Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00218/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00218-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HEATH TYLER WISDOM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-0218 AC P (TEMP) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action on January 26, 

2015, challenging his custody classification with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff’s 

complaint was premised on an allegedly erroneous 3-point increase in his score for a history of 

violence. By way of relief, plaintiff sought an order directing the BOP to lower his total custody 

score from 21 to 18, an action that would presumably open more desirable housing assignments 

within the federal prison system. 

On January 8, 2016, the undersigned1

 dismissed this action without leave to amend for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 10.) In the order of dismissal, the court held that 

while 5 U.S.C. § 702 generally allows for judicial review of a federal agency decision, the 

decision at issue in this case—a prisoner’s security classification and facility designation—is 

 

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 Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §636(b). (ECF 

No. 5.) 

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specifically excluded from review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3625. In determining that plaintiff’s 

complaint filed under 5 U.S.C. § 702 cannot state a claim under another statute, the court held as 

follows: 

Although this court has discretion, in some circumstances, 

to construe a pro se complaint filed under one statute as an action 

proceeding under another, or to allow a pro se plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend his complaint to aver the necessary legal 

elements of a potentially viable claim, in this case the court does 

not have that option: the futility of any viable cause of action, based 

on these allegations, is complete under the jurisdiction-stripping 

effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3625. No habeas action can lie here because 

“[t]o find that prisoners can bring habeas petitions ... to challenge 

the BOP’s discretionary determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3621 would be inconsistent with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 

3625.” Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1227. Nor can plaintiff assert any civil 

rights claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 

the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because 

under the BOP’s virtually unlimited authority to control prisoner 

classifications and housing assignments, an inmate “has no 

legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke 

due process” and thereby contest “prisoner classification ... in the 

federal system.” Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). 

See also Miller, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (stating “it is settled law that 

a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in his place of 

confinement or custody classification that can be redressed by the 

due process clause of the constitution”); Medina-Alvarez v. United 

States, No. CV 13-0783 ODW (JC), 2013 WL 799620 at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. March 4, 2013) (stating that “[t]he exemption of the BOP’s 

individualized housing determinations from judicial review is 

consistent with the recognition that inmates do not have a due 

process liberty interest in their placement and classification while 

incarcerated”). 

ECF No. 10 at 4-5. Judgment was entered accordingly. (ECF No. 11.) 

 Now pending is plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, wherein he seeks leave 

to amend his complaint to state a claim under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) and 

(g)(1)(C), and to bring a Bivens2 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) sets forth the standard by which this court may 

reconsider its order of final judgment: 

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 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971). 

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Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or 

Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a 

party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding for the following reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; 

(4) the judgment is void; 

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; 

it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or 

vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; 

or 

(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) “is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 

manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances...” exist. Harvest 

v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The 

moving party “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control....” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend 'shall be freely given when justice so 

requires.’” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)); accord Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cnty., 

708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013). However, courts “need not grant leave to amend where the 

amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue 

delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp., 465 F.3d at 951; accord 

Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emps., 708 F.3d at 1117. While “‘prejudice to the opposing party 

carries the greatest weight,’” Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emps., 708 F.3d at 1117 (quoting 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)), leave 

to amend “is properly denied ... if amendment would be futile,” Carrico v. City and Cnty. of San 

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Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 

1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Plaintiff was previously informed that he may not maintain a Bivens action on his claim 

that his classification score is erroneous. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). See also 

Miller v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 703 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating “it is settled law 

that a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in his place of confinement or custody 

classification that can be redressed by the due process clause of the constitution”); MedinaAlvarez v. United States, No. 13-cv-0783 ODW (JC), 2013 WL 799620, at *2 (C.D. Cal. March 

4, 2013) (stating that “[t]he exemption of the BOP’s individualized housing determinations from 

judicial review is consistent with the recognition that inmates do not have a due process liberty 

interest in their placement and classification while incarcerated”). Plaintiff now seeks to state an 

equal protection claim under Bivens that is predicated on the BOP’s alleged failure to maintain 

accurate records. The court is unpersuaded by plaintiff’s rephrasing of this claim since the 

gravamen is, again, that his classification score is erroneous. Nor does this rephrasing state an 

equal protection claim since plaintiff asserts no facts that would suggest that any inaccurate 

record-keeping was based on plaintiff’s membership in a protected class or that similarly situated 

individuals were treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 

Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008); North Pacifica LLC 

v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s motion to alter judgment and to 

amend his complaint on this ground will therefore be denied as futile. Carrico, 656 F.3d at 1008. 

 Plaintiff also seeks to amend his complaint to state a claim under the Privacy Act, 5 

U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5), which directs an agency to “maintain all records which are used by the 

agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, 

timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the 

determination.” Plaintiff cannot, however, state a cognizable claim under the Privacy Act based 

on the contents of his Inmate Central File because such claims have been exempted by the BOP 

from the Privacy Act provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2); Jennings v. Federal Bureau of 

Prisons, 657 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (D.C.C. Sept. 25, 2009) (“[U]nder 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2), the 

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BOP’s Inmate Central Records System is exempt from subsection (e)(5) of the Privacy Act.”); see 

also Speight v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2008 WL 3411660, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2008) (“[T]he 

Privacy Act’s provision for civil action is not available for matters arising from records in [the 

BOP’s] Inmate Central Records system, and [plaintiff] has no right of action with respect to those 

records.”); Clow v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2008 WL 2705193, at *2 (D.D.C. July 9, 2008) 

(determining that “plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, seek amendment of the [PSI and custody 

classification form] based on the BOP’s alleged failure to maintain accurate records” because 

these documents “are maintained in the Inmate Central Records System”); see also Marinez v. 

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of 

Privacy Act claims against the BOP because it had exempted the Inmate Central Records system 

from the accuracy provision of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5)). Plaintiff’s motion to 

amend to state a claim under the Privacy Act will therefore also be denied. 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to alter or 

amend judgment (ECF No. 12) is denied. 

DATED: July 11, 2016 

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