Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01563/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01563-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ERIC HENRIKSON, an individual;

IRIS KIEVERNAGEL, individually

and as administrator of the

estate of JOSEPH KIEVERNAGEL;

PATSY KIEVERNAGEL; JOSEPH

KIEVERNAGEL; and KATHLEEN

HAMILTON and THOMAS BLOUNT,

individually and as successors

in interest to the estate of

KEVIN BLOUNT,

NO. CIV. S-06-1563 WBS DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO STRIKE

TURBOMECA, S.A., a French

corporation; LA SOCIÉTÉ

ANONYME TURBOMECA FRANCÉ, a

French corporation; TURBOMECA

USA, a Texas corporation; and

TURBOMECA ENGINE CORPORATION,

a Texas corporation,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants

Turbomeca, S.A., a French corporation, La Société Anonyme

Turbomeca Francé, a French corporation, Turbomeca USA, a Texas

corporation, and Turbomeca Engine Corporation, a Texas

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corporation (together “Turbomeca”), alleging that Turbomeca

defectively designed and manufactured a helicopter engine

component which led to a helicopter crash that killed two

passengers and seriously injured a third. Defendants now bring a

motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(f).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department owned and

operated a Eurocopter EC-120-B single-engine helicopter known as

“Star VI.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) The Star VI was powered by an Arrius

2J engine, serial number 34144, containing a fuel control unit

(“FCU”), numbered 147-B, manufactured by the French Turbomeca

corporations. (Compl. ¶ 54.) The FCU 147-B contains a part

known as a “constant delta-P valve diaphragm,” which acts as a

seal between two differently-pressured fuel chambers in the

engine. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Damage to the diaphragm can result in an

excessive delivery of fuel to the engine, which can cause

overheating and additional serious engine problems. (Compl. ¶

42.)

On July 13, 2005, the Star VI experienced an engine

malfunction, which caused the helicopter to crash. (Compl. ¶

77.) Sheriff’s Deputies Joseph Kievernagel and Kevin Blount were

killed in the crash. (Id.) Sheriff’s Deputy Eric Henrikson

survived, but sustained severe and disabling injuries. (Id.)

On July 13, 2006, plaintiffs Deputy Eric Henrikson,

Iris Kievernagel (Joseph Kievernagel’s widow), individually and

as administrator of the estate of Deputy Joseph Kievernagel,

Patsy Kievernagel (Joseph Kievernagel’s mother), Joseph

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Kievernagel (Joseph Kievernagel’s father), Kathleen Hamilton

(Kevin Blount’s mother) and Thomas Blount (Kevin Blount’s

father), individually and as successors in interest to the estate

of Deputy Kevin Blount, (together “plaintiffs”), filed a

complaint against defendants alleging: 1) strict liability--

defective design and manufacture; 2) strict liability--failure to

warn; 3) negligence--design, manufacture, and installation; 4)

negligence--failure to warn; 5) breach of implied and express

warranty; and 6) fraud. Plaintiffs contend that defendants

incorrectly installed the diaphragm inside-out in the FCU 147-B

engine, which caused it to deteriorate over time and eventually

rupture, thus causing the crash.

In their motion to strike, defendants first object to

paragraphs 11 through 37 and 69 through 73 of the complaint, as

well as Exhibit A attached thereto, which recount a prior lawsuit

and subsequent judgment stemming from a crash involving a

different Turbomeca engine in 1993. (Mot. to Strike 4.) 

Defendants contend that these matters would be inadmissible into

evidence, and are thus solely prejudicial. (Id.) Secondly,

defendants object to paragraphs 85 and 89 of the complaint, which

contain detailed narratives of Deputies Kievernagel and Blount’s

experience during the several seconds prior to and during the

crash. (Id.) Defendants argue that these allegations do not

support any claim under which plaintiffs can recover. (Id.)

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the court

may strike from any pleadings any “redundant, immaterial,

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impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “Redundant” has been defined

as including allegations that “constitute a needless repetition

of other averments or which are foreign to the issue.” Wilkerson

v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). “Immaterial”

matter is that which has no essential or important relationship

to the claim for relief or the defenses pled. Fogerty, 984 F.2d

at 1527. “Impertinent” matter is that which does not pertain,

and is not necessary, to the issues in question. Id. 

“Scandalous” has been defined as allegations that “improperly

cast[] a derogatory light on someone, usually a party.” 

Wilkerson, 229 F.R.D. at 170.

Such motions are designed “to avoid the expenditure of

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” 

Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.

1983). Additionally, “motions to strike requests for certain

types of relief, such as punitive or compensatory damages, are

generally granted if such relief is not recoverable under the

applicable law.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.37[3] at 12-

96, 12-97 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2000). 

Motions to strike are generally disfavored, however,

because they are “often used as delaying tactics, and because of

the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice.” 

Buereerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996)

(citation and internal quotations omitted). Rather than avoiding

the expenditure of time and money, they most often have the

effect of expending more time and money in litigating the motion

itself. Furthermore, “motions to strike should not be granted

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unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the

allegation would be admissible, or those issues could have no

possible bearing on the issues in the litigation.” Gay-Straight

Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified School Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d

1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

B. Prior Litigation and Judgments

1. Complaint Paragraphs 11-37 and 69-73

Defendants argue that the references in the complaint

to prior litigation and judgments, stemming from a 1993 crash of

a helicopter containing a different Turbomeca engine, are

prejudicial, inadmissible, and immaterial. First, defendants’

contention that these references in the complaint will prejudice

the jury against them is simply false. Pleadings such as the

complaint, while generally available to the public, are not

evidence admitted at trial, nor are they given to the jury for

consideration. 

Defendants’ argument regarding the admissibility of the

prior judgments is similarly without merit. Most important, as

noted above, the mere inclusion of facts in a complaint does not

constitute their admission into evidence. Defendants argue that

any facts which would be inadmissible at trial must be stricken,

citing to the fact that a motion to strike must not be granted

“unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the

allegation would be admissible.” (Mot. to Strike 9 (citing

United States v. S. Ca. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 973

(E.D. Cal. 2004)).) This language simply stands for the

principle that when an allegation in a complaint would not be a

proper means for relief then striking it may be proper. 

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The prior crash and resulting litigation cited in this

complaint, however, are not allegations upon which plaintiffs are

basing their claims for relief--they are merely facts that are

part of a narrative in which plaintiffs’ attempt to demonstrate

defendants’ continuing disregard for safety. Cf. Fogerty, 984

F.2d 1524 (upholding a district courts order to strike

allegations against a particular party because they were barred

by res judicata and the statute limitations). Put simply, the

determination as to whether evidence is inadmissible is not ripe

for decision until an offer has actually been made to introduce

the challenged material into evidence. See Hanley v. Volpe, 305

F. Supp. 977, 981 (E.D. Wisc. 1969).

Finally, with regard to the “materiality” of these

portions of the complaint, defendants are correct that the 1993

accident, and resulting litigation, involved a different

Turbomeca engine, which malfunctioned because of the failure of a

different engine part than at issue here. However, merely

because the prior events would not be direct evidence of the

mechanical failure of the FCU 147-B does not mean that they have

“no essential or important relationship” to plaintiffs’ claims. 

Specifically, plaintiffs’ claim of fraud, as well as their claims

of failure to warn, are based on the theory that Turbomeca had a

continuing company policy of failing to repair known defects. 

The complaint cites the 1993 accident in support of this

assertion. 

It is neither necessary nor proper at this stage for

the court to assess the merits of such an argument, nor the

admissibility of evidence which plaintiffs might proffer in

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support thereof. It is sufficient to note that the prior events

have some “essential or important relationship” to plaintiffs’

arguments in support of their claims. Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527;

see In Re 2TheMart.Com, Inc. Securities Litigation, 114 F. Supp.

2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that courts generally deny

motions to strike allegations in a complaint “[i]f there is any

doubt as to whether the allegations might be an issue in the

action.”) (citing Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527). Therefore, these

portions of the complaint will not be stricken.

2. Exhibit A

Exhibit A, submitted with the complaint, consists of a

newspaper advertisement, published by Turbomeca in the Wall

Street Journal following judgment in the previous litigation. 

The exhibit recounts the facts surrounding the incident, and

offers Turbomeca’s opinion on the accident, litigation, and final

judgment. In opposition to this motion to strike, plaintiffs

assert that Exhibit A is necessary to show Turbomeca’s continuing

practice of concealing defects, and additionally that it

constitutes a key party admission.

The sole purpose of a complaint, however, is to offer a

“short and plain statement” of the grounds for relief, so as to

put the opposing party on notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While

the facts surrounding the prior crash, litigation, and judgment

arguably may be relevant to plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and

failure to warn, it is difficult to see the purpose of also

attaching Exhibit A. The facts contained therein are already

explicitly included in paragraphs 11-37 and 69-73 of the

complaint-- the advertisement does not add anything material to

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plaintiffs’ allegations. These portions of the complaint satisfy

Rule 8(a), as they give notice to defendants about plaintiffs’

theory of an ongoing company policy of failing to repair defects. 

Any further repetition of these facts is unnecessary.

Defendants argue that the advertisement constitutes a

“party admission.” As previously discussed, however, this

exhibit is not being introduced into evidence merely because of

its inclusion with the complaint, and the failure to include it

in the complaint conversely does not preclude its admission. If

defendants later seek to have this advertisement admitted into

evidence, and plaintiffs object, defendants may at that point

raise this evidentiary arguments. Accordingly, the court will

strike Exhibit A from the complaint. 

C. Non-recoverable Damages--Complaint Paragraphs 85 and 89

Granting a motion to strike is proper when a certain

“requested relief . . . is not recoverable as a matter of law.” 

Wilkerson, 229 F.R.D. at 172 (citing California Practice Guide:

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9-389-390); Gay-Straight

Alliance, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-11. California’s wrongful

death statute, under which plaintiffs seek relief, is clear that

the damages “are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent

sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or

punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been

entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do not include

damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement.” Cal. Code Civ.

P. § 377.34 (emphasis added); see also Vander Lind v. Superior

Court, 146 Cal.App.3d 358, 264 (1983) (noting how California

courts have “consistently held Code of Civil Procedure section

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Paragraph 85 describes deceased Deputy Kievernagel’s 1

experience, while paragraph 89 describes deceased Deputy Blount’s

experience. Other than the names of the officers (and the names

of the parties seeking relief) both paragraphs are identical.

9

377 and the remedies contained therein completely occupy the

field of wrongful death to the exclusion of any other action or

remedy.”). 

Defendants object to paragraphs 85 and 89 in the

complaint, because “they appear intended to support claims for

emotional distress damages. . . .” (Mot. to Strike 10.) These

two paragraphs contain identical descriptions of the experiences

of the two deceased deputies in the several seconds prior to and

during the crash. The text recounts in detail the deputies’ 1

impending knowledge of the crash, the helicopter’s eventual

impact and destruction, and the lethal injuries and extraordinary

pain experienced by the deputies prior to death. (Compl. ¶¶ 85,

89.) Based on these facts, the plaintiffs “allege[] that [the

deputies] suffered extraordinary mental anguish and terror in

this period of time.” (Id.) From this text, it seems clear that

plaintiffs are improperly seeking damages for pain and suffering.

In their opposition to this motion, plaintiffs contend

that they are not seeking actual damages for pain and suffering,

only punitive damages based on the decedents’ pain and suffering,

which they argue the statute allows. Such a reading of the

statute, while creative, is in direct contravention to the text

and purpose of § 377.34, as well as the law interpreting that

section. First, it must be noted that the statutory exclusion of

“damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement” does not

distinguish between actual and punitive damages--all damages for

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pain and suffering are unrecoverable. See Ambruster v. Monument

3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., 963 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

(refusing to grant damages for pain and suffering); Marron v.

Superior Court, 108 Cal.App.4th 1049 (2003) (same). 

Moreover, it is well established that under California

law, punitive damages may not be assessed absent compensatory

damages. Gagnon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 211 Cal.App.3d 1598 n. 5

(1989); Esparza v. Specht, 55 Cal.App.3d 1 (1976); Mother Cobb’s

Chicken T., Inc. v. Fox, 10 Cal.2d 203, 206 (1937), Cal. Civil

Code § 3294. In a case such as this, where actual damages cannot

be recovered for pain and suffering, punitive damages stemming

from pain and suffering are also improper. Accordingly, all

language in paragraphs 85 and 89 regarding the description of

facts leading to the decedents’ mental anguish and terror are to

be stricken.

Defendants concede, however, that punitive damages are

not wholly improper in this case, because they may be applied to

claims in survival actions for destruction of property. (Mot. to

Strike 10-11; see also Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38

Cal.App.3d 450 (1974)). Indeed, paragraphs 84 and 88,

immediately preceding the two paragraphs sought to be stricken,

describe damage and destruction to various items of the deceased

deputies’ personal property that occurred as a result of the

crash. Thus, the final sentence in paragraphs 85 and 89, in

which the plaintiffs seek “punitive and exemplary damages,” will

not be stricken, as they are not improper as applied to

paragraphs 84 and 88, respectively. 

///

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Exhibit A, and all of

paragraphs 85 and 89 except for the final sentence in each be,

and the same hereby is, STRICKEN. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects,

defendants’ motion to strike be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: December 12, 2006

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