. 582, 589 (S.D.Cal.1995). Under these

circumstances, courts allow depositions of an opposing party’s attorney where the

party seeking to take the deposition can show that: “(1) No other means exist to

obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) The information

sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) The information is crucial to the

preparation of the case.” Id. at 589; See also Light Salt Investments, LP v. Fisher,

13CV1158-MMA-DHB, 2013 WL 3205918 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2013) (applying

Kreiger’s three prong test when analyzing motion for protective order to prevent

deposition of counsel).

Both parties have argued extensively in their moving papers regarding the

applicability of Shelton v. America Motors Corp., supra, which would put the

burden to show good cause on the party seeking to depose counsel, and require the

application of the above three-prong test. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.

Plaintiffs argue that Shelton does not apply because Holbrook is not

“litigation counsel,” as defined in a case outside the Ninth Circuit, United States v.

Phillip Morris Inc., 209 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding, inter alia, that

Shelton applies only to “trial counsel or counsel directly involved in representing a

party in the case.”) (Doc. 37, at 15.) 

/ / /

Defendants argue that Shelton does apply. (Doc. 39, at 6.) Defendant’s

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authority is also a case outside the Ninth Circuit, Gruenbaum v. Werner

Enterprises, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 298, 309-10 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding, inter alia,

that Shelton applies to protective orders for depositions of in-house counsel.) (Doc.

39, at 6.) 

The most recent and analogous cases from the Southern District of California

apply Shelton. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Krieger, supra; Light Salt

Investments, LP v. Fisher, supra. 

In Krieger, similar to the case at hand, a protective order was sought to

prevent deposing “associate counsel,” who assisted litigation counsel in preparing

pleadings and the discovery process, and who “play[ed] no role in the present

case.” Krieger, supra at 588-89. The court noted that the deposition “will not cause

the disruption that would be engendered by the taking of depositions of a party’s

lead litigation counsel,” but that “the danger still exists that the attorney-client

privilege and/or the work product doctrine may be implicated” in light of the

attorney’s role in the litigation. Id. The court then applied the three Shelton criteria

in analyzing the motion for protective order. Id.

In Light Salt Investments, a protective order for deposition of non-party

corporate counsel was sought. Light Salt Investments, LP v. Fisher, supra at *2.

The court recognized that the corporate counsel did not represent any part in the

case, and that technically the attorney was not adversary counsel. Id. Nonetheless,

in determining whether the plaintiff should be allowed to depose a non-party’s

corporate counsel, the court applied Shelton through citation of Krieger. Id. at *2-

3.

Thus, whether or not Mr. Holbrook is “litigation counsel,” in determining

whether to grant a protective order preventing his deposition the Court will apply

Shelton’s three-prong test: (1) No other means exist to obtain the information than

to depose opposing counsel; (2) The information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) The information is crucial to the preparation of the case.”

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Shelton, supra, at 1327.

Ostensibly, Plaintiff’s intention in deposing Mr. Holbrook is to procure nonprivileged information regarding the findings of the Death Review Team and a

history of the Team’s meetings. In fact, Plaintiff lists several intended depositionquestion themes to this effect. (Doc. 37, at 9.) If true, and the information sought

from Mr. Holbrook is specific only to the Team, and not to Mr. Holbrook as

associate counsel, Plaintiffs will find as much purchase with any member of the

Team as Mr. Holbrook. As Defendants point out in their Reply, there are seven

members of the Death Review Team. (Doc. 39, at 7.) Plaintiffs have taken

depositions of only two members of the team. (Id.) Thus, other than Mr. Holbrook,

there are four members of the Team from whom Plaintiffs could seek information. 

The course which best preserves the concerns of Shelton is avoiding the

immediate deposition of Mr. Holbrook. Deposing a different Team member will

avoid “the danger... that the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product

doctrine may be implicated,” in light of Mr. Holbrook’s role as County counsel.

See Krieger, supra at 588-89.

Thus, it is clear that Plaintiff’s have not exhausted all avenues to the

information they seek; Shelton’s first prong has failed. The Court does not deign to

consider the remaining Shelton prongs, as the three are a conjunctive predicate to

the taking of opposing counsel’s deposition. Shelton, supra, at 1327.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION

 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order as to

Plaintiff’s Notice of Deposition of Geoffery Holbrook and Request for Documents.

(Doc. 30.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 19, 2014 Peter C. Lewis

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable William Q. Hayes All Parties and Counsel of Record

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