Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08039/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Plaintiff Kenneth Paul Hougas seeks judicial review of the denial of his application 

for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff 

argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by: (1) finding his hypothyroidism 

to be non-severe; (2) according inadequate weight to the opinion of his treating physician; 

(3) rejecting his subjective complaints; and (4) and concluding that his degenerative disc 

disease did not meet one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1 (Doc. 13 at 4). Ultimately, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence (Doc. 13 at 4).

A person is considered “disabled” for the purpose of receiving social security 

benefits if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result 

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration’s decision 

to deny benefits should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not supported by 

Kenneth Paul Hougas,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-19-08039-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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substantial evidence. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss 

v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “It means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted). The Court must review 

the record as a whole and consider both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s determination. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

I. DISCUSSION

A. NON-SEVERE IMPAIRMENT

Plaintiff first argues the ALJ erred in finding his hypothyroidism to be a non-severe 

impairment (Doc. 13 at 4-7). Plaintiff specifically argues the error was harmful based on 

the condition’s close association with his morbid obesity and ineligibility for lumbar 

surgery (Doc 14 at 4). 

First, aside from its association with his obesity, Defendant argues, and Plaintiff 

does not contest, that there is no medical source opinion stating that Plaintiff experienced 

any functional restrictions stemming specifically from his hypothyroidism (Doc. 21 at 9). 

Although the record confirms a diagnosis (see, e.g., AR 795, 798, 800, 804),1“a mere 

recitation of a medical diagnosis does not demonstrate how that condition impacts 

plaintiff’s ability to engage in basic work activities.” Wiehn v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-01517 

CKD, 2013 WL 4404120, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013).

To the extent Plaintiff argues that his hyperthyroidism is a major contributing factor 

to his obesity, which in turn prevented him from getting lumbar surgery, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s obesity to be a “severe” impairment (AR 18), and acknowledged that Plaintiff’s 

“morbid obesity has led to increased stress on his lumbar spine, as well as made him a poor

surgical candidate.” (AR 24). The Court is unclear as to what additional physical 

limitations Plaintiff believed should have been attributed to his hypothyroidism in the 

1 Administrative Record (Doc. 10).

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evaluation of his residual functional capacity. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (finding any error in failing to include a diagnosis to be harmless when the 

decision reflects consideration of the corresponding limitations). Accordingly, even 

assuming the ALJ may have erred, the Court finds such error was harmless.2

B. MEDICAL OPINION OF MARSHALL MEIER, M.D.

Plaintiff argues the ALJ accorded inadequate weight to the opinion of his primary 

care physician, Marshall Meier, M.D. (Doc. 13 at 7-8). 

To reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence. If a treating or examining 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an 

ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). “The 

ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.”

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, the ALJ made only a general passing reference to Dr. Meier’s opinion (AR 

24): 

[T]he claimant’s obesity would reasonably aggravate the pain 

from the degenerative disc changes in the lumbar spine. To be 

sure, [] in July 2017, the claimant saw a Board Certified 

Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Physician, who noted 

that the claimant’s morbid obesity has led to increased stress 

on his lumbar spine, as well as made him a poor surgical 

candidate.

(AR 24). Although it appears that the ALJ may have considered Dr. Meier’s opinion in 

2 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in failing to consider the side effects from his 

thyroid medication (Doc. 13 at 5-7) and in finding those allegations “were not recorded in 

the medical evidence of record.” (AR 23). In his Opening Brief, Plaintiff does not point to 

anything in the medical records to support significant side effects (Doc. 13 at 5-7). Instead, 

the only corroboration is Plaintiff’s testimony at the July 12, 2017 hearing (AR 51-54). 

Because this argument centers on subjective complaints, the ALJ was required to provide 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons to reject that testimony. Whether the ALJ erred in 

doing so is better addressed in the section evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. 

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evaluating Plaintiff’s obesity and degenerative disc disease, the decision is far from clear. 

See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ errs when he 

rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring 

it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or 

criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his 

conclusion.”); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1037 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007). Because 

the decision lacks any actual, meaningful evaluation of Dr. Meier’s opinion, the Court finds 

the ALJ erred.

C. PLAINTIFF’S SYMTOM TESTIMONY

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony (Doc. 

13 at 11-19). In evaluating a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ is required to engage in a twostep analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must 

decide whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an impairment 

reasonably expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged. Id. If the first test 

is met and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the testimony regarding 

the severity of the symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

the rejection. Id. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medical impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms, but concluded that his statements as 

to the intensity or limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible (AR 22). 

“In determining credibility, an ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation, such as considering claimant’s reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies 

in claimant’s testimony.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff’s daily living activities and reported functionality (AR 24), the 

effectiveness of medication (AR 23), and the objective medical evidence (AR 23-23)

illustrated that Plaintiff possessed greater functional abilities than he alleged. 

Here, although Plaintiff attacks the boilerplate language that Plaintiff’s “statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible for the reasons explained in this decision,” Plaintiff does not address the specific 

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reasons noted above and relied upon by the ALJ. See Rose-Eckert v. Berryhill, 694 Fed. 

App’x 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that boilerplate language standing alone may 

constitute reversible error). 

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to address the ALJ’s reasoning

amounts to a concession that those specific reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints were valid. See Independent Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 

929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Our circuit has repeatedly admonished that we cannot ‘manufacture 

arguments for an appellant’ and therefore we will not consider any claims that were not 

actually argued in appellant’s opening brief. Rather, we ‘review only issues which are 

argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.’” (internal citations omitted)); 

see also Sohmer v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. EDCV 18-01172-AB (RAO), 2018 WL 

6133724, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2018); Meyers v. Schriro, No. CV08-0078-PHX-GMS, 

2010 WL 2471914, at *6 (June 15, 2010).

D. DEGENERATIVE DISC DISEASE

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc 

disease failed to meet one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1, specifically Section 1.04 (Doc. 13 at 9-11). “For a claimant to show that his 

impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An 

impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not 

qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990), superseded by statute on other 

grounds as stated in Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013).

To meet listing 1.04(A), which covers disorders of the spine, including degenerative 

disc disease, a claimant must meet the following criteria:

Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuroanatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, 

motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or 

muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, 

if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg 

raising test (sitting and supine).

20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.04. Here, the ALJ found “there [was] no evidence 

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of clinical deficits for 12 continuous months,” nor “evidence of root compression 

characterized by motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle

weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss.” (AR 21). Upon review, the Court finds 

there is evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not 

demonstrate significant atrophy or muscle weakness (see, e.g., AR 524 (noting normal 

range of motion in the cervical spine with no weakness or pain); AR 525 (noting normal 

thoracic muscle bulk with atrophy, or spasms); AR 573 (noting no atrophy); AR 613 

(noting normal range of motion in cervical spine and no weakness); AR 772 (noting normal 

muscle tone and no clonus or atrophy); and 774 (noting claimant did not complain of 

weakness)). To the extent Plaintiff argues there is evidence to support that his degenerative 

disc disease meets § 1.04(A)’s requirements, we leave it to the ALJ to resolve conflicts and 

ambiguities in the record. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 

(9th Cir. 2014). To reverse would require this Court to review the factual record de novo 

and re-weigh the evidence. The Court is prohibited from doing so. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)); Flynn v. Charter, 107 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Rather, ‘if it is possible 

to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents 

the agency’s findings, we must affirm the decision.’” (citation omitted)). The Court thus 

finds that the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease failed to 

meet one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

E. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Finally, Plaintiff argues substantial evidence in the record supports a finding of 

disability in this case (Doc. 13 at 19). Within this argument, Plaintiff appears to argue the 

ALJ erred in relying on various consultative examiner reports and opinions, which are 

arranged by the Social Security Administration, and are inherently biased (Doc. 13 at 20-

21. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ has a higher than average denial rate, and that 

research suggests most denials may be found to be incorrect (Doc. 13 at 24). Plaintiff, 

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however, provides no support to find that consultative examinations cannot be relied upon 

by administrative law judges. In fact, under our regulatory framework, “the Commissioner 

‘has broad latitude in ordering a consultative examination.’” Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 

838, 842 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The Court thus finds that relying on a 

consultative examination is not error in and of itself. The Court notes, however, that it will 

reverse for further proceedings to allow the ALJ to properly consider Dr. Meier’s opinion, 

and other opinions in relation to each other, as previously discussed. To the extent Plaintiff 

appears to generally cite to evidence within those records that might support a finding of 

disability, Plaintiff has failed to include any legal argument, and the Court again refuses to 

reweigh the evidence. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ has a high denial rate, 

“ALJs are presumed to be unbiased.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 

685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate, or make any 

argument, that the ALJ’s behavior in this specific context, was “so extreme as to display 

clear inability to render fair judgment.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 

2001).

II. CONCLUSION

It is in this Court’s discretion to reverse and remand for an award of benefits or 

further proceedings. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001). In this 

case, remand is appropriate to properly consider Dr. Meier’s medical opinion. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 

vacated and remanded to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for 

further proceedings consistent with this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 30th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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