Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02419/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02419-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONIQUE RANEE KANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2419-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) finding plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of receiving Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons 

discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born March 4, 1960, applied on June 22, 2011 for DIB, alleging disability 

beginning April 13, 2011. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 40, 194-95. Plaintiff alleged she 

was unable to work due to multiple spinal disc bulges, back, right knee, and bilateral shoulder 

pain, arthritis, restless leg syndrome, headaches, tinnitus, and depression. AT 23, 208. In a 

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decision dated May 20, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.

1

 AT 19-30. 

The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2015.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since April 13, 2011, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: cervical 

degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy, status-post right knee 

arthroplasty, and chronic neck and right knee pain.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except 

lift/carry 40 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, sit and 

stand/walk six hours in an eight-hour day. The claimant could 

frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach, 

handle, finger, and feel, and had no environmental limitations.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a 

general clerk work [sic]. This work does not require the 

performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity.

7. The claimant has not been under disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from April 13, 2011, through the date of this 

decision.

AT 21-30.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly considered the medical opinions of Dr. Martinez and Dr. Palmer when 

determining plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); (2) failed to provide clear and 

convincing reasons for finding plaintiff’s testimony less than fully credible; and (3) improperly 

considered the lay witness statements.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

When previously granted benefits are terminated by the Commissioner, the burden of 

proof ordinarily shifts. Rather than resting on a current recipient of disability benefits to prove 

that he or she is disabled, the burden rests on the Commissioner to prove that the applicant is no 

longer disabled. “Once a claimant has been found to be disabled, . . . a presumption of continuing 

disability arises in [his] favor[, and the Commissioner] bears the burden of producing evidence 

sufficient to rebut this presumption of continuing disability.” Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Serv., 755 F. 2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Saltzman v. Apfel, 125 F. Supp. 2d 

1014 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (same). This evidence then is reviewed under the substantial evidence 

standard. Saltzman, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th

Cir. 1983)). 

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Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a 

preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sorenson v. 

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975)). “It means such evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 

402, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 

S. Ct. 206 (1938)). The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 

1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts 

from the ALJ’s conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The court may not affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 

evidence. Id.; see also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial 

evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a 

finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. 

Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal 

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th 

Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ Properly Considered the Medical Opinions in the Record When 

Determining Plaintiff’s RFC

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly gave reduced weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Martinez, one of plaintiff’s treating physicians. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by not 

adopting the mental limitations opined by Dr. Palmer, an examining psychiatrist, despite 

according “great weight” to Dr. Palmer’s opinion.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996).

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To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

1. Dr. Martinez

Dr. Martinez was plaintiff’s treating physician from May 4, 2011 to February 7, 2013. On 

February 28, 2013, Dr. Martinez completed a medical opinion form regarding plaintiff’s 

functional capacity to perform physical work-related tasks. AT 545. Therein, Dr. Martinez 

determined that plaintiff suffered from a “severe neck condition which is not amenable to surgical 

correction” and that “conservative treatment” such as steroid injections had “not been helpful.” 

Id. With regard to work-related functions, he opined that plaintiff could frequently and 

occasionally lift and carry less than ten pounds, stand and walk less than two hours in an eighthour workday, and sit for about two hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. He further opined that 

plaintiff would need to lie down hourly, have an opportunity to shift between sitting, standing, 

and walking positions at will, and take twenty-minute breaks every hour. Id. Finally, he also 

determined that plaintiff could not work a full-time workday or workweek while only taking the 

legally allowed rest periods and that plaintiff’s impairments would cause her to be absent from 

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work more than three times per month. Id.

The ALJ gave “minimal weight” to Dr. Martinez’s opinion because:

[I]t was not consistent with [plaintiff’s] daily activities and [plaintiff’s] statement, 

in which she reported that medication controlled her joint pain for years. 

Furthermore, Dr. Martinez[‘s] physical assessment was not consistent with Dr. 

Ali’s CE medical opinions as well as the State Agency (SA) determinations.

AT 29 (citation to the record omitted). 

The ALJ’s reasoning that Dr. Martinez’s opinion was inconsistent with the other opinion 

evidence in the record, by itself, constituted a specific and legitimate reason for discounting Dr. 

Martinez’s opinion. Specifically, the ALJ determined that Dr. Martinez’s functional opinion 

conflicted with the findings and opinions of Dr. Ali, a consultative examining physician who 

independently examined plaintiff, and the two non-examining State agency physicians. These 

opinions constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determination to assign reduced 

weight to Dr. Martinez’s opinion. For example, Dr. Ali observed during her physical 

examination of plaintiff that plaintiff was “able to walk in to the exam room without assistance” 

and “sit comfortably,” had a “normal gait,” and could “walk on her toes and heels.” AT 431. 

Based on her examination, independent findings, and a review of plaintiff’s medical records 

available at that time, Dr. Ali opined that plaintiff could stand, walk, and sit for up to six hours, 

lift and carry forty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently, and frequently climb, 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. AT 432-33. This opinion clearly conflicted with the 

more severe limitations opined by Dr. Martinez and the ALJ was permitted to rely solely on this 

conflict in support of his decision to reject Dr. Martinez’s opinion provided that it was supported 

by the objective medical evidence in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. Indeed, the other 

medical evidence in the record, including Dr. Martinez’s own treatment notes, generally bolstered 

the ALJ’s decision to assign greater weight to Dr. Ali’s opinion over Dr. Martinez’s opinion 

because it better supported Dr. Ali’s less restrictive functional findings. See, e.g., AT 393, 490-

98, 511-12, 530.

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Furthermore, the ALJ also relied in part on the opinions of the non-examining State 

agency physicians in determining that Dr. Martinez’s opinion conflicted with the other medical 

evidence. While the ALJ could not reject Dr. Martinez’s opinion based solely on the nonexamining opinions, he was permitted to refer to them, along with other objective medical 

evidence, in support of his determination that the functional limitations opined by Dr. Martinez 

were not consistent with the other medical evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (holding that while 

“[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that 

justifies the rejection of the opinion of . . . a treating physician,” it may be used by the ALJ to 

support his RFC determination when the opinion reflects other objective medical evidence in the 

record). Both non-examining physicians’ opinions contained physical limitations less severe than 

those opined by Dr. Martinez and were generally supported by the other objective medical 

evidence in the record. See AT 88-99, 101-12. Accordingly, the ALJ also properly drew on these 

opinions to support his conclusion that Dr. Martinez’s opined limitations were overly-severe in 

light of the other medical evidence in the record.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ could not properly give greater weight to Dr. Ali’s opinion 

because the fact that both she and Dr. Martinez diagnosed plaintiff with cervical radiculopathy 

and shoulder pain secondary to arthritis means that both physicians relied on “essentially the 

same” clinical findings to arrive at contrary functional opinions. ECF No. 14 at 27. Plaintiff 

contends that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ precedent precluded the ALJ from relying on 

Dr. Ali’s contrary opinion over Dr. Martinez’s opinion in such an instance. Id. (citing Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an examining physician’s contrary opinion 

cannot constitute substantial evidence to discount a treating physician’s opinion where both 

physicians rely on the same clinical findings, but differ only in their conclusions)). However, 

plaintiff’s argument lacks merit because Dr. Ali performed an independent examination that 

resulted in different clinical findings than those observed by Dr. Martinez. The mere fact that 

both physicians diagnosed plaintiff with the same impairments does not mean that Dr. Ali relied 

on the same clinical findings as Dr. Martinez in developing her conflicting opinion.

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The ALJ also determined that plaintiff’s statement to Dr. Martinez in December of 2012

that her medication had controlled her joint pain for years further undermined Dr. Martinez’s 

opinion that plaintiff was extremely limited in her ability to sit, stand, and walk, and required an 

option to lie down hourly. AT 29. A condition that can be controlled or corrected by medication 

is not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits under the Act. See Warre v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); Montijo v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 729 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1984); Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 

1983). Accordingly, it was proper for the ALJ to consider this statement in support of his 

determination that Dr. Martinez’s opinion that plaintiff was physically limited to the point of 

disability was entitled to lesser weight. 

Similarly, the ALJ also properly considered the evidence regarding plaintiff’s daily 

activities in support of his determination regarding Dr. Martinez’s opinion. For instance, plaintiff 

stated, either during the hearing or to her physicians, that “she is independent for basic activities 

of daily living,” was able to perform simple daily household tasks, and exercised by walking 

multiple times per week for 30 minutes at a time, all of which indicated that plaintiff was less 

physically limited than opined by Dr. Martinez. See AT 49, 430, 437. While some of the 

evidence regarding plaintiff’s daily living activities indicated that she may have been somewhat 

more limited, there still existed substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could base his 

determination that plaintiff’s daily activities conflicted with Dr. Martinez’s opinion that plaintiff 

had extreme physical functional limitations.

In sum, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning reduced weight to 

Dr. Martinez’s opinion. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in assessing his 

opinion is without merit.

2. Dr. Palmer

On September 29, 2011, Dr. Palmer performed a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of 

plaintiff. AT 435-39. During this examination, Dr. Palmer observed that plaintiff exhibited 

“fair” to “good” attention, concentration, memory, judgment, insight, and ability to perform 

calculations. AT 438. He also observed largely normal results with regard to plaintiff’s thought 

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process and content, but determined that plaintiff was depressed. Id. Based on his observations, 

Dr. Palmer diagnosed plaintiff with a “moderate,” recurrent major depressive disorder and 

determined that plaintiff had a Global Functioning Assessment (“GAF”) score of 55.2 Id. With 

regard to plaintiff’s mental functional capacity, Dr. Palmer opined that plaintiff had a “fair” 

ability to accept instructions from supervisors, interact with coworkers and the public, handle 

normal work-related stress, maintain regular workplace attendance, and complete a normal 

workday or workweek without interruptions from her psychiatric condition. AT 439. Dr. Palmer 

also opined that plaintiff could adequately perform both simple and complex tasks and could 

perform work activities on a consistent basis. Id. Finally, Dr. Palmer opined that plaintiff’s 

psychiatric condition “may be chronic in nature,” would likely last more than one year at the 

opined level of severity, and that plaintiff’s “prognosis is fair.” Id. The ALJ gave “great weight” 

to Dr. Palmer’s opinion. AT 29. 

Plaintiff contends because the ALJ gave Dr. Palmer’s opinion “great weight,” he erred by 

not adopting any of Dr. Palmer’s particular findings without an explanation. However, the ALJ 

was not required to adopt all of the limitations opined by Dr. Palmer solely because he gave Dr. 

Palmer’s opinion “great weight” and generally found it persuasive as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(e)(2) (“Administrative law judges are responsible for reviewing the evidence and 

making findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . [and] are not bound by any findings made by 

State agency medical or psychological consultants.”); Wilkinson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 558 F. 

App’x 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“[N]o rule or regulation compels an ALJ to 

incorporate into an RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives 

the source’s opinion as a whole ‘significant’ weight. On the contrary, the controlling regulations 

are clear that the RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner.”); 

Koonce v. Apfel, 166 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The determination of a claimant’s RFC and the 

 

2 GAF is a scale reflecting the “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a 

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders at 34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect 

and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school function (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). Id.

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application of vocational factors are reserved to the ALJ, who is not bound by medical opinion on 

these subjects.”). Furthermore, the ALJ relied on multiple sources in addition to Dr. Palmer’s 

opinion in reaching his RFC conclusion regarding the impact of plaintiff’s mental impairments. 

Specifically, he also accorded great weight to the opinions of the state agency reviewing 

physicians who opined that plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. AT 29, 93, 108. The 

ALJ further determined that the lack of (1) any opinions from treating psychologists or 

psychiatrists, (2) objective evidence that plaintiff underwent any treatment for her mental 

impairments, and (3) evidence that plaintiff received any emergency psychiatric care indicated 

that plaintiff did not have mental impairments that caused functional limitations. This evidence, 

in conjunction with Dr. Palmer’s opinion, substantially supported the ALJ’s RFC determination 

with regard to the impact of plaintiff’s mental impairments. 

Moreover, even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ somehow erred in not 

incorporating the mental limitations opined by Dr. Palmer, any such error was harmless. See

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“we may not reverse an ALJ’s decision 

on account of an error that is harmless”). Dr. Palmer opined that plaintiff had, at worst, a “fair” 

ability to perform a number of workplace activities and determined that plaintiff had a GAF score 

of 55, both indicating that plaintiff’s mental impairments caused only moderate functional 

limitations. AT 438-39. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that moderate mental 

limitations are not sufficiently severe so as to require vocational expert testimony. Hoopai v. 

Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving an assessment that the claimant was 

moderately limited in “his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; 

his ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual 

with customary tolerance; and his ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruption from psychologically-based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number and length of rest periods.”).

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B. The ALJ Properly Assessed the Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the credibility of plaintiff’s 

testimony because he determined that it was only partially credible without providing clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so.

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek 

treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ 

in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional impairment. 

See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, 

on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 

(9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 

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Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony to be only “partially credible” because 

plaintiff’s testimony regarding her daily activities appeared to conflict with the claimed extent of 

her limitations and the alleged extent of her impairments was not supported by the objective 

medical evidence in the record.

First, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s daily living activities indicated that plaintiff’s 

limitations were less extreme than what plaintiff expressed through her testimony. Plaintiff 

contends that this reasoning was erroneous because her testimony regarding her daily living 

activities actually supported her claim regarding the extent of her limitations rather than 

undermined them. However, substantial evidence from the record supported the ALJ’s 

determination.

“While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the 

ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday 

activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting . . . Even where those 

activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 

testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 

674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly considered claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, 

cook, clean, shop, interact with her nephew and boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of 

her nephew in the credibility analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in 

the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit 

the claimant’s credibility). 

Here, the ALJ highlighted plaintiff’s reports to her physicians that “she is independent for 

basic activities of daily living” and could perform daily household tasks such as washing dishes, 

making her bed, preparing her own meals, and tending to her personal needs. AT 430, 437. The 

ALJ also pointed to plaintiff’s testimony during the hearing that she exercises by taking 30 

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minute walks multiple times per week. AT 49.

While plaintiff correctly points out that the record also contains some contrary evidence, 

such as plaintiff’s statements that she had to perform certain household tasks slowly over a long 

period of time and did not do certain other household chores, suggesting that plaintiff’s activities 

are more limited, AT 46, 48 430, it is the function of the ALJ to resolve any ambiguities, and the 

court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. See

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s credibility 

determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly 

she was able to keep up with all of the activities and noting that the ALJ’s interpretation “may not 

be the only reasonable one”). The ALJ weighed the contrary evidence against the substantial 

evidence he cited to in support of his adverse credibility determination and reasonably resolved 

the inconsistencies. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in citing plaintiff’s daily living activities in 

support of his adverse credibility determination.

With regard to the ALJ’s second reason for discounting plaintiff’s testimony, plaintiff 

argues that the medical records, when viewed as a whole, actually corroborated plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the extent of her pain and functional limitations. However, contrary to 

plaintiff’s contention, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the medical 

evidence demonstrated that plaintiff’s pain and limitations were less severe than she alleged. For 

instance, Dr. Ali opined that plaintiff was functionally capable of standing and walking for up to 

six hours in an eight-hour day, and could lift and carry forty pounds occasionally and twenty-five 

pounds frequently. AT 432-33. Furthermore, plaintiff’s other physicians’ observations regarding 

her physical impairments showed that they were well controlled and even improving with 

medicine and other treatment. E.g., AT 328, 490, 511, 530. With regard to plaintiff’s mental 

impairments, Dr. Palmer determined that plaintiff was, at most, only moderately impacted. AT 

438-39. Outside of Dr. Martinez’s opinion, which the ALJ properly discounted for the reasons 

discussed above, the medical record generally demonstrates that plaintiff’s functional limitations 

were less severe than what she claimed through her testimony. Although lack of medical 

evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, it is 

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nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ provided other clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s 

testimony. Therefore, he did not err in also providing this reason in support of his determination 

that plaintiff’s testimony was less than credible.

C. The ALJ Properly Considered the Lay Witness’ Statements

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to consider and provide sufficient 

reasons to reject the third-party lay witness statements submitted in support of plaintiff’s 

application. 

“[L]ay witness testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects 

ability to work is competent evidence, and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” 

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 

918-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (friends and family members in a position to observe a plaintiff’s 

symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify to condition). “If the ALJ wishes to 

discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. Nevertheless, the ALJ is not required “to discuss every 

witness’s testimony on a individualized, witness-by-witness basis.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). Indeed, while the applicable regulations require “the ALJ to consider 

testimony from family and friends submitted on behalf of the claimant,” they “do not require the 

ALJ to provide express reasons for rejecting testimony from each lay witness.” Id. (citing 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 404.1545(a)(3)). “Rather, if the ALJ gives germane reasons for 

rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting 

similar testimony by a different witness.” Molina, 674 at 1114.

When the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for discounting a claimant’s 

testimony and the third-party lay witness’s testimony is similar to the claimant’s testimony, the 

ALJ’s reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony may also constitute germane reasons for 

rejecting the third-party lay witness’s testimony. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Molina, 674 at 1114. Furthermore, even when the ALJ 

errs by failing to explain his or her reasons for disregarding a layperson’s testimony, such error is 

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harmless if that layperson’s testimony largely reflects the limitations described by the claimant 

and the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony, 

because the layperson’s testimony in such a circumstance is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination in the context of the record as a whole.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 

(quotation marks omitted).

Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide what weight he accorded to each of 

the third party statements in the record. However, the ALJ individually discussed the third-party 

reports provided by plaintiff’s husband, son, friend, former coworkers, and former employer and 

accorded them “minimal weight” because they were “not consistent with [plaintiff’s] daily living 

activities, Dr. Ali’s CE medical opinions, and the SA determinations.” AT 23-24, 30. While the 

ALJ’s reasons for discounting these lay opinions were generally applied to all opinions without 

an individualized discussion as to each witness’s statement, this approach was still without error. 

See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (stating that the ALJ is not required “to discuss every witness’s 

testimony on a individualized, witness-by-witness basis”). Furthermore, the ALJ’s reasons for 

discounting the lay witness statements were largely the same as the ALJ’s reasons for finding 

plaintiff’s testimony not credible. As discussed above, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the extent of her limitations was not supported by the objective medical evidence in the 

record. Because all of the third-party witness’s statements reveal complaints regarding the extent 

of plaintiff’s limitations that are largely similar to those expressed by plaintiff, such a justification 

is equally applicable to each of the third-party witness’s statements. Accordingly, the ALJ also 

gave “germane” reasons for discounting the third-party statement evidence. See id.; Valentine, 

574 F.3d at 694.

Moreover, even had the ALJ erred by failing to provide any reasons for disregarding the 

lay witness testimony, this error would have been harmless because all of the lay witness 

statements in the record largely echo plaintiff’s own testimony regarding the impact of her 

impairments and extent of her limitations and, as discussed above, the ALJ properly discounted 

plaintiff’s testimony on these topics. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Buckner v. Astrue, 

646 F.3d 549, 560 (8th Cir. 2011)) (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to comment upon lay witness testimony 

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is harmless where ‘the same evidence that the ALJ referred to in discrediting [the claimant’s] 

claims also discredits [the lay witness’s] claims.’”). 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: September 9, 2015

11 Kane.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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