Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02556/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02556-34/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Environmental Cleanup Expenses

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

and CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STERLING CENTRECORP INC.,

STEPHEN P. ELDER and ELDER

DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

No. 2:08-cv–02556-MCE-JFM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Both the United States and the California Department of Toxic Substances 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “government” unless otherwise 

specified) have designated the former Lava Cap Mine, located in Nevada County, 

California, as a Superfund site polluted by elevated levels of arsenic that were 

disseminated through tailings and waste materials generated by mine operations. 

Plaintiffs have undertaken cleanup efforts designed to remediate that arsenic 

contamination. The present action, filed pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq. 

(“CERCLA”), seeks contribution for the costs of those activities both from former owners 

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of the site and operators responsible for its mining. After bifurcating the case between 

liability and damages, a bench trial as to the liability of Defendant Sterling Centrecorp 

Inc. (“Sterling”) was held over four days between October 31, 2012, and November 7, 

2012. Those proceedings resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed 

June 20, 2013, and June 24, 2013, that found Sterling liable for all proper removal and 

remedial costs incurred by Plaintiffs at the Mine. ECF Nos. 211, 213.1 

Presently before the Court are two related motions for summary judgment 

pertaining to the second damages phase of this case. Both Plaintiffs and Defendant 

Sterling Centrecorp Inc. (“Sterling”) ask the Court to summarily adjudicate the extent and 

recoverability of Plaintiff’s response costs under Section 107 of CERCLA. As set forth 

below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED and Defendant Sterling’s Motion is DENIED. 2

BACKGROUND

The Lava Cap Mine Superfund Site is located on approximately thirty acres in a 

rural residential area in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Gold and silver 

mining activities at the site began in approximately 1860. Between 1943 and 1945

mining was conducted at the site by the Lava Cap Gold Mining Corporation (“LCGMC”). 

Mining operations resulted in two piles of mining waste, a waste rock pile and a mill 

tailings pile. Findings of Fact ¶¶ 34-35.3 The waste rock pile, estimated to be several 

stories high, was situated immediately next to the mine and mill building. Id. at ¶ 34. 

The fine-grained materials comprising the mill tailings were impounded downstream from 

the mill behind a timber dam on Little Clipper Creek. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 35. In 1938, LCGMC 

 1 The liability of the remaining Defendants, Stephen P. Elder and Elder Development, had already 

been adjudicated by orders Dated February 23, 2010, September 20, 2011, and December 8, 2011 (ECF 

Nos. 78, 149 and 153, respectively.

2 Because it determined that oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court 

ordered both Motions submitted on the briefing in accordance with Eastern District Local Rule 230(g).

3 Citations to “Findings of Fact” refer to the Court’s Findings of Fact in the liability portion of this 

case, filed June 20, 2013. ECF No. 211.

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created another dam on Greenhorn Creek to also trap mill tailings, thereby creating Lost 

Lake. Id. at ¶13.

In 1979, a partial log dam collapse led to a release of mine tailings into Little 

Clipper Creek which, in turn, caused downstream neighbors to complain about pollution 

from the resulting silt. Findings of Fact ¶¶ 142-43, 166. In October of that year, the 

Central Valley Regional Control Board and the California Department of Fish and Game 

investigated and found that arsenic contaminated tailings had entered Little Clipper 

Creek and flowed downstream to Lost Lake. Id. at ¶ 142-43, 21. The Regional Water 

Quality Control Board thereafter issued a Cleanup and Abatement Order to Keystone, 

which technically held title to the Mine at the time. Id. at ¶ 144. 

Following an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to sell the Lava Cap Mine to another 

company, Keystone sold the property in1989 to Banner Mountain Properties, Ltd., an 

entity controlled by Defendant Stephen Elder, who currently owns four of the seven 

parcels comprising the former mine site. The remaining three parcels are owned by 

another Elder business interest, Defendant Elder Development, Inc. 

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) completed a 

Preliminary Assessment on the mine site in April of 1993, after Elder’s purchase of the 

property. Sediment and soil samples revealed elevated concentrations of both arsenic 

and lead. 

Heavy rainstorms in 1997 washed mine wastes downstream into Little Clipper 

Creek and Lost Lake. The upper half of the log dam thereafter collapsed, discharging an 

estimated 10,000 cubic yards of additional tailings contaminated with arsenic. Findings 

of Fact ¶ 21. In October of 1997, the EPA determined that the tailings release from the 

Mine met the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) criteria for a removal action under 

40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(2). During 1997 and 1998, the EPA conducted a physical 

removal action at the Site. Pls.’ Compl., ¶¶ 35-39. Thereafter, in January of 1999, the 

Site was officially designated a Superfund site in light of its potential risk to human health 

///

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and the environment. Soil, sediment, surface water and groundwater contamination 

from mining operations continues at the Site.

The EPA has conducted a variety of response activities to address this 

contamination. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PUF”) No. 12. It has 

reviewed information and sampling data for prior assessments, performed and analyzed 

groundwater, surface water, sediment and soil sampling to determine the extent of 

contamination, analyzed alternatives for eliminating or reducing said contamination, and 

performed several response actions to prevent exposure to hazardous contaminants. Id.

at 13-24.

Because of the size of the Site, the EPA elected to divide it into four operable 

units. Sterling’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DUF”) at No. 7. Only two of those 

operative units are at issue in the current motions. Operative Unit 1 (“OU1”) consisted 

of: 1) the residences on the mine property; 2) building, soils, and surface water 

contamination on the mine property; and 3) contaminated soils along Little Clipper Creek 

downstream to Greenhorn Road. Id. at 8. The EPA selected remedial treatment for 

OU1 consisting of removing “hot spots” of soil contamination near the mine buildings, 

removing mine equipment, constructing surface water diversions around the tailings and 

waste rocks piles, and installing a system to collect and treat water flowing from the mine 

entrance and seeping from the buttress containing the failings. Id. at 11. In addition, the 

treatment employed also included covering the waste rock pile with soil and vegetation, 

and covering the tailings pile with a High Density Polyethylene (“HDPE”) synthetic liner 

and vegetated soil. Id. at 12.

Operative Unit 2 (“OU2”) addressed risks posed by contaminated groundwater, 

including groundwater then used for drinking water by five residences. The remedy 

chosen by EPA was interim in nature because studies for possible long-term 

groundwater treatment were still ongoing, and potentially years away. See id. at 18. As 

an interim measure, EPA built a $3.795 million pipeline to connect the impacted 

///

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residences to a municipal water supply provided by the Nevada Irrigation District. Id. at 

24.

According to the government, through November 30, 2012, it incurred 

$32,205,011.39 in response costs at the Site. PUF at No. 42. Additionally, the 

California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) has $781,878.01 in 

unreimbursed response costs through October 31, 2014, and expects that figure to 

increase. Id. at 56. Of those amounts, the government claims it spent $3,611,624 on 

enforcement and legal costs that will be presented to the Court at a later date, and the 

DTSC spent some $58,151.25 for similar costs. Id. at 47, 56. Plaintiffs accordingly 

argue that Defendants, including Sterling, are liable for $28,593,387.39 in response 

costs to the government at this time, and $723,726.78 for response costs to DTSC. Id.4

On October 27, 2008, the United States and the DTSC commenced this civil 

action to recover both their past response costs under CERCLA and to obtain a 

declaratory judgment that Defendants are responsible for future response costs at the 

Site. Plaintiffs’ motion now before the Court seeks to establish its unreimbursed 

response costs as set forth below. Sterling, on the other hand, seeks summary 

adjudication that because some of Plaintiffs’ costs incurred at OU1, and all in OU2, were 

arbitrary or capricious or otherwise inconsistent with the NCP, they are unrecoverable.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to 

dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

///

 4 DTSC calculates the total balance owed as $847,912.86 after the addition of interest.

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Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or 

defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may 

move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each 

claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a 

motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for 

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic 

Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying summary 

judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and 

Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also 

demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 

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such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question 

before the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but 

whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the 

party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 

(quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). 

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under 

Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, 

“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. 87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Framework

The EPA is authorized until CERCLA § 104(a) to address a release or a 

substantial threat of release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). 

Permissible responses in that regard include “removal” actions, “remedial” actions, and 

any other actions necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment. 

Id. “Removal” actions including evaluative, assessment, and monitoring activities and 

related investigations, as well as actions necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate 

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environmental damage. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). “Remedial” actions refer to measures

taken to permanently deal with hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). In 

addition, CERCLA provides that the term “response” means either a removal or remedial 

action as well as enforcement activities related thereto. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).

The National Contingency Plan, or NCP, “provide[s] the organizational structure 

and procedures for preparing for and responding to . . . releases of hazardous 

substances.” Washington State Dep’t of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 

Pacificorp, 59 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 300.1). A party found 

liable under CERCLA § 107 is liable for “all costs of removal or remedial action incurred 

by the United States . . . not inconsistent with the [NCP].” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(4)(A). 

Once Plaintiffs establish a prima facie case that their response costs were 

incurred in connection with the release of hazardous substances from the Lava Cap 

Mine Site, such costs are presumed to be consistent with the NCP, and the burden shifts 

to Defendants to prove otherwise. Id. at 1170-71. Pursuant to CERCLA § 113(j) and 

well established Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendant Sterling then has the burden, in 

showing that a particular action was inconsistent with the NCP, to show that such 

response was “arbitrary and capricious” based on the administrative record. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9613(j); Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1170. The arbitrary and capricious standard of review 

is indicated “because determining the appropriate removal and remedial action involves 

specialized knowledge and expertise, [and therefore] the choice of a particular cleanup 

method is a matter within the discretion of the [government]. United States v. Hardage, 

982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Northeastern 

Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 748 (8th Cir. 1986)).

“If the Court finds that the selection of a response action was arbitrary and 

capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court shall award (A) only the 

response costs or damages that are not inconsistent with the [NCP], and (B) such other 

relief as is consistent with the [NCP].” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(3). In making that 

determination, the NCP identifies guides for investigation as well as the consideration of 

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remedial alternatives, and establishes criteria to be used in selecting remedies for the 

identified alternatives. First, the EPA requires that a remedial investigation/feasibility

study be undertaken for both the assessment and evaluation of site conditions and 

associated risks, with a range of alternatives then develop to address those concerns. 

40 C.F.R. §300,420, 300.430. Then, the proposed alternatives must be addressed using 

nine different criteria divided into three general categories denominated as Threshold, 

Balancing, and Modifying Criteria. The two Threshold Criteria are overall protection of 

human health and the environment, and compliance with applicable or relevant and 

appropriate requires. Threshold Criteria are essentially “pass-fail” screening criteria 

designed to determine whether proposed alternatives should be further considered. The 

Balancing Criteria contain five factors used to evaluate and compare alternatives that 

passed screening criteria. Those factors include long-term effectiveness and 

permanence, reduction of toxicity, mobility or volume through treatment, short-term 

effectiveness, implementability and cost. Finally, the two Modifying Criteria are state and 

community acceptance. 40 C.F.R. § 430(e)(9). 

In addition to overall cost, the NCP also requires that the EPA analyze the costeffectiveness of each remedial alternative. 40 C.F.R. § 300.43(f)(1)(ii)(D). A remedy is 

deemed cost-effective only if “its costs are proportional to its overall effectiveness.” Id.

B. Recoverable Response Costs

In opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion, Defendant Sterling does not question that either the 

government or the DTSC incurred the costs they claim through clean-up efforts at the 

site, or that the figures are improperly calculated, documented, and/or presented. 

Sterling’s Opp., ECF No. 284, 1:4-7. Instead, Sterling argues only that because some of 

the remedies utilized were arbitrary or capricious or otherwise inconsistent with the NCP, 

not all of Plaintiffs’ claimed costs can be recovered.

Specifically, as indicated above, Sterling takes issue with the remedies employed 

at the Site for part of OU1, as well as the entirety of the interim remedy for OU2.

///

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1. Operable Unit One (“OU1”)

Turning first to OU1, the EPA chose so-called Alternative 2-3 over Alternative 2-2 

to address contamination from the mine buildings, tailings, waste rock and acid 

drainage. Sterling argues that Plaintiff’s selection of Alternative 2-3 was arbitrary and 

capricious because the EPA: 1) failed to conduct the required NCP analysis before 

deciding to cover the waste rock with a vegetated soil cover; 2) failed to similarly analyze 

its decision to cover the tailings pile with an HDPE liner; and 3) failed to explain why its 

decision to excavate contaminated soil near the mine buildings was cost effective. 

These arguments will be addressed in turn.

a. Waste Rock Cover

Samples taken of the waste rock and mine tailings revealed that arsenic 

concentrations as high as 3,190 mg/kg. See Pls.’ Statement of Disputed Material Facts 

(“SOF”), ¶ 7. Given those results, the EPAA decided to regrade the waste rock pile and 

cap it with vegetated soil. Sterling does not dispute the need to regrade the pile and 

reduce infiltration, since that measure was included within Alternative 2-2, the remedial 

measure Sterling advocates. Sterling instead challenges the EPA’s decision to cap the 

regraded pile as set forth in Alternative 2-3. 

The EPA claims it determined that capping was needed in order to make the 

waste rock more difficult to disturb and to further reduce infiltration. Id. at 8-14. The 

government maintains that a cap does a better job of preventing people from disturbing 

the waste rock than no cap, a conclusion which seems obvious, and a distinction that 

Sterling appears reluctant to recognize. Sterling’s only counter is to take the 

unpersuasive position that the EPA should have discussed the likelihood that intruders 

would break into the Site to remove waste rock, an estimation that would be virtually 

impossible to quantify.

Sterling’s main argument against the selection of a vegetated soil cap rests with 

its contention that arsenic concentrations were primarily bound up in the rock matrix, and 

that, accordingly, they did not have the same potential to erode or leach into the soil as 

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the tailings pile. According to Sterling, in the absence of field investigation and/or 

solubility testing to determine just how much arsenic was apt to leach into the 

environment from the waste rock, the EPA’s decision to install the cap was arbitrary and 

capricious.

The Court disagrees. Evidence in the record indicates that EPA’s concern about 

infiltration from the waste rock was justified. Although Sterling is correct that the larger 

pieces of waste rock were less problematic in this regard, waste rock at the site ranged 

from eight inches in diameter to very small, sand-size particles, with fine-grained material 

situated throughout the waste rock pile to a depth of some 21 feet. Id. at 9, 10. As EPA

Remedial Project Manager David Seter noted in public hearings on its planned 

remediation, the Site’s waste rock “needs to be shaped to shed the rainwater, it needs to 

be capped, because there probably are some fine materials interspersed with the rock, 

and we just want to try to keep it all in place.” Id. at 14. Installing a cap under these 

circumstances would appear the prudent approach and it hardly can be considered 

arbitrary and capricious.

Sterling’s other objections are no more availing. While Sterling argues that the 

necessary data gathering failed to take place, it appears that solubility testing was done 

and that those results are part of the administrative record even if they were not 

expressly flagged by the EPA. Two of the three waste rock samples contained arsenic 

at levels in both in excess of the applicable maximum contaminant level and Site goals 

for the clean-up of arsenic in surface water. See SOF at Nos. 18-21. Making a 

determination that the EPA’s remedial choice was arbitrary and capricious solely 

because it failed to directly rely on adverse testing results already contained in the 

record would be nonsensical. Additionally, in response to Sterling’s argument that costeffectiveness was not considered, because capping created a better long-term barrier, 

the EPA determined that Alternative 2-3 (the next most economical option after 

Alternative 2-2, which did not envision installation of a cap) provided the best balance of 

///

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cost in combination with both long and short-term effectiveness. SOF at No. 26. That 

conclusion itself was sufficient for NCP purposes.

b. Waste Tailings Cover

The tailings pile posed an even greater environmental risk than did the 

concentration of waste rock at the Site. The EPA concluded that the tailings pile was 

both highly toxic and mobile, with surface water seeping from the tailings pile and 

groundwater beneath it containing elevated arsenic levels. Id. at 28. Alternative 2-3, 

the treatment choice adopted by the EPA, included six inches of sand over the tailings, 

followed by an impermeable HDPE liner and eighteen inches of vegetated lowpermeability soil. Alternative 2-2 as advocated by Sterling, on the other hand, called for 

only twelve inches of non/low-permeability soil to assist in revegetation, and no liner. Id.

at 4. As Sterling itself indicates, the EPA judged the engineered cap to be more 

effective because it concluded that the combination of an impermeable liner and lowpermeability soil deflected nearly all direct precipitation away from the tailings pile. See

Sterling Mot., ECF No. 273-1, pp. 8-9. The EPA determined that Alternative 2-2, on the 

other hand, “would allow water flow to enter the tailings and continue to produce 

leachate.” SOF at No. 29. Additionally, the EPA found that because it provided more of 

an access barrier to the tailings pile it made it more difficult for people and animals to 

come into contact with the contaminated tailings. Id. at 30.

In an argument similar to that employed against the EPA’s remedial choice for the 

Site’s waste rock pile, Sterling argues that the government’s choice to use an HDPE liner 

was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA failed to conduct appropriate testing and 

modeling to determine what, if any, increased benefit to groundwater and soil 

contamination was achieved by covering the tailings with the liner. According to Sterling, 

because the EPA failed to determine the amount of water infiltrating the pile and the 

arsenic migration caused thereby, it acted inconsistently with the NCP. Sterling also 

contends that the agency did not determine whether the HDPE liner was cost-effective. 

See Sterling Mot., ECF No. 273-1, 9:19-22.

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Sterling’s argument notwithstanding, the EPA need not calculate the precise 

amount of water deterred by the engineered cap in order to satisfy the NCP. Section 

300.430(d)(2) of the NCP, which Sterling cites to support that proposition, requires no 

such calculation. The record does show, however, that the impermeable liner reduces 

some 99 percent of infiltration and resists cracking, as opposed to the soil cap 

envisioned in Alternative 2-2 which the EPA determined would continue to allow for both 

infiltration and the generation of tailings leachate. SOF at Nos. 32-33. As indicated 

above, the EPA knew that the tailings released arsenic into both surface and 

groundwater. Common sense dictates that Alternative 2-3 was a safer choice under 

these circumstances, irrespective of whether precise testing was employed. Moreover, 

and in any event, although the EPA did not explicitly rely on testing to support its 

conclusion , a waste extraction test on the tailings using deionized water was 

performed, and arsenic levels in the sample showed levels in excess of the applicable 

maximum contaminant level and Site clean-up goals. Id. at 34, 21.

Even Sterling cannot challenge the superior long-term effectiveness of the liner, 

which was expected to last hundreds of years. See SOF at No. 36. Finally, with regard 

to cost-effectiveness, Sterling argues only that because the EPA did not determine the 

incrementally increased protection the HDPE liner offered, it could not determine 

whether the increased cost was proportional to that greater efficacy. Again, however, 

the EPA concluded that Alternative’s 2-3’s significantly better benefits were worth the 

additional cost. SOF at No. 41. A quantitative comparison of risk reduction under the 

circumstances was not necessary.

Given all these factors, the EPA’s decision to employ Alternative 2-3 in treating 

the waste tailings pile cannot be deemed arbitrary and capricious.

c. Excavation of Contaminated Soil

The EPA determined that the soils near the mine buildings were the most heavily 

contaminated on the entire Site, with arsenic and cyanide contaminant levels at 31,200 

and 419 ppm, respectively. Id. at 43. Sterling nonetheless faults the EPA for removing 

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those “hot spots” rather than simply fencing the affected areas and claims that the EPA 

did not explain in the record why excavating the polluted soils was more cost-effective. 

Given the superior protection provided by removing the soils as compared to fencing, 

whose protection against human exposure would depend on enforcement and whose 

deterrence to animal intrusion was at best, questionable, it appears plain to this Court 

that EPA’s remedial choice was not arbitrary or capricious.

2. Operable Unit Two (“OU2”)

OU2 addressed contaminated groundwater at the Site, and because a long-term 

solution was complex, and potentially years away, the EPA determined that residents of 

the area drinking from contaminated groundwater wells needed a safe and reliable 

source of drinking water. Consequently, as an interim and partial remediation measure, 

EPA connected area residents to Nevada Irrigation District water through construction of 

a pipeline costing some $3.795 million. Sterling argues that the EPA’s interim decision 

to construct the pipeline was arbitrary and capricious because it did not require residents 

to abandon their private wells and that therefore the underlying risk of contaminated 

groundwater was not addressed. That consideration, particularly when balanced against 

the significant cost of the pipeline and the fact that it affected only five residential wells 

used for drinking water (two additional wells were used only for irrigation, see DUF at 

No. 21), underlies Sterling’s belief that the remedy chosen did not pass muster under the 

NCP. Sterling also contends that because pipelining an additional water source does 

not technically involve treatment, that factor has to be balanced against water treatment 

measures at the wellheads themselves.

Sterling urges the Court to therefore find that wellhead treatment should have 

been employed for the residences at issue at a significantly lower cost of some $943,000

over a 50-year treatment for both installation and maintenance. DUF at No. 27. The 

EPA determined that construction of the pipeline was nonetheless the safer choice since 

it met threshold criteria like implementability, short-term effectiveness and treatment 

without qualification and provided a solution that required, unlike well treatment, no 

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additional maintenance from the EPT, the State of California, or the property owner. Id.

at 68-69.5 

Again, while Sterling may disagree with the EPA’s selected remedy, that does not 

mean that the government’s choice to pipe in safe drinking water from a public supply 

was arbitrary and capricious.6 Wellhead treatment would require continuous monitoring 

and maintenance and coordination with individual residents, who could change over 

time, for access to ensure that treatment units were operating properly and were 

consequently safeguarding drinking supply. SOF at Nos. 56, 60, 65. This was not a 

hypothetical concern since wellhead treatment units at the site had failed before. Id. at

59. On the other hand, the pipeline could deliver safe drinking water to affected 

residents in perpetuity without the necessity of any ongoing monitoring. Selecting a 

more protective remedy in that regard cannot be arbitrary and capricious.

The cost of building the treatment as opposed to maintaining wellhead treatments 

is nonetheless a balancing factor that has to be considered. Although the cost 

difference between those options is clearly significant, it is equally clear that the pipeline 

provides a fail-free method for delivering safe water without the need for ongoing, and 

potentially problematic, monitoring needed to maintain wellhead systems. Given those 

considerations, the Court again cannot say that EPA’s decision to employ the more 

expensive pipeline was arbitrary and capricious.

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 5 Wellhead systems, once professionally installed, require two filter and membrane changes and 

a water quality analysis each year. See ECF No. 289-4 at EPA011112.

6 The fact that individual residents could not be required to disconnect their individual wells does 

not alter this conclusion. As the EPA has noted, individual residents could be continuing to use wellhead 

water for reasons other than drinking purposes.

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CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to 

Amount of Recoverable CERCLA Response Costs is GRANTED. Defendant Sterling’s 

corresponding Motion for Summary Judgment as to the recoverability of certain 

response costs in the Lava Cap Mine Site’s Operable Units One and Two is DENIED.7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2016

 7 The Court notes that Plaintiff DTSC has filed a reply memorandum (ECF No. 291) that purports 

to take issue with Defendant Sterling’s alleged claim that certain costs incurred by DTSC are divisible and 

are accordingly not property attributable to Sterling. Since neither Motion presently before the Court 

purports to ask it to make any such determination, that issue is not before the Court at this time.

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