Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02843/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02843-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIRIKI A. HILL,

Petitioner,

v.

CHRISTIAN PHIEFFER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 16cv2843 JLS (KSC)

ORDER: (1) OVERRULING 

PETITIONER’S OBJECTION; (2) 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; (3) 

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (4) 

DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE 

PETITIONER’S PETITION

(ECF Nos. 8, 14.)

Presently before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition,” ECF No. 1), Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition as Untimely Filed 

(“MTD,” ECF No. 8), and Petitioner’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 13). Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R,” ECF No. 14), recommending that the Court grant Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss, and to which Petitioner filed an Objection, (“Obj.,” ECF No. 15).

Defendant did not file a reply to Petitioner’s Objection. 

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Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, as well as the underlying state 

court record, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection, ADOPTS Judge

Crawford’s Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition.

BACKGROUND

Judge Crawford’s Report and Recommendation contains a complete and accurate 

recitation of the relevant portions of the factual and procedural histories underlying 

Defendant’s pending Motion to Dismiss. (See R&R. 1–2.) This Order incorporates by 

reference the background as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection, 

however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

ANALYSIS

In his Opposition, Petitioner’s sole argument in support of tolling the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations (see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)) is that there were “lockdowns in prison preventing him access to the law 

library.” (Opp’n 3.) Petitioner further argues that his Motion for a Continuance—filed in 

his prior federal habeas case—“shed a light” on why tolling is appropriate. (Id.)

The document Petitioner references was a “Motion for a 30 Day Continuance” that 

Petitioner filed 959 days after his first federal petition was dismissed, or 757 days after 

formal judgment was entered in favor of Respondent. In the document, Petitioner requested 

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a 30 day continuance, noted that his state petition was denied by the California Supreme 

Court, and explained only that Petitioner had “been having problems obtaining documents 

that he need[s] to argue his case.”1

In his Objection to Judge Crawford’s R&R, Petitioner argues he “did the best he 

could in exhausting his federal claims . . . [and] [i]t has nothing to do with [sic] law library 

and its [sic] access to, but everything to do with his [sic] how much he knows about the 

legal process.” (Obj. 3.)

Petitioner has said nothing about the year-long stint between the denial of his final 

state petition and filing of his request for a thirty-day continuance. (See Opp’n 2; Obj. 2.) 

And even if Petitioner’s mere assertions that (1) he had “been having problems obtaining 

documents that he need[s] to argue his case[,]”2—which Petitioner subsequently explained 

was a reference to “prison lockdowns[,]” (see Opp’n 2–3)— and; (2) he does not 

understand “the legal process[,]” were sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations 

during this entire year,3the instant Petition would still be untimely.

Specifically, Petitioner’s first state petition was denied on March 3, 2013, and 

Petitioner took no further action until September 25, 2013, when he filed his first petition 

in federal court. This period comprises 204 days during which the AEDPA statute of 

limitations was running. Next, even assuming that Petitioner’s first federal petition tolled 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations from September 25, 2013 until the final judgment in favor 

of Respondents (rather than the petition’s initial dismissal)—issued on September 18, 

2014—then the statute continued to run from that point forward until Petitioner filed his 

 

1

See Hill v. Beard, 13cv2333-CAB (JMA), ECF No. 7. Because the Court rejected this document due to 

the case having already been dismissed, the document is not a part of the formal record for the case.

2

See Hill v. Beard, 13cv2333-CAB (JMA), ECF No. 7-1, at 1.

3 They are not. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have little difficulty 

determining that [the petitioner] is not entitled to equitable tolling . . . simply because he remained in 

administrative segregation and had limited access to ‘the law library [and] copy machine.’ ” (third

alteration in original)); Clark v. McEwen, No. 10-cv-2149, 2012 WL 1205509, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 

2012) (holding “a lack of understanding of the law does not constitute the extraordinary circumstances 

required for equitable tolling.”)

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next state-court petition4 on July 15, 2015, in the California Supreme Court. The period 

comprises 300 days during which the AEDPA statute of limitations was running. This 

totals 504 days—well beyond AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Thus, even if the 

Court granted Petitioner a year’s worth of equitable tolling from the denial of his final state 

petition to the date of his request for a thirty-day continuance, the instant Petition would 

still be untimely.

CONCLUSION

Given the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection, ADOPTS 

Judge Crawford’s Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition. Furthermore, 

because Petitioner’s Petition would be untimely even if the Court granted Petitioner the 

most generous amount of tolling possible under Petitioner’s allegations, Petitioner has 

failed to show “that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of 

his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 

(2003); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES a certificate of appealability. 

Because this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2017

 

4 Petitioner filed another state-court petition during the pendency of his first federal petition. Specifically, 

he filed his second state-court petition on June 18, 2014 in California Superior Court, which the Superior 

Court denied on August 18, 2014.

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