Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01060/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01060-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HENDON,

Petitioner,

v.

RAMSEY, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 06cv1060 J (NLS)

ORDER: 

1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; and

2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; 

Plaintiff Carlos Hendon (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleges that

prison medical staff forcibly drugged him in violation of his civil rights. [Doc. No. 50.] 

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and for failure to file a timely government claim prior to filing suit in federal court. [Doc. No.

51.] Plaintiff opposes the motion. [Doc. No. 53.] After a thorough review, the Court GRANTS

IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Background

Plaintiff is an inmate committed to the custody of the California Department of

Corrections (“CDC”) and is currently housed at California State Prison—Sacramento (“CSP

Case 3:06-cv-01060-CAB Document 60 Filed 12/28/07 Page 1 of 17
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1

 The Court’s docket does not reflect that Ridley, Lang, Carroll, Thompson, or Millspaugh were

served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint within the time allotted by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(m). Thus, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over those purported defendants and they are

not proper parties to the action. A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the

defendants has been properly served. See Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982).

2

 In Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526 (1986), the California Court of Appeal “upheld a consent

decree affirming the right of state prisoners to refuse anti-psychotic medications except under certain limited

circumstances.” In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 235 (Cal. 2004).

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Sacramento”) in Represa, California. This action concerns the administration of anti-psychotic

medications to Plaintiff while he was housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”)

in San Diego, California. (FAC at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff has named multiple defendants in his

complaint, including: RJDCF psychiatrist Ramsey; RJDCF psychologist M. Parker; and

unnamed medical contractor; RJDCF correctional officers Woods, Hernandez, Millspaugh,

Carroll, Lizarraga, Zieber, Clifford, Pascuzzi, Lang, and Doe; as well as RJDCF clinicians

Petersen, Yumiko, Ridley, Marquez, Thompson, and Ibarra.1

 (Id. at ¶¶ 4-8.)

According to the FAC, between 2002 and July 13, 2004, Defendants Ramsey and Parker

diagnosed Plaintiff as being suicidal, psychotic, and a potential danger to others. As a result,

Plaintiff received “mental health crisis bed treatment.” (FAC at ¶ 12.) Defendants Ramsey and

Parker prescribed psychotropic drugs and ordered Plaintiff to take the prescribed medication

against his will. (Id.) Various defendants aided in forcibly medicating Plaintiff by extracting

him from his cell and/or administering the medications to Plaintiff. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff suffered

side effects from the administered medications, including stiffness, a shuffling gait, extreme

weight gain in excess of fifty pounds, high blood pressure and cholesterol, dry mouth,

hallucinations, and symptoms akin to having Parkinson’s disease. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff claims

that these side effects continued after the drugging stopped. (Id. at ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff alleges that CDC policy requires notice and a hearing in front of a medications

review panel prior to drugging a prisoner forcibly, but that he received neither. (Id. at ¶ 16

(citing Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526 (1986)).) Under California law, the Keyhea

procedures Plaintiff cited in his FAC govern the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic

medications.2

 The Keyhea injunction provides procedural requirements and substantive

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3

 In order for an individual to be involuntarily medicated in excess of three days, a notice of

certification must be signed by both the chief psychiatrist at the treatment facility and a physician or

psychologist who participated in the evaluation of the prisoner, and it must be delivered to the prisoner. 

The notice of certification permits the involuntary medication of the prisoner for no more that 21 additional

days, and the prisoner is entitled to a certification review hearing within 10 days of the initial voluntary

medication. See In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224 at 236.

4 See www.oah.dgs.ca.gov/laws/keyhea.asp (“Keyhea Inj.”) (stating that “Penal Code Section 5054

vests ‘the responsibility for the care, custody, treatment, training, discipline and employment of persons

confined’ in the California Department of Corrections (CDC). CDC is required by Keyhea v. Rushen, . . . to

seek a court order authorizing the administration of long term involuntary anti-psychotic medication to

individuals confined within the jurisdiction of the CDC who, as a result of a mental disorder, are a danger to

others or to themselves or are gravely disabled and incompetent to refuse medication. Penal Code Section

2600, as amended by Chapter 555, Statutes of 1994, requires that the judicial hearing mandated in this

jurisdiction be conducted by an administrative law judge (ALJ).”)

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standards for medication of different durations.3 Involuntary medication more that 24 days after

the initial medication requires a court order.4

 Plaintiff’s allegations under Keyhea are unclear. 

Plaintiff, however, appears to allege that he was subjected to repeated mental health crisis bed

treatments whose duration and frequency violated Keyhea’s procedural safeguards. (See FAC at

¶ 14.) Plaintiff attaches records discussing a particular treatment that began on May 7, 2004, and

lasted through July 13, 2004, at RJDCF. (See FAC, Appx. A.)

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process of law in violation

of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and also alleges state law claims of negligence against all

defendants for negligence in their official capacities. (FAC at ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff further alleges

that the actions of the collective defendants constitute deliberate indifference to his medical

needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) Plaintiff seeks

compensatory damages for the physical and emotional injuries sustained as a result of the

unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs, and requests punitive damages be awarded

against all named defendants except the medical contractor. (Id. at p. 8.) 

Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his state law claims of

negligence should be dismissed for failure to file a timely government claim pursuant to the

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California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 900 et seq. (Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot.

Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 1.)

Legal Standard

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

as true all material allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC and must also construe the FAC, and all

reasonable inferences therefore, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The

issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but solely whether he has stated a claim

upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). When

the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). This rule of liberal construction is particularly

important in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not permitted

to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982.)

1. Eighth Amendment Claim: Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Medical Contractor’s deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Medical

Contractor created or continued a policy of allowing Defendant physicians to determine that he

should be forcibly drugged despite no immediate incidence or threat of violence. (FAC at ¶ 22.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that the other named defendants’ failure to intervene to prevent the forcible

drugging constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id. at ¶ 23.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment because his

allegations demonstrate that the Defendants treated his medical needs and, ergo, were not

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Defs.’ Mem. at 5.) Deliberate indifference

to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions against

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cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate

indifference includes denial, delay, or intentional interference with a prisoner’s medical

treatment. Id. at 104-05; see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 459-60 (9th Cir.

1980) (delay of six days in treating hepatitis was sufficient to state a deliberate indifference

claim); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1986) (allegation that jail medical staff

would not treat plaintiff’s painful hernia until it became strangulated stated a claim against

medical personnel). An actionable Eighth Amendment violation first involves an objective

inquiry into the seriousness of an inmate’s medical need. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination

of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s

response to that need.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002)

(discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim). A

serious medical need exists if the “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition would result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

Deliberate indifference lies somewhere between negligence and “conduct engaged in for

the very purposes of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994); see also Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,

1440 (9th Cir. 1991). To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must also

demonstrate that the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 839-40 (adopting “subjective recklessness” as standard for Eighth Amendment claims);

Clement, 298 F.2d at 904-05 (applying subjective state-of-mind element in medical treatment

context). Thus, an official must: (1) be actually aware of facts from which an inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists; (2) actually draw the inference; but (3) nevertheless

disregard the risk to the inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a valid Eighth Amendment claim as to any of

the named defendants because, by his own allegations, Plaintiff has demonstrated that

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Defendants were in fact attempting to treat a serious medical condition, rather than deliberately

acting with indifference to the condition. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to put forth any facts to

show that any of the defendants possessed the necessary state of mind to support an Eighth

Amendment violation. (Defs.’ Mem at 4-5.)

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court FINDS that

Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. An inmate must allege facts

sufficient to indicate a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991). Accordingly, neither a difference of opinion about the proper

course of treatment nor a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or

extent of medical treatment amounts to deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chang, 391

F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Here,

Plaintiff has not alleged a single fact to demonstrate that Defendant or any of the defendants

acted with the requisite “culpable state of mind,” nor has he provided sufficient facts regarding

the inadequacy of his treatment. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the treatment was involuntary

rather than inadequate. The Court agrees with Defendants’ assertion that “the gravamen of

Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendants ‘forcibly drugg[ed him] with anti-psychotic medications

without due process.’” (Defs.’ Mem. at 6.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim is more appropriately

analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim

as to all Defendants.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural

due process by forcibly medicating him without following CDC policies and procedures under

Keyhea that guarantee certain procedural safeguards in such situations. (FAC at ¶¶ 21-23.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim because adequate postdeprivation remedies exist and pre-deprivation process was impracticable given the seriousness

of Plaintiff’s medical state. (Defs.’ Mem. at 6-7.)

A. Due Process Standard in the Context of Involuntary Prisoner

Medication

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Ordinarily, interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two

sources—the Due Process Clause itself and state law. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27

(1976). In the prison context, the Due Process Clause is usually implicated. Changes in

conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the

Due Process Clause itself, whether or not state law authorized the changes. Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental

hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary administration

of psychotropic drugs)). A prisoner can show a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest only if

he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges a

liberty interest in being free from forcible drugging by prison officials. Both California law and

the Due Process Clause itself confer upon an inmate a right to be free from the arbitrary

administration of anti-psychotic medication. See Keyhea Inj., supra; Washington, 494 U.S. at

221-22. As such, Plaintiff has met the threshold requirement under Sandin. See 515 U.S. at 484. 

If a liberty interest is implicated, the prisoner must receive minimum due process prior to

deprivation of that interest. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005). In the context of

involuntary medication, “given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process

Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment

is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Washington, 494 U.S. at 227. The decision whether to

medicate an inmate against his will satisfies due process when facilitated by an administrative

review by medical personnel not directly involved in the inmate’s instant treatment. Id. at 233. 

Due process is satisfied if the inmate is provided with notice, the right to be present at an

adversarial hearing, and the right to be present and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 235. 

Appointment of counsel is not required; the provision of a lay advisor who understands the

psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection. Id. at 236. 

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5

 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3351 (a) (2007), “Inmate Refusal of Treatment,” states in pertinent part:

Health care treatment, including medication, shall not be forced over the objections of:

a mentally competent inmate; the guardian of a mentally incompetent inmate; or a

responsible relative of a minor inmate, except in an emergency, or as required to

complete the examination or tests for tuberculosis infection, or to implement the

treatment for tuberculosis disease, or unless the provisions of Probate Code sections

3200 et seq. or the procedures set forth in Keyhea v. Rushen, Solano County Superior

Court No. 67432, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and Modification

of Injunction and Permanent Injunction, filed October 31, 1986, hereby incorporated

by reference, are followed. An emergency exists when there is a sudden, marked change

in an inmate’s condition so that action is immediately necessary for the preservation of

life or the prevention of serious bodily harm to the inmate or others, and it is

impracticable to first obtain consent.

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The Keyhea injunction, incorporated by reference into Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations, section 3351,5

 allows for emergency administration of anti-psychotic medication. 

Keyhea Inj. at p. 22. “An emergency exists when there is a sudden marked change in the

prisoner’s condition so that action is immediately necessary for the preservation of life or the

prevention of serious bodily harm to the patient or others, and it is impracticable to first obtain

consent. If antipsychotic medication is administered during an emergency, such medication

shall be only that which is required to treat the emergency condition and shall be provided in

ways that are least restrictive of the personal liberty of the patient.” Id. In addition, Harper’s

procedural protections may not apply in an emergency situation. In Kulas v. Valdez, 159 F.3d

453, 456 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit appeared to agree that an emergency potentially could

excuse compliance with notice and a pre-medication hearing, even though the facts of the case

before it did not present an actual emergency. However, the Kulas court reiterated that, 

[t]o force anti-psychotic drugs on a prisoner or on a detainee awaiting trial is

impermissible under the federal constitution, “absent a finding of overriding

justification and a determination of medical appropriateness.” Riggins v.

Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). The serious side effects that such

medication can have on mind and personality, physical condition and life

itself, have caused the court to lay down this rigorous test. Harper, 494 U.S.

at 229-30. In the context of both Harper and Riggins such an invasion of the

human person can only be justified by a determination by a neutral factfinder

that the anti-psychotic drugs are medically appropriate and that the

circumstances justify their application.

Id. at 455-56.

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California’s Keyhea procedures differ from those approved in Harper in that the

medication starts before the hearing occurs. Under the Keyhea procedures, doctors decide

that medication is medically necessary and start the medication, with the hearing

scheduled to be held within 10 days. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to follow the

Keyhea requirements and thus violated his due process rights; Defendants assert that they

followed all appropriate procedures. Under the circumstances, this issue should be

resolved as a motion for summary judgment which either party may bring before the

Court at the appropriate juncture.

B. Defendants’ Argument that the Parratt/Hudson Doctrine Should

Apply

Defendants acknowledge that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a person’s

liberty interest in being free from the unwanted administration of medication. (Defs.’

Mem. at 6-7.) Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiff fails to state a valid due process

claim because he had access, subsequent to the alleged forcible drugging, to both the

prison grievance process and the California state tort claims process, and that these

procedural remedies defeat a claim of constitutional violation. (Id. at 12-13.) 

Defendants rely on the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), to argue that the

availability of adequate post-deprivation remedies under state law forecloses any federal

constitutional due process claim by Plaintiff in this case. (Defs’ Mem. at 7.) Relying on

this analysis alone, Defendants do not address the question of whether Plaintiff’s

allegations, considered without regard to the existence of post-deprivation remedies, state

a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Under limited circumstances, “a state can cure what would otherwise be an

unconstitutional deprivation of ‘life, liberty or property’ by providing adequate postdeprivation remedies.” Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.

2001.) The Parratt/Hudson doctrine “represent[s] a special case . . . in which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they are the only

remedies the State could be expected to provide.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128

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(1990); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986). The Parratt/Hudson

doctrine appears to be most applicable when the case involves prisoners, minor

constitutional infractions, and adequate post-deprivation tort claims. Daniels, 474 U.S. at

332-33; Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“Parratt

and Hudson dealt with relatively minor infractions of prisoners’ interests in their

personal property, and did not deal with official assaults, batteries, or other invasions of

personal liberty.”) The doctrine states that post-deprivation remedies, including those in

the form of a tort action under state law, pass constitutional muster if the government

agent’s actions were random or unauthorized. Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 738. Neither a

negligent act nor an intentional act deprives an individual of due process of law so long as

the act was unauthorized or random. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

For an act to be considered random, it must be shown that “the state administrative

machinery did not, and could not, have learned of the deprivation until after it has

occurred,” making pre-deprivation hearings impracticable. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541 (in

cases where the act is random and unauthorized, “the loss is not a result of some

established state procedure and the State cannot predict precisely when the loss will

occur”); Merrett v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987). “[W]here the injury is

the product of the operation of state law, regulation, or institutionalized practice, it is

neither random nor unauthorized, but wholly predictable, authorized, and within the

power of the state to control.” Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1357. As such, the Ninth Circuit

does not apply Parratt where a deprivation occurs because officials are acting according

to established procedures—even if those established procedures violate other state or

federal laws. Honey v. Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Piatt v.

MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1357 (citing

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982)). 

Defendants argue an inapplicable legal standard in this case. In Zinermon, the

Supreme Court clarified the reach of Parratt and Hudson and found the analogy to those

cases inapplicable where the deprivation is not unpredictable, a pre-deprivation process is

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not impossible or absurd, and the conduct of the defendants is not unauthorized. 494 U.S.

at 136-39; see also Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 738-39. The Court finds that the case at bar

is governed by Zinermon and Zimmerman rather that Parratt and Hudson. The

availability of post-deprivation remedies will only cure an unconstitutional deprivation

when an official has acted in “random, unpredictable, and unauthorized ways.” 

Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 738. Post-deprivation remedies cannot save an unconstitutional

act when the official acted pursuant to an established procedure. Id. Parratt and Hudson

do not protect the Defendants in this action from a constitutional challenge. An inmate is

entitled to certain procedural safeguards before he is medicated involuntarily. Plaintiff

claims that these safeguards were not followed in his situation. Defendants, relying

solely upon their misplaced application of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine to the facts of this

case, fail to demonstrate how Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate to state a cognizable

Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

Plaintiff had a protected liberty interest in being free from involuntary medication

under federal law. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants denied him the procedural due process protections he is guaranteed under

federal and California law. Plaintiff may or may not be able to prove that Defendants

actually violated his constitutional rights. However, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983.

The Defendants object to the Report and Recommendation’s (“R&R”) conclusion

that Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

claim on several grounds: (1) Defendants argue that “the Magistrate’s conclusion that

‘[t]he Parratt/Hudson doctrine appears to be the most applicable when the case involves

prisoners, minor constitutional infractions, and adequate post-deprivation tort claims’” is

contrary to Supreme Court precedent; (2) the state law post-deprivation process

comprises all the process that is due; (3) the Magistrate erred in concluding that Zinermon

and Zimmerman control this case instead of Parratt and Hudson; (4) the Magistrate failed

to identify the additional pre-deprivation process that could have been provided to

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Plaintiff; and (5) the Magistrate fails to reconcile controlling Ninth Circuit case law cited

in Defendants’ memorandum. (Defs.’ Objs. at 4.)

Defendants, in support of their first ground for objection, cite Zinermon to support

their claim that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine’s application is not dependent on the type of

liberty interest at stake. (Id. at 5) (citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124.) Defendants’ claim

is without merit, however, because the R&R’s conclusion that the Parratt/Hudson

doctrine does not apply did not rest on the liberty interest at stake. (See R&R at 9.) 

Rather, the R&R concluded that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies only to a

government agent’s random or unauthorized acts, for which pre-deprivation process

would be impracticable. (Id.) In this case, Defendants’ forcible drugging of Plaintiff was

not random, and Defendants could have followed established Keyhea pre-deprivation

procedures. Accordingly, the R&R correctly concluded that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine

does not apply. Defendants then assume that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine should apply in

asserting that “Plaintiff’s state law postdeprivation remedies comprises all the process

that is due.” (Defs.’ Objs. at 5.) Because the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not apply,

this objection is without merit. 

Third, Defendants assert that neither “[Plaintiff] [n]or the Magistrate state what

additional predeprivation procedures could have been provided before the alleged

deprivation occurred in this case.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff’s FAC and the R&R both state

that Defendants should have followed the established Keyhea pre-deprivation procedure. 

(FAC at ¶ 16; R&R at 8.) 

Defendants also object on the ground that the R&R failed to distinguish Raditch v.

United States, 929 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1991), which Defendants claim is controlling

Ninth Circuit precedent. (Defs. Objs. at 6-7.) In Raditch, the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs (“OWCP”) terminated the petitioner’s benefits without giving

him notice and an opportunity to respond, and without following the OWCP’s procedures

for gathering the requisite medical evidence. Raditch, 929 F.2d at 480. The court held

that the OWCP could compensate the petitioner for its employee’s unauthorized violation

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of established procedures through its post-deprivation procedures. Id. at 481-82. The

case at hand involves not an unauthorized procedural violation, but instead, a

“depriv[ation] of constitutional rights . . . by an official’s abuse of his position.” See

Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 139 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 167, 172 (1961). The

United States Supreme Court, in Zinermon, addressed pre-deprivation safeguards:

[W]hen [state] officials fail to provide constitutionally required safeguards to

a person whom they deprive of liberty, the state officials cannot then escape

liability by invoking Parratt and Hudson. It is immaterial whether the due

process violation [the prisoner] alleges is best described as arising from

petitioner’s failure to comply with state procedures for admitting involuntary

patients, or from the absence of a specific requirement that petitioners

determine whether a patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission.

Id. at 135-36. 

In the instant case, as in Zinermon, the State delegated to prison officials the

“power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of . . . and also delegated

to them the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set up by state law. . .

.” See id. at 138. In both Zinermon and in the case at hand, the prison officials

disregarded their duty to comply with established pre-deprivation procedures. See id.

Raditch is inapplicable and Zinermon’s clear command controls this case’s outcome. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and allow

Plaintiff to pursue his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

3. State Law Tort Claims: Compliance with the California Tort

Claims Act

Plaintiff also alleges claims for negligence against all defendants under California

state law. (FAC at ¶¶ 21-23.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims should

be dismissed for failure to file a timely government claim pursuant to California Tort

Claims Act (“CTCA”), California Government Code sections 900 et seq. (Defs.’ Mem.

At 1.) The District Court previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

state law claims, after adopting this Court’s finding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate

compliance with the CTCA. (Order Granting in Part and Den. in Part Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 9.) The court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, and Plaintiff added a single

revised allegation to his FAC, stating that his “state law claim was filed on February 9,

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2006, and he had not received a response, nor was his claim returned, more than fortyfive days later.” (FAC at ¶ 11.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s revised allegation once

again fails to demonstrate compliance with the CTCA, primarily because the claims board

has no record of Plaintiff’s claim having been filed, and secondarily, because even if

Plaintiff did file his claim as he states, he did so in an untimely manner. (Defs.’ Mem. At

15.)

The CTCA requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees be

presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board,

formerly known as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of

action accrues. See Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2. 

Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are conditions

precedent to suit. Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th

Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege

compliance with the CTCA. Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Although Plaintiff has demonstrated

successfully that he utilized the prison grievance process to exhaust his federal claims by

filing an inmate appeal, and has attached documentation in the form of his CDC 602 form

and administrative responses, these documents do not satisfy the CTCA with respect to

his state law negligence claims. Plaintiff’s allegation in Paragraph 11 of his complaint is

a cursory statement, which even construed as liberally as possible by the Court, remains

insufficient to demonstrate compliance with the CTCA. Plaintiff provides no facts related

to when such a claim was made, and attaches no proof to his complaint that any claim

was filed. Defendants, on the other hand, present certified copies of every claim on

record filed by Plaintiff with the Claims Board between 2002 and August 2006. (See

Decl. Of Daisy Sanchez in Supp. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A.) Plaintiff filed three

separate claims during that period, none of which involve his complaint of being

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6

 Plaintiff’s three claims were filed and recorded as follows: 1) Claim No. G54116, regarding prison

guards’ failure to protect Plaintiff from an assault on or about December 17, 2004; 2) Claim No. G553195,

regarding prison guards’ confiscation of Plaintiff’s personal property from his cell on or about November

2004; and 3) Claim No. G554250, regarding deprivation of Plaintiff’s personal property by prison guards.

15 06cv1060 J (NLS)

involuntarily medicated.6 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’

motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s state law negligence claim as to all

Defendants.

4. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because,

based on the circumstances under which Plaintiff was forcibly medicated, it would not

have been clear to a reasonable government official that Plaintiff’s rights were being

violated. (Defs.’ Mem. at 19.) Qualified immunity shields government officials “from

liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). Generally, the qualified

immunity doctrine must “give[] ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting ‘all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 229 (1991). Even if no constitutional violation occurred, the officer should

prevail if the plaintiff’s right “was not ‘clearly established’ or the officer could have

reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County,

931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

To analyze a qualified immunity claim, a court must first determine whether, taken

in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the

defendants violated the claimant’s constitutional rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). If the court determines the facts alleged could show violation of a

constitutional right, the second step requires determining “whether the right was clearly

established.” Id. at 201. The relevant inquiry focuses on “what the officer reasonably

understood his powers and responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established

standards.” Id. at 208. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the right allegedly

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violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Sorrels v. McKee, 290

F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Plaintiff has presented a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. During

the time period of Defendants’ alleged acts, an inmate’s right to be free from the arbitrary

administration of anti-psychotic medication was clearly established by existing case law. 

See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1989). The question, therefore, is

whether any or all of the defendants reasonably could have believed that their conduct

was lawful. Defendants argue that they were acting to the best of their knowledge under

appropriate Keyhea protocol when medicating Plaintiff against his will, and therefore they

are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. At 18-19.) The Court finds that the key

question is more properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment or at trial, when

Defendants may present evidence in support of their claim, and the Court may properly

consider such evidence. Defendants’ mere assertion of good faith is insufficient to

support a complete defense at this stage in the litigation. The Court cannot conclude at

this juncture that a reasonable official in any of the various defendants’ positions would

have believed that Plaintiff’s extended period of involuntary medication was authorized

and that their conduct was lawful in light of Plaintiff’s allegations that the required

stringent procedures were not followed.

Defendants object to the R&R’s finding that they are not entitled to qualified

immunity on the grounds that facts in Plaintiff’s complaint contradict Plaintiff’s claim

that reasonable officials in Defendants’ positions should have known their conduct was

unlawful. (Defs.’ Objs. At 7-8.) Defendants point to Plaintiff’s statement that prison

officials “were aware of [Plaintiff] being on Keyhea when they cell extracted him or gave

him his medications.” (Id. at 8.) Defendants contend that this statement proves that

prison officials administered Plaintiff’s medication based on their good-faith belief that

they were authorized to do so. (Id.) This single statement does not conclusively establish

that the prison officials actually believed Plaintiff was under a valid Keyhea order. This

Court liberally construes pro se pleadings. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375,

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381-82 (2003). Accordingly, this Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint based on a

single ambiguous statement.

Defendants also contend that the written response to Plaintiff’s administrative

grievance shows that prison officials complied with Keyhea procedures. (Defs. Objs. At

8.) Defendants assert that “[n]owhere else in Plaintiff’s complaint are these facts disputed

or contradicted.” (Id.) Those facts are flatly contradicted by Plaintiff’s allegation that

prison staff failed to follow Keyhea procedure. (FAC at ¶ 16.) This Court cannot resolve

this issue in Defendants’ favor unless they can present conclusive evidence that they

made a good-faith attempt to follow Keyhea protocol.

Thus, for the purposes of the instant motion, the Court cannot resolve the issue of

whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the Court DENIES

without prejudice Defendants’ claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the Report & Recommendation

and DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

DATED: December 28, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Stormes

 All Parties of Record

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