Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02776/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02776-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MASON JAMES HENRY, )

)

Defendant/Movant, ) CR 08-01377 PHX JAT

) CIV 10-02776 PHX JAT (MEA)

v. )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Mr. Mason Henry (“Movant”), proceeding pro se, filed a

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255, regarding a criminal conviction and sentence

entered by the Court on December 23, 2010. Respondent filed a

Response to Motion to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 on April 20, 2011. See Doc. 12. Petitioner filed a reply

to the response on May 24, 2011. See Doc. 13 & Doc. 14.

I Procedural History

 A grand jury indictment returned November 19, 2008,

charged Movant and co-defendant Melvin Nash with the firstdegree premeditated murder of Aaron Tierno (Count 1). The

indictment also charged Movant with three counts of brandishing

and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence resulting

in death (Counts 2, 4, and 6).

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The indictment also charged Movant with first-degree

felony murder, i.e., that the murder occurred during a robbery

(Count 3); one count of robbery, including robbing the victim of

his vehicle (Count 5); and one count of conspiracy (Count 7).

On November 21, 2008, Movant was arrested and counsel was

appointed to represent Movant. On January 22, 2009, Movant’s

motion to change counsel was granted and new counsel was

appointed to represent Movant. 

On May 29, 2009, Movant’s counsel filed a motion to

sever his trial from that of his co-defendant. See Criminal

Doc. 47. Movant argued, inter alia, that the evidence against

his co-defendant greatly out-weighed the evidence against Movant

and that Movant’s co-defendant had or would make statements

inculpating Movant. On July 23, 2009, finding that Movant

intended to raise a defense antagonistic to his co-defendant,

i.e., that the co-defendant acted alone, the Court granted

Movant’s motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant. See Criminal Doc. 67.

On August 4, 2009, the Court noted that Movant’s codefendant had entered a guilty plea and affirmed a trial date

regarding Movant. On August 5, 2009, Movant entered a guilty

plea to one count of second-degree murder, as a lesser-included

offense of Count 1 of the indictment. See Criminal Doc. 74.

Movant also signed a written plea agreement on August 5, 2009.

The terms of the written plea agreement included a stipulation,

pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, that Movant be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 25

years and not less than 15 years. See Criminal Doc. 109. The

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remaining counts of the indictment were to be dismissed at

sentencing. The plea agreement also included a waiver of

Movant’s right to appeal and his right to collaterally attack

his conviction and sentence pursuant to section 2255, providing

Movant’s sentence was consistent with the terms of the plea

agreement.

During the plea colloquy, the Court verified with

Movant, under oath, that he was competent to enter the guilty

plea and was satisfied with his attorney:

THE COURT: How far have you gone in school?

THE Movant: About to the eleventh grade.

THE COURT: Now, from what I can determine so

far, you seem to speak and understand the

spoken English, but do you also read, write

and understand the written English?

THE Movant: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you had any drugs, alcohol,

or medicine in the last 48 hours?

THE Movant: No.

THE COURT: Have you recently been treated for

any mental illness or addiction to substance

of any kind?

THE Movant: No

THE COURT: And, Mr. Simon, is there anything

in the government’s file or information the

government has learned through its

investigation of the Movant that would

indicate the Movant is not competent to

understand this proceeding or enter into this

plea agreement?

MR. SIMON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Raynak, anything you’ve

learned during your investigation of this

case or through your contacts with your

client that would lead you to believe that

your client is not competent to enter into

this plea?

MR. RAYNAK: No, Judge. I would note that was

one of my concerns when I first met him. It

takes a little longer sometimes for Mason to

process things, but he did go at least

through the eleventh grade and he was never

in any special education classes. And while

he seems to be a little slower in responding

to me, he does seem to understand once I

explain it to him. I sometimes have to go

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over it twice perhaps, but he does understand

the general nature of the proceedings and

what is going on. I’m just letting the Court

know I did -- because of my initial contact

with him, I did look at that a little more

closely.

THE COURT: And he has been able, in your

judgment, to adequately assist you in the

preparation of his case; is that correct?

MR. RAYNAK: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Have you been satisfied with your

lawyer in this case?

Movant: Yeah.

Criminal Doc. 103 at 4-6.

When reviewing the rights Movant was giving-up by

entering his guilty plea the Court specifically referred to the

paragraph of the plea agreement titled “Waiver of Defenses and

Appeal Rights”, stating:

THE COURT: And in term of rights you are

giving up, let me call your attention to the

written plea agreement and we will go over it

in more detail in a moment, but in this

written plea agreement there’s a paragraph

that is titled Waiver of Defenses and Appeal

Rights. And that waiver in detail specifies

that you are waiving or giving up any and all

motions or defenses or probable cause

determinations or objections which you could

assert to the indictment or the court’s entry

of judgment against you or imposition of

sentence upon you as long as the sentence is

consistent with this agreement.

 And furthermore, you are waiving and giving

up the right to appeal the judgment and

sentence imposed on you and you’re giving up

the right to later collaterally attack your

conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C.

Section 2255, or any other collateral attack

where you might later attack or challenge

your conviction and sentence.

 So, do you understand that by signing this

plea agreement, you’re giving up those

defenses and appeal rights that are set forth

in the plea agreement?

THE Movant: Yes.

THE COURT: Now then, I have gone over all

these rights with you that you have. Do you

still wish to give up those rights and enter

a guilty plea? Is that still your wish?

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THE Movant: Yes.

Id. at 7-8.

The Court also verified that Movant had read and

understood the contents of the plea agreement, ensuring that his

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The Court thereafter

reviewed with Movant the remaining provisions of the plea

agreement, including the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentencing

stipulation:

THE COURT: Now, this -- one of the provisions

in this plea agreement is ... is an agreement

between you and the government that you will

be imprisoned for a term not to exceed 25

years, but not less than 15 years, and with

the decision within that range as to exactly

what the sentence will be to be left to the

discretion of the court. Do you understand

that’s the way it works?

THE Movant: Yes.

Id. at 16.

At the close of the plea colloquy, the Court

specifically inquired about Movant’s decision to plead guilty:

THE COURT: All right. Sir, the charge then is

a lesser included offense of Count 1, and

that is Second Degree Murder, Aiding and

Abetting, in violation of Title 18, United

States Code, Sections 1153 and 111, a Class

A felony offense. Do you plead guilty or not

guilty?

THE Movant: Guilty.

THE COURT: And are you pleading guilty to

this crime because you are guilty?

THE Movant: Yes.

Id. at 21.

The Court accepted and entered Movant’s guilty plea and

set sentencing for November 2, 2009. On September 28, 2009, the

Presentence Report was completed. The report included

recommendations for a four-level upward departure from the

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otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guideline

(“U.S.S.G.”) sentencing range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21,

based on the seriousness and random nature of the offense. See

Civil Doc. 12 at 8. The PSR recommended that Movant be

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 25 years, the high end of

the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) stipulated sentencing range provided in the

plea agreement. Id.

On October 9, 2009, Movant filed a motion seeking to

change counsel, essentially alleging that Movant’s counsel “was

misleading ... ineffective and coercive by making false

statements-false promises and coaching Movant ... making the

Movant believe he had no option but to enter into the plea.”

Criminal Doc. 82. At that time Movant’s then-counsel filed a

motion seeking to continue Movant’s sentencing and stating that

Movant’s motion to change counsel indicated Movant “might” wish

to withdraw from the plea agreement. See Criminal Doc. 80.

On October 15, 2009, during the ensuing hearing on

Movant’s motion to change counsel, the Court reminded Movant of

his statements made during the plea colloquy, under oath, which

directly contradicted the allegations in Movant’s motion. See

Criminal Doc. 84. Movant’s counsel, while limited by

attorney-client privilege, nonetheless represented to the Court

that he disagreed with and denied Movant’s allegations. See id.

The Court, noting that Movant’s allegations were “totally

inconsistent with anything you [defense counsel] have done in

this court or, to my knowledge, any other court, or with your

reputation”, nonetheless granted Movant’s motion. See Criminal

Doc. 84.

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On October 19, 2009, new counsel was appointed to

represent Movant. See Criminal Doc. 85. On December 14, 2009,

Movant’s new counsel filed a sentencing memorandum which

included a request that the Court impose a sentence of

imprisonment of 15 years, that is, the minimum sentence

available under the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement stipulation.

See Criminal Doc. 102 & Criminal Doc. 119. Movant did not at

any time file a motion, pro se or otherwise, to withdraw from

the plea agreement.

On December 22, 2009, during the sentencing proceeding,

the Court verified that Movant had reviewed the pre-sentence

report. The Court, after providing Movant’s attorney and Movant

with the opportunity to address the Court regarding sentencing,

verified that Movant was satisfied with his attorney: “THE

COURT: And you’ve been satisfied with your lawyer? THE Movant:

Yes.” Criminal Doc. 121 at 5.

Movant was sentenced to a term of 25 years

imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months of supervised release.

The Court also verified Movant was aware that, because the

sentence imposed was consistent with the terms of Movant’s plea

agreement, Movant had waived his right to appeal.

THE COURT: ... Now sir, in the plea agreement

that you signed, at page 4 is a paragraph

where you agreed to waive your right to

appeal. Do you remember that paragraph in the

plea agreement?

THE Movant: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you signed that plea agreement

voluntarily, understanding that by

signing it you were waiving your right to

appeal. Is that correct?

THE Movant: Yes, sir

THE COURT: The Court finds Movant has

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to

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appeal.

Id. at 38-39.

Movant did not take a direct appeal of his conviction

and sentence.

In his section 2255 petition, Movant asserts that his

attorney factually misrepresented to the Court that Movant was

guilty of second-degree murder. The record establishes,

however, that in the written plea agreement and during his

guilty plea colloquy Movant voluntarily acknowledged as accurate

the facts that established his guilt. Movant also admitted to

the Court that he, Movant, was pleading guilty to the charge of

second-degree murder because he was guilty of that crime.

Movant also contends that he was induced into pleading

guilty by his counsel’s misrepresentation that Movant’s sentence

would fall within the guideline range of 168 to 210 months. The

record establishes, however, that in the written plea agreement

and during his guilty plea colloquy Movant specifically

acknowledged and understood that the plea agreement provided he

would be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 25 years and not

less than 15 years. 

Movant also maintains his counsel’s performance was

unconstitutionally ineffective because Movant was incompetent to

enter a guilty plea. Movant further asserts that “in the realm

of possibilities” his counsel may have been pressured by the

government to induce Movant to enter a guilty plea because this

would prevent information regarding victim Aaron Tierno’s

“possession of child pornography” from becoming public.

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Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent asserts that Movant waived his right to

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence pursuant to

section 2255 in the written plea agreement. The plea agreement

signed by Movant expressly waived his right to collaterally

attack any matter pertaining to Movant’s conviction and sentence

if the sentence imposed was consistent with the written terms of

the agreement. The sentence imposed on Movant was consistent

with the terms of the plea agreement, i.e., the plea agreement

stated Movant’s sentence would be between 15 and 25 years and he

was sentenced to a term of 25 years imprisonment. Because the

sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement, the

plea agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea

agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

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However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s

right to collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable

if the waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at

1156. In Jeronimo the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded

that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to consider

the appeal of a Movant who had waived his right to collaterally

attack his conviction in a plea agreement because the agreement

was knowing and voluntary on its face, stating: “A defendant’s

waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the

language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the

grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily

made”. Id. See also United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343

(5th Cir. 2002).

A collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel in negotiating a plea agreement may be brought

notwithstanding a waiver of this right in the agreement, but

only if the agreement was involuntary or unknowing, or if the

court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, or where

the agreement is otherwise unlawful. See United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); Bridgeman v.

United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. Cf. United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section 2255 case);

United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th Cir. 1998)

(holding, in a section 2255 case, that “a straightforward and

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simple ‘Yes, your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a Movant to [the]

consequences [of a plea agreement].”). Because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, Movant’s

guilty plea can be considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969).

The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and

made intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383

(9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

other than his own self-serving statement, the undersigned

concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was Movant’s

voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we doubt that a plea agreement could

waive a claim of ineffective of assistance of counsel based on

counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant

to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain.”).

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

In order to find that Movant was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and grant him habeas relief, the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was incompetent and

that his deficient trial performance prejudiced Movant. 

[N]ot every case of deficient performance

under Strickland represents a constructive

denial of the right to counsel. In fact, it

will be the rare claim of ineffective

assistance that is tantamount to a

constructive denial of counsel. Strickland

remains the norm for ineffective assistance

claims, and the Supreme Court has made clear

that it will not countenance a per-se

prejudice exception which will swallow the

actual prejudice Strickland rule.

Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2001). See also

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, Movant bears the

burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the Court can

conclude his counsel was ineffective. See Turner v. Calderon,

281 F.3d 851, 878 (9th Cir. 2002).

To establish that his counsel’s conduct was

unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255 petitioner must

establish that no competent counsel would have acted as his

counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were unreasonable.

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United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004);

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2001).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his counsel’s

representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the Movant did not go to trial are also

governed by the doctrine of Strickland. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Fields v.

Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). When

a Movant challenges a conviction or sentence resulting from a

plea agreement the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is

modified; the Movant must show there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pled

guilty to the charges against him, but instead would have

insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.

Ct. at 370. Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v.

McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986).

Section 2255 “[r]eview of counsel’s performance is

highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

representation.” United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d

1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996). With regard to the prejudice prong

of the Strickland analysis, the probability of prejudice may not

be based merely upon conjecture or speculation. See Mickens v.

Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1246 (2002) (Kennedy, J. concurrence)

(regarding speculation as having no place in a Strickland

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analysis). 

In response to the answer to his section 2255 motion,

Movant asserts his pre-sentencing counsel was ineffective

because he failed to investigate a diminished capacity defense.

Movant contends his counsel would have discovered Movant’s

mental incompetence had counsel examined Movant’s education

records. Movant contends his counsel coerced him into accepting

a plea agreement and that counsel coached Movant regarding

Movant’s speech and conduct at the plea colloquy. Movant also

contends his sentencing counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective because counsel failed to move to withdraw Movant’s

guilty plea.

Movant has not presented evidence that, absent his

counsel’s alleged errors, he would have chosen to reject the

plea agreement and proceed to trial on charges including firstdegree murder, felony murder, and conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder. Movant accepted the plea agreement offered to

him immediately after his co-defendant agreed to plead guilty

and presumably testify against Movant. There is no evidence

that asserting a diminished-capacity defense would have been

successful or that, under any circumstances, Movant would have

received a sentence of less than 25 years had he chosen not to

accept the plea agreement and proceed to trial.

III CONCLUSION

The plea agreement signed by Movant waived his right to

bring a section 2255 action if he was sentenced in accordance

with the plea agreement. Because he received a sentence

provided for in the plea agreement, the section 2255 action may

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be summarily dismissed. Additionally, Movant has not presented

any evidence that his entry of a guilty plea was unknowing or

involuntary, or that his counsel’s advice to accept the plea

agreement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Henry’s motion for

relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to section

2255 be dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

Case 2:10-cv-02776-JAT Document 15 Filed 06/14/11 Page 15 of 16
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States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 10th day of June, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-02776-JAT Document 15 Filed 06/14/11 Page 16 of 16