Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06043/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06043-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL AMADOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUMBOLDT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, LEGAL RESEARCH

ASSOCIATES, a California Corporation, 

KAREN LOVIE, an individual, HON. W.

BRUCE WATSON, an individual, THE

COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT, & DOES 1 TO

50,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-6043 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

On September 28, 2006 plaintiff Michael Amador filed this complaint against defendants

Humboldt County Correctional Facility, Legal Research Associates, the County of Humboldt, as

well as Karen Lovie, Honorable W. Bruce Watson, and unnamed Doe defendants 1–50, in their

individual capacities. Amador seeks monetary and injunctive relief for two separate violations of his

civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983: a denial of his constitutional rights as a result of

inadequate access to a law library while Amador was representing himself in a criminal proceeding;

and retaliation for his complaints to prison officials about the lack of adequate legal resources. Now

before the court is the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendants Lovie and Humboldt County. Having

considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court

enters the following memorandum and order. 

 

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BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Michael Amador is currently detained at defendant Humboldt County Correctional

Facility. Defs.’ Mot., Exh. B. Defendant County of Humboldt is the operator of the Humboldt

County Correctional Facility. The County of Humboldt contracts with defendant Legal Research

Associates to provide legal services to inmates at Humboldt County prisons. Defendant Karen

Lovie is a jail compliance officer at Humboldt County Correctional Facility. Defendant Honorable

W. Bruce Watson is a judge of the Humboldt County Superior Court who is currently presiding over

plaintiff’s criminal case. Defendants Does 1 to 50 are alleged agents of the above defendants. 

Plaintiff is currently a criminal defendant in Humboldt County Superior Court. At the time

he filed the instant complaint, Amador was representing himself in the underlying criminal case in

superior court. While proceeding in propria persona, plaintiff’s legal resources were limited to five

cases or statutes at a time by Humboldt County Correctional Facility officials. Plaintiff received

these materials only if he provided correct and accurate citations to those materials. Additionally,

plaintiff alleges that certain other resources were not made available to him, including Black’s Law

Dictionary, Witkin’s Criminal Procedure and “The Bluebook”. In August and September 2006,

plaintiff filed two inmate grievance forms, complaining of the inadequacy of the legal resources. 

Shortly after plaintiff lodged his grievances, defendant Lovie, a Jail Compliance Officer, reported to

defendant Watson, the judge presiding over the underlying criminal case, that plaintiff was misusing

his telephone privileges. As a result, plaintiff’s phone privileges were limited to calls to attorneys

and five other phone calls per week to pre-approved numbers. Plaintiff was also moved from

dormitory housing to maximum security housing a few days after filing his first grievance. 

On December 19, 2006 plaintiff requested and received appointment of a public defender. 

Defs.’ Mot., Exh. A. Since receiving the assistance of counsel, plaintiff has changed his plea in his

criminal proceeding to guilty. Defs.’ Mot., Exh. B. Accordingly, he has waived his right to a jury

trial and is currently awaiting sentencing. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief including

the provision of certain resources to indigent inmates who are representing themselves in pending

criminal proceedings. The requested resources include: a list of available reference materials; a

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“starter collection” of basic resources; a typewriter or computer with printer; access to the annotated

California Codes; internet access for all inmates, including those in maximum security cells; and “a

list of potential matching cases . . . if indigent inmates do not know and cannot readily determine the

exact citation to a case or statute”; unlimited materials to be sent within three days of the request;

Shepardization service; and unlimited free telephone access to pre-approved numbers at least three

times per day. Compl. ¶ 51. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the sufficiency of a

claim—and not the claim’s substantive merits, “a court may [typically] look only at the face of the

complaint to decide a motion to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977,

980 (9th Cir. 2002). Although the court is generally confined to consideration of the allegations in

the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached documents, such documents are

deemed part of the complaint and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted if “it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Allegations of material fact are taken as

true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that are conclusory, legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. 

See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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DISCUSSION

Defendants identify two defects in plaintiff’s complaint which they allege are fatal to each of

plaintiff’s causes of action. First, defendants claim that plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting his

denial of access to the courts. Second, defendants argue that plaintiff fails to state of cause of action

for retaliation.

I. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants have submitted a request that the court take judicial notice of two documents

from the underlying criminal case. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court may take

judicial notice of facts capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The submitted documents are official minutes from

hearings held in Humboldt County Superior Court. The accuracy of these documents is not

questioned here. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the request for judicial notice. 

II. Right of Access to Legal Resources

Plaintiff was an indigent pro per defendant in a California criminal proceeding prior to his

recent appointment of counsel. He argues that his right of access to the courts was violated due to

the inadequate legal resources available to him during his detention in Humboldt County

Correctional Facility. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the inadequate provision of legal resources

violates his right of access to the courts as protected by “due process rights [under] the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments”;2

 his First Amendment rights; and his rights to equal protection of the

laws.

Plaintiff’s reliance on the Fourth Amendment, which concerns searches and seizures, for a 

claim sounding in the right to access the courts is misplaced. The court can find no basis in the

Fourth Amendment for his claims. Rather, plaintiff’s claim would properly be brought pursuant to

his right of self-representation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See U.S. Const.

amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963) (holding that the Sixth

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Amendment guarantees indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel); Faretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806 818–20 (1975) (recognizing a right under the Sixth Amendment for criminal defendants to

represent themselves). Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the fundamental right of access to the

courts, acknowledged in Bounds v. Smith, guarantees his right of access to a law library in the

instant action. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The court will consider plaintiff’s claims under both the Sixth

Amendment and the right of access to the courts in turn. 

A. Right of self-representation

Following Faretta, many courts, including the Ninth Circuit, concluded that a criminal

defendant proceeding in propria persona is entitled to some legal resources in the preparation of a

defense. See, e.g., Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The rights to notice,

confrontation, and compulsory process [recognized in Faretta ] mean, at a minimum, that time to

prepare and some access to materials and witnesses are fundamental to a meaningful right of self

representation.”). Indeed, the requisite warnings given to a defendant who chooses to exercise his

right of self-representation acknowledge this trade-off. Faretta and its progeny suggest that when a

defendant exercises his right of self-representation, he will not have access to the facilities to which

his attorney might have access. See, e.g., Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir.1989)

(“Because a defendant normally gives up more than he gains when he elects self-representation, the

district court is required to make reasonably certain that he in fact wishes to represent himself.”)

(citations omitted).

In the context of reviewing an inmate’s habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court evaluated

the right of access to legal resources for a pro se criminal defendant detained prior to trial. Kane v.

Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005). The Court held only that the failure to provide legal resources to

a criminal defendant proceeding pro se did not violate clearly established federal law, as required for

habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)(1). Id. It declined to resolve the circuit split

with respect to whether such a right to legal resources existed. Id. Accordingly, this court is bound

by Ninth Circuit pronouncements on this issue. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged a

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constitutional right of pro se criminal defendants to some legal resources to assist in preparation of a

defense. See Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2000)3; Milton, 767 F.2d at 1445. 

However, the scope of this right has not been precisely defined. The Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged that some restrictions on the access to legal resources is permissible. See Bribiesca,

215 F.3d at 1020 (acknowledging that restrictions on access to law library based on security

concerns did not offend inmate’s constitutional rights); United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712,

717 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that limit on access to legal materials to a single box of materials

was constitutionally permissible). The Ninth Circuit has decidedly not required that a law library be

made available to all pro se defendants. See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982)

(declining to reverse conviction on the basis that pro se defendant had been denied access to law

library where defendant had some access to appointed counsel). It is not clear to what specific legal

resources a pro se criminal defendant is entitled in preparation for trial. The only firm line drawn in

the case law is that the deprivation of all means of preparing and presenting a defense is

impermissible. Milton, 767 F.2d at 1446. The legal resources available to Amador did not deprive

him of all means in preparing and presenting a defense. 

B. Right of access to the courts

Plaintiff relies on a second line of cases to support his right of access to the courts under the

First Amendment and the equal protection clause. Bounds acknowledged an inmate’s right to legal

resources for the purposes of filing collateral appeals to his conviction and sentence. 430 U.S. at

817. The court reviewed the adequacy of a prison law library for protecting inmates’ rights of

access to the courts and their rights of equal protection. The rights addressed in Bounds and its

progeny are post-trial rights involving situations in which inmates have no right to counsel. Id. at

827 (applying the Bounds rule to contexts, like that in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), in

which inmates have no right to counsel). 

In applying Bounds, the Ninth Circuit has said that “[t]his right does not mandate use of an

up-to-date legal library by the prisoners for post-conviction motions when other adequate outside

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legal assistance is available.” See Milton, 767 F.2d at 1446 n.2. In supplying prisoners meaningful

access to the courts, prison officials may select from numerous reasonable options, and courts are

not to become unnecessarily “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at

361 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)). Indeed, the Court specifically disclaimed

the proposition that the state must “enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate

effectively once in court.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (comparing these

“sophisticated legal capabilities” with the provision of legal counsel) . 

Therefore, plaintiff’s rights of access to the courts under Bounds, to the extent that they apply

to pre-trial confinement, do not require the provision of an extensive law library or internet access. 

Under Bounds and Lewis, an inmate is entitled only to “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present

claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825. 

C. Injury

At this stage it is not clear what resources, aside from court-appointed counsel, a criminal

defendant is entitled to pre-trial. However, for the purposes of a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C.

section 1983, plaintiff must present evidence of an actual injury resulting from the alleged

inadequacy. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (requiring the prisoner to demonstrate “that the alleged

shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim”);

see also Phillips v. Hust, No. 04-36021, 2007 WL 446593 at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007). At the

hearing on this matter, plaintiff suggested that the relevant injury was that he was forced to plead

guilty as a result of retaining counsel. This is hardly an injury for the purposes of section 1983. 

Nonetheless, in this case, plaintiff cannot complain of an injury based on inadequate legal resources

because he was represented when he pled guilty. See Defs.’ Exh. A. (noting that plaintiff requested

appointment of counsel and was provided a public defender); Defs.’ Exh. B. (With assistance of

counsel, plaintiff changed his plea in that criminal proceeding to guilty.). Proceeding under section

1983 with a claim based on unlawful conviction would present potential problems under the Heck

doctrine. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding that section 1983 actions are

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inappropriate mechanisms for challenging the validity of criminal judgments that require proof of the

unlawfulness of his conviction). Thus, plaintiff’s failure to allege injury, or offer any facts suggesting

injury, leads the court to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim that he was denied access to

the courts. 

II. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that prison officials punished him for complaining about the inadequacy of

the legal resources he was provided. This retaliation, he claims, took the form of limited phone

privileges and transfer to maximum security housing from his previous dormitory housing.

To claim retaliation, plaintiff must allege (1) that plaintiff engaged in constitutionally

protected conduct; (2) that the conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” inducing the alleged

retaliation; and (3) resulting injury. Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 1132,

1139 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996)); see also

David v. Baker, 129 Fed. Appx. 358, 360 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, he has satisfied two of the three

prongs of the test for alleging retaliation. First, his protests to prison officials about the available

legal resources may be construed as assertions of his due process or Sixth Amendment rights. 

The resulting injuries alleged by plaintiff include revoked privileges, further loss of access to the

courts, and emotional distress, satisfying the third requirement of retaliation. Plaintiff’s allegations

that these complaints substantially motivated the revocation of his phone privileges and his transfer to

high security housing, however, do not meet the second prong for purposes of overcoming Rule

12(b)(6). Plaintiff points to the timing of his request and the subsequent revocation of privileges,

asking the court to infer improper motivation on the part of the defendants. The court declines to

make such an inferential leap. For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for unlawful

retaliation. However, the court grants plaintiff leave to amend in order to add more facts sufficient to

establish improper motivation. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment claim

is GRANTED without leave to amend, and defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim

is GRANTED with leave to amend to supply facts supporting his claim of improper motivation.

Plaintiff shall file and serve his amended complaint, if any, within thirty (30) days of the date

of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2007

_______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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1. Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint and memorandum in

support thereof.

2. The complaint alleges that defendants interfered with plaintiff’s right to “reasonable access to the

[c]ourts, in violation of [p]laintiff’s due process rights as protected by the 4th and 14th Amendments

to the United States Constitution.” Compl. ¶ 37. 

3. In Kane, the Court concluded that the Bribesca court had erred in holding that a violation of a law

library access right rooted in Faretta was sufficient for habeas relief. 546 U.S. at 9. It left

undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Faretta based right to law library access, rather Kane

declined to say that the analysis was “clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 546 U.S. at 9. 

ENDNOTE

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