Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:741 Shipping

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The factual background of this dispute is set 1

forth in a numerous memoranda. (See Docs. 49, 102, 107.) 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LT. CMDR. RICHARD T. GENGLER and

LT. CMDR. DANIEL S. McSEVENEY,

 Petitioners,

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THROUGH

ITS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND

NAVY; and SECRETARY DONALD C.

WINTER, 

 Respondents.

1:06-CV-00362 OWW WMW

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS AS MOOT.

I. INTRODUCTION1

Before the court for decision is Defendants’ motion to

dismiss as moot the habeas corpus petitions of Lieutenant

Commanders Richard T. Gengler and Daniel S. McSeveney. (Doc.

118.) Petitioners, who served as fixed wing jet pilots in the

United States Navy, originally filed suit on March 31, 2006,

alleging that the United States was breaching the explicit sevenyear active duty terms contained within their military service

contracts by requiring them to serve eight years active duty, the

term of service for fixed-wing jet pilots provided in a federal

statute, 10 U.S.C. § 653. On December 20 and December 19, 2006,

respectively, Petitioners were discharged from active duty. The

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 135 Filed 04/04/07 Page 1 of 5
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Attached to the declaration of Petitioners’ counsel, 2

Jennifer A. Lopez, is a stipulation of dismissal that Petitioners

presented to Defendants on March 13, 2007, which, in addition to

providing for dismissal, sets forth a series of factual findings. 

(See Doc. 126-2.) Defendant rejected the stipulation. 

Petitioners now ask the district court to enter an order of

dismissal containing the same language. 

2

United States contends that the discharges render this case moot,

depriving this court of jurisdiction over the matter. 

Petitioners do not object to dismissal of the case, acknowledging

that their release from active duty means that they are longer in

the custody of Defendants. Petitioners consent to dismissal of

the case, but not on mootness grounds, arguing that the voluntary

cessation exception to the mootness doctrine applies here. 

Instead, Petitioners request that the district court enter an

order of dismissal without reaching the mootness issue.2

II. DISCUSSION

Article III of the United States constitution requires that

a live case or controversy exist throughout all stages of a

lawsuit in federal court. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,

398 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2005). “If there is no longer a

possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for his claim,

that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.” Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.

2003). “Mootness is a jurisdictional issue; federal courts have

no jurisdiction to hear a case that is moot, that is, where no

actual or live controversy exists.” Id. (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Here, Defendant voluntarily released

Petitioners from active duty (see Declaration of John David

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Booth, Doc. 118-3), granting Petitioners the only relief they

were entitled to seek on habeas corpus. See Parisi v. Davidson,

405 U.S. 34, 39 (1972). 

Petitioners invoke the voluntary cessation exception to the

mootness doctrine. “Ordinarily, voluntary cessation of allegedly

illegal conduct does not render a case moot, unless the defendant

can show (1) that there is no reasonable expectation that the

alleged violation will recur, and (2) that interim relief or

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of

the alleged violation.” Luckie v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 752

F.2d 454, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Petitioners do not dispute that their permanent release from

active duty has “completely and irrevocably eradicated the

effects of the alleged violation” upon them. Moreover, having

been permanently discharged from active duty, there is no

reasonable possibility that Petitioners could again be held in

service, barring their voluntary or involuntary re-activation on

other grounds. Instead, while acknowledging that this case is

not a class action, Petitioners assert that the Navy’s conduct

toward Petitioners “affects numerous other naval aviators.” 

(Doc. 125 at 4.) Petitioners suggest that the government should

therefore “not be permitted to render this case moot simply

because they voluntarily ceased their unlawful activity.” (Id.) 

But, where the government is the defendant, to satisfy the

voluntary cessation doctrine, “the mere probability of recurrence

must be coupled with a certainty that the impact will fall on the

same objecting litigants.” Luckie, 752 F.2d at 459 n.7 (emphasis

added); see also Halvonick v. Reagan, 457 F.2d 311, 313 n.3 (9th

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The United States also notes in its reply brief that 3

the Navy has corrected the error contained with their Officer

Candidate Program Service Agreement form signed by Petitioners. 

Self correction “provides a secure foundation for mootness os

long as it seems genuine.” 13 A Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Proc., §3533.7. 

 Defendants did not stipulate to dismissal on 4

Plaintiffs terms. Therefore, Petitioner must obtain court

approval to dismiss an action. Fed R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)(“Except

as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an

action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save

upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the

court deems proper.” Ordinarily, Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal must be

sought by formal motion. Cal. Prac. Guide, Fed. Civil Proc.

Before Trial ¶ 16:374 (Rutter Group 2006) 

4

Cir. 1972). Here, there is no chance that these individual 3

Petitioners will suffer from the same allegedly unlawful conduct. 

The voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine

therefore does not apply. 

 Petitioners’ request that the district court enter a

separate order dismissing the case without ruling on the issue of

mootness is not well founded. First, as Defendants correctly

point out, Petitioners have not formally moved for dismissal,

instead choosing to include their request within their opposition

to defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. But, most 4

importantly, a federal court has no jurisdiction over moot

claims. Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 615 (9th

Cir. 2007). Petitioners cite no legal authority to the contrary. 

Petitioner’s suggestion that “[a] decision granting the

motion to dismiss as moot will tell the Navy that it can do again

just what it did here –- fight a case for many months, fold at

the eleventh hour, and then claim as a matter of law that the

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action must be dismissed” is not compelling. As discussed above,

the law validates the propriety of the United States’ motion

under these circumstances. Defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot

is GRANTED. Petitioners’ eagerness to teach the government a

lesson evinces unjustified overconfidence. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

as moot is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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