Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-02866/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-02866-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

Land is represented here by Robert M. Illman, Federal Defenders in the Middle District of Alabama. He was

1/

represented at trial by Hiram Dodd, Jr., and Erskine Mathis. He was represented on direct appeal by Joe W.

Morgan, Jr. He was represented on petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

by Joseph T. Flood. He was represented on petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama by

Ursula Bentele. He was represented throughout the Rule 32 collateral review process by J. Drew Colfax,

Randall S. Suskind, and Gerald W. King, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama. 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

MICHAEL JEFFREY LAND, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-BE-2866-S

 )

DONAL CAMPBELL, Commissioner, )

Alabama Department of Corrections, )

 )

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Procedural Background

Michael Jeffrey Land, petitioner herein, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Land is represented by counsel. His claims for relief include – 1/

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and other claims. For

the reasons stated below, the petition is due to be denied.

On August 13, 1993, Land was convicted in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County of two

counts of capital murder for the death of Candace Brown – one count of murder during a burglary

in violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code (1975), and one count of murder during a kidnapping

in violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code (1975). The jury recommended that Land be

sentenced to death by a vote of 11 to 1. 

At a sentencing hearing held on December 2, 1993, the trial court found two aggravating

circumstances and no statutory mitigating factors. The trial court sentenced Land to death. 

FILED

 2007 Oct-18 PM 12:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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On January 13, 1995, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Land’s conviction

and sentence. Land v. State, 678 So.2d 201 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). The Alabama Supreme

Court granted certiorari and on March 1, 1996, affirmed Land’s conviction and sentence. Ex

parte Land, 678 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1996). The United States Supreme Court denied Land’s

petition for writ of certiorari on October 15, 1996. Land v. Alabama, 519 U.S. 993, 117 S.Ct.

308, 136 L.Ed.2d 224 (1996).

On October 2, 1997, Land filed a post-conviction petition in state court pursuant to Rule

32, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure (referred to hereinafter as a Rule 32 petition). He

amended his Rule 32 petition on November 6, 1998 and again on January 8, 2001. The state

court conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2001. On April 23, 2003, the trial court denied

Land’s Rule 32 petition, adopting the proposed order submitted by the state. On May 21, 2004,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Land’s Rule 32 appeal. Land v.

State, CR-02-1563, Memorandum Opinion, (Ala.Crim.App. May 21, 2004). On June 25, 2004,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied Land’s application for rehearing. On September

24, 2004, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Land’s petition for writ of certiorari. On

September 29, 2004, Land filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court and

subsequently filed his amended petition on February 16, 2005. In his petition, Land asserts what

he contends are instances of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, trial

court error, juror misconduct, and insufficiency of the evidence.

Factual Background

The Alabama Supreme Court summarized the facts as follows:

On the evening of May 18, 1992, Candace Brown drove to her

mother's home to pick up her two-year-old son. Because Ms.

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Brown's residence had been burglarized five days earlier, her

mother and brother followed her home to make sure the house was

safe. Ms. Brown's mother and brother left the house at

approximately 9:00 p.m. 

The following morning, May 19, Ms. Brown's landlord went to her

residence to supervise the installation of a fence. The landlord

observed that a window located near the rear entry to the house had

been broken into, that the telephone wires to the house had been

cut, and that the window on the driver's side of Ms. Brown's car

had been shattered. After knocking on the front door and receiving

no response, the landlord asked a neighbor to call the police and

then returned to his own home in order to get a spare set of keys to

Ms. Brown's house. When officers from the Birmingham Police

Department arrived at Ms. Brown's residence, they established that

all doors to the house were locked, that a storm window located

near a rear entry to the house had been removed, and that several

panes of the interior window behind that storm window had been

cut and removed. They saw on one of the removed panes of glass,

which was lying on the ground, a shoe imprint with a distinctive

tread design bearing the lettering “USA.”

The landlord opened the house for the police officers, who found

Ms. Brown's infant son alone and unharmed. The officers also

found on a bulletin board a note with the name and telephone

numbers of Michael Jeffrey Land and his mother, Gail M. Land.

After telephoning Ms. Land and learning from her where her son

Jeffrey was working, Detectives Steve Corvin and Larry Fowler

went to Riverchase Galleria, a shopping mall in Hoover, where

Jeffrey Land was repairing the roof of the mall. The detectives

informed Land that they were investigating the disappearance of

Ms. Brown, and he agreed to accompany them to the police station

to answer some questions. He was taken to an interrogation room

and informed of his rights, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He signed a

waiver of rights form and agreed to have his statement tape-recorded.

Land acknowledged in the tape-recorded statement that he knew

Ms. Brown, but said that he had not seen her in about a week, that

he had no idea where she was, and that he had no knowledge about

the most recent break-in at her residence. However, Land later

confessed that he had burglarized Ms. Brown's residence six days

earlier and that during the course of that burglary he had cut the

exterior telephone lines.

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The parties agree that Land was arrested at this point. 2/

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When the detectives inquired as to where he had been the night

before, i.e., May 18, Land claimed that he had been visiting a

girlfriend at her parents' apartment until approximately 11:30 p.m.

Land said that after he left the apartment he fell asleep in his car in

the parking lot at the apartments and that he awoke at

approximately 4:15 a.m., May 19, and drove to his grandfather's

house; he said he lived there with his grandfather. Land claimed

that he reported to work at the Galleria before 6:00 a.m. that

morning, that he had eaten lunch earlier that day with a second

girlfriend, and that his car was parked at that second girlfriend's house.

During the interrogation, Detective Fowler noticed that the tread

design on the bottom of Land's tennis shoes appeared to match the

print the officers had seen on the window glass at Ms. Brown's

house. At the completion of Land's interview, Detective Fowler

asked to see Land's shoes and, upon closer observation, noticed

what appeared to be bloodstains. The detectives asked Land to

removes [sic] his shoes and clothes, and they gave him a jail

uniform to wear. Meanwhile, Birmingham Police Lieutenant Carl

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Quinn telephoned Land's second girlfriend, who denied having

eaten lunch with him that day and also stated that Land's car was

not parked at her home.

After Lt. Quinn relayed that information to Detectives Fowler and

Corvin, Corvin informed Land that his second girlfriend had

denied eating lunch with him and had denied having his car.

Detective Corvin then told Land that he needed to tell the truth

about the disappearance of Ms. Brown. Confronted with this

discrepancy in his statement, Land then agreed to make a second

statement, but refused to allow it to be tape-recorded.

Once again, Land was informed of, and waived, his Miranda

rights. In his second statement, Land stated that he had met two

men, whom he named “Tony” and “Edward,” at a gas station late

the previous night and that these men had asked him if he knew an

“easy mark” for a burglary. Land stated that he suggested Ms.

Brown's house and that Tony and Edward had paid him $20 to cut

and remove the glass to a window in Ms. Brown's house. Land said

that the three of them entered the kitchen through this window.

Land said that after they entered the house Ms. Brown walked into

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the kitchen, where the three men were, and that either Tony or

Edward slapped her, knocking her to the floor and causing her nose

and mouth to bleed. According to Land, as Ms. Brown fell, she

grabbed his hand and, he said, in doing so she may have gotten

some blood on his gloves. When Detective Corvin told Land that

no trace of blood was found in Ms. Brown's house, Land said that

either Tony or Edward had cleaned the blood up with paper towels

and then had placed the towels in his pants pocket. Land said that

after Ms. Brown was injured he became frightened and left the

house and that he did not know what happened to her after that.

In this second interview, Land admitted that his car was not parked

at a girlfriend's house, but was instead parked in the parking deck

at the mall where he had been working. When told by Detective

Corvin that the police would need to look in his car, Land asked

what would happen if they found something in his car that he was

not supposed to have. Detective Corvin told Land that they were

looking for evidence concerning Ms. Brown's disappearance and

asked Land if he was referring to drugs. Land answered that he had

a .45 caliber automatic handgun in his car and would consent to a

search of the car only if the police agreed not to charge him with

carrying a gun. Without agreeing to Land's conditions, Detective

Corvin asked Land for his car keys. Land handed the keys to the detective.

Detective Fowler located Land's car, opened the trunk, and made a

visual inventory of the trunk, without moving or touching the

contents. He saw a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun in the

trunk, but did not seize it. Instead, the police had the car towed to a

secure lot; it was searched two days later pursuant to a valid search warrant.

On the evening of May 19, after completing his second statement,

Land was informed that he was under arrest. The next day, May 20,

Ms. Brown's body was discovered by hikers in a rock quarry on

Ruffner Mountain in Jefferson County. She had been shot once in

the back of her head. Land was charged with capital murder.

At trial, the State's expert testimony showed that a pair of wire

cutters found during the search of Land's car had made the cuts on

the telephone wire leading into Ms. Brown's residence; that two

types of glass fragments found on a pair of gloves seized from

Land's car were consistent with the glass in the shattered window

of Ms. Brown's car and with the glass in the broken window near

the rear entry of Ms. Brown's house; that Land's tennis shoe sole

had the same distinctive design as the shoe print found on a

removed pane of glass at Ms. Brown's house; that the bullet

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recovered from Ms. Brown's head had been fired from a .45 caliber

handgun and that it matched a bullet test-fired from the .45 caliber

handgun found in Land's car; and that a DNA profile of a semen

stain found on Ms. Brown's blouse matched Land's known blood

sample, and that only one in 20,620,000 white males would have

those same DNA characteristics (Land is white).

Land was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the death

of Ms. Brown. The jury found him guilty of murder during a

burglary, Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(4), and guilty of murder

during a kidnapping, Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(1). By a vote

of 11-1, the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death. The

trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Land

to die in the electric chair.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 228-30.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

Land’s federal habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA establishes the

analytical framework of review. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063,

138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 1486, 146

L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall 

be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.

“This presumption of correctness applies both to findings of fact made by the state trial

court as well as the state appellate court.” Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1344, 1354, (11th Cir. 2007),

citing, Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003). 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the United

States Supreme Court discussed the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” phrases of §

2254(d):

A state-court decision will . . . be contrary to our clearly

established precedent if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . . A statecourt decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly

established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.

. . . .

[A] state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of

this Court's precedent if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case. Second,

a state-court decision also involves an unreasonable application of

this Court's precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends

a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it

should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to

a new context where it should apply. . . .

A state-court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal

rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular

prisoner's case certainly would qualify as a decision “involv[ing]

an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law.”

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A state-court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal

rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular

prisoner’s case . . . would qualify as a decision “involv[ing] an

unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law.”

. . . .

[A] federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application”

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was objectively unreasonable.

. . . .

[U]nder § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause, then a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.

. . . .

[T]he phrase “clearly established Federal law”] refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision.

529 U.S. at 405-12, 120 S.Ct. at 1519-23

“[W]hether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the

record the court had before it.” Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 2737-38,

159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004).

A state court’s decision is not contrary to clearly established law simply because it did not

cite United States Supreme Court opinions “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 10, 157

L.Ed.2d 263 (2003), quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263

(2002).

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The state court does not have to explain its decision to be entitled to deferential review

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Herring v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 171, 163 L.Ed.2d 277 (2005). As the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

A judicial decision and a judicial opinion are not the same thing.

The chief responsibility of judges is to decide the case before them.

They may, or may not, attempt to explain the decision in an opinion.

The text of § 2254(d)(1) accepts this orthodox view. . . . The

statutory language focuses on the result, not on the reasoning that

led to the result, and nothing in that language requires the state court

adjudication that has resulted in a decision to be accompanied by an

opinion that explains the state court's rationale. . . . [A]ll that is

required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an explanation.

To conclude otherwise on this issue would be writing into §

2254(d)(1) an additional requirement that Congress did not put

there–a requirement that the state courts explain the rationale of

their decisions. Some might view such an addition as an

improvement, others would not. Regardless, it would be an

addition, and courts ought not add to what the legislature has said is

the law. 

Wright v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,

538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct. 1511, 155 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003).

Even if there were no legal explanation of the rationale for the decisions of the state courts 

set out in an opinion, a federal court may assume that the state court was aware of relevant

Supreme Court case law and review the state court decision accordingly. Wright, 278 F.3d at

1255-56; Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S.

1142, 125 S.Ct. 2963, 162 L.Ed.2d 892 (2005). 

Respondents assert procedural defaults as bars to the remedy sought by Land. A state

procedural rule will bar federal habeas review of a claim only if that rule is “firmly established

and regularly followed.” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857, 112 L.Ed.2d

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935 (1991) (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835, 80 L.Ed.2d 346

(1984)); Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1408 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1073,

116 S.Ct. 776, 133 L.Ed.2d 728 (1996).

In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989), the

Supreme Court held that a "procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on . . .

habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and expressly'

states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar." 

Where a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the independent state

procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the federal court should apply the state

procedural bar and generally decline to reach the merits of the defaulted claim. Harris, 489 U.S. at

264, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 1044 n. 10; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1301 -1302 (11th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 838, 117 S.Ct. 113, 136 L.Ed.2d 65 (1996); Alderman v. Zant, 22

F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061, 115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606

(1994). In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Supreme

Court held that the procedural default rule applies to a claim which was never properly presented

to the state court. 

A habeas petitioner may overcome a procedural bar by showing “cause” for the default

and “prejudice attributable thereto,” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644,

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), or by demonstrating that failure to consider the federal claim will result in

a “‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” 477 U.S. at 495, 106 S.Ct. at 2649, quoting Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1576, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). See also,Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Because the

“cause and prejudice” exception is in the conjunctive, a petitioner must prove both cause and

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prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Cause requires a showing of some objective factor

external to the defense, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645, which prevented

counsel from constructing or raising the claim. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497, 111 S.Ct.

1454, 1472, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). “[A] showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available to counsel or that there was ‘some interference by officials’ would

constitute cause under this standard.” Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 1776,

100 L.Ed.2d 249(1988), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2645. 

To demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner must show “not merely that the errors at trial

created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (emphasis in original)).

Alternatively, a habeas petitioner may overcome a procedural default by establishing the

existence of a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” In Calderon v. Thompson,, the Supreme

Court explained:

[T]he precise scope of the miscarriage of justice exception depends

on the nature of the challenge brought by the habeas petitioner. If

the petitioner asserts his actual innocence of the underlying crime,

he must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in light of the new evidence” presented

in his habeas petition. If, on the other hand, a capital petitioner

challenges his death sentence in particular, he must show “by clear

and convincing evidence” that no reasonable juror would have

found him eligible for the death penalty in light of the new

evidence.

523 U.S. 538, 559-60, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 1502-03, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998) (citations omitted;

however, the Court quoted in part from Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867,

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130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2523, 120

L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).)

The independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars federal habeas review “when a

state court declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a

state procedural requirement. In these cases, the state judgment rests on independent and adequate

state procedural grounds.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554,

115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Whether a state procedural rule is “adequate and independent” so as to

have a preclusive effect on federal review of a claim is a federal question. Lee v. Kemna, 534

U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 885, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002). To be considered “adequate,” by a

federal court, the state procedural rule must be “‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Id.

(quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)). In other

words, the rule must be “clear [and] closely hewn to” by the state for a federal court to find it to be

adequate. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. at 345. 

The applicable state procedural rules at issue in this case are found in Rule 32.2, Alabama

Rules of Criminal Procedure:

(a) Preclusion of Grounds. A petitioner will not be given

relief under this rule based upon any ground:

 . . . .

(2) Which was raised or addressed at trial; or

(3) Which could have been but was not raised at trial,

unless the ground for relief arises under Rule

32.1(b); or 

(4) Which was raised or addressed on appeal . . . .; or 

(5) Which could have been but was not raised on appeal

. . .

. . . .

(c) Limitations Period. . . . [T]he court shall not entertain any

petition for relief from a conviction or sentence . . . unless

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the petition is filed: (1) In the case of a conviction appealed

to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within one (1) year after

the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of

Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, Ala.R.App.P. . . .

 In Waldrop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 898, 117

S.Ct. 247, 136 L.Ed.2d 175 (1996), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized:

Alabama law precludes post-conviction relief for claims which

could have been but were not raised on direct appeal. Ala.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(5). Under Rule 32, this . . .claim should have been raised on

direct appeal. Because it was not, it has been defaulted. Thompson

v. State, 581 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Ala. Crim. App.1991), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 1030, 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992); Weeks v.

State, 568 So.2d 864, 871 (Ala. Crim. App.1989), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 882, 111 S.Ct. 230, 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990).

Rule 32.2(a)(5) is firmly established as a matter of Alabama law and regularly followed. 

This court should not review claims deemed procedurally barred by the state court because of an

application of Rule 32.2(a)(5) in the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Claims which are procedurally defaulted are not set out here but will be addressed in

abbreviated form in the order in which these claims were asserted in Land’s amended petition. 

With the exception of a claim of trial court error related to the admission of DNA allegedly

improperly collected, analyzed and admitted, Land elected to expend no effort to establish the

cause and prejudice necessary as a matter of law to overcome procedural default. Land has not

argued either actual or legal innocence in an attempt to overcome the procedural defaults. In light

of this discussion, where this court concludes a procedural default has occurred, the court will

simply state that Land has failed to make a showing of cause and prejudice and will not address

actual or legal innocence as a separate concept.

I. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct 

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On habeas review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct, “[t]he relevant question is

whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464,

2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), quoting, Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868,

40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 

Improper prosecutorial arguments, especially misstatements of law,

must be considered carefully because “while wrapped in the cloak

of state authority [they] have a heightened impact on the jury.”

Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1459 (11 Cir.1985). When th

assessing this type of claim, this Court examines the entire context

of the judicial proceeding to determine if it was fundamentally

unfair. See Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1400 (11 Cir.1985) th

(en banc), vacated, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732

(1986), reinstated, 809 F.2d 700 (1987). Not every improper

prosecutorial remark, therefore, renders the trial unfair. See id.

Improper arguments do, however, render the capital sentencing

hearing fundamentally unfair and require reversal when there is a

reasonable probability that they changed the outcome of the case.

See id. at 1402. “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id. at 1401

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Proper arguments, regardless of their

impact on the outcome of the case, do not render a trial unfair. 

Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1053, 121 S.Ct.

660, 148 L.Ed.2d 562 (2000).

Reviewing the challenged comments at issue in the context of the entire trial, for the

reasons discussed below, the record establishes that the comments did not so infect the trial with

an unfairness that would have denied Land constitutional due process. On more than one

occasion the comments about which Land has complained were made in response to arguments of

Land’s counsel. Further “improper statements during argument can be cured by clear and accurate

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15

jury instructions.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1185 (11th Cir. 2001). When considered

in light of the weight of the evidence and the trial court’s instructions to the jury, the prosecutor’s

comments were unlikely to have influenced the jury’s decision. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182, 106

S.Ct. at 2472, citing, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).

I.(a). Prosecutor’s alleged comments on Land’s decision not to testify

Land argues that in closing arguments the prosecutor made two comments on Land’s

decision not to testify. First, the prosecutor stated: “Jeff, tell us the truth, tell us the truth.” 

Second, the prosecutor stated: “Through his attorneys [Mr. Land] continues to say ‘I don’t know

anything about the wire cutters or the phone lines or the glass fragments, I don’t know anything

about the gun or how the bullet got into her head.” Land contends these statements violate the

prohibition against comments on his silence at trial.

“[T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government and in its

bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the

prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of

guilt.” Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). 

The Eleventh Circuit has described the proper manner in which to evaluate a claim under

Griffin: 

The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting

directly or indirectly on a defendant’s failure to testify. A

prosecutor’s statement violates the defendant’s right to remain silent

if either (1) the statement was manifestly intended to be a comment

on the defendant’s failure to testify; or (2) the statement was of such

a character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a

comment on the failure of the accused to testify. The question is

not whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the

remark in this manner, but whether the jury necessarily would

have done so. The defendant bears the burden of establishing the

existence of one of the two criteria. The comment must be

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16

examined in context, in order to evaluate the prosecutor’s motive

and to discern the impact of the statement. . . . 

United States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146 (11 Cir.1995) (citations,

th

quotations, and footnotes omitted). See also United States v.

LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1565 (11 Cir.1991) (same); Solomon v. th

Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 401 (11 Cir.1984). th

In applying Griffin, we have strictly enforced the requirement that a

defendant show that the allegedly offensive comment was either

manifestly intended to be a comment on the defendant’s silence or

that the comment naturally and necessarily related to the

defendant’s silence. For example, in Knowles, the Court considered

whether a prosecutor violated Griffin when he pointed out problems

with the defendant's defense, and then asked, “Did you ever hear an

explanation for that?” 66 F.3d at 1162. The Court held that this

statement did not necessarily relate to the defendant's silence,

because the defendant could have presented other types of evidence

to explain the inconsistency. Id. at 1163. Therefore, the Court

concluded that:

As such, the remark is not so much a comment on Wright's

failure to testify, but rather on Wright's counsel's failure to

counter or explain the [damaging evidence]. It is not error

to comment on the failure of the defense as opposed to the

defendant, to counter or explain the evidence.

Id. at 1163 (citations and quotations omitted).

Likewise, in Solomon v. Kemp, the prosecutor addressed the fact

that the State was not sure which one of two defendants possessed

which of two guns found at a crime scene, and stated: “We don't

know which defendant had which gun. The only person who can

tell us that is [the defendant].” 735 F.2d at 401. We held that this

statement was proper under Griffin, stating:

We find the statement to be rather an

attempt to explain why the state could not

match each defendant with one specific gun

and to stress that this fact was not crucial to

the state's case. Although the statement was

an indirect reference to petitioner's silence,

taken in context it is an objective evaluation

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17

of the state of the evidence. As such, it is

permissible under Griffin.

Id.

Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 988, 123 S.Ct.

1805, 155 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003) (Emphasis added.)

On certiorari review during the direct appeal proceedings, the Alabama Supreme Court

correctly identified the governing United States Supreme Court case law and addressed Land’s

claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the alleged references to Land’s failure to testify in

the following manner:

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d

106 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that a state

prosecutor's direct comment on an accused's failure to testify

violates the accused's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under this

standard, “a statement by a prosecutor is improper if it was

manifestly intended to be, or was of such a character that the jury

would naturally and necessarily take it to be, a comment on the

failure of the accused to testify.” Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d

1536, 1547 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534, th

102 L.Ed.2d 566 (1988). This Court has also ruled that “where

there is the possibility that a prosecutor's comment could be

understood by the jury as a reference to failure of defendant to

testify, § 6 [Alabama Constitution of 1901] is violated.” Beecher v.

State, 294 Ala. 674, 682, 320 So.2d 727, 734 (1975).

As noted by the State, Land failed to object to either of these

comments and, thus, failed to preserve for appellate review the

issues he now raises. However, because this is a case where the

death penalty has been imposed, this Court will, pursuant to Rule

39(k), Ala.R.App.P., notice any “plain error,” regardless of

whether an objection was made before the trial court. Plain error is

error that “has or probably has adversely affected the substantial

rights of the petitioner.” Rule 39(k). “In other words, the

plain-error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is to

be ‘used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a

miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.’ ” United States v.

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18

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985),

quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, n. 14, 102 S.Ct.

1584, 1592, n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).

We further note that “[w]hen an accused contends that a prosecutor

has made improper comments during a closing argument, the

statements at issue must be viewed in the context of the evidence

presented in the case and the entire closing argument made to the

jury-both defense counsel's and the prosecutor's.” Ex parte

Musgrove, 638 So. 2d 1360, 1368 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, Rogers

v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 845, 115 S.Ct. 136, 130 L.Ed.2d 78 (1994).

1. “ Jeff tell us the truth, tell us the truth.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue whether the

prosecutor's use of these words violated Land's constitutional

rights, and that court found no error, plain or otherwise. That court

held there was no chance that the jury could have understood the

comment to be a reference to Land's failure to testify. Land, 678

So. 2d at 218.

We agree. In the first part of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing, he

simply quoted or paraphrased statements Land had made to the

police and statements the police had made to Land while he was

being interrogated. It is clear that the prosecutor's discourse was

nothing more than a “story” of the evidence told to the jury by the

prosecutor's switching back and forth, speaking as Land, as the

police, as a witness, and as the prosecutor himself.

The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that “the

remark was not a comment on the appellant's failure to testify,

but a comment on the appellant's failure to tell the truth in his

statement to the police.” Land, 678 So. 2d at 217. In the context

of the prosecutor's entire closing statement, the jury could not have

construed the words “Jeff tell us the truth, tell us the truth,” to be

anything other than a narration of what the police had said to Land

when his initial statement conflicted with known facts. There was

no error in the prosecutor's use of those words.

2. “ Through his attorneys he continues to say ‘I don't know

anything about the wire cutters or the phone lines or the glass

fragments, I don't know anything about the gun or how that bullet

got into her head.’ ”

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19

These words, also part of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing

argument, followed his discussion of various statements that Land's

counsel had made during closing argument. Land's counsel had

attacked the credibility of the evidence presented by the State's

expert witnesses, including testimony regarding the tennis-shoe

“footprint” similar to Land's found on a pane of glass, the

procedure used to compare the cut made by Land's wire cutters to

the cut made on the telephone wire, the procedures used to analyze

evidence for a blood type and DNA match, the match of a bullet

fired from Land's gun to the bullet retrieved from the victim's body,

and the match of two types of glass found on Land's gloves with

the window glass in the victim's car and house.

We disapprove of a statement by a prosecutor referring the jury to

the fact that the defendant spoke through his attorneys, i.e., that he

did not speak for himself. Thus, if Land's counsel had made a

contemporaneous objection to this statement, and we were to apply

the Beecher standard explained above, we might have held the

comment to be reversible error. This is true even though it is clear

to this Court that, when viewed in the context of the

confrontational nature of closing arguments, the prosecutor's

comment was intended as a “reply in kind” to the argument

made by Land's counsel.

However, the comment was not objected to during trial. Thus, the

statement may be considered only by the standard of the plain error

rule. Under that standard, given the evidence presented in this case,

we find no plain error in the prosecutor's statement.

Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d at 232-33 (Emphasis added).

The Alabama Supreme Court noted “that the lack of a contemporaneous objection by

experienced defense counsel leads this Court to believe that the prosecutor's comment was not

stated with an inflection or tone that would have naturally led a listener to construe it as a

reference to Land's failure to testify.” 678 So. 2d at 233, n.2. This view is consistent with

federal case law. United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1061-62 (11th Cir.1987) (“The

defense counsel's failure to object highlights the innocuous nature of the remark.”), cert. denied,

486 U.S. 1025, 108 S.Ct. 2002, 100 L.Ed.2d 233 (1988).

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20

The portion of the closing argument relevant to the statement, “Jeff, tell us the truth, tell

us the truth” is as follows:

They arrested him ladies and gentlemen, for murder. They arrested

him following his statement to the Birmingham Police Department:

I wasn’t there, I didn’t have anything to do with it. I don’t know

what you’re talking about. I was over at my girlfriend’s house, my

car was out at Marie Fortis’s.

They take his shoes. They call Marie, they come back and say,

hey, Jeff, Marie ain’t got your car. And your shoes match the

shoeprint out there on the scene. What you got to say? Tell me

the truth.

Well, I’ll talk to you but not if that thing’s running. I’ll talk to you,

I don’t want it recorded like that. I’ll tell you what happened.

So then the defense wants you to believe that we have so

intimidated this man he is going to confess to breaking in a house

that we haven’t even told him anything about. He talks to you

about how he went in the window. That was known at 8:30 that

morning. How he broke the glass to go in that window. It’s

broken, it’s stacked up.

How he was wearing the same clothes that he’s got on right now. 

That matches the footprint out on the scene.

How he went inside, committed the burglary. They wanted to

commit a burglary, let’s go commit a burglary. What do you do

during a burglary? You steal. You steal.

He gets inside with these two, with these two fictional human

beings, I guess, and he gets scared and leaves because he realizes

he is in some deep trouble. He has got to get out of this thing

somehow. He ain’t about to admit to committing the killing, so he

is going to lay it off on Tony and Edward. Oh, I got scared and

left. And I had my car and I drove home and I went over – I went

on to work. That means he has got his car the entire time. And

where do we find the gun that fired the bullet into Candy Brown’s

head? We find it in the trunk of his automobile at 4:00 o’clock that

afternoon. And he’s got the keys until such time the Birmingham

Police Department take them from him. He’s got the keys.

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21

There was a bullet found inside that house by the front door. It is

consistent with having been fired out of this gun. Remember that.

Of course, Mr. Land, even in the statement where he talks to the

police, starts hedging his bets and covering his tail a little bit. 

Said, oh, I got scared after she got hit by Tony and Edward and

there was blood everywhere and that’s how it got on my hands – on

my gloves and on my pants.

Phyllis Rollan, did you go out there and luminol that place? Yep,

no blood.

Jeff, tell us the truth, tell us the truth.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Birmingham Police Department did not

conspire against Jeffrey Land. I don’t care about this guy unless or

until he breaks the law here in the state of Alabama. And that’s

what he has done in this case. He committed a burglary and during

that burglary he fired in that house. And then he marched Candy

Brown up to Ruffner Mountain and he tried to blow her brains out.

. . .

(TR. 2009-12) (Emphasis added).

Following his response to the arguments of defense counsel criticizing the testimony of the

prosecution’s witnesses (TR. 2022-26), the prosecutor stated: 

But this man right here, ladies and gentlemen, he stands before you

and says they lied, those people lied, I don’t know anything about a

footprint nor a statement saying I was there. Through his

attorneys he continues to say I don’t know anything about the wire

cutters or the phone lines or the glass fragments, I don’t know

anything about the gun or how that bullet got into her head. It may

not even be the right bullet.

(TR. 2026).

When the comments are viewed in context, Land has not established that either of the

prosecutor’s comments was manifestly intended to comment on Land’s failure to testify nor has

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This court is aware that the Alabama Supreme Court stated that, had there been a contemporaneous objection 3/

to the comment that defendant spoke through his attorneys, it might have found reversible error under Beecher

v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 682, 320 So.2d 727, 734 (1975). Under the Beecher standard, the Alabama Constitution

is violated “where there is the possibility that a prosecutor’s comment could be understood by the jury as a

reference to failure of defendant to testify.” Beecher, 294 Ala. at 682, 320 So.2d at 734. The question before

this court in evaluating a Griffin claim, “is not whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the

remark in this manner, but whether the jury necessarily would have done so.” Isaacs, 300 F.3d at 1270. When

viewed in the context of the entirety of the prosecution’s closing argument, the jury would not necessarily have

viewed the remark “[t]hrough his attorneys he continues to say” as a comment on Land’s failure to testify. 

22

he established that either statement was of such a character that the jury would necessarily have

viewed the comments to be a comment on Land’s failure to testify.3/

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision with respect to the prosecutor’s alleged

comments on Land’s failure to testify was not an objectively unreasonable application of Griffin

v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). 

I.(b). Prosecutor’s introduction of allegedly irrelevant, prejudicial and inflammatory photographs to secure a conviction based on passion and 

sensibilities in violation of Land’s due process rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land challenges the prosecutor’s introduction of 42 eight-by-ten color photographs of the

victim’s body that were taken at the scene of the crime and during the autopsy and the

prosecutor’s elicitation of testimony that investigators at the scene observed a fox near the

victim’s body. Land argues:

Photographs unrelated to the bullet wound to the back of [the

victim’s] head, especially those displaying the victim’s face, and

the insinuation that a fox had scavenged the corpse, were wholly

irrelevant and highly inflammatory. The impact of these

redundant, gruesome, and irrelevant photographs overwhelmed the

jury’s sensibilities and caused them to return a verdict and

recommend a sentence on the basis of passion and prejudice. 

(Amended Petition, ¶ 29). 

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23

Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally barred because it was not raised at trial

or on direct appeal. On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, however, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s preclusion of the claim that “3) The State

improperly introduced photographs of the victim, Rule 32.2(a)(2), (a)(4).” Land v. State, CR-02-

1563, memo. op. at 10. Although respondent argued that this claim is defaulted because it was

not raised at trial or on direct appeal, the trial court and appellate court held that the claim was

defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2) and (a)(4), which provide that a claim is precluded if it was

raised at trial or on appeal.

On direct appeal, Land argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing into

evidence photographs that were repetitive (Vol. 14, Tab R-28, pp. 58-63), and that “the

prosecution improperly elicited testimony [regarding the presence of the fox at the scene of the

crime] that was calculated to be inflammatory, prejudicial, and impossible to cure.” (Vol. 14,

Tab R-28, pp. 92-100). In the Rule 32 petition, first and second amended petition, and on appeal

from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, Land presented the claims concerning the photographs

and the fox testimony as instances of prosecutorial misconduct. (See Tabs R-40, p. 49; R-41, pp.

65-66; R-42, p.67-68; R-61, pp. 95-98). Because the state courts concluded that the claims were

raised at trial and on direct appeal, these claims are not precluded from federal review.

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court

did not err by admitting the photographs, but did not specifically address the claims of

prosecutorial misconduct with regard to the introduction of the photographs. The court stated: 

“The courts of this state have repeatedly held that photographs that accurately depict the crime

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24

scene and the nature of the victim’s wounds are admissible despite the fact that they may be

gruesome or cumulative.” Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 207-08 (citations omitted). 

“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations

on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d

385 (1991). Evidentiary errors in the admission of photographs, which are matters of state law,

ordinarily will not support habeas relief. See, Smith v. Newsome, 876 F.2d 1461, 1468 n. 8 (11th

Cir.1989). “In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders

the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a

mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720

(1991)(discussing victim impact evidence), citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-83, 106 S.Ct. 2470-

72. “Erroneously admitted evidence deprives a defendant of fundamental fairness only if it was a

crucial, critical, highly significant factor in the defendant's conviction. The introduction of

graphic photographic evidence rarely renders a proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Jacobs v.

Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir.1992) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 

See also, Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1509 (11 Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 946, 116 th

S.Ct. 385, 133 L.Ed.2d 307 (1995). The photographs were introduced to depict the crime scene

and the injuries suffered by the victim. Land has not demonstrated either that the admission of

the photographs was a crucial, critical, highly significant factor in his conviction or that the

photographs were so unduly prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the mention of the fox was not a

fundamental error requiring the granting of a mistrial: 

The appellant contends that “[t]he prosecution improperly elicited

testimony that was calculated to be inflammatory, prejudicial, and

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25

impossible to cure.” (Appellant's brief at 92). This argument relates to

testimony concerning a photograph of a fox taken at the rock quarry where

the victim's body was found.

Detective Larry Fowler testified that, on the morning of May 20, he went

to the rock quarry at Ruffner Mountain where the victim's body had been

found. Fowler then identified 25 photographs taken at the scene. The

prosecutor presented these photographs to Fowler in groups of 3 to 5.

When the last group of photographs was shown to Fowler, the following

occurred:

“Q. [By the prosecutor:] State's Exhibit 37, 38, 39, and 43, can you tell us

what those items are, please, sir?

“A. Yes, sir. 37 is a photograph of the rocks that the victim was lying on. 38 is

another photograph of the rocks where the victim was lying. And 39 is

also a photograph of the rocks where the victim was lying. 43 is a

photograph of a fox.

“Q. Can you tell us where the fox was seen?

“MR. DODD [defense counsel]: Excuse me, Judge, objection. That has absolutely

nothing to do with this case and that's why we

wanted to object in advance. It has absolutely no

evidentiary value. We object.

“THE COURT: We'll discuss it over lunch. Don't want to

argue in front of the jury.

“MR. MATHIS [defense counsel]: We would move that any further discussion

of that particular photograph be curtailed at

this time.

“THE COURT: Sure.” 

(R. 805-06).

Although the prosecutor immediately thereafter asked Detective Fowler if

“State's Exhibit Number 37, 38, 39, and 43 truly and accurately depict[ed]

the scene as it appeared out there on the 20th where the body of Candace

Brown was found,” R. 806-07, no further mention was made before the

jury of the fox.

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26

When the jury recessed for lunch, the attorneys and the trial judge

discussed the admissibility of the photographs identified by Fowler. With

regard to State's Exhibit 43, the following occurred:

“MR. DODD: State's 43 is depicting the fox. We objected at the

time, Your Honor. We would object again, [it]

absolutely has no value in this case and should not

have been admitted. And furthermore-

“THE COURT: It is not admitted.

“MR. DODD: -we would move again for a mistrial for it being

mentioned.

“THE COURT: Overrule.”

(R. 830-31) (footnote omitted).

The prosecutor then argued that the photograph was relevant to show “that

had this body been out there another half a day, the wild animals would

have been working on this body,” R. 834, and he elicited testimony from

Fowler in an attempt to support his argument. However, the trial court

adhered to its ruling that the photograph was not to be admitted. The

defense then renewed its motion for a mistrial:

“MR. DODD: Judge, we would renew our motion for a mistrial.

And I'm glad Mr. Anderton [the prosecutor] pointed

out what he was attempting to show to the jury

because that's just what the jury would have

garnered from that. It's already before the jury, no

reason for that picture to ever be presented before

this jury or testimony about a fox or any other thing

other than evoke emotion from that jury that that

poor deceased girl out there might have been eaten

by some wild animal, which has absolutely nothing

to do with this case. And it has absolutely

prejudiced this jury and we would move for a

mistrial.” 

(R. 835).

The trial court again denied the motion.

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27

[A] mistrial ‘specifies such fundamental error in a trial as to vitiate

the result,’ Diamond v. State, 363 So.2d 109, 112 (Ala. Cr.

App.1978), and should be granted only when a ‘high degree of

“manifest necessity” ’ is demonstrated, Wadsworth v. State, 439

So.2d 790, 792 (Ala. Cr. App.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 930,

104 S.Ct. 1716, 80 L.Ed.2d 188 (1984).” Garnett v. State, 555

So.2d 1153, 1155 (Ala. Cr. App.1989). If any error occurred by the

mere mention of the fox, it was clearly not the fundamental error

that is required for the granting of a mistrial. The photograph was

never admitted, and there were only two brief references to the fox

made before the jury. The trial court granted defense counsel's

request that “further discussion of that particular photograph be

curtailed at this time,” and the fox itself was never again

mentioned in the jury's presence.

Although the pathologist testified that the victim's body bore marks

that might have been the result of insect bites, there was absolutely

no indication that the body had been despoiled in any way by wild

animals. Moreover, the place where the body was found was

clearly an undeveloped area and one might expect that wild

animals could be seen there. In view of these facts and the fact that

there were almost 1200 pages of trial testimony, it is doubtful that

the two brief references to the fox made much of an impression

upon the jurors. See Rowell v. State, 647 So.2d 67, 69-70 (Ala. Cr.

App.1994). Under the facts of this case, including the strong

evidence presented by the State, any error occasioned by the

references to the fox was clearly harmless. See generally Ex parte

Greathouse, 624 So.2d 208, 210-11 (Ala.1993). Cf. State v.

Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752, 765 (1979) (introduction

of photographs depicting body of child victim when found some

two months after the murder, which had been dismembered by

wild animals was “harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in the

guilt determination phase of the trial”). 

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 219-20.

The transcript makes clear that the jury never heard the prosecutor’s argument that the fox

photograph was relevant to show that wild animals would have soon been feeding on the victim’s

body.

Case 2:04-cv-02866-KOB-PWG Document 27 Filed 10/18/07 Page 27 of 175
As stated above, the analysis of this claim is controlled by Wright v Secretary for Dept. of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245 4/

(11 Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct. 1511, 155 L.Ed. 2d 225 (2003). That is, even if the state th

court does not specifically address a claim that has been raised, the court will treat it as though it has been

addressed and will presume that the state court is aware of the applicable governing law as set forth by the

United States Supreme Court.

28

The trial court’s actions with regards to the photographs and fox do not warrant habeas

relief, nor do the prosecutor’s actions justify habeas relief in light of the evidence. The decision

of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that the prosecutor’s actions in introducing the

photographs of the victim and the crime scene and in eliciting testimony that one of the

photographs was that of a fox did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process” (Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471), is not

an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court law.4/

I.(c). Prosecutor’s alleged improper use of victim impact evidence at the guilt

phase in violation of Land’s due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land argues that the prosecutor improperly focused the jury’s attention on the victim’s

young son who was found at home alone and the effect of the victim’s death on her parents. The

Alabama Supreme Court addressed Land’s victim impact claim in the following manner:

Land argues that his rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and

similar rights guaranteed by Alabama law, were violated when, he

says, the prosecutor used prejudicial victim impact evidence during

the guilt phase of the trial. Before trial, Land's counsel asked the

court to prohibit the State from introducing evidence regarding the

condition in which the police found Ms. Brown's two-year-old son

following her disappearance. The grounds for this motion was the

argument that that 

evidence would likely inflame the emotions of the jury. The trial

court reserved its ruling on the motion until trial, but after the trial

began it never ruled on the motion.

According to Land, the prosecution learned during voir dire

examination of prospective jurors that those prospective jurors who

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29

 had some memory of news media accounts of Ms. Brown's murder

recalled that her infant son had been with her in the house. Land argues

that during opening statements the prosecutor then focused on Ms.

Brown's infant son by suggesting that he was the last person to see his

mother alive and by informing the jury that he had been left alone in the

house when his mother was abducted from the house. Land argues that

during the guilt phase of the trial the prosecutor elicited references to the

child from several witnesses, and that in closing statements he emphasized

the suggestion that Ms. Brown had sacrificed her life to keep her son alive.

Land also contends that the prosecutor improperly introduced evidence

regarding the impact Ms. Brown's death had upon her family and then,

during closing arguments, commented several times on the family's loss.

Land contends that this evidence should have been excluded because, he

says, its prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value it may have had.

In response, the State argues that there was no error in the prosecution's

questioning of those prospective jurors that remembered the crime, and

that any questioning regarding the presence of the victim's son was not for

the purpose of gathering victim impact evidence, but was merely a part of

the general questioning of the venirepersons to ascertain whether any of

them had prior knowledge and fixed opinions about the case. The State

argues that the prosecution's opening statement telling the jury about the

fact that the child had been left alone in the house was not improper

because that was a fact the prosecutor expected the evidence would show,

or, the State says, was a crucial part of the res gestae or chain of events in

Ms. Brown's death. Further, the State contends that any questioning of

witnesses regarding the child was not improper or was at most merely

harmless error. The State argues that any mention of the victim's child by

the prosecution during closing arguments of the guilt phase was to state a

legitimate inference derived from the evidence and was, therefore, proper.

Again, the State argues that, at most, the comments about the child were

harmless error. The State also says that Land did not object to any

references to the child during opening arguments, questioning of

witnesses, or closing arguments.

The State argues that any comment or questioning by the prosecution

regarding the effect of Ms. Brown's death on her family did not have an

impact on the fairness of Land's trial. It also says that Land did not object

to the comments or questioning. The State contends that, at most, the

prosecution's action was only harmless error.

Recently, this Court examined the issue of victim impact evidence in Ex

parte Rieber, [Ms. 1940271, May 19, 1995] 663 So.2d 999 (Ala.1995). In

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30

Rieber, we acknowledged that testimony regarding a murder victim's

children was not relevant to the issue of the accused's guilt or innocence

and was, thus, inadmissible during the guilt phase of trial; we noted,

however, that “a judgment of conviction can be upheld if the record

conclusively shows that the admission of the victim impact evidence

during the guilt phase of the trial did not affect the outcome of the trial or

otherwise prejudice a substantial right of the defendant.” 663 So.2d at

1005. After thoroughly reviewing the record of this present case, we

conclude that the limited testimony regarding Ms. Brown's infant son and

the impact of Ms. Brown's death on her family, and the prosecution's

limited references to such evidence, did not operate to deny Land a fair

trial or to prejudice his substantial rights. Thus, we find no reversible error

as to this issue.

Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d at 235-36.

This court has reviewed the portions of the record that petitioner asserts were improper

victim impact references during the guilt stage. These portions of the record are set out below.

During his opening statement, the prosecutor stated:

MR. ANDERTON: A little over a year ago, ladies and gentlemen, on the 19th

of May, 1992, Candace Brown was at her mother’s house

and decided to go home. Her mama and brother followed

Candace home to make sure she got there okay. Went in

the house with her, checked all the doors and windows and

looked under the bed to make sure that everything was all

right. Everything was fine.

She and her two-year-old son were there at the house alone

and mama and brother said bye, not realizing that was

going to be the last time they would ever see her.

. . . .

J.C. Leeth owns the house Ms. Brown is renting. He

showed up on the morning of the 19th to put in a fence. As

he went around the house he saw some glass broken out of

the back kitchen window, it was stacked up. As he went

further around the house he saw the phone lines had been

cut, phone lines to the house had been cut.

. . . .

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31

When Mr. Leeth saw the phone line cut on this occasion –

and he had previously seen the glass – he went around the

front of the house and knocked on the door and tried to get

somebody to the door. Couldn’t get anybody to the door.

He went home and got a key, notified the police and came

back. And inside the house, ladies and gentlemen, was a

two-year-old child in the bed. Candace Brown was

nowhere to be found. Her child was in that house.

(TR. 677-80).

Brenda Brown, the victim’s mother, testified:

Q: And who is that a photograph of?

A: That’s my daughter.

Q: Is that Candace?

A: That’s Candace.

Q: Ms. Brown, let me take you back to the 18th of May, about a year ago,

1992. Did you have a chance to see Candace on the 18th?

A: Yes. She had gone to school and we were watching Michael and she came

by to pick him up.

Q: Who is Michael?

A: Michael is her son.

Q: How old was Michael at the time?

A: Almost two.

Q: Ms. Brown, do you recall what time Candace came to your house?

A: It was about 8:30 at night, she was going to night school.

Q: Once she showed up at your house, what happened next?

A: She visited for a little bit and then she decided to go home and her brother

and I followed her home.

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32

Q: All right. What about Michael?

A: He went with her.

Q: Went in her car?

A: Went in her car.

. . . . 

Q: When y’all got to Candace’s house what, if anything, did y’all do at that

point?

A: We got out and we went in with her and went into all the rooms and

looked in all the closets and under the beds and checked all the windows

to make sure they were locked.

Q: Did you find anything wrong with her house at that time?

A: No.

Q: Following you and your son doing that, what did y’all do?

A: We left there and went home.

. . . . 

Q: Ms. Brown, how old was Candace at the time of her death?

A: She had just turned thirty on May the 19th.

. . . . 

Q: Where is Michael now?

A: At this time?

Q: Well, where is he now living?

A: He lives with us.

(TR. 709-13).

John Brown, the victim’s father, testified:

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33

BY MR. ANDERTON:

Q: . . . let me direct your attention to the 18th of May, approximately a year

ago, and do you recall seeing Candace on that occasion?

A: I believe that’s the day – the evening she came by my house and picked

her son, my grandson up.

Q: And did you accompany her over to her house when she left?

A: No, sir, I did not.

Q: So when she left your house was that the last time you saw her?

A: Yes.

(TR. 716-17).

J. C. Leeth, the owner of the house that the victim rented, testified:

Q: Mr. Leeth, when you went inside the house did you find anybody inside?

A: Small child.

Q: Where was that child located?

A: It was in the bedroom sitting in the bed.

Q: Was that child awake or was it asleep?

A: It was awake, sitting up in the bed at the head of the bed.

(TR. 745).

Larry Fowler, a homicide detective with the Birmingham Police Department, testified:

Q: Detective Fowler, let me direct your attention to the 19th of May, 1992,

and ask you if you had an occasion to participate in the investigation

involving the disappearance of Candace Brown?

A: Yes, sir, I did.

Q: And during the course of that investigation did you have an occasion to go

to Ms. Brown’s residence?

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34

A: Yes, sir, I did.

. . . .

Q: When you arrived can you tell us what all you found?

A: When we arrived on the scene at that time the father was there and the

child had been removed and given to the mother and she had the child.

Q: Now, you talk about a child and mother and father. Who are you talking

about?

A: I am talking about Candace Brown’s father was there at the time that I

arrived.

Q: And you mentioned the child.

A: There was a child found inside the house.

Q: Where was that child at that time when you arrived?

A: It had already left the scene with the grandmother.

(TR.758-60).

Sandy Triplett, senior fingerprint technician and supervisor of identification section with

the City of Birmingham, testified:

Q: Ms. Triplett, if an individual had a two-year-old child and that child were

to leave latent fingerprints, would that be – would the latent fingerprints be

consistent or inconsistent with the size that were submitted to you of those

three prints that were readable.

MR. DODD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustain.

. . . .

Q: Ms. Triplett, during your twenty-four years of being assigned to the I.D.

bureau of the Birmingham Police Department, have you had the occasion

to look at the latent prints or known prints of small children?

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35

A: Yes, sir.

Q: On few or many occasions?

A: I would say probably many occasions, very many occasions.

. . . . 

Q: And based on your experience in the past twenty-four years, along with

training, education and background, have you formed an opinion of

whether or not those handprints would be consistent or inconsistent with

having been left by a small child?

A: I would say they would be consistent.

(TR. 1316, 1322-23).

The prosecutor argued in closing argument:

You saw Brenda Brown and John Brown come in here and say she

was over at our house and picked up her child and she went home. 

Brenda said we followed her home and we checked the house out

and everything was fine. That was about 9:00.

Betty Matherson talked to her about 9:30, everything was fine. 

And I submit to you until about 1:30 the next morning everything

was just like it had been a hundred other nights. And then the

whole world is turned upside down for the Browns.

. . . .

And you have to consider each and every fact in this case. And

Brenda and John Brown can’t consider what’s Candy going to do

today anymore. They don’t get that option. That option was taken

away from them back on the 19 of May, 1992. Taken away by the th

man who fired this gun, the man that killed Candy Brown.

. . . .

What is he guilty of? That’s why we’re here right now, what is he

guilty of? Take a look at him. After it’s all said and done, after

you look at everything, you will be convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that Michael Jeffrey Land is guilty of not only capital murder

during the course of a burglary, but he is also guilty of capital

Case 2:04-cv-02866-KOB-PWG Document 27 Filed 10/18/07 Page 35 of 175
The Booth prohibition against evidence of family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime, the 5/

defendant, and the appropriate sentence remains the law. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (“Our

holding today is limited to the holdings of Booth . . . and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct.

2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), that evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's

death on the victim's family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing. Booth also held that the admission

of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate

sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the latter sort was presented at the trial in this case.”)

36

murder during the course of a kidnapping. That he abducted

Candace Brown, he abducted her after he broke into her house with

a gun. He abducted her and took her to Ruffner Mountain, Ruffner

Mountain nature area. An area that you can see is very secluded,

way out in the woods, at 3:00, 3:30 in the morning. Not anybody

around going to hear a gunshot.

Why did he pick that spot? I don’t know, I have got no idea,

except that it’s secluded. Maybe it meant something to him. It

certainly means something to the Browns now.

(TR. 1934-35, 1939, 1942-43).

In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) and South

Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), the United States

Supreme Court held that evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the

victim's death on the victim's family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing. These

holdings were overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d

720 (1991) when the Court held that there is no per se bar to the introduction of victim impact

evidence and argument at sentencing. See also, Jones v. United States, 527 U.S.373, 395, 119 5/

S.Ct. 2090, 2105, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1990) (“The Eighth Amendment . . . permits capital

sentencing juries to consider evidence relating to the victim’s personal characteristics and the

emotional impact of the murder on the victim’s family in deciding whether an eligible defendant

should receive a death sentence.”). The Payne Court recognized that only where such evidence

or argument is unfairly prejudicial may a court prevent its use through the Due Process Clause of

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Specifically, no testimony or argument was offered concerning the victim’s personal characteristics nor the 6/

specific emotional impact on her family. 

37

the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

168, 179-183, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2470-2472, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). The question then is whether

the victim impact evidence introduced “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471

(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431

(1974)). Land, however, complains about victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of the

trial.

Payne, Booth, and Gathers were all decided in the context of the sentencing phase of a

capital trial. While no decision of the Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

explicitly decided whether victim impact evidence may be introduced in the guilt phase, the

Court in Payne observed that “[i]n many cases the evidence relating to the victim is already

before the jury at least in part because of its relevance at the guilt phase of the trial.” 501 U.S. at

823, 111 S.Ct. at 2607 (Rehnquist, C.J., for the majority) and 501 U.S. at 840, 111 S.Ct. at 2616-

17 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter concluded that it would be anomalous to require strict

exclusion of such evidence at the sentencing phase when the jury would have already heard that

evidence at the guilt phase. Id. at 840-41, 111 S.Ct. at 2616-17. The testimony about which

Land complains during the guilt phase were not victim impact statements but rather evidence

6/

related to events surrounding the victim’s deaths. Assuming such testimony and closing

argument to be improper victim impact evidence and argument, the evidence and closing

argument did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471.

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38

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision finding that “the limited testimony regarding Ms.

Brown's infant son and the impact of Ms. Brown's death on her family, and the prosecution's

limited references to such evidence, did not operate to deny Land a fair trial or to prejudice his

substantial rights” was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court in Payne, Booth, and Darden. This court concurs.

I.(d). The claim that the prosecutor improperly commented on Land’s exercise

of his constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confrontation, to counsel

and to present a vigorous defense in violation of the Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Alleged improper comment on Land’s exercise of his constitutional

right to a jury trial.

Land argues that “the prosecutor repeatedly commented on his exercise of his right to a

jury trial, and openly encouraged the jury to count the exercise of that right against Mr. Land in

rendering its penalty phase verdict” (Amended Petition, ¶ 38). Land attacks the prosecutors

arguments in closing at the end of the penalty phase:

Ladies and gentlemen, this is a horrible, horrible situation. This is

not a time for celebrating on anyone’s part. I am certain [sic] not, I

think Mr. Mathis and Mr. Dodd know that. This is a bad situation.

But ladies and gentlemen, Michael Jeffrey Land is the one that

started this whole thing so long ago, so long ago. And he is the

one that put us all here when he killed Candace Brown during the

course of a burglary and kidnapping. I am going to ask you to

return a verdict of death for Michael Jeffrey Land. I submit to you

that based on the circumstances, the fact that the killing was

performed during the course of the burglary and the kidnapping, I

submit to you that those aggravating circumstances outweigh any

mitigating circumstances. And that’s the test.

I ask that in consideration of everything that you have done this

week and all of the evidence, I ask that you return a verdict of

death.

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39

(R. 2086-87) (emphasis added).

. . . .

I feel sorry for you people having to be put through this.

. . . .

But that man pronounced more than that single death sentence that

day. A part of everyone in this courtroom died that day. Some part

somewhere, all the friends of the Browns, the friends of the Lands,

the police officers who were involved in this case, a piece of all of

us died that day when we became involved in this case.

Michael Jeffrey Land pronounced multiple, multiple, multiple

death sentences when he performed that single execution. He is to

blame for all of his [sic] ladies and gentlemen. Gail Land is not to

blame. Mr. Morrison is not to blame. The Browns are not to

blame, you’re not to blame, the judge is not, the police are not. 

That man right there is to blame. For whatever his motives were

. . . [h]e decided to play like God and take life. He is the one that 

brought about this tragedy and it is a tragedy for everyone else.

(TR 2099-2101).

Land argues that the comments improperly “invit[ed] the jurors to consider their own

discomfort when deciding what sentence to recommend [and] amounted to the prosecutor asking

the jury to consider Mr. Land’s exercise of his constitutional right to a jury trial as a nonstatutory aggravating factor.” (Amended Petition, ¶ 39). 

Land raised this claim on direct appeal. Neither the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

nor the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the merits of the claim. The court will review these

statements to see if the State Courts’ implicit rejection of this claim was an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent.

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40

The first comment by the prosecutor was of a general nature often made by counsel

intended to ensure that counsel appreciated their service as jurors, especially in a case that is so 

distasteful. Defense counsel, Mr. Mathis, made similar statements when he said:

These trials are terrible. But our statute, our capital murder statute,

dictates that sometimes some of us have to go through this, it just

happens to be your day, I’m sorry.

(TR. 2088).

The first set of comments did not amount to the prosecutor asking that the jury consider Land’s

exercise of his right to a jury trial as a non-statutory aggravating factor. Rather, the comment to

which the court added emphasis was made at the penalty phase after Land had already been

convicted of killing the victim during a burglary and kidnapping. The prosecutor correctly stated

that the fact that the killing was performed during the burglary and kidnapping were aggravating

circumstances and argued that those aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating

circumstances. Such argument passes constitutional muster.

With respect to the second set of comments, the comments preceded the prosecutor’s

response to comments by defense counsel that Land was a “young boy” (TR. 2101) and were

clearly intended to emphasize that Land was responsible for his actions in murdering the victim. 

Neither set of comments could be construed as a comment on Land’s exercise of his right to a

trial by jury. Rather, the statements are a recognition that the jury was there because Land had

murdered the victim. “[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous

remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation,

will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.” Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 647, 94 S.Ct. at 1873. 

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41

The implicit decisions by the state appellate courts that the prosecutor’s comments to the

jury did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of

due process,” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, are not unreasonable applications of

United States Supreme Court law. 

(ii) Alleged juxtaposition of Land’s rights with victim’s rights.

Land alleges that the prosecutor improperly contrasted his exercise of his constitutional

rights with the rights of the victim when he argued during the sentencing hearing:

Candace Brown was shown absolutely no consideration by Mr.

Land. None. Through the courts of this country, the courts of this

land, through every opportunity the legal system has provided . . . 

Mr. Land [had] every opportunity to confront his accusers, to deal

with them in a fair and just manner just like the Constitution

provides. It has given him every opportunity to talk to the

witnesses, to look at evidence against him, and to prepare for

months, for months, for months for his day in court. Candy Brown

was given none of that. None of that. She was taken up to Ruffner

Mountain and executed.

(TR. 2160).

This claim was raised on direct appeal but was not addressed by either the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals or the Alabama Supreme Court. Again, the court must decide whether the

implicit rejection of the argument was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

Land cites Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1411 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other

grounds, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986), for the proposition that “[I]t is

wrong to imply that the system coddles criminals by providing them with more procedural

protections than their victims. A capital sentencing jury’s important deliberation should not be

colored by such considerations.” In Brooks, the prosecutor argued that Brooks himself believed

in the death penalty, as evidenced by the killing of his victim and noted that the victim did not

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42

have lawyers or a judge or any other procedural safeguards. The Brooks court went beyond the

portion of the opinion quoted by Land, stating: 

Although the remarks, as interpreted in the manner urged by

Brooks, clearly would be improper, the more obvious interpretation

of the argument is not. Correctly anticipating a defense argument

that the death penalty is bad, Whisnant argued that Brooks himself

believed in the death penalty. The thrust of the argument was that

Brooks' execution of Galloway in a manner much more horrible

than a procedurally proper, legal execution demonstrated Brooks'

belief in the death penalty. Following the command of Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 647, 94 S.Ct. at 1873, that “a court

should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intended an ambiguous

remark to have its most damaging meaning,” we doubt that the jury

understood the remark in the improper way suggested by Brooks.

Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1411.

The court notes that the argument made in Brooks was made to the jury while the

argument complained of by Land was made to the judge during the second sentencing hearing

after the jury had returned an advisory verdict of death. The trial court clearly knew that Land

could not be penalized for exercising his right to a jury trial to confront his accusers, to be

represented by counsel, and to present a vigorous defense. The implicit decisions by the state

appellate courts that the prosecutor’s comments at the sentencing hearing before the judge did

not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process,” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, are not unreasonable applications of

United States Supreme Court law. 

(iii) Alleged argument of facts not in evidence.

Land argues that the prosecutor argued facts at the guilt phase that were not introduced at

trial and which were calculated to distract and inflame the jury: Specifically Land cites the

following arguments:

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43

[Jeff Land] goes in and at some point Candy Brown wakes up and

he says you’re going with me. She said I’m not going anywhere. 

Maybe she ran towards the front door, maybe she was trying to get

out. But at one point Michael Jeffrey Land fires the gun and said

the next one’s for the kid. You’re going with me.

. . . I submit to you that at the point Candy Brown pulled her pants

on and puts some shoes on and walks out of the house and on the

way out Candy Brown did one last desperate attempt to protect her

child, she locked the door.

(R. 2015-2016) (emphasis added).

[Jeff Land] didn’t think nobody was going to find her. But Candy

Brown knew, Candy Brown knew somebody would find Michael,

the little boy.

I, like Mr. Mathis, am no biblical scholar, but there is a phrase in

there, no greater love have one man than to lay down his life for his

friend. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is what Candy Brown did

for her little boy, she gave up everything that she had, not knowing

if it would work. And she gave up everything in the world to save

that little boy. That’s exactly what happened. And I think if you

look at the evidence you can see that.

(R. 2025). 

While Land raised this claim on direct appeal, neither the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals nor the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the merits. Once again, the court applies the

stand of unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority to evaluate the state courts’

implicit rejection of this argument. 

Courts have widely recognized that “a prosecutor may argue both facts in evidence and

reasonable inferences from those facts.” Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1506 (11 Cir. 1985), th

cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986), citing, Alvarez v. Estelle,

531 F.2d 1319, 1323 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044, 97 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed.2d 757

(1977) citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3.5-8(a) (1980) (“The prosecutor may argue all

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44

reasonable inferences from evidence in the record”), which was also cited by United States v.

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9-10, 105 S.Ct. 1038,1043, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The evidence supported

the inferences that Land threatened to shoot the victim’s child and that Ms. Brown left to spare

her small child. The evidence showed that Ms. Brown left her home and locked the door with

her two-year-old child safely inside. (TR. 745). Although Land said in his statement that the

victim had been dressed in a nightshirt when she confronted him after he broke into her house at

1:00 a.m., she was found in a rock quarry on Ruffner Mountain wearing clothes but no shoes.

(TR. 798-801). Land mentioned the fact that the victim had a young child in his statement. A

bullet was retrieved from an interior wall next to the front door. (TR. 1257). 

The trial court instructed the jury that it was not to consider comments by counsel as

evidence. (TR. 1900). The implicit decisions by the state appellate courts that the prosecutor’s

closing argument based on reasonable inferences from the evidence did not “so infect[] the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” Darden, 477 U.S. at

181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, are not unreasonable applications of United States Supreme Court law. 

(iv) Alleged vouching for the veracity of its case.

Land alleges that the prosecutor vouched for the veracity of its case in arguments at both

the guilt and penalty phases of the trial by implying that the state had charged Mr. Land with

capital murder because he was guilty. During closing arguments at the guilt phase of trial the

prosecutor stated, “[t]he State of Alabama has not charged Michael Jeffrey Land with a capital

offense, either kidnapping or . . . burglary because we’re sitting here scratching our head” (TR.

1936). Land further alleges that during the penalty phase argument the prosecutor implied that

the state has already concluded that the case warrants the death penalty above even other capital

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45

murder cases and thereby reduced the jury’s sense of responsibility to reach a guilty and penalty

phase verdict in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86

L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution; specifically, he challenges the following argument:

I feel sorry for you people having to be put through this. But I’ll

just tell you right now and maybe this is cold and maybe this is

mean and maybe this is callous: One person I have no sympathy at

all for, Michael Jeffrey Land. Michael Jeffrey Land physically

killed Candace Brown in an execution styled killing, one shot to

the back of the head with a large caliber pistol.

. . . .

But that man pronounced more than that single death sentence that

day. A part of everyone in this courtroom died that day. Some part

somewhere, all the friends of the Browns, the friends of the Lands,

the police officers who were involved in this case, a piece of all of

us died that day when we became involved in this case.

Michael Jeffrey Land pronounced multiple, multiple, multiple

death sentences when he performed that single execution. He is to

blame for all of his [sic] ladies and gentlemen. Gail Land is not to

blame. Mr. Morrison is not to blame. The Browns are not to

blame, you’re not to blame, the judge is not, the police are not. 

That man right there is to blame. For whatever his motives were

. . . he decided to play like God and take life. He is the one that 

brought about this tragedy and it is a tragedy for everyone else. 

That man got what he wanted. That man got what he wanted. 

He knew what he was getting into. So, my heart goes out and I

mean this sincerely to everyone, I had no question of Mr. Morrison

or of Ms. Land, I feel for them. But my heart does not, does not

bleed a single drop for Michael Jeffrey Land. 

(TR. 2099-2101) (emphasis added).

While Land raised this claim on direct appeal, neither the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals nor the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the merits of the claim. The court must

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46

determine whether the implicit rejection of this claim was an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law.

Prior to making the comment that the prosecution was not “sitting here scratching our

head” (TR. 1936), the prosecutor had gone through the evidence at trial which supported a

finding of Land’s guilt; he summed up his discussion by stating “Ladies and gentlemen,

everything that we have presented shows you Michael Jeffrey Land killed Candace Brown

after kidnapping her, after breaking into her house.” (TR. 1936) (emphasis supplied). The first

challenged comment was not a vouching by the State but a comment on the evidence. As

previously stated, in his jury instructions at the guilt stage, the trial court told the jury that it was 

not to consider comments by counsel as evidence. (TR. 1900). 

Further, the second set of comments did not constitute a vouching by the State. The

argument was in substance that Land meant to kill the victim as evidenced by the fact that she

was shot execution style in the back of her head. 

In Caldwell, the Supreme Court held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a

death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the

responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere.” 472

U.S. at 328-329, 105 S.Ct. at 2639. “To establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily

must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local

law.” Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989); see

also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2826-2827, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990)

and Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2010, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). At the

penalty phase that immediately followed the guilt phase, the judge instructed the jury: 

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[I]t is left up to you people to determine what the facts are and what the

sentence shall be.

The law of Alabama provides that the punishment for the capital offenses

for which you have convicted Michael Jeffrey Land would be either death

by electrocution or life imprisonment without ever being eligible for

parole consideration.

(TR. 2105). The court further instructed the jury:

[I]n reaching your findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances in the case and determining what the penalty should be, you

must avoid any influence of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factors. 

Your deliberations and verdict should be based on the evidence you have

seen and heard and the law about which you have been instructed. There

is no room for the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary

factors.

(TR. 2118).

The jury instructions at the penalty phase took up 21 pages of the trial transcript. (TR.

2104-25). Based on the substance as well as the length of the instructions, the jury was certainly

NOT “led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's

death rested elsewhere.” The jury instructions cured any improper argument. The implicit

decisions of the state appellate courts that the prosecutor’s closing argument did not “so infect[]

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process” Darden, 477

U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, are not unreasonable applications of United States Supreme Court

law.

(v) Alleged disparagement of trial counsel.

Land alleges that the prosecutor disparaged trial counsel throughout his guilt phase

closing argument, suggesting to the jury that trial counsel had attempted to mislead the jury and 

had presented a ludicrous conspiracy theory by comparing defense counsel to Oliver Stone,

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48

director of the movie “J.F.K.” (TR 2003-13, 2021-22). He alleges that the prosecutor personally

attacked counsel when he stated 

[H]e is talking out of both sides of his mouth, ladies and gentlemen. He’s

saying they’re crooked, they’re trying to just convict people and that’s all

they’re trying to do. . . . They’re grasping at straws.

(TR. 2023).

Land alleges that the prosecutor characterized his exercise of his right to remain silent

and the theory of defense as an effort by defense counsel to present lies to the jury, the court and

the people of the county when he stated:

Through his attorneys he continues to say I don’t know anything

about the wire cutters or the phone lines or the glass fragments, I

don’t know anything about the gun or how that bullet got into her

head.

(TR. 2026).

While Land raised this claim on direct appeal, neither the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals nor the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the merits of the claim. The court again

examines the implicit decision of the state courts to determine whether those decisions were

unreasonable applications of Supreme Court law. 

If the challenged statements are put in context, the comments clearly were not a

disparagement of trial counsel but a reply in kind to attacks by Land’s counsel on the evidence 

presented by the prosecutor:

Mr. Dodd (defense counsel) says he understands the word protocol

out of the Department of Forensic Sciences now, because what it

means, according to Mr. Dodd, is let’s convict him, let’s certainly

don’t turn him loose. I guess that’s why Phyllis Rollan came in

here and said I got to tell you this, though, the three could be

missing, so that could be Mr. Land’s blood. And then Mr. Dodd

turns around, turns right around and said . . . she’s very honest

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when she said it. So he is talking out of both sides of his mouth,

ladies and gentlemen. He’s saying they’re crooked, they’re trying

to just convict people and that’s all their trying to do. . . . They’re

grasping at straws.

(R. 2023-23)

But this man right here, ladies and gentlemen, he stands before you

and says they lied, those people lied, I don’t know anything about a

footprint nor a statement saying I was there. Through his attorneys

he continues to say I don’t know anything about the wire cutters or

the phone lines or the glass fragments. I don’t know anything

about the gun or how that bullet got into her head.

(TR. 2026) (emphasis added to portions of quote relied upon by petitioner). The implicit

decisions by the state appellate courts that the prosecutor’s allegedly disparaging comments in

closing argument did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction

a denial of due process,” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, are not unreasonable

applications of United States Supreme Court law. 

I.(e). The claim that the prosecutor misled the jury on the law in violation

of Land’s right to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land argues that the prosecutor incorrectly stated the level of proof necessary for an

acquittal when he stated before the venire that a “reasonable doubt” was “a doubt for which you

can give a good, sound, sensible reason.” (R. 436). 

This claim was raised on direct appeal, but neither Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

nor Alabama Supreme Court addressed the claim. The court must therefore, determine whether

the implicit denial of this claim presents an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

During voir dire of the venire, the prosecutor stated:

MR. ANDERSON: . . . Now, as a member of the jury it is going to be up to you to listen to all

of the evidence and listen to all of the testimony and whatever physical

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exhibits will be presented to you and make a decision if the state has

proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Michael Jeffrey

Lane. And beyond a reasonable doubt is the burden of proof that the State

of Alabama carries, Mike Anderton carries in this case, that is the burden

of proof that is set up by law.

How many of y’all have seen or watched any of the lawyer shows on TV,

L.A. Law and there used to be Reasonable Doubt and Law and Order and

that kind of stuff; Perry Mason, Matlock, for heaven’s sake. Okay. 

During the course of those programs y’all hear the expression beyond a

shadow of a doubt, beyond all doubt. Mainly because the writers out there

don’t know what they are doing. Okay? The proof here in the state of

Alabama is beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt

for which you can give a good, sound, sensible reason. And towards

the end of the case the judge will tell you that.

Is there anybody here that thinks that beyond a reasonable doubt is too

heavy a burden for the State to carry? . . .

Is there anybody here who feels like beyond a reasonable doubt is too light

a burden? Feels like you have got to show me beyond any doubt, you’re

going to have to prove to me beyond any shadow of a doubt. That’s not

what the law says.

Is there anyone here who feels like beyond a reasonable doubt is too light a

burden on the State of Alabama when we are talking about something like

this?

. . . .

(TR. 434-37). 

The court then asked:

THE COURT: Let me ask this question of – if the Court instructs the jury about these

principles, the burden of proof, reasonable doubt and so forth, is there

anyone whose feelings about the subject suggests to you that you might

not follow the Court’s instructions?

. . . .

(TR. 437).

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When instructing the jury immediately before deliberations began, the court described

the burden of reasonable doubt:

THE COURT: Michael Jeffrey Land, the defendant in the case, is presumed to be not

guilty. . . . .

He is presumed to be not guilty. No burden of proof rests on Michael

Jeffrey Land here in the litigation. The burden of persuasion, the burden

of going forward with the evidence is on the State of Alabama, the

prosecuting governmental entity.

The fact that Mr. Land is here as the defendant, he enjoys the presumption

of innocence, that’s evidence in his behalf. That is evidence in his behalf

here in the case.

What does the State have to do in order to overcome or override the

presumption of innocence that Michael Jeffrey Land enjoys? The State

has to bring you strong and cogent evidence that convinces you people

beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt in order to overcome the

presumption of innocence.

So, let’s spend a moment on the quantum of proof required here in the

criminal division. . . . In the criminal division the State has a higher or

more onerous burden, [it has] to prove one’s guilt by evidence that

convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State doesn’t have to prove guilt to a mathematical certainty, that

wouldn’t be plausible when the evidence is derived from human beings. 

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.

Use your common sense here, folks, throughout the course of the week as

you have listened and when you deliberate and as you observe these

proceedings, please use your common sense. Reasonable double is selfdefining, a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful

consideration of all of the evidence in the case. Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt would be proof of such a convincing character that

you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the

most important of your own affairs.

. . . If after a full and fair consideration of all of the evidence in the case, if

there should remain in your collective minds an abiding conviction that

Michael Jeffrey Land here is guilty of one of the offenses charged, then

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52

you would be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and you should

convict him of the offense.

On the other hand, if after that same full and fair consideration of all of the

evidence in the case, if there does not remain in your collective minds that

abiding conviction that he is guilty, then you would not be convinced by

that full measure of proof required in the law and he should be acquitted.

A reasonable doubt may spring from the evidence that was actually

adduced in court. It may emanate from or spring from a lack of sufficient

and satisfying evidence. And indeed a reasonable doubt may be based on

any part of the evidence.

(TR. 1902-06).

In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), the Supreme

Court reviewed the following jury instruction:

“If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to

constitute the defendant’s guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of

that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence

demonstrates a probability of guilty, if it does not establish such guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt,

however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real

tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It

must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in

your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or law

thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual

substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously

entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty,

but a moral certainty.” 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).

498 U.S. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 329.

The Cage Court held:

In construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors

could have understood the charge as a whole. Francis v. Franklin,

471 U.S. 307, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). 

The charge did at one point instruct that to convict, guilt must be

found beyond a reasonable doubt; but it then equated a reasonable

doubt with a “grave uncertainty” and an “actual substantial doubt,”

and stated that what was required was a “moral certainty” that the

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defendant was guilty. It is plain to us that the words “substantial”

and “grave,” as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher

degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonabledoubt standard. When those statements are then considered with

the reference to “moral certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty,

it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the

instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof

below that required by the Due Process Clause.

498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 329-30.

In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed. 2d 385 (1991), the Supreme

Court explained how challenged jury instructions in general are to be reviewed:

The only question for us is “whether the ailing instruction by itself

so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” . . . It is well established that the instruction “may not be

judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. (citations

omitted). In addition, in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such

as the one at issue here, we inquire “whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way” that violates the Constitution. 

502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (citations omitted).

In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), the Supreme

Court concluded that no Cage violation arose based on references to “reasonable doubt” and 

“moral certainty” in the following jury instruction:

“‘Reasonable doubt’ is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable

and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important

transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the

represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon. It is such a

doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial

consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to

a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time,

absolute or mathematical certainty is not required. You may be

convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet

be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. 

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54

You may find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of

the case, provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude

any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an

actual and substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evidence,

from the facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the

lack of evidence on the part of the State, as distinguished from a

doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or

from fanciful conjecture.” 

511 U.S. at 18, 114 S.Ct. at 1249.

The Court explained:

[In Cage] we did not hold that the reference to substantial

doubt alone was sufficient to render the instruction

unconstitutional. . . . Rather, we were concerned that the jury

would interpret the term “substantial doubt” in parallel with the

preceding reference to “grave uncertainty,” leading to an

overstatement of the doubt necessary to acquit. In the instruction

given in Victor’s case, the context makes clear that “substantial” is

used in the sense of existence rather than magnitude of the doubt,

so the same concern is not present. 

In any event, the instruction provided an alternative definition

of reasonable doubt: a doubt that would cause a reasonable

person to hesitate to act. . . . [T]o the extent the word

“substantial” denotes the quantum of doubt necessary for

acquittal, the hesitate to act standard gives a common sense

benchmark for just how substantial such a doubt must be. We

therefore do not think it reasonably likely that the jury would

have interpreted this instruction to indicate that the doubt

must be anything other than a reasonable one.

511 U.S. at 20-21, 114 S.Ct. at 1250 (emphasis added).

In Land’s case, in the instructions to the jury prior to deliberation, the trial court

emphasized that the jurors should consider the evidence in determining whether they had a

reasonable doubt and stated:

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be proof of such a

convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon

it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.

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55

. . . .

(TR. 1905.) No reasonable likelihood existed that the jurors understood that a conviction could

be based on a standard other than reasonable doubt or factors other than the evidence presented at

trial.

Land also alleges that the prosecutor sought to prevent the jury from considering his

youth at the time of the crime as a mitigating circumstance. This claim was raised on direct

appeal, but neither the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals nor the Alabama Supreme Court

addressed the merits of the claim. The same standard applies to this implicit ruling. Land argues

that the prosecutor misled the jury on the law applicable to the penalty phase by suggesting that

the jury must consider Land’s age at the time of trial rather than at the time of the crime. The

prosecutor argued:

He is not a young boy, as [defense counsel] called him, he is

twenty-four years old, he is a grown, he is an adult. He knew what

was happening and he made an adult’s decision. He made an adult

decision to break into that house, take Candace Brown and he took

her up to Ruffner Mountain and shot her in the back of the head.

And that was an adult decision. 

(TR. 2101-02).

This statement was in response to defense counsel’s plea based on Land’s age that the

jurors sentence Land to life without parole instead of the death penalty:

Anyone put under such a sentence will never get out of prison, they

will be there until they die. And that is an awful thing for me to

ask you to do to this young boy. Are you twenty-three or twentyfour?

MR. LAND: Twenty-four.

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56

MR. MATHIS: Twenty-four years old. But to sentence him to die – well, perhaps

some argument can be made that that is the thing to do. It is a

terrible, terrible thing.

. . . I don’t believe in it here and I don’t believe killing this boy is

going to do one small iota of anything good for Candace Brown.

(TR. 2090-91).

The prosecutor did not argue that Land’s age at the time of the crime could not be considered as a

mitigating factor. He argued that Land was an adult and made an adult decision when he killed

the victim. The jury heard numerous references to the date of the victim’s disappearance (May

18-19, 1992). The court instructed the jury:

Our state law provides a list of some of the mitigating

circumstances which you may consider, but this list or that list is

not a complete list of the mitigating circumstances you may

consider. I am going to tell you some of the mitigating

circumstances you may consider.

Mitigating circumstances would include the age of Mr. Land

here at the time of the offense. Michael Jeffrey Land’s date of

birth, May the 23 , 1969. So, he would have been twenty-two rd

on May the 18th/19th, just short of his twenty-third birthday. 

(TR. 2113-14) (emphasis added). 

In light of the proper jury instructions, the decisions by the state appellate courts that the

prosecutor’s alleged misstatements did not change the outcome of the case and did not “so

infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,”

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, are not unreasonable applications of United States

Supreme Court law. 

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I.(f). The claim that the State failed to comply with its discovery obligations

under Brady v. Maryland in violation the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 215 (1963), the United States

Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-

97. “Impeachment evidence, [] as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule." 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 

Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct.

at 3383. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342

(1976), the Supreme Court stated that Brady applies in situations “involv[ing] the discovery,

after trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”

The Court extended Brady to apply to evidence “known to police investigators and not to the

prosecutor.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1568, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).

In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286

(1999), the United States Supreme Court stated: “There are three components of a true Brady

violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State,

either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” The prejudice component is

satisfied if the petitioner can show a reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would

have been different had the evidence been disclosed. 527 U.S. at 296, 119 S.Ct. at 1955. 

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58

Land alleges that the state failed to provide “a wealth of exculpatory evidence to Mr.

Land” including:

(1) Fingerprint evidence indicating that someone else had handled the broken glass at Ms.

Brown’s home (Amended Petition, ¶ 51);

(2) “Evidence about police officers and other state agents that would have impeached or

otherwise impugned their testimony, such as various misconduct that eventually led to

their dismissal from law enforcement” (Amended Petition, ¶ 51);

(3) Grand jury transcripts (Amended Petition, ¶¶ 52, 62);

(4) A Birmingham Police Department Inter-Office Communication dated July 28, 1992 and

entitled “Crime Scene Preservation” (Amended Petition, ¶¶ 53, 54); and 

(5) Investigation results concerning various leads and persons he believes should have been

considered as suspects (including the victim’s boyfriend, the father of the victim’s child,

and the victim’s ex-husbands.) (Amended Petition, ¶¶ 55-64).

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findings of preclusion with

regard to two aspects of Land’s Brady claim:

Claim IX – The State Failed to Comply with Its Discovery

Obligations Under Brady v. Maryland, Rule 32.2(a)(2), (a)(4) (To

the extent that Land claims the State violated Brady by failing to

disclose, prior to trial, that a child’s handprints were found on the

glass that had been removed from the rear window of the victim’s

home); Rule 32.2 (a)(2), (a)(5) (To the extent that Land claims the

State violated Brady failing to provide a transcript of the grand jury

proceedings.) . . . .

An examination of the record reveals that the trial court was

correct in summarily dismissing the aforementioned claims as

procedurally precluded for the aforementioned reasons.

Case 2:04-cv-02866-KOB-PWG Document 27 Filed 10/18/07 Page 58 of 175
The trial court dismissed these claims prior to the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing due to the procedural default. 7/

(Tab #75, pp. 3-4).

59

(CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 8, 11, 36.). 

7/

Land could have presented testimony at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing on all Brady claims but

for the fingerprint evidence and the grand jury transcript. The only Brady claim for which he

offered evidence was the inter-office communication claim. 

(i) Fingerprint evidence

The Brady claim pertaining to the child’s handprint is not precluded from federal review

based on the state court’s determination that it was barred from state review as it had been

addressed on appeal. On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

The appellant asserts that the prosecution violated Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by

failing to disclose, prior to trial, that a child's handprints were

found on the glass that had been removed from the rear window of

the victim's home. The short answer to this argument is that these

prints were not Brady material.

A defendant seeking to establish a Brady violation must show: “1.

that the prosecution suppressed the evidence; 2. that the evidence

was of a character favorable to the defense; and 3. that the evidence

was material.” Ex parte Dickerson, 517 So.2d 628, 630 (Ala.1987)

(emphasis added). Accord Johnson v. State, 612 So.2d 1288, 1293

(Ala. Cr. App.1992). While none of these requirements appears to

have been met in this case, it is readily apparent that the

complained of evidence was not favorable to the appellant.

Evidence that is “favorable to the defense” is evidence that “ ‘if

disclosed and used effectively, . . . may make the difference

between conviction and acquittal.’ ” Patton v. State, 530 So.2d

886, 890 (Ala. Cr. App.1988) (quoting United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).

Sandy Triplett, a latent print examiner, testified that she obtained

three readable prints from the panes of glass found on the back

porch of the victim's residence. None of these prints matched the

appellant's prints. However, Ms. Triplett stated that these prints

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60

were “[m]uch smaller, at least a fourth of [the] size” of an adult

print, (R. 1316), and that these prints were “consistent . . . with

having been left by a small child,” (R. 1323). It had previously

been established that the victim had a two-year-old son who lived

with her.

These prints obviously do not fall within the definition of evidence

favorable to the defense. Evidence that is not favorable to the

defense does not fall within Brady. Carr v. State, 640 So.2d 1064,

1073 (Ala. Cr. App.1994).

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 220.

 The finding of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that the fingerprints found on the

glass that were consistent with those of a small child were not “favorable” is not an objectively

unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny. 

Grand jury transcript

The Brady claim based on the State’s failure to provide a transcript of the grand jury

proceedings is precluded from federal review because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held that the trial court was correct in finding this claim precluded from state review at the Rule

32 stage based on Land’s failure to raise it on direct appeal after having raised it at trial. (CR-02-

1563, memo. op. at 8, 11). Land does not specifically address the procedural default argument

made by respondent as to this alleged Brady violation; however, he does argue that the trial

court erroneously barred him access to the grand jury testimony, citing Butterworth v. Smith, 494

U.S. 624, 110 S.Ct. 1376, 108 L.Ed.2d 572 (1990). While Land relies on Butterworth for the

proposition that he “was entitled to the grand jury transcripts in the same manner as he was

entitled to all other Brady materials,” Butterworth does not support this proposition. Rather,

Butterworth stands for the proposition that a “Florida law prohibit[ing] a grand jury witness

from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended [] violates the First

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61

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 626, 110 S.Ct. at 378

(emphasis added). 

Even assuming that the court’s action constituted cause for the procedural default, Land

cannot show prejudice because his argument that the State violated Brady by failing to provide

him with the grand jury transcript is based purely on speculation that, because some witnesses

who testified before the grand jury did not testify at trial, these witnesses must have offered

testimony that was “either exculpatory or otherwise helpful” to Land. (Amended Petition, ¶ 62). 

The only witnesses identified by name are “Birmingham police officers Mike Crawford, E.G.

Hull, and Robert Cornelius.” (Amended Petition, ¶ 62). Because Land has failed to show

prejudice based on the prosecutor’s failure to provide him with the grand jury transcript, this

claim is procedurally barred from federal review. 

Alternatively, Land has not made any showing that the grand jury testimony of Officers

Crawford, Hull and Cornelius was exculpatory but merely speculates that their grand jury

testimony may have been exculpatory. Mere speculation that their testimony would have been

exculpatory will not suffice to prove materiality. United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1252,

n. 81 (11 Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 821, 124 S.Ct. 133, 157 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003); United th

States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 -1294 (11 Cir. 2007) (“claim that the fingerprint card th

[discarded pursuant to a routine procedure] could have been exculpatory is both highly

speculative and insufficient to rise to the level of Brady error [in light of defendant’s admission]

that he owned the gun and that he placed it inside the SUV.”) “Neither mere speculation that the

prosecution might possess information helpful to the defense nor base assertions, without more,

of the presence of exculpatory information in the 

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Land did not identify this claim specifically under the heading of a trial court error; however, in arguing that 8/

the state failed to provide this information, Land states:

52. The trial court erroneously barred access to Brady material, by denying Mr. Land access to transcripts

or notes of the grand jury proceedings. Although the trial court initially offered to compare the

testimony proffered at trial with that given at the grand jury proceedings, this comparison never

occurred.

Regardless of whether this alleged Brady violation is considered as trial court error or prosecutorial misconduct,

the result is the same (no Brady violation) as petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that any of the

grand jury testimony would have been exculpatory or favorable to him. 

Under Alabama law, a defendant is not entitled to grand jury testimony until after a witness has testified at trial 9/

and, even then, must make some offer of proof (1) that the matters contained in the witness' grand jury

testimony were relevant to the subject matter of the prosecution; and (2) that an inconsistency exists between

grand jury testimony and trial testimony. McKissack v. State, 926 So.2d 367, 371 (Ala. 2005); Millican v. State,

423 So.2d 268, 270-71 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982). Because the officers did not testify at trial, their trial testimony

could not have been inconsistent with their grand jury testimony.

62

prosecution's files would be sufficient to warrant a Brady determination.” 25 James Wm. Moore

et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 616.06[2] (3d ed.1997).

Land must show a reasonable probability that the evidence could affect the outcome of

the trial. See Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1507 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 946,

116 S.Ct. 385, 133 L.Ed.2d 307 (1995). Because he failed to sufficiently allege a Brady

violation, the state trial court's denial of his request for grand jury transcripts and the 8/

prosecution’s failure to provide them raise questions of state law and, therefore, do not present a

question for this court on habeas review. See White v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11 Cir. th

1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1018, 116 S.Ct. 592, 133 L.Ed.2d 505 (1995), citing Beverly v.

Jones, 854 F.2d 412, 416 (11th Cir.1988) (“a state’s interpretation of its own laws provides no

basis for federal habeas relief since no question of a constitutional nature is involved.”), cert. 9/

denied, 490 U.S. 1082, 109 S.Ct. 2104, 104 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989).

Birmingham Police Department Inter-Office Communication

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63

In affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals stated:

[T]he trial court rejected the petitioner’s claim regarding the interofficer [sic] memorandum as follows:

“Even assuming, for the purpose of analysis that this was

‘Brady’ material and that it was suppressed, Land presented

nothing to establish that it was material to the issue at trial. 

He did not connect the document to this case and he never

established that, had it been disclosed, it would have led to

admissible exculpatory evidence. The document itself was

plainly hearsay and would not have been admissible at trial. 

Mr. Dodd testified that, had he been aware of the

document, he would have followed up on it. Current

counsel, on the other hand, did have the document and the

opportunity to follow up on it, but produced nothing. Land

has . . . failed to establish materiality and, therefore, this

claim is denied.”

“To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show that “(1) the

prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to

the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issues at

trial.” Johnson v. State, 612 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Ala. Crim. App.

1992). The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. “A ‘reasonable

probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Johnson, 612 So.2d at 1293, quoting United States

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d

481 (1985).

At the Rule 32 hearing, petitioner’s trial counsel testified that had

he been aware of the memorandum, he would have attempted to

determine whether “the genesis of the memorandum was Jeff

Land’s case” and if so, then, he “would have tried to develop it.” 

The record reveals, however, petitioner’s Rule 32 counsel was

aware of the memorandum and failed to plead and prove any

evidence tending to show that the memorandum was material to

the petitioner’s case; i.e., that it had anything to do with the

investigation of the victim’s death. Moreover, the petitioner failed

to present any evidence that the memorandum would have been

admissible at trial. Because the petitioner failed to present any

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64

evidence establishing that he was entitled to relief, the trial court

was correct in dismissing the petitioner’s petition. Rule 32.2,

Ala.R.Crim.P.

(CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 36-37).

The inadmissibility of the inter-office communication supports the state court's

conclusion that the report was not material. See Gilliam v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections,

480 F.3d 1027, 1032 -1033 (11 Cir. 2007), citing Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5-6, 116 th

S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (noting that inadmissible polygraph test was not “evidence” and

therefore was not material) and Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 964 (11th Cir.2002)

(“[i]nadmissible evidence could only rarely meet [Brady's materiality] standard-indeed no

Supreme Court case . . . has found inadmissible evidence was material for Brady purposes”),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1204, 123 S.Ct. 1825, 155 L.Ed.2d 699 (2003). This court cannot review

the determination of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that the report was inadmissible

under Alabama evidentiary law “unless it amounts to an egregious, unsupportable application of

state law designed to frustrate [the petitioner's] Brady claim.” Gilliam, 480 F.3d at 1033, n. 1,

citing, Breedlove, 279 F.3d at 964. Land makes no such claim.

While Land argues that the inter-office communication would have provided him with

critical impeachment evidence, nothing other than the temporal proximity of the communication

to the crime connects the two. Moreover, counsel thoroughly questioned witnesses concerning

the condition of the crime scene and the handling of evidence. Land argues:

[O]ne of the most important pieces of physical evidence in this

case was a pane of glass cut from the victim’s door, which

purportedly had a shoe print on it. That piece of glass was dropped

and broken by the Birmingham police department and the shoe

print was no longer available for further testing. Trial counsel

could have used that memo to undermine the credibility of the

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65

police officers who were charged with collecting and keeping the

evidence in Mr. Land’s case. 

(Petitioner’s brief, at 67-68.) The court notes that the pane of glass was available at trial. While

it is true that the pane had been broken into two pieces while it was in storage, the shoe print was

still visible on the glass. (TR. 1716-17, 1756-58). 

The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that the interoffice

communication was not Brady material because it was not material or admissible as evidence is

not an objectively unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny.

Evidence about police officers and other state agents that would have impeached or otherwise 

impugned their testimony and investigation results

Land alleges: “The state also failed to provide evidence about police officers and other

state agents that would have impeached or otherwise impugned their testimony, such as various

misconduct that eventually led to their dismissal from law enforcement.” (Amended Petition, ¶

51). 

He further alleges:

Evidence introduced at trial and contained in the files and records

that Mr. Land has received indicate that additional discoverable

material exists. For example, a police report detailing a nearly

identical break-in at Ms. Brown’s house a week before her death

lists “Willie Toyer” as the sole suspect. None of the police reports

or records provided to Mr. Land indicate why the police suspected

Mr. Toyer in the burglary of Ms. Brown’s house, or whether any

state or local law enforcement agencies investigated Mr. Toyer’s

involvement in Ms. Brown’s death. Similarly, a cryptic and

otherwise unlabeled note in the district attorney’s file lists someone

named Karen Erwin-Brown as having information about Ms.

Candace Brown. Another note lists an otherwise unknown person

named “Debra Atchison,” along with the telephone numbers where

she could apparently be contacted. The state, however, never

provided the defense with the follow-up investigation of any of

these leads.

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66

Further, information about an Edward and Tony was found in a

note in the district attorney files that reads: Edward + Tony. IAN

0678 1333 Prosch Av Tarrant.” While the police evidently

investigated the involvement of “Edward and Tony” in the

homicide, and discovered both their license plate number and

address, the state did not disclose this information to the defense.

According to yet another memorandum in the district attorney’s

files, an individual telephoned the police station and told the

Birmingham Police Department that two people named Rayford

Higgenbotham and Eugene Brashet might be involved in the death

of Ms. Brown because they had bragged of kidnapping and killing

two other females. Further corroboration of both this anonymous

tip and Mr. Land’s purported statement indicating that several

people were involved in Ms. Brown’s death comes from Ms.

Brown’s neighbor, who stated that she saw the victim talking to a

six-foot-tall white male on the day before her death. Mr. Land is

5'3". The state did not provide the results of its investigation into

these leads to Mr. Land or his trial counsel.

Another police memorandum lists the name, number, and

employment of a work partner of Mr. Land: “Vince Yacko 733-

8833 Southern Waterproofing.” The police records, however

indicate nothing about the outcome of their meeting with Mr.

Yacko, or his relevance to the homicide investigation.

The police apparently suspected one of Ms. Brown’s former

boyfriends, Aaron Adams, who was incarcerated with Mr. Land

and purportedly introduced him to Ms. Brown. Mr. Adams, who

was incarcerated for a drug offense, had been released from the

penitentiary just before Ms. Brown’s death, and had moved to

northern Alabama. The police interviewed Mr. Adams and asked

his whereabouts on the day of Ms. Brown’s death, but the records

give no indication of how or whether the police otherwise

investigated his possible involvement in the offense nor did the

state provide this information to Mr. Land. Given Mr. Adams’

criminal history, his recent release from prison, his tenuous

relationship with Ms. Brown, his lack of a reasonable alibi, and his

belief that Ms. Brown and Mr. Land had seen one another while he

remained incarcerated, Mr. Adams would be a likely suspect in the

death of Ms. Brown.

Similarly, Ms. Brown lived with her child, but nothing in any of

the documents provided to Mr. Land indicates the identity of the

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67

child’s father, or whether the state investigated that father as a

possible suspect in Ms. Brown’s disappearance and death. 

Moreover, none of the records provided to Mr. Land establish

whether Ms. Brown had sole custody of the child, received either

alimony or child support payments, or had any contact – amicable

or otherwise – with the child’s father.

Further, a note provided to Mr. Land indicated that Ms. Brown was

married twice. While the police undoubtably investigated the

victim’s ex-husbands, nothing in the file reveal their alibis or their

relations with Ms. Brown. Based on the nature of the murder, an

exhusband or boyfriend would be a likely suspect in Ms. Brown’s

death.

In addition, several witnesses testified at the Grand Jury

proceedings who never testified at trial, and whose connections to

Ms. Brown and Mr. Land were never established. These witnesses

surely testified at the Grand Jury proceedings because the district

attorney believed that they would contribute to the state’s

presentation. Nevertheless, none of the records made available to

Mr. Land contain any indication of their involvement in the

investigation of Ms. Brown’s death. For example, the state called

Birmingham police officers Mike Crawford, E.G. Hull, and Robert

Cornelius to testify at the Grand Jury proceedings, but the

disclosed records provide no documentation of their involvement

in the investigation into Ms. Brown’s death or Mr. Land’s

purported involvement. The fact that none of these people

subsequently testified at trial suggests a strong likelihood that these

individuals offered testimony that was either exculpatory or

otherwise helpful to Mr. Land.

The prosecutor’s files also contain a letter dated August 12, 1993,

in which an otherwise unknown person named Davis Copeland

claimed particular knowledge of the facts of the case and

announced his certainty of Mr. Land’s guilt. In his letter, Mr.

Copeland states that he knew Ms. Brown and “is now convinced,

based on the evidence, that Michael Jeffrey Land murdered

Candace Brown. I hope he frys [sic] in the electric chair till [sic]

his eye balls (sic) pop out!” How Mr. Copeland could form a

conviction as to Mr. Land’s guilt “based on the evidence” before

any was offered at Mr. Land’s trial is unclear. Given the

inflammatory tone of his letter and his claim that he knew the

evidence against Mr. Land, state law enforcement surely

investigated Mr. Copeland. Yet nothing in any of the records

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68

provided to Mr. Land’s counsel indicates the results of this

investigation.

A memorandum filed by Assistant District Attorney Michael

Anderton relates that he received a telephone call on August 17,

1993, from a man named Chris Hudson who told Mr. Anderton

where to locate Tony and Edward, the purported accomplices in the

homicide. Mr. Anderton noted that he told the caller that the

police would investigate the information, and relayed the

information to a Birmingham detective. However, the records

provided to Mr. Land’s counsel do not indicate the results of the

investigation of this tip by the Birmingham Police Department or

any other law enforcement agency.

Mr. Land’s defense at trial was largely premised on showing that

the police investigation was full of mistakes. Those mistakes

included the mishandling of the crime scene, the physical evidence

and the scene where the body was found. Mr. Land was prejudiced

by not having all of the exculpatory evidence the prosecution

uncovered and investigated, which Mr. Land could have used to

impeach witnesses or prove his innocence. The state’s

investigation of or failure to investigate these potential witnesses

was substantially likely to affect the outcome of Mr. Land’s trial. 

The prosecution’s failure to comply with the discovery

requirements of Brady denied Mr. Land his right to a fair trial

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995);

Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990); Giglio v. United States,

405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

(Amended Petition, ¶¶ 55-65).

The state maintains that these claims are procedurally defaulted because Land failed to

present evidence related to these claims at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing. The Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals, in affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 32 petition, held,

“[a]lthough there were a number of “Brady” claims included in the petition, this [failure to

disclose the Birmingham Police Department Inter-office Communication] was the only claim

upon which the petitioner presented any evidence during the hearing, and thus, the only claim

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The trial court in denying the Rule 32 petition stated “[a]lthough the petition contains several alleged [Brady]

10/

violations, Land only presented evidence on one [failure to disclose the Birmingham Police Department Interoffice Communication].” (R-75, p. 36). The trial court concluded its order by stating “As to the remaining

claims before this Court [not otherwise addressed], Land has failed to meet his burden of proof. See Rule 32.3,

A.R.Cr.P.” Rule 32.3, A.R.Cr.P. provides: “The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and proving by

a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.”

Even in this court, Land does not identify by name any police officers or state agents nor does he specify what 11/

acts of misconduct allegedly occurred that would have impugned the testimony of any of the officers or agents

who testified at trial. Mere speculation that some officer or agent may have engaged in misconduct that would

have allowed him to impugn testimony is not exculpatory and will not suffice to prove materiality. United

States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1252, n. 81 (11 Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 821, 124 S.Ct. 222, 157 th

L.Ed.2d 40 (2003). Moreover, with respect to the allegations concerning the prosecutor’s failure to inform

Land of investigation results, Land never alleges that any investigation results were favorable to him. There

is “no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense

of all police investigatory work on a case.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33

L.Ed.2d 706 (1972).

69

properly before this Court. Rule 32.2 Ala. R.Crim.P.” (CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 36). In

Alabama, “a petitioner is deemed to have abandoned a claim if he fails to present any evidence to

support the claim at the evidentiary hearing.” Brooks v. State, 929 So.2d 491, 497

(Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, (Ala. 2005), citing Payne v. State, 791 So.2d 383 (Ala. Crim.

App.1999), cert. denied, 791 So.2d 408 (Ala. 2000). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 10/

has also held that where a petitioner failed to present evidence to support this claim at an

evidentiary hearing, he failed to meet his burden of proof under Rule 32.3 and concluded that 

the trial court was correct in finding that this claim lacked merit. McNair v. State, 706 So.2d 828,

854 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied (Ala. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1064, 118 S.Ct. 1396, 140

L.Ed.2d 654 (1998). Land has not shown cause and prejudice for his failure to present evidence

in support of this vague, nebulous Brady claim at the Rule 32 hearing. These claims are thus

procedurally barred from federal review. 11/

The court concludes that neither the individual nor cumulative claims of prosecutorial

misconduct entitle Land to habeas relief because the Alabama courts’ decisions that prosecutor’s

actions did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

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of due process,” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471, were not unreasonable applications

of Untied States Supreme Court law.

II. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during trial

The principles in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d

674 (1984), govern all ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The state courts’ decisions in

this case were not “contrary to” clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court because both the trial court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

recognized that Strickland was the controlling law with respect to ineffective assistance of

counsel claims.

In Strickland the United States Supreme Court established a national standard for judging

the effectiveness of criminal defense counsel. "The benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. 

The Court elaborated:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

In reviewing the performance prong of Strickland, the Court stated:

In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance

inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable

considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as

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71

reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . .

are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only

guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct

can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced

by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding

how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules

would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of

counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making

tactical decisions.

466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.

In Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 956 (2003),

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated on the Strickland performance prong:

[W]e must bear in mind that the “touchstone of a lawyer’s

performance under the Constitution” is “reasonableness.” 

Chandler [v. United States], 218 F.3d [1305] at 1319 [(11 Cir. th

2000)]. As we have explained:

The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would

have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers

would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable

lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as

defense counsel acted at trial. . . . We are not interested in

grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in

whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked

adequately.

Waters [v. Thomas], 46 F.3d [1506] at 1512 [(11th Cir.

1995)](quoting White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th

Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, “[t]he relevant question is not whether

counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were

reasonable.” Putman [v. Head], 268 F.3d [1223] at 1244 [(11th

Cir. 2001)](quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481, 120

S.Ct. 1029, 1037, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). This recognizes that

“[t]o uphold a lawyer’s strategy, a court ‘need not attempt to divine

the lawyer’s mental processes underlying the strategy,’” but instead

must simply determine whether the course actually taken by

counsel might have been reasonable. Id. (quoting Chandler, 218

F.3d at 1315 n. 16).

Crawford, 311 F.3d at 1314.

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“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. “There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct is the result

of trial strategy and ‘strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.’” Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516,

1519 (11 Cir. 1987), (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066). “Counsel’s th

competence . . . is presumed and the defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that his

attorney’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the

challenged action was not sound strategy.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106

S.Ct. 2574, 2588, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (internal citation omitted). The respondent is not

required to assume the burden of demonstrating competence; rather, the petitioner must disprove

a presumption of competence. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315. Whether conduct by counsel was a

tactical decision is a question of fact. Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999). 

“Whether the tactic was reasonable, however, is a question of law. . . . .” Id. Counsel’s

challenged conduct is viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of the conduct. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; Collier, 177 F.3d at 1200. It is critical to understand that the

petitioner bears the burden of proof in the § 2254 action. In the absence of evidence to the

contrary, this court may assume that counsel’s decision was strategic. Birt v. Montgomery, 725

F.2d 587, 600 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874, 105 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed.2d 161

(1984). 

Land was afforded an evidentiary hearing in the Rule 32 collateral proceedings. He

elected to call only one of his attorneys to testify. The attorney witness was not questioned with

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73

regard to many of the allegations now asserted in the § 2254 petition. Land did not testify at the

Rule 32 hearing. 

In Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11 Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit explained the th

difficulty faced by the federal courts when an evidentiary hearing is conducted in state court but

no testimony is elicited on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel:

In judging whether trial counsel acted reasonably, we typically rely

on two sources: petitioner's own testimony as to conversations that

took place between petitioner and counsel concerning the pretrial

investigation of the case and trial strategy, and the counsel's own

explanation as to what took place. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at

1318-19 (en banc) (“[An] inquiry into counsel's conversations with

the [petitioner] may be critical.”); see Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.

374, 385, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2464, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)

(recounting the testimony of trial counsel during post-conviction

proceedings); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 517, 123 S.Ct. 2527,

2533, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (same). The challenge faced by the

Alabama courts, and the challenge we confront in this appeal, is

that neither petitioner nor his trial counsel testified during the Rule

32 hearing.

Despite the lack of live testimony from either petitioner or his

counsel, we are not without a basis on which to review the district

court's disposition of his claims. Both the Rule 32 court and the

court of criminal appeals made explicit findings of fact to which

we accord deference under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Bui

[v. Haley], 321 F.3d [1304], 1312 [(11th Cir.2003)]. 

In reviewing the prejudice prong, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland stated:

It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually

every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not

every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome

undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding. . . .

The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

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74

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted

in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge

to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the

judge or jury acted according to law. An assessment of the

likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude

the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,”

and the like. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a

lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be

reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the

assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously,

and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. It

should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular

decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or

leniency. Although these factors may actually have entered into

counsel’s selection of strategies and, to that limited extent, may

thus affect the performance inquiry, they are irrelevant to the

prejudice inquiry. Thus, evidence about the actual process of

decision, if not part of the record of the proceeding under review,

and evidence about, for example, a particular judge’s sentencing

practices, should not be considered in the prejudice determination.

The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the

question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s

errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is

whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the

factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.

When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at

issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer–including an

appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the

evidence–would have concluded that the balance of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-69.

Respondent asserts that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals concerning the

aspects of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was the decision based on an

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This court reviews the ineffective assistance of counsel claim only under the unreasonable application standard. 12/

75

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceedings. Land argues only that “[t]he Alabama court’s decision to deny Mr. Land state

habeas relief [on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel] was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law.” Specifically, Land maintains that the state courts ignored 12/

the Supreme Court’s holdings in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) and Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). (Petitioner’s reply brief, p.49). 

In those cases, the United States Supreme Court held that defense counsel were

ineffective in preparation for and performance during the penalty phase of a death penalty case. 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). The Supreme Court recognized,

however, that the decision was also governed by the holding in Strickland v. Washington. 

Although Land argues that the state court ignored the holdings in Wiggins and Williams, this

court’s review “is limited to whether the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts

of this case” as “the controlling Supreme Court precedent with regard to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel is Strickland.” Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11 Cir. 2006), th

cert. denied, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 1874, 167 L.Ed.2d 365 (2007). 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 

“The reasonableness of a trial counsel's acts, including lack of

investigation . . . , depends critically upon what information the

client communicated to counsel.” Chandler [v. United States], 218

F.3d [1305] at 1324 [(11 Cir. 2000)] (internal quotation marks th

omitted), [cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204, 121 S.Ct. 1217, 149

L.Ed.2d 129 (2001)]; see also Van Poyck [v. Florida Dept. Of

Corrections], 290 F.3d [1318] at 1325 [(11 Cir. 2002), cert. th

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76

denied, 537 U.S. 812, 123 S.Ct. 70 154 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002)]

(“Information supplied by a petitioner is extremely important in

determining whether a lawyer's performance is constitutionally

adequate.”). Because information about childhood abuse supplied

by a defendant is “extremely important” in determining reasonable

performance, “[w]hen a petitioner (or family members petitioner

directs his lawyer to talk to) [does] not mention a history of

physical abuse, a lawyer is not ineffective for failing to discover or

to offer evidence of abuse as mitigation.” Van Poyck, 290 F.3d at

1325; see also Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d [1223] at 1237 [(11th

Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1246, 120 S.Ct. 2696, 147

L.Ed.2d 967 (2000)](“An attorney does not render ineffective

assistance by failing to discover and develop evidence of childhood

abuse that his client does not mention to him.”).

Stewart v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 476 F.3d 1193, 1211 (11 Cir. 2007). th

 In Wiggins, the Supreme Court emphasized:

Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every

conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the

effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does

Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence

at sentencing in every case. Both conclusions would interfere with

the “constitutionally protected independence of counsel” at the

heart of Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We base our

conclusion on the much more limited principle that “strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable”

only to the extent that “reasonable professional judgments support

the limitations on investigation.” Id., at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A

decision not to investigate thus “must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances.” Id., at 691, 104 S.Ct.

2052.

539 U.S. at 533, 123 S.Ct. at 2541. 

In assessing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court has reviewed not

only the decisions of the state appellate courts on both direct appeal and collateral review but

also the transcripts of the trial and the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing. The court finds no error in

the state courts’ application of Strickland.

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77

II. (a) Respondent’s assertion that certain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

procedurally defaulted

Respondent argues that aspects of Land’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are

procedurally barred because the Rule 32 court and/or the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

found that Land failed to present evidence in support of the claims during the Rule 32 evidentiary

hearing. (Respondent’s brief, pp.11-15). Land does not specifically respond to the assertion that

he failed to present evidence. Instead he argues that because the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals made determinations of fact and relied on federal law in denying his claims, this court

should also reach the merits. A fair reading of the trial court’s decision in denying the Rule 32

petition and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision relying on that decision does not

appear to rest on a state procedural rule but rather on Land’s failure to satisfy his burden under

Strickland v. Washington to show a constitutionally deficient performance and resulting

prejudice. 

Respondent further argues that allegations asserted in support of the ineffective assistance

of counsel claim were not raised in the state court proceedings and are procedurally defaulted. 

Land responds that his “cumulative effect” claims (assertions that counsel failed to properly

litigate the state’s investigation and presentation, failed to obtain expert assistance, failed to

present evidence from Land’s family and friends which would have supported a sentence of life

without parole, and failed to present expert testimony in the penalty phase) were raised in a reply

brief to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, at the conclusion to his initial brief to the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals after the denial of his Rule 32 petition and in the petition for

writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court. 

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78

Land argues that the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert in

crime scene investigation and evidence handling is identical to the Rule 32 claim that counsel

was effective for failing to obtain an expert in police procedures and investigation. Similarly, he

argues that the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to “properly” litigate the admission of

improper physical evidence is identical to his Rule 32 claim that counsel failed to properly

litigate all evidentiary motions before the trial court and his Rule 32 appeal argument that

counsel was ineffective for not challenging the collection of physical evidence from Mr. Land

and the subsequent forensic analysis of this physical evidence. He contends that the claim that

counsel was ineffective in the penalty stage in not obtaining a mitigation expert is the same issue

as the Rule 32 assertion that the assistance of penalty phase experts would have been helpful to

the jury in assessing mitigating circumstances. Finally, he alleges that the claim that counsel was

ineffective at the penalty stage for not obtaining a forensic psychiatrist and forensic psychologist

was “implied” in the Rule 32 claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a sufficient

mental health evaluation. Because claims raised in a federal habeas petition are required to first

have been presented in state court, phrasing the issues in the same manner in federal court as in

state court is helpful to a subsequent review. Based on Land’s representation that what was

raised here is what was raised in state court, the court will construe the claims set forth earlier in

this paragraph to be the same as those presented in state court and declines to find the claims to

be procedurally defaulted. 

Respondent argues that Land did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

based on counsel’s failure “to exclude irrelevant, prejudicial, and inflammatory photographs of

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79

the victim and the crime scene” in the Rule 32 proceedings. In reply, Land refers the court to

page 23 of the Second Amended Rule 32 petition in which he clearly stated:

Counsel was ineffective for failing to fully litigate the admission of

gruesome photographs. (See Issue XIV). The photographs were

cumulative, gruesome, unnecessary, and served little purpose but to

inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury. Counsel failed to

adequately object to the photographs and document why they were

not properly admissible. As a result, the jury viewed over forty

(40) glossy, color photographs of Ms. Brown.

This instance of ineffective assistance of counsel is presented in conjunction with Claim

II(f)–trial counsel’s failure to adequately present, argue and obtain favorable rulings on numerous

motions. (Amended Petition, ¶ 108). For the reasons stated in section II(f) below, the court

concludes that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case.

II.(b). The claim that counsel were constitutionally ineffective in part because of grossly

inadequate compensation.

Land alleges that Alabama Code, § 15-12-21 (1975), limited the compensation for

appointed attorneys for out-of-court work to $1,000.00 for each phase of a capital trial and as a

result counsel could not devote the time necessary to prepare an adequate defense, investigate the

case, prepare for voir dire, interview the state’s witnesses prior to trial and present mitigating

evidence. He further alleges that lack of funds for expert assistance was debilitating in the face of

the genetic and forensic evidence relied upon by the prosecution.

On appeal from the denial of Land’s Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

“The Claim that trial counsel was ineffective, in part, because of

grossly inadequate compensation.

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While Land lists various persons who should have been interviewed by trial counsel as suspects, witnesses or 13/

mitigation witnesses, he does not state what the substance of their individual testimonies would be. See

Amended Petition, ¶ 33, n. 3. 

80

“As noted previously, to the extent Land intended to assert a

substantive claim regarding the amount trial counsel was

compensated, such a claim is barred from review because it could

have been, but was not, raised at trial and on appeal. See Rule

32.2(a)(3), (a)(5), Ala.R.Crim.P. The claim, as couched in terms of

ineffective assistance of counsel, is without merit. Mr. Dodd

pointedly testified that the amount of compensation he received

had absolutely no effect on the representation he provided in this

case. He additionally stated that, ‘as far as a capital case is

concerned,’ he and Mr. Mathis ‘probably worked as hard on this

case as any case [they had] tried together’ and they had ‘tried

several cases together.’ The claim that counsel’s representation

was ineffective because of the compensation received is, therefore,

denied.

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 17-18.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that counsel’s representation was not

rendered ineffective because of the compensation received. Consequently, Land is not entitled to

habeas relief in this claim. 

II.(c). The claim that trial counsel failed to investigate adequately and independently the State’s

capital murder charge against Land.

Land argues that trial counsel did not meet nor interview any of the state’s witnesses or

the officer charged with investigating the victim’s disappearance and death; that counsel met

with Land and his family members only a few times before trial; that counsel made no attempt to

locate either of Land’s alibi witnesses or other suspects; that counsel should have met with “each

of the individuals involved in the facts of this case, any and all possible mitigation witnesses, and

Mr. Land’s family members.” He alleges that counsel “would have discovered critical

13/

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81

exculpatory information had they met with and thoroughly investigated the appropriate

witnesses.” The only specific information Land identifies that counsel would have discovered is:

Birmingham Police Officer Gregg Bearden had a troubled work

history of incompetence and impropriety prior to Mr. Land’s arrest

and trial, apparently stemming from substance abuse problems. 

Mr. Bearden’s difficulties ultimately led to his removal from the

Birmingham Police Department. Given Mr. Bearden’s important

role as the lead investigator in the case against Mr. Land and h[is]

role in the collection and storage of evidence used to convict Mr.

Land such serious problems were important to the finder of fact’s

determinations.

(Amended Petition, ¶ 76).

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

“The Claim that trial counsel failed to adequately independently

investigate the State’s capital murder charge against Mr. Land.

“Land failed to offer any evidence in support of this claim. Trial

counsel was not asked any questions regarding what type of

investigation was conduc[t]ed before and after settling on a theory

of defense. Land contends that Mr. Dodd’s statement that he and

Mr. Mathis ‘more or less took the defense that was given to [them]

by the initial facts’ demonstrates that trial counsel ‘embrac[ed] the

state’s account of the events surrounding Brown’s death’ and,

therefore, ‘did not independently and adequately investigate Mr.

Land and other defense witnesses.’ (Land’s brief at p.8) Mr. Dodd,

however, stated that ‘we more or less took the defense that was

given to us by the initial facts’ when responding to the question

‘what was your primary defense.’ He never testified that he and

Mr. Mathis adopted the strategy without conducting any

investigation. To the contrary, he testified that ‘we probably

worked as hard on this case as any case that we’ve tried together.’

“To meet his burden of proof and establish that counsel did not

adequately investigate the case, Land needed to present something

regarding what septs [sic] counsel did take to investigate the case. 

He did not do so and therefore, failed to overcome the presumption

that counsel ‘did what [they] could have done, and that [they]

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82

exercised reasonable professional judgment.’ Williams v. Head,

185 F.3d 1223, 1236 (11 Cir. 1999). In the absence of any th

contrary information, a reviewing court must presume that counsel

acted reasonably and did what they should have done, including a

presumption that they adequately investigated the case.

“In addition, the record contradicts Land’s claims regarding this

issue. For example, Land asserts that counsel ‘met with [him] on

only a few occasions prior to trial.’ Mr. Dodd testified, however,

that he ‘met with Jeff often, and made numerous visits to the jail

and visited with him. [He] and Mr. Mathis, together, would visit

with him and then a lot of times [he] would visit with him [alone].’ 

Additionally, when directly asked about the extensiveness of the

investigation conducted, Mr. Dodd stated that he and Mr. Mathis

‘worked as hard on this case as any case that we’ve tried together.’

“Land failed to offer any evidence indicating, that had the

investigation been conducted differently, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different. For

example while he lists more than twenty individuals he claims

‘effective assistance’ would have met with, Land did not even

establish that counsel did not meet with the individuals listed. 

Indeed, it is indisputable that counsel did meet with several of the

people on Land’s list, such as Shelly Wade, who was called as [a]

witness for the defense, and David Higgins, who Mr. Dodd

specifically testified that he met with. Moreover, even assuming

that only an unreasonable counsel would not have met with all of

the individuals listed--and assuming that counsel did not do so--

Land has failed to demonstrate prejudice. He did not produce a

single witness at the evidentiary hearing who offered any testimony

relevant to a guilt phase issue.

“Finally, Land asserts that, ‘had trial counsel adequately

investigated Officer Bearden, they would have discovered that

Officer Bearden’s work history as a Birmingham Police Office is

troubled.’ This claim is denied for several reasons. First, it was

not asserted in Land’s initial petition for relief, and, in fact, was not

raised until January 8, 2001. It is, therefore, barred because it was

raised beyond the two-year statute of limitations. See Charest v.

State, No. CR-99-1663, 2002 WL 734306, at 1-2 (Ala. Crim. App.

April 26, 2002) (stating that ‘trial judge did not have the authority

to enlarge the two-year limitations period established by Rule

32.2(c)’ and, therefore, ‘should have addressed only those claims

raised in the first petition . . . and any subsequently filed legitimate

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83

amendments to that amendment relate back to the original

petition’).

“Second, the claim, as pleaded, fails to comply with Rule 32.6(b),

Ala.R.Crim.P. Even assuming that it is not barred by the statute of

limitations, therefore, it is dismissed for failure to comply with the

pleading requirements of Rule 32. Alternatively, the claim is

denied because Lane offered absolutely no evidence to support it. 

He did not question trial counsel about Officer Bearden and

therefore, the Court has no way of knowing that the premise of the

claim–that counsel did not investigate Officer Bearden is factually

accurate. Moreover, Land failed to present any evidence that such

an investigation would have led to useful and admissible evidence.

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 18-20.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Srickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice based on counsel’s investigation of the capital murder charge against

Land. Land’s petition, therefore, should not be granted on this claim.

II.(d). The claim that trial counsel failed to properly litigate the State’s investigation and

presentation of the case.

Land argues that counsel failed to properly present to the court and jury that Land was

illegally arrested without probable cause; failed to litigate the warrantless search of Land’s

automobile while in police custody; failed to object to the introduction of the improper collection

and analysis of physical evidence from Land; failed to properly litigate the state’s assertion that

Land used the gun recovered from his vehicle to kill the victim; and did not properly litigate that 

the state’s introduction of the bullets recovered from Land’s vehicle did not match the gun nor

bullets recovered from the victim and from the victim’s house. 

On appeal from the denial of Land’s Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

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84

“The claim that trial counsel failed to adequately challenge the

State’s investigation and presentation of the case.

“In support of this claim, Land asserts that counsel failed to

‘adequately challenge’ several aspects of the State’s case. Each of

the allegations are without merit and dismissed. First, Land claims

that trial counsel ‘failed to adequately challenge [his] arrest.’ Trial

counsel was, however, asked nothing about this claim during the

evidentiary hearing. Land has, therefore, failed to meet his burden

of proof. Moreover, on direct appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court

rejected a claim that the arrest was improper, ‘concluding that

Land’s arrest was amply supported by probable cause. Ex parte

Land, 678 So.2d 224, 239 (Ala. 1996). Land presented nothing

during these proceedings that would bring into question the

holding of the Supreme Court.’

“Land claims that trial counsel ‘failed to adequately challenge the

warrantless search of [his] automobile while he was held in police

custody.’ Again, trial counsel was asked nothing about this during

the hearing. Not unlike the previous claim, moreover, the appellate

courts have already determined that Land’s ‘vehicle was not the

subject of a unlawful search.’ Land v. State, 678 So.2d 201, 215

(Ala. Crim. App. 1995). No evidence relevant to this subject was

presented during the evidentiary hearing. The claims is, therefore,

denied.

“Land next contends that counsel ‘was ineffective in failing to

challenge the admissibility of evidence introduced by the State’s

witness.’ This claim is dismissed for the same reasons as the

previous two. On direct appeal, the appellate courts rejected the

arguments presented by Lane on this matter. He offered no

evidence to make them any more viable in these proceedings. 

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 209-213.

“Land additionally, and more generally, claims that trial counsel

failed to ‘challenge the police investigation, attributing the alleged

incompetence to their failure to procure an expert in police

procedures and forensic examination.’ (Land’s brief, p.12). Once

again, Land apparently felt that trial counsel’s testimony regarding

this matter would have no relevance. He did not question Mr.

Dodd about whether he or Mr. Mathis considered retaining an

expert in police procedures. To prove his claim, Land must

demonstrate that only an attorney acting unreasonably would fail to

utilize such an expert. He failed to do so. This is especially true

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85

here because Mr. Mathis, who had served as a police officer for

thirteen years was no doubt familiar with the subject matter. The

claim, is, therefore, dismissed.

“Additionally, Mr. Dodd testified-and the record reveals-that

attacking the State’s investigation was a primary strategy adopted

and pursued by the defense. Trial counsel was challenging the

State’s investigation at every turn. Moreover, through closing

argument, trial counsel was able to effectively summarize the

problems and possible mistakes made during the State’s

investigation. The fact that current counsel feels that there are

additional aspects of the investigation which could have been

questioned does not make trial counsel’s performance deficient.

“Finally, Land presented no evidence to demonstrate that, had

counsel ‘challenged the State’s investigation’ in the manner he

deems ‘adequate,’ there is a reasonable probability that the results

would have been different. As noted previously, he presented no

evidence related to any guilt phase issues during the evidentiary

hearing. His contention that he was prevented from doing do [sic]

because the court sustained the state’s objection to the admission

of the ‘Birmingham Police Department’s procedural manuals’ is

without merit. At the hearing Land simply offered the manuals in

their entirety without pointing to any particular relevant or to any

procedure that was allegedly violated. He offered no testimony

regarding the manuals and apparently expected the Court to search

the manual in the context of this case seeking out potential

improprieties or inconsistencies. Such a tactic would not have

been a viable option for trial counsel and, likewise, was not

appropriate here. The claim is denied.

 

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 20–22.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice based on counsel’s failure to challenge the State’s investigation and

presentation of the case. Accordingly, the court will not grant habeas relief on this claim.

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Land’s counsel acknowledges Land was evaluated for competency but argues that the evaluation was 14/

insufficient to determine whether Land was capable of forming the requisite intent required for capital murder,

capable of waiving his right to counsel and for giving the police permission to search his automobile, or

susceptible to the coercive pressure applied by the police in this case.

86

II.(e). The claim that trial counsel failed to procure necessary expert assistance.

Land argues that counsel should have filed an ex parte motion to procure funds for expert

assistance. He argues that counsel should have obtained experts in

(1) crime scene investigation and evidence handling to document police errors; 

(2) firearm and projectiles to challenge the state’s ballistics technician; 

(3) the field of forensic entomology or pathology to challenge the time of death;

(4) the field of forensic pathology to challenge the state’s medical evaluation of the victim

including injuries to her anus; 

(5) shoe prints to rebut the state’s testimony matching Land’s shoe to a footprint found on a

pane of glass at the crime scene; 

(6) toolmark identification to rebut the state’s testimony matching a cut telephone wire at the

victim’s residence to a pair of shears found in Land’s vehicle; 

(7) the field of genetic analysis and matching to independently analyze the state’s samples

and DNA evidence and assistance with cross-examination of the state’s experts; and 

(8) mental health evaluation to establish Land’s history of mental, behavioral, and emotional

problems.14/

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

“The claim that trial counsel failed to procure necessary expert

assistance.

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87

“Land asserts that counsel were ineffective for not obtaining an

‘expert’ in eight separate fields. During the hearing, however,

Land failed to question trial counsel about any specific decision to

seek, or not seek, expert assistance. Rather, he merely inquired as

to whether trial counsel sought ‘funds for expert assistance in

various areas.’ In no area, did Land establish deficient

performance on the part of trial counsel. As stated previously, in

the absence of contrary evidence, counsel will be presumed to have

done what they should have done. Here, the Court will presume

that the decisions they made regarding expert assistance were

within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance.

“Land’s failure to question counsel about his claims, necessarily

results in his failure to meet the burden of proof placed squarely

upon him by Strickland and the rules of procedure. For example,

he alleges that counsel’s decision not to procure an expert in

firearm and projectile examination constituted ineffective

assistance. The record reveals, however, that counsel did seek out

assistance, but ultimately decided not to use it. Specifically at one

point in the original trial proceedings, Mr. Dodd informed the court

of the following:

“‘While we are on the record, Judge, me and Mr. Anderton

had a conversation abut [sic] this right prior to lunch and he

told me this, but for the record I would ask that it be made

part of the record, that Mr. Higgins is going to testify later

on this afternoon about a ballistics examination and we

have told Mr. Anderton we are not going to use Phillip

Lane to testify in this case nor is he going to be up here. 

And Mr. Anderton has advised us that he has no intention

of bringing up the fact that Phillip Lane looked at this gun

and so forth and so on.’

“Additionally, when asked by the State, during the evidentiary

hearing, whether he ‘considered having someone else make a

[projectile] comparison, Mr. Dodd replied that “we considered it

and I think we tried to find someone that was qualified, but we

were unable.’”

“Apparently, whatever the result[s] were of his having ‘looked at

[the] gun,’ counsel did not think Phillip Lane was sufficiently

qualified and may have been concerned that he would not come off

well in front of a jury. The Court can only speculate. The fact is

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88

that what Mr. Lane did and why trial counsel decided not to call

him is unknown because Land, apparently deeming the information

unnecessary to his claim, did not ask the question. In the absence

of contrary evidence, the Court must presume that counsel’s

strategic decision as to how to deal with the ballistic testimony was

reasonable. This claim is denied.

“Land additionally contends that trial counsel were ineffective in

failing to obtain expert assistance in the area of DNA. The record

plainly reveals, however, that trial counsel did seek such

assistance. That they were unsuccessful in obtaining assistance

that would be beneficial to Land’s defense-indeed, the expert they

contacted ‘would be more or less reaffirming what the State’s

opinion was going to be’–does not render their performance

deficient. The claim is denied.

“As noted, Land claims that trial counsel were ineffective for

failing to obtain expert assistance in a number of other areas. As

also noted, however, he failed to question trial counsel about any

of those areas. It may very well be that counsel considered

additional expert assistance, but made a reasonable strategic

decision not to pursue it. It may also be the case that counsel

actually contacted individuals about the matters raised by Lane, but

were unable to obtain information beneficial to their case. The

Court is only aware of Phillip Lane’s involvement because his

name is included in the trial transcript. His involvement plainly

demonstrates, however, that, as part of their investigation, trial

counsel contacted and sought assistance from individuals whose

names may not be evident from the existing record.

“Put simply, because Land never inquired, the record does not

reveal the specifics or the extent of the investigation undertaken by

trial counsel. The Court does know that Mr. Dodd and Mr.

Mathis–two attorneys who regularly practice before the

Court–worked as hard on this case as any case that [they]’ve tried

together. Crediting that testimony and the presumption of

competence mandated by the law, Land has failed to demonstrate

that counsel’s performance was deficient in terms of expert

assistance. The Court will not hold that only an attorney acting

unreasonably would fail to see[k] expert assistance in each of the

areas Land raises.

“Finally, Land asserts that he was prevented from adequately

developing these claims because the Court denied his ex parte

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applications for funds. This claim is without merit. Land is not

entitled to funds at this stage of the proceedings and is certainly not

entitled to funds merely because he requests them. Moreover,

expert assistance would presumably be necessary to establish the

prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Because Land failed to

establish deficient performance on the part of trial counsel, this

Court need not evaluate the issue of prejudice. Regarding each of

the areas listed in the petition as mandating expert assistance, the

Court finds that trial counsel effectively represented Land in a

manner consistent with the chose[n] defense strategy.

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 23-25.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice based on counsel’s failure to procure expert assistance. Habeas relief

on this claim, therefore, is denied.

II.(f). The claim that trial counsel failed to adequately present, argue and obtain favorable

rulings on numerous motions.

Land argues that trial counsel did not challenge the composition of the grand or petit

juries, did not “adequately” challenge the indictment; failed to ensure that the jury selected was

impartial; failed to object to the trial court giving part of the jury instructions before closing and

part after; failed to object to the court’s instruction that the trial court would “determine the

voluntariness of the [defendant’s] statement” (TR. 1915); failed to effectively challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the burglary element; failed to effectively challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the kidnapping or sexual assault element; failed to litigate

the admission of physical evidence for which the state failed to establish a proper chain of

custody; failed to exclude irrelevant, prejudicial, and inflammatory photographs of the crime

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scene and victim’s body; and failed to move to exclude irrelevant testimony about the condition

of the victim’s body and injuries to her anus.

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

“The claim that trial counsel failed to present, adequately argue,

and obtain favorable rulings on numerous motions.

“In support of this claim, Land lists a number of motions he claims

counsel was ineffective for either not filing or, in the case where

such a motion was filed, not ‘adequately arguing.’ Land did not

question trial counsel about any of the matters raised within the

claim. He did not, therefore, overcome the presumption that

counsel’s conduct was ‘within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.’ Similarly, he presented no evidence to

demonstrate that, had trial counsel handled the matter differently,

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

probably would have been different. In short, he presented nothing

in support of this claim. It is, therefore, denied.

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 26.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Stickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice based on counsel’s failure to present and obtain favorable rulings on

various motions. Consequently, Land is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

II.(g). The claim that trial counsel failed to object to or otherwise prevent prosecutorial

misconduct.

Land argues that counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments of Land’s failure

to testify; failed to object to the unconstitutional composition of the jury even though the

prosecution allegedly “discriminated on the basis of race and gender in the use of its peremptory

strikes;” and failed to properly litigate the admission of 42 inflammatory photographs of the

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victim’s body. He also argues that counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s elicitation of

inadmissible testimony (that the victim’s telephone lines had previously been cut, that a small

child was found in the victim’s residence, and that a fox was seen near the victim’s body). He

argues that counsel failed to ensure the adequate preservation of the record for review, stating

that “throughout both pretrial and trial proceedings, numerous bench conferences were held but

not transcribed.”

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

“The claim that trial counsel failed to object to or otherwise

prevent prosecutorial misconduct.

“Not unlike the previous claim, Land failed to present failed to

present [sic] any evidence in support of this claim. He did not

question trial counsel about any of the matters asserted in support

of the claim and, therefore, he failed to meet his burden of proof. 

For example, one of the issues raised by Land reads as follows:

“‘Among the numerous instances of misconduct during the

prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments, the district

attorney presented the following paraphrase of what he

claimed Mr. Land was saying, through his attorneys:

“Through his attorneys he continues to say ‘I don’t know

anything about the wire cutters or the [p]hone lines or the

glass fragments, I don’t know anything about the gun or

how that bullet got into her head. As discussed elsewhere, .

. . a timely defense objections would have prevented the

ongoing prejudicial arguments of the district attorney, and

preserved the reversible error for appellate review. The

prejudice of trial counsel’s error was confirmed by the

Alabama Supreme Court, which expressly disapproved of

the state’s argument, noting that “if Land’s counsel had

made a contemporaneous objection to this statement, . . .

we might have held the comment to be reversible error.” 

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d 224, 233 (Ala. 1996). Trial

counsel’s failure is inexplicable, and can only be explained

by ineffectiveness.’

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“‘Contrary to Land’s contention, however, counsel’s

decision not to object may have been a result of something

other than ineffectiveness.’

“Counsel may have made a reasoned determination not to

object. Objections are a matter of trial strategy, and an

appellant must overcome the presumption that ‘conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance,’ that is, the presumption that the challenged

action “might be considered sound trial strategy.’ Moore v.

State, 659 So.2d 205, 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). 

Moreover, ‘the lack of a contemporaneous objection by

experienced defense counsel [led the Alabama Supreme]

Court to believe that the prosecutor’s comment was not

stated with an inflection or tone that would have naturally

led a listener to construe it as a reference to Land’s failure

to testify.’ Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d 224, 233, n.2 (Ala.

1996). In failing to raise this issue with trial counsel, Land

has failed to overcome the presumption of competency and,

therefore, failed to meet his burden of proof.

“‘Similarly, he failed to overcome the presumption with all

of the matters he relied upon to support this claim. 

Moreover, several of the underlying substantive claims

were addressed and rejected on direct appeal thereby

preventing Land from establishing prejudice. The claim

that counsel was ineffective for an alleged failure “to object

or otherwise prevent prosecutorial misconduct” is,

therefore, denied.’”

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 26-28.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it conclude that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice based on counsel’s failure to prevent prosecutorial misconduct. Thus

the court denies Land’s petition on this claim.

II.(h). The claim that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of

Land’s trial.

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II.(h)(1). The claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence

from Land’s family and friends that would have supported a sentence of

life without parole.

Land argues:

Trial counsel should have presented information of Mr. Land’s

family life, medical history, school records, institutional and

incarceration records, and other mitigating aspects of his

background. Mr. Land’s records, coupled with testimony from

available witnesses, would have established that Mr. Land had a

history of mental, emotional, and substance abuse problems; that

he grew up in an unstable home environment; that he grew up

largely without a father figure; that he was subjected to physical

and emotional abuse from his adoptive and biological parents and

acquaintances; that he suffered from genotypic and phenotypic

defects since birth; and that he had recently suffered from the

trauma and recent loss of several people close to him.

(Amended Petition, ¶ 122.)

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice at the penalty stage based on counsel’s failure to present information

about his background from family and friends.

II.(h)(2). The claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to obtain expert

assistance for the penalty phase of Land’s trial.

Land further argues that trial counsel should have obtained an expert in mitigation to

conduct interviews to develop information to be assessed by other experts including a social

worker, forensic psychiatrists and forensic psychologists to explain how Land’s home

environment affected his development and interactions with family members, friend, and peers;

medical geneticists and genetic dysmorphologists to explain Land’s atypical physical features,

behavioral problems, and detached courtroom demeanor. (Amended Petition, ¶ 145.)

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On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and supported by the record: 

“The claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty

phase of Land’s trial. 

 

“Not unlike the numerous guilt phase issues set forth in the petition

for relief, Land failed to question trial counsel about any of the

shortcomings he alleges occurred during the penalty phase of his

trial. In fact, Land did not ask trial counsel a single question about

the preparation undertaken for the penalty phase. Pursuant to

questioning by the State, Mr. Dodd testified that he and Mr. Mathis

were aware that they ‘were not limited to statutory mitigation’ in

terms of what could be presented and that they ‘decided to present .

. . what we felt like was the best for Jeff at the time.’ Applying the

presumption that Mr. Dodd and Mr. Mathis were competent in

preparing for the penalty phase, the Court finds that Land has failed

to meet his burden of proof. Again, the law plainly requires that a

presumption of competence be applied and that the burden of proof

be place[d] solely on Land. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315, n.15

(11 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that ‘[n]ever does the th

government acquire the burden to show competence, even when

some evidence to the contrary might be offered by the petitioner’). 

He had, therefore, failed to establish deficient performance on the

part of trial counsel.

“Moreover, counsel testified that any decision not to present

evidence regarding Land’s troubled home life was reasoned and

strategic. Specifically, Mr. Dodd stated the following:

“‘I’m sure we discussed Jeff and the fact he came from a

single parent home, that his mother raised him. That his

mother and father were divorced. But that is something, if I

discussed it, it was something that I probably would not

have used because of the fact that the truth of the mater is

50 percent of all marriages end in divorce. And if you are

using that as an excuse, you have people on the jury that

also probably come from single-parent homes. It is not

something that we decided to use as far as mitigation.’

“Regarding what witnesses counsel decided to present, Mr. Dodd

relayed the following:

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95

“‘I could not tell you when or exactly when we decided

what we were going to do. I know we talk[ed] about it and

Jeff’s mother, to me, was a wonderful witness. She made a

very good impression. In my dealing with Gail, she

impressed me a great deal. And his grandfather was a very,

very stately gentleman who testified in this case in chief

and made, to me a very compelling figure, sitting in this

witness stand.’

“‘And we decided that we would call Gail if it came to that

and his grandfather. My memory is they were very good

witnesses and it was a very emotional appeal on their part

to the jury. In fact, I think I recall there was a number of

the jurors who were teared up and were crying at the time. 

In fact, it got to me. It was very emotional and appealing,

compelling testimony. Unfortunately, it didn’t work.’”

“‘Land has failed to demonstrate deficient performance on the part

of trial counsel regarding the penalty phase of his trial. The

majority of the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing

was related to Land’s troubled home life-evidence Mr. Dodd

specifically testified that he would not have presented for strategic

reasons. Moreover, his reasons for not presenting such evidence

would likewise apply to other aspects of the testimony that was

forthcoming during the evidentiary hearing. For example, being

picked on at school and losing family members to death are things

most people have to deal with growing up.’

“‘Mr. Dodd testified that it was important to keep the negative

aspects of Land’s life, such as his extensive criminal history, from

the jury. Trial counsel was successful in this regard. If trial

counsel, had, however, taken the approach adopted by current

counsel during the evidentiary hearing, they would have opened the

door to an extensive amount of negative and damaging information

about Land. In fact, the information presented by the current

counsel was, to a large extent, very negative and hard to reconcile

with the objective of obtaining a sentence less than death.

“‘For example, the psychologist who testified at the evidentiary

hearing reached a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder based

upon a number of extremely negative characteristics and attributes

she identified with Land. Specifically, regarding this issue, the

record reveals the following.

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““‘Q: [Counsel for the State]: Would you read off the

characteristics that you found in Mr. Land’s background to

diagnosis him with antisocial personality disorder? You

don’t have to give specific examples, just tell me the ones

you found to exist in his background.’”

““‘A: [Dr. Boyer]: Okay. Certainly, one includes failure to

conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior.’”

““‘Q: That one, that would be indicated by his criminal

history?’”

“‘“A: Yes. Deceitfulness, repeated lying, use of aliases or

conning others for personal profit or pleasure,

impulsiveity, or failure to plan ahead, the next one

is irritability which I did not see as being a large

feature, which doesn’t mean he is never irritable,

but it wasn’t a prominent part of his personality. 

Reckless disregard for the safety of self or others,

that would fit, consistent irresponsibility as

indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent

work behavior or honor financial obligations, and

seven would be lack of remorse, as indicated by

being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,

mistreated, or stolen from another.’”

“‘“Q: You found he exhibits all of those except perhaps

[irritability]?’”

“‘“A: Correct.’”

“Dr. Boyer additionally testified that Land’s extensive criminal

history was not only relevant to her evaluation, but that it was

necessary to the diagnosis. Trial counsel felt that it was important

to keep Land’s criminal history from the jury. Such decision was

reasonable, strategic, and provides a basis to determine that trial

counsel was not ineffective in failing to present testimony similar

to that of Dr. Boyer. While current counsel may feel that Dr.

Boyer’s testimony was mitigating, a reasonable attorney could

certainly conclude to the contrary. Indeed, had trial counsel

presented testimony informing the jury of Land’s extensive

criminal history, his lack of remorse, his reckless disregard for the

safety of others, his deceitfulness, and his consistent

irresponsibility, Land would no doubt be accusing them of

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ineffective assistance for presenting such negative evidence. Trial

counsel’s objective was, after all, to present the jurors with

evidence that would hopefully convince them to recommend a

sentence of life without parole.

“This same reasoning can be applied to the Hillcrest records, which

are full of negative information about Land. While the Court will

not find that only an attorney acting unreasonably would have

presented the information contained in those records to the jury, it

certainly will not find that the opposite is true. An attorney acting

reasonably could have decided that allowing the jurors to be privy

to all the negative and damaging aspect of Land’s character and

background would not be the best way of convincing them that he

should not receive the death penalty.

“The claim of ineffective assistance as it relates to Dr. Boyer’s

testimony is additionally denied due to Land’s failure to establish

deficient performance on the part of trial counsel regarding the use

of a mental health expert. Land was evaluated prior to trial

pursuant to an order of the Court. The resulting report revealed

“no significant matter . . . as far as any abnormality or deficiency.” 

Moreover, Mr. Dodd specifically testified that, in his interaction

with Land, he never said ‘anything that would indicate . . . any kind

of mental health problem.’ If he had seen such an indication, he

would have followed up on it. Based upon the results of the courtordered examination and trial counsel’s personal experience with

Land, it is unclear what basis could have been proffered in support

of a request for additional evaluations. Land must show not only

that counsel should have requested funds for a mental health

expert, but also demonstrate that had they done so, the request

would have succeeded. Land “has failed to prove that he was

prejudiced by the absence of a request for [mental health]

assistance, because he had failed to show that he would have been

entitled to [mental health] assistance at trial. Floyd v. State, 571

So.2d 1221, 1229 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), rev’d on other grounds,

571 So.2d 1234 (Ala. 1990).

“Finally, Land’s claims of ineffective assistance at the penalty

phase are denied based upon his failure to prove prejudice. He did

not establish a reasonable probability that anything he presented

during the evidentiary hearing would have altered the outcome. As

noted, much of the information brought was extremely negative

and unlikely to be considered mitigating by either a judge or jury. 

Those aspects that might be considered mitigating, moreover, were

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considered by this Court and the appellate courts following the

original trial. Specifically, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that

the Hillcrest records contained the following information regarding

Land: ‘(1) that he suffered from a conduct disorder, (2) that he had

an unstable home environment, (3) that he had significant impulse

control problems, (4) that he had not had a father figure, and (5)

that he had no contact with his natural father.’ Ex parte Land, 678

So.2d 224, 241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). Even considering this

information, this Court determined that death was the appropriate

sentence and the appellate courts agreed. Land has presented

nothing in these proceedings to bring that determination into

question. His claim that trial counsel were ineffective during the

penalty phase of his trial is, therefore, denied.

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 29-35.

As previously observed, Land did not testify at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing and Hiram

Dodd, Jr., one of his two trial lawyers, testified only briefly. (Vol. 38, Tab-45, pp. 17-42). Land

did not call Erskine Mathis to testify. While Land sought to present evidence of additional

mitigation evidence or testimony, he did not question counsel about his investigation into Land’s

background. Land’s mother could not recall if Land’s attorneys explained mitigating

circumstances to her nor did she recall if trial counsel asked about Land’s background or medical

records. Land’s brother was not questioned as to whether he spoke to Land’s trial attorneys. 

Upon questioning by the state’s attorney, Mr. Dodd testified that Land was mentally evaluated

and he did not see anything that led him to believe that he could use that as a defense.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it concluded that Land failed to establish deficient

performance and prejudice at the penalty stage based on counsel’s failure to obtain expert

assistance.

Case 2:04-cv-02866-KOB-PWG Document 27 Filed 10/18/07 Page 98 of 175
The penalty phase of the case was submitted to the jury at 5:04 p.m., and the jury returned at 6:10 p.m. with an

15/

11 to 1 sentence in favor of death. TR. 2129-30. The speed with which the jury acted at the penalty phase was

comparable to the speed with which the jury acted at the guilt phase. At the guilt phase, deliberations began

at 2:25 p.m., and the jury returned at 3:27 p.m. with a guilty verdict. TR. 2072-73. 

99

II.(h)(3). The claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the submission

of the penalty phase case late Friday evening.

Land contends that he was prejudiced by the failure of counsel to object to the late

afternoon submission of the penalty phase because the jury hurriedly considered his sentence

rather than remain sequestered until the next day or through the weekend. Land relies upon 15/

Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) in

support of his argument that such pressure at a capital sentencing phase rises to an impermissible

level of coercion. Jenkins is distinguishable because it was not a capital case nor did it involve

the timing of the submission of a case to the jury. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court held that the

trial judge’s instruction to a deadlocked jury that “You have got to reach a decision in this case”

had the coercive effect of forcing jurors to surrender their conscientiously held views. There was

no such instruction in Land’s case. 

Respondent argues that Land has failed to offer any evidence to support his claim that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or that the timing of the deliberations forced the

jury to reach a hurried decision. At the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, counsel was not questioned

concerning his decision not to object to the submission of the penalty phase case on Friday

evening. Counsel did testify that after Land’s mother and grandfather testified at the penalty

phase a number of jurors were crying. (Rule 32 EH, pp. 38-39.) Counsel may well have wanted

the jury go into deliberations with the testimony of Land’s mother and grandfather fresh in their

minds – particularly as the testimony had an emotional effect on some of the jurors. 

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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.

Washington to the facts of this case when it implicitly found that Land failed to establish

deficient performance and prejudice based on counsel’s failure to object to the submission of the

penalty phase case late Friday evening.

Having reviewed the entire trial record and the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing transcript as

well as the state courts’ decisions, the court concludes with regard to all of the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably

apply Strickland v. Washington to the facts of this case. The court reiterates that during the Rule

32 evidentiary hearing counsel asked few questions of trial counsel and presented little evidence

regarding most of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel presented in the § 2254

petition. Only one of Land’s trial attorneys was called to testify and Land did not testify himself. 

Despite the lack of testimony on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the findings of the

Rule 32 court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are entitled to a presumption of correctness

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Bui, 321 F.3d at 1312. Because Land has not carried his burden

under Strickland v. Washington on any of the individual claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a cumulative effect claim must necessarily fail. Consequently, the court denies Land’s

habeas petition on these claims.

III. Claims related to constitutional violations by the trial court.

III.(a). The claim that the trial court’s failure to determine Land’s competency to stand trial

resulted in a denial of his rights to a fair trial, due process and reliable sentencing under 

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

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Land alleges that the trial court failed to assess Land’s competency “despite his

demonstrated problems” and “then arbitrarily concluded during the penalty phase proceedings

that [he] was not impaired and that no resultant mitigating circumstance existed, despite the lack

of . . . medical basis for its conclusion,” citing to the transcript at TR. 2181-82. (Amended

Petition, ¶157).

Although the court did not make a determination of competency prior to trial, Land was

evaluated for competency. (TR. 2181; Vol. 38, p.4002). The court in sentencing Land clearly

stated it was considering Dr. Rosecran’s competency report:

Number Six, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of law was substantially impaired does not apply. No

evidence of impairment was gleaned from any report or evidence in

the case that I have seen. I’m not unmindful of the defendant’s

diagnosis in 1986, that of conduct disorder, socialized aggression. 

In my view these findings, nor Dr. Rosecran’s findings more

recently support the existence of this factor.

. . . .

Returning to the eighth mitigating circumstance, inclusion of

defendant’s character, record, et cetera. . . .

As I mentioned earlier, ladies and gentlemen, I have carefully read

every scrap of paper submitted to me, including . . . Dr. Rosecran’s

findings, . . . .

(TR. 2181-83).

None the less, this claim is procedurally barred from federal review because the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could have been

but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 6-7, 11.

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III.(b). The claim that the trial court’s failure to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence deprived

Land of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution.

Land alleges:

The police arrested Mr. Land when they took away his shoes and

clothing. A reasonable person would not believe that after he was

stripped naked, he would be free to leave. Therefore, once he was

stripped of his clothing, he was under arrest. See United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (suspect must remain free

to disregard the questions and walk away).

At the time of Mr. Land’s arrest, the totality of the circumstances

did not create a “fair probability” that he had committed a crime. 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (employing a fair

probability standard given all circumstances). As a result, the trial

court should have found his arrest illegal for lack of probable cause

and suppressed the evidence arising from this illegal arrest,

including Mr. Land’s statement and the items taken from his car. 

See e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 35 (1970); Mapp v. Ohio,

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The interrogation and arrest of Mr. Land occurred on May 19,

1992. Officers Steve Corvin and Larry Fowler of the Birmingham

Police Department went to the rooftop of the Galleria Mall to talk

to Mr. Land. (R. 5, 772, 944). The police suspected Mr. Land

simply because they found his name and phone number, along with

his mother’s name and phone number, on a note on Ms. Brown’s

refrigerator. After a brief discussion, the officers transported Mr.

Land back to the police department for further questioning. (R. 6,

773, 945). At the police department, Officer Corvin took Mr. Land

to an interrogation room and read him his rights pursuant to

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Mr. Land signed a

waiver of rights form and agreed to make a statement. (R. 7, 949). 

In his statement to the police, the taping of which began at 2:42

p.m., Mr. Land stated that he knew Ms. Brown through a mutual

friend, but he emphatically denied involvement in her

disappearance. (R. 11, 956-65, 1027). When the officers asked his

whereabouts the previous evening, Mr. Land said that he was at his

girlfriend’s house until approximately 11:30 p.m., then fell asleep

in his car outside her home until 4:00 a.m., after which he went

home to get ready for work. (R. 967). In response to an officer’s

question, Mr. Land stated that a different girlfriend, Marie Fortis,

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borrowed his car after lunch that day. (R. 11, 789, 977). At this

time, the police had no reason to believe that Mr. Smith had

committed a crime. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) the

Supreme Court reaffirmed the “totality of the circumstances”

analysis to determine probable cause. Id. at 238-39. Since at this

point, there was no evidence linking Mr. Land to Mrs. Brown’s

disappearance, there was no probable cause for the police to make

an arrest.

After Mr. Land completed his statement, without explanation,

Detective Fowler immediately took Mr. Land’s shoes and clothing,

including his underwear, and forced him to sit naked in the

interrogation room until a prison uniform was provided to him. (R.

112, 778, 780, 788, 875, 988, 1032, 1047, 1115). Despite Mr.

Land’s repeated requests, the police continued to hold Mr. Land

without allowing him access to counsel. Lieutenant Butch Quinn

then called Mr. Land’s girlfriend Marie Fortis, who denied having

Mr. Land’s car. (R. 1100). When Officer Corvin confronted Mr.

Land with this fact, Mr. Land admitted that his car was in the

Galleria parking lot. (R. 16, 165, 997).

Because a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to

leave the police department building after the police took his shoes

and clothing, Mr. Land was under arrest. United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The police lacked

probable cause to arrest Mr. Land, because under the totality of the

circumstances, no fair probability existed that Mr. Land had

committed any crime. The police purportedly seized his clothing

because the interrogating officer claimed to see blood spatters on

Mr. Land’s clothing and shoes. Subsequent forensic testing,

however, yielded no information establishing such “spots.” (R.

1537-1539, 1681).

Even after the police obtained Mr. Land’s tape-recorded statement,

the police still had no sufficient probable cause to continue to hold

Mr. Land. The police’s subsequent discovery of incriminating

evidence in his car does not validate an illegal arrest.

The trial court should have suppressed the evidence arising from

this illegal arrest, including Mr. Land’s statement and the items

taken from his car. The trial court erred in admitting the

statements, in violating of existing United States Supreme Court

precedent and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Cale v.

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104

Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961).

(Amended Petition, ¶¶ 158-64).

In addressing these claims, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

Land argues that the “fruits” of his arrest, including his first

statement and the evidence obtained from his car, were improperly

admitted into evidence. He contends that when the police arrested

him, without an arrest warrant, they did not have probable cause to

do so. Thus, he argues, the statement and other evidence were

“fruit of the poison tree” and admission of the evidence violated

his rights guaranteed under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and

rights guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution. Land claims

that he was “under arrest” when the police took his shoes and

clothes and gave him a jail uniform to wear because at that time, he

says, he was no longer free to leave the police station.

He asserts that his arrest was made without probable cause

because, he says, under the totality of the circumstances there was

not a fair probability that he had committed a crime. He contends

that all the police knew about the crime at that time was that there

had been a burglary at Ms. Brown's house, that she had

disappeared, that his name and telephone number had been found

on a bulletin board in the house, and that he appeared to have

blood spatters on his shoes. Land points out that the police also

knew at that time that he had been cooperative with their

investigation of Ms. Brown's disappearance, had given a voluntary

statement, and had accounted for his whereabouts at the time she

had disappeared. Land argues that although the police later

obtained additional incriminating evidence against him, that fact

does not validate what he says was an illegal arrest. As noted

above, Land argues that the fruits of his arrest were not admissible

and that his conviction, based on that evidence, should be reversed.

The State agrees that Land was under arrest, though not formally,

when the police took his clothes and shoes. However, the State

argues that Land's arrest was supported by probable cause, pointing

to such evidence as the fact that Land's telephone number was

found in Ms. Brown's house, that Land had admitted to cutting the

telephone line and breaking into Ms. Brown's house a week before

her murder, that his story about having lunch that day with his

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105

second girlfriend and leaving his car at her house was not true, that

Land was wearing tennis shoes with a “USA” tread design that

appeared similar to a shoe print on a piece of glass that had been

removed from Ms. Brown's house, and that he appeared to have

blood spatters on his shoes.

Ala.Code 1975, § 15-10-3(a)(3), states that a police officer may

arrest a person without a warrant “[w]hen a felony has been

committed and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the

person arrested committed the felony.” An officer has reasonable,

or probable, cause to make an arrest “when, at the time the arrest is

made, the facts and circumstances within his knowledge, and of

which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to

lead a prudent person to believe that the suspect is committing or

has committed an offense.” Gord v. State, 475 So.2d 900, 902-03

(Ala. Cr. App.1985). See Manning v. State, 568 So.2d 327 (Ala.

Cr. App.1990), and Brannon v. State, 549 So.2d 532 (Ala. Cr.

App.1989). Thus, a warrantless arrest is not legal if it is supported

only by a suspicion in the officer's mind that the person has

committed an offense. Brannon, supra. Evidence seized pursuant

to a warrantless arrest not supported by probable cause is

inadmissible, and a conviction based on that evidence must be

reversed. Id.

Land and the State disagree as to whether the police were aware,

when they arrested Land, that the tread design on his tennis shoe

was similar to the print on the pane of glass that had been removed

from Ms. Brown's house. However, even if the police were

unaware of that particular connection of Land to the crime, we

conclude that Land's arrest was amply supported by probable

cause. The trial court did not err in admitting the evidence seized

pursuant to Land's warrantless arrest.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d 224, 238-239 (Ala. 1996).

Land does not dispute that the arrest occurred when his clothing was taken. He argues,

however, that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him when they took his clothing. 

Specifically, he states that his clothing was taken before (1) he allegedly admitted to cutting the

telephone line and breaking into the victim’s house a week earlier, and (2) the police determined

that his story about having lunch and leaving his car with his second girlfriend was not true. 

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106

When “the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment

claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). The Stone v. Powell

doctrine is applicable where the defendant “argued that evidence used in his trial was the product

of an illegal arrest.” Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572, 103 S.Ct. 2015, 2016, 76 L.Ed.2d

333 (1983). Because Land had a suppression hearing in the trial court as well as state appellate

review on the facts that form the basis of his illegal arrest issue, he has had a full and fair review. 

See Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 513-14 (11 Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. th

273, 116 L.Ed.2d 225 (1991).

Before this court may review the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim, Land must

demonstrate that the state courts deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. 

See, Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1224 (11 Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1142, 125 th

S.Ct. 2963, 162 L.Ed.2d 892 (2005). Land has not demonstrated that the state courts deprived

him of a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim. Rather, he argues that this claim cannot

be barred because his illegal arrest claim is based on the violation of his Miranda rights and,

thus, the Stone exclusionary rule is inapplicable, citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688,

113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)(declining to extend the Stone holding to include

Miranda based claims). Withrow and Miranda are inapplicable to Land’s illegal arrest claim

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If not precluded by Stone, any challenge to the appellate court’s finding of probable cause necessarily rests on 16/

a challenge to the court’s factual determination about when Land’s clothing was taken. The appellate court

found that prior to the arrest/taking of clothing the police were aware of the fact that Land's telephone number

was found in Ms. Brown's house, that Land had admitted to cutting the telephone line and breaking into Ms.

Brown's house a week before her murder, that his story about having lunch that day with his second girlfriend

and leaving his car at her house was not true, and that he appeared to have blood spatters on his shoes. Land

has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness of the appellate court’s factual determination by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The testimony at trial and in the suppression hearing indicates that before Land’s clothing was taken the police

were aware that the girlfriend story was not true and that Land had admitted to the circumstances behind the

burglary at the victim’s home the week before. After the recorded statement at which Land said he had lunch

with his girlfriend and she kept his car, Officer Quinn called the “girlfriend.” (TR. 162-63). Thereafter, during

an unrecorded interview, Land was told that the woman denied having the vehicle, Corvin told Land they

needed to see the car, Land told Corvin that the car was located on the third floor of the parking deck and gave

the keys to Corvin. (TR. 40-47, 90-91, 93-94, 119, 121, 1058-59). Land still had on his clothes when Land gave

him the keys to the car. (TR. 1029-30). During the course of the unrecorded interview with Corvin, Land told

him the account of his involvement in both the first burglary and the involvement in the burglary that had

occurred the night before. (TR. 14-15, 22-23). Land still had his clothing on when he told about his

involvement in the burglary with the two white men. (TR. 55). Land’s clothing was not taken until Land had

been at the station an hour or two (TR. 1071-72) [which would have been at the earliest around 3:40 p.m. since

the Miranda waiver signed when Land arrived at the police station indicated it was signed at 2:42 p.m. (TR.

34).] Corvin had Quinn go back into the interview room with Corvin and Land so that Land could repeat the

story at 4:00 p.m. (TR. 60, 160) by which time Land was dressed in a jail uniform. (TR. 1043-47, 1115). At

this time Land repeated what he had told Corvin to both Corvin and Quinn. (TR. 59-61, 1098). The appellate

court’s finding was neither an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence nor an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law as set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct.

2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (reaffirming that “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal

activity is the standard of probable cause”).

107

because probable cause existed to take Land’s clothing which resulted in an arrest. The 16/

Miranda claim will be addressed in the next section in the manner in which it was raised. 

III.(c). The claim that the trial court’s failure to exclude Land’s involuntary statement violated

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land alleges that both of his statements were inadmissible because they were obtained

pursuant to an illegal arrest. He further alleges that the second statement was also obtained after

Land requested to speak with a lawyer. In addition, he alleges that the police used coercion and

intimidation to extract the alleged second statement. 

 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the Miranda claim in the following

manner:

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108

The appellant argues that his second statement to the police was

involuntary.

“The oft-stated rule is that a confession is prima facie involuntary

and inadmissible and the state must show voluntariness and a

Miranda predicate in order for it to be admitted. Whether there was

a waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel and

whether it was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made must

be decided from the particular facts and circumstances of each

case, including the background, experience, and conduct of

accused – the totality of the circumstances. The question of

whether a confession was voluntary is initially to be determined by

the trial court. Thereafter, the voluntariness as affecting the

credibility and weight to be given any statement that an accused

has made is a determination for the jury. The finding of the trial

court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears contrary to

the great weight of the evidence or is manifestly wrong. Even

where there is credible testimony to the contrary, if the evidence is

fairly capable of supporting the inference that the rules of freedom

and voluntariness were observed, the ruling of the trial judge need

only be supported by substantial evidence and not to a moral

certainty. The trial court need only be convinced from a

preponderance of the evidence to find a confession to have been

voluntarily made. The fundamental requirements for voluntariness

are that the court must conclude, in order to find a defendant's

confession voluntary, that he made an independent and informed

choice of his own free will, that he possessed the capability to do

so, and that his will was not overborne by pressures and

circumstances swirling around him.”

Lewis v. State, 535 So.2d 228, 234-35 (Ala. Cr. App.1988)

(citations omitted).

Through the testimony of Detectives Corvin and Fowler, the

prosecution completely established the Miranda predicate. The

appellant does not dispute the fact that he was given the Miranda

warnings and that he waived his rights before making his second

statement. He challenges the admission of the statement solely on

the ground that it was coerced and that his will was overborne

when, he alleges, during interrogation, he was “[s]tripped of his

clothing, shouted at, called the classic Southern ‘boy,’ manhandled,

and frightened into assuming the fetal position.” Appellant's Brief

at 74.

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109

The appellant did not testify in connection with the motion to

suppress his statement. The testimony of Lt. Carl M. Quinn,

Detective Steven B. Corvin, and Detective Larry Fowler

concerning what occurred during their interview with the appellant

was unrefuted. See Jackson v. State, 549 So.2d 616, 620 (Ala. Cr.

App.1989); Grayson v. State, 479 So.2d 69, 75 (Ala. Cr.

App.1984), affirmed, 479 So.2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

865, 106 S.Ct. 189, 88 L.Ed.2d 157 (1985). All three officers

stated that the appellant was not threatened in any way in order to

make him confess. All testified that during interrogation the

appellant's clothes were taken and that he was given an orange jail

uniform to wear. However, there is nothing in the record to

indicate that the change of clothes was accompanied by any force

or was in any way humiliating to the appellant. There is also

nothing in the record to substantiate the appellant's allegation that

he was “shouted at.”

Lt. Quinn testified that during the interview the appellant changed

positions, often curling up “almost into a fetal position,” with his

head in his hands and his feet pulled up into his chair. R. 167. Lt.

Quinn interpreted the appellant's posture to mean that he was

“avoiding [Quinn's] questions.” R. 169. At one point, Quinn took

the appellant's wrist, moved his hand away from his head, R. 21,

and said “something to the effect, ‘Boy, look up at me when I talk

to you.’ ” R. 168. According to Detective Corvin, Quinn did not

bend or twist the appellant's arm or “do anything inappropriate in

talking with [the appellant].” R. 21-22.

The appellant is a 24-year-old white male. Lt. Quinn's addressing

him as “boy” obviously was not a racial epithet, and given the

appellant's relative youth, did not have the demeaning overtones it

might in another situation. Quinn's touching the appellant by

moving the appellant's hand away from his head so that the

appellant would face Quinn during the interview was not brutal and

did not amount to physical coercion. See State v. Joyner, 382

S.W.2d 683, 687 (Mo.1964) (accused's confession not coerced

when officer “touch[ed] defendant's jaw to cause defendant to turn

his head so that he would be looking at the questioning officer”).

The record indicates that the appellant assumed a “fetal position”

before he was questioned or touched by Lt. Quinn and that he

constantly shifted positions during the interrogation. The trial court

was justified in concluding, as Lt. Quinn did, that the appellant's

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110

body language indicated an aversion to the questions rather than a

fear of the questioner.

The trial court had substantial evidence upon which to conclude

that, under the totality of the circumstances, the appellant's will

was not overborne and his statement was not coerced. The court's

finding that the statement was voluntary was not “manifestly

contrary to the great weight of the evidence” and will be upheld on

appeal. Ex parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52, 53 (Ala.), cert. denied,

505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2996, 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992).

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 208-209.

(i). First Statement

Although neither of the appellate courts specifically addressed the voluntariness of the

first statement, the Alabama Supreme Court in its presentation of the facts stated that Land

“agreed to accompany them [the police] to the police station to answer some questions. He was

taken to an interrogation room and informed of his rights, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. He

signed a waiver of rights form and agreed to have his statement tape-recorded.” As noted in

section III(b) above, Land did not dispute that the arrest occurred when his clothing was taken. 

He also does not dispute that he had on his clothing at the time of the first statement, the recorded

statement. The first statement clearly was not the product of the allegedly illegal arrest. Further,

as previously discussed, Land’s challenge to the allegedly illegal arrest is precluded by the Stone

v. Powell doctrine. In a footnote in section III(b) above, the court also concluded that the

Alabama Supreme Court’s decision that the police had probable cause was not based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence. This court will not, therefore,

grant Land habeas relief on this claim.

(ii). Second Statement and Resulting Evidence

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Further, Land’s citation to the record does not support his position that the police continued to interrogate Land 17/

after he invoked his right to counsel. According to the handwritten account of the unrecorded statement, after

Land described his involvement with two other men in a burglary of the victim’s home, Corvin asked him to

repeat his statement on tape:

“At this time he stated he might better talk to an attorney since he was confessing

to burglary. At this time I ceased the interview and told Land if he wanted to talk

to me after contacting an attorney it probably would be in court.” 

(R. 257.) This is consistent with Corvin’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he stopped interviewing

Land after he requested counsel (TR. 39) and that Land said he wanted a lawyer after repeating his statement

concerning his involvement in the burglary of the victim’s home the night of her disappearance to Quinn. (TR.

61).

See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (“The sole concern 18/

of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion.”)

111

This leaves only Land’s allegations that the second statement was made after Land had

invoked his right to counsel, citing C. 253-57, and that the second statement was based on

coercion and manhandling.

To the extent that Land argues that his second statement was inadmissable because he had

requested to speak with an attorney, this claim is procedurally barred from federal review; the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could

have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op.

at 7, 11. Land has not established cause and prejudice. 17/

With regard to the alleged coercive tactics used to obtain the second statement, Land 18/

challenges only the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals finding of no coercion as an

unreasonable determination of the facts based upon the evidence. He has failed, however, to

rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

Corvin testified: “At one point of the interview I think Mr. Land had dropped his head

and was holding his head down with his hands and Lieutenant Quinn took his wrist and pulled

his hand away from his head and asked him to look at him when he talked to him.” (TR. 21). 

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112

Corvin testified that Quinn moved Land’s hand “right at the closing of the interview” and that in

response, Land said “something to Lieutenant Quinn about don’t touch me.” (TR. 64-65).

Q. Was he upset?

A. I wouldn’t say upset, no.

Q. At what point did that occur in this process?

A. That was probably right at the closing of the interview.

(TR. 65).

Quinn described the incident as follows:

“Mr. Land was more than just with his head down at the time or

during the conversation, he went almost into a fetal position. At

one time he had a leg here and here and would go down like this,

and I tried to talk with him. And at one point in time I did reach

over and say something to the effect, “Boy, look up at me when I

talk to you,” or something. Maybe not those specific words, but

similar to that.” 

(TR. 167-68).

Quinn said that he “took [the fetal position] as avoiding my question.” (TR. 169). The testimony

of Corvin or Quinn contains no mention of Land “rocking back and forth.” (Amended Petition, ¶

166). True, when asked if he felt Land was scared of Quinn, Quinn testified “I would say that

Mr. Land was probably frightened of me.” However, the characterization of Quinn’s actions as

exploitive of Land’s fear, the “grabbing” his wrist, “yanking” Land’s hand away from his face

(Amended Petition, ¶ 166) is not supported by the record. In any event, by the time, Quinn

entered the room, the incriminating statement had already been made to Corvin alone and Land

was simply repeating his statement to both Corvin and Quinn. (TR. 57-64, 1098).

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113

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that Land was not coerced was

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the testimony presented at the

suppression hearing and at trial. Further, the decision was not contrary to nor did it involve an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Land’s habeas petition

on this claim fails.

III.(d). The claim that the trial court’s admission of items seized pursuant to a warrantless 

search of Land’s vehicle deprived Land of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land alleges:

Detective Corvin testified that he returned to the interrogation

room at approximately 3:00 p.m., shortly after Mr. Land finished

his first statement. When Officer Corvin told Mr. Land that Marie

Fortis did not have his car, Mr. Land said: “I’ll only sign something

saying you can look in my car if you won’t charge me with

carrying a gun.” (C. 233, 254). No such document was prepared. 

However, at Officer Corvin’s instance, Mr. Land then relinquished

his car keys, which Officer Corvin gave to Officer Fowler

sometime between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. (R. 42, 85, 93). 

Officer Corvin also informed Officer Fowler where the car was

located. (R. 85).

At approximately 4:45 p.m., Officer Fowler and assistant district

attorney Mike Anderton went to the Galleria parking lot. (C. 239;

R. 119, 123, 791). After locating the vehicle, Officer Fowler

opened the trunk and, at Mr. Anderton’s direction, completed a

thorough search of its contents. (C. 239; R. 791-92). A .45 caliber

pistol was taken from the trunk of Mr. Land’s car. (R. 1284). 

Following his search of the car, Officer Fowler had the car

impounded and towed to the police garage. (R. 1152-56). Based

partly upon the search of Mr. Land’s trunk, Officer Fowler

obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery of additional

evidence introduced at trial. (C. 222-24; 792, 1198-1200).

Well-established federal law holds that a search within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the

government infringes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of

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114

privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984). 

While the law attaches a lower expectation of privacy to

automobile searches, an owner’s privacy right is not extinguished

and may be greater where, as in this case, the vehicle serves as a

depository for personal effects. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753

(1979). In this case, the evidence showed that Officer Fowler

conducted a search of Mr. Land’s car.

Moreover, Mr. Land not only refused to consent to this search, but

specifically stated that he would not consent to a search of the car. 

When the state attempts to rely upon consent to justify the legality

of a search, it must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that consent was voluntarily and intelligently given. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

In this case, the state failed to show that Mr. Land gave police

specific consent to search his car. After confronting Mr. Land with

an inconsistency in his statement, Detective Corvin asked him to

disclose the whereabouts of his car and car keys. Mr. Land, fearing

that he would be charged with possession of a weapon,

relinquished the keys but explicitly refused to consent to the

search.

Since Mr. Land specifically stated that he did not consent to a

search of his car, his conduct cannot be construed as an implied

consent to search. Even if his conduct could suggest consent, his

oral refusal renders the consent equivocal at best, and insufficient

to support a waiver of his fundamental Fourth Amendment rights. 

Lacking unequivocal consent, the police required a warrant to

search the car, and their failure to obtain one violated the [sic] Mr.

Land’s right to be free from search and seizure and his right to a

fair trial under the Fourth, Fifth, Six, Eighth and Fourteen

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Oliver v. United

States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

U.S. 753 (1979); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219

(1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

(Amended Petition, ¶¶168-73)

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

The appellant contends that evidence obtained during a warrantless

search of his automobile was inadmissible. Because the car was

searched pursuant to a warrant on May 21, we assume the

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115

warrantless “search” to which the appellant is referring was

Detective Fowler's May 19 visual inspection of the trunk, during

which he saw the pistol.

Since the appellant had already told Detective Fowler that he had a

.45 caliber pistol in his car, we fail to see how the appellant's

privacy rights were violated by Fowler's looking in the car and

seeing the pistol there. “In Burrell [ v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664,

666, 235 So.2d 913 (1970),] this Court held that where the

defendant volunteered the whereabouts of a gun, there simply was

no search.” Hubbard v. State, 382 So.2d 577, 592 (Ala. Cr.

App.1979), affirmed, 382 So.2d 597 (Ala.1980), set aside on other

grounds, 405 So.2d 695 (Ala.1981).

However, if Detective Fowler's opening the trunk and visually

inspecting the interior did constitute a “search” within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment, that search was authorized under both

the consent and the probable cause plus exigent circumstances

exceptions to the warrant requirement.

“[C]onsent to search may be given on actions alone.” Morgan v.

State, 518 So.2d 186, 189 (Ala. Cr. App.1987) (quoting Hubbard

v. State, 382 So.2d at 592). It was “reasonable to conclude that

when the defendant handed the keys to the police officer he

voluntarily relinquished all expectation of privacy.” Hubbard v.

State, 382 So.2d at 592. In this case, “[t]here is not even any

evidence that the police demanded the keys but only that [the

officer] asked the defendant where the keys were.” Id. 

The appellant's statement that he would sign a consent-to-search

form if the officer agreed not to charge him “for carrying a gun,” R.

1013, does not demonstrate that his consent was involuntarily

induced by the hope of a benefit. Detective Corvin testified that he

did not agree to the appellant's proviso. The proviso was simply a

unilaterally imposed condition which the appellant acknowledged

was not met when he refused to sign a consent to search form.

Compare Siebert v. State, 555 So.2d 772, 776-77 (Ala. Cr. App.)

(accused's confession not involuntarily induced by promise of

benefit when police officer acknowledged terms which accused

had unilaterally imposed on extent of his confession), affirmed,

555 So.2d 780, 782 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110

S.Ct. 3297, 111 L.Ed.2d 806 (1990).

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The very fact that the appellant imposed a condition on his giving

written consent to search indicates that he thought he had the right

to refuse consent. See Daniels v. State, 534 So.2d 628, 654

(Ala.Cr.App.) (“declaration [by accused's wife] to the officers that

she would rather her husband sign the written release indicates that

she knew she was being asked, rather than ordered, to permit the

search and that she had a right to refuse permission”), affirmed,

534 So.2d 656 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1040, 107 S.Ct.

898, 93 L.Ed.2d 850 (1987). The appellant's apparent ignorance of

the fact that an oral consent to search is as valid as a written one

does not make his oral consent involuntary. Compare Connecticut

v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832-33, 93 L.Ed.2d

920 (1987) (wherein the Court, holding that accused who agreed to

give an oral, but not a written, statement without counsel had

waived the right to counsel with regard to the oral statement,

observed: “[W]e have never ‘embraced the theory that a

defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions

vitiates their voluntariness' ”) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.

298, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)).

Before the appellant gave his car keys to Detective Corvin, he was

aware that he had been caught in two lies concerning his

involvement in the May 18 burglary of Ms. Brown's house and the

location of his car. He was specifically made aware that the police

“were looking for evidence about the disappearance of Candace

Brown.” R. 1012. He stated that he would not sign a written

consent to search unless he was promised he would not be charged

in connection with the gun. Officer Corvin did not agree to the

appellant's unilaterally imposed condition or solicitation of a

benefit. Nevertheless, the appellant handed over his car keys to

Detective Corvin. Based on the foregoing evidence, there is no

reasonable basis for a claim that the appellant did not consent to

the officers' looking in his car.

“A person may consent to a search without a warrant and thereby

waive any protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to his

right of privacy. Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840

(1965). Consent to a search must be knowingly, intelligently, and

freely given. Id. Based upon the evidence set out above, we

conclude that the defendant did satisfy these criteria in his consent

to the searches of his . . . automobile. Further, the record

establishes that the defendant gave the consent with knowledge

that he was a suspect in the [Candace Brown] murder case. The

trial court's ruling on this issue is supported by substantial

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That information was not presented to the jury. 19/

117

evidence. See Prince v. State, 420 So.2d 856 (Ala. Crim.

App.1982).” 

Ex parte Wilson, 571 So.2d 1251, 1255 (Ala.1990).

If a search of the appellant's vehicle occurred on May 19, it was

also authorized under the probable cause plus exigent

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. By the time

Detective Fowler opened the appellant's trunk, the police had the

following information: that the residence of Candace Brown had

been burglarized on May 13, and Ms. Brown had named the

appellant as a suspect in that burglary ; that the appellant had

19/

admitted his involvement in the May 13 burglary, including the

fact that he had cut the telephone lines to Ms. Brown's house on

that occasion; that the appellant had initially denied but later

admitted his involvement in the May 18 burglary of Ms. Brown's

house; that the appellant's description of what happened during the

May 18 burglary, specifically the fact that Ms. Brown had bled on

the kitchen floor, was inconsistent with the physical evidence, or

the lack thereof, at the scene of the burglary; that the appellant had

lied about the location of his vehicle; and that the tread design on

the appellant's tennis shoes appeared to match a shoe imprint on a

pane of glass at the scene of the burglary.

This “totality of circumstances” and information was sufficient to 

“warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,” that an offense

had been committed and that the appellant committed it. Texas v.

Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502

(1983) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45

S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). “[G]enerally, a vehicle may

be searched on probable cause without a warrant and without a

demonstration of any exigent circumstances other than its own

inherent or ready mobility.” Stanfield v. State, 529 So.2d 1053,

1060 (Ala. Cr. App.1988). See generally Mewbourn v. State, 570

So.2d 805, 810 (Ala. Cr. App.1990).

The appellant's vehicle was not the subject of an unlawful search.

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 213 -215.

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If not precluded, the appellate court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts nor 20/

was it an unreasonable application of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047-48,

36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (the question of whether a consent to search was voluntarily given is a question of fact

to be determined from the totality of the circumstances).

118

This claim, like the illegal arrest claim discussed in Section III(b) is precluded by Stone v.

Powell doctrine because th estate courts provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of this

claim.20/

III.(e). The claim that the trial court’s admission of improperly seized evidence (samples 

of hair, blood, and fingernail clippings) throughout trial deprived Land of a fair 

trial, due process and sentencing determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

This claim is procedurally barred from federal review because the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could have been but was

not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 7, 11. See,

Supra, pp. 9-13, discussing procedural default. Land has failed to establish cause and prejudice

to overcome the procedural default.

III.(f). The claim that the trial court’s admission of DNA evidence that was improperly

collected, analyzed and admitted at trial violated the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

This claim is procedurally barred from federal review because the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could have been but was

not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 7-8, 11.

Land seeks to excuse his procedural default by alleging the ineffectiveness of trial

counsel. In the amended petition before this court, Land presented as an independent claim that

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119

“trial counsel failed to properly litigate the state’s investigation and presentation of the case.”

Under this claim, Land contended:

In addition, counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the

introduction of the improper collection and subsequent forensic

analysis of physical evidence from Mr. Land.

(Amended Petition, ¶ 80)

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that various DNA evidence

was admissible over a chain of custody objection. Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 209-213. 

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals quoted with approval the following language found in the trial court’s order denying the

Rule 32 petition:

“Land next contends that counsel ‘was ineffective in failing to

challenge the admissibility of evidence introduced by the State’s

witness.’ This claim is dismissed for the same reasons as the

previous two. On direct appeal, the appellate courts rejected the

arguments presented by Land on this matter. He offered no

evidence to make them any more viable in these proceedings. 

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 209-13. 

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 21.

Land did not attempt to question counsel at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing concerning

introduction of this evidence. He has not sought an evidentiary hearing on the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel in this court. Land is not entitled to habeas relief on the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to present evidence in state court related

to counsel’s performance; therefore, the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel will not establish

cause for his default. He has offered no evidence of prejudice in either court. 

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120

While Land argues that the state did not meet state law threshold requirements for the

admission of DNA evidence under Ex parte Perry, 586 So.2d 242 (Ala. 1991), the trial court

conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to trial on this very issue. Subsequently, the trial court

concluded:

That certain DNA evidence referenced in 7/20/93 hearing by Ms.

Scott from Mobile and Ms. Rollins of Birmingham shall be

admissible in state’s case in chief–

State’s evidence at Frye type hearing conducted on 7/20/93 best

evidence that state’s evidence from Ms. Scott and Ms. Rollins

meets the test for admissability [sic] enunciated in Ex Parte Perry,

586, So.2d 242 (S. Ct. Ala.);

Daubert case cited at 61 L.W. 4805 is inapplicable to case at bar –

Daubert dealing with admission of ‘expert’ testimony in federal

trials as being governed by the Federal Rules of evidence as

opposed to Frye.

(R.6).

Because Land has failed to establish cause for his procedural default, this claim is precluded from

federal review; consequently, Land’s petition is denied on this claim.

III.(g). The claim that the trial court’s failure to seek a change of venue in light of pretrial

publicity deprived Land of his rights to due process, a fair trial and reliable sentencing in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

This claim is procedurally barred from federal review because the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could have been but was

not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563 , memo. op. at 8, 11. 

Again, Land does not address cause and prejudice. Thus, Land has no right to habeas

relief on this claim.

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III.(h). The claim that race and gender discrimination in the formation of the grand and petit

juries deprived Land of due process, a fair trial, equal protection and reliable sentencing

in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found the following issues to be precluded from

Rule 32 review because they could have been but were not raised at trial or on direct appeal: 

Land’s claim that race and/or gender discrimination occurred in the formation of his grand jury;

Land’s claim that the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes in a manner which discriminated

against African Americans; and Land’s claim that the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes in a

manner which discriminated against women. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 8, 11. 

These discriminatory claims are procedurally barred from federal review in light of the state

court’s ruling.

Land has not alleged cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of this claim. 

Again, therefore, these claims cannot provide a basis for habeas relief. 

III.(i). The claim that the evidence was insufficient to support Land’s conviction and sentence as

a matter of law in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

To the extent that Land alleges insufficient evidence to support a conviction for murder

during a kidnapping in the first degree, this claim is procedurally barred from federal review;

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could

have been but was not raised on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 10-11. 

Land has made no attempt to establish cause and prejudice to overcome his procedural default.

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 To the extent that Land alleges insufficient evidence to support a conviction during a

burglary in the first degree, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the sufficiency of the

evidence claim in the following manner:

Land next argues that his conviction under count one of his

indictment must be reversed because, he says, the State failed to

introduce sufficient evidence by which a rational jury could

conclude that he was guilty on that count. Count one charged Land,

pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(4), with the intentional

killing of Candace Brown in the course of a first or second degree

burglary. Land contends that the State introduced no evidence that

he intended to commit a theft when he entered Ms. Brown's home

and, thus, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a judgment of acquittal on that count. Relying on Coulter v.

State, 438 So.2d 336 (Ala. Cr. App.1982), judgment affirmed, Ex

parte Coulter, 438 So.2d 352 (Ala.1983), denial of habeas corpus

affirmed, Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1995), he

also argues that no proof of intent to commit a theft was put before

the jury, so that the aggravating factor that the murder was

committed while the defendant was engaged in a burglary, listed in

Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-49(4), should not have

been used in the determination of his sentence. Land contends that

he should receive a new sentencing hearing.

In response, the State argues that it presented evidence that, when

Land broke into Ms. Brown's home, he clearly intended to commit

a theft therein. The State notes that it presented in evidence Land's

statement to the police in which he said that when he met Tony and

Edward they discussed “doing a burglary” and in which Land said

he told them “he knew an easy mark.” In that statement Land said

he drove to Ms. Brown's home, broke a window, and entered

through that window, planning to commit a theft, but was

interrupted by Ms. Brown. The State contends that that evidence

was sufficient to support a jury's finding that, when Land broke

into Ms. Brown's home, he intended to commit a theft.

In Ex parte G.G., 601 So.2d 890, 892 (Ala.1992), we stated: “In

order to defeat a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the

State must prove, by substantial evidence, the elements of the

charge and the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

However, an appellate court will review the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution. Breckenridge v. State, 628 So.2d

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123

1012 (Ala. Cr. App.1993). Moreover, a conviction will not be set

aside because of an alleged insufficiency of the evidence unless the

preponderance of the evidence against the verdict is so decisive as

to clearly convince the appellate court that the verdict is unjust. Id.

In this case, given Land's statement to the police regarding his

“break-in” into Ms. Brown's house, we conclude that the State

presented substantial evidence that Land intended to commit a theft

therein. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Land's motion

for a judgment of acquittal on the first count of his indictment.

Given that ruling, we need not address Land's second contention,

that he should receive a new sentencing hearing.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 237-238.

The Supreme Court explained the constitutional review process to be applied to challenge

on sufficiency of the evidence: 

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence

to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine

whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether

the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]he relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar

standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact

fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate

facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged,

the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through

a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to

be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The

criterion thus impinges upon “jury” discretion only to the extent

necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process

of law.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Land’s statement in which he admitted that he broke into the house the night of the crime

establishes that the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court was not based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts presented at trial nor was it an unreasonable application of Jackson. 

Consequently, this court will deny Land’s habeas petition on this claim.

III.(j). The claim that the trial court’s failure to correct the jury’s misunderstandings about the

presumption of innocence, and their ultimate accountability deprived Land of his rights

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

The Alabama Supreme court squarely reviewed this issue. The Alabama Supreme Court

stated:

Land argues that his rights guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteen Amendments to the United States Constitution, and similar rights

guaranteed under Alabama law, were violated when, he says, the trial court

failed to correct what he calls a juror's misunderstanding about the

presumption of innocence and the juror's responsibility for recommending

a punishment. At the close of the guilt phase of the trial, the judge

informed both defense counsel and the prosecution that he had received an

anonymous note from the jury during defense counsel's closing argument.

The trial court informed the attorneys for both sides that it had decided

that Juror C. had written the note. Defense counsel agreed to have Juror C.

removed from the panel and replaced by alternate Juror S.

“[JUDGE HARD]: Let me get this on the record about the alternates. Let

me tell you what my proposal is. We had Walter, you don't know yet-we

had, as the jury exited for a break before Erskine [Mathis] argued, Andy

Willis, the bailiff, handed me a yellow paper that will become your

property, I read this to the fellows before Erskine [Mathis] argued. We

have divined that Ms. C. wrote this note, the lady that had been a victim

and wanted to talk privately, isn't that Ms. C., the one with the hat? That's

Ms. C. She wrote the note.

“I have the law here, the rules of procedure that tell me, in blue highlight,

if anybody wants to read it, the last person struck shall be the alternate and

if it becomes necessary for an alternate to replace a principal juror, then

the last person struck shall be so designated as such. So, I can say to you

guys that your last strike was 289, [Juror S.] Is that the blonde on the left?

Does anybody know?

“[MR. MATHIS (defense counsel) ]: I would state for the record that the

lady who wrote the note has glared at us ever since we found out about the

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note, as though she would like to spit. I have been particularly cognizant of

that. While I was standing up there within two feet of her trying to give my

closing argument, I was really worried-

“[JUDGE HARD]: Well, do you want her to be struck?

“[MR. MATHIS]: I think that is our client's decision and, of course, mine

and Hiram [Dodd's] as well.

“[MR. DODD (defense counsel) ]: I think the client needs to hear what she

said.

[THE COURT]: Here's what she said: ‘I object to Mr. Dodd's statement

about them wanting us to kill him. I feel he did it to play on our guilt.

Whatever the verdict may be we are not responsible for the punishment of

the defendant if found guilty, the defendant is. If I may object.’ It is signed

‘juror.’

“I show it to you. Give it to Walter when you are through with it.

“[MR. MATHIS]: I want to exercise my discretion-

“[MR. DODD]: You have observed her more than I have-

“[MR. MATHIS]: I have serious misgivings about leaving her on the jury,

in light of the appearance of things.

“[MR. LAND (defendant) ]: Did y'all just get the note today?

“[MR. MATHIS]: Yeah.

“[MR. DODD]: Just now.

“[MR. LAND]: She's been glaring before today.

“[MR. DODD]: All right. Don't say anything else.

“[JUDGE HARD]: All right.

“[MR. MATHIS]: We would like to have her excluded, Judge.

“[MR. DODD]: And whoever is supposed to be put in there, put them in.”

Land now points out that although the note was signed “juror,” it included

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the plural terms “us,” “our,” and “we,” and he argues that this fact

suggests that its contents actually represented the view of the jury as a

whole. Land contends that the text of the note evidences a

misunderstanding-that the jury is not responsible for recommending a

punishment-and also suggests that the jury may have prematurely

concluded that he was guilty. Land now asserts that, at a minimum, the

trial court was obligated to poll the jury or to allow defense counsel an

opportunity to ascertain whether there existed juror bias.

In response, the State argues that there was no error, because, it says, the

trial court properly instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence,

the reasonable doubt standard, and the jury's role in sentencing, and the

State says the judge alleviated any possible prejudice to Land by replacing

Juror C. with an alternate. The State contends that Land's argument based

on the use of the plurals “we” and “us” is unfounded because the note was

signed with the

singular noun “juror.” It also argues that Land presented no proof that the

note represented the feelings of more than the one juror that was replaced.

We find no error in the actions of the trial court. A trial court has

considerable discretion in determining the scope of the inquiry required

when there is an irregularity involving a juror or the jury. See Johnson v.

State, 620 So.2d 679 (Ala. Cr. App.1992), reversed on other grounds, 620

So.2d 709 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905, 114 S.Ct. 285, 126

L.Ed.2d 235 (1993), and Sistrunk v. State, 596 So.2d 644 (Ala. Cr.

App.1992). The record reveals that there was no doubt in the minds of the

trial judge, the prosecutors, defense counsel, or the defendant that Juror C.

had written the note. Not only did Land's counsel not object to the trial

court's actions, they specifically requested that the judge, to remedy the

problem, only replace Juror C. Moreover, because Land did not object to

the trial court's action, this issue is reviewable only under the plain error

standard. Clearly, the trial court did not commit plain error.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 233-235.

The jurors were correctly instructed that Land was “presumed to be not guilty” (TR.

1902) and that he “enjoys the presumption of innocence” (TR.1903). Immediately before the

penalty phase and subsequent to the dismissal of the juror who wrote the note, the jury was

clearly instructed of its responsibility in determining the appropriate penalty. (TR. 2115-2125). 

From the discussion on the record (TR. 2060-64), it appears that no question was in

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anyone’s mind as to which juror wrote the note nor was any request made for a hearing. Defense

counsel sought only the removal of the juror. The court did in fact replace her with an alternate

juror. (TR. 2062, 2064). Prior to jury deliberations, the court excused both the author of the note

and one of the original alternate jurors, telling them “[y]ou ladies will have served as the

alternates on the jury.” (TR. 2071). 

Land argues that the trial court should have inquired of each juror whether the juror was

aware of the note or shared similar beliefs. Land argues that the Alabama Supreme Court

“ignored the impact that the note or feelings of that juror may have had on the rest of the jury.” 

(Petitioner’s brief, p. 28). Land cites Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450,

451, 98 L.Ed. 954 (1954), for the proposition that a trial court must conduct a hearing involving

interested parties to determine the circumstances, impact upon jurors, and prejudice resulting

from extraneous material reaching the jury. In Remmer, the Court stated:

In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or

tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the

matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed

presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules

of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made

during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The

presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon

the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the

defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the

defendant. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 13

S.Ct. 50, 52-53, 36 L.Ed. 917; Wheaton v. United States, 8 Cir.,

133 F.2d 522, 527.

347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451.

The note challenged here was not extraneous contact or material. It was written by a juror

who took offense at defense counsel’s closing argument. Because it was not extraneous material,

Remmer is inapplicable. The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly

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established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, and, therefore, Land

has not established a basis for habeas relief on this claim.

III.(k). The claim that the trial court improperly considered the victim’s family’s haracterizations

and preferences thereby denying Land a reliable sentencing determination under the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land raised this issue before the Alabama Supreme Court:

Relying on Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96

L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111

S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), Land argued to this Court at

oral argument that he should receive a new sentencing hearing

because the trial judge stated that he had read and considered

several letters written to him by the victim's family and friends.

Land contends that the letters, which expressed the writers'

opinions regarding Land, the crime, and the appropriate

punishment, prejudiced the judge against

him, prevented him from receiving a fair sentencing hearing, and

violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

In response, the State agrees that the law prohibits a trial court

from considering victim impact evidence regarding

characterizations of the defendant, the crime, or appropriate

punishment. However, the State's position is that although the trial

judge did read the letters that are now at issue, he did not

improperly “consider” them during the process of determining

Land's sentence. The State asserts that the trial judge was an

experienced judge and was well aware of the law regarding what

factors he could consider in determining Land's sentence and was

capable of sorting out and using only the information he could

properly consider under the law.

Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d at 236.

The Alabama Supreme Court continued:

Because Land failed to make a contemporaneous objection during his

sentencing hearing when the trial judge stated that he had read the

letters from Ms. Brown's family and friends, we review this issue

under the plain error standard.

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The trial judge stated the following during the sentencing hearing:

“[JUDGE HARD]: I have also received, as you know, additional

correspondence from family members, both [members of the] Brown

family and [members of the] Land family. I would like to thank each

person who has written me from both sides for the heartfelt sentiments

that you have forwarded to me, many of you. I appreciate it. Many of

the comments were very disturbing, but I thought very carefully about

everything that's been written to me by every person. Of necessity, I

copied everything and gave it to the lawyers and Mr. Land.

“. . . .

“[JUDGE HARD]: All right. Proceeding to the determination of

sentence, as we know, we lawyers know that I am to determine

sentence based squarely on whether or not prevailing [sic]

circumstances found to exist outweigh mitigating circumstances found

to exist. I am to consider the jury's recommendation contained in their

advisory verdict, though, as we all understand, we are in a juryoverride state and the jury's recommendation is not binding on the Court.

“. . . .

“[JUDGE HARD]: To mitigation. Number one. . . .

“. . . .

“[JUDGE HARD]: As I mentioned earlier, ladies and gentlemen, I

have carefully read every scrap of paper submitted to me, including

the Hillcrest discharge papers, Dr. Rosecran's findings, the presentence report by Mr. Bryant, the letters submitted by the respective

families. I have listened, of course, to the trial, first and second stage

and, as well in October, comments of counsel, and I have reviewed the

entire case, recalling the arguments given at the first and second stage

and third stage in October.

“To conclude, I find no mitigating circumstance by way of 13A-5-52.”

In Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1993), this Court

directed a new sentencing hearing where the record did not reveal

whether the trial judge, in imposing the death sentence on the

defendant, had improperly considered certain portions of victimimpact statements that contained the type of information involved in

this case. In contrast, the record in this case indicates to this Court that

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the trial court determined Land's sentence in a manner consistent with

the procedure established by §§ 13A-5-47 to -52. The record indicates

that the trial court reviewed the letters at issue, both those written by

the victim's family and those written by Land's family, out of a respect

for the families and for the limited purpose of possibly establishing a

mitigating factor under § 13A-5-51 to be weighed in Land's favor at

trial. We find no plain error in the actions of the trial court.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 236-237.

In Section I(c) above, this court noted that Payne overruled Booth in part. Post-Payne,

that portion of Booth prohibiting presentation to the jury family members' opinions and

characterizations of the crime was retained. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1351 (11th

Cir. 2006) cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 1149 (2007). The Supreme Court in Booth

described the emotionally charged information presented to the jury and explained why this

information should not be presented to the jury: 

The second type of information presented to the jury in the VIS

[victim impact statement] was the family members' opinions and

characterizations of the crimes. The Bronsteins' son, for example,

stated that his parents were “butchered like animals,” and that he

“doesn't think anyone should be able to do something like that and

get away with it.” App. 61. The VIS also noted that the Bronsteins’

daughter “could never forgive anyone for killing [her parents] that

way. She can't believe that anybody could do that to someone. The

victims' daughter states that animals wouldn't do this. [The

perpetrators] didn't have to kill because there was no one to stop

them from looting. . . . The murders show the viciousness of the

killers' anger. She doesn't feel that the people who did this could

ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't want them to be able to do this

again or put another family through this.” Id., at 62.

One can understand the grief and anger of the family caused by the

brutal murders in this case, and there is no doubt that jurors

generally are aware of these feelings. But the formal presentation

of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to

inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant

evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. As we have

noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must “be, and

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appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.”

Gardner v. Florida, supra, at 358, 97 S.Ct., at 1204 (opinion of

STEVENS, J.). The admission of these emotionally charged

opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the

evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking

we require in capital cases.

482 U.S. at 508-09, 107 S.Ct. at 2535-36.

Letters from both Land’s and the victim’s friends and families were provided to the

sentencing judge. The letters at issue in this petition were not introduced by the State, were

never before the jury, and were not emotionally charged. The Alabama Supreme Court’s finding

that the letters were reviewed out of respect for the families and “for the limited purpose of

possibly establishing a mitigating factor under § 13A-5-51” is supported by the record. The trial

court’s imposition of the death penalty was clearly based on reason, not caprice or emotion as

evidenced by the court’s discussion of his findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision that the letters were considered for the limited purpose

of assessing the possibility of mitigation is not an unreasonable finding of the facts based upon

the evidence nor is its decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of Booth and Payne. 

The court, therefore, concludes that Land is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

III.(l). The claim that the trial court’s erroneous instruction on the voluntariness of Land’s

statement violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution.

While raised on direct appeal, neither the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals nor the

Alabama Supreme Court addressed the claim that the trial court improperly charged the jury with

regard to which factfinder was to decide the voluntariness of Land’s statements. The trial judge

instructed the jury:

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With regard to the alleged statements made by the defendant to the

officers, whether we are talking about the recorded statement or the

alleged unrecorded statement, you should know that you may

consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking

of the statement in determining the weight or credibility that you

give to the statement.

In exercising your exclusive prerogative of determining the

credibility of the evidence or the weight to which the evidence is

properly entitled, you people may consider the circumstances under

which the statement or statements were obtained, including the

situation and the mutual relation to the parties. 

I determine the voluntariness of the statement, you people

determine the weight and credibility of one’s statement and may

disregard a defendant’s statement which is unworthy of belief or in

which you entertain a reasonable doubt of its truth.

(TR. 1914-15).

Habeas relief based on a jury instruction is warranted only if “the ailing instruction by

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). 

In his brief, Land criticizes respondent’s failure to address Ex parte Singleton, 465 So.2d

443, 446 (Ala. 1985) and two federal circuit court cases cited therein. Land does not contend the

United States Supreme Court has ever considered the issue. In Ex parte Singleton, the Alabama

Supreme Court held that even though the trial court makes an initial determination of

voluntariness, “[i]t is improper for a trial judge to disclose to the jury that he made a preliminary

determination that a confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible.” 465 So.2d at 446. 

The challenged comment in Singleton was: 

Do you know yesterday when you were-the jury was out of here for

a long period of time? It is incumbent upon the Court first to hear

all of the testimony and first the Court must decide that it is a

voluntary statement and that it is admissible into evidence. The

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Court first makes this determination, which I did, and I allowed the

confession to be introduced. But, again, I am not the trier of the

facts, you are. So, then the burden is upon the State to show you

that it was a quote, voluntary statement. . . .

In finding no prejudicial error, the state supreme court in Singleton reasoned that because

the comments of the trial judge “did not imply that the jury should accept and believe appellant's

confession based on the trial court's ruling that the statement was voluntary,” the trial judge made

it clear to the jury that they were to ultimately determine whether the confession was voluntary. 

Id.

In Ex parte Gaddy, 698 So.2d 1150 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1032, 118 S.Ct.

634, 139 L.Ed.2d 613 (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court was faced with an instruction

extremely similar to the one here:

While I determine the voluntariness of the statement and thus you

were allowed to hear it, the jury determines the weight or

credibility and may disregard the defendant's statements which you

deem to be unworthy of belief or in which you entertain a

reasonable doubt as to its truth.

698 So. 2d at 1156 (emphasis omitted).

The court decided that although the instruction was partially erroneous, any error was harmless

because the trial court made it clear in its instruction that the jury was “to ultimately determine

whether the confession was voluntary” as “[t]he jury was informed that it could disregard

Gaddy's confession entirely if it decided to give no weight to the confession or if it found the

State's witnesses to be unworthy of belief.” Ex parte Gaddy, 698 So.2d at 1158. 

The Alabama Supreme Court’s implicit decision that the jury instruction did not result in

a violation of due process is not contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of law

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as established by the United States Supreme Court. Consequently, Land’s habeas petition fails

on this claim.

III.(m).The claim that the trial court prevented Land from a full cross-examination of important

state witnesses, depriving him of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land raised this issue in oral argument before the Alabama Supreme Court:

At oral argument, Land argued to this Court that his

cross-examination of Detective Fowler was improperly curtailed

when the trial court would not allow him to question Fowler about

the contents of an internal police memorandum outlining an

anonymous tip that two persons other than Land may have been

involved in Ms. Brown's murder. Land contends that the police

were overly zealous in their investigation of him and that they

failed to conduct a thorough investigation of other potential

suspects. He now argues that the memorandum was admissible

under the "public records exception" to the hearsay rule, relying on

Grantham v. State, 580 So.2d 53 (Ala. Cr. App.1991),FN3 and,

thus, he asserts that he should have been allowed to further

cross-examine Fowler on the question whether there were other

possible suspects. Land asserts that the trial court committed

reversible error in limiting the scope of his cross-examination of

Fowler because, he says, it prevented him from fully developing

his defense and infringed upon his right to confront witnesses

testifying against him. He contends that the court's action violated

his rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and rights

guaranteed by Alabama law.

1.FN3. In Grantham, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: "Sections

12-21-35 and 36-18-2 [Ala.Code 1975] essentially establish a public

record exception to the hearsay rule that is similar in nature to the

business record exception found in § 12-21-43." 580 So.2d at 55.

Land also argues that the trial court infringed on his right to full

cross-examination when, he says, it prohibited defense counsel

from asking leading questions of Detective Corvin. He contends

that the court's action limiting cross-examination of Corvin

violated his rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

rights guaranteed by Alabama law.

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In response, the State points out that Land's counsel was allowed,

without objection, to ask Fowler whether he had seen the

memorandum at issue and that counsel obtained a response

indicating that he had seen it. The State notes that Land's counsel

then attempted to elicit from Fowler a statement of the contents of

the memorandum. It argues that the memorandum was clearly

hearsay evidence and inadmissible, and that the trial court therefore

did not err in preventing Land from further questioning Fowler

regarding the contents of the memorandum.

Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d at 239.

The Alabama Supreme Court then rejected this argument:

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court correctly

ruled the internal police memorandum inadmissible hearsay. It

stated: "‘The general rule in Alabama is that an accused is not

entitled to introduce testimony that someone else was suspected of

committing the crime for which he is being tried.' " Land, 678

So.2d at 207 (quoting Johnson v. State, 612 So.2d 1288, 1293

(Ala. Cr. App.1992)).

With regard to Land's argument relating to his cross-examination

of Detectives Fowler and Corvin, we note that the latitude and

extent of cross-examination of witnesses rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court and that the trial court's ruling on these

matters will not be reversed except for an abuse of discretion. Ex

parte Pope, 562 So.2d 131 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841,

111 S.Ct. 118, 112 L.Ed.2d 87 (1990); Beavers v. State, 565 So.2d

688 (Ala. Cr. App.1990). We find no abuse of discretion with

regard to the trial court's limitation on Land's cross-examination of

Fowler with regard to the police memorandum. The contents of the

memorandum were clearly hearsay reduced to a writing. Although

Land argues that the memorandum was admissible under a "public

records exception" to the hearsay rule, which he says is similar to

the business records exception, we conclude that such an exception

would not make the document admissible, and admissibility was

required in order for Land to be entitled to further question Fowler

about the document. Exceptions to the hearsay rule will not make

admissible into evidence documents that are inadmissible for

reasons other than the fact of their hearsay nature. Gullatt v. State,

409 So.2d 466 (Ala. Cr. App.1981). In this case, the evidentiary

rule relating to testimony about other suspects, which the Court of

Criminal Appeals relied upon and which is quoted above, made the

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memorandum inadmissible. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in limiting Land's cross-examination of Detective

Fowler.

Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court with

regard to Land's cross-examination of Detective Corvin. The trial

court did sustain a "leading question" objection by the prosecution

to a question asked of Corvin by defense counsel. However, we

conclude that the one ruling by the trial court now complained of

by Land did not prevent his counsel from conducting a thorough

and sifting cross-examination of Corvin. The record contains an

additional 30 pages of questioning of Corvin by defense counsel

following the trial court's ruling that Land now claims abridged his

constitutional rights.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 239-240.

The Supreme Court has explained how cross-examination relates to the Confrontation

Clause:

The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides: “In all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

confronted with the witnesses against him.” This right is secured

for defendants in state as well as in federal criminal proceedings.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923

(1965). The Court has emphasized that “a primary interest secured

by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination.”

Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13

L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). The opportunity for cross-examination,

protected by the Confrontation Clause, is critical for ensuring the

integrity of the fact-finding process. Cross-examination is “the

principal means by which the believability of a witness and the

truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,

316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). . . . 

“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was

to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against

the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and

cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an

opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the

conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to

face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by

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his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his

testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” 

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 839,

39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). See also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47,

53, 19 S.Ct. 574, 576, 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899).

. . . . 

[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective

in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S., at 20, 106 S.Ct., at 294

(emphasis in original). This limitation is consistent with the

concept that the right to confrontation is a functional one for the

purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal trial.

“A defendant's confrontation rights are satisfied when the crossexamination permitted exposes the jury to facts sufficient to

evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and enables defense

counsel to establish a record from which he can properly argue why

the witness is less than reliable.” U.S. v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17

F.3d 1354, 1371 (11 Cir. 1994). “Once a defendant has engaged th

in sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause,

further questioning is within the trial court's discretion.” Mills v.

Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1288 (11 Cir. 1998). th

Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736-739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2662-64, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987).

At trial, the jury heard the following: 

Q [by Mr. Dodd]: Do you recognize that document?

A [by Detective Fowler]: It’s a inter-office memo from Lieutenant Dunn.

Q: You have seen that before?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Rayford Higgenbotham, did you ever talk to him?

A: No, sir.

Q: Eugene Brasher, did you ever talk to him?

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A: No, sir.

Q: Was it your information based on this inter-office memo that Rayford

Higgenbotham –

MR. ANDERTON: Objection, Your Honor. I object to the hearsay testimony.

THE COURT: You’re right. Do you want to talk to me about that letter or

do you want to finish your question for the record?

MR. DODD: I think this is the last question I am going to ask, Judge, but

I don’t –

THE COURT: Start over and ask your question.

Q: Number one, did you ever talk to Rayford Higgenbotham?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did you ever talk to Eugene Brasher?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did you receive information about these two individuals as a result of an

inter-office memo?

MR. ANDERTON: Objection.

THE COURT: Okay. Did you receive information or not, yes or no?

THE WITNESS: Yeah, during the course of the investigation that memo was

sent up.

MR. DODD: Judge, I don’t know of any way to do it –

THE COURT: Well, it’s not admissible, Hiram.

MR. DODD: Judge, I beg to differ with you.

THE COURT: Let’s do that out of the jury’s presence.

MR. DODD: Yes, sir. We would ask to do it right now.

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THE COURT: All right, we shall. Would you retire to the jury room for

just a moment?

. . . .

BY MR. DODD:

Q: Mr. Fowler, as a result of your investigation as the chief investigating

officer involved in the disappearance and death of Candace Brown, did

you ever interview any other suspect other than Jeff Land --

A: No, sir.

Q: – in regard to this case?

A: No, sir.

Q: To your knowledge did any other police officer that was involved in this

investigation interview any other suspects --

A: No, sir.

Q: – in this investigation?

A: No, sir.

(TR. 906-15).

The jury heard that during the course of the investigation an interoffice memo containing

information about Rayford Higgenbotham and Eugene Brasher was received but that the police

did not talk to either man or to any suspect other than Land. 

During cross-examination of Detective Corvin, defense counsel asked numerous

questions concerning the facts surrounding the statements given by Land. The court sustained

the prosecutor’s leading question objection to the following question: “The first statement that

he made that was recorded, Mr. Corvin, that statement would not in any way support any search

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of Jeff Land’s car, would it?” Land does not complain that he was prevented from asking any

other questions. 

The record makes clear that the defense had an opportunity for effective

cross-examination. The fact that the defense was not able to introduce the memo that was

inadmissible as hearsay or ask a particular leading question does not establish a violation of

Land’s right to confrontation. The evidentiary rulings did not affect the fundamental fairness of

the trial. The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable application

of United States Supreme Court law. Therefore, Land has not established a right to habeas relief

on this claim.

III.(n). The claim that the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial after the introduction by the

prosecution of testimony of a wild animal observed near the victim’s corpse deprived

Land of his rights to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

As discussed in Section I(b) above, Land challenged the prosecutor’s elicitation of

testimony concerning a photograph of a fox taken at the crime scene where the victim’s body

was found. He now argues that the trial court’s refusal to order a mistrial after this testimony is

grounds for habeas relief. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the mistrial issue

in the context of prosecutorial misconduct. 

The appellant contends that “[t]he prosecution improperly elicited

testimony that was calculated to be inflammatory, prejudicial, and

impossible to cure.” 

(Appellant's brief at 92). 

This argument relates to testimony concerning a photograph of a

fox taken at the rock quarry where the victim's body was found. 

Detective Larry Fowler testified that, on the morning of May 20,

he went to the rock quarry at Ruffner Mountain where the victim's

body had been found. Fowler then identified 25 photographs taken

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at the scene. The prosecutor presented these photographs to

Fowler in groups of 3 to 5. When the last group of photographs

was shown to Fowler, the following occurred:

“Q. [By the prosecutor:] State's Exhibit 37, 38, 39, and 43, can you tell

us what those items are, please, sir?

“A. Yes, sir. 37 is a photograph of the rocks that the victim was lying

on. 38 is another photograph of the rocks where the victim was

lying. And 39 is also a photograph of the rocks where the victim

was lying. 43 is a photograph of a fox.

“Q. Can you tell us where the fox was seen?

“MR. DODD [defense counsel]: Excuse me, Judge, objection.

That has absolutely nothing to do with this case and that's why we

wanted to object in advance. It has absolutely no evidentiary value.

We object.

“THE COURT: We'll discuss it over lunch. Don't want to argue in

front of the jury.

“MR. MATHIS [defense counsel]: We would move that any

further discussion of that particular photograph be curtailed at this

time.

“THE COURT: Sure.” 

(R. 805-06).

Although the prosecutor immediately thereafter asked Detective

Fowler if “State's Exhibit Number 37, 38, 39, and 43 truly and

accurately depict[ed] the scene as it appeared out there on the 20th

where the body of Candace Brown was found,” (R. 806-07), no

further mention was made before the jury of the fox.

When the jury recessed for lunch, the attorneys and the trial judge

discussed the admissibility of the photographs identified by

Fowler. With regard to State's Exhibit 43, the following occurred:

“MR. DODD: State's 43 is depicting the fox. We objected

at the time, Your Honor. We would object again, [it]

absolutely has no value in this case and should not have

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“THE COURT: It is not admitted.

“MR. DODD: -we would move again for a mistrial for it

being mentioned. FN3

FN3. We note that this is the first request for a

mistrial with regard to State's Exhibit 43.

“THE COURT: Overrule.”

(R. 830-31) (footnote added).

The prosecutor then argued that the photograph was relevant to

show “that had this body been out there another half a day, the

wild animals would have been working on this body,” (R. 834),

and he elicited testimony from Fowler in an attempt to support his

argument. However, the trial court adhered to its ruling that the

photograph was not to be admitted. The defense then renewed its

motion for a mistrial:

“MR. DODD: Judge, we would renew our motion for a

mistrial. And I'm glad Mr. Anderton [the prosecutor]

pointed out what he was attempting to show to the jury

because that's just what the jury would have garnered from

that. It's already before the jury, no reason for that picture

to ever be presented before this jury or testimony about a

fox or any other thing other than evoke emotion from that

jury that that poor deceased girl out there might have been

eaten by some wild animal, which has absolutely nothing

to do with this case. And it has absolutely prejudiced this

jury and we would move for a mistrial.” 

(R. 835).

The trial court again denied the motion.

 “[A] mistrial ‘specifies such fundamental error in a trial as to

vitiate the result,’ Diamond v. State, 363 So.2d 109, 112 (Ala. Cr.

App.1978), and should be granted only when a ‘high degree of

“manifest necessity” ’ is demonstrated, Wadsworth v. State, 439

So.2d 790, 792 (Ala. Cr. App.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 930,

104 S.Ct. 1716, 80 L.Ed.2d 188 (1984).” Garnett v. State, 555

So.2d 1153, 1155 (Ala. Cr. App.1989). If any error occurred by

the mere mention of the fox, it was clearly not the fundamental

error that is required for the granting of a mistrial. The photograph

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was never admitted, and there were only two brief references to

the fox made before the jury. The trial court granted defense

counsel's request that “further discussion of that particular

photograph be curtailed at this time,” and the fox itself was never

again mentioned in the jury's presence.

Although the pathologist testified that the victim's body bore

marks that might have been the result of insect bites, there was

absolutely no indication that the body had been despoiled in any

way by wild animals. Moreover, the place where the body was

found was clearly an undeveloped area and one might expect that

wild animals could be seen there. In view of these facts and the

fact that there were almost 1200 pages of trial testimony, it is

doubtful that the two brief references to the fox made much of an

impression upon the jurors. See Rowell v. State, 647 So.2d 67,

69-70 (Ala. Cr. App.1994). Under the facts of this case, including

the strong evidence presented by the State, any error occasioned by

the references to the fox was clearly harmless. See generally Ex

parte Greathouse, 624 So.2d 208, 210-11 (Ala.1993). Cf. State v.

Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752, 765 (1979) (introduction

of photographs depicting body of child victim when found some

two months after the murder, which had been dismembered by

wild animals was “harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in the

guilt determination phase of the trial”). 

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 219-20.

This claim is related to the prosecutorial misconduct claim addressed in section I(b)

above. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the habeas review standard for

claims based on evidentiary rulings:

Federal courts generally do not review a state court's admission of

evidence in habeas corpus proceedings. See McCoy v. Newsome,

953 F.2d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 944, 112

S.Ct. 2283, 119 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). We will not grant federal

habeas corpus relief based on an evidentiary ruling unless the

ruling affects the fundamental fairness of the trial. See Baxter v.

Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir.) (stating that we “inquire

only to determine whether the error was of such magnitude as to

deny fundamental fairness to the criminal trial.”) (citations

omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 946, 116 S.Ct. 385, 133 L.Ed.2d

307 (1995); McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1265. “A denial of fundamental

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fairness occurs whenever the improper evidence ‘is material in the

sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor.’ ” Snowden v.

Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 737 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Osborne v.

Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237, 1238 (11th Cir.1983)), cert. denied,

525 U.S. 963, 119 S.Ct. 405, 142 L.Ed.2d 329 (1998).

Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11 Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082, 120 S.Ct.

th

804, 145 L.Ed.2d 677 (2000).

 “The decision whether or not to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial

court.” Untied States v. Brooks, 670 F.2d 148, 152 (11 Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124, th

102 S.Ct. 2943, 73 L.Ed.2d 1339(1982). As discussed in Section I(b) above, the court did not

admit the photograph of the fox, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not

unreasonably apply Supreme Court law by deciding that the mere mention of the fox did not

violate due process. 

Although the court gave no curative instruction, none was requested, and the fox was not

mentioned before the jury again. The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that

the trial court’s denial of a mistrial did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial was not

contrary to nor was it based on an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Land’s

petition for habeas relief on this claim, therefore, is denied.

III.(o). The claim that the trial court failed to excuse jurors Hightower and Holloway as unfit to

serve in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

Land raised this issue before the Alabama Supreme Court, which addressed it in the

following manner:

Land argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it

denied defense motions to excuse two prospective jurors for cause.

Land argues that prospective Juror P.H. should have been

dismissed for cause because, Land says, voir dire questioning

revealed that he had significant knowledge about the case and that

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he had a significant potential for bias against Land arising from a

sympathy for Ms. Brown's son. Land argues that prospective Juror

W.H. should have been dismissed for cause because, he says,

during voir dire W.H. expressed an unequivocal belief that once a

person is found guilty of capital murder that person should be put

to death and that life without parole should not be considered.

Land argues that any later “rehabilitation” of W.H. was a response

learned by W.H. after observing other similarly opinionated

prospective jurors being struck from the jury panel.

In response, the State argues that prospective Juror P.H. did not

need to be struck for cause because he indicated only that he had

read the newspaper every day and recalled sketchy facts of the

case, but did not know any specifics of it. The State argues that

prospective Juror W.H. did not need to be struck for cause during

questioning by the trial court because he clearly expressed his

opinion that the death sentence was not appropriate in every

murder case and that each case should be judged on its own

merits. In sum, the State contends that there was no statutory

ground on which to strike either of these prospective jurors for

cause and that they did not show an absolute bias against Land or a

fixed opinion as to his guilt or as to the application of the death penalty.

Even though a prospective juror may initially admit to a potential

for bias, the trial court's denial of a motion to strike that person for

cause will not be considered error by an appellate court if, upon

further questioning, it is ultimately determined that the person can

set aside his or her opinions and try the case fairly and impartially,

based on the evidence and the law. Knop v. McCain, 561 So.2d

229 (Ala.1989); Siebert v. State, 562 So.2d 586 (Ala. Cr.

App.1989), affirmed, 562 So.2d 600 (Ala.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

963, 111 S.Ct. 398, 112 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990); Perryman v. State,

558 So.2d 972 (Ala. Cr. App.1989). Only when a prospective

juror's testimony indicates a bias or prejudice so fixed or deepseated that that person cannot be impartial and objective must a

challenge for cause be granted by the trial court. Knop, supra;

Siebert, supra; Perryman, supra. Finally, a trial court's ruling on a

motion to strike a juror for cause, based on an allegation of juror

bias, is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal

unless it is shown that the court clearly abused its discretion.

Forehand v. State, 624 So.2d 688 (Ala. Cr. App.1993); Siebert,

supra.

After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the voir

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dire testimony of both P.H. and W.H. clearly indicates they could

try the case fairly and impartially. Neither prospective juror

expressed a deep-seated or fixed bias or prejudice that would have

required a strike for cause. Accordingly, the trial court did not err

in denying Land's motions.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 240-241.

In support of his claim, Land now cites Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-30, 112

S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court stated:

[Wainwright v.] Witt, [469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851-852,

83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)] Witt held that "the proper standard for

determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause

because of his or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether

the juror's views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the

performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his

instructions and his oath.' " 469 U.S., at 424, 105 S.Ct., at 852

(quoting Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S., at 45, 100 S.Ct., at

2526). Under this standard, it is clear from Witt and Adams, the

progeny of Witherspoon that a juror who in no case would vote for

capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an

impartial juror and must be removed for cause.

Thereafter, in Ross v. Oklahoma, [487 U.S. 81, 88-89 (1988)], a

state trial court refused to remove for cause a juror who declared

he would vote to impose death automatically if the jury found the

defendant guilty. That juror, however, was removed by the

defendant's use of a peremptory challenge, and for that reason the

death sentence could be affirmed. But in the course of reaching

this result, we announced our considered view that because the

Constitution guarantees a defendant on trial for his life the right to

an impartial jury, 487 U.S., at 85, 108 S.Ct., at 2276-2277, the trial

court's failure to remove the juror for cause was constitutional

error under the standard enunciated in Witt. We emphasized that

"[h]ad [this juror] sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced

petitioner to death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right

to challenge the trial court's failure to remove [the juror] for

cause, the sentence would have to be overturned." 487 U.S., at 85,

108 S.Ct., at 2277 (citing Adams, supra).

We reiterate this view today. A juror who will automatically vote

for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to

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When juror Cooper was removed after it was determined that she had written the note referred to in section 21/

III(j) she was replaced by juror Seal. (R. 2062, 2064, 2070-71).

147

consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances

as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror

has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or

absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is

entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the

requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for

cause any prospective juror who maintains such views. If even one

such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the

State is disentitled to execute the sentence.

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728-29, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30.

A habeas petitioner may rightfully complain of a trial court's denial of his challenges for

cause when those venire members actually sit on the jury. Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1133

(11th Cir.1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1077, 112 S.Ct. 981, 117 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992). Where,

however, the defense elects to use a peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror, he cannot

later claim a constitutional violation absent deliberate misapplication of the law. United States

v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316, 120 S.Ct. 774, 782, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) ("In

choosing to remove [juror] rather than taking his chances on appeal, Martinez-Salazar did not

lose a peremptory challenge. Rather, he used the challenge in line with a principal reason for

peremptoriness: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.")

Neither of the challenged veniremen was on the jury because the defense struck both

Hightower, prospective juror # 144, and Holloway, prospective juror #152. (R.197, 208, 664).21/

The Alabama Supreme Court’s implicit decision that Land was not deprived of due process was

not based on an unreasonable application of Morgan, Ross and Martinez-Salazar. The court

denies Land’s habeas petition on this claim.

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III.(p). The claim that the trial court’s instructions undermined the presumption of innocence

and deprived Land of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

The appellant complains that the trial court's instructions to the

jury gave “more weight to a finding of guilty rather than one of not

guilty.” Appellant's brief at 107.

With the explicit consent of defense counsel, the trial court

delivered the jury instructions in two segments-one segment

preceded the closing arguments of the attorneys and the other

segment followed the closing arguments.FN4 The trial court began

the first segment by instructing the jury that the statements of

counsel were not evidence. He then stated:

FN4. When the defense rested, the trial court asked the prosecutor

if he had any rebuttal. The prosecutor responded, “No, sir.” R.

1894. The following then occurred:

“THE COURT: Do we understand that I'll go first, is that all

right with you guys, in my comments to the jury?

“MR. MATHIS [defense counsel]: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: I'll bring it up to the charges and I'll be the

first to tell them about the lesser offenses and then I'll turn it

over to you fellows and I'll conclude with the charges and a

rehash of what I first gave them.

“MR. DODD [defense counsel]: Yes, sir.

“. . . .

“THE COURT: Mike [Anderton, the prosecutor], is that all

right with you?

“MR. ANDERTON: Yes, sir.” 

(R. 1894-95).

“Michael Jeffrey Land, the defendant in the case, is presumed to

be not guilty. The lawyers talked with you about that. I think a

couple of jurors perhaps in the group were asked specific

questions about it, I'm not sure.

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“He is presumed to be not guilty. No burden of proof rests on

Michael Jeffrey Land here in the litigation. The burden of

persuasion, the burden of going forward with the evidence is on

the State of Alabama, the prosecuting governmental entity.

“The fact that Mr. Land is here as the defendant, he enjoys the

presumption of innocence, that's evidence in his behalf. That is

evidence in his behalf here in the case.

“What does the State have to do in order to overcome or override

the presumption of innocence that Michael Jeffrey Land enjoys?

The State has to bring you strong and cogent evidence that

convinces you people beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt in

order to overcome the presumption of innocence.” 

(R. 1902-03).

The court then explained the State's burden of proof, defined

reasonable doubt, and instructed the jury that the indictment was

not evidence or an indication of guilt. The trial judge informed the

jury that it was the “sole and exclusive judge of the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence,” (R. 1909-10), and gave instructions

regarding the credibility of witnesses.

At this point, the court again instructed the jury on the State's

burden of proof and reasonable doubt, then stated:

“The presumption of innocence that we have discussed at

length here is to be regarded by you people as a matter of

evidence, as I said, to the benefit of which Michael Jeffrey

Land here is entitled. And as a matter of evidence, it

attends Michael Jeffrey Land throughout the course of the

litigation until his guilt is by the evidence placed beyond a

reasonable doubt.”

(R. 1917). 

The trial judge then instructed the jury on direct and circumstantial

evidence. He concluded the first segment of instructions with brief

descriptions of the charges contained in the indictment and of the

lesser offenses included in those charges.

After the attorneys made their closing arguments, the trial court

gave the second, and final, segment of the jury instructions. In this

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segment, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the

capital offenses charged in the indictment-intentional murder

during the course of a burglary and intentional murder during the

course of a kidnaping – and on the lesser offenses included within

each charge – felony murder, intentional murder, and first and

second degree burglary and felony murder and intentional murder,

respectively. With regard to each of the charged offenses and the

lesser offenses included within each charge, the trial court

repeatedly stated that, in order to convict the appellant, the jury

must be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge then instructed the jury that its verdict must be

unanimous and that the jury would be polled when it returned the

verdict. After mentioning the verdict forms and briefly explaining

the role of the foreperson, the trial court stated:

“Don't forget some of the preliminaries: Presumption of

innocence that attends Mr. Land, he is presumed to be not

guilty. The burden of proof is on the State, it does not shift

to the defendant at any point in the litigation. The State

having to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we talked

at length about that.”

(R. 2050-51). 

The trial judge reminded the jury that he had previously instructed

it with regard to the credibility of witnesses and circumstantial

evidence. The judge then concluded by reiterating:

“[T]he State's burden is to always establish beyond a

reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offenses

charged, including the involvement of the defendant. The

burden of proof does not shift to a defendant who asserts

through his witnesses that he was elsewhere at the time and

occasion of the events complained of.”

(R. 2053-54).

The appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court's

“order and manner of giving the charge” in that “the two parts [of

the charge were] . . . divided so that the part of the charge that

favor[ed] the defendant [wa]s given at the first part of the charge,”

while in the last part of the charge, which was given after the

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closing arguments, “the phrase ‘not guilty’ [wa]s used [only] four

times.” (Appellant's brief at 107). This claim is without merit.

Rule 21.1, A.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part: “The court

shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon [any written]

requests [for jury instructions] prior to their arguments to the jury,

but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are

completed.” (Emphasis added.) By giving one segment of the jury

instructions before the closing arguments, the trial judge in this

case violated the letter of Rule 21.1. However, he did so with the

express consent of defense counsel. More importantly, the

appellant was not prejudiced by this action.

This Court must review the jury instructions given by a trial court

as a whole. Beard v. State, 612 So.2d 1335, 1344 (Ala. Cr.

App.1992); Williams v. State, 611 So.2d 1119, 1123 (Ala. Cr.

App.1992). The instructions in this case, when considered as a

whole, accurately stated the principles of law and the issues

involved. In the first segment of these instructions, the trial court

clearly and adequately covered the presumption of innocence. See,

e.g., Grace v. State, 456 So.2d 862, 864 (Ala. Cr. App.1984);

Brooks v. State, 380 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Ala. Cr. App.1980). Near

the end of the second segment, the trial court again reminded the

jury that the appellant was presumed innocent. Throughout both

segments, the court stressed to the jury that the State had the

burden of proof. The instructions as a whole were both fair and

accurate. 

Land v. State, 678 So.2d at 220-22.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the habeas review standard when

jury instructions are challenged:

Federal habeas relief is unavailable “for errors of state law.”

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780,

110 S.Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). A jury instruction

that “was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for

habeas relief,” Id. at 71-72, 112 S.Ct. at 482, because federal

habeas review “is limited to deciding whether a conviction

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

Id. at 68, 112 S.Ct. at 480. Unlike state appellate courts, federal

courts on habeas review are constrained to determine only whether

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the challenged instruction, viewed in the context of both the entire

charge and the trial record, “ ‘so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violate[d] due process.’ ” Id. at 72, 112 S.Ct.

at 482 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct.

396, 400-01, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)).

Jamerson v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 410 F.3d 682, 688 (11 Cir. 2005). th

The mere splitting of the jury instructions did not so infect the trial such that the conviction

violated due process. The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was not contrary

to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The charges

as a whole did not result in a violation of due process. See Jamerson, 410 F.3d at 688. 

Therefore NCP fails.

III.(q). The claim that the trial court deprived Land of an individualized sentencing when it

ignored unrebutted non-statutory mitigating circumstances in violation of his rights under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land alleges that the trial court failed to consider as non-statutory mitigating

circumstances the unrebutted factors contained in records from Hillcrest Mental Health Facility

regarding Land’s treatment in 1986. Those records reflected that Land (1) suffered from a

conduct disorder; (2) had an unstable home environment since at least age ten; (3) had

significant impulse control problems; (4) had no father figure; and (5) had not had contact with

his natural father since he was very young.

In reviewing this challenge, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

Land contends, for the first time, that he was deprived of his rights

guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and rights guaranteed by Alabama law,

to a reliable sentencing determination when, he says, the trial court

ignored what he calls an unrebutted nonstatutory mitigating

circumstance. Land argues that this unrebutted nonstatutory

mitigating circumstance is shown by information contained in

records from the Hillcrest mental facility regarding his treatment

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there in June 1986. Land stresses five bits of information

contained in the reports: (1) that he suffered from a conduct

disorder, (2) that he had an unstable home environment, (3) that he

had significant impulse control problems, (4) that he had no father

figure, and (5) that he had no contact with his natural father. Land

argues that the trial court erred by simply holding that this

information did not rise to the level of indicating a statutory

mitigating circumstance, without considering it to indicate a

nonstatutory one.

In response, the State argues that although the law requires that a

sentencing authority must not be precluded from considering any

mitigating evidence, a trial court is not required to list the

evidence it considers in determining the existence or nonexistence

of nonstatutory mitigating factors. It notes that in this case the trial

court clearly stated in its sentencing order that it did consider

Land's records from Hillcrest and, thus, that it must have

considered the information Land now emphasizes. The State

contends that it was not error for the trial court to consider the

Hillcrest records without finding the existence of a nonstatutory

mitigating circumstance.

In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57

L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that "the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the

rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a

mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record

and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant

proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." (Emphasis

original, footnote omitted.)

In Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 389 (Ala. Cr. App.1991),

affirmed, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 925,

113 S.Ct. 1297, 122 L.Ed.2d 687 (1993), the Court of Criminal

Appeals stated the following with regard to nonstatutory

mitigating factors:

"It is not required that the evidence submitted by the accused as a

nonstatutory mitigating circumstance be weighed as a mitigating

circumstance by the sentencer, in this case, the trial court;

although consideration of all mitigating circumstances is required,

the decision of whether a particular mitigating circumstance is

proven and the weight to be given it rests with the sentencer."

(Emphasis added.)

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The trial court's sentencing order specifically stated that the court

had reviewed the Hillcrest records Land now highlights. In fact, in

his order the trial judge quoted a portion of those records

summarizing Land's history and his condition on discharge.

Although the trial court did not find that any of the circumstances

described in the Hillcrest records qualified as statutory mitigating

factors, it is clear to this Court that the trial court did consider that

information when it determined Land's sentence. Thus, we find no

plain error in the trial court's sentencing of Land.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 241.

In imposing the sentence, the trial court considered the seven statutory mitigating

circumstances. (TR. 2175-82). The court then stated:

Returning to the eighth mitigating circumstances, inclusion of

defendant’s character, record, et cetera. It’s well known that the

defendant is the eldest son of Gail Land, a Birmingham police

officer, which to my knowledge has an unblemished record of

service to the community through her years of service on the

Force. Gail and the defendant’s biological father were divorced

apparently when the subject was a young child. Ms. Land

divorcing the stepfather when Mr. Land was about 10. According

to the Hillcrest discharge information, the defendant began acting

out during adolescence, stealing cars at 14 or so, arrested for

kidnapping, numerous runaways from home, committed to DYS,

obtaining his GED at Mt. Meggs [sic] on a juvenile commitment.

As I mentioned earlier, ladies and gentlemen, I have carefully read

every scrap of paper submitted to me, including the Hillcrest

discharge papers, Dr. Rosecran’s findings, . . . .

To conclude, I find no mitigating circumstance by way of 13A-5-

52.

(TR. 2182-2184).

The Alabama Supreme Court recognized the governing holdings of the Supreme Court. 

The Alabama Supreme Court also correctly recognized that the trial court considered the

Hillcrest records. The trial court considered the factors identified in the Hillcrest report in its

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analysis under 13A-5-52, which allows the court to consider any mitigating circumstances not

specifically enumerated in 13A-5-51.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision that the trial court considered the non-statutory

mitigating circumstances was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

evidence presented at the sentencing. The decision was not contrary to nor did it involve an

unreasonable application of Lockett and its progeny. Consequently, the court denies Land’s

habeas petition on this claim.

III.(r). The claim that the trial court’s refusal to allow the use of a jury questionnaire or

individual voir dire deprived Land of his rights to a fair and impartial jury in violation 

of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

Land raised this issue before the Alabama Supreme Court which stated:

Land also argues that the trial court's refusal to allow the use of a

jury questionnaire form or individual voir dire prevented him from

selecting a fair and impartial jury and, thus, violated his rights

guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and rights

guaranteed by Alabama law. He contends that the use of a jury

questionnaire, or individual voir dire examination of prospective

jurors, was required in order for him to be able to conduct an

effective voir dire designed to detect bias arising from pretrial

publicity, without contaminating the entire venire. Land argues

that the group voir dire, in which he says 33 of 56 members of the

venire responded by indicating that they had been crime victims,

left every prospective member of the jury with a greater sense of

vulnerability to crime. Land contends that these discussions

created an atmosphere of hostility toward him and destroyed any

chance of a fair trial. Land also argues that group voir dire

examination had the prejudicial effect of “training” members of

the venire on how to answer questions relating to the use of the

death penalty, in such a way as to avoid being struck for cause.

In response, the State argues that although the trial court did not

permit individual sequestered voir dire examination or the use of a

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jury questionnaire the record shows that the trial court allowed

extensive group voir dire examination on the questions of possible

prejudice arising out of pre-trial publicity, as well as questions

concerning the prospective jurors' views about the death penalty.

The State contends that the trial court took adequate steps to

ensure that Land would be judged by a fair and impartial jury and

that the failure to use the voir dire examination procedure Land

now argues was necessary was not reversible error.

A trial court is vested with great discretion in determining how

voir dire examination will be conducted, and that court's decision

on how extensive a voir dire examination is required will not be

overturned except for an abuse of that discretion. Fletcher v. State,

291 Ala. 67, 277 So.2d 882 (1973); Lane v. State, 644 So.2d 1318

(Ala. Cr. App.1994); Harris v. State, 632 So.2d 503 (Ala. Cr.

App.1992), affirmed, 632 So.2d 543 (Ala.1993), affirmed, 513

U.S. 504, 115 S.Ct.1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995). After

reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in this regard.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 241-242.

As the Supreme Court has noted, “the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally

accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors. The failure to accord an accused

a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.

717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639,1642 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 751 (1961). The court specifically addressed voir

dire:

[V]oir dire “is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a

great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” The

Constitution, . . . does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but

only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. Even so, part

of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an

adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. 

[Citations omitted] Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d

492 (1992).

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Land argues that the Alabama Supreme Court’s finding of no abuse of discretion in voir

dire was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented at trial. The court, the

prosecutor and defense counsel questioned the prospective jurors. Land has not alleged that he

was denied an opportunity to question jurors concerning a particular subject matter. Land has

not complained of the adequacy of the voir dire, only the form. Sequestered voir dire or

questionnaire as proposed by Land is not constitutionally required. An independent review of

the voir dire (TR. 374-653) makes clear that the voir dire protected Land’s due process right to

an impartial jury. The state supreme court’s finding of no abuse of discretion was not based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts presented in voir dire. Land’s habeas petition on this

claim, therefore, fails.

III.(s). The claim that the trial court’s erroneous calculation of Land’s age at the time of the

crime denied him an individualized sentencing determination in violation of the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Land argues that the trial court’s one-year miscalculation of his age deprived him of “an

applicable mitigating circumstance.” The Alabama Supreme Court addressed his claim as

follows:

Land next argues that the trial court miscalculated what Land's age

was at the time of Ms. Brown's murder, and that the miscalculation

denied him an individualized sentence and thereby violated his

rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and rights guaranteed by Alabama

law. Land states that he was born on May 23, 1969, and was only

22 years old at the time of Ms. Brown's death, on May 18, 1992.

He argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was

only a few days short of his 24th birthday at that time. Land

contends that, based on the error, the trial court concluded that

Land's age at the time of the crime was not an applicable

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mitigating circumstance. Relying on Lockett, supra, [438 U.S. 586

(1978)], and its progeny, Land argues that the trial court's reliance

on the miscalculation deprived him of the right to that court's

consideration of a possible mitigating factor that would have

suggested a sentence less than death and, thus, requires reversal of

his sentence.

In response, the State notes that Land did not raise this claim at his

sentencing or on direct appeal and that, therefore, it is subject to

review only under the plain error standard. In sum, the State

argues that Land has not shown the degree of harm required for a

reversal under the plain error standard. It argues that even if the

trial court had not made the miscalculation, which the State

considers “minor,” it is improbable that it would have made any

difference in that court's decision that Land's age at the time of the

crime was not a mitigating circumstance.

In its sentencing order, the trial court did miscalculate Land's age

at the time of Ms. Brown's murder. The trial court stated that Land

was “five days short of his 24th birthday,” when he was actually

five days short of his 23d birthday. Although Land has attempted

to magnify the error by arguing he was only 22 and the trial court

determined he was almost 24, the truth is that the trial court

miscalculated by only one year. Whether he was five days short of

23, or five days short of 24, Land was clearly an adult, not a

minor, when he killed Ms. Brown. We conclude that the trial

court's miscalculation of Land's age by one year did not rise to the

level of plain error.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 242-243.

The trial court correctly stated Land’s birth date of “5/23/69.” (TR. 2182). The court

incorrectly calculated Land’s age finding that the day the victim disappeared Land was five days

short of his 24 birthday (TR. 2182) when he was actually five days short of his 23 birthday. 

th rd

The state supreme court found no plain error based on the trial court’s miscalculation, noting

that Land was clearly an adult, not a minor. Implicit in this finding is that the trial court would

have sentenced Land to death even if it had correctly determined his age at the time of the crime

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to be just short of 23. The trial court considered the fact that Land was a young adult. He also

considered Land’s criminal history and military service. (TR. 2175-77, 2183). In addition, the

trial judge found inapplicable an allegedly mitigating circumstance that Land’s capacity to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law was substantially

impaired. The state supreme court’s finding that the miscalculation did not rise to the level of

plain error – that is, that it did not adversely affect the substantial rights of Land – is not

contrary to Lockett or Eddings as the trial court considered but rejected Land’s relative youth as

a mitigating circumstance. This claim, therefore, does not entitle Land to habeas relief.

III.(t). The claim that the trial court’s admission of a previous, uncharged offense violated

Land’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

Land argues, as he did before the Alabama Supreme Court, that the prosecutor’s

reference to “facts about the prior burglary” violated his constitutional rights. The Alabama

Supreme Court stated:

Land also argues that the prosecutor introduced, and that the trial

court improperly admitted, evidence of a prior burglary at Ms.

Brown[’s] home a few days before she was killed. Land argues

that the admission of this evidence violated his rights guaranteed

by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and rights guaranteed by Alabama law.

Land says that before his trial a local newspaper reported that Ms.

Brown's home had been burglarized, and the phone line cut, a few

days before her murder. Land says that the trial court granted his

motion in limine to preclude the State from referring to this

previous burglary, yet allowed the prosecutor to introduce facts

about the burglary through the testimony of Ms. Brown's former

landlord. Although Land's argument is not clearly articulated, he

contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to overrule

his objections and let the jury be told of a prior bad act that he says

they would assume he committed.

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In response, the State contends that there is no indication in the

record that the prosecutor, or any witness called by the State,

mentioned Land's involvement in a prior burglary, or mentioned

even that a burglary had occurred. The State argues that the

prosecutor merely described the sequence of events surrounding

the murder, i.e., the res gestae.

As a general rule, when a person is being tried for the alleged

commission of one crime, evidence that he or she committed

another illegal act that is not now charged is generally

inadmissible. McLemore v. State, 562 So.2d 639 (Ala. Cr.

App.1989); Gainer v. State, 553 So.2d 673 (Ala. Cr. App.1989);

C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 69.01(1) (4th ed.

1991). An exception to this rule is that . . . evidence of the other

crime is admissible if the other crime is part of the res gestae, or

the transactions inseparable from the crime charged. Gainer;

McElroy's, § 69.01(3).

Our review of the trial record indicates that there were no

comments by the prosecution, and no testimony by a witness,

informing the jury that a burglary had occurred at Ms. Brown's

home a few days before her murder. The prosecutor did comment

in his opening statement that the phone line at the house had been

previously cut and then repaired before the night of Ms. Brown's

abduction, and Ms. Brown's landlord was allowed to offer

testimony to the same fact. However, the statements regarding the

phone line did not directly violate the trial judge's order granting

Land's motion in limine and directing the State not to mention the

earlier burglary. Nor would a reasonable juror naturally assume

from such limited statements that a prior burglary had occurred

and that Land had committed it. The fact that the phone line had

previously been cut and then repaired, shortly before Ms. Brown's

abduction and murder, was sufficiently related to the murder to be

considered part of the res gestae. We conclude that there was no

violation of the general exclusionary rule described above and that

the trial court did not err in overruling Land's objections.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 243.

The landlord merely testified that when he went to the victim’s house on May 19, 1992

he saw that the telephone wire had been cut. He also testified that the wire had been cut on an

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earlier occasion and repaired. (TR. 738-39). In his opening argument, the prosecutor related the

substance of the landlord’s testimony but did not identify Land as a suspect in the first burglary. 

No testimony or argument suggested Land’s prior burglary of the victim’s home, nor that

Land was a suspect in the first burglary. The references were only to the fact that the telephone

wires had previously been cut, then repaired and cut again on May 19, 1992. The testimony was

relevant as part of the facts surrounding the crime. The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was

not contrary to nor was it an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Further, it was not

based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence. The court, therefore,

will not grant Land habeas relief on this claim.

II.(u). The claim that the systematic underrepresentation of African Americans from the jury

pool denied Land a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community in violation

of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

Land’s claim that African Americans were systematically excluded from the jury pool

fails for the same reason that it did before the Alabama Supreme Court. The Alabama Supreme

Court stated:

Land argues that African-Americans were systematically

underrepresented in the pool from which his jury was picked and

that the systematic underrepresentation prevented his having a jury

selected from a fair cross-section of the community and violated

his rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and rights

guaranteed by Alabama law. Land says that in the Birmingham

Division of Jefferson County, where his trial was held, AfricanAmericans constitute 42.92% of the total population. He says that

only 9 persons on the 56-member jury venire (or 16.07%) were

African-Americans. Land argues that this 26.85%

underrepresentation of African-Americans on his jury venire

requires the reversal of his conviction and death sentence. Citing

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J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128

L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), Land notes that although he is white, he may

raise an equal protection issue relating to exclusion of AfricanAmericans from his jury because, he says, the general rule is that

a defendant claiming an equal protection violation resulting from

the exclusion of a class of persons from a jury need not belong to

the class of persons alleged to have been illegally excluded.

Although the State concedes that African-Americans constitute a

distinctive group for equal protection purposes, it argues that, even

assuming Land's census calculations are correct, he failed to

establish that there had been a systematic exclusion of AfricanAmericans from the venire. Citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.

357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the State argues that

Land has failed to establish all the elements needed to prove a

violation of the constitutional requirement that a jury be taken

from a fair cross-section of the community.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d

690 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the

systematic exclusion of women from the jury selection process

deprived the defendant of his rights guaranteed by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to have

his jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Then

in Duren, supra, the Court stated:

“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair

cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1)

that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’

group in the community; (2) that the representation of this

group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair

and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in

the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due

to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection

process.”

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668-69. See Ex

parte Dobyne, 672 So.2d 1354 (Ala.1995). In Duren, the Supreme

Court held that the defendant had met the third prong of the test,

the most difficult one: “His undisputed demonstration that a large

discrepancy occurred not just occasionally but in every weekly

venire for a period of a year manifestly indicates that the cause of

the underrepresentation was systematic-that is, inherent in the

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particular jury selection process utilized.” Duren v. Missouri, 439

U.S. at 366, 99 S.Ct. at 669. Land, however, has offered no

evidence toward meeting the third prong of the test established in

Duren. Thus, we conclude that Land's argument on this issue is

without merit.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 243-244.

In light of Land’s failure to address the third prong of the test set out in Duren either in

state court or here, the court concludes that the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court was not

contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of Duren. Accordingly, Land’s habeas

petition must fail on this claim.

III.(v). The trial court’s failure to transcribe critical proceedings in this case violated Land’s

right to full transcription, prevented him from obtaining a complete appeal and deprived

him of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

The Alabama Supreme Court described Land’s argument on this claim and the State’s

response:

Finally, Land argues that the trial court's failure to transcribe

certain portions of the trial proceedings requires a reversal of his

conviction and sentence because, he says, it prevented him from

obtaining a full review of critical portions of his trial. Land says

that the trial record reveals over 20 instances in which no

transcription was made during what he says were important

portions of his trial. According to Land, these portions of the trial

include selection of the jury venire; striking the jury; conferences

regarding the admissibility of testimony or exhibits offered by the

State; a conference that occurred just beforeLand waived his right

to testify; a conference on jury instructions; and the polling of the

jury at both phases of the trial.

Land contends he was prejudiced by the lack of a complete

transcription. He first argues that it prevented him from

challenging the trial court's methods used for selecting a venire

and for striking the jury. Land contends that numerous objections

he made to the admission of prosecution testimony or exhibits

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were not preserved. Finally, he argues that the failure to transcribe

a conference that occurred just before he waived his right to testify

prevented him from challenging that waiver as involuntary or

unknowing.

In response, the State argues that there are only two ways Land

could show that he was legally entitled to have transcriptions made

of the portions of the trial that were not transcribed: (1) by

showing that he filed, and that the court granted, a pretrial motion

for a transcription of the entire proceedings, or (2) by showing that

those portions of the trial not transcribed came within the

requirements of Rule 19.4(a), Ala.R.Crim.P.. The State says that

Land did not move to have all portions of the proceedings

transcribed, and it argues that none of the portions not transcribed

falls within the requirements of Rule 19.4(a). The State further

argues that Land's claim of prejudice is unpersuasive because, it

says, he has failed to show any untranscribed trial incident as to

which he could prove reversible error if he had a transcription of

the incident.

Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d at 244.

The Alabama Supreme Court then addressed Land’s claim:

We conclude that there is no merit to Land's claim of reversible error

based on the lack of a complete transcript of his entire trial

proceedings. In Hammond v. State, 665 So.2d 970, 972 (Ala. Crim.

App.1995), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that with regard to

such a claim as Land now makes, the reviewing court “must

determine whether a substantial right of the appellant has been

adversely affected by [the] omission from the transcript.” Further,

this Court has ruled that even where a transcript was lacking for a

portion of the trial that should have been transcribed and the

defendant's appellate counsel had not been the defendant's trial

counsel, the appellate court had to examine the existing record of the

trial in order to determine whether the failure to transcribe that

portion of the trial was only harmless error rather than reversible

error. Ex parte Harris, 632 So.2d 543 (Ala.1993) (holding that

although the failure to transcribe the voir dire examination of the jury

was error, it was only harmless error, even when the trial court had

granted the defendant's motion to have all proceedings in all phases

of the trial transcribed), affirmed, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130

L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995).

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The portions of the trial that Land says were not transcribed involve

selection of the jury venire and striking the jury; bench conferences

among the trial judge, the prosecution, and defense counsel; or the

polling of the jury. Regarding transcription of a capital murder trial,

such as Land's, Rule 19.4(a), Ala.R.Crim.P.,FN4 states:

FN4. This rule creates duties for the court reporter in addition to

those established by Ala.Code 1975, § 12-17-275.

"In all capital cases (criminal trials in which the defendant is

charged with a death penalty offense), the court reporter shall

take full stenographic notes of voir dire of the jury and of the

arguments of counsel, whether or not such is ordered by the

judge or requested by the prosecution or defense. This duty

may not be abrogated by the judge or waived by the

defendant."

(Emphasis added.)

In Ex parte Harris, this Court noted that the phrase “arguments of

counsel,” as it is used in Rule 19.4(a), does not refer to “every

incidental discussion between counsel and the trial judge that occurs

at the bench,” but, rather, refers only to counsel's opening and

closing arguments. 632 So.2d at 545. Thus, it is clear that Rule

19.4(a) did not require the court reporter to transcribe the various

bench conferences now placed in issue by Land. Although Land

claims error in the lack of a transcript of the court's selection of the

venire and of the actual striking of the jury, Rule 19.4(a) requires

only transcription of the “voir dire of the venire,” which was

transcribed in full and which is part of the record in this case. Nor

does Rule 19.4(a) require transcription of the polling of the jury. The

transcript shows that both following the jury foreman's

pronouncement of the jury's finding as to guilt and then later

following the foreman's pronouncement of the jury's recommended

sentence, the court reporter made a contemporaneous notation

indicating that the judge polled the jury.

It is important to note that Land did not request that all proceedings

of the trial be transcribed and, as explained above, Rule 19.4(a) did

not require that they all be transcribed. Thus, Land cannot argue that

the trial court breached a legal duty with regard to the transcription

of his trial. Moreover, Land is raising this issue for the first time on

appeal, and our review is subject to the plain error standard. After

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reviewing the record at the point of each transcript omission

referenced by Land, we conclude that the lack of a complete

transcription has not adversely affected his substantial rights. Thus,

we find no plain error.

Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 244-245.

The United States Supreme Court has addressed the importance of a complete record in

reviewing a capital case. The Supreme Court stated “Since the State must administer its

capital-sentencing procedures with an even hand, . . . it is important that the record on appeal

disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the death sentence in every

case in which it is imposed.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1206, 51

L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) In Gardner, the Court remanded for further proceedings on the basis that the

presentence investigation report contained a confidential portion which was not disclosed to

defense counsel. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 167, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2922, 2936,

49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (Georgia capital

sentencing provision requiring transmittal on appeal of complete transcript and record is

important “safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice”); Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 358-59,

113 S.Ct. 835, 836, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993)(“We have emphasized before the importance of

reviewing capital sentences on a complete record.”) 

The Eleventh Circuit has had several occasions to address whether the failure to

transcribe certain portions of the trial rendered the record deficient. See Songer v. Wainwright,

733 F.2d 788, 792 (11 Cir. 1984)(Lack of charge conference transcript did not render record so

th

deficient that it would be impossible for the reviewing court to perform the function required 

under Gregg); Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1526 (11 Cir. 1983)(“Moore has not shown th

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that the state of the record [based on failure to transcribe closing arguments at sentencing

hearing] was inadequate to permit the Georgia Supreme Court to perform its required review

function” ), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1456, 79 L.Ed.2d 773 (1984); Corn v. Zant,

708 F.2d 549 (11 Cir. 1983) (“Absent any showing of harm by a petitioner, it is settled that th

failure to transcribe counsel's arguments is not a constitutional violation requiring vacation of a

death sentence”); cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81 L.Ed.2d 375 (1984); See also 

Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 402 (5th Cir.1980), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 446

(5th Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77

L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (rejecting the claim of a death-row inmate that the absence of the transcript

of both the closing arguments and arguments at petitioner's sentencing violated Gregg or

Gardner.) None of these cases support Land’s position here. 

Because Land has not alleged this claim with specificity nor offered evidence that

anything prejudicial occurred during the portions of the trial that were not transcribed or that his

conviction and sentence were based on anything other than the evidence presented and

transcribed, he has failed establish that the record was insufficient for the Alabama appellate

courts to perform their required review functions.

The state supreme court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. 

The court concludes, therefore, that Land is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

III.(w).The trial court denied Land of his right to fully examine each venire member in violation

of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

This claim was adequately addressed in section III(r) above. The court would add only

that the trial court specifically stated to counsel:

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I do not, in declining the use of a questionnaire, mean to diminish

one iota your opportunity to fully voir dire this venire.

(TR. 349).

Land failed to show any diminishment in his ability to fully examine each venire member, and,

therefore, he is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

IV. Claim that juror misconduct during Land’s trial deprived him of a fair trial, due process,

and a reliable sentencing determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

This claim is procedurally barred from federal review because the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals found it precluded from Rule 32 review because it could have been but was

not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 11. Land has not

addressed this procedural default and has thus failed to establish cause and prejudice to overcome

the procedural default. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals also agreed with the trial court that the juror

misconduct claim was precluded because it was raised beyond the two year statute of limitations

as provided in Rule 32.2(c), citing Charest v. State, 854 So.2d 1102 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). 

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 35. Land argues that the claim is not barred by the two

year statute of limitations because Charest v. State was overruled by Ex parte Jenkins, 2005 WL

796809 (Ala. 2005). Ex parte Jenkins, supra, was decided April 8, 2005. In Hunt v. State, 940

So.2d 1041, 1054, n.7 (Ala.Crim App. 2005), cert. denied (Ala. 2006), the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals applied the holding in Jenkins “because this appeal was pending at the time

that the decision in Jenkins was released. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708,

93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).” Thus, the state appellate courts would not apply Jenkins retroactively. 

Case 2:04-cv-02866-KOB-PWG Document 27 Filed 10/18/07 Page 168 of 175
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 22/

This Court notes that although there may be jury misconduct claims that could not

have been raised at trial or on appeal, the petitioner has failed to plead any facts

demonstrating that his claims fit into such a category. According to Rule 32.2,

Ala.R. Crim.P., the petitioner has the “burden of pleading and proving by a

preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.”

Land v. State, CR-02-1563, memo. op. at 36 (emphasis added). 

 Land has not addressed this procedural default. Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. Procedure,

provides:

The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and providing by a preponderance

of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The state shall

have the burden on pleading any ground of preclusion, but once a ground of

preclusion has been pleaded, the petitioner shall have the burden on disproving its

existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held:

Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) have been firmly established and regularly followed by the

Alabama courts. The Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently affirmed, as it did

with Jenkins, lower court decisions that have summarily dismissed Rule 32 petitions

that do not include specific facts which would entitle the petitioner to collateral

relief. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 949 So.2d 184, ---- (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); Tubbs

v. State, 931 So.2d 66, 68 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113,

1126-32 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Chambers v. State, 884 So.2d 15, 18-19 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2003).

Jenkins v. Bullard, 210 Fed.Appx. 895, 900-901, 2006 WL 3635410 (11 Cir. 2006). th

169

In Land’s case, the petition for writ of certiorari on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition

was denied on September 24, 2004. This federal habeas petition was filed on September 29,

2004. The fact that Charest was overruled by Jenkins subsequent to Land filing his federal

habeas petition would not allow this court to overlook the procedural default found in state court. 

 At any rate, the claim is also barred from federal review because it was precluded from

state review because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Land 22/

has not established cause and prejudice to overcome his procedural default.

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V. Request for evidentiary hearing

Land seeks an evidentiary hearing in federal court on five claims: (1) Trial court’s

admission of DNA evidence; (2) trial court’s failure to correct jury’s misunderstandings about

presumption of innocence based on a juror’s note; (3) juror misconduct; (4) Brady violations; (5)

prosecutorial misconduct based on prosecutor’s comment on his failure to testify.

As observed above, The trial court conducted a Rule 32 evidentiary hearing on July 2,

2001. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual

basis for a claim in State court proceedings, the

court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the

claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

Where a petitioner fails to develop the facts in support of his habeas claim in a state

collateral evidentiary hearing the petitioner is entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing only if he

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can show both cause for his failure to develop the facts in the state court proceedings and actual

prejudice resulting from that failure or if he can demonstrate that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,

504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). In Williams v. Taylor, a529 U.S. at 433-34,

120 S.Ct. at 1489, the Court observed that § 2254(e)(2) as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (herein AEDPA) “raised the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who

were not diligent in state-court proceedings. . . so that prisoners who would have had to satisfy

Keeney’s test for excusing the deficiency in the state-court record prior to the AEDPA are now

controlled by § 2254(e)(2).”

The Supreme Court court recognized that before § 2254(e)(2) is even called into play, the

court must first make a determination of diligence:

The question is not whether the facts could have been discovered

but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts. The

purpose of the fault component of “failed” is to ensure the prisoner

undertakes his own diligent search for evidence. Diligence for

purposes of the opening clause depends upon whether the prisoner

made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at

the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court . . .Though

lack of diligence will not bar an evidentiary hearing if efforts to

discover the facts would have been in vain, see § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii),

and there is a convincing claim of innocence, see § 2254 (e)(2)(B),

only a prisoner who has neglected his rights in state court need

satisfy these conditions.

. . . .

Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a

minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner

prescribed by state law. . . . For state courts to have their rightful

opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be

diligent in developing the record and presenting, if possible, all

claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails to do so, himself

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or herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair adjudication

in state court, § 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary hearing to

develop the relevant claims in federal court unless the statute’s

other stringent requirements are met. Federal courts sitting in

habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues

which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state

proceedings. Yet comity is not served by saying a prisoner “has

failed to develop the factual basis of a claim” where he was unable

to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that

circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2).

Williams, 529 U.S. at 435-37, 120 S.Ct. 1490-91.

Land had an opportunity in his Rule 32 evidentiary hearing to develop the factual basis

for his Brady claims, but failed to do so except with respect to the interoffice communication.

Land states that the other Brady claims were “record claims.” Land has failed to satisfy 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) and (B). Land cannot here rely on his counsel’s failure, in the Rule 32

evidentiary hearing, to develop this factual basis. “Attorney negligence . . . is chargeable to the

client and precludes relief unless the conditions of § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied.” Holland v.

Jackson, 542 U.S. at 653, 124 S.Ct. at 2738. See also, Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 698 (11 Cir. th

2002), cert denied, 540 U.S. 924, 124 S.Ct. 329, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003).

The Rule 32 court concluded prior to the evidentiary hearing that claims related to the

admission of DNA evidence and juror misconduct were precluded on grounds that the claims

were not raised at trial or on appeal and that his prosecutorial misconduct claim was barred

because it had been rejected on appeal. Because they were precluded, these claims were not

addressed at the Rule 32 hearing. 

The Supreme Court has recently explained that while the AEDPA generally prohibits

federal habeas courts from granting evidentiary hearings when applicants have failed to develop

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the factual bases for their claims in state courts, the district court, however, has discretion to

order an evidentiary hearing where the § 2254(e)(2) prohibition is not at issue. The Supreme

Court has explained what the district court should consider in deciding whether to grant an

evidentiary hearing:

[A] federal court must consider whether such a hearing could

enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.

See, e.g., Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1287 (C.A.10 2000).

Because the deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 control

whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into

account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing

is appropriate. See id., at 1287-1288 (“Whether [an applicant's]

allegations, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief is a

question governed by [AEDPA]”).

It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual

allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is

not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit has

recognized this point in other cases, holding that “an evidentiary

hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference

to the state court record.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176

(1998) (emphasis deleted) (affirming the denial of an evidentiary

hearing where the applicant's factual allegations “fl[ew] in the face

of logic in light of . . . [the applicant's] deliberate acts which are

easily discernible from the record”). This approach is not unique to

the Ninth Circuit. See Anderson v. Attorney General of Kan., 425

F.3d 853, 858-859 (C.A.10 2005) (holding that no evidentiary

hearing is required if the applicant's allegations are contravened by

the existing record); cf. Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 767

(C.A.5 2000) (holding that no hearing is required when the

applicant has failed to present clear and convincing evidence to

rebut a state court's factual findings); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209

F.3d 280, 290 (C.A.3 2000) (same).

This principle accords with AEDPA's acknowledged purpose of

“reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences.” Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206, 123 S.Ct.

1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, supra, at

386, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (“Congress wished

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to curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials' on federal habeas, and to give

effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law”)). If

district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to

develop even the most insubstantial factual allegations in

evidentiary hearings, district courts would be forced to reopen

factual disputes that were conclusively resolved in the state courts.

Schriro v. Landrigan, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1939-40, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007).

This court has concluded that the claims involving the admission of DNA evidence and

juror misconduct are procedurally barred from federal review because the state courts found them

to be precluded from state collateral review. The court has also determined that in conjunction

with these claims Land made no attempt to show cause and prejudice for the procedural default

of the juror misconduct claim and has failed to establish cause for the procedural default of his

DNA claim. 

The claims involving the jury’s alleged misunderstanding about the presumption of

innocence and the prosecutor’s alleged comments about Land’s failure to testify do not require an

evidentiary hearing because these issues are resolved on the merits by reference to the state court

record, as described in Sections I.(a) and III.(j) above.

Based on the foregoing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is due to be denied. A

separate final judgment consistent with this memorandum of opinion will be entered

simultaneously herewith.

DONE and ORDERED this 18 day of October 2007. th

____________________________________

KARON OWEN BOWDRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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