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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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F 1 L E D cr.l.s 1ted States Court o_f A'PP 

PUBLISH Un Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 3 1995 

PATRICK FISHER -------------- Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LOUIE R. MURRAY, III; RICKY M. WEAVER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. No. 93-5223 

CITY OF SAPULPA; JA'ELLA VANATTA; LARRY 

STANSBURY; CAROL MCMASTERS; CHARLES LACY; 

BILL ERWIN; CHRIS CARLTON; RICK BRUNER; 

HOWARD BROWN; ROGER MINOR; RON SOLE; TOM 

CLARK, Police Chief; BARBARA MCCOY; JACK 

MCCOY, Patrol Officer; KEVIN ABRAHAM; STEVEN 

KEATON; PHIL MCCORMICK, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CV-91-965) 

Frederick W. Southern, Jr., Oklahoma 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

City, Oklahoma, for 

Don R. Martin, Jr. (Kathryn D. Mansell and Reggie N. Whitten on 

the Brief), Mills, Whitten, Mills, Mills & Hinkle, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees; W. Craig Sutter (Susan B. 

Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, with him on the Brief), 

Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellee Jack McCoy. 

Before BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and KANE,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs Louie R. Murray, III, and Ricky M. Weaver, former 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-5223 Document: 01019290357 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 1 
City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma, police officers, filed a suit against 

various employees of the City of Sapulpa and other individuals. 

The police officers alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants 

finding the police officers failed to establish a RICO, civil 

rights, or conspiracy claim. The district court also dismissed 

the pendent state tort claim of interference with contract. On 

appeal, Messrs. Murray and Weaver challenge the granting of 

summary judgment only on their Title VII and conspiracy claims. 

We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

When reviewing the district court's ruling on a summary 

judgment motion, we review the motion de novo. Applied Genetics 

Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 

(lOth Cir. 1990). We must decide whether any genuine issue of 

material fact is in dispute and, if not, whether the law was 

correctly applied. We must look at the record in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Boren v. 

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (lOth Cir. 

1991) . Summary judgment is only appropriate if the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Mr. Murray, an African American man, and Mr. Weaver, a White 

man, worked for the City of Sapulpa as police officers. One 

evening, Messrs. Murray and Weaver were working off-duty as 

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Appellate Case: 93-5223 Document: 01019290357 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 2 
security guards at an apartment building when they apprehended a 

juvenile drug suspect and confiscated a white powdery substance 

believed to be crack cocaine. Mr. Weaver contacted the police 

department to transport the juvenile 

Meanwhile, Mr. Murray brought the 

apartment building to question him 

downtown for questioning. 

juvenile into a room in the 

about the drugs. Officer 

Barbara McCoy, accompanied by her husband, Highway Patrol Trooper 

Jack McCoy, arrived to pick up the juvenile. 

At the police department, the juvenile was returned to the 

custody of Messrs. Murray and Weaver who further questioned the 

suspect. They were unable to contact the juvenile's parents, so 

Mr. Murray drove the suspect home. Before leaving the police 

station, however, Mr. Murray flushed the white powdery substance 

down the toilet and warned the juvenile that if he got caught with 

drugs again he would face criminal prosecution. 

More than six months later, Officer McCoy reported this 

incident to Assistant Chief Tom Clark. However, she included an 

allegation that Mr. Murray was playing Russian Roulette with the 

juvenile when she and her husband arrived to transport the 

suspect. Trooper McCoy confirmed this report. Assistant Chief 

Clark conducted an internal investigation into the matter and held 

a hearing on the continued employment of Mr. Murray. After the 

hearing, at which Mr. Murray was represented by counsel, Chief Ron 

Sole decided to terminate Mr. Murray based upon the findings that 

Mr. Murray illegally disposed of the alleged crack cocaine and 

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Appellate Case: 93-5223 Document: 01019290357 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 3 
illegally used a hand gun.l 

Approximately one month before Officer McCoy reported the 

Russian Roulette incident, Mr. Weaver with three other officers 

arrested a drug suspect. During this arrest, Mr. Weaver and one 

of his co-officers, Phillip Main, had a physical altercation with 

the suspect. After the suspect had been arrested and handcuffed, 

he spit in Mr. Weaver's face. In response, Mr. Weaver struck the 

suspect on the head with a flashlight. Mr. Main struck the 

suspect in the face. 

Mr. Weaver filed an accurate police report of the incident 

including a description of the altercation. Mr. Main filed a 

false report by failing to disclose the altercation. Upon 

learning of the physical altercation, the police department did 

not allow Mr. Weaver to return to work. One week later, Mr. Main 

was terminated for filing a false report and also for hitting the 

suspect. 

Chief Sole gave Mr. Weaver a due process hearing and 

terminated Mr. Weaver based upon his own admission of hitting the 

suspect over the head. Mr. Weaver appealed his termination to·the 

City Manager and then to the Board of Review. Mr. Weaver was told 

1 The juvenile sued the City of Sapulpa for the officers' 

violation of his civil rights. The City of Sapulpa paid a 

settlement to the juvenile. Criminal charges were also brought 

against Messrs. Murray and Weaver. After a full trial, the jury 

found Messrs. Murray and Weaver not guilty of violating the 

juveniles' civil rights. 

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Appellate Case: 93-5223 Document: 01019290357 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 4 
he would be reinstated if he could guarantee such behavior would 

not occur again. Mr. Weaver responded that he could not make such 

a promise because it was a reflex action. The Department of 

Justice sent Mr. Weaver a letter stating that he had not violated 

the suspect's civil rights. 

The Supreme Court has laid out the allocation of burdens for 

Title VII discriminatory treatment suits. See McDonnell Douglas 

Cor,p. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff must 

satisfy a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case of 

disparate treatment, Mr. Murray must show (1) he is within the 

protected class or minority; (2) he was doing satisfactory work; 

(3) he was discharged; and (4) his position remained open or was 

filled by a non-class member. Id. at 802. To establish a prima 

facie case of retaliation Messrs. Murray and Weaver must each show 

(1) he engaged in opposition to Title VII discrimination; (2) he 

was subject to adverse employment action subsequently to or 

contemporaneously with the protected activity; and (3) "a causal 

connection [exists] between the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action." Burrus v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas, 683 

F.2d 339, 343 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 1071 (1982). 

If the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirements under 

the Title VII, then the case enters the second stage, and the 

burden of production moves to the defendant. It is the burden of 

the defendant to present "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" 

for its action. Furnco Constr. Cor,p. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 

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577-78 (1978). The explanation "must be legally sufficient to 

justify judgment for the defendant." Carey v. U.S. Postal 

Service, 812 F.2d 621, 624 (lOth Cir. 1987). If the defendant 

articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, 

then the burden of production moves back to the plaintiff. Texas 

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 

(1981) . In this third stage of the discrimination analysis, the 

plaintiff must show race was a determinative factor in the 

defendant's employment decision, or show the defendant's 

explanation for its action was merely a pretext. See Faulkner v. 

Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1424-25 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Failure to come forward with evidence rebutting the defendant's 

explanation may entitle the defendant to judgment. See Burdine, 

450 u.s. at 255. 

Although the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis is a 

tool the courts use in Title VII cases, the ultimate burden of 

persuasion rests upon the plaintiff.2 Id. at 253. The burden 

shifting analysis drops out of consideration when the case is 

submitted to the jury on the merits. Messina v. Kroblin Transp. 

Systems, Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (lOth Cir. 1990). Thus, the 

ultimate issue for us in reviewing the summary judgment is whether 

Messrs. Murray and Weaver have raised a question of material fact 

of discrimination entitling them to proceed to trial. 

2 Also, the burden shifting analysis need not be strictly 

applied. See Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61, n.l (lOth 

Cir. 1979); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, n.l3; 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, n.6. 

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It is undisputed Messrs. Murray and Weaver were terminated 

from employment with the City of Sapulpa Police Department. Mr. 

Murray alleges he was terminated because he is African American 

and because he filed complaints with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission. Mr. Weaver claims he was terminated in 

retaliation for supporting his friend and co-worker, Mr. Murray. 

The defendants have articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for Messrs. Murray's and Weaver's terminations: each 

violated local rules and regulations. Mr. Murray disposed of 

police contraband,3 and Mr. Weaver struck a suspect over the head. 

Thus, Messrs. Murray and Weaver must respond by showing how these 

nondiscriminatory explanations for their terminations are 

pretextual or how they were truly terminated for discriminatory 

reasons. 

Mr. Murray claims the Police Department's explanation for his 

termination is not credible, and his termination was in 

retaliation for charges he filed against the police department. 

Four months before his discharge, Mr. Murray filed a complaint 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the City 

of Sapulpa Police Department. Then, two months before his 

discharge and one month before Officer McCoy reported the Russian 

3 The Police Department also relied on the allegations of 

Russian Roulette in justifying their termination of Mr. Murray. 

Since the verisimilitude of this incident is disputed and since 

the Police Department relied upon another reason for Mr. Murray's 

discharge, we shall not consider the Russian Roulette as a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. 

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Roulette incident, Mr. Murray filed another complaint with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The record on appeal 

does not contain any information on these complaints, however, it 

simply reveals that the two complaints were referred to during Mr. 

Murray's due process hearing. Without further explanation of the 

complaints and how they were used at Mr. Murray's discharge 

hearing, we are unable to draw any conclusions on the causal 

connection between the complaints and Mr. Murray's discharge. Mr. 

Murray engaged in protected activity and faced adverse employment 

action subsequent to the protected activity, however, he has not 

introduced sufficient evidence to support the inference of a 

causal connection. He has presented insufficient evidence to 

support the inference that his termination was in retaliation to 

his complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

Mr. Murray admits he did flush the substance, which he 

thought was crack cocaine, down the toilet. This action is 

prohibited by City of Sapulpa rules and regulations. Mr. Murray 

claims pretext is shown because others employed by the police 

department have destroyed evidence without being terminated. If 

similarly situated white employees were treated differently with 

respect to enforcement of police rules and regulations, this may 

show the allegedly nondiscriminatory explanation for Mr. Murray's 

discharge was pretextual. Mr. Murray refers to three affidavits, 

which were attached to his Motion to Reconsider, to show 

dissimilar treatment. These affidavits from City of Sapulpa 

police officers make general comments on police culture. Each 

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affidavit is limited to the statement: 

The undersigned states that it was general 

knowledge of the administration that it was the common 

practice of members of the Sapulpa, Oklahoma police 

force that where it was determined that charges would 

not be filed, after a person was taken into custody, all 

contraband that could be used as evidence was destroyed 

by the officer on the scene. 

To survive summary judgment, "nonmovant's affidavits must be 

based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be 

admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are 

not sufficient." Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (lOth Cir. 

1991) . The three affidavits presented to show dissimilar 

treatment are merely conclusory and do not provide any factual 

bases for the inference that others were treated differently. Mr. 

Murray's allegation that he was treated differently than similarly 

situated white officers is not supported by the record. Thus, Mr. 

Murray has failed to present evidence showing he was terminated 

for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons and cannot survive 

summary judgment . 

Mr. Weaver also claims a violation of Title VII. The 

defendants explain Mr. Weaver was discharged from the police 

department for using excessive force against a restrained suspect. 

However, Mr. Weaver claims he was truly terminated for supporting 

his friend Mr. Murray. Mr. Weaver argues this is revealed by the 

department's disparate treatment of him. He alleges he was the 

only officer of four involved in the arrest to be immediately 

terminated. However, the record reveals, as soon as the 

department learned of Mr. Main's participation in the physical 

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altercation, he too was discharged. There is no showing that the 

other two arresting officers used excessive force after the 

suspect was handcuffed. Mr. Weaver has not demonstrated that he 

was treated any differently than the other officers. 

Mr. Weaver also cites incidents in which two Sapulpa police 

officers may have used excessive force but were not disciplined. 

In the first, a Sapulpa officer, in response to a bite on the arm, 

struck a combative prisoner in the head while the prisoner was 

handcuffed to a gurney. This officer was not disciplined. The 

second officer bit a prisoner on the nose after the prisoner 

butted and spit at the officer. This officer resigned before any 

disciplinary action was taken. The first officer responded to a 

physical attack by a combative prisoner. The prisoner Mr. Weaver 

struck had spit at him but had not harmed him. The second officer 

resigned, thus there was little for the police department to do in 

disciplining that officer. Because the incidents offered by Mr. 

Weaver to show disparate treatment are factually dissimilar to Mr. 

Weaver's conduct and the consequences thereof, the evidence is 

insufficient to support the inference that the police department's 

reason for discharging Mr. Weaver was improper. 

Both Messrs. Murray and Weaver also argue the district court 

erred in dismissing their conspiracy claims. They alleged a 

conspiracy to violate their civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985. The district court determined they had "failed entirely 

to offer evidence of a conspiracy." 

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To succeed with a§ 1985(3) claim, Messrs. Murray and Weaver 

must show (1) the existence of a conspiracy (2) intended to deny 

them equal protection under the laws or equal privileges and 

immunities of the laws (3) resulting in an injury or deprivation 

of federally-protected rights, and (4) an overt act in furtherance 

of the object of the conspiracy. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 

u.s. 88, 102-03 (1971); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 

676 (lOth Cir. 1973). 

Messrs. Murray and Weaver allege the conspiracy was conducted 

by the McCoy's and the juvenile suspect detained by Messrs. Murray 

and Weaver. The goal of the conspiracy was to deprive Mr. Murray, 

as an African American police officer, of his rights as a police 

officer and to deprive Mr. Weaver, as Mr. Murray's supporter, of 

his rights as a police officer. The overt act in furtherance of 

the conspiracy was to falsely report the allegation that Mr. 

Murray dry-fired a gun at a detained juvenile drug suspect. They 

claim the conspiracy is evidenced by inconsistencies among the 

reports filed by Officer McCoy, Trooper McCoy, and the juvenile. 

The basis for the conspiracy claim was the testimony in regard to 

the Russian Roulette incident causing Messrs. Murray and Weaver to 

be terminated. However, we have already determined that other 

reasons justified the terminations. Thus, Messrs. Murray and 

Weaver cannot show that the alleged conspiracy injured or deprived 

them of a right. 

Some of the defendants, in their individual capacities, have 

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raised the defense of qualified immunity. Since we have concluded 

none of Messrs. Murray's and Weaver's claims on appeal can survive 

summary judgment, it is unnecessary for us to address the specific 

immunity issues. The district court was correct in granting 

summary judgment, accordingly, we AFFIRM. 

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