Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02877/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LEE GIVENS, 

CDCR #H-29884,

Civil No. 15cv2877 GPC (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF Doc. No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

TO EFFECT SERVICE OF

SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3)

vs.

A. MILLER, et al.,

Defendants.

 

Robert Lee Givens (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison

(“CEN”) in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint

(“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF Doc. No. 1).

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF Doc. No. 2. 

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I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez

v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave

to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,”

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 2016 WL 112684 at *3 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016) (No. 14-

844); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of

whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of [his]

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v.

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement,

the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the

account for the pastsix months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody ofthe prisoner then

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any

month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those paymentsto the Court until

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

/ / /

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional 1

administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of

Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50

administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement, verified by a prison accounting official pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. See ECF Doc. No. 3; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.

Plaintiff’s statement shows that while he has had $50.01 in average monthly deposits,

and has carried an average monthly balance of $79.33 in his trust account during the 6-

month period preceding the filing of this action, he had a current available balance of

zero at the time of filing. Thus, while the Court assesses Plaintiff’s initial partial filing

fee at $15.86 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), it appears he may be unable to pay that

initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the

initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No.

2), and will direct the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”) to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

III. Initial Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint,

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which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

/ / /

/ / / 

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B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff claims Defendants, all alleged to be state correctional officials employed

at CEN, or appeals officials assigned to the CDCR’s office of inmate appeals, have

charged and punished him with repeated and progressively enhanced disciplinary

violations for failing to provide urine samples pursuant to the CDCR’s “Random Drug

Test Program,” as set forth in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3290. See Compl., ECF Doc.

No. 1 at 3, 7-26. Plaintiff claims he is unable to supply the ordered samples withoutsome

modifications based on his “mental health condition,” which includes an anxiety-related

“shy bladder syndrome,” that has been confirmed and documented by his treating

doctors. Id. at 8-17. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ refusal to accommodate his condition,

and his continued disciplinary punishments “due to his disability” violate the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, as well asthe Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 7, 18, 24-

25. Plaintiffseeks injunctive relief as well as general and punitive damages. Id. at 28-29.

As currently pled, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains constitutional

and/orstatutory claims which do not appear to be frivolous or malicious, and which may

“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to overcome the “low threshold” required to survive

the Court’s initial sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of Plaintiff’s

Complaint and summons on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the

court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R.

CIV. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal

or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under

28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is 2

cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [any

individual defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115,

1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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IV. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the

preceding month’s income and forwarding those paymentsto the Clerk of the Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

Doc. No. 1) upon Defendants and forward it to Plaintiff along with blank U.S. Marshal

Form 285 for each named Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with

a certified copy of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 1), and

the summons so that he may serve each Defendant named in the Complaint. Upon

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Plaintiff must, of course, identify the Defendant he lists only as “Jhon Doe,” and

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whom he currently describes only an Assistant Warden assigned to CEN, see Compl. at

3, by his true name and substitute that individual person in place of the Doe by amending

his Complaint to identify that party before the United States Marshal will be ordered to

execute service upon him. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567

(1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and served within [90] days of the

commencement of the action against them); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m).

Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.

1980). And when the plaintiff proceeds IFP, it is in most instances impossible for the

United States Marshal to serve a party identified only as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner,

14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly effect service under Rule 4 in

an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary to identify the

defendant.”). However, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Jhon Doe at

this time because where the identity of an alleged party is not known prior to filing of an

action, Ninth Circuit authority permits plaintiff the opportunity to pursue appropriate

discovery to identify the unknown Doe, unless it is clear that discovery would not

uncover his identity, or that his Complaint should be dismissed for other reasons. See

Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d

at 642).

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receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible for each named Defendant, and return them to the United States

Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his

IFP package. 

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons

upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).

6. ORDERS Defendants to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the time

provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the

right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a

preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a

“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required to respond).

7. ORDERS Plaintiff to serve upon Defendants or, if an appearance has been

entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document he wishes the Court to consider. Plaintiff must include with the original paper

to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the manner in which a true

and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants,

and the date of that service. Any paper received by the Court which has not been

properly filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service, may be

disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 14, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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