Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-06330/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-06330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH PERTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEARTLAND REALTY INVESTORS, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-06330-CRB 

ORDER STRIKING AFFIRMATIVE 

DEFENSES

Heartland Realty Investors’ and Heartland Santa Rosa Limited Partnership’s (collectively, 

“Heartland”) Answer (dkt. 11) to Sarah Pertz’s Complaint (dkt. 1) asserts thirty-two affirmative 

defenses. All thirty-two are devoid of factual support, and many are not affirmative defenses at 

all. Pertz’s motion to strike Heartland’s affirmative defenses is therefore granted. Heartland may 

amend its Answer to attempt to salvage any defenses struck without prejudice. The Court finds 

this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-

1(b), and therefore vacates the hearing currently set for Friday, January 17, 2020.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(c). “Affirmative defenses plead matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie 

case, which deny the plaintiff’s right to recover, even if the allegations of the complaint are 

true.” FDIC v. Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Gomez v. 

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640–41 (1980)). In contrast, allegations that plaintiff has not met its 

burden of proof or which deny liability are not affirmative defenses. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. 

Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A 

ruling on a motion to strike affirmative defenses must be based on matters contained in the 

pleadings. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 516 (1959).

The Ninth Circuit has long held that an affirmative defense is adequately plead if it

“gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 

(9th Cir. 1979). While the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, this Court 

and the majority of courts in this district have held that the heightened pleading standard of 

Twombly and Iqbal, which followed Wyshak, is now the correct standard to apply to 

affirmative defenses.1 See, e.g., Fishman v. Tiger Natural Gas Inc., No. C 17-05351 

WHA, 2018 WL 4468680, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018); Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 

941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Accordingly, Heartland’s affirmative 

defenses must contain sufficient factual matter to state a defense “that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

When a court strikes an affirmative defense, leave to amend should be freely given 

so long as there is no prejudice to the moving party. Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 826.

II. DISCUSSION

Heartland’s affirmative defenses do not meet this standard. Not one of the thirtytwo affirmative defenses pled in the Answer is supported by factual allegations. See

Answer at 9–13. All thirty-two affirmative defenses are stricken as insufficiently pled.

Additionally, Heartland’s first, twelfth, twentieth, and thirty-first affirmative 

defenses are not affirmative defenses at all. As Pertz correctly notes, they “merely contest 

the sufficiency of the pleading of the complaint.” Mot. (dkt. 17) at 9–10; see also Main 

 

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 Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2015), is not to the contrary. That case 

confirmed the “fair notice” standard for affirmative defenses, without addressing the applicability 

of Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard. See id. at 1019. The Court will therefore 

follow other decisions in this district that have continued to apply the heightened Twombly/Iqbal

standard to affirmative defenses after Kohler. See Fishman, 2018 WL 4468680, at *3.

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