Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01411/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01411-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Duhn Oil Tool, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Cooper Cameron Corporation,

Defendant.

1:05-cv-01411-OWW-GSA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DEFERRING IN PART PLAINTIFF

DUHN OIL, INC.’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANT COOPER CAMERON

CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF

NO INFRINGEMENT REGARDING

DEFENDANT’S PATENT PENDING

AND NEW STYLE DESIGNS (Doc.

143)

I. Introduction.

This case concerns defendant Cooper Cameron Corporation’s

(“Cameron”) alleged infringement of plaintiff Duhn Oil Tool

Inc.’s (“Duhn”) patented wellhead isolation tool, U.S. Patent No.

6,920,925 (“‘925 Patent”). Before the Court for decision is

Duhn’s ex parte application to strike Cameron’s motion for

partial summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘925 Patent

by Cameron’s Patent Pending and New Style Designs.

II. Background.

A. Initiation of the Present Lawsuit.

Duhn filed its complaint against Cameron for infringement of

the ‘925 Patent on November 9, 2005. Duhn’s complaint alleges

the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued

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the ‘925 Patent to Duhn on July 26, 2005. The complaint further

alleges Cameron “by itself, or in concert with others, has

offered for sale, sold, is offering for sale/or is selling in

this district and elsewhere in the United States, products which

infringe the ‘925 Patent.” Compl. ¶ 6. Duhn also alleged

“[Duhn] is being damaged by [Cameron’s] infringement of the ‘925

Patent and is being and will continue to be irreparably damaged

unless [Cameron’s] infringement is enjoined by this Court. [Duhn]

does not have an adequate remedy at law.” Compl. ¶ 9. In its

prayer, Duhn requested the following releif:

1. A declaration:

a. That the Court has jurisdiction over the parties

and of the subject matter of this action;

b. That the ‘925 Patent is valid and owned by Duhn;

and

c. That Cameron committed acts of patent infringement

by its offer for sale and sale of products that

infringe the ‘925 Patent. 

2. That Cameron, its agents, representatives, employees,

assigns and suppliers, and all persons acting in

concert or in privity with any of the be preliminarily

and permanently enjoined from making, using, offering

for sale, selling, or importing inventions of the ‘925

Patent;

3. That Cameron be required by mandatory injunction to

deliver to Duhn for destruction any and all products in

Cameron’s possession, custody, or control embodying the

patented invention as well as any promotional

literature therefor;

4. That Duhn be awarded damages caused by Cameron’s acts

of patent infringement in an amount sufficient to

compensate Duhn for infringement;

5. That Duhn be awarded prejudgment interest;

6. That Duhn recover its costs;

7. That Duhn have such other relief as the Court deems

just and proper. 

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Cameron filed its answer on March 17, 2006, denying that it

infringed the ‘925 Patent. Cameron’s answer is accompanied by a

counterclaim seeking “a declaratory judgment that its products do

not infringe any valid claims of the ‘925 Patent.” Ans. ¶ 9. 

Cameron also seeks to invalidate the ‘925 Patent on the grounds

that the ‘925 Patent fails to meet the conditions for

patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103; Duhn misused the

patent; and inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the

application that issued as the ‘925 Patent. Ans. ¶¶ 10-12. 

Cameron’s counterclaim seeks the following relief:

a. A finding that Cameron has not infringed any valid

claims of the ‘925 Patent;

b. A finding of invalidity for all claims of the ‘925

Patent;

c. A finding of unenforceability for the ‘925 Patent due

to patent misuse;

d. A finding of unenforceability for the ‘925 Patent due

to inequitable conduct;

e. A finding this case is exceptional requiring Duhn to

pay Cameron’s attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C § 285; and

f. An award of further relief that the Court deems just,

equitable, and proper.

Neither Duhn’s complaint, Cameron’s answer, nor Duhn’s

answer to Cameron’s counterclaim specify which of Cameron’s

“products” infringe the ‘925 Patent.

B. Cameron’s Summary Judgment Motions.

Discovery in this case cut off August 29, 2007. The

deadline for the parties to file dispositive motions was

September 28, 2007. Duhn filed its motion for summary judgment

on September 28, 2007, and Cameron filed two separate motions for

summary judgment, one on September 28, 2007 and the other on

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September 29, 2007. Cameron’s motion for partial summary

judgment of no infringement states:

[Cameron] will and hereby does move the Court for an

Order entering Partial Summary Judgment of No

Infringement Regarding [Cameron’s] Patent Pending and New

Style Designs. In particular, Defendant Cameron asks

this Court to grant a partial summary judgment in favor

of [Cameron], finding [Cameron’s] Patent Pending and New

Style designs do not infringe claims 1-88 of [Duhn’s]

‘925 Patent.

Cameron’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of

its partial motion for summary judgment of no infringement

describes Cameron’s wellhead products. There are three separate

Cameron products that are now in issue in this lawsuit. The

three products are referred to as the “Old Style” Design, the

“New Style” Design, and the “Patent Pending” Design. The New

Style Design and Patent Pending Design (collectively, “New

Designs”) are the subject of Cameron’s motion for partial summary

judgment of no infringement.

When Duhn commenced this case, Cameron was manufacturing

what it now identifies as the Old Style Design. Cameron is

presently manufacturing the New Style Design, and is phasing out

the Old Style Design. Cameron has also developed an additional

alternative design and filed a patent application for this design

with the USPTO on May 8, 2007; Cameron refers to this third 

design as the Patent Pending Design. From the outset of this

case, Duhn has only alleged the Old Style Design infringes the

‘925 Patent. While this case has been pending, Cameron has

implemented the New Style Design and filed a patent application

for the Patent Pending Design. This was not disclosed before the

summary judgment motions.

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Cameron maintains Duhn has not identified which particular

claims of the ‘925 Patent are infringed by the New Designs,

although Duhn’s experts in their reports and depositions assert

that the New Designs infringe the ‘925 Patent. However, Duhn

asserts prior to Cameron’s filing of its partial motion for

summary judgment of no infringement, Cameron never identified in

discovery any products being made, sold, or used with the New

Designs. In fact, Duhn claims it was surprised by Cameron’s

assertion that Cameron was manufacturing products incorporating

the New Style Design because Cameron did not identify in

discovery, after being requested to do so, any of its products

using the New Designs. 

III. Discussion.

Duhn maintains the Court lacks jurisdiction to award Cameron 

declaratory relief where no actual case or controversy exists

because the declaration Cameron seeks is not ripe for decision 

and any opinion the Court issues would be advisory. Duhn also

argues Cameron never disclosed information during discovery that

the New Designs existed, were being made, used, offered for sale,

or sold despite Duhn’s written discovery requests seeking

identification of each of Cameron’s wellhead isolation tools. 

Although not clearly articulated, Duhn advances two distinct

arguments to strike Cameron’s partial motion for summary judgment

of no infringement on justiciability grounds and as a discovery

sanction. 

Cameron seeks a determination that its New Designs do not

infringe claims 1 through 88 of the ‘925 Patent. Cameron’s 

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opposition argues for the first time, that it seeks partial

summary judgment of no infringement for the New Designs as a 

defense to Duhn’s assertion of alleged lost profits damages, and

that Duhn misconstrues the purpose of Cameron’s no infringement

motion.

A. Standard for Declaratory Relief.

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (“Act”),

authorizes federal courts to declare the rights and other legal

relations of parties when an actual controversy exists. 

Specifically, the Act provides 

[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction

. . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of

an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other

legal relations of any interested party seeking such

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be

sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and

effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be

reviewable as such.

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 

It is well-settled that the Act’s “actual controversy”

requirement is the same as the case or controversy requirement of

Article III of the United States Constitution. Societe de

Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter Eng’g Co., 655 F.2d 938,

942 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300

U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937)). The Act requires no more stringent

showing of justiciability than the Constitution does. Societe de

Conditionnement, 655 F.2d at 942. Issuing a judgment in a case

without an actual controversy is an advisory opinion, which is

prohibited by Article III of the United States Constitution. 

Hillblom v. United States, 896 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Concrete legal issues, rather than abstractions, are

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required for adjudication of constitutional issues. Id.

Where the alleged controversy is hypothetical, federal courts do

not have the authority to grant declaratory relief. Sellers v.

Regents of the Univ. of California, 432 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir.

1970).

A “controversy” in this sense must be one that is

appropriate for judicial determination . . . . A

justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a

difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract

character; from one that is academic or moot . . . . The

controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the

legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests

. . . . It must be a real and substantial controversy

admitting of specific relief through a decree of a

conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion

advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state

of facts . . . .

Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240-41 (citations omitted). “If a case is not

ripe for review, then there is no case or controversy, and the

court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Principal Life Ins.

Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005).

The standard for declaratory relief under the Act also

applies to cases involving patent infringement. See MedImmune,

Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., – U.S. –, 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). It is

well-settled 

that the dispute be definite and concrete, touching the

legal relations of parties having adverse legal

interests; and that it be real and substantial and admit

of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive

character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what

the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts

alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is

a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse

legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to

warrant the issue of a declaratory judgment.

Id. at 771 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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 The prevailing party in a successful suit for patent 1

infringement is entitled to an award of lost profits. Herbert v.

Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Federal

Circuit uses the Panduit test, which was articulated by the Sixth

Circuit in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d

1152 (6th Cir. 1978). The Panduit test is as follows: To obtain

as damages the profits on sales made by the infringer, a patent

owner must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) the

absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his

manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and

(4) the amount of profit he would have made. Panduit, 575 F.2d

at 1156. Cameron contends its New Designs are acceptable

noninfringing products that prevent Duhn from recovering lost

profits.

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B. Justiciability of Cameron’s Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment of No Infringement.

Cameron’s suggestion that its disputed motion is limited to

narrow the issues for trial related to Duhn’s claim for lost

profits is unavailing for two reasons. First, the motion itself 1

specifically states 

Defendant Cooper Cameron Corporation (“Cameron”) will and

hereby does move the Court for an Order entering Partial

Summary Judgment of No Infringement Regarding Defendant’s

Patent Pending and New Style Designs. In particular,

Defendant Cameron asks this Court to grant a partial

summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding that

Defendant’s Patent Pending and New Style designs do not

infringe Claims 1-88 of Plaintiff Duhn Oil Tool, Inc.

(“Duhn Oil”)’s United States Patent No. 6,920,925 (“the

‘925 Patent”).

Cameron’s motion does not mention that its purpose is to negate

an element of Duhn’s claim for lost profits damages. Profits are

mentioned only twice in Cameron’s supporting memorandum of points

and authorities. First, “[Duhn] relies upon its assertion that

the Patent Pending Design infringes as a basis for its alleged

lost profits damages clam[;]” and “[Duhn] relies upon this

alleged infringement in support of its alleged lost profits

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damages claim[,]” which apparently comes from Duhn’s damages

expert’s report. Cameron argues “[f]or the foregoing reasons and

authorities cited, Defendant Cameron respectfully requests that

this Court grant a partial summary judgment in favor of

Defendant, finding that Defendant’s Patent Pending and New Style

designs do not infringe Claims 1-88 of the ‘925 Patent.”

Second, Cameron’s opposition asserts:

Defendant Cameron’s request for summary judgment of no

infringement regarding its alternative Patent Pending and

New Style designs was not filed as a request for a

declaratory judgment pursuant to Defendant’s declaratory

judgment counterclaims of noninfringement. The summary

judgment motion was filed in order to narrow for trial

the issues underlying Plaintiff’s claim for alleged lost

profits damages.

Cameron later states in a footnote: 

[i]n the event that Plaintiff Duhn Oil may withdraw its

claim for alleged lost profits damages in this action in

an attempt to avoid a finding of noninfringement

regarding Defendant Cameron’s Patent Pending and New

Style designs, Cameron would assert that this Court

should resolve these noninfringement issues under its

discretionary declaratory judgment jurisdiction, which

Cameron respectfully asserts could be more efficiently

handled in this current action as opposed to a separate

declaratory judgment action as Plaintiff Duhn Oil

apparently desires.

These contradictory statements do not support Cameron’s

contention that the new claims have the sole purpose of negating

Duhn’s lost profits damage claim. Cameron seeks a declaratory

judgment of no infringement of the ‘925 Patent for its New

Designs. Judicial efficiency does not determine whether a claim

is ripe for review.

1. Cameron’s New Style Design.

Duhn first learned on September 28, 2007, that Cameron was

actually manufacturing the New Style Design, when Cameron filed

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its partial motion for summary judgment of no infringement and

first identified the New Designs. Throughout this case, Duhn has

only asserted that Cameron’s Old Style Design infringes the ‘925

Patent. During discovery, Duhn repeatedly sought to identify

each wellhead isolation tool designed, manufactured, sold,

leased, or distributed by or on behalf of Cameron since July 26,

2005. Cameron, in its responses and supplemental responses to

Duhn’s requests, only identified the Old Style Design. 

Similarly, Duhn’s responses to Cameron’s discovery requests

indicated only the Old Style Design infringed the ‘925 Patent,

because Duhn did not know the New Style Design existed.

Duhn’s contention that this case is not ripe for review due

to the lack of a factual record regarding the New Style Design is

unavailing. Duhn argues the lack of a factual record does not

allow Cameron, Duhn, or the Court to identify a definite and

concrete dispute over any adverse legal rights between Cameron

and Duhn. If Cameron is manufacturing the New Style Design as it

says it is, then Duhn should be able to determine, by reopening

discovery, whether the New Style Design infringes the ‘925

Patent. Ripeness addresses the legal relationship between the

parties, the imminency of harm, and inquires whether a dispute is

ready for review. The lack of an undeveloped factual record does

not make a case unripe for decision. Additional discovery may

reveal a definite and concrete dispute. 

Here, Cameron alleges it has the New Style design in

production and the Patent Pending Design before the PTO and

intends to market those products. Duhn also argues the New Style

Design was not on the market when it commenced this case and that

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Cameron failed to produce evidence of or that the New Style

Design was available at any time prior to the submission of

reports by Duhn’s damages expert, which do not address the New

Style Design. Duhn admits it only discovered the New Style

Design existed when Cameron filed this motion for partial summary

judgment of no infringement on September 28, 2007. 

No discovery has been conducted on this product. Further

discovery is required to ascertain whether Cameron’s New Style

Design infringes Duhn’s ‘925 Patent. A Rule 56(f) motion is in

order. However, the trial is currently set in January 2008. 

2. Cameron’s Patent Pending Design.

No evidence has been provided that Cameron’s Patent Pending

Design has progressed beyond the design stage. Cameron only

alleges that it has filed a patent application for the Patent

Pending Design. Cameron does not assert that the Patent Pending

Design is being manufactured, or that it has a working model. 

Cameron asks the Court to determine that Cameron’s Patent Pending

Design, whether in practice, or in theory, does not infringe

Duhn’s ‘925 Patent. The USPTO can require that Cameron change

the design of the Patent Pending Design or it can decline to

issue Cameron a patent with respect to the Patent Pending Design. 

It is premature to determine the legality of Cameron’s Patent

Pending Design, in advance of issuance of such a patent. Cameron

does not allege it has practiced the invention, or that the

product is offered for or on sale. No infringement is alleged. 

As yet, no adverse legal relationship exists between Duhn

and Cameron over Duhn’s ‘925 Patent and Cameron’s Patent Pending

Design. Duhn’s application to strike Cameron’s motion for

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partial summary judgment of no infringement regarding Cameron’s

Patent Pending Design is GRANTED as the necessary actual

controversy to satisfy the ripeness requirement for declaratory

relief does not exist. 

C. Prejudice to Duhn.

Permitting Cameron to proceed with its partial motion for

summary judgment of no infringement without discovery would

substantially prejudice Duhn. Duhn has had no opportunity to

examine any Cameron product incorporating the New Designs or

learn anything about the New Designs. A declaration of no

infringement of the ‘925 Patent by the New Designs at this point

in time would preclude Duhn from asserting an affirmative

infringement claim, or from knowing anything about the subject

matter of the products incorporating the New Designs. Cameron

did not identify a single product incorporating the New Designs

in discovery. Duhn has been unable to analyze whether such

products would infringe the ‘925 Patent. The Federal Circuit’s

opinion in Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,

Inc., 347 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2003), requires Duhn to bring a

compulsory counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“FRCP”) 13(a) or be forever barred from bringing an infringement

claim against Cameron for infringement of the ‘925 Patent by the

New Designs. This presents Duhn with an impossible situation; on

the eve of trial, after the discovery cut-off, it has no

knowledge of the new products or invention. 

Duhn’s counsel states that Cameron never identified the New

Designs in response to Duhn’s discovery requests. Cameron does

not dispute this. 

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Cameron, however, has explained that earlier in this case it

successfully moved to exclude Duhn’s counsel, Christie, Parker &

Hale LLP (“CPH”), from obtaining access to confidential

information designated “attorney’s eyes only.” CPH provides Duhn

with both patent prosecution and patent litigation services. CPH

prosecutes patents on behalf of Duhn that are in the same patent

family that Cameron currently has at least one patent application

pending before the USPTO. Because of CPH’s dual, service

providing role, Duhn has had to employ the services of an

additional law firm, Thomas, Whitelaw & Tyler LLP (“TWT”), in

this case. TWT is the firm that possesses the relevant

attorney’s eyes only information regarding the New Designs;

neither CPH nor Duhn have access to this information. 

Information regarding the New Designs was revealed in the

parties’ damages expert’s reports in June 2007. CPH is not privy

to these reports, which adequately explains why neither CPH nor

Duhn knew about the New Designs until Cameron filed its partial

motion for summary judgment of no infringement on September 28,

2007. 

IV. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, Duhn’s ex parte application to

strike Cameron’s motion for partial summary judgment of no

infringement is GRANTED, with respect to Cameron’s Patent Pending

Design, and the ruling is deferred with respect to Cameron’s New

///

///

///

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Style Design, pending a modification of the schedule in this

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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