Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01536/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01536-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY BERNARD HENDERSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

JOHN GRANT, 

Defendant.

No. 2:23-CV-1536-DJC-DMC-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendant’s unopposed motion to dismiss. See ECF 

No. 17. 

 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of 

material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The 

Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer 

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All 

ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 

factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 

In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

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See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order 

to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 

more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The 

complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 

570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but 

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement 

to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials 

outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) 

documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no 

party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, 

and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials 

of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

 Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no 

amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 

curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

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I. BACKGROUND

 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

This case proceeds on Plaintiff's original complaint. Plaintiff names the following 

as Defendants: (1) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; (2) John Grant, 

Canteen Manager at the California Health Care Facility; and (3) Does 1 through 50. See ECF No. 

1, pg. 1. Defendant Grant is sued in his official capacity only. See id. at 6. Plaintiff seeks 

compensatory and punitive damages. See id. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants falsely advertised the April 2023 Canteen price 

listings. See id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to adequately communicate that 

Plaintiff would be charged according to the increased prices listed in March 2023 rather than the 

decreased prices advertised in the April 2023 edition. See id. at 3. Plaintiff asserts that this failure 

to communicate and false advertisement were due to Plaintiff’s vulnerability as a qualified 

inmate/patient with a disability. Plaintiff alleges that he applied for canteen items for the month of 

April 2023. Plaintiff requested shredded beef, listed at $3.25, and mackerel, listed at $1.50 in the 

April canteen price listing. See id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, he was charged the prices for the 

March canteen price listing – shredded beef listed at $5.65, and mackerel listed at $1.85. See id. 

at 3. Plaintiff claims that he was intentionally overcharged for the items listed on the April 

canteen form and was instead charged according to the higher March canteen price listing. See id. 

at 3. 

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a “request for interview” form to the Canteen 

Manager concerning the charge discrepancy and was told that Defendant John Grant was 

“depleting old inventory at old prices.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Grant did not provide 

notice regarding the canteen’s increased pricing during the month of April. Plaintiff asserts that 

had Defendant Grant issued notice regarding the pricing inconsistencies, it would have put 

Plaintiff and other inmates on notice the products would not be sold at the reduced prices noted in 

April 2023 price listings. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Grant knowingly, intentionally, and 

willingly misled inmate/patients assigned to psychiatric care. Plaintiff further asserts that 

Defendant Grant’s failure to provide adequate notice of the decision to sell inmates/patients 

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products at the increased March prices in turn failed to provide aids and services that Plaintiff is 

entitle to under the ADA as a qualified individual with a disability. 

B. Procedural History

 The Court determined that Plaintiff’s complaint appeared to state cognizable 

claims against Defendant Grant based on denial of equal protection arising from disparate 

treatment due to disability. See ECF No. 10. The Court otherwise found that Plaintiff failed to 

state any other claims as against any other defendants. See id. Plaintiff was provided an 

opportunity to amend and cautioned that, if no first amended complaint was filed within the time 

permitted therefor, the action would proceed on Plaintiff’s original complaint as to his equal 

protection claim against Defendant Grant. See id. Plaintiff did not file a first amended complaint 

within the time permitted and, on March 15, 2024, the Court recommended dismissal of all claims 

and defendants except Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendant Grant. See ECF No. 

12. The findings and recommendations were adopted in full by the District Judge on June 7, 

2024. See ECF No. 18. 

II. DISCUSSION

 In the unopposed motion to dismiss, Defendant argues: (1) because Defendant is a 

prison official sued in his official capacity only for damages, he is immune under the Eleventh 

Amendment; and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to sustain an equal protection claim. 

See ECF No 17-1. The Court agrees. 

A. Immunity

 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 

against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 

Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh 

Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials acting in their official 

capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 

469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment does not, however, bar suits 

against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. Under the doctrine of Ex Parte 

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Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment also does not bar suits for prospective 

declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. See Armstrong v. 

Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 Here, Plaintiff does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief. Plaintiff sues 

Defendant Grant in his official capacity only for compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant 

Grant is, therefore, immune under the Eleventh Amendment. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from 

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security 

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also 

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial 

and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 

2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the 

disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 

2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals 

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 

(9th Cir. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination on the basis of gender). 

 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 

discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 

such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 

of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 

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F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Citing the allegations in the complaint, Defendant argues: 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was treated differently 

because of his disability, but rather that he should have been treated 

differently because of his disability. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

“fail[ed] to remove communication barriers” or “provide aids and 

services” to help Plaintiff and other EOP inmates understand that canteen 

items ordered in April 2023 would be charged according to the higher 

March 2023 prices. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant 

treated him, or other disabled inmates who purchased canteen items in 

April 2023, differently from other similarly situated inmates who 

purchased canteen items in April 2023. Indeed, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s 

complaint is that Defendant failed to treat disabled inmates differently 

from everyone else. That Defendant treated disabled inmates the same as 

others does not state an equal protection claim. . . . 

 * * * 

The Complaint also does not contain any facts from which it could 

be inferred that Defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Plaintiff’s 

vague and conclusory allegations that Defendant “intentionally, knowingly 

and willfully misled inmate/patients assigned to [EOP,]” and that “these 

deceptive marketing tactics target[ed] the [P]laintiff because of his 

disability” (ECF No. 1 at 4), are insufficient to state a claim that 

Defendant purposefully discriminated against Plaintiff because of his 

disability. . . . 

ECF No. 17-1, pgs. 4-5. 

 Defendant's arguments, which Plaintiff does not oppose, are well-taken. Most 

notably, and fatal to Plaintiff's complaint is the fact that Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant 

treated similarly situated non-EOP inmates differently than EOP inmates with regard to Canteen 

prices. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his rights by not treating him 

differently. This allegation does not support an equal protection claim. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff’s allegation that defendants failed to 

treat disabled persons differently from other similarly situated individuals did not state an equal 

protection claim); see also Lam v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 868 F. Supp. 2d 928, 951 (N.D. 

Cal. 2012), aff’d, 565 Fed.Appx. 641 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that plaintiff must plausibly allege 

that he “was treated differently from persons similarly situated”); see also Chaffee v. Chiu, 2012 

WL 1110012, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 

/ / /

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 The Court also agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant 

“intentionally, knowingly and willfully misled inmate/patients assigned to [EOP],” is too vague 

and conclusory, without additional detail, to allow the Court to plausibly infer that Defendant 

acted with discriminatory intent as to Canteen pricing. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Davis v. Ali, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29790 at *10-11 (E.D. 

Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of being treated differently and of 

defendant’s alleged prejudice, are insufficient to state a claim that any defendant purposely 

discriminated against plaintiff). Indeed, given Plaintiff's contention that Defendant Grant violated 

his rights by not treating EOP inmates differently, it is difficult to imagine a set of facts which 

would allow an inference of discriminatory intent. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's unopposed 

motion to dismiss, ECF No. 17, be GRANTED and that this action be DISMISSED with 

prejudice. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 

with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 

Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: September 10, 2024 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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