Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01929/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01929-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT C. WOMACK, an

individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv1929-WQH (DHB)

ORDER

vs.

SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN

TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT

BOARD, et al. DOES 1-500,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Award

of Attorneys’ Fees Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927 filed by Defendant San Diego

Metropolitan Transit Development Board (ECF Nos. 4-5), the Motion to Remand filed

by Plaintiff Robert Womack (ECF No. 8), and the Motion for Emergency Hearing filed

by Plaintiff (ECF No. 9). 

I. Background

On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff Robert C. Womack, proceeding pro se, commenced

this action by filing the Complaint in San Diego County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1

at 7). On August 8, 2014, Defendant San Diego Metropolitan Transit Systems (“MTS”)

removed to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). On

August 22, 2014, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a Request for

Judicial Notice, and the Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees. (ECF Nos. 4 and 5). On

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September 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Declaration of Robert C. Womack

Response to Defendants Motion to Removal of Action Under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and

1441(A) Federal Question and Plaintiff Request to Remain in State Court under 28

U.S.C. 1447(C)” (“Motion to Remand”). (ECF No. 8).1

 On September 29, 2014,

Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff Request for a Emergency Hearing as to

Jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s Complaint” (“Motion for Emergency Hearing”). (ECF No.

9). Plaintiff has not responded in opposition to either of Defendant’s pending motions. 

II. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff was hired by San Diego Trolley, Inc. as a Code Compliance Inspector

in June of 2005 and was terminated on October 11, 2007. (ECF No. 1 at 10). 

Throughout his career, “Plaintiff was praised, verbally and in writing, for achieving and

often exceeding his objectives.” Id. On May 11, 2007, Plaintiff was interrogated at

work without his union representative present. Id. at 12. On September 30, 2007,

Plaintiff received a letter stating that he would be terminated due to violation of six of

Defendant’s employment policies. Id. at 11. Plaintiff “denied all allegations to no

avail.” Id. at 12. After his termination, “Plaintiff took it upon himself to prove his

innocence and engaged a polygraph examiner to provide to MTDB the relevant

evidence.” Id. at 10. 

On January 30, 2008, Plaintiff had an administrative law hearing, where he was

not permitted to present “evidence [of] phone records, work schedule as well [as] a

polygraph test that vindicates Plaintiff and provides evidence that Savoy and Adams

both violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right of due process....” Id. at 13. 

 In an unspecified subsequent proceeding, the Honorable Barry T. Moskowitz,

Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California,

granted Defendants qualified immunity. Plaintiff requests that the Court order

judgment be declared void due to “fraud among the court, fraud, conspiring to commit

1

 The Court construes this filing as a Motion to Remand.

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fraud, and violations of Womack’s constitutional rights, Skelly Rights, and as well as

all officers of court [sic].” Id. at 9. Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of the First,

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983,

discrimination, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(B)(4). 

III. Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff challenged his termination from MTS in binding

arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Defendant asserts that after

the arbitrator upheld the termination, Plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit challenging the

termination. Defendant asserts that Judge Moskowitz granted Defendant summary

judgment. Defendant asserts that Judge Moskowitz then denied Plaintiff’s four postjudgment motions for reconsideration and warned Plaintiff to stop filing frivolous

motions. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff then filed the current action, reiterating the

same arguments and contending that Judge Moskowitz erred in dismissing the first

action. 

Defendant contends that the Complaint is a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to void the prior

judgment in the case before Judge Moskowitz. Defendant contends that this motion is

untimely because it was filed three and a half years after judgment. Defendant also

contends that this motion is unmeritorious because it cannot provide a substitute for a

timely appeal of a judgment. Defendant contends in the alternative that the Complaint

fails to state a claim. 

Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. Plaintiff’s Motion for Emergency Hearing

contends that Judge Moskowitz was presented with evidence that defendants were

dishonest in the case before him and that Judge Moskowitz had a “personal relationship

with defendant’s counsel.” (ECF No. 9 at 2). 

The Court takes judicial notice of the Order granting Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment in Case Number 09cv2679-BTM (NLS) (S.D. Cal.) (“case number

09cv2679”), issued February 28, 2011. (ECF No. 4-3 at 7). The Order granted

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims related to

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Plaintiff’s termination from MTS in October of 2007. The Court also takes judicial

notice of the judgment entered for Defendant in case number 09cv2679 on March 1,

2011 (“March 1, 2011 Judgment”). Id. at 25. The Court takes judicial notice of four

post-judgment motions filed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 4-3 at 47, 126, 297, 316). The

Court also takes judicial notice of four orders entered in case number 09cv2679, issued

on May 24, 2011, September 6, 2011, October 4, 2011, and February 27, 2012, all

denying Plaintiff’s requests for relief from the March 1, 2011 Judgment. (ECF No. 4-3

at 123, 294, 314, 341). 

In the October 4, 2011 Order, Judge Moskowitz denied Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b). Judge Moskowitz stated that “[c]ontinued

filings of Rule 60(b) motions and motions for reconsideration will not be fruitful. At

this juncture, Plaintiff may want to investigate the option of appealing to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id. at 315. In the February 27, 2012 Order, Judge

Moskowitz denied Plaintiff’s motion for relief pursuant Rule 60(b)(2) based on newly

discovered evidence. Judge Moskowitz stated:

[A]ny further Rule 60 motions or motions for reconsideration that lack

merit may be grounds for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Although the

Court denied Defendants’ instant motion for attorney’s fees incurred in opposing Plaintiff’s first 60(b) motion, the Court cannot continue to show

leniency for repeated filings of meritless Rule 60(b) motions and motions

for reconsideration. In the Court’s October 4, 2011 Order, the Court

explained, “Continued filings of Rule 60(b) motions and motions for reconsideration will not be fruitful. At this juncture, Plaintiff may want to investigate the option of appealing to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” Yet Plaintiff filed another Rule 60(b) motion, which the Court now denies.

Repeated filings which reiterate the same arguments that have already been rejected by the Court will not change the outcome of this lawsuit and will expose Plaintiff to liability for attorney’s fees incurred by Defendants in opposing the motions.

Id. at 345. 

In this case, the Complaint asserts a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(B)(4). The Complaint “pleads with Superior Court VOID the Judgment

due to FRAUD AMONG THE COURT, FRAUD, CONSPIRE TO COMMIT FRAUD,

and VIOLATIONS of WOMACK’S Constitutional Rights, Skelly Rights, and AS

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WELL AS ALL OFFICERS OF COURT.” (ECF No. 1 at 9). The Complaint alleges

that “the federal court erred in issuing summary judgment” and “erred in issuing orders

outside the scope of its jurisdiction, directly prohibited by the United States

Constitution, violative of due process, and to all standards of decency and propriety.” 

Id. at 14-15. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Moskowitz erred

in rendering rulings in case number 09cv2679. The Complaint concludes by praying

“the court will void this case [and] overturn the summary judgment issued on February

28, 2011 as well as issue an order granting Womack’s right to if ordered by the court

to refile and or remand back to the original case filed November 2009.” Id. at 38.

The Complaint does not identify any claims that would not require voiding the

judgment in case number 09cv2679. A district court has no authority to vacate the

judgment of a closed case before another district judge. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316

F.3d 822, 825-27 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Because a judgment for Plaintiff in this action would necessarily require the

Court to vacate the judgment entered in case number 09cv2679, the Court cannot

entertain this case. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. Because amendment

would be futile, dismissal is with prejudice.

IV. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (ECF No. 5) 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied

proceedings by now filing a fifth motion to be relieved from the March 1, 2011

Judgment, when he was specifically warned that doing so could result in sanctions. 

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s motion. 

 28 U.S.C. section 1927 provides that “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted

to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so

multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required

by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees

reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Sanctions under

section 1927 may be imposed where a litigant “recklessly raised a frivolous argument

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which resulted in the multiplication of the proceedings.” In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027,

1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). 

In this case, Plaintiff, as warned, did not continue to file post-judgment motions

before Judge Moskowitz. Plaintiff may have believed that he was not prohibited from 

seeking relief in state court, and that filing in state court would be a fruitful exercise. 

The Court does not find that Plaintiff recklessly raised a frivolous argument. The

motion for sanctions is denied. 

Plaintiff is instructed that the March 1, 2011 Judgment is a final, valid, and

enforceable judgment. 

Plaintiff is HEREBY NOTIFIED that subsequent filings in this case may be

grounds for sanctions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Further attempts in this case to vacate the

March 1, 2011 Judgment in case number 09cv2679 may be construed as recklessly

raising a frivolous argument.

V. Conclusion 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (ECF No.

4). The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is DENIED. 

(ECF No. 5). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) and the

Motion for an Emergency Hearing (ECF No. 9) are DENIED as moot. 

DATED: October 23, 2014

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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