Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02131/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02131-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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05cv2131WQH(JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN B. HOLLINS,

Petitioner,

v.

GUILLERMINA HALL, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 05-CV-2131-WQH (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Procedural Background

On November 16, 2005, Petitioner John Hollins filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, styled as a “First Amended”

petition. Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition, and

Petitioner filed a Traverse. At the Court’s request, on November

1, 2006, Respondent filed a Supplemental Notice of Lodgment

completing the submission of the record in this case.

II. Factual Background

While the underlying facts of Petitioner’s case are not

germane to an analysis of his claims, Respondent has summarized

them as follows:

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 On August 8, 1995, at approximately 10:00 p.m.,

Petitioner and Dana Myers, who had maintained a

tumultuous 10-year relationship, began arguing. Myers

left the room and Petitioner followed her and slapped

her on the face. (Lodg. 7 at 2.)

 Myers retreated to the kitchen. When Petitioner

followed her, Myers picked up a knife to defend

herself. Petitioner went into the living room and

retrieved a loaded gun. He returned to the kitchen and

pointed the gun at Myers. Myers struck Petitioner’s

arm and was able to get out of the house through the

front door. (Lodg. 7 at 2.)

 Myers attempted to re-enter the house to retrieve

her purse which contained her keys. Petitioner

attempted to close the door as Myers reached her arm

through the door. Petitioner hit Myers’ arm with the

gun. As Myers continued to push on the door, the gun

discharged. The bullet struck Myers in the left upper

shoulder area. (Lodg. 7 at 3.)

 Petitioner was tried and convicted of assault with a

deadly weapon with a true finding of a use of a weapon

enhancement in San Diego County Superior Court. The

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of four years for

assault with a deadly weapon and to a consecutive term

of 10 years for a use of a weapon allegation. (Lodg.

1.)

(Answer, Docket No. 11, at 1-2.)

III. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner challenges his sentence and contends:

1. His “‘sentence’ has been illegally increased by

[California Department of Corrections] in violation of the Fifth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Ex-Post Facto and Double

Jeopardy principles, under the guise of ‘Parole’” and

2. “On February 13, 2003, [Unit Classification Committee]

violated Petitioner’s due process rights, Fifth Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution and Ex-Post Facto principles by increasing

placement points and level of custody.”

(Petition, Docket No. 1, at 6 & 24.)

Because Petitioner’s claims are meritless, the Petition

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should be denied.

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Federal habeas corpus relief is granted “only on the ground

that [the state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. §2254(a). Mere errors of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Id.; Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) govern this petition. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA prohibits a federal

court from granting a petition of a state prisoner whose claims

were adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the federal

court first finds that the state court decision was contrary to

clearly established Supreme Court law, or involved an

unreasonable application of the facts to such law. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d). The Supreme Court has defined these terms:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000).

The Supreme Court has also stated that:

...[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law.

...Under §2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause,

...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

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because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.

Id. at 410-411 (emphasis in original). See also Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

C. Petitioner’s term of parole will not illegally increase

his sentence under state law.

On December 7, 1995, Petitioner was sentenced in San Diego

Superior Court to 14 years in prison, which Petitioner contends

is the maximum allowable sentence under California law for his

conviction. (Lodg. 1.) Petitioner claims that any term of

parole in his case must be included in that 14-year period. In

other words, Petitioner contends, in essence, that if he serves

12 years in prison, he may serve a maximum of two years on

parole. Likewise, Petitioner contends that if he serves all 14

years of his sentence in prison, he may not be placed on parole. 

Under California law, as interpreted by the California courts,

Petitioner is mistaken and, consequently, his claim is meritless. 

The Supreme Court of California denied Hollins’ petition for

writ of habeas corpus without opinion on April 13, 2005. (Lodg.

6.) Thus, this court must “look through” to the California Court

of Appeal’s decision as the basis for its analysis. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In denying his claim on

March 19, 2004, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Hollins ... complains his current 14-year

term of imprisonment will be illegally

increased by a period of parole he will be

required to serve upon his release from

prison. “[U]nder the present law the prison

‘term’ is the actual time served in prison

before release on parole, and the day of

release on parole marks the end of the prison

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term.” (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21

Cal.4th 86, 95.) Parole is simply a variable

period of supervision after the end of the

term. (Ibid.)

(Supp. Lodg. 4 at 2.)

Generally, matters relating to sentencing are governed by

state law and do not implicate federal constitutional issues. 

Federal habeas corpus relief is granted “only on the ground that

[the state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a). Mere errors of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, supra,

502 U.S. at 67-68; Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S. at 41. 

Moreover, this court defers to and is bound by a state court’s

interpretation of its own laws. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S.

78, 84 (1983).

Petitioner has made no showing that a term of parole will

violate the Fifth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, or the

prohibition against double jeopardy. Petitioner cannot show that

the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law because the court’s

decision rested on its interpretation of California law on an

issue governed exclusively by California law. The Court of

Appeal explained that, as defined and governed by California law,

parole is a period of supervision exclusive of the prison term

served by a convicted person. In other words, a term of parole

in California is not considered part of the sentence of

imprisonment. Thus, any parole term Petitioner serves will not

illegally increase his sentence. This Court defers to the

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California courts’ interpretation of California law and should do

so in this case.

Petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in state

court, and Petitioner has made no showing that the state court’s

decision violated federal law. Accordingly, this Court should

deny the claim.

D. The Unit Classification Committee’s increasing of

Petitioner’s “placement points and level of custody” did not

violate federal law.

Petitioner contends that the Unit Classification Committee

at his place of incarceration did not possess the authority to

designate Petitioner with a “violence exclusion” or raise his

custody to “Level Two.” He contends that the increased placement

level precluded him from consideration for a minimum security

classification and participation in work furlough, early release,

and college and social service programs. (Petition, Docket No.

1, at 24.) Again, because the rules governing inmate

classification are exclusively set forth in California law, this

Court should defer to the California courts’ interpretation of

those rules and regulations.

The Supreme Court of California denied Hollins’ petition for

writ of habeas corpus without opinion on April 13, 2005. (Lodg.

6.) Thus, this court must “look through” to the California Court

of Appeal’s decision as the basis for its analysis. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In denying his claim on

March 19, 2004, the California Court of Appeal stated:

John Bradley Hollins challenges his inmate

classification at the California Rehabilitation Center. 

He claims prison authorities improperly raised his

classification from Level One to Level Two which

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subjects him to a harsher level of security and limits

his participation in training and other programs.

The responsibility for the care, custody, treatment,

training, discipline and employment of state prisoners

is vested in the Director of Corrections. (Pen. Code,

§ 5054.) The Director may prescribe and amend rules

and regulations for the administration of the

prisoners. (Pen. Code, § 5058, subd. (a).) 

Departmental officials may impose an “administrative

determinant” to override the placement of an inmate at

a facility according to his or her placement score. 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3375.2, subd. (b); all

regulatory references are to the California Code of

Regulations.) An inmate with a “current or prior

conviction for a violent felony, or a sustained

juvenile adjudication including, but not limited to,

those listed under Penal Code section 667.5(c)” may

receive a “violence” determinant increasing his or her

level of security. (§ 3375.2, subd. (b)(25).)

The record shows the classification committee

determined Hollins met the criteria for violence

exclusion based on his convictions for voluntary

manslaughter in 1988 and assault with a firearm in

1995. His violence classification was not improper.

(Supp. Lodg. 4 at 1.)

 Petitioner has made no showing that the state’s increase of

Petitioner’s placement points and custody level violated his

federal due process rights, the Fifth Amendment, or the Ex Post

Facto Clause. The decision by the California Court of Appeal

indicates that the court thoughtfully reviewed the record in

Petitioner’s case and found that, under California’s rules and

regulations regarding inmate classification, the state acted

properly in changing Petitioner’s classification.

Petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in state

court, and Petitioner has made no showing that the state court’s

decision violated federal law. Accordingly, this Court should

deny the claim.

//

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V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, this Court hereby recommends that

the petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be

entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 5, 2007, any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed no later than January 19, 2007. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 4, 2006

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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