Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01067/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTURO DE CORDOVA, an

individual, and MARILYN A.

CORDOVA, an individual,

NO. CIV. S-07-1067 LKK/EFB 

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

PACIFIC POINT FUNDING, INC.,

a California corporation,

PAUL MOFFITT, an individual,

TIMOTHY PETER VOLK, an

individual, HOMECOMINGS 

FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC., a

Delaware corporation, and 

DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

This case involves a dispute over the refinance of a mortgage.

Plaintiffs originally filed in state court, alleging a claim under

the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §

2614, as well as various state law claims. After defendant

Homecomings Financial removed the case, plaintiffs filed a first

amended complaint omitting the federal claim. Pending before the

court is plaintiffs’ motion to remand, as well as a motion to

Case 2:07-cv-01067-LKK -EFB Document 32 Filed 08/20/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

dismiss filed by defendants Pacific Point Funding, Paul Moffitt,

and Timothy Volk, and a motion to strike filed by Homecomings

Financial.

Under Ninth Circuit law, “jurisdiction must be analyzed on the

basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal without

reference to subsequent amendments.” Sparta Surgical Corp. v.

National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213

(9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, “a plaintiff may not compel remand

by amending a complaint to eliminate the federal question upon

which removal was based.” Id. Because the plaintiffs in the case

at bar simply omitted their RESPA claim in the amended complaint,

the court is not obligated to remand the case.

Nevertheless, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state claims is discretionary. The Ninth Circuit

employs a two-part test to determine whether it is appropriate for

a court to exercise its discretion in declining supplemental

jurisdiction. See Acri v. Varian Assocs. Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th

Cir. 1997) (“While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of

one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the Gibbs

values ‘of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”). First,

the court must determine whether the case falls under one of the

four enumerated bases for declining supplemental jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, the case falls under the third basis

where all claims over which the court has original jurisdiction

have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Case 2:07-cv-01067-LKK -EFB Document 32 Filed 08/20/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Second, the court must consider whether economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity will be served by exercising jurisdiction.

Here, with regard to economy, the court’s involvement up to now has

been nonexistent. The case was removed on June 4, 2007, and the

pending matters constitute the first motion practice before the

court. Similarly, convenience does not appear to weigh in favor

of either retaining jurisdiction or remanding the case, given that

the state court action was filed in San Joaquin Superior Court.

Comity, however, weighs in favor of remand. See United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of

state law should be avoided [] as a matter of comity.”). Here, all

of plaintiffs’ claims, including (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2)

unfair business practices, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) breach of

oral agreement, and (5) fraud, arise under state law. 

Defendants respond that two of these claims -- unfair business

practices and unjust enrichment -- turn on the allegation that the

loan involved “an illegal yield spread premium,” which defendants

claim will require a finding that there was a RESPA violation.

Even assuming that this characterization is accurate, it does not

appear that California state courts are unfamiliar with RESPA

claims. See, e.g., Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 109 Cal.

App. 4th 1134 (2003) (affirming grant of summary judgment on

deceptive business practice claim involving allegedly illegal yield

spread premium and RESPA). Accordingly, a federal court would not

necessarily be more competent to adjudicate a state law claim that

indirectly alleged a RESPA violation. Furthermore, plaintiffs’

Case 2:07-cv-01067-LKK -EFB Document 32 Filed 08/20/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

remaining claims appear to turn on issues of purely state law.

This fact also suggests that declining to exercise supplemental

would be appropriate in the interests of comity.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 17, 2007.

Case 2:07-cv-01067-LKK -EFB Document 32 Filed 08/20/07 Page 4 of 4