Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03724/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03724-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. L. KELLY, 

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03724-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND 

SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

stemming from a March 13, 2013 incident at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), where he is still 

currently incarcerated. He alleges that Defendant PBSP Correctional Officer R. L. Kelly used 

excessive force against him. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as well as declaratory and monetary 

damages.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which will be granted in 

a separate written Order. 

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claim are alleged to have occurred at 

PBSP which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements, 

namely that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

II. EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM

A prisoner has the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including physical 

abuse by guards. Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 317 (1986)). 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2013, he was subjected to excessive force by Defendant 

Kelly. Dkt. 1 at 3-5. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on the date of the incident he was 

scheduled for law library access. Id. at 3. Defendants Kelly and “John Doe 1” escorted Plaintiff 

out of his cell. Id. Defendants engaged in a conversation which consisted of Defendant Kelly 

“venting of the fact that SHU inmates are given access to the prison’s law library, and on his 

having to do the ‘extra’ work of escorting them back and forth.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff did not want to 

participate in the conversation because he “thought it to be prejudice [sic] and stated it so and thus 

ignored further inquiries . . . .” Id. As Defendants escorted Plaintiff, Defendant Kelly “in an 

abrupt and violent act slammed Plaintiff into the wall and thus causing him to impact head first.” 

Id. Later, when Plaintiff requested medical attention for his injuries, Defendant Kelly slammed 

Plaintiff against the wall a second time. Id. When Plaintiff asked Defendant Kelly to “just take 

him to the library,” Defendant Kelly “shoved Plaintiff against the wall with the weight of his body 

and forearm across Plaintiff’s neck . . . .” Id. at 5. After verbally abusing Plaintiff, Defendant 

Kelly then turned around and escorted Plaintiff back to his housing unit. Id. At his cell, 

Defendant Kelly started “shoving” Plaintiff towards his half-opened cell door and “slammed 

Plaintiff’s arm onto the edge of the opening door . . . .” Id. Plaintiff claims he suffered physical 

and psychological injuries as a result of this incident. Id. at 6. 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim 

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against Defendant Kelly and against “John Doe 1” for failing to intervene.

III. CLAIMS AGAINST DOE DEFENDANTS

As mentioned above, Plaintiff identifies “John Doe 1” as well as several other Doe 

Defendants whose names he intends to learn through discovery. Dkt. 1 at 2-3. The use of Doe 

defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th 

Cir. 1980). However, where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known prior to the filing 

of a complaint the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify them. Id. 

Failure to afford the plaintiff such an opportunity is error. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the claims against Defendant John Doe 1 as well as all 

other Doe Defendants are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. Should Plaintiff learn 

these Doe Defendants’ identities through discovery, he may move to file an amended complaint to 

add them as named defendants. See Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th 

Cir. 2003).

IV. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIMS

Plaintiff has also named the following Defendants in his complaint: Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation J. Beard and PBSP Warden Ron E. 

Barnes. Dkt. 1 at 2. However, Plaintiff does not claim that these aforementioned Defendants 

personally violated his constitutional rights. Rather, Plaintiff seems to contend that these 

Defendants are liable based on the conduct of their subordinates, the aforementioned PBSP 

Defendants. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. See Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, Plaintiff must allege that the supervisory 

liability Defendants “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed 

to act to prevent them.” Id. Here, no facts are alleged to establish supervisorial liability on the 

part of these Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendants 

Beard and Barnes are DISMISSED without prejudice.

///

///

///

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for the use of excessive force 

against Defendants Kelly and “John Doe 1.”

2. The claims against Defendant John Doe 1 as well as all other Doe Defendants are 

DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.

3. Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendants Beard and Barnes are 

DISMISSED without prejudice.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

and all attachments thereto (dkt. 1) and a copy of this Order to Defendant PBSP Correctional 

Officer R. L. Kelly. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to

State Attorney General’s Office in San Francisco. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this 

Order to Plaintiff.

5. Defendant is cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 

Defendant to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendant, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, Defendant will be required to 

bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for the failure to sign and return the 

waiver form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendant had been served on the 

date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendant will not be 

required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for 

waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendant is asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver 

form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of service of 

the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before Defendant has 

been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on which the 

request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever 

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is later. 

6. Defendant shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendant 

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 

supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 

the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand1notice 

so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 

oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 

in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 

However, the Court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. 

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a defendant as an 

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is not clear on the face of the 

complaint, Defendant must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a motion for summary 

judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. 

But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the district judge 

rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 1168.

If Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

Defendant shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All 

 

1

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

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papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendant no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which Defendant’s 

motion is filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 

F.3d at 962-63.

Plaintiff also is advised that—in the rare event that Defendant argues that the failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint—a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 

exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 

may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 

others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents—

documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 

authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements 

in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have 

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personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide disputed 

issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168.

(The notices above do not excuse Defendant’s obligation to serve similar notices again 

concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and 

motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.)

d. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

7. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendant to depose 

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

8. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendant or 

Defendant’s counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

them.

9. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

10. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the 

deadline sought to be extended.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

April 15, 2015

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