Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02806/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH M. MUZQUIZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV2806 WHQ (LSP)

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S

vs. MOTION TO DISMISS

GLORIA DAVILA de MUZQUIZ,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or, alternatively, Motion to Stay

Action. (Doc. # 6). The Court finds this matter suitable for submission on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2005, Sarah Muzquiz (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint seeking a declaration that she

was the surviving spouse of the now deceased Raymundo Muzquiz (Sr. Muzquiz). Muzquiz v.

Muzquiz, S.D. Cal. Case No. 05cv1928, Doc. # 1. On January 10, 2006, this Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act because there were

two related and previously filed actions pending in Mexican courts; a jactancia and a juicio de

sucesión (probate proceeding). Muzquiz v. Muzquiz, S.D. Cal. Case No. 05cv1928, Doc. # 28. On

August 29, 2006, the jactancia concluded without resolving the dispute as to Sr. Muzquiz’s spouse at

the time of his death. Def. Mot. at 2; Pl. Opp’n at 3. Thereafter, on December 29, 2006, Plaintiff filed

the currently pending Complaint, again seeking a declaration that she was the lawful surviving spouse

Case 3:06-cv-02806-WQH-LSP Document 16 Filed 06/13/07 Page 1 of 5
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of Sr. Muzquiz at the time of his death. (Doc. # 1). The Mexican probate proceeding remains pending

in Mexico.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

On June 28, 1935, Plaintiff married Sr. Muzquiz in Yuma, Arizona. Compl., ¶ 6. On May 21,

1949, Sr. Muzquiz married Defendant Gloria Muzquiz without first obtaining a legal divorce from

Plaintiff. Compl., ¶ 8. Plaintiff maintained marital relations with Sr. Muzquiz after Sr. Muzquiz’s

marriage to Defendant. Compl., ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s marriage to Sr. Muzquiz was

“a bigamous union illegal and void ab initio,” and that Plaintiff was the lawful spouse of Sr. Muzquiz

at the time of Sr. Muzquiz’s death on September 6, 2002. Compl., ¶¶ 10, 13(e). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. De La

Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). The Complaint must, “give the defendant fair notice

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (abrogated on other

grounds). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (citations omitted). In ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), a court must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and further,

must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences to

be drawn therefrom. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint. Moore v. Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260,

262 (9th Cir. 1989). 

When a district court is presented with a request for declaratory judgment, a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted properly raises abstention considerations.

AMCO Insurance v. AMK Enterprises, No. C 06-1729 CRB, 2006 WL 1980405, at * 1 (N.D. Cal.

2006); Langan v. Town of Cave Creek, No. Civ. 06-0044-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 1722316, at *1, 5-6

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(D. Ariz. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves the Court to use its discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint because a previously filed and related probate proceeding is currently pending

in Mexico. Defendant contends that Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in order to claim a portion of Sr.

Muzquiz’s estate, and that even if this Court determines the identity of Sr. Muzquiz’s legal spouse

at the time of his death, the Court cannot divide Sr. Muzquiz’s assets because his estate is under the

jurisdiction of the Mexican probate court.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss should not be granted because this

Court’s prior order dismissing Plaintiff’s October 7, 2005 Complaint was based on the jactancia action

which has since concluded without disposing of the issue presented in Plaintiff’s current Complaint.

Plaintiff contends that the existence of the probate proceeding does not require dismissal of the current

Complaint because Plaintiff has not received notice the probate proceeding. Plaintiff further contends

that it is probable that all of the dispositive issues in the probate proceeding have already been

determined and that Plaintiff will be barred from making a claim in the probate proceeding due to the

passage of time. Finally, Plaintiff contends that dismissal is improper because the Court does not

know the status of the probate proceeding, and therefore the Court cannot be sure that Plaintiff will

be able to pursue her rights in the Mexican court.

Discretion to Entertain Actions Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides in pertinent part that, “any court of the United States,

upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28

U.S.C. § 2201(a). District courts “possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain

an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter

jurisdictional prerequisites.” See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 283 (1995). In deciding

whether to exercise discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court should consider

factors which include avoiding (1) needless determinations of state law issues; (2) suits filed by

litigants as a means of forum shopping; and (3) duplicative litigation. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of

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America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942); see also Gov’t Emples. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th

Cir. 1998). A court can also consider, “whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the

controversy; whether the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations

at issue; whether the declaratory action is being sought merely for the purposes of procedural fencing

or to obtain a 'res judicata' advantage; or whether the use of a declaratory action will result in

entanglement between the federal and state court systems.” Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394

F.3d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, a district court can consider the convenience of the parties and

the availability and relative convenience of other remedies. Id. When parallel proceedings involving

similar issues are pending at the time that a second action is filed, there is a presumption that the entire

suit should be heard in the original forum. Gov’t Emples., 133 F.3d at 1225; see also Chamberlain

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th Cir.1991). 

At the time that Plaintiff filed this Complaint, there was a probate proceeding pending in

Mexico which began on October 28, 2002, and remains pending. The Court concludes that a

determination of Sr. Muzquiz’s lawful spouse on the date of his death will likely be made in that

proceeding. Furthermore, the Court concludes that the Mexican probate proceeding could resolve the

issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled to a portion of Sr. Muzquiz’s estate.

While Plaintiff contends that the Court’s previous order of dismissal relied exclusively on the

now completed jactancia, the ongoing probate proceeding was also a basis for the Court’s dismissal

of Plaintiff’s prior Complaint on abstention grounds. See Muzquiz v. Muzquiz, S.D. Cal. Case No.

05cv1928, Doc. # 28 at 8. Furthermore, the Court once again concludes that adjudication of the

pending declaratory action could result in duplicative litigation and lead to inconsistent rulings by this

Court and the Mexican probate court. The proceeding in Mexico involves similar issues and parties,

and was pending when Plaintiff filed this Complaint. Finally, even if Plaintiff had not received notice

of the probate proceeding at the time she filed the initial Complaint in October 2005, she received

notice of the proceeding through this Court’s order of January 10, 2006, yet has not taken steps to join

in the Mexican probate proceeding. The Court finds that the entire suit should be heard in the original

Mexican forum. 

/

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/

The Court has the discretion to either stay or dismiss the action. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.

The Court finds that dismissal is warranted here. See Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, 145

F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

(Doc. # 6). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 13, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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