Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD F. STANLEY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

vs.

STEVEN ORNOSKI, Acting DEATH PENALTY CASE

Warden of the California State Prison

at San Quentin,

ORDER and

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, who underwent a competency trial in state court years ago, and was

found competent, who underwent competency proceedings early on in this federal habeas case in

order to determine if petitioner could waive his federal habeas proceedings, and was found

competent (but then determined that he would withdraw his request to withdraw from the habeas

proceedings), and who counsel characterized as being competent to proceed in this action a scant

year ago, has recently communicated with his counsel, and now asked that counsel seek a stay of

these federal habeas proceedings because, having been transferred to Corcoran from San

Quentin, petitioner believes he is not “in [his] rightful frame of mind.” Petitioner’s habeas

counsel join in petitioner’s request.

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Petitioner is so self-focused on a perceived problem that he is either unable to

communicate rationally with his counsel in order to assist counsel in this petition, or he has

thrown a temper tantrum over being transferred and/or denied creature comforts in prison, and is,

once again, attempting a manipulation of proceedings. An analogy to the present situation which

favors petitioner’s counsels’ position is a child who needs to go to school, but is so wrapped up

in a temper tantrum about his inability to take a video game to school, that he is unable to focus

on the need for school; therefore, he refuses to assist anyone in taking him to school. Or, another

possible analogy favorable to respondent is the child who does not want to go to school, but who

knows from experience that if he throws a temper tantrum over any ostensible issue, which

makes it difficult for his parents to take him to school, he may ultimately get out of going to

school in the short run, or at the very least, will make the situation uncomfortable for all

concerned with his attendance at school. 

For the reasons expressed below, the court finds petitioner’s actions to be a

manipulation, counter-productive or otherwise, which do not warrant a suspension of these

proceedings. 

Factual Background

The precipitating factor for petitioner’s motion to be found presently incompetent,

and hence requiring a hiatus in these ten year old federal habeas proceedings, was petitioner’s

transfer from San Quentin to Corcoran for medical reasons. When counsel and his expert

attempted to interview petitioner at Corcoran:

Around mid-September 2005, Mr. Stanley became extremely upset

at learning of possible plans to transfer him to the Acute Care

Hospital at Corcoran State Prison. Despite my agreement to look

into the issue, which I expected to have at least somewhat of a

calming effect on him, he could speak of little else. He was

generally aware of the time-consuming effort Assistant Federal

Defender Tim Schardl had devoted to the issue, which culminated

in a successful effort to enjoin the transfer, but insisted that we had

only “acted like prison guards” in ignoring his serious concerns. It

was not simply that he was angry or resentful at our failure to

prevent the move that raised my concerns. It was rather that his

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emotional outpourings were rambling, disjointed and illogical.

Shortly after his transfer, he began communicating concerns that he

was emotionally unable to assist us and that he believed he was

incompetent to proceed. He also persisted that there was no

legitimate reason for him to be at Corcoran. Although I share

many of his concerns regarding the purported “high risk”

assessment, he seemed utterly incapable of grasping simple

concepts – such as the possibility that they had made the high risk

assessment because he had made numerous complaints that they

had failed to take his heart condition seriously in the past. To this

day he is adamant that he is being punished for attempting to

provide news outlets and politicians with information about the

CDCR. During the few telephone conversations counsel have been

able to have with him while he has been at Corcoran he has

rambled endlessly and often incoherently about the disposition of

various small food items that were in his possession at San

Quentin. He is irritable and distracted by counsel’s inability to

give him day-by-day updates on the welfare of his adult children

living in California and Oregon.

I arrived at Corcoran State Hospital with Dr. Victoroff on October 26,

2005. After a lengthy admission process we arrived at a nurse’s station

adjacent to Mr. Stanley’s cell/hospital room around 10:30 a.m. I could see

Mr. Stanley through a narrow double glass panel in his door, and he

appeared to be agitated and emotionally upset, pacing his cell frantically. 

As we were to be admitted to his cell, he began to rant and shout about not

having a television, reading materials and personal items. I tried reasoning

with him, but it became apparent that he was refusing the visit, regardless

of whether I could address any of these problems. When Dr. Victoroff

tried to speak to him through the door, he darted over to the corner of the

room was [sic] if to hide or cower.

In fact, I spent the next one or two hours discussing Mr. Stanley’s issues

with the hospital staff, including the lieutenant in charge of the hospital. 

The staff members uniformly noted that Mr. Stanley seemed to have issues

and problems that were unique among any of the San Quentin inmates that

had been transferred there. I noticed while we were talking that Mr.

Stanley returned to the glass panel to peer nervously in my direction every

few minutes with a level of anxiety I had never seen in all the time that I

have known him. I felt that I was able to iron out many of the problems he

seemed to be having with his property, but he seemed unable to

comprehend what I was accomplishing by negotiating with the custodial

staff.

The next day, I returned to Corcoran alone in the hope that Mr.

Stanley would agree to see me, which he did. Throughout the visit,

he was uncharacteristically nervous, and distracted, and he seemed

to have great difficulty concentrating. Mr. Stanley rather

illogically “explained” that he very much wanted to meet with Mr.

Victoroff, had taken a liking to him as a result of a few shouted

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exchanges through a locked door, but for reasons he could not

adequately describe or defend, could not meet with him or Dr.

Watson at Corcoran. Although this was clearly related to

resentment and paranoid beliefs about the reasons for his transfer

to Corcoran, he could not explain any logical connection to his

refusal of visits, especially in light of his desire to cooperate with

the proceeding and be seen by an independent physician. He

completely lost his train of thought when counsel casually

mentioned that the sergeant in charge of the hospital had told him

that inmates are able to shower thrice per week, and became

fixated on convincing counsel that it is only twice.

I tried to get him to focus on his case by bringing up the issue of

whether he was handcuffed or shackled during any portion of the

competency trial. He seemed to exert a genuine effort to recall

whether he had been handcuffed in front of the jury on occasion,

but said that he was too confused and upset to concentrate. He

then abruptly ended the visit, something he had never done in all

my years of visiting with him.

Declaration of Joseph Schlesinger at 11-13.

As put succinctly by Mr. Schlesinger: “The events surrounding his transfer to

Corcoran appear to have put him on the very low[est] end of his always unusual behavior.”

The Legal Standard

In certain circumstances, a petitioner in a capital habeas proceeding may seek to

stay his proceedings because he is unable to rationally communicate with his counsel to assist in

his petition. It is important to focus upon the precise words of the Ninth Circuit in establishing

this right, as the court assumes that the words were chosen with care. It is also important to set

forth what the Ninth Circuit expressly determined was not being decided when it established the

basic right in federal habeas: 

Accordingly, we hold that, where an incompetent capital habeas

petitioner raises claims that could potentially benefit from his

ability to communicate rationally, refusing to stay proceedings

pending restoration of competence denies him his statutory right to

assistance of counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with

precision the information sought. 

Rohan ex rel Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).

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The Ninth Circuit was quick to add: “It goes without saying that the mere fact that Gates does not

communicate rationally does not mean that he is incapable of doing so.” Id. (Emphasis in

original).

Thus, the Ninth Circuit initially did not task the district court with determining

whether petitioner could understand his proceedings. It repeated its position several times that

the criteria for staying a federal habeas petition was an inability to rationally communicate with

counsel. However, at the tail end of the opinion, the court found that the relevant question was

whether its petitioner “now has the capacity to understand his position and to communicate

rationally with counsel.” Id. Nevertheless, counsel here present no facts that petitioner is unable

to understand the nature of these proceedings; indeed, the record of this case indicates that he

understands it only all too well. Therefore, the court’s inquiry is directed to the “rational

communication” prong.

The Ninth Circuit expressly determined not to decide:

1. Whether the entire action had to be stayed, or only those portions of the action

in which petitioner’s communication was necessary;

2. What showing a petitioner had to make to warrant a competency

determination;

3. The weight to be attached to prior competency proceedings;

4. Whether exhaustion of a claim of incompetent to proceed was necessary;

5. While we hold that competence to pursue habeas relief encompasses some

rational communication requirement, we need not decide whether the standard is the same as the

standard for competence to stand trial.

Rohan, 334 F.3d 819 (n.11).

A checking of subsequent citations does not reveal that the Ninth Circuit (or any other court) has

determined the questions expressly left open.

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 Neither petitioner nor respondent directly addressed all the questions expressly left

open by the Ninth Circuit. Respondent’s concession that petitioner has “accurately stated the

legal principles set down by the Ninth Circuit” cannot, of course, be applied to questions that

were expressly and purposefully not set down.

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The undersigned will answer the open questions as follows in that such questions

cannot be avoided here.1 Because only communication to assist counsel factually is at issue, it

makes no sense in the circumstances of this case to stay those adjudication of those issues which

do not reasonably require petitioner’s communication on factual matters. If only in part, the

issues in this case should be finally decided as to delay them even further serves no purpose. If

petitioner were to prevail on any of these “non-communication” issues, it might well moot the

necessity of finally determining (after appeal) petitioner’s competence, an always difficult issue.

Petitioner assumes that the standards for assessing the need for a competency

hearing at trial (bona fide doubt as to competency) are the same standard to be applied in this

habeas proceeding. The court disagrees for substantial reasons. First, the doubt at trial is readily

apparent, or not, in most cases to the trial judge from the defendants’ appearances and actions in

court. Moreover, at trial, counsel will be working with his client on a day-to-day basis, thereby

permitting for a more informed assessment by counsel of facts rendering his client incompetent. 

The situation is different for habeas proceedings. The habeas judge rarely, if ever, sees the

petitioner and can only glean facts about competence from secondary sources such as petitioner’s

communications. Counsel will not often see their client in a habeas case on a day-to-day basis,

and often obtain their information only on a hearsay basis. Thus, the foundation for real and

significant doubts is much more attainable to the judge in trial proceedings than it is in habeas. 

Importantly, in a capital case habeas proceeding, a petitioner will have much more incentive to

malinger and manipulate than he would in a trial setting where the decision of the defendant’s

guilt and/or penalty is very much up in the air. Often it would be counter-productive and not

without discomfort for a defendant, situated in a jail setting, to delay the trial to obtain a

competency determination. On the other hand, delay will serve a petitioner already sentenced to

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death almost as well as a victory. To permit such a de minimis standard for the stopping of

habeas proceedings as “bona fide doubt” is to invite wholesale manipulation of already complex

and lengthy habeas proceedings. Finally, in many, if not all capital habeas cases, petitioners are

being currently investigated and tested by mental health professionals. A capital petitioner will

have the where-with-all to impart to the court something more than a bona fide doubt. If all

habeas proceedings are to stop until petitioner regains his competency (never if some petitioners

have their way), the court should require something more than a doubt as to competency. For all

of the above reasons, nothing less than a prima facie case of incompetency must be set forth

before the habeas court should order a competency hearing. 

As to the weight that should be attached to prior competency hearings, the court

cannot fashion a fixed rule. The value of prior hearings will depend on factors such as the depth

into which the trial judge probed petitioner’s competency, the quality of the presentation, and

especially the remoteness of the decision from the present proceeding. As such, the value of

prior proceedings, which should generally be considered, will depend on case-by-case analysis of

the circumstances.

The short and intuitive answer to whether state court exhaustion of a claim of

incompetent to proceed in federal proceedings should occur is—no. Of what value could a state

court determination have on an issue that has arisen in the federal proceedings? The state has no

record of the current events, may well have none of the federal records in which a prima facie

case is made, and does not have any greater expertise in such matters than the federal courts. No

comity purpose is served by deferring yet another issue to overworked state courts on which they

have less information than the federal court. 

Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the competency standard set out

for trial will be the same as the competency standard for capital habeas proceedings. On this

point, petitioner urges that the standards should be the same. Respondent offers no analysis. For

the purposes of this case, the undersigned will not attempt to set out a differing standard when

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the point is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the standard for competency will be deemed

the same in either case—an ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and an ability to

rationally consult with counsel. See Medina v. California, 595 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S. Ct. 2572,

2579 (1992). 

Assessment

To put it in simple terms, petitioner’s interactions with his counsel and the court

have been mercurial. At times, his habeas counsel report that petitioner is assisting them,

assisting some of them, or acting contrary to the desires of all his counsel. The court, of course,

is aware of the many letters, writs and the like accusing his counsel, and the court of misfeasance

and malfeasance. The court is aware that petitioner is sometimes at peace with his habeas

counsel, more often with one or two of his habeas counsel, before those counsel again lose favor

for some seemingly illogical reason. Petitioner has never expressed any outrage at his erstwhile

“retained” but unauthorized counsel in this action—Jack Leavitt. None could seriously contend

that petitioner is not manipulative. The most egregious example is petitioner’s multiple attempts

to use his purported knowledge of the burial place of murder victim Diana Lynn in order to

obtain benefits that suit him at the moment, e.g., a change of counsel in this case, a return to San

Quentin, and the like. See e.g., Stanley Letters Docket Number 580 (attachment 1), Docket

Number 507, Docket Number 500. The question here is whether petitioner’s manipulations are

so bizarre as to constitute an inability to communicate with and assist counsel.

But counsel have never intimated that petitioner is unable to communicate with

them; their problem stems from petitioner’s counterproductive statements and actions apparent

from the communications. Petitioner’s request in one of his most recent letters to counsel, and

attached to the motion, obviously demonstrates that petitioner has not lost the ability to

communicate for a desired purpose: 

Well, doctors at Corcoran said three days after my arrival I should

not be here. Will you answer this? Can we delay evidentiary

hearing and start competency proceedings. I do not feel after what

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S.Q. [San Quentin] did moving me, taking everything I own I am

in my rightful frame of mind. 

Stanley Letter of October 11, 2005 attached to petitioner’s motion.

The remainder of the letter demonstrated someone who was lost in the moment of his perceived

daily difficulties, as opposed to the difficulties of his long term death penalty habeas proceeding, 

with little hesitancy to lash out at his attorneys who “never do anything to protect my rights.” 

But, the question for the court is whether petitioner is oblivious to his counter-productive actions,

or whether he is initiating them for some manipulative purpose.

Stanley also wrote on December 5, 2005:

This move to Corcoran solely as reprisal by S.Q. warden and

medical [department] of S.Q. has made me incompetent to proceed

in this court or to co-operate with attorneys....I hereby refuse to see

or co-operate with any doctor connected with the Federal

Defenders. I will see this court’s doctor....

Petitioner’s counsel averred in court that he is “used to” petitioner’s acting-up, but

the present situation is different—counsel’s ability to get petitioner to assist in his habeas

proceeding in any rational manner has become much more degraded recently than it was in the

past. Counsel’s observations are entitled to weight. Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner’s competency/mental health expert (Dr. Victoroff), both historical and

presently, primarily addressed in his declaration the lack of necessity for petitioner to be

transferred to Corcoran; however, that is not an issue for the undersigned to adjudicate in

connection with the present motion. In the last paragraph, Dr. Victoroff opines: 

To my observations through the cell window, Mr. Stanley was not

only angry but also agitated and somewhat confused. His

responses to Mr. Schlesinger revealed highly illogical thought

processing. The cause for these conditions could not be

determined under those circumstances. A much more extensive

assessment is required to characterize Mr. Stanley’s emotional,

cognitive and neurological condition(s), and to determine the most

likely cause or causes.

Victoroff Declaration at 12.

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 The undersigned will not characterize the entire, mammoth docket in this case. Suffice

it to say that the undersigned has read nearly every document on the docket, including the

misconduct letters, the writs, and so forth. It is hardly possible to get a clear picture of

petitioner’s actions in this case unless one has experienced them.

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As respondent points out, this opinion is not a final one in which the doctor believes that

petitioner is incompetent to proceed; it is probably the only opinion it could be—general,

tentative and non-final. Also, it is clear from past proceedings that petitioner has in the past

permitted his experts to visit and examine him.

Respondent, without medical proffer from any observer of petitioner at San

Quentin or Corcoran, concludes that petitioner is up to his usual tricks, and that “[c]ircumstances 

show that petitioner is angry over his transfer to Corcoran and refusing to cooperate with counsel

as a way to force them to placate him by getting the court to order his transfer back to San

Quentin.” Respondent’s position is colorable but somewhat begs the issue of whether some

mental illness exists which inevitably causes petitioner to engage in his usual counter-productive

activities to the point where he cannot rationally consult with his counsel.

However, respondent’s position is aided by petitioner’s own letters in which he

seeks to bargain with the court. Petitioner will (for the moment and until pressed) be glad to see

a court appointed doctor, especially the one who found him competent before in these federal

proceedings; he simply will refuse to see any doctor sent by the Federal Defender. While only

petitioner can fully explain the [il]logic of his position, he clearly is acting upon a template first

created at the penalty phase of his case in state court where petitioner understands he can tie the

courts and his keepers in knots if he simply refuses to participate and assist his counsel. Having

read petitioner’s numerous letters over the years, and being an observer of his manipulations to

withdraw his petition on numerous occasions, and manipulations for other reasons, the

undersigned clearly believes that petitioner gets some perverse pleasure out of such tangled

proceedings where petitioner believes that he is thereby exercising some control over the system.2

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Moreover, while quite dated, two findings of competency, one by the state after

jury trial, and one federal, early on in these federal proceedings, have been made. These favor a

finding that petitioner has not set forth a prima facie case of incompetency. Moreover, the “nowI-want-this-, now-I-don’t” aspect of petitioner’s participation in the federal competency

proceeding is typical of many actions of petitioner over the years. For example, petitioner sought

to terminate his federal habeas proceedings, and was found competent to do so by the court’s

appointed doctor (Shawn Johnston). However, when this point became clear to petitioner, he

retracted the request to terminate, and only when this request was safely granted, did petitioner

immediately begin anew his attempts to disrupt the proceedings. Included within this ongoing

disruption were petitioner’s long term efforts to proceed in this case with Bay Area counsel Jack

Leavitt in order to once again commence procedures for termination of his habeas proceedings.

This pattern of disruption is a continuing feature of this case.

Finally, the fact that counsel did not seek writs for petitioner’s appearance at the

previously scheduled evidentiary January 3, 2006 hearing weighs in favor of not delaying the

hearings on the merits, i.e., the need for petitioner’s significant assistance is dubious.

Thus, in the final analysis, the court views petitioner’s latest tirade as one in

which he again attempts to manipulate the system in order to obtain some short term goal, and/or 

to rail against the system which keeps him in prison. While working with petitioner is

undoubtedly very difficult, even temporarily not possible, and while petitioner undoubtedly has

mental issues, petitioner’s counsel have not set forth a prima facie case of incompetence to

proceed. Again, as stated by the Ninth Circuit, “[i]t goes without saying that the mere fact that

[petitioner] does not communicate rationally does not mean that he is incapable of doing so.”

(Emphasis in original).

It will come as little comfort to petitioner’s counsel, who deserve a more assistive

client, that this court has empathy for their predicament. Petitioner’s counsel in this case are

skilled advocates who find their energies being constantly sapped by the manipulations of their

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client. Rather than being able to focus on the colorable, complex issues in this case, counsel find

themselves diverted by petitioner’s demands and diatribes, including those in which petitioner

accuses his counsel either singly or collectively in nefarious, sometimes criminal, conduct. 

However, the undersigned did not get to choose this now over ten year old case either, and did

not bargain for all the time consuming diversions he has had to make from the ultimate

adjudication of this case. None of us signed up in this case for a life sentence, and the

undersigned has done his level best not to permit the case to become one. Tying up the

proceedings once more, on account of petitioner’s probable manipulative actions, is not likely to

accomplish any necessary due process task. This case should be decided.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the undersigned will not order a competency hearing for petitioner’s

recent actions. The undersigned will not recommend to the district judge that the case be stayed

pending competency hearings.

As discussed at hearing, and in order to alleviate if only a little, counsel’s expense

of time dealing with this competency side-issue, the evidentiary hearing on the merits ordered in

this case for January 3, 2006 shall commence instead on January 17, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. The court

will not repeat the other orders made at pre-hearing conference, but they were effective when

given.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). No later than

January 3, 2005, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed no later than January 7, 

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2006. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 12/21/05

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 __________________________________

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

stan1500.comp

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