Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00638/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00638-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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 The parties waived a hearing on the motion. See Docket Nos. 22, 24.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK G. MELLON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-06-0638 EMC

ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

(Docket No. 18)

William Kuntz, counsel for Plaintiff Mark Mellon, seeks an award of attorney’s fees of

$3,962.25. No opposition or response to the motion was filed by Mr. Mellon himself. Defendant

the Commissioner of Social Security filed a response that purportedly takes no position as to

whether the requested fee is reasonable but notes certain factors for the Court’s consideration. 

Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, including the supplemental

brief filed by Mr. Kuntz as requested by the Court, the Court hereby GRANTS Mr. Kuntz’s motion

for fees.1

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Kuntz represented Mr. Mellon in the instant action, in which Mr. Mellon sought review

of an adverse decision by the Commissioner. Previously, Mr. Mellon had signed a contingency fee

agreement with Mr. Kuntz pursuant to which Mr. Kuntz would receive 25% of all past-due benefits

recovered. See Kuntz Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 (agreement, dated June 20, 2001) (“Client agrees that . . . if

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2

 Section 1383(d)(2) only applies, however, to favorable judgments obtained after the effective

date of the statute, which was February 28, 2005. See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L.

No. 108-203, § 302(c), 118 Stat. 493 (2004) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply with

respect to fees for representation of claimants which are first required to be paid . . . on or after [the

effective date].”). Here, there is no dispute that a favorable judgment was obtained after this date.

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a Federal Court favorably decides this claim, client will pay attorney a fee equal to 25% of all past

due benefits resulting from the favorable decision . . . .”).

Mr. Mellon’s lawsuit against the Commissioner was filed on January 30, 2006. Thereafter,

the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and, on November 29, 2006, the Court issued

an order remanding the case based on the ALJ’s failure to consider third-party lay testimony. See

Docket No. 14. Subsequently, the parties stipulated to attorney’s fees to Mr. Mellon in the amount

of $1,746 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). See Docket Nos. 16-17.

In or about September 2007, Mr. Mellon was notified that, on remand, a decision had been

made by the Social Security Administration in his favor. See Kuntz Decl., Exs. 3A-B. Mr. Mellon

was awarded past-due benefits in the amount of $43,849. See Kuntz Decl. ¶ 4; Supp. Br., Ex. A. 

Based on the past-due benefits award, Mr. Kuntz moved for fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b) and

1383(d)(2). 

II. DISCUSSION

Attorney’s fees may be awarded to a successful social security claimant’s lawyer for his or

her representation before a court pursuant to Title II and Title XVI. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b),

1383(d)(2). In an action for past-due benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Title II), “the court may

determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of

25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such

judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the amount

of such past-due benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 794. Section 1383(d)(2) (Title XVI) incorporates

§ 406(b) by reference and applies in largely the same manner.2

 See id. § 1383(d)(2) (stating that the

provisions of § 406 -- other than subsections (a)(4) and (d) thereof -- shall apply to this part to the

same extent as they apply in the case of title II).

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3

 Mr. Kuntz claims that he does not have a noncontingent rate. See Kuntz Decl. ¶ 6 (claiming

that all work he does is done on a contingency fee basis).

3

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), the Supreme Court “clarified the legal

framework to be used for awarding attorney’s fees under § 406(b) for the successful in-court

representation of a Social Security benefits claimant who has signed a contingent-fee agreement.” 

Mudd v. Barnhart, 418 F.3d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court explained that “§ 406(b)

does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for

successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court

review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in

particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In assessing whether a contingency fee agreement is

reasonable, “[c]ourts . . . have [considered] the attorney’s recovery based on the character of the

representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. For example, “[i]f the

benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward

adjustment is . . . in order.” Id.

As noted above, in the instant case, Mr. Mellon entered into a contingency fee agreement

with Mr. Kuntz pursuant to which Mr. Kuntz would receive 25% of all past-due benefits recovered. 

Mr. Mellon was ultimately awarded past-due benefits in the amount of $43,849; twenty-five percent

of that amount is $10,962.25. In October 2007, Mr. Kuntz was awarded fees in the amount of

$7,000 for his representation of Mr. Mellon before the agency (i.e., instead of the Court). See Kuntz

Decl., Ex. 9; 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(2); see also Supp. Br. at 2 & Ex. A. Mr. Kuntz therefore only seeks

the balance of $3,962.25 for his representation of Mr. Mellon before this Court (i.e., $10,962.25 -

$7,000 = $3,962.25).

The Court concludes that the attorney’s fees sought by Mr. Kuntz are reasonable within the

meaning of § 406(b) and Gisbrecht. Mr. Kuntz declares that he spent 10 hours and 40 minutes (i.e.,

10.67 hours) working on the merits of this action in this Court. See Kuntz Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4. Such

an amount of time is reasonable and reflects the relative simplicity of the issues presented before the

Court. The effective hourly rate of $371.34 is reasonable considering the contingent nature of the

representation, the experience of counsel, and the results achieved.3 See Kuntz Decl., Ex. 7

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(reflecting receipt of J.D. in 1991). The Court notes that, in other cases, higher hourly rates have

been approved for a comparable amount of legal work performed. See, e.g., Grunseich v. Barnhart,

439 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034-35 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (approving hourly rate of $600 for 7.55 hours of

time).

Mr. Kuntz has already received $1,746 in fees under the EAJA, and any award under §

406(b) must be reduced by that amount. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (stating that Congress

harmonized awards for attorney’s fees under the EAJA with awards under § 406(b) by requiring the

claimant’s attorney “to refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee”). Accordingly, the

Court orders that Mr. Kuntz be allowed to collect attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,962.25 under §

406(b) and that counsel shall reimburse Mr. Mellon the $1,746 already received pursuant to the

EAJA.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Kuntz’s motion for fees is granted. 

This order disposes of Docket No. 18.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2008

 EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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