Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03927/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03927-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACK HINSHAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE VESSEL M/V AURORA, and AL BOURAQ

AVIATION, INC., a Delaware

Corporation,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-3927 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND MOTION TO

DISSOLVE ORDER OF

ARREST AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTIONS

Defendants M/V Aurora (the Vessel) and its owner Al Bouraq

Aviation, Inc. move for partial summary judgment with respect to

the first cause of action of the second amended complaint. In a

separate motion, they move to dissolve the November 29, 2005 Order

of Arrest. Pro se Plaintiff Jack Hinshaw opposes both motions. He

has filed numerous motions in response to Defendants' motions; his

motions were not properly noticed, but the Court will address them

nonetheless. The matters were heard on May 31, 2007. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the evidence

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United States District Court

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cited therein and oral argument, the Court grants Defendants'

motions and denies Plaintiff's motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 28, 2005. His

first cause of action was "an in rem action brought to enforce a

maritime lien"; his remaining claims were against the owner of the

Vessel. Pursuant to the Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims

Rule C, Plaintiff sought arrest of the Vessel. He further sought

to be appointed substitute custodian of the Vessel. On

November 29, 2005, the Court granted Plaintiff's application for

arrest and denied his application for appointment as substitute

custodian. The U.S. Marshal has not yet arrested the Vessel;

nonetheless, the Court's order of arrest restricts the movement of

the Vessel. 

In July, 2006, Plaintiff amended his complaint for the second

time, alleging, as he had in his earlier complaints, that he was

hired to oversee the refurbishing and re-fitting of the Vessel, but

was not paid for that work. His second amended complaint contains

four causes of action. Defendants move for summary judgment only

on the first. This claim, entitled "Brought by Plaintiff Against

All Defendants for Unpaid Wages, Supplies, Penalties and

Necessaries, Expenses Advanced, Maintenance, and Cure to Enforce

Maritime Lien," is alleged under admiralty law. Plaintiff states

that he provided services to the Vessel and that he joined the

Vessel as a member of the crew, fully performing his duties as a

crew member. He claims that he is entitled to penalty wages under

46 U.S.C. § 10313.

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 At his deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that his Coast

Guard seaman papers have not been updated since the early 1950s. 

He further testified that he had not entered his name in the

Vessel's log, that he never went on a voyage on board the Vessel

and that he was a crew of one. 

Plaintiff admitted that the Vessel was "almost what you call a

derelict vessel," Walsh Dec., Ex. 1 at 116:8-9, and that the

Vessel's most recent Certificate of Documentation expired in

August, 1991. It is not currently documented or numbered under the

laws of the United States. The Vessel had not been in operation

for "probably ten years or more." Id. at 117:19. At the time

Plaintiff was associated with the Vessel, its engines were not

operating; it was tied up and it never left the dock. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

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produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party's prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's

"burden of contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not

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negligible." Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's first cause of action, which

is based on federal admiralty law, fails as a matter of law. They

contend that, because the Vessel was a "dead ship" and because

Plaintiff did not serve as a seaman, there can be no admiralty

claim. 

In Robert E. Blake Inc. v. Excel Env't, 104 F.3d 1158 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit explained that, although a contract

to repair a ship is generally covered by admiralty law, contracts

for services to a vessel "laid up and withdrawn from navigation,

i.e., a 'dead ship,'" are not governed by admiralty law. 104 F.3d

at 1160. The "health of the ship at the time the contract is

formed" is determinative. Id. The court noted that the Second

Circuit has held that a ship that had laid idle for several years

and was then towed was dead "because her pumps were deactivated,

her engine was inoperable, and she lacked proper documentation." 

Id. (citing Murray v. Schwartz, 175 F.2d 72, 72-3 (2d Cir. 1949)). 

The court concluded that, at the time the parties formed their

contract, the vessel at issue was a dead ship: the ship had been

stored for several years and was withdrawn from navigation. 

Because "contracts for services to dead ships are not within

admiralty jurisdiction," the contract in Blake was not subject to

admiralty law, even though the contract was to reactivate the dead

ship. Id. at 1161. 

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Here, it is undisputed that, at the time any contract was

formed, the Vessel had not been operated for over a decade and its

certificate of documentation had long since expired. Indeed,

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Vessel is derelict. Rather, he

accuses Defendants of failing to acknowledge the less stringent

rulings of other circuits. Plaintiff's reliance on the Second

Circuit cases he cites, however, is misplaced. For example, in

Shipping Financial Services Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 132 (2d

Cir. 1998), the court concluded that, although "agency contracts

can be a basis for admiralty jurisdiction if the 'nature and

subject matter' of the contract is maritime," the particular

charter party brokerage contract at issue failed to qualify for

admiralty jurisdiction. The Second Circuit cases do not address

the issue of a dead ship. Nor was that issue addressed in the

Supreme Court case Plaintiff cites, Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf

Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 611 (1991). Further, cases from the

Second Circuit are not binding on this Court; the Ninth Circuit's

decision in Blake, however, is binding on this Court. And, as in

Blake, at the time any contract between the parties was entered

into, the Vessel was "withdrawn from navigation and thus admiralty

jurisdiction as well." 104 F.3d at 1160. Because the Vessel is a

dead ship, Plaintiff's first cause of action, his admiralty claim,

fails.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's admiralty claim fails for an

additional reason. According to Defendants, Plaintiff was not a

seaman on the Vessel and, thus, he is not entitled to the duties

and protections of federal maritime law and statutes. They note

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that the statute to which Plaintiff refers in his first cause of

action applies to a Vessel of the United States "on a voyage" and

that it is undisputed that Plaintiff never went on a voyage while

he was working on the vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Cf. McKinley

v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 980 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1992)

(holding that the ship was not in "navigation," within the meaning

of the Jones Act, and thus the decedent was not a "seaman" at the

time of the accident). 

Plaintiff responds that he performed substantial work on the

Vessel and that a jury could, based on his experiences, find that

he was a seaman. The evidence he attaches, including proof from

the U.S. Coast Guard of his last service as an ordinary seaman in

1950, however, does not show that Plaintiff was a "seaman" with

this Vessel; whether he was a seaman on another ship does not 

establish that he was a seaman here. Further, Plaintiff provides

no evidence that he is currently certified to be a seaman or that

he was hired by Defendants as a seaman. The employment agreement

says that his duties were to "rebuild, refit, commission, make

seaworthy, obtain certification as a commercial vessel." 

Plaintiff's Ex. 1. Nor does Plaintiff's citation to the Longshore

and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, save his

claim. That act provides compensation for injury, disability and

death. Plaintiff makes no such personal injury claim in his Second

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff fails to show that there is a

material dispute of fact concerning whether he served as a seaman

on the Vessel.

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1Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear his Motions to

Counter Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket

No. 145) is GRANTED IN PART. The Court did not hear Plaintiff's

motion to reject his prior attorney's lien for fees.

9

For this reason as well, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's

admiralty claim fails as a matter of law and grants summary

judgment in favor of Defendants.

II. Defendants' Motion to Dissolve Order of Arrest

The Court ordered the arrest of the Vessel pursuant to

Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule C. The

Supplemental Rules govern the procedure in admiralty and maritime

claims with respect to actions in rem. Supp. Rule A(1)(A)(ii). As

other courts have found, a prerequisite to arrest under Rule C is

an admiralty or maritime claim. See, e.g., Navieros

Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 313

(1st Cir. 1997) (“In order to invoke Rule C to arrest a vessel, a

plaintiff must have a valid maritime lien against the defendant's

vessel.”). Because no admiralty claims remain in this case,

Defendants' motion to dissolve the order of arrest is granted.

III. Plaintiff's Motions

Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion for summary

judgment containing five "supporting motions": Motion for Fraud and

Quantum Meruit; Motion to Substitute Dr. Abdullah Alanizi in Lieu

of David Tattum as Company Representative; Motion to Reject of

[sic] Lien for Fees in its Entirety; Motion to Reopen and

Adjudicate Motion to Compel and for Sanctions; and Motion for Cash

Bond in Lieu of Restriction of Movement of Aurora.1

 He then filed

a separate motion to reject his prior attorney's lien for fees,

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stating in the caption that the motion was part of his response to

Defendants' dispositive motion for partial summary judgment, and a

separate Motion to Substitute Dr. Abdullah Alanizi in Lieu of David

Tattum as Company Representative, which the Court took under

submission on the papers. Ten days before the hearing, he filed a

"Motion to Accept Plaintiff's Claims," which appears to be a

request for judgment in his favor. Then three days before the

hearing, he filed a motion for leave to file a third amended

complaint. None of these motions was properly noticed pursuant to

the Civil Local Rules. 

Because Plaintiff's motion to reject his prior attorney's lien

for fees (Docket No. 129) is not related to Defendants' motion for

summary judgment, the Court will not address it in this order and

will take the matter under submission. Plaintiff's former counsel

has already submitted a declaration in response to Plaintiff's

motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply. The Court will decide the

matter in a separate order without further briefing. The Court

will, however, address Plaintiff's other motions.

Plaintiff's motion for fraud and quantum meruit is denied. As

discussed below, Plaintiff's complaint does not contain a cause of

action for fraud and whether Plaintiff conferred something of value

on Defendants, which might support a quantum meruit claim, is a

question to be decided at the bench trial and cannot be resolved

here. 

Plaintiff's motion to substitute Dr. Abdullah Alanizi for

David Tattum as Company Representative is denied. Plaintiff cites

no legal authority for his motion and the Court knows of none.

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Plaintiff's motion to reopen and adjudicate his motion to

compel and for sanctions is denied. Plaintiff states that his

prior attorney "failed to incorporate a list of specific documents

that were not requested and subjects not covered prepared [sic] for

him." Discovery was closed on March 1, 2007, and Plaintiff does

not provide good cause to reopen discovery or for sanctions. 

Plaintiff's motion for a cash bond in lieu of restriction of

movement of Aurora is also denied. Plaintiff fails to show that

one is required in this case. 

The Court also denies the "Motion to Accept Plaintiff's

Claim." In addition to being untimely, the motion is without

merit. The Court cannot at this time "accept" Plaintiff's claim

for wages, benefits and reimbursements pertaining to the employment

agreement or "accept" his claim for a commission for finding

someone to buy the Vessel. That is to be decided at the trial.

Finally, the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff's motion

for leave to amend his complaint to add claims for quantum meruit

and fraud. As Plaintiff acknowledged at argument, his complaint

already contains a cause of action for quantum meruit. A motion

for leave to amend a complaint must attach a copy of the proposed

complaint. Plaintiff does not. Further, any pleading alleging

fraud is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which

requires that "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake

shall be stated with particularity." As the Ninth Circuit

instructs, "Averments of fraud must be accompanied by 'the who,

what, when, where, and how' of the misconduct charged." Vess v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

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Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). In

addition, the pleading must set forth what is false or misleading

about a statement, and why it is false. Id. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (Docket No. 118) is GRANTED. Their motion to

dissolve the order of arrest (Docket No. 121) is also GRANTED. The

November 29, 2005 order of arrest is DISSOLVED. The Court DENIES

Plaintiff's Motion for Fraud and Quantum Meruit, Motion to

Substitute Dr. Abdullah Alanizi in Lieu of David Tattum as Company

Representative (Docket No. 139), Motion to Reopen and Adjudicate

Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, Motion for Cash Bond in Lieu of

Restriction of Movement of Aurora and Motion to Accept Plaintiff's

Claims (Docket No. 146). Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his

complaint (Docket Nos. 158, 159) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If

Plaintiff wishes to seek leave to amend his complaint to add a

claim of fraud, he must do so within ten days of the date of this

order, and the motion must be noticed in accordance with Civil

Local Rule 7-2 and be accompanied by the proposed amended

complaint. Plaintiff's motion to reject his former attorney's lien

(Docket No. 129) is submitted on the papers and the Court will

address it in a separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/6/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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