Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01177/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01177-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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1 On December 12, 2005, this court dismissed claims against

the three Assistant United States Attorneys named as defendants in

this case. Also pending before the court are motions to dismiss

filed by the District of Columbia defendants. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIRGIL M. ROGERS,

NO. CIV. S-05-1177 LKK/PAN

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

PHILIP A. FERRARI, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Virgil Rogers alleges civil rights violations

arising from his allegedly unlawful arrest and detention by virtue

of the conduct of various private and governmental actors.1

Although the complaint names multiple defendants, the instant

motion to dismiss was filed by Karen Johnson-Norman, the woman who

plaintiff alleges falsely claimed that he was stalking her.

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2 As noted in the text, where the court considers a motion

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, it is not limited to

the complaint. Accordingly, the facts are derived from the entire

record. 

2

Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that (1) plaintiff’s

claims against her are barred under the doctrine of collateral

estoppel; (2) this court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant

Johnson-Norman; and (3) defendant Johnson-Norman is not subject to

liability under § 1983.

 As I explain below, the court concludes it is without

personal jurisdiction over the moving defendant. For reasons also

explained below, the court defers a decision as to whether the

matter should be dismissed or transferred to the District of

Columbia. 

I.

FACTS2

At one time, plaintiff and defendant Johnson-Norman had a

romantic relationship. Comp. 4:23. In 2001, after the

relationship ended, plaintiff was convicted in the District of

Columbia of attempted stalking. He was placed on probation. 

Thereafter, plaintiff alleges that defendant Johnson-Norman made

several false claims that plaintiff had contacted her in violation

of the terms of his probation. Comp. 5:13-16. Plaintiff alleges

that on each of these occasions defendant Johnson-Norman would call

defendant Durant, a detective with the D.C. Metropolitan Police

Department. Comp. at 5:15-16. In 2002, plaintiff moved to

Sacramento, California. Comp. at 5:22.

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3 Plaintiff was in Sacramento at the time and alleges he had

not received notice of the hearing. 

3

 On January 28, 2003, defendant Johnson-Norman contacted

defendant Durant, and told him that she had received a manila

envelope from plaintiff. Comp. at 23:9-10. The envelope contained

letters, photographs and a photocopy of an album cover. Comp. 

at 6:8-10. 

On March 21, 2003, defendant Durant, signed an affidavit in

support of an arrest warrant for the plaintiff. AUSA Mot. to

Dism., Ex. C. The affidavit listed the charge as felony stalking

and averred that by virtue of plaintiff having sent Johnson-Norman

the envelope, plaintiff was in violation of the conditions of

probation. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Durant knowingly swore

out a false affidavit in March of 2003. Comp. at 6:17-24. 

On June 10, 2003, a bench warrant was issued by a D.C.

Superior Court judge. This warrant was premised on charges of

“attempted stalking - probation violation” and “failure to appear

for a show cause hearing.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Ex. B.3 A box

was checked next to a preprinted sentence which reads “[t]his

warrant is issued extraterritorially pursuant to D.C. Code Sec. 23-

1329 (1996).” The warrant listed the plaintiff’s California

address and provided that the warrant "[m]ay be served at any place

within the jurisdiction of the United States unless specified

otherwise below." Id.

On June 16, 2003, plaintiff was arrested in Sacramento,

California. AUSA Mot. to Dism., Ex. E. On June 19, 2003,

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4

Magistrate Judge Peter Nowinski determined that there was a valid

warrant, that plaintiff was the person named in the warrant, held

plaintiff to answer to the charges in the District of Columbia, and

continued him in custody.

In October 2003, plaintiff was tried by a Washington, D.C.

jury, and found not guilty. The day after the trial concluded, the

trial judge granted defendant’s petition for a Civil Protection

Order. See Johnson-Norman v. Rogers, No. IF-2497-03 (D.C. Sup. Ct.

Oct. 29, 2003). The judge concluded that there was good cause to

believe that plaintiff had committed the offense of stalking

between June 2002 and May 2003, and that there was good cause to

believe that plaintiff posed a danger to Ms. Johnson-Norman.

Plaintiff objected to the decision and filed a motion for

reconsideration, which was denied on January 29, 2004. Def.’s Mot.

to Dism., Appellate Decision at 3, n. 2. Plaintiff then appealed

the decision to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which

on September 26, 2005 issued its opinion deeming all of plaintiff’s

claims to be without merit. See id.

Plaintiff brings eight causes of action against defendant

Johnson-Norman: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, premised upon

an unreasonable search and seizure; (2) violation of § 1983,

premised upon unreasonable detention and confinement; (3) violation

of § 1983, premised upon conspiracy; (4) negligence; (5) false

imprisonment; (6) malicious prosecution; (7) negligent infliction

of emotion distress; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional

distress. 

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5

II.

STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the necessary jurisdictional

facts. See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th

Cir. 1995). In ruling on the motion, the court is not limited to

the allegations of the complaint. See Parrinov v. FHP, Inc., 146

F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). When a court rules on the basis of

affidavits and discovery materials without holding an evidentiary

hearing, plaintiff's burden is met with a simple prima facie

showing of personal jurisdiction. See Fields v. Sedgwick

Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1986). In

determining whether a plaintiff has met this burden, uncontroverted

allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and

“conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits

must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.” AT & T Co. v. Compagnie

Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and

specific. Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th

Cir. 1995). General jurisdiction exists if the non-resident's

contacts with the forum are continuous and systematic, and the

exercise of jurisdiction satisfies “traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” Id. Plaintiff does not contend

that the court had general jurisdiction. I thus turn to the

question of specific jurisdiction.

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6

The exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with

California’s long-arm statute. See Omeluk v. Langsten Slip and

Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 1995). That statute permits

the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident

defendants on any basis consistent with the United States

Constitution, See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, and thus the

measure ultimately is the Due Process Clause. Due process, in

turn, requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts

with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

316 (1945).

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-step test to

determine whether the court may exercise specific jurisdiction over

a non-resident defendant. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. First,

specific jurisdiction requires a showing that the out-of-state

defendant purposefully directed activities toward residents of the

forum state or purposefully availed herself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum state, thus invoking the

benefits and protections of its laws. See Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475 (1985). Second, the controversy

must be related to or “arise out of” defendant's contact with the

forum. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. Third, the exercise of

jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice,

i.e., it must be reasonable, see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.

British-American Ins. Co., Ltd., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir.

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1987), which is in turn measured by a multi-element test.

If an action is filed in a district which does not have

personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court may dismiss it

or, if the interests of justice requires, transfer to a district

in which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Goldlawr,

Inc. v. Heiman, 396 U.S. 463, 466-7 (1962).

III.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

As noted, defendant moves to dismiss, inter alia, on the

grounds that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over her.

A. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 

Under the first element of the Ninth Circuit’s three-part

jurisdictional test, a defendant must “purposefully direct his

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the

forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”

Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., A.B., 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.

1993). The purposeful availment requirement ensures that

defendants will not be “haled into a jurisdiction through ‘random,’

‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.' ” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at

473. This is a qualitative analysis that determines whether a

defendant can reasonably anticipate being sued in a particular

jurisdiction. Id. 

The purposeful availment test differentiates between tort and

contract actions. A § 1983 claim has been held “more akin to a

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tort claim.” See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. 

The three elements of the purposeful availment test in a tort

claim are “(1) intentional action; (2) aimed at the forum state;

and (3) causing harm that the defendant should have anticipated

would be suffered in the forum state.” Id.; see also Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 (9th Cir. 2001).

In the case at bar, the purposeful availment test is not met.

Unlike the District of Columbia defendants, defendant JohnsonNorman’s contact with California is, if it existed at all,

extremely attenuated. Assuming defendant intentionally engaged in

the action of fabricating stalking charges against plaintiff, this

action was not aimed at California, since under plaintiff’s

pleadings defendant had no way of knowing that plaintiff resided

in California. It is true that, although plaintiff denies that he

sent the envelope, defendant, by reporting the matter to law

enforcement, demonstrated her belief that he did so. Moreover,

since it appears that the envelope was sent in the mail, it could

be inferred that it carried a California postmark, though it does

not follow that it was legible. In any event, the set of

attenuated inferences drawn above, is insufficient to support

jurisdiction. In this regard, it is significant that at oral

argument plaintiff’s counsel admitted that nothing in the record

supported a conclusion that defendant Johnson-Norman knew that

plaintiff was in California. In the absence of such knowledge,

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4 Counsel suggested that such evidence might exist, but none

has been filed with the court.

9

personal jurisdiction does not exist.4

The distinction between defendant Durant and defendant

Johnson-Norman is significant with respect to purposeful availment.

As a police officer, Detective Durant necessarily relied on

California law enforcement in the execution of the arrest warrant.

For example, in Lee v. City of Los Angles, 250 F. 3d 668, 692 (9th

Cir. 2001), the New York law enforcement defendants purposefully

availed themselves of California law in that they directed their

“efforts towards California to arrest, extradite and transport” the

plaintiff. Id. at 693. The same cannot be said of defendant

Johnson-Norman. Defendant Johnson-Norman may have made false

statements and conspired to have plaintiff arrested on false

stalking charges, but, given the present record, these actions were

not targeted specifically at California. 

While plaintiff argues that defendant knew of plaintiff’s

residence, Pl.’s Opp’n at 9:3-5, the record does not support the

contention. The complaint specifically alleges that defendant

Durant discovered that plaintiff resided in California, see Comp.

at 23:24-27, and nowhere does it allege that defendant JohnsonNorman knew plaintiff was in California. 

Because the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first prong

of the personal jurisdiction test, the court need not engage in

further analysis. Nonetheless, a question remains.

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10

Where personal jurisdiction is lacking, the law strongly

favors transfer rather than dismissal. See Dist. No. 1, Pacific

Coast Dist., M.E.B.A. v. State of Alaska, 682 F.2d 797, 798 (9th

Cir. 1982). Nonetheless, in the instant matter plaintiff has

averred that he has been unable to locate D.C. counsel. The court

does not know whether plaintiff wishes to continue the search for

counsel, or continue his action against Ms. Johnson-Norman in pro

se status. Accordingly, plaintiff is granted fifteen (15) days to

indicate to the court whether he favors transfer or will submit to

dismissal. A failure to timely respond will result in dismissal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 9, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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