Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35072/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35072-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA DEL CARMEN MEDINA

TOVAR; ADRIAN JOVAN ALONSO

MARTINEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LAURA B. ZUCHOWSKI, Director,

Vermont Service Center, United

States Citizenship and

Immigration Services; CHAD F.

WOLF, Acting Secretary,

Department of Homeland

Security; WILLIAM P. BARR,

Attorney General,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35072

D.C. No.

3:17-cv-00719-BR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Anna J. A. Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2019

Portland, Oregon

Filed January 17, 2020

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2 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

Before: N. Randy Smith, Paul J. Watford, and 

Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith;

Dissent by Judge Watford

SUMMARY*

Immigration 

Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of government defendants in a case involving when

a spousal relationship must exist for a spouse to be eligible

for derivative U-visa status, the panel deferred to a regulation

adopted by the United States Citizenship & Immigration

Service (“USCIS”) that construed the statutory phrase

“accompanying, or following to join” to require that a

spouse’s qualifying relationship exist at the time of the filing

of the initial U-visa petition.

A U visa grants temporary, lawful, nonimmigrant resident

status to an alien who has suffered substantial physical or

mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of criminal

activity in the U.S. and who helped law enforcement

investigating or prosecuting that criminal activity. Under

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii), a U-visa recipient may petition

for derivative status for a qualifying relative who is

“accompanying, or following to join,” the principal alien. 

That provision specifies which relationships may qualify for

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 3

derivative U-visa status: “(I) in the case of [a principal alien]

who is under 21 years of age, the spouse, children, unmarried

siblings under 18 years of age on the date on which such alien

applied for status under such clause, and parents of such

alien; or (II) in the case of [a principal alien] who is 21 years

of age or older, the spouse and children of such alien.” The

regulation at issue here, 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(f)(2), provides that

the relationship between the principal alien and the qualifying

family member must exist at the time the principal alien’s

petition was filed, must continue to exist at the time the

derivative petition is adjudicated, and at the time of the

qualifying family member’s subsequent admission to the U.S.

The principal alien in this case, Maria Medina Tovar, a

Mexican citizen, came to the U.S., was the victim of a serious

crime, and was helpful to law enforcement. She submitted

her petition for a U visa and later married a Mexican citizen. 

She was then granted U-visa status and filed for derivative Uvisa status for her husband. The USCIS denied that petition

on the ground that the couple was not married when Tovar

filed her initial petition. Tovar and her husband (“Plaintiffs”)

sought review in the district court, which granted the

government defendants’ summary judgment motion.

The panel applied the two-step analysis from Chevron,

U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984), to review the agency’s construction of the phrase

“accompanying, or following to join.” First, the panel

concluded that Congress has not directly spoken to the

question of when a qualifying relationship must exist for an

“accompanying, or following to join,” family member to be

eligible for derivative U-visa status. The panel rejected

Plaintiffs’ contention that that “accompanying, or following

to join” has a well-established meaning, explaining that the

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4 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

agency has defined the phrase differently depending on the

alien’s status. For example, for a refugee, the qualifying

relationship must exist prior to the refugee’s admission to the

U.S, must continue to exist at the time of filing for derivative

benefits, and at the time of the derivative’s admission to the

U.S. Whereas, for asylum, the relationship must exist at the

time the principal alien’s asylum application was approved,

must continue to exist at the time of filing for derivative

benefits, and at the time of the derivative’s admission to the

U.S.

The panel also rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the “age

out” provision for unmarried siblings – which provides that

an eligible unmarried sibling is one who is under 18 at the

time when the principal applied for a U visa – makes it clear

that Congress did not intend to limit other qualifying family

members to the date of the application. The panel explained

that the statutory provision does not provide any instruction

regarding the timing of when a spouse’s relationship would

qualify for status.

At step-two of Chevron, the panel concluded that the

agency’s regulation imposes reasonable requirements in light

of the text, nature, and purpose of the U-visa statute. The

panel explained that it is reasonable for the agency to require

that qualifying relationships exist at the time of the initial Uvisa application, where the purpose of the U-visa statute is to

provide only limited, temporary, nonimmigrant status to alien

victims of crime (already present in the U.S.) based on their

aid to law enforcement. 

The panel also concluded that the regulation does not

violate Equal Protection. With respect to Plaintiffs’ argument

that spouses and children of U-visa recipients are similarly

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 5

situated and yet treated inconsistentlywithout a rational basis,

the panel concluded that spouses and children are not

similarly situated because the dependency of spouses is not

equivalent to that of the parent-child relationship. The panel

further concluded that, even if the groups were similarly

situated, treating spouses and children differently is rationally

based on Congress’s interest in preventing marriage fraud. 

With respect to Plaintiffs’ argument that spouses of U-visa

holders, refugees, asylees, and other nonimmigrant and

immigrant visa holders are similarly situated and improperly

treated differently, the panel concluded that immigration

fraud concerns and the underlying purposes of the different

visa categories provide a rational basis for the different

treatment of U-visa spouses as compared to other spouses.

Dissenting, Judge Watford wrote that he would reverse on

the ground that the regulation is not a valid interpretation the

governing statute. Judge Watford wrote that USCIS’s

interpretation cannot be squared with the well-settled

meaning of “accompanying or following to join,” which had

consistently been construed to mean that the marital

relationship must exist at the time principal petitioner’s

application is granted, not when her application was filed.

Looking at the rules for refugees and asylees, Judge Watford

observed that in both contexts, principal petitioners may seek

derivative status on behalf of their spouses if the marriage

exists when the principal petitioner is granted status. Judge

Watford also wrote that it is clear that Congress used the

phrase “accompanying or following to join” in its traditional

sense in the U-visa statute because when Congress wished to

depart from that meaning it did so explicitly, by providing

that a principal petitioner who is under the age of 21 may

petition for derivative status on behalf of unmarried siblings

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6 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

under 18 years of age on the date on which such alien applied

for status. 

COUNSEL

Philip James Smith (argued), Nelson Smith LLP, Portland,

Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Aaron S. Goldsmith (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel;

Jeffrey S. Robins, Assistant Director; William C. Peachey,

Director; District Court Section, Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

The United States Citizenship & Immigration Service

(“USCIS”) permissibly construed the statutory phrase

“accompanying, or following to join” in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii) when it adopted its regulation, 8 C.F.R.

§ 214.14(f)(4), requiring that a spouse’s qualifying

relationship exists at the time of the initial U-visa petition and

that the qualifying relationship continues throughout the

adjudication of the derivative petition. Thus, we must accord

Chevron deference to the USCIS’s interpretation of the

statute in enacting the regulation. See K Mart Corp. v.

Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1988).

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 7

I. Administrative Framework

A U visa is a nonimmigrant visa category that grants

temporary, lawful, nonimmigrant resident status to a

noncitizen alien who “has suffered substantial physical or

mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of criminal

activity” in the United States and who helped law

enforcement “investigating or prosecuting [that] criminal

activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). A U visa provides

lawful temporary nonimmigrant status “for a period of not

more than 4 years,”

1

but a U-visa holder may apply for an

adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident

(“LPR”) after maintaining U-visa status for three years. Id.

§§ 1184(p)(6), 1255(m)(1)(A).

A U-visa recipient—a principal alien—may also petition

for derivative status for a qualifying relative who is

“accompanying, or following to join,” that principal alien. Id.

§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii).Thatstatutory provision specifies which

relationships may qualify for derivative U-visa status:

(I) in the case of [a principal alien] who is

under 21 years of age, the spouse, children,

unmarried siblings under 18 years of age on

the date on which such alien applied for status

under such clause, and parents of such alien;

or

1 The four-year period may be extended upon certification that “the

alien’s presence in the United States is required to assist in the

investigation or prosecution of such criminal activity” or “if the Secretary

determines that an extension of such period is warranted due to

exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6).

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(II) in the case of [a principal alien] who is 21

years of age or older, the spouse and children

of such alien.

Id. When the principal alien adjusts status, the Secretary

“may adjust the status of or issue an immigrant visa to a

spouse [or] a child . . . to avoid extreme hardship” if he or

she did not receive a nonimmigrant visa under

§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii). Id. § 1255(m)(3).

The agency promulgated regulations interpreting and

implementing these U-visa statutes. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14,

245.24. Under the regulations, the principal alien must file a

petition—Form I-918—to obtain U-visa status. Id.

§ 214.14(c)(1). The principal alien may also apply for

derivative U-visa status on behalf of qualifying relatives by

submitting a Form I-918, Supplement A. Id. § 214.14(f)(2).

“[T]he relationship between the U-1 principal alien and the

qualifying family member must exist at the time Form I-918

was filed, and the relationship must continue to exist at the

time Form I-918, Supplement A is adjudicated, and at the

time ofthe qualifying family member’s subsequent admission

to the United States.” Id. § 214.14(f)(4). Additionally, the

regulation includes a provision to prevent aliens from aging

out. The age of a principal alien under 21 and that alien’s

unmarried siblings under the age of 18 are determined as of

the initial petition date, so that such aliens may qualify for

status even if they are no longer under that age when their

petitions are adjudicated. Id. § 214.14(f)(4)(ii).

II. Procedural History & Facts

The principal alien in this case, Maria Medina Tovar, was

born in Mexico in 1992; she came to the United States when

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 9

she was six years old. In 2004, Tovar was the victim of a

serious crime while living in Oregon, and she was helpful to

law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of that

crime. On June 14, 2013, Tovar filed her U-visa petition

(Form I-918). Thereafter, on September 21, 2015, Tovar

married Adrian Alonso Martinez, a citizen of Mexico. Tovar

was granted U-visa status as of October 1, 2015. On March

26, 2016, Tovar filed a petition for derivative U-visa status

(Form I-918, Supplement A) for Martinez as her

“accompanying, or following to join,” spouse. The USCIS

denied that petition, because Tovar and Martinez were not

married when Tovar filed her initial petition for principal Uvisa status, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(f)(4).

On May 8, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district

court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from USCIS’s

denial of derivative status for Martinez.2 On cross-motions for

summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that the regulation

requiring the marital relationship to exist at the time of the

principal U-visa petition is contrary to the statute and that the

regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants replied that the U-visa

provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) is ambiguous, but the

agency’s regulation is a reasonable interpretation and should

be afforded deference.

2 Plaintiffs did not file an administrative appeal of USCIS’s denial.

However, Defendants conceded before the district court that exhaustion

of administrative remedies was not a prerequisite to judicial review in this

case. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993) (“[W]here the APA

applies, an appeal to ‘superior agency authority’ is a prerequisite to

judicial review only when expressly required by statute or . . . agency rule

. . . .”).

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The district court determined that (1) Congress did not

directly address the question of when a marital relationship

must exist for a spouse to be eligible for U-visa derivative

status and (2) the regulation is reasonable and entitled to

deference. Additionally, the district court concluded the

regulation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause,

because its treatment of nonimmigrant spouses is rationally

related to immigration concerns (such as marriage fraud)

recognized by Congress. Thus, the district court granted

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed.

III. Standard of Review

“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment.” Herrera v. USCIS, 571 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir.

2009).

IV. Discussion

A. The Statute is Ambiguous as to “Accompanying, or

Following to Join.”

As outlined above, Congress authorized the issuance of

derivative U-visa status to qualifying relatives who are

“accompanying, or following to join,” the principal alien. See

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii). The parties agree that this case

turns on the meaning of that phrase “accompanying, or

following to join.”

In reviewing “an agency’s construction of the statute

which it administers,” we must employ the two-step Chevron

analysis. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984). At step one of Chevron,

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 11

we must determine whether Congress has provided an answer

to the precise question at issue. “If the intent of Congress is

clear . . . the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to

the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id.

at 842–43 (emphasis added). “If, however, the court

determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise

question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own

construction on the statute.” Id. at 843 (emphasis added).

“Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to

the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.” Id. (emphasis added).

Here, Congress has not directly spoken to the question at

issue: when must a qualifying relationship exist for an

“accompanying, or following to join,” family member to be

eligible for derivative U-visa status? “[A]ccompanying, or

following to join” is not defined by statute, even though

Congress has used the phrase in numerous sections of the

Immigration and Nationality Act. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153,

1158.

Congress has never directly addressed when a qualifying

relationship must exist. Neither the plain language nor the

surrounding language of the U-visa statute answer the

question. In the surrounding language, Congress only

designated qualifying “accompanying, or following to join,”

family members in the U-visa context with this language:

(I) in the case of [a principal alien] who is

under 21 years of age, the spouse, children,

unmarried siblings under 18 years of age on

the date on which such alien applied for status

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12 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

under such clause, and parents of such alien;

or

(II) in the case of [a principal alien] who is 21

years of age or older, the spouse and children

of such alien.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p).

Otherwise, the statutory language is silent with regard to

whether Congress intended that the qualifying relationship

exist (1) when the principal filed his or her application,

(2) when the application is adjudicated, (3) throughout the

entire process, or (4) at some time after the principal alien has

been granted status. In the absence of such an indication, we

cannot impose our own construction of the statute.

Plaintiffs argue to the contrary. First arguing that the

intent of Congress is clear from the language of the statute,

Plaintiffs assert that “accompanying, or following to join” has

a well-established meaning, and that Congress (in other

contexts) has never limited the spouses’ eligibility to the date

of an application.

However, all parties agree that Congress has never

defined this statutory phrase. Thus, we must look to case law

or regulations to determine whether the phrase had a wellsettled meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute. Cf.

Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th

Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[w]here a statute does not

expressly define a termof settledmeaning, courts interpreting

the statute must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates,

that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning

of that term” (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted)). The Supreme Court has held that “Congress’

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 13

repetition of a well-established term carries the implication

that Congress intended the termto be construed in accordance

with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” Bragdon v.

Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). However, contrary to

Plaintiffs’ (and the dissent’s) argument, “accompanying, or

following to join” did not have a settled meaning when

Congress enacted the Victims of Trafficking and Violence

Protection Act in October 2000. Cf. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (noting that

“[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled

meaning under the common law, a court must infer, unless

the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to

incorporate the established meaning of these terms”

(alteration omitted)). Instead, the agency has defined

“accompanying, or following to join” differently depending

on the alien’s status. See, e.g., Procedures for Filing a

Derivative Petition (Form I-730) for a Spouse and Unmarried

Children of a Refugee/Asylee, 63 Fed. Reg. 3792-01 (Jan. 27,

1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 207, 208, and 299).

Giving consideration to the only two examples from the

nonimmigrant context, the qualifying relationship for a

refugee “must have existed prior to the refugee’s admission

to the United States and must continue to exist at the time of

filing for accompanying or following-to-join benefits and at

the time of the spouse or child’s subsequent admission to the

United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(c). Whereas, in considering

the qualifying relationship for asylum, it “must have existed

at the time the principal alien’s asylum application was

approved and must continue to exist at the time of filing for

accompanying or following-to-join benefits and at the time of

the spouse or child’s subsequent admission to the United

States.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(b). Thus, as is evident, both of

these regulations have different timing requirements for when

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14 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

the spouse’s qualifying relationship must exist. Although

asylee applicants may be more like U-visa applicants

(because they are both present in the United States), there is

no basis to conclude that (when it adopted the statute)

Congress intended the phrase have the same meaning for Uvisa applicants as it does for asylees.3

When enacting a statute, we presume Congress was aware

of the different regulations interpreting this phrase in the

immigrant, asylum, refugee, and U-visa contexts. See

Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85

(1988); cf. Rodriguez v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., LLC,

801 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). Yet, Congress never

added a definition of “accompanying, or following to join”

(in any context), nor has it added any clarifying language or

otherwise provided guidance to the agency on how that

language should be interpreted regarding the timing of

qualifying relationships.

Second, Plaintiffs assert that the “age out” provision for

unmarried siblings makes it clear that Congress did not intend

to limit other qualifying family members to the date of the

application. Although the “age out” provisions shed light on

Congress’s intent to preclude the alien him or herself, the

3 Additionally, Congress amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101 to add the U visa

in 2000, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.

L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, and the agency promulgated the U-visa

regulations in 2007, 72 Fed. Reg. 53014-01 (Sept. 17, 2007). Since then,

Congress has amended § 1101 numerous times, including an amendment

to the U-visa section itself. See, e.g., Violence Against Women

Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013

amendment adding qualifying crimes of which a noncitizen victimmay be

eligible for U-visa status). However, it has not defined or modified the

term “accompanying, or following to join.”

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 15

alien’s children, and unmarried siblings from aging out,4

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii), 1184(p)(7), it does not

provide any instruction regarding the timing of when the

spouse’s relationship would qualify for status. Importantly,

spouses and parents are the only qualifying relatives that have

no risk of “aging out” while the U-visa petition is pending.

Further, between spouses and parents, only spouses have the

potential of having different dates of assessments. Thus,

Congress left a gap to fill with regard to when spouses are

eligible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii). The fact that

Congress addressed when the alien and other qualifying

relatives should be assessed to preclude them from aging out,

does not unambiguously mean that Congress intended that

spouses be assessed at a different time than the date of

application.5

4

“Where Congress wanted to exempt certain aliens from aging out,

it has done so explicitly.” Contreras Aybar v. Johnson, 295 F. Supp. 3d

442, 455 (D.N.J. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Contreras Aybar v. Sec’y U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 916 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing that in

2013, Congress enacted legislation to protect children from aging out in

the U-visa context).

5 However, Congress has made it clear that once a U-visa holder

adjusts his or her status to legal permanent resident, “the Secretary of

Homeland Security may adjust the status of or issue an immigrant visa to

a spouse, a child, or in the case of an alien child, a parent who did not

receive a nonimmigrant visa under section 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii) of this title

if the Secretary considers the grant of such status or visa necessary to

avoid extreme hardship.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(3); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 245.24(h)(1)(iv) (defining extreme hardship). This provision, read in

context, makes it clear the assessment date for determining eligibility for

a qualifying family member must exist at some time prior to the U-visa

petitioner adjusting his or her status.

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Because “Congress has not directly addressed the precise

question at issue” and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with

respect to [this] specific issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, we

must “not simply impose [our] own construction on the

statute,” id., but instead must ask whether the agency’s

regulation reasonably fills the gap in the statute.

B. The Agency Reasonably Interpreted the Ambiguous

Phrase.

The agency has filled that gap by enacting regulations that

outline the parameters of the phrase in the various statutory

provisions it has been charged to interpret. “[W]here a statute

leaves a ‘gap’ . . . we typically interpret it as granting the

agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of

the text, nature, and purpose of the statute.” Cuozzo Speed

Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). Notably,

“[f]illing these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that

agencies are better equipped to make than courts.” Nat’l

Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,

545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). At step two, “the question for the

court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a

permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 843. Deference “is especially appropriate in the

immigration context,” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,

425 (1999), and “a court may not substitute its own

construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable

interpretation made by the administrator of an agency,”

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. An agency’s interpretation is

permissible “unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly

contrary to the statute.” Id.

Here, the agency’s regulation imposes reasonable

requirements regarding at what times a qualifying

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 17

relationship must exist for derivative U-visa status, “in light

of the text, nature, and purpose” of the U-visa statute. Cuozzo,

136 S. Ct. at 2142. The U visa serves a narrow purpose. It

was not created to allow aliens to come to the United States

to work or attend school; it is not an immigrant visa designed

to extend status to aliens who intend to permanently reside in

the United States; nor does it offer protection to aliens

seeking refuge from harm in their home country. Instead, the

U visa operates to grant limited, temporary, nonimmigrant

status to aliens already present in the United States who were

victims of a serious crime. The U visa requires that aliens be

or have been helpful in the investigation or prosecution of

those crimes. Notably, the U visa does not require aliens to

demonstrate that they will benefit the United States by

providing a skill, performing work, or bringing jobs; and it

does not require aliens to explain why they left their home

country or whether they could safely return. The narrow

nature and purpose of the U visa supports the agency’s

regulation. It is reasonable for the agency to require that

qualifying relationships exist at the time of the initial U-visa

application, where U-visa status provides only limited,

temporary, nonimmigrant status to alien victims of crime

(already present in the United States) based on their aid to

law enforcement.

Thus, the agency’s regulation is not “arbitrary, capricious,

or manifestly contrary to the statute.” See Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 844; see also Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 618 F.3d 1055,

1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding agency’s regulation regarding

timing of when alien beneficiaries of special immigrant visas

may apply for adjustment of status to be reasonable, after

determining Congress had been silent on the issue of timing);

Garcia-Mendez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1058, 1064–65 (9th Cir.

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2015) (upholding agency’s resolution as “a permissible

interpretation of an ambiguous statutory scheme”).

Plaintiffs argue that the regulation is unreasonable,

because it is inconsistent with other regulations interpreting

“accompanying, or following to join” in other contexts. That

the same statutory phrase—“accompanying, or following to

join”—is used in other contexts is not determinative.

“[W]ords have different shades of meaning and consequently

may be variously construed, not only when they occur in

different statutes, but when used more than once in the same

statute or even in the same section.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke

Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (quoting Atl.

Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433

(1932)). Put simply, “[c]ontext counts,” id. at 576, and the

circumstances of asylee and refugee status differs

significantly from nonimmigrant U-visa status, thus

supporting the agency’s differing regulations.

As stated above, nonimmigrant U-visa status is limited.

U-visa recipients are already present in the United States and

have become victims of a serious crime herein; they need not

demonstrate why they left their home country or whether they

can safely return.6See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i).

Nonimmigrant U-visa status generally lasts only for a period

of four years and must be maintained for three years before

a U-visa holder can apply to adjust status. Id. §§ 1184(p)(6),

1255(m)(1)(A).

6 Additionally, U-visa applicants need not demonstrate the same

general eligibility requirements as asylees and refugees. See 8 U.S.C.

1158(b)(2) (noting that alien will be ineligible for asylum if that alien,

inter alia, participated in persecution of any person on account of a

protected ground or was convicted of a particularly serious crime).

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By contrast, the status of asylees or refugees is broader

for a rational purpose. That status is granted to noncitizens

fleeing to the United States to escape harm or persecution in

their home country. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Applicants must

demonstrate that they have suffered (or likely will suffer)

persecution in that country on the account of a protected

ground, and are therefore unable to return. Id. Although

asylum “does not convey a right to remain permanently in the

United States,” it continues indefinitely and may be

terminated only if certain conditions are met. Id.

§ 1158(c)(2). After one year of physical presence in the

United States, the asylee may apply for adjustment of status

to that of an LPR. Id. § 1159(b)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 209.1(a)(1),

209.2(a)(1)(ii).

In short, these immigrant and nonimmigrant statutes are

aimed at addressing different concerns, have different

requirements, and extend different benefits to the status

holde r. Thus, a lthough the s ame t extua l

phrase—“accompanying, or following to join”—is used in

these contexts, the nature and purpose underlying the grants

of status differ significantly. The agency has reasonably

addressed these differences in its regulations by requiring that

qualifying relationships exist at the time of the initial petition

and through the grant of derivative status in the U-visa

context, where nonimmigrant status is only temporarily

granted for a fixed period of time to individuals based on

victimization in the United States.7

7 Notably, the agency regulations governing T visas (which operate

similarly to U visas, but are made available to victims of trafficking) has

the same requirement that a qualifying relationship exist at the time of the

initial application and throughout adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(k)(4).

The same reasonable basis supporting the regulation in the U-visa context

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Given the deference to the agency to impose regulations

interpreting (and gap filling) the immigration statutes, the

requirement that a spouse’s qualifying relationship exist at

the time of the initial U-visa petition and continue to exist

throughout the adjudication of the derivative petition in order

to obtain derivative status is a reasonable interpretation.

C. The Equal Protection Clause has not been Violated

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne

v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Classifications of

groups of noncitizens are subject to rational basis review. See

Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).

Applying rational basis review, a classification “is accorded

a strong presumption of validity and must be upheld if there

is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment

and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 1200

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he Equal

Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rationalbasis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker

actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale

supporting its classification.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.

1, 15 (1992). Rather, those challenging a regulation “have the

burden to negate every conceivable basis which might

provides support for the regulation in the T-visa context. The fact that the

agency has created the same requirements for U- and T-visa derivative

relationships further demonstrates that the requirements are based on the

nature and purpose of the U- and T-visa statutes.

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support it.” Fournier v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations

omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that spouses and children of U-visa

recipients are similarly situated and yet treated inconsistently

without a rational basis. Plaintiffs also argue that spouses of

U-visa holders, refugees, asylees, and other nonimmigrant

and immigrant visa holders are also similarly situated and

thus improperly treated differently.

1. Children and Spouses are not Similarly Situated

The regulations require that all qualifying relationships

exist at the time the U-visa application is filed. 8 C.F.R.

§ 214.14(f). However, Plaintiffs point out that if the U-visa

applicant “proves that he or she has become the parent of a

child after [the U-visa application] was filed, the child shall

be eligible to accompany or follow to join.” Id.

§ 214.14(f)(4)(i). Thus, the child and spouse are not treated

similarly. However, we need not reach the issue of whether

these regulations violate equal protection, because children

(especially in these circumstances) are not similarly situated

with adult spouses. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS,

533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001) (rejecting an equal protection claim

between mothers and fathers); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.

420, 433–45 (1998) (rejecting an equal protection claim

because the challenged classes (unwed mothers and fathers)

were not “similarly situated”). Children (in particular,infants)

are dependent upon their mother, father, or both for their very

survival. Whereas spouses may be dependent upon each other

in some respects, that dependency is not equivalent to that of

a parent-child relationship.

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22 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

Even if children and spouses were similarly situated, the

distinction between spouses and children does not violate the

Equal Protection Clause based on a rational-basis review.

Treating spouses and children differently is rationally based

on Congress’s interest in preventing marriage fraud. The

concerns of marriage fraud with derivative spouses are not

similarly present with derivative children.Congress has taken

steps to ensure that marriage-based immigration be regulated

and marriage fraud be punished. See Immigration Marriage

Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat.

3537. Thus, the prevention of marriage fraud is a legitimate

government purpose, and that purpose provides a rational

basis for the U-visa regulation’s different treatment of

spouses as compared to children.

2. Distinction Between Nonimmigrant Derivative

Spouses is Rationally Based.

The timing of when a spouse qualifies for derivative

status by “accompanying, or following to join,” the principal

alien depends upon the underlying relief requested by the

principal alien. Plaintiffs generally assert that there is no

rational basis for treating U-visa spouses differently than

asylum or refugee spouses. To prevail on an equal protectionrational basis challenge, Plaintiffs must “negate every

conceivable basis” that could support a rational basis for a

distinction between spouses. Fournier, 718 F.3d at 1123

(alteration and citation omitted). However, in their opening

brief, Plaintiffs do not negate any conceivable basis for the

distinction. Rather, Plaintiffs only summarily assert that any

distinction is irrational and their reply brief fails to address it

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 23

at all.8 Thus, we need not address this question. See

Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We

will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare

assertion does not preserve a claim . . . .”).

Nevertheless, Defendants respond that the risk of

marriage and immigration fraud provide a rational basis for

the different treatment of spouses under the regulations.

Immigration fraud concerns and the underlying purpose of the

different visa categories provide a rational basis for the

different treatment of U-visa spouses as compared to other

spouses. As discussed above, asylee and refugee status is

extended to noncitizens who come to the United States

fleeing their home country and cannot return at that time and

applicants must demonstrate what harm they are fleeing and

that they may likely be harmed if they return. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42). Once granted asylum, they may remain in the

country indefinitely (unless status is terminated for a

specified reason) and adjust to permanent resident status after

only a year. Id. §§ 1158, 1159.

By contrast, U visas are extended only to noncitizens

already present in the United States who have been personally

victimized. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U). U-visa petitioners need not

demonstrate why or how they entered the United States or

why they do not return to their country of origin. Because it

is a nonimmigrant category, U-visa status generally lasts only

8 Plaintiffs argue that the government cannot rely on marriage fraud

as a rational basis, because the government did not rely on this reason

when it enacted the regulations. However, under a rational basis review,

the government did not need to articulate its reasoning when it enacted the

regulations. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,

367 (2001).

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24 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI

for a period of four years (and does not confer the same

benefits as asylum or refugee status) and must be maintained

for three years before a U-visa holder can apply for

adjustment of status. Id. §§ 1184(p), 1255(m)(1)(A).

Because significant differences exist between the

categories of spouses and the requirements for obtaining

status, “there is a rational relationship between the disparity

of treatment” among spouses and it furthers a “legitimate

governmental purpose.” See Aleman, 217 F.3d at 1200

(citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I would reverse, as I do not think the regulation at issue

here is a valid interpretation of the governing statute.

The regulatory provision challenged by the plaintiffs

provides in relevant part as follows:

[T]he relationship between the U-1 principal

alien and the qualifying family member must

exist at the time Form I-918 was filed, and the

relationship must continue to exist at the time

FormI-918, Supplement A is adjudicated, and

at the time of the qualifying family member’s

subsequent admission to the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 214.14(f)(4). The plaintiffs do not challenge the

regulation’s requirement that the marital relationship exist at

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TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI 25

the time the petition for derivative status is adjudicated and at

the time (if pertinent) of the spouse’s subsequent admission

to the United States. So our focus is solely on the

regulation’s requirement that “the relationship between the U1 principal alien and the qualifying family member must exist

at the time Form I-918 was filed.”

Section 214.14(f)(4) plainly establishes an eligibility

requirement: It purports to define which spouses are eligible

to be treated as derivative beneficiaries in the U-visa context. 

Our cases make clear that an agency may impose eligibility

requirements with respect to immigration benefits only if the

requirements are grounded in the statutory text. See Bona v.

Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). Put differently,

when Congress has specified the class of non-citizens eligible

for a particular immigration benefit, an agency may not

“impose[ ] a new requirement that is not contemplated by

Congress.” Schneider v. Chertoff, 450 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.

2006).

The government contends that the eligibility requirement

imposed by § 214.14(f)(4) is authorized by the U-visa

statute’s use of the phrase “accompanying or following to

join” to describe those family members eligible to receive

derivative status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii). In the

government’s view, this statutory term is ambiguous, as

Congress did not attempt to define it elsewhere in the statute. 

The government further contends that USCIS reasonably

filled this statutory gap by interpreting the phrase to mean

that a spouse may “accompany or follow to join” the principal

petitioner only if the marital relationship existed on the date

that the principal petitioner filed her application for a U visa.

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I do not think USCIS’s interpretation can be squared with

the well-settled meaning of “accompanying or following to

join.” By the time Congress enacted the TVPA in 2000, that

statutory phrase had been used in dozens of federal

immigration provisions, the first dating back to the 1920s. 

See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 153,

162. And as applied to spouses, the phrase had consistently

been construed to mean that the marital relationship must

exist at the time the principal petitioner’s application for an

immigration benefit is granted, not at the time her application

was filed.

For example,Congress used the phrase “accompanying or

following to join” in defining the spouses and children who

may be treated as derivative beneficiaries when a non-citizen

adjusts her status to that of a lawful permanent resident under

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). See § 1255(i)(1)(B) (incorporating

§ 1153(d)). As we noted in Landin-Molina v. Holder,

580 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2009), spouses can “accompany or

follow to join” under this 1994 enactment so long as the

marital relationship exists at the time the principal

petitioner’s application for adjustment of status is granted. 

Id. at 919 (citing Matter of Naulu, 19 I. & N. Dec. 351, 352

n.1 (BIA 1986)). We relied in part on a 1999 policy

memorandum in which the former Immigration and

Naturalization Service explained that when a non-citizen

seeking to adjust status under § 1255(i) marries or has

children “after the qualifying petition or application was filed

but before adjustment of status,” these “‘after-acquired’

children and spouses are allowed to adjust under [§ 1255(i)]

as long as they acquire the status of a spouse or child before

the principal alien ultimately adjusts status.” Id. (quoting

Accepting Applications for Adjustment of Status Under

Section 245(i), HQ 70/23.1-P, HQ 70/8-P, at 5 (June 10,

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1999), reproduced at 76 Interpreter Releases 1017 (July 2,

1999)). This interpretation of the statutory phrase also

accords with the views of the State Department, both before

and after enactment of the TVPA. See 9 Foreign Affairs

Manual 502.1-1(C)(2)(b)(2)(b) (2018); 9 Foreign Affairs

Manual 42.42 n.9 (1997).

The phrase “accompanying or following to join” has been

given the same meaning in the context of non-citizens

applying for asylum or refugee status. In those contexts, too,

Congress has extended derivative status to family members

“accompanying, or following to join,” the principal petitioner. 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(2)(A) (refugees), 1158(b)(3)(A)

(asylees). In neither of those contexts does the spouse’s

eligibility for derivative status depend on the date on which

the principal petitioner filed her application for humanitarian

status.

Take first the rule for refugees. So long as the principal

petitioner (the refugee) was married to her spouse on the date

the principal petitioner is admitted into the United States, the

spouse is eligible for derivative status. 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(c);

Procedures for Filing a Derivative Petition (Form I-730) for

a Spouse and Unmarried Children of a Refugee/Asylee,

63 Fed. Reg. 3792, 3796 (Jan. 27, 1998). The couple need

not have been married on the date that the refugee applied for

refugee status. Likewise for asylees. Since asylees apply for

asylum from within the United States, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)(1), the eligibility rule for derivative beneficiaries

does not turn on the date the asylee is admitted into the

United States. Instead, if the principal petitioner (the asylee)

is married on the date her asylum application is granted, she

may petition for her spouse to receive derivative status as

well. 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(b); 63 Fed. Reg. at 3796. Again, that

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remains true even if the asylee married her spouse after

applying for asylum. In both contexts, then, principal

petitioners may seek derivative status on behalf of their

spouses if the marriage exists when the principal petitioner is

granted humanitarian status.

As these examples reflect, when Congress enacted the Uvisa statute, the phrase “accompanying or following to join”

had uniformly been interpreted to mean that eligibility for

derivative status is measured at the time the principal

petitioner is granted an immigration benefit, not at the time

the principal petitioner applies for that benefit. Indeed,

despite being pressed to do so, the government could not

identify a single instance in which, before 2000, the phrase

had been given a contrary construction. That fact triggers “a

longstanding interpretive principle: When a statutory term is

obviously transplanted fromanother legal source, it brings the

old soil with it.” Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801

(2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress’

deliberate choice to use the phrase “accompanying or

following to join” in the U-visa statute brought with it the old

soil concerning the point in time at which the required family

relationship for derivative status is measured.

One additional interpretive clue bears mentioning. We

know that Congress used the phrase “accompanying or

following to join” in its traditional sense in the U-visa statute

because when Congress wanted to depart from the settled

meaning of that phrase it did so explicitly. Congress

provided that a principal petitioner who is under the age of

21 may petition for derivative status on behalf of “unmarried

siblings under 18 years of age on the date on which such alien

applied for status under such clause.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii)(I) (emphasis added); see also

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§ 1158(b)(3)(B) (establishing similar rule for children of

asylees). This provision permits unmarried siblings who

would have “aged out” if the family relationship were

assessed at the time the principal petitioner’s U-visa

application is granted to remain eligible for derivative status. 

By contrast, in the very next subsection, Congress extended

eligibility to the spouse and children of a principal petitioner

who is 21 years of age or older without any reference to the

date of filing. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii)(II). That drafting choice

provides further confirmation that Congress intended the

phrase “accompanying or following to join” to carry its usual

meaning—with the family relationship assessed at the time

the principal petitioner’s application is granted—except with

respect to the one category of family members for which it

provided otherwise.

“Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous answer

to the interpretive question at hand,” so we need not venture

beyond step one of the analysis under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984). See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113

(2018). Congress’ use of the phrase “accompanying or

following to join” requires USCIS to assess the existence of

the marital relationship at the time the principal petitioner’s

application for a U visa is granted, not when the principal

petitioner files her application for a U visa. In my view,

§ 214.14(f)(4) is invalid insofar as it renders a spouse

ineligible for derivative status simply because she married the

principal petitioner after the principal petitioner filed her

application for a U visa. I would hold that a spouse is eligible

for derivative status so long as the marital relationship exists

on the date USCIS grants the principal petitioner a U visa,

and on the date USCIS adjudicates the petition for derivative

status filed by the principal petitioner on her spouse’s behalf.

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