Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00790/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00790-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELTON LOVE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFF MACOMBER, KATHLEEN 

ALLISON, TRACY JOHNSON, RICK M. 

HILL, T. JOHNSON, J. HECKMAN, D. 

HARRIS, O. DAVIS, C. HOUGH, E. 

MEJIA, K. O’CONNOR, R. BARTON, J. 

GELEIN, R. ROGERS, C. O’HAGAN, R. 

VIERA, M. STRAND, M. MARTINEZLUCATERO, G. WATERHOUSE, E. 

AGUILAR, B. BICK, J. STILWELL, and 

Does 1 thru 100.

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-00790-DJC-EFB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, moves this Court on an 

ex parte basis for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction 

enjoining Defendants from transferring Plaintiff to a Non-Designated Programming 

Facility (“NDPF”) pending final judgment in this matter (“Motion”). (Mot. (ECF No. 3) at 

1.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

Case 2:23-cv-00790-DJC-EFB Document 7 Filed 05/02/23 Page 1 of 6
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I. Background

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this matter on April 27, 2023, alleging Defendants, 

employees of the State of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, are 

attempting, either willfully or negligently, to enforce an “underground regulation” by 

requiring Plaintiff to transfer to a NDPF; the complaint claims various constitutional 

and state law violations that have allegedly been caused by the attempted

enforcement. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 5–9.) Plaintiff filed this Motion simultaneously 

claiming that he would suffer irreparable injury if enforcement of the “underground 

regulation” were permitted as Plaintiff, who is a documented Crip gang member, 

would be transferred to a NDPF which houses “debriefed”1 Crip gang members who 

may view Plaintiff as a threat and assault him. (Mot. at 2; Decl. of Felton Love, Jr. 

(“Love Decl.”) (ECF No. 3-1) at 2.) Plaintiff also argues there is a substantial likelihood 

he will establish at trial that Defendants are acting with deliberate indifference to his 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from dangerous conditions and attacks from other 

inmates, that granting the Motion will serve the public interest, and that any harm to 

Defendants is outweighed by the injury threatened to Plaintiff.

2

 (Mot. at 2.)

Plaintiff previously filed a complaint and motion for TRO and preliminary 

injunction before Judge Nunley in this district based on the same underlying set of 

facts and alleging the same constitutional and state law violations. See Love v. Hill, 

No. 2:22-cv-01233-TLN-AC, 2022 WL 17722351, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2022). 

Plaintiff’s motion was denied, and the court ruled the complaint failed to state a claim 

for relief, granting leave to amend. Id. Plaintiff’s subsequent first amended complaint 

was dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff’s 

1

“Debriefed” gang members are those who “have snitched on the gang to the police and in exchange 

[] have received their own yard and privileges.” (Love Decl. at 2.)

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff references attached declarations, exhibits, and a memorandum of law 

which will allegedly support these arguments. (Mot. at 2.) No exhibits or memorandum of law have 

been filed with this Motion, which is supported solely by Plaintiff’s declaration. 

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request to amend the complaint a second time was denied because “Plaintiff’s 

proposed second amended complaint fail[ed] to state a claim for relief for the reasons 

already articulated by the magistrate judge in screening the original and first 

amended complaints.” Love v. Hill, No. 2:22-cv-01233-TLN-AC, 2023 WL 1823896, at 

*1–2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023). 

II. Analysis

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65(b)(1)(B), which requires counsel to “certif[y] in writing any efforts made 

to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” No such certification 

was included with Plaintiff’s Motion.

3

Even if the Court were inclined to consider the request on the merits, res 

judicata principles and deficient showings of harm require dismissal. The standard for 

issuing a TRO is similar to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction, requiring

that the party seeking relief show: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood 

of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities 

tip in the movant’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See 

Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John 

D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the standards for a 

preliminary injunction and a TRO are “substantially identical”). 

Res judicata (claim preclusion) principles preclude Plaintiff from bringing claims 

based on the same facts that have been the subject of a prior final judgment on the 

merits. To establish claim preclusion the following is considered: (1) an identity of 

claims between the two cases; (2) the existence of a final judgment on the merits; and 

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff has also failed to meet the requirements of Local Rule 231 by neglecting 

to file (i) a brief on all relevant legal issues presented in the Motion and (ii) a proposed order with a 

provision for a bond and notice to Defendants of their right to apply to the Court for modification or 

dissolution of the order on two days’ notice. L.R. 231; see also L.R. 151; Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

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(3) identity or privity of the parties. See Cell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Lash Group, Inc., 586 

F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). Determining whether there is an identity of claims 

involves consideration of four factors: (1) whether the two suits arise out of the same 

transactional nucleus of facts; (2) whether rights or interests established in the prior 

judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (3) 

whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether 

substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions. See ProShipLine, Inc. 

v. Aspen Infrastructures, Ltd., 609 F.3d 960, 968 (9th Cir. 2010). Whether two suits 

arise out of the same transactional nucleus depends upon whether they are related to 

the same set of facts and whether they could conveniently be tried together. Id. 

Reliance on the first factor to dispose of this issue is especially appropriate because 

the factor is "outcome determinative." Id.

Plaintiff’s current claims and the claims at issue in No. 2:22-cv-01233-TLN-AC all 

arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts: enforcement of an “underground 

regulation” by Defendants resulting in Plaintiff being transferred to a NDPF where he 

claims he will be harmed by fellow inmates. (Compare Compl. at 6–9; First Amended 

Complaint at 2–4, Love v. Hill, No. 2:22-cv-01233-TLN-AC, ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff’s prior 

claims resulted in a final judgment against Plaintiff. Love, 2023 WL 1823896, at *1–2. 

Further, the parties to this action are the same as in No. 2:22-cv-01233-TLN-AC, with 

the exception of one additional Defendant, Defendant Macomber.4 Accordingly, the 

Court finds each factor in the claim preclusion analysis, and each sub-factor regarding 

4 Although Defendant Macomber was not a party to the prior action, No. 2:22-cv-01233-TLN-AC, he is 

likely in privity with the defendants in that action (who are also Defendants here) given that he is the 

new Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and the former Secretary,

Defendant Allison, was a named defendant in the prior action and remains a Defendant in this action. 

Generally, the Ninth Circuit has held that "when two parties are so closely aligned in interest that one is 

the virtual representative of the other, a claim by or against one will serve to bar the same claim by or 

against the other." Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, res judicata

likely applies to the claims against Defendant Macomber as well. 

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the identity of claims, satisfied. Because Plaintiff's current case will likely be dismissed 

on res judicata principles, it is unlikely to be successful on the merits.

Further, the propriety of a request for injunctive relief hinges on a threat of 

irreparable injury that must be imminent in nature. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. 

Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely 

allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate 

immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). 

Although Plaintiff claims that his life will be in danger if he is transferred to a NDPF, he 

fails to provide evidence that he is in fact set to be transferred. See id. at 674

(“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting 

a preliminary injunction.”). At most, Plaintiff’s declaration states that transfer to a 

NDPF was discussed by a classification committee on September 22, 2022 but does 

not state the outcome of that discussion. (Love Decl. at 2.) Plaintiff also states that 

although Defendant Mejia told him that he was being transferred to a NDPF, upon 

arriving at receiving and handling Plaintiff was told that there was no transfer order 

and was directed to go back to his building. (Id. at 2–3.) Thus, it does not appear that 

there is an order for Plaintiff’s transfer to a NDPF or that he is in any danger of being 

transferred absent such an order. Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Viera has been 

harassing him and attempting to force him to transfer to a NDPF does nothing to 

change this conclusion. (Id. at 3.) Moreover, even if Plaintiff has been approved for 

transfer to a NDPF, his evidence that receiving institution houses former members of 

his gang, which is the group he identifies as posing a threat to his safety, is conclusory 

at best.

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 (Id. at 2–3.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate immediate irreparable 

injury. 

5 While Plaintiff states that Defendants are attempting to “force [him to] transfer immediately to an 

NDPF yard, where known enemies of mine are house [sic], and where my life will be in danger,” Plaintiff 

does not state which facility he believes he is being transferred to, or the basis for his belief that facility 

houses former Crip members. (Love Decl. at 2–3.)

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Since Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or 

irreparable harm, the Court need not address the balance of equities and public 

interest factors. See, e.g., ET Trading, Ltd. v. ClearPlex Direct, LLC, No. 15-CV-00426-

LHK, 2015 WL 913911, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) ("The Court need not address all 

of the Winter factors because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden 

of demonstrating that it would be irreparably harmed absent a temporary restraining 

order."); Pom Wonderful LLC v. Pur Bevs. LLC, No. CV 13-06917-MMM (CWx), 2015 

WL 10433693, at *18 n. 97 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015) (“Because Pom Wonderful has 

failed to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm, the court need not consider the 

balance of hardships or the public interest.”). In any event, while Plaintiff argues that 

granting the Motion will serve the public interest, and that any harm to Defendant is 

outweighed by the injury threatened to Plaintiff, neither piece of evidence Plaintiff 

cites to support these claims (a "Declaration by Kim McGill” and “Exhibit ‘B’”) is 

attached. (Mot. at 2.)

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff’s Ex Parte

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. This 

matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for all further pretrial 

proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 1, 2023 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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