Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01810/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Todd Lee Smith, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-03-1810-PHX-SRB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR RECORD

EXPANSION, DISCOVERY, AND AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner Todd Lee Smith (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner under sentence of death.

He has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that he is imprisoned and

sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. Pending before the Court is

Petitioner’s Motion for Record Expansion, Discovery, and an Evidentiary Hearing. (Dkt.

46.)1

 Petitioner seeks evidentiary development as to Claims 1-7, 14-16, 18, and 20.

Respondents filed a response, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Dkts. 57, 62.) 

Pursuant to the Court’s general procedures governing resolution of capital habeas

proceedings, the parties have completed briefing of both the procedural status and merits of

Petitioner’s claims. Therefore, the Court will first determine whether the claims for which

Petitioner seeks evidentiary development are appropriate for review on the merits by a

federal habeas court or subject to a procedural bar.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1997, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of first-degree murder (on

premeditated and felony murders theories for each count), armed robbery and first-degree

burglary arising from the robbery and deaths of Joe and Elaine Tannehill at a campground

in Ashurst Lake, Arizona. Coconino County Superior Court Judge H. Jeffrey Coker

sentenced Petitioner to death for the murders and to a term of imprisonment for the other

counts. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Smith, 193 Ariz.

452, 974 P.2d 431 (1999). A petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was

denied in October 1999. Smith v. Arizona, 528 U.S. 880 (1999). 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) pursuant to Rule 32 of

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure on February 2, 2002. Without holding an

evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied relief. On September 9, 2003, the Arizona

Supreme Court summarily denied a petition for review. Thereafter, Petitioner initiated the

instant habeas proceedings.

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). The AEDPA

requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To properly

exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999).

 A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

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2

 Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state court is an

intrinsically federal issue to be determined by the federal court. Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d

247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995); Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th Cir. 1994).

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claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971).2

 Commenting on the importance of fair presentation, the United States Supreme

Court has stated:

If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the

prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam). Following Duncan, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus

exhausted) federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that the

claims were based on federal law. See, e.g., Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70

(2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency of

evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked the

specificity and explicitness required to present federal claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d

982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (broad reference to “due process” insufficient to present federal

claim); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.”). A

petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit by citing specific provisions of

federal statutory or case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v.

Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze

the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc). Such explicit fair presentation must be made not only to the trial or postconviction court, but to the state’s highest court. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004).

If a petitioner’s habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the state court,

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the claim may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal

claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed

to present the claim in any forum and “the court to which the petitioner would be required

to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims

procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. This is often referred to as “technical”

exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the

petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See id. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who

has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for

exhaustion; there are no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”); Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996).

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post-conviction proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their

convictions or sentences in state court. Rule 32.2 provides, in part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this

rule based upon any ground: . . . .

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

b. Exceptions. Rule 32.2(a) shall not apply to claims for relief based

on Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). When a claim under [these sub-sections]

is to be raised in a successive or untimely post-conviction relief proceeding,

the notice of post-conviction relief must set forth the substance of the specific

exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or

in a timely manner. If the specific exception and meritorious reasons do not

appear substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in

the previous petition or in a timely manner, the notice shall be summarily

dismissed.

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Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (West 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 32.2,

petitioners may not be granted relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior

petition for post-conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions

(subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was

omitted from a prior petition or not presented in a timely manner will the preclusive effect

of Rule 32.2 be avoided. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised

previously in state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies

currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. If no remedies are currently available,

petitioner’s claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. In addition, if there are claims that were fairly presented in state court

but found defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims also will be found procedurally

defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal law

and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262

(1989). A state procedural default is not independent if, for example, it depends upon an

antecedent federal constitutional ruling. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per

curiam). A state bar is not adequate unless it was firmly established and regularly followed

at the time of application by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of

procedurally defaulted claims unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure

to properly exhaust in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Ordinarily “cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that “some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s

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procedural rule.” Id. at 753. Objective factors which constitute cause include interference

by officials which makes compliance with the state’s procedural rule impracticable, a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,

and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional error or violation.

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice resulting

from a procedural default, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing not merely that

the errors at his trial constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension.

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). If a petitioner cannot meet the cause and

prejudice standard, the Court still may hear the merits of procedurally defaulted claims if the

failure to hear the claims would constitute a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Sawyer

v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).

PROCEDURAL STATUS OF CLAIMS

Petitioner seeks evidentiary development regarding Claims 1-7, 14-16, 18, and 20.

Respondents concede that Claims 1 (in part), 2, 3 (in part), 4, 5 (in part), and 6 are properly

exhausted. They contend that the remainder of the claims are procedurally defaulted in

whole or in part, and each will be addressed below. The Court first addresses some general

issues relevant to numerous claims.

Fifth Amendment Due Process Claims

With respect to most of his claims, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights under

the Fifth Amendment were violated. It is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth

Amendment that protects a person against deprivations of due process by a state. See U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due

process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due

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process by the several States.”). Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not

provide a cognizable ground for relief regarding Petitioner’s state court conviction, the

allegations that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was violated will be dismissed as

to every claim and will not be discussed below with respect to the individual claims.

Eighth Amendment Claims

With respect to almost every claim, Petitioner alleges that his right to be free of cruel

and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment was violated. The right to be

free of cruel and unusual punishment, by definition, is a protection related to the imposition

or carrying out of a sentence. In other words, the protection afforded by the Eighth

Amendment does not attach until a person is convicted and subject to punishment by the

state. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 667, 671 n.40 (1977) (summarizing that

the Eighth Amendment circumscribes only the type of punishment imposable on those

convicted, punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime and what can be criminalized

and punished); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (noting that the Eighth

Amendment has no application to pretrial detainees). There is no cognizable claim that

Petitioner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated as to claims relating solely to

a conviction. Because the Eighth Amendment does not provide a cognizable ground for

relief regarding conviction-related claims, the allegations that the Eighth Amendment was

violated will be summarily dismissed as to Claims 1-6 and 14.

Fundamental Error Review

Petitioner alleges that all of the claims in the Amended Petition are exhausted because

the Arizona Supreme Court “conducted a thorough fundamental error review.” (Dkt. 37 at

5.) However, at the time of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the statute that required Arizona

appellate courts to review criminal cases independently for fundamental error had been

repealed, see A.R.S. § 13-4035 (repealed by Laws 1995, Ch. 198, § 1), and the Arizona

Supreme Court’s opinion is devoid of any reference to having conducted a fundamental error

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3

 In support of his claim that the Arizona Supreme Court conducted a thorough

review for fundamental error in his case, Petitioner cites to appellate decisions in a wholly

unrelated capital case that predates repeal of A.R.S. § 13-4035.

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review.3 Moreover, even before repeal of this statute, the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion

that the Arizona Supreme Court’s statutory fundamental error review actually exhausted

claims for purposes of federal habeas review. See Poland (Michael) v. Stewart, 117 F.3d

1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 1997) (Arizona’s process of fundamental error review does not excuse

a petitioner’s failure to present federal claims to the state’s highest court); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that review for fundamental

error by Arizona Supreme Court prevents procedural preclusion from attaching). Therefore,

this Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that fundamental error review exhausted any claims

not actually presented to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Waiver of Procedural Default Defense

Throughout his Traverse, Petitioner asserts that Respondents have waived the defense

of procedural default for claims that Respondents assert are “technically” exhausted but

procedurally barred from habeas review. (See, e.g., dkt. 32 at 34, 52, 88, 89, 90; dkt. 37 at

33, 50, 118, 124, 130.) Specifically, Petitioner asserts that Respondents waived the defense

by failing to allege “what procedural bar applies and that there is no viable state court forum

for Mr. Smith to now raise” his claims. (Dkt. 37 at 50.) The Court disagrees.

In a preliminary part of its Answer, Respondents expressly state that claims

not previously presented to the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal or

collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt

to return to state court to present any additional claims would almost certainly

be futile. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.4(a) (successive postconviction relief in a capital case permissible only to raise certain categories

of claims); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-37, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53

(1996) (rules of preclusion and waiver strictly applied to capital petitioners in

state post-conviction relief proceedings).

(Dkt. 32 at 17.) Respondents have asserted generally that any claim not presented in state

court is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona’s Rule 32

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 This finding is limited to the instances in which Respondents expressly assert that

a claim was not presented in state court and is now procedurally barred. As discussed infra

regarding Claim 3, Respondents’ failure to address the procedural status of a claim can be

deemed a waiver of any procedural default.

5

 “AP doc.” refers to the documents filed in the Arizona Supreme Court during

Petitioner’s direct appeal (Case No. CR-97-0389-AP). “M.E.” refers to the one-volume set

of minute entries from Petitioner’s trial and sentencing proceedings prepared for Petitioner’s

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from exhausting the claim in state court. Respondents could have recited the pertinent state

rule of preclusion for each individual claim it subsequently asserted was not properly

exhausted in state court; however, the Court declines to find that Respondents have waived

any procedural default because they implicitly refer back to the above-quoted part of their

Answer when stating, without more, that a specific claim (or part of a claim) was not

presented in state court and is now barred from habeas review.4

 Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290

F.3d 1223, 1229-32 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding waiver of procedural default argument where

state argued for the first time on appeal that the petitioner was procedurally barred from

raising a claim in a successive state post-conviction petition). This was sufficient “to inform

the district court and the petitioner of the asserted procedural reason why petitioner may not

be heard in state or federal court.” Id. at 1232. Consequently, Petitioner’s repeated requests

in his Traverse to file supplemental “cause and prejudice” briefing should the Court disagree

with his waiver arguments are denied; Petitioner was provided an opportunity to raise cause

arguments and did so throughout the Traverse, even as to claims for which he argued waiver

of procedural default. 

Claim 1

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the

definition of premeditation, in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Dkt. 24 at 81.) In his opening appellate brief, Petitioner presented a claim

entitled, “The Premeditation Instruction in this Case Constituted Reversible Error.” (AP doc.

13 at 9.)5

 In the body of the argument, Petitioner argued only that the premeditation

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direct appeal. “PCR-ROA doc.” refers to documents in the three-volume record on appeal

prepared for Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme from the denial of PCR

relief. (Case No. CR-03-0039-PC). “PR doc.” refers to documents filed in the Arizona

Supreme Court during Petitioner’s petition for review. “R.T.” refers to the reporter’s

transcript. Certified copies of these records as well as the original trial transcripts were

provided to this Court by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Dkt. 50.)

6

 Petitioner’s original PCR petition was returned to counsel because it exceeded the

page limitations set forth in Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (PCRROA doc. 26.) Consequently, in his re-filed PCR petition, Petitioner “attempted to skirt the

page limit requirement” (PCR-ROA doc. 40) by attaching “exhibits” consisting of additional

argument in support of various PCR claims (PCR-ROA doc. 30). The PCR court expressly

refused to consider arguments and citations of cases contained in these “exhibits.” (PCRROA doc. 40). Accordingly, this Court does not consider whether the additional argument

and citations contained in Exhibit EE of the PCR petition exhausted Claim 1 because they

were not fairly presented to the state court in a procedurally proper manner. See Casey v.

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that no meaningful opportunity for

review afforded if claim not presented in manner required by state courts).

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instruction given in his case was disapproved in State v. Ramirez, 945 P.2d 376 (Ariz. App.

1997), which is based solely on state law; he did not reference any federal cases or federal

constitutional provisions. In its decision, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to address the

claim because Petitioner was also convicted of felony murder, which does not require a

finding of premeditation. Smith, 193 Ariz. at 339, 974 P.3d at 460. Petitioner re-raised the

claim in his PCR, but referenced only the Ramirez decision and failed to cite federal law.6

(PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 39.)

Although the Court determines that Petitioner failed to fairly present a federal

constitutional claim based on the trial court’s premeditation instruction, Respondents

expressly concede exhaustion of Claim 1 in their Answer, except to the extent that it asserts

prejudice at sentencing. (Dkt. 32 at 54.) Because Respondents expressly waive exhaustion

and do not assert any procedural default defense, the Court concludes that Claim 1 should

be addressed on the merits. 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(3); accord Kerns v. Ault, 408 F.3d 447, 449

n.3 (8th Cir. 2005). 

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With respect to the allegation that use of the premeditation instruction led to prejudice

at sentencing, Petitioner cites no authority to support his theory that an unconstitutional jury

instruction at trial provides a basis for habeas relief from a sentence. Rather, resolution of

Claim 1 turns on whether the instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. While success on this claim would

necessarily void Petitioner’s sentence as a result of reversing the conviction, the claim does

not implicate sentencing independent of the conviction. Because Petitioner’s sentence is

irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of Claim 1, the Court concludes that this aspect of Claim

1 fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Accordingly, this aspect of the claim will be

dismissed with prejudice; the remainder of Claim 1 will be decided on the merits.

Claim 3

Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor improperly: (A) argued irrelevant prejudicial

matters during closing; (B) attacked defense counsel and experts; (C) vouched for the State’s

case; (D) evoked sympathy for the victims; (E) provided prejudicial expert rebuttal

testimony; (F) commented on Petitioner’s invocation of his right to counsel; and (G) shifted

the burden of proof. (Dkt. 24 at 118-227.) He further argues that trial and appellate

counsel’s failures to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct and to present such issues on

direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). (Id.) 

Prosecutorial Misconduct Allegations

With respect to Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims, Respondents assert only

that allegations D and E were never presented in state court; they do not address allegations

A, B, C, F or G. (Dkt. 32 at 40-41, 43-45.) Although the exhaustion requirement must be

expressly waived by the State, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3), the same is not true of the procedural

default defense. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d at 1230 (rejecting argument that § 2254(b)(3)

precludes the application of ordinary implicit waiver rules to the habeas procedural default

doctrine); Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that government

waived procedural default argument by contending only that the petitioner had failed to

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exhaust remedies, which is “quite a different argument, of course, from asserting procedural

default”). Because Respondents fail to address the procedural status of allegations A, B, C,

F and G, the Court finds they have waived any procedural default defense; therefore, these

claims will be addressed on the merits.

In addition, contrary to Respondents’ contention, the Court finds that Petitioner

presented the substantive prosecutorial misconduct aspect of allegations D and E in state

court. In his PCR petition, Petitioner asserted that he was denied “due process” by the

prosecutor’s evocation of sympathy for the victims and cited Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416

U.S. 637 (1974). (PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 8.) In DeChristoforo, the Supreme Court assessed

whether remarks by a prosecutor “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 416 U.S.

at 643. Petitioner further asserted that a “defendant’s due process rights are violated if

prosecutorial misconduct renders a trial ‘fundamentally unfair,’” and in support cited Darden

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-83 (1986), which applies DeChristoforo in assessing a

claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 10.) In his argument concerning

the prosecutor’s use of expert rebuttal testimony, Petitioner cited state cases that referenced

the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993),

which identifies the Darden decision as being in accord with the state court’s analysis of

prosecutorial misconduct claims. (PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 10.) In his subsequent petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner again asserted that prosecutorial misconduct

violated his right to due process as “guaranteed by the United States and Arizona

Constitutions.” (PR doc. 3 at 3, 30.) This was sufficient to fairly present a federal due

process claim to the state courts. Accordingly, this Court will address allegations D and E

on the merits.

IAC Allegations

Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted IAC claims based on counsel’s failure

to object to prosecutorial misconduct as alleged above in A, D, and E. (Dkt. 32 at 33-34.)

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Respondents do not address the procedural status of allegations B, C or G; therefore, the

Court finds that Respondents have waived any procedural default defense and these claims

will be addressed on the merits. Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230; Francis, 894 F.2d at 355.

In contrast, Respondents assert that an IAC claim based on allegation F was never

presented in state court. The Court agrees. In his PCR petition, Petitioner asserted that

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s introduction into evidence of

an unredacted transcript and recording of Petitioner’s statement to police in which he invoked

his right to counsel. (PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 38.) However, he did not subsequently include

this claim in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, it was not

exhausted, Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848, and the Court must assess whether Petitioner now has

an available state remedy to exhaust an IAC claim based on allegation F.

Available State Remedies

Petitioner argues that if the Court determines that any aspect of Claim 3 is not

exhausted, the Court should stay these proceedings and allow him to return to state court.

See Rhines v. Weber, 125 U.S. 1528 (2005). He does not specifically assert that he has a

remedy available in state court for the IAC claim relating to Claim 3-F, but suggests there

are “several exceptions to preclusion contained in Rule 32 which create the possibility of a

viable state court forum.” (Dkt. 37 at 52.)

It is the role of the district court to determine if a petitioner presently has a remedy

available in state court. See Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 269-70

(O’Connor, J., concurring)). In making that decision, the court must “assess the likelihood

that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner a hearing on the merits of his claim.”

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 268

(O’Connor, J., concurring)). The question is whether “there is some reasonable probability

that (state) relief . . . will actually be available.” Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 320 (9th

Cir. 1982) (citing Powell v. Wyrick, 657 F.2d 222, 224 (8th Cir. 1981)). If a district court

determines that a state remedy is available, the court must then assess “whether there was

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good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Rhines, 125

S. Ct. at 1535. “Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district

court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims

are plainly meritless.” Id.

Rules 32.2(b) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a

petitioner may only file a successive, untimely PCR petition based on claims that fall within

the exceptions to preclusion set forth in Rule 32.1(d)-(h). Such a petition must set forth

“meritorious reasons” for not raising the claim in an available earlier proceeding. Here,

Petitioner actually presented the IAC aspect of Claim 3-F in his first PCR petition; the default

occurred when PCR counsel neglected to include the claim in the subsequent petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court concludes that the claim does not fall

within any of Arizona’s exceptions to preclusion and that Petitioner would be unable to show

meritorious reasons under Rule 32.2(b) for not including the IAC allegation of Claim 3-F in

his petition for review from the denial of his first PCR petition. Moreover, because this is

an IAC claim, Petitioner would be automatically precluded from seeking relief in a

successive PCR proceeding. See Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070

(2002) (noting that an IAC claim raised in a successive petition will be precluded

automatically if an IAC claim was presented in an earlier PCR petition). Thus, the Court

finds there is no “reasonable probability that (state) relief . . . will actually be available.”

Matias, 683 F.2d at 320.

Because the Court finds there are no remedies presently available to Petitioner in state

court, the IAC aspect of Claim 3-F is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. This claim will be barred from review on the merits

absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Cause and Prejudice/Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

As cause for any procedural default found by the Court, Petitioner asserts that

Arizona’s post-conviction process is inadequate and ineffective to protect his right to counsel

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and that PCR counsel performed deficiently.

A claim of counsel ineffectiveness can establish sufficient cause only when it rises to

the level of an independent constitutional violation. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. Thus, before

ineffectiveness may be used to establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been

presented to the state court as an independent claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.

446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the

procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted”); Murray, 477 U.S.

at 489-90 (“the exhaustion doctrine . . . generally requires that a claim of ineffective

assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to

establish cause for a procedural default.”); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.

1988) (exhaustion requires petitioner to first raise ineffective appellate counsel claim

separately in state court before alleging it as cause for default). However, when a petitioner

has no constitutional right to counsel, there can be no constitutional violation arising out

counsel’s ineffectiveness. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. There is no constitutional right to the

effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. See Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1989) (the

Constitution does not require states to provide counsel in PCR proceedings even when the

putative petitioners are facing the death penalty); Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th

Cir. 1999) (holding that IAC in PCR proceeding cannot constitute cause); Bonin v. Vasquez,

999 F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend the right of effective assistance of

counsel to state collateral proceedings); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.

1990). 

The fact that the PCR proceeding was Petitioner’s first and only opportunity to assert

claims of ineffectiveness at trial and on appeal does not change the analysis. In Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985), the Court held that a petitioner is entitled to effective

assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right. However, since Evitts was decided, the

courts have clarified that the holding in Evitts applies strictly to a first appeal as of right,

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even if particular types of claims could not have been raised in that appeal, because there is

no constitutional right to counsel in state PCR proceedings. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 558;

Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1996); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155,

1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (IAC claim defaulted for not being raised in first habeas petition, even

though the same counsel represented petitioner in both proceedings, because no right to

counsel in habeas proceedings); Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)

(plurality) (ruling an Arizona petitioner had “no Sixth Amendment right to counsel during

his state habeas proceedings even if that was the first forum in which he could challenge

constitutional effectiveness on the part of trial counsel”); see also Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396 n.7

(noting that discretionary appeals are treated differently because there is no right to counsel).

Petitioner’s argument fails because there is no constitutional right to counsel for PCR

proceedings even if it is an Arizona petitioner’s first opportunity to raise an ineffectiveness

claim. 

The Court is also unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Arizona court rules

render the PCR proceeding part of a mandatory bifurcated appellate process for capital cases

with a statutory right to counsel and, therefore, due process requires such counsel to be

effective. Petitioner cites no case, and the Court has found none, which holds that a state is

required by the federal constitution to provide counsel in PCR proceedings. The fact that a

state may, “as a matter of legislative choice,” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618 (1974),

provide for counsel in discretionary appeals following a first appeal of right does not extend

the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective counsel to discretionary appeals. See Evitts,

469 U.S. at 394, 397 n.7; Finley, 481 U.S. at 559 (where a state provides a lawyer in a state

post-conviction proceeding, it is not “the Federal Constitution [that] dictates the exact form

such assistance must assume,” rather, it is in a state’s discretion to determine what

protections to provide). Further, the Ninth Circuit has held explicitly that “ineffective

assistance of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings does not present an independent violation

of the Sixth Amendment enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of

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 Nor has Petitioner established that IAC of PCR counsel constitutes cause for any

further claims the Court determines in this Order are defaulted.

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the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1160. Because Petitioner’s PCR proceeding

took place after his appeal of right, it was a discretionary proceeding that did not confer a

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, even assuming PCR

counsel’s performance did not conform to minimum standards, it did not violate the federal

constitution and cannot excuse the procedural default of any claims. 

Petitioner has not shown cause for the procedural default of the IAC aspect of Claim

3-F.7

 Therefore, the Court declines to address prejudice. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, the Court finds no disputed issues of fact

warranting an evidentiary hearing on these issues. See Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512,

524 (9th Cir. 1992) (“An evidentiary hearing is not necessary to allow a petitioner to show

cause and prejudice if the court determines as a matter of law that he cannot satisfy the

standard.”). Petitioner’s request for a hearing on cause and prejudice is therefore denied.

Petitioner does not assert that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the

defaulted aspect of Claim 3 is not addressed on the merits. Because Petitioner has failed to

establish cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the default,

the IAC aspect of Claim 3-F is procedurally barred and will be dismissed with prejudice; all

remaining aspects of Claim 3, including all seven substantive prosecutorial misconduct

allegations (A-G) and IAC allegations A-E and G, will be reviewed on the merits and

considered with respect to the motions for evidentiary development.

Claim 5

Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present in his

state appellate brief the substantive issues contained in Claims 2-4 of his First Amended

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 The Amended Petition states that “appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise the aforementioned claims on direct appeal.” (Dkt. 24 at 237; emphasis added.)

However, as discussed supra, Respondents concede that Claim 1 was exhausted on direct

appeal. Because there can be no claim of appellate ineffectiveness for failing to present a

claim the parties agree was actually raised on appeal, the Court construes Claim 5 to allege

IAC for appellate counsel’s failure to raise on appeal the substantive issues underlying

Claims 2-4. 

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.8

 (Dkt. 24 at 237.) Respondents concede that Claim 5

is exhausted to the extent it asserts appellate IAC for failing to raise on direct appeal Claim

4 (prosecutor’s late notice of expert rebuttal witness). (Dkt. 32 at 52.) Except for the

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in Claim 3-F, the Court finds, for the reasons already

discussed with respect to Claim 3, that Petitioner fairly presented in state court an appellate

IAC claim based on counsel’s failure to raise on appeal the prosecutorial misconduct

allegations identified as A, B, C, D, E, and G.

Claim 2 alleges IAC for enlisting James Jarrett as a crime scene reconstruction expert.

In his PCR, Petitioner did not separately argue appellate ineffectiveness for the failure to

raise Claim 2 on direct appeal (PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 28-37), nor did he include an appellate

IAC claim on that ground in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court (PR doc.

3 at 23). Consequently, the Court finds that this aspect of Claim 5 was not properly

exhausted. Moreover, the allegation is plainly meritless. Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535.

Appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise Claim 2 on direct appeal because it

alleges trial IAC. At the time of Petitioner’s direct appeal, Arizona courts clearly required

that trial IAC claims be raised in a PCR, not on appeal. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 2,

39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (describing historical preference for presentation of trial IAC claims

in PCR proceedings). Accordingly, this aspect of Claim 5 will be dismissed with prejudice

as meritless.

In sum, Claim 5 will be reviewed on the merits and considered with respect to the

motions for evidentiary development only to the extent it asserts ineffectiveness for counsel’s

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failure to challenge on appeal (1) the prosecutorial misconduct allegations identified as A,

B, C, D, E, and G in Claim 3, and (2) the untimely disclosure issue set forth in Claim 4.

Claim 7

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding the pecuniary gain aggravating

factor under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5), in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. 24 at 310.) Respondents argue this claim was not properly

exhausted because Petitioner failed to raise it as a federal claim in state court. (Dkt. 32 at

72.)

In his opening appellate brief, Petitioner argued that the sentencing court should not

have found that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain under Arizona law. (AP doc.

13 at 13.) That is, he only argued that, under Arizona law, his actions failed to establish the

factor because he did not kill to steal. (Id. at 13-14.) Because Petitioner did not alert the

state supreme court to the federal basis of Claim 7, he failed to fairly present the claim. See

Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1350-51 (2004). However, because the Arizona Supreme

Court considered the pecuniary gain aggravating factor during its independent sentencing

review, this Court determines whether that review exhausted the claim. 

The Arizona Supreme Court, through its jurisprudence, has repeatedly stated that it

independently reviews each capital case to determine whether the death sentence is

appropriate. In State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 54, 659 P.2d 1, 13 (1983), the court stated

that the purpose of independent review is to assess the presence or absence of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances and the weight to give to each. See also State v. Blazak, 131

Ariz. 598, 604, 643 P.2d 694, 700 (1982). To ensure compliance with Arizona’s death

penalty statute, the court reviews the record regarding aggravation and mitigation findings,

and then decides independently whether the death sentence should be imposed. State v.

Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 493-94, 826 P.2d 783, 790-91 (1992). The Arizona Supreme Court

has also said that in conducting its review, it determines whether the sentence of death was

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factors. State v.

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Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976), sentence overturned on other

grounds, Richmond v. Cardwell, 450 F. Supp. 519 (D. Ariz. 1978). Arguably, such a review

rests on both state and federal grounds. See Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 493, 826 P.2d at 790

(finding that statutory duty to review death sentences arises from need to ensure compliance

with constitutional safeguards imposed by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments); State v.

Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981) (discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153 (1976), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and stating that independent

review of death penalty is mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court and necessary to ensure

against arbitrary and capricious application).

While the state court’s independent review does not encompass any and all alleged

constitutional error at sentencing, the Court must determine if it encompassed Petitioner’s

claim that the trial court erred in finding the pecuniary gain aggravating factor. In the

Arizona Supreme Court’s written opinion, it reviewed each of the aggravating factors found

by the sentencing judge to independently determine its existence and whether a death

sentence was appropriate. Smith, 193 Ariz. at 439-41, 974 P.2d at 460-62. With respect to

the pecuniary gain factor, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5), the court reviewed the evidence in the

record and determined that the (F)(5) factor had been satisfied. Id. at 440, 937 P.2d at 461.

The supreme court’s actual review of the trial court’s finding of the (F)(5) factor sufficiently

exhausted Claim 7. See Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir. 1984).

Thus, the Court finds that Claim 7 was actually exhausted, and it will be reviewed on the

merits and considered with respect to the motions for evidentiary development.

Claim 14

Petitioner asserts that, by failing to test a spot of blood on a flashlight found at the

murder scene, the prosecution violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and trial

counsel violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment. (Dkt. 24 at 348). He argues the

claims were exhausted as part of the Arizona Supreme Court’s fundamental error review and

independent review of the death sentence. (Id.) Alternatively, Petitioner requests a stay and

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asserts that state court relief is still available under Rule 32.1(e) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. (Id.; dkt. 37 at 119.) Respondents argue that these allegations were

never presented in state court and are now barred. (Dkt. 32 at 89.)

As already discussed, the Arizona Supreme Court did not conduct a review for

fundamental error in this case. Further, this claim clearly falls outside the scope of the state

supreme court’s independent sentencing review and was not thereby exhausted. Cf.

Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2005) (identifying types of claims

that fall outside scope of Arizona Supreme Court’s independent sentencing review).

Accordingly, the Court assesses whether Petitioner has an available state remedy to exhaust

these allegations now.

Arizona’s post-conviction rules allow, as an exception to preclusion, the filing of a

successive petition raising a claim of newly-discovered evidence. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b);

32.1(e). To satisfy this exception, a petitioner must first establish “meritorious reasons” why

the claim was not raised in a previous petition and in a timely manner, Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b), and then show that newly-discovered material facts probably exist and that such

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e).

Newly-discovered material facts exist if: 

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly discovered

material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or used

solely for impeachment . . . .

Id. (emphasis added).

The Court concludes that Claim 14 does not fall within Arizona’s “newly-discovered

evidence” exception to preclusion because there are no “newly-discovered” facts at issue and

Petitioner has not acted with due diligence. Petitioner asserts that blood on the flashlight, if

shown to be his, would provide evidence that the victims hit him with the flashlight and that

the murders were reflexive, not premeditated. However, there is no evidence establishing

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Petitioner as the source of the blood. Even if DNA testing today so established, Petitioner

would be precluded from relief because he cannot show that he exercised due diligence to

develop such evidence. Nothing in the record establishes that the prosecution interfered with

Petitioner’s ability to have the blood spot on the flashlight tested prior to trial. During trial,

the investigating detective testified that, although the prosecution chose not to test the

flashlight, it would have been turned over to the defense for testing if such a request had been

made. (R.T. 4/16/97 at 45.) Furthermore, the Court concludes that Petitioner would be

unable to show meritorious reasons under Rule 32.2(b) for not pursuing Claim 14 in his first

PCR proceeding and would be automatically precluded from presenting the IAC aspect of

Claim 14 because he raised other IAC claims in his first PCR. Smith, 202 Ariz. at 449, 46

P.3d at 1070. Thus, the Court finds there is not a “reasonable probability that (state) relief

. . . will actually be available.” Matias, 683 F.2d at 320. Because the Court finds there are

no remedies presently available to Petitioner in state court, Claim 14 is technically exhausted

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

As cause for the default, Petitioner asserts the merits of Claim 14 – that the

prosecution violated its duty, as set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to

disclose material evidence favorable to the defense. To succeed on a Brady claim, a

petitioner must establish (1) that evidence favorable to the accused was (2) suppressed by the

prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently, which (3) resulted in prejudice to the defense.

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82

(1999)). Establishing the second factor also establishes cause for any failure to develop a

Brady claim in state court. Id. Here, Petitioner cannot establish cause because there has been

no suppression of evidence by the prosecution. Petitioner does not allege, and the record

does not support, a claim that the State actually tested the blood spot on the flashlight and

thereby obtained evidence favorable to the defense. Nor does Petitioner allege that the State

interfered with defense access to the flashlight. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 371

(9th Cir. 1997) (“Because the carpet was available to Grisby for testing, the police’s failure

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to test it did not violate due process.”). As already noted, the record reveals that although the

State declined to test the blood spot, it would have provided the flashlight for testing by the

defense if counsel had made such a request. (R.T. 4/16/97 at 45.) 

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish cause for the default of

Claim 14; therefore, the Court need not address prejudice. Petitioner does not argue that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if this claim is not addressed on the merits.

Accordingly, Claim 14 is procedurally barred and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Claim 15

Petitioner asserts that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by

counsel’s deficient representation at sentencing. (Dkt. 24 at 353.) He argues this claim was

exhausted as part of the Arizona Supreme Court’s independent review of the death sentence.

(Id.) Alternatively, Petitioner requests a stay and asserts that state court relief is still

available under Rule 32.1(g) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because Wiggins

v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), represents a significant change in the law. (Id.; dkt. 37 at

124.) Respondents argue that this claim was never presented in state court and is now barred.

(Dkt. 32 at 52.)

The Court rejects Petitioner’s contention that the state supreme court’s independent

sentencing review exhausted Claim 15. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d at 1057 (holding

that Arizona Supreme Court’s independent sentencing review failed to exhaust a sentencing

IAC claim). The Court also finds that Petitioner would be barred if he returned to state court

to exhaust this claim now. 

Arizona’s post-conviction rules allow, as an exception to preclusion, the filing of a

successive petition raising a claim based on a significant change in the law “that if

determined to apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s conviction

or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(g). Claim 15 does not fall within this exception

because Wiggins is not a significant change in the law. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court

applied the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in

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determining that defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation. 539 U.S.

at 521-23 (citing Strickland and stating that issue before the Court was whether the

investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence was

reasonable). There is nothing “new” about the Wiggins decision; it is merely an application

of Strickland. See Landrigan v. Schriro, No. 00-99011, 2006 WL 549027, at *6 n.4 (9th Cir.

Mar. 8, 2006) (“Although Wiggins is a recent Supreme Court case, it applied the familiar

Strickland inquiry applicable to ineffective assistance claims in a post-AEDPA case.”).

Because the Court finds there are no remedies presently available to Petitioner in state court,

Claim 15 is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735

n.1. 

Petitioner does not assert cause and prejudice for the default or argue that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if this claim is not decided on the merits.

Accordingly, Claim 15 is procedurally barred and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Claim 16

Petitioner alleges that his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

were violated because the state courts “operated under the unconstitutional assumption that

Mr. Smith had to show a causal nexus between his proffered mitigating evidence and the

crime.” (Dkt. 24 at 356.) He argues this claim was exhausted as part of the Arizona

Supreme Court’s independent review of the death sentence. (Id.) Alternatively, Petitioner

requests a stay and asserts that state court relief is still available under Rule 32.1(g) of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004),

represents a significant change in the law. (Id.; dkt. 37 at 131.) Respondents argue that this

claim was never presented in state court and is now barred. (Dkt. 32 at 90.) 

The Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that the state supreme court’s independent

sentencing review exhausted Claim 16. Petitioner references no authority suggesting that the

scope of Arizona’s review encompasses any and all constitutional error at sentencing, and

this Court has found none. Rather, as already noted, it appears from Brewer that the state

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court’s review is limited to ensuring that imposition of a death sentence rests on permissible

grounds. See also State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. at 63, 628 P.2d at 946.

In Nave v. Delo, the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion concerning the scope

of the Missouri Supreme Court’s capital sentencing review. In that case, the Court analyzed

a Missouri statute which directed the state’s high court to consider “whether the sentence of

death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.”

Id. at 1039. Determining that the phrase “arbitrary factor” is a catch-all intended only to

describe possible improper bases for the imposition of the death penalty, the Nave court held

that a claim alleging an unconstitutional sentencing instruction fell outside the limited scope

of the state court’s mandatory review. 

As in Nave, this Court does not read the Arizona Supreme Court’s pronouncement in

State v. Richmond that it must determine “whether the sentence of death was imposed under

the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factors,” 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d

at 51, to encompass implicit review of any conceivable constitutional error. Rather, the

federal constitutional aspect of the court’s review is limited to ensuring that the death

sentence rests on permissible grounds. With respect to the instant issue, the Court finds that

the Arizona Supreme Court’s limited review did not necessarily include analysis of whether

the state courts were operating under an alleged “unconstitutional assumption” concerning

the consideration of mitigation evidence. Consequently, Claim 16 was not exhausted in state

court.

 The Court finds that Petitioner would be barred if he returned to state court to exhaust

this claim now. Arizona’s post-conviction rules allow, as an exception to preclusion, the

filing of a successive petition raising a claim based on a significant change in the law “that

if determined to apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s

conviction or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(g). Claim 16 does not fall within

this exception because Tennard is not a significant change in the law. In Tennard, the

Supreme Court assessed the petitioner’s entitlement to a certificate of appealability (“COA”)

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on the issue of whether instructions given to the jury in the penalty phase of his case violated

the Court’s holding in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the Texas capital

sentencing scheme provided a constitutionally inadequate vehicle for jurors to consider and

give effect to mitigating evidence). 542 U.S. at 276. The Court assessed whether the Fifth

Circuit had erred in determining that constitutionally relevant mitigation evidence, for the

purpose of reviewing a Texas capital prisoner’s Penry claim, is limited to evidence showing

that a defendant had “a uniquely severe permanent handicap” and that the criminal act was

attributable to this condition, i.e., a “nexus” requirement. Id. at 283. The Supreme Court

found no basis for the Fifth Circuit’s limited definition of relevant evidence and reaffirmed

that, for purposes of mitigation, evidence is relevant if it “tends logically to prove or disprove

some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating

value.” Id. at 284 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1990)). Thus,

Tennard is not a significant change in the law. Because the Court finds there are no remedies

presently available to Petitioner in state court, Claim 16 is technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

As cause for the default, Petitioner asserts appellate IAC. Before ineffectiveness may

be used to establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been presented to the state

court as an independent claim. See Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451-53 (“ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be

procedurally defaulted”); Murray, 477 U.S. at 489-90 (“the exhaustion doctrine . . . generally

requires that a claim of ineffective assistance be presented to the state courts as an

independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default.”).

Petitioner asserts that Respondents have conceded exhaustion of his appellate IAC claims,

but the Court disagrees. (Dkt. 37 at 133.) As discussed with respect to Claim 5, Respondents

conceded only that Petitioner properly exhausted a claim of appellate IAC based on counsel’s

failure to raise Claim 4 on appeal. A review of Petitioner’s PCR petition and subsequent

petition for review reveal no assertion of appellate IAC for failing to raise Claim 16.

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Because Petitioner is now precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from presenting this IAC

claim in state court, Petitioner cannot establish appellate IAC as cause for the default of

Claim 16.

Petitioner has failed to establish cause for the default of this claim and does not argue

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the claim is not decided on the merits.

Accordingly, Claim 16 is procedurally barred and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Claim 18

Petitioner alleges that execution by the State after an extended period of incarceration

on death row fails to serve any legitimate penological purpose and violates his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Dkt. 24 at 365.) Petitioner

concedes he did not present this claim to the state courts but argues it could not be raised in

state court because a sufficient amount of time had not passed. (Id.) Alternatively, he

requests a stay and suggests that state court relief may still available (although he does not

articulate an applicable exception to preclusion under Arizona law). (Dkt. 37 at 141.)

Respondents argue that this claim was never presented in state court and is now barred. (Dkt.

32 at 93.) 

Regardless of whether Petitioner could overcome the procedural default of this claim,

the Court will deny it as meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535.

The Supreme Court has not decided whether lengthy incarceration prior to execution can

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.)

(Stevens, J. & Breyer, J., discussing denial of certiorari and noting the claim has not been

addressed). In contrast, circuit courts including the Ninth Circuit, hold prolonged

incarceration under a sentence of death does not offend the Eighth Amendment. See

McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); White v. Johnson, 79

F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996) (delay of 17 years); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th

Cir. 1995) (delay of 15 years). Because the Supreme Court has never held that prolonged

incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment, Petitioner cannot establish a right to federal

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habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 958-60 (9th

Cir. 2006). Therefore, habeas relief on Claim 18 will be denied. 

Claim 20

Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s lethal injection procedures constitute cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Dkt. 24 at 381.)

He argues in the alternative that this claim was exhausted as part of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s independent review of the death sentence (id.), and that he was not required to

present the claim in state court because it was futile to do so in light of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s consistent rejection of similar claims (dkt. 37 at 147). If these arguments fail,

Petitioner requests a stay and asserts that state court relief is still available under the “newlydiscovered evidence” exception to preclusion under Arizona’s Rule 32.1(e). (Dkt. 37 at

148.) Respondents argue that this claim was never presented in state court and is now barred.

(Dkt. 32 at 93.)

The Court summarily rejects Petitioner’s assertion that the state supreme court’s

independent sentencing review exhausted Claim 20. A challenge to a method of execution

is not the type of claim that was necessarily considered by the Arizona Supreme Court when

it independently reviewed the propriety of Petitioner’s sentence. See Brewer, 170 Ariz. at

494, 826 P.2d at 791. Similarly, the Court rejects Petitioner’s claim that he was excused

from raising Claim 20 in state court because it was futile to do so. See Roberts v. Arave, 847

F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he apparent futility of presenting claims to state courts

does not constitute cause for procedural default.”). Finally, the Court concludes that

Petitioner has no available state remedies for this claim.

As already set forth regarding Claim 14, before a claim of newly-discovered evidence

will be considered in a successive PCR petition, it must be shown that the evidence supplies

newly-discovered material facts and that the petitioner exercised due diligence to secure it.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e). Petitioner asserts that he has “newly-discovered” evidence to

support his claim that did not exist at the time of his trial “because the scientific

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investigations supporting this evidence had not then been completed.” (Dkt. 37 at 148.) This

“evidence” consists of several affidavits submitted in the matter of Texas v. Flores, No.

877994A, in 2003, and an article published in 2005. (Dkt. 46, Exs. 32-35.) However,

Arizona’s Rule 32.1(e) “contemplates facts in existence at the original trial or sentence which

were not adduced” and cannot be used to relieve a prisoner from the consequences of a

sentence “because of facts arising after the judgment of conviction and sentencing.” State

v. Guthrie, 111 Ariz. 471, 473, 532 P.2d 862, 864 (1975) (holding that evidence of postjudgment rehabilitation not a “newly-discovered fact” within the meaning of Rule 32.1(e)).

In addition, Petitioner acknowledges that evidence “has existed for at least fifty years” that

the drugs used in lethal injections pose a risk of unnecessary pain to persons being executed.

(Dkt. 24 at 382-83.) Consequently, Petitioner cannot show diligence for not investigating

the facts underlying this claim and presenting it in state court either at trial or in his first PCR

proceeding. Indeed, Petitioner references autopsy reports of prisoners executed in Arizona

in 1995 (prior to Petitioner’s trial) and in 2000 (prior to Petitioner’s first PCR petition),

which bolsters this Court’s determination that Petitioner would be found precluded if he

sought to present this claim in state court now. (Id. at 400.) Because the Court finds there

are no remedies presently available to Petitioner in state court, Claim 20 is technically

exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

Other than a reference to futility, which the Court rejects, Petitioner does not assert

cause and prejudice for the default or argue that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

occur if this claim is not decided on the merits. Accordingly, Claim 20 is procedurally barred

and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Summary of Procedural Status Findings

Claims 1 (in part), 2, 3 (in part), 4, 5 (in part), 6 and 7 are properly before this Court

for review. The Fifth Amendment Due Process aspects of every claim and the Eighth

Amendment aspects of Claims 1-6 and 14 will be dismissed as not cognizable. Claims 5 (in

part) and 18 will be dismissed on the merits. Claims 3 (in part), 5 (in part), 14, 15, 16 and

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20 will be dismissed as procedurally barred, and Claim 1 (in part) will be dismissed as not

cognizable.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 

 EXPANSION OF THE RECORD AND DISCOVERY

Evidentiary Hearing

The decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing when there are material facts in

dispute is generally at the discretion of the district court judge. See Townsend v. Sain, 372

U.S. 293, 312, 318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992),

and limited by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999); Rule

8, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the district court

judge shall determine if an evidentiary hearing is required). However, a judge’s discretion

is significantly circumscribed by § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 420 (2000). 

Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). 

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, subsection (e)(2) precludes an evidentiary

hearing in federal court only if the failure to develop a claim’s factual basis is due to a “lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432. “The purpose of the fault component of ‘failed’ is to ensure the

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prisoner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence.” Id. at 435. The Court found that

this rule served AEDPA’s goal of furthering comity in that “federal courts sitting in habeas

are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient

effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Id.; see also Cardwell v. Netherland, 971 F. Supp.

997, 1008 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a § 2254 petition is limited to the factual record

developed in state court proceedings”), aff’d Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.

1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000). In

correlation, subsection (e)(2) allows factual development when a petitioner diligently

attempts to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court and is “thwarted, for example,

by the conduct of another or by happenstance was denied the opportunity to do so.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79.

In compliance with § 2254(e)(2), when the factual basis for a particular claim has not

been fully developed in state court, the first question for a district court in evaluating whether

to grant an evidentiary hearing on the claim is whether the petitioner was diligent in

attempting to develop its factual basis. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cardwell v.

Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236

F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court set an objective standard for determining

“diligence” – whether a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

435. For example, when there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable

attorney to the existence and importance of certain evidence, the attorney “fails” to develop

the factual record if he does not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and

present the evidence to the state court. See id. at 438-40 (counsel lacked diligence because

he was on notice of possibly material evidence and conducted only a cursory investigation);

Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2002) (lack of diligence because petitioner

knew of and raised claims of judicial bias and jury irregularities in state court, but failed to

investigate all the factual grounds for such claims). 

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Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires “that the prisoner, at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on

denial of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“inactions show insufficient diligence” on

ineffective counsel claim because petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing, and

brought claim only on appeal not in a collateral proceeding). What is more, the mere request

for an evidentiary hearing may not be sufficient to establish diligence if a reasonable person

would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir.

2000) (petitioner requested hearing but found not diligent because he failed to present

affidavits of family members that were easily obtained without court order and with minimal

expense); see also Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (lack of diligence

despite hearing request because petitioner made no effort to develop the record or assert any

facts to support claim that his counsel was ineffective for knowing of and failing to

investigate his psychiatric condition), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2070 (2004). If an evidentiary

hearing is requested, a petitioner’s inability to persuade a state court to conduct such a

hearing does not in itself demonstrate lack of diligence. See Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 338.

In sum, if this Court determines that a petitioner has not been diligent in establishing

the factual basis for his claims in state court, then the Court may not conduct a hearing unless

the petitioner satisfies one of § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. 

Expansion of the Record

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes a federal habeas court

to expand the record to include additional material relevant to the determination of the merits

of a petitioner’s claims. Rule 7 provides:

The materials that may be required include letters predating the filing of the

petition, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, to written

interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may also be submitted

and considered as part of the record.

Rule 7(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The purpose of Rule 7 “is

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to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings,

without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing.” Advisory Committee

Notes, Rule 7, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82

(1977).

Section 2254(e)(2), as amended by the AEDPA, limits a petitioner’s ability to present

new evidence through a Rule 7 motion to expand the record in the same manner as it does

with regard to evidentiary hearings. See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the conditions of § 2254(e)(2) generally apply to petitioners

seeking relief based on new evidence, even when they do not seek an evidentiary hearing)

(citing Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2737 (2004) (per curiam)). Thus, when a

petitioner seeks to introduce, through a Rule 7 motion, new affidavits and other documents

never presented in state court for the purpose of establishing the factual predicate of a claim,

he must show both diligence in developing the factual basis in state court and relevancy of

the evidence to his claim. If diligence is not shown, the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) must

be satisfied before the Court can consider expansion of the record. To find otherwise would

allow circumvention of the AEDPA’s restriction against federal habeas courts holding

evidentiary hearings in cases where the petitioner is at fault for failing to develop the facts

in state court.

When a petitioner seeks to expand the record for reasons other than to introduce

evidence to bolster the merits of his claim, the strictures of § 2254(e)(2) may not apply. See

Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding it nonsensical to apply §

2254(e)(2) when expansion of the record is used for reasons other than to introduce new

factual information on the merits of a claim). For example, expansion of the record may be

appropriate to cure omissions in the state court record, see Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 359

(1993) (per curiam) (reversing for failure to supplement the record with a late-discovered

transcript); see also Rule 5, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (directing

answering party to submit portions of record it deems relevant), or to establish diligence

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pursuant to § 2254(e)(2). See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792. 

In evaluating the instant motion, the Court must first determine whether Petitioner is

seeking expansion of the record to achieve the same end as an evidentiary hearing. If so, the

Court must then assess whether Petitioner demonstrated diligence in developing the factual

basis of the claim in state court and, if not, whether he meets the requirements of

§ 2254(e)(2). In addition, the Court must determine whether the proffered evidence is

relevant to a determination of the claim’s merits, see Rule 7(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, and

whether the new evidence fundamentally alters the claim such that it is rendered

unexhausted. See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 258-59. If Petitioner is seeking expansion for some

other purpose, such as curing omissions from the state court record, establishing cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice for a procedural default, or demonstrating

diligence for purposes of showing the inapplicability of § 2254(e)(2), the Court need only

evaluate relevance.

Discovery

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”) provides that

“[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and may limit the extent of discovery.” Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2254 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, a habeas

petitioner is not entitled to discovery “as a matter of ordinary course,” Bracy v. Gramley,

520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); see also Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999),

and a habeas court should not allow a habeas petitioner “to use federal discovery for fishing

expeditions to investigate mere speculation.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the

Northern Dist. of Cal. (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Aubut v. State

of Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970) (“[h]abeas corpus is not a general form of relief

for those who seek to explore their case in search of its existence”). Pursuant to Bracy,

whether a petitioner has established “good cause” for discovery requires a habeas court to

determine the essential elements of the petitioner’s substantive claim and evaluate whether

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“specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the

facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Id. at

908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).

MOTIONS DISCUSSION

Before assessing whether evidentiary development should be granted with respect to

the remaining exhausted claims – Claims 1, 2, 3 (in part), 4, 5 (in part), 6 and 7 – the Court

addresses Petitioner’s request, as to numerous claims, to expand the record with declarations

from a number of his trial jurors. Respondents assert that such evidence is inadmissible

because it is an improper attempt to delve into the “intrinsic jury processes.” (Dkt. 57 at 11.)

Petitioner responds that he offers this evidence – juror declarations averring that if they had

heard “certain bits of evidence,” they may have voted differently – solely to demonstrate how

a reasonable fact-finder would view the evidence or would have been affected by a legal

error. (Dkt. 62 at 2; Dkt. 46, exs. 1-7, 15.) 

It is firmly established in the common law that juror testimony is inadmissible to

impeach a jury verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987). Exceptions to

the rule are recognized only in situations in which an “extraneous influence” is alleged to

have affected the jury’s verdict. Id. Strong policy considerations underlie the rule:

[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned

into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took

part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be,

followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might

invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated

party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish

misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be

thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private

deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation – to the destruction

of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.

Id. at 119-20 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)). 

The rule has been codified in both the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the

Federal Rules of Evidence. Arizona prohibits the admission of testimony or affidavits that

inquire “into the subjective motives or mental processes which led a juror to assent or dissent

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from the verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(d). The federal rules likewise prohibit testimony

“as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or the

effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror

to assent to or dissent from the verdict.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).

It is clear from both the common law and state and federal rules that the juror

evidence Petitioner wishes to proffer in support of his habeas claims is improper. The Court

summarily rejects Petitioner’s specious assertion that the proffered declarations, in which

jurors expressly discuss the effect on their deliberative process of arguments and evidence

advanced by Petitioner’s habeas counsel, constitute “extraneous” evidence and are thus

permissible under Rule 606(b)’s exception for “extraneous prejudicial information that was

improperly brought to the jury’s attention.” Id. Scores of cases and the plain language of

the rule limit the exception to evidence of an extraneous influence on a jury. E.g., Tanner,

483 U.S. at 117 (listing cases). 

Finally, the Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion that juror testimony is necessary to

establish prejudice for his IAC and jury instruction claims. (Dkt. 62 at 2.) The legal standard

governing resolution of these claims requires the Court to determine whether there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), and whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the challenged instruction, Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). These are objective, not subjective, standards;

therefore, views of the jurors in Petitioner’s case are irrelevant to resolution of his claims.

See, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elev. Ass’n v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir. 1967)

(prohibiting affidavit of juror to show misinterpretation of court’s instructions). Moreover,

consideration of such evidence for the purpose of assessing prejudice would provide

encouragement to habeas petitioners to harass jurors about their decision-making process,

in contravention of the policy concerns underlying the common law rule regarding postverdict juror testimony. Therefore, the Court will not consider the proffered juror testimony

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to assess prejudice from any alleged trial or counsel errors and cautions counsel that such

inquiries are improper.

Claim 1

In support of his challenge to the constitutionality of the premeditation jury

instruction, Petitioner seeks discovery, expansion of the record and an evidentiary hearing

to establish prejudice. (Dkt. 46 at 27.) Specifically, Petitioner seeks permission to depose

trial counsel and the jurors in his case, to expand the record to include numerous declarations

from these individuals and to call them as witnesses at an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 27-35.)

Respondents argue that evidentiary development is unwarranted because Claim 1 presents

a purely legal issue. (Dkt. 57 at 14.) The Court agrees. 

At issue in Claim 1 is the constitutionality of a jury instruction. Resolution of this

claim turns on whether the instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In assessing the instruction, this

Court must consider it “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record” and

determine “‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Because Claim 1 presents a purely legal question that is reviewed

solely on the trial record, evidentiary development is unnecessary. See Hendricks v.

Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that no evidentiary hearing is required

if “there are no disputed facts and the claim presents a purely legal question”). Therefore,

Petitioner’s motions for discovery, expansion of the record, and an evidentiary hearing on

Claim 1 will be denied. 

Claim 2

In support of his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by utilizing James

Jarrett as an expert crime scene reconstructionist, Petitioner seeks to depose Jarrett, trial

counsel, the mental health experts who participated in his defense, a crime scene

reconstructionist who has reviewed Jarrett’s work, and the trial jurors. (Dkt. 46 at 56.)

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establish Strickland’s prejudice prong. In addition, the Court finds that opinions of trial

counsel’s performance from the mental health experts who participated in Petitioner’s

defense is wholly irrelevant to resolution of this claim. 

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Petitioner also seeks to expand the record with declarations from these individuals as well

as from his habeas investigator and trial defense team coordinator, and to have an evidentiary

hearing. (Id. at 41-55.) 

Respondents argue that evidentiary development is unwarranted because Petitioner

did not diligently attempt to develop this claim in state court and the evidence Petitioner

seeks to develop is irrelevant.9

 (Dkt. 57 at 14-15.) With respect to diligence, Petitioner

contends he made a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing in state court by presenting

a colorable IAC claim and was therefore diligent in developing the facts in state court. (Dkt.

62 at 4.) He argues that the failure to develop Claim 2 is attributable to the State because the

PCR court did not hold a hearing and “afforded him neither the means nor the opportunity

to investigate his claims before filing his post-conviction petition.” (Id.) The Court

disagrees.

Following her appointment in November 2000, PCR counsel sought an extension to

file the petition on the ground that she “must speak with trial counsel.” (PCR-ROA doc. 12

at 1.) Counsel also sought the appointment of an investigator to assist in gathering trial

counsel’s files. (PCR-ROA doc. 14 at 2.) The Court’s order authorizing appointment of an

investigator does not set any limitations on the investigator’s time, stating only that he would

be compensated at the standard county rate. (PCR-ROA doc. 16.) Subsequently, PCR

counsel sought a court order to compel the Coconino County Public Defender to provide

Petitioner’s client file. (PCR-ROA doc. 17.) The motion stated that the investigator had

contacted trial counsel, but that counsel had refused to allow unfettered access to the file.

(Id. at 2.) PCR counsel ultimately received the file on July 27, 2001, and filed the petition

on December 7, 2001, after requesting additional continuances to complete review of the file

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10 To the extent Petitioner seeks evidentiary development to establish prejudice from

counsel’s use of Jarrett as a witness, the Court finds that such development is unnecessary

because this issue may be resolved solely by reference to the state court record. 

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and conduct research and investigation. (PCR-ROA docs. 19 & 21.)

In his PCR petition, Petitioner argued that counsel performed deficiently by allowing

Jarrett to personally interview Petitioner, calling Jarrett as a witness during trial, and being

unfamiliar with the law regarding the permissible scope of expert testimony. (PCR-ROA

doc. 29 at 28-35.) He asserted that counsel’s actions prejudiced him because it enabled the

prosecution, on cross-examination, to elicit evidence of premeditation. (Id. at 35.) In support

of the claim, Petitioner appended copies of Jarrett’s interview notes with Petitioner (which

had been disclosed to the prosecution prior to trial), a transcript of the prosecution’s

interview of Jarrett, relevant excerpts from the trial transcripts and two affidavits from

criminal defense attorneys who opined that counsel performed deficiently. (PCR-ROA doc.

23, exs. F, R, S, T & BB.) However, the PCR petition did not contain a declaration from trial

counsel or a declaration from PCR counsel or her investigator either detailing an interview

with trial counsel or stating he refused to be interviewed. At the conclusion of his petition,

Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing. (PCR-ROA doc. 29 at 41.) 

In this Court, Petitioner seeks to develop facts to show that trial counsel did not

properly research Jarrett’s background, was aware Jarrett’s testimony would provide the

prosecution with damaging evidence, failed to recognize the dangers of having Jarrett

interview Petitioner, and failed to properly prepare Jarrett as a witness.10 (Dkt. 46 at 37.) He

proposes to develop this evidence through testimony of trial counsel, the defense team

coordinator, Jarrett, and a recently-retained crime scene reconstructionist. However, there

is no indication that Petitioner sought to develop this aspect of his claim in state court,

despite having the means and opportunity to do so. 

The first element of an IAC claim requires an examination of counsel’s performance

and the rationale underlying counsel’s decisions. Based solely on this element, it should

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11 Petitioner proffers a declaration from PCR counsel that states it “was standard

practice in Arizona on post-conviction, and my standard practice also, not to request funding

for experts and factual investigators until after the request for an evidentiary had been

granted.” (Dkt. 46, ex. 17 at 2.) The Court finds this assertion unpersuasive to excuse

counsel’s failure to develop evidence in light of Rule 32.5’s requirement that evidence such

as affidavits and records be attached to a PCR petition to support its factual allegations and

the fact that counsel requested and was authorized the services of an investigator. Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.5. 

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have been apparent to PCR counsel that the factual premise of this claim required, at a

minimum, determining why counsel hired Jarrett, allowed him to interview Petitioner, and

called him as a witness during trial. Inexplicably, although PCR counsel recognized the need

to talk to trial counsel and had the assistance of an investigator, the record does not reflect

that PCR counsel made any effort to develop the facts relating to trial counsel’s performance,

which he now seeks to develop in these proceedings. Similarly, PCR counsel did not seek

the appointment of a crime scene reconstructionist to review Jarrett’s work.11 Cf. Landrigan,

2006 WL 549027, at *2 (finding no lack of diligence where state court denied petitioner’s

request for post-conviction appointment of expert). The test for determining “diligence” is

whether Petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the

time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. The Court

concludes that he did not. See Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 758 (lack of diligence, despite hearing

request, based on failure to present easily obtained evidence).

Petitioner’s lack of diligence in state court prohibits this Court from holding a hearing

or expanding the record with respect to this claim, Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1241, and

Petitioner has not attempted to satisfy the requirements of §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B). Because

the Court is barred from holding an evidentiary hearing or expanding the record as to this

claim, any evidence developed through discovery could not be considered by the Court.

Thus, the Court finds there is no good cause for discovery. See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792

(finding that discovery should not be allowed to augment the merits of a petitioner’s claims

unless he was diligent); Murphy v. Bradshaw, No. C-1-03-053, 2003 WL 23777736, at *2

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(S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2003) (“there cannot be good cause to discover facts which could not

be presented because a petition is barred from an evidentiary hearing on those facts under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)”); Charles v. Baldwin, No. CV-97-380-ST, 1999 WL 694716, at *2 (D.

Or. Aug. 2, 1999) (no good cause for discovery to locate evidence in support of the merits

of a claim unless petitioner first satisfies § 2254(e)(2)). Therefore, Petitioner’s request for

evidentiary development of Claim 2 will be denied.

Claim 3

In support of his claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, that trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance for not objecting to such misconduct, and that appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not raising the issue on appeal, Petitioner seeks

to depose trial counsel, appellate counsel, and the trial jurors. (Dkt. 46 at 69.) Petitioner also

seeks to expand the record with declarations from these individuals and requests an

evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 58-70.) Respondents argue that evidentiary development is

unwarranted because Petitioner did not diligently attempt to develop this evidence in state

court and Claim 3 can be resolved by reference to the state court record. (Dkt. 57 at 16-17.)

Petitioner argues that the requested evidentiary development from jurors is necessary

to show that a reasonable fact-finder would have been affected by the prosecutor’s

misconduct and that the alleged misconduct was not harmless. (Dkt. 46 at 58-59.) As

already stated, the Court may not consider evidence from the jurors in this case to assess

prejudice from any alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to

depose jurors, expand the record with juror declarations and call jurors as witnesses at an

evidentiary hearing will be denied.

For the requests relating to trial and appellate counsel, Petitioner asserts evidentiary

development is necessary to establish that each counsel performed deficiently. As discussed

with regard to Claim 2, Petitioner had both the means and opportunity to interview trial

counsel. In addition, appellate counsel, in his role as Coconino County Public Defender and

trial counsel’s supervisor, spoke to PCR counsel’s investigator about Petitioner’s client file

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and ultimately provided the file to PCR counsel. There is nothing in the record to indicate

that either attorney refused to be interviewed or cooperate with PCR counsel’s investigation

of Petitioner’s IAC claims, and the Court finds that Petitioner could have “easily obtained

their affidavits.” Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 758. In addition, under Arizona law, appellate

counsel is “not ineffective for selecting some issues and rejecting others.” State v. Herrera,

183 Ariz. 642, 647, 905 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Ariz. App. 1995). Thus, to succeed on an appellate

IAC claim, it was incumbent upon PCR counsel to assert something more than the fact that

counsel failed to raise additional issues on appeal; she had to show that appellate counsel’s

failure to assert the additional issues was constitutionally deficient. Id. (holding appellate

IAC claim not colorable in the absence of evidence that failure to raise additional claims fell

below professional norms.) At a minimum, PCR counsel should have investigated why

appellate counsel did not raise prosecutorial misconduct issues on appeal. 

Petitioner’s lack of diligence in state court prohibits this Court from holding a hearing

or expanding the record with respect to this claim, Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1241, and

Petitioner has not attempted to satisfy the requirements of §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B). Because

the Court is barred from holding an evidentiary hearing or expanding the record as to this

claim, any evidence developed through discovery could not be considered by the Court.

Thus, the Court finds there is no good cause for discovery. Petitioner’s motions for

evidentiary development of Claim 3 will be denied.

Claim 4

In support of his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to

interview the state’s rebuttal expert witness prior to trial and failing to object to late notice

of this witness, Petitioner seeks to develop facts to show that the untimely disclosure left

counsel unprepared, that the prosecutor was not truthful in her explanation of the untimely

disclosure, that the defense experts were not asked by counsel to sit through the expert

rebuttal testimony to assist the defense, that appellate counsel did not raise this claim on

appeal, and that Petitioner suffered prejudice. (Dkt. 46 at 71.) Specifically, he seeks to

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depose his trial counsel, defense team coordinator, appellate counsel, defense experts, and

trial jurors; to expand the record with declarations from these individuals; and to have an

evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 76-83.) Respondents argue that evidentiary development is

unwarranted because Petitioner did not diligently attempt to develop this evidence in state

court and the claim can be resolved on the existing record. (Dkt. 57 at 18.) The Court

agrees.

First, the Court may not consider the proffered evidence from trial jurors in

considering the effect of alleged constitutional violations on the verdict. Tanner, 483 U.S.

at 117. Second, the Court concludes that the issue of prejudice from trial or appellate

counsel’s failures with regard to late disclosure of the State’s expert rebuttal witness is

capable of resolution from the existing court record. Third, Petitioner did not act diligently

in state court to develop the deficient performance prong of his IAC claims. As discussed

supra in Claims 2 and 3, Petitioner had the means and opportunity to interview trial and

appellate counsel as well as his defense experts and apparently failed to do so. Petitioner has

not attempted to satisfy the requirements of §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B); therefore, his requests

for expansion of the record and an evidentiary hearing will be denied. In addition, the Court

concludes that Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for discovery. See Boyko, 259

F.3d at 792.

Claim 5

In support of this appellate IAC claim, Petitioner seeks discovery, expansion of the

record and an evidentiary hearing to develop facts to show the circumstances surrounding

preparation of the direct appeal and appellate counsel’s failure to raise meritorious issues.

(Dkt. 46 at 84.) Specifically, he seeks to depose trial counsel, appellate counsel, and the trial

jurors; to expand the record with declarations from these individuals; and an evidentiary

hearing. (Id. at 86-90.) The Court may not consider the proffered evidence from trial jurors

in considering the effect of alleged constitutional violations on the verdict. Tanner, 483 U.S.

at 117. In addition, in light of PCR counsel’s failure to investigate and pursue the basic facts

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necessary to present an appellate IAC claim in state court, as set forth above with regard to

Claim 3, the Court finds that Petitioner was not diligent in developing this claim. See

Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 758. Petitioner has not attempted to satisfy the requirements of

§§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B). Therefore, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and to

expand the record will be denied. In addition, the Court finds no good cause for the

requested discovery. See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792.

Claim 6

In support of his claim that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to the

police, Petitioner seeks permission to subpoena the personnel files of the interviewing

detective, to depose the jurors in his case, to expand the record to include numerous

declarations from jurors, and to have an evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 46 at 91-98.)

Respondents argue that evidentiary development is unwarranted because Claim 6 is a recordbased claim. (Dkt. 57 at 14.) The Court agrees. 

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, and the Arizona Supreme Court upheld

the trial court’s ruling. Smith, 193 Ariz. at 456-60, 974 P.2d at 435-39. It is self-evident

that, when analyzing a claim of trial court error based on the admission of evidence, a

reviewing court assesses only the evidence that was before the trial court; thus, this is strictly

a record-based claim. The record-based nature of this claim is bolstered by the state supreme

court’s treatment of the claim on direct appeal, which looked only at the state court record

to resolve the issue. Because this claim must be decided based on the state court record,

evidentiary development is not warranted. 

Additionally, Petitioner could have attempted to develop additional supporting

evidence during his PCR, but did not raise this claim. Because Petitioner did not make a

reasonable attempt to develop the factual basis of this claim in state court and does not allege

that he can satisfy the requirements of §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B), this Court is barred from

granting an evidentiary hearing or expanding the record with respect to the merits of Claim

6. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. Finally, in light of the fact that this claim is premised on

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the already-existing state court record, Petitioner fails to satisfy the preliminary requirement

for an evidentiary hearing – a material factual dispute. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13.

Rather, Petitioner merely seeks to introduce additional evidence that he never attempted to

develop in state court. Petitioner’s motions for evidentiary development of Claim 6 will be

denied.

Claim 7

In support of his claim that the trial court erred in finding the murder was committed

for pecuniary gain, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5), Petitioner seeks to expand the record with

declarations from jurors and requests an evidentiary hearing and permission to depose the

jurors. (Dkt. 46 at 99-104.) As discussed above, common law prohibits this Court from

considering the jurors’ opinions of the effect on their verdict of evidence and arguments

developed after trial. In addition, federal habeas review of this claim is limited to

determining whether the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute

an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,

780 (1990). This is necessarily a record-based claim, for which the admission of additional

evidence is unwarranted. Consequently, Petitioner’s motions for evidentiary development

of Claim 7 will be denied.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the following claims are DISMISSEDWITH PREJUDICE:

(a) Claims 3 (in part), 5 (in part), 14, 15, 16 and 20 based on a procedural bar; (b) Claim 1

(in part), the Fifth Amendment Due Process aspects of every claim and the Eighth

Amendment aspects of Claims 1-6 and 14 as not cognizable; and (c) Claims 5 (in part) and

18 on the merits as a matter of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery, to Expand the

Record and for Evidentiary Hearing (Dkt. 46) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Order, such motion shall be filed

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within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of

this Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ

85007-3329. 

DATED this 21st day of March, 2006.

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