Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00009/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Benjamin Lee West, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro; Arizona Attorney General, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 07-0009-PHX-FJM (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Benjamin West filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his conviction

in Maricopa County Superior Court for first degree murder, and the trial court’s imposition

of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years. He contends that trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to (1) timely notify West that the State had offered a plea agreement,

(2) object to an erroneous jury instruction, (3) raise an issue regarding a lesser-included

offense of involuntary manslaughter, and (4) subject the prosecution to a meaningful

adversarial challenge at all phases of the trial. He also argues that the trial court committed

fundamental error in its premeditation instruction to the jury. Respondents contend that

West’s petition is untimely, and in the alternative, that he has procedurally defaulted his

claims. The Court finds the petition is timely filed, but agrees that West’s grounds are

procedurally defaulted, and therefore recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

Case 2:07-cv-00009-FJM Document 13 Filed 09/13/07 Page 1 of 7
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BACKGROUND

The evidence supporting West’s conviction is summarized in the court of appeals’

memorandum decision:

West lived in an apartment with Kevin Fuller, Emmanuel Fuller

(“Fuller”) and Verick Gray (“Gray”). On the evening of the offense, West,

Fuller and Gray went out to celebrate Fuller’s birthday. The trio started

drinking at the apartment and eventually went to a social club in Mesa.

Once inside the club, the three separated. At some point in the evening

while at the club, Gray could not locate West and Fuller. A club employee

told Gray the other two had left the club and were not allowed back. Gray left

the club and noticed that his vehicle was missing. West then drove Gray’s

vehicle into the parking lot and told Gray to get into it so that they could leave

as someone had been shooting at them. Gray noticed that West and Fuller

were arguing, and that West was holding a gun.

The argument between West and Fuller was ongoing when Fuller told

Gray to drop him off at his girlfriend’s apartment. Gray asked them to stop

fighting but they continued. When they reached the apartment, Fuller went

inside and then quickly returned to the vehicle and asked to be taken to a

nearby gas station. Gray drove to the gas station while West and Fuller

continued to argue.

West was still holding the gun when they returned to the parking lot

outside of the apartment. Gray again asked the other two to stop arguing.

Fuller then asked West if he was going to “smoke him.” West immediately

exited the vehicle and told Fuller to do the same. Gray stepped out of the

vehicle and attempted to stop the altercation by standing in the line of fire.

West demanded Gray move out of the way. When he did, West began

shooting at Fuller, the bullets striking him several times. Fuller asked West to

“chill out.” West fired again and Fuller fell. West walked over to Fuller’s

body and shot him in the head from close range before he and Gray drove off.

A witness called police and West was arrested. Fuller’s autopsy

showed that he had been shot several times and had died as a result of four to

seven gunshot wounds.

(Doc. #11, Exh V, memorandum decision at 2-3).

On direct review, West argued that the trial court committed fundamental error by

giving a premeditation instruction disapproved in State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471 (2003).

The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, conceding that the instruction was incorrect,

but finding the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Id. at 4-6). The supreme court

denied review (Doc. #11, Exh Y). West filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, and

a subsequent petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of counsel’s failure

to communicate a plea offer of second-degree murder. Following an October 14 evidentiary

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hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement, and on December 6, 2005, denied

West’s petition, finding that West was not denied effective assistance of counsel because the

testimony from both the prosecutor and defense counsel verified that the only offer extended

was a plea to first-degree murder with a stipulated sentence of life in prison with the

possibility of parole after 25 years (Id., Exh AA-II). West did not file a petition for review.

His federal petition was signed on December 5, 2006, and file stamped with the District

Court on January 3, 2007.

TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

West was required to file his federal petition within 1 year of the date the judgment

of conviction became final in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). West’s case became final

on direct review on November 15, 2004, the date upon which the time for filing a petition

for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). However, "[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation." See

2244(d)(2).

West’s post-conviction petition was pending until it was dismissed by the trial court

on December 6, 2005. Although the minute entry was filed on December 6, it was entered

in the clerk’s minutes on November 28, 2005. Respondents assert that the earlier date is the

date of the final ruling. The Court disagrees. In criminal proceedings, to avoid delay,

judgments are complete when orally pronounced and entered in court minutes, and not on the

later date of filing. Sims v. Ryan, 181 Ariz. 330, 331 (App. 1995). In Maricopa County,

under-advisement minute entry orders are by definition “not orally pronounced,” often

resulting in a gap of time between the time of entry in the clerk’s minutes, and the later date

of filing. It would thus appear that the latter date of December 6, 2005, should control in this

case. The Arizona Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in a case involving a very

limited time to appeal from a termination of parental rights in a juvenile proceeding (15

days). See Matter of Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-8441, 174 Ariz. 341, 342-43

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1

Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a filing is deemed “filed” when handed by the

prisoner to a prison official for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988).

See also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying “mailbox rule”

to a habeas petition).

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(1992). The Court has been provided no authority for not applying this same rule to the date

of a criminal post-conviction ruling. Indeed, the State does not even bring this issue to the

Court’s attention, but instead merely states that the date of the ruling was November 28. The

Court finds that the one-year period of limitations began to run on December 7, 2005.

West’s petition, filed on December 5, 2006,1

 is therefore timely.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be

met where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

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may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is "independent"

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'"

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

DISCUSSION

In his first ground, West alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, as he did in his state

post-conviction proceedings. In the state proceedings, his argument was limited to trial

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 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1986).

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counsel’s failure to timely inform West of a plea offer to second-degree murder. In his

federal petition, he also alleges that trial counsel failed to (1) object to an erroneous

instruction defining reasonable doubt; (2) raise an issue regarding the lesser-included offense

of involuntary manslaughter and (3) “subject [the] prosecution to meaningful adversarial

challenge.” West’s failure to raise these three additional claims of ineffective assistance in

his post-conviction proceedings means he has not “fairly presented” these claims in state

court. Swoopes. In addition, because he did not petition the court of appeals for review of

the trial court’s denial of the only ineffective assistance claim that he did raise in his postconviction petition, he did not “fairly present his claims to the state's highest court.”

O'Sullivan. Finally, a return to state court would be futile, because the trial court would rule

them precluded as not properly presented and/or reviewed during his first Rule 32

proceedings. Teague.

In his second ground, West argues, as he did on appeal, that the trial court committed

fundamental error by giving a premeditation instruction disapproved in State v. Thompson.

Respondents argue that he did not raise this argument on appeal as a federal claim. The

Court acknowledges that a state court is not required to “read beyond the petition or brief in

that court which does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541

U.S. 27, 33 (2004). However, the state court undoubtedly was alerted to the presence of a

federal claim by the citation to State v. Thompson, where the defendant claimed that the

instruction was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “[F]or purposes of exhaustion, a

citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a

citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue.” See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153,

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). In any event, the claim is without merit. Quoting from Chapman v.

California,

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 the court of appeals found the instruction harmless error, concluding that “no

reasonable jury could have found other than that West actually reflected on his decision to

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kill Fuller, and we therefore conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in the jury

instruction did not affect this verdict.” See Doc. #11, Exh V at 7. The state court’s

determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Benjamin Lee West’s petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 11th day of September, 2007.

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