Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03021/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3021

___________

Fred Gilbert, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Des Moines Area Community College, * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Appellee, *

*

Robert Denson; Kim Linduska; Darrell *

Roberts; Sandy Tryon; Larry Ebbers, *

*

Defendants. *

___________

Submitted: March 6, 2007

Filed: August 8, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Fred Gilbert (Gilbert) appeals the district court’s1

 summary judgment in favor

of Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC) on Gilbert’s claims of racial

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

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Before September 2003, DMACC referred to the leaders of the six campuses

as “executive deans.” The title for this position later was changed to “provost.”

Regardless of the change in name, the responsibilities of each position essentially

remained unchanged.

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42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code

chapter 216. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2003, DMACC commenced a search for a new president. DMACC has

six separate campuses, one of which is known as the Urban Campus. At the time of

DMACC’s search, Gilbert served as Urban Campus Provost2

 of DMACC’s Urban

Campus and was responsible for the operation and administration of that campus.

To assist with the presidential search, DMACC’s Board of Directors hired Dr.

Larry Ebbers (Dr. Ebbers), an Iowa State University professor teaching courses

focusing on community college organization and higher education administration. Dr.

Ebbers suggested a small screening committee initially review the applications and

select six to eight candidates to present to a larger search committee. The search

committee then would meet to discuss and rank the candidates and select three to five

finalists for recommendation to DMACC’s Board of Directors to interview.

DMACC received approximately forty-eight presidential applications, including

Gilbert’s. On July 2, 2003, the screening committee, which consisted of four

DMACC Board of Directors members, met with Dr. Ebbers to review the applications.

The screening committee reviewed the applications and ranked Gilbert twelfth. When

asked by the screening committee regarding the number of candidates to forward to

the search committee, Dr. Ebbers suggested submitting twelve candidates because

Gilbert, an African-American, was ranked twelfth. Later, an application was

submitted by another African-American candidate. Thus, to increase the diversity of

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the pool of candidates, the screening committee ultimately presented thirteen

candidates to the search committee.

Dr. Ebbers then met with the thirty-member search committee, which consisted

of faculty, staff, students, alumni, and community members. The search committee

was asked to review the thirteen candidate applications before meeting again on July

14, 2003. Between July 2 and 14, 2003, Dr. Ebbers contacted at least three references

on each candidate’s reference list, as well as three other persons who were familiar

with the candidate, and prepared a written summary of his reference checks. 

At the July 14 meeting, the search committee discussed the thirteen candidates.

Dr. Ebbers directed the search committee to rank each of the candidates from one

(most qualified) to thirteen (least qualified). The candidate receiving the lowest

numerical score would be the highest-ranked candidate. The four highest-ranked

candidates (finalists) were: Kim Linduska (Linduska), with 73 points; Robert Denson

(Denson), with 75 points; Karen Rafinski (Rafinski), with 93 points; and Jean

Goodenow (Goodenow), with 129 points. The fifth-ranked candidate had a score of

194 points. Gilbert was ranked eleventh with 278 points. The other AfricanAmerican candidates were ranked sixth and twelfth, receiving 226 points and 280

points, respectively. The search committee recommended the Board of Directors

interview the finalists.

Dr. Sandy Tryon (Dr. Tryon), DMACC’s Executive Director of Human

Resources and designated Affirmative Action Officer, examined the presidential

search process as part of an affirmative action review. This review included

examining the scores of the finalists and comparing that range to the scores received

by the three African-American candidates. Dr. Tryon concluded none of the AfricanAmerican candidates received a point score sufficiently close to the scores of the

finalists to receive an interview; thus, no additional candidates were added to the

interview list.

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Gilbert was represented by legal counsel and was placed under oath.

Following the meeting, DMACC prepared a transcript of the meeting.

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The Board of Directors interviewed the finalists for the presidency position and

ultimately selected Denson (President Denson), who had been serving as president of

Northeast Iowa Community College since 1998. 

On March 29, 2004, Gilbert filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights

Commission (ICRC), and cross-filed the complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging discrimination on the basis of age, race,

color, and retaliation. On September 21, 2004, after receiving a right-to-sue letter,

Gilbert filed a lawsuit against DMACC and various individuals (collectively, the

defendants) in state district court, which was later removed to federal court.

After Gilbert filed suit and in preparation for responding to Gilbert’s complaint,

DMACC officials began investigating both the presidential search process and

Gilbert’s application. During the course of the investigation, DMACC officials

discovered substantial portions of essay answers in Gilbert’s application were

plagiarized almost word-for-word from two separate textbooks. Gilbert’s application

included a signed certification stating, “I understand that any misrepresentation or

omission may be grounds for rejection of my application for current and future

employment or for termination if I have been employed.” On December 4, 2004,

during an interview with Dr. Tryon, DMACC’s counsel, and Gilbert’s counsel, Gilbert

acknowledged his application contained plagiarized materials, but Gilbert denied

having knowledge of or being involved in the actual act of plagiarism. Gilbert stated

(1) he had hired a consultant to assist him in completing his application, (2) the

consultant prepared the essay answers for Gilbert and apparently committed the act

of plagiarism, and (3) he was unaware any plagiarism had occurred. 

DMACC officials interviewed Gilbert again on December 22, 2004,3

 and

Gilbert again claimed the consultant, whom Gilbert stated he had paid about one

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Gilbert also alleged claims against DMACC and five individual defendants for

racial harassment, conspiracy to violate civil rights, and intentional interference with

Gilbert’s employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment in the

defendants’ favor on these claims as well. On appeal, Gilbert solely challenges the

district court’s dismissal of the racial discrimination and retaliation claims against

DMACC.

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thousand dollars in cash (with no receipt from the consultant), had prepared the essay

answers. However, Gilbert could not recall the consultant’s name, the number of

times he met with the consultant, or the length of their meetings. Gilbert was unable

to provide a description of the consultant. When asked whether the consultant was

male or female, Gilbert replied, “Both.” Gilbert then said, “I met with more than one

sex.” When asked how many people he consulted, Gilbert stated, “It would be one or

two, because I think there was [sic] two, but I’m not sure.”

Based on the results of DMACC’s investigation, the DMACC Board of

Directors voted to terminate Gilbert’s contract as Urban Campus Provost on the

ground “Dr. Gilbert’s application for President of DMACC contained substantial acts

of plagiarism and acts of misrepresentation.” The decision to remove Gilbert from

academic administrative employment was influenced largely by DMACC’s

consideration of Gilbert’s academic governance duties, which included administering

academic programs and determining sanctions for academic misconduct. In President

Denson’s words, “plagiarism is a serious matter in academia,” and DMACC “did not

want Dr. Gilbert in a position where [Gilbert was] judging students for plagiarism

when he has been involved in plagiarism.” DMACC offered Gilbert a new position

as a grants specialist, which carried a significant reduction in salary.

Gilbert’s lawsuit alleged (1) DMACC’s decision not to hire Gilbert for the

position of president was motivated by race, and (2) DMACC retaliated against

Gilbert based on Gilbert’s engagement in protected activity. The district court granted

summary judgment in DMACC’s favor on both claims.4

 Gilbert appeals.

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We analyze ICRA claims under the same analytical framework used for Title

VII claims. See Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 2005). 

6

As an initial matter, Gilbert attacks the district court’s method of analysis,

arguing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), modified the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting analysis by clarifying Title VII only requires a showing that

discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment decision. Gilbert contends

the district court employed a more restrictive standard at the summary judgment stage

by analyzing Gilbert’s claim pursuant to McDonnell Douglas and erroneously

required Gilbert to demonstrate race was the sole motivating factor in the challenged

employment decision. We disagree. We previously have rejected the argument that

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II. DISCUSSION5

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Green v. Franklin

Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment

is proper if, after viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact exists

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2007). “Mere

allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party’s

own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”

Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007). We may affirm a district

court’s grant of summary judgment on any basis supported by the record. Tenge v.

Phillips Modern Ag. Co., 446 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2006). 

B. Racial Discrimination Claim

Gilbert first contends the district court erred in finding there was no genuine

issue of material fact regarding whether race was a motivating factor in DMACC’s

decision not to hire Gilbert as president. Because Gilbert fails to produce direct

evidence to support his claim of intentional racial discrimination, we analyze his claim

under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).6 See Wells v. SCI Mgmt., L.P., 469 F.3d 697, 700

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Desert Palace modified our court’s use of the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis

at the summary judgment stage of an employment discrimination lawsuit. See Griffith

v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004). The district court

properly analyzed Gilbert’s claim under the McDonnell Douglas analytical

framework, and we find nothing in the record to indicate the district court improperly

hinged Gilbert’s race discrimination claim on Gilbert’s ability to show race was the

sole factor in DMACC’s decision not to promote Gilbert to the position of president.

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(8th Cir. 2006). Under this analytical framework, once the plaintiff employee

establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant

employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Wells, 469 F.3d at 701. If the defendant offers

such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to put forth evidence showing the

defendant’s proffered explanation is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Wells, 469 F.3d at 701. 

For summary judgment purposes, DMACC concedes Gilbert established a

prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, we need only determine whether DMACC

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, and, if so, whether

Gilbert demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to pretext. 

DMACC asserts Gilbert was not selected for an interview due to Gilbert’s low

search committee score and the superior qualifications of the four finalists. The

record indicates the search committee members were directed to review independently

each candidate’s application materials before meeting as a group. At the July 14,

2003, meeting, the search committee discussed and considered the applicants’

education, leadership, and job experience, including prior experience in serving as

president of a community college, working with governing boards of directors, and

executing board policy. Furthermore, the search committee also discussed Gilbert’s

experience as leader of the Urban Campus, as well as the size differential between the

Urban Campus and DMACC as a whole. During the meeting, Dr. Ebbers reported on

comments received from each applicant’s personal references, and he also solicited

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At the time of DMACC’s presidential search, Gilbert held a master’s degree

in educational administration and a doctorate in philosophy, focusing on higher

education administration. President Denson held a master’s degree in education

administration and a juris doctorate. Linduska held a master’s degree in industrial

vocational technical education and was to be awarded a doctorate in higher education

in December 2003. Rafinski held a master’s degree in physical education, a master’s

degree in public administration, and a doctorate in educational policy studies.

Goodenow held a master’s degree in rehabilitative counseling and a doctorate in

higher education administration.

8

At the time of the presidential search, President Denson had been serving as

president of Northeast Iowa Community College since 1998. Linduska had been

serving as DMACC’s acting interim president from March 2003 until President

Denson’s appointment, and she previously served as DMACC’s senior vice president

for academic affairs, where she was Gilbert’s supervisor. Rafinski and Goodenow had

been serving as community college presidents since 1992 and 1996, respectively.

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comments regarding each candidate from the search committee. Following this

process, the search committee ranked Gilbert eleventh out of the thirteen candidates.

Although Gilbert and the four finalists had relatively comparable academic

credentials,7

 the finalists all were sitting or acting interim presidents of community

colleges who reported directly to a governing board of directors.8

 Gilbert, in contrast,

lacked community college presidential experience. 

Following the search committee’s decision, Dr. Tryon performed an affirmative

action review. Based on a review of all thirteen candidates’ rankings and point

allocations, Dr. Tryon determined none of the minority candidates were close enough

in points to the finalists to be interviewed. On these facts, we conclude DMACC

offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting Gilbert for an

interview. 

Thus, the burden shifts to Gilbert to produce evidence sufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DMACC’s proffered reasons are

mere pretext for intentional discrimination. Before the district court, Gilbert argued

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Specifically, Gilbert argues the following are evidence of pretext:

(1) DMACC’s claim Gilbert was not interviewed based on the search committee’s

findings, because the search committee had nothing to do with the decision not to

interview Gilbert; (2) DMACC’s claim it considered the candidates’ prior presidential

experience or the difference in size of the campuses managed by the candidates in

assessing the candidates’ qualifications; and (3) DMACC’s failure to ever investigate

a discrimination claim by Gilbert. On appeal, Gilbert also launches a broad-ranging

attack on DMACC’s affirmative action policy, arguing DMACC failed to observe its

policy throughout the entire search process and did nothing to review the process

except look at the final numbers.

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a finding of pretext is supported by DMACC’s failure to follow its affirmative action

policy and its practice of interviewing internal applicants as well as by Gilbert’s

similar or superior qualifications as compared to the finalists. On appeal, Gilbert

attempts to buttress his pretext argument with several additional contentions.9

 We

reject Gilbert’s belated attempt to advance new arguments or theories not presented

below. See Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2002)

(“Ordinarily, we do not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. We

consider a newly raised argument only if it is purely legal and requires no additional

factual development, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.” (internal

citations omitted)). Gilbert contends the district court was generally informed of these

facts and issues argued now on appeal. We follow our standard practice and limit our

review to the specific arguments Gilbert raised before the district court in support of

a finding of pretext, as opposed to those arguments the district court might have

deduced from the record as a whole. “A district court is not required to speculate on

which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to wade

through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the

nonmoving party’s claim.” White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 904 F.2d 456, 458

(8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). Nor will our court “mine a summary

judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party’s arguments.”

Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2006). We therefore turn

our attention to those arguments that are properly before us.

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10Again, Gilbert’s opening brief on appeal is brimming with newly-asserted and

broad-ranging attacks on DMACC’s affirmative action policy. In contrast to his

limited argument before the district court, Gilbert now argues DMACC failed to

observe its policy throughout the entire search process and raises specific criticisms

and suggestions regarding what DMACC should have done differently. Because we

find no good reason to depart from the general rule of avoiding consideration of an

issue not passed upon below, we again decline to address Gilbert’s belated

contentions. See Stafford v. Ford Motor Co., 790 F.2d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 1986)

(recognizing a contrary rule allowing consideration on appeal of newly raised

arguments “could encourage a party to ‘sandbag’ at the district court level, only then

to place his ‘ace in the hole’ before the appellate court”). 

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Gilbert first contends DMACC failed to perform an affirmative action review

of the search committee’s selection process.10 We disagree. Dr. Tryon’s involvement

in the presidential search process included discussing with Dr. Ebbers on various

occasions: the advertisement for the position of president, the search process and the

timeline to be followed, the makeup of the search committee, and the progress of the

search process. Additionally, after the search committee’s votes were tabulated, Dr.

Tryon reviewed the score range of the finalists and compared that range to the scores

received by the three minority candidates. Dr. Tryon and Dr. Ebbers noted the

substantial gap in the scores between the fourth-ranked candidate and the fifth and

sixth-ranked candidates. Dr. Tryon concluded none of the minority candidates

received a total point score sufficiently close to the scores of the finalists selected for

an interview. 

Gilbert next argues DMACC’s failure to follow its practice of interviewing

qualified internal candidates demonstrates pretext. Again, we disagree. Although

Gilbert presented evidence DMACC has an unwritten practice of interviewing

qualified internal candidates, we are unable to find any evidence in the record this

practice has ever been applied specifically to the position of DMACC president. Even

assuming DMACC ignored this practice with regard to the president position, the

disparity in scores between Gilbert and the finalists contradicts Gilbert’s claim that

DMACC’s alleged deviation from its unwritten policy occurred based on racial

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discrimination. See Chock v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 864-65 (8th Cir. 1997)

(affirming summary judgment in employer’s favor where plaintiff presented no

evidence employer’s deviation from established promotion policies occurred due to

racial discrimination). Thus, the failure to afford Gilbert an interview based on

DMACC’s unwritten practice does not constitute evidence of pretext sufficient to

rebut DMACC’s legitimate basis for not selecting Gilbert for an interview.

Finally, Gilbert attacks DMACC’s reliance on presidential experience in

evaluating candidates and argues the finalists were less qualified than Gilbert was for

the position of president. Evidence of similar qualifications between Gilbert and the

selected candidates is insufficient to support a finding of pretext; rather, Gilbert must

show the finalists were less qualified than he. See Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 378

F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2004). “Although an employer’s selection of a less qualified

candidate can support a finding that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the

hiring was pretextual, it is the employer’s role to identify those strengths that

constitute the best qualified applicant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). However, we repeatedly have noted “the employment-discrimination laws

have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel

departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by

employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional

discrimination.” Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir.

1995); see, e.g., Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 2100 (2007); Kincaid, 378 F.3d at 805. 

Although DMACC did not require prior presidential experience at a community

college when screening candidates, such experience was considered a strength in

evaluating the candidates’ job experience and leadership skills. Gilbert possessed

similar educational qualifications as the finalists, but he lacked prior presidential

experience. Viewed in the light most favorable to Gilbert, the record shows Gilbert’s

qualifications, at best, were somewhat similar to those of the finalists, which is

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insufficient to rebut DMACC’s legitimate reason for not selecting Gilbert. Gilbert

fails to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DMACC chose

a less qualified applicant. See Pierce v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1988)

(“The mere existence of comparable qualifications between two applicants . . . alone

does not raise an inference of racial discrimination.”).

Having reviewed Gilbert’s remaining allegations on this issue, we find the

allegations unavailing. Because Gilbert offered insufficient evidence to rebut

DMACC’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting Gilbert to interview

for the position of DMACC president, summary judgment in DMACC’s favor was

proper on this claim. 

C. Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Gilbert must demonstrate (1) he

engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment

action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the two. See Thomas, 483 F.3d at

530. Because Gilbert presented no direct evidence of retaliation, we analyze his claim

under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See id. DMACC does not

dispute Gilbert engaged in protected activity when Gilbert filed a complaint with the

ICRC on March 29, 2004, and when Gilbert filed the instant lawsuit on September 21,

2004. Thus, we turn our attention to the remaining elements of Gilbert’s prima facie

case.

The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII protects individuals “from retaliation

that produces an injury or harm.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White),

548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006). The standard is an objective one,

requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate “a reasonable employee would have found the

challenged action materially adverse,” and the employer’s action “might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Id. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Gilbert argues he suffered four adverse employment actions: (1) his demotion

to the position of grants specialist; (2) his receipt of a letter from President Denson

directing Gilbert to improve his performance with regard to managing the Urban

Campus budget; (3) President Denson’s request that Gilbert not select President

Emeritus Joseph Borgen (Borgen) as a speaker for an Urban Campus open house

ceremony; and (4) his assignment to an open cubicle near a security camera dome

following his demotion. The district court determined that although Gilbert’s

demotion constituted an adverse employment action, the remaining events did not.

We agree. 

With regard to President Denson’s letter to Gilbert, the letter discussed certain

budget management goals and stated DMACC would “take appropriate disciplinary

action” if these goals were not met. “[U]nder White, retaliatory actions must be

material, producing significant rather than trivial harm.” Devin v. Schwan’s Home

Serv., Inc., __ F.3d __, __, No. 06-3551, 2007 WL 1948310, at *5 (8th Cir. July 6,

2007). Gilbert fails to identify any objectively adverse (let alone significant) injury

or harm resulting from the letter. Considering the document in its entirety, we cannot

say the letter would “have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination.” White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. Even assuming the letter

constituted an adverse employment action, Gilbert makes no argument concerning a

causal connection between his protected activity on March 29, 2004, and the July 21,

2004, letter. Indeed, DMACC’s criticisms of Gilbert’s budgetary problems predated

Gilbert’s engagement in protected activity, which weakens any inference of a causal

connection. See Kasper v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 425 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2005)

(recognizing an employer’s criticism of a plaintiff’s performance before the plaintiff

engaged in protected activity diminished any inference of causation).

We reach a similar conclusion regarding the objection to Gilbert’s preference

to select Borgen as a speaker for an Urban Campus ceremony. In late August 2004,

President Denson requested Borgen not speak at the ceremony given (1) Borgen’s

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submission of an affidavit in connection with Gilbert’s legal matter with DMACC,

(2) President Denson’s and Gilbert’s efforts to ensure there was “no carry-over

between [Gilbert’s] legal matter and [his] activities as Provost,” and (3) President

Denson’s wish to avoid distracting from the ceremony or having anyone distort any

comments Borgen might make. President Denson offered to recognize Borgen for his

accomplishments at DMACC and for Borgen’s efforts at the Urban Campus.

President Denson further noted he had “absolutely no problem” with Gilbert’s other

chosen speaker. Again, nowhere does Gilbert allege this event caused him significant

harm or injury. In our view, President Denson’s request that Gilbert not select Borgen

as a speaker would not have deterred a reasonable employee from engaging in

protected activity. 

Finally, Gilbert’s assignment to a cubicle near a smoked glass security dome

following his demotion did not constitute an adverse employment action. DMACC

officials classified Gilbert’s new position as a grants specialist as a “‘cubicle’ job, not

an ‘office’ job,” and thus did not require a private office. Additionally, the department

to which Gilbert was assigned only had one available spot, which happened to be

located near a security dome. The security dome at issue did not contain an actual

camera and was installed in the accounts receivable and financial aid areas to give

students, not employees, the impression a security camera might be located in those

areas. Gilbert’s new work space may not have been as desirable as his previous

quarters while serving as DMACC’s Urban Campus Provost, but Title VII does not

protect employees “from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place

at work and that all employees experience.” White, 126 S. Ct. 2415. This event does

not constitute an actionable harm.

Returning to the issue of Gilbert’s demotion, we agree with the district court

that Gilbert’s demotion clearly was an adverse employment action, which occurred

after Gilbert filed the instant lawsuit, and a causal connection may exist between the

two. However, Gilbert fails to meet his burden of rebutting DMACC’s legitimate,

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11Although DMACC does not have an official policy regarding plagiarism by

faculty, staff, or administrative employees, it does have such a policy applicable to

students. DMACC also has mission goals and value statements providing that the

“college adheres to the highest standards of integrity and ethical behavior,” which

President Denson described as being the “closest written statement [DMACC has] that

would indicate that plagiarism is not acceptable at any level.”

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nondiscriminatory reason for demoting Gilbert based on the extensive plagiarism

contained in Gilbert’s application and Gilbert’s acts of misrepresentation during the

investigation. To prove pretext, Gilbert must both discredit DMACC’s asserted

reason for the demotion and show the circumstances permit drawing a reasonable

inference that the real reason for his demotion was retaliation. See Twymon v. Wells

Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006). Gilbert satisfies neither requirement.

Indeed, Gilbert admitted his application contained plagiarized materials. Gilbert’s

response during the investigation could generously be labeled not fully candid. Until

DMACC began the investigation in response to Gilbert’s lawsuit, DMACC was

unaware of the nature and extent of Gilbert’s plagiarism. Only one search committee

member was suspicious of Gilbert’s choice of language because of the use of a

particular three-word phrase. This member was not Gilbert’s supervisor, and there is

no evidence the member reported his concern to DMACC officials during the search

process.

Furthermore, DMACC’s lack of an explicit policy regarding plagiarism by

faculty members does not demonstrate DMACC’s decision to investigate and

discipline Gilbert for his actions was pretextual.11 Gilbert fails to present any

evidence the persons involved in the decision-making process ever had considered

prior instances of plagiarism by a DMACC faculty or staff member. As Provost of the

Urban Campus, Gilbert’s duties included administering academic programs and

enforcing DMACC’s policies, including DMACC’s prohibition against plagiarism by

students. The reprehensibility of plagiarism in the field of higher education,

particularly by one in a leadership position, erodes Gilbert’s assertion that DMACC’s

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actions were retaliatory in nature. DMACC has never wavered from its explanation

for demoting Gilbert, which, as DMACC points out, militates against a finding of

pretext. See EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 462 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2006)

(noting the defendant employer never wavered from its one explanation for

terminating the plaintiff, and distinguishing those cases in which the employers’

substantial change in position supported an inference of pretext). 

Summary judgment in DMACC’s favor is proper on Gilbert’s retaliation claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the well-reasoned opinion and judgment

of the district court.

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Appellate Case: 06-3021 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/08/2007 Entry ID: 3338699