Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02396/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02396-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roy Samuel Umphrey, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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CIV 13-2396-PHX-MHB

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Roy Samuel Umphrey’s application for attorney

fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) (Doc. 25). After reviewing the

arguments of the parties, the Court now issues the following ruling.

Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income alleging disability beginning February 2, 2007. (Transcript of Administrative Record

(“Tr.”) at 15, 216-26.) His applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.

at 63-142.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. (Tr.

at 161-62.) A hearing was held on July 25, 2012, (Tr. at 30-62), and the ALJ issued a

decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. at 12-28). The Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. at 1-6), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. Plaintiff then sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

This Court, after reviewing the administrative record and the arguments of the parties,

remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. (Doc. 23.) Specifically,

Case 2:13-cv-02396-MHB Document 27 Filed 05/20/15 Page 1 of 4
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the Court found that the ALJ failed to make a step five determination and identify or discuss

any of the other jobs available in the national economy that could be performed. The ALJ

simply found that Plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform his past work as a

typesetter, warehouse lead worker, and school bus driver. The Court determined that this

finding directly contradicted the vocational expert’s testimony and, as such, ordered that the

decision of the ALJ be vacated and the case be remanded to the Commissioner. (Doc. 23.)

A prevailing party in an action against the United States is entitled to an award of

attorney fees and costs under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), unless the government’s

position was “substantially justified.” The government’s position is substantially justified

“if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and

fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. Therefore, the issue before the

Court is whether Defendant’s position in opposing Plaintiff’s appeal was “substantially

justified.” Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under the EAJA, “substantial justification” means that “‘the government’s position

must have a reasonable basis in law and fact.’” Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Corbin v.

Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Where ... the ALJ’s decision was reversed on

the basis of procedural errors, the question is not whether [Defendant’s] position as to the

merits of [Plaintiff’s] disability claim was substantially justified. Rather, the relevant

question is whether [Defendant’s] decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors

committed by the ALJ was substantially justified.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citations

omitted).

The Court concludes that Defendant’s decision to defend the ALJ’s determination was

not substantially justified. In her decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of

performing less than the full range of light work. She found that Plaintiff could lift and carry

10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, do unlimited sitting, standing and walking

with frequent climbing ramps and stairs, occasional climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds,

occasional crawling, occasional right upper extremity reaching in all directions and

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occasional handling, fingering and feeling with his right hand. (Tr. at 18.) When she asked

the vocational expert, Mark Kelman, this hypothetical, he found that Plaintiff could not do

his past relevant work. (Tr. at 57.) Specifically, he noted the occasional handling, finger and

feeling with his right hand would preclude the past work both as it was performed by the

claimant and as it was performed in the national economy. (Tr. at 57.) Mr. Kelman then

identified other jobs available in the national economy that an individual of Plaintiff’s age,

educational background, past work experience, and residual functional capacity could

perform. (Tr. at 57-61.)

However, the ALJ failed to make a step five determination and identify or discuss any

of the other jobs available in the national economy that could be performed. (Doc. 23.) The

ALJ simply found that Plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform his past work as

a typesetter, warehouse lead worker, and school bus driver. The Court found that the ALJ’s

decision directly contradicted the vocational expert’s testimony and ordered that the decision

of the ALJ be vacated and the case be remanded to clarify and determine whether Plaintiff

is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and

work experience. (Doc. 23.) In light of the Court finding the ALJ’s actions to be erroneous,

“[i]t follows a fortiori the government’s defense of the ALJ’s procedural errors was not

substantially justified ... .” Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1072.

Plaintiff’s counsel, Amy L. Foster, has filed an itemized statement of fees showing

that she worked 36.3 hours on this case. Having reviewed the statement of fees, and having

considered the relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30

& n.3 (1983), the Court finds that the amount of the requested fee award is reasonable.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees (Doc. 25) is

GRANTED;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $6892.79 pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2015.

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