Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01656/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01656-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

Uilited States Conn of Appeals 

P U B L I S H Tenth Circuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL l 2 1989 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GEORGE W. FLOROM, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ELLIOTT MANUFACTURING, a ) 

Nebraska Corporation, and ) 

ELLIOTT EQUIPMENT CORPORATION ) 

a Nebraska Corporation, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 86-1656 

ROBERT L. IfOECKER 

Clerk 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 83-JM-2187) 

James A. Cederberg, Bragg & Dubofsky, P.C., Denver, Colorado (John 

W. Hornbeck, Bragg & Dubofsky, P.C., Denver, Colorado was also on 

the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant 

John M. Lebsack, White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado (John M. 

Palmeri, White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado was also on the 

brief) for Defendants-Appellees 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, 

District Judge* 

PER CURIAM 

OPINION ON REHEARING 

* The Honorable David L. Russell, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern, Northern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-1656 Document: 01019569281 Date Filed: 07/12/1989 Page: 1 
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing of 

defendant-appellee Elliott Equipment Corporation (New Elliott) 

requesting that the court withdraw and revise its opinion with 

regard to the duty to warn issue, a response we ordered, and a 

reply thereto, the petition is denied. 1 

New Elliott argues that the duty to warn theory is based 

solely on negligence principles and does not arise from strict 

liability under § 402(A) of the Restatement(Second) of Torts. The 

plaintiff George w. Florom (Florom) pled and relies upon both 

negligence and strict liability theories. The Colorado law does 

not bar relief under strict liability principles for breach of a 

duty to warn. Anderson v. Heron Engineering Company, 604 P.2d 

674, 676-679 (Colo. 1979); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 

283-284 (Colo. 1978); Hiigel v. General Motors Corporation, 544 

P.2d 983, 987-988 (Colo. 1976); _D_o_w_n_i_n~g~_v_·~~O_v_e_r_h_e_a_d~~D_o_o~r 

Corporation, 707 P.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (Colo. App. 1985); Hamilton 

v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106-1108, 1110 (Colo. App. 1976). 

According to New Elliott, a duty to warn under strict 

liability "would apply against New Elliott only if it is found to 

have agreed to assume liabilities of Old Elliott and, therefore, 

legally becomes the successor of Old Elliott." Appellee's Reply 

at 2. We disagree. The duty to warn is an independent duty not 

determined by the contractual agreement between the predecessorseller and successor-buyer corporations. L.R. Furner, M.I. 

1 

As noted in our prior opinion, 867 F.2d at 572, Chief Judge 

Finesilver granted a summary judgment for Elliott Manufacturing 

Co. (Old Elliott). He also granted summary judgment for Elliott 

Equipment Co. (New Elliott) in a separate order, 629 F. Supp. 

1145, which was appealed. 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-1656 Document: 01019569281 Date Filed: 07/12/1989 Page: 2 
Friedman, Products Liability, § 2.06[5] (1988). 

arise despite "the nature of the transfer." Id. 

The duty may 

This case involves a situation where a corporation like New 

Elliott, which purchased only the assets and not the stock of the 

predecessor, may establish a special or 

with the predecessor's customers. Id. 

continuing relationship 

If such a relationship 

exists, it may impose a duty to warn and "[t]his rule has been 

adopted by a number of courts which otherwise adhere to the 

traditional rule of nonliability for successor corporations." 

Id.; see Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441-442 (7th 

Cir. 1977), on remand, 480 F. Supp. 286, 289-290 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 

While our opinion in this case recognized the traditional rule of 

nonliability of successor corporations, we held that the 

relationship between Florom's employer and New Elliott raised a 

genuine issue of material fact as to a duty to warn and breach of 

the duty. Florom v. Elliott Manufacturing, 867 F.2d 570, 576-577 

(10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff argues that New Elliott purchased Old 

Elliott's assets and thereafter established a continuing 

relationship with Florom's employer while servicing the machine 

involved in Florom's injuries. From this relationship, Florom 

argues that a duty to warn arose. This genuine issue of material 

fact precludes summary judgment on this claim. Under the 

principles set forth above, and the Colorado Supreme Court's 

express recognition that recovery for breach of a duty to warn may 

be had on strict liability principles, see Hiigel, 544 P.2d at 

987, we held that there is a genuine issue of material fact on the 

duty to warn claim here. Florom, 867 F.2d at 576-577. The 

petition for rehearing has not convinced us that we should revise 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-1656 Document: 01019569281 Date Filed: 07/12/1989 Page: 3 
our opinion and require that any duty to warn claim be based 

( solely on negligence principles. 

Moreover, under Rule 18, Fed. R. Civ. P., "A defendant cannot 

compel a plaintiff to choose. at his peril the theory upon which he 

intends to rely and thereby possibly defeat a recovery where two 

consistent, concurrent or cumulative theories can be urged without 

prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend." Senter v. B.F. 

Goodrich Company, 127 F. Supp. 705, 707-708 (D. Colo. 1954); see 

also Rule 318(a), Colorado Rules of County Court Civil Procedure 

(1970) (adopting Federal Rule 18 on joinder of independent or 

alternate claims); Furner, Products Liability§ 16.02[1] at 16-111, 

16-112 (doctrine of election remedies has no place in products 

liability area as plaintiff should be allowed to submit to the 

jury all claims on which there is sufficient evidence). There is 

no evidence of prejudice here. On remand, the plaintiff may 

pursue duty to warn claims under both negligence and strict 

liability in tort theories. 

Appellee's petition for rehearing is DENIED. 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-1656 Document: 01019569281 Date Filed: 07/12/1989 Page: 4