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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3324

___________

Stanford T.E. McClure, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for District of 

* Minnesota.

Career Systems Development *

Corporation; Vinnell Corporation, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2006

Filed: May 24, 2006 

___________

Before MURPHY, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Stanford T.E. McClure, Jr., appeals the district court's summary judgment on

his claims against two employers for race and sex discrimination, and retaliation. This

court reverses as to the retaliation claim, and affirms as to the other claims.

McClure, an African American, began working in 1996 for Vinnell Corporation

as a part-time Recreation Specialist at the Hubert H. Humphrey Job Corps Center. His

job involved planning and supervising leisure activities for youth. 

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The district court ruled that the MHRA claims were time-barred, and McClure

does not appeal that ruling.

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In February 2003, a Senior Recreation Specialist position became available

("the February position"). McClure decided not to apply. In April 2003, Vinnell hired

Lisa Walkley, a white female.

In April 2003, a full-time Recreation Specialist position became available ("the

April position"). McClure did not apply. Vinnell hired the only candidate: Dan

McGuire, a white male.

 In early 2004, Career Systems Development Corporation ("CSD") began

managing the Center. An Admissions Counselor position became available. McClure

applied. After interviews, CSD hired Terryann Nash, an African American female.

McClure sued in state court in October 2004. The case was removed to federal

court the following month. McClure claimed race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §

1981, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 363A.1

I.

This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment, viewing the record

most favorably to the nonmoving party. See Pieper, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Farmland

Feed, LLC, 390 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is proper if

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

To establish a prima facie failure-to-promote claim, a plaintiff ordinarily must

show "he or she applied for the promotion and was rejected." Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs.

of Univ. of Arkansas, 315 F.3d 1005, 1010 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). McClure

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McClure argues in passing that Vinnell violated Title VII by starting him at an

hourly rate of $8.50, when McGuire started at $9.50. McClure was hired in October

1996, while McGuire was hired in January 2000—over three years later. McClure

adduces no other facts, and fails to meet the burden of showing specific, tangible

evidence that the two are "similarly situated" in the relevant respects. See

Rose-Maston v. NME Hosp., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998).

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admits he did not apply for the April position. McClure does not recall seeing the

posting and did not look for it, implying—but never directly stating—that the position

was not posted. The record indicates otherwise. Two employees confirmed that the

posting was conspicuous. Vinnell also produced a copy of the position's external

listing. McClure, who was familiar with Vinnell's posting procedures, therefore does

not have a prima facie case based on Vinnell's decision to hire McGuire—the only

applicant.2

Nor does McClure state a prima facie case with respect to the February position.

McClure concedes he did not apply, but counters that the human resource manager

told him a master's degree was required. True, a plaintiff who does not apply may

establish a prima facie case if the employer's discriminatory practices make

application futile. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-68

(1977) (Title VII). However, McClure makes no such showing. The posting—which

three former Vinnell employees say was conspicuous—requires only an associate's

degree. During his deposition, McClure stated that he saw the posting for a

Recreation Specialist position and thought it was for the same job at issue in this case.

He also admitted that other employees told him about the posting. McClure decided

not to apply. No reasonable fact finder could conclude that McClure's failure to apply

was caused by any misrepresentation about the degree requirement.

As for the Admissions Counselor position, CSD does not dispute that McClure

states a prima facie case. Thus, CSD must articulate "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its employment decision." See Kobrin v. Univ. of Minnesota, 34 F.3d 698,

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702 (8th Cir. 1994). CSD explains it chose Nash because she has "a broad range of

experience of social services which were specifically relevant to the Admissions

Counselor position" and "many years of outreach experience in dealing with the type

of population that the Admissions Counselor position deals with and in dealing with

the kind of agencies and organizations that typically act as referral sources for

participants in the Job Corps program." In addition, CSD scored Nash higher than

McClure on the interview questions. CSD carried its burden of production. 

McClure can succeed only by showing that CSD's proffered reasons are a

pretext. McClure's only argument—that the interview scores were incorrectly

calculated—does not withstand scrutiny. CSD divided the number of points awarded

by the total points available. McClure received more points than Nash, but because

he was asked more questions, his percentage score was lower. McClure asserts that

he and Nash were asked the same number of questions, but the interview

questionnaires confirm that McClure was asked more questions. In addition, McClure

does not challenge that Nash worked with organizations that act as Job Corps referral

sources. Because McClure did not rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for the employment decision, CSD is entitled to summary judgment on the

Admissions Counselor position.

II.

During his February 22, 2005 deposition, McClure admitted never having a

bachelor's degree, although the resumes he submitted said he did. By letter of March

7, CSD suspended McClure without pay. McClure states in his affidavit that CSD

knew he did not have a bachelor's degree at the time it took over the Center.

CSD then discovered during Walkley's April 4 deposition that she, too, had

falsely represented on resumes having a bachelor's degree. CSD did not suspend

Walkley. Instead, on April 8, CSD notified her that it would overlook the incident if

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she submitted a corrected resume by April 14, 2005. Also on April 8, CSD notified

McClure that he would be reinstated—with back pay for time suspended—if he

submitted a corrected resume. McClure did so, and was reinstated with back pay.

McClure then amended his Complaint to add a section 1981 claim for retaliation.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, McClure

must show that he "engaged in statutorily protected activity," that CSD "took adverse

employment action against him," and that "there is a causal connection between the

two events." Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir.

2004).

Filing an employment discrimination complaint is a protected activity. See,

e.g., Heymann v. Tetra Plastics Corp., 640 F.2d 115, 124 (8th Cir. 1981) (Title VII).

Suspending McClure without pay is an adverse employment action. In Kim v.

Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997), this court held that an employer

took adverse employment action when it gave the employee lower performance

evaluations, warned him about his poor attitude, characterized him as unmotivated,

placed him under constant surveillance, excluded him from meetings, required him to

undergo remedial retraining, and placed written reprimands in his file. This court held

that these acts constituted an adverse employment action. Id. at 1053. Specifically,

the court reasoned that the employer's actions "are the kind of serious employment

consequences that adversely affected or undermined Kim's position, even if he was

not discharged, demoted or suspended." Id. at 1060 (emphasis added). Kim

recognizes that a suspension is an adverse employment action. See also Singletary

v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 423 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2005) (being placed on

administrative leave is not an adverse employment action because plaintiff

"maintained his pay, grade, and benefits."); White v. Burlington Northern & Santa

Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 802 (6th Cir. 2004) (employee suspended without pay

suffers an adverse employment action even when reinstated with back pay);

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Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 2001)

(suspension without pay for one week was an adverse employment action even though

the employee was later reimbursed for lost wages).

 The district court, however, found that McClure failed to show that his

suspension was caused by his protected activity. The court focused on the fact that

McClure was suspended five months after filing the complaint. See Clark County

Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (citing cases holding that threeor four-month interval between protected activity and adverse employment action is,

by itself, insufficient to establish causation); see also Kipp v. Missouri Highway and

Transp. Com'n., 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) (two-month interval, by itself, is

insufficient). CSD emphasizes that filing a complaint did not clothe McClure with

immunity for misrepresentation. See Shanklin v. Fitzegerald, 397 F.3d 596, 604 (8th

Cir. 2005).

The district court failed to consider two material facts. First, viewing the record

favorably to McClure, CSD knew about McClure's educational situation all along, but

did not suspend him until after he filed the complaint. Second, CSD did not suspend

Walkley, who committed the same infraction as McClure. Instead, CSD overlooked

her infraction.

CSD asserts that it did not suspend Walkley "because it did not learn about her

misrepresentation until CSD had undertaken an investigation of McClure's

misrepresentation and made the decision to reinstate McClure with full back-pay."

But that assertion contradicts CSD's statement that it became aware of Walkley's

misrepresentation "while it was investigating McClure's falsification." On this appeal

of summary judgment, the second statement must be accepted as true, particularly in

view of the chronology. CSD first learned of Walkley's misrepresentation on April

4, when she admitted during her deposition that she did not have a bachelor's degree

when hired. On April 8, CSD sent the letter to Walkley requesting a corrected resume.

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That same day, CSD sent the similarly-worded letter to McClure offering to reinstate

him (with pay) if he submitted a corrected resume. A reasonable juror could

disbelieve CSD's assertion that it had already decided to reinstate McClure when it

discovered Walkley's misrepresentation. 

McClure—who filed a complaint against CSD—was suspended a month

without pay for the same infraction for which Walkley—who did not file a

complaint—received no punishment. From the circumstantial evidence, a jury could

infer that CSD's proffered reason, to penalize misrepresentation, is pretextual. See

Bainbridge, 378 F.3d at 761. There is a material dispute whether McClure's

suspension was caused by his protected activity, or by the infraction. See Wallace v.

DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1115, 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing

district court's summary judgment on retaliation claim, in part because of evidence

that employer treated plaintiff differently from other employees).

 III.

The district court's judgment is reversed as to the retaliation claim against CSD,

and the case is remanded. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

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