Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02596/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02596-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD VAN POOL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-02596 WHA

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this action alleging disability discrimination, the Court recently granted a motion for

summary judgment by defendants the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco

Fire Department. This memorandum opinion explains the reasoning. 

STATEMENT

The San Francisco Fire Department had employed plaintiff since 1974. In 1993, he was

promoted to the rank of H-20 Lieutenant, which he retained at the time of the hearing on the

instant motion. Due to injuries plaintiff suffered on the job, the parties stipulated that he was

disabled (Stipulated Statement of Facts ¶ B.1). He suffered from injuries to his knee, wrist and

neck (Van Pool Decl. ¶ 6). In 1995, defendants assigned plaintiff to work in a temporary

position to accommodate medical restrictions imposed by his injuries. In January 2002, Fire

Chief Mario H. Treviño ordered that no employee could work more than a year in a position

designed to accommodate a temporary injury. After that, a firefighter who still could not work

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at his or her normal assignment could ask the department for reasonable accommodation under

federal and state disabilities laws. The fire chief wrote to plaintiff in August 2002, telling him

that his temporary assignment would end January 5, 2003 (Asaro Decl., Exh. V; Hecimovich

Decl., Exh. EE). 

Before plaintiff received that letter, he applied in 2002 for promotion to provisional

positions as an H-30 captain and as an H-28 lieutenant in the training division. He lost out on

both positions. Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White stated that he was not selected because he did

not have any recent experience fighting fires and because he did not have specialized skills that

the successful candidates possessed. (His most recent active experience was in 1995.) When

additional vacancies came up for H-28 positions later in 2002 and in 2003, Hayes-White did not

consider plaintiff because she already had deemed him unqualified. The department also did

not select plaintiff for either of two H-30 captain positions that he applied for in 2004, the first

in the Investigative Services Bureau and the other in the Emergency Communications

Department. 

In late 2002, plaintiff requested accommodation pursuant to the Americans With

Disabilities Act and state law. He asked to be assigned to any light-duty work normally

performed by an H-28 training officer, an H-30 captain or an H-20 lieutenant (Van Pool Decl. ¶

12). He said that his disability limited his capacity to perform manual tasks because it limited

the amount of time he could spend standing or sitting continuously. David L. Chittenden, M.D.,

certified that it was medically necessary for plaintiff to avoid squatting and ladder climbing, and

to limit his continuous amounts of time walking (four to six hours), standing (one hour) and

sitting (two to three hours) (Bushong Decl., Exhs. X, Y). 

The department offered plaintiff a position for an H-20 lieutenant, working on

emergency communications. That assignment, however, required twelve-hour shifts, mostly

sitting, which plaintiff’s doctor ultimately said he was medically unable to perform. The

department next offered plaintiff another job he could not do: a position for an H-20 lieutenant

doing administrative work in the Assignment Office, which required typing. His wrist injuries

prevented him from typing. After plaintiff told departmental officials that he could not type,

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then-fire chief Treviño wrote a letter stating that departmental records did not indicate any

restriction that would prevent plaintiff from taking the position. Chief Treviño ordered plaintiff

either to report to work in the Assignment Office, request a leave of absence, or face a forced

leave or “other appropriate action” while the department looked for an alternative position for

him (Courtney Decl., Exh. 6). The department extended his temporary assignment into

February 2003 (Bushong Decl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff took a temporary position in the department’s

print shop. In March 2003, the department offered plaintiff a job fitting firefighters for masks. 

Instead, he took a disability leave so that doctors could operate on his wrist. 

In March 2004, plaintiff’s disability leave ended. His wrist had not recovered fully. His

doctor told the department that he could not work shifts lasting longer than ten hours. The

department offered a training position to plaintiff, accommodating his needs in August 2004. 

He accepted the offer and continued to work in that position at the time of the hearing. With the

exception of the multiple times plaintiff took lucrative disability or medical leave, he always

was paid, always was assigned to a position and never was demoted. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action, contending that defendants’ refusal to offer him

positions as H-30 captain and H-28 lieutenant in the training division violated state and federal

anti-discrimination law. 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where the evidence shows that “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

FRCP 56(c), (e). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. On

summary judgment, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

255 (1986). 

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 The claims that were dropped were (1) that defendants failed to engage in an interactive process with

plaintiff to accommodate his disabilities; (2) that defendants violated California Government Code Section

12940(m); (3) that defendants violated public policy as set forth in California Government Code Section 12900

et seq.; and (4) that defendants retaliated against plaintiff for asserting claims under Sections 12940(a) and

12940(m), and under the Americans With Disabilities Act (Tr. 26, 29–30; Compl.). 

2

 Plaintiff originally alleged discrimination in not allowing him to remain in the temporary position he

had occupied since 1995. He dropped that aspect of the claim at the hearing (Tr. 25).

4

Plaintiff originally brought six claims. Counsel for plaintiff stated at the hearing on the

instant motion, however, that plaintiff had decided to pursue only two of those claims (Tr. of

Proceedings of Aug. 3 at 30).1

 One was the allegation that defendants discriminated against

plaintiff due to his disability, in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112, by not appointing him

to vacant H-30 captain positions or to H-28 lieutenant positions in the training division.2

Section 12112(a) bars an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a

disability on the basis of his or her disability in hiring, advancement, and other terms,

conditions and privileges of employment. See 42 U.S.C. 12111(2), (5)(A) (defining which

entities and employers are covered). 

The other claim was for violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, California

Government Code Section 12940(a), which bars employers from discriminating against a

person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, on the basis of physical disability. 

To maintain either claim, a worker must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. That includes showing that the person is a “qualified individual with a

disability — that is, a person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of her job.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806

(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The worker also must show that she suffered an

adverse employment action. If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the “burden of

production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of intentional

discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance,

offering evidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.” Raytheon Co.

v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50, n.3 (2003). 

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The FEHA test is similar. To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must provide

evidence that (1) he or she was disabled, (2) he or she was qualified for the position sought, (3)

he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) “some other circumstance suggests

discriminatory motive.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). The FEHA

burden-shifting scheme is identical to that under the ADA. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36

Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). 

1. PRIMA FACIE CASE. 

Defendants argued that there was no evidence upon which a jury reasonably could have

concluded that plaintiff was qualified for the positions he sought but was denied. They claimed

that he was not qualified because he did not have recent experience fighting fires. Fire Chief

Hayes-White, who was an assistant deputy chief in charge of training during the time that

plaintiff was applying for jobs in that division, submitted a declaration that described the “job

requirements” set forth in the general order advertising the H-28 training officer position. In

fact, the general order did not list any “requirements” but only “Desired Skills.” Hayes-White,

however, also stated:

“To be qualified for selection as an H-28 Training Officer, an

officer would need to have recent field experience employing the

full range of fire suppression equipment . . . . Lt. Van Pool lacked

recent field experience, an essential qualification for the H-28

Training Officer position. The instruction of new hires

. . . requires a competency that I believe can only be developed and

maintained through ongoing practice.” 

Hayes-White, however, stated contradictorily that she “did not reach the issue of whether Lt.

Van Pool would be able to perform the essential functions of the H-28 position with reasonable

accommodations” (Hayes-White Decl. ¶ 13, Exh. A) (emphasis added). 

Hayes-White’s statement that she did not consider whether plaintiff “would be able to

perform the essential functions of the H-28 position” could have been seen by a reasonable jury

as conflicting with her statements that he was not qualified. A reasonable jury might have

resolved this conflict by deciding that she never had assessed whether he was qualified. They

also could have interpreted the requirement of “recent” field experience as encompassing

service in 1995. “Recent” is a vague term. For these reasons, the evidence could have

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permitted a jury reasonably to conclude that plaintiff was qualified for the H-28 training officer

positions, including those later positions for which plaintiff also applied and was rejected. 

Defendants also argued that plaintiff could not show that he was qualified to be a

provisional captain in the Investigative Services Bureau because he “did not meet the written

requirements” for the job. Just as with the H-28 training officer position, there was no mention

in the written advertisement for applicants of any “requirements.” Instead, it only

communicated “[d]esired qualifications.” The department stated what it wanted but it left the

door open to accepting less. Defendants pointed out that plaintiff did not have all the

qualifications of the person eventually hired (Hayes-White Decl. ¶ 20, Exh. P). This, however,

did not show that plaintiff was unqualified. The issue is not whether he was the most qualified,

only whether he had the minimum required qualifications. 

Defendants also claimed that plaintiff did not qualify for the position as a provisional

captain in the Emergency Communications Division. They were correct. The posting for the

job included a list of “Minimum Qualifications,” including training in “Criteria Based Dispatch

(CBD)” and “[o]ne year experience in communications” (id., Exh. R) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff pointed to nothing in the record to indicate that he had such experience. 

Plaintiff made out a prima facie case as to the jobs in the Investigative Services Bureau

and in the training division but not as to the job in emergency communications. 

2. NONDISCRIMINATORY REASONS FOR ADVERSE JOB ACTIONS. 

Plaintiff did not dispute that defendants offered nondiscriminatory reasons for each of

the adverse job actions about which he complained. Defendants described why each candidate

who beat out plaintiff for an H-30 captain position or an H-28 training-division position had

qualifications plaintiff lacked. The Court agreed that defendants put forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not giving the jobs to plaintiff.

3. PRETEXT.

Plaintiff claimed that seven items of evidence supported his claim of pretext (Opp.

17–19). In light of defendants’ extensive efforts to accommodate plaintiff’s injuries since 1995,

these items did not establish grounds on which a reasonable jury could have found that

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defendants’ non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual and that the decisions were motivated

by plaintiff’s disability. 

Perhaps the strongest evidence was the deposition testimony by Suzanne Wong, the fire

department’s ADA coordinator, that defendants did not follow their usual procedure in

accommodating plaintiff’s disability. She began by describing conversations she had with her

superior about plaintiff’s application:

Q: Did [personnel director Jesusa Bushong] say anything to you

that made it sound as if Ron [Van Pool] had deliberately asked his

doctor to add this [medical] restriction?

A: I recall that she said something to that fact. . . . I recall that

she says something to the fact that the restriction would change

after . . . after he was placed or after he submitted the forms.

***

A: I feel that under 02A1 [the policy limiting, to one year’s

duration, temporary positions created for injured workers] there

are 15, 16, 17 people who apply for this type of accommodation. 

Other people were accommodated, and at that time Lt. Van Pool is

the only one who did not get accommodation and there were no

. . . any information on vacant positions or budget or any facts that

I see why I should treat him differently . . . . So I went to talk to

Jesusa about that, and every time I asked her she cut me off and

interrupted me. She did not give me [an] answer. Just told me that

I did not need to know. So this went on for about two months. 

Around March of 2003, I wrote an e-mail. I said “I don’t feel

comfortable signing [a] letter [to plaintiff].” From then on, I think

she handled the case herself.

Q: And it was your job, at the time, to handle the accommodation

request?

A: But I wasn’t really handling this case. I was directed what to

do, what to send out, when to call him, what to say when I called

him.

Q: By Jesusa?

A: Yes.

* * *

Q: What did you feel was not handled properly [about plaintiff’s

case]? 

A: I feel different because I didn’t have any information through

[sic] support why he’s different

(Van Pool Decl., Exh. F). 

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Plaintiff’s other evidence on pretext was:

• Defendants’ assignment of plaintiff to two positions, the emergencycommunications and the Assignment Office jobs, that he was unable to take due

to his disabilities.

• Defendants’ incorrect determination that he had rejected light-duty work (Van

Pool Decl., Exh. H).

• An accusation by a fire-department nurse that plaintiff was taking disability

leave to avoid working in the Assignment Office (id. ¶ 19).

• The fact that departmental officials negatively assessed plaintiff’s job

performance in documents filed in this litigation but did not do so earlier

(Siragusa Decl. ¶¶ 7–10).

• Fire Chief Treviño’s letter to plaintiff threatening to put him on leave or to take

other appropriate action if plaintiff did not report to work in the Assignment

Office (Courtney Decl., Exh. 6). 

• The fact that supposedly unqualified workers were assigned to the jobs that

plaintiff did not get (Opp. 18).

Even if a jury had considered this evidence collectively, it could not have concluded

reasonably that defendants’ asserted reasons for not putting plaintiff into an H-28 or an H-30

position were pretextual. The comments of Jesusa Bushong, the human-resources director,

indicated that she may have suspected that plaintiff was not truly disabled. Such suspicion was

not discrimination on the basis of plaintiff’s disability. Such suspicion indicated, at most, that

defendants discriminated against plaintiff because they thought he was not disabled. The same

was true for defendants’ incorrect determination that plaintiff had rejected light-duty work. The

close involvement of the human-resources director, to the exclusion of the ADA coordinator,

must be viewed in light of the fact that at least some of these events took place after plaintiff

had begun communicating with the department through an attorney. Such circumstances are

tense and fraught with risk for an employer. The department responded by deviating from its

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usual procedures. There is nothing about such a reaction that undercuts the non-discriminatory

reasons offered by defendants for their decisions. 

Defendants’ assignment of plaintiff to two positions, as an emergency-communications

H-20 lieutenant and in the Assignment Office, that he was unable to take due to his disabilities

also did not indicate pretext. The medical restrictions that kept plaintiff out of those positions

were not revealed clearly by him in his application for reasonable accommodations. The

department’s initial failure to recognize those restrictions therefore was not evidence of pretext. 

After being told of the restrictions, the department acted appropriately to find suitable positions. 

The fact that departmental officials negatively assessed plaintiff’s job performance

would have indicated pretext only if there were some reason to believe that these negative

assessments were given due to his disability, or that they were not genuine. In fact, the

assessments provided by Assistant Deputy Chief Thomas Siragusa described legitimate reasons

for negatively evaluating plaintiff. Siragusa stated that it took plaintiff all day to finish two-tothree hour tasks, that he frequently wandered through the offices chatting, that his training

materials were “unsophisticated” and that he presented them “in a scripted, non-interactive

fashion” (Siragusa Decl. ¶¶ 8–10). Plaintiff presented no evidence that these allegations were

untrue or were motivated by bias. 

Fire Chief Treviño’s letter to plaintiff threatening to put him on leave or to take other

appropriate action if plaintiff did not report to work in the Assignment Office indicated at most

that defendants viewed plaintiff as one who was trying to shirk his duties and had to be dealt

with in an authoritative and strict manner. 

Finally, plaintiff’s allegation that unqualified workers got the jobs was unsupported by

any evidence. He claimed that those firefighters were unqualified because they did not have the

rank of H-20 lieutenant. There was nothing in the job advertisements, however, to indicate that

the H-20 rank was a requirement. Other evidence indicated that these firefighters had specific

skills and experience that defendants desired (Hayes-White Decl. ¶¶ 19–21). 

At best, the supposed evidence of pretext showed that defendants were mistrustful of

plaintiff and hostile toward him because of a suspicion that he was faking his inability to do

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various jobs. All of this must be viewed in light of defendants’ extensive efforts to

accommodate plaintiff’s disabilities. They placed him in a light-duty position from 1995 to

2003 to accommodate those injuries. They offered him short-term positions and various

permanent positions until finally finding him a permanent, accommodated position as a training

officer. During all this time, plaintiff never lost pay. All of those facts weighed against a

finding of pretext. No reasonable jury could conclude, based on such evidence, collectively,

that defendants’ stated reasons for not putting plaintiff in the jobs he wanted were pretextual. 

Plaintiff failed to overcome defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their

decisions. Defendants therefore were entitled to summary judgment. The department went

beyond the call of duty in trying to accommodate plaintiff. No reasonable jury could find

otherwise. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants’ motion for summary judgement was GRANTED.

Dated: August 23, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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