Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05191/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05191-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TERI L. MITCHELL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5191

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER,

GENERAL, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE DEFENDANT

O R D E R

Now on this 9th day of April, 2007, comes on for

consideration defendant's Motion To Dismiss, Or In The

Alternative, Motion For Summary Judgment (document #66), and from

said motion, the supporting documentation, and the response

thereto, the Court finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to

discrimination in her employment by the U.S. Postal Service on the

basis of disability, sex, and race. The gravamen of her

allegations is that defendant refused to accommodate her with a

light duty assignment following breast cancer surgery. 

2. Defendant now moves for dismissal or summary judgment on

each of plaintiff’s several claims, as follows:

* as to plaintiff's claims of sex and race discrimination,

he contends that those claims were not properly exhausted, and

that plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case as to them;

* as to plaintiff's claim of disability discrimination, he

contends that plaintiff is not disabled as that term is understood

in Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence;

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* as to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, he

contends that such damages are not recoverable as against the

government; and

* finally, defendant moves for dismissal based on defects

in the process used to bring him before the Court.

3. Although defendant set forth his arguments relating to

process last, the Court will address that issue first, inasmuch as

it relates to the Court's jurisdiction: service of process is

"the means by which a federal court gives notice to the defendant

and asserts jurisdiction over him." Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d, §1353.

Defendant contends that the process in this matter is

insufficient because plaintiff failed to obtain and serve a

summons upon him, as required by F.R.C.P. 4.

Plaintiff responds that this admitted defect in process

should be viewed as harmless error ("I contend that I was acting

in good faith and Mr. Potter's rights have not been substantially

affected") and that "[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding

must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does

not affect the substantial rights of the parties," citing F.R.C.P.

61.

4. Plaintiff's contention that she was acting in good faith

is not, in the Court's view, borne out by the procedural history

of this case as is illustrated by the following brief review of

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the history of this case since its filing:

(a) Problems over the naming of the defendant and service of

process arose early, and have not been fully cured despite

repeated opportunity to do so. 

Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on November 30, 2005,

naming as defendant the "U.S. Postal Service." She obtained a

Summons and attempted service by mailing copies of the Complaint

and Summons to the U.S. Postal Service; the U.S. Attorney General;

the Arkansas Attorney General; and Preston McWhirter, Manager of

Labor Relations for the U.S. Postal Service. 

When no answer was filed, plaintiff obtained a Clerk's

Default on February 22, 2006. 

At that point, on February 28, 2006, John E. Potter,

Postmaster General of the U.S. Postal Service, filed an Answer in

which he asserted, as one of several affirmative defenses, that

process and service of process were insufficient because the

Complaint "was not served with proper summons on John E. Potter,

Postmaster General." 

On March 7, 2006, defendant moved to set aside the default,

reiterating this argument, and pointing out that plaintiff had

been instructed, in the Agency's Notice of Final Action, how to

properly name the defendant.

When plaintiff responded that "in every document filed I have

named John E. Potter as the defendant," defendant filed a copy of

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the Summons, which contains an address along with the name "U.S.

Postal Service" in the space allocated for the style of the case,

but is left blank in the space provided to indicate to the name

and address of the defendant. 

Given the content of the Complaint and the Summons,

plaintiff's claim that she named Potter as the defendant "in every

document filed" was clearly not correct as to these two crucial

documents. 

(b) On June 2, 2006, the Court set aside the Default, noting

that "[i]n a suit against the Postal Service the only proper

defendant is its head, John E. Potter, Postmaster General," and

that "proper service of process is necessary for the Court to

acquire jurisdiction over a defendant." Rather than dismiss,

however, the Court gave plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint and

perfect service. 

(c) An Amended Complaint was filed on June 6, 2006, which

identified Potter as the defendant. 

On June 15, 2006, defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss, which

included the statement that "[t]he United States Attorney's Office

does not know whether Plaintiff has properly served John E.

Potter, Postmaster General, in his official capacity with

complaint and summons as provided by Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 4(i)(2)(A), and reserves this issue until a

reasonable time has occurred for Plaintiff to obtain service." 

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In response, plaintiff contended that she had properly served

the defendant "when I presented copies of documents via certified

return receipt mail to [defendant's attorney]," and that she was

"enclosing another complete copy of the original complaint with

this response to [defendant's attorney] via certified return

receipt mail in order to insure compliance with this Court's

Orders and FRCP 4(i)(1)(A)(B)(C) and 4(i)(2)(A). As stated in my

Motion to Amend Complaint, heretofore I have not been provided

with an address or designated representative to send a copy to Mr.

Potter personally."

(d) On July 28, 2006, defendant filed an Amended Motion To

Dismiss, in which he stated as follows:

3. As set forth in the Motion to Dismiss filed

herein on May 25, 2006, service of complaint and summons

must be served upon the U.S. Attorney for the Western

District of Arkansas, the Attorney General and the

Postmaster General of the U.S. Postal Service.

Defendant is unaware of any attempt to obtain service

upon the Postmaster General with the Amended Complaint

and Summons. The Amended Complaint indicates service by

certified mail upon the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned

to this case, but there is no indication that the

Postmaster General was served with a copy of the

Complaint or the Summons as provided by Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 4(i)(2)(A).

4. The proper procedure to serve the Postmaster

General has been adequately set forth in the Court's

Order and the Motions filed by the Defendant. The

Plaintiff has failed to serve the Postmaster General

within the time period set forth in the Court's order

and this case should be dismissed.

In response, plaintiff made the following arguments:

I contend that by providing both the USPS Little Rock

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District and Southwest Area Offices with complete copies

of the original filing that any reasonable person would

agree that I acted in good faith to obtain proper

service on John E. Potter. By maintaining my proper

chain of command I actually saved the postal service

time and money. Further, I contend that had I sent the

original filing to John E. Potter, somewhere,

Washington, D.C. we would now be arguing over why I

broke that chain of command and did not properly serve

his regional representatives. Further, during the Rule

26 teleconference with [defendant's attorney], he made

it perfectly clear that he is the "designated legal

representative" of John E. Potter and that "all future

correspondence and communication" should be directed to

him.

(e) On September 13, 2006, the Court entered an Order

granting defendant's Amended Motion To Dismiss. The Order

explained why plaintiff's various reasons for failing to perfect

service were inadequate, and quoted from the applicable rule, towit:

[s]ervice on an . . . officer . . . of the United States

sued only in an official capacity, is effected by

serving the United States in the manner prescribed by

Rule 4(i) and by also sending a copy of the summons and

complaint by registered or certified mail to the

officer. . . .

(f) On September 15, 2006, plaintiff filed a Motion To Court

To Reconsider Order To Dismiss. Therein, she made the surprising

assertion that she had not served defendant because she could not

obtain an address for him, and reiterated her previous arguments

that defendant had notice of the suit. She asked that the Court

reconsider its order of dismissal and require defendant's attorney

to furnish her with an address at which to serve him.

The Court was skeptical of plaintiff's assertion that she

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could not obtain an address for the Postmaster General, but took

into consideration that it was not aware of the degree of

expertise plaintiff possessed in the use of the Internet; that the

U.S. Postal Service website did not readily reveal the

Postmaster's address; and that such address was quickly and easily

found in a Google search. The Court, therefore, granted the

Motion To Reconsider on September 22, 2006, furnished plaintiff

with the address of the defendant, and granted still more time for

plaintiff to perfect service.

In this same Order, the Court cautioned plaintiff "that

service of process is, by its very nature, a highly technical

matter, governed by F.R.C.P. 4, and that the Court has no

jurisdiction over a party who is not properly served, Murphy

Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344

(1999)."

(f) Plaintiff then sent a mailing to defendant by certified

mail, at the address supplied by the Court -- but it appears she

did not obtain a new Summons directed to Potter. Instead, it

appears -- from plaintiff's submissions -- that the mailing

included a copy of the original Complaint, a copy of the defective

Summons issued in connection with the original Complaint, and a

copy of the Amended Complaint.

(g) On October 6, 2006, defendant filed an Answer which

contained the following affirmative defense:

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The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant

because Plaintiff has failed to effect proper process is

[sic] this matter. The Original Complaint and Amended

Complaint were not served with proper summons on John E.

Potter, Postmaster General, and therefore, the complaint

should be dismissed. Rule 4(a) provides that a summons

shall name the parties and shall be directed to the

defendant. Plaintiff has failed to properly serve the

Defendant with a summons listing the proper parties and

directed to the Defendant, John E. Potter, Postmaster

General. Plaintiff's Affidavit of Service filed herein

on October 3, 2006, consists of Postal Service Forms

without any statement as to what was served upon the

Defendant. (Docket Entry 39). The Court's docket does

not reflect issuance of a summons subsequent to the

joinder of the Postmaster General as the Defendant.

(h) On February 20, 2007, defendant filed the motion now

under consideration, and plaintiff responded by asserting her good

faith.

(i) From the foregoing summary it can be seen that by

September 22, 2006, plaintiff:

* had been given the citation to the applicable rule of

procedure governing service of process; 

* had been supplied with the address of the defendant; 

* had been given two additional opportunities to perfect

service; and 

* had been cautioned that she must follow the

technicalities of the rule to obtain service and thereby give the

Court jurisdiction over the defendant. 

Nevertheless, although she was put on notice by defendant's

October 6, 2006, Answer that she still had not taken the proper

steps to serve him, plaintiff still has not obtained a proper

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Summons and served it upon the defendant. 

(j) This procedural history does not, in the Court's view,

represent a good faith attempt to comply with the rules governing

service of process. In light of plaintiff’s repeated assertions

of her belief that all she has to do (to properly commence a suit

in federal court) is make sure the defendant has notice of the

suit against him, the Court believes the difficulty is simply an

intractable stubbornness on plaintiff’s part. The steps necessary

to perfect service, although highly technical, are not difficult,

and plaintiff has been given more than adequate assistance and

opportunity to take the necessary steps. Her failure to follow

rules which govern all litigants suggests a latent

contemptuousness and the Court is not disposed to countenance it

further.

Moreover, the plaintiff’s disregard for and/or refusal to

comply with known rules of procedure cannot be excused by her pro

se status. The pleadings of pro se litigants are read liberally

as to their substantive content, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972), but such litigants are not excused from compliance with

procedural rules and Court orders, Ackra Direct Marketing Corp. v.

Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 1996).

5. The Court is likewise not persuaded that the procedural

defect herein complained of is harmless error -- or one which does

not affect substantial rights of the defendant. A summons is not

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an idle piece of paper. It is "[a] writ or process commencing the

plaintiff's action and requiring the defendant to appear and

answer." Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. It is issued on a

prescribed form, signed and sealed by the Clerk of Court, and

commands the defendant to whom it is directed as follows:

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve on

PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (name and address) an answer to the

complaint which is served on you with this summons,

within ---- days after service of this summons on you,

exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so,

judgment by default will be taken against you for the

relief demanded in the complaint. Any answer that you

serve on the parties to this action must be filed with

the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable period of

time after service. 

The contents of a Summons are specified in the very first

sentence of F.R.C.P. 4:

The summons shall be signed by the clerk, bear the seal

of the court, identify the court and the parties, be

directed to the defendant, and state the name and

address of the plaintiff's attorney or, if

unrepresented, of the plaintiff.

The only Summons issued in this case identified the defendant

as the U.S. Postal Service, rather than John E. Potter, Postmaster

General, U.S. Postal Service. It was directed to the U.S. Postal

Service, not to Potter. Thus both the Summons itself, and the

service thereof, were defective, and could not serve to bring

Potter before the Court. 

A similar problem was analyzed in Wasson v. Riverside County,

237 F.R.D. 423 (C.D.Cal. 2006), wherein the court explained:

Although the distinction between the Rule 12(b)(4) and

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12(b)(5) motions is easy to state, the line between them

becomes blurred when the alleged defect is that the

defendant either is misnamed in the summons or has

ceased to exist. In these cases, the form of the

process could be challenged under Rule 12(b)(4) on the

theory that the summons does not properly contain the

names of the parties, or a motion under Rule 12(b)(5)

could be made on the ground that the wrong party - that

is, a party not named in the summons - has been served.

237 F.R.D. at 424, citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil 3d, §1353 (quotation marks omitted). In Wasson,

the court dismissed the claim against a party not named in either

the complaint or the summons.

Although the defect here is one which could be corrected --

and ordinarily the Court would simply allow time to cure -- the

peculiar circumstances of this case counsel against that

disposition. Plaintiff has already been given two opportunities

to properly name and serve the defendant; has been instructed on

the rules that must be followed; and has even been furnished the

defendant's address for service, yet she has not taken the

necessary steps to perfect service. To grant yet another

extension of time, and still more explanation to plaintiff about

how she should go about serving defendant, would, in the Court's

view, cross the line between the judicial and the adversarial

functions. The Court is not permitted to assist either party in

litigating her or his case, but must remain impartial and allow

the adversaries to contend against each other. 

In sum, the Court believes that it has reached the limit of

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tolerance (by way of information, guidance, and additional time)

that it can fairly afford to one party in this lawsuit and that

providing further assistance to plaintiff in obtaining service

upon defendant would amount to the de facto repeal of an important

rule of federal civil procedure and would improperly benefit one

litigant before the Court at the unfair expense of the other.

Moreover, to do so would further delay the trial of a case that

has been filed since November, 1995, and which has been repeatedly

delayed to allow plaintiff time to correct deficiencies in naming

the defendant and serving process. The Court, therefore, declines

to offer plaintiff further assistance or delay.

The defendant has consistently and timely made his objections

to the process from the beginning -- and the Court now concludes

that they should be sustained, and the case dismissed.

6. Because the dismissal is not based on the substantive

merits of plaintiff's claims, it will be without prejudice.

However, because plaintiff may wish to re-file this action and

thereby incur an additional filing fee and related costs, the

Court will make the following observations:

Even if it were proper to allow plaintiff more time in which

to achieve proper service on the defendant, the Court believes it

would be, essentially, a futile act because of other problems

with respect to her claims:

(a) The first of those problems goes to the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies on the claims of

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discrimination on the basis of sex and race. The regulations

implementing Title VII provide as follows on the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies:

 (a) Aggrieved persons who believe they have been

discriminated against on the basis of race, color,

religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap must

consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order

to try to informally resolve the matter.

 (1) An aggrieved person must initiate contact with a

Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter

alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of

personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date

of the action.

29 C.F.R. §1614.105.

There is good reason for this rule: 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to

Title VII's statutory scheme because it provides the

EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory

practices and enables it to perform its roles of

obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting

conciliatory efforts.

Williams v. Little Rock Municipal Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222

(8th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff concedes that she failed to file charges of sex or

race discrimination with the EEOC, although it is clear that she

was aware of the need to file an EEOC charge to assert a

discrimination complaint, because she did file such a charge with

regard to her complaint of disability discrimination. 

In her response to the pending Motion, plaintiff states that

"the issues of discrimination based on the Civil Rights Act, Sex

and Race, did not become apparent to me until some time after the

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EEOC hearing." While this may well the true, the Court notes that

plaintiff failed to file an EEO charge as to those issues when

they did become apparent to her and, thus, they still remain

unexhausted.

The Court would, if addressing the issue, consider whether

plaintiff's sex and race discrimination claims can be said to be

"like or reasonably related to" her disability discrimination

claim, so as to allow her one formal EEOC charge to be deemed to

encompass all three claims herein asserted. For that to happen,

the "information contained in an EEOC charge must be sufficient to

give the employer notice of the subject matter of the charge and

identify generally the basis for a claim, but it need not

specifically articulate the precise claim." Wallace v. DTG

Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1123 (8th Cir. 2006). 

An EEOC charge is 

sufficient to support EEOC action, including a civil

suit, for any discrimination stated in the charge or

developed during a reasonable investigation of the

charge, so long as the additional allegations of

discrimination are included in the reasonable cause

determination and subject to a conciliation proceeding.

E.E.O.C. v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir.

1992). While such charges are to be read liberally, especially

when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, there must be limits to

such liberality. "'Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations

outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumscribe

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the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive

the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an

initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge'." Williams, supra,

21 F.3d at 223 (citation omitted).

The EEO Complaint of Discrimination in the Postal Service in

the captioned case, filed on May 22, 2002, was completed with the

assistance of a Dispute Resolution Specialist. The only box

checked in Section 14, "Type of Discrimination You Are Alleging,"

was the "Disability" box. The narrative explanation of the

situation is as follows:

I was denied temporary light duty after breast

cancer/lymph node removal surgery. The allegations of

discrimination, harassment and favoritism are based on

disability covered by Federal Law, USPS ELM, USPS

management handbooks, APWU and LMOU contracts and past

practice of management allowing light/limited duty to

other employees.

An "Attachment to EEO Complaint" stated that plaintiff had

surgery on April 9, 2002, and was released to return to work with

restrictions on April 20, 2002. It stated that plaintiff

repeatedly asked her Plant Manager for a light duty assignment,

but her requests were refused. A second "Attachment to EEO

Complaint" listed fifteen employees who had been granted light or

limited duty assignments, all but three of whom were female.

Plaintiff does not indicate her race or suggest that it played a

part in the refusal go grant a light duty assignment. Nothing in

the EEO Complaint of Discrimination or the Attachments contained

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a clue that plaintiff had any complaint related to sex or race.

(b) Another problem is highlighted by defendant’s contention

that plaintiff cannot prove her claim of disability

discrimination. He contends that her disabling condition was

temporary, encompassing her recovery and treatment period

following surgery, and as such does not constitute a disability

under controlling law.

Controlling law in this case is the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, 29 U.S.C. §701 et seq., which provides that "[n]o otherwise

qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by

reason of her or his disability, . . . be subjected to

discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by .

. . the United States Postal Service." 29 U.S.C. §794(a). 

The definitions of terms and standards for evaluation in the

Rehabilitation Act are not fleshed out as they are in the

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Instead, the

Rehabilitation Act provides that "[t]he standards used to

determine whether this section has been violated . . . shall be

the standards applied" under the ADA. 29 U.S.C. §794(d). Thus,

a claim under the Rehabilitation Act is analyzed in the same

fashion as a claim under the ADA. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d

761, 766, n.4 (8th Cir. 2004).

Under the ADA, disability is defined as "a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

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activities of [an] individual," and when that major life activity

is work, "substantially limits" requires a showing of inability to

work in a broad class of jobs. A temporary impairment with little

or no long-term impact is not a disability. Samuels v. Kansas

City Missouri School District, 437 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff testified that she had surgery on April 9, 2002,

and that she wanted to return to work on April 20, 2002, with some

medical restrictions. She testified that as of July 29, 2002, she

was under no work restrictions from her doctors. It thus appears

from plaintiff's own testimony, and evidence submitted by her,

that the period when she could not fully perform her regular job

lasted only from April 20 until July 29, 2002 - a little over

three months.

Plaintiff also offered a document entitled Temporary Light

Duty Offer, indicating that she was offered, and accepted, a light

duty job offer on May 23, 2002. Thus, of the brief period of

disability, she actually was not offered an accommodation only

from April 20 until May 23, 2002. On these facts, the Court

doubts that plaintiff could satisfy Samuels by showing that, in

fact, she has a disability.

The foregoing analysis, while not as thorough as it would be

if the Court were making a determination on the substantive

issues, persuades the Court that further extensions of time to

serve process in this matter would be futile, inasmuch as

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plaintiff's substantive case shows little potential for success.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's Motion To Dismiss,

Or In The Alternative, Motion For Summary Judgment (document #66)

is granted, and this matter is dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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