Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cv-00169/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cv-00169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

RUTH RUHL, in her capacity as PLAINTIFF

Administratrix and personal representative

of the Estate of Elizabeth Ann Sliffe, Deceased

v. No. 4:15CV00169 JLH

JOHN T. BOYD, individually and in his official

capacity as Deputy Sheriff for the Faulkner

County Sheriff’s Department; UNIECE JACKSON, 

individually and in her official capacity as Intake Officer 

for Faulkner County Detention Center; KANISHA 

DOUGLAS, individually and in her official capacity as

Detention Officer for Faulkner County Detention Center; 

KARL BYRD, individually and in his official capacity 

as Faulkner County Sheriff; MELINDA MARPLE, 

individually and in her official capacity as Lieutenant for 

Faulkner County Sheriff’s Department; BRIANNE 

PICKARD, individually and in her official capacity 

as Lieutenant for Faulkner County Sheriff’s Department; 

ALICIA HARDY, individually and in her official capacity 

as Lieutenant for Faulkner County Sheriff’s Department;

and FAULKNER COUNTY, ARKANSAS DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Ruth Ruhl, in her capacity as Administratrix and personal representative of the Estate of

Elizabeth Ann Sliffe, alleges that the defendants violated the United States Constitution, the

Arkansas Constitution, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and that they committed the torts of false

imprisonment and outrage in connection with Sliffe’s arrest on September 24, 2012, after Sliffe’s

son filed a petition to have her involuntarily committed due to mental illness. The defendants are

Faulkner County and several of its employees from the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Department and

the Faulkner County Detention Center. Three motions are pending in connection with defendant

John T. Boyd, the Faulkner County Deputy Sheriff. First, Ruhl has filed a motion for default

judgment against Boyd in the amount of $75,001. Document #27. Second, Boyd has filed a motion

Case 4:15-cv-00169-JLH Document 41 Filed 05/19/16 Page 1 of 6
to set aside the affidavit of service of summons, which Ruhl filed on April 14, 2016. Document #26;

Document #28. Third, Boyd has filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer. Document

#34. For the following reasons, Ruhl’s motion for default judgment is denied; Boyd’s motion to set

aside the affidavit of service of summons is denied as moot; and Boyd’s motion for extension of

time to file an answer is granted.

I.

According to the complaint, Curtis Sliffe filed a petition to involuntarily admit his mother,

Elizabeth Ann Sliffe, on September 21, 2012. Sliffe was 79 years old at the time. The Circuit Court

of Faulkner County entered an order setting a probable cause hearing for September 24. The court

ordered the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Department to pick up Sliffe and transport her to the hearing. 

On September 24, Boyd went to Sliffe’s home and told her she had to go with him to the hearing. 

Boyd did not have a warrant, did not provide Sliffe with a copy of the petition, and did not inform

Sliffe of her rights. Boyd hand-cuffed Sliffe and placed her in the back of his patrol car. Then,

Boyd took Sliffe to the Faulkner County Detention Center to be processed. Detention center

employees fingerprinted and photographed Sliffe, forced her to strip naked and shower, and forced

her to change into a striped jail uniform before they took her into the courtroom. Uniece Jackson,

Kanisha Douglas, and Alicia Hardy handled Sliffe roughly, leaving bruises on her arm and shoulder

and unseating her surgically-implanted defibrillator. Immediately after Sliffe entered the courtroom,

she was informed that her case had been dismissed. Sliffe returned to the detention center where

she was permitted to change back into her clothes and instructed to make arrangements for

transportation home.

2

Case 4:15-cv-00169-JLH Document 41 Filed 05/19/16 Page 2 of 6
II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A)(i) requires a defendant to serve an answer within

21 days after being served with the summons and complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)

states that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to

plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter

the party’s default.” A party must apply to the court for a default judgment if the claim is not for

a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation. FED.R.CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Ruhl has

requested the Court to enter a default judgment against Boyd, who has not filed an answer, in the

amount of $75,001. Document #27. Ruhl filed an affidavit on April 14, 2016 stating that Boyd was

served with the summons and complaint by certified mail, return receipt, and restricted delivery on

July 18, 2015. Document #26. Boyd argues that service should be set aside because Ruhl did not

file the affidavit within a reasonable time after he was served. Document #28-1 at 2, ¶ 7. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(l)(1) states that unless service is waived or the United States marshal or

deputy marshal executed service, proof must be made by the server’s affidavit. Rule 5(d)(1) states

that any paper after the complaint that is required to be served must be filed within a reasonable time

after service and Local Rule 5.4 states that a reasonable time is seven days. 

The Court does not need to decide whether the server’s affidavit is a paper that must be filed

within a reasonable time after service because the timely answer filed by Faulkner County, Jackson,

and Marple on June 5, 2015, inures to the benefit of Boyd under the common-defense doctrine.1

 See

1

 The parties focused their arguments primarily on good cause under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55(c) and excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1)(B), but Boyd did argue that the commondefense doctrine should prevent the entry of a default judgment against him. Document #33 at 2,

¶9. Good cause is a separate issue from the common-defense doctrine and is inapplicable here

because the common-defense doctrine applies to preclude entry of a default judgment against Boyd. 

3

Case 4:15-cv-00169-JLH Document 41 Filed 05/19/16 Page 3 of 6
Glass v. Saline Cnty. Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. App. 525, at 5-6, 423 S.W.3d 618, 622 (holding that it

was no abuse of discretion to deny a motion for default because the common-defense doctrine

applied). The common-defense doctrine directs that an answer that is timely filed by a co-defendant

inures to the benefit of a defaulting co-defendant. Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330, 335, 989 S.W.2d

887, 889 (1999). The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated:

The test for determining if an answer will inure to a co-defendant’s benefit is

whether the answer of the non-defaulting defendant states a defense that is common

to both defendants, because then a “successful plea . . . operates as a discharge to all

the defendants, but it is otherwise where the plea goes to the personal discharge of

the party interposing it.” Southland Mobile Home Corp. v. Winders, 262 Ark. 693,

561 S.W.2d 280 (1978); see also Arnold Fireworks Display v. Schmidt, 307 Ark.

316, 820 S.W. 444 (1991).

Richardson v. Rodgers, 334 Ark. 606, 612, 976 S.W.2d 941, 944-45 (1998). Here, inconsistent

judgments would result if Faulkner County were to defend and prevail on the merits while Boyd

suffered a default judgment. See Angelo Iafrate Const., LLC v. Potashnick Const., Inc., 370 F.3d

715, 722 (8th Cir. 2004).

 Ruhl’s complaint alleges that Faulkner County and its employees treated Sliffe in an

unlawful manner during her arrest and subsequent detention. Document #1. While the complaint

does state allegations against Boyd separately–Ruhl alleges that Boyd’s conduct involved the

arrest–the answer filed by Faulkner County, Jackson, and Marple denies the allegations

characterizing Boyd’s arrest of Sliffe and denies that those allegations have any basis in fact. 

Document #6 at 2, 6, ¶¶4, 12-13, 15-17; See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 613, 976 S.W.2d at 945 (noting

See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 611, 976 S.W.2d at 944 (holding that Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure

55(c) and its requirements do not control in cases where the common-defense doctrine is applicable). 

Because the common-defense doctrine applies, a timely answer inures to Boyd’s benefit, so he is

not in default. Therefore, excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1)(B) is not at issue. Rather, Boyd’s

motion should be construed as a motion for leave to file an amended answer under Rule 15.

4

Case 4:15-cv-00169-JLH Document 41 Filed 05/19/16 Page 4 of 6
that even though the complaint set out the allegations of negligence against the County employee

in a separate paragraph from the allegation of negligence toward the County, the answer denied

every paragraph of the complaint). Furthermore, viewing the complaint as a whole, Boyd’s liability

is not based on wrongful acts independent from the liability of the defendants who filed a timely

answer. See Angelo Iafrate Const., 370 F.3d at 722.

In addition, the answer includes a general denial of each and every allegation not specifically

mentioned in the answer. Document #6 at 5, ¶20. “[A] general denial of ‘each and every material

allegation contained in the complaint’ is the assertion of a common defense.” Sutter, 337 Ark. at

335, 989 S.W.2d at 889 (quoting Southland Mobile Home Corp., 262 Ark. at 694, 561 S.W.2d at

280). See also Richardson, 334 Ark. at 613, 976 S.W.2d at 945 (basing its holding upon, among

other paragraphs in the answer, the fact that the co-defendant made a general denial stating, “[the

co-defendant] denies, generally and specifically, each and every material allegation of the Complaint

not specifically admitted herein.”).

The answer also asserts the affirmative defenses of qualified immunity, punitive damages

immunity, statutory tort immunity, sovereign immunity, justification, mootness of any requested

injunctive relief, and asserts that Ruhl failed to state any claim. Document #6 at 5. The commondefense doctrine is applicable where an asserted defense would discharge all of the defendants. 

Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark. 148, 156, 72 S.W.3d 85, 89 (2002) (holding that because each of the

claims was subject to the statute of limitations defense raised in the answer, the common-defense

doctrine applied). If the Court finds that Ruhl failed to set forth enough facts to state any claim to

relief that is plausible on its face, then all defendants are discharged.

5

Case 4:15-cv-00169-JLH Document 41 Filed 05/19/16 Page 5 of 6
The effect of the answer filed by Faulkner County, Jackson, and Marple was to deny Ruhl’s

allegations of constitutional violations, statutory violations, false imprisonment, and outrage. Such

a denial goes to the existence of Ruhl’s causes of actions and asserts defenses common to Faulkner

County, Jackson, Marple, and Boyd. Though Boyd did not file an answer to the complaint, he did

appear and defend by virtue of the timely answer filed by Faulkner County, Jackson, and Marple,

which inured to Boyd’s benefit under the common-defense doctrine. Therefore, Boyd is not in

default and the Court will permit him to file an amended answer.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ruhl’s motion for default judgment is DENIED. Document #27. 

Boyd’s motion to set aside the affidavit of service of summons is DENIED as moot. Document #28. 

Boyd’s motion for extension of time to file an answer is GRANTED. Document #34. Boyd must

file an amended answer within fourteen days of the entry of this Opinion and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of May, 2016.

__________________________________

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6

Case 4:15-cv-00169-JLH Document 41 Filed 05/19/16 Page 6 of 6