Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01993/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01993-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

TARA ADAMS,

Plaintiff;

vs.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF

THE CITY OF BESSEMER,

ALABAMA,

Defendant.

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2:13-cv-01993-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Bessemer,

Alabama’s(“BHA”)Motion for Summary Judgment.(Doc. 25.)PlaintiffTara Adams

(“Adams”) brought this civil rights action against BHA, alleging gender

discrimination and retaliatory conduct in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Despite being specifically reminded

by the Court to provide a response and being granted sua sponte an extension of time

in which to file a response, Adams, acting pro se, has failed to file any response to

BHA’s motion. Therefore, the Court’s consideration of the motion is based solely on

BHA’s motion and the Court’s own review of the attached evidentiary material and

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FILED

 2015 Jan-21 PM 03:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-01993-LSC Document 35 Filed 01/21/15 Page 1 of 14
examination of the relevant law. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is due

to be granted.

I. Background

1

A. Employment History

Adams, a female, was hired by BHA as an assistant property manager for

Brasswell Homes on October 24, 2006. In February of 2012, Adams was promoted to

interim property manager at Southside Homes, after being recommended for that

position by BHA’s Director of Property Management, Julius Howard (“Howard”).

Adams’ offer letter stated that her promotion would be for a three month interim

period, and would then be reevaluated. 

Adams wasthen transferred to Sunset Homes,where she also held the position

of property manager, and remained at that location from April 2012 to January 2013.

Adams swapped positions with Jeffrey Wheeler (“Wheeler”), BHA’s only male

property manager, who wastransferred from Sunset to replace her at Southside. On

June 12, 2012, Duffey sent Adams a letter extending her interim period for another 60

days. In January of 2013, Adams was transferred back to Southside Homes, and

Adams has not disputed BHA’s statement of undisputed facts. When a party fails to 1

properly address another party’s statement of facts, the Court may treat these facts as undisputed.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The Court thus generally accepts BHA’s statement of material facts.

However, in recognition of Adam’s pro se status, the Court has also looked to Adam’s deposition

testimony and other evidentiary material to supplement the facts supplied by the BHA.

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Wheeler was transferred to another property. 

On June 10, 2013, Adams filed a complaint against BHA with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Adams was then terminated on

June 13, 2013 for insubordination and lack of cooperation. Adams returned to the

EEOC to sign her complaint on June 17, 2013. Adams’ EEOC claim was filed within

180 days of the last allegedly discriminatory act, and her suit wasfiled on October 30,

2013, within 90 days of receipt of her right-to-sue letter.

B. Alleged Discrimination and Insubordination

Adams’ first supervisor at the BHA was Toni Williams (“Williams”), another

woman. Adams believed that Williamsroutinely violated company policy, and verbally

reported Williams for these violations a number of times. In July of 2009, Williams

placed a verbal warning for insubordination in Adams’ personnel file; Adams denies

ever being told about the warning and deniesthe insubordination. Adamsreceived no

further punishment or reprimand at that time. 

In October of 2009, Mary Fortson (“Fortson”), Williams’ supervisor, sent

Adams an “Employee Notification of Intent to Separate” memo, which stated that

Adams had expressed dissatisfaction with the BHA and was conducting a search for

outside employment using BHA computers. Adams testified that she had actually

expressed dissatisfaction only with Williams’ improper conduct. Adams admits that

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she used BHA computers to investigate a position in Birmingham with the

Department of Housing and Urban Development, but saysthat other BHAemployees

did the same thing. The memo stated that the matter would be “assessed during the

next 30 days,” and Adams recalls speaking to Fortson about the problem being

“squashed” and them “moving on.” (Doc. 25-1 at 19.)

Shortly after her promotion to interim property manager in February of 2012,

Adams sent an email to several people within BHA, including Howard and Sharon

Duffey (“Duffey”) from Human Resources. In that email, Adams complained that

“Malcolm,” an outside landscaping vendor, had mentioned to her that her promotion

was on a three-month trial basis. Adams wrote that she was “disappointed in the lack

of professionalism” in disclosing the terms of her promotion, and asked that “the

same professionalism and respect given to other employees be given to me.” (Doc. 25-

2 at 28.)

After receiving the June 12, 2012 email from Duffey extending her interim

positing for 60 days, Adams sent Howard an email asking for more details of the

interim nature of her position. She also asked ifshewas being “singled out” or treated

with the same procedure as other BHA employees who had been promoted. Adams

wrote that shewas having a “hard time understanding what looksto me like I am being

picked on or discriminated against for some reason.” (Doc. 25-4 at 2.) Adams also

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copied a real estate broker in Birmingham with the email, because Adamstrusted the

broker and wanted an outside witness to her complaint. A meeting was held between

Adams,Howard, and Duffey following the email,where Adamsreiterated that she felt

shewas being discriminated against for some reason. Following the meeting, Howard

issued Adams a written warning for violating company policy by copying a non-BHA

employee on her email. 

Adams has expressed her belief that her transfer to Sunset in itself was

discriminatory, because the property had previously flooded and had numerous

mildew and mold problems. The previous manager, Wheeler, also managed Sunset

under those conditions.

Adams also believes that she was experiencing discrimination during her time

as property manager at the BHA because she was not provided with the same training

as other managers. Adams was provided with no formal training to be a property

manager. She was not sent to a class to enable her to receive a public housing

designation that all other BHA manager’s possessed, and was not given the

opportunity to shadow another property manager, assome other employees had been

given after their promotions. She also states that she was not given proper support

when she asked Howard for advice on how to deal with certain issues. Adams also

believes that the rules that applied to Wheeler, BHA’s sole male property manager,

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were different than the onesthat applied to her, as evidenced by the fact that Wheeler

did not do his job but was not fired.

Adams verbally complained about discrimination several timesto Lynn Gilbert

(“Gilbert”),BHA’smaintenance supervisor. Gilbert“agreedthat [Adams]was being

handled differently,” although he “might not have” specifically agreed that Adams

was being discriminated against. (Doc. 25-2 at 2.) Adamsspecifically told Gilbert that

she believed shewas being discriminated against because shewas a woman. (Doc. 25-2

at 2.) On at least two occasions, Gilbert told Adams that she should take her

complaints to the EEOC. 

At some point in 2013, Adams had a meeting with Howard where she told him

that she felt hewas discriminating against her. Howard asked ifshe had a problem with

him, and Adams replied by asking if he had a problem with her. The two then “just

kind of [sat]there in the office staring at each other.” (Doc. 25-2 at 6.) Finally, on June

7, 2013, Plaintiff had a meeting with Howard and Duffey. Adams again stated that she

felt she was being discriminated against, and Howard then asked her if she was

accusing him of discrimination,to which Adamsresponded “I will.” (Doc. 25-2 at 6.)

Adamsdid not informHoward or Duffey that she believed shewas being discriminated

against because she was a woman at that meeting or at any other time; she only ever

said shewas being discriminated against “forsome reason.” On that same day,Adams

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told Gilbert that she intended to file a complaint with the EEOC. Following the

meeting, Howard recommended to Alphonso Patrick (“Patrick”), executive director

of BHA, that Adams be terminated.

On June 12, 2013, Howard issued a written reprimand against Adams for

rudeness during the June 7 meeting, also admitting that Adams had accused Howard

of being rude during the meeting and acknowledging that Adamshad expressed a belief

that she was being discriminated against for some reason during that meeting. Adams

was terminated on June 13, 2013. Both Howard, who recommended that Adams be

fired, and Patrick,who made the ultimate decision to fire Adams, have stated that they

were unaware ofAdams’ EEOC complaint when they fired her, and that shewasfired

solely for insubordination and lack of cooperation. (Doc. 25-5 at 4; 25-6 at 3.)

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant showsthat there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). There is a “genuine dispute” asto a material fact “if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The trial judge

should not weigh the evidence but must simply determine whether there are any

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genuine issues that should be resolved at trial. Id. at 249.

Inconsidering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give deference

to the non-moving party by “considering all of the evidence and the inferences it may

yield in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender

Services, LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ellis v. England, 432 F. 3d

1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the moving

party hasthe burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving

party’s case.” Id. Although the trial courts must use caution when granting motions

for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment is properly regardednot as a disfavored

procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).

III. Analysis

A. Gender Discrimination

Adams arguesin her complaint that she was discriminated against on the basis

of her gender because she was treated differently than similarly situated male

employees.

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual

with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

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because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). “A plaintiff may establish a claim of illegal disparate treatment

through either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace,

Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “direct

evidence is composed of only the most blatant remarks,whose intent could be nothing

other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor.” Schoenfeld v.

Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). There is no

such direct evidence of discrimination in this case, and therefore Adams must prove

her case, if at all, using circumstantial evidence.

When a plaintiff “attempts to prove intentional discrimination in violation of

Title VII using circumstantial evidence, we apply the now familiar shifting burden

framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.Green, 411

U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep’tof Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).” Id. at 1267. The

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff can

satisfy this burden, aninference of discrimination arises. Id. The burden is thenshifted

to the employer to refute this inference by articulating a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Id. If the employer articulates a legitimate

reason, “then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason

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is really pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. The offered reason is not a pretext

for discrimination unless the plaintiff can show “both that the reason was false, and

that the discrimination was the real reason.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.

Grp., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson

Cty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis in original).

To make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she is a member of

a protected class; (2)she was qualified for her job; (3)she wassubjected to an adverse

employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside

her class more favorably.” Curtis v. Broward Cty., 282 F. App’x 882, 883 (citing

Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. Of Univs of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289

(11th Cir. 2003)). An adverse employment action may be an ultimate employment

decision such as termination. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).

To qualify as an adverse employment action, anything less than an ultimate

employment decision must “in some substantial way, alter the employee’s

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive him or her of

employment opportunities, or adversely affect his or her status as an employee.” Id.

(citations omitted). To meet the “similarly situated” requirement, a plaintiff must

show that “[she] is similarly situated in all relevant respects to the non-minority

employee.” Silvera v.Orange Cty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).When

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there are accusations of discriminatory discipline, the “quantity and quality of the

comparator’s misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from secondguessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing appleswith oranges.” BurkeFowler v. Orange Cty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Maniccia v.

Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999)).

2

It appears from Adams’ gender discrimination complaint that she is alleging

discrimination because other male employees were treated differently when it comes

to discipline. There is evidence that several male maintenance staff members were

written up for acts of insubordination and lack of cooperation, but received only

suspensions, reprimands, or even no discipline, while Adams was terminated.

BHA does not argue that Adams has not satisfied the first two elements of her

prima facie case. Adams alleges some misconduct in the issuance of verbal discipline

by Toni Williams in 2009, but this does not appear to rise to the level of an “adverse

employment action” under the Crawford standard because it does not appear to have 

had a substantial effect on her employment. However,Adams eventual termination for

insubordination was clearly an adverse employment action and therefore the question

The “nearly identical” misconduct requirement has been called into question by Alexander

2 

v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2000), however this Court is “bound to follow

Maniccia’s ‘nearly identical’standard rather than thestandard articulated in Alexanderbecausewhen

a later panel decision contradicts an earlier one, the earlier panel decision controls.” Burke-Fowler,

447 F.3d at 1323 n.2. 

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is whether she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated male employee.

There is not sufficient evidence in the record that the male employeeswho were

written up for insubordination and lack of cooperation were similarly situated to

Adamsunder the Maniccia standard. The only evidence provided wasthat several male

employeesreceived write upsfor insubordination and were not terminated; there is no

evidence concerning what conductwasinvolved in these instances of insubordination.

Therefore the Court does not have enough evidence to determine whether the

“quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct” is nearly identical to Adams’.

Because Adamshasnot shownthat these comparators are “similarly situated,” shehas

not met her burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination, and therefore her

gender discrimination claim is due to be dismissed.

B. Retaliation

Adams also claimsthat she wasfired in retaliation for making complaints about

discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “because [she] has opposed

any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because

[she] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation,proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42U.S.C. § 2000e-3. To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that

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“(1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2)she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970 (citing

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001)). To establish a

causal connection, “a plaintiff need only show that the protected activity and the

adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Brungart v. BellSouthTelecomms., Inc., 231

F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346,

1354 (11th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted). To show that they were not

“entirely unrelated, the plaintiff must generally show that the decision maker was

aware of the protected conduct at the time of the adverse employment action.” Id.

(citing Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993)). 

BHA correctly points out that there is no evidence of a causal connection

betweenAdams’ complaints of discrimination and her termination. While Adams did

complain to Howard and Duffey that she felt she was being “discriminated” against, 

Adams did not tell Howard and Duffey that she believed she was being discriminated

against because she was a woman or a member of any protected class. Adams stated

that she did tell Gilbert that she was being discriminated against because she was a

female, but there is no evidence that Gilbert ever communicated that information to

either Howard or Patrick,the two people involved in the decision to fire Adams. While

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Adams did go to the EEOC to make a complaint against BHA shortly before her

termination, there is no evidence that Howard or Patrick were aware of this when they

made the decision to fire her. Howard and Patrick have submitted affidavits stating

that they were both unaware of any complaints made by Adamsto either BHA or the

EEOC concerning gender discrimination. Therefore, Adams has also failed to make

out a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, and this claim is due to be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, BHA’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 25) is

due to be GRANTED, because Adams has failed to make out a prima facie case of

either gender discrimination or retaliation in violation of Title VII.

A separate order will be entered.

Done this 21 day of January 2015. st

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

177825

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