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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3211

JOSEPH FELTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14‐cv‐6857 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 28, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Joseph Felton sued the City of

Chicago and its police superintendent, alleging that police of‐

ficers used excessive force in arresting him. The district judge

consulted newspaper accounts of the arrest and then, without

requiring an answer from the defendants, dismissed the suit

as frivolous. But the suit was not frivolous and the judge

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should not have dismissed it by relying on newspaper stories.

We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

We recite the facts assuming the truth of Felton’s allega‐

tions. On March 15, 2014, Felton was in a car in Harvey, Illi‐

nois, when he was approached by an unmarked car with

“black tinted windows.” This caused Felton, who was un‐

armed, to fear for his life. He fled, turning onto the express‐

way and heading toward Chicago. Chicago police officers

“chased” him along the expressway and fired their guns at

him (but Felton does not say he was hit). The officers then

“ram[med]” their cars into his, causing him to “swerve out of

control” and crash. At some point, he was “shot by 6 different

stu[n] guns.” As a result of the officers’ actions, Felton was

“put into critical condition” and suffered broken bones,

bruises, a concussion, lost vision, and other injuries. He un‐

derwent several surgeries and suffered “excruciating pain

and mental anguish.” He brought this suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging the officers used constitutionally excessive

force.

Because Felton was incarcerated when he filed suit, the

district judge conducted an initial screening of the complaint.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The judge noted that the allegations

were insufficient to state claims against the only defendants

that Felton named—the City of Chicago and its police super‐

intendent (in his official capacity). Because that problem

could be cured by an amendment (naming the officers who

were actually involved in the incident), the judge moved on

to what he saw as “more grievous problems.”

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No. 14‐3211 3

The judge found it “painfully obvious” that Felton’s com‐

plaint “had omitted critical facts” which would “cast more

light” on whether the officers caused Felton’s injuries, or

whether his injuries “resulted from his own flight in what ap‐

peared from his narrative to be a high‐speed chase.” So the

judge consulted three newspaper accounts of Felton’s arrest.

“Instead of expending further resources in recapping what

those newspaper accounts reflected,” the judge merely at‐

tached them as exhibits to his order. Then, without explana‐

tion, the judge declared that Felton was trying “like the alche‐

mists of the Middle Ages, to transmute base metal into gold.”

So the judge dismissed the entire suit as “frivolous.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Felton appealed and we appointed him an attorney.

Though the City did not participate in the proceedings below,

we invited it to file an appellate brief. It declined, so we ap‐

pointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment.

II. ANALYSIS

District judges must screen prisoner complaints as soon as

practicable and must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Felton’s complaint was dismissed as

“frivolous,” which means “lack[ing] an arguable basis either

in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  

The judge did not say whether the fatal flaw was factual

or legal, so we consider each possibility. We review a dismis‐

sal for factual frivolousness for an abuse of discretion. Gladney

v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2002). Al‐

legations are not frivolous unless they are “clearly baseless,”

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4   No. 14‐3211

“fanciful,” “fantastic,” “delusional,” “irrational,” or “wholly

incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). Fel‐

ton’s allegations—that when he fled officers along an express‐

way, they chased him, rammed his car, and used stun guns on

him—were not frivolous. See id. at 33 (allegations that are

merely “unlikely,” “improbable,” or “strange” do not meet

the frivolousness standard). If the judge dismissed the suit as

factually frivolous, he abused his discretion.

Aclaim is legally frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28. Our review

is plenary. Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrs., 56 F.3d 785, 787 (7th

Cir. 1995). Felton’s theory is familiar: he says officers used ex‐

cessive force in arresting him, which violates the Fourth

Amendment (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth).

As an initial matter, Felton’s suit would lack “even an argua‐

ble basis in law” if his injuries were self‐inflicted and the of‐

ficers caused him no harm. That may be what the district

judge concluded after reading the newspapers. But when

screening for frivolousness, “the complaint is the entire rec‐

ord of the case.” Billman, 56 F.3d at 788. The “frivolousness

determination, frequently made sua sponte before the defend‐

ant has even been asked to file an answer, cannot serve as a

factfinding process for the resolution of disputed facts.” Den‐

ton, 504 U.S. at 32; see also Williams v. Wahner, 731 F.3d 731, 733

(7th Cir. 2003). Felton says the judge relied on the newspapers

to dismiss his suit. And though the City did not file a brief, it

sent a letter to the court, agreeing with Felton that the district

court dismissed the suit “based on the court’s independent re‐

search into newspaper accounts of the underlying incident.”

If the judge did so, that is unjustifiable, no matter how defer‐

ential our review. In our analysis, we credit Felton’s allegation

that the officers caused his injuries.

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No. 14‐3211 5

Felton argues that the legal viability of his suit depends on

facts that could not have been determined at the screening

stage. For example, he asks “whether the police were justified

in chasing [him] in the first place.” But that’s irrelevant be‐

cause “pre‐seizure conduct is not subject to Fourth Amend‐

ment scrutiny.” Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332–33 (7th

Cir. 1992); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626–27

(1991).1 Felton also questions whether the officers had “some

other purpose,” aside from stopping his flight. But the Fourth

Amendment analysis is objective, so the officers’intentions do

not matter. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007); Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“An officer’s evil intentions

will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objec‐

tively reasonable use of force ... .”).

Objectively, at least one part of Felton’s complaint was le‐

gally viable: his allegation that he was shot by multiple stun

guns. Nothing in the complaint says that this happened dur‐

ing the car chase. A reasonable inference is that it happened

afterward. And nothing in the complaint says whether Felton

was subdued, passively resisting, or actively resisting at the

time. Discovery may reveal that he was actively resisting, but

at the screening stage the judge was required to draw the rea‐

sonable inference that Felton was subdued or only passively

resisting. In that case, shooting him with stun guns could vi‐

olate clearly established law. E.g., Abbott v. Sangamon County,

                                                 

1 For a similar reason, the allegation that officers fired their guns, though

potentially troubling depending on the circumstances, is irrelevant be‐

cause Felton does not allege he was hit or that the shooting made him stop

his flight. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626–27 (no seizure if an officer’s show

of force does not physically touch the individual or compel him to submit

to the officer’s authority).

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705 F.3d 706, 732–33 (7th Cir. 2013); Cyrus v. Town of

Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2010). Dismissing

these allegations as frivolous was an abuse of discretion.

As to the legal effect of Felton’s allegations that officers

rammed his car, the parties were correct to focus on the objec‐

tive dangerousness of the car chase. Officers are allowed to

end a highly dangerous car chase by ramming the fleeing car.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 386 (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate

a dangerous high‐speed car chase that threatens the lives of

innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment,

even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious in‐

jury or death.”). But, as Felton stresses, the complaint does not

say that the chase was dangerous. Felton’s chase might have

been like O.J. Simpson’s: low‐speed, on a deserted express‐

way, with officers following at a safe distance. If Felton posed

no danger but officers rammed his car, a Fourth Amendment

claim would not be frivolous. Cf. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.

305, 312 (2015) (per curiam) (describing dangerousness of car

chase before concluding that officers did not violate the

Fourth Amendment); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022

(2014) (same); Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–81 (same).  

It might be fair to say that a car chase along an expressway

is usually dangerous, so the inference that the chase was O.J.‐

like is not reasonable. And if the chase in this case was not dan‐

gerous, Felton should have said that in his complaint. But

even if that was the case, when a plaintiff—especially a pro se

plaintiff—fails to state a claim in his first complaint, he should

ordinarily be given a chance to amend. Tate v. SCR Med.

Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015). And because Felton’s

stun gun allegations stated a claim, the case must be returned

to the district court. Because Felton did not name the specific

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No. 14‐3211 7

officers involved in his arrest, he must amend his complaint,

so he will have the opportunity to add detail to his car chase

allegations.

On remand, the parties should know that in Scott v. Harris,

the Supreme Court refused to accept the non‐movant’s ver‐

sion of the facts at summary judgment because that version

was clearly contradicted by a video of the chase. 550 U.S. at

378–80. If video exists that clearly contradicts Felton’s story,

an early and cost‐efficient motion for summary judgment

might be appropriate. Of course, as the Scott dissent noted, id.

at 395–96, video may not tell the whole story and reasonable

people can sometimes draw different conclusions from the

same video. If the defendants move for summary judgment,

the parties should know that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(d) allows non‐movants to argue that further discovery is

necessary to resolve the motion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment and

REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Circuit

Rule 36 shall apply on remand.

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