Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00641/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00641-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR MANUEL HERNANDEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

KATHY PROSPER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00641 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. #1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On March 11, 2004, Petitioner was convicted of one count of discharging a firearm at a

motor vehicle and three counts of assault with an automatic handgun. See Petition at 1. Petitioner

was sentenced to serve a total indeterminate term of thirty (30) years to life in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District.

Id. On April 5, 2005, the judgment was affirmed by the appellate court. Petition at 2. Petitioner

states he did not file a petition in the California Supreme Court.

On May 25, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The

petition contains the following five grounds for relief: (1) “The state court judgment was not

supported by the evidence or Petitioner was not given a full & fair hearing”; (2) “Petitioner was

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

denied his 14 Amendment rights to due process of law because the admissible evidence presented at

th

trial, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, failed to support a finding of

guilt because the admissible evidence was as consistent with innocence as with guilt”; (3) “A

petition for habeas corpus may challenge evidentiary rulings of a state trial court of they violate due

process and are fundamentally unfair to the defense”; (4) “Petitioner was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the court

failed to sua sponte five [sic] a self defense instruction”; (5) “ The petitioner is not time-barred

pursuant to 28 USC 2244(d) because he was actually innocent of the crimes for which he was

convicted.”

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8

indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion

under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has

been filed. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9 Cir.2001). th

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

1 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In this case, Petitioner admits never having sought relief in the California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner cites to Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) for the proposition that he need not seek

collateral review in the state courts before seeking a remedy in the federal courts. However, this does

not free Petitioner from the requirement that he fully exhaust his state remedies before presenting his

claims in federal court. Petitioner states he did not seek a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, nor did he file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court.

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A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and Petitioner will not be barred from returning

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to federal court after Petitioner exhausts available state remedies by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)’s prohibition on filing second

petitions. See In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9 Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held that: th

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate for an order dismissing a mixed 

petition to instruct an applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made 

aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential 

claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply with an order of the court 

is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000). Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal court

and files a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

Therefore, the highest state court has never been presented with Petitioner’s claims. Therefore, the

instant petition is unexhausted. The Court must dismiss without prejudice an unexhausted petition. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED without prejudice.

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This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy, any

party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to

the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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