Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02045/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02045-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAMERON O. WINDOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

NICHOLAS F. BRADY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02045-TSH 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH 

PREJUDICE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Cameron O. Windom filed a Complaint and an Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”). Compl., ECF No. 1; Appl., ECF No. 2. The Court granted Windom’s IFP 

application but ordered him to revise his complaint. Order Granting IFP and Screening Compl. 

(“Order”), ECF No. 5. On May 30, 2019 he filed a revised complaint removing all previously 

named plaintiffs aside from himself. Amended Compl., ECF No. 9. For the reasons stated below, 

the undersigned finds that the amended complaint still fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). As not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a 

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Court requests this case be 

reassigned to a District Judge, with the recommendation that the Amended Complaint be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court screened Windom’s initial complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Order. 

First, the Court informed Windom that the complaint failed to set forth “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 3 (quoting Federal Rule 

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of Civil Procedure 8). The Court explained to Windom that the complaint failed to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted because it did not adequately describe any claim or claims 

Windom seeks to bring against the defendants and it did not clearly connect any of the facts 

alleged in the complaint to any of the defendants. Id. at 4. Next, the Court informed Windom that 

as pleaded, his claims based on conduct from 1986 to 1990 seemed to be time barred by the statute 

of limitations and laid out the various possibly relevant statutes and their respective statute of 

limitations requirements. Id. Finally, because Windom filed a complaint on behalf of himself, I 

& O Publishing Co., and Neo-Tech Research Writing Center, the Court informed Windom that per 

Local Rule 3-9(b) a corporation, unincorporated association, partnership or other such entity 

needed to appear through a licensed attorney. Id. at 5. 

On May 30, 2019, Windom filed his revised complaint. Am. Compl. In it, Windom 

alleges the following specific paragraph against more than 60 Defendants on his own behalf by 

repeating it over and over for 25 pages:

1st amendment right to freedom of belief, conscience and religion 

[name of defendant] is neocheating and using its underlying tools of 

mysticism to usurp values from my value producing efforts to society. 

Im [sic] harmed because mysticism is a disease to my consciousness. 

Each unit of mysticism blocks further progressive integrations needed 

to preserve, expand, and create values. Im [sic] also harmed because 

I remain ensconced stagnantly in the political hoax based on 

mysticism. It is against my religion of Neo-Tech to accept any forms 

of mysticism personal, social, business, or political levels on a local, 

national, and world level.

Id. at 17-41. 

III. SUA SPONTE SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)

A. Legal Standard

A court is under a continuing duty to dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing 

fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the court dismisses a case pursuant to 

Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same complaint by paying the filing fee. This 

is because the court’s section 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is not on the merits, but rather an exercise of 

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the court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

To make the determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether there is 

an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin 

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Courts have the authority to 

dismiss complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Id. at 1228. A court can also dismiss a complaint where it is based solely on 

conclusory statements, naked assertions without any factual basis, or allegations that are not 

plausible on their face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); see also Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than 

those drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), a complaint, or 

portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to set forth “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

554 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] district court should not dismiss a pro 

se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of 

the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quotations omitted).

Judges may “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a dismiss 

a claim whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 

(1989). “Although an IFP complaint may not be dismissed simply because the court finds the 

plaintiff’s allegations unlikely, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts 

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Allen v. Chapel by the Sea, No. 

C18-0026JLR, 2018 WL 488945, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2018). For example, the court may 

dismiss “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 

32 (1992).

B. Analysis

The crux of Windom’s allegations is that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights 

by using “mysticism” to “usurp” his “value producing efforts to society” and keep him “ensconced 

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in the political hoax.” He argues this is the case because “[t]hose destructive individuals are 

entangled into a fully integrated honesty (Neo-Tech) ostracism matrix, capable of intemizing the 

net destructiveness of each individual value producer.” Am. Compl. at 15. Further, Windom 

argues that Defendants have been indicted and “put into the fully integrated honesty ostracism 

matrix” thus making them “liable for justice throught [sic] fully integrated honesty.” Id. at 16. 

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the complaint set forth a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(d)(1) 

requires that each allegation in a pleading be “simple, concise, and direct.” See McHenry v. 

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint that was 

“argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”). In addition, the 

complaint must include facts which are “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

554, 555 (2007). For instance, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court rejected conclusory 

assertions that “petitioners ‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject 

[him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on the account of [his] 

religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’” 556 U.S. 662, 

680 (2009). The Court reasoned that such allegations were akin to the “formulaic recitation of the 

elements” dismissed in Twombly, and therefore, insufficient to meet Rule 8(a). Id. In doing so, 

the Court explained, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. at 678.

Here, Windom’s amended complaint is a confusing string of allegations that are a far cry 

from a short and plain statement of a claim. A putative defendant would not know where to begin 

in responding, and there is nothing in these allegations that comes close to stating a claim. 

Windom’s pro se status does not relieve him of conformity to the pleading rules. See, e.g., 

Romano v. U.S. Army Core of Eng’rs, 2017 WL 6448221, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2017). The 

allegations are vague, and the amended complaint lacks sufficient facts to establish a plausible 

claim for relief. Windom’s claims for holding Defendants accountable “for their net destructions 

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inflicted upon value producers and society” because they are now within the “fully integrated 

honesty ostracism matrix” are not only lacking facial plausibility but are also frivolous. Although 

repeatedly stating Defendants are violating his First Amendment rights, he does not state a valid 

claim for the violation of any provision of the Constitution and does not allege that he individually 

suffered any injury other than his conclusory allegation that various individuals violated his right 

to freedom of belief, conscience, and religion by “Neocheating” and inflicting him with 

“mysticism” which he considers to be a disease to his “consciousness. Am. Compl. at 17. 

The Court has already given Windom leave to amend, and his amended complaint remains 

just as distant from stating a claim as his original complaint was. Therefore, the undersigned 

concludes that the amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because its defects 

cannot be cured with a further amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

As Defendants have not yet consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Clerk of Court shall REASSIGN this case to a District 

Judge, with the recommendation that Windom’s amended complaint be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, any party may serve and file objections to 

this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Dated: June 6, 2019

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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