Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01546/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01546-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

CASE NO. 14cr2590WQH

CASE NO. 16cv1546WQH

vs. ORDER

URIEL MENDOZA-MARTINEZ,

Defendant/Petitioner.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by

Defendant/Petitioner. (ECF No. 28). 

Defendant/Petitioner was charged in a single count Information with illegal

reentry in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1326(a) and (b). (ECF No. 9). 

On September 25, 2014, Defendant/Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the

Information pursuant to a Plea Agreement. (ECF No. 15). In the Plea Agreement,

Defendant/Petitioner admitted, in relevant part, that on or about July 19, 2013 he

“suffered a felony conviction for Inflict Corporal Injury to Spouse/Cohabitant, in

violation of California Penal Code, Section 273.5(E), in the Superior Court of

California, County of Riverside” and that he was lawfully removed from the United

States on January 21, 2014. Id. at 3. The Plea Agreement further stated:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in the plea agreement,

defendant waives to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to

collaterally attack the conviction and any lawful restitution order, except

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a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end of the guideline range (pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1) 

recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing. If the custodial sentence is greater than the high end of that range, defendant may appeal, but the Government will be free to support on appeal the sentence actually imposed. 

(ECF No. 15 at 11). Defendant signed the plea agreement, and initialed the page

including the waiver of appeal provision. Defendant certified that he had read the plea

agreement and fully discussed the agreement with his counsel. Defendant affirmed that

he was satisfied with his counsel. 

On January 5, 2015, the Court held a sentencing hearing. As set forth in the

Presentence Report, the Court applied the 16-level upward adjustment pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) which states, “if the defendant was deported . . . after –

a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence.” The Court concluded that the

conviction for Inflict Corporal Injury to Spouse/Cohabitant, in violation of California

Penal Code, Section 273.5(E), in the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside

constituted a felony crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).1

 The

Government recommended and the Court found the total offense level was 17, the

criminal history category was IV, and the guideline range was 37-46 months, after the

fast track departure. The Government recommended a sentence of 37 months. The

Court imposed a term of imprisonment of 46 months. (ECF No. 26). Defendant did

not appeal his sentence or file any petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 within the one-year

period set out in the 18 U.S.C. §2255(f). 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Defendant/Petitioner moves the Court to vacate his sentence on the grounds that

1

 Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), “‘Crime of violence’ means any of the following

offenses under federal, state, or local law: Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated

assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not

legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced),

statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of

credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal, state, or local law that

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another.” U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 Application Note 1(B)(iii). (emphasis added). The

language referred to as the “elements clause” appears in bold. 

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the 16-level upward enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) is

unconstitutional based upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson

v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Plaintiff United States of America contends

that the motion to vacate sentence should be denied on the grounds that Johnson has no

application to this case, any claim in the petition other than a claim based upon Johnson

is time barred, and Defendant/Petitioner has waived his right to challenge his sentence.

APPLICABLE LAW

28 U.S.C. §2255 provides that “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court

established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,

or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence

was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral

attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct

the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. §2255.

RULING OF THE COURT

In this case, the record conclusively shows that the Defendant has waived his

right to bring a § 2255 motion. In exchange for the Government’s concessions in the

plea agreement, the Defendant waived “to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal

or to collaterally attack the conviction and any lawful restitution order, except a postconviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless

the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end of the guideline range

(pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1) recommended by the Government pursuant to this

agreement at the time of sentencing. If the custodial sentence is greater than the high

end of that range, defendant may appeal, but the Government will be free to support on

appeal the sentence actually imposed.” (ECF No. 15 at 11). This waiver is clear,

express, and unequivocal. Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain

language will generally be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its

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face and the waiver was knowing and voluntary. United States v.Bibler, 495 F.3d 621,

623-24 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendant/Petitioner makes no claim that the plea agreement

was not knowing or voluntary. 

At the time of sentencing, the Government recommended an adjusted offense

level of 17 and a resulting guideline range of 37-46 months. (ECF No. 20). The

Government recommended a sentence of 37 months. (ECF No. 26). The Court imposed

a sentence of 46 months. (ECF No. 26). The sentence imposed was within the guideline

range recommended by the Government pursuant to the Plea Agreement at the time of

sentencing. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant waived his right

to appeal or to collaterally attack his conviction in this case. Even without the waiver,

the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is barred by the “1-year period of limitation”

provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

Finally, the Defendant/Petitioner presents no exception to the waiver in the plea

agreement or any grounds for relief under Section 2255 based upon Johnson.

2

 On June

26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court determined that the section of the Armed

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) known as the “residual clause” was void for vagueness

in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The ACCA residual clause

provided enhanced penalties for a defendant with a “violent felony,” that is, a felony

that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).3

 The Supreme Court in Johnson limited the

application of its holding to the residual clause of the ACCA. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at

2 The Supreme Court subsequently determined that Johnson stated a “new substantive

rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.” Welch v. United States, 136 S.

Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016). 

3 The ACCA defines “violent felony” as follows: “any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that—(I) has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson,

or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B). (emphasis added). The

language referred to as the “residual clause” appears in bold. 

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2563. (“Today’s decision does not call into question application of the Act to . . . the

remainder of the Act’s definition.”). 

Defendant/Petitioner was not sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924 or under any

provision similar to the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The sentence

challenged by the Defendant/Petitioner was based upon the conclusion that the

Defendant/Petitioner had sustained a prior conviction for a “crime of violence” which

“has as an element the use, or attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person of another” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), not the residual clause

language “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) found unconstitutionally vague in

Johnson.

Clearly established authority in the Ninth Circuit holds that California Penal

Code § 273.5 is a categorical crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C.

§ 16(a) which applies to “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 16(a).4

 In Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010), the Court of

Appeals held that “§ 273.5(a) requires that ‘corporal injury results from a direct

application of force on the victim by the defendant.’” Id. at 1085 (citing People v.

Jackson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 810 (2000)). See also United States v. Lauricio-Yeno,

590 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (“§273.5’s text does not apply to conduct outside the

term ‘crime of violence’ as defined in the Guidelines. To the contrary, it fits squarely

within the term by requiring the deliberate use of force that injures another”) and United

States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 752 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[N]othing in Johnson [130

S. Ct. 1265 (2010)] undermines the validity of Lauricio-Yeno, a conclusion we already

4 This language is identical to the language “or any other offense under federal, state,

or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person of another” in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 Application Note 1(B)(iii) applied to the

Defendant/Petitioner in this case. 

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reached in Banuelos-Ayon, and we reaffirm today.”). This Court concludes that no

portion of the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson calls into question the

elements clause of the definition of “crime of violence” pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) or the legality of the sentence imposed in this case. Any claim

outside the Johnson claim is waived by the plea agreement, time-barred by 28 U.S.C.

2255(f), as well as procedurally defaulted. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by

Defendant/Petitioner (ECF No. 28) is denied.

DATED: October 26, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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