Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03241/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03241-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3241

FRANCISCO CARRION,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

KIM BUTLER,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:13‐cv‐00778‐CJP — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2016

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Francisco Carrion was convicted of

residential burglary and of first‐degree murder following a

bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The

state courts affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and on

state postconviction review. Mr. Carrion then filed a habeas

petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he

raised multiple claims for relief. The district court denied his

petition, concluding that although the petition probably was

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timely filed, most of the claims were procedurally defaulted

and the remaining claims were meritless; the court further de‐

clined to grant a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Mr. Car‐

rion then appealed to this court, and we granted a COA in‐

structing the parties to address three questions: whether there

was sufficient evidence to support his convictions, whether

Mr. Carrion’s confession was voluntary, and whether appel‐

late counsel had been ineffective in failing to challenge the

voluntariness of his confession.  

After briefing and oral argument, we conclude that,

whether we apply the deferential review of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), or de novo review, Mr. Carrion is not entitled to re‐

lief on any of these claims. There is no question that the State

of Illinois met its burden of proving each of the charges be‐

yond a reasonable doubt. We further perceive no due process

violation in the reception into evidence of Mr. Carrion’s state‐

ment, even though it was translated by an investigating of‐

ficer. Any ambiguities in the statement were examined thor‐

oughly at trial and the state trial court was entitled to admit

and rely upon the statement. Accordingly, for the reasons set

out more fully in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Mr. Carrion’s habeas petition.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In the early morning hours of July 14, 2001, Francisco Car‐

rion entered the first‐floor apartment of sixty‐nine‐year‐old

Maryanne Zymali in Palatine, Illinois. Zymali confronted

Mr. Carrion, and he stabbed her multiple times causing her

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No. 14‐3241 3

death. At the time of the incident, Mr. Carrion, who lived in

an apartment on the floor above Zymali’s, was a nineteen‐

year‐old immigrant from Mexico who spoke almost no Eng‐

lish. Approximately two weeks after the murder, Mr. Carrion

was interviewed in Spanish by Detective Arturo Delgadillo.

He denied any involvement with Zymali’s death, but he

agreed to provide fingerprint samples.

On January 7, 2002, Mr. Carrion was arrested by Detec‐

tive Delgadillo after his fingerprint was found on a knife re‐

covered from Zymali’s apartment. The police took him to the

police station, advised him of his Miranda rights in Spanish,

and then interviewed him twice. Detective Delgadillo con‐

ducted the first interview in Spanish; an assistant state’s attor‐

ney conducted the second interview on camera with Detec‐

tive Delgadillo acting as translator. On January 31, 2002, the

State charged Mr. Carrion with residential burglary under

720 ILCS 5/19‐3(a), and three counts of first‐degree murder

(intentional murder, knowing murder, and felony murder

predicated on residential burglary) under 720 ILCS 5/9‐1(a).

Mr. Carrion waived his right to a jury, and the case proceeded

to a bench trial in June 2004.  

At trial, the State’s forensic scientist testified that Mr. Car‐

rion’s fingerprint and palm print were found on a knife recov‐

ered from the apartment. The parties then stipulated to the

nature of Zymali’s injuries, which included stab wounds to

her chin and forearm, a stab wound to her chest that “resulted

in massive internal hemorrhaging,” and “multiple bruises

and abrasions” on her thigh, forehead, chin, chest, abdomen,

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and right arm.1 The parties further stipulated that the stab

wounds caused Zymali’s death.

The State then called Detective Delgadillo to testify. Ac‐

cording to the officer, Mr. Carrion stated during the first of

the two interviews that, in the early morning of July 14, 2001,

after a night of drinking at a nearby bar, he was walking home

and noticed a light in Zymali’s ground‐floor apartment.

Mr. Carrion said that he “became curious as to what was in‐

side,” and he entered through the open sliding glass door and

unlocked screen door.2 Detective Delgadillo further testified

that Mr. Carrion said that he entered the apartment because

he was “looking to steal something.”3 While Mr. Carrion “was

in the kitchen looking around,” he was confronted by Zymali,

who “started to attack him, scratching him, kicking him,

fight[ing] him and that pretty much a fight ensued, a struggle

ensued.”4 The officer further testified that Mr. Carrion told

him that Zymali then pulled a knife out of a kitchen drawer,

that Mr. Carrion took the knife from her, and that after addi‐

tional struggle, “he pushed her with both hands,” which re‐

sulted in his “stabb[ing] her in the stomach area with the

knife.”5 According to the officer, Mr. Carrion stated that he

then pulled the knife out of Zymali’s chest and threw it across

                                                 

1 R.17‐13 at 34–37.

2 Id. at 73.

3 Id. at 73–74.

4 Id. at 74–75.

5 Id. at 76–77.  

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No. 14‐3241 5

the room. When Zymali fell to her knees bleeding, Mr. Car‐

rion became scared and ran out of the apartment, “went

around the building,” “climbed onto his balcony and entered

his apartment.”6

Detective Delgadillo next testified about the second inter‐

rogation in which he acted as translator between Mr. Carrion

and the assistant state’s attorney. He said that on the night of

the arrest, Mr. Carrion was taken to meet with an assistant

state’s attorney and agreed to give a videotaped statement.

During this interview, which took place around midnight and

lasted half an hour, the prosecutor posed questions in English,

and Detective Delgadillo translated the questions to Spanish

and then translated Mr. Carrion’s responses from Spanish to

English. The court admitted into evidence both the video and

a transcription of the interview that had been prepared by

someone other than Detective Delgadillo.7 At the conclusion

of the officer’s testimony, the video interview was played in

open court, and the State rested its case.

The defense called three witnesses: Mr. Carrion’s friend

Brenda Viveros, a certified interpreter named Ruth Ramos,

and Mr. Carrion himself. Viveros testified that she was with

Mr. Carrion on the night in question and that Mr. Carrion was

drunk, that “[h]e was talking funny and just having trouble

walking,” and that “[h]e asked [her] to take him home be‐

cause he was not feeling good.”8 On cross‐examination,

                                                 

6 Id. at 78.

7 Neither the videotape nor the transcription are part of the record on ap‐

peal. In the district court and in their briefs, the parties have relied solely

on the testimony given at trial.  

8 R.17‐14 at 37.

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Viveros acknowledged that she did not ask the bartender to

stop serving Mr. Carrion, nor did she call a cab or arrange a

ride for him, but she stated that she did tell another friend of

theirs to make sure that Mr. Carrion stopped drinking.

Viveros testified that she did not see Mr. Carrion leave the

bar, but that she did go looking for him after the bar closed

and found him sleeping in his bed in his apartment. Viveros

did not see any injuries on Mr. Carrion at that time.  

Ramos testified that she reviewed the videotape of

Mr. Carrion’s interview with the assistant state’s attorney

several times and prepared her own transcription of the con‐

versation. She went on to testify as follows:

[Mr. Carrion’s counsel]:

Q Do you remember a question put to Francisco

Carrion by Detective Delgadillo:

“Q: And what happened when you got close to

your home”?

Do you remember that question being asked?

A   Yes.

...

Q   All right. Did you hear Francisco Carrion an‐

swer that question in Spanish?

A   Yes.

Q   Did you take that answer in Spanish and tran‐

scribe it into English?

A   Yes.

Q   What was his answer in English?

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A   His answer was, [reading from her prepared

transcription] “I ... well ... I look down and I

saw a ... the apartment and I saw the light on. It

seemed like an easy thing to do, I don’t know. I

became curious ... I didn’t even know what I

was going to do ... ”

Q   Did he finish that answer?

A   As far as I remember, when viewing the video,

I think his answer was cut off. ...

...

Q   But he did say, “I don’t know. I became curious.

I didn’t even know what I was going to do it.”

Is that correct?

A   Yes.

Q   Do you remember a question put by Delgadillo

to Carrion ... “When you first came in the apart‐

ment, what were you looking for”?

A   Yes, I remember the question.

Q   Did you hear Francisco Carrion answer that

question in Spanish?

A   Yes.

...

Q   What was that answer?

A   Answer, [reading from her prepared transcrip‐

tion] “I didn’t even know what I wanted, I just

got in to see what thing ... just to look around

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... I didn’t even know what I was going to take,

it’s like ... ” And then an interruption.[9]

After testifying about specific translated questions and an‐

swers, Ramos was asked whether, based on her experience

and training as an interpreter, she believed that “Officer Del‐

gadillo’s rendering of Francisco Carrion’s answers in Spanish

to English was truthful, complete, and accurate.”10 Ramos an‐

swered:

A Well, I believe there were some omissions.

When the questions ... were posed in Spanish,

and there were some omissions when the an‐

swers were posed in Spanish to be translated

into English. I also believe that there were ...

some errors, grammatical errors in sentence

structure in the Spanish language, the way the

questions were posed to Mr. Carrion.

Q   Could you consider or would you consider De‐

tective Delgadillo’s rendering of Carrion’s an‐

swers from Spanish to English to be verbatim?

A   Yes.[11]

Ramos further testified on cross‐examination:

Q [W]hen you were able to hear the officer ask,

“[Were] you looking for something to take?”

You heard the defendant’s answer, Carrion’s

                                                 

9 Id. at 48–56.

10 Id. at 57.

11 Id.

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answer, “Well ... possibly yes. If I had found

something that ... ,” is that correct?

A Yes.[12]

Mr. Carrion then took the stand. He testified that on the

night in question he was heavily intoxicated and that he left

the bar for his apartment, noticed the light on in Zymali’s

apartment, and entered. Mr. Carrion stated that he did not

know why he entered the apartment, but he denied intending

to steal anything. Mr. Carrion then described the events that

occurred after Zymali confronted him. He stated that he in‐

jured Zymali in self‐defense during the course of a struggle

and that Zymali pushed, kicked, and scratched him. He ex‐

plained that he “grabbed a knife” and that Zymali was injured

when he pushed her and “the knife ... went inside [her].”13

Mr. Carrion conceded that he suffered no injuries during the

struggle and that, although he knew that Zymali was seri‐

ously injured, he did nothing to assist her. Instead, he left Zy‐

mali’s apartment, climbed onto the balcony of his sec‐

ond‐floor apartment, entered through the balcony door, and

fell asleep. When asked about his videotaped statement,

Mr. Carrion testified that he confessed to entering the apart‐

ment with the intent to steal because Detective Delgadillo

promised to help him by securing his deportation to Mexico

if he did so. On cross‐examination, however, Mr. Carrion

acknowledged that during the videotaped interview he stated

that no one had promised him anything. In closing, the de‐

fense contended that there was insufficient evidence that

Mr. Carrion entered Zymali’s apartment with the intent to

                                                 

12 Id. at 74.

13 Id. at 83–84.

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commit theft and that, in stabbing Zymali, he was acting in

imperfect self‐defense and therefore should only be found

guilty of second‐degree murder.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court, ruling orally,

found Mr. Carrion guilty on all counts. On the residential bur‐

glary charge, the court found that Mr. Carrion entered Zy‐

mali’s apartment intending to commit a theft. In the court’s

view, “[t]he most compelling evidence of [Mr. Carrion’s] in‐

tention to commit a theft [was] his own statement” to that ef‐

fect during the videotaped interview.14 Addressing the accu‐

racy of Detective Delgadillo’s translation, the court found Ra‐

mos’s testimony “very credible” and emphasized her opinion

that the officer’s translation was “verbatim.”15 Based on

Mr. Carrion’s demeanor and answers, the court said it had

“no doubt ... from looking at that video that the defendant

gave it up.”16 It was immaterial, the court noted, that Mr. Car‐

rion’s answers indicated that he “didn’t know what he

wanted to take” and “wasn’t sure what he wanted to get from

the apartment” because these statements did “not lessen the

intent to commit a theft inside the apartment.”17 The court also

rejected Mr. Carrion’s claim that Detective Delgadillo prom‐

ised to have him deported. Finally, the court addressed the

circumstantial evidence it found relevant to Mr. Carrion’s in‐

tent in entering the apartment. It noted that “[i]t was easy for

[Mr. Carrion] to enter” the unlocked, first‐floor apartment

                                                 

14 Id. at 142.  

15 Id. at 149.

16 Id.  

17 Id. at 141.  

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No. 14‐3241 11

and that he had done so at a very early hour in the morning18

;

it found these circumstances consistent with an intent to com‐

mit theft. The court believed that the lack of any traditional

burglary evidence was insignificant; in its view, there was no

sign of forced entry because the screen door was unlocked,

and there was no stacking of property because Mr. Carrion

was confronted by Zymali.

Addressing the first‐degree murder charges, the court

concluded that Mr. Carrion “stabbed [Zymali] repeatedly

with an intent to kill, and he then fled.”19 The court empha‐

sized both the force required to cause a stab wound the size

of the one to Zymali’s abdomen and also the separate stab

wounds to Zymali’s face and arm. It rejected the defense’s

theory that Mr. Carrion killed Zymali in self‐defense because,

in its view, there was no evidence of a struggle “except the

defendant’s own statement that there was a struggle.”20 The

court also rejected Mr. Carrion’s intoxication theory as “in‐

credible.”21 It noted that after reaching for a knife and stab‐

bing Zymali several times, “he had the ... forethought to es‐

cape” and climb up onto the second‐floor balcony: “I find it

hard to believe he had the ability both physical and mental to

do something like that ... [y]et he doesn’t remember anything

at all about this crime until three months later.”22 The court

found Mr. Carrion guilty under each of the three theories of

                                                 

18 Id. at 142.  

19 Id. at 150.  

20 Id. at 146.  

21 Id. at 145–47.  

22 Id. at 146–47.  

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12 No. 14‐3241

first‐degree murder presented by the State—intentional mur‐

der, knowing murder, and felony murder—but it merged the

three counts into one for purposes of sentencing.  

After finding Mr. Carrion eligible for the death penalty,

the court imposed a fifty‐five‐year term of imprisonment for

first‐degree murder and a concurrent fifteen‐year‐term of im‐

prisonment for residential burglary.

B.

Mr. Carrion appealed his conviction. His appointed appel‐

late counsel then moved to withdraw under Anders v. Califor‐

nia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In counsel’s view, an appeal—includ‐

ing arguments that trial counsel was ineffective and that the

evidence was insufficient to support the convictions—would

be without arguable merit. Mr. Carrion filed a response. The

state appellate court in due course granted the Anders motion

and affirmed the convictions. Mr. Carrion then filed a petition

for leave to appeal (“PLA”) to the Illinois Supreme Court that

raised only a new claim that appellate counsel provided inef‐

fective assistance. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to

appeal, and Mr. Carrion did not file a petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Mr. Carrion then filed a petition for state postconviction

relief raising the following claims: (1) trial counsel was inef‐

fective; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support either

conviction; (3) the trial court considered improper factors at

sentencing; (4) officers took advantage of his lack of under‐

standing of his rights during interrogation; and (5) appellate

counsel was ineffective. The trial court dismissed the postcon‐

viction petition. On appeal, Mr. Carrion’s appointed counsel

moved to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551

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No. 14‐3241 13

(1987), on the ground that all potential issues lacked arguable

merit. Counsel’s Finley brief considered raising arguments

about judicial bias at sentencing, the sufficiency of the evi‐

dence, the voluntariness of Mr. Carrion’s confession given

Mr. Carrion’s claims that he did not understand his rights and

was made a false promise of deportation, and whether

Mr. Carrion’s trial and appellate counsel provided effective

assistance. Counsel concluded: (1) all claims were meritless;

(2) that the sufficiency claims and the ineffective assistance

claims against trial counsel were barred by res judicata be‐

cause they were addressed on direct appeal when the appel‐

late court granted the Anders motion; (3) that the involuntary

confession claim was “barred by res judicata because it could

have been raised on direct appeal” and, even if it was not

barred, was not supported by the record; and (4) that alt‐

hough the ineffective assistance claim against appellate coun‐

sel could not have been raised on direct appeal, it was merit‐

less under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).23  

Mr. Carrion did not file a response, and the state appellate

court granted the motion to withdraw on April 13, 2012, ex‐

plaining that it had “carefully reviewed the record ... and the

[Finley] memorandum” and found “no issues of arguable

merit.”24 Mr. Carrion then filed a PLA, which reiterated his

judicial bias, sufficiency, ineffective assistance, and involun‐

tary confession claims. The PLA was denied without elabora‐

tion on March 27, 2013.  

                                                 

23 R.17‐3 at 9–17.

24 R.1‐1 at 82–83.

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14 No. 14‐3241

On July 29, 2013, Mr. Carrion filed a federal habeas peti‐

tion in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis‐

trict of Illinois. He raised the following grounds for relief: (1)

there was insufficient evidence at trial to support either the

residential burglary or the first‐degree murder convictions

beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial judge was biased and

considered improper evidence at sentencing; (3) trial counsel

was ineffective; (4) he was denied due process, equal protec‐

tion, and access to the courts because he lacked proficiency in

English; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise

grounds one through four and abandoning Mr. Carrion by fil‐

ing an Anders motion; and (6) postconviction counsel was in‐

effective in failing to raise all meritorious claims and in aban‐

doning Mr. Carrion by filing a Finley motion.25 The State re‐

sponded that Mr. Carrion’s petition was time‐barred, some of

his claims were procedurally defaulted, and all of his claims

were meritless. The district court denied Mr. Carrion’s peti‐

tion. It reasoned that although the petition probably was

timely filed, the first four claims were procedurally defaulted,

the fifth claim failed on the merits, and the sixth claim is not

grounds for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). The court

denied a COA.  

Mr. Carrion then filed a notice of appeal, which we con‐

strued as an application for a COA. We determined that

Mr. Carrion had made a substantial showing of a denial of his

right to due process and of his right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. We therefore recruited counsel and instructed

the parties to address the following issues: (1) whether the

prosecution introduced sufficient evidence of Mr. Carrion’s

                                                 

25 R.1 at 7–16.  

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No. 14‐3241 15

intent to convict him of residential burglary and first‐degree

murder; (2) whether the trial court violated Mr. Carrion’s due

process rights by relying on a confession elicited from a de‐

tective who also acted as Mr. Carrion’s translator; (3) whether

Mr. Carrion’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assis‐

tance by not challenging the admission of the confession un‐

der the Due Process Clause.  

II

DISCUSSION

As a general rule, we review the district court’s denial of a

habeas petition under a de novo standard of review, but that

review is governed by the standards set forth in AEDPA. Ruhl

v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1090 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, the State

has raised, as it did before the district court, a number of ar‐

guments urging us to reject the claims in Mr. Carrion’s peti‐

tion on procedural grounds. Specifically, the State contends,

among other things, that Mr. Carrion’s federal petition was

untimely filed, that his involuntary confession and sufficiency

claims are procedurally defaulted, and that his ineffective as‐

sistance claim based on a failure to challenge the confession is

waived. We need not address these potentially difficult pro‐

cedural questions, however, because even if we were to de‐

cide each of them in Mr. Carrion’s favor, his claims clearly fail

on the merits.26  

                                                 

26 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Estremera v. United States, 724 F.3d 773, 775

(7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t makes sense (and is permissible) to reject a collateral

attack on the merits while other procedural defenses, such as [statutes of

limitations,] waiver, default, or lack of exhaustion, remain in the back‐

ground.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2))); Johnson v. Pollard, 559 F.3d 746,

752 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e need not address the procedural default issue

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16 No. 14‐3241

Further, our conclusion is the same regardless of whether

we apply the deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

AEDPA provides that, in conducting our review, “we look to

the last reasoned state court opinion addressing each claim.”

Ruhl, 743 F.3d at 1091. Where a claim has been adjudicated on

the merits in state court, habeas relief is appropriate only if

the state court’s determination was (1) “contrary to, or in‐

volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determina‐

tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563

U.S. 170, 181 (2011). However, “[i]f no state court has squarely

addressed the merits of a habeas claim, we review the claim

de novo under the pre‐AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243,

but still with deference to the state court.” Ruhl, 743 F.3d at

1091. Here, the State has argued that § 2254(d) should apply,

contending that Mr. Carrion’s claims were rejected on the

merits by the state court. Again, we need not decide this issue

because even if Mr. Carrion’s claims fall outside § 2254(d) and

are, therefore, subject to the more generous pre‐AEDPA

standard of § 2243, they clearly fail on the merits.27 Therefore,

                                                 

raised by the State because [the petitioner]’s claim clearly fails on the mer‐

its.”); see also Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 610 n.10 (7th Cir. 2010) (sur‐

veying case law and noting that this practice is in accordance with both

Supreme Court precedent and also “the established practice in the other

circuits”).  

27 See Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir. 2014) (declining to decide

“which issues must be reviewed under AEDPA’s deferential standard and

which should be reviewed under the pre‐AEDPA de novo standard” be‐

cause petitioner’s claim failed even under de novo review); Johnson, 559

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No. 14‐3241 17

for purposes of our decision today, we will assume that a de

novo standard applies.

A.

We first address Mr. Carrion’s argument that the record

contains insufficient evidence to support, as a matter of law,

his convictions for residential burglary and first‐degree mur‐

der. The familiar standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979) makes clear that, to comport with the standards of the

Due Process Clause, a criminal conviction must be based on

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favora‐

ble to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). In conducting this

inquiry, we must “give[] full play to the responsibility of the

trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to

weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. It is also important that we

evaluate the record evidence “with explicit reference to the

substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by

state law.” Id. at 324 n.16.  

Turning first to the residential burglary conviction, the

Jackson inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Carrion “know‐

ingly and without authority enter[ed]” Zymali’s apartment

“with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 720 ILCS

5/19‐3(a). There is no dispute about the first element, so we

                                                 

F.3d at 753 (declining to decide finally whether Wisconsin state court

reached federal merits question because result would be the same under

either § 2254(d) or de novo review).

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18 No. 14‐3241

focus on whether there is legally sufficient evidence that

Mr. Carrion entered Zymali’s apartment intending to commit

a theft. See People v. Maggette, 747 N.E.2d 339, 353 (Ill. 2001)

(observing that “[t]he gist of the offense [of residential bur‐

glary] is the defendant’s felonious intent with which he or she

enters the dwelling”). Mr. Carrion argues that the State failed

to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt because the

details of his entry indicate that he did not possess the requi‐

site intent: he was heavily intoxicated; Zymali’s apartment

was lit and her door was open; he carried no burglary tools;

he did not attempt to conceal his entry or verify that the resi‐

dence was empty; and there was no evidence suggesting that

he searched for items of value before the confrontation. In

Mr. Carrion’s view, this evidence suggests either that he en‐

tered the apartment to gain access to the interior of the build‐

ing or that he was simply drunk and exploring. Alternatively,

Mr. Carrion suggests, relying on his own testimony and that

of his friend Viveros, that he was so intoxicated that he “ha[d]

blacked out” and was incapable of forming the requisite in‐

tent at all.28  

Viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor, as we are

obliged to do, we must conclude that a rational trier of fact

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Carrion

intended to commit a theft when he entered Zymali’s apart‐

ment. The state trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, had be‐

fore it direct evidence of Mr. Carrion’s intent in the form of

his own videotaped statements, which the court found to be

“[t]he most compelling evidence of his intention to commit a

                                                 

28 Appellant’s Br. 39.

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No. 14‐3241 19

theft.”29 Based on the trial evidence, the court was satisfied

both that Detective Delgadillo’s translations during the vide‐

otaped interview were accurate and that Mr. Carrion’s testi‐

mony that the detective made a false promise of deportation

was unbelievable. Relying on Mr. Carrion’s statements and

his demeanor, the court said that it “ha[d] no doubt ... from

looking at that video that the defendant gave it up.”30 Further,

the incriminating statements in the video aligned with Detec‐

tive Delgadillo’s trial testimony about his initial conversation

with Mr. Carrion. The detective testified that Mr. Carrion told

him that when he saw a light on in Zymali’s apartment he be‐

came “curious as to what was inside” and that he entered the

apartment because he was “looking to steal something.”31 To

be sure, Mr. Carrion’s trial testimony differed from Detective

Delgadillo’s, but it is the trier of fact, not us, that bears “the

responsibility ... fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  

The state trial court also found the circumstantial evidence

presented at trial corroborative of Mr. Carrion’s incriminating

statements. In Illinois, “[c]riminal intent is a state of mind that

not only can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances,

but usually is so proved.” Maggette, 747 N.E.2d at 354 (citation

omitted). “In a burglary case, the relevant surrounding cir‐

cumstances include the time, place and manner of entry into

the premises, the defendant’s activity within the premises,

and any alternative explanations offered for his presence.”

                                                 

29 R.17‐14 at 142.

30 Id. at 149.

31 R.17‐13 at 73–74.  

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20 No. 14‐3241

People v. Richardson, 470 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ill. 1984). Here, the

trial court noted the late hour of Mr. Carrion’s unauthorized

entry as well as its view that “[i]t was easy for [Mr. Carrion]

to enter [Zymali’s] apartment,” which was unlocked and lo‐

cated on the first floor of the building.32 It found the absence

of traditional burglary evidence immaterial; in its view, there

was no sign of forced entry because the screen door was un‐

locked, and there was no stacking of property because

Mr. Carrion did not have time to canvass the apartment be‐

fore Zymali confronted him. And the court explicitly rejected

Mr. Carrion’s alternative explanation that he was so heavily

intoxicated that he had simply wandered into Zymali’s apart‐

ment. In the court’s view, there was enough record evidence

of Mr. Carrion’s mental and physical alertness to render his

testimony on this matter “incredible.”33

Taking both the direct and circumstantial evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the

trial court certainly was justified in concluding beyond a rea‐

sonable doubt that Mr. Carrion entered Zymali’s apartment

intending to commit a theft and therefore was guilty of resi‐

dential burglary under Illinois law.

Having concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient

to support Mr. Carrion’s conviction for residential burglary

under 720 ILCS 5/19‐3(a), we also must conclude that his con‐

viction for first‐degree murder must stand. In Illinois, felony

murder is one of three categories of first‐degree murder. Illi‐

nois law provides that a person commits first‐degree murder

                                                 

32 R.17‐14 at 142.  

33 Id. at 145–47.

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No. 14‐3241 21

when, “in performing the acts which cause the death” of an

individual, “he is attempting or committing a forcible felony

other than second degree murder.” 720 ILCS 5/9‐1(a)(3). Res‐

idential burglary is an enumerated forcible felony under 720

ILCS 5/2‐8. Therefore, because Mr. Carrion killed Zymali

while attempting to commit residential burglary, he is guilty

of first‐degree murder under Illinois law.  

As we already have noted, the State charged Mr. Carrion

under all three categories of first‐degree murder in 720 ILCS

5/9‐1(a). The court accepted all three theories but merged the

counts into a single conviction. Therefore, our conclusion that

there is sufficient evidence to support the felony murder

charge is sufficient in itself to support the first‐degree murder

conviction under Jackson, regardless of Mr. Carrion’s mental

state at the time he committed the offense.

B.

We now turn to Mr. Carrion’s contention that the trial

court’s admission of his videotaped statement violated his

right to due process because Detective Delgadillo’s perfor‐

mance as translator during the interview rendered the confes‐

sion involuntary. A foundational principle of due process of

law is that the state cannot procure a criminal conviction

through the use of an involuntary confession. See generally

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223–26 (1973); United

States v. Stadfeld, 689 F.3d 705, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2012). An in‐

criminating statement is voluntary “if, in the totality of cir‐

cumstances, it is the product of a rational intellect and free

will and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intim‐

idation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome

the defendant’s free will.” United States v. Gillaum, 372 F.3d

848, 856 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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22 No. 14‐3241

“[C]oercive police activity is a ‘necessary predicate to the

finding that a confession is not “voluntary” within the mean‐

ing of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend‐

ment.’” United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). Thus,

to find that a confession is involuntary, we must conclude that

it is the product of coercive police activity. Whether a confes‐

sion is voluntary is a legal question subject to de novo review,

although we afford great deference to the trial court’s under‐

lying factual findings and will disturb them only in the case

of clear error. Id.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that Mr. Carrion’s

confession was not the result of official coercion, and, there‐

fore, its admission did not offend due process.

Mr. Carrion’s coercion argument is a rather novel one. A

voluntariness inquiry typically requires that we consider a

combination of factors.34 But Mr. Carrion simply contends

that when an interrogation is conducted through a translator,

due process requires that the translator “be (1) neutral and in‐

dependent and (2) fully capable of interpreting exactly both

                                                 

34 In evaluating coercion, relevant factors include  

the defendant’s age, education, intelligence level, and

mental state; the length of the defendant’s detention; the

nature of the interrogations; the inclusion of advice about

constitutional rights; and the use of physical punishment,

including deprivation of food or sleep. Narcotics, alcohol,

and fatigue also may be considerations in a particular

case.

United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Case: 14-3241 Document: 45 Filed: 08/31/2016 Pages: 29
No. 14‐3241 23

the questions posed and the answers given.”35 Because Detec‐

tive Delgadillo was not neutral or capable, Mr. Carrion con‐

tinues, the incriminating statements were necessarily coerced

and inadmissible.  

Our cases provide no support for the bright line constitu‐

tional requirement that Mr. Carrion proposes. The authorities

upon which he relies, treatises, state ethics codes, state case

law, and agency guidelines, may well suggest the best prac‐

tice. But our task is decidedly more narrow. Although these

sources may be of some help in our inquiry, the basic question

before us is not whether the officers in this case adhered to

best practices but “whether the circumstances surrounding

[Mr. Carrion’s] confession would have interfered with his free

and deliberate choice of whether to confess.” Johnson v. Pol‐

lard, 559 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). To be sure, evidence that Detective Delgadillo, in

acting as translator, manipulated or mistranslated the prose‐

cutor’s questions or Mr. Carrion’s answers is relevant to the

extent that it demonstrates coercive conduct. In the end, how‐

ever, the ultimate question is whether, under the totality of

the circumstances, Mr. Carrion was deprived of that “free and

deliberate choice.” Id.36

                                                 

35 Appellant’s Br. 19.  

36 This comports with our approach in dealing with more traditional ar‐

guments of coercive activity. For example, although “deception by an in‐

terrogator does not automatically invalidate a confession,” Sotelo v. Ind.

State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1988), “[g]iven the right circum‐

stances, a false promise of leniency may be sufficient to overcome a per‐

son’s ability to make a rational decision about the courses open to him,”

United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Hadley

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24 No. 14‐3241

Mr. Carrion first argues that Detective Delgadillo was so

inherently biased that his translation of Mr. Carrion’s state‐

ments to the assistant state’s attorney cannot be properly at‐

tributed to Mr. Carrion. Mr. Carrion goes so far as to suggest

that Detective Delgadillo served as translator solely to ensure

his own “ability to control Carrion’s words that would even‐

tually be presented to the court ... because [the officers] knew

that the only way they would get the confession they needed

was if Delgadillo acted as Carrion’s mouthpiece.”37 Were

these accusations true, they certainly would be relevant to our

coercion inquiry. But Mr. Carrion provides no support for his

charges of bias. The bare assertion that Detective Delgadillo,

as both investigator and translator, could not have acted neu‐

trally is insufficient to establish that he acted coercively. See

United States v. Lind, 542 F.2d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting

involuntary confession argument where Spanish‐speaking

FBI agent served as translator).

Mr. Carrion also questions Detective Delgadillo’s compe‐

tency as a translator. He relies on the testimony of Ruth Ra‐

mos, a language consultant and certified interpreter who re‐

viewed the videotaped interview several times and prepared

her own transcription. At trial, Ramos was asked whether,

                                                 

v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[a]lthough the

law permits the police to pressure and cajole, conceal material facts, and

actively mislead, it draws the line at outright fraud” (citation omitted) (in‐

ternal quotation marks omitted)).

37 Reply Br. 21.

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No. 14‐3241 25

based on her experience and training, she believed that Detec‐

tive Delgadillo’s translations were “truthful, complete, and

accurate.”38 Ramos replied:  

Well, I believe there were some omissions.

When the questions ... were posed in Spanish,

and there were some omissions when the an‐

swers were posed in Spanish to be translated

into English. I also believe that there were ...

some errors, grammatical errors in sentence

structure in the Spanish language, the way the

questions were posed to Mr. Carrion.[39]

These mistakes, Mr. Carrion suggests, altered the meaning of

his responses and rendered his confession involuntary.  

We cannot accept Mr. Carrion’s argument. As an initial

matter, it is important to remember that we must view this

issue through the lens of the trial court’s finding that Detec‐

tive Delgadillo’s translations were accurate, a determination

to which we afford great deference. See United States v. Stew‐

art, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that historical

facts are entitled to deference “especially when the suppres‐

sion decision turn[s] on the credibility of the witnesses” (al‐

teration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The

state trial court noted in its ruling that immediately after Ra‐

mos testified about the unspecified omissions and grammati‐

cal mistakes, she stated that, despite these errors, it was her

opinion that the translations were “verbatim”; the court

                                                 

38 R.17‐14 at 57.

39 Id.

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26 No. 14‐3241

found Ramos’s testimony on this matter “very credible.”40 See

United States v. Bernal‐Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1319–20 (11th

Cir. 2010) (finding confession voluntary even though officer

wrote down the defendant’s statement in English, a language

the defendant did not speak, because trial court found the of‐

ficers’ accounts of the substance of the interrogation credible).  

Furthermore, Mr. Carrion’s sole example of a mistransla‐

tion does not persuade us that the trial court clearly erred in

concluding that Detective Delgadillo’s translations were ac‐

curate. In the reply brief and at oral argument, appellate de‐

fense counsel emphasized that Ramos’s and Detective Delga‐

dillo’s translations of Mr. Carrion’s answer to the question,

“Well, you went in there to take something, right?” were in

conflict.41 Counsel argued that Detective Delgadillo translated

Mr. Carrion’s answer as “Well, I don’t know. If I went in there,

if I saw something that maybe I would like to take ... ,” but

Ramos testified that Mr. Carrion’s answer in fact was “I don’t

even know what I was going to do when I went in there.”42

This mistranslation, counsel suggested, was determinative at

trial of whether Mr. Carrion entered Zymali’s apartment with

the requisite intent.

The language cited by counsel, however, comes not from

the witnesses’ testimony but from Mr. Carrion’s trial counsel

during closing arguments. The actual testimony of Detective

Delgadillo and Ramos provides a more complete picture.

                                                 

40 Id. at 149; see also id. at 57.

41 Oral Argument at 00:59–2:06; Reply Br. 23.

42 Reply Br. 23.  

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No. 14‐3241 27

First, Ramos testified that, through Detective Delgadillo,

Mr. Carrion was asked the question, “And what happened

when you got close to your home [?]”43 According to her,

Mr. Carrion responded, “I ... well ... I look down and I saw a

... the apartment and I saw the light on. It seemed like an easy

thing to do, I don’t know. I became curious ... I didn’t even

know what I was going to do ... ,” and then was interrupted.44

Detective Delgadillo’s translation of Mr. Carrion’s answer to

the same question, however, omitted the final phrase, “I

didn’t even know what I was going to do.”45 This appears to

be the inconsistency to which trial counsel referred in his clos‐

ing argument and that counsel in this court similarly empha‐

sized, although both counsel misstated the question that was

posed.  

This discrepancy between the two translations, however,

is innocuous when considered in fuller context. During direct

examination at trial, Ramos went on to testify about two ad‐

ditional exchanges that took place during the video interview.

According to her translation, Mr. Carrion was asked the ques‐

tion, “When you first came in the apartment, what were you

looking for [?]”46 Mr. Carrion answered, “I didn’t even know

what I wanted, I just got in to see what thing ... just to look

around ... I didn’t even know what I was going to take, it’s

                                                 

43 R.17‐14 at 54.

44 Id. at 54–55.

45 Id. at 3.

46 Id. at 55.

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28 No. 14‐3241

like ... ,” and then was interrupted.47 Detective Delgadillo’s

translation was essentially the same: “I didn’t even know

what I was looking for, what I was going to take.”48 Addition‐

ally, Ramos testified on cross‐examination that the prosecutor

asked Mr. Carrion, “[Were] you looking for something to

take?”49 According to her translation, Mr. Carrion responded,

“Well ... possibly yes. If I had found something that ... .”50

Detective Delgadillo was not asked about this exchange dur‐

ing his testimony.

Upon review of the complete trial testimony, we cannot

conclude that the inconsistency that Mr. Carrion has identi‐

fied between the translations made by Detective Delgadillo

and Ramos renders clearly erroneous the trial court’s finding

that Detective Delgadillo’s translations were accurate. Cf.

Lind, 542 F.2d at 599 (finding confession through Spanish‐

speaking FBI agent and another individual acting as transla‐

tors not coerced where agent “[a]t all times ... was able to ver‐

ify the accuracy of the translation”).  

The totality of the circumstances, therefore, militates in fa‐

vor of the conclusion that Mr. Carrion’s confession was vol‐

untary and that it was not the product of coercion.

                                                 

47 Id. at 56.

48 Id. at 5.

49 Id. at 74.

50 Id.

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No. 14‐3241 29

C.

Mr. Carrion’s final contention derives from his coerced

confession argument. He argues that his appointed counsel

on direct appeal provided ineffective assistance by failing to

challenge the admission of the confession under the Due Pro‐

cess Clause. We have held that “[t]he filing of an Anders brief

that fails to point out meritorious issues can, in principle, con‐

stitute ineffective assistance.” Steward v. Gilmore, 80 F.3d 1205,

1213 (7th Cir. 1996). However, because we have concluded

that Mr. Carrion’s involuntary confession claim is without

merit, we also reject his related claim of ineffective assistance.

Warren v. Baenen, 712 F.3d 1090, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting

petitioner’s argument that court‐appointed sentencing coun‐

sel was ineffective because “[c]ounsel is not ineffective for

failing to raise meritless claims”); see also United States v. Stew‐

art, 388 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Stewart’s counsel can‐

not have been ineffective for failing to pursue what we have

concluded would have been a meritless [claim].”); Stone v.

Farley, 86 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Failure to raise a los‐

ing argument, whether at trial or on appeal, does not consti‐

tute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

Conclusion

Forthe foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s de‐

nial of the habeas petition.

AFFIRMED

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