Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01486/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01486-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR CHARLES FOURSTAR, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

PAUL COPENHAVER,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01486 MJS (HC)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND 

PETITION; ORDER DISMISSING

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

(Docs. 6-8)

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (See ECF Nos. 3, 5.)

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition in this Court on September 24, 2014

and an amended petition on October 28, 2014. (ECF No. 1, 6.) He is currently 

incarcerated at United States Prison Atwater. In October 2002, Petitioner was convicted 

in the District of Montana of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1153(a) and 2241(a). United States v. Fourstar, 87 Fed. Appx. 62, 63 (9th Cir. 2004).

Petitioner argues that his incarceration was improper as it was based in part on a prior 

state crime conviction that was wrongfully obtained. (See generally Am. Pet.)

///

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I. MOTION TO AMEND

Petitioner filed the instant action on September 24, 2014. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) On 

October 3, 2014, Petitioner filed a separate petition challenging the same conviction. 

(ECF No. 6.) The petition was construed as a motion to amend the present petition in 

this matter, and thereby transferred. (See E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:14-cv-01456-BAM, ECF 

No. 12.) Petitioner also filed two motions to amend on November 17 and 20, 

respectively. (ECF Nos. 7-8.) Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course up to 21 days after 

service of a responsive pleading is filed. Here Respondent has not been directed to, and 

has not filed a response. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to file an amended petition is 

granted. Regardless, even if it was not Petitioner's intent to amend the petition, the 

original petition would be dismissed for the reasons stated below. 

II. SCREENING THE PETITION

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), AEDPA applies to the 

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 

1499 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 

(Habeas Rules) are appropriately applied to proceedings undertaken pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas Rule 1(b). Habeas Rule 4 requires the Court to make a 

preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must summarily 

dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that 

the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court...." Habeas Rule 4; O'Bremski v. 

Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 

(9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each ground; and 3) state the 

relief requested. Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that 

point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 

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Adoption; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 

63, 75 n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its 

own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or 

after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 

8, 1976 Adoption; see Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. JURISDICTION

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his 

conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.

1988). In such cases, only the sentencing court has jurisdiction. Id. at 1163. A prisoner 

may not collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 

865 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be 

filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, 

location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in 

the custodial court.”); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162.

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of 

that sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865. Here, Petitioner is challenging the validity and 

constitutionality of his conviction. Therefore, the appropriate procedure would be to file a 

motion pursuant to § 2255 and not a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a narrow exception allowing a federal prisoner 

authorized to seek relief under § 2255 to seek relief under § 2241 if the remedy by 

motion under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his detention." 

Alaimalo v. United States, 636 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Harrison v. Ollison, 

519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008). "This is called the 'savings clause' or 'escape hatch' of 

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§ 2255." Id. Furthermore, § 2255 petitions are rarely found to be inadequate or 

ineffective. Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a court's denial of a prior § 2255 

motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition 

inadequate). The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or 

ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963).

The Ninth Circuit has also “held that a § 2241 petition is available under the 

‘escape hatch’ of § 2255 when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and 

(2) has not had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting that claim. Stephens v. 

Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner fails to meet either of these requirements. In this case, Petitioner is 

challenging the validity and constitutionality of his federal sentence imposed by a federal 

court, rather than an error in the administration of his sentence. Therefore, the 

appropriate procedure would be to file a motion pursuant to § 2255 in the sentencing 

court, not a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241 in this Court.

Petitioner did not lack an unobstructed opportunity to present his claims in his § 

2255 motion. Here, Petitioner has sought review of his federal petition many times. After 

his 2010 conviction, Petitioner appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which denied 

his claims on appeal on January 30, 2004. United States v. Fourstar, 87 Fed. Appx. 62

(9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner then sought relief in the district of conviction by way of motions 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For instance, on June 12, 2013, the District of Montana 

denied a successive motion under § 2255, and noted that it was at least Fourstar's third

such motion. United States v. Fourstar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82874, 1-2 (D. Mont. June 

12, 2013). 

Petitioner has also filed several petitions for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. 

On November 25, 2013, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed a § 2241 petition and 

noted that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had 

previously rejected a similar petition from Petitioner. See Fourstar v. Walton, 2013 U.S. 

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Dist. LEXIS 166775 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2013).

The Ninth Circuit has "held that a § 2241 petition is available under the 'escape 

hatch' of § 2255 when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has 

not had an 'unobstructed procedural shot' at presenting that claim. Stephens v. Herrera, 

464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner argues, however, that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective, because he 

has already filed § 2255 motions and they have been denied. Under the AEDPA, a 

prisoner may not bring a second or successive Section 2255 motion in district court 

unless "a panel of the appropriate court of appeals" certifies that the motion contains: (1) 

newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, 

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable 

factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 

that was previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 

952, 955 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner fails to meet either of these requirements. Fourstar v. 

United States, No. 11-72234, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26583 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2011) 

(denying application for authorization to file successive § 2255 motion).

Nevertheless, Petitioner's inability to meet the statutory requirements for filing a 

successive Section 2255 motion does not automatically render the remedy under 

Section 2255 inadequate or ineffective. See Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (concluding that a Section 2255 movant may not avoid the limitations imposed 

on successive petitions by styling his petition as one pursuant to Section 2241 rather 

than Section 2255, and that the AEDPA required dismissal of petitioner's successive 

Section 2255 motion because his claim was based neither on a new rule of constitutional 

law made retroactive by the Supreme Court nor on new evidence). To the extent 

Petitioner may argue that his only remedy is to pursue his claim via a habeas petition 

pursuant to Section 2241 because a panel of the court of appeals would refuse to certify 

a second or successive motion under Section 2255, Petitioner's argument fails. Section

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2241 "is not available under the inadequate-or-ineffective-remedy escape hatch of 

[Section] 2255 merely because the court of appeals refuses to certify a second or 

successive motion under the gatekeeping provisions of [Section] 2255." Lorentsen v. 

Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, as previously stated, the remedy under 

Section 2255 usually will not be deemed inadequate or ineffective merely because a 

previous Section 2255 motion was denied, or because a remedy under that section is 

procedurally barred. Id. at 953 (stating that the general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that 

"the ban on unauthorized second or successive petitions does not per se make § 2255 

'inadequate or ineffective'"); see also United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 

(9th Cir. 2001) (procedural limits on filing second or successive Section 2255 motion 

may not be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651); Moore, 185 

F.3d at 1055 (rejecting petitioner's argument that Section 2255 remedy was ineffective

because he was denied permission to file a successive Section 2255 motion, and stating 

that dismissal of a subsequent Section 2255 motion does not render federal habeas 

relief an ineffective or inadequate remedy); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63.

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his claims qualify under the 

savings clause of Section 2255 because Petitioner's claims are not proper claims of 

"actual innocence." In the Ninth Circuit, a claim of actual innocence for purposes of the 

Section 2255 savings clause is tested by the standard articulated by the United States 

Supreme Court in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 

2d 828 (1998). In Bousley, the Supreme Court explained that, "[t]o establish actual 

innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. 

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on this issue by a preponderance of the evidence,

and he must show not just that the evidence against him was weak, but that it was so 

weak that "no reasonable juror" would have convicted him. Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 954. 

"[S]uch a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with 

new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

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eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995).

In this case, Petitioner claims that he is innocent and that there us recent 

Supreme Court authority in support of his claims, but does not provide information 

regarding which Supreme Court decisions he is relying upon. (See Am. Pet.) 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Section 2255 

constitutes an "inadequate or ineffective" remedy for raising his claims. Accordingly, 

Section 2241 is not the proper statute for raising Petitioner's claims, and the petition 

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal 

a district court's denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain 

circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling 

statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, 

which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a 

person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

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If a court denies a petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability “if 

jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional 

claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, 

he must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of 

mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, reasonable jurists would not find to be debatable or wrong 

the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief nor 

would they find petitioner deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has 

not made the required substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

V. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Petitioner's Motions to Amend be GRANTED;

2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED;

3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and 

4) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 3, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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