Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02604/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02604-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNETTE L. DOUGLAS,

 Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM JOE SULLIVAN,

 Respondent.

Case No.: 18cv2604-WQH-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 11]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

The Court, having reviewed the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1), Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11), and 

all the supporting documents and lodgments submitted by the parties, 

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hereby RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Federal Proceedings

On November 13, 2018, Bennette L. Douglas (“Petitioner”), a state 

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) 

Petitioner contends that: (1) the trial court committed instructional 

error; (2) the prosecutor misstated the law relating to specific intent 

and voluntary manslaughter; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct 

by equating defense counsel’s role to that of Sisyphus; and (4) the trial 

court improperly denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial for failing to 

redact portions of a transcript. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.)

On February 11, 2019, Respondent William Joe Sullivan 

(“Respondent”) filed a Motion to Dismiss contending Petitioner’s claims 

are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the 

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 

(Lodgment No. 1, ECF No. 11-1 at 2-4.) Respondent further contends 

that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Id.) Petitioner’s opposition was due on 

March 11, 2019. (ECF No. 6.) As of the date of this Order, Petitioner 

has not filed an opposition. 

B. State Proceedings

On June 8, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of firstdegree murder with a multiple victim special circumstance and is 

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currently serving two consecutive terms of life without possibility of 

parole. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) Petitioner appealed to the California Court 

of Appeal on the same grounds raised in this Petition. (Id. at 2-3.) On 

August 16, 2006, the state appellate court denied the appeal and 

affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment No. 2, ECF No. 12-2 at 1-2.) 

On September 22, 2006, Petitioner appealed to the California 

Supreme Court and asserted the same claims presented to the appellate 

court. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) On November 29, 2006, the California 

Supreme Court denied the appeal without citation to authority. 

(Lodgment No. 3, ECF No. 12-3.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitation

AEDPA sets a one-year statute of limitations for all 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 habeas corpus petitions initiated by state prisoners after April 24, 

1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Petitioner filed 

his Petition in November 2018. 

The applicable statute of limitations is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) and provides that the one-year limitation period begins from 

the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant 

was prevented from filing by such State Action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right 

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has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The statute further provides that the 

limitation period will be tolled during the time in “which a properly 

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . 

is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner does not allege any facts to suggest a start date other 

than the date his conviction became final should be applied for statute 

of limitations purposes. After reviewing the record, the Court finds no 

basis to apply a different date. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Thus, 

the statutory period of limitation began to run at the conclusion of 

direct review when the conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A); see Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 

2001). The period of direct review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes 

the ninety-day period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a 

writ of certiorari regardless of whether the petitioner seeks such review. 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). “AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations begins to run on the date the ninety day 

period . . . expires.” Id. at 1159 (citing U.S.C.S. Supreme Ct. R. 13).

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

direct review on November 29, 2006. (Lodgment No. 3, ECF No. 12-3.) 

Petitioner then had ninety days, or until February 27, 2007, to file a 

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Bowen, 188 

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F.3d at 1159. Petitioner did not file a writ of certiorari and his 

conviction became final on February 27, 2007. Id. Thus, AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations began to run on February 27, 2007. 

Petitioner then had one year, or until February 27, 2008, to timely 

file a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner

did not file this Petition until November 13, 2018, more than ten years

after AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired. Absent tolling, this 

Petition is untimely. 

1. Statutory Tolling

As discussed above, Petitioner filed this Petition in November 

2018, more than ten years after AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired. 

It does not appear that Petitioner filed any post-conviction or collateral

petition during that time which would entitle Petitioner to statutory 

tolling after his direct appeals became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner is therefore not entitled to statutory tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

Even though Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling, the 

Petition can survive this Motion to Dismiss if Petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling. AEDPA’s statutory period can be equitably tolled only 

when extraordinary circumstances are shown. Holland v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the 

burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances beyond 

his control stood in the way and prevented timely filing. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

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In his Petition, Petitioner makes no showing or allegation that he

took any action to diligently pursue his legal interests in the more than 

ten years between his conviction becoming final and the date he filed 

this Petition. Nor does he allege any circumstances outside of his 

control prevented timely filing of this Petition. Petitioner had the 

opportunity to file an opposition in this action to offer evidence of

equitable tolling but did not do so. The Court’s review of the record 

found nothing to indicate that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Because Petitioner has not shown he diligently pursued his legal 

interests or that some extraordinary circumstance occurred that

prevented timely filing, he has not met his burden and is not entitled to 

equitable tolling. 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s 

Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED and that Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED with prejudice and 

without leave to amend.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this 

Report and Recommendation; (2) that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

be GRANTED; and (3) Directing that judgment be entered dismissing 

the Petition with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

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than April 29, 2019. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

May 10, 2019. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 

(9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 5, 2019

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