Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-04234/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-04234-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:552 Right to Privacy Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERSH & HERSH,

Plaintiff, No. C 06-4234 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IN PART AND DENYING

US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART

AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Defendant’s and the intervenor’s motion for summary judgment came on for hearing

before this court on January 23, 2008. Plaintiff Hersh & Hersh (“plaintiff”) appeared

through its counsel, Mark Barton and Jeanette Haggas. Defendant, the U.S. Department of

Health & Human Services (“HHS”) and intervenor Guidant Corporation (“Guidant”)

(collectively “defendants”), appeared through their respective counsel, Sara Winslow,

James Vines, Tom Woods, and Simeon Schopf. Having read the parties’ papers and

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES the motion in part, for

the reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows.

BACKGROUND

This action arises under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for the expedited processing and release of agency records

requested by plaintiff from the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), a division of HHS. See

Complaint for Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”), ¶ 1. 

A. Background Allegations

On September 19, 2005, plaintiff requested certain records from the OIG pursuant to

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FOIA. These records generally relate to information submitted by Endovascular

Technologies (“EVT”) – a subsidiary of Guidant – pursuant to a felony plea agreement and

Corporate Integrity Agreement (“CIA”) that EVT entered into with the OIG as the result of

earlier criminal misconduct. See Complaint, ¶ 7. Plaintiff requested these documents in

connection with a separate lawsuit brought by plaintiff against Guidant, in which plaintiff

seeks relief on behalf of numerous plaintiffs medically implanted with Guidant’s products. 

Id. Plaintiff specifically requested: 

• Implementation Reports

• Annual Reports

• Data Monitoring Committee Review Reports; and

• Independent Review Organization (“IRO”) Reports, including all

Medical Device Reporting Review Reports 

See Declaration of Robert Eckert ISO Mot. Summary Judgment (“Eckert Decl.”), Ex.

1. The OIG failed to respond to plaintiff’s September 19 request within the statutory 20

days prescribed by FOIA. See Complaint ¶ 8. Plaintiff therefore renewed its request in the

form of a November 1, 2005 letter. See id.; see also Eckert Decl. ¶ 9. On November 3,

2005, OIG acknowledged receipt of plaintiff’s FOIA request and indicated that it forwarded

the request to the HHS FOIA office. Complaint ¶ 10.

HHS responded to the request on March 31, 2006, releasing 859 pages of

responsive information. HHS withheld, however, certain documents and portions of

documents based on trade secret and commercial/financial information exemptions, and

noted that additional records would be forthcoming. Id. ¶ 12. Despite numerous phone

and email communications to the HHS FOIA office, plaintiff alleges that it did not thereafter

receive the additional documents. Nor was plaintiff given an anticipated date of completion. 

Instead, plaintiff alleges that it was informed to file a complaint to expedite receipt of the

documents. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff did so on July 10, 2006, alleging a single cause of action for

violation of FOIA and for wrongful withholding of agency records. See id. at ¶¶ 15-19. 

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After the filing of plaintiff’s complaint, on February 27, 2007, HHS issued a second,

and purportedly “final,” response to plaintiff’s September 19, 2005 FOIA request. See

Eckert Decl., Ex. 4. In its response, HHS enclosed 439 pages, again withholding and

redacting documents on the basis of the same FOIA exemptions employed by the agency

in its first production. 

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal of this final ruling on March 23, 2007, which is

pending concurrently with the instant litigation. 

B. Procedural History

On May 9, 2007, Guidant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that plaintiff

had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, since plaintiff did not file an administrative

appeal of HHS’s March 31, 2006 ruling before filing the instant suit. The court denied the

motion, finding that plaintiff’s administrative appeal of HHS’s final February 27, 2007 ruling

cured the defect. See May 11, 2007 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (“May 11, 2007

Order”) at 4-5. 

Then, on July 25, 2007, the parties brought three motions before the court: (1)

HHS’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on grounds that plaintiff failed to pay the customary fees

under FOIA; (2) HHS’s motion for relief from premature discovery on grounds that

discovery was inappropriate until such time as the court ruled on the parties’ summary

judgment motion; and (3) Guidant’s motion to remand the case to HHS to resolve the

appeal. On July 26, 2007, the court denied the first motion in part and granted it in part,

instructing plaintiff to pay all fees due immediately, but declining to dismiss the complaint

on that basis. The court also granted HHS’s second motion for relief from premature

discovery, instructing the parties to file any limited requests for discovery after the filing of

any motions for summary judgment, and further instructing the parties to file a stipulated

briefing schedule for dispositive motions after HHS had resolved the pending appeal. 

Finally, as a corollary to this ruling, the court granted Guidant’s motion to remand plaintiff’s

appeal to HHS for resolution. See generally July 26, 2007 Order Denying Motion to

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Dismiss in part and Granting it in part; Granting Relief from Premature Discovery; and

Remanding Case (“July 26, 2007 Order”).

Subsequently, the parties duly filed a stipulated briefing schedule, calling for the

filing of a joint summary judgment motion by Guidant and HHS, which was heard on

January 23, 2008. After the motion was heard, the court issued an order requiring further

briefing on January 28, 2008. The court’s order noted that defendants had failed to submit

any evidence with respect to the second prong of the FOIA exemption set forth at 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(4), which defendants claimed to rely upon. In view of the court’s desire to have a

complete record before it for evaluation, defendants were instructed to submit further

competent evidence on the foregoing point, if they wished to have the court evaluate the

applicability of the particular exemption ground at issue. 

Defendants thereafter submitted further evidence in compliance with the court’s

order on February 11, 2008. Plaintiff submitted a response thereto on February 18, 2008. 

Defendants’ motion is now properly before the court. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

FOIA requires, that unless an exemption applies, "each agency, upon any request

for records which (i) reasonably describes such records, and (ii) is made in accordance with

published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall

make the records promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 

An agency has a duty to construe a FOIA request liberally. Truitt v. Dep't of State,

897 F.2d 540, 544-45 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(citing Senate Report accompanying relevant

provision of FOIA). The agency is under a duty to conduct a "reasonable" search for

responsive records using methods that can be reasonably expected to produce the

information requested to the extent they exist. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C); see also SafeCard

Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Ogleby v. United States Dept. of

the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Zemansky v. United States EPA, 767 F.2d 569,

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571 (9th Cir. 1985). 

While there is no requirement that an agency search every record system, Truitt,

897 F.2d at 542, or that a search be perfect, Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 955-56

(D.C. Cir. 1986), the search must be conducted in good faith using methods that are likely

to produce the information requested if it exists. See Campbell v. United States

Department of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir.1998). An agency is not, however,

"required to reorganize its files in response to a plaintiff's request in the form in which it was

made." Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 150-151 (D.C. Cir. 1986). It is

sufficient that the searching person identified the employees who might have responsive

documents, reviewed certain documents, and requested that agency employees forward

responsive documents to her. See O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure, § 9:12, at 217

(2007 Suppl.).

As a general rule, all FOIA determinations should be resolved on summary

judgment. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 861 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1988);

O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure, § 8:21, at 173 (2007 Suppl.) (numerous citations);

Sakamoto v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 443 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1188 (N.D. Cal.

2006). Before it can obtain summary judgment in a FOIA case, however, an agency must

show beyond a material doubt, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

requester, that it “has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant

documents.” Steinberg v. United States Department of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (quoting Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 

The court may award summary judgment solely on the basis of information provided

by the agency in affidavits or declarations when the affidavits or declarations describe “the

documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail,

demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and

are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency

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bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Agency affidavits or

declarations must be “relatively detailed and non-conclusory.” SafeCard Services, Inc. v.

SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Such affidavits or declarations are accorded

“a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about

the existence and discoverability of other documents.” Id. While the affidavits or

declarations submitted by the agency need not “set forth with meticulous documentation

the details of an epic search for the requested records,” Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127

(D.C. Cir. 1982), they must “describe what records were searched, by whom, and through

what processes,” Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 552, and must show “that the search was

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg v. United States

Department of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1350-51 (D.C.Cir. 1983); see Campbell Justice, 164

F.3d at 27. Conclusory statements that the agency has reviewed relevant files are

insufficient to support summary judgment. Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The key issues for resolution are: (1) whether the evidence relating to the adequacy

of defendants’ search for responsive documents is sufficient to meet defendants’ burden on

summary judgment; and (2) whether that evidence supports defendants’ withholding of

documents (and portions of documents) pursuant to exemptions b(4) and b(6) of FOIA. 

Defendants have also requested that the court order the return of numerous documents

that they assert were inadvertently produced to plaintiff. 

1. Sufficiency of Supporting Affidavits and Vaughn Index

 Defendants’ evidentiary support includes: (1) a declaration from HHS FOIA officer

Robert Eckert; (2) the accompanying 59-page Vaughn Index identifying the specific

documents and information withheld and the reasons therefor; (3) a declaration from

Guidant’s Global Compliance Director, Dr. Michele Chin-Purcell; and (4) a declaration from

the Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs for the OIG, Gregory Demske. See

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generally Declaration of Robert Eckert ISO Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Eckert Decl.”);

Declaration of Michele Chin-Purcell ISO Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Chin-Purcell Decl.”);

Declaration of Gregory Demske ISO Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Demske Decl.”). 

Plaintiff argues that defendants’ evidentiary basis for summary judgment is deficient,

however, because the supporting affidavits (and accompanying Vaughn index) are

inadequate, and because they have been made in bad faith.

First, plaintiff asserts that Mr. Eckert’s supporting declaration lacks personal

knowledge of the decision as to which documents to withhold, and is furthermore replete

with inadmissable hearsay statements. Mr. Eckert’s declaration does not state, for

example, that he personally conducted the search for documents, and it also does not

actually set forth the reasons for defendants’ nondisclosure of the withheld documents. 

Second, plaintiff argues that both Mr. Eckert’s declaration and the supporting declaration of

Dr. Chin-Purcell both contain wholly conclusory statements that fail to explain defendants’

nondisclosure of documents, such that bad faith has been demonstrated. 

Both arguments are unpersuasive. With respect to Mr. Eckert’s declaration, while

true that Mr. Eckert does not aver that he personally conducted the search for documents,

there is no legal requirement that he do so. Rather, as defendants note, courts have

overruled objections based on lack of personal knowledge as long as the supervisor in

charge of coordinating the agency’s search efforts, or responsible for same, has submitted

an affidavit describing the search. See, e.g., Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807,

814 (2d Cir. 1994)(“An affidavit from an agency employee responsible for supervising a

FOIA search is all that is needed to satisfy Rule 56(e); there is no need for the agency to

supply affidavits from each individual who participated in the actual search”); see also

Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This is the case here. 

As such, plaintiff’s objections to the Eckert Declaration are overruled. Moreover, while also

true that the body of Mr. Eckert’s declaration does not set forth in writing the agency’s

rationale for withholding documents, or portions thereof, under the applicable exemptions, it

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does incorporate the Vaughn index, which itself contains detailed entries for each

withholding. See Eckert Decl., Ex. 8; see also, e.g., Minier v. Central Intelligence Agency,

88 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 1996)(a Vaughn index must identify each document withheld,

and provide a particularized explanation of how disclosure would violate an exemption). 

Furthermore, Mr. Eckert’s declaration affirmatively states that a more detailed explanation

as to the nature of the withheld documents is contained in the Chin-Purcell Declaration

submitted on behalf of Guidant. See Eckert Decl., ¶ 1. And contrary to plaintiff’s argument,

appellate courts have held that an evidentiary basis for summary judgment in FOIA cases

can appropriately be made, as here, by third-party defendants who supplied the confidential

documents to the agency in the first place. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Food & Drug Admin.,

803 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(once the document owner establishes a prima facie case of

confidential status, the burden of proof shifts to the requester to overcome that showing). 

In sum, plaintiff’s objections to Mr. Eckert’s declaration are without merit. 

Second, and with respect to plaintiff’s bad faith allegations regarding the Eckert and

Chin-Purcell declarations, the court finds that the existence of bad faith has not been

demonstrated. As a general matter, the mere allegation of bad faith should not “undermine

the sufficiency of agency submissions.” Carter v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 830

F.2d 388, 393 (D.C.Cir.1987). Accordingly, before rejecting an affidavit on grounds of bad

faith, “[t]here must be tangible evidence of bad faith.” Id. Such tangible evidence might

include where the evidence of the declarations are contradicted by other evidence in the

record, or where there is an unreasonable delay in responding to the request (but even

when there is delay, no disclosure shall be ordered if exemptions apply). See id.; see also

Minier v. Central Intelligence Agency, 88 F.3d at 803. Here, however, plaintiff has not

pointed to any evidence that the statements in either declaration are flatly contradicted

anyplace else (notwithstanding plaintiff’s vague allusions regarding the practices and

procedure of Guidant’s competitors, like Pfizer), nor is there any evidence of unreasonable

delay. The first responsive production here occurred in March 2006, just 6 months after the

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FOIA request was first made, and after correspondence regarding status had been

exchanged between the parties. Accordingly, the court finds no “tangible evidence” of bad

faith.

In sum, plaintiff’s objections to defendants’ evidentiary basis are overruled. The

court finds, after review of the evidence, that defendants have properly submitted

declarations that describe “the documents and the justifications for non-disclosure with

reasonably specific detail.. and [which] are not controverted by either contrary evidence in

the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d

724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir.

1973). 

Having so concluded, the next issue for the court is whether defendants have

successfully demonstrated – via reference to the Vaughn index and supporting affidavits –

that the claimed exemptions apply here, and justify nondisclosure of the documents (and

portions thereof) in question.

2. Applicability of FOIA Exemptions

a. trade secrets/confidential commercial information

Defendants assert that they have properly withheld and redacted numerous

categories of records containing confidential commercial or financial information, pursuant

to FOIA exemption b(4). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)(exemption covers “trade secrets and

commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or

confidential”). Generally speaking, the exemption prevents the disclosure of (1)

commercial and financial information, (2) obtained from a person or by the government, (3)

that is privileged or confidential. See, e.g., GC Micro Corp. v. Defense Logistics Agency,

33 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1994). Commercial or financial matter is in turn “confidential”

for purposes of FOIA if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the following

effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future;

or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the

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information was obtained. See id.; see also National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v.

Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.Cir.1974). 

The key dispute here is whether the documents being withheld and the information

being redacted are sufficiently “confidential.” Defendants contend that both prongs of the

above National Parks test are satisfied (i.e., both the impairment prong and the competitive

harm prong), while plaintiff asserts that neither is. Upon review of the supplemental

declaration submitted by Mr. Demske, the court has concluded that defendants are correct

as to the first National Parks prong: disclosure of the information sought here is likely to

impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future. 

The information sought is contained in documents that were produced by Guidant in

compliance with the CIA entered into between HHS and Guidant’s subsidiary corporation. 

The OIG, acting on behalf of HHS, generally enters into CIAs with entities as part of the

resolution of civil and administrative health care fraud cases. See Demske Decl., ¶ 2. In

exchange for an entity’s agreement to be bound by a CIA, the OIG agrees not to seek

exclusion of that entity from participation in federal health care programs. See id. As

explained by defendants at the hearing on the instant motion, the entity’s decision to enter

into a CIA is voluntary. Once an entity enters into a CIA, the CIA typically requires the

subject entity to adopt measures designed to promote compliance, and to submit annual

reports and documents addressing the requirements of the CIA, including the results of

audits and reviews. Id. at ¶ 2. These types of documents often include confidential or

proprietary information. Indeed, a frequent concern raised by the subject entities during

negotiation of the CIA is what type of protection the government will extend to the subject

entity’s confidential and proprietary information. Id. at ¶ 3. 

This concern was raised here. Guidant’s Director of Global Compliance, Ms. ChinPurcell, personally transmitted the implementation reports and annual reports required

under the CIA. In doing so, she expressly notified OIG that the documents submitted were

confidential and subject to exemption under FOIA. See Chin-Purcell Decl., ¶ 16. Ms. ChinCase 4:06-cv-04234-PJH Document 125 Filed 03/31/08 Page 10 of 15
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1 Plaintiff also argues, in connection with both exemptions, that defendants waived

all “privileges” with respect to any of the documents that Guidant turned over to HHS, by virtue

of the plea agreement that was entered between Guidant’s subsidiary and the federal

government. This argument is wholly unpersuasive. First, as defendants point out, the plea

agreement waiver provision relied on by plaintiff applied only to claims against the government,

and was meant to ensure that the government had access to all relevant Guidant documents.

See, e.g., Declaration of Jeanette Haggas ISO Opp. to Summary Judgment (“Haggas Decl.”),

Ex. A at ¶ 10c. Second, the waiver provision did not apply to claims involving third parties.

Indeed, the government expressly contracted “to maintain the confidentiality” of all materials

produced by Guidant under the agreement as against third parties. See id. 

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Purcell’s declaration furthermore contains a category by category description of the

documents at issue, and an explanation as to how and why each is confidential. 

Aside from the subject entity’s (i.e., Guidant’s) concern over the release of

confidential documents, however, defendants have also submitted evidence addressing the

government’s concern over the same. Mr. Demske’s declaration avers that, if the OIG

were to release confidential proprietary information submitted under a CIA, subject entities

under CIAs would “be reluctant to submit complete information with their annual reports,

thereby impairing the OIG’s ability to monitor the CIAs.” See Demske Decl., ¶ 4. 

Moreover, this would “severely impair” the OIG’s ability to “negotiate meaningful CIAs in the

future.” Id. 

In sum, the above facts are sufficient to demonstrate that, as part of the negotiations

attendant to the execution of the CIA between Guidant and the OIG, and as understood by

Guidant, the government obligated itself in good faith not to disclose the documents or

information received pursuant to the CIA. As such, disclosure of Guidant’s documents here

would impair the government’s ability to secure voluntary execution of CIAs in future.

Plaintiff, moreover, presents no adequate grounds for holding otherwise. Plaintiff

argues that some of the documents withheld by HHS were made publicly available in the

court’s electronic docketing system, and that other information is regularly produced to the

public – e.g., by way of required public filings. See Opp. Br. at 17-18.1

 However, as

discussed further below, those documents made publicly available on the docketing system

were inadvertently produced by defendants, must be returned to them, and cannot form the

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2 In view of this holding concerning the impairment prong, it is unnecessary for the

court to consider whether disclosure of the information sought is warranted under the second

prong of the National Parks test – i.e., substantial competitive harm. The court does observe,

that defendants’ showing as to this second prong is not as persuasive as the first. This is

ultimately a non-issue, however, in view of defendants’ submission of the Demske Declaration,

and the court’s acceptance of it as competent proof that the impairment prong is satisfied. 

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basis for a waiver argument here. As for other information that plaintiff asserts is regularly

produced to the public – e.g., Guidant’s annual reports – defendants explained at the

hearing on the instant motion, that the annual reports sought here are of a different nature

than those annual reports that are regularly filed as part of Securities and Exchange

Committee (“SEC”) compliance filings. 

In sum, the court finds that defendants have satisfied the first prong of the National

Parks test. And since there is no other dispute as to whether the information qualifies as

commercial or financial, or as to whether it was obtained from a person or by the

government, the court concludes that defendants have also met their burden in

demonstrating that the b(4) exemption applies. Defendants’ withholding and redaction of

documents is therefore warranted.2

 

b. personnel information

Defendants also assert that several of the withheld documents are covered by FOIA

exemption b(6), which covers “personnel” files, and which prohibits disclosure where it

would constitute “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” See 5 U.S.C. §

552(b)(6). Exemption b(6) requires that courts balance the public interests in disclosure

against the privacy interests that would be harmed by disclosure. See United States Dep't

of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989); see

also Painting Industry of Hawaii Market Recovery Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Air, 26 F.3d 1479,

1482 (9th Cir.1994). The Ninth Circuit has balanced four factors to determine whether the

disclosure constitutes a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy:” (1) the

plaintiff's interest in disclosure, (2) the public's interest in disclosure, (3) the degree of the

invasion of personal privacy, and (4) the availability of any alternative means of obtaining

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the requested information. See Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger For and on Behalf of

Carpet, 728 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here, the withheld documents comprise about 18 pages’ worth of documents, which

include Guidant employees’ personal identification and/or contact information. See Reply

Br. At 11:14-15. An example of the type of information redacted can be found on page 1 of

the Vaughn Index, entry no. 1. See Eckert Decl., Ex. 8 at 1. The entry itemizes a

transmittal letter dated August 27, 2004. It then states that the withheld portion of the

document contains the “name and signature” of a Guidant employee, which are not publicly

available. See id. This entry, as well as the remaining entries that invoke the b(6)

exemption, are purportedly supported by the Chin-Purcell declaration, which states that

documents withheld under the b(6) exemption “plainly implicate protected privacy

interests.” See Chin-Purcell Decl., ¶ 41. 

Looking at the four factors set forth above, the court agrees with plaintiff that the

public’s interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interests involved. First, plaintiff has an

interest in the withheld information because it may help ensure that Guidant is complying

with the terms of the CIA. The public has the same interest in ensuring compliance. By

contrast, the degree of invasion of personal privacy with respect to the personal information

contained in the limited documents and redactions is not strong here. While defendants

are correct that the case law has long recognized a privacy interest in private citizens’

identities, home addresses, home telephone numbers, social security numbers, medical

information, etc., defendants do not actually dispute that the only information they are

claiming exemption for here are the business addresses, phone numbers, and job titles of

Guidant employees. This type of information does not implicate the same type of

heightened concerns. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine “the injury and embarrassment that

can result from the unnecessary disclosure” of the personal business-related information at

issue here. See, e.g., Bowen v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 925 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir.

1990). Moreover, plaintiff has pointed out, and defendants have not disputed, that some of

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the information at issue is publicly available already. See Haggas Decl., Exs. J-L, O-Q. As

such, the court is unpersuaded by defendants’ argument that disclosure of the 18 pages

would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” 

In sum, defendants have failed to meet their burden in establishing that exemption

b(6) applies to the 18 pages of Guidant employees’ business signatures, business contact

and job title information. Accordingly, all such information must be produced. To the

extent, however, that the information withheld or redacted includes the signature of an

employee whose identity as a Guidant employee or member is not disclosed in any public

forum, or the private home addresses, home telephone numbers, social security numbers,

etc., the exemption applies to shield such information from disclosure. 

3. Inadvertent Production of Documents

Finally, defendants also request that the court instruct plaintiff to hand over the initial

productions of March 2006 and February 2007, since defendants’ August 2007 production

superceded these productions, which contained inadvertently produced documents. 

As the court stated at the hearing, plaintiff must return the earlier productions in

whole. Defendants’ claim that they did not become aware of the inadvertently produced

documents until July 2007 (when plaintiff attached the inadvertently produced documents to

a motion to compel) is supported by the record. It is undisputed that in July 2007,

defendants informed plaintiff that they had become aware of the inadvertent productions,

and requested that the documents be returned. See Declaration of Darolyn Y. Hamada

ISO Mot. Summary Judgment (“Hamada Decl.”), Ex 1. Since that time, defendants have

requested, on several occasions, that plaintiff return the documents to defendants. See

Hamada Decl., Exs. 1-3; Eckert Decl., Ex. 5, 7; Winslow Decl., Ex. 1. It was only upon the

failure to secure the cooperation of plaintiff in this regard, that defendants re-processed

plaintiff’s FOIA request in its entirety, and issued a revised production in August 2007. 

In light of defendants’ consistent efforts at securing return of the documents, the fact

that plaintiff was long ago placed on notice of this inadvertent production, and defendants’

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August 2007 production replacing all earlier productions, the court therefore orders plaintiff

to return all previously produced documents to defendants. Any inadvertently produced

documents that have been filed in the public docket pertaining to this action, shall be

withdrawn from the docket. According to the January 25, 2008 letter received from HHS,

the affected docket nos. include docket nos. 67, 82, and 86. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby GRANTS summary judgment in

defendants’ favor with respect to the applicability of FOIA exemption b(4). Summary

judgment with respect to the applicability of FOIA exemption b(6) is DENIED. Any

documents and information withheld or redacted pursuant to this exemption must be

produced to plaintiff (except as otherwise noted above). 

The court also ORDERS plaintiff to return in whole defendants’ initial production

dated March 2006 and February 2007, and to withdraw any inadvertently produced

documents from the public record, no later than April 9, 2008. 

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff’s request for sanctions can be construed as a valid

motion for sanctions, the motion is DENIED, in view of the court’s grant of summary

judgment in defendants’ favor as to FOIA exemption b(4). 

It appears to the court that there are no other issues pending in this case. The

parties are requested to notify the court No later than April 9, 2008 whether a judgment

may be entered.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2008 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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