Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00013/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00013-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Fidelity and Stefani characterize their motion as a

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6);

however, their motion, in part, seeks dismissal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and thus, in that respect, the motion

is properly considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LAMON MAXWELL,

NO. CIV. S-06-00013 FCD/CMK

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAUL PENDLETON, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on (1) defendants

Fidelity National Title Company of California (“Fidelity”) and

Donna Stefani’s (“Stefani”) motion to dismiss1 and (2) defendants

Paul Pendleton and Tammie Pendleton’s (“Pendletons”) motion for

judgment on the pleadings. In their motion, the Pendletons also

Case 2:06-cv-00013-FCD-CMK Document 46 Filed 11/02/06 Page 1 of 10
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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs.

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

3 While the Pendletons did not raise Rooker-Feldman in

their motion, the court finds the doctrine equally applicable to

plaintiff’s claims against them.

2

move to expunge a lis pendens recorded by plaintiff Lamon Maxwell

(“plaintiff”) against the real property at issue herein.2

In their respective motions, defendants move for dismissal,

arguing plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable civil

rights claim against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alternatively,

Fidelity and Stefani seek dismissal on the ground that

plaintiff’s action is barred by the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine,

which precludes federal district courts from reviewing certain

state court decisions.

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that

plaintiff’s action against all defendants is barred by RookerFeldman3 and therefore, dismisses the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff owned a home with his wife, Barbara Maxwell, in

joint tenancy. (Pl.’s Compl. for Damages, filed Jan. 4, 2006

[“Compl.”], ¶ 8.) The house was located at 5260 Rancho Vista

Way, Redding, California. (Id.)

On or about October 26, 1999, Mrs. Maxwell transferred her

interest in the home to plaintiff as his separate property. (Id.

¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges Mrs. Maxwell did so because plaintiff

would not let her visit her sick brother in Oregon until the

transfer was executed. (Id.) As consideration for 

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4 The Shasta County Superior Court found that Mrs.

Maxwell did not take any steps until approximately one year after

plaintiff entered the purchase agreement with the Pendletons, to

void the transaction. As such, her failure to assert her rights,

taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, barred Mrs. Maxwell

from challenging the property transfer to the Pendletons.

3

Mrs. Maxwell’s transfer, plaintiff transferred his interest in

the couple’s automobile to Mrs. Maxwell as her separate property. 

(Id.)

Thereafter, on October 20, 2000, plaintiff and the

Pendletons entered into a contract whereby the Pendletons agreed

to purchase plaintiff’s home for $149,500.00. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

However, on or about January 15, 2001, plaintiff realized that he

was not the sole owner of the home and therefore, could not sell

the property. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff admitted that he forced his

wife to transfer her interest in the home to him so she could use

the car to visit her sick brother. (Id.) 

Subsequently, plaintiff and the Pendletons, pursuant to the

terms of the purchase agreement, arbitrated their dispute over

the sale of the home in Shasta County Superior Court. (Id.

¶ 14.) The superior court ruled in favor of the Pendletons and

issued an arbitration award, directing plaintiff to complete the

sale of the home to the Pendletons (“Arbitration Award”).4 (Id.) 

The Arbitration Award provided a 45-day escrow period and limited

any extensions of the escrow to 10 days, following a superior

court order on any motion brought regarding the Award. (Id.)

Pursuant to the Arbitration Award, the Pendletons brought

several motions to extend the escrow period. (Id. ¶ 15.) The

initial extension complied with the terms of the Arbitration

Award, but the Pendletons were still unable to obtain funding

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5 The complaint does not disclose the specific roles of

Fidelity and Stefani in this dispute. However, as set forth in

their motion papers, Fidelity was the escrow holder and Stefani

was the escrow officer. (Defs.’ Fidelity and Stefani Mot. to

Dismiss, filed Aug. 7, 2006 [“Mot’n”], at 3:2-3.)

4

before the close of the extended period. (Id.) On the last day

of the extension, the Pendletons brought another motion to extend

escrow for an additional 30 days. (Id.) The Shasta County

Superior Court granted the motion. (Id.) Plaintiff contends

that, in doing so, the superior court breached the terms of the

Arbitration Award. (Id.)

On or about July 16, 2002, the Shasta County Superior Court

ordered Susan Null, clerk of the court, as duly appointed Court

Commissioner, to sign all necessary documentation for purposes of

consummating the sale of the property in lieu of plaintiff’s

signature. (Id. ¶ 17.) On the same day, Ms. Null signed the

deed to the property on behalf of plaintiff, conveying the

property to the Pendletons. (Id. ¶ 18.) Ms. Null also signed an

Installment Note, which required plaintiff to carry 10% of the

purchase price, payable in installments to the Pendletons. (Id.) 

On August 16, 2002, Fidelity transferred title to the property to

the Pendletons.5 (Id. ¶ 19.) Four days later, the Pendletons

took possession of the property. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff appealed the Shasta County Superior Court’s order

extending the escrow to the Court of Appeal of California, Third

Appellate District. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff’s appeal was

unsuccessful. (Id.) Plaintiff filed another complaint in Shasta

County Superior Court, challenging the Installment Note. (Id.

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5

¶ 22.) Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiff,

again, appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Third

Appellate District, which affirmed the superior court’s order of

dismissal. (Id.)

In this action, plaintiff asserts that the following events

deprived him of his due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983: (1) the Shasta County Superior Court’s 30-day escrow

extension; (2) Ms. Null’s signing of the Installment Note; 

(3) Fidelity’s transfer of title to the Pendletons; and (4) the

Pendleton’s possession of the subject property. Based on his

federal claim, plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens on the

property with the Shasta County Recorder’s Office. (Notice of

Action Pending, filed Jan. 30, 2006.) 

STANDARD

A federal district court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a

state court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415

(1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 476 (1983). Rather, the United States Supreme Court is the

only federal court with jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. Id.

There are only two statutory exceptions to this rule: (1) a

federal district court has original jurisdiction to entertain

petitions for habeas corpus brought by state prisoners who claim

the state court has made an error of federal law; and (2) a

federal bankruptcy court has original jurisdiction to void,

modify or discharge state judgments. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d

1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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6

Even a federal district court action alleging that a state

court’s action is unconstitutional does not change the rule. See

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (stating that district courts do not

have jurisdiction over “challenges to state court decisions . . . 

even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was

unconstitutional”). Moreover, claims raised in federal district

court need not have been argued in the state judicial proceedings

to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 483-84 n.

16. If federal claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a

state court judgment, the federal court may not hear them. Id.

“[T]he federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state

court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent

that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” 

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)(citation

omitted).

In Noel v. Hall, the Ninth Circuit summarized the test under

Rooker-Feldman as follows:

If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an 

allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks

relief from a state court judgment based on that decision,

Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal

district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff

asserts as a legal wrong, an allegedly illegal act or

omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar

jurisdiction.

341 F.3d at 1164. Ultimately then, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

applies “only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as [his]

injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as

[his] remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Kougasian v.

TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004)(emphasis added).

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7

ANALYSIS

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants assert that by this action, plaintiff seeks

recovery for the very same alleged wrongful actions for which

recovery was sought and denied in the prior state court actions. 

As such, defendants contend that plaintiff’s instant action is

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

The critical inquiry here is whether plaintiff’s federal

claim, under § 1983, is “inextricably intertwined” with the

previous state court judgments. In analyzing the applicability

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court “pay[s] close attention

to the relief sought by the federal court plaintiff,” as the

doctrine precludes the adjudication of a federal claim that seeks

to undo a prior state court judgment. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334

F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)(citation omitted).

Here, plaintiff contends he was deprived of his due process

rights in violation of § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-29.) In

particular, plaintiff argues that the 30-day extension of the

Pendletons’ escrow violated his due process rights. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

The Shasta County Superior Court granted the Pendletons’ motion

to extend escrow pursuant to the Arbitration Award. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District affirmed the

superior court’s order. (Id. ¶ 21.) This court’s consideration

of the issue would directly review these decisions of the state

courts. Such review is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. See e.g. Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th

Cir. 1995) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983

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8

claim seeking, inter alia, implicit reversal of a state trial

court action).

Plaintiff also contends that he was deprived of his due

process rights when Ms. Null signed the Installment Note on his

behalf. (Compl. ¶ 27.) The Shasta County Superior Court

directed Ms. Null to sign the Installment Note pursuant to the

Arbitration Award. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District affirmed the court’s order. (Id. ¶ 22.) 

Again, for this court to consider the issue, it would necessarily

review a state court’s decision, which is not permitted by

Rooker-Feldman. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (holding a district

court may not review a plaintiff’s constitutional claims when

they are inextricably intertwined with a state court’s decision

denying the plaintiff relief).

Finally, plaintiff contends that he was deprived his due

process rights when Fidelity transferred title to the Pendletons

and the Pendletons took possession of the subject property. (Id.

¶¶ 28-29.) These events were the result of the Shasta County

Superior Court’s Arbitration Award, awarding the property to the

Pendletons. (Id. ¶ 14.) In this action, plaintiff seeks return

of the property. (Id. at 8:1-4.) If the court provided

plaintiff with this remedy, it would directly reverse the Shasta

County Superior Court’s Arbitration Award. Rooker-Feldman

precludes this court from granting such relief, as the court is

without jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final

judgment of a state court. Kougasian, 359 F.3d 1140 (finding

Rooker-Feldman bars a federal court action seeking “relief from

[a] state court judgment”). 

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6 28 U.S.C. § 1964 directs this court to apply California

law on this issue.

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B. Lis Pendens

In their motion, the Pendletons move to expunge the lis

pendens recorded by plaintiff against the property. California

Code of Civil Procedure § 405.32 provides “the court shall order

that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant

has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the

probable validity of the real property claim.”6 “Probable

validity” means that the plaintiff will more likely than not

obtain a judgment against the defendant on the real property

claim. Orange County v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp.

Limited, 52 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, as described above. As such, plaintiff will not obtain

a judgment against the Pendletons by this federal action, and

accordingly, pursuant to § 405.32, the notice of lis pendens on

the subject property is expunged.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants Fidelity and Stefani’s

motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Defendants the Pendletons’ motion

for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and the lis pendens on

the subject property is expunged. The Clerk of the Court is 

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directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 2, 2006.

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