Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01797/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01797-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PCT International Incorporated,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Holland Electronics LLC,

Defendant.

No. CV-12-01797-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff PCT International, Inc. (“PCT”)’s motion for 

supplemental damages. (Doc. 449). The Court now rules on the motion.

I. Background

On September 8, 2015, the Court entered judgment in favor of PCT and against 

Holland Electronics LLC (“Holland”) in the amount of $576,027.53. (Doc. 433 at 1). On 

this same date, the Court also granted PCT’s motion for an accounting of Holland’s sales 

of infringing products from February 26, 2015 (the day following the last day for which 

evidence of Holland’s sales was submitted to the jury), through September 8, 

2015. (Doc. 432 at 34–35). On September 21, 2015, Holland appealed “from the 

judgment, order, and other relief entered on September 8, 2015, including the underlying 

claim construction and other rulings by the district court.” (Doc. 434 at 1). On October 

21, 2015, the parties stipulated that “the Court’s judgment should be amended to reflect 

an additional damage award of $32,561.94.” (Doc. 446). The Court, noting that an appeal 

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generally divests a trial court of jurisdiction, ordered briefing on the issue of whether it

retained subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 448). In light of the Court’s order, the parties 

contest whether the Court may award supplemental damages (Docs. 449; 453). The 

amount of damages is not at issue. See (Doc. 449 at 3). Having briefly reviewed the 

procedural background since judgment, the Court now turns to the pending motion.

II. Discussion

As noted supra, at issue is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to 

award PCT supplemental damages following an appeal of the initial judgment. Holland 

argues that PCT should have filed a timely motion under one of the applicable Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure1 which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, will 

deactivate a circuit court’s jurisdiction following an appeal. (Doc. 453 at 2). PCT

principally argues that Fed. R. Civ. P. 62 and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (2012) allow 

the Court to enter supplemental judgment in the amount agreed to by the parties’ 

stipulated accounting. (Doc. 454 at 2). 

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the applicable legal 

authority here is Rule 62 and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2).2The plain language of Rule 62 

states:

Except as stated in this rule, no execution may issue on a judgment, nor 

may proceedings be taken to enforce it, until 14 days have passed after its 

entry. But unless the court orders otherwise, the following are not stayed 

after being entered, even if an appeal is taken: . . . a judgment or order that 

 

1 Holland argues that per Fed. R. App. P. 4, PCT must seek to amend the judgment 

through Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. There is no dispute that PCT did not 

file a motion to amend the judgment under either of these provisions.

2 Holland argues that “no party has contended that the Court’s order directing an 

accounting was stayed” and that “[i]t is not evident how Rule 62(a)(2) authorizes or 

supports entry of a ‘supplemental judgment.’” (Doc. 453 at 3). The Court acknowledges 

that neither has the Court ordered a stay nor have the parties explicitly filed a motion to

stay. But Rule 62 applies here because the motion for supplemental damages arises from 

the order of an accounting for infringement damages. Furthermore, in line with the policy 

considerations underlying § 1292(c)(2), the amount of damages has already been 

calculated, rendering the award of supplemental damages analogous to an accounting. 

The policy considerations underlying § 1292(c)(2) will be fully discussed infra.

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directs an accounting in an action for patent infringement.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a)(2). Although an appeal is generally an event of jurisdictional 

significance that divests the district court of jurisdiction and confers it upon the court of 

appeals, Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982), Rule

62(a)(2) expressly states that “a judgment or order that directs an accounting in an action 

for patent infringement” is not stayed. Importantly, an “accounting” includes the 

determination of damages flowing from the patent infringement that was not included 

within the initial judgment. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 

1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Icyclair, Inc., v. Dist. Court of 

U.S. for S. Dist. of California, Cent. Div., 93 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1937), demonstrates

that an appeal does not divest a district court of jurisdiction to proceed with an 

accounting. In Icyclair, Inc., the district court found the defendant had infringed upon the 

plaintiff’s patents and referred the case to a special master for the purpose of determining 

damages and taking an accounting. 93 F.2d at 626. The defendants subsequently appealed 

the decree, which was final except for an accounting. Id. Post-appeal, the district court 

entered a second decree on the accounting. Id. The Ninth Circuit considered the 

predecessor statute to Rule 62(a)(2) and held that “the pendency of an appeal from the 

first decree constituted no impediment to the entry of the second decree.” Id. Indeed, 

courts in this Circuit have noted that under Rule 62(a)(2), a stay of the damages phase of 

a patent trial is the exception rather than the rule. R.E. Serv. Co. v. Johnson & Johnston 

Associates, Inc., 1995 WL 138545, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1995).

3

The Court also finds that Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co, 192 F.3d 973, 975 (Fed. 

 

3

R.E. Serv. Co. applied a “‘competing interest’” test to weigh whether a district 

court should exercise its discretion to stay an accounting following an appeal. 1995 WL 

138545, at *3 (quoting Filtrol Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1972)). The 

test includes weighing such factors as possible damage that may result from granting a 

stay, hardship or inequity that parties may suffer as a result of taking an accounting, and 

judicial expediency. Id. Here, Holland has failed to demonstrate any detriment it would 

incur as a result of the Court entering supplemental damages. Moreover, the factor of 

judicial expediency also weighs in favor of entering the accounting, or supplemental 

damages. Thus, even under the “competing interest” test, the Court’s conclusion would 

not change.

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Cir. 1999) supports the conclusion that the Court retains jurisdiction to enter 

supplemental damages post-appeal. In Elkay, the court ordered the plaintiff to file

petitions for infringement damages for the time period beginning on the day following 

the last date included in the initial judgment award and ending the day prior to the courtimposed permanent injunction. Elkay Mfg., No. 1:93-cv-05106 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1998) 

at Docs. 209; 224. Notably, the court-imposed permanent injunction to prevent further 

patent infringement did not become effective until approximately three weeks after the 

initial judgment. Id. at Doc. 209. Plaintiff, complying with the court’s orders, filed two 

motions pursuant to Rule 59(e): one motion for pre-verdict supplemental damages, id. at 

Doc. 211, and another motion for post-verdict supplemental damages (including the time 

period between entry of initial judgment until effect of the permanent injunction), id. at 

Doc. 242. Prior to the court awarding supplemental damages, the defendant appealed. Id.

at Doc. 245. Nonetheless, the court granted both motions and awarded supplemental 

damages to Plaintiff, including post-verdict infringement damages. Id. at Docs. 266; 267.

Holland attempts to distinguish Elkay in that it involved post-verdict damages 

whereas, here, pre-verdict damages are at issue. (Doc. 453 at 4). But as the Court has 

previously stated: “the Court cannot discern a principled distinction . . . between an 

accounting of pre-verdict damages and post-verdict damages.” (Doc. 432 at 34); see also 

Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

(finding an “absence of any meaningful distinction between pre-verdict and post-verdict 

infringement” damages). Thus, Holland’s stand-alone argument that the pre-verdict 

damages at issue here differ from the post-verdict damages in Elkay lacks support to 

substantiate a meaningful distinction. Furthermore, the sole reason that Elkay involved

post-verdict damages was due to the fact that the court did not order the permanent 

injunction to become effective until approximately three weeks after entry of the initial 

judgment whereas in the instant case the Court ordered the permanent injunction effective 

the same date as the initial judgment. 

Holland further attempts to distinguish Elkay by emphasizing that the plaintiff in 

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that case timely filed a Fed. R. of Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend the judgment. Elkay 

Mfg., No. 1:93-cv-05106 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1998) at Doc. 211. Here, the motion for 

supplemental damages was previously recognized by the Court as the Stipulated 

Accounting and Supplemental Damages that arose from the Court’s ruling that PCT was 

entitled to such an accounting.4(Doc. 424 at 31–35). But—as in Elkay—the Court seeks

to supplement the initial damage award under Rule 62. Therefore, the Court does not find 

Holland’s distinction of Elkay persuasive.

Holland next argues that the language of § 1292 of the United States Code5

suggests the Court does not retain jurisdiction to proceed with an award of supplemental 

damages post-appeal. But the Federal Circuit Court makes plain that a district court has

discretion to proceed with a determination of damages and has “repeatedly denied”

motions to stay damages trials during appeals in patent cases. In re Calmar, 854 F.2d 

461, 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Furminator, Inc. v. Kim Laube & Co., Inc., 410 Fed. Appx. 

341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Indeed, the Federal Circuit Court has explained that the purpose 

of § 1292(c)(2) is to “permit a stay of a damages trial”

6—only to conserve the time and 

 

4 Holland argues that, unlike the plaintiff in Elkay, PCT did not file a Rule 59 

motion to amend the judgment and is therefore precluded from receiving a supplemental 

damage award. (Doc. 453 at 2). However, Holland’s argument does not aptly consider

that PCT, prior to judgment, filed a timely motion requesting an accounting of 

“supplemental damages,” (Doc. 405 at 7), and that the Court ruled on the same date as 

entry of judgment that PCT is entitled to the accounting of supplemental damages, (Doc. 

432 at 34–35). Thus, another motion to amend the judgment was not necessary in the 

instant matter given the Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 62 and the policy justifications 

for 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2).

5

“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 

jurisdiction— . . . of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement 

which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2).

6 Holland argues there is a distinction between proceeding with a damages trial

following an interlocutory appeal and the issue here of proceeding with an accounting 

following appeal from a judgment. (Doc. 453 at 3 (citing Furminator, 410 Fed Appx. at 

340)). In Furminator, the court bifurcated infringement and damages and the defendant 

filed an interlocutory appeal following a finding of infringement before the damages trial. 

410 Fed. Appx. at 341. The Court acknowledges the distinction, but because more 

resources would be expended in conducting a damages trial than here where infringement 

damages have already been calculated in the accounting, the policy justifications for § 

1292 weigh even more so in favor of entering supplemental damages. Thus, the 

differences between Furminator and this case neither support rejecting the reasoning 

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resources required for a determination of infringement damages following an initial

judgment until after the appeal. In re Calmar, 854 F.2d at 464 (emphasis in original); see 

also McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 331 U.S. 96, 98–99 (1947) (finding that the 

purpose of § 1292(c)(2) is to conserve resources and to ensure that parties can appeal 

decisions in patent equity infringement suits without being compelled to await a final 

accounting). Here, as the record makes clear, the parties have already expended the 

requisite time and energy to calculate supplemental infringement damages. Furthermore,

Holland has not pointed to any authority showing that § 1292(c)(2) conflicts with Rule 

62(a). Consequently, the Court finds no conflict between § 1292(c)(2) and Rule 62(a), 

and § 1292(c)(2) does not support a discretionary stay here where conservation of 

resources is not a relevant concern.

7

In sum, Rule 62(a)(2) governs the matter of the Court’s jurisdiction and allows 

the Court to award supplemental damages post-appeal. Holland concedes that “the 

amount listed in the parties’ stipulation is correct.” (Doc. 449 at 3). The underlying policy 

justifications of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (c)(2) support entering supplemental judgment, and the 

Court will avoid expending unnecessary duplicative energy and resources and having to 

revisit the supplemental damages issue again in the future. Finally, Holland will not be 

harmed by the decision as it may appeal the award of supplemental damages. See Elkay, 

192 F.3d at 975.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to 

enter supplemental damages.8Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, (Doc. 446 at 2), the 

 

underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), nor convinces the Court that it does not have 

jurisdiction to proceed with an accounting, or an award of supplemental damages.

7

There is authority suggesting that an accounting generally should be stayed once 

an appeal is filed for reasons of conserving the parties’ and the courts’ time and 

resources. Wright et al., Patent Infringement Decrees, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3928 

(3d ed. 2015). But, as the Court previously stated, the policy concerns are not present in 

the instant matter.

8

The Court need not address PCT’s secondary argument—that Holland’s appeal 

was premature, (Doc. 454 at 2)—as the Court concludes that it has subject matter 

jurisdiction to award PCT supplemental damages. 

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Court hereby awards $32,561.94 in supplemental damages. The supplemental damages 

award is in addition to the initial damages award of $576,027.53. (Doc. 433 at 1).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that PCT’s motion for $32,561.94 in supplemental damages, 

(Doc. 449), is GRANTED; and the Clerk of Court shall issue judgment in this amount in 

favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. (This is a supplemental judgment and does not 

amend or in any way impact the original judgment).

Dated this 30th day of March, 2016.

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