Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00168/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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28 1 The docket numbers cited to in this Report and Recommendation

indicate the docket number of the pleading filed in the CM/ECF criminal case

docket number.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

 Plaintiff/Respondent, ) CR 05-00281 PHX EHC 

) CIV 08-00168 PHX EHC (MEA)

v. ) 

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Roberto Rivas Castillo, )

) 

Defendant/Movant. )

)

______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL:

Mr. Roberto Rivas Castillo (“Movant”) is currently

confined at the United States prison at Lompoc, California,

pursuant to his conviction by the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona. On January 25, 2008, Movant filed

a pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging his

conviction on one count of illegal reentry into the United

States. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Motion for

Reduction of Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Response”)

(Docket No. 139) on May 6, 2008.1

I. Procedural History

Movant was deported to Mexico on or about March 7,

1992. See Docket No. 133 at 6. Movant subsequently returned to

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any alien who--

(1) has been ... deported, or removed or has departed the

United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or

removal is outstanding, and thereafter

(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in,

the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at

a place outside the United States or his application for

admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney

General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying

for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously

denied admission and removed, unless such alien shall

establish that he was not required to obtain such advance

consent under this chapter or any prior Act,

shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than

2 years, or both.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2005 & Supp. 2008). Subsection b provides:

Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case

of any alien described in such subsection--

***

(3) ... or who has been removed from the United States ...,

and who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney

General, enters the United States, or attempts to do so,

shall be fined under Title 18 and imprisoned for a period

of 10 years, which sentence shall not run concurrently with

any other sentence.

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the United States without permission. Id. Movant was taken

into custody and, on April 23, 1999, the 1992 order of

deportation was re-instated and Movant was again deported to

Mexico. Id. 

On March 8, 2005, Movant was arrested by agents of the

United States Department of Homeland Security after entering the

United States from Mexico. Docket No. 1. On March 9, 2005, a

complaint was filed charging him with one count of illegal

reentry after deportation and one count of attempted illegal

reentry after deportation, both in violation of 8 U.S.C. §

1326(a) as aggravated by section 1326(b)(2). E.g., Docket No.

37 at 1.2

On April 5, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Movant

on one count of the completed crime of illegal reentry after

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deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) as aggravated by

section 1326(b)(2). See Docket No. 7. On May 17, 2005, at a

hearing intended to be a hearing regarding a plea agreement,

Movant asserted he did not want to enter into a plea agreement.

See Docket No. 11. At that time Movant asked the Court to

appoint new counsel in lieu of his appointed counsel, Mr.

Reeves. Id. Movant’s motion for different counsel was denied.

See id.

Movant, through counsel, filed several motions to

continue his trial date. See Docket Nos. 14, 16, 18. A minute

entry dated July 27, 2005, indicates counsel for the parties

appeared before the Court and represented to the Court that a

plea agreement had been extended and that Movant’s counsel

believed the case would be resolved by means of a plea

agreement. See Docket No. 20. On August 5, 2005, the Court

vacated a trial date with the intent of taking Movant’s guilty

plea. See Docket No. 22. On August 17, 2005, the Court vacated

the scheduled plea hearing and set August 30, 2005, as a trial

date. See Docket No. 23.

On August 23, 2005, the government filed a notice of

its intent to use Movant’s confession against him at trial. See

Docket No. 25. A hearing was conducted on August 25, 2005, at

which time a trial date was set for August 30, 2005. See Docket

No. 26.

On August 26, 2005, the government filed a motion to

dismiss the standing indictment, issued April 5, charging the

completed crime of illegal reentry after deportation. See

Docket No. 30. The government averred to the Court:

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Several days ago, defendant’s attorney raised

the issue that defendant, [] may have been

under “official restraint” in that defendant

may have been under continuance surveillance

(sic) by law enforcement for essentially the

entire period from his crossing of the border

from Mexico into the United States until his

physical apprehension approximately one half

mile north of the San Luis Port of Entry. The

United States investigated this claim and has

determined thus far that conclusive proof

does not exist to establish that defendant

was not under continual surveillance. Thus,

the United States presently believes

defendant should be charged under the

“attempts to enter” clause ..., rather than

the “found in” clause of the statute.

Therefore, the United States has re-charged

defendant by way of Criminal Complaint which

is presently pending. The United States

intends to re-indict defendant citing the

appropriate clause of the statute. Therefore,

it is necessary and appropriate to dismiss

the instant Indictment. Therefore, the United

States respectfully requests that the Court

dismiss the instant Indictment without

prejudice.

On August 30, 2005, Movant filed a stipulated motion

seeking substitution of counsel and retained counsel Erin

Alvarez entered the case. See Docket No. 31. 

On August 30, 2005, a superseding grand jury indictment

charged Movant with one count of attempted illegal reentry after

deportation. See Docket No. 34. On September 1, 2005, the

Court ordered the parties to brief the issue as to whether

dismissal of the indictment, pursuant to the government’s motion

at docket number 30, should be with or without prejudice. See

Docket No. 33.

On September 7, 2005, Ms. Alvarez filed a motion to

dismiss the superseding indictment with prejudice. See Docket

No. 37. In this pleading, counsel noted that, “On August 26,

[2005], a new complaint was filed against [Movant], alleging the

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same factual scenario as in Count I of the March 9, 2005

complaint. On August 30, 2005, a superceding indictment was

filed against [Movant] alleging attempted illegal re-entry, the

same charge as in the March complaint and the identical charge

as the August 26th complaint.” Id. at 2. Counsel further

stated that the second complaint was filed “to gain strategic

advantage since it had filed to dismiss on the original case.”

Id. With regard to Movant’s intent to pursue a “constant

surveillance” defense, counsel stated that the evidence that

Movant “may have been under constant surveillance by the

government” was “evidence that the government had since

inception of this case.” Id. at 4. Counsel further averred

that the government “had plenty of time to investigate and

properly charge its case... The government admitted first that

it had mis-charged this case. Later at the arraignment on the

superceding indictment, the government claimed there was an

‘error’ in the original complaint.” Id. at 5. 

Counsel argued that effectively allowing amendment of

the indictment to attempted re-entry, after the grand jury had

indicted only on the completed crime, violated Movant’s right

“to be tried only on a felony offense voted on by a grand

jury.” Id. 

In other words, after the original complaint

was filed in this case, the government, who

had already had the alternative theories of

illegal re-entry after deportation and

attempted illegal reentry after deportation

filed not only a new complaint against

defendant, but filed a superceding

indictment. The government chose, based on

the facts known to them then and today, to

seek an indictment for illegal re-entry. ...

It was only at the eleventh hour that the

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3 On October 11, 2005, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of

a defendant entered by the District Court for the District of Arizona,

holding the government’s failure to allege any specific overt act that was

a substantial step toward re-entry into the United States was a fatal defect

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government decided to change its course of

action in order to avoid losing the trial on

August 30th. ...

In federal criminal cases, the government is

the party which has access to most, if not

all, exculpatory information throughout the

case. In fact, defendant is not able to

interview the agents in question and only has

the word of the agents in a report when

assessing whether or not the case is an

attempt or an actual illegal re-entry. In

fact, the report itself indicates that the

Defendant was under surveillance by camera,

the same report available to the government

in March at the time of defendant’s arrest.

Defendant asserts that rather than conduct a

thorough investigation of its own witnesses

in order to seek the proper indictment, the

government assumed one theory and when

presented with the idea that it could be the

wrong one, immediately moved to dismiss

without prejudice, seemingly to buy more time

and “get their guy.”

Id. at 7-8.

On September 20, 2005, the Court denied the

government’s motion to dismiss the indictment as moot and also

denied Movant’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment

with prejudice. See Docket No. 40. 

On October 25, 2005, a second superseding indictment

was filed, charging Movant with attempted reentry on or about

March 7, 2005, after his deportation in April of 1999. See

Docket No. 44. The indictment charged Movant had committed an

“overt act that was a substantial step towards entering the

United States, to wit: crossing the border between the United

States and Mexico,” in violation of section 1326(a) as enhanced

by subsection (b)(2). Docket No. 44.3

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in an indictment charging attempted unlawful re-entry following deportation.

See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 425 F.3d 729. The decision of the

Ninth Circuit was reversed two years later by the United States Supreme

Court. In its opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit the Supreme Court noted

that, to be guilty of attempted re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

a defendant must commit an overt act qualifying as a substantial step toward

completion of his goal. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102,

127 S. Ct. 782, 787 (2007) (holding that an indictment alleging the

defendant had violated section 1326(a) was adequate because it alleged that

on a specific date near a specific place the defendant had “attempted to

enter the United States...” which was adequate as to both the overt act and

intent requirements for a criminal indictment). 

-7-

Movant filed a motion seeking to substitute his

retained counsel, Ms. Alvarez, on January 12, 2006. See Docket

No. 55. The motion was denied. See Docket No. 61.

Movant pled not guilty and was tried before a jury on

February 1, 2006. See Docket No. 71. The jury found Movant

guilty of attempted illegal reentry after deportation. See

Docket No. 75. Movant filed three motions to continue his

sentencing, which motions were granted. On July 18, 2006,

Movant was sentenced to a term of 70 months imprisonment

pursuant to this conviction. See Docket No. 83. The Court

recommended that Movant be committed to a facility near Oregon

and that Movant be provided educational opportunities.

Movant took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. As of November 7, 2006, Movant was represented in his

direct appeal by Mr. Park, who was appointed as his counsel

pursuant to an order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In

his direct appeal Movant argued the trial court erred by failing

to dismiss the first superseding indictment pursuant to the

requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, i.e., because it was filed

more than thirty days after the complaint was filed. See Docket

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No. 132. In a footnote in his appellate brief, Movant

“suggest[ed],” Answer at 2, that he had been denied his right to

the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed

to move to dismiss the superseding indictment on this basis. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the appeal in a

decision filed September 11, 2007. See Docket No. 132. The

Ninth Circuit determined that the trial court’s error in failing

to dismiss the first superseding indictment was harmless error

because any dismissal would have been without prejudice. Id.

In his section 2255 action, Movant asserts he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.

Movant alleges his counsel, Mr. Reeves, “let the government know

about the constant [surveillance] defense,” and that, had his

counsel not done so, a superseding indictment to allege an

attempted crime would have been precluded and Movant would have

been acquitted of the underlying, un-amended charge of completed

illegal reentry. Docket No. 133 at 5. Movant also contends his

appellate counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to

assert that the indictment in this matter was invalid because it

“rested upon a reinstatement order...” Id. at 6, citing 8

C.F.R. § 241.8. 

II. Discussion

Claims of ineffective assistance of federal criminal

counsel are properly raised for the first time in a section 2255

action. See, e.g., United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845

(9th Cir. 2003). To prevail on his claims, Movant must

establish both that his counsel’s performance was unreasonable

under the prevailing professional standards and the reasonable

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probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

results of his criminal proceedings would have been different.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 2068-69 (1984); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2001); United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th

Cir. 1996). Reasonable probability is defined as “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

Movant must overcome the strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Because Movant must establish

prejudice arising from any error, counsel is per se not

ineffective if counsel “failed” to raise a meritless argument or

to pursue a meritless defense. See, e.g., Wilson v. Henry, 185

F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27

(9th Cir. 1994); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427-28 (9th

Cir. 1992); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

A. Movant alleges his counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel informed the government on the eve of

trial that he intended to assert a “constant surveillance”

defense, and that providing this information to the government

was prejudicial. 

Movant asserts that his defense counsel “let the

government know about the constant [surveillance] defense,” and

that, had his counsel not done so, a superseding indictment

would have been precluded and Movant would have been acquitted

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4 The “constant surveillance” defense asserts a defendant may not

be found guilty of the completed crime of illegal re-entry when they

are being watched by federal agents from or before the time they cross

the border into the United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1326 prohibits deported aliens from reentering

the United States without authorization. Reentry occurs

when such an alien “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any

time found in, the United States” without consent. 8

U.S.C. § 1326.... The issue is whether there is sufficient

evidence of: (1) an entry; (2) an attempted entry; or (3)

being “found in” the United States. Because these three

offenses are distinct, see Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d at 1165

[vacating conviction pursuant to “found in” prong of

section 1326 because there was insufficient evidence to

conclude the defendant had actually “managed” to enter the

United States free of constant surveillance], the acquittal

denial must be affirmed if there is sufficient evidence to

support a conviction on any one of the three grounds. ...

Attempted entry essentially requires two elements: (1) the

specific intent to reenter without consent; and (2) an

overt act that was a substantial step towards this illegal

reentry. See United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d

1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

***

First, [the petitioner] argues that he could not have taken

a substantial step towards reentry because he was under

official restraint (the surveillance cameras) that

prevented him from completing an entry into the United

States. Assuming without deciding that [the petitioner]

was under official restraint to a sufficient degree as to

preclude an entry, see Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d at 1162,

any such restraint does not also ipso facto defeat a

conviction based on attempted reentry. The mere fact that

an alien is under official restraint does not make

substantial steps toward entry impossible.... United States v. Leos-Maldonado, 302 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002)

(emphasis added).

Attempted illegal reentry requires proof of specific

intent, [] more particularly the specific intent “to

reenter without consent.” United States v. Leos-Maldonado, 302 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). Because an alien has

not “reentered” unless he has done so free from official

restraint, the requirement of specific intent for this

attempt crime means that to be found guilty, a defendant

must have the specific intent to reenter “free from

official restraint.”

United States v. Lombera-Valdovinos, 429 F.3d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations omitted).

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of the underlying, un-amended charge of illegal reentry.4

To establish that counsel’s conduct was

unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255 petitioner must

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establish that no competent counsel would have acted as his

counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were unreasonable.

United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004);

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2001).

Movant has not shown that his counsel’s meeting with the

government and “revealing” to them that Movant may have been

under constant surveillance after crossing the border until his

apprehension was professional representation below the

prevailing norm. Pre-trial discussions between the prosecution

and the defense are an accepted criminal defense practice.

Competent counsel do regularly indicate to opposing counsel the

strengths of their defenses in order, for example, to achieve a

more favorable plea agreement for their client. 

Counsel’s performance with regard to the government’s

charging of the crime and the constant surveillance defense was

not deficient. Counsel vigorously challenged the government’s

attempts to supercede the indictment, and to re-charge Movant in

a separate criminal complaint, seemingly undertaken by the

government to avoid a trial on the merits of the charged

completed crime based on the government’s lack of evidence to

support conviction on the “entry” prong of the statute.

Counsel’s performance was within reason under the prevailing

professional norms. Accordingly, this claim may be denied

because Movant has not established the deficient performance

prong of the Strickland test.

Additionally, Movant has not established that he was

prejudiced by the government’s “discovery” of his counsel’s

intent to argue a constant surveillance defense to the jury. As

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noted by Movant’s counsel in the motion to dismiss the

superceding indictment with prejudice, the government knew of

the factual circumstances regarding any surveillance or lack

thereof well before the time defense counsel allegedly

“disclosed” its defense theory. The government presumably

considered the alternative prongs of section 1326, i.e., entry,

attempted entry, or “found in,” at the time it sought the grand

jury indictment in March of 2005. Accordingly, Movant suffered

no prejudice as a result of counsel’s allegedly deficient act in

disclosing a constant surveillance defense to the government in

August of 2005.

B. Movant argues his appellate counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to assert

the indictment was invalid.

Movant contends his appellate counsel should have

raised the issue that the second superseding indictment was

invalid because the predicate prior order of removal was

reinstated by an immigration officer rather than an immigration

judge. 

Federal statutes bestow the Department of Homeland

Security’s division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) with the authority to reinstate a previously executed

removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2005 & Supp. 2008).

Pursuant to this statute and federal regulations, immigration

officers and immigration judges may reinstate the prior removal

orders of aliens who illegally reenter the United States. See

8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2007). 

The undersigned agrees with Respondents’ response to

this claim in Movant’s petition:

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Defendant claims that the Ninth Circuit

invalidated the reinstatement process, but

does not cite the case. The United States

presumes Defendant refers to the case of

Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzalez, 486 F.3d 484

(9th Cir. 2007). 

The case history is as follows. On November

18, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision

in this case (Morales-Izquierdo v. INS, 388

F.3d 1299), which concluded that INA §

241(a)(5) required reinstatement hearings to

take place before immigration judges, and

invalidated the regulation permitting

immigration officials to enter reinstatement

orders. On September 12, 2005, the Ninth

Circuit granted the government’s petition for

a rehearing en banc and withdrew the opinion

in Morales-Izquierdo (423 F.3d 118 (9th Cir.

2005)). The Court’s decision in 2007

unambiguously held that the regulation

authorizing immigration officers rather than

immigration judges to reinstate removal

orders was not violative of due process and

was, therefore, allowable. Defendant’s

claim that reinstatement of prior order of

removal is not allowed is erroneous.

Defendant’s assertion that Ninth Circuit case

law precludes the reinstatement of prior

removal orders is mistaken and appears to be

based on case law which was withdrawn.

Appellate counsel cannot be expected to raise

issues that have no merit.

Docket No. 139 at 5.

At the time of Movant’s direct appeal, i.e., when he

was appointed counsel in November of 2006 through the time the

Ninth Circuit decided his appeal in September of 2007, the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion in Morales-Izquierdo had been withdrawn and

was not good law. Accordingly, an argument predicated on this

holding raised with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in

Movant’s direct appeal would have failed. This conclusion is

supported by the ultimate 2007 decision of the Ninth Circuit in

Morales-Izquierdo. Accordingly, Movant was not prejudiced by

any alleged failure of his appellate counsel to raise this

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argument. Because the specific issue Movant argues would not

have likely provided grounds for reversal, he has not shown

prejudice arising from his appellate counsel’s failure to raise

this argument. See, e.g., Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840

(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 210-11

(9th Cir. 1990).

III. Conclusion

Movant has not established that his trial counsel or

his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was

prejudiced by any alleged deficiency of either counsel.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Rivas Castillo’s

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

Case 2:08-cv-00168-GMS Document 4 Filed 07/15/08 Page 14 of 15
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900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 14th day of July, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00168-GMS Document 4 Filed 07/15/08 Page 15 of 15