Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_08-cv-00219/USCOURTS-ared-2_08-cv-00219-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HELENA DIVISION

SHARON Y. SANDERS PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 2:08CV00219 JLH

LEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1;

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LEE

COUNTY, ARKANSAS; ELIZABETH

JOHNSON, individually and as President and 

Member of the Board of Education of Lee

County, Arkansas; MILTON HALL, individually;

LEE HALL, as Member of the Board of Education

of Lee County, Arkansas; VICTORY PERRY,

individually and as Member of the Board of 

Education of Lee County, Arkansas; and

PEARLTHE COLLINS, individually and as

Member of the Board of Education of 

Lee County, Arkansas DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Sharon Sanders commenced this action against Lee County School District No. 1; the Lee

County Board of Education; Milton Hall, individually; and Elizabeth Johnson, Lee Hall, Victory

Perry, and Pearlthe Collins in their respective individual and official capacities. Sanders claims that

she was discriminated against because of her race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII.

The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Sanders has responded, and the

defendants have replied. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted

in part and denied in part.

I.

A court should enter summary judgment when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

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2

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV. P. 56(c); see also Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When

a nonmoving party cannot make an adequate showing on a necessary element of the case on which

that party bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The

moving party bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. If the moving party meets this burden,

“the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348,

1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). A genuine issue for trial exists only

if there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all inferences in his favor,

mindful that summary judgment seldom should be granted in discrimination cases where claims are

often based on inferences. Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005); Bassett v.

City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). But see Bainbridge v.

Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2004) (Arnold, J., dissenting).

II.

In August 2000 Sanders, a Caucasian, was hired as the Finance Coordinator for the Lee

County School District No. 1 in Arkansas. She reported directly to the Superintendent and was a

member of the management team. Her duties included supervising the School District’s finances

and finance personnel. As a classified position, Sanders’s contract had to be renewed annually.

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The defendants allege that Sanders initially tendered her letter of resignation because she

no longer wished to make personal presentations at Board meetings, and that she withdrew her

resignation only after Thompson agreed to do away with that requirement.

2

At that time, the racial composition of the Board was four Caucasians and three African

Americans.

3

On January 4, 2007, Sanders submitted a letter of resignation to School District

Superintendent Wayne Thompson, a Caucasian, to be effective March 1, 2007. Her letter stated that

she was resigning due to health issues. 

On or around February 20, 2007, Sanders withdrew her letter of resignation. At a Board of

Education meeting that same day,1

 Thompson recommended that the Finance Coordinator and Food

Service Coordinator—then Doris Lewellen, an African American—no longer be required to present

their respective reports to the Board in person. Previously, those positions had been required to

make reports at the Board’s monthly meetings. Sanders says that the African American Board

members, especially Elizabeth Johnson, regularly subjected her to openly hostile attitudes and

treatment at the Board’s meetings. Thompson informed the members that he and Sanders would be

available to answer questions about the financial report. He said that the purpose of the change was

to make Board meetings more efficient. The Board adopted Thompson’s recommendation by a

majority vote, with all three African American members opposed.2

Milton Hall, an African American, was elected to the Board in September 2007, changing

the racial composition to majority African American. At the Board’s October 23, 2007 meeting,

Johnson recommended changing the format of the financial report so that the Board could have

something they could understand. After formally moving for the change, Thompson asked the Board

to give him and Sanders time to study the format, and Collins thought it prudent to allow Thompson

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and Sanders time to review Johnson’s sample format. Johnson then withdrew her motion. A motion

to allow Thompson and Sanders to review the proposal and to reconsider the issue later passed, with

only Johnson opposed. Thompson and Sanders addressed the formatting concerns at the Board’s

special financial retreat on November 15, 2007.

At the close of the Board’s November 20, 2007 regular meeting, Hall made a series of

motions, each seconded by Johnson. Hall recommended reassigning Superintendent Thompson to

Assistant Superintendent of Maintenance and Transportation, effective immediately. Hall said

Thompson would maintain his current pay, and that it was nothing personal. The motion passed,

with only the four African American members voting in favor. Johnson then told Thompson that

he would receive a job description within the next fifteen days. 

Next, Hall recommended that Sharon Sanders be reassigned to “Food Service Assistant,” a

position that previously had not existed, effective immediately. Hall said Sanders would maintain

her current pay. Again, the motion passed with only the four African American members voting in

favor. The minutes reflect no discussion of the School District’s policy manual, Sanders’s previous

job performance, or any substantive reason whatsoever for the reassignment. 

Finally, Hall moved to appoint Clyde Noel as Interim Superintendent. And again the motion

passed with only the four African American members voting in favor. Noel had been a physical

education instructor before being appointed Interim Superintendent. Johnson announced a special

meeting to take place on November 26, and the Board meeting was adjourned immediately

thereafter. 

The next day, on November 21, 2007, Johnson sent Sanders a letter informing her of the

Board’s decision:

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On last night [sic] the Lee County Board of Education voted to reassign you to the

position of Assistant Food Service Coordinator at the same salary. This letter is to

inform you that the action of the Lee County School Board should take effect

immediately. The board is requesting you to remove all personal items from your

office and return your keys to Mrs. Elizabeth Johnson by 5:00 p.m., Monday,

November 26, 2007.

The day after receiving Johnson’s letter, Sanders sought and received sick leave under the Family

and Medical Leave Act. Nearly one year later, on September 2, 2008, Sanders submitted a letter of

resignation, stating only: “Please accept this letter as notice that I resign my position with the Lee

County School District effective immediately.” Sanders was apparently on FMLA sick leave from

the time she learned of her reassignment until she resigned. 

Sanders filed an EEOC charge on December 14, 2007, a little more than one month after

being reassigned. After an investigation, she received a letter dated March 8, 2008, from the EEOC

investigator stating that the evidence did not substantiate her allegations; she received a notice of suit

rights on August 4, 2008. In her complaint, filed on October 31, 2008, Sanders makes claims for

race discrimination and a hostile work environment. She alleges that the Board subjected her to an

adverse employment action (reassignment from Finance Coordinator to Assistant Food Service

Coordinator) because of her race (Caucasian). Sanders also alleges that, between the November 20,

2007 meeting and her September 2, 2008 resignation, she was subjected to adverse actions,

intimidation, and harassment. She says that on one occasion she was removed from the payroll for

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3

In an April 2008 Board meeting, Noel recommended that the position of Assistant Food

Service Coordinator be eliminated. The minutes do not reflect a reason for the recommendation. 

The minutes only state that Collins seconded the motion after a brief discussion. Hall, Perry, and

Johnson voted in favor, but the motion failed when Collins withdrew her second after another

brief discussion. 

4

In June 2008, Noel, in his capacity as Interim Superintendent, sent two letters to Sanders

asking for updates on her physical condition. The first letter, dated June 3, read:

Due to your extensive use of sick leave, it has become necessary to request

additional information pertaining to your illness and your ability to return to

employment with the Lee County School District.

The District will comply with the provisions of the rules and regulations as

afforded by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. I am invoking the

provision requiring you to provide additional medical certification supporting

your continuous leave from the district. Please make available two additional

opinions to support your cause, at district’s expense, and a fitness for duty report

stating your limitations upon returning to work.

Having received no response, on June 17 Noel sent Sanders a second letter, which is exactly the

same as the first, but with this postscript: “Please respond to this original request within five (5)

days.”

6

no reason; that the Board tried to eliminate her position3; and that Noel sent her harassing letters.4

III.

The defendants move for summary judgment on Sanders’s race discrimination and hostile

work environment claims. They also argue that the individual defendants are shielded by qualified

immunity.

A. RACE DISCRIMINATION

In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants assert that Sanders’s race

discrimination claim fails because she cannot make out a prima facie case. The Court employs the

McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework under both § 1983 and Title VII claims. Under that

analysis, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that:

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(1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate job

expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees

outside the protected class were treated differently. Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th

Cir. 2005). Instead of showing that other similarly situated employees were treated differently, a

plaintiff may also satisfy the fourth element by showing that there are facts permitting an inference

of discrimination. Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 361 F.3d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Id. If the employer articulates such a reason,

the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is mere pretext for

discrimination. Id.

The defendants concede that Sanders is a member of a protected class. They contest,

however, whether Sanders has established the other three elements of her prima facie case. First,

the defendants argue that Sanders was not meeting the School District’s legitimate job expectations

because she failed on multiple occasions to provide the School Board with information it rightfully

requested. The defendants do not explain exactly what information Sanders failed to provide to the

School Board. Based on the defendants’ statement of facts, it appears that they are referring to two

issues: that in February 2007 the Board (then majority Caucasian) changed the reporting procedures

so that neither Sanders nor Lewellen would have to make their reports to the Board in person, and

that in October 2007 the Board (then majority African American) voted to allow Thompson and

Sanders to study Johnson’s proposed changes to the formatting of the financial report. On the first

issue, there are no facts showing that either Thompson or Sanders withheld financial information

from the Board after February 2007. The Board approved the change in reporting procedures for

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both Sanders and Lewellen; Sanders did not unilaterally decide to stop appearing. On the second,

Johnson admitted in deposition testimony that at the Board’s financial retreat a few weeks later,

Sanders discussed the proposed formatting changes with the Board. The Court has reviewed

Sanders’s annual performance evaluations from 2002-2007. Under every area of review, Sanders

was rated as “satisfactory,” “excellent,” or “outstanding.” Her most recent performance evaluation

described her accomplishments as: “Excellent: Perfect audits for the last 6 years (no findings).”

There is at least a fact issue as to whether Sanders was meeting the School District’s legitimate job

expectations as Finance Coordinator.

Second, the defendants contend that Sanders did not suffer an adverse employment action,

arguing that a purely lateral transfer or reassignment cannot be materially adverse. The defendants

say that Sanders “suffered no diminution in title, position, salary, job responsibilities, benefits, hours,

or other material terms or conditions.” The defendants’ brief repeatedly states that Sanders was

reassigned to “Assistant Finance Coordinator,” but that is not the evidence. The minutes of the

Board meeting in which she was reassigned, Johnson’s letter to Sanders, the job description sent in

response to a discovery request, and Sanders’s unexecuted employment contract for 2008-2009,

show that the Board reassigned Sanders to the position of “Food Service Assistant” or “Assistant

Food Services Coordinator.” A purely lateral transfer with no reduction in pay or benefits cannot

constitute an adverse employment action, Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir.

1997), but a reassignment resulting in demotion in title and significantly diminished responsibilities

can be considered adverse. See Turner v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 688, 697 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding there

was a genuine issue of material fact where the work to which plaintiff was reassigned was “a

considerable downward shift from her responsibilities” in her previous position); Meyers v. Neb.

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5

In their reply brief, the defendants state that Sanders is “ask[ing] the Court to infer

similarity,” and they go on to argue that Sanders made no attempt to demonstrate similarity

between her and Lewellen. That is an inaccurate characterization of Sanders’s argument. She is

not asking that the Court infer similarity between her and Lewellen. Rather, she abandons

altogether the notion that there are similarly situated employees, and instead argues that other

9

Health and Human Services, 324 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that there was a genuine

issue of material fact where there was “a considerable downward shift in skill level required to

perform [the plaintiff’s] new job responsibilities”). Although Sanders’s salary and benefits may have

remained the same, she went from being the Finance Coordinator to being the Food Service

Assistant, a position which previously did not exist. A reasonable jury could find that her duties as

the Food Service Assistant were a considerable downward departure from her Finance Coordinator

responsibilities, which included managing personnel and the finances of the entire School District.

Finally, the defendants argue that Sanders has not identified a similarly situated African

American who was treated more favorably. A plaintiff can satisfy the fourth element of her prima

facie case by showing that she was treated differently than other employees who were “similarly

situated in all relevant respects.” Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir.

2001). However, the elements of a prima facie case vary with the circumstances of the alleged

discrimination. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff can

also satisfy the fourth element by showing that there are facts permitting an inference of

discrimination. Cherry, 361 F.3d at 478. 

Sanders concedes that there were no other employees in the School District who were

similarly situated in all relevant respects, since no other employees held “Coordinator” positions with

the same level of responsibility as Sanders. She argues, however, that the Court should follow

Cherry and evaluate whether there are facts permitting an inference of discrimination.5

 

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evidence is sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, which also may satisfy the fourth

element of her prima facie case.

6

The defendants assert that part of the reason for her reassignment was that she failed to

provide the Board with reports and information as requested. However, there is simply no

evidence that Sanders deprived the Board of requested information and reports. All the evidence

shows is that on one occasion Thompson requested that the Board give him and Sanders time to

review Johnson’s proposed changes to the formatting of the financial reports. The Board, then

majority African American, approved giving them time to review Johnson’s proposal—and

Sanders reported on the formatting proposal and other financial issues at the Board’s special

financial retreat a few weeks later.

10

The facts surrounding Sanders’s reassignment are these: In September 2007 the racial

composition of the School Board changed to majority African American. Hall, the newly elected

African American Board member who had little exposure to the seven-year body of Sanders’s work,

made a series of motions at the end of the November 2007 meeting. Each of Hall’s motions was

seconded by Johnson, whose issues with Sanders’s work performance are in dispute. As a result of

those motions, Superintendent Thompson, a Caucasian, was replaced by Interim Superintendent

Noel, an African American who previously had been a physical education instructor. Sanders was

reassigned from Finance Coordinator—a position she had held for seven years with satisfactory or

excellent reviews and results—to Food Service Assistant, a position that did not previously exist.

 Each of Hall’s motions were passed along racial lines, with the four African Americans voting in

favor, and the three Caucasians opposed. There is no evidence that Sanders’s reassignment was

based on an examination of or faults in her job performance. Indeed, there does not appear to be any

evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Sanders’s reassignment.6

 Although the Board

promised to send her a job description, she never received one, nor did she receive a written contract

for the position as in years past. Not until Sanders made discovery requests in this lawsuit did the

defendants produce a job description and an unexecuted contract. According to the language of the

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contract, the Board voted on it at their April 15, 2008 meeting, but the minutes of that meeting reflect

no such vote. Rather, that was the meeting in which a motion to eliminate Sanders’s position failed

only after one member withdrew her seconding of the motion. 

Where there is proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence, the fact finder

can infer that the employer is attempting to cover up its real, discriminatory motive. Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-09, 147 L. Ed. 2d

105 (2000). Suspicious timing of or ambiguous statements about the adverse employment action

may also support an inference of discriminatory motive. See Farr v. St. Francis Hosp. and Health

Centers, 570 F.3d 829, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2009). There are fact issues as to the reason for the Board’s

reassignment of Sanders. The Court concludes that a reasonable jury could infer from facts

surrounding her reassignment that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against Sanders.

Because Sanders has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action. Cherry, 361 F.3d at 478. As a reason for Sanders’s

reassignment, the defendants state only that she failed to provide the Board with information on the

School District’s finances. However, that statement is unsupported by the evidence, and even by the

deposition testimony of Johnson and Collins. Without some evidence—whether it be concerns

expressed in minutes of a Board meeting, an audit, a missed deadline, an explicit refusal to provide

the Board with information, or something similar—the defendants cannot meet their burden of

demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Sanders’s reassignment. Not only is there

no evidence to support the stated reason, but, as the Court has already discussed, there is evidence

that contradicts the defendants’ stated reason. Therefore, even if the defendants carried their burden,

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whether the defendants’ stated reason is pretext for discrimination remains an issue of fact. 

B. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

The defendants also move for summary judgment on Sanders’s hostile work environment

claim under § 1983 and Title VII. To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment,

a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) the occurrence of

unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus between the harassment and her membership in the

protected group; (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and

(5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and

effective remedial action. Vajdl v. Mesabi Academy of KidsPeace, Inc., 484 F.3d 546, 550 (8th Cir.

2007). 

Sanders, a Caucasian, was a member of a protected group for purposes of Title VII. The

other elements of her hostile work environment claim are in dispute. The defendants argue that

Sanders’s only evidence on her claim is the Board’s request for financial information that Sanders

refused to produce. Sanders responds that the totality of the circumstances satisfy the remaining four

elements, and that there were multiple instances of harassment beyond just the Board’s request for

financial information.

Sanders bases her hostile work environment claim on the following factual allegations. Until

February 2007, she had to make in person financial reports at Board meetings. Prior to that, she was

subjected to hostile attitudes from the African American Board members. In November 2007,

shortly after they gained a majority vote, the African American Board members reassigned her from

Finance Coordinator to Food Service Assistant, without notice or explanation. She was never sent

a job description or contract. Shortly thereafter, she went on FMLA approved sick leave. In April

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Up to that time, Sanders had been providing on a routine basis a doctor’s note in which

her physician recommended that she needed additional leave time from work. 

13

2008, a motion to eliminate her position received support from three of the four African American

Board members and failed only after the fourth withdrew her seconding of the motion. In June 2008,

Noel sent her two letters demanding that she provide additional evidence of her physical condition,

including two additional medical opinions and a fitness for duty report.7

 On at least one occasion,

she was removed from the payroll without explanation. 

To affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, the harassment must be “sufficiently

pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682

F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). Conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in terms and

conditions of employment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. In determining whether

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive, a district court must consider all the circumstances,

including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee’s work performance.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88, 118 S.

Ct. 2275, 2283, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998).

In Bradley v. Widnall, 232 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff claimed she was

discriminated against because of her race, African American, resulting in a hostile work

environment. The plaintiff alleged that her supervisory duties were curtailed, and that she was left

out of the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, and subjected to false complaints.

Although the defendants’ conduct may have created a “frustrating work situation,” the Eighth Circuit

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held that it was not “so severe or pervasive as to have affected a term, condition, or privilege of her

employment.” Bradley, 232 F.3d at 631-32. In Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections, 423 F.3d 886

(8th Cir. 2005), an African American plaintiff had information that some workers and managers had

used a racial slur when referring to him. The Eighth Circuit held that although racial epithets are

morally repulsive, a plaintiff must show more than a few occurrences over a course of years.

Singletary, 423 F.3d at 893 (“To be actionable, such conduct must be shown to occur with such

frequency that the very conditions of employment are altered and be viewed by a reasonable person

as hostile.”); see also Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir. 2004)

(finding that racial slurs directed toward the Asian plaintiff once a month for two years was

insufficient to render the workplace objectively hostile).

Even presuming that the instances of harassment were based on Sanders’s race, the conduct

complained of in this case is not as severe as the conduct alleged in Bradley, Singletary, and

Bainbridge, in which the conduct did not create an objectively hostile work environment. The

circumstances surrounding Sander’s reassignment in November 2007 are sufficient to create an issue

of fact as to whether she was demoted because of her race. However, the alleged instances of racial

harassment from 2007-2008, even including her reassignment in November 2007, are not sufficiently

frequent or severe to constitute an objectively hostile working environment. 

Sanders says only that she was subjected to hostile attitudes by the African American Board

members prior to February 2007, but there are no allegations that the African American Board

members made any racially derogatory remarks towards her. More than one year later, three African

American Board members attempted to eliminate her position, but that motion failed. That she was

removed from the payroll on one occasion does not evidence a pattern of attempted intimidation or

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discrimination. Finally, the letters from Noel in June 2008 regarding her FMLA leave make no

racial remarks and were sent only after Sanders had been on FMLA leave for about six months. The

several instances of alleged harassment occurred over the span of at least sixteen months, meaning

that they did not occur with any great frequency. The conduct also lacked severity and was not

physically threatening. There is also nothing to indicate that the harassment interfered with

Sanders’s work performance, either before or after she went on FMLA leave. Faragher, 524 U.S.

at 787-88, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (totality of the circumstances includes the “frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance”).

All of these occurrences may have created a frustrating work situation for Sanders, Bradley, 232 F.3d

at 631-32, but they are not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create a hostile work

environment. 

C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Finally, the individual defendants assert that they are shielded by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under § 1983 if their

conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002)). The individual defendants

argue that they were not on notice that requiring Sanders to respond to requests for financial

information violated any law. They say that Thompson prevented the Board from direct access to

the information by changing the requirement that Sanders give her reports in person.

There are several problems with the individual defendants’ argument. First, both Sanders

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and Lewellen, an African American, were dispensed from the requirement of having to provide inperson reports. Second, Thompson did not make the decision himself—a majority of the Board,

albeit at that time a Caucasian majority, approved the change. Third, as the Court has already

discussed, there is no evidence that the Board members were actually deprived of any of the financial

information that they sought. Johnson and Collins admitted as much in deposition testimony, and

none of the minutes of Board meetings indicate that Sanders failed to provide the Board with

requested information. 

Sanders’s race discrimination and hostile work environment claims are not premised solely,

or really even partly, on the Board’s requests for financial information. The Court has discussed at

length the factual allegations and evidence that support Sanders’s claims. She has established a

prima facie case for both race discrimination and hostile work environment. There is a clearly

established statutory and constitutional right to be free from acts of race discrimination and a hostile

work environment. A reasonable person would have known of that clearly established right. The

individual defendants, as elected members of the School Board, certainly knew of that right.

Therefore, the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Herts v. Smith, 345

F.3d 581, 588 (8th Cir. 2003) (where plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination, “there

is no question that intentionally discriminatory actions on the part of governmental officials would

not be entitled to qualified immunity”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion for summary judgment on Sanders’s claim for hostile

work environment is GRANTED; the motion for summary judgment on Sanders’s race

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17

discrimination claim is DENIED. Document #23. Sanders has also filed a motion to strike certain

arguments in the defendants’ reply brief. Those arguments were not necessary for the resolution of

the motion for summary judgment, and the Court has neither relied on nor addressed them in this

opinion. Therefore, the motion to strike is DENIED as moot. Document #43.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2010.

 

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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