Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03475/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03475-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 15-3475

_____________

IN RE: MODAFINIL ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Mylan Laboratories, Inc.; Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.; 

Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd; Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

 Appellants 

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-06-cv-01797

District Judge: The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

Argued July 12, 2016

Before: SMITH, JORDAN, and RENDELL,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 13, 2016)

Daniel Berger

Daniel C. Simons

David F. Sorensen

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2

Berger & Montague

1622 Locust Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Erin C. Burns

Dianne M. Nast

NastLaw

1101 Market Street

Suite 2801

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Russell A. Chorush

Connelly Baker Wotring

600 Travis Street

JPMorgan Chase Tower, Suite 700

Houston, TX 77002

Neill Wilson Clark

Peter Kohn, Esq.

Faruqi & Faruqi

101 Greenwood Avenue

Suite 600

Jenkintown, PA 19046

Stuart E. Des Roches

Andrew W. Kelly

Chris Letter

Odom & Des Roches

650 Poydras Street

Suite 2020, Poydras Center

New Orleans, LA 70130

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Bruce E. Gerstein [ARGUED]

Dan Litvin

Joseph Opper

Garwin Gerstein & Fisher

Wall Street Plaza

88 Pine Street, 10th Floor

New York, NY 10036

Miranda Y. Jones

Heim Payne & Chorush

600 Travis Street

Suite 6710

Houston, TX 77002

Linda P. Nussbaum

Nussbaum Law Group

570 Lexington Avenue

19th Floor

New York, NY 10022

Counsel for Appellees

Evan R. Chesler

David R. Marriott

Rowan D. Wilson [ARGUED]

Cravath Swaine & Moore

825 Eighth Avenue

Worldwide Plaza

New York, NY 10019

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David L. Comerford

Katherine M. Katchen

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld

2001 Market Street

Two Commerce Square, Suite 4100

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Catherine E. Creely

Cohn & Marks

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

C. Fairley Spillman

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20036

J. Douglas Baldridge [ARGUED]

Christopher K. Diamond

Danielle R. Foley

Molly Geissenhainer

Venable 

575 7th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

John J. O’Malley

Anthony S. Volpe

Volpe & Koenig

30 South 17th Street

Suite 1600

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Philadelphia, PA 19103

Erin C. Dougherty

Lathrop B. Nelson, III

Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads

123 South Broad Street

28th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19109

Katherine R. Katz

Karen N. Walker

Gregory L. Skidmore

Kirkland & Ellis

655 15th Street, N.W.

Suite 1200

Washington, DC 20005

James C. Burling

Mark A. Ford

WilmerHale

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

Frank R. Emmerich, Jr.

Nancy J. Gellman

John A. Guernsey

Conrad O’Brien

1500 Market Street

West Towers, Suite 3900

Philadelphia, PA 19102

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Emily R. Whelan

Whatley Kallas

60 State Street

7th Floor

Boston, MA 02109

Jeffrey B. Korn

William H. Rooney

Willkie, Farr & Gallagher

787 Seventh Avenue

New York, NY 10019

Joseph E. Wolfson

Stevens & Lee

620 Freedom Business Center

Suite 200

King of Prussia, PA 19406

Counsel for Appellants

Anna T. Neill

Scott E. Perwin

Lauren C. Ravkind

Kenny Nachwalter

1441 Brickell Avenue

Four Season Tower, Suite 1100

Miami, FL 33131

Moira E. Cain-Mannix

Bernard D. Marcus

Marcus & Shapira

301 Grant Street

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One Oxford Centre, 35th Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Monica L. Rebuck

Barry L. Refsin

Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller

4400 Deer Path Road

Suite 200

Harrisburg, PA 17110

Eugene P. Endress

Matthew M. Holub

Thomas J. Maas

Brian Sodikoff

Katten Muchin Roseman

525 West Monroe Street

Suite 1600

Chicago, IL 60661

James W. Matthews

Foley & Lardner

111 Huntington Avenue

Boston, MA 02199

Counsel for Amicus Appellee

________________

OPINION

________________

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

 

“The class action is an ingenious device for 

economizing on the expense of litigation and enabling small 

claims to be litigated. The two points are closely related. If 

every small claim had to be litigated separately, the 

vindication of small claims would be rare. The fixed costs of 

litigation make it impossible.” Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck 

and Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2008). But not every 

group of plaintiffs should be granted class action status, 

because “[t]he class action is an ‘exception to the usual rule 

that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 

named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 

U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 

U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).

When thinking of a class action brought under Rule 

23(b)(3), we typically think of a large aggregation of 

individuals (hundreds or even thousands), each with small 

claims. This case is quite different from that. Here, we are 

faced with a putative class of twenty-two large and 

sophisticated corporations, most of which have multi-million 

dollar claims, who wish to take advantage of the class action 

device. While we do not foreclose the possibility of class 

status in this case, or where the putative class is of similar 

composition, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing 

that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) has been 

satisfied. We now provide a framework for district courts to 

apply when conducting their numerosity analyses, and we 

will remand to the District Court to allow such an analysis in 

this case. 

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I. 

A. Regulatory Framework

The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 

Restoration Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), 98 Stat. 1585, as 

amended, provides a regulatory framework designed in part to 

(1) ensure that only rigorously tested drugs are marketed, (2) 

incentivize drug manufacturers to invest in new research and 

development, and (3) encourage generic entry into the 

marketplace. The Hatch-Waxman Act requires a drug 

manufacturer wishing to market a new brand-name drug to

first submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the federal 

Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and then undergo a 

long, complex, and costly testing process. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 355(b)(1) (requiring, among other things, “full reports of 

investigations” into safety and effectiveness; “a full list of the 

articles used as components”; and a “full description” of how 

the drug is manufactured, processed, and packed); see also 

F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228-29 (2013) 

(describing the statutory framework). If this process is 

successful, the FDA will grant the drug manufacturer 

approval to market the brand-name drug. After this approval, 

a generic manufacturer can obtain similar approval by

submitting an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”)

that “shows that the generic drug has the same active 

ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to, the brandname drug.” Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 

132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv)). This way, a generic manufacturer is

not required to undergo the same costly approval procedures 

to develop a drug that has already satisfied the FDA. Actavis, 

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133 S. Ct. at 2228 (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing 

the generic to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, 

‘speed[s] the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to 

market,’ thereby furthering drug competition.” (quoting 

Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676)). 

The FDA will not give final approval to produce a 

generic version of a drug that is entitled to non-patent 

exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and it “cannot 

authorize a generic drug that would infringe a patent.” 

Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. Thus, among other things, an 

ANDA’s approval will depend on “the scope and duration of 

the patents covering the brand-name drug.” Id. Brand

manufacturers are required to include the patent number and 

expiration date of the patent that covers the drug or that 

covers a method of using that drug in their NDAs, which are

then published by the FDA in the Orange Book, more 

formally known as the Approved Drug Products with 

Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 

§ 355(b)(1) and 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (3) 

(2011)). Once a patent has been listed in the Orange Book, 

the generic manufacturer is free to file an ANDA if it can 

certify that its proposed generic drug will not actually violate 

the brand manufacturer’s patents. Id. Under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), there are four ways in which a generic 

manufacturer can make this certification:

(I) that such patent information has not been 

filed,

(II) that such patent has expired,

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(III) of the date on which such patent will 

expire, or 

(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be 

infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the 

new drug for which the application is 

submitted.

An ANDA with a paragraph IV certification may only be 

filed after the expiration of the fourth year of the New 

Chemical Entity (“NCE”) five-year exclusivity period.1

 21 

U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(E)(ii). The “‘paragraph IV’ route[] 

automatically counts as patent infringement.” Actavis, 133 S. 

Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)). As a result, 

this often “means provoking litigation” instituted by the brand

manufacturer. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677. 

If the brand manufacturer initiates a patent 

infringement suit, the FDA must withhold approval of the 

generic for at least 30 months while the parties litigate the 

validity or infringement of the patent. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 

2228 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). If the suit has 

concluded at the end of this 30-month period, then the FDA 

will follow the outcome of the litigation. Id. However, if the 

litigation is still proceeding, the FDA may give its approval to 

the generic drug manufacturer to begin marketing a generic 

version of the drug. Id. The generic manufacture then has 

 1 This exclusivity period is granted via the Hatch-Waxman 

Act, and has nothing to do with whether the drug is covered 

by a patent. 

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the option to “launch at risk,” meaning that if the ongoing

court proceeding ultimately determines that the patent was 

valid and infringed, the generic firm will be liable for lost 

profits despite the FDA’s approval. C. Scott Hemphill,

Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 

Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1609

(2006). 

In order to incentivize a generic drug manufacturer to 

challenge weak patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that 

the first generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV 

certification will enjoy a 180-day exclusivity period. 21 

U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). This means that during this 

exclusivity period, “no other generic can compete with the 

brand-name drug,” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229, an opportunity 

that can be “‘worth several hundred million dollars,’” to the 

first-filer, id. (quoting Hemphill, supra, at 1579).2

 It is during 

this generic exclusivity period that the “vast majority of 

potential profits for a generic drug manufacturer materialize.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That is because once 

 2 It is a common practice for a brand manufacturer to market 

its own generic version of the drug when generic entry 

occurs. Unlike an ANDA filer, the brand manufacturer is not 

barred from entering the generic market during the 180-day 

exclusivity period to which the first paragraph IV filer is 

entitled. See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 

51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that 21 U.S.C. 

§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) did not prevent the filer of the original 

NDA from launching its own generic during the 180-day 

exclusivity period). 

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the exclusivity period has expired other generic 

manufacturers are free to enter the market, bringing the price 

down to competitive levels. Importantly, this 180-day 

exclusivity period belongs only to the first generic

manufacturer to file; if the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity 

rights, no other generic manufacturer is entitled to it. Id.

(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)). 

B. Facts

In April 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office issued U.S. Patent No. 5,618,845 (“the ′845 patent”) to 

Cephalon, Inc. (“Cephalon”), a pharmaceutical company. 

The ′845 patent claimed a specific particle-size distribution of 

modafinil, a wakefulness-promoting agent used to treat 

narcolepsy and other sleep disorders, and Cephalon later 

applied for a reissue of the patent, resulting in the issuance of 

U.S. Reissue Patent No. 37,516 (“the ′516 patent”) in January 

2002. Thus, Cephaolon’s use of modafinil was protected by a 

patent until October 6, 2014, to be later extended until April 

6, 2015. 

In December 1998, the FDA approved Cephalon’s 

NDA for the brand-name drug Provigil and granted it NCE 

exclusivity. This five-year period of exclusivity was 

extended until December 24, 2005, due to Cephalon’s status 

as an orphan drug.

3

 In March 2006, Cephalon obtained

 3 An orphan drug is used to treat a rare disease or ailment. 

Because pharmaceutical companies may lack the financial 

incentive to develop such drugs, the Orphan Drug Act 

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pediatric exclusivity, which added an additional six months of

exclusivity. 21 U.S.C. § 355a(c). Thus, in the absence of the 

‘516 patent, Cephalon’s exclusivity period for modafinil 

would have ended on June 24, 2006. 

On December 24, 2002, the first day that an ANDA for 

modafinil could be filed, four generic drug manufacturers –

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and Teva 

Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. (collectively “Teva”); Ranbaxy 

Laboratories, Ltd. and Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 

(collectively “Ranbaxy”); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and 

Mylan Inc. (collectively “Mylan”); and Barr Laboratories, 

Inc. (“Barr”) – each independently filed an ANDA with 

paragraph IV certifications seeking to sell generic modafinil 

products. Due to FDA guidance promulgated after the 

paragraph IV certifications in this case were filed, all four 

generic manufacturers were treated as being the first filer, and 

thus all four would have shared in the 180-day exclusivity 

period, making it less valuable to each individual generic 

manufacturer. See Guidance for Industry on 180-Day 

Exclusivity when Multiple Abbreviated New Drug 

Applications are Submitted on the Same Day, 68 Fed. Reg. 

45252, 45255 (Aug. 1, 2003). 

Because the filing of the paragraph IV certification 

“automatically counts as patent infringement,” Actavis, 133 S. 

Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)), Cephalon sued 

the four generic manufacturers for patent infringement in the 

 

provides the brand manufacturer with a seven-year period of 

non-patent exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a). 

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District of New Jersey on March 28, 2003. While motions for 

summary judgment were pending, Cephalon entered into 

what are known as “reverse-payment settlements”4 with each 

of the four generic manufacturers. First, Cephalon settled 

with Teva on December 9, 2005. This agreement ended the 

patent litigation between Cephalon and Teva, and as a result 

Teva was granted a license to sell modafinil in October 2012, 

which was before the expiration of Cephalon’s patent but 

several years later than Teva could have entered the market if 

it had launched its generic “at-risk.” In exchange for its 

agreement to settle, Teva was paid millions of dollars to stay 

out of the market via royalty agreements, supply agreements, 

and other contractual provisions. Importantly, the only term 

of the deal that was publicized was what is known as the 

“contingent launch provision.” This provision allowed Teva 

to enter the generic modafinil market if any other company 

entered the market for any reason. 

Almost two weeks later, on December 22, 2005, 

Ranbaxy entered into a similar reverse-payment settlement 

agreement with Cephalon on slightly less favorable terms, but 

also with a contingent launch provision. Again, the 

 4 In a reverse-payment settlement, “a party with no claim for 

damages (something that is usually true of a paragraph IV 

litigation defendant) walks away with money simply so that it 

will stay away from the patentee’s market.” F.T.C. v. 

Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013). Such agreements 

are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the “rule of reason” 

inquiry because such settlements, “where large and 

unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant 

anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 2237. 

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contingent launch provision was publicized via press release. 

Two weeks after the Ranbaxy settlement, on January 9, 2006, 

Mylan entered into a similar agreement – on less favorable 

terms than Ranbaxy – but also with a publicized contingent 

launch provision. The final remaining paragraph IV filer, 

Barr, settled on the least favorable terms on February 1, 2006. 

It too had a contingent launch provision, which was 

publicized as well. Because no subsequent paragraph IV filer 

would be entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period, there was 

no incentive for another generic manufacturer to unilaterally 

bear the litigation expenses for the reward that it would have 

to share with any other generic manufacturer who wanted to 

enter the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).5

 

The Direct Purchaser Plaintiff (“DPP”) putative class, 

appellees in this case, filed suit on April 27, 2006, alleging a 

global conspiracy involving Cephalon and all four generic 

 5 Generic manufacturer Apotex Inc. nonetheless filed a 

declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania in June 2006 alleging non-infringement, 

invalidity, and unenforceability of the ′516 patent. Apotex 

Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-2768, 2011 WL 6090696, 

at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2011). The District Court held that 

the patent was invalid and unenforceable on November 7, 

2011, a ruling which was upheld on appeal. Apotex Inc. v. 

Cephalon, Inc., 500 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per 

curiam). The District Court, in a separate opinion, also held 

that Apotex would not infringe the ′516 patent. Apotex, Inc. 

v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-2768, 2012 WL 1080148, at 

*1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2012)

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defendants under 15 U.S.C. § 1; four separate conspiracies 

between Cephalon and each generic defendant under the same 

statute; and a monopolization claim against Cephalon under 

15 U.S.C. § 2. The DPP class is made up of wholesalers who 

purchased Provigil directly from Cephalon.6

 

The District Court, with the full support of the parties,

ordered that motions regarding class certification were not to 

be filed until after fact and expert discovery and the motions 

for summary judgment had been filed. Thus, the DPP class 

did not file its motion for class certification until May 12, 

2014, after more than eight years of litigation. 

Approximately one month later, on June 23, 2014, the District 

Court granted summary judgment in favor of all of the 

defendants on the DPP class’ global antitrust conspiracy 

claim. Over the next 13 months, several letter motions and 

hearings were held on the class certification issue, and the 

District Court certified the DPP class on July 27, 2015. 

During this period, Cephalon, Teva, and Barr settled with the 

DPP class for $512 million on April 17, 2015. A settlement 

 6 Other parties challenging the reverse-payment settlement 

agreements are a putative class of end-payors, generic 

competitor Apotex Inc., several retail plaintiffs, and the 

F.T.C., which originally filed suit in the District Court for the 

District of Colombia before being transferred to Judge 

Goldberg’s docket. The FTC sued only Cephalon. Teva 

purchased Cephalon on October 14, 2011, and on May 18, 

2015, the F.T.C. settled with Teva for $1.2 billion. The 

remaining suits are consolidated for purposes of liability, and 

they have all been stayed pending our ruling on the DPP class 

certification issue. 

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class, which has the exact same composition as the putative 

DPP class at issue here, was also certified on July 27, 2015, 

and the settlement itself was approved by the District Court

on October 15, 2015. Thus, the only defendants remaining at 

the time of the DPP certification decision being appealed

were Ranbaxy and Mylan (collectively “Defendants”).

II. 

Defendants challenge two aspects of the District 

Court’s class certification decision – numerosity and 

predominance. Thus, even though other issues were 

contested at the District Court level, we focus only on the 

District Court’s numerosity analysis under Rule 23(a)(1) and 

its predominance analysis under Rule 23(b)(3). 

Plaintiffs argued before the District Court that the class 

was comprised of twenty-two members. Defendants 

challenged the inclusion of four of these members. Thus, the 

District Court began its numerosity analysis by determining 

the proper class size because “relevant precedent makes 

significant distinctions between classes containing more than 

twenty class members and those containing twenty or fewer.”

King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 309 

F.R.D. 195, 204 (E.D. Pa. 2015). Defendants challenged two 

class members’ inclusion solely for numerosity purposes

because they were partial assignees of two other class 

members. They argued that counting the partial assignees

would essentially allow the DPP class to “double dip” and 

artificially inflate the class size. Defendants next challenged 

the inclusion of a class member that ceased operations prior 

to generic entry actually occurred, arguing that there was no 

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way to know whether it would have actually purchased 

generic modafinil. Lastly, Defendants challenged the class 

status of a class member that only purchased branded Provigil 

from Cephalon after generic modafinil had already entered 

the market. Defendants argued that there was no overcharge 

as a result of this. The District Court rejected all of 

Defendants’ challenges to the class size. Id. at 204-06. 

The District Court next considered whether joinder of 

these twenty-two class members was impracticable such that 

class certification was appropriate under Rule 23(a)(1). 

While the District Court acknowledged that a class of twentytwo members was small compared to most class actions, the 

District Court found persuasive several district court cases in 

the reverse-payment settlement context with similarlysituated classes where the numerosity requirement was found 

to be satisfied. Id. at 204 (collecting cases) 

In analyzing whether joinder was impracticable, the 

District Court examined five factors: “(1) judicial economy, 

(2) geographic dispersion, (3) financial resources of class 

members, (4) the claimant’s ability to institute individual 

suits, and (5) requests for injunctive relief that could affect 

future class members.” Id. at 203-04 (quoting In re 

Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2011 WL 

3563385, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011)). The District Court 

placed great weight on the judicial economy factor, with 

particular emphasis on the late stage of the litigation. 

Specifically, the Court stated: “Considering the extensive 

history of this litigation and the exhaustive discovery that has 

been conducted, . . . judicial economy is best served by 

trying this case as a class action. Joinder of the absent class 

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members would likely require additional rounds of discovery, 

which would only further delay a trial date.” Id. at 206-07. 

Relatedly, the District Court also expressed the 

concern that if the class was not certified at this late date, 

unnamed class members would bring individual suits in other 

jurisdictions instead of seeking to be joined in the suit before 

him. Id. at 207 (“Further, if cases were brought within other 

jurisdictions, additional discovery is certainly a possibility, 

and separate trials could result in inconsistent verdicts.”). 

The other primary factor that the District Court found to 

weigh in favor of numerosity was the geographic dispersion 

of the class members, who were spread out over thirteen 

states and Puerto Rico. Id. 

On the other hand, the Court noted that some factors 

weighed against class certification. First, the class members’ 

vast financial resources weighed against certification, as each 

was a sophisticated corporation. Id. The District Court also 

looked to their incentive to bring individual claims, stating 

that the class members’ ability to bring individual suits 

generally weighed against certification, but equivocating 

somewhat because the six class members with claims below 

$1 million “likely do not have the same incentive to engage in 

costly antitrust litigation on their own.” Id. It is not clear 

what weight was ultimately placed on the parties’ financial 

incentive to bring suit, and the District Court appeared to treat 

this as either a neutral factor or one that weighed in favor of 

Defendants. Ultimately, the District Court held that the 

requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) were satisfied and the class was 

sufficiently numerous such that joinder was impracticable. 

Id.

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The District Court next addressed Defendants’ 

predominance argument that, after the District Court’s grant 

of summary judgment on the global conspiracy claim,

common issues of law and fact did not predominate over 

individualized inquiries under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 209. 

Defendants argued that the damages model of Plaintiffs’ 

expert, Dr. Leitzinger, no longer matched Plaintiffs’ theory of 

liability because it did not isolate the harm caused by each 

individual reverse-payment settlement. Defendants claimed 

that this mismatch is analogous to the problem at issue in the

Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 

S. Ct. 1426 (2013). Related to this argument, Defendants 

relied upon the doctrine of antitrust standing to support the 

view that, in the absence of a global conspiracy, each class 

member would have to show which agreement harmed him, 

and that this would necessarily be an individualized inquiry. 

The District Court rejected these arguments, concluding that 

Plaintiffs had antitrust standing and that the doctrine of joint 

and several liability was appropriate. Thus, it concluded that

Comcast was not controlling because Dr. Leitzinger’s 

damages model “matches Plaintiffs’ remaining theory of 

liability and impact.” Id. at 214. 

III. 

“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 

litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 

named parties only.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In order to justify this exception to 

the rule, “every putative class action must satisfy the four 

requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of either 

Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” Marcus v. BMW of N.A., LLC, 

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687 F.3d 583, 590 (2012). In order to satisfy Rule 23(a), a 

plaintiff must show:

(1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder 

of all members is impracticable” (numerosity); 

(2) there must be “questions of law or fact 

common to the class” (commonality); (3) “the 

claims or defenses of the representative parties” 

must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 

class” (typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs 

must “fairly and adequately protect the interests 

of the class” (adequacy of representation, or 

simply adequacy).

In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). Rule 23(b)(3), which is the 

basis for certification here, “requires that (i) common 

questions of law or fact predominate (predominance), and (ii) 

the class action is the superior method for adjudication 

(superiority).” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 (quoting In re Cmty. 

Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d at 291). “The party seeking 

certification bears the burden of establishing each element of 

Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 

We have held that “the decision to certify a class calls 

for findings by the court, not merely a ‘threshold showing’ by 

a party, that each requirement of Rule 23 is met,” and that 

“[f]actual determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be 

made by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Hydrogen 

Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008). 

In addition, a court “must resolve all factual or legal disputes 

relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the 

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23

merits – including disputes touching on elements of the cause 

of action.” Id. Class certification will thus be “proper only 

‘if the trial court, is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the 

prerequisites’ of Rule 23 are met.” Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. 

of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)); see also Newton 

v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 

166 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A class certification decision requires a 

thorough examination of the factual and legal allegations.”).

Thus, while a district court “possesses broad discretion 

to control proceedings and frame issues for consideration 

under Rule 23,” such discretion “does not soften the rule 

[that] a class may not be certified without a finding that each 

Rule 23 requirement is met.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 

at 310. This is particularly true because, acknowledging the 

practicalities of class litigation, we have said that class 

certification “is often the defining moment in class actions 

(for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part 

of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle 

nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants).” Newton, 

259 F.3d at 162. 

“We review a class certification order for abuse of 

discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 

upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 

of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Hydrogen 

Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although Defendants raise the issue of predominance first, 

the requirements of Rule 23(a) are “threshold requirements,” 

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997), 

and we therefore address them first. 

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A. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) sets forth what is commonly known as 

the numerosity requirement. The text is, however, 

conspicuously devoid of any numerical minimum required for 

class certification. Instead, the rule simply states that the 

numerosity requirement is satisfied when “the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed 

R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “Impracticable does not mean 

impossible,” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 

1993), and refers rather to the difficulties of achieving 

joinder. This calls for an inherently fact-based analysis that 

requires a district court judge to “take into account the 

context of the particular case,” thereby providing district 

courts considerable discretion in making numerosity 

determinations. Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan 

Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014). A district 

court abuses that discretion, however, when it considers 

issues that have no place in the numerosity requirement. 

Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312. In this case, the District 

Court abused its discretion by improperly emphasizing the 

late stage of the proceeding and by not considering the ability 

of individual class members to pursue their cases through the 

use of joinder.7

While “[n]o minimum number of plaintiffs is required 

to maintain a suit as a class action,” our Court has said that 

“generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the 

 7 Despite this conclusion, we recognize the thoughtful work 

of the District Court, which was diligently done even though 

there is a paucity of precedent on the numerosity issue.

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potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of 

Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 

220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 

936 (“[T]he difficulty in joining as few as 40 putative class 

members should raise a presumption that joinder is 

impracticable.”). At the other end of the spectrum, the 

Supreme Court has stated in dicta that a class of fifteen was 

“too small to meet the numerosity requirement.” Gen. Tel. 

Co. of the Nw, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980). 

Leading treatises have collected cases and recognized the 

general rule that “[a] class of 20 or fewer is usually

insufficiently numerous . . . [a] class of 41 or more is usually 

sufficiently numerous . . . . [while] [c]lasses with between 21 

and 40 members are given varying treatment. These midsized classes may or may not meet the numerosity 

requirement depending on the circumstances of each 

particular case.” 5 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s 

Federal Practice § 23.22; see also 5 William B. Rubenstein,

Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12 (“As a general guideline . . . 

a class that encompasses fewer than 20 members will likely 

not be certified absent other indications of impracticability of 

joinder, while a class of 40 or more members raises a 

presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers 

alone.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron 

Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Moore 

favorably). 

At this point, we need not specify a “floor” at which a 

putative class will fail to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 

Instead, we simply note that the number of class members is 

the starting point of our numerosity analysis. Although 

district courts are always under an obligation to ensure that 

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joinder is impracticable, their inquiry into impracticability 

should be particularly rigorous when the putative class 

consists of fewer than forty members. Because the District 

Court certified a class of twenty-two members, which is only 

slightly above the twenty-member floor suggested by the 

leading treatises, we first address Defendants’ challenge to 

the size of the putative class concerning the partial 

assignment of some claims. After determining that the class 

is comprised of twenty-two members, we scrutinize the 

District Court’s numerosity reasoning in this case. Because 

the District Court erred in its analysis of the two most 

important factors applicable here, we see no need to examine 

the other factors and will remand for the District Court to 

again engage in a numerosity inquiry consistent with the 

reasoning in this opinion. 

1. The Size of the Class

The District Court rejected Defendants’ argument that 

two class members should not be included in the class for 

numerosity purposes because they were partial assignees of 

two other class members. If Defendants were correct, the 

class would be comprised of only twenty class members, not 

twenty-two. On the other hand, for the first time on appeal, 

Plaintiffs argue that they have uncovered three more 

assignees of claims, and that the class consists of twenty-five 

members. 

Defendants appear to have abandoned their partial 

assignment argument on appeal, arguing in one sentence that 

“four of the 22 potential class members were improperly 

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included in the class.” Appellant Br. at 48.8 Defendants 

make no reference to case law and rely simply on cursory 

citations to the record. We could, for good reason, deem 

these arguments abandoned and waived on appeal. Kost v. 

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). However, 

because we are remanding the numerosity issue to the District 

Court, we think it appropriate to consider this issue pertaining 

to the size of the class because the partial assignability issue 

impacts whether the three additional class members should be 

included in the class on remand. See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 

F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (“This Court has discretionary 

power to address issues that have been waived.”). 

 8 Defendants raised two other challenges to the size of the 

class before the District Court and in a cursory manner on 

appeal. They argue (1) that named plaintiff King Drug 

Company of Florence, Inc. (“King Drug”) should not be 

included in the class because it went out of business before 

generic modafinil entered the market in 2012, and thus there 

is no way of knowing if it would have even purchased generic 

modafinil, and (2) that Drogueria Betances should not be 

included in the class because all of its brand modafinil 

purchases were made after generic entry. We see no need to 

question the inclusion of these two class members. King 

Drug presented testimony showing that it would have 

purchased generic modafinil instead of Provigil if it had been 

on the market. Similarly, the experts of both parties agreed 

that it takes several months before prices fall to competitive 

levels after generic entry. Because Drogueria Betances made 

its brand modafinil purchases only one month after generic 

entry, it is conceivable that it paid an overcharge. 

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Initially, Defendants’ partial assignment argument 

makes intuitive sense. Why should Plaintiffs be able to take 

one claim and turn it into two for numerosity purposes? How 

is this not a form of “double dipping”? Nevertheless, no 

matter how intuitively appealing this argument may be, it 

lacks legal support. The text of Rule 23(a)(1) says nothing 

about the number of claims; instead, it refers to the number of 

class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring an inquiry 

into whether “the class is so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable” (emphasis added)). 

Moreover, as the District Court recognized, there is 

persuasive circuit precedent establishing that partial assignees 

are appropriately considered to be members of a class. In In 

re Fine Paper Litigation, 632 F.2d 1081, 1089 (3d Cir. 1980), 

the state of Washington was the recipient of partial 

assignments of antitrust claims. It sought to be excluded from 

the settlement class, and the district court held, among other 

reasons for denying the right to opt out, that “the state’s 

assertion of the assigned claims would result in an 

impermissible fragmentation of the . . . causes of action.” Id. 

We reversed and “reject[ed] the defendant’s position that the 

partial assignments improperly fragment the claim.” Id. at 

1090. We looked to section 156 of the Restatement of 

Contracts for guidance and concluded that “[a]n assignment 

of a fractional part of a single and entire right against an 

obligor is operative as if the part had been a separate right.” 

Id. at 1091; Restatement (First) of Contracts § 156 (“An 

assignment of either a fractional part of a single and entire 

right against an obligor . . . is operative as to that part or 

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29

amount to the same extent and in the same manner as if the 

part had been a separate right.”).9

 

At the same time, we held that when the “collective 

right to the entire claim” is split, “the partial assignee may not 

maintain the original suit” unless the obligor has consented in 

order to protect the “right[] of the obligor to be free of 

successive and repeated suits growing out of the same basic 

facts.” In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d at 1091. When the 

obligor does not consent to these separate suits, then these 

rights are protected by the use of the joinder rules or the class 

action mechanism. Id. Thus, the state of Washington could 

be made a party that, unlike other class members, did “not 

have the right to opt out.” Id. In our case, Defendants are 

really seeking the opposite of what we said was permissible 

in Fine Paper Litigation: they want us to say that these two 

partial assignees must proceed independent of the class. 

While Fine Paper Litigation did not address 

numerosity, we consider its reasoning instructive. Crucially, 

we held there that a partial assignment “is operative as if the 

part had been a separate right.” Id. at 1091. Moreover, Fine 

Paper Litigation envisioned the class action mechanism as a 

proper tool for partial assignees to participate in the lawsuit, 

 9

 Nearly identical language is found in the Second 

Restatement of Contracts, which was pending approval at the 

time of In re Fine Paper Litigation. Restatement (Second) of 

Contracts § 326 (“[A]n assignment of a part of a right . . . is 

operative as to that part to the same extent and in the same 

manner as if the part had been a separate right.”).

 

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albeit with fewer individual rights than other claimants. We 

agree with the District Court that, unless there is evidence that 

the class plaintiffs are seeking to artificially inflate the 

number of claimants, partial assignees may properly be

treated as class members. On remand, the District Court will 

need to consider whether the three new assignees that 

Plaintiffs first mention on appeal should be considered as 

class members.10 Thus, at this point, we assume that the class 

consists of twenty-two members. 

2. Impracticability of Joinder

In Marcus, we recognized the three core purposes of 

the numerosity requirement:

 10 Although normally “Rule 23(a)(1) does not require a 

plaintiff to offer direct evidence of the exact number and 

identities of the class members,” Marcus v. BMW of N.A., 

LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 596 (3d Cir. 2012), when the number of 

class members is so small that any deviation may impact the 

district court’s numerosity analysis, plaintiffs must provide 

evidence of each class member’s identity or risk having that 

member not counted. The declaration of the settlement 

administrator that there are three more class members is not 

enough in this case, where we are at the low end of what is 

deemed to be a sufficient number of class members. This is 

particularly true where all assignees – partial or otherwise –

are large corporations whose identity is easily ascertainable. 

On remand, Plaintiffs will need to provide more evidence 

concerning these three potential class members if they wish to 

have them counted for numerosity purposes. 

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First, it ensures judicial economy. It does so by 

freeing federal courts from the onerous rule of 

compulsory joinder inherited from the English 

Courts of Chancery and the law of equity. 

Courts no longer have to conduct a single, 

administratively burdensome action with all 

interested parties compelled to join and be 

present. The impracticability of joinder, or 

numerosity, requirement also promotes judicial 

economy by sparing courts the burden of having 

to decide numerous, sufficiently similar 

individual actions seriatim. As for its second 

objective, Rule 23(a)(1) creates greater access 

to judicial relief, particularly for those persons 

with claims that would be uneconomical to 

litigate individually. Finally, the rule prevents 

putative class representatives and their counsel, 

when joinder can be easily accomplished, from 

unnecessarily depriving members of a small 

class of their right to a day in court to 

adjudicate their own claims.

687 F.3d at 594-95 (internal citations omitted). However, in 

Marcus, we had no need to provide a list of factors that 

should be considered in the numerosity analysis, because it 

was “[m]ere speculation” that anyone other than the named 

plaintiff was a class member. Id. at 596-97. 

 

We have not had occasion to list relevant factors that 

are appropriate for district court judges to consider when 

determining whether joinder would be impracticable. We do 

so now. This non-exhaustive list includes: judicial economy, 

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the claimants’ ability and motivation to litigate as joined 

plaintiffs, the financial resources of class members, the 

geographic dispersion of class members, the ability to identify 

future claimants, and whether the claims are for injunctive 

relief or for damages. See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice

§ 23.22; 5 Newberg on Class Actions § 3.12 (“These factors 

include: judicial economy arising from avoidance of a 

multiplicity of actions, geographic dispersion of class 

members, size of individual claims, financial resources of 

class members, and the ability of claimants to institute 

individual suits.”); Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys., 772 F.3d at 

120 (“However, the numerosity inquiry is not strictly 

mathematical but must take into account the context of the 

particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to 

joinder based on other relevant factors including: (i) judicial 

economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial 

resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue 

separately, and (v) requests for injunctive relief that would 

involve future class members.” (citing Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 

936)). 

These factors are only relevant to a binary choice at 

the certification stage: a class action versus joinder of all 

interested parties. At this point, we do not consider the 

possibility that plaintiffs may bring individual suits. After all, 

the text of Rule 23(a)(1) refers to whether “the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,”11 not 

 11 The superiority analysis required under Rule 23(b)(3) 

similarly calls for an inquiry into judicial economy and places 

great weight on whether the individual members can bring 

their own claims. However, superiority, unlike numerosity, 

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whether the class is so numerous that failing to certify 

presents the risk of many separate lawsuits. 

While all factors are relevant, we note at the outset that 

not all are created equal. Instead, both judicial economy and

the ability to litigate as joined parties are of primary 

importance. As we have held, judicial economy is one of the 

purposes behind Rule 23(a)(1) and class actions in general. 

Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594. The same is true of ensuring that 

small-value claims have a mechanism by which they can be 

economically litigated. Id.; Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank, 

 

considers alternatives to class actions other than joinder. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring an inquiry into whether “a 

class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); In re Warfarin 

Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 533-34 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(“The superiority requirement ‘asks the court to balance, in 

terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action 

against those of alternative available methods of 

adjudication.’” (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales 

Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 

1998))); id. at 534 (finding superiority to be satisfied because 

“there are a potentially large number of class members in this 

matter . . . . [and] each consumer has a very small claim in 

relation to the cost of prosecuting a lawsuit. Thus, from the 

consumers’ standpoint, a class action facilitates spreading of 

the litigation costs among the numerous injured parties and 

encourages private enforcement of the statutes.”). 

Numerosity, of course, is a prerequisite to all class actions, 

while a finding of superiority is necessary only in a (b)(3) 

suit. 

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Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it 

is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the 

traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual 

suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any 

effective redress unless they may employ the class action 

device.”). If we were to say that judicial economy and the 

ability of class members to bring their own suits as named 

parties weighed in favor of class certification, how could the 

other factors outweigh these considerations even though the 

core purposes of a class action were being advanced?12 In 

this case, the District Court’s judicial economy analysis was 

incorrect, as it improperly placed great weight on the late 

stage of the proceeding. Additionally, the District Court did 

not fully explore the ability of class members to join as 

plaintiffs. 

a. Judicial Economy 

Judicial economy, a primary factor frequently cited, 

looks to the administrative burden that multiple or aggregate 

claims place upon the courts. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 

(stating that the numerosity requirement “also promotes 

judicial economy by sparing the courts the burden of having 

 12 The third purpose behind class actions mentioned in 

Marcus, the due process concern of protecting the ability of 

individual members to bring their own claims, Marcus, 687 

F.3d at 594-95, is not present in Rule 23(b)(3) actions where 

members have the right to opt out of the class and where the 

identity of all class members is ascertainable such that there 

will be no difficulties in ensuring that they receive notice of 

the representative action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). 

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to decide numerous, sufficiently similar individual actions 

seriatim”); id. (“Courts no longer have to conduct a single, 

administratively burdensome action with all interested parties 

compelled to join and be present.”). This factor takes into 

account any efficiency considerations regarding the joinder of 

all interested parties that the district court deems relevant, 

including the number of parties and the nature of the action. 

See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.22 (instructing a court 

to consider “the actual, practical difficulties of joining all of 

the potential class members” by inquiring whether joinder 

“would be expensive, time-consuming, and logistically 

unfeasible”). In analyzing judicial economy, we focus on 

whether the class action mechanism is substantially more

efficient than joinder of all parties. 

Here, the District Court “conclude[d] that judicial 

economy [was] best served by trying this case as a class 

action.” King Drug Co., 309 F.R.D. at 206. It made this 

decision by looking to “the extensive history of the litigation 

and the exhaustive discovery that ha[d] been conducted.” Id. 

It expressed concern that further discovery would delay the 

case even more, or that unnamed class members would opt to 

file suit elsewhere, resulting in other civil actions with 

additional discovery and the potential for inconsistent 

verdicts. Id. at 206-07 (“Joinder of the absent class members 

would likely require additional rounds of discovery, which 

would only further delay a trial date. Further, if cases were 

brought within other jurisdictions, additional discovery is 

certainly a possibility.”).

13 While these predictions may 

 13 The dissent does not “read the District Court’s analysis [of 

the judicial economy factor] as turning upon a consideration 

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36

come true, the late stage of litigation is not by itself an 

appropriate consideration to take into account as part of a 

numerosity analysis.14

In complex cases such as this antitrust suit, the class 

certification decision is often delayed until after years of fact 

and expert discovery have been conducted and dispositive 

motions have been litigated. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 

F.3d at 324 (“But even with some limits on discovery and the 

extent of the hearing, the district judge must receive enough 

evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testimony, to be 

satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been met.” 

(quoting In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 

 

of the late stage of the proceeding.” However, this analysis 

consisted of three sentences in a single paragraph, each of 

which focused on the late stage of the proceeding. King Drug 

Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 195, 206-

07 (E.D. Pa. 2015). We also note that the District Court’s 

entire numerosity section spanned three pages, one of which 

is nothing more than a summary of the parties’ arguments.

14 The dissent cites several cases that it claims “recognize that 

it is appropriate for courts to consider the stage of the 

proceedings when weighing judicial economy.” None of 

these cases are class actions though, which we again 

emphasize are the “exception to the usual rule that litigation 

is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 

only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 

(2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 

(1979)).

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41 (2d Cir. 2006))). Courts routinely refuse to certify classes 

based on the need to conduct further discovery before being 

able to properly rule on a class certification motion. See In re 

New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 

F.3d 6, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the district court 

erred in preliminarily certifying the class because of the 

“novelty and complexity of the theories advanced and the 

gaps in the evidence proffered”); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 

Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 

record needed to decide [the class certification] issue remains 

incomplete because the district court improperly denied 

Abbott’s request to conduct so-called ‘downstream 

discovery.’”). However, such decisions do not prejudice a 

plaintiff; the class certification motion is not denied, but only 

deferred until after further discovery is conducted. 

Conversely, a rule that would allow courts to consider 

the late stage of litigation and the sunk costs already incurred

in their numerosity analyses would place a thumb on the scale 

in favor of a numerosity finding for no reason other than the 

fact that the complex nature of a case resulted in the class 

certification decision being deferred for years. Our view is 

consistent with the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c)(1)(A) 

which state that the class certification decision should be 

made “a[t] an early practicable time after a person sues or is 

sued as a class representative” as opposed to the previous rule 

which said that the decision be made “as soon as practicable 

after commencement of an action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 

advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendment (noting that 

the “as soon as practicable” designation does not “capture[] 

the many valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial 

certification decision”). We have recognized that the rule 

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38

was modified in order to discourage “premature certification 

determinations.” Richardson v. Bledsoe, __F.3d__, 2016 WL 

3854216, at *4 (3d Cir. July 15, 2016) (quoting Weiss v. 

Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 347 (3d Cir. 2004)).

15

As the Advisory Committee noted, there are “many 

valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial certification 

decision,” including the need to conduct discovery, a 

determination of what issues would be presented at trial, and 

the defendant’s desire to “win dismissal or summary 

judgment as to the individual plaintiffs without certification 

and without binding the class that might have been certified.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 

amendment. Thus, while Rule 23(c)(1)(A) now encourages 

further discovery so that all of the information and evidence 

relevant to certification is before a district judge before she 

makes the certification decision, the District Court’s analysis 

here would seem to consider any lengthy period following the 

filing of a putative class action as weighing in favor of 

finding numerosity. This cannot be right. Judicial economy 

does not permit consideration of the sunk costs from past 

 15 Weiss was abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald 

Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct.663 (2016). However, its reasoning 

concerning the impropriety of “premature certification 

decisions” was reaffirmed in Richardson, 2016 WL 3854216, 

at *4.

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discovery and litigation, or the need to conduct further 

discovery if the class is not certified.16 

Moreover, while the District Court expressed concern 

that “[j]oinder of the absent class members would likely 

require additional rounds of discovery,” King Drug, 309 

F.R.D. at 206, this does not mean that the litigation would 

have to begin anew for the unnamed class members. If the 

members all opted to join the case as individual plaintiffs, the 

District Court could, in its discretion, limit discovery where 

“is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 

burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(2)(C)(i). At this point, Defendants have not shown 

what further discovery they are entitled to; they only claim 

that they are entitled to further discovery as a matter of due 

process.17 In addition, as a class, Plaintiffs have been using 

 16 The District Court also considered the effects on judicial 

economy if individual suits in separate jurisdictions would be 

filed absent class certification. However, the text of Rule 

23(a)(1) envisions only two scenarios: joinder of all class 

members or a class action. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (inquiring 

whether “joinder of all members is impracticable”). The 

possibility of individual suits filed in separate jurisdictions is 

not a consideration that a district court should entertain in 

deciding numerosity vel non. 

17 In the District Court, Defendants never asked for discovery 

from unnamed class members. Defendants claim that a 

request for discovery of unnamed class members would have 

been futile because it is highly circumscribed. However, the 

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the same experts. It is not clear that there would be a need for 

that to change merely because Plaintiffs would be joined as 

individual parties instead of moving forward as a class. 

On remand, when considering the judicial economy

factor of the numerosity analysis, the District Court should 

not take into account the sunk costs of the litigation or the 

need to further delay trial were the class not to be certified.

18 

 

citations that they provide in support of this view make clear 

that this is merely a heightened standard, and if they could 

show a need for discovery from unnamed class members the 

District Court would allow it. See 5 Moore’s Federal 

Practice § 33.20 (“Reasonable discovery . . . should be 

permitted from unnamed class members when the special 

circumstances of the case justify it.”); Clark v. Universal 

Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 341 (7th Cir. 1974) (“The taking 

of depositions of absent class members is – as is true of 

written interrogatories – appropriate in special 

circumstances.”). 

18 The dissent suggests that we proclaim this rule “without 

any citation to authority.” Of course, our dissenting colleague

fails to provide any citation to authority to support a contrary 

rule. In fact, the only authorities that we can find to support 

the dissent’s position are the District Court’s opinion in this 

case, and another district court opinion from the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania upon which the District Court here 

relied, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2011 

WL 3563385, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011). This is a 

matter of first impression for any court of appeals. Indeed, 

our Court has never even identified the factors that a district 

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41

In other words, without considering the late stage of the 

litigation, it should determine whether a class action would 

have been a substantially more efficient mechanism of 

litigating this suit than joinder of all parties. This primarily 

involves considerations of docket control, taking into account 

practicalities as simple as that of every attorney making an 

appearance on the record. At the same time, the District 

Court is free to rely on its superior understanding of how the 

case has proceeded to date for the purpose of determining 

whether the class mechanism would have actually been a 

substantially more efficient use of judicial resources than 

joinder of the parties at the onset of the litigation.

b. Ability and Motivation to be Joined as 

Plaintiffs

The second purpose behind the numerosity 

requirement is to further the broader class action goal of 

providing those with small claims reasonable access to a 

 

court should consider in its numerosity analysis despite the 

dissent’s assertion that the District Court in this case 

“properly considered every factor we have ever held to be 

relevant” in this analysis. We cannot abdicate our 

responsibility to conduct a de novo review of legal issues. 

See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 

312 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that although class 

certification decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, 

“[w]hether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an 

issue of law to be reviewed de novo” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)).

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judicial forum for the resolution of those claims. Thus, the 

ability and motivation of Plaintiffs to pursue their litigation 

via joinder is the second factor upon which we focus. See 

Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (stating that the numerosity 

requirement “creates greater access to judicial relief, 

particularly for those persons with claims that would be 

uneconomical to litigate individually”).19 

This primarily20 involves an examination of the stakes 

at issue for the individual claims and the complexity of the 

litigation, which will typically correlate with the costs of 

pursuing these claims. Though joinder is certainly more 

 19 We read Marcus’s language about the ability “to litigate 

individually,” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594, to refer to each 

plaintiff appearing on the record as a joined party, and not 

whether each individual plaintiff can litigate his or her own 

claim as the sole plaintiff. While the latter concern is 

certainly a policy justification for the class device generally, 

as we emphasize, Rule 23(a)(1) requires only the binary 

choice between class actions and joinder of all parties. 

20 Other considerations may be relevant to a district court in 

determining class members’ ability and motivation to be 

joined as named plaintiffs. For example, the District Court 

here recognized that a fear of retaliation may hinder the 

ability and motivation of a party to appear as a named 

plaintiff. In this case, the District Court noted that there was

no proof of any fear of retaliation, and we do not disturb that 

factual finding on appeal. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. 

Cephalon, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 195, 207 (E.D. Pa. 2015).

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43

economical for most plaintiffs than pursuing the case alone, it 

is often still uneconomical for an individual with a negative 

value claim to join a lawsuit.21 After all, each plaintiff may 

need to hire his own counsel to protect his individual interests 

– although total litigation costs would still likely be lower due 

to joint litigation agreements. Similarly, each plaintiff would 

be subject to discovery, whereas the defendants would have 

to show a greater need for discovery from unnamed plaintiffs 

in a class action.22 See Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 

F.2d 324, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1974) (placing the burden on 

defendants to show the need for discovery from unnamed 

class members to ensure that the discovery is not requested 

“as a tactic to take undue advantage of the class members or 

as a stratagem to reduce the number of claimants” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

The District Court did not properly consider this 

factor, as it focused instead on whether the individual 

 21 A negative value claim is a “claim[] that could not be 

brought on an individual basis because the transaction costs 

of bringing an individual action exceed the potential relief.” 

In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 

2013). 

22 While discovery from joined parties is not subject to the 

heightened discovery standard of unnamed class members, 

even in a non-class action a district court has the discretion to 

limit unnecessary discovery pursuant to Rule 26(b)(C). 

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44

plaintiffs could have brought their own, individual suits.23 

However, the numerosity rule does not envision the 

 23 The dissent contends that we misread the District Court’s 

analysis, and argues that “the focus of the District Court’s 

opinion is on joinder throughout.” Yet every reference to 

joinder that the dissent cites comes from portions of the 

District Court opinion that were not about the ability of the 

plaintiffs to litigate via joinder. Instead, these references are:

“[j]oinder of the absent class members would likely require 

additional rounds of discovery,” which appears in the judicial 

economy section; “[t]he considerable geographic dispersion 

of the parties would certainly present challenges to plaintiffs 

in attempting to coordinate the litigation if all class members 

were joined,” which obviously is in the geographic dispersion 

section; and “Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the parties are sufficiently 

numerous so as to make joinder impracticable,” which is in 

the conclusion of the numerosity analysis. Even a cursory 

look at the section on the ability and incentive of the class 

members to litigate reveals that the District Court was 

focused on the alternative of individual suits, not on joinder. 

See King Drug, 309 F.R.D. at 207 (“Two factors that may 

weigh against Plaintiffs are the financial resources of the class 

members and the parties’ abilities to bring individual suits.”) 

(emphasis added); id. (“These prospective class members 

likely do not have the same incentive to engage in costly 

antitrust litigation on their own.”) (emphasis added). To the 

extent that the District Court did properly consider the 

alternative of joinder, as the dissent contends, on remand the 

District Court has the opportunity to more clearly state this 

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45

alternative of individual suits; it considers only the alternative 

of joinder. Here, the class members, based on the record 

before us, appear likely to have the ability and incentive to 

bring suit as joined parties, thus preventing the alleged 

wrongdoers from escaping liability.24 In fact, three class 

 

when it conducts its rigorous numerosity analysis. At this 

point, the references to “individual suits” and “on their own” 

prominently stand out when surrounded by the references to 

“joinder” in the other sections. 

24 Most of the dissent’s possible reasons why the class 

members would not be likely to join as named plaintiffs –

“desire to have one’s self and own law firm control the 

litigation, choice of favorable forum, familiarity with the 

local jurisdictions laws and procedures, [and] fear of being 

dragged into settlement” – are equally applicable to the 

decision of whether to opt out of the class. See Phillips 

Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985) (discussing 

the importance of allowing opt outs because if a “plaintiff’s 

claim is sufficiently large or important that he wishes to 

litigate it on his own, he will likely have retained an attorney 

or have thought about filing suit, and should be fully capable 

of exercising his right to ‘opt out’”). Moreover, these reasons 

do not show why joinder is “impracticable”; they simply 

show that joinder may not be the preferred method of 

proceeding with the case. If a plaintiff wants to proceed 

individually, it has that choice. The plaintiff does not need to 

join the suit – just as it need not remain a member of a 

certified class – if it wants to control its own litigation, 

choose a more favorable forum, select a jurisdiction whose 

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46

members, none of whom are named plaintiffs, each have 

claims estimated at over $1 billion – even before the trebling 

of damages. These three make up over 97% of the total value 

of the class claims, and can hardly be considered as 

candidates who need the aggregative advantages of the class 

device. While this factor could weigh in favor of class status 

if the remaining class members had very small claims, that is 

simply not the case here. Thirteen of the other nineteen class 

members have claims that are greater than $1 million, the 

value that the two parties seem to agree is the appropriate 

figure at which point bringing one’s own suit becomes 

economical. On the other hand, there are only six class 

members with claims below $1 million each. While it may be 

uneconomical for these claims to be pursued in individual 

litigation, there has been no showing that it would be 

uneconomical for these six class members to be individually 

joined as parties in a traditional lawsuit. On remand, the 

District Court should consider this issue. Even if it were 

uneconomical for some or all of these six individual plaintiffs 

to join the suit, the District Court must still determine 

whether, considering all the other relevant factors, class status 

– which is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 

 

laws and procedures it is familiar with, or avoid being 

dragged into a settlement. Cf. In re Diet Drugs Prods. 

Liability Litig., 369 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2004) (“By 

waiving an initial opt-out, the class member surrenders what 

may be valuable rights, in return for countervailing 

benefits.”). 

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conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 

only,” Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 348 – is appropriate here.

The District Court abused its discretion in analyzing

the two most important numerosity factors when it considered 

the late stage of the litigation as relevant to the judicial 

economy factor and failed to properly consider the ability and 

motivation of the plaintiffs to proceed as joined, as opposed 

to individual, parties. We therefore remand for the District 

Court to conduct a rigorous numerosity analysis for this class 

of twenty-two (or twenty-five) members. In conducting this 

rigorous analysis, factors that the District Court may consider 

include the financial resources of the class members, the 

geographic dispersion of the class members, the ability to 

identify future claimants, together with the fact that these 

claims are for damages, and not injunctive relief. 

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we are not 

“erecting roadblocks that do not exist.” Although the dissent 

suggests that Defendants have not yet shown why joinder is 

practicable, that suggestion is beside the point. The burden is 

on Plaintiffs to show why joinder is impracticable. Marcus, 

687 F.3d at 591 (“The party seeking certification bears the 

burden of establishing each element of Rule 23” – including 

the numerosity requirement – “by a preponderance of the 

evidence.”); id. at 595 (“Critically, numerosity—like all Rule 

23 requirements—must be proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence.”). Moreover, the dissent would have Defendants’ 

inability to articulate an argument against finding numerosity 

obviate a district court’s obligation to conduct “a rigorous 

analysis” and determine “that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 

have been satisfied.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (internal 

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48

quotation marks omitted); Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 

310 (“[A] class may not be certified without a finding that 

each Rule 23 requirement is met.”).

Finally, the dissent makes the extravagant claim that 

“nothing about [this case] cries out for anything but class 

treatment.” Yet this is not the typical class action where 

hundreds or thousands of claims are aggregated in order to 

ensure that the wrongdoer is held accountable and that small 

claims are vindicated. See Thorogood, 547 F.3d at 744. 

Putting aside the small number of class members in this case, 

the judges in the majority have never seen a class action 

where three class members, each with billions of dollars at 

stake and close to 100% of the total value of class claims

between them, have been allowed to sit on the sidelines as 

unnamed class members. Plaintiffs must satisfy their burden 

of showing why we should allow this unique putative class to 

take advantage of this “exception to the usual rule that 

litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 

named parties only.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). At this point, they have failed to 

meet that burden, and any suggestion that this is a run-of-themill class action ignores the facts of this case.25 

 25 The dissent makes the argument that if the class were not 

certified, then several individual judges would have to 

address what it terms “the real issues before the Court.” Yet 

the only other issue before the Court is the Comcast 

predominance issue. If the class were not certified because of 

a failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement, there would 

be no Comcast argument, as predominance is a question that 

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B. Predominance. 

Although we remand for the District Court to 

reconsider its numerosity analysis, we also see a need to 

address Defendants’ predominance argument. This argument 

makes selective use of language from the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 

(2013). The interpretation of Comcast advanced by 

Defendants is overly broad and simplistic, and, if the class 

were to meet the numerosity requirement on remand, the 

predominance argument advanced by Defendants is 

untenable. 

Under Rule 23(b)(3), “questions of law or fact 

common to class members [must] predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members.”26 This 

“inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently 

cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem 

Prods., 521 U.S. at 623. “If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s 

predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 

23(a),” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432, as it is “[f]ramed for 

situations in which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly 

 

arises only in the class action context. Additionally, the fact 

that there is a “key issue” that the parties seek to litigate does 

not justify class status. 

26 Rule 23(b)(3) also states that “a class action [must be] 

superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 

adjudicating the controversy.” This second requirement –

superiority – is not at issue in this appeal. 

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called for’ as it is in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations.” 

Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 

advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment). This 

“inquiry is especially dependent upon the merits of a 

plaintiff’s claim, since the nature of the evidence that will 

suffice to resolve a question determines whether the question 

is common or individual.” In re Constar Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 

585 F.3d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n individual 

question is one where members of a proposed class will need 

to present evidence that varies from member to member, 

while a common question is one where the same evidence 

will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing 

[or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” 

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 

(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The predominance requirement applies to damages as 

well, because the efficiencies of the class action mechanism 

would be negated if “[q]uestions of individual damage 

calculations . . . overwhelm questions common to the class.” 

Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. This does not mean, however,

that damages must be “susceptible of measurement across the 

entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” Neale v. Volvo 

Cars of N.A., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 374 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the 

predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). They make two 

interrelated arguments: (1) Plaintiffs’ theory of liability runs 

afoul of Comcast because, after the grant of summary 

judgment on the global conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs’ damages 

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model no longer corresponds to their remaining theory of 

liability that there were four independent Section 1 

conspiracies; and (2) predominance cannot be demonstrated 

because Plaintiffs’ remaining theory of liability must isolate 

the harm that each individual reverse-payment settlement 

agreement caused each individual class member under the 

doctrine of antitrust standing.27 

1. Comcast Argument 

Comcast was an antitrust suit brought by a class of 

Comcast subscribers. The plaintiffs initially had four theories 

 27 Plaintiffs argue that we should exercise our pendent 

appellate jurisdiction and review the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment on the global antitrust conspiracy claim 

because reversal on this claim would moot the Comcast issue. 

The use of the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine “is an 

exercise of discretion by a Court of Appeals and should be 

used sparingly.” United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 287 

(3d Cir. 1988). If we were to reverse on the Comcast issue, 

we would deem it prudent to examine the global antitrust 

conspiracy claim. However, because we would affirm on 

predominance grounds, we do not deem the class certification 

order and the summary judgment order to be so “inextricably 

intertwined” that the exercise of our pendent appellate 

jurisdiction would be appropriate. CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. 

v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we express 

no view on the merits of Plaintiffs’ global antitrust conspiracy 

claim. 

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of antitrust impact: (1) “Comcast’s clustering made it 

profitable for Comcast to withhold local sports programming 

from its competitors”; (2) “Comcast’s activities reduced the 

level of competition from ‘overbuilders’”; (3) “Comcast 

reduced the level of ‘benchmark’ competition on which cable 

customers rely to compare prices”; and (4) “clustering 

increased Comcast’s bargaining power relative to content 

providers.” 133 S. Ct. at 1430-31. Their damages model “did 

not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust 

impact,” id. at 1431, and simply “assumed the validity of all 

four theories of antitrust impact,” id. at 1434. The district 

court limited its certification order to the overbuilding theory 

because it was the only antitrust theory capable of classwide 

proof, but found the predominance requirement to be satisfied 

even though the damages model was not altered to reflect the 

only theory of harm remaining. Id. at 1431. A divided panel 

of our Court affirmed, Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 

182 (3d Cir. 2011), with Judge Jordan writing separately to 

say that he “would vacate the certification order to the extent 

it provides for a single class as to proof of damages,” id. at 

209 (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 

dissenting in part), because the model of plaintiffs’ expert “no 

longer fits Plaintiffs’ sole theory of antitrust impact, and, 

instead, produces damages calculations that are not the certain 

result of the wrong,” id. at 217 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the 

damages model does not need to be exact, “a model 

purporting to serve as evidence of damages in [a] class action 

must measure only those damages attributable to that theory. 

If the model does not even attempt to do that, it cannot 

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possibly establish that damages are susceptible of 

measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 

23(b)(3).” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. Because the 

plaintiffs’ damages model reflected injury from all four 

alleged antitrust violations, and because only the overbuilding

theory of harm remained, the damages model was unable to 

“bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in 

general and supra-competitive prices attributable to the 

deterrence of overbuilding.” Id. at 1435. The Supreme Court 

explained “[p]rices whose level above what an expert deems 

‘competitive’ has been caused by factors unrelated to an 

accepted theory of antitrust harm are not ‘anticompetitive’ in 

any sense relevant here.” Id. 

In the case before us, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Leitzinger, 

created a damages model that calculated the savings to the 

class if generic entry had occurred earlier. He noted the 

prices and overcharges actually paid by the class members 

and compared that to but-for worlds that included the launch 

of anywhere between one and five generic competitors. 

Crucially, this model did not allocate damages amongst the 

five original defendants (Cephalon and the four generic 

manufacturers), attribute a certain amount of harm from each 

individual reverse-payment settlement, or identify which class 

members were harmed by which reverse-payment settlement. 

In Defendants’ view, because only individual conspiracies 

remain, any damages model must reflect the harm caused by 

each individual conspiracy to each individual class member,

and the use of the same damages model that envisioned a 

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global conspiracy “does not even attempt,” Id. at 1433, to 

correspond to this remaining theory of liability.

28 

However, Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is not that each 

individual agreement caused an individual harm, such that a 

new damages model would be required under Comcast. 

Instead, their theory of liability is that each individual 

agreement contributed to the market-wide harm, and that all 

five original defendants are jointly and severally liable29 for 

this harm as concurrent tortfeasors. This theory may 

ultimately be proven wrong, but it does match Plaintiffs’

damages theory. Defendants next try to argue that Plaintiffs’ 

theory of liability must isolate the harm from each individual 

 28 Defendants have not challenged the substance of Dr. 

Leitzinger’s methodology. 

29 Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, “[i]f the 

tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal 

cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to 

liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their 

conduct is concurring or consecutive.” Restatement (Second) 

of Torts § 879 (1979); United States v. Alcan Aluminum 

Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying the 

doctrine of joint and several liability to an environmental 

statute when the harm was indivisible amongst the 

tortfeasors). The Third Restatement of Torts provides no 

guidance. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of 

Liability § 17 (stating that “the law of the applicable 

jurisdiction determines whether” whether concurrent 

tortfeasors “are jointly and severally liable”).

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agreement, and that any reliance on joint and several liability 

conflicts with the requirements of antitrust standing. 

2. Antitrust Impact

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are attempting to 

circumvent the doctrine of antitrust standing by asserting the

theory of joint and several liability. In essence, they are 

arguing that the joint and several theory of liability is not 

“plausible in theory,” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 325, 

because under the doctrine of antitrust standing Plaintiffs 

must show how each individual agreement harmed each 

individual class member. 

In an antitrust class action, “impact often is critically 

important for the purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)’s 

predominance requirement because it is an element of the 

claim that may call for individual, as opposed to common, 

proof.” Id. at 311. A district court must thus undertake a 

“rigorous assessment of the available evidence and the 

method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the 

evidence to prove impact at trial.” Id. at 312. The class 

should only be certified “if such impact is plausible in theory 

[and] it is also susceptible to proof at trial through available 

evidence common to the class.” Id. at 325. This inquiry 

often involves an overlap into the merits. Id. at 324. 

Defendants argue that, in the absence of the global 

conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs must prove which class members 

suffered an injury under a specific bilateral agreement. They 

state that under the doctrine of antitrust standing, a class 

member who would have purchased generic modafinil from 

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56

Ranbaxy cannot hold Mylan liable; a class member who 

would have purchased generic modafinil from Mylan cannot 

hold Ranbaxy liable; and a class member who would have 

purchased generic modafinil from Teva cannot hold either 

Ranbaxy or Mylan liable. If correct, such individualized 

inquiries would defeat predominance, and Plaintiffs’ joint and 

several liability theory would not be plausible. We agree with 

the general proposition that an antitrust plaintiff cannot defeat 

the doctrine of antitrust standing by resort to common-law 

tort principles untethered to antitrust law. But Defendants’ 

objection is misplaced in this case because the common law 

principle of joint and several liability is being invoked by 

Plaintiffs for the proper purpose of establishing antitrust 

impact and therefore antitrust standing. 

The doctrine of antitrust standing requires a plaintiff to 

“prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence 

in the market.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,

429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).30 This inquiry instead looks to 

whether the plaintiff suffered an antitrust injury, i.e., an 

 30 Antitrust standing, unlike Article III standing, is not a 

jurisdictional requirement. Associated Gen. Contractors of 

Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 

535 n.31 (1983) (“Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient 

to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in 

fact, but the court must make a further determination whether 

the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust 

action.”); Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 

223, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing antitrust standing as a 

prudential limitation that “does not affect the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the court, as Article III standing does”).

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“injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent 

and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts 

unlawful.” Id. In Associated General Contractors of 

California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters

(AGC), 459 U.S. 519, 537-38 (1983), the Supreme Court 

stated that many factors go into this determination. We have 

condensed these factors into a multi-part test:

(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 

violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 

intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 

neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) 

whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the 

type for which the antitrust laws were intended 

to provide redress; (3) the directness of the 

injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 

application of standing principles might 

produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 

more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 

violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 

recovery or complex apportionment of 

damages.

Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 232-33 

(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 

Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993)). We 

have said that the “directness of injury” is “the focal point by 

which the remainder of the AGC factors are guided.” Lower 

Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1166 n.19 (citing Holmes v. Sec. 

Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992)). 

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Defendants rely solely on a pre-AGC case of ours, 

Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 

F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979), which concerned the “all-important[]

directness factor,” in support of their position that Plaintiffs 

lack antitrust standing to bring claims against generic 

manufacturers from whom they would not have purchased. 

Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1167-68 (conducting an 

analysis of the AGC factors and discussing Midwest-Paper in 

the directness of injury section).31 In Mid-West Paper, the 

plaintiff claimed that it “suffered as a direct purchaser of 

consumer bags from competitors of the defendants, who 

allegedly were able to charge artificially inflated prices as a 

consequence of defendants’ price-fixing.” 596 F.2d at 580

(footnote omitted). We held that the plaintiff, who was not a 

customer of any member of the conspiracy, lacked antitrust 

standing to sue the conspiracy members even though it paid 

higher prices as a result of the conspiracy. In other words, the 

customer of a competitor of conspiracy members was not 

“one whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the 

antitrust laws.” Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In reaching this conclusion in Mid-West Paper, we 

took several factors into consideration. First, we noted that it 

would be “almost impossible, and at the very least unwieldy” 

to calculate the harm to the plaintiff from the conspiracy, 

because so many variables went into the competitor’s price 

 31 Because the parties only dispute the relevance of Mid-West 

Paper and the “directness” factor, and we reject Defendants’ 

understanding of Mid-West Paper, we will not analyze the 

other factors of antitrust standing.

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59

calculation irrespective of the existence of the monopoly. Id.

at 584. The value of any harm caused by the anticompetitive 

conduct would be speculative and “would transform this 

antitrust litigation into the sort of complex economic 

proceeding” that the direct-purchaser rule32 was adopted in 

part to prevent. Id. at 585. In addition, the defendants were 

“not in a direct or immediate relationship” to the plaintiff, and 

they gained no advantage from the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 

583. Moreover, there was another group of victims who were 

more likely to sue the conspiracy members – those who 

purchased directly from them – and one of the purposes of the 

antitrust standing doctrine is to “compensate[] those victims 

who are most likely to assume the mantle of private attorneys 

general for the injuries that they suffered.” Id. at 585. For 

that reason, we “concentrate[] the entire award in the hands of 

the direct purchasers in all but unusual circumstances and 

thereby giv[e] them an incentive to sue.” Id. If we were to 

allow the customer of a competitor to sue for treble damages 

when the “causal link to defendants’ activities is [so] 

tenuous,” it would “subject antitrust violators to potentially 

ruinous liabilities, well in excess of their illegally-earned 

profits, because . . . [violators] would be held accountable for 

higher prices that arguably ensued in the entire industry.” Id.

at 586. 

 32 The direct-purchaser rule states that only immediate 

customers of a supplier have antitrust standing to sue for 

damages as customers even if the direct purchaser passes the 

entirety of the higher price down the supply chain. Illinois 

Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977)

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As is clear from the above description, Defendants’

argument that Mid-West Paper means that a customer of a 

non-defendant cannot have antitrust standing is an 

oversimplification. Mid-West Paper reached its result 

because it wanted to ensure that only those who are most 

directly harmed by the anticompetitive conduct can sue to 

remedy the antitrust violation. When, as in Mid-West Paper, 

the anticompetitive conduct is price-fixing, the only 

customers who will have antitrust standing are the direct 

customers of the conspiracy members. The case before us is

not about price-fixing. It is, instead, a case about market 

exclusion, as it concerns conduct that prevents a competitive 

market from forming at all.

33 In such a scenario all market 

customers should have antitrust standing to sue those engaged 

in the allegedly anticompetitive conduct because all suffer 

equally from the foreclosure of choice. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 

538 (“[T]he Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the 

benefits of price competition, and our prior cases have 

emphasized the central interest in protecting the economic 

freedom of participants in the relevant market.”). 

In fact, in Lower Lake Erie, we addressed market 

exclusion in the market for the unloading of iron ore from 

ships. Traditionally, iron ore was shipped across the Great 

 33 Preventing a market from forming differs from an attempt 

to suppress competition in an established market. See Blue 

Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483 (1982) (stating 

that, in a conspiracy to suppress competition in the 

psychotherapy market by restricting access to psychologists 

(as opposed to psychiatrists), customers of the psychologists 

would only be indirectly injured). 

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Lakes, unloaded at railroad-owned docks onto a railroad, and 

then transported to the steel mills. Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d

at 1153-55. Large cranes called “huletts” were affixed to the 

docks and were needed to unload the iron ore from the ships, 

and, because the non-railroad-owned docks were not 

equipped with huletts, they “were not competitors for this 

segment of the ore business.” Id. at 1153. A new, less 

expensive technology was developed that would allow the 

iron ore to be unloaded without the use of huletts, and thus 

open the transshipment market to non-railroad-owned docks. 

Id. The railroad companies suppressed this new technology 

by threatening non-railroad-owned docks with higher rates, 

among other measures. Id. 

The issue of antitrust standing arose when the steel 

companies sued the railroad companies for higher rates paid 

to the vessel companies. Id. at 1167. We held that this injury 

was sufficiently direct, despite the railroad company’s 

reliance on Mid-West Paper. Specifically, we noted that even 

though the steel companies paid higher rates than it otherwise 

would have to several ore transportation companies – both 

defendants and non-defendants – “it was unquestionably the 

steel companies who bore the brunt of the increased costs 

attributed to the railroad’s agreement to thwart development 

of the less expensive technology.” Id. at 1168; id. (“The steel 

companies were the sole customers of the industry involved 

in the transshipment of ore; indeed, the industry existed for 

them.”). Although there were other victims of the harm, such 

as the vessel companies, the dock companies, and trucking 

companies, this did “not diminish the directness of the steel 

companies’ injury.” Id. at 1168-69. 

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Unlike in Mid-West Paper, where there was a market 

for consumer bags and we knew who was buying from whom, 

there was no market in this case due to Defendants’ allegedly 

anticompetitive conduct in delaying the availability of generic 

modafinil. Just as the railroad docks and their older, more 

expensive technology were the steel companies’ only choice 

in Lower Lake Erie, Cephalon’s brand-name version of 

modafinil – Provigil – was the only option available to the 

DPP class. All other options were prevented from entering 

the market by the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of the 

railroad companies and the drug manufacturers, respectively. 

Under Plaintiffs’ theory, each of the four generic 

manufacturers allegedly entered into separate anticompetitive 

arrangements with Cephalon.

34 If any one of them had 

 34 Defendants argue that either Teva – as the first company to 

settle with Cephalon – or Barr – as the last to do so – caused 

all of the injury, and that Mylan or Ranbaxy cannot be held 

liable. While we have delved deep into the merits in order to 

opine on the predominance question, this argument by 

Defendants is inappropriate at the class certification stage. It 

has nothing to do with whether common questions of law and 

fact predominate, and instead goes to the issue of liability. 

See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 

(2015) (“When, as here, ‘the concern about the proposed class 

is not that it exhibits some fatal dissimilarity but, rather, a 

fatal similarity—[an alleged] failure of proof as to an element 

of the plaintiffs’ cause of action—courts should engage that 

question as a matter of summary judgment, not class 

certification.’” (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class 

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63

refused to enter into this arrangement, there would have been 

no antitrust injury for anyone, as the market would have 

worked as envisioned by the Hatch-Waxman Act: there 

would have been between one and five generic manufacturers 

competing with the brand-name modafinil during the 180-day 

exclusivity period, after which there would have been a fully 

competitive market. However, because all four entered into 

these reverse-payment settlement agreements and prevented a 

competitive market from forming, each contributed to the

market-wide harm, and each can be held jointly and severally 

liable for such harm. This is not the sum of four separate 

individual harms emanating from each agreement; instead, it 

is a harm that all four agreements work jointly to produce, 

even if there was no conspiracy between the generic 

manufacturers. The class member who would have purchased 

from Teva is harmed by the Ranbaxy and Mylan agreements 

to the same extent that a Ranbaxy or Mylan customer would 

be. Thus, any class member would have antitrust standing to 

sue any or all of the four generic companies individually. 

There is no need to pursue an individualized inquiry into the 

harm caused by each agreement, and “questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

Defendants’ attempt to dictate Plaintiffs’ theory of liability 

based on the doctrine of antitrust standing should fail. 

IV. 

 

Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 

Rev. 97, 107 (2009)). 

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64

For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the 

District Court’s class certification order, and we will remand 

to the District Court for further consideration of whether 

joinder of all class members is impracticable. 

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1

In re: Modafinil Antitrust Litigation

No. 15-3475

RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part.

Today, the Majority concludes that the able District 

Court judge abused his discretion by purportedly focusing on 

a consideration that we have never—indeed, by my research, 

no court has ever—stated it should not consider. How can that 

be? Furthermore, how can it be that the Majority

mischaracterizes the late stage of the proceedings as being the 

focus of Judge Goldberg’s ruling when his reasoning actually 

focuses on the considerations that our case law dictates it

should? Also how can it be that in analyzing judicial 

economy district courts are prohibited from considering the 

stage of the proceedings? I am perplexed. I am similarly 

perplexed as to why the Majority is directing the District 

Court on remand to figure out whether joinder is practicable 

when the appellants have failed to make that case themselves. 

I therefore respectfully dissent from part III.A of the 

Majority’s opinion. 

The District Court Correctly Applied Rule 23(a)(1)

The text of Rule 23(a)(1) provides the standard by 

which a district court determines if a putative class is 

numerous enough to be certified—the district court must 

determine if “joinder of all members is impracticable.” See 

also Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 (5th ed.) (“[Rule 

23(a)(1)’s] core requirement is that joinder be 

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2

impracticable.”). Because the focus of Rule 23(a)(1) is on the 

practicability of joinder, it is well-established that “[t]he

numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific 

facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. 

Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980); see 

also Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2001)

(“No minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain a 

suit as a class action . . . .”); Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 

(“Numerousness—the presence of many class members—

provides an obvious situation in which joinder may be 

impracticable, but it is not the only such situation; thus, Rule 

23(a)(1)’s analysis may, in specific circumstances, focus on 

other factors as well.”). In examining the “specific facts of 

each case,” Gen. Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 330, we have instructed 

courts to bear in mind the underpinnings of the numerosity 

requirement. The first of these is “judicial economy by 

sparing courts the burden of having to decide numerous, 

sufficiently similar individual actions seriatim.” Marcus v. 

BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012). The 

second is “greater access to judicial relief, particularly for 

those persons with claims that would be uneconomical to 

litigate individually.” Id.1

Here, the District Court, after making a careful finding 

that the putative class consisted of 22 members, had to make 

a close call. Our cases have recognized that “[w]hile there are 

 1 As the Majority notes, the third underpinning, to

“prevent[] putative class representatives and their counsel, 

when joinder can be easily accomplished, from unnecessarily 

depriving members of a small class of their right to a day in 

court to adjudicate their own claims,” id., is not relevant to 

23(b)(3) actions. See Majority Op. 34 n.12. 

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3

exceptions, numbers under twenty-one have generally been 

held to be too few.” Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 808

n.35 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting 3B J. Moore, Moore’s Federal 

Practice ¶ 23.05[1], at 23–150 (2d ed. 1982)). This 

recognition, however, does not stem from any mechanical

numerical requirement, but rather from an understanding that 

the considerations bearing on the practicability of joinder are 

less likely to be met in classes with fewer than 21 members. 

See Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 (“Numerousness—the 

presence of many class members—provides an obvious 

situation in which joinder may be impracticable, but it is not 

the only such situation; thus, Rule 23(a)(1)’s analysis may, in 

specific circumstances, focus on other factors as well.”).

Recognizing the closeness of the issue, the District Court did 

exactly as we have instructed it to do and looked to factors

bearing on the objectives we cited in Marcus.

2 Indeed, the 

District Court examined the very factors that the Majority

embraces: judicial economy, the geographic dispersion of 

class members, the claimants’ ability and motivation to 

litigate as joined plaintiffs, and the financial resources of 

class members. 

The District Court first considered whether judicial 

economy weighs in favor of finding joinder to be 

impracticable:

 2 The Majority asserts that the factors we should 

consider have not been previously set forth. But Marcus’s 

recitation of the policies that animate numerosity provides a 

helpful standard from which the factors to consider are 

readily discernible. 

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4

Considering the extensive history of this 

litigation and the exhaustive discovery that has 

been conducted, I conclude that judicial 

economy is best served by trying this case as a 

class action. Joinder of the absent class 

members would likely require additional rounds 

of discovery, which would only further delay a 

trial date. Further, if cases were brought within 

other jurisdictions, additional discovery is 

certainly a possibility, and separate trials could 

result in inconsistent verdicts.

JA-021. The reasons cited for finding judicial economy to 

favor certification of the class are entirely appropriate. 

“Judicial economy” means “[e]fficiency in the operation of 

the courts and the judicial system; esp., the efficient 

management of litigation so as to minimize duplication of 

effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s time and 

resources.” Judicial Economy, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th 

ed. 2009). The District Court here noted that the additional 

discovery and potential separate trials would further delay 

litigation that was already near its end stages, wasting the 

judiciary’s time and resources and requiring the duplication 

of efforts.

The District Court next considered the geographic 

dispersion of the class members, a factor widely recognized 

as vital in determining whether joinder is practicable. See, 

e.g., Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 

772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (listing “geographic 

dispersion” as a factor in the numerosity analysis); Newberg 

on Class Actions § 3:12 (same); 7A Charles Allen Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1762 (3d 

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5

ed.) (same); 1 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.22 (Matthew 

Bender 3d ed.) (same). The District Court found this factor to 

weigh heavily in favor of finding joinder impracticable, 

noting that the “class members are spread out over thirteen 

states and Puerto Rico.” JA-021. This, the District Court 

found, “would certainly present challenges to Plaintiffs in 

attempting to coordinate the litigation if all class members 

were joined, particularly if additional discovery was 

required.” JA-021. Again, this finding is certainly reasonable, 

is supported by the record, and is in accordance with our 

instructions as to the relevant considerations in the 

numerosity calculation. 

Against these concerns about judicial economy and, in 

particular, geographic dispersion, the District Court 

considered that many of the class members were sophisticated 

corporations with strong incentives to bring their own 

lawsuits. But this was not true for every class member, as six

had claims below $1 million which might not be enough 

incentive “to engage in costly antitrust litigation on their 

own.” JA-022. This wholly appropriate consideration bears 

upon the objective to provide “greater access to judicial relief, 

particularly for those persons with claims that would be 

uneconomical to litigate individually.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 

594. 

Ultimately, the District Court found the factors 

favoring the plaintiffs’ position (judicial economy and 

geographic dispersion) to be more compelling than the factor

favoring the defendants’ position (the financial resources of 

the class members). In short, the District Court considered the 

policies we outlined in Marcus and made a thoughtful

determination in a close case. Our abuse-of-discretion 

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6

standard compels us to affirm that thoughtful determination.

Moreover, our clearly erroneous standard compels us to not 

disturb the factual findings on which it was based.

The District Court Did Not Err in Considering the Stage of 

the Proceedings

The Majority, however, concludes that the District 

Court erred in its analysis of the “judicial economy” factor by 

taking into consideration the stage of the proceedings. As an 

initial note, I do not read the District Court’s analysis as 

turning solely upon a consideration of the late stage of the 

proceedings. Rather, the District Court examined many 

factors, most notably the additional discovery and judicial 

resources that would have to be expended were the cases to 

be litigated outside of the class action mechanism, regardless 

of how far advanced the classwide proceedings were. 

At any rate, it is appropriate—indeed, necessary—for a 

district court to consider the stage of the proceedings when 

examining whether judicial economy favors class litigation or 

individual litigation. In considering judicial economy, a 

district judge must predict how the options before him will 

play out. This prediction becomes nonsensical, however, if 

the district judge cannot take into consideration the amount of 

effort already expended. If you want to determine whether the 

path you are following is the most economical, is it not

important to consider how far along that path you have 

already traveled?3

 

 3 The Majority’s references to “sunk costs” are inapt. 

See Majority Op. 37, 39, 40. Sunk costs are costs that have 

already incurred and cannot be recovered. See Verizon 

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7

Unsurprisingly, then, courts widely—if not

universally—recognize that it is appropriate for courts to 

consider the stage of the proceedings when weighing judicial 

economy. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 

U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (“[A] federal court should consider and 

weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 

values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity 

in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case 

brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims.”

(emphasis added)); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 

592 F.3d 412, 420-21 (3d Cir. 2010) (“However, 

considerations of efficiency, fairness, and judicial economy 

weigh against a wholesale dismissal of the action at this 

stage.” (emphasis added)); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. 

v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992) (“At the 

stage of the proceedings when the motion was filed, judicial 

economy would have been better served by dismissal.” 

(emphasis added)); Park S. Hotel Corp. v. N.Y. Hotel Trades 

Council, 851 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[J]udicial 

economy would not be served by remanding the case at this 

late stage for arbitration, which almost certainly would be 

followed by further judicial proceedings.” (emphasis added)); 

United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 

1982) (“The district judge appropriately considered that 

joinder would not serve the interests of judicial economy in 

 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 499 (2002) (“‘Sunk 

costs’ are unrecoverable past costs . . . .” (emphasis added)).

The District Court’s analysis did not consider sunk costs, but 

rather the relative costs, going forward, of joinder and class 

litigation. To determine the relative costs, going forward, of 

joinder and class litigation, one needs to know how much 

remains to be done under either alternative. 

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8

view of the late stage of the proceedings . . . .” (emphasis 

added)).

The Majority asserts, however, without citation to any 

authority, that a district court cannot consider “the fact that 

the complex nature of a case resulted in the class certification 

decision being deferred for years,” see Majority Op. 37, or 

“the need to further delay trial were the class not to be 

certified,” see Majority Op. 40, or even “the need to conduct 

further discovery if the class is not certified,” see Majority 

Op. 39. But these are precisely the type of practicalities—how 

long it would take, how complex it would be, how expensive 

it would be—that help determine the practicability of joinder.

The Majority’s directive as to what a district court should 

consider turns the issue into an exercise in abstraction.4 If a 

district judge cannot consider the practicalities of cost and 

time, then judicial economy will be poorly served indeed, and 

one of the core purposes of the class action mechanism—to 

“save[] the resources of both the courts and the parties by 

 4 The Majority instructs district courts to consider 

whether, in a hypothetical world, joinder would have been 

more efficient than the class mechanism. Cf. Majority Op. 41

(“In other words, without considering the late stage of the 

litigation, it should determine whether a class action would 

have been a substantially more efficient mechanism of 

litigating this suit than joinder of all parties. . . . At the same 

time, the District Court is free to rely on its superior 

understanding of how the case has proceeded to date for the 

purpose of determining whether the class mechanism would 

have actually been a substantially more efficient use of 

judicial resources than joinder of the parties at the onset of the 

litigation.”).

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9

permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member]

to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23”—will 

be undercut. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 

(1979).

The District Court Properly Considered the Ability of 

Plaintiffs to Litigate via Joinder

The Majority also characterizes the District Court’s 

ruling as focusing not on the ability of the plaintiffs to litigate 

via joinder but “focus[ing] instead on whether the individual 

plaintiffs could have brought their own, individual suits.” See 

Majority Op. 44. I disagree. To the contrary, the focus of the 

District Court’s opinion is on joinder throughout.5 See, e.g., 

 5 The Majority, citing references to “individual suits” 

in the District Court’s opinion, posits that “[e]ven a cursory 

look at the section on the ability and incentive of the class 

members to litigate reveals that the District Court was 

focused on the alternative of individual suits, not on joinder.” 

See Majority Op. 44 n.23. But the two concepts are not 

exclusive of each other, as the Majority itself recognizes in 

footnote 19, when it “read[s] Marcus’s language about the 

ability ‘to litigate individually,’ to refer to each plaintiff 

appearing on the record as a joined party, and not whether 

each individual plaintiff can litigate his or her own claim as 

the sole plaintiff.” See Majority Op. 42 n.19 (citation 

omitted). Litigation not pursued on a classwide basis is 

individual litigation, even if pursued via joinder, and the 

parties joined in a proceeding remain responsible for the 

individual litigation of their claims. See 7 Wright & Miller,

supra, § 1652 (“Consequently, rights that are separate and 

distinct under the governing law are not transformed into joint 

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JA-020-22 (“Joinder of the absent class members would 

likely require additional rounds of discovery, which would 

only further delay a trial date.”); (“The considerable 

geographic dispersion of the parties would certainly present 

challenges to plaintiffs in attempting to coordinate the 

litigation if all class members were joined, particularly if 

additional discovery was required.” (emphasis added)); 

(“Accordingly, Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the parties are sufficiently 

numerous so as to make joinder impracticable.”). 

The Majority makes its own contrary finding, 

surmising that the class members “appear likely to have the 

ability and incentive to bring suit as joined parties.” See 

Majority Op. 45.

6 It directs the District Court on remand to 

consider whether it would be “uneconomical” for the six 

smaller class members to be joined. It thus instructs the 

District Court to make the case for joinder—a case the 

defendants failed to support themselves. The defendants 

offered little argument (let alone evidence) before the District 

Court that, notwithstanding the vast geographic dispersion of 

the plaintiffs, surely joinder would be practicable. Indeed, at 

oral argument, counsel for Ranbaxy was asked whether 

joinder was impracticable and responded, “I don’t know.”

 

rights when plaintiffs join under Rule 20 in a federal court 

action; each plaintiff’s right of action remains distinct, as if it 

had been brought separately.”). 

6 This assertion stems from the defendants’ argument 

that “[e]ach of the 16 absent class members has the ability 

and the financial incentive to file its own claim.” See 

Appellants’ Br. 45. The Majority adopts this speculation as 

fact, but it is mere argument and speculation. 

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Oral Arg. at 9:30-10:00.

7 The Majority is erecting roadblocks 

that do not exist. 

Moreover, if one were to speculate as to the likelihood 

of these plaintiffs, many competitors in a relatively small 

market, agreeing to come together—for surely they couldn’t 

be forced to do so—the speculation would be to the contrary. 

Experience would dictate that many obvious practical reasons 

stand in the way of joinder: desire to have one’s self and own 

law firm control the litigation, choice of favorable forum, 

familiarity with the local jurisdiction’s laws and procedures,

fear of being dragged into settlement, and concerns about the 

costs of litigating in a far-flung locale. Further, the larger 

plaintiffs could clearly afford to go their own way. Even in 

cases that come before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 

Litigation for joinder, where the issue involves only pre-trial 

proceedings,8 plaintiffs invariably raise reasons for opposing 

joinder.9 How can we possibly assume that the plaintiffs

 7 An audio recording of the oral argument is available 

online at 

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-

3475InReModafinil.mp3

8 This case would not be appropriate for an MDL as it 

is ready for trial and pre-trial proceedings are largely 

completed. 

9 See, e.g., In re: Sci. Drilling Int’l, Inc., FLSA Litig., 

24 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1364-65 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (“Plaintiffs 

oppose centralization as unnecessary, stating that they 

recognize the overlap in the actions and they already have 

agreed to coordinate pretrial proceedings to avoid duplicative 

discovery and inconsistent rulings.”); In re: Standard & 

Poor’s Rating Agency Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1361 

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would have the “ability and incentive” to bring suit as joined 

parties? If the defendants had supported such a notion, that 

would be another matter. But the Majority asks the District 

Court to make its own record as to practicability. That is not 

our role, nor the role of the District Court. 

* * *

Lastly, I am struck by the inescapable fact that this 

case has proceeded as a class action for years and nothing 

about it cries out for anything but class treatment.10 One has 

 

(J.P.M.L. 2013) (“Plaintiffs oppose centralization and argue, 

inter alia, that the Panel has never centralized litigation of 

this type, that transfer to a distant forum will inconvenience 

the states, and that transfer is unnecessary in light of the 

historic cooperation among state attorneys general.”); In re 

Le-Nature’s, Inc., Commercial Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 

1373-74 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (“Plaintiffs opposed to 

centralization argue, inter alia, that (1) the allegations 

pertaining to the bottling actions make up only a minimal part 

of the Trustee’s case; (2) all active parties to the bottling 

actions have admitted that Le–Nature’s perpetrated a 

systematic fraudulent scheme and, therefore, a large portion 

of the allegations set forth in the Trustee’s action is 

insignificant to the bottling actions; (3) the bottling actions 

are straightforward fraud cases that can readily be handled by 

their respective district courts; and (4) discovery can be 

coordinated in the bottling actions without centralization.”). 10 The Majority contends that this is no “run-of-themill class action” given the top-heavy distribution of the 

claims among the class members. See Majority Op. 48. But

whether the class looks like other classes is not controlling as 

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13

only to read the Majority’s analysis of the real issues before 

the Court to conclude that it is unimaginable that this case 

should be torn apart at this late date and sent to the far corners 

of the United States to start over again as separate actions

before several judges, each deciding anew the identical issues 

facing each plaintiff’s claims. It should not be remanded at 

this late date. 

This should not happen because Judge Goldberg has 

ably managed this case for a decade and properly considered 

every factor we have ever held to be relevant in determining 

whether a class is so numerous that joinder would be 

impracticable. He has not abused his discretion in so doing or 

made clearly erroneous findings of fact. I would therefore 

affirm the judgment of the District Court in its entirety. 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part III.A of the 

Majority’s opinion. 

 

to whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. Rule 

23 was “designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that 

litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 

named parties only.” Califano, 442 U.S. at 700-01 (emphasis 

added). The plaintiff’s burden under Rule 23 is merely to 

demonstrate compliance by a preponderance of the 

evidence—not to establish “proof beyond any doubt.” Reyes 

v. Netdeposit, LLC, 802 F.3d 469, 485 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, 

given the evidence the plaintiffs have adduced regarding, 

inter alia, the impracticability of joinder and the 

predominance of common questions of law and fact, and 

given the paucity of contrary evidence adduced by the 

defendants, I reiterate that nothing about this case cries out 

for anything but class treatment.

Case: 15-3475 Document: 003112405738 Page: 77 Date Filed: 09/13/2016