Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_12-cv-04032/USCOURTS-alnd-4_12-cv-04032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

DERRICK MCCORMICK, }

 }

Plaintiff, }

 } CASE NO. 4:12-CV-4032-SLB

v. }

 }

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, } 1

Commissioner, Social }

Security Administration, }

 }

Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is currently before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Pursuant to

Sentence 6. (Doc. 12.) Upon review of the record, the submissions of the parties, and the

relevant law, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff’s Motion is due to be denied. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. McCormick initially filed an application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI

on July 27, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of December 8, 2008, (doc. 5-6 at 2; r. 129),

 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on 1

February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted for Commissioner

Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this suit: “Any action instituted in accordance with

this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the

office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”

FILED

 2014 Mar-10 PM 02:55

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:12-cv-04032-SLB Document 18 Filed 03/10/14 Page 1 of 6
due to “Bipolar; possible PTSD,” (doc. 5-7 at 6; r. 178). After the Social Security 2

Administration [“SSA”] denied his application, he requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”], which was held on March 4, 2011. (Doc. 5-3 at 27; r.

26.) After the hearing, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or a

combination or impairments listed in, or medically equivalent to one listed in, the Listings

of Impairments. (Doc. 5-3 at 30; r. 29); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ also found that

plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities at all

levels of exertion, with certain restrictions unrelated to exertion, (doc. 5-3 at 31; r. 30), and

that he was “capable of performing [his] past relevant work as a shipping and receiving

weigher,” (doc. 5-3 at 34; r. 33). In light of these findings, the ALJ found that Mr.

McCormick was not disabled from December 8, 2008 through the date of the decision,

March 21, 2011, and denied his request for a period of disability, SSI, and DIB. (Id.)

Plaintiff then requested the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 5-3

at 22; r. 21.) The Appeals Council found no reason under its rules to review the ALJ’s

decision, and denied his request for review. (Doc. 5-3 at 8; r. 7.) Therefore, the ALJ’s

decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.)

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to 2

each document as it is filed in the court’s record. When the document cited is duplicated

in the bound physical copy of the transcript of the entire record of the proceedings, the

page number of that transcript is also included, [“Doc. ___; r ___.”].

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Case 4:12-cv-04032-SLB Document 18 Filed 03/10/14 Page 2 of 6
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand Pursuant to Sentence 6, attaching certain treatment

notes and a medical opinion dated subsequent to the date through which the ALJ determined

that plaintiff was not disabled. (Doc. 12 and exhibits.) Later, plaintiff filed a Nov. 21, 2013

order from the Appeals Council as additional support for his Motion to Remand. (Doc. 15

and exhibits.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Section 405(g) permits a district court to remand an application for benefits to the

Commissioner . . . by two methods, which are commonly denominated ‘sentence four

remands’ and ‘sentence six remands,’ each of which remedies a separate problem.” Ingram

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

“The sixth sentence of section 405(g) provides a federal court the power to remand the

application for benefits to the Commissioner for the taking of additional evidence upon a

showing ‘that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the

failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.’” Ingram, 496

F.3d at 1261 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). “[A] sentence six remand is appropriate only

when the claimant submits evidence for the first time to the district court that might have

changed the outcome of the administrative proceeding.” Timmons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

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Case 4:12-cv-04032-SLB Document 18 Filed 03/10/14 Page 3 of 6
522 F. App’x 897, 902 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1267-68). “New evidence

is material, and thus warrants a remand, if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the new

evidence would change the administrative outcome.’” Id. at 902-903 (citing Hyde v. Bowen,

823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987)).

DISCUSSION

Defendant is correct that only one treatment note from C.E.D. Mental Health Center

dates to before the date of the decision. (See doc. 13 at 7.) “If new and material evidence is

submitted, the Appeals Council shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates

to the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing decision.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.970(b); see also § 416.1470(b). The treatment records after March 21, 2011 do

not relate to the relevant time period and thus are not appropriate for consideration on

remand. The treatment record dated February 24, 2011, does not contain any new material

information. (Doc. 12-2 at 1.) Therefore, it does not warrant remand under sentence 6. 

The medical opinion from Dr. Schosheim, (doc. 12-1), does not merit consideration

on remand for three reasons: 

(1) It is cumulative with the other medical records that diagnose plaintiff with bipolar

disorder. This unhelpful cumulativeness is readily apparent since Dr. Schosheim is not an

examining physician—he relied on plaintiff’s treatment notes that were already in the record

presented to the ALJ.

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Case 4:12-cv-04032-SLB Document 18 Filed 03/10/14 Page 4 of 6
(2) To the extent that the opinion purportsto assert that plaintiff’s alleged impairments

meet a listing, it has invaded the province of the ALJ and is not afforded any special weight.

See Kelly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 401 F. App’x 403, 407 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d); § 416.927(d)) (“A doctor’s opinion on a dispositive issue reserved for the

Commissioner, such as whether the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work,’ is not

considered a medical opinion and is not given any special significance . . . but will be taken

into consideration.”). Especially considering the fact that Dr. Schosheim is not an examining

physician, it is not reasonably probable that evidence of this nature would cause the ALJ to

reach a different decision. See Timmons, 522 F. App’x at 902-903 (citing Hyde v. Bowen, 823

F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987)).

(3) Plaintiff has not shown good cause for why he could not have obtained and

submitted Dr. Schosheim’s statement to the ALJ earlier. Plaintiff argues that “[g]ood cause

exists because the evidence did not exist and the ALJ failed to develop the Record and

former counsel failed to develop the Record.” (Doc. 12 at 4.) The court is not impressed with

such “cause.” True, Dr. Schosheim’s opinion did not exist at the time of the hearing (likely

because plaintiff’s counsel had not yet thought to retain Dr. Schosheim: the medical

interrogatory Dr. Schosheim filled out lists plaintiff’s alleged onset date as March 22,

2011—the day after the ALJ signed his opinion, (doc. 12-1 at 1)). But the evidence upon

which Dr. Schosheim relies existed, and the record at the time of the hearing was apparently

developed well enough for Dr. Schosheimto review it—not the claimant—and conclude that

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Case 4:12-cv-04032-SLB Document 18 Filed 03/10/14 Page 5 of 6
plaintiff met a listing. This is an attempt to “seek after-acquired evidence, and then use such

evidence as an unsanctioned backdoor means of appeal.” Milano v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 763,

767 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The order from the Appeals Council also does not warrant remand. The order directs

the ALJ in plaintiff’s second claim for disability to consider opinion evidence from a July 20,

2011 examination of plaintiff. (Doc. 15-1 at 2.) This examination was subsequent to the

ALJ’s opinion in plaintiff’s disability claim currently before this court. (See doc. 5-3 at 35;

r. 34.) The Appeals Counsel remanded because the ALJ in plaintiff’s second claimfound that

plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, but did not adequately address the opinion

that plaintiff had a severe affective disorder. (Doc. 15-1 at 2.) In the claim currently before

this court, the ALJ found that plaintiff had a severe impairment of mood disorder and

adequately addressed all opinion evidence available. The order is thus irrelevant.

CONCLUSION

The court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion To Remand Pursuant To Sentence 6, (doc. 12),

is due to be denied. An Order denying the motion will be entered contemporaneously with

this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE this 10th day of March, 2014.

 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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