Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02150/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02150-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LOREN BOND,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-99-2150 LKK DAD P

vs.

RICHARD A. RIMMER, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding by counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. This case is one of five that have been related for administrative purposes. On

September 9, 2005, the cases came before the court for hearing of respondents’ motions to

dismiss petitioners’ amended petitions as containing untimely claims that do not relate back to

claims that were timely filed. Glenn R. Pruden appeared for the moving parties. Lindsay Anne

Weston appeared for petitioner Bond. The parties’ arguments were heard, and the motions were

taken under submission. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend that

respondents’ motion be granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 2, 1991, Gary Summar was murdered in Trinity County. On

December 16, 1991, Robert Bond, Leafe Dodds, Robert Fenenbock, Ernest Knapp, Anthony

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Lockley, and Bernard MacCarlie were arraigned in Trinity County Superior Court on charges of

participating in the murder. On October 5, 1992, Barbara Adcock, Cherri Frazier, and Sue

Hamby were also arraigned in Trinity County on charges of participating in the murder.

Pretrial litigation in the Trinity County Superior Court lasted through September

1993. During this time, motions for multiple juries, motions to determine the competence of a

key government witness, motions for severance, motions for change of venue, motions to dismiss

or demur, and other motions were resolved in the Trinity County Superior Court. On August 16,

1993, the court ruled that there would be four separate trials, with two trials involving dual juries

to be conducted in Solano County Superior Court and two additional trials to be conducted in

either Stanislaus or San Joaquin County. Subsequently, however, Ernest Knapp was dismissed

as a defendant, and the remaining defendants were prosecuted in three rather than four trials.

The first two trials were conducted in Solano County, while the third was

conducted in Contra Costa County. All three trials were prosecuted by Robert Maloney, a special

prosecutor appointed to the case. Defendants Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier were tried in the

first trial, which began on November 15, 1993, and concluded on February 4, 1994; judgment

was entered on March 16, 1994. Defendants Bond, MacCarlie, and Dodds were tried in the

second trial, which commenced in September 1994; judgment was entered on January 20, 1995. 

The trial of defendants Adcock and Lockley was conducted in 1995.

I. Petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier

In the first trial, defendant Fenenbock was convicted of first degree murder, with

enhancements for use of a weapon and infliction of great bodily injury, but was acquitted of

conspiracy to commit murder. Defendants Hamby and Frazier were convicted of conspiracy to

commit murder but were acquitted of murder.

On appeal, defendant Fenenbock raised seven claims, alleging there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction, two jury instructions were erroneous, several

errors stemming from the testimony of child witness Randy Hogrefe, and the trial court

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erroneously allowed rebuttal witnesses. Defendant Hamby joined in the claims raised by

defendants Fenenbock and Frazier and raised additional claims concerning jury instructions and

trial court error with regard to rebuttal evidence. Defendant Frazier joined in the claims raised by

defendants Hamby and Fenenbock and raised additional claims concerning jury instructions and

her sentence. Defendant Frazier also filed a state habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance

of trial counsel.

In a partially published opinion filed on July 1, 1996, People v. Fenenbock, et al.,

46 Cal. App. 4th 1688 (1996), the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District

affirmed the judgments of conviction entered against defendants Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier

and denied defendant Frazier’s habeas petition. On October 2, 1996, the California Supreme

Court denied review. The defendants did not file petitions for certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court.

On January 31, 1997, Sue Hamby filed a pro se federal habeas petition raising two

claims. The respondent filed an answer to her petition on April 11, 1997, and a pro se traverse

was filed on May 14, 1997. On September 12, 1997, Robert Fenenbock filed a pro se federal

habeas petition raising seven claims, and on November 20, 1997, Cherri Frazier filed a pro se

federal habeas petition raising two claims. On December 4, 1997, the Federal Defender was

appointed to represent petitioner Fenenbock. The Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier cases were

related for administrative purposes on December 24, 1997, and the Federal Defender was

appointed to represent petitioners Hamby and Frazier. Jolie Lipsig subsequently substituted in as

counsel for petitioner Fenenbock, and Janice Lagerlof substituted in as counsel for petitioner

Hamby. At the initial status conference held on February 26, 1998, the undersigned granted the

first of many continuances requested by petitioners for the purpose of obtaining and reviewing

the voluminous records of their trial and of the two subsequent trials. On March 16, 1999, the

California Court of Appeal filed its decision in the consolidated appeals of co-defendants Bond,

MacCarlie, Adcock, and Lockley. Petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier were eventually

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ordered by the undersigned to file amended petitions and any accompanying motions by May 1,

2000. However, on April 5, 2000, petitioners moved for leave to conduct discovery regarding

claims not yet presented to any court. The motion was denied, and further continuances were

granted.

On September 24, 2001, petitioners moved to hold their federal proceedings in

abeyance. Petitioners indicated their intention to file state exhaustion petitions by November 16,

2001. In opposition, respondents argued that the statute of limitations had expired and any new

claims would be untimely. In findings and recommendations filed November 1, 2001, the

undersigned recommended that petitioners’ joint motion be granted and that all petitioners be

required to file a motion for leave to amend or an amended federal habeas petition within thirty

days after disposition of their state habeas petitions. The findings and recommendations were

adopted on December 4, 2001, and the Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier cases were stayed.

II. Petitioners Bond and MacCarlie

In the second trial in the Solano County Superior Court, defendant Dodds was

acquitted of all charges. Defendant MacCarlie was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder,

two counts of kidnaping, mayhem, and assault with a deadly weapon, plus enhancements for use

of a weapon and infliction of great bodily injury, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the

charge of murder. The trial court declared a mistrial on the murder charge against defendant

MacCarlie. Defendant Bond’s separate jury was also unable to reach a verdict on the charge of

murder, and a mistrial was declared to that count. Defendant Bond was convicted of conspiracy

to commit murder and acquitted of the remaining charges.

On appeal, defendant Bond claimed that there was insufficient evidence of

conspiracy to commit murder, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the requisite intent

for conspiracy, and the trial court failed to require the jury to determine whether petitioner

conspired to commit first or second degree murder. Defendant Bond joined in all applicable

arguments raised by defendant MacCarlie. Defendant MacCarlie argued on appeal that (1) the

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trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the requisite intent for conspiracy, lesser included

offenses to conspiracy to commit murder, and heat of passion; (2) trial counsel was ineffective

because he failed to request instructions on lesser included offenses to conspiracy to commit

murder; (3) the trial court erred by taking partial verdicts before replacing a juror who had

become ill; and (4) the trial court erroneously calculated presentence credits.

In an unpublished opinion filed March 16, 1999, the California Court of Appeal

for the First Appellate District affirmed the convictions of defendants Bond and MacCarlie but

remanded for modification of defendant MacCarlie’s presentence credits. On June 30, 1999, the

California Supreme Court denied review. Neither defendant Bond nor defendant MacCarlie filed

a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

On October 29, 1999, Robert Bond filed a pro se federal habeas petition alleging

that there was insufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit murder and that the jury instructions

on conspiracy to commit murder violated due process. The Federal Defender was appointed to

represent petitioner Bond, and the case was set for a status conference. Lindsay Anne Weston

substituted in as counsel for petitioner Bond. The court declined to relate the Bond case to the

Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier cases. Several continuances were thereafter granted in the Bond

case.

On August 23, 2000, Bernard MacCarlie filed a pro se federal habeas petition

alleging that the jury instructions on conspiracy to commit murder violated due process, the

failure to give instructions on conspiracy to commit second degree murder violated due process

and ex post facto laws, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on

conspiracy to commit second degree murder, the trial court’s failure to instruct on heat of passion

violated due process and ex post facto laws, and the verdict was coerced as a result of the court’s

taking partial verdicts before a juror was excused for illness. Petitioner MacCarlie’s application

to consolidate his case with petitioner Bond’s was denied. The court appointed the Federal

Defender to represent petitioner MacCarlie and set the case for a status conference. Margaret

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Littlefield substituted in as counsel for petitioner MacCarlie. Thereafter, several continuances

were granted at the request of counsel for the various petitioners.

A status conference was held in the Bond and MacCarlie cases on October 26,

2001, and a scheduling conference was set for January 18, 2002. The Bond and MacCarlie cases

were related to the Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier cases for administrative purposes on

December 12, 2001. On January 18, 2002, a deadline was set for the filing of abeyance motions

by petitioners Bond and MacCarlie. The motions were filed, and respondents opposed them on

the ground that the statute of limitations had expired and any new claims would be untimely. In

findings and recommendations filed April 23, 2002, the undersigned recommended that

petitioners’ motions be granted and that each petitioner be required to file an amended federal

habeas petition within thirty days after disposition of their state habeas petitions. The findings

and recommendations were adopted on May 20, 2002, and the Bond and MacCarlie cases were

stayed.

III. Further State Court Proceedings

On November 26, 2001, petitioner Hamby filed a habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court raising nine claims, and petitioner Frazier filed a petition raising fifteen claims. 

On December 10, 2001, petitioner Fenenbock filed a petition raising nine claims. On July 19,

2002, petitioner MacCarlie filed a petition raising ten claims. On August 20, 2002, petitioner

Bond also filed a petition raising ten claims. In a single order filed June 25, 2003, the California

Supreme Court denied the exhaustion petitions filed by all five petitioners.

IV. Further Federal Court Proceedings

On various dates after August 4, 2003, four of the five petitioners filed amended

habeas petitions as a matter of right. Petitioner Fenenbock’s amended petition alleges ten claims,

including the seven raised in his original petition. Petitioner Frazier’s amended petition alleges

sixteen claims, including the two raised in her original petition. Petitioner Bond’s amended

petition alleges twelve claims, including the two raised in his original petition. Petitioner

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MacCarlie’s amended petition alleges fourteen claims, including the five raised in his original

petition. Because the respondent previously filed an answer to petitioner Hamby’s original

petition, petitioner Hamby filed a motion for leave to amend. Respondent stipulated to the filing

of petitioner Hamby’s amended petition while reserving the right to raise a statute of limitations

defense to any untimely claims. Petitioner Hamby’s amended petition alleges eleven claims,

including the two raised in her original petition.

On December 5, 2003, respondents filed their first motions to dismiss petitioners’

newly added claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit subsequently ruled

that the transaction or occurrence at issue in a federal habeas petition for purposes of Rule 15(c)

is the petitioner’s state trial and conviction and that all new claims alleged in an amended petition

relate back to the date of filing the original petition and thereby avoid the one-year statute of

limitations. Felix v. Mayle, 379 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2004). The undersigned recommended that

respondents’ motions to dismiss be denied, and the findings and recommendations were adopted

on October 1, 2004.

On January 4, 2005, respondents moved to stay these proceedings pending

Supreme Court action in Felix v. Mayle. Respondents’ motions were heard and denied on

February 4, 2005, but respondents were granted six months to respond to the amended petitions. 

On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court held that new claims alleged in an amended habeas

petition do not relate back to the date of the original petition if the new claims are supported by

facts that differ in time and type from those set forth in the original petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545 

U.S. 644, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005). Respondents renewed their motions to dismiss in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision with those motion being filed on August 4, 2005.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss

Respondents move to dismiss petitioner Bond’s amended petition on the ground

that it contains claims that are untimely under the AEDPA statute of limitations and do not relate

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back to claims that were timely filed. Respondents assert that petitioner was aware at all times of

respondents’ intention to oppose petitioner’s newly exhausted claims as untimely, yet petitioner

did not include in his amended petition any reasons why the new claims should not be dismissed

as time barred. Respondents acknowledge that petitioner offered such reasons in opposition to

respondents’ first motion to dismiss, but they decline to assume petitioner will rely on the same

reasons in opposing their renewed motion to dismiss.

Respondents contend that the new claims alleged in petitioner Bond’s amended

petition are untimely. Respondents identify the newly added claims as Claims 1-8 and Claims

11-12. Respondents set forth a history of petitioner’s proceedings in state and federal court that

includes the following key dates:

June 30, 1999 California Supreme Court denied review on direct appeal

September 28, 1999 State court judgment became final upon expiration of the time to

file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court

October 29, 1999 Federal habeas petition was filed, alleging two claims

September 28, 2000 One-year period of limitation expired

August 20, 2002 First state habeas petition was filed in California Supreme Court,

alleging ten claims

June 25, 2003 California Supreme Court summarily denied the habeas petition

September 2, 2003 Petitioner filed an amended federal habeas petition alleging twelve

claims, including the two original claims (now designated claims 9

and 10)

Respondents point to the date on which petitioner’s judgment became final, the

date on which the statute of limitations expired, and the date, almost three years after the statute

of limitations expired, on which petitioner filed his amended federal habeas petition raising new

claims. Respondents conclude that they have met their burden to plead and prove that

petitioner’s new claims are untimely and must be dismissed unless petitioner can meet his burden

of establishing a factual basis for tolling the statute in some way that will circumvent the

limitations period for him. Respondents compare each of petitioner’s new claims with those

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alleged in petitioner’s initial federal habeas petition and contend that not one new claim relates

back to any claim alleged in the original, timely pleading. With regard to Claim 12, alleging

cumulative error, respondents also argue that the Supreme Court has not recognized the

availability of habeas relief for such a claim and that relief on that ground is Teague-barred.

II. Petitioner’s Opposition

Petitioner Bond acknowledges that his judgment became final on September 28,

1999, and that the statute of limitations expired on September 28, 2000, after he filed a timely

federal habeas on October 29, 1999. Petitioner asserts that respondents’ motion to dismiss

should be denied for four reasons set forth in his opposition. Petitioner further asserts that he

joins in all applicable arguments raised by petitioners in the four related cases in opposition to

respondents’ first motions to dismiss as well as in opposition to respondents’ second motions to

dismiss.

A. Rule 15(c) Relation Back

Petitioner contends first that most of his new claims relate back to the two claims

he raised in his timely initial federal petition or to claims raised in petitions timely filed in the

four related cases.

1. Claims That Relate Back to Petitioner’s Original Petition

Petitioner argues that his new Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 12, as well as portions of

Claims 6 and 8, relate back to his two timely filed claims.

Petitioner asserts that his original Claim 1, presented as Claim 10 in the amended

petition, put respondents on notice that (1) petitioner is “challenging all of the evidence used to

support that there was an agreement to kill Hop or that he intended Hop be killed,” (2) petitioner

was specifically challenging the truthfulness and credibility of Randy Hogrefe’s testimony, (3)

petitioner was claiming Hogrefe’s testimony was not reliable, reasonable, or of solid value, was

not credible, and was replete with inconsistent statements, and (4) petitioner may have been

guilty only of agreeing Hop should be assaulted.

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Petitioner describes his original Claim 2, presented as Claim 9 in the amended

petition, as alleging “constitutional error because of instructional error in failing to accurately

instruct that he had an intent to kill the victim.” Petitioner asserts that this claim put respondents

on notice that he was challenging all of the facts and evidence that showed his intent to kill and

necessarily challenged the evidence of a conspiracy. Petitioner argues that this claim also

challenged Hogrefe’s testimony as not credible due to the witness’s inconsistent statements.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts of his new Claim 1, alleging that

Hogrefe’s testimony was based on a false memory created by government manipulation,

coercion, and coaching, relate directly back to the original Claims 1 and 2, both of which

challenged the truthfulness, credibility, and reliability of Hogrefe’s testimony at petitioner’s trial.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts of his new Claim 2, alleging denial of

defense access to Hogrefe, relate directly back to the facts of the original Claims 1 and 2, because

those claims challenged the truthfulness, credibility, and reliability of Hogrefe’s testimony and it

was the denial of access to and sequestration of Hogrefe that allowed the false memories to be

planted.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts of his new Claim 4, alleging his actual

innocence, relate back to the facts of the original Claims 1 and 2 because in those original claims

he put respondents on notice that the evidence presented at trial, along with the defective jury

instructions, did not support petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder and at most

supported a conviction for conspiracy to commit assault against the victim.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts of his new Claim 5, alleging unfair

investigative techniques, relate directly back to the original Claims 1 and 2 because the new

claim asserts, among other things, that false memories were implanted in Hogrefe by the lead

investigative officer, who coerced, manipulated, and intimidated Hogrefe and other prosecution

witnesses.

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Petitioner asserts that most of the operative facts underlying his new Claim 6,

alleging repeated prosecutorial misconduct, relate directly back to the original Claims 1 and 2

because the prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony from witnesses to support Hogrefe’s

testimony, prevented Hogrefe from being interviewed by the defense, and assisted in planting

Hogrefe’s false memory.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts underlying his new Claim 7, in which he

alleges that his conviction of conspiracy was based on overt acts that were not separate from the

charged conspiracy agreement, relate back to the original Claims 1 and 2 because those claims

challenged that there was a conspiracy.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts of the following parts of his new Claim

8, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, relate directly back to the operative facts of the

original Claims 1 and 2 challenging the reliability of Hogrefe’s testimony: failure to present

expert testimony regarding Hogrefe’s false memories, failure to present evidence of the

investigating officer’s bad faith regarding Hogrefe’s false testimony, and failure to object to or

make a record of police misconduct regarding Hogrefe’s false testimony. Petitioner argues that

trial counsel’s failure to challenge the adequacy of the evidence of overt acts relates back to

petitioner’s original claims challenging his conviction on the conspiracy charge.

Petitioner asserts that the operative facts of his new Claim 12, alleging cumulative

error, relate back because the previously listed errors all relate back to his original claims.

2. Claims That Relate Back to the Timely Claims of Other Petitioners

Petitioner argues that Rule 15(c) permits the amended claims of one

“petitioner/plaintiff” to relate back to the claims of a “co-defendant and related

petitioner/plaintiff.” Petitioner contends that the advisory committee notes to the 1966

amendments to Rule 15(c) “strongly suggest” that amended claims may relate back to the claims

of other parties.

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Petitioner relies in part on the court’s December 24, 1997 order relating the cases

of petitioners Fenenbock, Hamby, and Frazier and stating that the three actions are based on the

same or similar claims, the same property, transaction or event, similar questions of fact, and the

same question of law, as well as the court’s December 12, 2001 order relating the cases of

petitioners Bond and MacCarlie to the cases of petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier and

stating that the five actions involve the same or similar claims, the same events, similar questions

of fact, and some of the same questions of law.

On the basis of the advisory committee notes to Rule 15(c), the court’s related

case orders, and citations to a treatise and a case concerning the existence and involvement of a

new plaintiff, petitioner asserts that his new Claim 1 relates back to the facts included in

petitioner Fenenbock’s original Claim 4; his new Claim 2 relates back to the facts included in

petitioner Fenenbock’s original Claim 5; most of his new Claim 6 relates back to facts included

in petitioner Fenenbock’s original Claims 4 and 7; portions of his new Claim 8, and “specifically

subsections 1, 5, 5, and 9” [sic], relate back to facts included in petitioner Fenenbock’s original

Claims 4 and 7; and his new Claim 12, alleging cumulative error, relates back to the facts alleged

in petitioner Fenenbock’s original Claims 4, 5, and 7. In addition, petitioner asserts that his new

Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 12, as well as portions of Claim 8, relate back to the claim of actual

innocence raised by petitioner Fenenbock presented under the title “Notice of Attention.”

3. Other Claims

Petitioner does not argue that his new Claims 3 and 11 or some portions of his

new Claims 6 and 8 relate back to any claims alleged in his own original petition or to any claims

alleged by other petitioners in their original petitions.

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B. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(D)1

Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on September

28, 1999, for his new Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8. Petitioner joins in specific arguments raised by

petitioner Frazier and in unspecified arguments anticipated to be presented by petitioner

Fenenbock. In this regard, petitioner states that when counsel was appointed in this case at the

end of January 2000, counsel for petitioners Frazier, Fenenbock, and Hamby had been reviewing

the record and investigating new claims for two years. Counsel for petitioner states that she

relied largely on the investigation of counsel for the related petitioners to discover the factual

predicates for some of the claims alleged in petitioner’s amended petition. Petitioner’s counsel

has not offered a declaration stating specific dates on which those factual predicates were

discovered.

1. Claim 1

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel did not challenge the planting of false

memories in the child witness Randy Hogrefe by any pretrial motion, did not raise the issue, and

did not investigate it. Petitioner’s habeas counsel states that she, and subsequently her client,

first learned of the official collusion that produced false memories and evidence when she was

advised by counsel for petitioners Frazier and Fenenbock of their extensive investigation and

research and the expert declaration they obtained concerning the planting of false memories by

authorities. Petitioner’s counsel states that she received “all of the applicable information” in

about November 2001, when petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier filed their state

exhaustion petitions.

2. Claim 3

Petitioner asserts that he was unaware of his trial counsel’s decision not to

challenge the scripted introduction that admitted elements of the offense because counsel waived

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his client’s appearance during the proceedings in which the scripted introduction was presented

to the jury. Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel did not raise this issue on appeal, although it

was in the record. Petitioner’s habeas counsel states that she discovered the issue only after

completing her review of the entire trial transcript and record of pre-trial proceedings and after

discussing the issue with counsel for the other petitioners.

3. Claim 5

Petitioner asserts that he was not aware and could not have been aware of the

coercive, dishonest, and unfair investigative techniques which were employed by the government

and law enforcement to procure false testimony and deprive him of a fair trial because neither his

trial counsel nor appellate counsel challenged the techniques or preserved the issue. Petitioner’s

habeas counsel states that she discovered the claim after a thorough review of the record,

including contradictory statements made by witnesses at successive trials, and after she received

information from other habeas counsel. Petitioner argues that factual support for the claim was

not available until counsel for the other petitioners interviewed prosecution witnesses and

developed information about Randy Hogrefe’s false memory in “about 2001.”

 4. Claim 6

Petitioner concedes that some of the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in Claim 6

was engaged in at his trial at which he was present, but he contends that the significance of the

prosecutor’s knowingly presenting false evidence, especially through Officer Kartchner, was not

developed by his trial counsel and was not evident until habeas counsel for petitioners

Fenenbock, Hamby, and Frazier procured media records that contradicted Kartchner and then

further developed the issue. Petitioner’s habeas counsel believes she received the pertinent

information with respect to this claim in “about fall of 2001.”

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5. Claim 8(c), (e), and (I)

Petitioner states that the ineffectiveness of trial counsel with regard to the scripted

introduction, Officer Kartchner’s bad faith, and police misconduct were discovered as noted in

his arguments concerning Claims 1, 3, 5, and 6.

C. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner argues that equitable tolling should be applied to the entire period

between the filing of his original federal petition on October 29, 1999, and the filing of his

amended federal petition on September 2, 2003, because “there are combinations of specific

extraordinary circumstances which require equitable tolling in this case.” Petitioner suggests that

even if each set of circumstances is not sufficient to warrant tolling, all of the circumstances

when considered together made it impossible for him to file all of his claims prior to the

expiration of the statute of limitations. Petitioner also joins in any equitable tolling arguments

raised by the related petitioners.

Petitioner cites the extraordinary and unusual complexity of the cases,

respondents’ lack of objection to continuances requested by petitioners’ counsel during most of

the pendency of this action, and the necessity of filing an exhaustion petition.

With regard to complexity, petitioner argues that the three separate trials in state

court, multiplicity of defendants, two years of pretrial proceedings, and a record exceeding

30,000 pages made identification of issues and their sufficient development extremely difficult. 

Petitioner’s counsel states that she did not obtain the trial transcript for petitioner Bond’s trial

until April 2000 and that she reviewed portions of the record of the other two trials and pertinent

parts of nearly 10,000 pages of discovery at the Office of the Federal Defender in Sacramento. 

Counsel explains that the petitioners conserved resources by relying on the investigation and

declarations obtained by counsel for other petitioners and that most of the investigation was not

completed until shortly before the state exhaustion petitions were filed by petitioners Hamby,

Fenenbock, and Frazier in November 2001.

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With regard to respondents’ lack of objection to continuances, petitioner asserts

that respondents stipulated to continuances in the Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier cases from

1997 to October 2001 and that petitioner Bond requested and was granted continuances without

objection by respondents from the end of January 2000, when habeas counsel was appointed, to

October 2001. Petitioner argues that, after four years of stipulating to continuances with the

express knowledge that the continuances were sought for the purpose of discovering and

developing new facts and legal claims not raised in the initial pro se petitions, respondents should

be estopped from maintaining that petitioners’ amended petitions are untimely. Petitioner’s

counsel claims that, had she been on notice that respondents would assert the statute of

limitations defense to bar new claims, she “may have been able to notify respondent earlier of

potential claims under investigation.” On the premise that the purpose of the statute of

limitations is to protect the state from stale claims being presented by petitioners who have slept

on their rights, petitioner argues that equity should preclude respondents in these cases from

asserting the statute as a bar to the petitioners’ new claims.

With regard to the necessity of filing a state exhaustion petition, petitioner argues

that he had to prepare and file a state petition that afforded the state a full and fair opportunity to

address and resolve the new claims on their merits and that the pleading had to comply with state

law, which requires facts and supporting evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case of a

constitutional violation. Petitioner asserts that he was unable to discover and develop his new

claims until after the statute of limitations expired, that the exhaustion petitions filed by

petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier on November 26, 2001, put respondents on notice of

all of petitioner’s new claims except his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual

innocence, and that petitioner Bond filed his own exhaustion petition on August 20, 2002. 

Petitioner argues in conclusion that equitable tolling should be granted where the

petitioner has not slept on his rights and the respondents received sufficient notice so that they

are not required to defend against stale claims. Petitioner notes that no evidence has been lost, as

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respondents agreed with petitioners to maintain the records and evidence necessary to litigate

petitioners’ claims on their merits. Petitioner also contends that respondents have already

responded on the merits to most of petitioner’s new claims because respondents filed briefs in

opposition to the state habeas petitions of petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier.

D. Actual Innocence

Petitioner’s final argument is that the actual innocence exception is applicable to

him and tolls the statute of limitations rendering his amended petition timely. Petitioner does not

dispute respondents’ contention that there is no definitive decision from the Ninth Circuit or the

Supreme Court whether there is an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA statute of

limitations. Rather, petitioner argues that logic, justice and the United States Constitution

compel a conclusion that the State has no legitimate interest in imprisoning a person who is

actually innocent and therefore an actual innocence exception must be recognized.

Petitioner asserts that he meets the gateway standard of Schlup v. Delos, 513 U.S.

298, 326-27 (1995), and that this court can therefore consider all claims raised in his amended

petition. In response to respondents’ attack on the sufficiency of petitioner’s evidence of actual

innocence, petitioner refers to petitioner MacCarlie’s trial testimony that he acted alone, that no

one planned to kill the victim, and that he never communicated to anybody else he was going to

kill the victim. Petitioner argues that there is no evidence that he himself ever said or planned

that the victim should or would be killed. In addition, petitioner cites prosecution witness

Michael Sutton’s statements to an investigator that there was no conspiracy to kill the victim and

that it just happened on the spur of the moment. Petitioner argues that a court could not have

confidence in the outcome of petitioner’s trial on the basis of this evidence or, at a minimum,

petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to show that he meets the Schlup gateway standard.

III. Respondents’ Reply

Respondents assert that petitioner’s arguments are misplaced and the motion to

dismiss should be granted.

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A. Relation Back

Respondents argue that petitioner cites no authority, other than a single Federal

Tort Claims Act case that is readily distinguished, for the sweeping proposition that respondents

had notice of some of petitioner’s new claims because similar claims were raised by separately

tried co-defendants in their own state appeals and federal habeas petitions. Respondents assert

that the plain language of Rule 15(c) contemplates relation back to the “conduct, transaction, or

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,” not to a different

pleading filed by a co-defendant. Respondents argue that petitioner’s reading of the rule would

not ensure effective notice to the state and would thwart the policy behind the AEDPA statute of

limitations.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s reliance on the court’s related case orders is

misplaced because the findings in those orders were made pursuant to Local Rule 83-123(a),

which states that, for purposes of judicial economy, an action is “related” to another action and

both will be assigned to the same judge if “(1) both actions involve the same parties and are

based on the same or a similar claim; [and] (2) both actions involve the same property,

transaction, or event.” Respondents argue that nothing in this rule suggests that the

determination of whether cases should be assigned to the same judge is based on the same

considerations that lie behind Rule 15(c) and further that logic does not compel such a

conclusion from two rules with such disparate concerns.

Respondents argue that petitioner misconstrues the Supreme Court’s language in

Mayle concerning the necessity of a common core of operative facts to justify application of the

“relation back” doctrine. Respondents reject petitioner’s contention that his original claim of

insufficient evidence to support his conviction of conspiracy to commit murder served to put the

state on notice that petitioner might claim that Randy Hogrefe’s testimony was coerced, that the

defense was denied access to Hogrefe, that the prosecutor committed misconduct, or that trial

counsel was ineffective. Respondents describe petitioner’s analysis as a thinly veiled

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repackaging of the approach that was taken by the Ninth Circuit in Felix v. Mayle and expressly

rejected by the Supreme Court. In this regard, respondents also assert that petitioner’s analysis is

flawed because petitioner assumes that “notice” remains the touchstone of whether a claim

relates back, when such an assumption does not appear to be viable in light of the Supreme

Court’s ruling that, for purpose of a habeas action, “the ‘original pleading’ to which Rule 15

refers is . . . the petition in a habeas proceeding.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 125 S. Ct. at

2569-70. Respondents note that the Supreme Court held that, “[s]o long as the original and

amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back

will be in order.” Id. at 2574.

Respondents dispute petitioner’s contention that some of his new claims relate

back to his own original claims, in which he alleged due process violations arising from (1)

insufficient evidence of the essential elements of agreement and intent to kill to support a guilty

verdict of conspiracy to commit murder and (2) trial court error in failing to instruct the jury that

a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires proof that the defendant intended to kill

the victim. Respondents assert that the core of operative facts for the instructional error claim is

comprised of the facts needed to determine whether the trial court correctly applied and

instructed the jury in California law on conspiracy to commit murder, while the core of operative

facts for the sufficiency of the evidence claim is comprised of the facts needed to determine

whether all of the evidence, reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could lead no

rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioner conspired to commit

murder.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s new Claim 1–alleging that the trial court

violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, to present a defense, and to confront witnesses by

permitting the prosecution to use testimony based on a false memory created by police, social

worker, and prosecutor manipulation, coercion, and coaching–does not share a common core of

operative facts with the original claims because neither of the original claims involves facts 

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concerning the credibility of witnesses or the prosecution’s alleged knowing presentation of false

material testimony through the manipulation, coercion, and coaching of Randy Hogrefe.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s new Claim 2– alleging violations of his

rights to a fair trial and to present a defense by denial of access to the key prosecution

witness–does not share a common core of operative facts with the original claims because neither

of the original claims involves facts concerning the actions of the prosecution and others, assisted

by the trial court, that kept defense counsel and their agents from having access to Randy

Hogrefe prior to his testimony at trial.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s new Claim 4–alleging violations of due

process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment based on petitioner’s actual

innocence of conspiracy to commit murder–does not share a common core of operative facts with

the original claims because those original claims rely on evidence that was part of the record

rather than on evidence that was not presented at trial. Respondents also assert that petitioner’s

new claim is one of legal rather than factual innocence. 

Respondents contend that petitioner’s new Claim 5–alleging denial of due process

through the use of unfair governmental investigative techniques that made it possible to present

false and misleading evidence at trial and impossible to present an adequate defense–does not

share a common core of operative facts with the original claims because neither of the original

claims is based on facts involving the actions of law enforcement personnel while investigating

and helping prepare the prosecution’s case.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s new Claim 6–alleging violations of his

rights to a fair trial and to confrontation by repeated prosecutorial misconduct–does not share a

common core of operative facts with the original claims because neither of the original claims is

based on facts involving the actions of the prosecutor, Officer Kartchner, other law enforcement

personnel, and others during the investigation and throughout the course of the trials.

/////

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With regard to petitioner’s argument that four parts of his new Claim 8–alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel–relate back to his original claims, respondents contend that the

specified parts of Claim 8 do not share a common core of operative facts with the original claims

because neither of the original claims involves facts concerning counsel’s failure to obtain or

present expert testimony regarding eyewitnesses and memory, counsel’s failure to attack the 

adequacy of the overt acts charged as not independent of the conspiracy agreement, or counsel’s

failure to object to or make a record of police misconduct. Respondents argue in addition that,

aside from the differences between the factual predicates for the old and new claims, a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the elements of Strickland v. Washington and those

elements differ significantly from the elements of proof applicable to the substantive predicates.

Respondents do not discuss petitioner’s contention that his new Claims 7 and 12

relate back to the original claims.

B. Delayed Discovery of Claims

Turning to petitioner Bond’s argument that he could not have discovered the

factual predicate of some of his claims any earlier through the exercise of due diligence, thereby

triggering a later start date for the limitations period, respondents note that petitioner has cited

petitioner Frazier’s opposition to respondents’ motion to dismiss. Respondents argue that

petitioner Frazier has conceded that she was aware of at least some of the facts underlying nine of

her new claims at the time of trial and that the factual predicates of four of those claims were

addressed by the California Court of Appeal in its 1996 opinion. Respondents assert that

petitioner Frazier has invoked § 2244(d)(1)(D) on the grounds that she was unable to locate and

interview witnesses with relevant information until 2000, 2001, or 2003, did not have a “full

understanding of the facts” until the fall of 2001, and the “full extent” of the claims emerged only

upon review of other trial transcripts.

Respondents argue that the factual predicate of a claim is discovered for purposes

of § 2244(d)(1)(D) when the petitioner has knowledge of the facts supporting the claim, not

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when the petitioner has evidentiary support for it. Respondents contend that petitioner Bond,

who asserts his reliance on the investigations of other counsel, must concede that many, if not all,

of his new claims pertain to trial events that he knew about as of December 16, 1994. 

Respondents note, for example, that petitioner Bond’s claim of actual innocence is based on the

testimony of Bernard MacCarlie, the co-defendant with whom Bond was tried, and Bond was

present when MacCarlie testified. Respondents dispute petitioner Frazier’s argument that it was

necessary to locate certain witnesses in order to develop claims that were known at the time of

trial. Respondents argue that such claims could have been investigated by petitioner Bond earlier

because he was aware of all of the witnesses cited by petitioner Frazier: Lockley, Dodds, and

Knapp were all charged as co-defendants, and Randy Hogrefe, Michael Roanhouse, and Michael

Sutton testified at petitioner’s trial. Respondents point to petitioners’ failure to offer evidence

that these six witnesses were unavailable between the conclusion of state court proceedings in

1996 and the date they were interviewed four to seven years later, as well as petitioners’ failure

to offer declarations by any of these witnesses other than the declaration of Dodds signed in

2002.

Respondents argue that petitioner Bond’s new Claims 1, 3, 5, 6 and specified

portions of 8 all concern acts or omissions that took place at trial, that petitioner’s lack of legal

training did not prevent him from discovering the factual predicates for these claims at an earlier

time, and that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not toll the AEDPA statute of

limitations. Respondents conclude that the statute commenced from the date petitioner knew or

should have known the relevant facts and that none of petitioner’s new claims qualify for an

extended deadline under § 2244(d)(1)(D).

C. Equitable Tolling

In response to petitioner’s contention that equitable tolling should be applied,

respondents assert that the Supreme Court allowed such tolling in the non-AEDPA case cited by

petitioner on the basis of considerations related to venue, misfiled pleadings, and national

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uniformity, considerations that are not applicable here. Respondents argue that it is well

established in the Ninth Circuit that the test for equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of

limitations is whether extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control made it

impossible for him to timely file his petition. Respondents agree that petitioner’s case is

complex but are unaware of any habeas case in which the statute of limitations has been tolled

because the issues presented are difficult. Respondents observe that Congress was aware when it

enacted the one-year statute of limitations that some petitions would involve complex claims and

nonetheless provided merely a six-month limitation period in capital cases. Respondents

acknowledge that they stipulated to continuances of status conferences but assert that they did not

agree at any time to waive the statute of limitations. Respondents state that none of the

stipulations mentioned the limitations period and respondents’ mere acquiescence in petitioners’

requests for continuances cannot constitute an express waiver. Respondents also argue that there

are no other factors in this case that could reasonably have been relied upon by petitioners or

their counsel as a basis for assuming that respondents were agreeing to waive the limitations

period. Respondents add that they had no duty to research petitioner Bond’s case and notify his

counsel of the filing deadline, that the statute of limitations had already expired prior to any of

the stipulations, that the stipulations continuing status conferences could not revive and extend

the limitations period, and that petitioner’s counsel could and should have developed the new

claims earlier. Respondents conclude that petitioner has failed to meet the very high threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling.

D. Actual Innocence

With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning actual innocence, respondents

argue that if there is an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations, Schlup

requires the petitioner to support the claim of actual innocence with “new reliable evidence –

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence – that was not presented at trial” and to establish that “it is more likely than not

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that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513

U.S. at 324, 327. Respondents assert that a court reviewing such a claim is entitled to consider

“how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable

reliability of that evidence.” Id. at 332.

Respondents argue that the MacCarlie testimony and Sutton statements relied

upon by petitioner do not meet the Schlup standard. Respondents dispute petitioner’s

characterization of MacCarlie’s testimony as a “confession” that he acted alone, that no one

planned to kill the victim, and that he never communicated to anyone else an intention to kill the

victim. Respondents assert that MacCarlie gave a bizarre hallucinatory account of the events

surrounding the killing and testified that he did not see others there but did not state that he was

the sole assailant and did not exculpate other co-defendants. Respondents point to the testimony

of the defense experts whose opinion was that MacCarlie suffered from blackouts and PTSD,

which could cause a dissociative state or flashbacks where the subject is unable to distinguish

reality. Thus, respondents reason, MacCarlie’s testimony fails to establish petitioner’s actual

innocence because the evidence does not qualify as a trustworthy eyewitness account that shows

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Respondents contend that the pretrial statement allegedly made by Michael Sutton

also fails to establish petitioner’s actual innocence. Respondents assert that Sutton’s alleged

statements to a defense investigator in November 1993 that there was “no big conspiracy” to kill

the victim and that it “apparently” happened “during the heat of the moment” were made in the

context of his description of a conversation that involved Adcock, Hamby, and some other

women. Respondents argue that these statements apply only to Adcock and Hamby, while other

statements by Sutton describe Bond and MacCarlie agreeing to get in MacCarlie’s truck and “go

get” the victim and then racing up the hill to where the victim was. Respondents note that this

issue was raised during the Hamby-Fenenbock-Frazier joint trial, which preceded petitioner

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Bond’s trial, and the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection and excluded Sutton’s

testimony about the incident happening during the heat of the moment because it amounted to

nothing more than Sutton’s opinion. Respondents argue that such evidence is not reliable and, if

petitioner intends to rely on other information obtained from Sutton after trial, he should have

submitted a declaration signed by Sutton. Respondents note that none of the petitioners has

presented such a declaration, despite the fact that petitioner Frazier asserts in her opposition that

Sutton was interviewed on August 26, 2003. Respondents cite the Supreme Court’s observation

in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993), that affidavits signed long after trial or based on

hearsay are “particularly suspect” and observe that in this case the petitioners have not provided

even a suspect affidavit for the court’s consideration.

Respondents conclude that petitioner cannot show that it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that no

evidentiary hearing is required because the proffered evidence does not come close to qualifying

as a gateway to overcome the statute of limitations.

ANALYSIS

In findings and recommendations filed in the five related cases on August 11,

2004, the undersigned recommended that respondents’ first motions to dismiss be denied

pursuant to Felix v. Mayle, 379 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the Felix decision was issued

on August 9, 2004, the undersigned recognized that renewed motions to dismiss might be

appropriate at a later time and therefore recommended that the motions to dismiss be denied

without prejudice. (See Findings and Recommendations filed Aug. 11, 2004, at 16.) The

findings and recommendations were adopted in full, and respondents’ motions were denied

without prejudice on September 30, 2004.

By order filed February 8, 2005, the undersigned directed the respondents to

respond to the amended petitions by answer or motion to dismiss. (See Order filed Feb. 8, 2005,

at 3.) Taking into consideration the fact that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Mayle

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v. Felix, the undersigned granted respondents six months to file and serve their responses. On

June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Felix. Mayle v. Felix,

545 U.S. 644, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005). Respondents have properly renewed their motions to

dismiss the amended petitions as containing claims that are untimely. Arguments unrelated to

the timeliness of petitioners’ claims will not be considered by the court at this time and should be

raised in answers responsive to the claims that are found to be timely presented.

I. The Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

was enacted. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following provision:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas

corpus petitions filed after the statute was enacted and therefore applies to the present case,

which was filed after April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

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A. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(A)

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), petitioner Bond’s judgment became

final on September 28, 1999, ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review on

appeal. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). The one-year period of

limitation began to run on September 29, 1999. Petitioner Bond did not file any state petitions

for collateral relief in the year following September 28, 1999. Accordingly, the one-year period

of limitation ran without interruption until it expired on September 28, 2000.

It is undisputed that the pro se federal habeas petition received from petitioner

Bond on October 29, 1999, was timely filed. Petitioner’s amended petition was filed by counsel

on September 2, 2003, almost three years after the statute of limitations expired. The ten new

claims alleged in the amended petition are barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations unless

some other statutory provision applies or the claims are rendered timely under some applicable

rule or doctrine.

B. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(D)

Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year period of limitation will run from “the

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence,” if that date is later than the date on which the petitioner’s

judgment became final. The language of § 2244(d)(1)(D) requires the court to determine the date

on which the petitioner “could have discovered the factual predicate” of his claim, not the date on

which the petitioner understood the legal significance of the facts known to him or the date on

which he obtained evidence to support his claim. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 & n.3

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the due diligence clock started ticking when the prisoner learned

facts that supported a good faith basis for arguing prejudice arising from ineffective assistance of

counsel, whether or not the prisoner understood the legal significance of the facts known to him);

Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Time begins when the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their

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legal significance.”); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Section

2244(d)(1)(D) does not convey a statutory right to an extended delay . . . while a habeas

petitioner gathers every possible scrap of evidence that might, by negative implication, support

his claim.”). 

Petitioner Bond contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on

September 28, 1999, for Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 in his amended petition. He asserts that counsel

received “all the applicable information” for Claim 1 in “about November 2001,” that counsel

discovered the issue alleged in Claim 3 on the unspecified date on which she completed her

review of the entire record and discussed the issue with counsel for other petitioners, that counsel

discovered the issue alleged in Claim 5 after a thorough review of the record and the receipt of

factual support for the claim in “about 2001,” that some of the misconduct alleged in Claim 6

was present at trial but counsel did not discover the significance of it and receive information

about it from other counsel until “about fall of 2001,” and that some of the ineffective assistance

of counsel alleged in Claim 8 was discovered in connection with the discovery of information

supporting Claims 1, 3, 5, and 6.

While the statute of limitations may not have begun to run on September 28,

1999, for all of petitioner’s claims, petitioner’s vague and conclusory assertions, unsupported by

appropriate declarations and other evidence, fail to establish specific dates on which the factual

predicates of Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 “could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” The vague dates cited by petitioner appear to be the dates on which or by which

petitioner received all the information and evidence applicable to Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8. Thus,

petitioner’s arguments establish, at most, the approximate time by which petitioner had collected

the evidence needed to support the claims. As such, the approximate dates provided by

petitioner’s counsel are irrelevant to the application of § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Put another way, petitioner has not shown that he did not and could not have

discovered the factual predicates for Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 before August 20, 2001, i.e., one

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year prior to the filing of his state exhaustion petition on August 20, 2002. If the factual

predicates for Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 could have been or were discovered prior to August 20,

2001, the one-year period of limitation expired for those claims before petitioner filed his state

habeas petition and long before the claims were presented to this court. Counsel was appointed

for petitioner on December 30, 1999. Current counsel substituted in on January 24, 2000, and, as

counsel herself has noted, immediately enjoyed the benefits of two years of investigation and

research undertaken by counsel for petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier. Petitioner has

not shown that she could not have discovered the factual predicates for Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8

prior to August 20, 2001. Petitioner has therefore failed to demonstrate that any claims in his

amended petition were timely filed by application of § 2244(d)(1)(D).

II. Relation Back of New Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or supplemented as

provided in the rules of civil procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. See also

Rule 11, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

may be applied in habeas corpus proceedings to the extent that the rules of civil procedure are not

inconsistent with any statutory provision or with the rules governing habeas cases); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 81(a)(2) (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings for

habeas corpus “to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the

United States, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings”).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a habeas petitioner may amend his

pleadings once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served and may seek leave of

court to amend his pleading at any time during the proceeding. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,

 , 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (2005). Under Rule 15(c), a petitioner’s amendments made after the

statute of limitations has run will relate back to the date of his original pleading if the new claims

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amended claim in a habeas petition relates back for statute of limitations purposes only if it shares

a ‘common core of operative facts’ with the original claim.) (quoting Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. at

2574).

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arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the

original pleading. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)).

In Mayle v. Felix, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he ‘original pleading’ to

which Rule 15 refers is the complaint in an ordinary civil case, and the petition in a habeas

proceeding.” Id. at 2569-70. The Court observed that the complaint in an ordinary civil case

need only provide fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds on which the claim rests,

while a habeas petition is required to specify all grounds for relief available to the petitioner and

state the facts supporting each ground. Id. at 2570. Because of this difference between civil

complaints and habeas petitions, the relation back of new habeas claims “depends on the

existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” 

Id. at 2572. The common core of operative facts must not be viewed at too high a level of 2

generality, and an “occurrence” will consist of each separate set of facts that supports a ground

for relief. Id. at 2573. See also United States v. Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A]

petitioner does not satisfy the Rule 15 "relation back" standard merely by raising some type of

ineffective assistance in the original petition, and then amending the petition to assert another

ineffective assistance claim based upon an entirely distinct type of attorney misfeasance.”), cert.

denied ___U.S.___, 126 S. Ct. 2906 (2006). Applying these principles in Mayle, the Court ruled

that the petitioner’s new claim did not relate back to his original claim because the new claim

arose from the petitioner’s own pretrial interrogation and was different in time and place from his

original claim, which arose from the pretrial police interrogation of a witness. Id. at 2572-73.

Neither the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mayle nor the language of Rule 15

supports a conclusion that a new claim raised by a party in his amended pleading can relate back

to a claim raised by another party in a separate pleading in the same action, much less to a claim

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raised by another party in a pleading in another action. Rule 15(a) speaks repeatedly of “a party”

amending “the party’s pleading,” and Rule 15(c) provides that “[a]n amendment of a pleading

relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the claim or defense asserted in the

amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to

be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and (c) (emphasis added). Thus, in

determining relation back pursuant to Rule 15(c), the only relevant pleadings are the party’s

original pleading and that same party’s amended pleading. 

While Rule 15(c) provides for relation back in three different circumstances, only

one of the three provisions is applicable to habeas proceedings. The rule, omitting only the

provisions concerning service of the United States or any agency or officer thereof for purposes

of Rule 15(c)(3), provides as follows:

(c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a pleading

relates back to the date of the original pleading when

 (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides

the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or

 (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the

original pleading, or

 (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of

the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing

provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by

Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the

party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such

notice of the institution of the action that the party will not

be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and

(B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake

concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would

have been brought against the party. . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (as last amended in 1993).

Rule 15(c)(1) does not apply to habeas proceedings because 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),

i.e., “the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action,” does not include a

provision permitting relation back.

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Rule 15(c)(2) is the provision applied to habeas proceedings by the Supreme

Court in Mayle. 125 S. Ct. at 2566 (“This case involves two federal prescriptions: the one-year

limitation period imposed on federal habeas corpus petitioners by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); and the rule that pleading

amendments relate back to the filing date of the original pleading when both the original plea and

the amendment arise out of the same ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

15(c)(2).”).

Rule 15(c)(3), which concerns amendments that change the party against whom a

claim is asserted, is not applicable to habeas proceedings because there is only one possible

petitioner and there are habeas statutes and rules that govern the naming of the proper respondent

and the service of respondents. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) with

Rule 2(a), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases (requiring a petitioner currently in custody under a

state-court judgment to name as respondent the state officer who has custody of him) and Rule 4,

Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases (stating requirements for service of habeas petition and order). 

See Rule 11, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases; Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2).

Petitioners’ reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendment to

Rule 15(c) is misplaced because, according to those very notes, the 1966 amendment amplified

the rule “to state more clearly when an amendment of a pleading changing the party against

whom a claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a

defendant) shall ‘relate back’ to the date of the original pleading” and in particular addressed a

problem that arose “in certain actions by private parties against officers or agencies of the United

States.” The 1966 amendment concerned only Rule 15(c)(3), which is not applicable to habeas

petitions, and the advisory committee notes addressed only the amendment of a pleading to

change the party against whom a claim or defense is asserted. The notes do not support a

conclusion that a habeas petitioner’s new claims can relate back to the date of a pleading filed by

another habeas petitioner in a separate habeas proceeding. In particular, the final paragraph of

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 The related case order filed in the Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier cases in 1997 3

specifically stated that “[t]he parties should be aware that relating the cases under Local Rule 83-123

merely has the result that the three (3) actions are assigned to the same judge and magistrate judge;

no consolidation of the actions is effected.” (Order filed Dec. 24, 1997, in case No. CIV S-97-0164,

case No. CIV S-97-1731, and case No. CIV S-97-2196, at 2.) Likewise, the related case order filed

in the Hamby, Fenenbock, Frazier, Bond, and MacCarlie cases in 2001 states that “[t]he parties

should be aware that relating these five cases under Local Rule 83-123 merely has the result that the

actions are assigned to the same judge; no consolidation of the actions is effected.” (Order filed Dec.

12, 2001, in case No. CIV S-97-0164, case No. CIV S-97-1731, case No. CIV S-97-2196, case No.

CIV S-99-2150, and case No. CIV S-00-1830, at 2.)

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those notes, referring to “[t]he relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs,” is irrelevant in

habeas proceedings in which the only possible “plaintiff” is the state prisoner who is challenging

his state court conviction or sentence. The undersigned rejects petitioners’ argument that any of

their new claims relate back to claims raised by the other petitioners in their separate cases. 

Petitioners’ reliance on orders relating their cases is also misplaced. Under the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California,

the court may assign two or more cases to the same district judge or magistrate judge, or both,

when doing so will “effect a substantial savings of judicial effort” and avoid a “substantial

duplication of labor.” Local Rule 83-123(a). As stated in the court’s standard order relating

cases pursuant to this rule, no consolidation of the cases is effected by their assignment to the

same judge or judges, and each case proceeds as a separate case. The relating of cases for 3

purposes of judicial economy has no bearing on the relation back of new claims alleged in a

party’s amended pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court turns to a comparison of the claims raised in petitioner Bond’s original

petition and those raised in his amended petition. The claims alleged in the original petition are

as follows:

Ground one: Petitioner’s conviction of conspiracy to commit

murder is supported by insufficient evidence of the essential

elements of agreement and intent to kill, in violation of petitioner’s

constitutional due process right not to be convicted except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime;

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Ground two: The trial court committed reversible error in

violation of petitioner’s due process right not to be convicted

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of

the crime and his constitutional right to have his jury determine

every factual issue in his case, when it failed to instruct the jury

explicitly that a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder

requires proof of the essential element that petitioner intended to

kill the victim.

In his amended petition, petitioner Bond alleges his two original claims as Claims

9 and 10. Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of new Claims 9 and 10, and the

undersigned finds that those claims relate back to the claims in the original petition.

Petitioner Bond’s new Claims 1-8 and 11-12, the timeliness of which are

disputed, are summarized by the court as follows:

Ground 1: Petitioner’s rights to due process, a fair trial, to present

a defense, and to confront witnesses under the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the trial court

permitted the use of key witness Randy Hogrefe’s testimony that

was based on a false memory of how the killing occurred that was

created by police, social worker, and prosecutorial manipulation,

coercion, and coaching;

Ground 2: Petitioner was denied his rights to due process, a fair

trial, and to present a defense under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments by denial of defense access to Randy Hogrefe, the

key prosecution witness;

Ground 3: Petitioner’s rights to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments and to a jury trial under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the reading of a scripted

introduction to the jury which admitted elements of the offense and

by the conducting of voir dire while petitioner was not present;

Ground 4: Petitioner’s rights to due process and against cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated because petition is an

innocent man;

Ground 5: Petitioner’s right to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments was violated by the use of unfair

governmental investigative techniques that made it possible to

present false and misleading evidence at trial and impossible to

present a constitutionally adequate defense;

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Ground 6: Petitioner was denied his rights to due process, a fair

trial, and confrontation under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments by repeated prosecutorial misconduct;

Ground 7: Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the conspiracy

conviction was based on overt acts that, as a matter of law, were

not separate from the charged conspiracy agreement;

Ground 8: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as

follows:

1. Failure to retain or present expert testimony

regarding eyewitnesses and memory to show how

Randy Hogrefe’s memories of the killing were false,

unreliable and obtained by improper techniques;

2. Failure to attack the adequacy of the overt acts

charged in that none of overt acts 1 through 3 is

independent of the conspiracy agreement;

3. Failure to object to judge giving a scripted

introduction, which conceded elements of the

offense, during hardship voir dire and advising

petitioner to waive his appearance during this

crucial stage of the proceeding;

4. Failure to adequately investigate, cross-examine,

and challenge by moving to exclude the testimony 

of Michael Sutton, who provided the crucial

testimony regarding the conspiracy;

5. Failure to present evidence of Officer

Kartchner’s bad faith and dishonesty;

6. Failure to object to repeated prosecutorial

misconduct;

7. Failure to investigate or present alibi evidence;

8. Ineffective examination of Sue Mendes and

failure to object to hearsay and prejudicial

testimony;

9. Failure to object to or make a record of police

misconduct;

10. Ineffective closing argument that failed to

adequately address issues of conspiracy, lack of

physical evidence, and police misconduct;

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Ground 11: Petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of

appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments when counsel failed to raise the issues presented in

the amended federal habeas petition and did not seek to expand his

appointment to file a state habeas petition on petitioner’s behalf;

Ground 12: Petitioner’s rights to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated by cumulative error and

prejudice.

After careful consideration of petitioner’s original and amended petitions, as well

as the parties’ arguments, the undersigned finds that petitioner’s new Claim 7 shares a common

core of operative facts with petitioner’s original Claim 1, now alleged as Claim 10. In this

regard, new Claims 7 and 10 arise from the elements of the conspiracy charge, the evidence

presented to support that charge, and the sufficiency of that evidence presented at trial to prove

the elements of the charge. The two new claims appear to merely assert different legal theories

from those originally presented arising from a common core of operative facts. In addition,

Claim 12, alleging the cumulative effect of individual errors, therefore relates back to the original

claims to the extent that petitioner asserts the combined prejudicial effect of the errors alleged in

Claims 7, 9, and 10. 

The same cannot be said, however, for the remainder of petitioner’s new claims.

Those claims do not share a common core of operative facts with either of petitioner’s two

original claims and therefore do not relate back to the original petition. As set forth above,

petitioner’s original two claims were quite specific and limited. Therein petitioner challenged

only the trial court’s failure to give a lesser related instruction on accessory after the fact and the

trial court’s finding that there were no lesser included offenses with respect to the charged

conspiracy to commit murder. On the other hand, petitioner Bond’s new claims 1-8 and 11-12

present a broad ranging challenge to his judgment of conviction. The grounds set forth in these

new claims include that petitioner was: convicted of the conspiracy based upon false evidence

tainted by prosecutorial and police misconduct; denied access to witness Hogrefe; convicted of

conspiracy based upon overt acts not separate from the conspiracy as a matter of law; denied the

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effective assistance of trial counsel in ten specific instances; denied the effective assistance of

appellate counsel; and denied a fair trial by the playing of the introductory videotape and by the

fact that he was convicted despite his innocence. Petitioner Bond’s original petition does not

recite any of the facts needed to support these new claims. Thus, the original claims and new

claims are based upon completely separate sets of facts. 

If respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted, petitioner should be permitted to file

a second amended petition alleging the claims currently alleged in the first amended petition as

Claims 7, 9, and 10, along with a cumulative error claim (Claim 12) grounded on the prejudicial

effect of the errors alleged in Claims 7, 9, and 10. So limited, petitioner’s new claim of

cumulative error would arise from the same common core of operative facts alleged in the

original petition and would relate back to that pleading. See Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d

1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding relation back of a claim that was based on the same facts

as the original pleading but clarified or amplified the claim or theory), cited with approval in

Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2574 n.7.

III. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined in 1997 that the one-year period

of limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations subject to tolling. 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in

part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.

1998). The court cautioned that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997)). The availability of

equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations must be limited because courts are expected

to “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process.” 128 F.3d at 1289. 

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See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s standard

as setting a “high hurdle” to the application of equitable tolling).

Even where extraordinary circumstances are shown, equitable tolling will not be

available unless the petitioner diligently pursued his claims. 128 F.3d at 1289. It is only when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

habeas petition that equitable tolling may be appropriate. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating grounds for equitable tolling. 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005); Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).

Since recognizing the availability of equitable tolling of the AEDPA context in

1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue many times. For the most part,

and most often in unpublished decisions, the appellate court has affirmed district court decisions

denying equitable tolling. Typical decisions affirming the denial of equitable tolling include

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002), in which the court affirmed the

district court’s denial of equitable tolling where the pro se petitioner filed his petition untimely

on the basis of erroneous information provided by the attorney appointed to represent him on

direct appeal, and Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001), in which the court

affirmed the district court’s denial of equitable tolling where the petitioner’s attorney

miscalculated the limitations period. In Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, U.S. , 126 S. Ct. 485 (2005), the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the district

court’s denial of equitable tolling where the petitioner filed an untimely petition after he had

previously filed a timely mixed petition but, pursuant to district court instructions that were not

affirmatively misleading, chose to dismiss the entire petition and return to state court to exhaust

additional claims. See also Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2006)

(affirming the denial of equitable tolling because neither the district court’s failure to advise the

petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s

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inability to correctly calculate the limitations period were extraordinary circumstances warranting

equitable tolling).

Due to the highly fact-dependent nature of the grounds for equitable tolling, the

Ninth Circuit has occasionally remanded a case for further factual development of an issue such

as a petitioner’s mental illness, a petitioner’s access to his legal materials, and the adequacy of a

particular prison law library at a specific time. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065,

1069-71 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding for appropriate development of the record on the issue of

whether petitioner’s inability to obtain Spanish-language materials or procure translation

assistance was an extraordinary circumstance preventing him from filing a timely habeas

petition); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for development

of the record or an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the petitioner’s mental illness

prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th

Cir. 2002) (remanding for development of the record related to the availability of equitable

tolling where the petition was filed, at most, twenty days late, and the pro se petitioner alleged in

his traverse that he was denied access to his legal files for eighty-two days during the one-year

period of limitation due to two temporary transfers for court proceedings in an unrelated civil

court matter); Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (remanding

for further factual development related to the availability of equitable tolling or a finding of a

state-caused impediment under § 2244(d)(1)(B) where the petitioner alleged that the prison law

library contained no legal materials describing the AEDPA and its one-year limitations period

until June of 1998).

The Ninth Circuit has affirmed or mandated equitable tolling in the relatively few

cases where a diligent petitioner was unable to file a timely petition due to a significant delay

caused by an external force such as the district court, prison officials, or, but rarely, the

petitioner’s own habeas counsel. See Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.

2005) (applying equitable tolling for the period of almost eleven months during which the pro se

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petitioner was housed in administrative segregation for his own protection and was denied access

to his legal materials throughout that time despite his diligent efforts to obtain access); Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the misconduct of the petitioner’s attorney

sufficiently egregious to justify equitable tolling where the attorney was hired nearly a full year in

advance of the deadline for filing a federal petition but did not prepare and file the petition

despite the fact that the petitioner and his mother contacted the attorney numerous times seeking

action and where, despite a request for return of the file, the attorney retained the file for the

duration of the limitations period and two months beyond); Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813 (9th

Cir. 2003) (applying equitable tolling where the district court had previously dismissed the pro se

petitioner’s timely habeas petition without giving him an opportunity to file an amended petition

as an alternative to dismissal); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying

equitable tolling where the prison litigation coordinator promised the petitioner’s attorney that he

would obtain the prisoner’s signature in time for filing the petition but broke his promise and

caused the petition to be late); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying

equitable tolling where the district court’s initial dismissal of a timely petition was improper and

the court’s lengthy delay in ruling that the amended petition was unexhausted consumed 258

days of the pro se petitioner’s one-year period of limitation and caused the petitioner to lose time

that would otherwise have been available for exhausting state court remedies); Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying equitable tolling where prison officials delayed the pro

se petitioner’s request that a check be drawn on his prison trust account for payment of the filing

fee); Calderon (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (applying equitable tolling in a death penalty case because

of an earlier court-ordered stay of the habeas proceedings, the petitioner’s alleged mental

incompetency, and the court’s mistaken dismissal of the timely habeas proceedings); Calderon

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283 (holding in a death penalty case that the withdrawal of court-appointed

habeas counsel, who moved out of state and whose work product was not usable by replacement

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counsel, qualified as an extraordinary circumstance beyond petitioner’s control that justified

tolling the statute of limitations).

Although the Supreme Court has recently “framed the equitable tolling standard in

less absolute terms” than the Ninth Circuit’s well established test of “impossible to file a petition

on time,” the Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether the Supreme Court’s formulation “has

lowered the bar somewhat.” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). In Pace, the Court noted that it

has “never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s

statute of limitations.” 544 U.S. at 418 n.8. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the

question in Pace because the petitioner’s failure to establish diligence would preclude the

application of equitable tolling to his untimely petition. Id. at 418-19. The Court observed that

“[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: 

(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” 544 U.S. at 418 (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,

96 (1990)). See also Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1153.

In the five related cases before this court, the petitioners rely in part on Justice

Stevens’s concurrence in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 182 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part

and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, agreed with the

Court’s decision that the statutory tolling provision contained in § 2244(d)(2) authorizes tolling

while a petitioner is pursuing state, but not federal, post-conviction remedies. Id. Citing the

general equitable powers of federal courts, Justice Stevens observed that those courts may deem

a limitations period tolled as a matter of equity and “might very well conclude that tolling is

appropriate based on the reasonable belief that Congress could not have intended to bar habeas

review for petitioners who invoke the court’s jurisdiction within the 1-year interval prescribed by

AEDPA.” Id. at 182-83. He speculated that, just as the federal courts of appeals uniformly

created a one-year grace period running from the date of AEDPA’s enactment for all prisoners

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whose state convictions became final prior to AEDPA, “federal courts may well conclude that

Congress simply overlooked the class of petitioners whose timely filed habeas petitions remain

pending in district court past the limitations period, only to be dismissed after the court belatedly

realizes that one or more claims have not been exhausted.” Id. at 183-84. However, equitable

tolling was not the only remedy suggested by Justice Stevens for the class of petitioners he

described. He also found “no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a

meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state

remedies,” especially when failure to do so would foreclose federal review of a meritorious claim

because of the limitations period. Id. at 183. See also id. at 182 (Souter, J. concurring) (“I have

joined Justice Stevens’s separate opinion pointing out that nothing bars a district court from

retaining jurisdiction pending complete exhaustion of state remedies, and that a claim for

equitable tolling could present a serious issue on facts different from those before us.”).

The Ninth Circuit has not hesitated to use its equitable powers to protect

petitioners in the class described by Justice Stevens. A stay-and-abeyance procedure was

approved by the Ninth Circuit soon after AEDPA was enacted. See Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Thomas), 144 F.3d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 1998) (endorsing a procedure permitting

withdrawal of unexhausted claims and abeyance); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor),

134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the district court’s authority to allow a

petitioner to amend a mixed petition to delete unexhausted claims and then hold the completely

exhausted petition in abeyance pending exhaustion); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274

(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the district court has discretion to stay a fully exhausted

petition). See also Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding in a preAEDPA case that the district court abused its discretion in denying a capital habeas petitioner’s

motion to stay a petition containing only exhausted claims pending exhaustion of additional

claims in state court). The Ninth Circuit has also applied the alternate remedy of equitable

tolling where a diligent petitioner was unable to file a timely petition due to an improper

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dismissal or other mishandling and consequent delay caused by the district court. See Smith, 323

F.3d 813; Corjasso, 278 F.3d 874; Calderon (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530. Moreover, in applying

equitable tolling in Corjasso, decided after Duncan, the court commented that its decision to toll

the statute “during part of the pendency of [Corjasso’s first federal habeas case] is not contrary to

the rule in Duncan, for we do not hold that equitable tolling of the statute is appropriate for the

entire time Corjasso’s petitioner remained in federal court” but “only during the delay caused by

the extraordinary circumstances beyond Corjasso’s control.” 278 F.3d at 879.

The petitioners in the five related cases before this court do not fall within the

class of petitioners described by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Duncan. Here, the

five petitioners filed timely habeas petitions raising only exhausted claims. Their petitions were

not dismissed, and all five petitioners are proceeding in their original federal habeas actions. 

These petitioners did not invoke the court’s jurisdiction over meritorious claims within the oneyear interval prescribed by AEDPA, only to find habeas review of those claims forever barred

due to the court’s failure to retain jurisdiction over the timely-filed claims while the petitioners

returned to state court to exhaust additional claims. Nor are these petitioners and the petitioner in

Corjasso similarly situated. Corjasso, 278 F.3d at 878 (applying equitable tolling where the

district court’s initial dismissal of a timely petition was improper and the court’s lengthy delay in

ruling that the amended petition was unexhausted consumed 258 days of the pro se petitioner’s

one-year period of limitation and caused the petitioner to lose time that would otherwise have

been available for exhausting state court remedies).

Petitioner Bond contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled for the

entire period of time between the filing of his original federal petition on October 29, 1999, and

the filing of his amended federal petition on September 2, 2003, because the complexity of the

five cases, respondents’ lack of objection to continuances requested by petitioners, and the

necessity of filing a properly pled and supported exhaustion petition made it impossible to file all

of his claims in federal court prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s

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 Although petitioner Bond’s counsel sought the trial files for petitioner Bond and the two 4

co-defendants tried with him, she learned that trial counsel for petitioner Bond had destroyed his

files, as had co-defendant Dodds’ trial counsel, and petitioner MacCarlie’s trial files were destroyed

in a fire. (See Pet’r Bond’s Status Report filed Oct. 17, 2001, Weston Decl. ¶ 4.) Petitioner Bond’s

counsel had to rely on the discovery materials already compiled by counsel for petitioners Hamby,

Fenenbock, and Frazier and the part of the record available to counsel prior to April 4, 2000.

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counsel has admitted, however, that, had she realized respondents would assert the statute-oflimitations defense to bar new claims, she “may have been able to notify respondent earlier of

potential claims under investigation.”

The undersigned finds that equitable tolling should be applied during a portion of

these federal proceedings, but, as the Ninth Circuit held in Corjasso, “only during the delay

caused by the extraordinary circumstances beyond [petitioner’s] control.” 278 F.3d at 879. 

Petitioner Bond was not present during the separate trials of his co-defendants, had no access to

the transcripts of the trials that preceded and followed his own, was in custody during pretrial

litigation, was incarcerated after sentencing, and was unrepresented after the California Supreme

Court denied review on direct appeal on June 30, 1999. Petitioner nevertheless filed a timely

federal habeas petition on October 29, 1999. Counsel was appointed for petitioner on December

30, 1999, almost nine months before the AEDPA statute of limitations expired on September 28,

2000, under § 2244(d)(1)(A). By April 4, 2000, petitioner Bond’s counsel had consulted with

counsel for petitioners Fenenbock and Frazier and had obtained copies of the complete record of

petitioner Bond’s trial. (See Pet’r Bond’s Initial Status Report filed Apr. 28, 2000, Weston Decl.

¶ 3.) Because counsel for petitioners Hamby, Fenenbock, and Frazier had compiled a

substantially complete state court record for all three trials by August 31, 1998, petitioner Bond’s

counsel had a copy of the record of petitioner Bond’s trial and access to the complete record of

all three trials by April 4, 2000.4

The undersigned finds that any delay caused by extraordinary circumstances

beyond petitioner Bond’s control ended by at least April 4, 2000. While the state court record is

voluminous, petitioner Bond has not shown that it was impossible to identify new claims and

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Indeed, at least as early as April 2000 counsel for respondent was suggesting in opposition 5

to a discovery motion that any new claims presented in an amended petition may be procedurally

barred.

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seek a stay within one year after April 4, 2000. Equitable tolling from September 28, 1999, when

petitioner Bond’s judgment became final, to April 4, 2000, when extraordinary circumstances

beyond petitioner’s control ceased to exist, does not render petitioner’s amended federal petition

timely. The one-year period of limitation began to run on April 5, 2000, and expired on April 4,

2001. The state exhaustion petition filed by petitioner Bond on August 20, 2002, was filed more

than a year too late to toll the statute under § 2244(d)(2), and the amended federal petition filed

in 2003 was filed approximately two and a half years late.

Other arguments advanced by the petitioners in favor of additional equitable

tolling are unpersuasive. It is undisputed that respondents’ counsel stipulated to continuances of

status conferences up to October 2001 and did not object to continuances of various deadlines

and hearing dates. However, the petitioners have not demonstrated that the respondents waived

the statute of limitations, and there is no evidence that petitioners were affirmatively misled by

respondents or by the court with regard to the statute of limitations. The need to prepare and file 5

state exhaustion petitions was not an external force that made it impossible for petitioner Bond to

prepare and file his state exhaustion petition within a year after April 4, 2000.

The petitioner in this case is not entitled to equitable tolling for a period of time

sufficient to render his amended petition timely.

IV. Actual Innocence

A habeas petitioner’s “otherwise-barred claims [may be] considered on the merits

. . . if his claim of actual innocence is sufficient to bring him within the ‘narrow class of cases . . .

implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995)). The petitioner’s claim of actual

innocence must be supported “with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific

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evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was not presented

at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The petitioner “must show that, in light of all the evidence,

including evidence not introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770,

776 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). See also Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d

956, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2003); Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

banc); Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). Where a habeas petitioner

alleges actual innocence, the federal court must first consider all alternative grounds for relief

from default that might obviate the need to reach the actual innocence question. Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 388-89 (2004).

Having considered all alternative grounds for relief from default above, the

undersigned turns to petitioner Bond’s claim of actual innocence. In order to decide whether

petitioner’s actual innocence claim brings his entire amended petition within an exception to the

AEDPA statute of limitations, the court must determine whether petitioner’s claim of actual

innocence is supported by new reliable evidence that would have affirmatively proved his actual

innocence had that evidence been presented at trial. The undersigned has carefully considered

the claim of actual innocence as alleged in petitioner’s first amended petition as well as all

arguments concerning the evidence presented at petitioner Bond’s trial and the new evidence

cited by petitioner as evidence of actual innocence. (See Pet’r Bond’s First Am. Pet. at 7-17 &

35-36; Pet’r Bond’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Second Mot. to Dismiss filed Aug. 23, 2005, at 27-29;

Resp’ts’ Reply to Pet’r Bond’s Opp’n filed Sept. 2, 2005, at 14-16.) Petitioner Bond’s new

evidence, consisting primarily of co-defendant MacCarlie’s testimony during the BondMacCarlie trial and a pretrial statement allegedly made by Michael Sutton to a defense

investigator in November 1993, falls far short of presenting “‘evidence of innocence so strong

that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Sistrunk, 292 F.3d at 673

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). 

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In this regard, MacCarlie’s testimony at his own subsequent trial cannot be

characterized as either compelling or exculpatory as to petitioner. In that testimony MacCarlie

described being outside his body, looking down on the scene of the killing from a tree and

watching a man with his own face knock Summar to the ground and stab him numerous times. 

Nonetheless, MacCarlie testified that he didn’t believe he killed Summar. Defense expert

witnesses testified that MacCarlie suffered from alcoholic blackouts and Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder, both of which could render him unable to distinguish reality from fantasy. The

statement given by Sutton in which he characterized the killing of Summar as “no big

conspiracy” but rather as something that “apparently” took place “in the heat of the moment”

likewise cannot be fairly characterized as compelling new evidence of Bond’s innocence so

strong that a court cannot have confidence in the verdict. This statement by Sutton was offered

into evidence by the defense at the trial of Hamby, Fenenbock and Frazier, a trial that preceded

petitioner Bond’s trial. The prosecution’s objection to the evidence was sustained with the trial

court finding that it amounted to nothing more than Sutton’s opinion. 

Given the absence of new reliable evidence, petitioner Bond does not have a

colorable claim of actual innocence pursuant to Schlup. Due to the inadequacy of petitioner’s

supporting evidence, his claim of actual innocence fails to bring him within the “‘narrow class of

cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477 (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315). Petitioner Bond’s amended petition is not rendered timely by his claim

of actual innocence.

CONCLUSION

IT IS RECOMMENDED that respondents’ August 4, 2005 motion to dismiss be

granted with leave to file a second amended petition alleging the claims alleged in petitioner’s

first amended petition as Claims 7, 9, and 10, along with a cumulative error claim, if appropriate,

grounded solely on the prejudicial effect of the errors alleged in those three claims.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and

serve written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections

shall be filed and served within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: September 11, 2006.

DAD:13

bond2150.mtd2

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