Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04229/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04229-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SYLVIA MENDOZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-04229-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING (1) MOTION TO 

DISMISS SECTION 17200 CLAIM AND 

(2) MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS 

ATTORNEY

[Re: ECF 32, 37]

Plaintiff Sylvia Mendoza alleges that Defendant violated the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights 

(“HBOR”) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) by failing to provide her with the 

information required under HBOR, including acknowledgement of its receipt of her loan 

modification application materials. First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), ¶ 1, ECF 30. Plaintiff alleges 

that, following this purported misconduct, Plaintiff and her husband lost their residence. Id. ¶¶ 1, 

11-12. The Court previously dismissed the UCL Claim for failure to plead causation, but granted

leave to amend. See First Dismissal Order, ECF 24. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to 

cure the deficiency and now asks the Court to dismiss the claim with prejudice. Def.’s Mot., ECF 

32. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the UCL Claim is GRANTED

without leave to amend.

In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel, the Mellen Law Firm (“Mellen”), seeks to withdraw as 

counsel of record in this matter. See Withdrawal Mot., ECF 37. The Court heard oral argument on 

the motion to withdraw on May 12, 2016 and neither Defendant nor Ms. Mendoza opposed the 

motion. For the reasons stated on the record and below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw is 

GRANTED. 

Case 5:15-cv-04229-BLF Document 45 Filed 05/13/16 Page 1 of 5
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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff and her husband owned and resided in the property 

located at 1315 Bagely Way, San Jose, CA (“Property”). FAC ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant is the servicer 

of her loan on the Property. Id. ¶¶ 7, 11. 

In January 2015, Plaintiff applied for a loan modification from Defendant. Id. ¶ 14. On or 

about April 21, 2015, Plaintiff received an email from Defendant asking her to provide additional 

application materials, which she provided on May 8, 2015. Id. ¶ 15. On or about May 18, 2015, 

Plaintiff received another email from Defendant asking for various tax documents, which she 

submitted by the deadline of May 20, 2015. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff did not hear from Defendant again 

until June 10, 2015, when she again received an email from Defendant requesting additional 

documents for her modification application. Id. ¶ 17. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, however, 

Defendant had caused the Property to be sold at a Trustee’s Sale earlier that day. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated HBOR and the UCL by failing to acknowledge receipt of 

her application materials and inform her of any deficiency in her application. Id. ¶¶ 23-28, 31-35. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek 

v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the Court need 

not accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

B. Discussion

As in its First Motion to Dismiss, see ECF 12, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has again 

failed to allege sufficient facts to establish her standing under the UCL, which requires allegations 

that she has suffered economic injury as a result of the unfair competition she challenges. See Cal. 

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Bus. & Prof. § 17204; see also Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 326 (plaintiff 

must show a “causal connection” between the economic injury and the alleged unfair conduct); 

Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 216 Cal. App. 4th 497 (2013). Defendant brought an 

identical argument in its first Motion to Dismiss, to which Plaintiff responded that her allegations 

sufficed because “had Defendant provided Plaintiff the required notice, ‘Plaintiff would have been 

able to supply the information necessary to complete her loan modification application and 

potentially obtain a modification.’ If, on the other hand, she did not obtain a modification, Plaintiff 

would still have had time to ‘appeal the modification, seek alternative relief, or reinstate her 

loan.’” First Dismissal Order at 2 (quoting First Opp., ECF 20).

Reviewing those arguments, the Court first noted that none of Plaintiff’s assertions 

appeared in her Complaint and found that “[e]ven if they did, they would not suffice to plead 

causation.” Id. The Court explained, “Plaintiff’s explanation is too speculative—for example, she 

does not state how she could have sought alternative relief or reinstated the loan; instead, she 

relies on contingencies and hypotheticals.” Id.

Defendant contends that the only relevant change in the FAC is that Plaintiff now pleads

those same contingencies, rather than simply arguing them in her brief. Mot. at 1, 5-7. Defendant 

is correct. Plaintiff now alleges that, had Defendant provided the notice it was required to provide, 

“Plaintiff would have been able to supply the information necessary to complete her loan 

modification application, and Plaintiff’s property would not have been sold at foreclosure during 

the ongoing review. If Plaintiff’s application was denied, she would have had the time proscribed 

within California Civil Code § 2923.6(d) to appeal the modification, seek alternative relief, or 

reinstate her loan pursuant to Civil Code § 2924c-d, if no other relief was available.” FAC ¶ 34. 

Plaintiff devotes only one paragraph of her Opposition to challenging Defendant’s 

argument, and the paragraph does nothing more than paraphrase ¶ 34. See Pl.’s Opp. at 5-6, ECF 

35. Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant. Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiency clearly 

outlined in the Court’s First Dismissal Order and has thereby established that additional leave to 

amend would be futile. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without 

leave to amend.

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III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW 

A. Legal Standard

The decision to grant or deny an attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel is committed to 

the sound discretion of the trial court. j2 Glob. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. C 08-

4254PJH, 2009 WL 464768, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009) (citing LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 

1253, 1269 (9th Cir.)). In this district, the California Rules of Professional Conduct govern 

withdrawal of counsel. See Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2008); j2 Glob. 

Commc'ns, Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. C 08-4254PJH, 2009 WL 464768, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 

2009). The Rules set forth several grounds under which an attorney may seek to withdraw, 

including “conduct [that] renders it unreasonably difficult for the member to carry out the 

employment effectively.” Cal. Rules of Prof ‘l Conduct R. 3–700(C)(1)(d). 

Under Civil Local Rule 11-5, “[c]ounsel may not withdraw from an action unless relieved 

by order of Court after written notice has been given reasonably in advance to the client and to all 

other parties who have appeared in the case.” Where “withdrawal of an attorney is not 

accompanied by simultaneous appearance of substitute counsel or agreement of the party to appear 

pro se, leave to withdraw may be subject to the condition that papers may continue to be served on 

counsel for forwarding purposes.” Civ. L.R. 11-5(b).

B. Discussion

Having completed briefing on the Motion to Dismiss, Mellen Law Firm seeks to withdraw 

as counsel for Ms. Mendoza due to an irretrievable breakdown in their relationship. In addition, 

Mellen explains that they have lost contact since March 2016, see Mellen Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 37-1, 

save for one call concerning this motion. Ms. Mendoza does not have substitute counsel and will 

proceed pro se if this motion is granted. 

The Court finds that the breakdown of the relationship and the loss of contact between 

Plaintiff and Mellen both constitute good cause to grant Mellen’s motion. Given the current case 

schedule, the Court further concludes that withdrawal will not prejudice justice or unduly delay 

resolution of this case. At the hearing on this motion, Mellen represented that the firm has fully 

advised Plaintiff that she needs to find additional counsel. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

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Mellen’s Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record. Pursuant to Rule 11-5(b), this withdrawal is 

subject to the condition that papers continue to be served on Mellen for forwarding purposes until 

Ms. Mendoza obtains substitute counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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