Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01364/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01364-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC PETERSEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

1: 06 - CV - 1364 AWI NEW (WMW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Document #16)

On September 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint. The complaint concerns the

Employees Compensation Appeals Board (“ECAB”)’s decisions and conduct. The first claim

alleges that the ECAB’s failure to allow a recording of proceedings in docket number 2005-1931

and 2005-1932 violated court procedural rules and regulations, deprived him of due process, and

violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. The second claim appears to be an appeal of the

ECAB’s decision, docket number 2005-1931. In this claim Plaintiff disputes the ECAB’s

finding that Plaintiff was a seasonal employee, the ECAB’s finding that Plaintiff should not be

categorized as an Administratively Determined Personnel (“AD Personnel”) or contract

employee, to whom federal rules do not apply, and the ECAB’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s rate

of pay. The third claim alleges violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that the United States’ failure to recognize that he was a federal employee, failure to

correspond with Plaintiff’s doctor, and failure to pay medical bills denied Plaintiff of medical

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treatment in violation of due process and equal protection. The fourth claim alleges that the

United States violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by not responding to Plaintiff’s allegations of

misconduct, abuse of discretion, and reckless misconduct. The fifth and sixth claims contend

that the United States is guilty of reckless misconduct and abuse of discretion. 

On March 13, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion

for summary judgment. Defendant contends that most of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res

judicata as Plaintiff previously litigated the issues in Peterson v. U.S. Department of Labor, No.

03-918, WL 21982812 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2003. Defendant also contends that 5 U.S.C. §

8128(b) bars judicial review of the decision granting or denying Plaintiff compensation. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for damages is with the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act (“FECA”). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for

damages for civil rights outside of FECA, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to file a

claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 

On March 30, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Plaintiff contends that the laws cited

by Defendant do not apply to him because he is an AD Personnel and not a Federal Employee

who signed an oath of office. Plaintiff contends that if the court rules he was a Federal

Employee, than he asks the court grant him all benefits, overtime, and back pay. Plaintiff

contends he was not a federal employee and the federal contract at issue failed to inform the

signors that they would be subject to agency regulations rather than the contract’s provisions. 

Plaintiff argues that under the contract, he was to be paid on a daily rate, not an hourly rate. 

Plaintiff again argues that the ECAB’s findings are invalid because they were not recorded. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the United States is in default in this case.

On April 5, 2007, Defendant filed a reply. Defendant contends that this action must be

dismissed for this court’s lack of jurisdiction based on res judicata and the preclusive effect of

the FECA.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction. Limits upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. Owen

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). The plaintiff has the burden to

establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient

allegations to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over the

action. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1). 

When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the

complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal

jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General

Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan th

Ass’n, 549 F. 2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977); Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D.

Cal.1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F. 2d 229 (9 Cir.1992). th

A defendant may also attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction apart from the

pleadings. Mortensen, 549 F. 2d at 891. In such a case, the court may rely on evidence extrinsic

to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico,

880 F. 2d 199, 201 (9 Cir.1989); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir.1987); th th

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir.1983). “No presumptive truthfulness th

attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude

the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill

Publishing, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). 

//

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FACTS

A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff has been a professional fire fighter / emergency

medical technician for 45 years. Plaintiff rose to the rank of E.M.S. Battalion Chief.

The complaint alleges that since August 31, 1992, Plaintiff has not been able to work

because of injuries. At the time of the injury, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was working

under a signed Federal Contract No. CA 020-EQO-107.

The complaint alleges that AD Personnel are emergency workers hired to support an

incident. The complaint alleges that this is a special category of personnel. The complaint

alleges that AD Personnel are not Federal employees who have signed an oath. The complaint

argues that you cannot use rules of Congress that apply to Federal Employees to AD Personnel

because AD Personnel do not sign an oath of office. The complaint alleges that AD Personnel

have little rights and they can be fired at any time without cause.

The complaint alleges that after his injury, Plaintiff was sent to a doctor for the

Department of Labor. The complaint alleges that the doctor told the Department of Labor that if

Plaintiff continued with rehabilitation, it could kill him. However, the Department of Labor

would not listen to the doctor or pay his services. The complaint alleges that the Department of

Labor told Plaintiff that if he did not continue with rehabilitation he would lose all compensation

and benefits. The complaint alleges that because Plaintiff did not have the correct medical

treatment, his lungs became infected and he could have died.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff timely filed a claim with the United States

Department of Labor. The Employees Compensation Appeals Board (“ECAB”) issued a ruling

in docket number 2005-1931. The complaint alleges that the ECAB incorrectly found Plaintiff

was a career seasonal employee. The complaint alleges that the ECAB incorrectly determined

Plaintiff’s wage earning capacity.

 The complaint alleges that the ECAB would not allow any type of recording of the issues

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 The parties submit additional facts. These are the facts outside the complaint that the 1

court relied on.

5

before it. The complaint alleges that there is no written record of what was said or agreed to by

the parties. The complaint alleges that this failure to tape record ECAB’s proceedings violated

Plaintiff’s due process rights. The complaint asks the court strike every decision of the ECAB.

B. Additional Facts

1

The Declaration of Terry Wallace states: 

Petersen filed appeals before the ECAB which were assigned Docket Nos. 2005-

1931 and 2005-1932. Oral argument was held for both of these cases on April 6,

2006 before a two member panel of the ECAB. The oral argument before the

panel for these cases was not recorded or transcribed. It is the practice of the

ECAB not to transcribe or record oral arguments.

The Declaration of Catherine P. Carter, Counsel for Claims and Compensation, Division

of Employee Benefits, Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Labor, states that Ms.

Carter coordinate’s administrative claims filed with the Department of Labor. Mr. Carter states

that she has searched the records of the Department of Labor and found no receipt form on behalf

of Plaintiff for money damages arising out of the circumstances set forth in the complaint.

The opinion dismissing Plaintiff’s prior case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in

Peterson v. U.S. Department of Labor, No. 03-918, 2003 WL 21982812 (N.D. Cal. August 11,

2003), reads in part:

. . . .

Plaintiff, a temporary employee of the United States Bureau of Land Management,

alleges that on August 31, 1992, he ingested diesel fuel into his lungs and stomach

and suffered an on-the-job injury (“1992 injury”). Pl. Compl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff filed

a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Program (OWCP) for the 1992

injury; the claim was denied by letter dated November 18, 1992. Id . at ¶ 5. After

plaintiff appealed the denial of an award for the 1992 injury, the OWCP found

plaintiff totally disabled and accepted his claim for workers' compensation

benefits. Declaration of Elizabeth Miller (“Miller Decl.”) at ¶ 4. Plaintiff was

awarded then and still receives the maximum monthly workers' compensation

benefit for his 1992 injury. Id.

Plaintiff also alleges that on July 14, 1995, while he was a temporary

employee of the National Park Service, he accidently fell off a 100 foot cliff and

injured his back, neck, and wrist (“1995 injury”). Pl. Compl. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff filed

a form CA-1 (Notice of Traumatic Injury), claiming an injury while he worked as

a search and rescue volunteer at Yosemite National Park; the Department of Labor

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denied the claim due to insufficient medical support for it. Miller Decl. at ¶ 7.

Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the claim for his 1995 injury, and on

December 26, 1996, a reconsideration decision was issued, denying the claim

because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between his

accident and his claimed injury, and because the medical evidence established that

plaintiff had a pre-existing condition. Id. Following subsequent requests by

plaintiff for reconsideration and appeals to the Employees' Compensation Appeals

Board, plaintiff's claims were finally denied by decision dated May 9, 2003. Id. at

¶¶ 8-10.

Plaintiff sued the United States Department of Labor under 28 U.S .C. §§

1343, 1346(b)(1), 2201 and 2202 (“Declaratory Judgment Act”), and 5 U.S.C. §

702 (“Administrative Procedure Act”). Pl. Compl. at 1:17-22. Plaintiff alleges that

he has been wrongfully denied benefits for his alleged 1992 and 1995 injuries

pursuant to the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq

(“FECA”). Plaintiff also alleges that defendant was negligent in processing his

claim for FECA benefits; conspired to deprive him of his rights to due process and

equal protection under the law by failing to timely and properly process his

workers' compensation claims for his 1992 and 1995 injuries; and intentionally

and maliciously removed, destroyed and otherwise disposed of evidence in his

claim files which was material to a full and final determination of his claims. Pl.

Compl. at ¶¶ 160-172.

Defendant has moved to dismiss all claims, based on lack of jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

. . . .

1. Negligence causes of action

. . . .

Plaintiff's negligence claims for his on-the-job injuries are preempted by

FECA because it is the exclusive remedy for federal employees who suffer

injuries covered by FECA. See Sheehan v. U.S., 896 F.2d 1168, 1173 (9th

Cir.1990). Through FECA, Congress established a workers' compensation scheme

that is exclusively administrative. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Consequently, plaintiff's

negligence claims must be dismissed by this Court for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, and no curative amendment is possible.

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. However, because the FECA administrative remedy is the exclusive

remedy available to federal employees for claims that are not of a constitutional

nature, judicial review is unavailable, whether or not administrative remedies have

been exhausted. Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9 Cir.1985) th

(“Jurisdiction and exhaustion ... are separate issues.”) Likewise, defendant's

argument that plaintiff named an improper defendant under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 and 2679(b), need not be addressed

because plaintiff seeks relief which is preempted by FECA.

2. Review of FECA entitlement and/or increase in benefits

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiff's petition

for entitlement to and/or an increase in his FECA benefits. Judicial review of the

Secretary of Labor's determination of FECA coverage is barred. 5 U.S.C. §

8128(b); see also Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90, 112 S.Ct.

486, 493, 116 L.Ed.2d 405(1991) (“FECA contains an ‘unambiguous and

comprehensive’ provision barring any judicial review of the Secretary's

determination of FECA coverage”) (citing Lindahl v. Office of Personnel

Management, 470 U.S. 768, 780 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 84 L.Ed.2d 674

(1985)). 

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. . . . Because the Secretary has determined that plaintiff's claim for the

1992 injury is covered by FECA, and he is receiving maximum benefits for the

injury, plaintiff's petition for this Court to adjust his FECA benefits level is

barred. Additionally, because plaintiff's claim for the 1995 injury is not covered

by FECA, plaintiff's petition for this Court to examine his FECA entitlement is

barred.

3. Constitutional causes of action

Although 28 U.S.C. § 8128(b) precludes judicial review of FECA benefits,

courts have recognized a limited exception to address substantial and cognizable

constitutional claims. Rodrigues, 769 F.2d at 1348. . . .

However, plaintiff's allegations regarding his 1992 injury are not

substantial because he has already received the maximum FECA benefits payable.

Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 4 and 7. Plaintiff's allegations of due process and equal

protection violations in connection to his 1995 injury are also without merit.

Because a plaintiff has no “property interest” for constitutional purposes where

benefits have been denied, Petersen has not been deprived of a protected interest

in “property” or “liberty.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59,

119 S.Ct. 977, 989, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). Furthermore, raising constitutional

claims merely to establish subject matter jurisdiction to review FECA benefits is

prohibited. § 8128(b); Rodrigues, 739 F.2d at 1348. Plaintiff fails to state a

substantial and cognizable constitutional claim. Accordingly, this Court does not

have subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiff's allegations of constitutional

violations with regard to his 1992 and 1995 injuries.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to

dismiss, without leave to amend. [Docket # 9 (Motion to Dismiss) ]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Review of ECAB’s Final Decision

FECA, 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq., is the workers’ compensation statute for those employed

by the United States. Except for certain specific exceptions, FECA requires the United States to

pay compensation for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury

sustained while in the performance of his or her duty. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). FECA's exclusivity

provision bars recovery for those injured while working for the United States pursuant to other

statutes, providing that “[t]he liability of the United States . . . under this subchapter . . . is

exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States . . . to the employee . . . and any

other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States . . . under a Federal

tort liability statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c).

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Under FECA, the Secretary of Labor makes all necessary determinations and findings of

fact regarding payment of compensation after considering the claim presented and completing

such investigation as he considers necessary. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8124. The Secretary may prescribe

rules and regulations necessary for the administration and enforcement of FECA, including rules

and regulations for the conduct of hearings. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8149 . The Secretary may appoint

employees to administer FECA and delegate powers. 5 U.S.C. § 8145. The Secretary has

delegated the responsibility for administering the FECA to the Director of the Office of Workers'

Compensation Programs (“OWCP”). 20 C.F.R. § 10.1.

Once a claim is filed with OWCP, OWCP considers the claim, the report by the

employer, and the results of such investigation as OWCP may deem necessary and applies the

law, the regulations, and its procedures to the facts as reported or obtained upon investigation. 

20 C.F.R. § 10.125 OWCP’s decision must contain findings of fact and a statement of reasons

and must be accompanied by information about the claimant's appeal rights, which may include

the right to a hearing, a reconsideration, and/or a review by the ECAB. 20 C.F.R. § 10.125. 

After receiving a final decision, a claimant may appeal OWCP’s decision to the ECAB. 5

U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. § 501.3. When addressing an appeal, the ECAB should review all

relevant questions of law, fact, and discretion, but the ECAB’s review is limited to the evidence

in the case record which was before the OWCP at the time of its final decision. 20 C.F.R. §

501.2(c). A claimant may request the opportunity to present oral argument to ECAB.

20 C.F.R. § 501.5(a). The ECAB’s decision must contain a written opinion setting forth the

reasons for the action taken and an appropriate order. 20 C.F.R. § 501.6(a).

The decision of the ECAB is final as to the subject matter appealed and such decision is

only subject to review by the ECAB. 20 C.F.R. § 501.6(c). Title 5 U.S.C. § 8128 provides as

follows:

(a) The Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of

compensation at any time on his own motion or on application. The Secretary, in

accordance with the facts found on review, may--

(1) end, decrease, or increase the compensation previously awarded; or

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(2) award compensation previously refused or discontinued.

(b) The action of the Secretary or his designee in allowing or denying a payment

under this subchapter is–

(1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law

and fact; and

(2) not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by

mandamus or otherwise.

. . . .

5 U.S.C. § 8128. 

1. Review of Non-Constitutional Errors

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b), federal courts are barred by statute from reviewing

decisions by ECAB to pay or deny claims. Staacke v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 841 F.2d

278, 280-81 (9 Cir. 1988); Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (9 Cir.1985). th th

In the complaint, Plaintiff asks this court to review ECAB’s decision, including its findings that

Plaintiff was a seasonal employee and its findings regarding Plaintiff’s rate of pay. Plaintiff also

alleges ECAB and OWCP failed to timely recognize that Plaintiff was a federal employee, failed

to correspond with Plaintiff’s doctor, failed to pay medical bills, and failed to respond to many of

Plaintiff’s complaints. Title 5 U.S.C. § 8129(b) prevents this court from reviewing the decision

and actions by ECAB and OWCP. Thus, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to the extent

Plaintiff is requesting this court review the ECAB’s and OWCP’s decisions.

Some of Plaintiff’s claims contain allegations that OWCP’s conduct in recognizing

Plaintiff’s status, failing to pay medical bills, and failing to ensure him proper treatment caused

Plaintiff’s injury to worsen. It appears from the complaint that Plaintiff is trying to obtain

benefits beyond his actual injury. Plaintiff appears to seek benefits or damages based on

Defendant’s actions in addressing and processing Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant’s alleged

failures to properly address Plaintiff’s injury do not give rise to a separate cause of action for

which this court has jurisdiction. FECA remains the exclusive remedy, even when a

work-related injury is subsequently aggravated by negligence and malpractice. Vander v. U.S.

Dept. of Justice, 268 F.3d 661, 663-64 (9 Cir. 2001). For example, the Ninth Circuit has th

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interpreted FECA to mean that FECA has taken away the right to sue the government in tort for

medical malpractice arising out of the injury, as well as for the injury itself. Lance v. United

States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9 Cir. 1995). Because the underlying injury falls under FECA, this th

court lacks jurisdiction to address Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant for the injury or

negligence regarding Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s injury.

Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims that request this court

review the ECAB’s and OWCP’s actions and decisions. Because this jurisdictional defect

cannot be cured, the court will dismiss these claims with prejudice. 

2. Review of Constitutional Errors

Several of Plaintiff’s claims contain allegations that ECAB and OWCP denied Plaintiff of

constitutional rights. Plaintiff contends ECAB’s failure to record docket number 2005-1931 and

2005-1932 violated due process. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s failure to recognize that he

was a federal employee, failure to correspond with Plaintiff’s doctor, and failure to pay medical

bills denied Plaintiff of medical treatment in violation of due process and equal protection. 

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by not responding to

Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct, abuse of discretion, and reckless misconduct. 

As discussed above, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b), this court is barred by statute from

reviewing decisions by ECAB to pay or deny claims. Staacke, 841 F.2d at 280-81; Rodrigues,

769 F.2d at 1347-48. However, the court does have jurisdiction to review a claimant’s

constitutional claim that the OWCP’s or ECAB’s procedures violated constitutional rights. 

Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281; Rodrigues, 769 F.2d at 1348. In order for the court to exercise this

jurisdiction, the constitutional contentions must “appear to be more than mere allegations

included in the complaint to create jurisdiction where none would exist otherwise.” Rodrigues,

769 F.2d at 1348. “A cognizable due process claim must be more than an ephemeral and

insubstantial denial of benefits to which a plaintiff does not claim entitlement.” Markham v.

United States, 434 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9 Cir. 2006). For example, in Rodrigues the Ninth Circuit th

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found that the Secretary's prolonged delay in holding a post-termination hearing presented a

cognizable due process claim. Rodrigues, 769 F.2d at 1348. In Raditch v. United States, 929

F.2d 478 (9 Cir.1991), the Ninth Circuit found jurisdiction because a disabled employee alleged th

his benefits were terminated without notice. Id. at 480.

Here, Plaintiff’s basic contention is that OWCP and ECAB’s errors in providing him the

benefits he believes he is entitled to and calculation of Plaintiff’s compensation denied him

procedural due process and equal protection. The court finds that Plaintiff’s references to

procedural due process and equal protection are merely attempts to seek court review of ECAB’s

decisions. Although in certain instances violations of the Constitution can give rise to a claim,

it is the constitutional violation and not the administrative procedure that forms a basis for

jurisdiction. Markham, 434 F.3d at 1188. Here, Plaintiff is clearly seeking review of ECAB’s

actions and findings. Such contentions cannot serve as the basis for jurisdiction. 

Unlike Plaintiff, the plaintiff in Rodrigues was “not arguing in any respect the merits of

his underlying compensation claim.” Id. at 1347. The ECAB’s decisions regarding Plaintiff’s

status as a seasonal employee, determination of Plaintiff’s wage earning capacity, and failure to

consider all of Plaintiff’s letters and documents do not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights or

equal protection rights. Similarly, the fact Plaintiff believes OWCP’s and ECAB’s actions

constituted an arbitrary and capricious conduct also did not deprive him of due process. These

contentions address neither of the requirements of due process: Notice and the opportunity to be

heard. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (Due process

requires “an opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant

property interest”). Plaintiff does not allege that he did not have notice nor that he did not

opportunity to respond to the evidence. Plaintiff’s contentions also do not address the

requirement for a violation of equal protection: Different treatment of similarly situated

individuals. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)

(the Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike.) 

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Plaintiff’s contentions do not include allegations that Defendant intentionally discriminated on

the basis of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 686 (9 Cir.2001). Plaintiff’s contentions also do not include allegations that others th

similarly situated to Plaintiff were treated differently, Defendant’s actions were without a rational

basis, and Defendant’s reasons for its actions are pretext for malignant animosity. See Squaw

Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944-48 (9 Cir. 2004) (quoting Village of th

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Plaintiff's vague allegations of

constitutional violations provide no subject matter jurisdiction for this court. The complaint’s

citations to procedural due process and equal protection are nothing more than allegations that

were included to create jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent the complaint seeks review of the

OWCP’s and FECA’s decisions based on alleged general violations of Plaintiff’s procedural due

process rights and equal protection rights, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

The complaint does contain one specific action taken by Defendant that Plaintiff alleges

violated his procedural due process rights. Plaintiff contends that his procedural due process

rights were violated by ECAB’s failure to transcript or record the final decision in Docket No.

2005-1931. “A procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural

protections.” Brewster v. Board of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9 Cir. 1998). The court will th

assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff has a property interest in his claim for payment. See

Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195 (2001) (“[w]e assume, without deciding,

that the ... respondent has a property interest . . . in its claim for payment”). As such, the issue is

whether the failure to record or transcribe the final hearing before ECAB denied Plaintiff of

adequate procedural protections. “When a government-created property interest is at stake, due

process principles require at least notice and an opportunity to respond in some manner, whether

in writing or at an oral hearing, before termination of that interest.” Raditch, 929 F.2d at 480. 

There is little case law concerning the right to a recording or transcript of an

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administrative proceeding. Because of this lack of authority, the court looks to recording and

transcription requirements in criminal cases for guidance on when due process requires a

recording or transcription. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), court reporters are required to record

verbatim “all proceedings in criminal cases had in open court.” However, even in the criminal

context, a violation of Section 753(b) does not require reversal of a criminal conviction unless

the criminal defendant can demonstrate specific prejudice. United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d

1379, 1381 (9 Cir. 1990); United States v. Carillo, 902 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (9 Cir.1990). th th

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a trial court’s failure to make a record of portions

of the trial only violates due process only if the record is such that a criminal defendant cannot

effectively appeal. When reviewing a state’s denial of transcripts to criminal defendants, the

court should consider two criteria: “(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection

with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that

would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.” Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 &

n.2 (1971); Madera v. Risley, 885 F.2d 646, 648 (9 Cir. 1989). th

Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to conclude that the lack of a recording or

transcript during the final ECAB hearing resulted in a denial of due process. Plaintiff has not

demonstrated the value of a transcript or recording in connection with an appeal. See Risley, 885

F.2d at 648. Because Plaintiff has no ability to appeal the ECAB’s final decision to a further

agency or court, a recording or transcript of the proceeding has no value to an appeal. The

ECAB’s decision is based on the prior administrative record and the court cannot consider new

evidence. Thus, a recording or transcript would have little influence on a motion for the ECAB

to reconsider its own findings. 

Other than fact that the hearing was not recorded, Plaintiff does not allege a constitutional

violation took place at the hearing. Rather, Plaintiff disagrees with the earlier decisions of

OWCP and final decision of ECAB based on its interpretation of the regulations, Plaintiff’s

status, and Plaintiff’s pay rate. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the final

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finding of ECAB is not in and of itself a constitutional violation. Because ECAB’s finding is

final, the lack of a transcript or recording would not aid further review of the decision. The mere

allegation that the final hearing of ECAB was not recorded does not rise to the level of a due

process violation. Thus, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s contentions

concerning the failure to record or transcribe because ECAB’s failures to record or transcribe the

proceeding do not sufficient allege a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

B. Plaintiff’s Tort Claims

 The fifth and sixth claims contend that the United States is guilty of reckless misconduct

and abuse of discretion. These claims appear to allege torts against the United States. 

Injuries to federal employees allegedly sustained during work-related activities must be

compensated under the FECA program administered by the Secretary of Labor. David v. United

States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9 Cir.1987). The remedies provided under FECA are exclusive, th

and if compensation is available under FECA, all other statutory remedies for claims arising

under the same facts are preempted. Moe v. United States, 326 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9 Cir. 2003); th

Figueroa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405, 1407 (9 Cir. 1993). “If a plaintiff has a colorable claim th

under FECA, the federal courts should dismiss any action arising under the same facts for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Moe, 326 F.3d at 1068. As such, this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over any tort claims arising from Plaintiffs’ underlying injuries. In addition, to the

extent Plaintiff alleges that the failure to provide him with adequate or timely medical treatment

resulted in an exacerbation of his injury, such a claim is also covered under FECA. See Vander,

268 F.3d at 664 (no right to sue the government in tort for medical malpractice and negligence

arising out of the injury, as well as for the injury itself); Lance, 70 F.3d at 1095 (FECA takes

away right to sue United States in tort for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, as well as

for the injury itself).

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to obtain money damages for alleged torts

committed by Defendant in processing his claims, Plaintiff appears to be raising a claim under

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the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The FTCA provides the exclusive remedy for “injury or

loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful

act of omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or

employment . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). The FTCA bars claimants from seeking damages

against the United States in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Jerves v. United States,

966 F.2d 517, 518-19 (9 Cir.1992). th

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money

damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while

acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall

have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim

shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or

registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim

within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time

thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered

to. Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9 Cir. 2000). th

Defendant has provided evidence that a search of the Department of Labor’s records

discloses no evidence of any claim for compensation in tort being filed by Plaintiff against the

Department of Labor based on its alleged handling of Plaintiff’s claims. Thus, assuming a tort

claim is even available for Defendant’s actions in processing Plaintiff’s claims, the court lacks

jurisdiction over any tort claims for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with FTCA. 

C. Res Judicata

In its motion, Defendant also contends that many, if not all, of Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “bars relitigation of all

grounds of recovery that were asserted, or could have been asserted, in a previous action between

the parties, where the previous action was resolved on the merits.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation

Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9 Cir.2003); United States th

ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1998)). Res judicata applies when

th

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there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between the

parties. Tahoe-Sierra, 322 F.3d at 1077. 

Plaintiff’s prior case, Peterson v. U.S. Department of Labor, No. 03-918, 2003 WL

21982812 (N.D. Cal. August 11, 2003), was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims that were litigated in this prior case, or could have

been litigated, are barred by res judicata. The court notes that under Rule 41(b) “any dismissal

not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . operates as an

adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. of Civ. P. 41(b). Because of Rule 41(b), a dismissal for lack

of jurisdiction ordinarily does not preclude a second action based on the same cause of action

that includes allegations that overcome the initial defect of jurisdiction. 18A Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

JURISDICTION § 4435 (2d ed. 2007). At the same time, such dismissals generally do preclude relitigation of the underlying issue of jurisdiction, venue, or party joinder. Id. Because this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action for the reasons discussed above, it is

unnecessary to determine if some or all of this actions’ claims are also barred under the doctrine

or res judicata.

D. Default

In his opposition, Plaintiff states that Defendant “is in default four times on the aboveentitled case.” It appears Plaintiff is attempting to argue that Defendant’s default is grounds for

the court to deny Defendant’s motion. A review of the court’s records reveal that Plaintiff filed

several motions for default against Defendant. On January 4, 2007, the Magistrate Judge then

assigned to this case denied Plaintiff’s motions. No motion for reconsideration of the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling has been filed. Plaintiff’s opposition is not the appropriate place for

Plaintiff to dispute the Magistrate Judge’s findings. Thus, the court declines to address

Plaintiff’s contentions regarding Defendant’s alleged default. However, the court does note that

while an entry of default might affect Defendant’s ability to file motions, it has no relevance on

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whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

ORDER

Accordingly, based on the above memorandum opinion, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. The complaint, to the extent it seeks review of ECAB’s or OWCP’s decisions or

seeks damages based on ECAB’s or OWCP’s actions, is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

3. The complaint, to the extent it alleges ECAB or OWCP violated the Constitution,

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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