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Nature of Suit Code: 875
Nature of Suit: Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2006 Decided December 19, 2006

No. 05-5052

EUGENE C. SMALLS

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv02620)

Eugene R. Fidell, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs as amicus curiae in support of appellant.

Eugene C. Smalls, pro se, filed briefs.

Oliver W. McDaniel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

 ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the denial

of two motions for reconsideration of a judgment dismissing, on

res judicata grounds, an amended complaint for the correction

of military records. Because the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying these motions, which are properly

considered as filed pursuant to FED.R.CIV. P. 60(b), we affirm.

 

I.

Eugene C. Smalls served in the United States Marine Corps

from 1978 to 1980. He received a general discharge under

honorable conditions for a physical disability existing prior to

his service. He later succeeded in having his general discharge

changed to an honorable discharge. Between 1986 and 1992,

Smalls repeatedly sought to have the Board for Correction of

Naval Records (“BCNR”) amend his record to reflect a

retirement for medical disability. In 1997, the Secretary of the

Navy affirmed the BCNR’s denial of Smalls’s requests.

Thereafter, Smalls filed two complaints under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 

In an amended complaint filed in the federal district court

of Hawaii, Smalls sought correction of his military record and

damages in an amount less than $10,000 for negligent infliction

of emotional distress and defamation. The district court ruled

that his APA claim was timely, but dismissed his emotional

distress and defamation claims. Smalls v. United States, 87 F.

Supp. 2d 1055, 1060 (D. Haw. 2000). On Smalls’s motion for

judgment on the administrative record, the district court

determined that the BCNR’s 1997 denial of Smalls’s requests

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was not arbitrary or capricious because it had followed the

correct procedures and had made specific findings that were

sufficient to support its decision. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

initially affirmed, Smalls v. England, 41 F. App’x 989, 989 (9th

Cir. 2002), but subsequently remanded the case for the district

court to explain the basis on which it had exercised jurisdiction,

Smalls v. England, 50 F. App’x 379, 379 (9th Cir. 2002).

Following the remand, where the district court claimed

jurisdiction based in part on the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit transferred the appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the

ground that court had exclusive jurisdiction. Smalls v. United

States, No. 01-15827 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2003). The Federal

Circuit held that Smalls’s claim was untimely because his

complaint was filed more than six years after his discharge.

Smalls v. United States, 87 F. App’x 167, 167-68 (Fed. Cir.

2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 942 (2004). It vacated the district

court’s opinion, and, upon remand, the Hawaii district court

dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Subsequently, in an amended complaint filed in the federal

district court of the District of Columbia, Smalls challenged the

Secretary’s denials of April 11, 1997 and January 6, 2003 of his

requests for disability retirement status. The government moved

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the complaint was barred by

the statute of limitations, by res judicata, and by the Tucker Act

because Smalls sought monetary relief in excess of $10,000. On

December 8, 2004, the district court granted the motion to

dismiss, ruling that res judicata, or claim preclusion, barred the

amended complaint. The court found that Smalls had merely

“repackaged . . . in virtually identical form” his earlier Hawaii

complaint challenging the same underlying decisions: Smalls’s

discharge from the Marines without disability pay and the

BCNR’s decisions concerning his retirement status.

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On December 27, 2004, Smalls filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the district court denied on February 8,

2005, relying on the same reasons it gave for dismissing his

amended complaint. On February 9, 2005, Smalls filed a notice

of appeal from the December 8, 2004 order dismissing his

amended complaint. On March 4, 2005, Smalls filed a second

motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied on

March 11, 2005, again relying on the reasons in its decision

dismissing the amended complaint. On March 25, 2005, Smalls

filed an amended notice of appeal, including the order denying

reconsideration. 

This court dismissed as untimely Smalls’s appeal from the

December 8 order dismissing his amended complaint, see FED.

R.APP.P.4(a)(1)(B), but held that the March 25 amended notice

of appeal from the orders denying reconsideration was timely

and that the denials would be reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard because the motions were filed more than ten

days after entry of the orders and properly viewed as filed

pursuant to Rule 60(b), Smalls v. United States, No. 05-5052

(D.C. Cir. July 6, 2005). 

 

II.

In seeking affirmance of the district court on alternative

grounds, the government contends that the district court lacked

jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346,

because Smalls is seeking retirement benefits back to 1980 and

has not waived damages in excess of $10,000. We therefore

address this threshold issue first.

The Tucker Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United

States Court of Federal Claims over claims against the United

States for “liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not

sounding in tort.” Id. § 1491. The Little Tucker Act provides

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an exception, vesting concurrent jurisdiction in district courts for

civil actions or claims against the United States for $10,000 or

less. Id. § 1346(a)(2). In contrast to the monetary limitations of

the Little Tucker Act, which are jurisdictional, see United States

v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 67 n.1 (1987), the defense of res judicata,

or claim preclusion, while having a “somewhat jurisdictional

character,” SBC Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229-30

(D.C. Cir. 2005), does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction

of the district court. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

8(c)); N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d,

1338, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

This court has adopted a bright line approach under which

it “consider[s] cases to be based on the Tucker Act’s waiver of

sovereign immunity only if the plaintiff seeks money or the

district court grants it.” Kidwell v. Dep’t of the Army, Bd. for

Corr. of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1995);

see also Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d

528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d

at 1521, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762

F.2d 1065, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). “[A] claim is subject to the

Tucker Act and its jurisdictional consequences if, in whole or in

part, it explicitly or ‘in essence’ seeks more than $10,000 in

monetary relief from the federal government.” Kidwell, 56 F.3d

at 284. A complaint is not in essence one for monetary damages

if the only remedy requested is “non-monetary relief that has

considerable value independent of any future potential for

monetary relief.” Tootle v. Sec’y of the Navy, 446 F.3d 167, 176

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a complaint

seeks monetary relief, “the court must generally limit [its

inquiry] to the four corners of the complaint.” Id. at 174. An

“inquir[y] into the consequences of [the] plaintiff[’s]

victor[y]—even ‘automatic’ consequences—would ‘take [the

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court] outside the record sought to be reviewed and thereby

complicate the jurisdictional issue.’” Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 285

(quoting Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 534). The fact that in

seeking the correction of a military record the plaintiff may, if

successful, obtain monetary relief from the United States in

subsequent administrative proceedings is insufficient to deprive

the district court of jurisdiction. See Tootle, 446 F.3d at 176;

Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284-85.

Consistent with the factors discussed in Kidwell and Tootle,

we conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction

because Smalls is not seeking money and, were Smalls to

prevail, the district court would not award such relief. A review

of Smalls’s pro se amended complaint reveals that, in essence,

he seeks, as in Tootle, 446 F.3d at 176, and Kidwell, 56 F.3d at

286, “declaratory or injunctive relief that is not negligible in

comparison with the potential monetary recovery.” See Tootle,

446 F.3d at 176 (quoting Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284) (citations

omitted). Smalls states in his amended complaint that he is

seeking equitable relief in light of an alleged “injustice” due to

the failures of the Secretary and the BCNR to correct “factual

errors and/or omissions” related to his “service-connected

disability.” Am. Compl. at 23, Smalls v. United States, No. 03-

2620 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003) (“Am. Compl.”). Alternatively,

Smalls seeks a remand to the BCNR for proper application of its

rules and regulations. Id. at 24. The amended complaint states

that he is filing suit “primarily to correct his military records”

and to receive “disability retirement status.” Id. at 6.

Specifically, he seeks a disability “rating of thirty percent or

more for service-related conditions.” Id. at 21. 

Although the amended complaint refers at several points to

Smalls’s desire to obtain “retirement benefits,” id. at 23-24, read

in context his cause of action, by its own terms, seeks “to correct

[his] military naval record to show entitlement to retirement[]

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benefits for a service-connected disability,” id. at 23. The

prayer for relief reflects this claim, tying his right to retirement

benefits to the correction of his military record. Id. at 24.

Moreover, as amicus explains, the phrase “retirement benefits”

connotes a host of benefits to which no monetary value can be

attached, such as medical treatment, priority access to Walter

Reed Army Medical Center, access to base facilities, space

available travel on military aircraft, the right to wear the uniform

on appropriate public occasions, military funeral arrangements,

and preferential burial privileges in national cemeteries. Amicus

acknowledges that retirement benefits can include disability pay,

receipt of which is Smalls’s goal once his naval record is

corrected, but it is clear that this would come as a result of

administrative proceedings based on Smalls being designated as

a disability retiree and not as a result of the adjudication of the

claims in his amended complaint. See Tootle, 446 F.3d at 175.

Although Smalls does allege “willful and/or negligent acts,”

Am. Compl. at 22-23, his prayer for relief, unlike the prayer in

his Hawaii complaint, does not seek money damages for these

injuries. 

III.

Smalls’s motions for reconsideration were filed more than

ten days after the dismissal of his amended complaint and are

properly viewed as filed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). See

Computer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72

F.2d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Our review is limited to

determining whether the district court abused its discretion.

Smalls v. United States, No. 05-5052 (D.C. Cir. July 6, 2005)

(citing Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 268 n.7

(1978)). The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] district

court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error

of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (citing

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).

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As this court has explained, review for abuse of discretion

generally is confined to determining whether the district court

did not apply the correct legal standard or misapprehended the

underlying substantive law, and whether the district court’s

ruling was within the scope of permissible alternatives in light

of the relevant factors and the reasons given to support it. See

Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted); see also RJE Corp. v. Northville Indus.

Corp., 329 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.

Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Where this court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion

for abuse of discretion, however, the nature of our review must

take into account that “Rule 60(b) was intended to preserve ‘the

delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and

the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be

done in light of all the facts.’ . . . [It] cannot . . . be employed

simply to rescue a litigant from strategic choices that later turn

out to be improvident.” Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v.

Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (first omission in

original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bankers Mortgage Co. v

United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970)). As this court

declared in Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d

1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988), “the district court’s grant or denial

of relief under Rule 60(b), unless rooted in an error of law, may

be reversed only for abuse of discretion.” (emphasis added). Cf.

D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C.

Cir. 1975) (citing 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S

FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.22(3) (1974)). In this context, the

appellate court’s function is not to determine the substantive

correctness of the judgment but rather is limited to deciding

whether the district court abused its discretion in ruling that

sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment

were not shown. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.

Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1971), cited in Browder, 434

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U.S. at 263. Consequently, the legal error warranting reversal

of a denial of reconsideration under Rule 60(b) review must be

clear. Cf. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Although the circuit courts of appeal do not always use

the same word to describe the nature of this review for legal

error, see, e.g., United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d

Cir. 2003); Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d

1179, 1186 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000); Caisse Nationale de Credit

Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996);

see also Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 471

nn.7-8 (5th Cir. 1998); Hill v. McDermott, Inc., 827 F.2d 1040,

1043 (5th Cir. 1987), the courts appear to be in agreement that

such review is limited by the finality considerations underlying

Rule 60(b). In any event, the district court does not abuse its

discretion in denying reconsideration where the movant fails to

demonstrate “a potentially meritorious claim or defense” to the

motion to dismiss the complaint. See Murray v. District of

Columbia, 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Of course, “judgments which are void or are

vehicles of injustice [can]not be left standing.” Brennan, 450

F.2d at 1003; cf. Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208. 

Neither of Smalls’s contentions that the district court

abused its discretion demonstrates clear error by the district

court. Smalls first contends that res judicata cannot apply

because the Federal Circuit vacated the initial decision of the

Hawaii district court. Under the doctrine of res judicata, or

claim preclusion, a subsequent lawsuit will be barred if there has

been prior litigation (1) involving the same claims or cause of

action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3)

there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a

court of competent jurisdiction. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.

v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971); Comm’r of

Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); see also

Nathan v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing

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Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)). The Federal Circuit

directed the Hawaii district court to dismiss Smalls’s claims

based on the bar of the statute of limitations. The Hawaii

district court is, like the D.C. district court, an Article III court,

and, for purposes of res judicata, “[t]he rules of finality . . . treat

a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds . . . as a judgment

on the merits.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,

228 (1995); see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003);

Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1996); Nathan,

651 F.2d at 1226 (6th Cir.); Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863, 865

(8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927

(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (citing Williamson v. Columbia Gas

& Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950)); 18 JAMES WM.

MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.30 (3d ed.

2006); 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 4441 (2d ed. 2002). 

Similarly, contrary to Smalls’s second contention, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider

his argument that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction: A

federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of

other federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 ff. 

Amicus’s contentions also fail to show an abuse of

discretion by the district court. Amicus points out that Smalls’s

D.C. amended complaint omitted a Tucker Act claim, which his

Hawaii complaint included, and challenged different

administrative decisions than his Hawaii complaint. Under the

transactional approach to determining whether two suits involve

the same cause of action, see Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals,

127 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the cause of action consists of

“all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with

respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of

connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Id.

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(quoting Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1989)

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982))).

Although Smalls omitted any reference to the Tucker Act and

any request for damages in his D.C. complaint, the factors

relevant to the transactional analysis point against Smalls in

light of his single goal of having his military record corrected so

that he will be eligible to receive medical disability retirement

benefits. See Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C.

Cir. 1984).

Amicus’s emphasis on the continuing or recurring nature of

BCNR proceedings demonstrates neither inconsistency with the

district court’s res judicata ruling nor unfairness due to

premature judicial intervention into the resolution of Smalls’s

claims. In accordance with the doctrine of res judicata, the

record shows that both the D.C. and Hawaii lawsuits arise from

the same underlying transaction and in both Smalls alleged he

was improperly discharged without medical disability benefits,

challenged agency decisions relating to his discharge and

subsequent administrative challenges, and sought correction of

his military record so as to qualify him for medical disability

retirement benefits. Additionally, no unfairness is demonstrated

by reason of premature judicial intervention because it is the

Secretary’s final decision in 1997 that underlay Smalls’s

untimely appeal from the order dismissing his amended

complaint. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the orders denying the Rule 60(b)

motions for reconsideration.

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