Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02496/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02496-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pi Diversity-Personal Injury

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- 1 - [03cv2496]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

APRIL KRUEGER, Individually and on

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 03cv2496 JLS (AJB)

ORDER: DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

vs.

WYETH, INC. f/k/a AMERICAN HOME

PRODUCTS, a Pennsylvania corporation;

WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS f/k/a

WYETH-AYERST PHARMACEUTICALS,

a Pennsylvania corporation; and DOES 1

through 100, Inclusive,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to certify the class [Doc. No. 15], Defendant’s

Opposition [Doc. No. 29], and Plaintiff’s Reply [Doc. No. 33.] For the following reasons, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

In December 2003, Plaintiff April Krueger filed a products liability action against Wyeth

and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. 

[Defs.’ Motion at 4.] The case was transferred to the Eastern District of Arkansas (Judge William

R. Wilson, Jr.) for pre-trial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 as part of In re Prempro

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 This Court incorporates by reference the background facts as set forth in Judge Wilson’s

opinion. 

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Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (MDL-1507).1 After transfer, the allegations

of Ms. Krueger’s complaint were merged with those of other class action complaints into a Master

Class Action Complaint, which was filed January 7, 2004. The Master Class Action Complaint

sought to certify a multi-state class action on behalf of women seeking consumer protection relief

and medical monitoring. The putative class included women who purchased Wyeth’s Hormone

Replacement Therapy drugs (“HRT”) to alleviate postmenopausal symptoms. Judge Wilson

denied class certification, in part, because of the differences in state law governing the plaintiffs’

causes of action. Plaintiff Krueger’s case was then remanded back to this Court. [Id.] 

Plaintiff now requests that this Court certify a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class that is defined

as: 

All California consumers who purchased Wyeth’s Hormone Replacement

Therapy products, Premarin, Prempro, and/or Premphase, between January 1995

and January 2003. 

[Pl.’s Motion at 4.] Plaintiff seeks two forms of relief for the class members:

First, Plaintiff seeks a refund of all purchase monies Class Members spent and

disgorgement of profits Wyeth earned from HRT sales to Class Members as

provided for by California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and

Professions Code §§ 17200 et. seq. 

Plaintiff Krueger also seeks damages, statutory damages, punitive damages and/or

refunds of purchase monies Class Members spent for these products as provided

for by California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civil Code §§ 1750

et. seq. 

[Id.] Defendants note that unlike Plaintiff’s prior class definition, her current definition fails to

exclude women seeking personal injury damages. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Motions for class certification proceed under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites to a class action: (1) the class is so numerous

that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the

class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses

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- 3 - [03cv2496]

of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 

A proposed class must also satisfy one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). To certify a class

under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must demonstrate that: “the questions of law or fact common to the

members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that

a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

As the party seeking to certify a class, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they

satisfy each of the Rule 23 requirements. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180,

1187 (9th Cir. 2001); W. States Wholesale, Inc. v. Synthetic Indus., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 271, 274

(C.D. Cal. 2002). “In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the

plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether

the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 178 (1974)

(quoting Miller v Mackey Int’l., 452 F 2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the Court is “at liberty to consider evidence which goes to the requirements of Rule 23

even though the evidence may also relate to the underlying merits of the case.” Hanon v

Dataproducts Corp, 976 F 2d 497, 509 (9th Cir 1992).

ANALYSIS

I. The Class Cannot be Certified Because Ms. Krueger Cannot Adequately

Protect the Interests of the Class as it is Defined

Rule 23(a)(4) provides that class representatives must “fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy requirement is met if the class

representatives meet two conditions: (1) the named representatives must appear able to prosecute

the action vigorously through qualified counsel, and (2) the representatives must not have

antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class. Lerwill v. Inflight

Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has indicated that:

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The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest

between named parties and the class they seek to represent. A class

representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer

the same injury as the class members.

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Here, the proposed California class consists of “[a]ll California consumers who purchased

Wyeth’s Hormone Replacement Products . . . ;” thus, it would include both uninjured plaintiffs,

like Ms. Krueger, as well as injured plaintiffs. [Pl.’s Motion at 4.] Plaintiff states in her motion

that she seeks damages, punitive damages, and statutory damages, but in her reply indicates that

she only seeks statutory damages (i.e. a refund of the purchase price). If Plaintiff is only seeking

partial relief, and will not pursue damages for those that have manifest personal injuries, then she

is engaging in claim-splitting. 

“Claim splitting is generally prohibited by the doctrine of res judicata, which bars parties to

a prior action[,] or those in privity with them[,] from raising in a subsequent proceeding any claim

they could have raised in the prior action where all of the claims arise from the same set of

operative facts.” In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 219 F.R.D. 661, 668 (D.

Kan. 2004); see generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments 2d § 24 (1982) (stating the general

rule barring splitting claims). As a California court explained:

It is clear under California law a party cannot, as a general rule, split a single

cause of action because the first judgment bars recovery in a second suit on the

same cause. As a result, by seeking damages only for diminution in market value,

plaintiffs would effectually be waiving, on behalf of the hundreds of class

members, any possible recovery of potentially substantial damages–present or

future. This they may not do.

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 464 (1974) (internal citations omitted). 

Other courts agree that the existence of claim splitting constitutes a compelling reason to

deny class certification. For example, in Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp.

595, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court refused to certify a class where the class representatives

asserted claims of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, but not for death, injury, or

accident-related property damage due to allegedly defective tires. The Feinstein court’s rationale

applies here: 

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[A] serious question of adequacy of representation arises when the class

representatives profess themselves willing, as they do here, to assert on behalf of

the class only such claims as arise from the breach of an implied warranty . . .

Plaintiffs so tailored the class claims in an effort to improve the possibility of

demonstrating commonality. But that improvement–essentially cosmetic . . . was

purchased at the price of presenting putative class members with significant risks

of being told later that they had impermissibly split a single cause of action. 

Id.

In an analogous case, Pearl v. Allied Corp., 102 F.R.D. 921, 922-23 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the

court determined that the proposed named plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives because

they sought to recover the cost of removing an allegedly defective product, punitive damages, and

a fund for testing, screening and treatment of future medical problems, while they abandoned their

claims for present physical injury, dimunition in property value, and breach of express warranty. 

In another related case, a court refused to certify a medical monitoring class of smokers

because the class representatives failed to assert claims for personal injury on behalf of absent

class members. Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 550-51 (D. Minn. 1999). 

The court reasoned that “the possible prejudice to class members is simply too great for the Court

to conclude that the named Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with those of the class.” Id. at 551. 

Finally, a recent court from this District, confronted with a similar issue, cited Thompson

and found the class representative inadequate, in part, because he could not “simultaneously

represent injured and uninjured class members” and “abandon[] particular remedies to the

detriment of the class.” Drimmer v. WD-40 Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62582, *5-9 (S.D. Cal.

2007). The court also noted that “[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that res judicata would not

bar the class members from obtaining further relief [citation], the court cannot ignore the inference

that [the class representative] holds different priorities and litigation incentives than a typical class

member.” Id. at *8. 

In the present action, Plaintiff leaves the class open to those who have suffered personal

injuries, while stating she does not seek to pursue personal injury damages claims. As a result, the

Court finds that Plaintiff Krueger is an inadequate class representative under the current class

definition. 

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2

 The Court also DENIES Defendant’s request for judicial notice of supplemental authority

as moot.

3

 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff may be able to satisfy the adequacy requirement by

redefining the class and therefore DENIES the motion to certify without prejudice. However, the

Court also recognizes that Plaintiff’s claims are dependent on the resolution of legal questions that are

currently pending before the California Supreme Court. Several courts are waiting on the California

Supreme Court to resolve these “reliance” questions before rendering judgment on similar claims.

For example, a court in the Northern District of California recently stated: 

It is therefore unsettled, as a matter of California law, whether actual reliance is

required to plead a cause of action under [the] UCL or FAL. As the state’s highest

court is in the process of deciding this question, it would be imprudent for the court

to reach the issue at this time. Accordingly, the court reserves judgment on

plaintiffs’ UCL and FAL claims until after the California Supreme Court issues its

decisions on these cases. 

Faigman v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52192, *20-22 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also

Suzuki v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51605, *19-21 (N.D. Cal. 2007)

(“As the state’s highest court is in the process of deciding this [reliance] question, it would be

imprudent for the court to reach the issue at this time.”). Accordingly, this Court finds that it cannot

properly resolve Plaintiff’s claims until the California Supreme Court rules on these “reliance” issues.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to certify the class without

prejudice.2 3

 

DATED: February 19, 2008

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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