Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-00635/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-00635-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Lisa Michelle Connelly,

Petitioner,

 v.

Gloria A. Henry et al.,

Respondent(s).

 /

NO. C 03-00635 JW 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging her

prison sentence under the California Three Strikes rule. Petitioner claims: (1) her sentence constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (2) her counsel was

ineffective for failing to request that the sentencing court reduce her two admitted wobbler offenses to

misdemeanors. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background: 

Petitioner was born in 1966 to parents who were both heroin addicts. Petitioner herself was

born an addict and evidence suggests that all her criminal behavior was a direct result of her drug

habits and those of the men with whom she was involved. At the age of fifteen, she bore a daughter

who was later molested by her then husband. The husband was subsequently convicted of child

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molestation and in light of Petitioner’s drug addiction, Child Protective Services took her daughter

away from her. In 1989, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of burglary. Following these

convictions, Petitioner was placed on probation and ordered to the Athena House residential drug

treatment program. However she was terminated from Athena House for non attendance. Thereafter,

she tested positive for methamphetamine and absconded from probation. She was committed to the

California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) and subsequently paroled on outpatient status. In 1993

Petitioner was again arrested on a burglary charge and ordered to complete a Delancey Street

residential treatment program but absconded after five months. She was incarcerated in the county

jail, from which she escaped. She was arrested again five months later and served three and a half

years of a twelve year, four month term before being paroled. Her parole was revoked three times in

sixteen months due to absconding, drug possession, and/or failure to follow parole instructions. 

Petitioner considered herself an alcoholic, drinking daily, although her parole forbade doing

so. She began inhaling methamphetamine at the age of eighteen and her use escalated to daily

injections of 1⁄2 gram. She was never able to abstain from illicit drug use when released from custody. 

Petitioner was granted parole after serving a portion of the sentence imposed on her for multiple

burglaries and escape from lawful custody. Among the conditions of parole were routine status

meetings and regular drug testing. 

Her current conviction arose when she missed a drug test and a scheduled status meeting. A

warrant issued for her arrest as a parolee at large and Petitioner’s parole officer informed Santa Rosa

Police detective Philip Brazis of the warrant and the kind of car Petitioner drove. Petitioner was

arrested in a public parking structure and after authorization from the parole officer, detective Brazis

searched her car. Inside, he found numerous items of property not belonging to Petitioner. Petitioner

volunteered that she had “crank” in her front pant pocket. The detective also seized a hypodermic

needle and a glass smoking pipe. Petitioner was charged with four felonies: first degree burglary, two

counts of possession of stolen property, and one count of possession of methamphetamine. 

Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, the burglary charge was dismissed and Petitioner pled

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In addition to the California Legislature's version of the Three Strikes Law found at California

Penal Code § 667, there is an initiative version of the Three Strikes Law found at California Penal

Code § 1170.12. The initiative version of the Three Strikes Law was passed by the voters several

months after the Legislature's version, and the California Supreme Court has not determined whether

the latter supersedes the former. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 53 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 789, 791-92 (1996). Although the two versions differ in minor respects, see id. at 792, the

initiative's history demonstrates the unequivocal intent of the voters to adopt a sentencing scheme

identical to the legislative version of the three strikes law, see People v. Hazelton, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2nd

443, 446 (1996) (using initiative's history to determine that the initiative version, like the legislative

version, of the three strikes law counts out-of-state prior convictions as strikes).

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no contest to a felony possession of a stolen autograph book and guilty to felony possession of 1.26

grams of methamphetamine. She admitted to three 1989 residential burglary convictions and one 1993

residential burglary conviction to count as prior strike convictions.

Under California Three Strikes law, Petitioner was sentenced to a 25-years-to-life prison

sentence. California's Three Strikes law, which appears in California Penal Code section 667(b)-(i),

was enacted by the Legislature and became effective March 7, 1994.1

 The heart of the Three Strikes

law is subdivision (e) of section 667, which prescribes increased terms of imprisonment for

defendants who have previously been convicted of certain "violent" or "serious" felonies, see Cal.

Penal Code § 667(d). The Three Strikes Law is specific in its intent to apply "in addition to any other

enhancement or punishment provisions which may apply . . ." Id. 

B. Procedural Background: 

The California Court of Appeals, addressing Petitioner’s direct appeal, affirmed the trial court

judgment and upheld the prison sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which

the California Court of Appeals denied on August 23, 2001. On February 14, 2003, Petitioner filed

the instant petition through her attorney with this Court. On April 8, 2004, an order to show cause

issued regarding Petitioner’s two claims. On August 3, 2004, this Court denied respondent’s motion

to dismiss and reset the briefing schedule for the order to show cause.

III. STANDARDS

A district court may grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he/she is in custody in violation of the

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Constitution or Laws or Treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court has no authority to

grant habeas relief unless the state court’s ruling was (a) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court,”

or (b) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The AEDPA requires a

district court to presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the

Petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). It is error for a federal court to review de novo a claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court. See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-43 (2003) (reversing judgment of 6th

Circuit granting habeas relief on de novo review where claims did not meet standards for relief under

§2254 (d)(1)). 

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by (the supreme) Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than (the) Court has on a set of marginally indistinguishable

facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Under the ‘reasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the court’s

decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the Petitioner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applies clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. The AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any particular methodology in

deciding whether a state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable explanation of clearly

established federal law. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). Clearly established federal

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law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States refers to “the holdings, as opposed to

the dicta, of (the Supreme) Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-04, 409 (2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

As grounds for habeas relief Petitioner alleges that: (1) her sentence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (2) her counsel was ineffective in

failing to move the sentencing court to reduce her two admitted wobbler offenses to misdemeanors.

A. Petitioner’s claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment is without

merit because her sentence arose out of her recidivism under the California Three Strikes rule,

which has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States as constitutional.

Under the California Three Strikes Law, Petitioner was sentenced to a 25-years-to-life prison

sentence. Petitioner claims that this sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment. 

In 2003, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of California’s Three

Strikes law. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). The Court maintained however, that any

criminal sentence disproportionate to the crime for which the Defendant was convicted violates the

Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 

The factual background in Ewing is somewhat similar to the case at bar in that it involved a

Petitioner sentenced to a life term based on prior burglary convictions. Ewing, a parolee, walked into

a Pro shop of the El Segundo golf course and walked out with three golf cubs concealed in his pant

legs. In light of his prior criminal record ( auto theft, burglary, drug possession, arms possession, etc),

the trial court convicted Ewing of felony grand theft and sentenced him to twenty five years to life

imprisonment. 

On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed Ewing’s sentence within the boundaries of the Eighth

Amendment and found that the sentence was neither cruel nor unusual. In arriving at this decision, the

Court revisited its holdings in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

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303 (1983), and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991). 

In Rummel, the Court upheld a 25-years-to-life with the possibility of parole sentence for a

three time offender. Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). In doing so, the Court characterized recidivism

statutes as nothing more than a societal decision to subject repeat offenders with the serious penalty of

life imprisonment. Id. Three years later, in Solem, the Court rejected a life-without-parole sentence

for a seventh non-violent felony. The Court in Solem specifically laid out three important factors in

determining the proportionality of any criminal sentence. These objective criteria include a

comparison of: (1) the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed

on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for the same crime in other

jurisdictions. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). These criteria were further distilled in

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991), where, Justice Kennedy, writing the holding in the

absence of a majority view, stated that only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the

crime violate the Eighth Amendment. The holding also indicated that Solem “did not mandate”

comparative analysis “within and between” jurisdictions. Id. 

In light of the precedent, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Ewing focused primarily on the

gravity of Petitioner’s offense and the harshness of the penalty. Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). The

Court found that Ewing’s grand theft of $ 1,200 worth of golf equipment, by itself, constituted a grave

felony and deserved a serious punishment. Id. at 29. In light of his recidivism, the Court found itself

willing to sentence Petitioner under the Three Strikes Scheme. Id. “Ewing’s sentence is justified by

the state’s public-safety interest in capacitating and deterring recidivist felons and amply supported by

his own long, serious criminal record. Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for

increased punishment and states have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals.” 

Id. at 30.

In consideration of the above established federal law, this Court rejects Petitioner Connelly’s

claim of cruel and unusual punishment and finds the sentence not grossly disproportionate to

Petitioner’s crimes. 

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This Court notes that the California Court of Appeals applied the factors enumerated in Lynch,

to determine the proportionality of the sentence imposed on Petitioner. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424

(1972). These factors ( the nature of the offense and/or the offender; a comparison of the instant

punishment to other punishments imposed by the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses; and a

comparison of the punishment to punishments imposed by other jurisdictions for the same offense) are

similar, if not identical to the factors enumerated in Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. This Court proceeds

with the analysis of the factors enumerated in Solem. Id.

1) The nature of the offense and/or offender: 

Petitioner was sentenced to a 25-years-to-life prison term. Although Petitioner correctly

claims that her current offenses do not amount to serious felonies, the state court explained that her

sentence arose out of her recidivism under the California Three strikes law and not her individual

offenses. Based on Petitioner’s record, the state court found that she had problems with drugs and

alcohol since at least her early teens and possibly even infancy. People v. Connelly, A091830. 

Although Petitioner claims that all her offenses arose from her drug habits, the state court

maintained that “drug addiction is not necessarily regarded as a mitigating factor when a criminal

defendant has a long term problem and seems unwilling to pursue treatment.” Id. It specified that the

law holds individuals responsible for their behavior despite the misfortune of addiction and

dysfunctional upbringing. Id.

The state court also found it fortuitous that the four residential burglaries committed by

Petitioner did not result in physical harm, especially since these burglaries involved the invasion of

sanctity of another person’s home and were possibly committed by Petitioner under the influence of

controlled substances. Id. 

2) Punishment in California for more serious crimes. 

 Petitioner argues that her sentence is longer than that imposed for violent offenses such as

voluntary manslaughter, rape, or kidnaping. 

Ewing clearly establishes that analysis of the second and third factors enumerated in Solem,

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463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983), is optional and the Court therefore need not consider Petitioner’s claims

under these factors. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). Even so, this Court finds that

Petitioner’s sentence arose out of her recidivism under the Three Strikes rule and therefore can not be

compared to that of one time offenders, irrespective of the gravity of the crime. 

3) Punishment in other states: 

Petitioner contends that her sentence is disproportionate because California’s recidivist statute

is among the most extreme in the country and her offenses would have gained her a lower sentence in

most other states. 

Although California’s recidivist statute is among the most extreme in the country, this fact

alone does not compel the conclusion that it is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. As previously

mentioned, the Supreme Court in Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003), upheld the Three Strikes law as

constitutional. 

Petitioner fails to show that her sentence was either contrary to established Supreme Court law

or an unreasonable application of the law to the facts of the underlying case and therefore her claim of

cruel and unusual punishment is rejected. 

B. Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit because her attorney

did not have the option of asking the court to reduce the wobbler offenses to misdemeanors, as

he had already entered into a plea agreement with the People on Petitioner’s behalf.

Petitioner alleges that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner

claims that her trial attorney failed to move the court to reduce her charged wobbler offenses to

misdemeanors. Even after the enactment of the Three Strikes law a trial court retains discretion under

section 17, subdivisions (b)(1) and (3) to determine whether a wobbler should be reduced to a

misdemeanor. People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) 14 Cal. 4th 968, 974-75 (1997). Under the Three

Strikes scheme, prior convictions do not become strikes for sentencing purposes until there exists a

predicate current felony conviction. Therefore, if the trial court had determined that the offenses

should have been sentenced as misdemeanors, the Three Strikes law would not have been triggered. 

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Id. at 975; § 667 (c). 

 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the sixth

amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. A criminal defendant must also establish prejudice

before he can obtain relief. Id. at 691-92. Further, it is not enough for the defendant to show that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Rather, the defendant must

show that there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors or omissions,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 693. Petitioner must show that counsel

made errors so serious that he/she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. Id. at 687. The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel

claims is considered to be clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405.

For reasons discussed below, this Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel fails and finds the actions taken by her attorney to be reasonable and nonprejudicial. 

A reasonably competent defense attorney is expected to assert all legitimate arguments for the

least restrictive punishment for his or her client. The California Court of Appeals, however, found

that Petitioner’s counsel had a rational purpose for not seeking a reduction of the wobblers to

misdemeanors. Petitioner was charged with four felonies: first degree burglary, two counts of

possession of stolen property, and possession of methamphetamine. On Petitioner’s behalf, her

counsel negotiated a disposition whereby the People agreed to dismiss the burglary charge, the only

one of the four charged offenses that is statutorily categorized as a “serious” felony for enhancement

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and strike purposes. §§ 667(a)1, 1192.7(c)1. In exchange, Petitioner specifically agreed to plead

guilty and no contest respectively, to possession of methamphetamine and possession of stolen

property. This plea agreement was based on the condition that Petitioner plead guilty or no contest to

at least some felony - as opposed to misdemeanor- offenses. Thus, any attempts by counsel to request

the court at sentencing to reduce the wobblers to misdemeanors would be contrary to the plea

agreement. The court also found that since the ultimate discretion lay with the trial court, it is not

reasonably probable that even if Petitioner’s counsel had asked for a lower offense, Petitioner would

have obtained a more favorable result. 

In the absence of unreasonable behavior on the part of Petitioner’s counsel, or prejudice to the

Petitioner, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds the California Court of Appeals’ determination of Petitioner’s claims did not

result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk

shall close the file. 

Dated: September 8, 2005 

03cv635hc

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Alex Mendoza mendozalaw@adelphia.net

Kelly Michelle Croxton Kelly.Croxton@doj.ca.gov

Peggy S. Ruffra peggy.ruffra@doj.ca.gov

Dated: September 8, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:_/s/JW Chambers_______

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

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