Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00654/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00654-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331cv Fed. Question: Other Civil Rights

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17-CV-654 JLS (BGS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAVIN B. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY; 

MR. LEONARD TRINH; SAN DIEGO 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOHN DOES,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-654 JLS (BGS)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(ECF No. 9)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Gavin B. Davis’s Emergency Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction. (“PI Mot.,” ECF No. 9.) Also before the Court are Defendant San 

Diego District Attorney Leonard Trinh’s and Defendant San Diego Police Department’s 

responses in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, (ECF Nos. 11, 12, respectively), and 

Plaintiff’s reply in support of his motion, (“PI Mot. Reply,” ECF No. 16). After considering 

the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

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LEGAL STANDARD

The same standard governs TROs and preliminary injunctions. Stuhlbard Int’l Sales 

Co. v. John D. Brush and Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A plaintiff seeking 

a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 

(2008)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2009); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 2010). In the 

Ninth Circuit, “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips 

sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as 

the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction 

is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that this “sliding scale” approach 

survives after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter). This is an “extraordinary remedy 

that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. To warrant injunctive relief, irreparable injury must be more than 

merely possible. See Midgett v. Tri-Cty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 254 F.3d 846, 850 

(9th Cir. 2001). Rather, the plaintiff must show “that he faces a real or immediate threat” 

that he will suffer irreparable harm. Id. Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction carry a 

particularly “heavy burden” of proving their entitlement to it. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 

626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689 (“A preliminary 

injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy.’”).

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff filed his emergency motion for preliminary injunction on April 25, 2017. 

(ECF No. 9.) In the Requested Relief section, Plaintiff requests:

1. That the Court “restrain[] Defendant SDDA from seeking Custody of the Plaintiff 

until such time as the California Attorney General fully opines on jurisdiction, as the 

Plaintiff alleges that each of Defendant Leonard and Defendant SDDA, do not have 

it, in any capacity”;

2. That the Court “ensure . . . that Defendant SDPD, does not communicate, 

temporarily, with other police departments in an effort to seek Custody, prematurely 

and without legal right, of the Plaintiff”;

3. That the Court enjoin Judge Jeffrey Fraser from presiding over his two criminal 

cases.

(PI Mot. 9–101.)

Plaintiff’s motion fails. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion is difficult to 

understand. He appears to generally discuss events occurring in two of his state law cases. 

(Id. at 5–8.) Apparently Judge Jeffrey Fraser issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest 

on April 17, 2017, and Plaintiff has filed, in his state court cases, motions to remove Judge 

Fraser from presiding over his cases and a motion to quash the bench warrant. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff alleges that on April 24, 2017, officers attempted to execute the arrest warrant, 

which Plaintiff argues caused him reputational harm. (Id. at 7.) Because Plaintiff argues he 

is contesting the validity of the warrant, he further argues that the officers do not have the 

authority to arrest him based on the same, and thus he apparently seeks an order from this 

Court barring officers from taking him into custody. (Id. at 7–8.)

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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Although Plaintiff engages with the relevant Winter factors in support of his motion

for a preliminary injunction, he fails to persuade the Court to grant him this “extraordinary” 

remedy. First, Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will 

prevail on the merits because the right to each of Due Process and counsel are some of the 

most basic and fundamental rights afforded to criminal defendants, which the Plaintiff is 

awaiting federal rulings on, while clearly not evading the law, and not a threat to anyone.”2

(Id. at 8.) This is insufficient to prove a likelihood of success on the merits. Among other 

things, Plaintiff does not explain what federal rulings he is “awaiting”; and, more 

fundamentally, “awaiting” a ruling on a matter is not indicative of a likelihood of success

on that matter or otherwise. At the very least Plaintiff must explain why he is likely to 

succeed on those federal matters and, of course, how rulings on those matters are relevant 

to his requested relief. To the extent his motion is premised on his motions in state court,

Plaintiff has failed to show that he will succeed in his challenge to Judge Fraser or any 

other relief he seeks in that forum.

Furthermore, Plaintiff, in a conclusory manner, states he “will suffer irreparable, and 

separately imminent harm, prima facie, if the preliminary injunction is not granted,” and 

that “[t]here is no adequate remedy of law other than seeking this relief herein.” (PI Mot. 

8.) This is plainly insufficient to establish “a clear showing that [he] is entitled to such 

relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Finally, Plaintiff argues that an injunction is in the public 

interest because “the right to due process and/or the assistance of counsel are some of the 

most fundamental rights to be afforded to a criminal defendant . . . .” (Id. at 9; see also PI 

Mot. Reply 17.) While the Court agrees with this statement in the abstract, Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated a likelihood that these rights have been violated in this case. Additionally, 

Defendants argue that “Plaintiff does not seek to protect any public interests, and a superior 

court judge seems to have determined the opposite—that Plaintiff presents enough of a risk 

 

2

In his reply in support of his motion, Plaintiff further argues that “it is clear that the plaintiff’s federal 

rights have been violated.” (PI Mot. Reply 16.) But saying that does not make it so. Thus, Plaintiff has 

failed to demonstrate that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his case. 

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to others that he must be taken into custody.” (E.g., ECF No. 11, at 4.) On balance, the 

Court finds that the Winter factors do not favor a grant of injunctive relief, and that Plaintiff 

has failed to at least demonstrate serious questions going to the merits of his claims and 

that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9).3

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2017

 

3 For this reason the Court does not reach Defendants’ alternative argument that the Court should abstain 

from hearing this case under the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. The 

Court will, however, consider this argument—and others—in assessing Defendants’ pending motions to 

dismiss.

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