Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00958/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00958-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHANIE HERRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF NAPA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-00958 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON JUNE 3, 2005: 

The Court tentatively GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does not wish to

hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to rely on

authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. See N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority.

Case 3:04-cv-00958-JSW Document 71 Filed 06/02/05 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The parties shall have twenty minutes to address the following questions: 

(1) In the context of warrantless arrests, the Supreme Court recently made clear that the

probable-cause inquiry is not limited to offenses “closely related” to the offense invoked

by the arresting officer. See Devenpeck v. Alford, -- U.S. --, 125 S.Ct. 588, 593-95

(2004). All that is required for a warrantless arrest to be reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment is that there be probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or

is being committed based on the facts known by the arresting officer at the time of the

arrest. Id. at 593. The officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the

criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Id. at 594. Given

the holding of Devenpeck, does Plaintiff dispute that if Defendants had probable cause to

arrest her for any crime, she cannot sustain her Section 1983 claim for false arrest?

(2) On what basis and supporting authority does Plaintiff contend that California Penal Code

§ 836(d) is unconstitutional? 

(3) Does Plaintiff dispute that Officer Peacock had probable cause to arrest her pursuant to

California Penal Code § 836(d)? If so, on what basis?

(4) If the Court concludes that Officer Peacock had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, is

there any basis on which may Plaintiff may hold the City liable on a Monell theory?

(5) While a single, post-event ratification may provide the basis to hold a city liable under

Monell, generally, the Ninth Circuit has done so only when there were very clear

instances of abuse and gross recklessness. See Siwiec v. Thompson L, 2004 WL

2480516, *22 (D.Or. Nov. 3, 2004) (summarizing Ninth Circuit law on this point). Does

Plaintiff have any factually analogous cases demonstrating the City’s conduct in this

matter amounts to the requisite level of such abuse or gross recklessness?

(6) Does Plaintiff dispute that she is bringing a claim under Title II of the Americans With

Disabilities Act, and thus, must prove intentional discrimination. See Duvall v. County

of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). If so, on what basis?

(7) Does Plaintiff have any authority demonstrating that oral notice of a claim may be

sufficient to give rise to the defense-waiver provisions of California Government Code

§§ 910.8, 911 and 911.3?

(8) If Plaintiff may give notice orally, does the deposition of Patricia Thompson at 29:10-16

and 60:11-20 demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether Plaintiff gave sufficient notice of her claim to give rise to the defense-waiver

provisions? Why or why not?

Case 3:04-cv-00958-JSW Document 71 Filed 06/02/05 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(9) Do the parties have anything further to add? 

Dated: June 2, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey S. White 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-00958-JSW Document 71 Filed 06/02/05 Page 3 of 3