Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01981/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01981-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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P O B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GILBERT NIETO, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GEORGE SULLIVAN, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 87-1981 

FILED 

United States Court ot Appeals rrenth Circuit 

JUN 2 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-85-0128C) 

Peter Schoenburg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant 

William McEuen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico 

(Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Santa Fe,· New Mexico, was also on 

the brief) for Respondent-Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Petitioner-appellant Gilbert Nieto appeals from the district 

court's order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

and adopting the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate. 

Petitioner was convicted in a New Mexico state district court, 

. following a jury trial, of the assualt, battery 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 1 
and armed robbery of Francis Rodriguez. We affirm. 

I. 

THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On the night of January 13, 1983, Francisco Rodriguez and his 

cousin, Mauricio Carreon, were playing video games at a local 7-

Eleven store in Albuquerque. As the two left the store, they were 

abducted by three men and forced into Rodriguez' truck. Rodriguez 

was directed to drive to an area near the Rio Grande River, while 

two of the attackers pointed weapons at him. 

Upon their arrival at the river bank, the three men took 

Rodriguez' money, class ring, Levi jacket and watch. Rodriguez 

and Carreon were ordered to lie down in the dirt while the three 

attempted to start the truck and leave. During this time, 

Rodriguez and Carreon jumped up and fled. Both Rodriguez and 

Carreon notified the police of the incident that evening and gave 

Albuquerque Police Officer, Jean Kurdoch, descriptions of the 

three assailants. Rodriguez told Officer Kurdoch that one of the 

attackers was a Hispanic male approximately 30 years old, with a 

playboy bunny tattooed on his neck and tattoos of women on his 

right forearm. 

Officer Kurdoch, relying on Rodriguez's description of the 

attacker with a playboy bunny on his neck, compiled a photo array 

from the identification bureau of the Albuquerque Police 

Department. This array included a picture of Nieto, as well as 

one other Hispanic male with a playboy bunny tattoo on his neck. 

When Rodriguez was presented with the photo array approximately 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 2 
two months after the incident, he identified Nieto as the oldest 

of the three attackers. 

At trial, the state's case consisted of only the testimony of 

Officer Kurdoch and Rodriguez. Neither the State nor the defense 

called Carreon as a witness. Nieto himself was the only defense 

witness. He testified that he did not know where he was on the 

day or night of January 13, 1983. He further testified that he 

was arrested on February 22, on a state charge of breaking and 

entering. 1 Nieto also showed his tattoos located on his neck and 

right forearm to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty 

on all counts. 

In Nieto's direct appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, 

the following issues were raised: (1) whether the prosecutor's 

references to matters not introduced in evidence and to Nieto's 

mug shot denied Nieto his right to due process and a fair trial; 

(2) whether the closure of the courtroom during Rodriguez's 

testimony denied Nieto's right to a public trial. The Court of 

Appeals affirmed and the New Mexico Supreme 

certiorari. 

II. 

ANALYSIS 

Court denied 

Nieto asserts in his petition for habeas relief that he was 

denied a fair trial as a result of the State's references to his 

mugshot and incarceration, to a non-testifying witness, and to a 

psychological phenomenon called ''object focus." He also contends 

that his right to a public trial was violated when the trial court 

1 

Nieto was later convicted of this charge and was incarcerated 

at the time of trial. 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 3 
closed the courtroom during the testimony of Rodriguez. The State 

responds that two of these issues have been procedurally waived, 

thus barring federal court consideration of these issues. 

Furthermore, the State argues even if the issues presented by 

Nieto are not barred, they are meritless. 

A. 

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND WAIVER 

The State relies on Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), and 

argues that Nieto has procedurally defaulted and waived any claims 

of error as to references made by the prosecutor during the trial 

to Nieto's mug shots and incarceration. The State asserts that 

Nieto procedurally defaulted and waived any right to claim error 

as to the prosecutor's references to the phenomenon called "object 

focus." We agree that the claim relating to references to Nieto's 

prior incarceration was waived; we hold, however, that the claims 

relating to references to mug shots and "object focus'' were 

preserved by Nieto. 

The Engle case is inapposite. There the issue was whether 

the petitioners could proceed with their federal habeas proceeding 

when they failed to raise and preserve their constitutional issue 

in the state courts by compliance with a state procedural rule for 

contemporaneous objections to jury instructions. Id. at 124-125. 

Here the State relies on Engle to argue that Nieto failed to 

preserve the issues for federal habeas review by failing to assert 

contemporaneous objections during his trial. The New Mexico Court 

of Appeals, however, clearly addressed the merits of the 

constitutional issues concerning the references to Nieto's mug 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 4 
shot and "object focus." 2 I R. doc. 11, exh. "A", pp. 9-11. 

Thus, unlike the petitioners in Engle, Nieto is not barred from 

obtaining federal habeas review of the issues concerning the mug 

shot testimony and the prosecution's statements concerning "object 

focus" phenomenon. 

On the other hand, the New Mexico Court of Appeals clearly 

stated that any error regarding the prosecutor's reference to 

Nieto's incarceration was not preserved for review. IR. doc. 11, 

exh. "A'', p. 10. Nieto has not offered any explanation for his 

counsel's failure to object to the State's reference to his 

incarceration. In fact, Nieto testified that he was incarcerated 

at the time of his trial and his counsel mentioned this fact 

during closing argument. Nieto has failed to show cause for the 

default and any actual prejudice from the alleged error. 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); See also United States v. 

Hay, 527 F.2d 990, 997 (10th Cir.)("[a]ny error in admitting 

evidence is cured by the defendant's admission concerning the same 

facts"). Therefore, this issue is not subject to review through 

federal habeas proceedings. Harris v. Reed, 109 s.ct. at 1042-44. 

B. MUG SHOT TESTIMONY 

Nieto argues that Officer Kurdoch's references to his mug 

shot during her testimony on direct examination is "prejudicial on 

its face." Appellant's Brief at p. 10. Officer Kurdoch testified 

2 

Although the New Mexico Court of Appeals' opinion is ambigous 

as to whether the issues complained of by Nieto were addressed on 

their merits or as procedually barred, we are not restrained from 

deciding the merits of those issues here because the state appeals 

court interchangeably discussed both methods of disposing the 

issues. Harris v. Reed, 109 s.ct. 1038, 1042-44 (1989) . 

. 5 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 5 
that mug shots are made of people who are arrested. Therefore, 

prejudice to Nieto arose from the jury's consequent awareness of 

his prior arrest and possible past convictions. 

However, in light of Nieto's own testimony that he had been 

previously arrested and was presently incarcerated, and his 

counsel's references to his prior arrest and mug shot during 

closing argument, we cannot agree that Neito was denied a fair 

trial or prejudiced by the officer's mug shot testimony. See 

Tapia v. Rodriguez, 446 F.2d 410, 413-16 (10th Cir. 

197l)(defendant's counsel's failure to object to testimony and 

references to a "mug book" did not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel nor constitute fundamental error). Fish v. 

Cardwell, 523 F.2d 976, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 

U.S. 1062 (1976)(reference to defendant's mug shot is not 

prejudicial error where defendant's own counsel elicited the 

statements). 

C. "OBJECT FOCUS" REFERENCE 

Next, Nieto asserts the prosecutor's statements during 

closing about a psychological phenomenon called "object focus" 

deprived him of due process. Specifically, Nieto argues the 

State's reference to "object focus" was not supported by any 

evidence and was used to improperly distract from Rodriguez' 

incorrect or incomplete discriptions of tattoos worn by his 

attacker. The State responds that Nieto's failure to object at 

trial constituted procedural default. 3 In addition, the State 

3 

We have already determined that this argument is without 

merit. See Section II, A, supra. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 6 
argues that Nieto's counsel disavowed any belief that an error was 

committed by his statements during closing that he had no 

objection to the ''object ~ocus" references and sought to use the 

phenomenon to Nieto's advantage. 

It is generally accepted that counsel during closing must 

confine their argument to admitted facts in evidence. However, to 

infer that the State's reference to "object focus" was improper 

does not necessarily establish that the reference itself deprived 

Nieto of due process. For an improper remark to cause reversal, 

it must also be prejudical; infringement of due process by such 

conduct must involve unfairness in the trial. 

Because Nieto's counsel disavowed any objection to the 

"object focus'' phenomenon during his closing, and in fact used the 

phenomenon to Nieto's own advantage, it would be difficult for us 

to find that the State's reference was prejudicial. Cf. Mason v. 

United States, 719 F.2d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir. 1985)(failure of 

defendant's counsel to object during closing tends to indicate 

there was not a serious objection to the argument). Just as a 

defendant cannot complain of any error he invites upon himself, 

United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1535 (10th Cir. 1986), he 

cannot take advantage of an alleged error brought on by the State 

during trial and then later complain about it in a habeas 

proceeding. Review of the record convinces us that Nieto was not 

prejudiced or denied a fair trial by its use. There is no showing 

by Nieto that he was prejudiced by the State's reference to 

"object focus'' during the closing argument. See Donnelly v. De 

Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1974). 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 7 
D. REFERENCES TO MAURICIO CARREON 

Another alleged victim of the January 1983 incident, Mauricio 

Carreon, was referred to often by the State during the course of 

the trial, including what his testimony would be, even though he 

was not called to testify. In its opening statement the State 

made reference to Carreon's physical description and eventual 

photo identification of Nieto. 4 In addition, during Rodriguez' 

direct examination, the prosecutor questioned him about Carreon. 5 

4 

5 

The prosecutor stated: 

"· .. also provided to the police depaitment 

at the time was a physical description by 

Francisco and Mauricio in terms of what these 

people looked like, II R., T. 3, 12/19/83 at 

129-30, .•. and evidence will also show that 

not only did Francisco Rodriguez make that 

selection, but at a separate point, Mauricio 

Carreon also made that same selection of 

photograph number five as being the person who 

assaulted them from the area of Central and 

University. II R., T. 3, 12/19/83 at 148-53. 

(The tape numbers are readings from the tape 

counter of a Dictaphone Model No. 2250). 

These questions were asked concerning Carreon: 

Q: On that date did you have occasion to be with a 

friend of yours by the name of Mauricio Carreon? 

0 0 0 O 

Q: How did you know Mauricio? 

Q: How old is Mauricio? 

Q: Do you know where Mauricio is now? 

Q: Why won't Mauricio come? 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 8 
Finally, during his closing argument the prosecutor told the jury 

that Carreon would not come to the trial because he was deathly 

afraid. It is these references to Carreon which Nieto points to 

as denial of a fair trial. 

After the prosecutor's opening statement, which contained 

comments about Carreon's physical description of Nieto, Nieto's 

counsel requested a bench confere·nce. It was revealed that the 

State was not going to call Carreon as a witness. Nieto's counsel 

moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State interjected a 

confrontation problem arising from Carreon's alleged 

identification. The court denied the motion for a mistrial and 

reminded the jury that opening statements were not evidence. 

In the court's opening instructions the jury was advised what 

was to be considered as evidence and that their verdict must be 

based only on the evidence and testimony heard at the trial. The 

court admonished the jury that opening statements by counsel were 

not evidence. Both the prosecutor and Nieto's counsel prefaced 

(Footnote continued): 

Q: Mr. Rodriguez, where were you with Mauricio on 

January 13th? 

Q: And was Mauricio also playing [the games]? 

Q: Where was Mauricio Carreon during this time? 

II R., T. 4, 12/19/83 at 340-55, 359 & 443. 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 9 
their openings by saying that their statements were not to be 

considered evidence. 

We do not believe that the prosecutor's re,ferences to Carreon 

during his opening remarks denied Nieto a fair trial and caused 

the jury to disregard the instructions to not treat the opening 

statements as evidence. See United States v. Humer, 542 F.2d 254, 

255 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 735-

37 (1968). We also feel that since it was Nieto's counsel who 

asked Officer Kurdock as to who had given her the descriptions 

used in developing the photo array (to which she responded that 

both victims gave her the description) there was not a persuasive 

argument for reversal. 6 

Nieto asserts that the questions regarding Carrion during 

Rodiguez' direct examination were prejudicial. Most of these 

questions were general in nature and provided background 

information about the armed robbery. 7 These questions were 

relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Nieto takes 

particular issue with the prosecutor's attempt to get Francisco to 

divulge why Carreon would not come to the trial. Nieto's counsel 

made an objection to this inquiry, which was sustained by the 

trial court, and the question was not answered. 

In our view the unanswered question concerning why Carreon 

would not attend trial did not have any substantial likelihood of 

changing the jury's verdict, and we feel reversal is not required. 

6 

We note that Nieto's counsel did not object to Officer 

Kurdock's answer. 

7 

See fn. 6, infra. 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 10 
United States v. Glover, 677 F.2d 57, 58. (10th Cir. 1982). We 

note also that the court earlier instructed the jury that it could 

not consider any evidence to which an objection was sustained and 

could not speculate as to the answer of any question which the 

court ruled could not be answered. II R., T. 3, 12/19/83 at 22-

29. The court's introductory instructions prevented Nieto from 

being prejudiced by the prosecutor's attempted inquiry. Glover, 

677 F.2d at 58. Additionally, because the prosecutor's inquiry 

was isolated, we do not believe the jury's verdict was improperly 

influenced. 

1987). 

United States v. Begay, 833 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 

During closing argument, Nieto's counsel said "Where is 

Mauricio? There was another witness. Where is he?" II R., T. 7, 

12/20/83 at 372. In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded: 

••• What about Mauricio Carreon? That's 

right. Defense counsel could have subpoenaed 

him. I asked Francisco, "Where is Mauricio?" 

As I recall, he said, "He won't come." I know 

what's happening--the man is sixteen, 

seventeen years old. He's deathly afraid 

also, I'm sure. 

II R., T. 7, 12/20/83 at 695-702. Counsel for defendant objected 

and the court sustained the objection. Nieto argues that while 

his inference regarding Carreon was proper, the State's response 

was improper and highly prejudicial. 

While we agree that the prosecutor's comment that Carreon was 

"deathly afraid" to testify was clearly improper, we find no 

constitutional error on this point. Due process analysis in 

habeas cases focuses on the fairness of the trial, not the 

culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 11 
219 (1982). Fairness of the trial is not generally determined on 

the basis of the prosecutor's statements or conduct standing 

alone, but must be viewed in context of the whole trial. United 

States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). The standard that 

governs in a habeas proceeding "is 'the narrow one of due process, 

and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.''' Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)(quoting Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). 

In the context of the entire trial we cannot agree that due 

process was denied. First, the State's comment about Carreon was 

in response to Nietois counsel's statement implying that the State 

could have called Carreon to testify. Although this alone does 

not purge the impropriety of the statement, see Young, 470 U.S. 

at 12, it may affect the context in which the improper statement 

is viewed by the jury. Here, the prosecutor's statement was in 

response to Nieto's counsel's remark that Carreon, an alleged 

victim of the incident, was not called to testify. Although the 

prosecutor's comment that Carreon was deathly afraid was clearly 

improper, he did not comment on any other matter such as Carreon's 

physical description and photo identification of Nieto made to 

Officer Kurdoch during her investigation. Second, the court 

instructed the jury that counsel's statements were not to be 

considered as evidence. Third, the trial court sustained Nieto's 

objection to the prosecutor's remark about Carreon being deathly 

afraid. Fourth, after reviewing the evidence against Nieto, we do 

not believe the prosecutor's improper closing statement tipped the 

scales in favor of the State. See Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 

12 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 12 
1501, 1509 (iOth Cir. 1987). Thus, we hold that there was no due 

process violation by the remark. 8 

E. THE CLOSURE OF THE TRIAL 

Nieto argues that there was a "Closure of The Trial" during 

the testimony of the State's complaining witness, Rodriguez; that 

the trial judge offered to close the courtroom to all but the 

jury, the defendant, the attorneys and the court staff; that the 

court's ban deprived him of the support of his family and 

friends, 9 and also encompassed the press and the general public, 

resulting in denial of Nieto's right to a public trial in 

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and of the New Mexico 

Constitution. 10 

Immediately before commencement of the trial a hearing was 

conducted in the trial judge's chambers. This was attended by the 

trial judge, the prosecutor, Nieto's attorney, Rodriguez, and Juan 

Benavidez, a friend of Rodriguez who acted as his interpreter. 

The court held this hearing because the State had brought to the 

court's attention the fact that Rodriguez was worried about 

8 

Nieto's reliance on Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512 

(11th Cir. 1985) is misplaced. In Hutchins, the petitioner 

claimed a Sixth Amendment violation arising from the prosecutor's 

reference in closing argument to an eyewitness who was afraid to 

testify because of fear of retribution. Id. at 515. Here, Nieto 

claims no Confrontation Clause infringement. 

9 

The record does not show how many relatives were present. 

10 

We discuss only the federal constitutional claim since the 

assertion of violation of the State Constitution is not cognizable 

under 28 u.s.c. § 2254(a). Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 

(1983). 

13 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 13 
testifying since two of the assailants were still at large. 11 The 

trial judge told Rodriguez he had no choice as to whether he would 

testify and that he was required to do so on behalf of the State. 

The judge told Rodriguez that if he did not testify he would be 

11 

The fear of Rodriguez was discussed in the 

colloquy: 

following 

COURT: Mr. Rodriguez, have you been contacted 

by anybody? II R., T.l at 18-19. 

INTERPRETER: He's afraid because of what 

happened to him. Id. at 23-24. 

COURT: Why won't he testify in this matter? 

Id. at 25. 

INTERPRETER: He'~ [Rodriguez] afraid of the 

other ones. Because the way he understood 

that if he went to testify for, whatever, 

Nieto, the way they would do it is to put one 

in this room, so they would see him. But I 

understand they have to be face to face. He 

said, you know, he's going to be contacting 

his relatives, whatever, and they go after him 

when to testify to him. Id. at 35-38. 

COURT: Why is he under 

this will happen to him? 

the impression 

Id. at 39. 

that 

INTERPRETER: He says that because they only 

have one imprisoned and the other two are 

still out, he's going to be fighting with 

them. And they told him that they would give 

him protection and that the police would be 

with him all the time ...• Id. at 43-46. 

COURT: Well, is he sure, is he positive, he 

hasn't been contacted by anyone that's been 

telling him this? Id. at 49. 

INTERPRETER: He just said that his folks told 

him just to forget about it. Id. at 51-54. 

14 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 14 
sent to jail and that he would get all the protection that he is 

entitled to after he testified. 12 

Rodriguez was then asked by the judge whether he would 

testify or go to jail. Rodriguez said he guessed he would go to 

jail. The judge explained there were thousands of victims in the 

same position that he was in and that since he had been on the 

bench, he had not seen anyone who testifed as a victim beaten up 

by a defendant. The judge explained that the State had decided to 

bring the charges. 13 

12 

The court's assurance was given during 

colloquy: 

the following 

13 

INTERPRETER: Well, that he's afraid about the 

other guys who know. He's .•• this one can't do 

nothing to him. It's the other two they haven't 

caught ••• that did it to him. Id. at 74-76. 

COURT: Well, if he's worried about his relatives, 

about his relatives being here, his relatives won't 

be in the courtroom. I won't let his relatives be 

in the courtroom. Id. at 76-78. 

INTERPRETER: [Nieto] 

with them in town. 

••.• Id. at 79-80. 

can always 

Remember the 

get in contact 

guy that we 

This discussion between the trial judge and the interpreter 

was as follows: 

INTERPRETER: 

would have to 

two are still 

at 100-103. 

[Rodriguez] is concerned that he 

testify against Nieto when the other 

loose. They know were he lives. Id. 

COURT: Does he know who the other two people are? 

Id. at 103. 

INTERPRETER: He would recognize them if he sees 

them. Id. at 105. 

COURT: Has he seen them since this happened? Id. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

15 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 15 
After some further discussion about Rodriguez' concern with 

identifying Nieto in a photo array, the judge repeated that 

Rodriguez would be required to go to jail if he did not testify. 

The judge stated that he "understands Francisco's worries, but 

that he is not convinced that they are legitimate because 

retaliation doesn't happen to most people who testify in court, 

and secondly, there is no guarantee that Nieto wouldn't do 

anything once he got out of jail." 

After the judge instructed Rodriguez and Benavidez to confer 

alone in another room about whether Rodriguez would testify or go 

(Footnote continued): 

at 106. 

INTERPRETER: He saw them and called the police but 

they were unable to do anything about it. Id. at 

105-108. 

COURT: What makes you think the others know where 

you live? Id. at 121-122. 

INTERPRETER: 

and Nieto's 

123-125. 

Because Nieto knows where he 

brothers know where he lives. 

lives 

Id. at 

COURT: Would you explain to him that when he 

testifies in the courtoom, the only one that's 

going to be in the courtoom is Nieto, and the jury 

and there's not going to be anyone else and we'll 

let him be brought in from a place where nobody's 

going to see him come in or out and he won't have 

to be in touch with the relatives, or near the 

relatives, or anything like that. Does he 

understand that? Id. at 126-30. 

INTERPRETER: He said well the police told him to 

buy himself a gun. Id. at 138. 

COURT: What's he saying? Id. at 142. 

INTERPRETER: He's going to think about it. Id. at 

142. 

16 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 16 
to jail, the following colloquoy took place between the judge, the 

prosecutor and Nieto's attorney: 

JUDGE: Well, we'll see what again, we're waiting 

for him to decide what he wants to do and of course 

it can be up to the State too, but if the State 

doesn't dismiss the case, the court's intention 

would be to send him to jail. 

PROSECUTOR: Judge, I would have great difficulty 

with doing that. 

JUDGE: Okay. Again, I would make sure he wasn't 

around any of the other prisoners if that was your 

worry that he would be contacted or hurt. 

PROSECUTOR: Well, judge could I have a few moments 

to discuss this with my supervisor downstairs, 

could I have another moment? 

JUDGE: Okay, sure. And as I indicated I don't 

know how long I'd keep him in jail, but I'd keep 

him in jail at least until tomorrow. 

PROSECUTOR: Okay. Thanks judge. I'll go down and 

talk to Mr. Gazowski. 

After Rodriguez and Benavidez returned, 

discussion among the parties took place: 

the following 

JUDGE: Okay we're in chambers now out of the 

presence and hearing of the jury again and Mr. 

Velasquez would you ask Mr. Rodriguez what he wants 

to do now --

PROSECUTOR: Ah, Mr. Benavidez. 

JUDGE: Oh, Mr. Benavidez, I'm sorry. 

INTERPRETER: .••• Let's go ahead and do it. 

JUDGE: Are you willing to testify? 

INTERPRETER: I don't have another choice. 

JUDGE: Okay, let's go ahead and do it. 

JUDGE: Okay, and let me -- is Mr. Benavidez, is he 

going to be the translator? 

17 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 17 
NIETO'S ATTORNEY: 

translator judge. 

No, we'll have Ms. Decourt as 

JUDGE: Okay, okay. And if there is some confusion 

about what he's suppose to do you'll tell him that 

in no way did the court intend to indicate 

previously that he was to do anything but to tell 

the truth and to the best of his memory and that's 

all I want him to do to the best of his memory. 

Would you tell him that. 

(Interpreter translates this to Rodriguez). 

PROSECUTOR: And judge can we also make certain 

that no relatives of the defendant would be in the 

courtroom during the testimony of the victim? 

JUDGE: Yes, we'll make sure of that and if he 

wants to --

INTERPRETER: Judge, can I ~sk you something. 

These relatives aren't going to be there, right? 

JUDGE: No, his relatives will not be present when 

he's testifying and if he wants he can wait in our 

court reporter's office until it's time for him to 

testify. We'll show you where that is and then 

we'll bring him into the courtroom through the jury 

room when he comes in to testify and then we'll 

make sure he gets out without having to see them. 

INTERPRETER: Okay. 

JUDGE: Okay? 

Before Nieto's counsel began cross-examination of Rodriguez, 

he requested that the courtroom be reopened so that Nieto's 

sisters and other relatives could attend the trial. Nieto's 

counsel's basis for the request was that Rodriguez testified on 

direct that he was not afraid and there was no evidence that 

anyone had threatened him. The court denied the request stating, 

"The hearing indicated Mr. Rodriguez was worried about his safety 

II . . . , I don't know what he meant by afraid .. I'll keep the 

courtroom closed until such time as he's finished testifying. At 

that time the defendant's relatives will be at liberty to enter 

the courtroom." (emphasis added). Nieto's counsel stated that 

18 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 18 
was over his objection. II R.,T. 5, 12-19-83, 171-186. During 

cross examination, Rodriguez testified that neither Nieto nor 

Nieto's family or friends contacted him. II R., .T. 6, 12-19-83, 

24-26. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy 

the right to a speedy and public trial. " The Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees defendants in state prosecutions a public 

trial. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-273 (1948). The right to 

a public trial belongs to the accused, not to the public. Estes 

v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588-89, (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); 

see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). 14 

The right to an open trial, however, may give way in certain 

cases to other rights or interests such as the defendant's right 

to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting 

disclosure of sensitive information. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45; see 

~ Douglas v. Wainwright (Douglas I), 714 F.2d 1532, 1544-45 

(11th Cir. 1983)(exclusion allowed of public other than 

defendant's family and press from courtroom to protect a 

testifying rape victim-witness from insult and embarrassment), 

vacated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984), reinstated, (Douglas 

..!..!.) 739 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 

14 

We note that here there has been no argument of nonretroactivity of Waller. It appears that Waller would apply to 

the instant case since the convictions and sentences challenged in 

this federal habeas case were not final on appeal in the New 

Mexico courts until after the May 1984 decision in Waller. The 

State Court of Appeals opinion affirming the convictions and 

sentences was filed on September 6, 1984. Thus under the test of 

finality recently reaffirmed in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 

1067 (1989), the Nieto convictions and sentences were not final 

before the Waller opinion was rendered and it applies. See also 

Santos v. Brown, 596 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (D. R.I. 1984) (Wailer 

applies retroactively). · 

19 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 19 
(1985); United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 747-48 (9th Cir. 

1979)(spectators excluded from courtroom during examination of 

witness who was in fear of his own personal safety after being 

threatened); United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 

971 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966)(spectators 

except press and the bar excluded to maintain order in the 

courtroom); United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 

1274 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (proper to 

exclude public from courtoom during testimony of a confidential 

informant) . 

A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and the 

purposes of the guarantee were analyzed by the Court in Waller, 

467 U.S. 44-47. In the context of a total closure of a 

suppression hearing, the Court stated that the applicable rule was 

that from Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 

464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984): 

The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an 

overriding interest based on findings that closure is 

essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 

tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be 

articulated along with findings specific enough that a 

reviewing court can determine whether the closure order 

was properly entered. 

In Waller, the Court held that the closure of the defendant's 

entire suppression hearing was improper. Id. at 48. 

Nieto argues that we should apply the "overriding interest" 

standard articulated in Waller to the facts here. He asserts 

there was a total closure during the testimony of Rodriguez, 

relying on the trial judge's comment made at the pre-trial hearing 

that during Rodriguez' testimony only the defendant and the jury 

would be present. II R., T.l at 126-30. 

20 

We do not feel the 

Appellate Case: 87-1981 Document: 01019784552 Date Filed: 06/26/1989 Page: 20 
record shows a total closure of the courtroom, with only the 

defendant, the jury and, of course, the judge and court staff 

present. The New Mexico Court of Appeals observed that the record 

affirmatively indicated that only Nieto's relatives were excluded 

from the courtroom during Rodriguez' testimony. IR. doc. 11, 

exh. "A", p. 6. The U.S. Magistrate considered affidavits 

submitted by the trial prosecutor and Nieto's trial counsel in 

addressing the issue of the extent of closure. In his proposed 

findings, the Magistrate concluded that there was no basis to 

disregard the New Mexico Court of Appeals finding that the closure 

only affected Nieto's relatives during Rodriguez' testimony. IR. 

doc. 24, p. 5. The Federal District Court fully adopted the 

Magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations in the habeas 

proceeding. I. R. doc. 26. 

Under the habeas corpus provisions of 28 u.s.c. § 2254, 

federal courts are required to afford a state court determination 

of a factual issue a "presumption of correctness.'' Sumner v. 

Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981). Such a presumption favoring state 

court factual findings applies unless certain stated exceptions 

are shown to exist or are admitted. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(l)-(8). 

A federal habeas court may disregard the state court finding if 

the petitioner "establish[es] by convincing evidence that the 

factual determination by the State court was erroneous." Ewing v. 

Winans, 749 F.2d 607, 609 (10th Cir. 1984). Here we agree with 

the Magistrate and the District Court that we should accept the 

finding of the New Mexico Court that the closure of the trial was 

partial, with exclusion of only Nieto's relatives during the 

testimony of Rodriguez. 

21 

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In Waller, in the context of the total closure of an entire 

suppression hearing of several days, the Court applied the 

"overriding interest" standard. We note, however, that the Ninth 

and Eleventh Circuits have applied a less stringent test of a 

"substantial reason" where partial closures are held necessary. 

See United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 

1989); Douglas I, 714 F.2d at 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1984). We are 

persuaded that we should apply the less stringent "substantial 

reason" test in the context of this habeas case in determining 

whether there was a violation of the petitioner-appellant's right 

to a public trial, by the partial closure ordered during the 

testimony of Rodriguez, when relatives of the defendant Nieto were 

excluded from the courtroom. 

In making the determination whether there was an infringement 

of the public_trial right, we consider the interests identified by 

the Supreme Court which are protected by the Sixth Amendment right 

to a public trial. These include the opportunity of interested 

spectators to observe the judicial system, the improvement of 

quality of testimony, the inducing of unknown witnesses to come 

forward with relevant testimony, insuring that the trial judge and 

prosecutor perform their duties responsibly, and discouraging 

perjury. See Waller, supra, at 46; Gannett Co. v. DePaquale, 443 

U.S. 368, 383 (1979). 1 5 Moreover, in In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 

15 

In Waller the Court stated that the parties did not question 

the consistent view of the lower federal courts that the defendant 

should not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to 

obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee. 467 

U.S. at 49. We are persuaded that once a violation is found of a 

defendant's right to a public trial, the defendant should not be 

required to prove prejudice because of infringement of the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

22 

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271-272 (1948), the Court noted that "without exception courts 

have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have 

his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what 

offense he may be charged II (footnote omitted); see Aaron 

v. Capps, 507 F.2d 685, 687-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 

878 (1975); State v. Ernest Klem, 438 N.W. 2d, 798, 803 n.5 (N.D. 

1989). 

We are persuaded that no violation of petitioner Nieto's 

Sixth Amendment right to a public trial occurred. The State trial 

court held a hearing just before the commencement of trial, as 

noted, attended by the prosecutor, Nieto's attorney, the State's 

witness Rodriguez, and his friend Benavidez who acted as his 

interpreter. The colloquies at the hearing are quoted at some 

length in the preceeding text and footnotes. See notes 11, 12, 

and 13. There are clear references to Rodriguez' fear or concern 

about his two other assailants who had not been apprehended. 

There was worry because Nieto knew where Rodriguez lived and 

"Nieto's brothers know where he lives." The police had advised 

Rodriguez to buy himself a gun. 

The prosecutor requested that it be made certain that no 

relatives of Nieto would be present during the victim's testimony; 

and then the interpreter for Rodriguez repeated the inquiry: 

"These relatives aren't going to be there, right." The judge then 

said the relatives would not be present while Rodriguez testified 

and that he could wait in the court reporter's office until it was 

time to testify and then "we'll make sure he gets out without 

(Footnote continued): 

interests pro.tected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee. See Douglas 

!, 714 F.2d at 1542. 

23 

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having to see them." Finally, the reason for the partial closure 

was made clear when the judge denied the request of Nieto's 

counsel to admit Nieto's sisters and other relatives during crossexamination of Rodriguez, the judge stating: "The hearing 

indicated Mr. Rodriuez was worried about his safety .•.. " 

We are convinced that the trial judge had "a substantial 

reason for the closure." United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d at 

1077. He conducted a hearing where the circumstances were 

discussed and tailored his order to what relief he felt needed, 

exclusion of the relatives of Nieto during Rodriguez' testimony, 

with others present and no secrecy imposed on the proceedings. We 

hold that Nieto's constitutional right to a public trial was not 

violated by the partial closure of the trial in light of the 

circumstances of this record. 

III 

Accordingly, the ·judgment of the District Court denying the 

writ is 

AFFIRMED. 

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