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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_______________ 

Nos. 15-1627 and 15-1628 

_______________ 

ELNOR WHITEHEAD, as Executrix of the Estate of 

John Cavadus Whitehead, Sr. 

v. 

THE PULLMAN GROUP, LLC, 

Appellant in No. 15-1627 

___

BARBARA MCFADDEN, as Executrix of the Estate of 

Gene McFadden 

v. 

THE PULLMAN GROUP, LLC, 

Appellant in No. 15-1628 

_______________ 

On Appeal from the District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(Civ. Nos. 2-08-cv-00192 and 2-08-cv-00193) 

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 

_______________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

December 10, 2015 

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Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and GREENBERG, 

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: January 22, 2016) 

Armen Manasserian, Esq. 

3121 Chadney Drive 

California, CA 91206 

Felton T. Newell, Esq. 

The Newell Law Firm 

601 South Figueroa Street, Suite 4050 

Los Angeles, CA 90017 

Attorneys for Appellants

Sayde J. Ladov, Esq. 

Dolchin, Slotkin & Todd, P.C. 

50 South 16th Street, Suite 3530 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

Attorneys for Appellees 

_______________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

_______________ 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 

 Singer-songwriters John Whitehead and Gene 

McFadden were “an integral part of the Philadelphia music 

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scene in the 1970s.”1 In 2002, appellant David Pullman 

approached Whitehead and McFadden about purchasing their 

song catalogue.2

 The parties signed a contract but never 

finalized the sale. Whitehead and McFadden passed away in 

2004 and 2006, respectively, and Pullman became embroiled 

in a series of disputes with their estates over ownership of the 

song catalogue.3

 The parties eventually agreed to arbitration. 

Pullman, unhappy with the arbitral panel’s ruling, moved in 

the District Court to vacate the arbitration award on the 

ground that the panel had committed legal errors that made it 

impossible for him to present a winning case. The District 

Court denied Pullman’s motions, and Pullman now appeals. 

Even if we were to agree with Pullman that the arbitrators 

misapplied the law—and we do not—legal error alone is not a 

sufficient basis to vacate the results of an arbitration. 

Accordingly, we will affirm. 

I. 

 Whitehead, McFadden, and Pullman entered into a 

contract in May of 2002.4

 The agreement gave Pullman the 

exclusive option to purchase Whitehead and McFadden’s 

song catalogue following a 180-day period in which Pullman 

was to conduct due diligence about the catalogue’s value.5

 

 

1

 Appellees’ Br. at 2 (punctuation modified). 

2

 Pullman acted through his company, The Pullman Group, 

LLC. We will refer to appellants collectively as “Pullman.” 

3

 We will refer to appellees collectively as “the Estates.” 

4 See Appellants’ App. at 67–73 (a copy of the contract). 

5 Id. at 68 ¶¶ 2–3. 

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Once Pullman had completed his investigation, he had the 

right to terminate the transaction after giving written notice to 

Whitehead and McFadden.6

 In the event that any dispute 

arose under the contract, the parties agreed to arbitration in 

New York City under the rules of the American Arbitration 

Association.7

 Pullman claims that his investigation turned up several 

tax liens that diminished the value of the song catalogue.8

 

Pullman communicated his concerns to Whitehead and 

McFadden via telephone, at which point they allegedly told 

him that they would get back to him with more information.9

 

Pullman contends that the two songwriters eventually told 

him that they did not want to consummate the transaction, 

thereby breaching their agreement.10

 The Estates assert that all of this occurred 

unbeknownst to Whitehead and McFadden’s relatives. After 

Whitehead and McFadden died, the Estates entered into 

separate negotiations to sell the song catalogue to Warner 

Chappell Music for $4.4 million.11 Shortly before completion 

of the transaction, the Estates received a letter from Pullman 

disclosing the existence of the May 2002 agreement. A few 

 

6 Id. at 71 ¶ 9. 

7 Id. ¶ 11. 

8

 J.A. 84 (Arbitration Tr. at 215:18–216:6), 86 (222:12–19). 

9 Id. at 85 (Arbitration Tr. at 220:4–24). 

10 Id. at 87 (Arbitration Tr. at 227:15–228:4). 

11 Id. at 114–15 (Arbitration Tr. at 336:21–337:9). 

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months later, Warner Chappell withdrew its offer to purchase 

the song catalogue.12 

 Litigation ensued. The Estates, claiming that Pullman 

had “torpedoed the deal with Warner Chappell in an effort to 

get McFadden and Whitehead to sell their catalogue to him 

for less money,” sued Pullman in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County.13 Pullman removed the case to the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity 

jurisdiction. The Estates ultimately sought (i) a declaratory 

judgment that Pullman’s contract with Whitehead and 

McFadden was void, and (ii) damages for intentional 

interference with contractual relations. Pullman 

counterclaimed, seeking his own declaratory judgment and 

raising a claim for breach of the May 2002 agreement.14 The 

parties ultimately filed stipulations agreeing to send the case 

to arbitration.15 

 A panel of three arbitrators issued its final award in 

September of 2014.16 The panel dismissed the parties’ 

 

12 Id. at 116–17 (Arbitration Tr. at 344:17–345:6). 

13 Appellees’ Br. at 5. 

14 J.A. 7 (containing the District Court’s summary of the 

case’s procedural history). 

15 Appellants’ App. at 75–76 (a copy of the stipulation). 

16 Id. at 2–11. The arbitrators included the Hon. George C. 

Pratt, formerly a judge in the Eastern District of New York 

(1976–1982) and on the Second Circuit (1982–1995); the 

Hon. Richard D. Rosenbloom, formerly a justice on the New 

York State Supreme Court; and James Kobak, Jr., Esq. 

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breach-of-contract and tort claims and dismissed the Estates’ 

request for a declaratory judgment as moot. While the panel 

agreed with Pullman that the May 2002 agreement with 

Whitehead and McFadden was a valid contract, it also 

concluded that Pullman had failed to introduce evidence 

sufficient to prove that he had ever notified Whitehead and 

McFadden that he had completed his due diligence. 

Consequently, the panel ruled that Pullman’s option to 

purchase the song catalogue had lapsed and the May 2002 

agreement was no longer enforceable.17 

 Pullman then moved to vacate the arbitral award. The 

District Court denied the motions, leading to this appeal.18 

II. 

 Pullman’s primary argument is that the arbitral panel, 

which conducted its proceedings in accordance with New 

York law, erred in its application of that state’s so-called 

Dead Man’s Statute.19 Subject to certain exceptions, the 

 

17 Id. at 4–5. 

18 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1332. This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal 

from the District Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

The District Court entered its final order on February 13, 

2015, and Pullman timely appealed. See J.A. 6–15 (District 

Court order); id. at 2–4 (Pullman’s notice of appeal). 

19 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4519. The Rule states: 

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Statute “disqualifies parties interested in litigation from 

testifying about personal transactions or communications with 

deceased or mentally ill persons.”20 Its purpose is “to protect 

the estate of the deceased from claims of the living who, 

through their own perjury, could make factual assertions 

which the decedent could not refute in court.”21 After the 

parties submitted briefs addressing whether the Dead 

Man’s Statute should apply to the arbitration, the panel ruled 

that (i) the Statute would apply, but (ii) rather than exclude 

otherwise inadmissible evidence from the hearing, the 

arbitrators would simply not “give it any weight” by “filtering 

 

 “Upon the trial of an action or the hearing upon 

the merits of a special proceeding, a party or a 

person interested in the event . . . shall not be 

examined as a witness in his own behalf or 

interest . . . against the executor, administrator 

or survivor of a deceased person . . . concerning 

a personal transaction or communication 

between the witness and the deceased 

person . . . except where the executor, 

administrator, survivor . . . or person so 

deriving title or interest is examined in his own 

behalf . . . concerning the same transaction or 

communication.” 

20 Poslock v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd. of Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 666 

N.E.2d 528, 530 (N.Y. 1996). 

21 Id. (quoting In re Wood’s Estate, 418 N.E.2d 365, 366–67 

(N.Y. 1981)). 

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out the evidence in our own minds.”22

 By causing the arbitrators to discount any testimony 

about oral communications between Pullman and his 

contractual counterparties, these rulings made it very difficult 

for Pullman to present a winning case. Because the panel 

concluded that the import of the May 2002 agreement hinged 

on whether Pullman had notified Whitehead and McFadden 

that he had completed his due diligence, Pullman asserts that 

the only way he could have succeeded in the arbitration was 

by producing evidence that he had notified Whitehead and 

McFadden in writing about the results of his investigation. 

Pullman claims not to have done so for the entirely 

understandable reason that he did not anticipate that 

Whitehead and McFadden would die. Pullman now argues 

that the arbitrators’ application of the Dead Man’s Statute was 

erroneous because it effectively made it impossible for him to 

prove his case, thereby depriving him of a fair hearing. 

III. 

 The District Court concluded that even if the arbitral 

panel erred in its application of the Dead Man’s Statute, that 

error was not sufficient to vacate the results of the parties’ 

arbitration. We agree.23 

 

22 J.A. 31 (Arbitration Tr. at 4:3–12). 

23 When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to 

vacate an arbitration award, we review its legal conclusions 

de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Sutter v. 

Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012), 

as amended (Apr. 4, 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). 

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 We begin with the Federal Arbitration Act, which 

specifies four circumstances under which a district court can 

vacate an arbitral award.24 The Supreme Court has held that 

these are the “exclusive grounds” for moving to vacate an 

award in a district court.25 One of the four grounds is 

“misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 

material to the controversy.”26 Pullman asserts that the 

arbitral panel erred under this subsection by refusing to 

consider testimony about Pullman’s oral communications 

with Whitehead and McFadden. 

 Contrary to Pullman’s argument, we have long held 

that for an error to justify vacating an arbitration award, it 

must be “not simply an error of law, but [one] which so 

affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was 

deprived of a fair hearing.”27 We have also spoken of 

procedural irregularities so prejudicial that they result in 

“fundamental unfairness.”28 Here, we discern no unfairness 

at all. The arbitral panel reasonably chose not to consider 

potentially self-serving testimony about communications with 

persons who are no longer able to present their side of the 

 

24 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 

25 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 

(2008). 

26 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). 

27 Newark Stereotypers’ Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning 

Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 1968). 

28 Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 995 

(3d Cir. 1997). 

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story. 

 Nor are we persuaded by Pullman’s argument that the 

only way he could have succeeded before the arbitrators was 

to have documented his communications with Whitehead and 

McFadden in anticipation of the fact that they might die. 

Pullman makes this assertion as though it illuminates some 

manifest injustice. To the contrary, the May 2002 agreement 

specified that any dispute about its meaning was to be 

arbitrated in New York. It was entirely foreseeable—even in 

2002—that an arbitral panel comprised of New York jurists 

might apply that state’s evidentiary rules, including the Dead 

Man’s Statute. 

 Pullman also argues that, even if the arbitral panel’s 

decision to apply the Statute was reasonable, the Estates 

“opened the door” to testimony about oral communications 

with Whitehead and McFadden by introducing evidence on 

the same subject. This argument is unavailing. Pullman is of 

course correct that a party generally cannot use an evidentiary 

rule as both sword and shield. Even so, that principle is 

meant to prevent one party from gaining an unfair advantage; 

it has no application to the present circumstances, in which 

the arbitral panel assured the parties that it would “filter out” 

any inadmissible testimony. The purpose of the panel’s 

ruling was to make the parties’ task easier by permitting them 

to present their respective cases without having to worry 

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about triggering any evidentiary tripwires.29 In view of the 

arbitrators’ promise to “filter out” any problematic testimony, 

it is fair to say that the panel reached the same result as it 

would have if there had been no testimony whatsoever about

conversations with Whitehead and McFadden. There was no 

“door” for the Estates to open at all. 

IV. 

 Lastly, Pullman contends that the arbitrators’ actions 

amounted to a “manifest disregard of the law.”30 Whether 

this standard survived the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 

Mattel that the Federal Arbitration Act provides the 

“exclusive grounds” for vacating an arbitral award is an open 

question.31 A circuit split has since developed, and this Court 

has not yet weighed-in.32 We decline the opportunity to do so 

 

29 See J.A. 85 (Arbitration Tr. at 218:14–25) (in which the 

chairman of the panel clarifies that the panel is “not 

preventing anyone from talking about” evidence otherwise 

inadmissible under the Dead Man’s Statute because it is 

“almost impossible to try to filter out [such evidence] by 

question and answer”). 

30 Appellants’ Br. at 21–23. 

31 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 

U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) (declining to resolve the issue). 

32 See, e.g., Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, 557 

F. App’x 168, 173–74 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining the 

current state of the law); Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music 

Franchising, LLC v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172, 176–77 

(3d Cir. 2010) (same). 

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now. 

 Indeed, even if we were to consider Pullman’s 

arguments under the rubric of “manifest disregard of the 

law,” we still would not arrive where Pullman wants us to go. 

The manifest disregard standard requires more than legal 

error. Rather, the arbitrators’ decision “must fly in the face of 

clearly established legal precedent,”33 such as where an 

arbitrator “appreciates the existence of a clearly governing 

legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to 

it.”34 We have therefore described this standard as 

“extremely deferential.”35 In these circumstances, where the 

arbitrators were fully cognizant of the Dead Man’s Statute, 

permitted the parties to brief the issue, and then applied the 

Statute in a way designed to promote efficiency and fairness 

in the arbitral proceedings, we see no legal error at all—much 

less one that would rise to the level of manifest disregard of 

the law. 

V. 

 Pullman twice agreed to settle disputes arising under 

the May 2002 agreement through arbitration, first in the 

agreement itself and again by stipulating to do so in the 

District Court. Having made that commitment, he is now 

bound by the terms of his bargain. Because we see no 

 

33 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 

F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995). 

34 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 

808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). 

35 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003). 

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unfairness in the arbitrators’ conduct, we will affirm the 

judgments of the District Court. 

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