Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02498/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02498-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHELLE CAMERON, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

DAVID BUETHER, MICHELLE CRAIG, 

and the COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 

Defendants. 

CASE NO: 09-CV-2498-IEG (WMC) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY 

DEFENDANTS MICHELLE CRAIG 

AND COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 

[Doc. No. 60] 

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Michelle 

Craig and the County of San Diego. [Doc. No. 60.] For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion on all of Plaintiff’s claims as they relate to Defendants Craig and the 

County. 

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Michelle Cameron and Defendant David Buether (“Buether”) were previously in a 

romantic relationship, lived together for nearly four years, and had two children together. [Pl.’s Exs. 

ISO Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, Dep. of David Buether [hereinafter “Buether 

Dep.”], at 18:12-18:21, 32:22-33:9, 36:14-36:22.] Defendant Buether was and is employed as a 

Deputy Sheriff with the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department. [Buether Dep., at 69:24-72:9.] After 

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moving in with Buether and just before the birth of their first child in October 2006, Plaintiff stopped 

working to care for their child. [Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, Ex. B, Decl. of 

Michelle Cameron [hereinafter “Cameron Decl.”], ¶¶ 6, 12.] 

When Plaintiff and Buether moved in together, they opened a joint checking account. Plaintiff 

did not have any other accounts under her name and believed all their finances were commingled. 

[Cameron Decl., ¶ 5.] Plaintiff used the joint checking account to make purchases for herself, their 

children, and their household. [See Buether Dep., at 123:19-129:2.] 

From approximately 2005 until December 2007, Cameron and Buether lived together in 

Cameron’s apartment. [See Buether Dep., at 43:1-45:4; Cameron Decl., ¶¶ 2, 5.] In or about 

September 2007, Buether purchased a home, titled in his name only, into which he and Plaintiff 

moved. [See Cameron Decl., ¶ 4-5; Decl. of Michelle Craig ISO Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment 

[hereinafter “Craig Decl.”], ¶ 6.] Although Buether owned their home, Plaintiff became a co-debtor 

with him on a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) of $125,000. [Cameron Decl., ¶8; Buether Dep., 

at 45:24-47:14.] 

Buether possessed a credit card, issued solely to Buether by U.S. Bank. [Buether Dep., at 

117:18-118:13; Craig Decl., ¶ 8.] Plaintiff claims that she believed the credit card was for their joint 

use and that Buether gave the credit card number to her for her personal use and household use on 

numerous occasions. [Cameron Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.] Buether maintains that, while he used the card with 

Plaintiff on at least one occasion during their relationship, he never granted permission for her to use 

the card without his being present and she did not have permission to use the card once the relationship 

had ended. [Buether Dep., at 118:3-121:9; Craig Decl., ¶ 8.] 

In June 2007, while Plaintiff and Buether still lived together, Buether registered both Plaintiff 

and himself with LifeLock, a company that monitors the use of subscribers’ personal information to 

prevent identity-theft. [Buether Dep., at 113:12-118:19; Cameron Decl., ¶ 11.] 

On October 8, 2008, Buether obtained a restraining and kick-out order against Plaintiff, 

alleging two unreported incidents of domestic violence. [See Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, Ex. 

3, Craig Aff. ISO Search Warrant [hereinafter “Craig Aff. ISO Warrant”], at Bates No. 30; Cameron 

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Decl. ¶ 16.] Plaintiff immediately moved out of Buether’s home and into a friend’s residence after 

being served with the order. [See Buether Dep., at 62:13-17; Craig Decl., ¶ 6.] As Cameron left 

Buether’s home, she asked Buether what she was supposed to do without any belongings; he told her 

to “do whatever you need to do.” [Cameron Decl., ¶ 16.] A few days before Buether obtained the 

restraining order, Plaintiff removed $30,000 from their joint home equity line of credit. [See Craig 

Decl., at ¶ 6 (stating that Buether told her Cameron withdrew $25,000 one day before she moved out); 

see also, e.g., Buether Dep., at 49:17-51:4; 152:17-23 (discussing Cameron’s withdrawal from the 

HELOC in the amount of $30,000).] 

The children initially stayed with Buether but began splitting time between their two parents 

after Buether rescinded the restraining order near the end of October 2008. [See Buether Dep., at 

105:22-106:18.] During that time, Plaintiff and Buether were involved in mediation to resolve custody 

of the children. [Cameron Decl., ¶ 19.] 

On October 13, 2008, Plaintiff used the U.S. Bank credit card issued solely to Buether to 

purchase items from Overstock.com, including furniture for herself and her children, jewelry, home 

decorations, and a refurbished flat-screen television. [Craig Aff. ISO Warrant, at Bates No. 27-31.] 

Plaintiff made three purchases, totaling $8,969.38. [Id. at 30; Craig Decl., at ¶ 3.] 

Buether claims that he became aware of the charges to his credit card only after receiving his 

monthly statement in early November 2008. [Craig Decl., ¶¶ 1-3.] On November 14, 2008, Buether 

filed a complaint against Plaintiff with the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that she 

fraudulently used his credit card. [Id.] Buether’s case was assigned to Defendant Michelle Craig 

(“Craig”), a detective with the Sheriff’s Department. [Id.] 

According to Plaintiff, Buether and Craig attended the law enforcement academy training 

together, worked together, and maintained a social relationship. [Cameron Decl., ¶ 14.] Buether and 

Craig, however, contend they had only a limited professional relationship with one another before 

Craig was assigned to investigate Buether’s allegations. [See Craig Decl., ¶ 16; Buether Dep., at 

101:10-102:23.] 

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During the investigation, Craig took statements from Buether and contacted Overstock.com. 

[Craig Decl., ¶¶ 3-9.] Buether told Craig that, upon receiving the monthly statement for the U.S. Bank 

credit card, he learned that someone had used his card to make three purchases from Overstock.com, 

totaling nearly $9,000. He inquired about the charges, and Overstock confirmed that someone had 

used his card to make the purchases, but Overstock refused to identify the purchaser. [Id. ¶ 3.] 

Buether stated that he thought Plaintiff, his ex-girlfriend, may have made the purchases, even though 

she was not on that account or authorized to use it. [Id.] He further reported that, though he and 

Plaintiff had used the card to make purchases together in the past, he was present each time the card 

was used, he never gave Plaintiff permission to use the card, and he had possession of the only card 

issued to that account. [Id.] Buether stated that he did not recall giving Plaintiff the credit card 

number, but he speculated that she had recorded the card number and was now using it to make 

purchases. [Id.] 

Buether further informed Craig he and Plaintiff lived with each other for the previous four 

years and had two children together, but they never married. [Id. ¶ 5.] Their relationship deteriorated, 

according to Buether, after Plaintiff grew violent with him. Plaintiff moved out of his home after 

Buether obtained a restraining order against plaintiff alleging two instances of domestic violence. [Id.

¶ 6.] Buether later rescinded that order. [Id.] 

He made Craig aware that Plaintiff had withdrawn $30,000 from their HELOC. [Id.] Buether 

visited Plaintiff’s new residence shortly after rescinding the restraining order and saw several new 

items purchased from Overstock. [Id.] Buether believed Plaintiff used the funds she withdrew from 

the account to furnish her new residence. [Id. ¶¶ 8, 12.] 

Finally, Buether told Craig that he confronted Plaintiff about the purchases on his credit card. 

[Id. ¶ 7.] Plaintiff responded by asking, “Oh, you mean our joint credit card?” Buether replied, “Since 

when was it our joint credit card?” [Id.] After the exchange, Plaintiff immediately changed the 

subject. [Id.] Craig interpreted this episode to suggest that Plaintiff knew she did not have permission 

to use Buether’s card. [Defs.’ Reply, Supplemental Declaration of Michelle Craig ISO Mot. for 

Summary Judgment [hereinafter “Supp. Craig Decl.”], ¶ 1.] 

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Craig contacted Overstock.com. and confirmed Plaintiff had made the purchases. [Craig Decl., 

¶ 5.] Overstock also informed Craig that U.S. Bank had charged back approximately $8,800 from 

Plaintiff’s purchases, making Overstock another victim. [Id. ¶ 9.] Overstock desired prosecution on 

the fraudulent charges. [Id.] 

On December 15, 2008, Craig presented an affidavit in support of a search warrant to a 

Superior Court judge. The judge issued the warrant for a search of Plaintiff’s home. [Id. ¶¶ 10-11.] 

On December 18, 2008, at 7:00 a.m., a team of between six and ten deputies executed the 

search warrant. The deputies entered Plaintiff’s residence, confiscated furniture and other goods 

purchased with Buether’s credit card (the items listed in the search warrant), and arrested Plaintiff. [Id.

¶¶ 14; Cameron Decl., ¶ 18.] Plaintiff spent approximately five days in jail before she posted bail and 

was released. [Cameron Decl., ¶ 18.] The matter was referred to the District Attorney for prosecution. 

Plaintiff was charged with grand theft, identity theft, and credit card fraud. Buether and Craig 

testified at a preliminary hearing before the Honorable Harry Powazek on February 23, 2009. [Defs.’ 

Mot. for Summary Judgment, at 3-4; see also id., Ex. 6, Transcript of Plaintiff’s Preliminary Hearing 

[hereinafter “Trans. Prelim. Hr’g”], at 4, 48.] The judge heard testimony regarding the professional 

relationship between Craig and Buether, as well as Plaintiff and Buether’s joint checking account, joint 

HELOC, and Plaintiff’s claims of prior permitted use of Buether’s credit card. [Id. at 4, 11, 15-16, 45, 

48.] At the hearing’s conclusion, Judge Powazek found probable cause that “the offenses listed in the 

complaint—the three counts—have been proven and committed. And there is sufficient cause to 

believe that [Plaintiff] is guilty thereof.” [Id. at 50-51.] 

Plaintiff was bound over for trial. After the preliminary hearing, Plaintiff’s case was assigned 

to a second Deputy District Attorney, Katherine A. Flaherty. Ms. Flaherty elected to dismiss the 

charges against Plaintiff. [See Pl.’s Notice of Lodging Exs. ISO Opp’n to Mot. for Summary 

Judgment, Doc. No. 63-6, Deposition of Katherine Flaherty, at 26:22-29:14.] 

II. Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff alleges a Section 1983 claim against Buether and Craig and state law causes of action 

for negligence, false arrest, and violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 against all Defendants. 

[Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Doc. No. 36.] Defendants Craig and the County (the “County 

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Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim, [Doc. No. 39], which the Court 

granted with prejudice. [Doc. No. 48.] The County Defendants now move for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action as they relate to Defendants Craig and the County. [Doc. No. 

60.] 

LEGAL STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 

56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

return a verdict for the non-moving party. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prod., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2006). 

In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or to a 

defense on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos. Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the nonmoving party 

would bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden on summary judgment 

by simply pointing out to the Court an absence of evidence from the nonmoving party. Miller, 454 

F.3d at 987. “The moving party need not disprove the other party’s case.” Id. 

Once the movant has made that showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce 

“evidence that it significantly probative or more than ‘merely colorable’ that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists for trial.” LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citing FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (“[T]he nonmoving party must come forward with more than ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.’”) 

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

The Court must review the record as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000). However, 

unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id.; 

Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). “Thus, ‘[w]here the record taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine 

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issue for trial.’” Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants Craig and the County move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and each of her state law claims. Nearly all of Plaintiff’s claims turn on her allegation 

that Defendant Craig obtained a search warrant with an affidavit that omitted material exculpatory 

information. As a result, Plaintiff alleges, the search warrant issued without probable cause and the 

subsequent search of Plaintiff’s residence violated her Fourth Amendment rights.1 Plaintiff also 

appears to claim the manner in which Craig and the Deputy Sheriffs under her supervision conducted 

the search violated her constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff further alleges that, because there was no probable cause to search her residence, any 

evidence seized during that search should not have been used to support probable cause to arrest 

Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested without probable cause, also in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. 

I. Plaintiff’s Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Plaintiff alleges Craig violated her Fourth Amendment rights and seeks damages pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The County Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff has 

failed to provide evidence tending to show a constitutional violation for which Craig should be 

stripped of her qualified immunity from a civil rights lawsuit. 

Qualified immunity is “‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” 

Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 

U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). Qualified immunity shields an officer from personal liability when she 

 

1

 Plaintiff also argues the search of her residence violated her substantive due process rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Where a specific constitutional amendment governs governmental 

conduct, claims arising out of that conduct must be analyzed under the standards appropriate to that 

specific amendment, not under the Fourteenth Amendment’s rubric of substantive due process. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The Fourth Amendment governs conduct related to 

searches and seizures; accordingly Plaintiff cannot establish a substantive due process violation. See

id.; Morris v. State Bar of Cal., 2010 WL 2353528, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010). 

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reasonably believes her conduct complies with the law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 

808, 823 (2009). 

Establishing whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-part analysis. 

First, the Court determines “whether the plaintiff has shown that the action complained of constituted a 

violation of his or her constitutional rights. Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002). To 

defeat qualified immunity at summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of asserting a violation 

of her constitutional rights. Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997). 

If the plaintiff satisfies the first step, the Court then decides “(1) whether the violated right was 

clearly established, and (2) whether a reasonable public official was could have believed that the 

particular conduct at issue was lawful.” Butler, 281 F.3d at 1021. “This inquiry turns on the ‘objective 

legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at 

the time it was taken.’” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 

(1999)); see Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2009). 

a. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim for Omissions from the Affidavit in Support of the Search Warrant

Plaintiff argues Craig omitted material information from her affidavit in support of a warrant to 

search Plaintiff’s residence, and the search warrant that issued was therefore unsupported by probable 

cause. As a result, Plaintiff argues the search of her residence violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 

The County Defendants argue, first, Plaintiff suffered no constitutional deprivation because 

probable cause supported the search warrant, and, second, even if Plaintiff did suffer such a 

deprivation, Craig is entitled to qualified immunity. 

In cases alleging judicial deception in the procurement of a search warrant, establishing a 

violation of the Fourth Amendment under the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is itself a 

two-part test. A plaintiff “must make (1) a ‘substantial showing’ of deliberate falsehood or reckless 

disregard for the truth, and (2) that but for the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have 

occurred.” Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Liston v. County of Riverside, 

120 F.3d 965, 972-75 (9th Cir. 1997)). Where the plaintiff has made a “substantial showing” that the 

officer intentionally or recklessly omitted the information, “the question of intent or recklessness is a 

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‘factual determination for the trier of fact.’” Liston, 120 F.3d at 974 (quoting Hervey, 65 F.3d at 791); 

Butler, 281 F.3d at 1026 (“Materiality is for the court, state of mind is for the jury”). 

With regard to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, where the plaintiff has 

made a substantial showing of judicial deception, the issue of qualified immunity is “effectively 

intertwine[d]” with the substantive Fourth Amendment determination. Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024. An 

officer cannot be said to have acted in an objectively reasonable manner so as to be entitled to qualified 

immunity where the officer has made obviously false misrepresentations or omitted information which 

was obviously relevant. Lombardi, 117 F.3d at 1126 (“In cases of ‘outrageous’ conduct such as 

Hervey,

2

 where probable cause is clearly lacking without the false statements, the officer cannot be 

said to have acted in an objectively reasonable manner and the shield of qualified immunity is lost.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where, however, the “materiality may not have been 

clear at the time the officer decided what to include in, and what to exclude from, the affidavit,” or 

“when it is not plain that a neutral magistrate would not have issued the warrant, the shield of qualified 

immunity should not be lost, because a reasonably well-trained officer would not have known that the 

misstatement or omission would have any effect on issuing the warrant.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted); see also id. at 1119 (it is “not objectively unreasonable to omit facts that 

weren’t plainly material when the warrant application was made”). Thus, if the alleged omissions 

were obviously material, the question of “whether a reasonable officer should have known that he 

acted in violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights” depends upon the answer to the question of 

whether the defendant acted dishonestly or recklessly. Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024; Liston, 120 F.3d at 

974. 

Plaintiff offers two theories in support of her material omissions claim. First, Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants Buether and Craig conspired to aid Buether in his then-ongoing civil dispute regarding 

custody of their children and various joint assets. In furtherance of that conspiracy, Craig knowingly 

 

2

 The Court in Lombardi highlighted that in Hervey, “[t]he officer fabricated perceptions of 

sight, smell and sound, which was ‘unforgivable’” and “[w]ithout the falsely included facts, all that 

remained was unproven, uncorroborated and unreliable informant information which no neutral 

magistrate could possibly have credited.” 117 F.3d at 1126. 

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submitted a false and misleading affidavit to secure a search warrant. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues 

that Craig acted with reckless disregard for the truth by (a) omitting obviously material information 

from her affidavit and (b) conducting an inadequate investigation into Buether’s claims, thereby failing 

to learn certain material information which she then omitted from her affidavit. 

1. Alleged Conspiracy

Plaintiff argues the following in support of her conspiracy allegation: (1) Buether and Craig 

were longtime friends as well as professional colleagues, [Cameron Decl., ¶ 14]; (2) Craig was 

assigned to the case rather than a deputy who did not know Buether or a deputy in the Sheriff 

Department’s Fraud Unit, [Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, at 9]; (3) Craig omitted 

this affidavit from her affidavit, [id. at 6-7]; (4) approximately two weeks before the warrant issued, 

Craig asked Buether whether he could be available “at any time” to pick-up his children in the event 

that a warrant issued and a search and arrest took place, [id. at 7]; and (5) upon entering Plaintiff’s 

residence to effect the search, Craig phoned Buether and asked him to pick-up his children. [Id.] 

 Aside from her own declaration, Plaintiff has offered no evidence of conspiracy. Conclusory 

allegations of a conspiracy cannot support a § 1983 claim. Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d 

1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Spreewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 

2001) (the Court need not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences”). 

By contrast, Defendants have offered evidence demonstrating the absence of a conspiracy. 

First, both Buether and Craig stated in their respective depositions that they are merely professional 

colleagues and that they do not socialize outside of work.3

 [See Buether Dep., at 102:5-23; Craig Dep., 

at 86:19-87:2.] Moreover, despite claiming that Buether and Craig were longtime social friends, 

during the four years she lived with Buether, Plaintiff admits that she never met or spoke to Craig, and 

she only saw Craig once or twice from a distance at Deputy Sheriffs’ functions. [Cameron Decl., 

¶ 14.] 

 

3

 Craig’s testimony during her deposition was consistent with her testimony nearly two years 

earlier at Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing. [Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 6, at 123:17-124:28 (Craig’s testimony at 

the preliminary hearing in Plaintiff’s criminal case).] 

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Second, Craig testified that she did not know Buether had filed a criminal complaint until she 

was assigned the case, and that Sergeant Bulow, then-supervising her unit (now deceased), assigned 

the case to her randomly. [Craig Decl., ¶ 1; Pl.’s Notice of Lodging Exs. ISO Opp’n to Mot. for 

Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 63-6, Deposition of Michelle Craig, at 14:21-15:15 [hereinafter “Craig 

Dep.”].] Plaintiff has neither alleged nor offered any facts suggesting that Sergeant Bulow knew or 

was friendly with Buether, or that he purposely assigned Buether’s case to Craig. Craig stated that the 

Fraud Unit only takes complex fraud cases involving multiple transactions and a geographic scope 

spanning multiple jurisdictions, often with international implications. [Id. at 12:24-14:14.] 

Third, Craig explained that she did not include information in her affidavit she did not believe 

to be relevant, or of which she was unaware. Craig did not include specific details of Plaintiff’s and 

Buether’s financial commingling because she thought that the nature of their former relationship 

implied some financial commingling. Craig did not think additional information was relevant to the 

question of whether, after the couple separated, Plaintiff used a credit card issued solely to Buether 

without his permission. [Craig Decl., ¶ 13; Craig Dep., at 93:20-95:16.] 

Craig did not interview Plaintiff before executing the search warrant, and she was unaware at 

the time she prepared her affidavit of Plaintiff’s claimed prior use of the card. In investigating cases 

involving allegations of illegally obtained property, Craig usually does not interview the suspect before 

seeking a search warrant. [Craig Dep., at 63:1-16.] 

Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence tending to show Craig conspired with Buether or 

intentionally omitted relevant information from her affidavit in support of a search warrant. 

2. Alleged Omissions

Plaintiff argues Craig recklessly disregarded the truth by submitting an affidavit that omitted 

details of the extent of financial commingling between Plaintiff and Buether and information regarding 

the professional relationship between Buether and Craig. None of the omissions Plaintiff identifies, 

however, are material. 

To find materiality, the Court must determine whether Craig’s affidavit, if it had included the 

omitted information, would have obviously failed to establish probable cause for the warrant to issue. 

Lombardi, 117 F.3d at 1126. A warrant should issue when it appears that, under the totality of the 

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circumstances, there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular 

place. Id.; Greenstreet v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 41 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The facts 

presented [to the magistrate] must be sufficient to justify a conclusion that the property which is the 

object of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued.”). 

Probable cause means a “‘fair probability,’ not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence.” 

United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Craig’s affidavit provided the following information: (1) Buether and Plaintiff dated and lived 

with each other for approximately four years and had two children together; (2) approximately two 

months prior to Craig submitting the affidavit, Buether obtained a restraining and kick-out order 

against Plaintiff, alleging two previously-unreported incidents of domestic violence; (3) approximately 

four days after moving out of the residence pursuant to the restraining order, Plaintiff used a credit card 

issued to Buether to make three purchases from Overstock.com for items totaling nearly $9,000; 

(4) Buether, the purported victim and sole person authorized to use the credit card, claimed that he 

never granted Plaintiff permission to use his card without his being present, and that he did not grant 

permission for her to make the purchases in question; (5) Overstock.com provided records confirming 

that the Plaintiff purchased nearly $9,000 worth of goods using Buether’s credit card and that those 

goods were shipped to Plaintiff’s then-current address; (6) Craig had shown photos of possible items 

purchased to Buether, and he stated that, during a visit three or four weeks prior to Craig’s filing of the 

affidavit, he saw at least some of those goods at Plaintiff’s residence, and Plaintiff stated to him that 

she had purchased numerous items from Overstock.com; (7) Buether stated that he thought Plaintiff 

had used the goods purchased to furnish her residence. 

a. Financial Commingling

Plaintiff argues that Craig’s affidavit should have noted that, during the time they lived 

together, Plaintiff and Buether jointly financed an automobile, secured a joint HELOC for $125,000, 

and opened a joint checking account. Plaintiff also argues that Craig’s affidavit should have stated 

that, before seeking a search warrant, Craig did not contact Plaintiff or ask her about her prior use of 

the relevant card. Had Craig contacted Plaintiff, she would have learned—and should have included in 

the affidavit—that Plaintiff claims (a) she used the card to make approximately 123 purchases—

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including with Overstock.com—while living with Buether, with his permission and without his being 

present, and (b) she thought she had permission to continue using the card. 

Plaintiff argues those facts are material because they suggest Plaintiff believed she had 

permission to use Buether’s credit card. If Plaintiff had permission to use the card, then she could have 

established that no crime had occurred. 

The alleged omissions do not negate the facts in the affidavit that established probable cause. 

First, it does not follow from the fact that Plaintiff and Buether commingled some of their finances that 

Plaintiff enjoyed permission or access to all of Buether’s accounts. To the contrary, detailed 

information about the couple’s financial commingling would have shown that Plaintiff had clear access 

to some accounts because they were in her name as well as Buether’s. But the card in question was 

opened and maintained solely in Buether’s name. [Craig Decl., ¶¶ 3, 8; Buether Dep., at 117:18-

118:16.] 

Second, Craig’s affidavit stated that Plaintiff had lived for four years and had two children with 

Buether, and that Plaintiff had only recently moved from Buether’s home. Some degree of financial 

commingling is implicit in such a relationship. Even if Craig’s affidavit had included explicit and 

extensive descriptions of Plaintiff and Buether’s financial commingling, such facts would not establish 

that Plaintiff had permission to use a credit card issued solely to Buether. 

 Third, even if the affidavit included facts tending to show that, at some point during her 

relationship with Buether, Plaintiff had permission to use all of his credit cards, such facts would not 

establish that she retained such permission after their relationship ended and after Defendant Buether 

had secured a restraining and kick-out order against Plaintiff with allegations of domestic violence. 

 Had Craig’s affidavit included the information Plaintiff identifies related to financial 

commingling, it would still have established probable cause for a search warrant. See Gourde, 440 

F.3d at 1069. The omissions were therefore immaterial. Lombardi, 117 F.3d at 1126. 

Plaintiff argues that, had Craig interviewed Plaintiff before seeking a warrant, she would have 

learned of Plaintiff’s claim that no crime occurred because had Buether’s permission to use the card. 

Plaintiff thus argues Craig conducted an inadequate investigation. [See Pl.’s Opp’n, Doc. No. 63, at 

13-15.] Craig had no obligation to interview the suspect in a criminal investigation before seeking a 

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search warrant; she needed only to uncover enough information to establish a “fair probability that 

evidence of a crime would be found.” Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1069. Craig’s investigation, described 

below, was adequate. Cf. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the 

standard for probable cause to arrest without a warrant, and rejecting the “broad proposition that a 

police officer who interviews witnesses and concludes probable cause exists to arrest violates the 

Fourth Amendment by failing to investigate the defendant’s alleged alibi witnesses”). 

The information related to Plaintiff and Buether’s financial commingling was immaterial, and 

Craig had no duty to interview Plaintiff before seeking a search warrant. Thus, Craig did not act with a 

reckless disregard for the truth by excluding from her affidavit the information Plaintiff identifies. 

b. Buether’s and Craig’s Professional Relationship 

Plaintiff argues that Craig’s affidavit should have noted that (a) Craig and Buether are both 

Deputy Sheriffs assigned to the same substation (San Marcos); (b) they attended the “academy” 

together approximately thirteen years before this incident; and (c) several years before this incident, 

they worked on the same shift, though not as partners or in the same patrol vehicle, for approximately 

three years. 

It is possible that a judge might have interpreted information that Craig and Buether were 

professional colleagues to suggest bias toward Buether tainted Craig’s investigation. On the other 

hand, including information about Buether’s thirteen years of service as a Deputy Sheriff or about the 

three years during which Buether and Craig worked separately, but on the same shift, might have 

bolstered the credibility of Buether’s claims. 

However, Craig’s affidavit did not rely solely on Buether’s statements. Craig also obtained 

information from the loss-prevention manager at Overstock.com, confirming that Plaintiff used 

Buether’s card to make the relevant purchases, that the purchased items were sent to Plaintiff’s thencurrent residence, and that the credit issuer had charged Overstock back for the purchases. [Craig 

Decl., ¶ 9.] Overstock.com, a second victim, desired prosecution on the fraudulent charges. [Id.] 

Information to the effect that (1) Plaintiff, the suspect in a criminal investigation for fraudulent 

use of another’s credit card, claimed to have had permission to use that card, and (2) Buether, the 

purported victim, was a 13-year veteran of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, with whom the 

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investigating officer had worked in the past, would not have undermined the showing of probable 

cause in Craig’s affidavit. Because the omissions about which Plaintiff complains were not “plainly 

material when the warrant application was made,” Craig is entitled to qualified immunity. Lombardi, 

117 F.3d at 1126. Even if the omissions were material, Craig conducted a sufficient investigation 

before submitting her affidavit. 

3. Plaintiff Has Not Established a Constitutional Deprivation

In sum, Plaintiff has not made a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless 

disregard for the truth, or that the omissions of which Plaintiff complains were plainly material. Thus, 

the search warrant issued with probable cause and Plaintiff has failed to establish that the search of her 

residence violated her Fourth Amendment rights. See Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024; Lombardi, 117 F.3d at 

1126. Accordingly, Craig is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Seigert, 500 U.S. at 229-30. 

Additionally, because no constitutional deprivation occurred, the County is also entitled to summary 

judgment on this claim. 

b. Plaintiff’s Possible § 1983 Claims Related to the Execution of the Search Warrant

It is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint or her opposition to the present motion for summary 

judgment whether Plaintiff is attempting to claim that Craig and the Deputy Sheriffs operating under 

her direction executed the search warrant in a manner that violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. [See TAC, ¶ 20 (describing a “SWAT-like raid”); id. ¶¶ 26-31 (setting out Plaintiff’s § 1983 

claims without mention of the execution of the warrant); see also Pl.’s Opp’n, at 7, 10-11 (again 

describing a “SWAT-like raid” in the context of alleged deprivations of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights).] 

The Court must analyze claims against law enforcement officers for excessive force under the 

Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395 

(1989). “The Fourth Amendment says nothing specific about formalities in exercising a warrant’s 

authorization.” United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35 (2003). Reasonableness in executing a search 

warrant is a “function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder 

results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case.” Id. at 36. The Court must 

determine the reasonableness of the manner in which a search is executed from the perspective of a 

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reasonable officer on the scene. See Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 387). 

To determine reasonableness, the Court must consider the severity of the crime at issue, 

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat the safety of the officers or others, and whether the 

suspect is actively resisting arrest. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court 

should also consider whether a warrant was used, the number of potential arrestees or officers 

involved, and whether other potentially dangerous circumstances existed at the time of the arrest. See

id. at 1440 n.5. 

Plaintiff intimates the execution of the warrant was unreasonable because (a) between six and 

ten armed officers entered Plaintiff’s residence; (b) Plaintiff was handcuffed; (c) deputies confiscated 

“Cameron’s and her children’s furniture, beds, clothes, and virtually everything else in the apartment.” 

[Pl.’s Opp’n, at 7.] 

In her deposition, Plaintiff described the execution of the warrant as follows: (1) deputies 

knocked on the door at 7:00 a.m. and announced, “Sheriff’s Department”; (2) one of Plaintiff’s 

roommates opened the door, and the armed deputies entered and began to secure those inside; 

(3) deputies had guns drawn as they secured the residence; (4) as the deputies approached Plaintiff, she 

was shouting and raising her arms; (5) when the deputies reached Plaintiff in a narrow hallway, she 

was jostled but did not fall; (6) Plaintiff was handcuffed, but did not complain that the cuffs were too 

tight; (7) no one pointed a weapon at Plaintiff after she was handcuffed; (8) once handcuffed, Plaintiff 

was seated on the couch with the people present in the residence; (9) Plaintiff’s approximately oneyear-old child remained in his crib, and her two-year old was unrestrained and in the room where 

Plaintiff sat on the couch; (10) upon entering the residence, Craig phoned Buether so that he could 

pick-up the children, which he did shortly thereafter; (11) meanwhile, the deputies seized everything 

on their inventory of items fraudulently purchased from Overstock.com; (12) Plaintiff was escorted to 

another room and interviewed, and then escorted to a patrol car and taken to jail. [See Cameron Dep., 

at 219-255.] Plaintiff did not complain of any injuries, though she noted that the handcuffs left 

“hickey-like” marks on her wrists that went away shortly. [Id. at 229:18-230:4.] 

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Prior to executing the warrant, Craig investigated Plaintiff’s background and the backgrounds 

of Plaintiff’s several roommates. None of the background checks raised any safety concerns; however, 

Craig could not obtain any information regarding one of the roommates. That lack of information 

raised the level of risk involved in executing the warrant. [See Craig Dep., at 63:17-68:19.] 

The deputies were armed when they entered the residence because they had no information 

about one of the roommates and they could not be sure whether or how many unknown and 

unexpected people would be present. Under the circumstances, the deputies took reasonable steps to 

ensure their own safety. See Martin v. City of Oceanside, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153-54 (S.D. Cal. 

2002) (noting that “courts are counseled to ‘allow[] for the fact that police officers are often forced to 

make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about 

the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.’”) (quoting Jackson v. City of 

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, (9th Cir. 2001)) (alterations in original). 

Plaintiff claims that, as she yelled and raised her arms in a narrow hallway, the deputies 

approached her with guns drawn, shouting instructions. [Id. at 220:13-230:4.224:12.] Plaintiff 

describes some commotion and physical contact as deputies handcuffed her and escorted her to the 

couch, but alleges no improper conduct or related injuries. [Id. at 224:13-230:7.] Moreover, Plaintiff 

does not allege that Craig pointed a weapon at or used any force against her. [Id. at 247:10-12; see 

also Craig Decl., ¶ 15]; Bryan v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 349 Fed. Appx. 132, 133-134 

(9th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in favor of officers who were merely present at the time 

of, but not directly involved in, the allegedly unconstitutional use of force). Under these 

circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to show the deputies used excessive force during the search. See

Martin, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where officers pointed 

their guns as they initially came upon an unknown man and woman in a home while effecting a search 

warrant, but holstered the weapons once they ascertained their identities and the uncertainty had 

passed). 

Once the residents and visitors were secure, the deputies simply seized the items listed in the 

search warrant. Reasonable detention during a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment, 

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Michigan v. Summers, 452 692, 702-03 (1981); nor does seizing the items listed for seizure on the 

search warrant. See Zeltser v. City of Oakland, 325 F.3d 1141, at 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Under the circumstances, the manner in which the officers executed the search warrant 

reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, if Plaintiff has raised a § 1983 claim for 

excessive force, Craig is entitled to qualified immunity. Because no constitutional deprivation 

occurred, the County is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

c. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim for Wrongful Arrest

Plaintiff claims she was subjected to a wrongful arrest. She argues that because the search 

warrant lacked probable cause, the evidence seized during the search could not support probable cause 

to arrest. 

The Fourth Amendment requires an officer to have probable cause to effect a warrantless 

arrest. United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). “Probable cause requires more than 

bare suspicion but need not be based on evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even a 

showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than false.” Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 

338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). Once an officer serving a valid search warrant discovers incriminating 

evidence, “that evidence can provide probable cause for a warrantless arrest.” Id. (citing United States 

v. Moreno, 891 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

As discussed above, there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. While executing the 

valid search warrant, Craig found incriminating evidence in Plaintiff’s residence. That evidence 

provided the necessary probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s arrest was lawful 

Accordingly, Craig in entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 wrongful arrest 

claim. The County is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights were not violated. 

d. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim for Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff claims Craig’s search and arrest of Plaintiff without probable cause subjected her to an 

abusive prosecution in violation of her Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [See

TAC, ¶¶ 27-29.] This claim also rests on Plaintiff’s meritless claim that the search warrant issued 

without probable cause. Therefore, this claim also fails. 

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Additionally, in the Ninth Circuit, malicious prosecution claims are generally not cognizable 

under § 1983 if the relevant state judicial system provides a remedy.4 Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 

828 F.2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1987). California provides a remedy for malicious prosecution. Id. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations of malicious prosecution under § 1983 are not cognizable. Even assuming 

her allegations were cognizable, Plaintiff’s claim could not survive summary judgment. 

Malicious prosecution under § 1983 incorporates the elements of the cause of action under the 

relevant state’s law. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2004). Under 

California law, a claim for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to show that the “prior action (1) 

was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and pursued to a legal termination in plaintiff's 

favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Sagonowsky v. 

More, 64 Cal. App. 122, 128 (1998). 

Regarding the first element’s requirement that the prosecution be commenced at the 

defendant’s direction, generally, “the decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to result from 

an independent determination on the part of the prosecutor, and thus, precludes liability for those who 

participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation of proceedings.” 

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. Absent a showing that the investigating officers exerted improper pressure 

on or knowingly presented false information to the prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney’s 

exercise of independent judgment in deciding to prosecute a case breaks the causal chain for abusive 

prosecution claims against the officers. Id.; Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In this case, the Deputy District Attorney had all the information Plaintiff claims Craig 

improperly omitted from her affidavit, and he decided to pursue the preliminary hearing. Plaintiff has 

neither alleged nor offered any evidence to support the notion that any Defendant improperly pressured 

the attorney to prosecute the case against Plaintiff. Thus, even if her malicious prosecution claim were 

cognizable, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first element of that claim. 

 

4

 Where, however, a plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully prosecuted for the purpose of depriving 

him of a specific constitutional right—equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, for 

example—he may have a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 

1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Plaintiff has also failed satisfy the second element, that the prosecution was pursued without 

probable cause. As discussed above, the search warrant issued with probable cause. While executing 

the search warrant, officers found incriminating evidence that, coupled with previously-known 

information, provided probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. The Deputy District Attorney initially 

assigned to Plaintiff’s case brought the charges and evidence against Plaintiff before Judge Harry 

Powazek at Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing. [See Trans. Prelim. Hr’g, at 4, 48.] Judge Powazek heard 

testimony regarding the information Plaintiff contends should have negated probable cause to search or 

arrest; yet Judge Powazek still found probable cause to try Plaintiff.5

 [Id. at 50-51.] 

The third element, malice, “relates to the subjective intent or purpose with which the defendant 

acted in initiating the prior action.” Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 

F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863 

(1989)) (alterations omitted). “[W]here malice must be shown, only ‘other, additional evidence’ apart 

from a lack of probable cause, is sufficient . . . ‘a lack of probable cause, standing alone, does not 

support an inference of malice.’” Id. (quoting Swat-Fame, Inc. v. Goldstein, 101 Cal. App. 4th 613, 

634 (2002)). Normally a fact for the jury to determine, summary judgment for lack of malice is 

“nonetheless appropriate when there is no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude 

that the defendant pursued the underlying action with malice.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s only allegation against Craig that can be construed as malice is that she conspired 

with Buether against Plaintiff. As discussed above, however, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Craig participated in any such conspiracy. 

Thus, Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing of malice to maintain a claim for malicious 

prosecution. 

 5

 Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the Deputy District Attorney assigned to her case after 

the preliminary hearing, Katherine A. Flaherty, elected to dismiss the criminal case against Plaintiff. 

But merely pointing to Ms. Flaherty’s decision to drop the case against Plaintiff does not establish that 

the prosecution was initially brought without probable cause. Indeed, Ms. Flaherty testified during her 

deposition that she decided to dismiss the case not for concerns about where jurors’ sympathies may 

lie, not for a lack of probable cause: “this isn’t a question of whether it happened; it’s a question of 

perception . . . and sympathy of the jurors.” Pl.’s Exs. ISO Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary 

Judgment, Dep. of Katherine A. Flaherty, at 26:2-6.] 

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on this claim as to the County 

Defendants. 

e. Municipal Liability Under § 1983 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person” who, under color of law, deprives 

any other person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. The term “person” includes municipalities, such as the County. Ulrich v. City and Cnty. of 

San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A municipality cannot, however, “be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. A municipality may only face liability under § 1983 

“where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through ‘execution of a government’s 

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy.’” Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 985 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

Plaintiff has neither claimed nor made any showing that her alleged constitutional deprivations 

resulted from any policy or custom of the County. Therefore, Plaintiff has not made the required 

showing to establish municipal liability under § 1983. 

II. Plaintiff’s Claim for False Arrest Under California Law

Plaintiff again argues the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, and, therefore, 

Plaintiff’s arrest was unlawful under California law. As discussed above, probable cause supported the 

search warrant and the evidence discovered when officers executed the search warrant provided 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s arrest was lawful. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

summary judgment on this claim as it relates to the County Defendants. See Arpin v. Santa Clara 

Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that, under California law, “no 

cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer . . . , acting within the scope of his or her 

authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest when . . . [t]he arrest was 

lawful”) (emphasis added). 

III. Plaintiff’s Claim Under California Civil Code § 52.1

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California Civil Code § 52.1 permits an individual to bring civil action for interference with her 

rights under the United States or California Constitutions by threats, intimidation, or coercion. 

Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1239 (2007) (“Venegas IV”). “[S]ection 52.1 does 

not extend to all ordinary tort actions . . . [but] its provisions are limited to threats, intimidation or 

coercion that interferes with a constitutional or statutory right.” Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 11 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 692, 707 (2004) (“Venegas II”). The word “interferes” as used in the statute means 

“violates.” Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 472 (Ct. App. 2007). 

Plaintiff does not identify a right under California law separate from the rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution that Defendant allegedly violated; therefore, Plaintiff’s 

claim under Section 52.1 depends on the merits of her § 1983 claims. See Reynolds v. Cnty. of San 

Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing section 52.1 cause of action where there was 

no violation of the federal Constitution and plaintiff did not allege violation of the state Constitution 

separate and distinct from federal rights), overruled on other grounds, Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 

114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997); Venegas IV, 153 Cal. App. 4th at 1239-40 (where plaintiffs 

alleged no state constitutional right separate and distinct from federal rights, and where the defendant 

officers’ initial detention and questioning of the plaintiffs and the search and impounding of the 

plaintiffs’ car did not violate plaintiffs’ rights under the federal Constitution, those acts by defendants 

necessarily did not violate their rights under the California Constitution). 

Because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants violated any right under the federal 

Constitution, “there is no conduct upon which to base a claim for liability under 52.1.” Reynolds, 84 

F.3d at 1170-71. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the County Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the summary judgment motion of 

Michelle Craig and the County of San Diego. The Court finds: 

1. The Court finds that Defendant Craig is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 

claims for omitting information from the affidavit for a search warrant, excessive force, and 

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wrongful arrest. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

those claims as to the County of San Diego; 

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s wrongful 

prosecution claim under § 1983; 

3. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest 

under California law; and 

4. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under 

California Civil Code § 52.1. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: _______________________________ 

 IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge 

 United States District Court

3/4/11

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