Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00050/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIO MAYEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC dba 

SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE 

SERVICING,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-50 JLS (MDD)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; AND

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

(ECF Nos. 6, 6-2)

Presently before the Court is Defendant New Penn Financial, LLC’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or for a More Definite Statement, (“MTD,” ECF No. 6-1).

Also before the Court are Plaintiff Julio Mayen’s Response in Opposition and Objection

to, (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 7), and Defendant’s Reply in Support of, (“Reply,” ECF No. 8), 

Defendant’s MTD, as well as Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion 

to Dismiss, (“RJN,” ECF No. 9-2). The Court vacated the hearing on the motion and took 

the matter under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 9.) After 

considering the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART Defendant’s RJN and GRANTS Defendant’s MTD.

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BACKGROUND

On December 27, 2004, Plaintiff Julio Mayen purchased the residential property 

located at 15335 Castle Peak Lane, Jamul, CA 91935 (the “Property”) with a $1,088,000 

loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Property, from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 

(Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff “allegedly defaulted on the loan” on March 1, 2009. 

(Id. ¶ 19.) On December 24, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that Resurgent Capital Services L.P.

(“Resurgent”) “sent Plaintiff a letter stating they have acquired the servicing rights of 

Plaintiffs [sic] defaulted loan.” (Id. ¶ 20.) In response, Plaintiff claims he “sent Resurgent 

a debt validation letter disputing the amount and validity of the debt” on January 31, 2014.

(Id. ¶ 21.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff alleges he received “a notice from Resurgent and 

Shellpoint transferring servicing rights to Shellpoint” on February 14, 2014, (id. ¶ 22), and 

in response, Plaintiff claims he “sent Shellpoint a debt validation letter disputing the 

amount and validity of the debt” on March 31, 2014, (id. ¶ 23). 

Plaintiff further alleges that in response to Plaintiff’s letters disputing his debt, 

“Shellpoint has provided documents as if Plaintiff has requested a Qualified Written 

Request (QWR) instead of account-level documents substantiating the amount and validity 

of the debt,” and that “[t]o this date, Defendant has never validated or verified the alleged 

debt.” (Id. ¶ 24.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant, for the past 12 months, has 

sent Plaintiff six demands for payment without providing any account-level documentation 

substantiating the amount of the debt.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that 

“Defendant’s correspondence regarding debt amounts due are very inconsistent and 

confusing.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on January 11, 2017, alleging causes 

of action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

(“FDCPA”) and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code 

section 1788, et seq. (“RFDCPA”). (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff brings three claims 

against Defendant based on these allegations: (1) Defendant’s continued collection activity 

of a disputed debt violates FDCPA Section 1692g(b); (2) Defendant’s false representation 

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of the character and amount of Plaintiff’s debt violates FDCPA Section 1692e(2)A; and 

(3) Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA constitute violations of the RFDCPA. (See 

generally id.) Plaintiff seeks statutory and actual damages, attorney’s fees, costs, and 

injunctive relief. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.) On March 17, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint or for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 6.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states 

a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it 

[does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A complaint will not suffice 

“if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ 

a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 

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550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained 

in the complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s 

“judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, 

the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” 

Id.

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must 

accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). When a plaintiff appears pro se, the 

court must be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff any 

benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Thompson, 295 F.3d 

at 895. Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court will grant leave to 

amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with the challenged 

pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655,

658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schriber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, “before dismissing a pro se complaint the district 

court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to 

ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Ferdick v. Bonzelet, 963 

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

I. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is accompanied by a Request for Judicial Notice. 

(See generally RJN.) Although within the context of a motion to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a Court generally may not consider matters outside of 

the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), it is nonetheless “appropriate for the Court to take 

notice of ‘relevant facts obtained from the public record . . . .’ ” See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 

298; see also Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting 

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that a court may “take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record” and that 

“documents not attached to a complaint may be considered if no party questions their 

authenticity and the complaint relies on those documents” (citing Lee v. City of L.A., 250 

F.3d 668, 688, 689 (9th Cir. 2001))).

Defendant moves the Court to take judicial notice of fourteen exhibits in support of 

its motion: (1) the Deed of Trust recorded on December 30, 2004 in the Official Records 

of the County Recorder’s Office of San Diego County, California; (2) the Assignment of 

Deed of Trust recorded on June 13, 2011 in the Official Records of the County Recorder’s 

Office of San Diego County, California; (3) the Notice of Default and Election to Sell under 

Deed of Trust recorded on February 29, 2016 in the Official Records of the County 

Recorder’s Office of San Diego County, California; (4) the Notice of Trustee’s Sale 

recorded on June 27, 2016 in the Official Records of the County Recorder’s Office of San 

Diego County, California; (5) the Electronic Docket from Case No. 13-01660-LT13, 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California; (6) the Voluntary 

Petition for Individuals Filings for Bankruptcy filed by Plaintiff on February 21, 2013 in 

Case No. 13-01660-LT13, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 

California; (7) the Balance of Schedules, Statements, and/or Chapter 13 Plan filed by 

Plaintiff on March 22, 2013 in Case No. 13-01660-LT13, United States Bankruptcy Court 

for the Southern District of California; (8) the Electronic Docket from Case No. 16-05104-

LT13, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California; (9) the 

Voluntary Petition for Individuals Filings for Bankruptcy filed by Plaintiff on August 22, 

2016 in Case No. 16-05104-LT13, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 

District of California; (10) the Balance of Schedules, Statements, and/or Chapter 13 Plan 

filed by Plaintiff on September 20, 2016 in Case No. 16-05104-LT13, United States 

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California; (11) the Electronic Docket from 

Case No. 16-07181-LT13, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 

California; (12) the Voluntary Petition for Individuals Filings for Bankruptcy filed by 

Plaintiff on November 28, 2016 in Case No. 16-07181-LT13, United States Bankruptcy 

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Court for the Southern District of California; (13) the Balance of Schedules, Statements, 

and/or Chapter 13 Plan filed by Plaintiff on January 4, 2017 in Case No. 16-07181-LT13, 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California; and (14) the Notice 

of Entry of Order Dismissing Case and Vacating All Automatic Stays and Injunctions 

issued on March 9, 2017 in Case No. 16-07181-LT13, United States Bankruptcy Court for 

the Southern District of California. (See generally RJN.)

Plaintiff opposes all documents filed by Defendant for “trying to make this case 

about [Plaintiff’s] alleged debt.” (Opp’n 6.

1

) Plaintiff further argues that the exhibits filed 

by Defendant “are irrelevant in this case for the simple reason that this case is about the 

conduct of Shellpoint as they attempted to collect an alleged debt” and that “[t]his is a very 

straight forward claim for violations of the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act resulting from 

Shellpoint’s conduct and has nothing to do with any alleged debt.” (Id. (emphasis in 

original).) However, Plaintiff does not question the authenticity of Defendant’s Exhibits 1 

and 32and the documents are objectively verifiable. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Given the 

foregoing, and because Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s failure to allege facts 

supporting claims under the FDCPA and RFDCPA has the potential to dispose of all of 

Plaintiff’s causes of action, the Court find Exhibits 1 and 3 are validly judicially noticed.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s 

RJN.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA and RFDCPA claims on multiple

grounds: (1) judicial estoppel from Plaintiff’s three prior bankruptcies bars Plaintiff from 

bringing this entire action; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting claims under the 

FDCPA or RFDCPA; and (3) Plaintiff fails to include a necessary and indispensable 

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

2 Because the Court does not need to consider Exhibits 2 or 4–14 to rule on Defendant’s MTD, infra

Sections II.A–B, the Court does not grant judicial notice to Exhibits 2 or 4–14. 

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party—co-borrower, Sarah A. Mayen. (See generally Defendant’s Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities to Its Motion to Dismiss or for a More Definite Statement (“MTD”), ECF 

No. 6-1.) Alternatively, Defendant requests that Plaintiff provide a more definite statement. 

(Id.) However, before the Court can determine whether judicial estoppel bars this entire 

action, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiff’s allegations support a cause of 

action under the FDCPA or RFDCPA. If Plaintiff is unable to allege sufficient facts

supporting the plausibility of his claims that Defendant violated the FDCPA or RFDCPA, 

then Plaintiff never had a claim to disclose during Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings.

A. Whether Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim for Violation of the FDCPA

Defendant argues that it does not qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA 

because Plaintiff “has not alleged Shellpoint began servicing his loan after he had already 

defaulted” and “[a]s the complaint currently stands, it is altogether unclear what the status 

of the loan was at the time of service transfer to Shellpoint.” (MTD 4–5.) Defendant further 

argues that Plaintiff’s claim “fails because his loan obligation serviced by Shellpoint is not 

a ‘consumer debt’ for FDCPA purposes” and even if Plaintiff’s mortgage loan did qualify 

as a consumer debt under the FDCPA, “the complaint does not contain a single specific 

fact connecting Shellpoint’s conduct to any FDCPA prohibition.” (Id. at 5.) In response, 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA because “the 

alleged default date of the alleged loan was March 1, 2009 which was at least four and a 

half years prior to” Plaintiff receiving the February 14, 2014 “notice from 

Resurgent/Shellpoint transferring servicing rights to Shellpoint.” (Opp’n 12.) And 

therefore, Plaintiff argues, Defendant’s failure to respond to Plaintiff’s March 31, 2014 

“debt [v]alidation letter disputing the amount and validity of the debt” and Defendant’s 

“six different demands for payment without providing any account-level documentation 

substantiating the amount of the alleged debt” constitute “continued collection activity of 

a disputed debt making this lawsuit ripe and proper for this claim.” (Id. at 13.) 

Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 

collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 

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collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State 

action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The 

FDCPA “regulates the conduct of debt collectors, imposing affirmative obligations and 

broadly prohibiting abusive practices.” Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 

1055, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2011). To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: 

(1) that he is a consumer; (2) that the debt arises out of a transaction entered into for 

personal, family, or household purposes; (3) that the defendant qualifies as a debt collector

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); and (4) that the defendant violated one of the provisions of 

the FDCPA. Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 

2011). Because Plaintiff’s debt originates from his obligation to pay for property he 

purchased for personal use, only the third and fourth prongs are at issue here.

(1) Whether Defendant Qualifies as a Debt Collector

Under the FDCPA, “[t]he term ‘debt collector’ means any person who . . . [is] in any 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly 

collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 

owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) of the FDCPA 

exempts—among other entities—“a mortgage servicing company, or any assignee of the 

debt, so long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” Nool v. HomeQ 

Servicing, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title 

Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also De Dios v. Int’l Realty & Invs., 641 

F.3d 1071, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ebt collector does not include those ‘mortgage 

service companies and others who service outstanding debts for others, so long as the debts 

were not in default when taken for servicing . . . .’ ”) (summarizing and quoting S. Rep. 

No. 95–382, at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698); id.

(“[E]xemption in § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) was intended to apply to mortgage companies and 

other parties ‘whose business is servicing current accounts . . . .’ ”) (summarizing and 

quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n, Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

§ 803, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,103 (Dec. 13, 1988) (emphasis in original)). Therefore, to 

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determine the threshold issue of whether Defendant, a mortgage servicing company, 

qualifies as a debt collector, the Court must first address whether Plaintiff’s debt was in 

default at the time it was assigned to Defendant.

Because the FDCPA does not define “in default,” “courts interpreting Section 

1692a(6)(F)(iii) look to any underlying contracts and applicable law governing the debt at 

issue.” De Dios, 641 F.3d at 1074; cf. id. at 1075 n.3 (noting further that the FDCPA’s 

“legislative history is consistent with construing ‘in default’ to mean a debt that is at least 

delinquent, and sometimes more than overdue.”). Here, the recorded Deed of Trust to 

Plaintiff’s property that Defendant filed as Exhibit 1 states the following:

Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or 

criminal, is begun that, in Lender’s judgment, could result in forfeiture of the 

Property or other material impairment of Lender’s interest in the Property or 

rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, 

if acceleration has occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing 

the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling that, in Lender’s 

judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of 

Lender’s interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. The 

proceeds of any award or claim for damages that are attributable to the 

impairment of Lender’s interest in the Property are hereby assigned and shall 

be paid to Lender.

(MTD Ex. 1, ECF No. 6-3, at 11.) However, the recorded Notice of Default and Election 

to Sell Under Deed of Trust filed by Defendant as Exhibit 3 identifies Plaintiff’s debt as 

delinquent and overdue since March 1, 2009. (MTD Ex. 3, ECF No. 6-3, at 73 (“A breach 

of, and default in, the obligations for which such Deed of Trust is security has occurred in 

that payment has not been made of the following: The monthly installment which became 

due on 3/1/2009, along with late charges, and all subsequent monthly installments.”).) 

Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff never alleged the loan was in default are 

unavailing. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that he “allegedly defaulted on the loan” on 

March 1, 2009, and that on February 14, 2014, he “received a notice from Resurgent and 

Shellpoint transferring servicing rights to Shellpoint.” (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 22.) Plaintiff further 

alleges that “Shellpoint acquired the servicing rights of Plaintiff’s consumer debt over four 

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and a half years after default . . . .” (Id. ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 3 (noting that Plaintiff’s claim 

is brought “as a result of Defendant’s conduct in the collection of an alleged consumer debt 

in default for over four and a half years prior to being assigned to Defendant for 

collection”).) In response to Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant neither disputes that the 

mortgage loan was in default, nor cites to any evidence to support that argument in its MTD 

or Reply. The Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, and must 

construe the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff. Given that payments on the loan were overdue and delinquent for 

over four and a half years, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts plausibly 

showing that the debt was in default at the time it was assigned to Defendant. Accordingly, 

the Court concludes that Defendant qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA. 

(2) Whether Defendant’s Conduct Violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g

Section 1692g governs the validation of debts and requires that “within five days 

after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any

debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial 

communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice.”

§ 1692g(a). The initial communication or notice must contain the following information: 

(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is 

owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt 

of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt 

will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the 

consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period 

that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain 

verification of the debt or a copy of a judgement against the consumer and a 

copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the 

debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request 

within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with 

the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current 

creditor.

Id. To satisfy the requirements of § 1692g(a), “the notice Congress required must be 

conveyed effectively to the debtor. It must be large enough to be easily read and sufficiently 

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prominent to be noticed . . . [and it] must not be overshadowed or contradicted by other 

messages or notices appearing in the initial communication from the collection agency.” 

Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Swanson v. S. Or. Credit 

Service, Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988)). In this circuit, courts assess the 

sufficiency of a notice “under the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard.” Swanson, 869 F.2d 

at 1225. The purpose of the standard is “ ‘to protect consumers of below average 

sophistication or intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naïve,’ particularly when 

those individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1062 (quoting 

Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874–75 (8th Cir. 2000)). However, the standard also 

“ ‘preserv[es] a quotient of reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding 

and willingness to read with care.’ ” Id. (quoting Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 

221 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Section 1692g(b) identifies the following course of action for a consumer to dispute 

a debt and the appropriate response from the debt collector: 

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day 

period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 

disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original 

creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed 

portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a 

copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a 

copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original 

creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.

Section 1692g was added to the FDCPA “specifically to ensure that debt collectors gave 

consumers adequate information concerning their legal rights.” Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225.

Thus identification of the sender of the notice is central to whether a notice is deficient 

because § 1692g(a) requires the entity seeking collection of any debt to send an initial 

communication or notice with the requisite information identified above. Moreover, any

determination on the sufficiency of a defendant’s notice of debt requires reviewing the 

information contained in the notice and the manner in which it is presented. However, §§

1692g(a) and 1692g(b) also require that a consumer wishing to dispute a debt must do so 

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within thirty days of receipt of notice of debt, and a “tardy request for verification of the 

debt [does] not trigger any obligation on the part of the [debt collector] to verify the debt.” 

Mahon v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff alleges that on February 14, 2014, he “received a notice from Resurgent and 

Shellpoint transferring servicing rights to Shellpoint.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) Because the notice 

was not an exhibit to the Complaint, the Court is unable to ascertain from Plaintiff’s 

allegations which debt collector, Resurgent or Shellpoint, sent the notice. Furthermore, the 

Court cannot ascertain from Plaintiff’s allegations what information the notice contained, 

aside from identifying the transfer of servicing rights from Resurgent to Shellpoint. 

Consequently, the Court must find that Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly state a claim

that Defendant’s notice was deficient under § 1692g(a).

To be sure, allegations that Defendant violated § 1692g(a) are not necessary for 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant separately violated § 1692g(b). However, Plaintiff alleges 

that he sent Defendant “a debt validation letter disputing the amount and validity of the 

debt” on March 31, 2014, (id. ¶ 23), i.e., forty-five days after the notice sent from 

Resurgent/Shellpoint. Based on Plaintiff’s own allegations, his debt validation letter was 

untimely and Defendant was under no obligation to verify the debt. Therefore the Court 

must find that Plaintiff fails to state a facially plausible claim that Defendant violated 

§ 1692g(b) of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this portion of Defendant’s 

MTD.

(3) Whether Defendant’s Conduct Violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)A

Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated § 1692e(2)A for the following reasons: (a) 

“Defendant has never substantiated the principle amount of this alleged debt as true and 

accurate;” (b) “Defendant’s correspondence regarding debt amounts due are [sic] very 

inconsistent and confusing;” and (c) “Defendant has falsely represented the character and 

amount of this debt.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) In response, Defendant argues that “the complaint 

does not contain a single specific fact connecting Shellpoint’s conduct to any FDCPA 

prohibition.” (MTD 5.) 

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Under § 1692e, “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Section 1692e(2)A 

specifically identifies “[t]he false representation of—the character, amount, or legal status 

of any debt” as conduct that violates § 1692e. In this circuit, “liability under § 1692e of the 

FDCPA is an issue of law.” Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1061. Determining whether conduct 

violates § 1692e “requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether the ‘least 

sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication.’ ” Donohue v. Quick 

Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions 

LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, 

the FDCPA “does not ordinarily require proof of intentional violation, and is a strict 

liability statute.” Gonzales, 660 F.3d 1055 (citing McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & 

Lauinger, LLC, 667 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant violated § 1692e(2)A rests on 

Defendant’s alleged failure to substantiate the amount of Plaintiff’s debt. However, as the 

Mahon court instructed, a “tardy request for verification of the debt [does] not trigger any 

obligation on the part of the [debt collector] to verify the debt.” 171 F.3d at 1202 (“If no 

written demand is made, ‘the collector may assume the debt to be valid.’ ”) (quoting Avila 

v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1996)). Again, based on Plaintiff’s own allegations 

and absent any allegations that Defendant’s notice was deficient, Plaintiff’s debt validation 

letter was untimely and Defendant was under no obligation to verify the debt. Therefore, 

the Court must find the debt amount to be valid, and that Plaintiff fails to state a facially 

plausible claim that Defendant violated § 1692e(2)A of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS this portion of Defendant’s MTD.

B. Whether Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim for Violation of the Rosenthal Act

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA also constitute violations 

of the RFDCPA under California Civil Code section 1788.17. (Compl. ¶¶ 25–26.) As 

California’s version of the FDCPA, the RFDCPA “mimics or incorporates by reference the 

FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes available the FDCPA’s remedies for violations.” 

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Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1788.17). Therefore, whether a debt collector’s conduct “violates the [RFDCPA] turns 

on whether it violates the FDCPA.” Id. Because Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claims are based on 

the same allegations as his FDCPA claims, the analysis above, supra Section II.A.3, applies 

here and Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claims must also fail. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this 

portion of Defendants’ MTD.

C. Whether Judicial Estoppel Bars Plaintiff’s Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are judicially estopped for failure to disclose 

them in his three prior bankruptcies. (MTD 3.) In response, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he 

alleged bankruptcies have been withdrawn by plaintiff and as a result have no bearing on 

the claims of the defendants making their claims moot as a result.” (Opp’n 7.) Plaintiff 

further argues that he has always maintained the same position in each of his three 

bankruptcy cases, i.e., “that the alleged debt is and has been disputed” and that Defendant 

has “never validat[ed] or verif[ied] the alleged debt.” (Id. at 7–8.) However, because the 

Court above determined that Plaintiff’s causes of action should be dismissed, the Court 

does not reach this argument.

D. Whether Plaintiff Failed to Include a Necessary and Indispensable Party

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to join Sarah A. Mayen, a coborrower on the mortgage loan, as an indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) is a 

sufficient basis for dismissal. (MTD 7; Reply 4.) Again, because the Court above 

determined that Plaintiff’s causes of action should be dismissed, the Court does not reach 

this argument.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART Defendant’s RJN, (ECF No. 6-1), and GRANTS Defendant’s MTD on all causes

of action, (ECF No. 6). Nonetheless, the Court will not yet dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with 

prejudice. E.g., Polich v. Burlington N. Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, 

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that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” (citing Kelson v. City of 

Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint and GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an 

amended Complaint, if any, on or before fourteen days from the date on which this Order 

is electronically docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2017

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