Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02474/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02474-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas M. Conroy, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Fizer, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-2474-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1), respondents’ response (doc. 15), and petitioner’s reply (doc. 18). We

also have before us the report and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge

(doc. 19), and petitioner’s objections (doc. 20). After de novo consideration of the issues,

we accept the recommended decision of the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, and deny the petition as untimely. 

In his habeas petition, petitioner challenges his 1989 convictions for child molestation,

raising two grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was required to file his

federal habeas petition the later of one year from the date the judgment of conviction became

final, or one year from the effective date of AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Herbst v.

Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, petitioner was required to file his

federal habeas petition no later than April 24, 1997, one year from the effective date of

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AEDPA. Petitioner did not file his petition until December 7, 2007, well outside the

limitations period. 

Petitioner acknowledges that his petition is untimely and instead argues that there

were extraordinary circumstances that justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

First, we note that it is unclear whether we have authority to apply an equitable tolling

exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.

Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) (broadly holding, in a non-AEDPA context, that time limits enacted

by Congress are “jurisdictional” and stating that federal courts do not have authority to

“create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements”). We need not decide this issue,

however, because we agree with the Magistrate Judge that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the

equitable tolling requirements. 

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of showing that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances stood in the way of his

timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005). The

“threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.” United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Petitioner alleges that he suffers from Huntington’s Disease and cerebral palsy, which

“cause conflict in his body and health, and that medications do sometimes distort the facts,”

and that “he needs help in formulating his facts and words and finally committing them to

paper.” Objections at 1-2. He claims that “if he had the help of competent counsel both trial

and appellate, and the cooperation of the Department of Correction he would have been able

to file this habeas sooner.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff does not adequately allege, however, how these

conditions prevented him from filing his habeas petition for more than ten years. A party

seeking equitable tolling must have acted with reasonable diligence “throughout the period

he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Despite his medical

condition, plaintiff initiated state post-conviction proceedings on December 1, 2005. The

proceedings concluded on December 20, 2005, when the trial court dismissed the petition.

Even if these post convictions proceedings could restart the statute of limitations period

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(which we expressly reject, see Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)),

petitioner waited almost two years after the conclusion of these state proceedings to file his

federal habeas petition—once again outside AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

We conclude that petitioner has failed to show either that he diligently pursued his

rights or that extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. Therefore, we accept the

magistrate judge’s conclusion that petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely.

IT IS ORDERED DENYING petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and

dismissing it with prejudice (doc. 1).

DATED this 11th day of June, 2009.

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