Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00050/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00050-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shaka, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 15-0050-PHX-SMM (BSB) 

 O R D E R 

On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff Shaka, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Yuma, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a February 13, 2015 Order, the Court 

denied the deficient Application to Proceed and gave Plaintiff 30 days to pay the 

administrative and filing fees or file a complete Application to Proceed. On March 2, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a certified six-month trust account statement. In a May 12, 2015 

Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint for 

failure to state a claim, specifically, the failure to allege facts to link the alleged 

constitutional violation to any named Defendant. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file 

an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. On May 26, 

2015, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The Court will dismiss the 

First Amended Complaint and this action. 

. . . . 

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I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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II. First Amended Complaint 

 In his single-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants Charles L. 

Ryan, Director of Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”); Richard Pratt, ADOC 

Interim Director of Health Services at the Central Office; Lori Johnson, ADOC Facility 

Health Administrator (“FHA”)/Corizon Site Manager at ASPC-Yuma’s Dakota Unit; and 

Anthony N. Medel, Assistant FHA at ASPC-Yuma’s Dakota Unit. Plaintiff seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. 

 Plaintiff again asserts a claim for the denial of constitutionally adequate medical 

care. In its last Order, Plaintiff was informed of the standard to state a claim for 

constitutionally deficient medical care, specifically, that Plaintiff must allege a serious 

medical need to which each defendant had acted with deliberate indifference. The Court 

expressly stated that in an amended complaint, Plaintiff must identify the constitutional 

right violated, the name(s) of the defendants who violated that right, exactly how each 

defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and how Plaintiff was injured. 

Because Plaintiff had failed to allege any facts against any named Defendant in his 

Complaint, his Complaint was dismissed. The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and that, after amendment, the 

Court would treat his original complaint as non-existent. 

 In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants knew that he 

suffered from knee pain and attaches copies of inmate letters, grievances, grievance 

appeals, and responses thereto, concerning his knee pain. Plaintiff largely leaves it to the 

Court to parse the legible portions of his attachments to determine the nature of his 

medical need and its severity and how any Defendant may have acted with deliberate 

indifference to his medical needs.1

 Plaintiff asserts that the exhibits show that all four 

 

1

 Plaintiff also quotes from documents filed in a class action concerning prison medical care. Parsons v. Ryan, CV12-0601-PHX-DKD (D. Ariz.), and alleges that he is a member of the class. Plaintiff quotes from documents filed in that case that reflect 

deficiencies in the provision of medical care to ADC inmates. However, these 

documents are not sufficient to support that Plaintiff was actually denied constitutionally adequate medical care. The stipulation entered in Parsons does not provide that every ADOC inmate received deficient care for serious medical needs. In short, citation to 

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Defendants had “sufficient notice” of his knee pain and that since 2014, the Defendants 

have failed to ensure that he received “the prompt & required medical treatment.” He 

also asserts that responses to his Health Needs Requests (“HNRs”) were not prompt and 

that “Specialist Orders & Requests” were not followed, “or sent to Dr. Latrell, [and/or] 

treatment [sic].”2

 He asserts that none of the Defendants performed their assigned duties 

“by which their position in the Grievance granted them to do so.” 

 The documents submitted by Plaintiff reflect the following facts: Plaintiff has 

been suffering from pain in both knees since at least January 2013. (Doc. 10 at 36.) In 

February 2014, an MRI of each of Plaintiff’s knees was performed and tears were 

observed. (Id.) 

 On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Informal Complaint Resolution 

stating that although he was to have received an outside consultation, seventeen months 

had passed without treatment for his knees and he continued to be in pain. (Id.) In a June 

26, 2014 response, Corrections Officer III (“CO III”) Connell stated that he had not 

received a response from nursing supervisor Pulido regarding Plaintiff’s June 9, 2014 

informal resolution and told Plaintiff that he could proceed to the next step. (Id. at 37) 

 On June 27, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance to the “FHA” in which 

he stated that he had been waiting since January 2013 for treatment for his knees. (Id. at 

38.) Plaintiff further noted that he had seen Dr. Vanderhoof on June 19, 2014, and Dr. 

Vanderhoof had recommended knee replacement surgery for both knees. (Id.) Plaintiff 

further stated that he had not yet been seen by a provider or informed whether surgery 

had been scheduled. (Id.) In a July 14, 2014 response, FHA Medel stated that the 

healthcare provider had submitted a request for an outside consultation regarding 

 Parsons does not support that Plaintiff was actually denied constitutionally adequate medical care. As discussed herein, Plaintiff has otherwise failed to state a claim for 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, despite the guidance provided in the last Order and Plaintiff’s considerable litigation experience and ability. 

2

 Plaintiff’s attachments refer to a December 19, 2014 appointment with an orthopedist, but Plaintiff spells the physician’s name in various ways. The Court refers to this orthopedist as Dr. Latrell, although it is unclear how his name is actually spelled. 

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Plaintiff’s knee problems, which the Clinical Coordinator had just received and which 

began “the process of submission for review.” (Id.) 

 On July 20, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance Appeal to the Assistant 

Director of Health Services in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with Medel’s 

response and asking whether “the MRB in Phx approve knee replacement of both knees.” 

(Id. at 35.) On August 6, 2014, Plaintiff submitted another Inmate Grievance Appeal to 

the Assistant Director of Health Services “per Grievance Coordinator on 8/6/14.” (Id. at 

39.) Plaintiff stated that he still had not been seen by the healthcare provider or informed 

whether he had been approved for surgery and stated that he was still in pain. (Id.) In an 

October 6, 2014 response, someone, on behalf of Ryan, denied Plaintiff’s appeal noting 

the following: 

Plaintiff was seen by an orthopedist on June 19, 2014, who had diagnosed 

Plaintiff with pseudo-gout and degenerative joint disease. Apparently at 

that appointment, the orthopedist injected corticosteroids and pain 

medication into Plaintiff’s “suprapatellar pouch,” which brought immediate 

relief. The orthopedist told Plaintiff that his knees did not look terrible and 

that he would see Plaintiff as needed. On July 14, 2014, a request for 

surgical intervention was denied by the Utilization Management physician, 

who instead ordered the continuation of conservative management so long 

as Plaintiff’s symptoms were relieved by injections. Plaintiff also 

continued to receive Sulindac for pain management. Plaintiff was to submit 

an HNR if he felt that he needed another injection or his symptoms 

worsened. 

(Id. at 34.) 

 On October 12, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an HNR complaining of knee pain. In 

response, on October 28, 2014, Plaintiff was referred to the “Nurse Line.” (Id. at 32.) In 

an October 14, 2014 Inmate Letter Response, Vanessa Headstream, “Program Evaluation 

Administrator” of the “Health Services Contracting Monitoring Bureau,” stated that 

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Plaintiff’s October 29, 2014 grievance appeal had been forwarded to her for review. (Id.

at 33.) She stated that she had forwarded Plaintiff’s “correspondence” to the Corizon Site 

Manager at Plaintiff’s facility for review. (Id.) She also told Plaintiff that, for timely 

response to his concerns, he should bring his concerns to the Corizon Site Manager and 

then proceed through the Inmate Grievance process if he was dissatisfied. (Id.) 

 On December 19, 2014, Plaintiff was transported for his appointment with 

orthopedist, Dr. Latrell. Dr. Latrell recommended injections for Plaintiff’s knees, but he 

could not administer the injections until Corizon authorized the injections. 

 On December 21, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Informal Complaint 

Resolution to the FHA, Complex Site Manager. (Id. at 29.) In it, Plaintiff stated that he 

had seen Dr. Latrell, who had recommended injections for Plaintiff’s knees that could 

provide relief for up to six months, but Dr. Latrell was unable to administer the injections 

until Corizon approved the treatment. (Id.) Dr. Latrell instead prescribed oral 

medications. (Id.) Dr. Latrell told Plaintiff that permanent relief would require joint 

replacement surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff complained that, because he was not allowed to 

receive the injections at the December 19 appointment, he would likely have to go 

another two months before he received treatment for his knee pain. (Id.) Plaintiff further 

contended that removal of bone chips in his knees, rather than knee replacement, would 

relieve his pain and was less drastic than replacement surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff complained 

that Corizon prevented Plaintiff from receiving the injections Dr. Latrell recommended, 

which if given at the time, could have relieved his pain. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff noted 

that, although Dr. Latrell had prescribed medications following Plaintiff’s return to 

prison, Plaintiff had yet to receive the prescriptions. (Id.) 

 In a January 6, 2015 response, Johnson stated that Dr. Latrell had determined that 

total knee replacement was not necessary and that he wanted to try injections, but 

because injections required preauthorization from Corizon, he could not administer them 

at that appointment. (Id. at 31.) Johnson reported that Corizon had since authorized the 

injections and that Plaintiff would be scheduled “with the provider” to receive them. (Id.) 

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 In a January 14, 2015 Inmate Grievance, Plaintiff noted that it had been almost 30 

days since he was seen by Dr. Latrell, but that he still had not received treatment for his 

knees. (Id. at 28.) He also noted that when he had previously received injections, he 

only experienced relief for one and half hours. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff noted that Dr. 

Latrell had not been provided with Plaintiff’s February 2014 MRIs. (Id.) Plaintiff asked 

to be returned to Dr. Latrell for injections or surgery. (Id.) In a February 9, 2015 

response, Assistant FHA Madeline Lowell stated that Plaintiff had an appointment for 

injections “coming up.” (Id.) In an Inmate Letter Response dated January 28, 2015, 

Ryan stated that surgery had not been recommended by Dr. Latrell and that Plaintiff was 

on a “medical hold until [his] next appointment at the end of February. (Id. at 27.) 

 In an February 3, 2015 Inmate Letter to Ryan, Plaintiff disagreed with Ryan’s 

characterization of Dr. Latrell’s recommendations and noted that he still had not received 

injections recommended on December 19, 2014. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff noted that Dr. 

Vanderhoff, who had seen Plaintiff’s February 2014 MRIs, had recommended knee 

replacements. Unlike Vanderhoof, Dr. Latrell had not seen the MRIs. (Id. at 24.) 

 In a February 10, 2015 Inmate Letter Response to Plaintiff’s February 3 letter to 

Ryan, Headstream informed Plaintiff that Corizon had approved the recommended 

injections, which were to be administered within the month. (Id. at 25.) 

 On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance to Johnson, which 

is illegible. On February 25, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance Appeal from 

Johnson’s response, which is also illegible. (Id. at 18.) Also on February 25, 2015, 

Plaintiff submitted an HNR asking to see the provider because of pain in his knees. (Id.

at 19.) On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance to the Grievance 

Coordinator, which is illegible. (Id. at 17.) In an April 29, 2015 response to Plaintiff’s 

Medical Grievance Appeal to the Director, someone on behalf of Ryan denied Plaintiff’s 

appeal, noting the following: 

On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff was issued knee sleeves for each knee. On 

February 24, 2015, Plaintiff received injections in each knee and nonCase 2:15-cv-00050-SMM--BSB Document 11 Filed 06/22/15 Page 7 of 12
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steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs were recommended for daily pain 

management, which he had received. Plaintiff was seen by the orthopedist 

again on April 14, 2015, who recommended further diagnostic testing. 

Finally, a request for an MRI of Plaintiff’s left knee had been made, and if 

approved, Plaintiff would be scheduled. 

(Id. at 15.) 

 Another MRI was approved on April 29, 2015. (Id. at 16.) On May 7, 2015, 

Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance Appeal of Johnson’s response to his grievance, 

which is illegible. (Id. at 14.) 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 at 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

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by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants 

Ryan, Pratt, Johnson, or Medel were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

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Plaintiff claims that, although Ryan delegates his authority to his subordinates, he is still 

responsible “to ensure the provision of medical care is constitutionally adequate.” There 

is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as 

the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not 

impose liability. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 

(1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and 

§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff further claims that Defendants were aware of his serious medical need 

and failed to take corrective action. Assuming that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts 

in his First Amended Complaint to support that he has or had a serious medical need, he 

has (again) failed to allege facts to support that any named Defendant was deliberately 

indifferent to this serious medical need. Plaintiff’s allegations, and attachments reflect 

that consulting physicians have indicated that surgery may be needed at some point, but 

have recommended less drastic treatment to see if Plaintiff gains relief without surgery. 

Plaintiff’s attachments reflect that delays in him receiving treatment, but that he did 

receive the recommended treatment. As noted above, mere delay is not sufficient to state 

a claim. Plaintiff appears to assert that different outside consultants made different 

recommendations, Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with the recommendation of one 

consultant does not support that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs. While Plaintiff may eventually receive surgery, Defendants did not act 

with deliberate indifference by following less drastic recommendations of physicians. 

At most, the attachments show that Plaintiff and consulting physicians differed as to 

whether Plaintiff’s condition warranted surgery; Defendants reliance on the 

recommendations of consulting physicians did not constitute deliberate indifference. . 

Plaintiff’s attachments reflect that he has been evaluated by specialists, received 

injections and other medication, and that further diagnostic testing has been approved. 

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Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a medical care claim against Defendants Ryan, 

Pratt, Johnson, and Medel, and the Court will dismiss these Defendants and this action. 

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his First Amended Complaint, the 

Court will dismiss his First Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given if a 

complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 

whether justice requires granting leave to amend.3

 Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

 Plaintiff has made two efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable to 

do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 

opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) and this action are 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 (2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

 

3

 Plaintiff is no stranger to litigation before this court. See Malumphy v. Cluff, et al., CV94-1728-PHX-SMM (LOA) (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 1998); Malumphy v. Ryan, et al., CV 95-0272-PHX-SMM (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 1997); Shaka v. Stewart, et al., CV00-1742-

PHX-SMM (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2004); Shaka v. Ryan, et al., CV10-2253-PHX-SMM (D. 

Ariz. Mar. 4, 2015); As reflected in his prior actions, Plaintiff has gained a familiarity with crafting a viable complaint. 

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 (3) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 22nd day of June, 2015. 

Honorable Stephen M. McNamee

Senior United States District Judge

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