Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00998/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00998-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

R&R SAILS, INC. d/b/a HOBIE CAT

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv998-MMA(POR)

vs. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REOPEN ORAL

ARGUMENT AND REVISE THE

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2

BARRING EVIDENCE OF HOBIE

CAT’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

[Doc. No. 178]

INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE

OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to reopen oral argument and revise its

ruling on Defendant Motion In Limine No. 2 barring evidence of Plaintiff’s attorneys fees claim. 

Defendant moved the Court in limine for an order precluding Plaintiff, its counsel, and its witnesses

from making reference to Plaintiff’s claim for attorneys fees and costs incurred in this case pursuant

to the decision in Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813. Defendant argued that Plaintiff

failed to disclose the evidentiary basis for its claim and therefore Defendant was not able to conduct

discovery regarding the claim or to retain an expert to review Plaintiff’s evidence supporting the

claim. Defendant asserted that Plaintiff should be precluded from presenting any evidence not

previously disclosed at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). Without any

Case 3:07-cv-00998-MMA-DHB Document 188 Filed 12/30/09 Page 1 of 4
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evidence, Defendant argued that Plaintiff will not be able to prove its claim for attorneys fees and

costs, and therefore the claim should be barred. Plaintiff argued in opposition to the motion that

Defendant had an affirmative duty to request the evidence during discovery, failed to do so, and

therefore the motion should be denied. The Court ruled as follows: 

Plaintiff identified an estimated claim for $350,000 in attorneys fees in its initial

disclosures served on September 14, 2007. Defendant is correct that Plaintiff failed

to produce any documentation of the claim at that time, and further failed to

supplement its initial disclosures with documentation regarding fees, running afoul of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) and 26(e). Plaintiff must substantiate the fees

claimed with some sort of evidence at trial or the claim shall fail (in most cases

documentation of hours worked by attorneys, etc). Concept Enterprises, Inc. v.

Hartford Ins. Co, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6901 at 30 (C.D. Cal. 2001). However,

allowing production of the documentation of two years worth of accumulated fees and

costs less than two months prior to trial, and without the benefit of discovery or expert

analysis, is highly prejudicial to Defendant. 

( . . . )

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s failure to disclose is not harmless. Defendant cannot be

expected or required to defend against a damages claim without having the prerequisite

access to the evidence supporting the claim. Thus, if the Court denies Defendant’s

motion, the Court will have to reopen discovery, allow Defendant a reasonable amount

of time once the evidence is produced to review it and hire an expert to analyze it and

prepare a written report, who then will likely need to be deposed. In the context of

Rule 37(c), “[d]isruption to the schedule of the court and other parties is not harmless.

Courts set such schedules to permit the court and the parties to deal with cases in a

thorough and orderly manner, and they must be allowed to enforce them, unless there

are good reasons not to.” Wong v. Regents of the University of California, 410 F.3d

1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show that the failure to

comply with Rule 26 was either substantially justified or harmless. Pursuant to the

federal rules and the consistently applied law in the Ninth Circuit, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff is precluded from offering evidence to support, or from

otherwise referencing, its Brandt claim at trial. 

(See November 20, 2009 Order, Doc. No. 175.) 

DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, reconsideration is appropriate if the Court is “(1) presented with newly

discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error, [(3)] or if the initial decision was manifestly unjust,

or (4) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County,

Oregon v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). While Rule 59(e) permits a district

court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an “extraordinary remedy, to be used

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani,

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342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider its November 20, 2009 ruling and to permit Plaintiff to

pursue its attorneys fees claim at trial. Plaintiff argues that it satisfied the requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 26 when it served initial disclosures on September 14, 2007, stating a claim

for attorneys fees in the amount of $350,000, and by offering on June 30, 2009 to deliver redacted

copies of all related billing invoices to Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that Rule 26 does not require a

party to produce copies of documents identified in its initial disclosures, absent a written request by

the opposing party. In sum, Plaintiff argues that it was incumbent on Defendant to make an

affirmative request for production of the billing invoices, which Plaintiff asserts Defendant did not

do until June 2009. 

Defendant opposes the motion on several grounds. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails

to present any new evidence in support of its position, does not allege that there has been any change

in the applicable law, and fails to demonstrate either clear error or manifest injustice. Second,

Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s renewed assertion that Plaintiff had no affirmative obligation to

produce the billing invoices. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s initial disclosure of its attorneys fees

claim was inadequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) because it did not

describe the category or location of the documents intended to support the claim. Plaintiff’s initial

disclosure stated only the amount of the claim, and indicated via a footnote that the amount was an

estimate and would be amended prior to trial. Defendant argues that Plaintiff ran afoul of Civil

Local Rule 16(f)(4)(b) by failing to produce the billing invoices during the parties’ exchange of

exhibits anticipated to be introduced at trial. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff violated the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iii), which requires a party to provide a

computation of damages and the documents/materials upon which the computation is based. 

Defendant asserts that contrary to Plaintiff’s position, this is clearly an affirmative obligation which

Plaintiff failed to meet until the day before this motion was filed. Finally, Defendant urges the Court

to consider the manner in which Defendant, as well as the Court, would be unduly prejudiced if

Plaintiff is allowed to introduce the billing invoices and other documentation in support of its

attorneys fees claim at trial. 

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The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a sound basis for modifying the November

20, 2009 ruling granting Defendant’s motion in limine. Plaintiff does not make the required

showing under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff incorrectly interprets the applicable Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure to support its position. Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) does not operate in tandem with Rule 34 in

the manner Plaintiff suggests. The rule could not be clearer – Plaintiff was required to have

disclosed the billing invoices to substantiate the amount of attorneys fees claimed. Rule

26(a)(1)(A)(iii) provides that a party must disclose, “without awaiting a discovery request. . . a

computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party” and must make available

for inspection “the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from

disclosure, on which each computation is based . . .” The uncontradicted evidence before the Court

confirms that Plaintiff did not comply with its obligations under the Federal Rules until, literally, the

eve of trial. Exclusion of the evidence is proper. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. The Court declines

to revise its November 20, 2009 ruling granting Defendant’s Motion In Limine No. 2. As such,

Plaintiff remains precluded from offering evidence to support, or from otherwise referencing, its

attorneys fees claim at trial 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 30, 2009

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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