Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00242/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00242-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

SUSAN H. BLAKE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:11-cv-242-MEF

)

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff Susan Blake’s (“Blake”) Motion to

Remand, filed April 19, 2011. (Doc. # 10). The Defendants Bank of America, N.A.

(“Bank of America”) and BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (“BAC” and collectively

“Defendants”) removed this action from the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama based

on diversity jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, Blake’s Motion to Remand is

DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997, Blake entered into a mortgage contract on a residential property located in

Auburn, Alabama. At the time of the alleged misconduct on the part of the Defendants,

Bank of America and BAC serviced Blake’s mortgage. According to Blake, the

Defendants improperly accelerated the debt Blake owed, instituted an illegal foreclosure,

engaged in a conspiracy to create false defaults for the purpose of charging fees, breached

the mortgage contract, and engaged in other wanton, malicious, and intentional conduct.

Case 3:11-cv-00242-MEF-WC Document 23 Filed 07/06/11 Page 1 of 8
(Doc. # 1 Ex. 4). Blake’s complaint includes four causes of action—negligent mortgage

servicing, wanton mortgage serving, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy. Blake seeks

compensatory damages, including those for mental anguish, and punitive damages. (Doc.

# 1). A tax appraisal done for tax year 2010 indicates that Blake’s home is valued at

$245,210. (Doc. # 19 Ex. B). At the time that the motion for remand was filed, Blake

owed $183,127.37 on the mortgage. (Doc. # 19 Ex. C).

On March 31, 2011 the Defendants removed this action based on the allegations in

the complaint, asserting that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the case pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1332. In other words, this is a case governed by paragraph one of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446. The Notice of Removal states that all parties are diverse. Blake is an individual

citizen of Alabama. Bank of America is a national banking association with its main

office, as set out in its articles of association, in North Carolina. BAC is a limited

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partnership with two partners—BANA LP, LLC and BAC GP, LLC. Bank of America is

the only member of both BANA LP, LLC and BAC GP, LLC. As discussed above, Bank

of America is a citizen of North Carolina. Hence, BAC is also a citizen of North

Carolina. According to the New Jersey Secretary of State, Defendant Best Interest Rate

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28 U.S.C. § 1348 provides that “[a]ll national banking associations shall, for the

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purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which

they are respectively located.” For purposes of § 1348, a national bank is located “in the

State designated in its articles of association as its main office.” Wachovia Bank v.

Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 319 (2006).

A limited partnership’s citizenship is determined from the citizenship of its

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partners, and a limited liability company’s citizenship is determined from the citizenship

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Case 3:11-cv-00242-MEF-WC Document 23 Filed 07/06/11 Page 2 of 8
Mortgage Company, LLC has one member who is a citizen of New Jersey. Accordingly,

Best Interest Rate Mortgage Company, LLC is a citizen of New Jersey.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th

Cir. 1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir.

1983). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been

authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. Kokkonen,

511 U.S. at 377.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 , federal courts have jurisdiction in civil actions “in

which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of

interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.” A party may remove a case

within thirty days of receiving the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon

which such action is based. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If the case is not removable from

the face of the complaint, the defendant may file a notice of removal within 30 days of

receiving some “other paper” which makes the case removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

of each of its members. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings, L.L.C.,

374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004).

Best Interest Rate Mortgage Company, LLC cannot be located and has not yet

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been served. Therefore, its consent to removal is not necessary. See Bailey v. Janssen

Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] defendant has no

obligation to participate in any removal procedure prior to his receipt of formal service of

judicial process.”).

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In no circumstance may the defendant remove the case under § 1332(a) more than one

year after the action has commenced. Id.

After removal, however, the non-removing party may move for remand, which will

be granted if “it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c). Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns,

“removal statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about

jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.” Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.

When the initial pleading does not specify the damages sought, the removing party

bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional

requirements have been met. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir.

2010); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007). “In some cases, this

burden requires the removing defendant to provide additional evidence demonstrating that

removal is proper.” Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

Blake’s complaint does not contain a specified amount of damages. Accordingly,

the Defendants must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the

jurisdictional requirements have been met in this case. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752.

A. Consideration of Blake’s request to enjoin foreclosure

In an attempt to do so, the Defendants contend that because Blake has requested

the Court to enjoin any foreclosure proceeding against her, the entire value of her home is

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in controversy. Her property, valued at $245,210, is worth much more than the

jurisdictional threshold of $75,000. In her motion to remand and her reply brief, Blake

claims that there is no foreclosure pending on her property and that any reference to a

foreclosure in her complaint is a mistake. (Doc. # 20). She encourages the Court to

disregard all references to a foreclosure in her complaint when determining whether the

amount in controversy requirements have been met.

This Court cannot do so. Blake’s attorney signed the complaint, and her signature

“constitutes a certificate by the attorney that the attorney has read the pleading, motion, or

other paper” and that “to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief

there is good ground to support it.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 11. Blake has not cited to this Court

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any authority for the proposition that the Court can selectively ignore allegations

contained in her complaint. Blake has made no attempt to formally amend her complaint

to remove the ‘mistakes.’ Additionally, Blake’s contention that her complaint contains

mere ‘mistakes’ strains credulity. The word foreclosure appears in paragraphs 6, 19, 20

,21, 29, 30, 31, 45, 46, and 50 of the complaint. The complaint states that “the action is

brought to enjoin foreclosure instituted in Lee County, Alabama.” Blake goes on to list 7

enumerated reasons why “the foreclosure is improper and illegal.” She repeatedly

Blake’s attorney filed the complaint in state court, and accordingly the Alabama

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Rules of Civil Procedure apply. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 embodies

the same principles—when an attorney signs a pleading, he or she makes a representation

to the court that the factual allegations contained therein “have evidentiary support.”

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contends that the Defendants do not have standing to foreclose on her property “and yet

they did so in violation of the law.”

Even had Blake sought leave to amend her complaint to eliminate the foreclosure

language, the Court would be required to determine removal jurisdiction based on the

original complaint. This Court must look to the complaint as it was written at the time of

removal to determine whether the applicable jurisdictional requirements have been met.

Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000); Conn.

State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1351 n.7 (refusing to

consider the plaintiff’s amended complaint because the amendments were made after

removal and “removal jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal, and ‘events

occurring after removal . . . do not oust the district court’s jurisdiction.’”). At the time

the case was removed, the complaint alleged that an illegal foreclosure proceeding had

been instituted on Blake’s property. Therefore, when determining whether of not federal

court jurisdiction exists in this case, this Court will consider the value of an injunction as

part of the amount in controversy.

B. Determining the value of injunctive relief

“[T]he value of the injunctive relief is the monetary value of the benefit that would

flow to the plaintiff if the injunction were granted.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228

F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000). The value of the object of the litigation is solely

measured from the plaintiff’s point of view. See Ericsson GE Mobile Commnc’ns Inc. v.

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Case 3:11-cv-00242-MEF-WC Document 23 Filed 07/06/11 Page 6 of 8
Motorola Commnc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216 (11th Cir. 1997). In this case, the

Court must determine the value to Blake of enjoining the foreclosure of her home. As

Judge Watkins pointed out in Mapp v. Deusche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 3:08-cv-695-

WKW, 2009 WL 3664118, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2009), foreclosure would require the

homeowner to forfeit the right to “peacefully possess and enjoy [her] home.” Foreclosure

would also cost the homeowner title to the house. Id. Therefore, from the plaintiff’s

perspective, “it is the whole title and its ‘bundle of rights’” that is at issue. Id. In

monetary terms, these benefits, objects, and rights are best measured by the value of the

home itself.” Id.

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In this case, the value of the home was determined to be $245,210. This amount is

well over the jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, the Defendants have satisfied their

burden of demonstrating the amount in controversy to a preponderance of the evidence.

There is a split of authority in this circuit about how best to measure the amount

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in controversy when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin a foreclosure. This Court once

determined that the best measure is the amount of equity the plaintiff has in his house.

See Sanders v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-369-MEF, 2009 WL 1151868

(M.D. Ala. April 29, 2009). Other courts have found that when injunctive relief would

only temporarily delay a foreclosure, the amount in controversy is the value of the

temporary delay. See James v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., No. 09-cv-247-MHT, 2009 WL

2170045, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 17, 2009). However, the more recent and thorough statelaw analysis contained in Mapp is the most persuasive. Additionally, Blake has not

contested the application of the principle contained in Mapp. In fact, she fails to present

any contrary authority whatsoever.

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Case 3:11-cv-00242-MEF-WC Document 23 Filed 07/06/11 Page 7 of 8
IV. CONCLUSION

It is hereby ORDERED that for the foregoing reasons, Blake’s Motion to Remand

(Doc. # 10) is DENIED.

Done this the 6 day of June, 2011.

th

/s/ Mark E. Fuller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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