Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02193/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02193-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIONICIO SOLORIO,

CDCR #AN-6346, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

M. L. MONTGOMERY, Warden and

JOHN DOES 1 & 2 Correctional Officers,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv2193-JAH (MDD)

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

On November 18, 2019, Plaintiff Dionico Solorio, a California state prisoner 

incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”) in Calipatria, California, filed this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging two John Doe Correctional Officers 

used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment by shooting him during a fight

and that Warden Montgomery failed to adequately train them. (ECF No. 1.) He has not 

prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but has filed a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 

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I. IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400.1

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 

1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified copy 

of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account 

for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six 

months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects 

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in 

which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire 

filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629. Prisoners who are 

granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in monthly installments 

regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. ___, 

___, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281

F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted copies of his California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Inmate Statement Report and 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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Prison Certificate attested by a CDCR trust account official. (ECF No. 2 at 4-8). These 

documents show that he had an average monthly balance of $141.00 and average monthly 

deposits of $25.00 for the 6-months preceding the filing of this action, but an available 

balance of zero at the time of filing. (Id.)

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, declines to exact any initial 

filing fee because his prison certificates indicate he may have “no means to pay it,” Bruce, 

136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of 

the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, 

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 

are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom 

v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must 

show that the alleged depribation was committed by a person acting under color of state 

law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Plaintiff’s Complaint presents a single cause of action for violation of his Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment arising from the use of 

excessive force. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) He alleges that on the morning of November 16, 2016, 

while housed at Calipatria, he was waiting in line for breakfast when a fist fight started 

behind him. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff states that he tried to move away but became pinned to the 

wall by the two fighting inmates, one of whom was his cellmate, and “found himself being

hit from every direction, at which point he tried to defend himself but couldn’t.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff “heard a shot from a 40 mm gun and felt the impact of a round on the top of his 

head. He couldn’t see because there was blood running from the top of his head into his 

eyes. Then he heard another shot from the 40 mm gun and felt the impact of that round on 

the right side of his face and right eye.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff states he was stunned by the impact of the rounds, could not see because 

blood was in his eyes, his ears were ringing, and nearly lost consciousness as the fighting 

stopped. (Id.) He was transported for medical treatment to the Central Health Triage 

Center at Centinela, and from there taken to the Brawley Medical Center where doctors 

used eleven sutures to close his head wound. (Id.) The Brawley Medical Center was unable 

to treat his eye injuries and he was taken by air ambulance to the Desert Regional Trauma 

Center where he received a cat-scan and was found to have a broken right orbital socket 

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with a concussion. (Id. at 4-5.) He claims his injuries “are the direct result of plaintiff 

being intentionally shot ‘twice’ in the head and face area by vindictive maliciously 

negligent Correctional Officers with a 40 mm Impact Round.” (Id. at 5.)

“[A] prison official violates the [Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the] 

Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must 

be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Second, Plaintiff must allege the prison official he seeks to hold liable had a “‘sufficiently 

culpable state of mind’ . . . [T]hat state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate 

health or safety.” Id. A prison official can be held liable only if he “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;” . . . he “must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

For claims arising from the use of excessive force, the issue is “whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). When alleging a 

breach of the duty to protect prisoners, a plaintiff must “show that the officials acted with 

deliberate indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad v. 

Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff alleges that the two John Doe Correctional Officers who fired the two 

rounds which hit him were “vindictive [and] maliciously negligent.” (ECF No. 5.) The 

facts as alleged in the Complaint, that Plaintiff was involved in a fist fight with two other 

inmates, albeit inadvertently and attempting to defend himself, which was broken up by 

two Correctional Officers who fired rounds which hit Plaintiff and injured him, do not 

satisfy the pleading requirement that the officers were not acting in a good-faith effort to 

stop the fight but were acting maliciously or sadistically to cause Plaintiff harm. The use 

of the terms “vindictive [and] maliciously negligent” to describe the officers’ behavior are 

conclusory allegations without factual support and as such do not plead an Eighth 

Amendment violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of 

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a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a 

§ 1983 claim). If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this claim, he must allege facts which, 

if proven, show that the two Correctional Officers were not acting in a good faith effort to 

break up the fight which he admits he was engaged in, albeit inadvertently and while 

attempting to defend himself, but acting maliciously and sadistically in order to cause him 

harm. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 

680 F.3d at 1121.

C. Doe Pleading & Individual Liability

Plaintiff has identified the two Calipatria Correctional Officers who he alleges shot 

him as John Doe Defendants. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize or 

prohibit the use of fictitious parties, but Rule 10 does require a plaintiff to include the 

names of all parties in his complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Courts especially disfavor 

Doe pleading in an IFP case because in the event the plaintiff’s complaint alleges a 

plausible claim for relief, it is effectively impossible for the United States Marshal or 

deputy marshal to fulfill his or her duty to serve an unnamed defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Plaintiff may seek discovery to obtain the names of the 

Does and later amend his pleading in order to substitute the true names of those defendants, 

unless it is clear that discovery will not uncover their identities, or that his complaint is 

subject to dismissal on other grounds. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 

(9th Cir. 1999), citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (“As a 

general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.”) 

The only other Defendant named in the Complaint is the Warden of Calipatria, who 

Plaintiff seeks to hold liable for a failure to train the two Correctional Officers who 

allegedly shot him. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The simple role as a supervisory official is 

insufficient to support a personal misconduct claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677 (“[E]ach government official [in a § 1983 suit], his or her own title notwithstanding, 

is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”) In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a 

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failure to train, Plaintiff must allege that Warden Montgomery “was deliberately indifferent 

to the need to train subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional 

harm or deprivation of rights.” Flores v County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th 

Cir. 2014), citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 58 (2011). Plaintiff must also allege 

a pattern of similar constitutional violations because isolated incidents are insufficient to 

allege that Warden Montgomery was put on “notice that a course of training is deficient in 

a particular respect” and that “the absence of such a course will cause violations of 

constitutional rights.” Id. The Complaint as presently drafted fails to allege facts which if 

proven would support a § 1983 claim against Warden Montgomery.

Accordingly, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendant Warden 

Montgomery for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for negligence under state law, the

Court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over any supplemental state law 

claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the 

usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors 

to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”) Because the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s federal law claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

any state law negligence claim to the extent he sought to bring such a claim.

D. Leave to Amend

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him leave to amend his pleading 

to attempt to sufficiently allege a § 1983 claim if he can. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 

1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without 

leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that 

the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”), quoting Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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III. Conclusion and Orders

For all the reasons discussed, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

(ECF No. 2.) 

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 

payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

MUST CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE NAME AND CASE NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph Diaz,

Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and GRANTS him 45 leave 

from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures the 

deficiencies of pleading noted. Any amended complaint must be complete by itself without 

reference to an original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in 

his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged 

in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”)

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and his 

failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. 

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of 

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the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 20, 2020

Hon. John A. Houston

United States District Judge

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