Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00826/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00826-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY GARCIA,

No. 2:06-cv-00826-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

QUASSAM TARIQ,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present motion, Plaintiff Rudy Garcia

(“Plaintiff”) seeks attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,

pursuant to both state law and 42 U.S.C. § 12205 of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), following his default judgment

against Defendant Quassam Tariq, (“Defendant”) for violations of

Title III of the ADA pertaining to the Sacramento Tire and Wheels

store located at 5889-C Stockton Boulevard, Sacramento,

California. Plaintiff requests $6,600.00 for fees incurred by his

attorney, and $478.00 in costs and litigation expenses, for a

total of $7,078.00. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion.

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BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from Plaintiff’s claim that he

encountered various architectural barriers when attempting to

visit Sacramento Tire and Wheel’s facility. Plaintiff is unable

to walk distances over twenty-five (25) yards or for more than

five (5) minutes without the use of wheelchair. Plaintiff was

not able to gain equal access to the facility because of a lack

of accessible parking.

Plaintiff filed his complaint against Quassam Tariq and the

Larry Gaines Living Trust, on April 17, 2006. The Larry Gaines

Living Trust was dismissed voluntarily as a defendant on November

2, 2006. Thereafter, his counsel conducted site assessments of

the Sacramento Tire and Wheel facility and noted numerous ADA

violations, including a lack of accessible parking and restroom

facilities. On May 17, 2007, default judgment was entered

against Defendant. The Court ordered the Defendant to (a)

identify one of the Store’s parking spaces as being reserved for

the disabled, by painting a three-inch square International

Symbol of Accessibility in it; (b) create an eight-inch wide

access aisle immediately adjacent to the accessible parking

space, on the passenger side, by marking the area

with diagonal lines; and (c) complete such modifications within

90 days of service of the order entering judgment against him.

The court reserved ruling on Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s

fees and costs pending Plaintiff’s application under Local Rules

54-292 and 54-293. 

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In its motion for default judgment, Plaintiff dropped some of his

demands pertaining to other alleged violations identified in the

complaint, specifically, claims pertaining to deficiencies

involving the men’s restroom.

Since the Court ordered it would retain jurisdiction to hear

Plaintiff’s request for fees and expenses, the present motion was

filed on May 22, 2007.

STANDARD

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violations of federal and

California law. Plaintiff’s federal claim arose under the ADA,

while her state law claims arose under the California’s Unruh

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, California Health & Safety Code §

19953, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §

54-55. 

Section 12205 of the ADA authorizes a court, in its

discretion, to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation

expenses, and costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A prevailing

plaintiff under a statute so worded “should ordinarily recover an

attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust.” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d

1128, 1134 (9 Cir. 2002), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 th

U.S. 424, 429 (1983). A plaintiff who enters a legally

enforceable settlement agreement is considered a prevailing

party. Id.

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Section 55 of the California Disabled Persons Act provides

that “the prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to

recover reasonable attorney’s fees.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55. Also,

under California Health & Safety Code § 19953, “[a]ny person who

is aggrieved or potentially aggrieved by a violation of this part

. . . may bring an action to enjoin the violation. The

prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover

reasonable attorney’s fees.” 

ANALYSIS

Quassam Tariq does not dispute that this Court has

discretion to award Plaintiff, as the prevailing party in this

litigation, attorney’s fees, as well as costs and litigation

expenses, in pursuing his case. Nor does Quassam Tariq challenge

the requested attorney’s fees and costs as unreasonable or

excessive.

This Court must therefore determine the extent to which

attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses are recoverable. In

making that assessment, the Court must identify the applicable

“lodestar” for calculating attorneys’ fees. Under the lodestar

method, a court multiplies the number of hours the prevailing

attorney reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable

hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Ketchum v.

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (expressly approving the use

of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar). Courts

may then adjust the lodestar to reflect other aspects of the

case. 

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See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.

1975); see also Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25 (1977). That

adjustment can go either upwards or downwards depending on the

circumstances present. Van Gerwen v. Guar. Mut. Life Co., 214

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9 Cir. 2000). th

Turning first to the number of hours reasonably billed, the

Court finds that the amounts claimed by Plaintiff for certain

tasks are reasonable and do not need to be adjusted. 

Accordingly, after analyzing the billing entries generated by

Plaintiff’s counsel the Court finds the total of 26.4 hours

billed by Thomas Stewart at $250/hour are reasonable.

The above analysis all pertains to the reasonableness of the

number of hours for which compensation is sought. The second

step of the lodestar analysis requires that the rate sought to be

charged per hour also be reasonable. Courts generally calculate

reasonable hourly rates according to the prevailing market rates

in the relevant legal community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984). The general rule is that courts use the rates of

attorneys practicing in the forum district, in this case, the

Eastern District of California, Sacramento. Gates v. Deukmejian,

987 F.2d 1392,1405 (1993); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473,

1488 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 899 (1991). 

The burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory

evidence that the requested rates are “in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum,

465 U.S. at 895 n.11. A court will normally deem a rate

determined this way to be reasonable. Id.

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The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the $250/hour rate

sought on behalf of attorney Thomas Stewart is reasonable. 

Plaintiff has sufficiently presented authority that supports this

rate as reasonable. See, e.g., White v. Save Mart (S-03-2402 MCE

KGM, Order filed October 20, 2005, page 7:9); Martinez v. Longs

Drug (S-03-1843 DFL CMK, Order filed November 28, 2005, page

19:7); Sanford v. GMRI (S-04-1535 DFL CMK, Order field

November 11, 2005, page 11:19) and; Hubbard v. Twin Oaks

(S-03-725 LKK CMK, Order filed April 7, 2005, page 4:25). [The

rate shown in Plaintiff’s counsel’s time and expense

records is $295, which is the rate Plaintiff’s counsel charges in

cases brought in the Northern District.]

In assessing whether the lodestar figure should be adjusted,

the Court must consider the extent to which Plaintiff prevailed

on the demands presented. Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9 Cir. 1995). In cases achieving th

partial success, courts must follow a two-part analysis in

deciding whether to reduce an attorneys’ fee award: 

First, the court asks whether the claims upon which the

plaintiff failed to prevail were related to the plaintiff’s

successful claims. If unrelated, the final fee award may

not include time expended on the unsuccessful claims. If

the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then the

court must apply the second part of the analysis, in which

the court evaluates the ‘significance of the overall relief

obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours

reasonably expended on the litigation.’ If the plaintiff

obtained ‘excellent results,’ full compensation may be

appropriate, but if only partial or limited success’ was

obtained, full compensation may be excessive. Such

decisions are within the district court’s discretion.

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Id. at 901-02. In determining whether the unsuccessful and

successful claims are related,

...the test is whether relief sought on the unsuccessful

claim is intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely

distinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave

rise to the injury on which the relief granted is premised. 

Thus, the focus is to be on whether the unsuccessful and

successful claims arose out of the same course of conduct.

Id. at 903, quoting Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 

1141 (9 Cir. 1986). If a court finds the unsuccessful claims th

to be unrelated to the successful claims, it may either attempt

to identify specific hours that should be eliminated or simply

reduce the award to account for the limited success. Id. at 904.

In the present matter, the Court finds it would be

inappropriate to reduce the lodestar figure based on Plaintiff’s

limited success. Each of the violations claimed by Plaintiff

represent different and unrelated claims that are premised on

different sections of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines to

determine liability. Claims pertaining to the accessibility of

the parking lot are completely separate from claims relating to

restroom access. However, Plaintiff did not proceed with the

original claims relating to restroom access because he did not

believe it was appropriate to incur the additional legal and

expert expenses, or the additional time that would have been

required of the Court. In his motion for default judgment,

Plaintiff gave notice he was not proceeding with the claims

relating to restroom access and he is not requesting compensation

for any legal work relating to those claims. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees will not be adjusted

because of partial success.

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Lastly, Plaintiff may recover, as part of the award of his

fees in this matter, litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

2205. The term “litigation expenses” in Section 12205 has been

interpreted to include “the same out-of-pocket expenses that are

recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Robbins v. Scholastic Book

Fairs, 928 F. Supp. 1027, 1037 (D. Or. 1996). Under Section

1988, Plaintiff recover those out-of-pocket expenses that “would

normally be charged to a fee paying client.” Harris v.

Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994).

As stated above, Plaintiff seeks a total of $478.00 in costs

and litigation expenses. Defendant has not opposed that amount.

Plaintiff has submitted an invoice from 1 Nationwide Legal st

Services that lists the fees for serving the defendant, totaling

$128.00. Plaintiff is also requesting the amount of the filing

fee, which is $350.00. These two costs are properly subject to

reimbursement.

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,600.00 and reasonable

litigation expenses in the amount of $478.00, for a total of

$7,078.00. Plaintiff will accordingly be awarded that amount.1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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