Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02068/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02068-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Alberto Villescas is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 34; Local Rule 302.

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw his consent to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, filed on November 23, 2015, respectively. 

(ECF Nos. 69, 70.) 

A. Motion To Withdraw Consent

Once a civil case is referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the reference can 

be withdrawn only “for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances 

shown by any party.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating 

that “[t]here is no absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other proceedings 

before a magistrate judge.”). A referral to a magistrate judge will not be vacated where a party has 

ALBERTO VILLESCAS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

M.T. DOTSON, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-02068-SAB (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO WITHDRAW CONSENT TO MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE JURISDICTION AND MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

[ECF Nos. 69, 70]

Case 1:12-cv-02068-SAB Document 73 Filed 12/01/15 Page 1 of 4
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consented in a signed writing to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the party fails to make a motion to 

vacate the reference that is supported by a showing of extraordinary circumstances, and the Court does 

not sua sponte find good cause for withdrawal of consent. Id. 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s consent to the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate 

judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case supported by Plaintiff’s express consent is binding 

because there is a lack of good cause for withdrawal of consent. 

In his motion to vacate the referral to the undersigned, Plaintiff submits that on October 28, 

2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time and did not get a response from the Court for 

several weeks. On November 22, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Clerk to inquire if it was filed, 

granted or denied, fearing if it was not granted he would miss the deadline. (ECF NO. 69, Motion at 

1.) On December 2, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time. Plaintiff 

contends that he felt his “non-consent caused or made Plaintiff believe that his non-consent caused the 

delay of over a month to decide the October 28, 2014 motion, Plaintiff felt he had to consent in order 

to avoid missing a deadline if his motions are not decided before or in time.” (ECF No. 69, Motion at 

2.) 

This case has proceeded expeditiously and the Court has not prejudiced Plaintiff by the timing 

of ruling on any pending motions. A party’s disagreement with a reasonable court ruling constitutes 

neither good cause nor extraordinary circumstance for withdrawing consent to the jurisdiction of the 

magistrate judge. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-556 (1994). Plaintiff has not 

presented evidence of “extraordinary circumstances,” and the Court does not find good cause to vacate 

the reference to a magistrate judge. To the extent Plaintiff contends that this Court has delayed in 

ruling on pending motions, Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to Local Rule 230(l), once a motion has 

been filed, the opposing party has twenty-one days to file an opposition and the moving party has 

seven days thereafter to file a reply. Local Rule 230(l). In certain circumstances, as was done in this 

case, the Court may elect to rule on a motion if an opposition is unnecessary, such as where good 

cause is indisputably presented to extend a pending deadline. Based on the record in this action, 

Plaintiff’s case has proceeded in an efficient manner. Furthermore, reassignment to a district judge 

Case 1:12-cv-02068-SAB Document 73 Filed 12/01/15 Page 2 of 4
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does not remove the role of the magistrate judge in ruling on non-dispositive matters. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the referral to the magistrate judge is DENIED. 

B. Motion For Reconsideration

In addition to seeking to withdraw his consent, Plaintiff requests reconsideration by a district 

judge of all prior rulings issued by the undersigned. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the prior ruling 

based on his argument that the undersigned is biased in the rulings. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the district 

court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on grounds 

of: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered 

in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by 

an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment 

that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). 

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin 

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en 

banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the 

court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th 

Cir. 1987). 

Although it is not clear what section under which Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration, to the 

extent he attempts to conjure Rule 60(b)(2), (3), (4), or (6), his motions are without merit. Plaintiff’s

November 23, 2015 motion for reconsideration is based on his disagreement with the Court’s 

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decisions and timing of rulings on non-dispositive matters. Plaintiff has not shown clear error or other 

meritorious grounds for relief, and has therefore not met his burden as the party moving for 

reconsideration. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s 

disagreement is not sufficient grounds for relief from the order. United States v. Westlands Water 

Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

The crux of Plaintiff’s arguments are centered on his disagreement with the undersigned’s 

rulings which cannot form the basis for bias or reconsideration of prior orders. Accordingly, Plaintiff

has not shown a basis for relief under Rule 60(b), and Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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