Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02031/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stephen Lewis Smith, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et. al, 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-2031-PHX-JAT (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Stephen Lewis Smith has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting three grounds for relief in which he challenges 

the state court’s jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) Respondents assert that the Petition should be 

dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking 

federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 20.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that 

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, that he waived review of his claims 

pursuant to his guilty plea, and that his claims are not cognizable on federal habeas 

corpus review because they are based on state law. (Id.) Petitioner opposes 

Respondents’ assertions and argues that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims. 

(Doc. 24.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the Petition untimely under 

the AEDPA, recommends that the Petition be denied, and does not reach Respondents’ 

alternative arguments. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Guilty Plea and Sentencing 

 On September 21, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty in the Arizona Superior Court, 

Maricopa County case number CR2007-008780, to two counts of attempted sexual 

exploitation of a minor; both counts alleged class three felonies and dangerous crimes 

against children in the second degree. (Respondents’ Ex. A at 13-21; Ex. B.)1

 On 

January 22, 2008, the court sentenced Petitioner to a mitigated sentence of nine years’ 

imprisonment on Count 1, and a consecutive term of lifetime probation on Count 2. 

(Respondents’ Ex. C at 31-34; Ex. D at 2.) 

 B. First Post-Conviction Proceeding (Rule 32 “Of-Right” Proceeding) 

Pursuant to his plea, Petitioner’s only avenue of direct review was a Rule 32 “ofright” proceeding. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B) ([I]n noncapital cases a defendant 

may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea 

agreement . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . . 

shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding known as a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding”). On March 28, 2008, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and the trial court appointed counsel. 

(Respondents’ Exs. F, G.) After reviewing the record, Petitioner’s appointed counsel 

filed a notice advising the court that he could find no meritorious claims for relief. 

(Respondents’ Ex. H.) The court granted Petitioner leave to file a pro per petition, and 

on October 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition asserting that his sentences were “illegal.” 

(Respondents’ Exs. I, J.) On February 9, 2009, the court denied post-conviction relief 

fining that Petitioner’s challenge to his sentences lacked merit. (Respondents’ Exs. K, 

L.) 

 On February 24, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Arizona Superior 

Court. (Respondents’ Ex. M.) Although Petitioner asserts that he filed a petition for 

 1

 Citations to “Respondents’ Ex.” are to exhibits to Respondents’ Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 20). Exhibits A-G are located at docket 20-1 

and exhibits H-U are located at docket 20-2. 

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review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on April 2, 2009, the record before the Court 

does not include a copy of that petition and Respondents state that they were unable to 

locate such a petition. However, the Maricopa County Superior Court case history 

indicates that the state court record was transmitted to the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

May 21, 2009. (www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCaseInfo.asp, 

Attachment 1 to Report and Recommendation).2 The record before the Court includes a 

Court of Appeals order file stamped April 13, 2010 stating that, having “considered this 

petition for review from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction review, it is ordered 

denying review.” (Respondents’ Ex. Q.) The superior court received the Court of 

Appeals order on June 2, 2010. (See Attachment 1; see also Respondents’ Ex. Q, 

stamped “filed” on June 2, 2010 by the Clerk of the Maricopa Superior Court, Michael K. 

Jeanes.) 

 Petitioner asserts that the April 13, 2010 order denied review of his Rule 32 ofright post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Respondents, on the other hand, assert 

that the appellate court’s April 13, 2010 order denied review of Petitioner’s second postconviction proceeding, which is discussed below in Section I.C. (Doc. 20 at 4 n.2.) The 

only appellate court order in the record that denies review of any post-conviction 

proceeding is the April 13, 2010 order. After review of the Maricopa County Superior 

Court case history and the record in this matter, and because it does not appear that 

Petitioner appealed the denial of his second post-conviction proceeding, the Court finds 

that the appellate court denied review of Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding on April 

13, 2010. 

C. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On October 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief, and 

he filed a supporting petition on November 20, 2009. (Respondents’ Exs. N, O.) The 

 

2

 The Court considers this record pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d), which provides that the court may take judicial notice of a fact if “it is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is (1) generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined by from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

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trial court dismissed the notice on December 8, 2009, finding that Petitioner failed to 

present any claims that could be raised in a successive notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Ex. P.) 

 Respondents assert that Petitioner sought review of the denial of his second postconviction proceeding in the Arizona Court of Appeals. In support of that assertion, 

Respondents cite the Arizona Court of Appeals’ April 13, 2010 order denying review 

“from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.” (Respondents’ Ex. Q.) 

Respondents, however, have not provided any evidence that Petitioner filed a notice of 

appeal in the superior court or a petition for review in the appellate court. Although the 

superior court case history contains an entry for the notice of appeal that Petitioner filed 

on February 24, 2009 challenging the denial of his first post-conviction proceeding, there 

is no similar entry following the denial of Petitioner’s second post-conviction proceeding. 

(See Attachment 1.) Additionally, Petitioner does not assert that he sought appellate 

review of the denial of his second post-conviction proceeding. On the existing record, 

the Court concludes that Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the denial of his 

second post-conviction proceeding. 

D. Third Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On January 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss Case with Prejudice 

for Trial Court’s Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction from Prosecutorial Misconduct” in 

the trial court. (Respondents’ Ex. R.) On November 3, 2010, the court construed the 

motion as a third notice for post-conviction relief, and dismissed it as untimely under 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). (Respondents’ Ex. T.) There is no evidence that Petitioner 

sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

E. Other State Court Proceedings 

 On June 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona 

Supreme Court, which was dismissed on September 15, 2010. (Respondents’ Exs. S, U.) 

On April 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Arizona 

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Supreme Court, HC-12-0008, which was dismissed on September 17, 2012.3 (Doc. 1 at 

6-8; Doc. 24 at 3.) 

F. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On September 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in 

this Court raising the following three grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were violated because the “Buckeye, Arizona Municipal/Justice Court 

lacked jurisdiction to issue a search warrant”; (2) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated because the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

conduct a “plea-conviction hearing”; and (3) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated because the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

convict and sentence Petitioner. (Doc. 1.) As discussed below, the Petition should be 

dismissed as untimely. 

II. Statute of Limitations

 The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That period 

generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents assert that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus is untimely because it was not filed within one year of the date on which 

Petitioner’s challenged convictions “became final by the conclusion of direct review,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and because he has not established a basis for tolling the limitations 

period. As set forth below, the Court agrees and finds the Petition untimely. 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

 To assess the timeliness of the Petition, the Court must first determine the date on 

which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of direct review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). By pleading guilty, Petitioner was precluded from pursuing a 

 

3

 Although Respondents do not mention this proceeding, and the record does not 

include a copy of the petition or of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Order, the Court finds 

no reason to doubt that Petitioner filed this action in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

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direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4033(B). Rather, 

Petitioner sought review of his convictions and sentences in an “of-right” proceeding 

pursuant to Rule 32; the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.1 and 32.4.; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 

Arizona courts consider Rule 32 of-right proceedings a form of direct review). 

Accordingly, his conviction became final upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of the time for seeking 

such proceeding or review.” See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711, 716-17 (“Arizona’s Rule 32 

of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).”). 

 Petitioner timely commenced a Rule 32 of-right proceeding by filing a notice on 

March 28, 2008. (Respondents’ Ex. F.) See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 

32 of-right proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or 

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief 

proceeding.”). After the trial court denied relief, on February 24, 2009, Petitioner sought 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. As discussed in Section I.B. above, the 

appellate court denied relief on April 13, 2010. 

 Petitioner then had thirty days in which to seek review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Because Petitioner did not seek review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court, his conviction became final on May 13, 2010. See Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) (direct 

review was final on the “date [petitioner] allowed his time for seeking review of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals decision in the Arizona Supreme Court to expire.”). 

Accordingly, the ADEPA limitations commenced on May 14, 2010 and expired one year 

later on May 16, 2011.4

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A) and (C). Thus, the Petition filed 

over a year later, on September 25, 2012, is untimely absent statutory or equitable tolling. 

 

4

 When reviewing whether a petition is timely filed under AEDPA, the court 

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B. Statutory Tolling

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 Here, as previously stated, the AEDPA limitations period commenced on May 14, 

2010. Petitioner’s second post-conviction action was pending from October 14, 2009 

until the trial court denied review on December 8, 2009. (Respondents’ Exs. N-P.) See

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 (stating that an application for collateral review is pending in 

State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper 

use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with regard to particular postconviction proceedings.”). Because the second post-conviction action concluded before 

the AEDPA limitations period commenced, it could not toll the limitations period.5

 On January 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction relief, which 

the trial court dismissed on November 3, 2010 as untimely under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. 

(Respondents’ Ex. T.) Because the third notice of post-conviction relief was untimely, it 

was not “properly filed” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2), and did not toll the limitations 

period. See Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction 

 calculates the one-year period in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, the 

general rule for computing time in federal courts. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Specifically, under Rule 6, the day of the event that triggers the time period is excluded from the computation, while the last day of the time period is included. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A). Here, because May 14, 2011 was a Saturday, the AEDPA limitations period concluded on the next business day, Monday, May 16, 2011. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). 

5

 Even if the Arizona Court of Appeals’ April 13, 2010 order pertained to the second post-conviction proceeding, that proceeding would have concluded before the 

AEDPA limitations period commenced in May 2010 and, therefore, it would not have 

tolled the limitations period. 

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petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of 

§ 2244 (d)(2).”); see also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 7 (2007) (untimely petition for 

post-conviction relief was not “properly filed” for purposes of tolling the AEDPA 

limitations period). 

 Similarly, the petition for special action, filed in the Arizona Supreme Court on 

June 9, 2010, did not toll the limitations period because a special action is not an 

“application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claims” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). See Dema v. Arizona,

2008 WL 2941167, *11 (D. Ariz. Jul. 25, 2008) (special action did not toll the AEDPA 

limitations period). 

 Finally, Petitioner’s petition for writ habeas corpus relief, filed in the Arizona 

Supreme Court on April 24, 2012, did not toll the limitations period because it was filed 

after the limitations period had expired. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 

2001) (stating that once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed 

notice of post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations). “Section 

2244(d)(2) cannot ‘revive’ the limitation[ ] period (i.e., restart the clock at zero); it can 

only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the limitation[] period is 

expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitation[ ].’” 

Johnson v. Galaza, 2001 WL 125312, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2001) (quoting Rashid v. 

Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (modifications in original)). See also 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “section 2244(d) 

does not permit reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state 

petition was filed.”). 

 Therefore, the AEDPA limitations period commenced on May 14, 2010 and, 

because it was not subject to statutory tolling, it expired on May 16, 2011. Petitioner’s 

Petition, filed on September 25, 2012, is untimely unless equitable tolling applies. 

C. Equitable Tolling

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

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limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, ___ U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 

2560 (2010). However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace 544 U.S. at 418. “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “When 

considering whether to apply equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 

need for ‘flexibility’ and for ‘avoiding mechanical rules.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 

777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563). 

 Petitioner does not address whether he diligently pursued his rights or whether an 

extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing a timely § 2254 petition. In his 

Reply, Petitioner argues that the Court should reject Respondents’ statute of limitations 

argument because he “was never charged with a crime.” (Doc. 24 at 2.) Petitioner 

apparently argues that the AEDPA limitations period does not apply in this case because 

─ as he argues in his Petition ─ the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his underlying 

criminal proceedings. This argument does not address whether Petitioner was diligently 

pursuing his rights or why he failed to file a timely § 2254 petition. 

 Even assuming that Petitioner diligently pursued his rights, nothing in the record 

suggests that an extraordinary circumstance prevented Petitioner from filing a timely 

federal habeas corpus petition. Considering Petitioner’s various state-court filings, there 

was apparently no impediment to Petitioner preparing and filing pleadings related to his 

challenged convictions and sentences. Petitioner does not explain why he was able to file 

numerous pleadings in state court, but could not file a timely habeas corpus petition in 

federal court. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 

“equitable tolling only [applies] where ‘external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of 

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diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim.’”) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). Additionally, Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the 

law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient 

to toll the limitations period. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 

(D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of 

representation during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not 

constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

 Because Petitioner has not presented any circumstance that would justify equitably 

tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations, his § 2254 Petition should be denied as 

untimely and the Court need not consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying 

the Petition.6

 

III. Conclusion 

 Because Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus after the expiration 

of the AEDPA statute of limitations and statutory and equitable tolling do not render the 

Petition timely, it should be dismissed as untimely. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

 

6

 Even if the Petition were timely and Petitioner had exhausted his claims, he 

would not be entitled to habeas corpus relief. As Respondents argue, all three of Petitioner’s claims challenge the state court’s jurisdiction over the underlying criminal proceedings. Questions regarding a state court’s jurisdiction are matters of state law. See 

Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases holding that whether state court had jurisdiction under state law is a state-law question). Federal habeas corpus review is not available for errors of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (explaining that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”). “Jurisdiction is no 

exception to the general rule that federal courts will not engage in collateral review of state court decisions based on state law.” Poe v. Caspari, 39 F.3d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that whether Missouri courts had jurisdiction to sentence petitioner was a state law issue and was not properly before the court on § 2254 review). 

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justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 15th day of August, 2013. 

 

 

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ATTACHMENT 

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