Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00030/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sandy Close, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-08-00030-TUC-FRZ (CRP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Sandy Close suffers, among other things, from asthma, low back pain, posttraumatic stress disorder from childhood sexual abuse, mood disorder, depression, and 

borderline intellectual functioning. She attended special education classes throughout her 

schooling. She lives with her parents and has never worked. 

 Ms. Close has applied for supplemental security income multiple times. Her first 

two applications were denied by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals 

Council denied review with respect to the first application. Ms. Close did not appeal that 

decision or the denial of her second application by the ALJ. 

A third application was filed January 29, 2004 when Ms. Close was 35 years old. 

Doc. 11, Tr. 378-83. A hearing before an ALJ was held on October 4, 2005. Tr. 812-36. 

The ALJ issued a decision on March 2, 2006, finding Ms. Close not to be disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 17-24. This decision became the 

Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 10-12. 

Ms. Close then brought this action for judicial review. Doc. 1. 

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After the filing of motions for summary judgment (Docs. 13, 14), an ALJ issued a 

decision granting Plaintiff’s fourth application for benefits (Docs. 24 at 10-16, 27-1). 

The ALJ found Plaintiff disabled as of March 3, 2006 (id. at 15), one day after the date 

Plaintiff was found not to be disabled based on her third application. 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for remand. Doc. 26. Defendant opposes the motion. 

Doc. 27. Oral argument has not been requested. For reasons stated below, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, grant Plaintiff’s 

motion for remand and deny without prejudice the summary judgment motions. 

I. Discussion.

 Pursuant to sentence six of the judicial review statute, 42 U.S.C § 405(g), the 

Court “may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of 

Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and 

that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in the 

prior proceeding.” New evidence is material “if it ‘bears directly and substantially on the 

matter in dispute,’ and if there is a ‘reasonable probability that the new evidence would 

have changed the outcome of the determination.’” Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 

827 (9th Cir. 2001) (alterations and citation omitted). 

 Because she was found to be disabled only one day after the adverse decision in 

the instant case, Plaintiff argues, the finding of disability constitutes new and material 

evidence warranting remand as to her third application for benefits. Doc. 26 at 1. The 

Magistrate Judge agrees. 

This Circuit has made clear that “‘in certain circumstances, an award based on an 

onset date coming in immediate proximity to an earlier denial of benefits is worthy of 

further administrative scrutiny to determine whether the favorable event should alter the 

initial, negative outcome on the claim.’” Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Bradley v. Barnhart, 463 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580-81 (S.D. W. Va. 2006)). 

The record in this case, as it presently stands, does not permit a determination whether 

the decisions on Plaintiff’s third and fourth applications are reconcilable or inconsistent. 

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Each ALJ found that plaintiff had the physical residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform light work with restrictions and the mental RFC to do simple, 

unskilled work. Tr. 23 ¶ 5; Doc. 24 at 13, ¶ 4. With respect to Plaintiff’s successful 

application, however, the ALJ found that “[t]he cumulative effect of [Plaintiff’s] mental 

limitations and lack of work history render her incapable of work in a regular, 

competitive work environment.” Doc. 24 at 14. Based on vocational expert testimony 

that there are no jobs available to Plaintiff given her ability to work only in a “sheltered 

environment,” the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was disabled as of March 3, 2006. Id.

at 15-16. This decision stands in stark contrast to the decision that Plaintiff was not 

disabled on March 2, 2006. Tr. 17-24. 

No remand is warranted, Defendant contends, because the favorable decision was 

based on an exacerbation of Plaintiff’s mental impairments. Doc. 27. Defendant notes 

that Plaintiff’s mood disorders were exacerbated when her father passed away on 

March 8, 2006. Id. at 3. Before that date, Defendant asserts, there had been no sign of a 

worsening mental condition. Id. at 4. To the contrary, a psychiatric evaluation on 

February 14, 2006 revealed that Plaintiff’s father was dying of cancer and “she is very 

much affected by this” given their close relationship. Doc. 26-1 at 2. 

 Defendant further notes that Plaintiff recently had been diagnosed with major 

depressive order with psychotic features. Doc. 27 at 2. Plaintiff has suffered from 

depression throughout her life, experiencing the first episode at the age of 8 or 9 after 

being raped by a male relative. Doc. 26-1 at 2; Tr. 643. Plaintiff reported hearing voices 

more than six years ago (Tr. 643), and the medical report cited by the ALJ regarding 

auditory hallucinations associated with depression is dated February 14, 2006 (Docs. 24 

at 13, 26-1 at 2-5) – a date preceding the denial of Plaintiff’s third application on 

March 2, 2006. 

Moreover, in granting Plaintiff’s fourth application, the ALJ did not rely solely, or 

even primarily, on the diagnosis of major depression. Rather, as Defendant himself 

recognizes (Doc. 27 at 3), the ALJ relied on the “cumulative effect” of Plaintiff’s mental 

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limitations. Doc. 24 at 14. The ALJ further relied on Plaintiff’s lack of work history. Id. 

Defendant does not dispute that the lack of work history supports the grant of benefits 

before March 3, 2006. 

Defendant contends that no remand is warranted because Plaintiff’s cognitive 

limitations were only moderate as of March 2, 2006. Doc. 27 at 3 & n.2; see Tr. 22. 

Defendant, however, fails to explain why some of those limitations were found to be 

marked only one day later. Doc. 24 at 13. As noted above, Plaintiff’s father did not pass 

away until March 8, 2006. Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in a 

host of functional limitations supported the finding that Plaintiff cannot perform in a 

regular, competitive work environment. Doc. 24 at 14. 

Defendant asserts that the ALJ “generously chose the earliest possible date for a 

finding of disability” (Doc. 27 at 4), but points to nothing in the ALJ’s decision to 

support this assertion. It is worth noting that the ALJ was precluded from finding an 

onset date earlier than March 3, 2006 as the present action deprived him of jurisdiction 

over the issue of Plaintiff’s disability prior to that date. Doc. 24 at 10. 

In this case, as in Luna, Plaintiff had an application for benefits denied, a 

subsequent application granted, and a finding of disability as of the day after the denial of 

benefits. The two decisions are not as easily reconcilable as Defendant contends. The 

Magistrate Judge, on the present record, cannot determine whether the “decision denying 

benefits is reconcilable with the nearly immediate subsequent grant of benefits.” Andrew 

v. Astrue, No. CV-10-386-C-REB, 2011 WL 4584815, at *7 (D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2011). 

“Given this uncertainty, remand for further factual proceedings [is] an appropriate 

remedy.” Luna, 623 F.3d at 1035; see Andrew, 2011 WL 4584815, at *6-7 (remanding 

for further proceedings where the basis for each application was the claimant’s ongoing 

schizophrenia); Dobson v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-01460 KJN, 2010 WL 4628316, at *3-4 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (remanding for further factual development despite the 

Commissioner’s supposition that the ALJ was simply being generous in selecting the 

onset date as one day after the initial denial); Daniel v. Astrue, No. CV 10-4825-JEM, 

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2011 WL 3501759, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (favorable benefits decision 

constituted new and material evidence to the extent it was based on the claimant’s mental 

impairments which had been at issue for several years); Pereira v. Astrue, No. CV-10-

0014-PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 251455, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2011) (favorable benefits 

decision constituted new and material evidence supporting remand). 

Defendant’s reliance on Bruton is misplaced. The two decisions in that case were 

“easily reconcilable on the record before the court,” Luna, 623 F.3d at 1035, because the 

second application for benefits involved “different medical evidence, a different time 

period, and a different age classification.” Bruton, 268 F.3d at 827; see Daniel, 2011 WL 

3501759, at *5 (distinguishing Bruton). 

II. Recommendation.

 Given the award of benefits based on an onset date coming in “immediate 

proximity” to the denial of benefits, Luna, 623 F.3d at 1034, the decision on Plaintiff’s 

fourth application “bears directly and substantially” on the merits of the third application, 

and there is a “reasonable probability” that the decision on the fourth application, when 

properly considered, would change the outcome of the third application, Bruton, 268 F.3d 

at 827. The favorable benefits decision on the fourth application therefore constitutes 

material evidence. The evidence is new, and good cause supports Plaintiff’s failure to 

present the evidence in connection with the third application, given that the evidence did 

not exist at the time that application was decided. See Dobson, 2010 WL 4628316, at *3; 

Pereira, 2011 WL 251455, at *2. In summary, the Magistrate Judge recommends that 

Plaintiff’s motion for remand (Doc. 26) be GRANTED pursuant to sentence six of 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Given this recommendation, it need not be determined whether remand is required 

under sentence four based on Plaintiff’s other challenges to the decision denying the third 

application. Under a sentence six remand, the Commissioner shall consider the new 

evidence and modify or affirm the findings of fact or decision, “and shall file with the 

court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision[.]” 42 U.S.C. 

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