Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01191/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1191

___________

Reginald Smith, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Missouri Department of Corrections, * Eastern District of Missouri.

Gary Kempker, Director; Charles *

Chastain, III, Doctor; Sharon Roper; *

Correctional Medical Services; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Elizabeth Conley, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: October 19, 2006

Filed: November 6, 2006

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Before SMITH, MAGILL, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Missouri inmate Reginald Smith filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against

employees of the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) and Correctional

Medical Services (CMS), claiming that defendants denied him adequate medical care

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Smith alleged that Dr. Charles

Chastain, III, exhibited deliberate indifference in diagnosing his diabetes-related foot

problem as gout, which led to the amputation of his foot. Smith alleged that he

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“begged” for “standard care,” but that Dr. Chastain would not allow him to see a

specialist due to the cost, and told him, “Wait until you get to your regular institution

for all of these problems,” and, “We are not set up for all of this.” He alleged that the

other defendants did not intervene to provide proper care. He further alleged that

another doctor subsequently stated that Smith should have been given antibiotics. The

district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it was identical to an earlier

complaint Smith had filed in Smith v. Chastain, No. 2:03-CV-1621 (E.D. Mo. Sept.

9, 2004), which was dismissed without prejudice. The court held that the prior

dismissal had res judicata effect.

We do not believe res judicata is a proper basis for dismissal. While res

judicata does apply to in forma pauperis (IFP) frivolousness determinations for future

IFP frivolousness determinations, see Waller v. Groose, 38 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.

1994) (per curiam), here the conditions of res judicata are not met because the first

action was dismissed without prejudice. See Pohlmann v. Bil-Jax, Inc., 176 F.3d

1110, 1112 (8th Cir. 1999) (“generally agree[ing] that dismissal of a case without

prejudice . . . creates no res judicata bar”); see also Rosemann v. Roto-Die, Inc., 276

F.3d 393, 398 (8th Cir. 2002) (count dismissed without prejudice resulted in non-final

disposition that did not create res judicata bar).

We further find that, liberally construed, Smith’s instant complaint states a

deliberate-indifference claim. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)

(complaint fails to state claim if it appears beyond doubt plaintiff can prove no facts

entitling him to relief); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (per

curiam) (complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state claim unless it is clear

plaintiff can prove no set of facts supporting his claim which would entitle him to

relief; pro se complaints must be liberally construed); Burke v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr.

& Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (medical treatment so

inappropriate as to evidence refusal to provide essential care violates Eighth

Amendment); Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001) (medical treatment

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may so deviate from applicable standard of care as to show deliberate indifference, but

such departure is factual question often requiring expert opinion to resolve); Smith v.

Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 92-94 (8th Cir. 1990) (grossly incompetent or inadequate care

can constitute deliberate indifference, as can doctor’s decision to take easier and less

efficacious course of treatment); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703-04 (2d Cir.

1998) (action improperly dismissed for failure to state claim where inmate alleged

treatment recommendations were based on monetary incentives and not medical

views).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion. We deny as moot Smith’s request for appellate counsel.

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