Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00573/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00573-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brittany Renae Roberson, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Newell Rubbermaid Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-00573-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) Motion to Remand. 

(Doc. 17). The Court now rules on the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs allege the following facts. In August 2011, Osbon Auto Repair, located 

in Glendale, Arizona, repaired the rear axle on Plaintiff Roberson’s 1997 Mercury 

Mountaineer. (Doc. 17, Ex. D). On November 24, 2011, Plaintiff Roberson’s 1997 

Mercury Mountaineer experienced a rear axle failure causing the vehicle to swerve off 

the road and rollover. (Doc. 16 at 4). Plaintiffs’ infant son was strapped in a Graco car 

seat. (Id.). The car seat detached from its base and was ejected from the vehicle. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ son was killed. (Doc. 17 at 2). 

 On November 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior 

Court against the manufacturers of the car seat, Defendant Newell Rubbermaid, Inc., and 

its subsidiary, Graco Children’s Products, Inc. (collectively “Graco Defendants”). (Doc. 

1, Ex. A at 3). Plaintiffs also named Osbon Auto Repair; the owner of Osbon Auto 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 1 of 7
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Repair, Felipe De Jesus Sauceda and his wife, Jane Doe De Jesus Sauceda; and the 

Osbon employee who worked on the vehicle, John Doe Arnenta and his wife, Jane Doe 

Arnenta (collectively the “Osbon Defendants”) as defendants. (Id.) When Plaintiffs filed 

their complaint, Osbon Auto Repair was no longer in business, and Plaintiffs could not 

locate any of the other Osbon Defendants for personal service. (Doc. 21 at 4). However, 

with the state court’s approval, Plaintiffs served the Osbon Defendants by publication of 

the Complaint on April 5, 2014. (Doc. 17, Ex. B). On March 19, 2014, Graco Defendants 

removed the matter to the United States District Court of Arizona, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1441 and 1446. (Doc. 1 at 1). Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. 

(Doc. 16). Plaintiffs now move to remand the matter to state court. (Doc. 17). 

II. MOTION TO REMAND 

 A. Legal Standard 

 A federal district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and 

costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The 

removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides, in pertinent part: “[A]ny civil action brought 

in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 

may be removed by the defendant” to the United States district court “for the district and 

division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see 

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only . . . actions that originally 

could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the 

defendant.”). 

 Courts strictly construe the removal statute and disfavor removal jurisdiction. See, 

e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, 

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). There is a “strong presumption” against removal, 

and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal 

in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (internal citations omitted). “The ‘strong 

presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 2 of 7
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. If at any time it appears that the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

 B. Analysis 

Plaintiffs assert that remand is proper because the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. (Doc. 17 at 2). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that there are no claims arising 

under federal law and because “Arizona residents are on both sides of this case . . . 

removal based on diversity was improper.” (Id.) In response, Graco Defendants make two 

arguments. First, they argue that removal is proper because it appears from the face of the 

Complaint that diversity jurisdiction exists. (Doc. 20 at 2). Alternatively, Graco 

Defendants contend that removal is proper because the Osbon Defendants were 

fraudulently joined to destroy diversity. (Id. at 4). 

 1. Residency 

 Graco Defendants contend that because Plaintiffs have not been able to locate the 

Osbon Defendants, Plaintiffs have not established that the Osbon Defendants were 

Arizona residents when Plaintiffs filed their original complaint. (Doc. 20 at 2–3). 

 For the Court to have diversity jurisdiction, each plaintiff must be a citizen of a 

different state than each of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 

(1996). A defendant who is a citizen of a plaintiff’s state destroys complete diversity, 

regardless of whether that defendant was properly served prior to removal. Pullman Co. 

v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939); Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co., 591 F.2d 74, 78 

(9th Cir. 1979); Clarence E. Morris, Inc. v. Vitek, 412 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1969) 

(“[T]he existence of diversity is determined from the fact of citizenship of the parties 

named and not from the fact of service.”). It is immaterial whether the resident defendant 

is named or whether that defendant’s true identity is known. See Preaseau, 591 F.2d at 

78; Pecherski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 636 F.2d 1156, 1159 (8th Cir. 1981). On a motion to 

remand, the removing party has the burden of proving complete diversity. Carson v. 

Dunham, 121 U.S. 421, 425–46 (1887); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 

1195 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 3 of 7
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Here, Graco Defendants assert that the Osbon Defendants are not Arizona citizens 

because Plaintiffs cannot locate them. (Doc. 20 at 2–3). However, Graco Defendants have 

not provided any legal authority for their conclusion. Moreover, case law indicates that a 

plaintiff’s inability to serve, or even identify, a defendant does not preclude a finding a 

resident defendant is properly joined. Pullman Co., 305 U.S. at 538 (1939); Preaseau, 

591 F.2d at 78. Additionally, Plaintiffs, despite not having the burden of proof, have 

proven that they properly served the Osbon Defendants by publication, provided at least 

the known last name of each Osbon Defendant, and established that the Osbon 

Defendants’ last known residence was in Arizona. Accordingly, Graco Defendants have 

not met their burden of proving that the Osbon Defendants are not Arizona residents. 

 2. Fraudulent Joinder 

 Alternatively, Graco Defendants argue that the Court nonetheless has diversity 

jurisdiction because Plaintiffs fraudulently joined the Osbon Defendants to defeat 

diversity jurisdiction. Specifically, Graco Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ original 

complaint “fails to state a plausible claim against the [Osbon] Defendants” and that the 

original, not the amended complaint, “is controlling for this Court’s analysis of 

jurisdictional issues.” (Doc. 20 at 4). In support of their argument, Graco Defendants 

state that Plaintiffs lack a cause of action against the Osbon Defendants because the 

police report taken after the incident states that Plaintiff Roberson’s father, not the Osbon 

Defendant’s worked on the vehicle’s rear axle prior to the incident. 

 Fraudulent joinder is a “term of art.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 

1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). Joinder of a resident defendant is considered fraudulent, and 

courts ignore the defendant’s presence in the lawsuit for purposes of determining 

diversity, “if the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and 

the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” Id. (quoting McCabe v. 

Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)). Courts resolve any doubt as to 

whether a plaintiff has stated a valid cause of action against the resident defendant in 

favor of the case being retained by the state court. Albi v. St. & Smith Publ’ns, 140 F.2d 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 4 of 7
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

310, 312 (9th Cir. 1944). A joinder is fraudulent only when the plaintiff does not have “a 

cause of action against the resident defendant, and has no reasonable ground for 

supposing he has,” but joins him only to “evade the jurisdiction of the federal court.” Id.

As one court in this District acknowledged, a defendant asserting fraudulent joinder must 

demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a “glimmer of hope” to establish a claim 

against the resident defendant. Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 436 F. Supp. 

2d 1070, 1072 (D. Ariz. 2006) (quoting Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 

1999)). 

 While the court may only consider the original pleading to evaluate whether 

removal is proper1

, see Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 

F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998), for fraudulent joinder purposes, the court may look past 

the original pleadings. See Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 

1998) (The court “will ‘look only to a plaintiff’s pleadings to determine 

removability’. . . . [However], where fraudulent joinder is an issue, we will go somewhat 

further.”) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, when a plaintiff files an amended 

complaint, a defendant asserting fraudulent joinder as a basis for removal must do more 

than show that the original complaint fails to state a claim against the resident defendant. 

See Didyoung v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1983779, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2012); 

Burris v. AT&T Wireless, Inc., 2006 WL 2038040, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2006). 

 Plaintiffs assert that they have properly pleaded negligence against the Osbon 

Defendants and thus, remand is appropriate. Under Arizona law, to establish negligence, 

a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff to conform to a 

certain standard of conduct, (2) the defendant failed to conform to that standard, (3) there 

is a reasonably close causal connection between the defendant’s failure and the resulting 

injury, and (4) the plaintiff actually suffered damage or loss. Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 

228, 231 ¶ 10 (Ariz. 2007); Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983). In their 

 

1

 Graco Defendant cites several cases in support of their contention that the Court must limit its analysis to the original complaint. (Doc. 20 at 4). However, none of the 

cases that Graco Defendants rely on discuss fraudulent joinder. 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 5 of 7
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the Osbon Defendants owed them a duty to 

perform car repairs so as not to create an unreasonable risk of harm, the Osbon 

Defendants breached that duty, and the Osbon Defendants’ breach caused Plaintiffs 

substantial injury and loss. (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 13–17). Plaintiffs also presented the auto repair 

order showing that the Osbon Defendants preformed repairs on Plaintiff Roberson’s 

vehicle shortly before the accident. (Doc. 17, Ex. D). The Graco Defendants, on the 

other hand, assert that Plaintiff Roberson’s father was the last person to service the 

vehicle’s rear axle, which makes it “clear that the [Osbon] Defendants are sham 

defendants who should be disregarded for the purposes of determining the existence of 

diversity jurisdiction.” (Doc. 20 at 5). 

 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ pleading and evidence demonstrate that it is far 

from “obvious” that Plaintiffs cannot prevail against the Osbon Defendants. Plaintiffs 

have plead at least the basic elements of negligence, and simply offering conflicting 

evidence falls well short of showing that Plaintiffs have no “glimmer of hope” to prevail. 

Therefore, Graco Defendants have not established that the fraudulent joinder exception to 

complete diversity applies. Accordingly, removal is not proper in this case. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court does not have federal question or diversity 

jurisdiction over this case. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must 

remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court will therefore grant Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Remand. 

Accordingly, 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 6 of 7
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 18) to Maricopa 

Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, found in 

Doc. 17, is not briefed adequately by either party for the Court to rule on at this time. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs may file a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 

Local Rule Civil 54.2 within 14 days. 

 Dated this 12th day of November, 2014. 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-JAT Document 22 Filed 11/12/14 Page 7 of 7