Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00427/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00427-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alan Ralph Moore, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-427 PCT JWS (VAM)

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Alan Ralph Moore ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner raises one ground for relief in

the petition. (Doc. 1 at p. 5). Respondents filed an answer

opposing the granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 7).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in Yavapai County Superior Court of

the crimes of sexual conduct with a minor and child molestation.

He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms totaling 31 years (17

and 14-year terms, respectively) in November, 1994. (Doc. 1 at p.

1; Doc. 7, Exhibit B at pp. 1,4). Petitioner appealed his

convictions to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner raised

the following claims:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF OTHER

BAD ACTS TO BE ADMITTED.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE

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JURY CONCERNING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING TWO FELONY

PENALTY ASSESSMENT[S] IN THIS CASE.

(Doc. 7, Exhibit A at p. 2).

In a memorandum decision issued on December 28, 1995, the

court affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences but reduced

a felony assessment of $200 ordered by the trial court to $100. 

(Doc. 7, Exhibit B at p. 13). The Arizona Supreme Court denied a

petition for review without comment on September 17, 1996. (Id.

at Exhibit D).

On August 15, 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 in the trial

court. (Doc. 7 at Exhibit E). Petitioner filed the petition for

Rule 32 relief on January 16, 1998. (Id. at Exhibit F). 

Petitioner raised the following claims in his Rule 32:

I. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, TO

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION, AND TO THE EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THAT THE SYSTEM FOR THE

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

RESULTED IN THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL UNQUALIFIED TO

UNDERTAKE REPRESENTATION OF AN INDIGENT PERSON CHARGED

WITH A SERIES OF OFFENSES IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH,

SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND ART. 2,

SUBSECTIONS 4, 13, 15 AND 24 OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION

.... 

II. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION DUE TO TRIAL COUNSEL'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST

WHICH PREVENTED HIM FROM DEMANDING THE DEFENSE EXPERTS

BE APPOINTED ....

III. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, TO

DUE [PROCESS] AND EQUAL PROTECTION, AND TO THE EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS COURT-APPOINTED TRIAL

COUNSEL FAILED TO RETAIN AND CONSULT WITH COMPETENT

FORENSIC EXPERT WITNESSES, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH,

SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND ART. 2,

SUBSECTIONS 4, 13, 15, AND 24 OF THE ARIZONA

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CONSTITUTION ....

(Doc. 7, Exhibit F, Attachment A at pp. 1, 4 and 6).

The trial court denied the Rule 32 petition on June 18, 1998. 

(Doc. 7 at Exhibit G). Petitioner filed a timely petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals but the court denied the

petition without comment on November 23, 1999. (Id. at Exhibit

I). On May 23, 2000, the Arizona Supreme Court also denied review

without comment. (Id. at Exhibit K).

More than two years later, on July 10, 2002, petitioner filed

a second petition for Rule 32 relief in the trial court. (Doc. 7

at Exhibit L). In an accompanying brief, petitioner raised the

following claims:

[I]. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF RULE 32 COUNSEL

[II]. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

[III]. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

A 12-PERSON JURY TO DECIDE HIS FATE IN THIS CASE

[IV.] INADMISSIBLE USE OF UNCHARGED PRIORS

[V.] THERE W[ERE] NO PRIOR CONVICTION(S) IN THIS CASE

[VI.] THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE ANY PRIOR BAD ACTS

[VII.] THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LAW

[APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)]

[VIII]. REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE

ELIGIBILITY

[IX.] APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE

(Doc. 7, Exhibit L).

The trial court denied Rule 32 relief on July 7, 2003. (Doc.

7 at Exhibit N). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review

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without comment on August 19, 2004. (Id. at Exhibit O). The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment on March 16,

2005. (Id. at Exhibit P). 

On February 9, 2006, petitioner filed a federal habeas

petition raising the following ground for relief:

GROUND I: Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law;

Fair Trial

Petitioner was charged with Two crimes against a minor,

arising out of the same event. Both were sex crimes. 

The State relied heavily on "prior bad acts" evidence,

relating to events eight years previous to the charged

crimes, when Petitioner was a minor. Ostensibly, that

evidence was introduced to show Petitioner's propensity

to commit sexually aberrant acts, but in fact was

introduced solely to inflame the minds of the jurors

against Petitioner and make conviction of the charged

crimes a forgone conclusion. In fact, in response to

Petitioner's Motion for New Trial in 1994, the State

conceded that the prior bad acts evidence was essential

to gaining a conviction in an otherwise difficult case,

and that the court would have been reluctant to admit

such evidence had there been available to the State

other evidence to corroborate the allegations ....

The admissibility of such evidence was hotly contested

prior to trial. Once the Trial Court decided to admit

the evidence Petitioner had to make the decision to not

testify in his own behalf in order to avoid having the

trial degenerate into a general assault and character

assassination, based on actions he was alleged to have

committed as a minor. The Trial Court found that the

prior bad acts evidence was relevant, but did not

consider at all the prejudicial effect of the evidence,

and whether with such evidence admitted if the

Petitioner could still receive due process of law and a

fair trial.

(Doc. 1 at p. 5).

DISCUSSION

Respondents ask that the habeas petition be denied because

the claim presented is barred by the 1-year statute of limitations

found at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Doc. 7 at pp. 3-7). 

Alternatively, they assert the claim raised in the petition has

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been procedurally defaulted. (Id. at p. 7 (n. 3)).

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioners challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

6

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed

by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by the statute of

limitations absent a showing the circumstances surrounding the

filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

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only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Review of the record shows that petitioner raised the claim

presented in his habeas petition in his direct appeal. (Doc. 7,

Exhibit A at pp. 8-9). Proceedings in his direct appeal concluded

on December 17, 1996, 90 days after the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review and the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We hold that the period

of "direct review" in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the

period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not

the petitioner actually files such a petition."). 

The record reveals petitioner initiated his first Rule 32 on

August 15, 1997. (Doc. 7 at Exhibit E). By then, eight months of

untolled time had already elapsed. The filing of the Rule 32

tolled the limitations period and this period remained tolled

until the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on May 23, 2000. 

(Doc. 7 at Exhibit K). However, after that, petitioner had

nothing pending in state court for more than two years (he

initiated a second Rule 32 proceeding on July 10, 2002). (Id. at

Exhibit L). Petitioner did not file his habeas petition until

February 9, 2006. (See Doc. 1).

Respondents contend that the limitations period expired on

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August 25, 2000 (including the 271 days between December 17, 1996

and August 15, 1997 (when the first Rule 32 commenced) and an

additional 84 days from May 23, 2000 (when the Arizona Supreme

Court denied review in the first Rule 32)). In any event, in

addition to the time noted by respondents, an additional period of

23 months of untolled time transpired before petitioner initiated

his second Rule 32 on July 10, 2002. (Doc. 7 at Exhibit L). All

told, nearly 3 years of untolled time elapsed before petitioner

filed his federal habeas petition on February 9, 2006. The fact

petitioner filed a second Rule 32 in July, 2002, does not save his

already untimely habeas petition. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ("we hold that section 2244(d) does

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has

ended before the state petition was filed."). 

Petitioner has presented no credible basis for statutory or

equitable tolling of the limitations period. His habeas claim is

clearly barred by the statute of limitations. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied as untimely. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

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which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2006.

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