Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00886/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00886-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 08cv886

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN GALLAGHER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08-CV-886-IEG-RBB

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT

CITY OF CORONADO’S MOTION

TO DISMISS; (Doc. No. 9)

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT SAN

DIEGO UNIFIED PORT

DISTRICT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; (Doc. No. 8) and

(3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF

LEAVE TO AMEND.

vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT

and CITY OF CORONADO,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court are: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by defendant San Diego Unified

Port District (“the Port District”); and (2) a motion to dismiss filed by defendant City of Coronado

(“the City”). For the following reasons, the Court (1) grants the City’s motion to dismiss; (2) grants

the Port District’s motion to dismiss; and (3) grants plaintiff leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Plaintiff John Gallagher has a weak and shortened left leg due to childhood polio. Plaintiff

brings this case primarily to challenge the Port District’s failure to re-issue the anchorage permit

for his boat in early 2007. Plaintiff previously sought an accessible anchorage for his boat in

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings in that case under Rule 201 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. 

2

The Port District also describes the circumstances leading to the change in the regulations of

the A-8 anchorage site in order to show that the regulations were changed due to a non-discriminatory

motive. The Court, however, cannot judicially notice the motives of the Port District. See Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding district court erred in taking judicial notice

of “disputed facts stated in public records”). The Port District does not cite any authority supporting

its request for judicial notice of agenda sheets and minutes of the Board of Port Commissioners’

meetings for disputed facts contained therin. The Court therefore denies the request for judicial notice

of Ex. 1 (agenda sheet from August 22, 2000 meeting); Ex. 8 (agenda sheet from December 6, 2005

meeting); Ex. 9 (minutes from December 6, 2005 meeting); Ex. 10 (agenda sheet from May 2, 2006

meeting); Ex. 11 (minutes from May 2, 2006 meeting); Ex. 12 (agenda sheet from June 6, 2006

meeting); Ex. 13 (minutes from June 6, 2006 meeting); Ex. 14 (agenda sheet from September 5, 2006

meeting); and Ex. 15 (minutes from September 5, 2006 meeting). 

3

The Court takes judicial notice of the regulations governing A-8 and A-9 anchorages, which

are public records not subject to reasonable dispute and are referenced by the plaintiff in his

complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting

courts may consider documents “referenced extensively in the complaint” and “accepted by all parties

as authentic” in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). 

- 2 - 08cv886

Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port District, 98-cv-0615 J (JAH).1 In that case, plaintiff alleged

the “A-8 anchorage,” which provided free long-term anchorage, was not accessible to him because

of the choppy surface waters and the distance from his anchorage site to the shore. Plaintiff

accepted the Port District’s third offer of judgment in that case in November of 2000. The terms

of the offer included:

The Port District shall designate Anchorage Area A-9 (the “Cruiser

Anchorage”) as an alternative free, long-term anchorage for qualified individuals

with a disability who, because of that disability, are unable to use Anchorage Area

A-8 . . . .

The Port District shall issue a permit to Plaintiff John Gallagher to anchor in

Anchorage Area A-9 as an alternative free, long-term anchorage area, subject to all

the regulations applicable to A-8.

(Port District’s Exhibit 4 at 1-2.) 

On September 5, 2006, the Port District adopted amendments to Section 4.36 of the Port

District’s Code.2

 In pertinent part, those amendments provide:

Upon enactment of this Section 4.36, as amended, the District shall discontinue

issuing Permits to anchor in the A-8 Anchorage, except for the purpose of reissuing Permits to Vessels with current valid Permits and meeting all the

requirements and conditions of this Section. 

(Port District’s Exhibit 16 at 134 (providing San Diego Unified Port District Code § 4.36(c)(11)).)3

The regulations of the A-9 Anchorage require permittees to comply with all regulations of the A-8

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Unless plaintiff is a licensed attorney, he may not bring his case

on behalf of a class. “[A] non-lawyer ‘has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than

himself.’” Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting C.E. Pope Equity

Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)); see Nielson v. Legacy Health Sys., 230 F.

Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (D. Or. 2001) (prohibiting plaintiff from representing his daughter in civil

action). 

- 3 - 08cv886

Anchorage. (Port District’s Exhibit 6 at 53-54 (providing San Diego Unified Port District Code §

4.38(h)(4)(d)).) Accordingly, the elimination of the A-8 anchorage also ended the Port District’s

issuance of A-9 permits. 

Plaintiff’s boat was vandalized on July 26, 2006, two days after he received his A-9 permit. 

Plaintiff alleges he attempted to renew his permit in January of 2007, but the Port District ignored

his letters and phone calls. Plaintiff eventually received a letter from the Port District dated July 6,

2007. (Port District’s Exhibit 16.) The letter directed plaintiff’s attention to the September 5,

2006 amendments regulating the A-8 and A-9 anchorages and explained the Port District would

not renew plaintiff’s permit because it expired in or around January of 2007. (Id. at 122-23). 

Procedural Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit on May 19, 2008 and filed the operative first

amended complaint (“Complaint”) on July 11, 2008 naming the San Diego Unified Port District

and the City of Coronado as defendants. Plaintiff alleges five causes of action: (1) violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 & 12131; (2) violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) discrimination in violation of the

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; (4) breach of California state laws protecting the disabled; and (5)

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff purports to represent a class of

similarly situated individuals.4

 On August 5, 2008, the Port District filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim and a request for judicial notice in support of the motion. 

(Doc. No. 8.) On August 7, 2008, the City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim. (Doc. No. 9.) On September 2, 2008, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants’

motions and the Port District’s request for judicial notice. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff also filed a

request for judicial notice. (Id.) Both defendants filed replies on September 8, 2008. (Doc. Nos.

11 & 12.) 

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 08cv886

The Court found the matter fully briefed and appropriate for disposition without oral

argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6); Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint

generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2);

Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). To a void a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court’s review is generally

limited to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir.

1996); Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995).

The court must accept all factual allegations pled in the complaint as true, and must construe them

and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty

Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th

Cir.1995) (citing Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987). In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to

assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, (1983). 

Furthermore, a court is not required to credit conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of

factual allegations, “unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 

The Court recognizes the mandate to construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in

determining whether a claim has been stated. Ortez v. Washington County, 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

The Court notes that the Constitution does not by itself create a private cause of action for

plaintiff. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 1988) (“a plaintiff may not

sue a state defendant directly under the Constitution”); see also Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los

Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992). 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the proper vehicle by which plaintiffs

can complain of a violation of a constitutional right by a state actor. See, e.g., Greenawalt v. Sun City

West Fire Dist., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1212-13 (D. Ariz. 2003). To state a claim under § 1983 , “the

plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred ‘under color of state law’ and (2) the action

resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

- 5 - 08cv886

Cir. 1996).

2. Defendant City of Coronado’s Motion to Dismiss

The City moves to dismiss the complaint on the basis that no specific factual allegations

are made against the City. In response, plaintiff cites the only paragraph of his complaint which

mentions the City. In that paragraph, plaintiff alleges:

Defendant’s [sic] SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, CITY OF

CORONADO has [sic] continued to do absolutely nothing about ADA

accommodations, or access on the issue of boat ramps and dock ramps within ADA

anchorage 9, Anchorage 3, Anchorage 5, and the City of Coronado.

(Complaint at ¶ 12.) In reply, the City notes the complaint alleges the Port controls the subject

anchorages, the Port committed the discriminatory acts, and the Port should provide him with

relief. The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the City. If plaintiff files

an amended complaint against the City, he must explain the factual basis for any claims against the

City and what relief he seeks from the City. 

3. Defendant San Diego Unified Port District’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

The Port District argues plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause or Title II of the ADA. 

In order to plead a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

plaintiff must allege the Port District treated him differently than similarly situated individuals. 

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686

(9th Cir. 2001).5

 To state a claim for violation of Title II of the ADA, plaintiff must show he was

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Although plaintiff has alleged two separate ADA causes of action, the only provision plaintiff

cites prohibiting discrimination is Section 12132. The Court therefore treats plaintiff’s ADA causes

of action as one claim. 

7

See Port District’s Exhibit 16 at 134 (providing San Diego Unified Port District Code §

4.36(c)(11); Port District’s Exhibit 17 (providing Judge Huff’s Order dismissing complaint in Renard

v. San Diego Unified Port District, 06-cv-2665 H (BLM))). The Court grants the Port District’s

request for judicial notice of Judge Huff’s decision, which is persuasive authority in this case. 

8

Plaintiff requests the Court takes judicial notice of the Port District’s opposition to his motion

to enforce the judgment in Case No. 98cv0615 J (JAH). Plaintiff argues the Port District’s statement

in that document that plaintiff’s permit “does not expire” is a binding admission. Plaintiff’s complaint

in this case, however, does not allege the Port District breached any agreement to provide plaintiff

with a permit that does not expire. Indeed, the offer of judgment in plaintiff’s earlier case explicitly

stated plaintiff’s permit would be “subject to all the regulations applicable to A-8.” (Port District’s

Exhibit 4 at 39.) Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as moot. 

- 6 - 08cv886

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services of a public agency.6 See

Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). “[I]t

is clear from the language of Title II . . . that public entities are not required to create new

programs that provide heretofore un-provided services to assist disabled persons.” Townsend v.

Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify a benefit or service which the Port District provides

to non-disabled individuals but not to plaintiff, or which is not accessible to plaintiff by reason of

his disability. Plaintiff’s primary concern is that he no longer has an A-9 anchorage permit. (See

Compl. ¶ 11.) As of September 5, 2006, the Port District no longer issues A-8 or A-9 permits.7

The Port District is only authorized to “re-issu[e] Permits to Vessels with current valid Permits.” 

(Port District’s Exhibit 16 at 134 (providing San Diego Unified Port District Code § 4.36(c)(11)).) 

Plaintiff attempted to renew his permit in January of 2007, but he does not allege facts showing he

was eligible for renewal at that time as required by Section 4.36(c)(11).8

 Accordingly, the

complaint does not contain facts showing the Port District denied plaintiff a benefit given to

individuals without disabilities. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiff’s federal claims for failure

to state a claim. 

B. Plaintiff’s Accessibility Claims

The Port District argues plaintiff has not stated a claim that the Port District’s facilities

violate California law. Plaintiff cites several provisions of California law which prohibit

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Section 54(a) provides: 

Individuals with disabilities or medical conditions have the same right as the general

public to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public

buildings, medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics, and physicians’ offices,

public facilities, and other public places. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 54(a). 

10The Port District also notes plaintiff settled his accessibility claims in his earlier federal case,

No. 98-cv-0615 J (JAH). (See Port District’s Exhibit 3 (setting forth settlement agreement in which

plaintiff releases all claims relating to previous complaint)). Because plaintiff has not set forth the

facts supporting his accessibility claims, the Court cannot ascertain whether plaintiff’s current claims

are covered by that settlement agreement. 

- 7 - 08cv886

discrimination on the basis of disability, including Sections 51, 52, and 54 of the California Civil

Code.9

 Plaintiff also cites California Government Code Section 4450 and California Health and

Safety Code Section 19955, which relate to the accessibility of public buildings, accommodations,

and facilities.

The Port District argues the Court should dismiss the accessibility claims because

plaintiff’s allegations are “patently false.” To support this argument, the Port District requests the

Court to take judicial notice of the “Completion Report for Accessible Boat Docks.” (Port

District’s Ex. 7.) The Port District submitted this report to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on

May 15, 2003. The Report contains photographs of an accessible ramp at one of the anchorages. 

The Port District does not explain the authority for judicially noticing such a report or the

truthfulness of the disputed representations contained therein. The court may not take judicial

notice of disputed facts simply because they are “stated in public records.” See Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 201 (authorizing courts to take judicial

notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute”). Accordingly, the Court denies the request for

judicial notice of the Completion Report. 

The Court, however, agrees that plaintiff has not stated facts which set forth a claim that

any Port District facilities are inaccessible. Plaintiff makes the generic allegation that the docks

and anchorages are not in compliance with state and federal law. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 28 (alleging

“San Diego Bay docks” do not have ramps).) Plaintiff does not identify which public facilities are

not accessible to him and the reasons he is not able to use those facilities.10 Accordingly, the Court

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11The Port District argues the Court should not grant leave to amend as to plaintiff’s claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress because plaintiff can no longer make a timely demand.

Under Section 911.2 of the California Government Code, a plaintiff must present any claim for

personal injury within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. Plaintiff, however, could be

able to plead facts showing (1) he complied with the Government Claims Act; or (2) California law

excuses his failure to comply. For example, California law does provide that leave to present a late

claim may be granted up to one year from the date of the injury. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 911.4 &

911.6.

- 8 - 08cv886

dismisses this portion of the complaint for failure to state a claim. 

C. Plaintiff’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

The Port District argues the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress for failure to comply with the California Government Claims Act. The

Government Claims Act requires tort plaintiffs to present a claim against a public entity to that

entity prior to filing suit for damages. Cal. Gov. Code § 814; see also Ovando v. City of Los

Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (explaining the purpose and procedures of the

Government Claims Act). Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act

and the Court therefore dismisses this claim.11

4. Leave to Amend

The Court may dismiss a complaint without granting leave to amend only if it appears with

certainty that the plaintiff cannot state a claim and any amendment would be futile. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a) (stating leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”); DeSoto v.

Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[L]eave to amend should be granted unless

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could

not possibly cure the deficiency.”). Plaintiff has requested leave to amend. In the interests of

justice, the Court grants plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies set forth in

this Order. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant City of Coronado’s motion to

dismiss. The Court also GRANTS defendant San Diego Port District’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order,

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 08cv886

addressing the deficiencies set forth herein. Specifically, in order to assert a claim against the

City, plaintiff must explain the factual basis of his claim and identify the relief he seeks from the

City. In order to assert a claim that his permit request was improperly denied in January of 2007,

plaintiff must allege facts showing his eligibility for a permit renewal at that time. In order to

assert a claim that defendants’ facilities are not accessible to him, plaintiff must identify the

facilities and explain the facts that make those facilities inaccessible in violation of federal or state

law. Finally, in order to assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff

must allege facts showing compliance with the Government Claims Act or excusing his failure to

comply under California law.

The Court GRANTS the Port District’s request for judicial notice in part and denies it in

part, as set out in this Order. The Court DENIES AS MOOT the Port District’s request for judicial

notice of each exhibit not expressly discussed herein. Finally, the Court DENIES AS MOOT

plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 1, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:08-cv-00886-AJB-WVG Document 14 Filed 10/01/08 Page 9 of 9