Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00746/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00746-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The Court issued a Notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc), advising Plaintiff of his obligation to respond. (Doc. #112.) 

WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Tillmon, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County, et al.

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0746-PHX-MHM (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Richard Tillmon filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

various employees of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO). (Doc. #42, Amend.

Comp.) Defendants move for summary judgment.1

 (Doc. #106.) The motion is fully

briefed. (Doc. ##114, 115.) 

The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I. Background 

Plaintiff raised three counts in his Amended Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff raised

federal and state claims alleging that MCSO Officers Rodriguez and Misquez used excessive

force on Plaintiff while Plaintiff was at the Maricopa County Courthouse for his initial

appearance. (Doc. #42, Count I.) In Count II, Plaintiff raised federal and state claims

alleging that Maricopa County, Sheriff Arpaio, and the Maricopa County Board of

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Supervisors had policies and practices that resulted in the use of excessive force on Plaintiff

as described in Count I. (Id., Count II.) In Count III, he raised federal and state claims

alleging that after he suffered injuries as a result of the excessive force used by Defendants,

nurse McBride only wrapped Plaintiff’s arm and gave him Tylenol for pain, failed to provide

further treatment or medication, and failed to schedule further medical visits. (Id., Count III.)

The Court directed Defendants to answer the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. #41.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) no excessive force

was used against Plaintiff; (2) McBride was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical

needs; (3) Plaintiff presents no evidence in support of his claims against Arpaio, Maricopa

County, or the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors; (4) Rodriguez, Misquez, and

McBride are entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) Plaintiff’s state-law claims should be

dismissed. (Doc. #106.) 

II. Legal Standard—Summary Judgment

 A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(e) compels the non-moving party to “set out specific facts

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showing a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact

conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require

a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank

of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). However, Rule 56(c) mandates

the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-

23. 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the

non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted. Id. at 249-50.

III. Federal Claims

A. Counts I and II—Excessive Force

1. Legal Standards

The Fourth Amendment establishes the constitutional parameters for claims of

excessive force during pretrial detention. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002). The

Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable force. Tatum v. City and County

of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether the force was excessive

depends on “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”

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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). See also Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli, 351

F.3d at 415. The Court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion against the

countervailing governmental interests. Id. Moreover, 

[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . “Not every

push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment.

The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the

fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (citation omitted). 

In determining whether an officer acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment, the

Court considers the “severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. The court must balance the nature and the

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

government interests at stake. Id. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

Whether the amount of force used was reasonable is usually a question of fact for the jury.

Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th 1991). Summary judgment should be granted

sparingly. Bell v. City of Seattle, 395 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 

 In addition, liability may be imposed on the county only if a plaintiff establishes that

his injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official county policy or custom. Thompson v. City

of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). And there is no respondeat superior

liability under § 1983; therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who

allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New

York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Official county policy may only be set by an official with

“final policymaking authority.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 443 (citing Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83 (1986) (plurality opinion)). In Arizona, the responsibility

of operating jails is placed by law upon the Sheriff. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5);

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Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-101. 

2. Parties’ Contentions

(a) Defendants

In support of their motion, Defendants submit their Statement of Facts (Doc. #107,

DSOF) and 17 exhibits, including the affidavits of Misquez (id., Ex. 4) and McBride (id.,

Ex. 8), various medical records and reports, and a CD with surveillance footage of events

at the Fourth Avenue Jail (id., Ex. 3.)

Plaintiff was arrested and booked into the Maricopa County Jail on May 28, 2006.

(DSOF ¶ 2.) On May 29, 2006, Plaintiff was taken with other inmates to the Initial

Appearances Courtroom for his first appearance before a judge on his criminal charges. (Id.

¶ 3.) Misquez escorted Plaintiff from the isolation tank to the courtroom and recalls that

Plaintiff seemed “out of it.” (Id. ¶ 3; Misquez Aff ¶ 4.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff told

a jail psychologist on July 20, 2006, that while in the courtroom on the morning of May 29,

2006, he was high and dozing off from using drugs. (DSOF ¶ 4.)

 The courtroom detention officers instructed the inmates to remain seated and quiet

because the judge would soon be taking the bench, but Plaintiff began making unnecessary

noise and creating a disturbance by standing up and talking. (Id. ¶ 5.) Rodriguez told Plaintiff

to sit and be quiet, but Plaintiff continued to cause a disturbance in the courtroom. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff then walked to the back of the courtroom, faced the wall, and demanded to be taken

back to his cell. (Id.) Rodriguez handcuffed Plaintiff behind his back and walked him into a

hallway. (Id.)

 Once in the hallway, Rodriguez called for assistance and placed Plaintiff against the

wall, face first. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff struggled and moved his body and

head away from the wall and told Rodriguez that he would “f--k [him] up” and “kick [his] ass.”

(Id.) To gain control of Plaintiff and to keep him from coming away from the wall and either

kicking or head-butting him, Rodriguez put his right knee into the back of Plaintiff’s right

thigh. (Id.)

Shortly thereafter, Misquez arrived in response to the radio call to assist, and Misquez

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removed Plaintiff from the hallway, taking hold of his left arm. (Id. ¶ 8; Misquez Aff. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff struggled with Misquez, dropping himself to his knees and refusing to walk further.

Both officers placed Plaintiff on the floor and radioed for assistance. (DSOF ¶ 8, Misquez ¶

9.) They kept Plaintiff in a prone position on the floor for a few seconds until other detention

officers arrived. (DSOF ¶ 9; Misquez ¶ 9.) Once back-up arrived, Plaintiff was lifted off the

floor and placed on his feet by officers. (DSOF ¶ 9.) 

Misquez then escorted Plaintiff to an isolation cell and the door was secured. 

(Misquez ¶ 19.) Plaintiff placed his handcuffed hands behind his back, through the trap

door of the cell. (DSOF ¶ 10.) A few moments later, officers removed Plaintiff’s single set

of handcuffs and closed the cell’s trap door. (Id.) During their interactions with Plaintiff,

Rodriguez and Misquez made no attempt to conceal their badges or identities. Plaintiff

never asked either his name or badge number. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Before beginning their jobs, both Rodriguez and Misquez were trained at the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department’s detention officer training academy, including

instruction in the appropriate use of force. (Id. ¶ 12; Misquez Aff. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was not

taken into a separate closet-sized room, as he has alleged in his Amended Complaint and in

his statement to Internal Affairs investigators; no such room or closet exists along the path

taken from the Initial Appearances Courtroom to the isolation cell in which Plaintiff was

placed. (DSOF ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was not double handcuffed; only one set of handcuffs is

evident in the video footage, and Misquez recalls a single set of handcuffs being removed

from Plaintiff’s wrists after he was placed in the isolation cell. (Id. ¶ 14; Misquez Aff. ¶¶ 6,

11, 20.) According to MCSO’s usual custom and practice, video footage was taken of the

areas through which Plaintiff was escorted, capturing these events, and the video footage

was preserved. (DSOF ¶ 15.) Defendants argue that although Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint alleges that Defendants slammed his head into a concrete wall; pushed him to

the floor; stepped on his back and repeatedly beat him with their fists and knees while he

was on the floor; put a knee on his broken jaw; placed a second set of handcuffs on him;

and picked him up and rammed his head into a wall, Plaintiff provides no evidence to

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support any of these allegations. They argue that both Defendants deny having committed

these acts, the video footage of the incident demonstrates that none of the acts occurred,

and there are no documented injuries consistent with an assault. (Doc. #106 at 9.) 

Defendants further argue that Defendants’ use of force against Plaintiff consisted

solely of two acts: Rodriguez placing his right knee briefly against the back of Plaintiff’s

right thigh and both Defendants maintaining Plaintiff in a prone position on the floor for a

few seconds while awaiting assistance of other officers because Plaintiff had dropped

himself to his knees and refused to walk further. They assert that Plaintiff had been acting

strangely in the courtroom, had been creating a disturbance, and was under the influence of

drugs. Plaintiff threatened to assault Rodriguez and was attempting to turn away from the

wall just before Rodriguez put his right knee briefly against the back of Plaintiff’s thigh. It

was reasonable for Rodriguez to protect himself and to maintain Plaintiff’s position against

the wall until assistance arrived. They further argue that once Plaintiff dropped himself to

the floor and refused to walk, the officers could not have safely dragged an uncooperative

inmate to a cell, and they did not attempt to do so. Rodriguez and Misquez acted reasonably

in holding Plaintiff in the prone position for a few seconds while waiting for other detention

officers. They argue that balanced against the government interests of maintaining order

and safety within a jail, these acts are, at most, minimal intrusions on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment interests and not unreasonable under the circumstances.

As to Arpaio, Maricopa County, and the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is a persistent, permanent

and well-settled practice by any of these Defendants that gave rise to any alleged violation

of his constitutional rights and which proximately caused him any injury. Both Defendant

officers received training, and there is no link between any policy and Plaintiff’s alleged

injuries. 

///

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///

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2

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ motion as untimely, asserting that it was due by April

15, 2008. (Doc. #114 at 1-2.) The Scheduling Order was amended to require dispositive

motions by September 3, 2008. (Doc. #65.) Defendants’ motion therefore is timely.

3

The Court notes that portions of Plaintiff’s exhibits have been blacked out. 

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(b) Plaintiff

In support of his opposition,2

 Plaintiff submits his Motion to Respond (Doc. #114),

including exhibits A-F.

Plaintiff asserts that Rodriguez was fired from MCSO for assaulting Plaintiff. (Id. at

5.) He submits a termination letter, dated November 14, 2007, addressed to Rodriguez. (Id.,

Ex. B.) The letter details several causes for the termination, including matters that appear to

be related to the incident about which Plaintiff complains.3

 Plaintiff asserts that he received

a letter from MCSO Internal Affairs indicating that after a “complete investigation” into

Plaintiff’s complaint, the investigations indicate that Rodriguez’s actions were “inappropriate

and outside of guidelines established by policy and procedure.” (Id. at 12; Ex. C, letter from

Internal Affairs, dated April 25, 2008, addressed to Plaintiff.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that Rodriguez was arrested on May 29, 2006, for assaulting

Plaintiff. (Id. at 15.) He submits a Maricopa County Release Questionnaire, showing the

offense location of 201 South Fourth Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona, on May 29, 2006. (Id.,

Ex. D.) Plaintiff also submits MCSO, Internal Affairs Division, Case Summary Report

regarding the investigation of Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id., Ex. E.) The summarized

“Findings” note that “[o]n May 29, 2006, Officer Rodriguez A9568 [document blacked out]

when he delivered a knee strike to Tillman’s right leg, while Tillman was handcuffed from

behind and facing a wall, with no movement toward Rodriguez [document blacked out]. . .

.” (Id., Ex. E, Findings at 2.) 

Plaintiff also accuses counsel of deceit and subterfuge regarding negotiations in

connection with counsel’s request for tax returns or other proof to substantiate Plaintiff’s

claims of lost earnings or $160,000 to $375,000 per year. (Doc. #114-2 at 28, Ex. F.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he is still seeking medical treatment for his injuries, which were more

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than de minimis. (Id. at 34.) 

Plaintiff also states that the CD submitted by Defendants does not show all the abuse

suffered by Plaintiff and that there were activities that occurred that are not shown on the

CD. (Id. at 34-5.) For example, the CD does not show that the Judge and two other people

came to Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at 35-6.) Plaintiff also argues that the investigators have

reason to minimize the damages seen on the video. (Id. at 36.)

(c) Reply

In their reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to file a Separate Statement of Facts

as required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(b) or to provide correspondingly numbered

paragraphs indicating whether he disputes each paragraph of DSOF. (Doc. #115 at 2.) They

claim that Plaintiff’s response provides no facts at all—merely Plaintiff’s own assertions with

no supporting evidence and that because he did not controvert DSOF, all of Defendants’ facts

should be deemed admitted pursuant to LRCivP 56.1. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants also maintain

that Plaintiff did not address any of his claims against Maricopa County, the Maricopa County

Board of Supervisors, Arpaio, or nurse McBride and offers no opposition to Defendants’

evidence and presents no facts to controvert those set forth by Defendants. (Id. at 3.) 

As to Rodriguez and Misquez, they argue that Rodriguez was terminated for violating

various policies of the MCSO and the letter to Rodriguez regarding his dismissal from

employment does not state that he used excessive force. (Id. at 4-5; ref. Doc. #114, Ex. B.)

They argue that Plaintiff’s Exhibit A states that Rodriguez used “unnecessary force against

Plaintiff; it does not state that he used excessive force.” (Id. at 5) (Emphasis in original). They

also point out that the district attorney’s office declined to prosecute Rodriguez because the

evidence does not support Plaintiff’s allegations, the video surveillance does not show an

assault, and the medical records do not support the injuries claimed. (Id. at 5; Doc. #116,

Supplement to Separate Statement of Facts ¶ 1, Ex. 18.) They note that Plaintiff’s response

contains no reference to Misquez’s acts. (Id.) 

Defendants argue that the video footage is complete, that it came from different cameras

throughout the Jail, and that it does not support Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) They assert that

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4

In Count I, Plaintiff asserted state law claims under the Arizona Constitution and for

assault, battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and general

negligence; and in Count II he asserted state law claims under the Arizona Constitution and

for “intent” and negligence. (Doc. #42.) 

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although Plaintiff has claimed to have a video of the events, he has never produced a copy of

it during discovery. (Id. at 6, n. 1.) Finally, they argue that Plaintiff produced no evidence

of injuries, even though he claims that he is “still getting treatment.” (Id. at 6.) 

3. Analysis

First, the Court declines to deem Defendants’ Statement of Facts as admitted and notes

that Plaintiff has clearly disputed some of the facts asserted by Defendants and has provided

some supporting evidence for the matters he alleges in his opposition. Pro se pleadings are

liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Second, Defendants’ motion

regarding excessive force is limited to the federal claims; Defendants discuss only the Fourth

Amendment standard and do not address the substance of the state law claims.4

 (Doc. #106

at 8.) As to the federal claims, although Plaintiff asserted claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and

Eighth Amendments in Count I and the Fourteenth Amendment in Count II, his allegations

state claims only under the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. #42.)

The Court will deny the motion as to Rodriguez because there is a genuine dispute of

fact as to the need for force—and therefore, its reasonableness—and as to the force used.

Although Defendants argue that Plaintiff was attempting to turn away from the wall and had

cursed at and threatened Rodriguez, Plaintiff offers evidence that he was handcuffed and did

not move at all just prior to Rodriguez inflicting a knee strike. And although the medical

records do not show severe injuries or any head injuries, it is clear that Plaintiff, who already

had a broken jaw, complained after the incident and received pain medication and a splint for

his arm. Moreover, Defendants admit that Plaintiff submits evidence showing that Rodriguez

used unnecessary force. (Doc. #115 at 5, ref. Doc. #114, Ex. A.) Although it does not appear

to the Court that Exhibit A makes this finding, in the course of the Internal Affairs

investigation, a witness who apparently viewed the video footage was asked if he saw

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5

There is no sound with the video.

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resistance from the inmate to warrant any type of defensive knee strike and stated:

He, he turned and put his hands behind his back to cuff up and

said take me outta here. [document blacked out] The only physical

activity that I saw was Officer Rodriguez pushing him against the

wall by the cuffs controlling him and several in the hand at the

back of the head holding him by the back of the neck. No

movement by the inmate. His hands don’t move; his feet don’t

move. He’s got him by the back and he throws a knee strike into

him? [document blacked out]. . . .

(Doc. #114, Ex. E at 13.) 

In addition, the Court has reviewed the video footage of the incident. (Doc. #106, Ex.

3.) In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007), the Supreme Court held that

on summary judgment in an excessive force claim, a court could not rely on the plaintiff’s

version of events when that version was so utterly discredited by video tape that captured the

events that no reasonable jury would believe the plaintiff. In the present case, although the

video does not demonstrate the beating described by Plaintiff, the Court finds that the video

is inconclusive. It shows Plaintiff being cuffed in the courtroom and then moved through

doorways and hallways to a small cell; there appear to be several views of each area from

different cameras. After the cuffing, Plaintiff is seen moving through a doorway and into a

hallway, where Rodriguez moves or pushes Plaintiff into a corner and pushes Plaintiff’s head

toward or into the wall. The knee strike described above does not appear to be very forceful,

but it also does not appear to be necessary as Plaintiff is handcuffed and facing the wall;

Plaintiff has his back to Rodriguez and does not seem to be moving toward the officer.5

 But

more important, there is a later period when Plaintiff is apparently on the floor with two to

three or more officers on top of him; because of the camera angles, it is not possible to

determine what the officers are doing, but Plaintiff’s leg is moving rapidly up and down and

kicking the floor while he is apparently lying face down. Plaintiff alleged that his head was

slammed into the floor while he was down. Thus, unlike the tape in Scott, the tape here does

not so utterly discredit Plaintiff’s version of events that no reasonable jury would believe him.

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As stated, the evidence shows only minor injuries. But as the Supreme Court noted in

Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), although an inmate, who was beaten while

handcuffed, suffered only minor injuries that required no medical attention, an Eighth

Amendment violation was established because “[p]unishments . . . ‘involv[ing] the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain’ are ‘repugnant to the Eighth Amendment.’” See also, Bingham

v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F. 3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that although the

Supreme Court has held that some intrusions may be so minor as to not violate the Fourth

Amendment at all, the Court has never held that actions that do violate the Fourth Amendment

may result in so little harm that § 1983 is not an available remedy). Although Hudson is an

Eighth Amendment case because that inmate was a prisoner, not a pretrial detainee, as a

pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to even greater protections than those afforded under the

Eighth Amendment. See Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court finds there is a genuine dispute of fact as to Rodriguez’s use of force.

Rodriguez also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. #106 at 14-5.)

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for civil liability

if his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). The Court has found that, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a

genuine dispute of fact, which precludes summary judgment as to the constitutional violation.

The Court will turn to the “qualified immunity inquiry” and ask if the right was clearly

established at the relevant time. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v.

Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808 (Jan. 21, 2009). This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

A right is clearly established if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Kennedy v. City of

Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior case with the identical facts showing that a

right is clearly established; it is enough that there is preexisting law that provides a defendant

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“fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065. At the time of

Plaintiff’s incarceration, it was clearly established that Plaintiff had a constitutional right not

to be subjected to the use of excessive force. Lolli, 351 F.3d 415.

Defendants argue that Rodriguez “could not have believed that [his] conduct constituted

excessive force” because his only application of force was to place his knee on the back of

Plaintiff’s thigh to prevent Plaintiff from turning toward him to kick him or head-butt him and

to hold Plaintiff on the ground for a few seconds. (Doc. #106 at 15.) But this argument on

the qualified immunity is the same as Rodriguez’s defense to the constitutional violation and

therefore implicates the same genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Rodriguez

used excessive force and, therefore, whether he would reasonably know if his conduct was

unlawful. See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F. 3d 1178, 1183-85 (9th Cir. 2003). Qualified

immunity will be denied. 

 The Court will grant the summary judgment motion as to Misquez. He denies Plaintiff’s

allegations of force and attests that his only involvement was to escort Plaintiff to the isolation

cell and to keep Plaintiff in a prone position after he dropped to his knees and refused to walk.

Plaintiff does not dispute any of this. Under the circumstances, which included Plaintiff’s

refusal or inability to walk, Misquez’s actions were reasonable. 

 The Court will also grant the motion as to Arpaio, Maricopa County, and the Maricopa

County Board of Supervisors. Plaintiff offers no evidence of a policy or practice or tacit

authorization of the use of excessive force. Rule 56(e) compels the non-moving party to “set

out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rely merely on allegations or

denials in its own pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S.

at 586-87; see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise

provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial).

Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ arguments except to assert that the letter terminating

Rodriguez “is a clear admission of guilt” by Maricopa County, the Board of Supervisors,

Arpaio, Rodriguez, Misquez, and McBride. (Doc. #114 at 12.). The Court does not agree.

The evidence of an extensive internal investigation of the incident, an apparent finding of

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inappropriate conduct by Rodriguez, and Rodriguez’s termination, in fact, suggest there was

no policy or practice or tacit authorization of the use of excessive force that led to the alleged

violation. Plaintiff has offered nothing more than conclusory allegations, which are

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. 

B. Count III—Medical Care

1. Legal Standard

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause, which establishes that “detainees have a right against jail conditions or

restrictions that ‘amount to punishment.’” Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1205. The Fourteenth

Amendment standard is more protective than the Eighth Amendment; “[t]his standard differs

significantly from the standard relevant to convicted prisoners, who may be subject to

punishment so long as it does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and

unusual punishment.” Id.; Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). Although a

pretrial detainee’s right to receive adequate medical care derives from the substantive Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)), it is difficult to apply

the “punishment” standard to medical care claims in the same manner it is applied to

conditions-of-confinement claims. See Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1206-13 (addressing detainees’

claims regarding reading materials, telephone access, holding cells, exercise, and other

conditions at the county’s jail facilities). Under the Due Process Clause, however, a detainee

is protected against conditions or conduct—including conduct related to medical

treatment—that is arbitrary or purposeless. See id. at 1205 (if a particular condition or

restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, a court may infer that the purpose of the action is

punishment that may not be inflicted on pretrial detainees) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539). And

the Due Process Clause, at a minimum, imposes the same duty to provide adequate medical

care to those incarcerated as imposed by the Eighth Amendment. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187.

Therefore, the Eighth Amendment standards governing medical care may be applied. See

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th

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Cir. 1986) (“the eighth amendment guarantees provide a minimum standard of care for

determining [the plaintiff’s] rights as a pretrial detainee, including his right to medical care”).

 To establish a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate

medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

This requires the plaintiff to satisfy both the objective and subjective components of a two-part

test. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). First, he must demonstrate that he

suffered a serious medical need. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

Indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment include the existence of

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104

F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s response to that serious medical

need was deliberately indifferent. “[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs is the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. An

official is deliberately indifferent if he both knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an

inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Mere negligence or medical malpractice does not

establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460

(9th Cir. 1980). At the same time, a prisoner does not have to prove that he was completely

denied medical care in order to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference may be shown when an official denies,

delays, or intentionally interferes with treatment or by the way that a medical professional

provides care. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A difference of medical opinion, however, is

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

/ / /

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2. Parties’ Contentions

 McBride asserts that he examined Plaintiff shortly after the alleged assault; Plaintiff

complained of pain in his right wrist/forearm and in his right jaw. (DSOF ¶ 16; McBride Aff.

¶ 7.) Plaintiff did not complain of elbow/shoulder pain, dislodged dental fillings, blurred

vision, hearing loss, back pain, chest pain, headache, or difficulty breathing, and he told

McBride that he had had pain in his jaw for two weeks after being hit with the butt of a

shotgun; x-rays had been taken at Phoenix Baptist Hospital which confirmed that his jaw was

broken. (DSOF ¶ 16; McBride Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.)

 McBride documented a “superficial skin contusion distal ulna consistent with handcuff

usage” and noted no other soft tissue injuries. (DSOF ¶ 17.) He noted capillary refill of less

than 3 seconds on all digits; intact sharp/dull differentiation of all fingers; good flexion and

extension strength of all digits and wrist; Plaintiff was able to pronate/supinate his forearm

unrestricted; no elbow/shoulder involvement. (Id. ¶ 17.) McBride applied a splint to

Plaintiff’s right forearm/hand, noting good support and that Plaintiff’s capillary refill was

unchanged after applying the splint. McBride noted no obvious swelling/crepitus/bony

deformities. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was not in acute distress and was speaking easily but with

minimal jaw movement. (Id. ¶ 18.) McBride saw no external signs of trauma to Plaintiff’s

jawline. (Id. ¶ 18.)

McBride asserts that it was not his responsibility to “schedule all medical visits for

inmates at Maricopa County 4th Ave. Jail and resolve medical grievances.” (Id. ¶ 19;

McBride Aff. ¶ 15.) He examined Plaintiff and called the on-call provider for orders; he

received orders from the on-call provider for a splint, Motrin 800 mg by mouth twice a day for

seven days, and follow up at the next facility regarding an x-ray to rule out fracture versus

contusion of right forearm. (DSOF ¶ 20.) McBride applied the splint, and an order for an x-ray

of Plaintiff’s right wrist was written on May 30, 2006. (Id.)

 McBride noticed no signs consistent with a concussion, and Plaintiff did not complain

of elbow/shoulder pain, dislodged dental fillings, blurred vision, hearing loss, back pain, chest

pain, headache, or difficulty breathing. (Id. ¶ 21; McBride ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff received the first

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dose of Motrin at approximately 5:00 p.m. on May 29, 2006, and continued to receive Motrin

800 mg by mouth twice a day through June 5, 2006. (DSOF ¶ 22.)

An x-ray of Plaintiff’s right wrist was taken on May 31 and showed normal bony

architecture and no acute bony injury. (Id. ¶ 24.) The spine x-ray showed changes suggestive

of muscle spasm and no acute bony abnormality or other abnormalities. (Id.). A September

5, 2006 chest x-ray, taken because Plaintiff felt an injury while moving a table, showed no

evidence of rib fracture. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

Defendants also assert that several of the physical problems that Plaintiff claims resulted

from the May 29 incident can actually be traced to injuries and complaints that pre-date the

incident. For example, Plaintiff’s complaints regarding his left hand predate the incident by

nearly two years. (Id. ¶ 26; Ex.14.) In June 2004, during an earlier incarceration, Plaintiff

complained about a broken left fifth finger and that he had been beaten with a poll stick and

received a broken nose. (Id.) Likewise, in 2004 he complained of nerve damage in his left arm

and hand and problems with his right hand. (DSOF ¶¶ 29-30; Exs.16, 17.) He also advised

a Jail psychologist in July 2006 that he had a history of migraines prior to incarceration.

(DSOF ¶ 31; Ex. 5.) 

 Defendants argue that McBride responded to Plaintiff’s medical needs when he saw

Plaintiff shortly after the alleged assault, examined the areas where he complained of pain, and

obtained orders from the on-call provider for a splint and pain reliever; he applied a splint and

Plaintiff received the pain medication. Because McBride was not involved in scheduling

medical visits for inmates in the 4th Avenue Jail or for resolving inmate medical grievances,

he cannot have been deliberately indifferent by failing to perform these tasks.

Plaintiff did not respond to McBride’s assertions. 

3. Analysis

Defendants have provided evidence that McBride responded appropriately to Plaintiff’s

medical needs. Plaintiff does not dispute McBride’s assertions. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249 (the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial). Because there is no genuine issue

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6

As with the Counts relating to excessive force, Defendants address only the federal

medical claim and do not address the state-law claims for negligence and medical

malpractice. 

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of material fact, the Court will grant summary judgment to McBride on Plaintiff’s claim for

deliberate indifference.6

 

IV. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state-law claims were dismissed from his original

Complaint and assert that the Court gave Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint only in order

to name the John Doe Defendants. (Doc. #106 at 15, ref. Doc. # 4.) They further assert that

when Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, the Court did not address the state-law claims

that were included in the Amended Complaint but which had been dismissed from the original

Complaint. (Doc. #106 at 16.) They ask the Court to dismiss the state-law claims.

Defendants note that a court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims if

“there is a sufficiently substantial federal claim to confer federal jurisdiction in the first place,

and a common nucleus of operative fact between the state and federal claims,” In Re Nucorp

Energy Securities Litigation, 772 F.2d 1486, 1487 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)), and that the Court found that these requirements were met

in the instant case. (Doc. #106 at 16, ref. Doc. #4 at 3.) Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the

state law claims because Plaintiff did not allege that he had complied with the notice of claim

procedures in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01. (Doc. #4 at 3.) Defendants also note that in the

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that he served a Notice of Claim on Arpaio and

Maricopa County. (Doc. #106 at 17, ref. Doc. #42 at 4B.) 

Defendants ask that the Court strike the allegations related to the state law claims

because they were already properly dismissed. (Doc. #106 at 17.) Plaintiff does not respond

to Defendants’ arguments regarding the state-law claims.

The Court will deny Defendants’ motion as to the state claims because in his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged compliance with the Notice of Claim requirements. Specifically,

he alleged that he filed his Notice on November 22, 2006, which would appear to be timely.

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See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01(A) (notice must be filed within 180 days after the claim

accrues). The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that because the state-law

claims were dismissed on screening of the original Complaint, Plaintiff could not amend his

Complaint to correct a deficiency. Those claims were not dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. #4

at 3-4, 12.) The Court notes that Defendants do not assert that Plaintiff did not file a Notice

of Claim and they make no argument as to any inadequacy of the Notice. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. #106).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #106) is granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

(a) granted as to the federal claims against Misquez in Count I; the federal 

claims against Arpaio, Maricopa County, and the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors in

Count II; and the federal claim against McBride in Count III;

(b) denied in all other respects.

(3) The remaining claims are:

(a) Count I—federal and state claims against Rodriguez and state claims against

Misquez;

(b) Count II—state claims against Arpaio, Maricopa County, and the Maricopa

County Board of Supervisors; and

(c) Count III—state claims against McBride.

DATED this 8th day of April, 2009.

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