Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-01909/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-01909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

2 Petitioner acknowledges that Claim 10 is moot. (Dkt. 86 at 60.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael S. Gallegos, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-01-1909-PHX-NVW

 DEATH PENALTY CASE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

AND ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner Michael S. Gallegos’s amended petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Dkt. 74.)1

 Petitioner alleges, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that he was

convicted and sentenced to death in violation of the United States Constitution. (Id.) 

The amended petition raised 33 claims for relief. (Id.) Respondents filed an answer

to the petition and Petitioner filed a traverse. (Dkts. 68, 86.) In an order denying Petitioner’s

requests for evidentiary development, the Court dismissed Claim 30 based on a procedural

bar, Claim 31 on the merits, Claim 32 for failure to state a cognizable ground for habeas

relief, and Claim 33 as premature.2

 (Dkt. 106.) This Order addresses the procedural status

and/or the merits of the remaining claims and concludes, for the reasons set forth below, that

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 1 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Except where otherwise indicated, the following background is based upon the

facts as found by the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal from Petitioner’s conviction.

State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 6-8, 870 P.2d 1097, 1102-04 (1994) (Gallegos I).

- 2 -

BACKGROUND

In 1991, Petitioner was tried and convicted for the first degree murder of, and sexual

conduct with, eight-year-old Kendall Wishon.3

The victim lived with her mother, Cynthia Wishon, and Petitioner’s brother Jerry

Gallegos (Gallegos) in Phoenix. In November 1989, the victim’s half-brother, George

Smallwood, moved to Flagstaff to live with Petitioner and Petitioner’s family. Petitioner’s

parents became Smallwood’s legal guardians. Petitioner and Smallwood were friends and

attended high school together.

Smallwood visited his mother, Mrs. Wishon, and his half-sister, the victim, in Phoenix

during holidays, and Petitioner sometimes accompanied him. Petitioner and Smallwood were

on spring break in March 1990 and spent the week in the victim’s home in Phoenix. They

worked on their respective vehicles most of that week. In the afternoons, they were

responsible for supervising the victim when she came home from school because both Mrs.

Wishon and Gallegos worked during the day.

Gallegos worked at a truck and trailer repair shop in Phoenix. On Thursday, March

15, 1990, at about 4:30 p.m., Petitioner and Smallwood went to Gallegos’s repair shop to

work on their vehicles. After the other employees left for the day, Gallegos supervised both

Petitioner’s and Smallwood’s repair work. They drank some beer and worked on their

vehicles until about 9:30 p.m. On their way home, Gallegos purchased a case of beer. They

arrived home about 10:00 p.m. and continued working on the vehicles until about 10:30.

During this time, Gallegos shared a couple of beers from his case with them. When

Petitioner and Smallwood came into the house at about 10:30 p.m., the victim was bathing;

she went to bed shortly thereafter. Mrs. Wishon stopped by the victim’s room to kiss her

goodnight on her way to bed. Gallegos took a shower and then played a video game with

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 2 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner and Smallwood before he retired at about 11:30 p.m. On his way to bed, Gallegos

checked the case of beer and found that the case was all “basically there.”

As to the events that transpired later that night, Petitioner confessed on two occasions

and testified at trial as follows. After Gallegos retired, Petitioner and Smallwood continued

playing video games and drank more beer. Petitioner suggested that they go into the victim’s

room to fondle her; Smallwood agreed. Once they were inside the victim’s room, Petitioner

lifted her nightgown and rubbed baby oil on the small of her back. According to Petitioner,

when the girl began to awaken, Smallwood put his hand over her mouth and Petitioner put

his hand over Smallwood’s hand and over the victim’s nose. She gasped for air, struggled,

and made sounds “like a little pig” before eventually going limp. Believing that the victim

was dead, Petitioner and Smallwood decided to “finish her off.” They pulled her body off

the bed and placed her on the floor. According to Petitioner, Smallwood attempted to insert

his penis into the victim’s vagina. Petitioner then had anal intercourse with her for 15 to 20

minutes. During this time, Petitioner testified, Smallwood stuck his penis inside the victim’s

mouth. After Petitioner completed the sex act, the two carried the victim’s naked body out

of the house and down the street where they dropped it under a tree. They returned to the

house and went to bed.

Early the next morning, Mrs. Wishon and Gallegos got up to go to work. The couple

did not attempt to awaken the victim, who did not have school that day. Mrs. Wishon went

into Petitioner and Smallwood’s room to give them money to buy milk. Smallwood took the

money and went to the store. When he returned, Petitioner went outside to work on his

vehicle. After talking with Petitioner, Smallwood called Mrs. Wishon at work and told her

the victim was missing. Mrs. Wishon left work and arrived back at the house at about 10:00

a.m. Smallwood also contacted Gallegos and the police. When Gallegos and the police

arrived, they began an extensive search of the neighborhood. Petitioner and Smallwood

participated in the search but deliberately avoided the area where they had dropped the

victim’s body. At around 1:00 p.m., an unidentified boy alerted the police as to the body’s

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 3 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

location. The police found the victim’s naked body under the tree where it had been left the

night before. Petitioner’s confessions and testimony in his own defense are the only evidence

implicating Smallwood.

The victim’s body was located 250 feet from the house. The victim was lying supine

with her legs spread apart. The body was dirty and covered with grass. There was obvious

trauma to the vaginal area and some type of oil located on one leg and in the vaginal area.

The victim had sustained contusions to the left side of her face, her forehead, her right eye,

and the right side of her nose.

The medical examiner determined that the victim died of asphyxiation due to

suffocation. He testified at trial that the victim’s rectum was “marketedly dilated” and that

the anal trauma occurred while the victim was alive. He noted that the victim had various

bruises and abrasions on her face and body, some of which were red, indicating that they

occurred while the victim was still alive. She had also suffered a blunt force injury to her

head. Mrs. Wishon testified that, before the night of the murder, the victim had no noticeable

bruises or marks.

The police searched the victim’s house and seized numerous articles of evidence,

including her underwear, nightshirt, and bed sheet. In the kitchen, the police found an empty

beer bottle and two empty cardboard beer cartons in a plastic trash container. They also

found two empty beer cans on the dishwasher and noted several hard liquor bottles on the

kitchen shelves. In the carport, the police found another empty beer can and a large

cardboard box filled with empty beer and soda cans. The police photographed the victim’s

room and dusted it for fingerprints.

Because the house showed no signs of forced entry, the investigation focused on

Petitioner and Smallwood. The police transported them to the police station for questioning.

Detectives Armando Saldate, Jr., and Michael Chambers escorted them into separate

interview rooms. Detective Saldate advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights and then

questioned him while Detective Chambers questioned Smallwood. After initially denying

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 4 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

any involvement in the victim’s death, Petitioner confessed to Detective Saldate. He later

confessed a second time in the presence of both Detective Saldate and Detective Chambers.

The trial court determined that these confessions were voluntary.

When Smallwood was confronted with Petitioner’s confessions, he denied any

involvement in the victim’s death. He stated that if Petitioner had implicated him, it was only

because he did not want to take the blame alone. The two were subsequently indicted for the

murder and sexual molestation of the victim.

The State submitted blood samples taken from Petitioner and Smallwood, along with

the evidence obtained at the crime scene, to a forensic laboratory for DNA testing. The lab

later notified the State that Smallwood could not be included as a contributor to the evidence.

The State dismissed the case against Smallwood based on insufficient evidence.

During Petitioner’s trial, the parties stipulated that a fingerprint removed from the

victim’s bedroom matched Petitioner’s right middle finger; that semen was detected on the

victim’s panties, nightshirt, and bed sheet; that DNA testing showed that the stain on the

victim’s panties contained a banding pattern that matched the pattern obtained from

Petitioner’s blood; and that the probability that an individual other than Petitioner was the

source of the stain on the victim’s panties was one in 10 million for Caucasians and one in

67 million for Hispanics.

Petitioner took the stand in his own defense and testified that he participated in the

victim’s death. He maintained that he was drunk and did not intend to kill her. He also

testified that he believed the victim was dead at the time of the sexual penetration. On crossexamination, he was unable to explain the various bruises and abrasions on the victim’s

body. Petitioner was prepared to call Smallwood as a witness, but on the advice of counsel

Smallwood invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.

The jury unanimously found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder and sexual

conduct with a minor. The jury was divided, however, on whether the murder was

premeditated or felony murder.

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 5 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 John Antieau represented Petitioner on appeal and at resentencing. Greg Clark

represented Petitioner at trial and the initial sentencing.

5

 “PCR doc.” refers to documents filed in the state PCR proceedings (Case No.

CR1990-3339). “PR doc.” refers to documents filed with the Arizona Supreme Court in

connection with Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of post-conviction relief

(Case No. CR-01-0054-PC). “ROA” refers to the trial court record for Petitioner’s direct

appeal (Case No. CR-94-389-AP). “RT” refers to the reporter’s transcripts and “ME” to the

- 6 -

In sentencing Petitioner, the trial judge found two aggravating circumstances, that

Petitioner committed the murder in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, and that

he was an adult at the time of the offense and the victim was under 15 years of age. The

judge found one statutory mitigating factor, Petitioner’s age of 18, and two non-statutory

mitigating factors, Petitioner’s remorse and the recommendations of leniency from

Detectives Saldate and Chambers. After considering each of the mitigating circumstances,

the trial judge found that they were not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating

factors and call for leniency. The judge, noting that “[e]ach aggravating circumstance

standing alone outweighs the total mitigation,” sentenced Petitioner to death for the murder.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal but reversed and

remanded for resentencing, holding that the trial court had failed to consider whether

Petitioner’s impairment at the time of the crime, coupled with his history of drug and alcohol

abuse, constituted a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1,

5, 21, 870 P.2d 1097, 1101, 1117 (1994) (Gallegos I). A resentencing hearing was held by

the trial court on October 24, 1994.4

 The court found that Petitioner’s impairment and

history of alcohol and drug abuse constituted additional non-statutory mitigation. However,

it concluded that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for

leniency and re-sentenced Petitioner to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. See

State v. Gallegos, 185 Ariz. 340, 343, 916 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1996) (Gallegos II).

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for state post-conviction relief (PCR) and a

supplemental petition in the trial court. (PCR docs. 188, 204.)5

 The court denied relief on

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 6 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

minute entries of the trial court. The original reporter’s transcripts and certified copies of the

trial and post-conviction records were provided to this Court by the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Dkts. 14, 18.) 

- 7 -

most of the claims, but set an evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. (ME 9/28/00.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the court denied

those claims on the merits. (PCR doc. 227; see PR doc. 10.) Petitioner filed a petition for

review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which summarily denied relief. (PR docs. 1, 12).

Thereafter, Petitioner initiated the instant habeas proceedings.

EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971). 

The principle of exhaustion requires that a petitioner clearly alert the state court that

he is alleging a specific federal constitutional violation. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896,

913 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (general appeal

to due process not sufficient to present substance of federal claim); Lyons v. Crawford, 232

F.3d 666, 669-70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to

insufficiency of evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury, and ineffective assistance of

counsel lacked specificity and explicitness required); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106

(9th Cir. 1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient

to establish exhaustion.”). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either

by citing specific provisions of federal law or case law, Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670, or by citing

state cases that plainly analyze the federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 7 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); cf. Fields v. Washington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022

(9th Cir. 2005) (mere citation to a state case that conducts both a state and federal law

analysis does not, by itself, satisfy exhaustion).

In Arizona, there are two procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to exhaust

federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and post-conviction relief proceedings. Rule 32

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a

petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in

a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may

be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions and the petitioner can justify why

the claim was omitted from a prior petition or not presented in a timely manner. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state

court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. The procedural bar relied on by the state court must be independent of federal law

and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262

(1989). Arizona’s preclusion rule is independent of federal law, see Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (per curiam), and the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly determined that

Arizona regularly and consistently applies its preclusion rules such that they are an adequate

bar to federal review of a claim. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)

(finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and adequate); Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094,

1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).

Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in

state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in

order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931 (district court must consider

whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). If no remedies

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 8 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see also Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-

62.

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross,

468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of a

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure

to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional

violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were

not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Finally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the Court may dismiss plainly meritless

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court to

allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under § 2254 (b)(2) as

“plainly meritless”). Therefore, the Court will undertake an analysis of the procedural status

of Petitioner’s claims only where necessary.

AEDPA STANDARD FOR RELIEF

Petitioner’s habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief”

with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal

criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (2007) (quoting

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demands that state-court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)

(quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 9 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party’s claim

which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other nonsubstantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant

state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04

(1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction

became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649,

653 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief cannot be

granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896,

907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit

court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly established and

whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. 

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 10 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974. 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner

must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1939; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at

25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In

considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed

to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 11 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1939-40; Miller-El

II, 545 U.S. at 240. But it is only the state court’s factual findings, not its ultimate decision,

that are subject to 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42

(“The clear and convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection

pertains only to state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its rationale.

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those

circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state

court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal

court nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167

(citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state

court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo,

because in that circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to

accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

Claim 1 Violation of Ring v. Arizona

Petitioner contends that he was entitled to be sentenced by a jury under Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). (Dkt. 74 at 33-35.) In Ring, the Supreme Court held that

Arizona’s aggravating factors, as elements of the offense of capital murder, must be found

by a jury. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), however, the Court held that Ring

does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Because direct review

of Petitioner’s case was final prior to Ring, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief premised

on that ruling. Therefore, Claim 1 is without merit and will be denied. 

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 12 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey A. Hotham presided over

Petitioner’s trial, both sentencing proceedings, and the PCR proceedings. 

- 13 -

Claim 2 Judicial bias on resentencing

Petitioner alleges that his due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal was violated

because the trial judge was biased against him when he heard the case on remand.6

 (Dkt. 74

at 35-41.) For this proposition, Petitioner cites comments made by the judge indicating

“antagonism” toward Petitioner and “contempt” for the resentencing proceedings. (Id. at 35-

36.) He further contends that judicial bias was manifest in the “procedural irregularities” that

occurred on resentencing – namely, the judge’s failure to hold a “separate” sentencing

hearing after receiving the new mitigation evidence. (Id. at 36.) Respondents counter that

the claim is unexhausted and meritless. 

Background

At the end of the resentencing hearing, the victim’s mother made a statement to the

court in which she described the emotional trauma caused by the ongoing legal process,

stating that “every time something like this comes up, it’s just one more knife that gets

jabbed into me and my family and friends . . . and it’s a constant never ending hell.” (RT

10/24/94 at 171-72.) She concluded, “I beg of you not to change anything that has been

handed down already, because with all this going on, there seems like there’s no end, that

there’s just no end.” (Id. at 172.) The trial judge responded with the following comments,

which included a reference to the dissenting opinion in Gallegos I:

Let me apologize to everyone involved here for the obvious emotional

trauma. Here we are these many years later and the matter has to be dragged

up again. Justice Martone has referred to this – coming back to this court for

resentencing as a triumph of form over substance. This is simply a legal

exercise, technicality type of situation, and again I wanted to apologize to

everyone for my part in the fact that the supreme court determined that a

remand hearing was necessary.

(Id. at 172.) 

After the parties’ closing arguments, the judge proceeded to pronounce sentence.

Prior to reading the portion of his special verdict dealing with nonstatutory mitigating factors,

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 13 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

the judge remarked, “I honestly can say that I don’t understand the Supreme Court’s ruling,

but I will abide by their ruling and I will do exactly that.” (RT 10/24/94 at 188.) Citing

testimony elicited at the resentencing hearing, the court found that Petitioner’s impairment

at the time of the murder and his history of substance abuse constituted a nonstatutory

mitigating circumstance in addition to the circumstances previously found but concluded that

all of mitigating evidence considered cumulatively was not sufficiently substantial to

outweigh the aggravating factors and call for leniency. (Id. at 182-89.) In a final comment

noted by Petitioner, the judge stated that “even if the Arizona Supreme Court told this court

to weigh the alcohol and drug history and impairment ten times, this court would still find

that each aggravating circumstance standing alone would outweigh all collective mitigation.”

(Id. at 189-90.)

Analysis

Petitioner asserts that he exhausted his claim of judicial bias by raising it in his initial

and supplemental PCR petitions and in his petition for review (PR). (Dkts. 74 at 35, 86 at

35.) The Court disagrees and finds that the claim is procedurally barred.

Petitioner’s initial PCR petition contained the allegation that Judge Hotham should

have recused himself at resentencing because he was unable or unwilling to “genuinely

reweigh” the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and failed to do so. (PCR doc. 188

at 19.) The supplemental PCR petition raised the claim that “[t]here was no separate

sentencing hearing, as required by law.” (PCR doc. 204 at 21.) The PR simply alleged that

the trial court erred because it “failed to exercise its discretion in weighing aggravating and

mitigating circumstances on remand.” (PR doc. 1 at 5.) The PR sought “review of all claims

raised” in the PCR petitions (id. at 2) and included an appendix containing the petitions. In

none of these filings did Petitioner allege a violation of his federal constitutional rights based

upon the sentencing court’s bias. The claim is therefore not exhausted. See Casey v. Moore,

386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996).

In addition, the PCR court found Petitioner’s recusal claim “precluded pursuant to

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 14 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 Petitioner filed a motion seeking to remove Judge Hotham from the PCR

proceedings, alleging that he had an “interest or prejudice that prevented him from being fair

and impartial in further proceedings.” (PCR doc. 187 at 1.) The motion cited the judge’s

comments and rulings at resentencing. (Id. at 2-4.) Judge Reinstein, to whom the issue was

assigned, denied the motion, writing:

[T]he Court does not find the defendant’s allegations to constitute a claim of

interest or prejudice. . . . The sentencing judge did not refuse to apply the

instructions from the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court. His agreement

with the dissenting opinion did not mean he would not consider the mitigating

circumstances. In fact, it is clear that he did, but found the aggravating

circumstances to outweigh all of the collective mitigation presented.

As to the sentencing court’s “apology” for the resentencing, while one

could question the choice of words, in effect, the Court was apologizing as

much for its failure to recognize the need to consider the defendant’s

impairment on the night of the homicide and the defendant’s alcohol and drug

history as non-statutory mitigating circumstances at the original sentencing.

Contrary to the defendant’s position, the sentencing court did reweigh

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Of particular note is that the

Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the defendant’s death sentence. The

sentencing judge afforded the defendant a full resentencing hearing . . . despite

his explanation that the hearing was “simply a legal exercise, technicality type

situation.” While these remarks and others made may have been ill-advised,

they do not constitute a showing of interest or prejudice such that a fair and

impartial hearing cannot be had in the defendant’s Rule 32 proceedings.

(PCR doc. 192 at 1-2.)

8 The fact that Judge Hotham alternatively discussed the merits of the claim does

not affect the application of Rule 32.2(a)(3) because the judge “explicitly invoke[d] a state

procedural bar as a separate basis for decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10

(1989).

- 15 -

Rule 32.2(a)(3) (waived because not raised at trial or on appeal), and, alternatively was

necessarily determined by Judge Reinstein in denying Defendant’s motion for change of

judge filed at the beginning of the post-conviction relief proceeding.”7

 (PR doc. 10 at 1.)

This preclusion ruling rests on an independent and adequate state procedural bar.8

 See Smith,

536 U.S. at 860 (Arizona’s Rule 32.2(a) is independent of federal law); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at

931-32 (Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an adequate procedural bar). 

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 15 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

As cause to overcome the default, Petitioner asserts the ineffectiveness of appellate

counsel. (Dkt. 86 at 38.) Before ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may be used to

establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been presented to the state court as an

independent claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000); Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489-90; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988).

Petitioner contends (see Dkt. 86 at 38) that he exhausted a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel by alleging, in his initial PCR petition, “The denial of the Constitutional

Right of representations [sic] by a competent lawyer at every stage of the proceedings” (PCR

doc. 188 at 2). The Court disagrees. The remainder of the initial PCR petition raises no

claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; nor does the supplemental PCR petition or the

PR. (PCR doc’s 188, 204; PR doc. 1.) Because the Arizona Supreme Court has not had a

fair opportunity to rule on Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim alleged as cause, and Petitioner

may not exhaust those claims now, such claims are technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Therefore,

Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective appellate counsel cannot constitute cause to excuse the

default. See Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 453 (ineffective counsel as cause can itself be

procedurally defaulted).

 Even if Petitioner had properly exhausted a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, he would not be entitled to relief on this claim. Where ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel is raised as cause for excusing a procedural default,

application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), requires the Court to look to

the merits of the omitted issue. Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002);

United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995) (to determine if appellate counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise an issue on appeal “we examine the merits

of the omitted issue”). If the omitted issue is meritless, counsel’s failure to appeal does not

constitute a Sixth Amendment deprivation. Cook, 45 F.3d at 392-93. Because the Court has

determined that the claim is without merit, the Court need not determine whether ineffective

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 16 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

assistance of appellate counsel caused the default.

To succeed on a judicial bias claim, a petitioner must “overcome a presumption of

honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47

(1975). “In the absence of any evidence of some extrajudicial source of bias or partiality,

neither adverse rulings nor impatient remarks are generally sufficient to overcome the

presumption of judicial integrity, even if those remarks are ‘critical or disapproving of, or

even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases.’” Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057,

1067 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). In addition,

as the Supreme Court explained in Liteky, “It has long been regarded as normal and proper

for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving

the same defendant.” 510 U.S. at 555; cf. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 57 (having the same judge

retry a case after remand does not violate due process).

On federal habeas review, the Court “must ask whether the state trial judge’s behavior

rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United

States Constitution.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). “To sustain a

claim of this kind, there must be an ‘extremely high level of interference’ by the trial judge

which creates ‘a pervasive climate of partiality and unfairness.’” Id. (quoting United States

v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Read in the context of the entire resentencing proceeding, the judge’s comments

neither suggested that he had a personal grievance against Petitioner nor created a pervasive

climate of partiality and bias. As Respondents note, in apologizing for the necessity of

holding the resentencing proceedings, the judge quoted from Judge Martone’s dissent in

Gallegos I. His comments were not directed against Petitioner but expressed frustration on

behalf of the victim’s family and regret at his role in prolonging the proceedings. The

judge’s other comments, while hyperbolic, simply reflect his conclusion regarding the weight

to be ascribed to Petitioner’s impairment and substance abuse history as a nonstatutory

mitigating circumstance. The remarks did not reveal opinions of “such a high degree of

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 17 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. 

Finally, even assuming that the judge was biased, there was no prejudice because the

Arizona Supreme Court independently reviewed the sentence and determined that the death

penalty was appropriate. Gallegos II, 185 Ariz. at 348, 916 P.2d at 1064.

Conclusion

Claim 2 is both procedurally barred and meritless. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief. 

Claims 3-9 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges that defense counsel performed in a constitutionally ineffective

manner during the guilt and penalty stages of his trial. The PCR court denied these claims

after holding an evidentiary hearing. (PCR doc. 227; see PR doc. 10 at 2.)

Clearly established federal law

For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicable law is set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88. Review of counsel’s performance under

Strickland is “extremely limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.

1998), judgment rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). “The test has nothing to do

with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers

would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted,

in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” Id.

The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 466

U.S. at 689. Thus, to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, deficient performance, a defendant

must overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might

be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. For example, while trial counsel has “a duty to make

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 18 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary, . . . a particular decision not to investigate must be directly

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference

to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 691. To determine whether the investigation was reasonable,

the court “must conduct an objective review of [counsel’s] performance, measured for

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, which includes a context-dependent

consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The

Supreme Court has reiterated, “In judging the defense’s investigation, as in applying

Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to ‘counsel’s perspective

at the time’ investigative decisions are made” and by applying deference to counsel’s

judgments. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689).

Because an ineffective assistance claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the

reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed”). A petitioner must

affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. To demonstrate prejudice, he “must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. In assessing prejudice, the court

should presume “the judge or jury acted according to law,” and “should proceed on the

assumption that the decision-maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying

the standards that govern the decision.” Id. at 694-95. 

“When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 19 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. In answering that question, a reviewing court necessarily

considers the strength of the state’s case. See Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 999 (9th Cir.

2005) (“even if counsel’s conduct was arguably deficient, in light of the overwhelming

evidence of guilt, [the petitioner] cannot establish prejudice”); Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d

835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1997) (where state’s case is weak, there is a greater likelihood that the

outcome of the trial would have been different in the absence of deficient performance). 

Also inherent in the prejudice analysis demanded by Strickland is the principle that

in order to demonstrate that counsel failed to litigate an issue competently, a petitioner must

prove that the issue was meritorious. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375

(1986). For example, with respect to allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to

file a motion, in order to demonstrate prejudice a petitioner “must show that (1) had his

counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as

meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been

an outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citing Morrison, 477 U.S. at 373-74); see Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d at 1173-74. 

Finally, the Court notes that under the AEDPA its review of the state court’s decision

is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002). In order

to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that the state

court’s ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable application of

Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Claim 3 Counsel “abandoned” Petitioner at trial by conceding guilt

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel’s strategy of conceding Petitioner’s role in the

victim’s death, together with his negative comments to the jury about Petitioner and his

actions, amounted to an abandonment of all defenses such that prejudice is presumed under

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). (Dkt. 74 at 41-56.) He contends that the PCR

court erred in applying the Strickland standard in rejecting this claim. Finally, he argues that

even under Strickland counsel’s performance was ineffective. 

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 20 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

Background

Trial

In his opening statement, counsel spoke of the “uncomfortable position” he was in

defending Petitioner, the difficulty of the jurors’ role, the horrific nature of the crime, and its

tragic effects on the victim’s family. (RT 3/7/91 at 47-49.) He continued: “What my client

has done is despicable. He’s absolutely responsible for the death of Kendall Wishon in this

case, and at the end of this case I’m going to ask you to convict my client, but we’re not quite

at that point yet.” (Id. at 47.) Cousnel also indicated that Petitioner would testify, explaining

that he “is the key in this case”:

You will hear from Mr. Gallegos. He will tell you what I have told you.

It will be difficult. It will be ugly. It will be horrible. But nonetheless, in

order for me to paint my picture, in order for me to paint that picture of events

as it truly happened, you have to hear from him . . . 

You can’t make that decision in a case of this magnitude, I believe,

unless you hear from him. And you will. He will get up and tell you what he

told Detective Saldate. He will tell you of his responsibility in this case; that

he is responsible. He will tell you of Mr. Smallwood. My client will get up

there and he will literally bear his soul to you so that you can make a fair and

adequate decision in this case.

(Id. at 49-50.) 

Counsel concluded his opening statement by reiterating that the State had the burden

of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that what they say is true, what they have accused

Michael Gallegos of doing is the truth, and that what they are asking you to convict him of

is first degree murder and sexual conduct with a minor.” (Id. at 51.) Counsel then stated:

I am asking you to be fair. I’m asking you to convict my client. I’m

asking you to make a fair and realistic assessment of the facts as they will be

represented to you. And I think that’s all I can ask. That’s all the court and

the system can demand of you. It’s a very difficult duty, and I hope you do it

well.

(Id.)

At trial, counsel vigorously cross-examined Dr. Bolduc, the medical examiner,

attempting to cast doubt on his testimony that the victim’s injuries indicated she was sexually

assaulted pre-mortem. (RT 3/11/91 at 51-65.) Counsel presented Petitioner’s testimony on

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 21 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

the last day of trial. Petitioner testified that he was extremely intoxicated at the time of the

crime, that Smallwood was an equal participant, that the victim’s death was accidental, that

he believed the victim was dead when he penetrated her, and that he was sorry for what he

had done. (RT 3/13/01 at 46-72.) 

The next day, during his closing argument, counsel explained to the jury:

Yesterday, I put my client on the stand and I treated him with taming

[sic] contempt. I don’t normally do that. But I though it was called for in this

case. You needed to see Michael Gallegos. You needed to see that he is not

the person that the State has portrayed to you. You needed to see that he’s a

child. He’s a man-child. He’s pathetic, he’s despicable, but he’s a child.

You needed to see what Detective Saldate saw. . . . He told you he

believed Michael Gallegos. Michael told him that he never intended for this

to happen. And he told you that he believed him. 

(RT 3/14/91 at 28.)

Counsel further informed the jury:

I told you in my opening that I felt uncomfortable. I do. Several times

throughout the course of this trial, that was willfully [sic] apparent. And I’m

sorry for that. But I don’t think to characterize the situation in any other

manner other than it’s very, very real. Stark reality is fair. I think I would

insult you. . . . I didn’t want to get up here and on behalf of my client deny

things that are not in dispute. The facts, as Mr. Stalzer [the prosecutor] related

them to you are not in dispute. His theory is, though.

(Id. at 25-26.) 

Counsel again acknowledged that Petitioner was “absolutely responsible for the taking

of Kendall Wishon’s life,” adding: “That is extremely difficult for me to say. It’s probably

extremely difficult for a lot of people to hear. But it’s true.” (Id. at 26.)

However, counsel proceeded to attack the allegation that Petitioner “knew he would

cause the death of Kendall and that he did so with premeditation.” (Id.) Counsel argued:

The State’s theory in this case is that George Smallwood, Michael

Gallegos were playing Nintendo, two 18-year-old high school boys, were

playing Nintendo and that when they walked into the bedroom of Kendall

Wishon, that they experienced those feelings. I think that that is absurd. I

don’t believe that the evidence in any way, shape, or form showed you that

that was the case.

(Id. at 26-27.)

Counsel urged the jury to set aside its passions and “make a fair and just assessment

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 22 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

of the facts.” (Id. at 27.) He then continued his attack on the first degree murder charge and

argued for conviction on a lesser count:

One of the instructions that you are going to receive is an instruction

that deals with the crime of reckless manslaughter, and what that says is if the

defendant caused the death of another person by conduct showing a conscious

disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, then you can find him

guilty of that. I submit to you that all of the facts that you have heard certainly

show that that was the case.

Mr. Stalzer has told you about premeditation. To me that’s just that

somehow my client was cunning, he was cold, he was calculating when he did

this. I would simply ask you to think of what he told you, think of what he

told Detective Saldate, think of what Saldate said about him. He was telling

the truth.

(Id. at 29.)

Next counsel discussed the medical examiner’s testimony:

We’ve had some testimony from Dr. Bolduc about post-mortem

injuries, about time of death, about the injuries that were present on the body

of young Kendall. I think you have heard enough to make the decision in that

regard for yourself.

(Id. at 30-31.)

Counsel concluded his closing argument by again apologizing to the jurors for the

difficulty of their task and asking the jury to be fair. (Id. at 30.)

PCR proceedings

Testifying at the evidentiary hearing before the PCR court, counsel disputed the

allegation that he had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial. (RT 12/1/00

at 6.) He explained that his strategy in conceding Petitioner’s responsibility for the victim’s

death was to ask the jury “to consider very seriously not finding him responsible for a first

degree murder but something lesser.” (Id. at 10.) He described his theory of the case as

follows:

[T]hat given Michael’s age, given his alcohol consumption, given his

. . . prior history, his upbringing, that this was in no way shape or form a

premeditated act. It was a lesser . . . type of situation, and we couldn’t escape,

given his statements, . . . the fact that he beared [sic] some responsibility, but

it was just an effort to characterize that.

(Id. at 39.)

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 23 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

Counsel defended his negative comments about Petitioner in his opening statement

as an attempt to prepare the jury for the horrific facts they were going to hear and to maintain

the defense’s credibility:

[I]t was going to draw the string with some very horrible facts that were going

to come in. We needed to set the stage for what was going to happen because

his statements [to Detective Saldate] were going to come in. We had already

litigated those . . . and I think you lose a lot of ground in a trial by simply by

trying to say, you know, it’s red when it’s really black. . . . This was going to

come down to the credibility of Michael and the believability of Michael. And

to . . . characterize what had happened in any type of a fashion less than what

it was, I think would have been . . . certainly ineffective. I mean, you can’t

dance around the issues in every case. And I think this was one that called for

us to simply step up to the plate and confront them and call them what they

were because otherwise I think . . . given the facts as they were about to unfold

at that point, given the pretrial rulings, we knew we had a tough road. And I

think to simply ignore things at that point would have been a disservice, and

I think would have clearly been . . . a less than adequate job.

(Id. at 25-26.) 

Counsel added that his comments during opening were “not an attempt to vilify or

distance myself from Michael. I mean, I think quite the opposite. We needed to . . . strongly

characterize what had happened accurately and then . . . explain the reasons for the conduct.”

(Id. at 34.) Counsel also testified that he had discussed this approach with Petitioner. (Id.

at 41-42.)

Counsel acknowledged that in his opening statement, when he conceded Petitioner’s

guilt and asked the jury to convict him, he did not qualify his statements by specifying a

charge less than first degree murder. (Id. at 27.) He testified that he did so purposely. (Id.

at 28.) He indicated that his strategy was “to present to the jury the facts and arguments from

which they would find him guilty of a lesser offense.” (Id. at 41.) Counsel testified that his

approach to the case was a “reasonable tactic based on [his] experience.” (Id. at 42.)

The PCR court, in denying Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance, determined

that the applicable standard was Strickland, not Cronic, because “trial counsel’s performance

did not constitute abandonment.” (PCR doc. 227 at 2.) The court then set forth its

application of Strickland’s two-pronged standard:

As to the first prong, the Court finds that Petitioner has not sufficiently

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 24 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

shown that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Because of the

overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt, it was reasonable for trial

counsel to adopt a strategy that could result in a conviction for a lesserincluded offense such as second degree murder or manslaughter, thereby

avoiding the death penalty. . . . To make a request for manslaughter, as trial

counsel did in closing argument here, it was important for him to maintain

credibility with the jurors, which might explain his tactics and choice of

wording during his opening statement. His words about the “despicable

conduct” of the Defendant were harsh, but probably added to counsel’s

credibility with the jury when pleading for manslaughter; there simply is no

way to sugar-coat the sodomization and murder of an eight year old female

child. 

(Id.)

The court then explained that even if counsel’s performance had been deficient,

Petitioner would not be entitled to relief under Strickland because he failed to prove

prejudice: 

[T]he State’s evidence was completely overwhelming: The Defendant

confessed twice to two different police detectives, and the DNA evidence in

Kendall’s rectum linked to the Defendant was devastating to the defense; all

the other evidence corroborated the Defendant’s guilt. There is no reasonable

probability that, but for any errors made by trial counsel, the result of the trial

would have been any different.

(Id. at 3.)

Analysis

In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court created an exception to the Strickland

standard for egregious cases evidencing an actual breakdown in the adversarial process at

trial. 466 U.S. at 656-58. In such cases, the prejudicial impact of counsel’s performance is

presumed and need not be proved. Id. at 659-60; see United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d

1070, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner argues that Cronic, rather than Strickland, provides

the appropriate analytical framework for evaluating defense counsel’s efforts. Controlling

case law dictates otherwise. 

In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 176 (2004), the Court held that defense counsel’s

failure to obtain the defendant’s express consent to a strategy of conceding guilt during a

capital trial did not automatically render counsel’s performance deficient. The Court rejected

the assertion that counsel’s effectiveness should be evaluated under the per se prejudice

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 25 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

standard of Cronic, explaining that the Cronic standard is a “narrow exception to Strickland’s

holding” and is “reserved for situations in which counsel has entirely failed to function as the

client’s advocate.” Id. at 189-90. Instead, the Court applied the Strickland standard and held

that, under the circumstances of the case, counsel’s concession strategy was reasonable. Id.

at 188-89. 

Similarly, in United States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005), defense

counsel, faced with overwhelming evidence, conceded his client’s guilt in an effort to

enhance the defendant’s credibility while attempting to avoid conviction on other charges.

The Ninth Circuit, citing Nixon, held that counsel’s performance did not descend to the level

of a complete failure to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing such

that it was presumptively prejudicial. Id.; see Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir.

1999) (in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt “it was an entirely reasonable strategy for

[defendant’s] trial counsel to concede [that defendant raped the victim] and focus his efforts

on persuading the jury that [the defendant] did not have the intent to commit first-degree

murder, and/or persuading the jury to spare [his] life”).

In Petitioner’s case, counsel actively advocated on his client’s behalf throughout the

trial, examining the State’s witnesses, including the medical examiner, and presenting

Petitioner’s testimony in an attempt to advance the theory that Petitioner, while responsible

for the victim’s death and therefore guilty of lesser-included offenses, should not be

convicted of first degree murder. See Milliner v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“Throughout the trial, petitioner’s attorney was an active participant: he cross-examined

witnesses, made proper objections, and presented a closing argument. This level of

representation does not fall below the low threshold required by Cronic.”); Hooper v. Mullin,

314 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 2002) (Cronic inapplicable where “[d]efense counsel crossexamined the State’s guilt-stage witnesses, made objections to the State’s evidence, presented

some evidence in Petitioner’s defense, and made opening and closing arguments”).

Moreover, counsel articulated a strategic purpose for his concession of Petitioner’s

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 26 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

guilt and his acknowledgment of the egregious nature of the crime; namely, he was

attempting to establish credibility with the jury. Courts have recognized this as a valid

strategy rather than a form of abandonment that would trigger the Cronic presumption of

prejudice. See Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1058 (counsel “had a sensible reason for not contesting

Thomas’s participation in the . . . robbery: it was, for all practical purposes, incontestible, and

he believed that doing so would enhance his credibility on counts where the evidence was

somewhat less clear and the penalties significantly greater”); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892,

906 (9th Cir. 2006) (counsel conceded his client’s guilt to protect his own credibility and

avoid conviction on other charges).

Because counsel subjected the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and had

a strategic basis for his concession of guilt, the Cronic presumption of prejudice does not

apply, and the Court will evaluate Claim 3 using the Strickland standard.

It is not necessary for the Court to assess the quality of counsel’s performance because

it is clear that Petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. Uncontested evidence, including Petitioner’s confessions and corroborative DNA

evidence, established that Petitioner killed the victim and sexually assaulted her. Given this

evidence, there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different

verdict if counsel had adopted a different defense theory or used different tactics at trial. See

Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1059; see also Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2002)

(counsel’s failure to obtain defendant’s consent before conceding in opening argument that

defendant was guilty of second-degree murder did not prejudice defendant where prosecution

possessed nearly conclusive evidence that defendant committed offense.); Parker v. Head,

244 F.3d 831, 840 (11th Cir. 2001) (counsel’s strategic decision to concede defendant’s guilt

did not amount to ineffective assistance in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, including

defendant’s admissible confession).

Conclusion

The PCR court’s rejection of this claim did not constitute an unreasonable application

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 27 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

of Cronic and Strickland. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 3.

Claim 4 Failure to introduce exculpatory photographic evidence 

Petitioner alleges that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to introduce

photographic evidence showing George Smallwood’s fingernails and the scratches on the

victim’s face. (Dkt. 74 at 56-59.) According to Petitioner, as a “chronic nail biter” his

fingernails, in contrast to Smallwood’s, were too short to have caused the scratches, a fact

which would have corroborated Petitioner’s testimony, supported a conviction on a lesser

count, and established several mitigating factors. (Id.)

At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that Petitioner had short nails as a result

of his nail-biting habit and that photographs had been taken of his and Smallwood’s hands.

(RT 12/1/00 at 14.) Counsel acknowledged that Petitioner’s testimony might have been

corroborated by evidence showing that Smallwood’s nails were more capable of causing the

scratches on the victim’s face. (Id. at 15.) However, counsel was concerned because the

photos of Petitioner showed cuts to the back of his hands; the State could have argued that

the injuries were caused in Petitioner’s struggle with the victim. (Id. at 16.) At the

evidentiary hearing counsel also noted that he had presented testimony from Petitioner’s

mother that Petitioner had a habit of biting his fingernails. (Id. at 35; see RT 3/13/91 at 29-

30.) Finally, counsel testified that Petitioner’s nails, while chewed down, were capable of

leaving scratches. (RT 12/1/00 at 43)

The PCR court found that there was “no merit” to this claim. (PCR doc. 227 at 3.)

This ruling is not an unreasonable application of Strickland because Petitioner can show

neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Counsel explained that he was aware of the

photos and made a tactical decision not to open the door to evidence of injuries to

Petitioner’s hands. According to Strickland, such strategic choices are “virtually

unchallengeable.” 466 U.S. at 690. Petitioner himself acknowledged that he participated

with Smallwood in smothering the victim, so little relevance would have attached to evidence

that his nails were shorter than Smallwood’s and perhaps less likely to have left the scratches

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 28 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 The applicable statute, A.R.S. § 13-1405(A), provides: “ A person commits

sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse

or oral sexual contact with any person who is under eighteen years of age.” 

As discussed in Claim 20, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s theory in

Gallegos I on “public policy” and other grounds. 178 Ariz. at 8-10, 870 P.2d at 1104-06.

- 29 -

on the victim’s face. To the extent that such evidence had any value, counsel realized it

through the testimony of Petitioner’s mother.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 4.

Claim 5 Failure to prepare for cross-examination of medical

examiner

Claim 6 Failure to retain independent expert to challenge medical

examiner

Petitioner alleges that counsel performed ineffectively in his presentation of the theory

that Petitioner had sex with a corpse rather than a human being. (Dkt. 74 at 60-63.) Pursuant

to this theory, Petitioner was technically not guilty of sexual conduct with a minor because

the offense required both a living victim and a belief on Petitioner’s part that the victim was

alive.9

 Petitioner faults counsel for failing to prepare for his cross-examination of the

medical examiner and for failing to retain an independent expert to support the defense

theory. (Id.) 

Analysis

The PCR court found these claims meritless. (PCR doc. 227 at 3.) This decision was

not an unreasonable application of Strickland because Petitioner cannot establish that

counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial. 

With respect to Claim 5, the record refutes Petitioner’s argument that counsel was

unprepared to cross-examine Dr. Bolduc. As previously noted, defense counsel questioned

the medical examiner regarding the timing of the victim’s injuries, challenging Dr. Bolduc’s

testimony that the anal penetration occurred prior to death. (RT 3/11/91 at 51-65.) 

 In support of his allegation that counsel was unprepared, Petitioner cites an incident

during Dr. Bolduc’s testimony when counsel became aware that certain notes and diagrams

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 29 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 -

from Dr. Bolduc’s report had not been disclosed. Counsel moved to exclude the materials;

the court took a recess to allow counsel to review the information, which documented blunt

force trauma to the victim’s head. (Id. at 31-37.) After reviewing the documents, counsel

withdrew his motion, informing the court:

Based upon my discussions with [Dr. Bolduc] . . . it appears that the

items are not going to make much of a difference to his opinions as it relates

to the typed version [which was disclosed to counsel]. I take it from speaking

to him there is going to be no surprise. Obviously I will listen closely; if there

is, I will jump up. But based upon what he’s told me, I’m not going to be

surprised about anything.

(Id. at 37-38.) 

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, counsel reiterated that the omitted material

was “not significant because clearly it was referred to within the body of the report, and it

was not something that I did not know about.” (RT 12/1/01 at 47.) Counsel further indicated

that his focus when cross-examining Dr. Bolduc was the injury to the victim’s rectum and

whether it was consistent with pre- or post-mortem sexual assault, explaining that his goal

was to point out inconsistencies in Dr. Bolduc’s testimony regarding the timing of the

victim’s death. (Id. at 44-45.) Based upon this record, Petitioner has not shown that counsel

performed at a constitutionally ineffective level with respect to his handling of Dr. Bolduc’s

testimony. 

Regarding Claim 6, counsel did not present a defense expert to testify on Petitioner’s

behalf. At the PCR evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he made efforts to retain an

independent medical examiner, contacting a pathologist in Los Angeles. (RT 12/1/00 at 11.)

However, counsel “was unable to secure an opinion that would have directly contradicted Dr.

Bolduc’s opinion” that the penetration occurred pre-mortem. (Id. at 48.)

Petitioner offers nothing but speculation that an expert witness could have been found

whose testimony would have supported the defense theory. This is insufficient to support

an allegation of ineffective performance or prejudice, particularly in light of counsel’s efforts

to locate such an expert and his substantial cross-examination of Dr. Bolduc. See Bower v.

Quarterman, 497 F.3d 459, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2007) (decision not to call an expert witness to

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 30 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 -

rebut the state’s ballistics evidence did not constitute deficient performance where counsel

felt the evidence was weak and brought out those weaknesses in cross-examination of the

state’s experts); see also Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (speculation

as to what expert might say “is insufficient to establish prejudice”); Grisby v. Blodgett, 130

F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“complaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review because

allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely speculative” and “to

demonstrate the requisite Strickland prejudice, [petitioner] must show not only that [the]

testimony would have been favorable, but also that the witness would have testified at trial.”)

(citations omitted).

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claims 5 and 6.

Claim 7 Requiring Petitioner to testify

Petitioner alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by requiring him to

testify without valid strategic or tactical reasons and without a full investigation and welldeveloped defense theory. (Dkt. 74 at 64-66.) He contends that his testimony was harmful

and unnecessary, given that Detective Saldate had already related all the details of his

confession to the jury. (Id.) Petitioner also asserts that counsel expressed contempt for him

and that the decision to put him on the stand was the product of a conflict of interest

stemming from counsel’s desire to ingratiate himself with the jury and distance himself from

Petitioner. (Id.)

Background

At the evidentiary hearing before the PCR court, counsel disagreed with the

contention that Petitioner’s testimony offered nothing beneficial to the defense: 

[I]t was my feeling that the jury in this case and in this type of case,

given the facts of the case and given the elements of what we were dealing

with, really needed to hear from Michael. They needed to make their own

assessment of him and make those critical credibility judgments that they had

to make given what we were asking them to do.

(RT 12/1/00 at 10.) When asked why he did not rely solely on Detective Saldate’s testimony

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 31 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 32 -

to put Petitioner’s version of events before the jury, counsel responded:

Well, you know, coming from a police officer that’s somewhat coldhearted and dispassionate, and it is a little bit worse, you know, than coming

from a defendant. I think in Michael’s situation he was a young man. He was

eighteen years old. . . . He was not sophisticated. He was not somebody that

was cold-blooded and uncaring, and I thought the jury needed to see that, to

see that he was literally a child. That he was not, you know, the man the State

was trying to portray him as. I mean, he was not that type of person.

(Id. at 49-50.) 

Counsel further explained that Petitioner’s testimony was necessary to demonstrate

his remorse, to detail his history of alcohol abuse, and to generate sympathy from the jury

by showing that he was “an honest and polite young person” who came from a “good, strong

family” and had “good support.” (Id. at 50-51.) Counsel stated that he “was hoping . . . that

. . . those values would come out and be apparent in front of a jury and maybe they would

realize that here was a poor young man who made a tragic mistake.” (Id. at 51.) According

to counsel, Petitioner’s testimony was also required to support the defense theory that the

victim was dead at the time of the sexual contact. (Id.)

When asked to characterize his demeanor toward Petitioner when Petitioner testified

at trial, counsel answered:

You know, it kind of went back and forth. . . . I put Michael on, and at

times it’s my recollection during his testimony – I mean, he and I had talked

about areas that we were going to directly confront, and he needed to let this

jury see him address those issues. And, you know, he was – he was certainly

very scared about it. He certainly . . . had some, I guess, reluctance to talk, and

I pushed him. I pushed him when he was on the stand because . . . I felt that

the jury needed to make . . . a real critical assessment of him. . . . He had a lot

of things going for him, and he had simply made a bad mistake, and they

needed . . . to make that assessment. And it is hard to make that assessment of

someone if they are sitting there being mute and emotionless, and that’s who

we tried to get out of Michael in front of the jury.

(Id. at 22-23.) Counsel acknowledged being “forthright” with Petitioner, asking “very direct

questions” and not “babying him when he was on the stand,” but he denied treating Petitioner

with contempt. (Id. at 23.)

Counsel also testified that, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, he did not force or

require Petitioner to testify:

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 32 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 33 -

[M]y recollection is that I didn’t force . . . Michael or put Michael – that

was a decision that we made. Before my opening statement we had discussed

it for some time because I would never have said what I said in my opening

statement . . . that he was going to take the stand, that these people were going

to hear from him unless I had discussed that, and I explicitly have a very clear

memory of discussing it with Michael, of writing a letter to Michael

memorializing our discussions with respect to what I was going to do in

opening because I told Michael I didn’t want to have any surprises. . . . [W]e

talked about him taking the stand and, you know, that type of point, you know,

this room is not a room to be timid in, and we decided . . . that, heck, this is

how we were going to play it. 

(Id. at 21-22.)

In contrast, Petitioner testified that he did not recall receiving a letter from counsel,

that the decision that he would testify was made on short notice, and that he had mixed

feelings about testifying but acceded to counsel’s advice. (Id. at 85-86.)

Applying Strickland, the PCR court found that the decision to offer Petitioner’s

testimony was a strategic matter and did not amount to deficient performance:

Calling the Defendant as a witness was also reasonable strategy because

that was the only way to emphasize the Defendant’s extreme intoxication that

night, which was very important to defeat the State’s claim of premeditation

and specific intent. The Defendant’s testimony also raised the issue of George

Smallwood’s complicity and the fact that it was George who put his hand over

Kendall’s mouth, causing her death by asphyxiation.

(PCR doc. 227 at 3.) The court also found that Petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice in

light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. (Id.) 

Analysis

The decision of the PCR court did not represent an unreasonable application of

Strickland. Counsel’s performance was not deficient. He explained that there were strategic

reasons for calling Petitioner as a witness. Petitioner was able to provide first-hand

information in support of key elements of the defense: his level of intoxication, the accidental

nature of the victim’s death, the extent of Smallwood’s participation, the assertion that the

victim was dead at the time he penetrated her, and Petitioner’s remorse. Counsel also

believed that Petitioner would be a sympathetic witness and that in order to humanize him

and explain his actions to the jury he would have to testify. 

The record indicates that counsel’s strategy was fully considered, developed in

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 33 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 34 -

consultation with Petitioner, and “the result of reasonable professional judgement.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. As the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated: “To declare that it was

wrong because in hindsight it proved unsuccessful and must have been uninformed is not

what the Supreme Court intended when we analyze a Strickland claim after the fact.”

Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 761 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Given the evidence presented by the

State, trial counsel’s tactical decision to advise [petitioner] to testify was reasonable.”). 

Having found that counsel’s performance was not deficient under Strickland, it is

unnecessary to address the question of prejudice. Nevertheless, the Court notes that

Petitioner’s allegations of prejudice are unpersuasive. Petitioner asserts that the decision to

present his testimony was harmful because the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court

relied on the testimony to find that he acted with foresight and appreciated the wrongfulness

of his conduct and to establish cruelty as an aggravating factor. To the contrary, the

information most damaging to Petitioner’s defense was contained in Detective Saldate’s

testimony. To the extent Petitioner’s testimony offered additional information, it tended to

reduce his culpability by emphasizing his level of impairment and the absence of any intent

to kill the victim.

Claim 7 is without merit and will be denied. 

Claim 8 Denial of right to counsel at resentencing

Petitioner alleges that the trial court denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel by its handling of his pro per motion for new counsel. (Dkt. 74 at 66-68.)

At the resentencing hearing, the court discussed with Petitioner and counsel a letter

Petitioner had sent to the court requesting a new attorney. (RT 10/24/94 at 108-10.) During

the discussion, Petitioner first told the judge that he would like the letter to be entered into

the record. (Id. at 108.) He then indicated, however, that he and his attorney had “resolved”

the issue and Petitioner had “agreed to keep him on as my attorney” and wanted him to

handle the hearing. (Id. at 109.) After Petitioner told the judge he was withdrawing his

request for new counsel, the judge gave him back the letter and it was not entered into the

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 34 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 35 -

record. (Id. at 110.)

The PCR court found this claim “precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) (waived

because not raised at trial or on appeal), and alternatively, . . . not colorable.” (PR doc. 10

at 1.) This preclusion ruling rests on an independent and adequate state procedural bar. See

Smith, 536 U.S. at 860; Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931-32. 

Petitioner alleges that the procedural default of this claim is excused by the ineffective

performance of his appellate counsel. (Dkt. 86 at 57-58.) As stated above with respect to

Claim 2, because Petitioner failed to exhaust an independent claim of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel in state court, such an allegation cannot constitute cause for the

procedural default of Claim 8. In addition, the issue omitted by appellate counsel is

meritless. Petitioner withdrew his request for new counsel after discussing the matter with

current counsel. The record clearly indicates that he was not, as he now contends, dissuaded

from filing his letter, but agreed to withdraw the document when the judge informed him that

he could do so if he wished. (RT 10/24/94 at 110.) To the extent Petitioner alleges that his

counsel was ineffective at resentencing, that claim will be discussed below.

Claim 9 Failure to investigate and present mitigating information at

sentencing 

Petitioner alleges that trial and resentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance

by failing to sufficiently investigate and present evidence concerning his mental health and

personal history. (Dkt. 74 at 68-77.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in his supplemental PCR petition, alleging that counsel

performed ineffectively by failing to explore Petitioner’s mental health background,

specifically the “origins, extent and implications of Petitioner’s learning disability.” (PCR

doc. 204 at 22-23.) The PCR court denied the claim, finding neither deficient performance

nor prejudice. (PR doc. 10 at 2.) 

This Court previously found the claim exhausted but denied Petitioner’s requests for

evidentiary development. (Dkt. 106.) Having reviewed the merits of the claim, the Court

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 35 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 This language reflects the statutory mitigating factor set forth in A.R.S. § 13-

703(G)(1).

- 36 -

finds, for the reasons set forth below, that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

Background

Initial sentencing

At the guilt phase of trial, Petitioner’s mother testified about his learning disability

and alcohol consumption. (RT 3/13/91 at 23-32.) Petitioner himself testified that he suffered

from a learning disability; he also detailed his alcohol consumption on the day of the crimes.

(Id. at 34-35, 37-41, 42-58, 84-90, 112-16.)

Following Petitioner’s conviction, counsel moved for a “diagnostic evaluation” of

Petitioner pursuant to Rule 26.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (ROA 119.)

The court granted the motion and appointed Dr. John DiBacco to evaluate Petitioner and

determine whether, at the time of the crime, his “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of

his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of the law was significantly impaired,

but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.”10 (ROA 122.) Counsel

prepared a sentencing memorandum and attached to it the predispositional reports written by

Petitioner’s juvenile probation officer. (ROA 127.) These reports detailed Petitioner’s status

as a learning disabled student. Specifically, the reports stated:

Mike is a Special Education student . . . currently enrolled in the 12th

grade. Mike was diagnosed as a Learning Disabled Student during Elementary

School. Mrs. Gallegos reports that Mike is able to learn things that require the

use of his hands, but book material takes a long time for Mike to understand.

Mrs. Gallegos reports that Mike does well in Mechanics, while Math gives him

the most difficulty.

Mike’s attendance has been poor. Attendance reports indicate an

excessive number of truancies and 21 classes missed due to Out of School

Suspension.

Mike’s grade report for the 1988-89 school year reflect the following:

Weight Training F; Resource English D; Resource U.S. History B;

Independent Study C; Welders Helper C and Resource Math F.

. . . .

It is this Officer’s opinion that Mike Gallegos is a young man who

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 36 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 37 -

apparently has not developed the ability to think before he acts. Mike tends

to behave impulsively and allows himself to become involved in a situation

without considering the consequences. Mike’s actions do not appear to be

vicious, just thoughtless. Once he is confronted with his mistake, it is this

Officer’s experience that Mike will choose to deny his actions and attempt to

avoid consequences instead of admitting his mistake.

(Id., Ex. at 5.) 

At the sentencing hearing, counsel called as witnesses Petitioner’s father, mother,

brother, and sister Margaret, all of whom testified that Petitioner was a good kid from a good

family and was remorseful for his actions. (RT 5/24/91 at 21-30.) Petitioner’s juvenile

probation officer also testified. (Id. at 10-20.) He expressed his opinion that Petitioner was

the least likely of his clients to commit this type of crime. (Id. at 16.) He also testified,

reiterating comments made in his written reports, that Petitioner tended to act impulsively.

(Id. at 15.) He further explained that Petitioner was a follower, not a leader; he “had always

been the type of person who would get involved with somebody else, and he always seemed

to be the person who was led rather than be the leader himself.” (Id. at 19-20.) Next,

Detectives Chambers and Saldate testified that they did not believe the death penalty was the

appropriate sentence for Petitioner. (Id. at 30-41.) Detective Chambers testified that he

strongly opposed the death penalty for Petitioner. (Id. at 37.) He indicated that Petitioner’s

“age is still a question in my mind. I’m aware of his chronological age, but I’m not certain

of his – his actual maturity. My impression in my brief contact with this young man was of

him, one, being unsophisticated, and, two, being at some point less than his chronological

age.” (Id. at 39-40.) Finally, Petitioner took the stand, reading a statement that expressed

his remorse for the victim’s death and attributing his actions to drug and alcohol impairment.

(Id. at 42-43.)

Counsel also submitted Dr. DiBacco’s report (id. at 57-58, 65) and dozens of letters

advocating a life sentence rather than the death penalty. Also before the court was the

presentence investigation report, which included sections on Petitioner’s substance abuse

history and mental health. (ROA 131.) The latter section included the comments of Dr. J.J.

Singer, who counseled Petitioner while he was on juvenile probation. (Id. at 6.) Dr. Singer

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 37 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 38 -

described Petitioner as “definitely a follower and not a leader” who “[w]hen he got into

trouble it was because he was following his peers in order to be accepted.” (Id.)

In its special verdict, the trial court stated that it had considered in mitigation

Petitioner’s “documented” history of drinking and substance abuse and the fact that

Petitioner had “a documented learning disability.” (RT 10/24/94 at 184-85.) The Arizona

Supreme Court likewise noted that Petitioner “presented evidence that he had a history of

alcohol and drug abuse, as well as a documented learning disability.” Gallegos I, 178 Ariz.

at 18, 870 P.2d at 1114.

Resentencing

As previously noted, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing

with the directive that the trial court assess Petitioner’s impairment as a nonstatutory

mitigating circumstance. Id. at 23, 870 P.2d at 1119.

Prior to the resentencing hearing, counsel sought and the court authorized the

appointment of mitigation investigator Mary Durand and Dr. C.J. Shaw, an addiction

specialist. (ROA 154.) Dr. Shaw prepared a report opining, based upon information

provided by Petitioner, that Petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time of the crimes was 0.2

or higher. (ROA 161; see RT 10/24/94 at 142.) 

At the resentencing hearing, counsel presented testimony from Petitioner and his

family and friends regarding his drug and alcohol use, learning disability, and passive, nonviolent personality. 

Petitioner testified that he suffered from a learning disability and was placed in special

education classes starting in the fourth grade. (RT 10/24/94 at 5-6.) He testified that he

began drinking alcohol at age 12 or 13, and began using marijuana in sixth or seventh grade

and methamphetamine in tenth or eleventh grade. (Id. at 6-7.) Petitioner stated that his

conduct deteriorated when George Smallwood arrived at his home in Flagstaff; he drank

more, used drugs, and skipped school. (Id. at 8-9.) He explained that on the day of murder

he and Smallwood drank half a bottle of scotch, schnapps, and beer in the morning, smoked

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 38 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 39 -

two joints, and then drank beer throughout the afternoon and night. (Id. at 11-12.) He

testified that the crimes would not have happened if he had not been impaired and if

Smallwood had not been present. (Id. at 13.) 

Petitioner’s mother testified that from second grade on he had attended special

education classes due to his learning disability. (Id. at 54.) She stated that Petitioner had a

tendency to take the blame for things other people did. (Id. at 55.) Mrs. Gallegos became

aware of Petitioner’s drug use when he was in junior high. (Id. at 56.) According to her

testimony, Smallwood was violent and a bad influence; he exerted control over Petitioner and

Petitioner followed his lead. (Id. at 58.)

Petitioner’s sister Margaret testified that she was aware of his drug and alcohol use

in the years before the murder. (Id. at 63-64.) She stated that Petitioner was nonviolent and

mellow when he was intoxicated. (Id. at 64-65.) She testified that after Smallwood arrived

Petitioner’s behavior changed; he became more sullen, withdrawn, and hateful, and

abandoned his old friends in favor of Smallwood. (Id. at 66.)

Petitioner’s sister Maria Covarrubiaz became aware of his drug and alcohol use when

he was in seventh grade. (Id. at 71.) She too indicated that Petitioner became quiet and

mellow when drinking; he did not get into fights or arguments. (Id. at 72.) She described

Petitioner as a follower who was led by other people; he did not stand up for himself or resist

peer pressure. (Id. at 72-73.) Smallwood was the leader and Petitioner followed him. (Id.

at 74.) She indicated that Smallwood had a bad influence on Petitioner, who began to drink

more and became rebellious and hateful toward his parents. (Id. at 76.)

Carlos Covarrubiaz, Petitioner’s brother-in-law, testified that Petitioner began

drinking at age 13 or 14. (Id. at 83.) He too had observed that Petitioner became mellow

under the influence of drugs. (Id.)

Michelle Emig, Petitioner’s niece, testified that Petitioner started drinking in junior

high. (Id. at 96.) According to Emig, Petitioner began to drink every day and used marijuana

and crystal meth. (Id.) She indicated that Petitioner was mellow when drunk. (Id. at 97.)

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 39 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 40 -

Emig explained that Petitioner became “snobby and rude” when Smallwood arrived. (Id.)

She testified that Smallwood was the leader and Petitioner the follower. (Id. at 98.) She also

testified that Smallwood expressed resentment of the victim and thought she was spoiled. 

(Id. at 99.) 

Todd Emig, Michelle’s husband and a school friend of Petitioner, testified that he

began drinking with Petitioner three years before the murder. (Id. at 86.) Like the other

witnesses, he testified that Petitioner was quiet and laid back when intoxicated. (Id. at 87.)

He further testified that Petitioner used marijuana, acid, and mushrooms, under the influence

of which he remained mellow and did not become argumentative or violent. (Id. at 88.) 

Petitioner began drinking more and became distant from family and friends after

Smallwood’s arrival. (Id.) Petitioner would go along with Smallwood’s ideas even if he did

not really want to; he never stood up to Smallwood. (Id. at 89.)

Greg Weiber, another friend of Petitioner, testified that they drank a lot and smoked

marijuana and crystal meth. (Id. at 116.) According to Weiber, they used marijuana 10 times

a day, crystal meth two or three times a week, and alcohol whenever they had the next day

off from work or school. (Id.) Petitioner became passive and mellow under the influence

of drugs and alcohol; he went along with the crowd, never initiated anything, and was never

violent. (Id. at 117-18.) Weiber testified that Smallwood was in control of the relationship

with Petitioner; he was stronger-willed and manipulative. (Id. at 119.)

David Harvey, an acquaintance of Petitioner, testified that he never saw Petitioner

drink but did smoke marijuana with him. (Id. at 128.) Petitioner never became violent. (Id.)

Harvey also testified that Smallwood dominated the relationship with Petitioner. (Id. at 129-

30.)

Anthony Duran, another Flagstaff friend, testified that he drank and used drugs with

Petitioner and that Petitioner was “easygoing” when under the influence. (Id. at 136.) Duran

indicated that Petitioner became less happy after Smallwood’s arrival. (Id. at 138.)

According to Duran, Petitioner was generally unable to resist Smallwood’s influence. (Id.

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 40 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 41 -

at 138-39.) Duran characterized Petitioner as a follower who was easy to manipulate. (Id.

at 140.)

In addition to these witnesses, counsel again presented the testimony of Detectives

Saldate and Chambers in opposition to a death sentence. Detective Saldate testified,

however, that he did not believe Petitioner was significantly intoxicated at the time of the

murder. (Id. at 36-37.) Detective Chambers testified in support of a life sentence based on

his feeling that the killing was accidental; he believed Petitioner had been drinking. (Id. at

43-45.)

In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Alexander Don to critique Dr. Shaw’s report and his

conclusion that Petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the crime with a high blood alcohol

level. (Id. at 148-54.) The State also called the victim’s mother, who testified that she did

not observe signs that Petitioner was impaired on the night of the murder. (Id. at 161.)

At the close of the hearing, the court indicated that it would consider mitigating

evidence from the first sentencing hearing, including the testimony of Petitioner’s juvenile

probation officer. (Id. at 170.)

In sentencing Petitioner, the court again rejected impairment as a statutory mitigating

factor. (Id. at 185.) In doing so, the court repeated its finding that Petitioner “has a

documented learning disability. His testimony is that it affects his math and spelling but not

his reading or understanding. There is no evidence that the defendant is mentally deficient.”

(Id.) The court found that Petitioner’s impairment and substance abuse history constituted

nonstatutory mitigation but that it, together with the other mitigating circumstances, did not

outweigh the aggravating factors. (Id. at 188-90.) 

In Gallegos II, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s findings

regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the mitigating value of

Petitioner’s impairment and history of substance abuse. 185 Ariz. at 344, 916 P.2d at 1060.

PCR evidentiary hearing

At the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims, counsel at

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 41 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 Mr. Antieau, Petitioner’s counsel on appeal and at resentencing, had passed

away prior to the evidentiary hearing. (See RT 12/1/00 at 90.)

- 42 -

Petitioner’s trial and initial sentencing testified on cross-examination that he had been

assisted by mitigation specialist Mary Durand. (RT 12/1/00 at 51.) Counsel had asked Ms.

Durand to identify “areas of mitigation that we could utilize on behalf of [Petitioner], . . .

school records, psych records, . . . disciplinary records, work history records, things like

that.” (Id. at 51-52.) Counsel testified that he had no reason to believe that Petitioner

suffered from “mental problems”; he “didn’t have any indication from the family or any

records to suggest that.” (Id. at 53.) In addition to Ms. Durand, counsel was assisted by

another investigator, who was referred to him by Petitioner’s family; this investigator was

able to find little mitigating information. (Id.)

Despite raising the claim in his PCR petition, during the evidentiary hearing PCR

counsel did not ask trial counsel any questions about his performance during the initial

sentencing proceedings or otherwise address the issue of ineffective assistance at

sentencing.11

Analysis

Clearly established federal law

The right to effective assistance of counsel applies not just to the guilt phase but “with

equal force at the penalty phase of a bifurcated capital trial.” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d, 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1995)).

In assessing whether counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland, the test is

whether counsel’s actions were objectively reasonable at the time of the decision. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689-90. The question is “not whether another lawyer, with the benefit of

hindsight, would have acted differently, but ‘whether counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.’” Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 42 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 43 -

With respect to prejudice at sentencing, the Strickland Court explained that “[w]hen

a defendant challenges a death sentence . . . the question is whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance

of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” 466 U.S. at 695. In

Wiggins, the Court further noted that “[i]n assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in

aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.” 539 U.S. at 534. The

totality of the available evidence includes “both that adduced at trial, and the evidence

adduced in the habeas proceeding.” Id. at 536 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 397-

98).

The clearly-established federal law governing this claim includes the Supreme Court’s

decision in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, which, as indicated above, clarifies the standard this

Court must apply in reviewing the PCR court’s rejection of Petitioner’s sentencing-stage

ineffective assistance claim. In Cone the Supreme Court, after noting the deferential

standards set forth in the AEDPA and required by its own precedent, explained that for a

habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim to succeed: 

he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his

claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1),

it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he

must show that [the state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner. 

Id. at 698-99 (citation omitted). 

In reviewing Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance, this Court further notes

that the judge who presided over the trial, sentencing, and resentencing also presided over

the PCR proceedings. Thus, in considering Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims, Judge

Hotham was already familiar with the record and the evidence presented at trial and

sentencing. The judge’s familiarity with the record provides this Court with an additional

reason to extend deference to the PCR court’s ruling. See Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263,

1271 (9th Cir. 1998). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smith, when the judge who governed

the post-conviction proceeding is the same as the trial and sentencing judge, the court is

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 43 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 44 -

considerably less inclined to order relief; doing so “might at least approach ‘a looking-glass

exercise in folly.’” Id. (quoting Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Application of Strickland to Claim 9

Petitioner contends that if his attorneys had conducted a constitutionally adequate

investigation into his mental health history, “they would have discovered that [Petitioner’s]

family, friends and teachers would have provided evidence, including significantly more

corroborating evidence than either counsel presented at sentencing or resentencing.” (Dkt.

74 at 70.) Specifically, witnesses could have addressed Petitioner’s “learning disability,

placement in special education classes, and designation as being Emotionally Handicapped,”

as well as the “embarrassment and low self esteem” he experienced as a result of his

placement in special education, and the fact that he was a “follower, incapable of standing

up to others, especially George Smallwood.” (Id. at 70-72.) Petitioner further contends that

he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present corroborating evidence of Petitioner’s drug

and alcohol use. (Id. at 73.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s sentencing-stage performance was

either deficient or prejudicial, let alone that the PCR court’s rejection of the claim was

objectively unreasonable. First, it is clear that resentencing counsel did not perform

deficiently in presenting evidence of Petitioner’s history of drug and alcohol abuse and

passive personality. As the Arizona Supreme Court noted, “At the resentencing hearing,

defendant and 9 lay witnesses testified concerning defendant’s past substance abuse, and Dr.

Shaw’s report discussed defendant’s self-report of past substance abuse.” Gallegos II, 185

Ariz. at 345, 916 P.2d at 1061. As described above, nearly all of these witnesses also

testified that Petitioner did not become violent when under the influence of drugs and

alcohol, that he had the personality of a follower, and that he was manipulated by

Smallwood. It is difficult to envision how counsel could have presented a more complete

picture of Petitioner’s impairment and history of substance abuse, as well as his passive

personality and the dynamics of his relationship with Smallwood. Moreover, both the trial

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 44 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 45 -

court and the Arizona Supreme Court found that Petitioner’s impairment and substance abuse

history constituted nonstatutory mitigation, so even if counsel could have presented

additional corroborating evidence, Petitioner was not prejudiced by this aspect of counsel’s

performance. 

Similarly, counsel did not perform ineffectively with respect to the presentation of

evidence concerning Petitioner’s intellectual capacity. Petitioner’s trial counsel retained the

services of Mary Durand, who subsequently assisted resentencing counsel, to review

Petitioner’s school and medical records in search of mitigating information to present at the

initial sentencing hearing. (RT 12/1/00 at 51-52.) At both the initial sentencing and at

resentencing, Petitioner’s attorneys made the court aware that Petitioner suffered from a

learning disability and had been placed in special education classes throughout his school

years. 

Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that counsel performed deficiently by relying on Dr.

DiBacco’s report at the first sentencing hearing because Dr. DiBacco originally

misdiagnosed Petitioner and because his revised report, which did address Petitioner’s

learning disability, was ignored by the court. (Dkt. 92 at 13.) This argument is unpersuasive.

Again, both the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged Petitioner’s

disability. In discussing Petitioner’s youth as a mitigating factor, the supreme court

explained:

The weight that age should receive as a mitigating factor depends on the

defendant’s intelligence, maturity, and life experiences. In this case, defendant

was in special education classes beginning in second grade, which could

indicate that his intelligence was below average. A psychological expert’s

report concluded, however, that defendant has “at least average fluid

intelligence,” that he is “not mentally deficient,” and that he can understand

the consequences of his behavior.

Gallegos II, 185 Ariz. at 345, 916 P.2d at 1061 (citations omitted). The court concluded,

however, that given Petitioner’s “extensive and prolonged” participation in the criminal acts,

his conduct was not the product of impulsivity and immaturity and therefore his age was “a

statutory mitigating circumstance worthy of some weight,” but was “discount[ed] . . . by the

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 45 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 This information is contained in the report of Nancy Cowardin (Dkt. 92, Ex.

1), one of the documents as to which the Court denied Petitioner’s motion to expand the

record (Dkt. 78; see Dkt. 106).

- 46 -

extent of defendant’s participation in the murder.” Id.

Because evidence regarding Petitioner’s mental functioning was presented to and

considered by the trial court and the state supreme court, Petitioner cannot establish that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. See Hedrick v. True, 443 F.3d 342, 353 (4th Cir.

2006) (“the connection [petitioner] would have had his trial counsel make between his low

intelligence, being easily led, and being prone to substance abuse . . . was nearly identical to

evidence presented”). Any further evidence that Petitioner was a slow learner who required

special education classes would have been cumulative to the evidence already presented. See

Babbit, 151 F.3d at 1176 (no prejudice where evidence omitted at sentencing was “largely

cumulative of the evidence actually presented”). Other evidence, such as that Petitioner

suffered from ADHD and an “inability to process language,”12 which Petitioner now

contends should have been presented, would not have altered the basic sentencing profile

provided to the judge. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699-700; see also Henley v. Bell, 487 F.3d

379, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2007) (no prejudice resulting from counsel’s failure to call a psychiatric

expert to testify during sentencing phase of capital murder trial that defendant had learning

disabilities, had dropped out of school, and at the time of the offense was depressed and

acting out of character).

In Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit held that the

habeas petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s performance at sentencing.

Eddmonds had been convicted of deviate sexual assault and murder and sentenced to death

for smothering a nine-year-old boy to death while raping him. Id. at 1311-12. The killing

was unintentional. Id. at 1322. At sentencing, counsel presented the testimony of a

psychiatrist who recounted Eddmonds’s history of mental illness, which included a diagnosis

of schizophrenia. Id. Counsel also offered a brief closing argument asking the court for

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 46 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 Petitioner also asserts that application of this factor was invalid under Ring.

(Dkt. 74 at 90-93.) As explained above in Claim 1, the holding in Ring does not apply

retroactively so this allegation is meritless.

- 47 -

mercy. Id. at 1322. Eddmonds alleged that counsel’s performance was ineffective because

he did not seek additional psychological evaluations or present evidence of Eddmond’s

extreme mental and emotional disturbance at the time of the crime or information concerning

his troubled upbringing and history of drug use. Id. at 1319-20. 

In rejecting this claim of ineffective assistance, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the

proffered mitigation evidence and found that “none of this would have helped had counsel

expressly raised it at sentencing.” Id. at 1321. The court concluded that “we are certain

counsel’s failure to throw a few more tidbits from the past or one more diagnosis of mental

illness onto the scale would not have tipped it in Eddmonds’ favor.” Id.

Likewise, in Petitioner’s case there was not a reasonable probability of a different

sentence if counsel had presented to the sentencer additional details regarding Petitioner’s

intellectual limitations or substance abuse history. 

Conclusion

The PCR court, having presided over the trial, the initial sentencing, and the

resentencing proceedings, rejected the claim that Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of

counsel was violated by the penalty-phase performance of his attorneys. This decision was

not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on Claim 9. 

Claim 11 Unconstitutionality of cruel, heinous, or depraved

aggravating factor 

Petitioner contends that the aggravating factor set forth in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) is

facially overbroad and was applied to his sentence in an unconstitutional manner.13 (Dkt. 74

at 78-90.) 

Background

At sentencing, the trial court found that Petitioner committed the murder in an

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 47 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 48 -

especially cruel, heinous and depraved manner pursuant to § 13-703(F)(6). (ROA 132 at 2-

4.) The court found that the murder was especially cruel based upon the victim’s physical

and mental suffering. (Id.) In finding the murder especially heinous or depraved, the court

noted the helplessness of the victim and the senselessness of the crime, as indicated by the

victim’s small size, trusting relationship with Petitioner, and the fact that Petitioner could

have accomplished his sexual goals without taking the victim’s life. (Id. at 3.) The court

further described the crime as “marked by debasement and perversion,” citing Petitioner’s

admission “that he had anal intercourse with the victim thinking that since she was already

dead, he might as well finish what he started.” (Id.) Finally, the court found that Petitioner

“actively participated in the killing” and in fact “killed Kendall.” (Id. at 8-9.)

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court considered and rejected both the facial

and as-applied challenges to (F)(6). In upholding the constitutionality of the factor, the court

explained:

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this

statutory provision, and has found that we have construed its operative terms

“in a manner that furnishes sufficient guidance to the sentencer.” Walton v.

Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3058, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990).

The trial judge specifically applied our limited construction of the terms

especially “heinous,” “cruel,” and “depraved” in its special verdict. We

therefore find no support in the record for defendant’s contention that the

judge applied this factor without adhering to statutory requirements. 

Gallegos I, 178 Ariz. at 14, 870 P.2d at 1110 (citation omitted). 

The court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that the (F)(6) aggravating factor was

inapplicable without proof that he physically performed the actions that caused the victim’s

death, finding that Petitioner “actively participated in the killing.” Id.

Finally, the court denied Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in finding that the

murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner. The court detailed its

findings:

Heinousness and depravity focus on defendant’s mental state and

attitude at the time of the offense as evidenced by his words and actions. State

v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 412, 844 P.2d 566, 579 (1992). In determining

whether the murder was committed in a heinous or depraved manner, we

consider 5 factors: (1) whether defendant relished the murder, (2) whether

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 48 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 49 -

defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim, (3) whether defendant

mutilated the victim, (4) the senselessness of the crime, and (5) the

helplessness of the victim. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 52, 659 P.2d 1, 11

(1983). “The mere existence of senselessness or helplessness of the victim, in

isolation, need not always lead to a holding that the crime is heinous or

depraved. . . .” Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52-53, 659 P.2d at 11-12. “Either or both

of these factors [senselessness and helplessness], considered together with

other circumstances present in a particular case, may lead to the conclusion

that an offense was heinous or depraved.” Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d

at 11. Here, we have more. See Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 65, 859 P.2d at

175.

We believe that the record in this case supports a finding of

senselessness, helplessness, and gratuitous violence. The victim was helpless;

she was an 8-year-old girl who stood a mere 4 feet 5 inches tall and weighed

only 57 pounds. Defendant, an 18-year-old male who was in a trust

relationship with the victim, stole into the victim’s room while she was asleep

and senselessly suffocated her. We agree with the trial judge that the victim

“never had a chance.”

We further find that defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the

victim. Recently, we held that a defendant’s act of necrophilia “without

question” constituted the infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim. State

v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 502, 826 P.2d 783, 799 (1992). Here, the trial court

noted that the medical examiner testified that the “injuries to [the victim’s]

rectum were inflicted either premortem or contemporaneously with her death

[perimortem].” Defendant, however, testified that he had anal intercourse with

the victim for about 15 to 20 minutes after she went limp and after he believed

she was dead. Thus, defendant believed he was committing an act of

necrophilia. Defendant explained his conduct in a statement made during the

presentence investigation:

He stated that he went ahead and finished the act because “it

wasn’t like she was going to tell anybody.” He sodomize[d] the

victim because it was like “why not.” He knew he was going to

get caught the next day.

This statement evinces the depravity of defendant’s mental state. Moreover,

other evidence of gratuitous violence exists. After defendant sodomized the

victim, he dumped her naked body under a tree where it was found, bruised

and battered, the next day.

We think the record supports the trial judge’s finding that the murder

was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner. We therefore

need not address the judge’s finding of cruelty.

Gallegos I, 178 Ariz. at 14-15, 870 P.2d at 1110-11.

Analysis

As the Arizona Supreme Court explained, the United States Supreme Court has upheld

the (F)(6) aggravating factor against allegations that it is vague and overbroad, rejecting a

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 49 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 50 -

claim that Arizona has not construed it in a “constitutionally narrow manner.” See Lewis v.

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774-77 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-56 (1990),

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Petitioner’s facial

challenge to the factor is therefore without merit.

With respect to the state courts’ application of the factor to Petitioner’s sentence,

habeas review “is limited, at most, to determining whether the state court’s finding was so

arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment

violation.” Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780. In making that determination, the reviewing court must

inquire “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found that the factor had been satisfied.” Id. at 781

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Petitioner contends that the state courts erred in finding that he committed the murder

in an especially heinous and depraved manner because there no proof that he actually killed

the victim and because he believed she was dead when he sexually assaulted her. He further

contends that the heinousness or depravity of his actions must be “evaluated in light of his

age and limited intellectual ability.” (Dkt. 74 at 88.)

The relevant issue in applying the heinous or depraved prong of (F)(6) is the

defendant’s state of mind; nevertheless, the determination is based not on his subjective

mental state but on his “words and acts.” See State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 255, 778

P.2d 602, 620 (1988). As the Arizona Supreme Court explained, five non-exclusive factors

are used to determine if a murder was heinous or depraved: relishing of the murder, the

infliction of gratuitous violence, mutilation of the victim’s body, the senselessness of the

murder, and the helplessness of the victim. Gallegos I, 178 Ariz. at 14-15, 870 P.2d at 1110-

11 (citing State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 52, 659 P.2d 1, 11 (1983)). A defendant’s

intellectual status is not assessed in applying the factor. 

Additionally, it is clear, notwithstanding Petitioner’s assertion to the contrary, that a

rational factfinder could have determined that Petitioner actually killed the victim. Petitioner

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 50 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 51 -

testified that, with Smallwood’s hand already on the victim’s mouth, he placed his hand over

her nose and kept it there as she gasped for air, struggled and flailed, and then went limp.

(RT 3/13/91 at 63-66, 103-04.) He testified that he knew he had killed her “by suffocation.”

(Id. at 97.) He acknowledged that he “actively participated in the killing of Kendall.” (Id.

at 127.) 

With respect to the heinous or depraved prong of (F)(6), a rational trier of fact could

also find, based upon Petitioner’s words and actions, several of the Gretzler factors. A

factfinder could determine that the purpose of the crime was sexual assault, and that the

murder was not necessary to achieve that goal. Therefore, the murder was senseless. The

age and size disparity between Petitioner and the victim support the finding that she was

helpless. Finally, as the Arizona Supreme Court explained, Petitioner’s prolonged act of

perceived necrophilia constituted gratuitous violence, the depravity of which was further

indicated by Petitioner’s comments about his conduct. 

A rational fact finder could have determined that Petitioner’s actions were heinous and

depraved in satisfaction of the (F)(6) aggravating factor. Therefore, the Arizona Supreme

Court’s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Jackson. Claim 11 is

denied.

Claims 12-18 Application of mitigating evidence

Petitioner alleges that the trial court refused to weigh, or gave inadequate weight to,

several mitigating circumstances, including his lack of intent to kill the victim (Claim12), his

intoxication and substance abuse history (Claim 13), his age (Claim 14), his lack of a serious

criminal record (Claim 15), the recommendations of leniency from two detectives (Claim

16), the “aberrant” nature of the crime (Claim 17), and the cumulative impact of all the

mitigating evidence (Claim 18). (Dkt. 74 at 93-114.)

Background

As the Arizona Supreme Court noted, Gallegos II, 185 Ariz. at 343, 916 P.2d at 1059,

over the State’s objection the trial court held a full resentencing hearing and allowed

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 51 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 52 -

Petitioner to present any mitigation evidence that he desired. The trial court again found two

aggravating circumstances, that Petitioner was an adult and the victim under 15 and that the

murder was especially heinous, cruel, and depraved. (ROA 163 at 2-4.) The court again

found that Petitioner had proved that his age and relative immaturity constituted a statutory

mitigating circumstance. (Id. at 7-9.) The court found that Petitioner failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence three other statutory mitigating circumstances: impairment,

under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1); that he was legally accountable for the conduct of another and

that his participation in the crime was relatively minor, under (G)(3); and that he could not

reasonably have foreseen that his conduct would cause death, under (G)(4). (Id. at 5-9.)

 The court further found that Petitioner proved four non-statutory mitigating

circumstances: remorse, recommendations of leniency by the police, a history of alcohol and

drug abuse, and alcohol impairment. (Id. at 9-10.) The court found that Petitioner did not

prove as a non-statutory mitigating factor the disparity in how he and Smallwood were

treated. (Id. at 10.)

Before resentencing Petitioner, the trial court considered the evidence introduced at

trial, mitigation evidence from the first sentencing hearing, the mitigation evidence

Petitioner presented at the resentencing hearing, and the presentence report and attachments.

(Id. at 2.) The court ultimately determined that the mitigating circumstances were not

sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and resentenced Petitioner to death. (Id. at 11.)

In Gallegos II, the Arizona Supreme Court considered Petitioner’s arguments that he

was entitled to leniency based on each of his proven mitigating circumstances. 185 Ariz. at

344, 916 P.2d at 1060. The court affirmed the findings of the trial court. Id. at 347-48, 916

P.2d at 1063-64.

Analysis

A sentencing court is required to consider any mitigating information offered by a

defendant, including non-statutory mitigation. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604

(1978); see Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1996). In Lockett and Eddings v.

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 52 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 53 -

Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments the

sentencer must be allowed to consider, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally

relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).

Constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence is “any aspect of a defendant’s character or

record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for

a sentence less than death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. However, while the sentencer must

not be foreclosed from considering relevant mitigation, “it is free to assess how much weight

to assign such evidence.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 1998); see Eddings,

455 U.S. at 114-15 (“The sentencer . . . may determine the weight to be given the relevant

mitigating evidence.”); see also State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 405, 132 P.3d 833, 849

(2006) (mitigating evidence must be considered regardless of whether there is a “nexus”

between the mitigating factor and the crime, but the lack of a causal connection may be

considered in assessing the weight of the evidence). 

On habeas review, a federal court does not evaluate the substance of each piece of

evidence submitted as mitigation. Instead, it reviews the state court record to ensure the state

court allowed and considered all relevant mitigation. See Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 418

(9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (when it is evident that all mitigating evidence was considered, the

trial court is not required to discuss each piece of evidence).

As described above, the judge considered and made findings regarding the mitigating

factors urged by Petitioner. (See ROA 163 at 5-10.) While Petitioner disagrees with these

findings, the court considered the evidence, which is the constitutional issue. Moreover, the

judge clearly articulated that he considered all the mitigation presented, nonstatutory as well

as statutory, and found that it did not warrant leniency. See Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308,

314-15, 318 (1991) (sentencing court properly considered all information, including

nonstatutory mitigation, where court stated that it considered all the evidence and found no

mitigating circumstances that outweighed the aggravating circumstances); Moormann v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the trial court need not exhaustively analyze

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 53 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 54 -

each mitigating factor as long as a reviewing federal court can discern from the record that

the state court did indeed consider all mitigating evidence offered by the defendant”).

In sum, there is a distinction between “a failure to consider relevant evidence and a

conclusion that such evidence was not mitigating.” Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1057

(9th Cir. 2006). Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the latter determination does not

implicate his federal constitutional rights. The fact that the court found the proffered

mitigating evidence “inadequate to justify leniency . . . did not violate the Constitution.”

Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 943; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15.

Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court independently reviewed the record and

“conclude[d] that the mitigation is insufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Gallegos

II, 185 Ariz. at 348, 916 P.2d at 1064. Even if the trial court had committed constitutional

error at sentencing, a proper and independent review of the mitigation and aggravation by

the Arizona Supreme Court cured any such defect. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.

738, 750, 754 (1990) (holding that appellate courts are able to fully consider mitigating

evidence and are constitutionally permitted to affirm a death sentence based on independent

re-weighing despite any error at sentencing). 

Claims 12 through 18 will be denied.

Claim 19 Erroneous jury instructions

Petitioner alleges that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the trial court

provided erroneous jury instructions on the element of premeditation and the charge of sexual

conduct with a minor. (Dkt. 74 at 114-21.) 

Premeditation instruction

Petitioner contends that the premeditation jury instruction provided by the trial court

relieved the State of proving the element of actual reflection necessary for first degree

murder. (Id. at 114-17.) This allegation is both procedurally barred and meritless.

He first raised the claim in his PCR petition. (PCR doc. 188 at 4.) The entirety of

the claim was contained in a heading which cited an Arizona Court of Appeals case and

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 54 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 Claim VIII, as set forth in the initial PCR petition, consisted of the following

heading: “THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED REGARDING PREMEDITATION

(ACTUAL REFLECTION NOT REQUIRED; STATE v. RAMIREZ, 249 Ariz. Adv. Rpt. 16, 945

P.2d 376) AND THEREFORE THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. (NO ARGUMENT

SUPPLIED BECAUSE OF TIME CONSTRAINTS).” (PCR doc. 188 at 4.)

- 55 -

made no allegation of a federal constitutional violation.14 The PCR court rejected the claim,

finding it “precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) (waived because not raised on appeal)” and

“not colorable.” (PR doc. 10 at 2.) In making this ruling, the Court invoked Arizona’s

adequate and independent state procedural bar. See Smith, 536 U.S. at 860; Ortiz, 149 F.3d

at 931-32. 

Petitioner alleges that the procedural default of this claim is excused by the ineffective

performance of appellate counsel. (Dkt. 86 at 80.) As previously indicated, because

Petitioner failed to exhaust an independent claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, such an allegation cannot constitute cause for the procedural default of this claim.

In addition, for the reasons set forth below, the claim is meritless.

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim.

See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th

Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, an error in jury instructions “cannot be

merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned,’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. State of California, 843

F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To

prevail on this claim, therefore, Petitioner must demonstrate that the instructions provided

by the trial court “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147); see

also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 

“It is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’

but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.”

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). In reviewing an ambiguous

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 55 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 56 -

instruction, a reviewing court inquires “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury

has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72-73 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Harmless error

analysis is ordinarily applied to trial errors, including an erroneous jury instruction. See

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69

(1997).

At the conclusion of the parties’ closing arguments, the court instructed the jury that:

“Premeditation” means that the defendant’s knowledge existed before the

killing long enough to permit reflection. However, the reflection differs from

the knowledge that conduct will cause death. It may be as instantaneous as

successive thoughts in the mind, and it may be proven by circumstantial

evidence. It is this period of reflection, regardless of its length, which

distinguishes first degree murder from knowing second degree murder.

(RT 3/14/91 at 35; see ROA 117.) The court did not include the provision, set forth in

A.R.S. § 13-1101(1), that “[a]n act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect

of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (RT 3/14/91 at 35; see ROA 117.) Arguably, this

omission, combined with the phrase “instantaneous as successive thoughts,” rendered the

instruction erroneous under state law. See State v. Ramirez, 190 Ariz. 65, 67-68, 945 P.2d

376, 378-79 (Ct. App. 1997) (instruction that omitted the “balancing language” contained in

the “instant effect” provision allowed the State to “mis-argue” that “an act can be both

impulsive and premeditated”); State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 479, 65 P.3d 420, 478

(2003) (discouraging use of “instantaneous as successive thoughts” phrase). 

Nonetheless, the court’s instruction on premeditation did not render Petitioner’s trial

fundamentally unfair. The instruction does not, on its face, permit a finding of premeditation

based solely on the passage of time, but specifically states that first degree murder requires

a “period of reflection.” Nothing in the prosecutor’s argument or the remainder of the court’s

instructions inaccurately suggested that the State needed only to prove the time element of

reflection in lieu of actual premeditation. In fact, in his closing argument the prosecutor

characterized the question of premeditation in this case as “difficult,” but emphasized, as

opposed to the mere passage of time, Petitioner’s “successive thoughts of the mind, that

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 56 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 57 -

period of reflection, that awareness, that knowledge” that occurred prior to and during

Petitioner’s smothering of the victim. (RT 3/14/91 at 11.) 

In addition, the jury was instructed on both felony murder and premeditated murder

theories of first degree murder. The jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder, but its

verdict was not unanimous as to whether Petitioner was guilty of premeditated murder or

felony murder. (ROA 116.) The jury also convicted Petitioner of the predicate felony of

sexual conduct with a minor. (ROA 115.) Given these circumstances, the fairness of

Petitioner’s trial was not affected by the premeditation instruction. The killing occurred in

the course of the sexual assault, so the predicate for felony murder was met, notwithstanding

any potential jury confusion regarding the premeditation theory of first degree murder. See

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 335 (9th Cir. 1992).

Sexual conduct with a minor instruction

The trial court provided the jury with written instructions on all of the counts,

including the charges of sexual conduct with a minor and attempted sexual conduct with a

minor. (ROA 117.) The instruction for sexual conduct stated:

The crime of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen requires

proof of the following two things:

1. The defendant knowingly penetrated the anus of another person with a

part of his body; and

2. The other person had not reached her fifteenth birthday.

(Id.) The instruction regarding attempted sexual conduct stated:

The crime of Attempted Sexual Conduct with a Minor requires proof

of one of the following:

1. The defendant intentionally engaged in conduct which would have been

a crime if the circumstances relating to the crime were as the defendant

believed them to be; or

2. The defendant intentionally committed any act which was a step in a

course of conduct which the defendant planned would end or believed

would end in the commission of a crime; or

3. The defendant engaged in conduct intended to aid another person to

commit a crime, in a manner which would make the defendant an

accomplice, had the crime been committed or attempted by the other

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 57 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 58 -

person.

(Id.)

When the trial judge verbally instructed the jury on the latter count, he omitted the

word “attempted” from the title of the offense. (RT 3/14/91 at 38.) However, his verbal

instructions on the elements of the offense conformed to the written instructions and included

the word “attempted.” (Id.) The judge did not define either the term “accomplice” or the

theory of accomplice liability. Defense counsel did not object to the instructions.

Petitioner asserts that the verbal instructions might have confused the jury and caused

it erroneously to convict him of sexual conduct with a minor rather than attempted sexual

conduct with a minor. (Dkt. 74 at 118-21.)

The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the allegation that Petitioner was prejudiced by

any confusion caused by the trial court’s verbal instructions. Gallegos I, 178 Ariz. at 10-11,

870 P.2d at 1106-07. The court reiterated that “a copy of the written instructions was given

to the jury, was available during its deliberations, was correct, and properly included the

word ‘attempted.’” Id. at 10, 870 P.2d at 1106. The court also noted that the jury was given

separate verdict forms for the crimes of sexual conduct with a minor and attempted sexual

conduct, and returned a guilty verdict on the former count. Id. The court further explained

that there was no evidence suggesting that the jury was confused by the instructions, and

concluded that “[m]ere speculation that the jury was confused is insufficient to establish

actual jury confusion. We therefore find that, taking the instructions as a whole, the jury was

adequately instructed and defendant suffered no prejudice from the omission of the word

‘attempted’ in the verbal instructions.” Id. at 10-11, 870 P.2d at 1106-07. In addition, the

court held that “[o]verwhelming evidence in the record supports the jury’s verdict” and

therefore found “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no effect on the jury’s verdict.”

Id. at 11, 870 P.2d at 1107.

This decision is not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In Petitioner’s case, there was “uncontested” and “overwhelming” evidence, Neder, 527 U.S.

at 17, that he engaged in sexual conduct with the minor victim. In light of this evidence, and

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 58 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 59 -

viewing the instructions as a whole, including the correct version of the written instructions,

it is clear that the verdict would have been the same if the trial court’s verbal instructions had

not omitted the word “attempted” and if the instructions had provided a definition of

accomplice. Id. Therefore, any error in the instructions was harmless, and Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief. 

For the reasons set forth above, Claim 19 is denied.

Claim 20 Insufficient evidence of sexual conduct with a minor

As discussed above, Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction for sexual conduct with a minor because the victim was already dead at the

time of the penetration, or Petitioner mistakenly believed that she was dead. (Dkt. 74 at 121-

24.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied this claim, rejecting Petitioner’s analysis of the

mistake-of-fact issue:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and we resolve all

reasonable inferences against defendant. Dr. Bolduc, the medical examiner

who performed the autopsy, testified that the anal trauma occurred while the

victim was alive. This uncontradicted expert testimony defeats the argument

that the victim was not a person at the time of the sexual penetration. 

We likewise reject defendant’s contention that he did not possess the

mental state of “knowingly” because he believed that the victim was dead at

the time of the sexual penetration. Sufficient evidence establishes that

defendant formed the intent to sexually assault the victim before her death.

Officer Saldate’s testimony regarding defendant’s confessions, although not

entirely consistent with defendant’s trial testimony, included the following

additional details. Officer Saldate testified that defendant had discussed with

George [Smallwood] his previous acts of sexual intercourse before entering the

victim’s room. Defendant further stated that he thought about fondling the

victim’s “ass.” Defendant got the baby oil from the bathroom, which he

eventually applied to his penis and the victim’s anus to facilitate the

penetration. Defendant also stated that once he and George thought that the

victim was dead, they decided that they “might as well finish.” . . . .

We also repudiate defendant’s argument for public policy reasons. We

refuse to apply a strict, literal interpretation to Arizona’s Criminal Code as

defendant would have us do. If the criminal code is to have any meaning, we

must fairly construe its provisions to promote justice and give effect to the

objects of the law. This is not a case where defendant happened upon a dead

body. Defendant beat and suffocated the victim in the course and furtherance

of a sexual offense. We do nothing to promote justice by allowing a sex

offender, who forcibly renders his victim unconscious before committing the

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 59 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 60 -

sexual offense and ultimately kills her, to avoid conviction because he says

that he mistakenly thought the victim was dead. Embracing such a concept

would only encourage sex offenders to first kill their victims or render them

unconscious before committing the sexual offense. 

Also, defendant contends that if a mistaken belief that the victim was

over 18 years old is a defense to sexual conduct with a minor, A.R.S. § 13-

1407(B), then a mistake as to the victim’s vitality likewise must constitute a

defense. If the legislature had intended to establish such a defense, which we

doubt for the reasons previously stated, then it could expressly have done so.

Gallegos I, 178 Ariz. at 9-10, 870 P.2d at 1105-06 (citations and footnote omitted).

Analysis

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. In reaching its determination as to the

sufficiency of the evidence, this Court may not substitute its determination of guilt for that

of the factfinder and may not weigh the credibility of witnesses. See Herrera v. Collins, 506

U.S. 390, 401-402 (1993); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 n.13. Moreover, a state court’s

construction of its own statute is binding on this court. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,

691 (1975) (“state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”). “These factors combine

to suggest that AEDPA deference may well be at its highest when a habeas petitioner

challenges a state court’s determination that the record evidence was sufficient to satisfy the

state’s own definition of a state law crime.” Policano v. Herbert, 453 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir.

2006).

It is plain that a rational factfinder could have determined that all of the elements of

sexual conduct with a minor had been proved. The Arizona Supreme Court detailed the

“overwhelming evidence” against Petitioner:

Defendant confessed on two occasions and testified at trial that he sexually

penetrated the victim’s anus. The stained material on the victim’s panties

contained a DNA banding pattern that matched the banding pattern of

defendant’s blood. Defendant’s fingerprint was lifted from the victim’s room.

In addition, no evidence was presented that George [Smallwood] or anyone

else penetrated the victim’s anus. Defendant’s only defense was that the

victim was dead. As defendant admits, Dr. Bolduc’s uncontradicted testimony

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 60 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 61 -

indicated that anal trauma occurred while the victim was alive. 

Gallegos 178 Ariz. at 11, 870 P.2d at 1107.

This evidence, together with the court’s interpretation of the relevant statute and its

rejection of Petitioner’s arguments about his state of mind and the timing of the victim’s

death, renders Claim 20 meritless. 

Claims 21-29 Death Penalty Challenges

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the death penalty in general and

Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme in particular. (Dkt. 74 at 124-49.) He asserts that

Arizona’s death penalty statute suffers from the following constitutional infirmities: it does

not adequately channel the sentencer’s discretion (Claim 21); the Arizona Supreme Court

abandoned the procedural safeguard of proportionality review (Claim 22); it fails to narrow

the class of death eligible defendants (Claim 23); it establishes an unconstitutional burden

of proof (Claim 24); it makes the death penalty mandatory and establishes a “presumption

of death” (Claim 25); and the prosecutor has “unbridled” discretion to seek the death penalty

(Claim 26). Petitioner also contends that the death penalty is not a deterrent (Claim 27) and

is imposed in a discriminatory manner against poor minority males (Claim 28). Finally, he

argues that Arizona’s death penalty scheme violates his substantive due process rights (Claim

29). These claims are baseless, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s rejection of them, Gallegos

II, 185 Ariz. at 348, 916 P.2d at 1064, was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.

Respondents contend that these claims have not been properly exhausted. As

previously noted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the Court may dismiss plainly

meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277.

Analysis

Rulings of both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have upheld

Arizona’s death penalty statute against allegations that particular aggravating factors do not

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 61 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 62 -

adequately narrow the sentencer’s discretion. See Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774-77; Walton, 497

U.S. at 649-56; Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 335 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit

has also explicitly rejected the contention that Arizona’s death penalty statute is

unconstitutional because it “does not properly narrow the class of death penalty recipients.”

Smith, 140 F.3d at 1272.

As Petitioner acknowledges, there is no federal constitutional right to proportionality

review of a death sentence, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987) (citing Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1984)), and the Arizona Supreme Court discontinued the practice

in 1992, State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 417, 844 P.2d 566, 584 (1992). The Ninth Circuit

has explained that the interest implicated by proportionality review – the “substantive right

to be free from a disproportionate sentence” – is protected by the application of “adequately

narrowed aggravating circumstance[s].” Ceja, 97 F.3d at 1252.

In Smith, the Ninth Circuit also disposed of the argument that Arizona’s death penalty

statute is constitutionally infirm because “the prosecutor can decide whether to seek the death

penalty.” 140 F.3d at 1272; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (pre-sentencing

decisions by actors in the criminal justice system that may remove an accused from

consideration for the death penalty are not unconstitutional); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986,

993 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the decision to seek the death penalty is made by a separate

branch of the government and is therefore not a cognizable federal issue).

In Walton, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that “Arizona’s allocation of the

burdens of proof in a capital sentencing proceeding violates the Constitution.” 497 U.S. at

651; see Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 275 (1993) (per curiam) (stating that “we recently

made clear that a State may require the defendant to bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to the

existence of mitigating circumstances”). Walton also rejected the claim that Arizona’s death

penalty statute is impermissibly mandatory and creates a presumption in favor of the death

penalty because it provides that the death penalty “shall” be imposed if one or more

aggravating factors are found and mitigating circumstances are insufficient to call for

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 62 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 63 -

leniency. 497 U.S. at 651-52 (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Boyde,

494 U.S. 370); see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (relying on Walton to

uphold Kansas’s death penalty statute, which directs imposition of the death penalty when

the state has proved that mitigating factors do not outweigh aggravators); Smith, 140 F.3d at

1272 (summarily rejecting challenges to the “mandatory” quality of Arizona’s death penalty

statute and its failure to apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).

With respect to Petitioner’s contention that the death penalty in Arizona is imposed

in a discriminatory manner against poor males, clearly established federal law holds that “a

defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence

of purposeful discrimination’” and must demonstrate that the purposeful discrimination “had

a discriminatory effect” on him. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 292 (quoting Whitus v.

Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). Therefore, to prevail on this claim Petitioner “must

prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” Id. Petitioner

does not attempt to meet this burden. He offers no evidence specific to his case that would

support an inference that his sex or economic status played a part in his sentence. See

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1490-91 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 986 F.2d

1583 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that statistical evidence that Arizona’s death penalty is

discriminatorily imposed based on race, sex, and socio-economic background is insufficient

to prove that decisionmakers in petitioner’s case acted with discriminatory purpose).

Also unsupported by Supreme Court precedent is the claim that the death penalty is

unconstitutional because it fails to serve as a deterrent to crime. In Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183,

the Court explained that the death penalty serves two potential functions, retribution and

deterrence. Regarding deterrence as a justification for capital punishment, the Court,

upholding Georgia’s death penalty statute, observed:

The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual

issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can

evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions

and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.

In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature that

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 63 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 64 -

capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.

Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature

to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the

death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the

absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death as a

punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not

unconstitutionally severe.

Id. at 186-87 (citation omitted).

Finally, there is no clearly established federal law holding that the death penalty

violates substantive due process. The Unites States Supreme Court has never held that the

death penalty per se is unconstitutional. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177, 186-87; Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-69 (2005) (noting that the death penalty is constitutional when

applied to a narrow category of crimes and offenders); cf. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398

(declining to hold that the execution of an innocent person would constitute an independent

due process violation); see also United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 61-70 (2d Cir. 2002)

(rejecting argument that death penalty is inherently unconstitutional); In re West, 119 F.3d

295, 296 (5th Cir. 1997) (summarily rejecting argument that death penalty statutes violate

substantive due process, because Supreme Court had previously decided that such statutes

do not violate the Eighth Amendment).

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claims 21 through 29.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to habeas relief on

any of his claims. Therefore, Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will

be denied and judgment entered accordingly.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

In the event Petitioner appeals from this Court’s judgment, and in the interests of

conserving scarce resources that might be consumed drafting and reviewing an application

for a certificate of appealability (COA) to this Court, the Court on its own initiative has

evaluated the claims within the petition for suitability for the issuance of a certificate of

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d at 864-65. 

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 64 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 65 -

Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when an appeal

is taken by a petitioner, the district judge who rendered the judgment “shall” either issue a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) or state the reasons why such a certificate should not

issue. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner “has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” This showing can be

established by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that

matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner” or that the

issues were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). For

procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate (1) whether the

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) whether the court’s

procedural ruling was correct. Id.

The Court finds that reasonable jurists could debate its resolution of the merits of

Claim 9. For the reasons stated in this Order and in the Court’s Order regarding Petitioner’s

request for evidentiary development filed on October 6, 2004 (Dkt. 106), the Court declines

to issue a COA with respect to any other claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Dkt. 74) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of execution entered by this Court on

October 16, 2001 (Dkt. 5), is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is GRANTED as

to the following issues: Whether the Court erred in determining that Claim 9, alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, lacked merit.

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 65 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 66 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this Order

to Rachelle M. Resnick, Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix,

AZ 85007-3329.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2008.

Case 2:01-cv-01909-NVW Document 111 Filed 09/29/08 Page 66 of 66