Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06025/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 1 7 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECI~ 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RODERICK LEWIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 92-6025 

(D.C. No. CR-89-103-A) 

(W. Dist. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Roderick Lewis appeals the district court's denial of his 

motion for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6025 Document: 010110276741 Date Filed: 08/17/1992 Page: 1
Represented by paid counsel, Mr. Lewis contended below that the 

trial court erred by admitting the co-conspirator testimony of 

Chris Nero without requiring an independent prior foundation to 

show that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Nero were in fact part of the same 

conspiracy. On appeal, his attorney persists in this argument on 

the basis of the rule on admitting the out-of-court statements of 

co-conspirators, Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E). 

The rule, put simply, is just this: a court may admit 

out-of-court statements offered by a co-conspirator of the 

defendant if (1) the statement was made in furtherance of the 

conspiracy; and (2) the court finds prior to admitting the 

testimony that the declarant and nonoffering party were members of 

the same criminal conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 

U.S. 171, 175 (1987); Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E). Most students 

of the law, as well as perhaps a number of casual observers, would 

probably perceive that a rule restricting the use of coconspirator hearsay1 would apply only in cases where there was, in 

1 Rule 80l(c) defines "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one 

made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, 

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 

Rule 801(d)(2) lists five such statements, including those of 

co-conspirators, which comply with the definition of hearsay but 

which are declared non-hearsay because they are believed more 

reliable than ordinary hearsay. Although out-of-court statements 

by co-conspirators thus technically do not constitute hearsay 

within the meaning of the rule, we will nevertheless sometimes 

refer to such statements as "hearsay" for ease of description, as 

do other courts. See~, Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 177-79 

(assessing whether co-conspirator "hearsay" may be considered in 

determining existence of conspiracy and defendant's participation 

under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 

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Appellate Case: 92-6025 Document: 010110276741 Date Filed: 08/17/1992 Page: 2
fact, an out-of-court statement. Mr. Lewis's counsel, in 

contrast, loudly asserts his client's rights under the rule 

without citing a single instance of hearsay testimony. 2 His 

lengthy brief discussing the foundational requirement and 

necessary findings by the trial judge before co-conspirator 

hearsay is admitted is perhaps of some academic interest. 

Unfortunately, it is completely inapplicable to his client's trial 

and does not advance his cause in any way. 

Mr. Lewis's counsel also appears confused by the procedural 

rules that govern federal habeas claims. There was no objection 

to Mr. Nero's testimony at trial on the basis urged today (of 

course, since there was no hearsay, there was nothing to object 

to), and there is now some dispute as to whether Mr. Lewis raised 

the claim he pursues here on direct appeal. Both the district 

court and the government believe that Mr. Lewis's unsuccessful 

direct appeal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence of 

conspiracy encompassed the same issue he now raises. They would 

therefore have us dismiss the claim under United States v. 

Pritchard, 875 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989). We think the coconspirator hearsay claim before us now is materially different 

(10th Cir. 1992) ("Coconspirator's 

admitted into evidence pursuant to 

(emphasis added). 

hearsay statements are properly 

Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)") 

2 The failure of citation is, in itself, not surprising, since 

our study of the record shows that Mr. Nero did not testify to any 

out-of-court statements by others. Rather, he testified to his 

own direct knowledge of events. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6025 Document: 010110276741 Date Filed: 08/17/1992 Page: 3
from the earlier insufficiency claim, and that it has not been 

raised before. 

The government points out, correctly, that in order to 

challenge a trial error without having contemporaneously objected 

at trial, a defendant must show cause for failure to raise the 

issue earlier, and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

error. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

Citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), defense counsel 

argues that he has shown cause for failing to raise the issue, 

because defendant did not deliberately by-pass it earlier. 

"Deliberate by-pass" has not been the law in the federal courts 

governing failure to object at trial since the Supreme Court 

decided Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977), 15 years 

ago. 

Finally, we note that even if counsel pointed to any error in 

the order of proof cognizable at this late stage of proceedings, 

it would not have withstood our inquiry into prejudice, given the 

holding on appeal that the conviction was supported by sufficient 

evidence. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6025 Document: 010110276741 Date Filed: 08/17/1992 Page: 4
We AFFIRM the order of the district court. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6025 Document: 010110276741 Date Filed: 08/17/1992 Page: 5