Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03987/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03987-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DMYTRO VEROVKIN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DAVID N. STILL,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-3987 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Defendant David N. Still, director of the San Francisco office

of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), moves for

summary judgment on Plaintiff Dmytro Verovkin’s claim for judicial

review of USCIS’s determination that he is not eligible to adjust

his status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 

Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment. The matter was taken

under submission on the papers. Having considered all of the

papers submitted by the parties, the Court denies Defendant’s

motion and grants Plaintiff’s cross-motion.

BACKGROUND

The material facts of this case are undisputed. Plaintiff was

born on October 16, 1984 and is a Ukrainian national. He lived in

Ukraine until 2004, when he withdrew from his studies at the Gorniy

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Institute of Jurisprudence and accompanied his mother to the United

States. His mother was admitted on a K-1 visa as the fiancee of a

U.S. citizen; Plaintiff was admitted on a K-2 visa as her child. 

Plaintiff’s mother subsequently married her fiance within ninety

days of her entry, as required by the terms of her visa.

On September 14, 2005, Plaintiff and his mother filed I-485

applications with USCIS seeking to have their status adjusted to

that of lawful permanent resident. On October 16, 2005, Plaintiff

turned twenty-one. Plaintiff’s mother’s application for adjustment

of status was later approved. However, in a notification dated

April 25, 2006, USCIS denied Plaintiff’s application because he was

“now over twenty-one years of age” and no longer qualified as an

accompanying child pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d). Ex. to Compl. 

Plaintiff now challenges USCIS’s determination that he is

statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

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evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

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F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party’s prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party’s

“burden of contradicting [the moving party’s] evidence is not

negligible.” Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is “highly fact specific.” Id.

II. Review of Administrative Action

Under § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a court

may set aside any agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). USCIS’s decision that Plaintiff is statutorily

ineligible for adjustment of status was based on its legal

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interpretation of the INA. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme

Court established a two-pronged framework for judicial review of an

administrative agency’s interpretation of the statutes and

regulations that it administers:

If congressional intent is clear, both the court and the

agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress. If, however, Congress has not

directly addressed the exact issue in question, a

reviewing court must defer to the agency’s construction

of the statute so long as it is reasonable.

Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011-1012 (9th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

However, in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27,

(2001), the Supreme Court held that Chevron deference applies only

“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency

generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the

agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the

exercise of that authority.” The Ninth Circuit has interpreted

Mead as placing “crucial limits on Chevron deference owed to

administrative practice in applying a statute, clarifying that

agency interpretations promulgated in a non-precedential manner are

beyond the Chevron pale.” Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1012

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d

1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Interpretations of the Act set forth

in [] non-precedential documents are not entitled to Chevron

deference.”). “In light of Mead, the essential factor in

determining whether an agency action warrants Chevron deference is

its precedential value.” Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1012

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(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff challenges the individual administrative

decision to deny his application for adjustment of status. The

decision has no binding effect on third parties and, as discussed

below, is not based on the clear dictates of statutes or formally

enacted regulations. Because it is has no precedential value, it

is not entitled to Chevron deference.

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory Framework

The K-1 visa is a non-immigrant visa that allows an individual

who is engaged to be married to a U.S. citizen to enter the United

States for the purpose of concluding the marriage. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(i). The child of such a fiance(e) who accompanies

or follows to join his or her parent may enter the United States

with a K-2 visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii). A child is

defined as an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age. 8

U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). A K-1 visa holder must conclude his or her

marriage with the U.S. citizen within ninety days of being admitted

to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1).

Prior to the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986

(IMFA), the INA provided that, after the conclusion of the

marriage, “the Attorney General shall record the lawful admission

for permanent residence of the alien and minor children.” See Pub.

L. No. 91-225, 84 Stat. 116, § 3(b) (1970). Since the repeal of

the automatic adjustment provision by the IMFA, K visa holders

seeking permanent residence have been required to apply for

adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). See Pub. L. No.

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Individuals not present in the United States may obtain an

immigrant visa by applying for one with the U.S. Consulate. Once

they arrive, they need not adjust their status.

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99-639, 100 Stat. 3537, § 3(d) (1986). This section provides that

the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security may adjust an

applicant’s status to that of lawful permanent resident if the

applicant “is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is

admissible to the United States for permanent residence,” and if

“an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his

application is filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). However, a K visa

holder’s status may only be adjusted to that of conditional

permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d). This conditional status

was created by the IMFA and is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. It is

designed to prevent an alien’s improper use of marriage to a U.S.

citizen as a means of obtaining permanent residence. After a

period of two years, the condition may be removed if USCIS is

persuaded that the marriage is legitimate. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1186a(c)(3)(B).

Section 1255(a) does not create an independent basis for an

applicant to obtain an immigrant visa; it merely establishes a

procedure (adjustment of status) by which a visa may be

distributed. An alien who is already in the United States but

seeks adjustment of status to permanent resident must demonstrate

that he or she is entitled to an immigrant visa.1

 After a K-1 visa

holder is married to a U.S. citizen, he or she will have no

difficulty making such a showing; the marriage renders him or her

the “immediate relative” of a citizen, and therefore “eligible to

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receive an immigrant visa.” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 

“Immediate relatives” include children, spouses, and parents of

U.S. citizens. Id. Likewise, an immigrant visa will be

“immediately available to [a K-1 visa holder] at the time his

application is filed” because immediate relatives of U.S. citizens,

unlike other categories of family-based immigrants, are not subject

to annual numeric limitations. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), (c)

and (a).

In contrast, some K-2 visa holders will find themselves

without an independent statutory basis for adjusting their status

under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Because the IMFA eliminated automatic

adjustment of status for K-2 visa holders, they must otherwise be

“eligible to receive an immigrant visa” under the INA, and such a

visa must be available immediately. K-2 visa holders under the age

of eighteen will have no difficulty satisfying these requirements

because their parent’s marriage will render them the stepchild of a

U.S. citizen, and thus an immediate relative entitled to an

immediate visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B). However, children

who are eighteen years or older at the time of the marriage are

excluded from the definition of “stepchild,” and therefore cannot

obtain an immigrant visa as the immediate relative of a U.S.

citizen. Id. This is true even though these children were given

K-2 visas to enter the United States with their K-1 parent when

they were already over eighteen. Nor can these children obtain

derivative benefits from their K-1 parent’s status as the spouse of

a U.S. citizen, because there is no statutory basis for such

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2

After the K-1 visa holder adjusts his or her status to lawful

permanent resident, the K-2 child may apply for an immigrant visa

as the child of a lawful permanent resident. However, such a visa

would not be immediately available because this category of familybased immigrants is subject to annual numeric limits.

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benefits.2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4).

USCIS has acknowledged that the IMFA left this unintended gap

in the INA with respect to the adjustment of status of K-2 visa

holders. Interoffice Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Assoc. Dir.

of Domestic Ops. for USCIS, re. Adjustment of Status for K-2 Aliens

(Mar. 15, 2007), available at www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/

K2AdjustStatus 031507.pdf. The agency filled the gap by enacting 8

C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii), which reads:

Upon contracting a valid marriage to the petitioner

within 90 days of his or her admission as a nonimmigrant

pursuant to a valid K-1 visa issued on or after November

10, 1986, the K-1 beneficiary and his or her minor

children may apply for adjustment of status to lawful

permanent resident under section 245 [8 U.S.C. § 1255] of

the Act. Upon approval of the application the director

shall record their lawful admission for permanent

residence in accordance with that section and subject to

the conditions prescribed in section 216 of the Act.

This regulation provides a basis for K-2 visa holders to obtain

permanent resident status, even though the INA itself does not

expressly provide that K-2 visa holders between the ages of

eighteen and twenty-one are eligible for an immigrant visa. As was

the case before the IMFA, these benefits flow from the parent’s

status as the spouse of a U.S. citizen.

The USCIS regulation furthers Congress’ intent in creating the

K visa to facilitate the entry and subsequent permanent residence

of alien fiance(e)s and of their children as well. See Pub. L. No.

91-225. Nothing in the legislative history of the IMFA suggests

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that Congress intended to eliminate the availability of permanent

residence for K-2 visa holders between the ages of eighteen and

twenty-one. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-906 (1986). Indeed, such an

interpretation would render the K-2 visa meaningless for these

children. Congress could not have intended to authorize the

admission of these young people as children of a U.S. citizen’s

fiance(e), only to send them back to their countries of origin when

they soon and inevitably reach the age of twenty-one, because there

is no basis for them to obtain an immigrant visa in the meantime. 

In addition, the only INA provision addressing adjustment of status

for K visa holders assumes that K-2 children will be able to adjust

their status along with their parents:

The Attorney General may not adjust, under subsection (a)

of this section, the status of a nonimmigrant alien

described in section 1101(a)(15)(K) of this title

[establishing eligibility for a K-visa] except to that of

an alien lawfully admitted to the United States on a

conditional basis under section 1186a of this title as a

result of the marriage of the nonimmigrant (or, in the

case of a minor child, the parent) to the citizen who

filed the petition to accord that alien’s nonimmigrant

status under section 1101(a)(15)(K) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (emphasis added).

II. Application of the INA to Plaintiff

USCIS denied Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status

because he was twenty-one years of age on the date his application

was adjudicated. The dispositive legal question is which date

should serve as a reference point for determining Plaintiff’s age

for purposes of his eligibility for adjustment of status. 

To begin with, USCIS applied the wrong provision of the Act in

reaching its decision to deny Plaintiff’s application. It

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concluded that, because Plaintiff was twenty-one years of age at

the time his application was adjudicated, he “no longer qualif[ied]

as an accompanying child pursuant to section 203(d) of the Act [8

U.S.C. § 1153(d)].” Ex. to Compl. Section 1153(d), however,

provides, “[A child] shall, if not otherwise entitled to an

immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under

subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, be entitled to the

same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the

respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the

. . . parent.” Thus, it grants derivative beneficiary status to

the children of individuals who are eligible for an immigrant visa

under § 1153(a), (b) or (c). Subsection (a) sets out the order of

preferences for family-sponsored immigrants subject to numerical

quotas; it does not apply to the immediate relatives of U.S.

citizens, who are not subject to such quotas and may obtain a visa

pursuant to § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Subsections (b) and (c) of § 1153

govern the allocation of preferences for employment-based and

“diversity” immigrants, respectively. Plaintiff’s mother did not

apply for an immigrant visa under any of these subsections. 

Rather, she applied for adjustment of status as the wife of a U.S.

citizen, having entered the United States on a K-1 visa as that

citizen’s fiance(e). Her eligibility for a visa, and thus

Plaintiff’s eligibility, was not governed by § 1153, and neither of

them was subject to a numerical quota. Because USCIS applied the

wrong statute in denying Plaintiff’s application, its decision was

arbitrary and capricious, and is subject to remand in any event.

Defendant justifies the USCIS decision on other grounds,

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arguing that, the inapplicability of § 1153 notwithstanding, the

INA nonetheless required that Plaintiff be under twenty-one at the

time his application was adjudicated. However, because the INA no

longer contains a provision explaining how a K-2 child is to obtain

permanent resident status, its text does not directly address this

issue. Accordingly, it is instructive to look at the age

requirement as it existed before Congress inadvertently eliminated

the procedure by which K-2 visa holders could obtain permanent

resident status.

Prior to the enactment of the IMFA, as now, Plaintiff would

have had to demonstrate that he was under twenty-one when he

applied for a K-2 visa. However, after he entered the United

States, his status would have been adjusted to that of lawful

permanent resident automatically once his mother’s marriage was

concluded. There is no indication that, prior to the IMFA, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service considered whether K-2

applicants were still under twenty-one at the time their status was

to be adjusted. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(d) (1985) (governing

adjustment of status for K visa holders). The IMFA eliminated the

automatic adjustment, requiring K visa holders to apply for

adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and obtain

conditional permanent residence before they could become fullfledged lawful permanent residents. By requiring these individuals

to maintain conditional permanent resident status for two years,

the IMFA made it easier for the government to deport those who

enter into fraudulent marriages. But nothing in the IMFA suggests

that, in furthering the purpose of deterring marriage fraud,

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Congress also intended to impose additional age eligibility

requirements on K-2 applicants. The IMFA does not purport to

require that K-2 visa holders demonstrate that they are still under

twenty-one when they seek to obtain conditional permanent

residence. Indeed, such a requirement would have no relationship

to the IMFA’s purpose.

Even today, the process of obtaining a K visa demonstrates

that presumptive eligibility for permanent residence is determined

prior to the applicant’s entry into the United States. Before a K

visa may be issued, the U.S. citizen must first file an I-129F

petition with USCIS on behalf of his or her fiance(e) and any

accompanying children. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d). This petition must be

supported by documents proving the petitioner’s citizenship status

and demonstrating that the petitioner and his or her fiance(e) are

free to contract a valid marriage. Instructions to Form I-129F,

available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-129Finstr.pdf.

Once USCIS approves the petition, it is transmitted to the

U.S. consular office in the alien fiance(e)’s home country. The

fiance(e) and his or her children must then apply for a K visa with

the consular office. In connection with this application, they

must submit numerous documents establishing their eligibility for

the visa and must undergo a medical examination. See Foreign

Affairs Manual, Procedural Note 1 to 22 C.F.R. § 4181. It is at

this point that the K-2 applicant must demonstrate that he or she

is a “child” within the meaning of the INA, i.e., that he or she is

under twenty-one. 22 C.F.R. § 4181(c); Foreign Affairs Manual,

Note 5.3 to 22 C.F.R. § 4181 (“The unmarried child of a K-1 or K-3

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applicant does not require a petition. The applicant needs only to

demonstrate that he or she is the ‘child’ (as defined in INA

101(b)(1)) of an alien classified K-1 or K-3.”). The consular

official determining the applicants’ eligibility for a K visa must

judge them as if they were applying for an immigrant visa in the

“immediate relative” category. 22 C.F.R. § 4181(d); Foreign

Affairs Manual, Procedural Note 3.4 to 22 C.F.R. § 4181.

Because K visa holders are required to demonstrate their

presumptive eligibility for permanent residence prior to entering

the United States, the subsequent application for adjustment of

status serves merely to verify that the K-1 alien fulfilled the

statutory requirement of marrying his or her U.S. citizen fiance(e)

within ninety days, and that the applicants are not otherwise

ineligible to adjust. The I-485 application for adjustment of

status lists, “I entered as a K-1 fiance(e) of a United States

citizen whom I married within 90 days of entry, or I am the K-2

child of such a fiance(e),” as a separate basis for adjustment. 

Form I-485, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf. 

This is distinct from another basis listed: “an immigrant petition

giving me an immediately available immigrant visa number has been

approved.” Id. As “evidence of eligibility,” the application

requires K visa holders to attach only a copy of the approval of

their I-129F petition, their entry form and the K-1 visa holder’s

marriage certificate. Instructions to Form I-485, available at

http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485instr.pdf.

In short, there is no statutory requirement that K-2 visa

holders demonstrate that they are still under twenty-one when they

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3

The Court need not and does not decide whether K-2 applicants

may satisfy the age requirement by demonstrating only that they are

under twenty-one at the time the I-129F petition is filed.

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apply for permanent residence. By imposing such a requirement in

Plaintiff’s case, USCIS applied an unreasonable interpretation of

the INA. Such a requirement is at odds with the fact that a child

can receive a K-2 visa up until the day of his or her twenty-first

birthday. Following Defendant’s interpretation of the age

requirement, a K-2 visa issued under these circumstances would be

worthless the next day. Congress could not have intended such an

absurd result. Accordingly, the Court holds that, once an alien

has demonstrated that he or she is under twenty-one when he or she

receives a K-2 visa,3 he or she remains eligible for later

adjustment of status, even if he or she has reached the age of

twenty-one in the interim.

None of the sections of the INA that Defendant cites in

support of his position persuades the Court to reach a different

conclusion. As stated above, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) permits an alien

to adjust his status if he “is eligible to receive an immigrant

visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent

residence,” and if “an immigrant visa is immediately available to

him at the time his application is filed.” Plaintiff meets both of

these requirements. As the child of a K-1 visa holder and pursuant

to USCIS’s gap-filling regulation, Plaintiff was entitled to an

immediate visa at the time his application for adjustment of status

was filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii). Defendant’s bald

assertion that § 1255(a) contains an “express requirement that an

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4

Even if the statute required that Plaintiff be eligible for

an immigrant visa or that such a visa be immediately available to

him as of the date of his application’s adjudication, Plaintiff

still met these requirements. As explained above, his eligibility

for an immigrant visa and the availability of such a visa did not

turn on his age at any time after he received his K-2 visa.

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immigrant visa be available on the date [an applicant’s] status is

to be adjusted” is simply not supported by the text of the statute. 

And Defendant has provided no explanation for his assertion that

Plaintiff’s eligibility for an immigrant visa should be evaluated

as of the date of the adjudication of his application, when the

statute clearly requires evaluating the availability of such a visa

as of the date of the filing of his application.4

Defendant also cites the Child Status Preservation Act (CSPA)

in support of his position. This act applies to several categories

of children seeking immigrant visas. It provides that whether such

applicants are considered “children” is determined by reference to

their age on the date of their petition for classification as such,

rather than on the date the petition is adjudicated. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1151(f) and 1153(h)(1). Defendant takes the position that the

CSPA rule “does not apply to nonimmigrant petitions,” i.e.

petitions for non-immigrant visas. Ex. to Compl. Even accepting

this argument as correct, the most that may be concluded from the

asserted limitation of CSPA’s scope to immigrant petitions is that

Plaintiff’s original I-129F petition for classification as the

child of an alien fiance(e) was not entitled to protection against

aging-out. This is not protection Plaintiff needs or seeks; he was

under twenty-one years of age both when his I-129F petition was

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The Court need not decide which of these is the operative

date.

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submitted and when it was adjudicated.5

As for Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status, the

Court agrees that CSPA has no bearing on it, but for a different

reason than that which Defendant advocates: Plaintiff did not have

to satisfy an age requirement when he applied for permanent

residence. He was not required to file a petition, whether of the

immigrant or non-immigrant type, when he sought to have his status

adjusted; he had already filed and obtained approval of an I-129F

petition, which classified him as the minor child of an alien

fiance(e). At the time he was issued a K-2 visa, he had already

been determined presumptively eligible for permanent residence,

conditioned only on the conclusion of his mother’s marriage and the

completion of a two-year probationary period. Plaintiff thus could

not have “aged-out” after he applied for adjustment of status

because his age was relevant neither at the time his I-129F

petition was submitted nor at the time it was adjudicated.

But even accepting Defendant’s argument to the contrary,

Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status was more akin to a

petition for an immigrant visa than one for a non-immigrant visa;

if it was approved, he would have been granted conditional

permanent resident status. Thus, Defendant’s argument that the

CSPA rule applies only to immigrant petitions offers him no

support.

Nor can Defendant derive support from the fact that the INA

does not explicitly afford aging-out protection to K-2 visa holders

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seeking adjustment of status. It is true that “[w]here Congress

includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits

it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed

that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,

23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this

general principle has little application here. The various

provisions of the INA were not enacted contemporaneously to effect

a single policy objective. Rather, the INA has evolved gradually

as Congress has reacted time and again to the need to cure one

perceived defect or another in immigration policy. Its piecemeal

amendment and lack of cohesiveness call into question the

significance of any minor variation in language between one section

and another. Moreover, this is not a case where Congress

intentionally used different language in two sections of the same

act. The INA no longer even contains a provision explaining how K2 visa holders are to obtain permanent resident status. Thus,

Defendant cannot present the Court with two sections of the Act to

compare. Accordingly, even if the age of a K-2 visa holder at the

time of his or her application for adjustment of status were

relevant, it is unlikely that Congress’ failure specifically to

apply CSPA’s aging-out protections to K-2 children reflects a

conscious choice to exclude them. It is more likely that their

situation was overlooked, as it was overlooked when Congress

eliminated the provision for the automatic adjustment of their

status and failed to replace it with a provision entitling them to

an immigrant visa.

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Although CSPA is not applicable to Plaintiff’s situation, even

if one accepts Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff was required

to remain under twenty-one to be eligible for adjustment of status,

the policy behind CSPA is applicable. Determining Plaintiff’s age

by reference to the date on which he applied for adjustment of

status rather than the date on which his application was

adjudicated would result in fair treatment analogous to that

provided by CSPA. In passing the Act, Congress recognized the

fundamental unfairness of letting a child applicant’s eligibility

for permanent residence turn on how long it takes USCIS to process

his or her application. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-45, at *2 (2001)

(finding a need to address “the predicament of these aliens, who

through no fault of their own, lose the opportunity to obtain an

immediate relative visa before they reach age 21”). The same

principles of fairness and equity apply with equal force in

Plaintiff’s case.

Defendant has cited no case law supporting the conclusion that

Plaintiff is ineligible for adjustment of status. Indeed, the only

factually similar case cited in Defendant’s submissions actually

weakens his position: In Jiang v. Still, 2007 WL 685700, at *5

(E.D. Cal.), the court concluded that the plaintiff was ineligible

for an immigrant visa because she turned twenty-one a day after

entering the United States, and therefore “was not a minor child at

the time of [her] application” for adjustment of status (emphasis

added). The Court disagrees with the reasoning in Jiang, and holds

that Plaintiff’s age at the time of his application for adjustment

of status is not the relevant inquiry. However, the obvious

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inference from Jiang’s holding is that if the plaintiff had been a

child at the time she applied for adjustment of status, she would

have been eligible. Thus, even under the Jiang rule, Plaintiff

prevails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (Docket No. 5) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for

summary judgment (Docket No. 16) is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered

to re-open Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status and

adjudicate it in conformity with this Order. Judgment for

Plaintiff shall enter accordingly. Plaintiff shall recover costs

from Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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