Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01520-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. 2:01-cv-1520-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EL DORADO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

and CITY OF SOUTH LAKE TAHOE,

CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

______________________________

AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff United States of

America (hereinafter “government”) seeks recovery under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq. (“CERCLA”) for response costs that

have been incurred and will be incurred in the future as a result

of hazardous substance contamination at a former landfill site

near Meyers, California (“Meyers landfill”). 

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El Dorado County, who operated the Meyers landfill for a number

of years, then proceeded to institute its own Third Party

Complaint against users of the facility for contribution towards

clean-up costs. One of the third party defendants in that action

is Barton Memorial Hospital (“Barton”). Barton now moves for

summary judgment on grounds that it did not generate any

hazardous waste subject to remediation efforts by the government. 

For the reasons set forth below, Barton’s Motion is denied as

premature at this juncture.

BACKGROUND 

In 1995, the government claims to have detected various

volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) leaching into the groundwater

beneath the site of the former Meyers landfill. Four metals were

also detected at levels in excess of that permitted under state

and federal law, including aluminum, chromium, iron and lead. 

(See El Dorado’s Statement of Fact No. 34). Various actions have

since been taken to investigate and characterize the scope of

contamination, but that process has not been completed, and

consequently no remediation plan has yet been finalized. Id. at

No. 35.

 As indicated above, the government’s institution of the

present lawsuit for its response costs under CERCLA prompted El

Dorado County, which was named as a Defendant in the government’s

case-in-chief, to file its own Third Party Complaint for

contribution against entities who used the Meyers landfill for

waste disposal. 

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The dispute here concerning contaminants for which Barton 1

was responsible appears to center almost exclusively around the

composition of its incinerated ash, rather than on any bottles

and cans that Barton discarded.

3

One of those entities, Barton, now moves for summary judgment on

grounds that it cannot, as a matter of law, be responsible for

any clean-up costs as sought by El Dorado.

Barton’s request for summary judgment hinges on a contention

that it could not have deposited VOCs at the Meyers landfill. 

Because Barton goes on to allege that clean-up efforts proposed

to date target only VOCS, it argues that there are no potential

response costs for which it can be liable.

Factually, Barton alleges that any VOCs present at the

landfill site result from the dumping of chlorinated solvents,

like perchloroethylene (PCE) and trichlorethene (TCE), in liquid

form. Barton contends that it dumped only incinerated ash at the

landfill, and that such ash, by definition, could not have

incorporated liquids containing VOCs. Barton has produced

evidence establishing that its hospital waste, with the exception

of bottles and cans, was all burned at temperatures high enough 1

to have eliminated any liquid component.

El Dorado County virtually conceded, at the time of oral

argument on this Motion, that there is no evidence that Barton

directly placed any VOCs at the landfill site. It nonetheless

argues that Barton’s ash included other hazardous substances, in

particular metals like chromium, that have been found in high

levels at the site. 

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According to El Dorado County, while remediation efforts to date

have indeed focused on VOCs, until characterization at the site

has been completed and a remediation plan finalized, Barton

cannot show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

inasmuch as the clean-up of residual metals cannot be eliminated

as a possibility until such finalization occurs. In addition, El

Dorado contends that the volume of waste deposited at the site,

including waste deposited by Barton, may create the need for a

low-permeability cap and methane collection system for which

Barton bears responsibility. Finally, El Dorado makes the

argument that leachate produced from Barton’s hospital

incinerator ash may have contributed indirectly to the absorption

of VOCs into the groundwater under the Meyers landfill through

formation of a buffer conducive to such absorption. El Dorado

argues that all these reasons preclude summary judgment in favor

of Barton at this stage of the litigation.

 STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

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5

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56 by

showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the

motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9 Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. th

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

ANALYSIS

Liability under CERCLA hinges on the establishment of

specified prerequisites, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). A

party is not liable unless 1) the site in question qualifies as a

“facility” at which hazardous substances were disposed; 2) the

allegedly liable party falls within the definition of a

responsible party under the statute; 3) a release or threatened

release of a hazardous substance has occurred; and 4) such

release or threatened release has made it necessary to incur

response costs. 

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42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclay’s Bank

of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).

In this case, the parties do not dispute that the Meyers

landfill qualifies as a “facility” falling within the purview of

CERCLA, since it appears uncontroverted that the landfill is a

“site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited...” 

42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B). In order to be a responsible party,

however, Barton itself must have been responsible for disposal or

treatment of a hazardous substance at the landfill. 42 U.S.C. §

9607(a)(3). Because the third prong for establishing liability

also hinges on whether a hazardous substance may have been

released, tying the presence of a hazardous substance to the

alleged polluter, here Barton, is critical. Even if the release

or threatened release of a hazardous substance has occurred,

however, there can be no liability on Barton’s part unless such

release on its part caused the incurrence of response costs to

clean up the Meyers landfill site.

In attempting to preclude any liability under CERCLA, Barton

argues first that there is no evidence that it is responsible for

any hazardous substance found at the Meyers landfill. Secondly,

Barton alleges that there has been no showing of any response

costs necessitated by any hazardous substance associated with

Barton’s waste disposal at the landfill in any event. Each of

these issue will now be addressed.

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A. Hazardous Substance

Barton’s contention that it cannot be held responsible for

any hazardous substance at the site is premised on an argument

that only VOCs are targeted for remediation under any proposed

clean-up. While VOCs do seem to have been the primary target in

considering response costs thus far, as indicated above elevated

levels of certain metals have also been detected at the Meyers

landfill site, including chromium. The Environmental Protection

Agency has specifically listed chromium as a hazardous substance

(see 40 C.F.R. § 302.4), and that designation is controlling for

purposes of liability under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14)(B),

9602(a). Because the characterization and assessment of the site

has still not been completed, with no final remediation plan in

effect, Barton cannot rule out the possibility that the

concentration of metals like chromium will also be addressed in

the ultimate clean–up proposal.

In addition, Barton is unable to show as a matter of law

that its waste cannot be linked to elevated levels of metals

(like chromium) found at the site. El Dorado County has cited

studies showing that hospital incinerator ash can contain

detectable concentrations of various metals, including chromium,

cadmium, and arsenic, that are listed as hazardous pursuant to 40

C.F.R. § 302.4. (Decl. of Anthony Daus, ¶ 12). 

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No specific level of a listed hazardous substance is 2

required in order to incur potential liability under CERCLA. See

Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989).

8

Another El Dorado expert, Anne McQueen, indicates that trace

metals were likely present in the ash generated by Barton.2

(Decl. of Anne McQueen, ¶ 6). Moreover, it is undisputed that

even Barton’s own expert, Dr. Richard J. Martin, concedes that

such metals may have been present in Barton’s ash. (See El

Dorado’s Statement of Fact No. 14).

Based on the foregoing, even aside from the issue of VOCs,

Barton cannot show it did not generate other hazardous substances

like cadmium that have been detected at the Meyers landfill site. 

Hence it cannot rule out CERCLA liability under the second and

third prongs of the four-part test for assessing such liability.

B. Response Costs

Even if Barton cannot overcome the first three components

for establishing liability under CERCLA, it may still escape such

liability if it can show that any hazardous substances it may

have generated will not incur any response costs. Again, Barton

argues that since remediation efforts to date have focused on

elimination of VOCs from the site, and since it could not have

deposited any such VOCs in incinerator ash (which would contain

no liquid chlorinated solvents responsible for such

contamination), there are no response costs for which it may be

liable.

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9

This ignores the undisputed fact, as enumerated above, that

efforts to fully characterize site contamination, and to finalize

remediation plans after such characterization has been completed,

remain ongoing. Until those endeavors are complete the Court

simply cannot rule out, as it must to grant Barton’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, the possibility of response costs tied to

hazardous substances found at the site for which Barton is

responsible. Until such time as site characterization/response

plans are complete, any request for summary judgment on Barton’s

part would be premature.

CONCLUSION

Until investigation and response efforts have been

completed, this Court cannot determine as a matter of law that

Barton bears no responsibility for remediating hazardous

substances at the Meyers landfill. Hence Barton’s Motion for

Summary Judgment must be denied as premature. 

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Because Barton’s Motion may properly be denied on this ground

alone, the Court need not address whether Barton may also be

liable for clean-up costs under any of the other theories

advanced by El Dorado County, including whether Barton must also

contribute to installation of a permeability cap and methane

collection system at the landfill site, or whether its ash, as a

leachate, contributed to the absorption of VOCs into the

groundwater under the site.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 8, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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