Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02875/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02875-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK McLEAN SAUNDERS,

Petitioner,

v.

RON RACKLEY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-2875 GPC (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS; and

ORDER: (1) DENYING REQUEST 

FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING; 

(2) DENYING REQUEST FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; 

and (3) DENYING REQUEST FOR 

DISCOVERY

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Mark McLean Saunders, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Amended 

Petition” or “Am. Pet.”) challenging the denial of his Proposition 36 petition. (Am. Pet., 

ECF No. 7.)1 Saunders raises four claims in the Petition he has filed in this Court. 

/ / /

 

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted 

by the Court’s electronic case filing system, except for lodgments.

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The Court has read and considered the Amended Petition, the Answer and 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer (“Answer”) [ECF No. 

11], the Traverse (“Traverse”) [ECF No. 16], the lodgments and other documents filed in 

this case, and the legal arguments presented by both parties. For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED. Further, the Court 

ORDERS the request for evidentiary hearing, the request for appointment of counsel, 

and the request for discovery be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v. Fraley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The state appellate court recited the factual and procedural history of this case as follows:

In 1987, Saunders was convicted of three counts of vehicular 

manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(4)). In 2005, Saunders was convicted of 

driving under the influence with a prior vehicular manslaughter 

conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a); 23626; 23540) and failing to 

appear while on bail (§ 1320.5). He admitted three prior serious/violent 

felony (strike) convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In 2005, Saunders was 

sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life.

In February 2014, the trial court denied Saunders’ petition to modify 

his sentence because the nature of his strike priors rendered him ineligible 

under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(3).

Saunders has filed a timely notice of appeal.

Saunders contends his prior convictions for vehicular manslaughter 

were neither “serious” nor “violent” and thus he was eligible for 

resentencing under section 1170.126. He also claims his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise this issue in the trial court.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2.)

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III. DISCUSSION

Saunders raises four grounds in his Petition. In ground one he contends his prior 

1987 conviction for Penal Code § 192(c)(4) does not make him ineligible for 

resentencing under California’s Proposition 36 and that he was denied his right to a fair 

hearing under Proposition 36. He also claims the plea agreement he entered into in 1987 

has been violated. (Am. Pet. at 16-25.) In ground two, Saunders argues that California 

Penal Code (Penal Code) §§ 667.5(c) and 1192.7, which define “serious” and “violent” 

felonies that render a convicted offender ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36,

do not include his prior 1987 offense. (Id. at 26-32.) Saunders also claims Penal Code 

§§ 667.5(c) and 1192.7 are unconstitutionally vague and violate the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Federal Constitution. In addition, he requests an evidentiary hearing. (Id.) 

In ground three, Saunders argues that the nature of a convicted offender’s prior 

conviction, for purposes of a Proposition 36 resentencing hearing, must be determined at 

the time of resentencing, not at the time of the original conviction. (Id. at 33-38.) 

Saunders also asks this Court to permit “discovery under Rule 6(b) and to appoint 

counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” (Id. at 35.) Finally, in ground four, Saunders 

contends his counsel at the Proposition 36 resentencing hearing was ineffective. (Id. at 

39-42.)

Respondent contends claims one through three do not state a federal question. 

(Answer at 4-5.) Respondent does not address Saunders’ contentions that the statutes at 

issue are vague and violate equal protection, nor his requests for discovery, an 

evidentiary hearing, or appointment of counsel. As to Saunders’ ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, Respondent argues it is meritless. (Id. at 5-7.)

Because Saunders’ grounds contain multiple claims which overlap and contain 

subclaims, the Court has divided the claims into the following categories: (1) claims 

based on state law; (2) due process violation; (3) violation of Saunders’ 1987 plea 

agreement; (4) violation of the “void for vagueness” doctrine; (5) equal protection; and 

/ / /

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(6) ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court also addresses Saunders’ request for 

discovery, appointment of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing. 

B. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s 

habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the 

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, 

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). The Court may also grant relief if the state court’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

C. State Law Claims (subclaims of grounds one, two and three)

Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act, passed by California voters in 2012, 

“created a recall and resentencing procedure for eligible defendants serving a life 

sentence under the Three Strikes law whose offense of conviction was not serious or 

violent.” California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice, 1064 (Nancy Yuenger, ed., 

2015). In 2014, Saunders filed a petition for resentencing under Proposition 36 entitled 

“Memorandum in Support of Three Strikes Lifer Sentence Recall” in San Diego Superior 

Court. (Petr’s Ex. C, ECF No. 7 at 54-65.) In it, he contended he was eligible for 

resentencing under Proposition 36 for his 2005 conviction because he did not have any 

serious or violent prior convictions. (Id.) Following a hearing, the court denied the 

petition, concluding that Saunders’ 1987 convictions for vehicular manslaughter rendered 

him ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. (Lodgment No. 1.)

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In grounds one, two and three of Saunders’ federal petition, he claims: (1) his 1987 

conviction for Penal Code § 192(c)(4) does not make him ineligible for resentencing 

under Proposition 36; (2) Penal Code §§ 667.5(c) and 1192.7, which define “serious” and 

“violent” felonies for purposes of resentencing under Proposition 36, do not include his 

1987 offense; and (3) the nature of a convicted offender’s prior conviction, for purposes 

of a Proposition 36 resentencing hearing, must be determined at the time of resentencing, 

not at the time of the original conviction. (Am. Pet. at 1-39.) Saunders raised these same 

claims in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 

No. 9.) The state supreme court denied the petition without citation of authority. 

(Lodgment No. 10.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the state appellate court’s 

opinion denying the claims as the basis for the state supreme court’s analysis. Ylst, 501 

U.S. at 805-06. The California Court of Appeal wrote:

[Saunders’] 1987 convictions were for three counts of vehicular 

manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (c)(4). The parties agree that 

since 1987, the Legislature renumbered section 192, subdivision (c)(4) as 

section 191.5, subdivision (b). [Footnote No. 2: Section 191.5, 

subdivision (b) provides: “Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is 

the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the 

driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 

23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the 

proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a 

felony, but without gross negligence, or the proximate result of a lawful 

act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, without gross 

negligence.”] 

Returning to the statutory definition of which persons are ineligible 

for resentencing, section 1170.126, subdivision (e) provides in part: “An 

inmate is eligible for resentencing if: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) The inmate has no 

prior convictions for any of the offenses appearing in clause (iv) of 

paragraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of section 667 or clause 

(iv) of paragraph (2) of section 1170.12.”

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Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C) provides in part:

“If a defendant has two or more prior serious and/or violent 

felony convictions as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 

667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 that have been 

pled and proved, and the current offense is not a serious or 

violent felony as defined in subdivision (d), the defendant 

shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision 

(e) unless the prosecutor pleads and proves any of the 

following: [¶] . . . [¶] (iv) The defendant suffered a prior 

serious and/or violent felony conviction, as defined in 

subdivision (d) of the section, for any of the following 

felonies: [¶] . . . [¶] (IV) Any homicide, including any 

attempted homicide, defined in section 187 to 191.5, 

inclusive.”

Saunders acknowledges this section but argues essentially that we 

should ignore it because of his various arguments that vehicular 

manslaughter is neither “serious” nor “violent” because the underlying 

conduct leading to the unlawful killing does not amount to a felony.

. . . .

As we have noted, Proposition 36 has both a prospective and 

retrospective feature. The statute with regard to resentencing has 

undertaken to define various types of inmates who, notwithstanding their 

current offense, are not eligible for relief under the act. The language of 

section 1170.126 subdivision (e)(3) is absolutely clear, inmates convicted 

of a homicide offense, including section 191.5, are not eligible for 

resentencing under the act. Further, when Saunders was convicted of the 

current offense he admitted that the three vehicular manslaughter 

convictions were qualifying strikes under section 667, subdivisions (b) 

through (i). He did not challenge the nature of his strike priors in the 

appeal from his 2005 convictions and sentence (People v. Saunders (Feb. 

27, 2007, D047541) [nonpub. opn.]). We agree with the People, Saunders 

should not be heard now to contend the prior convictions did not qualify 

as either serious or violent. (People v. Bow (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1551, 

1558.)

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In any event, the statute plainly establishes that prior convictions for 

violation of section 191.5 (previously § 192) are disqualifying for 

purposes of resentencing under Proposition 36.

The trial court correctly denied the petition. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 4-6.)

Saunders’ contentions that 1) his 1987 conviction for Penal Code § 192(c)(4) does 

not make him ineligible for resentencing, 2) Penal Code §§ 667.5(c) and 1192.7 do not 

include his 1987 offense, 3) the nature of a convicted offender’s prior conviction, for 

purposes of a Proposition 36 resentencing hearing, must be determined at the time of 

resentencing concern the state court’s interpretation and application of state sentencing 

law. A state court’s application of its own sentencing laws, such as the application of 

Proposition 36 in Saunders’ case, does not generally present a federal constitutional 

question. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that federal habeas 

relief is not available for alleged violations of state law); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.3d 1116, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1989). “Absent a showing of 

fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does 

not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). 

As long as a sentence “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel 

and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for 

a violation of state statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 

F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). As discussed below in Section III(D) of this Report and 

Recommendation, the state courts’ adjudication of Saunders’ Proposition 36 petition was 

not fundamentally unfair, but rather was consistent with applicable state law. Thus, as to 

Saunders’ claims that his 1987 conviction is not listed as a disqualifying offense for 

resentencing under Proposition 36, that his prior conviction is not a “serious” or “violent” 

felony under California law, that the nature of a prior conviction and whether it renders 

him ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 is to be determined at the time of the 

resentencing hearing are not cognizable on federal habeas review because they do not 

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allege a violation of federal constitutional law. He is not entitled to relief as to those 

claims.

D. Due Process (subclaim of ground one) 

As part of ground one, Saunders contends his Proposition 36 hearing violated his 

federal due process rights because information about his prior conviction was not 

presented. (Am. Pet. at 19-20.)

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge their state court convictions must first 

exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 

129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must 

“‘fairly present[]’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider 

it, or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). This claim is not exhausted, as it does 

not appear in the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 

No. 9.) This Court may nevertheless deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear that the 

applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 

614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).

A habeas petitioner may be entitled to habeas corpus relief if he can show that “an 

alleged state sentencing error was so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an 

independent due process violation,” Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992), and thus 

Saunders does state a federal constitutional claim as to his contention that he was denied 

his right to a fair hearing under Proposition 36. 

Saunders’ claim, however, fails on the merits. The state appellate court’s analysis 

of Saunders’ claim was not arbitrary or capricious. In 1987, Saunders was charged with 

three counts of former Penal Code § 192(c)(3), vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated 

and with gross negligence. Former Penal Code § 192(c)(3) defines vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated without gross negligence as follows:

Driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the 

Vehicle Code and in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to 

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felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in violation of 

Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of a 

lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with 

gross negligence.

Former Penal Code § 192(c)(3) (West 1984).

Saunders entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to three counts of 

former Penal Code § 192(c)(4), vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without gross 

negligence. Former Penal Code § 192(c)(4) reads as follows:

Driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the 

Vehicle Code and in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to 

felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in violation of 

Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of a 

lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without 

gross negligence.

Former Penal Code § 192(c)(4) (West 1984).

Thus, Saunders’ plea agreement reduced the charges he pled to from vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated with gross negligence to vehicular manslaughter while 

intoxicated without gross negligence. In 2005, former Penal Code § 192(c)(4) was 

renumbered as § 191.5(b). Penal Code § 191.5(b) reads as follows:

(b) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing 

of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a 

vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 

23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate 

result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, 

but without gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission 

of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but 

without gross negligence.

Penal Code § 191.5(b) (West 2011).

Former Penal Code § 192(c)(4) and current Penal Code § 191.5(b) prohibit the 

same conduct and contain the same elements of the offense: (1) killing a human being; 

(2) while driving a vehicle; (3) while intoxicated in violation of the California Vehicle 

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Code § 23152 or § 23153; (4) and while committing an unlawful act not amounting to a 

felony or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; and (5) without gross negligence. As the 

state court noted, Penal Code 191.5(b) is specifically listed as an offense which renders a 

petitioner ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. See Penal Code §§ 

1170.126(e) and 667(e)(2)(C). Accordingly, the state court’s conclusion that Saunders’ 

conviction for Penal Code § 192(c)(4), which is the same crime as Penal Code § 191.5(b), 

makes him ineligible for resentencing was not arbitrary or capricious. The state court’s 

denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). He is not entitled to 

relief as to this claim.

E. Violation of Saunders’ 1987 Plea Agreement (subclaim of ground one)

Saunders also contends his 1987 plea agreement was violated because it did not 

specifically designate his convictions as “serious” or “violent” and his convictions were 

later deemed to be “serious” or “violent” for purposes of the Three Strikes sentencing 

law. (Am. Pet. at 20-24.) This claim does not appear in the petition for review filed in 

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 9.) Thus, like the preceding claim, it is 

not exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34; Johnson, 88 

F.3d at 829. This Court may nevertheless deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear that 

the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624. 

The Supreme Court has held that “once a state court conviction is no longer open 

to direct or collateral attack in its own right,” it is presumed valid, and “[if] that 

conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not 

challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the 

prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. 

Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001). The majority in Lackawanna identified an exception 

to this rule, when the prior conviction was obtained without the defendant being 

represented by counsel. Id. at 404. A plurality of Justices also identified two other 

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possible exceptions – where a state court, “without justification, refuse[s] to rule on 

constitutional claim that has been properly presented to it,” and where “after the time for 

direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant may obtain compelling evidence that 

he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and which he could not 

have uncovered in a timely manner.” Id. at 405. The Ninth Circuit has since recognized 

the validity of the first possible exception identified by the Lackawanna plurality. 

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held a habeas corpus petitioner could challenge the use of 

one of his prior convictions to enhance his sentence under the Three Strikes Law where

the state appellate court had previously summarily denied his claim for relief as to the 

earlier conviction, without reaching the merits, because it had erroneously found that he 

was not “in custody” for purposes of seeking habeas relief. Durbin v. People of the State 

of California, 720 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Saunders has not established he qualifies for any of the exceptions to the general 

rule of Lackawanna. Saunders was represented by counsel at his 1987 conviction. 

(Petr’s Ex. A, ECF No. 7.) He has provided no evidence that he was prevented from 

obtaining timely review of his constitutional challenge to this 1987 conviction, and he has 

provided no evidence of his actual innocence of the crimes of which he was convicted in 

1987. 

Even if Saunders could challenge his 1987 conviction on grounds his plea 

agreement was violated, his claim fails on the merits. “Plea agreements are contractual in 

nature and are measured by contract law standards.” United States v. De la Fuente, 8 

F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993). The Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution 

confers on a defendant the right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement. Brown v. 

Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant 

degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 

inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 

404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 

/ / /

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Saunders has not established his 1987 plea agreement included a promise his 

convictions would never be used as serious or violent felonies to enhance a future 

sentence. Saunders has attached the plea form he signed in his 1987 vehicular 

manslaughter convictions. (Petr’s Ex. A, ECF No. 7 at 45-48.) While the plea form does 

not contain an indication the vehicular manslaughter convictions he pleaded guilty to are 

“serious” or “violent” crimes, there is also nothing on the plea form indicating the 

prosecutor promised Saunders the convictions would never be subject to changes in the 

law that would designate the convictions as “serious” or “violent.” At its heart, 

Saunders’ assertion that the 1987 plea agreement was breached rests on an argument that 

the prosecutor promised him state law would not change and that, if it did, the law would 

not be applied to him. There is no evidence such a promise was made, or that a 

prosecutor would have the authority to make such a promise. Accordingly it is perfectly 

clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim and therefore 

Saunders is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

F. Vagueness (subclaim of ground 2)

Saunders also contends Penal Code §§ 667.5, 1192.7, and 1170.126 are 

unconstitutionally vague. (See Am. Pet. at 29-32.) This claim does not appear in the 

petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 9.) Thus, like 

the preceding two claims, it is not exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 

481 U.S. at 133-34; Johnson, 88 F.3d at 829. This Court may nevertheless deny the 

petition if it is “perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal 

claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624. 

“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, 

liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ Our cases establish that the 

Government violates this guarantee by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property 

under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 

conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. 

United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2552, 2556 (2015), citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 

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U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). Thus, in order to avoid a claim of unconstitutional vagueness, 

“[a] penal statute [must] define the criminal offense (1) with sufficient definiteness that 

ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) in a manner that does 

not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Skilling v. United States, 561

U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010) (alterations in original) (quotations marks omitted); Shumate v. 

Newland, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In Kolender, the Court stated:

As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a 

penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 

ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 

manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 

L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 39 

L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 

2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 

U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Connally v. General 

Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). 

Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and 

arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more 

important aspect of vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but the other 

principal element of the doctrine – the requirement that a legislature 

establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Smith, supra, 

415 U.S. at 574, 94 S. Ct. at 1247–1248. Where the legislature fails to 

provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit “a 

standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 

pursue their personal predilections.” Id., at 575, 94 S. Ct. at 1248.7

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58.

The statutes at issue here are nothing like the statute declared unconstitutionally 

vague in Kolender. The statute at issue in Kolender required loiterers to provide 

“credible and reliable” identification and “account for their presence” when asked by a 

police officer. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. Because the statute gave “full discretion . . . to 

the police to determine whether the suspect has provided a ‘credible and reliable’ 

identification” and “encourage[ed] arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with 

sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute,” the statute 

was deemed unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 360-61. In contrast, Penal Code §§ 667.5, 

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1192.7, and 1170.126 do not give discretion to determine what conduct violates the 

statute. Penal Code § 667.5(c) defines violent felonies and Penal Code § 1192.7 defines 

serious felonies. While Saunders is correct that neither of those provisions include Penal 

Code § 191.5 in their definitions, Penal Code § 1170.126, which codifies the recall and 

resentencing procedure for those eligible under Proposition 36, states that an inmate is 

eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 only if “[t]he inmate has no prior 

convictions for any of the offenses appearing in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of 

paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 . . . .” Penal Code § 1170.126(e)(3). 

Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV) specifically lists Penal Code § 191.5 as an offense that 

renders a defendant ineligible for resentencing under § 170.126. Penal Code 

§ 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV). Moreover, Penal Code § 1170.126 does not give police, 

prosecutors, or the court discretion as to what conduct renders a petitioner ineligible for 

resentencing under Proposition 36. 

There is nothing vague about the applicable statutes. Saunders is not entitled to 

relief as to this claim.

G. Equal Protection (subclaim of ground 2)

Saunders also contends the denial of his Proposition 36 petition violates the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. (Am. Pet. at 29.) This claim does not 

appear in the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 

9.) Thus, like the preceding three claims, it is not exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), 

(c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34; Johnson, 88 F.3d at 829. This Court may 

nevertheless deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even 

a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624.

An equal protection claim is analyzed as follows:

The Equal Protection Clause does not require identical treatment; 

rather, it “guarantees that the government will not classify individuals on 

the basis of impermissible criteria.” Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 

F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997). Because “legislative classifications as a 

general rule are presumptively valid under the Equal Protection Clause,’ 

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we ordinarily must uphold a legislative classification if it is “‘rationally

related to a legitimate state interest.’” Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. 

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 

(1985)). 

Certain exceptions to that general rule trigger heightened judicial 

scrutiny. If the classification targets a suspect class or burdens the 

exercise of a fundamental right, we apply strict scrutiny and ask whether 

the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 

interest. Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 

1141 (9th Cir. 2011). If a law discriminates against a quasi-suspect class, 

it is subject to intermediate scrutiny; to survive a constitutional challenge, 

such discrimination must substantially relate to an important 

governmental objective. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479-80 (9th Cir.

2014), petitions for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) 

(No. 14-765), (U.S. Jan. 2, 2015) (No. 14-788), and (U.S. Apr. 9, 2015) 

(No. 141214).

Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2015).

The statute at issue is presumptively valid because it does not target a suspect 

class, such as race, or quasi suspect class, such as gender. Accordingly, because the 

statute is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of sentencing defendants 

who are repeat offenders with serious or violent prior convictions more severely than 

those who do not, it is a valid exercise of government authority. See id. There is no 

equal protection violation. Saunders is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

H. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (ground 4)

In ground four, Saunders contends his counsel at the Proposition 36 hearing was 

ineffective because when asked by the judge whether she had any evidence or argument 

to present in support of the petition, she said “We would submit to the Court on this 

issue.” (Lodgment No. 1 at 4.) Saunders raised this claim in the petition for review he 

filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 9.) The California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 10.) Thus, this Court 

must “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis 

for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court stated that because Saunders’ claims 

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failed on the merits, it was unnecessary to address the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. (Lodgment No. 6 at 2.)

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Saunders must 

establish that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). He must also show he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors by 

establishing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are 

both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (citations omitted). These standards are 

“difficult to meet” and “demand[] that state court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Federal habeas relief functions 

as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” and not 

simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979).) “Representation is constitutionally ineffective 

only if it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the 

defendant was denied a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Saunders contends counsel should have argued that he was eligible for 

resentencing under Proposition 36 because his prior convictions are not “serious” or 

“violent” under California law. (Am. Pet. at 39-42.) Even if the Court assumes counsel 

should have so argued, Saunders has not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

alleged errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As discussed above in Section III(D) of this 

Report and Recommendation, Penal Code § 192(c)(4), which Saunders pleaded guilty to,

and § 191.5(b), a statute included among those which render a person statutorily 

ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36, prohibit the same conduct and contain 

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the same elements of the offense. Penal Code § 192(c)(4) was simply renumbered as 

Penal Code § 191.5(b). See Penal Code §§ 1170.126(e) and 667(e)(2)(C). There is no 

reasonable likelihood that the state court judge hearing Saunders’ Proposition 36 petition 

would have granted it had counsel argued more forcefully for Saunders. Id. Indeed, the 

arguments made by Saunders, which Saunders contends counsel should have raised at the 

hearing on his Proposition 36 hearing, were rejected by the California Appellate Court 

and the California Supreme Court in Saunders’ case. (Lodgment Nos. 6, 10.)

The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Saunders is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

I. Request for Discovery, Appointment of Counsel, and Evidentiary Hearing

On page 35 of his Amended Petition, Saunders asks for discovery and for this 

Court to appoint counsel. (Am. Pet. at 35.) Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules following 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 provide for discovery in habeas cases. Rule 6(a) entitles litigants “to 

invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, 

and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his [or her] discretion and for good 

cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.” Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

Rule 7 empowers the Court to order the production of documentary evidence independent 

of adversarial hearing and at any stage of habeas review. See Rule 7, 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254. However, “[a] habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is 

not entitled to discovery as a matter of course.” Bracy v. Bramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 

(1997). In order to be entitled to discovery, a petitioner must make specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate good cause to believe that the petitioner may, through 

discovery, be able to garner sufficient evidence to entitle him to relief. See id. at 908-09. 

Saunders has not specifically stated what discovery he seeks or how discovery would 

assist him in establishing he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for discovery.

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Saunders also asks that counsel be appointed. The Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v. 

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 

1986). However, financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the 

interests of justice so require.’” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2005); 

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 

1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984). The interests of justice require appointment of counsel when 

the court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; 

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728; Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The appointment of 

counsel is discretionary when no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Terrovona, 912 F.2d 

at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. As discussed below, Saunders is not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing, and thus the Court must exercise its discretion.

In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not 

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that 

appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney v. Lewis, 801 

F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. Here, Saunders has 

sufficiently represented himself to date. He has a good grasp of this case and the legal 

issues involved. Under such circumstances, a district court does not abuse its discretion 

in denying a state prisoner’s request for appointment of counsel as it is simply not 

warranted by the interests of justice. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 

1987). Accordingly, the Court finds that the interests of justice do not require the 

appointment of counsel, and Saunders’ request for appointment of counsel is therefore 

DENIED.

Saunders also asks for an evidentiary hearing. (Am. Pet. at 31.) Evidentiary 

hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDPA, which “substantially restricts the 

district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 

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1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) control this 

decision:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim 

in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing 

on the claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on –

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; 

and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the 

applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West 2006).

In order to determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the court must first 

“determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Baja, 187 F.3d at 

1078). If not, the court must “ascertain whether the petitioner has ‘failed to develop the 

factual basis of the claim in State court.’” Id. at 669-70. A failure to develop the factual 

basis of a claim in state court implies “some lack of diligence, or some greater fault, 

attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

420, 432 (2000). The Supreme Court has said that “[d]iligence will require in the usual 

case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the 

manner prescribed by state law.” Id. at 437. 

Pursuant to Pinholster, Saunders is limited to the facts presented to the state court. 

In Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that where habeas claims have been decided on 

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their merits in state court, a federal court’s review must be confined to the record that was 

before the state court. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82. Saunders can only proceed to 

develop additional evidence in federal court if either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) is first 

satisfied. See Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “an 

evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) 

precludes habeas relief” and citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 203, n. 20). Neither 

§ 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) have been satisfied here for all the reasons discussed above. 

Accordingly, Saunders’ request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be 

entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

In addition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for discovery, 

request for appointment of counsel, and request for an evidentiary hearing are DENIED.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 3, 2017 any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 17, 2017. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2016

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