Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02005/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02005-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

On October 18, 2013, Johnny Lopez (“Plaintiff”), an individual proceeding pro se and 

in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ECF 

No. 1.) Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6.)

The Court screened Plaintiff‟s initial Complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a 

claim, but gave leave to amend. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff has since filed a First Amended 

Complaint (Am. Compl., ECF No. 10) which is now before the Court for screening. No other 

parties have appeared in this action. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against 

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

JOHNNY LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-2005-MJS

ORDER DISMISSING, WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND, PLAINTIFF‟S COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

ECF No. 10

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS 

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The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that 

are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Facial plausibility demands more than the 

mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff is incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. The events at issue in 

his Complaint occurred in Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”). Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by providing him with 

inadequate medical care. Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants: 1) James 

A. Yates, warden, 2) Inwumi Ola, medical doctor, and 3) unknown correctional officers.

More specifically, Plaintiff‟s alleges as follows:

Plaintiff has a number of medical problems, including dizziness and a history of falling 

due to dizziness. Defendant Ola was aware of Plaintiff‟s medical history, including his 

problems with dizziness. On March 14, 2012, Plaintiff asked Defendant Ola for a walker with 

a seat because he became dizzy after walking several steps. Defendant Ola refused to fulfill 

Plaintiff‟s request and instead prescribed orthopedic shoes for Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff asked for a walker again on March 27, 2012, but the request was again 

denied.

Plaintiff fell on April 13, 2012, injuring his head, nose, and right eye. Plaintiff was 

taken to a hospital by helicopter. Plaintiff‟s medical conditions worsened. 

Plaintiff asks for $25,000 in punitive damages, $25,000 in compensatory damages, 

and $50,000 in exemplary damages.

III. ANALYSIS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the „deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws‟ of the United States.” Wilder 

v. Virginia Hosp. Ass‟n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). § 1983 is not 

itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal 

rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

1987).

B. Supervisory Liability and Linkage

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Yates and “unknown correctional officers” should be 

held liable for the inadequate medical care he received. Plaintiff fails to link any of these 

parties to his allegations.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named Defendants to the participation in 

the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; 

Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934, and as an 

administrator, Defendant Yates may only be held liable if he “participated in or directed the 

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violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), 

cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 

2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Some culpable action or 

inaction must be attributable to Defendant and while the creation or enforcement of, or 

acquiescence in, an unconstitutional policy, as alleged here, may support a claim, the policy 

must have been the moving force behind the violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205; Jeffers v. 

Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2001); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 

1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff attributes no action or inaction to Defendant Yates or the “unknown 

correctional officers”. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff has named Yates as a Defendant simply 

because of his overall supervisorial responsibilities as warden. It also appears that Plaintiff 

legitimately named the “unknown correctional officers” as Defendants in the hope he could 

link them to claims at a later date. However, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 

against Defendant Yates or the “unknown correctional officers”.

C. Eighth Amendment – Inadequate Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ola subjected him to inadequate medical care in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment by not providing him with a walker when Plaintiff 

requested one. 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show „deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.‟” Jett v. Penner, 439 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The 

two part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “„a serious medical need‟ 

by demonstrating that „failure to treat a prisoner‟s condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,‟” and (2) “the defendant‟s response to 

the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 

104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)).

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It is unclear from Plaintiff‟s pleading whether he presented a serious medical condition 

to Defendant Ola. Certainly, if his dizziness caused him to fall with any significant 

frequency, it could be considered severe. However, without knowing how often he had 

symptoms of dizziness, how severe they were on the various occasions he had them, and 

what precipitated them, the Court is unable to find that he had a serious medical condition.

Plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to amend as to Defendant Ola (alone) to 

address the above deficiencies. If he chooses to amend, he should set out how often he had 

symptoms to the point he fell or how often he had to take precautions to keep from falling, 

what those precautions were, and, if he knows, what brought on his symptoms. In 

connection with the second prerequisite to a cognizable inadequate medical care claim, 

discussed below, Plaintiff also must set out in detail what he told Defendant Ola about his 

condition and when he told her relative to his fall and injury.

In addition to a serious medical condition, Plaintiff must also establish deliberate 

indifference. To show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show “a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner‟s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the 

indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 

standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the 

prison official must not only „be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,‟ but that person „must also draw the inference.‟” 

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “„If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth 

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.‟” Id. (quoting Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188).

Plaintiff fails to explain how Defendant Ola was deliberately indifferent to his medical 

condition. Plaintiff believes he should have been provided with a walker. Apparently, 

Defendant Ola did not agree.1 However, the pleading provides no basis for concluding that 

Defendant deliberately chose to ignore a risk of harm to Plaintiff. It is just as likely Defendant 

Ola simply disagreed with him regarding the nature of his medical needs or perhaps 

 

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The Amended Complaint does imply that Defendant Ola, oddly it seems, prescribed orthopedic shoes for 

dizziness. However, there are no facts pled that cause the Court to conclude the two events were related by 

Defendant at the time she made her treatment decisions..

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negligently diagnosed his condition or was negligent in responding to it. “A difference of 

opinion between a physician and the prisoner-or between medical professionals-concerning 

what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. 

McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th 

Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1986)). Mere medical negligence is not sufficient to 

show medical indifference. See Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), 

citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (1976). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the course of 

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that 

the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” 

Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff does state that Defendant‟s treatment decision reflected more than mere 

disagreement, but he identifies none of the facts upon which he relies in forming that opinion.

He also has failed to provide details supporting his claim that a walker was necessary and 

that Defendant Ola‟s decision to provide other treatment was medically unacceptable and 

reflected deliberate indifference. In short, Plaintiff has not pled deliberate indifference. He 

will be given one final chance to amend his claim against Defendant Ola (only). If he 

chooses to do so, he must provide facts, not just suspicion, belief, or speculation, to support 

his claim Defendant Ola acted intentionally and in a medically unacceptable way.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted under § 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend to cure 

the deficiencies in his claim. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this 

suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 

605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state 

what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights, 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 676-677. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

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[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), 

and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint, filed March 20, 2014, is dismissed 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

file an amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this 

order, this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DEAC _Signature- END:

ci4d6

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