Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05359/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 24, 2008 Decided August 1, 2008 

No. 07-5359 

IN RE: NAVY CHAPLAINCY

CHAPLAINCY OF FULL GOSPEL CHURCHES, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

UNITED STATES NAVY, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 07ms00269) 

Arthur A. Schulcz, Sr., argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellants. 

Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the 

briefs were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. 

Loeb, Attorney. Daniel E. Bensing, Attorney, entered an 

appearance. 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 1 of 28
2 

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH, in which Senior Circuit Judge SILBERMAN

joins. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

 KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: A group of Protestant Navy 

chaplains sued the Navy, alleging that the Navy’s operation of 

its retirement system discriminates in favor of Catholic 

chaplains in violation of the Establishment Clause. But the 

plaintiffs do not claim that the Navy actually discriminated 

against any of them. We conclude that plaintiffs lack 

standing to bring this claim, and we therefore affirm the 

judgment of the District Court. 

I 

 The U.S. Navy maintains a Chaplain Corps of 

commissioned Navy officers to meet the spiritual needs of 

those who serve in the Navy and their families. Like other 

officers, chaplains are subject to military regulations with 

respect to hiring, promotion, and retirement. 

The Navy divides its chaplains into four categories – 

Catholic, liturgical Protestant, non-liturgical Protestant, and 

Special Worship. As we explained in a previous opinion in 

this litigation, “liturgical Protestant” includes Protestant 

denominations that follow an established liturgy in worship 

services and practice infant baptism, such as Lutheran, 

Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregational. 

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 2 of 28
3 

290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Chaplaincy). “Non-liturgical 

Protestant” includes Protestant denominations that do not 

follow a formal liturgy in worship services and that baptize at 

the age of reason, such as Baptist, Evangelical, Pentecostal, 

and Charismatic. Id. at 294. The “Special Worship” category 

refers to other religious faiths, both Christian and nonChristian, and it includes Jewish, Christian Science, SeventhDay Adventist, Mormon, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, 

Jehovah’s Witness, and Unitarian. Id. at 295 n.3. 

Plaintiffs are non-liturgical Protestant Navy chaplains, 

both current and retired.1

 Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the 

Navy discriminates in favor of Catholic chaplains in certain 

aspects of its retirement system. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 

No. 07-ms-269, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2007). 

Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction. 

The District Court initially denied plaintiffs’ preliminary 

injunction motion, finding that the chaplains had not shown 

the necessary irreparable injury to support a preliminary 

injunction. See Adair v. England, Nos. 00-cv-566 & 99-cv2945, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2005). On appeal, this 

Court reversed, explaining that, for purposes of a preliminary 

injunction, the allegation of an Establishment Clause violation 

itself demonstrates sufficient harm to satisfy the irreparable 

injury prong of the preliminary injunction test – assuming, of 

course, that the party has standing to allege the violation in 

the first place. See Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 303-04 & n.8. 

The Court therefore vacated the denial of a preliminary 

 1

 Plaintiffs also include certain organizations of non-liturgical 

Protestant chaplains. Because the organizations have standing in 

these circumstances only if one of their individual members has 

standing, we do not address them separately. See Hunt v. 

Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 

(1977). 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 3 of 28
4 

injunction and remanded for the District Court to consider the 

remaining factors in the preliminary injunction analysis, 

including likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at 304-

05. 

On remand, in a well-reasoned opinion, the District Court 

concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this claim. 

This appeal followed. 

II 

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to 

deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.” “One of the 

controlling elements in the definition of a case or controversy 

under Article III is standing.” Hein v. Freedom from Religion 

Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2562 (2007) (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted).2

 The three factors 

establishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 

standing are well established. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First and most relevant here is 

injury-in-fact: A would-be plaintiff must have suffered “an 

invasion of a legally protected interest” that is (i) “concrete 

and particularized” rather than abstract or generalized, and (ii) 

“actual or imminent” rather than remote, speculative, 

conjectural or hypothetical. Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic 

Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

Second is causation: The asserted injury must be “fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). Third is redressability: It must be likely that a 

 2

 In referring to Hein throughout our opinion, we are referring 

specifically to Justice Alito’s opinion, which is the binding opinion 

of the Court in that case. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 

193 (1977). 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 4 of 28
5 

favorable decision by the court would redress the plaintiff’s 

injury. Id. at 561. 

“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic 

idea – the idea of separation of powers.” Allen v. Wright, 468 

U.S. 737, 752 (1984). The doctrine is “founded in concern 

about the proper – and properly limited – role of the courts in 

a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 

(1975). The federal courts are “not empowered to seek out 

and strike down any governmental act that they deem to be 

repugnant to the Constitution.” Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2562. 

“Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest 

in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is 

the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.” Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 576; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 

Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 

U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). 

Those critical and bedrock principles of separation of 

powers inform our approach to plaintiffs’ claim. 

III 

In reviewing the standing question, we must be “careful 

not to decide the questions on the merits for or against the 

plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the 

plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” City of 

Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For 

purposes of our analysis in this case, we therefore must 

assume arguendo that the Navy’s operation of its retirement 

system favors Catholic chaplains and disfavors non-liturgical 

Protestant chaplains in violation of the “clearest command of 

the Establishment Clause” – that “one religious denomination 

cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. 

Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Even assuming that 

plaintiffs’ allegations are accurate, however, they do not have 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 5 of 28
6 

standing to bring this claim against the Navy because they 

have not sufficiently demonstrated their own injury-in-fact. 

If plaintiffs had alleged that the Navy discriminated 

against them on account of their religion, plaintiffs would 

have alleged a concrete and particularized harm sufficient to 

constitute injury-in-fact for standing purposes. But plaintiffs 

have conceded that they themselves did not suffer 

employment discrimination on account of their religion. They 

have conceded that the Navy did not deny them any benefits 

or opportunities on account of their religion. See In re Navy 

Chaplaincy, No. 07-ms-269, slip op. at 7-9 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 

2007). Rather, they suggest that other chaplains suffered such 

discrimination. 

Plaintiffs argue that they nonetheless have standing for 

either of two reasons: (i) they are taxpayers who object to the 

Navy’s allegedly discriminatory operation of its chaplaincy 

program, or (ii) they have been subjected to the Navy’s 

“message” of religious preference as a result of the Navy’s 

running a retirement system that favors Catholic chaplains. 

We disagree. Because plaintiffs’ claim does not fit within the 

narrow confines of Establishment Clause taxpayer standing 

permitted by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), they do not 

have standing as taxpayers. See Hein v. Freedom from 

Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2562-72 (2007). 

Nor do plaintiffs have standing based on their exposure to the 

Navy’s alleged “message” of religious preference. 

A 

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a taxpayer’s 

interest in ensuring that appropriated funds are spent in 

accordance with the Constitution does not suffice to confer 

Article III standing. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2563 (2007). 

Back in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 6 of 28
7 

taxpayers sued the Government, arguing that the Maternity 

Act of 1921 improperly invaded powers reserved to States by 

the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected taxpayer 

standing in that case: “The administration of any statute, 

likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a 

vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability 

is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of 

public and not of individual concern. If one taxpayer may 

champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer 

may do the same . . . .” Id. at 487; see also Doremus Bd. of 

Educ. v. Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952). 

In 1968, 45 years after Frothingham, the Supreme Court 

carved out a narrow exception to the general constitutional 

bar on taxpayer suits; the Court held that federal taxpayers 

had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to 

federal financing for parochial schools. See Flast, 392 U.S. 

83. But according to Flast, taxpayers may bring an 

Establishment Clause challenge only when they challenge 

legislation passed pursuant to the Taxing and Spending 

Clause in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. See id. at 102-03. 

The Court has subsequently made clear that Flast is a 

very narrow exception to the general bar against taxpayer 

standing. In Valley Forge, for example, the plaintiffs argued 

that the Government violated the Establishment Clause when 

it transferred a tract of “surplus property” to a Christian 

college. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for 

Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1982) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court found that the 

plaintiffs, a group composed of “90,000 taxpayer members,” 

did not have standing both because the challenged action was 

executive rather than legislative and because the property 

transfer was an exercise of executive authority pursuant to 

legislation passed under the Property Clause in Article IV, § 3 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 7 of 28
8 

of the Constitution rather than the Taxing and Spending 

Clause in Article I, § 8. Id. at 469, 479-80 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Supreme Court allowed a 

group of federal taxpayers to challenge the Adolescent Family 

Life Act, a statute appropriating funds for religious 

organizations, among others, to fight teen pregnancy. 487 

U.S. 589, 593, 596-97 (1988). The Court found that 

plaintiffs’ claim challenged a program expressly authorized 

by Congress under the taxing and spending power, thus fitting 

within Flast. Id. at 619. The key to Bowen’s conclusion, as 

the Court has subsequently explained, was that the statute was 

‘“at heart a program of disbursement of funds pursuant to 

Congress’ taxing and spending powers’” and that plaintiffs’ 

claims were concerned with the expenditure of funds 

‘“pursuant to the AFLA’s statutory mandate.’” Hein, 127 S. 

Ct. at 2567 (quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619-20) (emphasis 

omitted). 

In its recent decision in Hein, the Court declined to 

expand Flast to encompass discretionary Executive Branch 

spending: “Because almost all Executive Branch activity is 

ultimately funded by some congressional appropriation, 

extending the Flast exception to purely executive 

expenditures would effectively subject every federal action – 

be it a conference, proclamation or speech – to Establishment 

Clause challenge by any taxpayer in federal court.” Id. at 

2569. Although Hein did not eliminate the Flast exception to 

the bar against taxpayer standing, the case forcefully 

emphasized the exception’s extremely limited contours: “It is 

significant that, in the four decades since its creation, the 

Flast exception has largely been confined to its facts.” Id. at 

2568-69. As Hein explained, the Court has limited the 

“expansion of federal taxpayer and citizen standing in the 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 8 of 28
9 

absence of specific statutory authorization to an outer 

boundary drawn by the results in Flast.” Id. at 2569 (internal 

quotation marks and emphasis omitted).3

 

In this case, plaintiffs’ claim does not fit within the 

narrow Flast exception. No legislative enactment expressly 

authorizes or appropriates funds for the Navy to favor 

Catholic chaplains in its retirement system. Plaintiffs cite, for 

example, the statutes establishing the Navy Chaplain Corps, 

but those statutes make no reference to denominational 

category, only to chaplains generally. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 5142, 

5150. And plaintiffs, who themselves are chaplains, 

obviously do not contend that congressional legislation 

establishing the Navy Chaplaincy itself violates the 

Establishment Clause; they merely want the Navy to operate 

the Chaplain Corps differently. Cf. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 

F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (approving military chaplaincy 

program). 

As in Hein, the challenged expenditures here – extra 

salary and retirement-related benefits allegedly provided to 

Catholic chaplains – “were not expressly authorized or 

mandated by any specific congressional enactment.” Hein, 

127 S. Ct. at 2568. Indeed, plaintiffs contend that the 

Chaplain Corps is being operated by the Navy in 

contravention of the law, not in accordance with the law. See

Plaintiffs’ Br. 48 (“Appellees have not followed either the law 

 3

 The Flast exception may be further limited to Congress’s 

disbursement of federal funds outside the Government. In both 

Flast and Bowen v. Kendrick, the only two Supreme Court cases 

upholding taxpayer standing, the statutes authorized disbursement 

of federal funds to outside entities, including religious 

organizations. But we need not address that question in this case 

given that plaintiffs’ argument for taxpayer standing fails at a more 

basic level. 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 9 of 28
10 

or the DOD regulations.”). Under the Supreme Court’s 

precedents, that contention directly undermines any claim to 

taxpayer standing. In sum, plaintiffs do not have standing as 

taxpayers. 

B 

Plaintiffs alternatively contend that they have standing 

because “Establishment Clause injury flows from the 

forbidden messages of preference or disapproval” inherent in 

the Navy’s denominational preference. Plaintiffs’ Br. 28. In 

so arguing, they rely primarily on this Court’s decision in 

Chaplaincy, which explained that for the purposes of a 

preliminary injunction, the “mere allegation” of an 

Establishment Clause violation is always sufficient to show 

irreparable harm. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. 

England, 454 F.3d 290, 303-04 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs 

claim that because their allegations demonstrate irreparable 

injury for preliminary injunction purposes, they have 

necessarily shown injury-in-fact for standing purposes. 

But the Court in Chaplaincy merely held that the 

allegation of an Establishment Clause violation is sufficient to 

satisfy the irreparable harm prong of the preliminary 

injunction standard – presupposing that a party has standing 

to allege such a violation. See id. at 303-04 & n.8. A per se 

rule defining automatic injury-in-fact for every plaintiff who 

claims an Establishment Clause violation – as plaintiffs strain 

to find in the Chaplaincy opinion – would run counter to 

decades of settled jurisprudence setting forth the requirements 

for standing in Establishment Clause cases. Jurisdictional 

requirements are not disposed of so easily, and the Court in 

Chaplaincy did not purport to make the sweeping change 

attributed to it by plaintiffs. 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 10 of 28
11 

Apart from citing Chaplaincy, plaintiffs also claim 

injury-in-fact from their being subjected to the “message” of 

religious preference conveyed by the Navy’s allegedly 

preferential retirement program for Catholic chaplains. The 

program, they say, makes them feel like second-class citizens 

within the Navy Chaplaincy even if they themselves have not 

suffered discrimination on account of their religion. 

As the Supreme Court has often stated, mere personal 

offense to government action does not give rise to standing to 

sue. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752-54 (1984); see also 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1992). 

“By the mere bringing of his suit, every plaintiff demonstrates 

his belief that a favorable judgment will make him happier. 

But although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy” from 

knowing that the Government is following constitutional 

imperatives, “that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable 

Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable 

Article III injury.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998). “Recognition of standing in such 

circumstances would transform the federal courts into no 

more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests 

of concerned bystanders.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiffs respond that their claim is similar to religious 

display and prayer cases where courts have found (or at least 

apparently assumed) standing. See, e.g., McCreary County v. 

ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005) (Ten Commandments 

displays that were “readily visible” to citizens conducting 

civic business) (internal quotation marks omitted); Van Orden 

v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2005) (Ten Commandments 

display on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol that 

petitioner frequently encountered); County of Allegheny v. 

ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989) (crèche display in county 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 11 of 28
12 

courthouse and menorah display outside city-county 

building); Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 

(4th Cir. 1997) (Ten Commandments display in county 

courtroom; noting that display cases are “particularized 

subclass of Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence”); 

see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) 

(governmental prayer at school graduation); Marsh v. 

Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1983) (daily prayer at 

opening of state legislature); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township 

v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205-12 (1963) (daily Bible reading 

in class); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962) 

(official state prayer in class). 

These Supreme Court cases do not all directly discuss the 

standing issue. It is a well-established rule that “cases in 

which jurisdiction is assumed sub silentio are not binding 

authority for the proposition that jurisdiction exists.” John

Doe, Inc. v. DEA, 484 F.3d 561, 569 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, accepting 

those cases as precedents on standing,4

 we nonetheless find 

significant differences between plaintiffs’ case and the 

religious display and prayer cases. In the religious display 

and prayer cases, the Government was actively and directly 

communicating a religious message through religious words 

or religious symbols – in other words, it was engaging in 

religious speech that was observed, read, or heard by the 

plaintiffs in those cases. Here, by contrast, the Navy is not 

communicating a religious message through religious words 

or religious symbols. Plaintiffs’ objection here is more akin 

to the objection to the property transfer in Valley Forge, 

 4 See generally Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 

494, 499-502 (5th Cir. 2007) (DeMoss, J., concurring); Ira C. Lupu 

& Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from 

Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause 

Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 158-64 (2008). 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 12 of 28
13 

where the Court stated that the plaintiffs failed “to identify 

any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the 

alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological 

consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct

with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to 

confer standing under Art. III, even though the disagreement 

is phrased in constitutional terms.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 

485-86 (emphasis added and omitted); see also Suhre, 131 

F.3d at 1086 (quoting Valley Forge and stating “a mere 

abstract objection to unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient 

to confer standing”). 

Plaintiffs’ argument would extend the religious display 

and prayer cases in a significant and unprecedented manner 

and eviscerate well-settled standing limitations. Under 

plaintiffs’ theory, every government action that allegedly 

violates the Establishment Clause could be re-characterized as 

a governmental message promoting religion. And therefore 

everyone who becomes aware of the “message” would have 

standing to sue. The neighbors in Valley Forge, the hotel 

workers at a conference for faith-based organizations in Hein, 

the list goes on – all could have obtained standing to sue 

simply by targeting not the government’s action, but rather 

the government’s alleged “message” of religious preference 

communicated through that action. Indeed, as plaintiffs’ 

counsel acknowledged at oral argument, under plaintiffs’ 

standing theory any recipient of the Navy’s “message” in this 

case, including the judges on this panel, would have standing 

to bring suit challenging the allegedly discriminatory 

Chaplain Corps. Oral Arg. Tr. at 6-7. The jurisdictional 

requirements of Article III are not so manipulable. They do 

not allow anyone who becomes aware of a government action 

that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause to sue over it 

on the ground that they are offended by the allegedly 

unconstitutional “message” communicated by that action. In 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 13 of 28
14 

the government employment context at issue here, it thus 

comes as no surprise that neither plaintiffs nor the dissent has 

cited any case holding that a plaintiff can maintain a religious 

employment discrimination suit under the Religion Clauses 

when complaining about employment discrimination suffered 

by others, not by the plaintiff himself or herself. We think the 

reason for the dearth of precedent is evident: When plaintiffs 

are not themselves affected by a government action except 

through their abstract offense at the message allegedly 

conveyed by that action, they have not shown injury-in-fact to 

bring an Establishment Clause claim, at least outside the 

distinct context of the religious display and prayer cases. 

To be sure, we recognize that plaintiffs’ creative analogy 

to the religious display and prayer cases has some surface 

logic. But the implications of plaintiffs’ theory for standing 

doctrine are quite radical: Plaintiffs seek to use the religious 

display and prayer cases to wedge open the courthouse doors 

to a wide range of plaintiffs alleging Establishment Clause 

violations who were previously barred by bedrock standing 

requirements – requirements that are essential to preserving 

the separation of powers and limited judicial role mandated 

by the Constitution. We decline the invitation to transform 

Establishment Clause standing doctrine in this way. What the 

Supreme Court said last year in Hein applies just as well to 

plaintiffs’ reliance on the religious display and prayer cases 

here: “It is a necessary concomitant of the doctrine of stare 

decisis that a precedent is not always expanded to the limit of 

its logic.” Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571. 

* * * 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 14 of 28
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Establishment

Clause prevents “the Government’s placing its official stamp of

approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular

form of religious services,” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429

(1962), and ensures that “all creeds . . . be tolerated and none

favored,” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992); see

McCreary County v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S.

844, 860 (2005). A governmental accommodation for religion

may violate the Establishment Clause if it “singles out a

particular religious sect for special treatment” because

“whatever the limits of permissible . . . accommodations may be

. . . , it is clear that neutrality as among religions must be

honored.” Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,

512 U.S. 687, 706-07 (1994) (citations omitted). “‘When the

power, prestige and financial support of government [are] placed

behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive

pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing

officially approved religion is plain.’” Sch. Dist. of Abington

Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963) (quoting Engel, 370

U.S. at 430-31). 

In Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454

F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the court thus observed that the

liberty interest shielded by the Establishment Clause is

“protection against government imposition of a state religion or

religious preference,” id. at 302 (emphasis added). Stating that

“the Establishment Clause is implicated as soon as the

government engages in impermissible action,” id., the court

explained that unlike freedom of expression cases, for example,

“[t]he harm inflicted by religious establishment is self-executing

and requires no attendant conduct on the part of the individual,”

id. at 303; see also id. at 302. In describing the impermissible

government action at issue, the court stated: 

Where, as here, the charge is one of official preference

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 15 of 28
2

 Due to the consolidation of three cases, appellants include 1

active duty, reserve, retired, and former non-liturgical Protestant Navy

chaplains as in Chaplaincy, and two endorsing agencies — Chaplaincy

of Full Gospel Churches and Associated Gospel Churches.

Hereinafter in referring to “appellants,” I refer only to the chaplains

currently serving in the Navy Chaplain Corps.

of one religion over another, such governmental

endorsement “sends a message to nonadherents [of the

favored denomination] that they are outsiders, not full

members of the political community, and an

accompanying message to adherents that they are

insiders, favored members of the political community.”

Id. at 302 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)

(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (alteration in original). The court

held that such an allegation sufficed to show irreparable harm,

or “injury [that is] beyond remediation [by monetary damages],”

id. at 297, for the purpose of obtaining injunctive relief,

crediting appellants’ allegation of “the harm that flows from the

‘forbidden message’ of marginalization [that the Navy’s] actions

send to [them],” id. at 299 (quoting Appellants’ Br. at 20). The

court did not expressly hold that appellants had Article III 1

standing, but see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998), but noted that its legal “conclusion

presupposes, of course, that the party has standing to allege such

a violation,” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 304 n.8. 

The court’s decision in Chaplaincy regarding appellants’

liberty interest that is protected by the Establishment Clause and

the nature of their injury is no less applicable here. The same

parties and the same charge are involved, see LaShawn A. v.

Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393-95 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), and

injury sufficient for irreparable harm has resonance for injuryin-fact under Article III, see Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 16 of 28
3

 To the extent the court seeks to avoid this precedent by 2

interpreting a footnote in Chaplaincy to indicate that the court was

“presupposing” appellants’ standing, Op. at 10, and thus addressing

the request for injunctive relief without satisfying itself that appellants

had standing, its approach is contrary both to the principle in Steel

Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95, and to the more natural reading of the footnote

as merely recognizing, as this court has done before, that this prong of

the preliminary injunction inquiry and the entirety of the Article III

standing inquiry “overlap[] . . . somewhat,” but are not coextensive,

see Taylor, 56 F.3d at 1508. 

F.3d 1497, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1995), because to show irreparable

harm “[a] plaintiff must do more than merely allege . . . harm

sufficient to establish standing,”Associated Gen. Contractors of

Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th

Cir. 1991). As explained in Chaplaincy, “[t]his court has set a

high standard for irreparable injury” within the preliminary

injunction inquiry. 454 F.3d at 297. Such injury must be “both

certain and great,” “actual and not theoretical,” “beyond

remediation,” and also “of such imminence that there is a clear

and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable

harm.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). For Article

III, the requisite injury-in-fact must be “concrete and

particularized” and “actual or imminent,” not “hypothetical.”

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)

(quotation marks omitted). Because “the Navy’s alleged

violation of the Establishment Clause per se constitutes

irreparable harm,” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 299, appellants have

met their burden on the injury prong of Article III standing.2

As members of non-liturgical Protestant churches and

fellowships, appellants assert that the Navy has singled out the

Catholic faith as the preferred religious tradition in its Chaplain

Corps by choosing over several decades to allow only Catholic

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 17 of 28
4

 According to appellants, “the 4109 program” has three 3

parts: (1) illegal appointments to active duty through age waivers for

over-age Catholic clergy, (2) the consequent illegal continuation of

such clergy as chaplains to the age of 67, and (3) the eventual illegal

transfer of such clergy to the Retired Reserve and subsequent recall to

active duty as designated 4109 Reservists. The program is designed

in part to allow Catholic chaplains who have reached their statutory

separation age to continue to serve until they have completed twenty

years of service and become eligible for pensions. See 10 U.S.C. §§

1251, 14509, 14703; see also Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 293-96. At the

time appellants filed their complaints, the age limit for the

appointment of chaplains, like other officers, was forty-two, see 10

U.S.C. § 532(a)(2); while this provision is no longer applicable to

chaplains, id. at § 532(d)(1) (as amended by Ronald W. Reagan

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No.

108-375, 188 Stat. 1811, 1872 (Oct. 28, 2004)), the statutory

separation age for chaplains and other officers remains in effect. 

 Appellants cite a list of Catholic chaplains coded as “4109” 4

currently serving with them in the Navy Chaplain Corps, and assert

that additional chaplains are destined to become 4109 chaplains in

view of the Navy’s list of Catholics appointed after age forty-two and

extended on active duty and the dates they become eligible for

pensions. For example, non-liturgical Protestant Chaplain Stewart

served with over-age Catholic Chaplain Erestain. After this court’s

decision in Chaplaincy, it appears that the Navy extended two

non-Catholic chaplains for service beyond the age of 62. See 454 F.3d

at 295. 

chaplains to serve beyond the required separation dates. This 3

sends a message of denominational preference for Catholics and

marginalization for non-Catholic adherents, causing appellants

to suffer psychological harm while serving as chaplains. Compl.

¶¶ 3, 37(e), 39. By endowing Naval officer status in a

preferential manner upon the representatives of a particular type

of religious ministry, who then, as part of their Naval service 4

duties, use words and symbols to serve their religious cause, the

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 18 of 28
5

 See, e.g., Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 5

(9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188,

196 (5th Cir. 2006); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358

F.3d 1020, 1026-31 (8th Cir. 2004), adopted in relevant part, 419 F.3d

772, 774 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 72 (2d Cir. 2001); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale

Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679, 682-83 (6th Cir. 1994); Doe v. County of

Montgomery, 41 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1994); Foremaster v.

City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1989); Saladin

v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 691-93 (11th Cir. 1987); Allen

v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

Navy allegedly has “take[n] sides in a religious matter,

effectively discriminating in favor of [one religion’s] view,”

Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415,

425 (2d Cir. 2002), of the type of religious ministry that is most

appropriate to serve “the religious needs of sailors,” In re

England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2004). See, e.g.,

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860; Kiryas Joel Vill., 512 U.S.

at 698-705. 

Appellants have suffered particularized Article III injury

because they are not strangers to the Navy’s 4109 program.

Their membership within the Chaplain Corps and their resulting

receipt of a message of denominational preference make them

comparable to a citizen who has “personal contact with the

alleged establishment of religion,” Suhre v. Haywood County,

131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997), such as in the religious

display cases. Appellants’ charge does more than present a 5

“creative analogy” with “some surface logic,” Op. at 14, as the

court offers no basisfor its unsupported conclusion that this case

is different from “the distinct context of the religious display

and prayer cases,” id. As counsel for the Navy acknowledged,

“if a chaplain . . . is personally exposed to a [message of

religious preference], there would be traditional standing.” Oral

Arg. Tr. at 13 (Apr. 24, 2008). That is what appellants allege in

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 19 of 28
6

 Contrary to the court’s suggestion, Op. at 12-13, Valley

6

Forge included no indication that the Supreme Court questioned the

plaintiffs’ standing on the ground that a government land transfer to

a religious institution could not send a message of government

endorsement of religion and thus violate the Establishment Clause.

The Court based its Article III holding on the fact that the plaintiffs

did not live in the state where the land transfer had occurred, had

learned about it indirectly through a press release, and indicated no

connection with the transfer that could personalize their stake in the

suit. See 454 U.S. at 486-87; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490

U.S. 605, 616 (1989). As our sister circuits have held, Valley Forge’s

holding, 454 U.S. at 485-87, suggests that “[t]he neighbors in Valley

Forge,” Op. at 13, may be the very plaintiffs who would have had

standing there. See, e.g., Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1087; Washegesic, 33

charging that the 4109 program establishes an “official

preference of one religion over another” that causes them

psychological injury due to their personal and direct receipt of

the “‘message . . . that they are outsiders, not full members’” of

the Navy’s Chaplain Corps. Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 302

(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

Appellants’ injury is thus as particularized, see Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 561 n.1, 573-74; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975),

as that of the children in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24, to whom

school prayers were read, the plaintiffs in Women’s Equity

Action League (WEAL) v. Cavazos, 879 F.2d 880, 884-85 (D.C.

Cir. 1989), who were enrolled or employed in segregated

schools, and the state legislator in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.

783, 786 n.4 (1983), who objected “as a member of the

Legislature” to the use of a state-employed chaplain to convene

its sessions. As members of a statutorily-defined community

within the armed forces, appellants are not mere bystanders,

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984), and they did not

“roam the country,” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United

for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982),

in search of impermissible government action.6

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 20 of 28
7

F.3d at 682-83; ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun County Chamber of

Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 1983). 

The uniqueness of appellants’ injury as chaplains in relation

to their service in the Navy Chaplain Corps eliminates the

concern expressed in Valley Forge that recognizing their

standing would, in this court’s words, inappropriately “wedge

open the courthouse doors,” Op. at 14; see also id. at 10, 13.

Appellants’ charge is based on an injury distinct to their status

within the Chaplain Corps, see Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9;

Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 302; see also WEAL, 879 F.2d at 884-

85, and, “like Schempp before it, Valley Forge recognized that

direct contact with an unwelcome religious exercise or display

works a personal injury distinct from and in addition to each

citizen’s general grievance against unconstitutional government

conduct,” Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. Their alleged “genuine

feeling of exclusion from the community . . . , and the deep

offense from a perceived insult to one’s religious view

committed by the government in one’s community,” Ariz. Civ.

Liberties Union v. Dunham, 112 F. Supp. 2d 927, 935 (D. Ariz.

2000);see Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1087; Saladin, 812 F.2d at 692-93,

demonstrates that appellants have suffered a personal injury-infact. 

To reach the opposite conclusion, the court ignores both the

nature of appellants’ charge and binding precedent. First, the

court describes the charge as if it concerns only religious

discrimination in traditional monetary terms, such as retirement

benefits not denied to appellants or “discrimination suffered by

others.” See Op. at 2, 3, 6, 14. Yet appellants do not so delimit

their charge; rather, they allege that the Navy’s 4109 program

violates the Establishment Clause by creating a government

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 21 of 28
8

 Although the court suggests that appellants have waived 7

aspects of their allegations, Op. at 6, 13, the record is clear that they

have not abandoned their Establishment Clause charge of an

unconstitutional endorsement of a religious denomination that is

particularized to them personally. Oral Arg. Tr. at 8-10; 25. Counsel

emphasized that it is appellants’ “direct contact [with the 4109

program and its message] because of the small community” that

creates their injury, id. at 8, for due to their direct exposure as

chaplains, they experience the 4109 program as a type of faith

discrimination, “a religious gerrymander,” because “[i]t draws lines”

to favor one religious faith over another. Id. at 10; see also

Appellants’ Br. at 27.

 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.

8

Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337-38

(D.C. Cir. 2003).

religious preference, see Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 302.7

Appellants’ standing thus does not hinge upon the mistreatment

of any individual chaplain but upon the Navy’s alleged

endorsement of a preference for another religious faith that

directly affects them. The court’s narrow focus ignores the

Constitution’s requirement that, in assessing constitutional

injury, “we keep in mind ‘the myriad, subtle ways in which

Establishment Clause values can be eroded,’” and that in

addition to the mistreatment of an individual, “we [must] guard

against other different, yet equally important, constitutional

injuries,” such as the unconstitutional implementation of a

government policy. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.

290, 314 (2000) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring)). 

Second, the court states that “mere personal offense” or

emotional injury is never enough for Article III injury, Op. at 11,

but that is not the law. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in 8

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 22 of 28
9

 See, e.g., WEAL, 879 F.2d at 884-85; Gray v. Greyhound 9

Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Shaw v. Hunt,

517 U.S. 899, 904 (1996) (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737

(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)); Trafficante v. Metro. Life

Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.

Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights:

Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92

MICH. L. REV. 483, 511-15 (1993); cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.

483, 494 (1954).

 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005); 10

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 853; Lee, 505 U.S. at 581; County of

Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 587

(1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987); Wallace v.

Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 42 (1985); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671; see also Op.

at 11-12 & n.4.

Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), “[a] person . . . may have a spiritual

stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to

raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause” if directly

affected by the challenged governmental practice, id. at 154

(citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203); see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at

486-87 & n.22. Later, in Allen, 468 U.S. at 755, while holding

that a plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation generally

must claim a personal denial of equal treatment, the Supreme

Court observed that “[t]here can be no doubt that . . .

noneconomic injury [such as stigmatizing injury] is one of the

most serious consequences of discriminatory government action

and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing.”9

In fact, the Supreme Court has reached the merits in numerous

Establishment Clause cases where “mere personal offense,” Op.

at 11, resulting from a plaintiff’s connection to a challenged

practice appears to have provided the main possible injury to

ground standing. As the Fourth Circuit has observed: 10

[T]he Establishment Clause plaintiff is not likely to

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 23 of 28
10

 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997); 11

County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93; Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,

Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,

612-13 (1971); Mt. Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745,

758 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd.

of Dirs., First Church of Christ, Scientist, 829 F.2d 1152, 1161-62

(D.C. Cir. 1987); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 69-70 (D.C. Cir.

1973) (Tamm, J., joined by Robb, J., concurring).

suffer physical injury or pecuniary loss. Rather the

spiritual, value-laden beliefs of the plaintiffs are often

most directly affected by an alleged establishment of

religion. Accordingly, rules of standing recognize that

noneconomic or intangible injury may suffice to make

an Establishment Clause claim justiciable. 

Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086 (quotation marks and citations omitted);

see supra note 5. 

Equally problematic is the court’s attempt to contrast

appellants’ case with those where the government has, in the

court’s words, “actively and directlycommunicat[ed] a religious

message through religious words or religious symbols,” Op. at

12. Establishment Clause precedent is not so conveniently

cabined into the narrow circumstances described by the court,

where the government itself “engag[ed] in religious speech,” id.

For one thing, the government need not intentionally favor one

religious denomination over another in order to violate the

Establishment Clause if its action has such an effect. When 11

considering whether a government action has the effect of

conveying a denominational endorsement, “[t]he question of

governmental neutrality is not concluded by the observation that

[a policy] on its face makes no discrimination between

religions.” Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971).

Equally important, there also is no requirement that the

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 24 of 28
11

government go so far as to use “religious words or religious

symbols,” Op. at 12, to establish an unconstitutional religious

endorsement. Rather, “the Establishment Clause forbids subtle

departures from neutrality, ‘religious gerrymanders,’ as well as

obvious abuses.” Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452 (quoting Walz v. Tax

Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

And, “the most basic command of the Establishment Clause —

not to prefer some religions (and thereby some approaches to

indoctrinating religion) to others” — does not apply only to a

government action such as a prayer or ceremony that explicitly

adopts a denomination’s chosen religious symbols, but also to

other action taken in the usual course of government regulation

or operation. Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335,

1346 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,

244 (1982)); see, e.g., Mt. Royal Joint Venture, 477 F.3d at 758;

Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 294 (5th

Cir. 2001). Thus, government action that draws a line around a

religious denomination in a community can send a symbolic

message of preference that needs no words just as easily as the

government’s direct presentation of a religious symbol. See,

e.g., Kiryas Joel Vill., 512 U.S. at 697 (citing Larkin, 459 U.S.

at 125-26).

The court ignores all of this precedent in adopting the novel

conception that appellants are not harmed for purposes of

standing under the Establishment Clause unless the Navy itself

directly uses religious words or symbols as occurred in the

religious display cases, Op. at 12, 14. Rather than distinguish

precedent in a reasoned manner, the court’s holding is the

assertion that “[w]hen plaintiffs are not themselves affected by

a government action except through their abstract offense at the

message allegedly conveyed by that action, they have not shown

injury-in-fact to bring an Establishment Clause claim, at least

outside the distinct context of the religious display and prayer

cases.” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). Yet, “[t]he

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 25 of 28
12

Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government

from appearing to take a position on questions of religious

belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any

way to a person’s standing in the . . . community,’” County of

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687

(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis added), and so directs the

government to avoid a practice that “may appear to the

nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the

machinery of the [government] to enforce a religious

orthodoxy,” Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). Moreover,

when a court reaches the merits “[i]n cases involving

[government] participation in a religious activity” — such as the

employment of Navy chaplains as religious ministry

professionals — the question is “whether an objective observer

. . . would perceive [its action] as a [governmental]

endorsement” of religion. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S.

at 308 (quotation marks omitted). Even so secular an act as the

grant of a copyright, this court held, ran aground because

providing exceptional copyright benefits to a particular religious

institution “bestowed upon the Church . . . symbolic recognition

as guardian of the [contested] text,” with consequent practical

advantages, and “ha[d] the unmistakable effect of advancing the

Church’s cause.” United Christian Scientists, 829 F.2d at 1171.

Although the religious institution alone used religious words and

symbols, the government’s unusual treatment of one church

“unequivocally and unqualifiedly endorsed [it] as first

interpreter and guardian of th[e] [copyrighted] work.” Id. at

1170; see also Commack, 294 F.3d at 425. 

Here, within the context of their chaplaincy assignments

and in the absence of a legitimate explanation, the 4109 program

could fairly be understood as a religious endorsement because

it has the effect of selecting particular “religious words and

symbols,” Op. at 12, to play an enhanced role within the Navy

Chaplain Corps byspecially retaining only representatives of the

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 26 of 28
13

 See also Instruction 1730.7B, Religious Ministry Support 12

within the Department of the Navy ¶ 4.a (Dep’t of Navy, Ofc. of Sec’y

Oct. 12, 2000); Instruction 1730.1D, Religious Ministry in the Navy

¶ 4 (Dep’t of Navy, Ofc. of Ch. of Naval Operations May 6, 2003). 

Catholic faith for extended service in which they engage in

religious speech on behalf of that Corps. See Santa Fe Indep.

Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 307-09. The job of a 4109 chaplain, as

for all chaplains, requires representing a particular denomination

as a “religious ministry professional,” an “individual endorsed

to represent a religious organization and to conduct its religious

observances or ceremonies.” Instruction 1304.28, Guidance for

the Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments ¶¶

6, E.2.1.9 (Dep’t of Def. June 11, 2004); see England, 375 F.3d

at 1171. So understood, due to appellants’ direct exposure to 12

the 4109 program’s preference for Catholics, the Navy conveys

to them the “message . . . that [as nonadherents of the favored

denomination] they are outsiders, not full members of the . . .

community,” McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (quotation

marks omitted), for “the government[] [appears to be] lending

its support to the communication of a religious organization’s

religious message,” County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601; see

Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125-26; Commack, 294 F.3d at 425; United

Christian Scientists, 829 F.2d at 1170-71, and thus causes them

psychological harm as Navy chaplains that is cognizable under

the Establishment Clause.

In any event, whether the Navy’s 4109 program sends a

prohibited message is a merits question that is not before the

court, see Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing

Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Of course, the

court’s premature determination of this issue may arise from the

realization that if a personally observed religious message

causes harm “there would be traditional standing,” as the Navy’s

counsel acknowledged, Oral Arg. Tr. at 13; see also id. at 18-22.

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 27 of 28
14

At this point in the proceedings in determining Article III

standing, however, the court must assume the merits of

appellants’ charge that the Navy’s 4109 program “d[oes], in

fact, convey” a message of denominational preference directly

harming them as chaplains. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1251; see

Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 502; Info. Handling Servs., 338 F.3d at

1029; City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir.

2003). 

Under the Establishment Clause, then, appellants’

membership in a narrowly defined community — the Navy

Chaplain Corps — directly affected by the 4109 program, and

the message this program communicates to them as chaplains

particularizes their injury-in-fact, for “[t]he practices of [one’s]

own community may create a larger psychological wound than

someplace [one is] just passing through,” Washegesic, 33 F.3d

at 683, by making one feel like a “second class citizen[],”

Saladin, 812 F.2d at 693; see Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1090. This

directly follows from Chaplaincy and Supreme Court precedent,

both of which the court misconstrues. Because appellants’

injury-in-fact is traceable to the Navy’s 4109 program and is

likely to be redressed by holding that the program is unlawful

and enjoining preferential treatment of 4109 chaplains and the

message it sends to appellants, they also meet the other prongs

of the standing test, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. 

Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of the motion for a

preliminary injunction and leave for the district court to

determine upon remand whether appellants have otherwise met

the requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction, see

Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 305, and respectfully dissent. Because

appellants have Article III standing, I do not reach the question

whether they also have taxpayer standing.

USCA Case #07-5359 Document #1130996 Filed: 08/01/2008 Page 28 of 28