Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-05550/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-05550-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RIVERBEND RANCH GOLF COURSE, )

et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

COUNTY OF MADERA, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-97-5550 REC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR RELIEF

On April 4, 2005, the court heard plaintiff Riverbend

Ranches motion to set aside the judgment entered in this action

on January 20, 2005 pursuant to Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court denies this motion for the reasons set

forth herein.

On March 7, 2005, plaintiff Riverbend Ranches (hereinafter

referred to as Riverbend) filed a motion to set aside the

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judgment entered in this action on January 20, 2005 pursuant to

Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to set the

matter for trial on the Tenth Claim for Relief. Riverbend

asserts that this motion should be granted because there is newly

discovered evidence and/or evidence which was not provided to the

court through mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. 

In its “Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on State Law Claims in Second Amended Complaint and

Directing Entry of Judgment for Defendants” filed on January 20,

2005 (hereinafter referred to as the January 20 Order), the court

ruled in pertinent part with respect to the Tenth Claim for

Relief that Riverbend had not substantially complied with the

claim requirement of the California Government Tort Claims Act

and, therefore, was not entitled to damages with respect to that

claim. 

Riverbend moves to vacate this judgment with respect to the

Tenth Claim for Relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence

and/or evidence which was not presented to the court through

mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.

In moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b),

Riverbend submits the Declaration of Thomas T. Watson, who avers

in pertinent part:

2. The firm of Watson & Doyle associated in

this case on February 15, 2005. Upon being

retained, I immediately attempted to review

all of the documents and pleadings related to

this matter which consisted of an excess of

forty boxes. Contained in these boxes was

correspondence dated July 19, 1996, August 5,

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1996 and January 3, 1997 ... In reviewing the

January 15, 2005 Order it was apparent to me

that these documents were neither submitted

nor considered by the Court in its

determination that the Gay-Straight Alliance

case was not applicable. Apparently, this

correspondence which was newly discovered by

me, was inadvertently not a part of the the

court’s record and was not before the court.

Attached to Mr. Watson’s declaration are the three letters

referred to therein. The first is a letter from James A.

McKelvey, then counsel for Riverbend Ranch, to Jeffrey L. Kuhn of

the County of Madera dated July 29, 1996. The second letter is

from Mr. McKelvey to Mr. Kuhn dated August 5, 1996. The third

letter is from Mr. McKelvey to Mr. Kuhn dated January 3, 1997.

Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just,

the court may relieve a party or a party’s

legal representative from a final judgment

... for the following reasons: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due

diligence could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)

....

Resolution of a motion to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) or

(2) is within the court’s discretion.

In order to be entitled to vacation of judgment on the

ground of newly discovered evidence, the movant must show that

the evidence (1) existed at the time of the trial, (2) could not

have been discovered through due diligence, and (3) was of such

magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to

change the disposition of the case. Coastal Transfer Co. v.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Riverbend has not made the requisite showing. It is clear

from Mr. Watson’s declaration that the evidence upon which

Riverbend relies has been in the possession of counsel for

Riverbend since this litigation commenced. “Evidence is not

‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it was in the

moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been

discovered with reasonable diligence.” Id. The fact that Mr.

Oeser was representing Riverbend at the time of the summary

judgment motion does not change this fact. In addition, it is

clear that Mr. Oeser did not act with reasonable diligence in

reviewing the evidence in this action. The motion for summary

judgment was filed on July 23, 2004 and Riverbend’s opposition

was not filed until November 1, 2004. Therefore, Riverbend had

more than ample time to review the documents in this action and

present them to the court in opposition to the County’s summary

judgment motion. Therefore, the court concludes that Riverbend

is not entitled to vacation of the judgment pursuant to Rule

60(b)(2).

Riverbend also bases this motion on the grounds of

inadvertence or excusable neglect. Riverbend’s new attorneys

argue:

As new counsel, Riverbend’s current attorneys

are not privy to all of the information

relating to discovery and motions that have

occurred in this case which has lasted over

six years and has involved multiple counsel. 

The complexity, length of time and confusion

of multiple counsel, one of which appears to

have failed to meet his basic obligations to

the Court in responding to motions and

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discovery, provides ample grounds to

establish inadvertency, mistake or excusable

neglect.

In Pioneer Investment v. Brunswick, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the

Supreme Court addressed the meaning of “excusable neglect” for

purposes of the Bankruptcy Rules in a situation where the

creditors’ attorney failed to file documents within the time

required by the rules. The Supreme Court stated in pertinent

part:

Because Congress has provided no other

guideposts for determining what sorts of

neglect will be considered ‘excusable,’ we

conclude that the determination is at bottom

an equitable one, taking account of all

relevant circumstances surrounding the

party’s omission. These include ... the

danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length

of the delay and its potential impact on

judicial proceedings, the reason for the

delay, including whether it was within the

reasonable control of the movant, and whether

the movant acted in good faith.

507 U.S. at 395. The Ninth Circuit holds that the equitable test

set out in Pioneer applies to Rule 60(b). Briones v. Riviera

Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, it is arguable that Riverbend’s troubles with its

various attorneys, especially Mr. Stevenson, resulted in Mr.

Oeser’s inability to fully familiarize himself with the evidence

in this case. Nonetheless, as noted above, Mr. Oeser had several

months to prepare for the opposition to the motion for summary

judgment. Furthermore, as the County notes, the letters upon

which Riverbend relies in this motion were authored by Mr.

McKelvey. Although Mr. McKelvey was disqualified as Riverbend’s

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counsel in February, 1998, he has participated as witness for

Riverbend in this action, as evidenced by declarations filed by

Mr. McKelvey and filed with this court on August 14, 2000 and

November 1, 2004. Therefore, the contention of Riverbend’s most

recent attorneys that they were precluded by court order from

consulting with Mr. McKelvey for assistance in reviewing the

record in this action is not sustainable. There is no question

that there is prejudice to the County. This case has been before

this court since 1997. The County’s motion was on file for

several months before it was heard because of Mr. Oeser’s

requests for continuance. Since judgment was entered, the County

has filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and a bill of costs, all

time wasted because of Riverbend’s belated review of the evidence

in this case. After judgment was entered, Riverbend retained yet

another set of attorneys (although Mr. Oeser also remains as

counsel) with the apparent view of reviewing the evidence to see

if there was any possible basis for vacating the judgment. The

retention of the new attorneys apparently delayed the review

until after the time for a motion under Rule 59 had elapsed. The

potential impact on judicial proceedings is that resolution of

this action, already on file for eight years, will be further

delayed, delay caused almost entirely by the actions of Riverbend

or its attorneys. Riverbend and its attorneys had the evidence

upon which they seek to vacate the judgment in its possession

and, in fact, Riverbend generated the evidence. While the court

has no reason to doubt that Mr. Oeser acted in good faith, the

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court note that he was given continuances to respond to the

motion for summary judgment and had ample time to review the

record in this action. It is noted that Riverbend did not oppose

or respond to a number of grounds asserted by the County for

summary judgment, electing to focus the opposition on only two

claims for relief. Riverbend’s argument that the County is not

prejudiced because the County had possession of these documents

as well is not persuasive under the circumstances of this case. 

As noted, this case has been in this court since 1997. The

County finally heard its motion for summary judgment on the

remaining state law causes of action after months of delay and

received final judgment in this action. As noted, the County has

since filed a post-judgment motion for attorneys fees and a bill

of costs, thereby expending more monies that would not have been

necessary. Therefore, the court concludes that Riverbend has not

demonstrated mistake, inadvertence, surprise of excusable neglect

within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for relief pursuant to Rule

60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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