Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01469/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01469-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

14‐1469‐cv

Ya‐Chen Chen v. City University of New York, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2014

(Argued: March 25, 2015   Decided: October 28, 2015)

No. 14‐1469‐cv

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

YA‐CHEN CHEN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

‐v.‐ 

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, ROBERT PAASWELL, Individual and Official

Capacity, BETH LESEN, Individual and Official Capacity, RICHARD F. CALICHMAN,

Individual and Official Capacity, GERALDINE MURPHY, Individual and Official

Capacity,

Defendants‐Appellees.

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Before: Winter, Livingston, and Chin, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff‐Appellant Ya‐Chen Chen brought suit against the City University

of New York (“CUNY”) and four of its employees (the “Individual Defendants”)

in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Abrams, J.).    She argued, inter alia, that CUNY violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000‐e et seq., and that the Individual Defendants

violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the New

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York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8‐107,

because they discriminated against her on the basis of her gender, race, and

national origin, and retaliated against her for a complaint that she filed against

several of the Individual Defendants.    Following discovery, the district court

granted summary judgment to CUNY and the Individual Defendants on all of

Chen’s claims.  We conclude that the district court correctly decided that, based

on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find that either CUNY’s or

the Individual Defendants’ actions were motivated, even in part, by a desire to

discriminate or retaliate against Chen.  Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

Judge CHIN concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.

FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: MATTHEW S. PORGES, Law Office of

Matthew S. Porges, Esq., Brooklyn, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLANTS: DAVID LAWRENCE III, Assistant Solicitor

General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor

General, Michael S. Belohlavek, Senior

Counsel, for Eric T. Schneiderman,

Attorney General of the State of New York,

New York, NY.

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge:

Beginning in September 2007, Plaintiff‐Appellant Ya‐Chen Chen served as

an assistant professor of Asian Studies in the Department of Foreign Languages

and Literatures at the City College of New York (“CCNY”), a school in the City

University of New York (“CUNY”) system.  She also acted as Interim Director of

the Asian Studies program during the 2008‐2009 academic year.  As that school

year drew to a close, Chen had a negative encounter with a student.  Members of

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the administration — including Defendants‐Appellants Beth Lesen, Richard F.

Calichman, and Geraldine Murphy — informed Chen that, in their view, she had

handled the incident inappropriately.  Chen disagreed with this assessment and

expressed her opinion to those administrators.    In July 2009, CCNY informed

Chen that she would not be reassigned to a second year as Interim Director of the

Asian Studies program.    Several months later, CCNY’s Department of Foreign

Languages and Literatures undertook its annual review of assistant professors,

who must be reappointed each year until they receive tenure.  The Department

decided against reappointing Chen for the 2010‐2011 academic year. Chen

unsuccessfully appealed this decision through two stages of administrative

review, and finally to CCNY’s President, Defendant‐Appellant Robert Paaswell.

Following her appeals, Chen filed suit against CUNY, Calichman, Lesen,

Murphy, and Paaswell in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Abrams, J.).  She argued that CUNY violated Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000‐e et seq., and that the individual

defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause and the New York City Human

Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8‐107, because they

discriminated against Chen on the basis of her race, gender, and national origin,

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and retaliated against her for an internal complaint that she filed against

Calichman, Lesen, and Murphy in August 2009.  Following discovery, the district

court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all of Chen’s claims.  We

agree with the district court’s decision, and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Chen’s Employment at CCNY

CCNY is the flagship institution in the CUNY system.    To identify and

attract talented educators and scholars, the College hires them as assistant

professors — a tenure‐track position subject to annual review and renewal.  

Every year, an executive committee in each of CCNY’s departments evaluates the

assistant professors under its jurisdiction before deciding whether to reappoint

them.    The committees consider the candidates’ “teaching effectiveness,”

“scholarly and professional growth,” “service” to the public and the institution,

J.A. 180, and whether candidates demonstrate “satisfactory qualities of

personality and character . . . and [a] willingness to cooperate with others for the

good of the institution.”  J.A. 166.  As assistant professors move closer to tenure,

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the evaluations become “progressively rigorous . . . to reflect the greater

expectations of more experienced faculty members.”  J.A. 181.

In September 2007, Chen secured a position as an assistant professor of

Asian Studies in CCNY’s Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures.  

Chen, a Taiwanese woman, is a scholar in the fields of East Asian languages and

cultures, Chinese comparative literatures, and women’s and gender studies.  She

holds degrees from the National Sun Yat‐sen University in Taiwan, Columbia

University, and Purdue University, and has published three books and over

twenty articles in academic journals.

During the 2007‐2008 school year, Chen taught two Chinese courses in the

fall, worked on two books and several academic articles, and undertook several

projects within the Asian Studies program.  In Chen’s annual evaluation, Richard

F. Calichman, the Chair of the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures,

recorded his impression of Chen’s first year at CCNY in a memorandum dated

June 2, 2008.  He noted that Chen was a “committed teacher and scholar” who

had done “everything that was asked of her in terms of department service.”  J.A.

185.    Calichman, however, had also “received several faculty complaints

regarding what some perceive[d] as her overaggressiveness and lack of tact.”  Id.  

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These “complaints were voiced primarily in the fall semester,” Calichman noted,

“suggesting that Prof. Chen has since improved her relations with other faculty

in the department.” Id.  Nonetheless, Calichman stated that he would “continue

to monitor th[e] situation.”    Id.    Chen was reappointed for the 2008‐2009

academic year.

This academic year proved to be a fateful one for the Plaintiff‐Appellant.  

Heading into the year, the President of CCNY appointed Chen as the Interim

Director of the Asian Studies program.    In addition to this role, Chen was

scheduled to teach one of two introductory Chinese courses offered by the

Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures during the spring.    Spring

semester began on January 28, 2009.    That morning, Chen met a middle‐aged

male student (the “Student”) who had registered for her Chinese course.   The

Student’s “persistent demands for [Chen’s] time and attention,” in Chen’s words,

quickly became a problem.  J.A. 60.

On that first day of classes, the Student, who had earlier written Chen to

express his interest in taking her class, appeared at Chen’s office for office hours

and stayed there for about two hours until class began.  He then attended class

and, when the instructional period ended, waited for Chen before leaving the

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classroom.  As Chen left, he followed her out the door, “talking with” her as she

went from the classroom back to her office.  J.A. 476.  The Student engaged in

similar behavior on two subsequent class days.  Chen found his conduct strange,

and she reports that she grew increasingly apprehensive on account of his

behavior in these encounters.    In an effort to show the Student that he was

spending too much time in her office, Chen pointed out that “other people” had

been waiting to speak with her “for more than ten minutes or fifteen minutes.”  

J.A. 480.  She did not, however, tell him that he made her feel afraid or that she

felt he was acting inappropriately.

After these three classes, Chen approached Calichman about the Student,

described the situation, and asked that the Student be transferred out of her class.  

Chen says that Calichman “gave [her] verbal support” and “immediately

approved to transfer” the Student to the other introductory Chinese course,

effective February 5.  J.A. 481.  The Student appeared in the Asian Studies office

shortly before Chen’s scheduled classes on six subsequent days between

February 5 and March 5.    When he tried to speak with her on at least one

occasion, Chen “just [said] hi and then immediately continue[d] to [her]

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classroom.”  J.A. 484.  These encounters stopped, however, in early March, and

Chen thereafter had no contact with the Student for about two months.   

At that point, at the end of April, Chen began to focus on class enrollment

for the fall semester of 2009.   Chen knew that she would be teaching the only

upper‐level Chinese course in the fall and she asked the other introductory

Chinese professor about which students planned to continue with Chinese

studies.    The professor told her that the Student intended to register for the

upper‐level course.  Concerned about dealing with the Student again, Chen sent

Calichman an email explaining the situation.  Calichman forwarded her message

to John Reynolds, the Dean of CCNY’s Humanities Division, who asked Deputy

Dean Geraldine Murphy to meet with Chen about the situation.   Murphy met

with Chen on May 6, 2009 and, after Chen informed her that the Student was

neither physically nor sexually threatening, directed Chen to speak with CCNY’s

Director for Students with Disabilities, Beth Lesen, who “regularly teaches

courses on dealing with difficult students.” J.A. 219.

   The next day, Chen met with Lesen.    Chen recalled that Lesen was

“understanding and supportive,” and provided examples of how Chen could

“set up boundaries with the student” if he joined her class — for instance, by

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informing him that he might “consider finding a tutor” so as to benefit from

more individualized instruction than she could provide, or by reserving portions

of her office hours for other students.   J.A. 501‐02.    Shortly after the meeting,

Lesen sent Chen a follow‐up email asking her to “let me know how things go

with that student,” and assuring her that, “if the situation does not improve after

you have created some boundaries . . . I will be able to step in and assist you

further. Definitely keep me posted.”  J.A. 442.

Chen “assumed” that this email was an instruction to meet with the

Student immediately.1  J.A. 325.  As a result, she arranged for a meeting between

herself, the Student, and the Student’s introductory Chinese professor, Chih‐ping

Ma, on May 13, 2009.  At the meeting, Chen presented the Student with a form

entitled “Ya‐chen Chen’s Written Document for [the Student’s] Confirmation of

Understanding,” which read:

According to Dr. Beth Lesen’s opinion, I am writing down the rules

for [the Student’s] Participation in my CHIN 225 class in fall 2009.  

Professor Chih‐ping Ma is the witness.

																																																								

1 Chen never testified that Lesen instructed her to immediately meet with the Student

during Chen and Lesen’s meeting. Instead, Chen’s deposition clearly states that Chen

assumed such a directive (for an immediate meeting) from the follow‐up email. Contrary

to the assertion in Chen’s brief on appeal, moreover, that the “e‐mail suggested that

Chen ‘set up boundaries’ before the end of the semester,’” Appellant’s Br. at 10 (emphasis

added), the email includes no such suggestion.

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Chinese tutor as the front line for academic questions or learning

problems

Maximum use of my office hours: five to ten minutes every week

Do not block the doorways of classrooms or offices

Keep an appropriate distance from professors and classmates

Class matters should be first brought to the instructor, not

administrative heads

Harmony with classmates and respect for the instructor

Do not rush the instructor before the class starts

The instructor reserves the right to take actions against unpredicted

or uncomfortable situations

   

J.A. 193.    She requested that the Student sign it.   He refused and immediately

went to Lesen, expressing hurt and confusion and asking “why [Chen] had never

told him that he was doing something she didn’t like.”  J.A. 189.

Chen appeared at Lesen’s office later that day with the intention of

informing Lesen that the Student had refused to accept the boundaries she set.  

According to Chen, Lesen reacted by faulting Chen for not “us[ing] stronger

words to confront the student.”   J.A. 509.    To demonstrate what Chen should

have done, Lesen “yelled very loudly at [her] and asked [her] to repeat a very,

very simple English word, stop . . . maybe six or eight times.”   J.A. 509.  Chen

also claims that Lesen “indicat[ed] that [the Student] never harassed” her and

that everything was in Chen’s “imagination.”  J.A. 335.

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Lesen presented a different version of events in an email to Calichman,

Murphy, and Reynolds dated two days later.  Describing the encounter as “one

of the most frustrating meetings I have ever had with a professor,” Lesen

reported telling Chen “that she should not have sought the student out when he

is not currently in any of her classes . . . , may not create any preconditions for

registration . . . , [and] must communicate requests and allow students

opportunities to change their behavior.”  J.A. 189.  Lesen added that Chen “spent

hours (literally) refusing to accept any responsibility for her own actions,

asserting that the student had done unacceptable things and should have ‘gotten

the message’ that she was uncomfortable though she never once actually told

him.”  J.A. 189.  Lesen also asserted that Chen “showed less than no concern for

the student” and also “made clear that she does not have time in her schedule for

students who require more attention than she is willing to provide, even if they

seek that time during her office hours.”  Id.

After receiving Lesen’s email, Calichman scheduled a meeting between

himself, Chen, and Murphy to be held on May 20, 2009.    Chen says that

Calichman did not give her a clear sense of what the meeting would cover, but it

soon became clear that Calichman and Murphy wanted to discuss the incident

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with the Student.    Chen reports that both Calichman and Murphy adopted

Lesen’s view of the situation, blaming Chen for not “stop[ping] the student with

clear and stronger words.”    J.A. 514.    Calichman also presented Chen with a

memo that, in his view, summarized the meeting.  The memo states that he and

Murphy advised Chen that it “is inappropriate to intervene with students who

are not currently in one’s class,” “to recruit other professors for help in such

intervention,” “to present and pressure [students] into signing a contract‐like

document listing certain conditions that must be satisfied in order for students to

enroll in [a] course,” and “to conduct what is, in effect, a smear campaign against

[a] student[].”2  J.A. 195.  Chen signed this memo to confirm that she had read it

and noted that she would write her own summary of the events.

The next day, Calichman again met with Chen to present his evaluation of

her performance during the 2008‐2009 academic year.  As in his evaluation for

the 2007‐2008 year, Calichman praised Chen’s “fine teaching record” and her

“productivity as a scholar,” noting that Chen received strong teaching reviews,

published new scholarship, and presented at several conferences.  J.A. 202.  But

																																																								

2 The record is undisputed that in the context of the May 13 incident, Chen contacted

other professors requesting information about the Student.

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“[r]egarding the matter of collegiality,” he felt that Chen “still ha[d] considerable

room for improvement.”  Id.  He explained:

My remarks in last year’s evaluation touched upon her

overaggresiveness and lack of tact, as perceived by several of her

colleagues.    Comments of this nature have continued, despite my

attempts to provide guidance throughout the school year . . . .  

Specifically, several faculty members in Asian Studies have come to

my office to complain of her conduct, specifically mentioning that

they found Prof. Chen unreasonably defensive and difficult to work

with.  In addition, a disturbing incident took place earlier this month

in which Prof. Chen acted inappropriately toward a student with

whom she had problems . . . .

Id.3  The evaluation then described Chen’s encounter with the Student, Lesen’s

report of Chen’s “unwillingness to claim responsibility for her inappropriate

conduct,” and the May 20 meeting between Chen, Calichman, and Murphy.  Id.

2. CCNY’s Employment Decisions

The end of the 2008‐2009 school year marked the beginning of an uncertain

time for Chen.    Because her position as Interim Director of the Asian Studies

program was a one‐year appointment, she would learn over the summer

whether she would be offered a second term on the job.    Similarly, although

																																																								

3 As an example of other complaints that Calichman received about Chen, Defendants‐

Appellees submitted an email from Reynolds to Calichman in which Reynolds wrote

that “Chen needs to torque‐down a bit[,]” in connection with her role as Interim

Director of the Asian Studies program, and that “[s]he hasn’t been appointed to the

federal bench.”  J.A. 207.  Reynolds expressed concern that Chen was “going to wear

out Geraldine [Murphy], who’s pretty patient.”  J.A. 207.

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Chen had already been reappointed as an assistant professor for the 2009‐2010

school year, the Executive Committee of the Department of Foreign Languages

and Literatures was scheduled to reconvene in fall 2009 to determine whether to

offer employment to its assistant professors for the 2010‐2011 academic year.

On July 7, 2009 — a little more than a month after Calichman’s evaluation

— CCNY’s then‐President, Gregory H. Williams, wrote Chen to thank her for her

“service . . . as Interim Director of Asian Studies” and to inform her that, “[f]or

the coming academic year, a time when long‐range strategic planning and hiring

will be necessary, I have asked Professor Calichman to take direct charge of the

program.”    J.A. 209.    According to Reynolds, both he and Calichman advised

against reappointing Chen to another term as Interim Director, but CCNY’s

President had ultimate authority over the decision.   

Following this decision, but before the Executive Committee convened to

consider assistant professorships, Chen filed a complaint with CCNY’s Office of

Affirmative Action (the “Affirmative Action Complaint”) and composed several

memoranda rebutting Calichman’s evaluation and his assessment of the May 20

meeting.  In the Affirmative Action Complaint — which she filed on August 25,

2009 — Chen claimed that Lesen committed “racial/linguistic discrimination” by

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“ask[ing] [Chen] to read the word, ‘stop,’ after her for 6‐8 times in a racially and

linguistically discriminatory tone.”  J.A. 213.  Chen also averred that Calichman

and Murphy denied her “equal treatment in employment” because she was a

“non‐white, junior and foreign woman,” and retaliated against her because she

complained about the Student.  J.A. 211.  According to the Complaint, Calichman

and Murphy should have referred her to the Affirmative Action office, not Lesen,

because the Student had sexually harassed her and Lesen is not qualified to

handle such harassment.    Chen also stated that Calichman and Murphy

negatively affected her career by criticizing how she handled the situation.   

Chen’s memoranda rebutting Calichman’s evaluation and his assessment

of the May 20 meeting reiterated these allegations, highlighted instances of

Chen’s collegiality, and defended her conduct vis‐à‐vis the Student.   In Chen’s

view, Lesen told her to confront the Student right away and later contradicted

herself by criticizing Chen’s actions.    The Student, Chen claims, “should have

thanked” her for presenting him with written rules of behavior.  J.A. 436.   

On October 15, 2009, the Executive Committee of the Department of

Foreign Languages and Literatures convened to determine whether to reappoint

assistant professors in the Department for the 2010‐2011 school year.  The group

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consisted of five voting members.  Calichman was among the voting members,

and he advocated against Chen’s reappointment.    Ultimately, the Executive

Committee sided with Calichman, with three votes against reappointment and

two abstentions.    The Committee informed Chen of its decision in a letter on

October 20, 2009.4   Several days later, the Affirmative Action Office informed

Chen that it had investigated her Complaint and determined that the Student

had not sexually harassed her or “threaten[ed] her with any type of violence”

and that her evaluation was consistent with the prior year and “gave a fair and

accurate representation of her performance, including her triumphs and

shortcomings.”    J.A. 220‐21.    The Affirmative Action Office found no

wrongdoing.

Once informed of the Executive Committee’s decision that she would not

be reappointed for the 2010‐2011 school year, Chen filed an appeal with the

Humanities Division’s Personnel and Budgetary Committee.    Chen submitted

documents on her behalf — including letters of support from faculty members —

and Calichman testified against Chen’s candidacy.  The chair of the Committee

recalled receiving this information, as well as having direct discussions with

																																																								

4 The Executive Committee reappointed the seven other assistant professors that it

discussed at the October 15 meeting.  Two of those assistant professors — Carlos Riobo

and Vanessa Valdes — started at the same time as Chen.

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Chen. J.A. 572.  The Personnel and Budgetary Committee denied Chen’s appeal

on November 3, 2009, by a vote of six against and one abstention.   Chen then

pressed her appeal before a CCNY Review Committee, which voted

unanimously against her reappointment.    When asked if he could remember

anything about the decision, the chair of the Review Committee noted that it

“had to do with her . . . inappropriate conduct, erratic behavior.”  J.A. 580.  

Finally, Chen sought relief from CCNY’s President, Robert Paaswell.  

Paaswell reviewed the documents Chen submitted, spoke with Calichman,

Lesen, and Murphy, and decided to deny Chen’s appeal.   In a letter to Chen,

Paaswell “recognize[d] that [Chen’s] teaching ha[d] been positively evaluated by

[her] peers and [her] students,” that her work as a scholar had been

“commendable,” and that she had “provided valuable service to the College.”  

J.A. 169.   He concluded, however, that Chen’s “conduct in connection with an

incident that occurred during the Spring 2009 semester with a student displayed

seriously poor judgment,” and that her subsequent memos about the situation

“demonstrate[d] that [she] failed to recognize the inappropriateness of [her]

conduct.”  J.A. 169.  In Paaswell’s judgment, this conduct demonstrated Chen’s

failure “to satisfy the mandate of [Bylaw] Section 11.7.B.2,” which requires

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assistant professors to demonstrate “satisfactory qualities of personality and

character.”  J.A. 170.

B. Procedural History

Chen filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human

Rights, claiming that CCNY took adverse employment action against her because

of her national origin, race, and sex, and because of her complaints about the

Student and several employees.    When the agency dismissed her claims, she

promptly brought suit against CUNY and four of its employees — Calichman,

Lesen, Murphy, and Paaswell (the “Individual Defendants”) — in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Abrams, J.) claiming,

inter alia, that CUNY violated Title VII and that the Individual Defendants

infringed on rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment and by the NYCHRL.5  In particular, Chen alleged that the decisions

not to reappoint her as Interim Director of the Asian Studies program or as an

assistant professor — along with the negative comments made by the Individual

Defendants — were motivated by discrimination on the basis of her race,

																																																								

5 Chen filed an initial complaint before Judge McMahon, who dismissed several claims

and gave Chen leave to file an amended complaint.  Judge Abrams took charge of the

case after this initial decision.   

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national origin, and gender, and by the desire to retaliate against her for filing an

Affirmative Action Complaint.

Following discovery, the defendants filed a joint motion for summary

judgment, which the district court granted on March 31, 2014.   On the federal

discrimination claims against CUNY and the Individual Defendants, the court

assumed, without deciding, that Chen established a prima facie case of

discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and national origin.  Even with that

assumption, the court concluded that Chen had failed to raise a genuine dispute

of material fact about whether CUNY’s employment decisions or the Individual

Defendants’ actions were motivated by discrimination.   In particular, the court

noted that the record contained “overwhelming evidence” that Chen lost her

Interim Director position and her assistant professorship because of the way she

handled the situation with the Student and because of her interactions with her

colleagues.  S.P.A. 13‐14.

As for the federal retaliation claim against CUNY, the court again assumed

that Chen could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, but concluded that

CUNY “articulated legitimate, non‐retaliatory reasons for not renewing Chen’s

appointments” and that Chen could not show that those reasons were a pretext

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for retaliatory animus.    S.P.A. 18.    The court observed that the employment

decisions were “entirely consistent as a progressive response to Chen’s

disturbing incident with the Student” and that her “reappointment had been

called into question long before she filed the affirmative action complaint.”  

S.P.A. 19.  In light of these facts, the mere temporal proximity of her complaint to

the employment decisions was not sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact about CUNY’s alleged retaliatory motive.    The court therefore

granted summary judgment for defendants on all of Chen’s claims.6  This appeal

followed.

DISCUSSION

We review the “district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de

novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.”  Burg v. Gosselin,

591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.

2009)).   Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that

																																																								

6  The district court addressed Chen’s discrimination and retaliation claims under the

NYCHRL separately from her federal claims, but granted the Individual Defendants

summary judgment on them for the same reasons.  It also granted summary judgment

on Chen’s claims that the Individual Defendants aided and abetted CUNY’s Title VII

violation.

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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A. Federal Claims

Chen’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred by

granting summary judgment on her claim that CUNY retaliated against her for

filing an Affirmative Action Complaint, in violation of Title VII.    She also

contends that the court was wrong to grant summary judgment on her

discrimination claims against CUNY under Title VII and against the Individual

Defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.  We address each issue in turn.

1. Retaliation

   Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating “against any . . . employee[]

. . . because [that individual] has opposed any practice” made unlawful by Title

VII.    42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).    We analyze retaliation claims using the burden‐

shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  

Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation by offering evidence that she “participated in a protected

activity,” “suffered an adverse employment action,” and “that there was a causal

connection between her engaging in the protected activity and the adverse

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employment action.”  Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir.

2010).  This showing creates a “presumption of retaliation,” which the defendant

may rebut by “articulat[ing] a legitimate, non‐retaliatory reason for the adverse

employment action.”  Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.

2005).    If the defendant provides such an explanation, “the presumption of

retaliation dissipates,” id., and the plaintiff must prove “that the desire to

retaliate was the but‐for cause of the challenged employment action.”   Univ. of

Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013).

The district court assumed, without deciding, that Chen established a

prima facie claim of retaliation.  CUNY, however, offered a legitimate rationale

for its decisions against reappointing her as either Interim Director of the Asian

Studies program or as an assistant professor: she demonstrated

“overaggressiveness and [a] lack of tact,” both with her colleagues and in the

incident with the Student.    J.A. 202.    Chen argues that this explanation is a

pretext for retaliation.  In brief, she contends that the timing of the employment

decision, her reliance on Lesen’s instructions, and the positive portions of her

reviews show that CUNY was led by Calichman to turn an isolated issue with a

student into a severe adverse employment decision as punishment for filing an

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23

Affirmative Action Complaint.7  We disagree and conclude that the district court

correctly decided that Chen failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact

about whether CUNY retaliated against her because of her Complaint.

Significantly, it is undisputed that members of the Department of Foreign

Languages and Literatures took issue with Chen’s collegiality long before she

filed her Affirmative Action Complaint.    Calichman wrote that in fall 2007 —

Chen’s very first semester at CCNY — he “received several faculty complaints

regarding what some perceive as her overaggressiveness and lack of tact,” and

that he felt it necessary to “continue to monitor th[e] situation.”  J.A. 185.  The

2008‐2009 school year then brought the incident with the Student.    Initially,

Calichman was sympathetic to Chen’s situation, transferring the Student out of

her class, while Lesen and Murphy provided assistance in developing strategies

for dealing with the Student if he joined Chen’s upper‐level course.  Once they

learned about the way that Chen confronted the Student, however, their attitude

																																																								

7 Although several different committees considered Chen’s reappointment, Calichman’s

evaluation played a significant role at every step of the process.  As a result, Chen can

succeed in her claim against CUNY if she shows that Calichman was motivated by

unlawful considerations.  See Holcomb v. Iona Coll. 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]

Title VII plaintiff is entitled to succeed, ‘even absent evidence of illegitimate bias on the

part of the ultimate decision maker, so long as the individual shown to have the

impermissible bias played a meaningful role in the . . . process.’” (quoting Bickerstaff v.

Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (alteration in original)).

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24

changed.  A frustrated Lesen wrote to Calichman and Murphy that she had been

“very clear that the student must not be hindered from registering for the course

. . . and [that] [Chen] must verbally communicate any problems she has to the

student when they’re actually happening.”  J.A. 188.  Chen, according to Lesen,

not only ignored these instructions, but also “spent hours (literally) refusing to

accept any responsibility for her own actions.”  J.A. 189.  Murphy and Calichman

agreed with Lesen’s view of the events and expressed their concern with Chen’s

actions in the May 20 meeting.   Calichman then reiterated these concerns in his

evaluation, describing the incident with the Student as “disturbing” and noting

that comments from faculty about Chen’s “overaggressiveness and lack of tact”

had continued.    J.A. 202.    These negative evaluations contributed to CUNY’s

decision not to offer Chen a second term as Interim Director of the Asian Studies

program — a decision that was made before Chen filed her Affirmative Action

Complaint.8

Not only did Lesen, Calichman, and Murphy develop these opinions about

Chen’s conduct before she filed her Affirmative Action Complaint, they also

maintained a consistent perspective afterwards.  See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ.,

																																																								

8 Because CUNY made its decision regarding Chen’s position as Interim Director of the

Asian Studies program before her Complaint, no reasonable jury could conclude that its

decision was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for that grievance.

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224 F.3d 33, 45 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the “consistency of the viewpoint

expressed” supports the “proffered nondiscriminatory reason” for the

employment action).    For instance, in interviews with the Affirmative Action

office, Calichman stated that Chen was “extremely resistant” to the idea that she

handled the situation with the Student incorrectly, and Murphy described the

May 20 meeting as “like pulling teeth.”    J.A. 414‐15.    Similarly, although the

record does not describe what Calichman said when he advocated against

Chen’s reappointment, the chair of the Review Committee recalled that the

central issue on Chen’s appeal was her “inappropriate conduct.”    J.A. 580.  

Paaswell also wrote that, after speaking with Lesen, Calichman, and Murphy, he

decided against reinstating Chen as an assistant professor because her conduct

with the Student “displayed seriously poor judgment,” and her subsequent

handling of the situation “demonstrate[d] that [she] failed to recognize the

inappropriateness of [her] conduct.”  J.A. 169.

In light of this background, Chen’s argument that she handled the Student

“precisely as Lesen directed,” Appellant’s Br. at 33‐34, is beside the point — at

least in regards to adducing evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that

Chen was the victim of retaliation.    Even if Calichman, Murphy, and Lesen

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26

reacted ill‐advisedly to Chen’s conduct somehow — faulting her for doing what

Lesen had counseled — they arrived at their opinions that Chen had behaved

improperly long before Chen filed her Affirmative Action Complaint.    Thus, no

reasonable jury could conclude that their views of the situation were motivated

by retaliatory animus arising from Chen’s Affirmative Action Complaint. 9  

Moreover, Calichman’s evaluation of Chen’s collegiality went beyond her

interactions with the Student, noting complaints from other faculty members

																																																								 9 Granted, the decision not to reappoint Chen as Director of Asian Studies (and any

deliberations or correspondence thereabouts) occurred after Chen initially complained

about the Student, albeit before the filing of the Affirmative Action complaint.  

Nevertheless, no reasonable jury could infer pretext from this temporal proximity.  Cf.

El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]emporal

proximity . . . is insufficient to satisfy [plaintiff’s] burden to bring forward some

evidence of pretext.”).  Chen produces no testimony or evidence suggesting that any of

the Defendants arrived at their opinions to recommend against reappointment until

after Chen’s confrontation with the Student.  Indeed, the record makes clear that, prior

to this confrontation, insofar as any of the Defendants reacted to Chen’s complaints, it

was with support: Chen herself acknowledges that when she first requested that the

Student be moved from her class, on February 4, Calichman “gave [her] verbal support”

and “immediately approved [the transfer].”  J.A. 481.  It was not until after the May 13

incident and the May 20 meeting with Calichman and Murphy in which both expressed

clear disapproval of Chen’s handling of that incident that Calichman recommended

Chen not be reappointed and Reynolds passed on that recommendation to the provost.  

Thus, no reasonable jury could find that retaliatory animus as a result of Chen’s

complaints about the Student, rather than disapproval of Chen’s handling of the

situation, motivated the Defendants to recommend against reappointment.

  

  

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about how Chen handled disagreements in Chen’s very first year of

employment.

Perhaps recognizing these issues, Chen counters that allegations of her

“overaggressiveness and lack of tact,” even if true, would not have caused

CUNY to deny her reappointment were it not for her Affirmative Action

Complaint.  In support, she cites the timing of her Complaint in relation to the

employment decision and the positive elements of her evaluations.    But this

evidence, in context, does not support the inference that Chen suggests.  We have

long held that “temporal proximity” between a protected complaint and an

adverse employment action “is insufficient to satisfy [plaintiff’s] burden to bring

forward some evidence of pretext,” El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931,

933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam), and the inference is particularly weak in this case.  

The executive committee of every department at CCNY conducts annual reviews

of assistant professors, and the Executive Committee of the Department of

Foreign Languages and Literatures evaluated Chen’s candidacy at the same time

as it reviewed the other assistant professors in the Department.  As a result, the

timing of its decision about Chen’s reappointment cannot, under these

circumstances, plausibly support an inference that Chen would have been

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28

reappointed had she not filed her Affirmative Action Complaint.    CCNY’s

annual review process, by its nature, must take into account the types of

collegiality and student interaction concerns that Calichman’s evaluation raised;

these concerns would thus have come up at Chen’s review regardless of her

protected activities.

Nor do the positive aspects of Chen’s evaluations, without more, support

the inference that CUNY’s reappointment decision was a disproportionate

response to the information it received about her conduct, much less that this

decision was retaliatory.   Chen’s positives are impressive: both Calichman and

Paaswell stated that she was a “fine teach[er],” a “productive[e] . . . scholar,” and

provided “valuable” service to CCNY.  J.A. 202; see also J.A. 169.  But as CCNY’s

Bylaws make clear, reappointment decisions also involve considering whether

the candidate demonstrates “satisfactory qualities of personality and character . .

. and [a] willingness to cooperate with others for the good of the institution.”10  

J.A. 166.    Chen has presented no evidence of how CCNY treated assistant

professors who were subject to comparable allegations of inappropriate conduct

																																																								

10 Chen’s unsupported argument that CUNY does not typically consider “qualities of

personality and character” when making reappointment decisions is belied by the

record.    CCNY’s Bylaws explicitly direct evaluators to consider such factors, and

members of both the Personnel and Budget Committee and the Review Committee

testified that their considerations are not limited to teaching, scholarship, and service.

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with a student or of a lack of collegiality.11  Without such comparators — or some

other evidence suggesting that the college acted on retaliatory motives — no

reasonable jury could decide that CUNY’s decision to prioritize the complaints

against Chen over her professional achievements evinces such motives.  See, e.g.,

Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001); Graham v.

Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000).  After all, “universities are free to

establish departmental priorities . . . and to act upon the good faith judgments of

their departmental faculties or reviewing authorities,” Zahorik v. Cornell Univ.,

729 F.2d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 1984), and Title VII is not an invitation for courts to “sit as

a super‐personnel department that reexamines” employers’ judgments, Delaney

v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Scaria

v. Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1997)).

In sum, the district court was correct that, assuming Chen established a

prima facie case of retaliation, CUNY offered a non‐retaliatory explanation for its

reappointment decision and Chen failed to present sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude “that the desire to retaliate was the but‐

																																																								

11 Chen argues that two assistant professors who began teaching in 2007 — Carlos Riobo

and Vanessa Valdes — were reappointed notwithstanding less significant scholarly

achievements and service to the university.    She has not, however, presented any

admissible evidence showing that either professor was subject to, or should have been

subject to, similar complaints about collegiality or interactions with students.  

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for cause” of CUNY’s action.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.  Accordingly, we affirm

the court’s decision to grant CUNY summary judgment on Chen’s Title VII

retaliation claim.

2. Discrimination Claims

Chen also argues that the district court was wrong to grant summary

judgment on her claims that CUNY violated Title VII by discriminating against

her on the basis of her race, national origin, and gender, and that the Individual

Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause for the same reason.  In brief,

she avers that Calichman, Lesen, and Murphy expressed negative opinions about

how Chen handled the situation with the Student as a pretext for discrimination.  

Because Calichman relayed these views, along with other comments about

Chen’s “overaggressiveness and lack of tact,” J.A. 202, to the committees and

individuals responsible for the decision not to reappoint Chen as Interim

Director of the Asian Studies program and as an assistant professor, including

Paaswell, their discrimination tainted CUNY’s ultimate decisions.

As with the retaliation charge, we evaluate Chen’s Title VII and Equal

Protection claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework.  Assuming that Chen

established a prima facie case of discrimination, we conclude that, in light of

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31

Calichman, Lesen, and Murphy’s stated basis for their opinions, Chen has failed

to “show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact

to infer that” either their views or CUNY’s employment decisions were “more

likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination.”    Feingold v. New

York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ.,

131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997)).

At bottom, Chen’s discrimination claims revolve around the argument that

she followed Lesen’s instructions about setting boundaries with the Student, so

Calichman, Lesen, and Murphy must have had discriminatory motives for

reacting as they did.   See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

147‐48 (2000) (permitting the factfinder “to consider [the defendant’s] dishonesty

about a material fact” (emphasis added)). Chen’s testimony, however, reveals

nothing more than a difference of opinion about her actions.  Calichman’s memo

after the May 20 meeting described what he, Lesen, and Murphy saw as

problematic aspects of Chen’s conduct, pointing out that she should not have

“pressure[d] [the Student] into signing a contract‐like document,” “intervene[d]”

with a student who was not in her class, “recruit[ed] other professors” to help

her, or established a barrier to “enroll[ing] in [her] course.”  J.A. 195.  There is no

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evidence that Lesen instructed Chen to handle the situation with the Student in

this manner.    Indeed, when asked to describe Lesen’s instructions in a

deposition, Chen made no mention of Lesen allowing restrictions on enrollment

and stated that Lesen described only verbal ways to set boundaries and told her

to “confront the student by [her]self.” Chen noted that she simply “assumed”

Lesen wanted her to meet with the Student immediately — an assumption she

arrived at not on the basis of a specific statement during the conversation, but

from Lesen’s suggestion in a follow‐up e‐mail that Chen “[d]efinitely keep [her]

posted.”  J.A. 324‐27, 442.  We take no position as to whether Chen handled the

matter improperly, and indeed, we do not question the sincerity of Chen’s belief

that she faced a difficult situation and handled it appropriately.  Nonetheless, we

cannot conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Chen’s colleagues were

insincere in their own belief that, even if the Student’s behavior was odd or

improper, Chen’s handling of the situation demonstrated exceedingly poor

judgment.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147‐48; Cross v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 417 F.3d

241, 248 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[P]laintiff must prove that a defendant’s proffered

reasons were not the true reasons for its actions but a pretext for

discrimination.”).  As a result, Chen’s evidence about Lesen’s instructions does

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33

not support the inference that Calichman, Lesen, Murphy, or CUNY

discriminated against her on the basis of her race, national origin, or gender.

Similarly, none of the other circumstances surrounding the reappointment

decisions warrants an inference of discrimination.  Chen may be correct that, in

certain contexts, vague words like “collegiality” can serve as a mask for

discrimination.    But in light of Calichman’s rationale for his review of Chen’s

collegiality and the fact that CCNY’s Bylaws require assistant professors to

demonstrate “satisfactory qualities of personality and character,” J.A. 170, it is

“simply not objectively reasonable to label” the word collegiality as a

“semaphore[] for discrimination.”    Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 44‐45.    By the same

token, Chen’s testimony as to Lesen’s repeated use of the word “stop” in her

second meeting with Chen — a meeting which focused on explaining how Chen

should have confronted the student — is not enough, standing alone, to support

an inference of discriminatory motivations.  Quite simply, even if sincerely held,

a plaintiff’s “feelings and perceptions of being discriminated against” do not

provide a basis on which a reasonable jury can ground a verdict.   Bickerstaff v.

Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 456 (2d Cir. 1999) (brackets omitted).12

																																																								

12 Chen also claims that Calichman informed her he would not consider her Chinese‐

language publications when setting her salary, and that he did not allow her to take

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Given the absence of evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination,

we agree with the district court’s decision that no reasonable jury could conclude

that CUNY and the Individual Defendants were motivated, in whole or in part,

by a desire to discriminate on the basis of Chen’s race, national origin, or gender.  

Indeed, as the district court concluded, there is simply “no evidence in the record

that Defendants’ failure to renew Chen’s Directorship or appointment as

Professor for the 2010‐2011 academic year had anything to do with Chen’s

gender, race, or national origin.”    S.P.A. 13.    We therefore affirm the district

court’s decision to grant summary judgment to CUNY on both of Chen’s Title

VII claims, and to the Individual Defendants on Chen’s Equal Protection claim.

B. New York City Human Rights Law

In addition to her federal claims, Chen also argues that Calichman, Lesen,

Murphy, and Paaswell violated the NYCHRL because they discriminated against

her on the basis of race, national origin, and gender, and because they retaliated

against her for filing an Affirmative Action Complaint.  Based on the evidence in

the record, no reasonable jury could agree with Chen’s claims.

																																																																																																																																																																																		

advantage of a course release.  She has failed, however, to identify any publications that

Calichman did not consider, to connect these allegations to the relevant employment

decisions, or to provide any admissible evidence of how other similarly situated

professors were treated.  These assertions are therefore insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact for trial.

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“[F]or many years, the NYCHRL was construed to be coextensive with its

federal and state counterparts.”  Velazco v. Columbus Citizens Found., 778 F.3d 409,

410 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam).    But in 2005, the New York City Council

amended the law to emphasize that “interpretations of state and federal civil

rights statutes can serve only as a floor below which the [NYCHRL] cannot fall”

and that the NYCHRL should “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of

the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof.”    Mihalik v. Credit Agricole

Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Local Civil

Rights Restoration Act of 2005, § 7, N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85).   In light of these

revisions “courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently

from any federal and state law claims, construing [its] provisions ‘broadly in

favor of discrimination plaintiffs to the extent that such a construction is

reasonably possible.’”   Id. (quoting Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472,

477‐78 (2011) (internal citations omitted).

   New York courts seeking to heed the City Council’s command have

approached discrimination and retaliation claims under a similar framework.  In

both situations, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, and the defendant

then has the opportunity to offer legitimate reasons for its actions.  See Bennett v.

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Health Mgmt. Sys., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112, 124 (1st Dep’t 2011).    If the defendant

satisfies that burden, summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable jury

could conclude either that the defendant’s “reasons were pretextual,” Melman v.

Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 35 (1st Dep’t 2012), or that the defendant’s

stated reasons were not its sole basis for taking action, and that its conduct was

based at least “in part on discrimination,” id. at 41 (quoting Aulicino v. New York

City Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2009)).    In other words,

summary judgment is appropriate if “the record establishes as a matter of law”

that discrimination or retaliation “play[ed] no role” in the defendant’s actions.  

Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n.8 (quoting Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120,

127 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38, 40

n.27 (1st Dep’t 2009).13

Viewed through this lens, we agree with the district court’s decision that

Chen has not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

																																																								

13 We note that, at least in the discrimination context, this inquiry closely mirrors the

questions that courts must answer when resolving summary judgment motions on Title

VII claims.  After all, once a Title VII claimant raises a prima facie case of discrimination

and the employer offers a legitimate explanation, the court considers whether a

reasonable jury could conclude that the employer’s decision was motivated, in whole or

in part, by discrimination.   The plaintiff can survive summary judgment by showing

that “the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action is entirely

pretextual,” or that the employer had “mixed motives,” one of which was the desire to

discriminate.  See Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 141‐42.  

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that discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, or gender played a role

in the Individual Defendants’ actions.   As explained above, Calichman, Lesen,

and Murphy provided a legitimate reason for expressing negative opinions

about Chen’s conduct.  Chen has failed to raise a genuine dispute about whether

those “complaints . . . were made in good faith.”   Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 36.  

Even under the NYCHRL, “[t]he mere fact that [a] plaintiff may disagree . . .

[and] think that [her] behavior was justified does not raise an inference of

pretext.”  Id. (quoting Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 312 (2004)

(brackets omitted).  Nor do Calichman’s reference to “collegiality” or Lesen’s use

of the word “stop” sufficiently support Chen’s claim; no reasonable jury could

conclude, in context, that either evinced discriminatory intent.

Turning to Chen’s retaliation claim, we note that NYCHRL’s retaliation

provision is broader than Title VII’s — protecting plaintiffs who “oppos[e] any

practice forbidden under” the law from conduct “reasonably likely to deter a

person engaging in such action.”  Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 112; see also N.Y.C. Admin.

Code § 8‐107(7).  Chen’s NYCHRL claim, however, still relies principally on the

idea that she was retaliated against because of her Affirmative Action Complaint;

she has not identified any earlier time when she “opposed any practice forbidden

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38

under” the NYCHRL.  Thus, she must show that Calichman, Lesen, Murphy, and

Paaswell engaged in some prohibited conduct and that their decision to do so

was “caused at least in part by . . . retaliatory motives.”    Id. at 113; see also

Brightman v. Prison Health Serv., 970 N.Y.S.2d 789, 789 (2d Dep’t 2013).

Chen’s retaliation claim fails even under this broader provision.  To begin,

there is simply no evidence that Lesen or Murphy engaged in any conduct

“reasonably likely to deter a person” from complaining about NYCHRL

violations after Chen filed her Affirmative Action Complaint.   See Melman, 946

N.Y.S.2d at 42 (noting that a defendant cannot “be deemed to have retaliated

against plaintiff simply by denying that it was discriminating against him and

confronting him with [his] professional lapses”).  Nor has Chen presented facts

from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Calichman’s advocacy against

Chen’s reappointment or Paaswell’s rejection of her appeal were motivated, in

part, by retaliation.    As explained above, Calichman took note of comments

about Chen’s “overaggressiveness and lack of tact” in her first year of teaching

and, in his view, her confrontation with the Student and handling of the

aftermath confirmed those concerns.   Calichman expressed those opinions in a

professional evaluation long before Chen’s Affirmative Action complaint and

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39

reiterated the concerns when advocating against Chen’s reappointment.    Cf.

Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 116 (denying summary judgment when defendant

“presented no evidence that anyone confronted [plaintiff] about [performance]

problems” until plaintiff complained).  Under these circumstances, the fact that

Chen’s reappointment decision came soon after her Affirmative Action

complaint is insufficient to support a claim of retaliatory discharge: Chen was

reviewed along with all other assistant professors and, in light of CCNY’s review

system, Calichman had no earlier opportunity to voice his opinion on Chen’s

reappointment.    See Suriel v. Dominican Rep. Educ. & Mentoring Proj., Inc., 926

N.Y.S.2d 198, 202 (3d Dep’t 2011).    Chen has also presented no evidence that

Paaswell’s decision was based on anything other than considering her record in

light of his discussions with Calichman and other faculty members.  

Accordingly, the district court was therefore correct to grant all of the defendants

summary judgment on Chen’s retaliation claim.

In sum, after conducting a separate analysis for Chen’s NYCHRL claims,

we conclude that the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the

Individual Defendants was correct.  We therefore affirm its decision.14

																																																								

14 Because we conclude that Chen has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a

jury could conclude that CUNY violated Title VII or that the Individual Defendants

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CONCLUSION

We have considered Chen’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit.   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

   

																																																																																																																																																																																		

violated the Equal Protection Clause or the NYCHRL, we also agree with the district

court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her aiding and abetting claims.

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