Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02324/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02324-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cvp Civil Rights (Personal Property)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL BLOOM, STEPHEN

CHATZKY, TONY DIAZ, VALERIE

GRISCHY, PENNY HELMS,

BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, DOUG

HIGGINS, SUZONNE KEITH,

GERALD STARK, ANNA STARK, and

DAVID WILSON, individually and on

behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17-CV-2324-AJB-MSB

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, 

(Doc. No. 93); AND

(2) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

AS MOOT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, (Doc. 

No. 109).

Presently before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”), and (2) Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Doc. Nos. 

93, 109.) Defendant City of San Diego (“the City”) opposes both motions. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a SAC and

DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case challenges the City of San Diego’s ticketing and impoundment of vehicles 

used by homeless individuals as shelter. At the time of the filing of the First Amended 

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Complaint, the City had been issuing citations under two City ordinances: (1) its ordinance 

prohibiting RV parking from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m., San Diego Muni. Code § 86.0139(a) 

(“the nighttime RV parking ordinance”); and (2) its ordinance prohibiting vehicle 

habitation, San Diego Muni. Code § 86.0137(f) (“the Original VHO”). (First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. No. 14, ¶ 50, 52.) Plaintiffs alleged both ordinances violated the 

constitutional and statutory rights of San Diego residents with no other shelter options 

besides their vehicles, including persons with disabilities who, due to their disabilities, are 

unable to access housing. (Id. ¶ 64, 129.) 

On August 26, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin 

enforcement of both ordinances. (Doc. No. 26.) On August 21, 2018, the Court enjoined 

enforcement of the Original VHO, but denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction 

as to “the nighttime RV parking ordinance.” (Doc. No. 44.) As a result of the preliminary 

injunction, the San Diego City Council repealed the Original VHO on February 25, 2019.

Then, on May 14, 2019, the San Diego City Council enacted a new vehicle habitation 

ordinance (“the New VHO”)—which is not a part of the current lawsuit—in response to 

concerns about the public health and safety effects of the repeal. (Doc. No. 103.) The New 

VHO prohibits San Diego residents from parking their vehicles for habitation anywhere in 

the City between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. except at a handful of designated 

lots, and from parking within 500 feet of any residence or school at any time. See San 

Diego Muni. Code § 86.0137(f). Violations of the New VHO may be charged as infractions 

or misdemeanors. If charged as a misdemeanor, violations carry a sentence of up to six 

months in jail and a $1,000 fine. See San Diego Muni. Code § 12.0201.

Plaintiffs alleges like they had before, that the New VHO is unconstitutionally vague 

and targets Plaintiffs and putative class members who reside in their vehicles due to having 

no other viable shelter options that meet their needs. (Doc. No. 93-1 at 6.) Plaintiffs seek 

to amend their complaint, to assert new claims of relief as to the New VHO. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs initiated this action challenging the City’s ticketing and impoundment of 

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vehicles used by homeless individuals on November 15, 2017. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs 

amended the original Complaint on February 14, 2018. (Doc. No. 14.) On June 8, 2018, 

the Court denied the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act 

and Rehabilitation Act claims. (Doc. No. 36.) On August 21, 2018, the Court granted in 

part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and enjoined the City 

from ticketing any vehicle or impounding any vehicle on the basis of violating the Original 

VHO. (Doc. No. 44.) On February 5, 2019, the San Diego City Council, in response to the 

preliminary injunction, voted unanimously to repeal the Original VHO. (Doc. No. 93-1 at 

8.) However, the City enacted the New VHO on May 14, 2019, which amends San Diego 

Muni. Code § 86.0137(f) to restrict living in vehicles. (Id.)

On November 18, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave to file a SAC. 

(Doc. No. 93.) On December 17, 2019, the City opposed, and on December 24, 2019, 

Plaintiffs replied. (Doc. Nos. 103, 107.) The deadline for class discovery was December 

22, 2019, and Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, filed January 21, 2020, is currently 

pending before the Court. (Doc. Nos. 92, 109.) This order follows. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend the 

party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 

served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party may amend only by leave of the 

court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice 

so requires. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court is to apply this policy of granting leave 

with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th 

Cir. 2001)).

In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the court considers five factors: “(1) 

bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; 

and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 

375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). The factors are not given equal weight and futility alone 

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is sufficient to justify the denial of a motion to amend. Washington v. Lowe’s HIW Inc., 75 

F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 2014). “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the 

opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052. 

“Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [ ] factors, there exists a 

presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs propose amending their complaint to address the impact of the New VHO 

on the same class and subclass of individuals impacted by the Original VHO and the 

nighttime RV parking ordinance. (Doc. No. 93-1 at 10.) The proposed amendments seek 

to add factual allegations to existing claims for relief to address the New VHO, in addition 

to entirely new causes of action. As addressed below, the Court concludes that leave to 

amend is appropriate. 

A. Bad Faith, Undue Delay, and Previous Amendments 

First, although Plaintiffs have had a previous opportunity to amend, the Court finds 

no bad faith or undue delay in Plaintiffs’ request. Plaintiffs could not have anticipated the 

need to amend their complaint to address the New VHO at the time they filed the existing 

operative complaint. The New VHO did not exist at that time and was enacted in response 

to the Court’s preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Original VHO. See 

DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[D]elay alone is not 

sufficient to justify the denial of a motion requesting leave to amend.”). 

B. Prejudice

Second, the City has not met its burden of demonstrating prejudice. “The party 

opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, 833 F.2d 

at 187. “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [Rule 15] factors, 

there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence 

Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052 (emphasis in original).

Here, the proposed SAC presents no surprises factually or legally, and does not add 

significant evidentiary burdens. The City enacted the New VHO in response to the Court’s 

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order enjoining enforcement of the Original VHO and therefore, the City knew that the 

New VHO could potentially impact the same group of Plaintiffs and putative class 

members impacted by the Original VHO. (Doc. No. 93-1 at 12.) Additionally, Plaintiffs 

point out that any evidentiary burden will be minimal because the City officials and 

departments involved with the New VHO largely overlap with those of the other ordinances 

at issue. (Id. at 13.) The ordinance was also recently enacted, so any discovery would not 

be unreasonably voluminous. (Id.) Thus, this factor weighs in favor of permitting 

amendment. 

C. Futility

Lastly, allowing amendment to add new claims, and new factual allegations to 

existing claims would not be futile. “While some courts liken the futility inquiry with that 

of a motion to dismiss,” most recognize that denial of leave to amend on futility grounds 

is rare. Defazio v. Hollister, Inc., No. Civ. 04–1358, 2008 WL 2825045, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

July 21, 2008) (quoting Netbula v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).

Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of “challenges to the merits of a proposed 

amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” 

Utterkar v. Ebix, Inc., No. 14-CV-02250-LHK, 2015 WL 5027986, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

25, 2015) (citing Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).

First, many of Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments relate to existing claims for relief, 

but only add new factual allegations relevant to the New VHO. (Doc. No. 93-1 at 14–16.) 

Plaintiffs points out the proposed factual allegations are similar to the to the prior claims

regarding the Original VHO, which either have survived a motion to dismiss or which the 

Court has already determined provides an adequate basis to issue a preliminary injunction. 

(Id.) While it cannot be determined at this time whether the New VHO will meet a similar 

fate, there is certainly support that these amendments would not be futile.

In opposition, the City argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments are not ripe for 

judicial review because “none of the Named Plaintiffs have been cited under the New 

VHO” and Plaintiffs only seek to amend their complaint to challenge to how the New VHO 

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will “likely be enforced.” (Doc. No. 103 at 11–12.) However, Plaintiffs allege that this is 

incorrect, and certain Named Plaintiffs have indeed experienced warnings and citations as 

a result of the New VHO. (Doc. No. 107 at 6–7.) Furthermore, the City’s own documents 

indicate that the issue is ripe. Based on the City’s documents, the San Diego Police 

Department has made 802 contacts under the New VHO, issued 675 warnings, issued 111 

citations, and made 16 arrests. (See Flores Declaration, Doc. No. 103-14, Exhibit A.) 

In addition to adding new factual allegations to existing causes of action, Plaintiffs 

also seek to add entirely new claims for violations of: (1) the Fourth Amendment and the 

California Constitution’s right to be secure from unreasonable seizures, (2) the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s right to procedural due process, (3) the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’

rights to be free from excessive fines, and (4) the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ right 

to association. (Doc. No. 93-1 at 16–17.)

The City asserts that Plaintiffs’ proposal to add Fourth Amendment claims is futile 

because Plaintiffs will not be able to prove causation. But the Court will defer consideration 

of this “challenge[] to the merits” until after “the amended pleading is filed.” Utterkar, 

2015 WL 5027986, at *3. At this juncture, there is not enough for the Court to conclude

that the amendment would be futile. The City additionally argues Plaintiffs’ allegations 

regarding the Fourth Amendment are “new theories of recovery based on old facts, with 

no explanation of why Plaintiffs failed to raise these causes of action two years ago when 

the lawsuit was initiated.” (Doc. No. 103 at 14–15.) To this point, the Court agrees, and 

Plaintiffs are reminded that leave to amend to add allegations relevant to the New VHO is 

not an invitation for Plaintiffs to bootstrap new allegations to claims that are only relevant 

to the Original VHO. The door has closed on Plaintiffs’ opportunity to develop their theory 

of the case as to the Original VHO. See Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 898 

(9th Cir. 1982) (denying leave to amend where “amended complaint was brought only to 

assert new theories, if anything, and was not premised upon new facts.”).

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court does not find any indicia of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or 

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futility that would warrant denying Plaintiffs’ request. Thus, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their SAC. Plaintiffs will have until May 1, 2020 to file 

their amended complaint consistent with this Court’s order. The Court additionally 

VACATES the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and DENIES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Plaintiffs 

may renew their motion for class certification after an opportunity for discovery on the 

New VHO. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 22, 2020

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