Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02894/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02894-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REMIGIO E. ALARCON, JACK FRAHM,

MARTIN MONROY, AND NILTON

SIGUENZA,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SHIM INC., CANADIAN-AMERICAN OIL

CO., SAN RAFAEL TOUCHLESS CAR

WASH, BERKELEY TOUCHLESS CAR

WASH, MIKE SHIMEK, ROY SHIMEK, AND

DOES 1 THROUGH 100, INCLUSIVE, 

Defendants. /

No. C 07-02894 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand this action to state court. Hearing on the motion is

currently scheduled for September 14, 2007. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this

matter appropriate for submission without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the September 14

hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Remigio E. Alarcon, Jack Frahm, Martin Monroy, and Nilton Siguenza are current or

former employees of San Rafael Touchless Car Wash and Berkeley Touchless Car Wash. On January

18, 2005, plaintiffs filed a wage and hour claim in Alameda County Superior Court. Plaintiffs’ initial

complaint alleged solely violations of California law and named six defendants in total, four companies

(Shim Inc., Canadian-American Oil Co., San Rafael Touchless Car Wash, and Berkeley Touchless Car

Wash) and two individuals (Mike and Roy Shimek). On July 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed a First Amended

Case 3:07-cv-02894-SI Document 29 Filed 09/13/07 Page 1 of 6
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 At time of removal, Mike Smith and Patty Shimek had yet to file an answer in state court. 

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Complaint (“FAC”) in which they added a cause of action under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C. § 201, and added two additional defendants, Mike Smith and Patty Shimek. Plaintiffs served

the six original defendants with the FAC on July 13, 2006; those defendants answered the FAC on

November 7, 2006. However, plaintiffs did not serve Mike Smith and Patty Shimek, the two new

defendants, until January 16, 2007 and January 22, 2007, respectively.

Following service of the FAC on defendants Mike Smith and Patty Shimek, various actions took

place in state court: defendants filed an unsuccessful motion to change venue; defendants filed an

unsuccessful request for stay and petition for writ of mandate to the court of appeal; defendants moved

the court for summary judgment; plaintiffs sought summary adjudication; motion hearing dates were

scheduled; and a trial date was set. The first hearing on the pending motions was scheduled for June

7, 2007. However, on June 4, 2007, nearly six months after they received the FAC, Mike Smith and

Patty Shimek filed a notice of removal based on the existence of a federal cause of action, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

Fourteen days later, on June 18, 2007, plaintiffs filed a request with this Court to enter default

on the ground that Mike Smith and Patty Shimek failed to answer the FAC within five days after filing

their notice of removal, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c).1

 On that same day,

defendants answered the FAC, and default was not entered. Finally, on July 3, 2007, 29 days after

defendants’ notice of removal, plaintiffs filed the present motion to remand the case to state court.

LEGAL STANDARD

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought

in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and

division embracing a place where such action is pending.” A notice of removal “shall be filed” within

thirty days after the defendant receives a copy of the initial pleading, amended pleading, motion, order,

or other paper setting forth the claim from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which

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is or has become removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. Remand after an action

has been removed from state court is available for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or “for any defect

in removal procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Buckner v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993).

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction

must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts must

strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. See Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663

(9th Cir. 1988). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal

in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The burden of establishing

grounds for federal jurisdiction rests on the removing party. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d

1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 

DISCUSSION

In their timely motion to remand, plaintiffs contend that defendants’ notice of removal is

procedurally defective because defendants failed to file it within thirty days after receiving service of

a removable complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Defendants do not dispute the untimeliness of their

removal. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Remand at 4:6-7 (“Opp’n”). Instead, defendants argue that

plaintiffs waived their right to contest removal because plaintiffs affirmatively invoked the jurisdiction

of the Court by filing a request to enter default. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees with

defendants, and GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to remand. 

I. Waiver of Right to Remand

Defendants contend that plaintiffs, by filing a post-removal request to enter default, waived their

right to remand on grounds of untimely removal. Certain actions taken by a plaintiff post-removal do

“preclude the Plaintiff from objecting to a late removal petition.” Transp. Indem. Co. v. Fin. Trust Co.,

339 F. Supp. 405, 407 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (citing Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173 (1913)). The

type of post-removal conduct that has been held to constitute waiver of the right to remand is

“affirmative conduct or unequivocal assent of a sort which would render it offensive to fundamental

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principles of fairness to remand . . .” Owens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 686 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D. Cal.

1988) (quoting Maybruck v. Haim, 290 F. Supp. 721, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); see also Transp. Indem.

Co., 339 F. Supp. at 408. However, “[t]he exact quantity or quality of conduct on Plaintiffs’ part which

would evidence waiver of the Petition’s defect or consent to removal is less than clear.” Knowles v.

Hertz Equip. Rental Co., 657 F. Supp. 109, 110 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Furthermore, “the district court has

broad discretion in deciding whether a plaintiff has waived a right to object to procedural irregularities

in removal proceedings.” Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1988). Courts

have found plaintiffs waived their right to challenge procedural defects in removal where plaintiffs filed

an amended complaint, see In re Moore, 209 U.S. 490 (1908) (overruled in part on other grounds, Ex

Parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363 (1911)); Koehnen v. Herald Fire Ins. Co., 89 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir.

1996), made multiple appearances in federal court, see Meadows v. Bicrodyne Corp., 559 F. Supp. 57

(N.D. Cal. 1983), or participated in discovery, see Johnson v. Odeco Oil & Gas Co., 864 F.2d 40, 42

(5th Cir. 1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the question whether a request for entry of default alone

constitutes affirmative conduct that waives a plaintiff’s right to remand. Only a few district courts have

addressed the issue. See Riggs v. Plaid Pantries Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (D. Or. 2001) (denying

motion to remand and stating that filing a request to enter default is by itself sufficient availment to

federal court’s jurisdiction); Fletcher v. Solomon, No. C-06-05492, 2006 WL 3290399 (N.D. Cal. Nov.

13, 2006) (finding that although the request to enter default may constitute affirmative conduct, concerns

of fairness demanded the case be remanded); Innovacom, Inc. v. Haynes, No. C 98-0068, 1998 WL

164933 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1998) (this Court, granting motion to remand and finding that plaintiff’s

requests for entries of default and a jury demand did not make it offensive to fundamental principles of

fairness to remand). 

The Court finds that in the context of this case, the naked request to enter default does not

demonstrate sufficient activity in federal court such that remand would violate principles of fairness.

Unlike the plaintiff in Riggs, who in addition to his request for default also filed a motion for default

judgment, a supportive memorandum, a declaration of counsel, and a copy of the certificate of service

on defendant, plaintiffs in the present case filed no documents in support of their request to enter default

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and they did not seek default judgment. See Riggs, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. Additionally, plaintiffs

here did not file any other motions with this Court or wait until matters were unsuccessfully adjudicated

before moving to remand. Cf. Koehnen, 89 F.3d at 528 (denying motion to remand where plaintiff

moved the district court for leave to file a supplemental complaint, unsuccessfully argued that motion,

and only then made its motion to remand). Instead, plaintiffs only filed a request with the Clerk of the

Court to enter default – a ministerial, not judicial, act. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); Abur v. Republic of

Sudan, 437 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that entry of default is normally a ministerial

task for the clerk of the court). 

Furthermore, the filing of the request for default caused defendants no harm. It appears to have

only forced them to file the answers that they should have filed six days earlier in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c). Likewise, plaintiffs’ two week delay in moving to remand after

their request to enter default does not appear to have prejudiced defendants in any way; indeed,

defendants do not argue otherwise. Finally, the parties have already devoted a significant amount of

time litigating this issue in state court, so remanding would not prejudice defendants by placing them

in unfamiliar territory. In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ request to enter default does not

make it “offensive to fundamental principles of fairness” in this case to allow plaintiffs to argue that

defendants’ removal was procedurally defective. 

II. Timeliness of Defendants’ Notice of Removal

Exercising their right to remand, plaintiffs contend that removal was improper because

defendants Mike Smith and Patty Shimek failed to file their notice of removal within thirty days of

receiving the FAC. Notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the actual or constructive

receipt by the defendant of the first pleading that sets forth a removable claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

In cases with multiple defendants, the Ninth Circuit has yet to decide whether the thirty day period

begins to run on all defendants based on the first-served defendant, or if the period is renewed with each

additional defendant served. See United Computer Sys. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 763 n. 4 (9th Cir.

2002). Here, however, even adopting the more flexible “last-served” defendant rule, Mike Smith and

Patty Shimek filed their notice 139 and 133 days, respectively, after being served with plaintiffs’ FAC.

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 Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that all defendants waived their right to remove to federal

court by affirmative conduct in the state court system. Because the Court finds plaintiffs’ untimeliness

argument persuasive, the Court does not address plaintiffs’ alternative contention. 

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Defendants do not contest this fact. Opp’n at 4:6-7 (“Defendants do not dispute that removal was

effected more than 30 days after service.”). Therefore, the Court concludes defendants’ notice of

removal was procedurally defective and improvidently filed.2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’

motion to remand, and REMANDS the action to Alameda County Superior Court where it was filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 13, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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