Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01941/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01941-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD G FUCCI,

Petitioner,

 v

A P KANE, Acting Warden, 

Respondent. 

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS,

Real party in interest.

 /

No C 06-1941 VRW 

ORDER

Respondent Anthony Kane has moved to dismiss petitioner

Ronald Fucci’s petition for habeas corpus claiming it is barred by

the one-year statute of limitations under 28 USC section 2244(d)(1). 

Doc #7. Petitioner opposes respondent’s motion and argues that his

petition was filed within the one-year limitations period. Doc #10. 

The court has reviewed both parties’ memoranda and finds

oral argument unnecessary to adjudicate this matter. For the

reasons stated herein, respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

\\

Case 3:06-cv-01941-VRW Document 12 Filed 03/21/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The BPT was abolished on July 1, 2005 and replaced with the Board of

Parole Hearings (BPH). See Cal Gov Code section 12838.4 (2007). 

2

“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 USC section

2244(d)(1). The parties agree that section 2244(d)(1) applies, but

disagree about when to begin counting the days and whether

petitioner is entitled to tolling between his state-court filings. 

The following table sets forth the relevant dates and events. 

Date Event Days from

Previous Event

December 18, 2003 The Board of Prison Terms (BPT)1 conducted

petitioner’s parole hearing at issue. Doc #7,

Ex 3. 

-

March 1, 2004 Petitioner files an administrative appeal of

the BPT’s denial of his parole. Doc #7, Ex 4.

-

March 17, 2004 The BPT’s decision to deny petitioner parole

becomes final. Doc #7, Ex 3 at 76. 

-

September 7, 2004 Petitioner files his habeas petition in Fresno

County Superior Court. Doc #7, Ex 6.

-

September 30, 2004 Fresno County Superior Court denies

petitioner’s habeas petition. Doc #7, Ex 6. 

0

January 5, 2005 Petitioner files his habeas petition in the

court of appeals. Doc #7, Ex 7. 

97

January 13, 2005 The court of appeals denies petitioner’s habeas

petition. Doc #7, Ex 8. 

0

June 21, 2005 The BPT denies petitioner’s appeal. Doc #10,

Ex 1. 

-

June 22, 2005 Petitioner files his habeas petition in

California Supreme Court. Doc #7, Ex 9. 

160

February 22, 2006 California Supreme Court denies petitioner’s

habeas petition. Doc #7, Ex 10. 

0

March 14, 2006 Petitioner files habeas petition with this

court. Doc #1. 

20

Case 3:06-cv-01941-VRW Document 12 Filed 03/21/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

I

Subparagraph (D) of § 2244(d)(1) applies to habeas

petitions challenging parole board decisions. See Shelby v

Bartlett, 391 F3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir 2004); Redd v McGrath, 343

F3d 1077, 1081-85 (9th Cir 2003). Subparagraph (D) mandates that

the statute of limitations begins to run from “the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 USC section

2244(d)(1)(D). The “factual predicate” used by courts in habeas

cases challenging parole board actions is the day the administrative

appeal becomes final, subject to the petitioner receiving proper

notice. Shelby, 391 F3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F3d at 1084. 

Respondent agrees that the event triggering the statute of

limitations is the date petitioner received the denial of his

administrative appeal –– in this case, June 25, 2005. Doc #7 at 3. 

Respondent contends, however, that petitioner “waived his right to

benefit from the statute of limitations rule” by filing his habeas

petition in superior court before his administrative appeal was

decided. Id at 3-4. The court rejects this argument.

The sole case respondent cites in support of his waiver

argument is United States v McGee, 993 F2d 184 (9th Cir 1993). In

McGee, the United States brought suit against McGee for unpaid

federal tax assessments. 993 F2d at 185. McGee did not dispute the

merits of the government’s claim but asserted that the government

was time-barred from bringing the suit. Id. McGee submitted an

offer in compromise to the IRS that contained the following waiver:

The taxpayer-proponents waive the benefit of any statute

of limitations applicable to the assessment and collection

of the liability sought to be compromised, and agree to

Case 3:06-cv-01941-VRW Document 12 Filed 03/21/07 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the suspension of the running of the statutory period of

limitations on assessment and collection for the period

during which this offer is pending, * * * and for 1 year

thereafter.

 

Id (ellipses in original). The IRS accepted McGee’s offer. Id.

In McGee, the court was asked to determine the date on

which the offer in compromise was no longer pending and, thus, when

the waiver of the statute of limitations terminated. Id. The court

held that the waiver was valid –– and the statute of limitations

tolled –– until the government formally rejected McGee’s offer, or

until McGee withdrew his offer. Id at 186. 

Petitioner, by contrast, a prisoner challenging the BPT’s

decision to deny him parole, filed a habeas petition in pro per in

superior court after waiting in vain nearly six months for the BPT

to issue a decision on his administrative appeal. Petitioner’s

impatience was perhaps not without basis: the BPT did not issue a

decision on petitioner’s appeal until June 21, 2005–over sixteen

months after petitioner filed his administrative appeal and one day

before petitioner filed his habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court. Doc #10, Ex 1; Doc #7, Ex 9. Under respondent’s

reading of McGee, the court must impute to petitioner an intent to

waive the benefit of the rule that the statute of limitations begins

to run only upon the issuance of a final administrative decision.

The court finds little resemblance between McGee and the

instant case. McGee, an employer who conceded that he failed to pay

the government money he withheld from his employees’ wages for

taxes, voluntarily entered into a contractual relationship with the

Internal Revenue Service that tolled the statute of limitations

running against the government while the parties tried to reach a

Case 3:06-cv-01941-VRW Document 12 Filed 03/21/07 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

compromise and included an express, written waiver. Petitioner can

hardly be analogized to the employer in McGee. 

Respondent further invokes a scenario in which a habeas

petitioner, by proceeding to exhaust his judicial remedies while his

administrative appeal was still pending, “could wait indefinitely

for the administrative decision without the statute ever running.” 

Resp Reply at 3. The factual predicate of this scenario, however,

is that the responsible agency perpetually failed to act on the

administrative appeal; under respondent’s theory, the prisoner would

never receive a final administrative decision and his claim would

therefore never become ripe for adjudication in the courts. While

this might be more convenient for the potential habeas respondents

in such cases, it would hardly be a just state of affairs. A better

solution would be more timely processing of administrative appeals. 

II 

The statute of limitations is tolled upon the filing of a

collateral challenge in state court until there is final resolution

in the state system. See 28 USC section 2244(d)(2); Evans v Chavis,

546 US 189, __ (2006); Carey v Saffold, 536 US 214, 219-20 (2002);

Brown v Poole, 337 F3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir 2003). But if the

petitioner “unreasonably delays” in filing a subsequent petition

after the lower court’s denial, the claim is no longer “pending” and

will not toll the statute of limitations. See Chavis, 546 US 189,

__ (2006); Saffold, 536 US at 225-27; Gaston v Palmer, 447 F3d 1165,

1166-67 (9th Cir 2006). 

Respondent argues that petitioner unreasonably delayed in

filing his petition with both the court of appeals and the

Case 3:06-cv-01941-VRW Document 12 Filed 03/21/07 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

California Supreme Court. Doc #7 at 4-5. Petitioner essentially

concedes that the 160-day lapse of time between the court of

appeal’s denial and his filing in the California Supreme Court was

“unreasonable” but denies that the other two delays were not

reasonable. The court finds it unnecessary to delve into the

details of this issue. In light of the court’s ruling that the

statute of limitations did not begin to run before petitioner’s

state court filing, the tolling issue cannot affect the outcome of

this motion. According to the chart on page 2 above, the three

periods of delay totaled 277 days. Assuming, arguendo, that tolling

was unavailable and all of these time periods counted toward the

limitations period, petitioner still filed his federal habeas

petition well within 2244(d)(1)’s one-year limitations period. 

For the forgoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss

is DENIED. Respondent shall now respond on the merits to the order

to show cause dated July 27, 2006. Doc #2. Respondent’s response

is due on or before May 4, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01941-VRW Document 12 Filed 03/21/07 Page 6 of 6