Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03142/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kim Pierce Moyaert,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Warden Stearnes, et. al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 05-3142-PHX-MHM (JI) 

ORDER

Petitioner Kim Pierce Moyaert ("Petitioner") filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. #1). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin for

Report and Recommendation. Following Respondent's Answer, Magistrate Judge Irwin filed

his Report and Recommendation with this Court. (Dkt. #14). Petitioner filed an objection

to the Report and Recommendation on May 19, 2006. (Dkt. #15). 

I. Standard of Review

The Court must review the Magistrate Judge's legal analysis in the Report and

Recommendation de novo if objection is made but not otherwise. United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F. 3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) ("[a]

judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."). 

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

II. Discussion

The Court has considered the pleadings and documents of record in this case.

Petitioner was charged with two counts of theft, one for a vehicle and one for a cashier's

check. (Respondent's Answer, Dkt. #11, Exhibit H). The State alleged one prior conviction

in Maricopa County, Arizona in 1997. (Id., Exhibit B). Prior to trial, trial counsel motioned

the court to dismiss the stolen check count because of discovery and best evidence

deficiencies, but the trial court denied trial counsel's motion. (Traverse, Dkt. #13, Exhibit

5). Petitioner was subsequently acquitted of theft of the vehicle but found guilty of theft of

the check. (Docket #11, Exhibits C and D). At sentencing, the State introduced testimony

of a fingerprint examiner, who stated that Petitioner's fingerprints matched the fingerprints

on a sentencing minute entry, and admitted printouts of the sheriff's booking records. (Id.,

Exhibit E at 7–8). Defense counsel objected to use of Petitioner's prior conviction in the

sentencing phase because the sentencing enhancement was improper, the prior conviction

was too old for consideration, and the booking records lacked adequate foundation to be

admitted into evidence. (Id., Exhibit E at 11–14). The trial court rejected the argument,

relied upon the prior conviction, and sentenced Petitioner to four and one-half years in

prison. (Id., Exhibit H at 4). 

Petitioner then filed a direct appeal, asserting two issues: (1) the State failed to satisfy

one of the elements of the crime by failing to provide proof of the value of the stolen

property; and (2) the State failed to prove that the prior conviction fell within the time limits

for sentencing consideration. (Id., Exhibit F at 1). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner's conviction and sentence. (Id., Exhibit H at 11). Petitioner asked for and received

an extension of time to file a pro se petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court, but

Petitioner did not file a petition for review. (Id., Exhibits J and K). 

Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32.1 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure claiming: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial

and on appeal; (2) the sentence imposed was not authorized; and (3) that the law had

changed substantially between the time Petitioner was sentenced and the affirmance of

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner's conviction on appeal. (Id., Exhibit N at 3). Petitioner's arguments were based

on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which bars hearsay testimonial statements.

Petitioner asserted that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to the use

the sheriff's booking records in light of a Crawford confrontation clause analysis. The trial

court summarily dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. (Id., Exhibit Q).

Petitioner's petition to review the trial court's dismissal was never received by the Arizona

Court of Appeals and, thus, was never filed. (Traverse, Dkt. #13, Exhibit 4). 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. #1).

Petitioner asserts the following grounds of relief: (1) the State failed to disclose a copy of the

cashier's check prior to trial; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal

based on (a) the best evidence rule, (b) non-disclosure of the stolen check, and (c) failure to

file a reply or adequately brief the appeal; and (3) use of the prior conviction to enhance his

sentence was a violation of the double-jeopardy clause. Respondents filed their Answer on

January 25, 2006, arguing that all three of Petitioner's claims were unexhausted and

procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. #11). Petitioner filed a Traverse (Dkt. #13) stating that any

procedural default should be excused on his showing of cause and prejudice. Petitioner

asserts that the cause for his procedural default was: (1) Petitioner was not given adequate

time to file his pro se petition for review to Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal; (2)

appellate counsel provided erroneous advice that presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court

was not necessary to exhaust state remedies; (3) Petitioner's petition for review of the denial

of his post-conviction relief petition was lost in the mail. (Dkt. #13 at 2-3). Petitioner asserts

that he suffered actual prejudice because: (1) the trial court's admission of the cashier's check

into evidence, despite the prosecutions failure to disclose it prior to trial, altered the outcome

of the trial and sentence (Dkt. 13 at 3-4); (2) prior disclosure of the cashier's check would

have given Petitioner the ability to show that the check produced at trial was not the check

taken from Petitioner at the time of his arrest (Id. at 4). Additionally, Petitioner argues that

his actual innocence should excuse his procedural default. (Id. at 4-5.)

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

In reviewing Petitioner's claim for relief, Magistrate Irwin concludes that Petitioner

states no claim for relief. Petitioner offers objections, but the objections do not directly

address the Report and Recommendation and are, therefore, meritless. 

III. Application of Law to Facts

A. Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state prisoner's

application for habeas relief, the prisoner must have exhausted his remedies in state court.

See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust one's remedies in

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise a claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his

conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th

Cir. 1994). Moreover, a petitioner must alert the state courts to the federal nature of the

claim in order to give the courts a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles. 28

U.S.C. § 2254; see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 27 (2004) (describing fair presentment);

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.

2001) (holding that fair presentation requires the petitioner make explicit the federal basis

of the claim and cite supporting law). "In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death

penalty, 'claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once

the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.'" Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

1. Failure to Fairly Present Federal Claims to State Courts

In the present case, Petitioner did not fairly present his federal claims to the Arizona

appellate courts. For Ground I (failure to disclose), Petitioner did not raise this claim on

direct appeal or in the post-conviction relief ("PCR") proceedings. For Ground II (ineffective

assistance of counsel), Petitioner's PCR petition did assert ineffective assistance of counsel;

however, the PCR petitioner was limited to a Crawford attack on the admissibility of the

booking records. Petitioner failed to file his petition for review from the denial of his PCR

petition. For Ground III (double jeopardy), Petitioner first made a double jeopardy claim on

direct appeal when he argued that if the matter was remanded for re-sentencing the state

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

should not be given a second chance to prove the prior conviction pursuant to the doublejeopardy clause. (Exhibit F, Opening Brief at 19). The direct appeal claim made is not the

claim made here, where the Petitioner argues that consideration of the prior conviction at

sentencing violated the double-jeopardy clause. 

Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present his federal claims to Arizona courts, and,

thus, all of Petitioner's grounds for relief were not properly exhausted. 

B. Petitioner Cannot Demonstrate That Review is Still Warranted Despite

Procedural Default

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims because of his failure to exhaust his

federal claims in state court. Cassett v. Steward, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005); see

also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989) (stating that under state court's procedural

rules the procedural default arises because a return to state court to exhaust the claim would

be futile). Under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner is precluded from

seeking further state review because the filing deadline has expired. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)

(stating that a prisoner must file a notice for petition of post-conviction relief "within ninety

days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the

order and mandate in direct appeal, whichever is later."). Additionally, none of these claims

fall within any of the narrow exceptions to the timely filing requirement. See Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.1(d)-(h). 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate why his procedurally barred claims still

warrant a federal habeas review. Although Petitioner argues that he has good cause for his

failure to exhaust his state remedies, Petitioner has not effectively demonstrated: (1) cause

for the default and actual prejudice suffered; or (2) that the failure to review the claims would

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 724; Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). 

1. Cause and Prejudice

Petitioner has not effectively demonstrated cause for the procedural default nor has

Petitioner demonstrated any actual prejudice suffered.

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

(a) Time For Petition for Review 

Petitioner claims that he failed to exhaust his state court remedies because he was not

given adequate time to file his pro se petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court on

direct appeal. Petitioner argues that, although he had over fifty days to prepare his petition

for review, this time was inadequate because of his pro se status and the limited legal

resources available to Arizona prisoners. However, during this time frame, Petitioner was

able to prepare and file his Notice for Post-Conviction Relief. Petitioner's failure to file his

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court is not the reason his claim is unexhausted.

 Petitioner is not required to present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court for exhaustion

purposes, but Petitioner did not raise this claim before the Arizona Court of Appeals as

required. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1154, 173

Ariz. 502, 504 (1993). 

With respect to Ground II (ineffective assistance of counsel), Petitioner could have

properly raised it in his PCR proceeding, but Petitioner did not. Thus, the alleged limited

time given to Petitioner did not cause Petitioner to fail to exhaust his claims. 

(b) Erroneous Advice on Exhaustion

Petitioner argues that he failed to exhaust his claims because of appellate counsel's

advice that he was not required to present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court in order

to exhaust his state remedies. Castillo and Swoopes clearly illustrate that presentation to the

Arizona Supreme Court is, in fact, not required. Therefore, counsel's advice was correct. 

(c) Lost Petition for Review

Finally, Petitioner asserts that he has shown cause by the fact that his petition for

review of the denial of his PCR petition was lost in the mail. Even if the petition for review

was lost in mail, Petitioner did not seek a delayed filing of the petition after learning it had

been lost. More importantly, the petition for review is limited to the issues raised in his PCR

petition, which did not address the issues raised in this habeas proceeding. Accordingly,

even if the petition had been filed, it would not have exhausted Petitioner's claims. 

(d) Summary: No Cause and Prejudice

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Petitioner presents no cause that precluded him from properly exhausting his state

remedies. The question of "actual prejudice" need not be considered. See Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982). 

(2) Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has

resulted from a constitutional violation, resulting in the conviction of an innocent person.

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 921 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has not provided any

"colorable showing of factual innocence" to supplement his constitutional claim. See Herrera

v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (holding that the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

exception to procedural defaults applies only where a prisoner provides evidence of actual

innocence). Instead, Petitioner asserts that the check entered into evidence was not the actual

check found on Petitioner at the time of arrest. Petitioner offers no evidence to show that he

did not, in fact, steal the check from the victim. Petitioner fails to establish that no

reasonable jury could have convicted him. Consequently, Petitioner's procedural default is

not overcome on the basis of his actual innocence. 

C. Summary

None of Petitioner's grounds for relief were properly exhausted, and they are all now

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause for his procedural default

or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result by failing to review his claims. 

Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Irwin, and for

the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby incorporates and adopts the Magistrate’s Report

and Recommendation.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Judge Irwin. (Dkt. #14).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED overruling Petitioner's objection to the Report and

Recommendation. (Dkt. #15).

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C § 2254. (Dkt. #1). The Petition is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter Judgment accordingly.

DATED this 20th day of December, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-03142-MHM Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 8 of 8