Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00446/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00446-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, all referenced exhibits are those attached to Respondent’s Answer

to Petition for Write of Habeas Corpus.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor A. Parsons,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. ______________________________________

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CV 09-0446 TUC-CKJ (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Victor A. Parson’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Docket No. 1]. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. Respondents filed their answer on

December 10, 2009 [Docket No. 8]. Petitioner filed his reply on January 28, 2010 [Docket

No. 12]. Additionally, Petitioner has filed a Motion to Stay [Docket No. 11], which is also

addressed herein. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court, after an independent review of the record, deny the motion to stay and dismiss the

Petition with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2001, a jury in Pima County found Parsons guilty of aggravated assault,

deadly weapon/dangerous instrument, and aggravated assault, serious physical injury. (Ex.

A.)1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals described the facts underlying the convictions as follows:

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 These facts are taken from Respondents’ Answer. The notice of appeal and documents

reflecting the reinstatement of the appeal are not included in Respondents’ exhibits. However,

Petitioner has stipulated to the accuracy Respondents’ rendition of the factual and procedural history

of this case. See Reply, p. 2.

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Parsons’s convictions arose from a domestic dispute with his

girlfriend in July 2000, in which a neighbor attempted to

intervene. When the neighbor, D., saw Parsons arguing with his

girlfriend and pressing his knee into her shoulder, D. sprayed

pepper spray on Parsons. Parsons then stabbed D. five times

with a “nine inch hunting knife,” causing injuries that included

a collapsed lung.

(Ex. C, pp. 2.) 

At sentencing, the trial court determined the offenses were of a dangerous nature

pursuant to former A.R.S. § 13-604. (Id., p. 3, 4.) The court also found the following

aggravating factors for both offenses: “the defendant’s prior criminal record, that this was

a violent attack and a weapon was used which caused serious injuries to the victim.” (Id.)

The court found no mitigation and imposed concurrent, aggravated terms of imprisonment

totaling 10 years. (Id.) 

On September 20, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment

and sentence. The Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the notice of appeal based on a

clerical error but reinstated the appeal on August 15, 2005, following Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.2

 On December 8, 2005, Petitioner filed an opening brief on direct appal

raising two arguments:

1. The trial court improperly aggravated Mr. Parsons’ sentence

because a weapon was used and because serious injuries

resulted, both of which are elements of the offenses of

conviction and therefore excluded as aggravating factors by

A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(1) & (2).

2. Mr. Parsons’ sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth

Amendment Right to a trail by jury and proof of aggravating

factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Ex. B, p. ii.) 

 By Memorandum Decision filed August 18, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (Ex. C.) Addressing Petitioner’s first argument, the court

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stated that Petitioner:

correctly points out that A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(1) requires a court

to consider as an aggravating circumstance the “[i]nfliction or

threatened infliction of serious physical injury, except if this

circumstance is an essential element of the offense of conviction

or has been utilized to enhance the range of punishment under

13-604.” See 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 261, § 8 (emphasis

added). Likewise, he correctly notes the parallel provision of §

13-702(C)(2) requiring a court to consider as an aggravating

circumstance the use or possession of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument as an aggravating circumstance, again,

except in those cases in which it is an element of the offense or

it has been used to enhance the sentencing range. Based on §

13-702(C), we agree with Parsons that the trial court erred by

considering the use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating

circumstance on count one and the infliction of serious injury as

an aggravating circumstance on count two.

(Ex. C, p. 3.) Despite finding error, the court concluded that Parsons had not established that

the error was prejudicial or fundamental. (Ex. C. P. 5.) Accordingly, the claim was denied.

Turning to Petitioner’s second argument, the court found that the trial court’s

consideration of the infliction of serious physical injury as an aggravating factor in relation

to count one was proper because, “[t]hat factor was found beyond a reasonable doubt by the

jury when it found Parsons guilty on count two.” (Id., p. 7.) However, in relation to count

two, the court determined that:

the jury’s count one finding that Parsons had used a deadly

weapon did not supply a viable Blakely-compliant aggravator

[on count two]. Although not an element of the offense on

count two, Parsons’s use of a deadly weapon had already been

used to enhance the range of punishment based on the jury’s

finding that the offense was dangerous. See § 13-604(I); 1999

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 261, § 5. The court’s consideration of that

factor thus violated § 13-702(C)(2).

(Id., p. 7.) Despite this violation, the Court of Appeals found no denial of Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to a jury determination of aggravating factors because

a reasonable jury would have found Parsons’s actions

constituted a “violent attack,” and because the existence of only

one aggravating circumstance was sufficient to expose him to a

sentence up to and including the statutory aggravated maximum,

. . ., Parsons has failed to show he was prejudiced by the fact

that a jury had not found the aggravating factors the court

considered.

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(Ex. C., pp. 8-9.) The court thus found no basis to reverse and Petitioner’s sentence on count

two was also affirmed.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court wherein he

raised the following three issues for review:

1. Can elements of one way of committing an offense be used to

aggravate the sentence for another form of the offense? Does

this violate the requirement for concurrent sentences when

offenses are committed at the same time, but increasing the

length of the sentence for one offense by the factors of a second

offense committed at the same time?

2. For purposes of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct.

2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), is criminal history or criminal

record different from prior convictions and must it therefore be

determined by a jury before it can be used as an aggravating

factor?

3. In fundamental error review under State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz.

561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005), can a court determine that a

reasonable jury would find an aggravating factor, violence, that

is at most a heightened degree of the inherent nature of the

offense, in this case assault with a deadly weapon or assault

causing physical injury? If so, can a court find that a jury would

have found the offense was violent when violence was not

argued by the prosecution to be an aggravating factor, nor

included in the statutory list of aggravating factors?

(Ex. D, p. 3.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment on March 13,

2007. (Ex. E.)

On May 1, 2007, Petitioner field a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Ex. F.) On November 7, 2007, appointed

counsel filed a notice of review stating counsel had found no claims for relief to raise in Rule

32 post-conviction proceedings and requesting additional time for Petitioner to file a pro se

petition. (Reply, Ex. G.) On November 15, 2007, the extension of time was granted and

Petitioner was ordered to file his PCR petition by December 28, 2007. (Id.) No further

action was taken in the case and, by motion dated June 3, 2008, the state sought dismissal of

the PCR petition based on Petitioner’s failure to prosecute the action. (Reply, Ex. H.) On

June 25, 2008, the order granting the motion was signed, but the certificate of service

indicates that it was not sent to Petitioner’s counsel until August 20, 2008. (Id.) 

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On August 17, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, which alleges the

following bases for relief:

Ground One: Use as an aggravation factor of an element of one

form of assault to aggravate the sentence for another form of

aggravated assault is improper.

Ground Two: “Criminal History” is different from “prior

convictions” and must be determined by a jury before it can be

used to aggravate a sentence. Even if a prior conviction can be

found by a judge the remaining factor, the violence of the attack,

must be determined by a jury.

Ground Three: For the purposes of “Henderson” fundamental

error review, a court cannot determine beyond a reasonable

doubt that a jury would find a subjective, non-enumerated

aggravating factor such as the violence of an inherently violent

aggravated assault with serious physical injury. 

Petition, pp. 5-8.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. The petition is untimely.

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. The Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides a one-year statute of limitation on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304

F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). The statutory tolling provisions of AEDPA provide that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a “properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d

1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, the dispute centers on whether Petitioner’s PCR Petition, which was dismissed

based on Petitioner’s failure to prosecute, was “properly filed” such that Petitioner is entitled

to tolling for the period of its pendency. There is no dispute regarding the significant dates

relevant to the determination. Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief on

May 1, 2007. (Ex. F.) On November 7, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel filed a Notice of Review

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indicating that she was unable to find any claims for relief to raise in Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings and requesting an extension of time for Petitioner to file a petition pro se if he

wished to do so. (Reply, Ex. H.) The extension was granted allowing Petitioner to file his

petition by December 28, 2007. (Id.) Subsequently, nothing was filed and by order dated

June 25, 2008, and served on August 20, 2008, the petition was dismissed. Petitioner filed

the instant Petition on August 17, 2008.

Under these facts, for the instant Petition to be considered timely filed, his PCR

petition must be found to have been properly filed and pending through August 20, 2008, the

date the order dismissing the case was served on Petitioner. Respondents contend that the

PCR was not properly filed because it did not comply with state procedural requirements.

Specifically, Respondents point to Rule 32.4(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

which provides that a defendant “shall have sixty days to file a petition from the date the

notice is filed.” Under Arizona law, the failure to comply with that Rule 32 procedures will

result in a finding that the petitioner waived his right to present a Rule 32 petition. State v.

Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 146, 692 P.2d 991, 996 (1984) (citations omitted). Under these

provisions, Petitioner waived his right to file a PCR petition when he missed the filing

deadline of December 28, 2007. A state petition that is not filed within the state’s required

time limit is not considered “timely filed” and is therefore not entitled to statutory tolling.

Pace v. Guglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a post-conviction petition is untimely

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. If it were

not so, the filing of a notice of PCR without ever filing the actual petition “would turn §

2244(d)(2) into a de facto extension mechanism, quite contrary to the purpose of AEDPA,

and open the door to abusive delay.” Id. at 413. 

There is also a separate reason for finding that the notice of PCR did not toll the

AEDPA statute of limitation. In Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007), the

Ninth Circuit reiterated that 

in Arizona, post-conviction “proceedings begin with the filing

of the Notice.” Thus, where notice is filed in conformity with

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the pertinent Arizona statutory provisions and contains a

specific prayer for relief in the form of a request for a new trial,

“it is sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.”

Id. at 1074. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections,

383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). At least in this case, Hemmerle requires a finding that

the PCR should be treated as if it were never filed. In Hemmerle, the Ninth Circuit required

that for the tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations, not only did the notice of PCR have

to be filed, but that it contain “a specific prayer for relief in the form of a request for a new

trial . . . .” 495 F.3d at 1074. A review of the notice filed in this case discloses that no such

prayer or request for a new trial was included. The notice identifies the Petitioner and his

address, the crimes for which he was convicted, some procedural history and the identity of

his counsel. (Ex. F.) Without the prayer and request, or the timely filing of the petition,

statutory tolling is unavailable. As Respondents note, this is a logical conclusion because to

find otherwise would provide habeas petitioners with a method of tolling the AEDPA statute

of limitations without actually alleging any defect in the proceedings leading to conviction.

As the PCR petition was never properly filed, the AEDPA statute of limitations

commenced to run on April 13, 2007, which was the date 30 days after the Arizona Supreme

Court issued the mandate finalizing Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. As Petitioner

did not file his habeas petition until August 17, 2009, it is untimely and must be dismissed

unless Petitioner can establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

B. The petition is not subject to equitable tolling.

The one-year statute of limitation may be subject to equitable tolling Petitioner can

establish: “(1) that eh has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). A

petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to equitable tolling. Id.

Here, in his Reply, Petitioner’s arguments relate to the time and difficulty encountered by he

and his counsel in reviewing the record and researching his claims. These are challenges

encountered by virtually every habeas petitioner and patently do not amount to extraordinary

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circumstances that would support equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

C. Petitioner’s request for a stay is moot.

Petitioner requests that this matter be stayed so that he can exhaust a “recently

discovered” claim that he was convicted by and eight person jury in violation of Arizona law.

The purpose of granting a stay of habeas proceedings is to permit a petitioner to exhaust in

state court previously unexhausted claims in order that they may ultimately be amended to

the already pending federal petition. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003),

abrogated on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). As

discussed above, however, the instant petition is untimely and must be dismissed. As such,

there are no claims to be stayed or to which the proposed claim, once exhausted, can relate

back for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Therefore, Petitioner's motion to stay

this action is moot.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed August 17, 2009 [Docket No. 1], and DENY AS

MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Request Stay [Docket No. 11].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b) and 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 09-446-TUCCKJ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues.

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See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 19th day of February, 2010.

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