Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01211/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL ESPINOZA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

RAUL LOPEZ, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:10-cv-01211-JLT HC

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE CASE

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO FILE

REGULAR STATUS REPORTS

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO

NOTIFY COURT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

OF ANY FINAL ORDER REGARDING

EXHAUSTION OF GROUNDS THREE AND

FOUR

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through retained counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner filed his federal petition on July 1, 2010. (Doc. 1). In the instant petition,

Petitioner, challenging his 2007 conviction for first degree murder in the Kings County Superior

Court and resulting an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life, raises four grounds for

relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to move for separate trials; (2) insufficient

evidence of deliberation and premeditation; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to conduct

an adequate investigation; and (4) cumulative error . (Doc. 1, pp. 11-12). 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

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In the petition, Petitioner indicates that Grounds One and Two have been exhausted by

presentation to the California Supreme Court, but that Grounds Three and Four have not been

exhausted, although Petitioner further states that the latter two grounds are the subject of pending

state habeas corpus petitions. (Id., p. 12). Petitioner seeks an order from this Court staying

proceedings until Petitioner has exhausted Grounds Three and Four. (Id., p. 13). 

DISCUSSION

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988 (9th

Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1002 th

(1997). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts carte

blanche to stay even fully exhausted habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. Granting a

stay is appropriate where there is no intention on the part of the Petitioner to delay or harass and in

order to avoid piecemeal litigation. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is proper

for a district court, in its discretion, to hold a petition containing only exhausted claims in abeyance

in order to permit the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his state remedies. Kelly v. Small,

315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9 Cir. 2004); Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 882-883 (9 Cir. 2002); James th th

v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9 Cir. 2002); Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. th

Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require that the

Court dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, such as the

instant petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). That changed with the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Recognizing that “[a]s a result of the

interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations and Lundy’s dismissal requirement, 1

petitioners who come to federal court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their

opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims,” the Supreme Court held that federal

courts may now issue “stay and abey” orders under appropriate circumstances to permit petitioners to

exhaust unexhausted claims before proceeding with their federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d). 

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U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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277. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that the procedure should be “available only in limited

circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277. Specifically, the Court said it was appropriate only when (1) good

cause exists for petitioner’s failure to exhaust; (2) petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly

meritless” and (3) there is no indication that petitioner engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or

intentional delay.” Id. at 277-278; Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9 Cir. 2005). When a th

petitioner has met these requirements, his interest in obtaining federal review of his claims

outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal petitions. Rhines, 544

U.S. at 278. 

In a ruling subsequent to Rhines, the Ninth Circuit re-affirmed the vitality of both the Rhines

two-step stay procedure as well as the Kelly three-step stay procedure:

Rhines allows a district court to stay a mixed petition, and does not require that unexhausted

claims be dismissed while the petitioner attempts to exhaust them in state court. In contrast,

the three-step procedure outlined in Kelly allows the stay of fully exhausted petitions,

requiring that the unexhausted claims be dismissed.

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139-1140 (9 Cir. 2009). There are, however, significant distinctions th

between the two procedures. First, claims exhausted during a Rhines stay are not subject to

timeliness challenges since the mixed petition remains pending throughout the stay procedure. Id. at

p. 1140. In contrast, any claim exhausted during a Kelly stay must “relate back” to the claims in the

original petition under the doctrine set forth in Mayle v. Feliz, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), or else be timely

filed under the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation. Id. Additionally, petitioners seeking to

avail themselves of a Rhines stay must make the additional showing of good cause, something not

required under Kelly. Id. at 1143.

Here, Petitioner has expressly requested a Rhines stay. (Doc. 1, pp. 19-20). Accordingly, the

Court will analyze Petitioner’s request under the criteria set forth by the United States Supreme

Court in that case. 

Under Rhines, the Court must first determine whether good cause exists for Petitioner’s

failure to exhaust and whether there is any indication that Petitioner engaged in “abusive litigation

tactics or intentional delay.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-278. Petitioner’s counsel has indicated that he

was retained in February 2010 to present the instant habeas claims, that counsel has been

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 3

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investigating the basis for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that he is presently

interviewing witnesses, and that, because the attorney against whom these ineffectiveness claims are

predicated continued to represent Petitioner until shortly before present counsel was retained, the

grounds for ineffectiveness continued to accrue. (Id., pp. 22-23). 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that good cause exists for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust Grounds Three and Four and that there is no indication that Petitioner has engaged in

“abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Therefore, neither of these criteria represent

obstacles for granting a stay under Rhines.

Next, in order to grant a Rhines stay, the Court must also make a finding that the claim or

claims a petitioner is seeking to exhaust are not “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-278. 

Here, Petitioner’s request for stay contains a lengthy discussion of the various bases for his

contention that former counsel provided ineffective assistance, including, inter alia, the fact that the

co-defendant’s counsel referred to Petitioner’s guilt in closing argument, the fact that the codefendants had antagonistic defenses and the absence of any tactical or strategic legal reason not to

move for severance. However, such arguments go to exhausted Ground One, failure to move for a

severance, not to unexhausted Ground Three, lack of an adequate investigation. Indeed, Petitioner

provides no further details regarding the claims he wishes to exhaust in state court beyond the

abbreviated explanation referred to above. While the Court expresses no opinion regarding the

likelihood that such a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel or cumulative error would

ultimately entitled Petitioner to relief in these proceedings, nevertheless, even based on Petitioner’s

sparse allegations, the Court cannot find that Grounds Three and Four, at this juncture, are “plainly

meritless.” 

Therefore, the Court will grant Petitioner’s motion for a stay of the proceedings and will hold

the petition for writ of habeas corpus in abeyance pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies.

However, the Court will not indefinitely hold the petition in abeyance. See Taylor, 134 F.3d

at 988 n. 11. No later than thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Order Petitioner

must inform the Court of the status of the habeas proceedings in state court, including the

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dates his cases were filed, the case numbers, and any outcomes. Further, Petitioner must 2

proceed diligently to pursue his state court remedies, and every sixty (60) days after the filing

of the initial status report, Petitioner must file a new status report regarding the status of his

state court habeas corpus proceedings. Following final action by the state courts, Petitioner will

be allowed thirty (30) days within which to notify the Court that he has fully exhausted Grounds

Three and Four. At that point, the Court will issue a new briefing schedule regarding the claims in

the instant petition. Failure to comply with these instructions and time allowances will result in this

Court vacating the stay nunc pro tunc to the date of this order. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1071.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant proceedings on his habeas petition (Doc. 1), is

GRANTED;

2. Proceedings on the instant petition are STAYED pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state

remedies regarding Grounds Three and Four;

3. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file a status report within thirty (30) days of the date of

service of this order, advising the Court of the status of all pending habeas proceedings filed

in state court, the dates when such cases were filed, and any outcomes;

4. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file a new status report every sixty (60) days after the filing of

the initial status report; and

5. Petitioner is DIRECTED to notify the Court within thirty days of any final order of the

state courts regarding Grounds Three and Four; 

6. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE the case. The

Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to re-open the case when and if the stay is lifted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

The filing should be entitled “Status Report.”

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E. D. California 5

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