Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01990/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01990-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE BROWNLEE,

Petitioner,

v.

LYDIA ROMMORO,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01990-LJO-SAB-HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 

(ECF No. 41)

Petitioner is a state prisoner who had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. On June 19, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a findings and 

recommendation that recommended that the petition be dismissed as successive. (ECF No. 30). 

On September 3, 2015, the undersigned adopted the findings and recommendation, dismissed the 

petition as second or successive, denied Petitioner’s motion to amend the petition, denied 

Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel, denied Petitioner’s motion in support of matters before 

this Court, denied Petitioner’s motion for order to show cause, and declined to issue a certificate 

of appealability. (ECF No. 39). On September 14, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from 

judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 

41). 

Under Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant relief 

from a final judgment based on “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). The party moving for relief from a final judgment has the burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the order or judgment was obtained through fraud, 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct and such conduct prevented the losing party from fully 

and fairly presenting its claims. See De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 

880 (9th Cir. 2000); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1957). 

The purpose of Rule 60(b)(3) is to provide relief from “judgments which were unfairly obtained, 

not at those which are factually incorrect.” In re M/V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir.

1987). 

Petitioner claims that Respondent has prevented him from fairly and fully presenting his 

case because there are no records or transcripts of Petitioner’s plea bargain. Petitioner has failed 

to meet his burden under Rule 60(b)(3) because he advances no argument as to why the plea 

transcript would change the Court’s decision to dismiss the petition as second or successive. 

On November 15, 2000, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition challenging the same 

1980 conviction and judgment, which was dismissed for failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)’s one year limitation period on September 25, 2002. See 1:01-cv-06120-OWW-SMS. 

For purposes of 28 U.SC. § 2243(b)(3), the court dismissed petitioner's previously-filed action 

on the merits, and therefore, petitioner was required to obtain authorization from the Ninth 

Circuit before filing his petition in this court. See McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“failure to comply with the statute of limitations renders subsequent petitions

second or successive for purposes of the AEDPA”). 

Petitioner’s 2013 amended abstract of judgment was merely a correction of a clerical 

error in the written judgment. The Fresno County Superior Court did not resentence Petitioner in 

2013. The Fresno County Superior Court had noted in its January 4, 2013 habeas order that the 

sentence orally produced in 1980 was 17 years to life and that the abstract of judgment should be 

corrected to reflect that. Therefore, the 2013 amended abstract of judgment by the Fresno 

County Superior Court was not an intervening judgment like in Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 

320, 323 (2010), or Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 

133 S.Ct. 2336 (2013). Therefore, the instant habeas petition is a second or successive 

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application. 

Although Petitioner may be arguing why this Court should allow him to proceed with a 

second or successive petition, it is not up to the district court to make that determination. Section 

2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: “Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is 

filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order 

authorizing the district court to consider the application.” In other words, Petitioner must obtain 

leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in district court. 

See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). Petitioner makes no showing that he has 

obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to file his successive petition attacking the 

conviction. Petitioner’s availability of the plea transcript argument has no bearing on this 

Court’s order dismissing the petition as second or successive. Petitioner has failed to show that 

Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct to obtain the September 3, 2015 

order and judgment. Petitioner’s arguments do not merit reconsideration of the dismissal. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for relief from 

judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01990-LJO-SAB Document 44 Filed 09/22/15 Page 3 of 3