Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01022/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01022-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 26:7429 IRS: Tax Jeopardy Assessment

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Carrillo )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 05-1022 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) AMENDED ORDER 

)

Internal Revenue Service, )

)

Defendant. ) )

This matter arises out of a refund suit filed in this Court by

Plaintiff George Carrillo against the Internal Revenue Service on

April 6, 2005 (doc. # 1). Currently pending before the Court is

the United States' motion to dismiss filed on August 12, 2005 (doc.

# 6). Plaintiff has not filed a response in opposition to this

motion, and the time to serve and file a responsive memorandum has

now passed. See LRCiv 7.2(c), 12.1(b), 56.1(b), and App. A ("Time

Chart"). Under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i), the Court may

deem a party's lack of opposition-- or untimely opposition-- as

consent to the granting of a motion, and may grant the motion

summarily if it is facially meritorious. LRCiv 7.2(i); Henry v. 

Case 2:05-cv-01022-RCB Document 8 Filed 01/25/06 Page 1 of 18
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Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). Having

carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint (doc. # 1) is comprised of several

unnumbered pages with unlabeled exhibits interspersed among them. 

For ease of reference, the Court will assign page numbers and

exhibit numbers to the Complaint as follows:

• the unnumbered page with the heading "JURISDICTION" shall be

construed as the jurisdictional allegation required by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), and shall be designated as

page 2 of the Complaint;

• the two-page letter from the IRS dated April 10, 2003 shall be

designated as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint;

• the unnumbered page with the heading "COMPLAINT" shall be

construed as Plaintiff's "short and plain statement" of his

claim required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), and

shall be designated as page 3 of the Complaint;

• the undated, notarized letter from Robert Carrillo shall be

designated as Exhibit 2 to the Complaint;

• the Notice of Right to do Business under an Alternative Name

filed with the Maricopa County Recorder on November 1, 1994

shall be designated as Exhibit 3 to the Complaint;

• the IRS Form 8300 shall be designated as Exhibit 4 to the

Complaint;

• the letter from the Arizona Department of Transportation shall

be designated as Exhibit 5 to the Complaint; and finally,

• the unnumbered page with the heading "DESIRED OUTCOME" shall

be construed as the demand for judgment and prayer for relief

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3), and shall

be designated as page 4 of the Complaint.

From January 1, 1995 through December 22, 1999, Plaintiff and

his brother, Roberto Carrillo, were partners in a partnership doing

business as Carrillos' Truck and Equipment Sales. Compl. (doc. #

1), Ex. 2-3. After Robert Carrillo's diagnosis with the

neuromuscular disorder myasthenia gravis in 1998, business

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1

 According to Plaintiff's exhibit, the notice was sent on April

10, 2003, see Compl. (doc. # 1), Ex. 1, while the United States'

exhibit indicates that the notice was sent on April 4, 2003, see Mot.

(doc. # 6), Ex. 1.

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operations apparently ceased or began winding down. See id., Ex.

2. The Carrillos have since remained partners throughout the

winding down of the business. Id. On March 25, 1999, Plaintiff

filed an IRS Form 8300 as a partner in Carrillos' Truck and

Equipment Sales in connection with the cash sale of a vehicle for

$19,500. Id., Ex. 4.

On May 20, 2002, Plaintiff filed an Amended U.S. Individual

Income Tax Return ("IRS Form 1040X") claiming a refund due of $577

based on a projected $2,030 net decrease in tax liability for tax

period 1999 . Id. at 2; Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 2. at 1. In early

April 20031, the IRS sent Plaintiff a notice of disallowance of

that claim. Compl. (doc. # 1), Ex. 1; Mot (doc. # 6), Ex. 1. As

its only reason for the disallowance, the IRS told Plaintiff that

"[b]ased on the information provided, you to [sic] not have

sufficient bases in the partnership to claim the distribution from

the partnhership [sic]." Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 1 at 2. The IRS

also advised Plaintiff of his right to bring suit within two years

of the mailing date of that letter. Id. at 1.

On April 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed this refund suit in this

Court, naming the IRS as the sole defendant. Compl. (doc. # 1). 

On August 12, 2005, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss or,

Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (doc. # 6) asking the Court to

dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), (5), and (6) for lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. 

II. JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATION

In its motion to dismiss, the United States contends that

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of

Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but

fails to expand on this argument in its supporting memorandum. 

Mot. (doc. # 6) at 1. Because the Court must satisfy itself that

it has jurisdiction, it will therefore construe this as an argument

that the jurisdictional allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint is

facially defective.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), a claim for

relief must contain a "short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." The Ninth Circuit

has held that, where the statements in the complaint are sufficient

for the district court to recognize that it has jurisdiction, the

particular statute conferring jurisdiction need not be specifically

pleaded. Aguirre v. Auto. Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168, 174 (9th Cir.

1980) (citing Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 954 (9th

Cir. 1969)).

Plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction to hear

this case because "[t]he United States District Court is the only

option given by the Internal Revenue Service." Compl. (doc. # 1)

at 2. He presumably refers to the letter from the IRS advising him

of his right to "fil[e] suit with the United States District Court

. . . or the United States Claims Court [United States Court of

Federal Claims]." Id., Ex. 1. Although the IRS may be correct in

its advisement, its letter should not be misunderstood to imply

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that the agency is actually granting the Court authority to hear

this case, because the power to confer jurisdiction on the district

courts is constitutionally vested in Congress. U.S. Const. art.

III, § 1; Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835). 

Nevertheless, the Court finds that there are sufficient statements

in Plaintiff's Complaint establishing jurisdiction in a manner

provided by Congress.

It is apparent to the Court from the face of the Complaint

that Plaintiff, by filing this civil action, seeks to recover

internal revenue taxes alleged to have been erroneously collected,

and that Congress has conferred jurisdiction on the district courts

to hear such disputes in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). See Compl. (doc.

# 1) at 2-3, Ex.1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1346(a)(1); see also 26

U.S.C. § 7422(f). Moreover, to the extent that naming the United

States as the proper defendant in such an action may be a

jurisdictional element, see 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f) (Refund suits "may

be maintained only against the United States . . . ."), such a

requirement may be deemed satisfied here because the United States

concedes that "suits against the IRS are properly deemed actions

against the United States." See Mot. (doc. # 6), Mem. in Supp. at

2, n.1 (internal quotation and citation omitted). As such, the

jurisdictional allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint is adequate.

Finally, because the United States is the only proper

defendant in this refund suit, see 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f), White v.

Internal Revenue Service, 790 F. Supp. 1017, 1919 (D. Nev. 1990),

the Court will exercise its authority to join the United States as

Defendant in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 19(a), and will grant the motion to dismiss (doc. # 6) as

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2

 Because the government is the defendant in this action, it is

important to consider its potential immunity from suit. Ordinarily,

the government cannot be sued without waiver of its sovereign

immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).

Plaintiff's suit, if relief is granted, would expend itself on the

public treasury of the federal government, and is therefore a suit

against the sovereign. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).

However, the government must raise sovereign immunity as an

affirmative defense, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999),

Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493, n.20 (1983),

and the United States has not done so here, Mot. (doc. # 6). Even

had the United States raised the defense, the Court is satisfied that

Congress has conditionally abrogated the government's sovereign

immunity in tax refund actions by providing that:

No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for

the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have

been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected . . .

until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with

the Secretary . . . .

26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (emphasis added). The notice of disallowance

attached to both Plaintiff's Complaint (doc. # 1) and the United

States' motion to dismiss (doc. # 6) confirms that the condition for

waiver has been met by Plaintiff's filing of the requisite claim with

the Secretary prior to his commencement of this suit. Compl. (doc.

# 1), Ex. 1; Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 1. Accordingly, the Court finds

that there will be no offense to the dignity of the sovereign in

allowing this case to proceed.

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to the IRS.2

III. INSUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS

The United States argues that Plaintiff's Complaint should be

dismissed for insufficiency of service of process under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), because the Complaint has not

been properly or timely served upon the Attorney General or the

United States Attorney for the District of Arizona. Mot. (doc. #

6), Mem. in Supp. at 3-4.

Effective service of process against the United States or its

agencies requires delivery of a copy of the summons and of the

complaint to the following persons: (1) the United States Attorney

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3

 The United States correctly notes that the IRS cannot be sued.

Mot. (doc. # 6), Mem. in Supp. at 2, n.1. However, even if the

agency was a proper defendant, Plaintiff would still have been

required to deliver a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

Attorney General and the United States Attorney, which he did not do.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(A).

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for the district in which the action is brought; (2) the United

States Attorney General at Washington, D.C.; and (3) any officer or

agency the validity of whose order is attacked by the action, and

who is not made a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A)-(C).

In the case at hand, it is beyond reasonable dispute that

service is defective because Plaintiff has not served the Attorney

General or the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona. 

Instead, only the IRS has been served.3 See Return of Service

(doc. # 3). The decisive inquiry is therefore whether Plaintiff's

failure to cure the defective service within the 120-day time limit

of Rule 4(m) warrants dismissal. For the reasons below, the Court

answers that question in the negative.

The timeliness of domestic service of process is measured by

reference to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m):

If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon 

a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the 

complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own 

initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss 

the action without prejudice as to that defendant or

direct that service be effected within a specified time; 

provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the 

failure, the court shall extend the time for service for 

an appropriate period. . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (emphasis added as quoted in Henderson v.

United States, 517 U.S. 654, 663, n.10). The Supreme Court has

held that Rule 4(m) "accord[s] discretion" for district courts to

"enlarge the 120-day period 'even if there is no good cause

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shown,'" Henderson, 517 U.S. at 671 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)

advisory comm. nn. (1993)), adding that the essential purpose of

service of process is "auxiliary," not jurisdictional, id. at 671. 

The Ninth Circuit has since confirmed "that district courts have

broad discretion under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)] to

extend time for service even without a showing of good cause." 

United States v. 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2001)).

One factor a court must consider in deciding whether to grant

a discretionary extension of time in the absence of a finding of

good cause is whether the statute of limitations for the underlying

claim has expired. See 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d at 773 (citing

Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 759 (3d Cir. 1997)); accord Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(m) advisory comm. nn. (1993) ("The new subdivision . . .

authorizes the court to relieve a plaintiff of the consequences of

[Rule 4(m)] even if there is no good cause shown. . . . Relief may

be justified, for example, if the applicable statute of limitations

would bar the refiled action . . . ."). As the Ninth Circuit has

explained, dismissal for improper service is intended to be without

prejudice so as to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to refile and

effectuate timely service. 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d at 773 (citing

Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1998)). That

purpose would be frustrated, however, if the statute of limitations

has already run, in which case a dismissal intended to be without

prejudice under Rule 4(m) would essentially be with prejudice. See

id.; Matasareanu v. Williams, 183 F.R.D. 242, 246 (C.D. Cal. 1998);

see also Coates v. Shalala, 914 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Md. 1996)

(waiving requirements of Rule 4(m) where pro se plaintiff had

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failed to serve the United States within the 120-day period and had

failed to establish good cause for the delay).

Other factors a court may consider in granting a discretionary

extension of time include whether the defendant upon whom service

was defective had actual notice of the claims asserted against it

in the complaint, and whether that defendant would be prejudiced by

an extension. See Coleman v. Cranberry Baye Rental Agency, 202

F.R.D. 106, 109, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).

The Court recognizes that "firm application of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure" is necessary to "ensure that federal

officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." See Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). However, given the early stage

of the proceedings and Plaintiff's pro se status, a Rule 4(m)

dismissal at this time would be unjust. Because the two-year

statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's refund claim will

have already run by the time of the Court's ruling on this motion,

see 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1), a Rule 4(m) dismissal would effectively

cut off Plaintiff's right to redress. In contrast, by bringing

this motion, the United States has demonstrated its notice of the

underlying claims against it notwithstanding Plaintiff's defective

service. Under these circumstances, the prejudice to Plaintiff in

dismissing his action would be much greater than any prejudice to

the United States in granting an extension of time. Therefore, the

Court finds that justice is best served by exercising its

discretion under Rule 4(m) to allow Plaintiff fifteen (15) days

from the date of entry of this Order in which to serve the United

States in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). If

service is not properly effectuated by that time, Plaintiff's case

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will be dismissed "without prejudice," subject to any statute of

limitations defense.

IV. RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

Finally, the United States argues that Plaintiff's Complaint

should be dismissed because (1) the relief sought is barred by the

two-year statute of limitations set forth at section 6532(a)(1) of

the Internal Revenue Code; and (2) the relief sought has already

been obtained through tax abatements. Because these arguments are

supported by extrinsic materials beyond the face of the Complaint,

the United States argues in the alternative that it would be

entitled to summary judgment if the Court were to convert its

motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

party to seek dismissal of a claim if the claimant failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), "dismissal for failure to state a

claim is improper unless ‘it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.’" Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics

Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Factual argument is

inappropriate in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which tests only the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Thus, in undertaking its analysis,

the court must limit its "review to the contents of the complaint,

accepting the material factual allegations as true and construing

them in the light most favorable to the [non-movant]." Id.

Ordinarily, when matters outside the pleadings are introduced

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on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and these matters are not excluded by

the court, the motion is to be treated as one for summary judgment

and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 

However, there are at least two instances in which a court may

consider such extrinsic materials in determining whether the

plaintiff can prove any set of facts in support of a claim without

converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 

First, the Ninth Circuit has held that "a district court

ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document the

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the

plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies." Parrino v. FHP, Inc.,

146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998).

Second, under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a

district court may take judicial notice of "matters of public

record" outside the pleadings without converting a motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. MGIC Indem. Corp. v.

Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may not,

however, take judicial notice of facts that are "subject to

reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

The United States has asked the Court, in evaluating the legal

sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims, to consider the following: (1) a

copy of a two-page notice of disallowance from the IRS dated April

4, 2003; and (2) a copy of IRS Form 4340, Certificate of

Assessments, Payments and Other Specified Matters for George

Carrillo for tax period 1999. Thus, a threshold matter of inquiry

is whether the Court should consider these extrinsic materials

under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review, or should instead

convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

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4

 Under section 6532(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, a

refund suit must be filed within two years from the date of mailing

of a notice of the disallowance of the claim to which the suit

relates. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1).

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1. Notice of Disallowance Dated April 4, 2003

Correspondence from the IRS is not a matter of public record

apt for judicial notice. However, if Plaintiff's Complaint

"necessarily relies" on the notice of disallowance, and its

authenticity is not contested, then the Court may consider that

document without converting the pending Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

In the instant case, the Court would be inclined to consider

the notice of disallowance because Plaintiff has also attached what

appears to be the same document to the Complaint. Compl. (doc. #

1), Ex. 1; see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

district court was justified in considering the factual findings of

an arbitration award attached to the plaintiff's complaint). 

However, the Court cannot say that the authenticity of the letter

offered by the United States, Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 1, is

undisputed. Although the United States' exhibit and Plaintiff's

exhibit substantially appear to be the same letter, the former is

dated April 4, 2003, while Plaintiff's exhibit is dated April 10,

2003. Compare Compl. (doc. # 1), Ex. 1 at 1 with Mot. (doc. # 6),

Ex. 1 at 1. Because Plaintiff's refund suit was filed on April 6,

2005, see Compl. (doc. # 1), the date of the IRS' letter is crucial

to determining whether Plaintiff filed this action within the twoyear statute of limitations.4 Therefore, the Court will not

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5

 Plaintiff's Complaint refers to an IRS Form 1040X which he had

filed prior to March 10, 2003, Compl. (doc. # 1) at 3, and

incorporates a letter from the IRS concerning a claim for $2,030 that

was received by the IRS on May 20, 2002, Id., Ex. 1. The United

States has attached to its motion the Form 1040X to which Plaintiff's

Complaint undoubtedly refers. See Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 2 at 1 (Form

1040X received by IRS on May 20, 2002, claiming $2,030 net decrease

in tax liability for tax period 1999). Although the Court could

consider the Form 1040X in connection with the United States' Rule

12(b)(6) motion as a document upon which the Complaint necessarily

relies, it cannot extend its review to the IRS Form 4340 to which the

Complaint makes no reference.

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consider the notice of disallowance dated April 4, 2003 under the

Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review.

2. IRS Form 4340 for Tax Period 1999

Similarly, the IRS Form 4340 attached to the United States'

motion, Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 3, is neither a matter of public

record suited for judicial notice, nor is it a document upon which

Plaintiff's Complaint necessarily relies. The United States notes

that the sum total of tax abatements reflected on the Form 4340 is

the same as the $577 refund claimed on the Form 1040X.5 See Mot.

(doc. # 6) at 4-5. This observation raises a factual dispute more

appropriate for a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Therefore,

the Court will not consider the IRS Form 4340 in resolving this

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

B. Conversion to Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment

If a district court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment on account of extrinsic

materials offered by the moving party, it must provide all parties

a "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to

such a motion by Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Where the

nonmoving party is appearing pro se, the Ninth Circuit requires

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strict adherence to the formal notice requirement before a Rule

12(b)(6) motion may be converted to-- and ultimately resolved as--

a Rule 56 motion for a summary judgment. Lucas v. Dep't of Corr.,

66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). The notice requirement serves to

protect the nonmoving pro se party from prejudice upon the

conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to Rule 56 motion. See

Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 438-40 (9th Cir. 1984).

Because the materials offered by the United States may not be

considered under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review, the Court

will convert the remainder of the United States' motion to a Rule

56 motion for summary judgment. In Parts II and III, supra, the

Court has already addressed the United States' arguments concerning

the jurisdictional allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint and

insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Rules 8(a)(1),

12(b)(1), and 12(b)(5). Therefore, only two issues remain to be

determined on summary judgment-- whether the relief sought by

Plaintiff is barred by the two-year statute of limitations of

Internal Revenue Code section 6532(a)(1); and whether the relief

sought by Plaintiff has already been obtained through tax

abatements. These matters will remain under advisement as a motion

for summary judgment, and the Court will rule after having provided

the parties with a reasonable opportunity to respond and present

all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of entry

of this Order within which to serve and file a response in

opposition to the United States' motion (doc. # 6) and to present

all evidence pertinent to a Rule 56 motion on the two remaining

issues-- whether the relief sought by Plaintiff is barred by the

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6

 As to the statute of limitations issue, the Court would be

inclined to find that a genuine issue of material fact has already

been established by virtue of the conflict between the April 10, 2003

mailing date of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, and the April 4, 2004 mailing

date of the United States' Exhibit 1. Compare Compl. (doc. # 1), Ex.

1 with Mot. (doc. # 6), Ex. 1. However, the authenticity of

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is not supported by any statement under oath.

Accordingly, the statute of limitations issue will remain under

advisement until it has been fully briefed.

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two-year statute of limitations of Internal Revenue Code section

6532(a)(1)6; and whether the relief sought has already been

obtained through tax abatements. The United States shall have

fifteen (15) days from the date on which a responsive memorandum,

if any, is filed by Plaintiff within which to serve and file a

reply in support of its motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that it

has subject matter jurisdiction over this case and that the

jurisdictional allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint satisfies the

requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1); that the

IRS is not a suable entity; that the United States is the only

proper defendant in this action and that complete relief cannot be

accorded among those already parties in the absence of the United

States' joinder as Defendant; that Plaintiff has not properly

effectuated service of process upon the United States in accordance

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i); that the circumstances

of the case warrant an extension of time within which Plaintiff may

properly effectuate service of process upon the United States; and

that the remainder of the United States' motion, which argues for

dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is

best resolved at this time by being converted to, and held under

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advisement as, a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, because the

United States has presented extrinsic materials beyond the face of

the Complaint. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days from the

date of entry of this Order within which to effectuate service of

process upon the United States in accordance with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(i); and shall have fifteen (15) days from the

date of entry of this Order within which to serve and file a

response to the United States' motion for summary judgment (doc. #

6), along with any evidence made pertinent to such a motion by Rule

56, on the following two issues-- whether the relief sought by

Plaintiff is barred by the two-year statute of limitations of

Internal Revenue Code section 6532(a)(1); and whether the relief

sought in the Complaint has already been obtained through tax

abatements. The United States shall have fifteen (15) days from

the date on which a responsive memorandum, if any, is filed by

Plaintiff within which to serve and file a reply in support of its

motion.

Finally, if Plaintiff does not properly effectuate service of

process upon the United States within the time allotted by this

Order, his Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, subject

to any statute of limitations defense.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the United States' motion to dismiss (doc.

# 6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, with the remainder of

the motion being converted to, and held under advisement as, a

motion for summary judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States is joined as

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Defendant in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 19(a).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' motion to

dismiss (doc. # 6) is GRANTED on all counts as to Defendant

Internal Revenue Service.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (doc.

# 6) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) (doc.

# 6) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of the United States'

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (doc. # 6) shall be

converted to, and held under advisement as, a Rule 56 motion for

summary judgment. Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days from the

date of entry of this Order within which to serve and file a

response, along with any evidence made pertinent to such a motion

by Rule 56. The United States shall have fifteen (15) days from

the date on which a responsive memorandum, if any, is filed by

Plaintiff within which to serve and file a reply in support of its

motion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the time for Plaintiff to

effectuate service of process upon the United States shall be

extended to fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of this Order. 

If Plaintiff does not properly effectuate service of process in

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) within that

time, his Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, subject to

any statute of limitations defense.

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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED, having determined that there is no just

reason for delay, directing the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgment in favor of Defendant Internal Revenue Service pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). This case is not to be

terminated, however, pending the passage of time allotted by this

Order for Plaintiff to effectuate service of process upon the

United States which has been joined as Defendant.

DATED this 24th day of January, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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