Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00436/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00436-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID O’SHELL,

Petitioner,

v.

STEVEN MAYBERG, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.08cv436-J(NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

PETITIONER’S FIRST AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

[Doc. No. 4]

David O’Shell (“Petitioner”) is currently in Respondent’s custody on a civil petition after a jury

found he was a sexually violent predator within the meaning of California Welfare and Institutions Code

sections 6600-6604. He is housed at Coalinga State Hospital. His time in custody is indeterminate. He

has filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising a

single claim for relief [Doc. No. 4]. Respondent filed an answer to the amended petition and lodged

documents in support [Doc. No. 11], arguing that because Petitioner’s challenge to his commitment is

ongoing in the California Court of Appeal, this Court should abstain from ruling on his amended

petition. In the alternative, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Petitioner filed a

traverse and documents in support [Doc. Nos. 16 & 18]. After a thorough review, the Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DISMISSED without prejudice. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2006, a Petition for Commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP

petition”) was filed against Petitioner in San Diego County Superior Court. The SVP petition alleged

that Petitioner previously was convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims, and

suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder that makes him a danger to the health and safety of others in so

far as it makes him likely to engage in future sexually violent predatory behavior within the meaning of

Welfare and Institutions Code §§6600 subd. (c) through (e). [Lodgment No. 1 at 1-63, “Petition for

Involuntary Treatment of a Sexually Violent Predator.”] On December 6, 2007, a jury found Petitioner

to be a sexually violent predator, and the trial court ordered his commitment to the Department of

Mental Health for an indeterminate term pursuant to the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code

sections 6600-6604. Petitioner remains committed to Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California.

[Id. at 136-37, “Order for Involuntary Treatment of a Sexually Violent Predator.”]

Subsequent to his commitment, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a state habeas petition in San

Diego County Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of the arraignment and probable cause

hearing which preceded his trial. The court denied the petition based on Petitioner’s failure to provide

any reasons to support his constitutional challenge, and advised Petitioner to consult with his legal

counsel prior to filing any further petitions. [Lodgment No. 4, “Order Denying Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus,” Sup. Ct. No. HC 18785.] On May 10, 2007 Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in

the California Court of Appeal, once again challenging the constitutionality of his arraignment and

probable cause hearing. [Lodgment No. 5, “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” Ca. App. Ct. No.

D050847.] Petitioner raised a single ground for relief, arguing the trial court’s failure to hold his

arraignment and probable cause hearing within the applicable time period violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights as he was not afforded the opportunity to waive time, and his attorney

chose not to do so. [Id. at 3.] On May 18, 2007, the appellate court denied the petition, finding that

Petitioner improperly used the writ to bypass a decision by his attorney not to file a motion to dismiss. 

[Lodgment No. 6, 2.] 

Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in the California Court of

Appeal raising the same ground for relief and attaching supporting exhibits which he had not submitted

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with his prior petition. [Lodgment No. 7, “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” Cal. App. Ct. No.

D050983.] On August 14, 2007, the appellate court found the petition procedurally barred pursuant to

In Re Clark, (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, which bars successive or piecemeal petitions. The court also

found that Petitioner failed to state a prima facie claim for relief. [Id., citing Townsend v. Superior

Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781 (trial counsel has general authority to control all decisions affecting

trial tactics and court proceedings).] On September 18, 2007, Petitioner filed the same state habeas

petition in the California Supreme Court. [Lodgment No. 9, “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” Cal.

S. Ct. No. S156411.] The court denied the petition without comment on November 14, 2007. 

[Lodgment No. 10.] 

On March 10, 2008, Petitioner, still proceeding pro se, filed a third state habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal. (See In re DAVID O’SHELL on Habeas Corpus, Ca. App. Ct. No.

D052648, Case Docket, available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=41, website

last accessed October 15, 2008 at 11:21 a.m.) Prior to this filing, on December 18, 2007, Petitioner’s

counsel filed a notice of direct appeal of Petitioner’s commitment in the California Court of Appeal. 

(See The People v. O’Shell, Ca. App. Ct. No. D052192, see id. re: access to docket.) On April 9, 2008,

the Court of Appeal decided to consider his third habeas petition filed March 10, 2008 concurrently with

his pending direct appeal, and ordered the Clerk of Court to forward a copy of the pro se petition to

Petitioner’s appellate counsel. (Id, April 9, 2008 Docket Entry.) On June 27, 2008, Petitioner’s

appellate counsel filed an opening brief; Respondent’s brief has not yet been filed after being granted

several extensions of time in which to do so. [Lodgment No. 11.] Petitioner’s most recent state habeas

petition and his direct appeal are currently pending in the California Court of Appeal. 

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed his original Petition in this Court on March 7, 2008. The

presiding District Judge dismissed the petition without prejudice because Petitioner failed to name a

proper respondent [Doc. No. 3]. Petitioner complied with the order, and filed a corrected First Amended

Petition on April 21, 2008 [Doc. No. 4]. Although he states the claim as three separate grounds for

relief, Petitioner raises the single claim raised in his previous state habeas petitions, challenging the

constitutionality of his arraignment and probable cause hearing because he did not knowingly waive

time to hold the hearing outside the applicable time periods. (See First Amended Petition, “Grounds for

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Relief,” 3-8.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on July 25, 2008 [Doc. No. 11]. Respondent

argues that this Court should dismiss the petition based on the principles articulated in the abstention

doctrine due to the pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner filed a traverse on October 8,

2008, in which he argues that the abstention doctrine is not applicable to his case [Doc. No. 16]. 

DISCUSSION

The Younger abstention doctrine forbids federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal

proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances that create a threat of irreparable injury. See Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 1054 (1993). Younger abstention is not limited to ongoing state criminal proceedings,”

however, and the doctrine extends to civil proceedings as well “provided those proceedings implicate

important state interests.” World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079,

1082 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). “Younger generally directs a federal court to abstain from

granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” 

Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1997). If Younger abstention applies, a

federal court may not retain jurisdiction over the case, but should dismiss the action. World Famous

Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 1987); see Kenneally, 967

F.2d at 331; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 348 (1977). In the habeas context, Younger abstention

promotes both the interests of comity and judicial economy. Courts have “long recognized that in some

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice

require a federal court to forego the exercise of its habeas corpus power.” Francis v. Henderson, 425

U.S. 536, 539 (1976). A habeas petitioner may be acquitted at trial, or on appeal, thereby mooting the

federal issue in the petition. Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983).

Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the

proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate

opportunity to raise federal questions. Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar

Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Baffert v. California Horse Racing Board, 332 F.3d 613, 617

(9th Cir. 2003); Kenneally, 967 F.2d at 331. Under the first prong of the Younger test, the pendency of

the state proceedings is determined at the time the federal complaint/petition is filed. Mission Oaks

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Mobil Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359, 360-61 (9th Cir. 1993); Beltran v. California, 871

F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988). State proceedings are ongoing if appellate remedies have not been

exhausted. Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975). The second Young factor anticipates

that state court proceedings may involve an important state interest when significant state policies are at

issue. Middlesex County Ethics Commission, 457 U.S. at 432; see World Famous Drinking Emporium,

820 F.2d at 1082-83 (civil proceeding implicated state’s interest in enforcing municipal ordinances

regulating public nuisances). With respect to the third factor, the Supreme Court has noted that “where

vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain ‘unless state law clearly bars the

interposition of the constitutional claims.’” Middlesex County Ethics Commission, 457 U.S. at 432. To

satisfy this final requirement, it is sufficient that constitutional claims may be raised in state court

judicial review of the proceeding. See Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,

477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986). All three of the Younger requirements are satisfied in the present case. 

First, Petitioner’s direct appeal from his trial and subsequent civil commitment is ongoing in the

California Court of Appeal. Petitioner also has a state habeas petition pending before the appellate

court, being considered concurrently with his appeal. His direct appeal was pending at the time he filed

his original federal petition. Petitioner filed his pending state habeas petition within days of his original

federal petition and over a month prior to his amended federal petition. As such, it appears that state

proceedings are ongoing that implicate the validity of Petitioner’s commitment and the related hearings

and procedures leading to his commitment, and potentially may render the claim in his amended federal

petition moot. Sherwood, 716 F.2d at 634. 

Second, the state judicial proceedings implicate important state interests. California’s Sexually

Violent Predator Act was passed to protect the public from individuals who have committed sexually

violent crimes and who risk engaging in repeated violent sexual acts as the result of a mental disorder. 

Third, the state appellate process provides an adequate opportunity for Petitioner to raise his

constitutional challenge to his commitment proceedings. Petitioner’s claim may be brought on direct

appeal, and the state appellate court will have the opportunity to rule upon the constitutionality of

Petitioner’s commitment. 

Petitioner argues in his traverse that his claim has been finally determined by way of his first

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three state habeas petitions, the last of which was before the state’s highest court. [Petitioner’s

Traverse, 5.] As such, he asserts that this Court has no reason to abstain from considering his amended

petition since it presents the same ground for relief asserted in his state habeas petitions. [Id.] The

essence of Petitioner’s argument is that he has exhausted his claim in state court, and therefore it is ripe

for consideration here. In order to properly exhaust, the specific factual basis of the federal claim must

be presented to the highest state court, see Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2003), either

on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a

fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3

(1981). 

The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine reflects the same policy of federal-state comity that

underlies the abstention doctrine: to give the state “‘the initial “opportunity to pass upon and correct”

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)

(citations omitted). However, the exhaustion requirement applicable to federal habeas petitions is not

satisfied if there is a pending post-conviction proceeding in state court. Sherwood, 716 F.2d 632, 634. 

This includes a pending direct appeal, as is the situation here. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held

unequivocally that the exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if there is a pending proceeding in state

court, even if the issue the petitioner seeks to raise in federal court has been finally determined by the

highest available state court. Id. This is because, in the instant case, the pending state action might

result in reversal of Petitioner’s commitment on some other ground, mooting the federal case. See id. In

Sherwood, a direct appeal was pending although the federal issues had been decided by the state courts

via another procedural route. The exhaustion rationale articulated in Sherwood provides an alternative

to the Younger abstention, and is well-established in this circuit. 

Abstention is therefore required in this case unless an exception to Younger applies, of which

there are few. Federal courts cannot interfere with pending state criminal proceedings, absent

extraordinary circumstances that create a threat of irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

53-54 (1971). Irreparable injury does not exist if the threat to the petitioner’s federally protected rights

may be eliminated by his defense of the criminal case. Id. at 46. Moreover, even irreparable injury is

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insufficient to permit interference with the proceeding unless it is “both great and immediate.” Id.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate a threat of immediate irreparable injury. 

This Court must respect California’s state judicial process and abstain from determining the

merits of Petitioner’s claim. Therefore, although Respondent discussed Petitioner’s claim on its merits,

the Court shall not address Respondent’s substantive answer to the amended petition.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, under the rationales of both Sherwood and Younger, the undersigned Magistrate

Judge RECOMMENDS that the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED

without prejudice to refiling once Petitioner’s state appellate proceedings are complete. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 14, 2008, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than November 21, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 16, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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