Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00572/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00572-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL MARTIN SANDERS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-00572 PHX EHC (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) AMENDED

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL:

On February 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state

court. Petitioner filed an amended petition seeking federal

habeas relief on January 25, 2006. See Docket No. 5.

Respondents filed an Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 24) on September 22, 2006.

Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer on April 30, 2007.

See Docket No. 34.

I Procedural History

In 1999, Petitioner was convicted on charges arising

from an incident occurring in Maricopa County on August 31,

1997, resulting in the deaths of two individuals, which was

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locally and colloquially known as the “bounty hunters case.” 

Petitioner and his codefendants David Brackney, Matthew

Brackney, Brian Robbins, and Ron Timms, were each charged in

September 1997 with two counts of first-degree felony murder,

“or in the alternative,” second-degree murder; two counts of

aggravated assault; four counts of unlawful imprisonment; two

counts of aggravated assault; and one count of burglary in the

first degree. See id., Exh. A. The state filed notice of its

intent to seek the death penalty if Petitioner was convicted of

first-degree felony murder. Id., Exh. B.

Petitioner and Mr. David Brackney were accused of being

the actual shooters of the victims and both were wounded in an

exchange of gunfire with one of the victims. Id., Exh. G at 2-

4. Petitioner asserted at his trial that he and his

codefendants were legitimate “bounty hunters,” i.e., bail

enforcement agents, who entered the victims’ home at 5035 West

Windsor, in Phoenix, to arrest an alleged California bail

absconder, Mr. Victor Alcantar. Mr. Alcantar was not a resident

of the house at the time of the entry, which was occupied at

that time by the two victims, two other adults and two children.

Petitioner and a codefendant attempted entry into a bedroom and

were shot by one of the victims. Petitioner and his codefendant

returned fire, killing both victims in the bedroom. Petitioner

argued at his trial that the entry into the home was justified

and that the victims were killed in self-defense. The

prosecution argued to the jury that Petitioner and his

codefendants used the bail bond on Mr. Alcantar, which was

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1

 After Petitioner was tried and convicted, Mr. Robbins

accepted a plea agreement in September of 1998, which was revoked in

November and reentered in March of 1999, revoked, and reentered in

2000. Mr. David Brackney was tried and convicted on all charges in

February of 2000, subsequent to Petitioner’s conviction. Mr. Brackney

argued at his trial, which lasted for approximately one month, that

he had no knowledge of a plan to burglarize the victims’ home. See

Gilbert Garcia, “Mutiny on the Bounty,” Phoenix New Times, Feb. 17,

2000. The Garcia article states Mr. Timms testified at Mr. Brackney’s

trial. Id. The Garcia article indicates Mr. Brackney testified in

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expired, as a cover story for an intended burglary and that

their acts, therefore, constituted first-degree felony murder.

The ballistics evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial

indicated a victim had fired his weapon before either Petitioner

or Mr. Brackney used their weapons. See id., Exh. G at 5.

Accordingly, the issue at trial was the defendants’ intent,

i.e., whether Petitioner and his codefendants really intended to

enter the home to enforce the expired bail bond regarding Mr.

Alcantar, or whether Petitioner had planned to enter the home to

burglarize the home, believing he would find drugs and a large

sum of cash in the home. See, e.g., id., Exh. G at 6

(Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal, which states: “The

critical issue in the case was [Petitioner’s] intent for

entering the home.”). 

Prior to Petitioner’s trial, Mr. Timms agreed to plead

guilty to a charge of second-degree murder and to testify

against Petitioner, i.e., to testify that Petitioner had

intended the events in question to be a burglary and not a

legitimate bail operation. Id., Exh. G at 6. 

Petitioner was tried separately from his codefendants,

in September and October of 1998. Id., Exh. F; Exh. G at 2.1

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his own defense, and that the jury in Mr. Brackney’s trial deliberated

for approximately five hours before returning a verdict. Id.

According to this article, at some point Mr. Robbins had incriminated

all of the defendants, but later recanted his incriminating

statements. Id. Matthew Brackney, David Brackney’s son, entered a

guilty plea in 2000, after his father’s conviction. See Arizona v.

Brackney, et al., CR1997-010238-C (docket available through the

Maricopa County Superior Court’s website).

2

 Petitioner asserts in his amended habeas petition that he

did not testify at his trial because he was forced to wear a shockbelt at trial. See Docket No. 5 (Amended Petition) at 96-98.

However, the Court notes allowing Petitioner to testify could have

opened the door to the introduction of Petitioner’s prior felony

convictions, including a conviction arising from an incident wherein

Petitioner shot an individual during a bail enforcement action. See

Arizona v. Sanders, CR1990-005085 (charging Petitioner with criminal

trespass, a felony, and misdemeanor assault); United States v.

Sanders, 93 CR 00170 (wherein Petitioner was found guilty of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and prohibited from

engaging in employment involving bond recovery for a period of three

years). See also Texas v. Sanders, 1981, wherein Petitioner was

convicted of assault and sentenced to a term of two years

incarceration, and Texas v. Sanders, 1978, wherein Petitioner was

convicted of carrying a prohibited weapon.

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Mr. Timms testified for the state at Petitioner’s trial. Id.,

Exh. G at 6 (“Timms testified that he had learned about money

and drugs at the home... and that he passed this information on

to [Petitioner]. [] The gist of Timms’ testimony on direct was

that the bond paperwork was simply a ruse.”). Petitioner did

not testify at his trial.2 Defense counsel offered the testimony

of a Phoenix Police Department detective assigned to the

narcotics division and a Phoenix Police Department sergeant.

Id., Exh. G at 7. These witnesses testified Mr. Brackney had

contacted them shortly before the incident to advise them he was

going to pick-up a bail absconder and that drug activity might

be involved. Id., Exh. G at 7. At Petitioner’s trial, a

detective testified that, in 1997, there were three outstanding

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felony warrants for Mr. Alcantar. See, e.g., id., Exh. X at 3.

Petitioner later asserted his belief that Mr. Alcantar was in

the home was reasonable and justified the entry into the home,

because 

the house had been watched by Sanders and his

co-defendants.... witness trial testimony

confirmed that Junior Rodriguez bore a

resemblance to Alcantar and frequented the

house to buy and use drugs... Timms testified

that he verified Alcantar’s presence at the

house to Sanders and the others. ...These

facts are not exhaustive, but illustrate that

a § 3892 defense was reasonably supported by

the evidence.

Id., Exh. Z at 3.

On October 30, 1998, after hearing approximately six

weeks of testimony, the jury found Petitioner guilty on each

charge stated in the indictment. Id., Exh. C & Exh. G at 2. 

 In March and April of 1999, the trial court held

hearings on a motion filed by the state to “determine”

Petitioner’s counsel. See id., Exh. O at 12; Exh. NN. The

state asserted Petitioner’s counsel (referred to herein as “Jane

Doe”)had a conflict of interest arising from her “personal

relationship” with Petitioner. Id., Exh. Z at 6. At a hearing

conducted April 27, 1999, Petitioner waived “any conflict that

might arise as a result of any personal relationship with [Jane

Doe].” Id., Exh. NN. On April 29, 1999, the trial court filed

a decision regarding the disqualification of Petitioner’s

counsel, Jane Doe. Id., Exh. QQ.

At that time, Petitioner waived any ineffective

assistance of counsel claim against Jane Doe due to jail

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surveillance “necessitated” by Petitioner’s conduct in the jail

with his counsel. Id., Exh. O at 12-13. In July of 1999, the

Arizona State Bar filed a formal complaint against Petitioner’s

lead public appointed defense counsel, Jane Doe, for engaging in

a sexual relationship with Petitioner during her representation

of him, inter alia by engaging in sexual acts in an interview

room at the jail. See, e.g., “State bar files complaint against

[Jane Doe],” Business J. of Phoenix, July 2, 1999. Jane Doe was

terminated from her position as a public defender as a result of

her acts, and was thereafter privately retained by Petitioner as

his defense and appellate counsel. Answer, Exh. Z at 6; Exh.

QQ.

After a hearing regarding aggravating and mitigating

circumstances, on August 25, 1999, the trial court issued a

special verdict and imposed on Petitioner consecutive natural

life sentences on each of the first-degree felony murder

convictions. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. The trial court imposed

consecutive, aggravated 15-year sentences on the aggravated

assault convictions; 24-year sentences on the aggravated assault

convictions committed against the two children; and 21 years on

the burglary conviction. Id., Exh. E. The trial court imposed

6-month jail sentences on the unlawful imprisonment convictions

Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the judgment. On

November 20, 1999, the trial court conducted an evidentiary

hearing and oral argument regarding the motion. Id., Exh. OO.

Petitioner asserted his right to counsel was violated because

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conversations with counsel were overheard or recorded by jail

staff. Id., Exh. OO. The trial court denied the motion to

vacate judgment. Id., Exh. OO.

Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. Jane Doe

represented Petitioner on direct appeal and raised the following

claims on his behalf:

1. The first-degree murder charges were duplicitous

because alternative second-degree murder charges were alleged in

the indictment.

2. The jury was improperly instructed regarding the

authority of a bounty hunter to enter a home and arrest a bail

absconder, depriving Petitioner of a legitimate defense.

3. The trial court erred by refusing to instruct the

jury that a bounty hunter’s conduct could be justified even if

there was a defect in the court order authorizing the arrest of

the subject bail absconder.

4. The trial court erred by unreasonably limiting the

cross-examination of Mr. Timms and two law enforcement officers.

5. The trial court abused its discretion by

precluding evidence regarding “fight or flight” syndrome and the

procedures employed by law-enforcement officers in forced-entry

situations. The trial court also erred by excluding the grand

jury testimony of Petitioner’s codefendant, Mr. Brackney and the

“admission of a party opponent,” i.e., statements made by the

prosecution prior to the trial.

6. The trial court erroneously allowed the admission

of other “bad act” evidence.

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7. The trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s

motion for a change of judge predicated on the fact that the

trial judge had presided over another capital case wherein the

defendants alleged Petitioner had committed a different murder.

8. The trial court erred by denying a motion to

disqualify the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (“MCAO”), based

on Petitioner’s “unique relationship” with MCAO, i.e., his

status as a former paid informant for MCAO.

On March 15, 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which summarily denied review on June 19, 2001. Id.,

Exh. K & Exh. L.

Petitioner filed a timely action for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court. Id., Exh. M & Exh. N,

Petitioner, through counsel, Mr. Reeves, raised the following

claims:

1. His trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

present a “legal entry” defense.

2. His trial counsel was ineffective for offering

expert witness testimony regarding police tactics rather than

expert witness testimony regarding the professional standards of

a bail enforcement agent.

3. The state induced a situation where Petitioner was

deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel by

“engineering” the denial of confidential meetings with his

defense attorney. 

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The Arizona Superior Court concluded Petitioner was not

entitled to relief. Id., Exh. P. On December 26, 2002,

Petitioner filed a motion for a rehearing regarding his Rule 32

petition, alleging “newly discovered material facts” regarding

the recording of his legal calls by jail officials. Id., Exh.

Q. The trial court ordered the state to respond to Petitioner’s

arguments and to further allegations set forth in an untimely

reply to the State’s response to Petitioner’s motion. Id., Exh.

R & Exh. S. On April 25, 2003, the trial court denied the

motion for rehearing for the reasons set forth in the state’s

response. Id., Exh. T.

On May 1, 2003, the trial court affirmed its previous

ruling denying Petitioner’s motion for rehearing. Id., Exh. V

& Exh. W. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. X. On July 13, 2004, the

Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. Id., Exh.

AA. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 20,

2004. Id., Exh. BB & Exh. CC.

On March 3, 2004, during the pendency of his first

post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner initiated a second

action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. DD & Exh. EE.

Petitioner averred there had been a significant change in the

law which permitted him to file a second post-conviction relief

petition asserting that forcing him to wear a shock belt during

his trial violated his constitutional rights. Id., Exh. EE. The

Arizona Superior Court ruled that the Arizona state courts were

not bound by the “new law” because it was a decision by the

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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. FF. The Superior

Court further determined the claim was precluded as waived

because Petitioner did not raise the issue regarding the shockbelt in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. FF.

Petitioner sought review of this decision and also

filed a motion to consolidate his second post-conviction action

with his first Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. GG & Exh. HH. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied the motion because Petitioner

had not made the requisite showing that both petitions involved

a substantially similar question for review. Id., Exh. II. The

Court of Appeals subsequently summarily denied review of the

trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief on May 26, 2005.

Id., Exh. JJ. On February 8, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court

also summarily denied review. Id., Exh. KK.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in federal court on February 18, 2005, and filed an amended

petition on January 25, 2006.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because:

1. The state courts interpreted a state statute at

Petitioner’s trial in accordance with the statute’s postincident revision and applied the revised statute retroactively

to criminalize Petitioner’ conduct.

2. Petitioner was deprived of his right to have the

jury, rather than the judge, determine his guilt.

3. Petitioner was deprived of his right to be

presumed innocent because the trial court relieved the

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prosecution of their burden of proving all of the elements of

the offenses charged.

4. The trial court failed to properly instruct jurors

regarding the relevant law, “blighting the whole trial,” in

violation of Petitioner’ constitutional rights.

5. His rights were violated by the allegedly

duplicitous murder counts in the indictment.

6. Petitioner was forced to wear a “shock belt”

during his trial, in violation of the “Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” 

7. Petitioner was denied his right to confidential

attorney-client communications, i.e., the government

surreptitiously recorded or listened to his attorney-client

communications.

8. The State of Arizona violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)

by intercepting Petitioner’s pre-verdict telephone conversations

with his counsel, without either a court order or his consent.

9. The trial court unduly inhibited Petitioner’

ability to conduct appropriate cross-examination regarding the

credibility of Mr. Timms.

10. His right to due process was violated when the

trial court admitted Mr. Timms’ testimony about Petitioner’s

alleged prior bad acts without the trial court first considering

the statements pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Evidence.

11. The trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due

process of law by precluding him from exercising his right to

confrontation, compulsory process, and a meaningful opportunity

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to present a complete defense.

12. The trial court’s preclusion of expert testimony

about “fight or flight” syndrome violated Petitioner’s right to

present a complete defense to the charges against him.

13. The trial court erred by precluding expert

testimony about law-enforcement procedures, violating

Petitioner’s right to present a defense.

14. Petitioner’s right to present a defense was

violated by the preclusion of Mr. Brackney’s grand jury

testimony.

15. Petitioner’s right to present a defense was

violated by the trial court’s preclusion of an admission of a

party opponent.

16. The trial judge was not impartial.

17. The Maricopa County Attorney’s Offices had a

conflict of interest precluding its prosecution of Petitioner.

18. His trial counsel were constitutionally

ineffective for failing to present a “legal entry” defense

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3892.

19. His trial counsel were ineffective for failing to

file a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury was

not instructed on Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3892.

20. His appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to raise Petitioner’s trial counsels’

ineffectiveness for failing to present a legal entry defense

under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3892 and for their failure

to request a new trial on the grounds that the jury was not

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instructed on this statute.

21. He was deprived of his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not present

expert witness testimony regarding bail enforcement tactics

rather than one on standards for a professional bail enforcement

agent.

22. “The State of Arizona induced ineffective

assistance of counsel post-verdict by invading” Petitioner’s

attorney-client relationship and confidential communications

with his attorney.

23. “The State of Arizona induced ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel by invading and interfering”

with Petitioner’s attorney-client relationship and confidential

communications with his retained appellate attorney, i.e., Jane

Doe.

24. “The State of Arizona by and through Maricopa

County has suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

via its Office of Court Appointed Counsel in violation of

Article I § 9, cl.2 of the United States Constitution.”

25. Petitioner, who is hearing disabled, was

discriminated against during his criminal proceedings, in

violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990.

26. “The errors set forth in this petition that are

not singly prejudicial, taken cumulatively worked to

[Petitioner’s] actual and substantial disadvantage in violation

of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

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to the United States Constitution, and laws of the United

States...”

Respondents argue Petitioner did not properly exhaust

some of his federal habeas claims in state court because the

claims were either never fairly presented in state court or they

were presented but were procedurally barred. Respondents

contend any attempt to return to the state courts to exhaust a

habeas claim would now be futile because Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally barred by state law regarding waiver and

preclusion. Respondents argue that, because the claims are

procedurally defaulted and because Petitioner has not

established either “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” to excuse his procedural default of his

claims, the Court may not grant relief on the merits of any

procedurally defaulted claims. Respondents further maintain

that habeas relief may properly be denied on the merits of the

claims which were properly exhausted in the state courts.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must exhaust a federal habeas claim in

the state courts before the District Court may grant relief on

the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the

state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in

a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

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3 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2007). 

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489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.

Ct. 2971 (2005).3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the

“highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied

if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement regarding a federal habeas claim, the

petitioner must present both the operative facts and the legal

principles controlling the claim to the state courts. See

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). The

Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose of exhaustion is

to give the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged federal constitutional errors. See Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if

the petitioner did not present the claim to the state court as

asserting the violation of a specific federal constitutional

right, as opposed to the violation of a state constitutional

right, state rule, or state law, the federal habeas claim was

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not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541

U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. A petitioner’s allusion to

“broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial” in their state court

pleadings is not sufficient to establish a federal

constitutional claim was fairly presented to the state courts.

Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (internal citations omitted).

B. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2007). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351,

109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See id.,

489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862

F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural default also occurs

when a petitioner did present a claim to the state courts, but

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the state courts did not address the merits of the claim because

the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See,

e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590,

2594-95 (1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating

a state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and

independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise

the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and

prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d

627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005,

1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and preclusion bar Petitioner from

now returning to the state courts to exhaust any unexhausted

federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claims not previously fairly

presented to the state courts. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Federal courts hearing habeas petitions may

not review state convictions, even for

federal constitutional claims, if the state

court judgment procedurally barring the

petitioner’s claims rests on an independent

and adequate state law ground. []. Procedural

default, a particular type of adequate and

independent state ground, applies to bar

federal habeas review when the state court

has declined to address the petitioner’s

federal claims because he failed to meet

state procedural requirements...

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

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C. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse

his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111

S. Ct. at 2555-56. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the

petitioner’s procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that the alleged error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires

Petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

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Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review

of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, Petitioner would have to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could have found

him guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at

393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-

43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner asserts that he need not show cause and

prejudice regarding any defaulted claim. See Docket No. 34 at

115 & 116 (“Sanders finds no necessity to assert ‘cause and

prejudice’ per se”). Petitioner further contends that his

ineffective counsel was the cause for his procedural default of

his claims. Id. at 115. Petitioner also contends that some of

his claims did not become apparent until after the time to raise

them had passed, and that “the State, State courts, or other

officials hindered compliance with a procedural rule or made

compliance impracticable.” Id. Petitioner further asserts:

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“trial or appellate counsel made or may have made the decision

that resulted in default to protect herself from adverse

consequences, rather than out of concern for client.” Id.

Petitioner further contends that the Court must conduct a

hearing “on the controlling and controverted factual issues

surrounding the default and any excuses for it...” Id. at 117.

D. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 &

Supp. 2007); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7,

10 (2003). When more than one state court has adjudicated a

claim, the Court must analyze the last reasoned decision by a

state court to determine if the state’s denial of relief on the

claim was clearly contrary to federal law. See Barker v.

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). Additionally, United States

Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court’s last

reasoned decision are the source of “clearly established federal

law” for the purpose of federal habeas review of state court

decisions regarding federal constitutional claims. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523

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(2000); Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093.

When reviewing a habeas claim, a federal court must

afford great deference to the state court’s rulings with regard

to issues raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 359-60

(2002). Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be controverted by a federal court only when it

is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See Miller-El

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239-40, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005);

Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The

“presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state

appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the

finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct.

1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

Additionally, a state prisoner may obtain a writ of

habeas corpus only upon a showing that he is being held in

violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2006); Engle, 456

U.S. at 119, 102 S. Ct. at 1567. Federal habeas relief is not

available for alleged errors in the interpretation or

application of state law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991). Furthermore, the

conclusion of an Arizona court regarding an issue of Arizona

state law is binding on this Court. See Menendez v. Terhune,

422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); Hartman v. Summers, 120

F.3d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has stated: “If a state law issue must be decided in

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4 In 1997, the Arizona state statute regarding the right of

a bond agent to arrest an individual on a bail bond provided in its

entirety:

For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, a

surety on the bail bond of defendant may arrest

him before the forfeiture of the undertaking, or

by written authority endorsed on a certified copy

of the undertaking, may empower any adult person

of suitable discretion to do so.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3885 (1989 & Supp. 1997). 

This statute was revised effective May 29, 1998, as a result

of the events involving Petitioner. The statute now provides, inter

alia: ***

B. A bail recovery agent or a bail bond agent

shall not do any of the following:

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order to decide a federal habeas claim, the state’s construction

of its own law is binding on the federal court.” Horton v.

Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Mullaney v.

Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1886 (1975).

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends Arizona statutes were applied

retroactively to criminalize his conduct, in violation of his

right to due process and to be free of ex post facto laws.

Petitioner contends the instruction given to the jury

regarding the Arizona statute governing the right of a bail

surety’s agent to arrest an individual on a bail bond

constituted a retroactive interpretation of the applicable

statute. Petitioner asserts the jury was told that, as a matter

of Arizona law, a bail recovery agent could not legally enter

the home of a third person to arrest a bail absconder, which

instruction deprived Petitioner of a legitimate defense.

Petitioner argues that, because the jury instruction was a

statement of the law as it was codified after Petitioner’s

crime, the jury instruction operated like an ex post facto law.4

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1. Enter an occupied residential structure

without the consent of the occupants who are

present at the time of the entry.

***

4. Authorize or allow any third party bail

recovery agent to undertake an apprehension or

arrest if the bail recovery agent has been

convicted in any jurisdiction of theft or of any

felony or any crime involving carrying or the

illegal use or possession of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument.

*** The bail recovery agent identified in the

written notice shall certify on the written

notice, under penalty of perjury, that the bail

recovery agent has never been convicted in any

jurisdiction of theft or of any felony or any

crime involving carrying or the illegal use or

possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument and that the bail recovery agent has

complied with § 20-340.04. ...

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Petitioner asserts: “The court’s interpretation of the pre-1998

version of [Arizona Revised Statutes] § 13-3885 was not a

statement on the law, but a comment on the evidence.” Docket

No. 5 at 78. Respondents allow this claim was properly

exhausted, and assert the claim is not cognizable on federal

habeas review because it involves an issue of state law.

In rejecting this claim, presented in Petitioner’s

direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the jury

instruction properly set forth the limitations on a bail agent’s

power to enter the home of a third-party that were in effect at

the time of the alleged crime. See Answer, Exh. J. The Arizona

Court of Appeals expressly held the trial court’s interpretation

of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3885 did not constitute a

change of law being retroactively applied to Petitioner. Id.,

Exh. J at 11. Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals

determined Petitioner’s right to be free of an ex post facto law

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5

 The Court concludes this comity is especially important

when the state courts have not interpreted the statute at all or to

the contrary prior to the petitioner’s criminal proceedings. Prior

to Petitioner’s trial, the Arizona courts had never directly

considered whether the relevant statute allowed entry into a home of

a third-party to arrest a bail absconder. With regard to the statute,

the Arizona courts had previously stated in an unpublished opinion:

Statutes that permit private citizens to make

arrests are generally narrowly construed. [].

Strict compliance with the statute is required so

a person arrested by an agent of the surety can

recognize it as a valid arrest, and a breach of

the peace can be avoided when a citizen effects

an arrest.

Arizona v. Reihley, 1991 WL 29290, at *2 (Ct. App. 1991) (concluding

the arrest and resulting search of the defendant were not authorized

by section 3885 and reversing the trial court’s denial of the

defendant’s motion to suppress and, accordingly, his conviction). 

The statute, as revised, has been reviewed by the Arizona

state courts only once since Petitioner’s conviction. See Arizona v.

Affordable Bail Bonds, 198 Ariz. 34, 6 P.3d 339 (Ct. App.

2000)(holding that law enforcement agencies do not have a statutory

duty to respond to a bond surety’s request to apprehend a fugitive who

has been located within a residence, and that the surety did not

“surrender” the defendant into the custody of the state, so as to be

entitled to relief from liability on the appearance bond). In that

case, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 

In response to a highly publicized killing of two

individuals in their home by purported “bounty

hunters,” the legislature in 1998 amended A.R.S.

section 13-3885 to narrow the authority of bail

bondsmen to arrest defendants. See Ann L. Merry,

S.B. 1257: Arizona Regulates Bounty Hunters, 31

Ariz. St. L. J. 229, 230-32 (1999). This statute

now provides, in significant part,

 B. A bail recovery agent or a bail bond agent

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was not violated.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial

court correctly interpreted an Arizona statute is binding on

this Court. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636, 111

S. Ct. 2491, 2499 (1991); Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691, 95 S. Ct.

at 1886 (concluding that “state courts are the ultimate

expositors of state law”); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083,

1087 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006).5

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shall not do any of the following:

 1. Enter an occupied residential structure

without the consent of the occupants who are

present at the time of the entry.

198 Ariz. at 37, 6 P.3d at 342.

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Therefore, the Arizona state courts’ decision that Petitioner

was not subjected to an ex post facto law was not clearly

contrary to federal law. 

Due process problems in the application of state laws

by state courts do frequently arise under the ex post facto

clause, and related due process constraints, when a state

changes a statute or rule. See, e.g., Brown v. Maloney, 267

F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2001). Article I of the United States

Constitution prohibits the states from passing any “ex post

facto law.” An ex post facto law is a law that, inter alia,

deprives a criminal defendant “of any defense available

according to law at the time when the act was committed.”

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. Ct. 68, 69-70

(1925). See also California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S.

499, 504-05, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1995). A jury instruction

that effects a judicial change in the applicable law violates

the prohibition against ex post facto laws. See Morales, 514

U.S. at 504, 115 S. Ct. at 1600-01; Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255

F.3d 926, 961 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the Arizona state

courts’ conclusion that the trial court properly instructed the

jury on the relevant constraints of the applicable statute is

binding on this Court, Petitioner has not established that his

right to be free of an ex post facto law was violated.

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Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on this claim.

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner is ordinarily

not entitled to habeas relief based on the “correctness” of jury

instructions because a claim that a jury instruction was an

erroneous statement of state law is not an allegation of the

deprivation of a federal right. See, e.g., Estelle, 502 U.S. at

68, 72, 112 S. Ct. at 480 (stating that a jury instruction which

allegedly violates state law can be the basis of federal habeas

relief only when the instruction “so infected the entire trial

that the resulting conviction violates due process”); Engle, 456

U.S. at 119, 102 S. Ct. at 1567. A petitioner’s mere assertion

that a jury instruction error violated their right to due

process does not render the claim a federal constitutional

claim. See, e.g., Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th

Cir. 1999) (concluding a habeas petition may not “transform a

state law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a due

process violation.”); Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 446-47

(6th Cir. 2007).

2. Petitioner contends his right to have a jury

determine his guilt was violated. Petitioner contends the

judge’s jury instructions removed an acquittal from the jury’s

options because the jury instruction allowed no justification or

reasonable belief defense to the charge of burglary and,

accordingly, first-degree felony murder.

With regard to the rights of a bail bond surety’s agent

to arrest a bail absconder, the trial court instructed the jury,

over defense counsel’s objection, as follows:

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 Now when bail is given, a defendant in a

criminal case is regarded as delivered to the

custody of the sureties. Whenever the

sureties choose to do so, they may arrest the

defendant and surrender him. For the purpose

of surrendering a defendant, a surety on the

bail bond of the defendant may arrest him

before the forfeiture of the undertaking, or

by written authority endorsed on a certified

copy of the undertaking, may empower any

adult person of suitable discretion to do so.

 In other words, the surety may exercise

their rights in person or by agent. They may

pursue the defendant into another state to

arrest him and, if necessary, may break and

enter the defendant’s house, but not some

third person’s, for that purpose.

Answer, Exh. J at 8 (emphasis added).

In his direct appeal Petitioner argued the emphasized

portion of this instruction stating a third-party’s home may not

be entered to arrest a bail absconder was not a correct

statement of the state law in effect at the time of the incident

giving rise to the charges against him. Petitioner asserted the

relevant statute did not, at that time, express specific

restrictions or limitations regarding entry into a third-party’s

home to arrest a bail absconder. Petitioner “objected to the

insertion of the words ‘but not some third person’ because no

Arizona Court had ever interpreted A.R.S. § 13-3885 to exclude

entry into the home of a third party.” Id., Exh. G at 17.

Petitioner further asserted in his direct appeal that including

this language violated his right to due process of law and his

Sixth Amendment right to a verdict rendered by a jury. Id.,

Exh. G at 16.

As stated supra, the Arizona Court of Appeals

determined the trial court had properly instructed the jury with

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regard to the law applicable at the time of Petitioner’s acts.

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner’s argument

regarding the statute, i.e., that it could not be read to

include the prohibition against entering the home of a third

party, ignored “the reality that other [state] statutes

authorizing arrests by peace officers and private persons

likewise do not include specific limitations on these arrest

powers,” but nonetheless limit the arrest powers of peace

officers and private persons. Id., Exh. J at 9-10. The Arizona

Court of Appeals concluded that, under the version of the

statute in effect in 1997, a bail surety agent could not “break

into” a building to arrest a bail absconder unless the absconder

had committed a felony in the agent’s presence. Id., Exh. J at

10. “As the applicable Arizona law is clear that a private

person was not authorized to break into a third party’s house

under the circumstances in the present case, there was no error

in the instruction given by the trial court.” Id., Exh. J at

10.

Respondents contend Petitioner only alluded to this due

process claim in his direct appeal. Accordingly, Respondents

argue, Petitioner failed to “fairly present” this ground for

relief as a specific due process claim premised on alteration of

the burden of proof.

Petitioner did not fairly present this federal habeas

claim to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 276 (1982);

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6

 In Castillo, the Ninth Circuit stated:

... we have held that citation to either a

federal or state case involving the legal

standard for a federal constitutional violation

is sufficient to establish exhaustion. [];

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[F]or purposes of

exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing

a federal constitutional issue serves the same

purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing

such an issue.”). ... Mere general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not

establish exhaustion. [] Nor is it enough to

raise a state claim that is analogous or closely

similar to a federal claim.

399 F.3d at 999 (internal citations and quotations omitted and

emphasis added).

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Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999;6 Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153,

1157 (9th Cir. 2003); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987–88

(9th Cir. 2000); Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1240 (8th

Cir. 1996) (concluding the petitioner must present the same

legal theory, not just the same facts, to exhaust a claim). Cf.

Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2001)

(finding a federal habeas claim had not been fairly presented

when the petitioner had objected to expert witness testimony on

evidentiary grounds, not on constitutional grounds).

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim by not

fairly presenting it to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause nor prejudice

regarding his procedural default of his claim. Because

Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice regarding his

procedural default of this due process claim, the Court may not

grant relief on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Bargas v.

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Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999). 

3. Petitioner contends his right to be presumed

innocent was violated because the trial court did not require

the prosecution to establish each element of the offense of

conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Respondents argue:

Petitioner contends that the surety

instruction relieved the prosecution of its

burden of proving the unlawful entry element

of burglary. [] Petitioner asserts that he

raised the federal constitutional basis for

this claim on direct appeal, but his

retroactive interpretation objection to the

surety instruction did not encompass this

federal basis. [] In fact, Petitioner only

alluded to this ground for relief in

contending that trial counsel were

ineffective for failing to present a “legal

entry” defense. []

The trial court addressed the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, and did not

separately address the correctness of the

surety instruction. [] Accordingly,

Petitioner has failed to substantively

exhaust this claim. Petitioner did not

“fairly present” this ground for relief as a

violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Docket No. 24 at 21.

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim by not

fairly presenting it to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause nor prejudice

regarding his procedural default of this claim. Because

Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice regarding his

procedural default of this claim, the Court may not grant relief

on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Bargas, 179 F.3d at

1215; Beard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The

exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if the petitioner

presents new legal theories or factual claims for the first time

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in his federal petition.”); Joubert, 75 F.3d at 1240 (holding

the petitioner must present the same legal theory, not just the

same facts, to exhaust his habeas claim).

4. Petitioner maintains the trial court failed to

properly instruct the jury because it did not include an

instruction on a “justification” defense, “blighting the whole

trial” and rendering the resulting convictions in violation of

Petitioner’s constitutional rights.

Respondents aver this claim has not been properly

exhausted because Petitioner did not present the federal

constitutional basis for this claim to the state courts, i.e.,

that “Petitioner had only contended that the abridged

instruction ‘substantially diminished’ his ability to assert

that his conduct was justified.” Docket No. 24 at 22.

Regardless of whether Petitioner substantively exhausted this

claim, it may be denied on the merits. 

The right to due process of law encompasses the right

to present a “complete” defense. “Due process requires that

criminal prosecutions ‘comport with prevailing notions of

fundamental fairness” and that “criminal defendants be afforded

a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark

v. Brown, 442 F.3d 708, 714 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

555 (2006), quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485,

104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984). Habeas relief may be predicated

on the state trial court’s failure to “instruct on the defense

theory of the case ... if the [defense] theory is legally sound

and evidence in the case makes it applicable.” Beardslee v.

Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Bradley

v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the

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right to present a complete defense would be “empty” if it did

not encompass the right to a jury instruction regarding a

legitimate defense). 

When habeas is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

failure to instruct on the defense theory of

the case is reversible error if the theory is

legally sound and evidence in the case makes

it applicable.... A habeas petitioner must

show that the alleged instructional error had

substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.

Clark, 442 F.3d at 714 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Accordingly, to succeed on a federal habeas claim that

a state court violated the petitioner’s due process rights by

omitting a proposed jury instruction requires a showing that the

error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violate[d] due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431

U.S. 145, 154, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (1977). Additionally, a

state trial court’s finding that the evidence does not support

a defense available by operation of state law is entitled to a

presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. See, e.g.,

Menendez, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); Hartman, 120 F.3d

at 161. 

Petitioner did get a justification instruction,

however, the justification instruction was not the one he

wanted. Answer, Exh. G at 22-23. The Arizona courts’

interpretation of Arizona statutes as stated in the form of jury

instructions, i.e., that Petitioner had not established he was

entitled to an instruction on his proffered defense, is presumed

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correct by this Court. And, as stated supra, a claim that a

trial court gave a jury instruction erroneous as to state law

does not state a claim that the petitioner’s constitutional

rights were violated. The state court’s conclusion that

Petitioner was not, as a matter of state law, entitled to a jury

instruction that his entry into the victims’ home could be

legally justified by the existence of the expired bail warrant

for Mr. Alcantar, is entitled to a presumption of correctness.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on his claim that the trial court erred by not giving the jury

a justification instruction.

 5. Petitioner avers the trial court erred by failing

to dismiss the allegedly duplicitous murder charges in the

indictment.

Count I and Count II of the indictment against

Petitioner asserted he was guilty of first-degree felony murder

or, in the alternative, second-degree murder. Petitioner raised

this claim in his direct appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded the indictment was not duplicitous because it charged

the first two counts in the alternative. 

Duplicity in an indictment occurs when two or more

separate offenses are joined in a single count. See, e.g.,

Schad, 501 U.S. at 631, 111 S. Ct. at 2496-97. An indictment is

not duplicitous, however, when it alleges alternative means of

committing a single crime. Id. Accordingly, the Arizona Court

of Appeals’ decision was not clearly contrary to federal law and

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

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6. Petitioner asserts that forcing him to wear a

“shock belt” during his jury trial violated his rights pursuant

to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. 

In his amended habeas petition, Petitioner asserts:

[T]he trial court allowed MCSO to force

Sanders to wear a shock-belt to physically

restrain him at jury trial. The court did

this notwithstanding the fact that no

compelling circumstance required Sanders to

be restrained to maintain courtroom security.

Rather the court failed to exercise close

judicial scrutiny of the Sheriff’s hi-tech

binding and gagging of Sanders with a shockbelt, which led to the following

constitutional consequences.

Sanders had a right to be present at his

trial so as to assist in his own defense.

This right included “hearing” the testimony

of witnesses, conferring with his counsels,

and being an active member of his own defense

team. Additionally, he had the right to

testify on his own behalf, and to display his

natural demeanor to jurors.

As a hearing disabled person who wears

hearing aids, Sanders must employ an array of

mitigating conduct to “hear” what is going on

and said. For example, he must see speaker’s

faces and body language, then contextually

add these to what he actually hears to make

speech intelligible to him. Due to the above

stated refusal of the trial court to

reasonably accommodate Sanders’ hearing

disability and the constant threat of being

shocked during trial if he physically moved

to mitigate his hearing impairment; (sic)

Sanders was unable to intelligibly “hear”

witnesses, prosecutors, the court, or defense

counsel. Accordingly, throughout trial he

could not assist in his own defense... These

deprivations were the direct result of the

psychological consequences of being forced to

wear a shock-belt during jury trial....

But for the foisting of a shock-belt upon

him, Sanders would have testified in his own

behalf.

Docket No. 5 at 94-96. 

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7

 Petitioner asserted in his second action for postconviction relief that his claim was not precluded because it was

based on a newly-issued decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

in Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2003). Previous

federal court opinions resolving habeas claims dealt primarily with

the use of shackles during a criminal jury proceeding. In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the use of a shock-belt,

which is worn on the inside of the defendant’s clothing. 

a decision to use a stun belt must be subjected

to at least the same close judicial scrutiny

required for the imposition of other physical

restraints.” Durham, 287 F.3d at 1306 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). And for

these reasons, before a court may order the use

of physical restraints on a defendant at trial,

“the court must be persuaded by compelling

circumstances that some measure [is] needed to

maintain the security of the courtroom,” and, as

noted, “the court must pursue less restrictive

alternatives before imposing physical

restraints.”...

***

The record clearly demonstrates that the trial

court failed to adhere to the relevant

constitutional standards in forcing the defendant

to wear the restraint. First, the decision to

-35-

Petitioner asserts, inter alia, that if he had

testified he “would have shown jurors that he had scrupulously

adhered to police procedures and that was the norm for him

during his bail enforcement activities.” Id. at 97. Petitioner

contends his testimony “would have deprived prosecutors of their

[] uncontested arguments that Sanders was reckless and was not

acting as a bail agent.” Id. Petitioner further asserts the

shock-belt was physically painful, and that the “shock-belt’s

outline was visible through his trial clothes ... [and]

negatively altered his demeanor before jurors.” Id.

 The Arizona Superior Court concluded this claim was

precluded as waived by Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim

in his direct appeal.7 The state court’s conclusion that the

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force the defendant to wear the stun belt during

trial was not made by the Court in the first

instance; it was made by correctional

officers....

 None of the articulated reasons provides an

adequate basis for depriving a defendant of his

constitutional right to attend trial free of

physical restraints. Gonzalez did not create any

disturbance at trial. He did not try to escape.

He made no threats. Despite this, the trial court

did not even hold an evidentiary hearing before

ordering the use of the belt. This procedure did

not satisfy the safeguards required by the

Constitution.

-36-

claim was procedurally barred constitutes an adequate and

independent basis for refusing federal habeas relief on this

claim and, accordingly, the claim may not provide a basis for

relief.

Alternatively, the Court concludes the claim may be

denied on the merits. To succeed on this type of claim, the

habeas petitioner must show that the physical restraints “had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict...” Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69,

106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986). To prevail on a claim of this

nature in a federal habeas petition, the Court must conclude the

defendant was indeed physically restrained in the presence of

the jury and that the jury saw or was aware of the restraint and

that the physical restraint was not justified by state

interests. See Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, for unjustified restraint to rise to the

level of a constitutional trial error, the petitioner must make

a showing that he suffered prejudice as a result of the

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shackling. See id.; Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 903. See also Dyas

v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2003). In Rhoden, the

Ninth Circuit emphasized prejudice arises not from the restraint

but from the jury’s awareness of the restraint. See 172 F.3d at

636 (“when the defendant’s shackling was not actually seen by

the jury during the trial, we have held that the shackling was

harmless error”). Similarly, in Dyas, the Ninth Circuit stated

prejudice was “particularly likely” when the restraints were

visible to the jury. 317 F.3d at 936-37. Cf. United States v.

Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007) (evaluating the

constitutionality of shackling individuals making an initial

appearance before a federal magistrate judge).

Petitioner has not asserted constitutional prejudice

arising from the imposed shock-belt. Petitioner does not assert

the jury was aware of the shock-belt, i.e., aware the trial

court had determined Petitioner needed to be restrained, which

would constitute prejudice. Accordingly, Petitioner has not

asserted constitutional prejudice as a result of the decision to

require him to wear a shock-belt. Although Petitioner contends

wearing the shock-belt was the reason he chose not to testify,

the proffered testimony regarding the reasonableness of

Petitioner’s actions was presented to the jurors through the

defense witness, Mr. Garrelts. Furthermore, the Court finds it

completely unbelievable that, absent the presence of the shockbelt, Petitioner would have chosen to take the stand and face

potential cross-examination regarding his extensive prior

criminal convictions.

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Because the Arizona state courts’ denial of this claim

rests on an adequate basis, independent of federal law, to deny

relief, Petitioner is not entitled to consideration of the

merits of this claim. Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled

to habeas relief on the merits of the claim because he has not

established prejudice from the use of the shock belt arising to

the level of a constitutional violation.

7. Petitioner contends his right to confidential

attorney-client communications was violated by the surreptitious

recording and eavesdropping upon his attorney-client meetings

and legal telephone conversations by jail officials. Petitioner

argues these acts violated his rights pursuant to the Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel has been interpreted to include

a limited right to confidential communication with counsel.

See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558-59, 97 S.

Ct. 837, 845 (1977). The United States Supreme Court held in

Weatherford that, in some circumstances, a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights might be violated by the state’s direct

interference with the attorney-client relationship. Id.

(concluding the Constitution was not violated where the

interference was not purposeful, did not result in the

introduction of tainted evidence, and did not result in the

disclosure of defense strategy to the prosecution). However,

the Supreme Court expressly rejected a per se rule that a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated solely by such an

intrusion. See id., 429 U.S. at 550-51, 554-58. 

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8

 

The Third Circuit has adopted the rule that

intentional intrusions by the prosecution

constitute per se violations of the Sixth

Amendment. [] The Second and District of

Columbia Circuits, ... have recognized that

prejudice may not be required when an intrusion

is intentional, but have not specifically

decided.[]. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits

have held that something beyond the intentional

intrusion itself is required to rise to the level

of a Sixth Amendment violation.

Shillinger, 70 F.3d at 1140-41.

-39-

Several of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal,

including the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that the state’s

deliberate interference with communications between a defendant

and his counsel, which interference prejudices the defendant,

violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. See Williams v.

Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584-85 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding a

habeas petitioner would be entitled to relief on a claim of

“improper interference” only if they established “substantial”

prejudice), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 419 (2005); Clutchette v.

Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985); Shillinger v.

Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1134-36, 1140-42 (10th Cir. 1996).8

“Substantial prejudice results from the introduction of evidence

gained through the interference against the defendant at trial,

from the prosecution’s use of confidential information

pertaining to defense plans and strategy, and from other actions

designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial.”

Williams, 384 F.3d at 585.

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Petitioner asserts “an agent of the State attempted to

intimidate Sanders’ lead counsel by confronting her regarding

the frequency and duration of her pre-trial attorney-meetings

with Sanders. The State admits to monitoring Sanders and his

counsel’s legal visits.” Docket No. 5 at 99. Petitioner

asserts his post-trial communications with counsel were

recorded. Id. Petitioner further contends the trial court and

prosecutors “were aware of the jail’s recording of Sanders’

legal calls.” Id. at 100. However, Petitioner does not assert

that any “surveillance” of his attorney-client communications

resulted in the introduction of unfavorable evidence at his

trial or sentencing proceedings, or that the state took

advantage of any trial or sentencing strategy revealed as a

result of any surveillance. Accordingly, Petitioner has not

alleged the type of substantial prejudice from the state’s

interference with his communication with counsel which would

allow the Court to conclude the interference resulted in a

violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights and Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief with regard to this claim.

 8. Petitioner contends that the State of Arizona

violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) by intercepting his communications

with his counsel without either a court order or consent.

Petitioner did not raise this claim in his direct

appeal or in his actions for post-conviction relief. Although

Petitioner argued in the state courts that his convictions

should be vacated because of the recording of his attorneyclient communications, he did not argue this same legal

predicate for this claim, i.e., that the recordings violated a

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specific federal statute. The exhaustion requirement is not

satisfied where the petitioner presents a new legal theory in

his federal habeas petition. See Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6–7, 103

S. Ct. at 277-78; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S.

Ct. 509, 512 (1971). Because the claim was not fairly presented

to the state courts and is now procedurally barred, and

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from

his procedural default of the claim, relief may not be awarded

on the claim.

 Additionally, the claim may be denied on the merits

because the violation of a federal statute by the state in the

course of criminal proceedings does not constitute a per se

violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional right to due

process of law. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354, 114 S.

Ct. 2291, 2300 (1994); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428,

82 S. Ct. 468, 471 (1962); Lord v. Lambert, 347 F.3d 1091, 1094

(9th Cir. 2003) (concluding an alleged violation of a federal

statute governing the interception of cordless telephone

conversations did not constitute a constitutional violation

absent a showing of a miscarriage of justice). The violation of

a statute does not provide a basis for concluding the

defendant’s constitutional rights were violated absent a showing

of a resulting “fundamental defect” in the defendant’s criminal

proceedings, which results in a miscarriage of justice. See

Reed, 512 U.S. at 354, 114 S. Ct. at 2300. Petitioner has made

no such showing and, accordingly, he is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on the merits of this claim.

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9. Petitioner asserts the trial court unduly inhibited

his ability to cross-examine a government witness, Mr. Timms, as

to his credibility.

During Mr. Timms’ testimony at Petitioner’s trial, when

Mr. Timms was asked by Petitioner’s counsel on cross-examination

if he had lied to his defense counsel regarding the defendants’

true intent on the night in question, Mr. Timms’ counsel

objected and invoked attorney-client privilege. See, e.g.,

Answer, Exh. G at 6-7. 

Petitioner raised a claim in his state proceedings that

his rights were violated by the curtailment of questions to Mr.

Timms on cross-examination. Id., Exh. G. In denying this

claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded:

On appeal, [Petitioner] challenges the trial

court’s ruling regarding the assertion of the

attorney-client privilege on two separate

grounds. First, he claims that the privilege

was never properly invoked because it had

been waived by the plea agreement and because

it was not asserted by Timms, but by his

counsel. However, we find nothing in the

plea agreement that constitutes a waiver of

the attorney-client privilege with respect to

Timms’ conversation with his current counsel.

In addition, although Timms never expressly

asserted his privilege on the record, all

parties, including the defendant, proceeded

on the understanding that the privilege had

been invoked. If [Petitioner] had desired to

raise a question concerning whether the

privilege had been properly invoked by Timms,

that issue could have been easily resolved in

the trial court without any difficulty or

delay. The failure by [Petitioner] to raise

this issue in the trial court constitutes

waiver of the issue on appeal.[]

Id., Exh. J at 16.

Petitioner raised this claim in the state courts, which

concluded the claim was precluded as waived. The state courts’

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conclusion that Petitioner waived this claim for failure to

contemporaneously object constitutes the application of an

adequate and independent state procedural rule barring federal

review of the claim on the merits. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at

729, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-54; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989) (holding that the state

court must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case to preclude

habeas review); Poland, 169 F.3d at 585; Correll, 137 F.3d at

1417; Quintero v. Stewart, 121 Fed. App. 203, 205 (9th Cir.

2005).

Alternatively, the claim may be denied on the merits.

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that any error regarding

the ability to cross-examine Mr. Timms was harmless.

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or

Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,

690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). However, state trial judges retain wide

latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to

impose reasonable limits on the cross-examination of witnesses.

See, e.g., King v. Trippett, 192 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 1999).

Alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause raised

in a section 2254 petition are subject to harmless error review.

See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803

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(1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682, 106 S. Ct.

1431, 1437 (1986). Accordingly, Petitioner would be entitled to

habeas relief on the merits of this claim only if he could

establish that curtailing Mr. Timms’ cross-examination had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict. See Barajas v. Wise, 481 F.3d 734, 741 (9th

Cir. 2007).

Petitioner was afforded a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense, including the opportunity to

meaningfully challenge the prosecution’s theory of the case,

i.e., that Petitioner’s intent was not to enforce a bail bond

regarding Mr. Victor Alcantar, but to burglarize a residence.

Petitioner’s counsel was able to cross-examine Mr. Timms

regarding his credibility and regarding his fluid statements to

others as to Petitioner’s motives for entering the home.

Petitioner’s counsel was able to cross-examine Mr. Timms

regarding the fact that Mr. Timms had changed his story

regarding the defendants’ intent before the grand jury and that

Mr. Timms had received a promise of leniency for his testimony.

Accordingly, Petitioner was not deprived of his right to

confront a witness before the court nor the opportunity to

present a complete defense in this regard and he is not entitled

to federal habeas relief on this claim. See Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2006); Crane, 476

U.S. at 689–90, 106 S. Ct. at 2146; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at

679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435. 

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9 Rule 404 provides:

Except as provided in Rule 404(c) evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible

to prove the character of a person in order to

show action in conformity therewith. It may,

however, be admissible for other purposes, such

as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident. 

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10. Petitioner maintains admission of Mr. Timms’

testimony about Petitioner’s alleged prior bad acts violated his

constitutional rights because the evidence was admitted without

the trial court first considering the evidence pursuant to

Arizona Rules of Evidence 401–404.9

Petitioner challenged the admission of testimony from

Mr. Timms regarding statements made by Petitioner prior to the

night in question about his intent in entering the home.

Petitioner also challenged Mr. Timms’ testimony that he and

Petitioner used methamphetamine on one occasion when they

discussed the alleged burglary. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied this claim, holding

the “other act” evidence was intrinsic to the charges against

Petitioner and, accordingly, that admitting the evidence did not

violate the applicable state evidentiary rule. The Arizona

Court of Appeals did conclude that testimony regarding

methamphetamine use should have been excluded, however, the

appellate court further determined the admission of the

testimony regarding this one act was harmless. 

Petitioner alleges the error in allowing the other act

testimony by Mr. Timms deprived him of due process because it

violated a state rule of evidence. A state court’s alleged

failure to follow a state procedural rule is not a per se

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violation of the defendant’s federal right to due process of

law. See Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1376 n.2 (9th Cir.

1986); Wayne v. Raines, 690 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1982). The

improper admission of evidence, which a habeas petitioner

contends was unduly prejudicial, has violated the petitioner’s

right to due process only when there were no permissible

inferences the jury could have drawn from the evidence. See

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998) (“whether

or not the admission of evidence is contrary to a state rule of

evidence, a trial court’s ruling does not violate due process

unless the evidence is ‘of such quality as necessarily prevents

a fair trial.’”). 

There were permissible inferences the jury could have

drawn from the evidence regarding the Mr. Timms and Petitioner’s

discussions prior to the break-in; indeed, the testimony was the

primary evidence regarding Petitioner’s intent in entering the

home. With regard to the evidence of methamphetamine use, the

admission of the challenged evidence did not deny Petitioner a

fundamentally fair trial because the right to due process has

never been held to include the exclusion of “bad acts” evidence.

See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006); Bugh

v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is no

clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a

state violates due process by permitting propensity evidence in

the form of other bad acts evidence.”); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268

F.3d 417, 439 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating in reference to habeas

corpus challenge to admission of other-acts evidence that

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10 In his direct appeal Petitioner argued his inability to

cross-examine the officers on these issues violated his constitutional

right to due process of law and to confront witnesses against him.

Answer, Exh. G at 33–38. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded it

was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to limit the crossexamination, agreeing that evidence regarding the tactics used for

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“[s]tate court evidentiary rulings do not rise to the level of

due process violations unless they offend some principle of

justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people

as to be ranked as fundamental.”). Accordingly, Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

11. Petitioner asserts his right to due process of law

was violated because the trial court prohibited him from

exercising his rights to “confrontation, compulsory process, and

a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”.

Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly

curtailed his cross-examination of two law enforcement officer

witnesses, depriving him of his right to confront witnesses

against him and his right to present a complete defense. During

trial, Petitioner’s counsel sought to elicit testimony from

these witnesses regarding law enforcement’s use of bullet-proof

vests and forcible entry regulations incumbent on law

enforcement agents. Answer, Exh. G at 33. The trial court

precluded the further cross-examination of officers Moissonier

and Wood regarding the use of bullet-proof vests and operational

tactics because the trial court determined it was irrelevant.

Id., Exh. J at 18. 

Respondents assert this claim was not exhausted in the

state courts because it was not fairly presented as a federal

constitutional claim.10 However, the claim may be denied on the

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bail recovery would be relevant, but evidence regarding certified law

enforcement officer procedures would not be relevant and so it could

be properly excluded. See Answer, Exh. J at 18. The Court of

Appeals concluded: “Although wide latitude is granted on crossexamination, a party does not have a license to run at large or to

introduce irrelevant testimony.” Id., Exh. J at 18.

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merits regardless of any failure to properly exhaust the claim.

Petitioner’s right to due process does not encompass a

right to cross-examination of prosecution witnesses when the

testimony would not be relevant to the question before the factfinder. See Holmes, 126 S. Ct. at 1732; Crane, 476 U.S. at

689–90, 106 S. Ct. at 2146; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.

Ct. at 1435. Petitioner’s right to present evidence, even in

the form of cross-examination of adversary witnesses, is not

absolute. Although the right to present a defense is

“fundamental,” “the state’s legitimate interest in reliable and

efficient trials is also compelling.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d

1447, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Alcala v. Woodford, 334

F.3d 862, 877 (9th Cir. 2003); Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d

1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2000).

As noted supra, “the Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense.” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S. Ct. at 2146. A

defendant’s due process rights are violated by the exclusion of

evidence if the precluded evidence, if introduced, would have

created “a reasonable doubt that did not exist without the

evidence.” Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir.

1997) (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,

868, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3447 (1982)); Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d

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788, 798 (10th Cir. 2005). However, the right to present

evidence in one’s defense is not unlimited. State rules which

operate to exclude evidence from criminal trials do not abridge

a defendant’s right to present a complete defense to the charges

against him if the rules are not arbitrary or “disproportionate

to the purposes they are designed to serve.” United States v.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (1998)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). “[W]here

constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of

guilt are implicated, [evidentiary rules] may not be applied

mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973).

Petitioner has not established that his right to

present a complete defense against the charges against him was

violated by the limitation on the law-enforcement officers’

testimony. The evidence was not relevant. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

12. Petitioner contends his “right to present a

defense” was violated by the trial court’s preclusion of expert

testimony about fight or flight syndrome. 

Petitioner proposed to offer testimony by an expert

concerning how human beings react when confronted with

extraordinary circumstances or when they perceive a lethal

threat. The state filed a motion in limine to preclude this

testimony arguing it was not proper expert testimony pursuant to

Rule 702, Arizona Rules of Evidence. The trial court ruled the

proffered expert testimony should not be admitted because it was

not a proper subject for expert testimony. In his direct

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appeal, Petitioner asserted that excluding this witness violated

his right to present a complete defense. Answer, Exh. G at 39-

43. In support of this argument Petitioner cited Logerquist v.

McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 1 P.3d 113 (2000), a case decided after

Petitioner’s conviction, maintaining that testimony on human

behavior is properly the subject of expert testimony.

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied this claim in

Petitioner’s direct appeal. The appellate court noted the

Arizona evidentiary rule provided expert testimony was

admissible if the trial court deemed it would assist the trier

of fact. Answer, Exh. J. The appellate court also noted that,

pursuant to Arizona law, the use of physical or deadly force in

self-defense is governed by a reasonableness standard, which it

determined was properly a question for the jury absent expert

testimony. Id., Exh. J. 

The manner in which a person responds to a

stressful circumstance invoking the ‘fight or

flight’ syndrome is something well within the

common experience of all persons. [] Hence,

we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s decision to exclude the proffered

testimony concerning how people react in such

circumstances.

Id., Exh. J at 21-22.

The issue presented was raised in the state courts as

a matter of state law and the proper application of a state rule

of evidence, and the Arizona Court of Appeals determined that,

as a matter of state law, Petitioner’s rights were not violated

in this regard. As stated supra, federal habeas relief does not

lie for alleged errors of a state court’s interpretation of a

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state rule of evidence and, accordingly, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

13. Petitioner contends his constitutional rights were

violated by the trial court’s preclusion of expert testimony

about law enforcement procedures.

Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to

present a defense by the trial court’s preclusion of his

proffered defense expert witness on law-enforcement operational

procedures. In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the

exclusion of this witness violated his right to present a

complete defense. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded this

evidence was irrelevant and, accordingly, that Petitioner’s

rights were not violated by the exclusion of the evidence. 

Respondents allow that the claim is exhausted, but

assert habeas relief is not available based on this claim

because it involves the admissibility of evidence pursuant to

state law and does not raise a federal question. Additionally,

Respondents assert there is no constitutional right to present

irrelevant evidence, citing Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544,

1549–50 (9th Cir. 1992).

The United States Supreme Court has “found the

exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or

disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty

interest of the accused.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308, 118 S. Ct.

1261. See also Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir.

2002). The Supreme Court has made clear that the erroneous

exclusion of critical, corroborative defense evidence may

violate both the Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair

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trial and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 93 S. Ct. at 1045; Washington, 388

U.S. at 18-19, 87 S. Ct. at 1922-23. The federal courts have

concluded that the right to present a defense has been violated

when the trial court’s decision precluded “presentation of the

substantive content of a defendant’s testimony or a percipient

witness’ testimony,” but not when the precluded evidence merely

substantiates other evidence or testimony. Greene, 288 F.3d at

1091-92. See also Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d 911, 922 (9th Cir.

2003) (concluding that, where the precluded testimony was the

defendant’s only defense, the preclusion of the testimony

violated the defendant’s right to due process of law because it

had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the

verdict).

The evidence Petitioner sought to introduce, regarding

law enforcement procedures, did not comprise the substantive

content of Petitioner’s defense. The proffered expert testimony

would only have been relevant as to what a reasonable law

enforcement officer, as compared to a bail recovery agent, would

do in an allegedly similar circumstance to that faced by

Petitioner. Petitioner was able to present evidence that a

reasonable bond recovery agent would have acted as Petitioner

allegedly did to enforce the bond on Mr. Alcantar. At

Petitioner’s trial, defense counsel presented the testimony of

a California bondsman hired to find Mr. Alcantar, who testified

he had been hired to arrest Mr. Alcantar on a legitimate arrest

warrant even though the bail bond on Mr. Alcantar had been

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exonerated. Answer, Exh. G at 22. 

Because, at best, the excluded testimony would have

supported the contention that Petitioner was posing as a law

enforcement official or that he had knowledge about their

procedures, the evidence would not have bolstered the

credibility of Mr. Timms or Petitioner regarding their intent to

execute a legitimate bail enforcement action or to engage in a

burglary. The proffered testimony was not Petitioner’s “only”

defense and the exclusion of the testimony did not have a

substantial and injurious effect in determining the verdict.

Accordingly, the exclusion of the evidence did not violate

Petitioner’s right to due process of law and Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on the merits of this claim.

14. Petitioner asserts his “right to present a defense”

was violated by the preclusion of codefendant Mr. Brackney’s

grand jury testimony under the “unavailable witness” exception.

Petitioner sought to introduce the grand jury testimony

of his codefendant, Mr. David Brackney, at his trial, to bolster

his defense of a legitimate bail enforcement action. Mr.

Brackney had testified before the grand jury that the events in

question were an attempt to legitimately execute a bail warrant.

Petitioner sought to have this testimony admitted at his trial

pursuant to a state rule of evidence, anticipating Mr. Brackney

would assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination at Petitioner’s trial if called to testify,

rendering him “unavailable” as a witness. 

The Arizona trial court held Mr. Brackney’s grand jury

testimony was not admissible pursuant to the state’s evidentiary

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rules because the state did not have an interest in a complete

examination of Mr. Brackney during the grand jury proceedings.

Answer, Exh. J at 22-23. In denying this claim on direct

appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that, at the time Mr.

Brackney testified before the grand jury, the matter was still

under investigation and Mr. Timms had not yet offered his

changed testimony regarding the fact the incident was a home

invasion robbery rather than a bail recovery. Id., Exh. J at

22-23. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded, the

government did not, at that time, have a reason to vigorously

challenge Mr. Brackney’s testimony as to the intent of the

codefendants and the situation did not fit the exception stated

in the Arizona Rules of Evidence.

 Petitioner contends in his federal habeas petition that

excluding this testimony violated his rights pursuant to the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution. Respondents allow that the claim has been

exhausted and argue the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion the

exclusion of this testimony was not error. Respondents further

assert Petitioner has not properly stated a claim that his

federal constitutional rights were violated.

Moreover, the trial court’s decision to

preclude Brackney’s grand jury testimony was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. In

Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414, the Court declined

to “draft a comprehensive set of standards to

guide the exercise of discretion in every

possible case [of witness preclusion],”

instead holding that, “the mere invocation of

[the right to call witnesses] cannot

automatically and invariably outweigh

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countervailing public interests.”

Accordingly, federal habeas review is not

available.

Docket No. 24 at 36.

As stated supra, the trial court’s preclusion of

evidence violates a federal habeas petitioner’s right to due

process of law only when the preclusion of the evidence has a

substantial and injurious effect in determining the verdict.

See Gill, 342 F.3d at 922. Because Mr. Brackney’s grand jury

testimony was not Petitioner’s only defense, the preclusion of

the testimony did not violate his federal right to due process

of law. Compare Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S. Ct.

2150, 2151 (1979) (reversing a death sentence when the

petitioner was not allowed to introduce testimony at the

sentencing phase from a witness who testified that someone else

had confessed to killing the murder victim). Accordingly, the

state’s decision denying relief on this claim was not clearly

contrary to federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief on this claim.

15. Petitioner further asserts his “right to present a

defense” was violated by the trial court’s preclusion of an

admission of a party opponent.

Respondents allow Petitioner has exhausted this claim.

Petitioner argued in his direct appeal that the prosecutor’s

pretrial assertions regarding Petitioner’s familiarity and

experience with law-enforcement procedures constituted

admissions of a party-opponent. The statements were made in the

context of the proceedings regarding whether Petitioner would be

forced to wear a shock-belt during his trial. Petitioner

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11

The court precluded Sanders from presenting the

following admission made by the state in response

to Sanders’ objection to being forced to wear a

shock belt:

Michael Sanders is sophisticated in all S.W.A.T.

type tactics and equipment utilized by law

enforcement personnel. Michael Sanders has a law

enforcement background and for the past several

years has worked as a bounty hunter. He is

experienced at apprehending and transporting

dangerous criminals and understands the tactics

of law enforcement. Through his work as a bounty

hunter, Mr. Sanders has established contacts with

a person/persons in the county of Mexico. Mr.

Sanders is an accomplished marksman.

Answer, Exh. G at 53.

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asserted the government’s statements should have been admitted

at his trial and could have raised reasonable doubt about his

guilt. See Answer, Exh. G at 53.11 The Arizona Court of

Appeals concluded Petitioner was not entitled to relief on this

basis, holding the statements were not judicial admissions

concerning facts at issue in the trial. Id., Exh. J at 24.

A claim that a state trial court improperly classified

testimony pursuant to state laws of evidence is not cognizable

on federal habeas review. Whether or not a statement is an

admission of a party-opponent is a decision committed to the

discretion of the state trial court and an exercise of

discretion on an evidentiary issue is not a violation of federal

law sufficient to warrant habeas relief. See McNeil v.

Middleton, 402 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2005); Bannister v. Delo,

100 F.3d 610, 622, n.12 (8th Cir. 1996). 

16. Petitioner contends his right to an unbiased judge

was violated.

Respondents allow that Petitioner has exhausted this

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claim, and assert the state courts’ decisions that Petitioner’s

rights were not violated in this regard were not clearly

contrary to federal law. Petitioner asserted in his direct

appeal that denying his motion for change of judge denied him

the right to due process of law and a fair trial. Petitioner

argued the judge assigned to his trial was biased because the

trial judge had presided over another capital case wherein the

defendant raised a third party defense alleging that Petitioner

committed the murders.

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on this

claim, concluding Petitioner had failed to prove the trial judge

was biased or prejudiced. The Court of Appeals noted the only

proof of bias proffered by Petitioner was the fact of the prior

criminal proceedings. See Answer, Exh. J at 28-30. The Court

of Appeals presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,

that there was nothing in the other matter that would prevent

the judge from providing Petitioner with a fair trial. 

The Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair

and impartial judge. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,

136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955). However, to succeed on a claim

of judicial bias a federal habeas petitioner must “overcome a

presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as

adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct.

1456, 1464 (1975). 

To be entitled to federal habeas relief on a claim that

the state trial judge was so prejudiced as to violate the

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petitioner’s federal constitutional right to due process, the

petitioner must establish the state trial judge’s behavior

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. See, e.g., Duckett v.

Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995); Gayle v. Scully, 779

F.2d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1985); McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811, 818

(6th Cir. 1985). The petitioner must show either actual bias or

the appearance of bias creating a conclusive presumption of

actual bias. See United States v. Lowe, 106 F.3d 1498, 1504

(10th Cir. 1997). Adverse rulings are not themselves sufficient

to establish bias or prejudice. See, e.g., Wallace v. Bell, 387

F. Supp. 2d 728, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 

Petitioner has not established the trial judge was

biased. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740. Petitioner has not

articulated any facts to overcome the presumption that the trial

judge was impartial. The judge presiding over Petitioner’s

criminal trial had no direct, personal, or substantial interest

in seeing him convicted of murder or any other related charge

and, accordingly, there is no evidence of bias. See Paradis v.

Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[D]efendants are

entitled to a judge who has no direct personal interest in the

outcome of a proceeding.”). The fact the judge had previously

presided over other criminal proceedings wherein Petitioner was

implicated in a crime does not establish the judge was likely to

be biased against Petitioner in the criminal proceedings at

issue. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S. Ct.

2697, 2704-05 (1974) (“the inquiry must be not only whether

there was actual bias on [the judge’s] part, but also whether

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there was such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias

that the judge was unable to hold the balance between

vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the

accused”). 

Because there is no evidence that Petitioner was

treated unfairly by the trial judge, the state court did not err

in rejecting this claim and the state court’s decision was not

clearly contrary to federal law. See Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832

F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that habeas relief is

available only when petitioner demonstrates unfair treatment due

to judicial bias), rev’d on other grounds, 497 U.S. 764 (1990);

Loritz v. Terhune, 60 Fed. App. 1, 2-3 (9th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim.

17. Petitioner maintains the Maricopa County

Attorney’s Office had a real conflict of interest with regarding

to their criminal prosecution of Petitioner, a former

confidential informant, which violated his right to due process

of law.

Petitioner presented this claim in his direct appeal

and the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that 

there was no abuse of discretion by the trial

court in denying defendant’s motion. To the

extent there is any appearance of impropriety

in having the MCAO prosecute defendant in

this matter it is extremely attenuated. ...

More importantly, there is nothing about the

fact that defendant assisted the MCAO with

other matters nearly a decade earlier that

would create prejudice to him in the present

matter.... Given the absence of any evidence

of a continuing relationship between

defendant and the MCAO or any other special

circumstances, we agree with the trial court

that the arguments [regarding a conflict] are

purely speculative.

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12 This statute provides:

A private person, in order to make an arrest

where a felony was committed in his presence, as

authorized in § 13-3884, may break open a door or

window of any building in which the person to be

arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if

he is refused admittance after he has announced

his purpose.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3892 (2001 & Supp. 2006).

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Answer, Exh. J at 32.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

this claim because the state court’s ruling was consistent with

Supreme Court precedent requiring a strong showing in order to

conclude that a conflict of interest existed. See Young v.

United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811,

107 S. Ct. 2124, 2139-40 (1987). To prevail on a habeas claim

that the prosecutor had a conflict of interest the petitioner

must establish that they were prejudiced by the conflict. Cf.

Newman v. Frey, 873 F.2d 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 1989); Hamilton v.

Nix, 809 F.2d 463, 470 (8th Cir. 1987). Petitioner has not

established that any alleged conflict created by the MCAO

prosecuting him after he had been a paid informant rendered his

trial fundamentally unfair and, accordingly, he is not entitled

to habeas relief on this claim. See Gallego v. McDaniel, 124

F.3d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).

18. Petitioner asserts he was deprived of his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel

because his counsel did not present a “legal entry” defense

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3892.12 

In Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of

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Appeals concluded that, as a matter of state law, Arizona

Revised Statutes § 13–3892 did not permit Petitioner to enter

the victims’ home to arrest Mr. Victor Alcantar. Answer, Exh.

J. Referring to the state statutes, the Court of Appeals

stated: 

Thus, pursuant to A.R.S. section 13–3892

(1989) (sic), a private person, such as a

bail bond surety or agent, is only authorized

under Arizona law to break into a building to

make an arrest when the person to be arrested

has committed a felony in that person’s

presence. Of course, as part of a bond

agreement, a defendant can authorize his

surety to enter his home to arrest him under

other circumstances, but a defendant has no

legal authority to grant his surety the right

to enter a third party’s home. As the

applicable Arizona law is clear that a

private person was not authorized to break

into a third party’s house under the

circumstances in the present case, there was

no error in the [limitations on surety]

instruction given by the trial court. The

validity of such a provision in a bail bond

has been recently restricted in Arizona by

virtue of amendments made to A.R.S. section

13–3885, which became effective May 29, 1998.

1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 215, § 1. 

Id., Exh. J at 10.

In his action for post-conviction relief, Petitioner

argued his counsel was ineffective for not asserting a “legal

entry” defense pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3892.

In denying this claim for post-conviction relief, the Arizona

trial court ruled that Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel

were not ineffective, stating: 

The evidence at trial did not support any

instruction supporting a defense under A.R.S.

§ 13–3892. Indeed, as the state argues, the

Court of Appeals has settled this issue

already on direct appeal. Accordingly, this

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issue has been litigated on appeal, and in

any event, even if trial counsel’s

performance was deficient on this point the

Court concluded that there was no prejudice

to the defendant as the trial outcome would

have been no different.

Answer, Exh. P. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed this

decision, as did the Arizona Supreme Court, in denying postconviction relief.

The Arizona courts’ decision that Petitioner’s right to

the effective assistance of counsel was not violated by the

failure to present a “legal entry” defense was not clearly

contrary to established federal law. To state a claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that

his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency

prejudiced the petitioner’s defense. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). 

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim premised on his counsel’s failure to raise an argument,

the petitioner must establish that the argument was likely to be

successful, in order to prove that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s failure to raise the argument. See Juan H. v. Allen,

408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (“trial counsel cannot have

been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection”);

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). A

defendant has no constitutional right to compel counsel to raise

particular claims if counsel, as a matter of professional

judgment, decides not to present those issues. See Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983)

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(declining to promulgate “a per se rule that the client, not the

professional advocate, must be allowed to decide what issues are

to be pressed”).

The state court’s interpretation of Arizona law, i.e.,

that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a

justification defense because the relevant statute did not

provide a legitimate justification defense, was not prejudicial

to Petitioner, and is binding on this Court. See Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2004); Chapman v. LeMaster,

302 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the state

court’s decision that counsel was not ineffective for failing to

raise this defense, because competent representation would not

require raising a losing argument and because Petitioner was not

prejudiced thereby, was not contrary to clearly established

federal law, or one involving an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540

U.S. 1, 6, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003). Compare Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510, 528, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2003). Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

19. Petitioner contends his counsel was ineffective

because she did not file a motion for a new trial based on the

ground that the jury was not instructed on the provisions of

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–3892.

This claim may be denied for the reasons stated supra.

Petitioner raised this claim and the Arizona courts concluded

Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for

a mistrial on this basis because such a motion would have been

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denied and, accordingly, the failure to do so was not

prejudicial. Because, as stated supra, this conclusion of state

law is binding on this Court, the state courts’ decisions

regarding counsel’s performance in this regard are not clearly

contrary to federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

20. Petitioner asserts his appellate counsel was

ineffective because they failed to raise assert Petitioner’s

trial counsels’ ineffectiveness.

Pursuant to Arizona law, a claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel must be raised during

post-conviction relief proceedings, and cannot be raised on

direct appeal. See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 214

Ariz. 411, 153 P.3d 1040, 1043-44 (2007) (en banc).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s appellate counsel had no basis for

raising any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on

direct appeal and any such claim would have failed. Because

Petitioner was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiency, habeas

relief is foreclosed on the basis of this claim. 

21. Petitioner contends both his trial counsel were

ineffective because they presented expert witness testimony on

police tactics rather than expert witness testimony regarding

the professional standards for a bail enforcement agent.

Petitioner raised this claim in his action for postconviction relief. The Arizona trial court concluded Petitioner

had not been deprived of his right to the effective assistance

of counsel due to this alleged error. The trial court

determined Petitioner had failed to proffer any proposed

testimony that should have been presented by trial counsel on

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his behalf but was not, i.e., Petitioner had not made a factual

case for deficient performance. Additionally, the trial court

also concluded that, even if counsel had called such an expert,

the verdict would have been the same, i.e., that Petitioner was

not prejudiced. 

The trial court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not

prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel

for not providing expert witness testimony regarding bail

enforcement procedures was not clearly contrary to federal law

nor an unreasonable application of the law to the facts of this

case. At Petitioner’s trial, the state presented expert

testimony on the standards of the bail recovery industry. See

Answer, Exh. LL, at 5–60. Petitioner’s counsel was able to

cross-examine this witness. Accordingly, the testimony

Petitioner alleges should have been introduced was introduced by

means of cross-examination of the state’s witness and Petitioner

was not prejudiced by any alleged failure to present another

witness regarding this particular evidence, which would have

been redundant. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir.

1994). 

22. Petitioner contends the State of Arizona “induced”

a violation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel

by “invading” Petitioner’s confidential communications with his

attorney.

This claim may be denied for the reasons stated supra

with regard to Plaintiff’s seventh claim for habeas relief.

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23. Petitioner also maintains the “State of Arizona

induced ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by invading

and interfering with [Petitioner’s] attorney-client relationship

and confidential communications with his retained appellate

attorney...”.

This claim is identical to the claim raised immediately

supra, and may be denied on the merits based on the reasoning

provided with regard to Petitioner’s seventh claim for relief.

24. Petitioner also argues he is entitled to relief

because the “State of Arizona by and through Maricopa County has

suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus via its

Office of Court Appointed Counsel in violation of Article I § 9,

cl.2 of the United States Constitution.”

Petitioner contends that inadequate compensation of

attorneys representing indigent defendants indirectly suspended

the writ of habeas corpus because it impacted the ability of his

appointed appellate counsel and his appointed post-conviction

relief counsel to present the federal constitutional basis of

his claims to state courts. 

This specific claim of inadequate representation of

appellate counsel is raised for the first time in the federal

habeas petition. The claim is not exhausted because it presents

a new legal theory and a new factual claim as a basis for

relief. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 275–76; Harless, 459 U.S. at

6–7. Accordingly, Petitioner may not be awarded habeas relief

on this claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice.

Petitioner has not established prejudice regarding his

failure to properly exhaust this claim. Petitioner was able to

exhaust numerous federal constitutional claims in his direct

appeal and in his action for post-conviction relief, i.e., a

total of sixteen claims for relief. Petitioner has not

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demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsels’ failure to

exhaust any specific, meritorious federal constitutional claim

in the state courts. Additionally, Petitioner has not

established that the basis for his counsels’ alleged failure to

present additional claims was the result of any action by the

state with regard to court-appointed counsel, as contrasted with

an alleged failure by Petitioner’s retained appellate counsel,

Jane Doe, to present federal claims to the state court. Compare

Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding a due

process violation where a two-year delay in adjudicating an

appeal was caused by the excessive case load of the public

defenders’ office); Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir.

1989) (granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus where an

eight-year delay in perfecting an appeal was caused by

“inexcusable neglect by a succession of assigned counsel, who

relieved one another but did little else...”). Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

25. Petitioner further alleges the State of Arizona

discriminated against him by violating his rights pursuant to

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which

violation constituted a violation of Petitioner’s right to a

criminal trial free of constitutional error.

Where a federal statute, rather than the United States

Constitution, is the basis for a federal habeas claim, relief is

available only when the statutory error qualifies as “a

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete

miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)

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(1994 & Supp. 2007); Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; Reed, 512 at 348.

Petitioner has not established that, despite being provided with

hearing aids, he was prejudiced by any alleged failure to

accommodate his hearing loss. The Court finds no evidence that

Petitioner’s hearing status resulted in a complete miscarriage

of justice or denial of the rudimentary demands of fair

procedure.

26. Petitioner asserts his conviction must be vacated

because prejudicial and cumulative errors worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, resulting in the violation of his

constitutional rights.

Petitioner contends that legal errors in his case, from

his pre-trial proceedings through his postconviction

proceedings, in combination, denied him a fair trial, i.e., his

right to due process of law. 

Federal habeas doctrine acknowledges that, even if no

single error was prejudicial to the petitioner, if several

substantial errors in the petitioner’s criminal proceedings

occurred, “their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so

prejudicial as to require reversal.” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d

1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). The

cumulative error doctrine applies where no single trial error

examined in isolation warrants relief but the cumulative effect

of multiple errors prejudiced the petitioner, violating the

petitioner’s right to due process. See, e.g., Whelchel, 232

F.3d at 1212. 

However, absent a specific constitutional violation,

habeas relief based on a petitioner’s assertion of cumulative

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error is barred unless the petitioner’s trial was so infected

with unfairness “as to make the resulting conviction a denial of

due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94

S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974). See also Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d

1030, 1045 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, a federal court may

not grant habeas relief on the basis of errors of state law,

which errors’ combined effect does not violate the United States

Constitution. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.

Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990); Parle, 387 F.3d at 1045.

Petitioner’s assertions of legal error are essentially

assertions that the Arizona law regarding the legitimacy of

Petitioner’s entry into the home of a third-party to enforce an

expired bail warrant is other than Petitioner needs or wants it

to be. The errors asserted by Petitioner are all “errors”

relating to Petitioner’s assertion of a theory of the case which

the jury obviously did not believe, i.e., that Petitioner’s only

intent in entering the home was to arrest Mr. Alcantar.

However, considering all of the evidence introduced at the trial

and the evidence Petitioner sought to introduce, the jury could

clearly conclude from the evidence that Petitioner intended to

enter the home to effectuate a burglary, and the evidence

excluded, Petitioner asserts in error, if admitted would not

have compelled the jury to conclude otherwise.

V Conclusion

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

his claims. Several of the claims were procedurally defaulted

and, because Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice

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arising from his default of the claims, federal habeas relief

may not be granted on the merits of those claims. Additionally,

with regard to the claims properly presented to the Arizona

state courts, the state courts’ conclusions were not contrary to

nor an unreasonable application of federal law and, accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of those

claims. Furthermore, some of Petitioner’s claims may be denied

independently on the merits of the claims and some of

Petitioner’s claims are predicated on errors of state law not

arising to the level of a violation of Petitioner’s right to due

process and, accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on those claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sanders’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

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the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 30th day of October, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-00572-JAT Document 41 Filed 11/01/07 Page 71 of 71