Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00443/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00443-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 While Plaintiff identified Nurse Dailey, the correct spelling is Daley (Doc. # 97). 

2

 Defendant Transportation Sergeant Doescher was dismissed for failure to serve

(Doc. # 44).

3 The Court also notes that there is a pending motion by Plaintiff to consolidate this

action with CV 04-1128-PHX-EHC, which also presents claims related to his assault on

WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Earl Felton Crago, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 06-0443-PHX-EHC (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Earl Felton Crago, Jr., an inmate in the custody of the Arizona Department

of Corrections (ADC), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

following ADC employees: (1) Director Dora Schriro; (2) Warden Trujillo; (3) Deputy

Warden Andre; (4) Major Johnson; (5) Correctional Officer (CO) II Teed; (6) Nurse Daley;1

(7) Criminal Investigation Unit Officer Tartaglia; (8) CO II Fischer; and (9) Facility Health

Administrator Sloan (Doc. # 1 at 1-2).2

 Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment (Doc. ## 78, 97). The motions are fully briefed (Doc. ## 98, 107, 113,

117). The Court will deny Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, grant Defendants’

summary judgment motion in part, but deny it as to Count I.3

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 April 20, 2004. The parties are encouraged to reaffirm their positions on whether

consolidation is appropriate in view of this Order. 

- 2 -

I. Background

Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants’ failure to protect him from other

inmates (Count I) and to provide medical care (Count II) constituted deliberate indifference

to his safety and health, which resulted in violations of his Eighth Amendment rights (Doc.

#1 at 4-5). Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by filing false

disciplinary charges against him and telling him the charges would not be removed until

Plaintiff dropped his lawsuits (Count III) (id. at 6). 

Plaintiff’s claim in Count I stems from an incident on April 20, 2004, when Plaintiff

was to be transported from the prison to the Pinal County Jail for an upcoming court

appearance. Plaintiff alleged that he informed Teed that the other inmates in the transport

vehicle could see that Plaintiff was a protective segregation (PS) inmate and they knew that

there was a murder order issued on him by a prison gang (id. at 4A). Plaintiff asserted that

he personally told Teed of his PS status and that he had been assaulted on two prior

transports by general population (GP) inmates. He stated that despite his pleas not to be put

in the transport van, Teed threatened to mace Plaintiff if he did not get into the van. Plaintiff

claimed that he did get in the vehicle with a GP inmate who subsequently assaulted Plaintiff

(id.). Plaintiff alleged that he was brought back to the prison and received treatment at the

ADC hospital for head and body injuries received in that attack (id.). He further claimed

that Teed informed Plaintiff that Trujillo and Johnson approved the transport, and were

therefore aware of the risk to Plaintiff (id.). Plaintiff claimed that Johnson, Andre, Trujillo,

and Schriro were responsible as supervisors who failed to enact policies to protect PS

inmates.

Plaintiff’s claim in Count II is based on his allegation that Daley filled out a medical

log that stated Plaintiff had no injuries following the April 20, 2004 attack, which prevented

Plaintiff from receiving follow up treatment at the Pinal County Jail and the ADC (id. at 5).

Plaintiff argued Daley’s action constituted deliberate indifference because she knew that

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Plaintiff sustained serious injures and that his body exhibited the need for further treatment

(id. at 5A). Plaintiff further alleged that Sloan, Schriro, and Trujillo are responsible for

Daley’s action because they supervise her and are responsible for implementing policies to

prevent negligence. 

Finally, Plaintiff presented two claims of retaliation. First, Plaintiff alleged that

Fischer wrote Plaintiff up for assault based on the April 20, 2004 incident (id. at 6). While

the assault ticket was dropped, Plaintiff claimed that it was reinstated after he announced his

intention to file another lawsuit (id.). Plaintiff further claimed that he was told he would be

kept in a Special Management Unit (SMU) facility until he dropped his lawsuits. Second,

Plaintiff alleged that another false disciplinary charge was filed against him on September

1, 2004, and when Plaintiff appealed he was told he would not have been found guilty if he

had not sued ADC officials (id. at 6A). Plaintiff claimed that as a result of the false

disciplinary charges, he is being classified as a maximum custody inmate (id.). 

II. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). On

summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility the burden then shifts to the

opposing party who must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 250; see Triton

Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The opposing party need

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968).

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). And the evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Defendants seek summary judgment on the basis that they were not personally

involved in any alleged constitutional violation; Teed, Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro

were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety; Daley and Sloan were not deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity; and Teed, Fischer, Johnson, Tartaglia, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro did not

retaliate against Plaintiff for filing lawsuits (Doc. # 97). 

In response, Plaintiff contends that he explicitly informed Teed that he was assaulted

twice previously when transported with non-PS inmates and that the inmates in the transport

van were aware that Plaintiff was a PS inmate (Doc. # 113 at 2). Plaintiff further argues that

the supervisors at his unit failed to enact policies or procedures to ensure the safe transfer

of PS inmates and such failure constitutes deliberate indifference (id. at 3). With respect to

Count II, Plaintiff contends that Daley prepared a medical transfer summary that stated he

had no injuries when he did, which resulted in the failure of the Pinal County Jail to treat

Plaintiff. Plaintiff further claims that Daley’s supervisor, Sloan, is responsible for failing to

rectify Daley’s error. Finally, as to Count III, Plaintiff claims that Fischer filed a false

disciplinary report against Plaintiff after he threatened to file another § 1983 lawsuit and that

ADC personnel told Plaintiff he would be kept in isolation until he dropped his lawsuits (id.

at 5). 

Plaintiff also seeks partial summary judgment as to Count I of his Complaint, arguing

that Defendants had knowledge that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious injury when

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4 Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was combined with

their own summary judgment motion (Doc. # 97). 

- 5 -

he was transported with the non-PS inmates (Doc. # 78 at 4). Plaintiff claims, as a result, that

Defendants’ actions constituted deliberate indifference to his safety (id.). In their Response,

Defendants reiterate the same arguments that they present in support of their own motion for

summary judgment on Count I (Doc. # 97).4

 In reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendants

failed to keep him separated from non-PS inmates and therefore he is entitled to summary

judgment (Doc. # 107). 

III. Count I - Failure to Protect

A. Legal Standard

States are obligated by the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from violence at

the hands of other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To demonstrate

that a prison official was deliberately indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury by

another prisoner, a plaintiff must show that the “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must

also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187-88

(9th Cir. 2002). To prove that officials knew of the risk, however, the prisoner may rely on

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to

establish knowledge. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 1995). Deliberate indifference is something more than mere negligence, but “is

satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or

with knowledge that harm will result.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). 

B. Personal Participation

Defendants’ first argument is that they did not personally participate in any alleged

constitutional violation against Plaintiff on April 20, 2004 (Doc. # 97 at 3). The crux of their

argument is that Plaintiff was “released to the custody of Pinal County” and therefore no

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

ADC employee could be held responsible for any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

(id.). Completely lacking from Defendants’ motion, however, is any case law to support

their assertion. Plaintiff was and remains an inmate of the Arizona Department of

Corrections. The April 20, 2004 incident took place on ADC’s premises. Indeed, Teed

acknowledges that she was aware of a potential risk to Plaintiff’s safety posed by the

transport with non-PS inmates (id. at 3-4). In the absence of any legal authority to support

their claim, the Court declines to grant summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff was no

longer in the “custody” of the ADC and therefore cannot be held responsible for any alleged

constitutional violation.

To the extent Defendants contend that Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978) supports their argument, they are mistaken. Monell stands for

the proposition that there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does

not address the present situation where cooperating governmental agencies were responsible

for an inmate and his safety. Moreover, Plaintiff aptly notes that ADC issued him a

disciplinary ticket for the incident that occurred on April 20, 2004 (Doc. # 113 at 6). It does

not follow, therefore, that ADC could discipline Plaintiff for conduct if he was not in their

custody or control. Defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

C. Deliberate Indifference

1. Teed

Defendants next contend that Teed was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety

(id. at 7). Specifically, Defendants contend that while Teed was responsible for ensuring

Plaintiff’s safety while in ADC custody, Teed “believed she had no choice but to allow”

Plaintiff onto the transport vehicle where she knew Plaintiff would be transported with nonPS inmates (id.). But Teed’s own statements create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

She acknowledges that “she expressed her concern to the driver as well as raising the issue

with her chain-of-command” when she learned that Plaintiff would be transported with nonPS inmates. The mere statement that Teed was “not sure” whether she had to allow Plaintiff

to be transported in this manner does not absolve her of responsibility. Nor does Defendants’

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5 Plaintiff also named Doscher in this claim, but he was dismissed for failure to serve

(Doc. # 44). 

- 7 -

argument that Plaintiff was not at a substantial risk of harm because he was not “really hurt”

on the two prior occasions he was transported with non-PS inmates. The operative facts here

are: (1) Teed knew that Plaintiff was a PS inmate; (2) she knew that Plaintiff was going to

be transported with non-PS inmates; (3) Plaintiff informed Teed that he had been assaulted

twice previously when transported with non-PS inmates; (4) Teed recognized the risk

inherent in such transfer because she expressed her concern to others; (5) Teed let Plaintiff

get in the vehicle; (6) where he was subsequently injured. The Court finds that a reasonable

jury could find that Teed was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety and she is therefore

not entitled to summary judgment.

2. Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro5

Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro argue that they were not personally involved in

Plaintiff’s transfer and cannot be liable on that basis. They also claim that they cannot be

liable simply because they supervise someone who was involved. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff’s remaining theory of liability is that these Defendants are responsible for

policies ensuring the safety of PS inmates. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, a plaintiff can

allege that through its omissions an agency can be responsible for a constitutional violation

committed by an employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186. In that instance, however, a plaintiff

must show that the agency’s deliberate indifference led to the omission that caused the

employee to commit the violation. Id.

Here, there is no evidence of any ADC policy concerning the transportation of PS

inmates. In their affidavits, the supervisory Defendants maintain that they were not aware

that Pinal County was transporting PS inmates with non-PS inmates (Johnson Aff., Doc. #

100, Ex. B ¶ 11; Andre Aff., Doc. # 100, Ex. D ¶ 13; Trujillo Aff., Doc. # 100, Ex. E ¶ 9).

The question, therefore, is whether the supervisory Defendants should have known whether

Pinal County had a practice of transporting PS and non-PS inmates together. 

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

While Defendants assert that there is “no legal mandate that not physically separating

PS and non-PS inmates . . . amounts to deliberate indifference” (Doc. # 117 at 4), it is clear

that knowing of and disregarding a substantial risk to an inmate’s safety can constitute

deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. If keeping PS and non-PS inmates separate

was unimportant, ADC would not require it at all times. See Director’s Instruction (DI) #

125 § 1.1, Doc. # 117, Ex. E. It follows, then, that ADC supervisors should have been aware

of or inquired about the transportation of PS inmates to cooperating agencies. Defendants

do not argue that they are not responsible for implementing policies to ensure the safety of

PS inmates; rather, they maintain that “there are no per se rules when it comes to providing

for inmate security while . . . being transported” (Doc. # 117 at 6-7). 

On this record, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial

as to whether the supervisory Defendants should have known that PS inmates were being

transported with non-PS inmates. As a result, the Court finds that the supervisory

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

D. Qualified Immunity

Teed, Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro claim that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. If a defendant claims qualified immunity, the court must make two distinct

inquires, the “constitutional inquiry” and the “qualified immunity inquiry.” See Estate of

Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002). The “constitutional inquiry”

asks whether, when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the facts

alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If so, a court turns to the “qualified immunity inquiry” and asks if the

right was clearly established at the relevant time. Id. at 201-02. This second inquiry “must

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Id. at 201.

As discussed supra, the Court has determined that disputed facts, viewed in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, create a triable issue of fact regarding whether (1) Teed was

deliberately indifferent when she allowed Plaintiff to be transported with non-PS inmates,

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

and (2) whether the supervisory Defendants should have enacted policies regarding

transportation of PS inmates with cooperating agencies. The second step of the Saucier

analysis requires Defendants to demonstrate that the failure to recognize the risk to Plaintiff

and putting him in the vehicle did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Defendants argue that the constitutional violation alleged by Plaintiff was not clearly

established in April 2004 (Doc. # 97 at 14). A right is clearly established if its contours are

“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right.” Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior case with

the identical facts showing that a right is clearly established, it is enough that there is

preexisting law that provides a defendant “fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful.

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065. A state official can be held liable where he affirmatively and

with deliberate indifference places an individual in danger he would not otherwise have

faced. Id. at 1066. Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence at the hands

of other inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Thus, at the time of the incident in April 2004

it was clearly established that Plaintiff had a constitutional right not to be placed in a

situation where he was at risk of serious harm from another inmate.

If Plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, he informed Teed that he was a PS inmate

and had been assaulted by GP inmates in the two prior months, and he “begged” Teed not

to put him in the vehicle with the GP inmate (Doc. # 1 at 4A). See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843

(“[t]he question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with

deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious

damage to his future health,’ and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single

source or multiple sources”). If an official claims that he was unaware of the risk to an

inmate, he does not escape liability if the evidence shows that he did not verify the

underlying facts, or that he declined to confirm inferences of risk that he suspected to exist.

Id. at 843 n.8. Teed contends that she did not know whether she could prevent Plaintiff from

being transported, despite her knowledge that he would be transported with non-PS inmates.

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

As articulated above, there is a question of fact as to whether Teed acted with deliberate

indifference. As for the supervisory Defendants, there is no evidence that they are not

responsible for the implementation of policies and practices regarding the security of PS

inmates. Indeed, the evidence reflects that the wardens are responsible for implementing

policies regarding PS inmate safety, but have no policies or procedures in this type of

situation. Moreover, there is evidence that Andre and Johnson were required to review

Plaintiff’s transport plan, but failed to do so. The Court therefore finds that Defendants

should have been aware that Plaintiff, a PS inmate, faced a substantial risk of harm if he was

transported with GP inmates. As a result, Defendants fail to pass the second prong of the

Saucier test, and they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

E. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

While genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Teed,

Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro, Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that

any of those five Defendants was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety as a matter of

law. Indeed, Plaintiff has not conclusively established that there was any action that could

have been taken by any Defendant after he was placed on the Pinal County transport vehicle.

Consequently, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.

IV. Count II - Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

A. Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment requires that prisoners receive adequate medical care. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Under § 1983, to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim

based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Id. The test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts in the Ninth

Circuit. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). A plaintiff must first

“show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

omitted). Second, a plaintiff must establish deliberate indifference to that need. McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. A state prison official is deliberately indifferent if he both knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This requires

a “purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” and

“harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may be

shown when an official denies, delays, or intentionally interferes with treatment or by the

way that a medical professional provides the care. Id. A prisoner need not show his harm

was substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that

the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. If the

harm is an “isolated exception” to the defendant’s “overall treatment of the prisoner [it]

ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate indifference.” Id. (citations omitted).

Negligence or medical malpractice does not establish a sufficiently culpable state of

mind. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). But a prisoner

does not have to prove that he was completely denied medical care in order to demonstrate

deliberate indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A] mere

‘difference of medical opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate

indifference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

To prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner

must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable in light

of the circumstances and that it was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to

plaintiff’s health. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Deliberate Indifference

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Daley was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs when she filled out a medical transfer summary on April 20, 2004, that

stated Plaintiff did not have any medical injuries (Doc. # 1 at 5). As a result, Plaintiff

contends that he did not receive necessary follow up treatment upon his transfer to the Pinal

County Jail. Plaintiff further alleges that Sloan, Trujillo, and Schriro are responsible for

Daley’s actions as her supervisors (id. at 5A). 

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need, thereby

satisfying the first prong of the deliberate indifference test. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.

To meet their burden on summary judgment, Defendants must come forward with the

lack of a triable issue of fact; namely, evidence that they did not act with deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. 

1. Daley

The foundation of Plaintiff’s claim against Daley is based upon her preparation of a

medical transfer summary for Plaintiff’s transfer from the ADC to the Pinal County Jail.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Daley was deliberately indifferent when she prepared

a transfer summary stating that Plaintiff did not have any injures (Doc. # 1 at 5A). 

In support of her summary judgment motion, Daley submits her affidavit (Doc. # 98,

Ex. F). She attests that while she has no independent recollection of preparing Plaintiff’s

medical transfer summary on April 21, 2004, she customarily reviews medical charts for

purposes of preparing transfer summaries (id. ¶ 11). She explained that night nurses prepare

medical transfer summaries without treating or examining inmates personally. As a result,

she did not see Plaintiff to independently assess his injuries. Daley also attested that it is

possible Plaintiff’s medical records from April 20, 2004, may not have been filed in his

medical chart by the time she prepared his medical transfer summary that evening (id.). 

On this record, Daley has met her initial burden to present the basis of her motion and

identify portions of the record that show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The

burden now shifts to Plaintiff to present specific facts that a genuine issue exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). 

Plaintiff cannot meet this burden for at least two reasons. First, there is no evidence

that Daley’s actions were anything more than negligent. It is undisputed that Daley did not

examine or treat Plaintiff prior to her preparation of the transfer summary, instead relying on

Plaintiff’s chart, which may not have been updated by the time she wrote the transfer

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 Plaintiff also maintains that it is ADC policy to send an inmate’s medical chart when

he is transferred to another agency (Doc. # 113 at 4). But this fact is not material. As stated,

there is no evidence that Daley’s actions were anything more than negligent. And the fact

that Plaintiff’s medical chart was not sent to the Pinal County Jail inferentially supports

Daley’s claim that Plaintiff’s April 20, 2004 records were not yet put into his chart. 

7 To the extent that Plaintiff claims that Daley’s actions resulted in not being treated

at the Pinal County Jail, this claim fails. Plaintiff himself maintains that his injuries were

severe and obvious. Moreover, Plaintiff has not named any employees of the Pinal County

Jail for failing to treat him. 

- 13 -

summary (Doc. # 98, Ex. F ¶¶ 10-11).6 And Plaintiff has neither alleged nor demonstrated

that Daley prepared the transfer summary with the knowledge that Plaintiff required

treatment and purposefully chose to indicate he had no injuries. Indeed, there is not one

piece of evidence to suggest that Daley had Plaintiff’s medical records from the day before

and deliberately indicated he had no injuries. Rather, Plaintiff merely concludes that Daley’s

actions were deliberate (Doc. # 113 at 4). But conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual

material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor, 880 F.2d at

1045. There are simply no facts from which to draw the inference that Daley’s actions were

deliberate. 

Second, Plaintiff’s own evidence demonstrates that at most his treatment was delayed

and not denied.7

 As a result, any delay in providing medical treatment does not constitute

deliberate indifference unless the delay was harmful. Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198,

200 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002)

(the Eighth Amendment is only violated if “delays occurred to a patient with problems so

severe that delays would cause significant harm that Defendants should have known this to

be the case ”); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1333-35 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that

a delay of several days in receiving pain medication for a broken shoulder did not amount

to a constitutional violation). After Plaintiff’s return from the Pinal County Jail, he saw an

ADC physician on May 10, 2004 for x-rays and received a referral for an eye appointment,

which he had on May 19 (Doc. # 116, Ex. 2 at 9, Ex. 3 at 6). Thus, there is no evidence from

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8 Plaintiff also named Doscher in this claim, but he was dismissed for failure to serve

(Doc. # 44).

- 14 -

which the Court could make a reasonable inference that there was harm caused by any delay.

See Jimenez v. Sambrano, 2007 WL 4961207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2007). Consequently, for

these reasons, Daley will be granted summary judgment on Count II.

2. Sloan, Trujillo, and Schriro

In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Sloan is responsible for Daley’s actions

because he is her supervisor and Schriro and Trujillo are responsible for failing to enact

policies to protect inmates’ health (Doc. # 1 at 5A). In his Response, Plaintiff argues that

Sloan was authorized to instruct Daley to see Plaintiff in order to prepare his transfer

summary (Doc. # 113 at 4). Plaintiff further contends that Sloan was made aware that Daley

had prepared a false transfer summary and failed to transfer Plaintiff’s entire medical file and

failed to take any action.

Plaintiff’s claim against Sloan, Schriro, and Trujillo fails because there is no evidence

that the ADC’s policy of using medical records to create transfer summaries creates a

substantial risk of harm to inmates. As stated, Plaintiff has not met his burden to come

forward with admissible evidence that supports his claim that Daley’s actions were anything

more than negligent. Because the Court has already determined that Daley was not

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff, that finding vitiates the possibility that her supervisors

were deliberately indifferent for failing to properly supervise her. Consequently, Sloan,

Trujillo, and Schriro are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

V. Count III - Retaliation

In Count III, Plaintiff alleged that Schriro, Trujillo, Andre, Johnson, Teed, Tartaglia,

and Fischer violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by retaliating against him for filing

§1983 lawsuits.8

A. Legal Standard

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five elements: (1) an assertion

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that inmate’s

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

protected conduct and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) the action

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d

559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997)

(retaliation claims require an inmate to show that (1) the prison official acted in retaliation

for the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right and (2) the action “advanced no

legitimate penological interest”). Retaliation claims must be evaluated in light of the

concerns of excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management, and courts

must therefore “afford appropriate deference and flexibility” to prison officials in the

evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Prisoners have a constitutionallyprotected right to file grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation without retaliation.

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. 

B. Fischer

Plaintiff alleges that Fischer wrote Plaintiff up for assault with a weapon after the

April 20, 2004 incident in retaliation for Plaintiff’s threat to file another § 1983 lawsuit (Doc.

# 1 at 6). Fischer moves for summary judgment on the basis that she had no knowledge of

Plaintiff’s intent to file a § 1983 lawsuit and, therefore, could not have retaliated against him

(Doc. # 97 at 16). In support of her motion, Fisher submits her affidavit (Doc. # 100, Ex. C).

Fischer attests that on April 20, 2004, she observed Plaintiff and another inmate fighting in

the back of a transport vehicle, and they continued to fight even after they fell out of the

vehicle (id. ¶¶ 8-9). As a result, based on her observations, Fischer attests that she placed

Plaintiff on disciplinary report for assault (id. ¶ 13). Fischer further attests that she had no

knowledge of (1) Plaintiff’s PS status because she was not assigned to his unit, (2) Plaintiff’s

litigation history, or (3) Plaintiff’s intent to file a § 1983 lawsuit (id. ¶¶ 14-17). Finally,

Fischer maintains that she wrote the disciplinary report because of her observation of the

April 20, 2004 incident, where Plaintiff was fighting with another inmate (id. ¶ 13). 

On this record, Fischer has met her initial burden to present the basis of her motion

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 There is also no evidence that Tartaglia had any involvement in Plaintiff’s

disciplinary proceedings related to the April 20, 2004 incident, and Plaintiff does not allege

any involvement.

- 16 -

and identify portions of the record that show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to present specific facts that a genuine issue exists. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff has not met this burden for two reasons. First, Plaintiff alleged

that he told Tartaglia that he intended to file a § 1983 lawsuit as a result of the April 20, 2004

incident (Doc. # 113 at 5). Plaintiff has never alleged that he told Fischer he intended to file

a § 1983 action or that Tartaglia ever had occasion to tell Fischer of Plaintiff’s intentions.9

Second, Plaintiff’s claim is unsupported by the record. Fischer wrote her disciplinary report

on April 20, 2004 at 1:30 p.m., contrary to Plaintiff’s allegation that she wrote her report on

April 21, and thereby undermining his claim that she wrote her report after he threatened to

file a lawsuit. Plaintiff has simply concluded that Fischer’s actions were retaliatory. But this

conclusion is not supported by any facts that give rise to an inference that she took an

adverse action against Plaintiff because of protected conduct. As a result, this conclusory

allegation is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Fischer is

entitled to summary judgment.

C. Tartaglia

Plaintiff alleges that Tartaglia interfered with a disciplinary proceeding stemming

from a September 1, 2004 incident where Plaintiff claims he was attacked by an inmate with

a razor blade (Doc. # 113 at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that although other ADC

personnel verified that a weapon was used against Plaintiff, Tartaglia stated a weapon was

not used, which resulted in Plaintiff being found guilty of fighting (id.). 

Tartaglia moves for summary judgment on the basis that he did not prepare any

disciplinary reports relating to the September 1, 2004 fight (Doc. # 97 at 17). In support of

his motion, Tartaglia submits his affidavit (Doc. # 100, Ex. H). Tartaglia attests that the

extent of his involvement in the September 1, 2004 incident was assessing the scene of the

altercation and taking pictures of the inmates’ injuries (id. ¶ 8). Tartaglia further attests that

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

he did not observe the fight and did not appear in person at Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing

(id. ¶¶ 9, 11). Tartaglia asserts that the Disciplinary Coordinator asked him whether a

weapon had been used in the fight, and Tartaglia replied that “to the best of his knowledge”

a weapon had not been used (id. ¶ 20; Doc. # 100, Ex. H, Attach. 2). But Tartaglia maintains

that he was not involved in Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings related to this incident and

did not submit a report (Doc. # 100, Ex. H ¶ 12). Finally, Tartaglia attests that he had no

knowledge of Plaintiff’s litigation history (id. ¶ 14). 

On this record, Tartaglia has met his initial burden to present the basis of his motion

and identify portions of the record that show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to present specific facts that a genuine issue exists. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff has not met this burden. In his response to Defendants’ summary

judgment motion, Plaintiff alleges that “Tartaglia . . . suppressed the IMS records during

disciplinary proceedings and stated there were no records of [a] weapon being used, which

resulted in Plaintiff being found guilty” (Doc. # 114 at 5). But Plaintiff’s claim is

unsupported by and is, in fact, contradicted by the record. Plaintiff has not introduced any

evidence that Tartaglia was present at or involved with his disciplinary proceeding.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not contradicted Tartaglia’s evidence that he merely told the

disciplinary coordinator that “to the best of his knowledge” no weapon was used against

Plaintiff (Doc. # 100, Ex. H, Attach. 2). As a result, there is no evidence from which the

Court could conclude that Tartaglia’s single statement that “to the best of his knowledge” no

weapon was used against Plaintiff was an adverse action taken against Plaintiff based on his

protected conduct. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. Tartaglia is entitled to summary judgment.

D. Andre

Plaintiff also alleges that Andre “suppressed the IMS reports” during his disciplinary

proceedings that showed officers verified Plaintiff was attacked with a weapon (Doc. # 113

at 5). Plaintiff claims as a result that he was found guilty of fighting and the charge was

upheld on appeal. 

In support of her argument that she did not retaliate against Plaintiff, Andre presents

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

her affidavit (Doc. # 100, Ex. D). Andre attests that when reviewing Plaintiff’s appeal of

Plaintiff’s disciplinary charge, she determined that it was not conclusively established that

a weapon was used and that Plaintiff pleaded guilty (id. ¶ 22). As a result, she upheld the

findings (id.). She further attested that she had no involvement in Plaintiffs’s classification

or placement because his transfer to SMU I occurred after her retirement (id. ¶ 23). 

Plaintiff has similarly not met his burden to create a genuine issue of material fact that

Andre took any action in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected conduct. In Andre’s written

decision upholding Plaintiff’s guilty finding, she acknowledges that one staff member

thought a weapon had been used, but noted that no weapon had been found (Doc. # 100, Ex.

D, Attach. 8). That fact, in conjunction with the facts that no staff member reported seeing

any weapon, no photographs of any weapon were viewed, and medical staff did not report

injuries consistent with any weapon, led Andre to conclude that the presence of a weapon had

not been conclusively established (id.). Finally, Andre noted that Plaintiff pleaded guilty to

fighting. As a result, she upheld the charge. 

The Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Andre’s actions were

retaliatory. Plaintiff simply maintains that a weapon was used against him and, therefore,

any action against him was retaliatory. But that conclusory allegation is simply unsupported

and insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Andre acknowledged that one staff member

thought a weapon was used, but also considered all the other evidence suggesting that a

weapon had not been used. That she determined the presence of a weapon had not been

conclusively established does not equate to retaliatory conduct because of Plaintiff’s

protected action, especially because Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the charge of fighting (id.).

There is simply no evidence from which a jury could infer that Andre’s actions were

retaliatory. She is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

//

//

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 In his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff makes

allegations against CO III Daughtry and other unnamed ADC personnel (Doc. # 1 at 6-6A;

Doc. # 113 at 5-6). Plaintiff claims that “ADC personnel” told him that he would be kept in

an SMU facility until he dropped his § 1983 lawsuits. Plaintiff also claims that CO III

Daughtry told Plaintiff he would not have been found guilty of his disciplinary violations if

he had not sued ADC officials (Doc. # 113 at 5-6). But these allegations do not create a

genuine issue of material fact for two reasons. First, none of these individuals are named as

Defendants. Moreover, there is no allegation or evidence that these individuals acted at the

behest of or in concert with the named Defendants. 

- 19 -

E. Schriro, Trujillo, Teed, and Johnson10

In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that Schriro, Trujillo, Johnson, and Teed “violated

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing” § 1983 actions (Doc.

# 1 at 6A). But Plaintiff does not allege any specific action by any of these four Defendants.

In his response to their summary judgment motion, Plaintiff does not articulate any specific

action that any of these four officials took that was retaliatory. 

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the

injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976). Here, there is no allegation of any alleged action by these four Defendants. And

there is no evidence that these four individuals were involved with any of Plaintiff’s

disciplinary proceedings. As a result, there is absolutely no evidence from which a jury

could conclude that any action they took was retaliatory. Consequently, Schriro, Trujillo,

Johnson, and Teed are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

VI. Conclusion

The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist for Counts II or

III—deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and retaliation—and Defendants’

summary judgment motion for those counts will be granted. Because the Court finds,

however, that material issues of fact exist regarding Count I—failure to protect—against

Teed, Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro, the Court will deny both Defendants’ and

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions as to that claim. 

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 97). All other matters in this action remain with the

Magistrate Judge for disposition as appropriate.

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 97) is granted in part and

denied in part. The motion is granted as to Counts II and III. The motion is otherwise

denied.

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 78) is denied.

(4) The remaining claim is Count I against Teed, Johnson, Andre, Trujillo and Schriro.

DATED this 24th day of September, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-00443-EHC Document 118 Filed 09/25/08 Page 20 of 20