Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02112/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02112-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWIGHT L. VANZANDT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv2112-LAB (DHB)

AMENDED ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

G. SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Defendant.

On May 14, 2014, Magistrate Judge David Bartick issued his report and

recommendation (the “R&R”), which recommended denying Petitioner Dwight Vanzandt’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Objections were due June

6. When no objections were received, the Court by an order signed on June 15 adopted the

R&R as unobjected-to, and mentioned some additional reasoning supporting the R&R. Then

on June 16, Vanzandt’s objections to the R&R were received.

Based on the date the objections were signed, it appears they are timely under the

prisoner mailbox rule, see Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003), and merely

took a long time to arrive. The Court will therefore consider and rule on the objections,

reviewing any properly objected-to portions of the R&R de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Some of Vanzandt’s objections merely register his disagreement with whole pages of the

R&R without identifying any errors. Such generalized or “blanket” objections are not effective

to trigger de novo review. See Saibu v. McEwen, 2014 WL 1877446 at *1 (S.D.Cal., May 9,

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2014) (citing United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 621 (4 Cir. 2007)); Player v. Salas,

th

2007 WL 935100 at *2 (S.D.Cal., Mar. 22, 2007).

The R&R recommended denyingthe petition as time-barred under AEDPA. Vanzandt

does not object to the R&R’s recitation of the procedural history, including dates various

pleadings were filed and various decisions issued, and the Court therefore ADOPTS the

R&R’s findings. Accepting the procedural history as correct, the petition is time-barred by

many months unless Vanzandt is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.

The objections focus on two main reasons for Vanzandt’s late filings: problems

gaining access to the prison library, and loss of his legal work product and materials. They

are, however, non-specific with regard to how long these problems lasted; instead, the

objections assert that because these problems were so serious, the entire limitations period

should be tolled:

No matter when the statute of limitations started petitioner had no access to

his property or his legal work product for large periods of time in 2012 and

in 2013. And had no access to a library in 2012–13 due to circumstances

beyond his control as a prisoner with no say so about anything. No matter

how many days elapsed between filings, petitioner was lucky to be able to

file anything with no access to a law library or legal assistant.

(Obj. to R&R, 5:23–6:3.) Vanzandt expanded on this, claiming he had no access at all to a

law library during 2012 or 2013. (Id., 4:28–5:4 (declaring that he had “wholly absolutely no

access” to any law library or paging system in the facility where he was confined); 5:25–28

(“And he [Vanzandt] had no access to a library in 2012–13 due to circumstances beyond his

control as a prisoner with no say so about anything.”) Although Vanzandt makes these

representations in absolute terms, as discussed below it is clear he did have access to a

library and legal materials.

Vanzandt’s first and most serious problem is that he waited 269 days from the date

his conviction was final (March 14, 2012) until December 8, 2012 to file anything. On

December 8, he filed a pleading in the state superior court, styled “Motion for extension of 1

time to file writ of habeas corpus petition per AEDPA.” (Lodgment 3.) This wasn’t merely a

 The state court accepted this for filing on December 27, 2012. 1

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bare-bones request for more time, citing information from Vanzandt’s personal knowledge

such as lack of access to the library or to legal or writing materials. Rather, it is a fully

researched five-page brief, with three exhibits attached. The exhibits are copies of

administrative appeals filed by a different prisoner, Cedric Walker, and one filed by a group

of inmates (not including Vanzandt) seeking better library access.

Even accepting the allegations in those documents as true and disregarding contrary

evidence or findings, they contradict Vanzandt’s current assertion that he had no library

access. The appeals show the prisoners were complaining about the library not having all

the books they needed, library hours not being posted, some computers being out of service

and long lines to use those that were working, and sporadic denials of access to the library.

The state court found Vanzandt had claimed he had difficulty accessing the library, but

wasn’t seeking relief from that. (Lodgment 4 at 2:1–4.)

Vanzandt’s argument proves too much. First, the documentary evidence shows that

other inmates were trying through administrative channels to gain improved access to the

library and facilities needed to prepare pleadings, and had some success in doing so. This

shows that they were diligent, not that he was. He also says that although he had no access

to the library himself, he was able to get assistance from another inmate who made copies

of legal papers for him. (Obj. to R&R at 3:20.) Moreover, the fact that he was able research

and draft a written brief belies any allegation that he had no access to legal materials and

couldn’t prepare or file pleadings. The fact that he was able to cite sixteen different federal

and state court decisions and two statutes makes it obvious that he could conduct research,

either by himself or with help. However sporadic or limited Vanzandt’s access to a library or

writing materials may have been, it is clear he was able to prepare and file pleadings during

2012, before AEDPA’s limitations period had run—and it is likewise clear that his claims of

absolutely no library access are inaccurate.

After Vanzandt filed the motion to extend time, the state court denied it, holding that

it wasn’t a request for habeas relief at all. (Lodgment 4.) The R&R noted this, and agreed

with it, and the Court agrees as well. As the R&R pointed out, only filings that present a

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challenge to a petitioner’s conviction will toll AEDPA’s limitations period pursuant to

§ 2244(d)(2). (R&R at 4:27–5:14); see also Malcolm v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 957 (9 Cir. th

2002) (holding that a petition for clemency was not an application for post-conviction review

and therefore did not toll AEDPA’s limitations period). He didn’t file anything else until June

10, 2013, when he simultaneously filed petitions in the California Superior Court and

California Supreme Court. Because AEDPA’s limitations period is statutorily tolled only while

a properly-filed petition for habeas review is pending, see § 2244(d)(2), the limitations period

expired on March 14, 2013, long before Vanzandt filed his petitions.

Even assuming the state superior court erred and the December, 2012 motion did

amount to a habeas petition, the R&R correctly points out that after its denial, Vanzandt

waited 108 days before simultaneously filing similar habeas petitions in the California

Supreme Court and the California Superior Court. The petitions did not explain why they

were filed so late, and neither court’s ruling comments on the late filing; the California

Supreme Court denied the petition without comment, and the California Superior Court

denied it on the merits without addressing timeliness at all. The fact that a state court

reached the merits does not mean that the petition was timely. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S.

189, 197–98 (2006). 

As the R&R correctly points out, an unexplained 108-day gap between rounds of state

habeas review is considered unreasonable (R&R at 8:9–18), and a petitioner is not entitled

to “gap tolling” during that period. While Vanzandt’s objections to the R&R attempt to show

he had inadequate library access in 2012, there is no adequate explanation of why he could

not have prepared and filed a petition early in 2013. The objections claim he was transferred 

to a different facility at some time in 2013, and did not immediately receive his “work

product” because of the “massive movement of thousands of prisoners” into and out of the 2

facility due to an outbreak of valley fever. He also claims he received Priority Legal User

/ / /

The claim that Vanzandt had any “work product” at this point contradicts his other 2

representations.

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(P.L.U.) status on April 14, 2014, “30 days prior to March 14, 2013 deadline” although he 3

never says when he requested this or how long prison officials took to approve it. In support

of this representation, he cites to Exhibit C, which is in fact inmate Walker’s appeals papers

from the old facility. 

Nothing at all in Exhibit C relates to Vanzandt or the facility he was transferred to in

2013, and it is significant that he is able to point to records showing that another inmate at

a different facility worked hard to gain library access, but nothing showing he himself did so.

Walker, for example, submitted a request for P.L.U. status (Docket no. 18 at 79), but

absolutely nothing—no documents, and no representations—shows when Vanzandt himself

requested library use at either the old or new facility, or how long prison officials took to grant

it. Knowing that other inmates were having difficulty getting access to the library and

facilities and supplies needed to prepare pleadings might have discouraged Vanzandt from

trying, but it does not excuse failure to work diligently.

Even assuming the motion for extension of time did amount to a habeas petition, the

inadequately-explained 108-day gap disqualifies Vanzandt for “gap tolling” and his federal

petition would not be entitled to statutory tolling sufficient to render his federal petition timely.

The R&R found that Vanzandt was not entitled to equitable tolling, and the Court

agrees. Equitable tolling is available only where a petitioner has been pursuing his rights

diligently, but that extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d

993, 997 (9 Cir. 2007). The petitioner must show the extraordinary circumstances were the th

cause of the untimeliness, and made it impossible to file a petition on time. Id. While a

wholesale denial of access to one’s legal papers or to writing materals or a prison law library

could constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” mere limitations on a prisoner’s access to the

law library and copy machine do not. Id. at 998. Bearing in mind how common such

restrictions are, they are not extraordinary. Id. Furthermore, where a petitioner has managed

This timeline makes hardly any sense. Vanzandt must either be referring to the 3

March 14 AEDPA deadline (in which case this should read “30 days after the March 14,

2013 deadline”) or to some unspecified deadline on May 14, 2013. Regardless, there is no

explanation why Vanzandt did not, or could not have requested library access earlier, nor

any explanation of why he did not file his petitions sooner.

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to research and file other substantial legal pleadings but claims inability to prepare and file

a timely habeas petition, it is incumbent on him to explain why this is so. Id. 

Because Vanzandt has not pointed to adequate evidence of diligence, nor any

evidence that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for him to file a timely habeas

petition, equitable tolling is unavailable. Even if the Court were to accept all the evidence he

points to, it would not show his petition is timely. Vanzandt’s objections to the R&R are

therefore OVERRULED.

Although the R&R did not consider the petition on the merits, the Court would have

denied it anyway. Vanzandt did not go to trial, but pleaded guilty. The trial court’s

determinations that he understood the plea bargain, that he was pleading guilty because he

was in fact guilty, and that he was mentally competent to plead guilty are entitled to

deference, and neither the petition to the California Supreme Court nor the petition to this

Court points to sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption. Although he now claims

his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, he did not exhaust these claims by

presenting them to the California Supreme Court in a fashion that alerted that court to the

presence of a federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The remaining arguments are 4

based on 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must fairly present it to each appropriate state court, 4

including the highest court of the state with powers of discretionary review (here, the

California Supreme Court). See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). The petition must

alert the state court to the federal nature of the claim, such as by citing federal law or

labeling the claim as federal. Id. at 32. Vanzandt’s petition to the California Supreme Court

cited only state cases for the proposition that trial counsel should have done more to confirm

that he was mentally competent. (See generally Lodgment 5.) The only mention of federal

law in the context of adequate representation by counsel was a citation to Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), which he cited for the proposition that because the trial

court determined he was competent, he should have been allowed to represent himself at

trial.

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claimed errors of state law. which cannot serve as the basis for federal habeas relief. See

Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011).

The petition is DENIED, and a certificate of appealability is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 20, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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