Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02306/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02306-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cr3447-LAB-2 and

14cv2306-LAB

ORDER DENYING MOTION

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

vs.

ARMANDO CAZAREZ-SANTOS,

Defendant.

Petitioner Armando Cazarez-Santos (“Cazarez”), a Mexican citizen, pled guilty

pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of transporting illegal aliens and aiding and

abetting, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II), and judgment was entered

against him on December 19, 2012. He was sentenced to twelve months in custody,

followed by three years of supervised release. He filed no appeal, and his conviction

became final on December 28, 2012.

On June 21, 2013, after Cazarez completed serving the custodial portion of his

sentence, he was served with a notice to appear for removal proceedings and placed him

in detention. The notice informed him that his alien smuggling conviction was considered an

aggravated felony, and that he was removable. On January 21, 2014, after an immigration

hearing, he was removed to Mexico. On May 28, 2014, he was apprehended while illegally

entering the United States, and is presently charged with returning to the United States after

deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

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 On September 29, 2014, Cazarez filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to

vacate his conviction for alien smuggling. The United States opposes that motion on the

grounds that the petition is time-barred and otherwise lacks merit. On November 10, the

Court held a hearing and received evidence. The Court made findings of fact and announced

its decision from the bench, but also specified that its decision from the bench would be

supplemented by a written decision. 

In his petition, Cazarez argues that his trial counsel committed error under Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) by failing to adequately advise him of the risk of deportation. 

As the party seeking to set aside his conviction, he bears the burden of showing he is

entitled to relief. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Hearing and Findings

At the hearing, Cazarez called his trial counsel, Steven Pactor, who testified regarding

what advice he had given Cazarez while representing him on the alien smuggling charge.

Both sides agreed that Cazarez waived the attorney-client privilege by calling into question

the effectiveness of Mr. Pactor’s legal representation, and that Mr. Pactor could testify

regarding the advice he gave regarding immigration consequences. Mr. Pactor testified at

length, and was subject to questioning by Cazarez and the Government, and also by the

Court. Cazarez did not testify, and did not present any other evidence beyond what he had

submitted in his written petition.

Mr. Pactor testified that he did not recall the specific words that he used in advising

Cazarez of the immigration consequences that would follow from an alien smuggling

conviction, but he stated that it is his practice to advise his clients regarding immigration

consequences, and that he did not deviate from his usual practice in this case. The essence

of Mr. Pactor’s testimony was that he advised Cazarez that a guilty plea would definitely

result in deportation proceedings, and that he was likely to be deported. He characterized

his advice this way: “You’re likely to be deported, but never say never.” In other words,

deportation was likely, but Mr. Pactor could not positively rule out the possibility that Cazarez

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might avoid it. He testified that Cazarez's version of the advice, which ascribed a much more

tentative warning about deportation, did not “ring true” to him.

Mr. Pactor testified that his standard procedure is to tell all clients in Cazarez’s

position that they are likely to be deported, but not to say that deportation is “certain.” He

explained that it would be irresponsible of him to tell a client that there was no chance at all

of avoiding deportation, because sometimes it can be avoided. For example, he testified

that a client might be eligible for asylum or for what he called a “snitch visa,” under which the

client avoids deportation by providing assistance to the government. Mr. Pactor also 1

testified that he routinely advises his clients that they should hire an immigration attorney if

they are intent on avoiding deportation, and he tries not to provide detailed immigration

advice himself.

At Cazarez’s change of plea hearing, Magistrate Judge William Gallo asked Mr.

Pactor whether he had advised Cazarez about the possibility of deportation. (Pet., Ex. B at

2:12–25.) Mr. Pactor responded that the portion of the plea agreement dealing with possible

immigration consequences “mimics the conversation [he] had with [Cazarez] yesterday.”

Cazarez argues that Pactor’s statement meant that the lawyer had advised him only about

striking the stipulated deportation language from the plea agreement – a subject that came

up during the Rule 11 hearing – and not more. But the Court disagrees with this

interpretation and finds it implausible.

The colloquy between Mr. Pactor and Judge Gallo concerned Cazarez’s desire to

strike the stipulated removal provision that was in the original draft of the plea agreement,

not whether Cazarez understood the likelihood of deportation. That was the subject

conversation that Pactor referred to when he stated that he had spoken with Cazarez

“yesterday” and that Pactor said “mimics” what was in the agreement. Mr. Pactor was not

asked by Judge Gallo to recount all previous advice he had provided to Cazarez about the

immigration consequences of an alien smuggling conviction – the subject that he testified

Although Mr. Pactor did not testify regarding this, it is worth remembering that

1

Cazarez was a junior member of a team of alien smugglers. It is at least possible that he

might have been eligible for this form of relief.

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about before this Court. When he took the stand at the § 2255 hearing, Mr. Pactor clarified

what general advice he had given. His advice regarding the likelihood of Cazarez’s

deportation was far more thorough than the terse colloquy during the Rule 11 hearing, and

Mr. Pactor was thoroughly examined about it. After observing and considering Mr. Pactor’s

testimony, the Court finds that it was credible in all particulars and believes his account.

In addition to the advice that Mr. Pactor gave Cazarez before he pled guilty, and in

addition to the warnings Cazarez received during the Rule 11 proceeding, both Mr. Pactor

and the Court discussed deportation during Cazarez’s sentencing hearing. Mr. Pactor

related that his client:

is an individual who has substantial ties to the United States. He is someone

who is not a hundred percent going to be deported but definitely going to be

in deportation proceedings. The family has retained immigration counsel, and

I negotiated this plea. And I know enough to know what language is in there,

but we checked with immigration counsel.

(Sentencing Hearing Tr. (Docket no. 85) at 5:2–7). Mr. Pactor’s statement at the sentencing

hearing fully corroborates his testimony at the § 2255 hearing. The Court finds it significant

that Cazarez was present during the sentencing hearing, and was obviously aware of what

was being said. In fact, the sentencing transcript reveals that shortly after Mr. Pactor spoke,

Cazarez was asked if he had anything to say. Cazarez took the opportunity to speak, but

he never disputed or sought to clarify anything that Mr. Pactor had said, nor did he even

mention the subject of deportation. (Id. at 5:18–6:1.) Later at the hearing, the Court

reiterated the likelihood of deportation while setting the conditions of supervised release. “If

Mr. Cazarez does not succeed in immigration court and he is deported, then there’ll be two

conditions of supervised release . . . .” (Id. at 8:4–8.)

Based on all of the evidence, the Court finds Mr. Pactor told Cazarez that he would

definitely be in deportation proceedings, and that he would more than likely be deported,

although deportation was not 100% certain.

Timeliness

Cazarez recognizes that his petition under § 2255 was filed after the one-year

limitations period had already run. He nevertheless argues that the petition is not time-

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barred for two reasons. First, he says his claim did not accrue until his removal became

administratively final. Second, he argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because of

attorney abandonment. At the hearing, the Court denied Cazarez's petition as untimely

because it was brought well after the one-year limitations period had expired and there was

no sufficient basis to find tolling.

Cazarez relies on Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005) in support of his

argument that the limitations period on his claim did not begin to run until his removal was

administratively final. In other words, he believes that his claim did not accrue as it ordinarily

would on the date his conviction became final. He argues that the final removal order

amounted to a new fact, and therefore pursuant to § 2255(f)(4), the limitations period began

to run on that later date. He also argues that until he was actually removed, he was relying

on his defense lawyer’s allegedly inadequate advice. His claim therefore accrued, he

maintains, on the date of removal.

The Government points out that Johnson is distinguishable. In Johnson, a state

court’s decision directly affected the petitioner’s claim; he could not have filed a habeas

petition until the state court decision was entered. Here, by contrast, the removal order itself

was not a new fact underlying or giving rise to Cazarez’s habeas claim. By no later than the

date that he pleaded guilty, Cazarez knew the facts underlying his habeas claim, i.e., that

he had been given certain advice by his attorney, that he was not an American citizen, and

that he had to plead guilty to the offense of alien smuggling. That he may not have realized

the legal significance of those facts until later makes no difference. For example, in ChangCruz v. Hendricks, 2013 WL 5966420, slip op. at *3 (D.N.J., Nov. 7, 2013), the court held

that a non-citizen’s claim accrued in 2005, when he pleaded guilty, and not later when he

realized that the plea would result in his deportation. Although that court was dealing with

the limitations period of § 2244(d)(1), the analysis applies with equal force here:

Mr. Chang–Cruz was aware that he was not an American citizen. He was

aware that he had pled guilty to the drug offenses when his conviction

became final in 2005. Mr. Chang–Cruz may not have been aware of the

precise legal consequences of his guilty plea (potential deportation), but he

was aware of the vital facts underlying his claim. Furthermore, Mr.

Chang–Cruz was specifically instructed by the state court at the plea hearing

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that his guilty plea could impact his immigration status. That placed him at

least on inquiry notice, even if the precise consequences of his guilty plea did

not materialize until he was picked up by immigration officials in June 2010.

These facts do not give rise to a claim of delayed accrual under Section

2244(d)(1)(D). The case law consistently draws a distinction between delayed

awareness of vital facts (which will delay accrual), and delayed awareness of

the legal significance of those facts (which will not). 

Id.

A more recent Supreme Court decision confirms this conclusion. In Chaidez v. United

States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013), the Court addressed the issue of whether Padilla

applied retroactively. The petitioner had pleaded guilty, and while she was still fighting

removal, Padilla was decided. Id. at 1106. The Court announced that Padilla was not

retroactive, and determined that she couldn't benefit from the decision, because her

conviction was final before it was decided. In other words, her Padilla claim accrued when

her conviction became final, and not later when she was finally ordered removed.

Nor is Cazarez entitled to pre-removal tolling based on lack of notice of the likelihood

of removal. In its ruling from the bench, the Court determined that the colloquy at sentencing

(discussed above) gave Cazarez notice that deportation was likely. At the very latest,

Cazarez knew that he would likely be deported when he was served with a order to show

cause notice (OSC) on June 21, 2013, that required him to show cause why he should not

be deported. It is undisputed that Cazarez was served with the OSC while he was in

custody, and that he remained in continuous immigration custody from the time he

completed his sentence until he was deported. During this period, he also hired an

immigration lawyer to fight the deportation. Cazarez offered no evidence that the

immigration lawyer failed to inform him of the likelihood of deportation.

Cazarez argues in the alternative that he is entitled to equitable tolling because his

subsequent immigration lawyer abandoned him. The petition provides only some of the

relevant dates. The facts as pleaded, however, make clear the attorney did not abandon

Cazarez. Rather, the attorney was hired on October 28, 2013, and he almost immediately

thereafter ordered and read the plea hearing transcript. After reading the transcript, the

attorney told Cazarez that he had no ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and so the

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immigration lawyer did not file a § 2255 petition on Cazarez’s behalf. (Pet. at 11:19–25.) 

This is not attorney abandonment; at most, it amounts to debatable legal advice. But even

if the immigration attorney’s actions amounted to malpractice — and the Court does not

believe that they did — it was not the kind of egregious misconduct that would support

equitable tolling. See Hunter v. Galaza, 366 Fed. Appx. 766, 767 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Frye

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) and Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083,

1090 (9th Cir. 2005)) (“mere negligence or professional malpractice” will not meet the

threshold for equitable tolling under AEDPA; tolling is available only where the attorney has

committed “egregious misconduct”). It is also clear that Cazarez knew no petition had been

filed, and did not file one himself. Assuming the immigration attorney’s advice was wrong,

nothing prevented Cazarez himself from filing a § 2255 petition before the limitations period

had run. Instead, Cazarez waited ten months after the one-year limitations period had run

to hire an immigration attorney, and then he waited many months after that to file his petition

in this case. In fact, he waited over a year after he was specifically informed that his plea

to an aggravated felony rendered him deportable before filing anything. In other words, even

if equitable tolling applied during the period his immigration attorney allegedly mishandled

his case, it would not make his petition timely.

Because the petition is untimely, relief under § 2255 is unavailable, and the petition

is denied primarily for that reason. The Court emphasizes, however, that Cazarez has not

established that the performance of either Mr. Pactor or of the immigration attorney was

ineffective. Nor has he established that even if it was, he was prejudiced by the allegedly

deficient advice. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 (holding that prejudice, i.e., the reasonable

likelihood of a different outcome, is an element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).

The petition is therefore denied on those additional grounds. 

Ineffective Assistance

Both Padilla and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980

(9th Cir. 2011) hold that a defendant should be informed of any clear immigration

consequences before pleading guilty. The Court put it this way in Padilla: “when the

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deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”

559 U.S. at 369. Notably, this admonition does not establish a particular quantum of certainty

by which the clarity or thoroughness of defense counsel’s advice should be measured. In

Bonilla, the Ninth Circuit opined that a defendant has the right to be told that his deportation

is “virtually certain” when that is the case. 637 F.3d at 985. However, as was the case in

Padilla, the defendant in Bonilla received no advice regarding the risk of deportation before

pleading guilty — not merely misadvice about the likelihood of deportation. In United States

v. Ruiz, 548 Fed. Appx. 410 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit cited Bonilla’s “virtually certain”

language, and treated it as establishing a standard of performance. But Ruiz, like Bonilla, 

was an appeal from the denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and

discussed Bonilla in the context of applying the more generous “fair and just reason”

standard. See Ruiz, 548 Fed. Appx. at 411.

Older Ninth Circuit cases established a standard that attorneys need only inform their

clients of the “possible consequences,” “potential consequences,” or “likely consequences”

of their guilty pleas. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2007);

Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994). This standard required that

a defendant be informed of consequences that were likely, not the likelihood of each

consequence. See Brady v. United States, 742, 748 and n.6 (1970) (using both “likely

consequences” and “possible consequences” to describe advice a defendant must be given,

in order to render his plea knowing and intelligent). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that

an attorney’s mistaken predictions of the probability of the consequences of taking or

rejecting a plea does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel and does not render

a plea involuntary. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970). And, as

Strickland has made clear, “No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can

satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel . . . .”

466 U.S. at 688–89.

In view of these precedents, this Court does not read Padilla as purporting to

announce a new, heightened standard for attorney effectiveness, higher than that

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recognized in McMann and other decisions. Rather, this Court understands that the effect

of Padilla was to extend the Strickland standard and require attorneys to provide advice

about the collateral consequence of the risk of deportation. Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1111–12

(explaining that Padilla had the effect of applying Strickland to immigration consequences,

and then conducted a Strickland analysis). In other words, the existing Strickland standard

still applied; Padilla did not announce a new, heightened standard for attorney performance

when advising about immigration matters. Reading Padilla as Cazarez does would have the

effect of overruling decades of precedent sub silentio, and would be unreasonable. This is

particularly true because that decision did cite other decisions it was disapproving. See

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370 (citing with disapproval lower court decisions distinguishing between

failure to advise and affirmative misadvice). See also Minority Television Project, Inc. v.

F.C.C.,736 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We do not credit Minority TV’s argument that

Citizens United . . . overruled decades of precedent sub silentio — especially given that the

Court there expressly overruled two other cases with no mention of [the precedent Minority

TV was challenging] or an intent to change the level of scrutiny . . . .”). And because Padilla

did not undermine or change the earlier standard set forth in both Supreme Court and Ninth

Circuit decisions, the three-judge panel that decided Bonilla was bound by that earlier

standard as well.

This Court is reluctant to characterize the “virtually certain” language in Bonilla as

mere dicta that can be disregarded, or at least, that need not be followed as broadly as the

opinion suggests. But this Court believes that construing Bonilla’s “virtually certain”

admonition as dicta is the correct way to read the case. An earlier point bears reiteration:

Both Padilla and Bonilla dealt with defendants who received no advice at all. The issue of

an attorney’s obligation to tell a defendant that deportation was “virtually certain” (as

opposed to possible, probable, highly likely, or some other level of probability) was not

presented in either case — or in any other Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision that this

Court is aware of. Neither case purported to reject or set aside the older standard that

attorneys need only inform their clients of the “possible consequences,” “potential

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consequences,” or “likely consequences” of their guilty pleas. And because no three-judge

panel of the Ninth Circuit has the power to overrule existing Circuit precedent, except in the

extremely narrow circumstance (not present here) where an older case is “clearly

irreconcilable” with higher authority, see Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc), it is unlikely that Bonilla intended to repudiate the holdings in Womack and

Gonzalez without even mentioning those cases by name. Furthermore, a requirement that

attorneys must couch advice concerning the likelihood of deportation in terms of “virtual

certainty” is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that an attorney’s mistaken

predictions of the probability of the consequences of taking or rejecting a plea does not

amount to ineffective assistance of counsel and does not render a plea involuntary. See

McMann, 397 at 770–71.

It’s also apparent to this Court that the “possible consequences” standard makes a

good deal more practical sense than the alternative of requiring attorneys to expertly quantify

the probability of deportation. Criminal defense attorneys are not, generally speaking, also

immigration attorneys. And even if they were, they would not be expected to predict with

absolute precision how an immigration court would rule on a given case. “Waiving trial

entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney

will turn out to be mistaken . . . as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts.”

McMann, 397 U.S. at 770. A requirement that the likelihood of deportation be precisely

quantified also makes almost impossible the district courts’ responsibility of confirming that

defendants have been properly advised before they plead guilty. While competent in

immigration law, a district court does not have the same record in front of it that an

immigration court has, and cannot with any degree of precision predict the degree of

probability that any given defendant will be in fact deported. See id. That is to say, a district

court often will have no information to evaluate the advice an attorney gave to a defendant

regarding the relative likelihood of deportation, and thus to meaningfully assess the knowing

and intelligent character of the plea as it pertains to that advice.

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Furthermore, reading the remarks in Padilla and Bonilla as literally and broadly as

Cazarez would have the Court do would, at least sometimes, lead to incompetent advice. 

Attorneys are supposed to give reasonable, balanced advice that permits their clients to

make informed decisions. See e.g., Purdy v. United States 208 F.3d 41, 44–45 (2d Cir.

2000) (citing Strickland and other cases for the principle that advising clients regarding plea

decisions amounts to steering between the “Scylla of inadequate advice and the Charybdis

of coercing a plea”). They are not required nor expected to provide the direst warnings

possible, or to give uniform warnings to every client according to an established script. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89 (emphasizing the wide variety of correct ways to represent

clients, and the impossibility of setting rules to guarantee attorney competence). There are

a number of ways non-citizen defendants who plead guilty to aggravated felonies can avoid

deportation. If attorneys are universally required to advise their clients they were “virtually

certain” to be deported, most defendants would undoubtedly accept that advice as true, and

as a result some would be dissuaded from taking advantage of favorable provisions of law

that might exempt them from deportation. Others might effectively be coerced by

excessively dire warnings into going to trial when in fact, pleading guilty is their best option.

See Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1986) (coercion of a plea by a defendant’s

own counsel renders the plea involuntary).

This is not to suggest, of course, that attorneys may incorrectly characterize highly

probable consequences of a guilty plea as highly improbable (or vice versa), or otherwise

mislead their clients regarding the general likelihood of deportation. See, e.g., United States

v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2005) (abrogated on other grounds by Padilla)

(counsel’s incorrect advice that there was “no serious possibility” of deportation was

ineffective, where changes in immigration law had rendered deportation highly likely). This

Court merely concludes that an attorney’s responsibility does not extend so far as to require

him or her to provide formulaic warnings to every client, or to precisely handicap the

probability of deportation.

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This Court therefore adheres to the older standard, which it believes survives Padilla, 

and concludes that even after Padilla attorneys need only inform their clients accurately of

the possible consequences of guilty pleas; they do not have to predict with exactitude the

likelihood of those consequences. In the context of this case, Mr. Pactor’s advice that

deportation was likely though not completely certain was therefore competent.

Prejudice

A petitioner bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must show a

“reasonable probability” that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s errors. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688. Cazarez argues that he would have done all he could to avoid deportation,

including accepting the strong likelihood of a longer sentence. While this claim could

conceivably be true, the facts of the case and Mr. Pactor’s testimony make it very

improbable to believe.

Cazarez argues that had he been told deportation was “virtually certain,” he would not

have pled guilty, and instead would have held out for a plea deal that did not require him to

plead to an aggravated felony. If such a deal were not forthcoming, he says, he would have

gone to trial. He points to his refusal to stipulate to deportation in his plea agreement as

evidence supporting this stance.

The Court finds to the contrary that there is no reasonable likelihood that Cazarez

would have insisted on going to trial, nor was he in a position to negotiate a plea to a lesser

charge. The facts of the case bear out this conclusion. Cazarez was apprehended near the

U.S.-Mexico border after border patrol agents witnessed approximately eleven aliens getting

into a pickup truck that he was driving. When that agents pulled the truck over, gave

Cazarez Miranda warnings, and questioned him, Cazarez admitted that he was a smuggler

and that he was being paid $100 per alien. (Pet., 5:16–23.) The prosecutor offered Cazarez

a plea agreement that included a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and a

two-level departure for fast-track. In view of the strength of the evidence, going to trial and

foregoing the deal would have been irrational. And based on the Court’s experience in

handling dozens of alien smuggling cases over the past 30 years, it is very unlikely that

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Cazarez would have been successful in obtaining a plea deal any more favorable than the

one he received. 

Mr. Pactor’s testimony bolsters this conclusion. He testified that after reviewing the

evidence, he advised Cazarez to plead guilty because the case was “not defensible.” Mr.

Pactor pointed out that had Cazarez gone to trial, he would have lost the benefit of fast-track

and the other concessions the Government was offering. In addition, the prosecutor may

have added other charges. Any of these circumstances would have increased Cazarez’s

exposure to greater jail time. The best Mr. Pactor was able to do for Cazarez with regard to

immigration consequences, he said, was to have the stipulated deportation provision

stricken.

Other facts also call into question whether avoiding deportation was a priority to

Cazarez. Cazarez was told in June 2013 that his aggravated felony conviction rendered him

deportable, yet he made no attempt to withdraw his plea until approximately fifteen months

later. His current petition seems to be motivated more by his latest arrest for illegal reentry,

and his effort to defend against that charge. In other words, Cazarez's primary goal appears

to be avoiding conviction and punishment for the instant offense, rather than squabbling over

whether he was properly deported a year ago. These additional facts undercut his assertion

that had he known with “virtual certainty” that he would be deported, he would have done

whatever he could have to avoid that outcome or lessen the chances of it, even if it meant

accepting a longer sentence. Even assuming Mr. Pactor had advised Cazarez that

deportation was virtually certain instead of giving the advice he did, the Court finds that there

is no reasonable probability Cazarez would have made a different decision.

Conclusion and Order

The petition is DENIED because it is untimely. In the alternative, it is denied because

Cazarez's trial counsel was not ineffective in violation of Padilla. Also in the alternative, the

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petition is denied for failure to show prejudice; even if Cazarez’s trial counsel was ineffective,

there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome.

The petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 5, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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