Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00100/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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FILED' 

MAR';" 9 201£ 

~~N;=.~~~WL~.~~==~~ BY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IMHOTEP JORDAN, Jr., 

aka JOHN JORDAN, 

CDCR #C-71742, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

J. CORONADO, 

Defendant. 

Civil No. 12cvOlOO WQH (RBB) 

ORDER: 

(1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO PAY FILING 

FEES AND FOR FAILING TO 

MOVE IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AND 

(2) AS FRIVOLOUS AND 

MALICIOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(I) 

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison ("CAL"), in Calipatria, 

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a set ofdocuments entitled "Notice ofFiling Intent" 

(ECF No.1). In his pleadings, comprised of a "Notice," a "Request for Entry of Default 

Judgment," a ''Notice and Demand," and two "Affidavits ofTruth," Plaintiff appears to seek a 

default judgment and monetary "settlemenf' against a correctional sergeant at CAL based on 

vague and unspecified acts ofmisconduct. (ECF No.1 at 10,37-40.) 

Plaintiff specifically alleges only that a default judgment must be entered against 

Coronado for "malicious[ly] and sadistic[aUy]" and with "deliberate indifference and callous 

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disregard," violating his "commercial, civil, constitutional and human rights" as a "living 

breathing flesh and blood God created sovereign sentient being." (ECF No. I at 9, 38-39.) 

Plaintiff makes clear that he "does not intend ... his filings be constructed and/or construed to 

be a complaint, specifically not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983," because he is, instead, fuing only a "request 

for entry of default judgment." (Id. at 2.)1 

I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 

Any party instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe United 

States, other than a writ of habeas cOIpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party's failure to pay only if the party is granted 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th 

Cir. 1999). However, Plaintiffhas not prepaid the $350 filing fee required to commence any sort 

of federal civil action; nor has he submitted a Motion to Proceed IFP. Therefore, his case must 

be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is 

obligated to review civil actions filed by anyone "incarcerated or detained in any facility who 

is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions ofparole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as 

I Plaintiffs ''Notice'' is identical to five others, all filed with the Clerk on the same day, 

purporting to seek default judgments against five other individual CAL correctional officials, all 

asserting the same frivolous claims and attempting to employ the same illicit procedure. See also Jordan 

v. Madden, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv0098 DMS (POR); Jordan v. Bui/teman, S.D. Cal. Civil Case 

No. 12cv0099 BEN (NLS); Jordan v. Carpio, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv0101 lEG (JMA); Jordan 

v. Powell, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv0102 DMS (BLM), and Jordan v. Price, S.D. Cal. Civil Case 

No. 12cv0103 WQH (JMA). A court "'may take notice ofproceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judicial system, ifthose proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue. '" Bias 

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 

803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002». Plaintiffhas not paid the $350 civil filing fee in any ofthese, or any prior civil 

case he has filed in the Southern District, and had thus far managed to avoid 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)'s "3­

strikes" bar by submitting "Requests for Entry ofDefault Judgment" unaccompanied by complaints or 

motions to proceed informa pauperis. See e.g., Jordan v. Cardenas, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cvl152 

DMS (NLS); Jordan v. Andersen, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cvl153 lEG (JMA); Jordan v. Borem, 

S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. l1cvl154 BEN (NLS); Jordan v. Drake, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cv1155 

AJB (MDD); and Jordan v. Coronado, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cv1156 BTM (MDD). 

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practicable after docketing" and regardless ofwhether the prisoner prepays filing fees or moves 

to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The Court must sua sponte dismiss prisoner 

complaints, or any portions thereof, which "seek[] redress from a governmental entity or officer 

or employee of a governmental entity," if they are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). 

As noted above, Plaintiffs pleading seeks to only to notifY the Court ofhis intent to file 

a request for entry of default judgment against a CAL correctional sergeant, who allegedly 

breached ofhis "oath ofoffice" in violation ofPlaintiffs "commercial, civil, constitutional and 

human rights" sometime in March 2009. (ECF No.1 at 39.) Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro 

se, the Court would generally consider his claims liberally to arise under the Civil Rights Act, 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Hainesv. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1 972)(noting that allegations asserted 

by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded," are held "to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). However, Plaintiffunequivocally states that he "does not 

intend ... his filings be constructed and/or construed to be a complaint, specifically not a 42 

U.S.C. § 1983." (ECF No.1 at 2.) 

Without § 1983 or some other constitutional or federal statutory basis for his suit, this 

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction altogether. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) 

("Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction 

to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also 

determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.") (citation omitted); 

see also SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the naming of a person 

in a motion insufficient to commence a civil action against him as a party). 

Moreover, "[the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] govern the procedure in all civil 

actions and proceedings in the United States district courts." FED.R.Clv.P. 1 (emphasis added); 

see also SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2003). "There is one form of action~the 

civil action," FED.R.CIY.P. 2, which is "commenced by filing a complaint with the court." 

FED.R.Clv.P.3. "In short, an 'action' is the formal and ordinary means by which parties seek 

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legal and/or equitable relief before a court of law through the filing of a formal complaint, 

triggering the full array of legal, procedural, and evidentiary rules governing the process by 

which a court adjudicates the merits ofa dispute. Absent express statutory authorization stating 

otherwise, there is no question that the Federal Rules govern all 'actions' [brought] before the 

district courts of the United States." New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404, 

407-08 (1960); McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 657. 

Thus, even if this Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1331 

based on a liberal construction ofPlaintiff's references to his "constitutional" rights (ECF No. 

1 at 39-40, 47), to the extent he apparently seeks to avoid the procedures required to commence 

a civil action as set forth by both the Civil Rights Act and the Federal Rules and simply forge 

ahead to victory by being granted an unnoticed and unopposed default judgment in his favor, his 

"Notice" is null and his litigation strategy futile. See Powell v. Rios, 241 F.App'x 500,504 n.4 

(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that only a 

properly -filed' complaint' can commence a civil acti on," and rejecting Plaintiff's attempts to file 

a motion for a temporary restraining order without first commencing a civil action pursuant to 

FED.R.CIY.P. 3 by filing a complaint); see also Boosalis Options, LP v. Farnbacher Loles 

Motorsports, LLC, 2010 WL 335651 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (unpub.) (rejecting plaintiff's 

attempt to circumvent Federal Rules by submitting an "Application for Entry of Judgment 

Pursuant to a Confession" to the court without first commencing a civil action by filing a 

complaint, paying the requisite filing fee, and serving a summons upon the defendants, as an 

illicit attempt "to skip over all the usual safeguards of a lawsuit," and "go straight to an 

unopposed victory .... The Federal Rules do not authorize such a procedure."); Patray v. 

Northwest Pub., Inc., 931 F. Supp 865, 869 (D. Ga. 1996) (court must have both personal and 

subject-matter jurisdiction over defendant in order to entertain any request for default judgment); 

lOA Wright, Miller & Kane, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIY., § 2682 (3d ed.) (2011). 

An action is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) "where it lacks an arguable basis 

eitherin law orin fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Lopez v. Dept. o/Health 

Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, there is no question that Plaintiff's 

-4- 12cv0100 WQH (RBB) 

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suit-regardless ofwhat he wishes to call it-lacks any arguable basis in either law or fact, and is 

therefore frivolous under § 1915A(b)(1). Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. 

In fact, Plaintiffs submissions, when considered in light of his repeated pattern of 

frivolous filings in this district,2 may further be classified as "malicious" insofar as they appear 

to lack good faith and "suggest[ s] an intent to vex the defendants or abuse the judicial process." 

See Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a complaint maybe inferred to 

be "malicious" ifit suggests an intent to abuse the judicial process); accord Aston v. Probst, 217 

F.3d 844,844 (9th Cir. 2000) (table disposition); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F. Supp. 627, 629 

(N.D. Ind. 1983). The test for maliciousness is subjective and requires the court to "determine 

the ... good faith ofthe applicant." Kinneyv. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915). 

In determining a litigant's "good faith," a court may consider not only the "printed words" ofthe 

complaint, but the circumstances and history ofthe filing, the tone of the allegations, and the 

presence or absence ofprobative facts. See Gjurovich v. California, 2010 WL 4321604 at *5 

(E.D. Cal. 2010) (unpub.) (quoting Spencer v. Rhodes, 656F. Supp. 458,463 (E.D. N.C.), aff'd, 

826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987)). Nothing in Plaintiffs "Notice" in this case, or in his litigation 

history in this district, suggests good faith of any sort. 

For these additional reasons, the Court dismisses the entirety ofPlaintiffs action as both 

frivolous and malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(I); Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

III. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby: 

(1) DISMISSES this action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to pay the $350 

filing fee or file a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 19l4(a) and 1915(a). 

2 See, e.g., Jordan v. Lloyd, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. llcvl724 JLS (BLM); Jordan v. 

Moskowitz, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cvl725 JLS (WMc); Jordan v. Sabraw, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

l1cv1726 JAB (JMA); Jordan v. Gonzalez, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cvl727 JLS (CAB); Jordan v. 

Battaglia, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. l1cv1728 LAB (BLM); Jordan v. Benitez, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

11cvl729 MMA (POR) and Jordan v. Anello, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11-1730 DMS (POR). In this 

series offilings, Piaintiifpurported to sue a Clerk's Office employee and individual judges ofthis Court 

for alleged violations offederal and state criminal statutes, rules ofcivil procedure, government codes, 

and "maxims" of commercial law, justice, truth, and sovereignty, simply for dismissing his previous 

cases. All ofthese cases, which were also initially presented to the Clerk captioned as "Notices" without 

accompanying complaints or motions to proceed IFP, have also been dismissed as frivolous and 

malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

(2) The entirety of this action is DISMISSED as frivolous and malicious pursuant to 

28 U .S.C. § 191 5A(b) ( 1). Moreover, because the Court fmds amendment futile, leave to amend 

is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a 

leave to amend is not an abuse ofdiscretion where further amendment would be futile); see also 

Robinson v. California Bd. o/Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Since 

plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should 

be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.") (citing Newland v. 

Dalton, 81 F.3d 904,907 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

(3) Finally, this Court CERTIFIES that no IFP appeal from this Order could be taken 

"in good faith" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 

438,445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is 

permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous). 

(4) The Clerk of Court shall close the file. 

DATED: ddL 

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