Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00751/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00751-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 00:0000 Cause Code Unknown

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Louis Tamale,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 02-0751 WBS PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

California State, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff filed this action as a state prisoner without

counsel, prosecuting civil rights claims against public

officials. He was released from custody shortly thereafter.

The court approved service of the September 20, 2002,

amended complaint on defendants Greenough, Calvo, Newland,

Noriega, Vong, Toppenberg, Orobeza, Rougeux, Drennan, Camaren,

Brumfield, Sisto, McNeill, Fortin, Alexander, Foster, Scottie and

Vong. All defendants except Alexander, Foster, Scottie and Vong

answered March 21, 2005. 

Case 2:02-cv-00751-WBS-PAN Document 102 Filed 02/10/06 Page 1 of 6
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Vong moved March 28, 2005, to dismiss for failure to state a

claim and on the ground plaintiff’s claims are not exhausted. 

Plaintiff opposed April 18 and Vong replied April 21, 2005. 

In considering dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the

court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true, read the

complaint most favorably to plaintiff, give plaintiff the benefit

of every reasonable inference that appears from the pleading and

argument of the case and dismiss the complaint only if it is

clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations. Wheeldin v.

Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 658 (1963); Retail Clerks International

Association, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746,

754 n.6 (1963); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). The court may consider documents attached to the

complaint in evaluating a motion to dismiss. Parks School of

Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

Section 1997e(a) of Title 42 of the United States Code

provides a prisoner may bring no § 1983 action until he has

exhausted such administrative remedies as are available. The

requirement is mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). The administrative remedy must be exhausted before suit

is brought and a prisoner is not entitled to a stay of judicial

proceedings in order to exhaust. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002). A prisoner need not plead exhaustion.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Ordinarily,

defendants must raise and prove absence of exhaustion as a

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defense raised by a motion to dismiss. Id. “Courts considering

‘nonenumerated’ Rule 12(b) motions on the issue of administrative

exhaustion may not only rely on matters outside the pleadings but

also have broad discretion to resolve any factual disputes.” 

Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2001),

citing Ritza v. Internat’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union,

837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, plaintiff was released from custody in July 2002,

shortly after commencing this action. It is undisputed that

administrative remedies through the prison grievance system are

unavailable to him. Dismissal for failure to exhaust is

unwarranted.

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. McGuckin v. smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth Amendment

occurs when prison officials deliberately are indifferent to a

prisoner’s medical needs. Id. The threshold for a medical claim

under the Eighth Amendment is extremely high:

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

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F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). This “subjective

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental

attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment rights. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted).

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote

omitted).

“Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by

circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to

demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.” 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted); see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197

(acknowledging a plaintiff may demonstrate that officers “must

have known” of a risk of harm by showing the medical need was

obvious and extreme). Delay in medical treatment can amount to

deliberate indifference if (1) the delay seriously affected the

medical condition for which plaintiff was seeking treatment, and

(2) defendants were aware the delay would cause serious harm. 

Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d

404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985).

The pleading alleges plaintiff arrived at Solano State

Prison December 1, 2002, and delivered to the medical department

his complete medical file, which documented his bipolar mental

illness; total bilateral hip replacement, requiring a right hip

revision; diabetes; and a history of deep vein thrombosis. The

file also showed plaintiff was taking glyberide for diabetes,

coumadin for blood clots, and lithium for manic-depressive mental

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illness. The pleading further alleges, as to Vong:

[Dr. Vong] resides in Solano county, is employed as a

medical doctor, is b[e]ing sued in his individual and

official capa[c]ities and while working under color of

law he failed/breached his duty to aid the plaintiff in

his “serious medical condition.”

Dr. Vong is a medical doctor at Solano State Prison and

reviewed the entire medical records on that plaintiff,

performed a complete medical examination, now, seeing,

knowing and having a duty an[d] legal obligation to aid

the plaintiff in his “serious medical condition” ...

his “acts or omissions” were sufficiently harmful as to

evidence deliberate indifference.

His decis[]ion to do nothing to aid the plaintiff was

“medically unacceptable, under the circumstances and

made with conscious disregard for the excessive risk to

the plaintiff’[s] health and is one that today’s

society chooses not to tolerate.” 

Vong urges the court to dismiss for failure to state a claim

based on allegations in plaintiff’s original complaint, viz.,

that Vong examined plaintiff on six occasions and gave him a

light duty “chrono” proscribing a work assignment where he need

not stand, sit or walk for more than five minutes. He argues

that a claim of deliberate indifference cannot be sustained

because plaintiff admits Vong gave him a light duty “chrono.”

Construing both the original and amended pleading in favor

of plaintiff, the court cannot say his claims of deliberate

indifference against Vong fail as a matter of law. The pleading

suggests plaintiff’s medical needs were substantial and Vong knew

of them. The court cannot, on the present record, determine

whether Vong’s response to those needs amounted to a “disregarded

an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.”

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendant Vong’s

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March 28, 2005, motion to dismiss be denied and he be required to

answer the amended complaint.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: February 9, 2006. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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