Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06794/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06794-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES B.,

1

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-06794-TSH 

ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 27, 32

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James B. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial 

review of a final decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security, denying his claim for disability benefits. Pending before the Court are the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 27 (Pl.’s Mot.), 32 (Def.’s Mot.). Pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 16-5, the motions have been submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having 

reviewed the parties’ positions, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and relevant legal authority, 

the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for the 

following reasons.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Age, Education and Work Experience

Plaintiff is a 37-year old resident of Alameda County, California with a history of learning 

and conduct problems. AR 854. As a child, he was beaten with belts and switches but “was wild 

 

1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the 

recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial 

Conference of the United States.

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and careless and laughed when he was beaten.” Id. Plaintiff attended special education classes for 

dyslexia and briefly attended Laney College’s culinary program. AR 82, 809, 855. He has had 

jobs in construction, painting and warehouse work. AR 855. Plaintiff also worked for a brief time 

as a line bagger at Revolution Foods, “tak[ing] stuff from one spot and put[ting] it on the line.” 

AR 83-84.

Plaintiff has been incarcerated multiple times for violence, including assault and rape, both

as a youth in the juvenile justice system and later in state prison as an adult. AR 809, 854-55. His 

parole was repeatedly extended “due to his short temper and inappropriate behaviors with the 

parole officer and judges” and he “reportedly cursed his parole officer out and threatened to throw 

things in the court room.” AR 855.

B. Medical Evidence

Exhibit 1F consists of records from Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, Prison Health 

Services, dated September 25-30, 2006. AR 350-68. The records primarily consist of Plaintiff

being treated for various conditions, including anxiety. AR 351-55. His symptoms included chest 

pain, facial numbness, vomiting and shortness of breath. AR 359.

Exhibit 2F consists of additional records from Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, 

Prison Health Services, dated September 26, 2006 to January 8, 2008. AR 369-412. These

records begin with medication lists from August 2007 through March 2008, indicating Plaintiff

was diagnosed with asthma and hypertension and prescribed various medications. AR 370-83. 

An intake form dated July 15, 2007 indicates Plaintiff did not appear agitated, depressed, 

confused, or developmentally delayed. AR 411. The records also contain results of a blood test, 

an X-ray for a hand injury that was negative for acute findings, as well as medical request forms 

completed by Plaintiff between August 2007 and January 2008. AR 385-408. 

Exhibit 3F consists of records from the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, San Quentin State Prison, dated from March 13, 2008 to October 15, 2009. AR 

413-74. The records include mental health evaluation notes, psychiatrist progress notes, and case 

manager progress notes. AR 441-74. On March 13, 2008, Plaintiff reported being diagnosed with 

Attention Deficit Disorder and leaving school prior to graduating in the 12th grade. AR 442. He

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also reported daily use of marijuana, “as much as I can buy,” and ecstasy “3x week and all 

weekend till now.” Id. He reported situational depression and sleep disturbance. AR 444. 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with polysubstance dependence and assessed a GAF2of 69, but the 

provider found he did not meet the criteria for mental health inclusion. Id. A September 17, 2008

note indicates a provisional diagnosis of Anxiety Disorder, but also indicates Plaintiff had no 

complaints or medication side effects, his sleep and appetite were okay, his grooming and hygiene 

were average, he was goal directed, his judgment and insight were average, and that he was

assessed a GAF score of 65. AR 455. A note from October 15, 2009 indicates Plaintiff was 

experiencing nightmares about being shot and killed. AR 447. The note refers to Plaintiff’s 

depression as an antecedent to substance dependence. Id. The treatment note also indicates 

Plaintiffs’ mood and affect were sad but his depression was stable, he was alert and oriented, his 

hygiene and grooming were good, his thought process was clear and linear, his judgment and 

insight were fair, his memory and concentration were intact, he denied any medical concerns, he 

did not exhibit psychosis, and he was goal directed and isolated himself to avoid trouble and get 

released on time. Id. Other notes indicate suicidal ideation, dysphoric mood, flat affect (AR 454),

“slightly slovenly, and somewhat malodorous’ (AR 461), and a prescription for Remeron to treat 

depression (AR 470).

Exhibit 4F contains additional records from the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, San Quentin State Prison, dated from January 16, 2009 to January 25, 2010. AR 

475-552. These records are chart notes and medication lists, indicating Plaintiff was being treated 

for asthma, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, a mental health disorder, rhinitis and skin rashes; and 

medicated with aspirin, Flovent, hydrochlorothiazide, Lisinopril, mirtazapine (Remeron), 

simvastatin, verapamil, and fluocinolone. AR 474-532. A chart note from October 29, 2009 

indicates Plaintiff sought medical treatment because he was experiencing nightmares. AR 533. 

 

2 A Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score is a numerical summary of a clinician’s 

judgment of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical 

continuum of mental health on a scale of one hundred. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). A GAF score of 61-70 represents some mild 

symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.

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He denied medication side effects, his appetite was normal, he was alert and oriented, his 

grooming and hygiene were adequate, his speech was normal and goal directed, his associations 

were intact, his mood was mildly low with congruent affect, he denied hallucinations, and his 

judgment and insight appeared average. Id. The provider assessed a GAF score of 65. AR 533.

Exhibit 5F contains additional records from Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, Prison 

Health Services, dated January 2, 2007 to March 10, 2011. AR 553-600. These records are chart 

notes indicating treatment for hypertension and asthma. AR 570. A November 26, 2007 note also 

indicates a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder. AR 566. A December 12, 2007 note indicates 

Plaintiff complained of insomnia. AR 576. 

Exhibit 6F contains additional records from Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, Prison 

Health Services, dated February 3, 2011 to August 16, 2012. AR 601-47. The records reflect 

ongoing treatment and medication for hypertension, hyperlipidemia, asthma, and depression. AR 

610. The notes also indicate that although Plaintiff reported a history of mental health disorders, 

he denied mental health symptoms, denied a history of special education, and denied having a 

learning disability. AR 613. 

Exhibit 7F contains additional records from Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, Prison 

Health Services, dated August 9, 2012 to October 7, 2012. AR 648-710. The records also reflect 

ongoing treatment and medication for hypertension, hyperlipidemia, asthma, and depression. Id. 

Exhibit 8F contains records from the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, Parole Outpatient Clinic, dated February 3, 2010 to April 11, 2013. AR 711-31. 

These records consist of individual and group therapy progress notes (AR 711-18) and a February 

3, 2010 mental health evaluation conducted by Francesca Biffi, LCSW. AR 728-31. Ms. Biffi 

indicated Plaintiff was alert and oriented to time, person, and place; he was cooperative, attentive, 

and pleasant; his speech was clear, organized, and had no abnormalities; his thought process and 

content were normal; he was calm with no unusual behaviors; his concentration was sufficient and 

he could follow instructions; he had fair long-term memory; his fund of knowledge was average 

and appropriate for his educational level; and he denied auditory or visual hallucinations. AR 729. 

Ms. Biffi noted Plaintiff had poor insight and judgment and refused to take responsibility for his 

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crime of rape. Id. She also noted he reported starting to drink alcohol at the age of 11 and using 

marijuana at the age of 12. AR 730. Ms. Biffi diagnosed Plaintiff with Sexual Abuse of Adult; 

Polysubstance Dependence; Alcohol Abuse; and Antisocial Personality Disorder. AR 728. A 

November 5, 2012 chart note completed by psychiatrist James Dotson, M.D., indicates Plaintiff

was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder after getting into fights in jail. AR 712. A July 16, 2012 

chart note also completed by Dr. Dotson diagnosed Plaintiff with provisional Depressive Disorder 

NOS. AR 722. Dr. Dotson indicated Plaintiff’s medications were effective for depression and he 

had no side effects aside from increased appetite. Id. 

Exhibits 9F and 10F are records from the Emergency Department of Alameda Medical 

Center, dated October 16, 2005 to May 27, 2013. AR 732-806. The records reflect treatment in 

the ER for injuries caused by being stabbed in 2005 (AR 772), hematuria and a wrist injury in 

2012 (AR 736, 794), and a hand injury, back pain and asthma in 2013 (AR 765, 800).

Exhibit 11F is a psychological evaluation by Jonathan Howard, Psy.D., dated September 

16, 2013. AR 808-11. Dr. Howard diagnosed Plaintiff with “Mood Disorder, NOS, with 

depressed, anxious, and reported angry and labile features, and reported auditory hallucinations; 

Rule out Psychotic Disorder, NOS; Marijuana dependence, in remission (by claimant’s report);”

and a GAF of 58-60.3 AR 810. Dr. Howard concluded that Plaintiff demonstrated “mild to 

moderate impairment in his ability to understand and carry out simple instructions and tasks;”

“moderate impairment as the instructions and task become more complex;” “moderate impairment 

in his ability to attend and concentrate on usual work situations;” “moderate to marked impairment 

in his ability to interact effectively with supervisors, co-workers, and the public;” “mild to 

moderate impairment in his pace, his persistence of tasks, and his ability to perform activities 

within a schedule and maintain regular attendance;” and moderate to marked impairment in the 

ability to adapt to changes in a work setting. AR 811.

Exhibit 12F is a medical evaluation completed by Rose Lewis, M.D., dated September 23, 

2013. AR 813-18. Dr. Lewis provided the following functional assessment:

 

3 A GAF score of 51-60 represents moderate symptoms or any moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school functioning.

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The claimant can stand and walk up to six hours because of the 

exertional dyspnea. The claimant can sit without limitations. The 

claimant does not use assistive device. The claimant can lift and carry 

up to 100 pounds occasionally and 50 pounds frequently. The 

claimant is capable of climbing without limitations, balancing without 

limitations, stooping without limitations, kneeling without 

limitations, crouching without limitations, and crawling without 

limitations. The claimant is capable of reaching without limitations, 

handling without limitations, fingering without limitations, and 

feeling without limitations. The claimant has no limitations with 

working at heights. The claimant has limitations with working around 

heavy machinery because of his exertional dyspnea. The claimant has 

no limitations with working around extremes of temperature. The 

claimant has limitations with working around chemicals and working 

around dust, fumes and gasses because of the exertional dyspnea, 

asthma, wheezing and shortness of breath. The claimant has no 

limitations with working around excessive noise.

AR 816.

Exhibit 13F consists of records from the Emergency Room of Highland Hospital, dated 

December 26, 2013 to October 22, 2014. AR 819-53. The records consist of treatment for asthma 

and bronchitis in 2013 (AR 847) and hematuria twice in 2014 (AR 821, 837).

Exhibit 14F is a psychological evaluation by Lesleigh Franklin, Ph.D., dated June 6, 2015. 

AR 854-62. Elizabeth Walzer, MSW, Psy.D., is also listed as an examiner. AR 854. Dr. Franklin 

diagnosed Plaintiff with Bipolar Disorder II; Attention Deficit Disorder, Combined Type; 

Antisocial Personality Disorder; Borderline Intellectual Functioning; Asthma; Obesity; 

Hypertension; Hyperlipidemia; and a Personal History of Physical Abuse in Childhood. AR 861. 

Dr. Franklin provided the following functional assessment:

If Mr. Plaintiff were to be placed in a work situation at this time he 

would likely have moderate difficulties remembering and carrying 

out simple directions, and marked difficulties remembering and 

carrying out complex directions. He would have marked problems 

with attention. He would have moderate difficulties completing tasks 

correctly at an adequate pace. He would have moderate trouble 

getting along with the public and co-workers, but he would likely 

have extreme trouble with authority when things were not going his 

way. Mr. Plaintiff would likely have marked difficulties completing 

a normal workday without intrusive psychological symptoms, and 

marked problems getting to work on time or at all. 

AR 861-62. In a chart indicating Plaintiff’s mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do unskilled 

work, Dr. Franklin concluded he would have a moderate impairment in the ability to understand, 

remember and carry out very short and simple instructions; perform at a consistent pace without 

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an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; get along and work with others; and interact 

appropriately with the general public. AR 862. In the same chart, Dr. Franklin also concluded 

Plaintiff would have marked impairment in the ability to understand, remember and carry out 

detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for two hour segments; respond 

appropriately to changes in a routine work setting and deal with normal work stressors; complete a 

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; 

maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances; and an 

extreme impairment in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism 

from supervisors. Id.

Exhibit 15F consists of case management notes from the Parole Outpatient Clinic, dated 

June 13, 2013 to April 23, 2015. AR 863-66. A June 27, 2013 note from Dr. Dotson indicates a 

diagnosis of Bipolar, euthymic. AR 865. These notes also indicate Plaintiff was doing well on his 

medications, his mood was even, he did not have depression, anger problems, or mood swings, he 

did not have medication side effects, he was doing well on parole, and he was alert, polite, calm, 

and logical with normal speech. AR 865-66.

Exhibit 16F consists of records from the Emergency Room of San Leandro Hospital, dated 

December 3, 2014 to March 29, 2016. AR 867-86. These records document treatment for face 

and back pain secondary to a car accident in 2014 (AR 878), and for chest pain and hematuria in 

2016 (AR 867).

Exhibit 17F consists of records from Lifelong Medical Care, dated July 6, 2015 to April 5, 

2016. AR 887-925. These records are chart notes indicating ongoing treatment for hypertension, 

asthma, hyperthyroidism, and elevated hemoglobin and indicate Plaintiff was prescribed various 

medications. AR 891.

Exhibit 1A contains a Psychiatric Review Technique form and Mental Residual Functional 

Capacity Assessment completed by State agency psychologist Michael Hammonds, Ph.D., dated 

October 22, 2013. AR 134-39. Dr. Hammonds concluded Plaintiff would have a mild restriction 

of activities of daily living; and moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning and 

concentration, persistence and pace. AR 135. As to mental residual functional capacity, Dr. 

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Hammonds concluded Plaintiff would have a moderate limitation in the ability to carry out 

detailed instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to maintain concentration for extended 

periods; moderate limitation in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public; 

moderate limitation in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors; and moderate limitation in the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work 

setting. AR 137-38. Dr. Hammonds opined that Plaintiff could maintain attention and 

concentration to perform simple tasks for two hours at a time; he could complete an 8-hour work 

day and a 40-hour work week; he could interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors, 

but supervision “should be direct and nonconfrontational”; he would do best in an environment 

that did not require ongoing public contact but was capable of casual and infrequent contact to 

answer questions and provide service that was “not persistent”; he could adapt to routine changes 

and respond to directions in a work environment requiring simple, repetitive tasks; he “may” have 

difficulty adapting to new work situations but could adapt to predictable work environments; and 

he could attend work regularly, make work-related decisions, protect against safety hazards, and 

travel to and from work independently. AR 138-39.

Exhibit 4A contains a Psychiatric Review Technique form and Mental Residual Functional 

Capacity Assessment completed by State agency psychologist Adrianne Gallucci, Psy.D., dated 

February 12, 2014. AR 151-52, 155-57. Dr. Gallucci concluded Plaintiff would have a mild 

restriction of activities of daily living and moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning 

and concentration, persistence and pace. AR 151. As to his mental residual functional capacity, 

Dr. Gallucci concluded Plaintiff would have a moderate limitation in the ability to understand, 

remember and carry out detailed instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to maintain 

attention and concentration for extended periods; moderate limitation in the ability to interact

appropriately with the general public; moderate limitation in the ability to accept instructions and 

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and moderate limitation in the ability to 

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. AR 155-56. Additionally, Dr. Gallucci 

concluded Plaintiff would be able to remember work-like procedures; understand and remember 

simple instructions; maintain attention for two-hour segments; maintain attendance and be 

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punctual at the customary tolerances; sustain ordinary routine without special supervision; 

coordinate with others without being distracted by them; make simple work-related decisions; 

complete a normal workweek and workday without interruptions from psychologically based 

symptoms; perform consistently without unreasonable breaks; respond appropriately to criticism 

from supervisors; get along with co-workers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral

extremes; respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; and be aware of hazards and 

take precautions. AR 156-57. 

III. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging 

disability beginning on May 1, 2006. AR 17. The Social Security Administration denied 

Plaintiff’s claim on November 18, 2013, finding he did not qualify for disability benefits. AR 

161-65. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied on February 

13, 2014. AR 169-74. On February 27, 2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 175-77. 

A. Initial Hearing

ALJ Bradlee S. Welton conducted a hearing on June 17, 2015. AR 78-128. Plaintiff

testified in person at the hearing and was represented by counsel, Michael Wolchansky. AR 78. 

The ALJ also heard testimony from Vocational Expert Kenneth Ferra. Id. 

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified he did not graduate from high school or obtain a GED, but later attended 

culinary classes at Laney College. AR 82. He stopped attending classes at Laney College due to 

concentration difficulty. AR 83. Plaintiff worked as a line bagger for two months in 2014 but was 

fired because he was late to work “a lot.” AR 83, 87. He also testified he had disagreements with 

co-workers “about six” times. AR 86. 

Plaintiff testified that he has acid reflux, asthma and high blood pressure. AR 95, 98. He 

takes Remeron, Depakote, Lisinopril, Verapamil, Hydrochlorothiazide and aspirin, but his 

medication makes him feel “like a zombie” and makes it difficult for him to wake up. AR 87, 

100. Plaintiff experiences anxiety “about everything.” AR 103. He also experiences suicidal 

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thoughts and attempted suicide the year before the hearing by cutting himself. AR 114. 

Plaintiff testified that he feels anger almost every day and that anything can trigger it. AR 

121. It makes him feel like isolating himself. Id. He testified he can focus on a task for five to 

ten minutes before losing concentration and that he experiences audio and visual hallucinations 

two to three times a week. AR 111, 116.

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The vocational expert testified that the only prior employment he considered substantial 

gainful activity was Plaintiff’s work as a line bagger. AR 123. He testified that the position was 

more accurately classified as material handler under Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)

929.687-030, 1991 WL 688174.

4

 The ALJ posed two hypotheticals to the vocational expert. 

First, the ALJ presented the following hypothetical:

Assume a hypothetical person the same age and education as the 

claimant, that being 31 years of age, with a limited education. Further 

assume that this hypothetical person retains the capacity to 

occasionally lift and carry a maximum of 20 pounds frequently, lift 

and carry 10 pounds. Can stand and walk with normal breaks for six 

hours out of an eight-hour workday; can sit for six hours out of an 

eight-hour workday; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, ladders, 

ropes, scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; and can frequently 

balance.

The non-exertional limitations would be work limited to one to two 

step tasks in a low stress job with only occasional decision-making, 

only occasional changes in work setting, only occasional judgment 

required on the job with no production - - fast-paced production rate 

work required. And no tandem tasks with coworkers. . . . Would such 

a person be able to do any of the work that the claimant has done in 

the past?

AR 123-24. The vocational expert testified the description of activities would be compatible with 

Plaintiff’s past work “as performed, not necessarily the material handler as described by the 

Department of Labor.” AR 124. The ALJ next asked if “there are other jobs in the open labor 

 

4 The Dictionary of Occupational Titles by the United States Department of Labor, Employment & 

Training Administration, may be relied upon “in evaluating whether the claimant is able to 

perform work in the national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The DOT classifies jobs by their exertional and skill requirements and may be a primary source of 

information for the ALJ or Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d) (1). The “best source for how 

a job is generally performed is usually the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2001).

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market that a person with these limitations could do.” Id. The vocational expert responded there 

were two: Cleaner, DOT 323.687-014; and Laundry Worker, DOT 302.685-010. AR 124-25.

The second hypothetical from the ALJ had the same limitations as the first, but with the 

addition that the person would miss one or more days of work per month. AR 125. The 

vocational expert testified there would be no available jobs because “[f]or entry level unskilled 

activities, almost any time away from tasks is going to be unacceptable to an employer.” AR 125-

26. When examined by Plaintiff’s attorney, the expert also testified there are no unskilled jobs 

available for a hypothetical individual who would be off task at least 25% of the time and none for 

a hypothetical individual who would be unable to interact appropriately with supervisors. AR 

127.

B. Second Hearing

After Plaintiff’s counsel requested an additional hearing to ask the vocational expert 

follow-up questions, ALJ Welton held a supplemental hearing on May 12, 2016. AR 34-77. 

Plaintiff was again represented by Mr. Wolchansky and the ALJ also heard testimony from 

another vocational expert, Christopher Salvo. AR 34. 

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified he did not work between the first and second hearings. AR 42. He 

testified he was fired from his line bagger job in 2014 for taking too many breaks and being late. 

AR 56. He stated he takes Depakote and Montelukast and his medication causes him to oversleep. 

AR 46, 57. He also experiences depression. AR 47. 

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ posed the following hypothetical:

Assume a hypothetical person with the same age and education as the 

claimant with a - - that’s with a high school education at 31 years of 

age. And further assume that this person can occasionally lift a 

maximum of 50 pounds; frequently lift and carry 25 pounds; can stand 

and walk with normal breaks for six hours out of an eight-hour 

workday; can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday; can 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

and crawl; can do no climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. . . . 

Must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dust, and other lung 

irritants; can do simple routine repetitive tasks in a low stress job 

environment requiring only occasional decision-making. Only 

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occasional changes in work setting; only occasional requirements for 

exercising judgment; no fast-paced production work; and no 

interaction with the public; and no tandem tasks with coworkers. . . . 

And would such a person be able to do the job that he did at 

Revolution Foods?

AR 59-60. The vocational expert replied that the hypothetical person would be able to do the job. 

AR 60. The expert also responded that other jobs were also available, including Hand Packer 

(DOT 920.587-018), Small Products Assembler (DOT 706.684-022), and Production Assembler 

(DOT 706.687-010). AR 60-61. The ALJ then added a definition of occasional as used in the 

hypothetical to mean 1 to 33 percent of the day; the vocational expert responded the jobs would 

still be appropriate. AR 61-62. 

The ALJ posed a second hypothetical:

I’m going to make it now a light hypothetical; occasionally lifting and 

carrying a maximum of 20 pounds, that’s occasionally, between 1 

percent of the day up to 33 percent of the day, and frequently lift and 

carry 10 pounds. Can stand and walk with normal breaks for six hours 

out of an eight-hour workday. Same postural as before, occasional 

with no ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Same avoiding concentrated 

exposure to fumes and dust and other lung irritants. And add to this 

a limitation to only frequent overhead reaching with the right major 

upper extremity; and then using all the same non-exertional 

limitations that I have you before. . . . Are there any jobs that would 

be available in the open labor market for a person with these 

limitations?

AR 62. The vocational expert responded that he would keep the small products and production 

assembler positions but eliminate the hand packer job. Id. The expert also added a Bench 

Assembler position (DOT 706.674-042). AR 63. 

When questioned by Plaintiff’s counsel, the vocational expert testified there would be no 

jobs available for the same hypothetical individual who would be off task at least 15% of the time 

(AR 67), 30 minutes late to work at least one day a week (AR 68), absent from work two or more 

days a month (AR 69), or who would be unable to respond appropriately to supervisors at least 

15% of the time (AR 72). 

C. ALJ’s Decision and Plaintiff’s Appeal

On September 27, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not 

disabled. AR 14-28. This decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to review it 

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on September 29, 2017. AR 1. Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Plaintiff

commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On December 19, 

2018, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 1, 2019, Defendant

filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if the findings are “supported by 

substantial evidence and if the [ALJ] applied the correct legal standards.” Holohan v. Massanari, 

246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence means more than a 

scintilla but less than a preponderance” of evidence that “a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). The 

court must consider the administrative record as a whole, weighing the evidence that both supports 

and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the court 

must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, and all other 

ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. Id. 

Additionally, the harmless error rule applies where substantial evidence otherwise supports 

the ALJ’s decision. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n error is 

harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error 

‘does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Batson v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)). A court may not reverse an ALJ’s 

decision because of an error that is harmless. Id. at 1111 (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006)). “‘[T]he burden of showing that an error is 

harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.’” Id. (quoting 

Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Framework for Determining Whether a Claimant Is Disabled

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Social Security provide for a fivestep sequential analysis to determine whether a Social Security claimant is disabled.5

 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520. The sequential inquiry is terminated when “a question is answered affirmatively or 

negatively in such a way that a decision can be made that a claimant is or is not disabled.” Pitzer 

v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). During the first four steps of this sequential 

inquiry, the claimant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate disability. Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). At step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner “to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work.” Id. (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is performing “substantial gainful 

activity,” which would mandate that the claimant be found not disabled regardless of medical 

condition, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). Here, the ALJ 

determined Plaintiff performed substantial gainful activity for two months in 2014, earning a total 

of $3,393.33, which “was above substantial gainful activities levels per the Social Security 

Regulations.” AR 19 (citing AR 277-84). The ALJ noted Plaintiff testified he came late because 

of side effects from his medications but noted “no such side effects were communicated to his 

treating doctors.” Id. He also noted Plaintiff’s testimony that he was fired “for taking too many 

breaks, oversleeping and arriving to work late,” and that neither Plaintiff nor his attorney argued 

he lost his job secondary to his impairments. Id. However, as there had been a continuous 12-

month period during which Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ 

proceeded to the next step. Id. 

At step two, the ALJ must determine, based on medical findings, whether the claimant has 

a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 

 

5 Disability is “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” because of a medical 

impairment which can result in death or “which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

Mood Disorder, Marijuana Dependence, Hypertension, Asthma, and Obesity. AR 19. 

If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a severe impairment, the process proceeds to 

the third step, where the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meet or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. 

P, App. 1 (the “Listing of Impairments”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If a claimant’s 

impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent to the 

criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering age, 

education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets the listings. AR 20.

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual Function 

Capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). RFC refers to what an individual can do in a work 

setting, despite mental or physical limitations caused by impairments or related symptoms. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including the medically determinable 

impairments that are nonsevere. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has 

the RFC to perform medium work6 with the following exceptions:

[C]laimant can occasionally lift a maximum of 50 pounds, and 

frequently lift and carry 25 pounds. He can stand and walk, with 

normal breaks, six hours out of an eight-hour workday, and sit for six 

hours out of an eight-hour workday. He can occasionally climb ramps 

and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He cannot climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He must avoid concentrated exposure to 

fumes, dusts, and other lung irritants. He can do simple routine and 

repetitive tasks in a job environment requiring only occasional 

decision-making, only occasional changes in work setting, and only 

occasional requirement for exercising judgment. He cannot perform 

fast-paced production work. He cannot interact with the general 

public and cannot perform tandem tasks with coworkers.

 

6

“Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or 

carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium work, we determine that 

he or she can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).

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AR 22. 

The fourth step of the evaluation process requires that the ALJ determine whether the 

claimant’s RFC is sufficient to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 

404.1520(f). Past relevant work is work performed within the past 15 years that was substantial 

gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to do his past relevant work, the claimant is not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (iv). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform 

past relevant work “because the demands of the claimant’s past relevant work exceed the residual 

functional capacity.” AR 26.

In the fifth step of the analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there 

are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can 

perform consistent with the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(g); 404.1560(c). The Commissioner can meet this burden by relying on the testimony of 

a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 2. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ 

determined there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff

can perform, including the jobs provided by the vocational experts: hand packer, small products 

assembler, and production assembler. AR 27. 

B. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff raises four arguments in support of his motion: (1) the ALJ’s rejection of treating 

and examining opinions in favor of non-treating and non-examining medical opinions is not based 

on substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ’s RFC finding and resulting vocational expert testimony are 

not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate medical equivalence 

at the third step of the sequential evaluation process; and (4) the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s 

credibility by failing to consider the entire case record and provide clear and convincing reasons 

supported by the evidence. 

///

///

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C. Medical Opinions7

In concluding Plaintiff could perform a range of medium work with the mental limitations 

in his RFC, the ALJ gave considerable weight to the opinions from the State agency psychologists 

(Drs. Hammonds and Gallucci) and little weight to the consultative examiners’ opinions (Drs. 

Howard and Franklin). AR 25-26. Regarding Dr. Hammond and Dr. Gallucci, the ALJ noted:

The psychological consultants opined that the claimant can perform 

simple tasks and maintain attention and concentration for two hours 

at a time, and sufficiently complete an eight-hour workday, 40 hours 

a week. He is capable of appropriate social interaction with coworkers and supervisors but would do best in an environment which 

does not require ongoing public contact. He is capable of casual and 

infrequent contact that would be required to answer questions and 

provide service that was not persistent. Supervision should be direct 

and non-confrontational. He is able to adapt to routine changes and

respond to direction from others. The claimant may have difficulty 

adapting to new situations at work, but can adapt to predictable 

environments. He can attend work regularly, make work-related 

decision [sic], protect against work related safety hazards, and travel 

to and from work independently.

Id. The ALJ gave “considerable weight” to this assessment, finding Plaintiff’s treatment notes 

generally find normal mental status, stable depression, and good response to medications. Id. at 

26. The ALJ also found that “treatment gaps without evidence of psychological decompensation 

or deterioration further support the above residual functional capacity.” Id. 

Plaintiff argues this finding is “at odds” with his “long history of anti-social behavior, 

including multiple incarcerations for assault, rape, robbery and drug sales.” Pl.’s Mot. at 9 (citing 

AR 855). He further argues that the ALJ’s finding that his “longitudinal treatment notes generally 

find normal mental status, stable depression, and good response to medications” fails to take into 

account his other mental health diagnoses, including bipolar disorder, anti-social personality

disorder and attention deficit disorder. Id. (citing AR 861). Plaintiff maintains that the record 

“documents an individual who has demonstrated extreme negative responses to authority, repeated 

 

7 Rules regarding the evaluation of medical opinion evidence were recently updated, but the 

updates were made effective only for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 82 Fed. Reg. 

5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). As Plaintiff’s claim was filed on May 24, 2013, the Court evaluates the 

medical opinion evidence in his case under the older framework as set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) and in Social Security Ruling 96-2p.

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treatment for mental illness and intellectual impairment since childhood, and an ongoing inability 

to meet the demands of adulthood, including employment or taking care of his children.” Id.

(citing AR 855-56). In contrast to the State agency opinions, Plaintiff contends the opinions of 

Drs. Howard and Franklin “are by far the most thorough, detailed and nuanced in the entire 

record.” Id. 

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ correctly evaluated the medical opinions. Def.’s 

Mot. at 7.

1. Legal Standard

When determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider each medical 

opinion in the record together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); 

Algazzali v. Colvin, 2016 WL 394009, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016). In deciding how much 

weight to give to any medical opinion, the ALJ considers the extent to which the medical source 

presents relevant evidence to support the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3). Generally, more 

weight will be given to an opinion that is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings, and 

the degree to which the opinion provides supporting explanations and is consistent with the record 

as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3)-(4).

In conjunction with the relevant regulations, the Ninth Circuit “developed standards that 

guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Courts “distinguish among the 

opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 

those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither 

examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). Where an examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another opinion, as in 

this case, an ALJ may reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Analysis

Having reviewed the record in this case, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. Contrary to the significant limitations that the consultative examiners 

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endorsed, the ALJ pointed out that the evidence showed Plaintiff responded well to medication, 

his mental impairments were stable, and his mental status examinations were largely normal. AR 

23-26, 719 (Plaintiff reported medications were helpful, he denied side effects, was doing well on 

parole, he was not depressed or agitated, and he was alert, polite, and calm with well-organized

speech); AR 721 (Plaintiff was alert and oriented, he was polite and engaged in treatment, his 

behavior was appropriate; his speech was clear and organized, his mood and affect were normal, 

and he was calm with no delusions or other unusual behavior); AR 729 (Plaintiff was alert and 

oriented; he was cooperative, attentive, and pleasant; his speech was clear and organized; his 

thought process and content were normal; he was calm with no unusual behaviors; his 

concentration was adequate to follow instructions; he had fair long-term memory; his fund of 

knowledge was average and appropriate; and he denied hallucinations; AR 781-82 (Plaintiff was 

cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully oriented, his affect was normal, and he responded 

appropriately to questions); AR 798-99 (same); AR 804 (Plaintiff was cooperative, alert, and 

oriented with clear speech); AR 821 (same); AR 837 (Plaintiff was cooperative, his speech was 

clear, he was fully oriented, his affect was normal, and he responded appropriately to questions); 

AR 850 (same); AR 889 (oriented to time, place, person, and situation, with appropriate mood and 

affect); AR 894 (same); AR 906 (same); AR 918 (same)). 

In light of this evidence, the ALJ properly afforded considerable weight to the State agency 

physicians’ opinions that Plaintiff could perform simple, routine work with additional limitations, 

since those opinions were consistent with his longitudinal treatment notes, his normal mental 

status examinations, his responsiveness to treatment, and evidence showing his mental 

impairments were stable. AR 25-26. For the same reasons, the ALJ appropriately discounted the 

significant mental limitations that the consultative examiners endorsed for being inconsistent with 

the evidence in the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4) (“the more consistent an 

opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”). The ALJ 

recognized that Drs. Howard and Franklin examined Plaintiff, but also appropriately considered 

supportability and consistency with the record as a whole in affording greater weight to the State 

agency psychologists’ opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c); Bray v. Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1221, 

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1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly rejected treating doctor’s statements and instead relied on nonexamining physician’s opinion in assessing the claimant’s RFC); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The 

opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when 

the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record”).

The ALJ also identified other inconsistencies that undermined the consultative examiners’ 

opinions. AR 25. As the ALJ noted, it did not appear that Plaintiff was entirely truthful with Dr. 

Franklin. Id. Although Plaintiff told Dr. Franklin that he last worked in 2012, he was no longer 

using marijuana, and he was receiving treatment through the Parole Outpatient Clinic, the 

evidence showed he worked in 2014, he was continuing to use marijuana, he was no longer 

receiving treatment through the Parole Outpatient Clinic in 2013, and there was little evidence of 

mental health treatment thereafter. AR 25; see AR 855-56. That Dr. Franklin reached her 

conclusions based on incomplete information was a relevant consideration in discounting her 

opinion. See Ridgly v. Berryhill, 706 F. App’x 365, 365-66 (9th Cir. 2017) (ALJ appropriately 

discounted opinions finding the claimant had marked limitations where evidence showed that the 

claimant did not accurately disclose her heroin use to evaluators); Timothy C. v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 2019 WL 653811, at *10 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2019) (“An ALJ may properly reject a 

medical opinion that is rendered without knowledge of a claimant’s substance abuse.”) (citing 

Coffman v. Astrue, 469 F. App’x 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2012). 

With respect to Dr. Howard’s opinion, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s outpatient treatment at 

the Parole Outpatient Clinic ended in 2013 but, even with gaps in his treatment, there was no 

evidence that his mental health deteriorated or that he experienced significant symptoms, contrary 

to the severe limitations that the consultative examiners assessed. AR 25, 864 (after Plaintiff

failed to show for multiple Parole Outpatient Clinic appointments in 2014, his case was closed); 

see, e.g., AR 850 (in December 2013, Plaintiff was cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully 

oriented, his affect was normal, and he responded appropriately to questions); AR 837 (in 

September 2014, Plaintiff was cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully oriented, his affect 

was normal, and he responded appropriately to questions); AR 821 (in October 2014, Plaintiff was 

cooperative, alert, and oriented with clear speech)). Such inconsistencies undermined the 

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reliability of the consultative examiners’ opinions and calls into question the significant 

limitations they endorsed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (when evaluating opinions, ALJ 

appropriately considers supportability, consistency with evidence in the record as a whole, and 

factors that tend to support or undermine the opinion, among other things). 

With respect to Dr. Franklin, the Court finds the ALJ adequately considered the diagnoses 

listed in Dr. Franklin’s report. However, a diagnosis does not establish any particular functional 

limitations or that an impairment is disabling. Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (1993) 

(“The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability” because the “claimant 

bears the burden of proving that an impairment is disabling”) (citation omitted). In his motion, 

Plaintiff did not dispute the ALJ’s finding that his only severe mental impairments were mood 

disorder and marijuana dependence, AR 19, and he has waived any argument to the contrary. See 

Morales v. Astrue, 252 F. App’x 843, 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (claimant waived argument that the ALJ 

failed to properly consider his impairments at step two “by failing to raise that argument in any 

prior proceeding”) (citing Warre v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006)). Merely listing 

diagnoses from Dr. Franklin’s report does not show any error in the ALJ’s evaluation of that 

report. See Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680.

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ and the State agency psychologists did not consider his 

“antisocial behavior” and history of incarceration for serious crimes. Pl.’s Mot. at 9. However, 

the Court’s review of the record shows the ALJ and the State agency psychologist did in fact 

consider his treatment records while he was incarcerated and on parole, among other information. 

AR 20-26, 135-36, 151-53. The relevant inquiry when determining disability is whether Plaintiff

is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(A). Thus, the ALJ and the State 

agency psychologists appropriately focused on evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s impairments, his

functional capacity, and his ability to work, not his criminal past, his alleged “inability to meet the 

demands of adulthood,” or other issues that Plaintiff raises.

While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the record as a whole 

constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Further, even “where the evidence 

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is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750 (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984); 

Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)). It is the ALJ, not the Court, that must 

resolve determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, and all other 

ambiguities. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196. Thus, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when 

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Accordingly, because provided specific and legitimate reasons for his evaluation of the 

medical opinions, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, the decision must be 

affirmed.

D. RFC and Vocational Expert Testimony

As noted above, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the capacity to perform medium work 

with certain exceptions. AR 22. Plaintiff argues the ALJ used an inaccurate RFC when posing 

hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, failed to include all his mental limitations, and 

incorrectly identified Plaintiff’s education level. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the 

ALJ “incorrectly found that [he] ‘has at least a high school education’” and “used the incorrect 

education level in the RFC questions posed” to the expert. Id. Plaintiff contends the record 

“includes multiple references to [him] not graduating from high school or receiving a GED” and 

that he “testif[ied] under oath that he did not graduate from high school.” Id. 

Plaintiff further argues the ALJ erred in crediting the opinions of the State agency 

consultants because the hypotheticals presented to the vocational expert are at odds with their 

assessed limitations. Id. The ALJ presented the mental RFC as: “simple routine repetitive tasks in 

a low stress job environment requiring only occasional decision-making; only occasional changes 

in work setting; only occasional requirements for exercising judgment; no fast-paced production 

work; and no interaction with the public; and no tandem tasks with coworkers.” AR 59-60. 

However, Plaintiff notes the state agency consultants determined he would be limited to 

“nonconfrontational” supervision; service that is not “persistent;” and only two-hour concentration

segments, and as such argues that “none of these limitations were included in the RFC presented 

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by the ALJ.” Pl.’s Mot. at 13. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to discuss the vocational expert’s testimony as to 

acceptable levels of being off task (AR 65), tardiness (AR 68), absenteeism (AR 69), and 

acceptable interaction with a supervisor (AR 70), yet “the medical evidence of record documents 

that [he] has at least moderate if not marked limitations” because he 

was fired from his last job for excessive tardiness. AR 19. The state 

agency consultants determined [Plaintiff] is moderately limited in the 

ability to accept criticism. AR 138. Similarly, the consultants 

determined [Plaintiff] can only maintain concentration for two hours 

at a time. Id. The ALJ does not explain how these limitations or his 

finding that Plaintiff is employable square with the testimony of the 

[vocational expert].

Pl.’s Mot. at 13.

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s RFC because the 

medical evidence supports his decision and, to the extent there is evidence that does not, the ALJ 

appropriately discounted those limitations based on his consideration of the opinion evidence as a 

whole. Def.’s Mot. at 19-20.

1. Legal Standard

RFC is the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It 

is assessed by considering all the relevant evidence in a claimant’s case record. Id.; see also 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When a case is before an ALJ, it is the ALJ’s 

responsibility to assess a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 

260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the 

claimant's physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”). “Generally, the more consistent 

an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4).

2. Analysis

Although Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding he “has at least a high school 

education,” he testified under oath that he did not leave high school early and that he “made it up 

to the 12th grade.” AR 82. The regulations provide that “[h]igh school education and above 

means abilities in reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills acquired through formal schooling at 

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a 12th grade level or above.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(4). However, the Court also notes that at 

the first hearing, the ALJ included a “limited education” level in his hypothetical question to the 

vocational expert. AR 123-24. Limited education means a 7th to 11th grade education. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.964(b)(3). Based on this definition, the record is somewhat unclear as to Plaintiff’s 

education level. Regardless, even if the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff’s education in his 

hypothetical question at the second hearing, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing how 

any such error was harmful. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s past 

work was unskilled, he had no transferrable skills, and he could perform only unskilled jobs. AR 

27. Plaintiff has not shown that a lower education level would have required a different outcome. 

Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(3) (“Limited education means ability in reasoning, arithmetic, 

and language skills, but not enough to allow a person with these educational qualifications to do 

most of the more complex job duties needed in semi-skilled or skilled jobs.”) with 20 C.F.R. § 

416.964(b)(4) (“High school education and above. . . . We generally consider that someone with 

these educational abilities can do semi-skilled through skilled work.”). As the ALJ did not 

determine that Plaintiff could perform semi-skilled or skilled jobs, any error regarding whether 

Plaintiff completed any of the 12th grade is harmless because the ALJ limited Plaintiff to unskilled 

jobs. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (error is harmless where “the ALJ would have reached the 

same result absent the error”).

Next, in disputing the RFC finding, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by omitting certain 

limitations in the State agency consultants’ opinions, specifically: that he could concentrate for 

two hours at a time; that he was capable of casual and infrequent public contact, including “service 

that was not persistent”; and that his supervision “should be direct and nonconfrontational.” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 12-13. However, the ALJ did not need to specify that Plaintiff could concentrate for twohour intervals because the RFC included “normal breaks,” which occur every two hours, and no 

additional two-hour restriction was necessary. AR 22; SSR 96-9p (breaks occur “at approximately 

2-hour intervals.”); Braithwaite v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 1253395, at *5 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 31, 2011) (normal breaks occur approximately every two hours). Second, because the RFC 

specified that Plaintiff could not interact with the general public, the ALJ did not need to address 

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the State agency consultant’s opinion that he could have casual and infrequent public contact, 

including “service that was not persistent.” AR 22, 138. Third, the opinion that Plaintiff’s 

supervision “should be direct and nonconfrontational” was a recommendation, not a specific 

functional limitation. AR 138 (emphasis added). The opinion also reflects that Plaintiff can 

interact with co-workers and supervisors. Id. An ALJ is not required to address physician 

recommendations regarding conditions that might be optimal but are not necessary for a claimant 

to work. See Harms v. Berryhill, 692 F. App’x 861, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (“An examining 

psychologist’s and a reviewing psychologist’s recommendations regarding a supportive work 

setting did not amount to concrete work-related limitations in function that the [ALJ] was required 

to include in his finding of the claimant’s [RFC].”); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 691-92 (physician’s 

opinion that claimant “is less likely to have difficulty with” certain tasks was a recommendation, 

not a statement that claimant was only capable of the recommended tasks). 

Finally, the Court notes that RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical determination, 

and need not match any physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we 

consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . 

the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner”); Vertigan, 260 

F.3d at 1049 (“[i]t is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to 

determine residual functional capacity”). The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s RFC 

based on the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 

Accordingly, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment and 

the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. 8

 

8 Plaintiff also contends the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert “failed to include 

all of his mental limitations,” but he raises the same arguments as discussed above, namely that 

the ALJ did not properly assess his RFC. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. However, as the Court already found 

that his argument lacks merit, his arguments regarding the vocational expert’s testimony fail for 

the same reasons. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In 

arguing the ALJ’s hypothetical was incomplete, [claimant] simply restates her argument that the 

ALJ’s RFC finding did not account for all her limitations because the ALJ improperly discounted 

her testimony and the testimony of medical experts. As discussed above, we conclude the ALJ did 

not.”).

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E. Third Step - Medical Equivalence

At the third step, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meet or equals the Listing of Impairments. AR 20. In making this 

determination, the ALJ performed the psychiatric review technique set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920a, which requires an ALJ to rate a claimant’s degree of functional limitation (none, mild, 

moderate, marked, or extreme) in activities of daily living, social functioning, and concentration, 

persistence, or pace, and to determine whether the claimant has had repeated episodes of 

decompensation.9 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c). The ALJ found Plaintiff had only mild limitations in 

activities of daily living because he was able to take care of personal needs, use public 

transportation, and do household chores such as vacuuming, mopping, sweeping, dusting, laundry, 

and dishes. AR 20. With respect to social functioning, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff

presented as polite, calm, and cooperative during evaluations, had no difficulties interacting with 

providers or others at group therapy, and engaged in social activities and sports. AR 20-21. The 

ALJ did find Plaintiff had moderate limitations in social functioning due to paranoia and difficulty 

with crowds. AR 20. The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace, but discounted the limitations asserted by consultative

examiners for his social security benefits claim because those reports were inconsistent with 

evidence in the record as a whole. AR 21. Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have any 

episodes of decompensation. Id. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ “failed to address medical equivalence in any meaningful way” 

because although he found Plaintiff has severe impairments, he “never analyzes how [his] mental 

impairments interact with or exacerbate his physical impairments.” Pl.’s Mot. at 14. He contends 

the ALJ’s discussion of medical equivalence “is limited to conclusory statements to the effect that 

[Plaintiff] does not meet or equal any listing.” Id. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ 

properly evaluated Plaintiff’s impairments at step three. Def.’s Mot. at 3.

 

9 These four areas are collectively called the “paragraph B” criteria. 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 

App’x 1, § 12.00C (in assessing severity, “[w]e assess functional limitations using the four criteria 

in paragraph B of the listings”). 

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1. Legal Standard

As noted above, at step three in the sequential process, an ALJ must consider whether a 

claimant’s conditions meet or equal any of the impairments outlined in the Listing of Impairments, 

20 C. F. R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The Listing of 

Impairments describes impairments that “would prevent an adult, regardless of his age, education, 

or work experience, from performing any gainful activity.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 

(1990) (emphasis in original). If a claimant’s “impairment meets or equals one of the listed 

impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 141 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of establishing 

a prima facie case of disability under the Listing of Impairments. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955; 

see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

An impairment meets a listing when all the medical criteria required of that listing is 

satisfied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To 

meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he or she meets each characteristic of a 

listed impairment relevant to his or her claim.”). “To equal a listed impairment, a claimant must 

establish symptoms, signs and laboratory findings ‘at least equal in severity and duration’ to the 

characteristics of a relevant listed impairment. . . .” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). 

“If a claimant suffers from multiple impairments and none of them individually meets or 

equals a listed impairment, the collective symptoms, signs and laboratory findings of all of the 

claimant’s impairments will be evaluated to determine whether they meet or equal the 

characteristics of any relevant listed impairment.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). However, 

“‘[m]edical equivalence must be based on medical findings,” and “[a] generalized assertion of 

functional problems is not enough to establish disability at step three.’” Id. at 1100 (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)).

2. Analysis

Although Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at step three, he does not point to any 

evidence showing the ALJ erred or that his impairments—either singly or in combination—met or 

equaled the requirements of a specific listing. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 

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2001) (claimant “offered no theory, plausible or otherwise, as to how his [impairments] combined 

to equal a listed impairment” and did not “point[ ] to evidence that shows that his combined 

impairments equal a listed impairment.”). Regardless, having reviewed the record, the Court finds 

the ALJ performed the required review under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a.

As to the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff had only mild limitations in activities of daily 

living, the record supports his finding that he was able to take care of personal needs, use public 

transportation, and do household chores such as vacuuming, mopping, sweeping, dusting, laundry, 

and dishes. AR 20, 814, 855-56; see also AR 301-04 (Plaintiff performed personal care activities, 

prepared simple meals daily, performed household chores, went out on his own, shopped in stores, 

played sports, and spent time with family). Although Plaintiff asserts that he watches television 

all day, Pl.’s Mot. at 15, the evidence showed that he was able perform various daily activities 

with no more than mild limitations, as the ALJ found. AR 20. 

With respect to social functioning, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred because, while he cites 

to Parole Outpatient Clinic records to support the claim that Plaintiff has no social problems, the 

ALJ “ignores the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder in the same records.” Pl.’s Mot. at 

15. The record does reflect a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder. AR 728. However, a 

diagnosis alone is insufficient to establish an impairment is severe, much less that an impairment 

is presumptively disabling. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(d) (“[I]mpairment(s) cannot meet the criteria 

of a listing based only on a diagnosis.”); Leddy v. Berryhill, 702 F. App’x 647, 648 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(“The existence of a mental impairment alone does not establish functional limitation or 

disability”) (citing Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680); Chapple v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3721584, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017) (rejecting claimant’s reliance on diagnoses, noting “to be severe, a 

claimant must prove that her impairment significantly limited her ability to perform basic work 

activities”). Plaintiff also cites to self-reported parole problems “due to inappropriate behavior” to 

rebut this finding, Pl.’s Mot. at 15 (citing AR 855), but his statements are unsupported and 

inconsistent with other evidence. See, e.g., AR 729 (following Plaintiff’s parole in January 2010, 

a provider reported that he was cooperative, attentive, and pleasant); AR 711 (in April 2013, while 

Plaintiff was on parole, a provider reported he was alert, polite, and calm).

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In determining that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 

persistence, or pace, the ALJ discounted the limitations asserted by the consultative examiners, 

Drs. Howard and Franklin, finding their reports were inconsistent with evidence in the record as a 

whole. AR 21. Instead, the ALJ determined that the evidence showed Plaintiff was able to work 

after his disability onset, he responded well to medication, and treating providers did not report 

cognitive difficulties or other significant mental health symptoms. AR 21, 23-26; see, e.g., AR 

719 (Plaintiff reported medications were helpful, he denied side effects, was doing well on parole, 

he was not depressed or agitated, and he was alert, polite, and calm with well-organized speech); 

AR 721 (Plaintiff was alert and oriented, he was polite and engaged in treatment, his behavior was 

appropriate; his speech was clear and organized, his mood and affect were normal, and he was 

calm with no delusions or other unusual behavior); AR 865-66 (Plaintiff “continues to do very 

well on his current medications,” with no depression, anger problems, mood swings, or side 

effects); AR 781-82 (Plaintiff was cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully oriented, his 

affect was normal, and he responded appropriately to questions); AR 798-99 (same); AR 804 

(Plaintiff was cooperative, alert, and oriented with clear speech); AR 821 (same); AR 837 

(Plaintiff was cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully oriented, his affect was normal, and 

he responded appropriately to questions); AR 850 (same). Although Plaintiff disagrees with the 

ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence, he does not cite any treatment records to rebut the ALJ’s 

findings other than the consultative examiners’ reports. However, as discussed above, the ALJ 

properly discounted those opinions. Since the record reflects no more than moderate mental 

limitations, the Court finds the ALJ properly evaluated the relevant evidence. Finally, since 

Plaintiff did not have at least two marked limitations or one marked limitation and repeated 

episodes of decompensation, he did not meet a mental disorder listing. See 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00C. Plaintiff does not dispute this finding in his motion.

Plaintiff argues generally that the ALJ failed to comply with step three because “[i]n

determining whether a claimant equals a listing under step three . . ., the ALJ must explain 

adequately his evaluation of alternative tests and the combined effects of the impairments.’” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 14 (quoting Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, the Ninth 

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Circuit has since clarified that “Marcia simply requires an ALJ to discuss and evaluate the 

evidence that supports his or her conclusion; it does not specify that the ALJ must do so under”

any particular heading. Kennedy, 738 F.3d at 1178 (citing Lewis, 236 F.3d at 513). Here, the ALJ 

discussed and evaluated the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental symptoms and limitations 

throughout his decision. AR 20-26. Nothing further was required. 

Moreover, “[a]n ALJ is not required to discuss the combined effects of a claimant’s 

impairments or [to] compare them to any listing in an equivalency determination, unless the 

claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff points to no such evidence here, nor does he identify in his 

motion any particular listing that he meets or equals, much less explain how he meets or equals it.

Merely alleging ALJ error does not warrant remand. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (a court “may 

not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless” and “‘the burden of showing 

that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination’”) 

(quoting Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409).

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s impairments did not 

meet or equal a listed impairment was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, 

and the decision must be affirmed.

F. Plaintiff’s Credibility

Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to consider the entire case record and provide clear 

and convincing reasons for finding his testimony was not credible. Pl.’s Mot. at 15. 

1. Legal Standard

Congress expressly prohibits granting disability benefits based solely on a claimant’s 

subjective complaints. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s statement as to pain or 

other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (an 

ALJ will consider all of a claimant’s statements about symptoms, including pain, but statements 

about pain or other symptoms “will not alone establish” the claimant's disability). “An ALJ 

cannot be required to believe every allegation of [disability], or else disability benefits would be 

available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to [the Social Security Act].” Fair v. Bowen, 885 

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F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). An ALJ is, however, required to make specific credibility findings. 

See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (the credibility finding “must be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight”).

A two-step analysis is used when determining whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 

their subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th 

Cir. 2007). First, it must be determined “whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 

1991) (en banc); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)). A claimant does not need to “show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; 

she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” 

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Second, if the claimant has met the first step and “there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the 

ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). “The 

ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record 

lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Courts must not engage in second-guessing, 

where the ALJ “has made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of 

excess pain, and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Fair, 885 

F.2d at 604. However, “a finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on 

a lack of medical support for the severity of his pain.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 

792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 

1986) (per curiam), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Bunnel v. Sullivan, 

912 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1990) (“‘Excess pain’ is, by definition, pain that is unsupported by 

objective medical findings.”).

Factors an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility include: “[claimant’s] 

reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or between [his] 

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testimony and [his] conduct, claimant’s daily activities, [his] work record, and testimony from 

physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which 

[claimant] complains.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (quoting Light, 119 F.3d at 792). An ALJ’s 

credibility finding must be properly supported by the record, and sufficiently specific to ensure a 

reviewing court he did not “arbitrarily discredit” a claimant’s subjective testimony. Id. at 958 

(citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46). 

2. Analysis

Here, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms, noting that he reported 

difficulty with concentration, attention, and memory; he got distracted and could not complete 

tasks; he felt anxious, irritable, and angry; he did not get along with others; and his medication 

caused side effects. AR 22. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence. AR 22-26. The ALJ noted that treating 

providers documented largely normal mental status findings, which were contrary to Plaintiff’s 

claims of disabling mental symptoms. AR 22-25; see, e.g., AR 719, 721, 781-82, 798-99, 804, 

821, 837, 850, 889, 894, 906, 918; see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (ALJ properly relied on 

objective clinical findings, including that claimant was alert and oriented, maintained good eye 

contact, did not appear excessively anxious, spoke coherently and fluently, smiled appropriately, 

and was congenial, to discount claimant’s allegations of disabling anxiety). 

In addition to the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s allegations and the objective clinical 

evidence, the ALJ identified other bases for discounting his allegations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(c)(3) (after considering consistency with the objective medical evidence, the ALJ 

considers whether and to what extent the claimant’s subjective statements are consistent with 

“other evidence” in the record, such as treatment, daily activities, and other factors). In this 

regard, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff’s impairments were stable and his symptoms were 

generally controlled when he took his medications. AR 23; see, e.g., AR 711-31. An ALJ 

properly considers effectiveness of treatment when evaluating symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(c)(3)(iv); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Such evidence of 

medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability” based on 

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a mental impairment); Warre, 439 F.3d at 1006 (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively 

with medication are not disabling.”). Although Plaintiff asserted that he experienced medication 

side effects that impaired his ability to work, his providers did not document significant side 

effects. See, e.g., AR 711 (Plaintiff denied side effects); AR 712 (same); AR 865 (same)); see also 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly excluded medication side 

effects where “[t]here were passing mentions of the side effects of [the claimant’s] medication in 

some of the medical records, but there was no evidence of side effects severe enough to interfere 

with [his] ability to work.”). 

As an additional basis for discounting Plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ noted that he 

engaged in activities of daily living that were inconsistent with his allegations of disability, such 

as performing his own personal care activities, playing sports, and doing household chores such as 

vacuuming, mopping, sweeping, dusting, laundry, and dishes. AR 20, 24, 814, 855-56; see also

AR 301-04 (Plaintiff stated he had no problem with personal care, prepared simple meals daily, 

performed household chores, went out on his own, shopped in stores, played sports, and spent time 

with family). Daily activities are relevant to evaluating a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(c)(3)(i); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages 

in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”). And, even if Plaintiff’s activities 

were not particularly extensive, the ALJ’s conclusion that he was not as limited as he claimed was 

a reasonable and valid basis for discounting his self-reported symptoms. Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1112-13 (“Even where those activities suggest some difficulty in functioning, they may be 

grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a 

totally debilitating impairment”); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (the ALJ properly determined that the 

claimant “demonstrated better abilities than he acknowledged in his written statements and 

testimony” and that his “non-work activities . . . are inconsistent with the degree of impairment he 

alleges”). 

The ALJ also pointed out that Plaintiff’s claim of hallucinations was inconsistent with his

treatment records, which reflected largely normal mental status findings and no reports of 

hallucinations of any kind. See AR 719, 721, 781-82, 798-99, 804, 821, 837, 850, 889, 894, 906, 

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918. In determining credibility, an ALJ properly considers whether there are any such 

inconsistencies in the evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4) (“We will consider whether there are 

any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between your 

statements and the rest of the evidence.”). 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ should not have considered his inconsistent mental health care

because he “was indigent at all times relevant to the case.” Pl.’s Mot. at 16. However, the ALJ 

did not specifically discount Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms for that reason. Regardless, 

notwithstanding his indigence, when Plaintiff did seek treatment, providers reported normal 

mental status findings. See AR 850 (Plaintiff was cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully 

oriented, his affect was normal, and he responded appropriately to questions); AR 837 (Plaintiff

was cooperative, his speech was clear, he was fully oriented, his affect was normal, and he 

responded appropriately to questions); AR 821 (Plaintiff was cooperative, alert, and oriented with 

clear speech)). 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ relied on “isolated instances of improvement” to discount his 

subjective symptom allegations. Pl.’s Mot. at 16. To the contrary, a review of the ALJ’s decision 

shows he considered the record as a whole, with treating providers reporting normal mental status

findings and responsiveness to treatment. See AR 22-25, 719, 721, 781-82, 798-99, 804, 821, 

837, 850, 889, 894, 906, 918. Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ relied on “isolated” portions of 

the record is without merit. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ pointed 

to specific evidence in the record, including numerous medical reports, in discounting the 

claimant’s complaints). 

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to explain how any error requires reversal. The ALJ found 

Plaintiff had limitations from his mental impairments and assessed a mentally-restrictive RFC: he

could perform only simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a job environment requiring only occasional 

decision-making, occasional changes in the work setting, and occasional exercise of judgment; he 

was precluded from performing fast-paced production work; and he could not interact with the 

general public or perform tandem tasks with co-workers. AR 22. Plaintiff has failed to explain 

how this restrictive RFC assessment was inadequate to accommodate the mental symptoms that 

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the record supported. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692 n.2 (court appropriately “reject[ed] any 

invitation to find that the ALJ failed to account for [the claimant’s] injuries in some unspecified 

way”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and free of legal error. Because he appropriately discounted Plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ’s 

decision must be affirmed.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s Cross Motion. The Court shall enter a separate judgment, 

after which the Clerk of Court shall terminate the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2019

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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