Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00281/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00281-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CINTAS CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-00281 JSW

NOTICE OF QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING ON CINTAS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF

MORGAN’S CLAIMS

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON

OCTOBER 14, 2005:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. See N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority.

The Court tentatively DENIES Cintas’ motion. The parties each shall have fifteen (15)

minutes to address the following questions:

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1. a. In determining whether or not to enforce the choice of law provision, the

Court must determine whether application of Ohio law would violate a

fundamental California policy. Morgan argues that to apply Ohio law

would violate California policy, but cites no conflicting Ohio law in

support of his argument. See Opp. at 4-6. What Ohio authority, if any, is

in conflict with the California case law cited by Morgan with respect to

the three policies he claims would be violated by the application of Ohio

law?

b. Cintas argues that Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148

(2005) did not hold that all class action waivers would be found to be

unconscionable and cites to the portion of the opinion that states

“classwide arbitration is only justified when ‘gross unfairness would

result from the denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis.’”

Id. at 168. What is Morgan’s best argument as to why it would be grossly

unfair to deny him the opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis? The

Court wishes Morgan to focus his response taking into account the fact

that statutory rights may be arbitrated, so long as he can effectively

vindicate such rights in an arbitral forum, and in light of the fact that this

is not a consumer class action case, where individual damages are likely

to be so minimal as to deter individual litigation. See Discover Bank, 36

Cal. 4th at 168 (distinguishing Gilmer and noting that in ADEA cases

large individual awards are commonplace).

2. Does Cintas agree that the UCL claim, to the extent it seeks injunctive relief, is

not arbitrable under California law? If the Court were to alter its tentative ruling

and grant the motion to compel arbitration, would Cintas object to severing this

aspect of Morgan’s claims from the remainder of his claims?

3. The Court found it significant that the 1999 and 2002 versions of the arbitration

agreement expressly capped the fees an employee could incur in connection with

arbitration. 

a. What is Cintas’ best argument that the costs issue would not preclude

Morgan from effectively vindicating statutory rights? As to this question,

the Court does not find it relevant that Cintas has agreed, for now, to front

the costs associated with the Salcedo arbitration. See, e.g., Morrison v.

Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 676 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In

considering the ability of plaintiffs to pay arbitration costs under an

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arbitration agreement, reviewing courts should not consider after-the-fact

offers by employers to pay the plaintiff’s share of the arbitration costs

where the agreement itself provides that the plaintiff is liable, at least

potentially for arbitration fees and costs.”).

b. Would Morgan agree that if California law does apply, under

Armendariz, and if the Court considers the 2003 Arbitration Agreement

to be silent on the question of costs that fact would not in and of itself “be

grounds for denying the enforcement of the arbitration agreement?” 

Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113. 

c. The 2003 Arbitration Agreement states that it is governed by the AAA’s

National Rules for Resolution of Employment Disputes. Those rules

have two provisions for fees. (See Declaration of Nina Rabin, Ex. 2.) It

seems to the Court that this case would fall under the rubric of disputes

arising out of individually-negotiated employment agreements and

contracts, which provides for a sliding scale of filing and service fees

depending upon the amount of the claim. Given this fact, why has

Morgan not met his burden to show that individual arbitration would be

prohibitively expensive? Even if the Court concludes that Morgan has

met his burden on this point, why should it not compel arbitration subject

to the condition that Cintas pay all costs unique to arbitration? See, e.g.,

Morrison, 317 F.3d at 674-75 (finding cost-splitting provision

unenforceable but severing that provision of arbitration agreement); Little

v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1085 (2003) (concluding on

remand that court compelling arbitration should require employer to pay

all costs unique to arbitration).

Dated: October 12, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-00281-JSW Document 158 Filed 10/12/05 Page 3 of 3