Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03356/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03356-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(B).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 24, 2010*

Decided March 25, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3356

KAY KIM,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

GEORGE F. PARKER, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:09‐cv‐829‐DFH‐JMS

David F. Hamilton,

Judge.

O R D E R

Kay Kim filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations

related to an upcoming competency hearing in a state prosecution on misdemeanor charges.

Kim complained that the judge and psychiatrist had taken away her right of self‐

representation without due process and were conspiring to have her indefinitely committed

to a mental institution.  She sued the judge who ordered the hearing; the court‐appointed

psychiatrist who evaluated her; and the psychiatrist’s employer, Indiana University.  The

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3356 Page 2

district court dismissed Kim’s federal lawsuit, concluding that none of the defendants could

be sued under § 1983.  Kim appeals, and we affirm.

Kim alleged in the complaint that the judge knew she could not be convicted of the

criminal charges and so concocted this scheme to have her committed in lieu of going to

trial.  Kim asserted that the judge, upon receiving the report of the court‐appointed

psychiatrist diagnosing her with a paranoid personality disorder, appointed a lawyer to

represent her at the competency hearing—an act she says unfairly deprived her of her right

to self‐representation.

The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  The court concluded

that the state‐court judge was entitled to absolute immunity because she had ordered the

competency examination and hearing in her official capacity.  The court also determined

that the psychiatrist had absolute immunity because his immunity was “co‐extensive” with

that of the judge who appointed him as an expert.  Finally, the court found that Indiana

University, as a state university, has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and,

additionally, could not be held liable under § 1983 solely on the basis of its status as the

psychiatrist’s employer.

On appeal Kim asserts that the judge was not entitled to immunity because she had

acted without any jurisdiction.  According to Kim, the judge lacked jurisdiction because the

statute of limitations had run on her criminal cases.  But the statute of limitations provides a

defense to criminal charges and does not affect a court’s jurisdiction.  See Wallace v. State,

753 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 2001).  More significantly, judges have absolute immunity in § 1983

actions seeking monetary damages for judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction.  Pierson v.

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553‐55 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351‐52 (1871).  Judges are

immune for their judicial acts even if they commit “grave procedural errors,” act

“maliciously,” or exceed the bounds of their authority as long as the case is not clearly

outside their subject matter jurisdiction.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356‐57 & n.7, 359

(1978).  Here, the judge had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the misdemeanor charges

against Kim.

Kim next attacks the grant of immunity for the court‐appointed psychiatrist and

asserts that those who conspire with a judge are not protected by the judge’s immunity.  But

“court‐appointed experts, including psychiatrists, are absolutely immune from liability for

damages when they act at the court’s direction.”  Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th

Cir. 2009); see Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1965); Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d

924, 928‐29 (7th Cir. 1963); Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1959); see also Hughes

v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127‐28 (3d Cir. 2001); Morstad v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 147 F.3d 741,

744 (8th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. United States, 547 F.2d 688, 693 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Burkes v.

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No. 09‐3356 Page 3

Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970).  The court‐appointed psychiatrist’s own immunity

was a proper basis for dismissal.

Regarding Indiana University, Kim asserts that the university is not entitled to

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because, she says, it is separable from the state,

as reflected by its independent efforts to raise funds from the public.  This assertion is

misguided.  Indiana University is an arm of the state and shares its sovereign immunity.

See Peirick v. Ind. Univ‐Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 694‐95 (7th Cir.

2007); Porco v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 453 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2006).  The university’s

independent power to raise funds does not affect its immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment.  See Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 1987).

AFFIRMED.

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