Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03428/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL MANUEL TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

WINSTON Y. CHAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03428-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Joel Manuel Taylor filed this pro se civil action and applied to proceed in forma pauperis. 

His complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which allows the 

Court to dismiss an in forma pauperis action if the action is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pro se pleadings must 

be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

In this action, Mr. Taylor sues the private attorneys -- four individuals and their law firm of 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher -- appointed to represent him in his federal criminal case. Mr. Taylor 

alleges that Defendants were negligent and committed other torts in their representation of him in 

his criminal case. According to a recent order in the federal criminal case, the federal criminal 

case against Mr. Taylor has been stayed and his counsel has withdrawn. See Docket No. 130 in 

United States v. Taylor, No. 14-cr-0117 JST. 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized 

by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994). As relevant here, the Court only has jurisdiction to entertain this action if the parties have 

diverse citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or if it raises a federal question, such as a civil rights 

claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 

Case 3:16-cv-03428-EMC Document 10 Filed 10/24/16 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

388 (1971). (There are other federal statutes that grant other bases of federal court jurisdiction, 

but none are applicable to this action.) In simple terms, this action can go forward in federal court 

only if there is diversity jurisdiction, or if a claim is stated under § 1983 or Bivens.

Diversity jurisdiction is absent because Mr. Taylor and the defendants are citizens of 

California. Diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000 and, 

more important for present purposes, that the action is between “citizens of different States.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Mr. Taylor alleges that he is a resident of California, that the 

individual defendants are residents of California, and that the law firm defendant is “organized and 

existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal place of business in [San 

Francisco], California.” Docket No. 1 at 1 (brackets in source). There is no diversity jurisdiction.

Federal question jurisdiction also is not alleged and does not appear to exist. A civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, would give the Court federal question 

jurisdiction over this action, but Mr. Taylor’s claim cannot be pursued under either § 1983 or 

Bivens because of the absence of a state or federal actor. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To state a claim under Bivens and its progeny, a 

plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution of the United States was violated 

and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a federal actor. See Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 

F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (Bivens actions and actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are identical 

save for replacement of state actor under § 1983 by federal actor under Bivens). 

Here, none of the defendants is a state or federal actor, and the absence of such is fatal to 

both a § 1983 action and a Bivens action. A public defender or other appointed counsel for a 

defendant in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law when performing a 

lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering pleas, making motions, objecting at trial, crossexamining witnesses, and making closing arguments. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-

19 (1981); see Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); 

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (private 

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attorney is not a state actor). This rule applies in a Bivens action as well as a Section 1983 action, 

i.e., the public defender or other appointed criminal defense attorney in federal court does not act 

under color of federal law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions. See Cox v. 

Hellerstein, 685 F.2d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1982). Although there is an exception to this rule 

which permits liability for an attorney jointly acting with state or federal officials in a conspiracy 

and acting under color of state or federal law, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980), Mr. 

Taylor has not alleged facts showing such a conspiracy between any defendant and any 

government officials.1 

Mr. Taylor has not identified any other federal statute that would give this Court federal 

question jurisdiction, and the Court is not aware of one that would. There is no federal question 

jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The action must be pursued, if at all, in state court. The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

 

1 Mr. Taylor filed an amendment to his complaint, in which he used the term “conspiracy.” See 

Docket No. 6. But the conspiracy mentioned in that document, and at Docket No. 1 at 8, is not a 

conspiracy in which the defendants are involved. Specifically, Mr. Taylor alleged that, in the 

course of proceedings to determine whether he was competent to stand trial and/or psychotropic 

medications should be involuntarily administered, Dr. Preston’s clinical formulation report stated 

that “Mr. Taylor presents with prominent paranoid ideation. He appears fixated on the delusional

belief that he was purposely infected with HIV, and that there[’]s a conspiracy to deny him 

medical treatment for this condition.” Docket No. 6 at 1-2. The allegation that an evaluating 

doctor reported that Mr. Taylor had a delusion that there was a conspiracy to deny him medical 

care does not even remotely suggest the Defendants were in a conspiracy with state or federal 

actors in their legal representation of him. 

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