Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01666/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01666-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

v. 

Janice Sue Taylor, 

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV12-01666-PHX-DGC (BSB)

 CR10-0400 PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 Movant Janice Sue Taylor filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. CVDoc. 1.1

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Bridget S. Bade issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the 

motion be denied. CVDoc. 18 at 14. Movant filed an objection to the R&R on 

August 26, 2013. CVDoc. 19. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will accept the 

R&R and deny Movant’s motion. 

I. Background.

 On March 30, 2010, a grand jury indicted Movant on four counts of tax evasion 

and four counts of willfully failing to file tax returns. CRDoc. 1. Before trial, Movant 

moved to terminate her attorney and represent herself. CRDoc. 61. The Court granted 

her request, but directed the assigned federal public defender to remain on the case as 

advisory counsel. CRDoc. 248. The federal public defender assisted Movant throughout 

 

1

 Documents filed in CV-12-01666-PHX-DGC will be referred to as “CVDoc.” 

and documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-10-0400-PHX-DGC, will be 

referred to as “CRDoc.” 

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trial. The jury found Movant guilty on all counts. CRDoc. 256. Shortly before her 

sentencing, Movant filed a notice that she was terminating her advisory counsel, and 

advisory counsel filed a separate motion to withdraw. CRDocs. 296, 297. The Court 

granted counsel’s motion. CRDoc. 302. The Court sentenced Movant to seventy-eight 

months’ in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. CRDocs. 310, 311, 

312, 314. Movant did not appeal. 

II. Legal Standard.

 Under § 2255, a person in custody may “move the court which imposed the 

sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on the grounds that “the sentence 

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 

was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of 

the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(a). 

III. Analysis. 

 Movant objects to the R&R asserting six grounds: (1) the Court has no jurisdiction 

to prosecute tax crimes; (2) Title 18 is invalid, thereby undermining this Court’s 

jurisdiction over criminal cases; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) failure to hold 

an evidentiary hearing; (5) prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the Tax Code is 

unconstitutional. 

 1. Jurisdiction of U.S. District Courts under the IRS Code. 

Movant appears to argue in her first objection that a Supreme Court decision from 

1796 bars this Court from hearing criminal cases prosecuting violations of the Internal 

Revenue Code. CVDoc. 19 at 3. Movant argues that Congress lacks the power to 

directly tax an individual’s revenue or wages unless the tax is apportioned among the 

states. This argument lacks merit. See Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 265 (8th 

Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“There is no constitutional impediment to levying an income tax 

on compensation for a taxpayer’s labors.”); Perkins v. C.I.R., 746 F.2d 1187, 1188 (6th 

Cir. 1984) (“§26 U.S.C. §61(a) is in full accordance with Congressional authority under 

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the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution to impose taxes on income without 

apportionment among the states.”). 

 2. Jurisdiction of U.S. District Courts under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

Movant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3231 is unconstitutional because the underlying 

legislation “died upon adjournment sine die” and the enrolled bill was signed without a 

quorum present. CVDoc. 1 at 2, 8, 38-61. This argument is frivolous and has been 

rejected by many courts. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 

2007) (rejecting as “unbelievably frivolous” the argument that the federal criminal code 

was unconstitutional due to irregularities in its enactment); United States v. Levy, 849 

F.Supp.2d 1353, 1354-57 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (stating arguments that Title 18 was not 

constitutionally enacted have been rejected by all federal courts to have considered 

them); Cardenas-Celestino v. United States, 552 F.Supp.2d 962, 966-68 (W.D. Mo. 

2008) (arguments that the federal criminal code was not constitutionally enacted are “part 

of a new rash of frivolous claims raised by prisoners across the country, many of whom 

have copied the arguments directly from Internet Websites.”). 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

 Movant’s third objection asserts ineffective assistance of counsel. CVDoc. 19 at 

8. She argues that “counsel rendered ineffective assistance during pre-trial [proceedings], 

trial, and appeal because she failed to investigate the facts and law related to the district 

court’s jurisdiction under Title 18 and 18 U.S.C. § 3231, Title 21, the drug statutes, the 

States of Emergency, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and failed to investigate the 

validity of Petitioner’s indictment.” CVDoc. 1 at 78-80. To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, Movant must show: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984). Under the second prong, Movant must show a 

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. It is not enough “to show that the 

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. 

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 To the extent Movant asserts that her appointed counsel provided ineffective pretrial assistance, her claim fails. Movant appears to argue that if appointed counsel had 

made the frivolous jurisdictional challenge addressed above, she would not have been 

convicted. CVDoc. 1 at 80. For reasons explained above, the Court disagrees. 

 To the extent Movant asserts that she provided ineffective assistance of counsel to 

herself, her claim fails. Movant chose to represent herself after being duly warned of the 

consequences, and any deficient performance in her self-representation cannot be a basis 

for § 2255 relief. See Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] 

defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of 

his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”). 

4. Need For Evidentiary Hearing.

 Movant asserts that it was a “major structural error” on the Magistrate Judge’s part 

to deny an evidentiary hearing. CVDoc. 19 at 9. She claims that “a hearing is required 

on a Constitutional claim if the material facts were not adequately developed at the trial, 

the factual dispute was not resolved at the trial, the factual determination is not fairly 

supported by the record as a whole . . . .” Id. at 10. But Movant’s arguments are not 

factual; they are entirely legal. As a result, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See 

United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an 

evidentiary hearing is only required if movant alleges “specific facts that, if true, would 

entitle him to relief”). 

5. Prosecutorial Misconduct.

 Movant argues that she was denied due process when prosecutors failed to present 

exculpatory evidence to the grand and trial juries. CVDoc. 19 at 10. Prosecutors 

generally have no obligation to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries. See United 

States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 564 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The prosecution was not required to 

present [exculpatory] evidence to the grand jury, and the appellants had no right to have it 

presented.”); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1976) (asserting 

that a prosecutor is under no duty to offer evidence to grand jury that might negate 

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suspect’s guilt). Nor are they obligated to present exculpatory evidence during trial. 

They must disclose it before trial, but the burden rests on those charged with offenses to 

present exculpatory evidence during trial. Moreover, the evidence identified by Movant 

was not exculpatory.2

6. Constitutionality of Title 26.

 Movant’s sixth objection asserts that title 26 is unconstitutional insofar as it 

authorizes a tax on Movant’s labor or wages. This argument fails for the reasons stated 

above. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

 1. The R&R (CVDoc. 18) is accepted.

 2. The motion to vacate sentence (CVDoc. 1) is denied. 

3. The renewed motion to dismiss indictment (CVDoc. 17) is denied.

 4. A certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied. Movant’s claims are meritless, a point on which 

reasonable jurists could not disagree.

5. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2013. 

 

2

 Movant filed no tax returns for 2003 through 2006 until she was charged by the Indictment with tax evasion. At that point she filed returns stating that she made zero income. RT 4/20/2011 at 20-22, 26-31. She also included falsified tax forms with the 

returns. Id. Three of the returns were admitted as trial exhibits. CR 260 at 7.

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