Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01006/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alberto Angel Gonzalez-Lozano,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Conrad Graber, 

Respondent.

No. CV-13-01006-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

 Petitioner Alberto Angel Gonzalez-Lozano had two incidents where he was caught 

without his pants on. Based on the second incident, he was found guilty of “stalking” and 

punished with, among other things, the loss of good time credit. Magistrate Judge 

Michelle H. Burns recommends denial of Petitioner’s challenge to the violation and 

sanction. Petitioner filed objections but, for the following reasons, the Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation will be adopted in full. 

I. Standard of Review for Report and Recommendation 

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court 

must review de novo the portions to which an objection is made. Id. The district court 

need not, however, review the portions to which no objection is made. See Schmidt v. 

Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“[D]e novo review of factual and 

legal issues is required if objections are made, but not otherwise.”) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

II. Factual Background 

 Petitioner did not object to most of the factual background recited by the 

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Magistrate Judge. Therefore, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recounting of the 

facts. The relevant facts, in brief, are as follows. 

 Petitioner is currently an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) 

Phoenix. On the morning of August 27, 2012, FCI-Staff psychologist, Dr. Marilyn Park, 

saw Petitioner “putting his khaki pants [on]” in front of the outdoor recreation area. 

(Doc. 12-2 at 8). Dr. Park told Petitioner “he needed to dress himself in his housing 

unit.” Four days later, another staff member saw Petitioner in a “hallway wearing only 

his underwear and a shirt.” When asked why he was not wearing pants, Petitioner said he 

was “waiting to use the restroom but someone is in there.” (Doc. 12-2 at 6). The staff 

member told him “to put his pants back on.” That same staff member noted the hallway 

where he observed Petitioner “is the hallway that leads up to Dr. Park’s office.” (Doc. 

12-2 at 6). That hallway “is in an area that Dr. Park must walk through to get to and from 

her office” and Petitioner was found “no more than 25 yards from Dr. Park’s office.” 

(Doc. 12-2 at 9). The staff member composed an incident report charging Petitioner with 

“stalking” and “indecent exposure.” (Doc. 12-2 at 6). 

 Petitioner was given a copy of the incident report later that same day. When first 

given the report, Petitioner stated “I admit I took off my shorts and then put my pants on, 

not thinking anyone would see me do this.” (Doc. 12-2 at 7). But Petitioner disputed he 

was “stalking anyone.” (Doc. 12-2 at 7). An investigation was conducted and a hearing 

before the Unit Discipline Committee (“UDC”) took place a short time later. (Doc. 12-2 

at 3). The UDC referred the matter to a Discipline Hearing Officer for a further hearing. 

(Doc. 12-2 at 3). 

 At the hearing before the Discipline Hearing Officer, a memo written by Dr. Park 

allegedly was read to Petitioner. Petitioner was then allowed to make a statement 

regarding Dr. Park’s memo. Petitioner admitted Dr. Park had confronted him and told 

him his “undressed state . . . made her feel ‘uncomfortable.’” (Doc. 12-2 at 10). The 

hearing officer held Petitioner had “committed the prohibited act of Stalking” and 

sanctioned Petitioner with, among other things, the loss of “27 days Good Conduct 

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Time.” (Doc. 12-2 at 10, 12). Petitioner appealed. 

 On appeal, Petitioner cited the definition of “stalking” that requires “repeated 

behavior which harasses” and argued there was “no documented pattern of repeated 

behavior.” (Doc. 12-1 at 16). The Regional Director issued a written opinion affirming 

the violation and sanctions. The Regional Director reasoned Petitioner “had previously 

been warned about [his] conduct” and there was an adequate “basis for the finding that 

[he] committed the prohibited act.” On Petitioner’s argument regarding the lack of 

“repeated behavior,” the Regional Director stated “the [hearing officer] drew a reasonable 

conclusion that you stalked the Staff Psychologist after she previously warned you about 

your behavior.” (Doc. 12-1 at 17). Petitioner then appealed again, but the violation and 

sanctions were again affirmed. (Doc. 12-1 at 4). 

 Petitioner filed this habeas petition asserting two challenges to the violation and 

sanctions. First, Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence supporting the 

“stalking” charge. And second, Petitioner believes his due process rights were violated 

during the disciplinary process because he was not permitted to “examine or challenge” 

Dr. Park’s memo. (Doc. 1 at 5). 

III. Standard for Prison Discipline 

 The Magistrate Judge correctly identified the very lenient standard the Court must 

apply when assessing Petitioner’s claims. A prison inmate is entitled to limited 

procedural protections before he “can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in good 

time credits.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985) (citing Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). Those protections require an inmate receive: 

(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, 

when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a 

written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons 

for the disciplinary action. 

Id. at 454. In addition to these requirements, the factual determinations must be 

“supported by some evidence in the record.” Id. This “some evidence” standard requires 

only a “modicum of evidence.” Id. It does not require the Court reexamine “the entire 

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record,” independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Id. It 

only requires the Court determine “whether there is any evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached by the [prison].” Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit 

has described this as a “minimally stringent” standard. Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 

705 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IV. Sufficient Evidence of Stalking 

 Petitioner’s first argument is that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty 

of “stalking.” The applicable regulation defines “stalking” as: 

Stalking another person through repeated behavior which harasses, alarms, 

or annoys the person, after having been previously warned to stop such 

conduct.1

28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1. The Magistrate Judge concluded there was sufficient 

evidence supporting the factual determination that Petitioner had engaged in “stalking.” 

Petitioner’s objections to this conclusion are not entirely clear. But assuming he is 

objecting to the sufficiency of the evidence, his objections are not convincing. 

 The evidence before the hearing officer was largely undisputed. Dr. Park found 

Petitioner in the hallway without his pants on and admonished him to dress appropriately. 

Four days later Petitioner was found by another staff member without his pants on. The 

second staff member explained Petitioner was found in a hallway leading up to Dr. Park’s 

office. While Petitioner now argues there were reasonable explanations for him not 

wearing pants on either occasion, and that he was not very close to Dr. Park’s office the 

second time, those arguments do not mean the ultimate conclusion regarding “stalking” 

was arbitrary or lacking a plausible basis. The undisputed evidence was that Dr. Park had 

warned Petitioner about his dress and a very short time later, in the general vicinity of Dr. 

Park’s office, Petitioner was found in a state of undress. This was sufficient to meet the 

very lenient “some evidence” standard.2

 Given the low standard, the Magistrate Judge 

 

1

 The regulation also explains that “[a]iding, attempting, abetting, or making plans to commit any of the prohibited acts is treated the same as committing the act itself. 28 C.F.R. § 541.3(a). 

2

 To find Petitioner guilty, the hearing officer was not required to conclude 

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correctly concluded Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his first argument. 

V. Sufficient Opportunity to Present Evidence 

 Petitioner’s second argument is that Dr. Park’s memo was not read aloud at the 

hearing. The Magistrate Judge concluded the memo was, in fact, read aloud. (Doc. 20 at 

5). But Petitioner’s objections dispute this conclusion. Petitioner has not, however, 

explained how this factual dispute makes a meaningful difference. 

 Petitioner apparently believes the failure to read the memo aloud meant he was not 

given the “opportunity to prepare [for] or contravene the information provided by Dr. 

Park.” (Doc. 22 at 2). It is not entirely clear what this means as Petitioner admits Dr. 

Park found him putting on his pants and the memo from Dr. Park merely recounted their 

interaction. It is also undisputed Petitioner knew his interaction with Dr. Park was at 

issue during the hearing and there is no indication Petitioner was prevented from 

presenting evidence or argument to the hearing officer regarding the incident with Dr. 

Park. Therefore, whether Dr. Park’s memo was read aloud or not, the Magistrate Judge 

correctly concluded Petitioner was provided due process and he is not entitled to relief on 

his second argument. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 20) is ADOPTED IN 

FULL and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 8th day of October, 2014. 

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

 Petitioner actually did harass, alarm, or annoy Dr. Park. Rather, the officer’s conclusion 

was permissible even if the officer believed Petitioner was only attempting to harass, alarm, or annoy Dr. Park. 28 C.F.R. § 541.3(a) (attempts are punished the same as committing the act). 

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