Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01349/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01349-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DON ANTOINE,

NO. CIV. 06-1349-WBS-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, DARIN

GRIEM, CHRIS BAKER, JOSEPH

REEVE, BRIAN WADE, CHRISTOPHER

BRITTON, and DOES 1 through 25,

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Don Antoine filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants County of Sacramento,

Darin Griem, Chris Baker, Joseph Reeve, Brian Wade, and

Christopher Britton violated his civil rights by assaulting him

while he was being held at the Sacramento County Jail. Plaintiff

now moves for summary judgment with respect to all but one of his

claims, and defendants have filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment.

///

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 1 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The Sacramento County jail’s safety cells are empty,

padded cells (the walls and floor are made up of rubberized foam

padding) used to temporarily confine violent or suicidal

prisoners so they cannot hurt themselves. (Pl.’s Mem. in. Supp.

of Mot. for Summ. J. 2:16-18.) The cells measure fifteen by ten

feet with an eight by six inch metal drainage grate in the middle

of the floor. (Id.)

2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On the evening of June 18, 2004, plaintiff was involved

in a one-car accident in which he ran his car off the road. 

(Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts # 1.) When firefighters arrived

to render aid, plaintiff was belligerent and combative. (Decl.

of Robert Chalfant in Supp. of Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. Ex. E (Dep. of Chris Johnson).) The firefighters

restrained plaintiff by pinning him to the ground, breaking his

nose in the process. (Id. Ex. C (Dep. of Don Antoine).) The

police arrived and subsequently arrested plaintiff on charges of

assaulting a firefighter, driving under the influence, and

possession of nun chucks in his car. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed

Facts # 3.) Thereafter, the police brought plaintiff to the

Sacramento County Jail. (Id.)

At approximately 11:30 p.m. that night, a registered

nurse evaluated plaintiff at the jail and deemed him “fit for

incarceration.” (Id. # 4.) At 12:36 a.m., defendants Griem,

Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton (“individually-named defendants”)

placed plaintiff in a safety cell1 because he forcefully refused

to follow directions during his booking process and defendants

feared he might assault an officer. (Id.) At 2:33 a.m.,

plaintiff began excessively hitting and kicking the safety cell

door. (Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts # 8.) 

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 2 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 No evidence was submitted regarding whether plaintiff’s

ribs were actually broken, only that he was sent to the medical

floor for evaluation to rule out rib fractures. In his

deposition, plaintiff only said he sustained injuries to his ribs

and that they “could be fractured.” (Decl. of Robert Chalfant in

Supp. of Defs.’ Opp’n. To Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E (Dep. of

Don Antoine).) 

3

Despite warnings that he would be restrained if he did not cease

such behavior, plaintiff continued to hit and kick the door. 

(Id. # 9.) Plaintiff contends that, in front of supervisor

defendant Griem, defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton then

entered his cell and physically attacked him, therein hitting and

choking him as they placed him in handcuffs and shackled his feet

to the metal drainage grate located at the middle of the safety

cell floor. (Pl.’s Mem. in. Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 3:1-2.) 

Defendants deny that plaintiff was beaten or choked; instead,

they assert that plaintiff was merely shackled to the drainage

grate to prevent him from injuring himself. (Defs.’ Mem. in

Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 6:5-6.) 

Jail deputies removed plaintiff’s handcuffs and

shackles at 3:26 a.m., approximately fifty-two minutes after

plaintiff was initially shackled to the drainage grate. (Pl.’s

Resp. to Defs.’ Separate Stmt. of Undisputed Facts # 9.) The

jail deputies eventually released plaintiff from the safety cell

at 10:52 a.m. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts # 13.) Just

minutes after his release, a nurse at the jail evaluated

plaintiff and subsequently sent him to the jail’s medical floor

to check for possible rib fractures. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed

Facts # 14.)2 As a result of the incident in the safety cell,

plaintiff contends that he suffered damage to his chest,

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 3 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff initially sued the defendants under the

fictitious name “Six Unknown Agents of the County of Sacramento,”

with the intention of amending the complaint once the true

identities could be ascertained. On October 10, 2006, Sacramento

County produced an Incident Report pursuant to Rule 26

disclosures that identified the five deputies who placed

plaintiff in the safety cell. (Decl. of Robert Chalfant in Supp.

of Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Ex. D.) Plaintiff subsequently deposed

the named deputies between February and May of 2006. (Decl. of

John Scott in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Amend 8.) On July 24,

2007, this court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend his

complaint to name the same five deputies as defendants under the

contention that they were the parties responsible for the

injurious acts and omissions set forth in his complaint. (July

24, 2007 Order.)

4

shoulder, ribs, wrist, face, neck, and throat. (First Am. Compl.

14.)

On June 19, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint against

the County of Sacramento and unnamed individual defendants, which

he later amended to include the individually-named defendants

listed above,3

 for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶

20-28.) Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment with respect to

his claims that (a) defendants’ practice of shackling pre-trial

detainees to the drainage grate is unconstitutional and (b)

defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton’s physical attack on

plaintiff while shackling him to the drainage grate--as observed

and ratified by their supervisor, defendant Griem--constituted

excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff additionally requests that this court enjoin

defendants’ practice of shackling pretrial detainees to the

drainage grate to prevent further constitutional violations. In

their cross-motion, defendants seek summary judgment with respect

to the aforementioned claims as well as plaintiff’s claim for

deprivation of medical care in contravention of his due process

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 4 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

rights.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ [and] designate ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 5 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Both parties have moved, in the alternative, for

summary adjudication. While caselaw exists suggesting that a

party may move for summary adjudication of individual issues,

see, e.g., Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981);

First Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F. Supp.

1051 (S.D. Cal. 1997), this is not the type of motion Rule 56

originally contemplated. Moreover, motions for summary

adjudication of issues request that the court resolve issues that

dispose of neither a party nor a claim, and seldom accomplish

anything. Importantly, neither party distinguishes between their

general request for summary judgment and particular issues apt

for summary adjudication. Therefore the court’s following

discussion applies to both requests.

6

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally,

the court must not engage in credibility determinations or weigh

the evidence, for these are jury functions.4 Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings various claims for violations of his

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is

not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights that are conferred

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that (1)

defendants acted under color of law, and (2) defendants deprived

plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

statutes. Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). 

As a pretrial detainee, plaintiff asserts that defendants

deprived him of three constitutional rights that arise under the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) his right to

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 6 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

be free of punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt; (2) his

right to be free from the use of excessive force; and (3) his

right to medical care.

1. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Be Free of

Punishment

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Sacramento

County Jail’s general practice of shackling pretrial detainees to

the drainage grate (“the practice”) amounts to a per se

constitutional violation. Specifically, plaintiff claims that

the practice is a punitive measure that effectively deprives

pretrial detainees of their liberty interest without due process

of the law. Pretrial detainees indeed have a substantive due

process right against practices or restrictions that amount to

punishment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987);

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

This right is violated if such practices are “imposed for the

purpose of punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. There is no

constitutional infringement, however, if practices are “but an

incident of some other legitimate government purpose.” Id. 

a. Defendant County of Sacramento

“A municipality may be held liable under a claim

brought under § 1983 only when the municipality inflicts an

injury, and it may not be held liable under a respondeat superior

theory.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436

U.S. 658, 694,(1978)). In considering whether a municipality

itself violated a person’s rights or directed its employee to do

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 7 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

so, the focus is on the municipality’s “policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers.” City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at

690). Such a practice can either be an official municipal policy

or merely a pervasive custom, L.A. Police Protective League v.

Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 889 (9th Cir. 1990), and liability will

arise only if a plaintiff can demonstrate both that a

constitutional deprivation occurred and that the municipality was

the “moving force behind the injury alleged.” City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

It is undisputed that the Sacramento County Jail

employs the practice of shackling pretrial detainees to the

drainage grate, which they assert is implemented only when

detainees display violent behavior that may result in physical

harm to themselves or others. (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n. to Pl.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. 6:5-6.) Thus, the proper consideration is

whether punitive intent can be inferred from the nature of the

practice. Plaintiff proffers three arguments in support of his

assertion that the practice is an impermissible punishment as

opposed to a permissible procedure employed to ensure the safety

of violent detainees and those around them.

First, plaintiff argues that the practice essentially

serves a punitive function as opposed to a legitimate government

interest because shackling even a violent pretrial detainee to

the drainage grate does not actually prevent the detainee from

injuring himself. Instead, plaintiff argues that a pretrial

detainee who is hitting or smashing himself against the safety

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 8 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Plaintiff implies that a “Prostraint Chair” might have

been a better alternative. A “Prostraint Chair” is a safety

mechanism that employs shackles to fasten down inmates and their

extremities against the back of a large, heavy chair. By

defendants’ account, this is an immensely restrictive practice

used only with the most combative and violent detainees/inmates. 

(Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7

(Dep. of Darin Griem).) By comparison, defendants assert that

shackling detainees/inmates to the grate is a less restrictive

9

cell wall or door could, subsequent to being shackled, will

simply begin smashing himself against the ground or the drainage

grate itself. 

However, plaintiff underestimates the effectiveness of

the practice’s safety efforts. Jail deputies and nurses reported

several past incidents in which pretrial detainees injured

themselves by banging themselves into the safety cell door, which

they describe as a heavy, unyielding object. (Decl. of Robert

Chalfant in Supp. of Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex.

J (Dep. of Brian Wade)); (Supplemental Decl. Of John Houston

Scott in Opp’n. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3 (Dep. of Gloy

Blugh).) Shackling violent detainees to the drainage grate,

which is located at the center of the safety cell, eliminates the

possibility that they can smash themselves against the cell door,

and it would appear particularly effective in cases where a

violent detainees take a running or jumping start. Moreover, the

act of keeping a violent detainee in the center of the cell also

appears to facilitate the ability of deputies and medical

personnel to safely enter the cell area to evaluate the detainee

and/or provide necessary support. 

While plaintiff may be hypothesize alternative methods

of restraint,5

 this mental exercise alone cannot recast

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 9 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 measure, requires the attention of fewer deputies, and takes

significantly less time to set up. (Id.)

10

defendants’ proffered interest in the safety of pretrial

detainees and those around them as a punitive measure. A

reasonable relationship between a governmental interest and the

challenged practice does not require an “exact fit.” Mauro v.

Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Nor does

it require showing a “least restrictive alternative,” Thornburgh

v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410-12 (1989), because otherwise “every

administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that

some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less

restrictive way of solving the problem at hand.” Id. at 410-11

(internal quotations omitted). In fact, a rational practice

should not be disturbed by the courts even if such practice

ultimately fails to advance its targeted purpose. See Mauro, 188

F.3d at 1060 (“[I]t does not matter whether we agree with the

defendants or whether the policy in fact advances the jail’s

legitimate interests. The only question that we must answer is

whether the defendants’ judgment was ‘rational,’ that is, whether

the defendants might reasonably have thought that the policy

would advance its interests.”).

Second, plaintiff contends the practice is

constitutionally unsanitary. Because the safety cells do not

have a toilet, the grate could hypothetically function as a drain

for excrement. (Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of Pl.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7 (Dep. of Darin Griem).) Thus, plaintiff

argues that the practice could cause detainees to come into

contact with urine, feces, or vomit. To support his contention,

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 10 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

plaintiff cites to Martino v. Carey, 563 F.Supp 984 (D.C. Or.

1983); in that case, the District Court of Oregon found that

housing inmates in cells overflowing with sewage violated the

Eighth Amendment. Id. at 999. 

Despite the repugnancy of this hyperbolic analogy,

plaintiff offers no evidence suggesting that any amount of sewage

or bodily waste has ever been either present in the safety cell

or near the drainage grate when any inmate was placed there. 

Notably, based on his own experience in the safety cell,

plaintiff correctly identified the drainage grate based on its

predominant purpose as a conduit for water when the cell is

cleaned. (Decl. of Robert Chalfant in Supp. of Defs.’ Opp’n. To

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E (Dep. of Don Antoine) (plaintiff

stated that he was shackled to “a grate at the bottom of the cell

where water drains out”).) 

Third, plaintiff contends that the practice lacks an

explicit policy detailing its parameters and thus relies too

heavily on deputy discretion. This oversight, plaintiff argues,

permits an arbitrary and punitive employment of the practice. 

While plaintiff is correct that defendants do not have an

explicit policy specific to the practice of shackling detainees

to the drainage grate, defendants do have a written policy

governing the use of all restraints in the safety cell--which

intuitively includes the use of handcuffs and shackles employed

during the practice. (Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9 (“Jail Operations Order 3/100 Use

of Restraints”); Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 8-9.) 

This extensive policy not only specifies when and how restraints

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 11 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

may be used, but it also requires medical and custodial

monitoring as well as documentation of each incident that

involves the use of any restraint method. (Decl. of John Houston

Scott in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9 (“Jail Operations

Order 3/100 Use of Restraints”).) In addition, the policy

expressly prohibits deputies from using restraints as a form of

punishment. (Id.)

Moreover, a certain level of discretion in the

employment of the practice is appropriately accorded to the

government and its officers, whose legitimate interests stem from

their need to manage the facility in which the individuals are

detained. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979). As a

general matter, courts ordinarily defer to the expert judgments

and professional expertise of corrections officials. Id. at

547-48. This policy comes within the United States Supreme

Court’s admonition that courts should rely heavily on

professional expertise in determining the proper means for

carrying out security responsibilities. In Bell, the Supreme

Court stated:

In determining whether restrictions or conditions are

reasonably related to the Government’s interest in

maintaining security and order and operating the

institution in a manageable fashion, courts must heed our

warning that “[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within

the province and professional expertise of corrections

officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in

the record to indicate that the officials have

exaggerated their response to these considerations,

courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment

in such matters.”

Id. at 540 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827

(1974)). Plaintiff has produced no evidence that deputies in the

Sacramento County Jail have, as a general matter, exaggerated

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 12 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

their response in maintaining security, order, and operation. 

Thus, the court will appropriately defer to the deputies

expertise and judgment in the implementation of the practice. 

In Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir.

1995), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief

to plaintiff inmates and detainees who alleged that the use of

safety cells for suicidal and mentally disturbed inmates and

detainees violated the Constitution. Id. at 1315. The court

found that while the safety cell is admittedly a very severe

environment, it is employed in response to very severe safety

concerns. Id. at 1314 (noting that some detainees and/or inmates

became so violent and such a danger to themselves “that temporary

placement in a safety cell was needed in order to deprive the

prisoners of all means of harming themselves”). 

Significantly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion also

acknowledged that if inmates or detainees in the safety cell “are

violent, they may be shackled to the grate.” Id. at 1313. 

Nonetheless, the court--fully aware of the prevalent practice of

shackling detainees to the drainage grate–-approved the use of

safety cell detention. Further, the court noted that the

plaintiffs’ own expert witness had testified that while it would

inappropriate to secure just “any prisoner” to the drainage

grate, it nonetheless “would not be inappropriate to restrain

violent prisoners in this manner.” Id. at 1313-14.

Plaintiff fails to show that defendant County of

Sacramento’s general practice of shackling pretrial detainees to

the drainage grate amounts to a violation of a his Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free of punishment. Accordingly, the court

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 13 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 Had the court found the practice to be a constitutional

violation, the individual defendants would nonetheless be

entitled to assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing

discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitution rights of which a reasonable person

should have known.” Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627

(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)) (internal quotations omitted). A right is clearly

established when “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638,

640 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635

(1987)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Here, while plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to

be free of punishment is clearly established, the contours are

such that a reasonable deputy would be hard-pressed to understand

that shackling a violent detainee to the middle of his cell to

stop him from actively harming himself or others clearly violates

that constitutional right. Significantly, plaintiff offers only

a series of conclusory assertions that the individually-named

defendants--insofar as they simply shackled him to the drainage

grate--violated his rights as opposed to offering any actual

evidence that a reasonable deputy should have known that

employment of the general practice was clearly unlawful. See

Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (in

response to the defense of qualified immunity, plaintiff must

offer more than general conclusory allegations that the

defendants violated a constitutional right--he must show “that

the particular facts of his case support the claim of a clearly

established right”) (citing Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386,

1389 (9th Cir. 1985)).

14

will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to

his claim that the practice amounts to a per se violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. 

b. Individually-Named Defendants

Because the court finds that plaintiff has not shown

that the general practice of shackling pretrial detainees to the

drainage grate is per se unconstitutional, it follows that he is

also unable to show that the deputies who act within the confines

of the practice deprive a pretrial detainee of his Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free of punishment.6 Accordingly, the

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 14 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 The Ninth Circuit had previously held that, where

claims for damages and equitable relief arise from the same

“operative facts and legal theory,” a plaintiff with standing to

seek damages also has standing to request injunctive and

declaratory relief. See Nava v. City of Dublin, 121 F.3d 453, 456

(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468

(9th Cir. 1983)). However, the Ninth Circuit later overruled

Nava in Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.

1999), and thus now refuses to conflate the claims for standing

purposes alone. Id. at 1040 n.1.

15

court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication with

respect to his claims that the individually-named defendants

violated his constitutional rights in following the general

procedure of shackling pretrial detainees to the drainage grate.

c. Injunctive Relief

A state agency may be enjoined from committing

constitutional violations where there is proof that officers

within the agency have engaged in a persistent pattern of

unconstitutional conduct, Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815-16

(1974). While this request would ultimately fail because--as

discussed above--plaintiff has not shown that the practice

violates the Constitution, the court need not entertain

plaintiff’s request in the first instance because he lacks

standing to claim injunctive relief.7

The Article III “case or controversy” requirement

restricts federal jurisdiction to those cases where the

plaintiffs can maintain that their injury or the threat of future

injury by the defendants is “both ‘real and immediate,’ not

‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).

Here, plaintiff cannot show that he will again be

arrested, again combat deputies during the booking process, and

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 15 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

again be violent to the point where he would be shackled to the

drainage grate for his own safety and the safety of others. See

id. at 109 (finding that if plaintiff “has made no showing that

he is realistically threatened by a repetition of his experience

. . . then he has not met the requirements for seeking an

injunction in a federal court”). Accordingly, the court will

deny plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Right to be Free from the Use

of Excessive Force

The Due Process clause protects pretrial detainees from

the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). While it is uncertain

whether the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable

searches and seizures continues to protect individuals during

pretrial detention, id., the Ninth Circuit has determined that

the Fourth Amendment sets the “applicable constitutional

limitations” for considering claims of excessive force during

pretrial detention. Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032,

1043 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, though a pretrial detainee’s

excessive force claim arises under the Due Process clause, the

claim is appropriately analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s

“objective reasonableness” standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 

This standard “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests’ against the countervailing government interests at

stake.” Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S.

696, 703 (1983)). When employing the balancing test, the court

must pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances in

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 16 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

each particular case.” Id.

a. Defendant County of Sacramento

Despite alleging in his complaint that the defendant

County of Sacramento “authorized, encouraged and condoned the use

of excessive force against inmates in the Sacramento County Jail

in violation of the United States Constitution,” plaintiff has

now decided not to bring an excessive force claim against the

County. (Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

3:4-5 (“Don Antoine is only pursuing an excessive[]force claim

against the individually-named Defendants, not against the

County.”).) 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion

for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s allegations of

excessive force against defendant County of Sacramento.

b. Defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton

Plaintiff contends that the individually-named

defendants used excessive force in violation of his

constitutional rights when they shackled him to the drainage

grate. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendants Baker,

Reeve, Wade, and Britton entered his cell to shackle him and then

commenced an unprovoked attack on him--which included hitting him

in vital spots and putting him in a chokehold--resulting in

several purported injuries. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for

Summ. J. 2-3.) To supplement his contention, plaintiff points

out that he was deemed “fit for incarceration” by the Sacramento

County jail’s medical unit upon his arrival, only to be sent back

to the medical floor for an examination into possible rib

fractures when he was released from the safety cell over eleven

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 17 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

hours later. (Decl. of John Houston Scott Ex. 1 (“Special Needs

Form”), Ex. 12 (“Medical Expedite Booking”).) Such behavior on

the part of the individually-named defendants, if taken as the

truth, would constitute excessive force and an unreasonable

intrusion on plaintiff’s constitutional interests. See Ruvalcaba

v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1999)

(finding that an officer’s action in kicking and striking

plaintiff constituted excessive force).

In response, defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton

contend that plaintiff is unable to place any of them in the

safety cell at the time of the alleged attack. See Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under

section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation

by the defendant.”). Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges that he is

unable to remember exactly who entered the safety cell to shackle

him, which he contends is due to the fact that he was immediately

attacked and forced into a protective position. While the

defendants admit that they were the ones who initially placed

plaintiff in the safety cell, each has testified in their

individual depositions that they have no recollection whether or

not they re-entered the safety cell two hours later to shackle

him to the drainage grate. Defendant Griem, the supervisor on

duty the night of the arrest, admits that he observed deputies

shackling plaintiff to the drainage grate; however, he also

asserts that he has no recollection as to who entered the cell. 

Due to the lack of direct evidence, plaintiff must rely

on circumstantial evidence to place defendants Baker, Reeve,

Wade, and Britton at the scene of the attack. The Ninth Circuit

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 18 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 Consistent with plaintiff’s theory that all four

officers were involved in the alleged attack, Sacramento County

deputy Aaron Marino testified in his deposition that

19

has explicitly held that police misconduct may be proved through

circumstantial evidence. Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“Nowhere in our cases have we held that police

misconduct may be proved only through direct evidence.”). To

survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must offer circumstantial

evidence that is consistent with an inference of illegal conduct

and permitting that inference must not be significantly harmful. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986). Plaintiff offers two separate channels of evidence

that he contends sufficiently link the four defendants to his

attack. 

First, plaintiff notes that the Sacramento County

Incident Report detailing his detention that night (“Incident

Report”) lists five deputies--defendants Griem, Baker, Reeve,

Wade, and Britton--as the officers who initially put plaintiff

into the safety cell. (Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2 (“Safety/Segregation Cell Incident

Report”).) While the Incident Report is silent as to who entered

the safety cell two hours later to shackle plaintiff to the

drainage grate, defendant Griem--the supervisor officer that

night--stated during his deposition that he would assume that

defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton re-entered to safety

cell to shackle plaintiff to the drainage grate because otherwise

the Incident Report would “list different officers in the report

if it wasn’t [them].”8 (Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 19 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

approximately four deputies would be required to shackle a

detainee to the drainage grate. (Decl. of John Houston Scott in

Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 5 (Dep. of Aaron Marino).)

20

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7 (Dep. of Darin Griem).) 

Second, plaintiff calls the court’s attention to

defendants’ brief filed in opposition to plaintiff’s June 13,

2007 motion to amend the complaint. Plaintiff, who had initially

sued the defendants under the fictitious names, sought to add

defendants’ names in light of the release of the Incident Report. 

Defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that plaintiff was

dilatory in adding the individually-named defendants because the

Incident Report--made available to plaintiff almost eight months

earlier--had clearly listed the names of the deputies “involved

in the incident [plaintiff] complains of, including that

[plaintiff] was handcuffed to the grate on the floor for his

safety.” (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. to Amend 8:5-7.) The

opposition further insinuates that defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade,

and Britton were present in the cell when it notes that “[i]f

plaintiff had acted diligently, perhaps the individuals may have

remembered [plaintiff] or the incident he complains of.” (Id.)

Based on the inference created by defendant Griem’s

deposition testimony-–i.e., that the Incident Report would have

noted a change in personnel if anyone other than Baker, Reeve,

Wade, and Britton had shackled plaintiff--as well as defendants’

prior position regarding the four defendants’ involvement in the

incident, a jury would not be unreasonable if it concluded that

the individual defendants were the ones who shackled him.

Even if the above evidence allows a reasonable jury to

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 20 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

place defendants at the scene of the alleged attack, defendants

argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Jones v. Williams, 297

F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2002) dictates that plaintiff must show the

“integral participation” of each defendant in the illegal conduct

before they may be held liable under a group theory. Id. at 935

(citing Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

While the proposition cited in Jones is correct, the

case is factually distinct. Jones dealt with an impermissible

jury instruction that would have invited the jury to find that

all of the defendant officers were liable for merely being

present at an alleged unreasonable search of plaintiff’s home. 

Id. at 934-35. Because the plaintiff in Jones had no idea which

of the officers had destroyed the personal items inside her home,

she sought group liability. Id. However, the court reasoned

that due to the lack of evidence that the officers “who simply

remained outside” were integral participants in the unlawful

conduct, an instruction to the contrary would have been

impermissible. Id. at 939. Significantly, while the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to give the

instruction, the court nonetheless approved the initial

submission of the case to the jury to allow it to hear each

party’s testimony and to draw all permissible inferences about

the liability of the individual officers. See Id. at 936 (“The

permissible inferences in [plaintiff’s] proposed instruction were

adequately covered by the fact that the court submitted the case

to the jury.”).

In contrast to Jones, the instant cross-motions are

summary judgment requests, not an attempt to submit an

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 21 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 As mentioned above, even the Jones court approved

submission of that case to the jury. Jones, 297 F.3d at 936.

22

overarching jury instruction. On summary judgment, the court

must view the evidence most favorably to the party against whom

the motion is made and, without weighing the credibility of

witnesses, the court must also give that party the benefit of all

reasonable inferences from the evidence. McCollum v. Smith, 339

F.2d 348, 349 (9th Cir. 1964). If conflicting inferences may be

drawn from the facts, the case must go to the jury.9 Neely v.

St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.

1978). 

Although plaintiff is unable to identify precisely

which deputy delivered exactly which blow or applied the

chokehold, he has both developed and presented sufficient

evidence to support a reasonable inference that the individual

officers who had physical contact with him during the shackling

process indeed participated in the alleged beating. 

Significantly, plaintiff has done more than simply place the

officers at the scene of the altercation and assert a group

liability theory. Instead, he has presented undisputed evidence

that (1) when he arrived at the jail at approximately 11:30 p.m.,

he was deemed “fit for incarceration” by the jail’s medical unit;

(2) the deputies entered the safety cell and shackled plaintiff

to the drainage grate at 2:33 a.m.; and (3) plaintiff was

released from the cell at 11:53 a.m. and immediately sent back to

the medical floor by a nurse to check for possible rib fractures. 

Given plaintiff’s allegations of force in combination

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 22 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 The individually-named defendants also contend that,

assuming arguendo the court finds they were present in the safety

cell during the incident, plaintiff still cannot establish that

they used excessive force against him. Defendants’ rely on a

Sacramento County Jail policy that mandates deputies prepare a

casualty and/or crime report whenever physical force is used that

results in injury to anyone involved. (Decl. of John Houston

Scott in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 8 (“Jail Operations

Order 3/110 Use of Force”).) It follows, defendants argue, that

if they had attacked plaintiff as he alleges, this use of force

would have been documented. However, this conclusory

presumption, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut plaintiff’s

allegations and proffered evidence. It would not be unreasonable

to assume that officers who had engaged in the kind of brutal

beating of a prisoner such as alleged here by plaintiff would

choose not to submit a report of their misconduct.

23

with the chronological evidence, a jury would not be unreasonable

if it concluded that plaintiff was indeed the victim of an

unprovoked attack that amounted to illegal conduct.10 See Lolli

v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 417-18 (9th Cir. 2003)

(distinguishing Jones by denying summary judgment against a

plaintiff who--despite his inability to identify which officer

did exactly what harm to him during his alleged

altercation--presented enough evidence “to create the necessary

inference that the deputies were integral participants in the

alleged unlawful act”) (internal citations omitted). 

Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton engaged in

excessive force while shackling plaintiff to the drainage grate,

neither party’s dispositive motion can be granted. Accordingly,

the court will deny plaintiff and defendants’ cross-motions for

summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that

defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and Britton used excessive force. 

c. Defendant Griem

Plaintiff contends that defendant Griem, as supervising

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 23 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

officer, is personally liable because he ratified his

co-defendants actions and/or refused to intervene during their

use of excessive force. In response, defendant Griem asserts

that he only observed the proper shackling of plaintiff to the

drainage grate and thus cannot be shown to have personally

participated in any alleged use of excessive force. 

In the case of a supervisor, “individual liability

hinges upon his participation in the deprivation of

constitutional rights.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d

630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). For defendant Griem to be held liable

in his individual capacity, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)

defendant Griem’s “own culpable action or inaction in the

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates” caused the

constitutional injury; (2) Griem “acquiesce[d] in the

constitutional deprivations of which [the] complaint is made;” or

(3) Griem’s conduct showed a “reckless or callous indifference to

the rights of others.” Id. at 646 (internal citations omitted). 

Based on the disputed inference of illegal conduct addressed

above, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

defendant Griem properly controled his subordinates, acquiesced

in the constitutional deprivation, or showed a callous

indifference for plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff and

defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s claim that defendant Griem is personally liable for

his co-defendants’ use of excessive force. 

3. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Medical Care

Pretrial detainees’ due process rights to medical care

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 24 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

are at least as broad as the those required by the Eighth

Amendment for convicted prisoners. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 535 n.16, 545 (1979)). Since it may suffice for Eighth

Amendment liability that prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to the serious medical needs of their prisoners, see

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), it follows that such

deliberate indifference must also be enough to satisfy the fault

requirement for due process claims based on the medical needs of

pretrial detainees. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

849-50 (1998). 

Under the deliberate indifference standard, a person is

liable for denying a prisoner needed medical care only if the

person “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health and safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38

(1994). If a person should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the person has not violated the Eighth Amendment--no

matter how severe the risk. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 914

(9th Cir. 2001). But if a person is aware of a substantial risk

of serious harm, the person may be liable for neglecting a

detainee’s serious medical needs on the basis of the person’s

action or inaction. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

a. Defendant County of Sacramento

Plaintiff alleges that defendant County of Sacramento

violated his right to receive adequate medical care while

detained in the Sacramento County jail. To find the County of

Sacramento liable, plaintiff must show that it (1) had a policy

that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff and

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 25 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 While a municipality may be liable under § 1983 when

its failure to train employees amounts to “deliberate

indifference” to the rights of persons with whom the police come

into contact, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989), plaintiff neither alleges, nor offers any evidence, that

defendant County of Sacramento failed to properly train its

employees.

26

(2) knew that its policy posed this risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837.

Plaintiff neither contends nor offers any evidence to

suggest that defendant County of Sacramento’s medical policy is

inadequate or poses a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather,

plaintiff disputes only whether this policy “was followed” by the

individually-named defendants during his detention (Pl.’s Opp’n

to Defs.’ Separate Stmt. of Undisputed Facts # 2 (“The issue is

whether medical attention was provided at any time during

Antoine’s confinement in the safety cell.”).) Because “a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory,” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978), defendant County of Sacramento cannot be

held accountable for the actions of its employees.11

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion

for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that

defendant Sacramento County deprived him of his constitutional

right to medical care.

b. Individually-Named Defendants

Plaintiff also alleges that the individually-named

defendants violated his right to receive adequate medical care by

not responding to his pleas for medical assistance and

disregarding several policies related to his detention in the

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 26 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

safety cell. 

Plaintiff asserts that prior to being shackled to the

drainage grate he repeatedly sought medical assistance for his

nose--which was purportedly broken during his post-accident

confrontation with the firefighters--by yelling for help and

repeatedly hitting the safety cell door to get the attention of

the individually-named defendants. As a general matter, jail

deputies will promptly relay a detainee’s request for medical

assistance to a nurse (Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Dep. of Darin Griem).) Thus, plaintiff

contends that the individually-named defendants’ refusal to

adhere to his desire to see a nurse show that they were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. 

Defendants state that plaintiff never requested medical

assistance, but instead became excessively violent as he

continuously banged on the safety cell door. Though both sides’

recollection of the facts conflict, the evidence taken in the

light most favorable to plaintiff does not show that the

individually-named defendants were aware of an excessive risk to

his health and safety but affirmatively chose to disregard it. 

While the awareness of a serious risk to medical needs can be

inferred from circumstantial evidence, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842,

the evidence here suggests that plaintiff’s condition was far

from dire. Plaintiff’s purported nose injury occurred prior to

his arrival at the Sacramento County Jail. However, once at the

jail, his condition was evaluated and he was deemed “fit for

incarceration.” Thus, plaintiff had no outstanding medical

issues that would prohibit detention. Under this premise, even

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 27 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 From the court’s perspective, plaintiff’s valid

assertions include that: (1) he was not evaluated by a nurse when

initially placed in the safety cell in violation of the “Safety

and Segregation Cell Use” manual (Decl. of John Houston Scott in

Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 12 (“Safety and Segregation

Cell Use”)); (2) a nurse was not notified within fifteen minutes

from the time he was shackled to the drainage grate in violation

of Jail Operations Order 3/100 “Use of Restraints” (Id. Ex. 9

(“Jail Operations Order 3/100 Use of Restraints”)); and (3) he

was left in the safety cell for a total of eight hours in

violation of the “Safety and Segregation Cell Use” manual. (Id.

Ex. 12 (“Safety and Segregation Cell Use”).) 

13 It does not appear to be the individually-named

defendants’ fault that plaintiff, as he asserts, was not

medically evaluated upon entrance into the safety cell. Rather,

28

if plaintiff’s recollection is believed, the court cannot say

that the individually-named defendants were deliberately

indifferent to a serious medical condition.

Plaintiff further contends that the individually-named

defendants disregarded several policies related to safety cell

detention and the use of restraints which amounted to a

deprivation of his right to medical care. (Decl. of John Houston

Scott in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9 (“Jail Operations

Order 3/100 Use of Restraints”), Ex. 12 (“Safety and Segregation

Cell Use”).) While an evidentiary review of plaintiff’s

contentions does disclose some notable violations of official

policy,12 plaintiff’s inability to tie any of the violations to

the individually-named defendants is fatal to his claim. Unlike

his claims against the individually-named defendants’ use of

excessive force, plaintiff cannot show that any of them were an

integral participant in his alleged deprivation of medical care. 

At most, plaintiff’s allegation is that unnamed medical and

custodial staff members did an unsatisfactory job of adhering to

Sacramento County Jail policy.13 

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 28 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

it is undisputed that the medical staff was notified upon his

detainment, (Decl. of John Houston Scott in Supp. of Pl.s’ Mot.

for Summ. J. Ex. 2 (“Safety/Segregation Cell Incident Report”)),

and thus the only remaining question is whether anyone from the

medical staff responded. Further, the fact that plaintiff was in

the safety cell for longer than the eight hour limit appears to

be the fault of the “Watch Commander,” who--according to the

“Safety and Segregation Cell Use” manual--is in charge of “the

removal of an arrestee at any time.” (Decl. of John Houston

Scott in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 12 (“Safety and

Segregation Cell Use”).) Significantly, the “Watch Commander”

listed on plaintiff’s Incident Report is only referred to as

“Sgt. Sherrel,” who to the court’s knowledge is not a named

defendant. 

29

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion

for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that the

individually named defendants’ deprived him of his right to

medical care.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief with

respect to the general practice of shackling violent detainees to

the drainage be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;

(2) plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with

respect to the claims that the general practice of shackling

violent detainees to the drainage is in violation of the

Constitution; that the individually-named defendants violated his

constitutional rights in following the general procedure to

employ the practice of shackling violent detainees to the

drainage grate; that defendant Griem is personally liable for his

co-defendants’ use of excessive force; and that defendants Baker,

Reeve, Wade, and Britton used excessive force be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED; 

(3) defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all

claims against the County of Sacramento be, and the same hereby

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 29 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

is, GRANTED;

(4) defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to the claim that the individually-named defendants were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs or

deprived plaintiff of his right to medical care be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED.

(5) defendants’ motion for summary judgement with

respect to the claim that defendants Baker, Reeve, Wade, and

Britton used excessive force be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;

and

(6) defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to the claim that defendant Griem is personally liable

for his co-defendants’ use of excessive force be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED;

DATED: November 26, 2007

Case 2:06-cv-01349-WBS-GGH Document 72 Filed 11/27/07 Page 30 of 30