Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01749/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01749-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Grayson, )

Plaintiff, )

 ) No. CIV 05-1749 PHX RCB

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) O R D E R

 ) 

 )

Dora Schriro, et al., )

Defendants. ) 

 )

Introduction

Two motions are currently pending before the court. The first

is a motion by the defendants to dismiss plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint ("FAC") (doc. 20). Second, the plaintiff has filed a

"Motion to Set and Certificate of Readiness" (doc. 24). The court

will address these motions in turn.

Background

I. Grayson I

The present action is not unfamiliar to this court. On June

10, 2005, plaintiff pro se Michael Grayson commenced this lawsuit

asserting claims against, among others, the State of Arizona; Dora

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1 A.R.S. § 13-3821 is what is colloquially referred to as

"Arizona's Megan's Law[.]" See John D. v. Vanderpool. No. CV 05-

2254-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2038466, at *1 (D.Ariz. July 19, 2006).

Basically that statute "requires registration and notification for

convicted sex offenders." Id.

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 Schriro, the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections

("ADC"); and Steve Butcher and Chuck Lopez, ADC parole officers

during the relevant time frame. In Grayson I, the court expressly 

found that plaintiff's original complaint was "void of any alleged

facts related to his claims." Doc. 16 at 2. Only after

deciphering his response to defendants' first motion to dismiss was

the court "able to deduce a general idea of what alleged events and

injuries Plaintiff bases his claims upon." Id. Although the court

was uncertain, it opined"that Plaintiff [wa]s either challenging

the registration of his name as a sex offender or unhappy with the

terms of a prior plea agreement in which he entered." Id.

(citation and footnote omitted). As he does in his FAC, plaintiff

sought to have his name removed from the sex offender registry1 and

$2.5 million dollars in damages. 

Contending that the original complaint had a number of

defects, defendants made a pre-answer motion for dismissal. Three

of the grounds for dismissal which defendants urged in Grayson I

are of particular significance at this juncture because defendants

are making those arguments again in moving for dismissal of the

FAC. In Grayson I, the defendants moved to dismiss based upon

plaintiff's failure to comply with the pleading requirements of

Rule 8(a). Additionally, the defendants in Grayson I sought

dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants also

sought dismissal of plaintiff's alleged violations of the Arizona

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State Constitution because plaintiff did not serve them with a

notice of claim as A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) requires. 

 The court found merit to both defendants' Rule 8 and Rule

12(b)(6) arguments. In particular, the court found that the

original complaint did not "satisfy the requirements of Rule 8[]"

because it was "unable to determine what Plaintiff's cause of

action entails." Doc. 16 at 5. In a similar vein, the court in

Grayson I found that "[p]laintiff's Complaint fail[ed] to define

sufficient alleged facts to support a cognizable legal theory." 

Id. at 7. More specifically, the court explained that "[i]t [wa]s

not clear . . . what event, injury or damage Plaintiff claims to

have suffered, and under what legal theory Defendants could be

found liable for such an event, injury or damage." Id. Except to

note that plaintiff confused notice pleading under Rule 8 with the

notice of claim which A.R.S. § 12-821.01 mandates, the court did

not explicitly address defendants' motion to dismiss premised upon

the latter, however. 

Although the original complaint did not comport with Rule 8

and did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the

court denied defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice. 

Recognizing the "liberal construction" which must be afforded pro

se pleadings, and the Ninth Circuit's "disfavor[] [of] summary

dismissal[s]" of pro se complaints, the court granted plaintiff

leave to amend "to correct the deficiencies" discussed in Grayson

I. Id. 

Mirroring the language of Rule 8(a), the court explicitly 

ordered plaintiff, "on or before June 19, 2006," to file a FAC:

in compliance with [that] Rule . . . 

and Rule of Practice 7.1, which 

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2 Given that plaintiff' filed his FAC less than a week late,

in combination with the fact that he is appearing pro se, the court

will overlook this de minimis delay.

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specifies the Court's jurisdictional 

basis therein, clarifies the statute(s) 

upon which Plaintiff is relying to 

support h[is] claim(s), names the 

defendant(s) therein []he believes 

are appropriate, provides a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing 

that Plaintiff is entitled to relief, and 

demands judgment for the relief Plaintiff seeks.

Id. at 8. The court "FURTHER ORDERED that failure to comply with

these Orders may result in the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint

without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41." 

Id. The court also ordered the "Clerk of the Court to provide the

Plaintiff with a copy of 'Filing A Complaint In your Own

Behalf[,]'" and that was done. Id. The same day that plaintiff

was mailed a copy of Grayson I, he was also mailed a copy of that

booklet which includes a "Sample Format for Complaint" and a

recitation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), pertaining to "general rules of

pleadings." 

II. FAC

A few days later on June 23, 2006, plaintiff filed his FAC.2

The FAC addresses some but not all of the defects outlined in

Grayson I. For example, to avoid a possible Eleventh Amendment

bar, in his FAC plaintiff names defendants Schriro and Butcher

solely in their individual capacities. Also, in contrast to his

original complaint where plaintiff did not specify the

jurisdictional basis for his claims, in the FAC he lists the fifth,

eighth, and fourteenth amendments, as well as article 1, section 10

of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his FAC plaintiff

also adds a section designated as "applicable law" wherein he cites

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to those same provisions of the United States Constitution, as well

as to a number of federal cases. Another addition to the FAC is a

section entitled "injuries." Included among the injuries which

plaintiff claims are allegations that he and his family were denied

the ability to "interact in [a] decent manner due to [his] homeless

shelter placement[,]" and that his "well-being" was "endanger[ed]"

twice. Doc. 17 at 5-6. The first time supposedly was when

plaintiff was "forced to sleep on [the] streets[.]" Id. at 6. The

second time was when he was placed in the "general [prison]

population yard after violating parole, and after meeting [the]

requirements of 13-3821[.]" Id.

Despite the foregoing, as will be seen, the FAC still does not

comply with Rule 8 in that it does not, as the court directed in

Grayson I, "clarif[y] the statute(s) upon which Plaintiff is

relying to support h[is] claims(s)[.]" See Doc. 16 at 8. 

Similarly, the FAC does not "provide[] a short and plain statement

of the claim[(s)] showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief[,]"

as the court also directed in Grayson I. See id. Additionally, as

will be more fully discussed below, the FAC runs afoul of Rule

12(b)(6) because it does not state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. 

Discussion

I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants are seeking dismissal of plaintiff's FAC on a

variety of grounds. As in Grayson I, defendants first assert that

they are entitled to dismissal because the FAC is "vague,

convoluted, and difficult to understand." Doc. 20 at 2. Hence,

according to defendants, the FAC does not comply with Rule 8's

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3 Plaintiff actually filed two Responses on two different

dates. Except for one word, they are identical. Compare Doc. 21

(Aug. 15, 2006) with Doc. 23 (Aug. 18, 2006). Therefore, the court

has considered both in deciding this motion to dismiss. 

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pleading requirements. Second, defendants assert that the court

must dismiss plaintiff's state law claims because he did not file a

timely notice of claim as A.R.S. § 12-821.01 requires. Third, as

another basis for dismissing plaintiff's state law tort claims,

defendants point out that those claims run only against the State. 

Thus, as individuals, defendants cannot be held liable for those

tort claims. Fourth, defendants posit that because they are being

sued in their individual capacities only, plaintiff cannot seek

injunctive relief against them. Finally, in essence defendants

maintain that dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) because given

the conclusory allegations in the FAC, plaintiff has failed to

state a claim for which relief may be granted. 

Before addressing these arguments, the court notes that

plaintiff's Response consists almost entirely of incomprehensible

and irrelevant rhetoric.3 To illustrate, in his conclusion

plaintiff writes: "[I]f one were hypothetically a member of the

BAR; (the British Accreditation Regency), and was intrusted with

conducting the Crown of England's business of commercial affairs

daily, why would one pretend to not be involved in a 'commercial

transaction'? Would it not seem quite honorable an undertaking to

be involved in such a grand architecture? Whenceforth comes

shame?" Doc. 23 at 3. Obviously, it is impossible to glean any

meaningful opposition arguments from this Response.

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8

Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading "contain (1) a short and

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4 Basically this Rule requires that averments in pleadings be

"simple, concise, and direct[;]" it also allows for alternative

pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) and (2).

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plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction

depends, . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

In other words, Rule 8 requires "'sufficient allegations to put

defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.'" Martinez

v. Maricopa County, No. CV 05-3512-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2850332, at *5

(D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2006) (quoting McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795,

798 (9th Cir. 1991)). "When a complaint fails to comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a), the district court has the power, on

motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint or to strike those

parts of the complaint that are redundant or immaterial." Marshall

v. United Nations, No. Civ.-S-05-2575 LLK GGH PS, 2006 WL 1883179,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, "[a]

complaint that fails to comply with rules 8(a) and 8(e)4 may be

dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b)." Id.

(citations omitted) (footnote added) (emphasis added). What is

more, "[t]he propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule

8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without

merit[.]" Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

(emphasis added). 

A comparison of the motion to dismiss in Grayson I with 

defendants' current motion reveals that their Rule 8 argument is

nearly identical to that which they made in Grayson I. This is

significant for two reasons. First, it means that plaintiff

Grayson has been previously notified of the claimed Rule 8

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deficiencies in his complaint. Of equal if not more import is the

fact that because there was an issue of plaintiff's failure to

comply with Rule 8 in Grayson I, the court discussed in some detail

the requirements of that Rule, and the ways in which the original

complaint failed to satisfy it. See Doc. 16 at 4-7. Basically

then, in Grayson I the court provided plaintiff with a primer on

Rule 8 pleading requirements. Even with those guidelines however,

for the reasons set forth below, the court finds that plaintiff's

FAC fails to conform to the strictures of Rule 8.

In Grayson I this court plainly stated, "Complaints that are

confusing and conclusory are not in compliance with Rule 8." Doc.

16 at 4 (citing Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th

Cir. 1985)). Yet, as with his original complaint, plaintiff's FAC

does "not [make] clear . . . under what legal theory Defendants

could be found liable[.]" See id. at 7. As mentioned at the

outset, in his FAC, with no elaboration, plaintiff cites to: (1) 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of

the United States Constitution; and (3) article 1, section 10 of

the Constitution. 

Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any facts supporting a

section 1983 cause of action, or any of these alleged

constitutional violations however. To illustrate, plaintiff

alleges that he was denied due process when he was "released

'homeless' erroneously[,]" but he does not allege a factual basis

for this purported denial of due process. See id. at 2, ¶ V. 

Count II of the FAC is equally conclusory. In that count plaintiff

alleges, inter alia, that through letters he provided to the ADC,

"[d]efendant(s) knew or should have known . . . that [his] (then)

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current commitment to" the ADC pursuant to a plea agreement

amounted to deliberate indifference and was a violation of the

double jeopardy clause. Id. at 4, ¶ V. 

Even when naming a particular defendant, plaintiff's

allegations are vague and conclusory. To illustrate, plaintiff

alleges that defendant Butcher "command[ed]" that plaintiff

"virtually sleep on the streets" the night of May 17, 2004, when

plaintiff was paroled. See Doc. 17 at 4, § V, count III. With no

explanation, plaintiff goes on to broadly allege that this

"command" "constitut[ed] cruel and unusual punishment, and

deliberate indifference[,] and double jeopardy." Id. (emphasis in

original). 

Plaintiff's allegations against defendant Schriro are

similarly vague and conclusory. He claims that Schriro was

deliberately indifferent to him because based upon an ADC

"corrections classification manual change[] which bears her

endorsement," purportedly she "knew or should have known" that

plaintiff was "erroneously placed" on the "yard" designated for

registered sex offenders. Id. at 4, § V, count IV. Further,

plaintiff makes the incomprehensible allegation that defendant 

Schriro was deliberately indifferent to him "by placing him in

general population after the fact of his status." Id. 

Plaintiff is under the mistaken impression that by simply

reciting constitutional buzzwords such as due process and

deliberate indifference, he is alleging valid legal claims. 

Plaintiff is wrong. The "mere[] cit[ation] . . . [to] incident[]s

and conclud[ing] that [they] w[ere] a violation of his

constitutional rights[,]" does not comport with Rule 8. See

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Spittal v. Apel, No. CIVS05204FDCGGHPS, 2006 WL 769031, at *3

(E.D.Cal. March 24, 2006). This FAC does not satisfy Rule 8

because, among other reasons, "[i]n none of his c[ounts] does the

plaintiff offer specific facts or a cognizable theory regarding why

the action was a violation." Id. Moreover, the FAC is far from

clear in terms of connecting the defendants to specific allegations

of wrongdoing. "[M]ere reference to a federal right[,]" as

plaintiff Grayson has done, "does not create the necessary

specificity which would allow the defendant to respond to the

plaintiff's allegations." See id. 

Simply put,"[n]one of the counts in [this FAC] presents an

intelligible picture of the nature of this lawsuit." See Kennedy

v. Andrews, No. CV052692PHXNVW, 2005 WL 3358205, at *3 (D.Ariz.

Dec. 8, 2005). Indeed, this FAC "must leave the defendants

wondering what each is being sued for and how it connects with

elements of any basis of liability." See Hanks v. Andrews, No. CV

05-2275-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 1371625, at * 1 (D.Ariz. May 15, 2006). 

Thus, because plaintiff Grayson does not allege sufficient facts to

explain how each defendant violated section 1983 and the 

constitutional amendments to which the FAC refers, defendants have

not received the notice which Rule 8 anticipates. See Caldwell v.

S.S.A., No. CIV S-06-0607 FCD GGH PS, 2006 WL 3251798, at *2

(E.D.Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th

Cir. 1996)) ("[T]o respect [an] individual defendant's right to be

notified of the allegations with which they are charged, a

complaint must make clear the connections between specific

allegations and individual defendants.") Based upon the foregoing,

the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC because it

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5 For purposes of section 12-821.01(A), "a cause of action

accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged

and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event,

instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the

damage." A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B) (West 2003). 

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is deficient under Rule 8. 

Even if the FAC did satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading

requirements, as will be more fully discussed below, it suffers

from several other defects which justify dismissal. Most notably,

the FAC fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Thus, although the court's inquiry could end here, the fact that

the FAC is defective in several other ways, including that it fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, bolsters the

court's conclusion that dismissal of the FAC is not only

appropriate, but necessary. 

B. Notice of Claim

Among the deficiencies identified in Grayson I was

"[p]laintiff's failure to provide a notice of claim as required by

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)." Doc. 16 at 4 (citation omitted). That

statute requires, among other things, that "persons who have claims

against a public entity or a public employee . . . , within 180

days after the accrual of the cause of action, file a notice of

claim with the person(s) authorized to accept service for the

public entity or public employee."5 Martinez, 2006 WL 2850332, at

*1. These notices of claim must "contain facts sufficient to

permit the public entity or public employee to understand the

basis upon which liability is claimed." A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)

(West 2003). The notice of claim must also include "a specific

amount for which the claim can be settled[,]" as well as the "facts

supporting that amount." Id. Failure to timely file a notice of

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6 Because the statutory notice requirements of A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A) are procedural, rather than jurisdictional, although

defendants moved to dismiss based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the

court will treat this aspect of defendants' motion as an unenumerated

12(b) motion, thus allowing it "to look beyond the pleadings to

consider the allegations . . . contained within Defendants' Motion

and Plaintiff's Response." See Martinez v. Maricopa County, No. CV

05-3512-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2850332, at *2 (D.Ariz. Oct. 4, 2006).

7 In Grayson I, defendants made this argument in the context

of claims which plaintiff was alleging under the Arizona

Constitution, as opposed to state common law causes of action. The

notice of claim requirement remains the same, however, regardless of

the basis for a particular cause of action.

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claim in accordance with section 12-821.01(A) bars a claimant from

proceeding on his state law claims against a public entity or

public employee. Id. 

In his FAC plaintiff alleges various state law claims against

the defendants, such as negligence (count I), breach of contract

(count II), and gross negligence (count IV). Defendants argue that

because plaintiff has not served them or the State with a notice of

claim as A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) requires, they are entitled to

dismissal of these state law claims.6 As noted earlier, this

notice argument is not new. As previously mentioned, defendants

made this same argument in moving to dismiss the original

complaint, thus alerting plaintiff to this possible procedural

irregularity.7 Nonetheless, conspicuously absent from the present

record is any indication that plaintiff ever filed a statutory

notice of claim in connection with this litigation. Nor did

plaintiff address this notice of claim argument in his Response. 

According to the FAC, on May 17, 2004, the ADC released

plaintiff as an inmate. At the time of his release, plaintiff

claims that defendants were negligent in that they "knew or should

have known" through his letters that "he would be released

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8 As the court previously observed, evidently plaintiff is

"unhappy with the terms of a prior plea agreement in which he

entered." Doc. 16 at 2 (citation and footnote omitted). Apparently

this is the basis for his breach of contract claim, although the FAC

is far from clear on this point.

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'homeless' erroneously[.]" Doc. 17, at 3, ¶ V, count I. However,

according to defendants Schriro and Butcher, "[t]here is no

indication that Plaintiff served a notice of claim on the State" or

upon them, see Doc. 20 at 3; and the plaintiff does not dispute

that failure. Thus, given that plaintiff did not comply with the

State's notice of claim procedure as A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)

mandates, the court hereby grants defendants' motion to dismiss

plaintiff's negligence claim in its entirety.

In count II of his FAC plaintiff alleges, inter alia, breach

of contract. Plaintiff does not allege the nature of this breach8

or exactly when it supposedly occurred. It can be inferred,

however, that this alleged breach occurred prior to May 17, 2004,

when plaintiff was released from prison. This inference can be

drawn from the reference in count II to plaintiff's "then[] current

commitment" to the ADC. See Doc. 17 at 4. Therefore, as with his

negligence count, because plaintiff did not timely filed a notice

of claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), the court also grants

defendants' motion to dismiss this breach of contract claim in its

entirety.

Plaintiff's third state law based cause of action is for gross

negligence. Once again the precise contours of this claim are

uncertain. As with plaintiff's breach of contract claim, however,

it appears that this cause of action also accrued while plaintiff

was incarcerated, i.e. prior to May 17, 2004. And once again,

because plaintiff did not timely file a notice of claim as section

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9 In contrast to his original complaint, plaintiff does not

name the State of Arizona as a defendant in his FAC. Defendants

Schriro and Butcher are the only named defendants; and, as discussed

above, they are named solely in their individual capacities. Thus,

despite defendants' suggestion to the contrary, the Eleventh

Amendment is not implicated here. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

30-31 (1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier

against suits to impose individual and personal liability on state

officials under § 1983.") 

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12-821.01(A) requires for claims against public employees such as

defendants Schriro and Butcher, the court grants defendants' motion

to dismiss this claim as well. 

C. Tort Claims

Even if plaintiff had timely filed a notice of claim,

defendants Schriro and Butcher still would be entitled to dismissal

of the tort claims alleged against them, i.e. negligence and gross

negligence. That is so because as defendants accurately state, in

accordance with A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F), "all causes of action which

may arise out of tort caused by the director, prisoner officers or

employees of the [ADC], within the scope of their legal duty, shall

run only against the state." A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F) (West 2002)

(emphasis added). Plaintiff's FAC is confusing in many ways, but

he does plainly allege that he is suing defendants Schriro and

Butcher solely in their capacity as ADC employees. In particular,

he avers that defendant Schriro's "occupation . . . at the time of

this action" is Director of the ADC. Doc. 17 at 2, ¶ III. 

Similarly, plaintiff avers that defendant Butcher's "occupation 

. . . at the time of this action" is ADC "Parole Officer (Southern

Division)[.]" Id. In light of the foregoing, because plaintiff's

tort claims can only run against the State, the court grants the

motion by defendants Schriro and Butcher to dismiss those claims.9

 

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D. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

In arguing that they are entitled to dismissal of the FAC for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as in Grayson I, defendants rely upon

several well-settled principles of section 1983 jurisprudence,

which will be discussed below. Rather than applying these legal

principles to the present case though, defendants fall back on

their familiar refrain that the FAC "consist[]s solely of

conclusory statements." Doc. 20 at 5. They point out that the

"cause of action" section of the FAC pertains to an unnamed parole

officer; there is no mention in that section of defendants or their

alleged misconduct. Defendants further note that interspersed

throughout the FAC are various state law references, yet in the

"applicable law" section of his FAC, plaintiff cites only to

federal law. Based upon the foregoing, defendants maintain that

plaintiff's "allegations are insufficient to state a State or

federal claim." Id. at 6. 

Before turning to the merits of the FAC, or more precisely

the lack thereof, the court stresses that it does not take such a

restrictive reading of the FAC as do the defendants. As just

alluded to, evidently defendants believe that in determining the

relative merits of the FAC, the court should focus solely upon the

"cause of action" section of that complaint. This is an overly

restrictive reading of the FAC, though, especially taking into

account, as the court must, plaintiff' pro se status. Despite

defendants' urging to the contrary, the court also will not

disregard plaintiff's putative state law claims simply because he

does not reference them in the "applicable law" section of his FAC. 

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 Thus, in resolving this motion to dismiss the court will read the

cause of action section together with the other sections of the

FAC, including the four specifically designated "counts." Reading

the FAC in this way is in keeping with the well-settled rules that

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion such as this, a court must "construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve

all doubts in the plaintiff's favor." See Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

1. Jurisdiction

As noted earlier, plaintiff Grayson asserts several possible

bases for jurisdiction in his FAC. He refers to the fifth, eighth

and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution, article 1,

section 10 of the Constitution, which prohibits states from passing

ex post facto laws, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent plaintiff

is attempting to assert claims against these state defendants

directly under the Constitution, he cannot do so. That is because

in this Circuit "[t]he exclusive remedy for vindicating alleged

violations of constitutional rights by state actors is 42 U.S.C.

1983." Varela v. San Francisco City & County, No. C 06-01841 WHA,

2006 WL 3747179, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 14, 2006); see also

Greenawalt v. Sun City West Fire District, 250 F.Supp.2d 1200,

1212-1213 (D.Ariz. 2003) (citing, inter alia, Martinez v. City of

Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added)

("The Ninth Circuit unequivocally holds that a plaintiff

complaining of a violation of a constitutional right by a state

actor must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may not pursue a claim

directly under the Constitution.") Therefore, the court must

construe the FAC as asserting jurisdiction based only upon section

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1983. The court will limit is consideration of plaintiff's

supposed section 1983 claims to those predicated upon alleged

violations of federally protected rights, not state law rights,

because "a violation of state law does not lead to liability under

§ 1983." See Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Unlike the original complaint, the FAC cites to section 1983

as a possible jurisdictional bases. However, the "mere mention of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and particular constitutional provisions does not

establish jurisdiction where the complaint on its face discloses

the absence of an essential element of such a claim." Rushdan v.

Hale, No.C02-1325TEH(PR), 2002 WL 981863 (N.D.Cal. May 7, 2002);

see also Rodriguez v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, No.

CIVS052600MCE GGH PS, 2006 WL 657207, at *2 (E.D.Cal. March 14,

2006), adopted, 2006 WL 1170017 (E.D.Cal. May 1, 2006). In the

present case, careful examination of the FAC reveals that

"essential elements" of a section 1983 claim are missing from that

FAC as to both defendants.

2. Defendant Schriro

Defendants accurately point out that before section 1983

liability attaches, there must be a showing of personal involvement

by a given defendant. This requirement is based upon the plain

language of section 1983, which states that to establish liability

thereunder a "person" must "subject[]" the plaintiff or "cause[]"

the plaintiff "to be subjected" to a deprivation of a

constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2003). "A sufficient

casual connection is established 'by some kind of direct personal

participation in the deprivation [or] by setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know

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would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.'"

Krittenbrink v. Crawford, No. 3:03CV000235-ECR(RAM), 2006 WL

2987616, at *3 (D.Nev. Oct. 12, 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). A corollary to this personal

involvement element is, as defendants also correctly state, "[i]n a

section 1983 action . . . , respondeat superior, or vicarious

liability, may not be imposed in the absence of a state law

imposing such liability." Id. (quoting Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (other citation

omitted)). By the same token though, a supervisor may be held

liable under section 1983 "if the supervisor participated in or

directed the [constitutional] violations, or knew of the violations

and failed to act to prevent them.'" Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d

676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Furthermore, even "[l]acking such overt personal

participation, § 1983 supervisory liability still exists if the

official implements a policy that is deliberately indifferent to

the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and that policy is the

moving force behind the violation." Nunes v. Driver, No. CV05-2114-

PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 3390318, at *2 (D.Ariz. No. 22, 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Because, as just mentioned, there is no respondeat superior

liability under section 1983, the only way defendant Schriro, the

ADC's Director, can be held liable under that statute is in her

supervisory capacity. The FAC does not contain sufficient facts to

impose liability under that theory, however. There are no

allegations that defendant Schriro "participated in or directed the

alleged constitutional deprivations." See Hydrick, 466 F.3d at 689

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, the FAC

does not allege that defendant Schriro "implement[ed] a policy that

is deliberately indifferent to . . . plaintiff's constitutional

rights[.]" See Nunes, 2006 WL 3390318, at *2 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

The court is fully aware that in this Circuit, "if the

supervisory liability is premised on a deliberately indifferent

policy implemented by the official, . . . , [a] plaintiff[] need

not specifically allege a policy, it is enough if the policy may be

inferred from the allegations of the complaint." Id. (citation

omitted). But here, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts

from which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant Schriro

implemented a deliberately indifferent policy. In this regard, the

present case stands in sharp contrast to Nunes where, based upon

allegations that the former chief of police knew or should have

known that a former police officer had sexually assaulted others

prior to allegedly sexually assaulting plaintiff, the court

"infer[red] . . . that it was a policy or custom to turn a blind

eye to these [sexual assault] infractions." See id. (citation

omitted). Based upon that specific factual allegation, which the

court expressly found "save[d] [the] complaint" from dismissal, the

Nunes court denied the former police chief's motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Id. 

Unlike plaintiff Nunes, plaintiff Grayson does not include any

specific factual allegations from which it could reasonably be

inferred that defendant Schriro knew or should have known that 

plaintiff Grayson would "erroneously [be] placed on [the sex

offender] yard[.]" See Doc. 17 at 4. By way of example, plaintiff

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does not allege that defendant Schriro knew or should have known

that plaintiff would be "erroneously . . . placed" on the sex

offender yard because other inmates had been so placed. Similarly,

the FAC does not include any specific factual allegations from

which it could reasonably be inferred that defendant Schriro knew

or should have known that plaintiff would be "put in jeopardy by

placing him in general population[.]" Id. In addition to these

pleading deficiencies, the FAC does not, as the Supreme Court

requires, allege any affirmative link between defendant Schriro's

actions and the purported constitutional deprivations. See Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Accordingly, the court finds that

plaintiff's FAC fails to state a section 1983 claim upon which

relief may be granted against defendant Schriro. Hence she is

entitled to dismissal of the FAC under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as

under Rule 8.

3. Defendant Butcher

To be sure, unlike defendant Schriro, the FAC includes

allegations that defendant Butcher personally violated plaintiff's

constitutional rights. For example, as previously mentioned,

plaintiff alleges that on "the evening of" May 17, 2004, defendant

Butcher "command[ed] plaintiff to virtually sleep on the

streets[.]" Doc. 17 at 4, §V, count III. These personal

involvement allegations are not enough to overcome defendants'

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however. They are

insufficient because "[t]he court is not required to accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.'"

See Rodriguez, 2006 WL 657207, at *1 (quoting Clegg v. Cult

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Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994)). Yet that is

precisely what plaintiff, albeit impliedly, is asking this court to

do. 

Plaintiff is seeking to have this court infer that his eighth

amendment rights and his right to be free from double jeopardy were

violated when defendant Butcher supposedly "command[ed]" plaintiff

to "virtually sleep on the streets" plaintiff's first night as a

parolee. Doc. 17 at 4. These unsupported legal conclusions do not

sufficiently allege a constitutional deprivation – an essential

element of any section 1983 cause of action. Simply characterizing

a "command" to sleep on the street as a constitutional violation

does not make it so. "The court will not read meaning into the

plaintiff's complaint in order to discern the basis for his

allegation." Rodriguez, 2006 WL 657207, at *3. 

Turning to the broader allegations against defendant Butcher,

the FAC still cannot withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. That is so

because neither in count I nor in count II of the FAC does

"plaintiff . . . state in a comprehensible manner how any of his

[constitutional] rights were violated[]" by this defendant. See

Fallon v. United States, No. CIV. S-06-0942 LKK GGH PS, 2006 WL

1806136 (E.D.Cal. June 29, 2006). Count II provides a prime example

of just how incomprehensible plaintiff's allegations are:

Defendant(s) knew or should have known

through letters from plaintiff, that 

(then) current commitment to [ADC] of 

plaintiff - contract #19815150 - plea 

agreement term 3: "Historical prior 13.604 

will not be alleged;" constituting breach

of contract & double jeopardy, and 

deliberate indifference.

Doc. 17 at 4. Even when read together with other allegations in

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10 Having found sufficient bases for granting defendants'

motion to dismiss, there is no need to address defendants' further

argument that plaintiff is impermissibly seeking injunctive relief

against these defendants whom he has sued solely in their individual

capacities. 

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the FAC, the court is left with the firm conviction, as it was in

Grayson I, that this FAC "fails to define sufficient alleged facts

to support a cognizable legal theory." See Doc. 16 at 7 (citing

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). Succinctly

put, at the end of the day, plaintiff's FAC is nothing more than

"baseless assertions of fact to make conclusory allegations of

misconduct that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to

[him] do not rise to a federal violation." See Rodriguez, 2006 WL

657207, at *2 (citing, inter alia, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)). For all of these reasons, the court finds that

plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983

against defendant Butcher. Therefore, in addition to being

entitled to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, defendant

Butcher also is entitled to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).10

Ordinarily the court would allow a pro se plaintiff such as Mr.

Grayson to amend his complaint. Plaintiff was already given that

opportunity, however, in Grayson I. Not only did he have the

opportunity to amend, but as previously discussed, in Grayson I the

court provided plaintiff with ample guidance as to how to do so. 

Plaintiff did not heed the court's comments, however. Nor,

evidently, did plaintiff avail himself of the booklet for pro se

litigants which, at the court's direction, the Clerk's Office

provided to plaintiff after Grayson I. Consequently, because

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"[t]here is little to support the conclusion that if [plaintiff]

were provided with [a second] opportunity to amend his Complaint, he

would do so in a manner so as to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure[,]" the court will not permit further amendment. 

See Hanks, 2006 WL 1371625, at *5. 

II. "Motion to Set and Certificate of Readiness

The second motion currently before the court is brought by

plaintiff pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 38.1. For

two equally valid reasons, the court denies this motion. First of

all, as is readily apparent, this state procedural rule has no

bearing on practice in this federal court. Second, even assuming

the availability of a Certificate of Readiness in this court, the

court's rulings herein render moot a claim for this type of relief. 

Likewise, the court's rulings herein also render moot defendants'

motion to strike this motion by plaintiff to "set and certificate of

readiness." Thus, the court denies this motion as well.

Conclusion

In summary, there are several grounds upon which the court

GRANTS the motions to dismiss by defendants Dora Schriro and Steve

Butcher (doc. 20). First, they are entitled to dismissal based

upon plaintiff's failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Second,

defendants' are entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Third, to the extent plaintiff's FAC can be read as

asserting state law claims, defendants, who are public employees,

are entitled to dismissal of those claims for the additional reason

that plaintiff did not file a notice of claim as A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A) requires when public employees are sued. Fourth,

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defendants are entitled to dismissal of the state tort claims, i.e.

negligence and gross negligence, against them because according to

A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F), those claims run only against the state. 

On the other hand, the court DENIES plaintiff's Motion to Set

and Certificate of Readiness (doc. 24) because that remedy is a

creature of state, not federal law; and, in any event, it is moot. 

IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for dismissal pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (doc. #20) is

GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to set and

certificate of readiness pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure

38.1 (doc. #24) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion to strike

plaintiff's motion to set and certificate of readiness (doc. #25) is

DENIED; and 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter

judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff, and to

terminate this action.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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