Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01559/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01559-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-1559 MMA (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE

ACT

[Doc. No. 16]

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff Richard Jordan’s application for disability

insurance benefits. Plaintiff subsequently sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

On July 16, 2010, this Court issued an order reversing the decision of the Secretary and remanding

the action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four

of section 405(g) (“sentence four remand”). Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorney’s fees under

the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Defendant, the

Commissioner of Social Security, filed a statement of non-opposition to the present motion. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees. [Doc. No.

16.]

/ / /

Case 3:09-cv-01559-MMA-WMC Document 19 Filed 04/26/11 Page 1 of 4
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A. Timeliness of Fee Award Application

Under the EAJA, a prevailing party seeking an award of fees must apply for such an award

within thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 58 controls the entry of judgment. “In cases where Rule 58(a) requires a ‘separate

document,’ judgment is considered entered ‘when the earlier of [two] events occurs: [1] the

judgment or order is set forth on a separate document, or [2] 150 days have run from entry of the

judgment or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).’” Harmston v.

City and County of San Francisco, 627 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2010), citing FED. R. CIV. P. 58.

After judgment is entered, in cases where the federal government is a party the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 4(a) allows a party to appeal up to sixty days after the entry of judgment. 

F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)(B). After the sixty day appeal period has run and the judgment is no longer

appealable, it is considered a “final judgment” for purposes of seeking an award of fees. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2)(G). A party must apply for an award of fees within thirty days of final judgment in

the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (“EAJA's

30-day time limit runs from the end of the period for appeal”).

Here, this Court entered the sentence four remand order on July 16, 2010. A sentence four

remand “of course, is a judgment for the plaintiff.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 303 (emphasis

omitted). However, a sentence four remand order is not a judgment “set forth on a separate

document” as Rule 58 requires. Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1994). A

judgment was not set forth in a separate document in the present case. Accordingly, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(c)(2), judgment is considered to have been entered 150 days

after the entry of this Court’s sentence four remand order in the civil docket. Judgment in this case

was entered on December 13, 2010. The judgment became final and non-appealable sixty days

later, on February 11, 2011. Plaintiff filed his application within thirty days of final judgment on

March 11, 2011. 

B. Reasonableness of Fee Request

Pursuant to the EAJA, a “prevailing party” in an action in which the United States is a

party may recover attorney’s fees and costs unless the Court finds that the government’s position

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was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award [of fees] unjust,”

provided the requested amount is reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2)(A). The Court

has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award, including the reasonableness of the hours

claimed by the prevailing party. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.1992). In

making its determination, the Court should provide a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons

for the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)) 

EAJA fee rates are based on a statutory threshold rate of $125 per hour, plus cost-of-living

adjustments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-877

(9th Cir. 2005). The annual statutory maximum hourly rates for EAJA awards are $172.24 for

2009 and $175.06 for 2010. See Thangaraja, 429 F.3d at 876-77 (cost-of-living increases are

calculated by multiplying the $125 statutory maximum hourly rate by the annual average

consumer price index figure for all urban consumers (“CPI-U”) for the years in which the

attorney’s work was performed and dividing by the CPI-U figure for March 1996 (155.7), the

effective date of the statutory maximum hourly rate); see also Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor

Statistics, Table 1A. CPI-U: U.S. city average at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost; Notice Re:

Statutory Maximum Rates Under EAJA at www.ca9.uscourts.gov.

Here, Plaintiff has obtained a judgment reversing the Commissioner’s final decision with a

remand for rehearing under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), and seeks an award of

attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,820.59. The requested fees are calculated at the hourly rates of 

$172.24 for 5.16 hours of work performed by counsel in 2009, and $175.06 for 22.46 hours of

work performed by counsel in 2010. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s itemization of hours, and

finds it contains a reasonable amount of hours claimed for the tasks completed. 

/ / /

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Because Plaintiff’s request is reasonable and appropriate, and because the Commissioner does not

oppose the requested fees, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for EAJA fees in an amount of

$4,820.59. Pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2525-29 (2010), the fees shall be made

payable to Plaintiff, not his attorney. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 26, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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