Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07163/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 21, 1997 Decided May 16, 1997

No. 96-7163

EDUARDO BURKHART,

APPELLEE

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv00812)

Gerard J. Stief, Associate General Counsel, Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, argued the cause for 

appellant, with whom Robert L. Polk, General Counsel, Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Counsel, David R. Keyser and 

Mark F. Sullivan were on the briefs.

Marc Fiedler argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee.

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Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, United 

States Department of Justice, Jessica Dunsay Silver and 

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Attorneys, were on the brief for the 

United States as amicus curiae.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Concurring opinion filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority ("WMATA" or the "Authority") appeals 

from a judgment following a jury verdict finding WMATA (1) 

directly liable for negligent hiring, training, and supervision 

of its bus operators; (2) directly liable for violations of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 

et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation 

Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.; and (3) vicariously liable for 

assault, battery, and infliction of emotional distress. 

WMATA raises a myriad of issues on appeal, many of which 

have been waived and others of which are frivolous. We need 

only consider certain of the issues, finding them sufficient to 

reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act claims and the negligent hiring, training, 

and supervision claims. However, we affirm the trial court's 

judgment as to the assault, battery, and infliction of emotional 

distress claims.

I. Background

This case arises from a physical altercation that took place 

in northern Virginia between Eduardo Burkhart, plaintiffappellee, and Archie Smith, a WMATA bus operator. On 

May 5, 1994, Burkhart and a friend, Basram Salman, both of 

whom are deaf, boarded a Metrobus in Arlington, Virginia. 

Burkhart and Salman each placed a thirty-cent token in the 

fare box. The correct fare for those with disabilities is fiftycents. As the bus pulled away from the curb, Smith called 

both Burkhart and Salman back to pay the correct fare. 

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However, because they are deaf, neither Salman nor Burkhart understood Smith's request. The events that followed 

this exchange are in substantial dispute. It is sufficient for 

our purposes to say that a series of blows was exchanged 

between Smith and Burkhart.

When the bus reached its destination at the Pentagon 

Metrorail Station, Burkhart exited the bus and began looking 

for a transit officer. At this point, the evidence is in dispute 

as to whether Burkhart was pointing to Smith or was sticking 

his finger in Smith's chest. In any event, Smith then 

grabbed Burkhart's finger. Burkhart responded by kicking 

Smith in the groin, causing him to release his hold of Burkhart's finger. Smith then picked up a stick, at which point he 

was restrained.

Ultimately, Transit Police Officer Jonathan Gray arrived on 

the scene. Officer Gray and Burkhart communicated by 

writing notes on a notepad. Burkhart testified that he requested an interpreter at some point during his exchange 

with Officer Gray. Officer Gray testified that no such request was ever made. An interpreter was not called to the 

scene. Upon completing his discussion with Officer Gray, 

Burkhart attempted to locate witnesses to the incident. Officer Gray then transported both Smith and Burkhart to a 

magistrate to press charges against one another. Both Smith 

and Burkhart were charged with assault and battery. However, these charges were ultimately dropped.

Burkhart subsequently filed suit against WMATA and 

Smith for injuries sustained as a result of the altercation with 

Smith. Burkhart asserted claims against Smith, and against 

WMATA vicariously, for assault, battery, gross negligence, 

and infliction of emotional distress. In addition, Burkhart 

alleged that WMATA negligently hired, trained, and supervised its bus operators and, as a result, caused the assault 

and battery at issue. Still further, Burkhart alleged that he 

was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability, in 

violation of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in that 

WMATA failed to take appropriate steps to ensure that 

communications with him were as effective as communications 

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with others. The case was tried to a jury with a magistrate 

judge presiding. At trial, WMATA admitted that Smith was 

acting within the scope of his employment with WMATA 

when the events at issue occurred. As a result, the district 

court granted Smith's unopposed motion that the claims 

against him be dismissed.

During the course of the trial, Burkhart called Edward 

Spurlock as an expert "as to how the ADA [and] Rehabilitation Act impact on police practices, procedures, and training." 

WMATA objected to Spurlock as a witness, and a voir dire 

examination of the witness was conducted during which Spurlock recounted his expertise in police training and procedures. 

The court accepted Spurlock "as an expert with respect to the 

issues of police procedures, practices, and training, as they 

concern the [ADA] and the Rehabilitation Act." The trial 

judge then allowed Spurlock to testify concerning whether 

WMATA and Officer Gray had complied with the requirements of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as well as accepted 

police procedures.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict for 

Burkhart. The jury concluded that WMATA was vicariously 

liable for assault and battery, and awarded Burkhart $373.65 

in damages for medical expenses incurred. In addition, the 

jury found WMATA vicariously liable for infliction of emotional distress, and awarded Burkhart $510.00 for medical 

expenses. Further, the jury found WMATA directly liable 

for negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and awarded 

Burkhart $50,000 for "injuries caused by the defendants' 

acts." Finally, the jury found WMATA directly liable for 

violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and awarded 

Burkhart another $50,000 in damages for "injury, embarrassment, humiliation, frustration, inconvenience, indignity and/or 

the stigma of discrimination." As a result, the trial court 

entered a judgment for Burkhart in the amount of 

$100,883.65 and awarded him attorneys' fees and costs of 

$62,071.46 on the ADA claim. WMATA appeals raising thirteen separate issues of which three warrant discussion.

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1On appeal, WMATA contends that Part A of Title II does not 

apply to public transportation providers subject to Part B. We 

decline to address this challenge as it was not properly preserved 

below. 

2The Department of Justice, as amicus in this case, asserts that 

the Attorney General's "regulatory authority extends as far as the 

substantive provision it implements." United States Brief at 11. 

We need not determine whether this is so given that we find other 

error sufficient to warrant reversal. 

II. Analysis

A. Expert Witness.

1. Error.

WMATA argues that the trial court erred in permitting 

Spurlock to testify as an expert concerning the ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act. Before considering whether Spurlock's 

testimony was proper expert witness testimony, we think it 

profitable to discuss briefly the requirements of the ADA.

The relevant provision of the ADA is Title II which governs 

"public entities," including agencies of state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132. Title II is divided into 

two parts. Part A generally prohibits disability-based discrimination by any public entity. Id. § 12132. Part B provides specific examples of prohibited discriminatory conduct 

in the public transportation context. Id. §§ 12142, 12143(a), 

12144, 12146, 12147, 12148, 12162 (defining "discrimination for 

purposes of section 12132"). Of course, public transportation 

providers are also subject to the general nondiscrimination 

mandate of Title II(A). See id. § 12131 (defining a "public 

entity" subject to section 12132 as including "any commuter 

authority").1

The Attorney General has authority to promulgate regulations implementing Title II(A)'s general rule of nondiscrimination, id. § 12134(a), while the Secretary of Transportation 

has authority to promulgate regulations implementing the 

transportation-specific provisions of Title II(B), id. §§ 12149, 

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tions governs communication with the disabled by a public 

entity. That subpart provides, inter alia, that:

(a) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to 

ensure that communications with applicants, participants, 

and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.

(b)(1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in 

and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity 

conducted by a public entity.

(2) In determining what type of auxiliary aid and 

service is necessary, a public entity shall give primary 

consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities.

28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (1996). The Secretary of Transportation's 

ADA regulations require that public transportation providers 

"ensure that personnel are trained to proficiency, as appropriate to their duties, so that they ... properly assist and treat 

individuals with disabilities who use the service in a respectful 

and courteous way." 49 C.F.R. § 37.173.

As detailed above, Burkhart alleged that WMATA violated 

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing to ensure that 

communication with him was "as effective" as communication 

with others. Spurlock testified as an expert in support of 

these claims. WMATA contends that it was error for the 

district court to permit certain aspects of this testimony. To 

evaluate expert testimony, the Federal Rules of Evidence 

provide that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 

otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702. Interpreting this provision, 

we apply a two-part test for determining the admissibility of 

expert testimony: the witness (1) must be qualified, and (2) 

must be capable of assisting the trier of fact. Exum v. 

General Elec. Co., 819 F.2d 1158, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We 

review a district court's decision concerning the admissibility 

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of expert testimony only for abuse of discretion. Joy v. Bell 

Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

a. Spurlock's Qualifications.

WMATA first objects to the magistrate judge's determination that Spurlock was qualified as an expert given that he 

had no prior work experience involving the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. While work experience is obviously one method 

by which an individual may acquire an expertise in a particular field, it "is only one among the five different ways to 

demonstrate an expert is qualified." Exum, 819 F.2d at 1163. 

A witness may be qualified as an expert based on "knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education" in the relevant field. 

FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).

Spurlock testified that he was a police officer with the 

Metropolitan Police Department for over twenty-four years. 

During that time he served as an instructor in police training 

and procedures. Prior to that Spurlock spent five years as an 

officer with the U.S. Capitol Police where he wrote policy and 

served as a trainer. Spurlock further testified that he had 

"taught police practice and procedures [his] entire career" 

and evaluated training programs for numerous cities. Still 

further, Spurlock testified that he had reviewed the training 

requirements under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. While 

Spurlock conceded that he was not an expert on the ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act, he asserted that he was an expert "with 

respect ... to how the ADA [and] Rehabilitation Act impact 

on police practices, procedures, and training." The trial 

judge agreed and accepted Spurlock as "an expert with 

respect to the issues of police procedures, practices, and 

training, as they concern the [ADA] and the Rehabilitation 

Act."

In light of the foregoing testimony, we cannot find that the 

judge abused her discretion in so ruling. Spurlock's lack of 

work experience with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act "goes 

to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence." 

Baerman v. Reisinger, 363 F.2d 309, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

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b. Spurlock's Testimony.

WMATA also objects to the trial court's determination that 

Spurlock's testimony would assist the jury, arguing that it 

was error to permit Spurlock to offer legal conclusions concerning whether WMATA had violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. FED. R. EVID. 704(a) provides that "otherwise 

admissible" opinion testimony "is not objectionable because it 

embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 

As a result, WMATA cannot successfully argue that Spurlock improperly testified as to an "ultimate issue." Rather, 

WMATA argues that Spurlock's testimony was not "otherwise admissible."

Whether expert opinion testimony is "otherwise admissible" depends, in part, on whether it will "assist the trier of 

fact" in either "understand[ing] the evidence or ... determin[ing] a fact in issue." See FED. R. EVID. 702. Expert 

testimony that consists of legal conclusions cannot properly 

assist the trier of fact in either respect, and thus it is not 

"otherwise admissible." See Torres v. County of Oakland,

758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that expert testimony couched in terms of a "legal conclusion" is "not helpful to 

the jury"); see also Weston v. WMATA, 78 F.3d 682, 684 n.4 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that "legal conclusions on domestic 

law ... are outside [an expert] witness' area of expertise").

Of course, the line between an inadmissible legal conclusion 

and admissible assistance to the trier of fact in understanding 

the evidence or in determining a fact in issue is not always 

bright. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6661, at 327 (Interim ed. 1992); see also

Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: 

Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 864 

n.210 (1988). The Sixth Circuit has concluded that "[t]he best 

resolution of this type of problem is to determine whether the 

terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct and 

specialized meaning in the law different from that present in 

the vernacular. If they do, exclusion is appropriate." Torres, 758 F.2d at 151. Applying this principle in a Title VII 

suit, the Torres court concluded that it was improper to 

permit an expert to testify as to whether the plaintiff "had 

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been discriminated against because of her national origin." 

Id. As the court explained, the expert's actual testimony 

constituted a legal conclusion for two reasons: it tracked the 

language of the applicable statute, and the term "discrimination" has a specialized legal meaning that is more precise 

than the lay understanding of the term. Id. However, the 

court noted in dicta that it would have been permissible for 

the expert to testify as to whether "national origin "motivated' 

the hiring decision." Id. Testimony phrased as such would 

"address the factual issue of ... intent without implicating 

any legal terminology." Id.

The Sixth Circuit's distinction between legal conclusions 

and factual opinions is consistent with the notes accompanying Rule 704 which explain that the rule does not permit 

"opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to 

reach" or which are "phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's 

note. For example, "the question, "Did T have capacity to 

make a will?' would be excluded, while the question, "Did T 

have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent 

of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to 

formulate a rational scheme of distribution?' would be allowed." Id. Just as the advisory committee stated that an 

expert cannot testify as to whether an individual possessed 

the "capacity" to make a will, so the Sixth Circuit concluded 

that an expert cannot testify as to whether "discrimination" 

occurred for purposes of Title VII. Both terms have specialized legal meanings that are inherently beyond the area of a 

witness' expertise. See Weston, 78 F.3d at 684 n.4. In other 

words, an expert may offer his opinion as to facts that, if 

found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at 

issue was satisfied, but he may not testify as to whether the 

legal standard has been satisfied.

In this case, the testimony of Burkhart's expert consisted 

of impermissible legal conclusions rather than permissible 

factual opinions. Concerning Officer Gray's communication 

with Burkhart, Spurlock testified that the means of communication employed by Officer Gray were not "as effective" as 

the means of communication with others. In addition, Spurlock testified that if a "person asked for a translator," the 

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ADA required that they be given one "unless it would change 

the service provided" or cause "an extraordinary expense or 

administrative requirement." Still further, Spurlock testified 

that communication with the disabled must be "equal to that 

of a person who is not disabled."

We are troubled by this testimony in two respects. First, 

Spurlock grossly misstated the law as to what constitutes "as 

effective" communication with the disabled. Nothing in the 

ADA itself or its implementing regulations dictates that a 

disabled individual must be provided with the type of auxiliary aid or service he requests unless it would alter the service 

provided or create an unreasonable burden or expense. The 

regulation to which Spurlock was apparently referring provides only that the type of aid or service an individual 

requests should be given "primary consideration." 28 C.F.R. 

§ 35.160(b)(2). However, the Attorney General's section-bysection analysis of this provision recognizes that the individual's request need not be honored if "another effective means 

of communications exists." 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160. While 

"[d]eference to the request of the individual is desirable," it is 

by no means required. See id. (emphasis added). As a 

result, Spurlock's testimony as to the applicable legal standard was plainly erroneous, thus demonstrating the danger in 

allowing experts to testify as to their understanding of the 

law. See Torres, 758 F.2d at 150. Each courtroom comes 

equipped with a "legal expert," called a judge, and it is his or 

her province alone to instruct the jury on the relevant legal 

standards. See Marx & Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 

505, 509-10 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).

Even aside from Spurlock's erroneous formulation of the 

pertinent law, we are also troubled by Spurlock's testimony 

that Officer Gray's communications with Burkhart were not 

"as effective" as the means of communication with others. 

The phrase "as effective" is lifted directly from the text of the 

Attorney General's regulations implementing the ADA. 28 

C.F.R. § 35.160(a). Moreover, the phrase as used in the 

regulations is a term of art with a meaning "separate" and 

"distinct" from the vernacular. Torres, 758 F.2d at 151. 

Whether a particular form of communication is "as effective" 

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3We question Spurlock's expertise in the area of communications 

with the disabled. 

as another is not judged on an absolute scale, but rather is a 

contextual determination based on the type of communication 

and number of people involved as well as the importance of 

the communication. See 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160 (explaining 

that the "factors to be considered in determining whether an 

interpreter is required include the context in which the 

communication is taking place, the number of people involved, 

and the importance of the communication"). Therefore, by 

invoking a legal term of art, Spurlock's testimony constituted 

an impermissible legal conclusion. See Torres, 758 F.2d at 

151 (finding inappropriate testimony that a defendant did not 

"discriminate").

It may well be permissible for an appropriate3expert to 

testify as to the difficulty an individual like Burkhart would 

have communicating with Officer Gray under the circumstances. It may also be permissible for an appropriate expert 

to testify concerning the relative merits of alternative forms 

of communication. But by allowing Spurlock to testify as to 

the legal question at issue, the trial court erred.

Spurlock also testified that Officer Gray was "not ... 

trained to proficiency in the requirements of the [ADA]" and 

the Rehabilitation Act. Again, the phrase "trained to proficiency" is lifted directly from the text of one of the regulations implementing the ADA, 49 C.F.R. § 37.173, and is a 

legal term of art defined by context, id. app. § 37.173 (stating 

that "training must be appropriate to the duties of each 

employee"). By invoking this nuanced statutory term, Spurlock again offered an impermissible legal conclusion.

As a final example of impermissible expert testimony we 

note Spurlock's response to the question: "Were all proper 

police practiceswith respect to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and in the national standards thereby, were all the 

police practices in this case proper?" Spurlock responded to 

this question by stating that Officer Gray should have, but 

failed to "gain control of the situation so that any combatants 

no longer cause harm to each other." Spurlock further 

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testified that Officer Gray failed to "search for witnesses" and 

seize relevant evidence. This testimony plainly misstated the 

requirements of those statutes, as we are unable to identify 

any provision of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act requiring that 

such steps be taken.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Spurlock to offer legal conclusions and 

misstate relevant legal principles. We emphasize that our 

discussion of the improper testimony by Spurlock is by no 

means exhaustive. We have simply highlighted those portions of the testimony we find most troubling. These examples should provide a sufficient guide on remand.

2. Prejudice.

We, of course, recognize that error alone does not warrant 

reversal of an otherwise valid judgment. An error that is 

harmless is not grounds for disturbing a judgment. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 61. "The burden of demonstrating prejudice 

requiring reversal rests with the party asserting error." 

Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 365 (2nd Cir. 1992). We hold 

that WMATA has carried its burden of proving that Spurlock's erroneously admitted testimony was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.

In Hygh, the Second Circuit considered two factors in 

assessing whether impermissible expert testimony as to a 

legal conclusion was harmless. At issue in that case was 

testimony by an expert concerning whether the force used by 

certain police officers in affecting an arrest was excessive. 

Id. at 361-62. In concluding that the testimony was harmless, the court first noted that the "impermissible testimony 

was expressed within a larger body of otherwise unobjectionable testimony concerning police procedures ... from which 

the jury could easily have drawn the same conclusions that 

[the expert] did." Id. at 365; see also Faison v. Nationwide 

Mortgage Corp., 839 F.2d 680, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding 

expert testimony harmless in that it "merely augmented 

other pattern evidence"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988). 

In addition, the court relied on the fact that the evidence 

supporting the expert's legal conclusion was "strong." 961 

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F.2d at 365; see also United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 

1381 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding erroneous expert testimony 

harmless given extensive evidence of guilt), cert. denied, 117 

S. Ct. 1271 (1997). Neither factor is present here.

Even setting aside his misstatements of the law itself, 

Spurlock's impermissible legal conclusions were not "expressed within a larger body of otherwise unobjectionable 

testimony from which the jury could easily have drawn the 

same conclusions that the expert did." For example, Spurlock testified that the means of communication employed by 

Officer Gray were not "as effective" as the means of communication with others. However, Spurlock did not provide 

other testimony to support this legal conclusion. Indeed, the 

facts indicate that Burkhart's difficulty, if any, in communicating with Officer Gray arose not because written means of 

communication were used, but because the communications 

were written in English rather than Spanish. Lack of fluency in English, of course, is not a disability within the meaning 

of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Moreover, the evidence of ADA and Rehabilitation Act 

violations in this case can hardly be described as "strong." 

Both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination 

"by reason of" a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794. Without deciding whether this language requires a 

showing of intentional discrimination or whether discriminatory effect alone is sufficient, we note that the evidence that 

Burkhart was discriminated against "by reason of" his deafness is thin. Indeed, the evidence arguably shows the opposite. At trial, Burkhart introduced evidence of Smith's prior 

employment history, including his previous confrontations 

with passengers. There is no indication that these prior 

confrontations involved disabled persons. Further, there is 

no evidence that Salman, who was also deaf, was subject to 

abusive treatment by Smith. These facts indicate that it was 

Smith's general rudeness that caused Burkhart to suffer 

humiliation, not discrimination "by reason of" Burkhart's 

disability. Unfortunately for Burkhart, general rudeness towards all does not violate either the ADA or Rehabilitation 

Act. Cf. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors,

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72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir.) (holding that Title VII does 

not generally prohibit rudeness at the workplace, but only 

that based on sex), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996). In 

addition, as discussed at length above, there is little to no 

evidence supporting Burkhart's claim that he was denied "as 

effective" communication aside from the impermissible legal 

conclusions rendered by Spurlock.

Given the scarcity of evidence of ADA and Rehabilitation 

Act violations and the lack of admissible testimony in support 

of Spurlock's legal conclusions, we cannot conclude that the 

improper expert testimony in this case was harmless.

B. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision Claims.

WMATA also urges that we reverse the judgment of the 

district court as to the negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims.

1. Duplicity.

WMATA argues that the district court erred in denying its 

motion to dismiss the claim for negligent hiring, training, and 

supervision. According to WMATA, permitting Burkhart to 

present claims against the Authority both for assault and 

battery, and negligent hiring, training, or supervision was 

duplicative. WMATA conceded that Smith was acting within 

the scope of his employment. Thus, the negligent hiring 

claim created no additional liability. It did, however, allow 

for admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence of prior 

unrelated passenger complaints involving Smith. See FED. R.

EVID. 404 (evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible in order 

to show action in conformity therewith). WMATA therefore 

contends that it was error to allow both claims to go to the 

jury.

The magistrate judge denied WMATA's motion to dismiss 

the negligent hiring claim as untimely. Local Rule 108(l) 

provides that "[a] dispositive motion in a civil action shall be 

filed sufficiently in advance of the pretrial conference." It is 

undisputed that WMATA's motion was filed one week prior to 

trial, well after the pretrial conference. Instead, WMATA 

argues that Rule 108(l) is inapplicable in that its motion 

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4Our concurring colleague concludes that the negligent hiring, 

training, and supervision claims were duplicative of the assault, 

battery, and infliction of emotional distress claims. Concurring 

Opinion at 1. However, our colleague fails to explain how he would 

overcome the procedural hurdles that bar consideration of 

WMATA's duplicity argument. 

to dismiss was not a "dispositive motion." According to 

WMATA, only those motions that "obviate[ ] the need for a 

trial" are "dispositive." Since dismissal of the negligent 

hiring claim would not have eliminated the need for a trial on 

the other claims, WMATA contends that its motion was not 

dispositive and thus not governed by Rule 108(l). This 

argument is plainly without merit.

A motion need not "obviate the need for a trial" to be 

dispositive. The term "dispositive motion" includes a motion 

that, if granted, would result either in the determination of a 

particular claim on the merits or elimination of such a claim 

from the case. For example, a court may grant a partial 

summary judgment as to fewer than all the claims in a case. 

A grant of partial summary judgment often leaves necessary 

a trial to resolve the remaining claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 

56(d). We, however, have referred to partial motions for 

summary judgment as "dispositive motions." E.g., Nixon v. 

Freeman, 670 F.2d 346, 364 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 

1035 (1982).

In this case, WMATA's motion, if granted, would have 

eliminated the negligent hiring claim from the case. It was, 

therefore, clearly a dispositive motion for purposes of Rule 

108(l). WMATA conceded at trial that its motion to dismiss 

was untimely. As a result, we cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.4 The 

fact that the trial court alternatively rejected WMATA's 

motion on the merits in no way undermines the timeliness 

ruling. United States v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1427 & n.4 

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 348 (1995). We therefore 

reject WMATA's claim despite serious reservations concerning the trial court's alternative denial of the motion on the 

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merits. See Hackett v. WMATA, 736 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 

1990).

2. Sovereign Immunity.

Because WMATA waived its duplicity claim, we are forced 

to consider WMATA's claim that it is immune from suits 

challenging its hiring, training, and supervision practices. 

This argument was raised below in the same untimely motion 

in which WMATA moved for dismissal of the negligent hiring 

claim as duplicitous. However, sovereign immunity claims 

are jurisdictional and thus cannot be waived by failure to 

present the defense to the trial court. See Edelman v. 

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that Eleventh 

Amendment claim cannot be waived as it is jurisdictional).

WMATA was created as the result of a compact signed by 

Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia and consented to by Congress (the "WMATA Compact"). Pub. L. No. 

89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966) (codified as amended at D.C.

CODE § 1-2431 et seq.). The WMATA Compact provides that 

"[t]he Authority shall be liable ... for its torts and those of 

its Directors, officers, employees and agents committed in the 

course of any proprietary function ... but shall not be liable 

for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental 

function." D.C. CODE § 1-2431(80).

We have developed two alternative tests for identifying 

"governmental" functions under the WMATA Compact. 

Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987). If 

an activity is a "quintessential[ ] governmental" function, such 

as "police activit[y]," it is within the scope of WMATA's 

sovereign immunity. Id. at 74. For those activities that are 

not quintessential governmental functions, immunity will depend on whether the activity is "discretionary" or "ministerial," id., a dichotomy employed by the Federal Tort Claims 

Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) et seq. Only those activities considered "discretionary" are shielded by sovereign 

immunity. See Dant, 829 F.2d at 75.

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Appellees cite our opinion in Biscoe v. Arlington County,

738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 

(1985), for the proposition that supervising and instructing 

employees is a ministerial function. In Biscoe, we held that, 

under D.C. law, the activities of "supervising and instructing" 

police officers are ministerial in that they "involve day-to-day 

operational matters, not planning and policy." Id. at 1363. 

However, in United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 

(1991), the Supreme Court held that discretionary activity, for 

purposes of the FTCA, can include operational activities and 

"is not confined to the policy or planning level." Thus, the 

foundation upon which we based our discretionary/ministerial 

distinction in Biscoe was repudiated as a matter of federal 

law in Gaubert. We do not mean to imply that Biscoe is no

longer binding precedent as to the definition of ministerial 

and discretionary activities under District of Columbia law. 

However, the question of whether an activity is a governmental function for purposes of the WMATA Compact "is one of 

federal law." Sanders v. WMATA, 819 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987). Therefore, Gaubert, not Biscoe, must guide our 

determination of whether hiring, training, or supervising employees are discretionary functions for purposes of the 

WMATA Compact.

In Gaubert, the Supreme Court stated that a discretionary 

function "is one that involves choice or judgment" exercised 

"based on considerations of public policy." See 499 U.S. at 

322. A two-part test flows from this definition of a discretionary activity. Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 

1995). First, a court must determine whether a " "federal 

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course 

of action for an employee to follow.' " Id. (quoting Gaubert,

499 U.S. at 322). If so, sovereign immunity does not bar suits 

based on an employee's failure to follow the prescribed course 

of conduct. Id. If, however, the governing statutes leave 

room for "choice," an exercise of such choice is exempt from 

suit under the FTCA if the decision is " "susceptible to policy 

judgment' and involve[d] an exercise of "political, social, [or] 

economic judgment.' " Id. (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325).

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Applying this test, we hold that decisions concerning the 

hiring, training, and supervising of WMATA employees are 

discretionary in nature, and thus immune from judicial review. The parties have pointed to no law or policy "specifically prescrib[ing]" guidelines for the hiring, training, or supervision of WMATA employees. The WMATA compact confers 

upon WMATA broad power to "[c]reate and abolish ... 

employments" and "provide for the qualification, appointment, [and] removal ... of its ... employees without regard to the laws of any of the signatories," D.C. CODE

§ 1-2431(12)(g); "[e]stablish, in its discretion, a personnel 

system based on merit and fitness," id. § 1-2431(12)(h); and 

"[c]ontrol and regulate ... the service to be rendered," id.

§ 1-2431(12)(j). These provision hardly constrain WMATA's 

determination of whom it will employ or how it will train and 

supervise such employees. Thus, WMATA has choices to 

make.

The hiring, training, and supervision choices that WMATA 

faces are choices "susceptible to policy judgment." The 

hiring decisions of a public entity require consideration of 

numerous factors, including budgetary constraints, public 

perception, economic conditions, "individual backgrounds, office diversity, experience and employer intuition." Tonelli v. 

United States, 60 F.3d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1995). Similarly, 

supervision decisions involve a complex balancing of budgetary considerations, employee privacy rights, and the need to 

ensure public safety. The extent of training with which to 

provide employees requires consideration of fiscal constraints, 

public safety, the complexity of the task involved, the degree 

of harm a wayward employee might cause, and the extent to 

which employees have deviated from accepted norms in the 

past. Such decisions are surely among those involving the 

exercise of political, social, or economic judgment. See, e.g., 

Kirchman v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273, 1277 (8th Cir. 1993) 

(holding that supervision of government contractors is a 

"discretionary function"); Tonelli, 60 F.3d at 496 (stating that 

"issues of employee supervision and retention generally fall 

within the discretionary function exception"); K.W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1988) 

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(holding that "failure to properly train and supervise EPA 

personnel" falls within the discretionary function exception).

As a result, we conclude that the hiring, training, and 

supervision of WMATA personnel are governmental functions. WMATA is therefore immune from suit for negligence 

in the performance of such functions. The district court 

erred in refusing to dismiss Burkhart's negligent hiring, 

training, and supervision claims against WMATA.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court as to the assault, battery, and infliction of 

emotional distress claims. We reverse the judgment of the 

district court as to the negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims, as well as the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. 

Because WMATA is immune from suit for negligent hiring, 

training, and supervision, we remand the case for retrial only 

of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

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EDWARDS, Chief Judge, concurring: I agree with the majority that plaintiff's claim of negligent hiring, supervision, and 

training by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") should never have been submitted to the 

jury.

On the principal point in issue, I am satisfied that the jury 

was fully justified in returning a verdict against WMATA on 

plaintiff's claim that WMATA violated the Americans With 

Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. There is 

substantial evidence to support the verdict on this claim, even 

absent the disputed testimony of plaintiff's expert witness. 

The record establishes that, after boarding the bus and 

attempting to pay his fare, the plaintiff was slapped in the 

face by a WMATA bus operator, who apparently had become 

frustrated when the plaintiff, who is deaf, did not understand 

his oral commands. See Transcript at 75, 135, reprinted in

Joint Appendix Volume II ("J.A. II"). Further, the record 

demonstrates that, after the plaintiff left the bus and located 

a transit officer so that he could report that the bus driver 

had struck him, the officer refused the plaintiff's request for a 

sign-language interpreter and, instead, compelled him to 

write notes in English. See id. at 80-82, 95, 171-76, reprinted in J.A. II. Written English is the third most comfortable 

language for the plaintiff, behind American Sign Language 

and written Spanish. See id. at 194, reprinted in J.A. II. 

This and other similar evidence offered by the plaintiff make 

it clear that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

jury's verdict. Thus, I believe that, without the erroneous 

admission of the expert's testimony, the plaintiff would prevail on his principal claim.

I agree, however, that the error in this case was not 

harmless. As I understand the "harmless error" doctrine, it 

is not within the province of an appellate judge to usurp the 

role of a jury by speculating on what a jury might have done 

in the absence of significant error. See Harry T. Edwards, 

To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should 

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Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1193-94, 

1205 (1995). Our role is to assess "whether the error "had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury's verdict,' not whether the record evidence is sufficient absent the error to warrant a verdict." Id. at 1202 

(footnote omitted) (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 

992, 994 (1995)). In this case, it cannot be said that the error 

did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

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