Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00342/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00342-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karen M. Baker,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Walgreens Arizona Drug Company,

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00342-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Walgreens Arizona Drug Company’s 

motion for summary judgment.1(Doc. 34). Defendant’s motion is in response to Plaintiff 

Karen Baker’s Complaint alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 

1967, Title 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2012) (“ADEA”), and a state-law claim of wrongful 

termination in violation of A.R.S. § 23-1501(A) (2014). (Doc. 1). The Court now rules on 

the motion.

I.

Plaintiff is an African American woman “over [forty] years of age” who began 

 

1 Neither party requested oral argument on the pending dispositive motion. Both 

parties have submitted memoranda discussing the law and facts in support of their 

positions and oral argument will not aide the Court’s decisional process. See e.g.,

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las Vegas Investors 

Group, Inc. v. Pacific. Dev. Malibu Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

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working as a Beauty Advisor2for Defendant at its Laveen, Arizona location (“the Store”)

“in March 2007.” (Doc. 35 at 1). From the beginning of Plaintiff’s employment through 

July 2014, the Store was managed by two individuals whose actions are not at issue in 

this case.3In July 2014, Mr. Luis Palomo4became the Store’s Manager. In August 2014, 

Ms. Krystal Faultner was hired as the Store’s Assistant Store Manager (“ASM”). (Doc. 

35 at 2). As an ASM, Ms. Faultner was responsible for supervising and overseeing the 

“front-end”—or the sales floor of the Store—which included all Beauty Advisors and 

cosmetics department employees. (Doc. 35 at 2; Doc. 36 at 3). Ms. Faultner’s job duties 

included “delegating tasks, creating schedules, planning staffing needs, interviewing, 

hiring and filling vacancies of front-end positions, and managing the performance of 

front[-]end positions,” as well as “managing the performance of front[-]end employees, 

including disciplining employees.”5(Doc. 35 at 2-3). 

The record reflects nothing other than a benign employment relationship between 

Plaintiff and Defendant from her hire until June 2014. Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in 

June 2014, her schedule began to be reduced without explanation, and that younger, 

Hispanic workers were frequently given increases in scheduled hours at her expense.

(Doc. 1 at 4). Then, on September 27, 2014, the events leading to Plaintiff’s eventual 

termination were set in motion. During her shift, Plaintiff was working at the register “in 

 

2

Plaintiff’s job responsibilities included “working in the cosmetics department, 

merchandising, setting up products . . . ringing up customers, helping customers on the 

sales floor and assisting other employees.” (Doc. 35 at 1).

3

Plaintiff has not alleged that these Store Managers discriminated against her in 

any way.

4

Plaintiff has alleged that only Mr. Palomo discriminated against her on the basis 

of age and race.

5 Certain portions of the Court’s recitation of facts are direct quotations from 

Defendant’s Statement of Facts. (Doc. 35). The only portions directly transcribed are 

those facts that Plaintiff “agree[d] and stipulate[d]” to. (Doc. 36 at 2-3). Plaintiff did not 

file a contravening Statement of Facts.

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the [c]osmetics department at the [Store] when, at approximately 1:46 p.m., a customer 

approached her register and initiated a transaction to purchase a six-pack of beer and one 

or two other items.” (Doc. 35 at 15-16). “After Plaintiff scanned the beer and other items, 

the customer placed five one dollar bills on the register counter as partial payment for the 

items he planned on purchasing.” (Id. at 16). “Plaintiff then picked up the cash, counted 

out the five one dollar bills and entered into the . . . register . . . that $5.00 had been 

tendered as partial payment.” (Id.) After several of the customer’s credit cards were 

declined in an attempt to cover the remainder of the transaction, the customer informed 

Plaintiff that “he was going to get cash out of the [ATM] that was located in the store and 

that he would return and” finish the transaction. (Id.). Plaintiff did not return the 

customer’s money that had been tendered as partial payment. (Id.). Plaintiff then called 

for support from a “Store Floor Leader” to void the partial transaction, and placed the 

dollar bills under the six pack of beers that the customer had attempted to purchase. (Id.) 

“A little while later,” Plaintiff “took the cash out from under the six pack of beer, folded 

the five one dollar bills in half and put them under the receipt printer by the register.” (Id.

at 16; Doc. 36 at 9). 

Isabel, the Store Floor Leader who responded to Plaintiff’s call for assistance at 

the cash register, saw Plaintiff place the dollar bills underneath the receipt printer, and 

then then informed Mr. Palomo of the incident. (Doc. 35-3 at 6-7). Plaintiff left the 

money under the receipt printer when she went home for the day; a second employee 

placed the dollar bills in an envelope with a note that the money belonged to Plaintiff and 

placed the envelope on Mr. Palomo’s desk. (Doc. 35 at 17). Several days later, Plaintiff 

retrieved the envelope from Mr. Palomo. Plaintiff did not look inside to view the contents 

of the envelope, and did not inform Mr. Palomo that it contained a customer’s money 

from the abandoned transaction. (Id. at 17-18). Finding Plaintiff’s behavior “odd,” Mr. 

Palomo reviewed the “Closed Circuit Television (“CCTV”) video of the transaction that 

[Isabel] voided on September 27, 2014,” and observed that Plaintiff had taken the dollar 

bills from the customer and placed them under the receipt printer. (Doc. 35-3 at 7).

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Adhering to Defendant’s corporate policy, Mr. Palomo contacted Duane Fletcher, 

a Loss Prevention Manager for Defendant, to investigate the incident. (Doc. 35-3 at 8).

On October 2, 2014, Mr. Fletcher interviewed Plaintiff about the incident with Mr. 

Palomo present. (Doc. 35-2 at 47-48). During the interview, Plaintiff recalled the 

abandoned transaction with the customer, and stated that she gave the customer a five 

dollar bill in exchange for the five one dollar bills, and then placed the dollar bills under 

the receipt printer to “make a purchase” later. (Id. at 49-51). After Mr. Palomo and Mr. 

Fletcher reviewed the CCTV footage with Plaintiff, Plaintiff “acknowledged that she did 

not give any money back to the customer but could not provide an explanation as to 

[why].” (Id. at 51). Plaintiff authored and signed a voluntary statement regarding the 

incident and was permitted to return to work, but was informed that the investigation was 

ongoing and that Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Palomo would meet with her again at its 

conclusion. (Id. at 52).

On October 3, 2014, the customer from the abandoned transaction returned to the 

Store and spoke with Mr. Palomo, confirming that Plaintiff never “offered to exchange 

the five dollar bills for a single five-dollar bill.” (Doc. 35-2 at 56). On October 7, 2014, 

Plaintiff returned to Mr. Palomo the money from the incident,

6

telling Mr. Palomo that 

she did not intend to take the money from the customer, and returned it “in good faith, 

because [she] knew [she] didn’t take it.” (Id. at 56-57). Plaintiff acknowledged that she 

failed to adhere to Defendant’s “policy with respect to customer money handling,” (id. at 

59), and also acknowledged that she lied to Mr. Palomo and Mr. Fletcher, but felt that she 

“was being pushed into” a “corner” on the issue. (Id. at 62-63). 

Plaintiff’s employment was thereafter terminated on October 15, 2014. (Doc. 35-3 

 

6

Plaintiff’s deposition contains testimony that she sought out the customer from 

the incident in order to return the five dollars by traveling “to his place of employment.” 

(Doc. 35-2 at 61). Plaintiff did not disclose the date of her attempt to locate the customer 

and has not further substantiated this claim, but acknowledged that until she viewed the 

CCTV footage of the incident with Mr. Palomo, it was her “understanding” that she had 

made change for the customer. (Id. at 62).

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at 10). Defendant maintains that the termination was based solely on “[Defendant’s]

investigation of her conduct relating to the September 27, 2014[,] customer transaction” 

and Defendant’s “good cause” belief that Plaintiff had “knowingly taken property that did 

not belong to her, and knowingly made false and inaccurate statements” to Defendant 

during the investigation.7(Id.). Defendant’s employee conduct policy lists “[d]ishonesty” 

as a form of serious misconduct that “may justify an employee’s immediate dismissal, 

without prior warning,” and “theft” is listed as a form of “gross misconduct” that is also 

grounds for immediate dismissal. (Id. at 13).

Following Plaintiff’s termination, she filed a complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 1 at 7). The record contains 

documentation establishing that the EEOC investigated Plaintiff’s complaint at some 

level, and on November 25, 2014, determined that “[b]ased upon its investigation, the 

EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the 

statutes.” (Id.). The EEOC further noted that the investigation “does not certify that the 

respondent is in compliance with the statutes,” and that “[n]o finding [wa]s made as to 

any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by [Plaintiff’s] charge.” 

(Id.). On February 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant.

Having set forth the pertinent factual and procedural background, the Court turns 

to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 34).

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

 

7

Plaintiff asserts that she “plans to offer testimony . . . to lay foundation that there 

was no violation of any duty Plaintiff owed [Defendant] on September 27, 2014. None of 

this purported testimonial evidence was included in the record, and it is not clear to the 

Court what Plaintiff means when she claims that she owed Defendant no “duty.” (Doc. 36 

at 12).

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law.” Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assocs. LLC of Olympia, 379 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 

2004) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial 

burden of demonstrating to the Court the basis for and the elements of the causes of 

action upon which the non-movant will be unable to establish a genuine issue of material 

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the 

non-movant to establish the existence of a material fact in dispute. Id. The non-movant 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts” by “com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 

(emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute 

about a fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The non-movant’s bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a 

material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. But in 

the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 

2004).

Plaintiff is pro se, and thus the Court “must liberally construe h[er] pleadings.” 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also

Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam) (noting that federal courts 

should liberally construe the “inartful pleading” of pro se litigants); Ashelman v. Pope, 

793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that courts in this Circuit should hold “pro se 

pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings prepared by lawyers”). But 

the Court need not undertake special endeavors to inform Plaintiff of her obligations 

under Rule 56. See Karlozian v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 8 Fed. Appx. 835, 836 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has held that “pro se litigants 

in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys 

of record”); see also Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that 

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“the present federal rules (particularly when amplified by local rules . . .) already apprise 

litigants of their summary judgment obligations”). It is proper to grant a defendant’s 

motion where a pro se plaintiff fails “to present any evidence creating a genuine dispute 

of material fact as to whether [the] defendant violated” federal law. Dang v. Solar 

Turbines, Inc., 452 Fed. Appx. 804, 805 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2007)). But, “[a]s a general matter, the plaintiff in an 

employment discrimination action need produce very little evidence in order to overcome 

an employer’s motion for summary judgment.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce, Ltd., 521 F.3d 

1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 

1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III.

The Complaint contains three counts: (1) that Defendant discriminated against 

Plaintiff on the basis of race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); (2) that 

Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of age, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 

623(a)(1); and (3) that Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff in violation of A.R.S. § 

23-1501(A) (2014). Defendant seeks summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s federal

claims.8

A. Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA Claims

The Complaint asserts that three actions9 were taken against Plaintiff that were 

 

8 Having reviewed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 34), 

Defendant does not address a distinct, state-law claim for wrongful termination from the 

Complaint. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff’s pleadings present difficulties in 

terms of identifying exactly what claims have been brought. The Court, adhering to the 

doctrine that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, finds that Plaintiff raised a 

distinct “state law” claim for wrongful termination. (Doc. 1 at 4).

9

The Complaint alleges that Defendant, through Mr. Palomo, “created a toxic 

environment to work in using his own polic[ies] and procedures,” and that Mr. Palomo 

“willfully and knowingly use[d] discriminatory practices throughout Plaintiff’s 

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discriminatory: (1) Plaintiff was “constantly overlooked . . . [for] job promotions[] that 

Plaintiff was well[-]qualified for”; (2) Defendant reduced Plaintiff’s hours “while newly[-

]hired Hispanic workers were constantly given increase[es] in hours” from June 2014 

through October 2014; and (3) Plaintiff’s termination. (Doc. 1 at 4-5). The Complaint 

appears to argue that each of these adverse employment actions were the result of 

discrimination on both the basis of age and race. Accordingly, the Court finds it most 

efficient to treat Plaintiff’s Title VII10 and ADEA11 claims as one analysis premised on 

three separate factual allegations.

To prevail on a Title VII or ADEA claim, Plaintiff must first “establish a prima 

facie case of discrimination.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 394 F.3d 634, 640 (9th 

Cir. 2003). A prima facie case is shown through “evidence that ‘gives rise to an inference 

of unlawful discrimination,’ either through the framework set forth in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green or with direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 

intent.” Id. (citing Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Absent direct or circumstantial evidence establishing discriminatory conduct, both Title 

VII and ADEA claims are evaluated under the “threestage burden-shifting framework 

laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Diaz, 521 F.3d at 

1207.

Plaintiff has failed to proffer any direct evidence12 of racial or age discrimination. 

 

employment.” (Doc. 1 at 3-4). The record is completely devoid of evidence to support 

this claim. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to direct the Court to some “specific and triable 

facts.” Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). Plaintiff has failed to do so, and the Court finds this allegation to be a 

“conclusory statement without factual support.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv., 518 F.3d 

1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court need not consider it further.

10 “Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual based 

on race.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1103 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).

11 The ADEA makes it unlawful to terminate any individual due to that 

individual’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

12 Plaintiff’s response argues that some evidence disclosed during discovery 

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Direct evidence is evidence that, “if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus 

without inference or presumption.”13 Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640 (quoting Godwin v. Hunt

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff acknowledges as much, as 

she conceded that she never heard Mr. Palomo make any negative or derogatory remarks 

about Plaintiff herself, her age, or her race, and further acknowledged that no other 

employee ever told her that Mr. Palomo made derogatory or discriminatory comments 

about the aforementioned topics. (Doc. 35-1 at 16-18). Plaintiff also offered no 

documentary evidence and made no argument beyond the Complaint. Additionally, 

proffered circumstantial evidence—that Mr. Palomo acted with discriminatory intent via 

an alleged reduction in shifts and Plaintiff’s termination following an incident involving 

mismanagement of customer funds—does not make out a prima facie case of 

discrimination. For example, Ms. Faultner was responsible for setting the schedules of 

front-end employees, including Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not alleged that Ms. Faultner 

discriminated against her. (Doc. 35 at 2). Thus, Plaintiff’s direct and circumstantial 

evidence is insufficient to “prove[] the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or 

presumption;” thus, for Plaintiff to prevail on summary judgment, she must survive under 

the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

Under the oft-cited McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie 

 

contains “conflicting information that Defendant [does] not want examined at trial.” 

(Doc. 36 at 13). Plaintiff has failed to include this evidence in the record, and the Court 

cannot consider what it cannot examine. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to provide even a 

cursory explanation as to what this evidence is and how it supports denying summary 

judgment. Plaintiff also asserts that she submitted “work schedules” during discovery in 

support of her position. The Court has considered all work schedules that were included 

as part of the record by the parties. (See Doc. 35-4 at 14-59).

13 Under the ADEA, direct evidence “is defined as evidence of conduct or 

statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as 

directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude . . . sufficient to permit the fact 

finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the 

employer’s decision.” Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 

1999)).

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case of unlawful discrimination where she can show that “(1) she belongs to a protected 

class, (2) she was performing according to her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she 

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other employees with qualifications 

similar to her own were treated more favorably.”14 Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220. If the 

plaintiff is successful, “then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct.” Id. If the defendant 

provides such a reason, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 

defendant’s proffered reason is mere pretext for discrimination. Vasquez, 394 F.3d at 640

(citing Cordova, 124 at 1148). “Despite the burden shifting, the ultimate burden of proof 

remains always on the former employees to show that [the employer] intentionally 

discriminated” against them. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281.

The Court finds that Plaintiff satisfies the first element of the McDonnell Douglas 

test, as she belongs to a protected class for both Title VII and ADEA purposes.

1. The Senior Beauty Advisor Position 

The first of Plaintiff’s factual claims is that she was passed over “constantly” for 

“job promotions,” and that “younger,”

15 less[-]qualified employees” were promoted 

“systematically.”16 (Doc. 1 at 4-5). The record makes clear, however, that Plaintiff felt 

 

14 In the context of an ADEA claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she was “(1) 

[a] member[] of the protected class (at least age 40); (2) performing [her] jobs 

satisfactorily; (3) discharged; and (4) replaced by [a] substantially younger employee[]

with equal or inferior qualifications.” Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281 (citing Nidds v. 

Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff may also satisfy 

the fourth element by establishing that she was “discharged under circumstances 

otherwise ‘giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.’” Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207 

(quoting Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281).

15 Based on the structure of Plaintiff’s claims, she appears to argue that she was 

passed over for promotions because of her age in violation of the ADEA. The Court, 

recognizing Plaintiff’s pro se status, also incorporates the allegation into her Title VII 

claim.

16 Plaintiff has produced no evidence that younger and less-qualified employees 

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aggrieved with respect to only a single alleged promotional opportunity: the Senior 

Beauty Advisor, a position that oversees the cosmetics apartment.17 (Doc. 35-1 at 18-19). 

As a member of a protected class, Plaintiff must also show that “(2) she applied for a job 

for which she was qualified; (3) she was rejected; and (4) the position remained open and 

the employer sought other similarly-qualified employees.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1105-06 

(citation omitted).

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has proffered 

insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue with respect to whether she applied for a 

job for which she was qualified, and whether “the position remained open and the 

employer sought other similarly-qualified employees.” Plaintiff failed to establish that the 

Senior Beauty Advisor position was ever vacant, that she spoke to management about a 

potential opening, or that she was passed over for “other similarly-qualified candidates.”

Plaintiff began working at the Store as a Beauty Advisor in March 2007. When 

Plaintiff began her employment, Sandra was the Store’s Senior Beauty Advisor. (Doc. 35 

at 3). Sandra has been employed in that capacity for the intervening nine years, and is 

currently employed as the Store’s Senior Beauty Advisor. (Id.). Plaintiff does not contest 

these facts. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that she “was told that the Senior Beauty Advisor 

position was open” by Sandra, and that Mr. Palomo asked Sandra “to step down.” (Doc. 

35-1 at 20). Plaintiff was “[n]ot real sure of the details of it, but that’s just what was told 

to [her].” (Id.). Plaintiff also asserts that “another employee” told Plaintiff “that Mr. 

Palomo had offered the [Senior Beauty Advisor] position to her” after Sandra stepped 

 

were hired and promoted “systematically.” As noted supra, it is Plaintiff’s responsibility 

to direct the Court to some “specific and triable facts.” Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1058 

(citation omitted). The Court finds this allegation to be a “conclusory statement without 

factual support,” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1103 (citation omitted), and need not consider it 

further.

17 Plaintiff has proffered no evidence to suggest that she was passed over for any 

additional job opportunities. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony readily acknowledges that 

she could only identify one position in which she felt discriminated against on the basis 

of age and race. (Doc. 35-1 at 18-19).

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down.18 (Id. at 21). Plaintiff felt that she had been discriminated against because of her 

race and her age, and that due to her seniority with Defendant, she “should have the right 

to be promoted.” (Id. at 31).

The aforementioned factual assertions represent the entirety of Plaintiff’s 

evidence. Nothing in the record suggests that Sandra stepped down or resigned from her 

position as Senior Beauty Advisor and she continues to work at the Store in the same 

capacity today. Nothing in the record substantiates Plaintiff’s claim that Sandra was 

asked to step down or that the position was offered to another employee. Mr. Palomo and 

Ms. Faulter both denied under penalty of perjury that Sandra was ever asked to step down 

or that the position was offered to another employee. Moreover, Plaintiff never 

approached Mr. Palomo, the Store Manager, or Ms. Faultner, the ASM, about whether 

the position was indeed vacant or whether Plaintiff had interest in the position.

Additionally, Ms. Faultner, as the Store’s ASM, “would have been directly involved” 

with hiring Sandra’s replacement if Sandra resigned from the Senior Beauty Advisor 

position. (Doc. 35-4 at 4). Ms. Faultner was never aware that Sandra was asked to step 

down, that she had stepped down, or that Mr. Palomo had offered the position to any 

other employee. More is required of Plaintiff.

The Court is aware of Plaintiff’s modest burden to “produce very little evidence in 

order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment.” Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207 

(citation omitted). But “conclusory statements without factual support are insufficient.” 

Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1103 (citing Nat’l Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagles Ins. Corp., 121 F.3d 

496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that there was an opening for 

the Senior Beauty Advisor position, or that she was passed over for promotion. The

allegation does not make out a prima facie case of discrimination.

 

18 During Plaintiff’s deposition, the parties referenced a “journal” and hand-written 

documents that had been provided to Defendant by Plaintiff. (Doc. 35-1 at 23-25). The 

deposition transcript reveals that Plaintiff’s testimony comports with what Plaintiff wrote 

in her “journal regarding [her] work at [the Store].” (Id. at 25). But this documentary 

evidence has not been entered into the record, and is not before the Court.

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2. Alleged Reduction in Plaintiff’s Hours Scheduled

Plaintiff acknowledges that Ms. Faultner was responsible for creating the work 

schedules of front-end employees, and that she did not allege that Ms. Faultner 

discriminated against her. (Doc. 35-1 at 39-40). Rather, Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Palomo, 

as the Store Manager and Ms. Faultner’s supervising authority, convinced her to reduce 

Plaintiff’s hours due to her age and race.19

Mr. Palomo became the Store Manager in July 2014.20 (Doc. 35-3 at 2). Ms. 

Faultner became the ASM in August 2014 and set Plaintiff’s work schedule in September 

and October 2014.21 (Id. at 10). In the five months prior to Mr. Palomo’s arrival, Plaintiff 

worked an average of 166.8 hours each month.22 Once Mr. Palomo became Store 

Manager, Plaintiff worked 162 hours in July 2014, 159.5 hours in August, 130.75 hours 

in September, and from October 1 to October 15, 2014—Plaintiff’s last day of 

employment—was scheduled to work 46.5 hours.23 (Doc. 35-4 at 9-12). 

Plaintiff has proffered no evidence to support her claim that her “hours were 

reduced while newly hired Hispanic workers were constantly given increase[s] in hours.” 

(Doc. at 4). The Court must therefore examine the record to determine whether sufficient 

 

19 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “Ms. Faultner, under the direction of Mr. 

Palomo [and] being an assistant manager, had to follow certain rules that were directed 

by him, by Mr. Palomo.” (Doc. 35-1 at 41).

20 This fact is noteworthy, as Plaintiff alleges that her hours began to decline due 

to discrimination in June 2014.

21 Plaintiff has not alleged that the ASM’s at the Store prior to Ms. Faultner 

discriminated against Plaintiff by reducing her hours from February through August 

2014.

22 Plaintiff worked 160 hours in February 2014, 169.5 hours in March, 154 hours 

in April, 179.5 hours in May, and 171 hours in June. (Doc. 35-4 at 8-12).

23 Plaintiff was scheduled to work 60.5 hours through October 17, 2014. (Doc. 35-

4 at 57).

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evidence exists to create a material factual dispute for trial. The Court begins with an 

analysis of the time frame Plaintiff alleges the discrimination took place. Plaintiff asserts 

that her hours were reduced in a discriminatory manner from June 2014 through October 

2014. (Id.). Mr. Palomo did not become Store Manager at the Store until July 2014. (Doc. 

35-3 at 2). Given that Mr. Palomo is the only employee that allegedly discriminated 

against her—and he did not work in the Store until July 2014—Plaintiff’s hours in June 

2014 are not probative of her claim, and will not be considered. 

Turning to July 2014 and August 2014, the Court notes that Plaintiff worked 162 

and 159.5 hours, respectively. (Doc. 35-4 at 8-10). Plaintiff’s monthly totals falls within 

4.5 and 7 hours, respectively, of her average monthly employment from February to June 

2014. Moreover, the record establishes that Plaintiff was scheduled to work the second 

most hours among all cosmetics department employees at the Store. (Id. at 10). The only 

employee scheduled to work more during this time period was Sandra, who was a higherranking employee and whose seniority was at least comparable to Plaintiff’s. Plaintiff has 

not pointed to any “newly hired Hispanic workers” who were scheduled to work more 

hours at Plaintiff’s expense in July or August 2014. And Ms. Faultner, who Plaintiff 

alleged was the vehicle of Mr. Palomo’s discrimination, did not set Plaintiff’s schedule 

until September 2014. The Court finds no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim from June 

to August.

Proceeding out of chronological order, the Court next addresses October 2014, 

where Plaintiff was scheduled to work 46.5 hours from October 1 to October 15, 2014. 

Defendant acknowledges the reduction in hours, but asserts that “in late September or 

early October 2014, [Plaintiff] asked Mr. Palomo and [Ms. Faultner] for some time off in 

early October.” (Doc. 35-4 at 12). “Per [Plaintiff’s] request, she was given these 

additional days off, which resulted in her having less scheduled hours than usual.” (Id.). 

Defendant’s assertion is supported by Ms. Faultner’s attestation, and a copy of Plaintiff’s 

October 2014 schedule that includes a one-week period without any shifts scheduled. 

Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s assertion that she asked for time off. Plaintiff’s 

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schedule included shifts on October 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and then October 15, 16, and 17, 2014, 

suggesting that Plaintiff requested approximately one week of time off. (Doc. 35-4 at 57). 

During the week of October 2 to October 6, Plaintiff worked 39 hours. (Id.). Assuming 

that Plaintiff would have worked a similar number of hours24 from October 7 to October 

14, Plaintiff would have worked approximately 90 hours through October 17, 2014, and 

would have been on pace to work approximately 170 hours during the month. This 

estimate is on par with Sandra’s schedule as Senior Beauty Advisor. (Doc. 35-4 at 12). 

Defendant’s assertion is not supported by further documentary evidence, but Plaintiff has 

failed to contest the validity of Defendant’s evidence. Absent any evidence to the 

contrary or any substantive argument from Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

October 2014 schedule does not support her claim.

Finally, the Court turns to the September 2014 schedule where Plaintiff worked 

130.75 hours. (Doc. 35-4 at 10). The Court notes that this is a precipitous drop in hours 

both from the prior month and from the average number of hours Plaintiff worked over 

the previous seven months,

25 and merits further scrutiny. Plaintiff, however, has failed to 

point to who the “newly-hired Hispanic workers” are who were given hours that should 

have been given to Plaintiff. The Court, therefore, has combed through the record and 

compiled a list of possible employees that Plaintiff may have been referring to. Based on 

the record provided by Defendant, the following employees may have been scheduled 

more often at Plaintiff’s expense:

Celeste A. (Employed from November 2013 to August 2014) 

Chelsea A. (Hired on or about June 12, 2014)

 

24 The Court acknowledges that this is not a perfect calculation, and it is not 

intended to be a representation of the exact number of hours that Plaintiff was scheduled 

to work in October 2014. The Court is merely conducting as thorough an analysis as 

possible of Plaintiff’s claim based on the record before it. The Court has been given no 

reason to suspect that Plaintiff’s hours would have fluctuated substantially from one week 

to the next. Moreover, Plaintiff has not argued that her schedule during this week would 

have been substantially different from the prior week.

25 From February 2014 to August 2014, Plaintiff worked an average of 165 hours.

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Amanda G. (Hired on or about September 12, 2014)

Asia T. (Hired on or about September 15, 2014)

Dezerae L. (Hired on or about July 2014)

Martha C. (Hired on or about February 20, 2014)

Sandra C. (Hired on or about August 5, 2011)26

(Doc. 35-4 at 14-16). As noted supra, during the month of September, Plaintiff worked 

130.75 hours. Celeste A. worked 130 hours in July 2014, 63 hours in August 2014, and 

no longer worked for Defendant in September 2014. Chelsea A. worked 96.25 hours in 

September 2014. Amanda G. worked 57 hours in September 2014. Asia T. worked 55.25 

hours in September 2014. Dezerae L. worked 106 hours in September 2014. And Martha 

C. worked 59 hours in September 2014. (Id. at 18-59). In the interest of thorough 

analysis, the Court has expanded its examination to include hours scheduled for October 

2014. Plaintiff was scheduled to work 46.5 hours through the first half of the month, but 

had requested up to a week of time off. Between October 1 and October 15, 2014, 

Chelsea A. was scheduled to work 67.75 hours, Dezerae L. was scheduled to work 91.75 

hours, and Sandra M. was scheduled to work 84.5 hours. (Id. at 12, 18-59). Absent her 

week off, Plaintiff would have been schedule to work approximately 80

27 hours through 

the first half of October.

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that one data point, at least initially, 

supports Plaintiff’s contention: her September 2014 work schedule. September saw a 

noticeable dip in the hours Plaintiff was set to work, falling from 159.5 hours to 130.5 

hours. (Doc. 35-4 at 10). Defendant describes the drop in hours as being due to Ms. 

Faultner needing to make “slight changes” to the schedule in order to ensure that the 

 

26 Sandra C. was transferred “to another store” in “the late summer of 2014”). 

(Doc. 35 at 4). She was scheduled to work 156.5 hours in May 2014, and 166 hours in 

June, and was “not scheduled to work in the cosmetics department in July 2014.” (Doc. 

35 at 12).

27 Plaintiff was scheduled to work a total of 14 hours on October 16 and October 

17, 2014. (Doc. 35-4 at 57). So, while she was scheduled to work a total of approximately 

90 hours through October 17, through the “first half” of the month—October 15—her 

approximate total is closer to 80 hours.

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Store “was following [Defendant’s] scheduling policies and that evening and weekend 

shifts were fairly distributed among the employees.” (Id. at 6). The Court is not 

persuaded by Defendant’s explanation that a “slight change” accounted for this drop in 

hours. But, at the same time, the Court recognizes Defendant’s position that “[n]o 

employee is guaranteed a set schedule” and that “schedules may vary based on business 

needs.” (Doc. 35-4 at 6). Moreover, Plaintiff’s September schedule contained roughly the 

same number of hours as Sandra, a similarly senior employee working in Defendant’s 

cosmetics department.28 (Id. at 10-11). And month-to-month fluctuations in other 

employee’s schedules show that a substantial change in the number of hours worked is 

not unique to Ms. Baker’s September 2014 calendar.29 Finally, none of the newly hired 

employees identified by the Court experienced a spike in hours in September 2014 at 

Plaintiff’s expense. Standing alone, the Court does not find that the drop in Plaintiff’s 

hours—isolated to September 2014—is sufficient to make out a prima facie claim of 

discrimination.

Plaintiff does not contest the factual assertion that ASMs, and not Store Managers, 

are “solely responsible for creating and drafting” her schedule, (Doc. 35-4 at 5), and she 

has failed to offer even a hint of evidence that Mr. Palomo had some influence over the 

creation of employees’ schedules, or that he in some way influenced or instructed Ms. 

Faultner to diminish Plaintiff’s work schedule on the basis of age or race. Coupled with 

Plaintiff’s inability to show that her hours were cut in favor of increasing the hours of 

young, Hispanic workers, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue 

of material fact for trial.

 

28 Sandra, the Senior Beauty Advisor for nine years, was scheduled to work 130.5 

hours in August 2014 and 130.5 hours in September 2014. (Doc. 35-4 at 10-11).

29 For example, Celeste A. was scheduled to work 130.5 hours in July 2014 and 63 

hours in August 2014. (Doc. 35-4 at 10). Sandra was scheduled to work 180 hours in July 

2014 and 130.5 hours in August 2014 and 130.5 hours in September 2014. (Id.). Celeste 

A. was also scheduled to work 147.5 hours in April 2014 and 98 hours in May 2014. (Id. 

at 9).

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3. Plaintiff’s Termination

Plaintiff’s final factual allegation in support of her claim is that she was terminated 

on October 15, 2014, due to her age and race. The Court notes that the Complaint does 

not directly assert this claim. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “[t]erminated her 

employment against state law”; (Doc. 1 at 4); the Complaint never states that it was on 

the basis of race or age. Nonetheless, liberally construing Plaintiff’s pleadings, Franklin, 

745 F.2d at 1235 (citation omitted), the Court will analyze a claim of age and racial 

discrimination via Plaintiff’s termination.

Plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case in order to shift the burden to 

Defendant to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 

1220. The Court has already found that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class under both 

Title VII and the ADEA. Plaintiff clearly suffered an adverse employment action, as she 

was terminated, and no evidence suggests that Plaintiff failed to perform according to 

Defendant’s legitimate expectations.30 Id. Plaintiff, however, must still demonstrate that 

“other employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated more favorably.”31

 

30 The Court finds that the proper scope with respect to this element is whether 

Plaintiff was adequately performing her job duties prior to Defendant’s internal 

investigation. Plaintiff’s job responsibilities included “working in the cosmetics 

department, merchandising, setting up products . . . ringing up customers, helping 

customers on the sales floor and assisting other employees.” (Doc. 35 at 1). Defendant 

has offered no evidence suggesting Plaintiff had shortcomings in these areas, and the 

record reflects seven years of employment without issues related to her work product.

31 Under the ADEA, Plaintiff must also establish that she was “replaced by [a]

substantially younger employee[] with equal or inferior qualifications.” Coleman, 232 

F.3d at 1281 (citation omitted), or that she was “discharged under circumstances 

otherwise ‘giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.’” Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207

(citation omitted). Even analyzing Plaintiff’s prima facie claim with ADEA specific 

language, the record contains no evidence that Plaintiff was replaced by someone 

substantially younger, or that the circumstances give rise “to an inference of age 

discrimination.”

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Id.

“The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title 

VII . . . on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Wallis v. J.R. 

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (noting that “[a]t the summary judgment stage, the 

prima facie case need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence”); see also 

Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(superseded by statute on other grounds) (noting that “[t]he amount [of evidence] that 

must be produced in order to create a prima facie case is ‘very little’”)). “Plaintiff need 

not plead specific facts that establish this element of the prima facie case as long as other 

factual allegations in the pleading can lead to a plausible inference that other employees 

with qualifications similar to her own were treated more favorably.” Washington v. 

Certainteed Gypsum, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00204-GMN-LRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

94920, at *19 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2011). And “[n]ormally, when such evidence has been 

introduced, a court should not grant summary judgment to the defendant on any ground 

relating to the merits.” Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, Plaintiff has not offered—and the Court 

cannot find—any evidence that “other employees with qualifications similar to her own 

were treated more favorably.” The Court has identified two possible analyses to 

determine whether Plaintiff was treated less favorably than other employees. The first, 

broader analysis is whether African Americans or employees over the age of forty were 

more frequently targeted by Defendant for “investigations” of workplace behavior than

other employees who do not belong to either of the aforementioned protected classes. The 

second, narrower analysis is to determine whether Plaintiff was terminated following her

internal investigation but other employees outside her protected classes were punished 

less severely after being found to have violated similar policies. In the instant matter, the 

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distinction is unimportant. Under either analysis, the record before the Court is devoid of 

evidence showing that Plaintiff was treated less favorably. As mentioned supra, Plaintiff 

has failed to compile any record to resist Defendant’s motion, and failed to file a 

contravening Statement of Facts. Even taking into account the facts pleaded in the 

Complaint and Plaintiff’s response to the pending motion, no facts assert—even in a 

conclusory manner—that other employees were treated more favorably than she was. Nor 

do “other factual allegations” lead to the “plausible inference that other employees with 

qualifications similar to her own were treated more favorably.” Washington, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 94920, at *19. Absent any evidence in the record, or even in her filings, 

Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.

The Court’s finding is bolstered by evidence offered by Defendant. On September 

18, 2014, Mr. Palomo contacted Mr. Fletcher and asked him to initiate an internal 

investigation of a separate employee following an incident of suspected theft. (Doc. 35 at 

24). The employee in question did not belong to either of Plaintiff’s protected classes 

under Title VII or the ADEA. (Doc. 35-3 at 11). The incident involved a “photo 

specialist” who had “printed a poster in the photo department” and then “left the store 

without paying for it” and subsequently “engaged in intentionally deceitful conduct to 

cover up what he did.” (Id. at 10-11). During Mr. Fletcher’s interview, the photo 

specialist “admitted to taking the poster and engaging in dishonest conduct” and was 

terminated on September 23, 2015. (Id.). “The value of the poster was nineteen dollars.” 

(Id. at 10). Plaintiff does not challenge the veracity of these assertions, which support 

Defendant’s position that it is standard “policy to terminate employees whenever there is 

a reasonable belief that the employee intentionally engaged in a dishonest act.” (Id. at 

10). While this policy may appear harsh in light of the amounts involved in each incident, 

the available evidence suggests that the policy is applied uniformly to all employees, and 

that Plaintiff was not treated less favorably because of her race or her age. Even absent 

this evidence, the Court reiterates that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing 

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that under either analysis, other employees were treated more favorably than Plaintiff.

32

The result is that the record contains insufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case 

of discrimination.

The Court is keenly aware of the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncement that Plaintiff’s 

burden is “minimal” to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Coburn, 372 Fed. 

Appx. at 798; Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207 (citation omitted); Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220; 

Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. The Court also remains cognizant of its responsibility to 

“liberally construe” Plaintiff’s pleadings. Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1235 (citation omitted). 

But the Court may not create out of whole cloth evidence that does not exist in the record 

to satisfy Plaintiff’s modest burden under McDonnell Douglas. The Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the District of Arizona apprise civil litigants of 

their obligations at the summary judgment phase. Karlozian, 8 Fed. Appx. at 836; 

Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1366. Plaintiff must point to some evidence in the record to show 

that other employees were treated more favorably than her. Although not required to, the 

Court has combed through the record in search of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim. 

See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[a] district court 

lacks the power to act as a party’s lawyer, even for pro se litigants” and that it “does not 

have a duty to search for evidence that would create a factual dispute”); Carmen v. S.F. 

Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that it would be 

“unfair” to the district court to require it “to search the entire record” if a party fails to 

“disclose where in the record the evidence for [the factual claims] can be found”).

Plaintiff has simply failed to produce even a modicum of evidence to support her 

claim that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than she was, 

and in light of this record, the Court will grant Defendant summary judgment on this 

issue. See Dang, 452 Fed. Appx. at 805 (citation omitted) (noting that it is proper to grant 

 

32 As discussed supra, Plaintiff admitted during the internal investigation that she 

failed to adhere to Defendant’s “policy with respect to customer money handling,” (Doc. 

35-2 at 59), and also acknowledged that she lied to Mr. Palomo and Mr. Fletcher, but felt 

that she “was being pushed into” a “corner” on the issue. (Id. at 62-63).

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summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff where she fails “to present any evidence 

creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether [the] defendant violated” federal 

law); Coburn v. PN II, 372 Fed. Appx. 796, 799 (9th Cir 2010) (finding sufficient 

evidence to make out a prima facie Title VII claim where the plaintiff proffered some 

evidence that similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably then female 

employees); Bias, 508 F.3d at 1218-19 (affirming summary judgment where the pro se 

plaintiff failed to present “any evidence to support her opposition”); Best v. Cal Dep’t of 

Corr., 21 Fed. Appx. 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding insufficient evidence to make out 

a prima facie disparate treatment case where the plaintiff “failed to provide any evidence 

that” similarly situated employees were treated more favorably “or, in fact, any evidence 

beyond mere allegation” and that “given the multitude of avenues available to [the 

plaintiff], [her] failure to provide evidence of disparate treatment beyond her own bare 

assertions are fatal to [her claim]”).

The Court has analyzed the three factual allegations that form the basis of 

Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA clams. With respect to each allegation, Plaintiff has failed 

to proffer sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment. Again acknowledging 

Plaintiff’s very modest burden in cases of discrimination, Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207 (citation 

omitted), Defendant is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII 

and ADEA claims.

B. Plaintiff’s Wrongful Termination Claim

Having adjudicated Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court turns to the final count of 

the Complaint, a state-law claim for “wrongful termination.” Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant “[t]erminated her employment against state law,” as it “[w]illfully and 

knowingly fabricated a lie and accused Plaintiff of theft.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Defendant did not 

move for summary judgment on this state-law claim, but did note in its Answer that 

“[d]ue to the vague allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint,” Defendant was unsure as to 

“whether this [claim] arises out of the same conduct alleged” in Plaintiff’s federal claims. 

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(Doc. 9 at 2 n.2). Defendant further “reserve[d] the right to seek dismissal of [Plaintiff’s 

state-law claim] because such allegations, even if true, are not sufficient to state a claim 

for relief under either Arizona statutory or common law.” (Id.).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has upheld the district 

court’s exercise of discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) over a state-law claim when all federal claims have been 

dismissed for failure to state a claim or where a grant of summary judgment for the 

defendant has been entered. Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare 

Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citations omitted). In each case, the Ninth Circuit “held it appropriate for the district 

court to decline jurisdiction over the pendent state claims because there was no viable 

federal claim.” Id. 

A question remains as to whether the Court has independent jurisdiction to hear 

this purely state-law claim under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), or whether jurisdiction 

hinges on 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Accordingly, the Court orders further briefing on the issue. 

Both parties shall file a brief, not to exceed four pages in length, addressing the issue of 

subject matter jurisdiction regarding Plaintiff’s state-law claim. The briefs shall be filed 

no later than Friday, April 8, 2016. 

IV.

To conclude, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims. The Court also orders additional briefing on the 

issue of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists to hear Plaintiff’s wrongful termination 

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

For the aforementioned reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

Title VII and ADEA claims, (Doc. 34), is hereby GRANTED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file briefs as specified above 

on the issue of whether jurisdiction continues for the Court to hear Plaintiff’s state-law 

claim no later than Monday, May 2, 2016. 

Dated this 18th day of April, 2016.

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