Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01716/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01716-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONICA GRAJEDA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-1716- IEG (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 13.]

vs.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Doc. No. 13.] For the reasons below, Defendants’

motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

This is a mortgage case. Plaintiff Monica Grajeda, proceeding pro se, filed a

complaint in San Diego County Superior Court alleging an array of state law claims,

all of which relating to a purported wrongful foreclosure. [Doc. No. 1 Ex. A.] 

Defendants timely removed to this court, [see Doc. No. 1 at 2], and moved to

dismiss for failure to sate a claim. [Doc. No. 8.] Plaintiff failed to file an

opposition, and the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and with leave

to amend. [See Doc. No. 10.] Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, [Doc. No. 12],

which Defendants presently move to dismiss with prejudice, [Doc. No. 13]. Again,

Plaintiff filed no opposition.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Motions to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) test the sufficiency of this

required showing. New Mexico State Investment Council v. Ernst & Young LLP,

641 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). “Dismissal is proper when the complaint does

not make out a cognizable legal theory or does not allege sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d

1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). And though pro se complaints enjoy “the benefit of any

doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), Rule 8 still “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to add any pertinent facts, much less cure

the numerous deficiencies identified in the Court’s previous order. Even affording

every benefit of the doubt, Plaintiff’s complaint again fails to allege sufficient facts

to support any cognizable legal theory. In “the Ninth Circuit . . . plaintiffs do not

enjoy unlimited opportunities to amend their complaints.” Stone v. Conrad Preby’s,

2013 WL 139939, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1174 (9th Cir.1996)). “Where . . . an amended complaint simply ‘restate[s]

the prior [dismissed claims] without curing their deficiencies,’ the Court properly

dismisses with prejudice.” Roger v. County of San Diego, Cal., 2013 WL 1629208,

at *2 (S.D. Cal. April 15, 2013) (quoting McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1174). Thus, and for

the additional reasons specified below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

1. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim attempts to enforce the United States’

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Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) as a third-party beneficiary. 

[Doc. No. 12 at 15-17.] “To sue as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, the third

party must show that the contract reflects the express or implied intention of the

parties to the contract to benefit the third party.” Klamath Water Users Protective

Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000). Borrowers such as Plaintiff

are incidental rather than intended beneficiaries under HAMP and thus lack standing

to enforce HAMP as third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 2009 WL 4981618, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is DISMISSED.

2. Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Negligence

Plaintiff alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, and negligence, all premised on Defendants’ failure to

modify Plaintiff’s loan under HAMP. [Doc. No. 12 at 15-17.] But Plaintiff fails to

allege any duty of care, fiduciary or otherwise, owed by Defendants. “As a general

rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s

involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional

role as a mere lender of money.” Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co. , Ltd., 642 F.Supp.2d

1153, 1161 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal.App.3d 27, 35

(Cal. 1980). Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that Defendants exceeded their role

as lender of money. Because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing any duty

owed, much less breached, Plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence are DISMISSED.

3. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to modify Plaintiff’s loan under

HAMP constitutes a violation of Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. [Doc.

No. 12 at 17-18.] “To be entitled to procedural due process, a party must show a

liberty or property interest in the benefit for which protection is sought.”

Buckingham v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 603 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010).

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“HAMP does not confer a protected property interest.” Phu Van Nguyen v. BAC

Home Loans Services, LP, 2010 WL 3894986, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010)

(internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Due Process claims are

DISMISSED.

5. Claims Premised on California Penal Code Provisions

Plaintiff also asserts claims under California Penal Code §§115 and 470. [See

Doc. No. 12 at 20-26.] “Generally, criminal statutes do not confer private rights of

action, and thus any party asserting such a private right bears the burden of

establishing its existence.” Bailey v. Clarke, 2012 WL 6720628, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

Dec. 21, 2012) (citing Stupy v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th

Cir. 1991)). Here, “all such claims ‘must be dismissed because Plaintiff has provided

no authority or argument supporting his implicit contention that he may maintain a

private right of action under th[ese] criminal statute[s].’” Id. (quoting Yeager v. City

of San Diego Cal., 2007 WL 7032933, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2007)). Moreover,

“[i]t is well settled that a private citizen may not use the courts as a means of forcing

a criminal prosecution,” Johnson v. Wennes, 2009 WL 1228500, at *4 (S.D. Cal.

May 5, 2009) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974)), and thus “an

individual may not bring criminal charges against someone by filing a complaint in

this Court,” id. (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)); see

also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (private individuals lack

standing to assert criminal statutes). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims premised on

criminal statutes are DISMISSED.

6. Unfair Business Practices Claim

Unfair business practices claims under California Business and Professions

Code § 17200 require allegations of a predicate violation. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc.

v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999); accord McDonald v. Coldwell

Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 2008). As discussed throughout, none of

Plaintiff’s asserted predicate violations is sufficiently pled, and thus neither is

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Plaintiff’s dependant unfair business practices claim. [See infra and supra.] 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s unfair business practices claim is DISMISSED.

7. Fraud Claims

Plaintiff also assert claims for fraud in the inducement, fraud in the

concealment, and violation of California Civil Code section 1572 (Fraud). [Doc.

No. 12 at 37-41.] To state any claim for fraud, Plaintiffs must plead: (1) a

misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of its falsity, (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable

reliance, and (5) resulting damage. Gil v. Bank of Am., N.A., 138 Cal. App. 4th 1371

(Cal. 2006). Here, in federal court, allegations of fraud are subject to the

particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); “the pleader must

state the time, place and specific content of the false representations as well as the

identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Misc. Serv. Workers, Drivers &

Helpers v. Philco–Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted);

see also Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and

how’ of the misconduct charged.” (citation omitted)). Even most liberally

construed, Plaintiff puts forth no allegations demonstrating Defendants’ respective

states of mind. [See Doc. No. 12 at 37-41.] Plaintiff thus fails to state any claim for

fraud. See Quitaro Family Trust v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 2010 WL 392312, at *11

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2010). Thus, Plaintiff’s fraud claims are DISMISSED.

8. Wrongful Foreclosure Claims

Wrongful foreclosure claims require allegations of credible tender.1

 See

Alicia v. G.E. Money Bank, 2009 WL 2136969, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2009)

(“When a debtor is in default of a home mortgage loan, and a foreclosure is either

pending or has taken place, the debtor must allege a credible tender of the amount of

1 In addition to Plaintiff’s seventh cause action expressly titled “wrongful foreclosure,” [see Doc. No. 12 at 33-37], Plaintiff’s claims premised on California Civil Code sections 2923 and 2924, [see Doc. No. 12 at 20], constitute wrongful foreclosure claims and thus fail for lack of tender. See Small v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 3719314, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010). 

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the secured debt to maintain any cause of action for wrongful foreclosure.”). 

Plaintiff again fails to make any such allegation and thus her wrongful foreclosure

claims are DISMISSED. 

9. Quiet Title Claim

 So too, a “quiet title action is doomed in the absence of Plaintiffs’ tender of

the full amount owed.” Gjurovich v. Cal., 2010 WL 4321604, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct.

26, 2010). Because Plaintiff fails to allege tender, see supra, her claim to quiet title

fails, Gjurovich, 2010 WL 4321604, at *8, and is thus DISMISSED.

10. Slander of Title Claim

Slander of title claims require “(1) a publication, (2) which is without

privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and

immediate pecuniary loss.” Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc., 173

Cal.App.4th 1040, 1050 (2009). Plaintiff makes no allegation that the notice of

default at issue was false. [See Doc. No. 12.] This deficiency is fatal, see Velasco v.

Security Nat. Mortg. Co., 823 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1069 (D. Hawai’i 2011), and thus

Plaintiff’s slander of title claim is DISMISSED. 

11. Declaratory Relief Claim

Claims for declaratory relief may be dismissed “where the substantive suit

would resolve the issues raised by the declaratory judgment action.” Fimbres v.

Chapel Mortg. Corp., 2009 WL 4163332, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (internal

quotation omitted). Here, the complaint fails to explain how or what declaratory

relief would address or provide beyond the relief requested pursuant to the

substantive claims. [See Doc. No. 12.] Nor does it explain how a declaratory

judgment would in any way resolve uncertainties aside from those that appear to

constitute Plaintiff’s substantive claims. [Id.] Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief

is thus DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

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dismiss. Plaintiff’s claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE without

leave to amend. The clerk of the court is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 10, 2013 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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