Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02188/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02188-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffrey A. Herald,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney General,

Respondents.

No. CV 14-02188 PHX DLR (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES:

Petitioner, who is pro se in this matter, docketed a motion seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about October 2, 2014. Respondents docketed 

a limited answer to the amended petition for habeas corpus relief on February 5, 2015. 

See Doc. 13 (“Answer”). On February 13, 2015, Petitioner docketed a reply to the 

answer to the petition. See Doc. 17. On February 20, 2015, Petitioner docketed a motion 

to strike the pleading at Doc. 17 and also docketed a reply to the answer to his petition. 

See Doc. 18 & Doc. 19.

I Procedural background

A grand jury indictment returned September 17, 2008, charged Petitioner (using 

his own and an additional nine “aka” identities) with 39 counts of fraudulent schemes and 

artifices, class 2 felonies, and 39 counts of theft, class 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 felonies (based 

upon the amount allegedly stolen). See Doc. 13 (Answer), Exh. A. Thirteen of the 

counts, encompassing seven victims, involved Petitioner’s “legal services” business and 

alleged he misrepresented to clients that he was a licensed attorney. Id., Exh. A. The 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 1 of 27
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

remaining counts pertained to a “loan origination” business. Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner was initially represented in his criminal proceedings by retained

counsel, who subsequently withdrew from representation. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. The 

state trial court thereafter appointed Mr. Wallin as Petitioner’s defense counsel. On 

August 3, 2009, Petitioner sought to remove Mr. Wallin as counsel because he

“considered [Petitioner] guilty without going through several boxes of evidence;” he had 

interviewed “several witnesses,” including family members, but “came up with a total 

different story than reality;” and because he had “no clue about [Petitioner’s] case.” Id., 

Exh. D. On December 29, 2009, Petitioner again moved to substitute counsel. Id., Exh. 

E. The state trial court denied these motions, finding that there was no legal basis to 

justify a change in defense counsel. Id., Exh. F.

On May 18, 2010, Petitioner again sought to remove Mr. Wallin as counsel, 

asserting that Mr. Wallin had interviewed only one of Petitioner’s proposed witnesses 

and that he had “corrupted the case” by interviewing state witnesses. Id., Exh. H. 

Petitioner filed two additional motions to remove Mr. Wallin. Id., Exhs. I & J. Mr. 

Wallin subsequently filed ten motions in limine, addressing multiple evidentiary issues. 

Id., Exhs. K–T. The trial court eventually granted Petitioner’s motion to change counsel 

and directed that Mr. Wallin “meet and confer with the newly assigned attorney to 

discuss the history and progress of this case, its charges, and interviews thus far 

conducted.” Id., Exh. U. 

On October 25, 2010, Ms. Shoemaker was appointed to represent Petitioner. Id., 

Exh. V. On January 11, 2011, with the trial scheduled to begin on February 14, 2011, 

Ms. Shoemaker filed a motion pursuant to Rule 11, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure, 

requesting that Petitioner undergo a mental evaluation, although Petitioner had previously 

been found competent in July 2010. Id., Exh. W & Exhs. X & Y. Ms. Shoemaker argued 

that she had personally witnessed Petitioner suffer extreme mood swings during during 

legal visits and phone calls. Id., Exh. X. The motion was granted, Petitioner was 

determined to be competent, and the trial was re-set for November 7, 2011. Id., Exh. Z. 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 2 of 27
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ms. Shoemaker then re–urged all of Mr. Wallin’s previously filed motions. Id., Exh. AA

On May 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a “petition to compel,” asking the state court to 

order defense counsel “to work with [Petitioner].” Id., Exh. BB. Petitioner avowed that 

he did not want to dismiss counsel, “as she seems capable to handle [his] case.” Id., Exh. 

BB. Petitioner averred, however, that counsel had not visited him often enough and that 

counsel “[had] not moved forward on this case much at all to prepare for trial.” Id., Exh. 

BB. Petitioner further alleged that he and his counsel suffered from a lack of 

communication and that he had not received certain documents he had requested from 

her. Id., Exh. BB. In a minute entry dated June 2, 2011, in response to Petitioner’s 

request, the trial court stated that its practice was to avoid involvement in the attorney–

client relationship unless there was a motion to change counsel before the court. Id., Exh.

CC. Petitioner then avowed to the trial court that the issues raised in his motion to 

compel had been “satisfactorily resolved, except for an issue regarding counsel obtaining 

Petitioner’s ‘Quick Books.’” Id., Exh. CC.

On August 9, 2011, the parties averred they were ready for a trial commencing

November 7, 2011. Id., Exh. DD On August 26, 2011, a settlement conference was 

conducted, during which the settlement judge reviewed with Petitioner the charges 

against him and the potential sentences he faced if found guilty. Id., Exh. EE at 4–6. At 

that time the state offered Petitioner a plea agreement that would allow Petitioner to plead 

guilty to three counts of fraudulent schemes as class 2 felonies with one prior conviction, 

with a sentencing range of 10 to 20 years on each count, with the court retaining 

discretion to decide whether the sentences would be concurrent or consecutive. Id., Exh. 

EE at 5. The plea agreement also required Petitioner to plead guilty to five additional 

counts of fraudulent schemes and receive sentences of probation on those convictions, to 

be commenced after Petitioner served the terms of imprisonment. Id., Exh. EE at 5–6.

The court advised Petitioner at that time that, if he proceeded to trial and was convicted

on most or all of the charges, he could potentially spend the rest of his life in prison. Id., 

Exh. EE at 6.

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 3 of 27
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner initially responded that he was legally innocent of the charges because 

he had run an “honest business” and that was merely the victim of a recession and clients 

who had falsified information. Id., Exh. EE at 8–9. The prosecutor then summarized the

evidence against Petitioner regarding both the legal services and loan businesses. Id., 

Exh. EE at 13–18. Petitioner disputed the state’s allegations and noted he had witnesses 

who said that he had actually closed some loans, thereby providing the agreed-upon 

services and arguing that, therefore, he could not be guilty of fraud. Id., Exh. EE at 18–

25. The judge (J. Schwartz) advised Petitioner that “the risk [was] huge” if Petitioner 

went to trial, particularly in light of his multiple prior felonies. Id., Exh. EE at 30. 

Petitioner said “I’m totally innocent in this case,” but stated that he and his lawyer would 

have to discuss the plea deal. He stated “it would be better if we could come down a little 

bit.” Id., Exh. EE at 33.

Petitioner brought “witnesses” with him to the settlement conference in an effort 

to bolster his argument that he had run a legitimate business and that he had not 

defrauded his clients. Id., Exh. EE at 11-14. The prosecutor again summarized the 

evidence that would be presented against Petitioner, including the fact that he had 

previously been imprisoned for fraud schemes and theft. Id., Exh. EE at 13 & 16. The 

prosecutor noted Petitioner had represented to his victims that he was a licensed attorney. 

Id., Exh. EE at 13-14. The prosecutor delineated Petitioner’s mortgage “scheme,” noting 

that he had represented to victims that he could fund their multi-million dollar projects 

“in house” if he failed to acquire financing for the projects through third-parties. Id., 

Exh. EE at 13-17. Petitioner again offered the “testimony” of an individual at the 

settlement conference who stated that they had given Petitioner $80,000 and he had 

returned the loan amount in full. Id., Exh. EE at 20. Petitioner again asserted that he had 

“closed” the loans his victims complained of but that he had not done it in a sufficiently 

timely fashion or at an interest rate sufficiently low enough to keep his clients from 

asserting they had been defrauded. Id., Exh. EE at 18-22. 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 4 of 27
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The settlement conference was continued on September 16, 2011. Id., Exh. FF. 

The court stated:

[O]bviously the worst case scenario is if the Judge gave a 23–year term 

and did three of them consecutively. That can add up to 69 years. I mean 

we have to have that possibility. But the best case scenario is a five year 

term on each count, all three of them to run concurrently. That’s a five–year 

term.

Id., Exh. FF at 4. Petitioner stated that he was 53 years of age and also noted the 

possibility that he could get “five times three which is 15 years.” Id., Exh. FF at 5. At the 

beginning of the settlement conference the court discussed with Petitioner potential 

sentencing judges, noting the parties had agreed that Judge Barton, who had been the 

assigned trial judge, would not sentence Petitioner. The prosecutor allowed that, if 

Petitioner would accept the plea agreement they would expand the “bottom” of the 

sentencing range in the plea agreement on each of the three counts to five years, and that 

she had “twisted arms” to get the five year “bottom”. Id., Exh. FF at 3–4 & 15-16.

After a recess to consult with his counsel and his wife, who was also present, and 

in the presence of the Deputy (because Petitioner was in custody), Petitioner agreed to the 

plea deal. Exh. FF at 20-21. At that time the parties agreed Petitioner would be 

sentenced by Judge Granville. Id., Exh. FF at 22. Petitioner then entered a guilty plea. 

Id., Exh. GG.

The plea agreement, dated September 16, 2011, stipulated that Petitioner would 

plead guilty to Amended Counts 1, 3 and 5, charging fraudulent schemes and artifices as

class 2 felonies with one prior felony conviction, and Counts 7 and 13, charging 

fraudulent schemes and artifices as class 2 felonies. Id., Exh. HH. Counts 1, 3 and 5 

carried a presumptive sentence of 9.25 years, a minimum of 6 years (4.5 if the court made 

exceptional circumstances findings), and a maximum of 18.5 years. Id., Exh. HH at 18–

25.

The presentence report recommended Petitioner be sentenced to concurrent, 

presumptive terms of imprisonment on each count of conviction. Id., Exh. II. The state’s 

sentencing recommendation detailed Petitioner’s history of arrests on fraud charges and

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 5 of 27
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

eight felony convictions in four states since 1979. Id., Exh. JJ.

Defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum, which stated that the five guilty 

pleas involved legal practices counts that had already been resolved by the Arizona State 

Bar Association, and that the victims had received refunds of any fees paid to Petitioner. 

Id., Exh. KK. Counsel further stated that Petitioner took responsibility for misleading 

those victims. Id., Exh. KK at 2. With regard to the counts involving the commercial 

loans, counsel averred Petitioner had “worked to get the loans funded,” but that those

clients “were not always happy with the loan terms.” Id., Exh. KK at 3. Counsel cited two 

clients for whom Petitioner believed that he had earned the fees paid to Petitioner. Id., 

Exh. KK at 4. Counsel also provided information on mitigating sentencing factors such as 

Petitioner’s family support, mental health concerns, and remorse. Id., Exh. KK at 5.

At Petitioner’s sentencing on November 18, 2011, the state court (Judge 

Granville) heard from two character witnesses for Petitioner, then entered judgment on 

the five counts set forth in the plea agreement. Id., Exh. LL. The prosecutor made 

additional statements regarding Petitioner’s conduct, including comments from victims. 

Id., Exh. LL at 13–21. Petitioner responded that the prosecutor’s facts were inaccurate 

and disputed the victims’ comments. Id., Exh. LL at 21–25. Petitioner asserted that the 

prosecutor could not “open my QuickBooks on the computer,” which would have showed 

that he had refunded money on loan contracts. Id., Exh. LL at 22. Petitioner stated that 

defense counsel “has the files” and “has gone through them,” and that the court should 

look at his spreadsheet showing he had made partial payments of monies owed to his 

victims. Id., Exh. LL at 24. Petitioner asked the court to follow the presentence report

with regard to imposing sentence. Id., Exh. LL at 21–25.

Defense counsel then spoke on Petitioner’s behalf and averred she had acquired

fifteen boxes of documents from Mr. Wallin, which documents were obtained from 

Petitioner’s business office. Id., Exh. LL at 26. She argued that Petitioner’s company had 

actually tried to assist the victims, although the victims did suffer harm. Counsel noted

the court had a list of victims whose money had been returned to them. Id., Exh. LL at 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 6 of 27
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24–32. She then noted Petitioner’s medical problems and argued the presumptive term of 

imprisonment be imposed. Id., Exh. LL at 24–32.

Before imposing sentence, the state court cited as mitigating factors Petitioner’s 

age, that Petitioner had repaid many of the victims, his acknowledgment of responsibility, 

and health issues. Id., Exh. LL at 34. The court then sentenced Petitioner to mitigated 

terms of eight years imprisonment on Counts 1, 3 and 5, with the term on Count 1 

consecutive to Count 3 and the term on Count 5 concurrent with Count 3 and consecutive 

to Count 1. Id., Exh. LL at 34. The court imposed a term of five years probation each on 

Counts 7 and 13, to begin after Petitioner’s discharge from prison. Petitioner also 

received credit for 984 days of presentence incarceration. After sentence was imposed,

Petitioner clarified with the court that the his aggregate sentence was 16 years. Id., Exh. 

LL at 36.

On December 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post–conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and counsel was appointed to 

represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings. Id., Exh. MM. On June 29, 2012, Petitioner’s 

appointed counsel filed notice avowing that they had reviewed the record, transcripts, and 

correspondence from Petitioner, trial counsel’s files, and a draft Rule 32 petition prepared 

by Petitioner, and that after doing so he was unable to find any colorable claims for relief 

to present in a Rule 32 petition. Id., Exh. NN. 

Petitioner filed a pro per Rule 32 petition asserting he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel because counsel failed to obtain “full discovery,” did not interview 

witnesses, and “never worked with Petitioner to prepare for trial.” Petitioner also alleged 

his counsel failed to prepare mitigating factors at sentencing and gave Petitioner 

erroneous advice which prevented him from making an informed decision on whether to 

accept the plea agreement. Petitioner also argued that the state had violated his right to 

due process by failing to provide “full disclosure” and that the state trial court had 

violated his right to due process by failing to consider a motion to change counsel that he 

alleged was filed at sentencing. Id., Exh. OO.

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 7 of 27
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The state trial court denied relief in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action in a decision 

entered January 11, 2013. Id., Exh. TT. The court concluded that relief was precluded

pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because Petitioner had 

waived the enumerated claims “when he validly entered into the plea agreement.” Id., 

Exh. TT. The court found the Rule 32 action was, therefore, subject to summary 

dismissal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6. Id., Exh. TT.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to “get full 

discovery” from the state and by not meeting with him often enough. Petitioner alleged 

counsel failed to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and erroneously advised him 

that he would receive a term of no more than seven or eight years imprisonment if he 

entered into the plea agreement. Petitioner further alleged counsel lied when she 

provided the factual basis for the plea. Petitioner also asserted he was denied his right to 

the effective assistance of counsel because counsel appeared at sentencing even though 

he had “fired” her two weeks prior and because she failed to investigate facts and 

interview witnesses. Petitioner also alleged the state did not provide full disclosure and 

that the trial court erred because it failed to consider a motion for a change of counsel that 

was allegedly filed after Petitioner pled guilty. Petitioner also asserted that the trial judge 

should have recused himself because the judge allegedly knew Petitioner’s uncle. 

Petitioner also argued he was innocent of the charges against him because there was 

insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Id., Exh. UU.

Attached to Petitioner’s pleading to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32 

action, and offered as evidence in this habeas action, is a typescript of a “report” from 

Joseph Kalcantu of Houston, Texas, which avers that he was retained by a former 

Governor of Texas to investigate the bringing of criminal charges against Petitioner by 

Maricopa County. Id. (Answer), Exh. WW, Attach. The letter avers that the fraud 

charges against Petitioner were the result of corporate materials stolen by Jeffrey 

Stallcup, a former employee, and provided to a Maricopa County detective “without a 

search warrant.” Id., Exh. WW, Attach. The letter references taped telephone 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 8 of 27
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conversations from 2006 in which a Maricopa County investigator conveyed to 

Petitioner’s clients that he was defrauding them. Id., Exh. WW, Attach. The letter 

averred it was “known” that Mr. Wallin and Ms. Shoemaker (Petitioner’s plea and 

sentencing counsel) “made a deal with Ms. Van Wie [the prosecutor] on other clients in 

order to sacrifice Mr. Herald’s case...” Id., Exh. WW, Attach. The letter concludes that, 

having been an FBI investigator on fraud cases for twenty-five years, Mr. Kalcantu had 

determined Petitioner had not committed fraud. Id., Exh. WW, Attach. The letter is 

signed as “signature on file,” and is not notarized nor sworn. See id., Exh. WW, Attach. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. Id., Exh. XX. The 

appellate court found that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims were without merit. 

The court also concluded Petitioner had waived any claim regarding the state’s discovery 

when he pled guilty and that there was no evidence in the record regarding Petitioner’s 

alleged motion to change counsel after sentencing. Id., Exh. XX. The Court of Appeals 

further determined that Petitioner had failed to support his judicial bias claim and that he 

had failed to demonstrate any potential prejudice. Id., Exh. XX. The court also 

determined Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim was without merit because Petitioner 

had provided a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty pleas on the counts of 

conviction. Id., Exh. XX.

On October 2, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas relief because he was denied his 

right to the effective assistance of counsel and because he was subjected to an illegal 

search and seizure. Petitioner further argues he is entitled to relief because the prosecutor

and defense counsel engaged in “corruption” and because there was “corruption and [a]

major conflict of the sentencing judge”. Doc. 1.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the District Court may only grant federal habeas 

relief on the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. 

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 9 of 27
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly 

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity 

to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s 

“highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 

346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 

2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). In Baldwin v. Reese, the 

Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 

124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal 

habeas claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a specific federal 

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state law or a state procedural rule, the 

federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. 

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2014). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 10 of 27
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727–28, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553–57(1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 

F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a 

state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar 

direct review ... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 

2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2014) A state rule is considered consistently 

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the “vast majority of cases.” 

Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 

1211, 1221 n.6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to preclude 

the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must actually have relied on the 

procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v. 

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). See also Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989); Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 11 of 27
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review in an action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, are generally barred from federal review because 

an attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow 

category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are limited to claims of being held in 

custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for 

delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably 

overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 

887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009). See also Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 710 (2014).

Because Petitioner pled guilty and waived his right to a direct appeal and because 

Petitioner has now completed a Rule 32 action, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims, which have been found to be 

consistently applied and well-established, bar Petitioner from now returning to the state 

courts to exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claims, Accordingly, Petitioner has 

exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, any claim not fairly presented to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals in his Rule 32 action. See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 

403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002).

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See 

Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 375 (9th Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of 

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance 

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 12 of 27
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. 

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must 

show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting 

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 

1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated that 

prejudice is established by a petitioner’s “actual innocence.” See Vosgien v. Persson, 

742 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise 

is not cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 

800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional 

error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal 

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617; Correll, 137 

F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the 

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been 

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 

2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and 

prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

A state criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987); Graves v. 

McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the general rule is that errors 

of counsel during a state post-conviction action cannot constitute “cause” to excuse the

procedural default of a federal habeas claim. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S. 

Ct. at 2565; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 374. However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), established a limited exception to this general 

rule, which exception applies only to Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 13 of 27
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of post conviction counsel or lack of 

counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1315. In 

Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit 

expanded Martinez, holding that this doctrine can also apply to excuse the procedural 

default of claims asserting ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel. Petitioner has 

not asserted such a claim.

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Standard of review on exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 14 of 27
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The AEDPA requires that the 

habeas court review the “last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that 

when the final state court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last 

decision from the state court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. 

Schriro 746 F.3d at 441, quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000).

A state court applies a clearly established standard unreasonably only if no 

“reasonable interpretation of the controlling [Supreme Court] standard” can 

“support [the state court’s] legal ruling.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, [] (2007). So, when evaluating the reasonableness 

of a state court’s application of a general standard, we must defer to any 

“principled reason for the state court to distinguish between the case before 

it and Supreme Court precedent.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 992 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court 

recently explained,

does not require state courts to extend [a Supreme Court] 

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as 

error. Thus, “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can 

apply to the facts at hand,” then by definition the rationale was not 

“clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.” 

AEDPA’s carefully constructed framework “would be undermined 

if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the 

guise of extensions to existing law.”

White, 134 S.Ct. at 1706 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Yarborough, 

541 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. 2140).

Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1133-34.

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in 

state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–

787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is 

because it was meant to be.” [] 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 15 of 27
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the 

“extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. [] 

131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2014); McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 909 (9th Cir. 2013); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013)..

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). 

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2014);

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 16 of 27
- 17 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 

2011); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008).

E. Waiver of claims upon entry of guilty plea

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to the charges against him in a written plea 

agreement. The United States Supreme Court limited the grounds upon which a state 

prisoner may seek habeas relief after entering a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea in 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602 (1973) (holding that a knowing and 

voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the entry of 

the guilty plea). Other than a challenge to the voluntary and intelligent character of the 

plea itself, a defendant’s guilty plea bars federal habeas relief based on pre–plea non–

jurisdictional constitutional claims. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319–20, 103 

S.Ct. 2368, 2376-77 (1983) (“Our decisions subsequent to Tollett make clear that a plea 

of guilty does not bar the review in habeas corpus proceedings of all claims involving 

constitutional violations antecedent to a plea of guilty”); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 

700 (9th Cir. 1994) (foreclosing pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Ortberg 

v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1992); Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 

1029–30 (9th Cir. 1985) (“As a general rule, one who voluntarily and intelligently pleads 

guilty to a criminal charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the 

basis of pre–plea constitutional violations.”); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 632 F.2d 767, 

769 (9th Cir. 1980) . Pre-plea error is considered “jurisdictional” when it implicates the 

government’s power to prosecute the defendant. United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 

1015, 1019 n.3 (9th Cir.1999). See also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574–76, 

109 S.Ct. 757, 765 (1989). For example, Tollett does not foreclose a claim that: a 

defendant was vindictively prosecuted, see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31, 94 

S.Ct. 2098, 2103-04 (1974), that the indictment under which a defendant pled guilty 

placed him in double jeopardy, see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, 96 S.Ct. 241, 

242 (1975), or the statute under which the defendant was indicted is facially 

unconstitutional. See United States v. Garcia–Valenzuela, 232 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 17 of 27
- 18 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2000).

The federal courts have concluded that a plea colloquy must satisfy several 

requirements in order for a guilty plea to be considered voluntary and knowing. See, e.g.,

Lofter v. Almager, 704 F.3d 645, 647-48 (9th Cir. 2012); Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 

1135, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). A guilty plea is not considered voluntary and knowing 

unless a defendant is informed of and waives his privilege against self-incrimination, his 

right to trial by jury, and his right to confront witnesses. Tanner, 493 F.3d at 1147, citing

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712-13 (1969). A defendant 

must understand the consequences of his plea, including “the range of allowable 

punishment that will result from his plea.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th 

Cir. 2006).

The transcripts of the settlement hearings in this matter and Petitioner’s plea 

colloquy indicate Petitioner’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. At the 

time he entered his guilty plea the state court found the plea was knowing and voluntary. 

A state court’s factual finding that a plea was voluntary and knowing is entitled to a 

presumption of correctness by a federal habeas court. See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 

943, 982 (9th Cir. 2004); Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). 

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by a 

federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Vega v. 

Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2014). Petitioner’s after-the-fact conclusory 

allegations that he was incorrectly advised as to the consequences of his guilty plea are 

not clear and convincing evidence which can overcome the weight of his 

contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea agreement. A 

petitioner’s contemporaneous statements carry substantial weight in determining if his 

entry of a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 

63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 

presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 18 of 27
- 19 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the 

face of the record are wholly incredible”); Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 

2007); Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D. Mass. 2003) (collecting cases so 

holding). 

Because Petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, federal habeas 

relief is precluded with regard to any pre-plea non-jurisdictional habeas claims, such as 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel which occurred prior to Petitioner’s entry 

of a guilty plea and his allegation that he was denied his Fourth Amendment rights in the 

investigation of the alleged crimes. 

F. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Petitioner argues that he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of 

counsel because counsel did not meet with Petitioner often enough, counsel failed to get 

full discovery from the state, counsel failed to interview witnesses and investigate and 

pursue facts, and because counsel failed to present evidence of mitigating factors at 

Petitioner’s sentencing. Petitioner also alleges counsel was lying when she provided the 

factual basis for the plea and that counsel provided erroneous information regarding the 

plea and the maximum sentence that could be imposed. Petitioner raised these claims 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals in his pro per petition in his state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the 

Court of Appeals found the claims without merit. To the extent any of these claims are 

not precluded by the entry of Petitioner’s guilty plea, they are without merit and the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying relief on Petitioner’s allegation that he was 

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law.

The Supreme Court established a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Strickland

test applies to a federal habeas petitioner’s challenge to a conviction entered upon a guilty 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 19 of 27
- 20 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plea. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 

864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005). In such a context, “the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether 

the alleged ineffective assistance impinged on the [petitioner’s] ability to enter an 

intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 980. To prevail

on this claim, Petitioner must show that his counsel’s representation fell below the range 

of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases and that he suffered actual 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s incompetence. Id. at 873. Because a petitioner’s failure 

to make the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the 

claim, the court need not address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 697–700.

In Hill, the Supreme Court adapted the two-part Strickland standard to 

challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 

holding that a defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his guilty plea 

on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) his 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his] 

counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.” 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S. Ct. 366.

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

Petitioner was not prejudiced by what he asserts was his counsel’s prediction of 

the sentences that might be imposed pursuant to the plea agreement because the state 

court clearly and repeatedly alerted Petitioner to the potential consequences of his guilty 

plea, including clarifying with Petitioner that he could be sentenced to a term of sixteen

years imprisonment if the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. See

Womack, 497 F.3d at 1003, citing Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (holding that the petitioner “suffered no prejudice from his attorney’s 

prediction because, prior to accepting his guilty plea, the court explained that the 

discretion as to what the sentence would be”).

The record in this matter belies all of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Petitioner offers only vague and conclusory allegations with regard to any 

possible prejudice he might have suffered as a result of counsel’s alleged inadequacies, as 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 20 of 27
- 21 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner faced a total sentence of 63 years imprisonment had he chosen to reject the 

plea agreement and proceed to trial. See Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner]’s cursory and vague [ineffective assistance of counsel claim] 

cannot support habeas relief.”). Accordingly, the state court’s decision that Petitioner 

was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to 

nor an unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill and Petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief on this claim.

2. Petitioner contends he was denied his Fourth Amendment right to be free 

of unreasonable searches and seizures. 

A Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas action if the 

petitioner had a “full and fair” opportunity to raise the claim in the state courts. See, e.g., 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 493, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3046, 3052 (1976). In Stone v. 

Powell the Supreme Court held that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full 

and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted 

federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 

search or seizure was introduced at trial.” 428 U.S. at 494, 96 S.Ct. at 3052 (internal 

citation omitted). See also Stephens v. Attorney General of Calif., 23 F.3d 248, 249 (9th 

Cir. 1994). A federal court may review Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus 

proceedings only if the state court proceeding denied the petitioner an “opportunity for 

full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 482, 96 S. Ct. 

at 3051–53. See also Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326-28 (9th Cir. 1993); Matthews 

v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) Whether the state court correctly 

decided the claim is irrelevant on habeas review as is the issue of whether the petitioner 

actually raised the Fourth Amendment claim. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 

891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[t]he inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to 

litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was 

correctly decided.”). 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 21 of 27
- 22 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The record of the state proceedings in this case compels the conclusion that 

Petitioner received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. 

See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, to the 

extent this claim is not precluded by Tollett, the Court should not review the merits of the 

claim pursuant to Stone v. Powell. 

3. Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecutor 

and defense counsel engaged in “corruption.”

Petitioner asserts that his counsel and the prosecutor “sacrificed” Petitioner in 

order to reach plea agreements in other criminal cases. Petitioner contends that an 

investigation undertaken at his behest by an alleged ex-FBI agent establishes that the 

Maricopa County prosecutor’s office and the prosecutor assigned to his case engaged in

prosecutorial misconduct. Petitioner arguably presented the factual basis for this claim to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32 action, however, Petitioner presented the 

claim as one of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and, arguably, as a Brady claim, 

arguing to the court that the prosecutor had not supplied and his counsel had not reviewed 

nor propounded in his defense all of the evidence seized from his business. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust a prosecutorial misconduct claim in the state 

courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice arising from this procedural 

default. The letter proffered by Petitioner from the purported investigator is neither 

verified, notarized, nor even signed. Accordingly, Petitioner has not produced clear and 

convincing evidence from which the Court might find that Petitioner was prejudiced by 

the state court’s “failure” to consider a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

Additionally, any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., that the prosecutor 

negotiated a plea deal with Petitioner’s counsel in some fashion that was in some way 

nefarious or that the prosecutor withheld material in violation of Brady, would involve a 

non-jurisdictional pre-plea error which was waived by Petitioner’s guilty plea pursuant to 

Tollett. 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 22 of 27
- 23 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. Petitioner alleges that the sentencing judge was corrupt and had a “major” 

conflict of interest. 

In his habeas petition Petitioner contends that the sentencing judge and 

Petitioner’s uncle were “great friends,” a fact Petitioner alleges he did not know until 

after his sentencing, and that the judge “did some shady deal[s] at times and did some 

under handed favors for his friends.” In support of this claim Petitioner proffers a letter 

alleged to be authored by Petitioner’s uncle, which letter is addressed to the presiding 

judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court. The letter is not notarized nor 

accompanied by a sworn affidavit, and lists a return address in Houston, Texas. In the 

letter the uncle states that Judge Granville is an old friend and that Mr. Stallcup (which is 

the last name of Petitioner’s ex-wife) convinced the sentencing judge to “throw the book”

at Petitioner. Petitioner also attaches a sworn affidavit from his wife which states that, 

after the settlement judge and prosecutor left the settlement conference so that Petitioner 

could confer with his counsel, counsel informed Petitioner that he would receive a 

maximum sentence of eight years imprisonment if he agreed to the plea deal. 

Petitioner alleged in his state action for post-conviction relief that the state 

sentencing judge had a conflict of interest. Petitioner filed a complaint against the 

sentencing judge after his sentencing, contending that the judge was extremely 

unprofessional during Petitioner’s sentencing, primarily because the judge was making 

unwarranted derogatory comments about Petitioner and smiling at Petitioner and his wife

during the sentencing proceedings. The Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner had 

failed to support his judicial bias claim and and failed to demonstrate any potential 

prejudice. “Herald also claims the sentencing court should have recused itself because 

the court allegedly knew Herald’s uncle. We deny relief on this issue because Herald 

offers no evidence the court knew Herald’s unidentified uncle and he does not otherwise 

explain how he suffered any prejudice even if the court did know his uncle.” Answer, 

Exh. XX.

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 23 of 27
- 24 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying Petitioner’s claim of judicial bias 

was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

 To succeed on a judicial bias claim, however, the petitioner must 

“overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 

adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, [] (1975). 

In the absence of any evidence of some extrajudicial source of bias or 

partiality, neither adverse rulings nor impatient remarks are generally 

sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial integrity, even if those 

remarks are “critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the 

parties, or their cases.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 

S.Ct. 1147, [] (1994); 

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008). On federal habeas review, the 

Court “must ask whether the state trial judge’s behavior rendered the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States 

Constitution.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). “To sustain a claim 

of this kind, there must be an ‘extremely high level of interference’ by the trial judge 

which creates ‘a pervasive climate of partiality and unfairness.’” Id., quoting United 

States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982).

 The Supreme Court held long ago that a “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 

basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 

S.Ct. 623, [] (1955). “Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias 

in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to 

prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Id.; cf. Mistretta v. United 

States, 488 U.S. 361, 407, 109 S.Ct. 647, [] (1989) (“The legitimacy of the 

Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and 

nonpartisanship.”). This most basic tenet of our judicial system helps to 

ensure both the litigants’ and the public’s confidence that each case has 

been adjudicated fairly by a neutral and detached arbiter. 

 “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a 

constitutional floor, not a uniform standard,” for a judicial bias claim. 

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793, [] (1997). While 

most claims of judicial bias are resolved “by common law, statute, or the 

professional standards of the bench and bar,” the “floor established by the 

Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal’ before a 

judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of 

his particular case.” Id. at 904–05, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (quoting Withrow v. 

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456, [] (1975)). The Constitution 

requires recusal where “the probability of actual bias on the part of the 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 24 of 27
- 25 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” 

Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. Our inquiry is objective. Caperton 

v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881, 129 S.Ct. 2252, [] (2009). We 

do not ask whether [the judge] actually harbored subjective bias. Id. Rather, 

we ask whether the average judge in her position was likely to be neutral or 

whether there existed an unconstitutional potential for bias. Id. “Every 

procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge 

to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which 

might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the 

State and the accused, denies the [accused] due process of law.” Tumey v. 

Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, [] (1927).

 [Petitioner] need not prove actual bias to establish a due process violation, 

just an intolerable risk of bias.... Thus, we must ask “whether ‘under a 

realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the

[judge’s] interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the 

practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be 

adequately implemented.’” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883–84, 129 S.Ct. 2252 

(quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456). Due process thus 

mandates a “stringent rule” that may sometimes require recusal of judges 

“who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the 

scales of justice equally” if there exists a “probability of unfairness.” 

Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623. But this risk of unfairness has no 

mechanical or static definition. It “cannot be defined with precision” 

because “[c]ircumstances and relationships must be considered.” Id.

...Non-pecuniary conflicts “that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality” 

also offend due process. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 878, 129 S.Ct. 2252. A 

judge must withdraw where she acts as part of the accusatory process, 

Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137, 75 S.Ct. 623, “becomes embroiled in a 

running, bitter controversy” with one of the litigants, Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 

465, 91 S.Ct. 499, or becomes “so enmeshed in matters involving [a 

litigant] as to make it appropriate for another judge to sit,” Johnson v. 

Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215–16, 91 S.Ct. 1778, [] (1971).

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 788-90 (9th Cir. 2014). 

The state court’s decision denying Petitioner’s claim of judicial bias was not 

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner asserted in 

the state court that the judge smiled and made unwelcome comments about Petitioner. 

These allegations fail to present a viable claim of constitutionally-impermissible judicial 

bias. See, e.g., Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 2002), citing Liteky, 510 U.S. 

at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. Additionally, the letter proffered by Petitioner which purports to 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 25 of 27
- 26 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be from Petitioner’s uncle and on it’s face states that the uncle influenced Judge Granville 

to “throw the book” at Petitioner when sentencing him, is not notarized nor sworn and, as 

such, does not constitute “evidence” from which the Court could find that Petitioner’s 

federal constitutional right to due process was violated by Judge Granville at sentencing. 

IV Conclusion

Petitioner’s knowing and voluntary entry of a guilty plea waived all habeas claims 

of non-jurisdictional error occurring prior to the entry of his guilty plea. Additionally, to 

the extent Petitioner properly exhausted his federal habeas claims in the state courts, the 

state appellate court did not err in concluding that Petitioner was not denied his right to 

the effective assistance of counsel, nor did the state court err in finding Petitioner was not 

subjected to judicial bias. Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable 

because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim in the state courts.

Therefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Mr. Herald’s application for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to section 2254 be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 26 of 27
- 27 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2015.

Case 2:14-cv-02188-DLR Document 20 Filed 02/23/15 Page 27 of 27