Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01942/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

VICTOR MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 05-1942 PHX DGC (BPV)

 ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 7).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a pro se Civil Rights Complaint by a

Prisoner (Doc. 1) on June 28, 2005. On September 12, 2005,

the Court ordered Defendant Arpaio to answer Plaintiff’s

allegation that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights by subjecting him to overcrowded and unsanitary living

conditions and failing to provide him with adequate meals

while Plaintiff was incarcerated in a Maricopa County jail.

Doc. 3. On October 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a notice of a

change of address. Doc. 6.

Case 2:05-cv-01942-DGC-BPV Document 11 Filed 04/14/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

On November 26, 2005, Defendant Arpaio filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 7). Defendant argues the

entire complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). 

On January 23, 2006, Plaintiff was ordered to answer the

motion to dismiss. Doc. 9. Plaintiff was warned by the Court

that his failure to respond to Defendant’s motion prior to

February 22, 2006, could be deemed consent to the entry of

judgment against Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 7.2, United

States District Court for the District of Arizona Local Rules

of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has not, as of April 10, 2006,

responded to Defendant’s motion to dismiss his complaint.

Discussion

A. Standard for granting a motion to dismiss

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must take the

factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Galbraith

v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002);

Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.

1996). Additionally, pro se complaints are held to a less

strict standard than those drafted by counsel. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976). It is

not appropriate to dismiss a pro se prisoner’s civil rights

action unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

Case 2:05-cv-01942-DGC-BPV Document 11 Filed 04/14/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

him to relief.” Id. See also Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119,

120 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Exhaustion

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is governed by 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). This statute provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983

of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003 & Supp. 2005). The

exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532

(2002). 

A plaintiff must fully exhaust his administrative

remedies before filing a section 1983 complaint. McKinney v.

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002). To fully

exhaust a section 1983 claim, a prisoner must pursue his

grievance to the highest administrative level available to

him. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2003);

Harper v. Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999); Morgan

v. Maricopa County, 259 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990-91 & n.13 (D.

Ariz. 2003).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; establishing

exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is not a

pleading requirement or a jurisdictional prerequisite. See

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.), cert.

Case 2:05-cv-01942-DGC-BPV Document 11 Filed 04/14/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

denied, 124 S. Ct. 50 (2003); Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670,

675 (2d Cir. 2004). Therefore, Defendant has “the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1119. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies

under the PLRA is treated as a matter in abatement and is

properly raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Id.

“In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust

nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings

and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. “If the

district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted

nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the

claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120.

It is Defendant’s burden to prove an absence of

exhaustion regarding Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant presents

evidence that Plaintiff had administrative remedies available

to him regarding his section 1983 claims. 

Additionally, Rule 7.2, United States District Court for

the District of Arizona Local Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a party’s failure to respond to a motion may, in

the Court’s discretion, be deemed a consent to the Court’s

granting of judgment in favor of the movant. See Brydges v.

Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1994). When the Court

has warned the non-moving part that their failure to respond

“‘shall constitute a consent’” to the granting of the motion,

the Court may properly exercise its discretion to a motion

based on the non-moving party’s construed consent. Id. See

also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995)

(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion

Case 2:05-cv-01942-DGC-BPV Document 11 Filed 04/14/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

by summarily granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to a local rule where the pro se plaintiff had time

to respond to the motion but failed to do so). 

Conclusion

Defendant has presented evidence to the Court that

administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff and that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust them. Plaintiff makes no

assertion in response to the motion. The Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed without prejudice

pursuant to section 1997e because Plaintiff failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies regarding his claims prior to

filing his section 1983 suit.

IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7)

is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed without

prejudice.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-01942-DGC-BPV Document 11 Filed 04/14/06 Page 5 of 5