Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00387/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00387-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GAVIN B. DAVIS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JASON M. ADLER; ODESSA R. 

JORGENSEN; and JANE DOES, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

 Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Jason Adler’s (“Defendant Adler”) 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Gavin Davis’s (“Plaintiff”) second amended complaint. (Doc. 

No. 41.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 43.) Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, 

the Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the papers and without oral argument. 

Accordingly, the motion hearing date set for October 12, 2017, in Courtroom 4A at 2:00 

p.m. is VACATED. For the reasons explained more fully below, the Court GRANTS

Defendant Adler’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 

 On February 27, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his initial complaint against 

Defendants Jason M. Adler, Odessa R. Jorgensen, and Jane Does (collectively referred to 

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

as “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) From what the Court could decipher, Plaintiff alleged that 

Defendants had illegally trespassed on his information by cyber-stalking him, created a 

hate crime website in his likeness, infringed on his reasonable expectation of privacy, and 

made references to fraud and virtual property law. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 33, 55.) Additionally, the 

majority of Plaintiff’s complaint was filled with references to statutes, definitions of legal 

terms, and identifies different professors, authors, and the O.J Simpson trial to support his 

contentions. (Id. ¶¶ 41–51.) 

 On March 21, 2017, Defendant Adler filed a motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 3), which 

the Court granted on April 26, 2017, (Doc. No. 15). The Court stated that “[f]rom a 

practical viewpoint . . . it is impossible for the Court to designate the cause or causes of 

action attempted to be alleged, or the events leading up to Plaintiff instituting this action.” 

(Id. at 4.) Moreover, the Court found dismissal based on a failure to adhere to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8 proper.1

 (Id.) Furthermore, the Court cautioned Plaintiff against 

grouping all of the Defendants together without distinguishing between the alleged conduct 

of each individual Defendant. (Id.) Based upon the foregoing, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. (Id. at 5–6.) 

B. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

 The day after his complaint was dismissed, Plaintiff filed his first amended 

complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 16.) The Court then set a briefing schedule that stated that 

Plaintiff’s opposition was due May 25, 2017, and Defendant Adler’s reply brief was due 

on June 8, 2017. (Doc. No. 18.) Subsequently, Plaintiff failed to file his opposition by said 

date, but instead requested ex parte, an extension of time to file his opposition on May 30, 

2017, which the Court denied.2

 (Doc. No. 19.) 

                                                                

1

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 states that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief 

must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

2

 Plaintiff’s ex parte request was emailed to Judge Battaglia’s E-File through his father. 

(Doc. No. 19 at 1.) 

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 On June 2, 2017, the Court again dismissed Plaintiff’s operative complaint finding 

that it suffered from many of the same defects as his previously-filed complaint. (Doc. No. 

20.) Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff had again failed to comply with Rule 8 and 

found the FAC replete with fragmented discussions that failed to plead sufficient facts to 

state a claim on which relief could be granted. (Id. at 4.) Moreover, the Court highlighted 

for Plaintiff’s benefit that his copyright protection claims were puzzling as he failed to 

illustrate what “work” he possessed that was copyrighted and how it was being allegedly 

violated. (Id. at 5.) Consequently, despite construing Plaintiff’s pleading liberally, the 

Court again found dismissal appropriate. (Id.) However, noting Plaintiff’s pro se status, the 

Court again granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Id. at 6.) 

C. Plaintiff’s Subsequent Filings 

 Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to electronically file documents, 

(Doc. No. 22), which was denied on June 15, 2017, (Doc. No. 24). This motion was sent 

to Plaintiff at his listed address, however, it was returned as undeliverable. (Doc. No. 25.) 

In total, the Court tried to mail Plaintiff various court documents on five different 

occasions, but each time the mail was returned. (Doc. Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 30.) 

 Plaintiff then filed a motion for relief from judgment on June 28, 2017. (Doc. No. 

32.) Specifically, Plaintiff requested that his late-filed reply3

 brief to Defendant Adler’s 

motion to dismiss the FAC be accepted, and to re-calendar the briefing schedule. (Id. at 6.) 

Defendant filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. No. 36.) Plaintiff then filed his second 

amended complaint (“SAC”)4

, and a reply to support his motion for relief. (Doc. Nos. 38, 

40.) Based on the filing of his SAC, the Court found Plaintiff’s motion for relief from 

judgment moot. (Doc. No. 39.) Defendant Adler then filed the present motion, his motion 

to dismiss the SAC on July 26, 2017. (Doc. No. 41.) The motion was fully briefed on 

                                                                

3

 The Court believes that Plaintiff meant to request that his opposition to the motion to 

dismiss be accepted. 

4

 Plaintiff’s SAC is missing the eighth page. (See generally Doc. No. 38.)

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

August 21, 2017. (Doc. No. 44.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 

complaint and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack 

of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” 

SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a complaint will survive a 

motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this 

determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual 

allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for a 

court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged . . . .” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 

519, 526 (1983). 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendant Adler contends that Plaintiff has again failed to follow the Court’s 

instructions by filing a SAC that fails to adhere to Rule 8. (Doc. No. 41-1 at 2.) In response, 

Plaintiff takes several different stances in opposition including that his complaint includes 

facts that can be reasonably inferred, that Defendant has fair notice of the claim, and that 

Defendant Adler has made a character attack on Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 4.) 

 The Court first notes that it appreciates that Plaintiff has attempted to follow the 

Court’s previous instructions in composing his SAC. Nevertheless, despite his efforts, the 

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court finds that the operative complaint still fails to plead a claim on which relief may be 

provided. 

Presently, Plaintiff’s SAC states that Defendant Adler is directly or indirectly 

working on a mixed media project that allegedly is utilizing Plaintiff’s protected 

information in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 4.) However, Plaintiff asserts 

that due to the project’s “fluidity in design” he is unable to properly plead the details 

surrounding the project, nor the specific actions of Defendant Adler that has resulted in the 

alleged illegal commercialization of Plaintiff’s likeness. (Id.) Plaintiff’s failure to provide 

any general allegations regarding his causes of action is a common theme throughout his 

SAC. For instance, in asserting violations of his intellectual property, all Plaintiff can allege 

is that “[g]iven the early stage of the production process . . . it is reasonably difficult to 

describe with specificity exactly how and where the Plaintiff’s intellectual property is being 

violated . . . .” (Id. ¶ 7.) 

First, the Court notes that even applying the liberal pleading standard under Rule 8, 

Plaintiff’s SAC is still deficient. The Court highlights that the Rule 8 standard does not 

require “detailed factual allegations,” but “naked assertion[s] devoid” of any factual 

enhancement do not suffice. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Presently, at this juncture, Plaintiff’s claims are still visibly unsupported 

by even a minutia of contentions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s inability to provide details 

surrounding his causes of action as a whole fails to demonstrate the proper standing to be 

in this Court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992) (holding that a 

plaintiff has standing when he can demonstrate that he has suffered an injury in fact, i.e., 

“a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest”). 

Moreover, Plaintiff has again resorted to contending that Defendant Adler has 

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125. (Doc. No. 38 at 5.) However, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 relates to a trade 

dress infringement claim. “Trade dress refers generally to the total image, design, and 

appearance of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color, color 

combinations, texture or graphics.” Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, as an 

example, a proper trade dress infringement claim would involve a restaurant appropriating 

another establishments’ eating atmosphere, interior dining and patio areas, and decorations. 

See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992). Unfortunately for 

Plaintiff, his SAC is devoid of any allegations surrounding a product whose features have 

been appropriated by Defendants or Defendant Adler and his contention that his likeness 

is being commercialized is not an appropriate trade dress claim under the law. 

Next, the Court expounds that Plaintiff’s SAC is also lacking in that it asks the Court 

to incorporate pages thirteen and fourteen, and paragraphs twenty to twenty-three of his 

FAC without actually pleading these allegations in his SAC. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 12.) However, 

the Court notes that “[g]enerally, after an amended pleading has been filed, courts will 

disregard the original pleading.” Larson v. USH of Rancho Springs, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 4th 

336, 434 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s request 

that the Court look at allegations present in his FAC is an unsuitable method of pleading. 

 Consequently, despite liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, see Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC has again failed to 

plead a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendant Adler’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC. See Ramirez v. Exec. Branch of U.S., 

No. CV 12-2851 JSL (SS), 2012 WL 3710612, *5 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (“Courts have 

also routinely exercised discretion to dismiss complaints without leave to amend relatively 

early in the litigation where, as here, the allegations are patently “incoherent and 

delusional”). 

 As Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend previously to no avail, and based on 

the fact that Plaintiff’s amended complaints continue to repeat the same errors, the Court 

finds it appropriate at this point in time to DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaint WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding that the grant 

or denial of a motion to amend is committed to the discretion of the district court); see also 

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7 

17-cv-387-AJB-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Vaillette v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 680, 685 (1993) (holding that leave 

to amend should not be granted where in all probability, amendment would be futile).

CONCLUSION 

 As set forth more fully above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Adler’s motion to 

dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s second amended complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 12, 2017 

Case 3:17-cv-00387-AJB-JLB Document 46 Filed 09/13/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7