Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02110/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02110-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE L. PHILLIPS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-CV-2110 GPC (NLS)

ORDER ADOPTING

 MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION AND 

DENYING PETITIONER’S WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Dkt Nos. 1, 10.]

vs.

M.D. BITER and K. HARRIS,

 Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Lawrence L. Phillips (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed the present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking 28 U.S.C. § 2254

habeas relief on the ground that the trial court improperly denied Petitoner’s first three

motions filed pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), for substitution of

counsel during Petitioner’s state court trial. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 5, 2013, United

States Magistrate Judge Nita Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)

recommending that this Court DENY the Petition. (Dkt. No. 10.) On April 24, 2013,

Petitioner filed objections (“Objections”) to the R&R. (Dkt. No. 16.)

For the reasons set forth below, this Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s

Objections, ADOPTS Judge Stormes’s R&R in its entirety, and DENIES Petitioner’s

petition for writ of Habeas Corpus. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district

court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. When no objections are filed,

a district court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact

and decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. United States Dist. Court,

501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217

(S.D. Cal. 2001). 

BACKGROUND

The R&R clearly lays out the underlying factual and procedural history. While

Petitioner’s filed Objections are couched as factual objections, they either confirm the

R&R’s factual findings or present differing legal conclusions drawn from the facts

rather than objecting to the facts themselves. This Court, therefore, presumes the

R&R’s recitation of the facts to be correct and incorporates by reference the

background as set forth in the R&R. See Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206. The Court

provides only a brief background here. 

Petitionerfiled four Marsdenmotions during his state court criminal proceedings

seeking substitution of counsel. The instant petition concerns the first three Marsden

motions filed by Petitioner seeking substitution of Petitioner’s trial counsel

(“Counsel”). The first Marsden motion (“Marsden I”) was made on August 3, 2009, the

date Petitioner’s trial was set to begin. (Lodgment 5, Vol. 3 at 31.) Petitioner informed

the trial court that: (1) Petitioner’s Counsel was away from his office for a month, (id.

at 32); (2) Counsel was disrespectful to Petitioner’s mother, (id. at 36-37); and (3)

Counsel decided not to cross-examine witnesses, (id. at 33-35). Petitioner’s Counsel

clarified that he was away from his office on a one-week vacation and a three-week

trial training program, and had met with Petitioner twice to discuss the case in the week

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prior to his trip. (Id. at 37-38.) Counsel designated his supervisor to handle his cases

while he was away. (Id.) Petitioner’s counsel acknowledged hanging up the telephone

on Petitioner’s mother, but explained thatshe was verbally abusive to himand that they

had since come to a “mutual respect.” (Id. at 39-40.) Counsel described the difficulty

of locating witnesses and confirmed that he and Petitioner had fundamental

disagreements on trial strategy. (Id. at 39-40.) Counsel stated that he did not have a

very good working relationship with Petitioner, but he was nevertheless prepared to

vigorously represent him. (Id. at 40-42.) The trial court observed that Petitioner and

Counsel were communicating despite the disagreements, and advised Petitioner that

Counsel held responsibility for tactical legal decisions. (Id. at 41, 44-45.) The trial

court concluded that Counsel’s representation was effective and that the attorney-client

relationship had not deteriorated to the point where deficient or incompetent

representation would be provided. (Id. at 45-47.) Furthermore, the trial court found that

Petitioner could not justify the untimeliness of the motion. (Id. at 46-47.) Accordingly,

the trial court denied the motion. (Id. at 47.)

The second Marsden motion (“Marsden II”) was made on August 4, 2009, the

following day. (Id. at 90.) Petitioner stated that he and Counsel could not communicate

because of their discrepant views and unwillingness to compromise. (Id. at 93.) The

trial court noted that Petitioner and Counsel must have been communicating if they

were disagreeing. (Id. at 95.) Counsel stated that he felt physically threatened by

Petitioner. (Id. at 90-91.) Petitioner assured the court, upon its request, that he would

not attack Counsel; Counsel confirmed that he would continue to effectively represent

Petitioner. (Id. at 96-98.) The trial court then denied the motion. (Id. at 98.)

The third Marsden motion (“Marsden III”) was made on the following day,

August 5, 2009. (Id. at 101.) Counsel advised the trial court that he was developing

physical symptoms of stress. (Id. at 102.) When asked whether he could proceed

representing Petitioner if sufficient securitymeasures were in place, Counsel indicated

that he could feelsafe in the courtroom but was concerned that he and Petitioner lacked

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mutual trust and communication. (Id. at 103, 105, 112.) The trial court found the

motion untimely and that granting the motion would significantly burden the

prosecution. (Id. at 118.) The trial court also found Petitioner largely responsible for

the conflict because of his refusal to cooperate with Counsel, which was not grounds

for substitution of counsel under People v. Marsden. (Id. at 106.) The trial court denied

the motion. (Id. at 123.) 

Petitioner was convicted on August 11, 2009 of two counts of assault, two

counts of corporal injury, one count of false imprisonment, one count of making a

criminal threat, and one count of unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle. (Lodgment

1 at 169, 171,172, 174, 176-78, 358-59.) Petitioner wassentenced to twenty-four years

and four months. (Lodgment 1 at 358-59.) Petitioner’s state law remedies were

exhausted when the California Court of Appeal denied his appeal and the California

Supreme Court denied his Petition for Review. (Lodgment 9; Lodgment 11.) 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorismand Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs

this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). Under AEDPA, a

federal court will not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the decision was (1) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented or (2) contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). The state court decision must be more

than incorrect or erroneous to warrant habeas relief. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

71-73 (2003). The standard under AEDPA is not met unless the state court’s

application of the law is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. For the following reasons, the

Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that either the

factual findings or the legal determinations of the state court were objectively

unreasonable.

//

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I. Factual Determinations and Objections

The first ground for habeas relief requires a showing that a state court’s

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented was unreasonable. “A

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. While Petitioner’s Objections assert

that the trial court’s factual findings were “false,” he did not point to any specific part

of the record that contradicts the court’s findings. Rather, Petitioner used the

Objections as an opportunity to restate the arguments already considered and rejected

by the trial court in the Marsden hearings at issue. This Court does not directly review

the Marsden motions, but only focuses on whether the trial court abused its discretion

in deciding the motions. The trial court’s factual determinations must be presumed to

be true because Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

In addition, in filing Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation, Petitioner has the burden of citing specific instances of error in the

R&R to alert the Court of the true grounds for the objections. Bridgeman v. Stainer,

12-CV-212 BEN PCL, 2014 WL 1806919 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2014). To conclude

otherwise would defeat the purpose of requiring objections and undermine the district

court’s effectiveness based on help from magistrate judges. Id. (quoting States v.

Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 621 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, the R&R contains all the material

facts stated in the Objections, with direct quotations from the record. Petitioner’s

Objections fail to challenge any particular portion of the R&R. In fact, Petitioner’s

Objections are largely consistent with the R&R. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that the trial court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

II. Clearly Established Federal Law

Because the trial court’s factual determinations were not unreasonable, the only

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remaining question under AEDPA is whether the trial court misapplied “clearly

established federal law” in a manner that was objectively unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an indigent

defendant the right to counsel and to conflict-free representation. See Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F. 2d 1193, 1195 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, Petitioner is not constitutionally guaranteed a “meaningful

relationship” with his counsel as long as he receives adequate representation. Morris

v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 2 (1983); Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). In

evaluating the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Marsden motions, the Court considers

a number of factors as set forth in United States v. Mills 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir.

1979): (1) the extent of the conflict; (2) the timeliness of the motion; and (3) the

adequacy of the court’s inquiry. (the “Mills factors”) See also Hudson v. Rushen, 686

F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982). In applying the three Mills factors, the Court considers

only whether the state court abused its discretion in such a way that violated

Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000).

The Magistrate Judge correctly found that all three factors weighed against Petitioner

in the present case. 

A. The Extent of the Conflict

The first Mills factor concerns whether the conflict between Petitioner and

Counsel was so great that it resulted in “a total lack of communication preventing an

adequate defense.” Mills, 597 F. 2d at 700. “Conflict” in the present context means

actual and legal conflict not of the defendant’s own making. See Plumlee, 512 F.3d at

1210; Schell, 218 F. 3d at 1026. A defendant cannot establish a claim of ineffective

assistance until he shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests.

Schell, 218 F. 3d at 1026 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)).

Subjective distrust or dislike does not create a “conflict” that satisfies the first Mills

factor. Id.

Legal conflict ofinterestsinvolves an incompatibility between the interest oftwo

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of a lawyer’s clients, or between the lawyer’s own private interest and those of the

client. Plumlee, 512 F.3d at 1210; e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002)

(recognizing potential conflict where appointed counsel previously represented the

victim in a separate case). Here, Petitioner did not allege and the record does not show

that Counsel represented any conflicting interest. Petitioner’s claim of conflict heavily

relies on the fact that he and Counsel had different views regarding trial strategy. 

As the trial court correctly pointed out, disagreement over tactics do not

constitute a conflict that would result in incompetent representation. Schell, 218 F.3d

at 1026. The court also properly advised Petitioner that tactical decisions were within

the discretion of Counsel. Id. The right to counsel is not an all-or-nothing right that

gives a defendant control to every aspect of his case beyond the basic structure. Jones

v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983). A counsel may properly make a tactical

determination of how to run a trial “even in the face of his client’s incomprehension or

even explicit disapproval.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. Absent exceptional circumstances,

a defendant is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial and on appeal. Henry v.

State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965). Here, the record reflects that

Petitioner’s trial counsel explained to the court that he believed cross-examining the

witnesses in this case would be inefficient and counterproductive. The choice of

strategy was based on Counsel’s professional judgment rather than any personal

animosity or conflicting interests. (Lodgment 5 at 39-40.) The Court therefore agrees

with the trial court that Petitioner received adequate representation. 

In addition, the Court notes that Habeas relief is generally granted when a

defendant’s federal rights have been violated, not when a defendant knowingly and

intentionally interfered with judicial proceedings. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026; See,

e.g., Hudson, 686 F.2d at 832 (weighing “voluntary conduct of defendant” in

sabotaging attorney-client relationship against defendant). Here, the contention in the

attorney-client relationship stemmed from tactical disagreement and was escalated by

Petitioner’s voluntary actions. In particular, the record reflects that Petitioner refused

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to cooperate with and intimidated his trial counsel. The trial court was therefore not

unreasonable in concluding that the nature and the extent of the contention did not

warrant substitution of counsel. 

B. Timeliness of the Motions

The Court next considers the timeliness of Petitioner’s three Marsden motions.

Mills, 597 F.2d at 700. Marsden motions must be timely made because society has a

strong “interest in prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Hudson, 686 F.2d

at 831. A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel must be balanced against the

interest of judicial expeditiousness. Id. Moreover, granting Marsden motions may

necessitate continuances and burden opposing counsel with the problems of

reassembling witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time. Morris,

461 U.S. 1, 11 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). Consequently,

trial courts have broad discretion to deny untimely Marsden motions unlessthe reasons

for delay are compelling and justified. Id.; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 887-88 (9th

Cir. 1990). Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to consult with his

client violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Morris, 461 U.S. 1, 11. The

question is whether the court’s insistence on expeditiousness is unreasonable and

arbitrary. Id.

Here, the trial court weighed Petitioner’s claims againstthe burden a continuance

would have on the prosecution. Unlike Morris, where the defendant sought a

continuance to obtain the services of his prior counsel, Petitioner has no such previous

association to weigh in his favor. The fact that Counsel was away from his office for

one month may have made the attorney-client communications less convenient or less

frequent. However, Petitioner appeared in court with Counsel two months before trial

and discussed the case with Counsel weeks before the trial on multiple occasions.

(Lodgment 5 at 37-38.) Furthermore, Petitioner never indicated any dissatisfaction until

the day of trial. (Id. at 47.) Balancing the competing interests at stake, the trial court

held that the untimeliness of the Marsden motions weighed against Petitioner. The trial

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court did not unreasonably or arbitrarily sacrifice justice for speed. Rather, the court

denied Petitioner’s motions in consideration of fairness and justice. 

C. Adequacy of the Inquiry

The final Mills factor considers the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry. Mills,

597 F.2d at 700. The Sixth Amendment requires only “an appropriate inquiry into the

grounds for such a motion.” Schell, 218 F. 3d at 1025. Following each of Petitioner’s

three Marsden motions, the trial court held a hearing to review Petitioner’s claim and

to seek Counsel’s response. The record shows that the trial judge was thorough and

sensitive in his inquiries. The R&R notes that the trial court urged Petitioner to be

specific in his claims, examined the communication between Petitioner and Counsel,

and discussed Counsel’s effectiveness in investigation and trial strategies. Petitioner

raised no objections to the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry either in his Habeas

Petition or his Objectionsto the R&R. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

the trial court’s level of review for each motion was appropriate and adequate.

II. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability. Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. A certificate of appealability is required to

appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1)(A). A certificate

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing

ofthe denial of a constitutional right.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could

debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the

issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). Here, the Court finds that

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the reasonable jurists could debate whether the

petition should have been resolved differently, and it therefore DENIES a certificate

of appealability.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner failed to show that the trial court based its

decision to deny Petitioner’s Marsdenmotions on either an unreasonable determination

of facts or unreasonable application of clearly established federal laws. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED;

2. Judge Stormes’s Report and Recommendation as to the Petition is

ADOPTED in its entirety ; and

3. Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation are

OVERRULED.

4. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 22, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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