Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06849/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06849-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRED RICK ATHERTON,

Petitioner,

v.

A. P. KANE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-6849 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Fred Rick Atherton, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed

this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is

now before the court for consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the

reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Atherton was convicted in Orange County Superior Court of second degree murder

with an enhancement for use of a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of

dangerous drugs. On March 18, 1988, he was sentenced to 17 years to life in prison. His

habeas petition does not challenge his conviction but instead challenges an August 30, 2005

decision of the Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH"), that found him not suitable for parole. 

This parole hearing was conducted at a time when he was 18 years into his 17-to-life

sentence. 

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The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Atherton’s drug

and criminal activity leading up to the murder, and Atherton's failure to follow the

recommendation of the previous panel to participate in self-help programs until four months

before the current hearing. The BPH also noted that the district attorney and the City of

Anaheim opposed parole. 

Atherton sought relief in the California courts. The Orange County Superior Court

denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a reasoned decision. The California Court of

Appeal summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the California Supreme

Court summarily denied his petition for review. 

Atherton then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found

cognizable a claim that his right to due process was violated because the evidence was

insufficient to support the BPH's decision that he was unsuitable for parole. Respondent

filed an answer and Atherton filed a traverse. 

The court earlier indicated that it intended to wait for guidance from the anticipated en

banc decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 527

F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008). Although much time has passed, Hayward remains pending in the

appellate court and it is unknown to this court when the decision will be released. The court

will proceed to decide the merits of the petition without the benefit of the Hayward decision. 

Atherton moved to lift the stay of this action but that was unnecessary because the

proceedings in this action were never stayed. 

 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action concerns the execution of the sentence of a prisoner housed at a prison in Monterey

County, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

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judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claim asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process

in the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the

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entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached'" by the BPH. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and

assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law

in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. As a matter of state

law, the parole authority’s decision must also satisfy the "some evidence" standard of review. 

See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1191 (Cal. 2008) (state court "standard of review

properly is characterized as whether 'some evidence' supports the conclusion that the inmate

is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently is dangerous"). 

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets

the criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to

answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

B. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A

first degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree

murder conviction yields a minimum term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal. 2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The upshot of

California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set unless

various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the

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Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole

release dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the

panel "shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration

for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b).

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The

regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of

crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years,

depending on some of the facts of the crime. The statutory scheme places individual

suitability for parole above a prisoner's expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to

ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is

not reached unless and until the prisoner is found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2403(a).

The "Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fundamental

consideration in parole decisions is public safety . . . [T]he core determination of 'public

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safety' under the statute and corresponding regulations involves an assessment of an inmate's

current dangerousness." Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205 (emphasis in source).2

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the parole authority's use of evidence

about the murder that led to the conviction. Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts

for applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, and Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d

846 (9th Cir. 2007).3

 Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time

as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and

requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued

reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct

prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system

and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the

initial denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the

prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . ., should Biggs

continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a

parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise

serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which

criticized the Biggs statements as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the

court: "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future parole hearings

could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not

precluded from relying on unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment

offense or the petitioner's pre-offense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id.

(commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support

denial of parole at subsequent parole consideration hearing). Sass also put to rest any idea

from Biggs that the commitment crime and pre-offense behavior only support the initial

denial of parole. Irons determined that due process was not violated by the use of the

commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole for a prisoner 16 years into

his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all three cases (Irons, Sass and Biggs) in

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which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process, the decision

was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of years required by his

sentence." Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. Interpreting this statement from Irons to suggest that the

offense can only be relied on until the minimum number of years has been reached would

suffer the same problem that Sass identified in Biggs: it is not the holding of the case. The

dicta in Biggs and Irons are speculative and do not determine when a denial of parole based

solely upon the commitment offense or pre-offense behavior violates due process. Neither

logic nor Irons compel a decision that such reliance must cease when the prisoner reaches the

minimum number of years in his sentence, such as the fifteenth year of a 15-to-life sentence.

The upshot of these three cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such as

the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the

prisoner is not currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight

to be attributed to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future

dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and

Irons). Sass did not dispute the principle that, other things being equal, a murder committed

50 years ago is less probative of a prisoner's current dangerousness than one committed 10

years ago. Not only does the passage of time in prison count for something, exemplary

behavior and rehabilitation in prison count for something according to Biggs and Irons. 

Superintendent v. Hill's standard might be quite low, but it does require that the decision not

be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the crime might eventually make for an

arbitrary decision.4

 C. Some Evidence Supports The BPH's Decision In Atherton’s Case

1. BPH Decision

The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Atherton’s drug

and criminal activity leading up to the murder, and Atherton's tardy return to the

recommended self-help programming. The BPH also noted that the district attorney and the

City of Anaheim opposed parole. In its decision, the BPH observed that Atherton had

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several positive attributes. He had no CDC-115 rule violation reports during his entire stay

in prison. He had only one CDC-128 counseling memorandum and that was a decade earlier

for smoking. He also had a recent favorable psychological evaluation, had marketable skills

in printing and graphics. He also had completed two vocations (i.e., printing and textiles),

and had favorable work reports while in prison. Nonetheless, the positive aspects of his

behavior did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability, in the BPH's view. 

a. Commitment Offense

In finding Atherton unsuitable, the BPH relied primarily on the murder and the

circumstances leading up to it. The BPH noted that the incident showed a total disregard for

the safety of others, involved Atherton terrorizing the first man he encountered and

culminated with him shooting the victim in the head in a killing that was “especially cruel or

callous, certain[ly] dispassionate.” August 30, 2005 BPH hearing reporter’s transcript

(“RT”), p. 61. The BPH’s decision indicates that its concern was not just the killing but the

killing as the culmination of Atherton’s criminal lifestyle. 

Atherton killed his partner in his meth lab business by shooting him in the head. The

circumstances surrounding the murder were described in the probation officer’s report which

was available to the BPH.

[O]n June 22, 1987, the defendant went to the Polynesian Motel, in Anaheim, in an

effort to locate the victim, John Beday. The purported reason for his trying to find the

victim was that the defendant wanted to discuss with Mr. Beday the latter’s having

removed a number of pieces of musical equipment from the defendant’s apartment. 

Some of the pieces belonged to Mrs. Atherton and some belonged to Mr. Beday, but

had been in the possession of the defendant and his wife as collateral for loans

advanced by the defendant’s wife to Mr. Beday.

At the Polynesian Motel, the defendant entered the open door to room number

four. He was followed inside by Raymond Barthlett who was staying in that room. 

While standing near the threshold of the door, Mr. Barthlett saw the defendant swing

what appeared to be a .357 caliber, long-barreled revolver and strike a [ceramic] pipe,

smashing it. The defendant turned and said to Mr. Barthlett, “Don’t even try it.” He

then asked Mr. Barthlett, “Where’s John?”, and when he did not get a satisfactory

answer, he further inquired, “Where’s Jerry?” After some additional conversation, the

defendant ordered Mr. Barthlett to, “Get down on the floor and shut your mouth.” He

then placed his gun approximately one inch from Mr. Barthlett’s nose with the barrel

pointed directly at him and said, “Tell him I’m not fucking around anymore.” The

defendant immediately fired on round into an air conditioner in the room, causing Mr.

Barthlett’s ears to ring. He then left, driving away in a brown 1979 Subaru station

wagon.

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A few minutes later, the defendant found Mr. Beday at a residential location in

Anaheim. While the defendant was still seated in the passenger side of the abovedescribed vehicle, and Mr. Beday was squatted down by the passenger door, the two

engaged in a conversation. During a conversation, but while both were out of the car,

the defendant fired one round into Mr. Beday’s head, causing massive destruction of

his brain. 

Resp. Exh. 2, probation officer’s report, pp. 4-5. Subsequent investigation by police found

chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine in the murder victim’s vehicle, as well as

“narcotics paraphernalia, scales, and other items used in drug trafficking” in Atherton’s

residence and vehicle. Id. at 5. When Atherton was arrested, he had 13.8 grams of

methamphetamine in his possession. Id

b. Atherton’s Criminal Lifestyle

It is clear from the record available to the BPH that the murder was not an isolated

incident but instead was the worst episode in the criminality of a drug manufacturer. 

Atherton was 30 years old when he committed the murder in June 1987, by which time he

had a growing criminal record. See Resp. Exh. 2 at 7-8. Although the record was not full of

violence, it does show that he was not just a user of drugs but also was very much in the drug

business. Atherton was convicted in May 1979 for being under the influence of drugs. He

was convicted for petty theft in February 1986. He was arrested for possession of a

controlled substance (i.e., about a quarter ounce of methamphetamine) on February 10, 1987;

that charge was still pending when he was arrested for the murder four months later. Two

days after that arrest, he was arrested on February 12, 1987 for possession of a controlled

substance (i.e., about 10.5 ounces of methamphetamine); he reported that he had been cited

and released, and that the charges later were dropped. Two months later he was arrested on

April 30, 1987 for manufacturing a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous

weapon. He explained that, in this arrest, he was found with about two pounds of

methamphetamine that he had been manufacturing in a motel room and had a pistol in his

pocket when arrested. These charges were still pending when he was arrested for the murder. 

On June 23, 1987, when he was arrested for the murder, Atherton also was charged with auto

theft and possession of dangerous drugs. He stated that the auto theft charge later was

dismissed. According to Atherton, the several drug charges that were pending when he was

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arrested for the murder went by the wayside because the “murder took precedence over

everything.” RT 14. However, the charge for possession of dangerous drugs filed with the

murder charge did result in a guilty plea and conviction. Resp. Exh. 2 at 3. And, as noted

earlier, he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon for his activities with the first

victim in the hotel room. 

Atherton became a heroin addict in the 1970s. RT 14-15. He told the probation

officer that in 1978 he was a heroin addict and had overdosed. Resp. Exh. 2 at 8. He

stopped using heroin when his older brother overdosed and died from heroin in 1981. He

started using methamphetamine 3-4 years later (i.e., in about 1984 or 1985). RT 15. About

six months before the murder, he was using amphetamines and heroin. RT 16. 

The district attorney, in his statement of opposition to parole, added more details

about Atherton’s drug-related lifestyle. According to the district attorney, a few days before

the murder, Atherton’s friend visited Atherton and his wife in the apartment in which they

had the meth lab, used heroin with them and overdosed. RT 42-43. The next day, Atherton

thought the friend was dead from the drugs. Rather than summon the authorities or seek

medical care for the friend, Atherton decided to roll him up in a comforter and dump his

body in Riverside. RT 44. When the police asked Atherton about it, he asked for immunity

and then told the police that his brother came up with the idea to dump the body. RT 45-46. 

The brother denied that it was his idea. RT 46. The district attorney hypothesized that

Atherton had dumped the body elsewhere because he did not want the police near his meth

lab. RT 46. This activity never resulted in any criminal charges apparently. 

 The BPH stated in its decision that Atherton was “kind of a one-man crime spree here

for a while. And it boiled down to, not making any excuses for you, but it boiled down to the

narcotics, both using it as a livelihood and doing them has a tendency to skew your good

judgment.” RT 61. The BPH also noted that Atherton’s criminal conduct may not have been

escalating in violence but was escalating in general during the several months before

Atherton committed the murder. RT 62. 

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c. Need For More Self-Help

The BPH also relied on the fact that Atherton needed further self-help programming. 

RT 62. The BPH was particularly concerned that Atherton had been told at the last Board

hearing that he needed to get some more self-help done, yet he had not bothered to start it

until four months before this hearing date. RT 62. Atherton stated that he had returned to

AA or NA four months before the present hearing but did not have the certificate of

participation. RT 31. It turned out that he had more than a two and a half year break from

AA or NA, as he had stopped it three years before the hearing and restarted it four months

before the hearing. RT 32. When asked why he waited so long to resume the self-help

programming after having been told in January 2004 to do it, Atherton responded, “I took a

short break.” RT 33. One of the commissioners pointedly told him, “it’s the wrong time to

take a break, sir, you know.” RT 62. Another commissioner noted that, if the 2005 hearing

had occurred on the planned schedule several months earlier, Atherton would not have had

any time in the AA or NA program since the last hearing at which he was told to return to the

self-help programming. RT 67. The BPH found that Atherton needed further self-help

programming.

 2. State Court Decision

The Orange County Superior Court rejected Atherton’s habeas petition in a reasoned

decision. Resp. Exh. 4. In that court, Atherton had made the familiar arguments that there

was no reliable evidence to support the BPH’s decision and that the BPH could not continue

to rely on only the commitment offense alone because it was an unchanging factor. Id. at 2. 

The superior court explained that under the then-controlling state court case of In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1071 (Cal. 2005), the BPH could protect public safety by

considering the dangerous implications of the commitment offense and had to point to factors

beyond the minimum elements of the crime, it did not need to do further comparative

analysis before concluding that the facts of the offense made it unsafe at that time to fix a

date for the prisoner’s release. 

Here, the BPT noted the “terrifying and terrorizing” of the first victim, the

dispassionate shooting of the murder victim, Petitioner’s life of crime at the time

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including his bail status and Petitioner’s apparent drug trafficking. Thus it pointed to

factors “beyond the minimum elements of the crime.” (Citation.) The BPT could

have denied parole on that basis alone. It did not, however, do so. The BPT also

mentioned that at the hearing 17 months before it had specifically told Petitioner to

participate in more self-help and Petitioner was very tardy in complying with that

direction. Thus no understanding had been gained; rather, a big question mark

remained.

Resp. Exh. 4 at 3. 

3. Analysis Of Federal Claim

This court applies § 2254(d) to the Orange County Superior Court’s decision because

it is the last reasoned decision from a state court on Atherton’s claim. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th

Cir. 2005). The superior court did not unreasonably apply Superintendent v. Hill in rejecting

Atherton’s petition, even though that court never mentioned the some evidence standard or

Superintendent v. Hill in its decision. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam)

(state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent to pass muster under § 2254(d)). 

Notwithstanding the positive factors for Atherton, the BPH had determined that, 18

years into his 17-to-life sentence, Atherton posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released from prison because of the murder plus his criminal lifestyle leading up to the

murder and his need for further self-help programming that he had delayed getting. There is

a rational connection between the evidence relied on and the decision that he is a current

threat. Atherton’s acts on the date of the murder were unusually callous, as he went to the

hotel room and shoved a gun in one man’s face, fired a shot near him, and threatened him

before departing in search of his ultimate victim, who he shot in the head. The record

indicates that this was not a spontaneous shooting: Atherton went with a loaded weapon in

search of the murder victim. Not only were his acts not spontaneous within that day, for

months he had been manufacturing methamphetamine and for years he had been abusing

drugs. The extensive involvement with drug use and drug manufacturing leading up to the

murder made this prisoner one for whom the parole board could reasonably have great

concerns about his current dangerousness. His history also provided reasonable cause for

concern about his apparent waning interest in self-help programming, a waning interest that

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was demonstrated by him stopping about three years before the parole hearing and waited

many months to return to it after a previous parol board recommended he do so. His excuse

that he had not returned to a self-help program because he wanted to take a break did not sit

well with the BPH commissioners. Their dismay was understandable in light of their view

that Atherton’s activities on the day of the murder were “so seriously antisocial.” RT 65.

Atherton argues here that he only took a break from self-help programming because of

a conflict with his work assignment. Traverse, p. 2. However, he did not present this reason

to the BPH and the reason he did present to the BPH suggested that a lack of interest was the

reason for stopping the program. Where, as here, the legal question is whether there was

sufficient evidence to support a decision, the petitioner cannot ask the reviewing court to

decide his case based on evidence that is new and different from that which he presented to

the decisionmaker whose decision is being reviewed. 

Atherton correctly points out that his criminal history is not of the violent sort

mentioned under the regulation’s list of factors showing unsuitability, 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(2), but overlooks the fact that subsection (b) of the same regulation allows the panel

to consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. Atherton’s drug-related

criminal history is a substantial part of the picture and the BPH reasonably could consider it

in its parole suitability decision. Ignoring the drug-related criminal history would lead to an

inaccurate picture. 

Bearing in mind that the court's chore is to consider not whether some evidence

supports the reasons, but whether some evidence supports the conclusion that Atherton’s

release unreasonably endangers public safety, this court concludes that the Orange County

Superior Court's rejection of his insufficient evidence claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard. Atherton is

not entitled to the writ.

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The motion to lift a

stay is dismissed because this action was never stayed. (Docket # 9.) The clerk shall close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2010 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the

prisoner has an unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual

offense, the prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;

and negative institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances

tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social

history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered

from battered woman's syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age reduces the

probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or developed

marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

2. The California Supreme Court's determination in Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, that state

law requires the parole authority to determine whether the inmate is unsuitable for parole

because he currently is dangerous is binding in this federal habeas action. See Hicks v.

Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). However, Lawrence does not govern this court's

analysis in every respect. This court is not bound by the discussion in Lawrence

(see footnote 4, infra) as to the evaluation of the commitment offense in determining whether

the parole applicant currently is dangerous. As to that point, Lawrence is persuasive

authority, while the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Sass, Biggs, and Irons are binding authority. 

Also, Lawrence's determination that "some evidence" is the proper standard of judicial

review, 44 Cal. 4th at 1211-12, does not bind this court because it is a state court decision

and, in any event, was not determining the standard required by the federal constitution. 

3. En banc review is now pending in a fourth case regarding the some evidence standard,

Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008). The order granting en banc review states that the panel opinion is of no precedential

value. 

4. The California Supreme Court discussed the use of the commitment crime

to deny parole in the companion cases of Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, and In re Shaputis, 44

Cal. 4th 1241 (Cal. 2008). The court explained that where "evidence of the inmate's

rehabilitation and suitability for parole under the governing statutes and regulations is

overwhelming, the only evidence related to unsuitability is the gravity of the commitment

offense, and that offense is both temporally remote and mitigated by circumstances

indicating the conduct is unlikely to recur, the immutable circumstance that the commitment

offense involved aggravated conduct does not provide 'some evidence' inevitably supporting

the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety." Lawrence, 44 Cal.

4th at 1191 (emphasis in source). Applying that rule, the court determined that there was not

some evidence to deny parole in Lawrence but that there was some evidence to deny parole

in Shaputis. 

NOTES

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