Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02548/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02548-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NATHAN LENARD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS 

COMPANY, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-2548 KJM AC 

ORDER 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff served defendant with a Demand for Inspection of Premises and/or Things, as 

permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2). See ECF No. 11 at 4-5. He sought permission to inspect, 

photograph and video tape the entire physical premises of defendant’s location (exterior and 

interior), which is the facility plaintiff managed before he was fired. It is also the facility where 

plaintiff engaged in a “heated” verbal exchange with his subordinate, which is what defendant 

says led to his being fired. Defendant refused to permit the inspection. Plaintiff’s motion to 

compel the site inspection is now before the court. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 A. Legal Standards 

 The scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) is broad: “Parties 

may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or 

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defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the 

discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. As 

the Supreme Court reiterated in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), 

relevance “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably 

could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” 

Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). 

 Pursuant to Rule 37(a), a party requesting inspection of property may seek an order 

compelling such inspection when the requested party “fails to respond that inspection will be 

permitted – or fails to permit inspection – as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). 

 The party seeking to compel discovery has the initial burden of establishing that its 

request satisfies the relevance requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Reece v. Basi, 2014 WL 2565986, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (Claire, M.J.). Following that showing (or if relevance is plain from the 

face of the request), the party who resists discovery then has the burden to show that discovery 

should not be allowed, and carries the “heavy burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its 

objections.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 

III. THE DISCOVERY REQUEST 

---------- 

PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR INSPECTION OF PREMISES AND/OR THINGS 

Location: 250 Dos Rios Street 

 Sacramento, CA 95811 

Date: December 9, 2014 

Time: 6:00 a.m. 

 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff NATHAN LENARD demands an inspection of 

the physical premises of Defendant THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY located at 250 

Dos Rios Street, Sacramento, California 95811, including the exterior of any building on the 

property and the interior of the property made accessible to Mr. Lenard during the course and 

scope of his employment. This site inspection will be conducted on Tuesday, December 9, 2014, 

beginning at 6:00 a.m. 

 During the site inspection Plaintiff intends to photograph and video tape all areas 

described above. 

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---------- 

IV. ARGUMENTS 

 A. Relevance (Objections 2 and 6) 

 1. Plaintiff’s argument 

 Plaintiff asserts that a site inspection is relevant to at least one issue, namely, why plaintiff 

raised his voice during the exchange with his subordinate that lead to plaintiff being fired. 

Plaintiff asserts that he had to raise his voice in order to be heard over the noise of nearby 

“shakers.” See ECF No. 12 at 29 (email exchange between counsel) & at 40 (plaintiff testifies 

that he was yelling “loud over the shakers,” “[w]e were close to the shakers then”). Plaintiff 

wants to video tape the premises so that he can show the jury how loud the shakers were. 

 Plaintiff also asserts that the exchange took place in several different parts of the premises. 

He wants to be able to show the jury where the exchange took place. He asserts that this will help 

the jury to decide whether particular witnesses could really have overheard the exchange or not. 

ECF No. 12 at 11. Plaintiff also asserts that plaintiff was the manager of the entire facility, and 

“the entire premises is therefore relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.” ECF No. 12 at 10. 

 2. Defendant’s argument 

 Defendant asserts that the only relevant issue here is that plaintiff threatened his 

subordinate by saying, among other things, “Don’t be surprised if I show up at your house.” ECF 

No. 12 at 3. It argues that the inspection is not likely to lead to admissible evidence, because the 

location is irrelevant to why plaintiff was fired. He was fired because he yelled at and threatened 

a subordinate, while they were standing only 2 or 3 feet apart, defendant says. It was the threat, 

not the location, that got plaintiff fired. 

 Defendant further asserts that the noise levels cannot be re-created in an inspection 

because plaintiff wrongly “assumes that there are the same number of shakers, that the same exact 

shakers are still in the facility, that the shakers still make the same sound (i.e., that the sound has 

not changed over time), etc.” ECF No. 12 at 15 ¶ 6. Defendant argues that it is “safe to assume” 

that the facility is different now than it was then, and so it will not show anything about sound 

levels that might otherwise be relevant to why plaintiff was yelling. Id., at 15 ¶ 6. Defendant 

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asserts that “[t]his information, of course, can best be obtained through deposition testimony.” 

Id., at 7. 

 3. Analysis 

 Plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating relevance. Defendant’s own assertions 

make clear that it intends to show at trial not just that plaintiff made a threatening remark, but that 

the context in which the exchange occurred contributed to the threatening nature of his remark: 

that plaintiff and his subordinate were standing just 2-3 feet apart; that plaintiff towered over the 

subordinate; and that plaintiff was yelling at the subordinate. Id., at 19-20. 

 Plaintiff is entitled to show that the physical layout of the premises explained why 

plaintiff was standing so close, and why he had to yell to be heard over the shakers. Perhaps 

more to the point, plaintiff is entitled to present his case to the jury as he thinks best, within 

reason. If he thinks it would be more effective for the jury to hear the shakers, and to see how 

close the men were to them, rather than just hear testimony about them, he should be permitted to 

present it that way. Of course, defendant will be free to present testimony that the shakers didn’t 

sound that way on the day of the exchange, and plaintiff will be free to present testimony saying 

that the shakers were that loud or louder, leaving it to the jury to decide for itself how to weigh 

any conflicting evidence. 

 The jury may have one view of a “heated” exchange that took place in a small, crowded 

space where plaintiff and his subordinate could not help but stand close together, and where they 

could not help yelling because of the noise. The jury might have an altogether different view of 

an exchange where plaintiff loomed over his subordinate, yelling at him, in a roomy, otherwise 

quiet space, where there would be no other explanation for the crowding and yelling other than to 

create a threatening atmosphere. 

 In addition, plaintiff was the manager of the entire facility, not just of the one spot where 

the heated exchange took place. One of defendant’s defenses is that it fired plaintiff because he 

did not do his job managing the facility properly – not because of race or retaliation – and so 

gathering information about the entire facility appears relevant. Finally, defendant’s counsel 

describes the reason for plaintiff’s termination as “violation of a workplace safety policy.” ECF 

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No. 12 at 62 (email exchange). It seems that an inspection of the workplace could be relevant to 

this issue. 

 B. Annoying, Harassing, Oppressive, etc. (Objections 1, 4 and 8) 

 Defendant argues that since the request is not designed to discover admissible evidence, it 

must be designed to annoy, harass, embarrass, oppress, and increase the cost of litigation. As 

discussed above, however, the inspection request is valid and could lead to admissible evidence. 

 Defendant further states that the request for inspection comes on top of other excessive 

discovery requests – more than 350 requests for production, and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition with 

more than 80 topics, and 200 additional, “duplicative” requests for production – making it unduly 

burdensome. However, these other discovery requests are not before the court. Plaintiff has only 

asked to compel plaintiff to permit an inspection of the facility, and defendant has asked only to 

deny or limit it. If defendant wants a protective order regarding these other discovery requests, it 

can request one in a separate motion, or it could have cross-moved for one here. It has not 

pursued either course. 

 Defendant also asserts that a site inspection would be disruptive to its business, especially 

considering that the other people involved in the exchange, or witnesses to it, will be working 

there. However, this is no longer an issue, as both sides agree that the inspection can take place 

during non-business hours. 

 C. Overbreadth (Objection 3) 

 1. Defendant’s argument 

 Defendant argues that the inspection request is overbroad, because plaintiff’s request 

allows him to inspect parts of the facility having nothing to do with the exchange, and even to 

“rummage” through his former office, though it has nothing to do with the case. 

 2. Plaintiff’s argument 

 Plaintiff argues that Rule 34 does not limit his inspection to the exact spot where the 

exchange occurred. In any event, areas other than the exact spot of the exchange are relevant to 

determining where other witnesses could have been, and whether they could have overheard or 

seen the exchange. Also, plaintiff points out that he was the manager of the entire facility, not 

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just the spot where the exchange occurred. 

 3. Analysis 

 Defendant does not meet his burden of establishing overbreadth. It cites no case or rule 

indicating that plaintiff is limited to inspection of the precise location of the incident that led to 

his firing, and no other place. As noted above, defendant’s Affirmative Defenses include 

assertions that plaintiff did not do his job properly, and that he was dismissed for nondiscriminatory reasons. ECF No. 6 (Answer) at 15 16 ¶¶ 12 15. 

 Plaintiff is entitled to make his case to the jury however he wishes, within reason. If he 

thinks it is effective to show what the entire workplace that he managed looks like, the court 

knows of no reason he should be prevented from doing so. Plaintiff is not an employee who 

never left the mailroom, is suing a supervisor who also never left the mailroom, but is 

nevertheless demanding access to the executive suite in discovery. 

 In addition, one of the non-discriminatory reasons defendant may offer as contributing to 

plaintiff’s firing or to its overall treatment of plaintiff, is that plaintiff took the entire workforce 

on a fishing trip, on a work day, leaving only one employee behind to mind the shop. See 

Answer (ECF No. 6) ¶ 21. Plaintiff is entitled to gather evidence on how big (or small) the 

workplace is, as that might affect the jury’s determination of whether leaving just one employee 

behind would legitimately cause an employer to want to fire him. Of course, plaintiff could hire 

an architect as an expert to present the exact dimensions of the premises, but plaintiff is entitled to 

conclude that it would be more effective to show a video or photographs of the facility. 

 D. Privacy Rights (Objection 5) 

 Defendant argues the photographing and video taping will violate the privacy rights of 

employees who do not want to be photographed or video taped. 

 This is not a live dispute, as plaintiff “has agreed not to photograph or videotape any 

individual should a site inspection proceed,” and has also agreed that it may take place during 

non-business hours. 

 E. Protective Order (Objection 7) 

 Defendant objects that plaintiff wants to proceed “without an appropriate protective 

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order.” ECF No. 12 at 15. Defendants asks for (but has not filed a motion for) a protective order 

limiting any inspection to 10 minutes.1 Plaintiff requested 30 minutes in his papers, but at oral 

argument, plaintiff’s counsel indicated that 30 minutes is the length he thought inspection would 

likely take, based on his past experience. Plaintiff argues, however, that he cannot predict with 

confidence how long inspection will take, since defendant has denied him photos or layouts of the 

facility. Thus, he now seems to be asking that no time limit be placed on the inspection. 

 The lack of a protective order is not a valid objection. It is the responsibility of the party 

resisting discovery, not the party seeking discovery, to seek a protective order. However, this 

court is free to issue an appropriate protective order here, if it grants the motion in part and denies 

it in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). The court agrees that some time limitation is warranted, 

since plaintiff seeks to inspect an active business premises. The inspection will therefore be 

limited to one hour, based upon the representations of plaintiff’s counsel of the time it normally 

takes him to conduct such an inspection, and his unfamiliarity with the facility at issue. 

V. ATTORNEY’S FEES 

 Plaintiff asks the court to order defendant “to pay Plaintiff the reasonable expenses, 

including attorneys’ fees, incurred by him in bringing this motion.” ECF No. 12 at 18. 

Defendant has not responded to this request. 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) provides that if the court grants a motion to 

compel discovery, it “must” order the non-moving party to pay the moving party's “reasonable 

expenses incurred in making the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, the Rule 

recognizes a number of exceptions, such as where a motion to compel “is granted in part and 

denied in part, the court . . . may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable 

expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). Accordingly, the determination of the 

propriety of awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the court. The Local Rules are 

not explicit with regard to when a motion for an award of fees under Rule 37 must be brought. 

 The court cannot rule on plaintiff’s request for fees at this time, as plaintiff has not 

 

1

 At oral argument, defendant asked for a 15 minute limit. 

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provided any information about how much it seeks in fees, the hours worked in bringing and 

arguing the motion to compel, the hourly rate at which he seeks fees, or any other information 

that would enable the court to rule. The parties will therefore be granted an opportunity to brief 

the attorney’s fee matter. 

 Without ruling on the request, the court notes that all of defendant’s objections to the 

discovery request are overruled, except for two. First, defendant objected that the inspection 

could violate the privacy rights of persons who do not wish to be photographed or video taped. 

ECF No. 12 at 15 ¶ 5. Second, defendant objected that the inspection request stated no end time 

and could disrupt defendant’s business operations. ECF No. 12 at 15 & 16 ¶¶ 6 & 8. Prior to 

filing his motion to compel, plaintiff specifically offered to revise his inspection demand to allay 

those concerns. See ECF No. 12 at 73 (noting that the inspection was scheduled to occur at 6:00 

a.m., one-half hour before business hours; offering to do the inspection even earlier; and offering 

to revise the inspection demand to specifically note that no persons would be photographed or 

video taped). Accordingly, the court is inclined to award plaintiff fees, but will defer a decision 

until hearing from both parties. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The request for an inspection seeks relevant information that may lead to admissible 

evidence. Defendant’s objections are all OVERRULED, except to the degree they seek a time 

limit on the requested inspection. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 11), is GRANTED in part, to the degree it 

seeks an inspection of the entire facility at issue, not limited to the location(s) where the exchange 

between plaintiff and his subordinate took place. 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 11), is DENIED in part, but only to the 

degree it seeks to avoid any time limitation. 

 3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C), the court orders that the requested site 

inspection shall take place no later than two weeks from the date of this order, during a one-hour 

block of time before the facility opens for normal business, or at such other time as the parties 

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may agree.

2

 4. Plaintiff shall have seven days from the date of this order to file a declaration 

together with a letter brief in support of its request for expenses. The letter brief is not to exceed 

two pages. Within seven days thereafter, defendant may file a reply letter brief, not to exceed two 

pages. The request for expenses will thereafter stand submitted. 

DATED: February 25, 2015 

 

2

 Defendant requested in its papers and at oral argument that plaintiff be ordered not to 

“rummage” through files or computers. Plaintiff has requested only an inspection, not a search or 

a document production, so this order does not authorize plaintiff to access defendant’s files. 

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