Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03376/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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Case No. 16-CV-03376-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SENSUS USA INC,

Plaintiff,

v.

BADGER METER INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-CV-03376-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 16

Plaintiff Sensus, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) brings this declaratory judgment action against

Defendant Badger Meter, Inc. (“Defendant”). Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 16 (“Mot.”). Having considered the parties’ briefing, the relevant 

law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS without prejudice Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. The case management conference, currently set for October 26, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., is 

VACATED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Defendant both develop and sell water meters for use by the water utility 

industry. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 10, 12–13; ECF No. 16-6, Def. Compl., Decl. of Michael T. 

Griggs (“Griggs Decl.”) Ex. E ¶¶ 6–8. 

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On June 8, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff a cease and desist letter, which alleged that 

Plaintiff’s newest water meter, the “Ally,” infringed Defendant’s ’827 patent. ECF No. 1-2, Def. 

June 8, 2016 Letter, Compl. Ex. 2 (“Def. June 8 Letter”). The letter requested that Plaintiff 

withdraw the Ally water meter from the market and cancel Plaintiff’s plans to debut the water 

meter on June 19, 2016 at the American Water Works Association conference in Chicago, Illinois

(“AWWA conference”). Id. Given the short time period before the conference, Defendant set a 

deadline of June 15, 2016 for Plaintiff to provide assurances that it had complied with the letter. 

Id.

On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff responded that it did not believe that the Ally water meter 

infringed the ’827 patent and that Plaintiff needed greater detail on the alleged infringement before 

it could engage in discussions or alter marketing and sales plans. ECF No. 1-3, Pl. June 13, 2016 

Letter, Compl. Ex. 3 (“Pl. June 13 Response”). Defendant subsequently provided Plaintiff a claim 

chart outlining the claimed infringement and renewed its request that Plaintiff “cease and desist 

from marketing, promoting, or selling the Ally water meter.” ECF No. 16-2, Def. June 13, 2016 

Letter, Griggs Decl. Ex. A (“Def. June 13 Letter”). 

On June 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed the present suit, in which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory 

judgment that the Ally water meter does not infringe the ’827 patent. Compl. ¶¶ 20–25. Plaintiff 

informed Defendant of the suit on the same day by letter, but did not serve Defendant

immediately, purportedly out of a desire to resolve the matter amicably. ECF No. 16-3, Pl. June 

16, 2016 Letter, Griggs Decl. Ex. B. Plaintiff also noted that it would soon file an application with 

the United States Patent and Trademark Office for Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) of the validity of 

Defendant’s ’827 patent. Id. In response, on June 17, 2016, Defendant requested a sample of the 

Ally water meter as well as a detailed explanation of Plaintiff’s non-infringement and invalidity 

positions. ECF No. 16-4, Def. June 17, 2016 Letter, Griggs Decl. Ex. C.

On July 19, 2016, Plaintiff presented the Ally water meter at the AWWA conference, 

notwithstanding Defendant’s request that Plaintiff not do so. Compl. ¶¶ 11. On June 22, 2016, 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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Plaintiff declined to provide its non-infringement and invalidity arguments in writing, but instead 

suggested that the parties meet on July 21, 2016, at which point Plaintiff stated that it would

provide limited access to the Ally water meter and discuss its non-infringement and invalidity 

positions. ECF No. 16-5, Pl. June 22, 2016 Letter, Griggs Decl. Ex. D. 

On June 23, 2016, seven days after Plaintiff filed the instant suit in the Northern District of 

California, Defendant filed a patent infringement suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. ECF 

No. 16-6, Def. Compl., Griggs Decl. Ex. E. 

On July 8, 2016, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a response 

on July 22, 2016, and Defendant filed a reply on July 29, 2016. ECF No. 23 (“Resp.”); ECF No. 

25 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court has “unique and substantial discretion” to 

decline declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995); 

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (“[A]ny court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal 

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.”). However, a district court does not 

have plenary power: “There must be well-founded reasons for declining to entertain a declaratory 

judgment action.” Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Because this is a patent case, Federal Circuit law controls when courts determine “whether to 

accept or decline jurisdiction in an action for a declaration of patent rights in view of a later-filed 

suit for patent infringement.” Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). 

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Federal Circuit precedent, the first-filed suit has priority over a later-filed suit 

“unless considerations of judicial and litigant economy, and the just and effective disposition of 

disputes, require otherwise.” Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 

1993), abrogated on other grounds by Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288–89. While exceptions are not rare, 

“there must . . . be sound reason that would make it unjust or inefficient to continue the first-filed 

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action.” Id. at 938. Such reasons include “whether a party intended to preempt another’s 

infringement suit,” as well as “the convenience and availability of witnesses, or absence of 

jurisdiction over all necessary or desirable parties, or the possibility of consolidation with related 

litigation, or considerations relating to the real party in interest.” Elecs. for Imaging, 394 F.3d at 

1345 (citation omitted); see also In re Founds. Worldwide, Inc., 542 F. App’x 998, 999 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). 

The analysis is not “based on any categorical rules.” Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., 

Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, at the very least, the Court must evaluate the

“convenience and suitability of competing forums” through “the ‘convenience factors’ found in a 

transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” Id. at 903–904. “The considerations affecting 

transfer to or dismissal in favor of another forum do not change simply because the first-filed 

action is a declaratory action.” Genentech, 998 F.2d at 938.

Here, the first-to-file rule requires a denial of the motion to dismiss unless an exception is 

warranted. Plaintiff filed this suit on June 16, 2016, seven days prior to the suit for patent 

infringement brought by Defendant in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Additionally, both cases 

involve the same issue: whether Plaintiff’s Ally water meter infringes Defendant’s ’827 patent. 

Thus, the Court must determine whether there is “sound reason that would make it unjust 

or inefficient to continue the first-filed action.” Id. The Court first addresses whether the instant 

suit is anticipatory, that is, whether Plaintiff “intended to preempt another’s infringement suit.” 

Id. Second, the Court turns to whether the convenience factors used to analyze motions to transfer 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), namely, the convenience of the witnesses and parties and the interest 

of justice, warrant dismissal. Finally, the Court addresses whether Plaintiff’s arguments against 

personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Wisconsin prevent dismissal.

A. Anticipatory Suit

Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the instant suit because it was filed in 

anticipation of Defendant’s suit. “A district court may consider a party’s intention to preempt 

another’s infringement suit when ruling on the dismissal of a declaratory action, but that 

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consideration is merely one factor in the analysis.” Micron Tech., 518 F.3d at 904 (citing 

Genentech, 998 F.2d at 938). The Court concludes that this factor does not weigh in favor of 

dismissal.

The Federal Circuit has not specified the exact circumstances where a suit is considered

anticipatory. However, courts considering the issue in patent cases have looked to the content of 

the parties’ pre-filing communications and the timing of the suit to determine whether the suit was 

an attempt to preempt the defendant’s choice of forum. For example, in Serco Services Co., L.P. 

v. Kelley Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of a 

first-filed suit where the district court had considered the balance of convenience and the 

anticipatory nature of the suit. Id. at 1039–40. The underlying district court opinion found the 

suit to be anticipatory because a cease and desist letter specified that the defendant would 

“commence a lawsuit” if the plaintiff did not “discontinue the manufacture or sale of any 

infringing device” by September 20, 1993. Id. at 1038. Three days before the deadline, on 

September 17, 1993, the plaintiff filed suit. Id. The threat of suit combined with the fast 

approaching deadline for the filing of the suit caused the suit to be anticipatory.

District courts in patent actions applying the Federal Circuit’s standard have similarly 

found suits to be anticipatory where a patent owner threatened that a suit would be forthcoming 

absent compliance with a cease and desist letter. In Raz Imports, Inc. v. Luminara Worldwide, 

LLC, 2015 WL 6692107 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2015), a court in the Northern District of Texas found 

a suit anticipatory where the defendant sent a cease and desist letter stating that if the plaintiff 

continued selling the infringing product, the defendant would sue the plaintiff. Id. at *3. The 

plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment suit the next day. Id. Similarly, in Teledyne Technologies 

Inc. v. Harris Corp., 2011 WL 2605995 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2011), a court in the Central District of

California found a suit to be anticipatory where the defendant had told plaintiff that, after initial 

discussions, the defendant was ready to take the “next step”—litigation—if a settlement was not 

reached. Id. at *3. The plaintiff expressed an interest in an amicable resolution, forestalling 

defendant from immediately filing suit, and then filed a declaratory judgment action. Id.

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In contrast, in Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp, 823 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2011), a 

court in this district found a first-filed declaratory judgment action not to be anticipatory even 

though it was brought after a cease and desist letter had been sent to the plaintiff. Id. at 991–92. 

There, the letter stated that defendant “believed” that the plaintiff’s technology was infringing 

some of the defendant’s patents, but did not set a deadline to cease and desist the activity. Id. at 

982. The parties then met three times and exchanged multiple emails as a part of ongoing 

negotiations; the plaintiff filed suit before the beginning of the parties’ fourth meeting. Id. The 

court held that the suit was not anticipatory because it did not involve a “direct threat of suit” and 

because the timing of the plaintiff’s filing could be “reasonably interpreted as [the plaintiff’s] 

effort to ‘cut to the chase’ and resolve the conflict as soon as possible once it reasonably believed 

it was not infringing the subject patents.” Id. at 992.

The facts of this case fall in between Serco Services, Raz, and Teledyne on the one hand 

and Barnes & Noble on the other. On June 8, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff a cease and desist 

letter stating that Defendant believed that the Ally water meter “clearly infringes the ’827 patent.” 

Def. June 8 Letter at 1. The letter requested that Plaintiff withdraw and stop marketing the Ally 

water meter, agree to no longer exhibit the Ally water meter at the AWWA conference from June 

19, 2016 to June 22, 2016, and provide written confirmation of Plaintiff’s compliance. Id. 

Defendant, motivated to prevent the debut of the Ally water meter at the AWWA conference,

provided Plaintiff until June 15, 2016, one week, to comply with the requests. Id. at 2. The letter 

also stated that it was “without prejudice to any rights or remedies that” Defendant otherwise had. 

Id.

On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff responded by denying infringement and requesting more 

information about Defendant’s claims. Pl. June 13 Letter. The same day, Defendant responded in 

a letter that stated that Defendant would “take into consideration any explanation that Sensus may 

have to offer as to why the Ally water meter does not infringe,” but also reiterated Defendant’s 

“request that [Plaintiff] cease and desist from marketing, promoting[,] or selling the Ally water 

meter.” Def. June 13 Letter. Plaintiff filed suit on June 16, 2016, one day after the deadline set in 

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the June 8, 2016 cease and desist letter. Defendant filed suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin 

on June 23, 2016, one week after Plaintiff filed suit and the day after the close of the AWWA 

conference where Plaintiff debuted the Ally water meter.

The pre-filing communications in this case do not rise to the level of the statements in the 

letters in Serco Services and the district court cases interpreting Federal Circuit law. The letters 

sent from Defendant to Plaintiff did not explicitly threaten suit. The first letter stated it was 

“without prejudice to any rights or remedies” Defendant otherwise had, set a deadline to comply 

with the cease and desist letter, and indicated that Plaintiff should not present the Ally water meter 

at the AWWA conference. Overall, while these statements from the cease and desist letters could 

be reasonably interpreted as an indication of an impending suit, and are stronger than the mere 

statement of belief of infringement in Barnes & Noble, they do not constitute a direct threat of 

suit. 

However, the timing of suits in this case is similar to that found in Serco Services. There, 

the suit was filed three days before the deadline set in the cease and desist letter. In this case, the 

suit was filed one day after the cease and desist deadline and three days before the AWWA 

conference. Unlike Barnes & Noble, where the plaintiff sued the defendant after extensive 

meetings and conversations, Plaintiff here filed without extensive meetings or conversations.

Two factors are also present in this case that were not addressed in Serco Services or 

Barnes & Noble. First, after Plaintiff filed suit, Plaintiff decided not to serve the suit because 

Plaintiff hoped to “resolve this matter amicably.” Pl. June 16 Letter. Although Plaintiff is 

allowed 90 days to serve other parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), Plaintiff’s 

stated desire to resolve the suit amicably undercuts any argument that Plaintiff sought to “cut to 

the chase” to quickly obtain an adjudication of rights. Second, Plaintiff filed this suit in a district 

that has, as far as Plaintiff has alleged and as discussed further below, few connections to Plaintiff, 

the underlying dispute, or the Defendant. This supports the inference that Plaintiff filed quickly to 

bypass Defendant’s choice of forum.

Overall, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s suit is not anticipatory. In Serco Services and the 

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district court cases applying the Federal Circuit’s standard, a finding of anticipatory suit has 

always been accompanied by a direct threat of litigation. The timing of Plaintiff’s suit is certainly 

suspect and provides some evidence that Plaintiff intended to preempt Defendant’s suit, but 

without a concrete threat of litigation, Plaintiff’s decision was not necessarily tied to Defendant’s 

impending lawsuit. For example, the suit could have simply been brought in an effort to gain an 

advantage during settlement discussions: a discourteous act, but one not proscribed by the 

anticipatory suit doctrine. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal.

Even if the court had found the first-filed action to be anticipatory, that finding would be 

insufficient on its own to dismiss a first-filed declaratory judgment action: the intent to preempt

another’s suit “is merely one factor in the analysis.” Micron Tech., 518 F.3d at 904. Thus, the 

Court must consider the balance of convenience and the jurisdiction of the competing forums to 

determine whether there is “sound reason that would make it unjust or inefficient to continue the 

first-filed action.” Genentech, 998 F.2d at 938.

B. Balance of Convenience

The Federal Circuit has emphasized that in cases involving the dismissal of a declaratory 

judgment action and “competing forum interests, the trial court needs to consider the ‘convenience 

factors’ found in a transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” Micron Tech., 518 F.3d at 902–

04 (“[T]he jurisdiction question is basically the same as a transfer action under § 1404(a).”); 

Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

The Federal Circuit usually analyzes motions to transfer under the “laws of the regional 

circuit in which the district court sits.” In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). However, because the Court is determining whether to dismiss a declaratory judgment 

action, the Court still must follow Federal Circuit precedent. Elecs. for Imaging, 394 F.3d at 

1345–46. 

Under § 1404(a), a case may be transferred “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, 

in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In this analysis, a court balances the convenience 

of the parties, witnesses, and access to evidence, and the interest of justice or expediency. Micron 

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Tech., Inc., 518 F.3d at 904. The Court addresses each of these issues in turn.

1. Convenience of Parties, Witnesses, and Access to Evidence 

The convenience of the parties, witnesses, and access to evidence are the most important 

factors when determining whether to decline to hear a first-filed suit for convenience reasons. See

Serco Servs., 51 F.3d at 1039–40 (upholding dismissal of suit where district court looked only to 

convenience of parties, witnesses, and access to documents in the convenience analysis and did 

not discuss the interest of justice); see also Barnes & Noble, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (discussing 

the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and the access to evidence when applying the 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404 convenience factors).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the Plaintiff or the instant dispute has a

connection with the Northern District of California. Plaintiff has alleged that the Ally water meter 

will soon be sold in the “marketplace,” but has not specifically indicated it will be sold in 

California. See Compl. ¶ 11. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s state of incorporation is Delaware and its 

primary place of business is North Carolina. Id. ¶ 2. This lack of asserted connection to the 

Northern District of California indicates that Plaintiff’s choice of forum should be given little 

weight. See Barnes & Noble, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 994; cf. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (“If the operative facts have not occurred within the forum and the forum has no 

interest in the parties or subject matter, [plaintiff’s] choice is entitled to only minimal 

consideration.”). 

Regarding the convenience of witnesses, Defendant has provided a declaration stating that 

Defendant’s “expected witnesses for this action work at Badger Meter’s headquarters and live in 

Milwaukee or the surrounding area.” Begale Decl. ¶ 9. Although Defendant has three branch 

offices in California, including one in the Northern District of California, the declaration indicates 

that those offices were not involved in the ’827 patent and no witnesses relevant to this suit are 

located in California. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6; ECF No. 24-2, Li Decl. Ex. B at 5 (indicating that Defendant 

only has a “Silicon Valley Innovation Center” in the Northern District of California). Therefore, 

allowing the suit to continue in California would require Defendant to pay cross-country travel 

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costs and would be more disruptive to business operations than if the suit proceeded in the Eastern 

District of Wisconsin, where Defendant is headquartered. 

In contrast, Plaintiff has presented no information about the witnesses it intends to present 

at trial. Instead, Plaintiff simply argues that Defendant’s declaration should be accorded less 

weight because the witnesses are Defendant’s employees and Defendant has not provided specific 

information on the identities and subject matter of the potential witnesses’ testimony. Resp. at 9–

10; see Florens Container v. Cho Yang Shipping, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 

2002); Getz v. Boeing Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2008). However, given the 

complete lack of information about Plaintiff’s witnesses, Defendant’s declaration is sufficient to 

conclude that the convenience of the witnesses favors the Eastern District of Wisconsin over the 

Northern District of California.

As to documentary evidence, Defendant argues that its records are kept in its headquarters 

in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and that it would be burdensome to transfer the records to the 

Northern District of California. However, this factor is neutral because, “[w]ith technological 

advances in document storage and retrieval, transporting documents does not generally create a 

burden.” Reyes v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int’l Pension Fund, 2015 WL 

1738269, at *4 (N.D. Cal. April 9, 2015) (citation omitted).

The convenience of the parties and witnesses ultimately weighs in favor of this case being 

heard in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Plaintiff does not reside in the Northern District of 

California, the alleged facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims did not occur in the Northern District 

of California, and none of the witnesses brought to the attention of the court reside in the Northern 

District of California. On the other hand, Defendant is headquartered in the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin and some of the witnesses relevant to this dispute reside in the Eastern District of

Wisconsin. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

2. Interest of Justice

The interest of justice must also be considered alongside the convenience of the parties and 

witnesses under a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) analysis. Micron Tech., 518 F.3d at 904; see also Barnes & 

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Noble, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 993. Factors related to the interest of justice include court congestion, 

the local interest in deciding local controversies, conflicts of laws between jurisdictions, and 

burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 

235, 241 n.6 (1981) (citing public interest considerations when determining whether to dismiss 

under forum non conveniens). 

While a minor factor, court congestion can weigh in favor of transferring a case. From the 

perspective of the parties, this factor slightly favors not dismissing the case: Plaintiff provides 

evidence that cases in the Northern District of California reach trial 3.7 months faster than in the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin (23.9 months versus 27.6 months). ECF No. 24-3, Decl. of Zhu Li 

(“Li Decl.”) Ex. 3. However, from the perspective of judicial administration, the Eastern District 

of Wisconsin is favored: as of June 30, 2015, the Northern District of California has more than 

three times (5,226) the amount of pending cases as the Eastern District of Wisconsin (1,338). See

United States Courts, Table C-1, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and 

Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2015, 

http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18976/download. On balance, this factor is neutral.

Defendant argues that the local interest in the suit favors the Eastern District of Wisconsin 

because California has little interest in a suit between corporations that have their primary places 

of business in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and North Carolina, especially when the case 

involves a patent with little asserted connection to California. Reply at 9. The Court agrees. The

Eastern District of Wisconsin has a stronger interest than the Northern District of California in the 

dispute because it is Defendant’s primary place of business and is the location where personnel 

knowledgeable about the ’827 patent live and work. ECF No. 16-12, Begale Decl. ¶ 7–9; cf. Vu v. 

Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that, although 

the transferee district’s interest was not substantially stronger than the transferor’s, it “nevertheless 

remains stronger because the events at issue took place there”).

Finally, the concern regarding a conflict of laws is inapposite here because patent law 

arises from a federal statute that is uniform across the United States. Consequently, either forum 

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is equally capable of hearing and deciding this case. Cf. M.K. v. Visa Cigna Network POS Plan, 

2013 WL 2146609, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2013). 

Overall, in light of the fact that the Eastern District of Wisconsin has a greater interest in 

the dispute than the Northern District of California, the Court concludes that the interest of justice

slightly favors transferring the case. 

C. Jurisdiction

If a forum lacks jurisdiction over a necessary party, transfer to or dismissal in favor of that 

forum would likely be inappropriate. See Elecs. for Imaging, 394 F.3d at 1347 (citing Genentech, 

998 F.2d at 938). Here, the Court notes that a fully briefed motion is pending before the Eastern 

District of Wisconsin where Plaintiff argues for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction. 

See ECF No. 24-1, Pl. Mot. to Dismiss, Li Decl. Ex. 1. However, the concern over jurisdiction

can be mitigated by providing Plaintiff leave to re-file in the Northern District of California should 

the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff. On such 

occasion, Plaintiff may be able to provide additional evidence why the Northern District of 

California is an appropriate forum. 

Overall, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate. The convenience of the witnesses 

and parties and the interest of justice weigh in favor of the Wisconsin forum. Thus, it would be 

“unjust or inefficient to continue the first-filed action.” Genentech, 998 F.2d at 938.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss without 

prejudice. Plaintiff may refile the complaint should the Eastern District of Wisconsin action be 

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:16-cv-03376-LHK Document 36 Filed 09/27/16 Page 12 of 12