Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01940/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01940-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

INDIAN COUNTRY, U.S.A., INC . , ) 

a South Dakota Corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION, ) 

a Federally Recognized Indian ) 

Tribe, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) No. 87-1940 

FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN O 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v . ) 

) 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex ) 

rel. The Oklahoma Tax Commis- ) 

sion, and The District ) 

Attorney for Tulsa County; and ) 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. ) 

David Moss, District Attorney, ) 

(D . C. No. 85-C-643-E) 

(N . D. Oklahoma) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

This is an appeal from the denial of an application for 

attorney fees. In effect, the district court refused to grant the 

application of plaintiff, The Muscogee (Creek) Nation, on the 

grounds that plaintiff was not a prevailing party within the 

context of 42 u.s.c. § 1988 and that counsel for the adverse party 

did not act in bad faith. The court also determined plaintiff was 

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 1 
not entitled to fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). We agree 

with the conclusions of the trial court and therefore affirm. 

We have examined the briefs and record and conclude the 

disposition of this case requires little in addition to the 

analysis employed by the district court. We therefore adopt 

substantially the trial court's reasoning with additional comments 

for the sake of clarity. 

Central to plaintiff's request for attorney fees pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1988 is whether it was a prevailing party within the 

context of the statute. The pertinent question is, was the action 

in which the plaintiff succeeded one for the enforcement of 42 

u.s.c. § 1983?1 The trial court concluded it was not, holding the 

basis of the plaintiff's success in the underlying action was the 

Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the United States 

Constitution; hence, § 1988 was inapplicable. The trial court 

reached that conclusion before our determination of the merits of 

the underlying case. After entry of the trial court's 

dispositional order on attorney fees, our decision was published. 

On the merits, we held federal law preempted Oklahoma from 

imposing its regulatory power upon the plaintiff. Indian Country, 

U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 

974-76 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988). We 

also held that tribal sovereignty prevented Oklahoma from 

exercising regulatory power in Indian Territory. Id. at 976-81. 

1section 1988 states: "In any action ••• to enforce a provision 

of section[] ... 1983 ... of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ••. a 

reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 

- 2-

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 2 
None of our analysis involved application of § 1983, nor was 

plaintiff's success predicated upon a vindication of any right 

secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, the trial 

court correctly relied upon J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 

767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985). We have considered the authority 

which the plaintiff suggests undercuts this reasoning, but we find 

it inapposite. Because this action did not involve the 

deprivation of individual rights secured by the Constitution and 

laws of the United States, but rather involved the allocation of 

regulatory power between governmental entities, the plaintiff 

simply did not prevail within the context of § 1988. See also 

Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wash. 

1985), aff'd sub nom. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima 

Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 

granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 

Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 107 s. Ct. 

940 (1987). 

The trial court also denied fees based upon the "bad faith" 

exception to the "American Rule." We agree with its analysis. 

United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th 

Cir.), (award of attorney fees under "bad faith" exception 

committed to trial court's discretion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 

(1984). Because of the status of Oklahoma law at the time of the 

filing of this action, Oklahoma's claims were more than colorable. 

Even though the trial court did not directly address the 

request founded upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, the same analysis would 

apply. Plaintiff now argues, however, that the trial court 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 3 
decided the issue without the benefit of discovery, and summary 

disposition of its request was consequently improper. 

We note the application for attorney fees was totally bereft 

of factual support for the plaintiff's contention that certain 

actions of the State's counsel were subject to sanction under Rule 

11 and 28 U.S.C. S 1927. Indeed, the application was at best 

conclusory, stating only that: "said attorneys have filed and 

asserted many unfounded and unsupported positions and have 

unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceeding herein." 

For plaintiff to now assert the need for discovery to flesh out 

the nature of its claim is itself suggestive of a failure to 

comply wi th Rule 11. 

Yet, given that the defendants' responded to the application 

for attorney fees by filing a motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff was required to come forth with the assertion of 

material facts to show the defendants were not entitled to relief. 

A party resisting summary judgment upon the ground that further 

discovery is required cannot simply stand upon the pleadings. 

Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832-

33 (10th Cir. 1986). That party must either establish existence 

of triable issues of fact or file an affidavit under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) showing why the party cannot present facts 

to oppose summary judgment. Id. Failure to present such an 

affidavit is a sufficient ground for affirmance of a motion for 

summary judgment over the opposing party's claim of a need for 

additional discovery. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 4 
850 F.2d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir. 1988). See also Patty Precision v. 

Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff filed no Rule 56(f) motion. Prior to the filing of 

defendants' motions for summary judgment, plaintiff moved for 

additional discovery asserting the need to depose Assistant 

District Attorney Denise Graham "in order to determine the nature 

and extent of the bad faith practices of said defendant [sic] in 

the conduct of this litigation." It is noteworthy that even the 

request for discovery merely suggests the possibility of, or 

plaintiff's counsel's belief in, the "bad faith" of Ms. Graham. 

Nevertheless, relying upon National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. 

Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982), plaintiff 

contends this motion entitled it to discovery prior to judgment. 

That contention overlooks the very language of the case upon which 

plaintiff depends. 

In connection with discovery motions filed in response to 

attorney fee requests, the D.C. Circuit stated: "Discovery 

requests should be precisely framed Unfocused requests to 

initiate discovery without indicating its nature or extent serve 

no purpose, and the District Court has full discretion to deny 

such requests." National Ass'n, 675 F.2d at 1329. In this 

instance, the plaintiff's assertion of a need to "determine the 

nature and extent of the bad faith practices" is just such an 

unfocused request. From the record, we can perceive no legitimate 

assertion of any disputed issue of fact which required the 

district court to permit discovery or to hold an evidentiary 

hearing. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 5 
Finally, the district court denied attorney fees predicated 

upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). The motion requesting the fees 

stated: "Attorney fees should also be awarded to 

plaintiff ••. in that defendants failed to admit numerous 

matters proponded [sic] to them under FRCP 36 and plaintiff was 

required to prove the truth of these matters." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) states: 

If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any 

document or the truth of any matter as requested under 

Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions 

thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the 

truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply to 

the court for an order requiring the other party to pay 

the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, 

including reasonable attorney fees. 

It is immediately observable that plaintiff's motion failed to 

inform the court what documents or what truths plaintiff proved at 

trial which subjected defendants to Rule 37(c) sanctions. More 

importantly, the motion failed to identify what expenses or 

~ttorney fees resulted as a consequence. Indeed, this motion has 

the precision of a broadside, fired only to shift the burden of 

all the plaintiff's attorney fees to the defendants. The district 

court denied the motion on the grounds of waiver, however, and 

plaintiff contends on appeal that waiver should not have been 

applied. 

That argument notwithstanding, we find the motion wanting and 

therefore properly denied. The generality of plaintiff's motion 

is fatal to the cause it asserts. Without the specific allegation 

of which facts or documents plaintiff was required to prove over 

defendants' refusal to admit, the defendants were deprived of the 

opportunity to assert the defenses Rule 37(c) provides. Moreover, 

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 6 
Rule 37(c) is not intended to be a vehicle by which general 

attorney fees are shifted between parties. 

The focus of the rule is upon promoting discovery and 

assuring its effectiveness. 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 2281 (1970). To compel the admissions 

required by Rule 36, Rule 37(c) provides for expense shifting as a 

sanction. Nothing within Rule 37(c) suggests, however, that the 

price of failing to make a proper admission is the payment of all 

the opposite party's attorney fees. Only those fees directly 

linked to the process of proving what was not admitted are 

provided for in the rule. Since plaintiff failed to particularize 

those fees, its application was properly denied. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

-7-

Appellate Case: 87-1940 Document: 01019962010 Date Filed: 01/04/1989 Page: 7