Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01543/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01543-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Loretta H. Cheeks, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

General Dynamics, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-01543-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Loretta H. Cheeks Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 85) on Defendants General Dynamics Corporation (“GD”) and 

General Dynamics C4 Systems Incorporated’s (“GDC4S”) affirmative statute of 

limitations and failure to mitigate damages defenses and GDC4S’s counterclaim for 

breach of contract. Also pending is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 93) on all of Plaintiff’s claims and on GDC4S’s counterclaim. Both motions are 

fully briefed (Docs. 90, 94, 95, 102) and the Court heard oral argument on May 15, 2014. 

The Court now rules on both motions. 

I. BACKGROUND1

 Defendant GD is the parent company of Defendant GDC4S. (Defendants’ 

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“DSOF”), Doc. 88 ¶ 1; 

 

1

 This section contains general background information to provide context for the 

Court’s analysis, not factual findings of the Court. The Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2004). 

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Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (“PRSOF”), 

Doc. 96 ¶ 1). Plaintiff (a female African-American with a son disabled by autism) began 

her employment with GDC4S in September 2001 after GDC4S acquired the division of 

Motorola where Plaintiff worked. (DSOF ¶ 19; PRSOF ¶ 19). As a condition of 

employment, Plaintiff signed an Employee Confidentiality Agreement in which she 

agreed not to remove or possess GDC4S property or documents without prior written 

consent. (DSOF ¶ 20; PRSOF ¶ 20). 

 Plaintiff was one of thousands of engineers employed by GDC4S whose career 

paths generally lead to development of either specialized technical or management skills. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 4–7; PRSOF ¶¶ 4–7). GDC4S divides its engineers into “sections” managed by 

a “Section Manager” who helps the engineers find (often temporary) assignments on 

various customer-funded programs, business development projects, or internal research 

and development projects. (DSOF ¶¶ 8–10; PRSOF ¶¶ 8–10). The Section Managers 

often work directly with “Program Managers” in an informal process to help place 

engineers in specific projects. (DSOF ¶¶ 10–14; PRSOF ¶¶ 10–14). When engineers are 

not assigned to a specific project, they charge their work time as department “overhead.” 

(DSOF ¶ 12; PRSOF ¶ 12). An engineer’s grade level, title, salary and benefits do not 

change regardless of whether the engineer is assigned to a project or charging overhead 

because GDC4S anticipated it will be able to find future assignments for its engineers. 

(DSOF ¶ 13; PRSOF ¶ 13). If an engineer seeks a promotion or transfer to a different 

position involving a title, pay, department, or grade change, then the engineer must 

formally apply for an open position through GDC4S’s Internal Opportunity System 

(“IOS”). (DSOF ¶ 15; PRSOF ¶ 15). 

 During her employment, Plaintiff variously worked on customer-funded projects 

and internal “overhead.” Plaintiff’s early customer-funded project assignments tended to 

be focused on management duties rather than technical aspects of the project. (DSOF 

¶¶ 32–36, 41; PRSOF ¶¶ 32–36, 41). In 2004, Plaintiff was removed from a position as 

project lead on the “Rescue 21” project because of perceived performance issues. (DSOF 

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¶ 63; PRSOF ¶ 63). After being removed, Plaintiff filed an internal complaint through 

GDC4S’s Dispute Resolution Program (“DRP”) (DSOF ¶ 69; PRSOF ¶ 69). Although 

Plaintiff now alleges that the 2004 DRP complaint was also motivated by racial, sexist, 

and anti-disability bias, she admits that her primary purpose in filing the complaint was to 

find a position on a customer-funded program. (DSOF ¶¶ 71–75; PRSOF ¶¶ 71–75). 

Sometime during the pendency of the 2004 DRP complaint investigation, Plaintiff was 

placed on a “Mobile User Objective System” (“MUOS”) project, which, at the time, 

Plaintiff agreed resolved her complaint. (DSOF ¶¶ 68, 74, 77; PRSOF ¶¶ 68, 74, 77). 

Between 2005 and 2009, Plaintiff worked variously on business development and other 

projects, described her experience as “outstanding,” and, at multiple times, worked on 

overhead without any resulting adverse employment actions or other negative impacts. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 78–83; PRSOF ¶¶ 78–83). 

 Beginning in 2009, drastic government spending cuts (GDC4S’s develops 

technology primarily for government customers) dramatically decreased opportunities for 

GDC4S engineers. (DSOF ¶¶ 84–91; PRSOF ¶¶ 84–91). In May 2010, Terry O’Dea 

(“O’Dea”) became Plaintiff’s section manager and began working to place Plaintiff and 

other engineers who had no assignment onto available programs. (DSOF ¶¶ 93–99; 

PRSOF ¶¶ 93–99). The various program managers offered neither Plaintiff nor many of 

O’Dea’s other engineers (most of whom where Caucasian males) assignments on their 

projects. (DSOF ¶¶ 106, 111–13; PRSOF ¶¶ 106, 111–13). 

 Only one program at GDC4S provided a significant number of assignment 

opportunities (eventually, 72 assignments) in 2010 and 2011: the new Space Network 

Ground Segment Sustainment (“SGSS”) satellite program for NASA which started 

staffing in the fall of 2010. (DSOF ¶¶ 101, 179; PRSOF ¶¶ 101, 179). The SGSS program 

managers, Bill Worger (“Worger”) and Vince Pipitone (“Pipitone”), sought engineers 

with substantial relevant technical experience and informally made assignment decisions 

based largely on their personal knowledge of each individual’s relevant work experience. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 180–84; PRSOF ¶¶ 180–84). O’Dea (and other section managers) informally 

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sent lists of available engineers, but most, including Plaintiff, were not specifically 

considered for SGSS assignments. (Id.). Thus, throughout the vast majority of 2010, 

Plaintiff, as well as many other engineers, had no assignment and charged overhead. 

 In January 2011, O’Dea expressed growing concern with engineers charging 

overhead and Plaintiff requested a meeting with O’Dea and HR representatives to express 

her concerns about finding assignments. (DSOF ¶¶ 185, 187; PRSOF ¶¶ 185, 187). Prior 

to meeting, Plaintiff emailed O’Dea: “Thanks for the help. No need at this point. I trust 

you’ve done your best,” which Plaintiff honestly believed. (DSOF ¶¶ 188–89; PRSOF 

¶¶ 188–89). Shortly thereafter, O’Dea completed the 2011 performance review process of 

his engineers’ 2010 performance. (DSOF ¶ 191; PRSOF ¶ 191). During the process, 

O’Dea gave a “Needs Improvement” rating to all ten engineers, including Plaintiff, who 

did not have sufficient customer-funded assignments in 2010 from which performance 

could be evaluated.2

 (DSOF ¶¶ 191–92; PRSOF ¶191–92). At that point, O’Dea planned 

to place all ten engineers on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) because he 

thought it was required by company policy. (DSOF ¶ 193; PRSOF ¶ 193). However, 

O’Dea later learned that a PIP was not mandatory and he did not place any engineers, 

including Plaintiff, on a PIP. (DSOF ¶¶ 194–95, 204–06; PRSOF ¶¶ 194–95, 204–06).

 On February 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the EEOC 

against GDC4S alleging that her 2004 removal from the Rescue 21 program, various 

denials of program assignments since that time, and January 2011 placement on a PIP 

(which did not actually occur) were motivated by racial and sex-based discrimination and 

retaliation for her 2004 DRP complaint. (DSOF ¶ 207; PRSOF ¶ 207). Later that 

February, Plaintiff filed charges with the OFCCP claiming that the same actions occurred 

because of her association with a disabled son. (Id.). Kevin Jardine, a HR representative, 

received the EEOC and OFCCP charges, forwarded them to the legal department, and did 

 

2

 The group of engineers who received an NI rating included five Caucasian males, one Caucasian female, one Hispanic male, one Hispanic female, one African- American male, and one African-American female (Plaintiff). (DSOF ¶ 192; PRSOF ¶ 192). 

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not disclose the charges to O’Dea or other managers. (DSOF ¶¶ 208–10; PRSOF ¶¶ 208–

10). However, O’Dea learned about the charges as part of GDC4S’s legal department’s 

investigation. (DSOF ¶ 211; PRSOF ¶ 211). 

 By the spring of 2011, the number of engineers O’Dea was attempting to find an 

assignment for had increased to 25 or 30. (DSOF ¶ 214; PRSOF ¶ 214). On March 1, 

2011, O’Dea informed Plaintiff of a short assignment assisting a MUOS manager with 

various tasks, which Plaintiff accepted. (DSOF ¶¶ 215–16; PRSOF ¶¶ 215–16). O’Dea 

continued to search for longer-term projects for Plaintiff and emailed her multiple IOS 

requisitions, but noted that they required relocation; Plaintiff declined to apply for any of 

the positions (DSOF ¶¶ 217–19; PRSOF ¶¶ 217–19). Also in March, O’Dea successfully 

placed Plaintiff on a longer-term MUOS assignment under Ivan Hobson (“Hobson”) and 

Starlene Maskalenko (“Maskalenko”). (DSOF ¶¶ 220–25; PRSOF ¶¶ 220–25). 

 Shortly after Plaintiff began working on the MUOS project, she received emails 

one weekend with task requests. (DSOF ¶ 249; PRSOF ¶ 249). In response, Plaintiff sent 

an email to Hobson and other MUOS managers on Monday, April 4, 2011 stating: “I do 

not work on Saturday and Sunday. On Friday’s [sic] I work intermittent[ly] as needed.”3

(Id.). The MUOS managers expressed dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s email and forwarded 

it to O’Dea. (DSOF ¶¶ 253–54; PRSOF ¶¶ 253–54). In particular, Hobson expressed an 

expectation that Plaintiff would be available for work on Fridays.4

 (PRSOF ¶ 533). Also, 

Maskalenko forwarded other emails to O’Dea that indicated Plaintiff had communication 

performance problems prior to her April 4 email. (DSOF ¶ 254; PRSOF ¶ 254). 

 On April 5, 2011, O’Dea emailed HR seeking approval of a draft email response 

to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 538). The draft email states: 

As an exempt employee you cannot define your job to be a specific number of hours per week, nor the days you will 

3

 In 2011, Plaintiff regularly took FMLA-protected leave approximately every other Friday in order to care for her disabled son. (See, e.g., DSOF ¶¶ 262–63; PRSOF ¶¶ 262–63). 

4

 Hobson also inquired of O’Dea whether Plaintiff had some sort of arrangement not to work on Fridays. (DSOF ¶ 279; PRSOF ¶¶ 279, 531–32). 

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work. Anyone supporting a program must be flexible and 

willing to work what is asked. . . . It concerns me when I’ve 

worked so hard to find you a position on a paying program, and you tell them as an exempt employee you’ll only work the schedule you’ve defined. This has caused them to 

question your role on MUOS, and certainly your commitment to making the program a success.

(Id. (emphasis added)). After various discussions between O’Dea, Plaintiff, and HR 

regarding Plaintiff’s communication skills (see DSOF ¶¶ 250–62; PRSOF ¶¶ 250–62), 

Plaintiff continued working on MUOS and regularly taking FMLA leave on Fridays, and 

none of the MUOS program managers raised further issues about or asked that she be 

removed because of her work schedule. (DSOF ¶¶ 263–65; PRSOF ¶¶ 263–65). 

However, on April 16, Hobson complained to O’Dea about Plaintiff’s performance and 

asked that she be removed from the MUOS program. (DSOF ¶¶ 270–74; PRSOF ¶¶ 270–

74). At O’Dea’s insistence, Hobson continued working with Plaintiff and Plaintiff 

continued to have performance problems. (DSOF ¶¶ 274–78; PRSOF ¶¶ 274–78). Then, 

on May 30, citing numerous documented performance problems, Hobson firmly 

requested O’Dea remove Plaintiff from the MUOS project; Plaintiff was removed shortly 

thereafter and returned to charging her time to overhead. (DSOF ¶ 277; PRSOF ¶ 277). 

 On June 7, 2011, GDC4S conducted a nationwide Reduction in Force (“RIF”) of 

over 450 employees, including Plaintiff. (DSOF ¶¶ 281, 288; PRSOF ¶¶ 281, 288). As a 

section manager, O’Dea selected all 29 of his engineers who did not have a current or 

future long-term customer-funded project assignment, including Plaintiff, for the RIF.5

(DSOF ¶ 284; PRSOF ¶ 284). 

 In November 2011, after the RIF, Plaintiff amended her February 2011 EEOC and 

OFCCP charges, filed an additional EEOC retaliation charge, eventually received rightto-sue-letters, and commenced the instant litigation. (DSOF ¶¶ 295–302; PRSOF ¶¶ 295–

302; Doc. 1).

 

5

The 29 engineers were composed of 18 Caucasian males, five Caucasian females, 

three Hispanic males, one African-American male, one African-American female 

(Plaintiff), and one Asian-American male. (DSOF ¶ 284; PRSOF ¶ 284). 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, or 

declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by 

“showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” 

Id. at 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586B87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247B48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at the 

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summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of 

credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.”) (internal citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “has set a high standard for the 

granting of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. 

Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996). As the Ninth Circuit has 

explained, “[w]e require very little evidence to survive summary judgment in a 

discrimination case, because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved 

through a ‘searching inquiry’—one that is most appropriately conducted by the 

factfinder, upon a full record.” Lam v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9th Cir. 

1994) (internal quotations omitted). 

III. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR (PARTIAL) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 68) alleges seven causes of 

action against GDC4S: (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964; (2) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII; (3) retaliation for opposing 

discriminatory practices in violation of Title VII; (4) discriminatory harassment in 

violation of Title VII; (5) wrongful termination in violation of Arizona law; (6) disability 

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and (7) 

retaliation for using Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave in violation of the 

FMLA. Plaintiff’s FAC also alleges Counts Two, Three, and Seven against Defendant 

GD. (Id. at ¶¶ 76, 81, 112). In their Answer (Doc. 69), GDC4S preserves 13 “affirmative 

defenses”6

 to Plaintiff’s claims and alleges a single counterclaim against Plaintiff for 

breach of contract (a confidentiality agreement) (id. at 15–21). 

 Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 85) seeks summary 

 

6

 The Court notes that Defendants have labeled 13 defenses as “affirmative 

defenses.” Except where specifically stated later in this Order, the Court takes no position on whether any or all of these 13 defenses are either actually “affirmative” or available in 

the instant action. 

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judgment on the breach of contract counterclaim and two of GDC4S’s affirmative 

defenses: failure to mitigate damages (Doc. 85 at 5–6; see Answer, Doc. 69 at 14, ¶ C); 

and the applicable statute of limitations renders the claim untimely (Doc. 85 at 9–11; see 

Doc. 69 at 14, ¶ E). In Response (Doc. 90), GDC4S argues that disputed issues of 

material fact preclude summary judgment on any of these three issues. Additionally, 

GDC4S’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 93) seeks summary judgment on each of 

Plaintiff’s seven claims and the counterclaim. Similarly, Defendant GD seeks summary 

judgment on each of the three claims against it (Counts Two, Three, and Seven). (Id.). 

The Court will consider the counterclaim, affirmative defenses, and each claim in turn. 

A. GDC4S’s Counterclaim for Breach of Contract 

 Both Parties have moved for summary judgment on GDC4S’s counterclaim for 

breach of contract (an employment confidentiality agreement). (Docs. 85, 93). 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that GDC4S’s counterclaim fails because GDC4S has not 

and cannot present evidence of damages. (Doc. 85 at 6–7). GDC4S argues that it is 

entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff’s breach is not in dispute and the contract 

was not unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. (Doc. 93 at 23–24). 

 1. Breach of Contract and Enforceability 

 GDC4S moves for summary judgment on its breach of contract counterclaim 

arguing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the contract (a confidentiality 

agreement) was enforceable and that Plaintiff breached the contract. (Doc. 93 at 23–24). 

With regard to the contract’s enforceability, Plaintiff argues that the confidentiality 

agreement is invalid because it is an overly broad contract of adhesion. (DSOF ¶ 30; 

PRSOF ¶ 30). The Court, however, has already denied Plaintiff’s similar attempt to have 

the contract “declared unlawful and illegal.” (Plaintiff’s Motion to Have Employment 

Agreement Declared Unlawful and Illegal, Doc. 25; March 27, 2013 Order of the Court, 

Doc. 42 (denying Plaintiff’s motion)). 

 With regard to breach of the contract, Plaintiff admits that she took various 

documents from GDC4S and that she currently retains at least some of them. 

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(Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts in Response to Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“DRSOF”), Doc. 91 ¶ 39; DSOF ¶ 30; PRSOF ¶ 30). Nonetheless, 

Plaintiff argues that she has not breached the contract because “the documents that she 

retained were only related to her discrimination claims and did not contain any 

confidential information.”7

 (PRSOF ¶ 30). Plaintiff does not dispute, however, that the 

plain terms of the confidentiality agreement cover “all documents . . . whether or not such 

materials contain Confidential Information.” (DSOF ¶ 20; PRSOF ¶ 20). Thus, there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff has breached the contract, regardless of the 

allegedly non-confidential nature of the documents she took and retains. 

 2. Damages 

 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on GDC4S’s breach of contract 

counterclaim arguing that GDC4S has not offered evidence of damages, an essential 

element of the claim. (Doc. 85 at 6–7). To recover on a breach of contract claim under 

Arizona law, “a plaintiff must show proximately caused damages.” Firetrace USA, LLC 

v. Jesclard, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1054 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citing Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 

83 P.3d 1103, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Home Indem. Co. v. Bush, 513 P.2d 145, 150 

(Ariz. 1973)). Plaintiff contends that because GDC4S’s counterclaim requests only 

monetary damages (Doc. 69 at 20) and GDC4S has not demonstrated that Plaintiff sold or 

otherwise profited from the documents, GDC4S has no proof of damages. (Doc. 85 at 7). 

In Response, GDC4S argues that it is nonetheless entitled to monetary damages under 

both the terms of the contract8

 and Arizona’s fee shifting statute9 in the amount of its 

 

7

 The Court notes that there appears to be some dispute as to what, exactly, is contained in the documents Plaintiff took and retains. Although Plaintiff alleges that the documents “were related to her discrimination claim” (PRSOF ¶ 30), GDC4S characterizes them as “including copies of designs, processes and meeting minutes, copies of work performed by co-workers, documents showing organization charts, management structure and assignment allocation, and documents related to financial 

records, contract awards, acquisitions and new hires” (Doc. 90 at 10 (citing DRSOF ¶ 39)). 

8

 “In the event that [GDC4S] is forced to and successfully does enforce this Agreement against me in any court, I will reimburse and indemnify [GDC4S] for the actual costs incurred by [GDC4S] in enforcing this Agreement, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees.” (Employee Confidentiality Agreement, Doc. 91-1 at 47; see DRSOF 

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costs and attorneys’ fees “incurred to enforce the contract,” which “cannot be determined 

fully until the counterclaim is litigated to conclusion.” (Doc. 90 at 11). 

 In a recent case strikingly similar to the instant case and predicated on the same 

contractual terms, the Court has previously confronted Plaintiff’s argument that currently 

unquantified attorneys’ fees, alone, are insufficient proof of damages. U.S. ex rel. 

Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., No. CV-06-1381-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1457036 

(D. Ariz. May 21, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 

Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). In Cafasso, a GDC4S employee who believed she 

had been wrongfully terminated removed more than ten gigabytes of GDC4S’s data and 

documents and refused to return them. (Id. at *13 n.2). Although the plaintiff did not sell 

the documents or profit from her breach, the Court found that “there is no question 

GDC4S has been damaged” by the cost of years of litigation to enforce its contractual 

rights. (Id. at *13). 

 Plaintiff contends (Doc. 94 at 3–4) that Cafasso is inapposite because in Cafasso, 

the employer also sought equitable relief in the form of an injunction ordering the 

plaintiff to return GDC4S’s documents and data (Cafasso, 2009 WL 1457036, at *8, 13–

15). In contrast, here, GDC4S seeks only attorneys’ fees and Plaintiff contends that, 

rather than attempting to keep the documents confidential, GDC4S “has now publicly 

disclosed the exact same documents in its motion for summary judgment, making the 

issue moot.” (Id.). 

 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s assessment. The issue is not moot for two 

reasons. First, the record is unclear (and Plaintiff cites no evidence supporting its 

contention) that GDC4S has now publicly disclosed the entirety of the documents 

Plaintiff took. Second, even if GDC4S has disclosed every document Plaintiff kept, it is 

undisputed that GDC4S incurred attorneys’ fees seeking return of the documents prior to 

 ¶ 38). 

9

 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01(A) provides that “[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” 

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this point. Thus, at most, GDC4S’s publication of certain documents indicates only the 

futility of further seeking their return; it has no effect on the damage GDC4S has already 

suffered. 

 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that GDC4S’s apparent current lack of interest in 

the return of the documents proves that GDC4S “has failed to show that its underlying 

claim served any legitimate purpose.” (Doc. 94 at 3–4). This argument, however, ignores 

the undisputed facts. GDC4S first learned that Plaintiff possessed GDC4S’s documents 

on September 11, 2012, during discovery. (DRSOF ¶ 39). At that time, the scope of the 

documents was unclear: Plaintiff claims they were discrimination related only, but 

GDC4S characterizes them far more broadly. (PRSOF ¶ 30; DRSOF ¶ 39). Beginning the 

very next day, GDC4S repeatedly sought the return of the documents. (DRSOF ¶ 39). On 

September 24, 2012, the Court held a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference and ordered the 

Parties to confer to resolve the confidential documents issue. (Doc. 26). A mere four days 

later, Plaintiff moved to file 250 pages of GDC4S’s documents with the Court as 

“evidence” (Docs. 29, 30, 35)—a motion GDC4S successfully opposed (Docs. 32, 42). 

Clearly, GDC4S has previously expended time and treasure successfully fighting to 

preserve the GDC4S’s contractual confidentiality rights. Lastly, Plaintiff’s May 6, 2013 

refusal to return the documents because GDC4S would not agree to dismiss the 

counterclaim and waive attorneys’ fees and costs upon their return (Doc. 94 at 3–4) does 

not evidence a lack of legitimate purpose in GDC4S’s counterclaim; rather, it 

demonstrates the wastefulness of Plaintiff’s intransigence. 

 In sum, GDC4S has undoubtedly suffered damages—in the form of attorneys’ fees 

and costs—proximately caused by Plaintiff’s breach of contract.10 Accordingly, the Court 

grants GDC4S’s motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial 

 

10 Plaintiff also argues that GDC4S “never provided a damages calculation for its 

counterclaim as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(iii). Given that 

GDC4S’s damages are an as-yet-to-be determined amount of attorneys’ fees and costs, 

previous disclosure of a specific damages calculation would have been both impossible and inappropriate. Furthermore, GDC4S’s Counterclaim explicitly provided Plaintiff notice that GDC4S was pursuing both its “actual damages” and “its costs and attorneys’ fees.” (Doc. 69 at 20 ¶¶ E–F). 

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summary judgment with respect to the Breach of Contract Counterclaim. 

B. GDC4S’s Affirmative Defenses 

 In her motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 85), Plaintiff argues that she is 

entitled to summary judgment on two of Plaintiff’s Affirmative defenses: (1) failure to 

mitigate damages; and, (2) statute of limitations of the various EEOC (Title VII) claims. 

 1. Failure to Mitigate Damages 

 Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on GDC4S’s affirmative 

failure to mitigate damages defense “because [GDC4S] failed to produce evidence of 

equivalent, open positions for which the Plaintiff failed to apply.” (Doc. 85 at 5). To 

prevail on a failure to mitigate damages defense, GDC4S has the burden of proving both 

that there were substantially equivalent jobs available and that Plaintiff failed to use 

reasonable diligence in seeking one. Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 

(9th Cir. 1995). 

 Plaintiff’s motion does not argue that there is no genuine dispute of material fact 

regarding Plaintiff failing to use reasonable diligence.11 (Doc. 85 at 5–6). Instead, 

Plaintiff challenges GDC4S’s ability to prove that substantially equivalent jobs were 

available to Plaintiff. (Id.). In Response, GDC4S provides documents Plaintiff produced 

during discovery that purport to show Plaintiff received notice of approximately 100 

available positions from several employers during the relevant time period. (DRSOF 

¶¶ 22, 29). These documents consist of dozens of pages of job search results from both 

job search engines and individual employers’ websites that were responsive to search 

parameters provided by Plaintiff.12 (DRSOF ¶¶ 22, 29 (citing Townsend Decl., Doc. 91-2 

¶¶ 3, 5 & Exs. 1, 3)). 

 Despite producing these documents herself, Plaintiff objects to GDC4S’s use of 

 

11 Indeed, upon review of the evidence cited in GDC4S’s Response (Doc. 90 at 7– 9), the Court finds that GDC4S has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the reasonable diligence element. 

12 Plaintiff used Boolean searches such as “ ‘Application Developer’ OR ‘Architecture’ OR ‘Cloud’ AND Phoenix.” (Doc. 91-2 at 9). 

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these documents on the grounds that they are inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 801 when used to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that the listed jobs 

were, in fact, available at the relevant time. Plaintiff further argues that Defense Counsel 

can only authenticate that these documents were produced by Plaintiff and cannot 

establish the necessary foundation for a business records exception to the rule against 

hearsay. See F.R. Evid. 803. Although Plaintiff’s hearsay objection is likely to be well 

taken, because the evidence could conceivably be converted into an admissible form for 

trial, the Court will consider the evidence for the purposes of summary judgment. See 

Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (“At the summary judgment 

stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence's form. We instead focus on 

the admissibility of its contents.”). Thus, GDC4S has produced sufficient evidence to 

create a genuine dispute of material fact that certain jobs were available. 

 GDC4S, however, must also demonstrate that available jobs bear substantial 

equivalence to Plaintiff’s previous position at GDC4S. Odima, 53 F.3d at 1497. 

“Substantially equivalent employment is that which affords virtually identical 

promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions, and 

status as the position from which the Title VII claimant has been discriminatorily 

terminated.” Cassella v. Mineral Park, Inc., No. CV-08-01196-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 

454992, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2010) (quotation omitted). Here, the job search results 

proffered by GDC4S consist only of job titles, employers, and locations.13 (Townsend 

Decl., Doc. 91-2 at Exs. 1, 3). 

 Relying on Cassella, 2010 WL 454992, Plaintiff argues that GDC4S’s burden on 

summary judgment requires GDC4S to specifically “explain how these positions have 

virtually identical promotional opportunities, job responsibilities, or working conditions 

as” Plaintiff’s previous position with GDC4S. (Doc. 94 at 5). Cassella, however, is 

 

13 For example: “Software Engineer II at Honeywell in Phoenix, AZ” (Doc. 91-2 at 7), “Lead Data Architect Job” in Phoenix at American Express (id. at 9), and “IT 

Software Developer III (Senior CCL / Rules & Reports Writer) Job – Phoenix” at the 

Mayo Clinic (id. at 17). 

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inapposite because, unlike here, in Cassella, defendant employer brought the motion for 

summary judgment. Thus, in Cassella, the employer had a burden of demonstrating that 

there was no genuine dispute of material fact. In contrast, here, GDC4S is the nonmovant and must merely establish a genuine dispute of material fact to survive summary 

judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Because of the sheer number of jobs specifically 

responsive to Plaintiff’s own search parameters, the Court finds it reasonable to infer that 

at least one of the dozens of potentially equivalent jobs may have been, in fact, equivalent 

to Plaintiff’s previous position at GDC4S. Thus, the Court finds that, at the summary 

judgment stage where all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant, 

GDC4S’s failure to proffer detailed descriptions of the jobs is not fatal.14

 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that because some of the job search results were obviously 

inferior to her previous position,15 GDC4S has failed in its burden. Although a “claimant 

need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position,” 

to mitigate damages, Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 232 (1982), Plaintiff’s 

argument is a red herring because the vast majority of the positions were, based on job 

titles, potentially equivalent to Plaintiff’s previous position at GDC4S (see Townsend 

Decl., Doc. 91-2 at Exs. 1, 3). 

 In sum, the Court finds that GDC4S has met its summary judgment burden on 

both elements of its failure to mitigate affirmative defense. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to GDC4S’s failure to 

mitigate affirmative defense. 

 

14 Plaintiff also cites to Kawar v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. CV-08-0046-PHXDGC, 2009 WL 1698918, at *6–7 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2009) for the proposition that a defendant-employer non-movant’s failure to provide salary information about allegedly available jobs prevents comparison to the plaintiff’s previous position. In Kowar, however, the employer presented only two potentially equivalent available jobs of its own choosing. In contrast, GDC4S presents dozens of potentially equivalent available jobs responsive to Plaintiff’s own search terms.

15 Plaintiff cites to results such as “payroll assistant job,” “accountant job,” and “student nurse extern (unpaid).” 

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 2. Statute of Limitations and Equitable Tolling 

 Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on GDC4S’s affirmative 

statute of limitations defense to Plaintiff’s EEOC claims because she is entitled to 

equitable tolling. (Doc. 85 at 1–2, 7–11). GDC4S argues that genuine issues of material 

fact preclude this. (Doc. 90 at 2–7). However, because the Court grants summary 

judgment to GDC4S on the merits of each of Plaintiff’s EEOC and ADA counts (Counts 

One through Six), infra III.C., Plaintiff’s motion on this issue is moot.16 Accordingly, the 

Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment with 

respect to GDC4S’s statute of limitations affirmative defense. 

C. Plaintiff’s Individual Claims 

 As stated above, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges seven counts against GDC4S: (1) race 

discrimination in violation of Title VII; (2) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII; 

(3) retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices in violation of Title VII; (4) 

discriminatory harassment in violation of Title VII; (5) wrongful termination in violation 

of Arizona law; (6) disability discrimination in violation of the ADA; and (7) retaliation 

for using FMLA leave in violation of the FMLA. (Doc. 68). Plaintiff’s FAC also alleges 

Counts Two, Three, and Seven against Defendant GD. (Id. at ¶¶ 76, 81, 112). 

 1. Claims Against Defendant GD 

Defendant GD argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all three counts 

against it (Counts Two, Three, and Seven) because GD, as merely the corporate parent of 

GDC4S, neither employed Plaintiff nor exercised control over the GDC4S managers that 

employed Plaintiff. (Doc. 93 22–23 (citing DSOF ¶¶ 1–3)). Courts may treat two entities 

as one based on four factors: (1) interrelated operations; (2) common management; (3) 

centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. 

Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Childs v. 

 

16 The Parties’ briefs on the statute of limitations affirmative defense make no 

mention of Plaintiff’s FMLA Retaliation claim. (Docs. 85, 90, 94). Accordingly, the Court takes no position on the availability or merits of a statute of limitations affirmative 

defense to Plaintiff’s FMLA Retaliation claim (Count Seven). 

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Local 18, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 719 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Int’l 

Bhd. of Teamsters v. Am. Delivery Serv. Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 1995) (using 

factors as “guideposts” to determine LMRA § 301(a) liability while also looking to all the 

circumstances). 

 Here, Plaintiff does not dispute GD’s lack of control over GDC4S’s day-to-day 

operations, personnel decisions, or Plaintiff’s employment. (PRSOF ¶¶ 1–3). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 95) fails to contest GD’s argument that it is not a 

proper defendant in this suit. Therefore, the Court finds no dispute of material fact that, 

for purposes of Plaintiff’s suit, GD and GDC4S are separate entities. Accordingly, the 

Court grants Defendant GD’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts Two, Three, and 

Seven of Plaintiff’s FAC.

 2. Counts One and Two: Race and Sex Discrimination Through 

 Disparate Treatment 

Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action allege that GDC4S violated Title VII, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), by treating Plaintiff inconsistently from GDC4S’s male 

employees and non-African American employees. (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 66–80). This provision of 

Title VII makes “disparate treatment” based on sex or race a violation of federal law. 

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation 

omitted); see Johnson v. Teltara, LLC, No. CV 08-1894-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2873492, 

at *4 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2010). 

 a. Legal Framework for Disparate Treatment 

 Discrimination Claims 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on 

the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To 

prevail on a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must prove that an adverse employment action 

was taken “because of” unlawful discrimination. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 

838, 857 (9th Cir. 2002). Title VII disparate-treatment claims like Plaintiff’s “require the 

plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with conscious intent to discriminate.” 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805–06 (1973). Specifically, the 

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plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she performed according 

to her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she was subjected to an adverse 

employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were 

treated more favorably. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 

1998) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit “has explained that under the 

McDonnell Douglas framework, ‘the requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a 

prima facie case for Title VII . . . on summary judgment is minimal and does not even 

need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Wallis v. J.R. 

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 Furthermore, Courts employ a burden-shifting analysis for Title VII claims: 

[T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory 

conduct. If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination. 

Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 802–05). At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff does not have to prove 

that the employer’s reason for firing her was pretext for discrimination, but the plaintiff 

must introduce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

the employer’s reason was pretextual. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

 b. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 

 Initially, the Court notes that both Parties comingle their race and sex-based 

disparate treatment arguments.17 (See Doc. 93 at 9–18; Doc. 95 at 9–14; Doc. 102 at 1–5). 

Furthermore, the same Title VII legal standards apply to both causes of action. 

Accordingly, the Court considers Counts One (Race) and Two (Sex) together. 

 

17 The Parties also comingle their ADA-based disability discrimination arguments with the race and sex-based arguments. However, because the elements of a prima facie disability-based case differ from those of race and sex-based cases, the Court considers 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim separately. 

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 Here, Plaintiff alleges several discrete events of disparate treatment across two 

categories of potentially adverse employment action: (1) termination of employment as 

part of the June 2011 Reduction in Force; and (2) work assignments in the context of 

several individual projects. The Court considers each in turn. 

 1. Termination: June 2011 RIF 

 GDC4S argues not only that Plaintiff fails to make a prima facie case, but also that 

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regards to race and sex-based 

discriminatory discharge. (Doc. 93 at 9). Specifically, GDC4S explains that, with regard 

to the June 2011 RIF, Plaintiff’s initial and revised EEOC charges alleged only race and 

sex-based retaliation, not discriminatory discharge, and the EEOC has not investigated 

Plaintiff’s discharge for race or sex-based discrimination. (Id. (citing DSOF ¶¶ 295–301 

(citing Loretta Cheeks’ Nov. 14, 2011 EEOC Charge re: RIF, Doc. 88-3 at 70))). Plaintiff 

has not disputed GDC4S’s several factual statements concerning the contents and 

amendments to Plaintiff’s EEOC charges (PRSOF ¶¶ 295–301), except to note that she 

was “not a lawyer.”18 (PRSOF ¶ 299). 

 The Court construes Plaintiff’s “EEOC charges with utmost liberality since they 

are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Lyons v. England, 

307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). Further, the Court 

considers Plaintiff’s “claims to be reasonably related to allegations in the [EEOC] charge 

to the extent that those claims are consistent with [Plaintiff’s] original theory of the case, 

as reflected in [Plaintiff’s] factual allegations and [her] assessment as to why the 

employer’s conduct is unlawful.” Id.

 Here, even construing Plaintiff’s RIF EEOC charge with the utmost liberality, 

Plaintiff’s plain language solely alleges retaliation.19 (Loretta Cheeks’ Nov. 14, 2011 

 

18 Similarly, Plaintiff’s Response fails to contest, or even mention, GDC4S’s 

argument on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

19 The “Particulars” section of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge reads, in its entirety: 

On or about June 7, 2011, I was terminated; I believe that my involuntary termination without cause is directly related to 

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EEOC Charge re: RIF, Doc. 88-3 at 70). Additionally, Plaintiff checked only the 

“Retaliation” box. (Id.). In contrast, on the same day, Plaintiff amended her February 

2011 EEOC charge regarding various work assignments in which she checked the 

“Race,” “Sex,” and “Retaliation” boxes while specifically including claims of race and 

sex-based discrimination in her description of the particulars. (Loretta Cheeks’ Nov. 14, 

2011 EEOC Charge re: Failures to Promote, Doc. 88-3 at 80–81). Furthermore, in her 

contradicting statement of facts, Plaintiff describes her RIF EEOC charge as asserting 

that she “was selected for the RIF based on not having an assignment, and she alleged she 

did not have an assignment because of her race and gender.” (PRSOF ¶ 300). Thus, even 

construing Plaintiff’s theory of the case liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s RIF 

EEOC charge expresses a theory of retaliation, not unlawful race or sex-based discharge. 

Because Plaintiff’s EEOC charge narrowly focused exclusively on retaliation, the Court 

finds that nothing in it would have lead the EEOC to investigate Plaintiff’s RIF 

termination for race or sex-based discrimination or provided notice to GDC4S of such a 

claim. See Loos v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d. 1013, 1019 (D. Ariz. 2011). Thus, 

the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust her race or sex-based RIF claims at the 

administrative level. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (id.) and 

dismisses Plaintiff’s race and sex-based discrimination claims to the extent that they 

allege Plaintiff’s termination in the June 2011 RIF as an unlawful adverse employment 

action.20

 the fact that I was placed on a Performance Improvement 

Plan and because I filed a previous sex and race discrimination grievance in 2004 and a previous EEOC 

charge (540-2011-01169) in February 2011. 

I believe I have been retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 

(Loretta Cheeks’ Nov. 14, 2011 EEOC Charge re: RIF, Doc. 88-3 at 70). 

20 Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider this issue, the Court does not consider GDC4S’s additional argument that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of race and sex-based discriminatory discharge. 

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 2. Work Assignments: Internal Projects 

 Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s FAC (Doc. 68) alleges numerous discrete 

instances where Plaintiff was either removed from or not assigned to various customerfunded projects during her seven years21 of employment. Consequently, GDC4S’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 93) includes arguments related to four different 

project-assignment decisions that may have occurred no earlier than 300 days prior to 

Plaintiff’s initial February 3, 2011 work-assignment EEOC charge: IOS (id. at 13 n.6, 

16–18); SGSS (id. at 13–15); MUOS (id. at 15–16); and Battle Management Systems 

Division (“BMSD”) (id. at 16 n.8). In her Response, Plaintiff’s initial recitation of facts 

mentions the four projects listed above and one additional Federal Aviation 

Administration (“FAA”) project. (Doc. 95 at 2–9). Nonetheless, the substance of 

Plaintiff’s Response relies exclusively on the SGSS program in order to establish a prima 

facie “failure to consider” case of disparate treatment and pretext. (Id. at 11–14; see id. at 

9–11). Thus, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute either GDC4S’s arguments (Doc. 93 at 

11–18) or material factual support (see cited DSOF paragraphs; PRSOF paragraphs 

generally not disputing same) that Plaintiff fails to present a prima facie case of race or 

sex-based discrimination in the non-SGSS project assignments.22 Upon review of the 

undisputed facts, the Court finds that even when viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not established a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to 

non-SGSS project assignments. Accordingly, the following analysis specifically 

addresses the SGSS program assignment decision. 

 a. Work Assignment: SGSS Project23

 

21 Plaintiff was employed by GDC4S from 2001 through June 2011. (DSOF ¶¶ 32, 288; PRSOF ¶¶ 32, 288). 

22 Presumably, Plaintiff’s approach reflects Plaintiff’s counsel’s legal analysis of the merits of the various claims and demonstrates Plaintiff’s counsel prioritization of the SGSS-assignment. Indeed, at the oral argument, Plaintiff’s Counsel similarly relied solely on the SGSS non-assignment 

23 GDC4S preliminarily argues that Plaintiff’s SGSS non-assignment cannot support her discrimination charges because work assignments are not adverse employment actions. Courts have held that work assignments can be adverse employment 

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 In the failure to consider for a particular work-assignment context, Plaintiff “can 

make out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) [s]he belongs to a 

statutorily protected class, (2) [s]he applied for and was qualified for an available 

position, (3) [s]he was rejected despite [her] qualifications, and (4) after the rejection, the 

position remained available and the employer continued to review applicants possessing 

comparable qualifications.” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1112. 

 First, the Parties do not dispute that as an African-American female, Plaintiff 

belongs to two protected classes. Second, it is undisputed that the SGSS program 

managers knew that Plaintiff was available and interested in an SGSS assignment. 

(DSOF ¶ 184; PRSOF ¶¶ 184, 424). Additionally, although the SGSS program sought 

engineers with certain specialized expertise (DSOF ¶¶ 181–84), the informal staffing 

process did not publish specific qualifications for its positions. Thus, because Plaintiff 

demonstrates educational qualifications greater than those of at least some SGSSassigned engineers,24 Plaintiff satisfies the qualifications aspect of element two. See

Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1114 (“where the employer has not published the qualifications for 

positions that were awarded without a competitive application process, it would be 

unreasonable to require a plaintiff to present direct evidence of the actual job 

 actions even where, as here, an employee’s title, pay grade, and employment benefits remained the same. See, e.g., Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1101 (where the adverse employment action was the failure to assign an employee to a temporary “detail” that included other 

job duties without any upgrade in pay or benefits because previous assignments to “details” were considered a positive factor during promotion considerations). Here, even if true that not having a customer-funded project assignment did not meaningfully impact an engineer’s career during most of Plaintiff’s employment, it is undisputed that as early as May 2010, Plaintiff’s supervisor, O’Dea, began stressing the importance of being on a customer-funded project in order to minimize “overhead.” (DSOF ¶¶ 96, 103, 114–15; PRSOF ¶¶ 96, 103, 114–15 (not disputing same)). Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that 

at the time SGSS made its assignment decisions (late 2010 and early 2011), both engineers and their supervisors recognized assignment to SGSS (or another customer- funded project) as materially preferable to non-assignment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s SGSS non-assignment is an adverse employment action. 

24 An examination of the educational credentials of the various SGSS-assigned engineers reveals that the minimum educational qualifications appear to have been a 

Bachelor of Science degree. (GDC4S’s Sworn Resp. to Plaintiff’s 30(B)(6) Notice, Doc. 

99-1 at 10–24, 30–31; PRSOF ¶ 422). In contrast, Plaintiff holds a Master of Science 

degree. (Cheeks Decl., Doc. 96-1 at 2). 

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qualifications as part of his prima facie case”). 

 With regard to the third and fourth McDonnell Douglas elements (Plaintiff’s 

rejection in favor of other comparatively qualified individuals), GDC4S argues that 

Plaintiff cannot “raise a triable issue of fact over not being assigned to the [SGSS] 

program because she was never specifically considered for it” during the project 

managers’ informal selection of engineers that they were already familiar with. (Doc. 93 

at 14 (citing, e.g., Greene v. Potter, 557 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (no discrimination 

where manager gives preference to friends over others)).25 However, as Plaintiff explains 

in her Response, a prima facie case of disparate treatment can be made where, as here, an 

employer fails to consider an otherwise qualified individual and then considers 

comparably qualified applicants. Diaz v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 

1985); see Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1114. Thus, GDC4S’s admission that the SGSS managers 

did not consider Plaintiff and then hired other arguably comparably qualified engineers 

satisfies the remainder of Plaintiff’s prima facie burden. 

 c. Defendant’s Articulated Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory 

 Reasons for Plaintiff’s SGSS non-Assignment and Plaintiff’s 

 Evidence of Pretext

 GDC4S argues that Plaintiff’s lack of relevant technical experience constitutes a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s SGSS non-assignment. GDC4S 

argues, and the undisputed evidence demonstrates, that the SGSS hiring managers 

assigned engineers with highly technical experience and knowledge of recent technology, 

NASA, satellites, and the various component parts of the SGSS project. (GDC4S’s 

Sworn Resp. to Plaintiff’s 30(B)(6) Notice, Doc. 99-1 at 10–24; DSOF ¶¶ 180–84). At 

the relevant time, however, Plaintiff’s résumé showed a “people management” career 

path with only very narrow recent technology experience (DSOF ¶ 160; PRSOF ¶ 160) 

and her only arguably relevant experience was on a 2005 MUOS project five years earlier 

(DOSF ¶ 181; PSOF ¶ 181; see DSOF ¶¶ 82, 87, 91; PRSOF ¶¶ 82, 87, 91, 424). 

 

25 For purposes of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, GDC4S’s arguments about a lack of discriminatory intent in the selection of other engineers is relevant towards the pretext analysis, not Plaintiff’s prima facie case. 

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Additionally, the undisputed evidence shows that 40 of the 72 SGSS positions were filled 

by systems engineers and Plaintiff concedes that she has “never worked as a systems 

engineer.” (DSOF ¶ 118; PRSOF ¶ 118 (not disputing same)). Thus, GDC4S has clearly 

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s SGSS non-assignment. 

 With regard to pretext, Plaintiff’s scant argument, in its entirety, is as follows: 

 Here, Defendant’s explanation is that SGSS “largely” 

relied on personal experiences, but in other cases did not. 

[DSOF] ¶ 184. However, this reason does not address 

Plaintiff specifically. Furthermore, evidence shows Plaintiff 

was considered and rejected for not having the right “skillset,” which contradicts Defendant’s explanation and is another content-less “non-reason.” Quaranta v. Mgmt. 

Support, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1051 (D. Ariz. 2003) (holding contradictory explanations is [sic] evidence of pretext). 

(Doc. 95 at 13–14). Plaintiff’s assessment of the evidentiary record, however, is fatally 

mistaken. When SGSS first began staffing, O’Dea submitted the names and credentials of 

dozens of engineers under O’Dea, including Plaintiff, to the SGSS hiring managers, 

Worger and Pipitone. (DSOF ¶¶ 179–84; PRSOF ¶¶ 179–84). Worger and Pipitone, 

however, made most of the initial staffing decisions based on their “personal knowledge 

of each individual’s work experiences relevant to the SGSS program.” (DSOF ¶ 182; 

PRSOF ¶ 182). Consequently, Worger and Pipitone did not specifically consider dozens 

of engineers with whom they had not had personal experience, including Plaintiff. (DSOF 

¶ 184; PRSOF ¶ 184). 

 Nonetheless, without citation to the record, Plaintiff argues that she was 

specifically considered and rejected for an SGSS assignment because she did not have the 

right “skillset.” (Doc. 95 at 13). Upon careful review of the record, the Court believes 

Plaintiff is referring to an August 2010 exchange between O’Dea and Tyrone Strozier 

(“Strozier”), the SGSS program manager to whom Worger and Piptone reported. O’Dea 

contacted the leadership of multiple programs, not just SGSS, in an attempt to place 

Plaintiff on a customer funded program. (Weeks Decl., Doc. 98 at 3; see PRSOF ¶ 431). 

Strozier, who had had personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s skills and experience from a 

previous project, replied that the SGSS program did not have a fit for her skillset at that 

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time. (Id.). Strozier’s informal evaluation of Plaintiff’s skillset and experience for SGSS 

staffing is consistent with Worger and Pipitone’s similar staffing evaluations of the 

engineers, including Plaintiff, submitted for their consideration. Thus, the Court finds no 

contradiction. 

 Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff is instead referring to an August 2010 

“hallway” conversation between her and Strozier about a specific SGSS opening (Weeks 

Decl., Doc. 98 at 4; PRSOF ¶ 432), the Court notes that the particular position was for a 

“technical point of contact for subcontracts manager.” Given that Strozier had personal 

knowledge of Plaintiff’s project lead (people management) experience and knew that she 

did not have the requisite technical experience, Strozier’s explanation that he “talked to a 

few people” about Plaintiff’s request but never seriously discussed it with a functional 

manager (id.) is entirely consistent with GDC4S’s general explanation that Plaintiff was 

never specifically considered for a SGSS assignment because of her mismatched skillset. 

 Thus, the Court finds no reasonable dispute of material fact evidencing a 

contradiction in GDC4S’s explanations for Plaintiff’s SGSS non-assignment. Because 

Plaintiff appears to rest her pretext argument solely upon this perceived contradiction, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether the employer’s reason was pretextual. Accordingly, the Court 

grants GDC4S’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts One and Two, 

Title VII Race and Sex Discrimination. 

 3. Count Three: Retaliation for Complaints of Sex and Race 

 Discrimination (Title VII) 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that, in violation of Title VII, GDC4S 

terminated her employment in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaint of sex and race 

discrimination. (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 81–88). Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] 

against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

 a. Legal Framework 

 The McDonnell Douglas framework and allocation of proof that governs disparate 

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treatment claims also governs retaliation claims. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 784 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 

of retaliation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) an adverse 

employment action; and, (3) a causal link between the two. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 

229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 

retaliation, the defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory 

reason for its action. Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2005); 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Once the defendant has presented a purpose for the 

action, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of providing evidence that the defendant’s 

reason is “merely a pretext for a retaliatory motive.” Id.; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 

804. 

 b. Prima Facie Case 

 First, Plaintiff has offered enough evidence to show two protected activities: 

(1) complaints of sex-based discrimination in her internal 2004 Dispute Resolution 

Program (“DRP”) complaint (DSOF ¶¶ 69–76; PRSOF ¶¶ 69–76), and (2) complaints of 

race and sex-based discrimination and retaliation in her February 2011 EEOC and 

OFCCP complaints (DSOF ¶ 207; PRSOF ¶ 207). Second, Plaintiff has clearly 

demonstrated at least one adverse employment action: her June 2011 termination as part 

of GDC4S’s RIF. (DSOF ¶ 281; PRSOF ¶ 281). Additionally, Plaintiff scantly argues 

that her January 2011 “Needs Improvement” rating and various unarticulated “work 

assignments” 26 constitute adverse employment actions for the purposes of demonstrating 

a prima facie case of retaliation. (Doc. 95 at 14–15). The Court need not determine 

whether these additional employment actions were adverse, however, because even 

 

26 Throughout her Complaint, Plaintiff appears to refer to five categotries of project-staffing decisions: SGSS by Worger, Pipitone, and Strozier; IOS by Paul Alonge, Cliff Willis, Ron Wood, and Scott Jamison; BMSD by Raul Monreal; FAA by Mike Monteilh; and MUOS by Ivan Hobson. 

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assuming in arguendo that they were, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a prima facie 

causal link. 

[U]ntil recently in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation claim could establish the causal element 

of a retaliation claim by merely showing that the protected activity was a motivating factor in the adverse employment 

action. However, following the recent United States Supreme 

Court decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical 

Center v. Nassar, the causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action in a retaliation claim under 

Title VII must be “proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in 

§ 2000e–2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful 

retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the 

alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). 

Drottz v. Park Electrochemical Corp., No. CV 11-1596-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 6157858, at 

*14 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff must show that she would not have 

suffered the adverse employment action but-for either her 2004 DRP or her 2011 

administrative complaints of alleged race and sex discrimination. 

 Here, Plaintiff provides no direct evidence of but-for causation, and instead asks 

the Court to infer causation through proximity in time and by inferring knowledge of the 

complaints on her superiors. The Court, however, does not find such inferences 

reasonable. Plaintiff broadly claims to have suffered “a pattern of retaliation after her 

initial complaint” culminating in being “laid off for performance problems a few weeks 

later” (Doc. 95 at 15), but cites to no relevant27 evidence of record to support an inference 

of race or sex-based retaliation. 

 With regard to Plaintiff’s January 2011 “Needs Improvement” rating for her 2010 

performance, it is undisputed that O’Dea expressed concern about engineers’, including 

Plaintiff’s, excessive “overhead” time28 shortly after O’Dea became National Systems 

 

27 In the more than two pages arguing that the evidence establishes a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, Plaintiff cites only to paragraphs 538 and 544 of the PRSOF. 

Both of these paragraphs, however, concern Plaintiff’s April 4 email about her Friday schedule. As such, the paragraphs may be relevant to Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim 

(Count 7), but are not relevant to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim. 

28 “Overhead” is time attributed to GDC4S generally, not to a specific project, 

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Division (“NSD”) Section Manager (and Plaintiff’s supervisor) in May 2010 and even 

warned Plaintiff in August 2010 that he was considering rating her “Needs Improvement” 

because she was not on a customer-funded project.29 (DSOF ¶¶ 96, 103, 114–15; PRSOF 

¶¶ 96, 103, 114–15 (not disputing same)). Critically, this occurred months before O’Dea 

learned of Plaintiff’s 2004 DRP complaint in December 2010. Thus, even though 

Plaintiff (along with nine other engineers who had not engaged in a protected activity) 

received a “Needs Improvement” rating in January 2011, O’Dea’s implementation of the 

policy does not justify a causal inference. Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 797 

(9th Cir. 1982) (“An employer who has decided upon a new policy is not guilty of 

unlawful retaliation simply because it proceeds with the implementation of that policy 

after learning that one of the employees who will be affected thereby has recently 

engaged in a protected activity.”).30

 With regard to the various program managers’ decisions not to assign Plaintiff to 

their projects, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that could lead to a reasonable 

inference that, at the relevant times, the various project managers knew of either 

Plaintiff’s 2004 DRP31 or Plaintiff’s 2011 administrative charges. (DSOF ¶¶ 128, 173, 

279, 290, 333; PRSOF ¶¶ 128, 173, 279, 290, 333). Accordingly, the Court cannot 

reasonably infer that the program managers had knowledge and Plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate but-for-causation. 

 when an engineer is not currently assigned to a specific customer-funded project. 

29 Further, Plaintiff does not dispute that as early as August 2010, she knew the 

importance of being on a customer-funded program because she “understood that charging overhead was becoming a bigger concern.” (DSOF ¶¶ 114–15; PRSOF ¶¶ 114– 15). 

30 Moreover, Plaintiff’s February 2011 administrative charges cannot provide the requisite causal link because they occurred after O’Dea rated Plaintiff “Needs 

Improvement.” 

31 Citing to Mr. Monteilh’s deposition, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Monteilh knew of Plaintiff’s 2004 DRP complaint because “he was interviewed as part of the investigation and submitted a written statement.” (PRSOF ¶ 291). However, Mr. Monteilh’s deposition testimony clearly explains that HR “did not tell” him why HR requested a written statement. (Sept. 13, 2013 Dep. of Micahel A. Monteilh, Doc. 88-1, Ex. 3 at 26:4–25). 

Plaintiff proffers no evidence contradicting Mr. Monteilh’s deposition testimony. 

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 With regard to Plaintiff’s termination by O’Dea as part of the June 2011 RIF, 

Plaintiff has shown that O’Dea had knowledge of both complaints and, arguably, 

temporal proximity.32

Under the pre-Nassar “motivating factor” test, evidence of knowledge and proximity in time, together, could have been sufficient for the Court to find a disputed issue of fact on causation. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376 (citing Miller v. 

Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731–32 (9th Cir. 1986)); 

Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000) (a 

causal link may be inferred from proximity in time). PostNassar, however, Plaintiff must meet the “more demanding” burden of showing but-for causation. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 

2534. 

Drottz, 2013 WL 6157858, at *15. While knowledge and temporal proximity certainly 

remain relevant when inferring but-for causation, in this case they cannot be enough to 

satisfy Plaintiff’s prima facie burden. Here, Plaintiff has offered no other evidence 

supporting but-for-causation despite the undisputed fact that all 28 of O’Dea’s other 

engineers without a current assignment were also selected for the RIF despite not 

participating in any protected activity. Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that O’Dea 

continued attempting to find Plaintiff a project assignment in the months between 

Plaintiff’s February 2011 administrative complaint and the June 2011 RIF. (DSOF ¶¶ 

214–21; PRSOF ¶¶ 214–21) and that Plaintiff, herself, “determined that the open IOS 

requisitions were ‘not a fit’ for her” (DSOF ¶ 219; PRSOF ¶ 219). Alleged retaliatory 

motives notwithstanding, Plaintiff even admits that O’Dea, himself, assigned her to a 

MUOS project in March 2011. (PRSOF ¶¶ 518–24). Thus, Plaintiff has not set forth 

sufficient evidence on which to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on but-for 

causation, an element of a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim. 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to meet her prima facie burden, the Court does not 

continue the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Accordingly, the Court grants 

 

32 The four month period between the February 2011 administrative complaints and the June 2011 lay-off may be too long to demonstrate temporal proximity. However, the Court need not decide this because a finding of temporal proximity would not affect the Court’s ultimate decision that Plaintiff fails to meet her prima facie but-for-causation 

burden. 

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GDC4S’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Count Three, Title VII 

Retaliation.33

 4. Count Four: Sexual and Racial Harassment 

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action purportedly alleges that GDC4S subjected her to 

a race and sex-based workplace harassment. (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 89–97). Title VII’s general 

prohibition against discrimination extends to harassment claims. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 

U.S. at 786; Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003); Fuller v. City 

of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). GDC4S argues that Plaintiff’s FAC 

“fails to plead any of the elements of a harassment claim; in fact, the Complaint does not 

even allege which of her various protected classifications is or are supposed to be the 

basis for her claim.”34 (Doc. 93 at 21 (citing FAC, Doc. 68 at 89–97)). Nonetheless, 

GDC4S’s motion articulates (Doc. 93 at 21–22) undisputed facts that demonstrate, at 

worst, a single 2005 racist comment made by Plaintiff’s subordinate (DSOF ¶¶ 38–39), 

two isolated arguably sexists comments made in 2003 and 2004 (one made by a manager 

and another by other engineers) (id. ¶ 40), and the single email response to her April 4th 

scheduling email that Plaintiff subjectively believes indicates some sort of ADA or 

FMLA-based discrimination despite containing no specific mention of her disabled son 

or FMLA-leave to care for her son (id. ¶ 249). Such isolated, old, and content neutral 

statements do not provide adequate basis for a harassment claim. Manatt v. Bank of AM., 

339 F.3d 792, 789–99 (9th Cir. 2003) (isolated comments); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (old comments); Al-Raheem v. Care, No. 1:10-CV2064 AWI GSA, 2012 WL 2116530, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (content-neutral 

comments). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 95) fails to contest GDC4S’s 

 

33 The Court notes that to the extent that Plaintiff’s arguments also imply that Count Three includes retaliation based on whether or not her protected actions included complaints of disability discrimination, the but-for-causation analysis of Title VII retaliation similarly results in granting GDC4S’s motion for summary judgment. 

34 Plaintiff’s FAC merely alleges that GDC4S “subjected [her] to a pattern of pervasive discriminatory treatments by barring her to work positions that she was qualified to work, which were afforded to similarly situated employees.” (Doc. 68 ¶ 93). 

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arguments or otherwise argue that a genuine dispute of material fact exists with regard to 

Count Four. (See PRSOF ¶¶ 38–40, 249). Therefore, the Court finds no genuine dispute 

of material fact that Plaintiff was subjected to racial or sexual (or ADA or FMLA-based) 

harassment. Accordingly, the Court grants GDC4S’s motion for summary judgment with 

respect to Count Four. 

 5. Count Five: Wrongful Termination 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action appears to allege that GDC4S wrongfully 

terminated her employment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Arizona 

Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1463, et seq. (Doc. 68 at ¶¶ 98–102). However, as GDC4S 

notes (Doc. 93 at 22), Plaintiff has previously admitted that she “does not contest that 

there is no independent claim for “wrongful discharge” (Plaintiff’s Response to 

Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 37), Doc. 41 at 14–15). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 95) again fails to contest that Count Five, retitled 

as “Wrongful Termination,” is not an independent claim. Accordingly, the Court grants 

GDC4S’s motion and dismisses Count Five, “Wrongful Termination.”

 6. Count Six: Disability Discrimination 

 Similarly to Counts One and Two, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges that 

GDC4S violated Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., by treating Plaintiff 

inconsistently from GDC4S’s employees who were not associated with an autistic child. 

(Doc. 68 ¶¶ 103–11). Section 12112 makes “disparate treatment” based on disability a 

violation of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 

 a. Legal Framework for ADA Discrimination 

 Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination “against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Lopez v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 

657 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[t]he ADA prohibits employment decisions made 

because of a person’s qualifying disability”). To state a prima facie claim under the ADA, 

Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is a “qualified individual” within the meaning of 

the ADA; (2) that she can perform the essential functions of her job; and, (3) that she 

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suffered an adverse employment action because of35 the disability. Kennedy v. Applause, 

Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996); see also, Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiff has produced no direct evidence of 

disability discrimination, the Court will apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 

framework. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

 b. Prima Facie Case 

 Initially, the Court notes that both Parties comingle their Title VII disparate 

treatment arguments with those of ADA disparate treatment. (See Doc. 93 at 9–18; Doc. 

95 at 9–14; Doc. 102 at 1–5). However, where in her Response Plaintiff points to 

evidence, makes arguments, and cites to authority specific to Title VII disparate 

treatment, Plaintiff nearly completely ignores her ADA disparate treatment claim. (Doc. 

95 at 9–14). Upon scrutinization, Plaintiff’s Response offers only two trivial 

acknowledgements of Plaintiff’s ADA claim: alleging in her facts that none of the 72 

SGSS-assigned engineers “were disabled or associated with a disabled person” (id. at 9); 

and stating that she is a member of a protected class because she “has a disabled son” 

(id.).36

 Turning attention upon the elements of a prima facie ADA disparate treatment 

claim, it quickly becomes apparent that Plaintiff’s decision not to elaborate on her ADA 

claim was likely occasioned by its utter lack of merit. Although Plaintiff clearly meets the 

first two elements,37 she does not even attempt to articulate a causal link between an 

 

35 Here, “because of” is read to require “but for” rather than “proximate” causation. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shalter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 

1017 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 

F.3d 293, 301 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007), for the proposition that “[T]he ADA prohibits discrimination against an individual ‘by reason of such disability.’ . . . [T]his language . . . clearly establishes that the . . . ADA . . . requires only but for causation.”). 

36 Plaintiff’s oral argument was similarly bereft of any meaningful ADA-based 

argument. 

37 This assumes that Plaintiff’s association with a disabled (autistic) child is a 

qualifying disability under the ADA; Plaintiff has not cited to any authority establishing this assumption, but GDC4S has not contested it. 

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adverse employment action and her association with a disabled son. Rather than 

demonstrating any sort of causal link, the undisputed evidence proves that at the relevant 

times nearly all of the various GDC4S employees related to Plaintiff’s numerous alleged 

adverse employment actions had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s disabled son. (DSOF 

¶¶ 128, 173, 266–68; PRSOF ¶¶ 128, 173, 266–68 (not disputing same)). Of the rare 

exceptions, such as Strozier (who learned in 2004 when Plaintiff was soliciting donations 

for an autism-related organization), Plaintiff offers no evidence linking their knowledge 

to an adverse employment action.38 Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine 

dispute of material fact that the various decision makers had knowledge of her 

association with her disabled son, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a prima facie case. See 

Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (“If [the employer] were truly unaware 

that . . . a disability existed, it would be impossible for her hiring decision to have been 

based, even in part, on [the employee’s] disability. And, if no part of the hiring decision 

turned on [the employee’s] status as disabled, he cannot, ipso facto, have been subject to 

disparate treatment.”). 

 Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to use her FMLA retaliation claim to 

imply causation in her prima facie ADA disparate treatment claim, Plaintiff’s attempt 

conflates the two causation burdens. The ADA prohibits employment decisions made 

because of a person’s qualifying disability, not decisions made because of factors merely 

related to a person’s disability. Lopez v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 657 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 

2011). Although Plaintiff’s FMLA leave is related to her son’s disability, animus towards 

Plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave does not directly imply animus towards her son’s 

disability, itself. Therefore, success on Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim demonstrates 

only that she was terminated because of her use of FMLA leave, not because of her son’s 

disability. 

 In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient to raise 

 

38 Plaintiff offers no evidence contradicting Strozier’s statement that, to his knowledge, Plaintiff’s son’s disability never affected any employment decision at GDC4S (Weeks Decl., Doc. 98 at 2–5). 

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a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered an adverse employment action because 

of her association with a disabled son. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a prima 

facie case of disparate treatment disability discrimination under the ADA. Accordingly, 

the Court grants GDC4S’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Count Six, 

ADA Disability Discrimination.

 7. Count Seven: FMLA Retaliation 

 Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action alleges that, in violation of the FMLA, 

29 U.S.C. §§ 2615, et seq., GDC4S terminated her employment in retaliation for 

Plaintiff’s use of FMLA time on Fridays to care for her autistic son. (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 112–24). 

The FMLA states that it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny 

the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 

 a. Legal Standard 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that adverse employment actions taken against 

employees for exercising rights under the FMLA should not be construed as retaliation or 

discrimination, but rather as interference with rights guaranteed by the statute. See 

Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that to 

prevail on a claim under § 2615(a)(1), a plaintiff “need only prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that her taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the 

decision to terminate her”); Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 

146-47 (3rd Cir. 2004) (applying the Bachelder approach). 

 The appropriate legal framework for analyzing 

Plaintiff’s claims, therefore, is not the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination 

and retaliation claims, but a simpler standard derived from the 

applicable statute and regulation. Bachelder, 259 F.3d. at 

1124–25 (construing § 2615(a)(1) and its implementing regulation). Plaintiff need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he took FMLA-protected leave, (2) he 

suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse 

action was causally related to his FMLA leave. See 

Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 146–47. 

Foraker v. Apollo Grp., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41 (D. Ariz. 2006). 

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 b. Analysis 

 Here, the Parties agree that Plaintiff meets the first two elements of an FMLA 

retaliation case. In 2011, Plaintiff regularly took FMLA-protected leave approximately 

every other Friday. (See, e.g., DSOF ¶¶ 262–63; PRSOF ¶¶ 262–63). Additionally, it is 

undisputed that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action: termination in the June 

2011 RIF. With regard to the third element, causation, “Plaintiff must show that the 

alleged adverse employment actions were causally related to [her] FMLA leave.” 

Foraker, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 942. Here, Plaintiff presents direct evidence of causation: 

O’Dea’s email response to Plaintiff’s April 4, 2011 email. 

 It is undisputed that shortly after Plaintiff began working on the MUOS project, 

she received emails one weekend with task requests. (DSOF ¶ 249; PRSOF ¶ 249). In 

response, Plaintiff sent an email to Hobson and other MUOS managers on April 4, 2011 

stating: “I do not work on Saturday and Sunday. On Friday’s [sic] I work intermittent[ly] 

as needed.” (Id.). The MUOS managers expressed dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s email 

and forwarded it to O’Dea. (DSOF ¶¶ 253–54; PRSOF ¶¶ 253–54). In particular, Hobson 

expressed an expectation that Plaintiff would be available for work on Fridays. (PRSOF 

¶ 533). On April 5, 2011, O’Dea emailed HR seeking approval of a draft email response 

to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 538). The draft email states: 

As an exempt employee you cannot define your job to be a specific number of hours per week, nor the days you will 

work. Anyone supporting a program must be flexible and 

willing to work what is asked. . . . It concerns me when I’ve 

worked so hard to find you a position on a paying program, and you tell them as an exempt employee you’ll only work the schedule you’ve defined. This has caused them to 

question your role on MUOS, and certainly your commitment to making the program a success.

(Id. (emphasis added)). Plaintiff argues that “this” in the email refers to her use of FMLA 

leave on intermittent Fridays, and, therefore constitutes direct evidence of causation. 

 GDC4S disputes Plaintiff’s interpretation of “this” and argues that “this” refers to 

an “insolent tone” in Plaintiff’s April 4 email. (Doc. 93 at 18 (citing DSOF ¶¶ 253–54)). 

Although GDC4S points to substantial evidence suggesting that GDC4S’s interpretation 

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of “this” is correct (see Doc. 102 at 9–11 (citing numerous paragraphs of the DSOF)), the 

evidence merely demonstrates that there is, indeed, a genuine dispute of material fact 

about the meaning of “this.”39 Critically, at the summary judgment stage, all reasonable 

inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Because the Court does not find it 

unreasonable to interpret “this” as a reference to Plaintiff’s Friday FMLA-protected 

leave, the Court finds a genuine dispute of material fact on causation. See Godwin, 150 

F.3d at 1221 (“When the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a 

triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is 

not substantial.”). Thus, Plaintiff has met her summary judgment burden on all three 

elements of her FMLA retaliation claim. Accordingly, the Court denies GDC4S’s motion 

for summary judgment with respect to Count Seven, FMLA Retaliation. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that consistent with the above, Plaintiff Loretta Cheek’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 85) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that consistent with the above, Defendants 

General Dynamics Corporation and General Dynamics C4 Systems Incorporated’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 93) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

 With respect to Defendant General Dynamics Corporation, summary judgment is 

granted on Counts Two, Three, and Seven. 

 With respect to Defendant General Dynamics C4 Systems Incorporated, summary 

judgment is granted on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, and the Counterclaim. 

Summary judgment is denied on Count Seven. 

 

39 For example, although Hobson may not have known that Plaintiff did not work 

certain Fridays because of FMLA leave, Hobson did immediately inquire of O’Dea whether Plaintiff had some sort of arrangement not to work on Fridays. (DSOF ¶ 279; PRSOF ¶¶ 279, 531–32). O’Dea may not have told Hobson the true FMLA-based reason, 

however, shortly thereafter O’Dea did request that Hobson document any performance issues of Plaintiff. (PRSOF ¶ 547). Then, on May 30, Hobson firmly requested O’Dea remove Plaintiff from the MUOS project and O’Dea selected Plaintiff for the June 2011 

reduction in force. (DSOF ¶¶ 277, 281, 283). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties are directed to confer in good faith 

to resolve any disputes concerning the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

related to GDC4S’s Counterclaim for Breach of Contract. See L.R. Civ. 54.2(d)(1). If the 

Parties are unable to agree, GDC4S may file a motion pursuant to Local Rule 54.2. Any 

such motion shall be filed, with a supporting memorandum, on or before June 27, 2014, 

with the response and reply briefs due in accordance with the time periods provided in 

Local Rule 54.2(b)(3) and (4). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant General Dynamics shall be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 Dated this 19th day of May, 2014. 

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