Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00939/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00939-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY E. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN POTTER, Postmaster General of the United

States, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-0939 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint came on regularly for hearing on June 17, 2005.

After carefully considering the papers and pleadings on file and the arguments of the parties, the motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, for the reasons set out below.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out ofplaintiff’s employment with the United States PostalService (“USPS”). He has

worked for the USPS since October 18, 1978, and for the past eleven years has been in information

technology in the San Mateo Integrated Business Support Service Center. Plaintiff alleges that the USPS

discriminated against him on the basis of his disabilities, including sleep apnea, as well as “his age (over 40),

race (white, i.e., reverse discrimination), religious, ethnic and national origin background (Jewish), sexual

orientation (gay), [and] gender (male),” in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities

Act(“ADA”), Title VII ofthe CivilRights Act, and the Age Discriminationin EmploymentAct(“ADEA”). See

Compl. ¶ 19. He brings suit against the USPS and John Potter, the Postmaster General of the United States.

Specifically, the alleged acts of discrimination include passing plaintiff over for promotion, refusing to allow

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1 Plaintiff filed a grievance based on the USPS’s failure to promote him to the position of computer

systems analyst/programmer level 20, which was denied after arbitration. Arbuckle Decl., Ex. C. 

2

plaintiffto modify his work schedule to accommodate his sleep apnea, harassing plaintiff, “spying” on plaintiff

by assigning monitors to oversee his work, and prying into his medical records. See id. at 3:1-13. Plaintiff

seeks damages, back pay, lost benefits, and an injunctioncompelling defendant to promote him to the position

of “Computer Systems Analyst Programmer, Level 20,” for which he has applied. 1 He also seeks an

accommodation of his disabilities, in the form of a modified work schedule. See id. at 9; ¶ 9. 

Although plaintiff’s complaint states that he “has exhausted all of his available administrative remedies

under federal statute,” he also allegesthat “it would be futile to pursue any internal administrative actions within

the defendants Potter and USPS because of defendants’ hostility toward him, their unconscionable delays in

considering or arbitrating his grievances, and other factors,” and that he is therefore “exempt from having to

internally appeal each and every act taken against him by defendants.” Compl. ¶¶ 7, 13, 18, 22.

On May 2, 2005, defendant John Potter filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit; (2) the government cannot be sued under the ADA; and (3)

discrimination based on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title VII and the ADA. That motion is now

before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge a federalcourt's jurisdictionover

the subjectmatter ofthe complaint. As the party invoking the jurisdictionof the federal court, the plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subjectmatter jurisdictionto grant the reliefrequested.

See Kokkonen v. GuardianLife Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 376-78, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994)

(citation omitted). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack

ofsubjectmatter jurisdictionmay either “attack the allegations ofthe complaint or may be made as a 'speaking

motion' attacking the existence ofsubjectmatter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. General Tel. And

Elec., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Land v. Dollars, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n. 4. (1947)). Where

the jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of the case, the court need only consider evidence related

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to the jurisdiction issue, and rule on that issue, resolving factual disputes as necessary. Id. (citing Berardinelli

v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 587 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1978)) 

DISCUSSION

1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, and ADEA claims must be dismissed

because exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before a claim may be filed under any of these

statutes, and plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies. 

Before a federalemployee mayfile a complaint under Title VII or the RehabilitationAct, he orshe must

participate in the EEO process, which includes submitting an informal complaint to an EEO counselor and

subsequently filing a formal EEO complaint with the agency employer. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105(a)(1),

1614.106(b); see also Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2001). Once the agency

issues a final decision on the formal complaint, the employee may appeal this decision either to the EEOC or

to a district court. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. The Ninth Circuit has held that Title VII’s exhaustion requirements

are not jurisdictional and may be subject to the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, but that

“substantial compliance with the presentment of discrimination complaints to an appropriate administrative

agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708. Thus, “where a plaintiff has never

presented a discrimination complaint to the appropriate administrative authority,” a district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. at 709 (emphasis added). In addition, Title VII’s exhaustion requirements are

applicable to claims made under the RehabilitationAct. See Boyd v. U.S. PostalService, 752 F.2d 410, 413-

14 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the ADEA, a federal employee must either pursue the administrative process or file

with the EEOC a written notice ofhis intent to file a civil action at least 30 days before filing the action in district

court. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.201(a). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff never complied with any of these exhaustion requirements despite his

actual knowledge of the required procedures. It is undisputed that plaintiff received notice about the proper

procedures in the course of his employment with the USPS through EEO posters in his workplace. Stange

Decl. ¶ 2; Arbuckle Decl., Ex. B at 146:15-21. Plaintiff made verbal complaints via telephone to the USPS

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2

 Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion pertains to the Title VII, Rehabilitation Act, and ADEA claims,

but not to his ADA claim. Defendant seeks dismissal of the ADA claim on separate grounds.

3

 Plaintiff’s counsel also argues that defendant’s motion is a “thinly disguised motion for summary

judgment,” see Pl.’s Opp’n at 12:12-13, because defendant has submitted declarations and otherwise

provided evidentiary support for its arguments. While a 12(b)(6) motion is based solely upon the pleadings

in a matter, a court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion consider evidence related to the jurisdictional issue, and

the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ’g, supra, 594 F.2d at 733. In

addition, because defendant’s motion is not a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff’s request for discovery

pursuant to Rule 56(f) is DENIED.

4

EEO counselors in Washington, D.C. on August 22, 2003, October 6, 2003, November 13, 2003, and

November 28, 2003, and after each telephone contact, USPS mailed him an EEO package containing

informationabout the EEO process and ADEA procedures and a form to request EEO counseling. DeSorbo

Decl. ¶ 2; Arbuckle Decl., Ex. B at 191:1-192:23. Plaintiff never returned any ofthe pre-complaint counseling

forms provided in the EEO packages or filed a complaint with the EEOC or a notice ofintent to sue the USPS.

DeSorbo Decl. ¶ 2; Arbuckle Decl., Ex. B at 53:1-4, 69:21-70:6. Beyond his verbal complaints, plaintiff’s

sole attempt to initiate his administrative process was a letter from his counsel to the USPS, dated January 3,

2004, entitled “FormalEEO Complaint” and stating “This is a formalEEO Complaint ofDiscrimination, which

I am sending to you prior to filing a federal lawsuit in federal court.” Arbuckle Decl., Ex. B at 186:7-10; Ex.

E. 

Plaintiff apparently mistakes defendant’s motion to dismiss forlack ofsubjectmatter jurisdictionunder

Rule 12(b)(1)for a motion to dismissforfailure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).2 A lack ofsubjectmatter

jurisdiction, if found, is fatal and cannot be cured by amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever

it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the

court shall dismiss the action.”).3

The issue here is whether plaintiff’s actions are sufficient to constitute “substantialcompliance”with the

exhaustion requirements of Title VII, the RehabilitationAct, or the ADEA. The Court finds that they are not.

Plaintiff’s verbal complaints, without follow-up in the form of any informal requests for counseling or formal

EEO complaints, and the January 3, 2004 letter fromhis counseldid not engage the administrative process so

that the EEOC orthe USPS could investigate and address his allegations of discrimination. See Sommatino,

255 F.3d at 710. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not participate in EEO counseling, did notfile a formal EEO

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complaint, and did not notify the USPS of his intent to sue under the ADEA or otherwise comply with the

ADEA administrative process. Moreover, even if the Court considered the January 3, 2004 letter a proper

EEO complaint or intent-to-sue notice, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not receive a final agency decision

before filing suit. 

Plaintiff’s argument that administrative exhaustion would be “futile” and that he is “exempt” from

undertaking administrative appeals is unavailing. In support of this argument, plaintiff alleges that USPS

employees engaged in “delay tactics” and that a unionrepresentative told him to defer any EEO complaint until

the end of arbitration of his union grievance. In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff must offer more than “purely

speculative” “allegations of bias” to establish futility; there must be “objective and undisputed evidence of

administrative bias.” Anderson v. Babbitt, 230 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, plaintiff has presented

no such evidence of bias, but rather admits that he simply had “an overall impression, feeling” that the EEO

counselors he contacted were not there to help him. Arbuckle Decl., Ex. B at 25:8-22. In addition, plaintiff’s

allegation that a union representative advised plaintiff against filing an EEO complaint until later in the

proceedings does not help him, because plaintiff did not ever file, or attempt to file, an administrative complaint.

Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 710 (finding that equitable estoppel did not apply where an EEO counselor

discouraged plaintiff from filing a complaint, because no administrative complaint was ever filed). On this

record, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff is exempt from the exhaustion requirements on grounds of

futility.

For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the first, third, and fourth causes of action is

GRANTED. These claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling if and when plaintiff exhausts his

administrative remedies.

2. ADA claim

Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s ADA claim, in the second cause of action, must be dismissed

because the federal government may not be sued under this statute. Plaintiff does not address this argument

in his Opposition, and the statute appears to forbid any suit against the USPS. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i)

provides that an “employer” under the ADA “does not include . . . the United States, a corporation wholly

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owned by the government of the United States, or an Indian tribe.” The Ninth Circuit has held that this

language specifically exempts the federal government from suit under the ADA. See Zimmerman v. Oregon

Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, plaintiff’s second cause of action is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Sexual orientation discrimination

As part of plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims, he alleges that he was discriminated against on the

basis of his sexual orientation. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 23. Defendant argues that this form of discrimination is not

protected under these statutes and cannotformthe basis ofplaintiff’s claims. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,

Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001)(Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 633a; 42 U.S.C. § 6101. Because the

Court finds that these claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, it need not

decide this separate ground.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion

to dismiss. [Docket # 25] The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 17, 2005 S/SUSAN ILLSTON 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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