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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 2, 2008 Decided July 15, 2008

No. 06-3146

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DWAYNE CASSELL,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00270-01)

Mitchell M. Seltzer, appointed by the Court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant. 

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Elizabeth Trosman,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND,Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Dwayne Cassell

of several drug and gun crimes, including possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). We affirmed Cassell’s convictions on

direct appeal, and he now mounts a collateral challenge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that his trial was subject to a host

of errors by his counsel, the prosecutor, and the court. We reject

all of Cassell’s allegations for the reasons set forth in the district

court’s careful, detailed opinion. We address only one of those

allegations in this opinion: Cassell’s claim that his trial counsel

was constitutionally ineffective for failing to insist that the judge

instruct the jury that possession of a “semiautomatic assault

weapon” was an element of a separate offense under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1) that the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt.

We consider this issue in depth not because we disagree with the

district court’s judgment, but because we think it important to

have a circuit precedent on the question. We conclude that the

type of firearm possessed by the defendant was a sentencing

factor, which the district court properly found without a jury

under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 

I

On July 13, 2000, District of Columbia police officers

executed a search warrant at a house located at 1129 Trinidad

Avenue in Northeast Washington, D.C. Lawrence Hart owned

the house and shared it with his nephew, appellant Cassell.

During the search, the officers found guns, drugs, and drug

paraphernalia.

In a bedroom that Hart later identified as belonging to

Cassell, the police found a blue duffel bag containing two

loaded firearms: a Colt AR-15 semiautomatic rifle and a Cobray

9-mm semiautomatic pistol. They also found an identification

card bearing Cassell’s name and photograph as well as the 1129

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Trinidad Avenue address, an envelope addressed to Cassell, and

$3154 in cash. In Hart’s own bedroom the police found a loaded

.32 caliber revolver, .22 caliber ammunition, marijuana, and

additional cash, all of which Hart admitted belonged to him.

On the rear porch of the house, in a box on a chair, the

officers recovered a receipt for the purchase of a car in Cassell’s

name, a magazine for a semiautomatic handgun, and a scale. On

the seat of the chair was a plate covered with white, rocklike

crumbs that field-tested positive for cocaine. The plate bore

Cassell’s right thumbprint.

In the dining room of the house was a table with a “hutch”

on top of it. Inside the hutch, the police found a brown bag

containing 71 ziplock bags of cocaine base, one round of 9-mm

ammunition, and one round of .30 caliber ammunition. On the

hutch, they found a court document and a telephone bill in

Cassell’s name. The house’s bathroom, hallway, and kitchen

yielded additional cocaine base, marijuana, and ammunition.

On August 24, 2000, a grand jury charged Cassell with five

crimes: (1) possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or

more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii); (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine

base within 1000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

860(a); (3) using, carrying and possessing a firearm during a

drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

and (c)(1)(B)(i); (4) unlawful possession of a firearm and

ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1); and (5) possession of marijuana, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 844(a). Cassell went to trial on December 4, 2000.

Four days later, the jury acquitted him of marijuana possession,

but convicted him on all of the other charges. On March 7,

2001, the district court sentenced Cassell to 288 months’

incarceration and 10 years of supervised release. This court

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affirmed the conviction on June 11, 2002. See United States v.

Cassell, 292 F.3d 788 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

On September 9, 2003, Cassell filed a motion under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on

numerous grounds, including the alleged ineffectiveness of both

his trial and appellate counsel. In a memorandum opinion and

order, the district court denied Cassell’s motion. Cassell v.

United States, 2006 WL 2051371 (D.D.C. July 19, 2006).

Cassell then moved for a certificate of appealability under 28

U.S.C. § 2253, which the district court granted. Thereafter,

Cassell filed the instant appeal.

Cassell’s appeal once again raises multiple objections to his

conviction. We reject all of them for the reasons set forth in the

district court’s opinion. In this opinion, we consider only his

claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a

jury instruction that classified the term “semiautomatic assault

weapon” as an element of a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1).

II

A petitioner may bring a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel “in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not

the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.”

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); see United

States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2005). To evaluate

such a claim, we turn to the familiar two-prong test established

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove

constitutionally defective representation, the defendant must

show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2)

“that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at

687. “The latter prong requires the defendant to demonstrate

that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

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1

The semiautomatic assault weapon provision of § 924(c)(1)(B)(i)

expired on September 13, 2004, well after Cassell’s offense and

subsequent conviction. See Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105(2), 108

Stat. 1796, 2000 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 921 note. In all other relevant

respects the current version of the statute is identical to the version at

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.’” United States v. Eli, 379 F.3d 1016, 1019 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

Count Three of the indictment charged Cassell with using

and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense, and with possessing a firearm in furtherance

of such an offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The

count was submitted to the jury on the possession-in-furtherance

theory only, and the judge instructed that the offense had two

elements: “that the defendant possessed the firearm,” and “that

the defendant possessed the firearm in furtherance of [a] drug

trafficking offense.” Trial Tr. 572 (Dec. 7, 2000). The court

defined the term “firearm” as “any weapon which . . . expel[s]

a projectile by the action of an explosive.” Id. at 572-73. It

neither mentioned nor defined the term “assault weapon.”

Cassell’s counsel agreed to those instructions and did not object

when they were given. See Appellant’s Br. 37. 

After the jury convicted Cassell on Count Three, the district

court determined that the firearm that Cassell possessed -- a Colt

AR-15 semiautomatic rifle -- was a “semiautomatic assault

weapon” for purposes of § 924(c)(1). The relevant provision of

that subsection states: “(B) If the firearm possessed by a person

convicted of a violation of this subsection -- (i) is a . . .

semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to

a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.” 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000).1

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issue in this case, and this opinion refers to those common provisions

as the “current” version of the statute.

Cassell contends that § 924(c)(1)(B) defines a separate

offense, of which the type of firearm the defendant possessed is

an element, and that his jury should have been so charged.

Instead, and without objection by his counsel, the district court

treated the type of firearm as a sentencing factor that the court

could itself determine based on a preponderance of the evidence.

Cassell argues that his counsel’s failure to object constituted

constitutionally deficient performance under the first prong of

Strickland. He further maintains that this deficient performance

prejudiced him under Strickland’s second prong, because it led

the court to sentence him to a mandatory minimum sentence of

10 years, rather than the 5-year mandatory minimum applicable

to an unspecified type of firearm. Compare 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1)(A)(i) (imposing a sentence “of not less than 5 years”),

with § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) (imposing a sentence “of not less than 10

years”).

For the reasons discussed in Parts III and IV below, we

conclude that Cassell’s argument fails to satisfy either prong of

Strickland. Counsel’s failure to argue that the type of firearm

was an element of the offense was not “deficient” because the

type of firearm is not an element of a § 924(c)(1) offense.

Moreover, even if it were an element and counsel were deficient

for not raising the issue, Cassell cannot show that he was

prejudiced by the court’s failure to so charge the jury. 

III

If the type of firearm possessed by the defendant constitutes

an element of the § 924(c)(1) offense, then the question must be

submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 123 (2000). If it is a

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sentencing factor, however, the district judge may find it --

without a jury -- by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 123-

24. Section 924(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:

(c)(1)(A) . . . [A]ny person who, during and in relation

to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . ,

uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any

such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to

the punishment provided for such crime of violence or

drug trafficking crime --

(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not

less than 5 years;

(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and

(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.

(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a

violation of this subsection --

(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun,

or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less

than 10 years; or

(ii) is a machinegun . . . , the person shall be

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less

than 30 years. 

(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction

under this subsection, the person shall --

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(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not

less than 25 years; . . . 

(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law -- . . .

(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person

under this subsection shall run concurrently with

any other term of imprisonment imposed on the

person . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (emphasis added); see supra note 1.

Two Supreme Court opinions light our path toward resolving

whether the assault weapon provision is an element or a

sentencing factor. We first describe those precedents and then

apply them to the instant case. 

A

The first precedent is Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120

(2000), in which the Court construed a previous version of §

924(c)(1). That version consisted of a single paragraph, which

read in relevant part:

(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of

violence . . . , uses or carries a firearm, shall, in

addition to the punishment provided for such crime of

violence . . . , be sentenced to imprisonment for five

years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle [or a]

short-barreled shotgun to imprisonment for ten years,

and if the firearm is a machinegun, . . . to

imprisonment for thirty years. In the case of his

second or subsequent conviction under this subsection,

such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for

twenty years . . . . Notwithstanding any other provision

of law, . . . the term of imprisonment imposed under

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this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any

other term of imprisonment . . . . No person sentenced

under this subsection shall be eligible for parole . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. V 1988) (emphasis added). A jury

determined that the Castillo defendants had violated § 924(c)(1)

by knowingly using or carrying firearms, and the judge found

that the firearms at issue included machineguns. The judge then

imposed the statute’s mandatory 30-year prison term. The

question before the Supreme Court was whether Congress

intended each reference to a firearm type in § 924(c)(1) to define

a distinct crime or merely to indicate a sentencing factor.

Castillo, 530 U.S. at 123. After considering the statute’s

“language, structure, context, history, and such other factors as

typically help courts determine a statute’s objectives,” the Court

concluded that the references to firearm type defined separate

crimes. Id. at 124.

The Court focused first on the statutory language, the

relevant sentence of which, at the time, read as follows:

“Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . ,

uses or carries a firearm, shall . . . be sentenced to imprisonment

for five years, and if the firearm is a . . . machinegun, . . . to

imprisonment for thirty years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. V

1988). The Court found that language “neutral.” Castillo, 530

U.S. at 124. It could be read, the Court said, “as setting forth

two basic elements of the offense” -- “uses or carries a firearm”

and “during and in relation to a crime of violence.” Id. On that

reading, the provision’s subsequent reference to “machinegun”

would “merely increas[e] a defendant’s sentence in relevant

cases.” Id. “But, with equal ease,” the Court thought, the

phrase could be read as “creating a different crime containing

one new element.” Id.

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Although the Court read the statute’s language as neutral,

it found that “its overall structure strongly favors the ‘new

crime’ interpretation.” Id. “Congress,” the Court observed,

“placed the element ‘uses or carries a firearm’ and the word

‘machinegun’ in a single sentence, not broken up with dashes or

separated into subsections.” Id. at 124-25. Moreover, the

following three sentences “refer directly to sentencing: the first

to recidivism, the second to concurrent sentences, the third to

parole.” Id. at 125. The Court found that “[t]hese structural

features strongly suggest that the basic job of the entire first

sentence is the definition of crimes and the role of the remaining

three is the description of factors (such as recidivism) that

ordinarily pertain only to sentencing.” Id.

Important for Cassell’s case, the Court noted a “structural

circumstance[] that suggest[ed] a contrary interpretation.” Id.

That circumstance was Congress’ 1998 reenactment of §

924(c)(1), which “separat[ed] different parts of the first sentence

. . . into different subsections.” Id. This “postenactment

statutory restructuring,” however, could not help the Court

“determine what Congress intended at the time it enacted the

earlier statutory provision.” Id.

The Court then addressed the remaining considerations that

it had identified. It found that courts have not traditionally

regarded firearm types as sentencing factors; that asking a jury

to decide the type of firearm would rarely complicate a trial; that

the legislative history was not helpful; and that the length of the

added mandatory sentence that turned on the presence of a

machinegun weighed in favor of treating the provision as

referring to an element. Summarizing its entire analysis, the

Court concluded “that Congress intended the firearm typerelated words it used in § 924(c)(1) to refer to an element of a

separate, aggravated crime.” Id. at 131.

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The second governing precedent is Harris v. United States,

536 U.S. 545 (2002), in which the Court interpreted the version

of § 924(c)(1) that applies to Cassell’s case. Harris was indicted

and convicted of knowingly carrying a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of §

924(c)(1)(A). At sentencing, the district court found by a

preponderance of the evidence that Harris had brandished the

firearm in question, and it sentenced him to the mandatory

minimum sentence of seven years required by §

924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Harris objected on two grounds: (1) that as a

matter of statutory interpretation, brandishing is an element of

a separate offense and not merely a sentencing factor; and (2)

that if the statute makes brandishing a sentencing factor, then the

statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000). On review, the Supreme Court rejected both

claims.

On the first issue, the Court found -- as it had with respect

to the machinegun provision at issue in Castillo -- that the

statutory language did not resolve the question. Harris, 536

U.S. at 552. This time, however, it found that “the structure of

the [brandishing] prohibition suggests” that it is a sentencing

factor. Id. Quoting Castillo, the Court noted that “[f]ederal

laws usually list all offense elements ‘in a single sentence’ and

separate the sentencing factors ‘into subsections.’” Id. It then

described the structure of the version of the statute relevant to

Harris’ (and Cassell’s) case:

Here, § 924(c)(1)(A) begins with a lengthy principal

paragraph listing the elements of a complete crime --

“the basic federal offense of using or carrying a gun

during and in relation to” a violent crime or drug

offense. Toward the end of the paragraph is “the word

‘shall,’ which often divides offense-defining provisions

from those that specify sentences.” And following

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“shall” are the separate subsections, which explain how

defendants are to “be sentenced.” Subsection (i) sets a

catchall minimum and “certainly adds no further

element.” Subsections (ii) and (iii), in turn, increase

the minimum penalty if certain facts are present, and

those subsections do not repeat the elements from the

principal paragraph.

Id. at 552-53 (citations omitted) (quoting Castillo, 530 U.S. at

124, and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 233 (1999)). 

“When a statute has this sort of structure,” the Court said,

“we can presume that its principal paragraph defines a single

crime and its subsections identify sentencing factors.” Id. at

553. The Court did not find anything to overcome this

presumption. It noted that there was no federal tradition of

treating brandishing as an offense element. Id. And it further

found that, unlike the provision in Castillo, the “provisions

before us . . . have an effect on the defendant’s sentence that is

more consistent with traditional understandings about how

sentencing factors operate; the required findings constrain,

rather than extend, the sentencing judge’s discretion.” Id. at

554. The Court explained this point as follows:

Section 924(c)(1)(A) does not authorize the judge to

impose “steeply higher penalties” -- or higher penalties

at all -- once the facts in question are found. Since the

subsections alter only the minimum, the judge may

impose a sentence well in excess of seven years,

whether or not the defendant brandished the firearm.

The incremental changes in the minimum -- from 5

years, to 7, to 10 -- are precisely what one would

expect to see in provisions meant to identify matters

for the sentencing judge’s consideration.

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Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 233).

Finally, the Court addressed petitioner Harris’ contention

that the canon of constitutional avoidance counseled against the

single-offense interpretation. Id. at 554-55. The constitutional

question, Harris argued, was raised by the Court’s decision in

Apprendi, which held that “‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,’ whether the statute

calls it an element or a sentencing factor, ‘must be submitted to

a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 550

(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). As the Court noted,

however, the relevant version of § 924(c)(1)(A) does not

increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum once

specified facts (like brandishing) are found; such findings “alter

only the minimum” sentence. Id. at 554. Nonetheless, Harris

maintained that it was “at least an open question . . . whether the

Fifth and Sixth Amendments require every fact increasing a

federal defendant’s minimum sentence to be alleged in the

indictment, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt,” and he argued that to “avoid resolving that

question (and possibly invalidating the statute), . . . [the Court]

should read § 924(c)(1)(A) as making brandishing an element of

an aggravated federal crime.” Id. at 555. 

The Court was unpersuaded: The “petitioner’s proposed

rule -- that the Constitution requires any fact increasing the

statutory minimum sentence to be accorded the safeguards

assigned to elements -- was rejected 16 years ago in McMillan.”

Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)). In

McMillan, the Court “sustained a statute that increased the

minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory

maximum, when the sentencing judge found, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had possessed

a firearm.” Harris, 536 U.S. at 550. Petitioner Harris suggested

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that Apprendi and related cases had “cast doubt on McMillan’s

viability,” and that the Court “should construe the problem out

of the statute” to “avoid deciding whether McMillan must be

overruled.” Id. at 555. But the Court rejected the suggestion

that it “use the canon to avoid overruling” its own precedent,

particularly since “McMillan was in place when § 924(c)(1)(A)

was enacted.” Id. at 556. Finding that “the avoidance canon

poses no obstacle and the interpretive circumstances point in a

common direction,” the Court held that, “as a matter of statutory

interpretation, § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense” and

“regards brandishing and discharging as sentencing factors to be

found by the judge, not offense elements to be found by the

jury.” Id. In a subsequent part of the opinion, the Court

reaffirmed McMillan and concluded that § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) is

constitutional. Id. at 568.

B

Having laid out the governing precedents in some detail, we

find the resolution of Cassell’s case straightforward. Unlike the

structure of the version of § 924(c)(1) in effect at the time of

Castillo, the structure of the version relevant here strongly

indicates that possession of a particular type of firearm is a

sentencing factor rather than an offense element. As the Castillo

Court itself noted, the statute no longer has “the element ‘uses

or carries a firearm’ and the word ‘machinegun’ in a single

sentence, not broken up with dashes or separated into

subsections.” 530 U.S. at 125. Instead, Congress has now

“separat[ed] different parts of the first sentence (and others) into

different subsections.” Id. And as Castillo further noted, this

“structural circumstance[] . . . suggest[s] a contrary

interpretation” to the one it reached in that case. Id. 

The current statute, as described in Harris, “begins with a

lengthy principal paragraph listing the elements of a complete

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crime -- ‘the basic federal offense of using or carrying a gun

during and in relation to’ a violent crime or drug offense.”

Harris, 536 U.S. at 552 (quoting Castillo, 530 U.S. at 124).

Following this paragraph are “separate subsections” that set

increasing minimum penalties “if certain facts [i.e., brandishing

or discharging] are present, and those subsections do not repeat

the elements from the principal paragraph.” Id. at 552-53

(referencing § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii)). There then

follows a second group of subsections that again set increasing

minimum penalties if certain facts are present, this time facts

relating to the type of firearm involved. See § 924(c)(1)(B)(i),

(ii). And as with the brandishing and discharging subsections,

the subsections referencing firearm type “do not repeat the

elements from the principal paragraph.” Harris, 530 U.S. at

553. Consistent with the Court’s instruction, “[w]hen a statute

has this sort of structure, we can presume that its principal

paragraph defines a single crime and its subsections identify

sentencing factors.” Id. 

Turning to the remaining interpretive factors identified in

Castillo, we note that the legislative history is again

inconclusive, and that two of Castillo’s other observations -- that

courts have not traditionally treated firearm type as a sentencing

factor and that asking a jury to decide the type of firearm would

rarely complicate a trial -- again cut against the sentencingfactor interpretation. More significant, however, is the fact that

the current version of § 924(c)(1) -- unlike that at issue in

Castillo, but like that in Harris -- does not increase the statutory

maximum sentence. Rather, the firearm-type provisions “have

an effect on the defendant’s sentence that is more consistent

with traditional understandings about how sentencing factors

operate; the required findings constrain, rather than extend, the

sentencing judge’s discretion” by “alter[ing] only the minimum

[sentence that] the judge may impose.” Harris, 530 U.S. at 554.

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Finally, most significant is the fact that the language of §

924(c)(1)(B) -- unlike the pre-1998 text examined in Castillo or

the text of § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) examined in Harris -- is not

“neutral” on the issue before us. Section 924(c)(1)(B) states:

“If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of

this subsection -- (i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled

shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The use of the

phrase “convicted of a violation” indicates that the provision is

to be applied only after a conviction and, hence, only at

sentencing. The referenced “violation” is for “‘the basic federal

offense of using or carrying a gun during and in relation to’ a

violent crime or drug offense.” Harris, 536 U.S. at 552 (quoting

Castillo, 530 U.S. at 124). And, as Harris makes clear, all of

the elements of that crime are contained in the “lengthy principal

paragraph” of § 924(c)(1)(A). Id. 

“Against the single-offense interpretation to which these

considerations point,” id. at 554-55, Cassell -- like the defendant

in Harris -- argues that Apprendi counsels a different outcome.

But the Supreme Court rejected that precise argument in Harris,

and so do we. Nor is there anything in the Court’s post-Harris

decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) -- two cases that

applied Apprendi to sentencing guidelines -- that would require

a different result. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-05

(distinguishing McMillan because the Washington state

guidelines did not merely impose statutory minima). We

therefore conclude that, unlike in the version of the statute

examined in Castillo, in the current version “Congress intended

the firearm type-related words it used” in § 924(c)(1)(B) to refer

to sentencing factors rather than offense elements. Castillo, 530

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2

See United States v. Harrison, 272 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2001);

United States v. Barton, 257 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2001); United States

v. Sandoval, 241 F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gamboa,

439 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158

(10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264 (11th

Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404 (6th Cir.

2005).

U.S. at 131. In so doing, we join all but one of the other circuits

that have considered the question.2

Because the district court properly treated Cassell’s

possession of an assault weapon as a sentencing factor, his

counsel was not deficient in failing to demand a jury instruction

on the issue. Accordingly, Cassell cannot satisfy the first prong

of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel.

IV

Even if possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon were

an element of the § 924(c)(1) offense, Cassell’s ineffective

assistance claim would not succeed because he cannot show that

counsel’s failure to demand a jury instruction on the issue

caused him prejudice -- as required by Strickland’s second

prong. There is, in short, no “reasonable probability” that, if the

court had left the question of Cassell’s possession of an assault

weapon to the jury, “the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Neder v. United States, 527

U.S. 1 (1999), makes this conclusion inescapable. In Neder, a

district court wrongly determined that the materiality of false

statements was not an element of tax fraud that had to be

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submitted to the jury, and instead decided the issue on its own.

Applying the harmless error standard of review -- a standard

more favorable to the defendant than the prejudice prong of

Strickland, see United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286-87 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) -- the Supreme Court found the absence of a jury

instruction harmless. It did so on the ground that the

government’s trial evidence, which showed that the defendant

had failed to report over $5 million in income, “incontrovertibly

establishe[d] that [his] false statements were material to a

determination of his income tax liability.” Neder, 527 U.S. at

16. No jury, the Court said, “could reasonably [have found] that

Neder’s failure to report substantial amounts of income on his

tax returns was not a ‘material matter.’” Id.

The same is true with respect to Cassell’s possession of an

assault weapon. At trial, a police officer testified that during the

search of the Trinidad Avenue house, the police found a blue

duffel bag in Cassell’s bedroom, at the foot of his bed. The

officer testified that the bag contained two firearms: a Colt AR15 semiautomatic rifle, and a Cobray 9-mm semiautomatic

pistol. A Special Agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms also identified the rifle as a Colt AR-15. Cassell has

not disputed this identification, nor suggested that he could. At

the time of Cassell’s offense and trial, the statute defined

“semiautomatic assault weapon” to include a “Colt AR-15,” see

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A)(iv) (2000), and the government was

certainly entitled to a jury instruction to that effect.

Accordingly, the trial evidence “incontrovertibly establishe[d],”

Neder, 527 U.S. at 16, that one of the weapons in the bag was a

semiautomatic assault weapon.

The only remaining question is whether there is any

reasonable probability that the jury could have found that

Cassell did not possess the AR-15. Count Three of the

indictment charged him with possessing the AR-15 and the

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3

Cf. United States v. Johnson, 331 F.3d 962, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(ruling, in a case in which the evidence showed that the defendant had

tossed away two bags of drugs that together held more than 50 grams

of cocaine base, that there was no plain error in the court’s failure to

instruct the jury regarding drug quantity because the defendant

proffered “no scenario under which [the jury] could have convicted

him of unlawful possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, yet

found that the quantity involved was less than 50 grams”); United

States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding no plain

error in the failure to instruct the jury on the issue of drug quantity,

where the defendant “offer[ed] no scenario under which the jury could

have convicted him of the [drug] transactions, yet rationally found that

they involved different quantities than those testified to by the

government chemist”).

Cobray pistol in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and

those were the only weapons the government contended he

possessed. See Trial Tr. 178, 184-85 (Dec. 5, 2000) (opening

argument); Trial Tr. 584, 608 (Dec. 7, 2000) (closing argument).

The court instructed the jury that, to convict Cassell on Count

Three, it had to find that he possessed “a” firearm, Trial Tr. 572

(Dec. 7, 2000), and the verdict form makes clear that the jury so

found, see Verdict Form at 2. There is thus no doubt that the

jury determined that Cassell possessed at least one of the two

weapons. And because both guns were in the same bag, and

Cassell has never offered any scenario under which the jury

could have found that he possessed one gun but not the other,

there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have

acquitted Cassell of possessing the AR-15 semiautomatic assault

weapon in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.3

In sum, we conclude both that Cassell’s counsel did not err

in failing to request a jury instruction that firearm type was an

offense element, and that, in any event, Cassell was not

prejudiced by the absence of such an instruction. Cassell thus

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cannot satisfy either prong of Strickland’s two-prong test, and

we must deny his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is, in all respects,

Affirmed.

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